Court Opinion

ID: 9615328
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:34:42.168401+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:45.773938
License: Public Domain

Judge TAUBMAN
dissenting.
Because I respectfully disagree with the majority’s construction of the grand jury statute, its upholding the constitutionality of the dogfighting statute, and its assessment of prosecutorial misconduct, I dissent.
I. Interpretation of the Grand Jury Statute
The majority concludes that Bergen waived her rights under the grand jury statute and thus was not entitled to the prosecu-torial immunity it affords. I disagree with both that conclusion and the majority’s interpretation of the statute.
The majority’s interpretation rests on the premise that the statute is clear and unambiguous on its face. In my view, such is not the case.
The majority holds that since the purpose of formal written advisement of rights is to protect those who are forced to appear, § 16-5-204(4)(b), C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8A) applies only to subpoenaed grand jury witnesses. Its holding is based upon a reading of this subsection in the context of the preceding one, § 16-5-204(4)(a), C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8A). Under its interpretation, only witnesses subpoenaed without a formal written advisement would be immune from prosecution under the non-advisement immunity subsection.
A statute should be construed as a whole to give consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all of its parts and to render it effective in accomplishing the purpose for which it was enacted. Thus, if separate clauses within a statute may be reconciled by one construction but would conflict under a different interpretation, a construction which results in harmony rather than inconsistency should be adopted. People v. District Court, 713 P.2d 918 (Colo.1986).
In my view, the plain meaning of the language warrants a different interpretation from that of the majority. Section 16-5-204, C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8A) sets forth the procedures applicable to all witnesses appearing before the grand jury, both voluntarily and involuntarily. The required advisement subsection states: “At the option of the prosecuting attorney, a grand jury subpoena may contain an advisement of rights.” The advisement required under this subsection notifies witnesses of the right to an attorney, the privilege against self-incrimination, and the right to have an attorney appointed if the witness cannot afford one.
Subsection 16-5-204(4)(b) provides:
any witness who is not advised of his rights pursuant to paragraph (a) of this subsection (4) shall not be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for *547or on account of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which he testifies or any evidence he produces, nor shall any such testimony or evidence be used as evidence in any criminal proceeding, except for perjury, against him in any court, (emphasis added)
Since I conclude that subsection (4)(b) confers prosecutorial immunity on invited witnesses, such witnesses cannot “waive” their right not to be prosecuted.
The term “any witness” in this subsection, given its plain meaning, encompasses all witnesses not advised of their rights on a subpoena issued under § 16-5-204(4)(a). See Obert v. Colorado Department of Social Services, 766 P.2d 1186 (Colo.1988) (“any” broadly interpreted to mean without restriction or limitation).
Thus, I conclude that the plain meaning of subsection (4)(b) protects all witnesses testifying without a subpoena containing a formal written advisement. However, when subsection (4)(b) is read in context with the other sections of the statute, the scope of “any witness” becomes narrower, but not as narrow as the majority holds.
Section 16-5-204(3)(b), C.R.S. (1986 Repl. Vol. 8A) gives the grand jury the right to “call and interrogate witnesses.” Section 16-5-204(4)(i), C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8A) permits any person to “approach the prosecuting attorney or the grand jury and request to testify or retestify in an inquiry before a grand jury or to appear before the grand jury.”
My reading of subsection (4)(b) in context with the other statutory provisions, mandates that it be construed to include all witnesses who are not subpoenaed under subsection (4)(a) but who do not appear of their own initiative under § 16-5-204(4)(i).
When the language of the statute is construed as a whole and § 16 — 5—204(4) (b) is read in context with other provisions, my interpretation gives a more harmonious effect to the entire statute than does the majority’s interpretation.
Subsection 4(b) provides immunity from prosecution to “any witness who is not advised of his rights pursuant to [subsection 16-5-204(4)(a) ]_” “Any witness” is not defined in the statute. Section 16-5-204(4)(b) does not specify whether “any witness” must be a subpoenaed witness.
To assist in understanding the scope of § 16-5-204(4)(b) it is instructive to look at other similar provisions of the statute. Significantly, § 16-5-204(4)(d), C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8A) refers to “any witness subpoenaed to appear and testify before a grand jury or to produce books, papers, documents, or other objects before such grand jury_” See also § 16-5-204(4)(h), C.R.S. (1986 Repl. Vol. 8A) (“any witness summoned to testify before a grand jury”). ■ Thus, when the General Assembly wished to limit a statutory provision to subpoenaed or summoned witnesses, it knew how to do so. The absence of such specificity in § 16-5-204(4)(b) lends weight to the argument that the phrase “any witness who is not advised of his rights pursuant to [§ 16-5-204(4)(a) ]” is not limited to subpoenaed witnesses.
Nonetheless, I agree that subsection (4)(b) could be interpreted to apply only to subpoenaed witnesses, as the majority holds. Alternatively, it could be interpreted, as Bergen contends, to apply broadly to all witnesses who were not advised of their rights pursuant to subsection (4)(a), including witnesses who request to testify under § 16-5-204(4)(i), as the plain meaning of the term “any” warrants.
However, § 16-5-204(3)(b) provides additional insight into the intended scope of “any witness.” That subsection gives grand juries the right to “call” witnesses. Black’s Law Dictionary 185 (5th ed. 1979) defines “call” as “to make a request or demand; to summon or demand by name.... ” See also Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, 317-318. Thus, when “call” is given its plain meaning, the statute provides the grand jury the right to invite witnesses to testify or subpoena witnesses to appear.
In construing the language of all the pertinent statutory provisions to render each subsection harmonious with the others, I conclude that subsection (4)(b) was intended to be read broadly to include invited witnesses.
*548The grand jury has the right to invite witnesses to appear. Invited witnesses are not given a formal written advisement under subsection (4)(a) because they are not subpoenaed. However, invited witnesses do not come within § 16 — 5—204(4)(¿) because they do not appear before the grand jury at their own request.
If the statutory language leads to alternative constructions and its intended scope is unclear’, a court may examine pertinent legislative history to determine which construction is more in accordance with the objectives of the legislation. Constructions which defeat the obvious legislative intent should be avoided. See § 2-4-212, C.R.S. (1980 Repl. Vol. IB); People v. District Court, supra.
These alternative constructions of subsection (4)(b) render the statute sufficiently ambiguous to warrant consideration of the legislative history.
One of the primary purposes of the reforms to the grand jury statute proposed in the 1977 legislative session was to provide witnesses with protections against prosecuto-rial misconduct, including harassment, perjury traps, and prosecutors’ use of the grand jury to circumvent constitutional protections and gain access to otherwise protected information. As part of this reform, the General Assembly intended to protect tai’get witnesses by requiring that they receive a formal written advisement of rights, access to previous grand jury testimony, access to other statements attributed to the subpoenaed witness in the prosecutor’s possession, the right to have counsel present during testimony, and the ability to have a court review the proceedings for probable cause. See Tape Recordings of Senate Judiciary Committee on S.B. 186, 51st General Assembly, 1st Session (February 16 and March 7, 1977) (S.B. 186 Hearings).
The legislative history further indicates that the General Assembly’s intent in providing for a written advisement on the subpoena instead of during the hearing was to notify target witnesses of their rights prior to testifying. This advisement was required for every witness in the initial bill, but was later amended as a compromise to require an advisement only for potential target witnesses.
The advisement was designed not only to protect target witnesses from self-incrimination but to allow them to seek counsel and to permit them to exercise other rights provided in the statute, such as obtaining statements in the prosecution’s possession. S.B. 186 Hearings, supra; see People ex rel. Gallagher v. District Court, 198 Colo. 468, 601 P.2d 1380 (1979) (failure to subpoena witness with written advisement of rights prior to grand jury hearing denied witness’ privilege against self-incrimination because it prevented him from exercising that privilege prior to the hearing).
The legislative testimony also reveals that subsection (4)(b) was intended to protect both subpoenaed and invited witnesses not identified initially as “target witnesses” but who might become target witnesses on the basis of their grand jury testimony. One senator expressed a particular desire to create substantive rights for any witness who could become a target. S.B. 186 Hearings, supra.
A representative from the District Attorneys’ Association agreed that subsections (4)(a) and (4)(b) offered a good compromise. He maintained: “[M]y solution ... is these matters of notice and advisement apply to anybody you know is or would become a defendant and without that [notice and advisement] they [sic] wouldn’t become a defendant.” He also agreed that if a district attorney later charged or indicted an unadvised witness, that failure to give notice and advisement would be grounds to quash an indictment. S.B. 186 Hearings, supra.
Even though the majority concludes that the statute is clear on its face, it discusses the legislative history and recognizes that “the primary focus of the reformers was to provide expanded rights for ‘target witnesses.’” Despite its acknowledgment of this legislative intent, the majority concludes that “target witnesses” can waive their statutory right to a subpoenaed advisement by voluntary appearance.
In my view, the legislative history demonstrates that the General Assembly intended to protect any witness who was or could become the target of the grand jury investí-*549gation by providing such a witness with the specific safeguards contained in subsection 4(a). It further shows a legislative intent that target witnesses or potential target witnesses not afforded the statutory protections not be prosecuted.
Furthermore, People ex rel. Gallagher v. District Court, supra, is distinguishable. There, the supreme court dismissed an indictment because the prosecution failed to subpoena a witness pursuant to § 16 — 5— 204(4)(a); the record demonstrated that the witness was notified that he would be subpoenaed to appear’ but no subpoena was ever issued. The supreme court rejected the prosecution’s argument that the witness’ voluntary appearance constituted a waiver of service of the subpoena. It held that since the prosecution failed to comply with § 16-5-204(4)(a) and Crim.P. 6.1, the witness could not be prosecuted because § 16 — 5—204(4)(b) prohibited prosecuting unadvised witnesses.
In dictum the supreme court implied that a witness appearing voluntarily may waive service of the subpoena and the rights and protections afforded under that subpoena. However, it did not address the issue specifically because the trial court had found that the witness did not appear voluntarily.
Here, Bergen did not initially request to testify pursuant to § 16 — 5—204(4)(i). Instead, the People invited her to testify and warned that an indictment against her might be forthcoming. Thus, Bergen’s initial appearances cannot be construed as a waiver of her rights because she was not a witness under § 16-5-204(4)(Z).
I would hold that an invited witness is afforded immunity from prosecution under subsection (4)(b) because he or she is neither a witness requesting to testify nor a subpoenaed witness, afforded rights and protections under subsection 4(a). Thus, I would conclude that the indictment must be dismissed on this basis.
II. Constitutionality of the Dogfighting Statute
I would also conclude that the dogfighting statute must be construed narrowly here so as to exempt Bergen’s conduct and to avoid a finding of unconstitutionality.
The statute which formed the predicate for Bergen’s convictions, § 18-9-204, C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8B), provides in pertinent part:
(l)(a) No person shall cause, sponsor, arrange, hold, or encourage a fight between dogs for the purpose of monetary gain or entertainment.
(b) For the purposes of this section, a person encourages a fight between dogs for the purposes of monetary gain or entertainment if he:
(I) Is knowingly present at such a fight....
Bergen contends that she was improperly convicted for being “knowingly present” at a dogfight, in part because attending such a fight in her capacity as a news'reporter was constitutionally protected under the First Amendment.
The United States Supreme Court has held that news-gathering is not without its First Amendment protection, for “without some protections for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated.” Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 2656, 33 L.Ed.2d 626, 639 (1972). However, the court also declared in that case that “the First Amendment does not guarantee the press a constitutional right of special access to information not available tó the public generally.” 408 U.S. at 684, 92 S.Ct. at 2658, 33 L.Ed.2d at 641. See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 85 S.Ct. 1271, 14 L.Ed.2d 179 (1965) (federal government’s refusal to validate passports to Cuba sustained even though such action restricted flow of information concerning that country). Moreover, the state has a legitimate interest in prohibiting attendance at animal fights. See City of St. Louis v. Schoenbusch, 95 Mo. 618, 8 S.W. 791 (1888). Accordingly, the state might be able constitutionally to prohibit all persons from attending dogfights and criminalize such conduct.
Here, however, § 18-9-204 does not prohibit all persons from attending dogfights. Rather, the prohibition extends to those, in*550ter alia, encouraging a dogfight “for the purpose of monetary gain or entertainment.”
Statutes are not unconstitutional because of facial overbreadth unless the overbreadth is “not only real but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.” People v. Batchelor, 800 P.2d 599, 601 (Colo.1990), citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2917, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973). Moreover, statutes confronting First Amendment freedoms must be specific enough not to inhibit the exercise of those freedoms. People v. Batchelor, supra.
Bergen argues that the statute is unconstitutionally overbroad because it operates to prevent a journalist from presenting a brief and simple demonstration in which precautions are taken to assure that the dogs will not be injured. To the extent that Bergen seeks special protection for journalists under her overbreadth claim, I would reject her argument. See Branzburg v. Hayes, supra.
However, I perceive that the statute here should be construed as facially overbroad because, unless narrowly construed, it would bring within its terms actions clearly beyond the statute’s “plainly legitimate sweep.” See Whimbush v. People, 869 P.2d 1245 (Colo.1994) (Colorado’s criminal extortion statute facially overbroad); People v. Smith, 862 P.2d 939 (Colo.1993) (Colorado’s harassment statute facially overbroad).
Construed as the People urge and the majority holds, the statute effectively establishes a presumption that any individual “knowingly present” at a dogfight “encourages a fight between dogs for the purpose of monetary gain or entertainment....” See § 18 — 9—204(1)(b), C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8B). Indeed, the majority concludes that the statute even applies to “disgusted observers” at dogfights. Thus, for example, a humane society member who seeks to investigate and expose the evils of dogfighting could be brought within the sweep of the statute under the majority’s interpretation. Similarly, researchers, investigators, reporters, and even animal control officers could be brought within the terms of the statute if it is interpreted broadly as the majority maintains is appropriate. Thus, the conduct of various categories of people in addition to journalists may be criminalized by the dogfighting statute as construed by the majority.
I recognize that two other courts have held constitutional against overbreadth challenges cock fighting statutes that prohibit individuals from being “knowingly present.” See State v. Tabor, 678 S.W.2d 45 (Tenn.1984); Peck v. Dunn, 574 P.2d 367 (Utah 1978).
In both cases, however, the courts noted that the statutes applied to spectators, thereby making the statutes analogous to the limitation in § 18-9-204 to those attending dogfights “for the purpose of monetary gain or entertainment.” Indeed, in State v. Tabor, supra, cited by the majority, the court noted that it was not passing on the question of whether investigators, news reporters or other completely innocent persons might have a First Amendment right to attend cock fights since the defendants did not allege they were within these categories. Cf. State v. Abellano, 441 P.2d 333 (Haw.1968) (mere “presence” requirement held unconstitutional).
People v. Superior Court, 247 Cal.Rptr. 647, 201 Cal.App.3d 1061 (1988), also relied upon by the majority, is distinguishable. There, the court upheld a statute punishing knowing presence of spectators at animal fights against a vagueness challenge by narrowly interpreting the statute. No challenge was made to the statute on overbreadth grounds.
Moreover, the “knowing” requirement in the dogfighting statute does not save it from overbreadth concerns. See Whimbush v. People, supra (a specific intent requirement does not eliminate overbreadth concerns when the effect associated with the intent provision encompasses a substantial amount of protected activity).
It is a -cardinal rule of statutory construction that courts must construe statutes in such a manner as to avoid, if possible, finding them unconstitutional. See § 2^4-201(l)(a), C.R.S. (1990 Repl.Vol. IB); Whimbush v. People, supra (Lohr, J., dissenting) (criminal extortion statute should be construed narrowly to avoid finding of facial overbreadth). We must also interpret statutes to give effect to the purpose and intent of the General *551Assembly. See In re Petition of S.O., 795 P.2d 254 (Colo.1990).
Here, the statute as construed by the majority would bring within its sweep constitutionally protected conduct not only for journalists but for others as well. In order to avoid such a finding of uneonstitutionality, I would interpret the statute narrowly so that the phrase “encourages a fight between dogs for the purpose of monetary gain or entertainment” applies only to the attendee at a dogfight who is knowingly present “for the purpose of monetary gain or entertainment.” Under this construction, a humane society member attending a dogfight to investigate and expose its evils would not be presumed to be there for purposes of monetary gain or entertainment and, thus, would not come within the embrace of the statute. Similarly, an animal control officer would not be acting for the purpose of monetary gain or entertainment and would not be at risk for prosecution by attending a dogfight.
Here, Bergen claimed that she personally was not entertained by the dogfight she witnessed. Similarly, it is arguable whether she received any monetary gain from attending the dogfight. She was not betting on the dogfight, and she would have received her salary from the television station which employed her whether she was working on the dogfight story or another story. Thus, consistent with my construction of the statute, the jury should have been instructed that it must acquit Bergen if it found she was not present at the dogfight for purposes of monetary gain or entertainment.
Indeed, this interpretation is consistent with the legislative intent, which was to prohibit entertainment and gambling for dog owners and spectators at dogfights, since such dogfights were viewed as “a kind of animal cruelty which should be treated as a serious crime.” Tape recordings of Hearings before the House Judiciary Committee on Senate Bill 183, 59th General Assembly, 1st Session (April 14, 1981). This interpretation is also consistent with those of other courts which have construed similar statutes to apply only to those attending animal fights purposefully and intentionally. See State v. Tabor, supra; People v. Superior Court, supra. Significantly, I am aware of no other case upholding a conviction against one attending an animal fight for any purpose other than personal enjoyment.
If one of the alternative means of committing the offense charged is to perform an act protected by the constitution, a general verdict of guilt for that offense must be set aside. James v. People, 727 P.2d 850 (Colo.1986). Similarly, if, as here, one of the alternative means of committing the offense charged is not within the scope of a statute, so as to avoid a finding of that statute’s uneonstitutionality, the general verdict of guilt must be set aside as well. Here, the jury did not specify which among the alternative acts or purposes set forth in § 18-9-204 was the basis for its general verdict, so it is impossible to know on which theory Bergen’s convictions were based. Thus, since Bergen’s convictions for dogfighting, conspiracy to commit dogfighting, and accessory to dog-fighting all rely on an impermissibly broad interpretation of the dogfighting statute, I would set aside her convictions.
III. Prosecutorial Misconduct
The majority opinion addresses only one part of a two-part allegation of prosecutorial misconduct made by Bergen. The majority responds only to Bergen’s allegation that the prosecution conducted a number of “off the record” proceedings which amounted to pros-ecutorial misconduct. However, more significantly, Bergen also contends that the prosecution’s intentional cancellation of her subpoena in order to avoid providing her with statements in its possession attributed to her, as required under the grand jury statute, amounted to prosecutorial misconduct undermining the structural fairness and integrity of the grand jury statute.
A.
As to this latter contention, I would hold that there is sufficient evidence to warrant dismissal of the indictment based on the prosecution’s intentional cancellation of the subpoena in order to deny Bergen other statutory rights.
*552Here, the prosecution admittedly cancelled Bergen’s subpoena to avoid having to provide her with statements in its possession attributed to her as required under § 16-5-204(4)(h), C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8A). The prosecution did not want Bergen to know it had caught her in a perjury trap. This is the type of blatant misconduct that I believe warrants dismissal of the indictment.
The majority holds that an indictment can be dismissed if the defendant shows actual prejudice, but it then concludes that Bergen did not meet this test. The majority also recognizes that an indictment may be dismissed if the prosecutorial misconduct undermines the integrity of the grand jury proceedings, but determines there was no such misconduct here.
A court may exercise its supervisory power to protect judicial integrity in the face of governmental misconduct which amounts to a denial of due process. People v. Auld, 815 P.2d 956 (Colo.App.1991). A court may dismiss a grand jury indictment because of prosecutorial misconduct when those “few, clear rules which were carefully drafted ... to ensure the integrity of the grand jury’s functions” have been violated. United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. -, -, 112 S.Ct. 1735, 1741, 118 L.Ed.2d 352, 364 (1992). Supervisory dismissal is warranted when the structural protections of the grand jury have been so compromised as to render the proceedings fundamentally unfair. Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 108 S.Ct. 2369, 101 L.Ed.2d 228 (1988).
Unlike the limited statutory protections given to grand jury witnesses on the federal level, the General Assembly has adopted broad protections for its grand jury witnesses under § 16-5-204. Thus, Colorado grand jury witnesses are afforded more protection than is constitutionally required.
Here, the prosecution violated statutory provisions intended to protect grand jury witnesses from self-incrimination. The language of § 16-5-204(4)(a) and (b) explicitly requires that witnesses receive a subpoena containing formal written advisement of their rights or they cannot be indicted, except for perjury. Furthermore, § 16-5-204(4)(h) requires that the prosecution provide subpoenaed witnesses with copies of statements attributed to them prior to testifying. The language of this subsection is clear: any witness who is required to appear before the grand jury has the right to examine any statement the prosecution possesses which is attributed to that witness. See also § 16-5-204(4)(g), C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8A).
The majority simply concludes that Bergen was not entitled to her statements because she was not under a subpoena. It fails to address the admitted intent of the prosecution in cancelling the subpoena to prevent Bergen from obtaining statements in the prosecution’s possession attributed to her. Nor does the majority note that Bergen’s subpoena was not cancelled until after the trial court issued an order directing the People to provide Bergen with copies of her prior statements.
The General Assembly specifically enacted §§ 16-5-204(4)(g) and (4)(h) to prevent the prosecution from using witnesses’ prior statements to ensnare them in a perjury trap. See S.B. 186 Hearings, supra. By allowing witnesses to review their previous testimony and other statements in the prosecution’s possession, the General Assembly attempted to eliminate perjury traps and allow witnesses the opportunity to exercise their right against self-incrimination.
Under my interpretation of the statute, once the prosecution cancelled the subpoena to avoid providing Bergen with statements attributed to her, it relinquished its right to indict her based upon her subsequent grand jury testimony because the protections the subpoena ensured were no longer present. This is the type of fundamental misconduct that compromises the basic structural protections intended by the General Assembly. Accordingly, I would dismiss the indictment.
Furthermore, the indictment should be dismissed to protect the integrity of the grand jury proceedings. The legislative history indicates the reforms to the grand jury statute were spurred by prosecutorial abuses of the grand jury process. Unless the court’s supervisory power is invoked here, the integrity of the grand jury process will again be diminished.
*553B.
I also disagree with the majority that the admitted prosecutorial violations of the grand jury statute and Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure did not warrant remedial action. If the indictment were not dismissed, these other violations were sufficiently alleged to have required a further evidentiary hearing.
Bergen alleged, based upon an affidavit obtained from the court reporter, that prosecutors spoke with grand jurors off the record, that grand jurors were invited to the prosecution’s offices, and that the prosecution corrected transcripts of the proceedings without consent from the court. Bergen also claims, based on the court reporter’s affidavit, that the prosecutors instructed the grand jury not to question target witnesses directly.
All of this conduct violates provisions of § 16-5-204 and Crim.P. 6.4. The prosecution admitted that this misconduct occurred but downplayed its nature and extent. In my view, Bergen’s allegations warrant a hearing to determine the extent of the misconduct and the prejudice to defendant.
Crim.P. 52(a) provides that “any error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.” However, dismissal is required when actual prejudice accrues to a defendant because of prosecutorial misconduct, and whether there was prejudice to the defendant is a factual determination best resolved by the trial court. People v. Rickard, 761 P.2d 188 (Colo.1988).
The majority holds that the alleged violations were technical and therefore harmless. It also concludes that the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings would be breached if Bergen were allowed to call the court reporter and grand jurors to testify. In so holding, the majority concludes that a hearing could not have made a difference because sufficient evidence on which to base the indictment was presented regardless of what evidence would have been elicited at such hearing.
I disagree with this analysis. The majority improperly concludes that the grand jurors would be required to discuss the reasons and basis for their indictment. However, the only testimony Bergen sought to elicit from the grand jurors and the court reporter was the nature of the “off-the-record” conversations held.
The majority also concludes that the defendant failed to establish any prejudice from the alleged prosecutorial misconduct based on the affidavits submitted. Again, I disagree.
One affidavit from the court reporter clearly states that she cannot go into the details of “off-the-record” conversations without the court’s permission. If a hearing had been held, then the court would know with certainty the nature and extent of the prosecutor’s conduct and whether any prejudice occurred.
Absent a finding that the prosecutors’ conduct was prejudicial, dismissal of the indictment was not warranted. However, I believe that Bergen sufficiently established the presence of enough prosecutorial misconduct to warrant a hearing on whether it was actually prejudicial.
The record demonstrates that the prosecution admitted to off-the-record conversations during the grand jury proceedings, although it explained that these conversations were administrative in nature, concerning such topics as when to reconvene and when to take a break. The prosecution further admitted that grand jurors were invited to the district attorney’s office to review transcripts of testimony which occurred during sessions they could not attend but that only “pleasantries” were exchanged. Also, the prosecution admitted that it corrected the grand jury transcripts without court permission; it explained that the only corrections made were typographical and supplied the list of the corrections it requested to be made.
However, since the court reporter declared in her affidavit that she could not divulge the details of the prosecutor’s conduct because of her oath of secrecy, Bergen was prevented from establishing the extent of the statutory violations. See § 16-5-204(4)(f), C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8A). Thus, in order to ensure that defendant was not prejudiced by the misconduct, a hearing was necessary. See People v. District Court, 199 Colo. 398, 610 P.2d 490 (1980) (grand jury secrecy may be breached *554when clear examples of inappropriate conduct may affect the validity of the indictment).
Accordingly, I would either dismiss the indictment, or, at a minimum, I would remand for an evidentiary hearing regarding the prosecution’s- off-the-record conduct.