Court Opinion

ID: 9852032
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:23:21.915871+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:21.354790
License: Public Domain

LEVINSON, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
While I agree with the majority’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ appeal, I respectfully dissent from the denial of defendants’ motion for attorney fees.
Under N.C.R. App. R 34, “Frivolous appeals; Sanctions” this Court is authorized under certain circumstances to impose sanctions, including attorneys’ fees, upon a party:
(a) A court of the appellate division may ... impose a sanction against a party or attorney or both when the court determines that an appeal or any proceeding in an appeal was frivolous because of one or more of the following:
(1) the appeal was not well grounded in fact and warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law;
(b) A court of the appellate division may impose one or more of the following sanctions:
*644c. reasonable expenses, including reasonable attorney fees ....
N.C.R. App. P. 34(a)(1); (b)(2)c (emphasis added). I conclude that in the present case plaintiffs’ interlocutory appeal was “not . . . warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal” of existing law. Accordingly, I would grant defendants’ Rule 34 motion for sanctions, and would require plaintiffs to pay defendants’ reasonable attorney fees. See Steadman v. Steadman, 148 N.C. App. 713, 714, 559 S.E.2d 291, 292 (2002) (imposing Rule 34 sanctions, including attorney’s fees, where “this Court is constrained to conclude that the appeal was taken for an improper purpose so as to cause unnecessary delay and needless increase in the cost of this litigation”).
Regarding plaintiffs’ appeal from a holding that they would be required to provide notice to potential class members of their intention to withdraw their motion for class certification, I note plaintiffs conceded during the motions hearing in the trial division it would need to provide some notice to putative class members. Further, the trial court’s ruling is entirely interlocutory; at this juncture the trial court has merely memorialized its intention to require notification and has not even ruled on the type of notice it will require. Interestingly, plaintiffs rely on defendants’ estimate of $100,000 to provide notice as a ground for appeal. Specifically, plaintiffs contend that the outlay of this amount of money affects a substantial right. Again, however, we have no idea of what type of notice the trial court will require — or the attendant cost — or upon which parties this burden might fall. Perhaps the cost will be $10,000. Maybe $1,000,000. We cannot know at this point. Plaintiffs also contend that the trial court’s order requiring them to provide affidavits related to their contacts with the media, consumer groups, trade associations or attorneys affects a substantial right that would be lost without relief from this Court, namely their ability to “further investigate the long-standing pattern of corporate misconduct by Appellees DaimlerChrysler.” The force of this argument is completely lost, however, when one considers the fact plaintiffs have previously voluntarily complied with this directive of the trial court. Further, in a related assignment of error, plaintiffs contend the trial court erred in holding that court approval of the Millers’ voluntary dismissal of claims against Empire Dodge was required. As the majority opinion correctly points out, however, the trial court has not yet approved or disapproved the voluntary dismissal. The gravamen of plaintiffs’ appeal — that the trial court lacks *645the authority to require notification under the facts of this case, and that court approval of a voluntary dismissal is not required — will not be lost by a later, proper appeal.
Plaintiffs also purport to appeal from the trial court’s order referring defendants’ Show Cause motion to Judge Stafford G. Bullock, who was designated by Judge Donald W. Stephens, Senior Resident Superior Court Judge, to hear matters related to this issue. Plaintiffs’ contention, that the order of the trial court referring the Show Cause to another judge affects a substantial right, is patently frivolous. The order was a routine administrative transfer which determined no substantive issue in the case, and affected no substantial right. See Romig v. Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins. Co., 132 N.C. App. 682, 686, 513 S.E.2d 598, 600 (1999), aff'd, 351 N.C. 349, 524 S.E.2d 804 (2000) (Court dismisses as interlocutory defendant’s appeal from discovery order that did “not impose sanctions or adjudge defendant to be in contempt[,]” and rejects argument that order “deprives defendant of the substantial right to a fair and impartial adjudication of the class certification issue”). The trial court’s order itself states, “[w]hether the contempt, if any, is civil or criminal is a determination this Court will leave to the judge who hears the motion.”
Plaintiffs’ appeal has needlessly extended this litigation and prevented the trial court from conducting, inter alia, a hearing on defendants’ Show Cause motion. It is self-evident this appeal does not affect any substantial rights. I would grant defendants’ motion for attorney fees.