Court Opinion

ID: 9590729
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:57:57.887257+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:41:00.991105
License: Public Domain

Sognier, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The record reveals that David R. Kam & Associates (Kam) and Jones & Kolb (J&K) brought suits against four partners, Payne, Malin, Rivers and Pelt, jointly and severally, to recover for services rendered. The suits were consolidated with plaintiffs seeking a combined sum of $27,090.20. As plaintiffs acknowledge in their brief, both plaintiffs settled with Malin, Rivers and Pelt for an aggregate sum of $10,000. The case proceeded to trial solely against Payne based on the alternate theories of breach of contract and quantum meruit. A review of the transcript reveals that the evidence presented at trial went to the value of all services rendered by plaintiffs: no evidence was presented indicating Payne’s individual share of the amount due. Further, no evidence was presented to the jury regarding other sums received by plaintiffs nor was any charge given the jury intimating such other payments. The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff Kam for $3,915.20 and in favor of plaintiff J&K for $2,000. The trial court’s denial of Payne’s motion to reduce the judgment by the amount of payments received by plaintiffs in settlement with Payne’s partners is enumerated as error on appeal.
The principle is well established that a plaintiff is entitled to but one satisfaction of the claim. Ford Motor Co. v. Lee, 137 Ga. App. 486, 490-491 (10) (224 SE2d 168) (1976), aff’d in part, rev’d in part 237 Ga. 554 (229 SE2d 379). “ ‘By the weight of authority, . . . since the creditor is entitled to but one satisfaction, no matter how many persons may be bound to render it to him, any payment so made must be credited as against the other co-obligors. . . .’” Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Ouzts, 82 Ga. App. 36, 59 (60 SE2d 770) (1950). There is no merit in appellees’ argument that this principle is limited only to actions ex delicto. See City Express Svc. v. Rich’s, Inc., 148 Ga. App. 123, 125 (4) (250 SE2d 867) (1978). Nor is there any support in the record for appellees’ argument that the verdict did not reflect the jury’s assessment of the total value of services provided by appellees. Finally, although appellees accurately state that evidence of settlement sums received was presented to the jury in Ford Motor Co. v. Lee, 137 Ga. App. at 490, and the jury charged regarding such sums, but see Ford Motor Co., 237 Ga. at 555, no such evidence was presented or charge made to the jury in Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., *66supra, in which this court directed that the $4,000 settlement amount be written off the verdict received by the plaintiff therein. Appellees thus fail in their attempt to distinguish the case sub judice from the controlling authority presented in Ford Motor Co. and Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., supra, by asserting that the settlement sums they received from appellant’s partners cannot be written off the verdict because appellant failed to introduce evidence regarding those sums at trial.
Decided January 3, 1989
Rehearing denied January 27, 1989
Herbert P. Schlanger, for appellant.
Jeffrey A. Bashuk, for appellees.
The jury having determined that the services rendered by appellees were worth $5,915.20, rather than the $27,090.20 value claimed by appellees, and appellees having admittedly received a $10,000 aggregate sum from appellant’s jointly and severally liable co-defendants, this sum operated as a payment pro tanto upon the judgment obtained against appellant. American Chain &c. Co. v. Brunson, 157 Ga. App. 833, 837 (278 SE2d 719) (1981). I would therefore reverse the entry of judgment insofar as the trial court’s failure to write off from the verdict the amount earlier received by appellees. See Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., supra at 61 (3). However, while appellees do not controvert appellant’s computations which indicate the entire verdict against appellant as to both appellees must be completely written off, the record indicates the amounts paid each appellee only insofar as Rivers is concerned. The record reveals that there was no apportionment between appellees in the payment made by Pelt and the record fails to reflect the terms of the settlement made by Malin. Thus, I would set aside the judgment and remand for further hearing by the trial court as to the proportions, the amounts received by appellees, and the proper interest thereon, in order to determine properly the amounts to be written off the verdict.