Court Opinion

ID: 9405379
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-28 13:14:17.963337+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:21.687841
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Harris, 2023-Ohio-2138.]

                      IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                  FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
                       HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

 STATE OF OHIO,                              :     APPEAL NO. C-220341
                                                   TRIAL NO. 20CRB-23078
           Plaintiff-Appellee,
                                             :
     vs.
                                             :
 MARQUISE HARRIS,                                        O P I N I O N.

           Defendant-Appellant.              :

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Municipal Court

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: June 28, 2023

Emily S. Woerner, City Solicitor, William T. Horsley, Chief Prosecuting Attorney, and
Amanda Tholke, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,

Michael J. Trapp, for Defendant-Appellant.
                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

BOCK, Judge.

       {¶1}    Defendant-appellant Marquise Harris appeals his conviction for

improperly handling firearms in a motor vehicle. Harris argues that the state’s

explanation of circumstances at his no-contest plea hearing failed to establish an

element of the offense, warranting a reversal of his conviction. Harris also argues that

the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress. We disagree and affirm the

trial court’s judgment.

                              I. Facts and Procedure

       {¶2}   While on patrol, members of the Cincinnati Police Department Gun

Crime Task Force spotted what they suspected was marijuana in a Ford Escape parked

in a residential neighborhood in Cincinnati. Harris was across the street. As officers

began to force their way into the Escape, Harris approached. Officers handcuffed

Harris and spotted a gun in his waistband. Harris was arrested and charged with

violating R.C. 2923.16. The complaint alleged:

       DURING      DRUG      INVESTIGATION         SUBJECT      APPROACHED

       OFFICERS ASKING “WHY THEY WERE NEAR HIS CAR.” AS

       SUBJECT WAS DETAINED A LOADED GLOCK 26 9MM PISTOL WAS

       IN SUBJECT’S FRONT RIGHT PANTPOCKET. HANDLE IN PLAIN

       SIGHT. SUBJECT DID NOT NOTIFY LEO’S OF CCW.

       {¶3}   Harris moved to suppress the firearm, arguing that the search and

seizure violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States

Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution. Specifically, he

maintained that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop.

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                   OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

                                Suppression Hearing

       {¶4}   At the suppression hearing, Officer Joshua Condon identified himself as

a member of the Gun Crime Task Force, which was patrolling the area because of its

reputation of “high level of gun crime [and] drug transactions,” and because “drug

transactions go hand in hand with gun crimes.” Condon explained that officers spotted

marijuana in the Escape, which was “still illegal” in Cincinnati, and officers were

instructed to destroy any contraband and provide a written warning. After “two to five

minutes,” Condon used his commercially sold “lockout kit” to break into the Escape.

According to Condon, Harris approached the officers surrounding the Escape,

claiming ownership, and remarked that the officers had no right to search the Escape.

       {¶5}   Officers detained Harris. Condon recalled that Harris complied with

orders to place his hands behind his back, and while he was being handcuffed “another

officer alerted me to the gun” before Harris informed officers “he was a CCW holder.”

       {¶6}   At a later hearing, the trial court denied the motion to suppress, finding

that officers had probable cause to detain Harris. Specifically, Condon “observed what

he believed to be marijuana inside a motor vehicle” and as officers surrounded the

truck, Harris approached. The trial court continued, explaining that “[w]hile no

marijuana was seized – this happened in the city of Cincinnati, Hamilton County, State

of Ohio – Officer Condon noticed the defendant had a firearm in his waistband.”

                                    Plea Hearing

       {¶7}   Initially, Harris pleaded guilty to the complaint as charged. The

following day, he withdrew that guilty plea and entered a no-contest plea. Harris

informed the trial court that he would “stipulate to the facts in the record and in the

complaint.” The trial court accepted his plea and sentenced Harris.

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶8}    But following an off-the-record discussion, the parties returned to the

courtroom and the state explained that in 2020, Harris

       did knowingly fail to inform law enforcement officers of his CCW

       permit, contrary to and in violation of Section 2923.16 of the Ohio

       Revised Code, a misdemeanor in the first degree, when during a drug

       investigation he was approached by officers, and as a subject he was

       detained, and a loaded Glock 26 nine millimeter was in the subject’s

       front right pocket.

       {¶9}    Harris’s attorney responded:

       Waive further reading, stipulate to what’s been read in the record, Your

       Honor. We’ll waive any defects with respect to the sentencing that had

       gone forward, Judge. We understand we wanted to cure any issues, and

       we would stipulate to the facts that have been read into the record and

       are appropriate, Judge.

       {¶10} Once again, the trial court found Harris guilty of a violation of R.C.

2923.16(E)(1). On appeal, Harris raises two assignments of error.

                                 II. Law and Analysis

                                Harris Invited The Error

       {¶11} We begin with Harris’s first assignment of error, where he challenges

the trial court’s finding of guilt because his no-contest plea failed to admit to facts that

would establish the elements of a violation of R.C. 2923.16(E)(1).

       {¶12} A no-contest plea “is not an admission of defendant’s guilt, but is an

admission of the truth of the facts alleged in the indictment, information, or

complaint.” Crim.R. 11(B)(2); see R.C. 2937.07. After accepting a no-contest plea for a

misdemeanor offense, a trial court “may make a finding of guilty or not guilty from the
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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

explanation of the circumstances of the offense.” R.C. 2937.07. The explanation-of-

circumstances requirement is designed “ ‘to ensure that the trial court does not make

a finding of guilty in a perfunctory fashion.’ ” State v. Haskamp, 12th Dist. Clermont

No. CA2019-04-033, 2020-Ohio-419, ¶ 13, quoting State v. Cox, 12th Dist. Madison

No. CA2001-01-003, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 4277, 2-3 (Sept. 24, 2001), citing

Cuyahoga Falls v. Bowers, 9 Ohio St.3d 148, 151, 459 N.E.2d 532 (1984).

       {¶13} But the facts to which a defendant admits must establish the elements

of the offense. In other words, “the explanation of circumstances must contain

sufficient information to support all of the essential elements of the offense.” State v.

Robinson, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-170473, 2018-Ohio-1797, ¶ 3, citing Bowers at 150.

Further, “ ‘a no contest plea may not be the basis for a finding of guilty without an

explanation of circumstances.’ ” Haskamp at ¶ 12. Indeed, the explanation of

circumstances provides a degree of protection for the defendant “even though he has

admitted to the allegations of the complaint.” City of Girard v. Giordano, 155 Ohio

St.3d 470, 2018-Ohio-5024, 122 N.E.3d 151, ¶ 18.

       {¶14} At issue is a violation of R.C. 2923.16(E)(1), which provides,

       No person who has been issued a concealed handgun license * * * [and

       is carrying] documentation of a successful completion of firearms

       training as described in [R.C. 2923.125 (G)(1)], who is the driver or an

       occupant of a motor vehicle that is stopped as a result of a traffic stop or

       a stop for another law enforcement purpose * * * and who is

       transporting or has a loaded handgun in the motor vehicle or

       commercial motor vehicle in any manner, shall do any of the following:

       (1) Before or at the time a law enforcement officer asks if the person is

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       carrying a concealed handgun, knowingly fail to disclose that the person

       then possesses or has a loaded handgun in the motor vehicle.

       {¶15} We agree that the state’s explanation of circumstances fails to establish

that Harris was a driver or occupant of the Escape, or that he had a loaded handgun in

the truck. And we agree, as Harris argues, that the facts in the complaint fail to

establish that he was the driver or occupant of a motor vehicle stopped by law

enforcement, that the firearm was in the motor vehicle, or that he failed to disclose to

the officers that the firearm was in the motor vehicle.

       {¶16} But we also agree with the state’s argument that the invited-error

doctrine precludes Harris from “ ‘tak[ing] advantage of an error which he himself

invited or induced the court to make.’ ” State v. Arnold, 2017-Ohio-326, 72 N.E.3d 715,

¶ 12 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Ritch, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 97CA2491, 1998 Ohio App.

LEXIS 2193, 4 (May 11, 1998), citing State ex rel. O’Beirne v. Geauga Cty. Bd. of

Elections, 80 Ohio St.3d 176, 181, 685 N.E.2d 502 (1997), and State ex rel. Bitter v.

Missig, 72 Ohio St.3d 249, 254, 648 N.E.2d 1355 (1995). Here, Harris did more than

waive the reading of the explanation of circumstances. He informed the trial court that

Harris “wanted to cure any issues” and stipulated “to the facts that have been read into

the record [] are appropriate.” Consequently, Harris invited the error.

       {¶17} We overrule Harris’s first assignment of error.

                       The Investigatory Stop Was Constitutional

       {¶18} In his second assignment of error, Harris maintains that the trial court

erred when it denied his motion to suppress the firearm evidence seized by the police.

First, Harris argues that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest Harris when they

handcuffed him. Second, Harris contends that the officers lacked facts to support an

investigatory stop.
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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶19} A trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress presents a mixed question

of law and fact. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d

71, ¶ 8. We must accept the trial court’s factual findings as true if they are supported

by competent, credible evidence. Id., citing State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 437

N.E.2d 583 (1982). But we review the trial court’s legal findings de novo. Id. (“the

appellate court must then independently determine, without deference to the

conclusion of the trial court, whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard.”).

       {¶20} The Ohio and United States Constitutions protect the rights of people to

be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. See Fourteenth Amendment to the

United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14, Ohio Constitution. The rights of

Ohioans to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under the Ohio

Constitution are interpreted as having “at least the same protection [under] the Fourth

Amendment.” State v. Leak, 145 Ohio St.3d 165, 2016-Ohio-154, 47 N.E.3d 821, ¶ 13.

       {¶21} To make a warrantless arrest, an officer must have probable cause to do

so. State v. Jordan, 166 Ohio St.3d 339, 2021-Ohio-3922, 185 N.E.3d 1051, ¶ 19, citing

Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964);United States v.

Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 415, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976). Probable cause is a

nontechnical concept, “ ‘defined in terms of facts and circumstances “sufficient to

warrant a prudent [person] in believing that the [suspect] had committed or was

committing an offense.” ’ ” Jordan at ¶ 19, quoting Beck at 96, quoting Carroll v.

United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543, T.D. 3686 (1925).

       {¶22} But officers may temporarily detain a person during a brief

investigative stop if “the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person

has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity.” State v. Hawkins, 158 Ohio

St.3d 94, 2019-Ohio-4210, 140 N.E.3d 577, ¶ 19, quoting United States v. Place, 462
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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

U.S. 696, 702, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88

S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Reasonable suspicion is a “less demanding”

standard. State v. Houston, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190598, 2020-Ohio-5421, ¶ 57.

To find that an officer has reasonable suspicion, there must be a “ ‘particularized and

objective basis’ for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity.” Id., quoting

United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-418, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981).

When assessing reasonable suspicion, “ ‘the totality of circumstances’ must be

considered and ‘viewed through the eyes of the reasonable and prudent police officer

on the scene who must react to events as they unfold.’ ” Hawkins at ¶ 21, quoting State

v. Andrews, 57 Ohio St.3d 86, 87-88, 565 N.E.2d 1271 (1991).

       {¶23} Here, the trial court found that Condon “observed what he believed to

be marijuana” inside the Escape before Harris approached the officers and claimed

ownership of the truck. Condon testified that Harris was detained as part of the

investigation into the marijuana in the truck. Further, Condon testified that “there was

an unknown amount, total, of marijuana in that vehicle.”

       {¶24} Under Cincinnati Municipal Code 910-23(A), “[n]o person aged

eighteen or over shall knowingly obtain, possess, or use marijuana in an amount less

than one hundred grams.” Though “[w]hover violates this section is guilty of

possession of marijuana, a minor misdemeanor,” a person who violates Cincinnati

Municipal Code 910-23 “shall be fined $0.00, provided that any such use of marijuana

did not occur in a public place.”

       {¶25} While Harris contends that possession of marijuana is not an arrestable

offense under current policy of the Cincinnati Police Department, Condon’s testimony

established that officers had reasonable suspicion to believe that Harris had violated

Cincinnati Municipal Code 910-23. And in the process of detaining Harris, the firearm
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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

was spotted in plain view. See State v. Gies, 2019-Ohio-4249, 146 N.E.3d 1277, ¶ 10

(1st Dist.).

        {¶26} In sum, officers possessed reasonable suspicion to detain Harris and the

trial court properly denied the motion to suppress. The second assignment of error is

overruled.

                                     III. Conclusion

        {¶27} We overrule Harris’s two assignments of error and affirm the

conviction.

                                                                      Judgment affirmed.

BERGERON, P.J., and WINKLER, J., concur.

Please note:

               The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.

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