Court Opinion

ID: 9587374
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:21:24.684415+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:13.340567
License: Public Domain

Hill, Justice,
concurring specially.
Heretofore, this court has at times recognized a distinction between retained and appointed counsel in reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel: Thornton v. Ault, 233 Ga. 172, 174 (210 SE2d 683) (1974); Hopkins v. Hopper, 234 Ga. 236, 238 (215 SE2d 241) (1975); Allen v. Hopper, 234 Ga. 642, 643 (217 SE2d 156) (1975). In certain situations (primarily post-conviction advice as to the right of appeal), the court has expressly declined to maintain any difference between retained and appointed counsel: McAuliffe v. Rutledge, 231 Ga. 745 (204 SE2d 141) (1974); Kreps v. Gray, 234 Ga. 745, 747 at 748 (218 SE2d 1) (Nichols, C. J., concurring specially) (1975); Bell v.Hopper, 237 Ga. 810 (229 SE2d 658) (1976).1
*240In some cases we have not recognized the difference between retained and appointed counsel (Dobbs v. State, 235 Ga. 800 (4) (221 SE2d 576) (1976); Fortson v. State, 240 Ga. 5 (237 SE2d 335) (1977)), but it would have made no difference in the result, see Allen v. Hopper, supra.
In the case sub judice the majority has, without comment, applied to retained counsel the "reasonably effective assistance” test (for judging trial performance) originally applicable to appointed counsel. See Pitts v. Glass, 231 Ga. 638 (203 SE2d 515) (1974). Although the majority opinion does not expressly acknowledge it, the majority has consciously decided to judge the effectiveness of retained counsel’s trial performance by the same standard as appointed counsel. However, the majority have not said whether they are applying the 6th and 14th Amendments, or some provision of our State Constitution or laws. In my view when we decide to abolish a distinction so as to expand the law to a new or different situation, we should acknowledge and justify it.
At first, the right to a new trial by virtue of ineffective assistance of counsel was available only to indigents for whom counsel were appointed. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (53 SC 55, 77 LE 158) (1932). A defendant who selected and retained his own counsel was *241not entitled to a new trial merely because his chosen counsel was ineffective (Darby v. State, 79 Ga. 63, 69 (3 SE 663) (1887)); rather, the ineffectiveness of retained counsel had to be made known to the judge or another responsible state official to warrant a new trial. Hudspeth v. McDonald, 120 F2d 962 (10th Cir. 1941), cert. den., 314 U. S. 617 (1941). Now, without acknowledgment or explanation, the majority erases the historical difference between retained and appointed counsel. They do so on the basis that one rule is simpler to administer than two.
I agree that one rule is simpler to administer than two (see Dobbs v. State, supra), but I am unable to justify abolition of this distinction solely on the basis of simplification. I would affirm the conviction on the basis that defendant has failed to demonstrate on motion for new trial and appeal that the state is chargeable with knowledge of his chosen counsel’s ineffectiveness;' i.e., that the trial judge, prosecutor or other responsible state officer was aware of retained counsel’s now confessed ineffectiveness in conducting the defense at trial.2 See Fitzgerald v. Estelle, 505 F2d 1334, 1336-1337 (5th Cir. 1975).

 I find valid reasons for judging retained counsel by *240the test applicable to appointed counsel insofar as each of them or the state is required to advise a defendant as to his rights of appeal, because after conviction the fee paid generally has been earned; the defendant may experience difficulty in raising the additional fee for the appeal; there may be a breakdown in communication between counsel and client during this interval; and while the fee is being negotiated and the defendant’s family is trying to raise it retained counsel may overlook advising the defendant of the right to have counsel appointed to represent him on appeal if he is indigent. See Bell v. Hopper, supra. Since a defendant has the right to be advised as to his rights of appeal and since a defendant who had a retained attorney at trial may be entitled to appointed counsel on appeal, we ask the trial judges to advise defendants represented by retained counsel at trial of their rights of appeal. Kreps v. Gray, supra.

 "A lawyer shall not (1) handle a legal matter which he knows or should know that he is not competent to handle. . .” DR6-101, 238 Ga. at 788.