Court Opinion

ID: 9659219
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:35:22.628606+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:05.187689
License: Public Domain

Colwell, D.J., Retired,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
It would appear that the appellant in this case lacks standing to raise questions concerning the possible rights of others to the custody of Carmelita, a nonreservation Indian child under the Indian Child Welfare Act. It is noted that no other person has filed a notice of appeal.
I disagree with the majority opinion that assumes the constitutionality of the Indian Child Welfare Act and its directives to our courts on procedure and subject matter. The act is an attempt to invade a primary power and duty of the State of Nebraska to protect the rights and best interests of children reserved to it by article X of the Constitution of the United States.
Some of the objectionable parts of the act are:
Section 1912: “(d) Any party seeking to effect a foster care placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child under State law shall satisfy the court that active efforts have been made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that these efforts have proved unsuccessful.”
Section 1915: “(a) In any adoptive placement of an Indian child under State law, a preference shall be given, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, to a placement with (1) a member of the child’s extended family; (2) other members of the Indian child’s tribe; or (3) other Indian families.
“(b) Any child accepted for foster care or preadoptive placement shall be placed in the least re*753strictive setting which most approximates a family and in which his special needs, if any, may be met. The child shall also be placed within reasonable proximity to his or her home, taking into account any special needs of. the child. In any foster care or preadoptive placement, a preference shall be given, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, to a placement with—
“(i) a member of the Indian child’s extended family;
“(ii) a foster home licensed, approved, or specified by the Indian child’s tribe;
“(iii) an Indian foster home licensed or approved by an authorized non-Indian licensing authority; or
“(iv) an institution for children approved by an Indian tribe or operated by an Indian organization which has a program suitable to meet the Indian child’s needs.
“(c) In the case of a placement under subsection (a) or (b) of this section, if the Indian child’s tribe shall establish a different order of preference by resolution, the agency or court effecting the placement shall follow such order so long as the placement is the least restrictive setting appropriate to the particular needs of the child, as provided in subsection (b) of this section. . . .
“(d) The standards to be applied in meeting the preference requirements of this section shall be the prevailing social and cultural standards of the Indian community in which the parent or extended family resides or with which the parent or extended family members maintain social and cultural ties.’’
At the time the law was under consideration by the Congress, the U.S. Department of . Justice advised there were serious constitutional questions concerning the act. In- a letter to the committee chairman it was stated: “A third and more serious constitutional question is, we think, raised by section 102 of the House draft. That section, taken together with sections 103 and 104, deals generally with the *754handling of custody proceedings involving Indian children by State courts. Section 102 establishes a fairly detailed set of procedures and substantive standards which State courts would be required to follow in adjudicating the placement of an Indian child as defined by section 4(4) of the House draft.
“As we understand section 102, it would, for example, impose these detailed procedures on a New York State court sitting in Manhattan where that court was adjudicating the custody of an Indian child and even though the procedures otherwise applicable in this State court proceeding were constitutionally sufficient. While we think that Congress might impose such requirments [sic] on State courts exercising jurisdiction over reservation Indians pursuant to Public Law 83-280, we are not convinced that Congress’ power to control the incidents of such litigation involving nonreservation Indian children and parents pursuant to the Indian commerce clause is sufficient to override the significant State interest in regulating the procedure to be followed by its courts in exercising State jurisdiction over what is a traditionally State matter. It seems to us that the Federal interest in the off-reservation context is so attenuated that the 10th Amendment and general principles of federalism preclude the wholesale invasion of State power contemplated by section 102. See Hart, ‘The Relations Between State and Federal Law,’ 54 Colum. L. Rev. 489, 508 (1954).” 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 7561, 7562-63.
The Recommended Guidelines for State Courts-Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg. 24,000 at 24,002 (1979), states in part: “For purposes of any such foster care, preadoptive, or adoptive placement, a determination of good cause to the contrary for such placement in accord with the preferences set out above should consider:
“(1) the requests of the biological parents, or the child when the child is of sufficient age.”
*755It is of some significance in this case that the mother of the child, “on many occasions and for extensive periods of time,” left the child in the care of the Dunnicks, the parties who have temporary custody of the child. The child has spent a major part of her lifetime in the care of the Dunnicks, who were chosen by the mother to care for the child.
I would affirm.
Boslaugh, J., joins in this dissent.