Court Opinion

ID: 9581675
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:17:26.310336+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:11.022123
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE COMPTON, with whom JUSTICE LACY joins,
dissenting.
Recently, this Court said that ‘‘it has not been the policy of the law of Virginia to facilitate litigation by [policemen and firemen] as *497a means of compensating them for injuries received in the line of duty, but rather to impose that burden on the public generally, through workers’ compensation and other benefits.” Commonwealth v. Millsaps, 232 Va. 502, 509, 352 S.E.2d 311, 315 (1987) (citing Pearson v. Canada Contracting Co., 232 Va. 177, 184-85, 349 S.E.2d 106, 111 (1986)). In Millsaps, a property-damage claim on behalf of the Commonwealth, the Court stated, “we perceive no logical basis for a distinction between damage to public property and injuries to public officers.” Id. Thus, the Court, adhering to precedent, reaffirmed the principle as follows: “Under the ‘fireman’s rule,’ such officers are held, as a matter of law, to assume the risks of injury occasioned by ordinary negligence inherently involved in the normal pursuit of their duties.” Id. at 509-10, 352 S.E.2d at 315 (citing Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Crouch, 208 Va. 602, 608-09, 159 S.E.2d 650, 654-55, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 845 (1968)). The Court pointed out that this settled rule “is based upon the officer’s relationship with the public, from which arises his obligation to accept the usual risks inherent in his duties, whether caused by negligence or not.” Millsaps, 232 Va. at 510, 352 S.E.2d at 315.
In the present cases, the majority has departed from precedent in a hairsplitting discussion relying on cases from foreign jurisdictions. In one case, we have a policeman injured while engaged in enforcing the traffic laws. In the other case, we have a fireman injured in responding to a fire. In my opinion and to paraphrase Millsaps, both injuries were occasioned by ordinary negligence inherently involved in the normal pursuit of both plaintiffs’ public duties. No logical distinction properly can be drawn between the activities of these two public officers at the times of their injuries and the activity of the policeman at the time of the property damage in Millsaps.
Accordingly, I would affirm the judgments of the respective trial courts.