Court Opinion

ID: 9773266
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:40:52.367048+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:51.367251
License: Public Domain

Donald L. Corbin, Justice, dissenting. I would affirm. Appellant’s time for a speedy trial began to run on April 1,1989, the date of his arrest. He would have to have been tried on or before April 1, 1990, unless there was an excludable period of delay. On February 1, 1990, both sides announced ready for trial. On February 12, 1990, trial was set for March 14, 1990. On March 13,1990, defense counsel was notified that the March 14, 1990 trial date was continued and would be rescheduled at a future date. A docket entry was made on March 27,1990, stating that the trial was continued due to the crowded docket. Although it was entered prior to the expiration of the speedy trial period, Cox v. State, 299 Ark. 312, 772 S.W.2d 336 (1989), this docket entry in and of itself was clearly inadequate because exceptional circumstances were not stated by the trial court as required by Ark. R. Crim. P. 28.3(b). Novak v. State, 294 Ark. 120, 741 S.W.2d 243 (1987). However, the exceptional circumstances were stated in the trial court’s order entered April 10, 1990. On April 10, 1990, the trial judge entered a written order fully explaining the exceptional circumstances surrounding the delay and for continuing the case until April 10, 1990, to-wit: The Court scheduled the matter of State of Arkansas v. Charles A. Moore, No. CR-89-147, for trial on March 13,1990. All trials are scheduled for a one day to complete. Because the Moore trial required two days to complete, this matter was continued from its setting. Both parties had announced ready for trial previously. However, neither party objected to the continuance. The Court was unable to rescheduled this matter for trial prior to April 10, 1990. Being within a Judicial Circuit comprised of six counties and having jurisdiction over all felony criminal matters in the Circuit, the Court must travel to each county on a monthly basis to tend to pending cases. It is well established that the Court travels the Circuit the last week of each month for these purposes and such occurred the last week of March 1990. Additionally, the Court has scheduled trials in Calhoun County, Arkansas for the period of April 2-9, 1990. This matter could not have been rescheduled prior to April 10, 1990. Given the facts of this case, I would exempt this case from such rigid and confining rules. The docket was indeed congested and exceptional circumstances did exist as reflected in the April 10, 1990 order. It should also be noted that appellant was notified by telephone on March 13, 1990, that the case had been continued and appellant requested that he be given as much advance notice of the rescheduled date as possible. The state filed a motion to exclude the period on speedy trial grounds on March 23, 1990. The appellant did not respond to this motion until April 2, 1990 — one day after the time for speedy trial had run without an excludable period. As noted by the state, this case is an extreme example of an appellant who did not ask for a speedy trial — who, by coincidence or by design, did not file an objection to the continuance based upon a crowded trial docket, until the first day after the twelve month period had expired. As the state pointed out in the defendant’s motion to dismiss, the appellant did not allege any prejudice. The period of delay appellant argues is impermissible is nine days. In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), the Supreme Court declared that four factors should be considered in determining whether a defendant has been denied his right to speedy trial: the length of delay; the reason for the delay; the defendant’s assertion of his right; and prejudice to the defendant. Clearly, all four of these factors weigh in the state’s favor. Based on these factors, I would conclude that appellant has not been denied his right to a speedy trial. Hays and Glaze, JJ., join in this dissent.