Court Opinion

ID: 9851430
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:12:35.129872+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:55.795502
License: Public Domain

NETTESHEIM, P.J.
(dissenting). I contend that the condition of probation requiring Daniel Handley to deposit moneys to cover the cost of the victims' possible psychological treatment as a result of Handley's sexual assaults is reasonable. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
Section 973.09(l)(b), Stats., authorizing restitution, and sec. 973.20, Stats., setting out the procedures for determining restitution, assume that restitution is appropriate and that the restitution amount is either known or ascertainable at the time of sentencing. See sec. 973.20(13). The majority decision assumes that the probation condition at issue in this case is restitution. Since the need for restitution does not presently exist, the majority understandably concludes that the restitution statutes do not contemplate or permit the payment condition ordered by the trial court in this case.
The majority's error lies in its assumption that the condition of probation is restitution. Although the trial court's order has a restitution ring to it, I contend that the payment of the money contemplated by the order is not, at this time, restitution. It will only become such when, and if, the victims actually require treatment. At *846such time, the trial court may address any restitution claims under the applicable law.
Until then, I contend that this case is governed by sec. 973.09(l)(a), Stats., which authorizes reasonable and appropriate conditions of probation:
[T]he court, by order, may witold sentence or impose sentence under s. 973.15 and stay its execution, and in either case place the person on probation to the department for a stated period, stating in the order the reasons therefor. The court may impose any conditions which appear to be reasonable and appropriate. [Emphasis added.]
In State v. Heyn, 155 Wis. 2d 621, 456 N.W.2d 157 (1990), the Wisconsin Supreme Court, adopting the court of appeals' language in State v. Connelly, 143 Wis. 2d 500, 421 N.W.2d 859 (Ct. App. 1988), explained the interaction between sec. 973.09(l)(a), Stats., authorizing "reasonable and appropriate" conditions of probation and sec. 973.09(l)(b), authorizing restitution:
The statute [sec. 973.09, Stats.] does not state that the only time a probationer can be required to pay out funds as a consequence of his or her criminal activity is to provide restitution to a crime victim. It simply requires that if there is an ascertainable victim, he or she must be compensated under the guidelines therein stated. The adoption of the mandatory victim restitution provisions of sec. 973.09(1)(b) did not inhibit or restrict the authority of a trial court to impose 'reasonable and appropriate' conditions of probation, as generally authorized by sec. 973.09(l)(a). The provisions of secs. 973.09(l)(a) and (l)(b) are cumulative and concurrent; the latter section neither usurps nor abridges the former.
*847Heyn, 155 Wis. 2d at 628, 456 N.W.2d at 160 (citation omitted).
Instead of interpreting these two subsections of the probation statutes as "cumulative and concurrent" pursuant to Heyn, the majority interprets the restitution subsection as usurping the trial court's discretionary authority to otherwise fashion financial conditions of probation which seek to rehabilitate the offender through reasonable conditions of probation. See id. at 629, 456 N.W.2d at 161.
Medical authorities recognize that the trauma of sexual assault and the need for treatment may not emerge until long after the assault itself. The American Medical Association's Council on Scientific Affairs recently reported that the after effects of sexual assault are "persistent and long lasting." Council on Scientific Affairs, Violence Against Women; Relevance for Medical Practitioners, J.A.M.A. 3181, 3185 (June 17, 1992). The same authority reports that " [vjictims often react with chronic anxiety and feelings of vulnerability, loss of control, and self-blame long after the assault. Long-term reactions include anxiety, nightmares, catastrophic fantasies, feelings of alienation and isolation, sexual dysfunctions, and physical distress." Id. In addition, the council reported that " [approximately one fifth of child sexual abuse victims evidence serious long-term psychological effects." Id. at 3187.
A victim's reaction to sexual assault can follow two stages: (1) the acute phase (disorganization), and (2) the long-term process (reorganization). Martin, Warfield, & Braen, Physician's Management of the Psychological Aspects of Rape, J.A.M.A. 501, 501 (Jan. 28, 1983). The latter process may last for months or years. Id. at 503. A victim's outward behavior may not reflect the degree or *848nature of the emotional crises which she is experiencing. Id. at 501.
Other authorities report that 26% of sexual assault victims did not feel recovered by the end of follow up, which was four to six years after the attack. Riesenberg, Treating a Societal Malignancy — Rape, 257 J.A.M.A. 726, 727 (Feb. 13, 1987).
Finally, and most importantly to this case, victims of sexual assault may not seek psychotherapy until months or years after the assault. Rose, " Worse Than Death”: Psychodynamics of Rape Victims and the Need for Psychotherapy, 143 Am. J. Psychiatry 817, 823 (July 1986).
I of course hope that the young victims' beliefs that they do not or will not need treatment or counseling is well founded. However, in light of the medical data, these victims are probably the least informed or capable of making such a judgment at this time. If the need for treatment arises in the future, the victims may make application for the funds provided by this condition of probation. The court should then determine whether the funds should be made available to the victims under the appropriate law.
Probation is not a matter of right to a defendant; instead it is a privilege. Heyn, 155 Wis. 2d at 627, 456 N.W.2d at 160. Having accorded this privilege to Han-dley, the trial court's condition of probation attempts to rehabilitate Handley by educating that sexual assault often results in emotional trauma to the victim with an attendant need for treatment and resulting cost. The reasonableness of such a condition should not be governed solely by whether the victim in the particular case presently has such a need.
I conclude that sec. 973.09(l)(a), Stats., contemplates such a condition of probation. Under the facts of *849this case, I farther conclude that the condition is reasonable and appropriate.1

 This is especially so since the trial court has allowed for the return of the moneys with interest to Handley at the end of the probation period if the victims have made no claim to the fund.