Court Opinion

ID: 9760550
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:00:11.661033+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:13.560467
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
PER CURIAM.
The holding in this case that a change in the visitation rights of a non-custodial parent must, in like manner to a change in custody, be supported by evidence of a change in circumstances of the child or his custodian, is challenged by respondent on motion for rehearing. He asserts a different rule prevails in the Eastern District of this court, citing Blankenship v. Blankenship, 699 S.W.2d 44 (Mo.App.1985), and perhaps in the Southern District, an inference drawn from Keith v. Keith, 708 S.W.2d 350 (Mo.App.1986). If there be such a divergence in views among the districts, which is not at all certain, this court adheres to the view expressed in the principal opinion under the analysis which follows.
The earliest case that research has disclosed dealing with the issue of what proof is necessary to modify child visitation provisions for the non-custodial parent is Phipps v. Phipps, 168 Mo.App. 697, 154 S.W. 825 (1913). The appeal was from an order which changed non-specific visitation rights to allow temporary custody on Saturdays. The custodial parent contended the modification was erroneously ordered because no evidence had proved a change in circumstances from those existing when the decree was entered. The opinion concluded that the modification was supported by proof showing a sufficient change in the mother’s “situation and character” to justify the order. The language used implies that some change in the situation which existed when the decree was make is a prerequisite to a modification of visitation.
*255Some of the earlier cases appear to treat orders modifying child custody and orders changing visitation schedules as being of the same category but with a somewhat lesser degree of proof required where only visitation is at issue. Thus, in Poor v. Poor, 237 Mo.App. 744, 167 S.W.2d 471 (1942), the trial court changed the custody of two children, leaving one with the mother but giving custody of the other to the father, and also providing as to each child that the non-custodial parent would have weekend and vacation visitation. The opinion held:
“It is our conclusion that * * * there is not sufficient change in the conditions of the parties * * * to warrant the court changing the original decree, except as to the rights of visitation.”
Poor, supra, at 478.
The next series of cases demonstrates a tendency in the opinions to use the term “custody” in discussing visitation, particularly where the non-custodial parent is to have the child weekends or for vacation periods. Each of the following cases, however, adheres to the proposition that changes in visitation from arrangements provided in the original decree may be ordered only upon proof of change circumstances. Pope v. Pope, 267 S.W.2d 340 (Mo.App.1954); Lewis v. Lewis, 301 S.W.2d 861 (Mo.App.1957); Hughes v. Wagner, 303 S.W.2d 181 (Mo.App.1957). Representative of this group of cases is Pope in which the father appealed a modification order giving the mother custody of the child from 9:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. on Sundays. The court states: “Upon the record presented plaintiff failed to show any change of condition affecting the child’s best interest and welfare warranting the modification which was made.” Pope, supra at 342.
An opinion form this court in Mitchell v. Mitchell, 350 S.W.2d 116 (Mo.App.1961), noted the difference in requirements for proof of changes in circumstances justifying a modification of custody and a modification of visitation. It was there said:
“It must be kept in mind that the order appealed from does not change the general custody of the child. The original decree was only modified with respect to visitation privileges. This court announced in the case of Phipps v. Phipps, 168 Mo.App. 697, 154 S.W.2d 825, that where the order merely relates to visitation privileges only slight changes in the conditions arising since the original decree was entered will justify the order.” (emphasis in original)
Mitchell, supra at 118.
Turning to more recent opinions, McCammon v. McCammon, 680 S.W.2d 196 (Mo.App.1984), was an appeal from an order which modified the father’s visitation rights and allowed the children to be with him during vacations and at other specified periods. To some extent, the case was similar to the subject case in that in McCammon, the father alleged that the mother had denied his visitation. In McCammon, however, the father also alleged changed circumstances resulting from his remarriage and establishment of a suitable home environment. The court affirmed the order stating that there was proof of a change of condition of the children sufficient to justify modification.
In Wolff v. Wolff, 628 S.W.2d 923, 924 (Mo.App.1982), the decree was modified in several respects, including a change in visitation which allowed the minor son to travel by airplane from Florida to the father’s home in Missouri for visits. The court affirmed the order citing the rule that modification requires a showing of changed circumstances so substantial and continuing as to make the terms unreasonable. Several cases rule, as did In re Marriage of Hays, 594 S.W.2d 369, 370 (Mo.App. 1980), that a change ordered in visitation was supported by “sufficient evidence.”
The two cases upon which respondent’s motion primarily relies, Blankenship and Keith, do contain language from which it could be argued that a change in circumstances is not a prerequisite to an order changing visitation. That proposition, however, is only an inference and not a direct holding in either case. Blankenship, supra at 45, recites evidence in the case which justifies the modification. That evidence showed changed circumstances. The *256opinion in Keith does say that the conditions of § 452.410, RSMo.1986 need not be met to allow the non-custodial parent overnight visitation, but the same opinion, Keith, supra at 354, affirms the trial court’s decision to deny enlarged visitation on the ground that a substantial or continuing change of circumstances had not been proved.
No case has been found in which it has been held that a change in visitation may be ordered modifying a dissolution decree without some proof of changed circumstances. All of the cases indicate that visitation orders must be constructed to further the best interests of the children. It therefore follows that a party affected by a dissolution decree in respect to visitation in the non-custodial parent must, as a condition to securing a modification order, show that circumstances since the decree have changed and that revised visitation as sought will be in the best interests of the children. Neither was proved in this case and the order therefore lacks evidentiary support.