Court Opinion

ID: 9914745
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-02 20:00:47.88479+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:14:23.173219
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-14095    Document: 37-1      Date Filed: 01/02/2024   Page: 1 of 22

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-14095
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        AVERY LANS,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Middle District of Florida
                   D.C. Docket No. 6:22-cr-00092-RBD-DCI-2
                            ____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-14095      Document: 37-1     Date Filed: 01/02/2024     Page: 2 of 22

        2                      Opinion of the Court                22-14095

        Before JORDAN, LUCK, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Avery Lans challenges his conviction and sentence for con-
        spiracy to distribute cocaine. Lans makes several arguments on ap-
        peal. First, he argues that there was insufficient evidence for his
        conviction because the government failed to prove Lans knew he
        was involved in a conspiracy to distribute cocaine, or alternatively,
        that the government only showed a buyer-seller relationship. Sec-
        ond, Lans argues that the district court should not have admitted
        evidence obtained from his cell phone or from a storage unit be-
        cause the evidence was irrelevant or, alternatively, more prejudi-
        cial than probative. Third, Lans argues that the district court
        plainly erred when it gave a deliberate ignorance instruction to the
        jury because the government’s theory of the case was that Lans had
        actual knowledge. Finally, Lans argues that his sentence was pro-
        cedurally unreasonable because the district court clearly erred in
        calculating his guideline range.
              For the following reasons, we affirm.
                                         I.
               A grand jury charged Lans, along with co-conspirator
        Wayne Stout, with one count of conspiracy to distribute and pos-
        sess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, in
        violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(b)(1)(A). Lans pled not guilty.
USCA11 Case: 22-14095       Document: 37-1      Date Filed: 01/02/2024      Page: 3 of 22

        22-14095                Opinion of the Court                          3

                Prior to trial, the district court ordered the parties to file
        jointly proposed jury instructions and to indicate if any proposed
        instruction was in dispute. The government filed a document ti-
        tled, “JOINTLY PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS,” which
        stated that “[a]lthough the United States is filing this document,
        both parties have reviewed its contents prior to its filing” and that
        “[a]ll instructions are jointly proposed, other than Government
        Proposed Instruction #6.” “Government Proposed Instruction
        #6” is not relevant to this appeal. The government’s document
        also contained “Jointly Proposed Instruction 12,” which was an in-
        struction on when a defendant’s deliberate ignorance can establish
        that the defendant acted knowingly.
               The government also submitted an exhibit list before trial,
        which included several exhibits “to be received in evidence by
        agreement without objection.” These agreed-upon exhibits—ex-
        hibits 29 to 34—included a set of photos, and both the court and
        the government’s counsel referred to them as “joint exhibits.” At
        the start of trial, the district court received the agreed upon exhibits
        into evidence and were admitted without objection.
                Lans, however, opposed another exhibit—exhibit 46—
        which depicted text conversations allegedly between Lans and his
        son, Olicity McMillan-Lans. Lans argued that this evidence was ir-
        relevant, that its potential prejudice outweighed any relevance, and
        that it should be excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)
        because it was evidence of bad acts by someone other than the de-
        fendant. The government argued that this evidence was relevant
USCA11 Case: 22-14095      Document: 37-1      Date Filed: 01/02/2024      Page: 4 of 22

        4                      Opinion of the Court                  22-14095

        because it would show that (1) McMillan-Lans, who had also been
        charged with cocaine trafficking, connected Lans with Stout, (2)
        that Lans and McMillan-Lans talked about cocaine trafficking “con-
        stantly,” and that (3) McMillan-Lans sent Lans the address where
        he met Stout on the day of Lans’s arrest. The district court over-
        ruled Lans’s objection, explaining that because Lans entered a plea
        of not guilty, he put at issue whether he had the knowledge and
        intent to engage in a cocaine trafficking conspiracy and that the text
        messages were relevant to those issues.
                Turning to the government’s trial witnesses, the govern-
        ment first called Carolina Martinez, a federal Homeland Security
        Investigations (“HSI”) agent, who testified to the following. The
        government was surveilling Stout as part of a money laundering
        investigation. On June 1, 2022, Stout rented a bronze car and drove
        from Miami, Florida, to Orlando, Florida. When he arrived in the
        Orlando area, Stout went to a storage unit—which agents later dis-
        covered was rented in his name—where he retrieved a duffel bag.
        After leaving the storage unit, Stout went to an Orlando-area res-
        taurant. A silver car pulled into the restaurant’s parking lot and left
        after “a very brief amount of time.” Martinez followed the silver
        car, which she said was driving in an unusual pattern, i.e., in a way
        as if someone was trying to see if they were being followed and
        trying to evade any followers. Martinez identified Lans as the
        driver of the silver car.
               The government next called Jean Saint-Louis, a Miami-area
        police detective serving on a federal HSI task force, who testified
USCA11 Case: 22-14095      Document: 37-1      Date Filed: 01/02/2024     Page: 5 of 22

        22-14095               Opinion of the Court                         5

        to the following. Saint-Louis was part of the team surveilling Stout
        on June 1. He observed that, when the silver car pulled into the
        parking lot, Stout grabbed the duffel bag from his car and handed
        it to Lans, who took the bag and placed it in the passenger seat of
        the silver car. The entire interaction between Stout and Lans lasted
        about thirty seconds. During cross-examination, Saint-Louis testi-
        fied that no one on the team saw Lans open the duffel bag.
                Next, the government called Pedro Villa, another Miami-
        area detective with the task force, who testified to the following.
        Villa was part of the June 1 surveillance team and observed Stout
        as he traveled from the car rental place in Miami to the Orlando
        storage facility. Villa saw coolers in the storage unit and suspected
        there may be narcotics involved because, in his experience, narcot-
        ics importers who bring drugs into the country by boat sometimes
        use coolers to blend in with fishermen. While Villa followed Stout
        to the restaurant, he did not observe what happened in the parking
        lot. From there, Villa followed the silver car driven by Lans. At a
        red light, Lans appeared to spot Villa in the car’s mirrors and, after
        that, began to drive fast—up to 90 miles per hour. Villa then pur-
        sued, activating his car’s lights and siren. While driving, Lans
        dropped the duffel bag out the passenger-side window, and his car
        was stopped seconds later. During Villa’s testimony, the govern-
        ment presented photos showing the duffel bag on the side of the
        road, with one photo showing the bag was slightly unzipped when
        it was found. According to Villa, the bag contained 5 kilograms, or
        about $135,000 worth, of cocaine wrapped in distinctive packaging,
        and Villa stated that groups marked their cocaine to distinguish it
USCA11 Case: 22-14095        Document: 37-1         Date Filed: 01/02/2024        Page: 6 of 22

        6                         Opinion of the Court                      22-14095

        from other organizations. Villa said that the amount of drugs
        found in the bag was for distribution, not consumption.
               The government then called Robert Palombo, a HSI agent,
        who testified as follows. Palombo was part of the June 1 surveil-
        lance team and later searched the storage unit that Stout visited.
        The unit contained three coolers filled with 109 bricks of cocaine,
        which were wrapped in different packing that signified they likely
        belong to different organizations. One cooler contained bricks la-
        beled and embossed with the same symbol as the bricks found in
        the duffel bag. Exhibits 29 through 34 were photos of the storage
        unit’s contents.
               Finally, the government called Robert Picket, another task
        force detective, who testified to the following. Lans was carrying
        two cell phones when he was arrested, and from one of the phones,
        investigators recovered a text message conservation on the appli-
        cation, WhatsApp. One June 1, 2022, an unidentified sender mes-
        saged Lans’s phone with the address of the restaurant where Stout
        and Lans exchanged the duffel bag and immediately called Lans’s
        phone. After reviewing the text conversation, investigators con-
        cluded that the sender was McMillan-Lans because: (1) the sender
        referred to Lans as “pop’s”; (2) the sender sent Lans a link to a court
        document from McMillan-Lans’s criminal case 1; and (3) on

        1 Picket read from McMillan-Lans’s court document, which stated that he was

        charged with drug possession and importation involving around 453.78 kilo-
        grams of cocaine. The district court gave a limiting instruction for the injury
        to only consider this document as it related to the charges against Lans.
USCA11 Case: 22-14095      Document: 37-1     Date Filed: 01/02/2024     Page: 7 of 22

        22-14095               Opinion of the Court                        7

        McMillan-Lans’s birthday, Lans sent the sender a message wishing
        a happy “b day” and referring to the sender as “son.” This conver-
        sation also contained shared links to news stories and court docu-
        ments about cocaine trafficking and importation, which, to Picket,
        went beyond a news interest in the topic and gave the impression
        of “someone coaching somebody into how to do certain things and
        what to do if you were caught doing them.” Further, McMillan-
        Lans texted Lans the contact information for “Weezy 4,” who was
        identified as Stout. The associated phone number was the same
        number used to rent the storage unit. Lans and Stout called each
        other four times on March 30, and car rental agreements and toll
        road records indicated that the two both traveled around March 31,
        2022. In Picket’s experience, drug traffickers often use applications
        like WhatsApp, talk in code, limit what is communicated in writ-
        ing, and use a burner phone. And Lans was using a burner phone
        and attempted to hide his identity as the phone subscriber.
               The government then rested, and Lans moved for judgment
        of acquittal, arguing that the government had not proved Lans
        knew what was in the duffel bag and therefore did not prove he
        knowingly conspired to distribute cocaine. The district court de-
        nied the motion. Lans presented no evidence and renewed his mo-
        tion, which the court again denied.
               Before closing arguments, the court held a charge confer-
        ence and went through the revised jury instructions with both par-
        ties. The court had proposed rewordings for some instructions,
        including the deliberate ignorance instruction. Neither party
USCA11 Case: 22-14095      Document: 37-1      Date Filed: 01/02/2024     Page: 8 of 22

        8                      Opinion of the Court                 22-14095

        objected to those changes or the inclusion of the deliberate igno-
        rance instruction during the charge conference, and the jury re-
        ceived a deliberate ignorance instruction. The jury found Lans
        guilty. Lans moved for a new trial and renewed his motion for a
        judgment of acquittal. The court denied these motions.
               A probation officer prepared a presentence investigation re-
        port (“PSI”). The original PSI stated that Lans’s offense involved
        116.66 kilograms of cocaine and 32.65 grams of crack cocaine,
        based on the drugs that were found in the storage unit with the
        same packaging as the drugs in the duffel bag. Accordingly, his
        base offense level was 34, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(5) and
        (c)(3). The original PSI added two levels, pursuant to U.S.S.G.
        § 2D1.1(b)(12), because the offense involved the maintenance of a
        premises for drug trafficking—the storage unit. Lans objected to
        the drug amount, the base offense level, and the two-level increase
        for maintaining for drug trafficking, among other factual objec-
        tions.
                Then, a probation officer prepared an amended PSI that re-
        solved the objections, assigning him a base offense level of 30 based
        only on the 5 kilograms of cocaine found in the duffel bag and re-
        moving the two-level premises enhancement. Lans also received a
        two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice because he “reck-
        lessly created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to
        another person in the course of fleeing from a law enforcement of-
        ficer.”
USCA11 Case: 22-14095      Document: 37-1      Date Filed: 01/02/2024     Page: 9 of 22

        22-14095               Opinion of the Court                         9

               The amended PSI included the following criminal history.
        In 1989, Lans was charged with second-degree murder. The of-
        fense involved Lans firing multiple shots at two individuals, and a
        week later, when officers were arresting Lans, he was involved in
        a shootout with police officers. He was sentenced to 40 years’ im-
        prisonment, released on parole in 2009, and then pardoned in 2014.
        In 2013, Lans was charged with armed assault after he pointed a
        handgun at someone, threatened him, and struck him in both eyes
        with a cell phone, but he was acquitted. The amended PSI also
        noted that, in 2016, Lans was diagnosed with stage four prostate
        cancer, which went into remission following treatment but re-
        turned in 2020 and 2022.
                With a total offense level of 32 and a criminal history score
        of II, Lans’s guideline range was 135 to 168 months’ imprisonment.
        The government objected to the amended PSI, essentially asking
        the district court to reinstate the original PSI, with a base level of
        34 based on the higher drug amount and the two-level premises
        enhancement.
                At the sentencing hearing, federal agent Brian Di Perna tes-
        tified that of the about 100 cocaine bricks recovered from the stor-
        age unit, 21 were similarly wrapped to the bricks found in the duffel
        bag. The district court sustained the government’s objections in
        part and overruled them in part. The district court found that the
        government had proved by a preponderance of the evidence that
        Lans’s involvement in the conspiracy was sufficient to hold him re-
        sponsible for the 21 similarly marked bricks in the storage unit and
USCA11 Case: 22-14095     Document: 37-1      Date Filed: 01/02/2024    Page: 10 of 22

        10                     Opinion of the Court                22-14095

        the 5 kilograms in the duffel bag. Likewise, the court found that it
        was foreseeable to Lans that the drugs that he acquired on the date
        of the exchange were stored in a facility and to impose responsibil-
        ity on him for maintaining a premises for drug trafficking. The
        court found that Lans had a base offense level of 32 and a two-level
        enhancement for obstruction of justice, and that the two-level en-
        hancement for maintaining a drug trafficking premises applied to
        him. Those findings resulted in a guideline range of 210 to 262
        months’ incarceration.
               Once the guideline calculation was established, the govern-
        ment asked for a sentence at the top of the guideline range based
        on Lans’s role in the conspiracy and his criminal history. Lans
        asked for a sentence below the guideline range based on his health
        and argued that his criminal history should not weigh in favor of a
        longer sentence because he was acquitted of one offense and par-
        doned for another.
               The district court sentenced Lans to 240 months’ imprison-
        ment. The district court reasoned that the sentence was appropri-
        ate because of the scope of Lans’s involvement in an extensive con-
        spiracy to import narcotics, as well as the need to impose a sen-
        tence that was just, that promoted respect for the law, and that pro-
        vided sufficient protection for the public. The district court also
        found that Lans’s criminal history category underrated the danger
        he posed to the public. But the district court found that Lans’s
        health was a mitigating factor that warranted a slightly lower sen-
        tence than he would otherwise receive. The district court then
USCA11 Case: 22-14095      Document: 37-1       Date Filed: 01/02/2024     Page: 11 of 22

        22-14095                Opinion of the Court                         11

        stated it “would have upwardly varied to impose a 240-month sen-
        tence on Mr. Lans irrespective of [its] ruling on the [g]overnment’s
        objection[s]” because of his criminal history. And the district court
        stated that it had “taken into account all of the factors identified in”
        18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
               This appeal ensued.
                                          II.
               Lans first argues that the government failed to prove every
        element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, insisting that
        there was insufficient evidence for his conviction because the gov-
        ernment failed to prove Lans knew he was involved in a conspiracy
        to distribute cocaine, or alternatively, that the government only
        showed a buyer-seller relationship.
                We review the sufficiency of the evidence to support a con-
        viction de novo, “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
        to the government and drawing all reasonable inferences and cred-
        ibility choices in favor of the jury’s verdict.” United States v. Rodri-
        guez, 218 F.3d 1243, 1244 (11th Cir. 2000). “The district court’s de-
        nial of motions for judgment of acquittal will be upheld if a reason-
        able trier of fact could conclude that the evidence establishes the
        defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.
               “It is not necessary that the evidence exclude every reasona-
        ble hypothesis of innocence or be wholly inconsistent with every
        conclusion except that of guilt, provided that a reasonable trier of
        fact could find that the evidence established guilt beyond a reason-
        able doubt.” United States v. Ellisor, 522 F.3d 1255, 1271 (11th Cir.
USCA11 Case: 22-14095     Document: 37-1     Date Filed: 01/02/2024    Page: 12 of 22

        12                    Opinion of the Court                22-14095

        2008) (quoting United States v. Calderon, 127 F.3d 1314, 1324 (11th
        Cir. 1997)). “In other words, the question is whether reasonable
        minds could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, not
        whether reasonable minds must have found guilt beyond a reason-
        able doubt.” Id. (emphasis in original).
               “The prerequisites to a finding of guilt on a drug conspiracy
        count are proof that two or more persons agreed to commit a drug-
        related offense, that the defendant knew of this conspiracy, and
        that he agreed to become a member.” United States v. Carrascal-
        Olivera, 755 F.2d 1446, 1450 (11th Cir. 1985). “The existence of
        these elements may be established through circumstantial evi-
        dence.” Id. But proof that the defendant “knew he was involved
        in something criminal,” absent more, is insufficient to prove that
        the defendant knew he was part of a conspiracy to distribute a con-
        trolled substance. See United States v. Louis, 861 F.3d 1330, 1334
        (11th Cir. 2017).
               “[A] simple buyer-seller controlled substance transaction
        does not, by itself, form a conspiracy.” United States v. Achey, 943
        F.3d 909, 917 (11th Cir. 2019). But “a conspiracy can be found if
        the evidence allows an inference that the buyer and seller knew the
        drugs were for distribution,” rather than for the buyer’s personal
        drug habit. Id. A reasonable jury can infer a conspiracy to distrib-
        ute from the amount of drugs involved in a transaction. Id.
               We conclude that the district court did not err in denying
        Lans’s motions for judgment of acquittal because a reasonable ju-
        ror could find that the government proved Lans’s knowledge of his
USCA11 Case: 22-14095     Document: 37-1      Date Filed: 01/02/2024    Page: 13 of 22

        22-14095               Opinion of the Court                       13

        involvement in a cocaine distribution conspiracy beyond a reason-
        able doubt based on the circumstantial evidence it presented.
        Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the govern-
        ment and drawing all reasonable inferences and credibility deter-
        minations in its favor, the evidence shows Lans knew that he was
        part of a cocaine trafficking conspiracy. For example, Lans used an
        encrypted messaging platform, communicated through vague
        messages and phone calls, and attempted to evade police and dis-
        pose of the duffel bag in the silver car after he left the restaurant
        parking lot before he was arrested. The government also presented
        evidence showing that Lans knew he was distributing cocaine and
        not just involved in “something criminal,” e.g., his text messages
        to his son that were often about cocaine trafficking. The govern-
        ment also showed that Lans knew what was in the duffel bag by
        presenting evidence that the bag was partially unzipped and that
        Lans and Stout had previously met. And the amount of cocaine
        found in the duffel bag—$135,000 worth—suggests that it was un-
        likely to be entrusted to an unwitting courier or to be for personal
        consumption. While Lans argues that there was no evidence he
        opened the duffel bag and that the bag could have equally contain
        laundered money, again, “[i]t is not necessary that the evidence ex-
        clude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence” so long as a rea-
        sonable trier of fact could have, not must have, found guilt beyond
        a reasonable doubt. See Ellisor, 522 F.3d at 1271.
                Because the government presented sufficient evidence such
        that a jury could reasonably reach a guilty verdict, we affirm as to
        this issue.
USCA11 Case: 22-14095      Document: 37-1        Date Filed: 01/02/2024     Page: 14 of 22

        14                      Opinion of the Court                   22-14095

                                          III.
              Lans next argues that the evidence derived from his cell
        phone and from the storage unit should have been excluded as ir-
        relevant or, alternatively, as more prejudicial than probative.
               We normally review a district court’s evidentiary ruling for
        abuse of discretion. United States v. Elysee, 993 F.3d 1309, 1347 (11th
        Cir. 2021). “[T]he district court is uniquely situated to make nu-
        anced judgments on questions that require the careful balancing of
        fact-specific concepts like probativeness and prejudice, and we are
        loathe to disturb the sound exercise of its discretion in these areas.”
        United States v. Troya, 733 F.3d 1125, 1131 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting
        United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1285 (11th Cir. 2003)). But
        objections or arguments that are not raised at the district court are
        reviewed for plain error. See United States v. Evans, 478 F.3d 1332,
        1338 (11th Cir. 2007). To prove plain error, a defendant must show
        (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights.
        United States v. Monroe, 353 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2003). If all
        three conditions are met, an appellate court may exercise its discre-
        tion to recognize the error if it “seriously affects the fairness, integ-
        rity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (alteration
        adopted) (quoting United States v. Lejarde-Rada, 319 F.3d 1288, 1290
        (11th Cir. 2003)). An error is plain when it is clear or obvious. Id.
        at 1352.
             Any “evidence that makes the existence of any fact at issue
        more or less probable” is relevant. Huddleston v. United States, 485
USCA11 Case: 22-14095      Document: 37-1      Date Filed: 01/02/2024      Page: 15 of 22

        22-14095                Opinion of the Court                         15

        U.S. 681, 687 (1988). Relevant evidence is admissible unless there
        is a rule that provides for its exclusion. Fed. R. Evid. 402.
               A court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value
        is substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice. Fed. R.
        Evid. 403. “[I]n a criminal trial, relevant evidence is inherently prej-
        udicial; it is only when unfair prejudice substantially outweighs pro-
        bative value that the rule permits exclusion.” United States v. Edou-
        ard, 485 F.3d 1324, 1346 (11th Cir. 2007) (emphasis in original)
        (quoting United States v. King, 713 F.2d 627, 631 (11th Cir. 1983)).
        Unfair prejudice “speaks to the capacity of some concededly rele-
        vant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground
        different from proof specific to the offense charged.” Old Chief v.
        United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180 (1997). “In reviewing issues under
        Rule 403, we look at the evidence in a light most favorable to its
        admission, maximizing its probative value and minimizing its un-
        due prejudicial impact.” United States v. Brown, 441 F.3d 1330, 1362
        (11th Cir. 2006).
               Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or bad acts is not admis-
        sible to prove a person’s character to show that he acted in con-
        formity with that character. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). But such evi-
        dence may be admissible for another purpose, such as to prove in-
        tent, knowledge, or absence of mistake. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2).
        Part of the test to determine whether evidence is admissible under
        Rule 404(b) is whether the evidence satisfies Rule 403. United States
        v. Chavez, 204 F.3d 1305, 1317 (11th Cir. 2000). In other words, ev-
        idence of other crimes, wrongs, or bad acts is not admissible if the
USCA11 Case: 22-14095     Document: 37-1      Date Filed: 01/02/2024    Page: 16 of 22

        16                     Opinion of the Court                22-14095

        evidence’s probative value is substantially outweighed by its dan-
        ger of undue prejudice. Id.; Fed. R. Evid. 403.
               A limiting instruction to the jury can diminish any unfair
        prejudice caused by the admission of Rule 404(b) evidence. Edou-
        ard, 485 F.3d at 1346. A jury is presumed to follow limiting instruc-
        tions. United States v. Hill, 643 F.3d 807, 829 (11th Cir. 2011).
                We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discre-
        tion in admitting the cell phone evidence because it was relevant
        to Lans’s knowledge of the conspiracy, and the probative value was
        not substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice. The
        phone records included conversations between Lans and another
        charged cocaine trafficker and centered on investigations and crim-
        inal cases involving cocaine. The records were relevant because
        Lans’s knowledge was at issue, and the phone records made the
        fact that Lans knowingly participated in a conspiracy to distribute
        cocaine more likely. The evidence had significant probative value
        because, as discussed above, Lans’s messages made it more likely
        that he knew he was involved in cocaine trafficking, not merely
        “something criminal.” And while, like all relevant evidence, the
        phone evidence was prejudicial, Lans fails to articulate how the ev-
        idence was unfairly prejudicial. Lans asserts that the evidence
        paints Lans as a cocaine trafficker, but that was the very thing that
        the government was trying to prove. To the extent that there was
        a risk that a jury would unfairly conflate McMillan-Lans’s alleged
        crimes with Lans’s conduct, the risk was mitigated by the two lim-
        iting instructions given to the jury which the jury presumably
USCA11 Case: 22-14095         Document: 37-1         Date Filed: 01/02/2024          Page: 17 of 22

        22-14095                   Opinion of the Court                                 17

        followed. Because there was significant probative value and little
        risk of unfair prejudice, the district court was within its discretion
        when it found that the evidence was admissible.
               As to the storage unit evidence, Lans did not object to the
        evidence before the district court and fails to show that the district
        court plainly erred in admitting the evidence. The storage unit ev-
        idence had probative value because it showed the scope of the con-
        spiracy. And Lans had failed to show that the risk of unfair preju-
        dice from the evidence substantially outweighed the probative
        value to such a degree that it was “obvious.”
                Accordingly, we affirm as to this issue. 2
                                               IV.
               Lans further argues that the district court erred by instruct-
        ing the jury on deliberate ignorance because the evidence did not
        show that he purposely avoided learning what was in the duffel
        bag.

        2 In his reply brief, Lans argues for the first time that he was denied effective

        assistance of counsel because his counsel failed to object to the admission of
        the storage unit evidence. But “[a]n appellant in a criminal case may not raise
        an issue for the first time in a reply appellate brief,” United States v. Levy, 379
        F.3d 1241, 1242 (11th Cir. 2004), and we generally do not review a claim of
        ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal when the district court has
        not heard the claim, nor developed a factual record. See United States v. Khoury,
        901 F.2d 948, 969 (11th Cir.), modified by 910 F.2d 713 (11th Cir. 1990). We
        therefore decline to address this argument.
USCA11 Case: 22-14095     Document: 37-1      Date Filed: 01/02/2024     Page: 18 of 22

        18                     Opinion of the Court                 22-14095

               But we are precluded from reversing or invoking plain-error
        review when a party has invited the error. United States v. Silvestri,
        409 F.3d 1311, 1327 (11th Cir. 2005). “The doctrine of invited error
        is implicated when a party induces or invites the district court into
        making an error.” Id.
                Here, because Lans and the government jointly proposed
        jury instructions that included a deliberate ignorance instruction,
        the invited error doctrine bars Lans’s challenge. Indeed, the filing
        that proposed the instructions states, “[a]lthough the United States
        is filing this document, both parties have reviewed its contents
        prior to its filing. All instructions are jointly proposed, other than
        Government Proposed Instruction #6.” The deliberate ignorance
        instruction, however, was contained in Jointly Proposed Instruc-
        tion 12. And there is nothing in the record showing that the gov-
        ernment filed a false statement in this filing.
               We therefore decline to review the instructions because
        Lans invited any error. See id. at 1328.
                                         V.
               Lans also argues that the district court’s sentence was proce-
        durally unreasonable because it was based on clearly erroneous
        facts.
               We review de novo the district court’s legal interpretation of
        the sentencing guidelines and its application of the guidelines to the
        facts. United States v. Cubero, 754 F.3d 888, 892 (11th Cir. 2014). We
        review a district court’s findings of fact for a sentencing
USCA11 Case: 22-14095      Document: 37-1      Date Filed: 01/02/2024     Page: 19 of 22

        22-14095               Opinion of the Court                         19

        enhancement under a clear error standard. United States v. Ghertler,
        605 F.3d 1256, 1267 (11th Cir. 2010).
                In criminal cases, any errors that do “not affect substantial
        rights must be disregarded.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a). In sentencing
        cases, an error in calculating the advisory guideline range may be
        harmless if the district court would have imposed the same sen-
        tence with a different guidelines calculation. See United States v.
        Keene, 470 F.3d 1347, 1348–50 (11th Cir. 2006). If a district court
        states that its sentence would be the same with a different guideline
        calculation, we assume there was an error, calculate the guideline
        range without the error, and analyze whether the sentence would
        be substantively reasonable under that guideline range. See id. If
        the sentence would be reasonable, any error in the guideline calcu-
        lation was harmless, and we will not address the disputed calcula-
        tion. Id. at 1350.
               We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence un-
        der an abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
        38, 51 (2007). The party challenging a sentence bears the burden
        of establishing that it is unreasonable “in light of the entire record,
        the § 3553(a) factors, and the substantial deference afforded sen-
        tencing courts.” United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1256
        (11th Cir. 2015). Section 3553(a) mandates that the district court
        consider the nature and circumstances of the offense, the defend-
        ant’s history and characteristics, the purposes of sentencing, the
        kinds of sentences available, the guideline sentencing range, any
        pertinent policy statements, the need to avoid unwarranted
USCA11 Case: 22-14095     Document: 37-1      Date Filed: 01/02/2024     Page: 20 of 22

        20                     Opinion of the Court                 22-14095

        sentencing disparities between similarly situated defendants, and
        the need to provide restitution to any victims. § 3553(a).
                The district court does not have to give all the factors equal
        weight, and the determination of how much weight to assign to
        each factor is within its discretion. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1254.
        “[D]iscretion in weighing sentencing factors is particularly pro-
        nounced when it comes to weighing criminal history.” United
        States v. Riley, 995 F.3d 1272, 1279 (11th Cir. 2021). District courts
        “have broad leeway in deciding how much weight to give to prior
        crimes,” and we have repeatedly affirmed the substantive reasona-
        bleness of major-upward-variance sentences for defendants with
        significant criminal histories. Id. (quoting Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d
        at 1254). And “[a] sentence imposed well below the statutory max-
        imum penalty is another indicator of reasonableness.” United States
        v. Croteau, 819 F.3d 1293, 1310 (11th Cir. 2016).
               A defendant responsible for at least 5 kilograms but less than
        15 kilograms of cocaine has a base offense level of 30. U.S.S.G.
        § 2D1.1(c)(5). A defendant responsible for at least 15 kilograms but
        less than 50 kilograms of cocaine has a base offense level of 32. Id.
        § 2D1.1(c)(4). The sentencing guidelines prescribe a two-level en-
        hancement for a defendant who “maintained a premises for the
        purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance.”
        Id. § 2D1.1(b)(12). A defendant with a criminal history category of
        II and an offense level of 32 would have a guideline range of 135-
        168 months’ imprisonment. U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, Pt. A. A defendant
USCA11 Case: 22-14095      Document: 37-1      Date Filed: 01/02/2024     Page: 21 of 22

        22-14095               Opinion of the Court                         21

        with the same criminal history category and an offense level of 36
        would have a guideline range of 210-262 months. Id.
               We need not reach the question of whether the district court
        erred in calculating Lans’s guideline range because even assuming
        for the sake of argument there was error, it was harmless. Because
        the district court stated that its sentence would be the same under
        the guideline range that Lans contends is correct, we ask whether
        his 240-month sentence would be substantively reasonable under
        that range. Keane, 470 F.3d at 1348–50.
               With the lower drug quantity and without the enhancement
        for maintaining a premises for distributing drugs, Lans’s guideline
        range would be 135 to 168 months’ imprisonment. A 240-month
        sentence would be a 72-month upward variance from that guide-
        line range, but in light of Lans’s criminal history and the substantial
        deference given to sentencing courts, it would be substantively rea-
        sonable. Indeed, Lans’s criminal history included shooting at two
        individuals, killing one of them, and participating in a shootout
        with police officers. And Lans’s present offense also involved dan-
        gerously evading the police. The court reasonably concluded that
        the sentencing guidelines underrated Lans’s danger to the public
        and was within its discretion to place greater weight on criminal
        history than on the guideline range or other sentencing factors. See
        Riley, 995 F.3d at 1279. Finally, we note that the 240-month sen-
        tence is well below the statutory maximum penalty of life, further
        indicating reasonableness. See Croteau, 819 F.3d at 1310.
USCA11 Case: 22-14095       Document: 37-1      Date Filed: 01/02/2024   Page: 22 of 22

        22                      Opinion of the Court                22-14095

              Thus, any error in calculating Lans’s guideline range was
        harmless. Accordingly, we affirm as to this issue.
                                          VI.
                 For the reasons stated, we affirm Lans’s conviction and sen-
        tence.
                 AFFIRMED.