Court Opinion

ID: 9855351
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:23:08.417936+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:25:45.497303
License: Public Domain

STEINMETZ, J.
(dissenting). The majority holds that a municipal court in Wisconsin has the authority to declare a municipal ordinance unconstitutional. The majority also holds that city of Milwaukee ordinance 2-138 (1979) is unconstitutionally overbroad on its face. Because I disagree with the majority's analysis and conclusions, I dissent. I would reverse the decision of the circuit court.
Municipal courts in Wisconsin are not constitutional courts;1 rather, they are the product of legislative enactment.2 As such, they have no jurisdiction except that which is conferred upon them by statute. While it may be presumed that a particular creating statute endows a superior court with jurisdiction, no presumption exists as to inferior courts such as municipal courts. 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts sec. 28 (2d ed. 1965). In fact, *236jurisdiction conferred upon municipal courts by statute must be express. 57 Op. Att'y Gen. 11, 14 (1968); 9A E. McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations, sec. 27.02 (C. Keating 3d ed. 1986); C. Sands, Local Government Law, sec. 11.28 (1981).
Clearly, sec. 755.045, Stats.,3 which prescribes the jurisdiction of municipal courts, makes no express grant of jurisdiction to declare an ordinance unconstitutional. Arguably, the jurisdiction that the majority purports the municipal courts to have in this case is not even implied in the statute. Because the municipal courts in Wisconsin are endowed neither by the constitution nor by statute with the authority to declare unconstitutional a municipal ordinance, the majority has reached a mistaken result.4
*237Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972), logically and reasonably requires my conclusion. In Just, we determined that trial courts, as such, have authority to pass on constitutional issues. Id. at 26. As article VII, sec. 2 of the Wisconsin Constitution itself makes clear, Wisconsin distinguishes "trial courts" from "municipal courts." In essentially characterizing our conclusion in Just as a singular exception to the longstanding rule that "inferior courts" normally should regard a legislative enactment as constitutional until the contrary is decided by a court of appellate jurisdiction, we specifically referred to "trial courts," identifying them with "circuit courts." Id. at 24-26. Just's holding is properly extended only to trial courts, i.e., circuit courts, and not to inferior courts such as municipal courts. Indeed, it is patently unreasonable to extend the Just exception to municipal courts. Just requires, with good reason, that any constitutional issues be "thoroughly briefed" and "fully presented" to the court, Id. at 26, whereas in municipal court it is often the case that no counsel is available on behalf of the defendant.5
As the majority acknowledges, municipal courts, unlike tried courts, are not courts of record. Majority op. at 215. Indeed, sec. 800.13(2), Stats., says as much. The majority ignores the significance of this distinction. Nevertheless, the distinction has been acknowledged by the United States Supreme Court. In Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 470-71 (1987), the Houston municipal courts apparently did not rule on the question of the constitutionality of the ordinance. However, the Supreme Court evidently considered the Houston municipal courts to have had the authority to do so precisely because they are courts of record. "It is undis*238puted that Houston's Municipal Courts, which have been courts of record in Texas since 1976, have had numerous opportunities to narrow the scope of the ordinance." Id. at 469-70.
Because Wisconsin municipal courts are not courts of record, they are able to provide something of a summary procedure, less costly and less protracted than the procedure used in courts of record, in applying local regulations to the facts of a particular case. Certain legal technicalities that may encumber an ordinary proceeding are generally dispensed with in municipal court proceedings. As the United States Supreme Court announced in Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 117 (1972):
'[T]he inferior courts are not designed or equipped to conduct error-free trials, or to insure full recognition of constitutional freedoms. They are courts of convenience, to provide speedy and inexpensive means of disposition of charges of minor offenses.'
In other words, municipal courts, by definition and necessity, are not courts in which the fullest and most careful legal consideration is given to the issues presented, generally speaking.
In this connection, I would invoke the well established maxim that questions involving the interpretation and application of the constitution must be approached with the greatest possible deliberation. 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts, sec. 66 (2d ed. 1965). Even those courts which have jurisdiction to declare an ordinance unconstitutional must exercise that power with the greatest possible caution and even reluctance. Id. Clearly, municipal courts are neither formulated nor equipped to provide the particularly careful attention needed to pass on constitutional issues.
*239Even assuming that counsel is available in any given case before the municipal court, there is another important consideration that the majority fails to recognize: municipal court judges are not required to be attorneys at law. According to a very recent study using raw data furnished by this court, only about 40 percent of all municipal court judges in Wisconsin are attorneys.6 See Wisconsin Municipal Judges Association Court Survey (5th ed. 1990). Formally uneducated in constitutional law, non-attorney municipal judges may not be adequately trained so as to be able to declare an ordinance unconstitutional.7 Insofar as this raises any concern as *240to the ability of municipal courts in Wisconsin to fully and equally deliver justice to all who appear before them, it is inappropriate for the majority to conclude, as it presumptively does, that municipal courts have the constitutional jurisdiction with which the well represented defendant as here would endow them. The result of the majority's decision may well be that, in the future, constitutional ordinances will be invalidated as unconstitutional.8
The fact that municipal courts have neither the jurisdiction nor the practical wherewithal needed to exercise jurisdiction to declare an ordinance unconstitutional is related to the very nature of the actions that municipal courts address. First of all, constitutional issues arise very infrequently in municipal courts. L. Wasby, Public Law, Politics and the Local Courts, 14 *241Journal of Public Law 105 (1966). As a natural consequence, in the rare circumstance of a constitutional issue actually surfacing, the municipal judge will be unpracticed in addressing it, even if he is an attorney. Particularly if the municipal judge is not an attorney, his potential disadvantage in being able to address the issue will be reinforced and exaggerated by his practical lack of familiarity and experience with constitutional issues.
In addition, an action for violation of a municipal ordinance is civil rather than criminal in nature. Section 800.02(1), Stats.; State ex rel. Prentice v. County Court, 70 Wis. 2d 230, 241, 234 N.W.2d 283 (1975). This rule is well-settled generally. See e.g., E.C. Yokley, Municipal Corporations sec. 376 (1957). There are two primary reasons for the rule. "The first is that only the state is the sovereign, and that only an offense against the sovereign is a crime." Prentice, 70 Wis. 2d at 241. "Another reason is that violations of municipal ordinances are minor offenses for which a forfeiture is the only permissible direct punishment." Id. at 241-42. This court has said that, at least to the extent that the potential forfeiture does not exceed $500, there is no criminal penalty involved. State v. Kramsvogel, 124 Wis. 2d 101, 369 N.W.2d 145, cert. denied 474 U.S. 901 (1985). Under the ordinance in question in this case, the maximum forfeiture is $250.9
*242Thus, the proceeding in this case clearly was civil and not criminal in nature. Given that civil proceedings are to be less closely examined than criminal ones, Record Head Corp. v. Sachen, 682 F.2d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 1982), it is all the more clear that the municipal court did not have any legitimate basis upon which to declare unconstitutional the civil ordinance in question.10
Although it denies it is doing so, the majority essentially asserts that because a municipal court judge pledges to uphold the constitution when he takes his *243oath of office, a municipal court has the authority to declare an ordinance unconstitutional as did the municipal court in this case. Majority op. at 221-222. This is a nonsequitur. As even the majority points out, Id. at 222, Wisconsin's constitutional officers, legislators, and members of the bar all take oaths to uphold the constitution; their reading of their oaths does not endow them or their respective positions with the authority to pass upon constitutional issues that might surface in a court. The majority confuses the oath made by the particular judge with the jurisdiction of the court in general.
The conclusion I draw has support in the case law of other jurisdictions. For example, the New Jersey Superior Court has noted that a "municipal court is an inferior court and it is not ordinarily within its purview to deal with debatable questions relating to the constitutionality of statutes, especially those of long standing." State v. Celmer, 384 A.2d 894 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 404 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1979). Other courts have indicated that a municipal court has jurisdiction to pass upon constitutional issues only under circumstances where the municipal court proceedings are regarded, because of the relative severity of the possible penalties prescribed by the respective ordinances or because of statutory grants of criminal jurisdiction conferred upon the municipal court, as criminal in nature. See, e.g., West v. Winnsboro, 252 La. 605, 211 So. 2d 665 (1967); State v. Price, 105 Ohio St. 376, 152 N.E.2d 776 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957). Even where the municipal court proceeding was regarded as criminal in nature, one court concluded that it would be improvident to permit the "poorly equipped" municipal court jurisdiction to pass upon the constitutional question at issue. Aluminum Cooking Utensil Co. v. City of North Bend, 210 Or. 412, 311 P.2d 464, 467 (1957). These courts obviously recog*244nize that to burden municipal courts with a responsibility they are not authorized or equipped to handle jeopardizes the fair and proper delivery of justice by the municipal courts.
In conclusion, then, I submit that municipal courts in Wisconsin do not have jurisdiction to declare municipal ordinances unconstitutional. Moreover, it simply is not wise to put Wisconsin municipal courts in a situation in which some are called upon to accomplish things for which they are inadequately trained. Allowed to carry out their useful and necessary function of considering the merits of the case before them, Wisconsin municipal courts, which have earned a reputation for excellence, will continue to be a widely esteemed pillar of the judicial function of government. Asked by the majority to go beyond their constitutional and statutory mandate, municipal courts could potentially lose some of the popular respect they now enjoy and deserve.11
If a defendant wishes to raise constitutional objections to a given ordinance, the proper approach, assuming the defendant is not successful on the merits of his case in municipal court, is for the defendant to address his constitutional concerns on appeal to the circuit court, pursuant to sec. 800.14, Stats., in which case the *245defendant receives a trial de novo. See, e.g., State ex rel. Beaudry v. Panosian, 35 Wis. 2d 418, 151 N.W.2d 48 (1967). As Just makes clear, constitutional questions are properly considered at trial to the circuit court.
I also dissent as to the majority's conclusion that the Milwaukee ordinance is unconstitutional. As the majority has shown, Milwaukee ordinance 2-138 (1979)12 is, at first glance, facially overbroad. Unfortunately, that is where the majority's analysis effectively ends, and where its error begins. The majority gives only perfunctory attention to the duty of this court to devise a limiting construction of the ordinance so as to render it constitutional if such is possible. Further analysis shows that the ordinance can be rendered constitutional.
" [T]his court must interpret an ordinance, as it would a statute, to preserve its constitutionality." Milwaukee v. K.F., 145 Wis. 2d 24, 47, 426 N.W.2d 329 (1988). "It is elementary that an ordinance is presumed to be constitutional and that the attacking party must establish its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt." J&N Corp. v. Green Bay, 28 Wis. 2d 583, 585, 137 N.W.2d 434 (1965). "[T]his court will not interfere with a municipality's exercise of police power unless it is clearly illegal." Id.
*246As noted by the United States Supreme Court in Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973), challenged legislation generally should not be found facially overbroad "when a limiting construction has been or could be placed" on it. In this regard, the Supreme Court looks for state courts to craft a suitable limiting construction. State legislation or a municipal ordinance "should not be deemed facially invalid unless it is not readily subject to a narrowing construction by the state courts." Id. Indeed, only the state courts can supply the requisite narrowing construction, since the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to authoritatively construe state legislation. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520 (1972).
The majority fails to take up the task of crafting a suitable limiting construction. Instead, at majority op. at 230, the majority cites Hill. In Hill, the Supreme Court found unconstitutionally overbroad an ordinance that prohibited any person "in any manner [to] . . . interrupt" any policeman in the execution of his duty. The majority focuses on the ordinance's use of the words "in any manner," likening it constitutionally to the words "any way" used in the Milwaukee ordinance regulating that a person may not "resist, or any way interfere . . .." Majority op. at 231.
The most notable feature of the majority's discussion in this regard is that it fails to consider that in Hill the state courts had never even attempted to craft a limiting construction upon that ordinance.13 Hill, 482 U.S. at 469-71. Had the state courts prescribed a limiting construction, the Supreme Court would have been bound by it. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949). *247It is possible that the Supreme Court in Hill might have concluded that the result of a particular limiting construction devised by the state courts was to render the ordinance not constitutionally overbroad.14
Thus, Hill is poor precedent for the majority. If need be, this court has the power to completely sever from an ordinance arguably constitutionally objectional words, leaving intact the rest of the ordinance. See Madison v. Nickel, 66 Wis. 2d 71, 223 N.W.2d 865 (1974); see also State ex rel. McStroul v. Lucas, 215 Wis. 285, 29 N.W. 73 (1947). Insofar as the words "any way" in the Milwaukee ordinance are truly objectionable, this court can simply sever those words from the ordinance.
The majority also suggests that the ordinance is unconstitutional because it "could apply irrespective of any purpose or 'intent.' " Majority op. at 233. In City of Milwaukee v. Nelson, 149 Wis. 2d 434, 453, 439 N.W.2d 562 (1989), aff'g 142 Wis. 2d 944, 419 N.W.2d 573 (Ct. App. 1988), however, this court found the particular ordinance in question in that case not overbroad even though it, like the ordinance here, did not contain an element of intent. Whether or not an ordinance contains an intent element clearly is not dispositive of the ordinance's constitutionality.
For its part, the City of Milwaukee has submitted that, as a matter of police practice, the ordinance in question here does not apply to all verbal conduct as such but only to physical conduct and "fighting words." *248For all intents and purposes, the majority has ignored Milwaukee's argument.15 In doing so, it also has ignored the longstanding rule that, in construing an ordinance for constitutionality, a court should consider "very persuasive" the particular construction given by those responsible for enforcement of the ordinance. Adams Express Co. v. New York, 232 U.S. 14, 30-31 (1914). Cf. Milwaukee Fire Fighters Assoc. v. Milwaukee, 50 Wis. 2d 9, 18, 183 N.W.2d 18 (1971) (the practical administrative construction of an ordinance over a long period of time is entitled to great weight). Had the majority given due consideration to Milwaukee's construction of the ordinance, it would have found the ordinance not constitutionally overbroad.
Given this court's duty, as articulated in K.F., J&N Corp. and other case law, to find an ordinance constitutional if at all possible,16 it is unfortunate that the majority does not even attempt a limiting construction. The ordinance here quite easily could be constructed so as to reach only physical conduct and "fighting words."17 The majority's dictionary definitions of the words "resist," "interfere," "hinder," and "prevent," majority op. at 230, do little to advance the majority's position. "Each of *249these [words], with the possible exception of 'resist,' " the majority asserts, "could as reasonably refer to verbal expression as to conduct." Majority op. at 230.
That is not, at least it should not be, the question. The question should be whether the words and the ordinance as a whole can be construed so as not to be over-broad. As a preliminary matter, given the meaning attributed to "resist," "interfere," "hinder," and "prevent" in common usage, the words arguably relate primarily to physical and not to verbal conduct. In any case, within the ordinance, they can be construed in a limited way so as to be rendered constitutional in general application. Furthermore, if necessary, an "intent" element can be read into the ordinance. See State v. Williams, 534 A.2d 230 (Conn. 1987). Such a construction certainly would render the ordinance here constitutional.
One might hypothesize, as does the majority opinion, situations in which the ordinance might unconstitutionally intrude upon a third party's first amendment rights. "However, in analyzing the constitutionality of potential applications of a regulation, the court should not deem an ordinance invalid because in some conceivable, but limited, circumstances the regulation might be improperly applied." K.F., 125 Wis. 2d at 40.
Even after Hill, courts in other jurisdictions have construed legislation very similar to the Milwaukee ordinance to be constitutional. For example, in Matter of E.D.P., 573 A.2d 1307 (D.C. App. 1990), the court construed as constitutional a hindering statute that made it unlawful to "assault," "resist," "oppose," "impede," "intimidate," or "interfere" with a police officer or government supervisor of juveniles. The court said:
[The statute] can be narrowly construed to apply to physical conduct rather than speech. [Citations omitted.] As applied to appellant, the statute can be con*250strued to prohibit individuals from physically opposing District juvenile supervisors. This construction is consistent with the plain language of the statute, eliminates free speech and assembly concerns, and sufficiently clarifies the standard of conduct required by the statute.
573 A.2d at 1309.
In Wilkerson v. State, 556 So. 2d 453 (Fla. App. 1990), a Florida court of appeals chose to limit and save that state's resisting statute. That statute generally made it unlawful to "obstruct or oppose" a police officer in the execution of his or her duty "without offering or doing violence to the person of the officer." 556 So. 2d at 454. The defendant was arrested after yelling at the police officers (who were arresting drug sellers) and refusing to leave the area. The court said it did not "construe the language of [the statute] as reaching protected free speech." Id. at 455. "[W]e agree with the state's argument that this statute may be given a limiting construction that avoids the overbreadth deficiency found in the Houston ordinance by the Court in Hill." Id. at 456.
Other jurisdictions as well have distinguished Hill and have imposed limiting constructions on ordinances alleged to have been unconstitutionally overbroad. See Williams; State v. Krawsky, 426 N.W.2d 875 (Minn. 1988). See also People v. Dietze, 75 N.Y.2d 47, 549 N.E.2d 1166 (1989) (Wachtler, C.J., concurring).
Milwaukee ordinance 2-138 (1979) has a legitimate purpose — primarily to prohibit acts or conduct that operate to physically oppose an officer in the performance of his lawful duties. The ordinance can and should be constructed so as not to be unconstitutionally over-broad. The majority ignores the opportunity and duty it *251has to save this statute from extinction. I therefore dissent and would reverse the holding of the trial court.
I am authorized to state that JUSTICE LOUIS J. CECI joins this dissenting opinion.

Although municipal courts are permitted by Article VII, sec. 2 and discussed in Article VII, sec. 14 of the Wisconsin Constitution, they are not created by the Wisconsin Constitution.
Article VII, sec. 2 of the Wisconsin Constitution reads:
The judicial power of this state shall be vested in a unified court system consisting of one supreme court, a court of appeals, a circuit court, such trial courts of general uniform statewide jurisdiction as the legislature may create by law, and a municipal court if authorized by the legislature under section 14.

Section 755.01, Stats., gives municipalities the authority to create municipal courts.

Section 755.045, Stats., reads:
Jurisdiction. (1) A municipal court has exclusive jurisdiction over an action in which a municipality seeks to impose forfeitures for violations of municipal ordinances of the municipality which operates the court, unless the action is transferred under s. 800.04(1) or 800.05(3) to a court of record. If equitable relief is demanded the municipal court does not have jurisdiction and the action must be brought in a court of record.
(2) A municipal judge may issue civil warrants to enforce matters which are under the jurisdiction of the municipal court. Municipal judges are also authorized to issue inspection warrants under ss. 66.122 and 66.123.
(3) A municipal judge may order the payment of restitution for violations of ordinances in conformity with s. 943.24 or 943.50. The judge shall use the restitution procedure under s. 943.24(5) or 943.50(5), as applicable.

While courts "have inherent power to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice," that power is confined "within the scope of their jurisdiction." 20 Am. Jur. Courts sec. 79 (2d ed. 1965). That is, where there is no jurisdiction, a court does not have inherent powers.

Neither this court nor the legislature has imposed the right of counsel in a municipal court proceeding.

The majority asserts that "[t]he fact [that] municipal judges need not be lawyers is irrelevant to the municipal courts' power to declare legislation unconstitutional." Majority op. at 222 n.10. The majority then attempts to equate the professional responsibilities and continuing education requirements of the municipal court judges with that of the judges of the circuit court, court of appeals and supreme court. Majority op. at 223 n.ll. In so doing, the majority ignores the fact that, at least in numerical terms, the continuing education required of municipal judges is a far cry from that required of judges of the other courts. See generally SCR ch. 32 and SCR ch. 33.

In fact, a reading of the Wisconsin Municipal Judges Manual itself suggests that municipal judges do not have the training or power to pass on constitutional questions. That is because the manual, although it instructs municipal judges in making a determination as to statutory validity of an ordinance, mentions nothing as to a municipal judge's making a determination of the constitutional validity of an ordinance. See Wisconsin Municipal Judges Manual 11-1-11-2 (1989). Nowhere in the manual is there any suggestion to municipal judges being trained in even such basic constitutional review matters as the burden of proof upon review. Nor does any such training appear to be offered at the periodic seminars and conferences held for municipal judges. Certainly none was offered in 1990. See Agenda from Municipal *240Judge Orientation Seminar (June 4-5, 1990); Agenda from 1990 Special Topic Seminar: The Statutes and the Reality of Municipal Court (March 22-23, 1990); Agenda from 1990 Municipal Judge Traffic Seminar (August 20-21, 1990); Agenda from Municipal Judge Trial Seminar (October 4-5, 1990).
As will be noted later in this dissenting opinion, judges in courts that have jurisdiction to pass on constitutional issues have the responsibility of crafting a limiting construction where such is necessary and possible. Such a task requires skills and a knowledge of constitutional law that, at least in some instances, would seem to require that the judge have gained a formal constitutional law education.

Unrelated to the issues of legal representation and the formal educational background of municipal court judges but nevertheless expository of the informality with which municipal court proceedings historically have been conducted, the legislature has considered it necessary to instruct that no municipal court judge may "keep his or her office or hold court in any tavern, or in any room in which intoxicating liquors are sold, or in any room connecting therewith." Section 755.09(2), Stats.

A facial reading of the ordinance in question in this case might suggest that incarceration for a period of up to six months — a criminal penalty — might directly result if a defendant were to be unsuccessful on the merits. However, it has been clear for many years, as Prentice indicates, that Wisconsin municipalities may not apply criminal sanctions as direct punishment for ordinance violation. As to any facial invalidity of the ordinance, then, I note that court has the power to construct a statute or an ordinance so as to find it compatible with existing law. If nothing *242else, the court can simply "read out" of the ordinance the references to possible incarceration as those references now are phrased; it is not the case that the entire ordinance must be invalidated. See State ex rel. McStroul v. Lucas, 251 Wis. 285, 29 N.W. 73 (1947). Moreover, as a practical matter, there is no indication in this case that the defendant would have been subject to incarceration as a direct penalty of losing on the merits, or that, assuming what must be regarded as the remote possibility of incarceration for failure to pay a forfeiture, see Kramsvogel, 124 Wis. 2d 101,120, the jail time that the defendant might have been ordered to serve for violation of the ordinance would have exceeded 90 days, the maximum amount of time sanctioned under sec. 800.09, Stats. In any case, the defendant in this case has never argued that the ordinance is invalid by virtue of the issue considered in this paragraph.

Civil proceeding or not, the very long life of the Milwaukee ordinance offers an additional argument against the municipal court's ability to pass on the question of the ordinance's constitutionality. In State v. Stehlek, 262 Wis. 642, 645-46, 56 N.W. 514 (1953), this court indicated that a non-appellate court was without jurisdiction to pass on the constitutionality of legislation that had been in effect for "nearly eight years." Even after Just, I submit, Stehlek remains applicable to municipal courts, especially where, as here, the ordinance has been on the books for over 135 years.

According to certain studies, the municipal judges of certain other states have indicated a lack of confidence in the ability of municipal courts to accord constitutional protections to those members of the public, particularly the poor and unrepresented, who appear before them. See M. Kaye and F. Yaffe, Trial de Novo: An Attitudinal Profile of Two-Tiered Lower Criminal Courts, 10 Law & Psychology Review 19,40 (1986). Other surveys indicate that the public itself has little faith in at least some municipal court systems. R.C. Thomas, Amendment 64 — An Opportunity, Arkansas Lawyer 168 (July 1986). The majority's decision will open the door to such problems in Wisconsin.

Milwaukee ordinance 2-138 reads:
Resisting Officer. Whoever in this city shall resist, or any way interfere with any police officer or member of the police department in the discharge of his duty, or shall hinder or prevent him from discharging his duty as such officer or member, or shall offer or endeavor so to do, and whoever shall in any manner assist any person in custody of any officer or member of the police department to escape from such custody, or shall rescue or attempt to rescue any person in custody, shall forfeit a penalty of not less than ten dollars ($10), nor more than two hundred and fifty dollars ($250), or be imprisoned in the house of correction for not less than thirty (30) days nor more than six (6) months, or by both such fine and imprisonment.

 After being acquitted in municipal court on the merits of the charge he was facing, Hill brought suit in federal district court challenging the ordinance's constitutionality and seeking, inter alia, damages and attorney's fees. Hill, 482 U.S. at 455.

The majority also suggests that the term "any way" in the Milwaukee ordinance modifies not only "interfere" but also the words "prevents" and "hinders" as used in the statute. Majority op. at 231. In fact, there appears to be little basis for such a suggestion by the majority. The text of the ordinance clearly indicates that in reality the term "any way" applies only to the word "interfere."

The majority refuses to consider Milwaukee's arguments while admitting that it cannot "even venture an opinion of the original intent of the drafters 135 years ago." Majority op. at 234. "We know nothing of the legislative history, the particular facts, or societal problems that impelled the passage of the Milwaukee ordinance." Id. at 228.

Following Stehlek, 262 Wis. 642, this is particularly the case when an ordinance has been on the books for an extended period of time, as has been the ordinance in this case.

That is, physical conduct and "fighting words" could be considered to be regulated by the ordinance at least insofar as such a proscription would not be preempted by state statute.