Court Opinion

ID: 9397264
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-24 21:00:35.432692+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:22.933964
License: Public Domain

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                                              UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                                No. 20-4338

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                     Plaintiff – Appellee,

               v.

        RAMON AVILA DAVILA, a/k/a Raymond,

                     Defendant – Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
        Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle, District Judge. (5:19-cr-00112-BO-1)

        Argued: May 4, 2023                                               Decided: May 23, 2023

        Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, KING, Circuit Judge, and MOTZ, Senior Circuit Judge.

        Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by per curiam opinion for further
        proceedings consistent with this opinion.

        ARGUED: Sandra Barrett, Hendersonville, North Carolina, for Appellant. John Gibbons,
        OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
        ON BRIEF: Todd A. Smith, SMITH GILES PLLC, Graham, North Carolina, for
        Appellant. Michael F. Easley, Jr., United States Attorney, David A. Bragdon, Assistant
        United States Attorney, Joshua H. Rogers, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF
        THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               Ramon Avila Davila challenges his conviction and sentence for crimes related to

        drug trafficking and distribution. He argues that the district court failed to comply with the

        requirements of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 while conducting his plea hearing,

        that his 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) conviction lacks a sufficient factual basis, and that his

        sentence must be vacated. Although the district court did err in failing to comply with

        many of the requirements of Rule 11, Davila has not demonstrated that the errors

        prejudiced him or that his 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) conviction lacks a factual basis. We

        thus affirm his conviction. But we vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing

        because of the inconsistency between his pronounced and written sentences.

                                                      I.

               In December 2017, federal agents first learned of Davila’s involvement in a drug

        trafficking organization when they seized marijuana he had distributed to a confidential

        informant. 1 Two months later, officers stopped Davila for speeding and, in searching his

        vehicle, found eight pounds of marijuana. Davila then gave the officers consent to search

        three properties.

               The officers found drug trafficking paraphernalia in each of the properties. In the

        first they found 457 grams of methamphetamine and a kilogram press with cocaine residue.

               1
                 Because Davila pled guilty in a plea agreement containing no written factual
        statement, the facts within are those proffered by the Government during the Rule 11
        hearing and included in the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR). Davila makes no
        objections to either the Government’s proffered facts or the PSR.

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        During that search, Davila admitted that he had recently used the kilogram press to press

        five kilograms of cocaine. In the second, the officers found 43 pounds of marijuana. In

        the third, which Davila identified as his home, they found approximately $14,000 in U.S.

        currency, a small amount of marijuana, and a handgun located in the master bedroom of

        the property.

               In a written plea agreement, Davila pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute and

        possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and a quantity of

        marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), (D), 846 (Count 1); aiding and

        abetting the distribution of 500 grams or more of cocaine and a quantity of marijuana, in

        violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), (D) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count 2); and

        possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C.

        § 924(c)(1)(A) (Count 3). The plea agreement contained no factual statement, but the

        Government offered facts at the Rule 11 plea hearing in support of the plea, without

        opposition from Davila.

               At the Rule 11 plea hearing, the district court made more than a dozen errors or

        omissions. For example, the court did not inform Davila of his right to plead not guilty,

        ensure that Davila understood the elements of the charges to which he pled guilty, or

        accurately describe the potential penalties Davila faced. At sentencing, however, the court

        imposed the sentence upon which Davila and the Government had previously agreed:

        160 months’ imprisonment and five years of supervised release.

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               In imposing the conditions of supervised release, the court stated:

               [Davila is] not to violate any federal, state or local law; use or associate with
               any controlled substance or dangerous weapon; remain gainfully employed;
               support his dependents; submit to any process from immigration regarding
               his stay in the United States and otherwise obey the conditions of supervised
               release that are in force in this district.

        The district court then filed a written judgment containing the mandatory conditions of

        supervised release and 13 standard conditions corresponding to those recommended in the

        United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual.          The written judgment also contained

        additional conditions, including a condition that Davila “consent to a warrantless search

        [of his person and premises] . . . at the request of the probation officer, or any other law

        enforcement officer.”

               Davila’s counsel filed an appellate brief in compliance with this court’s process

        under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). After a thorough review of the record,

        we appointed new counsel for Davila and ordered the parties to brief three issues:

        (1) whether the district court’s errors and omissions in the Rule 11 hearing undermined the

        validity of Davila’s guilty plea; (2) whether a sufficient factual basis supports his guilty

        plea to the 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) offense; and (3) whether his sentence is procedurally and

        substantively reasonable.

                                                      II.

               We consider first Davila’s challenges to his guilty plea and conviction.

                                                      A.

               Rule 11 imposes a series of requirements on a district court when accepting a

        defendant’s guilty plea. Through colloquy with the defendant, the district court “must

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        ensure that the defendant understands the nature of the charges to which the plea is offered,

        any mandatory minimum penalty, the maximum possible penalty, and the various rights

        the defendant is relinquishing by pleading guilty.” United States v. Williams, 811 F.3d

        621, 622 (4th Cir. 2016) (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)).       The district court must also

        confirm that the plea is knowing and voluntary and that a factual basis supports the plea.

        Id.

               Where, as here, the defendant did not seek to withdraw his guilty plea before the

        district court, we review the sufficiency of the Rule 11 hearing only for plain error. United

        States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 524–25 (4th Cir. 2002). In the context of Rule 11, this

        standard requires that even if a reviewing court identifies an error that is plain, in order to

        prevail on appeal a defendant must also “demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for

        the error, he would not have pleaded guilty.” United States v. Sanya, 774 F.3d 812, 816

        (4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation omitted). The Government concedes that Davila’s

        Rule 11 hearing contained several errors and omissions. See Oral Arg. at 38:40. And

        failure to comply with the explicit requirements of Rule 11(b) is plain error. See United

        States v. Massenburg, 564 F.3d 337, 343 (4th Cir. 2009). Therefore, the only question at

        issue with respect to the Rule 11 hearing is whether Davila can demonstrate that absent

        these errors, “the probability of a different result is ‘sufficient to undermine confidence in

        the outcome’ of the proceeding.” United States v. Lockhart, 947 F.3d 187, 192–93 (4th

        Cir. 2020) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83 (2004)).

               Davila cannot do so. Davila began cooperating with the Government immediately

        after officers apprehended him during a traffic stop. He waived his rights under Miranda

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        v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and then volunteered information about his drug

        distribution activities. As his trial counsel stated during sentencing, Davila was “more

        honest than they were asking for.” Davila gave the officers his consent to search three

        properties used in his drug distribution. He also provided information to the Government

        about other members of the organization during a debriefing interview after his full

        confession.

               In response to Davila’s forthrightness, the Government filed a U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1

        motion on Davila’s behalf, acknowledging his acceptance of responsibility and

        cooperation.    The Government recommended, and Davila agreed to, a sentence

        (160 months) substantially shorter than the low end of Davila’s sentencing guidelines range

        (248 months). And although the district court failed to properly inform Davila of the

        maximum penalties for his crimes, the court imposed a sentence shorter than the potential

        punishment the court stated at the Rule 11 hearing. See Martinez, 277 F.3d at 533 (holding

        that a misstatement of the maximum penalty did not affect a defendant’s substantial rights

        when he would have been subject to a far greater potential penalty if he proceeded to trial);

        cf. Lockhart, 947 F.3d at 194, 197 (holding that a misstatement of the maximum penalty

        prejudiced a defendant when, among other things, he was in fact sentenced to a term of

        imprisonment longer than that described during the Rule 11 hearing).

               While the cumulative effect of multiple individually harmless errors may prejudice

        a defendant to the same extent as a single reversible error, to warrant reversal under the

        cumulative error doctrine these harmless errors must render the proceeding fundamentally

        unfair. United States v. Runyon, 707 F.3d 475, 520 (4th Cir. 2013). Given the complete

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        lack of evidence that Davila might have proceeded to trial absent the errors and the

        significant benefit at sentencing that Davila earned from his cooperation and acceptance of

        responsibility, we cannot conclude that the Rule 11 errors during Davila’s plea hearing

        prejudiced him in such a manner.

               We would be remiss not to note that the lack of compliance with Rule 11, and the

        very minimal record available to us to evaluate the voluntariness of Davila’s guilty plea, is

        troubling. The Supreme Court has made clear that where there is “no evidence that a

        defendant knew of the rights he was putatively waiving” by pleading guilty, “the conviction

        must be reversed.” Dominquez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 84 n.10 (citing Boykin v. Alabama,

        395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969)). “Such a conviction could [not] be saved even by overwhelming

        evidence that the defendant would have pleaded guilty regardless.” Id. Although we have

        identified several errors in Davila’s Rule 11 colloquy, the record as a whole in this case

        indicates that Davila understood his plea agreement and its consequences.

               For example, retained counsel represented Davila before and during the plea

        hearing, and Davila stated that he was satisfied with his counsel’s work. Davila pled guilty

        in a written plea agreement and confirmed that the court’s summary of that agreement was

        accurate. Davila also confirmed that he was aware of the charges filed against him and he

        was indeed guilty of those charges. Thus, while the number of Rule 11 errors and the

        limited record before us establishing Davila’s understanding of his plea is concerning, these

        errors do not rise to a level that requires us to vacate Davila’s conviction under Boykin. Of

        course, in another case, Rule 11 errors accompanied with less evidence that the defendant’s

        plea was knowing and voluntary might well require us to vacate a conviction.

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                                                      B.

               Davila also argues that an insufficient factual basis supported his guilty plea to a

        violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (Count 3).           We review the district court’s

        determination of whether a guilty plea has a sufficient factual basis for abuse of discretion.

        United States v. Mastrapa, 509 F.3d 652, 660 (4th Cir. 2007). After a review of the full

        record, we conclude that a sufficient factual basis supported Davila’s conviction on

        Count 3. 2

               Davila asserts that the lack of written factual statement in the plea agreement

        prevented the court from finding a sufficient factual basis to support his conviction on

        Count 3. But “the district court may conclude that a factual basis exists from anything that

        appears on the record.” United States v. Stitz, 877 F.3d 533, 536 (4th Cir. 2017). And the

        court may defer its inquiry into the factual basis until sentencing. Martinez, 277 F.3d

        at 531. Thus, the district court did not need a written factual statement, but rather could

        satisfy itself of the sufficiency of the factual basis through the facts that were proffered by

        the Government during the Rule 11 hearing and included in the PSR, neither of which

        Davila objected to.

               2
                 Davila makes two additional arguments that rely on the initial premise that there
        was no factual basis to support his conviction on Count 3: that his counsel provided
        ineffective assistance in allowing him to plead to Count 3 and that his sentence is
        unreasonable because it includes punishment for Count 3. Because we hold that there is a
        factual basis for Count 3, and thus affirm his conviction on that count, those arguments
        necessarily fail.

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               To establish that Davila violated 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), the Government had to

        provide a factual basis showing that he “(1) committed a drug trafficking offense and

        (2) possessed a firearm (3) in furtherance of that drug offense.” United States v. Moody,

        2 F.4th 180, 192 (4th Cir. 2021).        Here, the indictment premised the 18 U.S.C.

        § 924(c)(1)(A) offense, Count 3, on the drug trafficking offense in Count 1. In considering

        whether a firearm is possessed in furtherance of a drug offense, the district court may

        consider facts such as the type of drug offense, the type of firearm, the firearm’s

        accessibility, and the firearm’s proximity to drugs and drug profits. Moody, 2 F.4th at 192. 3

               The Government proffered facts during the Rule 11 hearing to establish that officers

        found $14,000 in cash, marijuana, and a .40 caliber handgun in a property where Davila

        authorized a consensual search. The PSR provided further detail, clarifying that this was

        Davila’s own residence, and that the handgun was found in the master bedroom. Both the

        accessibility of the handgun in Davila’s master bedroom and its proximity to the marijuana

        and cash proceeds could lead to a conclusion that the handgun was possessed in furtherance

        of the drug crime. See Moody, 2 F.4th at 192. “Finding drugs and firearms in a residence

               3
                  Davila argues that the factual basis supporting Count 3 was insufficient because
        there is no evidence that he “used” or “carried” the firearm in accordance with the Supreme
        Court’s interpretation of those terms in Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995),
        superseded by statute, Act of Nov. 13, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-386, 112 Stat. 3469, as
        recognized in United States v. O’Brien, 560 U.S. 218, 232–33 (2010). Davila Br. at 18–20.
        However, Bailey is inapposite here, because Davila pled guilty to possessing the firearm,
        not using or carrying it. We note that in 1998, after the Supreme Court’s decision in Bailey,
        Congress amended 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) to criminalize the possession of a firearm in
        furtherance of a drug trafficking offense. See Act of Nov. 13, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-386,
        112 Stat. 3469.

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        used to sell drugs supports a finding that the firearms were being used in furtherance of a

        drug trafficking crime.” United States v. Hardy, 999 F.3d 250 (4th Cir. 2021). And in

        staking his challenge to the factual basis on the improper application of Bailey v. United

        States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995), see n.3, Davila has failed to argue that the facts proffered by

        the Government are insufficient to support a conviction for possessing a firearm in

        furtherance of a drug crime. Davila’s argument that no sufficient factual basis supported

        his plea to Count 3 thus fails.

                                                     III.

               We next consider Davila’s sentence. The Government concedes that Davila’s

        sentence contains a reversible error under this court’s precedent in United States v. Rogers,

        961 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2020), and United States v. Singletary, 984 F.3d 341 (4th Cir. 2021).

        Supp. Resp. Br. of United States at 8. However, the Government argues that Davila has

        waived a challenge under Rogers because he did not raise this argument until prompted to

        do so in a supplemental briefing order from this court.

               The Government’s initial concession is well taken. It is clear that the district court

        imposed at least one condition of supervised release in the written judgment that was not

        pronounced at sentencing. The written judgment imposed the condition that Davila consent

        to warrantless searches by the United States Probation Office and other law enforcement

        officers. The district court did not mention this condition during the sentencing hearing,

        and thus there is a discrepancy between Davila’s oral and written sentences. Under our

        precedent in Singletary, 984 F.3d at 346, the remedy for this error is “to vacate the [entire]

        sentence and remand for the district court to resentence [Davila].” Accordingly, we need

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        not decide whether any other conditions of supervised release were improperly imposed in

        violation of Rogers and Singletary.

               The Government’s waiver argument finds support in our usual approach, which is

        to refuse to consider issues not raised in a party’s opening brief. A Helping Hand, LLC v.

        Baltimore County, MD, 515 F.3d 356, 369 (4th Cir. 2008).                 However, “in rare

        circumstances, appellate courts, in their discretion, may overlook this rule and others like

        it if they determine that a ‘miscarriage of justice’ would otherwise result.” Id. (citing

        Venkatraman v. REI Sys., Inc., 417 F.3d 418, 421 (4th Cir. 2005)).

               The principles underlying our decisions in Rogers and Singletary guide our

        discretion in determining whether to forgive Davila’s waiver of this issue on appeal. Those

        cases hold that resentencing is the appropriate remedy for this type of error because

        “[d]iscretionary conditions that appear for the first time in a subsequent written judgment

        . . . are nullities.” Singletary, 984 F.3d at 344. The oral pronouncement of conditions at

        sentencing is “not a meaningless formality, but a critical part of the defendant’s right to be

        present at sentencing.” Id. at 346 (internal quotations omitted). The opportunity for a

        defendant to object to conditions in open court is essential. Id. at 346–47.

               Accordingly, we exercise our discretion to forgive Davila’s waiver of the Rogers

        error here. A miscarriage of justice that might excuse waiver is most likely to exist “when

        fundamental rights are involved.” United States v. Davis, 954 F.2d 182, 187 (4th Cir.

        1992). Here, the condition that Davila consent to warrantless searches by law enforcement

        officers infringes on his most fundamental rights under the Fourth Amendment. U.S.

        Const. Amend. IV. The district court imposed this significant infringement on Davila’s

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        constitutional rights without allowing him the critical opportunity to be present and ensure

        that the condition is “sufficiently tailored to [his] individual circumstances.” Singletary,

        984 F.3d at 346–47 (internal quotation omitted). Affirming the imposition of such a

        condition would be a miscarriage of justice. See Venkatraman, 417 F.3d at 421.

                                                    IV.

               The district court committed several errors and omissions during Davila’s Rule 11

        hearing, but none of those errors prejudiced Davila. Therefore, we affirm Davila’s

        convictions. We vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing because the district court

        did not orally pronounce the written conditions of supervised release at sentencing, in

        violation of Rogers. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is

                                                AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND
                                                 REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
                                                        CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION.

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