Court Opinion

ID: 9939957
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-13 15:09:44.928929+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:42:09.261962
License: Public Domain

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                                NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NOS. A-3835-21
                                                                     A-1623-22

E.S.K.,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

M.K.,

     Defendant-Appellant.
___________________________

                   Submitted December 11, 2023 – Decided February 13, 2024

                   Before Judges Gilson and Bishop-Thompson.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
                   Chancery Division, Family Part, Hudson County,
                   Docket No. FV-09-0480-22.

                   Dario, Albert, Metz, Canda, Concannon & Ortiz,
                   attorneys for appellant (Shelley D. Albert, on the
                   briefs).

                   Heymann & Fletcher, attorneys for respondent (Alix
                   Claps, on the briefs).

PER CURIAM
      These consolidated appeals involve challenges to a final restraining order

(FRO), amendments to the FRO, and an award of attorney's fees. Defendant

M.K. appeals from a June 30, 2022 FRO entered under the Prevention of

Domestic Violence Act (the Act), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35, based on predicate

acts of simple assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(a), and harassment, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4.1

Defendant also appeals from a September 8, 2022 amended order awarding

plaintiff $32,539.50 in attorney's fees and costs incurred in connection with the

domestic violence matter. Finally, defendant appeals from a December 21, 2022

amendment to the FRO that clarified that plaintiff's girlfriend is a protected party

under the FRO.

      The trial court's findings that defendant committed assault and harassment

are supported by substantial, credible evidence, and the trial court correctly

applied the well-established law. The trial court's finding that plaintiff needed

the restraining order to prevent further abuse is also supported by substantial,

credible evidence. Therefore, we affirm the FRO.

1
  We use initials and titles to protect the confidentiality of the participants in
these domestic violence proceedings. See R. 1:38-3(d)(10).
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      The trial court considered the appropriate proofs and factors in awarding

attorney's fees and costs under the Act. We discern no abuse of discretion and,

therefore, affirm the order awarding fees and costs.

      Finally, we discern no reversible error in the trial court's decision to

include plaintiff's girlfriend as a protected party. The trial court made express

findings that defendant's harassment included disparaging comments about

plaintiff's girlfriend, and there was sufficient evidence to include plaintiff's

girlfriend as a protected party under N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b)(7).

                                     I.

      We summarize the facts from the record developed during the trial, which

was conducted over five non-consecutive days between December 2021 and

June 2022. Both parties were represented by counsel during the proceedings.

The parties were the only witnesses called to testify at trial , and they both

submitted numerous exhibits into evidence.

      The parties were married in 2012 and divorced approximately eight years

later in 2020. They have one child together, a son born in August 2015. At the

time of their divorce, the parties entered into a marital settlement agreement,

under which they agreed to share joint legal and physical custody of their son.

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      Several months after the divorce, the parties began to have disputes

concerning parenting time. Defendant began to disparage plaintiff by texting

him that he was "a loser" and a "big piece of shit." Those disputes escalated

over time and intensified in the first half of 2021, after defendant became aware

that plaintiff was dating another woman. In June and July 2021, defendant sent

plaintiff a series of text messages making disparaging comments about plaintiff's

girlfriend, K.W., including calling K.W. a "cockroach" and comparing her to a

pig and a fish.

      Things came to a head on August 15, 2021. On that date, plaintiff was

with the parties' son, but defendant wanted the son to come back and spend

parenting time with her. She confronted plaintiff and the son in a hallway near

the rear entrance to plaintiff's apartment building.     Plaintiff testified that

defendant yelled at him and then repeatedly hit, punched, and kicked him. Some

of that confrontation was captured by surveillance cameras in the hallway and

the area outside the building's elevators. Plaintiff also recorded audio of the

confrontation. Ultimately, a concierge separated plaintiff and defendant.

      That same day, plaintiff sought a temporary restraining order (TRO ),

which was granted the following day. The TRO prohibited defendant from

having any contact with plaintiff.         The section prohibiting contact or

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communication with "other[s]" included "[K.W.'s] primary residence." The

TRO also restrained defendant from going to plaintiff's home, plaintiff's place

of employment, and the "primary residence" of plaintiff's girlfriend.

      Over the next several months, plaintiff amended his TRO several times to

include, among other things, more history of the incidents between the parties.

In his amended TROs, plaintiff asserted four predicate acts of domestic violence:

assault, contempt, criminal trespass, and harassment.

      The trial commenced on December 14, 2021, and continued on March 22,

2022, May 2, 2022, May 25, 2022, and June 13, 2022. One of the amendments

to the TRO was made on March 4, 2022, during the trial.

      As already noted, only two witnesses testified at trial:      plaintiff and

defendant.   The parties also submitted over forty exhibits into evidence.

Plaintiff's evidence included the audio recording of the incident on August 15,

2021, and a copy of a video taken from surveillance cameras in plaintiff's

building on August 15, 2021.

      After hearing the testimony of the parties and considering the evidence

submitted, the trial court made its findings of fact and conclusions of law on the

record on June 30, 2022. The court found that plaintiff's testimony was credible

and was corroborated by the documents and video evidence. By contrast, the

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trial court found that defendant's testimony was incredible and that much of her

testimony was "not reasonable," "inconsistent," "evasive, non-responsive[,] and

argumentative, at times."

      The trial court then analyzed each of the four alleged predicate acts and

found that credible evidence proved defendant had assaulted and harassed

plaintiff. In finding a simple assault, the trial court credited plaintiff's testimony

that on August 15, 2021, defendant had kicked, punched, and hit plaintiff with

her fists and cell phone.       The court noted that plaintiff's testimony was

corroborated by both the surveillance video and a photo depicting two scratches

on plaintiff's forehead. The court also pointed out that the assault took place in

front of the parties' young son, who "pleaded with his mother to stop."

      Concerning the alleged harassment, the trial court found that the emails

and text messages sent by defendant to plaintiff were offensive, included

disparaging comments and profanity, and were sent with the purpose to harass

plaintiff. In making those findings, the court also found that many of defendant's

comments were meant to annoy and alarm plaintiff. In addition, the court found

that defendant had harassed plaintiff by "striking, kicking and shoving" him.

      In finding that defendant had committed harassment, the trial court

reasoned that many of defendant's alarming comments were directed at or

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disparaged plaintiff's girlfriend. In that regard, the court found that defendant's

comments about and depictions of plaintiff's girlfriend were "meant to seriously

annoy" plaintiff.

      The trial court then found that plaintiff needed an FRO to prevent "further

acts of abuse." While the court acknowledged that defendant did not pose an

immediate physical threat to plaintiff's safety, the court found that without an

FRO, defendant would continue to harass plaintiff. In making that finding, the

court considered the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(1) to (6). In

particular, the trial court was concerned about the best interests of the parties'

child. Therefore, the court found "the issuance of an FRO between the parties

would, in fact, be in the best interest of the victim and the child," so that the

child would be protected from future traumatic incidents.

      On the same day that it made its findings of fact and conclusions of law,

the trial court issued an FRO against defendant. Among other things, the FRO

prohibited defendant from going to plaintiff's home or the home of his girl friend.

The FRO also prohibited defendant from having any contact or communications

with plaintiff. Addressing other protected parties, the FRO prohibited defendant

from having any contact or communications with plaintiff's girlfriend by listing

"[K.W.'s] primary residence."

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      After entering the FRO, the trial court allowed plaintiff to apply for

attorney's fees and costs in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b)(4). Plaintiff

then filed an application, including a certification from his counsel, and

defendant filed opposition. On August 19, 2022, after requesting additional

financial documentation from the parties, the court granted plaintiff's

application. Thereafter, it issued an amended order on September 8, 2022

awarding plaintiff $32,539.50 in fees and costs.

      Defendant filed her first appeal on August 12, 2022, challenging the June

30, 2022 FRO. She, thereafter, amended her appeal to include the September 8,

2022 order granting fees and costs.

      In December 2022, counsel for plaintiff wrote to the family court,

asserting that defendant had physically assaulted plaintiff's girlfriend at a school

event for the parties' son. Plaintiff's counsel requested the court to amend the

FRO to make it clear that plaintiff's girlfriend was a protected party under the

FRO. Counsel for defendant opposed that request. The trial court then issued

two amended FROs on December 19, 2022, and December 21, 2022. The court

clarified that the controlling order was the December 21, 2022 order. The only

substantive change made in that order was in section three, where the reference

to K.W.'s primary residence was replaced with K.W.'s name. In other words,

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the provision in the FRO that prohibits defendant from having communications

or contacts with certain people was clarified so that it covered both plaintiff and

his girlfriend.

      Defendant then filed a second notice, appealing from the December 21,

2022 amended FRO. Thereafter, we granted defendant's motion to consolidate

the two appeals.

                                        II.

      On these appeals, defendant challenges the FRO on several grounds. She

argues that the trial court abused its discretion in (1) granting the FRO because

it misapplied the analysis set forth in Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112, 125-

27 (App. Div. 2006); (2) admitting the video surveillance footage without a

proper foundation; and (3) admitting what are alleged to be privileged and

confidential communications between the parties and their co-parenting

therapist. In addition, for the first time on appeal, defendant contends that her

due process rights were violated because she was not properly served with some

of the amendments to the TRO. Defendant also seeks to vacate the September

8, 2022 order, arguing that the trial court erred in awarding plaintiff attorney's

fees and costs.     Finally, defendant challenges the December 21, 2022

amendment to the FRO, contending: (1) the amendment was entered when the

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trial court did not have jurisdiction because of the pending appeal ; and (2)

plaintiff's girlfriend was improperly included as a protected party.

      We reject these arguments because they are not supported by the record

or the law. We, therefore, affirm all orders challenged in these consolidated

appeals.

      A.    The FRO.

      Our scope of review of the grant or denial of an FRO is limited. See C.C.

v. J.A.H., 463 N.J. Super. 419, 428 (App. Div. 2020). We accord substantial

deference to family judges' findings of fact because of their special expertise in

family matters. N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. M.C. III (In re M.C. IV &

N.C.), 201 N.J. 328, 343 (2010) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413

(1998)). That deference is particularly strong when the evidence is largely

testimonial and rests on a judge's credibility findings. Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J.

414, 428 (2015). We will "not disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions

of the trial [court] unless we are convinced that they are so manifestly

unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably

credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice." Balducci v. Cige, 456

N.J. Super. 219, 233 (App. Div. 2018) (alteration in original) (quoting In re

Forfeiture of Pers. Weapons & Firearms Identification Card Belonging to F.M. ,

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                                       10
225 N.J. 487, 506 (2016)).        "[W]e owe no deference to a trial court's

interpretation of the law, and review issues of law de novo." Cumberland Farms,

Inc. v. N.J. Dep't of Env't Prot., 447 N.J. Super. 423, 438 (App. Div. 2016).

      The Act was passed to further New Jersey's "strong policy against

domestic violence." N.T.B. v. D.D.B., 442 N.J. Super. 205, 216 (App. Div.

2015) (quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. at 400). Domestic violence occurs when an

adult or emancipated minor commits one or more of the predicate acts identified

by the Act. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a). When determining whether to grant an FRO,

a trial judge must engage in a two-step analysis. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 125-

27. "First, the judge must determine whether the plaintiff has proven, by a

preponderance of the credible evidence, that one or more of the predicate acts

set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a) has occurred."            Id. at 125 (citation

reformatted); see also N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a) (providing that an FRO may only

be granted "after a finding or an admission is made that an act of domestic

violence was committed"). Second, the court must determine that a restraining

order is necessary to provide protection for the victim. Silver, 387 N.J. Super.

at 126-27; see also J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 475-76 (2011) (quoting

N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b) and explaining that an FRO should not be issued without

a finding that relief is "necessary to prevent further abuse").

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                                       11
      The trial court found that plaintiff had proven two of the four predicate

acts he alleged: simple assault and harassment. A person is guilty of a simple

assault if he or she, among other things, "[a]ttempts to cause or purposely,

knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another." N.J.S.A. 2C:12-

1(a)(1).

      The trial court found that defendant assaulted plaintiff on August 15,

2021, when she "kicked and punched the plaintiff, chased him down the hallway,

[and] continued to hit him with her fists and cell phone." In making that finding,

the judge relied on plaintiff's credible testimony, the surveillance footage

capturing the incident, and a photograph taken by plaintiff on the date of the

incident evidencing two scratches on his forehead.

      Our review of the record confirms that the judge's findings are supported

by substantial, credible evidence. Moreover, the application of those factual

findings to the elements of simple assault supports the judge's conclusion that

defendant assaulted plaintiff. See Capell v. Capell, 358 N.J. Super. 107, 111

(App. Div. 2003); N.B. v. T.B., 297 N.J. Super. 35, 42-43 (App. Div. 1997).

      The harassment statute provides that a person commits harassment:

            [I]f, with purpose to harass another, he [or she]:

                  a. Makes, or causes to be made, one or
                  more communications anonymously or at

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                  extremely inconvenient hours, or in
                  offensively coarse language, or any other
                  manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm;

                  b. Subjects another to striking, kicking,
                  shoving, or other offensive touching, or
                  threatens to do so; or

                  c. Engages in any other course of alarming
                  conduct or of repeatedly committed acts
                  with purpose to alarm or seriously annoy
                  such other person.

            [N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a) to (c).]

      The trial court found that defendant had harassed plaintiff both before and

after the TRO was entered by sending "harassing, threatening, unsolicited, and

racist" communications via text, email, and the "Our Family Wizard" system.

Those communications were sent over a period of several months, and the court

found that they were intended to annoy and alarm plaintiff. The trial court

rejected defendant's characterization of those communications as "co-parenting

communications." Instead, the court found that the communications clearly fell

"outside the realm of incidental parenting disputes." In addition, the court found

that defendant had subjected plaintiff to "striking, kicking, and shoving," which

when viewed in conjunction with the communications, constituted "a pattern of

abusive and controlling behavior."

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      Like the findings concerning the simple assault, the trial court's findings

concerning harassment are all supported by substantial, credible evidence.

Thus, we reject defendant's arguments that the trial court did not correctly apply

the first prong of the Silver analysis.

      We also reject defendant's arguments that the trial court did not correctly

apply the second prong of the Silver analysis. In finding that plaintiff needed

an FRO, the trial court made specific findings concerning the factors set forth in

N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(1) to (6). In that regard, the trial court found that the FRO

was needed to prevent further acts of domestic violence, including harassing

communications.      Here again, the trial court's findings are supported by

substantial, credible evidence, and we discern no error in the court's application

of its findings to the law.

      B.     The Admission of Certain Evidence.

      Defendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting the video of the

incident on August 15, 2021, and an email sent by defendant to the parties' co-

parenting therapist. Appellate courts review a trial court's admission of evidence

for an abuse of discretion. State v. Gonzalez, 249 N.J. 612, 633 (2022); State v.

Rochat, 470 N.J. Super. 392, 453 (App. Div. 2022).

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      At trial, plaintiff introduced an audio recording made on his cell phone on

August 15, 2021, and a recording of the surveillance footage from the apartment

building on the same day. Initially, defendant objected to the video, contending

that it had not been properly authenticated. Thereafter, plaintiff produced a

notarized certification describing how the video was recorded. Plaintiff then

introduced and used the video in cross-examining defendant.

      "[R]eliability is the decisive factor in determining the admissibility of a

recording." State v. Brown, 463 N.J. Super. 33, 52 (App. Div. 2020) (alteration

in original) (quoting State v. Nantambu, 221 N.J. 390, 395 (2015)). Testimony

must "establish that the videotape is an accurate reproduction of that which it

purports to represent and the reproduction is of the scene at the time the incident

took place." Ibid. (quoting State v. Loftin, 287 N.J. Super. 76, 98 (App. Div.

1996)). The videographer need not testify to establish a recording's accuracy;

rather, "any person with the requisite knowledge of the facts represented in the

. . . videotape may authenticate it." Ibid. (quoting State v. Wilson, 135 N.J. 4,

14 (1994)).

      We discern no error in the admission and use of the video. The testimony

given by both parties acknowledged the incident on August 15, 2021.               In

addition, defendant's testimony established that the recording was an accurate

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reproduction of the incident and the location within plaintiff's apartment

building at which it occurred. That testimony, together with the certification

concerning how the video was copied from the surveillance system, sufficiently

authenticated the video.

      We also discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court's admission of the

email chain that included some of defendant's communications to the therapist.

The testimony at trial established that the parties worked with a therapist before

August 15, 2021 to try to assist them in the parenting of their child. Plaintiff

read excerpts from one email from defendant to their therapist that summarized

an interaction defendant had with the concierge at plaintiff's apartment building.

      N.J.R.E. 534(b) mandates that a communication between a family

therapist and the person in therapy be kept confidential. N.J.R.E. 534(a)(3)(iii)

(incorporating the definition of "marriage and family therapists" under N.J.S.A.

45:8B-6).    Confidential communications are those transmitted between a

therapist and patient in the course of treatment of, or related to, that patient's

condition of mental or emotional health. N.J.R.E. 534(a)(1). Defendant's email

did not contain any confidential communications between her and the parties'

co-parenting therapist. The substance of the email did not relate to the treatment

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of defendant's mental or emotional condition. Accordingly, we discern no

violation of a privilege.

      C.    The Amendments to the TRO and Defendant's Due Process Rights.

      For the first time on this appeal, defendant argues that her due process

rights were violated because she was not given proper notice of certain

amendments to the TRO. In that regard, defendant argues that she was unable

to properly defend against certain of these allegations because she was not

served with the amendments to the TRO and could not access them via e-Courts.

      Parties to a domestic violence action are entitled to certain procedural due

process rights. J.D., 207 N.J. at 478. Our Supreme Court has explained that

"ordinary due process protections apply in the domestic violence context,

notwithstanding the shortened time frames for conducting a final hearing that

are imposed by the statute." Ibid. (citations omitted). Therefore, the Court has

explained that "ensuring that defendants are not deprived of their due process

rights [in a domestic violence matter] requires our trial courts to recognize both

what those rights are and how they can be protected consistent with the

protective goals of the Act." Id. at 479.

      Defendant did not raise a due process argument at trial. Accordingly, we

review this issue for plain error to determine whether the amendments to the

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TRO were "clearly capable of producing an unjust result." See R.G. v. R.G.,

449 N.J. Super. 208, 220 (App. Div. 2017) (quoting State v. Green, 447 N.J.

Super 317, 325 (App. Div. 2016)).

      Defendant contends that she and her counsel were never provided the

amendments allegedly raising new allegations. The record, however, establishes

that by the time of trial, both defendant and her counsel had received the

amended TROs and had the opportunity to prepare for and address the issues

and claims raised in the amendments. In short, we discern no due process

violation and no plain error.

      D.    The Fees Award.

      Victims of domestic violence are entitled to reasonable attorney's fees as

compensatory damages when the fees are the direct result of the act of domestic

violence. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b)(4). "An award of counsel fees in a domestic

violence proceeding requires no special showing, as an award of counsel fees is

a form of 'monetary compensation'" under N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b)(4). N.G. v.

J.P., 426 N.J. Super. 398, 422 (App. Div. 2012) (citing McGowan v. O'Rourke,

391 N.J. Super. 502, 507 (App. Div. 2007)). When issuing a fee award, the trial

court must apply the factors set forth in Rule 4:42-9(b) and RPC 1.5(a). Ibid.

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Rule 4:42-9(b) requires counsel for the party seeking the award to submit an

affidavit of services addressing the factors enumerated in RPC 1.5(a).

      We review a trial court's award of counsel fees for an abuse of discretion.

N.G., 426 N.J. Super. at 422.       If a defendant fails to supply information

regarding his or her financial circumstances, the trial court has discretion to

award fees without considering defendant's ability to pay the fees. Ibid.

      The trial court properly considered the factors set forth in RPC 1.5(a) and

found that the fees incurred by plaintiff were a direct result of defendant's act s

of domestic violence. The court also reviewed plaintiff's counsel's affidavit of

services and found that the time spent was reasonable, the hourly rates charged

were fair, and the fees incurred related to the domestic violence matter. In

making the award, the court limited the fees to those incurred between the entry

of the TRO and the entry of the FRO, including amendments.

      We discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court's award of fees. We

also reject defendant's contention that the court failed to consider her Case

Information Statement (CIS). The trial court had directed the parties to submit

updated CISs. Defendant failed to comply with that directive. Ultimately, the

trial court considered defendant's certification but did not find that it warranted

a change in the fee award.

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      E.     The December 21, 2022 Amendment to the FRO.

      Finally, defendant challenges the December 21, 2022 amendment to the

FRO. She contends that that amendment was made when jurisdiction was with

this court, and that plaintiff's girlfriend is not a proper protected party.

      When the FRO was originally entered on June 30, 2022, it made reference

to plaintiff's girlfriend in the section related to other protected parties. In that

regard, it referred to plaintiff's girlfriend's primary residence. Considered in

context, the reference was clearly to plaintiff's girlfriend. The court clarified

that point in amending the FRO on December 21, 2022. Although defendant

had already filed a notice of appeal, we discern no error because the family court

had a right to clarify what it intended when it entered the FRO. See R. 1:13-1

(explaining that clerical mistakes in orders "arising from oversight and omission

may at any time be corrected by the court on its own initiative . . .

notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal"); McNair v. McNair, 332 N.J.

Super. 195, 199 (App. Div. 2000) (holding that a trial court was not without

jurisdiction because of the pendency of an appeal to correct an "obvious or

acknowledged error in the order under appeal").

      We also reject defendant's argument that plaintiff's girlfriend was not a

proper protected party under the Act. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b)(7) authorizes a

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family judge to issue an order forbidding a defendant from making contact with

the plaintiff or "others." "Others" is expressly defined to include those "with

whom communication would be likely to cause annoyance or alarm to the

victim." Ibid. Here, the trial court found defendant's disparaging text messages

about plaintiff's girlfriend were likely to cause plaintiff annoyance and alarm.

Defendant's history of harassment, which the court found escalated after

plaintiff began dating his new girlfriend, contributed to the need for an FRO to

prevent further acts of abuse. Based on those findings, we discern no reversible

error in the trial court's decision to extend protection to plaintiff's girlfriend.

      Affirmed.

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