Court Opinion

ID: 9753819
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:31:16.120408+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:43.083186
License: Public Domain

*527Concurring Opinion by
Mr. Justice Roberts:
. . fundamental to the concept of due process is the notion that the law should never be permitted to direct its punitive force against a man unless that man is. first given an opportunity to defend himself. To insure that this opportunity be not lost as a whisper in a windstorm, the law has created strict and often formal procedures whereby a potential defendant is notified of each proceeding at which his rights may be affected. Thus, when a court undertakes, on petition of a private citizen, to hold a man in contempt, it is absolutely imperative that the defendant be notified of the pendency of this drastic action, and be apprised of the exact time and place at which a hearing will be held to determine whether punishment will be meted .out. To hold, therefore, as the majority has done in .the present case, that Dr. Brocker need not have been notified of the September 6, 1966 contempt hearing simply because he must have been aware that he was violating a June 18, 1965 custody order is to ignore both due process of law and reality itself.
As far back as 1912 this Court has held that a man may not be held in contempt of court “without such previous notice as will afford him an opportunity of being heard.” Douglass-Whisler Brick Co. v. Simpson, 233 Pa. 517, 519, 82 Atl. 760 (1912). That rule remains unchanged. Nor will it suffice to say that the present defendant did not need any notice of the contempt hearing since he must have known that, by failing to return the children at the conclusion of summer vacation, he was violating a custody order issued over a year before. Indeed, this line of reasoning not only reduces itself to the proposition that a defendant need never be given notice of any contempt proceeding, but it also assumes that, in the present case at least, Dr. Brocker must be held to have known that by fail*528ing to return the children he was not only violating the decree, hut was also subjecting himself to a contempt citation by so doing. This second assumption, I believe, is completely unfounded. In fact, there is every reason to believe that Dr. Brocker felt assured that his actions were completely within the letter of the law:
It is uncontradicted that on August 10, 1966 Dr. Brocker petitioned the Court of Common Pleas of Butler- County for an amendment of the June 18, 1965 custody order, alleging that he should be granted complete custody of the children on the grounds that Mrs. Brocker was an unfit mother; pursuant to that petition, a rule was issued upon Mrs. Brocker to show cause why the children should not be given to Dr. Brocker, said rule to be returnable October 11, 1966. Certainly, having secured the rule to show cause, Dr. Brocker need not have assumed that he would be in contempt of court by failing to return the children in August; Furthermore, when he realized that the Butler County court was not going to act on his petition in time to decide the matter before the September school term began, Dr. Brocker then commenced an action in an Ohio court on August 25, 1966. In fact, according to appellant’s brief, not contradicted by appellee, ■ he has now been awarded custody of the children by Ohio. Thus, when it is considered that appellant, at the time of the contempt hearing on September 6, had not one, but two court actions pending to obtain custody of the children, it seems a gross deprivation of due process to hold that he was not entitled to formal notice of the- Butler County contempt proceeding simply because he should have known that his actions were a violation of the June decree.
Nevertheless, although I believe that Dr. Brocker -was entitled to notice of the hearing, a careful exami*529nation of the record convinces me that such notice was in fact given. Since Dr. Brocker’s Pennsylvania counsel was from Pittsburgh, he decided to retain a Butler County lawyer to represent his interests in that forum. The record reveals that although Dr. Brocker himself did not appear, nevertheless his Butler counsel not only was present on August 30, 1966, the day the contempt petition was filed, but was also in court on September 2, the return day for the contempt rule. On that day, counsel asked the court to postpone the contempt hearing to September 6 and this request was granted. Later that same day, Butler counsel was permitted to withdraw from the case, but only after he had assured the judge that he had contacted Brocker’s Pittsburgh attorney and told him of the hearing scheduled for September 6. On this appeal, appellant claims that his Pittsburgh counsel was never told this information. However, there is nothing in the record to support this contention except the bare fact that no one appeared on Brocker’s behalf on the sixth. Absent something more than this, I would be loathe to conclude that the Butler attorney falsified information, in open court, before a judge of his own county merely to withdraw from a case. I would therefore hold that Brocker’s Pittsburgh counsel did have notice of the contempt proceeding; since notice of this sort to the lawyer should certainly bind the client, I conclude that Brocker’s rights were not violated at this juncture of the litigation.
It is the majority’s resolution of the merits of the contempt citation, however, that gives me greatest pause. Although I do not agree with appellant that the mere commencement of an Ohio custody proceeding relieves him of liability for contempt in Pennsylvania, nevertheless I am also unable to subscribe to the majority’s notion that Ohio can do nothing to the June *53018, 1965 custody order absent “substantial and .impor.r tant. changed circumstances.” . Not only .does the majority fail to offer .the slightest explanation of what constitutes a “substantial” and “important” changed circumstance, as opposed to the simple “changed conditions” which Pennsylvania cases require to alter a custody decree, see cases, infra, but the majority also interprets the thrust of Full Faith and Credit in this area in a manner seemingly contrary to the Supreme Court of the United States.
In New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 67 S. Ct. 903 (1947), the mother had left her husband, -taking their child to Florida while Mr. Halvey remained in New York. While in Florida she was granted a divorce and permanent custody of the child.. However, on the day before the Florida custody order was officially rendered, Mr. Halvey traveled to.Florida and spirited the child back to New York. Mrs. Halvey followed him North, and armed.with her Florida custody decree brought habeas corpus in New York for return of the child. When New York, although returning the child, also modified the Florida custody decree to grant the father summer. visitation rights, Mrs.1 Halvey appealed, arguing that under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, New York could not alter the Florida decree. After first pointing out that Florida itself could have modified its own custody decree, the Supreme Court held that New York did not have to give the Florida decree any more Full Faith and Credit than Florida would have given it. It therefore affirmed the state tribunal saying succinctly: “So far as the Full Faith and Credit Clause is concerned, what Florida could do in modifying the decree, New York may do.” 330 U.S. at 614, 67 S. Ct. at 906. Thus, the conclusion is inescapable that in the present case, Dr. Brocker may justifiably rely on any custody award made by the Ohio *531court so long as a similar award could have been made. by Pennsylvania, and so long as Ohio had proper juris-' diction;
■ It is-no longer open to question that Pennsylvania custody decrees may be modified if conditions change which affect the child’s welfare. Commonwealth ex rel. O’Hey v. McCurdy, 199 Pa. Superior Ct. 22, 24, 184 A. 2d 290, 291 (1962); Commonwealth v. Bishop, 185 Pa. Superior Ct. 362, 367, 137 A. 2d 822, 824 (1958). In Bishop, the court insisted: “Orders determining the custody of children are temporary in their nature and are always subject to modification to meet changed conditions.” (Emphasis supplied.) Certainly it would seem that a finding if immoral behavior by the child’s mother (as was here alleged) would be more than sufficient to meet our changed conditions test. Thus, under Halvey, Ohio could modify the June 18, 1965 Pennsylvania decree if that forum found that Mrs. Brocker’s behavior had deteriorated to the extent claimed by her ex-husband.
So also am I convinced that on August 9, 1966, when Dr. Brocker began his Ohio action, that forum had jurisdiction to modify the 1965 custody decree. Under Ohio law, a court has jurisdiction to determine custody of a child so long as the child and. one parent are- present in that state when the action is commenced. Reed v. Reed, 11 Ohio Misc. 93, 40 Ohio Op. 2d 327, 229 N.E. 2d 113 (C.P. 1967); Noble v. Noble, 80 Ohio L. Abs. 581, 160 N.E. 2d 426 (C.P. 1959); cf. Black v. Black, 110 Ohio St. 392, 144 N.E. 268 (1924). Since it is-undisputed that on August 25, 1966 the Brocker children were lawfully in Ohio with their father pursuant to the Juné 18, 1965 custody order, Ohio’s jurisdiction cannot be questioned by Pennsylvania; In fact, it would seem that under Halvey, Ohio would have jurisdiction even if the children had been unlawfully *532taken into that state, for in Halvey itself the children had been secretly taken from Florida to New York without the knowledge or consent of the mother who had just been awarded custody by a Florida court. Yet it was nevertheless held that New York had jurisdiction to modify the Florida decree.
The majority lays great stress upon the agreement entered into between Dr. and Mrs. Brocker that Butler County would have continuing jurisdiction over matters concerning custody of the children regardless of their residence. From this the majority concludes that Ohio had no jurisdiction. However, the contract language nowhere recites that Butler County shall have exclusive jurisdiction. Bather I believe that a fair reading of this agreement shows that it was made simply to permit a Pennsylvania action where there might not otherwise be jurisdiction. It was not intended to prevent a second state from exercising concurrent jurisdiction.
Admittedly, the record in this case does not indicate the final outcome of Dr. Brocker’s Ohio action, although it was acknowledged below that such action had been commenced on August 25, 1966. Only in appellant’s brief is there any statement that this action has proceeded to judgment. It is there recited that Ohio has awarded custody of the children to Dr. Brocker. However, absent any indication in the record below of the resolution of the Ohio proceeding, I would at this time be unwilling to hold that Dr. Brocker is not in contempt of court for his failure to return the children to Pennsylvania. Rather, I believe that the proper resolution of this controversy requires that we leave the contempt citation undisturbed with the understanding that Dr. Brocker may purge himself of contempt by demonstrating to the Butler County court that he has been awarded custody of the children by *533Ohio, or that he has returned the children to Pennsylvania.