Court Opinion

ID: 9861712
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 00:21:08.583271+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:28:51.645901
License: Public Domain

MESCHKE, Justice,
dissenting.
I believe that Wiedrich had a fair trial and that his deliberate, tactical choice not to request a jury instruction on negligent homicide was not obvious error. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
The majority opinion formulates a “right of the defendant, as a trial tactic, to reject any lesser-included offense instructions.” When the defendant’s tactics are unsuccessful, the majority concludes that it is “unwarranted and grossly unfair” to the defendant to give a lesser-included offense instruction requested by the prosecution if there is an additional lesser offense possible. According to the majority, failure to instruct on “all the lesser-included offenses” becomes obvious error when the defendant “could have requested” another since he “was not required to do so.”
This is new criminal procedure, ignores existing rules, and unsettles precedent. I suspect that it will cause confusion and doubt in the trial courts and that it will bring on a surge of defense appeals urging obvious error when defensive trial tactics are unsuccessful.
This court’s decision in State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811 (N.D.1983) did not foreshadow today’s decision. In Leidholm, the dispositive issue was whether the trial *686court correctly instructed the jury on self-defense. Leidholm held that the trial court’s instruction on an objective standard of self-defense was erroneous and that a subjective standard was necessary. Leid-holm was a thorough analysis of the definition of self-defense, but the statement on the “necessity” of instructing on both manslaughter and negligent homicide as lesser-included offenses was dictum, secondarily addressed “to ensure a proper disposition of the case on remand.” 334 N.W.2d at 819, 821. Moreover, this ruling was made in response to a defense claim that it was error for the trial court to instruct the jury, over defense objections, that manslaughter was a lesser-included offense of murder. Giving of the manslaughter instruction, over objection by the defense, was approved: “We have no question that the court's instruction on manslaughter was warranted in this case.” Id. at 821. The Leidholm decision was not responding to a claim of obvious error for not instructing on an unsought lesser offense, but rather held that it was proper to instruct on a lesser offense in spite of defense objection.
This court’s decision in State v. Frey, 441 N.W.2d 668 (N.D.1989) did not foreshadow today’s decision. It is true that the State did not request either manslaughter or negligent homicide as lesser-included offenses of murder in Frey, but it did request the lesser included offense of aggravated assault as a lesser offense of attempted murder, which was given with the self-defense instruction requested by the defense. We held in Frey, 441 N.W.2d at 671:
Because Frey's trial counsel specifically objected to instructions on lesser included offenses of murder, Frey waived any right to those instructions that he might otherwise have had, and the trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury on lesser included offenses of murder. (Footnote omitted).
Similarly, in State v. Stoppleworhk, 442 N.W.2d 415 (N.D.1989), we rejected a claim of obvious error for failure to instruct on lesser offenses in an appeal from a jury conviction of gross sexual imposition. There had been no instructions on any lesser-included offenses, but defense counsel had objected to an abortive attempt by the State to amend the complaint to add a lesser charge. “Error wittingly created by defense counsel’s tactics cannot be obvious error.” Id. at 417.
In State v. Motsko, 261 N.W.2d 860 (N.D.1977), simple assault had been given as a lesser-included offense of kidnapping upon a defense request. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court should have also instructed on felonious restraint and unlawful imprisonment as additional lesser-included offenses even though not requested. This court ruled:
In the absence of a request, there was no error. State v. Heasley, 196 N.W.2d 896 (N.D.1972); State v. Berger, 148 N.W.2d 331 (N.D.1967). We do not agree with the rule in some jurisdictions that a trial court must, even in the absence of a request and irrespective of the facts, instruct on all included offenses. See State v. Piper, 261 N.W.2d 650 (N.D.1977).
261 N.W.2d at 867. Since Motsko, this court has often applied the same principle in similar decisions.
For example, State v. Demery, 331 N.W.2d 7 (N.D.1983), affirmed a conviction for Class B robbery and rejected a claim of obvious error for not instructing on Class C robbery. In his Demery opinion for this court, the author of today’s majority opinion used the correct analysis:
Our interpretation of the requirements of Rule 30(c) of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure has made it clear that an attorney’s failure to object at trial to instructions which he had an opportunity to examine before they were given to the jury operates as a waiver of his right on an appeal to object to the instructions. See State v. Gates, 325 N.W.2d 166 (N.D.1982); State v. Allery, 322 N.W.2d 228 (N.D.1982); State v. Granrud, 301 N.W.2d 398 (N.D.1981). The issue, therefore, has not been properly preserved for our consideration, and consequently our inquiry is limited to the question whether or not the alleged error constitutes an obvious error which af*687fects substantial rights of the defendant. Rule 52(b), N.D.R.Crim.P.; Allery, supra, 322 N.W.2d at 232; Granrud, supra, 301 N.W.2d at 401-402; cert. denied, 454 U.S. 825, 102 S.Ct. 113, 70 L.Ed.2d 98 (1981); State v. Reich, 298 N.W.2d 468 (N.D.1980). We conclude it does not. See State v. Motsko, 261 N.W.2d 860 (N.D.1977); United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001, 101 S.Ct. 1709, 68 L.Ed.2d 203 (1981). (Footnote omitted).
331 N.W.2d at 11. Today’s majority opinion ignores and unsettles this long prece-dential line. Motsko and related decisions are silently, but substantially, overruled.
In today’s case, Wiedrich was aware that the trial court, at the request of the prosecution, proposed to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses of A murder and manslaughter. On that expectation, Wied-rich sought changes in jury instructions defining intent and manslaughter. Before the trial court instructed the jury, Wied-rich’s counsel was given an opportunity to review the proposed instructions and to designate objectionable parts. NDRCrimP 30(c) instructs: “Thereafter, only the parts or omissions so designated are deemed excepted to by the counsel designating the same.”
As the majority opinion outlines in footnote 5, Wiedrich’s counsel thereafter objected to the instruction on manslaughter, but he did not ask that negligent homicide be included. Wiedrich’s trial counsel could not have made his position more clear. He objected to all lesser-included offenses and he did not request that negligent homicide be included. This was clearly a trial tactic. It would have been inconsistent with the trial strategy to have requested an instruction on negligent homicide.
On appeal, another attorney representing Wiedrich has changed the strategy and now urges that “the trial court’s failure to properly instruct on negligent homicide was error which infringes upon substantial rights of the Defendant, and therefore can be noticed for the first time on appeal by this Court under Rule 52(b), N.D.R.Crim. P.” I think that is wrong. We should follow Frey, not dissect it. We should hold that, where a criminal defendant has waived instructions on lesser-included offenses as a trial tactic, “[w]e decline to review this claim of error as obvious under NDRCrimP 52(b).” Stoppleworth, 442 N.W.2d at 417. As we have often preached, our power to notice obvious error should be exercised cautiously and only in exceptional situations where the defendant has suffered serious injustice. State v. Hersch, 445 N.W.2d 626, 634 (N.D.1989); State v. Kopp, 419 N.W.2d 169 (N.D.1988). Obvious error ought to be just that, not obscured or obviated by a defendant’s deliberate choices.
I do not understand how a defendant gains an appellate right to insist on instructions not sought. This court did say in Frey, 441 N.W.2d at 670, that a defendant has a right to waive instructions on lesser included offenses as a trial tactic, citing several cases from other states. I agree with that; NDRCrimP 30(c) implicitly says so. But, it is quite a different thing to make the defendant’s waiver right paramount to the prosecution’s equal right to request lesser-included offense instructions. NDRCrimP 30(b) says, “any party may file written requests that the court instruct the jury on the law....” See also State v. Marks, 452 N.W.2d 298, 304 (N.D.1990); State v. Allery, 322 N.W.2d 228 (N.D.1982). The defendant’s waiver right cannot be superior to the trial court’s power to instruct on lesser-included offenses within the evidence. See 8A Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 31.03[1] (2d ed 1990). I find no precedential support for the proposition that it is “unwarranted and grossly unfair” to a defendant to instruct on one lesser-included offense at the initiative of the prosecution, but not to instruct on another lesser offense possibly within the scope of the evidence but unrequested by anyone.
It is not obvious to me that an instruction on negligent homicide was mandated by this evidence.
“The test is not merely whether or not the offense is a lesser included offense of the basic offense charged, but rather *688is whether or not there is evidence which will create a reasonable doubt as to the greater offense and support a conviction of the lesser included offense.”
State v. Langan, 410 N.W.2d 149, 152 (N.D.1987), quoting from State v. Piper, 261 N.W.2d 650, 654 (N.D.1977); State v. Trieb, 315 N.W.2d 649, 656 (N.D.1982). The lack of evidence suggesting mere negligence is a part of my difficulty with today’s decision.
Manslaughter and negligent homicide differ from other homicide crimes in the state of mind of the accused. Murder occurs when one acts intentionally or knowingly. NDCC 12.1-16-01. Manslaughter occurs when one “recklessly causes the death of another human being.” NDCC 12.1-16-02. One acts “recklessly” when “he engages in the conduct in conscious and clearly unjustifiable disregard of a substantial likelihood of the existence of the relevant facts or risks, such disregard involving a gross deviation from acceptable standards of conduct,_” NDCC 12.1-02-02(l)(c). Negligent homicide occurs when one “negligently causes the death of another human being.” NDCC 12.1-16-03. One acts “negligently” when “he engages in the conduct in unreasonable disregard of a substantial likelihood of the existence of the relevant facts or risks, such disregard involving a gross deviation from acceptable standards of conduct.” NDCC 12.1-02-02(l)(d). The honesty and reasonableness of a defendant’s beliefs bear upon these different states of mind when there is a claim of self-defense. NDCC 12.1-05-07 and 12.1-05-08. But, a state of mind is rarely proven directly and must usually be inferred from conduct and circumstances.
In the circumstances of this case, it is easy to see how manslaughter was warranted. It is much more difficult to see how Wiedrich’s conduct in shooting twice to kill a man was merely negligent.
The State maintained that Wiedrich’s guilt of manslaughter was based upon “the facts that Goodbird was unarmed, that no warning shots were fired, and that [Wied-rich] made no attempt to escape from the alleged attack....” The State pointed out that one of Wiedrich’s own statements clearly evidenced his recklessness, rather than a need for self-defense:
[Deputy]: So he was hitting you with his fists?
[Wiedrich]: With his fist, tried to kick me a few times and asked me to get out of the way and he kicked me in a certain place (inaudible) which he was aiming for. (Emphasis by the State).
This jury was instructed:
The use of deadly force is not justified if it can be avoided, with safety to the actor and others, by retreat or other conduct involving minimal interference with the freedom of the person menaced. The use of deadly force is not justified unless the person honestly and reasonably believed that he could not retreat from his attacker with safety.
See State v. White, 390 N.W.2d 43, 45-46, n. 3 (N.D.1986). The State took the position that “[t]he jury ... properly ... determined that defendant’s belief that his life was being threatened was unreasonably held.” I agree. I can understand why neither the prosecution nor the trial court believed a negligent homicide instruction was warranted without a clear request from the defendant.
Wiedrich’s statement claimed that Good-bird was the aggressor, that Goodbird demanded money, and that Goodbird beat and choked him. In contrast, testimony of witnesses showed that, to begin, Wiedrich was the verbal aggressor. The pictures of Wiedrich showed slight bruises and abrasions to the left side of his face, but the autopsy revealed that Goodbird had no blood on his hands. There was no showing of any bruises around Wiedrich’s neck where he was allegedly strangled. Wied-rich refused medical treatment and had no physical examination. Wiedrich’s initial verbal aggression and superficial injuries were circumstances which clearly contradicted his claim of self-defense.
Other circumstances also contradict Wiedrich’s claim of self-defense. Expert testimony about a lack of powder burns on Goodbird’s shirt tended to evidence that Goodbird was not as close as claimed by *689Wiedrich and thereby also evidenced that Wiedrich could not have reasonably believed that the use of deadly force was necessary to prevent imminent unlawful harm. There were no eye witnesses to the shooting. Wiedrich’s breath smelled of alcohol. As a whole, the circumstantial evidence emphatically contradicted Wiedrich’s claim of self-defense.
I would not have disagreed with Wied-rich’s right to have the lesser-included offense of negligent homicide submitted to this jury if he had requested it. State v. Thiel, 411 N.W.2d 66, 67 (N.D.1987). “In determining on appeal whether the jury should have been charged on a particular defense [requested], we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant.” Id. But that is a standard different from our standard of review for obvious error.
Here, I think there is a good deal of doubt whether negligent homicide was so manifested that it’s omission ought to be treated as obvious error, even though Wiedrich did not request it. Consider, for example, corresponding doubts in the conflicting opinions in State v. Haakenson, 213 N.W.2d 394 (N.D.1973), which reversed a manslaughter conviction for error in instructing the jury on self-defense. If it is unclear that an unrequested lesser-offense was warranted, we should defer to the trial court’s discretion in choosing not to submit it. A defendant should not be able to substitute a new strategy on appeal when his trial strategy was unsuccessful.
Because I believe that Wiedrich had a fair trial and that he made a deliberate, tactical choice not to request instructions on the lesser-included offense of negligent homicide, I would affirm. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
ERICKSTAD, C.J., concurs.