Court Opinion

ID: 9851361
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:11:21.999721+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:54.510456
License: Public Domain

*247Waller, Justice
(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent. I concur with the majority opinion insofar as it holds application of § 2-1-100, as applied to General Assembly members seeking election to the Court of Appeals, is unconstitutional. I write separately, however, to express my view that S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-1370(A) (Supp. 1994) is permissible special legislation. Accordingly, in my view, legislators running for the office of family court judge are exempt from § 2-1-100.
Section § 20-7-1370(A) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any former member of the General Assembly may be elected to the office of family judge.
In State ex rel Riley v. Martin, 274 S.C. 106, 262 S.E. (2d) 404 (1980), we found a similar exemption unconstitutional as special legislation in violation of S.C. Const. Article III, § 34.1 Riley involved S.C. Code Ann. § 14-8-30 which exempted Court of Appeals judges from application of § 2-1-100. There, the court noted that § 14-8-30 was specifically enacted for the benefit of members of the 1979 General Assembly to permit them to avoid the general prohibition of § 2-1-100. The Court found § 14-8-30 to be a special law and found no peculiar conditions justifying special treatment for members of the 1979 Legislature or judges of the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, § 14-8-30 was held to be impermissible special legislation. In my opinion, unlike the statute invalidated in Riley, the special legislation at issue in this case is permissible since peculiar conditions do exist which justify special treatment of family court judges.
The overall purpose of the prohibition against special legislation is to prevent discrimination and to assure that all persons are equally treated, thereby requiring acts of the Legislature to apply equally to all persons within an appropriate class. Thompson v. South Carolina Comm’n on Alcohol & Drug Abuse, 267 S.C. 463, 229 S.E. (2d) 718 (1976). However, special legislation is permissible where “peculiar conditions” exist which require special treatment. Riley supra; see also *248Horry County v. Horry County Higher Educ. Comm’n, 306 S.C. 416, 412 S.E. (2d) 421 (1991). In adopting special legislation, the Legislature may adopt classifications “based upon differences which are either defined by the Constitution, or are natural or intrinsic, and which suggest a reason that may rationally be held to justify the diversity in the legislation.” Sansing v. Cherokee County Tourist Camp Board, 195 S.C. 7, 11, 10 S.E. (2d) 157 (1940).
Section 20-7-1370(A), although originally enacted in 1976, was reenacted in 1981, the year after our decision in Riley. Notwithstanding its knowledge of Riley, the Legislature saw fit to reenact an exemption from § 2-1-100 for those seeking election to the office of family court judge. In my opinion, there is a rational justification for special treatment of family court judges, to wit, the equal treatment of any legislator seeking election to a position in the Unified Judicial System.
In McLure v. McElroy, 211 S.C. 106, 44 S.E. (2d) 101 (1947), this Court held that the Legislature is without authority to add to the qualifications of constitutionally created courts. The qualifications for the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and circuit court are constitutionally mandated. S.C. Const. Art. V, § 15. Accordingly, as noted by the majority opinion, the Legislature may not add to the qualifications of these courts, and persons seeking election to these positions are therefore exempt from § 2-1-100. However, the family courts of this state were created as part of the Unified Judicial System. S.C. Const. art. V, § 1 et. seq. Those seeking election to the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and circuit court are exempt from § 2-1-100. In my opinion, it is quite rational for the Legislature to have determined that the family court, as the only remaining branch of the Unified Judicial System which is elected by the General Assembly,2 should be treated similarly. Sansing, supra; Thompson, supra. Moreover, unlike the statute at issue in Riley, § 20-7-1370(A) was not enacted solely for the benefit of members of the 1995-96 General Assembly, but has been in existence since 1976 and was reenacted in 1981.
Accordingly, in my opinion, although § 20-7-1370(A) is special legislation, it is permissible. I would hold that former Gen*249eral Assembly members seeking election to family court are exempt from § 2-1-100.
Burnett, A.J., concurs.

 Article III, § 34 prohibits enactment of a special law where a general law can be made applicable.

 Although magistrates and probate court judges are also a part of the Unified Judicial System, they are not elected by the General Assembly.