Court Opinion

ID: 9901036
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-20 22:11:54.699773+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:24.542458
License: Public Domain

2023 UT App 101

               THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

          STATE OF UTAH, IN THE INTEREST OF D.A.M.G.,
            A PERSON UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE.

                        STATE OF UTAH,
                          Appellee,
                              v.
                          D.A.M.G.,
                          Appellant.

                            Opinion
                       No. 20210625-CA
                     Filed August 31, 2023

      Third District Juvenile Court, Salt Lake Department
                The Honorable Steven K. Beck
                          No. 1189685

        Monica Maio, William R. Russell, Hannah Welch,
         and Hilary S. Forbush, Attorneys for Appellant
                  Sean D. Reyes and Emily Sopp,
                      Attorneys for Appellee

  JUDGE DAVID N. MORTENSEN authored this Opinion, in which
     JUDGES RYAN M. HARRIS and AMY J. OLIVER concurred.

MORTENSEN, Judge:

¶1     D.A.M.G. (D.M.)—a minor—and a friend, J.T., decided to
skip their morning high school classes and go to J.T.’s house.
Courtney, 1 a classmate, joined them. While in J.T.’s room, D.M.
         0F

and J.T. sexually assaulted Courtney, with D.M. unzipping
Courtney’s jacket and touching her breasts over and under her

1. A pseudonym.
                          In re D.A.M.G.

bra. 2 After Courtney begged D.M. to let her go, he stopped
    1F

touching her. But then J.T. told D.M. to hold Courtney down, and
D.M. did so while J.T. continued sexually assaulting Courtney.
D.M. also touched Courtney’s breasts again after he began
holding Courtney down at J.T.’s direction.

¶2     After a trial, the juvenile court found that D.M. had
committed aggravated sexual assault and aggravated kidnapping
and accordingly adjudicated D.M. delinquent. D.M. then moved
to amend the judgment and findings. D.M. argued that the
aggravated kidnapping charge merged with the aggravated
sexual assault charge because the charged conduct did not
involve separate acts. The court found that D.M. committed
separate acts amounting to both aggravated sexual assault and
aggravated kidnapping. Accordingly, the court denied D.M.’s
motion. D.M. now appeals. We agree with the juvenile court that
D.M.’s actions constitute separate acts that satisfy the elements of
each charge. Therefore, we affirm.

                         BACKGROUND 3      2F

¶3     One day, Courtney met up with two supposed friends,
D.M. and J.T., and decided to join them in skipping their morning
classes and going to J.T.’s house. As the group walked from the
school to J.T.’s house, J.T. told Courtney that “they were going to
run a train on” her. 4 She didn’t understand and asked what that
                    3F

2. Courtney’s jacket doubled as her shirt.

3. “In an appeal from a bench trial in juvenile court, we view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s ruling,
and we recite the facts here with that standard in mind.” In re
J.R.H., 2020 UT App 155, n.1, 478 P.3d 56 (cleaned up).

4. This slang term “refers to when multiple men have sex with a
woman one after the other, with or without consent.” See Run
                                                  (continued…)

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                         In re D.A.M.G.

meant, and “they said that [she] would find out at the house.”
When they reached the house, they went upstairs to J.T.’s
bedroom, where J.T. slapped Courtney on the buttocks. Courtney
told J.T. not to do that again. The group then went outside, where
they smoked marijuana. After some time, they went back up to
J.T.’s room.

¶4     When back in J.T.’s room, J.T. began playing video games
while Courtney sat on the edge of the bed and D.M. sat on a couch.
J.T. complimented Courtney’s pants, and Courtney “awkwardly
said thank you.” The next thing Courtney knew, she was on the
other side of the bed with D.M. on the “upper half of [her] body”
and J.T. “on the other half of [her] body.” “D.M. was trying to
unzip [her] jacket so he could touch [her] breasts,” and J.T. “was
trying to unzip [her] pants so he could touch” her vagina. Despite
Courtney’s efforts to fight back, D.M. touched her breasts both
over and under her clothes. At trial, she gave the following
testimony in response to questioning by the prosecutor:

      Q: And at any point did he hold you down, or
      anything like that?

      A: When [J.T.] would tell him to.

      Q: And did you ever ask the boys to let you leave?

      A: D.M.

      Q: And did he let you leave?

      A: He would for a second.

      Q: When you say that he would, what would he do?

Train, Dictionary.com, https://www.dictionary.com/e/slang/run-
train/ [https://perma.cc/7FPV-NAXW].

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                          In re D.A.M.G.

       A: He would just stop and look at me.

       Q: And you said that you’d ask him to stop and he
       would, just for a minute. . . . [W]hen would he
       continue?

       A: When [J.T.] would ask him to.

       Q: And what would he do when he kept going?

       A: Continue what he was doing.

       Q: And was that touching your breasts and holding
       you down?

       A: Yes.

In later testimony, Courtney stated that D.M. had “started
helping” her off the bed after she “beg[ged] him to stop” but then
he held her down after J.T. told him to.

¶5      Courtney also testified that J.T. put a condom on and, as he
did so, said, “This is what run a train means.” D.M. then said he
too was going to put a condom on. But Courtney then saw an
opportunity to try to escape and attempted to run from the room.
In doing so, however, she tripped over J.T.’s weights, and J.T.
grabbed her. She went to the corner where D.M. was then sitting
on the couch, and J.T. grabbed his belt and started hitting her with
it, while D.M. looked on without attempting to intervene.

¶6      At that point, J.T. realized that his mother would be home
soon, and he and D.M. grabbed their belongings and started
walking back to school. Courtney zipped up her jacket and pants,
put on her shoes, and also started walking back to school, leaving
some distance between the boys and herself, though she could see
them acting “[a]s if it was a joke.” Once back at school, Courtney
told a friend what had happened and then went into the bathroom
and cried.

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                         In re D.A.M.G.

¶7    Within the next couple of days, Courtney had a
conversation with D.M. over Snapchat, and she took pictures of
the messages. These photos were admitted at trial, and Courtney
read portions aloud. Their conversation, in relevant part, read as
follows:

      D.M.: [Were] u sad we did dat shit

      Courtney: [I]t got me depressed ya.

      D.M.: Why though[?] We ain’t gonna do dat shit no
      more

      Courtney: [I]magine shit happened to you in your
      past . . . and then one day you trust 2 boys and your
      like in your head they playing they playing and I get
      hit with a belt[,] I get punched, I get held down
      [and] touched while I’m fighting y’all saying stop
      and begging you to stop

      D.M.: Damn fuck we fucked up forgive us for dat
      shit u my homegirl[.] And I didn’t punch u or hit
      u[.] I mean we still friends we just ain’t gonna say
      dat shit no more

      Courtney: [N]ot you but [J.T.] hit me

      D.M.: Damn ok but u forgive us we didn’t know dat
      shit happened too u

      Courtney: [I]t’s kinda hard[.] I know at the moment
      y’all weren’t thinking, but [I don’t know]. I told you
      guys and y’all didn’t stop

      D.M.: Well we stopped but we was playing wit u but
      we didn’t know dat happened and I was tryna be

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                          In re D.A.M.G.

       easy on u[.] But you should still kick it wit us[.] And
       be friends only

       Courtney: [T]hat isn’t playing when your begging
       them to stop and they don’t and keep holding you
       down and y’all laughing while doing it and not
       giving a shit bout how I feel[.] [H]ow would you feel
       if that happened to you

After investigation, the State charged D.M. with aggravated
sexual assault and aggravated kidnapping, and the case
proceeded to trial.

¶8     At trial, in addition to having Courtney testify, the State
called the detective who was assigned to the case. The court also
admitted into evidence a photo showing bruising on Courtney’s
hand where the belt had struck her.

¶9     After the State rested, D.M.’s defense moved to dismiss the
aggravated kidnapping charge, arguing that the State presented
no evidence that D.M. restrained Courtney beyond the level of
restraint necessary to commit a sexual assault. The court denied
the motion, “find[ing] that there is not one act under which two
different charges are being sought, but that there are separate acts,
which justify each charge.”

¶10 D.M. was the sole witness for the defense. He testified that
after the group went outside to smoke marijuana, they listened to
some music in J.T.’s room. Then D.M. went to the bathroom for a
while. He testified that when he came back, Courtney “was just in
a way acting weird.” He also said that as it got close to lunchtime
and the group needed to head back to school, J.T. was changing
his clothes and Courtney kept doing something that made J.T.
angry, so he hit her with the belt. He claimed that Courtney was
flirting with J.T., including repeatedly touching him and sitting
on his knee. D.M. asserted that he never kept Courtney in J.T.’s
room without her consent, sexually assaulted her, or held her
down. When asked why he apologized to her through the

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                           In re D.A.M.G.

messages, he said he felt bad about J.T. hitting her with the belt
and about a comment he had made after she had told them while
smoking marijuana that she had been raped before. He said, “I
was being messed up to her about it, and I feel like she holds a
grudge against me, and so that’s why I said, ‘My bad.’”

¶11 After hearing closing arguments, the juvenile court found
Courtney’s testimony to be “believable” and said that her
testimony was “supported by the other evidence in the case.” The
court found that D.M.’s testimony was not believable and was not
supported by the exchanged messages or the photo of Courtney’s
injuries. The court found beyond a reasonable doubt that D.M.
had committed both aggravated sexual assault and aggravated
kidnapping and adjudicated him delinquent on those grounds.

¶12 After trial, D.M. moved to amend the judgment and
findings. D.M. argued that the aggravated kidnapping charge
merged with the aggravated sexual assault charge because both
charges were based on the same acts. In its order denying the
motion, the juvenile court found that D.M. forcibly sexually
abused Courtney while J.T. aided and abetted him (the
aggravated sexual assault) and that D.M., in a separate act, held
Courtney down at the behest of J.T. to aid J.T. in his sexual assault
(the aggravated kidnapping) after D.M. had “a crisis of conscience
and realized what he was doing was wrong.” Specifically, the
court found that after J.T. instructed D.M. to hold Courtney down
to facilitate J.T.’s assault, D.M.’s “intent at that point had shifted
from gratifying his own sexual desire to assisting his co-defendant
in the co-defendant’s commission or attempted commission of a
felony.” D.M. now appeals.

            ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶13 D.M. asserts that “the juvenile court exceeded its discretion
when it denied D.M.’s [motion] and declined to merge aggravated
sexual assault and aggravated kidnapping.” “We review the trial
court’s underlying factual findings for clear error and its ultimate

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                          In re D.A.M.G.

grant or denial of a motion to amend or make additional findings
for abuse of discretion.” Eskelsen v. Theta Inv. Co., 2019 UT App 1,
¶ 22, 437 P.3d 1274. “In addition, the underlying merger issue asks
a question of law, which we also review for correctness.” State v.
Wilder, 2018 UT 17, ¶ 15, 420 P.3d 1064.

                            ANALYSIS

  I. Merger of Aggravated Kidnapping into Aggravated Sexual
                   Assault Under Utah Law

¶14 D.M. argues that “[w]hat the State repeatedly described is
the same acts based on the same facts—a mutually assisted
nonconsensual act with a detention that was both inherent to and
required in order to commit the act.” We first address D.M.’s
insinuation that some level of detention is inherent in sexual
assault and particularly in aggravated sexual assault. This
position has been rejected by our supreme court, 5 and it is not
                                                    4F

supported by the relevant statutes.

5. Our supreme court has recognized that there are situations in
which a perpetrator may sexually assault a victim without
physically restraining the victim or otherwise ensuring that the
victim is unable to leave. For example, in State v. Barela, 2015 UT
22, 349 P.3d 676, a woman testified that she “just froze” when a
massage therapist allegedly penetrated her vaginally without her
consent. Id. ¶¶ 6–7. The court said, “To determine whether a
victim has truly consented, the factfinder must pay close attention
to the verbal and nonverbal cues given by the victim and to a wide
range of other elements of context.” Id. ¶ 39. It expounded,
        [T]he question of consent is highly nuanced and
        context-dependent. Thus, the outward indicators of
        consent in one context may suggest nonconsent in
        another. A person who had previously been a victim
        of sexual assault might well respond to unwanted
                                                      (continued…)

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                           In re D.A.M.G.

¶15 In State v. Wilder, 2018 UT 17, 420 P.3d 1064, our supreme
court rejected “the Finlayson-Lee test,” “a common-law merger test
that ha[d] its most common application in cases involving sexual
assault and kidnapping.” Id. ¶ 21 (cleaned up) (discussing and
overruling State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, 994 P.2d 1243, and State
v. Lee, 2006 UT 5, 128 P.3d 1179). The court recounted how, in
Finlayson, it had opined that “absent a clear distinction between
sexual assault and kidnapping, . . . virtually every rape would
automatically be a kidnapping as well.” Id. (cleaned up). In line
with this, it had espoused “a test for determining when a
defendant’s kidnaping conviction is sustainable in addition to
[the defendant’s] sexual assault convictions,” which test required
that “the prosecutor . . . show that the kidnaping detention was
longer than the necessary detention involved in the commission
of the sexual assault.” Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, ¶ 19, overruled by
Wilder, 2018 UT 17. In Lee, the court determined “that aggravated
kidnaping is not a lesser included offense of aggravated assault”
but applied “the Finlayson factors” to decide whether the
defendant’s actions of detention were “slight, inconsequential
and merely incidental to” the sexual assault. 2006 UT 5, ¶¶ 33–34
(cleaned up), overruled by Wilder, 2018 UT 17.

       sexual contact in a post-traumatic-stress response of
       “freezing.” And it would be reasonable under those
       circumstances for a jury to infer that the victim’s
       freezing reaction was indicative of non-consent—
       and of the defendant’s knowledge of nonconsent if
       the defendant was aware of the victim’s past. But
       that does not suggest that “freezing” would always
       support such a determination, since . . . it might be
       possible for a defendant to establish that a victim’s
       nonparticipation indicated consent in context.
Id. ¶ 39 n.7; see also In re J.F.S., 803 P.2d 1254, 1257 n.4 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990) (highlighting “studies indicat[ing] that, while some
[victims] respond to sexual assault with active resistance, others
freeze”), cert. denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991).

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                          In re D.A.M.G.

¶16 But the court in Wilder noted a “glaring problem[] with the
reasoning of Finlayson and Lee”: “neither remotely addressed the
fact that the legislature has enacted a statute dictating the terms
and conditions of merger of criminal offenses in this context.”
2018 UT 17, ¶ 22 (cleaned up). The court continued, “We cannot
see how absent the existence of a constitutional ground we can
exercise common-law power in the face of a statute regulating the
enterprise of merger in this field.” Id. (cleaned up). The court
further declared that “there’s no constitutional basis for exercising
common-law power as the double jeopardy concern is
unfounded.” Id. ¶ 23.

¶17 Accordingly, the State is no longer required to prove that a
kidnapping “detention was longer than the necessary detention
involved in the commission of the sexual assault.” Finlayson, 2000
UT 10, ¶ 19. Instead, courts look to the applicable statute to
determine if merger applies. Wilder, 2018 UT 17, ¶ 22.

¶18 Utah’s merger statute codifies the merger doctrine, which
is designed “to protect criminal defendants from being twice
punished for committing a single act that may violate more than
one criminal statute.” State v. Bond, 2015 UT 88, ¶ 65, 361 P.3d 104
(cleaned up); see also Utah Code § 76-1-402(1). “The merger statute
contains two merger tests.” State v. Corona, 2018 UT App 154, ¶ 44,
436 P.3d 174 (cleaned up), cert. denied, 437 P.3d 1249 (Utah 2019).
Our court has previously explained the two merger tests as
follows: “Subsection (1) addresses whether the same criminal act
forms the basis for multiple criminal charges. This is known as the
same act provision. Subsection (3) addresses included offenses—
predominantly lesser-included offenses, and is known as the
lesser included offense provision.” State v. Lesky, 2021 UT App 67,
¶ 17, 494 P.3d 382 (cleaned up), cert. denied, 497 P.3d 830 (Utah
2021); see also Corona, 2018 UT App 154, ¶ 44; Utah Code
§ 76-1-402. Only the first test is at issue here.

¶19 Utah Code subsection 76-1-402(1) declares that “[a]
defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all
separate offenses arising out of a single criminal episode;

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                            In re D.A.M.G.

however, when the same act of a defendant under a single
criminal episode shall establish offenses which may be punished
in different ways under different provisions of this code, the act
shall be punishable under only one such provision.” This
indicates that our inquiry is not whether D.M. detained Courtney
beyond what the sexual assault required—again, we are not
convinced that a sexual assault requires any detention—but
whether D.M.’s actions constituted the same act or different acts. 6   5F

     II. Whether D.M.’s Actions Constituted “the Same Act”

¶20 We do not agree with D.M. that his actions composed a
single act such that the court’s findings as to aggravated sexual
assault and aggravated kidnapping should be merged.

¶21 “Acts are independent if they are in no way necessary to
each other or are sufficiently separated by time and place.” State
v. Lesky, 2021 UT App 67, ¶ 19, 494 P.3d 382 (cleaned up), cert.

6. We are also unconvinced by D.M.’s intimation that the act of
holding down a victim while committing a sexual assault is
necessarily “the same act,” see Utah Code § 76-1-402(1), as the
assault. These actions are both undeniably part of a “single
criminal episode.” See id.; see also id. § 76-1-401 (“‘[S]ingle criminal
episode’ means all conduct which is closely related in time and is
incident to an attempt or an accomplishment of a single criminal
objective.”). But the act of sexually assaulting and the act of
holding a victim down may well—depending on the
circumstances—be different acts “incident to an attempt or an
accomplishment of a single criminal objective”: that of sexually
assaulting the victim. See id. Indeed, the relevant statute defines
“[a]ct” as “a voluntary bodily movement,” see id. § 76-1-101.5(1),
and the voluntary bodily movements associated with holding
someone down and sexually assaulting that person may be
distinct. But we need not decide this question in this case because,
as we explain, we have no difficulty concluding that D.M.
performed different acts when he stopped assaulting Courtney
and then subsequently held her down at J.T.’s behest.

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                          In re D.A.M.G.

denied, 497 P.3d 830 (Utah 2021). In Lesky, the defendant
contended that both his aggravated assault conviction and his
aggravated kidnapping conviction “arose from the same criminal
transaction, namely, that [he] walked up to [his] ex-girlfriend and
[her] boyfriend, pointed a gun at them, ordered them inside the
house, held the gun to the ex-girlfriend’s head, threatened her,
and pulled the trigger.” Id. ¶ 21 (cleaned up). The defendant
argued “that the aggravated assault was necessary to the
aggravated kidnapping because [he] held the ex-girlfriend at
gunpoint while threatening her,” but the State responded that
“the aggravated kidnapping was based on [the defendant’s]
pointing the gun at the ex-girlfriend and ordering her into the
house[,] whereas the aggravated assault was based on his putting
the gun to her head and pulling the trigger.” Id. (cleaned up). This
court agreed with the State, concluding that the two offenses
“were in no way necessary to each other” because “the aggravated
kidnapping of the ex-girlfriend . . . was accomplished when [the
defendant] held the ex-girlfriend at gunpoint, thereby restricting
her movements” and “the aggravated assault . . . was
accomplished by putting the gun to the ex-girlfriend’s head and
pulling the trigger.” Id. ¶ 22 (cleaned up). The Lesky court
emphasized that the “separate act was not the means by which
the kidnapping was accomplished—each element of aggravated
kidnapping was satisfied when [the defendant] restricted the ex-
girlfriend’s movements by holding her at gunpoint.” Id.

¶22 We reach a similar conclusion here. The record is clear that
Courtney begged D.M. to stop, that he then stopped assaulting
and restraining her, and that, afterward, he held her down at J.T.’s
direction. Courtney testified to these facts, even stating that D.M.
“started helping” her off the bed before restraining her again at
J.T.’s behest. At the point that D.M. ceased his initial assault and
detention of Courtney, all the elements of aggravated sexual
assault had been satisfied. See Utah Code § 76-5-405(2)(a)(iii) (“An
actor commits aggravated sexual assault if . . . in the course of a
rape, object rape, forcible sodomy, or forcible sexual abuse, the
actor . . . is aided or abetted by one or more persons.”); id.
§ 76-5-404(2)(a)(i)(B) (“[A]n actor commits forcible sexual abuse if

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                            In re D.A.M.G.

. . . without the consent of the individual, the actor . . . touches the
breast of another individual who is female . . . .”).

¶23 Courtney testified that after D.M. stopped assaulting her,
he held her down again when J.T. told him to. If D.M. did so in
order to assist J.T. so that J.T. could sexually assault Courtney,
then doing so was a distinct act providing the grounds for D.M.’s
aggravated kidnapping charge. See id. § 76-5-302(2) (“An actor
commits aggravated kidnapping if the actor, in the course of
committing unlawful detention or kidnapping[,] . . . acts with the
intent to . . . commit a sexual offense . . . .”); State v. Briggs, 2008
UT 75, ¶ 13, 197 P.3d 628 (“To show that a defendant is guilty
under accomplice liability, the State must show that an individual
acted with both the intent that the underlying offense be
committed and the intent to aid the principal actor in the
offense.”).

¶24 The court stated that it “ha[d] no doubt that after forcibly
sexually abusing [Courtney] while being aided or abetted by his
co-defendant, [D.M.] had a crisis of conscience and realized what
he was doing was wrong.” It found that his “intent at that point
had shifted from gratifying his sexual desire to assisting his
co-defendant in the co-defendant’s commission or attempted
commission of the felony.” D.M. argues that this finding as to a
shift in his intent was against the clear weight of the evidence. We
disagree. The record bears out the conclusion that D.M. again
placed his hands on Courtney—after removing them—for the
purpose of assisting J.T. As the court stated, D.M. “evidenced his
shift in intent when, after [Courtney] begged him to, he stopped,
looked at [her], and let her go for a second.” Courtney’s
testimony, which the court found to be “believable,” was that
D.M. then resumed his previous actions only when J.T. told him
to do so. She indicated that he “let [her] go, but then it was [J.T.]
who was directing.” We agree with the court that this testimony
is sufficient to support the juvenile court’s finding that when D.M.
resumed touching Courtney, he did so with the intent to aid J.T.
in J.T.’s sexual assault.

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                          In re D.A.M.G.

¶25 Moreover, we agree with the court that other evidence
corroborated this shift in intent, namely D.M.’s subsequent
Snapchat messages to Courtney. The court noted that “[w]hile
[D.M.] repeatedly referred to his and his co-defendant’s actions
by saying ‘we’ throughout the text thread, he only referred to
himself when he said, ‘I was tryna be easy on u.’” This message
contains D.M.’s own admission of what he was trying to do and
indicates that he acted intentionally to go “easy” on Courtney.
D.M. asserts that the message “is ambiguous at best and could
mean any one of many things.” He argues that this statement
could refer to him not participating in punching Courtney or
hitting her with the belt when she tried to flee. Or, he contends, it
could refer “to the fact that after [Courtney] broke free, [D.M.]
abandoned the sexual assault entirely, even though J.T. continued
his assault on [her].”

¶26 But while D.M. said earlier in the exchange “I didn’t punch
u or hit u,” that does not appear to be what he was discussing
here, nor does it appear that he is referencing the point where he
ceased assaulting Courtney after she tried to flee. In the message
previous to this one, Courtney said, “I know at the moment y’all
weren’t thinking, but . . . I told you guys and y’all didn’t stop.”
D.M. responded, “Well we stopped but we was playing wit u but
we didn’t know dat happened and I was tryna be easy on u.” His
statement refers to a point where “we”—both he and J.T.—
stopped. Because no party asserts that J.T. stopped his assault
earlier, this can only mean the end of the attack when the boys
realized J.T.’s mother would be returning and grabbed their
belongings to return to school. And D.M.’s statement that “we
was playing wit u”—again plural—must refer to a shared
understanding with J.T. throughout the attack that Courtney was
to be assaulted in some sort of twisted version of “playing.”
Within this context, D.M.’s choice of the singular in his statement
“I was tryna be easy on u” means that he—and not J.T.—was
trying to go “easy” on her before the point that the attack finally
ended and even before she tried to flee and J.T. hit her. Therefore,
the only possible readings are that D.M. was trying to go “easy”
on Courtney the whole time or that at some point during the

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                          In re D.A.M.G.

attack he decided to do so. Because D.M. does not assert the
former and because the latter is corroborated by Courtney’s
testimony, we find the court’s reading to be the most natural and
persuasive of the various interpretations presented.

¶27 We have no reason to believe that D.M.’s desire for sexual
gratification gave him any reason to go “easy” on Courtney.
Instead, this comment substantiates the court’s finding that D.M.
experienced “a crisis of conscience.” This record evidence
supports the court’s finding as to a shift in D.M.’s intent.
Accordingly, the court did not commit clear error in making this
factual finding. And whether D.M.’s intent ever shifted again to
fulfilling his own sexual gratification is immaterial to our inquiry
because, at the point that it shifted to aiding J.T. and that D.M.
held Courtney down for this purpose, D.M. committed
aggravated kidnapping.

¶28 This act constituting aggravated kidnapping was separate
from the act constituting D.M.’s own sexual assault of Courtney.
See Lesky, 2021 UT App 67, ¶ 19. Like in Lesky, the two charges
were accomplished at different points in the criminal episode. See
id. ¶ 22. We therefore conclude that the sexual assault “was not
the means by which the kidnapping was accomplished,” rather,
“each element of aggravated kidnapping was satisfied when”
D.M. held Courtney down at J.T.’s direction for J.T. to assault her
after the above-described shift in intent, and each element of
aggravated sexual assault was satisfied before that shift when
D.M. sexually assaulted Courtney with the assistance of J.T. See id.
And while the Lesky court also determined that “time and
circumstances separate[d] the two acts” there, see id. ¶ 23, and we
do not delve into the question of whether that is true here, acts
need only satisfy one of these conditions to be classified as
independent, see id. ¶ 19 (“Acts are independent if they are in no
way necessary to each other or are sufficiently separated by time
and place.” (cleaned up) (emphasis added)). D.M.’s act of holding
Courtney down for J.T. to assault her was “in no way necessary
to” his act of assaulting her for his own sexual gratification before
his intent shifted. See id. (cleaned up). Accordingly, we have no

 20210625-CA                     15              2023 UT App 101
                         In re D.A.M.G.

difficulty concluding from the record evidence that D.M.
committed at least two distinct acts and that these separate acts
satisfied the separate charges. Therefore, the court was right not
to merge D.M.’s charges.

                         CONCLUSION

¶29 The court was correct in declining to merge D.M.’s
aggravated sexual assault and aggravated kidnapping charges
because D.M. committed separate acts satisfying the elements of
both charges. Consequently, the court acted within its discretion
when it denied D.M.’s motion. We affirm.

 20210625-CA                   16              2023 UT App 101