Court Opinion

ID: 9649192
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:44:26.287856+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:08.696548
License: Public Domain

MACK, Associate Judge,
dissenting:
I find the analysis of the majority troubling and its holding contra to established law in this jurisdiction. I can think of no more compelling combination of circumstances for invoking the due process doctrine against prosecutorial vindictiveness than that presented here.
The spectre of prosecutorial vindictiveness arises whenever the prosecution “ups the ante” after a defendant has exercised a right in which the prosecution has a stake. Here the defendants exercised a right, permitted by our rules, in requesting joinder; the government by its own admission had a “stake” in prosecuting the defendants in two groups; the reindictment following the motion for joinder, without advance notice to the defendants or the court, exposed each defendant to 105-135 additional years punishment on 10-14 additional felony counts. This is the appearance of vindictiveness which the majority recognized. Having cogently and correctly argued that due process requires the elimination of the appearance of vindictiveness in the legal process, the majority lapses into faulty reasoning.
In the first instance, the majority has lost sight of the fact that the trial court, after a hearing, found not merely the appearance of vindictiveness but actual vindictiveness. This record clearly shows that the trial judge found as a matter of fact that the government had retaliated against the accused for requesting joinder. We are required to sustain the trial court’s determination unless it is clearly erroneous or without support in the record.1
*59In the second instance, the majority — certainly after the fact in this case — has written into the doctrine of prosecutorial vindictiveness a balancing test2 which is contrary to established precedent, inconsistent with due process concerns, and irrelevant to the purposes for which it is advanced. Thus we all agree that, once there are factors raising the appearance of vindictiveness, it is the government that has the burden of dispelling the likelihood of such. Yet the majority’s inquiries as to the nature of the right exercised by the accused, the nature of the harm suffered by the accused, and the nature and status of the case shed no light whatsoever on the question of whether the government was acting in retaliation. Quite obviously, once the possibility of vindictiveness exists, the proper inquiry is whether the alleged retaliatory action was sufficiently independent of the defense assertion of a right as to make the likelihood of vindictiveness de minimus.
Both the Supreme Court in Pearce3 and Blackledge,4 and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in United States v. Jamison,5 have alluded to the type of factors and proof necessary to dispel an apparently vindictive motive.6 In Pearce, the Supreme Court held that a sentencing judge, upon retrial, must justify a harsher sentence on the record in a way which negates the possibility of vindictiveness. In Blackledge, the Court noted one factor that might dispel the likelihood of vindictive motivation of a prosecutor’s rein-dictment — the impossibility of proceeding on the more serious charge in the first indictment. 417 U.S. at 30 n.7, 94 S.Ct. at 2103 n.7. In Jamison, the District of Columbia Circuit elaborated on these cases, reasoning that a reindictment on an increased charge “might in some circumstances be justified by intervening events or by new evidence of which the government was excusably unaware at the time of the first indictment.” Id. 164 U.S.App.D.C. at 310, 505 F.2d 407.7 One can deduce from these eases that when the prosecution “ups the ante” after defense assertion of a right, the government has the burden of showing some independent or new circumstance to dispel the apparent retaliation. Absent such a showing, the reindictment cannot stand.
In my view, the reindictment should not stand in this case. The trial court held the proper inquiry8 to enable the government to dispel the likelihood of vindictiveness and determined thereafter that there were facts establishing vindictiveness. The court’s determination is well supported by a record, not only showing that there were no intervening events or new evidence dispelling vindictiveness, but replete with inferences to be drawn to the contrary from prosecuto-rial timing, inconsistent positions, inadequate explanations, a candid but near-facetious admission, and silence in the face of an affirmative duty to speak.
Thus the record shows that at the July 5 arraignment of the Schiller defendants, the defense revealed they would seek joinder. The government opposed this suggestion, *60giving as its reasons that “during the grand jury stage it became obvious that there were two different types of cases and these were indicted separately because we expect little overlápping witnesses ...” and “one of the reasons that the cases are indicted separately is based on what the government’s evidence in each case is going to be, and it’s going to be different.” (Indeed, the two indictments underscore this assertion: in the Schiller indictment, each defendant was named as a principal in at least one count; none of the defendants in the Ava-kian indictment was named as a principal.)
The defense formally filed its motion for joinder on July 17. On July 24 the government obtained the second indictment. On July 25, the government filed its response to the formal motion, now giving a different reason for the first indictments: “the government was trying to avoid the confusion of having seventeen defense attorneys and seventeen defendants in trial at once and to minimize prejudice to the defendants against whom we have the least amount of evidence.” The government no longer opposed joinder “because the defendants now specifically waive any potential prejudice.” The pleading stated an intention to seek reindictment because it would be “impractical and prejudicial to the government to try the existing indictments together.” But it had already obtained the new indictment, significantly increasing the charges as to each defendant, without revealing this “price” either to the defense or the court. This silence of the government is a key factor in the trial court’s conclusion.
Finally, in its opposition to the defense motion to dismiss Indictment # 2, the government explained that “[f]or what the government had thought would be convenient packaging for trial, the government initially chose to [indict separately]. However when defendants asked for joinder ... the government gave them what they asked' for. The new indictment holds them all accountable for all the assaults to which they plan their common defense.” (Emphasis added.)
We cannot ignore this record. Rather I think that in the circumstances here the Pearce-Blackledge line of cases operates, in effect, to take the decision to reindict out of the realm of prosecutorial discretion. The evidence was known to the prosecutor when it brought the first indictments. It made the initial decision, for apparently valid tactical and administrative reasons, to indict the defendants in two groups. When the motion for joinder was made, the government realized the trial of all the defendants under the existing indictments presented problems prejudicial to its case. Faced with the joinder motion and possible prejudice to its case, it should have opposed joinder unless a second indictment were possible and presented the issue to the trial court for resolution. This would have put the defendants on notice, as would seem to be required by Bordenkircher, of the possible consequences of their request, before it became a fait accompli. Had the second indictment been ordered by the trial judge, the taint of vindictiveness would have been dispelled.9
The defendants are charged with serious accusations. Yet the government, in giving them what they asked for, also is engaged in serious business, and so are we. Of the 78 persons originally arrested, the grand jury returned indictments for only 17. Each of the 8 Schiller defendants was originally charged with 15 felony counts, upped to 25 counts after reindictment, exposing them to potentially an additional 105 year punishment. The 9 Avakian defendants were each originally charged with 12 felony counts, none as named principals, to which 14 were added, increasing their punishment exposure to 135 years.10
*61The trial court, after a hearing, made a finding of actual vindictiveness. I do not see how, on this record, an appellate court can conclude that there is no “realistic likelihood of vindictiveness.” If the rule against prosecutorial vindictiveness is to mean anything in this jurisdiction, it must be applied here.

. The majority employs an ambiguous standard of review. A hearing was held and a finding of vindictiveness made by the trial judge. Thus, we are at most presented with a mixed question of fact and law, if not simply a factual matter. Yet the majority seems to treat this as a matter of law alone; or alternatively that the court’s ruling is not supported by sufficient evidence. Moreover, the majority engages in its own factfinding and accepts as persuasive the very facts the trial court rejected, at the *59same time rejecting the facts the court relied on — the government’s silence and changing explanations.

. The majority has not given the trial court the option of “balancing” in this case.

. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969).

. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 94 S.Ct. 2098, 40 L.Ed.2d 628 (1974).

. United States v. Jamison, 164 U.S.App.D.C. 300, 505 F.2d 407 (1974).

. In addition, Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 98 S.Ct. 663, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978) would seem to suggest that advance notice to the defense of the possible consequences of seeking joinder is also required.

. See Harvey v. United States, D.C.App., 395 A.2d 92, 98 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 936, 99 S.Ct. 2061, 60 L.Ed.2d 665 (1979) (even where prosecutor reindicted after failure of plea bargain, governed by Bordenkircher, we nonetheless noted the preferred practice of bringing all the charges at the outset, unless there were compelling reasons for bringing a later charge such as new evidence).

. See Wynn v. United States, D.C.App., 386 A.2d 695 (1978).

. See, e. g., Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 1953, 32 L.Ed.2d 584 (1972) (where increased sentence was imposed by different judge, the possibility-of vindictiveness was dispelled); Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 93 S.Ct. 1977, 36 L.Ed.2d 714 (1973) (where jury, rather than judge, imposed stiffer sentence, possibility of vindictiveness dispelled).

. For unexplained reasons, one of the Avakian defendants, Barry Greenberg, was a named principal in the second indictment. In the original indictment he was not.