Court Opinion

ID: 9940578
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-14 19:12:56.599475+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:45:03.331240
License: Public Domain

J-S03008-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :          PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :
 BRANDON ROSS SNYDER                      :
                                          :
                    Appellant             :     No. 1384 MDA 2023

         Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered September 25, 2023
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-54-CR-0001511-2017

BEFORE: OLSON, J., NICHOLS, J., and BECK, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                         FILED: FEBRUARY 14, 2024

      Appellant, Brandon Ross Snyder, appeals pro se from the order entered

on September 25, 2023, dismissing his third petition filed pursuant to the Post

Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9541-9546 (PCRA). We affirm.

      Previously, we summarized the facts and procedural history of this case

as follows. “On April 3, 2019, a jury convicted Appellant of one count each of

aggravated assault - police officer, resisting arrest or other law enforcement,

criminal mischief – real or personal property, and two counts each of simple

assault and harassment.    [18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a)(3), 5104, 3304(a)(5),

2701(a)(1), 2709(a)(1), respectively].”       See Commonwealth v. Snyder,

2020 WL 1245129, at *1 (Pa. Super. 2020) (non-precedential decision). On

May 17, 2019, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of

three to six years of imprisonment.     Id.     Appellant filed a timely pro se

post-sentence motion on May 22, 2019.           Id.   Appellant’s “judgment of
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sentence became an appealable final order following the entry of the trial

court's May 24, 2019 [o]rder denying his pro se post-sentence [m]otion.” Id.

Therefore, Appellant had until June 24, 2019 to file a timely notice of appeal.

Id. Instead, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition three days later, on June

27, 2019. Id.    “On July 11, 2019, the PCRA court denied [Appellant’s] pro

se PCRA [p]etition based on its mistaken belief that his pro se post-sentence

[m]otion was still pending.”      Id.    However, on appeal, we noted that

Appellant’s “pro se PCRA [p]etition was, in fact, timely filed after his judgment

of sentence became final” and we remanded for “the appointment of counsel

and consideration of his [PCRA] claims.”      Id.   The PCRA court appointed

counsel and held an evidentiary hearing on November 5, 2020.                See

Commonwealth v. Snyder, 262 A.3d 508, at *3 (Pa. Super. 2021)

(non-precedential decision).     On December 30, 2020, the PCRA court

dismissed Appellant’s PCRA petition and Appellant timely appealed. Id. at *4.

On August 17, 2021, we affirmed the dismissal of Appellant’s first PCRA

petition and permitted appointed counsel to withdraw. Id. at *6. Appellant

did not appeal that determination.

      On September 7, 2021, Appellant filed a second PCRA petition alleging

PCRA counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel.        On January 18,

2022, Appellant filed another PCRA petition “that the PCRA court treated [] as

an amendment to his September 7, 2021 petition.”           Commonwealth v.

Snyder, 289 A.3d 60, at *1 (Pa. Super. 2022) (non-precedential decision).

“On April 20, 2022, the PCRA court entered an order and opinion dismissing

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Appellant's January 18, 2022 PCRA petition [and finding] Appellant had raised

claims that were previously litigated in Appellant's first PCRA petition and

indicated that this Court had properly allowed [prior PCRA counsel] to

withdraw on collateral appeal.”    Id. at *2.   On November 10, 2022, we

affirmed the PCRA court’s decision on different grounds, recognizing that

Appellant’s second PCRA petition was untimely and that he did not invoke any

of the exceptions to the PCRA’s one-year jurisdictional timing requirement.

Id. at *2-3. Our Supreme Court thereafter denied Appellant’s petition for

allowance of appeal. See Commonwealth v. Snyder, 298 A.3d 380 (Pa.

2023).

      On August 16, 2023, Appellant filed the instant pro se motion, alleging

his innocence, which the PCRA court treated as a third PCRA petition. On

September 25, 2023, after giving requisite notice and a chance to respond

under Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, the PCRA court issued an order and opinion

dismissing Appellant’s petition without an evidentiary hearing.     The PCRA

court concluded that Appellant’s claims were either previously litigated or

waived. Appellant filed a timely pro se notice of appeal on October 2, 2023.

      Before examining the merits of Appellant’s appeal, we note that

Appellant’s “judgment of sentence became final on June 24, 2019 and

Appellant was required to file a timely [PCRA] petition within one year of that

date.”   Snyder, 289 A.3d 60, at *2.       As such, Appellant’s current PCRA

petition filed in August 2023 is patently untimely.        See 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 9545(b)(1) (Generally, a PCRA petition “including a second or subsequent

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petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment of sentence

becomes final.”); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3) (“A judgment of

sentence becomes final at the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of

the time for seeking the review.”).            Pennsylvania courts may consider an

untimely PCRA petition if the petitioner expressly pleads and proves one of

the three exceptions enumerated in Section 9545(b)(1), which include: (1)

the petitioner's inability to raise a claim as a result of governmental

interference; (2) the discovery of previously unknown facts that would have

supported a claim; or (3) a newly-recognized constitutional right that has been

held to apply retroactively by the Supreme Court of the United States or the

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii); see also

Commonwealth v. Beasley, 741 A.2d 1258, 1261 (Pa. 1999).                     Here,

Appellant was required to plead and prove that one of the PCRA’s timeliness

exceptions applied in order to overcome the PCRA time-bar; in fact, Appellant

does not meaningfully discuss the PCRA’s timeliness exceptions at all.1
____________________________________________

1 Appellant makes a passing reference to the governmental interference
exception set forth at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i), appearing to suggest that
he validly invoked Section § 9545(b)(1)(i) because the court refused to grant
recusal and counsel failed to litigate the issue. See Appellant’s Brief at 4-10.
Appellant, however, has not explained how the actions of counsel or the court
interfered with his efforts to raise the issues presented in the instant petition
previously.    Hence, we reject Appellant’s bald effort to invoke the
governmental interference exception, as neither the PCRA court nor counsel
can generally be viewed as government officials for purposes of 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9545(b)(1)(i). See Commonwealth v. Yarris, 731 A.2d 581, 587 (Pa.
1999) (noting that Section 9545(b)(4) excludes defense counsel as
government officials); see also Commonwealth v. Quinn, 276 A.3d 232,
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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“[E]ven where the PCRA court does not address the applicability of the PCRA

timing mandate, this Court will consider the issue sua sponte, as it is a

threshold question implicating our subject matter jurisdiction and ability to

grant the requested relief.” Commonwealth v. Beatty, 207 A.3d 957, 961

(Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted).          Even though the PCRA court found

Appellant’s issues had been previously litigated or waived, we may affirm on

any basis appearing of record. See Commonwealth v. Reese, 31 A.3d 708,

727 (Pa. Super. 2011) (en banc). Here, we affirm the PCRA court’s dismissal

order because Appellant’s third petition for collateral relief was patently

untimely and he failed to establish that the filing was subject to an exception

found at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).

       Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 2/14/2024

____________________________________________

*2-*3 (Pa. Super. 2022) (non-precedential decision) (rejecting petitioner’s
effort to invoke governmental interference exception found at Section
9545(b)(1)(i) based upon PCRA court’s disposition of prior petitions).

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