Court Opinion

ID: 9693523
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:47:51.987956+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:48.035809
License: Public Domain

PAIR, Associate Judge, Retired,
dissenting:
The crucial issue in this case — the one my colleagues have declined to address — is not the timeliness of the appeal from the March 19, 1979 order, but rather the appealability of that order in the first place. It is settled now that this court’s jurisdiction is limited to review of final orders and judgments. Butler v. United States, D.C.App., 388 A.2d 883, 885 (1978); Brown v. United States, D.C.App., 379 A.2d 708, 709 (1977); D.C. Code 1973, § 11-721(a). Since it is almost too clear for discussion that no appealable order has been brought here for review,1 I would dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.2
Perhaps it would be helpful, in putting the issue in perspective, to set forth a chronology of the case:
11/ 9/77 Appellant sentenced.
12/22/77 Motion for reduction of sentence filed by appellant’s attorney.
1/23/78 Motion denied.
10/ 2/78 Pro se motion for vacation of sentence and resentencing filed. Motion stressed that attorney failed to file timely notice of appeal.
12/ 5/78 Motion denied without a hearing, but no appeal.
2/ 1/79 Pro se motion to vacate order denying motion for vacation of sentence and resentencing, and to grant a hearing.
3/19/79 Motion denied.
4/10/79 Pro se notice of appeal filed.
5/14/79 Appellate counsel appointed. 10/23/79 Counsel filed motion to vacate sentence.
10/25/79 Motion denied. No appeal.
2/19/80 Appellant’s counsel filed briefs on appeal, but did not appeal 10/25/79 denial of motion to vacate.
*1268The foregoing facts of record are fairly stated in the majority opinion with one very important exception, i.e., the characterization of the February 1, 1979 motion as one for reconsideration of the December 5,1978 order denying appellant’s motion to vacate his sentence. The relief sought by the February 1,1979 motion 3 was not reconsideration, but vacation of the December 5, 1978 order.
No doubt the reason for this unusual procedure was that although D.C.Code 1973, § 23-110(f) conferred upon appellant a right to appeal, he failed to exercise that right. See Brown v. United States, D.C.App., 379 A.2d 708 (1977).
My colleagues reason that by the simple expedient of treating the February 1, 1979 motion as one for reconsideration, they can restore to appellant the right of appeal which he lost. The fallacy of this reasoning is as crystal clear from this record as it was from the record in In re Alexander, D.C.App., 428 A.2d 812 (1981), and the record in United States v. Jones, D.C.App., 423 A.2d 193 (1980). We have held that neither this court nor the trial court may enlarge the time for filing notice of appeal in a criminal case, absent excusable neglect or other compelling circumstances. See Jackson v. United States, D.C.Mun.App., 119 A.2d 721, 722 (1956). As we said in Hargett v. United States, D.C.App., 380 A.2d 1005, 1008-09 (1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 932, 99 S.Ct. 324, 58 L.Ed.2d 327 (1978): “[O]ur rules have been fashioned to provide every opportunity for appeal, but they also dictate that there be an end to litigation.”
In their eager activism, my colleagues have overlooked one other controlling consideration. Assuming that, in a proper case, a motion for reconsideration will toll the running of the appeal times prescribed by our Rule 4(a) and (b), it is mandatory that the motion be timely filed. In re Alexander, supra; United States v. Jones, supra. In In re Alexander, it was said in footnote 2 at 814-15:
This court has rejected such a contention in the context of appeals in civil cases. In 901 Corp. v. A. Sandler Co., D.C.App., 254 A.2d 411 (1969), this court held that in the absence of specific authority, a motion for reconsideration does not toll the time for filing an appeal. See id. at 412.
The rules of this court governing civil appeals since have been amended and now provide:
The running of the time for filing a notice of appeal is terminated as to all parties by the timely filing pursuant to the rules of the Superior Court of the following motions... :
******
a motion to vacate, alter or amend the order or judgment;
* * * and
any motion seeking relief in the nature of the foregoing. [D.C.App.R. 4 11(a)(2).]
In Coleman v. Lee Washington Hauling Co., D.C.App., 388 A.2d 44 (1978), we held that under the new rule “a motion to reconsider a judgment or other appeala-ble order, filed within ten days of entry of such judgment or order, terminates the running of the time for noting an appeal ... until the motion is acted upon.” Id. at 47.
Because appellant filed the motion to reconsider this case after the ten-day appeal period had expired, we need not decide whether a motion to reconsider filed within the appeal period would toll the appeal period in a criminal case. Accord, United States v. Jones, D.C.App., 423 A.2d 193, 196 & n.4 (1980); see United States v. Dieter, 429 U.S. 6, 8 & n.3 [97 S.Ct. 18, 19 & n.3, 50 L.Ed.2d 8 (1976) (per curiam); United States v. Jones, 608 F.2d 386, 390 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Woodruff, 596 F.2d 798, 799 (8th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
In the case at bar the motion, treated as a motion for reconsideration, was filed some 58 days after the entry of the December 5, *12691978 order denying appellant’s motion to vacate his sentences. Clearly, therefore, the February 1,1979 motion to vacate that order, however treated, did not and could not have had the effect of restoring to appellant the right of appeal which he lost. In re Alexander, supra; United States v. Jones, supra.
All of this is consistent with reason, for, if a lost right of appeal can be so easily restored, our Rule 4(a) and (b) would be frustrated in its jurisdictional purpose. United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 80 S.Ct. 282, 4 L.Ed.2d 259 (1960); United States v. Fraser, D.C.App., 330 A.2d 761, 763 (1975).
My colleagues have apparently overlooked the decision of this court in Irani v. District of Columbia, D.C.App., 292 A.2d 804 (1972). In Irani, appellant, having obtained from the Superior Court an order expunging his arrest record, became convinced that he was entitled to additional relief. To this end, he submitted to the court more than 60 days after the entry of the order of expungement a “Proposed Final Order,” spelling out the additional relief to which he felt entitled. The trial court treated the submission as a motion for reconsideration, but denied any additional relief. An appeal followed, which this court for want of jurisdiction, dismissed, holding that the order expunging the arrest record was final and appealable and that the proposed final order, treated as a motion for reconsideration and filed, as it was, more than 30 days after the entry of the order, did not have the effect of enlarging the time for appeal.
So it was in the case at bar. The December 5, 1978 order denying the motion to vacate appellant’s sentences was final and appealable. D.C.Code 1973, § 23-110(f). Appellant failed to exercise .that right and the February 1, 1979 motion filed some 58 days later did not have the effect of restoring the right of appeal, even when viewed with the gloss furnished by my colleagues.
What this case comes down to then is a most injudicious effort to subvert the motions procedures of the Superior Court and the appellate procedures governed by Rule 4 of the Rules of this court. I refuse to join in the enterprise and am therefore in dissent.

. The March 19, 1979 order denied a motion to vacate an order which denied a motion to vacate, pursuant to D.C.Code 1973, § 23-110, sentences imposed after appellant’s convictions for assault with intent to kill while armed and carrying a pistol without a license. The order accomplished nothing which disturbed appellant’s status as a convicted felon and was therefore lacking in the essential element of dispositional finality contemplated by D.C.Code 1973, § 11-721(a). See DeFoe v. National Capital Bank of Washington, D.C.Mun.App., 90 A.2d 242 (1952); Brooks v. Trigg, D.C.Mun.App., 51 A.2d 302, 304 (1947); Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 75 U.S.App.D.C. 223, 225, 126 F.2d 13, 15 (1942).

. In re Alexander, D.C.App., 428 A.2d 812, 813 (1981); United States v. Jones, D.C.App., 423 A.2d 193, 196 (1980); Irani v. District of Columbia, D.C.App., 292 A.2d 804, 806 (1972).

. While the motion was filed pro se, it was prepared by a Staff Attorney in the Office of the Public Defender Service, who undertook to advise appellant.