Court Opinion

ID: 9472565
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:04:02.457347+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:00.797183
License: Public Domain

MANSFIELD, Circuit Judge, with whom LUMBAAD, Circuit Judge,
joins (dissenting).
With due respect I must dissent.
Contrary to the majority’s characterization of the case before us, the issue we face is not whether the defendant in a Hobbs Act prosecution must induce the giving of benefits; a fair reading of the *697record shows that the district court properly charged the jury that it must find inducement. The real question in this case is the nature of the evidence of inducement that the government must present. The majority here rules that the prosecution must show more than the district court required, yet it gives absolutely no indication of what this “more” entails. Because today’s decision conflicts with all precedent of this and other circuits, and because it creates a “standard” that is both unknowable and unworkable, I dissent.
More specifically, the question before us is whether a public official violates the Hobbs Act prohibition against “obtaining of property from another, with his consent ... under color of official right,” 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2), when he receives more than $34,000 worth of benefits over a period of years from contractors with business pending before him, knowing that the benefits are paid because of his power as an official to take action that would be helpful or harmful to them. In my view this is the very type of corruption or “wrongful use of official power,” United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 131 (2d Cir.1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913, 103 S.Ct. 1891, 77 L.Ed.2d 282 (1983), against which the Hobbs Act is directed.
To require proof of affirmative or express words or acts of inducement on the part of the official, as the majority seems to read into the statute, sacrifices substance for form. A corrupt official, well aware of the power he possesses by virtue of his office, does not shout his demands. He lets it be known in subtle ways what is expected of those doing business with him. His continued acceptance of substantial “gifts” is an advertisement that speaks louder than words. The message is simply that those doing business with him must pay or face the consequences. Spoken words are often unnecessary. A mere wink or gesture will do. In the world of official corruption the repeated acceptance of lavish benefits (in this case on 43 occasions for periods of 2 to 6 days each) tells those dependent on the recipient’s official action what they must do to gain official approval or avoid unfavorable rulings. The official can easily return “gifts” known to be made because of his power to take action that will be helpful or harmful to the donors, and let it be known that such benefits are riot welcomed.
In such Hobbs Act cases there is no risk that an official would be held to violate the Act by his mere passive acceptance of a “hot dog from a street vendor” (Maj.Op. 693). The majority incorrectly suggests (Maj.Op. 694) that only prosecutorial discretion could prevent such prosecutions; in fact, the law requires that the benefit be sufficiently large that a reasonable person could conclude it had the capacity to influence the public official. Indeed, Judge Platt properly instructed the jury that before it could convict it must find “beyond a reasonable doubt that ... material and substantial benefits were provided____” (Transcript 1793, emphasis added). If a mere hot dog were at issue, no reasonable person would infer that an official would be influenced in the performance of his duties by such a miniscule “benefit.” In the present case, if the payments had stopped after the first trip or two, that undoubtedly would have ended the matter. Absent further evidence, the district court would probably have granted a judgment of dismissal on the ground that no reasonable basis existed for an inference of misuse of official power, particularly if O’Grady had expressly refused to accept further expensive trips. However, we are not here confronted with such minutiae but with payments for some 43 trips to pleasure resorts combined with golf, lavish food and entertainment over a period of several years, in addition to all-events season tickets to Madison Square Garden, totalling a minimum of $34,199.86.1 There was noth*700ing “de minimis” or “ambiguous” (Maj.Op. 694) about O’Grady’s conduct.
The majority bases its decision on the ground that there was “very little” evidence of direct solicitation of benefits by O’Grady (Maj.Op. 692) and that the court’s instructions therefore were crucial. But there was an enormous amount of circumstantial evidence. The record reveals that O’Grady made clear to all contractors concerned what he expected from them; one vendor, for instance, testified that O’Grady had developed a reputation for “taking almost anything that was given to him.” (T. 208). Indeed, he clearly created the impression that he expected contractors to make generous “gifts” to him if they wanted to get his ear, not only by establishing a pattern of repeated acceptance but by other conduct. For instance, he criticized one contractor, General Electric Company, as “tight” and “not generous.” (T. 345-47). He complained of excessive motor vibration, causing GE motor brushholders to fall apart, rapid wear of GE electric circuit “contactor tips” and tiny holes in its gear box seals. (T. 320-27). General Electric thereupon provided O’Grady with a 5-day all-expense trip to Disney World in Orlando, Florida, including travel, food, lodging and golf, at the cost of $986.72. During the course of the five days he spent a short time riding the Disney monorail system which had “contactor tips” like those sold by General Electric to the Transit Authority. (T. 334). However, nothing was discussed with the GE representative that could not have been discussed in New York. (T. 335). O’Grady then withdrew his complaint that GE’s traction motors and equipment provided for the R-46 project did not meet contract specifications and rescinded his prior rejection of some 80% of the contractor’s gear-box seals. (T. 341-42, 592). The result was undoubtedly a very substantial saving for the contractor, many times the amount paid by it to O’Grady. However, it left open the question of whether the public did not suffer serious harm. Indeed, the City later recovered a $72 million judgment against two of the donating contractors for defects in the R-46 subway cars inspected under O’Grady’s supervision. New York v. Pullman, 662 F.2d 910 (2d Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1164, 102 S.Ct. 1038, 71 L.Ed.2d 320 (1982).
Under the circumstances it would be difficult for any reasonable person not to conclude that the contractors’ payments to O’Grady of over $34,000 in benefits were induced by him and made in the belief that they would influence his official action. To label this continued practice a mere cultivation of “goodwill” or “positive customer-vendor relationship” (Maj.Op. 685), comparable to giving a cigar or a Good Humor cake or ice cream to an official (Maj.Op. n. 12), is tantamount to condoning obvious corrupt and wrongful use of public office, against which the Hobbs Act is aimed. That such corruption may be widespread, which I seriously doubt, is no more an excuse barring prosecution under the Hobbs Act than was the prevalent dishonesty in Boss Tweed’s day or the “custom” followed for many years by American companies of giving money to officials of foreign governments with whom they did business. Congress rejected precisely such an argument in enacting the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub.L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977). In the House report, H.R.Rep. No. 640, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1977), the Congress stated:
*701“More than 400 corporations have admitted making questionable or illegal payments. The companies, most of them voluntarily, have reported paying out well in excess of $300 million in corporate funds to foreign government officials, politicians, and political parties. These corporations have included some of the largest and most widely held public companies in the United States; over 117 of them rank in the top Fortune 500 industries. The abuses disclosed run the gamut from bribery of high foreign officials in order to secure some type of favorable action by a foreign government to so-called facilitating payments that allegedly were made to ensure that government functionaries discharged certain ministerial or clerical duties.”
Nor does the evidence support the claim that O’Grady thought his acceptance of $34,000 in “gifts” constituted “business as usual.” His consciousness of his wrongdoing is evidenced by his strict instructions to inspectors under his supervision not to take anything from contractors (T. 983,1013-14, 1020), his false statements to Department of Justice Investigator Anthony Valenti denying that he had received anything approximating the many benefits that had been given him (T. 1102-08, 1162-63), and his penurious statements regarding the benefits, which he made in civil litigation instituted by New York City because of defects in the R-46 subway cars inspected under his supervision (T. 1556-63). All of this evidence must, of course, be construed at this stage in the light most favorable to the government. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 469, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942).
Despite this clear proof of corruption the court reverses the conviction on the ground that the instructions given by the trial judge with respect to what constitutes “obtaining of property from another, with his consent ... under color of official right” were erroneous. The court now reaches out to develop this issue despite its not properly being before us. Appellant completely failed to raise it initially on the appeal. Upon his original appeal O’Grady claimed error only on the grounds (1) that the government had failed to show “force, fear, or duress,” a contention we had rejected in Margiotta, supra, 688 F.2d at 131, and (2) that there was insufficient proof that he delivered any quid pro quo to the contractors for the benefits paid to him, which we had also previously held not to be an essential element of the crime, United States v. Trotta, 525 F.2d 1096, 1100 (2d Cir.1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971, 96 S.Ct. 2167, 48 L.Ed.2d 794 (1976); see also Margiotta, supra, 688 F.2d at 133; United States v. Wright, 588 F.2d 31, 35 n. 2 (2d Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 917, 99 S.Ct. 1236, 59 L.Ed.2d 467 (1979). (See Appellant’s Brief filed Dec. 6, 1982).
The adequacy of the trial judge’s instructions was raised entirely sua sponte, appearing for the first time in Judge Meskill’s panel dissent, followed by the court’s decision to hear the case en banc despite appellant’s failure to file any petition for rehearing. It was only then that appellant took the cue and raised the issue of the jury charge in his en banc brief. In my view the court goes too far in using this case as a vehicle to volunteer its interpretation of the Hobbs Act rather than to follow the normal course of waiting until the issue is properly raised by the parties in a case squarely presenting it. The error is compounded by the fact that, even under the court’s interpretation of the Act, a clear violation is shown. As Judge Meskill concedes, his opinion is not intended “to say that O’Grady could not have been found guilty on the facts of this case if the jury had properly been charged.” (Maj.Op. 692).
Turning to the district court’s instructions to the jury, neither I nor the district court would disagree with the majority’s view that in order to be guilty of “obtaining ... property ... under color of official right” an official must, acting under color of official right, have “induced” a person doing business with him to provide him with a benefit that could reasonably be expected to influence his official conduct and that the “inducement” may consist of *702his “misuse” of his office. As we stated in Margiotta, supra, 688 F.2d at 132:
“[I]t is the utilization of the power of public office to induce consent of the payments that is the gist of an offense of obtaining money ‘under color of official right.’ See, e.g., United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578 (3rd Cir.) (Hobbs Act covers actions by public officials under color of official right even when payment is not obtained by force, threats or use of force), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106, 102 S.Ct. 2906, 73 L.Ed.2d 1315 (1982). The use of public office, with the authority to grant or withhold benefits, takes the place of pressure or threats.”
Indeed, the indictment here, which was read in its entirety by Judge Platt to the jury, expressly alleges that the contractors’ consent to the making of gifts to O’Grady was “wrongfully induced under color of official right” and the court charged the jury that such inducement under color of official right was an essential element of the crime. Said the court:
“Now the indictment, which I have just read to you, charges that the defendant unlawfully did attempt to affect commerce and did affect commerce, and the movement of goods in commerce, by knowingly and wilfully obtaining specified benefits for himself and others from the Pullman Company and from other companies who did work on the R-46 contract, with the consent of the company and/or companies to give the defendant the benefits having been induced under color of official right.
sf: s}! sfc jj; sj;
“The issue you must decide is whether the defendant’s conduct constituted extortion, as Congress used the term, in the statute the defendant is accused of violating — which is obtaining property with consent induced under color of official right. I will discuss this aspect of the charge with you in a moment.
“There are four elements to the crime of extortion as defined in this statute, each of which must be proven by the Government beyond a reasonable doubt.
“First, there must be an obtaining of property of another with his consent. There is no dispute as to this element and it has been agreed that it has been proven.

“The second element, which is one of the ones in dispute, is that the consent must be induced by extortion, that is, i.e. under color of official right. That is one that is in dispute.

“The third element is that the act of obtaining by these means by the defendant must be knowing and wilful. This is in dispute.
“And finally the act of obtaining property by these means must affect commerce. That is not in dispute.” (T. 1778-81, emphasis added).
As the district court recognized, however, the terms “inducement,” “color of official right” and “misuse” of office are generalities; they must be applied according to some definitive standard. The majority, without advancing any standard, simply reverses on the ground that certain sentences in Judge Platt’s charge to the jury, when considered separately, may be interpreted to indicate that no inducement need be shown and that the government may satisfy the statute by proving only that benefits were passively received by the official with knowledge that they were bestowed on him because of his official position.2 Extrapolating from these isolat*703ed statements, the court suggests that the instruction would criminalize any gift to a public official, however small or innocent, and that it must therefore be rejected.
The majority’s analysis suffers from a deficiency, in my view fatal; it ignores still other portions of the instructions which required the jury, before it could convict, to find that the benefits were induced by the contractors’ belief that they would forestall any harmful official action by O’Grady. We are not permitted to disregard these qualifications which were expressly integrated in the charge; we are required to read Judge Platt’s instructions as a whole. In United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 674-75, 95 S.Ct. 1903, 1912-13, 44 L.Ed.2d 489 (1975), the Supreme Court stated:
“Turning to the jury charge in this case, it is of course arguable that isolated parts can be read as intimating that a finding of guilt could be predicated solely on respondent’s corporate position. But this is not the way we review jury instructions, because ‘a single instruction to a jury may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the overall charge.’ Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146-47, 94 S.Ct. 396, 400-01, 38 L.Ed.2d 368 (1973). See Boyd v. United States, 271 U.S. 104, 107, 46 S.Ct. 442, 443, 70 L.Ed. 857 (1926).
j{e $ sfc sjc $
“Moreover, in reviewing jury instructions, our task is also to view the charge itself as part of the whole trial. ‘Often isolated statements taken from the charge, seemingly prejudicial on their face, are not so when considered in the context of the entire record of the trial. ’ United States v. Birnbaum, 373 F.2d 250, 257 (CA2), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 [88 S.Ct. 53, 19 L.Ed.2d 99] (1967).” (Emphasis in Park). See also United States v. Velez, 652 F.2d 258, 261 (2d Cir.1981); United States v. Precision Medical Laboratories, Inc., 593 F.2d 434, 443 (2d Cir.1978); United States v. Hanlon, 548 F.2d 1096, 1101 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Gentile, 530 F.2d 461, 469 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 936, 96 S.Ct. 2651, 49 L.Ed.2d 388 (1976). When the charge here is read in its entirety, it clearly and repeatedly informs the jury that it might find the defendant guilty only if it found beyond a reasonable doubt (1) that “the defendant had the power to affect, or influence the company’s interest in the delivery of the R-46 Pullman subway car” (T. 1783, emphasis added), including “the power to take or withhold action that could hurt or benefit the company, or to affect or influence the inspection and delivery of the R-46 subway car ...,” (T. 1785, emphasis added); (2) that “the benefits were bestowed because the [donor] company ... reasonably believed that in his capacity as Superintendent of the Quality Control Section Department of New Car Engineering, New York City Transit Authority,” (T. 1783) the defendant had such power; and (3) “that the defendant knew that that [was] the reason travel and entertainment benefits were given to him....” (T. 1785-86). The jury was further told that “if either or both of these facts has not been so proven beyond a reasonable doubt ... you must find for the defendant.” (T. 1786). These elements amount to wrongful use of public office.
Judge Platt went on to instruct the jury that, although proof of use of force or the giving of a quid pro quo by the official was unnecessary because “the crime is complete if the public official accepts a benefit knowing it was given with.a focus on his office[,] it is of course appropriate to consider whether any of the companies involved expected that, by bestowing benefits on the defendant, he would not exer*704cise his power to the detriment of the company. Such an expectation, if proven, establishes that the company gave the benefits focused on the defendant’s office.” (T. 1787-88, emphasis added).
Thus, although certain sentences in the charge, if taken out of context, might support the majority’s view that Judge Platt required the government to prove only that O’Grady received benefits with knowledge that they were bestowed upon him because of his office, the context in which these sentences appear makes clear that the phrase “because of or focused on the office of the public official” meant that the government also was obligated to prove that the benefits were given because of the official’s power “to take or withhold action that could hurt or benefit the company” (T. 1785). A more complete quotation from the charge, which shows the relevant context, is set forth in the margin.3 When one reads the charge in its entirety, it is apparent that it did not dispense with the requirement that the defendant “induce” the benefit; on the contrary, the district court *705made clear that a public official can supply the required inducement if (1) he has the power to aid or injure the donor; (2) the donor makes the gift because of that power; and (3) the official knows that is the reason for the gift.
In my view Judge Platt’s instruction properly sets forth the standard of proof required to establish the crime of “obtaining property with the donor’s consent ... under color of official right.” To require more of a showing of inducement, as the majority appears to do, unnecessarily weakens the statute as an instrument for combating corruption in the face of the proof problem presented by the subtlety and secrecy with which the participants in such misconduct act.
Proof problems aside, the majority opinion leaves in limbo the concept of “inducement” and “misuse” of office. The majority states, on the one hand, that the government “is not required to prove that the public official demanded or directly solicited the benefits received, or that he offered a specific quid pro quo in exchange for the benefits” (Maj.Op. 688-689, but, on the other hand, that the government must prove that “the public official misused his office to obtain the benefits” (Maj.Op. 689). The term “misuse of office,” however, is never defined. Instead, we are given a 3-page list of garden-variety bribery cases (Maj.Op. 689-690) in which the public official either directly solicited the benefits or furnished a quid pro quo for them, or both. In other words, the only guidance we are given is an implicit suggestion that there should be a demand by the official or his furnishing of a quid pro quo for the benefits, even though the court expressly concedes that neither a demand nor a quid pro quo is an essential element of the crime (Maj.Op. 689).
In short, although the majority concludes that “there must also be proof that the public official did something, under color of his public office, to cause the giving of the benefits” (Maj.Op. 687) and “that wrongful use of public office involves some action by the public official to induce the benefits given” (Maj.Op. 690), it never states what that “something” or that “action” must be. The public is entitled to a more definitive standard than the majority here provides for determining what constitutes wrongful use of public office inducing the bestowal of benefits upon the official “under color of official right.”
Several other circuits, interpreting the Hobbs Act liberally as Congress intended, see Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 215, 80 S.Ct. 270, 272, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960) (the Hobbs Act “speaks in broad language, manifesting a purpose to use all the constitutional power Congress has to punish interference with interstate commerce by extortion, robbery or physical violence”), have required less to be shown than that prescribed by Judge Platt’s charge. They hold it to be sufficient for the government to establish only that the government official accepted the money or benefits with knowledge that they were conferred because of his or her public office and that it is unnecessary for him to “take the initiative” or “induce payment” to violate the Act. United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 595 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106, 102 S.Ct. 2906, 73 L.Ed.2d 1315 (1982); United States v. Hedman, 630 F.2d 1184, 1195 (7th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965, 101 S.Ct. 1481, 67 L.Ed.2d 614 (1981); United States v. Butler, 618 F.2d 411, 417-18 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 927, 100 S.Ct. 3024, 65 L.Ed.2d 1121 (1980). The Seventh Circuit, whose position was later adopted by the Third Circuit, summarized its view as follows:
“It is settled law in this Circuit as well as others that in a Hobbs Act prosecution for extortion under color of official right it is unnecessary to show that the defendant induced the extortionate payment or that the payor was entitled to the benefit obtained from such payment. The government is merely required to prove that a public official obtained money to which he was not entitled and which he obtained only because of his official position. ” United States v. *706Hedman, supra, 630 F.2d at 1196. (Emphasis added, footnote omitted).
In United States v. Jannotti, supra, the Third Circuit observed:
“At common law, extortion was defined as ‘any officer’s unlawfully taking, by color of his office, from any man, any money or thing of value that is not due to him.’ 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *141. The requirement that the money be taken ‘by color of his office’ meant ‘simply that the officer must have taken money not due him for the performance of his official duties.’ ...
“The holding in our cases that the Hobbs Act covers the acceptance of bribes by public officials even when payment was not obtained by force, threats, or use of fear, and the further suggestion that there need be no inducement or prior request for such payments, accords with the view taken by other courts of appeals. ” United States v. Jannotti, supra, 673 F.2d at 595 (emphasis added, citation omitted).
Indeed, in United States v. Trotta, 525 F.2d 1096, 1100 (2d Cir.1975), we quoted with approval the following from the Seventh Circuit’s decision (per opinion of Supreme Court Justice Tom C. Clark, sitting by designation) in United States v. Braasch, 505 F.2d 139, 151 (7th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910, 95 S.Ct. 1561, 43 L.Ed.2d 775 (1975):
“ ‘The use of office to obtain payments is the crux of the statutory requirement of “under color of official right”, and appellants’ wrongful use of official power was obviously the basis for this extortion____ It matters not whether the public official induced payments to perform his duties or not to perform his duties, or even as here, to perform or not to perform acts unrelated to his duties which can only be. undertaken because of his official position. So long as the motivation for the payment focuses on the recipient’s office, the conduct falls within the ambit of 18 U.S.C. § 1951.’ ” (525 F.2d at 1100, emphasis added).
Although Judge Platt’s charge does not go as far as the simple rule adopted by these other circuits and I am not urging the adoption of their rule by this court, the majority’s attempt to distinguish these other cases on the ground that in those cases there was evidence “from which inducement can readily be inferred” (Maj.Op. 689) is unpersuasive. The same can be said of the present case where the majority concedes that O’Grady might “have been found guilty on the facts of this case if the jury had been properly charged” (Maj.Op. 692). If inducement clearly existed in those cases, no purpose would have been served by the flat, unequivocal and repeated pronouncements by these other circuits and even by ourselves to the effect that further proof of inducement is unnecessary as long as benefits were bestowed upon the official because of his public office. See Jannotti, supra, 673 F.2d at 595; Hedman, supra, 630 F.2d at 1195; Butler, supra, 618 F.2d at 417-18; Braasch, supra, 505 F.2d at 151. Had any of those courts construed the statute as it has been interpreted by the majority here they would have reversed and remanded for a new trial.
The plain fact, which cannot be escaped, is that these circuit court decisions are in direct conflict with the majority opinion in this case. That fact is not changed by the majority opinion’s string-cite of numerous cases in which there were express affirmative inducements in the forms of demands, furnishing of quid pro quo, or the like, on the part of the official (Maj.Op. 689-690). O’Grady’s conduct does not become any less a violation of the Hobbs Act because there have been other’cases in which officials behaved in an even more outrageous manner.
O’Grady’s contention that Hobbs Act extortion under color of official right must be construed as narrowly as “extortion” under the New York Penal Code, see People v. Dioguardi, 8 N.Y.2d 260, 203 N.Y.S.2d 870, 168 N.E.2d 683 (1960) (bribery and extortion are mutually exclusive under New York law); People v. Feld, 262 A.D. 909, 28 N.Y.S.2d 796 (2d Dept.1941) (same), was *707vigorously advanced by Judge Aldisert of the Third Circuit, dissenting in United States v. Cerilli, 603 F.2d 415, 426 (3d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1043, 100 S.Ct. 728, 62 L.Ed.2d 728 (1980), but has not gained acceptance by any circuit, including his own. See United States v. Harding, 563 F.2d 299, 304-05 (6th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1062, 98 S.Ct. 1235, 55 L.Ed.2d 762 (1978). The preferable view, adopted by several circuits, is that, bribery and extortion are not mutually exclusive and that extortion as defined in the Hobbs Act “could include such activity as is commonly considered to be bribery.” United States v. Harding, supra, 563 F.2d at 305; see United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 364, 372 (8th Cir.1976); United States v. Hall, 536 F.2d 313, 321 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 919, 97 S.Ct. 313, 50 L.Ed.2d 285 (1976); United States v. Hathaway, 534 F.2d 386, 394 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819, 97 S.Ct. 64, 50 L.Ed.2d 79 (1976). As we have emphasized and other circuits have noted, see, e.g., Jannotti, supra, 673 F.2d at 594-95, Hobbs Act extortion under color of official right is basically equivalent to the common law crime of extortion by officials, Trotta, supra, 525 F.2d at 1100. “At common law a public official who under color of office obtained the property of another not due either to his office or the official was guilty of extortion,” United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286, 289, 89 S.Ct. 534, 536, 21 L.Ed.2d 487 (1969). The crime was the official’s taking of money not due him. No proof of use of force, solicitation, inducement, or duress on the part of the official was required. See Ruff, Federal Prosecution of Local Corruption: A Case Study In The Making of Law Enforcement Policy, 65 Geo.L.J. 1171, 1179 (1977).4
Equally unpersuasive is the majority’s effort to support its narrow interpretation of the “official right” provision of the Hobbs Act, which was enacted July 3,1964, Pub.L. No. 79-486, 60 Stat. 420, on the ground that Congress would not later in 1962 have enacted 18 U.S.C. § 201(g), which prohibits receipt of gratuities by federal officials, if it believed that such payments were already prohibited by the Hobbs Act (Maj.Op. 691). In the first place, § 201 is merely a successor to earlier provisions of the Criminal Code that were enacted in the nineteenth century and existed long before the Hobbs Act was adopted. Thus § 201(g) is but part of Congress’ “substitution of a single comprehensive section of the Criminal Code for a number of existing statutes concerned with bribery ... [which] would make no significant changes of substance and, more particularly, would not restrict the broad scope of the present bribery statutes as construed by the • courts.” S.Rep. No. 2213, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1962 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.News, 3852, 3853. Secondly, the mere existence of partially overlapping federal criminal statutes prescribing differing penalties has never been accepted as a basis' for judicial rejection of a prosecution under one rather than the other (except when the government seeks to enforce both to punish one offense, in which event one of the two must be dismissed on double jeopardy grounds, see generally Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 336-39, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 1140-42, *70867 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981); that situation, of course, does not exist here).
Indeed, the courts have repeatedly recognized that the Hobbs Act overlaps with a number of state and federal criminal statutes, but have refused to restrict its scope on that ground. See United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371, 379, 98 S.Ct. 1112, 1116, 55 L.Ed.2d 349 (1978) (Congress was aware that “the conduct punishable under the Hobbs Act was already punishable under state robbery and extortion statutes”); United States v. LaBinia, 614 F.2d 1207, 1209 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 969, 100 S.Ct. 2951, 64 L.Ed.2d 830 (1980) (“overlapping coverage” of Hobbs Act and later-enacted federal Bank Robbery Act does not preclude prosecution under the former); United States v. Cerilli, supra, United States v. Cerilli, supra, 603 F.2d at 420-21 (same for overlap between Hobbs Act and 18 U.S.C. § 601). Such partial duplication is but the inevitable product of piece-meal additions to the Code over the last 150 years and constitutes one of the reasons behind proposed legislation designed to simplify and unify the Code.
Nor does the Hobbs Act's provision for heavier maximum penalties (up to 20 years imprisonment and a $10,000 fine) than § 201(g) (up to 2 years imprisonment and a $10,000 fine) provide a ground for the majority’s narrow interpretation of the former. The larger maximum penalties of the Hobbs Act were designed to permit imposition of appropriately severe sentences in cases involving violence or threats of violence, which are not within the range of conduct prohibited by § 201(g), and not to preclude prosecution of official corruption under the former’s “color of official right” provision.
In sum, although the court’s present decision directly conflicts with Jannotti, Red-man, Butler, Harding, and Brown, supra, and our own quotation with approval in Trotta, supra, of the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Braasch, I do not believe that it is necessary for us to construe the “official right” section of the Hobbs Act as broadly as those courts have in order to affirm the conviction in the present case. In my view the minimum standard for convicting an official of “obtaining ... property from another, with his consent... under color of official right” in violation of the Hobbs Act is proof beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) he received property that may reasonably be perceived as likely to influence his exercise of his official duties, (2) the donor made the gift because of the official’s power to take or withhold action that could harm or benefit him or a party for whom the donor acted, and (3) the official was aware of the donor’s motive for the gift. This standard is a fair one. It requires proof of far more than mere receipt of picayune benefits, which might be innocent. It accords with the common law concept of extortion and with Congress’ purpose in enacting the Hobbs Act, which was to deter corruption of public officials in the exercise of their duties. Being specific, this standard avoids the pitfalls associated with such vague general terms as “wrongful use of official power” or “inducement.” At the same time it does not pose the barrier of requiring an express affirmative word or act of solicitation or use of threats or force by the official, which, of course, would clearly constitute extortion but would be impossible to prove in instances of subtle official corruption against which the Hobbs Act is aimed. This proposed construction of the statute, moreover, by providing “a reasonable person” standard for determining whether the benefits paid to the official are sufficiently sizeable to be extortionary in nature, avoids the conflicts and inconsistencies that could occur if the question were left to the official’s subjective belief. In the present case, for instance, O’Grady, when asked under oath whether he thought it “proper to accept gratuities from people that you’re doing business with?” testified unqualifiedly “I don’t think anything is wrong with it.” Although he viewed a payment of $500 as a bribe he was unwilling to say that it would have been improper to accept a gift of a Cadillac or Toyota from such persons (T. 1522-23). Such a warped perspective *709would be no defense under the objective standard proposed here.
For all of the foregoing reasons I would affirm the judgment convicting the defendant of violating the Hobbs Act.5

. Government Exhibit 12-3 shows that companies doing business with the Transit Authority spent the following amounts on "entertainment” expenses for O'Grady between 1972 and 1981:
Pullman............................$ 5,903.74
Abex ............................... 2,902.09
Ellcon.............................. 2,611.01
General Electric.................... 2,043.27
*698Luminator.......................... 598.34
McGraw Edison..................... 2,789.32
New York Air Brake................ 14,580.71
Rockwell ........................... 601.82
Standard Steel...................... 572.55
WABCO ............................ 687.51
Walton............................. 227.58
Westcode........................... 681.92
Total.......................$34,199.86
The evidence at trial indicated that these figures are underestimates of the actual amount of benefits provided by O'Grady, since these figures include only amounts listed on vouchers, and do not include amounts billed by other means. For instance the figures do not include numerous meals and golf games furnished by vendors to O’Grady when they met with him in New York City or on Long Island or when he made inspections at their plants. (See, e.g., T. 276-83). The figure do not include personal gifts made by contractors to O’Grady, such as golf clubs or GE toasters. (T. 347-50). In some instances O’Grady not only accepted the benefits from contractors but collected from the New York City Transit Authority payment for meals furnished by the contractor. (Tr. 1653).
Government Exhibit 12-2 listed the trips to resorts taken by O'Grady and paid for in part or in full by vendors:
3/23-26/72 Greenbrier White Sulphur Springs West Virginia New York Air Brake (NYAB) Food, Lodging, Golf, Travel (Wife)
3/21-25/73 Greenbrier White Sulphur Springs West Virginia N.Y.A.B. Food, Lodging, Golf, Travel (Wife)
6/13-16/73 Greenbrier White Sulphur Springs West Virginia McGraw-Edison Food, Lodging, Golf (Wife)
3/28-31/74 Greenbrier White Sulphur Springs West Virginia N.Y.A.B. Food, Lodging, Golf, Travel (Wife)
8/2-4/74 Lakeview Inn Country Club Morgantown, W. Va. Wabco Food, Lodging, Golf, Partial Travel
1/25-26/75 San Antonio Country Club San Antonio, Texas Luminator Food, Golf, Lodging, Partial Travel
3/14-16/75 Riviera Country Club California Luminator Food, Lodging, Golf
3/19-23/75 Greenbrier White Sulphur Springs West Virginia N.Y.A.B. Food, Lodging, Golf, Travel (Wife)
6/26-29/75 Seaview Country Club New Jersey Ellcon Lodging, Golf
12/17-21/75 Bent Tree Country Club Dallas, Texas Luminator & General Electric Food, Lodging, Golf (Car Rental)
3/24-28/76 Greenbrier White Sulphur Springs West Virginia N.Y.A.B. Food, Lodging, Golf, Travel (Wife)
4/29-5/2/76 Greenbrier White Sulphur Springs West Virginia N.Y.A.B. Food, Lodging, Golf, Travel
5/5-8/76 Lakeview Inn Country Club Morgantown, W. Va. Wabco Food, Lodging, Golf, Partial Travel
5/14-16/76 ITT Golf Course Boston, Mass. Pullman & ITT Food, Lodging, Golf
6/4-5/76 Seaview Country Club Absecon, N.J. Standard Steel Food, Lodging, Golf (Wife)
7/7-11/76 Hyatt on Hilton Head N.Y.A.B. Food, Lodging, Travel, Golf
*69911/16- Pine Valley Abex, Pullman, etc. Food, Golf, 17/76 New Jersey Lodging
2/25- Innisbrook Country Club Rockwell Food, Lodging, 27/77 Tarpon Springs, Fla. _ Golf, Travel
3/9- Disney World General Electric Food, Lodging, 14/77 Orlando, Fla. Golf, Travel
3/23- Greenbrier N.Y.A.B. Food, Lodging, 27/77 White Sulphur Springs Golf, Travel West Virginia (Wife)
5/5-- Greenbrier N.Y.A.B. Food, Lodging, 8/77 White Sulphur Springs Golf, Travel West Virginia
6/7- Tides Inn McGraw-Edison Food, Lodging, 11/77 Irvington, Va. Golf (Wife) (Little Masters)
6/23- Seaview Country Club Ellcon Food, Lodging, 25/77 Absecon, N.J. Golf
7/7- Gaylord, Michigan Rockwell Food, Lodging, 11/77 Golf, Partial Travel
7/13- Disney World N.Y.A.B. Food, Lodging, 17/77 Orlando, Fla. Golf, Travel (Wife)
10/28- Seaview Country Club Standard Steel Food, Lodging, 29/77 Absecon, N.J. Golf (Wife)
11/2- Pine Valley Ellcon, Abex, Food, Lodging, 3/77 New Jersey Rockwell Golf
3/15- Greenbrier N.Y.A.B. Food, Lodging, 19/78 White . Sulphur Springs Golf, Travel West Virginia (Wife)
5/3- Greenbrier N.Y.A.B. Food, Lodging, 7/78 White Sulphur Springs ' Golf, Travel West Virginia
5/31- Tides Inn McGraw-Edison Food, Lodging, 6/4/78 Irvington, Va. Golf (Wife)
6/22- Seaview Country Club Ellcon Lodging, Golf 25/78 New Jersey (Wife)
7/12- Myrtle Beach Hilton N.Y.A.B. Food, Lodging, 16/78 Myrtle Beach, S.C. Golf, Travel (Wife)
10/13- ITT Golf Course ITT Food, Golf 15/78 Boston, Mass.
11/1- Pine Valley Rockwell, etc. Food, Lodging, 2/78 New Jersey Golf
3/21- Greenbrier N.Y.A.B. Food, Lodging, 25/79 White Sulphur Springs Golf, Travel West Virginia (Wife)
5/3- Greenbrier N.Y.A.B. Food, Lodging, 6/79 White Sulphur Springs Golf, Travel
5/30- Tides Inn McGraw-Edison Food, Lodging, 6/3/79 Irvington, Va. Golf (Wife)
3/26- Greenbrier N.Y.A.B. Food, Lodging, 30/80 White Sulphur Springs Golf, Travel West Virginia (Wife)
5/1- Greenbrier N.Y.A.B. Food, Lodging, 4/80 White Sulphur Springs Golf, Travel West Virginia
*7007/29- Hyatt on Hilton Head 8/2/80 South Carolina N.Y.A.B. Food, Lodging, Golf, Travel (Wife)
3/25- Greenbrier 30/81 White Sulphur Springs West Virginia N.Y.A.B. Food, Lodging, Golf, Travel (Wife)
4/30- Greenbrier 5/3/81 White Sulphur Springs West Virginia N.Y.A.B. Food, Lodging, Golf
6/3- Tides Inn 7/81 Irvington, Virginia McGraw-Edison Food, Lodging, Golf (Wife)

. The principal sentences relied on by the majority are as follows:
"The Government need not show that that defendant in words or otherwise, induced, requested, demanded, or solicited the benefits from the companies involved.
"So long as the motivation for the bestowal of any of the benefits focused on Mr. O’Grady’s office — that is, so long as the office or the fact of his official position, induced the payments — and so long as the defendant knew such was the case — then the conduct falls within the ambit of the Statute." (T. 1784).
However, the foregoing immediately followed the instruction that the government must prove that the benefits were bestowed because the contractor "reasonably believed that ... the defendant had the power to affect, or influence *703the company’s interest in the delivery of the R-46 Pullman subway car to the City of New York.” (T. 1783-84).
Moreover the sentences relied on by the majority were immediately followed by an instruction that to find the defendant guilty the jury must first find beyond a reasonable doubt that the benefit was conferred "because the company reasonably believed that, in his official capacity, Mr. O'Grady had the power to take or withhold action that could hurt or benefit the company ... and ... that the defendant knew that that [was] the reason travel and entertainment benefits were given to him ____” (T. 1785-86).

. The following is a more complete verbatim copy of the pertinent portions of the court’s charge:
“Now with regard to the second element, one of the two you must turn your attention to, that is, that the property was obtained under color of official right. The offense of obtaining property under color of official right was intended by Congress to prohibit the obtaining of something of value, be it money or any other benefit, by a public official, through the wrongful use of his office, where the benefit is not lawfully due and owing to him or the office which he holds. There need be no specific acts by the public official threatening economic loss, so long as the person — which includes a corporation — consents to giving the property, or benefit, because of or focused on the office of the public official who obtains the property. Similarly, so long as the benefit is given because of or focused on the office held by the official, there need be no promises made by the official to do or to refrain from doing anything in return for receiving the benefit. In other words, the giving of a quid pro quo is not an essential element; the gravamen of the offenses [sic] the obtaining by a public official or property to which he is not entitled, which focuses on the office he holds.
******
"Under this Statute, no showing of fear on the part of the bestower of the benefit is required; what must be established is that any of the benefits were bestowed because the company that bestowed a benefit reasonably believed that in his capacity as Superintendent of the Quality Control Section Department of New Car Engineering, New York City Transit Authority, the defendant had the power to affect, or influence the company’s interest in the delivery of the R-46 Pullman subway car to the City of New York.
“The Government need not show that the defendant in words or otherwise, induced, requested, demanded, or solicited the benefits from the companies involved. "So long as the motivation for the bestowal of any of the benefits focused on Mr. O’Grady's office — that is, so long as the office or the fact of his official position, induced the payments — and so long as the defendant knew such was the case — then the conduct falls within the ambit of the Statute.
******
“If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that a company gave any benefit that it is alleged to have given in the indictment because the company reasonably believed that, in his official capacity, Mr. O'Grady had the power to take or withhold action that could hurt or benefit the company, or to affect or influence the inspection and delivery of the R-46 subway car, then you may find that the consent of the bestowing company was induced under color of official right, and if you further find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew that that [sic] the reason travel and entertainment benefits were given to him, then the second element is satisfied; but if either or both of these facts has not been so proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then it is not, and you must find for the defendant.
******
“Now, in determining whether the consent of the company or companies giving benefits to Mr. O’Grady was induced under color of official right, it is of course proper to rely on human experience.
"While the Government need not prove that the defendant promised something in return for the benefits — that is, while the Government need not allege or prove that there was, in fact, any quid pro quo, because, as I’ve indicated, the crime is complete if the public official accepts a benefit knowing it was given with a focus of his office — it is of course appropriate to consider whether any of the companies involved expected that, by bestowing benefits on the defendant, he would not exercise his power to the detriment of the company.
“Such an expectation, if proven, establishes that the company gave the benefits focused on the defendant's office.” (T. 1781-88).

. While there are indications from the congressional debates regarding other portions of the Hobbs Act that the New York law of extortion was considered with respect to the legality of certain labor union activities, see United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 406 n. 16, 93 S.Ct. 1007, 1013 n. 16, 35 L.Ed.2d 379 (1973), I find no congressional mandate to incorporate the New York law of extortion into the Hobbs Act. As the Harding court noted, many states besides New York had statutes barring extortion "under color of official right” at the time Congress passed the Hobbs Act, see Harding, supra, 563 F.2d at 304-05, suggesting that Congress intended to refer not only to the law of New York State on extortion but to the common law and that of other states as well. Id. at 304. In the absence of some indication that Congress intended to shackle the broad language of the Hobbs Act with the particular restrictions existing in a single state’s law, the Act should not be read so narrowly. It is relevant in that regard that New York itself repealed its narrow interpretation by statute in 1965. See N.Y.Penal Law §§ 135.70, 155.10, 180.30, 200.15.

. Since the unpublished panel decision is vacated and this dissent supersedes our panel opinion, no purpose is served by publishing the latter.