Court Opinion

ID: 9659739
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:53:56.307791+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:11.246949
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
SEARS, Justice.
On appellants’ motion for rehearing, we heard oral argument en banc. We now grant the motion for rehearing, withdraw our original opinion of March 1, 1990, and reverse and remand.
This is an appeal from a summary judgment granted in favor of U.S. Home (appel-lee). In October 1984, Park Meadows Section 4 Civic Association, Kenneth Bradshaw, and Carol McClellan filed a class action against U.S. Home. Because the trial court refused to certify the suit as a class action, plaintiffs amended their petition naming 123 homeowners as individual plaintiffs. Plaintiffs later filed fourth and fifth amended petitions, adding and deleting individual plaintiffs. Park Meadows Section 4 Civic Association remained in the suit as a named plaintiff in each of these amended petitions.
In February 1988, appellants filed their sixth amended original petition. This petition did not list the individual names of the plaintiffs, but generically referred to them in the style as “PARK MEADOWS SECTION 4 CIVIC ASSOCIATION, INC., ETAL," and as “all plaintiffs” in the opening paragraph of the petition. In May 1988, U.S. Home filed a plea in abatement objecting to Park Meadows as a party to the lawsuit. Appellants then filed a motion for voluntary non-suit, requesting the court to dismiss Park Meadows. On June 8, 1988, the trial court granted appellants’ motion and dismissed Park Meadows. On June 27, 1988, appellee filed a “Motion to Close File,” contending the voluntary non-suit on behalf of Park Meadows effectively dismissed all plaintiffs. That same day appellants filed their seventh amended original petition, renaming the individual plaintiffs in the style. Appellee then filed a motion to strike the seventh amended original petition and moved for summary judgment on the ground these “new” plaintiffs were intervenors and were barred by limitations. The trial court granted appel-lee’s motion to strike and granted its motion for summary judgment.
Appellants contend the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because their sixth amended original petition did not dismiss the individual plaintiffs from the suit. Specifically, they contend the generic use of the term “et al” in the style, as well as “and all plaintiffs” in the opening paragraph, was sufficient to retain the plaintiffs as parties. Alternatively, appellants argue the sixth amended original petition at most created an ambiguity, subject to special exception, as to the name of each individual plaintiff.
Appellee argues the omission of the individual names of the plaintiffs effectively dismissed them from the suit. It relies on a litany of cases holding that the omission of a party, even if inadvertent, operates to dismiss that party from a suit as effectively as if a formal order of dismissal has been entered. See Webb v. Jorns, 488 S.W.2d 407 (Tex.1973); Ridley v. McCallum, 139 Tex. 540, 163 S.W.2d 833 (1942); Mercure Co., N.V. v. Rowland, 715 S.W.2d 677 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Burton v. Bridges, 641 S.W.2d 635 (Tex.App. — El Paso 1982, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Dingman v. Spengler, 371 S.W.2d 416 (Tex.Civ.App. — El Paso 1963, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Brennan v. Greene, 154 S.W.2d 523 (Tex.Civ.App.— San Antonio 1941, writ ref’d). The purpose of the rule promulgated in these cases, however, is to insure that pleadings meet the fair notice requirement of Tex.R.Civ.P. 45. In each of the cases cited by appellee the party omitted was the defendant. *824Nonetheless, appellee asks us to apply the rule to plaintiffs as well as defendants, and contends our failure to do so will result in confusion regarding the petitioners’ identities. We disagree. During the time the “et al” pleading was the live pleading, ap-pellee noticed the depositions of several plaintiffs who were not individually “named” in that pleading. Although we agree the omission of a defendant acts as a voluntary dismissal, we find the “omission” rule inapplicable to plaintiffs who have been individually named in prior pleadings and have been generically referred to in a subsequent pleading.
In the event the generic language results in confusion, the pleading is subject to a special exception to identify by name all plaintiffs. A defect in pleadings results in dismissal only after special exceptions have been filed and sustained, and after a party has been given an opportunity to amend. Texas Department of Corrections v. Herring, 513 S.W.2d 6, 10 (Tex.1974); Estate of Murphy v. McCall, 678 S.W.2d 530 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref’d n.r.e.). A special exception points out a pleading’s “defect, omission, obscurity, duplicity, or other insufficiency.” Tex.R. Civ.P. 91. Although appellee styled its motion as a “Motion to Close File,” it was actually a challenge to the sufficiency of the sixth amended petition’s identification of “and all plaintiffs”; therefore, it was a special exception. The trial court should have treated the motion as if it had been properly designated and should have sustained the exception. Tex.R.Civ.P. 71. We find the trial court erred in failing to recognize plaintiffs’ seventh amended original petition a response to the special exception, and erred in finding the plaintiffs in that petition were intervenors and were barred by limitations.
We find that the generic description of the plaintiffs in the style and in the opening paragraph of the sixth amended original petition was sufficient to maintain the cause of action as to all plaintiffs individually named in the fifth amended original petition.
We reverse the judgment and remand the cause to the trial court.
PAUL PRESSLER, J., not participating.