Court Opinion

ID: 9838338
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-06 06:00:19.186381+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:17.473859
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     TIFFANY LEVY,                                   DOCKET NUMBER
                         Appellant,                  DC-0752-18-0038-I-1

                  v.

     SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE                         DATE: September 5, 2023
       COMMISSION,
                   Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Peter Broida, Esquire, Arlington, Virginia, for the appellant.

           Daniel L. Garry, Esquire, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                      REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed her appeal for lack of jurisdiction. For the reasons discussed below, we
     GRANT the appellant’s petition for review, VACATE the initial decision, and

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                       2

     REMAND the case to the Washington Regional Office for further adjudication in
     accordance with this Remand Order.

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2         The essential undisputed facts are as follows.        In February 2017, the
     appellant and the agency entered into a settlement agreement resolving an equal
     employment opportunity (EEO) complaint that the appellant had filed against the
     agency, under which the agency agreed to increase the appellant’s salary,
     effective January 1, 2017.     Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 11-14.       On
     October 3, 2017, the agency notified the appellant that it had incorrectly
     processed her salary increase when it implemented the terms of the settlement
     agreement. Id. at 9. As a result, the agency informed her that it had erroneously
     overpaid her beyond what was provided for in the settlement agreement and that
     it would be taking action to correct its “administrative error.” Id.
¶3         On October 16, 2017, the appellant filed a Board appeal alleging that she
     had suffered a reduction in pay as a result of the agency’s October 3, 2017 letter.
     IAF, Tab 1 at 6.     She further alleged that the action violated the settlement
     agreement and constituted retaliation for her EEO activity.        Id.   The agency
     moved to dismiss the appeal as premature and for lack of jurisdiction, asserting
     that no action had yet been taken regarding the appellant’s salary. IAF, Tab 4.
     The agency further noted that on October 25, 2017, it had issued the appellant a
     Notice of Proposed Reduction in Salary and provided her with due process rights.
     Id. at 5, 7-10. The administrative judge issued an order indicating that the Board
     may lack jurisdiction over the appeal as a reduction in pay and ordering the
     appellant to file evidence and argument demonstrating that the Board has
     jurisdiction over the appeal. IAF, Tab 5. In response, the appellant argued that
     the Board has jurisdiction over the appeal as a reduction in pay based on the
     agency’s October 3, 2017 letter, which she contended amounted to a final
     decision. IAF, Tab 6 at 4.
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¶4        Thereafter, the administrative judge issued an order indicating that it
     appeared that the Board may lack jurisdiction over the appeal to the extent the
     appellant was seeking to enforce the terms of the February 2017 settlement
     agreement, which was reached outside of the Board’s proceedings and not entered
     into the Board’s record for enforcement purposes. IAF, Tab 8. The jurisdictional
     order afforded the parties an opportunity to address this issu e. Id. In response,
     the appellant reiterated her argument that the Board has jur isdiction over her
     appeal as a reduction in pay based on the agency’s October 3, 2017 letter. IAF,
     Tab 9.
¶5        Without holding the appellant’s requested hearing, the administra tive judge
     issued an initial decision, dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.   IAF,
     Tab 12, Initial Decision (ID). The administrative judge construed the appeal not
     as a reduction in pay, but rather as an attempt to enforce the terms of the
     settlement agreement. ID at 6-7. Consequently, he found that the Board lacks
     jurisdiction to consider such a claim because it lacks the authority to enforce
     and/or interpret a settlement agreement that was not entered into the Board’s
     record for enforcement purposes. ID at 6.
¶6        The appellant has filed a petition for review in which she disputes the
     administrative judge’s finding that her appeal amounted to an effort to enforce the
     settlement agreement instead of an appealable reduction in pay.        Petition for
     Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. The agency has opposed the appellant’s petition, and
     the appellant has filed a reply. PFR File, Tabs 4-5.

                     DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶7        The Board’s jurisdiction is limited to those matters over which it has been
     given jurisdiction by statute or regulation. Maddox v. Merit Systems Protection
     Board, 759 F.2d 9, 10 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see 5 U.S.C. §§ 7512-7513.             The
     appellant bears the burden of proving jurisdiction by preponderant evidenc e.
     5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(2)(i)(A). If the appellant makes a nonfrivolous allegation
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     that the matter is within the Board’s jurisdiction, she is entitled to a hearing at
     which she must prove jurisdiction. Garcia v. Department of Homeland Security,
     437 F.3d 1322, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2006). A nonfrivolous allegation is an assertion
     that, if proven, could establish the matter at issue.    5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(s).     In
     determining whether an appellant has made a nonfrivolous allegation of
     jurisdiction entitling her to a hearing, the administrative judge may consider the
     agency's documentary submissions; however, to the extent that the agency's
     evidence constitutes mere factual contradiction of an appellant's otherwise
     adequate prima facie showing of jurisdiction, the administr ative judge may not
     weigh evidence and resolve conflicting assertions of the parties, and the agency's
     evidence may not be dispositive. Ferdon v. U.S. Postal Service, 60 M.S.P.R. 325,
     329 (1994).
¶8         Generally, the Board has jurisdiction to review actions involving reductions
     in pay. 5 U.S.C. § 7512(4); Arrington v. Department of the Navy, 117 M.S.P.R.
     301, ¶ 8 (2012).    If the agency reduced the appellant's pay to correct what it
     believed was a pay-setting error, then the agency bears the burden of showing that
     it set her pay at a rate contrary to law or regulation. Kile v. Department of the Air
     Force, 104 M.S.P.R. 49, ¶ 17 (2006). An appellant should not be forced to prove
     that the agency did not make a pay-setting error because the agency is in a much
     better position to know why it originally set her pay as it did and what later led it
     to conclude that it made an error. Id.
¶9         Here, the administrative judge did not construe the appeal as a reduction in
     pay, despite the appellant’s allegation that the Board ha s jurisdiction over the
     appeal as a reduction in pay based on the agency’s October 3, 2017 letter. IAF,
     Tab 6 at 4. We therefore consider this jurisdictional issue now. The agency’s
     October 3, 2017 letter stated clearly that it would be taking action to correct its
     error setting the appellant’s salary.    IAF, Tab 1 at 9.     Although the agency
     subsequently issued an October 25, 2017 Notice of Proposed Reduction in Salary,
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      there is no evidence indicating that the agency rescinded the October 3, 2017
      letter or expunged it from the appellant’s files.
¶10         Accordingly, we find that the appellant nonfrivolously alleged that the
      agency reduced her pay based on the October 3, 2017 letter. To the extent the
      agency reduced the appellant's pay to correct what it believ ed was a pay-setting
      error, further development of the record is needed on this issue. The appellant is
      therefore entitled to a jurisdictional hearing.      Garcia, 437 F.3d at 1344.   On
      remand, the appellant must prove by preponderant evidence the matters th at she
      has nonfrivolously alleged.

                                            ORDER
¶11         For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the Washington
      Regional Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

      FOR THE BOARD:                             /s/ for
                                                 Jennifer Everling
                                                 Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.