Court Opinion

ID: 9939830
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-12 21:08:18.804379+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:42:01.669584
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Tucker, 2024-Ohio-516.]

                       IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                           THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                SENECA COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,
                                                          CASE NO. 13-23-17
       PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

       v.

LUKAS A. TUCKER,                                          OPINION

       DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

                  Appeal from Seneca County Common Pleas Court
                            Trial Court No. 22 CR 0215

                                      Judgment Affirmed

                           Date of Decision: February 12, 2024

APPEARANCES:

        Brian A. Smith for Appellant

        Stephanie J. Kiser for Appellee
Case No. 13-23-17

ZIMMERMAN, J.

       {¶1} Defendant-appellant, Lukas A. Tucker (“Tucker”), appeals the June 27,

2023 judgment entry of conviction and sentencing of the Seneca County Common

Pleas Court after Tucker was found guilty by a jury of failure to comply with an

order or signal of police officer. For the following reasons, we affirm.

       {¶2} The case stems from Fostoria Police Department Officer Kyle

Reinbolt’s (“Reinbolt”) observation of Tucker while driving his (Tucker’s)

motorcycle on October 16, 2022. Reinbolt (who was familiar with Tucker from

previous law-enforcement involvement) ran Tucker’s information through dispatch.

After learning that Tucker had an active bench warrant and no operator’s license,

Reinbolt attempted to initiate a traffic stop. However, Tucker failed to comply with

Reinbolt’s audible and visual signals to stop. Thereafter, a high-speed pursuit

ensued reaching speeds in excess of 100 miles per hour (“mph”).             Reinbolt

eventually terminated the pursuit for safety reasons. However, Reinbolt was later

able to make contact with Tucker who was ultimately arrested on the instant offense.

       {¶3} On October 26, 2022, Tucker was indicted by the Seneca County Grand

Jury on one count of failure to comply with an order or signal of a police officer in

violation of R.C. 2921.331(B), (C)(5)(a)(ii), a third-degree felony. On November

9, 2022, Tucker entered a plea of not guilty in the trial court.

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Case No. 13-23-17

       {¶4} Tucker proceeded to a jury trial on May 30, 2023, wherein he was found

guilty of failure to comply. The jury further found that Tucker did cause a

substantial risk of serious physical harm to persons or property. Thereafter, the trial

court sentenced Tucker to an 18-month prison term.

       {¶5} Tucker timely appeals his case and raises two assignments of error for

our review, which we will address out of order for ease of discussion.

                           Second Assignment of Error

       Because the evidence was needlessly cumulative and because its
       probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of
       unfair prejudice, the trial court abused its discretion in admitting
       State’s Exhibits 2 through 5, the photographs purporting to be of
       Appellant’s Facebook posts.

       {¶6} In Tucker’s second assignment of error, he argues that the trial court

erred by admitting State’s Exhibits 2 through 5 (i.e., photographs of Tucker’s

motorcycle posted on his Facebook profile).         Specifically, he asserts that the

photographs should have been excluded under Evid.R. 403 since he argues there is

a danger of unfair prejudice and because they were cumulative.

                                 Standard of Review

       {¶7} “Generally, ‘[a] trial court is given broad discretion in admitting and

excluding evidence * * *.” State v. Wendel, 3d Dist. Union No. 14-16-08, 2016-

Ohio-7915, ¶ 23, quoting State v. Williams, 7th Dist. Jefferson No. 11 JE 7, 2013-

Ohio-2314, ¶ 7, citing State v. Maurer, 15 Ohio St.3d 239, 265 (1984).

Consequently, we review a trial court’s admission or exclusion of evidence for an

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Case No. 13-23-17

abuse of discretion. State v. Allsup, 3d Dist. Hardin No. 6-10-09, 2011-Ohio-404,

¶ 16 (Jan. 31, 2011), citing State v. Sage, 31 Ohio St.3d 173, 182 (1987). We will

not disturb the exercise of that discretion absent a showing that the accused has

suffered material prejudice. State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 98 (1978); State v.

Hymore, 9 Ohio St.2d 122, 128 (1967), certiorari denied, 390 U.S. 1024, 88 S.Ct.

1409 (1968). An abuse of discretion suggests that a decision is unreasonable,

arbitrary, or unconscionable. State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151,157 (1980).

       {¶8} However, “if the party wishing to exclude evidence fails to

contemporaneously object at trial when the evidence is presented, that party waives

for appeal all but plain error.” State v. Bagley, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-13-31, 2014-

Ohio-1787, ¶ 53-54, citing State v. Hancock, 108 Ohio St.3d 57, 2006-Ohio-160, ¶

59-60, State v. Barrett, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 03CA2889, 2004-Ohio-2064, ¶ 20, and

State v. Lenoir, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 22239, 2008-Ohio-1984, ¶ 19.

       {¶9} “Crim.R. 52(B) governs plain-error review in criminal cases.” Bagley

at ¶ 55, citing State v. Risner, 73 Ohio App.3d 19, 24 (3d Dist.1991). “We recognize

plain error ‘with the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to

prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.’” State v. Cartlidge, 3d Dist. Seneca No.

13-18-33, 2019-Ohio-1283, ¶ 11, quoting State v. Frye, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-17-30,

2018-Ohio-894, ¶ 94.

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Case No. 13-23-17

                                      Analysis

       {¶10} Initially, we must first determine if Tucker preserved this issue on

appeal. We note that Tucker objected to the admission of State’s Exhibits 2 through

5 arguing that those exhibits were irrelevant. Importantly, Tucker did not raise an

objection at trial under either Evid.R. 403(A)’s or (B)’s balancing test, but rather

lodged his objection under Evid.R. 402. The trial court overruled his objection on

the basis that the photographs were relevant. For this reason, we will review the

admission of these pictures for plain error. Wendel at ¶ 23.

       {¶11} The burden to demonstrate plain error falls upon the party seeking to

assert it. State v. Quarterman, 140 Ohio St.3d 464, 2014-Ohio-4034, ¶ 16; State v.

Hahn, 3d Dist. Henry No. 7-21-02, 2021-Ohio-3789, ¶ 10. Significantly, Tucker

failed to develop a plain-error argument on appeal, and thus, we will not fashion one

for him. See Hahn at ¶ 10, citing State v. Rottman, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-20-1061,

2021-Ohio-1618, ¶ 7. Consequently, we will not address Tucker’s arguments

related to Evid.R. 403(A) or (B).

       {¶12} Accordingly, Tucker’s second assignment of error is overruled.

                            First Assignment of Error

       Because the jury lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage
       of justice in convicting Appellant, Appellant’s conviction for
       Failure to Comply with an Order or Signal of a Police Officer was
       against the manifest weight of the evidence.

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Case No. 13-23-17

        {¶13} In Tucker’s first assignment of error, he argues that his failure-to-

comply conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically, he

asserts that he could not hear nor see the officer’s audible and visual signals to stop.1

                                        Standard of Review

        {¶14} In determining whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of

the evidence, a reviewing court must examine the entire record, “‘weigh[ ] the

evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider[ ] the credibility of witnesses and

determine[ ] whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [trier of fact] clearly

lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction

must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380,

387 (1997), superseded by statute on other grounds, State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d

89 (1997), quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist.1983). But,

we must give due deference to the fact-finder, because

        [t]he fact-finder occupies a superior position in determining
        credibility. The fact-finder can hear and see as well as observe the
        body language, evaluate voice inflections, observe hand gestures,
        perceive the interplay between the witness and the examiner, and
        watch the witness's reaction to exhibits and the like. Determining
        credibility from a sterile transcript is a Herculean endeavor. A
        reviewing court must, therefore, accord due deference to the
        credibility determinations made by the fact-finder.

1
 To the extent Tucker’s argument appears to sound in sufficiency, we need not address his argument since
Tucker's assignment of error concerns the manifest weight of the evidence. See App.R. 12(A)(1)(b); App.R.
16(A)(3).

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Case No. 13-23-17

State v. Williams, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-20-54, 2021-Ohio-1359, ¶ 8, quoting State

v. Dailey, 3d Dist. Crawford, No. 3-07-23, 2008-Ohio-274, ¶ 7, quoting State v.

Thompson, 127 Ohio App.3d 511, 529 (8th Dist.1998). A reviewing court must,

however, allow the trier of fact appropriate discretion on matters relating to the

weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. State v. DeHass, 10

Ohio St.2d 230, 231 (1967). When applying the manifest-weight standard, “[o]nly

in exceptional cases, where the evidence ‘weighs heavily against the conviction,’

should an appellate court overturn the trial court’s judgment.” State v. Haller, 3d

Dist. Allen No. 1-11-34, 2012-Ohio-5233, ¶ 9, quoting State v. Hunter, 131 Ohio

St.3d 67, 2011-Ohio-6524, ¶ 119.

                                       Analysis

       {¶15} Here,    Tucker     is   challenging       the   jury’s   witness-credibility

determination regarding the different versions of the events that Reinbolt and he

testified to at trial regarding the high-speed chase.

       {¶16} Reinbolt testified that he observed Tucker pull up on a yellow sport

bike at a convenience store. He was familiar with Tucker because he had prior law

enforcement involvement with him. When dispatch advised Reinbolt that Tucker’s

operator’s license was suspended, and that Tucker had an active bench warrant out

of Findlay, Reinbolt attempted to initiate a traffic stop by turning on his siren and

his lights. Reinbolt testified (and his dash-cam video corroborates) that Tucker

looked back at Reinbolt over his shoulder and then executed a right turn. (See

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Case No. 13-23-17

State’s Ex. 6). Following that turn, Tucker accelerated the motorcycle reaching

speeds up to 100mph and passing other motorists on the roadway. (Id.).

        {¶17} On the contrary, Tucker testified that he never saw Reinbolt following

him, and that he did not look over his shoulder, but rather was looking at the

roadway. Tucker also testified that since he was wearing earbuds and listening to

loud music and because of the noise of his motorcycle, he could not hear Reinbolt’s

siren even when it was within a few feet of him. (See State’s Ex. 6). Tucker further

testified that he had decreased visibility from his helmet, mirrors, and based upon

the time of day, which prevented him from seeing Reinbolt following him or his

lights. Moreover, Tucker maintained that he accelerated the motorcycle to avoid an

accident with another motorist who appeared to be attempting to assist the officer

(with Tucker’s apprehension), and not to flee or elude from Reinbolt.

        {¶18} Significantly, Tucker also provided other versions of the events to

Reinbolt during the book-in process that were at variance with his trial testimony,

which the jury had the opportunity to observe.2 (See State’s Ex. 7). Ultimately,

Tucker admitted to Reinbolt that he “ran” from him because his operator’s license

was suspended, and that he did not want to go to jail on the Findlay warrant. (Id.).

        {¶19} Based upon our review of the entire record, we conclude that the

evidence supporting the jury’s finding of guilt for failure to comply is of greater

2
  During booking, Tucker initially denied being on the motorcycle in question. Later, he conceded that he
sat on and revved the engine of a yellow sport bike (owned by someone else) while seated in a stationary
position at a convenience store. However, he denied driving the motorcycle off the premises.

                                                  -8-
Case No. 13-23-17

weight than the evidence against it. Additionally, we do not conclude that jury’s

witness-credibility determination was unreasonable. Therefore, we do not conclude

that the jury clearly lost its way, which created a manifest miscarriage of justice

such that Tucker’s failure-to-comply conviction must be reversed and new trial

ordered. Consequently, we conclude that the jury’s finding of guilt for failure to

comply is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

       {¶20} Accordingly, Tucker’s first assignment of error is overruled.

       {¶21} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the

particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                                Judgment Affirmed

WILLAMOWSKI, P.J. and WALDICK, J., concur.

/hls

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