Court Opinion

ID: 9667081
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:34:43.043038+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:34.767596
License: Public Domain

HALL, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
The writer submits the following reasons for entering this dissent, based upon the hereinafter quoted portions of sworn testimony introduced against appellee’s motion for summary judgment.
The following excerpt is taken from affidavit of W. J. Holt, attorney for O. S. Hurley:
“ * * * I have in my possession in response to the inquiry that I have made a letter from Mr. H. D. Lemmon in which he states: ‘I was attempting to get this •business and had the policies issued on my own volition and not at the request of Mr. Hurley and as well as I remember it was never accepted by him.’ * * * We, of course, hope and expect to present this defense to plaintiff’s cause of action. * * * ”
The facts set out in the Haven D. Lem-mon affidavit raise a fact issue as to whether appellant purchased the policy in question, and is as follows:
“Amarillo, Potter County, Texas,
“February 19, 19'5l
“It has come to the attention of the undersigned that Mr. O. S. Hurley of Dallas, Texas is being sued Iby Mr. Will G. Knox, Receiver of the Texas Fire and Casualty Underwriters on the grounds that he at one time ordered and held a policy in the Texas Fire and Casualty Underwriters, the same being written by H. D. Lemmon & Company, a licensed agent at that time for the Texas Fire and Casualty Underwriters. This is to certify that on the occasion mentioned the writer felt he would be able to sell the coverage to Mr. Hurley and ordered out the policy from the home office of the Texas Fire and Casualty Underwriters. The policy was later presented to Mr. Hurley for his approval and, upon learning the type of company involved, he advised the writer he did not wish the coverage and the policy was later cancelled. The entire transaction was brought about by the writer and was not authorized in any way by Mr. Hurley.
“(s) Haven D. Lemmon
“Subscribed and sworn to this 19th day of February, 1951.
“(Seal)” “(s) Mildred Long, Notary Public in and for Potter County, Texas.”
The auditor, Floyd Herring, appellee’s witness, testified by deposition, among other things, as follows:
“It is true that H. D. Lemmon & Company issued to various people insurance policies for and on behalf of Texas Fire & Casualty Underwriters. I do not know whether or not H. D. Lemmon and Company kept an accurate set of books during the period above mentioned. * * *
*561“It is true that H. D. Lemmon & Company, as a local agent for Texas Fire & Casualty Underwriters made and .entered into contracts with and issued policies to various people during the period involved. I do not know whether or not H. D. Lem-mon & Company accepted cancellations of policies during the period involved.”
The following circumstances could be taken into consideration by a trier of the facts:
1. The Company's act in cancelling the policy one day before it submitted its books into court for receivership was not explained.
2. No notice of such cancellation was sent to appellant, which was required under the proposed contract (if same was in force on the date of cancellation).
3. The Company may have ascertained from the books and effects of the Lemmon Insurance Company of Dallas that the policy was never in effect, such books being available for auditing on the date of cancellation.
4. The longevity of time in which the receiver decided to file this law suit from the date he was appointed, to-wit, approximately nine years.
5. The letter referred to in the majority opinion, wherein appellant wrote the usual and customary notice to the Casualty Insurance Commissioner when the policy was to be taken out, was merely a circumstance but not, as a matter of law, determinative of the question as to whether appellant accepted the policy.
6. Appellee’s records do not reveal whether appellant paid for the premium. In this connection it can be taken also in consideration that appellee’s records failed to show that the receiver either billed or sued appellant for such premium.
7. ¡The record is also silent that no action was ever taken on the policy by anyone and no correspondence referring thereto from the time it was written until it was formally canceled by the Company.
8. It appears to the writer that the case was not fully developed by either party upon the hearing for summary judgment, and the best that can be said of the majority opinion is it resolved the issue in favor of appellee.
9.The above facts and circumstances raise a reasonable doubt in the writer’s mind that an issue of fact was before the trial court when it rendered the summary judgment.
The writer believes that said opinion of the majority is in error wherein it holds, that the receiver’s judgment should bear in-, terest from date of the class suit for the-following reasons:
1. The class suit was brought in Travis, County for the sole purpose of determining the assessment liability of each and all subscribers of the company involved during a certain period.
2. That part of said class suit judgment is void wherein it grants 6% interest against those subscribers who were not personally served. It is noted in the Southern Ornamental Iron Works v. Morrow, Tex.Civ.App., 101 S.W.2d 336, and the other cases cited in the majority opinion, there is not one case relied upon and cited in such case wherein a personal judgment for money was rendered against a person who was not personally served. The cases cited in the-Morrow case (which is the case of first impression upon the principals of class judgments in this State) were there cited for-authority to render such a judgment upon the doctrine of virtual representation pertaining to this particular class of litigants.
3. The principal amount sued for in the-instant case was not determined in the class, suit. The facts are, that the trial court rendered its summary judgment for a less, amount in the instant case than appellee sued for. It would be repugnant to good' government for a court of competent jurisdiction to render a monetary judgment against a person without said person having-his day in court to defend' against same. In, the Travis County class case involved herein, the trial court undertook to render judgment against subscribers (who had not been personally served) for 6% interest on $191,-000 indebtedness which it found to be due- and owing by them, without- giving them the right to defend against same.
4. One of the most convincing reasons, why that portion of the class suit is voidt *562wherein it undertakes to render judgment for interest at the rate of 6% per annum upon an unstated amount, as against the parties individually who were not personally served, is the fact that appellee saw fit to bring the instant suit in a district court where appellant resides, personally serving him and there undertaking to establish a personal judgment against him.
If the Travis County District Court had authority to render a 6% judgment against the unserved subscribers, then it would have had authority to render the principal amount upon which said interest would bear without the necessity of filing an additional suit and serving appellant personally.
Of course, this interest question is in point only if, as and when the trial court’s summary judgment becomes final.