Court Opinion

ID: 9907867
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-07 15:09:24.180497+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:07:57.764297
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

In Re: Condemnation by the City of               :
Philadelphia of the Airport Business             :    No. 1355 C.D. 2021
Center, Tinicum Township, Delaware               :    Argued: June 7, 2023
County                                           :
                                                 :
Appeal of: City of Philadelphia                  :

BEFORE:        HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
               HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
               HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
               HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
               HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
               HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
               HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE DUMAS                                                 FILED: December 7, 2023
               The City of Philadelphia (City) appeals from the order entered by the
Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County (trial court), which held that the jury
could consider testimony regarding the highest and best use of the property owned
by Wilbur C. Henderson & Son, David C. Henderson Marital Trust, Ambassador II
Joint Venture, Henderson-Columbia Corp., and Henderson Ambassador Associates
(collectively, Condemnees). On appeal, the parties dispute whether the trial court’s
order is a decree under 26 Pa.C.S. § 518(2) of the Eminent Domain Code (Code).1
We grant Condemnees’ application and quash the appeal.
                                     I. BACKGROUND2
                The City condemned Condemnees’ land, which was located adjacent
       1
           26 Pa.C.S. §§ 101-1106. We may cite to the codified Code to the extent older jurisprudence
cites to the uncodified Code.
         2
           We state the facts as presented in the trial court’s November 10, 2021 order. The original
record transmitted to this Court consists of several thousand, mostly unbound pages. Due to the
to the Philadelphia International Airport.              Order, 11/10/21, ¶ 1.3        Condemnees
petitioned for a Board of View (Board), which issued a report. The City timely
appealed to the trial court and requested a jury trial de novo. 42 Pa.C.S. § 5571; 26
Pa.C.S. § 517(b).
               The City’s notice of appeal raised almost 50 objections to the report,
which in the City’s view, required the trial court to modify, change, or refer the report
back to the Board. Notice of Appeal from Board’s Report, 11/12/20, at 3-18.4
               We roughly categorize the City’s relevant objections as follows. The
City objected to the Board’s failure to “apply the correct standard of proof when
determining the highest and best use of the [p]roperty. The correct standard prohibits
valuation based on a speculative use.” Id. at 4 (citation omitted). The City
questioned the Board’s failure to address whether the property’s highest and best use
was financially feasible for Condemnees. Id. at 10. The City also claimed that the
Board violated “the City’s due process rights by considering reports from witnesses”
that the City could not cross-examine. Id. The City asserted the Board erred by
crediting some testimony and disregarding other evidence. Id. at 11-14.
               In the City’s view, the Board also “made numerous factual errors
requiring reversal[.]” Id. at 14-18. For instance, the City contended that the “Board
erred as a matter of fact by finding that the property is adaptable for air cargo use
when there is no infrastructure on the property for that use.” Id. at 15 (cleaned up).

near-universal absence of fasteners, we respectfully request that all involved ensure the
transmission of a complete, organized record to facilitate disposition following the trial de novo.
See also Admin. Order, 6/5/18 (requiring electronic filing in Delaware County).
         3
           The City disputes the characterization of the property as “adjacent” to the airport. City’s
Resp. in Opp’n to Condemnees’ Mot. to Quash, 12/27/21, at 9. To the extent the characterization
is legally significant, it may be resolved at the trial de novo.
         4
           Precisely, the City identified 12 objections, but many objections listed multiple “sub-
objections” and some “sub-objections,” in turn, had numerous “sub-sub objections.” See generally
Notice of Appeal from Board’s Report.

                                                  2
Yet another example is the City’s claim that the “Board erred as a matter of fact by
finding that a zoning change was reasonably likely . . . .” Id.
              The trial court held a hearing and ordered post-hearing briefing,
following which it issued an order making “preliminary determinations” under 26
Pa.C.S. § 518(1). Order, 11/10/21. The court noted that it considered the parties’ legal
briefs and oral argument. Id. at 1.5 The City requested that the court remand to the
Board “with judicial findings as to the standards of proof and parameters as to the
scope of evidence when determining the highest and best use of the condemned
parcels.” Id. ¶ 4 (cleaned up). The court construed the City’s request as a pretrial
ruling on “legal and evidentiary questions” regarding the “elements and evidence of
damages” on the “highest and best use” of the property. Id. ¶¶ 5-6. In the court’s
view, remand to the Board was unnecessary and would serve “no purpose
whatsoever” given the inevitable “de novo jury trial.” Id. ¶ 6; see also Notice of
Appeal from Board’s Report at 14-18 (alleging numerous errors of fact by the Board);
N.T. Hr’g, 7/26/21, at 86. The court added that it could “not take questions of fact
or mixed questions of law and fact from the jury.” Order, 11/10/21, ¶ 7.
              With that background, the trial court reasoned that the property’s
“highest and best use” requires resolving whether that use is “reasonably available.”
Id. ¶ 10. In turn, the term “reasonably available,” in the court’s view, required
consideration of “existing improvements, the demand in the market, the supply of
competitive properties for such use, the zoning[,] and other reasonably pertinent
factors.” Id. In light of the above, the court held that the jury “may hear and weigh
testimony of various uses of the property.” Id. ¶ 11.
              In sum, the trial court overruled the City’s legal objections to the

       5
         See also Notes of Testimony (N.T.) Hr’g, 7/26/21, at 86 (reflecting counsels’ discussion
on additional fact discovery, including potential depositions, for the trial de novo).

                                               3
Board’s report. Id. ¶ 12. The court held that the City’s remaining objections are
either (1) “moot” in light of the court’s resolution of the City’s legal objections, or
(2) “mixed questions of law and fact” that are best resolved at the trial de novo. Id.
¶ 14. The court ordered the parties to set a pretrial schedule, and the court scheduled
a pretrial conference. Id. ¶¶ 15-16. The court’s order did not explicitly confirm,
modify, or change the Board’s report. See 26 Pa.C.S. § 518(2).
               The City timely appealed to this Court. Notice of Appeal, 11/24/21. The
trial court did not order the City to comply with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) but filed an
opinion explaining its decision. The court concisely reasoned that the order appealed
from was not an appealable interlocutory or collateral order. Trial Ct. Op., 12/6/21,
at 1-2. Before this Court, Condemnees filed a motion to quash the City’s appeal as
interlocutory, which was referred to this panel for disposition. Order, 1/11/22.
                                             II. ISSUE
               Condemnees contend that under Pa.R.A.P. 1972(a)(3), this Court must
quash the City’s appeal because the trial court’s order is not an appealable order
under the Code.
                                       III. DISCUSSION6
                                              A. Code
               To provide context for Condemnees’ issue, we begin with a simplified,
       6
         Under Pa.R.A.P. 1972(a)(3), any party may move to “dismiss for want of jurisdiction in
the unified judicial system of this Commonwealth.” Pa.R.A.P. 1972(a)(3). Our Supreme Court
suggested that quashal is appropriate when the order appealed from is interlocutory. Sahutsky v.
H.H. Knoebel Sons, 782 A.2d 996, 1001 n.3 (Pa. 2001). In resolving “the finality of orders
dismissing objections to the reports of viewers, . . . our appellate jurisdiction to review such orders
should be construed very narrowly. In most instances the findings of the viewers to which
objections have been raised will be the subject of testimony and legal rulings in the trial de novo.”
In re Condemnation by Dep’t of Transp. of Right of Way, for Legis. Rt. 153, 515 A.2d 102, 105 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 1986) (Rt. 153).
        We follow the rules of statutory construction in interpreting the rules of appellate procedure

                                                  4
general overview of the Code. The Code provides that a condemnee is entitled to
damages. See 26 Pa.C.S. §§ 701-702. A condemnee may petition for an appointment
of viewers, which prepares a report stating, inter alia, the amount of damages. Id.
§§ 502, 504, 512(5). A party aggrieved by the report may appeal to the court of
common pleas for a de novo trial. Id. § 516.
               The appeal must “raise all objections of law or fact to the viewers’
report.” Id. § 516(a)(1); see also id. § 517(a)(4).7 In turn, “[a]ll objections, other than
to the amount of the award, raised by the appeal shall be determined by the court
preliminarily.”      Id. § 518(1).       Subsequently, the trial court enters a “decree
confirming, modifying or changing” the report, which “constitutes [an appealable]
final order.” Id. § 518(2); Kellman Tr. Fund v. Dep’t of Transp., 354 A.2d 583, 592
n.11, 595 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1976) (en banc) (Kellman).8

and the Code, 26 Pa.C.S. §§ 101-1106. 1 Pa.C.S. §§ 1901-1991; Pa.R.A.P. 107; Commonwealth v.
Walker, 185 A.3d 969, 976 (Pa. 2018). Although the text of the Code controls, the “comments or
report of the commission, committee, association or other entity which drafted a statute may be
consulted in the construction or application of the original provisions of the statute if such
comments or report were published or otherwise generally available prior to the consideration of
the statute by the General Assembly . . . .” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1939; Title 26 cmt. (“The comments provided
throughout [the Code], including those preceding its 2006 enactment were supplied by the
Pennsylvania Joint State Government Commission, and may be used in determining the intent of
the General Assembly”); Rt. 153, 515 A.2d at 104. We may cite to applicable cases predating the
current version of the Code. See In re Est. of Warden, 2 A.3d 565, 572 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2010)
(Warden) (noting we may rely on nonconflicting cases predating the Uniform Trust Code, 20
Pa.C.S. §§ 7701-7799.3, and the Rules of Evidence, Pa.R.E. 101-1008). We may conditionally cite
Superior Court cases. Marshall v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 300 A.3d 537, 540 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2023).
        7
          Section 516(a)(1) states that “[a]ny party aggrieved by the decision of the viewers may
appeal to the court. The appeal shall raise all objections of law or fact to the viewers’ report.” 26
Pa.C.S. § 516(a)(1). Section 517(a)(4) provides that the “appeal shall set forth . . . [o]bjections, if
any, to the viewers’ report, other than to the amount of the award.” Id. § 517(a)(4).
        8
          Section 518(1)-(2) follows in full:
       An appeal shall be disposed as follows:
           (1) All objections, other than to the amount of the award, raised by the appeal

                                                  5
                                          B. Arguments
               We next summarize Condemnees’ arguments in support of quashing the
City’s appeal. Condemnees argue that the trial court’s order is not appealable under
26 Pa.C.S. § 518. Mot. to Quash, at 5, 7. Per Condemnees, the trial court’s order is
not appealable because it did not explicitly “confirm, modify or change” the Board’s
report. Id. at 6 (discussing In re S. Whitehall Twp. Auth., 873 A.2d 855 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2005) (Whitehall), and In re Condemnation by Dep’t of Transp., of Right of Way for
Legis. Rt. 50, 503 A.2d 1028 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986) (Rt. 50)). Condemnees maintain
that although the trial court’s order resolved, i.e., “determined,” certain objections,
the order did not confirm, modify, or change the Board’s report. Id.
               Relatedly, Condemnees contend the trial court’s preliminary
determinations in the order did not implicitly operate to confirm, modify, or change
the Board’s report. Id. at 7. In support, Condemnees reason that the court addressed
the elements and evidence of damages, and, as such, the order could not confirm or
modify the report. Id. at 7-8. Further, Condemnees reason that the trial court’s order

           shall be determined by the court preliminarily.
           (2) The court may confirm, modify or change the report or refer it back to the
           same or other viewers. A decree confirming, modifying or changing the report
           constitutes a final order.
26 Pa.C.S. § 518(1)-(2). Section 518(3) and (4) identify the factfinder for the amount of damages
and the parties’ designations at trial. Id. § 518(3)-(4). Notably, the en banc Kellman Court rejected
the dissent’s argument that any “pre-trial order which disposes of an objection raising a question
of law basic to the inquiry is a confirmation, modification, or change of viewer’s report, and is a
final and appealable order.” Kellman, 354 A.2d at 595 (Kramer, J., dissenting).
        We recognize that our Supreme Court resolved an appeal in which the trial court had
“reviewed the evidence presented to the Board of Viewers and confirmed the findings of fact and
conclusions of law of the Board.” City of Chester v. Dep’t of Transp., 434 A.2d 695, 699 (Pa. 1981)
(Chester). But in Chester, it was not clear if the trial court had entered separate orders determining
the objections of fact and confirming the report. See generally id.; Maloney v. Valley Med.
Facilities, Inc. 984 A.2d 478, 485-86 (Pa. 2009) (stating that all “decisions are to be read against
their facts”).

                                                  6
could not have modified the report because the City demanded a jury trial on
damages. Id. at 8. Condemnees also reason that the order is not a final order under
26 Pa.C.S. § 518(2), because it left unresolved the highest and best use of the
property. Id. at 9.9
                                            C. Analysis
               Before addressing Condemnees’ arguments, we divide our analysis into
several sections. We discuss (1) the terms “all” and “preliminarily” in 26 Pa.C.S. §
518(1); (2) appealing the Board’s Report; and (3) our disposition of Condemnees’
arguments.
           1. The Terms “All” and “Preliminarily” in 26 Pa.C.S. § 518(1)
               To briefly recap, 26 Pa.C.S. § 518(1) provides that “[a]ll objections,
other than to the amount of the award, raised by the appeal shall be determined by
the court preliminarily.” 26 Pa.C.S. § 518(1). An aggrieved party may raise
objections of fact, objections of law, and objections of mixed fact and law. See
generally 26 Pa.C.S. § 516(a)(1). Our Courts have defined the terms “all” and
“preliminarily.” From our jurisprudence, we glean the following.
               Initially, as used in 26 Pa.C.S. § 518(1), the term “all” does not mean
“every.”10 In response to a party’s notice of appeal from the board’s report, the trial

       9
          The City counters that the order is an appealable order under 26 Pa.C.S. § 518. City’s
Resp. in Opp’n, 12/27/21, at 7, 16. In support, the City points out that the trial court “overruled” all
of the City’s legal objections to the report, which essentially held that the Board applied the correct
standard of proof. Id. In the City’s view, the court’s order “confirmed” the Board’s report, which
rendered the order final and appealable. Id. at 7-9, 18-19 (discussing Commonwealth v. Hession,
242 A.2d 432 (Pa. 1968)). Per the City, the court’s resolution of any objections to the report must
occur before any trial de novo. Id. at 17. The City also rejects Whitehall and Rt. 50 as factually
distinguishable. Id. at 19-20.
        10
           In re Condemnation by the Pa. Tpk. Comm’n of 14.38 Acres in Fee Simple, 698 A.2d 39,
42 (Pa. 1997) (14.38 Acres) (acknowledging this Court’s rejection of a literal interpretation of the
term “all” in 26 Pa.C.S. § 518(1)).

                                                   7
court must decide only some (i.e., not all) objections of law (i.e., not objections of
fact or mixed fact and law) before the trial de novo.11 As for the term “preliminarily,”
only objections of law raising questions “of improper board procedures or issues
determinative of the legal outcome of a board’s report” must be decided by the trial
court prior to the trial de novo. Kellman, 354 A.2d at 591. The Kellman Court
emphasized that the General Assembly did not intend to require that a trial court
resolve “all questions of law prior to a trial de novo.” Id. at 594 (footnote omitted).12
The remaining objections, including outstanding questions of law, questions of

       11
             14.38 Acres, 698 A.2d at 42; In re Condemnation by Dep’t of Transp., of Right-of-Way
for Legis. Rt. 1005-2, 342 A.2d 497, 500 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1975) (Rt. 1005) (holding that 26 Pa.C.S. §
518(1) permits the trial court “to decide preliminarily only [q]uestions of law basic to the inquiry”
(emphasis added)); Kellman, 354 A.2d at 591 (“Questions of improper board procedures or issues
determinative of the legal outcome of a board’s report must be settled preliminarily to a trial de
novo.”); Rt. 153, 515 A.2d at 105 (stating that if the trial court perceives a Section 518(2) decree
would not prevent a trial de novo, then the court “may order that the case proceed to trial and may
reserve answering questions of law and fact, except those which are basic to the inquiry raised by
objections to the viewers’ report until the trial de novo”); accord McGaffic v. Redevelopment Auth.
of New Castle, 732 A.2d 663, 675 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999).
         12
            Specifically, the Code does not require the “initial settling of all questions of law prior
to a trial de novo.” Kellman, 354 A.2d at 594 (cleaned up and emphases added) (rejecting argument
that 26 Pa.C.S. § 518(1) requires “a binding judicial determination of matters of law prior to the
start of the trial de novo”).
         For example, the Rules of Evidence do not apply to board proceedings but apply to a trial
de novo. See Pa.R.E. 101; 26 Pa.C.S. § 1101; see also Lower Makefield Twp. v. Lands of Chester
Dalgewicz, 67 A.3d 772, 776 n.5 (Pa. 2013). Thus, the trial court could not resolve “preliminarily,”
and prior to an actual trial de novo, the City’s contention that it could not cross-examine witnesses
that prepared reports presented for the Board’s consideration. See Notice of Appeal from Board’s
Report at 10. For one thing, those witnesses and reports may not necessarily be presented at a trial
de novo, which would render premature any trial court ruling. Similarly, questions of law may
arise at the trial de novo that simply could not be raised in objections to the Board’s report. See
Kellman, 354 A.2d at 595; Whitehall, 873 A.2d at 858.

                                                  8
fact,13 and mixed questions of law and fact, must be resolved at the trial de novo.14
               In resolving whether a particular objection is a question of fact or a
mixed question of fact and law, our Supreme Court noted that in “a condemnation
proceeding, what constitutes the highest and best use of the condemnee’s property is
generally considered a question of fact or at least, a mixed question of law and fact.”
In re De Facto Condemnation & Taking of Lands of WBF Assocs., L.P., 903 A.2d

       13
            Objections of fact “are reserved for the trial de novo and are ruled on at that time.”
Kellman, 354 A.2d at 593; accord McGaffic, 732 A.2d at 675. For example, at a non-jury trial de
novo, the judge could consider stipulations, refer to a transcript presented to the Board of View, or
hold “a separate evidentiary hearing prior to trial.” Rt. 1005, 342 A.2d at 501. The judge could
also consider “evidence adduced at trial but not submitted to the jury.” Id. The Rt. 1005 Court
emphasized that the “important thing is that no objections which involve a question of fact be
decided without an orderly factfinding process.” Id. The 14.38 Acres Court, however, rejected the
Rt. 1005 Court’s reasoning to the extent it “allowed the trial court to engage in factfinding on
remand where the parties demanded a jury trial.” 14.38 Acres, 698 A.2d at 42. We add that the
Kellman Court suggested, perhaps unartfully, that objections of fact are “moot because[] they will
be ruled on during the course of the de novo trial.” Kellman, 354 A.2d at 592 n.10.
         14
            See, e.g., Rt. 153, 515 A.3d at 105 (stating “courts have also acknowledged that it is not
always possible to determine these objections preliminarily on the basis of briefs and oral argument
because the objections often involve questions of fact or mixed questions of law and fact”); Amoco
Oil Co. v. Dep’t of Transp., 679 A.2d 1369, 1373 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996) (en banc) (disapproving any
interpretation of Section 518 that “requires the trial court to determine preliminarily all objections
other than those to the amount of the award” (emphasis added)).
         In Amoco, the condemnor identified its objections and then sought a preliminary
determination of only one of its objections prior to the trial de novo. Amoco, 679 A.2d at 1373.
Following an appeal to this Court after a trial de novo, the condemnees argued that because the
condemnor failed to seek a preliminary determination of its other objections, the condemnor
waived those objections. Id. The en banc Court rejected the condemnees’ argument, reasoning
that objections of fact or objections raising “mixed questions of law and fact” cannot be resolved
preliminarily but “were properly preserved for the trial de novo.” Id.; accord Rt. 1005, 342 A.2d
at 500 (same); Chester, 434 A.2d at 699 (suggesting that a trial court could “decide mixed
questions of fact and law”). Cf. 14.38 Acres, 698 A.2d at 42 (opining that “factual issues” are
reserved “for the jury” (citing Kellman, 354 A.2d at 592-93)). We note, however, that the 14.38
Acres Court’s citation to Kellman refers to a trial de novo and not a jury. Cf. Rt. 1005, 342 A.2d at
501 (implying bifurcation, at a trial de novo, of “questions [of fact] not involving the amount of an
award”). We add that our Supreme Court clarified that in Chester, the parties had not requested a
jury trial. 14.38 Acres, 698 A.2d at 42 n.6.

                                                  9
1192, 1210 n.14 (Pa. 2006) (WBF) (cleaned up). Similarly, the issue of whether
condemned property is subject to the assembled economic unit doctrine15 was a
mixed question of fact and law for the jury. 14.38 Acres, 698 A.2d at 42. Because
the 14.38 Acres condemnees demanded a jury trial, our Supreme Court held that a
jury must resolve conflicting evidence about whether the property fell within the
scope of the doctrine. Id. at 41, 43.16
                2. Disposition of the Appeal from the Board’s Report
               The trial court’s order resolving objections to the Board’s report may
not necessarily be an appealable order.                See Kellman, 354 A.2d at 593-94
(distinguishing between an order resolving certain objections and a decree
addressing the board’s report). Rather, the Kellman Court suggested that the trial
court must enter a decree following the court’s order determining any objections.
Id.; 26 Pa.C.S. § 518(2).
               An aggrieved party may appeal from the trial court’s decree “or any
other [f]inal decision of the lower court . . . raising any of the objections [r]aised
originally which were adjudicated adversely to the party.” Kellman, 354 A.2d at

       15
            The doctrine “allows compensation for certain machinery, equipment and fixtures when
the nature of a condemnee’s business requires a unique building for its operation and no other
building within a reasonable distance is adaptable to the functioning of the business.” 14.38 Acres,
698 A.2d at 41 (citation omitted).
         16
            We add that in Rt. 1005, the en banc Court held that whether a tenant was entitled to
compensation for the taking of leased land was a mixed question of law and fact. Rt. 1005, 342
A.2d at 501. The Amoco Court reached a similar holding, although it did not identify the objections
that it concluded “constituted mixed questions of law and fact.” Amoco, 679 A.2d at 1373. In
Chester, the issue of whether the Code permitted damages to include the replacement cost of a
bridge was a mixed question of fact and law. Chester, 434 A.2d at 698-99. Relatedly, this Court
held that whether the board “lacked jurisdiction to determine if” the condemnees’ use of the
property violated a zoning board order was a mixed question of fact and law that went “to the
valuation of the property.” Rt. 153, 515 A.2d at 106. In Whitehall, the Court held that the issue of
whether the taking was in the nature of a fee simple or an easement was a mixed question of fact
and law reserved for the factfinder. Whitehall, 873 A.2d at 858.

                                                10
593.17 The en banc Court explained that “while a lower court might rely on its
disposition of those issues raised in the appeal from the viewers’ report in its
subsequent trial of the case or, on an appeal from a trial de novo, the issues raised
and decided in the appellate structure of [Chapter 5 of the Code] may preclude such
issues from being raised again, the mere failure to raise issues pursuant to [Chapter
5] does not preclude their subsequent disposition after a trial de novo.” Id.18
               We unpack the Kellman Court’s explanation as follows. At a trial de
novo, the trial court may rely on its prior disposition of any applicable questions of
law in a 26 Pa.C.S. § 518(1) appeal of the board’s report. See id. Further, if an
aggrieved party appeals from a trial de novo, and elects to appeal questions of law
that this Court had previously resolved with finality, the law of the case or a similar
doctrine may apply. See id. Finally, an aggrieved party’s failure to appeal the trial
court’s rulings on applicable questions of law to this Court under Chapter 5 of the
Code does not bar that party from challenging the trial court’s rulings post-trial. See
id. & 593 n.17 (explaining that the Code’s “bifurcated appeals structure” permits
“such issues” to “be raised in this manner”).19
       17
             Some objections, however, must “be raised at other stages” of a condemnation
proceeding, i.e., outside of a trial de novo. Kellman, 354 A.2d at 593.
         18
            For example, if a trial de novo is inevitable when, e.g., numerous objections of fact are
raised, then an aggrieved party has the option of appealing at the conclusion of the trial de novo.
         19
            Framed differently, the Kellman Court suggests that an aggrieved party may not lose its
right to appellate review of a trial court’s decree resolving, prior to the trial de novo, objections of
law involving procedural legal issues or legal issues basic to the inquiry. See Kellman, 354 A.2d
at 593. An aggrieved party has two options. First, an aggrieved party may appeal to this Court
from a decree resolving the report, which essentially rendered the trial court’s resolution of any
such objections final. Second, an aggrieved party may appeal the trial court’s resolution of such
objections by (1) filing a post-trial motion after the trial de novo, and (2) appealing an adverse
ruling to this Court. See Pa.R.Civ.P. 227.1(h); Kellman, 354 A.2d at 593. But if the aggrieved party
selects the first option, that party may be bound by the law of the case doctrine at any subsequent
trial de novo. See Kellman, 354 A.2d at 593. Cf. McGaffic, 732 A.2d at 675 (explaining that a trial
de novo does not permit “an aggrieved party to re-litigate the entire case”). Nonetheless, because

                                                  11
               3. Quashing an Appeal to this Court from the Board’s Report
               As noted above, in Kellman, this Court held that an aggrieved party
may appeal from a decree confirming, modifying, or changing the board’s report.
See Kellman, 354 A.2d at 593. Indeed, this Court has quashed appeals from orders
that did not confirm, modify, or change the board’s report. For example, in
Whitehall, the trial court granted a motion in limine to preclude certain expert
testimony. Whitehall, 873 A.2d at 857. The trial court subsequently clarified its
ruling and stated that its initial order “was in the nature of a preliminary legal
determination made pursuant to Section [518] . . . and therefore constitutes” a final,
appealable order. Id. Neither order by the Whitehall trial court confirmed, modified,
or changed the board’s report. Id.
               Despite the Whitehall trial court’s belief that the order was an
appealable order, this Court held that because the trial court’s orders did not confirm,
modify, or change the board’s report, the orders were not final. Id. at 858. The
Whitehall Court reasoned that such orders did not resolve questions of law regarding
the board’s report, but rather resolved the admissibility of evidence at the trial de
novo. Id. Accordingly, the Whitehall Court held, those orders were reviewable
following the trial de novo. Id.
               Similar to the trial court in Whitehall, in Rt. 50, following a pretrial
conference, the trial court ordered that the parties may offer testimony about the
“appropriateness of all items of damages.” Rt. 50, 503 A.2d at 1029. The condemnor
appealed, and the Rt. 50 Court quashed, reasoning that because the order pertained
“to the elements and evidence of damages to be presented at trial, and does not
confirm, modify or change” the board’s report, it was not a final order. Id. at 1030.

of our disposition of this case, we need not definitively address the scope of Kellman. Cf. Gibraltar
Rock, Inc. v. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 286 A.3d 713, 725 (Pa. 2022).

                                                12
              In contrast to Whitehall and Rt. 50, and notwithstanding the Code’s
language requiring a decree, 26 Pa.C.S. § 518(2), our Supreme Court declined to
quash an appeal from a trial court order that left open “only the issue of the amount
of damages.” Hession, 242 A.2d at 434. The Hession trial court had entered an order
holding that the condemnees had a right to compensation under the Code and
awarded a jury trial. Id. at 433. The Hession Court reasoned that because the amount
of damages was the only outstanding issue, the only reasonable interpretation of the
trial court’s order was that it confirmed the board’s report. Id. at 434-35.20 It is
unclear from the Hession decision, but it appears that the trial court’s order was not
a decree confirming the board’s report. See 26 Pa.C.S. § 518(2).
              Thus, on one hand, this Court has held that orders “determining” certain
objections of law but not confirming, modifying, or changing the board’s report are
unappealable. See, e.g., Whitehall, 873 A.2d at 857; Rt. 50, 503 A.2d at 1030; see
generally Kellman, 354 A.2d at 592. On the other hand, in Hession, our Supreme
Court entertained an appeal from an order that resolved a singular question of law,
i.e., the condemnees’ right to compensation, and left open a sole question of fact: the
amount of damages. Hession, 242 A.2d at 434-35.
              We need not resolve whether Hession or Kellman controls because,
under either, the instant trial court’s order is unappealable for the following reasons.
First, the trial court’s order did not confirm, modify, or change the Board’s report.
The trial court’s order explicitly rendered “preliminary determinations” under 26

       20
         In Hession, it appears the condemnees’ right to compensation was a controlling question
of law determinative of the legal outcome of the board’s report. See Kellman, 354 A.2d at 591.
The Hession Court explained that the condemnees’ theory of damages was previously rejected by
our Supreme Court. See Hession, 242 A.2d at 435 (explaining that under Wolf v. Department of
Highways, 220 A.2d 868, 875 (Pa. 1966), the Hession condemnees suffered no legally compensable
harm).

                                              13
Pa.C.S. § 518(1) regarding “elements and evidence of damages” on the property’s
highest and best use, which is a mixed question of law and fact. Order, 11/10/21, at
1, ¶ 7. The trial court’s “preliminary determinations” are akin to the pretrial,
evidentiary rulings at issue in Whitehall and Rt. 50. See Whitehall, 873 A.2d at 858
(rejecting trial court’s reasoning that its “preliminary determination” was a final
appealable order); Rt. 50, 503 A.2d at 1030; see also Kellman, 354 A.2d at 592 n.11
(rejecting the dissent’s reasoning that any pretrial order disposing of an objection
raising a basic question of law is appealable).
             Second, even if the trial court’s order was a de facto decree, it is unlike
the Hession order. Cf. Hession, 242 A.2d at 434-35. Unlike the Hession order, which
resolved a controlling question of law dispositive of the board’s report, i.e., the
condemnees’ right to compensation, the City raised numerous objections regarding
the property’s highest and best use. See Notice of Appeal from Board’s Report at
14-18; Kellman, 354 A.2d at 591. For example, the City asserted that the Board erred
by holding that the property could be used for air cargo and that a zoning change
was reasonably likely. Notice of Appeal from Board’s Report at 15; see generally 26
Pa.C.S. § 703. The City’s objections as to the instant property’s highest and best use
raise a question “of fact or at least, a mixed question of law and fact,” unlike the
dispositive question of law at issue in Hession. See WBF, 903 A.2d at 1210 n.14
(cleaned up); 14.38 Acres, 698 A.2d at 42. Similar to 14.38 Acres, in which our
Supreme Court held that the jury must resolve a mixed question of fact and law at
the trial de novo, the instant factfinder must also hear and weigh evidence and
testimony regarding the property’s highest and best use. See 14.38 Acres, 698 A.2d
at 41, 43.
             Finally, to paraphrase the Rt. 153 Court, the “testimony and findings

                                          14
challenged by [the City] are no longer relevant because they will be relitigated in the
trial de novo at which the testimony, the findings, and the award of the viewers will
be” inadmissible. See Rt. 153, 515 A.2d at 106. Because the parties may present
evidence significantly different from that presented to the Board, the trial court’s
evidentiary rulings could differ. Id. (quashing in part the appeal from the trial court’s
order resolving the condemnor’s objections of fact).21
                                      IV. CONCLUSION
               For these reasons, we quash the appeal. The trial court’s order was not
a decree confirming, modifying, or changing the Board’s report. See, e.g., Kellman,
354 A.2d at 593-94. But even if the instant order confirmed the Board’s report, see
Hession, 242 A.2d at 434-35; cf. Chester, 434 A.2d at 699, numerous issues of fact
and mixed fact and law remain. Primarily, the City’s challenge to the property’s
highest and best use is a question of fact or mixed fact and law that must be resolved
at a trial de novo. See, e.g., WBF, 903 A.2d at 1210 n.14; 14.38 Acres, 698 A.2d at 41,
43. Our jurisprudence reflects that a preliminary determination under 26 Pa.C.S. §
518(1) was intended to obviate the need for a trial de novo, which was inevitable
given the City’s numerous allegations of errors of fact. Notice of Appeal From
Board’s Report at 14-18; Rt. 153, 515 A.2d at 106.22

                                      LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

Judge Fizzano Cannon did not participate in this decision.

       21
           We comment that the jury demand itself does not presumptively negate a 26 Pa.C.S. §
518(1) appeal, because the parties may opt for a bench trial. 26 Pa.C.S. § 518(3).
        22
           We note that the City has not lost its right to appeal the trial court’s November 10, 2021
order (or any other ruling), should it appeal following the trial de novo. See, e.g., Kellman, 354
A.2d at 593-94. Of course, the trial court may always revisit its prior rulings at or before the trial
de novo. See generally 26 Pa.C.S. § 102 cmt.

                                                 15
          IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

In Re: Condemnation by the City of       :
Philadelphia of the Airport Business     :   No. 1355 C.D. 2021
Center, Tinicum Township, Delaware       :
County                                   :
                                         :
Appeal of: City of Philadelphia          :

                                     ORDER

            AND NOW, this 7th day of December, 2023, we GRANT the application
to quash filed by Wilbur C. Henderson & Son, David C. Henderson Marital Trust,
Ambassador II Joint Venture, Henderson-Columbia Corp., and Henderson
Ambassador Associates and QUASH the appeal filed by the City of Philadelphia.

                                  LORI A. DUMAS, Judge