Court Opinion

ID: 9422264
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:01:54.987583+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:35.539168
License: Public Domain

Me. Justice Whittaker,
whom Mr. Justice Clark joins, dissenting.
I must say, with all respect, that I think the Court has grossly misread this record. For, after studying and analyzing it, it seems entirely clear to me that not only did petitioner fail to complain of any uncertainty about the subject under inquiry, or object that the questions put to him were not pertinent to the inquiry, but, moreover, at least three of the questions he refused to answer were, on their face, clearly pertinent to the inquiry as a matter of law. Demonstration of these facts can be made only by carefully setting forth in detail the undisputed relevant facts in the record. I now turn to that task.
Acting under the statutory command of Congress to investigate and report to it on the extent, character and objects of “un-American propaganda activities,” the “diffusion ... of subversive . . . propaganda,” and “all other questions in relation thereto that would aid *476Congress in any necessary remedial legislation,” 1 a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Un-American Activities conducted investigatory hearings at Albany, New York, on April 7, 8 and 9, 1954, relative to Communist subversive activities. At those hearings evidence was adduced, principally by the testimony of a former graduate student of the School of Industrial and Labor Relations of Cornell University, one Marqusee, and by one Richardson, a former student in the Cornell Law School, that a Communist cell existed in that University from 1947 through 1953. Those witnesses testified that they were members of that cell, and, in addition to holding frequent secret meetings and occasionally passing out handbills at strike scenes, the members of the cell formulated and carried out a plan of using the prestige and innocent aid of the university’s placement service in getting summer jobs with labor unions in upper New York — particularly, Ithaca, Schenectady and Syracuse — where, by fellow Communists, they were put in contact with the leaders of Communist cells in the unions and there further carried on their Communist activities. Richardson — who was in fact an employee of, and regularly reported to, the Federal Bureau of Investigation — testified that there were at least six members of the Cornell cell and that one of the most active members of it was petitioner, Deutch, and that another was one Homer Owen. Richardson further testified that, in 1952 and 1953, Deutch was the liaison between an undisclosed member of the Cornell faculty and that cell; that, in that period, Deutch collected for and turned over to the cell various contributions, including one for $100, but declined to name the donor.
*477Having this and other similar information, the Subcommittee determined to interrogate Deutch, and, locating him in the graduate school of the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia, it caused him to be subpoenaed to appear before the Subcommittee at Albany on Friday, April 9, 1954. But, at the request of petitioner’s counsel, and for petitioner’s convenience, the' Subcommittee agreed to take petitioner’s testimony in executive session at Washington, D. C., on Monday, April 12, instead of at Albany on Friday, April 9.
At the appointed time, petitioner, accompanied by his counsel, appeared before the Subcommittee in Washington and was sworn and interrogated. After asking and obtaining his name, place and date of birth, and his educational background, the committee advised petitioner that the particular aspect of Communist infiltration into the educational and labor fields to be inquired into in his interrogation was the existence and nature of "... a Communist Party group or cell operating among undergraduates . . . [and] graduates at Cornell . . . .” Specifically, counsel for the committee stated:
“Mr. Deutch, during hearings at Albany last week, the committee heard testimony regarding the existence of a Communist Party group or cell operating among undergraduates at Cornell University, among certain graduates at Cornell and in the city of Ithaca.
“In connection with that testimony, the committee was informed that you were a member of one or more of those groups. If so, I would like to ask you [about] certain matters relating to your activity there.”
The subject under inquiry, so stated, would appear to have been thus made quite plain. It appears to have been entirely plain to petitioner and his counsel, as neither of them then, or at any time during the hearing, mani*478fested any want of understanding of the subject or asked for any further explanation of it.
Thereupon the following immediately occurred:
“[Mr. Tavenner — counsel for the Committee]: Were you a member of a group of the Communist Party at Cornell?
“Mr. Deutch: I will answer that question, but only under protest.
“I wish to register a challenge as to the jurisdiction of this committee under Public Law 601, which is the committee’s enabling legislation. This question, or any similar questions involving my associations, past or future, I am answering, but only under protest as to its constitutionality. But, under your jurisdiction as stated, I answer yes, I was a member of the Communist Party.
“Mr. Tavenner: The committee was advised that a witness by the name of Ross Richardson has stated that you acted as liaison between a Communist Party group on the campus and a member of the faculty at Cornell, and that you knew the name of the member of that faculty, who was a member of the Communist Party.
“Will you tell us who that member of the faculty was?
“Mr. Deutch: Sir, I am perfectly willing to tell about my own activities, but do you feel I should trade my moral scruples by informing on someone else?
“Mr. Jackson [the acting chairman of the Subcommittee] : That is entirely beside the point. You have been asked a question and we must insist that you answer the question or decline to answer it, and *479your declination must consist of something more than your moral scruples.
“Mr. Deutch: As to details of that, I think the whole question has been magnified more than it should have.
“Mr. Jackson: There is a question pending and the Chair must insist that you answer the question that has been asked.
“Mr. Deutch: I can only say that whereas I do not want to be in contempt of the committee, I do not believe I can answer questions about other people, but only about myself.
“Mr. Jackson: You therefore refuse to answer the question that is pending, is that correct?
“Mr. Deutch: Yes, sir . . .
Petitioner’s refusal to answer that question resulted in Count One of his subsequent indictment.
A colloquy then ensued between petitioner and the acting chairman and another member of the Subcommittee, at the conclusion of which petitioner stated: “The only thing I am saying, sir, my challenge is, is it constitutional under Public Law 601?”
Thereupon the following occurred:
“Mr. Tavenner: The committee received testimony from Ross Richardson to the effect that you collected certain donations for the benefit of the Communist Party, and that on one occasion you delivered to him the sum of $100, without designating to him the source of it. Will you tell the committee, please, the source of that $100 contribution, if it was made?
“Mr. Deutch: No; this contribution was made — I believe I gave you the reason why I decline to answer regarding names, and this was from a personal friend.”
*480In reply to the acting chairman’s direction to answer the question, petitioner stated:
“Mr. Deutch: I feel like I can’t answer that question. I realize there are many problems facing me, and it wasn’t an easy decision to make.
“Mr. Jackson: The Chair directs again that you answer.
“Mr. Deutch: I am unable to.
“Mr. Tavenner: . . . I want to know if you refuse to answer the question.
“Mr. Deutch: Yes, sir.”
Petitioner’s refusal to answer that question resulted in Count Two of his subsequent indictment.
The background of the question, and the question, that resulted in Count Three of the indictment are omitted, because the District Court dismissed that Count, and it is not before us.
Petitioner then refused, though directed by the acting chairman, to answer the question: “Were you acquainted with Homer Owen?” And that refusal resulted in Count Four of his subsequent indictment.
Then, after saying “. . . so when I came to college I was approached and joined [the Communist Party],” petitioner was asked and answered as follows:
“Mr. Tavenner: By whom were you approached?
“Mr. Deutch: I was approached by a student. I don’t wish to give his name.
“Mr. Jackson: The witness is directed to give the name of the person by whom he was approached.
“Mr. Deutch: I decline to give the name.”
Petitioner’s refusal to answer that question resulted in Count Five of his indictment.
This, I submit, is a fair statement of the undisputed relevant facts, and it sets forth literally every contention, objection and reason given by petitioner at the hearing *481for his refusal to answer these questions. Apart from the formal testimony of Mr. Tavenner and some documentary exhibits offered by the Government, this was the evidence that was offered and received at petitioner’s contempt trial in the District Court.
I think this record provides an ample basis to support the District Court’s finding that, in general, “The Committee was investigating the infiltration of Communism into educational and labor fields,” 147 F. Supp., at 91, but whether or not that was the general and announced subject of the hearings is immaterial to this case, because here petitioner was told, near the beginning of his interrogation and before the relevant questions were propounded, that the subject about which the committee wished to interrogate him was “the existence of a Communist Party group or cell operating among [students] at Cornell University . . . [and] matters relating to [his] activity there.” Like the Court of Appeals, I think these “quoted statements made to [petitioner] by the committee counsel and a committee member clearly indicated the object of the inquiry” of petitioner — i. e., the nature and extent of Communist infiltration at Cornell — “and the pertinency of the questions [to that subject].” 108 U. S. App. D. G, at 148, 280 F. 2d, at 696.
Likewise, it seems entirely clear to me, as it did to the Court of Appeals, that not only did petitioner fail to object to any question on the ground of pertinency but “Never once did he indicate unawareness of the purpose of the hearing, or doubt as to the pertinency of the questions.” 108 U. S. App. D. C., at 146, 280 F. 2d, at 694. It also seems plain to me, as it did to the Court of Appeals, that petitioner “declined to answer the questions, not on the ground of pertinency [but rather on the ground] that it was against his 'moral scruples’ to answer questions about other people.” 108 U. S. App. D. C., at 147, 280 F. 2d, at 695. “Nor,” as said by the Court of Appeals, “did he claim that he did not understand how the ques*482tions related to the subject under inquiry, or what that subject was. On the contrary, it is quite obvious that he recognized that the questions were pertinent to the subject under inquiry, and he based his refusal to answer solely and simply on the fact that he did not wish to give the names of other persons . . . [and] [n]ot until the trial in the District Court, in what appears to be afterthought, did appellant raise the questions of pertinency and unawareness of the subject matter of the inquiry.” 108 U. S. App. D. C., at 147-148, 280 F. 2d, at 695-696. It thus seems clear to me, as it did to the Court of Appeals, that “the Government has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the subject under inquiry and the pertinency of the questions were made to appear at the committee hearing with ‘indisputable clarity.’ ” 108 U. S. App. D. C., at 147, 280 F. 2d, at 695.
Yet this Court now reverses the findings and judgments of the two courts below upon the sole ground “that the Government at the trial failed to carry its burden of proving the pertinence of the questions.” I am compelled by the evidence, respectfully, to disagree.
Here, whether or not petitioner was told or knew that the general subject of the inquiry was “infiltration of Communism into educational and labor fields,” he was specifically told that the committee had information that he had recently been a member of a Communist cell at Cornell, had acted as the liaison between an undisclosed member of the faculty and that cell, had collected and turned over to the cell monies from donors whom he refused .to identify; and, then, coming specifically to the particular subject about which the committee desired to interrogate him, petitioner was told that the committee wished to interrogate him about “a Communist Party group or cell operating among undergraduates . . . [and] . . . graduates at Cornell and in the city of Ithaca” and “matters relating to [his] activity there.” In the second place, the subject under inquiry, thus stated, was not only *483crystal clear but appears to have been entirely plain to petitioner and his counsel, as neither of them then, or at any time during the hearing, manifested any want of understanding of the subject or asked for any further explanation of it. In the third place, neither petitioner nor his counsel made any objection, or even hinted any objection, to any question put to petitioner at the hearing on the ground of pertinency. Instead, petitioner said: “The only thing I am saying, sir, my challenge is, is it constitutional under Public Law 601?” And, finally, at the trial the Government proved this specific committee purpose by introducing into evidence not only the record made at the hearing but also the testimony of the Committee’s counsel as to these matters. It is, therefore, passing strange that the Court is unable to find any proof of pertinency of the questions.
In Watkins v. United States, 354 U. S. 178, the witness had expressly “objected to the questions on the grounds of lack of pertinency” (id., at 214), and the committee failed to clarify that matter. Hence, we said: “Unless the subject matter has been made to appear with undisputable clarity, it is the duty of the investigative body, upon objection of the witness on grounds of pertinency, to state for the record the subject under inquiry at that time and the manner in which the propounded questions are pertinent thereto.” Id., at *214-215. (Emphasis added.) Here, as stated, not only was pertinency made to appear with “undisputable clarity,” but moreover petitioner and his counsel gave every indication to the committee that they were aware of the subject under inquiry and made no objection whatever on the ground of pertinency.
In Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U. S. 109, the witness had said at the hearing, “I might wish to . . . challenge the pertinency of the question to the investigation,” and at another point, in a lengthy written statement, he quoted from this Court’s opinion in Jones v. Securities & *484Exchange Comm’n, 298 U. S. 1, language relating to a witness’ right to be informed of the pertinency of questions asked him by an administrative agency, and then contended in this Court that his conviction for contempt of Congress should be reversed because the subject of the inquiry and the relevancy of the questions thereto were not made clear. In rejecting that claim, and in contrasting that situation from the one existing in the Watkins case, we said: “These statements cannot, however, be accepted as the equivalent of a pertinency objection. At best they constituted but a contemplated objection to questions still unasked, and buried as they were in the context of petitioner’s general challenge to the power of the Subcommittee they can hardly be considered adequate, within the meaning of what was said in Watkins, supra, at 214-215, to trigger what would have been the Subcommittee’s reciprocal obligation had it been faced with a pertinency objection.” 360 U. S., at 123-124.
I also think that this Court’s decision in United States v. Bryan, 339 U. S. 323, is highly relevant to this question. For it is as true here, as it was there, that if petitioner did not understand the subject under inquiry or believed that the questions put to him were not relevant to that subject, “a decent respect for the House of Representatives, by whose authority [he was being questioned], would have required that [he] state [his] reasons for [refusing answers to the questions].” Id., at 332. Such an objection would have given the Subcommittee an opportunity to avoid the blocking of its inquiry by a further and even more detailed explanation of the subject under inquiry and the manner in which the propounded questions were pertinent thereto. “To deny the Committee the opportunity to consider [such an] objection or remedy it is in itself a contempt of its authority and an obstruction of its processes. See Bevan v. Kreiger, 289 U. S. 459, 464-465 (1933).” 339 U. S., at 333. Petitioner’s failure to *485make any such objection at the hearing, but raising it, for the first time, at his contempt trial, was patently an attempted “evasion of the duty of one summoned . . . before a congressional committee [, and] cannot be condoned.” id., at 333. And see McPhaul v. United States, 364 U. S. 372, 379.
This alone should be, and is for me, a complete answer to petitioner’s claim, and to the Court’s holding, “that the Government at the trial failed to carry its burden of proving the pertinence of the questions.”
But, in addition, at least the questions involved in Counts One, Two and Five of the indictment were, on their face, clearly pertinent to the inquiry as a matter of law.2 Petitioner had been specifically told that the particular subject upon which he was to be interrogated was “the existence of a Communist Party group or cell operating among undergraduates . . . [and] graduates at Cornell and in the city of Ithaca,” and “matters relating to [his] activity there.” Surely the questions involved in Counts One, Two and Five of the Indictment were, on their face, clearly pertinent to that subject. One cannot profitably elaborate a truth so plain. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U. S. 109, 123-125. And see McPhaul v. United States, 364 U. S. 372, 380-381.
For these reasons, I am bound to think that the two courts below were right, and that the judgment should be affirmed.

 Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 812, 828. Rule XI (l)(q)(2), Rules of the House of Representatives. H. Res. 5, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 99 Cong. Rec. 15. And see pp. 18, 24.

 Inasmuch as a general sentence was imposed on the four counts of no more than the law allows to be imposed on any one count, it follows that if any one of the four counts was adequately proved by the Government the judgment must be affirmed. Barenblatt v. United States, supra, at 126, note 25.