Court Opinion

ID: 9926990
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-25 22:35:04.574415+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:30.533525
License: Public Domain

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
                           SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                                    FILED
                                                                                January 25, 2024
State of West Virginia,                                                           C. CASEY FORBES, CLERK
Plaintiff Below, Respondent                                                     SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                                     OF WEST VIRGINIA

vs.) No. 22-646 (Wood County 21-F-268)

Nicholas Kane Montgomery,
Defendant Below, Petitioner

                              MEMORANDUM DECISION

         Petitioner Nicholas Kane Montgomery appeals the Circuit Court of Wood County’s July
7, 2022, order sentencing him to not less than two nor more than ten years of incarceration for
soliciting a minor via computer and ordering that he be placed on extended supervision for twenty
years, and he here challenges that sentence.1 Upon our review, finding no substantial question of
law and no prejudicial error, we determine that oral argument is unnecessary and that a
memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s order is appropriate. See W. Va. R. App. P.
21(c).

         Petitioner was indicted in September 2021 on one count each of third-degree sexual assault,
use of obscene matter with intent to seduce a minor, and soliciting a minor via computer. At the
time he was alleged to have committed these crimes, petitioner was eighteen years old. His victim,
A.S., was thirteen. In January 2022, petitioner and the State entered into a plea agreement. Pursuant
to that agreement, petitioner pled guilty to soliciting a minor via computer, and the State agreed to
dismiss the remaining charges. The circuit court accepted petitioner’s plea, and he underwent a
sex offender risk assessment in aid of sentencing, which was left to the court’s discretion under
the terms of the plea agreement.

        The examiner who performed the sex offender risk assessment concluded that petitioner
“presents as a Low Risk regarding the probability of sex offender reoffending.” The examiner also
reported that it was his “understanding that with the exception of the instant offense, [petitioner]
has not engaged in prior attempts to groom minors with the intent of sexual involvement.”

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         Petitioner appears by counsel Reggie R. Bailey, and the State appears by Attorney
General Patrick Morrisey and Assistant Attorney General Lara K. Bissett. Initials are used where
necessary to protect the identities of those involved in this case. See W. Va. R. App. P. 40(e).

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        Petitioner appeared for sentencing on March 21, 2022, and argued for probation. During
allocution, petitioner referenced a second victim, apologizing for “meeting with two minors that
would be ages [thirteen] and [fourteen], and . . . for engaging in sexual activity with [A.S., the
victim of the crime to which he pled guilty,] and sending pictures to her and [another minor].”2

         The court sentenced petitioner to a twenty-year term of extended supervision; however, the
court “defer[red] further sentencing” and ordered that petitioner undergo an additional evaluation
due to the court’s concern that petitioner was not “fully honest with the evaluator regarding the
other child that has been mentioned.” The report following that second evaluation again made no
reference to petitioner’s other victim. Instead, the evaluator noted that because the “current charge
is [petitioner’s] first sexual offense as well as criminal offense[,] . . . no victim pattern or pattern
of problematic sexual behavior and poor decision making is known.” The evaluator stated further
that petitioner “does not exhibit predatory behavior” and determined that petitioner presented
“minimal risk of returning to criminal behavior.”

       The parties appeared for continued sentencing on June 16, 2022, and petitioner again
argued for probation. The court recounted that

       [w]e have a case where we have not just soliciting by the computer, but a period of
       grooming and predatory activity. And as mentioned by the Prosecutor, there was a
       second young lady involved, and that was covered at the last hearing. We do have
       actual sexual activity, including oral sex and digital penetration. So this is a very
       extremely serious case happening to a junior high student by an eighteen-year-old
       at the time. And he indicated that he well knew that she was a junior high student
       and understood her age.

Because “this is a very serious crime and we do have the victim impact statement as to how it has
affected the victim in this case,” the court saw “no choice” but to deny petitioner’s motion for
probation and to sentence him to not less than two nor more than ten years of incarceration. In its
July 7, 2022, sentencing order from which petitioner appeals, the court memorialized petitioner’s
sentence and its denial of petitioner’s request for probation, finding that “the character of the
[petitioner] and the circumstances of the case indicate that he is likely to again commit crime and
that the public good does require that he be imprisoned.”

       On appeal, petitioner raises three assignments of error. First, relying on State v. Arbaugh,
215 W. Va. 132, 595 S.E.2d 289 (2004), where this Court found error in the circuit court’s denial
of probation given the defendant’s “tender age and [own] extreme victimization,” id. at 137, 595
S.E.2d at 294, petitioner argues that his own young age and traumatic upbringing, along with his
lack of prior criminal history, “limited intellectual ability,” and low re-offense risk, warranted
probation or other alternative sentence. Petitioner also argues that the court’s reference to his
“predatory” behavior was erroneous in light of the evaluations that concluded otherwise. For these
same reasons, petitioner argues in his second assignment of error that the court erred in not

       2
         According to the State, the other minor “did not want . . . to be part of an investigation.”
Petitioner’s counsel also referenced the other minor, representing that petitioner had expressed
remorse for his conduct related to both minors.

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sentencing him as a youthful offender. In his third assignment of error, petitioner argues that his
twenty-year period of supervised release violates double jeopardy principles and is
disproportionate.

        This Court “reviews sentencing orders . . . under a deferential abuse of discretion standard,
unless the order violates statutory or constitutional commands.” Syl. Pt. 2, in part, State v.
Georgius, 225 W. Va. 716, 696 S.E.2d 18 (2010) (quoting Syl. Pt. 1, in part, State v. Lucas, 201
W. Va. 271, 496 S.E.2d 221 (1997)). The discretion afforded to courts at sentencing includes
deciding whether to impose probation: “[T]he decision as to whether the imposition of probation
is appropriate in a certain case is entirely within the circuit court’s discretion.” State v. Shaw, 208
W. Va. 426, 430, 541 S.E.2d 21, 24 (2000) (quoting State v. Duke, 200 W. Va. 356, 364, 489
S.E.2d 738, 746 (1997)). And it includes deciding whether to sentence a defendant as a youthful
offender: “Just as a trial court’s decision to grant or deny probation is subject to the discretion of
the sentencing tribunal, so too is the decision whether to sentence an individual pursuant to the
Youthful Offender’s Act.”3 Id. at 430, 541 S.E.2d at 25; see also State v. Richard D., No. 13-1249,
2015 WL 7628835, *3 (W. Va. Nov. 23, 2015)(memorandum decision) (finding no abuse of
discretion in the circuit court’s denial of alternative sentencing). Nothing in Arbaugh alters this
discretion, mandates the imposition of an alternative sentence in any case, or otherwise evidences
an abuse of the court’s discretion in this case. See Georgius, 225 W. Va. at 721, 696 S.E.2d at 23
(“This Court’s decision in Arbaugh did not create any new standards, guidelines, or requirements
to be followed by the circuit courts of this State[; rather,] Arbaugh was a per curiam decision
decided by this Court upon application of existing precedent and was confined to the very specific
facts of that case.”). Instead, the record in this case reflects the court’s reasoned explanation for its
denial of an alternative sentence, with particular focus given to the effects of petitioner’s crime on
his victim, and the court’s discounting of the conclusions reached by the evaluators was reasonable
as those evaluators lacked information pertinent to the conclusions they were formulating.
Accordingly, petitioner has demonstrated no abuse of the court’s discretion in denying him an
alternative sentence, as alleged in his first two assignments of error, and we find no abuse of the
court’s discretion.

       Petitioner’s third assignment of error also lacks merit. We easily dispense with petitioner’s
claim that the imposition of a term of supervised release violates double jeopardy principles,
having previously held that

                [t]he imposition of the legislatively mandated additional punishment of a
        period of supervised release as an inherent part of the sentencing scheme for certain
        offenses enumerated in West Virginia Code § 62-12-26 (2009) does not on its face
        violate the double jeopardy provisions contained in either the United States
        Constitution or the West Virginia Constitution.

Syl. Pt. 11, State v. James, 227 W. Va. 407, 710 S.E.2d 98 (2011). Further, this Court’s review of
a challenge to the proportionality of a sentence, including a term of supervised release, is reserved
for life recidivist sentences or sentences for crimes involving no statutory maximum. Syl. Pt. 4,
Wanstreet v. Bordenkircher, 166 W. Va. 523, 276 S.E.2d 205 (1981) (“While our constitutional
proportionality standards theoretically can apply to any criminal sentence, they are basically

        3
            Petitioner’s plea agreement likewise explicitly left sentencing to the court’s discretion.
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applicable to those sentences where there is either no fixed maximum set by statute or where there
is a life recidivist sentence.”); Syl. Pt. 3, State v. Tyler, 211 W. Va. 246, 565 S.E.2d 368 (2002)
(“Sentences imposed by the trial court, if within statutory limits and if not based on some
impermissible factor, are not subject to appellate review.”) (quoting Syl. Pt. 4, State v. Goodnight,
169 W. Va. 366, 287 S.E.2d 504 (1982)). Because the extended supervision statute has a fixed
maximum, see West Virginia Code § 62-12-26(a) (requiring imposition of a period of supervised
release of up to fifty years for soliciting a minor via computer), and because we are not here
considering a life recidivist sentence, petitioner’s extended supervision sentence is not reviewable.
See State v. Jeffrey S., No. 15-1222, 2016 WL 6678992, *3 (W. Va. Nov. 14, 2016)(memorandum
decision) (finding that petitioner’s extended supervision sentence was not reviewable as it was
“imposed within the statutory guidelines” and, therefore, not unconstitutionally disproportionate);
State v. Pifer, No. 12-1544, 2013 WL 5708442, *2 (W. Va. Oct. 21, 2013)(memorandum decision)
(finding that the defendant’s twenty-five-year term of extended supervision was “within the
confines of West Virginia Code § 62-12-26 and, therefore, . . . not subject to appellate review”).

       For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

                                                                                          Affirmed.

ISSUED: January 25, 2024

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Justice Tim Armstead
Justice Elizabeth D. Walker
Justice John A. Hutchison
Justice William R. Wooton
Justice C. Haley Bunn

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