Court Opinion

ID: 9571372
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:31:14.374517+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:30:21.999722
License: Public Domain

CONNOR, Judge
(dissenting):
We respectfully dissent. The majority1 opinion engages in a tortured analysis which relies on very little South Carolina law for support and whose policy will leave in its wake very little order.
VALIDITY OF THE ARREST
The majority hinges its opinion exclusively on dicta in this Court’s opinion in State v. Nall, 304 S.C. 332, 404 S.E.2d 202 (Ct.App.1991), and on sources from other jurisdictions to support its position the common law grants private persons the authority to arrest for a breach of the peace misdemeanor committed in their presence. A review of the history of citizen’s arrest in South Carolina, however, reveals otherwise. After a thorough analysis of the opinions of the South Carolina Supreme Court and the actions of the General Assembly, we are convinced the law of our State grants private citizens no such authority.
The Nall Court relied on English common law to support its proposition private citizens can arrest for breach of the peace misdemeanors committed in their presence. It cited two old English cases and the English treatise, Hawkin’s Pleas of the Crown. Nall, 304 S.C. at 339 n. 7, 404 S.E.2d at 206-07 n. 7. As noted by the majority, South Carolina’s reception statute declares the common law of England shall continue in effect in South Carolina. S.C.Code Ann. § 14-1-50 (1977). The common law of England, however, is only presumed to govern if there is no South Carolina authority to the contrary. S.C.Code Ann. § 14-1-50 (1977) (English common law continues where not altered by the Code or inconsistent with the Constitution or laws of this State); State ex rel. McLeod v. Sloan Constr. Co., 284 S.C. 491, 496, 328 S.E.2d 84, 87 (Ct.App.1985) (“[T]he English common law ordinarily is pre*629sumed to govern if there is no South Carolina authority to the contrary.”)• Moreover, the treatise cited in Nall is a secondary authority.
The South Carolina case State v. Anderson, 19 S.C.L. (1 Hill) 327 (1833), predates the cases cited in Nall. According to Anderson, an arrest by a private person was only justified if the proof showed a legal felony was committed and the prisoner was the perpetrator. Id. at 341. The South Carolina Supreme Court has restated this rule several times. See, e.g., State v. Griffin, 74 S.C. 412, 54 S.E. 603 (1906) (prior to enactment of the statute, the rule of law prevailing in this State was the rule stated in Anderson); State v. Davis, 50 S.C. 405, 27 S.E. 905 (1897) (common law provided private person right to arrest person who committed or attempted to commit a felony in his view; private person not authorized to arrest for a misdemeanor).
The majority claims Anderson “simply held a private citizen could arrest without a warrant a person shown to be a felon and a fugitive from justice,” and “does not address at all the issue of whether a private citizen can arrest another person without a warrant for a breach of the peace committed in the private citizen’s presence.”
However, Anderson cannot be read in isolation. In 1865, the General Assembly enacted a statute to govern warrantless arrest in this state. See An Act to Amend the Criminal Law, Act No. 4731, § XXIX-XXXII, 13 South Carolina Statutes at Large 278 (1865). That statute provided in pertinent part:
XXIX. Upon view of a misdemeanor committed by a person of color, or by a white person toward a person of color, a Magistrate may arrest the offender ...[.]
XXX. Upon view of a misdemeanor committed by a person of color, any person present may arrest the offender and take him before a Magistrate, to be dealt with as the case may require. In case of a misdemeanor committed by a white person toward a person of color, any person may complain to a Magistrate, who shall cause the offender to be arrested ...[.]
XXXI. Upon view of a felony committed, or upon certain information that a felony has been committed, any person may arrest the felon ...[.]
*630XXXII. In the night time, any person may be arrested by such efficient means as the darkness and the probability of his escape render necessary, even if his life should be thereby taken, in cases where he has committed a felony, or has entered a dwelling-house with evil intent, or has broken, or is breaking into an out-house, with a view to plunder, or has in his possession stolen property, or being under circumstances which raise just suspicion of his design to steal or to commit some felony, flees when he is hailed.

Id.

This statutory scheme reflects an intent by the Legislature to regulate all situations, both misdemeanors and felonies, in which a private citizen had the right to arrest without a warrant. In terms of misdemeanors, the statute specifically limited the right of warrantless arrest only if the perpetrator was a person of color. Moreover, the statute is silent concerning a private citizen’s right to arrest without a warrant for breach of the peace committed in the citizen’s presence.
By enacting a statute which drastically curtailed a private citizen’s right of warrantless arrest, we believe the Legislature intended to “take over the entire field of operations, to the necessary exclusion of the [common law].” See Branchville Motor Co. v. Adden, 158 S.C. 90, 95, 155 S.E. 277, 279 (1930) (Where there is an existing established right, and an existing remedy, either statutory or at common law, a new statute, recognizing the right and providing a new remedy supersedes the existing remedy if “[i]t clearly appears that by the new act the Legislature intended to take over the entire field of operations, to the necessary exclusion of the old remedy.”); 73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes § 185 at 386 (1974) (“[Wjhenever a statute undertakes to provide for a specific matter or thing already covered by a common-law rule, omissions in its provisions of certain portions of the rule may be taken as indicative of a legislative intent to repeal or abrogate the same, although in all other respects the statute and common law are in exact conformity.”).
In 1866, the General Assembly took another step toward eliminating a private citizen’s right to arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor. See An Act to Alter the Act Entitled An Act to Amend the Criminal Law, ” Act No. 4802, §§ XI-XII, *63113 South Carolina Statutes at Large 406 (1866). This amendment repealed all of the 1865 provisions regarding warrantless arrest for misdemeanors. Significantly, the Legislature only retained the 1865 provisions involving a warrantless arrest when a felony had been committed, upon certain information that a felony had been committed, and situations involving nighttime warrantless arrests as set forth above. These provisions are the precursors to the current codification of S.C.Code Ann. § 17-13-10(a), (b) (1985) and S.C.Code Ann. § 17-13-20 (1985) (amended 1995).
In 1897, the Supreme Court concluded private persons had no right to arrest for misdemeanors. State v. Davis, 50 S.C. 405, 426, 27 S.E. 905, 912 (1897). In reaching this decision, the Supreme Court specifically cited State v. Anderson, 19 S.C.L. (1 Hill) 327 (1833). In discussing Davis, the majority suggests the Court only applied the existing statute, which involved a private citizen’s right to make a warrantless arrest when a felony had been committed, or upon certain information that a felony had been committed. Actually, the Court analyzed both the common law and the statute and found no authority for citizens to arrest for misdemeanors in either. Id.
The Davis Court stated:
At common law a private person had the right to arrest, without warrant, any person who committed or attempted to commit a felony in his view. In State v. Anderson, 1 Hill (S.C.) 212, the court said that, in order to justify an arrest by private persons, the proof must show that a felony was committed, and that the prisoner was the perpetrator. Section 1 of the Criminal Code, quoted above, allows any person to arrest upon view of a felony committed, or upon certain information a felony has been committed.
Davis, 50 S.C. at 426, 27 S.E. at 912 (emphasis added).
According to Davis, the trial judge erred by charging the jury that if one sees another committing a larceny, one has a right to arrest him. Id. The Court based its holding on the lack of evidence concerning the amount stolen. It pointed out both the common law and the statute and reasoned, if less than twenty dollars had been stolen, then only petit larceny had been committed. Accordingly, the commission of petit *632larceny, a misdemeanor, would not authorize a citizen’s arrest. Id. at 426-27, 27 S.E. at 912-13.
To get around the Davis holding, the majority claims petit larceny is not a breach of the peace, and therefore, the Davis holding did not affect the common law rule.2 “Breach of the peace” is defined as “commission of an unlawful and unjustifiable act, tending with sufficient directness to breach the peace.” State v. Peer, 320 S.C. 546, 552, 466 S.E.2d 375, 379 (Ct.App. 1996) (quoting 12 Am.Jur.2d Breach of the Peace § 4 (1964)). By definition, one must look at the circumstances surrounding the specific act in question to make an accurate determination of whether an act is a breach of the peace. “For instance, hurling objects in an open deserted field is not breach of the peace, but throwing them near a tavern is.” 12 Am.Jur.2d Breach of the Peace § 10 at 540-41 (1997).
Consequently, not all instances of petit larceny rise to the level of breach of the peace. A larceny committed in an isolated area, by stealth, for example, may not “tend with sufficient directness to breach the peace.” Cf Dag E. Ytreberg, Annotation, Larceny as Within Disorderly Conduct Statute or Ordinance, 71 A.L.R.3d. 1156, 1157 (1976) (“[PJetit larceny ... unaccompanied by physical violence to the person of another trying to effect detention, arrest, or recovery, was not an offense defined or included in a general disorderly conduct ordinance.”).
Many instances of petit larceny, however, would constitute breach of the peace. The defendant in Davis was stealing money from a cash drawer when the owner confronted him. The owner yelled at the defendant, who then took more money from the drawer and ran. When the owner demanded the money back, the defendant continued on. The owner gave chase and a fight ensued outside the store. During the fight, the defendant shot the owner twice. The following day, the owner died from his injuries. Davis, 50 S.C. at 420, 27 S.E. at 910.
The majority asserts in Davis the “larceny itself did not create the breach of the peace; instead the attempted private *633arrest led to the gun battle in the streets.” Considering this claim, we return to the definition used by the majority defining breach of the peace as
embracing a great variety of conduct destroying or menacing public order and tranquility. In general terms, it is a violation of public order, a disturbance of public tranquility, by any act inciting to violence. Although it includes acts likely to produce violence in others, actual violence is not an element of breach of the peace.... “[It] may be generally defined as such a violation of public order as amounts to a disturbance of the public tranquility, by act or conduct either directly having this effect, or by inciting or tending to incite such a disturbance of the public tranquility. Under this general definition, therefore, in laying the foundation for a prosecution for the offense of breach of the peace it is not necessary that the peace be actually broken; commission of an unlawful and unjustifiable act, tending with sufficient directness to breach the peace is sufficient.”
State v. Peer, 320 S.C. 546, 552, 466 S.E.2d 375, 379 (Ct.App. 1996) (citations omitted) (quoting 12 Am.Jur.2d Breach of the Peace § 4 (1964)) (emphasis added).
Under this definition, the larceny in Davis was the act or conduct that incited the property owner to engage in the public affray and resulting gun battle in the streets. It is hard to imagine an act or conduct that is more likely to incite someone to violence than stealing the person’s property directly from him. Yet, the majority firmly denies the thief in Davis breached the peace. McAteer, however, who drove two hundred and fifty yards on an isolated dirt road and pulled into a dirt driveway committed an act inciting violence, according to the majority.
The Davis Court squarely faced the issue of whether an arrest was invalid if less than twenty dollars had been stolen and a citizen attempted an arrest for a breach of the peace misdemeanor committed in the citizen’s presence. The Court invalidated such an arrest, holding citizens in South Carolina are not authorized to arrest for misdemeanors.
The General Assembly reacted to Davis the next year by amending the statute to allow citizens to arrest “upon view of a larceny committed.” An Act to Amend Section 1 of the *634Criminal Statutes of South Carolina, Act No. 508, 22 South Carolina Statutes at Large 809 (1898) (emphasis added). Realizing the Court believed neither the common law nor the statute authorized a citizen to arrest for a petit larceny that was a clear breach of the peace, the Legislature amended the statute to rectify the situation. However, rather than specifically including all breach of the peace misdemeanors, the Legislature narrowly crafted the amendment to include only larceny.3
Since the amendment, the South Carolina Supreme Court has upheld a finding of liability for false imprisonment against a citizen who detained the plaintiff for the crime of disorderly *635conduct and turned him over to the police. Percival v. Bailey, 70 S.C. 72, 49 S.E. 7 (1904). The plaintiff in Percival was interfering with the defendant’s laborers and being disorderly. Id. at 73, 49 S.E. at 7. The defendant held the plaintiff and delivered him to the custody of a City of Columbia police officer. The plaintiff sued for false imprisonment. The Court held:
The first cause of action contains the allegations, the defendants “gave the plaintiff into the custody of a policeman of the city of Columbia, &c.” That was an illegal act, unless the offense charged is a felony or was committed in the presence of the officer. The offense charged is only a misdemeanor, and there is no allegation that it was committed in the presence of the officer. The arrest was, therefore, illegal, and the giving over the -plaintiff to the policeman was illegal.
Percival, 70 S.C, at 74, 49 S.E. at 7 (emphasis added).
The majority claims Percival is “irrelevant to the issue before us because the court did not address the validity of any private arrest.” They also argue Percival is irrelevant because the opinion does not make clear whether the citizen actually effected an arrest or simply called the police. Considering the Court upheld a finding of false imprisonment against the citizen defendant, specifically finding “the giving over the plaintiff to the policeman was illegal,” we believe Percival is precisely on point. The language in Percival makes it clear the facts at least support a detention, which is exactly what happened to McAteer. In fact, the State stipulated Thompson’s detention of McAteer was not an arrest.
As the majority acknowledges, the Percival Court specifically cited the common law rule granting peace officers the “right to arrest upon view without warrant all persons who are guilty of breach of the peace or other violation of the criminal laws.” Id. at 74, 49 S.E. at 7. The Court further definitively stated, “The foregoing is the rule, and its modifications, so far announced in this State, with reference to arrest without warrant for offenses less than felony.” Id. at 74, 49 S.E. at 7-8.
The majority perceives support for its position in the Percival Court’s statement the matter turned on whether or not the officer could legally arrest. To the contrary, the Court looked *636to the officer’s authority precisely because a citizen had no authority to arrest for any misdemeanor. If the South Carolina Supreme Court believed a common law rule granted citizens the right to arrest for breach of the peace, it would have said so.
Two years prior to Percival, the Supreme Court had decided Loggins v. Southern Ry. Co., 64 S.C. 821, 42 S.E. 163 (1902). In Loggins, the jury found the conductor of a train liable for unlawful arrest of an unruly passenger. The passenger obviously breached the peace by behaving in a boisterous manner, shouting and cursing at other passengers, throwing a rock against the train, and, finally, rocking the train itself. Id.
The Court reversed the jury’s verdict and ordered a new trial. It cited the statute now codified as S.C.Code Ann. § 58-17-3610 (1977), which declares conductors of railroad trains and station or depot agents “conservators of the peace.” The statute grants these individuals “the common-law power of constables to make arrests,” but limits that power to “their respective trains” or “their respective places of business.” Id.
A comparison of the holdings in Percival and Loggins makes it even more apparent the South Carolina Supreme Court does not believe a common law rule exists granting all citizens the right to arrest under the circumstances in McAteer’s case. Where the citizen in Percival had no statutory authority to detain the plaintiff, the Supreme Court deemed the arrest illegal. Percival, 70 S.C. at 74, 49 S.E. at 7. In Loggins, the Court held “by terms of the act” the conductor enjoyed the common law authority of constables to “arrest those whom [he] saw engaged in an affray or breach of the peace.”4 Loggins, 64 S.C. at 327-28, 42 S.E. at 165. If the conductor in Loggins had been authorized to arrest as a private person for a breach of the peace misdemeanor, the Court would not have had to rely on the statute.5
*637Other Code provisions provide evidence the Legislature has never intended to authorize citizens to arrest for breach of the peace misdemeanors. When our Legislature has wished to carve out a statutory rule regarding arrest for breach of the peace, it has done so explicitly. See S.C.Code Ann. § 14-1-140 (1977) (persons going to or from court are free from arrest except for treason, felony, or breach of the peace); S.C.Code Ann. § 17-13-60 (1985) (person engaged in or attending military duty not to be arrested except for treason, felony, or breach of the peace); S.C.Code Ann. § 23-17-90 (1989) (Sheriff or deputy arresting without writ, warrant or process liable for illegal arrest but nothing prevents from arresting for treason, felony, or breach of the peace committed in his presence).6
A well-reasoned South Carolina Attorney General’s Opinion also concludes South Carolina law does not allow citizens to arrest for breach of the peace misdemeanors committed in their presence.7 When Mayor Brooks of Andrews requested an opinion from the Attorney General on the validity of an arrest for disorderly conduct by one of his officers, the Attorney General responded:
*638Here, the officer arrested an individual beyond the territorial boundaries of the Town of Andrews for a misdemeanor that was committed within the presence of the officer but outside the municipal limits. The offender had not been pursued by the officer nor had he offered Right. As the policeman had no more authority outside the town limits than a private citizen, his action must be viewed as though he was acting in a private capacity. Because a private party could not lawfully arrest the person for the crime of disorderly conduct, which is a misdemeanor in South Carolina, it follows that the arrest by the police officer without a warrant was unlawful.
1964 Op.S.C. Att’y Gen. No. 1693 at 149.8
In summary, a review of our history and law reveals the legislative, judicial, and executive branches of South Carolina government have all operated under the belief neither our common law, nor our statutes, allow citizens to arrest for breach of the peace misdemeanors other than petit larceny. It is not for this Court to rewrite that history or our law.
Clear and ample South Carolina authority contravenes the English common law rule cited as dicta in Nall. Anderson, its progeny and their interpretation of the statute clearly control. State ex rel. McLeod, 284 S.C. at 496, 328 S.E.2d at 87 (“[T]he English common law ordinarily is presumed to govern if there is no South Carolina authority to the contrary.”); S.C. Const, art. V, § 9 (The Court of Appeals is bound by decisions of the Supreme Court.). Because the Anderson rule only allows citizens to arrest when a felony has been committed, the common law of South Carolina did not authorize Thompson to arrest McAteer for driving under the influence, second offense, a class (c) misdemeanor. Anderson, 19 S.C.L. (1 Hill) at 341.
DUI IS NOT A PER SE BREACH OF THE PEACE
Even if citizens have the authority to arrest for breach of the peace misdemeanors committed in their presence, we do *639not believe driving under the influence constitutes a per se breach of the peace. Although we acknowledge violence does not actually have to occur for an act to constitute breach of the peace, the act must tend “with sufficient directness to breach the peace.” State v. Peer, 320 S.C. 546, 552, 466 S.E.2d 375, 379 (Ct.App.1996) (quoting 12 Am. Jur.2d Breach of the Peace § 4 (1964)). As noted, the Court must examine the particular circumstances of each occurrence, to make a determination whether the individual act is a breach of the peace. 12 Am.Jur.2d Breach of the Peace § 10 at 540 (1997) (“Not only the type of act or conduct, but also the particular circumstances of the occurrence, are taken into consideration in determining whether a breach of the peace has been committed”).
The majority cites only out-of-state law to support its assertion driving under the influence is a breach of the peace. Additionally, the circumstances in all but one of the cases it relies on are very different from those in this case.9 The *640South Carolina Supreme Court has never held driving under the influence is a per se breach of the peace.
To the contrary, our Supreme Court declined an opportunity to hold actual reckless driving, which was threatening immediate harm to the public, constituted breach of the peace. Jordan v. C & S Nat’l Bank of S.C., 278 S.C. 449, 298 S.E.2d 213 (1982). Jordan concerned the repossession of a truck. There was evidence the driver of the truck “exceeded the speed limit, failed to observe traffic signals and drove recklessly.” Id. at 450, 298 S.E.2d at 214. The plaintiff in the case specifically charged such driving constituted breach of the peace. Id. The Supreme Court found it unnecessary to make a final determination of the issue, but commented, “We are not at all sure the alleged violations of the traffic laws amounted to a breach of the peace.” Id. at 452, 298 S.E.2d at 214.
Generally, we agree with the Supreme Court’s reluctance to declare violations of traffic laws breaches of the peace. More specifically, we do not believe McAteer breached the peace under the circumstances of this case, where he was on an isolated dirt road and slowly pulled about two hundred and fifty yards into a dirt driveway.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Considering the policy implications of the majority opinion, the wisdom of the Founding Fathers’ decision to place the policy-making function in the hands of the Legislature, and not the judiciary, becomes clear. While we fully recognize the dangers of driving under the influence, allowing untrained citizens to confront and arrest each other for violations of the traffic laws invites anarchy and potential tragedy. It is the majority who notes the attempted citizen’s arrest in Davis ended with a “gun battle in the streets” and ultimately, the citizen’s death. We would not add this additional danger to *641South Carolina’s highways. The law enforcement officers of this state are highly trained professionals. Until now, South Carolina has wisely chosen to leave this difficult job to them.
It was apparent at oral argument the State was concerned about the prospect of roaming bands of citizens stopping each other for traffic offenses, but went on to say it pursued this case because this officer should have been permitted to make this arrest. Because Thompson was a trained, off-duty police officer, we agree the facts of this particular case seem unfair. However, it is not proper or wise for this Court to engage in a legislative expansion of citizen’s arrest in order to avoid what we may see as an unfortunate result in one case. Holman v. Bulldog Trucking Co., 311 S.C. 341, 348, 428 S.E.2d 889, 893 (Ct.App.1993) (“When the Legislature has enacted a rule embodying a particular policy choice, the courts have no power to annul the Legislature’s judgment by substituting their own views of sound public policy.”).
Other jurisdictions have discovered the merits of granting state-wide jurisdiction to all sworn police officers to address the concern the State expresses in this case. See N.Y.Crim. Proc.Law § 140.10(3) (1992) (amended 1996) (“A police officer may arrest a person for a crime ... whether or not such crime was committed within the geographical area of such police officer’s employment, and he may make such arrest within the state, regardless of the situs of the commission of the crime.”). Such a policy change would address concerns over seemingly unfair outcomes such as this one, yet avoid the dangers of expanded citizen’s arrest power. This would be a matter for our Legislature and not the courts.
CONCLUSION
Because we believe the law is plain and'obvious citizens have no authority to arrest for breach of the peace misdemeanors committed in their presence, because we do not believe McAteer breached the peace in this case, and because we strongly disagree with the policy of allowing citizens to *642arrest each other for traffic violations, we would reverse and remand for a new trial with instructions to suppress all evidence stemming from the illegal arrest.10

. For want of a better term, we refer to the prevailing view, to which four members of the Court adhere, as the majority, even though the agreement of five members of the Court numerically constitutes a majority.

. However, the majority cites no South Carolina law for this proposition. In fact, it refers only to Nall which specifically held petit larceny was a breach of the peace.

. Therefore, we agree with the majority the Legislature "intended by its 1898 amendment only to change the result of cases like Davis so that one who sees a petit larceny may lawfully arrest the thief.”
We disagree, however, with the majority's interpretation of the Supreme Court's decision in Davis II, a decision filed several months after the enactment of the 1898 amendment. See State v. Davis, 53 S.C. 150, 31 S.E. 62 (1898). Following remand, Davis was again convicted of murder. On appeal, the Supreme Court again reversed his conviction. By reversing Davis’ conviction, the majority contends the "supreme court seemingly reversed its earlier view regarding the right of a private citizen to arrest another for petit larceny of the private citizen’s own property.” In reaching this conclusion, the majority relies on the following language of the opinion.
It seems idle to say that if the goods stolen shall amount in value to $20 or more, that such being a felony, the thief may be arrested without a warrant for such arrest; but that if the goods be of the value of $19 or less, stolen from the owner in his presence, the owner will not be justified in arresting the thief and recovering his property.... I would be understood upon this matter, for we mean only to hold that when a thief is caught in the act of stealing from the person, or the house, or the premises, the owner, in such a case, is authorized to arrest the thief and regain his property at that moment in the possession of the thief.
Davis, 53 S.C. at 154, 31 S.E. at 63. Based on the quoted language distinguishing the value of stolen goods, the Supreme Court recognized the distinction between an impermissible warrantless arrest for petit larceny, a misdemeanor, and a permissible arrest for larceny, a felony. Just as the Legislature only intended by its 1898 amendment to change the result of cases like Davis, so too did the Supreme Court recognize the right of a private citizen to make a warrantless arrest only in this very limited situation. In fact, the Supreme Court noted it would not have found error in the trial judge's charge had he charged "in this restricted sense.” Id. at 154, 31 S.E. at 63. Accordingly, we do not believe the Davis II decision can be read to expand a private citizen’s right to make a warrantless arrest beyond what is permitted by statute.

. A later holding of the South Carolina Supreme Court reaffirms the notion all citizens do not enjoy the authority granted train conductors by the statute. Pullman Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 238 S.C. 358, 363, 120 S.E.2d 214, 216 (1961) ("The police protection afforded passengers would be the same with a porter in charge as with a pullman conductor for neither have police powers as does the train conductor.”).

. According to the majority, the common law rule may not have been raised on appeal. They contend the Court did not need to address the *637rule because the statute was clear. Under their view, however, the statute declaring train conductors "conservators of the peace” and giving them “the common law power of constables to make arrests” would be wholly unnecessary, as all citizens would be "conservators of the peace.” We should not presume the Legislature undertook a meaningless act. 73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes § 249 at 422 (1974) (”[T]he legislature is not to be presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute.”). The Legislature certainly would not have geographically restricted the authority of train conductors and depot agents if ordinary citizens enjoy such authority statewide.

. States intending to preserve the English common law rule of citizen’s arrest for breach of the peace have done so explicitly. See, e.g., Miss.Code Ann. § 99-3-7(1) (Supp.1997) ("An officer or private person may arrest any person ... for ... a breach of the peace-”); Ind. Code Ann. § 35-33-l-4(a) (1994) (“Any person may arrest any other person if: ... (3) a misdemeanor involving a breach of the peace is being committed in his presence....”); Tex.Code Crim.P.Ann. art. 14.01(a) (1997) (Peace officer or any other person may arrest without warrant when offense is committed in presence and is felony or offense against the public peace.).

. Incidentally, this Attorney General's Opinion was written by the author of the majority.

. A second Attorney General's Opinion also reaches the same conclusion. "Since a private citizen cannot arrest for a misdemeanor even committed within his presence, neither can a municipal police officer who exceeds his corporate limits....” 1970 Op.S.C. Att'y Gen. No. 2845 at 77.

. In State v. Hart, 669 N.E.2d 762 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), the citizen "observed Hart's vehicle swerve in and out of traffic and, at one point, cross the center line into oncoming traffic.” Id. at 763. Furthermore, "Hart’s driving forced two or three other vehicles from their respective lanes of traffic, and his vehicle almost ran two stoplights.” Id.
In Romo v. State, 577 S.W.2d 251 (Tex.Crim.App.1979), the defendant was "driving ‘erratically’ and at a high rate of speed.” Id. at 252. His car “was weaving across the center lane and on to the shoulder of the road,” and "passed in a way that forced [the officer’s] car into the curb in order to avoid an accident.” Id.
In Edwards v. State, 462 So.2d 581 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1985), the defendant crossed the center line three to seven times. The Court found "most important” the fact defendant’s "erratic driving forced approaching vehicles to run onto the berm.” Id. at 582. Finally, defendant "almost hit a bridge abutment before coming to a halt after being signalled [sic] to stop.” Id. The Florida Court held his conduct "constituted a breach of the peace because it posed a threat to himself, other motorists, and pedestrians.” Id. The Court noted it could think of no better example of breach of the peace than "a drunk driver at the wheel of a killing machine that is going all over the road and scaring oncoming drivers to death rather than killing them.” Id. The Florida Fourth District Court of Appeals recently said of Edwards, ”[W]e determined that the erratic driving observed by the officer was a breach of the peace...." Steiner v. State, 690 So.2d 706, 708 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1997) (emphasis added).
In City of Waukesha v. Gorz, 166 Wis.2d 243, 479 N.W.2d 221 (Wis.Ct.App.1991), the officer "observed an automobile cross the center line several times.” Even in State v. Rue, 72 N.M. 212, 382 P.2d 697 *640(N.M.1963), the driver was charged with both driving while intoxicated and reckless driving, indicating his driving was erratic and dangerous.
Therefore, only in State v. Jennings, 112 Ohio App. 455, 176 N.E.2d 304 (Ohio Ct.App.1959), was there no indication before the Court of actual dangerous driving immediately threatening injury to the driver or others at the time of the arrest.

. The State argued alternatively that the evidence should not be suppressed because Thompson’s arrest of McAteer did not constitute state action. Thompson was in full uniform when he approached McAteer. But for the indicia of Thompson’s office, McAteer would likely have ignored his instructions. McAteer's peaceful adherence to apparent police authority should not serve to rob him of Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment protection. Cf. League v. National Surety Corp., 198 S.C. 289, 295-96, 17 S.E.2d 783, 785 (1941) (off-duty patrolman’s appearance in official uniform carried assurance to public he was in discharge of his duties; respect for and obedience to officers should be maintained, not undermined, weakened or destroyed).