Court Opinion

ID: 9828844
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 18:47:18.628399+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:49.562385
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
This suit was instituted during the lifetime of B. M. Faulkner, by attaching the land, to which suit the said B. M. Faulkner appeared and answered during his lifetime. Upon motion the attachment was quashed.
If E. R. Faulkner was the foreign administrator, and did not recognize the proceedings as valid, then there can be no reason seen why he made his voluntary appearance as he did. His answer to the merits was so complete as to justify the other defendants in adopting it. Though he tried to limit it in words, in substance, and in fact, it was a complete defense on its merits, just such as his ancestor no doubt would have made. A glance at his answer is a complete denial to his present complaint that he has been improperly subjected to the jurisdiction of the Texas court.
Strenuous complaint is made of our judgment, and wé are charged in this case with not only overruling the prior opinion of this court and the Supreme Court, but all other reputable courts. Such vigorous complaints are not unknown to appellate courts. But the facts here are just to the contrary, as we not only referred to, but followed the decisions of the courts by express words. The cases most referred to by appellant that have not been followed are the cases of Jones v. Jones’ Heirs, 15 Tex. 463, 65 Am. Dec. 174; Clark v. Webster, 94 S. W. 1088; Id., 100 Tex. 333, 99 S. W. 1019, 123 Am. St. Rep. 813; and Blinn v. McDonald, 92 Tex. 608, 46 S. W. 787, 48 S. W. 571, 50 S. W. 931. We have not for a moment departed from the principles there announced, but have followed them, and said so in the opinion. As said in Blinn v. McDonald, supra:
“There is nothing in the language of the provisions above referred to indicating a legislative intent either to relieve the property that may be returned to the heir, devisee, or legatee by such trustee from the statutory lien aforesaid as to debts that may still be unsatisfied, or to charge such heir, devisee, or legatee personally therewith. But there is an intent on the face of the statute above quoted that the property in the hands of the heir, devisee, or legatee, and not any longer subject to be taken by the statutory trustee, may be passed free of such lien to a bona fide purchaser; for the statute does not undertake to extend the lien any longer than the property is ‘in their hands.’ In legal contemplation, it would still be ‘in their hands’ if the transfer were fraudulent in law, but would not be if transferred to a bona fide purchaser.” Clay v. Clay, 13 Tex. 202.
The land in controversy was conveyed to Laura Nyman by E. R. Faulkner and his mother, Mary. The latter, the surviving wife of B. M. Faulkner, deceased, owned a one-half community interest in the land. No one can deny that she was not a proper party to the suit. And in no sense the personal representative of that estate as an executrix or otherwise than as the survivor in community, or entitled to an interest in Faulkner’s estate. Since the apparent legal title was in Laura Nyman, who had paid no consideration other than the execution of the outstanding promissory note for the purchase money, which note was then in the hands of E. R. Faulkner, both he and his mother recognizing and affirming the sale, she was so necessary a party that it requires no more than a mere statement of the facts of the case to answer all of appellant’s contention. As said in Blinn v. McDonald, supra: She made the question of the bona lides an issue. She had the right to a cancellation of the note in case of the loss of the land, which was still in E. R. Faulkner’s hands, representing the consideration of the purchase. Equally appellee was entitled to all this relief to subject the land freed from such claims.
As said in Olay v. Clay, supra, there can be no good reason, under the facts of this case, showing no other debts unprovided for against the estate in Texas or Ohio, which required an administration in this state or compelled the appellee to go to Ohio. The only necessity for an administration in Texas would be to establish the debt, then proceed to set aside the sale. All this has been accomplished. Appellee was a creditor, and as such he had a creditor’s lien. That is all that was foreclosed or dealt with. Unless he had brought this suit, no action could or would have been necessary. E. R. Faulkner held the note, and it was alleged by Mrs. Laura Nyman that she purchased the land in good faith, acquired title to it “as an innocent purchaser, and of this she prays judgment of the court.”
It seems too clear for argument 'that the parties themselves made the district court, *950by their own pleadings, not only the proper, but the only, tribunal for the disposition of this ease, and the only one that, under the facts and pleadings, could administer that complete, full and adequate relief to which all the parties were entitled.
The motion for rehearing .is overruled.