Court Opinion

ID: 9627244
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:40:45.603904+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:33:24.223247
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Sutton
dissenting.
I dissent for the primary reason that the record discloses this to be one of those cases where a strict adherence to the form of the law by the trial court has hidden its true substance which guarantees each defendant a fair trial. Conducting the insanity hearing phase of a murder trial in an atmosphere charged with tension because of a defendant’s admitted participation in the crime and prior erroneous conviction thereof is not conducive to due process of law.
It is clear that Leick was compelled to exercise peremptory challenges during the selection of the jury against several jurors whom the trial court should have excused for cause. The thirteenth juror, who was one not discharged for cause, and yet not subject to a peremptory challenge because no more existed, was excused before the jury began its deliberation.
A reading of the record relating to jurors challenged for cause reveals that some jurors who were up to then disqualified due to their answers were pressed with leading questions and thorough interrogation to finally give the answers desired by the state to qualify them. Trial courts have a rather wide latitude in such examinations and we do not lightly set aside their rulings in such matters; however, here I believe that considering the record as a whole the trial court abused its discretion in this case.
For example, the thirteenth juror stated in reply to a question that she would decide the issue of insanity by the number of psychiatrists who testified on each side because she felt they knew more about it than she did. After further questioning she stated she would fairly *571and impartially decide the case upon all the evidence and according to the court’s instructions. In spite of this juror’s change of heart under prodding a quotation from 112 A.L.R. 534 is appropropriate here:
“And where in a murder trial the defense relied upon was insanity of the defendant at the time of the killing, it was held that such defendant did not obtain the impartial jury to which he was entitled where one of the jurors, on his examination, expressed his determination to give weight to no evidence of defendant’s insanity except that of a physician, but such juror was nevertheless held qualified over the defendant’s challenge for cause. Territory v. Lum Dim (1917) 23 Haw. 792.”
The interrogation of juror Corbett is representative of several of those where the challenge for cause was denied. The pertinent parts are:
“Q. Mr. Corbett, you have heard the questions that I have directed to the other jurors for the purpose of trying to get a fair and impartial jury in this case. I will ask you whether you heard the facts with respect to the murder that is involved in this matter? A. Yes. Q. Have you read about it? A. Yes, I have. Q. At the time it occurred, I suppose? A. Yes. Q. Did you from that, form a conviction of your own as to — or did you form an attitude against this defendant? A. In all honesty I would say ‘Yes.’ Q. You did form one? A. Yes. Q. It would be rather difficult for you to remove that? A. I think it would. Q. Challenge the juror for cause.
“Mr. Keating: If the Court please, we resist the Challenge. We don’t know what counsel is seeking — as to whether or not Mr. Corbett has any opinion as to the sanity or insanity of the defendant on December 1st.
“The Court: Mr. Corbett, do you feel that you could sit here and hear the evidence as adduced from this witness stand and any exhibits that may be introduced; taking that evidence along with the law and instructions given by this Court; and fairly and impartially deter*572mine the sanity or insanity of this defendant? A. I think I could.
“Mr. Keating: We resist the Challenge.
“Mr. Ginsberg: I will question the juror a little further.
“The Court: Proceed, Mr. Ginsberg.
“Q. (By Mr. Ginsberg), You say you would find some difficulty in removing the opinion that you now have? A. Yes, sir. Q. You are not certain that it could be removed. You are not certain that it could be removed? A. No. Not at this time, I am not certain. Q. At this time you are not certain of that — that it can be removed? A. No, sir. Q. That conviction carries with it a prejudice against the defendant, does it not? A. No. Q. I mean a feeling against him — not a prejudice, necessarily, but your feelings against the death for the acts that he committed? A. No, I don’t carry any feelings against the defendant at this time. Q. Pardon me? A. I don’t carry any feelings against the defendant at this time. Q. But the opinion that you hold is one prejudicial to him — the opinion that you say would have to be removed; is that one that is prejudicial to the defendant? A. Not to him, no, sir. Q. Pardon me. A. Not to him personally. Q. I don’t mean that you have any personal malice against him, but you have personal convictions affecting him, have you not? A. Yes. Q. It affects this defendant. It isn’t anything personal on your part. You have the right to your conviction. You have a right to your opinion. I am not quarreling with you. All that we are attempting to do is to get a fair and impartial jury. * * * But, in your present mental attitude you have a feeling that affects this defendant and your opinion of him, is that right? A. Yes, sir. Q. You are not certain that that can be removed? A. Not at this time, no. Q. I repeat the Challenge for cause.”
Similar attention to the juror Mr. McFarland reveals the following questions and answers:
“Q. Do you have any pre-conceived notions of his *573guilt? A. I believe that has already been established. Q. Do you think that has been established? A.. Yes. Q. Well you condemn one that has been established of having committed murder, don’t you? A. That is right. Q. That feeling exists in your mind, does it not? A. Yes, sir, it does. Q. You definitely have the feeling of condemnation in your mind against this defendant as far as his guilt is concerned? A. Yes, sir.”
Thereupon a challenge was made for cause which was denied by the court. With the jurors Corbett and McFarland already on record as indicated by the above questioning and answering, the juror Mr. Traylor made the following statement in open court:
“A. I would like to state my position. I feel that the man had been tried and found guilty. Because of a minor technicality, I understand that that decision was thrown out and the trial is to be resumed, as I see it now; and, that we are in the first phase of determining whether the man was sane or insane at the time of the crime. I must in my own mind feel that if we declare the man is sane, that he will go onto trial again. I believe that is correct in the present setup, but I must in my own mind know what is going on to be the result of my decision in order to answer the question that you are going to ask me. Now, if he is adjudged insane, I know in my own mind what will ultimately — if he is found guilty again happen to him. In other words, we are basically determining the mode of punishment. That is how I feel here. Now, the man is guilty, when he was declared guilty; but found not guilty or something on a technicality. If the man is guilty — if he is sane or insane — is immaterial to me.”
The majority opinion then details how the court excused Mr. Traylor, instructed the jury to disregard his remarks and denied defendant’s motion for a mistrial as a result of what under these facts was a prejudicial statement. This is mentioned here to point up the atmosphere in which the trial was held.
*574Questions and answers similar in character to those asked witness Corbett are revealed in the interrogation of the juror Walkup. She was the thirteenth juror. The defendant was not able to eliminate her from the jury either through his challenge for cause or the exercise of his peremptory challenge.
Among the questions and answers to the juror Mrs. Wyatt were the following: Q. You in your own mind think his guilt has been fixed? A. Yes, sir. Q. That would involve the sanity too, and that was fixed? A. I have no opinion about his sanity at all.”
During the first part of the examination the trial court admonished Leick’s counsel concerning his attempts to question the prospective jurors concerning their belief in the guilt of the defendant, saying that was not in issue, that the sole issue was whether defendant was insane at the time of the offense charged. Counsel protested this and the court did not always thereafter strictly enforce its ruling so we cannot know how restrictive it may have been to the voir dire examination desired. There exists, however, the possibility that at least some of the jurors who were chosen did not have their beliefs on guilt properly explored.
The objections of the District Attorney to this line of questioning may generally be summed up from the following excerpts of the record:
“As I say, we have no objections to his finding out the frame of the mind that this Jury may be in because of something they read or heard about the case, or anything else in connection with that.
“But, we do say that insanity is an element of murder and they are called upon to decide whether or not he is guilty of one of the elements of murder. I say that that is wrong.
“There can be only one verdict in this case. That is the sanity or insanity. It has nothing to do with the next trial.”
*575The trial court then ruled on the objections in the following language:
“The Court having been fully advised by counsel on both sides, it is the ruling of this Court that counsel for the defense may inquire into the state Of mind as best he can of these prospective jurors and can advise them that there has been a charge of murder. However, the objection is sustained that the sanity case is one of the parts of the murder trial.”
I agree with Mr. Justice Holland when he says he fails to follow the reasoning of the district attorney and the trial court in this matter, because the verdict in the sanity trial has everything to do with the trial of the murder charge, because, although the jury in that case is not bound by the verdict of the sanity trial, it certainly would be persuasive, and the ruling of the trial court to the effect that the sanity case is not one of the parts of the murder trial was and is prejudicial error. This court has determined that the issue involved in a sanity trial is not a collateral matter, but is a substantive defense to the criminal charge of murder. Beckstead v. People, 133 Colo. 72, 292 P. (2d) 189.
Only recently we reversed a conviction for murder partly on the grounds that the minds of the jury had or could have been inflamed by certain of the state’s exhibits as well as remarks of the prosecutor. Archina v. People, 135 Colo. 8, 307 P. (2d) 1083. Here is a different version of the same problem with the voir dire examinations revealing the same danger to the defendant.
We held in Zancannelli v. People (1917), 63 Colo. 252, 165 Pac. 612, that a defendant has the right to interrogate prospective jurors regarding their expressed opinions concerning the guilt of the accused, because denial of such a right would prevent a defendant from determining whether there exist grounds for challenge for cause or reasons for making a peremptory challenge. The rule is not different just because the first defense alleged is not guilty by reason of insanity.
*576We now have the question to determine whether this defendant was denied due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution and under Article II, §3, of the Colorado Constitution because of the denial of several of his challenges for cause and the attempt by the trial court to limit the voir dire examination.
What is due process depends on circumstances varying with the subject matter and the necessities of the situation. 12 Am. Jur. 263, Sec. 570. It clearly includes all the steps essential to deprive a person of life, liberty, or property, and all the forms and acts essential to its application and to give it effect. “Process” is the mode by which the purpose of the law may be effected. “Law” as used in the guaranty embraces all the legal and equitable rules defining human rights and duties and providing for their enforcement, not only as between man and man, but also between the state and its citizens. 12 Am. Jur. 265, §571.
In the case at issue we must consider the circumstances, subject matter and necessities. Here the first two principles are that the court had a defendant for trial who had once before, with admitted widespread publicity, been tried, found guilty and ordered executed for murder. His defenses there were the same as here. In both trials he admitted at least planning and participation in the crime. The necessities are that society to protect itself from the actions of such persons must have laws which though firm, nevertheless protect each accused in his constitutional rights. A successful defense of insanity at the time of the commission of an act results in law as though the act had not been committed.
In the Zancannelli case supra the record is considerably more replete with prejudice of jurors than here; however, the court ably points out there that it was error for the trial court to rule out as improper “* * * substantially every question propounded by the defense to elicit the condition of the mind of the jurors respect*577ing the defendant * * There in a murder case we also had examinations on voir dire of proposed jurors who held opinions concerning the guilt or innocence of the defendant; these were in part based upon newspaper articles and the jurors stated that notwithstanding such opinions they could give the defendant a fair and impartial trial according to the law as it should be given to them by the court under the evidence submitted in the case.
Here the majority has held, and I agree, that the proceedings actually are one trial even though the defense of insanity is tried first. The fact that it is only one trial with one judgment means that whether a prospective juror has an opinion as to the defendant’s guilt or innocence is a material matter which must be held to be within the scope of reasonable examination by the defense.
Many times it is difficult to empanel a proper jury where as here the air is charged with tension against the act of murder and with the knowledge of the participation of the accused in a crime. The widespread newspaper, radio and other publicity, however, must not preclude a defendant from having jurors whom, the entire record discloses, lack conscious or unconscious prejudice. Here a consideration of the record shows that there were one or more jurors serving, or for whom challenges for cause were denied, who had expressed opinions which could have affected the outcome of the hearing.
Defendant has advanced an erroneous concept that in Colorado a juror is automatically subject to removal by a challenge for cause because of an opinion of the guilt or possibly of the innocence of a defendant. C.R.S. ’53, 78-5-3. Also see Thompson v. People, 26 Colo. 496, 505, 59 Pac. 51 and Bowers on “Judicial Discretion of Trial Courts,” p. 341, et seq. §303, 304, 305.
C.R.S. ’53, 78-5-3 provides:
“No person summoned as a juror in a criminal case shall be disqualified to serve as such by reason of a *578previously formed or expressed opinion with reference to the guilt or innocence of the accused; provided, the court shall be satisfied, from the examination of the juror or from other evidence, that he will render an impartial verdict, according to the law and the evidence submitted to the jury in the trial of such cause.” ■
This statute has been in effect since 1872 and has been sustained or commented upon in many cases from Solander v. People, (1873), 2 Colo. 48, through McGonigal v. People, (1923), 74 Colo. 270, 220 Pac. 1003. Assuming its constitutionality under modern conditions it nevertheless can occur thereunder, as happened here, that the court in exercising its discretion unwittingly abused it. Here the abuse arose because the court, though excusing some jurors did sustain the state as against the defendant on other jurors when their examinations showed there could have been proper grounds for excuse. Such a succession of rulings against the defendant certainly did not give him the benefit of any doubts and discloses a frame of mind prejudicial to him. Undoubtedly the trial court was led to its conclusions on each such contested juror because he felt and had stated that the defendant’s guilt had nothing to do with this trial. I have already pointed out that this was error. The issue was what was framed by the defendant’s plea of not guilty by reason of insanity.
In the absence of a statute the modern rule unquestionably is that formation of an opinion suffices to disqualify a juror. 31 Am. Jur. 665, §145. Also, a juror who has an opinion in a case, and whose declaration that he could render an impartial verdict is qualified by a doubt, is incompetent; such declaration must be unequivocal and absolute, 31 Am. Jur. 667, §148. Some courts have taken the view that the constitutional right to a jury trial is not to be impaired by compelling parties to take chances with a juror who has formed an impression or preconceived opinion, irrespective of how fairly and conscientiously he believes that he can act impartially in *579the matter, in the light of the evidence introduced. A juror who has formed an opinion, it has been said, cannot be impartial. 31 Am. Jur. 667-668, §148.
We point out that in the instant case there was conflicting evidence as to whether defendant was insane as alleged. We cannot usurp the jury’s function to determine which evidence was in the preponderance. We can point out though that a jury selected without full right to examine as to opinions held, coupled with a concept that guilt of the crime had no bearing on the insanity issue, could easily not give proper weight to the evidence. A defendant does not have to run that risk even under our statute. The discretion of the trial court is almost complete in this matter but all doubts must be resolved in favor of the defendant, not the state. The recent civil case of Burke v. Poindexter, (Okla. 1957) 313 P. (2d) 1090, is in point here. The question there was primarily whether some jurors who had sat on a previous case for damages against the same defendant were proper jurors in a different action by a new plaintiff. The court there said in reversing the cause for a new trial:
“Due regard to careful protection of the rights of litigants, which should actuate trial courts, requires that they scrupulously confine the proceedings wherein these rights are to be settled, within recognized boundaries providing for determination by impartial trials. * * *
“Recognition by this court of the general rule, relative to the trial court’s discretion in determining the competency of jurors, may be observed in Meier v. Edsall, 192 Okla. 529, 137 P. 2d 926. However, recognition of the rule decrees necessity for examination of the trial court’s action to determine if there has been an abuse of discretion.
“* * * a trial court’s discretion to do, or to refuse to do something, in certain instances is a legal discretion, to be exercised in accordance with fixed principles of law. The term (judicial discretion) is the subject of *580many definitions, though generally recognized as being synonymous with judicial power. In Kidd v. Commonwealth, 255 Ky. 42, 74 S.W. 2d 944, ‘Judicial Discretion’ was said to be an impartial discretion, guided and controlled by fixed legal principles; a discretion to be exercised in conformity with the spirit of the law (an equitable decision as to what is proper and just under the law) and in a manner to subserve and not defeat the substantial ends of justice. * * *
“Examination of this record discloses the trial court assumed to exercise judicial discretion by determining the competency of the challenged jurors solely upon the basis that from their own testimony that they considered themselves able to render an impartial verdict. And, this was done without reference to other known factors, or equitable considerations as to what was just and proper under the circumstances.
“We are of the opinion the trial court erred in holding, over defendant’s objection, that all of the challenged jurors who sat in previous trial involving the same questions of fact, were competent to sit in the present case, particularly when it appeared upon examination that certain of such jurors had preconceived opinions which could have only been removed, if at all, by the introduction of evidence.”
Other errors urged by the defendant appear to be without merit and I concur with the majority opinion thereon.
I would reverse the judgment with directions to grant a new trial as to the defense of insanity at the time of the alleged offense and a trial on the defense of insanity since the alleged offense if defendant makes a proper showing therefor.
Mr. Justice Day states that he concurs in this dissent.