Court Opinion

ID: 9767954
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:36:33.187664+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:35.056175
License: Public Domain

DOUGLAS, Judge
(concurring).
I concur that the appellant properly presented the evidence concerning the *298court-martial of the witness to the judge during the trial.
The State’s motion in limine was filed and granted on March 20, 1974. On March 21, during the trial, appellant filed a motion for reconsideration of the State’s motion in limine and for discovery with a copy of the court-martial order attached. This was denied on the 21st of March.
During the trial and outside the presence of the jury, the witness testified that he had been convicted in 1972 for theft of property. Counsel for the defense stated that he had the court-martial order and if there were other orders that changed this order he would have no objection. Before counsel finished his statement, the court interrupted and refused to admit the evidence.
This was sufficient as an objection in a hearing outside the presence of the jury under Article 40.09, Section 6(d)(3), V.A.C. C.P.
This is like Powers v. State, 456 S.W.2d 97 (Tex.Cr.App.1970). There, during the trial on the merits, the jury was retired and the court denied a motion to suppress. This was held to be sufficient as an objection because it was during the trial.
In the present case the appellant filed his motion to reconsider the granting of State’s motion in limine. It was also brought to the attention of the trial court outside the presence of the jury while evidence was being introduced during the trial.
The appellant complied with Article 40.-09, Section 6(d)(3), supra, and the objection to the exclusion of the evidence was sufficient and he properly showed the court what evidence he wanted before the jury.
Motions in limine, whether they be motions to suppress or motions to introduce evidence or objections to evidence, should be treated alike. The main thing to be considered is that the judge should have sufficient notice of what a defendant is complaining about during the trial to pass upon the matter. In this case he did.
The part of the opinion holding that the judgment in the court-martial proceeding should have been admitted is correct, but to the part which states, apparently in dictum, that the witness could not testify that the conviction was reversed, I cannot agree. The jury could pass upon his credibility. The best evidence rule should not be applied. See Johnson v. State, 453 S.W.2d 828 (Tex.Cr.App.1970).