Court Opinion

ID: 9425079
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:13:39.784626+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:53.551377
License: Public Domain

Mr. Chief Justice Burger,
with whom Mr. Justice Blackmun joins,
dissenting.
The history of this cause is so remarkable — indeed unique in the annals of modern federal jurisprudence, so far as I am aware — that I must preface my dissent on the *390merits with a recital of the course of this litigation over nearly a dozen years. This protracted litigation, conducted at enormous cost, now comes to an abrupt end on an issue directly presented to this Court nearly eight years ago but not decided. As the strange history will demonstrate, resolution of the issue when it was first before the Court, as now decided, would have terminated this litigation without having the parties invest untold efforts and vast expense in a now wholly irrelevant contest over the proper measure of damages.
On June 30, 1961, TWA filed a complaint against the Hughes Tool Co. in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, charging violations of the antitrust laws. On February 7, 1962, the District Court filed a pretrial order, appointing a Special Master to act in discovery and deposition proceedings. After discovery proceeded to an impasse, on February 1, 1963, the District Court ordered Howard Hughes to appear for a deposition and ordered the defendant Toolco to produce certain documents that it had previously refused to produce. Shortly thereafter, on February 7, 1963, the District Court entered a memorandum opinion and order denying a motion to dismiss TWA’s complaint.1 In response to the order to produce Hughes for examination along with the contested documents, Toolco filed a “notice of position,” on February 8, 1963, advising the District Court and TWA that it had chosen to rest on the merits of its positions in order to “avoid the burdens and expenses involved in further pretrial and trial proceedings prior to the time that an appellate court has had the opportunity to rule upon the decisions and orders heretofore made herein.”
This “notice of position” constituted a default and accordingly judgment was entered against Toolco, on *391May 3, 1963. The District Court then certified to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit the question of the sufficiency of the complaint on which the default judgment was based. The issue of damages was referred to the Special Master. On June 2, 1964, the Second Circuit issued an opinion in which it decided that the District Court had jurisdiction of the action and that the orders of the Civil Aeronautics Board affecting the relationship between the parties did not constitute a good defense to the antitrust claims of TWA.2 On November 16, 1964, this Court granted certiorari to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals.3 After full argument and briefing, but without opinion, the writ was dismissed as improvidently granted on March 8, 1965,4 and the case returned to the District Court for further proceedings to determine the amount of TWA’s damages.
For nearly three years, proceedings were held before the Special Master 5 to determine the appropriate amount of damages. On December 23, 1969, the District Court filed a new opinion confirming a report of the Special Master awarding damages amounting to $137,611,435.95.6 On April 14, 1970, the District Court filed a superseding order in which it added to the TWA award $7,500,000 as a reasonable attorney's fee (representing some 56,000 hours of work at a “mixed rate” of $128 per hour) and $336,705.12 in costs, for a total of $145,448,141.07, plus interest. The judgment was stayed pending a renewed appeal to the Court of Appeals, which, *392on September 1, 1971, affirmed the judgment of the District Court, with only slight modification.7
This Court again granted certiorari on February 22, 1972,8 and today — more than 11 years after it all began and more than seven years after the now-determinative issue was brushed aside by this Court — the Court discovers that the actions alleged in TWA’s complaint were immunized from the antitrust laws by the Civil Aeronautics Board’s role in the Toolco-TWA relationship. This, of course, was the precise issue tendered to this Court for decision in 1964 in order to secure an early decision that might end the contest before enormous additional sums were expended in proving damages resulting from the actions alleged in TWA’s complaint.9
*393This capsule chronicle of the present litigation barely suggests its factual complexity. To describe this litigation as a 20th-century sequel to Bleak House is only a slight exaggeration. Dickens himself could scarcely have imagined that 56,000 hours of lawyering at a cost of $7,500,000 would represent the visible expenses of only one party to a modern intercorporate conflict, to say nothing of the time of corporate and management personnel diverted from their daily tasks.10 Indeed, today’s “ending” is quite a surprise — as great a surprise for some of us as it must be for the parties. I suggest it will even surprise the victors, for in the oral argument to this Court only a few fleeting comments were devoted to the point that now becomes the dispositive issue in the case. Of course, this was a sound allocation by counsel of the limited time allowed for argument since the Court had not considered the point worthy of notice in 1964 when the case was first here.
To be sure, all this is secondary to the correctness of today’s decision. I am unable to join the Court’s disposition because I believe it departs markedly from our prior decisions uniformly holding that repeal of the antitrust laws to accommodate other federal regulatory statutes “is to be regarded as implied only if necessary to make the [regulatory scheme] work, and even then only to the minimum extent necessary.” Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U. S. 341, 357 (1963). In particular, the Court today substantially enlarges the scope of Pan American World Airways v. United States, 371 U. S. 296 (1963), a case which the Court says “requires” the result it reaches today — notwithstanding that *394Pan American’s teaching was available in Volume 371 of the United States Reports when the Court dismissed the writ in this cause as improvidently granted.
I
Passing to the merits of the Court’s holding, I find it necessary at the outset to supplement the Court’s description of the statutory framework from which this litigation arises. Section 408 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U. S. C. § 1378,11 requires the approval of the *395CAB when any person12 seeks to acquire a controlling interest in any air carrier. The Board may approve such acquisition only if it finds that the acquisition will be consistent with the public interest. § 408 (b), 49 U. S. C. § 1378 (b). Specifically, the Board “shall not approve any . . . acquisition of control which would result in creating a monopoly or monopolies and thereby restrain competition or jeopardize another air carrier not a party to the . . . acquisition of control.” Ibid.
The Act fails to elaborate on the scope of its command to the CAB not to approve any acquisition that would create a monopoly and thereby restrain competition. In other words, the Act fails to specify the relevant market or markets to which the Board must look in determining whether a particular acquisition or exercise of control is forbidden. Section 102 of the Act,13 *396enumerating the general policies that are to guide the Board, is similarly ambiguous. It includes among those factors to be weighed in evaluating the “public interest” factor under the Act “[c]ompetition to the extent necessary to assure the sound development of an air-transportation system properly adapted to the needs of the . . . commerce of the United States . . . Again, though, the question is: competition by whom? In which market or markets?
There can be no doubt the Board is responsible for promoting competition in some sense; our inquiry is whether the Board is charged with fostering competition both within the air transportation market and without, in other markets essentially unrelated to air transportation and alien to the purposes for which the Board was created. Resolution of this ambiguity is *397critical to proper interpretation of § 414 of the Act,14 which confers antitrust immunity upon “[a]ny person affected by any order made under [§ 408, inter alia] . . . insofar as may be necessary to enable such person to do anything authorized, approved, or required by such order.” What is “authorized, approved, or required” by the CAB must surely be determined, at least to a very large extent, by the scope of the Board’s mandate to evaluate potentially anticompetitive conduct.
II
The Court today neglects to resolve, or indeed even mention, this problem, and well it might, for the legislative history of the Act demonstrates that the competitive concerns that troubled the framers of the Aviation Act related exclusively to competition by and among air carriers. A major impetus to federal regulations of air transportation was the failure of the preceding era of freely competitive price and route warfare to bring stability to the Nation’s air transport industry. In his statement accompanying the report of the Committee on Commerce on the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Senator Copeland stated:
“Competition among air carriers is being carried to an extreme, which tends to jeopardize the financial status of the air carriers and to jeopardize and render unsafe a transportation service appropriate to the needs of commerce and required in the public in*398terest, in the interests of the Postal Service, and of the national defense. Aviation in America today, under present laws, is unsatisfactory to investors, labor, and the air carriers themselves. . . . The committee feels that this bill will not only promote an orderly development of our Nation’s civil aeronautics, but by its immediate enactment prevent the spread of bad practices and of destructive and wasteful tactics resulting from the intense competition now existing within the air-carrier industry.” S. Rep. No. 1661, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., 2 (1938).
Similar views were voiced by the Chairman of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Congressman Clarence Lea:
“Under existing law there is little economic regulation of air carriers. Routes are awarded not upon the basis of the ability of the particular air carrier to perform the service or the requirements of the public convenience and necessity, but upon the letting of air-mail contracts to the lowest responsible bidders. This system has completely broken down in recent months, because the air carriers, in their desire to secure the right to carry the mail over a new route, have made absurdly low bids, indeed, have virtually evinced a willingness to pay for the privilege of carrying the mail over a particular route. A route once secured, however, under the existing system of air-mail contracts does not protect the air carrier operating that route from possible cutthroat competition, for air carriers are not required to secure a certificate or other authorization from the Government before beginning operations, other than one based upon safety requirements. Nor, is there any authority in the Federal Government under existing law to prevent *399competing carriers from engaging in rate wars which would be disastrous to all concerned.
“The result of this chaotic situation of the air carriers has been to shake the faith of the investing public in their financial stability and to prevent the flow of funds into the industry.” H. R. Rep. No. 2254, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., 2 (1938).
A key aim of the new legislation, then, was to eliminate “cutthroat competition” among air carriers. From the beginning, the air carriers pushed for a scheme of regulation to control entry and regulate price competition in the air transportation market. Yet equally soon after serious consideration of an air regulation bill began, the prospect of regulation gave rise to concern that the new system of regulation might be used to foster the development of an “airline trust” or similar overconcentration in the air transportation market. In 1937, Commissioner Eastman of the Interstate Commerce Commission, who supported full federal regulation of air transportation, reminded the members of the Senate Commerce Committee that the proposed legislation would give the Commission unlimited authority to consolidate the Nation’s airlines and, possibly, to do away with competition altogether. Eastman suggested that language be drafted to preclude undue consolidation among carriers.15 As one commentator has stated, “Eastman’s suggestion appears to have been heeded, for when the [1937] bill was reported, the merger clause contained [the language which became the anti-monopoly restriction of section 408].” Comment, Merger and Monopoly in Domestic Aviation, 62 Col. *400L. Rev. 851, 856-857 (1962). Final consideration of the aviation bill was postponed until the next session of Congress, but when Senator McCarran and Representative Lea introduced legislation at the 1938 session to create an independent air regulatory agency, both bills “contained a monopoly proviso virtually identical to the one that had been added to the 1937 bills, as reported.” Id., at 857.
To implement § 408’s scheme for balancing stability with competition in the air transportation market, the bill provided explicit antitrust immunity in § 414.16 The debates over § 414 — like the origins of § 408 — reflect congressional concern with competition in the air transportation market. Senator McKellar asked Senator Truman, a major supporter of the aviation bill, if it were true that the proposed legislation would repeal the antitrust provisions of the existing airmail laws. When Senator Truman answered in the affirmative, Senator McKellar complained that:
“[S]uch a provision is very inadvisable, and very bad legislation, and ought never to be agreed to. *401As everyone knows, at the present time the air companies are complaining that they are not allowed to consolidate. Some years ago we allowed them to consolidate, and the result was the greatest ill that ever befell the air companies. The same ill will befall them again if such combinations are permitted.

“I desire to state that I cannot vote for any bill which proposes that a commission shall give air companies the right to combine and confederate into a huge monopoly. I regret very much that I shall have to vote against the bill.” 83 Cong. Rec. 6728-6729.
Senator McCarran disagreed. He told Senator McKellar that the bill “contain [ed] every protection against the very thing which the Senator from Tennessee fears.” Senator Truman reminded his colleagues of the § 408 proviso requiring that the Board approve no acquisition of control that would “result in creating a monopoly or monopolies and thereby unduly restrain competition or unreasonably jeopardize another air carrier not a party to the consolidation . . . .” Senator McCarran agreed that “every precaution has been written into the bill so that the antitrust laws and all laws for the prevention of combinations and monopolies shall be enforced. . . . Protection has been written into the bill against combinations and monopolies in restraint of trade, in restraint of commerce, and in restraint of everything which would constitute a monopoly.” Id., at 6729. Senator Copeland recited five different provisions of the bill “where the question of monopoly is dealt with in one way or another with the view to its control and prevention.” When the debate turned from the discussion of general, principles to ap*402plication of those principles to a particular fact situation, again the Senators spoke of consolidation and competition by air carriers.17
Thus, the debates, as well as the remainder of the legislative history of the 1938 Act, reflect that the Congress that enacted the 1938 legislation was concerned only with problems of competition and monopoly in the air carrier market. Moreover, the debates show that there was considerable concern over even the limited grant of antitrust immunity deemed necessary to provide the proposed authority with sufficient flexibility to administer the air carrier market in the public interest. It is most unlikely that the concerns expressed would have been put to rest by extending the new authority’s pre-emptive antitrust responsibilities under § 408 beyond the air transportation market into every market that might happen to be touched by transactions with an air carrier.
Ill
Our holding in Pan American World Airways v. United States, 371 U. S. 296, becomes important in this setting. There, the Government filed an antitrust complaint alleging, inter alia, anticompetitive interference by Pan American with the route acquisitions of Panagra, a joint venture of Pan American World Airways and W. R. Grace & Co. This court held that the complaint should be dismissed. The Court stood behind the presumption against implied antitrust immunity, 371 U. S., at 304-305, n. 9; however, for two interdependent reasons, the Court held that the conduct alleged in Panagra’s complaint. was immunized from the antitrust laws. First, the conduct specified in the complaint fell within the *403Board’s basic mission and competency — the regulation of entry into and competition within the air transportation market:
"Limitation of routes and divisions of territories and the relation of common carriers to air carriers are basic in this regulatory scheme.” Id., at 305.
Second, and equally important, we held that § 411 of the Act gave the Board a specific substantive mandate to investigate and regulate unfair practices and unfair methods of competition among air carriers in the air transportation market, id., at 302, 308.
In Pan American the Board had not only the statutory power to supervise the relevant transactions but also the statutory responsibility to remedy the abusive features of those transactions specified in the Panagra complaint. Consequently, “If the courts were to intrude independently with their construction of the antitrust laws, two regimes might collide.” Id., at 310. Even this narrow holding provoked the dissent of Mr. Justice Brennan, in which Mr. Chief Justice Warren joined.
The present case is different from Pan American in a critical respect. Here, we may assume the Board possesses full authority under the Act to supervise § 408 transactions between a controlling person and an air carrier — just as in Pan American, the allocation of routes and division of territories constituted the basic stuff of the Board’s day-to-day business. Yet, unlike the acts specified by Panagra in Pan American, the acts charged in TWA’s complaint are components of an antitrust conspiracy to restrain trade in the aircraft supply and manufacturing market. Section 411 does not command Board responsibility for preventing such a conspiracy, since § 411 is in terms restricted to unfair methods of competition “in air transportation or the sale thereof.” Thus, to sustain its result in this case, the Court must *404fall back on one (or both) of two propositions: it must either find some specific authority in the Federal Aviation Act other than § 411 for its conclusion that the Board’s mandate to police anticompetitive practices extends to the subject matter of TWA’s complaint; or it must consider such statutory authority irrelevant to a finding of antitrust immunity. Neither approach is, in my view, sound.
IV
A. Improbable as it seems, there is much in the Court's opinion to suggest that its judgment rests upon the assumption that antitrust immunity is conferred here simply by virtue of a rather - extensive grant of procedural authority for. the Board to intervene in the control-person-air-carrier relationship. The Court recounts in detail the history of the Board’s involvement in the Toolco-TWA relationship — though the Court does not suggest, as it cannot, that the Board specifically considered the actions by Toolco alleged in TWA’s complaint to violate the antitrust laws.18 The Court tells *405us that in 1950, the Board embarked upon a wide-ranging evaluation of the treatment afforded TWA by Toolco as the controlling person — though the Court does not sug*406gest, as again it cannot, that the 1950 proceeding of the Board even remotely considered Toolco’s actions as components of an antitrust conspiracy directed toward the aircraft supply and manufacturing market.19 Finally, *407the Court makes much of the powers of investigation and continuing supervision provided by § 415 of the Act — though the Court does not acknowledge that those powers are explicitly limited by Congress to Board actions “[f]or the purpose of exercising and performing [the Board’s] powers and duties under this Act,” and are therefore no indication of the scope of the Board’s substantive responsibility.
The weakness inherent in the Court’s recitation of "procedural underbrush” is that it leaps from the premise of the Board’s acknowledged procedural power to intervene in § 408 “control” transactions to the conclusion that the Board’s substantive statutory duty to consider the anticompetitive impact of such transactions is or, for some reason of policy, ought to be equally unlimited. Yet, inescapably, it is the Board’s substantive mandate upon which antitrust immunity properly turns; as our prior decisions teach, the potential of colliding substantive judgments forces the carving out of antitrust immunity, not simply the overlapping of jurisdiction to intervene in a particular type of transaction. We have uniformly insisted upon a substantive mandate to the regulatory agency to consider fully and remedy the relevant anticompetitive conduct. See, in addition to Pan American, supra, United States v. Borden Co., 308 U. S. 188, 206 (1939) (relevant provision of Capper-Volstead Act “does not cover the entire field of the Sherman Act”); Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 *408U. S. 439, 458 (1945) (“no warrant in the Interstate Commerce Act and the Sherman Act for saying that the authority to fix joint through rates clothes with legality a conspiracy to discriminate against a State or a region, to use coercion in the fixing of rates, or to put in the hands of a combination of carriers a veto power over rates proposed by a single carrier”); Milk Producers Assn. v. United States, 362 U. S. 458, 469 (1960) (§ 7 of Clayton Act immunized “transactions duly consummated pursuant to authority given by . . . the Secretary of Agriculture” under statutory authority, but this included only marketing agreements and not agreements or restraints of wider scope typically covered by the antitrust laws) ; California v. Federal Power Comm’n, 369 U. S. 482, 485 (1962) (“Here . . . while ‘antitrust considerations’ are relevant to the issue of ‘public interest, convenience, and necessity’ . . . there is no ‘pervasive regulatory scheme’ ... including the antitrust laws that has been entrusted to the Commission”); United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U. S. 321, 351-352 (1963) (though Comptroller of Currency was required to consider effect on competition in passing on bank merger, not required to give the factor any particular weight, to hold a hearing, or to subject his determination to judicial review).
B. The major premise of the Court’s decision must, then, be that the Federal Aviation Act imposes on the Board full responsibility for evaluating and preventing anticompetitive impact, of whatever variety, flowing from a control transaction touching an air carrier. As the Court puts it, “Competition and monopoly — two ingredients of the antitrust laws — are thus standards governing the CAB’s exercise of authority in granting, allowing, or expanding or contracting the control which Tooleo had over TWA by reason of the various orders issued by the CAB under § 408.”
*409I cannot agree with the Court’s reading of the provisions of the Act that require the Board to maintain competition. The Court offers no support for its reading of those provisions; and, as I have already indicated, the legislative history surely provides none. Moreover, the Board itself has consistently interpreted the Act not to impose on it the expansive role the Court now perceives for the first time. In a brief amicus curiae filed in 1964 and again in 1972, the Board disclaimed the mandate or the competency to police the aircraft supply market or any non-air carrier market which may be threatened by anticompetitive acts involving control of an air carrier. We have only recently reaffirmed the well-established doctrine that the consistent administrative construction of federal legislation “is entitled to great weight.” Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., ante, at 210; Udall v. Tollman, 380 U. S. 1, 16 (1965); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424, 433-434 (1971). As for the Board’s competence to do the job assigned it by the Court, we are not tied to the Board’s self-appraisal, but “it is entitled to some weight,” particularly when the legal issues surrounding Toolco’s alleged behavior in the aircraft supply market “are typical antitrust problems and not at all typical airline law problems.” “The search for a practical accommodation of court and agency ... is not advanced by our ignoring the agency’s considered sense of self-limitation.” Pan American World Airways, supra, at 328, 330 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
If the Board’s basic function, the Act’s legislative history, and the Board’s view of its own mandate and competence were not enough to convince me that the Court’s reading of the Act is erroneous, these factors are at least enough to raise substantial doubts. Such doubts, as our prior cases teach, are enough to secure the continuing availability of anti*410trust or other judicial remedies as additional safeguards for protection of the public interest. “Repeals of the antitrust laws by implication from a regulatory statute are strongly disfavored.” United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, supra, at 350, United States v. Borden Co., 308 U. S., at 198 (“a cardinal principle of construction that repeals by implication are not favored”). See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 226-228 (1940); Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U. S., at 456-457; California v. Federal Power Comm’n, 369 U. S., at 485, and 14 additional cases cited in Mr. Justice Brennan’s opinion for the Court in United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, supra, at 350 n. 28. The traditional aversion to implied repeal of the antitrust laws should have particular force in the context of the Federal Aviation Act, which explicitly states that “[n]othing contained in this chapter shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by statute, but the provisions of this chapter are in addition to such remedies.” 49 U. S. C. § 1506; and see Pan American World Airways, supra, at 321 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Nor does the Court’s result seem justifiable for practical reasons of regulatory accommodation. Indeed, I find the Court’s expansive reading of the Board’s antitrust responsibilities inconsistent with our duty “to make the [regulatory scheme] work.” Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U. S., at 357. Section 408 of the Act has now been amended to require Board approval when any person, whether or not engaged in any aspect of aeronautics, acquires a controlling interest in an air carrier. In this age of conglomerate mergers, the time may soon arrive when another industrial corporation seeks to acquire control of an air carrier. It may well be that some similar future acquisition may be in the best interests of American air transportation. It may *411likewise pose serious anticompetitive dangers. The Court’s decision today will, I think, provide a serious obstacle to proper consideration of any such transaction that may be proposed in future years, since the Board will be faced with a difficult dilemma. If it approves the control acquisition, under the terms of the Court’s decision the Board engages itself to exercise continuing supervision over all aspects of the control relationship, including the anticompetitive impact of the relationship in the computer market, the hotel market, the insurance market, the credit market, or whatever market happens to be affected by the control transaction. Quite understandably, the Board’s response may be to play it safe, in keeping with its own advice to this Court that it cannot effectively function as the ombudsman of the American economy whenever that economy touches air transportation in any way. On the other hand, the Board may feel obliged to heed the Court’s yawning interpretation of § 408. This course of action poses the threat that the Board will have extended itself so far beyond its competence and manpower that it is diverted from those central tasks of regulation imposed on it by § 408 of the Act. In either event, I cannot imagine that the Court’s new reading of § 408 will contribute to the effective enforcement of the congressional scheme for promoting a sound national system of air transportation.
Returning to the 1964 efforts of Toolco to have the Court resolve the issue of the Board’s authority with respect to the antitrust issue, it is elementary, of course, that a denial of a petition for certiorari decides nothing. It is also true that dismissal of a petition as improvidently granted, after full oral argument and briefing, is not a judgment on the merits in any sense. But when parties to litigation reach that stage and the Court fails to respond with a decision on the merits, lawyers read that as a signal that the case should proceed. These parties *412did so — for nine years and more than 15 million dollars in legal expense — only to be told by the Court now that on the facts there is no legal liability — the very issue that could as well have been decided in 1964 as today. All of the litigation since 1964 has been confined to the massive task of determining damages and it will not do to say that the Court could not resolve the legal issues until damages were ascertained. Precisely the contrary is true.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the Court’s judgment. I would hold that actions permitted by the Board under § 408 of the Federal Aviation Act are “authorized, approved, or required” by the Board’s action (and thereby immunized by § 414 from antitrust liability) only to the extent that the antitrust claim falls within the core of the Board’s statutory responsibility to regulate air transportation while maintaining, in that market, the maximum degree of competition consistent with the public interest. In view of the Court’s disposition, it would not be fruitful for me to express at length my views on the other issues presented to the Court, other than to note that, with modifications not relevant to the overriding issue, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. At the very least, I would set the cases for reargument so the dispositive issue might be fully explored by the Court.

 32 F. R. D. 604.

 332 F. 2d 602.

 379 U. S. 912.

 380 U. S. 248.

 Herbert Brownell replaced J. Lee Rankin as Special Master when Rankin resigned in December 1965 to become Corporation Counsel for New York City.

 308 F. Supp. 679.

 449 F. 2d 51.

 405 U. S. 915.

 Toolco’s 1964 petition for certiorari posed three questions, the first being as follows:
“1. Where the Civil Aeronautics Board has approved the acquisition of a controlling stock interest in an air carrier by a person engaged „in a phase of aeronautics and has further approved or has jurisdiction to approve all relevant transactions between them under an Act which immunizes the approved transactions from the antitrust laws, does the district court have jurisdiction to entertain a complaint by such air carrier alleging that the transactions between the subsidiary air carrier and its parent violated the antitrust laws in that they constituted a conspiracy, an attempt to monopolize and an acquisition in violation of the antitrust laws?”
Toolco’s petition in the present ease posed seven questions, the fourth of which was as follows:
“4. When the Civil Aeronautics Board has approved an acquisition of control over an air carrier by a person engaged in a phase of aeronautics and has further approved all relevant transactions between them, is the exercise of that control to determine how the air carrier acquires aircraft and the necessary financing therefor immunized from the operation of the antitrust laws under Section 414 of the Federal Aviation Act?”

 It is not unreasonable to assume that the battalions of lawyers for these adversaries devoted substantially the same effort and time, thus bringing counsel fees in the aggregate to the sum of $15 million.

 Section 408, 49 U. S. C. § 1378, reads in pertinent part as follows:
“(a) Prohibited acts.
“It shall be unlawful unless approved by order of the Board as provided in this section—
“(2) For any air carrier, any person controlling an air carrier, any other common carrier, or any person engaged in any other phase of aeronautics, to purchase, lease, or contract to operate the properties, or any substantial part thereof, of any air carrier;
“(5) For any air carrier or person controlling an air carrier, any other common carrier, any person engaged in any other phase of aeronautics, or any other person to acquire control of any air carrier in any manner whatsoever: Provided, That the Board may by order exempt any such acquisition of a noncertificated air carrier from this requirement to the extent and for such periods as may be in the public interest;
“(b) Application to Board; hearing; approval; disposal without hearing.
“Any person seeking approval of a consolidation, merger, purchase, lease, operating contract, or acquisition of control, specified in subsection (a) of this section, shall present an application to the Board, and thereupon the Board shall notify the persons involved in the consolidation, merger, purchase, lease, operating contract, or acquisition of control, and other persons known to have a substantial interest in the proceeding, of the time and place of a public hearing. Unless, after such hearing, the Board finds that the consolidation, *395merger, purchase, lease, operating contract, or acquisition of control will not be consistent with the public interest or that the conditions of this section will not be fulfilled, it shall by order approve such consolidation, merger, purchase, lease, operating contract, or acquisition of control, upon such terms and conditions as it shall find to be just and reasonable and with such modifications as it may prescribe: Provided, That the Board shall not approve any consolidation, merger, purchase, lease, operating contract, or acquisition of control which would result in creating a monopoly or monopolies and thereby restrain competition or jeopardize another air carrier not a party to the consolidation, merger, purchase, lease, operating contract, or acquisition of control . . .

 Section 408 (a) (5) was amended in 1969 to require Board approval of an acquisition of control of an air carrier by “any other person.” 83 Stat. 103, 49 U. S. C. § 1378 (a)(5). Prior to 1969, the Act required Board approval only for acquisition of control of an air carrier by another air carrier, by persons having other specified transportation interests, or by a “person engaged in any other phase of aeronautics.”

 Section 102, 49 U. S. C. § 1302, reads:
“In the exercise and performance of its powers and duties under this chapter, the Board shall consider the following, among other *396things, as being in the public interest, and in accordance with the public convenience and necessity:
“(a) The encouragement and development of an air-transportation system properly adapted to the present and future needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United States, of the Postal Service, and of the national defense;
“(b) The regulation of air transportation in such manner as to. recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of, assure the highest degree of safety in, and foster sound economic conditions in, such transportation, and to improve the relations between, and coordinate transportation by, air carriers;
“(c) The promotion of adequate, economical, and efficient service by air carriers at reasonable charges, without unjust discriminations, undue preferences or advantages, or unfair or destructive competitive practices;
“(d) Competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound development of an air-transportation system properly adapted to the needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United States, of the Postal Service, and of the national defense;
“(e) The promotion of safety in air commerce; and
“(f) The promotion, encouragement, and development of civil aeronautics.”

 Section 414, 49 U. S. C. § 1384, reads:
“Any person affected by any order made under sections 1378, 1379, or 1382 of this title shall be, and is hereby, relieved from the operations of the ‘antitrust laws/ as designated in section 12 of Title 15, and of all other restraints or prohibitions made by, or imposed under, authority of law, insofar as may be necessary to enable such person to do anything authorized, approved, or required by such order.”

 Testimony of Joseph B. Eastman, Member, Interstate Commerce Commission, on S. 2 and S. 1760 before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 334-335 (1937).

 At the House hearings, Colonel Edgar Gorrell, President of the Air Transport Assn, of America, testified that a major element of uncertainty that kept money from flowing into commercial aviation was “cutthroat competition, . . . where one company went out to make warfare against another and wound up by destroying the capital of both. . . . That is a fact. It has happened, and the only agency or agent in America today that can stop it is myself; and the moment I stick my neck out to stop it, if I did, I would face a jail sentence and a fine for violating the antitrust laws. Our companies today cannot lawfully agree on prices.” Hearings on H. R. 9738 before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., 309.
See Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U. S. 341, 347 (1963), where we noted that the relevant “collective action . . . would, had it occurred in a context free from other federal regulation, constitute a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.”

 83 Cong. Rec. 6730-6731.

 Between 1956 and 1960, the Board entered various modification orders permitting Toolco and TWA to enter into short-term leases of jets and permitting various limited extensions of those leases. Specifically, the record shows that the Board approved 12 transactions between Toolco and TWA from 1956 to I960:
—on May 17, 1956, the Board approved sale of 33 Lockheed aircraft, and spare parts, by Toolco to TWA;
—on Dec. 18, 1956, the Board approved a proposal for TWA to borrow some $10 million in operating capital from Toolco;
—on June 11, 1957, the Board approved a proposal whereby Toolco would refinance TWA’s May 17, 1956, purchase of Lockheed aircraft;
—on Dec. 30, 1958, the Board again approved a transaction relating to the nonjet Lockheed aircraft;
—on Feb. 26, 1959, the Board approved a proposal whereby TWA would lease one Boeing 707-131 aircraft from Toolco, plus spare parts, for the purpose of training its crews to fly jet aircraft;
—on May 15, 1959, the Board approved the lease by Toolco to *405TWA of 11 Boeing 707-131 jet aircraft, with provision for obtaining spare parts from Toolco and leasing spare jet engines;
—on July 1, 1959, the Board approved the lease of four additional aircraft by Toolco to TWA, and the extension of the leases on the previous jet aircraft. The leases were prolonged pending the working out of “definitive financing arrangements” which, presumably, would enable TWA to acquire ownership of the aircraft;
—on Sept. 30, 1959, the Board again approved extension of the jet leases upon the representation of Toolco and TWA that financing arrangements had not yet been completed;
—on Jan. 29, 1960, the Board approved the lease by Toolco to TWA of eight 707-131’s and eight Convair 880’s (all jet aircraft), on a day-to-day basis, and again with provision'for spare parts. This approval was again premised on completion in the near future of “definitive financing arrangements permitting [TWA] to operate these aircraft on a permanent basis”;
—on June 23, 1960, the Board approved acquisition — i. e., purchase — by TWA of 25 Boeing 707 and 20 Convair 880 jet aircraft, with $260 million to be raised by an offering of bonds and junior securities. Toolco was to guarantee the subscription and would lend $50 million to TWA to enable it to make the offering;
—on July 21, 1960, the Board approved acquisition of title to two additional jet aircraft by TWA from Toolco; and
—finally, on December 29, 1960, the Board approved creation of a voting trust for the placement of Toolco’s holdings in TWA.
As the Court’s opinion observes, damages were awarded for those allegations of the TWA complaint that charged that TWA had been damaged by the diversion of six Convairs by Toolco to Northeast Airlines; by the temporary retention by Toolco of four Convairs and the ultimate lease of these aircraft to Northeast; by the diversion of six Boeing jet aircraft, of 33 ordered, to Pan American Airways, TWA’s principal trans-Atlantic competitor; by the lease of planes to TWA, in lieu of sales that would have been more to TWA’s financial interest; and by the late delivery of 47 of the 63 jets procured for TWA by Toolco.
With the exception of the decision to lease planes to TWA rather than sell them, the actions alleged to have damaged TWA related, not to the documented structure of Toolco’s transactions with TWA, as presented to and approved in fact by the Board, but rather to *406the manner in which Toolco executed the paper transactions, without Board approval or knowledge. The leases were never considered in relation to other means of aircraft acquisition, as the complaint required they be viewed. The Court dismisses these discrepancies by observing that the restraint alleged in Pan American was held to be immune “even though the CAB had taken no action to investigate, let alone act on, the alleged misfeasance as the Board has done here for over 16 years.” In other words, if the Board were responsible for complete supervision of the Toolco-TWA transactions, immunity would not be undermined by the Board’s failure to undertake such supervision in fact.
At best, though, the Court’s historical recitation is irrelevant since it in no way explains why it was the Board’s statutory responsibility to consider the transactions between Toolco and TWA as components of an antitrust conspiracy allegedly pointed toward the aircraft supply and manufacturing market.

 The Board’s 1950 proceeding undertook “to consider the over-all impact of the acquirer’s plans and policies with respect to the controlled carrier.” 12 C. A. B. 192, 196. The Board reviewed the past transactions involving the financing of aircraft. In particular, the Board considered whether Toolco had properly resolved, in favor of debt financing, a longstanding dispute between the Toolco and TWA managements over the relative merits of debt or equity financing of new aircraft. The Board concluded that Toolco’s financial and technical contributions to TWA had been of considerable benefit to the carrier. On the other hand, the Board viewed TWA’s capitalization as “neither reasonable nor sound” since “[i]ts proportion of debt to total capitalization is far too large.” Id., at 218. Yet “the extent to which Toolco and its principal officers can be held directly or principally responsible for TWA’s present capital structure poses a most difficult problem,” since “[njumerous factors . . . operate to complicate and often delay agreement on a financial plan.” Id., at 221. On balance, the Board concluded that Toolco control of TWA had been in the public interest, and it approved the additional acquisition by Toolco of TWA stock.
While it is true that the Board’s evaluation of Toolco’s “stewardship” over TWA involved decisions regarding the acquisition of *407aircraft, including the method of financing and the timing of purchase and lease decisions, there is nothing in the Board’s decision to indicate that the Board’s 1950 proceeding undertook to analyze Toolco’s control of TWA from the perspective of Toolco’s own market position. Consequently, the 1950 proceeding in no way suggests that the Board has deviated from its consistent position that Congress did not entrust it with the exclusive responsibility for policing anticompetitive effects of § 408 transactions.