Court Opinion

ID: 9532062
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:17:38.834461+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:39.855264
License: Public Domain

M. S. Coleman, J.
(dissent). The majority opinion creates concepts which represent a significant departure from time tested theories of tort liability. Landowners must now disavow all but the most casual personal interest in projects undertaken on their property or assume responsibility for any on-site injuries. General contractors must now be prepared to assume responsibility for any injury received by the employee of a subcontractor, no matter how negligent the employee may be.
This alone would warrant my dissent. Additionally, the manner in which the trial was conducted denied defendants a fair hearing. I would reverse and remand for a new trial as to both defendants.
The majority opinion has not been directed to the issue of law which prompted the grant of leave to appeal. We were to describe the perimeters of the theory of intrinsically and inherently dangerous activity. The majority opinion has done nothing to untangle the snarl created by our 2-2-1-2 vote in McDonough v General Motors Corp, 388 Mich 430; 201 NW2d 609 (1972).
This case has been used to advance theories of employment relationships which can render the property owner and the general contractor absolute insurers for any injury received by the em*117ployee of an independent contractor. Under any circumstances, I would have reservations concerning the social value of such policy and its relationship to rules of law. Under the facts of this case, I find such theories indefensible.
Our workmen’s compensation laws have insured that injured workmen will not be left uncompensated. Mr. Funk was not left uncompensated. The employer could not cite Mr. Funk’s own negligence as a defense. See MCLA 411.1; MSA 17.141. The Court has afforded Mr. Funk two additional avenues of recovery and has allowed him to proceed without fear of being called to answer for his own negligence.
Like the Court of Appeals, I could easily conclude that Mr. Funk so obviously contributed to or brought about his own mishap that imposing liability on the general contractor and the property owner would be unwarranted. The facts will demonstrate this contention. The Court prefers to negate these facts. I will, however, approach this matter on issues other than contributory negligence.
The relationship of the defendants’ size to the ultimate result has been like grease to the wheel. It makes it much easier to proceed from one point to another. However, the theory adopted must fall equally upon the large and the small, upon the corporation and the individual, upon the large landowner and the small homeowner.
This dissent will first detail the facts. They clearly indicate the extent of Mr. Funk’s responsibility for the accident. It will then show how the defendants were prejudiced by the manner in which the trial was conducted. This alone would call for a new trial. Finally, it will explain my understanding of the Michigan precedent dealing *118with the theory of inherently and intrinsically dangerous activities.

FACTS

The true facts and issues of this case were not easily discernable because of a veritable blizzard of arguments, alleged facts, charges and counter-charges (including a claim by the defendants of inaccurate briefing and oral argument by the plaintiff). The writer has read the record, briefs and opinions, has reviewed tapes of the oral arguments and finds that the following basic facts emerge as reliable.
Plaintiff, Ellis Funk, was injured on February 27, 1967 when he fell while working in Flint, Michigan. He was employed by Ben Agree Company which had contracted with General Motors Corporation (hereafter designated GM) to supply plumbing, pipefitting and related work on an A. C. Sparkplug building. This contract had been assigned to Darin & Armstrong, the general contractor. GM employed the architect and owned the property.
On Friday, February 24, 1967, the foreman in charge of installing the sprinkler system came to Calvin Strang, the Ben Agree foreman in charge of installing pipes; He complained that 600 feet of pipe were too close to the sprinkler pipes. Mr. Strang agreed that he probably had made a mistake and said that he would have the pipe moved. Mr. Strang failed to notify his employer’s representative, the project superintendent or the architect engineer of this situation.
The following Monday Mr. Strang told plaintiff and Dennis Eddington, an apprentice, to go up under the roof and move the pipe two feet to the *119north. The pipe was hanging in 40-foot lengths. It was attached to the steel beams by J-hooks. Mr. Strang told the workers to use a hammer to move the hooks. Where the roof slabs had been installed, they were to push up the edge of each slab which was resting on the steel beam and move the J-hooks along. They were to work from the lower level of the structural steel under the roof.
After nearly 400 feet of pipe had been moved, the workers came to a part of the roofing which was stuck. Without informing the foreman, Funk and the apprentice went up on the roof. (The roofing subcontractor was working in another area.) With a hatchet, they chipped away ice which had collected around the roof slabs. Using a crowbar, they succeeded in moving four slabs weighing over 200 pounds each, turning them back onto the solid roof. Reaching down through the holes, they moved the J-hooks.
When they came to a ventilator shaft (or heat duct), two slabs were pulled from under the metal skirt surrounding the shaft. The workers did not move the slabs completely. They were left in a "teeter-totter” fashion on a beam which ran diagonally beneath them. Because of the position of the J-hook, Eddington was preparing to reach through the ventilator and was on his hands and knees.
What happened here is interpreted differently by plaintiff and the assistant. Plaintiff states that he was kneeling near one of the holes created by removing a slab and was using his hammer to push himself up when he slipped or the hammer slipped. He stated that he reached for the protrusion which came up a foot or so around the ventilator, missed and fell on the "teeter-totter” slab.
Mr. Eddington testified that plaintiff was standing, not kneeling, when he fell. The assistant said *120that the steel came right up to the side of the ventilator. Therefore, he had intended to reach the J-hook through the ventilator and not go through the hole made by pulling back the slab. Mr. Eddington had looked up from his kneeling position to see plaintiff standing on his feet. He then heard a "holler” as he looked back down the ventilator and looked up again to see plaintiff falling feet first through the opening left by pulling back the slab.
In any event, plaintiff fell to the floor beneath and was injured.
The foreman claimed that he did not know that Mr. Funk was on the roof until after the fall. Darin & Armstrong and GM claim that they had no knowledge of the moving of the pipe and no knowledge that plaintiff was on the roof at any time.
It is noteworthy that Mr. Funk, a journeyman plumber and pipefitter of 17-years experience, (1) failed to ask for instructions from his foreman when he wished to proceed other than as directed, and (2) "crossed the line” into the work of another subcontractor. Mr. Funk affirmed that he would take orders only from his foreman. He said that if any other craft "crossed over” into his area of responsibility, he would have complained to his steward. He admitted that this was wrong and contrary to the custom of the trade.
The case was tried before a jury. The trial judge stated that to find defendants liable plaintiff had to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that defendants were guilty of negligence and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the accident. Negligence was defined as the "violation of a legally imposed duty.” It was sufficient to show that either or both of the defendants acted, or *121failed to act, in a manner which was reasonably prudent and careful.
GM was said to owe plaintiff a duty to hire competent contractors. No other duties were required unless the jury found that the custom and usage of the trade was such as required GM to protect such workers or that GM had retained control of the construction site.
GM was also said to be liable if the work was inherently or intrinsically dangerous. This is an exception to the general rule that the owner is not liable for the negligence of independent contractors. The court provided the following definitions:
"Now, what do we mean by inherently? I am going to turn to the dictionary and let the record show that I am using the dictionary of the Reader’s Digest Great Encyclopedic Dictionary. Inherent: Forming a permanent and essential element or quality. It means belonging to the very nature of the thing.
"Intrinsically, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, according to the dictionary, belonging to or arising from the true or fundamental nature of a thing. Essential: Inherent. They are almost together. I think that it is the type or quality of the work.”
The jury returned a general verdict (upon what theory we do not know) against both defendants for $150,000 on August 8, 1969. Requests for a judgment n.o.v. were denied as were the requests for a new trial.
The Court of Appeals granted defendants’ motions for a judgment n.o.v. 37 Mich App 482; 194 NW2d 916 (1972). The reason for the injury was said to have been "a hazardous condition created by plaintiff and his assistant without the direction or knowledge of either defendant.” The Court rejected the theory of inherently dangerous work *122saying that the "record contains no factual support for this theory.”

CONDUCT OF TRIAL

One of the initial problems of this case is that a large amount of irrelevant and prejudicial material was delivered to the jury and to this Court. It was unreasonable to expect this jury to sort out the proper facts and effectively apply the law as given in the instructions. We are exceedingly careful in Michigan about what reaches the ears and eyes of the jury in criminal cases and increasingly permissive in what goes to the jury in civil cases. Because this case is in point, some effort should be made to give direction to the trial court which is at present caught between the Scylla of the plaintiffs bar and the Charybdis of the defendant’s bar.
The present case was presented in reverse order. The testimony of expert and nonexpert witnesses was permitted on the assumption it would be applied to facts presented later in the case. Much irrelevant and inflamatory material was admitted (partially through counsel’s own testimonial remarks and questions) and not connected with specific facts. This could have left the jury with opinions and impressions which were indelible. An aura of fundamental unfairness pervades the testimony and doubtless contributed to the finding of the Court of Appeals.
It is "black letter law” in Michigan that the conduct of a trial is controlled by exercise of the judge’s discretion. This includes the order of proof and the sequence of witnesses.1 This Court has *123properly avoided interference in most instances. This case should be an exception.
The manner in which evidence was presented was a basis for reversal of a verdict for plaintiff in Sima v Wright, 268 Mich 352; 256 NW 349 (1934), and is relevant to the case at bar. This was an action for medical malpractice. The Court described the situation at p 355:
"In spite of frequent warning by the court that the practice was hazardous, plaintiffs counsel tried the case in reverse order. They presented their medical witnesses and asked hypothetical questions before plaintiff testified and were permitted to do so only on their assurance that the basic facts would be shown later. While the order of proof is largely in the discretion of the court, the practice employed in this case is not to be commended because it prevents opposing counsel from making specific objections to hypothetical questions and hinders the court in keeping the testimony to the issue.”
In Blickley v Luce's Estate, 148 Mich 233; 111 NW 752 (1907), the Court said the order in which the proofs are introduced does not require a reversal "except where such course deprives the complaining party of a fair trial or occasions a miscarriage of justice.” (p 241.) This echoes the rule that any error made in the conduct of a trial must be prejudicial in order to warrant reversal.2
The trial judge of the instant matter recognized the hazards inherent in plaintiffs presentation of proof after a few hypothetical questions were asked. The judge said in chambers that she "may have been wrong” in denying defense counsel’s request that plaintiff proceed with the facts first
*124" * * * because you are * * * you are putting in a lot of hypotheticals, and you are saying assuming this and assuming that, and the evidence will show * * * it may be possible that you can never connect it up. I am not saying that you won’t but there is a possibility that you may not connect it up, and then it is going to be very difficult for the jury to erase from their minds those things that are irrelevant. Not necessarily irrelevant, but never were connected up.”
The judge went on again to say to plaintiffs attorney:
"I don’t think you should be putting in all of those hypotheticals and assuming this and assuming that, and that the evidence will show this and the evidence will show that.”
Much of plaintiffs testimony was in no way connected to the facts involved in plaintiffs accident. It remained in the record and was highly prejudicial.

EXPERT WITNESSES

Inseparable from the discussion above is plaintiffs use of expert witnesses. To be specific, defendants repeatedly objected to the testimony of Robert M. Jenkins.
Mr. Jenkins testified that he had no knowledge of the construction in question, but referred to a number of companies of good reputation in the construction field and to a variety of safety methods used by different groups. The thrust of Mr. Jenkin’s testimony concerned working conditions "on the steel”. None of this testimony was relevant to the later developed facts. Plaintiff was not "on the steel”, but had gone (needlessly) on his own, contrary to directions and without approval or knowledge of his foreman, to the roof where he *125"crossed lines” into the craft of the roofers. He admittedly knew this was wrong and against the custom of the trade.
The expert testimony presented in this case had no probative value to the instant set of facts. Had the facts of the case been presented first, it is doubtful that the testimony would have been allowed.
From time to time, this Court has addressed itself to the use of an expert witness. A recent analysis appears in O’Dowd v Linehan, 385 Mich 491; 189 NW2d 333 (1971). The following comparison was made at p 508:
"The use of an expert is similar to that of a translator — the evidence which has been presented to the jury cannot be adequately comprehended, analyzed and weighed by it without the aid of the special knowledge of the expert as to the meaning and significance of the facts in evidence.”
The Court listed (pp 509-510) three rules which govern the admissibility of expert testimony:
"1. There must be an expert. * * *
"2. There must be facts in evidence which require or are subject to examination and analysis by a competent expert. * * * (Emphasis added.)
"3. Finally, there must be knowledge in a particular area that belongs more to an expert than to the common man. This is the most difficult test of all. The application of it depends upon the relation of expert knowledge to common knowledge at a given time.”
The verdict for defendant Linehan which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals was reversed and a new trial ordered by this Court because "there was nothing so exceptional in the record of this *126case as to require an expert opinion on the ultimate issue for the jury.” (p 513.)3
In the instant case, there were no "facts in evidence” to be analyzed by an expert. Further, the "common man” who heard the unadorned facts needed no expert to tell him what was common knowledge. The entire proceeding could not have been more confusing to the jury if plaintiff had set about structuring the case with that in mind.
By introducing the expert testimony first, there were no facts against which the judge could measure the need for or probative value of the expert testimony. Many hours were devoted to publications, periodicals and opinions having to do with safety or the lack of it in construction and non-construction work in the United States. Sometimes the testimony dealt with safety measures used in other states by those working "on the steel” which plaintiff was not doing at the time of the accident. He was working on the roof. Making ventilators safe was another subject, but Mr. Funk did not fall through a ventilator.
Mr. Jenkins, admittedly, did not know any Michigan contractors and specifically did not know Darin & Armstrong. He was a retired engineer who said that he had worked for the law firm of plaintiff’s attorney on about five other cases.
The answers in the instant case to the O’Dowd questions therefore are:
1. Yes, there was an expert.
2. There were no facts in evidence which re*127quired or were subject to examination and analysis by a competent expert.
3. There was no need for knowledge which belongs more to an expert than to the common man.
Further, unless the expert testimony is read with a practiced eye, one is inclined to be swept into an attitude adverse not only to defendants but to all those even remotely connected with construction business long before the actual facts of the case are elicited. This bias against the industry in general and defendants in particular permeated the proceedings, rendering it impossible to receive an impartial and fair hearing. Again, if the facts of the case had been presented first, it is unlikely that much, if any, of Mr. Jenkin’s testimony would have been admitted.
On the issues set forth above, the verdict warrants reversal.

INHERENTLY DANGEROUS ACTIVITY

Mr. Funk receives his benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation Act through Ben Agree, his employer. The question here is whether he is to receive an additional award(s) from the general contractor, Darin & Armstrong, and from the owner, GM.
Although a "shotgun” approach has been employed in this matter, plaintiff has relied most heavily upon the doctrine of "inherently dangerous activity”.
The doctrine applies not only to corporations, but is equally applicable to homeowners or any other citizens who employ others to do work for them — be it installing a TV antenna, removing trees or tree stumps or repairing plumbing, a porch, sidewalk, etc. This subject comes home to everyone.
*128In analyzing this historically imprecise doctrine, three questions must first be answered:
1. What is an inherently dangerous activity?
2. Who may invoke the doctrine?
3. Who is to decide whether the doctrine applies?
The first question is the most difficult. As Prosser indicates in his Handbook of the Law of Torts (4th Ed), the phrase has never been well defined. In his analysis of the case law, he states:
"[T]he principle seems to be limited to work in which there is a high degree of risk in relation to the particular surroundings, or some rather specific risk or set of risks to those in the vicinity, recognizable in advance as calling for definite precautions. The emphasis is upon the 'peculiar’ character of the risk, and the need for special, unusual care.” (p 473.)
In 41 Am Jur 2d, Independent Contractors § 41, the doctrine is labeled "an exception to the general rule of nonliability of an employer for the tort of an independent contractor”, (p 805.)
"The theory upon which this liability is based is that a person who engages a contractor to do work of an inherently dangerous character remains subject to an absolute, nondelegable duty to see that it is performed with that degree of care which is appropriate to the circumstances, or in other words, to see that all reasonable precautions shall be taken during its performance, to the end that third persons may be effectually protected against injury. However, liability of the employer in such cases depends upon his antecedent knowledge of the danger inherent in the work or on a finding that the average, reasonably prudent man or corporation should, in the exercise of due diligence, have known.” (pp 806-807.)
It is noted here also that the term "inherently *129dangerous” is "not susceptible of accurate definition.” (p 807.) Section 43 states:
"Ordinary building operations or activities, including both construction and demolition, are generally not considered work of an inherently or intrinsically dangerous character rendering the employer-owner liable for injuries resulting from the negligence of an independent contractor in doing the work.”
The Restatement Torts 2d also reflects the difficulty one faces in defining inherently dangerous activity. Section 416 defines work dangerous in absence of special precautions:
"One who employs an independent contractor to do work which the employer should recognize as likely to create during its progress a peculiar risk of physical harm to others unless special precautions are taken, is subject to liability for physical harm caused to them by the failure of the contractor to exercise reasonable care to take such precautions, even though the employer has provided for such precautions in the contract or otherwise.” Section 427 defines negligence as to danger inherent in the work:
"One who employs an independent contractor to do work involving a special danger to others which the employer knows or has reason to know to be inherent in or normal to the work, or which he contemplates or has reason to contemplate when making the contract, is subject to liability for physical harm caused to such others by the contractor’s failure to take reasonable precautions against such danger.”
Comments to §416 say that the rules above "represent different forms of statement of the same general rule” holding that employer liable if injuries result "from dangers which he should contemplate at the time that he enters into the contract”. Liability may attach if the risk is one *130"which the employer should recognize as likely to arise in the course of the ordinary and usual method of doing the work, or the particular method which the employer knows that the contractor will adopt.” Comments to § 427 speak of risks "recognizable in advance” and note that the section "has no application where the negligence of the contractor creates a new risk not inherent in the work itself or in the ordinary or prescribed way of doing it and not reasonably to be contemplated by the employer. "(Emphasis added.)
These analyses refer to danger to others, third parties, although in Michigan employees have been included in a few cases involving the doctrine. However, Michigan case law does little to render the meaning of inherently dangerous activity clear. In Lake Superior Iron Co v Erickson, 39 Mich 492; 33 Am Rep 423 (1878), plaintiff was suing the mine owners for her husband’s death. The husband was employed by a firm who had contracted to work the mine. He had been killed by a large rock which fell from the walls of the mine. There was evidence the rock had been considered dangerous prior to the accident. The Court said it was a "general principle of law that a responsibility lies somewhere to prevent workmen from being exposed without such protection as is reasonably required in a dangerous business.” (p 500.)
The basic dispute in the case was where to place that responsibility. The Court noted that the owners planned the mine, selected the job site, determined where to sink the shafts. They reserved the right to determine when and where and how rock was to be removed. The Court said at 502-503:
"Under such circumstances it is very plain that the company being the owners of the dangerous property, *131and inviting men to work on it, their responsibility for its protection cannot be changed by the fact that the work is done by the ton instead of by the day, or by the fact that the men who contract with them have laborers of their own. By employing men to act for them in either way they hold out the assurance that they can work in the mine on the ordinary conditions of safety usually found in such places. They guarantee nothing more than is usual among prudent owners, and they do not insure against that which is purely accidental. But they do tacitly represent that they have not been and will not be reckless themselves.”
There the site itself was not safe and the owners knew of the danger. The Court affirmed a verdict for the wife against the mine owners. However, in the instant case there are no proofs that the site was unsafe or that even his subcontractor-employer, much less the defendants, knew of Mr. Funk’s venture from his assigned location. Certainly, none could foresee that Mr. Funk would engage in the extraordinary activities which led to his injury and, therefore, guard against such danger.
Plaintiff in Inglis v Millersburg Driving Association, 169 Mich 311; 136 NW 443 (1912) alleged damages to his land caused by fire started on defendant’s land. The trial court directed a verdict for the association saying it was not liable for the act of the independent contractor hired to clear the land. This Court reversed.
In so doing, the Court said the record clearly showed that the members of the association had indicated to plaintiff that the association was in charge of the work. Plaintiff warned the members of the dangers involved in setting the fires. Proper precautions were not taken. Plaintiff was not told of the independent contractor and was thus unable to warn him of the danger.
*132The Court quoted the following as being an exception to the general rule that the principal is not responsible for the tortious acts of an independent contractor:
" 'Where the work is dangerous of itself, or as often termed, "inherently” or "intrinsically” dangerous, unless proper precautions are taken, liability cannot be evaded by employment of an independent contractor to do the work. Stated in another way, where injuries to third persons must be expected to arise, unless means are adopted by which such consequences may be prevented, the contractee is bound to see to the doing of that which is necessary to prevent the mischief. The injury need not be a necessary result of the work, but the work must be such as will probably, and not which merely may, cause injury if proper precautions are not taken.’ ” (pp 319-320.)
The Court said defendant had a duty "in doing work necessarily involving danger to others” to take such steps "against negligence as may be commensurate with the obvious danger.” (p 321.)
Olah v Katz, 234 Mich 112; 207 NW 892 (1926) arose from an incident where a child fell into a hole dug by an independent contractor hired by defendant. The Court said at p 116:
"The general rule relied on by defendant that one who has contracted with a competent person to do a work within the scope of his independent employment is not answerable for the negligent acts of such contractor, or of his servants or agents, in the performance of the contract, is subject to the exception that immunity from responsibility may not be claimed when the work to be done is of such a character that it necessarily subjects third persons to unusual danger.”4
*133Invocation of the doctrine of inherently dangerous activity was rejected in Utley v Taylor & Gaskin, Inc, 305 Mich 561; 9 NW2d 842 (1943). A workman had received injuries when a steel beam fell and struck him. He received workmen’s compensation benefits. Under the statute his employer then sued the independent contractor to recover the amount paid. Defendant, citing cases discussed above, claimed in part that any negligence on its part was imputable to plaintiff. The Court responded at pp 573-574:
"In the above-discussed cases, the exception to the independent contractor rule was clearly invoked to prevent the general contractor from escaping liability to third persons injured in connection with 'inherently dangerous’ work, by the defense that such work was being done by a subcontractor. In such cases the plaintiffs were not employees of the general contractor and, therefore, the provision of the workmen’s compensation act under which the present suit is brought was not involved or construed. Such cases are readily distinguishable from the case at hand, in which the statute expressly gives plaintiff as employer the right to enforce, for the benefit of his insurer, the claim of his injured employee against defendant.”
The Court of Appeals has discussed the doctrine. In Vannoy v City of Warren, 15 Mich App 158; 166 NW2d 486 (1968), defendant appealed an award to plaintiff for the death of her husband. Death resulted in part from the presence of methane gas in the construction site. The Court rejected any distinction between injured persons based on whether they were third parties or employees of the independent contractor. Such distinctions were said to violate "the absolute character of the duty” imposed on defendant by the dangerous nature of the activity. Determination of whether an activity was inherently dangerous was *134said to be a fact question for the jury. Leave to appeal was denied. 382 Mich 768 (1969).
A verdict of no cause of action was affirmed in Huntley v Motor Wheel Corp, 31 Mich App 385; 188 NW2d 5 (1971). Plaintiff had been injured while operating an electrical switch. The accident occurred in a plant owned by defendant. It was leased to another company which sublet the premises to plaintiffs employer. The Court wrote at pp 393-394:
"As pointed out in Vannoy v. City of Warren, the inherently or intrinsically dangerous activity doctrine is closely akin to strict liability. The duty to make such provision against negligence as may be commensurate with the obvious dangers involved only arises where the employer is doing, or is causing to be done, 'work necessarily involving danger to others unless great care is used.’ In order to apply this doctrine it must appear that the work itself was of such a nature that it would inevitably and unavoidably result in danger to others unless great care was used to prevent injury. The facts of this case are such that it cannot be said that plaintiffs injury was inevitable and that, therefore, the defendant should be held vicariously without proof of culpable negligence on its part. It would appear that the plaintiff was in fact injured by an instrumentality incidental to the work being performed by the independent contractor.”
Also see Mulcahy v Argo Steel Construction Co, 4 Mich App 116; 144 NW2d 614 (1966), leave to appeal denied 378 Mich 741 (1966).
This Court has also had occasion to reexamine the doctrine of inherently dangerous activity in McDonough v General Motors Corp, 388 Mich 430; 201 NW2d 609 (1972). Plaintiffs husband was killed by a falling derrick boom. He was employed by a contractor involved in adding a floor to a Chevrolet assembly plant. Four Justices wrote *135opinions, none of which had more than one cosigner. The decision of the Court was to reverse a directed verdict for defendant and remand for new trial. This case is pending on an application for rehearing.
How then are we to define what constitutes an inherently dangerous activity? The Michigan cases are uniform in holding that generally an employer is not liable for the torts of an independent contractor. An exception has been developed for activities or tasks which reasonably can be foreseen as dangerous to third parties, with a few cases extending the exception to employees. These activities include those dangerous despite use of all reasonable care and those dangerous unless reasonable care is exercised (Prosser, p 472). It is clear that this doctrine imposes a form of strict liability upon the owner or employer of the independent contractor. However, such liability is not absolute.
Without exhausting the possibilities, two situations obviously do not warrant imposition of liability. If defendant perceives the possibility of danger, and takes all reasonable steps to prevent injury from occurring, we should not hold him or her liable if injury unavoidably occurs. Similarly, the owner or employer of the independent contractor should not be required to foresee all possible activities which might create a dangerous situation and lead to injury, such as in the instant case.5
*136The second question posed at the beginning of this section was, "who may invoke the doctrine of inherently dangerous activity?” Some say liability only extends to business invitees or the general public. Others say employees are also included. This split was also seen in McDonough.
As the earlier discussion indicated, the doctrine of inherently or intrinsically dangerous activity is an exception to the general rule that an employer is not liable for the torts of an independent contractor. It was designed to prevent the employer from delegating his or her responsibility to eliminate or minimize foreseeable risks.
I feel that the thrust of the exception was to impose a duty on the employer in certain circumstances. It was not designed to afford a single class of injured persons an additional theory upon which to seek damages.
In Michigan, this Court has not seen fit to limit availability of the doctrine to nonemployee third parties.
The final question asks, "who is to decide whether liability is to be imposed under the doctrine of inherently dangerous activity?” Because the doctrine is an exception to the usual scope of duty imposed in such cases, it should be closely controlled.
First, the threshold question of what duty there is under the circumstances of the case is one of law for the judge. Second, the factual question of whether there was a breach of such duty, if any, is *137for the fact finder unless there are no facts upon which reasonable minds could disagree. Third, it is also for the fact finder to determine whether the breach of duty, if any, was the cause or proximate cause of the injury.
In the instant case, the threshold question of duty must be resolved in favor of the defendants. It is unreasonable to impose upon the defendants a duty to foresee that not only would the employee of an independent contractor act contrary to the custom of his trade in at least two respects,6 but proceed to lift huge slabs weighing over 200 pounds, turn them back on the roof and then replace all but the last two moved. If Mr. Funk had not fallen through the hole left by removing one of the slabs, he caused any number of other hazards which could have taken a toll. Any required precautions against foreseeable dangers would not reasonably have included the hazard made by Mr. Funk himself.
In any event, the instruction to the jury as to the legal definition of inherently or intrinsically dangerous work was in error. The resolution of this issue is not necessary to the finding in this case and, therefore, would not normally be discussed. However, the proffered use of this doctrine has gained such popularity that it is deemed important to set some guidelines for the profession.
In the instant case the trial court quoted the Reader’s Digest Great Encyclopedic Dictionary. This permitted the jury too much latitude. The definitions were those of common usage and were not sufficient as legal definitions of so complex a doctrine. We expect the courts to instruct the *138juries fully as to the rules and principles of law which are to be followed in analyzing the evidence. If the instructions are deficient, then the fact finder’s conclusions are suspect.
It is easy to be critical of the jury instructions in this case and similar cases, but not so easy to propose a "boilerplate” instruction. However, following are some of the elements of the doctrine of inherently or intrinsically dangerous activity:
1. It is work done by an independent contractor involving a high degree of risk in relation to the specific surroundings or involving some specific peculiar risk or set of risks to those in the vicinity which requires special, unusual care.
2. It is work which probably would result in injury.
3. There is a risk or danger recognizable in advance (foreseeable) as requiring special precautions.
4. Such special precautions are not taken.
5. This breach of duty is the cause or proximate cause of the injury.
In this case, plaintiffs claim must fail, insofar as it is predicated on the doctrine of inherently dangerous activity. I would not impose absolute liability on defendants. There must be a limit to their responsibility under this theory. A line must be drawn and I would do so here.
As an exception to a general rule, the doctrine must have some limits or the exception will become the general rule. This would make property owners, corporate and individual, general and absolute insurers of all who come upon their property.
Defendants should not be required to anticipate the unusual manner in which plaintiff undertook to complete his task. Defendants must not be held liable for every on-site accident. Plaintiff left the *139steel work and went to the roof. He did not seek help from those whose task it was to work with the roof slabs. Without notice to defendants, or even to his own employer, plaintiff created an unusual risk and then suffered injury by it. The danger was not inherent but was created by plaintiff. Defendants should not be held to answer for such conduct.
In summation, I would hold:
1. Defendants were denied a fair trial by plaintiffs failure to establish the basic facts prior to introducing certain expert and nonexpert testimony and by the failure to link such testimony with the pertinent facts.
2. Defendants were denied a fair trial by plaintiffs introduction of unnecessary "expert” testimony. Such testimony had no probative value and much prejudicial effect.
3. Defendants may not be held liable under a theory of inherently dangerous activity. Defendants could not foresee nor could they have been reasonably expected to foresee the manner in which the accident occurred. Defendants have breached no duty under this theory.
We cannot know whether the judgment was based upon negligence of the general contractor and/or owner, a retention of control over the premises by contract or otherwise, or upon the theory of inherently dangerous activity. Because at least the instruction as to inherently dangerous activity was inadequate, I would reverse the trial court and remand for a new trial consistent with these findings.7
*140J. W. Fitzgerald, J., did not sit in this case.

 See Watson v Watson, 53 Mich 168; 18 NW 605; 51 Am Rep 111 (1884); Mally v Excelsior Wrapper Co, 181 Mich 568; 148 NW 443 (1914); Steele v Banninga, 225 Mich 547; 196 NW 404 (1923); Halloran’s National Detective Agency v Weiden, 238 Mich 242; 213 NW 158 (1927); Brandt v C F Smith & Co, 242 Mich 217; 218 NW 803 (1928); Madalinski v Hill, 277 Mich 219; 269 NW 147 (1936); Anthony *123v Cochrane, 295 Mich 386; 295 NW 197 (1940); Coburn v Goldberg, 326 Mich 280; 40 NW2d 150 (1949).

 Murchie v Standard Oil Co, 355 Mich 550; 94 NW2d 799 (1959); VanOordt v Metzler, 375 Mich 526; 134 NW2d 609 (1965).

 Also see People v Zimmerman, 385 Mich 417; 189 NW2d 259 (1971) which was an appeál from a conviction for negligent homicide. The issue concerned a trial judge’s refusal to permit a non-eyewitness to give expert testimony on the question of an oncoming automobile’s speed. Affirmed.

 Also see Wight v H.G. Christman Co, 244 Mich 208; 221 NW 314 (1928); Watkins v Gabriel Steel Co, 260 Mich 692; 245 NW 801 (1932) and Grinnell v Carbide & Carbon Chemicals Corp, 282 Mich 509; 276 NW 535 (1937).

 The Restatement includes a section protecting the employer from liability in certain instances. Section 426 says:
"[A]n employer of an independent contractor, unless he is himself negligent, is not liable for physical harm caused by any negligence of the contractor if
"(a) The contractor’s negligence consists solely in the improper manner in which he does the work, and
"(b) it creates a risk of such harm which is not inherent in or normal to the work, and
*136"(c) the employer had no reason to contemplate the contractor’s negligence when the contract was made.”
Comment b urges that an employer "is not required to contemplate or anticipate” a contractor’s negligence in performing work which one would expect to be done properly. This does not apply if the circumstances give the employer "warning of some special reason to take precautions, or some special risk of harm to others inherent in the work.”

 1. Having been told by his foreman to work under the roof in a certain manner, he went onto the roof without approval or even knowledge of his foreman.
2. He "crossed over” into the roofer’s area of responsibility.

 The practical application of the opinion of Justice Levin, reversing and remanding for a new trial as to GM and reinstating the verdict as against Darin & Armstrong, is to leave the latter liable for the entire $150,000. The verdict was jointly entered against the two defendants. Damages have been determined and the amount is not at issue. Mr. Funk cannot financially profit by continuing his suit *140against GM (if the present state of the law remains applicable), so he may reasonably be expected to accept his full award and not expend further effort, time and money to pursue the question of liability of GM. What redemptive action, if any, Darin & Armstrong may pursue against GM remains to be determined.