Court Opinion

ID: 9900467
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 22:13:28.886172+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:08.982944
License: Public Domain

538                           April 26, 2023         No. 216

            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                    STATE OF OREGON

                      STATE OF OREGON,
                       Plaintiff-Respondent,
                                 v.
                       JOSHUA OVALLE,
                      Defendant-Appellant.
                 Washington County Circuit Court
                      17CR66194; A175319

   Andrew Erwin, Judge.
   Argued and submitted August 23, 2022.
   Kyle Krohn, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause
for appellant. Also on the briefs was Ernest G. Lannet,
Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, Office of Public
Defense Services.
   Timothy A. Sylwester, Assistant Attorney General,
argued the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Ellen
F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General.
  Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, and Lagesen, Chief Judge,
and Mooney, Judge.*
   MOONEY, J.
   Reversed and remanded.

______________
   * Lagesen, C. J., vice James, J. pro tempore.
Cite as 325 Or App 538 (2023)   539
540                                                          State v. Ovalle

           MOONEY, J.
         This case presents the question whether an ORS
14.210 motion to disqualify judge for cause is subject to the
procedural limits of ORS 14.260(3). As we will explain, the
answer is no. This is defendant’s second appeal. The first
time, we reversed three of his convictions, affirmed two,
and remanded for resentencing. State v. Ovalle, 303 Or App
356, 463 P3d 610, rev den, 366 Or 827 (2020). Defendant
was resentenced by the same judge who had presided over
the trial and sentenced him the first time. He now appeals
from the judgment of conviction and sentence after remand,
asserting one assignment of error and two pro se supplemen-
tal assignments of error. We reject the first supplemental
assignment asserting instructional error as unpreserved.
We write to address the first assignment, which challenges
the trial court’s denial of defendant’s ORS 14.210(1)(c)
motion to disqualify judge. We conclude that the trial court
erred when it summarily denied the motion as unavailable
to defendant. More specifically, we conclude that the court
erred in applying ORS 14.260(3) as a bar to the motion on
the ground that the judge whose disqualification was sought
had previously made substantive rulings in the case. Given
that disposition, we need not and do not reach the second
supplemental assignment.
          We begin with a general discussion about fairness
and impartiality to provide context for and to help explain
our holding on the motion to disqualify judge. All persons
charged with a crime have the right to a fair and impartial
trial under both the Oregon and United States Constitutions.
Or Const, Art I, § 11; US Const, Amend XIV. The right to
a fair trial includes the right to a trial before an impartial
judge. State v. Leland, 190 Or 598, 608, 227 P2d 785 (1951),
aff’d, 343 US 790, reh’g den, 344 US 848 (1952).1 That right
may be secured and enforced through recusal, removal, or
disqualification, any of which may be prompted administra-
tively, by a party’s motion, or by the court’s own motion. For
example, a judge may, of their own accord, request not to be
    1
      Although defendant does not appear to have affirmatively sought to have
a particular judge for his resentencing, we note that “[t]he public has no right
to have a particular judge preside over a particular case.” State ex rel Oliver v.
Crookham, 302 Or 533, 537, 731 P2d 1018 (1987).
Cite as 325 Or App 538 (2023)                                                     541

assigned to a certain case because of a potential conflict or
appearance of conflict. A party might seek to disqualify a
judge on the basis of conflict or bias as a matter of constitu-
tional due process. See State v. Garza, 125 Or App 385, 388-
89, 865 P2d 463 (1993), rev den, 319 Or 81 (1994) (describ-
ing a defendant’s constitutional due process claim based on
judge’s refusal to recuse herself and stating that a “judge’s
actual or apparent bias must by necessity result in disqual-
ification, even when the statutory requirements for recusal”
have not been followed). A party may seek to disqualify a
judge based upon one or more of the specific causes set forth
in statute, ORS 14.210(1),2 or upon a good faith belief that
they cannot get a fair trial before the assigned judge, under
ORS 14.250.3
         Oregon’s judicial disqualification statutes, ORS
14.210 to 14.275, have been in existence in one form or
another for well over a century. They were designed to
ensure the rights of parties to fair and impartial trials and
to maintain public confidence in the court system. U’Ren v.
Bagley, 118 Or 77, 82-83, 245 P 1074 (1926). Those who have
endeavored to chronicle the history of those statutes have
generally divided them into two separate tracks: (1) those
that permit or require disqualification for cause—interest
in the case, relationship to a party, or prior participation
   2
     ORS 14.210(1) provides, in part, that:
        “A judge shall not act as such in a court of which the judge is a member
   in any of the following circumstances:
        “(a) * * * if the judge is a party to or directly interested in the action, suit
   or proceeding[.]
        “(b) * * * if the judge was not present and sitting as a member of the court
   at the hearing of a matter submitted for its decision.
        “(c) * * * if the judge is related to any party, or to the attorney for any
   party, or to the partner or office associate of any such attorney, by consan-
   guinity or affinity within the third degree.
        “(d) * * * if the judge has been attorney in the action, suit or proceeding
   for any party.
        “(e) * * * on appeal if the judge participated in making the decision that is
   subject to review.”
   3
     ORS 14.250 provides, as relevant, that:
        “No judge of a circuit court shall sit to hear or try any suit, action, matter
   or proceeding when it is established, as provided in ORS 14.250 to 14.270,
   that any party or attorney believes that such party or attorney cannot have a
   fair and impartial trial or hearing before such judge.”
542                                                State v. Ovalle

in matters connected to the case, and (2) those that permit
or require disqualification for bias or prejudice—based on
affidavits of subjective belief that the judge is biased or prej-
udiced, making a fair trial impossible. See Disqualification
of Judges for Prejudice or Bias – Common Law Evolution,
Current Status, and the Oregon Experience, 48 Or L Rev 311,
360 (1969). The Supreme Court has likewise stated:
   “It is important to note that there are two separate stat-
   utory schemes for disqualifying judges in Oregon. ORS
   14.210 describes disqualification for cause. ORS 14.250
   describes disqualification for prejudice[.]”
Hanson v. Dept. of Rev., 294 Or 23, 27, 653 P2d 964 (1982).
For-cause disqualification statutes have received less legis-
lative and judicial attention over the years than for-prejudice
statutes, no doubt at least partly because the specific for-
cause grounds are “well-rooted in the American common
law,” and are measurable by objective standards, whereas
the for-prejudice grounds are more elusive and harder to
measure. See Disqualification of Judges for Prejudice or
Bias, 48 Or L Rev at 312.
        At issue here is defendant’s motion to disqual-
ify a particular judge for a specific cause—consanguinity
within three degrees of kinship to an attorney in the district
attorney’s office—under ORS 14.210(1)(c). That provision
provides:
   “A judge shall not act as judge if the judge is related to any
   party, or to the attorney for any party, or to the partner or
   office associate of any such attorney, by consanguinity or
   affinity within the third degree.”
We review the trial court’s ruling on defendant’s motion to
disqualify for legal error. State v. Langley, 363 Or 482, 498,
424 P3d 688 (2018), adh’d to as modified on recons, 365 Or
418 (2019), cert den, 141 S Ct 138 (2020).
        The pertinent facts are not in dispute. Defendant
was charged with several criminal offenses against his
minor stepdaughter. The Honorable Andrew Erwin presided
over the jury trial and, after the jury returned its verdict
acquitting defendant of one charge and convicting him of
several others, Judge Erwin also sentenced defendant to
time in prison. As mentioned, an appeal followed, and we
Cite as 325 Or App 538 (2023)                                 543

reversed in part and remanded for resentencing on the two
counts that we affirmed. Ovalle, 303 Or App at 358.
         Upon remand, defendant filed a motion to disqualify
Judge Erwin under ORS 14.210(1)(c), supported by his law-
yer’s declaration that the judge “is related by consanguinity
within the third degree to a partner or office associate of the
attorney for the state in this matter.” Judge Erwin engaged
defense counsel in a colloquy about the motion during a
remotely conducted status hearing, particularly focusing on
(1) whether ORS 14.260(3) barred defendant from seeking
to disqualify a judge who had previously made substantive
rulings in the case, and (2) whether the basis for disquali-
fication relied upon by defendant should be deemed waived
pursuant to ORS 14.210(2). Defense counsel responded that,
in his view, the “time limits for motions under ORS 14.250
to 14.270” do not apply to “motions under ORS 14.210.” The
state was present for and represented at the hearing but
was not asked any questions and did not participate in the
discussion concerning the motion.
         It is unclear whether the motion to disqualify
was scheduled to be heard at the status conference when
it was discussed. No evidence was offered or received,
although there was this discussion about the alleged family
relationship:
   “[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: * * * The only other issue regard-
   ing the disqualification motion, Your Honor, is the basis
   that give rise to disqualification under 210 did not exist—
   to my knowledge, did not exist in this particular case at
   the time that—that Your Honor made substantive rulings
   in—in this case prior to, I guess, remand from—from the
   appeal.
      “It has been a new circumstance that has arisen that’s
   given rise to the Court having that relationship with the—
   with the party in this case.
      “[COURT]: And I understand the position that you’re
   taking. You’re correct in your understanding, but, at this
   point in time, the statutory language that prevails as far as
   motion to disqualification does not apply to this particular
   case because I have made enumerable substantive rulings
   throughout the trial of this case.”
544                                            State v. Ovalle

Judge Erwin denied the motion from the bench on the
grounds that he had already made substantive rulings in
the case and, because of that, the motion was not available
to defendant. Judge Erwin then set a date for the next hear-
ing, at which time he resentenced defendant on Counts 5
and 6, imposing the same sentence as he had originally
imposed on those counts.
          On appeal, the state argues first that defendant
failed to preserve his argument but that, even if he preserved
it, the court did not err, because the motion was “procedur-
ally barred” by ORS 14.260(3), given Judge Erwin’s previous
substantive rulings in the case. ORS 14.260(3) provides, as
relevant:
   “A motion to disqualify a judge may not be made after the
   judge has ruled upon any petition, demurrer or motion
   other than a motion to extend time in the cause, matter or
   proceeding.”

We conclude that defendant preserved his argument under
the judicial disqualification statutes. He filed a written
motion, he answered the court’s questions to him about the
motion, and he argued below, as he does here, that ORS
14.260(3) does not bar his motion. We, thus, turn to the mer-
its question.
         This case concerns a for-cause motion to disqual-
ify, but even for-cause motions vary somewhat in terms of
whether disqualification or recusal is mandatory and depend
on the type of cause identified in the motion. For example,
there has been less certainty about whether disqualification
should always be required when the cause is a family rela-
tionship between the judge and a party or a party’s attorney
as opposed to when the judge has a direct interest in the
case. See Disqualification of Judges for Prejudice or Bias, 48
Or L Rev at 317-18. That tension between disqualification
due to direct interest in a case and disqualification due to a
family relationship with a party or attorney is reflected in
ORS 14.210(2), which deems cause due to a family relation-
ship waived if not raised, but does not provide for waiver
when cause is based on a judge’s direct interest in a case.
ORS 14.210(2) provides, as relevant:
Cite as 325 Or App 538 (2023)                                545

       “In the circumstances specified in subsection (1)(c)
   [where judge is related to party or attorney by consanguin-
   ity within third degree] and (d) [where judge has been an
   attorney in the case] of this section, the disqualification
   shall be deemed waived by the parties unless a motion for
   disqualification of the judge is made as provided by statute
   or court rule.”
The fact that ORS 14.210 designates which of the listed
causes may be deemed waived, while excluding others, cuts
against the state’s argument that the procedural require-
ments of ORS 14.260(3) apply to ORS 14.210. It seems
unlikely that the legislature would designate a judge’s direct
interest in a case nonwaivable under ORS 14.210, but then
allow the interested judge to preside over the case when the
defendant does not seek to disqualify the judge under the
procedural requirements of ORS 14.260.
          Langley supports the notion that ORS 14.260(3)
does not apply to an ORS 14.210 motion to disqualify judge.
Langley was an aggravated murder case that had been
remanded to the trial court for a fourth resentencing hear-
ing following automatic and direct review in the Supreme
Court. 363 Or at 484. When the matter was remanded
for its fourth sentencing proceeding, the presiding judge
assigned the case to a particular judge and, after that, the
defendant filed a motion for change of judge, citing ORS
14.250 to 14.270 as authority. Id. at 487. He also filed a for-
cause motion to disqualify judge under ORS 14.210(1)(d).
Id. at 488. The presiding judge denied the motions as
untimely, and the particular judge declined to recuse them-
self. Id. at 488-89.
         The Supreme Court concluded that the for-prejudice
motion filed under ORS 14.250 had correctly been denied as
untimely. Id. at 494. It nevertheless proceeded to reach the
merits of the for-cause motion filed under ORS 14.210. Id. at
495. The defendant relied on ORS 14.210(1)(a) (direct inter-
est of judge) and ORS 14.210(1)(d) (judge has been attorney
in case) in Langley. Id. at 497. The cause described in para-
graph (d), like the cause in paragraph (c)—on which defen-
dant relies in the case before us—is deemed waived when
not raised by motion “as provided by statute or court rule.”
ORS 14.210(2). That the court addressed the merits of the
546                                            State v. Ovalle

ORS 14.210 motion despite the state’s procedural objections
under ORS 14.260 is consistent with the approach that it
took in Hanson. In that case, the court acknowledged that
if ORS 14.250 were available to tax court litigants, those
litigants would be required to comply with the procedural
requirements for ORS 14.250 motions, and then noted that
the litigants there had failed to timely file their motion
within the time limitations of ORS 14.260(2). Hanson, 294
Or at 27-28. The court nevertheless went on to address the
parties’ constitutional due process argument, noting that
if the parties were asserting actual bias or prejudice, they
needed to have made factual allegations that would support
a finding of such bias or prejudice, as distinct from the “con-
clusory statements” that are allowed under ORS 14.250.
Id. at 28. Langley and Hanson strongly suggest that under
the circumstances of the case now before us, the trial court
should have addressed the merits of the for-cause motion
rather than summarily denying it. At a minimum, the court
should have held a hearing to address the substantive ques-
tions of whether the alleged cause existed and, if so, whether
it was waivable and, if so, whether it was waived.
         There might be times when an actual conflict arises
after a judge makes a substantive ruling in a case. In such
cases, the questions of whether a cause exists and whether a
cause can be or was waived should be addressed at a hearing
on the merits of the motion. When an actual conflict arises
under ORS 14.210 or is otherwise alleged in factual terms of
constitutional magnitude, that conflict can be readily exam-
ined as a matter of fact under the evidence code, because it
is specific and concrete and, thus, susceptible to objective
measurement. In such instances, it does not matter when
the conflict arose, only that a conflict exists and must be
evaluated on the merits question of whether recusal or dis-
qualification is required.
         The same cannot be said for the situation where a
party forms a belief that a judge is biased after the judge
rules on a substantive matter in their case and then desires
to disqualify the judge on that belief alone. The lack of objec-
tive measurement in such cases renders just and efficient
resolution through court proceedings exceedingly difficult
and carries the risk of creating adversity and conflict where
Cite as 325 Or App 538 (2023)                                               547

none, in fact, exists. The question of the party’s motivation
to file the motion after a judge rules would create, by timing
alone, its own practical and legal challenges, and the ill-
advised practice of judge-shopping may well increase. The
courts’ already full and burdened dockets would necessar-
ily have to shift and expand to accommodate the changes
that such motions would create. The Supreme Court has
clearly stated that by permitting motions to be filed under
ORS 14.250 on a belief of bias alone, the legislature “pro-
vided parties and lawyers an opportunity, one that is not
constitutionally or otherwise required, to remove a judge for
personal, but not necessarily legal, reasons.” State v. Pena,
345 Or 198, 207-08, 191 P3d 659 (2008). Such motions are,
thus, strictly held to the procedural limitations the legisla-
ture placed on them. Id.
         The differences in motions to disqualify judge are
not unlike the differences between a motion to excuse a
juror for cause and a peremptory strike used to strike a
juror after counsel has passed that juror for cause. The goal
of each is to remove a prospective juror from the jury in a
particular case. The basis for excusing a juror is different
for each—a stated cause versus an undisclosed reason. The
associated quantum and burden of proof required for each
method of excusing a juror is necessarily different. See, e.g.,
ORCP 57 D(1)(g), applicable to civil cases and also to crim-
inal cases under ORS 136.210(1) (“A challenge for actual
bias may be taken * * * but on the trial of such challenge,
although it should appear that the juror challenged has
formed or expressed an opinion upon the merits of the cause
from what the juror may have heard or read, such opinion
shall not of itself be sufficient to sustain the challenge[.]”);
ORCP 57 D(2) (“A peremptory challenge is an objection to a
juror for which no reason need be given, but upon which the
court shall exclude such juror.”).4 Those differences roughly
    4
      Although ORCP 57 D(2) is not made expressly applicable to criminal cases,
the Supreme Court has treated peremptory challenges in criminal cases much
the same as in civil cases, strictly enforcing the statutory limitations placed on
such juror challenges. For example, where the defendant requested more than
the allotted statutory number of peremptory challenges, the court stated that
“the proper course for a defendant who has exhausted his peremptory challenges
but who believes that there still are biased jurors on the panel is to challenge
those jurors for cause, and appeal if his challenges are denied. The legislature
548                                                           State v. Ovalle

parallel the differences in the statutory methods for disqual-
ification of judges. The differences in measurability and the
evidentiary challenges that those differences present illus-
trate why it is more important to enforce strict procedural
limitations on motions filed on subjective belief alone than
on motions filed for cause.
         The declaration submitted here by defense coun-
sel does not address when or why he formed the belief that
Judge Erwin had a family relationship that constituted
cause for disqualification. That raises questions of whether
such a conflict exists and whether, if it does, it is waivable
and whether it has been waived. The best way to address
those issues would be at a hearing on the motion. Given that
Judge Erwin denied the motion solely because he had pre-
viously ruled on substantive issues in the case, the merits
of the for-cause motion were not reached, despite the brief
colloquy that occurred between the court and counsel where
it appeared that some family relationship may have been
acknowledged in passing.
         Relying on Straub v. State of Oregon et al., 121 Or
451, 255 P 897 (1927), defendant asks us to broadly and lib-
erally construe the statutes concerning the disqualification
of judges. It is certainly as true today as it was in 1927 that
every party is entitled to a fair trial before an impartial
judge and that “sound public policy” is interested in preserv-
ing the integrity and good credit of every court. Id. at 457.
We agree that where, as here, the motion to disqualify is
based upon a specific cause under ORS 14.210, liberal con-
struction is favored in the interest of serving justice. The
court should have addressed the merits of the motion. A dif-
ferent approach is required, though, when disqualification is
sought solely on a subjective belief of bias under ORS 14.250
because that provision is merely “an extension of legislative
grace” to the moving party and must be construed according
to the strict procedural limitations with which that grace
was extended. Langley, 363 Or at 493-94.

did not empower trial courts to grant more than twelve peremptory challenges
in capital cases and, accordingly, the trial court here was without discretion to
grant defendant’s motion.” State v. Barone, 329 Or 210, 228, 986 P2d 5 (1999), cert
den, 528 US 1086 (2000).
Cite as 325 Or App 538 (2023)                           549

         Having concluded that the trial court erred in sum-
marily denying defendant’s ORS 14.210 motion to disqual-
ify, we reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
        Reversed and remanded.