Court Opinion

ID: 9851040
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:06:19.633144+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:47.621499
License: Public Domain

Quillian, Judge.
A conspiracy is a combination of two or more persons to accomplish an unlawful end or to accomplish a lawful end by unlawful means. Groover v. Brandon, 200 Ga. 153, 164 (36 SE2d 84); Foster v. Sikes, 202 Ga. 122, 125 (42 SE2d 441). With this in mind, on motion for summary judgment, we determine whether the proof offered negates both of these proscribed courses of conduct.
In the consideration of the wilful and malicious procurement of a breach of an employment contract (see Code §§ 105-1401 *499and 105-1207), there are two categories of cases: (1) where there-is a definite term of employment and the corporation or employer by discharging an employee would be liable for the breach of the employment contract—as exemplified in Wrigley v. Nottingham, 111 Ga. App. 404, 407 (141 SE2d 859), reversed in part-in Nottingham v. Wrigley, 221 Ga. 386 (144 SE2d 749); (2) where, even though the contract is terminable at will, a party with no authority to discharge the employee, being activated by an unlawful scheme or purpose to injure and damage him, maliciously and unlawfully persuades the employer to breach the contract with the employee. Ott v. Gandy, 66 Ga. App. 684, 687 (19 SE2d 180). See Bromley v. Bromley, 106 Ga. App. 606, 613 (127 SE2d 836); and King v. Schaeffer, 115 Ga. App. 344 (1) (154 SE2d 819).
Contradistinguished from the above classifications, the following unique combination of facts is present in the instant case, to wit: an employment contract which was terminable at-will and alleged conspiratory tortious acts by the corporate employer’s directors, who in such capacity constituted the sole management of the corporation and without whom it could take no effective action. “The exercise of an absolute right or privilege is recognized as being closely akin to the question of justification, but it is inherently different therefrom in that such a right can be exercised without incurring liability regardless of of the motive for so doing. It is generally held that no liability for procuring a breach of contract exists where the breach is caused by the exercise of an absolute right—that is, an act-which a man has a definite legal right to do without any qualification. 30 AmJur 79, Interference, § 33.” Shaeffer v. King, 223 Ga. 468, 470 (155 SE2d 815). See Code § 66-101. Here there is no question that the directors, the alter egos. of the corporation, had an absolute right to discharge the plaintiff, an employee.
The Supreme Court pointed out in Lambert v. Ga. Power Co., 181 Ga. 624, 628 (183 SE 814): “ ‘The averment of a conspiracy in the declaration does not ordinarily change the nature of the action nor add to its legal force or effect. The gist of the action is not the conspiracy alleged, but the tort committed against *500the plaintiff and the damage thereby done wrongfully. Where damage results from an act which, if done by one alone, would not afford ground of action, the like act would not be rendered actionable because done by several in pursuance of a conspiracy.’ ” Since under this authority a conspiracy to effect what one has a legal right to accomplish is not actionable, there are no grounds to complain of defendants’ actions, as directors, in voting for the plaintiff’s discharge. Elliott v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 116 Ga. App. 36 (156 SE2d 656).
The only conceivable theory for finding a tortious interference would be that they unlawfully acted to influence the third director, C. R. May, to vote for the plaintiff’s discharge. The proof offered in this regard may be summarized as follows.
By affidavit May expressly denied that he was importuned, influenced or even approached with regard to the matter. He swore that his vote was predicated solely on his own independent judgment.
In an affidavit the plaintiff stated that: at one meeting of the bank directors the defendant Carroll instructed C. R. May to move to cut the plaintiff’s salary, which motion passed with the two defendants and May voting in favor thereof; May related to him that he undertook to make the motion only as a matter of formality. However, there was no statement contained therein as to May being instructed how to vote at the meeting when the plaintiff was discharged.
By deposition the plaintiff answered in response to the question whether at the meeting either of the defendants said anything to May about discharging him: “Not in my presence.”
Thus the proof adduced by the two defendants established that they did not unlawfully conspire to obtain May’s vote to discharge the plaintiff and no countershowing was made. In such circumstances, the allegations of the complaint were effectively pierced, the movant having affirmatively shown that the plaintiff could not recover for alleged tortious interference with his employment at the bank. That being so, the trial judge did not err in granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to Count 1 of the complaint.
Case 44685 is a cross appeal taken from the denial of *501defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Counts 2 and 3 of the plaintiff’s complaint. There was no certificate by the trial judge under the provisions of Code Ann. § 81A-156 (h) (Ga. L. 1966, pp. 609, 660; 1967, pp. 226, 238).
The defendants contend that Section 5 of the Appellate Practice Act of 1965, as amended (Code Ann. § 6-803; Ga. L. 1965, pp. 18, 21; 1966, 493, 496; 1968, pp. 1072, 1077), is controlling with respect to cross appeals. It contains a provision that: “the appellee may present for adjudication on the cross-appeal all errors or rulings adversely affecting him, and in no case shall the appellee be required to institute an independent appeal on his own right, although the appellee may at his option file an independent appeal.”
Thus, it is urged that a cross appeal may be brought on the denial of a motion for summary judgment, citing Algernon Blair, Inc. v. National Surety Corp., 222 Ga. 672 (151 SE2d 724). Further appellee requests that any language in Hood v. General Shoe Corp., 119 Ga. App. 649 (2) (168 SE2d 326), to the contrary be overruled.
The Hood case recited (Hn. 3): “Should we treat the appeal as a cross appeal we would be unable to pass upon the sole enumeration of error as the overruling of a motion for summary judgment may be reviewed only upon a direct appeal from that judgment. Section 25 of the Act of 1967 (Ga. L. 1967, pp. 226, 238; Code Ann. § 81A-156 (h) amending Section 56 (h) of the Civil Practice Act of 1966, pp. 609, 660; and Section 1, Paragraph 4 of the Act of 1968 (Ga. L. 1968, pp. 1072, 1073; Code Ann. § 6-701).”
The Algernon Blair case, 222 Ga. 672, supra, was decided prior to both the 1967 and 1968 Acts above cited. The 1968 Act amending Section 1 of the Appellate Practice Act, by adding subparagraph (4), provides: “Review of orders and judgments with respect to motions for summary judgment shall be governed by Section 56 (h), as amended, of the Georgia Civil Practice Act, approved March 18, 1966 (Ga. L. 1966, p. 609), as amended.” Ga. L. 1968, pp. 1072, 1073 (Code Ann. § 6-701 (4)). Following the reasoning adopted in Undercofler v. Grantham Transfer Co., 222 Ga. 654, 656 (151 SE2d 765), the 1968 Act, “as the last expression of the legislature,” controls.
*502Counsel for the cross appellants attach significance to the-fact that this provision was placed in Section 1 of the Appellate Practice Act (Code Ann. § 6-701) and argues that this shows an intent to limit such provisions to direct appeals only. However, in our view the legislative intent was simply to broadly exempt summary judgments from the provisions of Sections 1 and 5 of the Appellate Practice Act as amended (Code Ann. §§ 6-701 and 6-803) and to place their review in a special category. This is fortified by the language of the applicable section of the Civil Practice Act which • provides: “order denying summary judgment is not subject to review by direct appeal or otherwise, unless within 10 days of the order of denial the trial judge certifies that the order denying summary judgment as to any issue or as to any party should be subject to review, in which, such order shall be subject to review by direct appeal.” (Emphasis supplied.) Code Ann. § 81A-156 (h) (Ga. L. 1966, pp. 609, 660; 1967, pp. 226, 238). See discussion in Hill v. Willis, 224 Ga. 263, 266 (161 SE2d 281).
While in the writer’s opinion it would be more expedient for the court to determine all issues in the case, without a clear showing that the legislature intended to make a further exception with regard to review of summary judgments on cross appeal, we must hold, absent the proper certificate, that review of the denial of a summary judgment is not subject to review by direct appeal or otherwise, as by cross appeal.

Judgment affirmed in Case 44684.

Bell, C. J., Hall, P. J., Eberhardt, Pannell, Deen, and Whitman, JJ., concur. Jordan, P. J., and Evans, J., dissent.

Appeal dismissed in Case 44685.

Bell, C. J., Pannell, Deen, and Evans, JJ., concur. Jordan, P. J., Hall, P. J., Eberhardt and Whitman, JJ., dissent.