Court Opinion

ID: 9674003
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:21:43.598357+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:25.125005
License: Public Domain

ON REHEARING.
Mr. Justice Wilson
delivered the opinion of the Court.
By motion for rehearing defendant contends that the evidence of plaintiff’s shore employment was uncontroverted and, since no fact issue requiring submission was raised, this should have been treated as a question of law. This contention is correct.
The trial court should not have allowed maintenance for the eight-week period during which plaintiff was making $35.00 a week for the reason that he was able to support himself and therefore was not incapacitated. The $12.00 a week which plaintiff earned during the twelve-week period did not equal the *303amount the jury determined to be necessary for support. The fact that plaintiff earned something during this period is evidence that he was not totally disabled, at least during this period. The duty to pay maintenance arises under the employment contract from plaintiff’s incapacity. We have found no cases discussing the effect of a partial disability upon maintenance and cure. Under this record, we hold that the trial court was correct in allowing maintenance for this twelve-week period but it should have deducted the amount he actually earned.
We did not intend to hold in our original opinion that the submission discussed in this case is the only way that a trial judge can submit problems of maintenance and shore employment. Maintenance does not have to be submitted on a per diem basis. We are limited in this opinion to the specific points of error and trial objections made to this charge as supported by the evidence in this case. Wages earned by shore employment should be treated as evidence negativing disability and thus putting in issue the duty to pay maintenance in whole or in part.
In the treatment of this subject in our original opinion we said that defendant was entitled to credit for plaintiff’s entire earnings during the eight-week period, whereas on rehearing we have determined that defendant is entitled only to a cessation of maintenance during the periods when the plaintiff is completely self-supporting, and not to his entire earnings. Loverich v. Warner Co., 118 Fed. 2d 690. Here the trial court should have deducted from the total sum allowed for maintenance $4.00 a day for eight weeks or $224.00 plus his earnings during the twelve-week period of $144.00, — a total of $368.00. In view of the fact that we have reduced the judgment for maintenance on the pleadings by $1896.00, this error of the trial court does not require a modification of the judgment under Rule 503, T.R.C.P.
Defendant relies upon U.S. v. Robert E. Johnson, 160 Fed. 2d 789, affirmed in 333 U. S. 46, 68 Sup. Ct. 391, 92 L. Ed 468, for the proposition that a plaintiff cannot recover for maintenance while living with his parents. This decision was based upon a California statute which requires parents to maintain their minor children. Here plaintiff was not a minor but was 28 years old and his mother and stepfather were under no legal obligations to furnish him board and room free of cost. In addition, the Johnson case specifically limits its holding to a situation in which there was no agreement by the plaintiff to reimburse his parents for board and room.
*304We have re-examined the record and again find evidence of an agreement between plaintiff and his mother. The fact that there may be a conflict in the testimony goes to its weight.
Neither was plaintiff furnished board and room while attending the mortuary school. The fact that he received an allowance under the GI Bill of Rights, Title 38, Ch. 11c, U.S.C.A., would not operate to relieve defendant any more than would any other income of plaintiff’s not arising from and demonstrating an ability to work. While seamen were held to be wards of the admiralty court because they frequently were destitute and helpless, defendant has cited no cases and we have found none holding that a seaman must be destitute and without any income or resources in order to receive maintenance. On the contrary, there are numerous cases holding that a seaman cannot recover maintenance except for money actually spent or liability incurred (involving an extension of credit). Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, 318 U. S. 724, 63 Sup. Ct. 930, 87 L. Ed. 1107; The Baymead, 88 Fed. 2d 144; Murphy v. American Barge Line Company, 169 Fed. 2d 61. Under this rule, the seaman obviously has to live upon credit or to pay his living expenses from savings or an income. These cases do not bar recovery here because plaintiff spent money for board and room. On the other hand, those cases holding that a seaman cannot recover for maintenance and cure received in a charity hospital at no expense to himself, Reed v. Canfield, 20 Fed. Cas. 426, No. 11,641; Davis v. The Erie, 7 Fed. Cas. 120, No. 3632(a), do not apply for the reason that money received under the GI Bill of Rights was earned by a prior service and is not charity and has specific limitations. It is not similar in any respect to benefit received from a marine hospital except that both originate in the Federal Government. From a marine hospital the seaman received maintenance and cure in kind as such and by reason of his employment as a seaman plus a disability incurred during that employment. The Baymead, supra. The fact that plaintiff chose to avail himself of the educational provisions of the GI Bill of Rights during convalescence rather than sitting in idleness is not a comparable situation and does not operate to relieve defendant of its maintenance obligation.
Defendant argues that our discussion of maintenance is in conflict with Calmar Steamship Corporation v. Taylor, 303 U. S. 525, 58 Sup. Ct. 651, 82 L. Ed. 993, in providing for future maintenance. We do not so construe it. The plaintiff is limited by a finding of the definite time at which he will obtain his *305maximum cure. What we have said is consistent with the Calmar case.
Defendant re-urges its contention that Special Issue No. 6 is not an ultimate fact issue, in that it does not submit an inquiry as to the degree of roll and pitch of the ship. The degree of roll and pitch of the ship is not an ultimate issue in itself but is a circumstance to be considered in determining whether the act of ordering plaintiff upon the shelf was or was not negligence. See Naylor v. Isthmian Steamship, 187 Fed. 2d 538 (time for perfecting appeal not yet expired) for a similar situation. The act of ordering plaintiff upon the shelf being uncontroverted, the only issues required were an issue determining whether or not it was negligence to order plaintiff upon the shelf under circumstances prevailing at that time and an issue on proximate cause. Rule 279 T.R.C.P.
Defendant raises in this court for the first time the contention that the court’s charge allows a double recovery in that the measure of damages for negligence includes an item of the present cash value of lost wages between the date of the accident and the date of the trial and also maintenance and cure for the same period. Defendant argues that plaintiff was obligated to support himself from this item of damages and therefore is not entitled to maintenance, relying upon Smith v. Lykes Bros.-Ripley Steamship Co., 105 Fed. 2d 604, certiorari denied 308 U. S. 604, 60 Sup. Ct. 141, 84 L. Ed. 505. Since this was not raised in the trial court either in the objections to the court’s charge or the motion for' new trial, or on appeal in the assignments of error, we do not pass upon it.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.
Opinion delivered June 20, 1951.