Court Opinion

ID: 9545859
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:20:50.5351+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:15:39.332174
License: Public Domain

Grady, J.
(dissenting)—I am inclined to the view that the conclusion reached by the majority opinion finds justification by what was decided in Craine v. Department of Labor & Industries, 19 Wn. (2d) 75, 141 P. (2d) 129, and other cases. I was not in accord with the decision reached in the Craine case, as I believed, and still believe, that the statute defining “employer” was not properly construed and applied to the factual situation then before the court.
The original workmen’s compensation act, chapter 74 of the Laws of 1911, p. 345, defined “employer” as one “engaged in this state in any extra hazardous work.” By the definition of “workman,” it was made clear that the extra-hazardous work referred to was that classified as such in § 4 of the act. This would necessarily lead to the conclusion that, in order to be affected by the act, an employer would have to be engaged in carrying on or conducting one of the industries scheduled or classified in the act as extrahazardous. He would have to be so engaged as his business. The definition of “employer,” considered in con*516nection with the definition of “workman,” excluded the idea that those who performed casual or occasional work for another, even though such work be classified as extra-hazardous, were covered by the act.
By chapter 182 of the Laws of 1921, p. 719, the single aspect definition of “employer” was changed into one of double import by the use of the following words:
“. . . employer means any person, body of persons, corporate or otherwise, and the legal personal representatives of a deceased employer, all while engaged in this state in any extra-hazardous work or who contracts with another to engage in extra-hazardous work.”
The italicized words were added to the former definition of employer. The definition of “workman” was changed to include the dual features as follows:
“Workman means every person in this state, who is engaged in the employment of an employer coming under this act whether by way of manual labor or otherwise, . . .”
Chapter 132 of the Laws of 1929, p. 325, carried forward the same definitions of “employer” and “workman.”
In the case of Carsten v. Department of Labor & Industries, 172 Wash. 51, 19 P. (2d) 133, a majority of the court, by a process of construction, read out of the definition of “employer” the second part thereof, namely the words “or who contracts with another to engage in extra-hazardous work,” and gave them no consideration. The reason given was that, because of certain administrative difficulties connected with the administration of the act, such as collection of premiums, etc., it was thought that the legislature could not have intended to bring within the act the odd-job man, or the man employed on occasions by an ordinary householder to repair or improve his property, though admitting that temporary or casual employment of a workman by one engaged in an extrahazardous business as defined by statute would be included. If this case had been decided under the original act defining “employer,” the conclusion would have been correct.
It is quite evident to me that, when the words quoted *517above were added to the original definition of “employer,” the legislature intended to and did include casual employment if the work done was in the extrahazardous class, even though the administrative difficulties referred to in the Carsten case might exist. Their existence furnished no reason to ignore or disregard a part of the legislative enactment. The Carsten case was followed in subsequent cases.
With the foregoing misconstruction and misapplication of the definition of the word “employer” before it, the legislature, by § 2 of chapter 41 of the Laws of 1939, p. 122, redefined the word “employer” as follows:
“Except when otherwise expressly stated, employer means any person, body of persons, corporate or otherwise, and the legal personal representatives of a deceased employer, all while engaged in this state in any extra-hazardous work, by way of trade or business, or who contracts with one or more workmen, the essence of which is the personal labor of such workman or workmen, in extra-hazardous work.”
Notwithstanding this redefinition with a further emphasis placed upon the dual features of previous definitions, this court, in Craine v. Department of Labor & Industries, 19 Wn. (2d) 75, 141 P. (2d) 129, again read out of the statute one of the dual features and applied the doctrine of the Carsten and other cases. This was met by a protest on the part of three members of the court.
It has always been very plain to me that the definition of “employer” as set forth in the acts of 1921, 1929, and 1939 covers two situations: where one is engaged in any extra-hazardous work, and where one contracts with a workman to do extrahazardous work. The first instance applies to those who are engaged in extrahazardous work as a business, and the second to anyone who hires a workman to do extra-hazardous work for him, even though his business is not extrahazardous. It seems to me the added words used in the act of 1939 make this very plain, and that the legislature has not been concerned about the administrative difficulties in collecting premiums from employers who fall in *518the second class covered by the statute. It is interesting to note in this connection that neither Melzer nor the department found any administrative difficulty in so far as the construction of the boat Windward was concerned.
I am in accord with the view many times expressed that when an appellate court construes a statute and thereafter one or more sessions of the legislature follows, and no amendment is made to such statute, it furnishes strong evidence in support of the construction given. The legislative history outlined indicates the legislature did not acquiesce in the construction placed upon the acts of 1921 and 1929, because it enacted chapter 41 of the Laws of 1939. The failure of the legislature to further act after the Craine case was decided, indicates to my mind that it did not desire to continue the endurance contest with the court, and should not be considered as an acquiescence in the construction of the statute. It would have been difficult, if not impossible, to have defined “employer” by words which would have satisfied some members of the court as then constituted.
Melzer was an employer in that he employed respondent to do extrahazardous work for him in the construction of the boat Homeward, and his fishing business has nothing to do with the right of respondent to compensation.
We should overrule the Craine case in so far as it fails to apply the second part of the definition of “employer,” and affirm the judgment.