Court Opinion

ID: 9964486
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-30 11:10:30.05262+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:33.547225
License: Public Domain

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

                                                -
                                     NO. 03-22-00222-CR

                             Roberto Rico Hernandez, Appellant

                                                v.

                                 The State of Texas, Appellee

                FROM THE 428TH DISTRICT COURT OF HAYS COUNTY
      NO. CR-10-0473-D, THE HONORABLE WILLIAM R. HENRY, JUDGE PRESIDING

                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

               Appellant Roberto Rico Hernandez was convicted by a jury of aggravated sexual

assault of a child and indecency with a child by sexual contact.          See Tex. Penal Code

§§ 21.11(a)(1), 22.021(a)(1)(B)(i), (2)(B). The trial court sentenced Hernandez to twenty-five

years’ and five years’ confinement on those charges, respectively, and ordered that the sentences

run concurrently. In a single issue, Hernandez contends that the trial court abused its discretion

by denying his request for a hearing on his motion for new trial. We affirm the trial court’s

judgments of conviction.

                                       BACKGROUND

               Following outcries by his stepdaughters, Hernandez was charged by indictment

with four counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child and three counts of indecency with a

child by sexual contact. At trial, the State presented testimony from 16 witnesses, including the
children, Maria and Ana Perez 1; their mother (Mother); CPS investigator Katie Wilson; current

and former Hays County Sheriff’s Office (HCSO) personnel; sexual assault nurse examiner

(SANE) Corrine Trainer; forensic scientists Jennifer Howard, Allison Heard, and Caitlin Lott;

and forensic interviewers Melissa Rodriguez and Maggie Ortuno.                 The defense recalled

several of the State’s witnesses and offered testimony from Dr. Robert C. Benjamin, a DNA

forensic-testing expert; Dr. Aaron Pierce, an expert in forensic interviews; Hernandez’s wife; and

his former employer.

               Maria Perez, who was 18 at the time of trial in 2021, testified regarding two

2010 incidents in which she was assaulted by Hernandez and explained inconsistencies in

statements that she had given between the incidents and trial. The first incident occurred in the

family’s two-bedroom trailer in San Marcos on the evening of January 8, 2010, when Maria was

six. While Mother was showering, Hernandez came into Maria’s bedroom. Ana, then eight, was

in the other bedroom with her and Maria’s infant half-brother. Hernandez pulled down Maria’s

pajama bottoms and underwear and touched her vagina with his hand. Although she at first

testified that his hand did not go inside her vagina, she later agreed that “part or a little bit of the

time his fingers went on the inside.”         After he left the trailer, she told Ana what had

happened, and Ana told Mother, who called the police. Maria was examined by a SANE

approximately three hours after the incident and was forensically interviewed by Rodriguez on

January 11, 2010.

               In the interview, Maria denied 15 times that Hernandez had touched her

inappropriately, that someone had done “something to [her],” or that anything had happened to

       1Because the children were minors at the time of the offenses, we will refer to them by
pseudonyms in the interest of privacy. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.10(a)(3).
                                                   2
her. However, when asked if Hernandez had done “something wrong,” she stated that he

“raped” her and Ana, that he “raped . . . [Maria’s] butt . . . with the tongue,” that he licked her

“butt,” that he only touched her with his tongue, and, conversely, that “he didn’t do anything

with the tongue.” Maria testified at trial that at six years old she had heard the word rape but did

not know what it meant and that she had been untruthful when she told Rodriguez that Ana had

been touched inappropriately “like 10 times,” that Hernandez touched Maria’s private part with

his tongue, and that she had seen Hernandez rape Ana. She clarified that Hernandez had not

touched her with his tongue but had “used his fingers to touch [her] vagina.” As to whether he

had “raped [Ana]” in 2010, she testified that Ana “told [her] it happened to her, too.”

               Within a few months of the first incident, Hernandez “came back into [Maria’s]

life” after Mother forgave him. The family had moved into a yellow two-bedroom house, and he

was there one night while Mother was at work. Maria awoke to him “touching” her; he pulled

down her pajama bottoms, touched her vagina and breasts with his hands and fingers underneath

her clothes, and put his fingers into his mouth between touches. Asked whether his fingers went

inside her vagina, Maria testified, “Just like the first time.” When Mother returned home, Maria

told her what he had done, and he left the house after the couple argued.

               Maria participated in a second forensic interview in 2019, when she was 15. She

told the interviewer, Ortuno, that Hernandez would “physically touch” her and Ana on their

“private areas” and breasts with his hands; that he touched Maria twice; and that Ana told Maria

that he had touched her too, but Maria did not “know if it was true.” When asked whether he

touched them with something other than his hands, Maria nodded and responded, “Not—his

like—I don’t want to talk about it.” She then wrote the word “mouth” on a piece of paper and

stated that he would touch her private area with his mouth. Later in the interview, however, she

                                                 3
clarified that his mouth never directly touched her private area but that “he would just like put

his hands in his mouth and then put them on [her].” Shown a drawing of a body, she confirmed

that his fingers went “past the line or inside of the line” on the private area.

               Maria testified that the 2019 interview was the first occasion on which she stated

that Hernandez had touched her vagina with his fingers. She testified that at first, she “held stuff

back,” but she “really need[ed] to say what happened to [her] now.”

               Ana Perez, 20 years old at trial, also testified about her and Maria’s being abused

by Hernandez. In 2009 or 2010, the sisters were eating breakfast when Maria asked if Ana could

keep a secret and told her “stuff that [Hernandez] did to her.” Ana disclosed Maria’s statement

to Mother, who called the police. Although Ana did not recall exactly what Maria had said,

Maria did not use the word “rape” in describing it to her.

               Like Maria, Ana was forensically interviewed by Rodriguez on January 11, 2010.

During the interview, Ana stated that Hernandez left the family’s trailer because “he [did]

something to [Maria],” “licked her hin[e]y,” “picked her up and . . . pulled down her pants,” and

“stuck his finger in her butt.” When asked whether he “raped [Maria’s] hin[e]y,” Ana replied,

“Uh-huh.” Ana told Rodriguez that she knew that this had happened because Maria told her;

Ana had not seen what Hernandez did because she was in another room with her brother. She

also told Rodriguez that, while Mother was showering, she had heard Maria screaming, “[H]elp,

help”; that “[Maria] was also saying other little things like, ‘[J]ust let me go daddy, just let me

go’”; and that Ana had thought “it was tickling” because “[her] dad was there . . . doing

something to [Maria].” Later, Maria told Ana that Hernandez “licked [her] butt and he put his

finger in [her] butt.” Ana stated that when she told Mother what Maria had said, Mother and

Hernandez “talked like that, that made [Mother] cry.” Elsewhere, Ana stated that Hernandez

                                                   4
gathered clothes, wrote a letter for Mother, and left while she was showering. In response to

Rodriguez’s questioning, Ana repeatedly denied that Hernandez had done “anything like that”

to her.

               However, at trial, Ana testified that she had lied when she denied being abused.

Around the time that Hernandez assaulted Maria, Ana experienced leg pain, and he offered to

apply alcohol to her leg, told her to lie down, and insisted that she remove her underwear. She

complied, and, while rubbing alcohol on her leg, he “put his finger inside” her vagina. She

testified that this was the only time that she remembered him doing something like that to her

and that she had not reported the abuse because she was scared and felt guilty that, had she done

so, Maria would not have been assaulted. She explained that she had come forward because she

“saw [Maria] was getting her justice and wanted the same.”

               Mother, who is Spanish-speaking, testified through an interpreter about

Hernandez’s abuse of Maria as well as Mother’s relationship with him. She became aware of the

first assault because Hernandez “left a letter for [her]. And besides, [her] daughters told [her]

what happened.” Ana told her that Hernandez took Maria’s pants off, that he touched Maria in

her “private parts,” that Maria had “some pain,” and that he left with a suitcase while Mother

was in the shower. She obtained “the same information” from Maria and learned that he had

touched her with both his hands and mouth. Mother had been upset with him for coming home

late that evening, but they had not fought or yelled at one another. Hernandez had not said

anything about their relationship not working nor expressed a need to leave. In his letter, he

wrote, “Love[,] I want to tell you that I love you a lot but you don’t trust me anymore and that’s

killing me. That’s why I’m leaving you because you don’t trust me. I love you but I think it’s

better this way.” He also wrote that he intended to visit his son “as many time[s] as [she]

                                                5
allow[ed] him.” She tore up the letter because it “didn’t make sense,” and she and her daughters

cried “because of what happened.” She called the police that night.

               A few days after the incident, Hernandez called her from a number with a

Mexican area code to tell her that he “didn’t know why he did that,” that “he was out of control,”

that he had touched Maria, and that he was in Mexico “trying to get better.” He blamed

witchcraft and suggested that his mother “was doing, like, maybe some sort of sorcery so [they]

could split.” He also told her “that something gets into his mind and makes him do these things.”

Mother did not reveal the call to police because she wanted to believe him, still loved him, and

was scared that CPS would take away her children.

               In March, Hernandez returned from Mexico, and they attempted to resume their

relationship; however, while she would allow him to come to the house, he did not live with her

or her children. On the evening on which the second incident of abuse against Maria occurred,

Mother was at work, and her sister was watching Maria and Ana while he was at the house. Her

sister had to leave early, and Mother told her to put the girls to bed and lock the bedroom door.

When Mother returned home, her son was on her bed, and Hernandez was masturbating in the

bathroom. She went to Maria and Ana’s bedroom, which was locked, and when she entered,

Maria began crying and told her that “her dad didn’t change and that he didn’t want to change

and that he was not seeking for forgiveness because he did it again.” Maria also told her that

Hernandez had used something to open the door, that he had touched Maria “in her private parts”

with his hands, and that Ana had not awoken. Mother confronted him, and he “admitted

everything, but he said it was something that’s stronger than him,” “that it was something that

would get into his mind,” and that it was like “a person would get into his mind.” He showed her

the knife he had used to open Maria and Ana’s bedroom door, and she kicked him out of the

                                                6
house. She did not call the police on that occasion or when Ana later told her that he had put his

fingers inside Ana’s vagina. When CPS asked in June 2010 if Hernandez had attempted to

contact her, she lied and said that he had not.

                On recall by the defense, Mother testified that Hernandez attempted to reconcile

with her because he wanted her forgiveness and to see his son. He “knew what he had been

accused of.” She acknowledged that she had invited him to spend Christmas with her in

2010 and agreed that she had testified in a 2019 proceeding that she had “frequent and continual”

contact with him in 2010 and that she had “always been in contact with [him] via phone.” She

testified at trial that she did not report the second assault because she “just wanted to believe

what he was saying” but continued, “It happened exactly the way that my daughters told me,

because he accepted that.      He told me that and he asked for forgiveness from me and

my children.”

                CPS Investigator Katie Wilson testified that she met with the family on

January 11, 2010, and that CPS was not investigating whether there was penetration; the sole

allegation, rather, was that Hernandez had licked Maria’s privates. Wilson testified that she had

seen children not disclose everything during their first outcries and be confused about what

happened to them sexually. Mother told her that she did not understand why Hernandez did

what he did but suspected that it was a “one-time incident.”

                HCSO Deputy Amy Stacy testified about information she received when she

responded to the family’s trailer on January 8, 2010. When she arrived, Stacy observed Mother,

Maria, and Ana crying on the couch. Two medics assisted Stacy, who speaks “broken” Spanish,

by translating for Mother. Maria was writing in a journal, and Stacy saw that she had drawn a

circle with a line through it around a heart. Next to the heart she had scratched out “Rico,”

                                                  7
Hernandez’s middle name. Mother told Stacy that Hernandez had put his mouth “in the area of

the anus of [Maria].” Mother also showed Stacy a text message purportedly from him, “advising

that he had left the car at the bus station” and stating, “[M]any apologies and take care of the

baby.” Mother’s car was subsequently found at the station, and a bus company employee

confirmed that Hernandez had tried to purchase a ticket to Mexico.

               Mother later told Stacy that she had received a call from Hernandez’s mother’s

phone number in which he informed Mother that he was in Mexico. He repeatedly apologized

and stated that a trucker took him to Mexico and that he had left his cell phone in the car at the

bus station. Stacy wrote in her report that Mother “did not go into detail about what he was

apologizing for, but she felt certain that it was for molesting [Maria].”

               Corrine Trainer, a SANE, testified about Maria’s sexual assault forensic

examination (SAFE), which Trainer performed on January 9, 2010, at approximately 12:15 a.m.

Through an interpreter, Mother told Trainer:

       My little one told me her father had touched her while I was taking a bath. He
       had gone into the room where she was watching TV and took her pants and
       panties off and he put his fingers in her butt a lot of times and had licked her butt
       many times.

Mother also told Trainer that Ana “did not see anything” but “heard her sister screaming” and

“thought her sister was playing around.” Mother reported that Maria had not showered or

bathed, been washed or wiped, vomited, had anything to eat or drink, brushed her teeth, or

changed her clothes since the incident. It was unknown whether she had used the restroom.

Maria stated that Hernandez “had licked her butt” and touched her and Ana with “[h]is hands on

her feet and legs.”

                                                  8
               Trainer noted redness in Maria’s labia minora and testified that it “may support or

not support the history.” She took swabs of Maria’s cheek, vagina, and anus and collected dried

secretions from her left thigh and left breast. When asked by defense counsel whether saliva, if

tested, will contain “an abundance of DNA,” Trainer testified, “Yes, as far as – you know, I’m

not an expert on DNA, so, yes.”

               Jennifer Howard, a forensic scientist in the Trace Evidence Section of the Austin

Crime Laboratory, testified that she reviewed tape lifts taken from Maria’s bedding and clothes

and a towel recovered from Maria’s bed and that “there were a variety of trace evidence that was

identified, including animal hairs, body hairs, hair fragments, possible carpet fibers, apparent

paint, apparent head-hair fragments, and possible pubic hair.”         Howard testified that hair

comparison is used “more as an exclusionary technique,” that she did not compare the pubic hair

because there was no “standard” from a known individual against which she could compare it,

and that she could not “make any deductions about who that hair may have belonged to at all.”

She also testified that there was no confirmation that the evidence was in fact pubic hair.

               Allison Heard, who in 2010 was a forensic scientist at the Department of Public

Safety crime lab in Austin, testified about the results of short tandem repeat (STR) DNA testing

that she performed on the swabs and secretions obtained from Maria. Heard testified that DNA

transfer “does not always occur” with skin-to-skin contact but “can occur.” Saliva-to-skin

contact would be more likely to transfer DNA “because of the amount of DNA in saliva,” which,

however, is “more attributable to the skin cells from the inside of the mouth” than from saliva

itself. Heard explained that “you have a lot of skin cells in your inner cheek.” She also testified

that DNA transfer is dependent on other factors, including “time since a sample was collected or

any type of activity that may have, like, washed off or removed some of those cells”; using the

                                                 9
restroom and wiping “definitely would be a possibility to have some of that foreign DNA be

wiped away.”

               Heard’s analysis, reported in 2020, showed that “[t]he partial DNA profile

obtained from the anal swab from [Maria] is consistent with a mixture of two individuals with

[Maria] as an assumed contributor.” Because of the quality of DNA obtained, however, no

comparison was made to the foreign contributor. Testing of the vaginal, breast, and thigh swabs

did not indicate the presence of a DNA profile other than Maria’s. Following Heard’s analysis,

the samples were given to another analyst, Caitlin Lott, who conducted Y-STR testing.

               Lott testified about the differences between STR and Y-STR analysis as well as

the results that she obtained in this case. STR is the “standard, traditional DNA analysis,”

whereas Y-STR testing is “male-specific DNA testing just on the Y chromosome,” which only

males have. The Y-profile is typically identical in male lineal descendants, and it is rare for

males in the same line to have different Y-profiles.

               Y-STR testing is more sensitive than STR testing and “can detect in that

Y chromosome if there’s also a female in that mixture, potentially.” Because Y-STR testing

“essentially ignores the female DNA,” analysts can “develop male-specific Y-STR profiles from

a sample that had low quantity DNA detected in it.” Lott testified that it is common not to get

any results from DNA testing in sexual assault cases, which could be for several reasons: “there

was no DNA there to be begin with,” “it degraded over time so it can no longer be detected,” or

“it’s such a low-level DNA that our instruments still aren’t sensitive enough to detect it.” She

could not determine “whether a crime did or did not occur from” the absence of DNA.

               Although Maria’s vaginal swab indicated the presence of a small amount of male

DNA, it was “at such a low level that it was not interpretable.” Lott could not determine if the

                                                10
DNA came from one or multiple individuals. A partial DNA profile was obtained from the anal

swab, interpreted to be “an indistinguishable mixture of at least two” males contributing similar

amounts of DNA. Lott was unable to draw any conclusions as to whether Hernandez was one of

the contributors and could neither include nor exclude him. No male DNA was recovered from

the left thigh or left breast swab.

                Lott also testified, including on recall by the defense, regarding DNA transfer.

She explained that analysts are sometimes unable to develop DNA profiles from a skin swab and

that obtaining a profile depends in part on how hard the swab is applied, whether the individual

is sweating at the time, and whether there are any “downstream effects” causing the sample to

degrade over time. Skin is not the most “abundant source” of DNA, and it is “generally a little

bit easier to get a full profile” from bodily fluids. Nevertheless, licking something does not

always leave a “large deposit of DNA”; “varying degrees of DNA can be left behind,” and the

amount of deposited DNA depends on “how much surface area was covered” and “how much

saliva was deposited.” She had seen alleged saliva-to-skin contact where no DNA results were

returned.    Moreover, wiping, urinating, defecating, showering, changing clothes, or the

movement of clothing can remove transferred DNA over time. Lott testified that in a scenario

where one person licks another’s body, DNA would be transferred but that the detection of that

DNA would depend on what occurred between the licking and the collection of a DNA sample.

She testified that it was “fair” to say that “a lot can happen in three hours.”

                Dr. Robert C. Benjamin testified as a DNA expert for the defense concerning the

DNA testing in this case. He confirmed that the STR and Y-STR reports appeared to be

                                                  11
supported by the underlying data and clarified that Hernandez was excluded as a contributor to

the profile obtained from STR testing of Maria’s vaginal swab. 2

               With respect to the Y-profiles of male lineal descendants, Benjamin testified that

Hernandez and his son would have the same Y-STR profile, excusing the slight chance of a

mutation. Benjamin explained that current Y-STR testing cannot distinguish between a father

and son and that he did not know “what on earth” Lott meant by testifying that the two male

profiles obtained from the anal swab were insufficient to determine a familial relationship. He

testified that if the two males were related, “then you’d just have one profile. It would look like

one, even though there’s two people there.”

               Benjamin also testified about DNA transfer. The fact that Maria’s DNA profile

was not obtained from her breast swab, he noted, was a “good demonstration of honestly how

little DNA there is, a lot of times, on your skin if it’s not an area that, we’ll say, deposits a lot

there.” He testified that saliva is “a very rich source” of DNA that “can actually beat out blood”

and that there is “no distinguishable difference between a saliva sample and a buccal swab.”

               Dr. Aaron Pierce, an expert in forensic interviews, testified that he reviewed

transcripts of Maria’s and Ana’s 2010 interviews for the defense. He testified that forensic

interviewers in Texas “essentially work for law enforcement”; that “we know that not all

allegations of sex abuse are true”; and that younger children can be more easily influenced by

       2    Heard—after asserting that Maria was an “assumed contributor” to the samples—
testified that she did not find “any other indication of another profile” in the vaginal-swab
results. Heard’s report stated:

       The DNA profile from the vaginal swab from [Maria Perez] is consistent with the
       DNA profile from [Maria Perez]. Roberto Hernandez is excluded as the
       contributor of the DNA profile from the vaginal swab from [Maria Perez].

                                                 12
leading questions and suggestive phrasing, are more susceptible to coaching, and can “be more

easily misled in terms of misunderstanding the behavior of other people.” He also testified that

repetitive questioning can cause children to change their answer and that Rodriguez had asked

the children many times in different ways whether anything had happened to them. Rodriguez

should not have specifically asked about Hernandez, used peer-pressure questions in Ana’s

interview, and was improperly suggestive when asking Maria if her “daddy d[id] something

wrong.” Pierce testified that Maria’s use of the word “rape” indicated that she might have heard

it from someone else.

               Hernandez’s wife testified that they had dated since 2013 and been married since

2015. She testified that their families were from the same town in Mexico, that she had last seen

him in Mexico in 2006, that she came to the United States in 2012, and that she would have

known if he had returned to their town in 2010, as Mother had informed Stacy. She also testified

that she had never observed him participate in a witchcraft ceremony and that Mother twice

threatened him in January 2015: Mother told him, “[I]f I find out that you’re married to someone

else, you’re going to find out who I am,” and warned, “If I ever know that you are with someone

else, you’re never gonna see your child again because I’m gonna tell that woman who you are

and you are never going to see the child again.”

               During the jury’s deliberation in the guilt-innocence phase, the jury foreman sent

a note to the trial judge informing him that the jury was “deadlocked after extensive

deliberation” and was unable to reach a unanimous verdict on counts IV and VI. The trial judge

                                               13
read a supplemental Allen 3 charge to the jury instructing them to continue deliberating and, if

possible, to “resolve [their] differences and come to a common conclusion, so that a verdict may

be reached and this case may be disposed of.”

                The jury subsequently found Hernandez guilty of aggravated sexual assault of a

child and indecency with a child by sexual contact, as alleged in counts IV and VI of the

indictment, respectively. 4 He was acquitted on the remaining five counts. Following a hearing

on punishment, he was sentenced to twenty-five years’ confinement for aggravated sexual

assault of a child and five years’ confinement for indecency with a child.

                On March 14, 2022, Hernandez filed a motion for new trial, asserting that the jury

had received evidence from an outside source during its guilt-innocence deliberations. Attached

to the motion was an affidavit from the jury foreman, P.M., which attested in relevant part:

        (1)     Juror [W.Z.] informed jurors prior to and during deliberations about DNA
                facts and statistics that were not admitted into evidence during the trial.

        (2)     Juror [W.Z.] shared with the Jury that he investigated the DNA evidence
                by touring a DNA lab.

        (3)     After communicating to the Court that the Jury had reached a deadlock on
                Count 4 and Count 6 at approximately 7 p.m. on November 8, 2021 and
                after the Court directed us to continue deliberating, Juror [W.Z.] insisted
                that the information he learned from his visit to the DNA lab should shift
                their opinions on the verdict.

        (4)     Juror [W.Z.] cited statistics and DNA facts he learned directly from his
                tour of the DNA lab.

        3  See Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501 (1896) (permitting supplemental jury
instruction that reminds jury that if it is unable to reach verdict, mistrial will result, case will still
be pending, and there is no guarantee that second jury would find issue any easier to resolve).
        4  Counts IV and VI alleged that Hernandez touched Maria’s genitals and digitally
penetrated her sexual organ and anus.
                                                   14
       (5)    Juror [W.Z.] did not indicate he was a scientist or any type of expert on
              DNA evidence or that the statistics he was relaying to the Jury were based
              on his personal experience with DNA testing or scientific theory. Juror
              [W.Z.] was just relaying information he learned from sources outside the
              jury room.

       (6)    This outside information impacted the Jury’s verdict. The Jury went from
              being deadlocked and almost evenly split between “not guilty” and
              “guilty” at 7 p.m. to returning a unanimous “guilty” verdict at
              approximately 10 p.m. on November 8, 2021 after the Jury was instructed
              Mr. [W.Z.’s] visit to the DNA lab was the basis for his information.

              The trial court denied Hernandez’s motion without a hearing, and this

appeal followed.

                                         DISCUSSION

              In his only issue, Hernandez contends that “[t]he trial court abused its discretion

by denying [his] motion for new trial without granting an evidentiary hearing.”

I.     Standard of Review

              “The right to a hearing on a motion for new trial is not absolute.” Rozell v. State,

176 S.W.3d 228, 230 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). A hearing on a motion for new trial is mandatory

only when the trial court determines that the motion and accompanying affidavit(s) raise matters

that are both not determinable from the record and reasonable, meaning they could potentially

entitle the defendant to relief. Smith v. State, 286 S.W.3d 333, 340 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009);

Wallace v. State, 106 S.W.3d 103, 108 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). The trial judge’s discretion and

our review are limited to these two requirements. Smith, 286 S.W.3d at 340. To be sufficient to

entitle the defendant to a hearing, the motion and affidavit(s) need not establish a prima facie

case for a new trial or reflect every component legally required to establish relief but must

“reflect that reasonable grounds exist for holding that such relief could be granted.” Wallace,

                                               15
106 S.W.3d at 108 (quoting Martinez v. State, 74 S.W.3d 19, 22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)); see

Jordan v. State, 883 S.W.2d 664, 665 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994); Reyes v. State, 849 S.W.2d 812,

816 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). “The requirement of an affidavit is to prevent ‘fishing expeditions’

and is a prerequisite to obtaining a hearing and as a matter of pleading.” Klapesky v. State,

256 S.W.3d 442, 454 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, pet. ref’d) (citing Reyes, 849 S.W.2d at 816;

McIntire v. State, 698 S.W.2d 652, 658 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)).

               The purposes of a hearing on a motion for new trial are to decide whether the

case should be retried, give the defendant an opportunity to fully develop the matters raised in

his motion, and prepare a record for presenting issues on appeal in the event the motion is

denied. Smith, 286 S.W.3d at 338; Wallace, 106 S.W.3d at 108. We review a trial court’s denial

of a hearing for an abuse of discretion. Wallace, 106 S.W.3d at 108; Corporon v. State,

586 S.W.3d 550, 557 (Tex. App.—Austin 2019, no pet.). “In so doing, we reverse only when the

trial judge’s decision was so clearly wrong as to lie outside that zone within which reasonable

persons might disagree.” Smith, 286 S.W.3d at 339. The question is not whether the trial court

has reasonably denied the motion for a new trial, but rather whether the court has reasonably

denied the defendant a hearing on his motion for a new trial. See Wallace, 106 S.W.3d at 108.

II.    Other Evidence

               Hernandez’s motion for new trial was based in relevant part on the argument that

the jury was improperly subjected to an “outside influence” 5 when juror W.Z. informed his

       5  In using the phrase “outside influence,” P.M.’s affidavit and Hernandez’s brief conflate
Rule of Appellate Procedure 21.3(f), which provides a basis for entitlement to a new trial, with
Rule of Evidence 606(b), which “prohibits a juror from testifying about ‘any matter or statement
occurring during the jury’s deliberations,’ with two exceptions,” including “whether any outside
influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror.” McQuarrie v. State, 380 S.W.3d 145,
                                               16
fellow jurors of DNA “facts and statistics” he had learned after touring a DNA laboratory. 6

Hernandez asserts that “[h]ad an evidentiary hearing been held on [his] motion, . . . [he] would

have had an opportunity to address the egregious actions of a juror that influenced the jury’s

verdict, depriving [Hernandez] of a fair and impartial trial.”

               “The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United State[s] Constitution

guarantee the right to be tried by impartial, indifferent jurors whose verdict is based solely upon

the evidence developed at trial.” Compton v. State, 666 S.W.3d 685, 725 (Tex. Crim. App.

2023), cert. denied, No. 23-5682, 2024 WL 1607737 (U.S. Apr. 15, 2024); see Holbrook

v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 567 (1986) (“Central to the right to a fair trial, guaranteed by the Sixth

and Fourteenth Amendments, is the principle that ‘one accused of a crime is entitled to have his

guilt or innocence determined solely on the basis of the evidence introduced at trial’” (quoting

Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 485 (1978))). This principle is codified in Texas Rule of

Appellate Procedure 21.3(f), which provides that a defendant must be granted a new trial “when,

after retiring to deliberate, the jury has received other evidence; when a juror has talked with

150 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (quoting Tex. R. Evid. 606(b)); see Tex. R. App. P. 21.3(f). Rule
606(b) likewise prohibits a trial court from receiving “a juror’s affidavit or evidence of a juror’s
statement on these matters.” Tex. R. Evid. 606(b). While it is correct that “[a] juror’s affidavit
states reasonable grounds only if the matter discussed in the affidavit would be admissible in a
subsequent hearing on the motion for new trial,” Dunkins v. State, 838 S.W.2d 898, 899 (Tex.
App.—Texarkana 1992, pet. ref’d), the affidavit is “but a pleading that authorizes the
introduction of supporting evidence” and “is not evidence in itself,” Stephenson v. State,
494 S.W.2d 900, 909–10 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973). In other words, Rule 606(b) does not offer a
basis for Hernandez to demonstrate entitlement to a hearing on his motion for new trial but
merely limits his attempt to prove that Rule 21.3—which does offer such a basis—could have
potentially entitled him to relief. See Fino v. State, No. 05-17-00169-CR, 2018 WL 3829781, at
*16 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 13, 2018, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
       6   Although Hernandez raised other grounds in his motion for new trial, he does not
advance them on appeal in arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his
request for a hearing.
                                                 17
anyone about the case; or when a juror became so intoxicated that his or her vote was probably

influenced as a result.” Tex. R. App. P. 21.3(f).

               To merit reversal under Rule 21.3(f), the “other evidence” must be (1) received by

the jury and (2) detrimental to the defendant. Najar v. State, 618 S.W.3d 366, 374 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2021) (citing Stephenson v. State, 571 S.W.2d 174, 176 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978)).

“Whether the jury has ‘received’ other evidence is a fact question to be decided by the trial court

and may also be a question of degree in some circumstances.” Guevara v. State, 4 S.W.3d 771,

779 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, no pet.) (citing Guice v. State, 900 S.W.2d 387, 389 (Tex.

App.—Texarkana 1995, pet. ref’d)). “In determining whether evidence was ‘received’ by the

jury, a court may consider how extensively the evidence was examined by the jury.” Bustamante

v. State, 106 S.W.3d 738, 743 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). A “passing remark” does not qualify as

“other evidence.” Najar, 618 S.W.3d at 374.

               Whether evidence is detrimental “depends on ‘the character of the evidence, in

light of the issues before the jury, not the effect of such evidence on the jurors.’” Id. (quoting

Garza v. State, 630 S.W.2d 272, 274 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981)). “The Court of Criminal Appeals

has explained that evidence is detrimental to the accused when ‘reason and common sense can

see it was harmful to the accused.’” In re M.A.F., 966 S.W.2d 448, 450 (Tex. 1998) (quoting

Collier v. State, 297 S.W.2d 160, 162 (Tex. Crim. App. 1956)). If evidence is detrimental, “the

presumption of injury to the defendant will obtain, and it is unnecessary for the accused to

prove that the jurors’ votes were influenced by the improper evidence.” Id.; see Carroll v. State,

990 S.W.2d 761, 762–63 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, no pet.) (recognizing presumption of injury,

assuming that constitutional harmless error analysis applies, and stating that appellate court must

reverse unless it determines “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute[] to the

                                                18
conviction or the punishment”); cf. Lucero v. State, 246 S.W.3d 86, 95 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)

(where foreman read Bible during punishment deliberations, concluding that Court need not

determine whether action was “outside influence” under Rule 606(b) because “record presents no

‘reasonable grounds’ that this Bible reading affected the jury’s verdict”).

               The trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing Hernandez’s request for a

hearing on his motion for new trial because the motion’s accompanying affidavit was

conclusory, and the court could have reasonably concluded that the “other evidence” received by

the jury was not detrimental.

               First, we note that while the State does not directly assert that P.M.’s

accompanying affidavit was conclusory, “a court of appeals may properly affirm the denial of a

hearing on a motion for new trial based upon a holding that the affidavit supporting the motion

was insufficient, even though that specific claim was not made by the state.”             Martinez,

74 S.W.3d at 21. A motion for new trial must be accompanied by an affidavit that sets out the

factual basis for the raised claims and “specifically show[s] the truth of the grounds of attack.”

King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 569 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); see Hobbs v. State, 298 S.W.3d 193,

199 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Colone v. State, 573 S.W.3d 249, 260 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019).

“[A]ffidavits that are conclusory in nature and unsupported by facts do not provide the requisite

notice of the basis for the relief claimed; thus, no hearing is required.” Smith, 286 S.W.3d at

339. “Bare assertions, without supporting factual allegations, are not sufficient to entitle a party

to a hearing, and a trial court is not required to hold a hearing to conduct a ‘fishing expedition.’”

Colone, 573 S.W.3d at 260.

               P.M.’s affidavit attested only that juror W.Z. “prior to and during deliberations”

shared “DNA facts and statistics that were not admitted into evidence during the trial.” P.M.

                                                 19
also attested that W.Z. “shared with the Jury that he investigated the DNA evidence by touring a

DNA lab” but that other jurors were not swayed by his information until they were “instructed

Mr. [W.Z.]’s visit to the DNA lab was the basis for his information.” Nowhere in his affidavit

does P.M. state what the “facts and statistics” were, whether they directly concerned or were

relevant to the DNA testing in this case, or how they could have influenced the jury. Although

Hernandez did not need to plead a prima facie case, he had to “‘at least allege sufficient facts that

show reasonable grounds to demonstrate that he could prevail’ on the merits of his claim.”

Corporon, 586 S.W.3d at 557 (quoting Hobbs, 298 S.W.3d at 199–200). From this record, the

trial court could have reasonably concluded that the affidavit was deficient and did not entitle

Hernandez to a hearing on his motion. See, e.g., Colone, 573 S.W.3d at 260 (finding that

defendant’s “affidavits made a number of bare assertions without alleging supporting facts to

show that those assertions were true” where he alleged that State leaked trial information through

jailhouse snitch but did not show that leaked information was untruthful or was known to jury);

King, 29 S.W.3d at 569 (concluding that “[n]one of [defendant’s] bare assertions establish facts

entitling him to a new trial” where his motion and affidavit explained neither who threatened

prospective witness or what witness’s testimony would have been); Jordan, 883 S.W.2d at 665

(holding that affidavit was deficient where defendant alleged counsel failed properly to

investigate facts or subpoena witnesses but did not explain why counsel’s investigation was

deficient, what further investigation would have revealed, or what witnesses would have said).

               Even if the affidavit had been sufficient, the trial court could have reasonably

concluded that any information provided by W.Z. was not detrimental to Hernandez. Three

                                                 20
DNA experts, Heard, Lott, and Benjamin, testified at length at trial. 7 While the DNA evidence

played a substantial role in both party’s cases, the defense argued that it was central to

Hernandez’s case and necessitated acquittal. Defense counsel repeatedly emphasized that the

amounts of DNA recovered were minuscule, which she asserted disproved Maria’s account

because Hernandez’s saliva would have been a rich source of DNA. In her opening statement,

counsel insisted, “DNA results will come back in 2011 and they do not support [Maria]’s claim.”

Counsel reiterated the DNA evidence’s benefit to Hernandez in closing: “Saliva. Man, the

saving grace in this case, in my opinion, is that DNA test.” She also stressed that Hernandez

could not be included as a contributor to any of the samples, hypothesized that the DNA

evidence had led Maria to change her story, and contended that it refuted the State’s theory that

the two male profiles obtained from the anal swab were of Hernandez and his son. In contrast,

the State argued that it was probative that any male DNA was recovered from Maria’s vaginal

and anal swabs and underscored that multiple witnesses had testified to the mechanisms by

which DNA evidence could have been removed before testing.

              The trial court could also have inferred that W.Z.’s facts and statistics had not

been detrimental to Hernandez because at least one juror did not recall W.Z.’s sharing the

information. Attached to Hernandez’s motion was not only P.M.’s accompanying affidavit but a

       7 The comprehensiveness of the DNA testimony presented during the trial makes the
conclusory nature of P.M.’s affidavit all the more apparent. “Other evidence” does not include
evidence that is redundant or cumulative of that presented at trial. See Perez v. State,
No. 03-10-00265-CR, 2011 WL 3518047, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 12, 2011, pet. ref’d)
(mem. op., not designated for publication); Flix v. State, 782 S.W.2d 1, 2–3 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, pet. ref’d). Yet without knowing the substance of the information
W.Z. shared, we cannot say whether it was cumulative.
                                               21
questionnaire 8 completed by juror L.H., in which she answered “No” when asked if “any juror

communicate[d] information to other jurors regarding DNA testing, results or statistics that was

not presented as evidence during the trial,” if “any juror communicate[d] that DNA or

Y chromosomes had a short life span and/or would not be available for testing within hours of

being collected,” and if she observed “any juror referring to information, facts, data, statistics,

etc. that was not introduced at trial as evidence and to which the Defendant was not provided an

opportunity to cross-examine.”

               Moreover, “DNA facts and statistics” is evidence of a character qualitatively

different from “other evidence” found to be detrimental.        We recited a catalogue of such

evidence in Carroll v. State, in which the jury received a mugshot of the defendant that was

unconnected with the trial in that case:

       Bearden v. State, 648 S.W.2d 688, 692 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (juror commented
       on alcohol-service policies of nightclub in appeal from DWI conviction);
       Alexander v. State, 610 S.W.2d 750, 752 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (juror stated
       during deliberations that he knew accused and that “his character was bad”); Hunt
       v. State, 603 S.W.2d 865, 868–69 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (juror speculated on
       details of murder based on his Marine Corps training); Stephenson v. State,
       571 S.W.2d 174, 176 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (juror claimed to know facts
       personally, and other jurors claimed to have personal knowledge that some
       witnesses were not truthful); Shivers v. State, 756 S.W.2d 442, 443–44 (Tex.
       App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no pet.) (jury foreman drove to crime scene
       during jury deliberations and reported to jury that eyewitness’s view was not
       obstructed by tree).

990 S.W.2d at 762–63 (citing In re M.A.F., 966 S.W.2d at 450–51) (after retiring to deliberate,

jury discovered marijuana cigarette in juvenile’s jacket, which had been admitted as exhibit). In

       8 While L.H. swore that her answers were true and correct to the best of her knowledge
and signed below the jurat, the questionnaire was not notarized.
                                                22
contrast to the evidence in these cases, there is nothing inherently indicative of bias or

detrimental to Hernandez’s defense in information about DNA testing.

                 Although P.M. averred that W.Z.’s information “impacted the jury’s verdict”

because it “went from being deadlocked and almost evenly split” at 7 p.m. to “returning a

unanimous ‘guilty’ verdict” around 10 p.m., we do not consider the evidence’s effect on the jury

in deciding whether it was detrimental.       See Najar, 618 S.W.3d at 374 (quoting Garza,

630 S.W.2d at 274). We also note that the trial court read a supplemental so-called “Allen

charge” or “dynamite charge” to the jury during that interval.

                 For these reasons, we cannot say that the trial court’s denial of Hernandez’s

request for a hearing on his motion for new trial “was so clearly wrong as to lie outside that zone

within which reasonable persons might disagree.” Gonzales v. State, 304 S.W.3d 838, 842 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2010) (quoting Smith, 286 S.W.3d at 339–40); see also State v. Gonzalez,

855 S.W.2d 692, 695 n.4 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (adding that it is not reviewing court’s place to

substitute its judgment for that of trial court but to determine whether its decision was

unreasonable or arbitrary); Charles v. State, 146 S.W.3d 204, 208 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004),

superseded by rule on other grounds as recognized by State v. Herndon, 215 S.W.3d 901, 906

n.16 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (clarifying that “[a] trial court abuses its discretion only when no

reasonable view of the record could support the court’s ruling”). We overrule Hernandez’s

sole issue.

                                        CONCLUSION

                 Having overruled Hernandez’s only issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgments

of conviction.

                                                23
                                           __________________________________________
                                           Edward Smith, Justice

Before Justices Baker, Triana, and Smith

Affirmed

Filed: April 24, 2024

Do Not Publish

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