Court Opinion

ID: 9710155
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:03:15.775724+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:54.574173
License: Public Domain

Robert W. Hansen, J.
(concurring). School boards in this state are directed by statute to contract for the services of qualified teachers in their schools.1 School teachers in this state are employees of such school boards and stand “in a contract relation.” 2 Except as otherwise provided by statute,3 or constitutionally required,4 the *502entire relationship between a school board and a school teacher derives from the contract between them.5
The school board in Hortonville had entered into such contractual relationship with each of its school teacher employees for the school year, 1973-1974. Each such personal service contract fixed the salary, determined the services to be performed and set the term or period of employment. Each such contract incorporated into it “the last collective bargaining agreement,” the 1972-1973 master contract, between the Hortonville school board and the Hortonville education association.6 When the Hortonville teachers went on strike, they were teaching under contract, not after their contracts had expired.7 When they, failed to appear at the school to perform their duties under the contract, it became the duty of the school board to conduct an “inquiry into the question of the failure of a teacher to perform his contract obligation” and in case of such breach “to take such steps as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of the school.” 8
*503Facing such duty to . . take such steps as may be necessary” to reopen the school, the Hortonville school board acted. It did not go to court (as appellants now claim it should have) to seek an injunction, not only declaring the strike illegal 9 but also ordering the teachers back to the classroom under the contract. It could have chosen this route, but was not required so to elect. Neither did the school board prefer charges of misconduct against the teachers, seeking their “discharge for cause” under the contract.10 It could have taken this approach, but it is clear that it did not bring charges of misconduct under the contract. Instead, what the Hortonville school board did was to rescind or terminate the personal service contracts as to all teachers who elected to remain on strike. (The dissenting-in-part opinion terms this “. . . an acceptance of the breach of contract by the teachers,” which is another way of saying the same thing.)
*504The communication sent each teacher by the board stated that the board had been informed by its superintendent of schools that, “You have breached your individual employment contract; You have engaged in an unlawful strike contrary to Wisconsin law.” 11 The communication set a time and place for hearings as to whether the individual teacher had breached the employment contract, and noted that possible board action, if the facts established such breach, included “. . . termination of your employment contract.” 12 A subsequent resolution, adopted by the school board, terminated the employment relationship as to teachers who had been thus notified or who had waived notice of their “. . . alleged breach of employment contract and participation in an unlawful strike.” 13 To the writer it appears clear that the school board, by thus terminating the employer and employee relationship on the ground of a major breach of such contract by the striking teachers, was rescinding the contracts of personal service as to all teachers who did not return to their teaching assignments.
A contract, including a personal service contract,14 remains in force in accordance with its terms, unless one party to it “. . . acts inconsistently with the duty imposed upon him by the contract, which amounts to an abandonment . ...” 15 However, it is not every breach of a contract consisting of failure to perform exactly that entitles the other party to rescission. Our court *505has held that, before a party not in default may be entitled to relief of rescission, there must be “so serious a breach of the contract by the other party as to destroy the essential objects of the contract.” 16 Or, as another court has phrased it, the failure of performance, in order to constitute a ground for rescission, must be total, “such as to defeat the object of the contract or render it unattainable.” 17 The claim of right to terminate and rescind its contracts with its teachers on ground of breach of contract was properly assertable by the Horton-ville school board. But the determination of whether the claimed breach of contract constituted ground for such rescission was here for a court to decide.
With the school board action found to be a rescission of contract, based on claim of teacher breach of contract, it follows that either party to the contract had right of recourse to the courts for a judicial determination of whether the breach warranted the rescission.18 With the multiple cancellations of personal service contracts involved in an area of vital public concern, in the case before us the legal remedy is obviously inadequate, and the aid of a court of equity is required.19 It follows that the school board here might have sought by application to a court of equity a judicial affirmation of its action in *506rescinding the employment contracts on ground of serious breach of contract by the teachers. Certainly the teachers, all or any one of them, are also entitled to challenge in a court of equity the action taken by the board. In either event, the issue for the court to determine is whether the breach of their contracts by the teachers under the circumstances,20 was such as to warrant the school board’s action in terminating their employment and rescinding their contracts. The test is the Hoffmann Case test.21 In the posture of this case, the teachers have instituted equity proceedings, but not for the purpose above set forth. However, with an opportunity to amend such petition or pleadings granted, the proceedings instituted can be amended to present this issue and permit a judicial determination as to whether the teacher conduct, under the circumstances, justified the school board action.
Also on appeal to this court is the challenge to an order of the county court of Outagamie county, the Honorable R. Thomas Cane, presiding, which included orders that the school board submit a list of discharged teachers whom the board “would offer positions back” for the balance of the 1973-1974 school year, that the board offer striking teachers positions for the balance of the 1973-1974 school year “. . . if and when vacancies arose,” and that striking teachers offered a vacancy for the remainder of the 1973-1974 school year accept such offer. The basic issue on appeal appears to be the juris*507diction of the county court, sitting in equity, to issue the order. The board initiated the proceedings involved, seeking a court order limiting picketing activity. Without comment on the issues raised on such appeal, pro or con, the writer considers it unfortunate that such appeal (No. 133, August Term, 1974) was not consolidated with the appeal here, so that all aspects of judicial proceedings involving the Hortonville teachers’ strike could have, at one time and in one opinion, been considered and determined.
On this appeal, however, applying the law to the facts, the writer would: (1) Concur in the majority holding that the no strike by county or municipal employees’ statute, sec. 111.70 (4) (1), Stats., is constitutionally valid; (2) concur in the majority holding that the open meeting law was not here violated; and (3) concur in the majority holding for reversal and remand but would limit the scope and purpose of such remand, with appellants here granted leave to amend their petition within thirty days, the petition to be amended to raise and present for judicial determination the issue of whether the acts of the teachers, under these circumstances, justified the school board in rescinding the employment contracts and terminating employment..

 Sec. 118.21 (1), Stats., providing: “The school board shall contract in writing with qualified teachers. . . .”

 State ex rel. O’Neil v. Blied (1925), 188 Wis. 442, 446, 206 N. W. 213, holding: “One engaged in teaching in this state and whose services are to be paid for in whole or in part by the state school fund . . . stands in a contract relation ....’’

 See: Muskego-Norway C. S. J. S. D. No. 9 v. W. E. R. B. (1967), 35 Wis. 2d 540, 557, 151 N. W. 2d 617, holding sec. 111.70 (3) (a), Stats., to prohibit municipal employers, including school districts, from “ ‘1. Interfering with, restraining or coercing any municipal employe in the exercise of the rights provided in sub. 2.
“‘(2) Encouraging or discouraging membership in any labor organization, employe agency, committee, association or representation plan by discrimination in regard to hiring, tenure or other terms or conditions of employment.’ ”
See also: Sec. 119.42, Stats., establishing teacher tenure or permanent appointment after three years of continuous teaching service, but applying only to cities of the first class. As to status under tenure law, see: State ex rel. Thompson v. School Directors (1923), 179 Wis. 284, 288, 191 N. W. 746, citing State ex rel. Murphy v. Board of Trustees (1918), 168 Wis. 238, 169 N. W. 562.

 See: Alston v. School Board of City of Norwalk (4th Cir. 1940), 112 Fed. 2d 992, holding that the right of a negro teacher to declaratory or injunctive relief against the practice of a school board in fixing salaries for negro teachers at a lower scale than for white teachers is not waived, or otherwise precluded, by the fact that the negro teacher has entered into a contract with the school board for the current year to perform teaching services. (Certiorari denied in 311 U. S. 693, 61 Sup. Ct. 75, 85 L. Ed. 448.)

 Board of Education of South Milwaukee v. State ex rel. Reed (1898), 100 Wis. 455, 462, 76 N. W. 351, holding: “. . . the relations and obligations between the relator . . . and the high school board of said district were purely and strictly of a contractual character. . . .”

 “It is Further Agreed, that this contract incorporates herein by reference, to have the same effect as if made a part thereof of the last collective bargaining agreement entered into by and between the Hortonville Education Association, and said School Board, dated May 8, 1972, and is subject to all terms and conditions of such collective bargaining agreement. . . .” (Individual contract, March 12, 1973.)

 As to “minimal procedural safeguards” of sec. 118.22, Stats., applying to teachers not rehired, see: Richards v. Board of Education (1973), 58 Wis. 2d 444, 458, 206 N. W. 2d 597.

 Curkeet v. Joint School District (1914), 159 Wis. 149, 152, 149 N. W. 708, this court holding: “. . . School boards have thereby [sec. 441, Stats. 1913] enjoined upon them very extensive duties in maintaining the common schools and in administering the school affairs. Such duties embrace that of inquiry into the ques*503tion of the failure of a teacher to perform his contract obligation as a teacher, and if they find that a teacher has breached his contract it is their duty to take such steps as may he necessary to carry out the purposes of the school, and if a teacher has failed to perform his duties under his contract they can discharge him from further service. . . .”

 See: See. 111.70(4) (1), Stats, (upheld as constitutionally valid, applied to teachers, by majority opinion here), provides: “Strikes prohibited. Nothing contained in this subchapter shall constitute a grant of the right to strike by any county or municipal employe and such strikes are hereby expressly prohibited.”

 Scott v. Joint School District (1881), 51 Wis. 554, 557, 8 N. W. 398, this court holding: “. . . We think the school board . . . have the power to close the school and discharge the teacher for just cause. . . .” As to scope of judicial review of such discharge for just cause, see; Clark v. Blochowiak (1942), 241 Wis. 236, 239, 5 N. W. 2d 772, holding, where board of vocational education discharged for cause a supervisor of its dental clinic after a hearing, that, on certiorari to review the action taken by the board, “. . . the only matter the court could properly consider was whether on the evidence properly received by the board the charges against the plaintiff were sustained.”

 Letter from Roger Weihing, President, for the Board of Education to individual teachers, March 29, 1974.

 Id.

 Resolution, Adopted by the Board of Education, April 2, 1974.

 68 Am. Jur. 2d, Schools, p. 476, sec. 143, stating: “The principles governing contracts generally are applicable to contracts for the employment of teachers. Thus, such a contract is considered one for personal services and, where entered into for a definite term, is an entire contract for the period covered.”

 17 Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts, p. 951, sec. 482.

 Hoffmann v. Danielson (1947), 261 Wis. 34, 38, 27 N. W. 2d 759, this court holding: “. . . Before a party not in default may he entitled to the relief of rescission, there must be so serious a breach of the contract by the other party as to destroy the essential objects of the contract. . .

 Ellison, Son & Co. v. Grocery Co. (1911), 69 W. Va. 380, 387, 71 S. E. 391, stating the rule to be: ‘“Generally the failure of performance, in order to constitute a ground for rescission, must be total; such as to defeat the object of the contract or render it unattainable. . . ” Quoting 24 Am. & Eng. Ency. L. 644.

 17 Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts, p. 979, see. 603, stating: “Although contracts do not terminate as a matter of course on a breach, they may be terminable therefor. . . .”

 See: 17 Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts, p. 965, sec. 485.

 17 Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts, p. 977, sec. 601, stating: “No hard and fast rule exists as to the right of rescission for cause; the right usually depends on the circumstances of the particular case. . . .” See also: 17 Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts, p. 980, sec. 503, stating: “. . . Moreover a party seeking to rescind must show that he was free from default in relation to the obligation which he claims the other party failed to perform. . . .” See also: As to violations of contract held not to justify rescission: E. L. Husting Co. v. Coca-Cola Co. (1931), 205 Wis. 356, 237 N. W. 85, 238 N. W. 626.

 Hoffmann v. Danielson, supra, footnote 16.