Court Opinion

ID: 9807439
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 20:04:35.17461+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:37:13.266242
License: Public Domain

Hoke, L,
dissenting: I differ from the court in its de-*564cisión of this case and am of opinion that the defendant has not had his canse tried in accordance with law.
The defendant in apt time and in proper manner requested the court below to put its instructions to the jury in writing,' and where this is done the statute provides that the judge shall put his instructions in writing and read them to the jury as written, and sign and file the same as a part of the record in the cause. Code, sec. 414.
The facts which transpired on the trial in respect to this requesfiof the defendant are embodied in the case on appeal as follows: The judge at first put his charge in writing and read it to the jury, and the written charge seems to be free from error. The case on appeal then proceeds as follows: “After the conclusion of the charge and after the jury had been out some time, they returned into court and one of them stated they could not agree. The court stated he could be of no aid as to the facts; that they were the sole triers of the facts; if it was upon a point of law he would be glad to aid them, but upon the facts- they must decide, and further stated it was the duty of a jury to reconcile the testimony where there was a conflict, and if they could not reconcile the testimony then it became their duty to adopt the most plausible theory of the evidence in-arriving at a verdict. The jury then retired and counsel for the defendant called the attention of the court to what defendant claimed was an error in leaving out the question of reasonable doubt and fraudulent intent. The court immediately called the jury back and restated to them what he had just told them, and further stated that the State must satisfy them beyond a reasonable doubt of the fraudulent intent at the time of appropriating the funds, if you find he did appropriate the funds. The court then read the second time his charge and the special instructions of defendant.”- Defendant excepted.
Here the judge laid down orally an erroneous proposition *565as to bow the jury should weigh the evidence and reach a conclusion.
The jury having again retired and the error being called to his attention, His Honor recalled the jury and restated the erroneous proposition and then added: “The State must satisfy the jury beyond a reasonable doubt of the fraudulent intent at the time of appropriating the funds, if you find he did appropriate them.” The judge below then again read his written charge to the jury. This erroneous proposition was nowhere in terms withdrawn from the jury. We have it then that the judge twice told the jury orally that it was their duty to reconcile the evidence if they could, and if they could not, it was their duty to adopt the most plausible theory of the evidence in arriving at a verdict. In other wTords, to convict the defendant, if that was the most plausible conclusion. And twice he tells them that the State must satisfy them beyond a reasonable doubt; once in the, written charge, and once orally. To which direction did the jury give the most heed and what rule has guided them to the conclusion which they reached ? In my judgment unless expressly withdrawn this would amount to a reversible error if the entire deliverance of His Honor had been in writing. The counsel for the defendant differ from His Honor as to what he did say in his spoken charge, but this is really of no moment on the question now considered, nor is it important whether the oral part of the charge was erroneous or not. The case declares that instructions embodying legal propositions have been twice spoken to the jury, and nowhere expressly withdrawn, when the law requires that the entire charge shall be put in writing.
North Carolina has been extremely fortunate in having Superior Court judges who are capable, learned and impartial ; birt we know that there have been and may be again, occasions and instances where the due enforcement of this statute was the only guaranty that a citizen had that his prop*566erty, liberty, life and character would be dealt with in accordance with the law of the land. It is to my mind of vital importance in the due administration of justice, and its provisions should be in no wise disregarded or ignored. The proposition here stated will find support in Currie v. Clark, 90 N. C., 355; State v. Young, 111 N. C., 715; Wheatley v. West, 61 Ga., 461; Thompson on Trials, sec. 2375-2377.
In Currie v. Clark, supra, it is said: “Moreover that statutory mandate positively forbids any verbal explanatory comments which may affect or modify the written language and tend to mislead the jury as to its purport or aim. The propositions embodied in the writing must stand in their assumed form, not added to or diminished by any contemporary and extraneous words falling from the lips of the judge. The jury must gather the meaning of the instructions solely from the written words in which they are conveyed, as must the revising court in passing upon their correctness in law.”
In State v. Young, supra, it is held that “at the request of counsel made in apt time, the court must put its entire charge to the jury in writing, and it is error to charge them orally upon any point when they return into court for instructions.”
The only decision which I can find that tends to support a contrary view is State v. Crowell, 116 N. C., 1052, and this is more apparent than real. In Crowell’s case the judge had put his charge in writing and read the same to the jury as the statute requires. The defendant had preferred a prayer for instructions that the case was barred by the statute of limitations. This prayer was refused, the judge saying to the jury that “the statute of limitations has nothing to do with the case.” It was simply a refusal to submit an instruction preferred in writing by which the defendant got the benefit of an exception, and was in no wise given so that it could in any way influence the verdict, which was rendered on the facts submitted for the jury’s consideration. It is answered that this objection is not open to the defendant be*567cause uo exception was taken, but I do not so understand tbe record. Tbe very feature of tbe trial to wbicb tbis objection is urged is set out in tbe case on appeal and exception duly noted.
I am of opinion that tbe statute wbicb should govern cases of tbis kind bas not been complied with, and that tbe defendant is entitled to a new trial.