Court Opinion

ID: 9587243
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:19:53.279637+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:57.376396
License: Public Domain

Mobley, Presiding Justice,
dissenting. The ruling by the majority of the court that acceleration of the indebtedness could be made only upon declaration thereof by the holder, and notification of such determination to the obligor, was based on Lee v. O’Quinn, 184 Ga. 44, 45, supra. In that case the acceleration clause of the note provided that failure to comply with the terms of the contract would accelerate the principal "at the option of the holder of this note,” and this court, with one Justice dissenting, held that a default in payment did not automatically accelerate the indebtedness, but the creditor must evidence his intention to take advantage of the acceleration clause, and until this was done, tender could not be refused.
In the present case the acceleration clause in the note provides that failure to comply with any of the terms of the deed securing the note accelerates the principal and interest "at the option of the holder, without notice to the undersigned.” (Emphasis supplied.) It is my view that the language in the note allowing the creditor to accelerate the indebtedness without notice to the debtor removes the present case from the ruling in Lee v. O’Quinn, supra, and that the applicable ruling is found in Delray, Inc. v. Piedmont Investment Co., 194 Ga. 319 (3) (21 SE2d 420, 142 ALR 1116), where it was held that the indebtedness secured by a security deed could be accelerated on breach of a covenant of the deed, without notice to the debtor, where the deed provided waiver of notice.