Court Opinion

ID: 9892526
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-24 13:08:54.958183+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:13:52.219613
License: Public Domain

State of New York                                           MEMORANDUM
Court of Appeals                                       This memorandum is uncorrected and subject to
                                                     revision before publication in the New York Reports.

 No. 100 SSM 7
 The People &c.,
         Appellant,
      v.
 Nikolas Lovett,
         Respondent.

 Submitted by Taylor Fitzsimmons, for appellant.
 Respondent, precluded.

 MEMORANDUM:

       The County Court order should be affirmed.

       Defendant was charged by simplified traffic information with a single traffic

 infraction. On the day of trial, he moved to dismiss the information for noncompliance
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with the speedy trial statute (CPL 30.30), and the People conceded their obligation to be

ready for trial within the time period that was alleged to apply under the statute. Town

Court granted the motion, and County Court affirmed, concluding that CPL 30.30 (1) (e)

applies to traffic infractions.

       On appeal, the People contend that CPL 30.30 (1) (e)—which took effect more than

a year before defendant was even charged—was enacted to clarify that CPL 30.30 (1)

applies “ ‘to accusatory instruments charging traffic infractions jointly with a felony,

misdemeanor, or violation,’ ” but that, as we stated in People v Galindo, “ ‘actions

involving only traffic infractions would still not be covered by the speedy trial statute’ ”

(quoting 38 NY3d 199, 201, 206 [2022] [emphasis added]). Thus, the instant appeal

involves no intervening newly declared principle of law.

       Because the People agreed in Town Court that CPL 30.30 applied to the simplified

traffic information, the issue is unreviewable (see CPL 470.05 [2]). Contrary to the

dissent’s suggestion, we engender no unjust result by applying our well-settled principles

governing reviewability to reject the People’s attempt to reinstate the accusatory instrument

against this pro se defendant, now almost two years after dismissal, by renouncing their

express concession that CPL 30.30 applied.

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RIVERA, J. (dissenting):

      I would reverse and remit to Town Court because that court should have denied

defendant Nikolas Lovett’s CPL 30.30 motion to dismiss the Vehicle and Traffic

Law § 1146 charge. In People v Galindo, we held that a standalone traffic infraction, like

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the underlying charge here, is not subject to CPL 30.30’s speedy trial time limits under a

newly-amended version of that statute (38 NY3d 199, 206 [2022]). Notwithstanding the

majority’s conclusion that we did not pronounce a new principle of law, Galindo

interpreted this new statutory amendment and is an intervening decision from this Court,

issued during the pendency of the prosecution’s direct appeal in the instant case; it thus

controls (see People v Pepper, 53 NY2d 213, 219 [1981] [noting that the Court has deviated

from the “historic common-law rule, that all cases on direct appeal must be decided in

accordance with any newly declared but conceptually always existent principle” only when

there has been “significant reliance on a now overruled and, therefore, in theory,

erroneously stated precedent”]).

       The prosecution’s argument before Town Court that CPL 30.30 applied to

standalone traffic infractions and that it had complied with the statute does not bar our

consideration of the issue because the prosecution took that position without the benefit of

our holding in Galindo. Thus, it cannot be said that the prosecution “affirmatively and

knowingly relinquish[ed]” a claim based on settled law (People v Jurgins, 26 NY3d 607,

611 [2015]).

       Nor is the prosecution’s claim unpreserved for our review merely because it was

first raised before County Court. Although parties generally may not raise claims for the

first time on appeal, the Court has long held that parties may do so if those claims “could

not have been obviated or cured by factual showings or legal countersteps” in the nisi prius

court (see Telaro v Telaro, 25 NY2d 433, 439 [1969]). Thus, “where a statute is before us

for construction we should construe it in the light of all the facts as they exist” because

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“[t]o do otherwise might result in deciding litigation contrary to law” (People v Duell, 1

NY2d 132, 134 [1956], citing Persky v Bank of Am. Nat. Assn., 261 NY 212, 218-219

[1933]; see also Matter of Richardson v Fiedler Roofing, Inc., 67 NY2d 246, 250 [1986]

[“The argument raises solely a question of statutory interpretation, . . . which we may

address even though it was not presented below”], citing Telaro, 25 NY2d at 439 [“ ‘No

party should prevail on appeal, given an unimpeachable showing that (they) had no case in

the trial court’ ”], quoting Cohen & Karger, Powers of the New York Court of Appeals at

627-628). Here, the defendant could not have made any factual showings or taken legal

countersteps to avoid the plain text interpretation of CPL 30.30 that the speedy trial

requirement does not apply to a standalone traffic infraction charge.

       The prosecution also acted expeditiously in presenting its Galindo claim. In its

motion to reargue County Court’s affirmance of Town Court’s CPL 30.30 dismissal, the

prosecution contended “at virtually the earliest possible moment” (People v Finch, 23

NY3d 408, 412 [2014]), that County Court had overlooked Galindo—which we decided

after the prosecution had filed its County Court brief but before County Court affirmed the

dismissal. However, County Court denied reargument, stated that it “was already aware of

and took into consideration, People v Galindo”, and nevertheless concluded that traffic

infractions are subject to a 30-day speedy trial deadline under CPL 30.30 (1)—a holding

based on reasoning we specifically rejected in Galindo (38 NY3d at 206 [explaining that it

is “obvious from its plain text” that CPL 30.30 (1) (e) does not apply to freestanding traffic

infractions]).

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      Contrary to the majority’s assertion (maj mem at 2), its analysis results in an absurd

outcome in that it subjects the prosecution to the preservation rule based on an assertion

before Town Court of compliance with a speedy-trial obligation that we subsequently held

to be nonexistent. Notably, the prosecution did not attempt to game the system or seek to

evade the preservation rule as the prosecution gained no benefit from the position it took

before Town Court regarding the applicability of CPL 30.30 (1) (e) to freestanding traffic

infractions. Although the majority grounds its decision on the prosecution’s position

below, at no point did County Court so much as hint that a “concession” by the prosecution

factored into either its initial affirmance—which relied on a pre-amendment Appellate

Division case purportedly holding that the version of CPL 30.30 then in effect applied to

simplified traffic informations—or its denial of the motion to reargue (maj mem at 2).

      Moreover, when denying the prosecution’s motion to reargue, County Court

displayed the same misunderstanding of CPL 30.30 (1)’s application to freestanding traffic

infractions as the prosecution had before Town Court. I see no reason to disadvantage the

prosecution for reaching the same conclusion on this issue as did County Court, which

insisted it had read and understood Galindo. “[P]rocedural rules should be so designed as

to keep unjust results to a minimum” (Finch, 23 NY3d at 415).

      I dissent.

On review of submissions pursuant to section 500.11 of the Rules, order affirmed, in a
memorandum. Chief Judge Wilson and Judges Garcia, Singas, Cannataro, Troutman and
Halligan concur. Judge Rivera dissents in an opinion.

Decided October 24, 2023

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