Court Opinion

ID: 9758624
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 23:38:24.373912+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:53.551111
License: Public Domain

KELLER, Justice,
Concurring.
Although I concur in the result reached by the majority, I believe the trial court improperly instructed the jury to disregard a portion of defense counsel’s closing argument, and I therefore write separately as to Section IV. In my opinion, Garrett’s trial counsel’s commentary regarding the complaining witness’s knowledge of sexual penetration at the time of trial fell within the latitude we allow attorneys during closing argument.1 While I believe the trial court erred when it sustained the Commonwealth’s objection and admonished the jury to disregard trial counsel’s statement, I do not believe the error warrants reversal because it caused Garrett no prejudice.
*18At trial, Garrett denied committing the sexual offenses and attempted to attack the primary evidence of his guilt by impeaching the credibility of the complaining witness, T.J., and demonstrating the dearth of corroborating evidence. Consistent with its theory of the case, the defense attempted to prove inconsistency between the complaining witness’s testimony that Garrett had penetrated her vaginally and the examining physician’s normal gynecological findings. On cross-examination, however, the physician, Dr. Bright, volunteered that child sexual abuse victims are often inexperienced and inaccurately describe the extent of penetration from sexual intercourse. Defense counsel’s goal was to persuade the jury that, although some children may give inaccurate descriptions, T.J.’s testimony at trial that Garrett had “gone in all the way and it hurt” was a fabrication rather than a misunderstanding. Toward that end, trial counsel attempted to distinguish this case from other cases in which child sexual abuse is alleged by observing that, because of her pregnancy, T.J. likely possessed enough information to correctly describe such an event. Thus, during closing argument, trial counsel referred to T.J.’s pregnancy when he stated: “[T.J.] knows the difference between what we’ve been calling ‘attempt’ and what penetration is. She’s pregnant, and if she didn’t know then, she sure knows now.”
The majority contends this statement was improper commentary because there was no evidence introduced at trial from which counsel could draw such a reasonable inference. While I agree completely that attorneys may not argue facts without some evidentiary support,2 I beg to differ with the majority’s strained interpretation of “facts in evidence.” In my opinion, a fact is “in evidence” when the jury can visually observe and recognize that fact from the jury box.
I have a picture of a horse in my office, but nowhere on the picture does it state that it is a picture of a horse. Yet, everyone who sees the picture recognizes it as a horse. T.J.’s pregnancy was equally recognizable. Not one person in the courtroom who even glanced at T.J. during her testimony could have possibly harbored any doubt that she was pregnant and I believe the fact of her pregnancy was thus a fact in evidence.
During a bench conference at the beginning of the voir dire examination, the Commonwealth recognized that any juror with the ability to see would quickly discover T.J.’s pregnancy and thus sought advice and consent from the trial court on how best to avoid the possibility of prejudicing the defendant:
She’s very pregnant — nine months pregnant. Since she’s going to walk in here looking pregnant, that’s something that we’re going to have to address.
As the majority observes, the Commonwealth informed the jury about T.J.’s pregnancy during its voir dire and clarified that Garrett was not responsible. Once again, just before the Commonwealth called T.J. as its first witness, the Assistant Commonwealth’s Attorneys asked to approach the bench and emphasized just how undeniably pregnant T.J. was by advising the trial court that T.J. had just experienced some “dizziness and lightheadedness” which they hoped were not labor-related. Less than a minute later, T.J. entered the courtroom and was sworn as a witness. The video record reflects a fourteen (14) year old girl visibly in the ninth month of pregnancy. If any member of the jury missed the disclosure during voir dire and failed to observe T.J. as she entered the eourt-*19room, the two hours that T. J. testified with her profile exposed to the jury offered ample opportunities to observe the witness’s condition.
Apparently, the majority believes that T.J.’s pregnancy was not introduced into evidence because no attorney ever asked her during her testimony whether she was pregnant. A witness’s testimony is not confined to the words he or she speaks3— certainly not in an era of video records where the image and mannerisms of a witness are available for appellate review.4 While the majority cites authority suggesting that matters observed by members of the jury during a “jury view” of the crime scene are not evidence,5 the Commonwealth presented T.J.’s obvious pregnancy during T.J.’s sworn testimony inside the courtroom. Although, without citation, the majority urges a narrow reading of our prior cases, this Court has emphasized countless times that trial courts and juries are in a prime position to assess a witness’s credibility because they can physically observe that witness’s demeanor as well as the witness’s appearance.6 In a very real sense, thus, a testifying witness puts him or herself into evidence. As T.J.’s pregnancy was an identifiable characteristic of a testifying witness — just as her hair or eye color, her height or weight, her clothing, or any other physical characteristic would be — it was “in evidence” and trial counsel should have been allowed to argue reasonable inferences from this fact.
Nevertheless, I agree with the majority that no reversible error resulted from the trial court’s rulings. Although I believe defense counsel properly addressed testimony which the Commonwealth could have utilized during its closing argument, the Commonwealth’s closing argument did not discuss this portion of Dr. Bright’s testimony. As such, I believe defense counsel *20suffered no prejudice when the trial court prevented him from preempting an argument which the Commonwealth elected not to make and which was not a likely juror inference given the unequivocal nature of T.J.’s testimony. I believe Garrett suffered no prejudice and I find the error harmless.7
LAMBERT, C.J., and STUMBO, J., join this concurring opinion.

. See Derossett v. Commonwealth, Ky., 867 S.W.2d 195, 197-98 (1993) ("Attorneys are to be given great leeway in arguments.” Id.).

. See Coates v. Commonwealth, Ky., 469 S.W.2d 346, 348-9 (1971).

. See Hawpe v. Commonwealth, 234 Ky. 27, 27 S.W.2d 394, 395 (1930) ("[T]he written or printed page containing the statement of witnesses is a dim picture of the impression that was actually made by the witnesses appearing in court and testifying in the presence of the jury.” Id.).

. See Barnett v. Commonwealth, Ky., 403 S.W.2d 40, 45 (1966) ("[A] reasonable and effective right of appeal demands all things of importance in the course of the trial be kept within reach of a tangible and visible record that can be reviewed by the appellate court.” Id.).

. See Id. at 44:
At the conclusion of all the testimony the jurors were sent to the scene of the shooting for a view in the presence of the appellant, the trial judge, the sheriff, and some of the lawyers....
[T]he trial court may, in its discretion conduct the trial at the scene of the alleged crime. That may be so, but a jury view is not to be equated with the reception of evidence....
Id. (emphasis added).

.See, e.g., Hawpe v. Commonwealth, supra note 3 at 395:
The evidence of the man of "hang-dog” expression and furtive eye whose shifting demeanor stamps him before the jury as a man of doubtful veracity, stands out as clearly on the printed page as the evidence of the frank, open man of character whose every word an action bespeak truth and candor. It is because of the opportunities of juries to see the witnesses and observe their appearance and conduct that this court is slow to reverse a case on the evidence.
Id. (emphasis added); Elmendorf v. Commonwealth, 171 Ky. 410, 188 S.W. 483, 490 (1916) ("The witnesses were before the juiy, and it had an opportunity to observe their manner, appearance, intelligence, and apparent truthfulness, which we have not.” Id. (emphasis added)); Sesmer v. Barton's Adm’x, 248 Ky. 15, 57 S.W.2d 1020, 1022 (1933) ("A jury sees the witnesses and hears them testify, observes their demeanor on the witness stand and considers many things in the conduct of a witness which this court has no opportunity to consider.” Id.); Commonwealth v. Willis, Ky., 716 S.W.2d 224, 228 (1986).

. RCr 9.24.