Court Opinion

ID: 9710812
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:18:04.77086+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:00.045291
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE MORAN, dissenting: Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in dismissing and in refusing to reinstate that part of his complaint which predicated liability upon the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. The pleading had been dismissed prior to trial, and immediately prior to the beginning of trial the plaintiff moved to reinstate the pleading on the theory that the judge assigned for trial was not the same judge who had dismissed the pleading. Other happenings during the trial indicate that plaintiff was prevented from presenting this theory at the trial. The defense, objecting to comments made by the plaintiff’s attorney in his opening statement to the jury on the ground that the case supported a res ipsa theory, stated: “It has been decided by this court that the doctrine is not applicable and now he is arguing control and they did not know what happened, and that’s not the doctrine applicable and he should not be allowed to discuss res ipsa loquitur with the jury.” Later, in a conference outside the presence of the jury at which the trial court ruled that part of Dr. Ruge’s deposition would be excluded from evidence, the attorney for the plaintiff stated: “We are also submitting again that we have been ruled out in this case by the court on a res ipsa theory * * Then again, in the arguments on a motion for directed verdict, the defendant’s attorney began his reply by noting that “the bulk of Mr. McGrady’s argument is that res ipsa loquitur should be applied in this case.” He then argued, as he does in his brief, that res ipsa is only available where the negligence is so obvious as to place it within the common knowledge of a layman. Plaintiff again claimed error in his post trial motion because of the trial court’s exclusion of the res ipsa theory. Under the foregoing circumstances the plaintiff has sufficiently preserved this error for review. I do not believe the homespun description of the res ipsa doctrine in Illinois by the majority is accurate. I particularly take issue with the majority’s summarization of the doctrine as they apply it to medical malpractice cases in Illinois. Three elements are necessary to establish a res ipsa loquitur case: (1) The result must be caused by an agency or instrument which is, or has been, within the control or management of the defendant; (2) the result must not be due to any action on the part of the plaintiff; and (3) the result must be one which normally does not occur without negligence in the control or management of the agency or instrument. Cobb v. Marshall Field & Co., 22 Ill.App.2d 143, 153, 159 N.E.2d 520, 524; Bollenbach v. Bloomenthal, 341 Ill. 539, 542, 173 N.E. 670, 671. Bollenbach v. Bloomenthal, 255 Ill.App. 305, applied the res ipsa loquitur doctrine in a malpractice case against a dentist, saying: “The defendants in the case at bar undertook to show that they exercised reasonable care in the manner in which extraction of the tooth was performed, but this evidence did not account for the manner in which, nor how, the filing and part of the tooth came to lodge in the throat of the plaintiff. The jury had a right to draw the conclusion from the facts that the defendants had not properly provided against the happening of just such a condition.” Bollenbach was reversed by the Illinois Supreme Court at 341 III. 539, not on the ground that res ipsa did not apply to malpractice cases, but on the ground that the presumption arising from the res ipsa doctrine was rebutted by evidence produced by the defendant. The court said at 548: “The presumption raised in the first instance by that doctrine was rebutted by the evidence produced by the defendant and it could not thereafter be properly applied.” Bollenbach was later overruled by our Supreme Court in Metz v. Central Illinois Gas & Elec. Co., 32 Ill.2d 446, which held that the presumption of negligence raised by the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not simply vanish but remains to be considered with all of the other evidence in the case when contrary evidence is offered by the defendant. It is significant that in overruling Bollenbach, a malpractice case, the Supreme Court did not except malpractice cases from the ambit of the res ipsa doctrine. Since plaintiff was compelled to try his case without benefit of the res ipsa doctrine to which he was entitled, he was denied his day in court. Therefore, a review of the evidence to ascertain whether his case came within that doctrine is useless, because we really do not know how plaintiff would have presented his case had his hands not been tied by the rulings of the trial court both before and at the time of trial. An offer of proof as suggested by the majority would have been futile under these circumstances. However, the plaintiff should not have been directed out of court even on the evidence presented. Verdicts should be directed only in those cases in which aU of the evidence when viewed in its aspect most favorable to the opponent so overwhelmingly favors the movant that no contrary verdict based on that evidence could ever stand. Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern R.R. Co., 37 Ill.2d 494, 229 N.E.2d 504. The defendant’s testimony was somewhat equivocal. For example, he testified: “* * * I wouldn’t have advised him specificaUy as to the left eyehd, as it is only part of the entire risk of paralysis of the left side of the face. # # « j never had a result like this in a posterior fossa operation. * # * This case is peculiar to my practice and is the only case of paralysis I have had in a posterior fossa operation. * * * I cannot remember that Mr. EsteUe had it explained to him specificaUy that he could lose the use of his eyehd. I did not advise as to loss of hearing and loss of balance, as it is unheard of in this type of operation.” Concerning Dr. Max Minor Peet, the defendant also testified: “* * * The figures I gave as to Dr. Peet involve aU types of surgery to the trigeminal system, none involve the eyehd. I merely gave the figure of 6% paralysis loss of motor functioning.” Defendant testified under Section 60 that he had not previously experienced an inability to close an eyehd in the posterior fossa approach in trigeminal nerve surgery, and that the loss of hearing and equilibrium were unheard of comphcations in this type of operation. Thus, according to the testimony of an expert (the defendant in this case), this result should never occur in this type of an operation, but it did occur. The foUowing general rule appears at 82 ALR2d p. 1271: “# # # A study of the cases both pro and con on the application of the doctrine in malpractice actions demonstrates that the doctrine is apphcable only where it is a matter of common knowledge among laymen or medical men or both that the injury would not have occurred without negligence.” I would remand this case to the Circuit Court of Sangamon County for a new trial.