Court Opinion

ID: 9637009
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 14:52:37.435633+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:52.074753
License: Public Domain

DOWD, District Judge,
dissenting:
I find that the defendants have complied with the order of my colleagues published on January 31, 1992. The defendants were instructed to reconsider the 1991 apportionment plan and submit a revised plan unless the defendants were able to show a justification for the creation of additional majority-minority districts in the State of Ohio. In response the defendants filed an exhaustive set of fact findings1 and engaged in a slight modification of the majority-minority districts.2
The basis for the creation of the majority-minority districts has been dismissed with the criticism that the justification is on a state-wide basis and does not include an analysis or justification on a district by district basis. I read the latest opinion of my colleagues to establish the proposition that an apportionment body, be it a legislative body or, as in Ohio, a constitutionally created body, is not permitted to take into consideration the Voting Rights Act in the apportionment process unless the body, be it the legislature or the specifically designated body such as the governor, auditor of state, secretary of state and the two representatives from the General Assembly conduct a judicial like proceeding such as the case that gave rise to the Armour decision.3 I again reject that proposition as unsound and not in keeping with precedent4 or the legislative history of the Voting Rights Act.
Moreover, in this case, despite the sweeping language of the majority opinion, the recently filed fact findings of the defendants do address the creation on a specific basis the proposed majority-minority districts contained in the 1991 Apportionment Plan.
I commend my colleagues for the order to the extent it identifies for the citizens of Ohio the ramifications of its order today appointing a special master. As indicated, the May primary will not take place as scheduled unless a higher court should see fit to stay the majority’s order. The General Assembly is now faced with the need to consider whether to move back the May primary until the designated date of June 2. However, the majority’s opinion fails to address whether prospective candidates *759will be given an opportunity to file nomi--nating petitions after the legislative boundaries are finally determined. Despite my commendation, I am apprehensive that the work of the master and considerations of the challenges that are certain to flow from his recommendations place in jeopardy the revised date of June 2 for holding the primary for the General Assembly candidates.
I believe the order to the master also suffers from a lack of comprehensive instructions. The master is given no directions on the following issues.
1. What data base is the master to consider in responding to the reference? Is he to consider or ignore the extensive testimony received by the Apportionment Board as it conducted public hearings across the State of Ohio in 1991 before the 1991 apportionment plan was adopted? Is the master to ignore the Voting Rights Act in arriving at his recommendation? Is the master to conduct public hearings before making his recommendation?
2. The 1981 Apportionment Plan created four majority-minority districts. The plan advanced in the 1991 Apportionment Plan as adopted calls for eight majority-minority districts. The plan advanced by the plaintiffs Quilter and Ferguson, also members of the Apportionment Board, proposed the creation of an additional two majority-minority districts. The rejection by the majority of this panel of the 1991 Apportionment Plan is anchored in the creation of the additional four districts without the requisite justification as deemed necessary by the majority. QUERY: Is the master free to recommend on this issue as to the number of majority-minority districts and, if so, based on what criteria? 5
3. How should the master consider and apply, if at all, the decision of the Ohio Supreme Court in its decision in the case of Voinovich v. Ferguson (1992) 63 Ohio St.3d 198, 586 N.E.2d 1020? 6
4. Should the master, as recommended by the defendants in its plan, create single county districts for the three counties of Fairfield, Wayne and Ashtabula, or disregard the discretionary decision of the defendants and adopt the view of the plaintiffs Ferguson and Quilter which declined to provide those three counties whole county district status? 7
5. When is the master to report to this court? 8
*760I have outlined some of the problems that the majority opinion creates to emphasize again the view that the responsible effort on the part of the defendants Voino-vich, Taft and Aronoff to fairly reapportion the State of Ohio consistent with the provisions of the Ohio Constitution and the mandate of the Voting Rights Act does not warrant the majority’s unprecedented judicial interference. Moreover, electoral chaos in Ohio for 1992 appears inevitable. I must respectfully dissent.

.On February 20, 1992 the defendants Voino-vich, Taft and Aronoff filed findings and conclusions with respect to the creation of the majority-minority districts. The findings number 254 paragraphs and 106 pages and address such issues as History of Official Discrimination, Racial Bloc Voting, Racial Barriers to Effective Participation, Effects of Discrimination, Summary of Unemployment Rates by Race, Showing Disparate Unemployment Rates as to Blacks, Mean Household Income showing a great disparity between white and black households, an Analysis of Families Living Below Poverty Level, showing great disparity between white and black families, Education Findings, demonstrating that the percentage of blacks that have not completed high school and who have not completed one or more years of college are significantly higher than whites, findings that the value of housing between white families and black families are grossly disproportionate, the effects of overt or subtle racial appeals in the political process, the extent to which minorities had been elected to public office, and the lack of success of minorities in the election process in the major urban counties in Ohio other than Cuyahoga.

. After the majority of this Court remanded the 1991 Apportionment Plan to the Apportionment Board, downward adjustments as to black voters were made in six of the house districts represented by black incumbents with an increase in House District 38 represented by black incumbent Roberts.

. 775 F.Supp. 1044 (N.D.Ohio 1991).

. See Garza v. City of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763 (9th Cir.1990). In Garza, the Court held that an apportionment Board has an obligation to reapportion when the districts do not meet the requirements based on the total population of the state divided by the number of districts designated in the state’s constitution. A failure to reapportion, according to the Court, would be a violation of the Voting Rights Act.

. The Court notes that while the plaintiffs in this action criticized the defendants Voinovich, Taft and Aronoff, for creating eight majority-minority districts in compliance with the Voting Rights Act, the minority plan proposed by the Democrats contained two new majority-minority districts without even an attempt to make the fact findings the majority declares necessary to justify the creation of additional majority-minority districts.

. Justice Resnick of the Ohio Supreme Court authored a dissent in which she was critical of the 1991 Apportionment Plan as adopted by the three defendants Voinovich, Taft and Aronoff. The plaintiffs have seized upon the Resnick dissent and suggest that the 1991 Apportionment should be revisited in the context of the Resnick dissent. However, Justice Douglas’ opinion is highly critical of the Resnick dissent and points out that the plaintiffs in this case, Ferguson and Quilter, declined to present the issues raised in the Resnick dissent. Consequently, significant issues of both collateral estoppel and abstention apply with respect to what consideration, if any, the Master is to give to the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Voinovich v. Ferguson.

. See Article XI, § 10(B) which provides: Each county containing population between 90 and 95% of the ratio or between 105 and 110% of the ratio may be designated a representative district, (emphasis added)

.The plaintiffs filed in this case on March 10, 1992 a motion requesting this Court to order the Secretary of State to show cause why the Ohio Primary Election of May 5 should not be postponed pending the establishment of lawful legislative boundaries for the Ohio General Assembly. The Order of the Court approved by the majority of the panel inferentially addresses the motion by continuing the primary election for the Ohio General Assembly until June 2, 1992. As pointed out by the plaintiffs, Ohio Rev.Code § 3513.05(D), provides that sixty days before the primary date, the Secretary of State must "certify to each board [of elections] in the state the forms of the official ballots to be used at such primary election together with the names of the candidates to be printed thereon_” (emphasis added).
The sixtieth day before June 2, 1992 is, by this Court’s calculation, April 2, 1992. To meet that date and to allow time for candidates to file nominating petitions after the report of the Master is received and the Court hears objections thereto and enters a final order, it would appear *760that the Master's report should be filed with this Court by no later than March 16, 1992. Such a filing would give all interested parties seven days to file objections, i.e., by March 23, 1992 and then give this Court two days to respond by filing its final order on March 25, 1992. Under that scenario, prospective candidates would have until April 1, 1992 to file nominating petitions and the Secretary of State would have to respond under the provisions of O.R.C. 3513.-05(D) by April 2, 1992.