Court Opinion

ID: 9577242
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:33:20.416606+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:20:13.088888
License: Public Domain

Sxjtton, C. J., and Felton, J.,
dissenting. Assuming that the claimant’s husband was an employee at the time he died, he had not entered upon his labors. His death came about as a result of a purely personal obligation and undertaking, carrying his tools to his job. The fact that the misfortune occurred cn the premises of the employer is incidental and irrelevant to the issue. If the employee had obtained permission to go to work by telephone, and had died while carrying his tools to work before he reached the premises, the case would be the same. In this case the injury was not caused by a hazard of the employment or one present on the premises. The carrying of the tools was a personal obligation of the deceased, performed in preparation for work and in our opinion the case does not come within any exception to the rule that injuries occurring while persons are going to and from work are not compensable.
It is well settled that, in order for an accidental injury to be compensable under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, it must arise out of and in the course of the employment. An accident arises in the course of the employment within the meaning of the act, when it occurs during the period of the employment, at a place where the employee reasonably may be in the performance of his duty, and while he is performing that duty or engaged in doing something incidental thereto, and an accident arises out of the employment when it arises because of it, as when the employment is a contributing, proximate cause; and these two essentials must concur before the act applies. We think that the uncontradicted evidence in this case demands a finding that the injury for which compensation is sought did not arise out of and in the course of the deceased’s employment within the meaning of the Workmen’s Compensation Law. See Code, § 114-102; Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corporation v. Farr, 180 Ga. 266, 270 (178 S. E. 728); Georgia Casualty Co. v. Martin, 157 Ga. 909, 915 (122 S. E. 881); Independence Indemnity Co. v. Sprayberry, 171 Ga. 565 (156 S. E. 230); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Honea, 71 Ga. App. 569 (31 S. E. 2d, 421); Harper v. National Traffic Guard Co., 73 Ga. App. 385 (36 S. E. 2d, 482); *308Wilcox v. Shepherd Lumber Corporation, 80 Ga. App. 71 (55 S. E. 2d, 382). Also, see Maryland Casualty Co. v. Sanders, 182 Ga. 594 (186 S. E. 693). The facts applicable to this last case are stated in 49 Ga. App. 600 (176 S. E. 104.)
Decided March 9, 1950.
Adhered to on Rehearing March 30, 1950.
C. Baxter Jones, Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy, for plaintiffs in error.
T. Elton Drake, Fraser & Irwin, contra.