Court Opinion

ID: 9700923
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:53:23.486546+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:12.639178
License: Public Domain

DEL SOLE, Judge,
dissenting:
I dissent. Unlike the majority, I would find that the Appellant has preserved his claims for appellate review and therefore would reach the merits of his contentions.
Appellant was found guilty at trial on November 8, 1985. He filed a “Motion in Arrest of Judgment” on November 18, 1985. The motion assigned the following reason for seeking arrest of judgment:
The verdict was against the weight of the evidence in that the Commonwealth failed to establish that the defendant’s license was in fact subject to a driving under the influence related suspension on the date on which the defendant was cited for operating a motor vehicle while driving under the influence related suspension.
It is the majority’s opinion that the above motion is boilerplate and preserves no issue for review and furthermore that the Appellant has confused the distinction between evidentiary weight and sufficiency by raising a weight of the evidence claim in a motion in arrest of judgment. I disagree. I have examined the Appellant’s post-trial motions and find that a substantive reading of his claim leads to the inescapable conclusion that his challenge satisfies the requirements set forth in Commonwealth v. Holmes, 315 *175Pa.Super. 256, 461 A.2d 1268 (1983). Additionally, the defendant raised this issue during the trial. (N.T. 9-11). Clearly, the trial court was made aware of the defendant’s contention as required. The defendant’s motion claims that the Commonwealth failed to prove his license was suspended on the day he was charged with driving under suspension. That is not boilerplate and specifically raises the issues before us.
Therefore, I find it necessary to discuss the merits of the Appellant’s claim. This is an appeal from a judgment of sentence following a conviction for driving with a suspended license. I would reverse.
The Appellant was charged with driving under the influence and placed in ARD on September 20, 1984. One of the conditions of his ARD placement was a thirty day suspension of his motor vehicle driver’s license.
The Pennsylvania Department of Transportation sent Mr. MacSherry the following notice on October 9, 1984:
As a result of the order from the Court of Bucks County, your driving privileges are being suspended for a period of 1 month as mandated by section 3731(E)(6)(H).
In order to comply with this suspension/revocation, you are required to return any current driver’s license, learner’s permit and/or temporary driver’s license (camera card) in your possession no later than the effective date listed below. Failure to comply with this notice shall result in this bureau referring this matter to the Pennsylvania State Police for prosecution under section 1571(A)(4) of the vehicle code.
You will not be permitted to operate a motor vehicle until you meet all requirements as stated above. Please allow five to seven days for license to be returned to you.
Effective date 11/12/1984 12:01 a.m. Credit will not begin until license is received by bureau.
This notice was received at the home of the Appellant’s mother from which the Appellant had recently moved. Appellant testified at trial that his mother told him about the notice in a telephone conversation, but that he never actual*176ly saw the notice. Appellant never surrendered his driver’s license as required.
On March 6, 1985, the Appellant was stopped by a police officer while he was driving a car with an expired inspection sticker. The officer discovered that Mr. MacSherry had received the notice of October 9, 1984 but had not surrendered his license. The Appellant was then cited for driving under suspension and subsequently convicted of this offense by the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County.
On appeal Mr. MacSherry argues that he was not driving under suspension on March 6, 1985. He claims his. license had never been suspended because he never surrendered it. He bases this argument on the language of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1541(a) which provides:
§ 1541. Period of revocation or suspension of operating privilege.
(a) Commencement of period. The period of revocation or suspension of the operating privilege shall commence on the date on which the driver’s license was surrendered to and received by the court or the department, as the case may be. The period of revocation or suspension of a nonresident licensed driver or an unlicensed driver shall commence on the date of conviction, or in the case of a revocation or suspension without a conviction, on a date determined by the department in accordance with its regulations. The department may, upon request of the person whose license is suspended, delay the commencement of the period of suspension for a period not exceeding six months whenever the department determines that failure to grant the extension will result in hardship to the person whose license is suspended. (Emphasis added).
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1541(a).
The Appellant argues that by statute a driver license suspension does not begin until the license is surrendered. Clearly, this is the plain meaning of the words contained in 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1541(a).
The Commonwealth claims that MacSherry’s position that his conviction cannot stand because he failed to return his *177license is implausible. The Commonwealth argues that if we accept the Appellant’s argument the department would be at the whim of the offender in that the suspension would start, if ever, at the Appellant’s convenience.
I do not find that the Commonwealth’s argument is persuasive. The motor vehicle code provides the department with other means to enforce an order to surrender a license.
The notice which was sent to Mr. MacSherry on October 9, 1984 by the department warned him that his failure to surrender his license could lead to prosecution under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1571(a)(4). This section provides that it is unlawful for any person to fail or refuse to surrender a driver’s license to the department upon lawful demand. Mr. MacSherry has not been prosecuted under this section.
The department may also order the police to seize a license. The record in this case shows that a police pick up of Mr. MacSherry’s license was ordered by the department on December 11, 1984. The record does not reveal why this pick up was not completed. Further, the license can be withheld at the time of renewal for the appropriate period.
I find that the Appellant’s argument is a sound one. The plain meaning of § 1541 of the motor vehicle code is that the suspension commences when the license is surrendered. In this case the Appellant did not surrender his license and so his suspension had not begun when he was cited for driving under suspension. I would therefore reverse the judgment of sentence. The department had means at its disposal to enforce the surrender of the Appellant’s license in order to commence his period of suspension. A conviction for driving under suspension was not an appropriate means.
Also, it must be pointed out that in no event could an operator extend the period of noncompliance with the order to return his license beyond the time for renewal of the license. Certainly when the operator’s license is to be renewed, the Commonwealth could have under the then existing statute, refuse renewal for the suspension.
*178The majority cites the revised language in §§ 1540 & 1541 and cavalierly states: “the General Assembly apparently aware of the ambiguity of §§ 1540 & 1541, amended them,”. Certainly, the language found in § 1541 holding that the period of revocation or suspension commences on the date which the license was surrendered to the court or the department is not ambiguous. More specifically, the amendments to the statutes indicated in the majority, all of which occurred after the charges were filed in this case and after the violation alleged occurred, clearly indicate the General Assembly’s intent to correct an anomaly in the law by providing that upon conviction of an offense with a mandatory suspension that the court shall confiscate the license immediately at the time of the conviction or, in cases where the department notifies of a suspension that the suspension begins on the date set by the department but does not end until the appropriate time expires following receipt of the license. That is the way the law presently reads, it is not the way the law was at the time of the defendant’s arrest.
How the majority finds an ambiguity in clear language of the statute and attempts to bolster its ambiguity argument by citing sections of amended statutes which clearly change the law is beyond me. For these reasons I must dissent.