Court Opinion

ID: 9781027
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 15:18:59.478788+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:09:22.788240
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

                                             2023 WY 88

                                                                    APRIL TERM, A.D. 2023

                                                                           August 30, 2023

 TYLER BRYAN MARTINSON,

 Appellant
 (Defendant),

 v.                                                             S-22-0241, S-23-0027

 THE STATE OF WYOMING,

 Appellee
 (Plaintiff).

                      Appeal from the District Court of Campbell County
                         The Honorable Stuart S. Healy, III, Judge

Representing Appellant:
      Casandra Ann Craven, Longhorn Law Limited Liability Company, Cheyenne,
      Wyoming.

Representing Appellee:
      Bridget Hill, Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, Deputy Attorney General; Kristen
      R. Jones, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Kristine R. Rude, Assistant Attorney
      General. Argument by Ms. Rude.

Before FOX, C.J., and KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, GRAY, and FENN, JJ.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are
requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of
any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the
permanent volume.
FOX, Chief Justice.

[¶1] A jury convicted Tyler Bryan Martinson of six counts of aggravated child abuse,
and the district court sentenced him to concurrent prison terms of four to eight years on
each count. Mr. Martinson appeals his sentence and the court’s subsequent denial of his
motion for sentence reduction and correction. He claims the court failed to adequately
consider probation and his sentence was thus illegal. He further argues his sentence was
illegal because: the presentence investigation (PSI) report contained no sentencing
recommendation; the child abuse statute under which he was convicted fails to distinguish
between intentional and reckless acts for purposes of sentencing; and the sentence was
cruel and unusual. Mr. Martinson also claims the court abused its discretion in denying his
motion to reduce his sentence. We affirm.

                                         ISSUES

[¶2]   We rephrase the issues as follows:

              1. Did the district court consider probation in sentencing Mr.
                 Martinson?

              2. Did the lack of a sentencing recommendation in the PSI
                 report violate Mr. Martinson’s due process and equal
                 protection rights?

              3. Does the child abuse statute, under which Mr. Martinson was
                 convicted, violate the Wyoming Constitution because it fails
                 to distinguish between intentional and reckless acts for
                 purposes of sentencing?

              4. Was Mr. Martinson’s sentence cruel and unusual?

              5. Did the district court abuse its discretion in denying Mr.
                 Martinson’s motion for a sentence reduction?

                                         FACTS

[¶3] On January 2, 2021, Mr. Martinson took his three-month-old son, RM, to the
Campbell County Memorial Hospital emergency room in Gillette, Wyoming. He and the
child’s mother told the intake nurse that RM “was having some popping while he was
breathing” and was not moving his right leg. When Mr. Martinson removed him from his
car seat, he screamed and cried, and the intake nurse believed him to be in the most pain
she had seen in a three-month-old child.

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[¶4] RM had bruises on his upper abdomen, and x-rays showed four recent rib fractures,
five recent leg fractures, and twenty-two older fractures in various stages of healing, for a
total of thirty-one fractures. Mr. Martinson and RM’s mother told the intake nurse that Mr.
Martinson had been moving RM’s legs to help relieve the child’s gas, and “they mentioned
that he may have been a little rough with him.” Mr. Martinson told one investigator that
RM’s injuries were his fault, that he got angry, and “just lost it, I guess.” In another
interview, Mr. Martinson acknowledged RM’s fractures could have come from him not
being as gentle as he should have been with RM and that he went too far. He further
admitted he became frustrated and irritated with RM and squeezed him to the point he
could tell it hurt him. He also told of an occasion when RM choked on something and he
held RM upside down by his legs and hit him on the back.

[¶5] The State charged Mr. Martinson with thirty-one counts of aggravated child abuse
but dismissed twenty-one of the charges before trial. The dismissed charges were for older
rib fractures. The amended information alleged acts occurring between December 20,
2020, and January 2, 2021. Counts I through V alleged child abuse resulting in rib fractures,
and Counts VI through X alleged child abuse resulting in leg fractures.

[¶6] A jury found Mr. Martinson guilty of Counts I through V, child abuse resulting in
rib fractures, and Count VI, child abuse resulting in a diaphyseal fracture of RM’s right
femur. It found him not guilty of the remaining counts. For each guilty verdict, the jury
was required to find whether Mr. Martinson acted intentionally or recklessly in causing
RM’s injuries, and for each, it found he acted recklessly.

[¶7] Mr. Martinson’s defense theory was that RM suffered from a disorder called Ehlers-
Danlos syndrome, a condition “associated with easy bruisability, muscle hypersensitivity,
gastroparesis, and skeletal fractures,” and his expert testified he had diagnosed the
condition in RM. However, his expert agreed on cross-examination that there is “no
medical consensus” the disorder can be diagnosed in children.

[¶8] One of RM’s treating physicians from Colorado testified that the team of physicians
treating RM, which included genetic specialists, “agreed that the nature and constellation
of [RM’s] fractures didn’t suggest any metabolic or bone disease.” Concerning the injuries
for which Mr. Martinson was found guilty of child abuse, she testified:

              Q.     Now, with the several rib fractures we’ve previously
              discussed, mechanistically, what causes those types of
              injuries?

              A.     In a child like this – so first of all, an infant’s ribs are
              very cartilaginous, they’re not hard. So even things like CPR
              would rarely cause a rib fracture in a child because they’re

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             much more flexible. But when we see these kinds of fractures,
             it’s really from grabbing, squeezing, bending of the ribs.

             Q.   . . . With respect to the diaphyseal femur fracture,
             mechanistically what causes a fracture such as that?

             A.    So that fracture is what we would call a spiral fracture.
             That means it spirals down the bone, and that would require
             some level of torsion or twisting.

             Q.     Given all of the efforts you extended in this regard, were
             you ultimately able to come up with a medical diagnosis?

             A.     Yes, I was.

             Q.     And what was your medical diagnosis?

             A.     Child physical abuse.

                                            ...

             Q.     And then would medical child physical abuse, would
             that be a form of nonaccidental trauma?

             A.     Yes.

             Q.    Was this a medical diagnosis that the team collectively
             made, or is this something that you, alone, made?

             A.     No, the team had consensus on this.

[¶9] Following the jury’s verdict, the district court ordered a presentence investigation.
The Wyoming Department of Corrections performed the investigation and prepared a PSI
report that did not include a sentencing recommendation. The agent who prepared the
report wrote:

             This writer has considered all of the sentencing options for the
             Defendant to include a term of incarceration, community
             supervision, and placement in an adult community corrections
             facility. Mr. Martinson presents as low risk for recidivism, has
             remained employed and although does not take full
             accountability for the nature of the injuries, shows remorse and
             has sought out counseling and medication to assist him. On the

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              other hand, the amount of injuries inflicted on this young child
              is impossible to comprehend and it is difficult to say whether
              or not he is suitable for supervision or poses a risk to the
              community. If given a prison sentence, he would be able to
              attend treatment while incarcerated and would not be an
              immediate threat. Mr. Martinson is a low risk; therefore, he
              does not qualify for the Adult Community Corrections
              Program or the ISP program. Should this Court determine
              community supervision is appropriate, this Agent would
              request DFS, or another third party, and the Probation Office
              work together with his counselors to determine the appropriate
              time to reunite.

[¶10] At sentencing, the district court noted the lack of a sentencing recommendation in
the PSI report, which it observed was unusual and likely reflected the difficulty the
sentencing presented. Defense counsel made similar comments but did not object to the
lack of a sentencing recommendation or any other aspect of the report. The court
considered statements from Mr. Martinson’s supporters and then heard argument from the
State and Mr. Martinson. The State argued for a prison term of eighteen to twenty-five
years on Counts I through V, to run concurrently, and a consecutive term of eighteen to
twenty-five years on Count VI, for a total term of thirty-six to fifty years. Mr. Martinson
requested a sentence of probation.

[¶11] After hearing from both sides, the district court noted the difficulty its sentencing
decision presented because Mr. Martinson acted recklessly, not intentionally. The court
then weighed the need for punishment, rehabilitation, general and specific deterrence, and
community protection; the nature and circumstances of the crime; and mitigating factors
such as Mr. Martinson’s acceptance of responsibility, youth, employability, and efforts at
rehabilitation. After considering these factors, the court sentenced Mr. Martinson to prison
terms of four to eight years on each count, to be served concurrently.

[¶12] Mr. Martinson filed a notice of appeal but subsequently moved this Court for leave
to file a motion in district court for reconsideration or correction of an illegal sentence and
asked that we stay briefing pending the district court’s ruling on the motion. We ruled that
such leave was not required but granted it to avoid any jurisdictional questions or concerns,
and we stayed briefing.

[¶13] Mr. Martinson then filed a motion to correct his sentence, which he claimed was
illegal for the reasons now asserted on appeal. Alternatively, he requested that the district
court exercise its discretion to reduce his sentence to probation. He pointed to the
Department of Corrections’ placement of him at the Wyoming Honor Farm, a minimum-
security facility, as evidence he was a proper candidate for probation. The district court

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denied the motion, and Mr. Martinson appealed. This Court lifted the stay of Mr.
Martinson’s first appeal and consolidated his two appeals.

                                STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶14] Mr. Martinson claims his sentence was illegal on several grounds and that the
district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a sentence reduction. “Whether
a sentence is illegal is a question of law that we review de novo.” Cruzen v. State, 2023
WY 5, ¶ 11, 523 P.3d 301, 304 (Wyo. 2023) (quoting Newnham v. State, 2021 WY 54, ¶ 3,
484 P.3d 1275, 1276 (Wyo. 2021)). We review a district court’s ruling on a motion for a
sentence reduction for abuse of discretion.

              The district court has broad discretion in determining whether
              to reduce a defendant’s sentence, and we will not disturb its
              determination absent an abuse of discretion. The sentencing
              judge is in the best position to decide if a sentence modification
              is appropriate and is free to accept or reject information
              submitted in support of a sentence reduction at its discretion.
              Our objective on review is not to weigh the propriety of the
              sentence if it falls within the sentencing range; we simply
              consult the information in front of the court and consider
              whether there was a rational basis from which the district court
              could reasonably draw its conclusion. Because of the broad
              discretion given to the district court in sentencing, and our
              significant deference on appeal, this Court has demonstrated
              many times in recent years that it is a very difficult bar for an
              appellant to leap seeking to overturn a sentencing decision on
              an abuse of discretion argument.

Harper v. State, 2023 WY 49, ¶ 5, 529 P.3d 1071, 1073 (Wyo. 2023) (quoting Mitchell v.
State, 2020 WY 131, ¶ 7, 473 P.3d 1255, 1257 (Wyo. 2020)).

                                       DISCUSSION

I. The record does not support Mr. Martinson’s claim that the district court failed to
   consider a sentence of probation.

[¶15] Mr. Martinson claims the district court failed to consider a sentence of probation
and his sentence was therefore illegal. He concedes the court’s written sentence indicated
it considered probation but asserts the court used the term “probation” only once in the
sentencing hearing, and this he contends is evidence the court did not meaningfully
consider probation. He also points to standards this Court has held should guide a court’s

                                              5
consideration of probation and contends the lack of verbal or written findings on those
standards renders his sentence illegal. His claims find no support in the record or our law.

[¶16] “While the trial court is not obligated to grant probation to a criminal defendant, it
must consider an application for probation and, if such is not granted, include a statement
in the written sentence expressly acknowledging that it considered the application.”
Villafana v. State, 2022 WY 130, ¶ 24, 519 P.3d 300, 307 (Wyo. 2022) (quoting Monjaras
v. State, 2006 WY 71, ¶ 11, 136 P.3d 162, 164 (Wyo. 2006)). The district court’s written
sentence stated, “The Court has considered . . . the advisability of probation.” It is thus
clear, as Mr. Martinson concedes, the court complied with the requirement that it include
a statement of its consideration in the written sentence.

[¶17] Mr. Martinson nonetheless contends the consideration was inadequate because the
district court’s oral ruling did not include a weighing of the required standards and an
express discussion of probation. “No particular amount of consideration of probation is
required as long as the record discloses that the court considered it, however slightly.”
Villafana, 2022 WY 130, ¶ 24, 519 P.3d at 307 (quoting Monjaras, 2006 WY 71, ¶ 11, 136
P.3d at 164-65). Moreover, there is no requirement that a sentencing court make specific
findings, set forth its reasons for denying probation, or even use the word “probation”
during its oral pronouncement. Monjaras, 2006 WY 71, ¶¶ 9, 11, 136 P.3d at 164-65
(noting longstanding precedent that “law does not require a trial court to render specific
findings in sentencing matters”); Stoddard v. State, 707 P.2d 176, 178 (Wyo. 1985) (“We
do not believe that it is of any consequence that the trial court did not use some magic
words to say affirmatively that it considered probation.”).

[¶18] Mr. Martinson is correct that this Court, in Sanchez v. State, cited American Bar
Association (ABA) standards that it held “should be taken into account in the determination
of a grant of probation[.]” 1 592 P.2d 1130, 1138 (Wyo. 1979). We have also, however,

1
    Those ABA standards state:
                1.3 Criteria for granting probation.

                  (a) The probation decision should not turn upon generalizations about
                  types of offenses or the existence of a prior criminal record, but should be
                  rooted in the facts and circumstances of each case. The court should
                  consider the nature and circumstances of the crime, the history and
                  character of the offender, and available institutional and community
                  resources. Probation should be the sentence unless the sentencing court
                  finds that:

                  (i) confinement is necessary to protect the public from further criminal
                  activity by the offender; or

                  (ii) the offender is in need of correctional treatment which can most

                                                       6
consistently maintained since Sanchez that “[t]he decision whether or not to grant probation
is discretionary.” Villafana, 2022 WY 130, ¶ 24, 519 P.3d at 307 (quoting Monjaras, 2006
WY 71, ¶ 11, 136 P.3d at 164); see also Beaulieu v. State, 608 P.2d 275, 275-76 (Wyo.
1980) (addressing application of Sanchez and holding “[o]ur position is clear that an
appropriate sentence is within the discretion of the trial judge[.]”).Moreover, even when
acknowledging the Sanchez holding, the Court has declined to require a sentencing court
to set forth its reasons for denying probation. Volz v. State, 707 P.2d 179, 182 (Wyo. 1985).

[¶19] We have also recognized that circumstances other than a verbal recitation that
probation was considered may be more persuasive evidence that the sentencing court
considered probation. Cohee v. State, 2005 WY 50, ¶ 18, 110 P.3d 267, 273 (Wyo. 2005)
(quoting Volz, 707 P.2d at 182); see also Kenney v. State, 605 P.2d 811, 812 (Wyo. 1980)
(“Although statements of the trial court relative to consideration of probation are indicative
that such was done, they are not the only facts by which the fact of such consideration can
be determined.”). For example, Mr. Martinson requested probation and argued numerous
sentencing factors favored probation. That request placed the question of probation before
the court and is indicative the court considered it. See Burk v. State, 848 P.2d 225, 236
(Wyo. 1993) (fact that defendant requested probation and put issue before court was
evidence it was considered). Indeed, at one point in the hearing, the court expressly stated
it was weighing the sentencing factors in consideration of Mr. Martinson’s request for
probation.

                       The nature and circumstances of the offense. These
                factors don’t stack up in favor of Mr. Martinson, really. Is it a
                crime of violence? Yes, it’s a crime of violence, whether it’s
                reckless or intentional, [the prosecutor] is right, it’s a crime of
                violence. Did it involve children or vulnerable individuals? It
                involved a three-month-old baby. Did it involve a position of
                trust? It did. A father. Those factors weigh against Mr.
                Martinson in his request for probation.

[¶20] Additionally, the court indicated its struggle with the sentencing decision, noting
the case involved “a lot of gray,” and commenting that in considering the aggravating and

                effectively be provided if he is confined; or

                (iii) it would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the offense if a sentence
                of probation were imposed.

                (b) Whether the defendant pleads guilty, pleads not guilty or intends to
                appeal is not relevant to the issue of whether probation is an appropriate
                sentence.

Id. (cleaned up).

                                                     7
mitigating factors, “the scales of justice tip back and forth.” This is further evidence the
court was considering probation. See Cohee, 2005 WY 50, ¶ 18, 110 P.3d at 273 (court’s
struggle with sentencing viewed as evidence it considered probation).

[¶21] The sentencing transcript shows the district court undertook a painstaking and
 exhaustive weighing of the sentencing factors to determine whether probation or
 incarceration was an appropriate sentence for Mr. Martinson. The court’s written sentence
 confirmed that consideration. We thus reject Mr. Martinson’s claim that a failure to
 consider probation rendered his sentence illegal. 2

II. The PSI report’s lack of a recommendation on probation did not render Mr.
    Martinson’s sentence illegal.

[¶22] Mr. Martinson next contends that the PSI report’s lack of a recommendation on
probation violated his rights to due process and equal protection of the law under both the
Wyoming and federal constitutions and his sentence was therefore illegal. This argument
again finds no support in the law.

[¶23] Mr. Martinson provides no analysis of the law governing a due process or equal
protection claim. He simply asserts that Rule 32 of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal
Procedure requires that a PSI contain a recommendation regarding probation and therefore
the lack of such a recommendation in the report here violated his rights. Setting aside the
lack of cogent argument to support this claim, the premise of Mr. Martinson’s argument is
wrong. Rule 32 does not require a PSI report to contain a sentencing recommendation. It
provides:

                (2) Report. — When a report of the presentence investigation
                is required by the court and its scope is not otherwise limited,
                the report shall contain:
                       (A) Information about the history and characteristics of
                the defendant, including prior criminal record, if any, financial
                condition, and any circumstances affecting the defendant’s
                behavior that may be helpful in imposing sentence or in the
                correctional treatment of the defendant;
                       (B) Verified information stated in a nonargumentative
                style containing an assessment of the financial, social,
                psychological, and medical impact upon, and cost to, any

2
 Mr. Martinson briefly argues that the State’s arguments to the sentencing court and the PSI report focused
on the general nature of his crime, contrary to the standards set forth in Sanchez. He does not, however,
suggest the district court likewise did so in its weighing of the sentencing factors. The State’s arguments
and the PSI report are of no consequence if the court did not embrace them, and we thus do not address
whether the record supports Mr. Martinson’s contention.

                                                    8
              individual against whom the offense has been committed and
              attaching a victim impact statement as provided in W.S. 7-21-
              103 if the victim chooses to make one in writing. In any event
              the report shall state that the victim was advised of the right to
              make such a statement orally at the defendant’s sentencing or
              in writing. If the victim could not be contacted, the report shall
              describe the efforts made to contact the victim;
                      (C) Information concerning the nature and extent of
              non-prison programs and resources available for the defendant;
              and
                      (D) Such other information as may be required by the
              court.

W.R.Cr.P. 32(a)(2).

[¶24] In Mehring v. State, we explained that although PSI reports commonly include a
sentencing recommendation, neither Rule 32 nor the statute governing presentence
investigations requires a recommendation. 860 P.2d 1101, 1115 (Wyo. 1993); see also
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-303 (2023). We thus noted that when a sentencing recommendation
is included in the report, it is surplusage and is not binding on the court. Mehring, 860 P.2d
at 1115; see also Dillard v. State, 2023 WY 73, ¶ 10, 533 P.3d 179, 181 (Wyo. 2023)
(district court not required to base sentence on recommendations of PSI report) (citing
Thomas v. State, 2009 WY 92, ¶ 12, 211 P.3d 509, 513 (Wyo. 2009)); Wright v. State, 670
P.2d 1090, 1095 (Wyo. 1983) (sentencing court not required to accept recommendation of
PSI report as sentencing is court’s duty, not that of probation agent).

[¶25] The district court did not order the PSI report to include a sentencing
recommendation, and our law does not otherwise require the recommendation. There is
therefore no basis for Mr. Martinson’s due process or equal protection claim.

III. Mr. Martinson’s claim that the statute under which he was convicted and sentenced
     violates the Wyoming Constitution is not supported by cogent argument.

[¶26] Mr. Martinson was convicted and sentenced under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-503,
which provides in relevant part:

                     Aggravated child abuse is a felony punishable by
              imprisonment for not more than twenty-five (25) years if in the
              course of committing the crime of child abuse, as defined in
              subsection (a) or (b) of this section, the person intentionally or
              recklessly inflicts serious bodily injury upon the victim or the
              person intentionally inflicts substantial mental or emotional

                                              9
              injury upon the victim by the torture or cruel confinement of
              the victim.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-503(c) (2023).

[¶27] Mr. Martinson contends his sentence was illegal because Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-503
violates the requirement of Article 1, Section 15 of the Wyoming Constitution that “[t]he
penal code shall be framed on the humane principles of reformation and prevention.”
Specifically, he argues that because the statute does not distinguish between intentional
and reckless acts, it is not framed on principles of reformation and prevention and is
therefore unconstitutional. In so arguing, Mr. Martinson offers no analysis of the
constitutional provision and cites no authority to support his argument that intentional and
reckless acts that result in serious bodily injury to a child must be treated differently to
satisfy the principles of reformation and prevention. We therefore do not consider this
claim. See Mitchell v. Rust, 2023 WY 47, ¶ 19, 529 P.3d 1062, 1068 (Wyo. 2023),
rehearing denied, (Court will not consider arguments unsupported by cogent argument and
relevant authority) (citing WyoLaw, LLC v. Off. of Att’y Gen., Consumer Prot. Unit, 2021
WY 61, ¶ 37, 486 P.3d 964, 975 (Wyo. 2021)).

IV. Mr. Martinson’s sentence was not cruel or unusual.

[¶28] In his final constitutional claim, Mr. Martinson contends that his prison term of four
to eight years violates the state and federal prohibitions on cruel and/or unusual
punishment. We find no merit in this claim.

[¶29] The Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments that are barbaric or disproportionate
to the crime committed. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 3006, 77
L.Ed.2d 637 (1983). Similarly, the Wyoming Constitution’s prohibition against cruel or
unusual punishment prohibits punishment that is grossly disproportional to the gravity of
the crime. Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 14; Villafana, 2022 WY 130, ¶ 29, 519 P.3d at 308. To
determine whether a sentence is proportional under either provision, we consider:

              (i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty;
              (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same
              jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of
              the same crime in other jurisdictions[.]

Id. (quoting Norgaard v. State, 2014 WY 157, ¶ 11, 339 P.3d 267, 271 (Wyo. 2014));
Solem, 463 U.S. at 292, 103 S.Ct. at 3011.

[¶30] This Court begins its analysis with consideration of the first of the three criteria and
evaluates the remaining two only if warranted.

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              We will not engage in a lengthy analysis under all three of the
              Solem criteria, including a consideration of the sentences
              imposed on similarly situated defendants in this and other
              jurisdictions, except in cases where the mode of punishment is
              unusual or where the relative length of sentence to
              imprisonment is extreme when compared to the gravity of the
              offense (the first of the Solem criteria).

Chapman v. State, 2015 WY 15, ¶ 15, 342 P.3d 388, 393 (Wyo. 2015) (quoting Oakley v.
State, 715 P.2d 1374, 1379 (Wyo. 1986)).

[¶31] In addressing the first criterion, the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the
penalty, Mr. Martinson’s sole argument is as follows:

              Here, Defendant was convicted of reckless action which
              harmed his child. The Jury was presented evidence of a genetic
              defect, and it appears that the jury believed that the child had
              said defect. The inference to be drawn is that it is unclear, and
              was unclear to the jury, whether the child’s injuries occurred
              as a result of the actions of his father, or if the injury occurred
              in some other way.

[¶32] Essentially, Mr. Martinson argues he did not cause his three-month-old child’s
injuries, and therefore his sentence was too harsh. This represents no more than a rejection
of the jury’s verdict. There was no confusion in the jury’s verdict. It found Mr. Martinson
guilty of six counts of aggravated child abuse and therefore necessarily found he caused
his child’s injuries.

[¶33] As detailed in our recitation of the facts underlying Mr. Martinson’s conviction,
Counts I through V were for rib fractures caused by squeezing that Mr. Martinson admitted
he knew caused his infant child pain. Count VI was for a femur fracture caused by torsion
or twisting. We cannot find a total prison term of four to eight years extreme when
compared to the gravity of Mr. Martinson’s offenses. We therefore do not consider the
remaining criteria of the proportionality test and reject Mr. Martinson’s claim that his
sentence was cruel and/or unusual.

V. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Martinson’s motion for
  a sentence reduction.

[¶34] Rule 35(b) of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure governs motions for
sentence reduction. It provides:

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              A motion to reduce a sentence may be made, or the court may
              reduce a sentence without motion, within one year after the
              sentence is imposed or probation is revoked . . . . The court
              shall determine the motion within a reasonable time. Changing
              a sentence from a sentence of incarceration to a grant of
              probation shall constitute a permissible reduction of sentence
              under this subdivision. The court may determine the motion
              with or without a hearing.

W.R.Cr.P. 35(b).

[¶35] Mr. Martinson argues the lack of a sentencing recommendation in the PSI report
and the new information the district court had that he had been placed in a minimum-
security facility should have led to a reduction of his sentence to probation. He thus
contends the court abused its discretion in denying his motion.

[¶36] In its order denying Mr. Martinson’s motion for a sentence reduction, the district
court indicated it had considered the information he submitted. We have recognized that
the sentencing court “is in the best position to decide if a sentence modification is
appropriate and is free to accept or reject information submitted in support of a sentence
reduction at its discretion[.]” Dillard, 2023 WY 73, ¶ 10, 533 P.3d at 181 (quoting Harper,
2024 WY 49, ¶ 8, 529 P.3d at 1074). As discussed herein, the lack of a sentencing
recommendation in the PSI report was of no consequence, and the court was free to reject
the Department of Corrections’ placement decision as a basis to reduce Mr. Martinson’s
sentence. We find no abuse of discretion in the court’s decision.

[¶37] Affirmed.

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