Court Opinion

ID: 9940546
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-14 18:03:11.487908+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:44:59.416092
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/14/24 P. v. Boswell CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 THE PEOPLE,                                                          D081117

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.
                                                                      (Super. Ct. No. SCN408911)
 TRAVIS LEE BOSWELL,

           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Sim von Kalinowski, Judge. Affirmed.
         Theresa Osterman Stevenson, by appointment of the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Collette
C. Cavalier and Maxine Hart, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
         A jury convicted Travis Lee Boswell of two counts of oral copulation
with a child 10 years of age or younger (counts 1 & 2, Pen. Code § 288.7,
subd. (b));1 eight counts of lewd or lascivious acts with a child under 14 years
of age by duress (counts 3−10, § 288, subd. (b)(l)); and one count of exhibiting
harmful matter to a child with sexual intent (count 11, § 288.2, subd. (a)).
The jury also found true special allegations as to counts 3 through 10 that
Boswell had substantial sexual conduct with the victim, his daughter, within
the meaning of § 1203.066, subd. (a)(8). The trial court sentenced Boswell to
a determinate term of 51 years plus an indeterminate term of 30 years to life
in prison.
      Boswell asserts there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s
findings that the victim was 10 years of age or younger for counts 1 and 2 and
that he committed the acts in counts 3 through 10 by use of duress. In
addition, he asserts the trial court erred by admitting evidence of additional
uncharged acts; improperly instructing the jury on expert testimony
concerning the way in which victims typically disclose sexual abuse; and
imposing consecutive sentences on counts 5 through 10 pursuant to section
667.6. We are not persuaded by any of these assertions and affirm the
judgment.
             FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      Boswell has three daughters. His oldest daughter has a different
mother than the younger two and was no longer living with Boswell at the
time of the charged incidents. We will refer to the younger two daughters as
Jane Doe (Jane) and her sister (Sister).   In late 2019, Jane, the youngest
daughter, disclosed to a friend from school that Boswell had been making her
do inappropriate things with him. The friend told her mother, and the
mother reported the allegations to the police and child welfare services.

1     All further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                       2
      The police contacted Jane’s mother (Mother), Boswell’s wife, and she
agreed to have Jane participate in a forensic interview that same day.
During the interview, Jane disclosed an incident the previous summer during
which Boswell had made her take her clothes off and put his penis in her
mouth. She also disclosed that Boswell had touched her vagina with his
hand on other occasions, including at least once when she was 10 years old
and in the 5th grade. She said that the abuse started when she was about 6
years old, in the first grade, and living in Georgia, but she could not recall the
details of the first time it happened.
      After the forensic interview, Mother agreed to follow the police officers
to the station to conduct a pretext call with Boswell. She confronted Boswell
with the allegations that Jane had made. Boswell began to whine and denied
the allegations, but did not do so adamantly. Later that evening, a social
worker went to the family home to discuss a safety plan. Boswell agreed to
leave the home, so that Jane and Sister could stay there with Mother.
      The police spoke with Sister after Boswell left. Sister initially denied
that Boswell had ever touched her inappropriately, but a couple of days later,
she called the police officer and disclosed that Boswell had also sexually
abused her, primarily when the family lived in Arizona when she was
younger.
      Around the same time, Mother conducted a second pretext call with
Boswell. She told Boswell that Sister had also made similar allegations and
asked him, “Why would they both say this?” After some further conversation,
Boswell admitted that he had sexually abused all three of his daughters. He
said that he had them do “[o]ral stuff” “both ways,” but that he never forced
them and was trying to teach them to “not be afraid of sex.” He also verified
an allegation by Sister that she vomited once when he put his penis too far

                                         3
into her mouth. He said that the abuse had occurred primarily in other

states with the other girls, and in California with Jane.2
      The police arrested Boswell the following week, and took him to the
station for questioning. Boswell initially denied the allegations, but
eventually admitted that he had tried to “teach” the girls to be comfortable
with their bodies and sex. He said that he touched Jane’s vagina, and that he
had her touch his penis, and that he had her perform oral sex on him on two
occasions, about one week apart in the summer of 2019, when she was 11
years old and living in California. He also admitted to similar conduct with
Sister, approximately once a month for about a year, when they were living
in Arizona, and with his oldest daughter before that.
      The district attorney charged Boswell with 2 counts of oral copulation
of a child 10 years old or younger, 8 counts of lewd and lascivious conduct
with a child under the age of 14, and one count of sending harmful matter to
a minor. The charges related solely to Boswell’s conduct with Jane in
California.
      Jane, Sister, and Mother each testified at trial. The prosecution
presented testimony from a police officer and social worker involved in the
investigation, and Christina Schultz—a forensic interviewer and program
manager for the Child Advocacy Center North San Diego County—who also
served as an expert on the way in which children generally disclose sexual
abuse. The prosecution also played recordings of the forensic interview of
Jane., the second pretext call between Boswell and Mother, and the police
interrogation of Boswell for the jury. The court also admitted into evidence

2    The family lived in Arizona and Georgia before moving to California in
December 2016. The record is consistent with Boswell’s suggestion that
much of the abuse that occurred in California involved Jane.

                                       4
screenshots of text messages that Jane exchanged with her friend disclosing
the abuse. Boswell did not testify and the defense did not present any other

witnesses on his behalf.3
      The jury convicted Boswell on all asserted charges and made true
findings as to each of the special allegations included in the complaint. The
trial court sentenced Boswell to two indeterminate terms of 15 years to life on
counts 1 and 2; stayed the sentence for counts 3 and 4; and sentenced him to
an additional determinate term of 51 years, comprised of 6 consecutive terms
of 8 years each for counts 5 through 10 plus a 3 year term for count 11.
      Boswell filed a timely notice of appeal.
                                DISCUSSION
        I.    Substantial Evidence Supports the Jury’s Verdict
      Boswell raises two independent arguments regarding the sufficiency of
the evidence to support the jury’s verdict: 1) that there was insufficient
evidence to support the jury’s finding that he committed two separate acts of
oral copulation on Jane while she was 10 years of age or younger, as alleged
in counts 1 and 2; and 2) that there was insufficient evidence that he
committed lewd and lascivious acts on Jane “by use of force, violence, duress,
menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury” to support the
convictions under section 288, subdivision (b) in counts 3 through 10.
A.    Standard of Review
      “It is the prosecution’s burden in a criminal case to prove every element
of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Cuevas (1995) 12 Cal.4th
252, 260.) “ ‘In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we do

3     Given the sensitive nature of the case, we discuss the testimony and
evidence in more detail, post, only as necessary to resolve Boswell’s
arguments on appeal.

                                       5
not determine the facts ourselves. Rather, we “examine the whole record in
the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses
substantial evidence—evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid
value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ ” (People v. Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1186,
1215 (Houston).) “ ‘We do not reweigh evidence or reevaluate a witness’s
credibility,’ ” and “ ‘presume in support of the judgment the existence of every
fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.’ ” (Ibid.) “ ‘ “[I]f the
circumstances reasonably justify the jury’s findings, the judgment may not be
reversed simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be
reconciled with a contrary finding.’ ” ’ (Ibid.)
      “The [substantial evidence] standard is deferential: ‘When a trial
court’s factual determination is attacked on the ground that there is no
substantial evidence to sustain it, the power of an appellate court begins and
ends with the determination as to whether, on the entire record, there is
substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the
determination.’ ” (People v. Superior Court (Jones) (1998) 18 Cal.4th 667,
681.) An appellant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence under the
foregoing standards “bears an enormous burden.” (People v. Sanchez (2003)
113 Cal.App.4th 325, 330.)
B.    Substantial Evidence of Separate Acts for Counts 1 and 2
      The district attorney charged Boswell with two separate violations of
section 288.7, subdivision (b), which makes it a felony for “[a]ny person 18
years of age or older [to] engage[ ] in oral copulation or sexual penetration . . .
with a child who is 10 years of age or younger.” The People relied solely on
oral copulation for both charges and, therefore, had to prove that Boswell
engaged in oral copulation with Jane at least twice before she turned 11
years old. As the trial court explained, this put the relevant timeframe as

                                         6
between December 2016, when the family moved to California, and February
2018, just over a year later.
      During closing argument, the prosecutor explained: “There’s two
charges per type of touching, first time and last time. Because if something
happened more than once, there has to be a first time and there has to be a
last time. So if you believe that something happened more than once, if you
believe [Jane], the defendant’s going to be guilty of the first time and the last
time.” And he explained further, with respect to counts 1 and 2 specifically,
that they “refer to the defendant having [Jane] perform oral sex on him from
the time they moved to California until the time she turned 11. If you believe
her testimony that he had her do this more than once, he’s guilty on both
counts.” The verdicts suggest that the jury did in fact believe Jane’s
testimony, as it found Boswell guilty on both counts. Substantial evidence
supports the verdicts, including the requisite finding that Boswell engaged in
oral copulation with Jane twice in California, before she turned 11.
      At trial, the prosecutor set the timeframe by showing Jane and Mother
two photographs; one of a daddy-daughter dance that occurred in February,
2017 when Jane was 10 years old, and another of Halloween, approximately 8
months later, before Jane turned 11. Mother explained that Jane was about
to turn 10 when they moved to California, and that Jane had not yet turned
11 by the time the second photo was taken, around Halloween of that same
year. Thus, the record is clear: Jane did not turn 11 until over a year after
the family moved to California.
      Jane testified that the abuse was happening in her home in California
around the time she went to the daddy-daughter dance depicted in the first
photo and around the time the Halloween photograph was taken. She
specifically stated that Boswell made her put her mouth on his penis around

                                        7
the time of the daddy-daughter dance and the Halloween photo, and that it
happened more than once or twice. On cross-examination, Jane conceded
that it was sometimes hard for her to pinpoint exactly where she was when
certain things happened. However, both Jane and Sister testified that the
abuse was continuous once it started and that there was never a long period
where it did not occur.
      On re-direct, the prosecutor asked Jane additional questions to clarify
the timeline:
         “Q: I just want to be clear without going through the
             specifics of each incident: From the time you moved to
             Oceanside around the time that daddy-daughter dance
             photo was taken, until the summer of 2019, did your
             dad, the defendant that you pointed out earlier, did he
             make you put your mouth on his penis more than once?

         “A: Yes.

         “Q: Did he make you do that more than once around the
             time frame of the daddy-daughter dance and the
             Halloween photo?

         “A: Yes.

         “Q: Did he make you do that more than once after the
             Halloween photo, as you got older?

         “A: Yes.”

      Jane’s testimony was evidence of “reasonable, credible and of solid
value,” and it was corroborated by other witnesses. (See Houston, supra,
54 Cal.4th at p. 1215.) Boswell asserts, to the contrary, Jane’s testimony was
vague and inconsistent. As defense counsel did at trial, he relies on her
initial disclosures, including the forensic interview, in which Jane said that
Boswell abused her in the summer of 2019. At trial, Jane explained that she
had not told the forensic interviewer everything because she was not ready to

                                       8
speak up yet and had been “thrown into the situation.” That testimony was
consistent with the explanation provided by Schultz—an expert in how
children disclose sexual abuse—that children often begin by “test[ing] the
waters,” perhaps by telling only “a little bit . . . to kind of see what the
response [is] going to be.” It is evident from the verdict that the jury credited
Jane’s testimony, as they were entitled to do. “ ‘We do not reweigh evidence
or reevaluate a witness’s credibility’ ” on appeal. (Houston, supra, at p. 1215.)
      The authority that Boswell relies on does not compel a different
conclusion. In People v. Mejia (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 86, the appellate court
noted that “there was no evidence as to when defendant abused her in
September, including whether the abuse occurred before and/or after her
birthday.” (Id. at p. 95, italics added.) Likewise, in People v. Valenti (2016)
243 Cal.App.4th 1140, the evidence was insufficient to establish that the
abuse was continual, meaning that it lasted at least three months, where “the
court’s careful questioning of [the victim] elicited unequivocal testimony that
the abuse did not last for more than one month.” (Id. at p. 1160, italics
added.) To the contrary here, there was evidence in the form of testimony
from Jane and Mother that Boswell made Jane put her mouth on his penis on
more than one occasion around the time of two photos, taken approximately 8
months apart, well before Jane turned 11. Boswell provides no authority
indicating that the prosecution was required to prove the exact date on which
each incident occurred.
      Based on the foregoing, we conclude there was substantial evidence to
support the convictions on counts 1 and 2.
C.    Substantial Evidence of Duress
      In counts 3 through 10, the district attorney charged Boswell with
violations of section 288, subdivision (b)(1). Section 288, subdivision (a)
makes it a felony for any person to “willfully and lewdly commit[ ] any lewd or

                                         9
lascivious act . . . upon or with the body, or any part or member thereof, of a
child who is under the age of 14 years, with the intent of arousing, appealing
to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of that person or the
child.” Section 288, subdivision (b)(1) increases the penalty for the felony if
the person “commits an act described in subdivision (a) by use of force,
violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on
the victim or another person.” The jury found Boswell guilty on all asserted
counts. On appeal, Boswell contends that the prosecutor relied solely on
duress—as opposed to force, violence, menace, or fear—to prove the
additional requirement of subdivision (b)(1); that the jury’s verdict was
therefore based solely on duress; and that there was insufficient evidence to
prove the asserted element of duress.

      Even if we assume that the jury’s finding was limited to duress,4 there
was sufficient evidence to support that finding. “ ‘ “[D]uress as used in the
context of section 288 [means] a direct or implied threat of force, violence,
danger, hardship or retribution sufficient to coerce a reasonable person of
ordinary susceptibilities to (1) perform an act which otherwise would not
have been performed or, (2) acquiesce in an act to which one otherwise would
not have submitted.” ’ ” (People v. Garcia (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1013, 1023
(Garcia), italics added.) The test is objective. (People v. Soto (2011) 51
Cal.4th 229, 246 (Soto).) The focus is on the perpetrator’s actions, not the

4      As Boswell points out, the verdict forms for all 8 counts stated that the
jury found Boswell guilty “of the crime of Lewd or Lascivious Act with a Child
Under 14 Years of Age by Duress.” (Italics added.) However, we note that
the trial court instructed the jury that for the prosecution to prove those
counts, they had to prove, among other things, that “the defendant used force,
violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury to
the child or someone else.”

                                        10
victim’s response, and the trier of fact should consider all relevant
circumstances, including the age of the victim and the victim’s relationship to
the abuser. (Id. at p. 246, fn. 9.)
      In Garcia, the court found there was sufficient evidence of duress
where the defendant told the victim, his daughter, that “ ‘he was going to do
something to my mom [or my family] if I didn’t let him do something to me.’ ”
(Garcia, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 1024.) In addition, the defendant used
direct force by grabbing or pushing different parts of the victim’s body. (Ibid.)
The evidence here was similar, and more than sufficient to establish that
Boswell used direct and implied threats to coerce Jane to perform or submit
to acts that she otherwise would not have. (See id. at p. 1023.) Moreover,
even if the jury did not explicitly consider whether the abuse was committed
by means of force, they could have nevertheless found that Boswell employed
direct or implied threats of force in concluding that he committed the abuse
by use of duress. (Id. at pp. 1023−1024.)
      In the text exchanges with her friend from school, Jane said that
Boswell “made it very clear not to tell anyone when I was little.” During the
forensic interview, she said, similarly, that Boswell told her not to tell
anyone, that he would be in big trouble and that he would be taken away if
she did. After disclosing the abuse, she said that she was nervous that her
dad was going to get in trouble and that it was going to “be really awkward at
home.” In addition, Jane disclosed one instance, when the abuse first
started, when Boswell told her that she could not go to a friend’s house until
she engaged in inappropriate acts with him. Although this incident occurred
before the charged counts, it is relevant in establishing the overall
circumstances and Boswell’s continued use of implied and direct threats.
(See, e.g., Soto, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 246.)

                                        11
      At trial, Jane testified that she told Boswell that she was
uncomfortable with what was happening, and sometimes either verbally
argued with him or pushed him away, but that did not stop him. In addition,
Jane testified that Boswell told her the abuse was “normal” and that more
parents should do those types of things with their children. She explained
that she was scared to tell anyone what was happening because Boswell told
her that he would go to jail and her mother would not be able to take care of
her on her own. Later, Jane explained that she did not tell because she was
trying to protect Boswell, “[b]ecause that’s what [she] was trained to do as –
growing up.” And when she asked Boswell to stop tickling her or touching
her face in public, she got in trouble for disrespecting him. Sister
corroborated this testimony, and stated that she “was often told that if I did
tell, my mother would get in trouble so she would have to go away.”
      Sister said that there were times when she left the room and Boswell
did not pursue her further, but she also said that she still felt pressured to
comply because if she did not, he would be “quite grumpy later that day.”
Contrary to Bowell’s assertions, this testimony is not sufficient to undermine
the substantial evidence of duress presented throughout the trial. (See
Houston, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 1215 [“the judgment may not be reversed
simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a
contrary finding”].) We do not reweigh the evidence on appeal. (Ibid.)
      In addition, there was also evidence that Boswell used force in at least
some instances. Jane testified that he would push her head down to make
her touch his penis with her mouth. In addition, Jane described one incident
where Boswell “grabbed [her] head” and continued to thrust his penis in her
mouth until she threw up. Again, even if the jury did not convict Boswell
based on the actual use of force, these instances could be considered as

                                       12
further evidence of implied or explicit threats of force. If the girls did not
comply on their own, Boswell would, at times, use force.
      Boswell relies on a 2002 case from our sister court, People v. Espinoza
(2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1287, to assert that the evidence that he was Jane’s
father, that he was much older and bigger than Jane, and that Jane was
scared to tell anyone was not sufficient to establish duress. Other cases have
declined to follow that reasoning and have instead acknowledged that duress
can involve psychological coercion, and that the familial relationship and
relative ages of the victim and perpetrator are relevant factors to consider in
proving duress. (See People v. Veale (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 40, 49 [victim’s
fear that something would happen to her mother was sufficient to establish
that father used duress]; People v. Cochran (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 8, 16,
fn. 6 (Cochran) [Although the parent/child relationship does not establish
duress as a matter of law, “as a factual matter, when the victim is [young]
and is molested by her father in the family home, in all but the rarest cases
duress will be present.”].)
      In Cochran, much like the present case, the abuse began when the
victim was in the fourth grade and the perpetrator, the victim’s father, told
her not to tell anyone because he would go to jail. (Cochran, supra, 103
Cal.App.4th at p. 12.) The court concluded that the child’s reluctant
participation in response to her father’s parental authority constituted
duress. (Id. at p. 15.) We find the reasoning in Cochran, and other similar
cases, compelling, and decline to follow Espinoza.
      Based on the foregoing, we conclude that there was substantial
evidence to support the jury’s verdicts on counts 3 through 10, including the
requisite finding on the element of duress.

                                        13
       II.   Sister’s Testimony Regarding Prior Uncharged Acts
               Was Admissible and Not Overly Prejudicial
      Boswell next contends that the trial court abused its discretion under
Evidence Code section 352 and violated his right to due process and a fair
trial by allowing Sister to testify regarding prior uncharged acts, and
specifically prior uncharged acts involving both her and Boswell’s oldest
daughter.
      The trial court allowed the prosecution to introduce evidence of other
uncharged sexual offenses perpetrated against Sister and Boswell’s oldest
daughter pursuant to Evidence Code section 1108, subdivision (a) which
provides: “In a criminal action in which the defendant is accused of a sexual
offense, evidence of the defendant’s commission of another sexual offense or
offenses is not made inadmissible by Section 1101, if the evidence is not
inadmissible pursuant to Section 352.”
      Boswell does not dispute that the evidence falls under Evidence Code
section 1108; he asserts only that the trial court abused its discretion in
determining it was not otherwise inadmissible as unduly prejudicial under
Evidence Code section 352. (See People v. Branch (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 274,
282 (Branch) [“We review a challenge to a trial court’s choice to admit or
exclude evidence under section 352 for abuse of discretion.”].)
      The trial court explained its reasoning under Evidence Code section
352 in detail, stating:
         “So turning to the 352 analysis, we look to how similar the
         conduct was. The greater the similarity, the greater the
         probative value. And here, the conduct is virtually, if not
         identical, and also included the daughters all being about
         the same age when it occurred, so it makes it highly
         probative.

         “Whether the prior conduct was unreported; in other words,
         not reported prior to the current allegations, and that is

                                       14
correct. It wasn’t reported until after [Jane] disclosed.
That normally reduces the admissibility as it increases the
uncertainty that it occurred or that it’s being disclosed for
some ulterior purpose. But here, the defendant admitted in
the recorded conversations that it did occur.

“Regarding the recency, the conduct with [Sister] was
within about four years of the conduct with [Jane], and [the
oldest daughter] – the conduct with [the oldest daughter]
was within about eight years of the conduct with [Jane].
That’s not too remote or stale, especially considering the
additional factor that it all occurred at around the same age
for each of the daughters.

“Another factor is whether defendant was punished for the
prior crimes, and no, these were previously unreported, and
they can’t be charged here as they occurred out of state.

“Another factor is the comparative offensiveness between
the prior conduct and the currently charged conduct. And
here it’s all the same as the current allegations. It’s not
more inflammatory, nor is the evidence stronger in
uncharged acts than the charged crimes.

“Another factor is whether or not the jury would be
confused by – confuse the issues. But it seems clear that
the jury should be able to differentiate the conduct that
involved – has involved each different child. It’s not going
to take an undue consumption of time. The People have
represented that it’s going to be through the testimony of
[Sister], and they’re not going to go into the detail they are
with [Jane], as well as testimony from [their mother] and
[the detective] as to the defendant’s admissions of conduct
to them, which were recorded.

“So under Evidence Code Section 352, prejudice means
evidence that tends to evoke an emotional bias against the
defendant with very little effect on the issues, not evidence
that is probative of defendant’s guilt. Also, prejudice under
352 is not prejudice or damage that naturally flows from
relevant, highly probative evidence; rather, it is prejudice

                              15
         in the sense of prejudging a person or cause on the basis of
         extraneous factors.

         “And here the evidence of the prior uncharged sexual
         offenses is highly probative of defendant’s guilt, and it’s not
         prejudging a person based on extraneous factors. So we
         would find it admissible under Section 1108 after the 352
         analysis.”

      We decipher no abuse of discretion from this detailed analysis of the
relevant factors under Evidence Code section 352. (See, e.g., People v. Loy
(2011) 52 Cal.4th 46, 61 [courts should consider such factors as the
remoteness of the evidence; the degree of certainty of its commission; the
likelihood of confusing, misleading, or distracting the jurors from their main
inquiry; the similarity of the uncharged acts to the charged offenses; the
likely prejudicial impact of the evidence on the jurors; the additional burden
of defending against the uncharged offense; and less prejudicial alternatives
such as exclusion of inflammatory details].)
      Boswell argues, without any supporting authority, that the evidence
was of minimal probative value because it was cumulative in nature, and
because Jane did not know about the prior acts. But as the trial court
explained, the fact that the pattern of abuse, and the specific physical acts,
were so similar is precisely what makes the evidence probative. (See People
v. Hernandez (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 953, 966 [“uncharged prior offenses that
are very similar in nature to the charged crime logically will have more
probative value in proving propensity to commit the charged offense”]; People
v. Johnson (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 520, 532 [“similar prior offenses are
‘uniquely probative’ of guilt in a later accusation”].) Moreover, that Jane
disclosed similar abuse, including to her friend and in the forensic interview,
without any knowledge of the prior abuse of Sister, and Boswell’s oldest
daughter, only serves to make the evidence that much more probative.

                                       16
      Boswell also contends the evidence was unduly prejudicial. As an
initial matter, where, as here, the prior uncharged acts that are “very
similar” to the charged acts, the evidence is less likely to be inflammatory in
nature. (Branch, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at pp. 283−284.) Here, the abuse
described by both girls was extremely similar. With the minor exception of
the instance in which Boswell made Sister vomit (which he admitted to on
more than one occasion), the instances Sister described were no more
inflammatory than those described by Jane. Bowell argues that the evidence
was nevertheless unduly prejudicial because of the risk that the jury would
be tempted to punish Boswell for the uncharged acts. As the trial court
noted, though, the charges stemmed solely from abuse involving Jane after
the family moved to California, and thus the jury would readily be able to
differentiate the conduct at issue from that which was directed towards
Sister and Boswell’s oldest daughter, years earlier, in other states.
      Finally, Boswell argues, once again, that Jane’s testimony was vague
as to the individual charged acts and, therefore, the jury was even more
likely to convict him based on Sister’s testimony regarding prior acts. We
reject this argument for the same reasons discussed ante. Moreover, as we
have also discussed, rather than encourage the jury to convict Boswell based
on the uncharged offenses, Sister’s testimony corroborated Jane’s testimony
that the charged offenses committed against her occurred on multiple
occasions. The trial court also gave the jury a limiting instruction, and
expressly stated that the evidence of uncharged acts was “not sufficient by
itself to prove the defendant is guilty of the offenses charged in this case.”
We presume the jury understood and followed the court’s instructions. (See
People v. Phillips (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 643, 692; People v. Martinez (2010)

                                       17
47 Cal.4th 911, 957 (Martinez).) Notably, the jury asked to review the
testimony of Jane during their deliberations, and not that of Sister.
      Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion by permitting testimony and evidence of prior uncharged acts of
abuse against his two older daughters.
          III.   The Trial Court Correctly Instructed the Jury
                    Regarding the Expert Testimony
      The People presented testimony from Christine Schultz regarding the

way in which children typically disclose sexual abuse.5 Evidence of this
nature is admissible “ ‘for the limited purpose of disabusing a jury of
misconceptions it might hold about how a child reacts to a molestation.’ ”
(People v. Wells (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 179, 188.) However, it “may not be
used to corroborate the victim’s claims of abuse.” (People v. Housley (1992)
6 Cal.App.4th 947, 957.)
      Boswell does not dispute the admissibility of Schultz’s testimony but
contends that the trial court erred in instructing the jury with CALCRIM No.

1193 both before her testimony and at the conclusion of evidence.6

5      As written, CALCRIM No. 1193 refers to Child Sexual Abuse
Accommodation Syndrome, commonly referred to CSAAS. Likewise, prior
courts have frequently referred to CSAAS when discussing this type of expert
testimony. As here, courts have begun omitting the phrase “accommodation
syndrome” and referring simply to child sexual abuse. Likewise, Schultz did
not use the words CSAAS or “accommodation syndrome” while testifying in
this case.

6     Boswell concedes that he did not object to the instruction at trial but
asserts the error is nevertheless cognizable on appeal and that his attorney
provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to object. In light of these
arguments, we exercise our discretion to address the merits of the alleged
instructional error. (See People v. Jimenez (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 862, 874.)

                                       18
      The trial court told the jury:
         “[You are] going to be hearing testimony from Ms. Schultz
         about child sexual abuse. Her testimony about child sexual
         abuse is not evidence that the defendant committed any of
         the crimes charged against him or any other conduct or
         crimes with which he was not charged but you’ve heard
         about in evidence.

         “You may consider this evidence only in deciding whether
         or not [Jane]’s conduct was not inconsistent with the
         conduct of someone who has been molested and in
         evaluating the believability of her testimony. So this
         testimony is for that limited purpose.”

      Boswell asserts that the instruction was confusing and argumentative,
and actually suggested that the jury could use Schultz’s testimony to
determine whether Jane’s claims were true. As Boswell recognizes, similar
arguments have been rejected by California courts. (See People v. Munch
(2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 464, 468 (Munch); People v. Gonzales (2017) 16
Cal.App.5th 494, 504; People v. Lapenias (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 162, 176.)
      In Munch, the appellant similarly asserted that “instructing jurors that
they may use [expert testimony regarding the reporting of child sex abuse] ‘in
evaluating the believability’ of the child’s testimony means they will
improperly use it to find the defendant is guilty.” (Munch, supra, 52
Cal.App.5th at p. 474.) The appellate court rejected the argument and
explained: “ ‘The purpose of [testimony regarding the ways in which children
generally disclose sexual abuse] is to understand a child’s reactions when
they have been abused. [¶] A reasonable juror would understand CALCRIM
No. 1193 to mean that the jury can use [the expert’s] testimony to conclude
that [the child’s] behavior does not mean she lied when she said she was
abused. The jury also would understand it cannot use [the expert’s]
testimony to conclude [the child] was, in fact, molested. The [ ] evidence

                                       19
simply neutralizes the victim’s apparently self-impeaching behavior. Thus,
under CALCRIM No. 1193, a juror who believes [the expert’s] testimony will
find both that [the child’s] apparently self-impeaching behavior does not
affect her believability one way or the other, and that the [ ] evidence does not
show she had been molested. There is no conflict in the instruction.’ ” (Ibid,
italics omitted.) We agree with that analysis, and likewise conclude the
language of CALCRIM No. 1193 does not misstate the law.
      Boswell asserts, to the contrary, that the use of the double negative
“not inconsistent” renders the instruction confusing. We disagree. We
consider the instruction in the context of the entire record, including
Schultz’s testimony, and presume the jury understood and followed the
instruction. (See People v. Foster (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1301, 1335 [“ ‘It is well
established that [a jury] instruction “may not be judged in artificial
isolation,” but must be considered in the context of the instructions as a
whole and the trial record.’ ”]; Martinez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 957.)
      Here, the trial court explicitly told the jury that Schultz’s testimony
was not evidence Boswell committed any crime. The court then explained
that the jury could consider the evidence to determine whether Jane was
believable, and, specifically, whether their conduct was “not inconsistent
with” someone who had been molested. Schultz then testified consistent with
the court’s instruction. She began by explaining the process of a forensic
interview, and then discussed the different ways in which a child may make
an initial disclosure of abuse. She did not discuss the details of the case or
mention Boswell, Jane, or Boswell’s other daughters. On this record, we
conclude that the limiting instruction the trial court gave was both
comprehensible and consistent with the law, and that Schultz’s testimony

                                       20
was consistent with that instruction. (See Munch, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at
p. 474.)
       Regardless, any error was harmless, even under the more stringent
federal Chapman standard. (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24
(Chapman) [holding that errors that violate a defendant’s federal
constitutional rights are harmless if the court concludes beyond a reasonable
doubt that the verdict would have been the same absent the error].) Boswell
admitted, both in a pretext call and during a postarrest interrogation, that he
committed lewd acts with all three of his daughters and, specifically, that he
had Jane perform oral sex on him at least twice while they were living in
California. The contested issues centered primarily around how frequently
the abuse occurred, and whether there were at least two instances of oral
copulation after the move to California and before Jane turned 11. As we
have already explained, the testimony of Jane, Sister, and Mother was more
than sufficient to support each of the asserted counts. Both children testified
that the abuse happened regularly, and Jane confirmed that it started for her
before the family moved to California, that it continued in California and
occurred around the time of the daddy-daughter dance and that Halloween,
and that there was never an extended break where Boswell was not abusing
her.
       Even setting the instruction aside, there was nothing in Schultz’s
testimony or the prosecutor’s arguments pertaining to that testimony that
would have led the jury to rely on the testimony in assessing guilt. Schultz
gave generic testimony about how forensic interviews are typically conducted,
and how children generally disclose abuse. As noted, she did not discuss
Jane or any other member of the family at all, nor did she provide any
hypotheticals or specific paralleling to the case at hand. The prosecutor then

                                       21
relied primarily on Jane’s testimony and the video of her forensic interview
during closing arguments. Before speaking about Schultz’s testimony, he
reminded the jury that the court had provided a limiting instruction as to the
use of that testimony, that Schultz did not look at any reports in the case,
and that her testimony could not be used as evidence of guilt. He then
discussed the testimony consistent with the law and the instruction, to assert
that Jane’s form of disclosure—delayed and initially incomplete—was both
typical and reasonable for a child in her situation.
      Based on the foregoing, we conclude any alleged error in the instruction
on sexual abuse testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
            IV.    The Trial Court Did Not Err in Sentencing
      Boswell’s final assertions is that the trial court erred by imposing full
consecutive terms on each of counts 5 through 10. Each of those counts
alleged independent acts of lewd and lascivious acts involving Jane. Counts 5
and 6 alleged a first and last instance of mouth to penis contact between
February 2018 and August 2019; Counts 7 and 8 alleged a first and last
instance of finger to vagina contact between December 2016 and August
2019; and counts 7 and 8 alleged a first and last instance of hand to penis

contact between December 2016 and August 2019.7
      Section 667.6 discusses sentencing for multiple instances of certain
sexually based offenses, including lewd or lascivious acts in violation of
section 288, subdivision (b). (§ 667.6, subd. (e)(5).) Section 667.6, subdivision
(c) provides that “a full, separate, and consecutive term may be imposed for
each violation of an offense specified in subdivision (e) if the crimes involve

7    The date range on counts 5 and 6 was shorter than the remaining
counts, due to the additional charges in counts 1 through 4, related to similar
conduct when Jane was 10 years of age or younger.

                                       22
the same victim on the same occasion,” and section 667.6, subdivision (d)(1)
provides further that a “[f]ull, separate, and consecutive term shall be
imposed for each violation of an offense specified in subdivision (e) if the
crimes involve separate victims or involve the same victim on separate
occasions.” (Italics added.)
      The trial court found that “Count 5 occurred on a separate day than
either Counts 1 or 2,” that it was not “one period of aberrant behavior,” and
that “the evidence showed that the defendant is a sexual serial abuser
of . . . all of his daughters.” The court then found that “Counts 5 and 6,
although committed against the same victim, were committed on different
days based on the evidence at trial” and therefore sentenced Boswell to a full
consecutive term on each of counts 5 and 6 pursuant to section 667.6,
subdivision (d).
      As to count 7, the court found that it involved a different type of abuse
and thus, even if it occurred on the same day as counts 5 and 6, “the
objectives were predominantly independent as each different sexual act was a
different and distinct sexual gratification of the defendant.” After reiterating
that Boswell was a serial abuser of his minor daughters, the court stated that
it could not affirmatively determine whether count 7 occurred on a different
day than counts 5 and 6, and therefore exercised its discretion to impose a
full consecutive term under section 667.6, subdivision (c). The court applied a
similar analysis to counts 8, 9, and 10, sentencing Boswell to a full
consecutive term for each under section 667.6, subdivision (c).
      Boswell asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support the trial
court’s findings as to each count. In reviewing that claim, we apply the same
deferential substantial evidence standard of review as we did in connection
with the convictions themselves. (See People v. Baker (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th

                                       23
463, 468−469.) We do so while keeping in mind that the burden of proof for
the trial court’s finding that at least counts 5 and 6 occurred on separate
occasions than counts 1 and 2, and each other, is by a preponderance of the
evidence. (People v. Groves (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1227, 1230-1232.) Again,
we have no trouble concluding there is substantial evidence to support the
trial court’s findings under section 667.6.
      Boswell admitted that there were two separate instances of oral
copulation around a week apart when Jane was approximately 11 years old.
That admission on its own is sufficient to support the trial court’s findings as
to counts 5 and 6. In addition, as we have explained, there was substantial
evidence to support the jury’s finding that there were also at least two
separate instances of oral copulation before Jane turned 11. Moreover, both
girls testified that once the abuse began, it continued without any extended
breaks. Thus, there was at least an inference from the evidence that
although there were instances when multiple types of abuse occurred on the
same date, there were also multiple, separate instances of each type of abuse.
      Regardless, exercising extreme caution, the trial court elected to
impose the remaining consecutive sentences, for counts 7, 8, 9, and 10, under
section 667.6, subdivision (c), which allows for consecutive terms even if the
offenses occurred on the same occasion. Boswell does not take issue with the
court’s underlying finding that “the objectives were predominantly
independent as each different sexual act was a different and distinct sexual
gratification of the defendant.” (See, e.g., People v. Latimer (1993) 5 Cal.4th
1203, 1211 [“A person who commits separate, factually distinct, crimes . . . is
more culpable than the person who commits only one crime].) Rather, he
argues that in order to exercise its discretion under that subdivision, the trial

                                       24
court had to affirmatively find that the offenses did in fact occur on the same
occasion. We are not persuaded.
      “ ‘Under settled canons of statutory construction, in construing a
statute we ascertain the Legislature’s intent in order to effectuate the law’s
purpose.’ ” (People v. Gonzalez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1118, 1125.) “ ‘The statute’s
plain meaning controls the court’s interpretation unless its words are
ambiguous.’ ” (Id. at p. 1126.) However, when interpreting the plain
meaning of a statute, “ ‘ “Literal construction should not prevail if it is
contrary to the legislative intent apparent in the statute . . . ; and if a statute
is amenable to two alternative interpretations, the one that leads to the more
reasonable result will be followed.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
      A plain reading of section 667.6, subdivisions (c) and (d)(1) demonstrate
that the Legislature intended to mandate consecutive sentences for offenses
involving the same victim on separate occasions, and to permit consecutive
sentences for offenses involving the same victim but not on a separate
occasion. If the mandatory provision of section 667.6, subdivision (d)(1) does
not apply, then the court necessarily retains discretion to impose a
consecutive sentence under subdivision (c). There is no logical reason to
presume the Legislature intended to create a loophole whereby a defendant
could avoid a consecutive sentence by simply claiming there was some
uncertainty as to whether the offenses occurred on the same or separate
occasions, despite the trial court exercising its discretion under the more
lenient provision.
      As a final matter, Boswell argued in his opening brief that the
mandatory imposition of full, consecutive sentences based on a judicial
finding that the acts occurred on separate occasions violates the Sixth
Amendment right to trial by jury. However, as Boswell subsequently

                                        25
concedes, our high court decided this issue while the present appeal was
pending and concluded that the Sixth Amendment right to have certain facts
found by a jury does not apply to a trial judge’s findings of facts necessary to
impose a consecutive term under section 667.6. (See People v. Catarino
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 748, 755−757.) We are bound by our high court’s decision.
      Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err by imposing
full consecutive terms on counts 5 through 10.
                                DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.

                                                                    KELETY, J.

WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

CASTILLO, J.

                                       26