Court Opinion

ID: 9657504
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:28:13.730654+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:45.788033
License: Public Domain

MORGAN, Justice
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I concur in part and dissent in part.
I agree completely with the disposition of the first two issues, i.e., the polygraph refusal and the admission of the testimony regarding the attempt to repay the money. I dissent on the disposition of the third issue on incompetence of counsel.
I agree that the conviction stands entirely on circumstantial evidence. In State v. Schafer, 297 N.W.2d 473, 476-77 (S.D.1980), we stated again our rule on convictions upon circumstantial evidence:
[T]o warrant a conviction upon circumstantial evidence alone, such facts and circumstances must be shown as are consistent with each other and with guilt of the party charged and such as cannot by any reasonable theory be true that the party charged be innocent, (citations omitted) ... To support a conviction on circumstantial evidence, it is not necessary to exclude every possible hypothesis of innocence, (citations omitted).
In this instance, I cannot imagine a stronger circumstantial case. The register was opened three times in a very short period of time. The first time the money was there, the third time it was not, and in between Dornbusch was in the immediate vicinity alone. Coupled with that, he tried unsuccessfully to buy off the prosecution by offering to repay the money. With all that evidence before the jury, I cannot believe that the testimony regarding the refusal to take a lie detector test tipped any scale against Dornbusch. As far as the inquiry regarding the complaining witness’ previous suspicions against Dornbusch, I would say that was clearly a trial tactic to illicit sympathy for Dornbusch against the complaining witness whom they were attempting to portray as picking on him. In short, I do not think that this prejudice rises to the Strickland v. Washington test. I do not agree that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. I would not put the taxpayers of Codington County to the expense of another trial.