Court Opinion

ID: 9679845
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:10:58.781358+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:22.168459
License: Public Domain

SAM GRIFFITH, Justice.
I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the trial court’s granting of Defendant/Ap-pellee Terri Loftin’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
PlaintifiyApp ell ant Janice Lee’s First Amended Original Petition contended her injuries were the result of Loftin’s failure to exercise ordinary care with regard to both failing to inquire about Lee’s riding ability,13 and for failing to warn14 Lee of the latent dangerous condition of the land upon which the trail ride15 occurred.
Chapter 87 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code is entitled “Liability Arising from Equine Activities or Livestock Shows,” and was enacted by the Texas Legislature to address the issue of liability for persons involved in equine activities and livestock shows. In drafting and enacting the legislation, the Legislature, by the Act’s language, clearly recognized the inherent dangers of working around livestock and especially of riding horses. Chapter 87 provides limitation of the liability of “any person,” which was very broadly defined,16 for personal injury *536or death that resulted from “the dangers or conditions that are an inherent risk of an equine activity....” 17 Tex. Crv. Prao. & Rem.Code Ann. § 87.003 (Vernon 2005). Section 87.003 contains a nonexclusive list of five of the more obvious manners in which injuries can occur due to the “inherent risk” of working with livestock. The list includes such admonitions that horses have a “propensity ... to behave in ways that may result in personal injury or death,” that horses are unpredictable in them “reaction to sound, a sudden movement, or unfamiliar object, person or other animal,” that injuries could result due to a horse’s response to certain “activities, certain land conditions and hazards, including surface and subsurface conditions,” or that injuries could result from “a collision with another animal or an object,” among various enumerated risks. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 87.003.
Section 87.004 also provides exceptions to the limitation on liability of the Equine Activity Act. Although the Legislature wanted to provide protection from lawsuits for those involved in livestock operations, the protection was balanced with a recognition that a completely unskilled rider, ignorant of basic horsemanship, should be protected from dangers of which they would be unaware due to their inexperience.
Two provisions of Section 87.004 relate to the merits of Lee’s litigation. First, a defendant may be held liable for damages if “the person provided the equine or livestock animal and the person did not make a reasonable and prudent effort to determine the ability of the participant to engage safely in the equine activity or livestock show and determine the ability of the participant to safely manage the equine or livestock animal, taking into account the participant’s representations of ability[.]” Tex. Civ. PRAC. & Rem.Code Ann. § 87.004(2). A defendant can also be held liable for injuries if
“the injury or death was caused by a dangerous latent condition of and for which warning signs, written notices, or verbal warnings were not conspicuously posted or provided to the participant, and the land was owned, leased, or otherwise under the control of the person at the time of the injury or death and the person knew of the dangerous latent condition.”
Tex. Civ. Prao. & Rem.Code Ann. § 87.004(3).
*537The present case is exactly the manner of litigation the Legislature sought to address in enacting Chapter 87 of the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code. As noted in Chief Justice Worthen’s opinion, whether the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff under Section 87.003 is a question of law for the trial court to decide.
The first issue raised by Lee is whether Loftin made the appropriate inquiry regarding Lee’s riding ability, as provided in Section 87.004’s Exceptions to Limitation on Liability. Tex Civ. Prac. & RemCode Ann. § 87.004(2). It is significant that the Legislature did not include a list of questions one is to ask to establish a participant’s abilities, nor are there any criteria provided to assess riding skills. Inquiries regarding riding ability would logically be more in-depth where the situation required more advanced riding skills. Thus, there should be more questions where a participant wanted to ride in a competitive calf roping or barrel racing event than would be necessary if a participant wanted to ride in a sedate trail ride.
The issue before the trial court was whether there was any genuine issue of material fact that would preclude the granting of Loftin’s summary judgment motion. The trial court considered the entire summary judgment evidence, including the submitted excerpts of Loftin’s and Ms. Lee’s depositions, in determining whether Loftin’s inquiry was sufficient to apprise her of Lee’s riding ability. The trial court ruled there was not, and granted Loftin’s motion.
Lee testified that she and her husband had owned horses since 1988 or 1984, and at the time of the deposition, they owned twelve horses. She admitted that she rides the horses, had been riding horses for “quite some time,” but “not very often.” Lee admitted she knew how to ride a horse, and needed no training on the day of the accident, saying that she did not need any training “as far as just getting on and riding” the horse. She admitted the horse was gentle. Lee agreed with the statement that “there is nothing that [Lof-tin] did or didn’t do with regard to this horse as far as checking into your ability to ride that horse? You had the ability to do it, right?”
Lee admitted she had talked to the Lof-tins previously about wanting to go riding with them, and so the Loftins called and invited her. Lee’s experience as a rider and as one knowledgeable about horses was demonstrated in her testimony regarding events immediately preceding the accident. Lee said she felt the horse growing nervous as the horse walked into the mud. Lee admitted she had “enough experience with horses to realize that if they get something wrapped around their flank, they’re going to jump.” She also agreed that the horse’s jumping when the vine was wrapped around the horse’s leg “would be something you would expect in a horse’s normal conduct,” and that “that’s one of the dangers that happens when you ride a horse, isn’t it?” She also admitted that she “realized that things like this could happen with horses even before this accident,” and agreed “that’s something that’s just kind of inherent in the risk of riding a horse.” Lee concluded her deposition with the statement that “I’m not upset with the fact that they asked me to come over and ride or anything like that. I have nothing against them whatsoever. Probably the biggest thing is the poor choice of riding. I look back and we shouldn’t have been riding on the trail.”
In her Response to Loftin’s motion for summary judgment, Lee asserted that “although they owned horses, she did not ride them very often” and had not ridden a horse in the past several years “more than three or four times.”
*538The summary judgment evidence supports the trial court’s findings that there is no fact issue regarding the exceptions provided in Section 87.004, in that Lee acknowledged “there was nothing that [Lof-tin] did or didn’t do with regard to this horse as far as checking into your [Lee’s] ability to ride.’” Lee admitted she was familiar with horses and their behavior, and of the dangers of riding them. Lee further admitted she rode horses.
Therefore, I would hold that the evidence contained in the summary judgment motions clearly indicated that Mr. and Mrs. Loftin’s discussion with Lee prior to allowing her to ride their horse met the requirements of Section 87.004(2), as was found by the trial court. I would sustain the trial court’s ruling on that facet of Lee’s appeal.
Lee’s second issue addressed the alleged “dangerous latent18 condition” of the land. In order to hold a defendant liable for injuries, the statute requires evidence that “the land be owned, leased, or otherwise under the control of the person at the time of the injury or death and the person knew of the dangerous latent condition.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 87.004(3). This provision is logical: if the defendant did not own or control the property, the defendant would be unable to conspicuously post warning signs. Further, in order to expose a defendant to liability, the defendant must be shown to have known of the existence of a dangerous latent condition of the land. If a defendant either did not own or control the property, or did not know of the latent condition of the land, the statutes’s exception to the limitation of liability would not apply.
There is no question that the summary judgment evidence established that the Loftins did not own or control the land on which the accident occurred. Thus, the first requirement for the exception of the limitation to apply fails. Without contradiction, Loftin testified in her deposition that the land was owned by her neighbor who, at some unknown time in the past, had evidenced his acquiescence to her riding on his property.19 Since Loftin neither owned nor leased the property, the question arises: how did Loftin have “control of the property” in such manner as to require her, much less to permit her, to post signs or warn Lee of “latent dangers” of the land? Clearly, based on the evidence before the trial court, Loftin did not have any control of the land, but, rather, had merely a suggestion from her neighbor that he did not object to her riding on the land. Certainly, without any right to control the land, it follows Loftin similarly had no right to “conspicuously post[]” warning signs or notices on someone else’s property. Thus, the evidence adduced at the summary judgment hearing fails to comport with the requirements that the land be under Loftin’s ownership or control.
Even more significant to the analysis of this case, the evidence established that the “dangerous latent condition of the land” was unknown to Loftin. Lee’s First Amended Original Petition alleged that she *539was unfamiliar with the area and the choices for riding trails and the Plaintiff had to rely and depend upon Defendant’s judgment concerning the selection of riding trails that would be reasonably safe and appropriate under the existing circumstances. The Plaintiff was following behind the Defendant and as they proceeded with their trail ride along the particular path chosen by the Defendant, it became very thick and overgrown with trees and bushes. At this point in the trail, the Defendant changed places so that the Plaintiff was riding in front of her. As the Plaintiff then proceeded forward she came upon a wet, boggy area in the woods and her riding horse because uneasy and anxious. Suddenly, the Defendant’s horse being ridden by the Plaintiff bolted forcefully away from the boggy area causing the Plaintiff to be thrown off the horse, resulting in her injuries. This was not consistent with the evidence.
Months after Loftin’s neighbor mentioned that she could ride on his property,20 when riding with Lee on the day of the accident, although it was Loftin who initially led them onto the neighbor’s property at the beginning of then trail ride, it was Lee who took over the lead position on the ride. It was Lee who led them into a boggy, vine and brush-covered area. Lee described how Loftin, who had been leading, “moved over, and I don’t remember if she got off her horse. I don’t even recall. I just know she moved over and I kept going, my horse just kept going.” Therefore, it was Lee who was responsible for choosing the course of the trail ride and was also responsible for her horse finding itself in the boggy mud, surrounded by brush and trees.21
Lee testified at her deposition that she was the one who directed her horse into a “really boggy” area. Her horse began to sink into the mud, and the horse began to get nervous. She decided to try to get him out of the boggy area and she turned her horse and headed towards a hill, and as it was going up the hill, the horse bolted. Lee admitted that she could see the mud or soft ground before she directed her horse into the boggy area. Lee admitted she did not tell Loftin, now following her lead into the bog, that she wanted to turn around. And Lee concluded her deposition by responding to the question, “what do you claim that Terri [Loftin] did wrong in this case? Why are you suing her?” by responding that she was “not upset with the fact that they asked me to come over and ride or anything like that. I have nothing against them whatsoever. Probably the biggest thing is the poor choice of riding. I look back and we shouldn’t have been riding on the frail.” But yet the trail on which they were riding was one that Ms. Lee herself, not Loftin, chose to lead them.
Further, Loftin stated in her deposition that she did not see any wet spots, boggy spots, or standing water until after the accident. Loftin also testified that she had *540ridden over the area of the accident previously and it was not “boggy and wet and anything to avoid.” Lee, by contrast, said they had already crossed a wet area “on the other side of the road,” but after she rode past Loftin, her “horse just kept going. It was really boggy-” The latent boggy condition was unknown to Loftin, preventing her from warning Lee. However, Lee had seen wet areas earlier in their ride, and, as the lead rider who was setting the route for the ride, Lee was, or should have been, on notice that wet conditions could possibly be found on the land.
Further, Loftin said the horse lunged and caused the accident after a vine touched the horse’s leg and “went up into his stifle22 and [the horse] lunged.” When asked what she had done “in the past to make sure that the trail was clear of any debris and vines and limbs and brush,” Loftin responded that it was February, and there had been no recent new growth and that she had ridden the same route previously, and that it was “clear for riding purposes.” When Lee took the lead, she was responsible for deciding the course they rode. The owner of the land on which they rode had evidently mowed some riding “paths” months before. However, in the intervening months, vegetation had grown back up. Had Lee wanted to ride in a riding corral, they could have done so. However, she chose to embark on a trail ride with Loftin.
Because the land was neither owned by nor under the control of Loftin, and both parties agreed it had been Lee who led them into the boggy place where the horse jumped, and because the boggy condition of the land was unknown to Loftin, the trial court correctly entered its summary judgment in favor of Loftin on the issue of the exception to limitation of liability contained in Section 87.004(3) regarding the dangerous latent condition of the land. I would sustain the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Loftin on the second of her two issues on appeal.
Lee’s appeal is predicated on two issues: That the Loftins failed to adequately inquire as to her riding ability, and that the Loftins failed to warn her of the dangerous latent condition of the land where the accident occurred. Because the evidence supports the trial court’s decision to grant Loftin’s summary judgment motion, I would affirm.

. Lee alleged that her injuries were "proximately caused by Defendant’s failure to exercise ordinary care” in "failing to make a reasonable and prudent effort to determine the ability of Janice Lee to engage safely in the equine activity and determine the ability of Janice Lee to safely manage the equine.”

. Specifically, Lee alleged:
In failing to warn Janice Lee of a dangerous latent condition of land for which warning signs, written notices, or verbal warnings were not conspicuously posted or provided to Janice Lee, and the land was under the control of Terri Loftin at the time of the injury and Terri Loftin knew of the dangerous latent condition. In failing to select a safe trail for horseback riding. In selecting a trail for horseback riding that had a known boggy, wet, low area and then putting Janice Lee on a horse that was known to dislike the mud or water. In selecting a trail for horseback riding that was too thick and overgrown for safe trail riding with guests who were unfamiliar with the area and the horse being ridden. In failing to investigate the riding trails to determine if there were any areas along the trail that would pose a hazard or risk of harm to riding guests. In failing to lead the way along the trail ride for the safety and proper supervision of riding guests unfamiliar with the trial route and potential hazards. In allowing the Plaintiff to lead the way along the trail and into a hazardous area of water, mud and overgrowth.

. A trail ride is an equestrian activity whereby the riders casually ride their horses together outdoors along roads, natural trails, or through pastures, rangeland, or even forests. The activity is conducted outside an arena, a riding corral, or other more established, more sterile riding areas. The trail ride can be conducted wherever the riders wish to ride, including along unmarked routes of the riders’ own choosing in wilderness areas. See generally Green v. Pool, 421 S.W.2d 439, 440 (Tex.Civ.App.-Tyler 1967, no writ) (riding along a public road); Moore v. Drummet, 478 S.W.2d 177, 179 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1972, no writ) (riding together over ranch acreage).

. "Person” is defined as “an equine activity sponsor, equine professional, livestock show participant, or livestock show sponsor.” Tex. *536Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 87.004 (Vernon 2005).

. § 87.003. Limitation on Liability
Except as provided by Section 87.004, any person, including an equine activity sponsor, equine professional, livestock show participant, or livestock show sponsor, is not liable for property damage or damages arising from the person injury or death of a participant in an equine activity or livestock show if the property damage, injury, or death results from the dangers of conditions that are an inherent risk of an equine activity or the showing of an animal on a competitive basis in a livestock show, including: (1) the propensity of an equine or livestock animal to behave in ways that may result in personal injury or death to a person on or around it; (2) the unpredictability of an equine or livestock animal’s reaction to sound, a sudden movement, or an unfamiliar object, person, or other animal; (3) with respect to equine activities, certain land conditions and hazards, including surface and subsurface conditions; (4) a collision with another animal or an object; or (5) the potential of a participant to act in a negligent manner that may contribute to injury to the participant or another, including failing to maintain control over the equine or livestock animal or not acting within the participant’s ability.
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 87.003.

. A “latent" condition of the land is one that is "concealed.” Little v. Needham, 236 S.W.3d 328, 333 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (citing Black's Law Dictionary 898 (8th ed.2004)).

. Q: And did you have [the land owner's] permission to ride on his property?
[Terri Loftin] A: I didn’t ask him that day.
Q: Had you asked him on other days?
A: He had just made the comment that he had cleaned out some of the trails if we wanted to ride, that they were there.

. The neighbor had also mentioned he had recently mowed "paths” on his property, but the vegetation had sincere grown. Lee described the area in the woods into which she led the "trail ride” as being "pretty overgrown. ... When I was riding, there was [sic] trees that were brushing the sides of my legs on both sides when we rode."

. There is a question of how overgrown the area was where the accident occurred. Lee described it as very overgrown with trees and bushes all around, making it difficult to turn her horse around and leave the area without crossing through the water-soaked land. Lof-tin said there were trees on one side, but the area was open on the other. However, this factual inconsistency is not germane to the disposition of the case.

. A stifle is ‘‘the joint of the hind leg analogous to the human knee in certain quadrupeds, such as the horse.” American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1266 (1978).