Court Opinion

ID: 9736004
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:39:36.235633+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:03.276986
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
I join so much of the majority Opinion by Judge Del Sole as discusses the issue regarding the preservation of issues raised in supplemental post trial motions and the issue of lack of informed consent. My reason for not joining out*390right is because I do not believe Judge Del Sole’s analysis goes far enough.
The fundamental issue is whether Millard gave informed consent for removal of her ovary. In my mind, Millard is entitled to judgment n.o.v., not on the basis of reversible error in jury instructions, but rather because there is no conflicting evidence on whether she was informed about her ovary removal, and no evidence that the unexpected appearance of the swollen ovary presented an emergency that could be dealt with only with removal. The majority concludes, and I agree, that although Millard may have given her informed consent to surgery for repair of her bladder because the record shows that she was informed of all the known risks associated with such surgery, there was no testimony to dispute her claim that she did not give consent to the removal of her ovary, a totally separate procedure with different risks and resulting effects. Majority Opinion, at page 385.
However, the majority does not take this finding to its logical and, I believe, warranted conclusion, which is that therefore the trial court should have granted Millard’s motion for judgment n.o.v. Under the undisputed facts in this case, no two reasonable persons could fail to agree that the verdict for the doctor is improper. Moure v. Raeuchele, 387 Pa.Super. 127, 132, 563 A.2d 1217, 1219 (1989), allowance of appeal granted 524 Pa. 629, 574 A.2d 70 (1990). Where there is no evidence of emergency, no evidence of discussion of ovary removal, and where the remaining ovary has been removed, I believe Millard is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The majority, without citation to any authority, determines that its decision with regard to the claim of improper jury charge “mandates a new trial and makes unnecessary a discussion of the remaining claims of error.” Maj. opinion, page 12. I must respectfully disagree.
From the record, its clear that the motion for judgment n.o.v. was properly filed and before the trial court. In its Opinion and Order dated April 15, 1988 the trial court *391considered and rejected the motion. Millard has included, as the first issue in her Statement of Questions Involved on appeal:
Where patient was denied opportunity to decide whether her last remaining ovary should be removed as part of an unrelated operative procedure, was there such lack of informed consent as to require a Judgment N.O.V. in her favor?

Suggested answer: yes

Brief for Appellants, filed July 13, 1988, page 2. The issue was ably presented at oral argument on April 25, 1990.
Where the appellant has complied with all the requirements for preserving an issue on appeal, I cannot join with my colleagues in the majority who are willing to grant partial relief without any explanation for denying additional relief to which the appellant is, arguably, entitled. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a), 2116(a).
The majority states that:
... [T]he jury should be asked to determine whether consent, actual or implied, was given to Dr. Nagle to remove Ms. Millard[’s] ovary, or whether Dr. Nagle’s unanticipated discovery of the misplaced organ created an emergency in which immediate action was necessary to preserve his patient’s life or health. Absent such a finding, Ms. Millard should be entitled to recover for any damages suffered as a result of the unauthorized removal of her ovary.
Majority opinion, page 388.
The undisputed deposition testimony of Dr. Nagle which was introduced at trial establishes that there was no consent, either actual or implied, to remove an ovary. Moreover, there is absolutely nothing in the record to suggest an emergency of any sort. Dr. Nagle testified that during the operative procedure, Millard was in no danger of any sort other than being under the effects of anesthesia, a normal occurrence. Deposition of Warren Charles Nagle, M.D., *392November 16, 1982, Notes of Testimony, April 28, 1986, pages 42-43, R.R. 44a-45a.
When we accept as true all facts and proper inferences which tend to support the contentions of Dr. Nagle and the Guthrie Clinic, and when we reject all testimony and inferences to the contrary, we still must conclude that, as a matter of law, the defendants have failed to erect a viable defense. On this, I believe that two reasonable minds could not differ. Thomas v. Allegheny & Eastern Coal Co. 309 Pa.Super. 333, 455 A.2d 637 (1982). The majority has not suggested to the contrary.
I would grant judgment notwithstanding the verdict on behalf of the plaintiff Christine Millard, and only remand this case for trial as to the amount of damages. The issue of liability has been fairly determined, after a second trial, and the issue of damages is readily separable from the issue of liability. Nakles v. Union Real Estate Co., 415 Pa. 407, 204 A.2d 50 (1964); Gudat v. Heuberger, 275 Pa.Super. 535, 419 A.2d 30 (1980).
I therefore must concur and dissent.
ROWLEY, J., joins.