Court Opinion

ID: 9956249
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-01 17:01:05.800618+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:05.761579
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        APR 1 2024
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

WALTER STEVE SCOTT,                             No.    21-56089

                Petitioner-Appellant,           D.C. No.
                                                2:15-cv-06125-DSF-LAL
 v.

MARTIN BITER, Warden,                           MEMORANDUM*

                Respondent-Appellee.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Central District of California
                    Dale S. Fischer, District Judge, Presiding

                     Argued and Submitted February 15, 2024
                              Pasadena, California

Before: BOGGS,** NGUYEN, and LEE, Circuit Judges.

      Walter Scott appeals the denial of his habeas petition. We review a district

court’s denial of a habeas petition de novo. Musladin v. Lamarque, 555 F.3d 830,

835 (9th Cir. 2009). Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

(“AEDPA”), we may reverse only if the last reasoned state court’s decision was

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
            The Honorable Danny J. Boggs, United States Circuit Judge for the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
“contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court” or based on an “unreasonable

determination of the facts.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). We have jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253, and we affirm.

      During jury deliberations in Scott’s trial in 1991, the jury sent a note to the

trial court asking whether they could still discuss the case and change the verdict

form after the foreperson had signed it. There is no record of whether the court

addressed the question at all, or whether Scott’s counsel was consulted or present.

Scott argues that automatic reversal is required under U.S. v. Cronic, which held

that a structural error occurs when a defendant is denied counsel at a “critical

stage.” 466 U.S. 648, 658-59 (1984).

      As we noted in Musladin, “the Supreme Court has not provided a definitive

list of Cronic ‘critical stages[,]’” and no case supports Scott’s argument that a jury

question about the verdict form constitutes a “critical stage.” 555 F.3d at 839.

Under AEDPA review, we conclude that the state court’s decision not to apply

Cronic’s automatic reversal rule here was not objectively unreasonable. We may

therefore grant Scott’s habeas petition only if the denial of counsel was prejudicial.

See Musladin, 555 F.3d at 834 (stating that we must ask whether the denial of

counsel had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the

jury’s verdict”) (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993)).

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       Scott argues that he was prejudiced, despite the trial court’s individual

polling of the jurors to confirm their verdicts, because the jury may have been

confused about whether they were “locked” into the verdict once the foreperson

signed the verdict form. We disagree. Both immediately before the jury retired to

deliberate, and before the trial court read the verdict, the court instructed the jury

that they would be polled on their individual verdicts and must state truthfully

whether the verdict accurately expressed their vote. Specifically, before reading

the verdict, the trial court told the jury to “listen carefully” to the verdicts, and “[i]f

any count is not your individual verdict, please make a note of it. Because at the

conclusion of reading all the verdicts, we will poll you and ask each of you if this

is your verdict.” The court then told the jury to alert the court “if any particular

count is not your verdict or does not reflect what your vote was in the jury room.”

(emphasis added). When the trial court individually polled the jury, each juror

affirmed that the verdict against Scott accurately reflected his or her vote. No juror

expressed any disagreement, signaled any confusion, or asked any questions. On

this record, we find that the state court reasonably determined that Scott did not

suffer any prejudice.

       AFFIRMED.

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