Court Opinion

ID: 9472002
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:46:33.532947+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:41.440604
License: Public Domain

STARR, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. In my view, the critical threshold issue resolved by the majority is whether the communication in question here was in fact unsolicited. Based upon the record evidence, the District Court concluded that the Congressional Reference Service (“CRS”), through Mr. Lindahl, had expressly indicated an interest in the Webster-Heise device and that the transmittal of the allegedly defamatory memorandum was part of the response of Sun Oil’s Washington representative to this *8expression of interest. In view of this specific factual finding, which is amply supported in the record, it is unwarranted to conclude that the memorandum was “unsolicited” simply because there was no specific request for it.
The importance of this factual determination by the District Court is fundamental. CRS was, in effect, carrying on a fact-gathering inquiry within the scope of its broad and varied duties under 2 U.S.C. § 166(d). Given the sweep of CRS’ duties and the vital importance to the legislative process of CRS’ gathering of information, I would conclude that the allegedly defamatory material was in fact submitted to CRS in the course of CRS’ legitimate and appropriate activities or “proceedings.” Where, as here, the material was supplied to CRS in response to an indication of its interest in the device, I would conclude, as did the District Court, that the communication enjoys the absolute privilege conferred by the common law. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 590A. Indeed, the majority admits that section 588 comment e of the Restatement, which addresses communications preliminary to a proceeding, applies only if the communication were unsolicited. Since in my view the communication was solicited, I see no need for a remand to conduct a subjective intent inquiry based upon the “contemplated in good faith” language of comment e.1
This position, grounded upon the specific factual determinations by the District Court, faithfully serves the policies which inform the Restatement’s balancing of individual interests in being able to redress defamatory statements and the interests of legislatures in the full and free flow of information. In deference to the needs of the National Legislature, as evidenced by Congress’ establishing CRS and conferring upon it a.broad mandate to gather information, I would not cabin the Restatement’s privilege under the circumstances of this case. To do otherwise regrettably intrudes the judicial process into the vital task of Congress’ obtaining information through the eyes and ears of CRS. Information and ideas are, of course, the very stuff of which legislation is born. We should, therefore, be quick to show deference under these circumstances to the needs of the coordinate branch of government most directly accountable to the people. I would, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the District Court.2

. Moreover, even if I were to view the communication as unsolicited, I would still doubt the appropriateness of applying a subjective intent test derived from a comment which by its terms applies only to communications preliminary to a proceeding. In this case, CRS was actually engaged in an official proceeding, pursuant to its power to make inquiries on behalf of Congress. With respect to communications in an extant proceeding, § 590A requires only that a communication have some relationship to a proceeding, regardless of the communicator's intent. That requirement is fully satisfied here.

. In view of the foregoing analysis, I do not reach the Speech and Debate Clause issue raised by the appellee.