Court Opinion

ID: 9847074
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:53:20.559686+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:00.252647
License: Public Domain

Utter, J.
(dissenting)—In legal controversies involving the validity of fishing regulations, the time between action and effect is usually so compressed that the issues are moot before the appellate process can be fully utilized. This was true in the present case. It is therefore of critical importance for this court to resolve issues that are likely to arise again, if we can, consistent with our earlier decisions. The majority recognizes all the elements exist in this case to justify this court resolving the issues presented, even if the case is moot. See Hartman v. State Game Comm’n, 85 Wn.2d 176, 532 P.2d 614 (1975). It refuses, however, to consider important issues involved in this appeal, raised by the parties and discussed in the briefs, stating, “vital questions inherent in the case have not been raised, and much less argued.” I am completely unable to understand how this can justify our refusal to decide those issues which are fully briefed and properly before us, and which do not require consideration of the additional, peripheral questions raised by the majority. The fishermen of this state and the Department of Fisheries deserve whatever assistance this court can give them by clarifying issues likely to arise in future cases. This is particularly true where the lower court has ruled incorrectly, as I believe it has.
Assuming the Director is bound by the court decrees requiring the State to provide certain fish to Indians, the issue presented is whether he has the authority under the applicable statutes to establish management regulations over other fisheries more completely within the control of *423the State. The trial court erroneously concluded certain regulations promulgated by the Director were outside his authority. The court erred by failing to consider the full statutory authority of the Director and did not consider at all his specific authority to promulgate regulations. The trial court looked only to the authority of the Director specified in RCW 75.08.020, which states in part: “The director shall devote his time to the duties of his office and enforce the laws and regulations of the director relating to propagation, protection, conservation, preservation, and management of food fish and shellfish.” Additional authority is found in RCW 75.08.080, which provides:
The director shall investigate the habits, supply and economic use of, and classify, the food fish and shellfish in the waters of the state and the offshore waters, and from time to time, make, adopt, amend, and promulgate rules and regulations as follows:
(2) Specifying and defining the areas, places, and waters in which the taking and possession of the various classes of food fish and shellfish is lawful or prohibited.
(6) The fixing of the size, sex, numbers, and amounts of the various classes of food fish and shellfish that may be taken, possessed, sold, or disposed of.
The Director’s authority to control the increased Indian fishery is severely restricted both by our decisions and those of the federal courts. See Department of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44, 38 L. Ed. 2d 254, 94 S. Ct. 330 (1973); State v. James, 72 Wn.2d 746, 435 P.2d 521 (1967). If the Director is unable to manage Indian treaty fishing, which is the subject of federal court decisions, and non-Indian fishing as well, due to the trial court’s ruling in this case, the result is a complete lack of proper management leading to over-fishing of the resource. To prevent this he must be able to promulgate regulations in the one area in which he can still exercise control.
The words “conservation” and “management” in the applicable statutes are broad enough to encompass the princi*424pies of allocation embodied in the challenged regulations. Allocation is an important factor in the conservation of fish runs. Where a resource is not presently plentiful enough to satisfy all needs, a restriction on withdrawal must be instituted in order to conserve the renewable resource and insure its availability in the future.
I dissent from the majority’s refusal to resolve important issues likely to arise in future litigation. I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and affirm the action of the Director.
Brachtenbach and Horowitz, JJ., and Wiehl, J. Pro Tern., concur with Utter, J.
Petition for rehearing granted November 4, 1976.