Court Opinion

ID: 9515350
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:55:51.432266+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:28.358930
License: Public Domain

ZINTER, Justice
(dissenting).
[¶ 47.] I join the Court’s opinion concerning the prior assault’s inadmissibility to prove modus operandi under the identity exception in SDCL 19-12-5 (Rule 404(b)). However, in my view, the prior assault was admissible under the motive exception; ie., to prove that a “jilted” Lassiter had a motive to assault his former girlfriend’s new boyfriend.
[¶ 48.] As the Court notes, prior acts are admitted under the motive exception to prove identity in two types of cases. In the first type, the prior act supplies the motive for the charged act. See supra ¶ 21 (citing Edward J. Imwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence § 3.15 (Rev. ed. 1999 & Supp. 2004)). This is not that type of case.
[¶ 49.] This is the second type of case in which “the uncharged act evidences the existence of a motive, but does not supply the motive.” See supra ¶ 22 (citing Im-winkelried, § 3.18). The uncharged act is relevant when identity is at issue because the uncharged crime evidences the same motive that impelled the charged crime. See, Imwinkelried, § 3.18 at 103. Imwink-elried explains:
the motive is the cause, and both the charged and uncharged acts are effects. Both crimes are explainable as a result of the same motive. The prosecutor uses the uncharged act to show the existence of the motive, and in turn the motive strengthens the inference of the defendant’s identity as the perpetrator of the charged crime.

Id.

[¶ 50.] Prior uncharged acts are typically admitted in this type of case when “the motive is in the nature of hostility, antipathy, hatred or jealousy,” and there is some relationship between the victims. Supra ¶ 22 (citing Imwinkelried, supra § 3.18). The Court observes that there was no relationship between Beckmann and Davis, and therefore, it concludes that the prior uncharged acts evidence was only used to prove Lassiter’s general violent *185nature. See supra ¶¶ 22-23. However, the Court’s reliance on a “relationship between the victims” fails to analyze whether Beck-mann and Davis were members of a class of victims. See supra ¶ 22. Imwinkelried collects numerous cases holding that uncharged acts are also admitted when the hostility, antipathy, hatred or jealousy is “against a class which included the victim.” Supra § 3.18 at 103.11
[¶ 51.] Here the victims were unrelated, but they were members of a well-recognized class. This class is composed of individuals that are subject to domestic violence because of their direct or indirect association with the non-consensual breakup of domestic relationships. It includes women who are former spouses or girlfriends (in this case Lori Beckmann and Brenda Tobin), and the new boyfriend (Davis). There is an obvious relationship and connection among the victims in this class. Indeed, daily news reporting and the examination of any court docket confirm the existence of this class of endangered people. The hostility, antipathy, hatred and jealousy that often exist against this class is a fact of life that we cannot ignore.
[¶ 52.] Consequently, even though the victims are unrelated, courts permit the admission of an uncharged act as proof of motive in the charged crime if the victims are members of the class of individuals involved in broken domestic relationships involving the defendant. For example, in Johnson v. State, 936 P.2d 458, 465 (Wyo.1997), the assault of a former girlfriend was admitted to prove motive for a subsequent assault of a second, unrelated girlfriend.12 As the Wyoming Supreme Court explained:
Motive was also at issue in this case given that “the prosecution is permitted to prove the accused’s motive to identify the accused as the perpetrator of the charged crime.” According to Professor Imwinkelried: “Motive is not an ultimate fact or element of the crime; rather it is an intermediate, evidentiary fact. The courts have variously described the concept of motive as the ‘reason that *186nudges the will and prods the mind to indulge the criminal intent,’ an ‘inducement or state of feeling that impels and tempts the mind to indulge in a criminal act,’ and ‘the moving force which impels to action for a definite result.’ While intent accompanies the actus reus, the motive comes into play before the actus reus. The motive is a cause, and the actus reus is the effect.” He continued: “[T]hat the defendant had a motive for that particular crime increases the inference of the defendant’s identity. Many other persons presumably had no motive, and the defendant’s motive raises the probability of defendant’s identity.... It is ideal if the defendant is the only person with such a motive. At the other extreme, if the motivation is almost universal such as a general sexual desire, proof of the motive has little or no probative value on the issue of identity. In the motive cases ... the courts do not insist that the motive be truly unique to the defendant. The courts assume that motive has strong probative value because a motive naturally leads to action. If the motive is not universal but shared by many other persons, the courts tend to admit the proof of motive.”
936 P.2d at 464 (quoting Mitchell v. State, 865 P.2d 591, 596-597 (Wyo.1993) (quoting Edward J. Imwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence § 3.15 (1992 & Supp. 1993))) (internal citations omitted).
[¶ 53.] Moreover, the admission of pri- or domestic assaults has been extended from prior girlfriends to third parties such as Davis. “[T]he web of spousal13 discord often entangles third parties, and accordingly, [we] have extended the scope of the motive exception to allow evidence showing wrongful acts against the spouse when the ultimate crime was committed against a third party.” Mitchell v. United States, 629 A.2d 10, 13-14 (D.C.1993). The motive exception has even been used to admit a prior assault upon a defendant’s first girlfriend’s new boyfriend, when the charged crime of murder was committed against the defendant’s second girlfriend. It was admitted to prove identity through the common motive, jealousy, that was displayed after each woman broke off the domestic relationship. The North Carolina Supreme Court described this three-person relationship (or class) as a “romantic triangle.” State v. Lloyd, 354 N.C. 76, 552 S.E.2d 596, 603 (2001).
[¶ 54.] I would follow these authorities and recognize that in recently broken domestic relationships, the jilted boyfriend, his ex-girlfriends, and their new boyfriends are members of a class. Membership in that class makes the perpetrator’s common hostility, antipathy, hatred and jealousy towards members of this class relevant to prove identity. It simply ignores reality not to acknowledge the common motive and relationship that exists among the individuals involved in what the Lloyd court described as “romantic trianglefe].” Even this Court acknowledges the foundation for this class when it concedes that Lassiter’s “breakup with Tobin supplied evidence of a possible motive for defendant to assault her new boyfriend.” Supra ¶ 23.
[¶ 55.] We should therefore recognize this class of domestic violence victims. A judicial mind could have reasonably reached the conclusion that Lassiter was unable to deal with being “jilted,” he harbored ill will and hostility towards those directly and indirectly involved, and therefore, he had a motive to threaten and assault members of this class. What else *187explains Lassiter’s motive to assault a stranger such as Davis? Only one thing: Lassiter’s common motive following the breakup of domestic relationships.14 Because motive is the only explanation for this defendant to act against this particular victim, the uncharged act increases the inference of the defendant’s identity. Given that hostile and jealous motives are, unfortunately, all too real within this class, I would recognize the relevancy of motive to prove identity. Therefore, I would affirm 15 the trial court.

. Imwinkelried cites decisions that have permitted admission of prior acts involving members of classes such as, nonunion workers, persons connected with the Yugoslav government, Jewish persons and organizations, members of the same racial group, other women, and daughters. Id. See Peats v. State, 213 Ind. 560, 12 N.E.2d 270, 276 (1938); People v. Pertsoni, 172 Cal.App.3d 369, 218 Cal.Rptr. 350 (1985); United States v. Khorrami, 895 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir.1990); United States v. McInnis, 976 F.2d 1226 (9th Cir. 1992); Schurman v. Leonardo, 768 F.Supp. 993 (S.D.N.Y.1991); State v. Jackson, 82 Ohio App. 318, 81 N.E.2d 546 (Ct.App.1948); Masters v. People, 58 P.3d 979 (Colo.2002).

. Although this Court attempts to distinguish Johnson, noting that it discussed the "substantial similarities” of those two offenses, that discussion does not make the case distinguishable. First, the "similarity of offenses” discussion in Johnson was only one of three alternative grounds for admitting ‘the other acts evidence (it was part of the court’s opinion on proof of identity by modus operandi). However, the court also discussed motive to prove identity, and the motive discussion was a separate, independent basis for admission of the other acts. Consequently, Johnson was not a case that was limited to proof of identity by the commission of substantially similar offenses. The Wyoming Supreme Court's alternative discussion of motive was clearly part of the holding of the case.
Second, this Court's use of the "substantial similarities” discussion to distinguish Johnson is legally misplaced. Imwinkelried explicitly notes that when the motive exception is involved, the "uncharged act need not be similar to the charged crime to evidence the common motive.” Imwinkelried, § 3.18 at 103.

. "Spousal” relationships are not limited to marriage. "For these purposes, a significant relationship can be the functional equivalent of a marriage.” Mitchell v. United States, 629 A.2d 10, 13, n. 6 (D.C.1993) (citations omitted).

. Contrary to the Court's opinion, the prior assault of Beckmann and the motive that drove Lassiter to that act assisted the jury in identifying the actual assailant here. Nothing else explained why Lassiter would assault a stranger. Therefore, character was not the "only justification” for admission of the prior assault, and furthermore, it was not offered to "smuggle forbidden [propensity] evidence.” Supra ¶ 24. It is true that "[i]f the only reason for offering the evidence is to show a defendant's propensity, then it is clearly irrelevant.” State v. Wright, 1999 SD 50, ¶ 14, 593 N.W.2d 792, 799. However, propensity was not the only reason for admission of the prior act and "[ojnce the evidence is found relevant ... the balance tips emphatically in favor of admission unless the dangers set out in Rule 403 'substantially' outweigh probative value.” Id.

. Lassiter’s other issues are without merit.