Court Opinion

ID: 9838496
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-06 16:08:28.739458+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:36.246611
License: Public Domain

J-S19035-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    IN RE: K.S., JR., A MINOR                  :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
    APPEAL OF: K.S., SR., FATHER               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 366 MDA 2023

               Appeal from the Decree Entered February 23, 2023
               In the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County
                      Orphans' Court at No(s): 2022-6820

    IN RE: L.S., A MINOR                       :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
    APPEAL OF: K.S., SR., FATHER               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 367 MDA 2023

               Appeal from the Decree Entered February 23, 2023
               In the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County
                      Orphans' Court at No(s): 2022-6821

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., McLAUGHLIN, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.:                    FILED: SEPTEMBER 6, 2023

       K.S., Sr. (“Father”) appeals from the decrees granting the petitions to

involuntarily terminate his parental rights to his children, K.S., Jr. (“K.S.”) and

L.S. (“L.S.”), a son and a daughter both born in February 2019.1 After careful

____________________________________________

1 By separate decrees on the same date, the Orphans’ Court involuntarily
terminated the parental rights of C.M. (“Mother”). Mother did not appeal, and
she is not a party to Father’s appeals. This Court consolidated Father’s appeals.
J-S19035-23

review, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings

consistent with this memorandum.

       As summarized by the Orphans’ Court the relevant facts and procedural

history are as follows:

              The [Lycoming County Children and Youth Services (“the
       Agency”)] first became involved with the family in April of 2021,
       when [K.S. and L.S. (“the children”)] were seen playing alone on
       the playground after getting out of the home. On April 20, 2021,
       the children were later seen playing near and hanging out of an
       open 2nd story window, and were found home alone when Agency
       workers responded. At that time there was a bathtub in the home
       that was overflowing with water.[2] Mother claimed that Father
       was supposed to be in charge of the children at the time. . . .
       Father testified that Mother asked him to drive her to the store
       and he assumed Mother’s friend was in the home and would be
       responsible for the children. Father also testified, in an apparently
       conflicting manner, that he was contacted about this incident and
       when he arrived at the scene Mother asked him to lie and say he
       was there the entire time but stepped out to take the trash
       outside. A safety plan was implemented on June 2, 2021, wherein
       the paternal grandmother was to stay in the home and Mother
       was not to have unsupervised contact with the children. On July
       1, 2021, Mother violated the safety plan by taking the children to
       Cumberland County without permission and without a supervisor
       named on the safety plan. On that date, the Agency was verbally
       granted emergency custody of the children.

              A Shelter Care hearing was held on July 2, 2021. Both
       parents attended. Following the hearing, the [c]ourt found that
       sufficient evidence was present to prove that return of the
       [children] to the home of the parents was not in the best interest
       of the [children]. Legal and physical custody of the [children]

____________________________________________

2 The children were then two years old.

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       remained with the Agency and placement of the [children]
       remained in Foster Care.[3]

              A Dependency hearing was held on July 21, 2021, after
       which the [c]ourt adjudicated the [children] dependent. As the
       [c]ourt found that allowing the [children] to be returned to either
       parent’s home would be contrary to the [children]’s welfare, legal
       and physical custody w[ere] ordered to remain with the Agency.
       The [c]ourt noted that both parents should work with their
       Outreach worker and caseworker, and comply with the Family
       Service Plan. The parents were specifically ordered to follow
       through with any services or counseling offered with regard to
       their relationship as there was a history of domestic violence.[4]

              A permanency review was held on December 8, 2021.[5] The
       [c]ourt noted that there had been minimal compliance with the
       permanency plan on the part of Mother, in that she and Father
       were in an on again/off again relationship but she was not
       receiving domestic violence treatment. . . .           Father was
       incarcerated for the majority of this review period and the [c]ourt
       found him to have no compliance with the permanency plan.
       Father had made no progress toward alleviating the circumstances
       which necessitated placement as he was not participating in
       domestic violence counseling.         Father was released from
       incarceration on November 10, 2021, and had made no effort to
       resume visits with the children at the time of the permanency
       review.    His attendance rate prior to his incarceration was
       approximately 50%.         In its [o]rder, the [c]ourt strongly
       emphasized the need for each parent to participate in counseling
       or other program to address the domestic violence that was
       prevalent in their relationship. Following the hearing, the [c]ourt
       reaffirmed dependency and the [children] remained in the legal
____________________________________________

3 The court wrote separate, virtually identical opinions concerning K.S. and L.S.

We cite to the court’s opinions in the singular and refer to the children
collectively.

4 Mother sought a Protection from Abuse order against Father in August 2019

but it was dismissed when she failed to pursue it. See N.T., 2/8/23, at 48.

5 The court appointed the children’s dependency Guardian ad litem as the
children’s termination of parental rights counsel and found no conflict in the
dual representation. See Orders, 10/26/22.

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     and physical custody of the Agency with continued placement in
     the foster care home.

            On March 21, 2022, the [c]ourt granted the Agency’s Motion
     to Modify the [Children’s] Placement, as the [foster] parents
     relocated and were no longer able to be a resource for the
     [children]. A permanency review hearing was held on March 25,
     2022.     The [c]ourt found that there had been moderate
     compliance with the permanency plan by both Mother and Father.
     . . . Father was residing with his sister and unemployed at the
     time of the review. Father was consistently late for his visits but
     did attend most of his visits and they reportedly went well. . . .
     [F]ather was found to have made moderate progress toward[]
     alleviating the circumstances which necessitated the original
     placement.     Following the hearing, the [c]ourt reaffirmed
     dependency and legal and physical custody of the [children]
     remained with the Agency for continued placement in the current
     foster home.

            A permanency review was held on July 20, 2022. . . . Father
     was found to have minimal compliance with the permanency plan
     in that he continued to reside with his sister instead of obtaining
     independent housing and he changed jobs several times. Father
     was not meeting with Outreach Services and only attended 45%
     of his visits. Father chose not to engage in domestic violence
     counseling because he and Mother were no longer in a
     relationship. The [c]ourt found that both Mother and Father had
     made minimal progress toward alleviating the circumstances
     which necessitated the original placement. The [c]ourt noted [its]
     concern with the progress made by Mother and Father in obtaining
     and maintaining suitable housing, and emphasized the need for
     both Mother and Father to act with urgency to obtain and maintain
     suitable housing and employment to be able to support the needs
     of the children, as the children had been in placement for over a
     year. Both parents requested community visits which the [c]ourt
     directed the [A]gency to arrange if that parent attended at least
     90% of his or her visits over the following four weeks. Following
     the hearing, the [c]ourt reaffirmed dependency and legal and
     physical custody of the [children] remained with the Agency for
     continued placement in the current foster home. On August 5,
     2022, the [c]ourt granted the Agency’s Motion to Modify the

                                    -4-
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       [Children’s] Placement, as the current resource parents were no
       longer able to be a resource for the [children].[6]

              A permanency review hearing was held on October 14,
       2022. . . . Father had no compliance with the permanency plan,
       in that he was not employed and did not have independent
       housing. Father did not participate in any Outreach Services or
       any type of counseling or domestic violence treatment. Father
       attended only 63% of his visits during the review period, and was
       frequently late when he did attend. Neither parent met the 90%
       attendance goal necessary to progress to community visits. The
       [c]ourt found that Mother and Father made no progress toward
       alleviating the circumstances which necessitated the original
       placement. . . . Following the hearing, the [c]ourt reaffirmed
       dependency and legal and physical custody of the [children]
       remained with the Agency for continued placement in the current
       foster home.      The [c]ourt approved another Petition for
       Modification of the [Children’s] Placement on October 14, 2022,
       which resulted in the fourth resource home[7] since the [children
       were] placed in the legal and physical custody of the Agency.

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 2/23/23, at 1-6.

       The court conducted a hearing on the Agency’s involuntary termination

petitions in February 2023. Father’s outreach caseworker, Cory Burkholder,

testified that after Father’s incarceration from August to November 2021,

Father did not resume visits to the children until the court ordered him to do

so in December 2021. See N.T., 2/8/23, at 11-13; see also id. at 30-32.

Burkholder further testified that Father’s compliance with visitation and

____________________________________________

6 The Agency filed petitions seeking involuntary termination of Father’s and
Mother’s parental rights based on 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and
(b). See Petition, 9/9/22.

7  The court used          the   terms     “foster   home”   and   “resource   home”
interchangeably.

                                           -5-
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participation with parenting “tailed off” after he and Mother became estranged,

when the children were in placement. See id. at 12-13. Father could not

maintain consistent employment, had several jobs for short time periods, and

lived primarily with his sister. See id. at 13-15.8 Father did complete the

parenting program included in his goals. See id. at 17.

       Agency visitation caseworker Heather Goodbrod (“Goodbrod”) testified

that in April 2022 Father was placed on “call-in status” when he failed to appear

or call to cancel three scheduled visits. Because Father failed to achieve the

court’s 90% visitation goal, he did not progress to community visits with the

children and his twice-weekly, one-hour visits remained closely observed or

supervised at the time of the hearing.           See id. at 19, 26-27, 30, 32, 36.

Goodbrod testified that Father was loving with the children but frequently late

for visits and did not always change the children’s diapers without being

prompted to do so, once declaring, “My visit is over. I don’t need to do that.”

See id. at 34, 39-40. Goodbrod testified that in his visits in the six months

before the February 2023 hearing, Father sat on the sofa and allowed the

children to play around him without interacting. See id. at 34-35, 37-38. On

another occasion, he declined L.S.’s request to be picked up and told her,

“You’ll get me sick.” See id. at 35, 42. Goodbrod had to pick L.S. up because

____________________________________________

8 Father obtained an apartment in late December 2022 or early January 2023.

See N.T. 2/8/23, at 16.

                                           -6-
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the child was crying so heavily to the point she seemed about to make herself

sick. See id.

      Pompey Suggs (“Suggs”), a caseworker with the Agency, testified that

Father had six indicated reports of child abuse, including a report of indecent

sexual assault of a child. See id. at 44-45, 75-78, 84. Suggs testified the

Agency was concerned about Mother’s and Father’s use of physical discipline

on the children and domestic violence counseling was added to the family

service plan. See id. at 50, 91-92. Suggs testified that the court directed

Father and Mother to get counseling to address domestic violence concerns,

but Father was discharged after he attended only two sessions that were

provided to him at no cost. See id. at 59-60, 64-65, 92, 100, 114-17. Suggs

testified that Father said he did not need counseling because he was not going

to reconcile with Mother. See id. at 64, 77-78. Suggs testified that Father did

not send the children any letters or birthday or Christmas presents. See id.

at 78, 90. Suggs testified that Father did not make himself available for a

bonding assessment and did not set up a time for the assessment even after

Suggs provided him the information.      Although Father testified he did not

receive mail or otherwise know about the assessment, he had received, and

replied to, other mail from Suggs. See id. at 79-81, 91, 93, 128-29.

      The resource mother, with whom the children had been living since

October 2022, testified that she and her husband took care of all the children’s

physical and emotional needs, the children were very fond of her ten-year-old

                                     -7-
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daughter, were integrated into Halloween, Thanksgiving, and Christmas family

activities, and experienced an emotional toll from visits with Father. See id.

at 54-58. She also testified she and her husband love the children very much

and were prepared to adopt them if the court terminated Father’s and Mother’s

parental rights. See id.

       Father testified that he had lied on Mother’s behalf and assumed

responsibility for the April 2021 incident, his mother’s death in March 2022

delayed his ability to reclaim his children and impaired his ability to engage in

domestic violence counseling seven month later, and L.S. looked malnourished

for months while with the foster family. See id. at 94-103, 106-114, 125-28,

137.    Father claimed that the court previously supported his attempts to

concentrate on grief counseling for his mother’s death rather than domestic

violence counseling.   See id. at 115-16.    He claimed he later tried to find

domestic violence counseling but could not. See id. at 117-18. He testified

that he was not sure why it took thirteen months from his release from prison

to get his own residence. See id. at 122-23. He also testified that he had a

new job as of October 2022 and a new apartment, although he had no plans

for daycare if reunified with the children. See id. Father was not sure why he

attended only two of the children’s medical and dental visits. See id. at 104-

05.

       By Opinions and Decrees dated February 22, 2023, the court terminated

Father’s parental rights to K.S. and L.S. Father timely appealed and complied

                                      -8-
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with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).         The Orphans’ Court thereafter

incorporated its prior opinions and orders as its Rule 1925(a) opinion.

      On appeal, Father presents the following issues for our review:

      1. The court erred in terminating the parental rights of [Father]
         pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(a)(1) when [Father] has
         not failed to perform parental duties of a period of at least six
         months and made every effort to have a relationship with his
         child.

      2. The court erred in terminating the parental rights of [Father]
         pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(a)(2) when there was
         insufficient evidence that the child was without essential
         parental care, control or subsistence necessary and causes of
         the incapacity cannot or will not be remedied as [Father] made
         substantial progress to remedy the incapacity and provide the
         child with essential parent[al] care, control and subsistence
         necessary.

      3. The court erred in terminating the parental rights of [Father]
         pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(a)(5) in finding that (1) the
         child has been removed from parental care for at least six
         months; (2) the conditions which led to removal or placement
         of the child continue[] to exist; (3) and termination would best
         serve the needs and welfare of the child when [Father] has
         remedied the conditions and the needs and welfare of the child
         would not be best served by termination.

      4. The court erred in terminating the parental rights of [Father]
         pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(a)(8) in finding that [(1)]
         the child has been removed from parental care for twelve
         months or more from the date of removal; (2) the conditions
         which led to removal or placement of the child continue[] to
         exist and termination would best serve the needs and welfare
         of the child when [Father] has remedied the conditions and
         the needs and welfare of the child would not be best served
         by termination.

      5. The court erred in terminating the parental rights of [Father]
         pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(b), when there is a healthy
         bond between the child and [Father] which would be traumatic

                                      -9-
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          if broken and the best interests of the child would not be
          served by termination.

See Father’s Brief at 7-8.

      Father’s issues implicate the involuntary termination of parental rights.

Pennsylvania’s Adoption Act (“the Act”) governs involuntary termination of

parental rights proceedings.    See 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938.           We review

involuntary termination orders for an abuse of discretion, which requires an

error of law or a showing of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice,

bias, or ill-will. See In re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580, 591 (Pa. 2021)

(citation omitted). In applying this standard, an appellate court must accept

the trial court’s findings of fact and credibility determinations if supported by

the record. See Interest of S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d 1108, 1123 (Pa. 2021); see

also In re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 358 (Pa. 2021). This standard

“reflects the deference we pay to trial courts, who often observe the parties

first-hand across multiple hearings.” In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817,

830 (Pa. 2012).

      In considering a petition to terminate parental rights, a court must

balance the parent’s fundamental right “to make decisions concerning the care,

custody, and control” of his or her child with the “child’s essential needs for a

parent’s care, protection, and support.”        See C.M., 255 A.3d at 358.

Termination   of   parental   rights   can   have   “significant   and   permanent

consequences for both the parent and child.”          L.A.K., 265 A.3d at 591.

Pennsylvania law requires the moving party to establish the statutory grounds

                                       - 10 -
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by clear and convincing evidence, evidence that is so “clear, direct, weighty,

and convincing as to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without

hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” Interest of M.E., 283

A.3d 820, 830 (Pa. Super. 2022). We remain mindful that “a parent’s basic

constitutional right to the custody and rearing of [his] child is converted, upon

the failure to fulfill [his] parental duties, to the child’s right to have proper

parenting and fulfillment of his or her potential in a permanent, healthy, safe

environment.” In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa. Super. 2004).

      Here, the Orphans’ Court terminated Father’s parental rights to the

children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).        To

affirm the decree, we need only agree with the court’s decision as to any one

section of 2511(a), along with subsection (b). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d

380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). Accordingly, we analyze the court’s

termination decree pursuant to section 2511(a)(8) and (b), which provide as

follows:

      (a)   General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child
            may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the
            following grounds:

                                     ****

            (8) The child has been removed from the care of the
            parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement
            with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from
            the date of removal or placement, the conditions which
            led to the removal or placement of the child continue
            to exist and termination of parental rights would best
            serve the needs and welfare of the child.

                                     ****

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      (b)   Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights
            of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
            developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of
            the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated
            solely on the basis of environmental factors such as
            inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and
            medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.
            With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection
            (a)(1), (6), or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts
            by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
            which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of
            the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8), (b).

      To satisfy section 2511(a)(8), the petitioner must establish three

elements: (1) the child has been removed from the care of the parent for at

least 12 months; (2) the conditions which led to the removal or placement of

the child still exist; and (3) termination of parental rights would best serve the

needs and welfare of the child. See In re Adoption of J.N.M., 177 A.3d 937,

943 (Pa. Super. 2018). This section focuses on the conduct of the parent. See

In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1004 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc). Although we

have recognized that the application of Section 2511(a)(8) may seem harsh

when a parent has begun efforts to resolve the problems that had led to the

removal of a child, we are cognizant that the statute implicitly recognizes “that

a child’s life cannot be held in abeyance while a parent attempts to attain the

maturity necessary to assume parenting responsibilities. The court cannot and

will not subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stability to

a parent’s claims of progress and hope for the future.” In re Adoption of

R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa. Super. 2006); see also id. at 511-12 (holding

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that a parent’s argument that there was a reasonable probability she could

remedy the conditions that led to a child’s removal from her care is irrelevant

under subsection (a)(8)).

       Father asserts with respect to subsection (a)(8)9 that the dispute in this

case centers on whether the conditions which led to removal or placement still

exist and cannot or will not be remedied by Father. He asserts that he has

remedied those conditions and substantially completed his goals, and his

domestic violence counseling is moot.           Without offering any argument, he

asserts that termination would not serve the needs and welfare of the children.

       The Orphans’ Court concluded that sufficient evidence established

subsection (a)(8) because the children have been in the legal and physical

custody of the Agency since July 2021, Father had moderate compliance in one

review period and minimal or no compliance in the other three, Father

struggled to maintain consistent employment, Father was unable to articulate

specific reasons for his delay in achieving his reunification goals, and Father

failed to address his domestic violence issues, “which was a primary factor

leading to the removal of the [children] from the home and placement in foster

care.” See Orphans’ Court Opinion, 2/23/23, at 16. In finding that termination

best served the needs of the children, the court noted that Father took fifteen

____________________________________________

9 Father and the Orphans’ Court combine their analyses of subsections (a)(5)

and (a)(8). See Father’s Brief at 25-28; Orphans’ Court Opinion, 2/23/23, at
14-17.

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months to obtain steady employment and almost eighteen months to obtain

independent housing while leaving the care of children’s physical and emotional

needs to be met by multiple foster families.        See Orphans’ Court Opinion,

2/23/23, at 16-17.10 The court also highlighted the willingness of the current

foster family, with whom the children had lived for four months, to give the

children permanency. See id.

       We discern no error of law or abuse of discretion in the Orphans’ Court’s

determination.      At the time the Agency filed the termination petition in

September 2022, the children had been removed from the parents’ care, at

least twelve months had elapsed, the conditions that led to placement (Father’s

housing, employment, and domestic violence concerns) continued to exist, and

Father, based on his conduct, did not demonstrate a present ability to meet

the children’s needs and welfare, thereby demonstrating that termination

would best serve the children’s needs and welfare.      See J.N.M., 177 A.3d at

943.11

       Father’s second issue implicates the best interest of the children. Section

2511(b) requires a separate consideration of whether termination will meet the

____________________________________________

10 The court’s proper focus was on Father’s and Mother’s pre-petition conduct.

See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b) (stating that in assessing a petition filed under
subsection (a)(8), the court shall not consider a parent’s remedial measures
initiated after receipt of notice of the filing of the petition).

11 Father improperly relies on his post-petition conduct when asserting that he

demonstrated conditions supporting reunification. See n.9.

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child’s needs and welfare. See In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super.

2010).     The Supreme Court has recently re-emphasized that pursuant to

section 2511(b) courts “shall give primary consideration to the developmental,

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. . ..               This of course

requires the court to focus on the child and consider all three categories of

need and welfare.” Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085, 1105 (Pa. 2023). K.T.

specifically directs courts to “consider the matter from the child’s

perspective, placing her developmental, physical, and emotional welfare

above concerns for the parent.”                   Id. (citation omitted; emphasis in

original). The child’s emotional needs and welfare include intangibles, such as

love, comfort, security, and stability.          See T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa.

2013).12

       When it considers the parental bond, the court must examine whether

termination of parental rights “will destroy a necessary and beneficial

relationship,    thereby     causing     a     child   to   suffer   extreme   emotional

consequences”.       K.T., 296 A.3d at 1110 (quotation marks and citation

omitted). That focus enables a court to properly prioritize the child’s needs:

____________________________________________

12 Courts considering an involuntary termination petition “must keep the ticking

clock of childhood ever in mind. Children are young for a scant number of
years, and we have an obligation to see to their healthy development quickly.”
K.T., 296 A.3d at 1108 (citation omitted; emphasis in original) (also noting
that T.S.M. advised courts to move toward an alternative permanent home
when it is clear the parent will be unable to provide for the child’s basic needs
in the near future, so as not to impair the bond with pre-adoptive parents).

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      [B]y evaluating the impact of severance to determine if it will
      impose more than an adverse or detrimental impact, courts
      correctly refine their focus on the child’s development and mental
      and emotional health rather than considering only the child’s
      “feelings” or “affection” for the parent, which even badly abused
      and neglected children will retain.

Id. The subsection (b) inquiry must consider not only the parental bond, if

any, but also the child’s need for permanency, the length of time in foster

care, whether the child is in a foster home and bonded with foster parents,

and whether the foster home meets the child’s developmental, physical, and

emotional needs, including intangible ones. See K.T., 296 A.3d at 1106.

      With respect to section 2511(b), Father argues that he has a bond with

children and the breaking of that bond would be traumatic, he did not

intentionally fail to comply with the bonding assessment, and the children have

not been with current foster family long enough to have developed a parental

bond with them.

      The court rejected Father’s claim because Father had a poor attendance

rate of visits with the children, and the court found termination of parental

rights would not cause irreparable harm to the children because the children

had “clearly bonded with the resource parents.” See Orphans’ Court Opinion,

2/23/23, at 18-19.

      Following our review, we conclude that the Orphans’ Court abused its

discretion when rendering its involuntary termination decision without properly

considering the 2511(b) factors which the Supreme Court highlighted in K.T.

At the outset, the record fails to disclose any meaningful testimony concerning

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the nature of the bond between the children and Father or the effects of

termination on the children.     The Agency’s witnesses described Father’s

declining interest in the children during visits in the six months before the

hearing but did not elicit any evidence concerning the child-parent bond,

beyond some sense of the children’s engagement during visits with Father and

the emotions, or lack therefore, at the end of those visits. We note that at

least some testimony suggested that the children continued to seek Father’s

attention and care and were upset when he did not respond.           See N.T.,

2/23/23, at 35, 41. As K.T. explains, a child’s developmental and mental and

emotional health are the critical subjects of inquiry rather than their feelings

or affection for a parent. See K.T., 296 A.3d at 1110 (noting that even abused

and neglected children may retain feelings or affection for the parent). K.T.

requires a fuller exploration of the nature of the bond, if any, between the

children and Father than occurred here.

      Additionally, the court did not have enough information concerning the

nature of the children’s relationship with the current “resource” mother to

comply with K.T.’s direction to consider the matter from the child’s

perspective, placing their developmental, physical, and emotion welfare

above concerns for the parent. See K.T., 296 A.3d at 1105. The court heard

no testimony from a social worker or anyone else about whether the children

had a bond with resource parents.     Instead, the court heard only resource

mother’s testimony about her deep affection for the children, that she had

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incorporated the children into her family and family activities, the children and

their resource sibling had a close connection, and she attended to the children’s

daily dietary, emotional, and medical needs. We further note that she testified

the children were suffering an emotional toll from visits and she received

reports of “behavior” following those visits from the children’s preschool. See

N.T., 2/23/23, at 57. However, resource mother only had the children for four

months before the hearing, none of the Agency’s witnesses testified that the

children had bonded with the resource family to such a degree that termination

of Father’s parental rights would have no detrimental effect on the children’s

development, emotional, and physical needs, and the court heard nothing from

the children themselves.    K.T. requires the court to focus on the child’s

perspective, not adults’, see K.T., 296 A.3d at 1105. The trial court therefore

could not give proper weight to the children’s perspective with the evidence

before it.

      We note that the Agency made a referral for a bonding evaluation. See

N.T., 2/8/23, at 80. The record is not entirely clear why the evaluation did not

occur.   There is some evidence to suggest that Father knew about the

evaluation but declined to cooperate, see id. at 80-81, 91-93, but the Orphans’

Court declined to make a specific finding about Father’s knowledge.         See

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 2/23/23, at 18. There was some evidence that a more

formal bonding evaluation would have assisted the court. Given the lack of

analysis of the factors that K.T. states are critical and the enormous

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consequences of involuntary termination on Father and the children, it is

appropriate to remand this case for the court to conduct a more detailed inquiry

into the best interests of the children, at which the Agency may provide

additional evidence concerning the children’s needs and any bond they have

with Father and/or resource parents. See R.J.S., 901 A.2d at 516 (holding

that remand is proper where the evidence of record is insufficient to permit an

assessment of the emotional bonds between parent and children). We thus

affirm the Orphans’ Court’s finding as to subsection (a)(8), vacate its decision

as to subsection (b), and remand for further proceedings consistent with this

decision.

      Case remanded for proceedings consistent with this decision. Jurisdiction

relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 9/6/2023

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