Court Opinion

ID: 9486792
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:00:12.1017+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:56.207963
License: Public Domain

Opinion for the Court filed PER CURIAM.
Separate statement filed by Circuit Judge SILBERMAN, dissenting from the award of attorney’s fees and costs.

ORDER

Upon consideration of the application for award of attorney’s fees and the amendments thereto, the responses thereto and the re*1416plies; and the bill of costs, the response thereto and the reply, it is
ORDERED, for the reasons stated in the accompanying memorandum, that petitioner be granted an award of attorney’s fees and expenses in the amount of $57,973.27.
PER CURIAM:
Denver Cooper seeks an award of attorney’s fees and expenses in connection with his challenge to the Railroad Retirement Board’s (“Board”) refusal to waive the recovery of $40,661.24 in disability annuity over-payments made to him between 1980 and 1984.
Although Cooper views his fee petition as a single request, it is actually four requests addressing separate parts of his litigation against the Board: 1) Cooper v. Railroad Retirement Board, 977 F.2d 647 (D.C.Cir.1992) (“Cooper I ”); 2) In re Cooper, No. 93-1102, 1993 WL 71714 (D.C.Cir. Mar. 3, 1993) (petition for mandamus); 3) proceedings on remand to the Board; and 4) Cooper v. Railroad Retirement Board, No. 93-1442, 1993 WL 515541 (D.C.Cir. Dec. 6, 1993) (“Cooper II”).
1. Cooper I
Cooper requests compensation for 539.05 hours of attorney time at the rate of $113.85 per hour. The Board opposes awarding any attorney’s fees for Cooper I, arguing that Cooper did not “prevail,” and that the Board’s position was “substantially justified.” Alternatively, the Board argues that any fees awarded should not exceed $75 per hour, and that the number of hours should be reduced.
Under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1988), a court shall award attorney’s fees to a “prevailing party” unless the court concludes that the position of the United States was “substantially justified.” A party “prevails” when the outcome of his lawsuit “materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant’s behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff.” Farrar v. Hobby, - U.S.-,-, 113 S.Ct. 566, 573, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992).
The Board argues that Cooper did not “prevail” in Cooper I, since the court only decided that he was “without fault” in obtaining the overpayment, but did not determine that he was entitled to a waiver of the overpayment. The Board’s position is meritless. The Supreme Court has held that a party who obtains a remand, and then ultimately succeeds on the merits of his underlying claim, is entitled to an award for attorney’s fees incurred in obtaining the remand. See Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877, 886, 109 S.Ct. 2248, 2254-56, 104 L.Ed.2d 941 (1989) (“[WJhere a court’s remand to the agency for further administrative proceedings does not necessarily dictate the receipt of benefits, the claimant will not normally attain ‘prevailing party’ status ... until after the result of the administrative proceedings is known”).
The Board acknowledges that Cooper prevailed in Cooper II, where the court reversed the Board’s determination that repayment would not cause Cooper “hardship.” Both “fault” and “hardship” were at issue in this case, and it is now clear that Cooper prevailed on both issues.
Nor was the Board’s position in Cooper I substantially justified. The Supreme Court has interpreted that standard to mean that agency action is justified “to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person” and has a “reasonable basis both in law and fact.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565, 108 S.Ct. 2541, 2550, 101 L.Ed.2d 490 (1988). As we have recognized in prior cases, the inquiry into reasonableness for EAJA purposes may not be collapsed into our antecedent evaluation of the merits, for EAJA sets forth a “distinct legal standard.” Federal Election Comm’n v. Rose, 806 F.2d 1081, 1089 (D.C.Cir.1986). However, the agency bears the burden of establishing that its position meets the substantial justification threshold, Lundin v. Mecham, 980 F.2d 1450, 1459 (D.C.Cir.1992), and we find that the Board has failed to carry that burden here.
In the agency decision underlying Cooper I, the Board concluded that Cooper, by virtue of his union experience and education, should have known that he could not convert his disability annuity into an age and service *1417annuity and that he therefore was “not without fault” in causing the overpayments. Cooper I, 977 F.2d at 650. On review, although the court couched its holding in the language of the relevant legal standard — i.e., “no substantial evidence” — we essentially determined that the Board wholly lacked a reasonable factual basis for its conclusion. We held that “[njothing in the record” indicated that Cooper’s union experience should have apprised him of the “intricacies” of a “highly complex [statute], capable of being misunderstood even by those considered experts in the field_” Id. (emphasis added). We also noted that, while the Board relied on the fact that Cooper had read a particular informational pamphlet, that pamphlet simply did “not address[ ]” the prohibition on converting disability annuities. Id. Indeed, mistakes of the kind Cooper made were “not unusual,” particularly in light of the fact that “the [Railroad Retirement] Act says nothing explicit on the matter and neither do the Board’s regulations.” Id. at 651. In short, although we did not question the Board’s interpretation of its own statute and regulations, the plain import of our decision is that there was no reasonable factual basis for finding that Cooper should have known that his annuity could not be converted. Accordingly, we hold that the Board’s finding to the contrary was not substantially justified.
Since Cooper prevailed, and the government’s position was not substantially justified, he is entitled to a “reasonable” attorney’s fee. The court calculates the fee based on “the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983).
Under EAJA, the maximum rate of $75 per hour may be adjusted by the change in the cost of living since 1981, when EAJA was enacted. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). Cooper seeks fees at the rate of $113.85 per hour, which represents a 51.8% increase in the cost of living from 1981 to 1992. We agree with Cooper’s calculation of the cost of living increase, and will award fees at the rate of $113.85 per hour.
We conclude, however, that Cooper’s fee request must be reduced in several respects. First, Cooper seeks payment for 24 hours of work preparing his “Reply to Petitioner’s Motion for Emergency Relief.” In fact, leave to file this pleading out of time was denied and it was returned to Cooper. Accordingly, these hours will be deducted.
Second, Cooper seeks compensation for 13 hours he spent driving to and from oral argument. This circuit has not specifically addressed whether an attorney’s fee award may include travel time, as contrasted with travel expenses. Compare Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 672 F.2d 42, 58 (D.C.Cir.1982) (apparently including travel time in fee award, but not deciding issue of compensating travel time at a lower rate) with Massachusetts Fair Share v. Law Enforcement Assistance Admin., 776 F.2d 1066, 1069 (D.C.Cir.1985) (expenses such as taxi fares, messenger services, travel expenses, telephone bills and postage not eligible for reimbursements as “costs” under EAJA). Other circuits allow payment for attorney travel time, although sometimes at a lower hourly rate. See, e.g., International Woodworkers of Am. v. Donovan, 792 F.2d 762, 767 (9th Cir.1985) (items routinely billed to a client, including attorney travel, are recoverable under EAJA); Domegan v. Ponte, 972 F.2d 401, 425 (1st Cir.1992) (noting court’s “disinclination” to compensate an attorney at professional rates for travel time), vacated on other grounds, - U.S.-, 113 S.Ct. 1378, 122 L.Ed.2d 754 (1993). We conclude that travel time in this case will be compensated at half the base hourly rate, or $56.92.
Finally, it is clear that the time Cooper claims for performing certain tasks is unreasonable and should be reduced significantly. In particular, the time claimed for legal research and writing briefs, and for oral argument preparation, is excessive. Nearly all of the time claimed in June through September 1992 — 399.8 hours — relates to research and writing an opening and reply brief, and preparing for oral argument.
Although there is no doubt that the law concerning railroad retirement annuities is complex, and that Cooper’s attorney had lit-*1418tie prior experience in that field, the issues involved in this particular case were not difficult. The briefs Cooper submitted were not well-organized, and they devoted considerable space to arguments extraneous to the main issues-whether Cooper was “without fault” and whether recovery of the overpayment would cause “hardship.” Therefore, we award fees for only one-half of the time devoted to brief-writing and argument preparation. This amounts to a deduction of 200 hours.
2. Mandamus Petition
While his case was being considered by the Board on remand, Cooper filed petition for review No. 93-1102, which the court construed as a petition for a writ of mandamus. The court denied Cooper’s petition, although the order allowed Cooper to refile if the Board “unreasonably” delayed its remand proceedings.
It is clear that Cooper did not prevail in his mandamus petition, and therefore is not entitled to attorney’s fees. Therefore, the fee award will be reduced by the 10.7 hours Cooper claims for this task.
3. Remand Proceeding
The 136.7 hours Cooper claims for February and March 1993 relate to proceedings on remand before the Board. Since the court in Cooper I remanded the case to the Board and did not retain jurisdiction, Cooper is not entitled to fees for the remand proceedings. See Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 97, 111 S.Ct. 2157, 2162, 115 L.Ed.2d 78 (1991) (attorney’s fees under EAJA may be awarded for administrative litigation where the “court retains jurisdiction ... and contemplates entering a final judgment following the completion of administrative proceedings”). Accordingly, we deduct 136.7 hours for Cooper’s work on the remand proceedings.
In addition, Cooper devoted 21 hours to preparing the “Amended Application for Award of Attorneys Fees,” and to responding to the Board’s opposition. The amended application mainly addresses the mandamus petition and the proceedings on remand. The court will therefore deduct 14 of the 21 hours Cooper devoted to the amended application.
4.Cooper II
The Board acknowledges that Cooper prevailed in Cooper II, in which the court held that the Board’s hardship determination was not supported by substantial evidence. The Board argues, however, that its position was substantially justified.
For essentially the same reasons discussed in relation to Cooper I, we conclude that the Board’s position was not substantially justified. As the court’s opinion in Cooper II made clear, the Board’s action in that case lacked the reasonable basis in fact required for a finding of substantial justification. See Pierce, 487 U.S. at 565,108 S.Ct. at 2550. In determining that an income surplus of only $55 per month would not cause petitioner undue hardship, the Board “made no reference whatsoever to the hardship factors documented by petitioner.” Cooper II, Mem.Op. at 2. We faulted the Board for focusing solely on one portion of the record-Cooper’s past income statements-while completely ignoring the uncontroverted supplemental evidence of hardship and extraordinary expenses that Cooper submitted. See id. at 2-3. Indeed, the Board’s decision took no account of critical facts concerning “petitioner’s increasing debt, advancing age, deteriorating health and imminent major expenses.” Id. at 3. EAJA directs us to consider the underlying agency action as well as its litigating posture, see 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(D) (1988), and, in light of the above-mentioned omissions, we find that the Board’s action lacked a reasonable factual basis and therefore was not substantially justified.
We agree, however, that Cooper’s fee request for Cooper II should be reduced. As in Cooper I, Cooper seeks to be compensated for 13 hours of time travelling to oral argument. That time will be compensated at the rate of $56.92.
The amount of time spent on legal research and writing, and preparing for oral past income statements-while completely the Board points out, there was only one issue involved in Cooper II, namely, whether the Board’s hardship determination was sup*1419ported by substantial evidence. All of the documentation on this issue, such as Cooper’s income and expense data, had been prepared at the administrative level. Much of the research Cooper did to prepare Cooper I would have been useful in preparing the briefs in Cooper II. Finally, as the Board notes, Cooper included arguments in his brief, and at oral argument, that did not relate to the only issue before the court. Accordingly, the time Cooper claims for research, writing, and oral argument preparation in Cooper II will be reduced by half.
5. Bill of Costs and Third Amendment to Petition
Finally, Cooper seeks reimbursement for $453.16 in duplicating costs related to Cooper II, and $200 in filing fees for Cooper II and No. 93-1102 (the mandamus petition).1 We award the $100 filing fee for Cooper II, and $453.16 for duplicating costs, but exclude the filing fee for No. 93-1102, the unsuccessful mandamus petition.
The fee award is calculated as follows:
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. Costs for Cooper I have already been awarded in the amount of $281.91.