Court Opinion

ID: 9908744
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-11 18:06:00.67826+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:29.700487
License: Public Domain

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
                         Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

                                STATE OF MINNESOTA
                                IN COURT OF APPEALS
                                      A23-0931

          In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: N. L. and B. Y., Parents.

                                 Filed December 11, 2023
                                         Affirmed
                                      Johnson, Judge

                              Redwood County District Court
                                  File No. 64-JV-23-1

Brooke Beskau Warg, Hennepin County Adult Representation Services, Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for appellant-mother N.L.)

Jenna M. Peterson, Redwood County Attorney, Redwood Falls, Minnesota; and

Travis J. Smith, Special Assistant County Attorney, Slayton, Minnesota (for respondent
Southwest Health and Human Services)

Shanna Latterell, Marshall, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

         Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Frisch,

Judge.

                            NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

JOHNSON, Judge

         The district court terminated a woman’s parental rights to four children. We

conclude that the district court did not err by finding that the county made reasonable

efforts to reunite her with the children or by finding that the petitioner proved a statutory

ground for termination. Therefore, we affirm.
                                         FACTS

       N.L. is the biological mother of four minor children: K.F.Y., who was born in

August 2012; B.S.Y., who was born in June 2014; Z.N.Y., who was born in November

2015; and K.L.Y., who was born in July 2019.

       In July 2021, law-enforcement officers conducted a warranted search of a rural

home near the city of Walnut Grove, where N.L. lived with the four children and their

biological father, B.Y. The officers found a variety of contraband, including loaded and

unloaded firearms, ammunition, methamphetamine, and unknown pills. Both N.L. and

B.Y. were charged with criminal offenses, including unlawful possession of firearms and

controlled substances.

       The matter was reported to Southwest Health and Human Services (SWHHS), a

health-and-human-services agency serving multiple counties in southwest Minnesota.

SWHHS met with N.L. and B.Y. to discuss the welfare of their children, but the parents

were uncooperative. SWHHS social workers documented several unsuccessful attempts

to work with the parents voluntarily between October 2021 and March 2022.

       On March 25, 2022, SWHHS petitioned the district court for a determination that

the children were in need of protection or services (CHIPS). SWHHS obtained hair-follicle

samples from the four children on April 8, 2022, which indicated that three of the children

had “extremely high levels of amphetamine and methamphetamine.” At an emergency-

protective-care hearing on April 12, 2022, the district court ordered that the children be

placed in foster care.

                                            2
       On April 19, 2022, the district court ordered the parents to follow case plans. N.L.

signed four case plans—one for each child—in late May 2022. N.L.’s case plans included

five areas of need: chemical health, mental health, parenting education, home environment,

and visitation/parenting time.

       The district court held an intermediate-disposition hearing in late May 2022. The

district court ordered that legal custody of the children remain with SWHHS for placement

in a licensed foster-care home. The district court allowed N.L. and B.Y. to have supervised

visits with the children.

       Between April and June of 2022, N.L. attended some supervised visits with the

children at a visitation center but was late on 13 occasions and did not show up on several

other occasions. In addition, the children reacted negatively after the visits with N.L. The

visitation center suspended both parents’ visits on July 6, 2022, because they continually

violated the center’s policies. The district court later granted SWHHS’s motion to suspend

N.L.’s right to supervised visits.

       On October 4, 2022, the district court held a permanency-progress-review hearing.

The district court found that N.L. had not made progress on her case plan and that the

permanency deadlines should not be extended. The district court ordered SWHHS to file

a permanency petition.

       The next day, N.L. began an intensive outpatient substance-abuse treatment

program at Club Recovery. But she stopped attending treatment a few weeks later and was

discharged from the program. On November 28, 2022, N.L. started a chemical-dependency

                                             3
treatment program and parenting classes at the Healing House. She remained there until

she and SWHHS learned that it was not a licensed treatment facility.

       On January 6, 2023, SWHHS petitioned for the termination of N.L.’s and B.Y.’s

parental rights. SWHHS alleged five statutory grounds for termination. See Minn. Stat.

§ 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(1), (2), (4), (5), (8) (2022). Before trial, B.Y. stipulated to the

voluntary termination of his parental rights.

       The case was tried on three days in April 2023. SWHHS called seven witnesses,

including N.L. In May 2023, the district court filed a 41-page order in which it found that

SWHHS had proved four statutory grounds for termination, that SWHHS had made

reasonable efforts to reunite N.L. with the children, and that termination of her parental

rights was in the children’s best interests. Accordingly, the district court granted SWHHS’s

petition and terminated N.L.’s parental rights to all four children. N.L. later filed a motion

for amended findings or a new trial, which the district court denied. N.L. appeals.

                                        DECISION

       N.L. argues that the district court erred by granting SWHHS’s petition and

terminating her parental rights. She raises three issues.

       This court reviews an order terminating parental rights “to determine whether the

district court’s findings address the statutory criteria and whether the district court’s

findings are supported by substantial evidence and are not clearly erroneous.” In re

Welfare of Children of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008). “Parental rights are

terminated only for grave and weighty reasons,” In re Welfare of M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d 370,

                                                4
375 (Minn. 1990), but this court gives “considerable deference to the district court’s

decision to terminate parental rights,” S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 385.

       We apply a clear-error standard of review to a district court’s findings of historical

fact and an abuse-of-discretion standard of review to a district court’s determinations

concerning the existence of statutory grounds for termination, the children’s best interests,

and the ultimate decision to terminate parental rights. In re Welfare of Children of J.R.B.,

805 N.W.2d 895, 901 (Minn. App. 2011), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012); In re Welfare

of Child of A.M.C., 920 N.W.2d 648, 657 (Minn. App. 2018).

                                   I. Reasonable Efforts

       We begin by considering N.L.’s argument that the district court erred by finding

that SWHHS made reasonable efforts to reunite N.L. with the children.

       After a CHIPS adjudication, a social-services agency “shall ensure that reasonable

efforts . . . are made to prevent placement or to eliminate the need for removal and to

reunite the child with the child’s family at the earliest possible time.” Minn. Stat.

§ 260.012(a) (2022). In a proceeding to terminate parental rights, the district court “shall

make specific findings . . . that reasonable efforts to finalize the permanency plan to reunify

the child and the parent were made including individualized and explicit findings regarding

the nature and extent of efforts made by the social services agency to rehabilitate the parent

and reunite the family.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 8(1). In determining whether a

social-services agency made reasonable efforts, the district court “shall consider” various

statutory factors. Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h) (2022). The reasonable efforts required of a

county social service agency depend on the facts and circumstances of the case. See In re

                                              5
Children of T.A.A., 702 N.W.2d 703, 709 (Minn. 2005); A.M.C., 920 N.W.2d at 663. This

court applies a clear-error standard of review to a finding that a county made reasonable

efforts to reunite a parent with a child. See S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 387.

       N.L.’s first argument has three parts, which we address in turn.

                                             A.

       N.L. first contends that the district court erred by discussing the reasonable-efforts

issue in the memorandum attached to its order, not in the body of the order. N.L. does not

cite any caselaw for the proposition that it is improper for a district court to do so. We are

aware of caselaw stating that a district court’s reasons for its decision may be expressed in

a memorandum that is attached to an order, so long as the memorandum is made part of

the order. See, e.g., Merriman v. Sandeen, 267 N.W.2d 714, 716 n.5 (Minn. 1978); Viking

Automatic Sprinkler Co. v. Viking Fire Prot. Co., 159 N.W.2d 250, 256 (Minn. 1968);

Anderson v. Jennie, 80 N.W.2d 41, 42-44 (Minn. 1956). Even if a memorandum is not

made part of an order, an appellate court may refer to the memorandum “for the purpose

of throwing light upon or explaining a decision.” Merriman, 267 N.W.2d at 716 n.5; see

also Sieren v. American Family Fin. Srvcs., Inc., 356 N.W.2d 408, 410-11 (Minn. App.

1984), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 6, 1985); cf. Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01 & 1985 advisory comm.

note (permitting findings of fact and conclusions of law “in an accompanying

memorandum”). In this case, the district court’s order concludes with the following

statement: “The attached memorandum is incorporated herein by reference.” The district

court did not err by discussing the reasonable-efforts issue in the memorandum attached to

its order.

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                                              B.

       N.L. also contends that the district court erred on the ground that its findings related

to SWHHS’s efforts are lacking in specificity. N.L. focuses on this paragraph:

                      In the present case, given the needs of the parent and
              children, the efforts expended by SWHHS were reasonable and
              were specifically directed at correcting the conditions leading
              to children’s placement.          Mother has struggled with
              methamphetamine addiction, and the treatment and random
              testing were attempts to provide her with the resources and
              accountability necessary to obtain and retain sobriety. She
              often curtly denied or specifically ignored numerous attempts
              at testing, and actively resisted appropriate treatment
              opportunities. Similarly, parent education, therapy and
              parenting classes were directed specifically at parenting
              deficiencies (particularly supervision) necessary to safely
              parent these children. Her failure to engage in treatment
              frustrated these opportunities. The additional supportive
              services (foster care, financial assistance, supervised parenting
              time, and others) were intended to remove barriers the parents
              might experience in accessing more important services -
              making them more realistic, available and accessible. The
              services provided to mother were “reasonable efforts.”

       The paragraph identified by N.L. is merely a summary of the district court’s

discussion of the reasonable-efforts issue. In its order, the district court wrote 164

paragraphs of findings of fact spanning 24 pages. Many of those findings describe

SWHHS’s efforts to assist N.L. in complying with her case plan and in being reunited with

the children. More specifically, the district court’s findings describe SWHHS’s efforts to

help N.L. obtain treatment, participate in a parenting program, complete home inspections,

and engage in supervised visits with the children. Considering the order and memorandum

as a whole, the district court did not fail to make “specific findings . . . that reasonable

efforts to finalize the permanency plan to reunify the child and the parent were made” or

                                              7
to make “individualized and explicit findings regarding the nature and extent of efforts

made by the social services agency to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family.” See

Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 8(1).

                                              C.

       N.L. further contends that, for three reasons, the district court erred by finding that

SWHHS made reasonable efforts.

       First, N.L. contends that “SWHHS failed to ensure Mother’s home was safe and

suitable for her and her children as required under the case plan or, alternatively, assist her

in finding suitable housing.”       In response, SWHHS contends that it was N.L.’s

responsibility—not the agency’s—to do the work necessary to clean her home so that the

children could return.

       N.L.’s case plan required her to “maintain stable, clean, and sober housing free from

any hazardous or dangerous items.” The district court found that a SWHHS social worker

coordinated with N.L. to schedule an environmental consultant’s inspection of her home,

which found the presence of methamphetamine residue in ten locations. The district court

also found that SWHHS personnel visited N.L.’s residence in late June 2022 for a follow-

up inspection, during which N.L. said that she did not intend to do additional cleaning

because she intended to sell the home. These findings are supported by the social worker’s

testimony and by SWHHS’s exhibits. The district court did not clearly err by finding that

SWHHS made reasonable efforts to assist N.L. in complying with the requirement that she

maintain a home free of the hazards of methamphetamine residue.

                                              8
         Second, N.L. contends that “SWHHS failed to assist [her] in finding a treatment

center that would allow her children to stay with her in later stages of the case.” In

response, SWHHS contends that it had no obligation to find such a treatment facility while

N.L.’s supervised visits were suspended.

         N.L.’s case plan required her to undergo a chemical-dependency assessment and

follow its recommendations. The case plan states that SWHHS would “make referrals as

needed, discuss recommendations and any barriers,” and “discuss solutions and assist

[N.L.] to work around the concerns.” The district court found that N.L. completed a

comprehensive chemical-use assessment, which resulted from SWHHS’s referral. The

district court also found that SWHHS discussed with N.L. the need and options for

treatment on at least six occasions. These findings are supported by the social workers’

testimony and case notes. The evidence does not show that SWHHS assumed an obligation

to find a treatment facility that would allow the children to live with N.L. N.L.’s supervised

visits with the children were suspended after September 2022, except for one visit by

videoconference in January 2023, after which supervised visits again were suspended. As

SWHHS argues, because N.L. did not have a right to visit the children during the relevant

time period, there would have been no value in the type of facility N.L. describes in her

brief.

         Third, N.L. contends that “SWHHS failed to timely advise mother that the treatment

facility she chose was inadequate and then assist [her] in finding another treatment

facility.” In response, SWHHS contends that N.L. disregarded SWHHS’s recommended

treatment providers and insisted on finding her own treatment providers. SWHHS further

                                              9
contends, and the district court found, that SWHHS learned that the Healing House is

unlicensed at the same time that N.L. learned of that fact. The district court’s finding is

supported by the testimony of the social-work supervisor, who testified that Healing

House’s unlicensed status became apparent when she visited N.L. there in March 2023.

She also testified that SWHHS made efforts to help N.L. obtain treatment before then, such

as by contacting treatment facilities and talking with N.L. about returning to inpatient

treatment.

       In sum, the district court did not err by finding that SWHHS made reasonable efforts

to reunite N.L. with the children.

                         II. Statutory Grounds for Termination

       We continue by considering N.L.’s argument that the district court erred by finding

that the county proved four statutory grounds for the termination of her parental rights. We

begin with the second ground identified by the district court, that “reasonable efforts, under

the direction of the court, have failed to correct the conditions leading to the child[ren]’s

placement.” See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5).

       The district court noted that N.L.’s case plan focused on “five primary areas of need:

(a) chemical health; (b) mental health; (c) parenting education; (d) home environment; and

(e) visitation/parenting time.” The district court made 55 paragraphs of findings of fact

concerning N.L.’s compliance with her case plan with respect to the five primary areas of

need. Specifically, the district court found that N.L.’s goals with respect to her mental

health were “partially met” and that her goals with respect to the other four areas were not

met.

                                             10
       N.L. first contends that SWHHS did not make reasonable efforts to reunite her with

the children. But we have concluded that SWHHS made such efforts. See supra part I.

       N.L. also contends that the conditions that led to the out-of-home placement “have

been addressed.” She argues that the district court overlooked evidence that she had

participated in treatment programs and had not tested positive for controlled substances

during the four-and-one-half-month period preceding trial. The district court found that

N.L.’s last positive test result was in November 2022. The district court also found that

N.L. had not completed a chemical-dependency treatment program and that, only three

weeks before trial, she had started a new program that would require four to five months

to complete. The district court concluded that N.L. “has failed to meaningfully address her

obvious and severe chemical abuse.” These findings are supported by the evidence.

      N.L. also asserts that she had made some progress in therapy and in a parenting-

education course. The district court acknowledged her progress. But her progress was not

enough to avoid a finding that the conditions that led to the children’s out-of-home

placement had not been corrected.

      N.L. further contends the evidence does not support the district court’s finding that

she had not addressed the methamphetamine contamination of her home. She cites her

testimony that she did the required cleaning and that SWHHS representatives had not

inspected the home to confirm her remediation work. The April 19, 2022 court order

required N.L. to “open [her] home to SWHHS to address any environmental hazards and

comply with an in-home inspection to ensure there is no controlled substance residue in

the home.” The environmental report summarizing the inspection required “whole-house

                                            11
ventilation system remediation” and stated that the “HVAC system should be cleaned

thoroughly by professional personnel.” At trial, N.L. initially testified that she personally

cleaned the ventilation ducts but, two days later, testified that she hired a professional

cleaning company to clean the ducts, without informing SWHHS that she had hired the

company. A SWHHS social worker testified that the ducts and furnace had not been

cleaned.   Thus, the district court’s finding that N.L. did not complete the required

remediation is supported by the evidence.

       N.L. makes no argument that the fifth condition—described in the district court’s

order as “visitation/parenting time”—was corrected.

       N.L. further contends that the district court erred by relying too much on her past

history and not enough on the conditions that existed at the time of trial. She asserts that a

district court should rely “not primarily on past history, but to a great extent upon the

projected permanency of the parent’s inability to care for his or her child.” In re Welfare

of S.Z., 547 N.W.2d 886, 893 (Minn. 1996) (quotations omitted). That statement in the

S.Z. opinion was made in the context of a review of a district court’s finding of palpable

unfitness. Id. The statutory ground at issue here—that reasonable efforts have failed to

correct the conditions that led to the child’s out-of-home placement—is different and is

inherently focused on the conditions as they existed at the time of trial. Furthermore, the

district court’s findings are appropriately focused on N.L.’s situation as it existed at the

time of trial. The district court referred to N.L.’s past history only in limited ways, as

necessary to put N.L.’s current status in context.

                                             12
       We acknowledge our recent nonprecedential opinion in In re Welfare of Child of

T.R.T., No. A22-0539, 2022 WL 9613322 (Minn. App. Oct. 17, 2022), in which we

reversed the termination of the appellant’s parental rights and remanded for further

proceedings on the ground that the district court erred in determining that adverse

conditions would continue for a prolonged, indeterminate period. Id. at *10. The evidence

in that case was meaningfully different from the evidence in this case for several reasons.

The appellant in T.R.T. had fully completed all parts of her case plan; she had completed a

chemical-dependency evaluation, inpatient treatment, and outpatient aftercare. Id. at *6.

In this case, however, N.L. has not completed any of the five main parts of her case plan.

In addition, N.L. has failed to correct additional conditions that were not present in T.R.T.,

namely, the unsafe conditions of her home and her lack of parenting skills. Accordingly,

we reach a different conclusion than in T.R.T.

       Thus, the district court did not err by determining that reasonable efforts had failed

to correct the conditions that led to the out-of-home placement.

       A district court may terminate parental rights based on the existence of only one

statutory ground for termination. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b). Likewise, an

appellate court may affirm “if at least one statutory ground alleged in the petition is

supported by clear and convincing evidence.” In re Welfare of Children of T.R., 750

N.W.2d 656, 661 (Minn. 2008). Having concluded that the district court did not err by

finding that reasonable efforts had failed to correct the conditions that led to the out-of-

home placement, we need not consider N.L.’s challenges to the district court’s conclusions

on the three other statutory grounds.

                                             13
                                 III. Conversion to CHIPS

       N.L. last argues that the district court erred by not converting the permanency case

to a CHIPS case. She relies on the following statute:

                      If, after a hearing, the court does not terminate parental
               rights but determines that the child is in need of protection or
               services, or that the child is neglected and in foster care, the
               court may find the child is in need of protection or services or
               neglected and in foster care and may enter an order in
               accordance with the provisions of section 260C.201.

Minn. Stat. § 260C.312(a) (2022). She also cites the following procedural rule:

                       If the court finds that the statutory grounds set forth in
               the petition are not proved, the court shall either dismiss the
               petition or determine that the child is in need of protection or
               services. If the court determines that the child is in need of
               protection or services, the court shall either enter or withhold
               adjudication pursuant to Rule 50 and schedule further
               proceedings pursuant to Rule 51. If the court finds that one or
               more statutory grounds set forth in the termination of parental
               rights petition are proved, the court may terminate parental
               rights.

Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.04(c)(1).

       N.L.’s argument fails because it depends on a condition precedent that is not

satisfied.   Both the statute and the rule provide that a district court may convert a

termination case to a CHIPS case if the district court has not granted the termination

petition. Neither the statute nor the rule authorizes a district court to convert a termination

case to a CHIPS case if a petitioner has proved statutory grounds for termination and the

district court has terminated parental rights. Because the district court in this case found

that SWHHS proved four statutory grounds and granted its termination petition, the district

court did not have authority to convert the case to a CHIPS case.

                                              14
       In sum, the district court did not err by granting SWHHS’s petition and terminating

N.L.’s parental rights.

       Affirmed.

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