Court Opinion

ID: 9444960
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 21:16:48.585925+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:04.698679
License: Public Domain

KALODNER, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
In order to arrive at the disposition which it made the majority had to make these two separate rulings:
First — Since judgment on the appel-lee’s motion for summary judgment was granted December 10, 1954, the District Court’s January 5, 1955 Order entered pursuant to appellant’s motion for reconsideration filed that day, was a “nullity” because “(Rule) 6(b) renders a *392court powerless to , entertain such motions when untimely made”.
Second — “no written motion” was presented to the District Court on December 20th or December 21st by appellant’s counsel when he made oral request for reconsideration as required by Rule 7(b) d).
■ A brief statement of certain critical facts is essential in order to bring into sharper focus the issues presented.
The appellee filed a motion for summary judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) alleging that the appellant’s cause of action was barred by a state statute of limitations. Following argument the District Court filed an opinion on December 10, 1954, sustaining appel-lee’s motion. The docket entries disclose that judgment for the appellee, pursuant to' the District Court’s opinion, was “Noted and Notice Mailed” on December 13, 1954, making that day the date of judgment and not December 10th as stated by the majority. Within ten days, on December 20th or December 21st, counsel for the appellant visited the District Court and made oral request for reargument and submitted in support of that request a “written” memorandum of authorities. The District Court took the request under advisement. On January 3, 1955 it advised appellant’s counsel that it would grant reargument and the next day,.. January 4th, entered a written Order allowing reargument pursuant to a written motion filed at the time.
Proceeding now to the majority’s disposition.
Taking first its ruling that the January 4th Order granting reargument on the appellee’s motion for summary judgment was a “nullity” under Rule 6 (b):
The crux of that ruling is that under the Rules the motion for reargument in the instant case had to be filed within ten days of judgment — accordingly the motion of January 4th was “untimely” because it was filed more than ten days after the judgment of December 13, 1954, and therefore the District Court was “powerless” to entertain it.
I do not agree with the majority’s application of the ten-day filing limit to a motion for reargument such as was made here.
As authority for my view I rely on our recent decision, filed December 29, 1955, in Kelly v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 3 Cir., 228 F.2d 727. In that case we stated:
“ * * * we have no doubt of the power of a district court, after denying or dismissing a motion for a new trial, to entertain an application for reargument of the motion and thereupon to reinstate the motion and order it to be reargued. Moreover such action, if taken more than 10 days after the entry of judgment, does not violate the prohibition of Rule 6 (b) against extending the time fixed by Rule 59(b) for serving a motion for a hew trial. For an application for reargument of a prior motion for a new trial is not to be regarded as itself a motion for a new trial or even as a renewal of such a motion. It is simply a request that the court reconsider its action upon the original motion. If the reargument is granted the original motion is heard anew upon the original papers just as if it had never previously been heard or determined.” 1
Applying the principles above stated it is clear that the majority erred in dismissing the instant appeal since within 30 days of the judgment of December 13, 1954, the District Court, pursuant to the appellant’s written motion of January 4, 1955, on that day entered its Order granting reargument. That Order operated to terminate the running of the time for appeal from December 13, 1954 and instead made the appeal time commence to run from May 16, 1955, *393when the District Court filed its subsequent Order “denying motion for rear-gument.” Since the notice of appeal was filed on May 16, 1955, immediately following the entry of this second Order, the instant appeal was, of course, timely filed.
In view of the foregoing no extended discussion is necessary of the majority’s ruling that the appeal must be dismissed because the appellant failed to present a “written motion” to the District Court on December 20th or 21st, as required by Rule 7(b) (1).
Implicit in the majority’s ruling is its view that the District Court could not in the exercise of its discretion treat the “written” memorandum of authorities given to it in support of the oral motion for reargument as a sufficient compliance with the provisions of Rule 7(b) (1).
I think that it is a fair inference that the District Court regarded the appellant’s memorandum as a sufficient compliance with the “writing” requirement of Rule 7, and I further believe that it had the discretion to do so and that the discretion was properly exercised.
In this connection it is pertinent to note that the Rules do not specifically deal with the subject of reconsideration of summary judgments under Rule 12 (c). That being so there is every reason why appellate courts should refrain from calling into play “unwritten” Rules which would operate to deprive a district court of its inherent discretion to reconsider, when the ends of justice and efficient judicial administration so require, summary judgments of the kind here involved.
For the reasons stated I would deny the motion to dismiss the instant appeal.

. We made it clear however, in the case cited, that any action taken by the District Court had to be within 30 days of the judgment originally entered under the provisions of Rule 73(a).