Court Opinion

ID: 9530464
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:00:04.367584+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:07.392274
License: Public Domain

TRAYNOR, J., Concurring.
My views with respect to the enforcement of integrated bargains by contempt proceedings are set forth in dissenting opinions in Bradley v. Superior Court, 48 Cal.2d 509, 523 [310 P.2d 634], and Dinner v. Superior Court, 50 Cal.2d 631, 638 [328 P.2d 193]. Although those views remain unchanged, I am bound by those cases until they are overruled. If they necessarily controlled the result in this case, I would concur in the judgment under their compulsion. I do not believe they do, however, for in my opinion petitioner is entitled to the entry of the final decree as a matter of right even if he could be held in contempt of court for not performing the conditions of the interlocutory decree.
Early interpretations of section 132 of the Civil Code establish that a final decree of divorce may be denied only if the parties are no longer entitled to the dissolution of the marriage because of condonation (O’Connell v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. App. 350, 353 [240 P. 294]; Lane v. Superior Court, 104 Cal.App. 340, 347 [285 P. 860]) or reconciliation (Olson v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. 250, 252-253 [165 P. 706, 1 A.L.R. 1589]); if the parties were not entitled to the dissolution of the marriage in the first instance (Carp v. Superior Court, 76 Cal.App. 481, 485 [245 P. 459] [interlocutory decree obtained by mistake or fraud] ; cf. McGuinness v. Superior Court, 196 Cal. 222, 229-230 [237 P. 42, 40 A.L.R. 1110]; Miller v. Miller, *15226 Cal.2d 119, 121 [156 P.2d 931] [setting aside final decree procured by fraud]) ; or, in the court’s discretion, if the marriage has been dissolved by the death of one or both parties. (Civ. Code, §132; Gloyd v. Superior Court, 44 Cal.App. 39, 43 [185 P. 995].) Section 132 also provides for delaying the entry of the final decree pending appeal from the interlocutory judgment or motion for a new trial. That section has been interpreted to achieve the strange result of postponing dissolution of the marital relationship until after an appeal from the property part of the judgment is heard and determined, although the final decree may then be entered even if the result of the appeal is to remand the cause for further proceedings. (.Harrold v. Harrold, 43 Cal.2d 77, 83-86 [271 P.2d 489].) My view that section 132 refers only to appeals from that part of the interlocutory decree dissolving the marriage is set forth in the concurring opinion in the Harrold case, 43 Cal.2d at 86-90. (See also 1 Armstrong, California Family Law, 272-273.) In other cases, where the parties are entitled to a dissolution of, the marriage on the merits, entry of the final decree is a ministerial act. (Claudius v. Melvin, 146 Cal. 257, 260-261 [79 P. 897] ; Keller v. Keller, 122 Cal.App. 712, 715 [10 P.2d 541] ; Ringel v. Superior .Court, 54 Cal.App.2d 34, 35 [128 P.2d 558]; see Olson v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. 250, 251-252 [165 P. 706, 1 A.L.R 1589] ; McGuinness v. Superior Court, 196 Cal. 222, 229 [237 P. 42, 40 A.L.R. 1110] ; Lane v. Superior Court, 104 Cal.App. 340, 345 [285 P. 860]; ef. Angell v. Angell, 84 Cal.App.2d 339, 342 [191 P.2d 54]; Nemer v. Nemer, 117 Cal.App.2d 35, 38 [254 P.2d 661].)
Four California cases would add as another ground for denying entry of the final decree the moving party’s disregard of the court’s orders. (Weeks v. Superior Court, 187 Cal. 620, 622 [203 P. 93] ; Sullivan v. Superior Court, 72 Cal.App. 531, 535-536 [237 P. 782] ; Pearson v. Superior Court, 32 Cal.App. 2d 87, 89 [89 P.2d 162] ; Knackstedt v. Superior Court, 79 Cal.App.2d 727, 729 [180 P.2d 375].) The Weeks case, upon which the other three cases rest, relies upon O’Neill v. Thomas Day Co., 152 Cal. 357, 362-363 [92 P. 856, 14 Ann.Cas. 970], a personal injury action in which plaintiff refused to answer pertinent questions under subpoena at a deposition proceeding. The court’s declaration in O’Neill that “certainly no plaintiff can, with right or reason, ask the aid and assistance of a court in hearing his demands, while he stands in an attitude of contempt to its legal orders and processes” was not formulated with the policy considerations appropriate to a *153divorce action in mind. The Weeks court undertook to incorporate the O’Neill rule into divorce law by relying upon the Olson ease, supra, 175 Cal. 250, 252-253. The Olson case, however, was ill suited to that purpose, for it involved an unconditional reconciliation—a situation plainly distinguishable from contempt and one in which entry of the final decree is not ordinarily warranted. The Weeks case failed to notice the significant difference in terms of public policy between a final decree of divorce and other processes withheld from disobedient contestants in civil eases.
A court’s power to withhold its processes, like its power to punish for contempt, rests on the necessity of upholding the court’s dignity and enforcing its orders. (See In re Shortridge, 99 Cal. 526, 532 [34 P. 227, 37 Am.St.Rep. 78, 21 A.L.R. 755]; Raiden v. Superior Court, 34 Cal.2d 83, 86 [206 P.2d 1081].) A court exercising this power may dismiss (Knoob v. Knoob, 192 Cal. 95, 97 [218 P. 568] ; MacPherson v. MacPherson, 13 Cal.2d 271, 277 [89 P.2d 382]) or stay (Borenstein v. Borenstein, 11 Cal.2d 301, 302 [78 P.2d 388]; Krog v. Krog, 32 Cal.2d 812, 818-819 [198 P.2d 510]; Kopasz v. Kopasz, 34 Cal.2d 423, 425 [210 P.2d 846]) the appeal of a recalcitrant party to the divorce action; deny a change of venue (Ross v. Ross, 48 Cal.App.2d 72, 78 [119 P.2d 444]); refuse to permit the taking of depositions (Paddon v. Superior Court, 65 Cal.App. 479, 479-480 [224 P. 474]) or the introduction of evidence (Schubert v. Superior Court, 109 Cal.App. 633, 635-636 [293 P. 814]) ; refuse to vacate an interlocutory (Travis v. Travis, 89 Cal.App.2d 292, 295 [200 P.2d 843]) or a final decree (Soderberg v. Soderberg, 63 Cal.App. 492, 494-495 [219 P. 82]); or deny the writs of mandate and prohibition (Funfar v. Superior Court, 107 Cal.App. 488, 490-491 [290 P. 626]). (See also the questionable exercise of this power in Kubon v. Kubon, 51 Cal.2d 229, 232 [331 P.2d 636]; dissenting opinion, 233.) When, however, there has been a final determination that the marriage should be dissolved, it is my opinion that the public interest in vindicating judicial dignity should yield to its interest in preserving the sanctity of marriage when the process sought to be withheld is a final decree of divorce, for “ [i] t is a degradation of marriage and a frustration of its purposes when the courts use it as a device for punishment.” (De Burgh v. De Burgh, 39 Cal.2d 858, 864 [250 P.2d 598].)
I would therefore overrule the Weeks case and disapprove the Sullivan, Pearson, and Knaekstedt eases and hold that the *154trial court lacks discretion to withhold entry of the final decree of divorce solely because the moving party stands in disregard of its orders.