Court Opinion

ID: 9774397
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:18:56.522733+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:07.899956
License: Public Domain

CONCURRING OPINION BY
OTT, J.:
¶ 1 While I concur with the Majority decision, I write separately to emphasize what I believe is the most salient problem with this matter.
¶ 2 It is undisputed in this matter that Dixon’s job entails his driving vehicles of the post office fleet and that he is not driving any specific or particular vehicle. Therefore, to the extent the interpretation of the exclusion rests on the fact that Dixon operates vehicles from a fleet of ears, Nationwide v. Easley, 960 A.2d 843 (Pa.Super.2008), and Brink v. Erie, 940 A.2d 528 (Pa.Super.2008), tell us the exclusion applies.9
¶ 3 What is at issue is how often Dixon drives those vehicles and whether the frequency of his driving the vehicles qualifies as regular use. The record before us is singularly lacking in that information. Geico submitted a request for admissions to Dixon. Number 16 stated: “At the *929time of the ACCIDENT, plaintiff regularly used vehicles owned by the United States Postal Service to perform his job duties.” See Request for Admissions, Interrogatories, Request for Production of Documents, July 13, 2009. This admission was denied. See Response to Request for Admissions, July 23, 2009. Also included in the record are two pages of Dixon’s deposition, neither of which explain how often Dixon is required to operate any of the post office fleet vehicles.
¶ 4 In his memorandum of law against summary judgment, Dixon specifically raises the issue of the frequency of his use of the vehicles: “Operating a postal vehicle, such as the one involved in this accident, was not a regular or routine- part of plaintiffs job.” See Plaintiffs Memorandum of Law Contra Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, at 2, Sept. 2, 2009.
¶ 5 Whether Dixon’s job required him to regularly use post office fleet vehicles is a material fact that needs to be determined. However, this central issue is not resolved in the record and was not addressed by the trial court.
¶ 6 Because summary judgment is not appropriate when genuine issue of material facts are unresolved, summary judgment in favor of Geico was inappropriate.

. Easley involves driving cars in a taxi fleet and Brink involves a fleet of police cars. Another case, Williams v. Geico, 968 A.2d 804 (Pa.Super.2008) (table), also agrees that the exception applies to fleet (police) vehicles. Our Supreme Court has accepted Williams for review. See Williams v. Geico, 986 A.2d 45 (Pa.2009).