Court Opinion

ID: 9825832
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 14:07:30.810967+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:30:08.688357
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: AUGUST 25, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                          TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                           Court of Appeals

                              NO. 2022-CA-1232-MR

ERIN HELM                                                            APPELLANT

                 APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
v.              HONORABLE KELLY MARK EASTON, JUDGE
                       ACTION NO. 13-CR-00581

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                               APPELLEE

                                    OPINION
                                   AFFIRMING

                                   ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CALDWELL, JONES, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

JONES, JUDGE: Erin Helm appeals from the Hardin Circuit Court’s order

sentencing her to an alternate term of twelve months’ incarceration after she

absconded from pretrial diversion. Helm now contends the trial court did not have

authority to modify her diversion because the diversionary period had expired.

After considering the facts and the law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
                                        I. BACKGROUND

                On October 8, 2013, the Hardin County Commonwealth’s Attorney,

proceeding by information, charged Helm for nine counts of second-degree

criminal possession of a forged instrument.1 Helm had forged and cashed checks

belonging to Betty Hawk, with the total amount drawn on the forged checks

amounting to $221.46. Helm entered a negotiated guilty plea on the counts in the

indictment. Upon the Commonwealth’s recommendation, the trial court thereafter

sentenced Helm to a term of two years’ imprisonment, diverted for five years

under the state’s pretrial diversion program outlined in KRS 533.250. As part of

her conditions for pretrial diversion, Helm agreed to pay restitution of $221.46.

She also acknowledged that her diversion period would be supervised by the

Division of Probation and Parole. Helm agreed to the terms for diversion in both

her signed agreement with the Commonwealth and during her plea colloquy with

the trial court on October 15, 2013. If Helm completed the five-year diversionary

period successfully, her charges would be dismissed-diverted and would not

constitute a criminal conviction pursuant to KRS 533.258.

                Unfortunately, within two weeks, the trial court received an affidavit

from Helm’s probation officer indicating that she had absconded from supervision.

The trial court ordered a bench warrant for Helm’s arrest on October 31, 2013, but

1
    Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 516.060, a Class D felony.

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Helm was not arrested until April 9, 2015. The Commonwealth moved to void

Helm’s pretrial diversion based on the violation. In a hearing on the motion, Helm

acknowledged her wrongdoing. After ordering an evaluation, and in lieu of

revocation, the trial court added a condition that Helm must complete mental

health court to successfully complete her diversion.

             A little over one year later, on June 6, 2016, Helm reported to her

probation officer and listed her address as 105 Blackburn Road, Rineyville,

Kentucky. However, when the officer contacted the resident of 105 Blackburn

Road, the resident indicated that Helm had not lived there for approximately ten

days. This meant that Helm had filed a false report of her current address on June

6, and her whereabouts were once again unknown. Furthermore, the program

supervisor at mental health court filed an affidavit indicating that Helm had

absconded from the program on June 8, 2016. The trial court thereafter terminated

Helm from the mental health court program and issued another bench warrant for

her arrest. The bench warrant, entered on June 14, 2016, would not be executed

until August 29, 2022, when Helm turned herself in. The Commonwealth moved

to void Helm’s diversion on September 6, 2022, the same day Helm was brought

before the trial court on the warrant. The trial court explained to Helm that she had

violated her diversion and, with her permission, the diversion would be extended

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for another week so she and her lawyer could prepare for a hearing on the

violation. Helm agreed.

             On September 13, 2022, the trial court heard testimony from a

probation and parole officer outlining Helm’s history of noncompliance with the

terms of her diversion. The officer finished by pointing out that Helm had

effectively disappeared for six years, and probation and parole had no idea what

she had been doing in the meantime. Helm testified in her defense, stating how

mental health court had given her the tools to maintain sobriety, but she

acknowledged that absconding was a poor decision. She also stated that she turned

herself in because she wanted to do the right thing. Helm then testified that she

just made a payment on her restitution. The trial court, unimpressed, pointed out

that this payment, over nine years later, was the first time she had made any

payments toward her restitution. In response to her testimony that she was now

maintaining sobriety, the trial court also pointed out that she tested positive for

marijuana when she was arrested. Helm then admitted she had smoked marijuana.

             In the hearing’s final arguments, Helm’s counsel argued that the trial

court no longer had jurisdiction over the case because the diversionary period had

expired, and the Commonwealth had not filed a timely motion to void diversion.

As a result, Helm’s counsel asserted that the trial court had no option other than to

order the charges dismissed-diverted. The Commonwealth, citing the number and

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length of the times Helm had absconded, argued that Helm had shown no respect

for the trial court. The Commonwealth then asked the trial court to impose an

alternate sentence. The trial court agreed and ultimately declined to void Helm’s

diversion, instead ordering her to serve twelve months as an alternate sentence.

The trial court followed up on its order with a written memorandum explaining its

ruling. This appeal followed.

                                           II. ANALYSIS

                Pretrial diversion is conducted under the auspices of RCr2 8.04 and

KRS 533.250 et seq. A trial court’s decisions regarding pretrial diversion are

reviewed using the same criteria as decisions to revoke probation. Richardson v.

Commonwealth, 494 S.W.3d 495, 498 (Ky. App. 2015). “A decision to revoke

probation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Andrews, 448

S.W.3d 773, 780 (Ky. 2014) (citation omitted). “Under our abuse of discretion

standard of review, we will disturb a ruling only upon finding that ‘the trial judge’s

decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal

principles.’” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky.

1999)).

                In her sole argument on appeal, Helm contends the trial court

incorrectly ruled that it had the authority to impose a sanction after the

2
    Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure.

                                              -5-
diversionary period had expired. Helm asserts “[t]he only action the trial court was

authorized to take was to enter a final disposition of the case as diverted-

dismissed.” (Appellant’s Brief at 6.) For support, she cites as authority Ballard v.

Commonwealth, 320 S.W.3d 69 (Ky. 2010), and Tucker v. Commonwealth, 295

S.W.3d 455 (Ky. App. 2009). These cases collectively stand for the proposition

that, although a trial court has authority to void diversion after expiration of the

diversionary period, a “motion by [the] Commonwealth to void [a] diversion

agreement is ‘required to be made before expiration of the pretrial diversion

period.’” Ballard, 320 S.W.3d at 74 (quoting Tucker, 295 S.W.3d at 458). Helm

asserts that the Commonwealth failed to file a motion to void her diversion prior to

its expiration, which left the trial court with no authority except to dismiss the

charges as diverted in her case.

             Helm is correct regarding the points of law in her cited authorities.

However, she fails to recognize that these authorities are inapplicable to the facts

of her case. The crucial distinguishing factors are (1) the trial court never voided

her diversion, and (2) the trial court issued a bench warrant for her arrest after she

absconded during the diversionary period. In its memorandum explaining its

decision, the trial court pointed out that “[t]he law recognizes probation and

diversion are to be generally treated the same.” (Record (R.) at 106.) The trial

court also noted that KRS 533.254(1) applies the provisions of KRS 533.020 to

                                          -6-
pretrial diversion, which extends the probationary period while a warrant is

pending.

             The trial court’s analysis is correct. KRS 533.254(1) states, in

relevant part, that “[t]he provisions of KRS 533.020 relating to the period of

probation shall, in so far as possible, be applicable to the period of pretrial

diversion[.]” KRS 533.020(4) reads, in relevant part, that “[u]pon completion of

the probationary period, probation with an alternative sentence, or the period of

conditional discharge, the defendant shall be deemed finally discharged, provided

no warrant issued by the court is pending against him[.]” (Emphasis added.) The

Kentucky Supreme Court explained:

                     The language of KRS 533.020(4) is clear:
             probation is automatically discharged upon completion of
             a probationary period unless it has been revoked or an
             arrest warrant is pending. If neither condition exists, the
             trial court loses jurisdiction both to revoke and to modify
             the conditions of probation. A warrant remains
             “pending” until the defendant is brought before the court
             at which time, given probable cause to do so, the court
             may extend the probationary period for a reasonable time
             until a revocation hearing can be held.

Commonwealth v. Tapp, 497 S.W.3d 239, 242 (Ky. 2016). More succinctly, “the

issuance of a warrant for a probation violation will toll the period of probation

preventing the probationer from being automatically discharged pursuant to KRS

533.020(4).” Whitcomb v. Commonwealth, 424 S.W.3d 417, 420 (Ky. 2014).

                                          -7-
              There are very few cases discussing KRS 533.020(4) in the context of

extending pretrial diversion based on a pending warrant. The unpublished cases

which are on point, however, agree that a pending warrant permits the trial court to

continue exercising jurisdiction over the case; see, e.g., McElroy v.

Commonwealth, No. 2005-CA-002547-MR, 2006 WL 3375244 (Ky. App. Nov.

22, 2006); Kopp v. Commonwealth, No. 2002-CA-001629-MR, 2004 WL

816441(Ky. App. Apr. 16, 2004).3 Furthermore, the statutory language is

expansive, indicating that the General Assembly wished to apply the provisions of

KRS 533.020 to pretrial diversion “in so far as possible.” KRS 533.254(1). “Our

ultimate goal when reviewing and applying statutes is to give effect to the intent of

the General Assembly. . . . We also presume that the General Assembly did not

intend an absurd statute or an unconstitutional one.” Commonwealth v. Wright,

415 S.W.3d 606, 609 (Ky. 2013) (citing Shawnee Telecom Resources, Inc. v.

Brown, 354 S.W.3d 542, 551 (Ky. 2011)).

              As the trial court noted in its memorandum, “For the law to be

interpreted and applied to permit a multiyear absconding without consequence

would be an absurd result which the General Assembly could not possibly have

intended when considering how the various relevant statutes are to be applied.”

(R. at 108.) Despite her nearly complete history of noncompliance, during which

3
  Pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Appellate Procedure (RAP) 41, these unpublished cases are not
binding authority and are cited only for their illustrative value on the relevant point of law.

                                              -8-
Helm was supervised for approximately fourteen months instead of the five years

to which she agreed, the trial court nonetheless gave her an alternate sentence

which will ultimately result in diverted charges rather than a felony record. We

discern no abuse of discretion.

                                   III. CONCLUSION

             For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Hardin

Circuit Court.

             ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                    BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Sarah D. Dailey                          Daniel Cameron
Frankfort, Kentucky                      Attorney General of Kentucky

                                         Christopher Henry
                                         Assistant Attorney General
                                         Frankfort, Kentucky

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