Court Opinion

ID: 9863101
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 03:05:38.447213+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:46:56.742157
License: Public Domain

EAGER, Judge
(dissenting).
I find that I am unable to concur in the reasoning or the result of the foregoing majority opinion. Actually, there is little or no controversy about the principles involved in the construction of a will and they have been repeated so often that it is hardly necessary to set them out here. The difficulty arises in applying those principles to a concrete situation.
It seems wholly ineffective to me to say that the testatrix here must be presumed to have intended to dispose of all her property; naturally, the ordinary person who *727prepares and executes a will intends to do so. The real question is — did she do it or not? And the mere reconstruction of a supposed intent will not supply a complete omission in the dispositive provisions of a will.
In my opinion there is in this will a complete absence of any provision disposing of the principal of the residue, either to the beneficiaries named in subparagraph (c) of Article Fifth or in subparagraph (f), — except, of course, for the conditional disposition provided for in subparagraph (f) to the University and the Church. In other words, there is a complete absence of such disposition in case any of the individuals named in subparagraph (c) survived the ten-year period following the death of the husband of testatrix. This, I feel, results in an inescapable intestacy as to the entire residue of the estate. The result may be unfortunate, but we are not empowered to rewrite the will. Under Section 468.150, RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S. (now § 474.320) every will is required to be in writing and duly authenticated, except nuncupative wills (§§ 468.160, 468.170, Id., now § 474.340). The judicial function of construing the will a testator makes does not authorize a court to make a new will or an equitable distribution of the estate. If upon an examination of the will it is found unambiguous and a term used therein is clearly expressed and has a well defined meaning, exposing testator’s intent, there is no occasion for resort to the canons of construction or extrinsic evidence that might have some bearing upon an unexpressed intention of the testator. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Kelley, 355 Mo. 924, 199 S.W.2d 344, 349 [2] ; American Red Cross v. Hannibal Nat. Bk., 360 Mo. 297, 228 S.W.2d 679, 682[3]; Thomas v. Higginbotham, Mo., 318 S.W.2d 234[2, 3], and cases infra. “ ‘However clearly an intention not expressed in the will may be proved by extrinsic evidence, the rule of law requiring wills to be in writing stands as an insuperable barrier against carrying the intention thus proved into execution.’ ” Lang v. Estorge, Mo., 242 S.W.2d 50, 53 [1, 2], and cases cited. Approved in Gehring v. Henry, Mo., 332 S.W.2d 873, 878[12, 13]; In re Fowler’s Estate, Mo., 338 S.W.2d 44, 48[2],
The clause in ¶[ (f) of Article Fifth, reading, so far as involved: “except that if all of the individual beneficiaries above named [referring to ¶[ (c) ] * * * shall die within the ten (10) year period [referring toff (d)] * * *, the trust shall cease and terminate and my trustees shall pay over the property” to respondents, is in professional language, is unambiguous and clearly creates an interest subject to a condition precedent. This is true whether the bequest to respondents be treated as a contingent remainder or a contingent execu-tory bequest. The quoted provision conveys and creates an interest in the property to respondents only upon the happening of the event, dubious under the facts involved, of all four individual beneficiaries being dead at the termination of the ten-year period. The property does not vest in respondents if one or more of said beneficiaries be then living. See, among others, Norman v. Horton, 344 Mo. 290, 126 S.W.2d 187, 191 [8, 9], 125 A.L.R. 531; Sullivan v. Garesche, 229 Mo. 496, 129 S.W. 949, 951, 952, 49 L.R.A., N.S., 605; Lewis v. Lewis, 345 Mo. 816, 136 S.W.2d 66, 71 [7, 8]; 33 Am.Jur., Life Estates, etc., § 68; 31 C.J.S. Estates § 71.
Testatrix is presumed to have known the law and the legal effect of the language she used. Thomas v. Higginbotham, Mo., 318 S.W.2d 234, 237[3], If she made mistakes, we cannot rewrite her will. Gehring v. Henry, Mo., 332 S.W.2d 873, 878.
The presumption against intestacy often relied upon has definite exceptions and it “cannot control directions plainly to the contrary, or enlarge dispositions beyond their clear meaning.” Watson v. Watson, 110 Mo. 164, 171, 19 S.W. 543, 545. It is stated in Wills, 57 Am.Jur. § 1159, that it “will not prevail where the language of the *728will, fairly construed, * * * is insufficient to carry the whole estate.” See 95 C.J.S. Wills § 615, p. 840.
If we were to speculate upon the intent of the testatrix, we might suggest that it would seem wholly unreasonable for her to have cut off absolutely at the end of ten years the four chosen representatives of all her relatives, especially when three of them are said to have then been well along in years. It would be much more reasonable to assume, and speculate, that she intended to continue the income to those of the four who survived the ten years until all had died, with the principal then to go to the University and the Church. This sort of speculation merely shows, however, that something vital was omitted from the will, that we cannot be sure what it was, and that the courts cannot supply the defect.
The reference in the principal opinion to “two residuary beneficiaries” appears in paragraph numbered 3 of subparagraph (f), following the provision for the conditional payment of principal to the University and the Church in case all the individual beneficiaries named in (c) have died within the ten-year period. Consequently, it adds nothing to the other provisions of the will. It also seems that the use of specific words providing that the University and the Church should receive the principal “if all of the individual beneficiaries above named shall predecease me or shall die within the ten (10) year period,” would by normal rules of construction exclude the transfer of the principal to them if all of the individual beneficiaries did not so die. Otherwise, the words would be meaningless. But they are there, and we cannot ignore them. The fact remains that the will thus provided in express terms that the principal should go to the University and the Church if the individual beneficiaries all died within ten years and that meaning cannot be changed by transposition of words and phrases.
In conclusion, we note again as generally applicable, the cases of Lang v. Estorge, Mo., 242 S.W.2d 50, and Crowson v. Crowson, 323 Mo. 633, 19 S.W.2d 634, but it would be more or less pointless to discuss-cases in detail in this dissent. It is my view that this will did not contain a mere ambiguity, but that there was a complete omission of any provision disposing of the principal of the residue under the existing facts, and that in supplying this omission we-are rewriting the will; and that such is not our function, however desirable the result may be.
Under the circumstances, it would be fruitless to discuss the other points raised by certain appellants, for the point decided in the majority opinion makes these wholly immaterial. We do note, however, that the-views expressed in this opinion would also obviate any ruling that the beneficiaries, named in subparagraph (c) of Article Fifth; should receive the principal of the residue as an “equitable defeasible fee,” for there appears to be no conveyance of the principal to them either equitable or otherwise-In this opinion we have incorporated certain; excerpts from the opinion written by Commissioner Bohling in Divison Two, without quotations. For these reasons I respectfully dissent.