Court Opinion

ID: 9694291
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 17:35:07.534952+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:58.884901
License: Public Domain

WAGNER, Chief Judge,
dissenting:
The record reveals that the trial court had no power to grant appellant’s motion for new trial on an “interest of justice” standard, and it did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion based on a claim of newly discovered evidence, even assuming the truth of the claimed “recantation.” See Super. Ct.Crim. R. 33.1 Therefore, no remand is required to dispose of the issues raised on appeal.
Rule 33 requires that any motion for new trial which is not based upon newly discovered evidence be filed within seven days of verdict or finding of guilt.2 Id. This seven-*445day time constraint is a jurisdictional limitation on the court’s power to grant the motion. Kimes v. United States, 569 A.2d 104, 117 & n. 7 (D.C.1989); United States v. DiBernardo, 880 F.2d 1216 (11th Cir.1989); United States v. Hall, 854 F.2d 1269, 1272 (11th Cir.1988). While the government concedes that appellant’s first motion was filed within that seven-day window, as it points out, it is not the first motion that forms the basis for appellant’s claim on appeal. Appellant first raised his claim that the witness, Phyllis Gray had recanted her testimony in a motion filed well after the expiration of the seven-day period specified in Rule 33. It would be an abuse of discretion to grant the second motion under an “interest of justice” standard unless it could be brought within the limitations period set by the rule. See DiBernardo, 880 F.2d at 1223. Otherwise, the motion would be procedurally time-barred. See Kimes, 569 A.2d at 117; United States v. Lara-Hernandez, 588 F.2d 272, 275 (9th Cir.1978); United States v. Sanchez, 917 F.Supp. 29, 33-34 (D.D.C.1996).
Only if appellant’s later motion, which was filed well after the expiration of the seven-day period, relates back to the earlier motion can the “interest of justice” standard be applied to it. See Hall, supra, 854 F.2d at 1271; United States v. Reyes, 510 F.Supp. 150, 152 (D.Ariz.1981).3 No relation-back can be found here because the second motion asserted a different ground for relief than the first. In the first motion, appellant argued that the testimony of the witness, Phyllis Gray, at the time that she testified “was incompetent in that she was obviously intoxicated and [her testimony] therefore should have been stricken from the record.”4 In the later filed motion, appellant requested a new trial based upon the alleged recantation. Specifically, appellant claimed in the second motion that the witness Gray disclosed after trial that she had been drinking liquor and beer on the morning of the crime, August 7, and for that reason did not see exactly what happened, but reported what others had told her.5 Since the grounds set forth in the original motion were specific and unrelated in any way to the claimed newly discovered evidence, the second motion could not relate back, and the “interest of justice” standard could not be applied. Hall, supra, 854 F.2d at 1271. Therefore, the stricter, newly discovered evidence standard must apply to appellant’s motion. Id. The government argues, correctly, that appellant failed to meet that test.
There are, as the majority points out, five prerequisites for granting a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.6 Byers, supra note 6, 649 A.2d at 287. The record shows that appellant failed to meet at least two of them. Specifically, the testimony at trial reveals (1) that the evidence was not newly discovered, and (2) that it was merely impeaching and cumulative. See id. Gray ad- ' mitted at trial, as she did in her affidavit in support of appellant’s motion, that she had been drinking vodka on the morning of the crime, and appellant’s trial counsel cross-examined her about it.7 Therefore, there is *446nothing newly discovered about her drinking on the morning of the offense. The same is true with respect to her claim that she did not see “exactly what happened.” During her testimony at trial, Gray indicated that she was not paying full attention to the crime, as the following excerpt from the transcript discloses:
Q: But it’s fair to say that when you were in the apartment, you weren’t paying attention to everything that was going on, right?
A: I didn’t have to because I didn’t go over there to pay attention to other people's] business.
The purported recantation about the witness’ inattention to the events surrounding the crime is another inconsistent statement much like the one she made to the grand jury which appellant’s counsel used to impeach her at trial. That statement was as follows:
And then when I looked up again, the man was stabbed. With what, I don’t know because I still hadn’t seen no knife or whatever.
As a matter of law, the evidence proffered by appellant in support of the motion for new trial was not newly discovered, and it was cumulative and impeaching. Therefore, even assuming the truth of the witness’ post-trial statement, it would not warrant a new trial applying the newly discovered evidence standard. See Townsend v. United States, 549 A.2d 724, 726 (D.C.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1102, 109 S.Ct. 2457, 104 L.Ed.2d 1011 (1989). Accordingly, the decision of the trial court denying the motion should be affirmed.
Finally, I agree with the majority that the evidence was sufficient to support appellant’s conviction. See Earle v. United States, 612 A.2d 1258, 1265 (D.C.1992). However, I cannot agree that “a conclusive determination of evidentiary sufficiency must await the trial court’s evaluation of the purported recantation by a key government witness.” Majority Op. at note 7. Appellant’s claim of eviden-tiary insufficiency is a separate argument for reversal, and its resolution is not dependent upon the disposition of his motion for new trial. Therefore, the matter should be resolved conclusively in this appeal.8 See Wright v. United States, 513 A.2d 804, 808 & n. 6 (D.C.) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 933, 107 S.Ct. 406, 93 L.Ed.2d 359 (1986). For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the court.

. Rule 33 provides in pertinent part that
[t]he Court on motion of a defendant may grant a new trial to that defendant if required in the interest of justice.... A motion for a new trial based on the ground of newly discovered evidence may be made only before or within 2 years after final judgment, but if an appeal is pending, only on remand of the case may the Court grant the motion. A motion for a new trial based on any other grounds shall be made within 7 days after verdict or finding of guilty or within such further time as the Court may fix during the 7-day period.

. The rule permits such motions to be filed "within such further time as the Court may fix during the 7-day period." (Emphasis added.) This aspect of the rule is not relevant here because there is no claim that the trial court enlarged the period in accordance with the rule. In addition, Super. Ct.Crim. R. 45(b), which authorizes the trial court to enlarge time limitations for some actions, specifically precludes the extension of "the time for taking any action un*445der Rule[] ... 33 except to the extent and under the conditions stated in [the rule].”

. We have held repeatedly that we may look to federal court decisions as persuasive authority when interpreting a local rule which is identical to a federal rule. Group Health Ass'n v. Reyes, 672 A.2d 74, 75 n. 3 (D.C.1996); Peoples v. Warfield & Sanford, Inc., 660 A.2d 397, 401 n. 3 (D.C.1995); Cohen v. Owens & Co., 464 A.2d 904, 906 n. 3 (D.C.1983).

. Appellant also argued in the first motion that the evidence was insufficient to convict him; that Gray’s testimony was incredible and inconsistent with other witnesses; and that the government’s evidence concerning the second-degree murder count was "inconsistent and equivocal.”

. As the government points out in its brief, there were no other eyewitnesses to the actual stabbing who could have provided Gray with an account of the events.

. The prerequisites for granting a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence are that: (1) the evidence must be newly discovered; (2) the movant must show diligent efforts to obtain the new evidence; (3) the material must not be merely cumulative or impeaching; (4) the new evidence must be material to the issues involved; and (5) the evidence must be of a nature that acquittal would be likely if it were used. Byers v. United States, 649 A.2d 279, 287 (D.C.1994) (citations omitted).

. In her affidavit, Gray states with regard to the claimed recantation the following:
*446That morning of August 7, 1993, I was drinking liqu[or] and Beer, And Because of that I really didn't see what exactly happen[ed]. I just said what I said because of what other people told me.

. A reversal for insufficiency of the evidence would bar any retrial. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 15-17, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2149-50, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978).