Court Opinion

ID: 9856477
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:48:12.150913+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:50.308421
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing  Petitioner in his motion for rehearing is chiefly dissatisfied with the type of hearing he was given in this court, asserting the court should have ordered a personal hearing before it and requesting now that such hearing be given. As stated in our opinion, a request for personal hearing was made by petitioner, but this request was withdrawn as being premature by letter of May 21,1954. No further request for hearing was made and the case was presented to us, briefed and orally argued, all with reference to the record of hearing before the Board of Bar Examiners held July 16, 1954. The question presented to us was whether applicant had established his good moral character so as to entitle him to take the examination for membership in the bar in-this state. Petitioner was given precisely the hearing before this court which he sought. Petitioner is also dissatisfied because we did not rule whether former membership in the Communist Party alone establishes a lack or absence of good moral character. The answer to this is the question was not and is not now before us. We stated in our opinion and we reiterate here: “We believe one who has knowingly given his loyalties to such a program and belief for six to seven years during a period of responsible adulthood is a person of questionable character.” This conduct of petitioner, together with his other former actions in the use of aliases and record of arrests, and his present attitude toward those matters, were the considerations upon which application was denied. In connection with the matter of the arrest in Detroit, Michigan, for violation of the Neutrality Act we take this opportunity to dispel some doubt which may have arisen about the events leading thereto and the appropriateness of criminal prosecution under c. 321, § 10, March 4, 1909, 35 Stat. 1089 (substantially the same as the present § 959(a), Title 18 U.S.C.A.) Said § 10 provides: “Whoever, within the territory or 'jurisdiction of the United States, enlists, or enters himself, or hires or retains another person to enlist or enter himself, or to go beyond the limits or . jurisdiction of the United States with intent to be enlisted or entered in the service of any foreign prince, state, colony, district, or people, as a soldier, or as a marine or seaman, on board of any vessel of war, letter of marque, or privateer, shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars and imprisoned not more than three years.” Mr. Justice Kiker in his dissent filed herein has asserted that petitioner’s activities were not such that he could have been convicted under the statute. Either Mr. Justice Kiker has construed the statute in a manner at odds with the authorities (Gayon v. McCarthy, 1920, 252 U.S. 171, 40 S.Ct. 244, 64 L.Ed. 513; United States v. Blair-Murdock Co., D.C.Cal.1915, 228 F. 75, reversed on other grounds, 9 Cir., 1917, 241 F. 217, certiorari denied, 1917, 244 U.S. 655, 37 S.Ct. 742, 61 L.Ed. 1374, which interpret the words “hire or retain” as meaning “engage” in the clause reading, “Whoever * * * hires or retains another person to enlist or enter himself,” and the word “himself” in this connection refers to its antecedent “another person”); or he has ignored the following portions of letters from petitioner to his wife, introduced in evidence as exhibits. From the letter of May 9, 1944, we read: “ * * * The question of my enlisting to fight on the side of the Spanish Republicans against, Franco, Hit- ■ ler & Mussolini. Was in Detroit at the time. In my position as Secretary of the Wayne County Workers Alliance and also as Chairman of the Single Men’s Unemployed League (more on this organization later) was very strategically placed for getting recruits to go across. “And much as I hated it, because I was doing such a good job they kept on putting off and off my own date of departure. Finally put my feet down and insisted I be allowed to go. By this time it was getting toward the end. Finances were low. Arrived in New York with two auto workers. Were given a weeks vacation. “The boys were now going across without passports and stowing away on ships going to France. ‘Twas a beautiful system elaborately worked out and couldn’t have been successful if the crews weren’t overwhelmingly sympathetic to the cause. “Remember now as if it had just happened. There were S of us. Two from San Francisco, us three from Detroit. One morning the S. F. boys left and came back the next day. They ■ had gotten caught. Were unfamiliar with ships. That afternoon the announcement, We will only be able to send four. One of you will have to go back home.’ “A simple problem in arithmetic and finances. Cost less to send one person back to Detroit than San Francisco. The choice was left to us as to which one goes back. The 3 of us flipped coins. Two tails and one head fell. I had flipped a head. Given a bus ticket back to Detroit. Cursing my hard luck went back and resumed where I had left off. Thus ends a tale of how not to get to Spain. Incidentally of the last four who left, only one of the Detroit boys lived to come back.” In a letter written May 13, 1944, petitioner described a friendship he had developed with a man named Pete Kowal in Detroit, and stated: “In mentioning Spain said that soon I would be going across, that someone would be needed to take my place, that despite his lack of experience, thru diligent study he was capable of being that person, that it meant hard'work, something he was used to, and besides wherever he went he would run into the same conditions as existed in Detroit. “He-joined the party and decided to stick it out. From that nite we were inseparable. * * . * * * The-next week the secretary we had wasn’t doing so hot, ousted him and Pete elected in his place. “Pete helped me with, recruiting, too. As a result he was arrested with me by the FBI on February 6, 1940. Became a member of an exclusive club, the 59ers. All our prison numbers I believe started with 59.” Petitioner is also distressed over the fact the Board of Bar Examiners had access to certain confidential information already noted in our opinion and the fact the content of the file was not made known to him. As stated in our opinion, its author and the justices concurring therein at no time examined the content of this file. The sworn response of the Board of Bar Examiners to the original petition herein declared its recommendation was not based upon confidential information but upon facts disclosed by petitioner himself. Petitioner is now merely seeking to read some prejudice to himself into the proceedings where there is none in fact. No answer can now be made to petitioner’s request he be advised as to whether he will be permitted to take the bar examination at some future date. The answer to such a request will depend upon the showing then made and how it may be viewed by the Court. Other matters argued upon the motion for rehearing are found to be without merit. The motion for rehearing is hereby denied. It is so ordered. COMPTON,' C. J., and LUJAN and SADLER, JJ., concur.