Court Opinion

ID: 9752362
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 18:01:02.629577+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:15.152101
License: Public Domain

House, C. J.
This case arose from an accident in which the fifteen-year-old plaintiff, Richard Griffith, son of the plaintiffs Granville and Violet Griffith, was injured. The accident involved his bicycle and an uninsured automobile. At the time of the accident, there was in effect an automobile insurance policy issued by the defendant to Gran-ville Griffith. The plaintiffs applied to the Superior Court for an order directing the defendant company to proceed with arbitration in accordance with the provisions of § 52-410 of the General Statutes and the decision of this court in Frager v. Pennsylvania General Ins. Co., 155 Conn. 270, 231 A.2d 531. In their application, the plaintiffs alleged that by the *452terms of the insurance policy Bichard was an insured and legally entitled to recover damages sustained as the result of the operation of an uninsured motor vehicle. By a more specific statement filed after the court had issued an order to the defendant to appear and show cause why the application should not he granted, the plaintiffs pleaded that at the time of the accident “the home address of the plaintiffs, Bichard Griffith and Violet Griffith, was 93 Whiting Street, New Britain. The home address of the plaintiff, Granville Griffith, was primarily 450 Main Street, New Britain, and secondarily 93 Whiting Street, New Britain.” The defendant company denied the allegation that Bichard was an insured under the provisions of the policy issued to his father. By way of special defense, it pleaded that at all times covered by the complaint Granville Griffith resided at 450 Main Street, New Britain; that both Violet Griffith and Bichard Griffith resided at 93 Whiting Street, New Britain; and that, since the plaintiff Granville and the plaintiffs Violet and Bichard were not residents of the same household, the coverage extended under the subject insurance policy did not extend to the latter two plaintiffs. After a hearing, the court rendered judgment ordering the defendant to arbitrate the questions covered, under the arbitration clause of part IV of the policy issued to Granville Griffith.
The decisive issue before the trial court was whether Bichard was an insured under the terms of the policy issued to his father. Part IV of the policy concerning “Protection Against Uninsured Motorists” provided for protection for “the insured or his legal representative.” Under “Definitions” Part IV provided: “The definitions under Part I, except the definition of ‘insured,’ apply to Part IV *453and under Part IV: ‘insured’ means: (a) the named insured and any relative.” Part I of the policy provided: “ ‘relative’ means a relative of the named insured who is a resident of the same household.” Hence, the basic question at issue was whether the father, Granville Griffith, and his son, Richard, were residents of the same household so that Richard was an insured under the terms of the policy. The court concluded that they were residents of the same household, that Richard was an insured under the terms of the policy, and that the plaintiffs had the right to compel the defendant to arbitrate since uninsured motorists coverage was available. It rendered judgment accordingly, and it is from this judgment that the defendant has appealed.
On its appeal the defendant assigned as error the conclusions of the court to which we have just referred, claiming that the facts set forth in the finding do not support them. It has further assigned error in three paragraphs of the court’s finding as facts found without evidence and in refusing to find material facts as set forth in eleven paragraphs of the defendant’s draft finding which facts the defendant claims were undisputed.
Before discussing the assignments of error, it is pertinent to refer again to the general rules governing the interpretation of written contracts, including insurance policies. “When the language of a policy is plain and unambiguous the terms must be accorded their natural and ordinary meaning. LaBonte v. Federal Mutual Ins. Co., 159 Conn. 252, 256, 268 A.2d 663; Lyon v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 140 Conn. 304, 99 A.2d 141.” DeRubbo v. Aetna Ins. Co., 161 Conn. 388, 392, 288 A.2d 430. “A court *454will not torture words to import ambiguity where the ordinary meaning leaves no room for ambiguity, and words do not become ambiguops simply because lawyers or laymen contend for different meanings. A. M. Larson Co. v. Lawlor Ins. Agency, Inc., . . . [153 Conn. 618, 622, 220 A.2d 32]; Downs v. National Casualty Co., . . . [146 Conn. 490, 494, 152 A.2d 316].” Marcolini v. Allstate Ins. Co., 160 Conn. 280, 284, 278 A.2d 796. No persuasive argument or legal authority has been submitted for the proposition that the controlling words of the policy, “resident of the same household,” are ambiguous. The Supreme Courts of Hawaii and Minnesota, in considering the same provisions in insurance policies, have concluded that the words are not ambiguous, and we agree with their conclusions. Mun Quon Kok v. Pacific Ins. Co., 51 Haw. 470, 462 P.2d 909; Smitke v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 264 Minn. 212, 118 N.W.2d 217.
The common and ordinary meaning of “household” as defined in Webster’s Third New International Dictionary is: “those who dwell under the same roof and compose a family: a domestic establishment; specif: a social unit comprised of those living together in the same dwelling place.” To the same effect, see 41 C.J.S. 367; see also Rathbun v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 144 Conn. 165, 169, 128 A.2d 327.
As we have noted, the defendant has attacked the court’s conclusion that the plaintiffs Granville and Richard were residents of the same household. “The court’s conclusions are to be tested by the finding. Brockett v. Jensen, 154 Conn. 328, 331, 225 A.2d 190. The conclusions reached by the court must stand *455unless they are legally or logically inconsistent with the facts found or unless they involve the application of some erroneous rule of law material to the case. Johnston Jewels, Ltd. v. Leonard, 156 Conn. 75, 79, 239 A.2d 500; Craig v. Dunleavy, 154 Conn. 100, 105, 221 A.2d 855.” Barnini v. Sun Oil Co., 161 Conn. 59, 63, 283 A.2d 217.
It is not questioned that Granville and Violet Griffith had been divorced for four years at the time of the accident in question. She lived with their son Richard and their other sons and daughters at 93 Whiting Street, and Granville lived at 450 Main Street about one-half mile away. The divorce did not significantly change the relationship between Granville and the children; he supported them, saw them frequently, took them on trips and was visited by them, including Richard, at his Main Street address. He frequently went to 93 Whiting Street, often stayed overnight and baby-sat there. He also kept clothes and a razor at 93 Whiting Street and had meals with his children three to seven times a week. All of these uncontested findings clearly indicate a close paternal relationship between Gran-ville Griffith and his children but, in view of the fact that it is also undisputed that he lived at 450 Main Street, one-half mile away from 93 Whiting Street, they do not support an additional finding that he lived at 93 Whiting Street so that he and Richard were members of the same household, and that finding has been attacked.
Several paragraphs of the defendant’s draft finding recited facts relevant to Granville’s maintenance of his own separate apartment and household on Main Street from which he frequently visited *456his children at 93 Whiting Street. The court refused to find these facts and this refusal has been assigned as error. This court may correct a finding which fails to include admitted or undisputed facts, having due regard to the principle that the trier of fact is the judge of the credibility of witnesses. Salvatore v. Milicki, 163 Conn. 275, 277, 303 A.2d 734; Solari v. Seperak, 154 Conn. 179, 182, 224 A.2d 529; Practice Book § 627. We may also consult the court’s memorandum of decision to understand better the basis of its decision and to interpret its finding. Bridgeport Pipe Engineering Co. v. DeMatteo Construction Co., 159 Conn. 242, 247, 268 A.2d 391; Craig v. Dunleavy, 154 Conn. 100, 221 A.2d 855. In examining the court’s memorandum of decision in connection with its refusal to find paragraphs of the draft finding which recite relevant facts taken directly from that memorandum, we find a strange inconsistency. For example, the memorandum of decision states: “The father voted from Main Street and registered his automobile at that address.” Nevertheless, the court refused to find as requested by the defendant that “[t]he Plaintiff Granville Griffith’s automobile registration listed his home address as Main Street” and refused to find that “[t]he Plaintiff Granville Griffith’s residence as a voter was Main Street.” Similarly, relevant to the question of whether Granville and Richard were residents of the same household, the court noted in its memorandum of decision that “on the date of their son’s injury the wife lived with the plaintiff-minor and four other children at the . . . [Whiting] Street address and the father at the Main Street address,” yet it refused to find that “[t]he Plaintiff Richard Griffith lived at Whiting Street.” Furthermore, not only did the *457plaintiffs not dispute the facts stated in the defendant’s draft findings in question but in their testimony they admitted them, as disclosed by the evidence printed in the appendix to the defendant’s brief. The plaintiff Granville testified that although he would “visit” the household of his children and former wife three or four times a week, he kept all of his personal belongings, including his television and radio sets, at Main Street. He also testified that he kept his personal and financial business records there, received most of his mail there and used that address on the registration of his car, for voting purposes and for paying income tax, and claimed that “Main Street is where he lived.” The plaintiff Richard testified that he was living with his mother at 93 Whiting Street and his father lived at 450 Main Street. The plaintiff Violet Griffith testified that when her former husband came to Whiting Street “he was visiting his family.” The plaintiffs’ brief had no appendix containing evidence. “ ‘It is the duty of both parties to print all material evidence in the appendices to their briefs.’ Pass v. Pass, 152 Conn. 508, 511, 208 A.2d 753; Cushing v. Salmon, 148 Conn. 631, 632, 173 A.2d 543; State v. Pundy, 147 Conn. 7, 9, 156 A.2d 193.” Solari v. Seperak, supra, 183. We find merit to the defendant’s assignment of error in the refusal of the court to find these facts set out in the defendant’s draft finding, all of which were admitted by the plaintiffs in their own testimony. The defendant is entitled to have these facts added to the finding.
The finding, with the addition of those facts to it, clearly does not support the court’s conclusion that the plaintiffs Granville Griffith and Richard Griffith were residents of the same household and, *458since in the absence of that circumstance the plaintiff Richard was not an insured under the provisions of the insurance policy issued to his father, the court erred in concluding that Richard was an insured under the terms of that policy.
Over the years, many courts have been faced with the similar problem of deciding whether on a given state of facts individual persons are members of a particular household and, in each case, the decision has depended upon the particular factual circumstances, involved. These factual circumstances are so varied that the decisions themselves are of little precedential value. For example, the facts in the case most heavily relied upon by the plaintiffs, Mazzilli v. Acc. & Cas. Ins. Co. of Winterthur, 35 N.J. 1, 170 A.2d 800, differ in significant detail from the present case. That case involved a policy issued to a Mr. Selger which was “curiously hybrid in nature.” Id., 6. Of the policy, the New Jersey Supreme Court observed that “the insurer undertook to blend into one instrument a general public liability premises policy and a comprehensive personal liability policy.” Ibid. “Premises” were defined as “all premises where the Named Insured or his spouse maintains a residence.” Ibid. The insured premises consisted of a single 2.46-acre tract owned by Mr. Selger on which were located both a house and a bungalow situated 150 feet apart. No physical barrier interfered with free movement about the tract. Id., 3. Mr. and Mrs. Selger were married. She lived in the bungalow with their son and he lived in the house, and, pursuant to a pendente lite court order issued in a separate maintenance action, he provided the bungalow for his wife and son. There was no custody order entered regarding the son. Id., 4. The plaintiff secured a verdict against *459Mrs. Selger because of her negligence in leaving a gun accessible to the Selgers’ minor son who wounded the plaintiff. The court concluded; id., 19; that the trial court had reasonably found Mrs. Selger to be a resident of her husband’s household within the scope of the defendant’s contract of insurance, noting that “of primary significance was his feeling that ‘this (meaning the premises) was all one place where the entire family was living’ and being maintained by him.” Id., 15. Obvious differences in the fact pattern of that case and the case before us include the facts that in our case the couple were not husband and wife but had been divorced and living apart for four years, by court order custody of the son Richard had been awarded to the former wife, and the son Richard lived with her at her residence which was on a different street and one-half mile away from where his father lived in his own apartment. Unlike Mr. Selger in the New Jersey case, Granville, although he paid support for his children, did not provide the home on Whiting Street for them where they lived with their mother. Such differing fact patterns as these render cases from other jurisdictions of little value as precedents.
There is error and the case is remanded with direction to render judgment denying the plaintiffs’ application for an order directing the defendant to proceed with arbitration.
In this opinion Shapiro, Loiselle and MacDonald, Js., concurred.