Court Opinion

ID: 9492693
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:47:38.448292+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:26.274969
License: Public Domain

SOTOMAYOR, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
It is no easy task for a district court to manage its docket efficiently, particularly when confronted with a litigant who is suffering from mental or emotional problems. I therefore have little difficulty understanding the district court’s apparent desire to bring this case to a speedy conclusion that assured Neilson a comfortable settlement. No matter how well intentioned, however, the district court’s desire for a quick and a seemingly fair resolution of this litigation could not and does not displace Neilson’s fundamental rights under the Constitution. In my view, the district court failed to give Neilson even the most basic notice before appointing a guardian ad litem who then assumed full control over her case. Because I believe this failure amounted to a denial of due process of law, I respectfully dissent.1
I. Due Process
As the majority acknowledges, Neilson had a due process right to notice and an opportunity to be heard before the district court could appoint a guardian ad litem on her behalf. See, e.g., Thomas v. Humfield, 916 F.2d 1032, 1033-34 (5th Cir.1990) (holding that a party to litigation “doubtless ha[s] a protected liberty interest in pursuing the suit as a principal [and safeguarding his] good name, reputation, hon- or, or integrity,” and is therefore entitled to notice and a hearing before the court declares him incompetent and appoints a guardian ad litem) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). From this basic proposition, however, the majority takes an extraordinary leap. In holding that the district court adequately notified Neilson of the pending competency proceedings in this case, the majority adopts the astonishing position that a mentally ill individual is entitled to less, rather than more, notice based on her illness. In my opinion, this conclusion turns the due process principle of “notice and opportunity to be heard” on its head.
The majority begins with the fundamental rule that “[t]he opportunity to be heard must be tailored to the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard.” Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268-69, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970). It concludes from this rule that when a litigant’s mental capacity is limited, the district court may neglect its duty to provide adequate notice because any effort to do so would be futile. Neither Goldberg nor the other cases on which the majority relies, however, support this conclusion. On the contrary, the cases the majority cites stand uniformly for the proposition that when a party exhibits a limited ability to understand a proceeding affecting her rights, the court must undertake even more strenuous efforts to explain the process and give the party a meaningful opportunity to respond. See id at 268-69, 90 S.Ct. 1011 (holding that written objections to the deprivation of welfare benefits did not provide uneducated and unrepresented welfare recipients with an adequate opportunity to be heard); Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U.S. 141, 145-47, 76 S.Ct. 724, 100 L.Ed. 1021 (1956) (holding that notice measures “deemed sufficient in the case of the ordinary taxpayer” did not suffice as applied to a “known incompetent”); Gray Panthers v. Schweiker, 652 F.2d 146, 169 (D.C.Cir.1980) (holding, in the context of the denial of Medicare benefits, that because “the elderly, as a group, are less able than the general populace to deal effectively with legal notices and written registration requirements,” additional methods of notice were required); cf. Mennonite Bd of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 799-800, 103 S.Ct. 2706, 77 L.Ed.2d 180 (1983) (holding that notice of *659sale mailed to a property owner was not “reasonably calculated” to inform the mortgagee of the sale).
These cases simply reflect the rule that “[a]n elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950). It Mows that in giving notice “reasonably calculated” to inform a mentally ill litigant, a court must go to greater lengths than would be necessary in the ordinary case. The majority, however, draws the opposite conclusion that when a litigant’s mental capacity renders her unable to comprehend ordinary notice procedures, the court may dispense with notice altogether.
I cannot agree with this proposition as a general matter, nor can I agree that the district court gave Neilson adequate notice in this case. Although sufficient notice and opportunity to be heard would not necessarily have required a formal eviden-tiary hearing, as Neilson urges, it would at a minimum have required that Neilson be informed that she had a liberty interest at stake: specifically, that if she was found incompetent and a guardian ad litem was appointed, she would lose all authority to make decisions concerning her own case. Cf. N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 81.07(c) (McKinney 1996) (requiring applicant for general guardian to give allegedly incompetent person specific written notice that applicant “believes you may be unable to take care of your personal needs or financial affairs,” and is seeking appointment of “someone ... to make decisions for you”); Law Revision Commission Comments on § 81.07 (“The notice must include a legend which describes the nature and seriousness of the proceeding and the person’s right to due process.”).
Although the majority concludes that Neilson received adequate notice here, it fails to identify a single communication from the- district court alerting Neilson to the significance of the pending competency determination. In fact, there were no such communications. The district court’s August 15, 1997 order requiring Neilson to submit to a psychiatric examination certainly does not qualify as such notice, as it did not contain, nor was it accompanied by, any explanation of the possible implications of the examination or the legal repercussions of a guardian ad litem appointment. The court’s September 10, 1997 order was similarly deficient. That order simply scheduled a hearing to consider Dr. Pulver’s recommendation that a guardian ad litem be appointed, and directed that “if the plaintiff consents to the appointment of a guardian ad litem, she should submit ... a written declaration giving such consent.” Nor did the district court explain the nature and import of a guardianship ad litem either during the July status conference at which Colgate first questioned Neilson’s competency or during the September proceeding at which the court appointed the guardian.
The majority nonetheless concludes that the district court adequately protected Neilson’s interests by 1) informing Neilson that it was considering appointing a guardian ad litem; and 2) ordering an independent psychological examination. See ante at 653. Neither of these measures, however, even approaches sufficient notice under the Due Process Clause. As a pro se litigant, Neilson could hardly have been expected to understand the meaning and effect of a guardianship ad litem absent an explanation of the role the guardian would play in directing the case, which the district court did not provide. Nor did the mere fact of the psychological examination constitute adequate notice. Nothing in the examination itself was calculated to educate Neilson regarding the legal consequences of a guardianship ad litem, and Neilson did not even receive a copy of the resulting expert report until sometime in *660December 1997, nearly three months after the court appointed the guardian ad litem. As a result, Neilson had no opportunity to challenge Dr. Pulver’s observations or object to his conclusions.
The court compounded the inadequacy of this notice, moreover, by improperly leading Neilson to believe that her case would be dismissed with prejudice if she refused to consent to the psychiatric examination and to the guardian ad litem appointment. The district court first raised the possibility of dismissal in its August 15, 1997 order, which unequivocally stated that Neilson’s case would be dismissed with prejudice unless she submitted to a psychiatric examination. Neilson immediately wrote the court a letter pointing out that the case cited in the order, Krain v. Smallwood, 880 F.2d 1119 (9th Cir.1989), in fact held that a court could not dismiss a case with prejudice based on a pro se plaintiffs failure to comply with an order under Fed.R.Civ.P. 35(a), id. at 1121.2 The court did not respond to Neilson’s letter, thereby suggesting that it adhered to the threat of dismissal contained in the August 15 order notwithstanding the incorrect citation of Krain. This failure to respond, which left Neilson with a clear misconception regarding the probable consequences of withholding her consent to the examination, falls far short of notice “reasonably calculated to inform” her of the nature of the proceedings.
As would be expected given the court’s threat of dismissal, Neilson submitted to the examination. One week later, the court issued a second order scheduling a hearing to consider the appointment of a guardian ad litem and again inviting Neil-son’s consent. Although the second order did not explicitly state that Neilson’s case would be dismissed with prejudice if she withheld her consent, it was both proximate in time to and concerned the same subject matter (Neilson’s competency) as the first order. Even Colgate, from the time it first questioned Neilson’s competency, linked its request for a psychiatric examination under Fed.R.Civ.P. 35(a) to the prospect of a guardianship ad litem under Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(c). Neilson, proceeding without counsel, reasonably could have inferred that the court’s threat of dismissal in the first order applied to the second order as well, and that she therefore had no choice but to consent to the appointment of a guardian ad litem. In fact, Neilson herself informed the court just one week after the appointment that she consented “[f]or fear of having the case dismissed.” The court did not attempt to correct Neilson’s misimpression that the court could dismiss her case with prejudice, or to ensure that Neilson understood her right to refuse consent to the appointment of a guardian ad litem. The district court’s failure in this regard further illustrates that its notice procedures were not tailored to Neilson’s capacity and circumstances.
Given the sparse notice she received, it is not surprising that Neilson’s communications to the district court revealed considerable confusion as to the significance of the psychiatric examination and the guardian ad litem appointment. In fact, the record is abundantly clear that Neilson, proceeding without counsel, was operating under the mistaken belief that the court was contemplating appointing an attorney — not a legal guardian — on her behalf. Repeatedly, Neilson emphasized to the court that she was competent “to make rational decisions,” but not to act as her own counsel. See, e.g, Letter from Francine Neilson to Court dated July 31, 1997 (“Because Neilson is sufficiently competent to make rational decisions does not mean that she is also sufficiently competent to act in the capacity of an attorney before the court, to be ProSe.”) Read in context, Neilson’s statements to the effect that she *661was not “competent” to litigate the case plainly referred to her legal rather than mental capacity. See, e.g., id. (noting that “Webster’s dictionary [defines] competency [as] to meet or to be sufficient; efficient; sufficient skills or training to do something; legally capable,” and arguing that “Neilson does not have sufficient skills and training to meet the needs of plaintiff in this case”). On several occasions, moreover, Neilson specifically asked the court to appoint an attorney to represent her. See, e.g., Letter from Francine Neilson to Court dated August 28,1997.3
Indeed, as soon as Neilson became aware that her recently appointed guardian ad litem would have full control over the litigation, she immediately protested the appointment. See Letter from Francine Neilson to Court dated September 25, 1997 (“Ms. Neilson has stated to the Court that she is competent to handle day to day decisions but not competent to litigate her case, which was the initial issue of appointing an ad litem, her ability to continue to litigate the case, being ProSe. Plaintiff needs to have Mr. Niss’ role clarified and also what her options are which are to be determined by the discretionary powers to be used by the Court on her behalf.”). Thereafter, she repeatedly asserted her competency and objected to the guardian ad litem appointment, both in writing and at each and every court proceeding held in this matter. See Transcript of October 27, 1997 Proceeding (“Mr. Niss is telling me that he can do anything he wants to do because he is the guardian ad litem and I’m adjudicated incompetent. Well, I’m far from incompetent. I’m incompetent to litigate, but I’m certainly competent enough to handle my day-to-day affairs....”); Transcript of November 25, 1997 Proceeding (“As I indicated to you when I had to respond to your request on the August 15th order for going for psychiatric evaluation to determine whether or not I was competent to litigate the case, that, no, I was not competent to litigate the case, I tell you that right out. I’m not an attorney.... And I pleaded to you, during that time, assign a litigator. I need a litigator. If the ad litem is going to be a litigator, that’s what I need. When I was told that Mr. Niss was an attorney, I assumed that he was going to be the litigator. Mr. Niss has a different idea totally.... The last time I spoke to Mr. Niss was yesterday he told me that he’s still waiting to hear from finalizing some issues on the settlement that he proposed. He had made it very clear to me that what he proposed, whether I like it or not, has to be accepted by me because he’s the ad litem. You know, I’m not mentally deficient where I need an ad litem or someone to tell me what I need to do and how I need to run my life.... I plead and I beg to you one more time, your Honor, please give me a litigator, assign to me a litigator who is willing to take on this case.”); Letter from Francine Neilson to Court dated December 27, 1997 re: Inability to Obtain a Fair and Impartial Trial — Removal of Ad Litem (“Pro se plaintiff requests removal of Guardian Ad Litem, James Niss, because of his apparent lack of independence, insensitivity to needs of plaintiff, disregard of Court instructions regarding the handling of his responsibilities.... All of this leaves plaintiff without legal representation in the litigation matters, resulting in her continuing to represent herself in legal matters, thus remaining a pro se plain*662tiff.”); Transcript of January 6, 1998 Proceeding (“Mr. Niss ... was appointed guardian ad litem in the broader sense. He was appointed guardian ad litem to assist because I needed assistance in litigation. He is not litigating. He has no intention of litigating.”); Transcript of January 28, 1998 Proceeding (“I consented to having the ad litem who would be the litigator to this case in trial, not to sit there and start to make a disability claim to say Mrs. Neilson was impaired, you know.... But I did ask that if there was doubt as to what my intent was when I agreed to have an ad litem, then I withdraw that approval and I request that Mr. Niss be removed from serving as my ad litem. I did that over six weeks ago to this court. And I did not get a response to that.”).
All things considered, Neilson was hardly erratic in her representations concerning her competency. To the contrary, after an initial period of understandable confusion triggered by inadequate notice, Neilson emphatically and consistently challenged the district court’s guardian ad litem appointment. This course of conduct cannot seriously be characterized as informed “consent,” see Neilson v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 993 F.Supp. 225, 226 (S.D.N.Y.1998), and the majority correctly declines to affirm the district court’s appointment of the guardian ad litem on this convenient but unsupported basis. See ante at 653 n. 5.
The manner in which the majority does dispose of Neilson’s appeal, however, is even more problematic. Even apart from its unprecedented approach to the question of notice, in the end the majority’s analysis — its own characterization to the contrary, see ante at 653, notwithstanding— amounts to harmless error review. By relying on the district court’s “post-appointment safeguards” to compensate for its pre-appointment due process deficiencies, the majority treats those deficiencies as harmless in light of the overall fairness of the settlement. Moreover, in using Neilson’s now-uncontested incompetence to justify the district court’s failure to give her proper notice, the majority in essence holds that any error below was harmless because proper notice would have been ineffective in light of Neilson’s mental state.
As the majority appears to concede, however, it is highly doubtful whether a court’s failure to provide sufficient notice and an opportunity to be heard before appointing a guardian ad litem is subject to harmless error review. See, e.g., WJR, The Goodwill Station v. Federal Communications Comm’n, 174 F.2d 226, 241 (D.C.Cir.1948) (“Denial of a procedural right guaranteed by the Constitution — in this instance denial of a hearing guaranteed by the due process- clause — is never ‘harmless error.’”), rev’d on other grounds, 337 U.S. 265, 69 S.Ct. 1097, 93 L.Ed. 1353 (1949); cf. Kim v. Hurston, 182 F.3d 113, 119 (2d Cir.1999) (reversing judgment as a matter of law in favor of defendant and remanding for entry of nominal damages award, reasoning that even though “the minimal hearing that procedural due process requires would have done [the plaintiff] little good since she could not have realistically contested [the ground for deprivation of her liberty interest] ...[,] the procedural due process requirement ... must be observed”). Accordingly, the district court’s post-appointment efforts to monitor the work of the guardian ad litem are irrelevant to the determination of whether its pre-appointment notice to Neilson was adequate. The due process right to notice and opportunity to be heard is wholly independent of the guardian ad litem’s duty to protect a litigant’s interests. Consequently, not even the most diligent and capable guardian ad litem can compensate for an unlawful deprivation of a party’s right to be fully informed before she loses control of her case.
Even if harmless error analysis is appropriate, the district court’s denial of due process in this case was not harmless. *663The evidence simply does not support the majority’s conclusion that “there was no way [the district court] could provide an explanation that would have been suited to [Neilson’s] mental condition.” Ante at 652. At the very least, the consistent and detailed manner in which Neilson objected to the guardian ad litem once she became aware of his function suggests that she was far from unable to understand or protect her right to pursue her own case. Had Neilson received timely and adequate notice of the nature of the proceedings going on around her, she might well have refused either to submit to the psychiatric examination or to consent to the appointment of a guardian ad litem, thereby potentially inviting a dismissal without prejudice. Cf. Krain, 880 F.2d at 1121 (noting that when a pro se litigant refuses to cooperate in competency proceedings, the court may dismiss the case without prejudice). Alternatively, given a meaningful opportunity to be heard, Neilson might have convinced the district court to appoint an attorney for her rather than a guardian ad litem. Cf. id. (specifying appointment of an attorney as an alternative to holding competency proceedings or dismissing the case without prejudice). Had she undertaken either of these actions, it is at least possible that Neilson, with the assistance of her general guardian and her family4, would have been able to continue litigating her case or to refile her claims later and either try them successfully or negotiate a more favorable settlement. See infra Part II.B.
In sum, the district court’s decision to divest Neilson of authority over her own case violated her due process rights. With such an important constitutional interest at stake, the district court had the responsibility to provide Neilson with notice that was tailored to her mental capacity and designed to ensure that sh$ understood the course her case was taking. The record simply does not support the majority’s conclusion that such notice would have been futile due to Neilson’s incompetence, nor do the district court’s “post-appointment safeguards” mitigate the inadequacy of the notice she did receive. I therefore reject the majority’s holding and vote to vacate the judgment and remand the case to allow Neilson’s general guardian to proceed with the lawsuit.
II. Refusal to Defer Consideration of Proposed Settlement
For the reasons explained, I fear that the district court, in its haste to conclude this matter, took a shortcut where Neil-son’s due process rights were concerned. The point is underscored by the district court’s subsequent decision to approve the *664proposed settlement rather than, as Scott Neilson requested, to defer consideration of the agreement pending the state court’s imminent appointment of a general guardian for Neilson. The majority offers two justifications for this decision, both of which are exaggerated and neither of which is sufficient.
A. Delay
The majority concludes that allowing Neilson’s general guardian an opportunity to review the proposed settlement would have entailed considerable delay. Ante at 657. This concern finds no support in the record. Quite the contrary, Scott Neil-son’s attorney informed the district court, both in his affidavit and at oral argument, that the state court judge had decided to appoint a guardian, understood the need for prompt action and was likely to finalize the appointment within a matter of weeks.5 Even the guardian ad litem expressed confidence that the state court judge would complete the process as soon as possible, observing that “the state court judge ha[d] moved like the wind.” New York law, moreover, gives guardianship proceedings “a preference over all other causes” and imposes deadlines for the appointment and commission of general guardians. See N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 81.13.
The district court apparently viewed these facts as irrelevant, noting that Neil-son’s general guardian “would be required effectively to duplicate the efforts of the [gjuardian [a]d [ljitem,” who had by then spent more than four months working on the case, and anticipating “a delay of many months before the general guardian could give [her] evaluation of the proposed settlement.” Neilson, 993 F.Supp. at 227. Initially, I cannot agree that obtaining the views of Neilson’s general guardian would have involved “costly duplication” of the guardian ad litem’s efforts. See id. at 228. In contrast to a general guardian, who under New York law has broad powers and access to information about the incompetent party, see N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law §§ 81.21, 81.22, the guardian ad litem had very little interaction with Neilson and thus had virtually no first-hand knowledge of her personal situation or financial means. Indeed, throughout his involvement in this case, the guardian ad litem repeatedly indicated that he expected his role would be taken over by a general guardian. At one point, the guardian ad litem even joined in Scott Neilson’s request for an adjournment. Athough the guardian ad litem subsequently changed his position and opposed the adjournment, the record does not suggest that he had any new information concerning Neilson’s personal or financial circumstances that might have cast doubt on the wisdom of his earlier recommendation that the court give the general guardian time to consider the proposed settlement.
The record similarly offers no basis for the district court’s conclusion, apparently credited by the majority, see ante at 657, that Neilson’s general guardian would require “many months” to review the proposed settlement. See 993 F.Supp. at 227. Much of the four months that the guardian ad litem spent on this case was devoted to negotiating and finalizing the settlement. As early as October 27, 1997, six weeks after he was appointed, the guardian ad litem was sufficiently familiar with the details of the case to report that “the prospects of settlement [we]re real, especially since Colgate’s counsel and [he] [had begun] exploring the possibility] that Colgate’s Disability Plan might provide an alternative to the relief sought in this lawsuit.” The guardian ad litem later informed the court that only one-third of his *665time on this case was spent reviewing materials related to the merits of Neilson’s claims. In any event, even without the benefit of this hindsight, see ante at 657, the district court easily could have taken steps to ensure against undue delay. The court could, for instance, have required the general guardian to submit an evaluation of the proposed settlement within a specific, limited period of time, e.g., "within 30 or 45 days, of her appointment and commission. The district court’s failure even to explore such a possibility seriously undermines its conclusion that granting Scott Neilson’s adjournment request would have led to “extended” delay. See 993 F.Supp. at 227.
The district court expressed concern that any delay in finalizing the settlement “would be highly prejudicial to plaintiffs interests, depriving her of much-needed benefits that would flow to her immediately under the settlement agreement.” 993 F.Supp. at 227. Neither Neilson nor her son, however, shared this concern about “plaintiffs interests.” Indeed, the court’s trepidation should have been allayed at least somewhat by the fact that Neilson’s son, who was taking appropriate legal steps to ensure his mother’s long-term care, himself favored a brief adjournment. In any case, as Scott Neilson’s attorney noted in his affidavit, the district court had before it virtually no information concerning Neilson’s personal or financial resources, rendering its finding that Neilson needed “immediate” benefits wholly speculative.6 What the majority characterizes as an “entirely reasonable assessment of the circumstances,” ante at 657, thus appears to have been a conclusion based merely on a set of unsupported assumptions about Neilson’s needs, hardly a sound basis for a decision with potentially momentous implications for Neilson.
B. Neilson’s Prospects at Trial
The majority also affirms the district court’s decision to approve the proposed settlement, without waiting for the general guardian to review the agreement, because Neilson had limited prospects for recovery at trial. See ante at 654-55, 657. Neither the district court nor the majority has, however, undertaken any detailed analysis of the merits of Neilson’s claims, particularly her claim of retaliatory discharge. Federal courts, in determining the fairness of a proposed settlement, should consider a variety of factors, including “the range of reasonableness of the settlement fund in light of the best possible recovery.” County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 907 F.2d 1295, 1323-24 (2d Cir.1990) (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Maywalt v. Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co., 67 F.3d 1072, 1079 (2d Cir.1995) (“In determining whether a proposed settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate, the primary concern is with the substantive terms of the settlement: Basic to this is the need to compare the terms of the compromise with the likely rewards of litigation.”) (citations, alterations and quotation marks omitted).
There is an extraordinary aspect of this case that the majority ignores altogether: it is undisputed that Colgate expressly conditioned Neilson’s continued employment on the withdrawal of her EEOC complaint. When Neilson refused to withdraw the charge, Colgate fired her. In light of this potential “smoking gun” evidence, I believe a jury would have little difficulty finding that Neilson suffered a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of her employment under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. See Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 640 (2d Cir.1997) (“It is conceivable that a demand to withdraw an *666EEOC charge could constitute retaliation, if it truly had so great an effect on the plaintiff as to alter the conditions of her employment in a material way.”)-7 This evidence alone thus immediately places this case — whether or not it can ultimately be defended successfully — on sounder footing than many employment discrimination cases that are settled for significantly greater amounts.8 It is undoubtedly this sort of consideration that might prompt an attorney to leap at the opportunity to represent a client in a retaliatory discharge case. Indeed, Neilson’s former attorneys, the prominent employment law firm of Vladeek, Waldman, Elias & Engelhard, strenuously opposed the settlement negotiated by the guardian ad litem and even offered to reenter the case and “vigorously pursue Ms. Neilson’s claims” on a pro bono basis.9
While I agree that a district court has the authority to approve a settlement negotiated by a guardian ad litem notwithstanding the subsequent appointment of a general guardian in state court, see ante at 657, I cannot disregard the fact that a general guardian invariably has more information about the personal and financial circumstances of an incompetent party than a guardian ad litem appointed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(c). Where, as here, the appointment of a general guardian is imminent, this factor should weigh heavily on a district court’s decision whether to approve a settlement on behalf of an incompetent party, particularly if the only negative consequence of an adjournment is a short delay with no appreciable prejudice to either the plaintiff or the defendant. In my view, the benefits of a brief adjournment to allow Neilson’s general guardian to review the proposed settlement so far outweighed any speculative harm caused by a few months’ delay in the case that the district court’s refusal to defer consideration of the settlement amounted to an abuse of discretion. For this reason, and because the procedures employed by the district court in appointing the guardian ad litem failed to satisfy due process, I respectfully dissent.

. I concur in Part A of the majority’s discussion, which holds that Neilson's general guardian has standing to bring this appeal. See ante at 650-51.

. Even Colgate does not attempt to defend the propriety of the district court’s August 15 order.

. Some of Neilson's initial comments to the court referred to a guardian ad litem and an attorney conjunctively. See, e.g., Letter from Francine Neilson to Court dated September 15, 1997 (“I again consent to the appointment of a guardian ad litem in addition to an attorney....”). Viewed in its entirety, however, the record demonstrates that Neilson perceived no distinction between a guardian ad litem and a lawyer who would litigate her case. See, e.g., Transcript of October 27, 1997 Proceeding ("He's not acting as a guardian ad litem. I do not need a guardian for day-today affairs. I need someone to litigate the case.”); Transcript of November 25, 1997 Proceeding ("I still have to go back to the issue that we initially asked for an ad litem, a guardian ad litem, for powers of litigating this case. That's why I consented to it. No other reason. For litigating this case.”).

. I note that under New York law, copies of an application for a general guardian must, if possible, be served on the allegedly incompetent person's spouse, parents and adult children, among others. See N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 81.07(d)(ii). Although the precise procedure for appointing a guardian ad litem is left to the district court's discretion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(c), see Thomas, 916 F.2d at 1035 (holding that district court “may apply any procedure [for determining competency] that meets the requirements of due process”), there is no reason why a district court should not attempt to follow the state procedures, where possible, for notifying the individual’s family. The state procedures for notice to families have a sound basis in logic and experience, and district courts should use them as a guideline for competency proceedings in federal court. Asking an allegedly incompetent party about his or her family, and attempting to obtain their names and addresses, are simple steps that courts can and should take before proceeding with the appointment of a guardian ad litem.
Had the court below taken these measures, this case might not have progressed to its current unfortunate state. Neilson’s son, who commenced a state court proceeding to appoint a general guardian soon after the district court appointed the guardian ad litem, appears to have been both willing and able to help her oversee her affairs until a general guardian was appointed. Had Scott Neilson been apprised of the proceedings in federal court regarding his mother's competency, he might have been able to explain more fully the import of the competency proceedings to his mother and to assist her in deciding whether to consent to a psychiatric examination or to a guardianship ad litem.

. These representations proved accurate. Neilson’s general guardian was appointed on February 27, 1998, just nine days after the district court issued its order approving the settlement and dismissing this action with prejudice. The state court’s order appointing the general guardian was entered in the New York County Clerk's Office on March 18, 1998, and her commission was issued on March 31, 1998.

. Although the majority points to Dr. Pulver's report indicating that Neilson was apparently "living on financial handouts from friends and relatives” and "not eating regularly," ante at 657, the district court had no reason to believe that Neilson’s basic subsistence needs were not being met, or were not likely to be met during the few months required for the general guardian to review the matter, particularly given the imminent appointment of a general guardian and Scott Neilson’s demonstrated concern for his mother's welfare.

. Given the documentation and testimony by Colgate employees evidencing the company's quid pro quo offer, moreover, I question the district court’s view that Neilson's testimony would have been "crucial” to her retaliation claim. See 993 F.Supp. at 228. Even if her testimony would have been vital, Dr. Pulver suggested that a general guardian could have helped Neilson obtain psychiatric treatment, which might have improved her ability to communicate to a jury. Neilson, whose "obvious intelligence and articulateness” the district court repeatedly noted, see, e.g., id. at 226, might well have been capable, with appropriate medical care, of testifying credibly.

. The majority speculates that even if Neilson were to prevail at trial, her damages would be limited in light of the jury’s awareness "of Neilson’s mental disorder and of its early onset.” Ante at 654-55. Because Neilson disputes the guardian ad litem's conclusion that her illness began while she was working at Colgate, however, the majority's assessment of this factual question entirely fails to support its conclusion that the settlement was reasonable.

. In light of Judith Vladeck's expressed willingness to forego fees for the remainder of the case, I am puzzled by the district court’s suggestion, echoed by the majority, see ante at 657, that counsel was motivated only by a desire to recoup her fees. See 993 F.Supp. at 228 n. 4.