Court Opinion

ID: 9590100
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:51:32.511475+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:47.081187
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellant contends in his motion for rehearing that appellee’s representation, made at the time the financing was obtained, that it would procure long-term financing for the property supports his fraud claim because the evidence generated on motion for summary judgment creates an issue of material fact as to whether appellee intended to perform this alleged promise at the time it was made. Thus, appellant contends that the promise may constitute actionable fraud pursuant to Hayes v. Hallmark Apts., 232 Ga. 307, 308 (207 SE2d 197). However, a careful review of the record demonstrates no *593evidence to support the contention that appellee had no intention to perform the alleged promise with respect to long-term financing. The subject loan was made to appellant in January 1979. Appellee phased out its mortgage loan department in late 1979 or early 1980. Appellant argues that the latter fact creates a genuine issue as to whether appellee intended to perform its alleged promise to procure long-term financing for the property when that promise was allegedly made in January 1979. However, appellant’s contention overlooks the unrebutted, unimpeached affidavit testimony of appellee’s officer who allegedly made the promise for long-term financing. That officer deposed that he did undertake specific efforts to obtain long-term financing for the property. This direct, unimpeached testimony showing that appellee undertook to perform on its alleged promise is not rebutted by the circumstantial evidence that it phased out its mortgage loan department approximately one year later, which is not inconsistent with the testimony as to performance. “In passing upon a motion for summary judgment, a finding of fact which may be inferred but is not demanded by circumstantial evidence has no probative value against positive and uncontradicted evidence that no such fact exists. . . . Absent direct evidence to the contrary or circumstantial evidence necessarily inconsistent with [the testimony of appellee’s officer], neither of which appears in this case... appellee is entitled to summary judgment on the issue of whether [appellee had no intention to perform its alleged promise with respect to long-term financing].” (Emphasis supplied.) Splish Splash Water Slides v. Cherokee Ins. Co., 167 Ga. App. 589 (4e) (307 SE2d 107). Appellant has simply failed to present evidence that would bring this case within the Hayes rule; thus, the case falls within the rule enunciated in Hornsby v. First Nat. Bank, supra, precluding a claim of fraud based upon a promise to perform a future act.
We have reviewed the other contentions made in appellant’s motion for rehearing and likewise find them to be without merit.

Motion for rehearing denied.