Court Opinion

ID: 9537125
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:12:54.400212+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:56:05.653531
License: Public Domain

SUTIN, Judge (dissenting). I dissent. A. The admission of ,"one drink” of beer was prejudicial error. “Reckless driving” is defined in § 64-22-3(A), N.M.S.A.1953 (2d Repl.Vol. 9, pt. 2). It reads: Any person who drives any vehicle carelessly and heedlessly in willful or wanton disregard of the rights or safety of others and without due caution and circumspection and at a speed or in a manner so as to endanger or be likely to endanger any person or property is guilty of reckless driving. [Emphasis added] Was “one drink” of beer an hour or more before the fatal accident admissible to prove the charge of homicide by vehicle while violating the statute on reckless driving? There was no evidence that defendant, at any time, was intoxicated, under the influence of intoxicating liquor, or that his ability to drive was impaired in any way by reason of “one drink” of beer consumed. The “one drink” had no bearing upon reckless driving nor was it relevant to the charge. The majority opinion relies on the phrase “drinking and driving” in order to justify relevancy. My colleagues look at “one drink” of beer with antagonistic eyes. Defendant’s first contention is that the relevancy of the “one drink” was conditional on a showing that the “one drink” played some causal role in the accident. The majority opinion does not answer this contention. Common sense and common knowledge teaches us that one drink of beer, an hour or more before the fatal accident, in the absence of any other evidence bearing on this issue, played no part in the proximate cause thereof via reckless driving. The question to decide is: Was the admission of the testimony, over objection, prejudicial error? State v. Martin, 73 Wash.2d 616, 627, 440 P.2d 429, 437 (1968) says: A prejudicial error may be defined as one which affects or presumptively affects the final results of the trial. State v. Britton, supra [27 Wash.2d 336, 178 P.2d 341 (1947)]. When the appellate court is unable to say from the record before it whether the defendant would or would not have been convicted but for the error committed in the trial court, then the error may not be deemed harmless, and the defendant’s right to a fair trial requires that the verdict be set aside and that he be granted a new trial. But, where the defendant’s guilt is conclusively proven by competent evidence, and no other rational conclusion can be reached except that the defendant is guilty as charged, then the conviction should not be set aside because of unsubstantial errors. S Am.Jur.2d Appeal and Error 786 (1962). To determine whether prejudice has resulted, it is necessary that the appellate court examine the entire record. . An examination of the entire record shows that on June 20, 1974, at 3:10 p. m., defendant was driving north on South Second Street in Raton, approaching a right angle intersection with Apache Avenue. South Second Street is the main through street of Raton. The defendant was driving 40 to 45 m. p. h., 10 to 15 m. p. h. in excess of the speed limit. The deceased’s car stopped at the stop sign on Apache facing west. He looked both ways, and then crossed the main street in front of defendant’s vehicle. The defendant’s car hit the driver’s side of the deceased’s car broadside while defendant was in his left hand northbound lane. Defendant’s car left 74 feet of skid marks up to the point of impact. The only question is: Does driving at a 40 to 45 m. p. h. speed in the left northbound lane of the multi-lane main street conclusively establish defendant’s guilt of reckless driving when the deceased’s car drove out in front of him? Of course not. The reckless driving statute requires three elements: (1) driving carelessly and heedlessly in willful or wanton disregard of the rights and safety of others, and (2) without due caution and circumspection, and (3) at a speed or in a manner so as to endanger or be likely to endanger any person or property. The State must prove each of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant is presumed to be innocent, and this presumption remains with him until his guilt is established by the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Henderson, 81 N.M. 270, 466 P.2d 116 (Ct.App.1970). Reckless driving consists of driving at an excessive speed on the wrong side of the road in a residential neighborhood. State v. Richerson, 87 N.M. 437, 535 P.2d 644 (Ct.App.1975). Cases cited therein cover other similar situations. Under the guest statute, § 64—24-1, N. M.S.A.1953 (2d Repl.Vol. 9, pt. 2), a guest has a cause of action if the host drives in a heedless or reckless disregard of the rights of others. Valencia v. Dixon, 83 N.M. 70, 488 P.2d 120 (Ct.App.1971) holds that the reckless driving statute falls within this portion of the guest statute. The Supreme Court has consistently held that speed alone is not sufficient to constitute a heedless or reckless disregard of the rights of others. McGuire v. Pearson, 78 N.M. 357, 431 P.2d 735 (1967). And where a driver makes a U turn, fails to keep a lookout for approaching vehicles, fails to yield the right of way and fails to heed a warning, he does not act with heedless or reckless disregard of the rights of others. Dee v. Buford, 82 N.M. 642, 485 P.2d 976 (Ct.App.1971). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has said that the standard of culpability under the guest statute is “not different from that required to secure a conviction for involuntary manslaughter”. Amaro v. Moss, 65 N.M. 373, 376, 337 P.2d 948, 951 (1959); Valencia v. Strayer, 73 N.M. 252, 387 P.2d 456 (1963); McGuire v. Pearson, supra. The facts set forth, supra, do not conclusively establish that defendant was guilty of reckless driving. We must now determine whether the “one drink” evidence was prejudicial error. This depends upon whether we are unable to say from the record that defendant would or would not have been convicted but for the error committed in the trial court. Gensemer v. Williams, 419 F.2d 1361 (3rd Cir. 1970) held that, under Pennsylvania law, the mere fact of drinking intoxicating liquor is inadmissible unless it reasonably establishes a degree of intoxication which proves unfitness to drive; that it is highly prejudicial to hear evidence bearing on the subject where the jury could not reach a finding of intoxication. Gilberto v. Nordtvedt, 1 Ill.App.3d 677, 274 N.E.2d 139 (1971) held, in a civil suit for damages, that “one can of beer” testimony should have been stricken; that the introduction of this irrelevant evidence is cause for reversal only if it results in prejudicing the jury’s verdict. The error was not prejudicial because “. . . there was no other reference to drinking in any argument to the jury . . ..” In the instant case, in closing argument, the State did raise this issue before the j ury as follows: Now, there is evidence here that the defendant was drinking shortly before this wreck. He was drinking from a quart bottle. How much he drank during the afternoon, we don’t know for sure, but that fact has been brought into evidence. And if he was drinking from a quart bottle, we could assume I suppose that he had more than one drink. We all know what drinking does to a driver. [Emphasis added] See, Dominguez v. Albuquerque Bus Co., 58 N.M, 562, 273 P.2d 756 (1954) on argument to the jury on inadmissible evidence. The testimony shows that the vehicle was in a filling station for about ten minutes to have a flat tire repaired. The attendant testified that defendant and Gilbert Martinez were walking around waiting for the repair job; that Gilbert Martinez, not defendant, had a quart bottle of beer. The attendant saw defendant drink once from this bottle, an hour or more before the accident. This was the only evidence of record. The argument of the State on “one drink” was prejudicial error. The majority opinion follows the argument of the State. It says: But common sense and common knowledge teaches us that drinking and driving do not mix. Evidence of drinking does have a tendency to make the existence of carelessness or lack of due caution more probable than it would be without the evidence. [Emphasis added] My colleagues, in jumping over prejudicial error, did a pole vault without a pole. Defendant tried to cure this prejudicial error by a requested instruction that the jury “may not consider any evidence pertaining to drinking . . . for any purpose in reaching your verdict.” The requested instruction was refused. I cannot say from the record whether defendant would or would not have been convicted but for the “one drink” error.