Court Opinion

ID: 9898924
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-15 16:09:40.713277+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:52.590354
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Coriell, 2023-Ohio-4113.]

                                         COURT OF APPEALS
                                     MUSKINGUM COUNTY, OHIO
                                     FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

STATE OF OHIO,                                :       JUDGES:
                                              :       Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, P.J.
        Plaintiff - Appellee                  :       Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.
                                              :       Hon. Andrew J. King, J.
-vs-                                          :
                                              :
WILLIAM RALPH CORIELL,                        :       Case No. CT2023-0011
                                              :
        Defendant - Appellant                 :       OPINION

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                              Appeal from the Muskingum County
                                                      Court of Common Pleas, Case No.
                                                      CR2022-0568

JUDGMENT:                                             Affirmed

DATE OF JUDGMENT:                                     November 14, 2023

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Appellee                                For Defendant-Appellant

RON WELCH                                             RICHARD D. HIXON
Prosecuting Attorney                                  3808 James Court, Suite 2
Muskingum County, Ohio                                Zanesville, Ohio 43701

By: JOHN CONNOR DEVER
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
Muskingum County, Ohio
37 North Fifth St., P.O. Box 189
Zanesville, Ohio 43702
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0011                                                2

Baldwin, J.

       {¶1}   William R. Coriell appeals the verdict of the jury in the Muskingum County

Court of Common Pleas finding him guilty of domestic violence, a violation of R.C.

2919.25(A), a fourth degree felony as a result of a prior offense and Intimidation of an

Attorney, Victim or Witness in a Criminal Case, in violation of R.C. 2921.04(B)(1), a felony

of the third degree. Appellee is the State of Ohio.

                     STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND THE CASE

       {¶2}   Coriell contends the trial court erred when it permitted the victim of his

crimes to testify about his threats and assault and when it allowed a police officer to repeat

the victim’s post-assault complaint that Coriell had struck her, pushed her against the wall

and bruised her. He further contends the Counts should have been merged and that the

verdict was not supported by the manifest evidence. We reject Coriell’s claim that he was

entitled to shield his actions with the spousal privilege described in R.C. 2317.02(D), that

the victim’s statements were barred by the hearsay rule and that the charges should

merge.   We find that the verdict was supported by the evidence and that Coriell’s

Assignments of Error have no merit.

       {¶3}   Patrolman Logan Miller of the Zanesville Police Department responded to a

call from the victim, Katlin Curliss on October 28, 2022 claiming that her husband, William

Coriell, had assaulted her. She explained that she was obligated to appear at a trial

regarding domestic violence charges against Coriell later that morning, and that the

threats and assault were an attempt to persuade her to change her testimony.

       {¶4}   Curliss told Officer Miller that she returned to her room at the Travel Inn

where she and her husband were staying and they began arguing about the upcoming
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0011                                               3

domestic violence trial. She attempted to leave and Coriell grabbed her wrist and told her

that she was not going anywhere. She stayed in the room for several hours until it was

time to prepare to go to court.

       {¶5}   As she was preparing to leave, Coriell told her that “she needed to change

it, tell the judge nothing happened, and that she didn't want to file charges.” (Trial

Transcript, p. 182, lines 7-9). She told the Officer that Coriell “* * * grabbed her throat

and pushed her up against the wall and said, I want you to walk in the courtroom, tell the

judge that you want the charges dropped, that you were scared and upset, and that there

-- nothing else needs to happen with this” and then he let go. (Id. at lines 10-15). She

continued with her complaint by telling the Officer that they continued arguing and Coriell

grabbed her by the throat again and threw her down, injuring her elbow.

       {¶6}   Curliss insisted on showing the Officer each injury she received. Officer

Miller photographed each as she pointed out a bruise on her left arm, left elbow and left

wrist, a scratch and marks on her neck. Curliss filed a domestic violence complaint and

Officer Miller arrested Coriell.

       {¶7}   Coriell was charged with domestic violence, a violation of R.C. 2919.25(A),

a fourth degree felony as a result of a prior offense and Intimidation of an Attorney, Victim

or Witness in a Criminal Case in violation of R.C. 2921.04(B)(1), a felony of the third

degree. The case was presented to a jury who returned a guilty verdict and the trial court

imposed an aggregate prison term of thirty-six months.

       {¶8}   Coriell filed a timely appeal and submitted four Assignments of Error:
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0011                                           4

      {¶9}   “I. THE JURY’S GUILTY VERDICT AS TO COUNT TWO OF THE

INDICTMENT WAS BASED ON INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY EVIDENCE, IN VIOLATION

OF DEFENDANT/APPELLANT’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.”

      {¶10} “II. THE JURY’S GUILTY VERDICTS AS TO COUNTS ONE AND TWO OF

THE INDICTMENT WERE AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.”

      {¶11} “III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT COMPELLED MS. CURLISS’S

TESTIMONY, DESPITE THE ASSERTION OF THE R.C. SEC. 2317.02(D) SPOUSAL

PRIVILEGE BY DEFENDANT/APPELLANT.”

      {¶12} “III.     THE     TRIAL      COURT       ERRED        IN     SENTENCING

DEFENDANT/APPELLANT ON BOTH COUNTS ONE AND TWO, AS THE TWO

COUNTS SHOULD HAVE MERGED FOR THE PURPOSES OF SENTENCING UNDER

R.C. SEC. 2941.25.”

                                      ANALYSIS

      {¶13} Coriell has rearranged the order of his Assignments of Error between the

statement of the assignments and his argument. We will follow the order presented in his

argument.

      {¶14} Further, he modified the First Assignment of Error between the statement

of the assignments and the argument. In his argument, he describes the assignment of

error as “The Trial Court Erred When It Allowed Ms. Curliss’s Testimony Regarding

Communications Made Between Spouses In Coverture Despite The Assertion Of The

R.C. Sec. 2317.02(D) Spousal Privilege By Defendant/Appellant” but the corresponding

assignment of error in the statement of assignments is “The Trial Court Erred When It

Compelled Ms. Curliss’s Testimony, Despite The Assertion Of The R.C. Sec. 2317.02(D)
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0011                                               5

Spousal Privilege By Defendant/Appellant.” For purposes of our review, we will rely on

the assignment of error described in Coriell’s Argument.

                                              I.

       {¶15} Coriell argues in his First Assignment of Error that his demand that Curliss

“make it right” and his threats to her safety were communications made in coverture

without the presence of a third person competent to testify and therefore Curliss was not

permitted to testify regarding the content of those conversations or the acts he committed.

(R.C. 2317.02(D)). Coriell is implying, without stating, that the privilege is unlimited and

can be utilized to protect a criminal act when the victim is a spouse. We cannot accept

his interpretation of this statute and the privilege described therein.

       {¶16} The Tenth District Court of Appeals, relying on Sessions v. Trevitt (1883),

39 Ohio St. 259, found the purpose of spousal privilege is the “public policy which requires

that husband and wife not be allowed to betray the trust and confidence which are

essential to the happiness of the marital estate.” Harrison v. Harrison, 10th Dist. Franklin

No. 91AP-888, 1992 WL 40556, *2. The court found that the privilege provided under

R.C. 2317.02(D) does not apply to statements that “are not confidential in nature” and

that “abusive language and conduct of one spouse against another, [was] not privileged

because they are unrelated to preservation of the marital relationship and do not contain

an indicia of confidentiality. See Ohio v. Taylor (Aug. 10, 1988), Lorain App. No. 4280,

unreported (Judge George concurring).” Id.

       {¶17} “Verbal threats and violent acts between spouses are not marital

“confidences” which the privilege was intended to shield from courtroom disclosure.” State

v. Greaves, 6th Dist. No. H-11-012, 2012-Ohio-1989, 971 N.E.2d 987, ¶ 19. The goal of
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0011                                                 6

the privilege, to “promote marital peace and harmony” is “wholly lost where one spouse

has threatened or physically assaulted the other.” Id. at ⁋ 20.

       {¶18} Further, we have held that “[i]n criminal cases, spousal privilege is governed

by R.C. 2945.42* * * .” State v. Nowlin, 5th Dist. Muskingum No. CT2012-0015, 2012-

Ohio-4923, ¶ 38 and that statute expressly excludes communications made or acts done

“* * * in the case of personal injury by either the husband or wife to the other * * * .” “Such

threatening or turbulent behavior is incompatible with the traditional premise of inter-

spousal harmony out of which the confidences of marriage are imagined to

flow.”(Citations omitted.) Id. at ¶ 44.

       {¶19} Coriell threatened Curliss in an attempt to convince her to change her

testimony and followed the threats with a physical attack. We find the spousal privilege

inapplicable to Coriell’s statements and actions as they are incompatible with the

“traditional premise of inter-spousal harmony out of which the confidences of marriage

are imagined to flow” and inconsistent with the goal of marital peace and harmony. The

threats directed toward Curliss and her assault by Coriell are not communications or acts

that are protected by spousal privilege.

       {¶20} We find that the court did not err by denying Coriell’s assertion that Curliss’s

testimony violated the spousal privilege.

       {¶21} The First Assignment of Error is denied.

                                              II.

       {¶22} In his Second Assignment of Error, Coriell contends that the jury’s guilty

verdict as to charge of Intimidation of an Attorney, Defendant. Victim, or Witness in a

Criminal Case was based on inadmissible hearsay evidence. Coriell acknowledges that
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0011                                                 7

trial counsel did not object to the alleged hearsay testimony so he is obligated to persuade

this court that the admission of the testimony was plain error.

       {¶23} Pursuant to Crim.R. 52(B), a plain error or defect affecting substantial rights

may be noticed if not brought to the attention of the court. State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d

91, 94, 7 O.O.3d 178, 372 N.E.2d 804 (1978). Plain error is to be invoked only in

exceptional circumstances to avoid a miscarriage of justice. (Citation omitted.) Id.

       {¶24} The test for plain error is enunciated under Crim.R. 52(B). In order for

Crim.R. 52(B) to apply, a reviewing court must find that (1) there was an error, i.e., a

deviation from a legal rule; (2) that the error was plain, i.e., that there was an “obvious”

defect in the trial proceedings; and (3) that the error affected “substantial rights,” i.e.,

affected the outcome of the trial. (Citations omitted.) State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21,

27, 759 N.E.2d 1240 (2002). We will apply this test to determine whether the admission

of Curliss’s statements to the Officer was plain error.

       {¶25} Coriell contends the Officer’s repetition of Curliss’s statements was hearsay

and trial court committed plain error by admitting them. Evid.R. 801(C) defines hearsay

as “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or

hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Hearsay is

inadmissible at trial unless it falls under an exception to the rules of evidence.

       {¶26} The state counters that even if the statements are hearsay, they are

otherwise admissible as an excited utterance. The excited utterance exception to the

hearsay rule is contained in Evid.R. 803(2). If applicable, the exception is valid regardless

of whether the declarant is available as a witness.
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0011                                                8

       {¶27} An excited utterance is “[a] statement relating to a startling event or

condition made while the declarant is under the stress of excitement caused by the event

or condition.” The rationale for the admission of these statements is that the shock of the

event causes the declarant's reflective process to be halted. Thus, the statement is

unlikely to have been fabricated and carries a high degree of trustworthiness.

       {¶28} Coriell contends the shock of the alleged threats and assaults resolved

before Curliss made her statements to the Officer. While some time had passed between

the conflict and Curliss’s report, there is no per se amount of time after which a statement

can no longer be considered to be an excited utterance. The central requirements are

that the statement must be made while the declarant is still under the stress of the event

and the statement may not be a result of reflective thought.

       {¶29} Curliss reported the assault hours after the incident but it was still evident

to Officer Miller that she was under the stress of the event. He reported that “She was

very adamant about showing me. She started taking her shirt off kind of right in the middle

of the conversation, and I told her slow down a little bit, let's figure it out. But, yes, she

was very adamant about pointing to every specific injury.” (Trial Transcript, p. 195, line

25 to p. 196, line 4). Officer Miller confirmed that she was “[v]ery upset and adamant about

wanting to report it” and angry with Coriell. (Id. at p. 196, lines 5-6, 14-15). The record

supports a finding that Curliss was still under the influence of the stress of the event,

eroding the foundation that the trial court committed plain error.

       {¶30} The Supreme Court of Ohio has “acknowledged the discretionary aspect of

Crim.R. 52(B) by admonishing courts to notice plain error ‘with the utmost caution, under

exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.’ ” Barnes
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0011                                                    9

at 27, 759 N.E.2d 1240, quoting State v. Long (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 7 O.O.3d 178,

372 N.E.2d 804, paragraph three of the syllabus as quoted in State v. Lynn, 129 Ohio

St.3d 146, 2011-Ohio-2722, 950 N.E.2d 931, ¶ 14. Our review for plain error in the context

of this assignment of error is also limited by the rule that “[a] trial court is vested with broad

discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence in any particular case, so long as

such discretion is exercised in line with the rules of procedure and evidence.” Rigby v.

Lake Cty., 58 Ohio St.3d 269, 271, 569 N.E.2d 1056 (1991). An abuse of discretion is

more than a mere error in judgment; it is a “perversity of will, passion, prejudice, partiality,

or moral delinquency.” Pons v. Ohio State Med. Bd., 66 Ohio St.3d 619, 621, 614 N.E.2d

748 (1993).

       {¶31} We find no plain error in this case because we do not find that the trial court

abused its discretion by admitting the statement of Officer Logan Miller. There is sufficient

evidence to demonstrate that the statement was an excited utterance by Ms. Curliss as

she was still under the stress of the event.

       {¶32} The Second Assignment of Error is overruled.

                                               III.

       {¶33} In his Third Assignment of Error, Coriell contends that the jury’s verdict was

against the manifest weight of the evidence. He argues that Curliss’s testimony was

internally contradictory and incorporates his argument that the testimony of the Officer

was hearsay and should not have been permitted.

       {¶34} We have denied Coriell’s Second Assignment of Error and found that the

trial court did not commit plain error by failing to exclude Officer Miller’s testimony
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0011                                                 10

regarding Curliss’s description of the offense, so that issue is resolved leaving only

consideration of the credibility of Curliss.

       {¶35} In determining whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the

evidence, the court of appeals functions as the “thirteenth juror,” and after “reviewing the

entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility

of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly

lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must

be overturned and a new trial ordered.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678

N.E.2d 541, 547 (1997) quoting State v. Martin (1983), 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 20 OBR

215, 219, 485 N.E.2d 717, 720–721 Reversing a conviction as being against the manifest

weight of the evidence and ordering a new trial should be reserved for only the

“exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.” Id. See

State v. Acker, 5th Dist. Holmes No. 22CA008, 2023-Ohio-2085, ⁋ 36.

       {¶36} Coriell was charged with “knowingly causing or attempting to cause physical

harm” to his spouse, Curliss (Domestic Violence) and “knowingly and by force or by

unlawful threat of harm to [Curliss] or by unlawful threat to commit any offense or calumny

against [her] attempt to influence, intimidate, or hinder [her] in the filing or prosecution of

criminal charges.” (Intimidation).

       {¶37} Curliss clearly described Coriell’s assault of her and pointed out the bruises

to the Officer for photographing. While Coriell cites to the domestic violence charge in

his argument and requests that his assignment be granted generally, he does not

expressly contend that this charge was against the manifest weight of the evidence. After
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0011                                                 11

a review of the record, we find that the jury did not lose its way when it found Coriell guilty

of domestic violence.

       {¶38} The subject of Coriell’s threats and assault was the pending domestic

violence trial schedule for the next day. The circumstances support a conclusion that

Coriell acted to convince Curliss to “make it right” by changing her story in court. Coriell

offered no other explanation for his attack of Curliss. While Curliss’s testimony suggests

that she was not intimidated by the verbal and physical assaults, we find that the record

contains sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude, beyond a reasonable

doubt, that Coriell knowingly attempted to “to influence, intimidate, or hinder [Curliss] in

the filing or prosecution of criminal charges.”        After considering all the facts and

circumstances, we find that this was not “exceptional case in which the evidence weighs

heavily against the conviction.”

       {¶39} The Third Assignment of Error is denied.

                                              IV.

       {¶40} In his Fourth Assignment of Error, Coriell argues that the trial court erred by

failing to merge the two charges for sentencing pursuant to R.C. 2941.25, contending that

the separate incidents were part of a continuing course of conduct rather than multiple

occurrences.

       {¶41} Appellate review of an allied-offense question is de novo. State v. Miku, 5th

Dist. No. 2017 CA 00057, 2018-Ohio-1584, ¶ 70, appeal not allowed, 154 Ohio St.3d

1479, 2019-Ohio-173, 114 N.E.3d 1207 (2019), quoting State v. Williams, 134 Ohio St.3d

482, 2012-Ohio-5699, 983 N.E.2d 1245, ¶ 12.
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0011                                               12

       {¶42} Revised Code 2941.25 protects a criminal defendant's rights under the

Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and Ohio Constitutions by prohibiting

convictions of allied offenses of similar import:

              Where the same conduct by defendant can be construed to

       constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, the indictment or

       information may contain Counts for all such offenses, but the defendant may

       be convicted of only one.

              Where the defendant's conduct constitutes two or more offenses of

       dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in two or more offenses of

       the same or similar kind committed separately or with a separate animus as

       to each, the indictment or information may contain Counts for all such

       offenses, and the defendant may be convicted of all of them.

       {¶43} The application of R.C. 2941.25 requires a review of the subjective facts of

the case in addition to the elements of the offenses charged. State v. Hughes, 5th Dist.

Coshocton No. 15CA0008, 2016-Ohio-880, ¶ 21. In a plurality opinion, the Ohio Supreme

Court modified the test for determining whether offenses are allied offenses of similar

import. State v. Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 153, 2010-Ohio-6314, 942 N.E.2d 1061. The

Court directed us to look at the elements of the offenses in question and determine

“whether it is possible to commit one offense and commit the other with the same

conduct.” (Emphasis sic). Id. at ¶ 48. If the answer to such question is in the affirmative,

the court must then determine whether or not the offenses were committed by the same

conduct. Id. at ¶ 49. If the answer to the above two questions is yes, then the offenses

are allied offenses of similar import and will be merged. Id. at ¶ 50. If, however, the court
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0011                                              13

determines that commission of one offense will never result in the commission of the

other, or if there is a separate animus for each offense, then the offenses will not merge.

Id. at ¶ 51.

       {¶44} Johnson's rationale has been described by the Court as “incomplete.” State

v. Earley, 145 Ohio St.3d 281, 2015-Ohio-4615, 49 N.E.3d 266, ¶ 11. The Supreme Court

of Ohio has further instructed us to ask three questions when a defendant's conduct

supports multiple offenses: “(1) Were the offenses dissimilar in import or significance? (2)

Were they committed separately? and (3) Were they committed with separate animus or

motivation? An affirmative answer to any of the above will permit separate convictions.

The conduct, the animus, and the import must all be considered.” State v. Ruff, 143 Ohio

St.3d 114, 2015-Ohio-995, 34 N.E.3d 892, ¶ 31.

       {¶45} We have reviewed the record and find that there were two offenses

separated in time by several hours. After the first offense, Curliss went into the bathroom.

Hours later, when she was getting ready to go to court, the second offense occurred. The

offenses “were committed separately” and, therefore separate convictions are permitted.

       {¶46} The Fourth Assignment of Error is denied.
Muskingum County, Case No. CT2023-0011                                       14

      {¶47} The decision of the Muskingum County Court of Appeals is affirmed.

By: Baldwin, J.

Delaney, P.J. and

King, J. concur.