Court Opinion

ID: 9673933
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:20:39.508066+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:06:33.943547
License: Public Domain

HIGGINS, Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent and concur in the Dissenting Opinion of Blackmar, C.J., and write separately to express an additional view of this appeal.
The majority utilizes Missouri’s probate non-claim statute, section 473.360, to affirm dismissal of appellant’s petition to force a sale of certain real estate to satisfy a subsequently acquired judgment in favor of appellant against respondent Estate.
Flora Myers died March 8, 1979, during the course of long-standing condemnation litigation over the amount due the State from Mrs. Myers because of an excessive condemnation award. Letters testamentary issued to Ardeis Myers, Jr., (later substituted as Executor) May 15, 1979. The first Notice of Letters Testamentary was published May 18, 1979, and on November 18, 1979, probate claims against the Estate of Flora Myers were barred by the non-claim statute.
On February 15, 1983, while proceedings in the Estate of Flora Myers were pending, the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, determined that the Circuit Court of Jackson County (the trial court) “erroneously applied the standard articulated by the Supreme Court in this [condemnation] case by finding Mrs. Myers’ Estate liable for only one-half of the excess [of the condemnation award] rather than the full amount.” The adverse judgment was reversed and the cause was remanded “with directions to enter judgment for the State Highway Commission and against the Estate of Flora E. Myers in the amount of $237,000 plus interest from February 21, 1971.” See State ex rel. State Hwy. Com’n v. Morganstein [Morganstein II], 649 S.W.2d 485, 490 (Mo.App.1983).
On remand, judgment was entered by the circuit court September 14, 1983, against the Estate of Flora Myers for the full amount of the excess condemnation award and interest which by then totaled $415,-626.58. A copy of the judgment was delivered to the probate court January 11, 1984; the petition to enforce followed.
In these circumstances, I deem it inappropriate to say that the bar to claims of November 18, 1979, precludes collection of the judgment which came to life September 14, 1983, while the Estate proceedings remained pending.
Claims against estates of deceased persons, as that phrase is used in section 473.-360 governing limitations on filing of claims against estates, refers to liabilities of the decedent which survived. Higgins v. McElwee, 680 S.W.2d 335 (Mo.App.1984). The liability of the Estate for the judgment sum could not be known until liquidated by the trial court by its judgment of September 14, 1983.
Traditionally, claims subject to the bar of section 473.360 are typified by those for personal services, groceries, clothing, merchandise, and the like; and they are for allowance by the probate court. Appellant’s petition to sell real estate does not seek to establish this type claim; it seeks to enforce a judgment that in itself is for a *78liquidated sum established by a trial division of the same circuit court.
In my view, the petition for enforcement of the judgment aforesaid is not subject to preclusion by the non-claim statute, § 473.360, as applied by the majority, but falls rather under the protection of section 473.370, RSMo, which deals specifically with “establishment of claims by judgment.” It provides:
1. A person having a claim against an estate may establish the same by the judgment or decree of some court of record, in the ordinary course of proceeding, upon filing a copy of the judgment or decree in the probate division.
2. Except where notice of revival of an action or of institution of an action is filed as required by section 473.363 or 473.367, any judgment or decree is deemed filed within the meaning of section 473.360 as of the time a copy of the judgment or decree is filed in the probate division as required by this section.
For this reason and for the reasons expressed by the Chief Justice, I would reverse the judgment of dismissal and remand the cause for further consideration and determination of the appellant’s petition to force sale of real estate on its merits.