Court Opinion

ID: 9850853
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:03:38.538777+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:44.624819
License: Public Domain

Cavanagh, J.
I dissent. The majority holds that Sherry Culkar’s testimony was admissible because the defendant put his character at issue by testifying that he would not have molested the victims because he loved them. The majority concludes that inquiry into specific acts of conduct, and proof thereof by extrinsic evidence, was proper as rebuttal. However, in the majority’s stampede to affirm the defendant’s conviction, it entirely ignores this Court’s precedent and demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of the Rules of Evidence, specifically MRE 405 and 608(b). ,
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The majority contends that the defendant opened the door to this similar acts evidence when he testified that he loved the victims and would not hurt them. MRE 404(a)(1) provides that character evidence may be used to establish "a pertinent trait of character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same . . . .” Thus, *507before the prosecution may offer rebuttal testimony, the defendant must actually put some aspect of his character at issue.
In this case the defendant did not call any character witnesses in the traditional sense. His only "character witness” was himself. Ordinarily, if the defendant chooses to inject his own character into the trial, he does so by introducing witnesses who testify to his good character. In this case, the majority claims that he put his character at issue when he testified that he loved the victims and did not molest them. I am suspicious of the conclusion that the defendant’s professed love of the victims somehow put his character at issue. Absent more direct testimony unambiguously placing defendant’s character at issue, I conclude that it was not properly at issue.1
Nevertheless, even assuming that the defendant somehow put his character at issue, thereby permitting some form of rebuttal, the majority conveniently ignores that MRE 405 specifically dictates the forms that such rebuttal may take:
In all cases in which evidence of character or a trait of character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On cross-examination, inquiry is allowable into reports of relevant specific instances of conduct. [MRE 405(a).]
Therefore, once a defendant puts his character at *508issue, the only evidence the prosecutor may use on rebuttal is opinion or reputation.2
The case at bar is similar to People v Champion, 411 Mich 468; 307 NW2d 681 (1981), a unanimous decision of this Court. In that case, the defendant put his character at issue by calling two witnesses who testified regarding the defendant’s reputation for truthfulness and for being a law-abiding citizen. The prosecutor did not cross-examine the defendant’s witnesses about any specific acts of misconduct. Instead, he called another witness to rebut the testimony of the character witnesses by recounting specific instances of conduct. In finding this procedure improper under MRE 405(a), this Court held:
The prosecutor may cross-examine the defendant’s witness "to test his knowledge and candor . . ., and for that purpose he may be asked if he has heard of specific acts of misconduct.” People v Rosa, 268 Mich 462, 465; 256 NW 483 (1934). The prosecutor’s rebuttal witness may testify only as to reputation, however. In this case, the prosecutor reversed the procedure permitted under MRE 405(h) by inquiring into specific instances of conduct in examination of a rebuttal witness. [Id. at 471 (emphasis added); see also People v Whitfield, 425 Mich 116, 131; 388 NW2d 206 (1986).]
Champion reestablished3 the rule that rebuttal witnesses may only give reputation or opinion testimony._
*509With no discussion or analysis, the majority cavalierly casts aside over seventy years of this Court’s precedent along with the Rules of Evidence by holding that specific instances of conduct may be used on rebuttal to establish character. This conclusion is legally erroneous as established by MRE 405(a), Whitfield, Champion, supra, and People v Powell, 223 Mich 633; 194 NW 502 (1923). The use of specific instances of conduct on rebuttal is clearly prohibited.4
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The majority also holds that the testimony of Sherry Culkar was admissible to "refute[] a specific statement made by the defendant on cross-examination.” Ante at 506. This holding, in turn, fails to discuss MRE 608(b), which prohibits the use of extrinsic evidence for impeachment purposes unless the evidence is probative of truthfulness.
Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness’ credibility . . . may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning the witness’ character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined has testified. [MRE 608(b).]
This evidentiary rule codified the long-established common-law practice that when a cross-examining *510attorney questions a witness regarding a collateral matter, the attorney is bound by the answer given. People v Hillhouse, 80 Mich 580, 585; 45 NW 484 (1890); Hamilton v People, 46 Mich 186, 188; 9 NW 247 (1881). The rationale behind this rule has long been recognized:
The use of extrinsic evidence to contradict is more restricted due to considerations of confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, undue consumption of time, and unfair prejudice raised by the introduction of so-called collateral matters. If a matter is considered collateral, the testimony of the witness on direct or cross-examination stands —the cross-examiner must take the witness’ answer; extrinsic evidence, i.e., evidence offered other than through the witness himself, in contradiction is not permitted. [1 McCormick, Evidence (4th ed), § 49, pp 182-183. Emphasis added.]
A matter generally is held to be collateral if the party offering it would not be allowed to offer it in the case in chief. Id. In the case at bar, the majority holds that the rebuttal evidence is admissible because it contradicts the defendant’s professed love of the children.
Here, the rebuttal evidence was narrowly focused on refuting defendant’s denial that he had told Ms. Culkar about his belief that it was acceptable for family members to initiate young girls into sexual activity. This in turn was in direct response to defendant’s testimony on direct examination in which he stated that he had not had sexual activity with the young girls because "I love those children like they are my own. They call me grandpa, Paw-Paw Frank, because they love me.” Because this was a matter so closely bearing on defendant’s guilt or innocence, it was *511not error for the prosecutor to have impeached defendant. [Ante at 504.]
In essence, the majority argues that whether the defendant had a loving relationship with the victims was a fact of consequence. However, the defendant’s feelings are not at issue. Nowhere is it claimed that the defendant’s feelings for the victims somehow motivated him to commit these offenses. Thus, whether the defendant loved the children is irrelevant to guilt or innocence. Love for a victim simply says nothing about guilt or innocence.
. Even assuming that defendant’s love of the victims was somehow relevant, the testimony regarding defendant’s belief that young girls should have sex with their older male relatives does nothing to rebut the proposition that he loved these children. No matter how repulsive the defendant’s beliefs are, they have nothing to do with his feelings for the victims. That a defendant holds an abhorrent belief does not logically make it more or less likely that he loves or hates those whom the belief affects. Indeed, the alleged beliefs of the defendant are directed against those whom the defendant would presumably love the most: his own family members.
Moreover, the defendant’s beliefs were directed towards newly or nearly pubescent girls. This has little relevance to the three-year-old complainant in this case. Neither the majority nor the prosecutor argues that the defendant was implementing his beliefs with these girls, probably because it stretches credulity to do so.
The rebuttal testimony of Culkar could not have been introduced by the prosecutor in his case in *512chief because it is not relevant to a material issue5 that the prosecutor could prove independently of its use as rebuttal evidence. Accordingly, the prosecutor was bound by the defendant’s answer that he never told anyone that children should have sex with their male relatives, because this was a collateral matter, and a witness may not be impeached with extrinsic evidence on collateral matters. People v Teague, 411 Mich 562, 566; 309 NW2d 530 (1981). While the majority pays lip service to this rule, citing People v McGillen No 1, 392 Mich 251; 220 NW2d 677 (1974),6 and other authority, it fails to follow that authority.
For example, the majority represents that "[t]his Court has stated that when the rebuttal testimony at issue was a simple contradiction of the defendant’s testimony that directly tended to disprove the exact testimony given by the witness, it was proper rebuttal testimony. People v Sutton (After Remand), 436 Mich 575, 597, n 23; 464 NW2d 276 (1990).” Ante at 505-506. This ignores the fact that the lead opinion in Sutton was signed by only three justices.7
*513Chief Justice Brickley concurred in the result reached by Justice Boyle only because he held that defendant had waived the substantive issue by failing to object. Had he reached the substantive issue, the Chief Justice indicated that he would have joined Justice Levin’s opinion.
The record before us has been sufficiently developed for the Court to rule on whether the prosecutor’s question on cross-examination was in fact error. On this issue I agree with Justice Levin that the question itself constituted error because it was an attempt by the prosecutor to use defendant’s postarrest, post-Miranda [v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966)] silence for impeachment.
However, I concur in the result reached by Justice Boyle because defendant waived any claim of error. I join in her analysis to the extent that defendant’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s question on cross-examination pointing to a post-Miranda period waived any claim of error as to the question posed. I therefore also agree with Justice Boyle’s analysis regarding admissibility of defendant’s responses and further questioning resulting therefrom. [Id. at 600. Emphasis added.]
Contrary to the belief of the majority, it is clear that Chief Justice Brickley believed that because the defendant failed to object, no relief was available. It is equally clear, however, that had an objection been raised, he would have signed Justice Levin’s opinion. Properly understood, Chief Justice Brickley’s concurring opinion simply reaffirms the long-established rule that a failure to *514object at the trial level will preclude subsequent appellate review in most circumstances.
Thus, the "Court” did not make the statement attributed to it; Justices Boyle, Griffin and Riley did. It is axiomatic that it takes a majority of the participating justices to speak for the "Court.”
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I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals because the asserted evidentiary errors were not harmless. The defendant’s conviction should be overturned because of the improper use of specific instances of conduct and their proof by extrinsic evidence on rebuttal. Having disposed of the case on this basis, I see no need to reach the issue of religion.
Brickley, C.J., and Levin, J., concurred with Cavanagh, J.

 While I agree that sometimes the testimony of a witness may "open the door” on a pertinent trait of character, courts should be extremely reluctant to find that such is the case lest the Pandora’s box of character evidence be opened every time the prosecutor draws a statement from a witness that arguably relates to a character trait. See, generally, People v Johnson, 409 Mich 552, 561; 297 NW2d 115 (1980).

 Of course, the prosecutor may cross-examine the defendant’s character witnesses with specific instances of misconduct to test the witnesses’ knowledge of the defendant’s reputation.

 Indeed, the rule is firmly entrenched even in our common law:
[EJvidence of good character may only be rebutted by evidence that it is bad. Specific acts of misconduct may not be shown for that purpose. [People v Powell, 223 Mich 633, 640; 194 NW 502 (1923).]

 See, generally, 1 McCormick, Evidence (4th ed), § 191, pp 812-818, and 2 Weinstein, Evidence, ¶ 405[04], pp 405-48 to 405-55.

 For example, the majority does not claim that the evidence is relevant to a material issue such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, scheme, plan, or system in doing an act, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. If such were the case, similar acts evidence would, of course, be admissible. MRE 404(b)(1).

 It is interesting to note that the McGillen Court ruled that the rebuttal testimony in that case was also improper. 392 Mich 268.

 It should also be noted that the lead opinion clearly held that the substantive issue had been waived by a failure to object and was, therefore, not properly before the Court.
The defendant’s failure to object prevented development of a record that would allow us to decide whether the prosecutor’s question was (1) a legitimate inquiry testing the credibility of defendant’s testimony on direct examination implying that he would have made an explanation consistent with his trial testimony but for the police conduct in "grabbing him,” or (2) an attempt to make less probable the inference that the defendant sought to establish .... Thus, it is not possible to deter*513mine whether the inquiry was improper for constitutional or evidentiary reasons. [Id. at 580-581. Emphasis added.]
Thus, Justice Boyle’s discussion in Sutton of the substantive issue is dicta.