Court Opinion

ID: 9786153
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 23:48:49.478839+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:43:17.636915
License: Public Domain

Judge SCHWARTZMAN,
specially concurring.
I concur in the opinion of this Court. I specifically wish to limit my concurrence as to Count II (First degree kidnapping), however, to the issue presented, that is the sufficiency of the evidence relative to the specific intent element of “for the purpose of raping” the victim. I seriously question whether this incident was a “kidnapping” at all, as opposed to a burglary, i.e., a home entry with the intent to commit a felony, namely rape; and/or a battery with intent to commit rape or an attempted rape. See People v. Stanworth, 11 Cal.3d 588, 114 Cal.Rptr. 250, 522 P.2d 1058, 1065 (1974); People v. Daniels, 71 Cal.2d 1119, 80 Cal.Rptr. 897, 459 P.2d 225, 238 (Cal.) (movement merely incidental to commit the crime of rape is not kidnapping); compare State v. Couch, 635 P.2d 89 (Utah 1981). However, this issue is not before the Court on this appeal.
Moreover, even without the kidnapping conviction, defendant Norton stands convicted of the crime of rape, and is serving a longer sentence — one he richly deserves for his appalling and egregious conduct therein — on this charge than the one meted out for the “kidnapping.”