Court Opinion

ID: 9760898
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:22:01.869782+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:18.370024
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
dissenting.
A jury convicted appellant of three separate offenses of burglary of a habitation and assessed punishment at 50 years’ imprisonment for each. The Court of Appeals originally reversed and ordered acquittals in all three cases, but issued another opinion pursuant to Tex.R.App.Pro. 101 affirming one of the convictions after the State filed petitions for discretionary review of the original opinion. Christopher v. State, 779 S.W.2d 459 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1989). We granted appellant’s petition for discretionary review of the second opinion on grounds one and three to decide in the case affirmed whether the evidence was sufficient and whether evidence of an aggravated robbery was admissible. I would reverse and order an acquittal.
About 9:30 a.m. on April 22, 1988, police received a report of three suspicious men driving a white Toyota. A check of the license plate number given by the caller indicated that the car had been taken in an aggravated robbery four-and-a-half to five hours earlier. When officers found the car about 10 a.m. they ordered appellant, who was driving, to stop. After initially complying, appellant attempted “to go into reverse” * as the officers approached, but the car stalled. There were two other men and several items of property in the car. One passenger held “a T.V. set” in his lap, while the other held “a microwave oven.” There were also “a typewriter, another T.V. set,” and a “jewelry case type box” in the car. The car’s occupants were immediately arrested at gunpoint, made to lie face *531down on the ground, handcuffed, and given Miranda warnings. Appellant gave a false name when asked to identify himself. None of the men was asked about the property in the car, nor did they volunteer any explanation of their possession of it. Police took the men and “the property” to the Southeast patrol division, where the property was turned over to Investigator Bird.
The complainant, Martin, testified that when he returned home from work about 6:15 p.m. on Friday, April 22, 1988, he discovered someone had broken into his house and taken “a 13-inch color T.V., a remote control to [his] ceiling fan, a portable electric typewriter, and an old trumpet that was in a trumpet case.” On the following Monday he received a message at work that “a Detective Bird had called” and the police had “recovered [his] stuff.” He arranged to pick it up the next day, and agreed that he did “go down and identify and pick it up.”
Appellant testified, admitting he had been to the penitentiary twice before for burglary, and was currently on parole. He said he had met a casual acquaintance at a car wash about 8 a.m. on April 22, drank some beer with him, and then borrowed the guy’s car. At the time he took the car all of the property was in it, but he did not ask where it came from, and did not know it was stolen. He later picked up his two passengers shortly before being stopped. Appellant did not deny that he “was in possession of stolen property,” but denied knowledge that it was stolen or any involvement in or knowledge of any of the three burglaries for which he was on trial.
Appellant argued on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions because the property found in his possession was not shown to be the same property taken in the burglaries. The Court of Appeals agreed on original submission that the State was required to prove that the property found in appellant’s possession was the identical property taken from the burgled places, citing Vasquez v. State, 694 S.W.2d 56, 60 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1985, pet. ref’d), and Nichols v. State, 479 S.W.2d 277 (Tex.Cr.App.1972). The Court held that since there was no evidence that the property taken was the property found in appellant’s possession, the evidence was insufficient in all three cases. In the Rule 101 opinion a majority of the Court of Appeals held that the testimony was sufficient to show that some of the property found in appellant’s possession belonged to Martin, because the property possessed by appellant was deposited with Bird, and Martin picked up his stolen property from Bird. One Justice dissented, finding that Martin’s retrieval of his property from Bird did not show that it was the same property taken from appellant and deposited with Bird, and it was impermissible to pile inference upon inference in this circumstantial evidence case.
Appellant argues that the property Martin identified could have come from a source other than the officer who arrested appellant, and the evidence did not show chain of custody between Martin, Detective Bird, and the arresting officer. According to appellant the evidence fails to show that at least one specific article shown to and identified by Martin was one of the same articles taken from appellant when he was arrested, citing Owens v. State, 576 S.W.2d 859 (Tex.Cr.App.1979), Nichols, supra, and Cantu v. State, 655 S.W.2d 278 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1983, no pet.).
It is well established that the State may rely on the inference that a person in possession of property which has been recently stolen in a burglary was criminally responsible for the burglary. See Harris v. State, 656 S.W.2d 481 (Tex.Cr.App.1983). However, where the only proof connecting the accused with the burglary is his possession of that property, the evidence is insufficient if there is no positive identification of the property taken from the house at the time of the burglary. Reyes v. State, 468 S.W.2d 64 (Tex.Cr.App.1971). To hold otherwise would allow conviction upon an inference from an inference, which is too tenuous to constitute proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
In Nichols the evidence showed that a Rayco eight-track tape player and a jar of *532Deep Magic hand lotion were taken from the complainant’s car, and that she later retrieved similar items from the University of Texas police department, identifying the tape player as hers. Nichols was arrested by a University of Texas police officer near the scene of the burglary, carrying an eight-track tape player and jar of Deep Magic hand lotion, but there was no testimony concerning the disposition or custody of the items found in Nichols’ possession. The failure to show the player and lotion taken were the same as those in Nichols’ possession was held to render the evidence insufficient to support a probation revocation.
In Owens the facts showed that sixteen to eighteen rifles and shotguns from a gun collection were taken in a burglary, and footprints led from the burglary scene to a room of a motel where the defendant was seen with some rifles on the night of the burglary. Eight of the rifles were returned to the complainant, but there was no proof of how the rifles were recovered or returned, or that the rifles handled by the defendant were the same or similar to the rifles taken in the burglary. The evidence was held insufficient to uphold appellant’s burglary conviction.
In this cause there was no description of the items stolen or those found in appellant’s possession except a general designation of a “T.V. set” and a “typewriter.” There was no testimony that any of the items deposited with Bird were the same as those retrieved by Martin. The Court of Appeals interpreted Martin’s testimony as showing he retrieved his property from Bird, when he merely stated that he had received a message from Bird that his property had been recovered, and did not say who had actually given him the property the next day. The message from Bird came three days after the property found in appellant’s possession had been given to Bird, and Martin’s property could easily have been recovered from some other source during that period.
Additionally, Martin stated that he discovered the burglary of his house at 6:15 p.m., several hours after appellant’s 10 a.m. arrest, and never indicated when he had last seen his house intact. This leaves the reasonable possibility that the house was burgled after appellant was arrested.
Appellant’s actions at the time of his arrest and his incredible testimony at trial strongly suggest he was guilty of some offense. How 3ver, evidence showed that at the time of his arrest he was driving a vehicle taken in an unrelated robbery, and he was being tried for two other burglaries in addition to the Martin burglary. Therefore, this evidence showing appellant’s guilty state of mind does not indicate his guilt of the particular offense for which he was tried. He is still entitled to be tried for the offense with which he is charged and not for some collateral crime or for being a criminal generally. Maynard v. State, 685 S.W.2d 60 (Tex.Cr.App.1985). Couret v. State, 792 S.W.2d 106 (Tex.Cr.App.1990)
I would hold this evidence insufficient to support the inference that appellant was in possession of property taken in the Martin burglary, and therefore insufficient to support the inference that he was criminally responsible for that burglary. Because the Court does not, I respectfully dissent.

 Quoted phrases pertain to verbatim testimony and constitute the only evidence describing the relevant property or action.