Court Opinion

ID: 9653048
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:37:48.79205+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:56.116948
License: Public Domain

WINTERSHEIMER, Justice,
concurring.
I concur with the result reached by the majority in this case, but I wish to state my views separately.
I fervently hope that this case will put an end to the continuing debate in the legal profession regarding the question of juror disqualification as a result of extra-judicial information received by the juror during the course of the trial. It should be noted in passing that counsel for both appellants and appellees should be complimented on thoughtful and well reasoned arguments.
Two of the cases that seem to have created the most discord among counsel are Montgomery v. Commonwealth, Ky., 819 S.W.2d 713 (1991), an unsigned opinion of a fragmented court, and Thomas v. Commonwealth, Ky., 864 S.W.2d 252 (1993). In both of these criminal cases, I filed extended dissenting opinions. It is my hope that we can make it clear that Montgomery, supra, did not deliberately reduce the sound discretion of a trial judge in the jury selection process. I believe that case stood for the proposition that discretion should be based on the totality of the circumstances rather than a specific routine question. The broad discretion of a trial judge in considering the qualifications of a juror to serve was more clearly established in Mabe v. Commonwealth Ky., 884 S.W.2d 668 (1994).
As I noted in my dissent in Montgomery, the sound discretion of a trial judge as to whether a juror should be excluded for cause should not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous. Simmons v. Commonwealth Ky., 746 S.W.2d 393 (1988); See also Jones v. Commonwealth Ky.App., 737 S.W.2d 466 (1987).