Court Opinion

ID: 9574953
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:09:56.258207+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:47:31.627981
License: Public Domain

KENNARD, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
This case is a watershed event in the development of the law of privacy, and the majority opinion makes major contributions to the evolution of privacy jurisprudence. Most important, today this court firmly establishes that, in accordance with the will of the voters who enacted the Privacy Amendment to article I, section 1 of the California Constitution in 1972, the state constitutional right to privacy applies to nongovernmental as well as governmental invasions of fundamental privacy interests.
The majority provides a thorough and thoughtful exposition of the constitutional principles at issue here. I agree with the majority’s basic legal analysis. I write separately to comment briefly on several of the most significant aspects of the majority opinion’s legal discussion, and to explain why, after careful consideration, I cannot join the majority in its disposition of this case. As I shall discuss, in view of the principles set forth in the majority opinion, I would direct the Court of Appeal to remand this case for further consideration by the trial court.
I
When the voters enacted the Privacy Amendment to the California Constitution in 1972, they set in motion a new phase of constitutional adjudication. In the past 20 years, this court and the Courts of Appeal have been called upon to consider and apply the broad constitutional concept of privacy to a wide array of factual scenarios. (See, e.g., Long Beach City Employees Assn. v. City of Long Beach (1986) 41 Cal.3d 937, 943-948 [227 Cal.Rptr. 90, 719 P.2d 660] [polygraph examinations]; White v. Davis (1975) 13 Cal.3d 757, 773-776 [120 Cal.Rptr. 94, 533 P.2d 222] [police surveillance of university students]; Luck v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1, 15-16 [267 Cal.Rptr. 618] [collection and testing of urine]; Porten v. University of San Francisco (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 825, 829-830 [134 Cal.Rptr. 839] [unauthorized disclosure of academic information].) Although this court has not previously addressed the question, the Courts of Appeal have concluded that the Privacy Amendment does indeed apply against nongovernmental actors as well as public entities. (See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp. (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1034 [264 Cal.Rptr. 194]; Kinsey v. Macur (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 265 [165 Cal.Rptr. 608]; Porten v. University of San Francisco, supra, 64 Cal.App.3d 825.) But at least one *59commentator has disagreed (Kelso, California’s Constitutional Right to Privacy (1992) 19 Pepperdine L.Rev. 327), and the issue could not be considered settled until this court had spoken. We have not, however, until now been required to pass upon the question whether the Privacy Amendment grants a right of action against private actors. (See Schmidt v. Superior Court (1989) 48 Cal.3d 370, 389, fn. 14 [165 Cal.Rptr. 608] [open question].)
Today the majority opinion removes all doubt as to whether there is a state action requirement for lawsuits alleging a violation of the Privacy Amendment: there is none. (Maj. opn., ante, p. 20.) This conclusion is sound, and is consistent with the will of the electorate as revealed in the ballot pamphlet argument accompanying the Privacy Amendment when it was presented to the voters for their decision in 1972. The argument in favor of the Privacy Amendment in the official ballot pamphlet has numerous references to the application of the amendment to private parties. To give but one example, the argument says, “Each time we apply for a credit card or a life insurance policy, file a tax return, interview for a job, or get a drivers’ license, a dossier is opened and an informational profile is sketched.” (Ballot Pamp., Proposed Stats, and Amends, to Cal. Const, with arguments to voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 1972) p. 27 [hereafter Ballot Argument].)
Yet, as the majority recognizes, although the Privacy Amendment reaches nongovernmental invasions of privacy interests as well as government action, this does not mean that asserted invasions of privacy are to be tested by an identical legal standard regardless of whether the defendant is a public or private actor. The majority properly insists that the courts of this state, in assessing alleged invasions of privacy, be guided above all by the context of the particular case. This necessarily means that the correct legal analysis will differ depending in part on the governmental or nongovernmental status of the defendant. Thus, the majority recognizes and accepts the existing law that in appropriate circumstances the compelling interest standard continues to be applicable to governmental invasions of privacy rights, and holds that the compelling interest test must be applied when the interest invaded is fundamental to personal autonomy. (Maj. opn., ante, pp. 34-35; see e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma (1942) 316 U.S. 535, 541 [86 L.Ed. 1655, 1660, 62 S.Ct. 1110]; Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers (1981) 29 Cal.3d 252, 274-275 [172 Cal.Rptr. 866, 625 P.2d 779, 20 A.L.R.4th 1118]; People v. Belous (1969) 71 Cal.2d 954, 963, 964 [80 Cal.Rptr. 354, 458 P.2d 194].) This standard is also consistent with the Ballot Argument. (Ballot Argument, supra, at p. 27 [right to privacy “should be abridged only when there is compelling public need”].)
But when the actions of a nongovernmental entity or person are alleged to have invaded constitutional privacy rights, the majority opinion properly *60demands an additional degree of judicial caution. Under the majority’s approach, nongovernmental action that allegedly abridges privacy rights is not necessarily tested by a compelling interest standard; instead, a less rigorous but still heightened standard of scrutiny will often be proper. As the majority opinion makes plain, the use of different standards for governmental and nongovernmental intrusions on privacy interests is justified by the greater coercive power of government, by the generally wider range of choice available to individuals when dealing with private entities, and by our traditions of tolerance and associational freedom in the private sphere of conduct. (Maj. opn., ante, pp. 38-39; see generally Roberts v. United States Jaycees (1984) 468 U.S. 609 [82 L.Ed.2d 462, 104 S.Ct. 3244].)
The holding that the Privacy Amendment applies to nongovernmental actors is the most significant feature of the majority’s opinion. But two additional aspects of the majority’s exposition of the constitutional law of privacy deserve further comment.
First, the majority opinion correctly requires that a plaintiff who alleges invasion of the constitutional right to privacy must demonstrate a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances, and it characterizes the expectation of privacy as founded on broadly based and widely accepted community norms. (Maj. opn., ante, pp. 36-37.) In so doing, the majority properly focuses on the context in which the invasion of the privacy interest occurs. It is important to emphasize, however, that the applicable social norms are those of society overall, not “social norms” created by an association or an industry practice. (See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland (1979) 442 U.S. 735, 740-741, fn. 5 [61 L.Ed.2d 220, 226-227, 99 S.Ct. 2577]; Rest.2d Torts, § 295A, com. c, p. 63; Prosser & Keaton on Torts (5th ed. 1984) § 33, pp. 194-195.) No association, industry, or other group or entity may establish the parameters of the reasonable expectation of privacy at the expense of society. For instance, an employer may not, simply by announcing in advance that all employees will be subject to periodic strip searches, thereby defeat the employees’ otherwise reasonable expectation that such searches will not occur. Governing social norms, not the specific practices of an individual defendant or industry, define whether a plaintiff has a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Second, the majority opinion holds that once a plaintiff has shown an invasion of a legally cognizable privacy interest, a nongovernmental defendant may assert as an affirmative defense that its actions are justified because they substantively further a countervailing interest. (Maj. opn., ante, p. 40.) The interest, as I understand the majority opinion, must be more than an interest that is not itself illegal. It must be an interest that is necessary to a *61proper and legitimate organizational purpose central to the organization’s objective. In this case, the interest would be comparable to the “educational necessity” the high court has held is appropriate in assessing educational discrimination under title X. (See, e.g., Board of Education, New York City v. Harris (1979) 444 U.S. 130, 151 [62 L.Ed.2d 275, 290-291, 100 S.Ct. 363].) In other cases, the interest may be analogous to the “business necessity” justification applied under the Civil Rights Act. (Dothard v. Rawlinson (1977) 433 U.S. 321, 329 [53 L.Ed.2d 786, 797, 97 S.Ct. 2720]; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e).) In addition, the method used to advance the countervailing interest that results in the invasion of the plaintiff’s privacy must be tailored to serve that interest. (Maj. opn., ante, p. 44; see Treasury Employees v. Von Raab (1989) 489 U.S. 656, 678-679 [103 L.Ed.2d 685, 710-711, 109 S.Ct. 1384]; Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Assn. (1989) 489 U.S. 602, 626-627 [103 L.Ed.2d 639, 665-666, 109 S.Ct. 1402].)
II
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeal determined that the applicable legal standard for resolving this case was to place on the National Collegiate Athletic Association the burden of proving that a compelling interest justified the drug testing program; this case was tried on that basis. The judgments of the trial court and Court of Appeal, although not consistent with the ultimate decision of this court today, were based on existing decisional law (see, e.g., White v. Davis, supra, 13 Cal.3d 757, 775; City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 123, 131 [164 Cal.Rptr. 539, 610 P.2d 436, 12 A.L.R.4th 219]), and were reasoned and good faith efforts to address the very difficult issues presented by this case. Simply put, this matter was tried by the parties and the courts in good faith on a legal theory that this court now holds to be inapplicable.
The result of the majority’s change in the governing legal standard here is that the parties and the trial court, sitting as finder of fact, have not been given a full opportunity to litigate this matter under the new test. The majority holds as a matter of law that plaintiffs have a legally recognized privacy interest (maj. opn., ante, pp. 39-40; accord, Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Assn., supra, 489 U.S. 602, 617 [103 L.Ed.2d 639, 659-660] [“collection and testing of urine intrudes upon expectations of privacy that society has long recognized as reasonable”]). Plaintiffs, however, have not been given a fair opportunity to offer evidence of their reasonable expectations of privacy and of feasible and effective alternatives having a lesser impact on privacy. Plaintiffs should be given the chance to present evidence and argue this case under the legal test announced today. Defendant too should be afforded the opportunity to show that its drug testing program is justified by countervailing interests.
*62Accordingly, in my view, this court should direct the Court of Appeal to remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with today’s decision.