Court Opinion

ID: 9963377
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-25 14:00:47.819496+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:47.843241
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-11386    Document: 26-1      Date Filed: 04/25/2024   Page: 1 of 13

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 23-11386
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        JUAN RANGEL-RUBIO,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Georgia
                  D.C. Docket No. 4:18-cr-00274-LGW-BWC-2
                           ____________________
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        2                              Opinion of the Court               23-11386

        Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and BRANCH, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Appellant Juan Rangel-Rubio (“Rangel-Rubio”) was charged
        and convicted of conspiring to conceal, harbor, and shield undocu-
        mented persons, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(I); con-
        spiring to commit money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
        1956(h); conspiring to kill a witness, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
        1512(k); and conspiring to retaliate against a witness for providing
        testimony or documents in an official proceeding conducted by the
        Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), in viola-
        tion of 18 U.S.C. § 1513(f). Rangel-Rubio appeals those convictions
        and seeks a new trial, arguing that the district court improperly
                                   1
        overruled his Batson challenge regarding a particular juror. After
        careful consideration, we affirm.
                                                  I.
               A summary of the facts as alleged in the indictment is help-
        ful. Rangel-Rubio and his brother Pablo Rangel-Rubio (“Pablo”)
        worked for the Davey Tree Expert Company. Pablo helped undoc-
        umented individuals gain employment there by providing them
        with assumed identities. Pablo paid the undocumented persons in
        cash, but with the help of Rangel-Rubio, he diverted the paychecks
        to Rangel-Rubio’s bank account for their own financial gain.
        Eventually, Eliud Montoya, who worked for a subsidiary of the

        1
            Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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        23-11386                   Opinion of the Court                               3

        Davey Tree Expert Company, reported the scheme to the EEOC.
        Later, Rangel-Rubio and Pablo conspired to kill Montoya for re-
        porting them, and Pablo paid someone to help Rangel-Rubio mur-
        der Montoya. On August 19, 2017, Montoya was shot near his
        home in Georgia. Rangel-Rubio was charged with the four counts
        set forth above, and the case proceeded to trial.
               During voir dire, each of the potential jurors answered pre-
        pared questions. The juror at issue here, Juror 31, 2 is a Black fe-
        male, who said she was single, had a young daughter, was self-em-
        ployed as a hair stylist, had never served in the military, had never
        served on a jury before, and had obtained an associate’s degree. At
        the conclusion of voir dire, the parties exercised their peremptory
        strikes, with the government using only five of its six strikes, in-
        cluding one to strike Juror 31.
               When the district court asked if there was any reason to be-
        lieve that the jury was not fairly and impartially impaneled, the
        government responded in the negative, but Rangel-Rubio raised a
        Batson challenge. During a sidebar on the Batson challenge, Rangel-
        Rubio argued that the government used all but one of its peremp-
        tory strikes to strike potential jurors who were either Black or His-
        panic. And counsel argued that the seated jury had only two Black
        individuals, even though the jury pool was more diverse. When
        the district court asked Rangel-Rubio to establish a prima facie case
        under Batson, counsel pointed out that the government struck one

        2 At trial Rangel-Rubio raised concerns over the fact that various potential ju-

        rors were struck. But in this appeal, only Juror 31 is at issue.
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        4                     Opinion of the Court                 23-11386

        Black man, one Hispanic man, three Black women, and one white
        woman. Juror 31 was one of the Black women the government
        struck. But counsel agreed that each side gave up a strike volun-
        tarily.
                The district court concluded that Rangel-Rubio produced
        sufficient evidence to draw the conclusion that an inference of dis-
        crimination occurred. So it asked the government to provide non-
        discriminatory reasons for the strikes. The government went
        through the jurors and provided a reason for each particular strike.
        As for Juror 31, the government said that she did not have stable
        employment and did not have strong ties to the community, and
        other jurors had longer and stronger ties to the community. The
        government also noted that during the second phase of the selec-
        tion process, it observed Juror 31 (who was sitting “right behind”
        counsel), and it appeared she was not paying attention. In the gov-
        ernment’s view, that raised concerns about her ability to remain
        engaged and focused during the proceedings. Finally, the govern-
        ment voiced concern over what it thought was an inconsistency in
        Juror 31’s responses: in the written summary she answered before
        voir dire, Juror 31 claimed to be unemployed, but when questioned
        during void dire, she said she was self-employed as a hair stylist.
               Following this explanation, the district court determined
        that the government provided legitimate, non-discriminatory rea-
        sons to support the peremptory strikes. It concluded, based on
        counsel’s demeanor and its observation of the potential jurors’ de-
        meanor, the proffered reasons were sufficiently race- and gender-
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        23-11386               Opinion of the Court                        5

        neutral for all five peremptory strikes, including the one used on
        Juror 31. With respect to Juror 31 specifically, the district court
        voiced its own observation that she “was not paying attention for
        a good bit of the jury selection.” In sum, the jurors’ demeanor
        along with counsel’s demeanor led the district court to conclude
        that the Batson challenge should be overruled.
                The trial proceeded, and the jury found Rangel-Rubio guilty
        of all counts. Rangel-Rubio moved for a new trial based on the
        alleged Batson violation. In that filing, he argued, among other
        things, that the race-neutral reasons that the government provided
        were not sufficient because the government failed to strike poten-
        tial white jurors with the same attributes. The district court denied
        the motion for new trial, rejecting Rangel-Rubio’s argument that
        the government did not strike similarly situated white potential ju-
        rors. The court also noted that the government had a strike re-
        maining and opined that the government could have used that
        strike to remove one of the two seated Black jurors if removing
        minorities had been its goal. Based on its own observations and
        the government’s proffered reasons, the district court concluded
        Rangel-Rubio failed to show purposeful discrimination in the jury-
        selection process.
               Rangel-Rubio now appeals the district court’s ruling on his
        Batson challenge, claiming he is entitled to a new trial.
                                         II.
               When a defendant alleges a Batson violation, we review jury
        selection de novo but review the district court’s underlying factual
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        6                       Opinion of the Court                  23-11386

        findings for clear error. United States v. Campa, 529 F.3d 980, 992
        (11th Cir. 2008). A district court’s ruling on the issue of discrimina-
        tory intent involves credibility determinations, so we must sustain
        it unless it is clearly erroneous. United States v. Gamory, 635 F.3d
        480, 495-96 (11th Cir. 2011).
                                          III.
                Under the Equal Protection Clause, a criminal defendant is
        entitled to “be tried by a jury whose members are selected pursuant
        to nondiscriminatory criteria.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 85-86. Accord-
        ingly, the purposeful and deliberate denial of a member of a minor-
        ity group to participate as a juror in the administration of justice,
        on account of race, violates the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 84.
        A defendant may challenge the government’s exercise of peremp-
        tory challenges when it believes they reveal a pattern of purposeful
        racial discrimination in the selection of the jury. Id. at 94-97.
               Batson and its progeny established a three-step framework
        for evaluating race-discrimination claims in jury selection. The Su-
        preme Court summarized this test in Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S.
        322 (2003), as follows:
               First, a defendant must make a prima facie showing
               that a peremptory challenge has been exercised on
               the basis of race. Second, if that showing has been
               made, the prosecution must offer a race-neutral basis
               for striking the juror in question. Third, in light of the
               parties' submissions, the trial court must determine
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        23-11386                Opinion of the Court                          7

                whether the defendant has shown purposeful dis-
                crimination.
        Id. at 328-29 (internal citations omitted).
               Here, the district court found that the defendant satisfied
        step one—Rangel-Rubio made a prima facie showing that the gov-
        ernment struck Juror 31 on the basis of race. Neither party chal-
        lenges this finding. Because Rangel-Rubio made a prima facie
        showing, the burden shifted to the government to articulate a race-
        neutral reason for the strike.
                At step two, we ask whether the reasons the government
        tendered for striking a juror are nondiscriminatory on their face.
        United States v. Folk, 754 F.3d 905, 914 (11th Cir. 2014). Batson’s sec-
        ond step does not demand an explanation that is persuasive. Id.
        Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s expla-
        nation, the reason offered will be deemed race-neutral. Id. (citing
        Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767-68 (1995)). In the district court,
        among other things, the government pointed to Juror 31’s inatten-
        tiveness as one of the reasons for its use of a peremptory strike. We
        have held that inattentiveness is a valid race-neutral reason for us-
        ing a peremptory strike. United States v. Cordoba-Mosquera, 212 F.3d
        1194, 1197 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam). So here, the government
        satisfied step two.
               At step three, the burden then shifts to the defendant to
        prove purposeful discrimination. United States v. Tokars, 95 F.3d
        1520, 1533 (11th Cir. 1996). The district court must evaluate the
        persuasiveness of the government’s proﬀered reason and
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                  23-11386

        determine whether, considering all relevant circumstances, the de-
        fendant has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimina-
        tion. United States v. Ochoa-Vasquez, 428 F.3d 1015, 1039 (11th Cir.
        2005). The defendant may show evidence of purposeful discrimi-
        nation through side-by-side comparisons conﬁrming that the rea-
        sons for striking a Black panelist also apply to similar non-Black
        panelists who were permitted to serve. See United States v. Houston,
        456 F.3d 1328, 1338 (11th Cir. 2006). If the government’s reason for
        striking Black venire members applies equally to white venire
        members who were not struck, that provides evidence supporting
        purposeful discrimination at Batson's third step. Id. But the failure
        to strike similarly situated jurors is not pretextual when relevant
        diﬀerences exist between the struck and comparator jurors. United
        States v. Novaton, 271 F.3d 968, 1004 (11th Cir. 2001).
                The critical question at this final stage is whether the trial
        court finds the proffered race-neutral explanations credible. Mil-
        ler-E, 537 U.S. at 338-39. “Credibility can be measured by, among
        other factors, the prosecutor’s demeanor; by how reasonable, or
        how improbable, the explanations are; and by whether the prof-
        fered rationale has some basis in accepted trial strategy.” Id. at 339.
        The best evidence of discriminatory intent typically will be the de-
        meanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge. Snyder v. Lou-
        isiana, 552 U.S. 472, 477 (2008).
               In cases when race-neutral reasons for peremptory chal-
        lenges invoke a juror’s demeanor, though—such as the individual’s
        nervousness or inattentiveness—the district court “must evaluate
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        23-11386                Opinion of the Court                          9

        not only whether the prosecutor’s demeanor belies a discrimina-
        tory intent, but also whether the juror’s demeanor can credibly be
        said to have exhibited the basis for the strike attributed to the juror
        by the prosecutor.” Id. These determinations of credibility and
        demeanor lie within a district court’s province. Id. In fact, the dis-
        trict court’s decision on this “ultimate question of discriminatory
        intent” is a finding of fact that we “accord[] great deference on ap-
        peal.” Folk, 754 F.3d at 914 (citation and internal quotation marks
        omitted). Finally, although the presence of a Black juror on the
        jury does not dispose of the allegation of a race-based peremptory
        challenge, under our precedent, it is a factor that tends to moderate
        against a finding of discriminatory intent. United States v. Puentes,
        50 F.3d 1567, 1578 (11th Cir. 1995).
                We conclude that the district court did not clearly err when
        it accepted the government’s reasons for striking Juror 31 as non-
        discriminatory. First, Rangel-Rubio does not challenge the district
        court’s finding about the government’s demeanor in exercising its
        strikes. That unchallenged finding weighs in favor of affirming the
        district court’s decision to overrule the Batson challenge. Second,
        contrary to Rangel-Rubio’s assertion, the record was sufficiently
        developed to support a finding that Juror 31 was inattentive, and
        that is enough on its own to affirm the district court’s ruling.
                In United States v. Diaz, we noted that a potential juror’s ina-
        bility to pay attention is race-neutral reason for a peremptory
        strike. 26 F.3d 1533, 1544 (11th Cir. 1994). Still, we recognized that
        when explanations are based on the juror’s demeanor, a greater
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                 23-11386

        chance of abuse exists. So we explained that, in such a case, the
        district court must develop the record to allow for meaningful ap-
        pellate review. Id. at 2543. We said that to do so, the district court
        should confirm that the stricken juror’s demeanor was different
        than that of other potential jurors. Id. In Diaz, like here, the gov-
        ernment’s proffered reason for using a peremptory strike was the
        inattentiveness of the juror. Id. This Court concluded that the dis-
        trict court did not clearly err in finding that the prosecutor offered
        a race-neutral reason for the strike because the record reflected that
        the juror directed her attention to the defendants rather than the
        prosecution during jury selection. Id. This behavior allowed us to
        infer that the juror’s behavior was different than other venireper-
        sons. Id.
                Likewise, in Cordoba-Mosquera, a district court determined
        that a peremptory strike was not intentionally discriminatory when
        the potential juror’s demeanor was the reason for the strike. 212
        F.3d at 1197-98. The prosecution pointed to the fact that the juror
        shrugged his shoulders and did not answer audibly as a race-neutral
        reason for the strike. Id. We determined that the proffered reason
        was clear and reasonably specific because the government ex-
        plained that the juror’s body language and mannerisms indicated
        that he did not want to be a juror. Id. We inferred that the juror
        was “more inattentive” than other seated jurors. Id. at 1198. And
        we deferred to the district court where it made an “on-the-spot in-
        terpretation” of the juror’s behavior. Id.
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        23-11386                   Opinion of the Court                         11

                Here, the government asserted that Juror 31 was inattentive
        during jury selection and that it had personally observed her since
        she was sitting “right behind” counsel. The district court also ex-
        pressly noted its own observation that Juror 31 “was not paying
        attention for a good bit of the jury selection.” Although Rangel-
        Rubio asserts otherwise, the statements by the government and the
        district court are sufficiently specific to allow for appellate review.
        See Diaz, 26 F.3d at 1543 and Cordoba-Mosquera, 212 F.3d at 1198.
        And as in Diaz and Cordoba-Mosquera, the statements that both the
        government and district court made are sufficient to allow us to
        infer that Juror 31 was more inattentive than other seated jurors.
        Significantly, when given the opportunity to rebut the reason re-
        lated to inattentiveness, Rangel-Rubio failed to do so. He did not
        identify any other potential jurors who were inattentive, other
        than those who were struck. Accordingly, the district court did not
        clearly err in finding that Juror 31 was inattentive, and her inatten-
        tiveness alone was a race-neutral reason to support striking her.
              But even if we consider Rangel-Rubio’s argument that
        seated white jurors were similarly situated to Juror 31, that argu-
        ment fails because he did not identify a seated juror who had the
        same characteristics as Juror 31. 3 The government stated that Juror
        31 was struck because she was single, did not have stable employ-
        ment, did not have strong ties to the community, was inattentive,
        and had inconsistent answers with respect to her employment

        3 We assume without deciding that Rangel-Rubio adequately raised this issue

        with the district court in his motion for new trial.
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        12                      Opinion of the Court                  23-11386

        status. Of the twelve seated jurors, none had all the characteristics
        that Juror 31 had and about which the government complained,
        and only five had more than one shared characteristic. The only
        potential juror who was single and unemployed (or underem-
        ployed), who had discrepancies between her questionnaire and an-
        swers in court, who had minimal ties to the community, and who
        was inattentive was Juror 31. Most importantly, all other potential
        jurors identified as inattentive were struck.
                Given that none of the seated jurors had all the characteris-
        tics of Juror 31 (or even a majority of the characteristics), the seated
        jurors were not similarly situated to Juror 31. See Novaton, 271 F.3d
        at 1004. Rangel-Rubio therefore failed to show that the district
        court clearly erred in accepting the government’s proffered reasons
        for striking Juror 31.
               Finally, under our precedent, we must consider the fact that
        the government did not attempt to exclude as many Black individ-
        uals as it could have from the jury. As the record reflects, the gov-
        ernment chose not to use one of its peremptory challenges and the
        jury as seated included two Black jurors. Although the presence of
        Black individuals on the jury is not dispositive, that fact under our
        precedent supports the district court’s determination that no Batson
        violation occurred. See Campa, 529 F.3d at 998 and Gamory, 635
        F.3d at 496 (citing Puentes, 50 F.3d at 1578) (“Although the presence
        of African–American jurors does not dispose of an allegation of
        race-based peremptory challenges, it is a significant factor tending
        to prove the paucity of the claim.”)).
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        23-11386             Opinion of the Court                     13

                                      IV.
               For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the district
        court did not err in overruling Rangel-Rubio’s Batson challenge.
              AFFIRMED.