Court Opinion

ID: 9564268
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:56:56.691391+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:19.473759
License: Public Domain

Ness, Justice
(dissenting) :
I dissent. The proper course for relief from a summary judgment is by appeal to this Court. Further, even if Code Section 15-27-130 (1976) may be invoked to supplant the appellate process, I do not believe the facts of this case warranted the vacation of the prior judgment.
The order for summary judgment was rendered by Judge Robinson after he reviewed the pleadings, depositions, unanswered requests for admissions, and affidavits. Virtually no rebutting evidence was presented to sustain any of the allegations in respondent’s answer. The following language from Conran v. Yager, 263 S. C. 417, 420, 211 S. E. (2d) 228, 229 (1975), indicates that Judge Robinson’s order of summary judgment was clearly proper:
“Where the appellant relies solely upon the pleadings, files no counter-affidavits, and makes no factual showing in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, the lower court is required under this rule, to grant summary judgment, if, under the facts presented by the respondent, he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
As a decision on the merits of the case, Judge Robinson’s order should have prevailed unless and until reversed by this Court. I cannot sanction the method employed by respondent to circumvent the orderly process of appeal. The individual yet equal authority of the circuit judges is vital to our state court system. To permit litigants to “appeal” an adverse decision from one circuit judge to another would promote unending litigation and judge shopping. Our prior decisions have established that no such chaotic system of *455justice was envisioned by our trial judge structure. In Steele v. Railroad Co., 14 S. C. 324, 329 (1880), the Court stated:
“There is no appeal from one Circuit judge to another. All are of equal dignity and have the same right to pronounce the judgments of the court. One Circuit judge upon the same state of facts, has no power to change, alter or reverse a decision of a brother judge of the same Circuit. Otherwise, there would be no end to litigation.”
I am unpersuaded by the majority’s view that Judge Morrison received the matter on a different set of facts, and therefore, Judge Robinson’s prior order was not res judicata. It is evident from Judge Robinson’s order that he considered but abandoned the issue of excusable neglect by respondent’s attorney as he cited his efforts to locate him.
Accordingly, I would hold that the relief sought by respondent pursuant to Code Section 15-27-130 was inappropriate, and that appeal to this Court was respondent’s only recourse. The respondent filed notice of intention to appeal but failed to perfect its appeal. Therefore, I would hold respondent bound by the order of summary judgment.
Assuming, without deciding, that one circuit judge may utilize Code Section 15-27-130 to vacate an order of summary judgment rendered by another circuit judge, I do not believe such relief was justified in this case.
The record reveals extreme negligence by the prior attorney for the Town of Loris. The attorney notified respondent on April 27, 1977 that he was resigning as City Attorney without informing the Town of the hearing to be held on April 29, 1977. Admittedly, the Town of Loris was left in a difficult situation by the resignation of its attorney; yet it could have taken steps to protect itself in the pending lawsuit.
Despite the neglect of its attorney in failing to inform the Town of the upcoming hearing, this Court has consistently held that the neglect of an attorney is synonymous with the neglect of the client. As stated by Mr. Justice Lewis (now *456Chief Justice) in the prevailing opinion in Lee v. Peek, 240 S. C. 203, 213, 125 S. E. (2d) 353, 358 (1962):
“[Tjhe general rule undoubtedly is that the neglect of the attorney is the neglect of the client. . . . The acts and omissions of the attorney in such case are those of the client.”
See also Simon v. Flowers, 231 S. C. 545, 99 S. E. (2d) 391 (1957); Clark v. CM, 244 S. E. (2d) 743 (S. C. 1978).
The majority justifies its departure from the above general rule by characterizing the conduct of respondent’s prior' attorney as “willful abandonment.” In my view, the line between negligence and willful abandonment is not to clearly drawn as to justify a contrary result in the two instances.
I would impute the neglect of respondent’s attorney to respondent and conclude that Code Section 15-27-130 affords no remedy for culpable neglect. See Woodward v. Elliott, 27 S. C. 368, 3 S. E. 477 (1887) ; Savage v. Cannon, 204 S. C. 473, 30 S. E. (2d) 70 (1944).
I would reverse.