Court Opinion

ID: 9724555
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:01:52.10471+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:02.542205
License: Public Domain

SIMS, J.
I respectfully dissent from the decision reversing the order quashing the service of summons. In my opinion each party’s reference to the provisions of section 413.10 of the Code of Civil Procedure has led the court to apply what it deems, and what I might question to be (see fns. 2 and 3, infra), California law to a question of immunity which by comity, if not by full faith and credit, should be governed by Florida law.
Section 413.10 of the Code of Civil Procedure states in pertinent part: “Except as'otherwise provided by statute, a summons shall be served on a person: . . . [f] (b) Outside this state but within the United States, as provided in this chapter [§ § 413.10-417.40] or as prescribed by the law of the place where the person is served. . . .” Section 415.10 provides for service of a summons by personal delivery; section 415.40 reiterates that a summons may be served on a person outside this state in any manner provided in sections 415.10 to 415.50 inclusive, including section 415.40; and section 416.10 provides for service of summons on a corporation by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to certain designated officers. It may be assumed that the law of Florida has similar provisions, and that summons has been served “as provided in [sections 413.10 to 417.40 inclusive of the Code of Civil Procedure]” and as prescribed by the law of Florida. Section 410.50 then provides, “(a) Except as otherwise provided by statute, the court in which an action is pending has jurisdiction over a party from the time summons is served on him. . . .”
There is no question but that California, being the state of the forum where the action in which process was issued is pending, can control the manner in which process shall be served, provided such notice as is required by constitutional principles of due process of law is given. “A state may not exercise judicial jurisdiction over a person, although he is subject to its judicial jurisdiction, unless a reasonable method is employed to give him notice of the action and unless he i§ afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard.” (Rest.2d Conflicts (1971) § 25, p. 109.) Subject to the foregoing restriction, the following rule generally applies: “The local law of the forum determines the method of serving process and of giving notice of the proceeding to the defendant." (Id., § 126, p. 358.)
*765In this ease, however, the issue is whether or not a defendant who has been personally served with process and has notice of the proceedings is entitled to immunity from the effect of that service of process because of the needs of judicial administration. All concerned with this case have fallen into the trap engendered by frequent reference to “immunity from service of process.” If there were true immunity from service of process there would not be a case in the books on the subject. Everyone who has successfully asserted the “immunity,” “privilege” or “exemption” has been served with process, but has been relieved of the effect of that service. Having thus cleared the air about “service,” the claim of immunity, privilege or exemption can be reviewed in an isolated and more precise and illuminated setting.
I
Regardless of the scope of, and the exceptions to the rule under consideration, all agree that its purpose is to expedite the administration of justice. “A state will not exercise judicial jurisdiction when inaction on its part is required ... by the needs of judicial administration.” (Rest.2d Conflicts (1971) § 83, p. 249.) The comment states, “In order to encourage their appearance, it is customary for a state to grant immunity from service of process to non-residents whose presence it deems necessary for the proper conduct of a judicial proceeding. Such immunity is usually granted to witnesses and to lawyers and in some states to parties as well. . . (Id., p. 250. See also, 72 C.J.S., Process, §§ 80-81, pp. 1112-1121; 62 Am. Jur„2d, Process, §§ 136-156, pp. 919-940; 2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1970) Actions, §§ 581-588, pp. 1393-1400; and 40 Cal.Jur.2d, Process etc., § 32, pp. 57-62.) In the usual case the process is that of the same forum which is seeking to protect the integrity of the pending litigation. Here, however, two forums are involved. Reflection indicates that the administration of justice, in the sense of administering a collateral pending suit in which the petitioners are involved, in this case is not a concern of this state, but is a problem of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.1 The courts of this state should not arbitrarily apply *766their will so as to exercise jurisdiction over nonresident defendants served outside of this state when such service and exercise of jurisdiction will be deemed to interfere with the administration of justice at the place where the service was effected. I would therefore look to the law to be applied in the forum where the administration of justice is to be protected.
The rule to be followed by the federal courts was promulgated in 1916 in Stewart v. Ramsay (1916) 242 U.S. 128 [61 L.Ed. 192, 37 S.Ct. 44] where the court affirmed a judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois which was entered following the granting of a plea in abatement and the quashing of the service of summons upon a nonresident defendant who was personally served while he was within the district as the plaintiff and as witness in a suit against a third party in that very district court. The court stated the rule as follows: “The true rule, well founded in reason and sustained by the greater weight of authority, is, that suitors, as well as witnesses, coming from another State or jurisdiction, are exempt from the service of civil process while in attendance upon court, and during a reasonable time in coming and going.” (242 U.S. at p. 129 [61 L.Ed. at p. 197].) The court further observed, “The state courts, with few exceptions, have followed this rule, applying it to plaintiffs as well as defendants, and to witnesses attending voluntarily as well as those under subpoena.” (Id., p. 130 [61 L.Ed. at p. 198].)2 The *767court quoted from an early federal case [Parker v. Hotchkiss (E.D.Pa. 1849) 1 Wall.Jr. 269, Fed. Case No. 10,739] as follows: ‘“The privilege which is asserted here is the privilege of the court, rather than of the defendant. It is founded in the necessities of the judicial administration, which would be often embarrassed, and sometimes interrupted, if the suitor might be vexed with process while attending upon the court for the protection of his rights, or the witness while attending to testify. Witnesses would be chary of coming within our jurisdiction, and would be exposed to dangerous influences, if they might be punished with a law suit for displeasing parties by their testimony; and even parties in interest, whether on the record or not, might be deterred from the rightfully fearless assertion of a claim or the rightfully fearless assertion of a defense, if they were liable to be visited on the instant with writs from the defeated party.’ ” (Id., pp. 130-131 [61 L.Ed. at p. 198].) It finally noted, “Since this decision, the federal Circuit and District Courts have consistently sustained the privilege. [Citations.]” (Id.)
Thereafter, in Page Co. v. Macdonald (1922) 261 U.S. 446 [67 L.Ed. 737, 43 S.Ct. 416] the court affirmed a judgment entered after the District Court for the District of Massachusetts had sustained a plea in abatement filed by a nonresident Canadian defendant who was personally served within the district while she was in attendance before a special master appointed by the state superior court to hear the parties and their evidence in an action in which she was the plaintiff, and the federal court plaintiff was the defendant. In fact the federal court suit was for libel allegedly committed through the allegations of the complaint in the state court. It was contended that immunity cannot be claimed and sustained from the judicial process of a different sovereignty. The court overruled the contention and stated, “A federal court in a State is not foreign and antagonistic to a court of the State within the [immunity] principle and, therefore, as said in Stewart v. Ramsay, supra, ‘suitors, as well as witnesses, coming from another State or jurisdiction, are exempt from the service of civil process while in attendance upon court, and during a reasonable time in coming and going.’ And we can add nothing to what is said in support of the rule. ‘It is founded’ it is said, ‘in the necessities of the judicial administration,’ and the courts, federal and state, have equal interest in those necessities. They are both instruments of judicial administration within the same territory, available to suitors, fully available, neither they nor their witnesses *768subject to be embarrassed or vexed while attending, the one ‘for the protection of his rights’, the others ‘while attending to testify.’ ” (261 U.S. at pp. 447-448 [67 L.Ed. at p. 739].)3
So here it may be assumed that if petitioner Dassler as a witness, and petitioner Adidas, whose representative he was, as a plaintiff, were served, *769while in Florida prosecuting their trademark infringement suit, by summons issued in a nonrelated action filed in the same federal district court, the district court would have quashed the service of summons as in Stewart v. Ramsey.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has stated, citing the three United States Supreme Court decisions referred to above, that the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, . has broad discretion in determining whether to grant or withhold immunity to a nonresident from being served with process while a subpoenaed witness at [a] hearing” in that district. The opinion, in affirming the judgment of the trial court, fails to indicate how that discretion has been exercised. (Gill v. Miller (5th Cir. 1968) 393 F.2d 22.)
The fact that there may have been some compulsion for the individual petitioner to appear for his deposition did not destroy his immunity under the federal rule. In McDonnell V. American Leduc Petroleums, Ltd. (2d Cir. 1972) 456 F.2d 1170, an individual defendant from New Jersey who was served with process issued by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, was served while attending another action in the court under a subpoena duces tecum. The court upheld the lower court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to quash the service of process on the ground that the second action was related to the first. (See Lamb v. Schmitt (1932) 285 U.S. 222, 228 [76 L.Ed. 720, 724, 52 S.Ct. 317].) With respect to the contention that the immunity rule does not apply to a witness appearing under compulsion the court stated, “Although it is often said that the purpose of granting immunity is to encourage the voluntary attendance of nonresident witnesses, [the defendant] appears to be correct. . . . This extension of the federal immunity rule has been criticized [citations], but we think it inappropriate in the context of this litigation to undertake a re-examination of the question.” (456 F.2d at p. 1179. See also Shapiro & Son Curtain Corp. v. Glass (2d Cir. 1965) 348 F.2d 460, 462 [cert. den. (1965) 382 U.S. 942 (15 L.Ed.2d 351, 86 S.Ct. 397)].)
In Shapiro & Son Curtain Corp. v. Glass, supra, the defendant whose motion to quash service of process was granted was a citizen of Britain, residing and domiciled in London and the director of an English corporation, which was the plaintiff in an action in the same federal district against a defendant who was also the plaintiff in the second suit. He was served while present being examined before trial. The court, after finding that the principles of Lamb v. Schmitt, supra, were inapplicable, continued, “The fact that [the defendant’s] appearance was pursuant to court order does not affect the immunity. [Citation.] Further, although it is claimed *770that he dominates and controls [the corporation] (the plaintiff in the first action), [he] does not lose his immunity on that account. Contrary to appellant’s contention, immunity from service is not denied to plaintiffs. Page Co. v. MacDonald, supra.” (348 F.2d at p. 462.)
Page Co. v. Macdonald indicates that the pendency of the federal district court suit would similarly require that a Florida state court should quash the service of a summons issued in a subsequent nonrelated state action and served under similar circumstances. Florida decisions indicate that such would be the case.
In Rorick v. Chancey (1937) 130 Fla. 442 [178 So. 112] (subsequently vacated and reversed on other grounds in. Rorick v. Chancey (1938) 142 Fla. 290 [195 So. 418]) the plaintiff in the state action sought accounting and other relief from Rorick, a resident of the State of Ohio, and other defendants including an Ohio corporation, for which Rorick was concededly the agent. Rorick and one of the corporations, as have the petitioners in this case, had commenced an action in the United States District Court of the Southern District of Florida. At the time of service of process in the state action, Rorick was temporarily in Florida as a suitor and witness in the suit in the federal court. It was stated that his attendance was necessary for the purpose of the disposition of the cause and that he was brought to Florida for no other purpose. By special appearance the nonresident defendants sought to remove the second, state, action to the federal court. It was remanded to the state court and then the nonresident defendants sought to quash the service of summons. This motion was denied and they appealed. The Supreme Court of Florida recognized that the defendants were entitled to the immunity from service of process upon which petitioners rely in this case. The court stated, “It is contended here that H. C. Rorick was in Florida upon request of counsel in connection with pending litigation in the courts. It is admitted that he is a non resident. He was served with process by the Sheriff or other officer while in the office of his attorney while consulting on legal business and under these circumstances he was immune from the service of process. It appears to be established that witnesses and suitors in attendance in court outside of the territorial jurisdiction of their residence are immune from service of process while attending court and for a reasonable time before and after going to court and in returning to their homes. See 50 C.J. par. 227, page 548.” (130 Fla. at pp. 452-453 [178 So. at p. 116].)4
*771The rule quoted from Rorick v. Chancey, supra, has been generally followed by the Florida courts.5 Any criticism or limitation on the general rale which gives immunity from service of process should be addressed to the federal or state courts in Florida.6 In those cases which have noted that there was a choice of law, the protection of the administration of justice in the forum in which the litigant, witness, or attorney was first involved has been recognized as paramount. This question was presented *772in Marlowe v. Baird (6th Cir. 1962) 301 F.2d 169 where the court with jurisdiction over the first action, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, had an opportunity to protect its own administration of justice because the second Kentucky state action was removed to that federal court. The defendant, a resident of Louisiana, was served in the state' action while he was in Kentucky for the sole and only purpose of attending the trial of another action in the federal court in which he was the plaintiff, and the plaintiff in the action filed in the state court was the defendant. In upholding the action of the federal district court which had dismissed the second case for lack of jurisdiction because the defendant in that action was immune from the service of summons, the Court of Appeal stated in response to the contention that the service would have been valid under Kentucky law, “The rule of immunity from process is founded upon the necessity of judicial administration and operates to protect litigants and witnesses from being harassed, embarrassed or vexed while attending the trial of a case. [Citation.]
“We think that the District Court had a clear right to protect its suitors. This right does not stem from local law, but is inherent in the powers of the federal court. Immunity from process is certainly a procedural matter concerning which the federal court was free to follow decisions of the Supreme Court.” (301 F.2d at p. 170.)
In Lyf-Alum, Inc. v. C & M Aluminum Supply Corporation (1966) 29 Wis.2d 593 [139 N.W.2d 601], the state court affirmed a trial court’s order which had quashed service of summons upon a defendant, served individually and as an officer of a defendant corporation, because the service was effected while that individual was in the state giving his deposition pursuant to the rules of federal procedure as an officer of the corporation in an action brought by the corporation in the federal District Cburt for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. The court observed, “It makes no difference whether the original suit is in the federal court or the state court. The effect of denying immunity would be the same, either that nonresidents would not seek a forum in Wisconsin or the prosecution of the suit would be hindered or unduly penalized by the commencement of the second action." (29 Wis.2d at p. 600 [139 N.W.2d at p. 605].)
In Durst v. Tautges, Wilder & McDonald (7th Cir. 1930) 44 F.2d 507, the court applied the immunity rule to affirm the federal district court’s order which, after the removal of a state action to the federal court, had quashed the service of summons on a nonresident attorney in a suit initiated in the Wisconsin state court even though the state court had denied *773a similar motion. The facts revealed that the nonresident Minnesota attorney came into Wisconsin to take depositions in a pending Minnesota suit, and was then served in related Wisconsin actions,. and while there for both purposes was served in the instant nonrelated suit. The court’s reference to the Minnesota action indicates that it was concerned with protecting the administration of justice in that court, as well as in the intermediately instituted actions in the Wisconsin court. (See 44 F.2d at pp. 510-511. Cf. Hand v. Superior Court (1919) 42 Cal.App. 168, 170 [183 P. 456].)
H
Neither Dassler nor his corporation could be effectively served in Florida on the cause of action now asserted by appellants if the action had been commenced in a state or federal court within that state. Can the State of California subject the respondents to its jurisdiction on that cause of action by service of process in Florida?
In Murrey v. Murrey, supra, the court observed, “This exemption from service of process is, of course, in derogation of the right which every creditor has to collect his debt by subjecting his debtor to suit in any jurisdiction where he may find him. Since this is so, the privilege should not be extended beyond the reason of the rule upon which it is founded. [Citation.]” (216 Cal. at p. 710, italics added.) It is apparent that the whole concept of immunity relates back to earlier concepts of jurisdiction. In Internat. Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945) 326 U.S. 310 [90 L.Ed. 95, 66 S.Ct. 154, 161 A.L.R. 1057], Chief Justice Stone in creating new concepts for the exercise of jurisdiction over corporations, observed: “Historically the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam is grounded on their de facto power over the defendant’s person. Hence his presence within the territorial jurisdiction of a court was prerequisite to its rendition of a judgment personally binding him. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733. But now that the capias ad respondendum has given way to personal service of summons or other form of notice, due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463.” (326 U.S. at p. 316 [90 L.Ed. at pp. 101-102].) In Pennoyer v. Neff (1877) 95 U.S. 714 [24 L.Ed. 565] the court had said, “. . . it is laid down by jurists, as an elementary principle, that the laws of one State have no operation outside of its territory, except *774so far as is allowed by comity; and that no tribunal established by it can extend its process beyond that territory so as to subject either persons or property to its decisions.” (95 U.S. at p. 722 [24 L.Ed. at p. 568]; See also Flexner v. Farson (1919) 248 U.S. 289, 293 [63 L.Ed. 250; 253, 39 S.Ct. 97].) Under such concepts of jurisdiction there was no power to exercise judicial jurisdiction unless the defendant was found and served within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Therefore there was reason to grant the privilege of exemption from exercise of that jurisdiction when its use would interfere with the administration of justice in a pending matter.
There have been developments in the concept of jurisdiction. In 1934 the American Law Institute approved the original Restatement of the Conflict of Laws. It dealt with “Jurisdiction in General” (ch. 3, §§ 42-73) and “Jurisdiction of Courts” (ch. 4, §§ 74-118). With respect to the former the Restatement provided in part, “§ 47. (1) A state has jurisdiction over a person: (a) if he is within the territory of the state, (b) if he is domiciled in the state although not present there, (c) if he has consented or subjected himself to the exercise of jurisdiction over him either before or after the exercise of jurisdiction.” With respect to the jurisdiction of the courts there was but limited recognition of accountability for and the exercise of jurisdiction over an individual or a corporation for acts done within the state. (See Rest,, Conflicts of Law (1934) §§ 77, subd. (l)(e), 84, 85, 92 and 93.7)
*775Today it is recognized that a state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over an individual or corporation on the basis of an act done in the state or on the basis of causing an effect in the state by an act done elsewhere. (Rest.2d Conflicts (1971) § 27, subds. (1) (g), (h) and (i); and see Code Civ. Proc., § 410.10.) Section 36 of the 1971 Restatement provides: “(1) A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over an individual who has done, or has caused to be done, an act in the state with respect to any cause of action in tort arising from the act. (2) A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over an individual who has done, or has caused to be done, an act in the state with respect to any cause of action not in tort arising from the act unless the nature of the act and of the individual’s relationship to the state and to other states make the exercise of such jurisdiction unreasonable.” Section 37 provides: “A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over an individual who causes effects in the state by an act done elsewhere with respect to any cause of action arising from these effects unless the nature of the effects and of the individual’s relationship to the state make the exercise of such jurisdiction unreasonable.”
The genesis for the application of these sections to contract actions is found in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co. (1957) 355 U.S. 220 [2 L.Ed.2d 223, 78 S.Ct. 199] where the court said, after reviewing earlier cases: “Looking back over this long history of litigation a trend is clearly discernible toward expanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over foreign corporations and other nonresidents. In part this is attibutable to the fundamental transformation of our national economy over the years. Today many commercial transactions touch two or more States and may involve parties separated by the full continent. With this increasing nationalization of commerce has come a great increase in the amount of business conducted by mail across state lines. At the same time modern transportation and communication have made it much less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a State where he engages in economic activity.
“Turning to this case we think it apparent that the Due Process Clause, did not preclude the California court from entering a judgment binding on respondent. It is sufficient for purposes of due process that the suit was based on a contract which had substantial connection with that State.” (355 U.S. at pp. 222-223 [2 L.Ed.2d at p. 226].)
Here the alleged transaction is international rather than interstate. The existence of, distinguished from the exercise of, jurisdiction, since it depends on actions or omissions or effects caused within the state, should *776not be affected by the character or nationality of the actor. Any attack on the existence of jurisdiction would have to attack the allegations of the complaint which alleges losses and damages suffered in this state by the acts and omissions of petitioners. Such issue has not been raised.
The service of the process in Florida is not, as pointed out at the beginning of this opinion, a matter of acquisition of jurisdiction, but merely a question of notice that jurisdiction which exists is about to be exercised. The 1971 Restatement states the general rule in section 25 as follows: “A state may not exercise judicial jurisdiction over a person, although *he is subject to its judicial jurisdiction, unless a reasonable method is employed to give him notice of the action and unless he is afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard.”
It is difficult to conclude that there has not been notice and a reasonable opportunity to be heard when process has been delivered to an individual defendant, who also is admittedly one empowered to receive process for partnership and corporate defendants. It must be concluded that the court acquired jurisdiction to proceed. Nevertheless the question remains as to whether jurisdiction should be exercised under the circumstances of this case. Sections 36 and 37 of the 1971 Restatement predicate the existence of jurisdiction upon whether its exercise is reasonable in the light of the nature of the acts or the effect produced, and the individual’s relationship to the state of the forum. In Wangler v. Harvey (1963) 41 N.J. 277 [196 A.2d 513], in rejecting the immunity rule, the New Jersey court concluded, “Pursuant to the usual practice under a motion to dismiss based on forum non conveniens, the granting of immunity will be considered an exception rather than the rule. The court will retain jurisdiction unless there is an affirmative showing that it would violate traditional concepts of fair play and substantial justice to subject the defendant to its jurisdiction. If unfairness is shown, the court might dismiss outright or condition its dismissal upon certain assurances by the defendant. [Citation.]” (41 N.J. at p. 286 [196 A.2d at p. 518].)
In this state Code of Civil Procedure section 410.30 provides: “When a court upon motion of a party or its own motion finds that in the interest of substantial justice an action should be heard in a forum outside this state, the court shall stay or dismiss the action in whole or in part on any conditions that may be just.”
The right to exercise the jurisdiction through notice was only fortuitously acquired because of the presence in Florida of a defendant, also a partnership and corporate officer, who although present was immune from federal *777and state process because of local interest in the administration of justice. To subject petitioners to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state appears to place an unreasonable restraint on the right of the state and federal courts of Florida to employ what they deem is a reasonable rule to further proceedings in their courts. The witness-litigant, if knowledgeable, had a right to believe he would be exempt from service of process in nonrelated matters while giving his testimony in Florida.
On the other hand, this state has an interest in permitting its residents to pursue their just claims against those who by acts or effects within this state have caused damage to its citizens. The quashing of the service of summons in Florida does not preclude the courts of this state from acquiring jurisdiction. Plaintiff need not be relegated to bringing an action or actions in foreign countries. Subdivision (c) of section 413.10 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: “Except as otherwise provided by statute, a summons shall be served on a person: . . . (c) Outside the United States, as provided in this chapter, or as directed by the court in which the action is pending, or, if the court before or after service finds that the service is reasonably calculated to give actual notice, as prescribed by the law of the place where the person is served or as directed by the foreign authority in response to a letter rogatory.”
It may be said that resort to that procedure is an absurd repetition when the petitioners already have actual notice, and have been offered an opportunity to be heard. Nevertheless if any jurisdiction where assets of the petitioner can be found recognizes the Florida state and federal rule of immunity from process such jurisdiction would deny enforcement of the California judgment if the action were to proceed to an otherwise successful conclusion for plaintiff. If there are assets here, of course, the plaintiff may proceed by attachment. There also may be treaty complications upon the service of summons which would render the attempted exercise of jurisdiction by the courts of this state ineffective.
On balance, I conclude that regardless of what the courts of this state have or should hold as to immunity from service of process, the trial court in this case properly quashed the service of process under the peculiar circumstances of this case. I would affirm the order.

In Higgins v. California Prune & Apricot Growers (2d Cir. 1922) 282 F. 550, the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed an order which had refused to enjoin the plaintiff in an action in a New York federal district court from proceeding in three other actions on the same claims filed respectively in the federal district courts for the Northern and Southern Districts of California, and in the state court. The New York defendant, who instituted the appeal, was served while he was in California attending depositions as a party to the New York suit. The court found harassment, and that there had been sufficient service of the motion for an injunction on the corporation, which was the plaintiff in all the California actions, by service on the attorneys *766representing it in the New York action. The court observed, “. . . the privilege of the party from service of process is not merely his personal privilege, but it is the privilege of the District Court itself in which the original action is pending. [Citation.]’’ (282 F. at p. 559.)

The principles applied by the United States Supreme Court in Stewart v. Ramsay often have been recognized in this state. (See Hand v. Superior Court (1919) 42 Cal.App. 168, 169 [183 P. 456]; Murrey v. Murrey (1932) 216 Cal. 707, 710 [16 P.2d 741, 85 A.L.R. 1335] [cert. den., (1933) 289 U.S. 740 (77 L.Ed. 1487, 53 S.Ct. 658)]; Franklin v. Superior Court (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d 292, 294 [220 P.2d 8]; Slosbergv. Municipal Court (1950) 101 Cal.App.2d 238, 240 [225 P.2d 312]; Velkov v. Superior Court (1953) 40 Cal.2d 289, 291 [253 P.2d 25, 35 A.L.R.2d 1348]; Russell v. Landau (1954) 127 Cal.App.2d 682, 688-689 [274 P.2d 681]; Muller v. Muller (1956) 141 Cal.App.2d 722, 728-729 [297 P.2d 789]; St. John v. Superior Court (1960) 178 Cal.App.2d 794, 798 [3 Cal.Rptr. 535, 84 A.L.R.2d 415]; and People v. Wilson (1963) 213 Cal.App.2d 290, 291 [28 Cal.Rptr. 675].)
In Russell v. Landau, supra, in applying the rule to a nonresident witness in a probate proceeding, the court observed after reviewing earlier California cases, “From such decisions it is now the universal rule that a nonresident witness while in attendance upon a trial in an alien state to give evidence enjoys immunity against service of civil process. [Citations.] No rule of practice is more firmly rooted in the jurisprudence of the United States. [Citation.] Such privilege is extended to suitors and witnesses to secure to them the right to give testimony and other assistance, in the trial of an action.” (127 Cal.App.2d at p. 689. For other applications of the principles see: Fox v. Hall & Norcross S. M. Co. (1895) 108 Cal. 369, 424 [41 P. 308]; Minthorne *767v. Superior Court (1963) 213 Cal.App.2d 748, 751 [29 Cal.Rptr. 265]; Mattison v. Lichlyter (1958) 162 Cal.App.2d 60, 63-65 [327 P.2d 599]; Gerard v. Superior Court (1949) 91 Cal.App.2d 549, 552-555 [205 P.2d 109]; and Hammons v. Superior Court (1923) 63 Cal.App. 700, 707-709 [219 P. 1037].)

Subsequently in Lamb v. Schmitt (1932) 285 U.S. 222 [76 L.Ed. 720, 52 S.Ct. 317] the court upheld a Circuit Court of Appeals decision which had overruled a district court order quashing service of process, in a second suit to recover funds of a debtor allegedly improperly diverted for attorney’s fees, upon the nonresident attorney who came into the district to represent one of the defendant debtors in pending litigation in the same district which sought to recover assets allegedly disposed of in fraud of creditors. “Here the two suits, pending in the same court, are not independent of each other or unrelated. The second was brought in aid of the first, on which the petitioner, when served with process, was in attendance, charged with the duty of counsel in the case to assist the court. It was brought to secure rights asserted in the first suit which, but for the acts charged against the petitioner in the second, would have been secured in the first. [Citation.] The later suit was so much a part and continuation of the earlier one that the jurisdiction of the court over the first extended to the second without regard to citizenship of the parties or the satisfaction of any other jurisdictional requirements.” (285 U.S. at p. 227 [76 L.Ed. at pp. 723-724].)
The court after reviewing the rule itself did observe, “. . . the privilege should not be enlarged beyond the reason upon which it is founded, and that it should be extended or withheld only as judicial necessities require. [Citations.] Limitations of it on this basis have been not infrequently made because the attendance upon the trial of a cause, however vital to the personal interests of those concerned, was not for the purpose of facilitating the progress of the cause. [Citations], or because- the service was made on one whose attendance was not voluntary, and hence had no tendency to interfere with judicial administration.” (Id., at pp. 225-226 [76 L.Ed. at p. 723].) This observation on limitations made in other courts has no more or less weight than the earlier observation quoted above from Stewart v. Ramsey.
The exception to immunity promulgated in Lamb v. Schmitt has often been applied in this state. (See Von Kesler v. Superior Court (1930) 109 Cal.App. 89, 90-91 [292 P. 544]; Horn v. Superior Court (1949) 94 Cal.App.2d 283, 285 [210 P.2d 518]; Slosberg v. Municipal Court (1950) 101 Cal.App.2d 238, 240-241 [225 P.2d 312]; Velkov v. Superior Court (1953) 40 Cal.2d 289, 292-294 [253 P.2d 25, 35 A.L.R.2d 1348]; St. John v. Superior Court (1960) 178 Cal.App.2d 794, 798-800 [3 Cal.Rptr. 535, 84 A.L.R.2d 415]; Gaines v. Superior Court (1961) 196 Cal.App.2d 749, 753 [16 Cal.Rptr. 909].)
This state has also proceeded to exercise jurisdiction over objection when the person séeking immunity was not the attorney of record in the prior litigation (see Tadge v. Byrnes (1918) 179 Cal. 275, 276 [176 P. 439]); when the person served came into the state to attend a deposition for use in litigation in another state (see Hand v. Superior Court, supra, 42 Cal.App. 168, 170); when the nonresident was within this state on National Guard duty to which he had consented (see Murrey v. Murrey, supra, 216 Cal. 707, 711-714); when the nonresident came into the state to avoid litigation rather than to prosecute it, and only later filed the suit (see Franklin v. Superior Court, supra, 98 Cal.App.2d 292, 296) [although the assumption may be questioned the facts fall within the principle of Lamb V. Schmitt and other cases cited above]; and when the nonresident is a criminal defendant who is served after his conviction (see People v. Wilson, supra, 213 Cal.App.2d 290, 292-294).

The court in that opinion affirmed the order of the lower court on the grounds the appearance for the purpose of removing the action to the federal court had constituted a general appearance (130 Fla. at p. 452 [178 So. at p. 116].) A rehearing *771was denied January 27, 1938 (130 Fla. at p. 442 [178 So. at p. 112].) Thereafter a rehearing was granted, but an evenly divided court on October 26, 1938, adhered to the earlier decision (142 Fla. 290, 291-297 [195 So. 418, 419-422]); but on a further rehearing, after a vacancy on the court had been filled, a 4 to 3 decision, on June 2, 1939, reversed the order of the trial court which had refused to quash summons, because it found no general appearance (142 Fla. 290, 298-302 [195 So. 418, 422-423]); and on April 23, 1940 (almost five years after the nonresidents had been served) a final opinion denied a “second” petition for rehearing (142 Fla. 290, 302-306 [195 So. 418, 423-425].)

State v. Adams (1941) 148 Fla. 426 [4 So.2d 457] [noncounty resident immune from service while attending court before his discharge under a criminal charge].
State v. Circuit Court of Eleventh Judicial Circuit (Fla. 1951) 51 So.2d 792 [recognizes and applies exception, for process issued in litigation incidental to or correlated with the subject matter of the proceedings, to nonresident witnesses and respondents in a will contest, who were served in collateral suit for declaratory relief involving same estate and issues],
Lawson v. Benson (Fla.App. 1962) 136 So.2d 353 [nonresident father appearing as the moving party and as a witness in child custody proceeding against former wife, held immune from process when served as a defendant in an action by an attorney to recover fees incurred in an earlier similar proceeding],
Lienard v. DeWitt (Fla. 1963) 153 So.2d 302 [nonresident witness, appearing with reference to employee’s claim for workmen’s compensation, held immune from service as defendant in employee’s tort action] affirming Lienard v. DeWitt (Fla.App. 1962) 143 So.2d 42, and overruling L. P. Evans Motors, Inc. v. Meyer (Fla.App. 1960) 119 So.2d 301 [which had applied State v. Circuit Court of Eleventh Judicial Circuit, supra, to uphold service upon embezzling nonresident former employee, in a second suit by employer against employee, when employee appeared as witness in suit by employer against surety company],
Bruner v. Robbins (Fla.App. 1966) 191 So.2d 567 [nonresident defendant and witness in prior state court suit, held immune from service in similar, but not essentially connected suit].
Crane v. Hayes (Fla. 1971) 253 So.2d 435 [nonresident father, entitled to custody of daughter under North Carolina decree which had previously been recognized in Florida, but which was evaded there by mother, held to be immune from service of process in new action commenced by mother when he came into state to secure his daughter under the earlier ruling],

Strong arguments have been advanced to show that the immunity from service of process rule should be abandoned or at least be extensively curtailed. (See Wangler v. Harvey (1963) 41 N.J. 277 [196 A.2d 513]; Note (1951) 26 Ind.L.J. 459; Keeffe & Roscia, Immunity and Sentimentality (1947) 32 Cornell L. Q. 471. Also note, Thode, Special Appearance (1964) 42 Tex.L.Rev. 279, 339; Developments— Jurisdiction (1960) 73 Harv.L.Rev. 909, 940, 941; Note (1920) 33 Harv.L.Rev. 721, 722.)

Section 77 provided: “(1) The exercise of jurisdiction by a state through its courts over an individual may be based upon any of the following circumstances: (a) the individual is personally present within the state, (b) he has his domicile within the state, (c) he is a citizen or subject owing allegiance to the nation, (d) he has consented to the exercise of jurisdiction, (e) he has by acts done by him within the state subjected himself to its jurisdiction. [1|] (2) In the absence of all these bases of jurisdiction, a state through its courts cannot exercise jurisdiction over individuals.”
Section 84 provided: “A state can exercise through its courts jurisdiction over an individual who has done an act within the state, as to a cause of action arising out of such act, if, by the law of the state at the time when the act was done, a person by doing the act subjected himself to the jurisdiction of the state as to such cause of action.”
Section 85 qualified section 84 as follows: “If a State cannot, without violating the Constitution of the United States, make the doing of certain kinds of acts within the State illegal unless and until the person doing the acts or causing them to be done has consented to the jurisdiction of the courts of the State as to causes of action arising out of such acts, the State cannot validly provide that the doing of the acts shall subject him to the jurisdiction of the courts of the State.”
It gave the following comment, “(a) A State cannot without violating various provisions of the Constitution of the United States, such as those relating to the privileges and immunities of citizens of other States or of the United States, absolutely forbid the doing of certain kinds of acts within the State, nor forbid the doing of such acts unless the person doing the acts or causing them to be done has consented to the jurisdiction of the courts of the State, even as to causes of action arising out of such acts. In the absence of consent, the mere doing of such acts does not subject the actor to the jurisdiction of the courts of the State in which the acts are done.”