Court Opinion

ID: 9586076
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:06:56.89418+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:24:19.825058
License: Public Domain

Fletcher, Presiding Justice,
dissenting.
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the defendant’s confession to an FBI agent was voluntary because the agent was the defendant’s father. None of the cases relied upon by the majority involves a law enforcement officer who is also a family member and who questions the defendant after the invocation of the right to counsel and before Miranda7 warnings. Therefore, I dissent.
After the defendant was formally arrested and had asked for a lawyer, he was questioned by Agent Cook without being given Miranda warnings. Minnick v. Mississippi7
8 is clear in its requirement that once “counsel is requested, interrogation must cease, and officials may not reinitiate interrogation without counsel present.”
When Agent Cook first questioned the defendant about the crimes, the defendant said he could not speak with him because “you’re a cop.” Only after Agent Cook assured him that he (Agent Cook) was acting as a parent did the defendant answer questions. Agent Cook proceeded to “question [ ] [the defendant] like you would question a criminal suspect” and obtained incriminating admissions. Despite assuring the defendant that he was acting as a parent and not as a cop, Agent Cook immediately called his supervisor because “I needed to tell law enforcement that I thought my son was responsible” and told his supervisor that he planned to go to Sheriff Bittick the next day. In less than 24 hours, Agent Cook did inform the sheriff of the defendant’s admissions.
After the defendant’s arrest, the record shows that Agent Cook sought to question him in part because he was “law enforcement oriented” and that he had the intent of revealing any incriminating statements the defendant made to law enforcement officials. No one informed the defendant of this intent or of his Miranda rights. Instead, the sheriff told him that “his Daddy wanted to talk to him.” The “talk” consisted of the defendant “not volunteering any of [the confession, but] responding to specific and direct questions.” The record shows that Agent Cook conducted the type of thorough interrogation expected of an experienced FBI agent, even though he *833admitted at the Jackson-Denno9 hearing that he was “not conducting an interview as objectively as I would normally.” After obtaining the defendant’s confession, Agent Cook informed the sheriff of all that the defendant had said and later gave a written statement.
When the sheriff initiated the contact between the defendant and Agent Cook, the sheriff had a long-standing personal and professional relationship with Agent Cook and knew that he would disclose future admissions as he had revealed the defendant’s prior admissions. GBI Agent Upton, who arrested the defendant, testified that shortly after he brought the defendant to Monroe County and before Agent Cook began his questioning, he (Agent Upton) informed Sheriff Bittick and the district attorney that the defendant had requested a lawyer. The law enforcement officers all agree that no efforts had been made to contact a lawyer prior to Agent Cook interrogating the defendant. Under the totality of these circumstances, I conclude that the behavior of law enforcement officials coerced the defendant’s confession.
The cases relied upon by the majority are not on point and do not support the majority’s conclusion. In United States v. Gaddy,10 the aunt who urged Gaddy to confess was an evidence technician employed by the county police. The aunt did not question Gaddy about the crime, but only urged him to speak with the investigating officers about any knowledge he might have. Gaddy spoke to officers and confessed only after being informed of and waiving his Miranda rights. The aunt did not make a statement to police or testify regarding admissions made by Gaddy. Buttersworth v. State11 is also distinguishable in that Buttersworth had not been arrested and had not invoked his right to counsel as the defendant did in this case. Additionally, in Buttersworth the father who received the incriminating admissions was not a law enforcement officer.
Finally, none of the other cases relied upon by the majority involves family members who were also law enforcement officers. The cases are also distinguishable because the defendant was given Miranda warnings before making an inculpatory statement directly to or in the presence of the police.12
*834Decided March 19, 1999 —
Reconsideration denied April 2,1999.
Ham, Jenkins, Wilson & Wangerin, Thomas H. Wilson, Kevin A. Wangerin, for appellant.
Tommy K. Floyd, District Attorney, Blair D. Mahaffey, Assistant District Attorney, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Susan V. Boleyn, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Patricia A. Burton, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Even if the defendant’s confession were admissible, I disagree with the majority’s summary conclusion that the trial court’s clear violation of Crane v. Kentucky13 and OCGA § 24-3-50 was harmless. In the sentencing phase of a death penalty case, the jury is instructed to remember the evidence introduced during the guilt-innocence phase.14 I am not persuaded that the jury would have necessarily returned a death sentence had it known all the circumstances surrounding the confession, including that no law enforcement officer told the defendant that any statement he made would be used against him.

 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (86 SC 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966).

 498 U.S. 146, 153 (111 SC 486, 112 LE2d 489) (1990).

 Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (84 SC 1774, 12 LE2d 908) (1964).

 894 F.2d 1307 (11th Cir. 1990).

 260 Ga. 795 (400 SE2d 908) (1991).

 State v. Massey, 342 SE2d 811 (N.C. 1986) (the defendant had already received Miranda warnings and made a confession to police when he made an incriminating statement to his father in the presence of an officer); Snethen v. Nix, 885 F.2d 456 (8th Cir. 1989) and Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520 (107 SC 1931, 95 LE2d 458) (1987) (the defendant made an inculpatory statement to a family member in the presence of police after receiving Miranda warnings); Lowe v. State, 650 So.2d 969 (Fla. 1994) (the defendant had received Miranda warnings and volunteered his confession to police at the urging of his girlfriend).

 476 U.S. 683, 688-690 (106 SC 2142, 90 LE2d 636) (1986).

 Ga. Super. Ct. Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal) (IV) (B) (13) (b).