Court Opinion

ID: 9814018
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 23:29:46.003336+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:33:20.214278
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
No. 2125. Decided March 8, 1951.
OPINION
By WISEMAN, J:
Submitted on motion for rehearing. There is no rule controlling applications for rehearing but this Court has followed the practice of considering such applications if seasonably filed and where the questions raised merit consideration.
*462Plaintiff-appellee contends that a presumption of agency arose by reason of the fact that the automobile driven by Fink at the time of the collision carried dealer’s license plates of the defendant and that therefore a jury question was presented. In support of this proposition plaintiff-appellee cites Fredericks v. B. L. Williams Co., 68 Oh Ap 217, 40 N. E. (2d) 162, the second syllabus of which is as follows:
“The presence of an automobile dealer’s license plates on an automobile being driven by the sales manager of such dealer ■creates a rebuttable presumption that the automobile is toeing driven under the authority of and upon the business ■of the dealer.”
On page 223 the court cites an unreported case of HartenBrooks Co. v. Gayer (Sixth Appellate District) supporting this proposition. The court also cites Vols: 1-2 Huddy on Automobiles (9 Ed.), 394, Section 180, to the effect that the rule stated above is the general rule. An examination of Huddy does not support the claim that the rule stated is regarded as the general rule. On page 224 the court states that: “In Ohio, the question of agency such as here presented must be governed by the rule of respondeat superior.” The court then concludes:
“Under Ohio statutes and decisions and in most other jurisdictions, the most that can be said under the facts here shown is that a rebuttable presumption arose that Cozad was operating the car owned by the company and operating it on company business; and that the evidence offered in rebutting the presumption thus arising presented a jury question. Ball v. Hail, 196 Ark., 491, 118 S. W. (2d), 668.”’
In the Fredericks case the ownership of the automobile was in dispute. Evidence as to dealer’s license plates was relevant in establishing ownership. The presumption of agency could only spring from the fact of ownership. In the Fredericks case the court held that the fact of the use of dealer’s license plates raised a rebuttable presumption. Both in this opinion and in the original opinion this Court recognizes this proposition of law. However, in the instant case ownership of the automobile was not in dispute. The defendant admitted ownership. The evidence showing that the automobile involved in the collision had upon it dealer’s license plates of the defendant loses some of its probative effect. In our principal opinion we discussed the inferences which may be drawn from the fact of ownership of the automobile and the effect of the rebutting evidence. We conclude that on the basis of the whole record reasonable minds *463could not come to different conclusions with respect to the issue of agency.
Defendant’s liability rests upon the application of the rule of respondeat superior. The rule of respondeat superior arises out of the relationship of the parties — the relationship of master and servant or of principal and agent. In order to permit recovery it must be shown that the relation between the defendant and Fink was that of master and servant or of principal and agent at the time of the collision. The test of a master’s liability is not whether a given act was done •during the existence of the servant’s employment, but whether such act was done by the servant while engaged in the service-of and while acting for the master in the prosecution of the: master’s business. Vol. 26, O. Jur., pp 620-628.
In the Fredericks case the court cites in support of the-proposition adhered to the case of Ball v. Hail, 196 Ark. 491, 118 S. W. (2d) 668. That case did not involve the use of dealer’s license plates. It is authority for the proposition that a rebuttable presumption arose from the fact that the salesman was driving the dealer’s automobile at the time of the accident and that the salesman was acting for the dealer. The court held that where the only rebutting testimony on the subject was given by the dealer and the salesman the question whether the salesman was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident was a jury question. The court in that case referred to Mullins v. Ritchie Grocer Co., 183 Ark. 218, 35 S. W. (2d) 1010, among other cases, in support of this proposition. That case is authority for the proposition that “where evidence refuting presumption that employee was acting within employment when driving employer’s automobile is contradicted, question is for jury, but, where uncontradicted, question is for court.” That case lays down a proposition of law which is in accord with our principal opinion. In a later Arkansas case, Brooks v. Hale Chevrolet Co., Inc., 198 Ark. 17, 127 S. W. (2d) 135, the court, on page 138, held:
“(2) It is true that if an automobile causing an accident belongs to the defendant and is being operated at the time of the accident by one of the regular employees of the defendant, there is a reasonable inference that at such time the employee was acting within the scope of his employment and in furtherance of the master’s business.
“But this is only a prima facie presumption or inference —a presumption or inference deducible from the naked facts *464of physical ownership, contract of employment, and permissive or directed operation.
“(3) When, as in the instant case, it is shown by undisputed evidence that five young people met at half past ten o’clock on Saturday night, drove from one to two hours without important purpose, then directed their course to a night club and were well on their way to that objective when the accident occurred, presumption of pursuit of the master’s business must give way to the obvious facts.”
In Ford and Son Sanitary Co. v. Ransom, 210 S. W. (2d) 508, (decided by the Supreme Court of Arkansas, April 26, 1948) the court discusses the Mullins case and on page 509 again lays down the proposition: “The inference or presumption of fact, however, may be refuted or overcome by evidence adduced by the defendant during the trial. Where the evi•dence on this point is contradictory, the question is one for the jury. Where the facts are undisputed and uncontradicted it becomes a question for the court.”
The question here presented is discussed in Vol. 5 A. L. R. (2d series) beginning at page 199. The text is as follows:
“That the presumption or the inference of an owner’s consent to another’s operation of his automobile, or the agency of such operator, arising from proof of ownership, or proof of ownership coupled with proof that the driver was in the general employment of the owner, is rebuttable and will be overcome by proper countervailing evidence, is universally held or conceded.
* * * * '
“The great weight of authority recognizes that the presumption from proof of ownership of an automobile alone, or coupled with proof that the driver was in the general employment of the owner, that at the time of the accident the car was being driven by the driver in the business of the owner within the scope of the driver’s employment, may and will be overcome as a matter of law and the plaintiff’s prima facie case will fail, with the procedural consequence of a directed verdict or binding instructions for the defendant, or a judgment non obstante veredicto for the defendant, or a judgment of nonsuit against the plaintiff, upon clear, direct, undisputed, positive, convincing, uncontroverted, unequivocal, and credible, and, according to some cases, substantial, countervailing evidence showing without contradiction, improbability, and with certainty not susceptible of more than one inference by reasonable men, that the drver was not in the employ of the owner or that he was not at the time of the accident *465acting in the business of the owner or within the scope of his employment, but in his own business or for his own pleasure having no connection with the business of the owner; or that the automobile was not in the possession of the owner or his servant, but in the possession of someone else, not the servant of the owner, and the circumstances do not support a reasonable inference to the contrary.” (Emphasis ours.)
It is contended in this case by the plaintiff-appellee that the testimony given by the defendant and Fink, although uncontradicted and undisputed, was not of sufficient weight to overcome the presumption of agency which arose by reason of the fact that the defendant was the owner of the automobile involved in the collision. In Vol. 5, A. L. R. (2d Series) page 203, we find this statement:
“There is some conflict in the decisions as to the degree and character of proof necessary to refute or overcome such presumption. By some authorities it is held that the presumption disappears when met by positive proof or substantial proof or by evidence which the jury has the right to believe or by the uncontradicted testimony of the defendant. Others hold that the presumption is not overcome by the testimony of the defendant alone or by the testimony of interested witnesses or by evidence which the jury has the right to disbelieve. The authorities are, however, in almost complete agreement that the presumption is conclusively overcome by clear, positive, and undisputed evidence.”
This was the view taken by this court in its principal opinion. This Court, in Arthurs v. Citizens’ Coal Co., 37 Abs 438, 47 N. E. (2d) 654, held:
“The burden of proof remains upon plaintiff at all times, and where the defendant presents clear and conclusive testimony to the contrary and plaintiff goes no farther, the latter must fail in his proof.”
The Court, on page 441, states:
“The strength of the prima facie rule necessarily depends on the circumstances and evidence in each particular case.
“It disappears when surrounding circumstances are such that its recognition is unreasonable. * *
“And if so overcome by proof that the automobile was not in the owner’s possession or that of his servant, or was not being used by the servant within the scope of his employment, the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict in his favor. * *
*466The Court, on page 441, concludes as follows:
“So the fact that, from the ownership of an automobile being operated upon the highway, an inference arises that it was being operated by or on behalf of the owner of the car, and under circumstances which would render him liable for injuries caused by it, does not require the court to submit the question of the owner’s liability to the jury, if there is undisputed and uncontroverted evidence that at the time of the injury the driver of the car was not engaged in the employer’s business.”
We also refer to a most exhaustive opinion on this whole question by the Supreme Court of the State of Washington in 1942 under the title of Bradley v. S. L. Savidge, Inc., 123 P. (2d) 780. The eleventh paragraph of the syllabus is as follows:
“The presumption that driver was agent of owner of automobile involved in collision, and was acting within scope of his authority, can be overcome by competent evidence from either interested or disinterested witnesses, provided their testimony is uncontradicted, unimpeached, clear and convincing, in which event the presumption disappears entirely, casting on plaintiff the burden of establishing by preponderance of the evidence the fact that, at time of accident, driver of automobile was agent of defendant and was acting within scope of his authority, and if plaintiff failed in such respect, the trial court is required, on motion of defendant, to direct verdict in defendant’s favor.”
In the opinion the court reviews innumerable opinions from courts of almost all the States in the Union, and cases arising in the Federal jurisdiction. The only Ohio case cited by the court in support of the proposition therein announced is White Oak Coal Co. v. Rivoux, 88 Oh St 18, 102 N. E. 302, 46 L. R. A. N. S. 1091, Ann. Cas. 1914 C., 1082. On page 795 the court concludes:
“After a careful study of our cases and those from other jurisdictions to which we have called attention, we conclude that there is no good reason for adhering to the rule that the presumption in cases of this nature may only be overcome by disinterested testimony, but every good reason is demonstrated in the authorities cited that cases of this character should be subject to the same rules governing other presumptions or inferences of fact.
“Litigants are entitled to have their cases decided upon the evidence presented in accordance with general rules. A litigant should not be penalized because the truth comes from *467himself or from his employees. Every witness is presumed to tell the truth and his evidence should be accorded that presumption.”
The court on page 795 departs from former rulings and holds:
“Departing, however, from the rule as heretofore declared in a number of our own cases, to the effect that such presumption may be overcome only by disinterested testimony, and following what we conceive to be the correct rule as declared by the great weight of authority, including any decisions of this court, we now hold that the presumption may be overcome by competent evidence' from either interested or disinterested witnesses, provided that their testimony is uncontradicted, unimpeached, clear and convincing. When evidence of that degree and character is submitted by the defendant, the presumption disappears entirely from the case, casting upon the plaintiff the burden of producing competent evidence to meet the evidence of the defendant, and of establishing by preponderance of the evidence the fact that, at the time of the accident, the driver of the offending automobile was the agent of the owner and was acting within the scope of his authority. If the plaintiff fails in that respect, the court is required, upon motion of the defendant, to direct a verdict in the latter’s favor. The pronouncement of this rule requires and results in the overruling of those cases, hereinbefore cited, which have proceeded on a contrary view.”
We adhere to the rule laid down in the principal opinion that the evidence introduced by the defendant on the question of agency was sufficient to overcome the presumption which arose by reason of defendant’s ownership of the automobile involved in the collision, and that on the state of the whole record reasonable minds could not arrive at different conclusions on the issue of agency. The trial court should have sustained the motion to direct the verdict in favor of the defendant.
Application for rehearing overruled.
HORNBECK, PJ, and MILLER, J, concur.
ON MOTION FOR AN ORDER
No. 2125. Decided March 22, 1951.
OPINION
By THE COURT:
Submitted on motion of defendant-appellant for an order releasing the supersedeas bond heretofore filed.
*468The supersedeas bond filed to stay execution under the provisions of §§12223-9 and 12223-14 GC, is effective until all remedies of the adverse party are exhausted and the appeal is finally determined.
This Court, in a journal entry filed March 17, 1951, reversed a judgment in favor of plaintiff-appellee. The appellee may secure a review of the judgment by the Supreme Court. If this Court should release the bond at this stage of the proceedings and if the Supreme Court should reverse the judgment of this Court, the appellee would then be without remedy on the bond. Until there is a “final determination” of the rights of the parties in this appeal the bond will not be released.
Motion overruled.
HORNBECK, PJ, WISEMAN and MILLER, JJ, concur.