Court Opinion

ID: 9563852
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:48:19.818629+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:05.805294
License: Public Domain

PIERCE, Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent on three grounds:
I.
Defendant correctly perceived the expert witness’ testimony regarding a “typical incest family” as irrelevant. As a general rule, evidence which tends to prove or disprove a fact in issue or which sheds light upon a matter contested is relevant. People v. More, 668 P.2d 968 (Colo.App.1983); CRE 401. However, evidence so remotely related to contested issues that it affords only conjectural inference should not be admitted into evidence. People v. Botham, 629 P.2d 589 (Colo.1981); People v. More, supra.
The trial court generally has broad discretion in determining whether tendered evidence meets the relevancy test. However, this discretion is not unlimited. People v. Lowe, 660 P.2d 1261 (Colo.1983).
There are two avenues of inquiry regarding relevancy. The first question is whether the tendered evidence in some degree advances the inquiry of the case: whether it is material and probative. However, probative significance does not insure admissibility. There remains the question of whether its value is worth what it costs. See McCormick on Evidence § 185 at 544 (3d ed. 1984). For example, relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. CRE 403. In addition, there are limitations on character evidence pursuant to CRE 404(a)(1).
Here, the expert testimony was probative of the characteristics exhibited by some or even by many families which experience incest-related problems, but it is not of consequence to the determination of whether this defendant committed the sexual assault with which he was charged. See McCormick on Evidence § 185 (3d ed. 1984). The facts of significance to this case concern the actions of the defendant. Characteristics or actions by people who are strangers to this case do not bear on a determination of the charges against defendant. See generally Conrad v. City & County of Denver, 656 P.2d 662 (Colo.1982); People v. Gallegos, 644 P.2d 920 (Colo.1982). Contrast People v. Koon, 724 P.2d 1367 (Colo.App.1986), where there was testimony connecting expert opinions regarding unique child-incest patterns with the observed behavior of the child-victim. No similar connecting evidence is present in the case at bar.
The prosecution here did not relate the general testimony about the profile of an “incest father” and the bearing of those characteristics to the defendant here except in its rebuttal argument. Thus, the testimony of the expert was a cause for conjecture by the jury that defendant had acted in conformity with the general characteristics described by the expert. Such testimony is inadmissible. See People v. Botham, supra; CRE 404(a).
It is evident that the prosecution attempted, in a round-about manner, to provide evidence of a trait of defendant’s character. Such evidence “is not admissible for the purpose of proving that [defendant] acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion.” CRE 404(a).
The United States Supreme Court explained the common-law rule prohibiting use of character evidence when it held:
“Courts that follow the common-law tradition almost unanimously have come to disallow resort by the prosecution to any *1378kind of evidence of a defendant’s evil character to establish a probability of his guilt. Not that the law .invests the defendant with a presumption of good character ... but it simply closes the whole matter of character, disposition and reputation on the prosecution’s case-in-chief_ The overriding policy of excluding such evidence, despite its admitted probative value, is the practical experience that its disallowance tends to prevent confusion of issues, unfair surprise and undue prejudice.” Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 69 S.Ct. 213, 93 L.Ed. 168 (1948).
Other jurisdictions have ruled that it is error to admit testimony that a parent fits a “battering parent” profile, because to allow this testimony may lead a jury to penalize a defendant for being a “bad” person and unfairly requires a defendant to defend his personality. State v. Loebach, 310 N.W.2d 58 (Minn.1981); see also Sanders v. State, 251 Ga. 70, 303 S.E.2d 13 (1983).
Character evidence of an accused may be properly admitted when such evidence is offered by an accused or by the prosecution to rebut the same. CRE 404(a)(1); cf. People v. Lucero, 677 P.2d 370 (Colo.App.1983). However, this exception is not applicable to the case at bar.
Trial court errors do not require reversal unless they affect the substantial rights of a defendant. Crim.P. 52(a). In determining whether substantial rights of a defendant have been affected by a trial court error, the proper inquiry is whether the error substantially influenced the verdict or affected the fairness of the trial proceedings. People v. Quintana, 665 P.2d 605 (Colo.1983).
Here, the key to the case was the credibility of the victim. See People v. Hampton, (Colo.App. No. 85CA0019, June 5,1986). To buttress that credibility, the prosecution’s case was built around presenting evidence that all members of the defendant’s family fit the behavioral profile described by the expert witness.
Because the testimony of the child-victim was confused and at times inconsistent with prior statements given to investigators, the erroneous evidence was a crucial part of the case as it added credibility to the victim’s testimony. There is no doubt that the extensive nature of the expert’s testimony, and its use by the prosecutor in rebuttal argument, substantially influenced the proceedings, and thus, it cannot be deemed harmless error. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of conviction.
II.
In addition, given the focus of the case on the child victim’s credibility, the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury as required by § 13-25-129(2), C.R.S. (1985 Cum.Supp.) was also reversible error. See People v. Mathes, 703 P.2d 608 (Colo.App.1985).
The statements of the child-victim related directly to her recitation of the incident to the police officer, and the record demonstrates they were offered to prove the truth of the incident. Thus, the statements were hearsay. CRE 801(c). Nothing in the record identifies an exception to the hearsay rule which would make the statements otherwise admissible. See CRE 803 and CRE 804. Therefore, admission of the statements could only be pursuant to § 13-25-129(1), C.R.S. (1985 Cum.Supp.), which changes the rules of evidence and admits hearsay statements “made by a child ... not otherwise admissible by a statute or court rule which provides an exception to the objection of hearsay....”
If statements are admitted pursuant to that statute, it mandates the court to “instruct the jury that it is for the jury to determine the weight and credit to be given the statement[s] and that in making the determination, it shall consider the age and maturity of the child, the nature of the statement[s], the circumstances under which the statements] [were] made, and any other relevant factor.” Section 13-25-129(2), C.R.S. (1985 Cum.Supp.); People v. Mathes, supra. Omission of this instruc*1379tion is reversible error. People v. Mathes, supra.
Because the statute places the burden on the court to instruct the jury under such circumstances as here, defendant’s failure to object to the statements or his failure to request the instruction does not forgive the error. Furthermore, People v. Watson, 668 P.2d 965 (Colo.App.1983) is inapplicable here because there not only was the jury issued a limiting instruction, but also the instruction there in question was not mandatory.
III.
Finally, the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to require the child victim to submit to an examination by a defense psychiatrist. The trial court here failed to make any findings in support of its decision to deny defendant’s motion. See People v. Coca, 39 Colo.App. 264, 564 P.2d 431 (1977). Thus, there being nothing in the record indicating that the trial court balanced the requisite considerations, it cannot be said, with the ease which the majority asserts, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
The child victim here was committed to the state hospital by a prior court order and had, thus, undergone other prior and similar examinations. In addition, she was unable to testify in a related Children’s Code case, which was as a result dismissed. Therefore, it cannot be concluded that the possible emotional trauma or intimidation to the child victim here would be so great as to outweigh the likelihood that the examination would produce material evidence. See People v. Neely, 228 Cal.App.2d 16, 39 Cal.Rptr. 251 (1964) (victim was an inmate of a state mental hospital). Under the circumstances of this case, defendant presented sufficient evidence to show that there was a compelling reason for the psychiatric examination. Cf. People v. King, 41 Colo.App. 177, 581 P.2d 739 (1978). Therefore, the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion.
I would grant a new trial on the basis of these errors.