Court Opinion

ID: 9953447
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 06:07:29.351423+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:55:02.401637
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                  revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

RODNEY WHITESIDE,                                                      UNPUBLISHED
                                                                       March 21, 2024
               Plaintiff-Appellant,

v                                                                      No. 363919
                                                                       Oakland Circuit Court
EARLENE M. REINWAND,                                                   LC No. 2021-188388-NI

               Defendant-Appellee.

Before: GADOLA, C.J., and K. F. KELLY and MURRAY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        In this negligence action, plaintiff appeals by right the trial court’s opinion and order
granting defendant’s motion for directed verdict after a jury trial, determining that plaintiff failed
to establish the elements of duty, causation, or breach, all necessary to show that defendant was
negligent. Finding no errors warranting reversal, we affirm.

                       I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

        This case arose after plaintiff Rodney Whiteside fell off a ladder while changing a lightbulb
on defendant Earlene M. Reinwand’s property, who is the aunt of plaintiff’s wife. Plaintiff and
his wife conducted maintenance around defendant’s property on a weekly basis between May 2020
and November 2020 in exchange for compensation. On November 7, 2020, plaintiff and his wife
visited defendant to assist her with the property. In order to change a lightbulb, plaintiff acquired
an aluminum extension ladder from a pole barn; however, because of the older design it lacked
“feet” at the bottom, impacting its stability and safety.

        Evidence presented at trial showed that plaintiff positioned the ladder against the pole barn,
approximately one foot to the left of the lightbulb, which was 14 feet from the ground. Defendant
stood to the left of the ladder, with one hand wrapped around each side to stabilize the bottom.
Plaintiff removed the existing lightbulb without issue; however, when plaintiff attempted to
replace the lightbulb, he had difficulty securing it in the socket, and the ladder subsequently shifted
and fell to the ground. Both plaintiff and defendant were injured. Plaintiff attributed the fall to
defendant walking away and failing to secure the ladder, causing it to shift and become

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imbalanced. Defendant stated that the accident occurred because plaintiff’s unnatural movements
while standing at the top of the ladder caused it to slide and fall.

        After plaintiff’s presentation of proofs, defendant moved for a directed verdict, contending
that: (1) plaintiff maintained the burden of proof, at trial, to establish if or how defendant was at
fault for the ladder shifting, and the occurrence of an incident or injury did not sufficiently
demonstrate duty or fault under the negligence doctrine; and (2) defendant owed plaintiff no duty
to continually hold the ladder because her conduct did not increase the hazard to plaintiff. In
response, plaintiff argued that the only two relevant considerations were duty and breach, and any
detail related to causation was not before the jury per the parties’ stipulated jury instructions and
verdict form. Moreover, defendant failed to fulfill her promise to plaintiff to continuously hold
the ladder, which plaintiff relied on for safety during the fulfillment of his task.

       Ultimately, the trial court granted defendant’s motion for directed verdict, concluding that
(1) defendant owed plaintiff no duty based on the relationship between the parties, the
foreseeability of the harm, and relevant policy considerations; (2) the record established that
defendant voluntarily secured the ladder and there was nothing to indicate defendant’s conduct
exacerbated any risk to plaintiff or that plaintiff relied on defendant to secure the ladder; and (3) a
jury could not reasonably conclude defendant breached any duty when plaintiff neglected to
demonstrate defendant walked away from the ladder or otherwise contributed to the ladder falling.
This appeal followed.

                                  II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

       This Court reviews a trial court’s decision to grant a directed verdict de novo. Aroma
Wines & Equip, Inc v Columbian Distribution Servs, Inc, 303 Mich App 441, 446; 844 NW2d 727
(2013), aff’d 497 Mich 337 (2015). “When evaluating a motion for directed verdict, the court
must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, making all
reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party’s favor.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Any conflict in the evidence is resolved in favor of the nonmoving party to determine whether a
question of fact existed. Cacevic v Simplimatic Engineering Co (On Remand), 248 Mich App 670,
679; 645 NW2d 287 (2001). “A directed verdict is appropriately granted only when no factual
questions exist on which reasonable jurors could differ.” Id. “If reasonable jurors could reach
conclusions different than this Court, then this Court’s judgment should not be substituted for the
judgment of the jury.” Id.

                                          III. ANALYSIS

        Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred when it granted defendant’s motion for directed
verdict because: (1) under the negligence doctrine, defendant owed a duty to plaintiff to continually
hold the ladder after defendant voluntarily secured the bottom of the ladder; (2) there were
unresolved factual questions concerning whether defendant’s conduct increased the risk of harm
to plaintiff; and (3) the court improperly shifted the evidentiary burden to plaintiff regarding
causation. We disagree and affirm the trial court’s order.

      “To establish a prima facie case of negligence, a plaintiff must prove the following
elements: (1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a legal duty, (2) the defendant breached the legal

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duty, (3) the plaintiff suffered damages, and (4) the defendant’s breach was a proximate cause of
the plaintiff’s damages.” Anderson v Transdev Servs, Inc, 341 Mich App 501, 508; 991 NW2d
230 (2022). Consequently, a defendant cannot be held liable in a suit unless the defendant owed
the plaintiff a legal duty. Loweke v Ann Arbor Ceiling & Partition Co, LLC, 489 Mich 157, 162;
809 NW2d 553 (2011). Whether a defendant owes a plaintiff a duty of care is a question of law
decided by the trial court. Hill v Sears, Roebuck & Co, 492 Mich 651, 659; 822 NW2d 190 (2012).

        In evaluating whether a legal duty exists, courts examine a number of factors, including
the relationship of the parties, the foreseeability of the harm, the degree of certainty of injury, the
closeness of connection between the conduct and injury, the moral blame attached to the conduct,
the policy of preventing future harm, and the burdens and consequences of imposing a legal duty.
In re Certified Question (Miller v Ford Motor Co), 479 Mich 498, 505; 740 NW2d 206 (2007).
“The most important factor to be considered is the relationship of the parties.” Id. “If one
voluntarily undertakes to perform an act, having no prior obligation to do so, a duty may arise to
perform the act in a nonnegligent manner.” Fultz v Union-Commerce Assoc, 470 Mich 460, 465;
683 NW2d 587 (2004). In other words, a person who has no duty who nevertheless chooses to act
is bound to use reasonable care so as not to increase the danger to the plaintiff. Id.; see also Hill,
492 Mich at 660 (“Every person engaged in the performance of an undertaking has a duty to use
due care or to not unreasonably endanger the person or property of others”).

        The trial court did not err when it concluded that defendant did not owe plaintiff a legal
duty. Concerning the relationship between the parties, it is undisputed that defendant and plaintiff
maintained a familial relationship and plaintiff occasionally performed property maintenance for
defendant in exchange for compensation. However, there was no “special relationship” between
the parties imposing any sort of duty, such as that of an innkeeper or common carrier. See Hill,
492 Mich at 666 (“We have recognized that certain types of special relationships, such as common
carriers and their passengers, innkeepers and their guests, and doctors and patients, justify the
imposition of a duty because a person entrusts himself or herself to the control of another person”);
Dougherty v Detroit, 340 Mich App 339, 347; 986 NW2d 467 (2022) (“A special relationship
exists only when one party ‘entrust[ed] [themselves] to the protection and control of another and,
in doing so, that party loses the ability to protect [themselves]’ ”) (citation omitted); Chelik v
Capitol Transp, LLC, 313 Mich App 83, 91; 880 NW2d 350 (2015) (“Under Michigan common
law, generally there is no duty for one person to aid or protect another, absent a special relationship
based on control”). Concerning the foreseeability of the harm, it was undisputed that the aluminum
extension ladder lacked “feet,” which compromised the ladder’s stability. Thus, it was foreseeable
to plaintiff that the ladder could shift and fall if not used properly.

        While plaintiff criticizes defendant’s and the trial court’s consideration of how the
underlying incident occurred in light of the parties’ stipulation regarding the omission of the
causation element, a trial court may consider the closeness of connection between the conduct and
injury in its determination of whether defendant owed plaintiff any duty. See Kandil-Elsayed v F
& E Oil, Inc, 512 Mich 95, 110; ___ NW2d ___ (2023) (confirming that courts may consider
additional factors to determine whether there is a duty, including the closeness of connection
between the conduct and injury). Moreover, it would be unreasonable to impose a duty requiring
a person to secure a ladder on his or her respective property when the injured party was aware of
the instrument’s defects, the task associated with the ladder was optional, and the injured party
failed to look for an alternative method to complete the task. See Chelik, 313 Mich App at 92-93

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(providing that in instances when the legal obligations imposed would be “endless, unpredictable,
and therefore unreasonable,” it would be unreasonable to impose a duty). Plaintiff, as opposed to
defendant, was in the best position to prevent the harm by refusing to use the ladder when he
recognized the risk because of the lack of feet. See Roberts v Salmi, 308 Mich App 605, 626-627;
866 NW2d 460 (2014) (considering which party was in the best position to avoid the harm caused
in its determination of whether a limited legal duty should be imposed). The trial court aptly noted
it was also unclear, based on plaintiff’s narrative of the fall, exactly why or how the ladder shifted,
as plaintiff did not see defendant holding the ladder nor did plaintiff observe defendant walk away.
Accordingly, defendant did not owe plaintiff any specified legal duty, and thus, defendant was
solely obligated to act in a manner that did not increase the hazard or risk to plaintiff.

        Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, it is clear defendant
voluntarily assumed the task of securing the bottom of the ladder while plaintiff ascended to
replace a lightbulb on defendant’s pole barn. While plaintiff testified that his use of the ladder was
predicated on defendant continually securing the bottom of the ladder, plaintiff never confirmed
defendant’s presence during his ascent nor did plaintiff see defendant walking away from the
ladder. While there was conflicting testimony regarding whether defendant warned plaintiff
regarding the ladder’s defects, plaintiff knew the ladder was designed and built without feet, which
was common in older, aluminum extension ladders, and he recognized that the feet were
instrumental in ensuring the ladder was balanced. Ultimately, defendant’s conduct of securing the
ladder during plaintiff’s ascent minimized, rather than exacerbated, the danger presented by the
ladder.

         Both parties agreed that plaintiff did not have difficulty ascending the ladder and removing
the original lightbulb, and it was only after plaintiff attempted to thread the new lightbulb into the
socket that the ladder shifted. Defendant testified that she saw the top of the ladder starting to slide
because plaintiff was twisting and turning to the right on the ladder; plaintiff was initially facing
the pole barn with both feet positioned on the top of the ladder when he initially removed the
lightbulb. Defendant stated she instructed plaintiff to make his way back down, and as plaintiff
began his descent, he turned and “jumped to the right side of the ladder and landed on the ground”
feet first. Plaintiff, comparatively, testified that when he attempted to place the new lightbulb, he
felt the ladder became unstable as the bottom “kicked out,” and “[he] heard . . . the bottom of the
ladder scrape against the cement, and then [he] just went straight down.” Plaintiff’s wife stated
that she saw defendant securing the ladder before plaintiff’s fall, but she turned away before the
incident occurred.

        While the evidence must be viewed in light most favorable to plaintiff, the record supports
defendant’s contentions that she continually secured the ladder throughout the underlying incident.
In addition to defendant testifying regarding her injuries as a result of the ladder’s fall, plaintiff’s
wife stated that she tended to defendant’s injuries as defendant was lying on the ground, and she
helped defendant into her residence and wrapped defendant’s head with a bandage. Plaintiff’s
wife also stated that she saw defendant holding the ladder before plaintiff’s fall and she did not see
defendant walk away before she heard the ladder tumble to the ground. For his part, plaintiff
asserted that he relied on defendant to secure the ladder and he attributed the ladder fall to
defendant’s failure to continually hold the ladder. However, plaintiff simultaneously contended
that he did not confirm defendant secured the ladder in the first place nor did he see defendant
walk away. Because plaintiff only assumes that defendant must have walked away for the ladder

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to become unstable, plaintiff’s testimony regarding the cause of the underlying fall is nothing more
than mere speculation. See Ahmed v Tokio Marine America Ins Co, 337 Mich App 1, 7; 972 NW2d
860 (2021) (stating that speculation and conjecture are not sufficient to create material issues of
fact for trial). Ultimately, plaintiff opted to use the unsafe ladder and the activity of climbing the
ladder was dangerous before defendant volunteered to maintain it, and plaintiff cannot demonstrate
how defendant’s conduct otherwise contributed to his fall.

        Plaintiff also argues that the trial court improperly shifted the burden regarding causation
to plaintiff despite the parties stipulating in their submitted jury instructions and verdict form that
the issue of whether defendant’s alleged negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiff’s damages
was not a matter to be considered by the jury. “A stipulation . . . is an agreement, admission or
concession made in a judicial proceeding by the parties or their attorneys, respecting some matter
incident thereto. Its purpose is generally stated to be the avoidance of delay, trouble, and expense.”
Staff v Johnson, 242 Mich App 521, 535; 619 NW2d 57 (2000) (quotation marks and citation
omitted). “Stipulations of fact are sacrosanct, whereas stipulations of law do not bind a court.”
Wolf v Mahar, 308 Mich App 120, 126-127; 862 NW2d 668 (2014) (quotation marks and citations
omitted).

         Fundamentally, regardless of any alleged stipulation regarding the element of causation,
the court did not require the plaintiff to establish the element of causation nor did the court base
its ruling on any theory of causation. In its opinion and order granting defendant’s motion for
directed verdict, the trial court extensively discussed the matter related to duty and breach, and
stated that “the jury could not reasonably conclude, without more on the record, that defendant
breached a duty where there is no evidence that defendant let go of the ladder.” The court also
explained: “And when I say but for, again, it’s difficult for this Court to separate breach and
causation. Although you all may have agreed to causation, when I say but for, this Court cannot
find that there was a breach, the breach here being that [defendant] let go of the ladder.”

        Regardless of plaintiff’s protestations, the trial court was not obligated to abide by the
parties’ purported stipulation regarding the element of causation because it constituted a stipulation
of the law, as it concerned the legal requirements to establish a prima facie case of negligence.
See Wolf, 308 Mich App at 126-127 (noting stipulations of law do not bind the court). Thus, the
trial court appropriately determined that plaintiff was nevertheless required to demonstrate the
cause of the ladder fall to establish a claim of negligence. See Holman v Farm Bureau Gen Ins
Co of Mich, 511 Mich 974; 990 NW2d 364, 366 (2023) (to establish a prima facie case of
negligence, “a plaintiff must prove that . . . the defendant’s breach was a proximate cause of the
plaintiff’s damages”) (quotation marks and citation omitted; emphasis added). Additionally, there
is no alternative stipulated agreement, or any other document in the record, that indicates the
parties clearly and unequivocally waived any element of a negligence claim, and the jury
instructions and verdict form do not contain any waiver language regarding causation. See Patel
v Patel, 324 Mich App 631, 634; 922 NW2d 647 (2018) (“Magic words are unnecessary to
effectuate a valid waiver, but a waiver must be explicit, voluntary, and made in good faith”).

       “[A] valid waiver may be shown by “express declarations or by declarations that manifest
the parties’ intent and purpose or be an implied waiver, evidenced by a party’s decisive,
unequivocal conduct reasonably inferring the intent to waive.” Id. (quotation marks and citations
omitted). The absence of causation language in the jury instructions is insufficient to demonstrate

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waiver, particularly when the verdict form, explicitly provided the following questions (1) was
defendant negligent, (2) was plaintiff negligent, (3) did plaintiff’s negligence cause or contribute
to plaintiff’s injuries, and (4) using 100 percent as the total, enter the percentage of negligence
attributed to plaintiff and defendant individually. The verdict form represented a modified version
of M Civ JI 66.03, which addressed comparative negligence in personal injury actions, and the
doctrine of comparative negligence, by definition, distributes responsibility according to the
proportionate fault of the parties, which is impossible to establish without presenting how and to
what extent each party’s conduct contributed to the underlying incident.

        Defense counsel additionally provided, during the lower court proceedings, that the parties
never agreed plaintiff was not required to show how the accident occurred, rather, they solely
agreed the parties would not dispute whether plaintiff’s injuries stemmed from his fall.
Furthermore, “[j]ury instructions should include all the elements of the plaintiff’s claims and
should not omit material issues, defenses, or theories if the evidence supports them,” which
necessarily includes causation; an essential element in a prima facie negligence claim. Cox ex rel
Cox v Bd of Hosp Managers for Flint, 467 Mich 1, 8; 651 NW2d 356 (2002) (quotation marks and
citation omitted). Ultimately, the trial court properly considered whether plaintiff was able to
sufficiently describe the events leading to the underlying incident, and its decision did not violate
any alleged stipulation or waiver. See Taylor v Kent Radiology, 286 Mich App 490, 518; 780
NW2d 900 (2009) (opining when the plaintiff was unable to adequately explain how his fall off
the ladder transpired, “mere consistency with the known facts is not enough; the theory must be
deducible from those facts or it is mere conjecture. And when a party’s theory of causation is
merely conjecture, the trial court has a duty to direct a verdict on that issue”) (citation omitted).
Because plaintiff failed to demonstrate any error in the trial court’s decision to grant defendant’s
motion for directed verdict to warrant reversal, he is not entitled to relief.

       Affirmed. Defendant, as the prevailing party, may tax costs. MCR 7.219(A).

                                                              /s/ Michael F. Gadola
                                                              /s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
                                                              /s/ Christopher M. Murray

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