Court Opinion

ID: 9620409
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:41:57.626402+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:50.281669
License: Public Domain

KAUGER, Justice,
with whom OPALA, C.J. joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
The result reached by the majority may arguably be in the best interest of the child, but it is not the law.1 I agree that in the absence of a trial transcript, we must presume that the trial court’s judgment was responsive to the evidence.2 However, the Decree Establishing Paternity provides in pertinent part:
“... 1. The court is satisfied that the requirements of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act have been met, that the Indian Child Welfare Act does not apply since the Baby Boy W. has never been in the custody of his Indian father, and that this Court has jurisdiction over both the parties and the subject matter of this litigation....”3
Although the majority cites appropriate authorities, it does not apply the facts of the case to the controlling law. The trial court in the paternity decree makes the specific finding that the father of Baby Boy W. was an Indian, and it held, contra to Mississippi Band v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 48, 109 S.Ct. 1597, 1608, 104 L.Ed.2d 29, 46 (1989), that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) was satisfied because the child had never been in the father's custody.
In Holyfield, the United States Supreme Court held that a child’s domicile is determined by the parents’ domicile — the child’s domicile may be a place where the child has never been. The Holyfield Court noted that traditionally the domicile of a child born out of wedlock is the mother’s domicile. However, this Court held in the Matter of Swarer, 566 P.2d 126-27 (Okl.1977), that parenthood is acknowledged if from the time of birth the father publicly acknowledges the child as his own and treats the child as his child. The father in this case acknowledged the baby by the filing of the paternity action. Under the teaching In re Estate of LaSarge, 526 P.2d 930, 933 (Okl.1974), the admission of paternity in a filed court document is sufficient to constitute public acknowledgment of a child born out of wedlock. The father’s filing of the paternity action with the court clerk created a public record of the father’s acknowledgement of his child.
The Holyfield Court held that Congress’ concern over the placement of Indian children in non-Indian homes extended to cases where the child had never been a part of an Indian family. The Court found that Congressional concerns extend beyond the wishes of individual parents. Rather, the interest protected is that of Indian tribes, and of Indian children. The interests of the tribe and the child were not met by the trial court’s determination that the ICWA-did not apply because the child had never been in his father’s custody. The majority approves the trial court’s failure to heed the mandate of the Indian Child Welfare Act. No determination of the child’s status was sought from either the tribe or the BIA, nor was the tribe notified of the impending adoption proceedings. The record supports the father’s allegations that the baby is an Indian child subject to the ICWA.4 This finding cannot be ignored.
Even if the ICWA and Holyfield are inapplicable, the majority has also ignored the Oklahoma statute, 10 O.S.1991 § 60.6,5 as well as the controlling precedent of Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 2993, 77 L.Ed.2d 614, 626 (1983), Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392, 99 S.Ct. 1760, 1768, 60 L.Ed.2d 297, 307 (1979), *649and Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255, 98 S.Ct. 549, 555, 54 L.Ed.2d 511, 520 (1978). In those eases, the United States Supreme Court held that if an unwed father demonstrates a commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood, his parental rights require substantial protection under the Due Process Clause. The majority condones the discriminating treatment of parents of children born out of wedlock. It ignores extant law and tolerates substandard procedures for termination of the unwed father’s parental rights thus violating the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution and of the Okla. Const, art 5, § 59.6

. In re Interest of C.W., 239 Neb. 817, 479 N.W.2d 105, 114 (1992).

. Hamid v. Sew Original, 645 P.2d 496-97 (Okl.1982).

. Record at p. 78.

. Title 10 O.S.1991 § 40.2(2) provides:
“2. 'Indian child’ means any unmarried or unemancipated person who is under the age of eighteen (18) and is either:
a. a member of an Indian tribe, or
b. is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe;”

.Title 60 O.S.1991 § 60.6 refutes the majority’s finding that the statute terminates the unwed father’s parental rights because the father failed to exercise parental rights toward the child. The statute provides in pertinent part:
"A child under eighteen (18) years of age cannot be adopted without the consent of its *649parents, if living, except that consent is not required from:
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3. The father or putative father of a child born out of wedlock if:
a. prior to the hearing provided for in Section 29.1 of this title, and having actual knowledge of the birth or impending birth of the child believed to be his child, he fails to acknowledge paternity of the child or to take any action to legally establish his claim to paternity of the child or to exercise parental rights or duties over the child, including failure to contribute to the support of the mother of the child to the extent of his financial ability during her term of pregnancy, or ...”
Here, the father filed for paternity five days after his baby’s birth. The father has not been afforded an opportunity to exercise his parental rights, and he should not be held accountable for his failure to exercise them.

. United States Const., amend. XIV, § 1 provides:
"All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
Okla. Const., art. 5, § 59 provides:
“Laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation throughout the State, and were a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted.”
In re Adoption of Baby Boy D, 742 P.2d 1059, 1071 (Okl.1985) (Kauger, J., dissenting opinion).