Court Opinion

ID: 9755936
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 21:00:34.402182+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:13.205975
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Bell:
A Court has a fundamental and inherent right and power to correct its records and to modify, change or vacate a decree whenever such record or decree has been obtained by fraud; and such power may be exercised (a) sua sponte, with or without an amicus curiae, or (b) in a proper proceeding by a party having a right or interest therein, or (c) in certain cases, in a quo warranto proceeding brought by the Attorney General. The majority opinion admits, as it must, the jurisdiction as well as the basic power of the Court to vacate its decree when obtained by fraud: Macoluso’s Naturalization, 237 Pa. 132; Cochran v. Eldridge, 49 Pa. 365; Sallada v. Mock, 277 Pa. 285; cf. *114also National Endowment Co., 142 Pa. 450; and neither the common law nor any statute or decision of this Court declares the last remedy to be exclusive.
The Act upon which the majority relies, i.e., §209 of the Nonprofit Corporation Law of 1933 provides that “proceedings may be* instituted by the Commonwealth to dissolve, wind up and terminate a corporation which should not have been formed under this act.” It is crystal clear that this provision is permissive or directory not mandatory or exclusive.
The decision of the majority is not only based upon an act which being permissive, utterly fails to support its position, but it is likewise contrary to prior decisions of this Court, which require this appeal to be quashed or dismissed. This is not an appeal from a final judgment, order or decree; this is an appeal under and limited by the Act of 1925. In Com. ex rel. Shumalcer v. New York & Pennsylvania Co., Inc., 367 Pa. 40, 79 A. 2d 439, the Court said (page 46): “. . . The narrow scope to which this inquiry must be confined was clearly restated recently by Mr. Justice Jones in Upholsterers’ International Union etc. v. United Furniture Workers, etc., 356 Pa. 469, 52 A. 2d 217 (1947), where he said, p. 472, 473, ‘The procedure prescribed by the Act of 1925 for testing jurisdiction “in the court of first instance” applies to questions of jurisdiction either of the defendant or of the subject-matter: Welser v. Ealer, 317 Pa. 182, 184, 176 A. 429. In the present instance, the question involved goes to the jurisdiction of the cause of action (whereon the suit was instituted) which “. . . relates ‘solely to the competency of the particular court to determine controversies of the general class to which the case then presented for its consideration belongs’: Skelton v. *115Lower Merion Twp., 298 Pa. 471, 473. See also Koontz v. Messer, 314 Pa. 434”: Welser v. Ealer, supra . . . The thing of chief importance on a question of jurisdiction of subject-matter is not whether the plaintiff may recover in the particular forum on the cause of action pleaded but whether the court is empowered to hear and determine a controversy of the character involved: Matthews v. Plum Township, etc., 152 Pa. Superior Ct. 544, 546-547, 33 A. 2d 38.’ ”
In Welser v. Ealer, 317 Pa., supra, this Court said (page 183-184): “This case is before us by virtue of the provisions of the Act of 1925, P. L. 23, authorizing an appeal from the preliminary determination of the lower court’s ‘jurisdiction over the defendant or of the cause of action for which suit is brought.’ The action is in trespass to recover damages for injuries resulting from an automobile accident. . . . Manifestly it has jurisdiction over the cause of action alleged in the statement, namely, trespass to recover damages for personal injuries. No other matters are open for inquiry in proceedings of this nature. Jurisdiction of the cause of action, as used in the statute, relates ‘solely to the competency of the particular court to determine controversies of the general class to which the case then presented for its consideration belongs’: Skelton v. Lower Merion Twp., 298 Pa. 471, 473. See also Koontz v. Messer, 314 Pa. 434.”
The majority opinion necessarily admits that the Court below had jurisdiction over the defendant and over the subject matter or cause of action, viz.,- fraud, as well as the power to determine controversies of the general class to which the case belongs, viz., the grant and revocation of charters of nonprofit corporations. The majority dismiss this appeal on procedural grounds and because the parties plaintiff have no interest in the suit, thus flying in the teeth of the foregoing authorities *116which they ignore and which specifically hold that no such matters are open for inquiry in an appeal under the Act of 1925. Mercy, equity, justice, changed conditions or modern times may impel a Court to modify or reverse prior decisions, but no such reason or justification exists in this case. For this additional reason, the opinion of the majority is untenable.
The pleadings allege (and the Court below heard testimony which up to now has not been contradicted) that this charter was fraudulently obtained to teach, foster, advocate and spread Communism instead of its chartered purpose of promoting Jewish culture.
It is at long last recognized, legislatively, judicially and by public officials that a major objective of Communism is the overthrow of our Government by sabotage, violence, and revolution. To counteract this and to protect our Country from its mortal enemies, we need the aid not only of all our public officials, agencies, and Courts but also of every patriotic American citizen. A Court’s power to revoke a decree obtained fraudulently is clear and unquestioned; the only question is whether it must suppress or nullify its own fundamental powers, jeopardize the interests of our Country, and call upon a very busy and distant Attorney General to institute the proceedings. If there were any doubt on this question — and in my opinion there is none — it should not be resolved in favor of those who are charged with advocating and plotting the destruction of our Country.
How untenable, unrealistic, and unwise is the majority opinion which gives to the Attorney General, who has a multiplicity of other important duties, the sole and exclusive power to vacate a fraudulent decree and to protect the security of our Country and the safety of our citizens, is further apparent from the Attorney General’s brief: “The rule asked for by the *117appellant [and adopted by tbe majority] make tbe courts dependent upon the Attorney General; if the Attorney General capriciously or arbitrarily refused to bring an action of quo warranto, the court would be powerless to cleanse itself of the fraud. It is submitted that such is not the law of Pennsylvania nor is it desirable. On the other hand, the rule as announced by the court beloio fully protects the court and in no way limits the power of the Attorney General to bring quo warranto where fraud is present, since Section 209 of the Act of 1933, supra, provides that proceedings may be instituted by the Commonwealth to dissolve, wind up and terminate a corporation ‘which should not have been formed.’
“It is respectfully submitted that the appeal in this case be dismissed and the action of the court below affirmed.”
I would sustain and protect the fundamental powers of our Court, and like the Attorney General, I would not limit or restrict the protection of our Country in these critical times to one administrative department of our Government. Especially would I not do so, when the head of that department, viz., the Attorney General of Pennsylvania, although imbued with a high sense of patriotism and conscientious discharge of duty, asserts that such exclusive delegation of power is neither necessary nor desirable or even legal.

 Italics throughout, ours.