Court Opinion

ID: 9769736
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 15:01:05.453581+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:44:52.281808
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
          FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 7, 2023                 Decided August 29, 2023

                         No. 22-1142

               GRAYSCALE INVESTMENTS, LLC,
                       PETITIONER

                               v.

          SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
                       RESPONDENT

              On Petition for Review of an Order
         of the Securities and Exchange Commission

    Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. argued the cause for petitioner.
With him on the briefs were Paul Mishkin, Joseph A. Hall,
Daniel J. Schwartz, Elaine J. Goldenberg, and Sarah E.
Weiner.

     Jonathan Cooper and Rachel Frank were on the brief for
amici curiae Blockchain Association, et al. in support of
petitioner.

     Joseph R. Palmore and Adam L. Sorensen were on the
brief for amicus curiae Coinbase, Inc. in support of petitioner.

    Robert A. Long, Jr. and Kevin King were on the brief for
amicus curiae NYSE Arca, Inc. in support of petitioner.
                               2
     Stephen B. Kinnaird was on the brief for amici curiae
Investor Choice Advocates Network, et al. in support of
petitioner.

     Jordan L. Von Bokern, Tyler S. Badgley, and Judson O.
Littleton were on the brief for amicus curiae The Chamber of
Commerce of the United States of America in support of
petitioner.

    Emily True Parise, Senior Appellate Counsel, U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission, argued the cause for
respondent. With her on the brief were Megan Barbero,
General Counsel, Michael A. Conley, Solicitor, Tracey A.
Hardin, Assistant General Counsel, David D. Lisitza, Senior
Appellate Counsel, and Daniel T. Young, Attorney.

    Before: SRINIVASAN, Chief Judge, RAO, Circuit Judge,
and EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.

    Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge RAO.

     RAO, Circuit Judge: It is a fundamental principle of
administrative law that agencies must treat like cases alike. The
Securities and Exchange Commission recently approved the
trading of two bitcoin futures funds on national exchanges but
denied approval of Grayscale’s bitcoin fund. Petitioning for
review of the Commission’s denial order, Grayscale maintains
its proposed bitcoin exchange-traded product is materially
similar to the bitcoin futures exchange-traded products and
should have been approved to trade on NYSE Arca.

     We agree. The denial of Grayscale’s proposal was
arbitrary and capricious because the Commission failed to
explain its different treatment of similar products. We therefore
grant Grayscale’s petition and vacate the order.
                               3
                               I.

    Before listing a new product for trading, a securities
exchange generally must file a rule change with the SEC. See
Securities Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, sec.
16, § 19(b), 89 Stat. 147–48 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)).
The Commission “shall approve” a new rule if it “finds that
such proposed rule change is consistent with the requirements”
of the Exchange Act and any SEC regulations. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78s(b)(2)(C)(i).

     Under the Exchange Act, the rules of an exchange must be
“designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and
practices, to promote just and equitable principles of trade, to
foster cooperation and coordination …, to remove impediments
to … a free and open market …, and, in general, to protect
investors and the public interest.” Id. § 78f(b)(5). The rules of
an exchange may not be “designed to permit unfair
discrimination between customers, issuers, brokers, or dealers,
or to regulate … matters not related to the … administration of
the exchange.” Id. The Commission has not promulgated a
regulation interpreting and implementing these standards.
Rather, it approves rule changes on a case-by-case basis. The
“burden to demonstrate that a proposed rule change is
consistent with the Exchange Act” is on the securities exchange
proposing the new rule. 17 C.F.R. § 201.700(b)(3).

                              A.

     This case involves two kinds of exchange-traded products
(“ETPs”)—those holding bitcoins and those holding bitcoin
futures. Grayscale’s primary claim is that the Commission
failed to treat like cases alike by denying the listing of
Grayscale’s proposed bitcoin ETP and approving two bitcoin
futures ETPs. Because assessing this claim requires an
understanding of how the products work, we briefly explain
                                4
bitcoin, the spot and futures markets, and exchange-traded
products.

     Bitcoins are cryptocurrency, a kind of digital “token” that
can be used to pay for goods and services directly or exchanged
for traditional currencies. Bitcoin is not tracked through bank
ledgers like traditional currencies. Instead, bitcoin transactions
are recorded on a blockchain maintained by a decentralized
computer network. Grayscale Order, 87 Fed. Reg. 40,299,
40,300 (July 6, 2022). One bitcoin was worth less than a penny
in 2009 and by mid-2023 was worth about $30,000. John
Edwards, Bitcoin’s Price History, INVESTOPEDIA.COM (2023),
https://perma.cc/98H5-T9MV.

     As with commodities, there are spot and futures markets
for bitcoin. A spot market is another term for the cash market
of a commodity or financial instrument. In the bitcoin spot
market, cash is exchanged for bitcoin, with delivery expected
immediately. In a derivatives market, by contrast, the financial
instrument being traded derives its value from the underlying
spot market but is not traded on that market. One such
derivative is a future, which is a contract to buy or sell an asset
at a predetermined price on a specific later date. Futures
contracts, which enable investors to hedge against risk, trade
on commodity futures exchanges, like the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange (“CME”), a global derivatives market. The CME is
regulated by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(“CFTC”).

     At issue in this case are bitcoin investment funds that hold
either bitcoin or bitcoin futures contracts. Many bitcoin and
bitcoin futures funds have sought to be listed and traded on a
national exchange—that is to become exchange-traded
products. See, e.g., Winklevoss Order, 83 Fed. Reg. 37,579,
37,579 (Aug. 1, 2018); Teucrium Order, 87 Fed. Reg. 21,676,
                                 5
21,676 (Apr. 12, 2022). An exchange-traded product may offer
continuous share redemption and creation, allowing arbitrage
to prevent the product’s price from deviating too far from the
value of its underlying assets. Products not traded on an
exchange cannot offer this, so rather than tracking the value of
the underlying assets, they often trade at a discount. Listing on
an exchange is desirable because it helps eliminate this
discount.

      Over the last several years, the Commission received
numerous proposals to list bitcoin investment products on
national exchanges. The Commission denied every proposal to
list a bitcoin ETP. For example, in 2018, the SEC denied Bats
BZX Exchange’s proposal to list the Winklevoss Bitcoin Trust.
Winklevoss Order, 83 Fed. Reg. at 37,579. And in 2020, the
SEC denied NYSE Arca’s proposal to list the United States
Bitcoin and Treasury Investment Trust.1 USBTIT Order, 85
Fed. Reg. 12,595, 12,596 (Mar. 3, 2020). In each of these
orders, the SEC denied the listing of the proposed bitcoin ETP
for the same reason: the products were not “designed to prevent
fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices” as required by
the Exchange Act. See, e.g., Winklevoss Order, 83 Fed. Reg. at
37,580. Specifically, the SEC found that protections inherent
to bitcoin—like the blockchain and the size and liquidity of the
bitcoin market—were insufficient to prevent fraud. See
Grayscale Order, 87 Fed. Reg. at 40,305–06. The Commission
instead required a surveillance sharing agreement with a related
and regulated market of significant size. But every proposed

1
 These are just two examples among many. See, e.g., NYDIG Order,
87 Fed. Reg. 14,932, 14,932 (Mar. 16, 2022) (denying the listing of
a bitcoin fund); One River Order, 87 Fed. Reg. 33,548, 33,549 (June
2, 2022) (same); Bitwise Order, 87 Fed. Reg. 40,282, 40,282 (July 6,
2022) (same).
                               6
bitcoin ETP failed the Commission’s significant market test.
See id. at 40,302.

      Two bitcoin futures ETPs, however, were recently
approved by the Commission. In April 2022, the Commission
approved NYSE Arca’s proposal to list the Teucrium Bitcoin
Futures Fund. Teucrium Order, 87 Fed. Reg. at 21,676. A
month later, the Nasdaq’s proposal to list the Valkyrie XBTO
Bitcoin Futures Fund was approved. Valkyrie Order, 87 Fed.
Reg. 28,848, 28,848 (May 11, 2022). For both products, the
listing exchange had a surveillance sharing agreement with the
CME that the Commission found satisfied the significant
market test. Id. at 28,850; Teucrium Order, 87 Fed. Reg. at
21,682. In both orders, the Commission explicitly stated that
approval of bitcoin futures ETPs did not mean approval of
bitcoin ETPs was imminent. See Teucrium Order, 87 Fed. Reg.
at 21,678 n.31; Valkyrie Order, 87 Fed. Reg. at 28,850 n.29.

                              B.

      The Grayscale Bitcoin Trust is a would-be bitcoin ETP.
Grayscale currently owns 3.4 percent of outstanding bitcoins,
worth tens of billions of dollars. Grayscale Order, 87 Fed. Reg.
at 40,314. If Grayscale traded on an exchange, it would be
worth roughly the value of the assets in the Trust. Because
Grayscale does not have SEC approval to trade on an exchange,
however, its shares are restricted securities, with trading
limited to accredited investors and over-the-counter markets
not registered with the SEC. As Grayscale explains, it cannot
offer the continuous share redemptions and creations that are
permissible for ETPs and add enormous value. Accordingly,
Grayscale’s shares trade at a discount—as much as 30 percent.
Grayscale estimates this leaves over $4 billion on the table for
its investors.
                               7
      NYSE Arca, an affiliate of the New York Stock Exchange,
proposed listing shares of the Grayscale Bitcoin Trust. See
Grayscale Proposal, 86 Fed. Reg. 61,804, 61,804 (Nov. 8,
2021). Of the thousands of public comments, nearly all favored
listing Grayscale. Nonetheless, the Commission denied the rule
change, finding “NYSE Arca ha[d] not met its burden to
demonstrate that its proposal [was] consistent with the
requirements of [the] Exchange Act.” Grayscale Order, 87 Fed.
Reg. at 40,302. As with every other proposed bitcoin ETP, the
Commission found Grayscale was not “designed to prevent
fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices” and failed to
satisfy the significant market test. Id. Grayscale petitions for
review.

                              II.

     We have jurisdiction over Grayscale’s petition under the
Exchange Act, which provides that a “person aggrieved by a
final order of the Commission … may obtain review of the
order in the United States Court of Appeals for the … District
of Columbia Circuit, by filing in such court, within sixty days.”
15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)(1). The Administrative Procedure Act
(“APA”) requires the reviewing court to “hold unlawful and set
aside agency action” that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2). When assessing an arbitrary and capricious claim, we
consider whether the agency’s decision was “reasonable and
reasonably explained.” FCC v. Prometheus Radio Project, 141
S. Ct. 1150, 1158 (2021). We will not substitute our policy
judgments for that of the agency. Instead, we ensure the agency
“considered the relevant issues” and adequately “explained the
decision.” Id.
                                  8
                                III.

      Grayscale’s primary argument is straightforward: the
Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously by denying the
listing of Grayscale’s proposed bitcoin ETP and approving the
listing of materially similar bitcoin futures ETPs.2

     To evaluate Grayscale’s petition, we first must consider
whether Grayscale demonstrated its investment product was
similar across the relevant regulatory factors to the Teucrium
and Valkyrie ETPs that were approved by the Commission.
“[T]he great principle that like cases must receive like
treatment is … black letter administrative law.” Baltimore Gas
& Elec. Co. v. FERC, 954 F.3d 279, 286 (D.C. Cir. 2020)
(cleaned up); see also Westar Energy, Inc. v. FERC, 473 F.3d
1239, 1241 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“A fundamental norm of
administrative procedure requires an agency to treat like cases
alike.”). In fact, “dissimilar treatment of evidently identical
cases” is “the quintessence of arbitrariness and caprice.” See
Colo. Interstate Gas Co. v. FERC, 850 F.2d 769, 774 (D.C. Cir.
1988). Failing to distinguish “prior orders in similar
cases … fails to satisfy the APA’s reasoned decisionmaking
requirement.” Baltimore Gas, 954 F.3d at 285. Particularly
when agencies articulate legal standards on a case-by-case
basis, they must justify different results reached on similar facts

2
  Grayscale also maintains the significant market test is contrary to
law because it imposes requirements beyond the Exchange Act. The
Act requires rule changes be “designed to prevent fraudulent and
manipulative acts.” 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5). A surveillance sharing
agreement might be one way to protect against fraud, but Grayscale
argues it is not the only way. By effectively requiring a surveillance
sharing agreement, Grayscale maintains the Commission displaced
the Exchange Act with a stricter, standalone surveillance
requirement. We do not reach this argument because we set aside the
SEC’s order as arbitrary and capricious.
                                9
“to lend predictability and intelligibility” to agency actions,
“promote fair treatment, and facilitate judicial review.” Id. at
286. These principles are especially salient here, as the
Commission must ensure the rules of an exchange “are not
designed to permit unfair discrimination between customers,
issuers, brokers, or dealers.” 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5). Treating
similarly situated parties differently is at the core of “unfair
discrimination.”

     If we find that Grayscale is similar to the bitcoin futures
ETPs across the relevant regulatory factors, we must determine
whether the Commission provided an adequate explanation for
approving the two bitcoin futures ETPs but denying
Grayscale’s bitcoin ETP. “If a party plausibly alleges it has
received inconsistent treatment under the same rule or
standard, we must consider whether the agency has offered a
reasonable and coherent explanation for the seemingly
inconsistent results.” Baltimore Gas, 954 F.3d at 286; see also
Petroleum Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 22 F.3d 1164, 1172
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (“We have long held that an agency must
provide adequate explanation before it treats similarly situated
parties differently.”). The distinctions made by the agency must
be relevant to the action at issue and “rationally explain[ed].”
See Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. FERC, 45 F.4th 265,
280 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (per curiam).

                               A.

     Grayscale advanced substantial evidence that its proposed
bitcoin ETP was similar to the Teucrium and Valkyrie bitcoin
futures ETPs and therefore should have received the same
regulatory treatment.

     Grayscale’s proposed bitcoin ETP and the approved
bitcoin futures ETPs all track the bitcoin market price, i.e., the
spot market price. Grayscale’s link is direct: it holds bitcoins.
                              10
Grayscale calculates the value of its bitcoin assets using the
CoinDesk Bitcoin Price Index, which is based on spot trading
across four major bitcoin platforms. See Grayscale Order, 87
Fed. Reg. at 40,302 & n.35, 40,317–18. The bitcoin futures
ETPs hold CME futures contracts, but their exposure to the
spot market price is nearly identical to Grayscale’s proposed
ETP. Grayscale presented uncontested evidence that there is a
99.9 percent correlation between bitcoin’s spot market and
CME futures contract prices. See id. at 40,318 n.223. This tight
correlation is not a coincidence: bitcoin futures prices are
ultimately based on spot market prices. Bitcoin futures trade
based on predicted settlement prices that are in turn calculated
using the Bitcoin Reference Rate. The Reference Rate, like the
CoinDesk Index, aggregates spot prices from multiple
exchanges. Id. at 40,317. Four of the six exchanges are shared
between the indexes. See id. at 40,318. A study conducted by a
finance professor and expert on derivative contract valuation
found the CoinDesk Index and the Reference Rate are “near
perfect substitutes.” Robert E. Whaley, Comment Letter on
Proposed Rule to List Grayscale 1 (May 25, 2022).

     Moreover, the listing exchanges for Grayscale and the
bitcoin futures ETPs have identical surveillance sharing
agreements with the CME, on which bitcoin futures trade.
Compare Grayscale Order, 87 Fed. Reg. at 40,317, with
Teucrium Order, 87 Fed. Reg. at 21,678, and Valkyrie Order,
87 Fed. Reg. at 28,850. Because the spot and futures markets
for bitcoin are highly related, it stands to reason that
manipulation in either market will affect the price of bitcoin
futures. The Commission acknowledged this connection when
approving the Teucrium and Valkyrie ETPs. The Commission
found “CME’s surveillance can reasonably be relied upon to
capture the effects on the CME bitcoin futures market caused
by a person attempting to manipulate the proposed futures
ETP … whether that attempt is made by directly trading on the
                              11
CME bitcoin futures market or indirectly by trading outside of
the CME bitcoin futures market.” Teucrium Order, 87 Fed.
Reg. at 21,679; Valkyrie Order, 87 Fed. Reg. at 28,851. To the
extent that the price of bitcoin futures might be affected by
trading in both the futures and spot markets, the Commission
concluded fraud in either market could be detected by
surveillance of the CME futures market.

     Grayscale has demonstrated its proposed bitcoin ETP is
materially similar, across relevant regulatory factors, to the
approved bitcoin futures ETPs. First, the underlying assets—
bitcoin and bitcoin futures—are closely correlated. And
second, the surveillance sharing agreements with the CME are
identical and should have the same likelihood of detecting
fraudulent or manipulative conduct in the market for bitcoin
and bitcoin futures.

                              B.

     Despite these salient similarities, the Commission rejected
Grayscale’s proposed bitcoin ETP and approved two bitcoin
futures ETPs. The Commission distinguished the two products
solely through the application of the significant market test.

     The Commission requires bitcoin-based ETPs to address
concerns of fraud and manipulation by having their listing
exchanges enter into surveillance sharing agreements with
markets that are (1) related to the listing exchange, (2)
regulated, and (3) of significant size. See Grayscale Order, 87
Fed. Reg. at 40,300. If fraud or manipulation occurs, the
surveillance sharing agreement, in theory, should identify the
problem. Surveillance sharing agreements “provide a
necessary deterrent to manipulation because they facilitate the
availability of information needed to fully investigate a
manipulation if it were to occur.” Id. at 40,301.
                                 12
     The Commission acknowledges NYSE Arca has a
surveillance sharing agreement with the CME; the CME
bitcoin futures market is related to Grayscale’s proposed ETP;
and the CME is adequately regulated by the CFTC. See id. The
only dispute is whether the CME market for bitcoin futures is
a market of significant size. Id.

     Despite its name, the “significant market” or “market of
significant size” requirement implicates more than the size of
the surveilled market. See id. at 40,300. To allow the
Commission to assess whether market manipulation will be
detected in the surveilled market, the significant market test has
two prongs. First, there must be “a reasonable likelihood that a
person attempting to manipulate the ETP would … have to
trade on [the related] market to successfully manipulate the
ETP.” Id. In other words, the Commission will consider
whether a person attempting to manipulate the ETP could
simply bypass the related market and thus circumvent the
surveillance. Second, it must be “unlikely that trading in the
ETP would be the predominant influence on prices in [the
surveilled] market.” Id. If trading in the ETP dominated prices
in the surveilled market, that market might be unable to pick up
price discrepancies between the ETP and its underlying assets.3

     The Commission concluded that Grayscale, like every
other proposed bitcoin ETP, failed to meet both prongs of the
significant market test. By contrast, the Commission found the
significant market test satisfied for the Valkyrie and Teucrium
bitcoin futures ETPs. This differential application of the

3
 The SEC indicated these prongs are “illustrative and not exclusive.”
Wise Origin Order, 87 Fed. Reg. 5,527, 5,528 n.16 (Feb. 1, 2022).
“There could be other types of ‘significant markets’ and ‘markets of
significant size.’” Id. With respect to bitcoin ETPs, however, the
Commission applied only these prongs.
                               13
significant market requirement is at the core of Grayscale’s
arbitrary and capricious challenge. We take each prong in turn.

                               C.

     The Commission found Grayscale failed the first prong of
the significant market requirement because there was not “a
reasonable likelihood that a person attempting to manipulate
[Grayscale] would have to trade on the CME.” Id. at 40,311.
On the other hand, the Commission found it was “unnecessary”
for the bitcoin futures ETPs to establish a “would-be
manipulator would have to trade on the CME.” Teucrium
Order, 87 Fed. Reg. at 21,679; see also Valkyrie Order, 87 Fed.
Reg. at 28,852 (explaining “deficiencies” in Nasdaq’s evidence
of whether there was “a reasonable likelihood that a would-be
manipulator of the proposed ETP would have to trade on the
CME” did not prevent approval). According to the
Commission, this showing was unnecessary for the bitcoin
futures ETPs because their only holdings are securities traded
directly on the surveilled exchange. Grayscale maintains it
should be treated the same as the bitcoin futures ETPs, despite
the fact that its holdings do not trade on the CME. Grayscale
has the same economic risks as the futures ETPs, and so a
surveillance sharing agreement with the CME should have
similar fraud prevention capabilities. Therefore, Grayscale
reasons, it should also be exempted from the first prong.

    Under the first prong of the significant market test, the
Commission failed to provide the necessary “reasonable and
coherent explanation” for its inconsistent treatment of similar
products. Baltimore Gas, 954 F.3d at 286.

                               1.

     The Commission never explained why Grayscale owning
bitcoins rather than bitcoin futures affects the CME’s ability to
                               14
detect fraud. While the Commission asserted that owning
assets not traded on the surveilled exchange was a “significant
difference” and proclaimed that there was “reason to question
whether a surveillance-sharing agreement with the CME
would, in fact, assist in detecting and deterring fraudulent and
manipulative misconduct affecting the price of the spot bitcoin
held by that ETP,” it provided no support for these claims.
Grayscale Order, 87 Fed. Reg. at 40,317. Grayscale, however,
provided evidence that CME bitcoin futures prices are 99.9
percent correlated with spot market prices. Based on that data,
fraud in the spot market would present identical problems for a
bitcoin ETP and a bitcoin futures ETP. Bitcoin futures are
derivatives of bitcoin and, as long as the market is efficient,
arbitrage will drive the prices together.

     The Commission neither disputed Grayscale’s evidence
that the spot and futures markets for bitcoin are 99.9 percent
correlated, nor suggested that market inefficiencies or other
factors would undermine the correlation. The Commission
faults Grayscale for failing to provide other types of evidence.
Without further explanation, however, the Commission’s
assertion that “information in the record for this filing does not
support [the] claim” that “any fraud or manipulation in the
underlying [spot] market will affect both products in the same
way” is unreasonable. See id. The Commission’s unexplained
discounting of the obvious financial and mathematical
relationship between the spot and futures markets falls short of
the standard for reasoned decisionmaking. See Menkes v. DHS,
486 F.3d 1307, 1313 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“[I]t would be
presumably arbitrary and capricious … to ignore an obvious
[fact].”).
                               15
                               2.

     Even if the spot and futures markets are highly correlated
and the respective ETPs are functionally identical, the
Commission maintained Grayscale would not pass the first
prong of the significant market test. Why? The Commission
claimed “correlation analysis” does not “provide evidence of
the causal economic relationship of interest: namely, whether
fraud or manipulation that impacts spot bitcoin would also
similarly impact CME bitcoin futures contracts.” Grayscale
Order, 87 Fed. Reg. at 40,318 n.224. The Commission’s
explanation is insufficient.

     When approving the bitcoin futures ETPs, the
Commission acknowledged the risk of fraud to bitcoin futures
from “trading outside of the CME bitcoin futures market,” such
as trading in the spot market. Teucrium Order, 87 Fed. Reg. at
21,679; Valkyrie Order, 87 Fed. Reg. at 28,851. This was an
important problem to address for the futures ETPs because
futures markets “are hard to manipulate … because of actual
and potential competition from the cash commodity,” so the
primary risk is often in the spot market. See Frank H.
Easterbrook, Monopoly, Manipulation, and the Regulation of
Futures Markets, 59 J. Bus. S103, S103 (1986). Fraud and
manipulation in the bitcoin spot market pose a similar risk to
both futures and spot products. Because the spot bitcoin market
and the CME bitcoin futures market are so tightly correlated, a
price distortion in the spot market will be reflected in the price
of the futures market. After all, futures are derivatives of the
spot market.

    The SEC did not suggest the 99.9 percent correlation was
coincidence or caused by some third variable. We recognize
the basic principle that mere correlation does not equal
causation. But here the correlation was based on the logical and
                                16
mathematical connection between the spot and futures markets.
In this context, the almost perfect correlation was at least strong
evidence of causation. And the Commission failed to explain
why a surveillance sharing agreement with the CME was
sufficient to protect bitcoin futures ETPs from potential fraud,
but not Grayscale’s proposed bitcoin ETP.

     The Commission also faulted NYSE Arca for failing to
demonstrate the futures market leads the spot market.
Grayscale Order, 87 Fed. Reg. at 40,313. Because evidence of
the lead/lag relationship between the two markets was
“inconclusive,” the Commission doubted the connection
between the two markets. Id. Whatever the reality of the
lead/lag relationship, however, by requiring this evidence from
Grayscale, the Commission failed to treat like cases alike.
When approving the bitcoin futures ETPs, the Commission
found evidence of a lead/lag relationship to be “unnecessary.”
See Teucrium Order, 87 Fed. Reg. at 21,679 n.47; Valkyrie
Order, 87 Fed. Reg. at 28,851 n.43. Yet when rejecting
Grayscale’s bitcoin ETP, the Commission said it considered
“the lead/lag relationship … to be central to understanding
whether it is reasonably likely that a would-be manipulator of
a spot bitcoin ETP would need to trade on the … futures
market.” Grayscale Order, 87 Fed. Reg. at 40,313 n.163
(emphasis added). The Commission offered no compelling
reason why the lead/lag relationship between spot and futures
bitcoin markets was central for assessing the potential for fraud
and manipulation of bitcoin ETPs and yet unnecessary for
assessing bitcoin futures ETPs.

    When denying Grayscale under the first prong of the
significant market test, the Commission failed to reasonably
explain why it approved the listing of two bitcoin futures ETPs
but not Grayscale’s similar proposed bitcoin ETP. Without
                              17
such an explanation, inconsistent treatment of similar products
is arbitrary and capricious.

                              D.

     The Commission also applied the second prong of the
significant market test unreasonably. The Commission
concluded there was a risk that trading in Grayscale would be
“the predominant influence on prices” in the CME bitcoin
futures market and therefore that Grayscale could not meet the
second prong of the significant market test. Id. at 40,313. We
conclude the Commission’s reasons for differentiating
Grayscale from the bitcoin futures ETPs again fall short.

                              1.

     First, the Commission failed to explain how the proposed
Grayscale bitcoin ETP would be the predominant influence on
the price of bitcoin futures traded on the CME. The
Commission’s primary argument appears to be that because
Grayscale had substantial assets, valued at “approximately $30
billion,” with potential for further growth, Grayscale might
dwarf the CME market for bitcoin futures, which had
“approximately $1.7 billion” of open contracts. Id. at 40,314.
The Commission also expressed concern about the relative
trading volume between Grayscale and the CME bitcoin
futures market. According to the Commission, Grayscale
provided no explanation for “why a single bitcoin ETP with
trading volume close to one-quarter that of the CME bitcoin
futures market [was] not likely to be the predominant influence
on prices in that market.” Id.

    The Commission, however, did not adequately connect the
value of Grayscale’s assets to the conclusion that those assets
would influence prices in the CME futures market. Because
Grayscale owns no futures contracts, trading in Grayscale can
                               18
affect the futures market only through the spot market. See
Brief of Amicus Curiae NYSE Arca for Petitioner 17 (“[T]he
only way in which the Trust could conceivably be the
predominant influence on prices in that market is by virtue of
its effect on prices in the bitcoin spot market.”). But Grayscale
holds just 3.4 percent of outstanding bitcoin, and the
Commission did not suggest Grayscale can dominate the price
of bitcoin. In light of these economic realities, the Commission
should have explained why it considered the relevant
comparison to be the value of Grayscale’s assets as a
percentage of the total value of the CME bitcoin futures
market. Simply faulting NYSE Arca for not directly addressing
that ratio was neither “reasonable” nor “reasonably explained.”
See Prometheus Radio Project, 141 S. Ct. at 1158. An agency
may ask a regulated party for further information, but such
requests must be reasonably related to the relevant regulatory
standards.

     The Commission also expressed concern that Grayscale
underestimated its potential for growth if approved as an ETP,
and that if such growth occurred the ETP could overwhelm the
futures market. Grayscale Order, 87 Fed. Reg. at 40,313–14.
Yet the Commission did not adequately justify this concern in
light of the record before it. As the Commission acknowledged,
Grayscale owns only 3.4 percent of outstanding bitcoin. Id. at
40,314. And bitcoin is a deep and liquid market. One comment
included evidence that bitcoin had an average daily trading
volume of “approximately $45 billion, which … is
significantly higher than that of the largest equity stocks.” Id.
at 40,304. This is the kind of evidence the Commission has
repeatedly relied on to approve other ETPs. See, e.g., Gold
Order, 69 Fed. Reg. 64,614, 64,619 (Nov. 5, 2004) (approving
a gold ETP in part because the spot market was “extremely
deep and liquid”). The Commission did not explain why
Grayscale underestimating the growth potential of its spot
                               19
assets posed a threat to the CME’s bitcoin futures market,
which is the market under surveillance.

     Moreover, the Commission dismissed evidence that could
have mitigated concerns about Grayscale growing to have the
predominant influence on bitcoin prices. Because future
inflows cannot be predicted, NYSE Arca compared the
“historical inflows” of bitcoins into Grayscale to bitcoin’s
“market capitalization.” Grayscale Order, 87 Fed. Reg. at
40,313. The comparison showed that while Grayscale
experienced nearly $7 billion of inflows over a two-year
period, “the market capitalization of bitcoin grew by $721
billion” during the same time period. Id. This evidence
suggested Grayscale was unlikely to dominate prices because
the spot bitcoin market was huge and growing faster than
Grayscale. In addition, the record included evidence that,
among “global commodity ETPs,” Grayscale would “rank
fourth … in assets under management and seventh in … trading
volume,” so its size was not unusually large. See id. at 40,313
n.168. By presenting this evidence, Grayscale and NYSE Arca
sought to demonstrate that Grayscale’s ETP would have a
minimal impact on the bitcoin spot price because of its
relatively small share of the large and fast-growing bitcoin
market.

     Grayscale’s      evidence      directly    addressed     the
Commission’s concerns—if trading in Grayscale has a minimal
impact on the price of bitcoin, it necessarily follows that
trading in Grayscale will have a minimal impact on bitcoin
futures. If the Commission thought these economic realities do
not hold true for the bitcoin market such that trading in
Grayscale would be the predominant influence on the CME
futures market, it failed to sufficiently explain this conclusion
in light of the record.
                              20
                               2.

     The Commission also failed to treat like cases alike under
the second prong of the significant market test. With respect to
the bitcoin futures ETPs, the Commission found the second
prong was satisfied because “the CME bitcoin futures market
ha[d] progressed and matured significantly,” so trading on a
single ETP was unlikely to be the predominant influence on the
CME. Teucrium Order, 87 Fed. Reg. at 21,680 (cleaned up);
see also Valkyrie Order, 87 Fed. Reg. at 28,853 (recognizing
“the maturation of the CME bitcoin futures market”). This
reason, however, applies equally to Grayscale.

     The Teucrium and Valkyrie bitcoin futures ETPs hold
assets that trade on the CME, namely bitcoin futures contracts.
When explaining why trading in these ETPs would not
predominantly influence prices in the CME futures market, the
Commission focused on the robustness of that market. The
Commission emphasized the size and liquidity of the CME
futures market, finding that “nearly every measurable metric
related to” bitcoin futures had “trended consistently up.”
Teucrium Order, 87 Fed. Reg. at 21,680. Trading in bitcoin
futures increased from $737 million in December 2017 to $44.6
billion in December 2021. Id. at 21,680–81. As the
Commission concluded, the CME was a “large futures market,”
and so there was little reason to think trading of a single ETP
would be the predominant influence on prices in that market.
Id. at 21,680.

     The Commission failed to explain why this reasoning does
not similarly apply to Grayscale. NYSE Arca has the same
surveillance sharing agreement with the CME, and the CME
bitcoin futures market is robust, as the Commission recognized
in its previous orders. Because the spot market is deeper and
more liquid than the futures market, manipulation should be
                                21
more difficult, not less. The Commission’s reasons for
approving the Teucrium and Valkyrie ETPs seem to apply
equally to Grayscale, but Grayscale’s listing was denied.
Lacking a “reasonable and coherent explanation for the[se]
seemingly inconsistent results,” the Commission’s order in this
case is arbitrary and capricious. Baltimore Gas, 954 F.3d at
286; see also Cnty. of L.A. v. Shalala, 192 F.3d 1005, 1022
(D.C. Cir. 1999) (“An agency action is arbitrary when the
agency offers insufficient reasons for treating similar situations
differently.”) (cleaned up).

                              ***

    To avoid arbitrariness and caprice, administrative
adjudication must be consistent and predictable, following the
basic principle that similar cases should be treated similarly.
NYSE Arca presented substantial evidence that Grayscale is
similar, across the relevant regulatory factors, to bitcoin futures
ETPs. The Commission failed to adequately explain why it
approved the listing of two bitcoin futures ETPs but not
Grayscale’s proposed bitcoin ETP. In the absence of a coherent
explanation, this unlike regulatory treatment of like products is
unlawful. We therefore grant Grayscale’s petition for review
and vacate the Commission’s order.

                                                      So ordered.