Court Opinion

ID: 9398082
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-30 14:00:52.660966+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:30.774958
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-12416    Document: 33-1      Date Filed: 05/30/2023   Page: 1 of 11

                                                 [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-12416
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        KELLIE WALTERS,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, COMMISSIONER,

                                                     Defendant-Appellee.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Alabama
                      D.C. Docket No. 4:21-cv-01348-ACA
                           ____________________
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        2                          Opinion of the Court                        22-12416

        Before WILSON, ROSENBAUM, and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Kellie Walters appeals from the district court’s affirmance of
        the Appeals Council, which declined to consider her proposed ex-
        hibits that were not before the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).
        After careful review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm.
                                                I.
                Walters applied for disability insurance benefits (DIB), disa-
        bled widow’s benefits, and supplemental security income (SSI).
        Walters alleged an onset date of June 30, 2018 for the following
        disabilities: back pain, loss of vision in left eye, pins in right hand,
        and depression. Disability examiners denied Walters’ application
        initially and on reconsideration. Walters then requested and re-
        ceived a hearing before an ALJ, who found Walters not disabled.
               The ALJ must follow five steps when evaluating a claim for
        disability. 1 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a). First, if a claimant
        is engaged in substantial gainful activity, she is not disabled. Id.
        §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). Second, if a claimant does not have an
        impairment or combination of impairments that significantly limits
        her physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities, she
        does not have a severe impairment and is not disabled. Id. §

        1 If the ALJ determines that the claimant is or is not disabled at any step of the
        sequential analysis, the analysis ends.           20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4),
        416.920(a)(4).
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        22-12416                  Opinion of the Court                              3

        404.1520(c), 416.920(c); see also McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026,
        1031 (11th Cir. 1986) (describing Step Two as a threshold inquiry,
        allowing “only claims based on the most trivial impairments to be
        rejected”). Third, if a claimant’s impairments meet or equal an im-
        pairment listed in a provided appendix (the “Listings”), she is disa-
        bled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d); 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt.
        P, app. 1. Fourth, if a claimant’s impairments do not meet or equal
        an impairment in the Listings, the ALJ must assess the claimant’s
        Residual Functional Capacity (RFC).2 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e),
        416.920(e). Fifth, using the claimant’s RFC, the ALJ will determine
        whether the claimant can still perform past relevant work. Id.
        §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f). If the claimant can do this type of work,
        she is not disabled. Id. Finally, if a claimant’s impairments (consid-
        ering her RFC, age, education, and past work) do not prevent her
        from performing other work that exists in the national economy,
        she is not disabled. Id. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g).
               Here, the ALJ determined Walters had not engaged in sub-
        stantial gainful activity since her alleged onset date. 3 The ALJ
        found Walters possesses the following severe impairments: lumbar
        disc disease, stenosis with reported radicular symptoms, and right

        2 A claimant’s RFC is the level of physical and mental work she can consist-
        ently perform despite her limitations. Id. §§ 404.1545(a), 416.945(a).
        3 The ALJ also found Walters met the insured status requirements of the So-
        cial Security Act and the non-disability requirements for widow’s benefits set
        forth in the Social Security Act.
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        4                          Opinion of the Court                         22-12416

        middle and index finger neuropathy.4 But the ALJ found Walters’
        impairments or combination of impairments fail to meet or medi-
        cally equal the severity of an impairment in the Listings. The ALJ
        then found Walters has an RFC to perform light work 5 with the
        following caveats: Waters can push and pull up to 20 pounds occa-
        sionally and up to 10 pounds frequently; stand or walk for about 6
        hours altogether but not more than 25 minutes continuously; sit
        for at least 6 hours out of an 8-hour work day, but not more than
        25 minutes continuously; perform occasional fine and gross manip-
        ulation with the right dominant hand; frequently balance, stoop,
        kneel, crouch, crawl, and climb, but not on ladders, ropes, or scaf-
        folds; perform tasks not involving operation of vibrating tools or

        4 The ALJ also found that Walters had the following non-severe impairments:
        hypertension, history of migraine headaches and syncope, decreased visual
        acuity, acid reflux disease, thoracic nodules, vitamin deficiency, grief/depres-
        sive disorder, anxiety disorder, and overweight/obesity.
        5 “Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent
        lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. Even though the
        weight lifted may be very little, a job is in this category when it requires a good
        deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with
        some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls. To be considered capable of
        performing a full or wide range of light work, you must have the ability to do
        substantially all of these activities. If someone can do light work, [the Social
        Security Administration] determine[s] that he or she can also do sedentary
        work, unless there are additional limiting factors such as loss of fine dexterity
        or inability to sit for long periods of time.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b),
        416.967(b).
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        22-12416               Opinion of the Court                         5

        equipment; and must avoid exposure to workplace hazards such as
        unprotected heights and dangerous moving machinery.
               Based on these findings, the ALJ determined Walters could
        not perform her past relevant work as stock clerk or sales clerk.
        The ALJ then determined Walters can perform other jobs existing
        in significant numbers in the national economy, specifically jobs for
        furniture rental clerk, counter clerk, and usher. As a result, the ALJ
        found Walters not disabled.
                Walters then requested the Appeals Council review the
        ALJ’s decision. Walters submitted 23 pages of new evidence to the
        Appeals Council. Relevant here, Walters submitted a Physical Ca-
        pacities Form from Dr. Victoria Masear and a Psychological Eval-
        uation from Dr. June Nichols. The Appeals Council found that the
        evidence did not relate to the period at issue and thus denied Wal-
        ters’ request for review, making the ALJ’s decision the final deci-
        sion of the Commissioner.
               Walters appealed to the district court, which affirmed the
        Appeals Council’s refusal to consider new evidence and the ALJ’s
        denial of Walters’ DIB and SSI. Walters timely appealed.
                                         II.
              Walters argues that the Appeals Council erred in finding that
        Drs. Masear’s and Nichols’ opinions were not chronologically rele-
        vant. Walters also argues that those opinions were material and
        should have been considered, and because the Appeals Council did
        not address whether those opinions were material, we should re-
        mand to the Appeals Council for first review.
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        6                       Opinion of the Court                   22-12416

                With a few exceptions, a claimant generally may present ev-
        idence at every stage of the administrative process. Hargress v. SSA,
        Comm’r, 883 F.3d 1302, 1308 (11th Cir. 2018) (per curiam). “If a
        claimant presents evidence after the ALJ’s decision, the Appeals
        Council must consider it if it is new, material, and chronologically
        relevant.” Id. at 1309. Evidence is material if there is a reasonable
        possibility “that the evidence would change the administrative re-
        sult,” and it “is chronologically relevant if it relates to the period on
        or before the date of the ALJ’s hearing decision.” Id. (quotation
        marks omitted, alterations adopted); 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(a)(5),
        416.1470(a)(5).
               “[W]hether evidence meets the new, material, and chrono-
        logically relevant standard is a question of law subject to our de novo
        review.” Washington v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 806 F.3d 1317, 1321
        (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (quotation marks omitted). And
        “when the Appeals Council erroneously refuses to consider evi-
        dence, it commits legal error and remand is appropriate.” Id.
               First, Walters’ argument that remand is the only appropriate
        solution to the materiality question is incorrect. As part of de novo
        review, we may consider facts, such as the materiality of the evi-
        dence, that the Appeals Council did not address when it refused to
        consider the new evidence. See id. at 1321–22 (considering both
        chronological relevance and materiality even though the Appeals
        Council only considered whether the evidence was chronologically
        relevant). As a result, we will consider both the chronological
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        22-12416                 Opinion of the Court                              7

        relevance and materiality of both Drs. Masear’s and Nichols’ opin-
        ions.
                                  A.      Dr. Masear’s Opinion
               The Appeals Council found that Dr. Masear’s opinion did
        not “relate to the period at issue.” Walters argues that the Appeals
        Council erred in that determination. We disagree.
               Dr. Masear completed a Physical Capacities Form on April
        15, 2021, less than a month after the ALJ’s decision. In that form,
        Dr. Masear noted that Walters could lift up to 5 pounds constantly,
        between 6 and 10 pounds frequently, between 11 and 20 pounds
        occasionally, and never greater than 20 pounds. With her right
        hand, Walters could reach frequently, handle occasionally, but
        could never ﬁnger or feel. Walters could sit upright for eight hours
        at one time, and she could stand for ﬁve hours at one time. During
        an 8-hour day, Walters would need to lie down, sleep, or sit with
        her legs propped up for less than 15 minutes. Dr. Masear checked
        a box indicating that the limitations existed back to June 30, 2018.
               Dr. Masear’s opinion was not chronologically relevant. Dr.
        Masear’s opinion postdated the ALJ’s decision. Although Dr.
        Masear treated Walters during the relevant period, 6 there is no in-
        dication that Dr. Masear considered Walters’ past medical records
        when noting Walters’ physical limitations on the Physical Capaci-
        ties Form. Further, Dr. Masear did not cite any medical evidence

        6Walters attempts to paint Dr. Masear as a treating physician, but the record
        shows that Walters saw Dr. Masear only once during the relevant period.
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                22-12416

        to support her conclusion that the limitations existed back to June
        30, 2018.
                However, even assuming Dr. Masear’s opinion was chrono-
        logically relevant, remand is not required, as that opinion is not
        material. For evidence to be material, there must be “a reasonable
        possibility . . . that the evidence would change the administrative
        result.” Hargress, 883 F.3d at 1309. Dr. Masear’s opinion is substan-
        tially similar to her August 2020 treatment notes that the ALJ con-
        sidered when making his decision. Further, Dr. Masear’s treatment
        notes contained more details about the physical findings of Wal-
        ters’ right hand. In looking at Walters’ RFC, several of Dr. Masear’s
        physical limitations are reflected. Thus, there is not a reasonable
        probability that Dr. Masear’s opinion would have changed Wal-
        ters’ RFC.
              Accordingly, the Appeals Council did not err in declining to
        review Dr. Masear’s opinion postdating the ALJ’s decision.
                                B.     Dr. Nichols’ Opinion
               The Appeals Council found that Dr. Nichols’ opinion did not
        “relate to the period at issue.” Walters argues that the Appeals
        Council erred in that determination. We agree with Walters that
        Dr. Nichols’ opinion is chronologically relevant, but the Appeals
        Council did not err in declining to review Dr. Nichol’s opinion be-
        cause it is not material.
               Dr. Nichols conducted a Psychological Evaluation of Wal-
        ters on June 8, 2021, three months after the ALJ’s decision. In the
        Psychological Evaluation, Dr. Nichols found that Walters could
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        22-12416              Opinion of the Court                        9

        not maintain attention, concentration, and/or pace for periods of
        at least two hours; she could not perform activities within a sched-
        ule and be punctual; she could not adjust to routine and infrequent
        changes; and she could not interact with supervisors or coworkers.
        Dr. Nichols also found that Walters would be off task for 25 to 30%
        of an 8-hour workday, and she would fail to report to work about
        10 to 12 days out of a 30-day period due to her psychological symp-
        toms. Dr. Nichols found that Walters’ limitations dated back to
        June 30, 2018.
               Our decision in Washington is worth discussing as it helps
        highlight why Dr. Nichols’ opinion is chronologically relevant but
        not material. In Washington, we found that the evidence submitted
        to the Appeals Council was chronologically relevant because the
        claimant described his symptoms during the relevant period, the
        physician reviewed the treatment records from the relevant period,
        and the physician’s opinion “relate[d] back” to the relevant period.
        806 F.3d at 1322. Like in Washington, it is clear from Dr. Nichols’
        opinion that she reviewed Walters’ prior medical records and re-
        lied on Walters’ history of symptoms during the relevant period.
        Thus, the Appeals Council erred in determining Dr. Nichols’ opin-
        ion was not chronologically relevant.
              But that is where the similarities to Washington end. In
        Washington, we explained that to determine materiality of new ev-
        idence before the Appeals Council, we must consider whether the
        new evidence was “wholly inconsistent” with the evidence that
        was considered before the ALJ. Id.
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                22-12416

                Here, Dr. Nichols’ opinion is inconsistent with the rest of
        the medical evidence. Dr. Nichols explained that as a result of Wal-
        ters’ depression and anxiety, Walters would miss a significant
        amount of work each month and be off task one-third of each
        workday. While the medical records indicate that Walters suffered
        from depression and anxiety after her husband’s sudden passing in
        February 2020, the medical records indicated improvement and a
        mild treatment plan. For example, in June 2020, Walters’ doctors
        noted gradual improvement with medication. And in December
        2020, although Walters reported depression, she reported no other
        symptoms such as anxiety, suicidal thoughts, or fatigue, and the
        doctor reported no abnormalities in Walters’ distress level. As
        such, Dr. Nichols’ opinion regarding Walters’ depression and anx-
        iety is “wholly inconsistent” with the evidence in the record, there-
        fore the opinion was not material.
               Because Dr. Nichols’ opinion was not material, there was no
        reasonable possibility that the new evidence would change the ad-
        ministrative result. Thus, the Appeals Council did not err in declin-
        ing to review Dr. Nichols’ opinion postdating the ALJ’s decision.
                                        III.
               Because Dr. Masear’s opinion was not chronologically rele-
        vant or material, the Appeals Council did not err in declining to
        review that evidence. Although Dr. Nichols’ opinion was chrono-
        logically relevant, it was not material and would not have changed
        the result. Thus, the Appeals Council did not err in declining to
        review that evidence. Accordingly, we affirm.
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        22-12416           Opinion of the Court                    11

              AFFIRMED.