Court Opinion

ID: 9912563
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-22 18:07:37.98498+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:00:13.354241
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Bowser, 2023-Ohio-4684.]

                            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                    OTTAWA COUNTY

State of Ohio                                    Court of Appeals No. OT-23-008

        Appellee                                 Trial Court No. 22 CR 083

v.

Samantha Bowser                                  DECISION AND JUDGMENT

        Appellant                                Decided: December 21, 2023

                                             *****

        James J. VanEerten, Ottawa County Prosecuting Attorney and
        Thomas A. Matuszak, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

        Christopher Bazeley, for appellant.

                                             *****
        OSOWIK, J.

        {¶ 1} This is an appeal from a March 14, 2023 judgment of the Ottawa County

Court of Common Pleas, sentencing appellant to a five-year total term of incarceration

following appellant’s convictions, pursuant to a plea agreement, on three counts of

making false alarms, in violation of R.C. 2917.32(A), felonies of the fifth degree, and one
count of tampering with evidence, in violation of R.C. 2921.12(A), a felony of the third

degree. For the reasons set forth below, this court affirms the judgment of the trial court.

         {¶ 2} Appellant, Samantha Bowser, sets forth the following two assignments of

error:

         “The trial court failed to properly advise [appellant] of all of the possible penalties

         for a violation of PRC.

         “The trial court’s failure to advise [appellant] renders her plea unknowingly,

         involuntarily, and [unintelligently] given.”

         {¶ 3} The following undisputed facts are relevant to this appeal. This case arises

from a series of law enforcement investigations, at both the local and state level, triggered

by a series of allegations reported by appellant to law enforcement agencies, hospitals,

and homeless shelters serving abused women, maintaining that she had been sexually

abused, assaulted, and raped by multiple individuals on multiple occasions. Appellant had

become acquainted with the accused individuals in various ways, including co-workers,

mutual acquaintances, and via online dating applications for those seeking sexual

encounters.

         {¶ 4} Ultimately, following extensive investigations and inter-agency

collaboration, it was uniformly determined that the evidence collected overwhelmingly

demonstrated that appellant had fabricated the entirety of the above-referenced claims,

going so far as to plant evidence, and self-inflict injuries designed to support her claims,

2.
such as severe bruising, cuts, and the internal placement of foreign objects. Appellant

ultimately conceded to the bulk of the deception.

       {¶ 5} In addition, it was discovered that appellant had active warrants for her

arrest in at least six other states for similarly making false reports of alleged sexual

criminal offenses, as well as for identity theft, forgery, and receiving stolen property. It

was determined that appellant had utilized approximately 20 different aliases, and had

resided at least 11 different states in the last several years.

       {¶ 6} On May 4, 2022, based upon the forgoing, appellant was indicted on a total

of 17 offenses; including five counts of making false alarms, in violation of R.C.

2917.32(A), felonies of the fifth degree, two counts of tampering with evidence, in

violation of R.C. 2921.12(A), felonies of the third degree, five counts of falsification, in

violation of R.C. 2921.13(A), misdemeanors of the first degree, and five counts of

obstruction of official business, in violation of R.C. 2921.31(A), felonies of the fifth

degree.

       {¶ 7} On February 2, 2023, following completion of a mental health evaluation

assessment by the Court Diagnostic & Treatment Center, which determined appellant to

be legally competent, appellant withdrew her prior plea of not guilty by reason of

insanity, and, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, appellant pled guilty to three

counts of making false alarms, in violation of R.C. 2917.32(A), felonies of the fifth

degree, and one count of tampering with evidence, in violation of R.C. 2921.12(A), a

3.
felony of the third degree. In exchange, the 13 remaining offenses were dismissed. A

presentence investigation was ordered.

       {¶ 8} On March 13, 2023, the sentencing hearing was conducted. The trial court

emphasized at sentencing that, “The [untrue] allegations that you made were very serious

and certainly could ruin peoples[‘] lives. And that’s a very serious concern.” After

weighing the aggravating and mitigating evidence and circumstances, the trial court

sentenced appellant to a five-year total term of incarceration, with credit for 262 days

served. This appeal ensued.

       {¶ 9} In the first assignment of error, appellant alleges that the trial court did not

properly advise appellant of the potential penalties for a post-release control violation.

Appellant argues that, “The trial court failed to inform [her] about all of the consequences

she faces for a failure to comply with PRC during her plea colloquy and at her sentencing

hearing.” Notably, appellant simultaneously concedes, “Admittedly, the trial court

advised [appellant] at sentencing that any violation of the terms of her PRC would subject

her to the [R.C. 2967.28] sanctions.” Appellant fails to cite any specific post-release

control violation consequence of which the trial court allegedly failed to inform

appellant. Appellant also acknowledges that the plea form executed by appellant

contained, “the full list of possible penalties for violating PRC.”

4.
       {¶ 10} R.C. 2967.28(B) of the post-release control statute, establishes in

relevant part,

       Each sentence to a prison term, other than a term of life imprisonment, for a

       felony of the first degree, for a felony of the second degree, for a felony sex

       offense, or for a felony of the third degree * * * shall include a requirement

       that the offender be subject to a period of post-release control imposed by

       the parole board after the offender’s release from imprisonment.

       In conjunction, as held by this court in State v. Sprouse, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-22-

1230, 2023-Ohio-2893, ¶ 24,

       [R.C. 2967.28(B)] requires the trial court provide notice of post-release

       control at the sentencing hearing and in the sentencing entry * * * State v.

       Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio-6085, 817 N.E.2d 864, ¶ 23,

       overruled on other grounds, State v. Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-

       Ohio-2913, 159 N.E.3d 248, ¶ 40. At both the sentencing hearing and in

       the sentencing entry, ‘[t]he trial court must advise the offender * * * of the

       term of supervision, whether post-release control is discretionary or

       mandatory, and the consequences of violating post-release control.’ Id.,

       citing State v. Grimes, 151 Ohio St.3d 19, 2017-Ohio-2927, 85 N.E.3d 700,

       ¶ 11.

       {¶ 11} As applied to the instant case, the transcript of the February 2, 2023 change

of plea hearing irrefutably shows that the trial court stated to appellant in the course of

5.
the change of plea colloquy, “[Y]ou could be required to serve a two-year term of post-

release control following your release from prison. Post-release control is parole. If you

violate the terms of post-release control, you could be sent back to prison for up to one-

half of your original prison sentence * * * Do you understand?” Appellant replied,

“Yes.”

         {¶ 12} Likewise, the transcript of the March 13, 2023 sentencing hearing

irrefutably shows that the trial court stated to appellant at sentencing, “[Y]ou may have a

two-year term of post-release control following your release from prison. The Adult

Parole Authority will administer post-release control pursuant to Revised Code Section

2967.28. And any violation of post-release control will subject you to the consequences

set forth in that statute.”

         Lastly, the March 14, 2023 sentencing entry issued by the trial court states,

         The court explained the concepts of post-release control and advised that

         the defendant would be subject to a discretionary period of two years of

         post-release control upon release from prison. APA will administer the

         post-release control pursuant to R.C. 2967.28 and any violation by the

         offender of the conditions of post-release control will subject the offender

         to the consequences set forth in the statute, including being sent back to

         prison for up to one-half of the stated prison term or whatever time remains

         on post-release control, whichever is longer.

6.
       {¶ 13} Based upon the foregoing, we find that the record reflects that, in accord

with Grimes and Sprouse, the trial court properly advised appellant of the consequences

of violations of post-release control, and did so in the change of plea hearing, in the

sentencing hearing, and in the sentencing entry.

       {¶ 14} Appellant also cites State v. Heinzen, 2d Dist. Clark No. 19-CA-65, 2022-

Ohio-1341, in support of the first assignment of error. We have reviewed Heinzen and

find it to be materially distinguishable from the instant case. In contrast to the facts

present in this case, in Heinzen, the trial court did not advise the defendant of the

potential post-release control violation penalty of being imprisoned for up to one-half of

the stated prison term.

       As held in Heinzen, ¶ 27,

       The trial court, however, never advised Heinzen that she could receive a

       prison term of up to one-half of the stated prison term originally imposed

       * * * Although the trial court included this information in the sentencing

       entry, it was not discussed at the sentencing hearing, as required by R.C.

       2929.19(B)(2)(f). For this reason, the post-release control portion of

       Heinzen’s sentence is contrary to law.

       {¶ 15} Accordingly, the above-quoted omission by the trial court of the

consequences of post-release control violations in Heinzen, which did not occur in the

instant case, required the defendant to be resentenced to remediate the omission.

7.
         {¶ 16} We have carefully reviewed and considered the record of evidence. It

demonstrates that, in accord with R.C. 2967.28, R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(f), Grimes, and

Sprouse, the trial court properly advised appellant of the consequences of violations of

post-release control. Wherefore, we find appellant’s first assignment of error is not well-

taken.

         {¶ 17} In appellant’s second assignment of error, appellant similarly alleges that

appellant’s plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently given, as required by

Crim.R. 11, also based upon appellant’s allegation that the trial court failed to properly

advise appellant of the consequences of violations of post-release control, the same legal

basis upon which appellant’s first assignment of error was premised. As such, the merit

of appellant’s second assignment of error is contingent upon the merit of appellant’s first

assignment of error.

         {¶ 18} Given our determination in response to appellant’s first assignment of

error, finding that the trial court properly advised appellant of the consequences of

violations of post-release control, we likewise find appellant’s second assignment of error

not well- taken on the same basis set forth above in response to the first assignment of

error.

8.
         {¶ 19} On consideration whereof, the judgment of the Ottawa County Court of

Common Pleas is hereby affirmed. Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal

pursuant to App.R. 24.

                                                                         Judgment affirmed.

       A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.

Thomas J. Osowik, J.                             ____________________________
                                                         JUDGE
Gene A. Zmuda, J.
                                                 ____________________________
Myron C. Duhart, P.J.                                    JUDGE
CONCUR.
                                                 ____________________________
                                                         JUDGE

          This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
     Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
          version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
                   http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.

9.