Court Opinion

ID: 9862459
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 01:11:20.23507+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:25:35.182169
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE GEORGE J. MORAN, dissenting: The majority holds that the insurer’s representations to the plaintiffs in the letter dated December 1, 1971, set the terms of the original policy of insurance, but did not affect the terms of the renewed policies. The law in Illinois, however, is that the provisions of a renewed policy are regarded as identical to the provisions of the original policy unless the insured and insurer have expressly agreed to a change. (See Palmer v. Bull Dog Auto Insurance Association, 294 Ill. 287, 128 N.E. 499 (1920); Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Walsh, 54 Ill. 164 (1870); Annot., 91 A.L.R.2d 546, 549 (1963); 43 Am. Jur. 2d Insurance §384 (1969).) The insurer’s merely sending to the plaintiffs a renewed policy which indicated a reduced scope of coverage, without calling the plaintiffs’ attenion to the reduction, was not enough to change the terms of the original policy. (See Annot., 91 A.L.R.2d 546, 549 (1963).) The plaintiffs certainly did not expressly agree to a reduction in the scope of coverage. Thus the plaintiffs’ son was covered by the renewed policy, just as he was covered by the original policy, and a judgment should have been rendered for the plaintiffs. Then, too, the majority bases its rationale on a ground not advanced in the trial court. Although the need for a just result and for the maintenance of a sound and uniform body of precedent will occasionally require disposition of an appeal on grounds not raised by the parties (.Hux v. Roben, 38 Ill. 2d 223, 230 N.E.2d 831 (1967)), no such need exists in this case.