Court Opinion

ID: 9758572
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 23:36:33.293926+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:53.134596
License: Public Domain

HOFFMAN, Judge
dissenting:
I- dissent for two reasons: first, the instant case is not properly before us; and second, I disagree with the Majority’s analysis of the merits of appellant’s Rule 1100 claim. Rule 1100, Pa.R.Crim.P., 19 P.S. Appendix.
As noted by the Court, appellant was charged by a criminal complaint which was issued on January 23, 1975. When the court called appellant’s case to trial on July 25, appellant elected to plead guilty to charges of assault,1 and indecent assault.2 The court imposed sentences of 129 days to 23 months on the charge of indecent assault and one years’ probation on the assault charge. This appeal followed.
Appellant took the instant appeal without first petitioning to withdraw his guilty plea. We recently noted in Common*85wealth v. McCusker, 245 Pa.Super. 402, 403, 369 A.2d 465, 466 (1976), “[i]n Commonwealth v. Roberts, [237 Pa.Super. 336, 352 A.2d 140 (1975)], this Court mandated strict compliance with the requirement that the appellant file a petition to withdraw. For appeals filed prior to the filing date of Roberts, December 1, 1975, this Court has generally remanded cases involving challenges to guilty pleas to permit appellants an opportunity to file a petition to withdraw.” Because the instant appeal was filed before our decision in Roberts, I believe that the proper procedure is to remand the case to the lower court.
I dissent for a second reason: the Majority holds that appellant’s plea was voluntary because his Rule 1100 claim has no arguable merit. The Court is able to conclude that appellant was tried expeditiously because . . the record amply demonstrates that the appellant was at large from January 23 until February 14, and was therefore unavailable for trial under Rule 1100(d)(1) for a period of twenty-two days.” (At 84). I agree that were appellant “unavailable” between the issuance of the complaint and his arrest, that delay is automatically excluded from the relevant period. Rule 1100(d)(1); Commonwealth v. Flores, 247 Pa.Super. 140, 371 A.2d 1366 (1977). Before time can be excluded, however, the Commonwealth must show that it exercised due diligence in attempting to effectuate the defendant’s arrest. See Comment to Rule 1100: “For purposes of subparagraph (d)(1), . . . the defendant should be deemed unavailable for any period of time during which he could not be apprehended because his whereabouts were unknown and could not be determined by due diligence, . . . ” See also, Commonwealth v. Flores, supra. To permit exclusion of that time without a showing of due diligence would seriously erode the purposes of the rule. Although the record does indicate delay between the complaint and the arrest, there is no evidence that the Commonwealth exercised due diligence in attempting to locate appellant. Thus, without amplification of the record, we cannot *86summarily dismiss appellant’s contention. Cf. Commonwealth v. Twiggs, 460 Pa. 105, 331 A.2d 440 (1975).
Therefore, I dissent and would remand the instant case.
CERCONE and SPAETH, JJ., join in this dissenting opinion.

. The Crimes Code, Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334, § 1; 18 Pa.C.S. § 2701.

. The Crimes Code, supra; 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126.