Court Opinion

ID: 9963245
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-24 20:01:03.536438+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:43.911926
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-13110    Document: 38-1      Date Filed: 04/24/2024   Page: 1 of 15

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-13110
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        ANDRE SAINT-CYR,
                                                     Petitioner-Appellant,
        versus
        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                                   Respondent-Appellee.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket Nos. 0:20-cv-61184-WPD,
                             0:13-cr-30267-WPD-2
USCA11 Case: 22-13110       Document: 38-1      Date Filed: 04/24/2024      Page: 2 of 15

        2                       Opinion of the Court                  22-13110

                             ____________________

        Before WILSON, BRANCH, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Andre Saint-Cyr appeals from the district court’s dismissal
        for lack of jurisdiction of his pro se “motion for reconsideration . . .
        or petition for writ of audita querela, habeas corpus, or error coram
        nobis” on the ground that it was an unauthorized second or
        successive motion to vacate sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. After
        review, we conclude that it was not a second or successive motion
        because there was a new, intervening amended judgment.
        Accordingly, we vacate and remand.
                                   I.     Background
                In 2014, a jury found Saint-Cyr guilty of conspiracy to
        commit Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Count
        1); conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or
        more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A),
        and 846 (Count 2); attempted possession with intent to distribute
        500 grams or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1)
        and 846 (Count 3); conspiracy to use a firearm during and in
        relation to a crime of violence as set forth in Count 1 and a drug-
        trafficking crime as set forth in Counts 2 and 3 of the indictment, in
        violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(o) (Count 4); use of a firearm during
        and in relation to a crime of violence as set forth in Count 1 of the
        indictment, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Count 5); use of a
        firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime as set forth
USCA11 Case: 22-13110         Document: 38-1        Date Filed: 04/24/2024        Page: 3 of 15

        22-13110                  Opinion of the Court                               3

        in Counts 2 and 3 of the indictment, in violation of § 924(c) (Count
        6); and possession of an unregistered firearm (silencer), in violation
        of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (Count 7). The district court sentenced Saint-
        Cyr to a total of 295 months’ imprisonment, which included a term
        of 60 months’ imprisonment on each of Counts 5 and 6, to run
        concurrently with each other but consecutively to the other
        counts. 1 We affirmed on appeal. United States v. Cazy, 618 F. App’x
        569 (11th Cir. 2015).
               In July 2016, Saint-Cyr filed a pro se motion to vacate
        sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing in relevant part that,
        Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015), 2 invalidated his
        convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Counts 5 and 6). The district
        court denied the motion on the merits. 3 Thereafter, Saint-Cyr filed
        at least two other pro se § 2255 motions that were dismissed as
        unauthorized second or successive motions.

        1 In 2017, Saint-Cyr, proceeding pro se, successfully moved for a sentence

        reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), and the district court reduced his term of
        imprisonment on Counts 1–4, which resulted in a reduced total sentence of
        248 months’ imprisonment.
        2 In Johnson, the Supreme Court struck down a portion of the definition of a

        violent felony in the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii),
        as unconstitutionally vague. 576 U.S. at 596–97. Section 924(c)(3)’s definition
        of a crime of violence contained similar language to that struck down in
        Johnson. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B). Therefore, Saint-Cyr argued that Johnson
        should apply to § 924(c)(3)(B) as well.
        3 Although the district court denied the § 2255 motion on the merits, it

        amended the judgment in an abundance of caution by reducing the special
        assessment to $600.
USCA11 Case: 22-13110      Document: 38-1     Date Filed: 04/24/2024     Page: 4 of 15

        4                      Opinion of the Court                22-13110

               Meanwhile, in United States v. Davis, the Supreme Court
        extended its holding in Johnson and its progeny to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)
        and struck down a portion of § 924(c)(3)(B)’s definition of a crime
        of violence as unconstitutionally vague. 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2324–25,
        2336 (2019). Thereafter, we held that Davis announced a new rule
        of constitutional law within the meaning of § 2255(h)(2) that was
        retroactively applicable. See In re Hammoud, 931 F.3d 1032, 1038–
        39 (11th Cir. 2019).
                Post-Davis, Saint-Cyr, proceeding pro se, requested
        permission from this Court to file a second or successive § 2255
        motion challenging his convictions on Counts 4 and 5 in light of
        Davis, and we granted his request. The district court ultimately
        granted Saint-Cyr relief as to Count 5 only, concluding that
        conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery was no longer a valid
        predicate crime of violence for purposes of § 924(c) post-Davis,
        thereby rendering his conviction on Count 5 unlawful.
        Accordingly, in July 2020, the district court issued an amended
        judgment vacating Count 5 and the corresponding 60-month
        sentence and related special assessment. However, Saint-Cyr’s
        total sentence remained the same.
               Saint-Cyr subsequently filed a pro se motion for a limited
        resentencing and appointment of counsel. The district court
        denied the motion explaining that Saint-Cyr had already received a
        “limited resentencing” when the court issued the amended
        judgment. The district court elaborated about its sentencing
USCA11 Case: 22-13110      Document: 38-1     Date Filed: 04/24/2024     Page: 5 of 15

        22-13110               Opinion of the Court                        5

        decision further in a second order denying Saint-Cyr relief,
        explaining as follows:
              The Court exercises discretion and declines to see the
              need for a new sentencing hearing. Because a limited
              resentencing was appropriate, there is no need for the
              court to require Saint Cyr’s presence or to allow
              objections. Moreover, there was no sentencing
              hearing for a transcript to be prepared from. The
              request for an updated [presentence investigation
              report] is Denied. The Court does not share Saint-
              Cyr’s negative view of the ATF sting in this case. The
              Court      has    considered     the     factors    in
              18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and a 248 month sentence
              promotes respect for the law and acts as a deterrent.

              Wherefore, Saint Cyr’s Motion to Vacate Count Five
              is Granted, but denied as to Count Four and dismissed
              as the Count Six. The Clerk has already ﬁled an
              amended judgement, vacating Count Five and one
              special assessment. The remaining 248 month
              sentence remains intact.          The request for
              appointment of counsel is denied.

               Almost two years later, on August 22, 2022, Saint-Cyr filed
        the underlying pro se “motion for reconsideration of court’s prior
        order or petition for writ of audita querela, habeas corpus, or error
        coram nobis,” which is the subject of the present appeal. He
        maintained that his § 924(o) conviction (Count 4) was no longer
        valid post-Davis and in light of the Supreme Court’s then-recent
USCA11 Case: 22-13110       Document: 38-1       Date Filed: 04/24/2024      Page: 6 of 15

        6                       Opinion of the Court                    22-13110

        decision in United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845 (2022), 4 and he urged
        the district court to reconsider its prior ruling. He also challenged
        the validity of his conviction for Count 6, and he requested an
        evidentiary hearing.
               Two days after Saint-Cyr filed his motion, the district court
        construed it as a § 2255 motion and dismissed it for lack of
        jurisdiction, concluding that it was filed without the required
        permission from this Court under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2255(h),
        2244(b)(3)(A). The district court also explained that relief was not
        available under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) because that
        rule does not permit “re-litigation of matters previously decided in
        a collateral attack.” Likewise, the court noted that audita querela
        “does not apply to this successive motion to vacate,” and habeas
        corpus was unavailable because it “lies only in the district where
        Saint-Cyr is housed.” Finally, the court explained that “[c]oram
        [n]obis [did] not apply because [Saint-Cyr was] still in custody.”
        Saint-Cyr, proceeding pro se, now appeals.5
                                    II.     Discussion
              Saint-Cyr argues that the district court erred in construing
        his motion for reconsideration as an unauthorized successive
        § 2255 motion because he did not seek to raise a new claim, but

        4 The Supreme Court in Taylor held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery does

        not categorically qualify as a predicate crime of violence for purposes of
        § 924(c). 596 U.S. at 851.
        5 The government moved for summary affirmance on appeal, which we

        denied.
USCA11 Case: 22-13110      Document: 38-1      Date Filed: 04/24/2024      Page: 7 of 15

        22-13110               Opinion of the Court                          7

        merely sought reconsideration of the court’s prior ruling which
        was erroneous. He notes that he filed the motion under “several
        theories” of relief because he was not sure which one was proper,
        and that the district court has a duty to liberally construe his pro se
        motion “under any vehicle that would provide relief.” Finally, he
        maintains that he is entitled to relief on the merits of his claims and
        an evidentiary hearing.
                “Federal courts have long recognized that they have an
        obligation to look behind the label of a motion filed by a pro se
        inmate and determine whether the motion is, in effect, cognizable
        under a different remedial statutory framework.” Gooden v. United
        States, 627 F.3d 846, 847 (11th Cir. 2010).
                “We review de novo the district court’s dismissal of a 28
        U.S.C. § 2255 motion as second or successive.” McIver v. United
        States, 307 F.3d 1327, 1329 (11th Cir. 2002). The Antiterrorism and
        Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) provides that,
        before a movant may file a second or successive § 2255 motion, he
        first must obtain an order from the court of appeals authorizing the
        district court to consider the motion.               See 28 U.S.C.
        §§ 2244(b)(3)(A), 2255(h). Absent authorization from this Court,
        the district court lacks jurisdiction to consider a second or
        successive motion to vacate sentence. See Armstrong v. United
        States, 986 F.3d 1345, 1347 (11th Cir. 2021) (explaining that without
        the requisite authorization, “the district court must dismiss a
        second or successive § 2255 [motion] for lack of jurisdiction”).
        However, AEDPA does not define what it means for a petition to
USCA11 Case: 22-13110        Document: 38-1        Date Filed: 04/24/2024        Page: 8 of 15

        8                         Opinion of the Court                     22-13110

        be “second or successive.” See generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2255.
        Rather, “second or successive is a term of art, [a]nd since it limits
        the courts’ jurisdiction, we read it narrowly.” Scott v. United States,
        890 F.3d 1239, 1247 (11th Cir. 2018) (quotations and internal
        citation omitted).
               “Whether a petition is second or successive depends on the
        judgment challenged.” Patterson v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 849 F.3d
        1321, 1325 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (emphasis omitted)
        (quotations omitted). “[T]he judgment to which AEDPA refers is
        the underlying conviction and the most recent sentence that
        authorizes the petitioner’s current detention.” Ferreira v. Sec’y,
        Dep’t of Corr., 494 F.3d 1286, 1292 (11th Cir. 2007); Insignares v. Sec’y,
        Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 755 F.3d 1273, 1281 (11th Cir. 2014) (“[T]here is
        one judgment, comprised of both the sentence and conviction.”).
        Thus, “where . . . there is a new judgment intervening between the
        two habeas petitions, an application challenging the resulting new
        judgment is not second or successive . . . .” Magwood v. Patterson,
        561 U.S. 320, 341–42 (2010) (quotations and internal citations
        omitted).
              Here, as an initial matter, the district court did not err in
        looking beyond the label of Saint-Cyr’s pro se motion to “determine
        whether the motion [was], in effect, cognizable under a different
        remedial statutory framework.” 6 Gooden, 627 F.3d at 847. In the

        6 As the district court noted, although Saint-Cyr styled the motion primarily

        as a “motion for reconsideration,” such a motion “cannot be used to relitigate
        old matters, raise argument[,] or present evidence that could have been raised
USCA11 Case: 22-13110         Document: 38-1        Date Filed: 04/24/2024         Page: 9 of 15

        22-13110                  Opinion of the Court                                9

        motion, Saint-Cyr sought to collaterally attack his convictions on
        Counts 4 and 6, and it is well-established “that a § 2255 motion is
        the exclusive remedy for a federal prisoner to collaterally attack his
        conviction and sentence . . . .” Antonelli v. Warden, U.S.P. Atlanta,
        542 F.3d 1348, 1351 n.1 (11th Cir. 2008). Thus, the district court
        did not err in construing the motion as a § 2255 motion.
               The next question we must consider is whether the district
        court properly determined that the motion was a second or
        successive motion within the meaning of AEDPA. The answer to
        this question turns on whether the July 2020 amended judgment,
        which vacated Saint-Cyr’s conviction on Count 5 and the related
        60-month sentence, constituted a new intervening judgment.
             We start with what constitutes a new judgment. The
        Supreme Court addressed this issue in Magwood v. Patterson. After

        prior to entry of judgment.” Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 740 (11th Cir.
        2010) (quotations omitted). Regardless, any motion for reconsideration
        would have been untimely as it was filed almost two years from the district
        court’s entry of judgment granting in part and denying in part Saint-Cyr’s
        § 2255 motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1) (providing that “[a] motion under
        Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time” and, if based on certain
        grounds, “no more than a year after the entry of the judgment or order” from
        which reconsideration is sought).
                Similarly, Saint-Cyr could not receive relief through the requested writ
        of audita querela or a writ of coram nobis because relief was available through
        § 2255. See United States v. Holt, 417 F.3d 1172, 1175 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[W]e
        hold that a writ of audita querela may not be granted when relief is cognizable
        under § 2255.”); United States v. Peter, 310 F.3d 709, 712 (11th Cir. 2002)
        (explaining that a writ of coram nobis is only available “to vacate a conviction
        when the petitioner has served his sentence and is no longer in custody”).
USCA11 Case: 22-13110     Document: 38-1      Date Filed: 04/24/2024    Page: 10 of 15

        10                     Opinion of the Court                22-13110

        being sentenced to death for murder and exhausting
        postconviction relief in the Alabama state courts, Magwood filed a
        federal habeas petition challenging both his conviction and
        sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 561 U.S. at 323. The federal
        habeas court conditionally granted Magwood’s § 2254 petition
        with directions that he either be released or resentenced. Id. The
        state trial court subsequently held a full resentencing, but
        ultimately imposed the same sentence. Id. at 323, 326. After again
        challenging his renewed death sentence in state court, Magwood
        filed another § 2254 petition raising two claims that were directly
        related to the resentencing proceedings. Id. at 327–28. The district
        court determined that this new § 2254 petition was not second or
        successive for purposes of § 2244, and proceeded to address the
        merits of Magwood’s claims. Id. at 328. On appeal, we reversed in
        part as to the successive nature of the petition, concluding that one
        of Magwood’s claims was a prohibited second or successive claim
        under § 2244 because it “challenged the trial court’s reliance on the
        same (allegedly improper) aggravating factor that the trial court
        had relied upon for Magwood’s original sentence.” Id. at 329. The
        Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that the phrase “second or
        successive” in § 2244(b) “must be interpreted with respect to the
        judgment challenged.” Id. at 332–33. Accordingly, the Court
        concluded that because a new, intervening judgment was entered
        following the resentencing, Magwood’s § 2254 petition challenged
        “new errors” made at the resentencing and was not “second or
USCA11 Case: 22-13110         Document: 38-1          Date Filed: 04/24/2024           Page: 11 of 15

        22-13110                    Opinion of the Court                                 11

        successive” for purposes of § 2244(b). 7 Id. at 339, 342. In reaching
        this conclusion, the Court left open the question of whether a
        petitioner could challenge the original, undisturbed conviction in a
        new habeas petition following an intervening judgment where the
        State imposed only a new sentence. Id. at 342.
                Thus, the government here argues that Magwood is
        inapplicable because Saint-Cyr’s motion sought to challenge his
        undisturbed convictions on Counts 4 and 6 which were part of the
        original 2014 judgment. The government’s argument is misplaced
        because we have since considered the question left open in
        Magwood as to whether a habeas petition is “second or successive”
        for purposes of § 2244 where it challenges an undisturbed
        conviction following the imposition of only a new sentence, and
        we squarely rejected the same argument the government advances
        in this case. See Insignares, 755 F.3d at 1277–78.
              Specifically, in Insignares, following initial § 2254
        proceedings, the state court granted the defendant’s motion for a
        sentence reduction, reduced the mandatory-minimum term of
        imprisonment for one count of conviction, and “entered [a]

        7 Although Magwood addressed habeas petitions by a state prisoner under

        28 U.S.C. § 2254, Magwood and its progeny “also appl[y] to cases involving
        § 2255 motions” by federal prisoners. Armstrong v. United States, 986 F.3d 1345,
        1349 (11th Cir. 2021); see also Stewart v. United States, 646 F.3d 856, 859 n.6 (11th
        Cir. 2011) (“Because of the similarities between the provisions governing
        second or successive petitions under § 2254 and second or successive motions
        under § 2255, precedent interpreting one of these parallel restrictions is
        instructive for interpreting its counterpart.”).
USCA11 Case: 22-13110      Document: 38-1      Date Filed: 04/24/2024     Page: 12 of 15

        12                     Opinion of the Court                  22-13110

        corrected sentence and new judgment.” Id. at 1277. Insignares
        then filed a new § 2254 petition. Id. Although the State did not
        contest that a new judgment was entered for purposes of § 2244, it
        argued that Insignares’s new § 2254 petition was nevertheless
        “second or successive” because it challenged the undisturbed
        conviction and raised the same issues as his first § 2254 petition. Id.
        at 1278. We rejected this argument, and held that because there is
        only one judgment, which “is comprised of both the sentence and
        the conviction,” a habeas petition is not second or successive where
        it follows a new judgment, “regardless of whether its claims
        challenge the sentence or the underlying conviction.” Id. at 1281.
               Nevertheless, we must emphasize that not every action that
        alters a sentence constitutes a new judgment for purposes of
        AEDPA. Rather, what matters is “the judgment authorizing the
        petitioner’s confinement.” Patterson, 849 F.3d at 1325 (en banc)
        (quotations omitted). Thus, in Patterson, we held that where the
        state court granted a motion to correct sentence and issued an
        order removing a sentencing condition that the defendant undergo
        chemical castration did not constitute a new judgment for purposes
        of § 2244. Id. at 1325–28. In so holding, we emphasized that the
        order removing the chemical castration condition did “not
        otherwise address the term of Patterson’s imprisonment,” and thus
        Patterson was still in custody pursuant to his original judgment. Id.
        at 1326.
              Likewise, we have held in the context of federal prisoners
        pursuing relief under § 2255 that a sentence reduction under 18
USCA11 Case: 22-13110     Document: 38-1      Date Filed: 04/24/2024    Page: 13 of 15

        22-13110               Opinion of the Court                       13

        U.S.C. § 3582(c) based on a reduction of the applicable sentencing
        guidelines range does not constitute a new judgment for purposes
        of AEDPA. Armstrong, 986 F.3d at 1349–50. In so holding, we
        emphasized the many differences between Armstrong’s
        circumstances and the circumstances in Magwood. Id. at 1349. One
        key difference was that the petitioner in Magwood “demonstrated
        in his original collateral attack that his original sentence violated
        the Constitution,” and he received a full resentencing. Id. at 1349–
        50. On the other hand, the petitioner in Armstrong had merely
        received a reduction to “an otherwise final sentence in
        circumstances specified by the [Sentencing] Commission.” Id. at
        1349 (quotations omitted). In other words, Armstrong’s “existing
        sentence [was] merely reduced to account for the subsequent
        lowering of the sentencing range by the Sentencing Commission.”
        Id. at 1350. We also emphasized that “by its terms, § 3582(c) [did]
        not authorize a sentencing or resentencing proceeding, but rather
        authoriz[ed] only a limited adjustment to an otherwise final
        sentence and not a plenary resentencing proceeding.” Id. at 1349
        (quotations omitted). Indeed, in the very preceding subsection of
        § 3582, Congress wrote that “[n]otwithstanding the fact that a
        sentence to imprisonment can subsequently be . . . modified
        pursuant to the provisions of subsection (c) . . . a judgment of
        conviction that includes such a sentence constitutes a final judgment
        for all other purposes.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(b) (emphasis added). “This
        means that, even though the sentence might have changed, the
        relevant final ‘judgment’ did not.” Telcy v. United States, 20 F.4th
        735, 745 (11th Cir. 2021); see also id. at 743–45 (holding that a
USCA11 Case: 22-13110      Document: 38-1       Date Filed: 04/24/2024      Page: 14 of 15

        14                      Opinion of the Court                   22-13110

        discretionary sentence reduction under § 404(b) of the First Step
        Act did not constitute a new judgment for purposes of AEDPA).
                Here, there are clear parallels between Saint-Cyr’s case and
        Magwood. Like the petitioner in Magwood, Saint-Cyr demonstrated
        in his authorized second § 2255 motion that one of his
        convictions—namely, Count 5—violated the Constitution and was
        not authorized by law. By its terms, § 2255 provides that, where
        the court determines the § 2255 movant is entitled to relief, “the
        court shall vacate and set the judgment aside and shall discharge
        the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the
        sentence as may appear appropriate.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b). And in
        Saint-Cyr’s case, the district court vacated and set aside the
        judgment as to Count 5, conducted a “limited resentencing,”
        determined that the same sentence of 248 months’ imprisonment
        was appropriate after considering the relevant § 3553(a) factors,
        and issued a new amended judgment to that effect. Although the
        district court did not conduct a full de novo resentencing and Saint-
        Cyr’s total sentence remained the same, the amended judgment
        nevertheless is the operative judgment that authorizes Saint-Cyr’s
        current confinement. The amended judgment did not merely
        make a reduction or correction to his sentence like that in Patterson,
        Armstrong, and Telcy. Rather, it substantively changed the
        underlying convictions and sentencing package that together form
        the final judgment by vacating an unlawful conviction and
        sentence. Thus, the amended judgment in this case constituted a
        new judgment for purposes of AEDPA. Magwood, 561 U.S. at 339,
        342; Insginares, 755 F.3d at 1281; see also Johnson v. United States, 623
USCA11 Case: 22-13110      Document: 38-1       Date Filed: 04/24/2024       Page: 15 of 15

        22-13110                Opinion of the Court                           15

        F.3d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that “where a first habeas
        petition results in an amended judgment, a subsequent petition is
        not successive regardless of whether it challenges the conviction,
        the sentence, or both”).
               In light of the intervening amended judgment, we conclude
        that the district court erred in determining that Saint-Cyr’s § 2255
        motion was an unauthorized second or successive § 2255 motion,
        and the district court had jurisdiction to entertain it. Accordingly,
        we vacate the district court’s order and remand for further
        proceedings consistent with this opinion. 8
               VACATED AND REMANDED.

        8 We note that on remand, the district court should consider the merits of

        Saint-Cyr’s motion along with any defenses and arguments the respondent
        may raise such as AEDPA’s statute of limitations.