Court Opinion

ID: 9453044
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 18:00:54.235489+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:56.791965
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-50064     Document: 00516846139         Page: 1    Date Filed: 08/04/2023

                         REVISED August 4, 2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                       United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                Fifth Circuit

                                ____________                                  FILED
                                                                          July 21, 2023
                                 No. 22-50064                            Lyle W. Cayce
                                ____________                                  Clerk

   Clint Mueck,

                                                           Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                      versus

   La Grange Acquisitions, L.P.,

                                            Defendant—Appellee.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Western District of Texas
                            USDC No. 5:20-CV-801
                  ______________________________

   Before Higginbotham, Southwick, and Higginson, Circuit
   Judges.
   Stephen A. Higginson, Circuit Judge:
         In 2019, Plaintiff-Appellant Clint Mueck received his third citation for
   Driving While Intoxicated (“DWI”). As a term of his probation, Mueck, an
   alcoholic, was required to attend weekly substance abuse classes. Some of
   these classes conflicted with shifts that Mueck was scheduled to work as an
   operator at a plant owned by Defendant-Appellee La Grange Acquisitions,
   L.P. Mueck informed his supervisors that he was an alcoholic and that several
   of the court-ordered substance abuse classes would conflict with his
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   scheduled shifts. When Mueck was unable to find coverage for these shifts,
   La Grange, citing this scheduling conflict, terminated Mueck. After
   exhausting his administrative remedies, Mueck sued La Grange under the
   Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112 et seq., for
   intentional discrimination, failure to accommodate, and retaliation. The
   district court granted summary judgment in favor of La Grange on all three
   claims. Mueck appeals. We AFFIRM, but our analysis takes into account
   significant statutory revisions.
                                      I. Background
          Defendant La Grange Acquisition L.P. (“La Grange”) operates a
   natural gas processing plant, the Fashing gas plant, in Karnes City, Texas. In
   February 2015, Plaintiff Clint Mueck started working as an operator at the
   plant. As an operator, Mueck was responsible for checking pipeline
   equipment and recording an hourly log of various plant indicators, including
   pressures, readings, flows, and temperatures. Operators at the plant worked
   a seven-day-on, seven-day-off shift schedule, alternating between day and
   night shifts. Under this schedule, operators would work a 12-hour day shift
   (6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.) for seven days, take seven days off, work a 12-hour
   night shift (6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m.), and then take another seven days off
   before restarting the rotation.
          During the relevant time period, Mueck reported directly to Kevin
   Pawelek, the Plant Supervisor, who reported to Jerry Frausto, the Manager
   of Operations. Frausto in turn reported to Ricky Bonewald, the Director of
   Operations, who in turn reported to Chad Ingalls, the Vice President of
   Operations. Additionally, Raymond De La Vega, Senior Manager of Human
   Resources, provided human resources support to the plant.
          Mueck is an alcoholic. Mueck, who first started drinking while at
   college in the late 1990s, described his alcoholism as mainly consisting of

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   binge drinking, that is, he has difficulty controlling his drinking once he starts.
   By his own account, while employed by La Grange, Mueck would have, at
   most, one to two drinks in the evening on days when he worked and his
   drinking never prevented him from working. Mueck, however, drank
   excessively whenever he was off duty. 1 On a typical day off, Mueck would
   consume twelve to eighteen beers, along with vodka drinks, until he passed
   out. To treat his resulting hangover and mental fog, Mueck would begin
   drinking again. This cycle would repeat until Mueck had to return to work.
          When in the middle of one of his drinking binges, Mueck would
   neglect basic elements of self-care. He would not shower, brush his teeth,
   clean his house, or keep up with any other chores. Similarly, his ability to
   concentrate, think clearly, and make decisions was greatly impaired during a
   binge. Mueck tried to hide his drinking problem from everyone, including
   friends, family, and his primary care physician, to the detriment of his
   relationships with others. In Mueck’s own words, drinking was his priority
   and his cravings made it difficult to focus on anything else.
          Mueck’s drinking also led to legal consequences, including a lengthy
   criminal history for alcohol-related crimes. In 1997, while in college, Mueck
   was cited for Driving Under the Influence (“DUI”) and placed into a pretrial
   diversion program. In 2017, while employed by La Grange, he received a
   second citation for Driving While Intoxicated (“DWI”) and was placed on
   pretrial diversion. In March and June 2018, he received citations for public
   intoxication. Mueck was placed on deferred adjudication for one of these
   citations, while the other citation was dismissed for lack of evidence. Due to
   these citations, Mueck’s pretrial diversion for the 2017 DWI was revoked.

          _____________________
          1
             Indeed, Mueck attested that his drinking problem worsened while he was on
   medical leave for a knee injury because he did not have to sober up for work.

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   Finally, on March 3, 2019, while still under probation for the 2017 DWI for
   which his pretrial diversion had been revoked, Mueck was cited for a third
   DWI.
           On March 6, 2019, Mueck disclosed to Pawelek his most recent DWI,
   as well the fact that he had a prior DUI and public intoxication charges. At
   the meeting, Mueck promised to keep Pawelek apprised of his legal situation.
   According to Mueck, he told Pawelek that he was an alcoholic and had a
   drinking problem, that he wanted to turn his life around, and that he was
   going to seek help. Mueck also claims that, around the same time, he told
   Frausto that he was an alcoholic and had a drinking issue. Pawelek, however,
   claims that Mueck never informed him that he was an alcoholic, and
   Bonewald and De La Vega similarly deny being informed by Pawelek or
   Frausto that Mueck had an alcohol problem. 2
           That morning, Frausto emailed De La Vega and Bonewald (with
   Pawelek copied on the email) a summary of a prior discussion about Mueck’s
   situation. Frausto noted that—as far as he was aware—this was Mueck’s
   second DWI offense and that Mueck had hired a lawyer to help him deal with
   the most recent offense. Frausto further wrote that Mueck had reached out
   to the Employee Assistance Program (“EAP”), a confidential hotline that is
   designed to provide employees assistance with a variety of personal
   problems. Mueck states that while he did call the hotline, he did not end up
   receiving help from the EAP.

           _____________________
           2
            Bonewald and De La Vega were forwarded an email originally sent from Pawelek
   to Frausto on May 17, 2019, in which Pawelek reported that Mueck was 60 days sober and
   had been attending Alcoholics Anonymous meetings four to five times a week. De La Vega
   explained, however, he did not feel that he could speculate, on these facts, that Mueck was
   an alcoholic or disabled.

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            That spring, Mueck continued to work at the plant. During this
   period, Mueck started taking independent steps to address his alcoholism.
   He began attending Alcoholics Anonymous (“AA”) meetings four to five
   times per week and, on May 9, 2019, disclosed to his primary care physician
   that he needed help with his drinking. His doctor prescribed medication to
   help with his cravings and advised Mueck to seek counseling and a support
   group. As of October 2021, Mueck was still attending AA meetings multiple
   days per week.
            Meanwhile, Mueck’s legal proceedings were ongoing. Because of his
   most recent DWI, as well as the public intoxication charges, the State moved
   to revoke Mueck’s probation for the 2017 DWI. To avoid revocation of his
   probation, on May 16, 2019, Mueck agreed to an extension of his probation.
   This extension came with certain conditions, including a requirement that
   Mueck carry a personal breathalyzer to work and use it three times per day,
   and that Mueck install a breathalyzer in his truck. Mueck was also ordered to
   participate in the 81st District Court Substance Abuse Intensive Outpatient
   Program.
            On May 17, 2019, Mueck notified Pawelek of these conditions and
   provided Pawelek with a copy of the court order. Mueck and Pawelek briefly
   spoke about the breathalyzer requirement and Mueck’s participation in the
   substance abuse program, details about which Mueck promised to provide
   shortly. Following the meeting, Pawelek wrote to Frausto (who then
   forwarded the email to Bonewald and De La Vega) that he had asked Mueck
   how he was doing, to which Mueck had responded that he had been sober for
   sixty days and was attending AA meetings four to five times per week. Mueck
   claims that he also told Pawelek that he needed the substance abuse program
   because his drinking was affecting every aspect of his life, which had fallen
   apart.

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          Soon after this meeting, Mueck received more details about the
   substance abuse program. The program would consist of weekly one-on-one
   sessions with a substance abuse counselor as well as weekly group sessions.
   This group class included other individuals referred through the court system
   as well as private paying clients. Although the individual counseling sessions
   could be scheduled at Mueck’s discretion, the group sessions met every
   Monday from 6 p.m. to 8 p.m. The class, for which Mueck needed to plan for
   around an hour of travel time, was intended to run for three months.
          Mueck’s participation in this program would impact the end of some
   of his day shifts and the beginning of four of his night shifts over the relevant
   three-month period. Mueck independently arranged for a coworker to cover
   the days on which he would need to leave early from his day shift to attend
   the class but could not find coverage for the night shifts for which he would
   have to arrive late. On May 24, Pawelek, who told Mueck that the
   opportunity for overtime had to be offered to everyone, sent out an email to
   operators not on Mueck’s rotation asking if anyone would be willing to trade
   shifts for the necessary dates. No one responded to the email. Pawelek
   confirmed that the co-worker Mueck had identified was still willing to cover
   on days when Mueck would have to leave early to make his class.
          Although Mueck and Pawelek had resolved the scheduling conflict for
   his day shifts, he still needed coverage for his night shifts. Pawelek stated he
   was willing to help facilitate a voluntary shift swap but would not force
   another employee to cover for Mueck. On May 28, Pawelek notified Frausto,
   Bonewald, and De La Vega that no one had volunteered to cover for Mueck
   when he was to work the night shift. La Grange suspended Mueck for a week
   while it reviewed the situation. Frausto called Mueck to notify him of the
   suspension, telling him only that he was suspended “pending investigation.”

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          Neither Pawelek nor any other La Grange employee discussed options
   other than shift swaps to resolve the conflict. According to Bonewald, “it was
   [Mueck’s] job to find coverage,” especially where he was not planning to take
   vacation or sick leave. Mueck, however, claims that he was never told that he
   could use vacation time or time under the company’s “Personal Leave”
   policy to attend the classes. Bonewald confirmed that La Grange would have
   accommodated Mueck if he had requested time off as “vacation,” but
   reiterated that Mueck did not want to use his vacation time—an assertion
   Mueck denies. Bonewald also explained that had La Grange’s EAP
   recommended that Mueck attend substance-abuse classes, La Grange would
   have covered his shifts.
          Moreover, although La Grange would approve voluntary shift swaps,
   Pawelek explained that employer-mandated shift swaps at the plant were
   uncommon and were typically done only on a permanent basis.
   Nonpermanent swaps could result in extended hours for employees already
   working twelve-hour shifts, leading to safety concerns and overtime costs to
   the business. That said, according to Mueck, La Grange would regularly find
   coverage for other employees, sometimes on short notice. One of the lead
   operator’s job functions was to substitute for absent operators, and Pawelek
   noted that one potential solution would have been for him to fill in for Mueck.
          Ultimately, Bonewald recommended to Ingalls that Mueck’s
   employment be terminated. After consulting with human resources, Ingalls
   decided to terminate Mueck. On June 4, Mueck was informed of his
   termination and told that the decision was based on the conflict between the
   substance-abuse classes and his shift schedule.
          After exhausting his administrative remedies through the EEOC,
   Mueck sued La Grange under the ADA for intentional discrimination, failure
   to provide reasonable accommodation, and retaliation. Following the close of

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   discovery, La Grange moved for summary judgment on each of these claims.
   The district court granted the motion in its entirety, first finding that Mueck
   failed to provide sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude that
   his alcoholism was a disability under the ADA as required by his intentional
   discrimination and failure-to-accommodate claims. Additionally, the district
   court held that Mueck had failed to show that he requested an
   accommodation as required for both his failure-to-accommodate claim and
   retaliation claim. Mueck appeals.
                                    II. Discussion
          We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.
   EEOC v. Agro Distrib., LLC, 555 F.3d 462, 469 (5th Cir. 2009). Summary
   judgment is proper when the moving party can demonstrate that, viewing the
   evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there is no issue
   of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
   Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A genuine dispute as to a material fact exists ‘if
   the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
   nonmoving party.’” Rogers v. Bromac Title Servs., LLC, 755 F.3d 347, 350
   (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
   (1986)). Moreover, we may affirm on “any ground supported by the record,
   even if it is different from that relied on by the district court.” Reed v. Neopost
   USA, Inc., 701 F.3d 434, 438 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Moss v. BMC Software,
   Inc., 610 F.3d 917, 928 (5th Cir. 2010)).
          Mueck raises four issues on appeal: (1) whether, as a threshold matter,
   the district court erred in finding that he failed to produce evidence that his
   alcoholism is a disability under the ADA, (2) whether the district court
   therefore erred in granting summary judgment as to his intentional
   discrimination claim, (3) whether the district court erred in granting
   summary judgment as to his failure-to-accommodate claim, including on the

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   alternate basis that he had not requested an accommodation, and (4) whether
   the district court similarly erred in granting summary judgment as to his
   retaliation claim on the ground that he had not engaged in a protected
   activity. We address each in turn.
                                          A. Disability
           First, Mueck contends that the district court erred in finding that he
   did not present evidence showing that he is disabled under the ADA. 3
           The ADA defines “disability” as, with respect to an individual, “a
   physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
   activities of such individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). “Merely having an
   impairment” is not enough to qualify as disabled under the ADA—a plaintiff
   “also need[s] to demonstrate that the impairment substantially limits a major
   life activity.” E.E.O.C. v. Chevron Phillips Chem. Co., 570 F.3d 606, 614 (5th
   Cir. 2009). The ADA defines a “major life activity” as including “caring for
   oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking,
   standing,     lifting,    bending,     speaking,       breathing,     learning,     reading,
   concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working,” 42 U.S.C.
   § 12102(2)(A), as well as “the operation of a major bodily function,
   including . . . neurological [and] brain . . . functions,” id. § 12102(2)(B).
           Today, the inquiry as to whether a limitation is substantial requires
   assessing “whether [the plaintiff’s] impairment substantially limits his ability

           _____________________
           3
              To succeed on both his intentional discrimination and failure-to-accommodate
   claims, Mueck must show that he has a disability under the ADA. See, e.g. EEOC v. LHC
   Grp., Inc., 773 F.3d 688, 697 (5th Cir. 2014) (explaining that to establish a prima facie case
   of discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must first demonstrate that he has a disability);
   Feist v. La. Dep’t of Just., 730 F.3d 450, 452 (5th Cir. 2013) (explaining that to prevail on a
   failure-to-accommodate claim, a plaintiff must first establish that he is a “qualified
   individual with a disability”).

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   to ‘perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general
   population.’” Cannon v. Jacobs Field Servs. N. Am., Inc., 813 F.3d 586, 591
   (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting 29 C.F. R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii)). Determining whether
   a plaintiff has a disability therefore requires an individualized assessment of
   the impact of the impairment on an individual’s major life activities. 4 Griffin
   v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 661 F.3d 216, 223 (5th Cir. 2011) (“Neither the
   Supreme Court nor this court has recognized the concept of a per se disability
   under the ADA, no matter how serious the impairment; the plaintiff still
   must adduce evidence of an impairment that has actually and substantially
   limited the major life activity on which he relies.” (cleaned up)).
          Courts initially construed the definition of disability narrowly,
   particularly in the context of determining whether an impairment
   substantially limited a major life activity. See Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of
   Disability Under Federal Anti-Discrimination Law: What Happened? Why? And
   What Can We Do About It?, 21 Berkeley J. Empl. & Lab. L. 91, 93
   (2000). In response, Congress enacted the ADA Amendments Act of 2008
   (“ADAAA”) with the goal of “reinstating a broad scope of protection to be
   available under the ADA.” Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(a), 122 Stat. 3554; see
   generally Cannon, 813 F.3dat 590 (“[The 2008] amendments ‘make it easier
   for people with disabilities to obtain protection under the ADA.’” (quoting
   29 C.F.R. § 1630.1(c)(4))). Put another way, Congress directed that courts,
   in assessing whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity,
   “interpret[] and appl[y]” the term “substantially limits” “to require a

          _____________________
          4
              The EEOC itself does not recognize any per se disabilities, although it does
   recognize that “the individualized assessment of some types of impairments will, in
   virtually all cases, result in a determination of coverage” under the ADA. 29 C.F.R.
   § 1630.2(j)(3).

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   degree of functional limitation that is lower than the standard . . . applied
   prior to the ADAAA.” 5 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iv).
            Additionally, the ADAAA explicitly provided that “[a]n impairment
   that is episodic or in remission is a disability if it would substantially limit a
   major life activity when active.”42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(D). Consequently,
   courts       have   recognized        numerous        episodic      conditions—including
   depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, and other mental health
   conditions where an individual may experience flare-ups—as disabilities. See,
   e.g., Hostettler v. Coll. of Wooster, 895 F.3d 844, 854 (6th Cir. 2018)
   (depression and severe separation anxiety).
            Relying primarily on case law that failed to account for the impact of
   the ADAAA, however, the district court held that Mueck had failed to
   establish that his alcoholism was an impairment which substantially limited a
   major life activity, in large part because the impairments Mueck suffered
   during a drinking binge were short-term and not permanent. 6 Specifically, in

            _____________________
            5
             See also Alex B. Long, Introducing the New and Improved Americans with Disabilities
   Act: Assessing the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 103 Nw. L. Rev. Colloquy 217, 218-
   23 (2008) (explaining that the ADAAA rejected much of the restrictive view courts had
   taken of the “substantially limits” requirement and expanded the list of major life activities
   that may be considered).
            6
              The district court limited its discussion to Mueck’s specific factual
   circumstances—it did not adopt a blanket rule that alcoholism can never be a disability
   under the ADA. This was proper—as we and other circuits have recognized, both before
   and after the ADAAA, alcoholism can, without a doubt, rise to the level of a disability. See
   Burch v. Coca-Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305, 316 n.9 (5th Cir. 1997) (“This is not to say that an
   alcoholic can never demonstrate a substantially limiting impairment.”); Sullivan v. Neiman
   Marcus Grp., Inc., 358 F.3d 110, 114-15 (1st Cir. 2004) (recognizing that “there is no
   question that alcoholism is an impairment under the ADA” that may, if it substantially
   limits a major life activity, qualify as a disability) (cleaned up); Makinen v. City of New York,
   857 F.3d 491, 495 (2d Cir. 2017) (noting that the ADA “treat[s] alcoholism as an
   impairment that can form the basis of a disability discrimination suit”); Mararri v. WCI

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   reaching this conclusion, the district court turned to Burch v. Coca-Cola Co.,
   119 F.3d 305 (5th Cir. 1997), a case in which we found that a plaintiff could
   not show that his alcoholism rose to the level of a disability. Id. at 314-317
   (discussing why, based on the evidence presented, the plaintiff’s alcoholism
   did not make him a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA). The
   district court treated Burch as controlling both as to the governing law and its
   applicability to the facts presented by Mueck. We find, however, that Burch
   is distinguishable on both grounds.
           To begin, the district court cited Burch for the proposition that
   “[p]ermanency, not frequency, is the touchstone of a substantially limiting
   impairment.” Id. at 316. In Burch, we noted that even if the plaintiff’s
   underlying alcoholism was a permanent condition, and even though the
   plaintiff’s bouts of inebriation were frequent, the impairments caused by his
   drinking were temporary. Id. Accordingly, we “rejected [the] attempt[] to
   transform [a] temporary affliction[] into [a] qualifying disabilit[y].” Id.
           Yet, critically, Burch predates the ADAAA. And not only did the
   ADAAA generally seek to make it easier for plaintiffs to establish that they
   have a disability, but it plainly stated that an “episodic” impairment—that
   is, an impairment that is not always active—can still qualify as a disability.
   See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(D). Other circuits have recognized that the
   ADAAA directly abrogated prior case law requiring that an impairment be
   “permanent” or “long term” to qualify as a disability. See, e.g., Shields v.
   Credit One Bank, N.A., 32 F.4th 1218, 1222-26 (9th Cir. 2022) (holding that
   the district court erred in relying on case law and regulations that failed to
   account for the ADAAA to hold that an impairment is not substantially

           _____________________
   Steel, Inc., 130 F.3d 1180, 1185 (6th Cir. 1997) (“There is no dispute that alcoholism is a
   disability within the protection of the ADA.”).

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   limiting unless it involves permanent or long-term effects); Hamilton v.
   Westchester Cnty., 3 F.4th 86, 92-94 (2d Cir. 2021) (joining other circuits in
   recognizing that the ADAAA overrode previous case law indicating that
   temporary impairments could not qualify as disabilities under the ADA);
   Summers v. Altarum Inst., Corp., 740 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2014) (noting
   that while the district court’s ruling that an injury was not a disability because
   it was “temporary” was “entirely reasonable” under prior case law, the
   plaintiff nonetheless “unquestionably alleged a ‘disability’ under the
   ADAAA”).
          We have not yet explicitly joined other circuits in repudiating the
   “permanent or long-term” requirement. Although the issue was raised in
   Moore v. Centralized Management Services, LLC, 843 F. App’x 575 (5th Cir.
   2021), we expressly declined to address whether the district court had erred
   in determining that the plaintiff failed to show that his alcoholism was a
   disability under the ADA because his drinking was episodic, not permanent,
   Moore v. Centralized Mgmt. Servs., LLC, No. 19-1592, 2020 WL 972711, at *4
   (E.D. La. Feb. 28, 2020), reconsideration denied, 2020 WL 2037191 (E.D. La.
   Apr. 28, 2020); 843 F. App’x at 578-79. Specifically, because we found that
   the district court had not erred in finding that the plaintiff was terminated for
   poor performance, not on account of his alcoholism, we determined that we
   did not need to decide whether the plaintiff’s alcoholism was a disability.
   Moore, 843 F. App’x at 579. And while we have approvingly cited precedent
   that requires courts to consider the “permanent or long-term impact” of an
   impairment when assessing whether it “substantially limits” a major life
   activity in other cases decided after the ADAAA, see, e.g., Milton v. Texas
   Dep’t of Crim. Just., 707 F.3d 570, 573 (5th Cir. 2013); Agro Distr., 555 F.3d
   at 470; Chevron Phillips, 570 F.3d at 615, these cases applied pre-ADAAA case
   law and are therefore inapposite, see Milton, 707 F.3d at 573 n.2 (explaining
   that it applied pre-ADAAA law because the events giving rise to the

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   plaintiff’s claim arose before the enactment of the ADAAA and the ADAAA
   does not apply retroactively); Agro Distr., 555 F.3d at 469 n.8 (same); Chevron
   Phillips, 570 F.3d at 619 (relying on a prior version of 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)
   and pre-ADAAA precedent).
           We now take the opportunity to acknowledge, as our sister circuits
   have, that, following the ADAAA’s passage, an impairment need not be
   “permanent or long-term” to qualify as a disability.
           In the alternative, the district court viewed Burch as standing for the
   proposition that the mere fact that an individual is unable to perform
   activities of daily living while inebriated or hungover is not enough to
   demonstrate that the individual has a substantially limiting impairment. On
   this point, however, Burch can be distinguished on its facts. In Burch, the
   plaintiff’s primary evidence as to the limitations imposed by his alcoholism
   was his own testimony that that his “ability to walk, talk, think, and sleep
   were affected when he drank too much,” and that he “had hangovers in the
   morning that affected his memory.” 7 119 F.3d at 316. This testimony,
   however, showed only that the plaintiff had suffered the “natural result of
   overindulgence,” namely “the temporary impairment of senses, dulled
   reactions, and the prospect of a restless sleep followed by an unpleasant

           _____________________
           7
              The plaintiff in Burch also pointed to testimony from his treating physician that
   alcoholics as a class, not the plaintiff individually, were disabled under the ADA. 119 F.3d
   at 315. However, as discussed, the ADA requires an individualized inquiry. Fatally, in
   Burch, the only testimony specific to the plaintiff from the physician concerned the
   plaintiff’s ability to function without limitation, that is, the physician “acknowledged that
   Burch’s status as a recovering alcoholic did not affect his ability to walk, sit, hear, work, or
   participate in any ‘usual activities.’” Id. at 315 n.8. Additionally, the Burch plaintiff pointed
   to the fact that he was voluntarily admitted to a hospital to treat his alcoholism as evidence
   that his alcoholism substantially limited a major life activity. Id. at 312, 316. In rejecting this
   argument, we noted that the “mere existence of a hospital stay” was not enough, on its
   own, to demonstrate that an impairment is substantially limiting. Id. at 317.

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                                            No. 22-50064

   morning.” Id. In other words, the plaintiff suffered from the same ill effects
   of too much alcohol as any individual who drank too much.
           Mueck, however—unlike the plaintiff in Burch—provided evidence
   demonstrating that the “the effects of his alcoholism-induced inebriation
   were qualitatively different than those achieved by an overindulging social
   drinker.” Id. When he drank, he drank excessively, either to the point of
   passing out or to where he was too sick to drink any more. Mueck further
   testified that, during these binges, his major life activities of thinking,
   concentrating, and caring for himself would be substantially impacted—he
   would not shower, brush his teeth, clean, eat healthily, or follow a consistent
   sleep schedule, and would often drink to the point of unconsciousness. 8 See,

           _____________________
           8
             As an alternative ground on which to grant summary judgment in favor of La
   Grange, the district court stated that Mueck had failed to specify in his complaint which
   specific major life activities were impacted by his alcoholism. Relying on Mora v. Univ. of
   Tex. Ws. Med. Ctr., 469 F. App’x 295, 297 (5th Cir. 2012), the district court found that this
   failure was fatal to his claims. Mora, however, was decided in the context of a motion to
   dismiss, not a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 297. And typically a deficiency in the
   pleadings results in the dismissal of the case—and an opportunity to amend—not a decision
   on the merits in favor of the defendant. See, e.g., Great Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley,
   313 F.3d 305, 329 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting that, “unless it is clear that the defects are
   incurable” or the plaintiffs are “unwilling or unable to amend in a manner that will avoid
   dismissal,” courts “often afford plaintiffs at least one opportunity to cure pleading
   deficiencies” in an attempt to “decide cases on the merits rather than on the sufficiency of
   pleadings”). Moreover, in his response to the motion for summary judgment, Mueck both
   articulated the major life activities in which he was substantially limited and provided
   evidence demonstrating that he was so limited. We thus find that any deficiency in the
   complaint did not warrant summary judgment on the merits in favor of La Grange.
            To the extent that the district court’s judgment for La Grange depended on the
   observation that Mueck did not present evidence showing that his alcoholism impacted his
   major life activity of “work,” we note that Mueck himself never asserted that his impacted
   major life activity was his work. Nor must a condition interfere with an individual’s job in
   order to qualify as a disability. See, e.g., Cannon, 813 F.3d at 591 n.3 (explaining that the fact
   that a plaintiff could perform work tasks “[did] not undermine the evidence indicating that

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   e.g., Chevron Phillips, 570 F.3d at 617 (finding that a plaintiff had submitted
   sufficient evidence to demonstrate that she was substantially limited in the
   major life activity of caring for herself where she attested that she often did
   not shower for days, was unable to shop for food, cook, or even zip up her
   clothes). Put simply, the level of impairment described by Mueck far exceeds
   that which is typically experienced by a casual drinker, even one who
   overindulges.
           Moreover, these binges were of substantial duration. As Mueck
   explained, he would not simply overindulge for a night at a time—rather, he
   would drink non-stop whenever he was off work, which could be a full week
   (or, as when he was on FMLA leave, months) at a time. In Burch, however,
   there was no evidence that the plaintiff (who worked an office job), engaged
   in such lengthy or debilitating binges. See 119 F.3d at 310 (describing how the
   plaintiff in Burch, although he would drink heavily in the evenings, would still
   report to work the next morning, albeit with a hangover).
           Other out-of-circuit cases to which La Grange cites are inapposite. For
   instance, La Grange cites Ames v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 629 F.3d 665 (7th
   Cir. 2011), in which the Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor
   of the defendant on the basis that the plaintiff could not show that her
   alcoholism substantially limited major life activities. In that case, however,
   the plaintiff “presented no evidence that her alcohol problem substantially
   limited her activities at home” and “insisted that her alcohol problem did not
   affect her work performance.” Id. at 670. Yet here, while Mueck claims that
   his alcoholism did not affect his work, he does provide evidence that he was
   substantially limited whenever he was off the clock. Cullen v. Verizon

           _____________________
   his injury substantially limit[ed] his ability to lift, which [was] all that [was] required to
   establish a disability”).

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                                          No. 22-50064

   Communications, No. 14-464, 2015 WL 4508711 (W.D.N.Y. July 24, 2015), is
   similarly unhelpful for La Grange, as Mueck has done more than vaguely
   assert that his alcoholism “merely ‘affected’ certain abilities.” Id. at *3. He
   has described, in detail, the exact ways in which his alcoholism impacted his
   life.
           Accordingly, Mueck has put forth evidence raising a triable issue of
   fact as to whether his alcoholism amounts to a disability. Therefore, the
   district court erred in granting summary judgment to La Grange on both the
   intentional-discrimination and failure-to-accommodate claims on the basis
   that Mueck had failed to establish that he was a qualified individual with a
   disability under the ADA.
                              B. Intentional Discrimination
           Having determined that Mueck’s alcoholism may qualify as a
   disability under the ADA, we address whether Mueck has raised a triable
   issue of fact as to his intentional discrimination claim. 9
           The ADA prohibits “discriminat[ion] against a qualified individual on
   the basis of disability” by employers. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). An employee
   bringing a claim for disability discrimination under the ADA “may either
   present direct evidence that []he was discriminated against because of [his]
   disability or alternatively proceed under the burden-shifting analysis first
   articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).” EEOC
   v. LHC Grp., Inc., 773 F.3d 688, 694 (5th Cir. 2014). Mueck does not argue

           _____________________
           9
              The district court granted summary judgment to La Grange on this claim solely
   because it found that Mueck failed to establish that he had a disability. We may, however,
   affirm on “any ground supported by the record, even if it is different from that relied on by
   the district court.” Reed, 701 F.3d at 438.

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   that he has presented direct evidence of discrimination: accordingly, the
   McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework applies.
          Under this framework, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie
   case of discrimination. Delaval v. PTech Drilling Tubulars, LLC, 824 F.3d
   476, 479 (5th Cir. 2016). “To establish a prima facie discrimination claim
   under the ADA, a plaintiff must prove: (1) that he has a disability; (2) that he
   was qualified for the job; and (3) that he was subject to an adverse
   employment decision on account of his disability.” Clark v. Champion Nat’l
   Sec., Inc., 952 F.3d 570, 582 (5th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). Once he has
   done so, “the burden shifts to the employer to ‘articulate a legitimate,
   nondiscriminatory reason’ for its actions,” after which the plaintiff bears
   “the burden to prove that the employer’s explanation was a pretext for
   discrimination.” Thompson v. Microsoft Corp., 2 F.4th 460, 470 (5th Cir.
   2021) (citation omitted). To carry the burden of showing pretext, “[t]he
   plaintiff must put forward evidence rebutting each of the nondiscriminatory
   reasons the employer articulates.” Wallace v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., 271 F.3d
   212, 220 (5th Cir. 2001). A plaintiff may demonstrate pretext by presenting
   “evidence of disparate treatment or by showing that the employer’s
   proffered explanation is false or unworthy of credence.” Gosby v. Apache
   Indus. Servs., Inc., 30 F.4th 523, 527 (5th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks
   and citation omitted).
          We have already found that Mueck has met his burden as to the
   existence of a disability, and there is no dispute that Mueck was both qualified
   for his position and that the termination of his employment constituted an
   adverse employment action. Mueck, however, must also show that he was
   terminated on account of his disability—his alcoholism—to establish his prima
   facie case. For judicial economy, we assume without deciding that he has
   done so.

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          La Grange, however, has produced a legitimate, non-discriminatory
   reason for Mueck’s termination: the conflict between his court-ordered
   substance abuse classes and his shift schedule. Mueck does not contest that
   this is a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for an adverse action.
          The burden therefore shifts to Mueck to establish that this legitimate,
   non-discriminatory reason is pretextual. Mueck contends that he has done so
   by providing evidence of disparate treatment—that is, evidence showing that
   he was treated differently, and worse, than non-disabled employees.
   Specifically, Mueck points to evidence showing that La Grange covered
   absences for other employees, even on short notice. For example, Mueck
   notes that a plant supervisor had filled in for him when he had to miss work
   due to a spider bite in 2017, and that the supervisor had covered for other
   employees (none of whom La Grange had reason to believe were alcoholics
   or otherwise disabled) when they were ill. Mueck also claims, more generally,
   that La Grange would accommodate other operators who needed time off for
   a variety of reasons, including vacation, sickness, injury, doctor
   appointments, family issues, and drug testing, even when the request for
   leave was on short notice.
          In the context of discrimination claims, “we [have] require[d] that an
   employee who proffers a fellow employee as a comparator demonstrate that
   the employment actions at issue were taken under nearly identical
   circumstances.” Lee v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 574 F.3d 253, 260 (5th Cir.
   2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Some of the examples Mueck
   provides are easily distinguishable from his own circumstances: employees
   who cannot come into work because of an unplanned and unavoidable
   absence—such as illness or injury—are not similarly situated to employees
   who will need to miss work on a known, regular basis in the future. And while
   Mueck contends that his situation is akin to an employee who requests time
   off to attend a doctor’s appointment, he fails to proffer any evidence that

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                                         No. 22-50064

   such requests were actually made under comparable circumstances. For
   instance, Mueck does not provide any detail as to who made these coverage
   requests, how they went about requesting time off, when they requested time
   off, or how the request was handled. Instead, he simply asserts that coverage
   was granted. These details matter, however, because employees who have
   different work responsibilities or different supervisors are not considered
   “similarly situated.” Id. at 259-60. In fact, La Grange has provided evidence
   that those similarly situated to Mueck—that is, other employees who were
   unable to make their shifts because of court sanctions—have not been granted
   coverage and have instead been disciplined and terminated.
           Alternatively, Mueck argues that evidence in the record shows that “a
   discriminatory motive more likely motivated [La Grange’s] decision.”
   Wallace, 271 F.3d at 220 (international quotation marks omitted). First, he
   points to Bonewald’s admission that La Grange would have viewed Mueck’s
   request for time off differently and found coverage had he sought time off on
   the recommendation of the EAP, as opposed to a court order. Similarly,
   Mueck notes that although La Grange now states that he could have taken
   the time off with his vacation, he was never informed that this was an option
   to cover his shifts. 10 According to Mueck, because La Grange admits that it
   would have found coverage had Mueck phrased his request differently, it
   necessarily admits that a shift-schedule conflict cannot be the real reason for
   his termination.

           _____________________
           10
             Bonewald appeared confused as to why Mueck did not explore this option, saying
   that he thought Mueck did not want to use his vacation time. Pawelek testified that he did
   not think that Mueck had sufficient vacation time to cover his missed shifts. Mueck
   disputes both accounts, stating that he had vacation time and would have used it had he
   known it was a possibility.

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                                       No. 22-50064

          Yet this evidence does not create a triable issue of fact as to whether
   the given reason for his termination was pretextual, that is, “false or
   unworthy of credence.” LHC Grp., 773 F.3d at 702. Simply stated, nothing
   in the record supports such a finding. There is no dispute that, while La
   Grange may have been able to do more to find coverage for the shifts Mueck
   needed to miss, La Grange did attempt to coordinate coverage for him and,
   while partially successful, eventually these efforts failed. It was only at this
   point, when some of Mueck’s shifts were left uncovered, that La Grange
   dismissed Mueck. Given this context, no reasonable jury could find that La
   Grange’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason—the shift conflict—for
   Mueck’s suspension and termination was pretext for discrimination.
          We therefore AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary
   judgment in favor of La Grange on Mueck’s intentional discrimination claim.
                            C. Failure to Accommodate
          We now address the district court’s grant of summary judgment in
   favor of La Grange as to Mueck’s failure-to-accommodate claim.
          The     ADA       requires     employers      to   “mak[e]    reasonable
   accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise
   qualified individual with a disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). To prevail
   on a failure-to-accommodate claim, a plaintiff “must show that (1) [he] is a
   qualified individual with a disability; (2) the disability and its consequential
   limitations were known by the covered employer; and (3) the employer failed
   to make ‘reasonable accommodations’ for such known limitations.” Jennings
   v. Towers Watson, 11 F.4th 335, 343 (5th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks
   and citation omitted).
          As a threshold matter, the employee who “needs an accommodation
   because of a disability has the responsibility of informing [his] employer.”
   Chevron Phillips, 570 F.3d at 621; see also Jenkins v. Cleco Power, LLC, 487

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                                    No. 22-50064

   F.3d 309, 315 (5th Cir. 2007) (“It is the plaintiff’s burden to request
   reasonable accommodations.”). Failure to request an accommodation,
   particularly where an employee’s disability is not obvious, will doom a claim.
   Clark, 952 F.3d at 587 (holding that a plaintiff’s failure-to-accommodate
   claim failed on a “fundamental level” where he did not request an
   accommodation); see also Griffin, 661 F.3d at 224 (“However, an employer
   cannot be found to have violated the ADA when responsibility for the
   breakdown of the ‘informal interactive process’ is traceable to the employee
   and not the employer.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). In
   making this request, “[s]pecial words, like ‘reasonable accommodation,’
   need not be uttered, but the employee ‘must explain that the [proposed]
   adjustment in working conditions . . . is for a medical condition-related
   reason.” Delaval, 824 F.3d at 481 (second and third alterations in original)
   (quoting Chevron Phillips, 570 F.3d at 621).
          The district court found that Mueck had failed to present evidence
   showing that he had requested an accommodation for his disability of
   alcoholism. Mueck disagrees. In his view, he presented evidence
   demonstrating that, in his conversations with Pawelek, he generally
   acknowledged struggling with a medical condition (alcoholism) and needed
   time off to address that condition (via the court-ordered substance abuse
   classes). Thus, Mueck maintains that in ruling against him, the district court
   improperly imposed a “magic word” requirement.
          The facts presented here, however, do not show that La Grange was
   informed by Mueck that his request for time off was for a disability. Rather,
   La Grange reasonably viewed his request as one for time off to deal with the
   legal consequences of his most recent DWI. Here, both of Mueck’s
   discussions with Pawelek were set up to discuss his DWI and the associated
   court case. Indeed, the second meeting on May 17, 2019, specifically
   concerned the conditions of his probation. And these conditions included not

                                         22
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                                          No. 22-50064

   just Mueck’s court-ordered participation in the substance abuse program,
   but also breathalyzer requirements that posed a possible interference with his
   work. 11 This context matters. Mueck referred to his struggles with drinking
   only when discussing how criminal sanctions traceable to his drinking would
   impact his work. Indeed, Mueck himself confirmed that he had always met
   his work obligations, despite his alcoholism. We do not think it reasonable,
   on these facts, to expect an employer to view Mueck’s statements as him
   claiming to have a disability which required accommodation.
           Moreover, Mueck would have needed to request time off regardless
   of whether he had a disability. Mueck maintains that the court-ordered nature
   of the substance abuse classes has no impact on the analysis, suggesting that,
   because the court-ordered counseling was intended to treat his underlying
   disability, any request for time off to attend must be understood as a
   requested accommodation. 12 But we cannot disregard the circumstances
   surrounding an employee’s alleged request for accommodation when
   determining whether an employee made the requisite request. Here, no
   reasonable juror could have found that Mueck, by notifying La Grange that
   his court-ordered classes would conflict with his shift schedule and informing
   his supervisors that he was attempting to resolve this conflict by finding
   coverage, was requesting an accommodation for his disability of alcoholism.

           _____________________
           11
             Specifically, Mueck was ordered to carry a personal breathalyzer that had a
   camera to capture an image when he blew into the device. Plant employees, however, were
   prohibited from taking photos inside the plant.
           12
              We note that the EEOC, which has submitted an amicus brief in this appeal,
   appears to suggest that where a court orders counseling, as opposed to another condition
   of probation such as community service, employers must assume that, because the purpose
   of court-ordered substance abuse counseling is always to treat the underlying disability, any
   request to comply with such a court order is necessarily a request for an accommodation.
   We decline this broad invitation because Mueck did not convey to La Grange that the court-
   ordered counseling was a product of his disability.

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                                           No. 22-50064

           We emphasize that this is not to say that Mueck’s alcoholism is not a
   disability—we have already discussed, in detail, why Mueck has raised a
   triable issue of fact as to that matter. Instead, we find only that Mueck has
   not shown that he made his employer aware that his alcoholism was the reason
   why he was requesting accommodation. 13
           In the alternative, Mueck argues that, even if he did not clearly request
   an accommodation for a disability, because his statements raised the
   possibility that he could be requesting an accommodation, La Grange bore the
   burden of clarifying the nature of Mueck’s request. Put another way, Mueck
   contends that La Grange failed to engage in the required interactive process
   by failing to ask follow-up questions about whether he was requesting an
   accommodation. See Agro Distr., LLC, 555 F.3d at 471 (noting that once a
   qualified employee requests a reasonable accommodation, “the employer
   and employee should engage in flexible, interactive discussions to determine
   the appropriate accommodation”). But the duty to engage in the interactive
   process is only triggered after the employee has requested an
   accommodation. Id.; Chevron Phillips, 570 F.3d at 621.
           To support his position, Mueck cites to several out-of-circuit cases for
   the proposition that an employer, when faced with an ambiguous request,
   bears the burden of confirming whether an employee has, in fact, requested
   an accommodation. See Colwell v. Rite Aid Corp., 602 F.3d 495, 507 (3d Cir.

           _____________________
           13
                To the extent that Mueck contends that self-identifying as an alcoholic was
   enough, on its own, to put La Grange on notice that he was seeking an accommodation, we
   disagree. As discussed, an impairment (here, alcoholism) must substantially limit a major
   life activity to be considered a disability. An individual may identify as an alcoholic, or even
   be clinically diagnosed as one, without that impairment substantially limiting a major life
   activity. See, e.g., Ames, 629 F.3d at 670 (noting that the plaintiff was unable to show that
   her alcoholism was an ADA disability where there was no evidence that her alcoholism
   substantially limited her activities at home or at work).

                                                 24
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                                         No. 22-50064

   2010) (“[C]ircumstances will sometimes require the employer to meet the
   employee half-way, and if it appears that the employee may need an
   accommodation but doesn’t know how to ask for it, the employer should do
   what it can to help.” (quoting Conneen v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., 334 F.3d
   318, 332 (3d Cir. 2003))). These cases emphasize that the initial burden still
   rests upon the employee to put the employer on notice that they both have a
   disability and require some accommodation for it. See Conneen v, 334 F.3d at
   332 (emphasizing that “circumstances must at least be sufficient to cause a
   reasonable employer to make appropriate inquiries about the possible need
   for an accommodation”). 14
           Furthermore, even accepting, without deciding, that Mueck’s
   proposed burden-shifting framework applies, Mueck must initiate the
   dialogue. Here, the facts suggest only that a reasonable employer might have
   found that Mueck might have been seeking an accommodation for his
   disability. To hold that La Grange was required to determine whether Mueck
   had a disability and needed accommodation in this situation would place the
   initial burden of identifying an accommodation request on the employer, not
   the employee. We cannot find that Mueck’s terse references to his struggles
   with drinking and self-identification as an alcoholic, made while discussing
   the legal implications of a recent DWI, were enough to place a legal

           _____________________
           14
               Similarly, the EEOC cites to EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck, & Co., 417 F.3d 789, 804
   (7th Cir. 2005) for the proposition that if notice of a disability is “ambiguous” but
   nonetheless raises the possibility that the employee may need accommodation, the
   employer has the duty to ask for clarification. Sears addresses a situation where an
   employee has given notice “sufficient to notify the employer that the employee may have
   a disability that requires accommodation,” but that “notice is ambiguous as to the precise
   nature of the disability or desired accommodation.” Id. Like Mueck’s cited cases, Sears
   makes clear, however, that the “initial duty” still requires that an employee “indicate to
   the employer that [he] has a disability and desires an accommodation.” Id. at 804. Here,
   Mueck did not do so.

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                                          No. 22-50064

   responsibility on La Grange to probe whether Mueck was requesting a
   disability accommodation.
           For the reasons discussed above, we AFFIRM the district court’s
   grant of summary judgment as to Mueck’s failure-to-accommodate claim. 15
                                        D. Retaliation
           Finally, Mueck challenges the district court’s grant of summary
   judgment in favor of La Grange on his retaliation claim.
           The ADA prohibits retaliation against an individual who “has
   opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter.” 42 U.S.C.
   § 12203(a). As with the other claims under the ADA, a retaliation claim not
   supported by direct evidence is evaluated under the McDonnell Douglas
   burden-shifting framework. Sherrod v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 132 F.3d 1112, 1122
   (5th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case
   of unlawful retaliation, which requires a plaintiff to show that “(1) [he]
   participated in an activity protected under the statute; (2) [his] employer
           _____________________
           15
              Because we hold that Mueck failed to request a disability accommodation, we
   need not address the district court’s alternative holding that his claim was barred by 42
   U.S.C. § 12114(c), which states that an employer “may hold an employee who . . . is an
   alcoholic to the same qualification standards for employment or job performance and
   behavior that such entity holds other employees, even if any unsatisfactory performance or
   behavior is related to the . . . alcoholism of such employee.” Id. § 12114(c)(4). Nonetheless,
   we take this opportunity to caution that § 12114(c) should not be read to bar
   accommodations, such as time off, for an alcoholic employee. Instead, § 12114(c) merely
   allows an employer to discipline or discharge an employee for workplace misconduct even
   if that misconduct is attributable to the employee’s disability of alcoholism. See, e.g.,
   Humphrey v. Mem’l Hosp. Ass’n, 239 F.3d 1128, 1139 n.18 (9th Cir. 2001) (“The text of the
   ADA authorizes discharges for misconduct or inadequate performance that may be caused
   by a ‘disability’ in only one category of cases—alcoholism and illegal drug use.”); see also
   McElwain v. Boeing Co., 244 F. Supp. 3d 1093, 1099 (W.D. Wash. 2017) (denying a failure-
   to-accommodate claim where the employee sought time off for his incarceration for a DUI
   and holding that while the employee’s conviction may have been related to his alcoholism,
   the ADA did not require the employer to accommodate infractions of the law).

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                                          No. 22-50064

   took an adverse employment action against [him]; and (3) a causal connection
   exists between the protected activity and the adverse action.” Feist v. La.
   Dep’t of Just., 730 F.3d 450, 454 (5th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted).
           Mueck contends that he engaged in protected activity by requesting a
   reasonable accommodation for his alcoholism. See Jenkins, 487 F.3d at 316-
   17 (holding that the plaintiff had established a prima facie case for retaliation
   where he alleged that his employer retaliated against him by terminating him
   for requesting reasonable accommodations). Because we find that Mueck did
   not request a reasonable accommodation for his disability, his retaliation
   claim must also fail.16
           We thus AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment as
   to Mueck’s retaliation claim.
                                       III. Conclusion
           For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.

           _____________________
           16
               We note that, even if we had found that Mueck requested an accommodation,
   his retaliation claim would fail for the same reason as his intentional discrimination claim:
   his failure to provide sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that La
   Grange’s proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for his termination—the shift
   conflict—was pretextual.

                                                27