Court Opinion

ID: 9910347
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-15 15:07:36.507934+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:52:20.125629
License: Public Domain

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                                NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
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                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-2400-22

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

C. P.,1

     Defendant-Appellant.
___________________________

                   Submitted November 8, 2023 – Decided December 15, 2023

                   Before Judges Sumners and Smith.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Passaic County, Indictment No. 95-08-0915.

                   Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
                   appellant (Alison Gifford, Assistant Deputy Public
                   Defender, of counsel and on the brief).

                   Camelia M. Valdes, Passaic County Prosecutor,
                   attorney for respondent (Timothy P. Kerrigan, Jr., Chief
                   Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

1
 We employ initials to refer to defendant C.P. as required by N.J.S.A. 30:4-
123.51e(e)(4). See also State v. F.E.D., 251 N.J. 505, 524 (2022).
PER CURIAM

      On November 24, 2021, C.P. petitioned the trial court for release pursuant

to the Compassionate Release Act (CRA), N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e. C.P. currently

suffers from a combination of debilitating medical conditions including,

hypertension, hyperlipidemia, chronic kidney disease, diabetes mellitus, chronic

renal insufficiency requiring dialysis, and gangrene in her right foot. She also

had her left leg amputated below the knee and suffered a recent heart attack.

Due to her full-time nursing needs, C.P. currently is living in the infirmary at

Edna Mahan Correctional Facility for Women (EMCF). She has served twenty-

eight years of a life sentence and is eligible for parole on March 8, 2025.

      The trial court rejected C.P.'s petition after a plenary hearing, finding the

presence of certain extraordinary aggravating factors warranted denial. C.P.

appealed, arguing the trial court abused its discretion. We agree and find the

trial court misapplied the Supreme Court's guiding principles set forth in State

v. A.M., 252 N.J. 432 (2023).         We therefore reverse and order C.P.'s

compassionate release.

                                        I.

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                                        2
        On May 28, 1997, C.P. pleaded guilty to several charges, including the

murder of Tara Carter, the murder of her husband A.P., 2 and the attempted

murder of Eugene Cooper. Carter, eighteen at the time of her death, was living

in Paterson with C.P., the mother of her close childhood friend. Carter's body

was discovered in a park on March 4, 1995. Her autopsy revealed the cause of

death to be blunt force trauma to the head. Once her body was identified, the

police learned that Carter had been living with C.P., and through further

investigation found that C.P. was listed as a beneficiary on a $25,000 life

insurance policy in Carter's name.

        During execution of a search warrant at C.P.'s address, an officer recalled

that a stabbing victim, Cooper, had previously resided with C.P.               When

interviewed, Cooper confirmed he was living with C.P. and her family when he

was stabbed. He identified his assailant as Charlie Pinchom, C.P.'s daughter's

boyfriend, from a photograph. Cooper also said that C.P. had asked him to name

her as a beneficiary to a life insurance policy, and that C.P. had solicited him to

murder her husband, A.P., but he refused. The search of C.P.'s residence

revealed insurance documents related to Cooper.

2
    A.P.'s initials are used to more effectively preserve C.P.'s confidentiality.
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                                          3
      A.P. died in September 1991 due to mixed drug intoxication involving

several anti-anxiety and anti-depressant prescription medications. At the time,

his death was considered accidental. Police initiated an investigation into A.P.'s

death after interviewing Cooper, and their review of the toxicology report

revealed prescription medications in A.P.'s system which were also prescribed

to C.P. Notably, police also learned C.P. had received a life insurance payout

for her husband's death.

      Pinchom confessed to the attempted murder of Cooper and killing Carter

and disposing of her body, at the direction of C.P. The police then charged C.P.

for Carter's murder, A.P.'s murder, and the attempted murder of Cooper, in

addition to lesser charges.

      In 1997, a trial court sentenced C.P. to concurrent life terms with thirty

years of parole ineligibility for the murders of A.P. and Carter, and to a

consecutive prison term of twenty years for the attempted murder of Cooper. At

sentencing, the judge found three aggravating factors: (1) the offense was

committed in a heinous, cruel, or depraved manner; (2) the risk defendant will

commit another crime; and (3) the need to deter defendant and others from

violating the law. See N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1), (3), (9).

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                                        4
      Some twenty-four years later, C.P. filed her compassionate release

petition, resulting in six days of hearings between September 2022 and March

2023. The State presented multiple witnesses in opposition to release. C.P.

presented testimony from medical professionals and family members. The court

considered numerous documents submitted into evidence by both sides,

including but not limited to letters for and against release.

      Dr. Sandra Braimbridge, the medical director of EMCF and an expert in

internal medicine, testified that C.P. required assisted living "at a minimum," i f

not placement in a nursing home. Another expert, Candace Lumax from the

New Jersey Department of Health, Division of Aging Services, testified that

C.P. would qualify for Medicaid if released, and that C.P. meets a "nursing

facility level of care." Dr. James Cassidy, the supervisor of mental health at

EMCF and an expert in forensic psychology, testified concerning C.P.'s mental

state, opining that C.P. is mentally stable and presents a "very low risk" for

committing harm to herself or others, or for committing any crimes.

      Four of C.P.'s family members testified for release: her daughter and son,

as well as two adult granddaughters. C.P.'s proposed release plan, approved by

the New Jersey State Parole Board, involves living with her daughter, a licensed

nurse living in Texas who has experience working in the state's prison system.

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                                         5
C.P.'s daughter testified that she would support C.P. emotionally and physically

if released.

      Opposing C.P.'s petition, three witnesses related to murder victim Carter

testified. Rosie Carter, Tara's older sister, spoke about their strong relationship,

and their plans to move to Georgia. Tara White, a childhood friend of Carter

also testified in opposition to C.P.'s release, stating she was upset by the petition.

The last witness to testify in opposition was Benicia Curry, Carter's daughter.

Curry testified that she was two years old when her mother died, and she has

no memory of her. She also testified about the emotional challenge of growing

up without her mother.

      The trial court issued an order denying C.P.'s petition, along with a

comprehensive statement of reasons. The court found by clear and convincing

evidence that C.P established both the medical and public safety factors under

N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e. The court stated:

               There is no doubt that C.P. . . suffers from permanent
               physical incapacity, as related by the medical witnesses
               herein. She is dependent on others, on a 24/7 basis, for
               transfer, locomotion, bathing, dressing, and needs
               assistance to get to the bathroom.
                      With respect to whether she is a danger to society
               if released, this court finds that. . . she is not. . . .The

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                                            6
             AM/Oliver[3] decisions discuss whether the defendant
             is a "realistic danger" to the public. Realistically, I find
             that she is not.

The court took note of C.P.'s good behavior and work ethic while in prison and

found the parole plan satisfactory. Next, the court turned to "whether there are

extraordinary aggravating factors, relating to the original offenses." The court

found that

             [F]urther harm to the victims would be intense and that
             the aggravating factors surrounding these offenses, two
             deceased victims and a third seriously injured victim,
             the vulnerability of each victim, and the heinous cruelty
             involved, particularly as to Tara Carter who was beaten
             to death with a crowbar, and to Eugene Cooper who was
             stabbed repeatedly, strongly mitigates against release.

The court rested its decision in part on the manner of the victim's murders, noting

"these horrible crimes were committed over a substantial period of time. . . . not

. . . on one date under great stress or turmoil," along with the fact that life

insurance policies were taken out on each of the victims by C.P. The court found

C.P.'s testimony lacked sincerity, and stated "[c]andidly, I am simply unable to

draw any strong conclusion as to her alleged remorse. In this court's view, the

3
 State v. A.M., 252 N.J. 432 (2023) (companion case, State v. Oliver, 251 N.J.
209 (2022))
                                                                             A-2400-22
                                          7
most compelling testimony was that of Bernicia Curry, Tara Carter's daughter,

and of Rosie Carter, Tara's sister." The court found:

              Bernicia's life has been and continues to be profoundly
              and grievously affected by both the death of her mother
              and by the horrible manner in which she died. It has
              been terrible enough for her to cope while C.P. is
              serving her prison sentence. This court concludes that
              releasing C.P. on this petition would cause additional
              profound grief and depression and anger to her. Such
              reaction would, in this court's view, be reasonable and
              expected.

        The single issue on appeal is whether the trial court engaged in a proper

exercise of discretion when it applied the analytical framework established by

the Supreme Court in A.M., 252 N.J. 432.

                                        II.

        As background, we briefly examine the CRA and the Supreme Court's

application of it in A.M. The Legislature enacted the CRA, which "provides for

the release of inmates who suffer from a medical condition so severe that they

are incapable of committing a crime and, in certain cases, would not pose a threat

to public safety if released." Id. at 438. The CRA was designed to replace the

prior medical parole law 4 by "outlin[ing] a streamlined process to obtain relief."

Ibid. Unlike the previous law, the CRA expands eligibility to inmates convicted

4
    N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51c (repealed 2020).
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                                        8
of certain serious crimes.       The new statute shifts the forum for initial

consideration of release applications from the parole board to the courts. Ibid.

The CRA "reflect[s] the Legislature's intent to show compassion to people with

serious medical needs, decrease the prison population, and reduce healthcare

costs for correctional facilities." Ibid.

      Procedurally, the inmate must procure a "Certificate of Eligibility" from

the Department of Corrections (DOC), before an inmate may petition for release

under the CRA. N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e(f)(2). The DOC must "promptly issue"

the certificate if two department-assigned physicians "determine[] that an

inmate is suffering from a terminal condition, disease . . . or permanent physical

incapacity." N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e(d)(2). A "permanent physical incapacity"

is defined as "a medical condition that renders the inmate permanently unable

to perform activities of basic daily living, results in the inmate requiring

[twenty-four] hour care[,] and did not exist at the time of sentencing." Ibid.

      Once in possession of a certificate, an inmate may file a petition with the

court and serve notice to the county prosecutor or attorney general, who then

must provide notice to the inmate's victims or family of the victim(s) that would

be entitled to notice regarding the inmate's parole. N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e(e)(2).

The victims as well as friends and family of victims may also testify at the

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                                            9
hearing concerning "any harm [they]suffered." Ibid. Compassionate release

"may" be granted only where the court finds by clear and convincing evidence

that the inmate is so debilitated or incapacitated by the terminal condition,

disease or syndrome, or permanent physical incapacity as to be permanently

physically incapable of committing a crime if released.         N.J.S.A. 30:4 -

123.51e(f)(1).

      The A.M. Court considered the language of the statute and determined

that "[c]onsistent with the text and history of the statute, trial courts have

discretion to decide whether to release an inmate who meets the first two

requirements." A.M., 252 N.J. at 457. In its reasoning, the Court noted that the

statute's inclusion of the victims, and providing them with an opportunity to

testify, is instructive in determining the Legislature's intent, "[o]therwise,

testimony from victims would be little more than a potentially cathartic but

hollow exercise. . . ." Id. at 453.

      The CRA does not spell out factors for a trial court to consider, but the

A.M. Court spotted this flaw and provided further instruction. Id. at 456. The

Court concluded that "unless one or more extraordinary aggravating factors

exist," an inmate who satisfies "the Act's medical and public safety criteria

should be granted compassionate release." Id. at 460. The Court then provided

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                                      10
examples of "extraordinary circumstances" a trial court may consider in

determining whether extraordinary aggravating factors exist to defeat release.

Ibid. The examples included:

            (1) particularly heinous, cruel, or depraved conduct; (2)
            a particularly vulnerable victim based on the person’s
            advance age, youth, or disability; (3) an attack on the
            institutions of government or the administration of
            justice; and (4) whether release would have a
            particularly detrimental effect on the well-being and
            recovery process of victims and family members. For
            the fourth factor, courts should apply a standard of
            objective reasonableness.

            [Ibid.]

We note the bar for finding extraordinary aggravating factors "is a necessarily

high one," and that "such factors cannot be used as a substitute for all serious

crimes." Id. at 460-61.

      C.P.'s petition is the first CRA appeal since A.M. was decided.

                                      III.

      The record shows C.P. demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence

that she satisfied both the medical and public safety requirements. See N.J.S.A.

30:4-123.51e(f)(1). Mindful that murder always is a "most serious" offense,

A.M. 252 N.J. at 462, we turn to the trial court's "extraordinary aggravating

factor" findings.

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                                      11
                                        A.

      The court found the murders of A.P. and Carter, as well as the assault on

Cooper, to be "extraordinarily cruel and vicious," consistent with its conclusion

that C.P. engaged in particularly heinous, cruel or depraved conduct in line with

extraordinary aggravating factor one under A.M., In support of its finding, the

court cited the blunt force trauma sustained by Carter and the repeated stabbing

of Cooper.5 Finally, the court found C.P.'s crimes did not result from "stress or

turmoil," but rather were planned crimes which were driven by financial gain,

as evidenced by the life insurance policies C.P. procured for all three victims.

These facts represent the totality of the trial court's support for its finding that

extraordinary aggravating factor one applies to deny release.

      The court next turned to A.M. extraordinary aggravating four, "whether

release would have a particularly detrimental effect on the well-being and

recovery process of victims and family members." The court focused on the

testimony of Curry, Rosie Carter, and White in connection with Carter's death.

We address the witnesses in ascending order of significance to the analysis.

5
  We note the court identified Cooper as an autistic victim in its statement of
reasons, however we find nothing in the record to support this characterization
of his medical condition.
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                                        12
      White, a friend of Carter's, testified that the victim was "beloved," and the

court acknowledged White's grief as well as that of other friends and relatives

who wrote in opposition to release. Rosie Carter testified that the victim was

preparing to relocate to the family home in South Carolina when she was

murdered. After hearing Rosie's testimony, the court found she "had suffered

grievously and would be profoundly affected and emotionally harmed by an

early release of C.P." The court called Rosie's emotional state "reasonable and

expected." The trial court took a longer look at the impact of Carter's death on

her surviving child, Bernicia. It found her "profoundly affected" by her mother's

death and concluded, without medical expert testimony, that C.P.'s release

would cause Bernicia "additional profound grief, depression, and anger." The

trial court acknowledged the ongoing trauma, sense of loss, and pain testified to

by Carter's friend, sister, and daughter as they opposed C.P.'s release.

                                        B.

      We consider the trial court's aggravating factor analysis in light of the

Supreme Court's principles set forth in A.M. First, the facts found by the trial

court undoubtedly establish a basis for a finding of aggravating factor one

pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1). Indeed, the sentencing court made such a

finding in 1995, however that is not the statutory framework we are asked to

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                                       13
apply. Instead, we must examine the record through the lens of the CRA. The

tragic facts present here—premeditation, blunt force trauma, and monetary

gain—are often present in first-degree murder cases. This sad reality in no way

diminishes the seriousness of C.P.'s crimes. However, the A.M. Court instructs

us that in the context of compassionate release, the standard for evaluating

aggravating factors is "necessarily" higher. We must ask whether extraordinary

aggravating factors exist. A.M. at 460. We cannot conclude that these facts,

common to the crime of murder, rise to the level of extraordinary. In our view,

characterizing the trial court's findings on this factor as extraordinary would

create "de facto categorical barriers to release," against the guidance of A.M.

252 N.J. at 459-60.

      We next turn to consideration of aggravating factor four. The trial court's

findings were primarily grounded in the survivors' testimony. It found that

C.P.'s release, almost twenty-eight years after her conviction, would cause

"intense" further harm "to the victims."      Although the trial court did not

expressly state it in these terms, its findings can be reframed in the language of

A.M. this way: it is objectively reasonable to conclude C.P.'s release would

have a detrimental effect on the recovery process of the victims' relatives. We

do not agree. Nearly three decades after C.P's conviction and sentencing, we

                                                                            A-2400-22
                                       14
cannot conclude that her compassionate release under the statute would have a

"particularly detrimental effect" on well-being and recovery.

      When we consider the harm testified to by Curry and Rosie Carter, we

recognize that such harm is an unfortunate byproduct of the expected trauma

that survivors of murder victims will experience.       Applying a standard of

objective reasonableness, we cannot conclude the survivors' testimony, which

evoked great pathos during the hearing, rose to the level of an extraordinary

aggravating factor. Id. at 460.

                                       C.

      Recognizing the inherent seriousness of C.P.'s crimes, our application of

the principles established by the Court in A.M. leads us to conclude "there are

no extraordinary aggravating factors that would bar [C.P.'s] release." We are

therefore constrained to conclude that the trial court engaged in an inappropriate

exercise of judicial discretion when it denied C.P.'s compassionate release. Id.

at 461.

      In closing, we note the Court's final words in A.M.6 are apt:

6
  We comment briefly on Oliver, the companion case to A.M. In Oliver, the
defendant shot and killed a detective in the Essex County courthouse. 252 N.J.
at 446. The Supreme Court denied compassionate release to the defendant solely
on the ground of extraordinary aggravating factor three, an attack on the

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                                       15
            A.M.'s crime was without question a most serious
            offense. She deliberately murdered her husband, and
            her children offered heartfelt testimony in opposition to
            her release. But the law no longer bars inmates
            convicted of murder from seeking compassionate
            release. Although A.M.'s crime is an inherently serious
            one, there are no extraordinary aggravating factors that
            would bar her release.

            [Id. at 462.]

We reach the same result. C.P. met the requirements under the CRA, and her

petition should have been granted.

      Reversed and remanded to the trial court for entry of a prompt order

granting C.P.'s release.    In accordance with N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e(g), our

reversal of the court's order denying C.P.'s petition for compassionate release

shall not become final for ten days to allow the State to petition the Supreme

Court for certification or other relief. We note this matter should be addressed

on an accelerated basis.

      Reversed.

institution of justice. A.M. at 463. The Court considered no other extraordinary
aggravating factor in denying release. Ibid.
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