Court Opinion

ID: 9706343
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:41:10.041025+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:21.759751
License: Public Domain

CLIFFORD, J„
with whom CALKINS, J., joins concurring in part and dissenting in part.
[¶ 13] Because in my view, the Court does not sufficiently address the application of section 224,1 write separately.
[¶ 14] Title 39-A M.R.S.A. § 224 (Supp. 2002) addresses the manner in which partial incapacity benefits and the inflation adjustment provided for in 39 M.R.S.A. §§ 55 and 55-A (Pamph.1986) repealed and replaced by P.L.1991, ch. 885, §§ A-7, A-8 (codified at 39-A M.R.S.A. § 213 (2001 & Supp.2002)) are calculated. Assuming the Court is correct in its conclusion that the manner of calculating Grubb’s partial incapacity benefits cannot be changed in the absence of a circumstance justifying the hearing officer addressing that calculation, in my view, the provisions of section 224 can and should be applied on the anniversary date when a calculation is called for to determine if there is an entitlement to benefits, and to adjust any benefit for inflation, without any res judicata or separation of powers implications.
[¶ 15] Former 39 M.R.S.A. § 55-A provides, in pertinent part:
While the incapacity for work resulting from the injury is partial, the employer shall pay the injured employee a weekly compensation equal to 2/3 the difference, due to the injury, between his average gross weekly wages, earnings or salary before the injury and the weekly wages, earnings or salary which he is able to earn after the injury .... This weekly compensation shall be adjusted annually so that it continues to bear the same percentage relationship to *122the state average weekly wage, as computed by the Maine Unemployment Insurance Commission, as it did at the time of the injury, but in no case may the annual adjustment exceed the lesser of 5% or the actual percentage increase in the state average weekly wage for the previous year. The annual adjustment required by this section shall be made on the anniversary date of the injury
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39 M.R.S.A. § 55-A (Pamph.1986) (emphasis added), repealed and replaced by P.L. 1987, ch. 559, Pt. B, §§ 29, 30 (codified at 39 M.R.S.A. § 55-B (1989)), repealed and replaced by P.L.1991, ch. 885, §§ A-7, A-8 (codified at 39-A M.R.S.A. § 213 (2001 & Supp.2002)).
[¶ 16] Our decision in Bernard v. Mead Publishing Paper Division, 2001 ME 15, ¶ 16, 765 A.2d 576, 579, construed section 55-A, and concluded that in calculating benefits to which an employee is entitled, the hearing officer must first compare pre-injury wages, unadjusted for inflation, to post-injury wages, and then apply the inflation adjustment to the difference between the two. Id.
[¶ 17] Section 224 was enacted in reaction to our decision in Bernard, and it addresses the way that the partial incapacity benefit and the inflation adjustment are calculated. The statute provides that to determine the benefit, the inflation adjustment must be applied to an employee’s pre-injury wage before the comparison of pre-injury and post-injury wages.
[¶ 18] The Legislature made very clear that section 224 is to be given “the broadest possible application.” Bernier v. Data Gen. Corp., 2002 ME 2, ¶ 17, 787 A.2d 144, 150. Its enacting provision states that “[t]his Act applies retroactively to benefit calculations made under the Maine Revised Statutes, former title 39, sections 55 and 55-A at any time after January 1, 1972, and applies notwithstanding any adverse order or decree." P.L.2001, ch. 390, § 2 (emphasis added).
[¶ 19] The Workers’ Compensation Act is uniquely statutory. American Mut. Ins. Cos. v. Murray, 420 A.2d 251, 252 (Me.1980). Retroactive application of workers’ compensation provisions does not violate due process if the statutory provisions are enacted to further a legitimate legislative purpose. Tompkins v. Wade & Searway Const. Corp., 612 A.2d 874, 877-78 (Me.1992).
[¶ 20] Section 224 reflects a legislative policy that addresses the manner in which partial incapacity benefits, including the inflation adjustment provided for in former section 55-A, are calculated. The Court acknowledges that the Legislature does have the authority to change prospectively “the manner in which benefits are calculated.” Section 55-A requires that the “weekly compensation be adjusted annually.” See also Marchand v. E. Welding Co., 641 A.2d 190, 192 (Me.1994) (discussing application of annual inflation adjustment); Bernard v. Cives Corp., 395 A.2d 1141, 1149-1151 (Me.1978) (same). The Legislature clearly intended section 224 to apply retroactively. I agree with the Court that, despite the legislative directive that the statute should be applied retroactively, there was no circumstance justifying the immediate application of section 224 in this case. In my view, however, the new provisions of section 224 should be applied to Grubb’s benefit, previously calculated to be zero, upon the occasion of the date called for by the statute for an annual adjustment of Grubb’s weekly compensation. The requirement in former section 55-A that a new calculation be made on an annual basis clearly allows, indeed requires, section 224 and the new method of calculation to be applied from the date of the annual adjustment forward, and I *123would vacate the decision of the hearing officer and remand for that to occur.