Court Opinion

ID: 9949763
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-12 16:00:50.465767+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:28:45.864690
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

      UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MILLY KALULU,                                        No. 21-895

                      Petitioner,                   Agency No.
     v.                                            A213-592-589

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,                                              OPINION

                      Respondent.

           On Petition for Review of an Order of the
               Board of Immigration Appeals

             Argued and Submitted April 20, 2023
                  San Francisco, California

                      Filed March 11, 2024

    Before: Lawrence VanDyke and Gabriel Sanchez, Circuit
       Judges, and Stephen J. Murphy, III, District Judge. *

                  Opinion by Judge VanDyke;
    Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge Sanchez

*
  The Honorable Stephen J. Murphy, III, United States District Judge for
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, sitting by
designation.
2                       KALULU V. GARLAND

                          SUMMARY **

                           Immigration

    Granting Milly Kalulu’s petition for review of the Board
of Immigration Appeals’ decision upholding the denial of
asylum and related relief, and remanding, the panel held that
although substantial evidence supported the agency’s
adverse credibility determination, the agency did not
properly evaluate whether Kalulu’s supporting evidence
independently supported her claims of past persecution in
her native Zambia on account of her sexual orientation.
    As a threshold matter, the panel explained that because
the immigration judge’s adverse credibility determination
and the underlying facts upon which it was based are part of
the record, this court must consider all those facts in its
substantial evidence review, regardless of whether the BIA
expressly mentioned them. The panel held that while some
of the reasons the agency relied upon did not support its
credibility finding, the administrative record as a whole did
not compel a conclusion different than the agency’s, even
after the record was stripped of any of the agency’s
erroneous findings. Specifically, at least five of the factual
bases underlying the agency’s adverse credibility
determination were supported by the record, including four
identified inconsistencies, as well as the IJ’s demeanor
finding.
   The panel held that the IJ failed to properly consider and
evaluate the evidentiary weight of multiple documents

**
  This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                     KALULU V. GARLAND                     3

Kalulu offered into the record independent of her
noncredible testimony, and the BIA made clear factual errors
when it reviewed those documents. The panel therefore
remanded for the IJ or BIA to consider whether those
documents, when properly read, independently proved
Kalulu’s past persecution claim.
    Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Judge Sanchez
agreed with the majority that remand was required because
the agency failed to consider whether Kalulu’s supporting
evidence independently proved her claims. However, Judge
Sanchez wrote that because the bulk of the agency’s
credibility findings were based on significant errors, the
REAL ID Act, principles of administrative law, and
precedent require remand to the BIA to determine whether
the few remaining factors supporting the credibility
determination are sufficient in light of the totality of the
circumstances. Judge Sanchez also disagreed that this
court’s substantial evidence review includes factual findings
that the BIA did not expressly consider or adopt.

                        COUNSEL

Claire Weintraub (argued) and Natalie Kaliss (argued),
Certified Law Students; Amalia Wille (argued) and Judah
Lakin, Supervising Attorneys; University of California,
Berkeley School of Law, Berkeley, California; for
Petitioner.
Robert D. Tennyson, Jr. (argued), Trial Attorney, and Paul
Fiorino, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration
Litigation; Brian Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant
Attorney General, Civil Division; United States Department
of Justice, Washington, D.C.; for Respondent.
4                       KALULU V. GARLAND

                            OPINION

VANDYKE, Circuit Judge:

    Milly Kalulu petitions for review of a Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision dismissing her appeal
of a removal order. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252 and grant her petition. Even though substantial
evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility
determination, the agency did not properly evaluate
documents Kalulu introduced into the record to support her
claims of past persecution in her native Zambia on account
of her sexual orientation. We grant the petition and remand
this case with instructions for the agency to consider whether
those documents, when properly read, independently prove
those claims.
    I.   BACKGROUND 1
    Kalulu is a native of Zambia who identifies as a lesbian.
Homosexual activity is illegal in Zambia, and Kalulu says
she began to experience persecution on account of her sexual
orientation after brothers of her girlfriend discovered their
relationship in 2019. She recounts two episodes when those
brothers attacked her in her hometown, and then another
episode when they harried her from a restaurant in Zambia’s
capital city after she fled there.
   Shortly after the last alleged attack, Kalulu entered the
United States on a tourist visa to attend a world scouting
jamboree in West Virginia with her Zambian girl scout

1
  Some facts provided in this section are based on parts of Kalulu’s
testimony the IJ found not to be credible. The court presents them here
only as background and does not rely on those facts in its analysis.
                     KALULU V. GARLAND                       5

troop. Her visa permitted her to remain in the United States
for up to six months at a time, renewable for up to three
years, and Kalulu chose to reside in California with her
naturalized aunt for approximately five months after the
jamboree ended. She then took an extended weekend trip to
Mexico so that on reentry she could reset the six-month
clock on her stay in the United States.
    Kalulu legally reentered without difficulty at a California
port of entry. But when she then tried to extend her visa in
person at the port, she was directed to a building where her
wallet and phone were inspected. That inspection uncovered
a California public health benefits card and WhatsApp
messages describing her paid babysitting work in California.
Her tourist visa did not permit receipt of those benefits or
earned income, so border officials cancelled her visa and
placed her in removal proceedings. Kalulu did not mention
any past persecution or fear of future persecution to border
officials during her interactions with them.
     Roughly a month after her removal proceedings had
begun, Kalulu mentioned past persecution and future fears
for the first time in a credible fear interview. She recounted
the three abovementioned attacks, which she said had been
motivated by her sexual orientation. She said she feared that
unnamed “people” or government officials in Zambia might
kill her upon her return to the country because of her sexual
orientation. And she said she feared future persecution not
only because of her sexual orientation, but also because of
her ethnicity, nationality, membership in the country’s
dominant religion, an undescribed political opinion, and her
appearance. The asylum officer deemed only Kalulu’s
testimony about fear of persecution due to her sexual
orientation to be credible, even as the officer recognized that
it was inconsistent with her earlier silence at the border.
6                    KALULU V. GARLAND

    By the time Kalulu applied for asylum, withholding of
removal, and CAT relief about three months later, she no
longer claimed to have suffered past persecution (or to fear
future persecution) on any basis other than her sexual
orientation. She offered various documents into the record
before her hearing to support her claims of past persecution,
including purported declarations from eyewitnesses to the
three alleged attacks described above and a purported
medical report describing injuries from the second attack.
To support her claims of a well-founded fear of future
persecution, Kalulu offered news articles and a State
Department report on Zambia that described ongoing
persecution of homosexuals there.
    At her removal hearing, Kalulu initially offered her own
testimony in support of her asylum application. But when
the IJ began to question her about her story, the IJ found
some of her testimony evasive and contradictory. After
detailed examination of the perceived inconsistencies and
evasiveness, the IJ determined that they rendered her
testimony not credible. And because the IJ did not believe
that the testimony from Kalulu’s other witnesses or
supporting documents rehabilitated her credibility,
independently established her claims of past persecution, or
demonstrated that she was more likely than not to be tortured
if she returned to Zambia, the IJ entered an order denying
asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief.
    On appeal, the BIA found no clear error in the IJ’s
adverse credibility determination or in the IJ’s determination
that Kalulu’s supporting documents did not rehabilitate her
                    KALULU V. GARLAND                     7

credibility or independently establish her claims of past
persecution. The BIA explained:

       The affidavits from the respondent’s cousin,
       neighbor, and friend are not signed or
       sworn …, which        undermines         their
       evidentiary value. The respondent’s cousin’s
       letter does not mention any reason for the
       June 2019 attack on the respondent. The
       neighbor’s statement also does not mention
       any underlying reason for the attack. The
       friend’s statement indicates that the
       respondent would be in danger if she returned
       to Zambia but does not mention whether she
       was aware of the respondent’s sexuality.

The BIA likewise found no clear error in the IJ’s
determination that Kalulu’s medical report failed to
rehabilitate her testimony or support even the second
purported attack because the report (1) had been signed by a
police officer even though Kalulu testified that she did not
report that attack to police and (2) omitted injuries Kalulu
had testified to during her hearing.
    The BIA thus concluded that Kalulu could not meet her
burden to establish eligibility for asylum. A fortiori, it
reasoned, she could not meet the higher burden of proof of
persecution to establish eligibility for withholding of
removal. The BIA similarly upheld the IJ’s denial of CAT
relief because Kalulu had offered only her noncredible
testimony as to the likelihood that the Zambian government
would persecute her or acquiesce to her persecution by a
private party.
8                    KALULU V. GARLAND

    II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
    This court’s review of an agency order denying asylum,
withholding of removal, and CAT relief “is limited to the
BIA’s decision, except to the extent that the IJ’s opinion is
expressly adopted.” Singh v. Garland, 57 F.4th 643, 651
(9th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). Such
adoption occurs when “the BIA reviewed the IJ’s credibility-
based decision for clear error and relied upon the IJ’s opinion
as a statement of reasons but did not merely provide a
boilerplate opinion.” Dong v. Garland, 50 F.4th 1291, 1296
(9th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). In such
cases, this court reviews the grounds and reasoning in both
decisions. De Leon v. Garland, 51 F.4th 992, 999 (9th Cir.
2022).
    The agency’s factual findings are reviewed for
substantial evidence, which exists when the agency’s
conclusions “are supported by reasonable, substantial, and
probative evidence in the record.” Gutierrez-Alm v.
Garland, 62 F.4th 1186, 1194 (9th Cir. 2023) (cleaned up).
Under that extremely deferential standard of review, this
court may not independently weigh the evidence and reverse
the agency unless “the evidence compels a conclusion
contrary to the BIA’s.” Umana-Escobar v. Garland, 62
F.4th 1223, 1228 (9th Cir. 2023). As this court oftentimes
phrases the same point in the inverse, we must accept agency
factual findings “as conclusive unless any reasonable
adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the
contrary.” Antonio v. Garland, 58 F.4th 1067, 1073 (9th Cir.
2023) (cleaned up); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).
   The agency may deny asylum, withholding of removal,
and CAT relief because it deems an applicant’s testimony,
under the totality of the circumstances, not to be credible,
                     KALULU V. GARLAND                      9

and the lack of credible testimony renders the applicant
unable to meet her burden. Iman v. Barr, 972 F.3d 1058,
1064–65 (9th Cir. 2020). Such an adverse credibility
determination may be based on inconsistencies in an
applicant’s testimony even if no uncovered inconsistency
goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Lalayan v. Garland, 4 F.4th 822, 835
(9th Cir. 2021). It also may be based on a finding that a
petitioner’s demeanor undermined her credibility. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Munyuh v. Garland, 11 F.4th 750, 758
(9th Cir. 2021).
  III. DISCUSSION
    Even though substantial evidence supports the agency’s
adverse credibility determination in this case, the agency
misread some of Kalulu’s supporting documents. Because
that mistake prevented the agency from properly evaluating
whether the documents independently prove Kalulu’s claim
of past persecution, this court remands with instructions for
the agency to reexamine their evidentiary value when
properly characterized.
   a. Substantial Evidence Supports the Agency’s
       Adverse Credibility Determination.
    The agency based its adverse credibility determination
on (1) twelve inconsistency and implausibility findings and
(2) Kalulu’s demeanor during her hearing. The adverse
credibility determination is supported by substantial
evidence because at least four of those inconsistencies, as
well as the IJ’s demeanor finding, are supported by the
record.
    At the threshold, the parties disagree about which of the
IJ’s findings related to the adverse credibility determination
10                    KALULU V. GARLAND

the BIA adopted. Kalulu argues the BIA adopted only some
of the IJ’s findings because it did not affirmatively and
expressly adopt each one or invoke Matter of Burbano, 20 I.
& N. Dec. 872 (BIA 1994), and that those findings not
expressly adopted by the BIA are not properly before this
court. The government, on the other hand, argues that all the
IJ’s findings are properly before the court.
    Kalulu’s argument fails to appreciate that this court, in
agreement with every other circuit, considers an adverse
credibility determination to be a factual finding informed by
other factual findings made by the IJ (such as inconsistencies
and demeanor). Mukulumbutu v. Barr, 977 F.3d 924, 925
(9th Cir. 2020). As such, the IJ’s adverse credibility
determination, together with all the findings that fed into that
determination, are subject to clear error review by the BIA.
See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i). Reviewing for clear error,
the BIA may not overturn an IJ’s factual finding sub silentio.
Instead, unless the BIA determines an IJ’s factual finding
was clearly erroneous, that finding remains part of the record
before this court, regardless of whether the BIA expressly
relies on it. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A). This is particularly
true of an IJ’s adverse credibility determination and the
findings that led to it, because the IJ directly observes a
petitioner and thus “is best positioned to assess [her]
credibility in the first instance.” Garland v. Ming Dai, 141
S. Ct. 1669, 1678 (2021).
    Because the IJ’s adverse credibility determination and
the underlying facts it was based on are part of the record in
this case, this court must consider all those facts in its
substantial evidence review—again, regardless of whether
the BIA expressly mentioned them.              See Ramirez-
Villalpando v. Holder, 645 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2011)
(rejecting argument that “our review may consider only
                         KALULU V. GARLAND                           11

evidence expressly identified in the BIA’s decision”); see
also I.N.S. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992)
(“The BIA’s determination … must be upheld if supported
by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the
record considered as a whole.” (emphasis added and internal
quotation marks omitted)); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)
(“administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any
reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to
the contrary”). 2
    This court must review the agency’s conclusions in this
case for substantial evidence, which means that the court
must review the agency’s decision against the whole record
and “must accept ‘administrative findings,’” including the
adverse credibility determination, “as ‘conclusive unless any
reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to
the contrary.’” Ming Dai, 141 S. Ct. at 1677 (quoting 8
U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)). The two pre-REAL ID Act cases
Kalulu relies on to argue for less deference, believing the IJ
questioned her too intensively, do not suggest otherwise, not
least of all because this court in both cases ultimately
employed the same standard of review we apply here:
substantial evidence. See Arulampalam v. Ashcroft, 353
F.3d 679, 688 (9th Cir. 2003); Garrovillas v. I.N.S., 156 F.3d
1010, 1015–16 (9th Cir. 1998).
   In any event, both those cases are dissimilar to this one.
There, IJs bullied petitioners during their removal hearings
with pervasive “haranguing,” “derisive innuendos,” and

2
  Kalulu relatedly argues that some of the agency’s findings that inform
the IJ’s adverse credibility determination should not be reviewed
deferentially by our court. Again, the law unambiguously requires us to
review the agency’s factual findings deferentially.           8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(4)(B); see Mukulumbutu, 977 F.3d at 926–27.
12                   KALULU V. GARLAND

“inexplicable outbursts.” Garrovillas, 156 F.3d at 1014–15;
see Arulampalam, 353 F.3d at 682, 687. Here, Kalulu
asserts only that the IJ (1) asked lots of clarifying questions
and (2) grew frustrated when she concluded Kalulu was
trying to evade those questions. Neither warrants or even
permits departure from the substantial evidence standard of
review. An IJ who perceives inconsistencies in a petitioner’s
testimony may certainly ask clarifying questions so she has
an opportunity to reconcile the inconsistencies. And this
court has made clear that while an IJ’s expression of
frustration during a hearing might not be optimal, it does not
taint her findings such that substantial evidence review no
longer holds. Gonzalez-Veliz v. Garland, 996 F.3d 942, 950
(9th Cir. 2021).
    Moving onto the findings themselves, the agency offered
thirteen factual reasons for its adverse credibility
determination. This court does not draw a bright line as to
what number or percentage of the underlying factual reasons
identified by the agency must be supported by the record for
the agency’s ultimate determination to survive substantial
evidence review. See Barseghyan v. Garland, 39 F.4th
1138, 1142 (9th Cir. 2022). Instead, this court examines the
totality of the record, Alam v. Garland, 11 F.4th 1133, 1137
(9th Cir. 2021) (en banc), considers all the factually
supported reasons for the agency’s determination, and defers
to that conclusion unless no reasonable adjudicator
considering the factual record as a whole could come to the
same conclusion that the agency did, Antonio, 58 F.4th at
1072–73.
   Here, while some of the reasons relied on by the agency
do not support its ultimate credibility finding, once those
unsupported reasons are disregarded, substantial evidence
remains to support the agency’s determination that Kalulu
                         KALULU V. GARLAND                            13

was not credible. Put inversely, the administrative record as
a whole does not compel a conclusion different than the
agency’s, even after the record is stripped of any of the
agency’s erroneous findings. Here, at least five of the factual
bases underlying the agency’s adverse credibility
determination are supported by the record.
    First, the record supports the agency’s finding that
Kalulu was inconsistent about when she made plans to
remain in the United States after the jamboree rather than
return to Zambia. She initially testified that she did not make
the plan while still in Zambia. But her testimony shortly
thereafter contradicted that timeline, indicating that she had
made the plan “[w]hen [she] was in Zambia.” Kalulu did not
take advantage of opportunities the IJ afforded her to clarify
the apparent inconsistency, and it was not unreasonable for
the IJ to find that she could not have both made and not made
the plans while in Zambia. 3
    Second, the record supports the agency’s finding that
Kalulu was inconsistent about her alleged fear of future
persecution if she returned to Zambia. She did not disclose
such a fear during her first border interview. She only
claimed that fear during her credible fear interview a month
later, due not only to her sexual orientation but also to her
ethnicity, religion, political opinion, and appearance. Yet

3
  Kalulu argues that “the IJ never notified [her] or her counsel that she
perceived as inconsistent [her] testimony about her plans to stay in the
United States.” While the IJ never uttered the word “inconsistent”
during the lengthy colloquy with Kalulu on this point, the IJ repeatedly
advised her that the IJ was trying to reconcile two apparently
irreconcilable statements. That sufficed to meet the IJ’s obligation to
give Kalulu notice of the substance of the perceived inconsistency and
an opportunity to explain it. See Lizhi Qiu v. Barr, 944 F3d 837, 846
(9th Cir. 2019); Rizk v. Holder, 629 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 2011).
14                        KALULU V. GARLAND

she then claimed in her asylum application and hearing
testimony only that she was afraid because of her sexual
orientation. Kalulu does not endeavor to argue that these
changing claims were in any way consistent. And there is
nothing in the record that compels a contrary conclusion. 4

4
  Although Kalulu does not argue that her varying descriptions of
whether she was afraid and why she was afraid are consistent, she does
claim she failed to disclose her fear of repatriation at the border because
she was scared. But the agency was not required to credit Kalulu’s
proffered explanation and disregard or discount the inconsistency. Li v.
Garland, 13 F.4th 954, 960–61 (9th Cir. 2021).
  Kalulu relies on two cases to argue to the contrary, but neither supports
her position. In Mousa v. Mukasey, a female petitioner said she did not
declare her fear of rape upon repatriation to a male border official
because she was scared and ashamed to disclose it. 530 F.3d 1025,
1027–29 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2008). The agency relied on this lack of
disclosure as the “primary reason” for its adverse credibility
determination. This court reversed, holding that nondisclosure of rape is
sui generis, not “a bellwether of truth,” and unreliable as a primary
reason for an adverse credibility determination. Id. at 1027. Here,
Kalulu has not articulated a fear of rape or other sexual assault, and her
failure to disclose fear at the border is just one of multiple independent
reasons the IJ offered for the adverse credibility determination. And in
any event the Mousa decision did not require the agency to entirely
disregard the inconsistency arising from the petitioner’s failure to
disclose.
  Kalulu’s second case, Singh v. I.N.S., did not even involve a
petitioner’s claimed fear of border officials. 292 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir.
2002). Instead, a petitioner who spoke Punjabi and only “a little” Hindi
needed to communicate with an American border interviewer who only
spoke English through a Hindi-English translator who could not speak
Punjabi. Id. at 1022–23. His interview report indicated he did not
disclose fear of persecution upon repatriation, but also strongly
suggested he had not understood the border official’s question about fear
as it went through two layers of translation. Id. at 1022. No similar
                        KALULU V. GARLAND                           15

    Third, the record supports the agency’s finding that
Kalulu was inconsistent about whether she planned to attend
college in California. Her border incident report indicates
she told a border officer that she intended to enroll at the
California State University campus in San Marcos and that
her California-based aunt would pay her tuition there.
During her hearing, though, Kalulu insisted she had never
actually told the border official she planned to attend college.
When asked to explain why the border report indicated she
had, she said the border official must have misunderstood
her. But the IJ was not required to accept that proffered
explanation, see Rivera v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 1271, 1275
(9th Cir. 2007), and the record does not compel a conclusion
that Kalulu’s testimony about her college plans was
consistent with the border incident report.
    Fourth, the record supports the agency’s finding that
Kalulu was inconsistent about her health condition before
she was diagnosed with HIV in 2020. During her hearing,
Kalulu testified that she had not felt or been sick in any way
prior to that diagnosis. But when the IJ later asked Kalulu
about why she had obtained a state public health benefits
card in 2019, Kalulu testified that it was because “I wasn’t
feeling well with my health…. I had health problems, so
that’s why [medical clinic staff] advised me to have the, the
insurance.” 5    Kalulu did not take advantage of an
opportunity the IJ gave her to explain this inconsistency, and

linguistic barrier was present here. And like the Mousa decision above,
the Singh decision did not ultimately require the agency to entirely
disregard the failure to disclose during its credibility analysis. Id.
5
  The IJ misquotes Kalulu’s testimony here as “I had heart problems.”
But the inconsistency remains because the record, when properly read,
shows that Kalulu testified both that she had and did not have health
problems before her HIV diagnosis.
16                   KALULU V. GARLAND

the record does not compel a conclusion that she was
consistent when she said, on the one hand, that she was not
sick before 2020 and, on the other hand, that she was sick in
2019.
    Fifth, the record supports the agency’s finding that
Kalulu’s demeanor during her removal hearing further
undermined the credibility of her testimony because of her
evasiveness and non-responsiveness while answering
several of the IJ’s questions. A short excerpt from the
lengthy verbal exchange between the IJ and Kalulu about
when Kalulu decided and planned to stay in the United States
rather than return to Zambia is illustrative:

       JUDGE TO MS. KALULU
          So when did you make the arrangements
          with your aunt to leave West Virginia and
          go to California?
       MS. KALULU TO JUDGE
         I was talking to her a while on the phone.
       JUDGE TO MS. KALULU
          Okay. But that still doesn’t answer my
          question. When did the two of you decide
          that you would not go back to Zambia and
          that the plan was for you [to] come to
          California to be with her?
       MS. KALULU TO JUDGE
         When they just give [sic] me my visa, I
         knew I wasn’t going to come back to, to
         go back to Zambia?
       JUDGE TO MS. KALULU
                     KALULU V. GARLAND                     17

           Okay. But did your aunt know that as
           well?
       MS. KALULU TO JUDGE
         No, that’s right.

This back and forth continues for another three pages of the
hearing transcript without a clear answer to the IJ’s question
even though Kalulu twice confirmed that she understood
what the IJ was asking her. It only ends when Kalulu, after
taking “a long pause,” finally answers the question. The
record does not compel the conclusion that Kalulu was not
evasive, particularly given that this court accords demeanor
findings special deference because the IJ uniquely observes
demeanor first-hand while this court must try to extract it
from “cold records.” Dong, 50 F.4th at 1298; accord Manes
v. Sessions, 875 F.3d 1261, 1263–64 (9th Cir. 2017) (per
curiam).
    Kalulu argues that even if the agency was right about
those inconsistencies and her demeanor, those facts cannot
justify an adverse credibility determination because they are
counterbalanced by other consistencies in her testimony.
But this court repeatedly has emphasized that an adverse
credibility determination is not a balancing exercise. A
petitioner might (at least appear to) be consistent in much of
her testimony, including all aspects of that testimony that go
to the heart of her claim. But if the record demonstrates that
some of her testimony is inconsistent, even if that testimony
is peripheral to the heart of her claim, an IJ is permitted to
18                        KALULU V. GARLAND

make an adverse credibility determination. See Lalayan, 4
F.4th at 835. 6
    Kalulu takes a second unsuccessful bite at the same apple
by arguing that the agency erred by failing to give greater
weight to consistencies between what she said during her
hearing and in her credible fear interview. But, again, an
adverse credibility determination is not a balancing exercise,
where inconsistent or untrue testimony is weighted against
the other testimony in the record that has not been shown to
be inconsistent or untrue. The whole point of an adverse
credibility determination is to conclude that a person is not
generally credible because of some observed indicia of lack
of truthfulness, which then permits the factfinder to
disregard the person’s other testimony about which there is
no evidence of untruthfulness. Because of that, once a
person has sufficiently demonstrated she is not credible in

6
  Kalulu correctly notes in her opening brief that this court has held this
enormous discretion is not entirely unbounded: “‘An utterly trivial
inconsistency … will not by itself form a sufficient basis for an adverse
credibility determination.’” And she characterizes many inconsistencies
the agency found as being utterly trivial, apparently interpreting this
court’s use of the term to be roughly synonymous with “insignificant in
comparison to counterevidence.”
   But Kalulu in her brief misuses ellipses to hide key words from the
quote in Shrestha: “[A]n utterly trivial inconsistency, such as a
typographical error, will not by itself form a sufficient basis for an
adverse credibility determination.” Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1043
(emphasis added). In the fourteen years since this court decided
Shrestha, it has resisted characterizing as “utterly trivial” an
inconsistency arising from anything other than a typographical error or a
minor inconsistency about a date lacking any nexus to the petitioner’s
claim. Rizk, 629 F.3d at 1088. None of the inconsistencies supported by
the record that the agency relied on here can naturally be read to be akin
to a third-party typographical error or a minor difference in an immaterial
date. They are not “utterly trivial.”
                          KALULU V. GARLAND                             19

part of her testimony, no amount of ostensibly credible
testimony elsewhere can rehabilitate her. Thus, the INA
does not require an IJ to gather all credible and noncredible
assertions in the record and then somehow expressly weigh
them against each other to determine whether a petitioner is
more credible than not. Instead, in making an adverse
credibility determination, the IJ need only discuss
inconsistencies in a petitioner’s testimony (or between that
testimony and other evidence in the record). 7
    Lastly, Kalulu argues that even if the inconsistencies are
supported by the record and cannot be counterbalanced by
consistencies in the record, she still could have explained
them if the IJ had only given her a meaningful opportunity
to do so. But the IJ repeatedly gave her such opportunities,
so much so that Kalulu elsewhere in her briefing
characterizes the IJ as badgering her by asking too many
questions to clarify perceived inconsistencies in her
testimony. As discussed above, the IJ engaged in frequent—
and often quite lengthy—colloquies with Kalulu to give her
multiple chances to explain an inconsistency the IJ expressly

7
  Kalulu is correct that the agency is required to consider all evidence in
the record as a whole. So the agency may not rely on a supposed
inconsistency when other evidence in the record shows there is actually
no inconsistency. But beyond that, our court has made clear that the
obligation to consider the entire record is typically satisfied when, as
here, the IJ makes a “general statement that the agency considered all the
evidence before it.” Cole v. Holder, 659 F.3d 762, 771–72 (9th Cir.
2011) (cleaned up). Absent a reason to think otherwise, we do not
assume the agency failed to comply with its legal obligations. B.R. v.
Garland, 26 F.4th 827, 836 (9th Cir. 2022). And as explained, here the
agency’s lack of discussion of other “consistent” testimony that is
irrelevant to its adverse credibility determination provides no reason to
think that the agency failed to consider that testimony or otherwise failed
to review the entire record.
20                       KALULU V. GARLAND

identified for her. Indeed, Kalulu’s own attorney, also
recognizing the inconsistencies, at one point attempted to
interject herself into at least one of those colloquies to help
Kalulu try to resolve whether she decided with her aunt to
stay in the United States while she still was in Zambia. At
that point, the IJ, while not allowing Kalulu’s attorney to
testify on behalf of Kalulu, did expressly allow the attorney
“to ask [Kalulu] questions … to clarify” the inconsistency.
And the IJ again at the end of the hearing gave Kalulu’s
attorney another opportunity to ask any questions she wanted
on redirect to try to resolve any inconsistent testimony—an
opportunity the attorney declined to take.
     b. The Dissent’s Reasoning Largely Tracks the
         Unsuccessful Arguments Made by Kalulu and is
         Therefore Unconvincing for Many of the Same
         Reasons.
    Looking to the inconsistencies relied on by the agency,
and focusing its attention on other perceived consistencies in
Petitioner’s unrelated testimony, the dissent suggests that the
appropriate course of action is to remand the agency’s
adverse credibility determination for reconsideration in light
of only those factors that are supported by substantial
evidence. But it is important to recognize at the outset that,
with one minor exception, the dissent does not disagree with
the majority on the decisive issue that many of the agency’s
findings regarding credibility are supported by the record. 8

8
  The dissent disagrees as to whether there was substantial evidence to
support the finding of an inconsistency in Petitioner’s testimony relating
to her health issues. While the dissent implies that her testimony on this
one issue could be read as consistent, the agency as the fact-finder was
not required to read it as such. And ultimately, our narrow disagreement
                         KALULU V. GARLAND                            21

Nor does it contend that the agency would be unjustified in
relying on those findings to make an adverse credibility
determination. Indeed, there appears to be complete
agreement that these facts could constitute substantial
evidence. Yet despite this critical—and in our view
dispositive—agreement, the dissent nevertheless advocates
for remand because it repeats many of the same errors made
by the Petitioner and rejected above by this court.
     First, the dissent asserts that in evaluating credibility, the
agency must “consider the totality of the circumstances” and
all “relevant factors.” That much is undoubtedly true, which
is indeed what the agency here did. But the dissent missteps,
contending that because other parts of the record contain
unrelated testimony that has not been shown to be
inconsistent, those parts should be re-weighed against
Petitioner’s inconsistencies to reevaluate her credibility.
Again, that is not how an adverse credibility determination
works. And that is certainly not how we deferentially review
such a determination.
    The agency’s obligation to examine the record as a
whole in making its credibility determination does not carry
with it an obligation to weigh or counterbalance all of a
petitioner’s consistent statements against all of her
inconsistent statements. Instead, if there is sufficient
inconsistent testimony in the record to constitute “substantial
evidence” supporting the conclusion that a petitioner is not

on just this one basis for the agency’s adverse credibility determination
is inconsequential. The dissent agrees that there remain at least four
independent bases, which together constitute substantial evidence,
supporting the agency’s credibility determination. We don’t read
anything in the dissent as concluding that our minor disagreement about
the agency’s conclusion on the health issues alone controls anything in
this case.
22                   KALULU V. GARLAND

credible, those statements may be used by the agency fact-
finder to make an adverse credibility determination. Such a
factual determination that the petitioner is not credible then
properly supports the agency’s discounting of all the
testimony of a petitioner—regardless of whether the
petitioner’s other testimony may appear credible or not.
     Put differently, once the agency catches a petitioner in
some lies, the agency does not have to weigh those lies
against all the other testimony where the agency couldn’t tell
if the petitioner was lying. Of course, in making an adverse
credibility determination the agency must consider the
“record as a whole” and the “totality of the evidence” in the
sense that the agency cannot disregard other evidence in the
record directly showing that the petitioner was not, in fact,
inconsistent or evasive about the issue or issues that formed
the basis for the agency’s credibility finding. But the idea
that a petitioner’s other, unrelated testimony can somehow
outweigh or overcome the fact that she elsewhere lied to the
agency has no basis in either logic or our precedent. Nor is
there any support for the similar idea that corroboration of a
petitioner’s unrelated testimony can overcome a showing
that she elsewhere lied. In looking at the record and
circumstances as a whole, if the agency finds that there are
sufficient testimonial inconsistencies in part of that
evidentiary record, then the agency can properly rely on
those findings to render all the petitioner’s other testimony
non-credible. As long as the agency has some evidence
showing non-trivial inconsistencies in the petitioner’s
testimony, that is all that is needed to make an adverse
credibility determination. It is irrelevant how much
                         KALULU V. GARLAND                             23

ostensibly consistent testimony was presented about other
issues by the petitioner. 9
    Similarly, the dissent contends that independent,
corroborating documents somehow undercut the adverse
credibility determination and potentially revive Petitioner’s
testimony. As explained, however, a petitioner’s lack of

9
  Perhaps part of the dissent’s erroneous understanding of our standard
of review stems from its fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of
substantial evidence review—particularly the misconception that when
engaging in this review this court can only rely on the facts the BIA
expressly relied on. That is wrong. See Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 481
(noting that in conducting our substantial evidence review the record
must be considered “as a whole”); Ramirez-Villalpando, 645 F.3d at
1039 (stating that in this consideration, the court is not limited to the
“evidence expressly identified in the BIA’s decision”).            When
conducting our substantial evidence review, we review the record as a
whole, which necessarily includes all the facts determined by the IJ, the
agency’s fact-finder.
  The dissent is of course correct that this court may only affirm on the
grounds relied upon by the BIA. Garcia v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 1136,
1143 (9th Cir. 2021). But a legal ground relied on by the agency is not
the same thing as the facts underlying that ground. The legal grounds
for the agency’s decision in this case are that there was neither evidence
of past persecution nor a showing that it was more likely than not that
Petitioner would be persecuted or tortured upon her return to Zambia.
Those were the “grounds” for the agency’s denial of relief. The adverse
credibility determination, on the other hand, is part of the factual basis
underlying those grounds for the BIA’s decision.
  The court’s task in conducting substantial evidence review is to
determine whether the facts in the record “as a whole” sufficiently
support the legal grounds for the agency’s conclusion. Umana-Escobar,
62 F.4th at 1228. As explained above, the law is very clear that in
making that evaluation the court is required to review the record “as a
whole,” which includes all the facts relating to the adverse credibility
factual determination itself, not just those the BIA happened to mention
in its summary decision.
24                       KALULU V. GARLAND

credibility supported by substantial evidence in the record
cannot be rehabilitated just because some of her testimony
about issues unrelated to the agency’s adverse credibility
determination is corroborated by other evidence. Once the
agency has properly concluded that the petitioner lied about
some things, the fact that corroborating evidence indicates
that she may not have lied about everything does not
somehow repair her credibility. A petitioner may be able to
sufficiently support her claims by relying on evidence other
than her own testimony—indeed, that possibility is precisely
why the majority is remanding to the agency in this case—
but that is irrelevant to her damaged credibility. 10

10
   In arguing for a remand on the adverse credibility issue, the dissent
inexplicably cites to cases stating that remand is appropriate where an
agency has not had the first chance to answer a question delegated to it.
Of course. But those cases are inapplicable here, because nobody can
dispute that the agency has already addressed Kalulu’s credibility.
Instead, the appropriate standard of our review is the well-established
substantial evidence standard. And applying that extremely deferential
standard, we do not remand just because the agency’s decision is not
supported by all of the evidence it purported to rely on. We instead ask
only whether, with any factual errors corrected, substantial evidence
remains that nonetheless supports the agency’s decision. So long as
there is enough evidence supporting the agency’s decision that the record
doesn’t compel a remand, we will defer to the agency, even where the
agency’s decision is supported by less evidence than the agency may
have thought. The dissent’s WWiJD- (“What Would an Immigration
Judge Do”) the-second-time-around-with-a-corrected-record approach is
something other than the substantial evidence standard.              And
notwithstanding the dissent’s attempt to portray its revisionist approach
as somehow deferential to the agency, it is clearly much less so than a
proper substantial evidence review. The dissent’s standard would result
in much more frequent remands to the agency. Cases would be
remanded whenever a court was unsure how the agency might redecide
                         KALULU V. GARLAND                           25

     Of course, there are certainly circumstances in which
independent documentary evidence could be directly
relevant to an adverse credibility determination. This could
occur in situations where the independent evidence directly
relates to the basis for the adverse credibility determination.
For example, if documents prove that those statements the
agency found to be inconsistent are in fact consistent, then
that would render the adverse credibility determination
unsupported by substantial evidence. But that is not the case
here. The so-called “corroborating evidence” that the
Petitioner and the dissent reference in this case concerns
wholly unrelated aspects of Kalulu’s testimony; it has
nothing to do with the inconsistencies that formed the basis
of the agency’s adverse credibility determination. As such,
it is irrelevant to that determination.
    Finally, the dissent elsewhere seems to be inventing and
applying a novel ratio test applicable to the agency’s factual
bases for its credibility determination: compare the total
number of facts the agency relied upon for its determination
to the subset of just those facts the court finds reliable. If
that ratio is too low (although the dissent nowhere tells us
precisely where the cutoff is), then apparently remand of the
credibility issue is appropriate, even if the agency’s
determination remains amply factually supported by the
record. Here, the dissent emphasizes that “about two-thirds
of the findings identified by the Agency are not supported by

a case once any evidentiary mistakes were corrected, even in those cases
(like here) where, once those evidentiary mistakes are accounted for,
substantial evidence still supports the agency’s original decision.
26                        KALULU V. GARLAND

the record.” Because that ratio is too low, the dissent asserts,
we must send the credibility issue back. 11
    The dissent cites no authority whatsoever for this faux
quantitative approach, and for good reason. As described
above, it runs contrary to both the way in which a credibility
determination works and the concept of substantial evidence,
which defers to an agency’s decision even if the agency
made some factual errors so long as sufficient evidence
nonetheless supports the agency’s conclusions.              The
dissent’s error is also highlighted by the odd results it would
lead to. As the dissent admits, there are at least four adequate
bases for the agency’s adverse credibility determination in
this case. It would be strange to conclude that had the agency
mentioned and relied only upon these four correct facts
(without mentioning any others), then its decision would

11
  The dissent claims the majority does not “dispute that the vast majority
of the agency’s credibility findings” are not supported by sufficient
evidence. But we do. By the majority’s count, at least five of the
agency’s factual bases for its adverse credibility determination are
supported. Even assuming all the other findings are unsupported, barely
more than one-half of the agency’s findings related to credibility are
unsupported, hardly a “vast majority.” Even by the dissent’s count, fully
one-third of the agency’s findings remain supported. Apparently “vast
majority” too is being affected by inflation.
  We don’t point this out to be pedantic or to manufacture disagreement
where our dissenting colleague is admirably trying to find common
ground. Rather, this ungenerous characterization of the majority’s
position relates back to the fundamental problems with the dissent’s
novel ratio test. Our job is not to effectively redo the agency’s decision-
making process based on some comparative ratio of its supported and
unsupported findings. Nor is it our job to ask what decision we think the
agency might make if any of its evidentiary mistakes are fixed. Instead,
our job is simply to determine whether there is substantial evidence in
the record to support the finding that the agency did make—here, that
the Petitioner is not credible.
                          KALULU V. GARLAND                             27

stand; but because it relied on additional facts (right or
wrong), remand is appropriate. And while the dissent
acknowledges our precedent stating there is no bright line
rule for how many factual bases must properly support the
agency’s credibility finding, that seems to be precisely what
the dissent’s ratio test would eventually lead to. Ultimately,
the dissent’s new ratio test is not compatible with proper
substantial evidence review, which both the Supreme Court
and this court have made clear requires that we must deny a
petition unless, reviewing the record as a whole, “any
reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to
the contrary.” Ming Dai, 141 S. Ct. at 1677 (quoting 8
U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (emphasis added)). 12
    Once this court finds substantial evidence in the entire
record to support the agency’s conclusion, our review is
over, and we do not apply novel ratio tests or speculate about
what the agency might have done had it read the evidentiary
record precisely as we do.       Contrary to the dissent’s
inexplicable characterization, this is clearly not a case in

12
   It is worth adding that the dissent’s ratio approach is additionally
problematic because it fails to take into account potential differences in
the strength of the various facts supporting an adverse credibility
determination. Imagine two different situations in which the agency
relied on twelve factual findings to make its credibility determination.
In the first, the court concludes that only four of the factual bases are
supported by the record, but these four facts are non-trivial and strongly
support the conclusion that the petitioner is not credible. In the second,
the court concludes that seven of the factual bases are supported by the
record, but are all very trivial and only questionably support a non-
credibility finding. Under the dissent’s ratio approach, the former would
be remanded while the latter would not, even though the agency’s
credibility determination would be much more supported by “substantial
evidence” in the former case. 93.2% of statistics give the illusion of
quantitative certainty while providing very little in the way of substance.
28                   KALULU V. GARLAND

which the rejected findings “all but gut” the basis for the
agency’s determination. By the dissent’s own admission,
there remain at least four independent and supported factual
findings that together constitute more than substantial
evidence supporting the agency’s credibility determination.
This is all that is needed for us to deny the petition on this
point. What this court cannot do, and what the dissent is
effectively asking us to do, is reweigh evidence and make
our own credibility determination. See Don v. Gonzalez, 476
F.3d 738, 743 (9th Cir. 2007).
                            * * *
    Oddly, the dissent accuses the majority of “usurp[ing]
the agency’s role by concluding that the agency would make
the same adverse credibility determination on remand.” Not
true. The majority takes no position about what the agency
might do on remand because that isn’t the appropriate
question to ask. We are simply taking the agency’s decision
as a given, and asking if what the agency already did is
supported by substantial evidence. It is the dissent’s novel
approach that would require the court to partially assume the
role of the agency decisionmaker, asking if the court is
confident the agency would necessarily reach the same
conclusion if the case was remanded on a corrected record.
Whatever else that might be, it is not the substantial evidence
review standard.
     c. The Case Nevertheless Is Remanded for the
       Agency to Properly Consider Whether
       Supporting Documents Independently Prove
       Kalulu’s Past Persecution Claim.
    If a petitioner who has been found noncredible provides
independent evidence to support her claims, the agency must
evaluate whether that evidence independently proves her
                     KALULU V. GARLAND                     29

claims. Here, Kalulu offered such documentary evidence in
the form of purported eyewitness declarations to three
attacks on her in Zambia and a purported medical record
detailing injuries of the second attack. Because the agency
discounted the documents’ evidentiary value based on a
clear misreading of them, this case is remanded with
instructions for the agency to reconsider whether, when
properly read, they independently prove Kalulu’s past
persecution claim.
    The first document the agency must review properly is
the declaration Kalulu offered from her second cousin, who
Kalulu testified housed her after the first alleged attack and
witnessed the second alleged attack. Kalulu’s cousin
recounts in that declaration that:

       In the middle of the night Milly came into the
       house. I was asleep. She woke me up and
       told me that she was attacked. But she did
       not tell me who attacked her. She was very
       scared and lived in fear. Then I asked her
       why she doesn’t even want to go out
       anymore. That’s when she explained the
       story that made me sick to my stomach [that
       Kalulu was lesbian].
       She first asked me if I can keep a secret? I
       told her that you are my favorite cousin and
       yes I will. Then she told me that Amina
       [Kalulu’s alleged girlfriend in Zambia] and
       her were a couple they are in a relationship
       with. She is into girls and the day she got
30                    KALULU V. GARLAND

       attacked it was Amina’s brothers that beat her
       up.

The IJ misread the declaration to expressly state that all these
events occurred on the same night, which would be
inconsistent with Kalulu’s testimony that weeks passed
between the first attack and when she disclosed her sexual
orientation to her cousin. But the declaration does not in fact
state any timeline, neither its syntax nor grammar implies
one, and common sense might even suggest that Kalulu’s
cousin would not ask her “why she doesn’t even want to go
out anymore” right after Kalulu allegedly arrived at her
house bloodied and beaten in the middle of the night. In any
event, the IJ’s misreading of the declaration led her to
impermissibly discount its evidentiary value based on a
clearly nonexistent inconsistency.
    The second document the agency must review anew is
the declaration Kalulu offered from her second cousin’s
neighbor, who she testified intervened to protect Kalulu
during the second alleged attack and then drove her to the
hospital. On its face, it purports to contain a stamp from a
Zambian commissioner for oaths certifying it as a true copy
of the original document. Yet the IJ characterized the
declaration as lacking information to establish its
authenticity, and the BIA characterized it as unsworn. When
the IJ and BIA decisions are read together, the agency’s
characterization makes sense only if it deemed the stamp
inauthentic. It may or may not be. But it would be
“illogical,” and thus impermissible, for the agency to
discount the declaration on that basis, De Leon, 51 F.4th at
1000, given that it elsewhere discounted a different
declaration as possibly inauthentic because it lacked the
same stamp.
                     KALULU V. GARLAND                    31

    The third eyewitness document the agency must
reconsider is the declaration Kalulu offered from a friend in
Zambia who Kalulu testified witnessed the third attack at the
restaurant in the capital city of Lusaka. That declaration on
its face purports to contain the friend’s handwritten
signature. But the BIA incorrectly stated that it is “not
signed or sworn … which undermines [its] evidentiary
value.” The agency then improperly discounted the
evidentiary weight of the declaration on that inaccurate
basis.
    Last, the agency must reconsider the medical record
Kalulu offered as evidence, which on its face purports to be
from the hospital where Kalulu allegedly received
emergency care to stitch a stab wound she received during
the second attack. The report mentions a deep cut on
Kalulu’s chest. The IJ observed that this statement “is
consistent with Respondent’s claim that she was stabbed in
the chest during the [second] attack.” The BIA disagreed,
finding without analysis or explanation that the cut to
Kalulu’s chest does not “fully comport with” Kalulu’s
testimony about being stabbed in the chest.
 IV. CONCLUSION
    This court grants a petition for review of an agency
denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief
only under the most extraordinary circumstances. See
Gutierrez-Alm, 62 F.4th at 1194; Sharma v. Garland, 9 F.4th
1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2021). This is one of those rare
instances. For the reasons discussed above, the agency’s
adverse credibility determination is amply supported by
substantial evidence. But the IJ failed to properly consider
and evaluate the evidentiary weight of multiple documents
Kalulu offered into the record independent of her testimony,
32                   KALULU V. GARLAND

and the BIA made clear factual errors when it reviewed those
documents. Because the agency’s decision therefore
“cannot be sustained upon its reasoning,” this case must be
remanded for the IJ or BIA to reconsider its decision. De
Leon, 51 F.4th at 1008 (internal quotation marks omitted).
    On remand, the agency must reexamine the three
declarations and medical document discussed in section
III(b) to consider whether they, when properly read
alongside other nontestimonial evidence in the record,
independently prove Kalulu’s claims for asylum or
withholding of removal. This court takes no position on
whether those documents provide such proof or whether
Kalulu merits any of the relief for which she applied.
     PETITION GRANTED.

SANCHEZ, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting
in part:

    Petitioner Milly Kalulu, a native of Zambia, alleges she
was persecuted because she is a lesbian in a country that
criminalizes same-sex relationships. When her relationship
with a woman was discovered by her girlfriend’s brothers,
she was beaten, whipped, injected with an unknown
substance, stabbed in the chest, doused with gasoline, and
threatened with death over several violent encounters.
Kalulu submitted documentary evidence corroborating her
claims, including a copy of her medical report, a declaration
from her aunt in California, and declarations from several
Zambians who witnessed the attacks on her. The agency,
however, dismissed this evidence based on unsupportable or
trivial grounds.
                     KALULU V. GARLAND                      33

    I agree with the majority that the agency failed to
consider     whether      Kalulu’s    supporting     evidence
independently proves her claims for asylum, withholding of
removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture
(CAT). “Where potentially dispositive testimony and
documentary evidence is submitted, the BIA must give
reasoned consideration to that evidence.” Cole v. Holder,
659 F.3d 762, 772 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Antonio v.
Garland, 58 F.4th 1067, 1077 (9th Cir. 2023) (“[W]here
there is any indication that the agency did not consider all of
the evidence before it the decision cannot stand.” (cleaned
up)). Remand is required where, as here, the agency did not
give reasoned consideration to highly probative evidence
that may independently support Kalulu’s claims of past
persecution.
    But the agency’s failure to consider the documentary
evidence was emblematic of other significant errors
underlying its adverse credibility determination. The most
egregious example? Disbelieving Kalulu’s claim that she is
a lesbian because she had not visited gay clubs or
participated openly in “LGBT activities” during her first five
months in the United States. As the majority recognizes,
two-thirds of the factors cited by the agency for its adverse
credibility determination were based on dubious
stereotyping, mischaracterizations of the testimony, or
purported inconsistencies not found in the record.
    Where “the bulk of the [agency’s] credibility findings …
are infirm,” our precedent requires that we “remand to the
BIA to determine whether the few remaining factors are
sufficient—in light of the totality of the circumstances—to
support such a finding.” Kumar v. Garland, 18 F.4th 1148,
1151 (9th Cir. 2021). The majority ignores our precedent
and instead concludes that the agency would have reached
34                   KALULU V. GARLAND

the same adverse credibility determination in the absence of
these unsupported findings. That approach contravenes the
REAL ID Act, binding circuit precedent, and fundamental
principles of administrative law. I respectfully dissent.
                              I.
    The agency made two findings regarding Kalulu’s
eyewitness declarations and medical documentation: (1) the
documents did not rehabilitate her testimony, and (2) they
did not independently establish her claims of past
persecution. As the majority correctly observes, those
findings were “based on a clear misreading” of the
documents. The agency manufactured inconsistencies,
applied arbitrary authentication requirements, and
overlooked or mischaracterized key portions of the
documents to discredit them. The majority correctly
concludes that the agency “failed to properly consider and
evaluate” the documents and therefore “the agency’s
decision … cannot be sustained upon its reasoning.”
    Based on the majority’s analysis, one might expect for
the court to set aside both of the agency’s document-related
findings. After all, the eyewitness declarations and hospital
documents corroborated Kalulu’s testimony that she was
attacked on multiple occasions, driven to the hospital, and
received emergency treatment for a stab wound to her chest.
The agency’s failure to consider whether this evidence
independently established her claims of past persecution
necessarily requires reexamining whether the documents
also rehabilitate her testimony—that is, whether she testified
truthfully about these violent incidents and about her sexual
orientation as the underlying basis for these attacks.
Inexplicably, however, the majority sets aside the second
finding while upholding the first, concluding that “the
                      KALULU V. GARLAND                       35

agency’s adverse credibility determination is amply
supported by substantial evidence.”
    The majority’s inconsistent reasoning contravenes the
REAL ID Act, which requires the agency to consider “the
totality of the circumstances” and “all relevant factors” when
making a credibility determination.             See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).      “To ignore . . . relevant record
evidence [is] to make an adverse credibility determination
on less than the total circumstances in contravention of the
REAL ID Act’s text.” Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034,
1044 (9th Cir. 2010). The majority’s conclusion that the
agency “failed to properly consider and evaluate” Kalulu’s
corroborating evidence means the agency also ignored
relevant evidence when making its adverse credibility
determination. See Yan Rong Zhao v. Holder, 728 F.3d
1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2013) (The BIA “is required to consider
the evidence in its entirety . . . and where its failure to do so
could have affected its decision, remand is appropriate.”
(cleaned up)); see also Garcia v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 1136,
1142 (9th Cir. 2021). Because the agency failed to consider
the evidence in its totality, I would remand for
reconsideration of its adverse credibility determination.
                               II.
     The agency’s adverse credibility determination must be
set aside for a second reason: about two-thirds of the findings
identified by the agency are not supported by the record. The
IJ relied on thirteen factual reasons for its adverse credibility
finding. The BIA explicitly addressed twelve of these
factors, which we review for substantial evidence. See
Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1039 (“When the BIA conducts its own
review of the evidence and law rather than adopting the IJ’s
decision,” we review only the BIA’s decision “except to the
36                    KALULU V. GARLAND

extent that the IJ’s opinion is expressly adopted.” (cleaned
up)).
    The majority contends that our substantial evidence
review includes not only the reasons expressly relied upon
by the BIA to support its adverse credibility determination,
but also findings by the IJ that the BIA did not expressly
consider or adopt, “unless the BIA determines an IJ’s factual
finding was clearly erroneous.” The majority is mistaken.
That the BIA must review the IJ’s findings for clear error,
see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(1), does not mean that the BIA
must catalogue every IJ finding with which it disagrees or
chooses not to incorporate into its decision. The majority
cites no statute or regulation in support of this proposition.
Those unadopted IJ findings, in turn, do not form a part of
our judicial review of the agency’s adverse credibility
determination.
    “It is a ‘foundational principle of administrative law’ that
judicial review of agency action is limited to ‘the grounds
that the agency invoked when it took the action.’” Dep’t of
Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct.
1891, 1907 (2020) (quoting Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743,
758 (2015)); see Garland v. Ming Dai, 592 U.S. 357, 369
(2021) (“[R]eviewing courts remain bound by traditional
administrative law principles, including the rule that judges
generally must assess the lawfulness of an agency’s action
in light of the explanations the agency offered for it rather
than any ex post rationales a court can devise.”)
    Our circuit precedent is in accord. See Garcia, 988 F.3d
at 1142 (“In reviewing the BIA’s decisions, we consider only
the grounds relied upon by that agency.”); Diaz-Reynoso v.
Barr, 968 F.3d 1070, 1075-76 (9th Cir. 2020) (“Where the
BIA writes its own decision, as it did here, we review the
                     KALULU V. GARLAND                    37

BIA’s decision, except to the extent it expressly adopts the
IJ’s decision.”); Tekle v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 1044, 1051 (9th
Cir. 2008) (“Stated differently, we do not review those parts
of the IJ’s adverse credibility finding that the BIA did not
identify as ‘most significant’ and did not otherwise
mention.”). As these and numerous other circuit opinions
make clear, we are not free to rove about the administrative
record in search of grounds never relied upon by the agency
under the guise of substantial evidence review.
    Of the dozen adverse credibility factors expressly
adopted by the BIA here, two-thirds of those findings are not
supported by substantial evidence in the record. My
colleagues do not seriously dispute that the vast majority of
the agency’s credibility findings are based on dubious
stereotyping, mischaracterizations of the evidence, or
purported inconsistencies that are not inconsistencies at all
or that the agency did not allow Kalulu to address. As
discussed below, only four of the agency’s dozen credibility
findings survive our deferential standard of review.
   A. Implausibility Findings
    The agency found that Kalulu testified implausibly
regarding her (1) status as a lesbian, and (2) delay in
applying for asylum. Both of those findings relied on
speculation and conjecture, which “cannot form the basis of
an adverse credibility finding, which must instead be based
on substantial evidence.” See Shah v. INS, 220 F.3d 1062,
1071 (9th Cir. 2000).
    The most egregious example was the BIA’s conclusion
that the IJ “permissibly determined that the record evidence
was insufficient to support the respondent’s assertion that
she was a lesbian.” The IJ deemed Kalulu’s lesbian identity
“implausible” because she did not visit “locations or clubs
38                      KALULU V. GARLAND

geared towards the LGBT community” after arriving in the
United States. 1 The agency may not rely on “dubious”
stereotypes to determine how the petitioner “ought to act.”
See Munyuh v. Garland, 11 F.4th 750, 764 (9th Cir. 2021);
Tan Xia Zhu v. Mukasey, 537 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir.
2008).
    The agency also found that Kalulu’s delay in applying
for asylum undermined her claim that she was afraid to
return to Zambia because of her sexual orientation. The
agency reasoned that Kalulu’s “lack of effort to investigate
her eligibility for fear-based relief undermines her claim that
she was so afraid to return to Zambia that she decided to
remain in the United States as soon as she received her
tourist visa[.]”
    This finding lacks support in the record. In Guo v.
Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 1194, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 2004), we
rejected an adverse credibility finding based on the
petitioner’s failure to apply for asylum immediately upon
entering the United States. We concluded that the agency’s
reasoning—that waiting to apply for asylum meant the
petitioner was doing so only “as an afterthought”—was
“conjecture and speculation [that] cannot substitute for
substantial evidence.” Id. at 1202 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Here, when asked why she did not apply for
asylum during the five months she lived with her aunt,
Kalulu testified that she “wasn’t aware” that asylum existed.
Kalulu explained she had been “looking for ways to live in
America” and traveled to the U.S.-Mexico border to speak
with an immigration officer because she did not want to have

1
  The government, to its credit, acknowledges that the agency’s
reasoning “reflects rank speculation and stereotyping” and agrees this
factor is not supported by substantial evidence.
                     KALULU V. GARLAND                    39

any problems with an expired visa. Kalulu’s testimony
establishes that she made “efforts” to remain in the United
States, contrary to the agency’s unsupported conjecture.
   B. Inconsistencies in Kalulu’s Testimony
    The BIA relied on six purported inconsistencies in
Kalulu’s testimony in determining that she lacked
credibility. Inconsistencies that “form the basis of the IJ’s
adverse credibility determination” must be “actually
inconsistent in light of all ‘relevant record evidence.’”
Bhattari v. Lynch, 835 F.3d 1037, 1043 (9th Cir. 2016)
(quoting Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1043–44). The agency may
not base an adverse credibility determination on
inconsistencies “when [it] did not ask [petitioner] about
these discrepancies or give [petitioner] an opportunity to
reconcile them.” Soto-Olarte v. Holder, 555 F.3d 1089,
1092 (9th Cir. 2009). Finally, “[i]f the applicant gives a
reasonable and plausible explanation” for the inconsistency,
the agency “must state a specific and cogent reason for
rejecting it.” Barseghyan v. Garland, 39 F.4th 1138, 1145
(9th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    The agency found that Kalulu testified inconsistently
regarding six topics: (1) whether she feared returning to
Zambia; (2) whether she planned to attend university in
California; (3) the date she made arrangements with her aunt
to remain in the United States; (4) whether she attended the
Girl Scout Jamboree as a “regular scout” or a “leader”;
(5) the state of her heath before she was detained; and
(6) whether anyone in her family knew she was a lesbian.
The agency “considered these inconsistencies in the
aggregate . . . to conclude that the respondent had not set
forth a credible claim.” I agree that the first three
inconsistency findings are supported by substantial
40                      KALULU V. GARLAND

evidence, but the remaining three inconsistency findings
lack support in the record. 2
    The agency found that Kalulu “initially testified that she
attended the jamboree as a regular scout, but when
questioned about the age limitations for the event, she
changed her testimony to state that she attended as a leader.”
Kalulu’s exchange with the IJ regarding her role in the
jamboree follows:

        IJ: In what role were you attending this
        Jamboree?
        Kalulu:      Well, I was a participant, Your
        Honor.
        IJ: I’m sorry. You want to repeat that again?
        Kalulu: Participant. Participant.
        IJ: As a—as a participant?
        Kalulu: Yes, Your Honor.
        IJ: Just like a regular scout?
        Kalulu: Yes, Your Honor.
        [. . .]
        IJ: And isn’t, generally, the requirements to
        attend as a participant that you have to be
        between the ages of 14 and 17?
        Kalulu: Yes, Your Honor.

2
  I also agree that substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse
demeanor finding. The remaining three adverse findings arose from the
agency’s misreading of the documentary evidence as discussed above.
                     KALULU V. GARLAND                      41

       IJ: Okay. But you were 22 at the time that
       you attended. So how . . . could you attend a
       youth jamboree of scouts at age 22?
       Kalulu: Because I was one of the leaders, so
       we’re all participating.
       IJ: Well, that’s interesting ma’am. Because
       that’s what I just asked you. How were you
       participating? And you said as a participant.
       And I just said as a regular scout participant,
       and you said yes. So why are you now
       changing to say that you were a leader?
       Kalulu:       No, Your Honor.     Because
       everybody, even the other people, we’re all
       participants.

Immediately after this exchange, the government informed
the IJ that Kalulu’s visa corroborated her testimony about
participating in the jamboree.
    There was no actual inconsistency between Kalulu’s
statements. One can, of course, be a “participant” and a
“leader” at the same event, and as Kalulu testified,
“everybody. . . we’re all participants.” 3 The agency
“manufacture[d] a discrepancy by characterizing the factual
situation as an ‘either/or’ situation.” Barseghyan, 39 F.4th at
1145. It is clear from the context of Kalulu’s testimony that
she did not testify inconsistently, and even if she had, the IJ
failed to address Kalulu’s reasonable explanation for her
testimony.

3
  See Participant, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2005) (“A
person who participates in something; a person who experiences
something in common with others”).
42                       KALULU V. GARLAND

    The agency found that Kalulu testified inconsistently
regarding her health because she “initially testified that she
did not have any health issues prior to being diagnosed with
HIV in June 2020 while she was in the detention facility, but
subsequently admitted that she had previously not felt well
and went to a clinic for heart problems and obtained a pap
smear.” 4 This finding is not supported by substantial
evidence. When the IJ asked Kalulu if she had received a
medical exam since she had been taken into custody, Kalulu
responded, “[y]es . . . I was diagnosed [] with HIV.” The IJ
then asked the compound question, “[b]efore that, did you
ever have any indication that you had been HIV positive or
that you were sick in any way?” Kalulu replied, “No, Your
Honor.” Later, when asked why she had a Medi-Cal
Benefits Identification Card in her possession when she was
detained at the U.S.-Mexico border, Kalulu informed the IJ
that she had been visiting a medical clinic in the United
States for “health problems” and had obtained a pap smear.
    Even if the IJ perceived an inconsistency in Kalulu’s
testimony as to whether receiving a “pap smear” constituted
a preexisting “health issue,” the IJ deprived Kalulu of the
opportunity to address that inconsistency. See Soto-Olarte,
555 F.3d at 1092. After questioning Kalulu about treatment
she received at the clinic, the IJ changed the topic and began
questioning her about how she obtained a California ID card.
The IJ never mentioned that she perceived Kalulu’s

4
  While both the IJ and BIA found that Kalulu testified she had received
treatment for “heart problems,” the transcript contains no such
testimony. Instead, it appears that both the IJ and BIA misread the
transcript in which Milly testified that she “had health problems.” The
majority inappropriately corrects the record, replacing “heart problems”
with “health problems”—substantively altering the agency’s decision to
correct its erroneous reading of the transcript.
                     KALULU V. GARLAND                    43

statements as inconsistent, which the government tacitly
acknowledges.
    Although the majority makes the threadbare assertion
that the IJ gave Kalulu an opportunity to explain the
purported inconsistencies in her statements regarding her
health, the record does not support it. Kalulu’s supposedly
inconsistent statements are in response to different lines of
questioning at different parts of the hearing, separated by
nearly fifty pages in the record transcript. The agency did
not afford Kalulu an opportunity to explain any supposed
inconsistency in her health testimony, and therefore cannot
rely on this inconsistency to support an adverse credibility
determination. See Munyuh, 11 F.4th at 762.
    Finally, the agency found that Kalulu “provided
conflicting testimony related to . . . whether anyone in her
family knew that she was a lesbian.” Kalulu testified that
she fled to her cousin’s house after she was beaten and
kidnapped by her girlfriend’s brothers. The IJ then asked if
she told her cousin that she was a lesbian:

       IJ: Did you tell your cousin what happened?
       Kalulu: No, I did not tell her at that time
       because I did not want her to contribute to the
       feelings I was feeling. And because she did
       not know that I was a lesbian.
       IJ: Did any of your family know that you
       were a lesbian?
       Kalulu: Nobody did.
       IJ: And why not?
       Kalulu: Because I was afraid to tell them.
44                   KALULU V. GARLAND

       IJ: And why were you afraid?
       Kalulu: Because it’s a big taboo to be a
       lesbian in my country. And because it’s . . .
       illegal.

At a later point in the hearing, the IJ asked again if anyone
was aware that Kalulu was a lesbian:

       IJ: And you also stated that no one in
       Zambia knew that you were a lesbian except
       for [the girlfriend], correct?
       Kalulu: Until I told my cousin.
       IJ: Okay. But up until that time . . . no one
       knew, correct?
       Kalulu: Yes, Your Honor.
       [. . .]
       IJ: Okay. And when did you tell your cousin
       about being a lesbian?
       Kalulu: About three weeks [after the
       incident] when she kept asking what
       happened to me.
       [. . .]
       IJ: Okay. So other than your cousin that we
       just talked about that you told . . . about being
       a lesbian, have you ever told any of your
       other family, including siblings, cousins,
       aunts, uncles, parents, anybody?
       Kalulu: No, Your Honor.
       IJ: Nobody at all.
                      KALULU V. GARLAND                      45

       Kalulu: Only my auntie, the one who was
       here in America.

    Kalulu’s testimony about her family’s knowledge of her
sexual orientation does not conflict. The IJ mischaracterized
the record when she stated that Kalulu “changed her
testimony and said that she told her cousin that she is a
lesbian approximately three weeks after the incident[.]”
Kalulu’s testimony that she did not tell her cousin she was a
lesbian “at that time” is in reference to seeing her cousin just
after she was attacked. Her statement immediately follows
her testimony about fleeing to her cousin’s house after being
beaten. Thus, Kalulu did not “change” her testimony when
she later testified that she had informed her cousin she was a
lesbian three weeks after the attack. And her immediate
clarification, “only my auntie,” cannot be deemed an
inconsistency. Unprompted, Kalulu clarified that other than
her cousin, the only family member who knew she was a
lesbian was her aunt living in California. See Ren v. Holder,
648 F.3d 1079, 1087 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[Petitioner]’s initial
error . . . was quite clearly a quickly-corrected innocent
mistake. As such, it cannot form the basis for an adverse
credibility determination.”).
   C. Remand Is the Appropriate Remedy
    The main area of disagreement between the majority and
dissenting opinions is not whether most of the agency’s
adverse credibility factors are supported by substantial
evidence in the record. It is clear they are not. But the
majority concludes that if even only four or five of the twelve
adverse findings are supported by the record, we must affirm
that agency’s adverse credibility determination. This
conclusion ignores binding circuit precedent and basic
principles of administrative law.
46                   KALULU V. GARLAND

    Although “[t]here is no bright-line rule” under which
some specific number of infirm adverse credibility findings
requires remand, Alam v. Garland, 11 F.4th 1133, 1137 (9th
Cir. 2021), the rejected findings here “all but gut” the
agency’s rationale, see Kumar, 18 F.4th at 1156. “Because
so little remains in support of the adverse credibility
finding,” our precedent requires that “we grant the petition
and remand to determine whether the totality of the
circumstances continues to support that finding.” Id. at
1153; see Barseghyan, 39 F.4th at 1141 (“We remand on an
open record for the BIA to determine in the first instance
whether the remaining inconsistency is sufficient to support
the adverse credibility determination.”). We do so because
the agency has not had the opportunity to consider whether
the small handful of remaining findings—a few minor
inconsistencies and an observation about her demeanor
during a single line of questioning—are sufficient on their
own to discredit Kalulu’s testimony under a totality of the
circumstances. Kumar, 18 F.4th at 1156.
     Fundamental principles of administrative law forbid us
from answering that question ourselves. See Smith v.
Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1765, 1779 (2019) (“Fundamental
principles of administrative law, however, teach that a
federal court generally goes astray if it decides a question
that has been delegated to an agency if that agency has not
first had a chance to address the question.”); see also Florida
Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985) (“[I]f
the agency has not considered all relevant factors, . . . the
proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to
the agency for additional investigation or explanation.”).
   Indeed, both our precedent and the Supreme Court have
consistently repudiated the majority’s approach. See, e.g.,
Coronado v. Holder, 759 F.3d 977, 987 (9th Cir. 2014)
                     KALULU V. GARLAND                      47

(“[U]nder the ordinary remand rule, we are not permitted to
decide a claim that the immigration court has not considered
in the first instance.” (internal quotation marks omitted));
Tekle, 533 F.3d at 1055 (“Under INS v. Ventura, [537 U.S.
12, 16 (2002) (per curiam)], after determining that an
adverse credibility finding is not supported by substantial
evidence, we ordinarily remand to the BIA to ‘make the
basic asylum eligibility decision.’”); Zi Lin Chen v. Ashcroft,
362 F.3d 611, 621 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Ventura and noting
that the Ninth Circuit has only recognized two “rare”
exceptions to remand with respect to adverse credibility
determinations); Barseghyan, 39 F.4th at 1146 (remanding
for the BIA to determine whether one remaining
inconsistency is sufficient to support an adverse credibility
determination).
    More recently, the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth
Circuit for “conduct[ing] a de novo inquiry” and “reach[ing]
its own conclusions” in its review of an agency decision
imposing sanctions against a former bank executive. Calcutt
v. FDIC, 589 U.S. 623, 629 (2023). In that case, the Sixth
Circuit found that the FDIC’s sanctions were supported by
substantial evidence, “even if some findings . . . were
incorrect.” Calcutt v. FDIC, 37 F.4th 293, 334-35 (6th Cir.
2022). The Supreme Court reversed, observing that the
agency had “never . . . considered whether the sanctions
against [the executive] were warranted on the narrower set
of [findings] that the Sixth Circuit identified.” 598 U.S. at
628. Like an adverse credibility finding, the Court noted that
an agency’s decision to impose sanctions “is highly fact
specific and contextual, given the number of factors relevant
to petitioner’s ultimate culpability.” Id. at 630. The majority
48                       KALULU V. GARLAND

here repeats the Sixth Circuit’s error by substituting its own
judgment for that of the agency. 5
    Accordingly, I would remand not only for the agency to
consider whether Kalulu’s supporting documentary
evidence independently establishes her claims of past
persecution, but also to determine in the first instance
whether the remaining factors on their own support an
adverse credibility determination.

5
  The majority falls back on a strawman argument that “because other
parts of the record contain unrelated testimony that has not been shown
to be inconsistent,” the dissent contends that “those parts should be
reweighed against Petitioner’s inconsistencies to reevaluate her
credibility.” A careful reading of the dissent shows that no such
comparison in testimony was made. Rather, I have reviewed the
agency’s findings for substantial evidence and explained how a clear
majority of the agency’s adverse credibility factors are infirm, a
conclusion my colleagues do not seriously dispute. The REAL ID Act
and our precedents therefore require that we remand for the agency to
determine in the first instance whether the remaining inconsistencies are
sufficient, under a totality of the circumstances, to support an adverse
credibility finding. See Barseghyan, 39 F.4th at 1146; Alam, 11 F.4th at
1137; Kumar, 18 F.4th at 1155-56. It is notable that the majority fails to
grapple with this caselaw, and what the majority labels a “novel ratio
test” is simply an application of our established precedent. At bottom, it
is the majority that usurps the agency’s role by concluding that the
agency would make the same adverse credibility determination on
remand. That is not the province of this court.