Court Opinion

ID: 9478458
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:49:20.343061+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:26.178819
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
It cannot be stated often enough that “death is qualitatively different from other punishments that can be imposed by the state.” Cartwright v. Maynard, 822 F.2d 1477, 1483 (10th Cir.1987) (en banc), aff'd, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988). Because of the finality attendant with the punishment of death, it is critical that the process by which a criminal defendant is sentenced to death not be one tainted by error which could result in the imposition of the death sentence in a manner inconsistent with constitutional guarantees. In the instant case, an error of constitutional magnitude flawed the decision of the jury to sentence defendant James Stringer to death. Specifically, the jury was permitted to consider an unconstitutionally vague statutory aggravating circumstance during its sentencing deliberations, deliberations which involved the balancing of statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Further, the improper consideration by the jury of the invalid aggravating circumstance was not cured on appeal by the Mississippi Supreme Court. Moreover, the unconstitutionally vague aggravating circumstance was vigorously argued to the jury by the prosecutor as a justification for imposing the death sentence on Stringer. Today, a majority of this panel concludes that the above error does not necessitate a resentencing of Stringer. Persuaded that the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution demand the reversal of Stringer’s death sentence which was imposed pursuant to a sentencing determination that included the consideration by the jury of an unconstitutional statutory aggravating circumstance in the balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors, I respectfully dissent.
Pursuant to the Mississippi death penalty scheme, defendants eligible for conviction for capital murder are limited to defendants committing murders in eight situations: murder of a peace officer or fireman; murder committed while under sentence of life imprisonment; murder committed by use of an explosive device; murder committed for remuneration; killing committed in the course of burglary, robbery, kidnapping, arson, rape, and other sexual offenses; killing committed in the course of felonious abuse of a child; and murder of an elected official. Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-19(2) (Supp.1987). By limiting the types of murders which may be classified as capital murders in such a fashion, Mississippi narrows the class of defendants eligible to receive the death penalty. Following the conviction of a defendant for capital murder in Mississippi, the jury is next required to determine whether any statutory aggravating circumstances exist to justify the imposition of the death penalty. To impose the death penalty on a defendant, the jury must find at least one aggravating circumstance'. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-103 (Supp.1987); Johnson v. Thigpen, 806 F.2d 1243, 1247 (5th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 951, 107 S.Ct. 1618, 94 L.Ed.2d 802 (1987). After finding that at least one statutory aggravating circumstance exists, the jury is then required to weigh the statutory aggravating circumstances found against any mitigating circumstances found in deciding the appropriate punishment. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-103.
Pursuant to this process, the jury in the instant case found three statutory aggravating circumstances and, pursuant to the balancing analysis described above, sentenced Stringer to death. Specifically, the jury found the following three statutory aggravating circumstances in Stringer’s case: (1) that the murder was intentional and committed while engaged in an attempt to commit robbery for pecuniary gain; (2) that the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing detection and lawful arrest; and (3) that *1120the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. On appeal, Stringer challenges the constitutionality of the “especially heinous” aggravating circumstance, asserting that the aggravating circumstance is unconstitutionally vague.
Last term, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of the especially heinous aggravating circumstance as applied under Oklahoma law in Maynard v. Cartwright, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988), explaining the concept of vagueness in the context of capital punishment in the following manner:
Claims of vagueness directed at aggravating circumstances defined in capital punishment statutes are analyzed under the Eighth Amendment and characteristically assert that the challenged provision fails adequately to inform juries what they must find to impose the death penalty and as a result leaves them and appellate courts with the kind of open-ended discretion which was held invalid in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 [92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346] (1972).
108 S.Ct. at 1858.
In Maynard, as will be discussed in greater detail subsequently, the Supreme Court held that the especially heinous aggravating circumstance as applied by the Oklahoma courts was unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 1859. In the instant appeal Stringer relies on the Maynard decision in seeking a reversal of his death sentence. The majority today nevertheless concludes that Stringer’s claim in this regard is foreclosed by the recent decision of this Court in Edwards v. Scroggy, 849 F.2d 204 (5th Cir.1988), petition for cert. filed, — U.S. L.W. - (U.S. Oct. 18, 1988).
In Edwards, a Mississippi capital murder case, the defendant Edwards was sentenced to death after the jury found six statutory aggravating circumstances. The Edwards Court, in rejecting a claim that the invalidation of one of the six statutory aggravating circumstances necessitated a resentencing of Edwards, relied on the holding by the Supreme Court in Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983), that “the invalidation of one aggravating circumstance [does] not require the vacation of the death penalty so long as there [are] other valid aggravating circumstances remaining.” Edwards, 849 F.2d at 211. The Edwards Court, addressing the impact of the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Maynard, then reasoned that the Maynard decision was distingui-shible for the reason that the Oklahoma law reviewed in Maynard was unclear regarding the effect of the invalidation of one aggravating circumstance on the validity of a death sentence. The Edwards Court thereafter, in contrast, stated “Mississippi law is clear that one invalid aggravating circumstance will not suffice to overturn a death penalty where other valid aggravating circumstances remain.” Edwards, 849 F.2d at 211 n. 7 (citation omitted). Thus, relying on the above distinction of the Maynard decision, the Edwards Court refused to vacate Edwards’ death sentence.
The Edwards opinion, as stated by the majority, now constitutes Circuit precedent; nevertheless, I feel compelled to address what I perceive to be an important issue left unaddressed by this Court in Edwards and one which was purposefully reserved by the Supreme Court in Zant — that issue being the effect on the validity of a death sentence of a holding that “a particular aggravating circumstance is ‘invalid’ under a statutory scheme in which the judge or jury is specifically instructed to weigh statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances in exercising its discretion whether to impose the death penalty.” Zant, 462 U.S. at 890, 103 S.Ct. at 2749.
In Zant v. Stephens, the Supreme Court concluded that the validity of a death sentence based in part on the consideration by the jury of an invalid aggravating circumstance “depends on the function of the jury’s finding of an aggravating circumstance under [a state’s] capital sentencing statute, and on the reasons that the aggravating circumstance at issue ... was found to be invalid.” Id. at 864, 103 S.Ct. at 2736. See also Cartwright v. Maynard, 822 F.2d 1477. In Zant, the Supreme Court addressed the validity of a death sentence *1121imposed pursuant to Georgia law under circumstances where the jury, in sentencing the defendant Stephens to death, was permitted to consider a statutory aggravating circumstance subsequently declared invalid by the Georgia Supreme Court. In its analysis of Zant, the Supreme Court initially noted that the function of a jury’s finding of an aggravating circumstance under the Georgia capital sentencing scheme is to narrow the class of individuals eligible to receive the death penalty. In this regard, as long as one aggravating circumstance is found by the jury, the threshold dividing murderers in Georgia that are eligible for the death penalty and those murderers that are not so eligible, is crossed. Zant, 462 U.S. at 870-72, 103 S.Ct. at 2739-40. Significantly, the Zant Court noted that a function which an aggravating circumstance does not serve under the Georgia statute is that of guiding the discretion of the sentencer in deciding whether to impose life imprisonment or death. Id. at 874, 103 S.Ct. at 2741. Georgia, unlike other states, does not instruct its juries “to give any special weight to any aggravating circumstance, to consider multiple aggravating circumstances any more significant than a single such circumstance, or to balance aggravating against mitigating circumstances pursuant to any special standard.” Id. at 873-74, 103 S.Ct. at 2740-41.
After noting the function, as described above, of an aggravating circumstance under the Georgia capital scheme, the Supreme Court in Zant concluded that the existence of two valid aggravating circumstances served the constitutional requirement of narrowing the class of persons eligible for the death penalty despite the consideration by the jury of a third aggravating circumstance — that the defendant had “a substantial history of serious as-saultive criminal convictions” — which had been declared unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 879, 103 S.Ct. at 2744. Thus, concluding that the defendant Stephens had already crossed the threshold into the class of individuals eligible for the death penalty by virtue of the two valid statutory aggravating circumstances found by the jury, the Supreme Court determined that the jury’s consideration of the invalid statutory aggravating circumstance in deciding whether to actually impose the death penalty did not amount to constitutional error. The Supreme Court stated that “the Constitution does not require the jury to ignore other possible aggravating factors in the process of selecting, from among that class, those defendants who will actually be sentenced to death.” Id. at 878, 103 S.Ct. at 2743. Thus, despite recognizing the possibility that the labelling of the invalid aggravating circumstance as statutory in Stephens’ case might have caused the jury to afford that circumstance greater weight in its sentencing deliberations', the Supreme Court determined the death sentence to be constitutionally valid. Id. at 888-89, 103 S.Ct. at 2748-49.
At this point, some observations regarding the Zant decision which are important to the instant appeal by Stringer must be made. First, the Supreme Court, in upholding Stephens’ death sentence, relied in part on the meaningful appellate review conducted by the Georgia Supreme Court in capital cases to insure that the death penalty is not imposed in a disproportionate, arbitrary, or capricious fashion. Id. at 890, 103 S.Ct. at 2749. Additionally, and of considerable import, is the fact that the Supreme Court in Zant established that the function of an aggravating circumstance in a capital scheme is critical to the validity of a death sentence imposed pursuant to the consideration by the sentencer of an invalid aggravating circumstance. In this regard, the Supreme Court in the final paragraph of its opinion in Zant, purposefully declined to intimate an opinion as to the following issue:
Finally, we note that in deciding this case we do not express any opinion concerning the possible significance of a holding that a particular aggravating circumstance is ‘invalid’ under a statutory scheme in which the judge or jury is specifically instructed to weigh statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances in exercising its discretion whether to impose the death penalty.
Id. at 890, 103 S.Ct. at 2750.
Recently, in the Tenth Circuit’s en banc treatment of Cartwright v. Maynard, that *1122court confronted the above question reserved by the Supreme Court in Zant regarding the effect of an invalid aggravating circumstance on the validity of a death sentence imposed pursuant to a capital sentencing scheme under which a jury is required to balance statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances in exercising its discretion to impose the death penalty. Maynard, 822 F.2d 1477. In the Tenth Circuit’s en banc Maynard opinion, a case in which the court was reviewing the validity of a death sentence imposed under Oklahoma law, the Tenth Circuit engaged in an extensive discussion of the Supreme Court’s pronouncements addressing the effect of a jury’s consideration of an invalid aggravating circumstance on the validity of a death sentence. The Tenth Circuit Maynard court observed that the Supreme Court decisions in this area “leave open the question of whether a sentencing authority that must weigh all statutory factors [aggravating and mitigating] may consider constitutionally invalid aggravating circumstances.” Maynard, 822 F.2d at 1482 (quoting Special Project, Capital Punishment in 1984: Abandoning the Pursuit of Fairness and Consistency, 69 Cornell L. Rev. 1629, 1681 (1984)). In resolving the above question in Maynard, the Tenth Circuit applied the language of the Supreme Court in Zant regarding the function of an aggravating circumstance under a capital scheme and the reason a particular aggravating circumstance is invalid.
On the function of an aggravating circumstance under Oklahoma law, the en banc Maynard court stated that “[t]he purpose of an aggravating circumstance in the Oklahoma statute is decidedly different from the purpose of an aggravating circumstance in the Georgia statute considered in Zant.” Id. at 1480. Pursuant to Oklahoma law, any first degree murder is eligible to be classified as a capital murder and thus, the purpose of an aggravating circumstance under the Oklahoma capital sentencing scheme is not to narrow the class of persons eligible to receive the death penalty. Instead, “Oklahoma uses an aggravating circumstance to guide the discretion of the sentencer in determining whether the death penalty should be imposed for a particular murder.” Id. at 1480; Okla.Stat.Ann. Title 21, § 701.10 (West 1983). Following the conviction of a defendant for first degree murder in Oklahoma, a jury is required to balance all of the statutory aggravating circumstances found against all of the mitigating circumstances found in determining whether or not to impose the death penalty. Okla. Stat.Ann. Title 21, § 701.11 (West 1983). As a result, the effect of the consideration by the jury of an invalid aggravating circumstance under Oklahoma’s capital sentencing scheme, as compared to the Georgia scheme, is a greater likelihood that the death penalty will be imposed in an arbitrary and capricious manner as “[a]n aggravating circumstance in Oklahoma plays a critical role in guiding the discretion of the sentencer who must decide whether a particular murder merits life imprisonment or death for the defendant.” Maynard, 822 F.2d at 1482.
In addressing the second aspect of the Supreme Court’s analysis in Zant regarding the reason a particular aggravating circumstance is invalid, the en banc Maynard court noted that the Supreme Court has previously upheld death sentences where an invalid aggravating circumstance was considered by the jury and that aggravating circumstance was invalid only under state, not federal, law. See Wainwright v. Goode, 464 U.S. 78, 104 S.Ct. 378, 78 L.Ed.2d 187 (1983); Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 103 S.Ct. 3418, 77 L.Ed.2d 1134 (1983). Particularly relevant to the instant appeal by Stringer is the ruling by the Supreme Court in Wainwright v. Goode, wherein the Supreme Court emphasized the curative effect of the appellate review conducted by the Florida Supreme Court of the death sentence imposed in that case. In Goode, the Florida Supreme Court independently rebalanced only the valid aggravating circumstances found by the jury against the mitigating circumstances to determine if the death sentence was valid. In upholding the death sentence imposed in Goode, the Supreme Court stated that “there is no claim that in conducting its *1123independent reweighing of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances the Florida Supreme Court considered [an invalid aggravating circumstance].” Goode, 464 U.S. at 86-87, 104 S.Ct. at 388-84.
In Maynard, the Tenth Circuit distinguished the defendant Cartwright’s case from that of the invalid aggravating circumstances at issue in Barclay and Goode on the basis that the invalid aggravating circumstance in Cartwright’s case — the identical “heinous, atrocious, or cruel” circumstance at issue in the instant appeal by Stringer — was invalid not under state law, but under federal constitutional law. Maynard, 822 F.2d at 1480. Further, the Tenth Circuit in Maynard noted that Oklahoma courts do not provide for a method of appellate review whereby the Oklahoma appellate courts may independently reweigh only the valid aggravating and mitigating circumstances in a capital case so as to cure on appeal a sentencer’s consideration of an invalid aggravating circumstance. Id.
On the basis of the above observations regarding the function of an aggravating circumstance in Oklahoma and the reason the especially heinous aggravating circumstance was invalid, the Tenth Circuit ultimately concluded that:
[Rjeliance upon an aggravating circumstance that is invalid under the federal constitution could affect the balance struck by the sentencer. The improper reliance is not corrected by the state appellate review process and is not a matter of state law beyond the review of a federal court in a habeas corpus proceeding. A death sentence that is imposed pursuant to a balancing that included consideration of an unconstitutional aggravating circumstance must be vacated under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. We therefore must consider Cartwright’s allegation that Oklahoma’s application of the ‘especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel’ aggravating circumstance in this case was unconstitutionally vague.
Id. at 1482-83. After reaching the above conclusion, the Tenth Circuit then proceeded to hold that the especially heinous aggravating circumstance as applied pursuant to Oklahoma law was in fact unconstitutionally vague under the Federal Constitution. Id. at 1483-91. The Tenth Circuit reasoned that it was therefore presented with the question of whether or not the court could sua sponte apply a limiting construction of the especially heinous aggravating circumstance to the facts of Cartwright’s case so as to cure any error by the jury in considering the unconstitutional aggravating circumstance. Observing that Oklahoma had adopted no such limiting construction, the Tenth Circuit determined that the fashioning of such a saving construction must be made by the State in the first instance and accordingly, remanded Cartwright’s case to the state courts for a redetermination of his sentence. Id. at 1492.
Thereafter, the Supreme Court, reviewing the en banc decision of the Tenth Circuit in Maynard, affirmed the holding by the Tenth Circuit that the language of the especially heinous aggravating circumstance was unconstitutionally vague under the eighth and fourteenth amendments. Maynard, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. at 1859. However, the Supreme Court did not comment on the further conclusion by the Tenth Circuit that a death sentence imposed pursuant to a balancing that included consideration of an unconstitutional aggravating circumstance must be vacated under the eighth and fourteenth amendments. Instead, the Supreme Court in Maynard, recognizing, as did the Tenth Circuit, that Oklahoma had no provision for curing the consideration of an invalid aggravating circumstance on appeal, remanded Cartwright’s case to the Oklahoma state courts for a redetermination of the appropriate sentence. In this regard, the Supreme Court stated that:
It is true that since the decision of the Court of Appeals, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has restricted the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance to those murders in which torture or serious physical abuse is present. At the same time, that court decided that it would not necessarily set aside a death *1124penalty where on appeal one of several aggravating circumstances has been found invalid or unsupported by the evidence.
What significance these decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeals have for the present cases is a matter for the state courts to decide in the first instance.
Maynard, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. at 1860 (citations omitted).
Turning to the facts of the case sub judice, it is observed that the function of an aggravating circumstance under the Mississippi capital sentencing scheme constitutes a hybrid between that of the function of the aggravating circumstance under the Georgia capital scheme reviewed in Zant and the aggravating circumstance under the Oklahoma capital scheme reviewed in Maynard. Under the Mississippi scheme, a statutory aggravating circumstance serves not only to narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty, but also to guide the discretion of the sentencer in deciding whether or not to impose the death penalty. Regarding the latter, as required of a jury in Oklahoma, a jury in Mississippi is required to weigh statutory aggravating circumstances against mitigating circumstances in deciding whether to impose the death penalty once a defendant has been convicted of a capital offense. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-103 (Supp.1987). Thus, like the aggravating circumstance in Oklahoma, the aggravating circumstance in Mississippi’s capital sentencing scheme “plays a critical role in guiding the discretion of the sentencer” in determining whether an individual defendant is sentenced to life or death. Further, as in Oklahoma, Mississippi provides no method for curing on appeal the improper consideration by a sentencer of an unconstitutional aggravating circumstance.1 As a result, reliance on an unconstitutional aggravating circumstance by a jury in Mississippi could affect the delicate balance struck by the sentencer in deciding whether or not to impose the death penalty. I am persuaded, therefore, that this Court, like the Tenth Circuit in Maynard, must consider Stringer’s assertion that the “heinous, atrocious, or cruel” circumstance as applied under Mississippi law is unconstitutionally vague.
On this question, it is noted that, in light of the recent holding by the Supreme Court in Maynard that the especially heinous aggravating circumstance is facially unconstitutional, any further inquiry in this area is limited to determining whether or not Mississippi applies a limiting construction of the especially heinous aggravating circum*1125stance in reviewing a death sentence on appeal. In this connection, this Court, in Johnson v. Thigpen, 806 F.2d 1243, noted that the Mississippi Supreme Court, in Coleman v. State, 378 So.2d 640 (Miss.1979), had indeed adopted a limiting construction of the especially heinous aggravating circumstance to be applied in conducting appellate review of death sentences. However, in reviewing Mississippi’s actual application of the limiting construction adopted in Coleman, this Court in Johnson concluded that:
[T]he Mississippi Supreme Court has not consistently applied its Coleman limiting construction of the especially heinous aggravating circumstance. The limiting construction we found in Gray [v. Lucas, 677 F.2d 1086 (5th Cir.1982)] had been adopted in Coleman appears now to be more honored in breach than observance.
Johnson, 806 F.2d at 1247. Despite recognizing that the Mississippi Supreme Court no longer applies a limiting construction to the especially heinous aggravating circumstance, this Court upheld the death sentence imposed in Johnson as constitutionally permissible on the basis that the remaining valid aggravating circumstances serve the constitutional requirement of narrowing the class of persons eligible for the death penalty under the Mississippi capital sentencing scheme. Id. at 1248. Further, the Court in Johnson concluded that even if error was present due to the broadened construction of the especially heinous aggravating circumstance, it was error under Mississippi, and not federal law, and thus, an error of state law not cognizable on habeas corpus review. Id. at 1249.
Since Johnson, however, the Supreme Court has decided Maynard v. Cartwright. Maynard now teaches that the especially heinous aggravating circumstance is unconstitutionally vague in violation of federal, not state law. Therefore, any error in this regard is cognizable by this Court on habeas corpus review. Moreover, as observed by this Court in Johnson, the Mississippi courts no longer apply a limiting construction to the especially heinous aggravating circumstance to cure on appeal the sentencer’s reliance on an unconstitutional aggravating circumstance in determining whether to impose the death penalty. Id. at 1247. Relying on the fact that “the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals would not attempt to save the death penalty when one of several aggravating circumstances found by the jury was found invalid or unsupported by the evidence,” the Supreme Court in Maynard declined to adopt such a saving construction of the especially heinous aggravating circumstance in the first instance and instead deferred to the state courts to rule initially on the issue. Maynard, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. at 1860. This Court should do likewise.
Returning full circle to the point first noted by this dissent, this Court is now bound by the recently issued opinion of this Court in Edwards v. Scroggy, which rejected Maynard as a basis for habeas corpus relief concluding that Mississippi law is clear that one invalid aggravating circumstance will not suffice to overturn a death penalty where other valid aggravating circumstances remain. Setting aside for the moment the fact that the Edwards Court did not address the critical issue of the validity of a death sentence imposed pursuant to a balancing which includes consideration of an unconstitutional aggravating circumstance, the Edwards ruling does not foreclose Stringer’s argument on this issue in the instant appeal. Stringer’s argument is not foreclosed due to the fact that Mississippi law has created at least one exception to the general rule stated in Edwards regarding the effect of a sentencer’s consideration of an invalid aggravating circumstance on the validity of a death sentence. Specifically, the Mississippi Supreme Court has, at least on one occasion, stated that it would “eschew” a harmless error analysis in a situation where a prosecutor has argued an invalid aggravating circumstance to a jury as a justification for imposing the death penalty. Johnson v. State, 511 So.2d 1333, 1338 (Miss.1987), rev’d on other grounds, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 1981, 100 L.Ed.2d 575 (1988). In Johnson, the prosecutor argued to the jury as a justification for imposing the death penalty a previous conviction of Johnson *1126which was later determined to be invalid. In rejecting a harmless error analysis under the facts of the Johnson case, the Mississippi Supreme Court relied on the fact that the “district attorney argued this particular aggravating circumstance as a reason to impose the death penalty.” Id. This decision by the Mississippi Supreme Court to refrain from applying a harmless error analysis was cited with approval last term by the Supreme Court in Johnson v. Mississippi, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 1981, 1989 n. 8, 100 L.Ed.2d 575 (1988).
In the instant case, as in Johnson, the prosecutor vigorously argued as a justification for imposing the death sentence on defendant James Stringer the fact that the instant crime was especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel. In this regard, the prosecutor stressed repeatedly to the jury that if they should find only one aggravating circumstance to outweigh any mitigating circumstances, then the verdict should be the death penalty. Proceeding in such a fashion, the prosecutor then apparently showed photographic slides of the crime to the jury, describing in detail the facts of the murders and asking of the jury “Is that atrocious? Is that cruel?” This argument by the prosecutor certainly raises a question as to whether, under Mississippi law, Stringer would be entitled to a resentenc-ing due to the jury’s consideration of the unconstitutionally vague especially heinous aggravating circumstance. Moreover, it is highly suspect that the Mississippi capital sentencing scheme continues to channel the sentencer’s discretion by “clear and objective standards” where an unconstitutionally vague aggravating circumstance is vigorously argued to the jury as a justification for imposing the death penalty. See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 1765, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980). Therefore, contrary to the conclusion reached by the majority today, this Court’s decision in Edwards does not foreclose Stringer’s request for habeas corpus relief in the instant appeal. Mississippi law is not well settled on the aspect of a jury’s consideration of an invalid aggravating circumstance in a capital sentencing proceeding where that circumstance has been vigorously argued to the jury as a basis for the death penalty. Accordingly, I would remand the instant proceeding to the state courts for a redetermination of Stringer’s sentence.
As a final note, I would harken back to the previously mentioned fact that this Court has consistently declined to recognize or address the vital issue of the effect on the validity of a death sentence of a jury’s consideration of an unconstitutional aggravating circumstance pursuant to a capital sentencing scheme which requires a sentencer to balance all statutory aggravating circumstances against all mitigating circumstances in deciding whether or not to impose the death penalty. For the reasons set forth by the Tenth Circuit in its en banc opinion in Maynard and discussed more fully above, I would conclude, and urge this Court to also conclude, that the consideration of an unconstitutional aggravating circumstance under a capital sentencing scheme which requires a jury to balance aggravating and mitigating circumstances and which is not effectively cured on appeal must be vacated under the eighth and fourteenth amendments. It is absolutely imperative that a death sentence not be imposed pursuant to a sentencing process which fails to protect against the imposition of our most severe and final punishment in an arbitrary or capricious fashion.

. The majority opinion points to the fact that the Mississippi Supreme Court, on appeal, reviews whether or not a sentence of death is imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor; whether the evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s finding on each statutory aggravating circumstance; and whether the sentence of death is not excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases considering both the crime and the defendant. Majority Opinion at slip opinion p. 1303, at p. 1114. This type of appellate review, however, is not sufficient to cure on appeal the consideration by a sentencer of an invalid aggravating circumstance in weighing statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances to determine whether or not to impose the death penalty on a particular defendant. Rather, as recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in Wainwright v. Goode, the type of appellate review which would have a curative effect in such a situation is that review pursuant to which an appellate court independently reba-lances only the valid aggravating circumstances found by the sentencer against the mitigating circumstances to determine if the death sentence is valid. Goode, 464 U.S. at 86-87, 104 S.Ct. at 383-84. In fact, in Cartwright v. Maynard, the Tenth Circuit en banc rejected the proportionality review conducted by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals in that case as a justification for upholding the validity of the death sentence where the sentencer considered an unconstitutional aggravating circumstance. In doing so, the Tenth Circuit noted that Supreme Court decisions do not in any manner suggest "that a proportionality review [can] serve as an independent basis for upholding a death sentence imposed after reliance upon an unconstitutional aggravating circumstance.” Cartwright, 822 F.2d at 1481 n. 3.
Therefore, since Mississippi, like Oklahoma, does not provide a method for curing on appeal the improper consideration by a sentencer of an unconstitutional aggravating circumstance, the appellate review which was conducted by the Mississippi Supreme Court of Stringer’s death sentence in the instant case cannot cure the jury’s reliance upon the unconstitutional especially heinous aggravating circumstance in arriving at its decision to sentence Stringer to death.