Court Opinion

ID: 9900876
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-20 17:08:19.838426+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:21.364195
License: Public Domain

J-S32037-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  CARRIE J. WALKER                             :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1569 MDA 2022

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 6, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s):
                          CP-67-SA-0000205-2022

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                     FILED: NOVEMBER 20, 2023

       Appellant Carrie J. Walker appeals pro se from the judgment of sentence

imposed following her conviction for reckless driving.1     Appellant challenges

the sufficiency of the evidence and argues that the trial court erred in denying

her request to continue the summary appeal hearing. We affirm.

       By way of background, Appellant was charged with one count of reckless

driving following a traffic stop in June of 2022. Following a hearing on August

9, 2022, the magisterial district judge found Appellant guilty. Appellant filed

a timely appeal from her conviction with the Court of Common Pleas of York

County on August 29, 2022, and a summary appeal hearing was scheduled

for October 6, 2022.

____________________________________________

1 75 Pa.C.S. § 3736(a).
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       On October 3, 2022, Appellant filed a motion for a continuance, which

was denied that same day. See Motion, 10/3/22; Order, 10/3/22. At the

start of the summary appeal hearing, Appellant then verbally moved for a

continuance, which the trial court denied.       See N.T., 10/6/22, at 3-4.

Following the summary appeal hearing, the trial court convicted Appellant of

reckless driving and sentenced Appellant to a $200 fine plus costs. See Order,

10/6/22, at 1.

       Appellant filed a post-sentence motion, which was denied by the trial

court. Appellant subsequently filed a timely notice of appeal2 and a court-

ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. The trial court issued a Rule 1925(a)

opinion addressing Appellant’s claims.

       Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

       1. Whether the evidence presented at trial, even when viewed in
          the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, was sufficient
          to establish beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements of
          reckless driving under 75 Pa.C.S. § 3736[?]

       2. Whether [Appellant] was denied due process in being denied a
          continuance[?]

Appellant’s Brief at 1 (some formatting altered).

       In her first issue, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence

supporting her conviction for reckless driving. Id. at 6. In support, Appellant

claims that the Commonwealth failed to prove “the mens rea element of the

____________________________________________

2 We note that the thirty-day appeal deadline fell on Saturday, November 5,

2022. Therefore, Appellant’s November 7, 2022 notice of appeal was timely
filed. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1908.

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crime” because there was no evidence that she “(1) drove in such a manner

that there existed a substantial risk that injury would result; (2) . . . was

aware of any risk or danger to any person or property; [and] (3) [] despite

that awareness drove in such a manner callously disregarding any risk she

was allegedly creating.” Id. (some formatting altered). In support, Appellant

alleges that “[t]o the contrary, the undisputable evidence was that [she]

entered an empty parking lot where there were no people that she could have

hit or put at risk” and claims that she was not aware of any risk associated

with driving beyond a police barricade. Id. at 6-7. Finally, Appellant claims

that her conduct did not rise to the level of willful and wanton. Id. at 7.

      When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we are governed by the

following standard of review:

      In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine
      whether the evidence admitted at trial and all reasonable
      inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to
      the Commonwealth as verdict winner, is sufficient to prove every
      element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. As an
      appellate court, we may not re-weigh the evidence and substitute
      our judgment for that of the fact-finder. Any question of doubt is
      for the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive
      that as a matter of law no probability of fact can be drawn from
      the combined circumstances.

Commonwealth v. Martin, 297 A.3d 424, 434 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation

omitted).

      Pursuant to the Motor Vehicle Code, “[a]ny person who drives any

vehicle in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property is

guilty of reckless driving.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 3736(a). This Court has recognized

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that reckless driving as being among the offenses within the Motor Vehicle

Code that “contemplates the most serious departures from the standard of

care the [Motor Vehicle Code] imparts upon operators.” Commonwealth v.

Greenberg, 885 A.2d 1025, 1027 (Pa. Super. 2005).

     Additionally, this Court has explained:

     In Commonwealth v. Forrey, 92 A.2d 233, 234 (Pa. Super.
     1952), a case which discussed the removal of the willful and
     wanton element from reckless driving in 1951, we stated:

        The 1951 amendment redefined reckless driving by
        eliminating willful or wanton conduct in the operation of a
        vehicle as an essential element of the offense. But in so
        doing it is clear that the legislature did not intend to increase
        a driver’s responsibility for ordinary negligence by
        reclassifying mere negligence as reckless driving. What was
        contemplated in the language ‘carelessly disregarding the
        rights or safety of others, or in a manner so as to endanger
        any person or property’ was to set the minimal requisite of
        the statutory offense of reckless driving at less than willful
        and wanton conduct on the one hand and, on the other,
        something more than ordinary negligence or the mere
        absence of care under the circumstances.

     Consequently, even after the term willful and wanton was
     removed, reckless driving required something more than ordinary
     negligence. It follows then, that by reinserting willful and wanton
     into the definition, the standard for reckless driving was raised
     substantially higher. Since the reinsertion of willful and wanton
     coincided with the introduction of a lesser offense called careless
     driving, it stands to reason that to satisfy the elements of reckless
     driving, the offender’s driving must be a gross departure from
     prudent      driving   standards.       We     recognized this     in
     Commonwealth v. Bullick, 830 A.2d 998 (Pa. Super. 2003),
     where we expounded upon the nature of reckless driving while
     focusing upon the element key to that offense, the requisite mens
     rea of willful or wanton conduct. We stated:

        the mens rea necessary to support the offense of reckless
        driving is a requirement that [the defendant] drove in such

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         a manner that there existed a substantial risk that injury
         would result from his driving, i.e., a high probability that a
         motor vehicle accident would result from driving in that
         manner, that he was aware of that risk and yet continued to
         drive in such a manner, in essence, callously disregarding
         the risk he was creating by his own reckless driving.

      Id. at 1003. Thus, by including provisions for maximum speeds,
      unsafe speed, careless driving and reckless driving, the legislature
      created a stratum of violations or offenses to cover driving
      behavior that is increasingly divorced from prudent driving
      behavior.

Greenberg, 885 A.2d at 1027-28 (footnote omitted).

      In the instant case, the Commonwealth presented testimony from

Northern York Regional Police Officer Gage Baumgardner, who stated that he

was on a special detail patrol in an Old Navy parking lot for a street rod event

at the time of the incident. N.T. Hr’g, 10/6/22, at 6. Officer Baumgardner

testified that several portions of the parking lot were blocked off with wooden

barricades and yellow caution tape attached to the barricades. Id. Officer

Baumgardner explained that the yellow caution tape was present to indicate

that the area had been blocked off. Id.

      Officer Baumgardner then testified that he witnessed a red sedan drive

through the Old Navy parking lot at what he described as a “high rate of

speed.” Id. at 7. The officer observed the vehicle drive through the yellow

caution tape that was attached to the wooden barricades, knock down police

signs, and continue to the “back side of the Old Navy parking lot.” Id. Officer

Baumgardner initiated a traffic stop and identified Appellant as the driver of

the sedan. Id. at 7-8.

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      When asked whether there were other people present in the parking lot

at that time, Officer Baumgardner offered the following testimony:

      In the parking lot that [Appellant] drove into, I don’t believe there
      [were] any people in that parking lot. However, there was – I
      mean the street rod event, there’s thousands of people that are
      in and around this parking lot at those times. So there [were
      people in the parking lot.

Id. at 8. During cross-examination, Officer Baumgardner testified as follows:

      The parking lot that [Appellant was] entering that was restricted
      was empty. The rest of the parking lot was full of people.

                                  *    *    *

      There was also a flower stand in that area that was still open to
      the public.

Id. at 14-15.

      The trial court, sitting as the finder of fact, reached the following

conclusion:

      The credible testimony of Officer Baumgardner shows [Appellant]
      drove through a police barricade at a high rate of speed when said
      barricade was erected to protect pedestrians from exactly those
      types of dangers while they participated in a street rod event.
      [Appellant] argues [Officer] Baumgardner stated the portion of
      the parking lot she drove through, even though blocked off by
      police barricades, did not have pedestrians in it.          [Officer]
      Baumgardner did not testify, as [Appellant] alleges, that the
      parking lot was empty. To the contrary, [Officer] Baumgardner
      testified there were “thousands of people that are in and around
      this parking lot at those times.” Again, it just happened that there
      were no pedestrians in the area [Appellant] drove through at the
      time she drove through it.         Further, by [Appellant’s] own
      admission to [Officer] Baumgardner, she saw the barricades and
      [caution] tape and chose to ignore them.

Trial Ct. Op., 12/1/22, at 5-6.

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      Following our review of the record, and in viewing the evidence in the

light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we conclude that there was

sufficient evidence supporting Appellant’s conviction for reckless driving. See

Martin, 297 A.3d at 434.       The trial court credited Officer Baumgardner’s

testimony that Appellant drove through a police barricade marked with caution

tape at a high rate of speed in a parking lot where people were present. See

Trial Ct. Op. at 6. Under these circumstances, we conclude that Appellant’s

behavior demonstrates her willful and wanton disregard for safety of persons

or property as contemplated by Section 3736 of Motor Vehicle Code. See

75 Pa.C.S. § 3736(a); see also Greenberg, 885 A.2d at 1027-28.

Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled to relief.

                           Motion for Continuance

      In her next issue, Appellant contends that the trial court erred when it

denied her motion for a continuance.       Appellant’s Brief at 9.   Specifically,

Appellant contends that she was entitled to a continuance in order to: (1) seek

the assistance of counsel; (2) receive requested documents and information

from the Commonwealth; and (3) have more time to prepare for her summary

appeal hearing. Id.

      In reviewing Appellant’s claim, we note that

      [a]ppellate review of a trial court’s continuance decision is
      deferential. The grant or denial of a motion for a continuance is
      within the sound discretion of the trial court and will be reversed
      only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion. As we have
      consistently stated, an abuse of discretion is not merely an error
      of judgment. Rather, discretion is abused when the law is
      overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is manifestly

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      unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will,
      as shown by the evidence or the record.

Commonwealth v. Norton, 144 A.3d 139, 143 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation

omitted).

      First, to the extent Appellant claims that she needed more time to obtain

counsel, this Court has held that a “bald allegation of an insufficient amount

of time to prepare will not provide a basis for reversal of the denial of a

continuance motion.” Commonwealth v. Ross, 57 A.3d 85, 91 (Pa. Super.

2012) (en banc) (citation omitted). Instead, an appellant “must be able to

show specifically in what manner [s]he was unable to prepare [her] defense

or how [s]he would have prepared differently had [s]he been given more

time.” Id. (citation omitted). Put another way, it is an appellant’s burden to

establish that he or she was prejudiced as a result of the trial court’s denial of

a motion for continuance. Id.

      Here, the trial court addressed Appellant’s claim as follows:

      There are several key characteristics of a summary conviction
      appeal. First, [Appellant] herself initiated the process which
      triggered a hearing to be scheduled. Second, [Appellant] had
      already experienced one trial in this matter at the Magisterial
      District Judge level. Third, Pa.R.Crim.P. 462 governs the appeal
      process unlike the process for court cases.

      Here, [Appellant] requested a continuance stating [three]
      reasons: 1) the appeal hearing was scheduled less than 30 days
      after the appeal was filed; 2) she needed additional time to consult
      with an attorney; and 3) she had not received responses to her
      discovery requests. Her first reason was factually false. The

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       summary conviction appeal hearing was scheduled for 41 days[3]
       after she filed her summary conviction appeal.

       [Appellant’s] second reason has no merit. [Appellant] filed the
       summary conviction appeal for the purpose of having a second
       hearing on the summary charge filed against her. She promptly
       received a hearing notice giving her more than 30 days to consult
       with an attorney. [Appellant] is not entitled to an appointed
       attorney for a charge of reckless driving, as the punishment is the
       imposition of a fine and costs only and no incarceration. [See
       Pa.R.Crim.P. 122(A)(1).] Thus, there was no need to continue the
       hearing which had been scheduled for more than one month as of
       the time of [Appellant’s] request.

       Third and finally, [Appellant] justified her request for a
       continuance because, according to her, she had served discovery
       requests upon the Commonwealth. In her Concise Statement,
       [Appellant] claims she “had the right to motion the court for an
       order to compel” the Commonwealth to respond to her discovery
       requests. Again, [Appellant] is incorrect. Nothing in the rules
       governing summary conviction appeals provides a right to
       discovery. Further, “[s]ince summary cases are not ‘court cases,’
       pretrial discovery does not apply to [a]ppellants unless Brady[4]
       or its progeny require otherwise.” Commonwealth v. Lutes,
       793 A.2d 949, 960 (Pa. Super. 2002)[; see also Pa.R.Crim.P.
       103, 573]. According to [Appellant], she requested discovery in
       order to obtain the name of a second police officer on the scene
       so she could subpoena him for the summary conviction appeal
       hearing. Such information is not exculpatory in nature, and
       therefore, not subject to Brady.

Trial Ct. Op. at 3-4 (some citations omitted).

       Based on our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion by

the trial court in denying Appellant’s motion for a continuance. See Norton,

144 A.3d at 143. As noted by the trial court, Appellant failed to demonstrate

____________________________________________

3 Appellant filed her appeal on August 26, 2022, and the trial court scheduled

the summary appeal hearing for October 6, 2022, for a total of forty-one days.

4 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

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that she had a right to counsel for the purposes of the summary appeal

hearing or that she was entitled to discovery.      See Trial Ct. Op. at 3-4.

Additionally, Appellant has failed to demonstrate that she suffered prejudice

due to the trial court’s denial of her motion for a continuance. See Ross, 57

A.3d at 91.   Therefore, Appellant is not entitled to relief.   Accordingly, we

affirm.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 11/20/2023

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