Court Opinion

ID: 9899793
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-17 18:01:46.514801+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:49.747911
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

      UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOSE MARIA ZUNIGA DE LA                              No. 21-352
CRUZ,
                                                    Agency No.
                                                   A215-674-691
               Petitioner,

     v.                                              OPINION

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

               Respondent.

          On Petition for Review of an Order of the
              Board of Immigration Appeals

                   Submitted March 16, 2023 *
                      Pasadena, California

                    Filed November 17, 2023

Before: Daniel A. Bress and Salvador Mendoza, Jr., Circuit
      Judges, and Joan N. Ericksen, District Judge. **

*
 We granted the parties’ joint motion to submit this case on the briefs
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
**
  The Honorable Joan N. Ericksen, United States District Judge for the
District of Minnesota, sitting by designation.
2                 ZUNIGA DE LA CRUZ V. GARLAND

                   Opinion by Judge Bress;
                 Concurrence by Judge Bress;
                Concurrence by Judge Mendoza

                          SUMMARY ***

                           Immigration

    Denying Jose Maria Zuniga De La Cruz’s petition for
review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals,
the panel rejected Zuniga’s claims that the exclusionary rule
of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1996), should apply in
his removal proceedings, and that he should have received
Miranda warnings.
    The panel observed that this court has long held that the
substantial distinctions between a civil deportation
proceeding and a criminal trial make Miranda warnings
inappropriate in the deportation context. Zuniga asked this
court to forge an exception, arguing that because he was
arrested pursuant to an administrative warrant, his un-
Mirandized statements should have been excluded. The
panel rejected that contention, explaining that Zuniga’s
focus on the warrant was misplaced because it is the nature
of the proceeding (criminal vs. civil), and not the nature of
the arrest (warrantless vs. with a warrant) that is relevant.
  Concurring, Judge Bress wrote to address Judge
Mendoza’s concurrence, in which Judge Mendoza suggested

***
   This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                ZUNIGA DE LA CRUZ V. GARLAND                  3

that this court should consider whether to require aliens to
be informed of rights that they do have. Judge Bress wrote
that there is no apparent legal basis to order immigration
officers to give general, Miranda-style prophylactic
warnings, or to impose exclusionary rule-type
consequences. Judge Bress further observed that Miranda is
not authority for creating new versions of itself in the
immigration context.
    Concurring, Judge Mendoza wrote that noncitizens are
entitled to due process under the Fifth Amendment, have the
right to be represented by counsel at their own expense,
cannot be detained solely to verify their immigration status,
and have the right to remain silent. Although Miranda
applies only to criminal proceedings, he saw no reason not
to inform noncitizens of their rights, observing that this court
in a previous case had affirmed an injunction requiring
immigration agents to inform noncitizens of their right to
apply for political asylum and their right to counsel.

                         COUNSEL

Saman Nasseri, Nasseri Legal, San Diego, California, for
Petitioner.
Aric A. Anderson, Trial Attorney; Kohsei Ugumori, Senior
Litigation Counsel; United States Department of Justice, Civil
Division, Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, D.C.;
Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant, California
Attorney General; for Respondent.
4              ZUNIGA DE LA CRUZ V. GARLAND

                        OPINION

BRESS, Circuit Judge:

    Our law is clear that the exclusionary rule of Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), does not apply in civil
immigration proceedings. The petitioner nonetheless argues
that Miranda should apply in his removal proceedings, and
that he should have received Miranda warnings, because he
was apprehended by immigration officers pursuant to an
administrative warrant. This asserted distinction does not
make a difference. We deny the petition for review.
                              I
     The petitioner, Jose Maria Zuniga De La Cruz (Zuniga),
is a native and citizen of Mexico. He last entered the United
States in November 2004, without being admitted or paroled.
In June 2018, an Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) officer conducting a database review determined that
Zuniga was likely present in the United States unlawfully.
Based on this, the officer secured an administrative arrest
warrant. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (“On a warrant issued by
the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained
pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed
from the United States.”).
    On the morning of June 13, 2018, three ICE officers
surveilled Zuniga’s residence in Escondido, California. The
officers observed a man matching Zuniga’s description leave
the home and get into a car that was registered under
Zuniga’s name. Two uniformed ICE officers followed
Zuniga and initiated a vehicle stop.
    The officers asked Zuniga to identify himself, which he
did, presenting a driver’s license. When Zuniga asked the
                ZUNIGA DE LA CRUZ V. GARLAND                  5

officers why they stopped him, they told him to relax and
that they would explain. In response to questioning about
his citizenship, Zuniga admitted he was a citizen of Mexico
and that he was illegally present in the United States. Zuniga
later testified that he felt obligated to answer the officers’
questions. The officers did not tell Zuniga he had the right
to remain silent, nor did they provide him any other Miranda
warnings.
    Based on Zuniga’s admission that he was in the United
States illegally, the ICE officers arrested Zuniga and
transported him to the San Diego ICE field office for
processing. Zuniga was not told that officers had secured an
administrative warrant for his arrest. Once at the field office,
Zuniga was placed in a holding cell. Zuniga was then
personally served with a Notice to Appear (NTA) charging
him as removable for being an alien present in the United
States without being admitted or paroled.
    Later, another ICE officer interviewed Zuniga. At some
point during this process, officers asked Zuniga if he needed
an attorney. Zuniga was not informed that he could decline
to answer questions. Around 5:00 p.m. that same day,
Zuniga was released, having spent ten hours in custody.
Zuniga later testified that he knew his answers to the
officers’ questions could affect his immigration status, but
that he felt obligated to answer them. Although the officers
did not threaten him, Zuniga was nervous during the
questioning.
    On June 18, 2018, the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) filed the NTA with the immigration court. In a
hearing before an Immigration Judge (IJ), Zuniga denied the
factual allegations in the NTA and contested removability.
DHS then submitted its Record of Deportable/Inadmissible
6              ZUNIGA DE LA CRUZ V. GARLAND

Alien (Form I-213), in which one of the arresting ICE
officers recorded that Zuniga had admitted to being in the
United States illegally and to having twice been voluntarily
returned to Mexico. Zuniga in turn filed a motion to
suppress the Form I-213, arguing that he was coerced into
giving the inculpatory statements contained within it.
    After hearing testimony from Zuniga, the IJ denied the
motion to suppress. The IJ found that ICE officers had not
engaged in misconduct and that the Form I-213 neither
contained false information nor was obtained through
duress. The form was therefore admissible and sufficient to
establish Zuniga’s unlawful presence in the United States.
The IJ further found that Zuniga was not entitled to Miranda-
type warnings. Because Zuniga did not establish any
misconduct by ICE officers, there was no basis to order
additional discovery. The IJ thus found Zuniga removable
as charged.
    The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed
Zuniga’s appeal. It agreed with the IJ that the arresting ICE
officers did not engage in misconduct and that Zuniga had
not demonstrated his admissions were coerced. Nor could
the Form I-213 be suppressed under Miranda. As the BIA
explained, “[b]ecause immigration proceedings are civil in
nature, questioning for purposes of those proceedings need
not be preceded by Miranda warnings,” whether Zuniga was
“arrested with or without an administrative warrant.” The
Form I-213 thus sufficiently established Zuniga’s alienage,
and Zuniga had not presented any contrary evidence. The
BIA thus agreed that Zuniga was removable.
   Zuniga timely petitions for review. We have jurisdiction
under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review constitutional claims de
novo. Martinez-Medina v. Holder, 673 F.3d 1029, 1033 (9th
                ZUNIGA DE LA CRUZ V. GARLAND                7

Cir. 2011).     And we review the agency’s factual
determinations for substantial evidence. Guerra v. Barr, 974
F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2020).
                              II
    Zuniga’s petition fails because he seeks to import into
the civil immigration context rules that are reserved for
criminal cases. Almost forty years ago, the Supreme Court
explained that “[c]onsistent with the civil nature of the
proceeding, various protections that apply in the context of
a criminal trial do not apply in a deportation hearing.” INS
v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984). Lopez-
Mendoza held that based on fundamental differences
between immigration proceedings and criminal trials, the
Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule generally does not
apply in the former. Id. at 1035, 1040–50. We have
recognized some very limited exceptions to this rule, see
Sanchez v. Sessions, 904 F.3d 643, 649 (9th Cir. 2018), but
Zuniga does not argue that they apply. The Sixth
Amendment’s right to counsel is likewise inapplicable in
civil immigration proceedings. E.g., Castro-O’Ryan v. INS,
847 F.2d 1307, 1312 (9th Cir. 1987).
    Zuniga instead concentrates his argument on the Fifth
Amendment, and, more specifically, the “prophylactic rules”
of Miranda, the violation of which “does not necessarily
constitute a violation of the Constitution,” but which the
Supreme Court has deemed “necessary to protect the Fifth
Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination.”
Vega v. Tekoh, 142 S. Ct. 2095, 2106 (2022). Yet here, too,
the protections that apply in the civil immigration context do
not mimic those afforded to defendants in criminal
proceedings. Indeed, we settled the matter nearly fifty years
ago.
8               ZUNIGA DE LA CRUZ V. GARLAND

   In Trias-Hernandez v. INS, 528 F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1975),
we held that “the substantial distinctions between a
deportation proceeding and a criminal trial make Miranda
warnings inappropriate in the deportation context.” Id. at
368. We elaborated specifically on why this must be so:

       A principal purpose of the Miranda warnings
       is to permit the suspect to make an intelligent
       decision as to whether to answer the
       government        agent’s    questions.      In
       deportation proceedings, however—in light
       of the alien’s burden of proof, the
       requirement that the alien answer non-
       incriminating questions, the potential adverse
       consequences to the alien of remaining silent,
       and the fact that an alien’s statement is
       admissible in the deportation hearing despite
       his lack of counsel at the preliminary
       interrogation—Miranda warnings would be
       not only inappropriate but could also serve to
       mislead the alien.

Id. (quoting Chavez-Raya v. INS, 519 F.2d 397, 402 (7th Cir.
1975)) (alterations and citations omitted).
    Requiring ICE officers to advise an alien that he has the
right to remain silent is incongruous in the civil immigration
context, in which “there is no prohibition against drawing an
adverse inference when a petitioner invokes his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination.” Gutierrez v.
Holder, 662 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th Cir. 2011). As Justice
Brandeis put it nearly a century back, “there is no rule of law
which prohibits officers charged with the administration of
the immigration law from drawing an inference from the
                 ZUNIGA DE LA CRUZ V. GARLAND                  9

silence of one who is called upon to speak.” United States
ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 154 (1923); see
also, e.g., United States v. Alderete-Deras, 743 F.2d 645,
647 (9th Cir. 1984). That explains why Miranda warnings
in this context are not only analytically discrepant but could
even create the wrong impression for those who would
receive them. Trias-Hernandez, 528 F.2d at 368. There is
no existing legal basis for transposing into the civil
immigration context Miranda rules that are designed for
criminal defendants (rules the violation of which does not
contravene the Fifth Amendment in the first place, see
Tekoh, 142 S. Ct. at 2108).
    Thus, in Trias-Hernandez, our foundational precedent,
we specifically held that a Form I-213 was not inadmissible
in immigration proceedings merely because it contained the
petitioner’s un-Mirandized statements. 528 F.2d at 368. Our
case law is clear: the “[a]dmission of a Form I-213 is fair
absent evidence of coercion or that the statements are not
those of the petitioner.” Sanchez v. Holder, 704 F.3d 1107,
1109 (9th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (quoting Espinoza v. INS,
45 F.3d 308, 310 (9th Cir. 1995)). There is no such evidence
here. Nor does Zuniga argue that ICE violated any of its own
regulations.
    The law we have just described is settled. In the decades
since Trias-Hernandez, we have repeatedly recognized and
applied its core rule that Miranda does not apply in civil
immigration proceedings. See, e.g., Samayoa-Martinez v.
Holder, 558 F.3d 897, 901 n.6 (9th Cir. 2009); United States
v. Salgado, 292 F.3d 1169, 1173 (9th Cir. 2002); United
States v. Solano-Godines, 120 F.3d 957, 960–61 (9th Cir.
1997) (“Miranda warnings are not required before
questioning in the context of a civil deportation hearing . . . .
This is because deportation proceedings are not criminal
10              ZUNIGA DE LA CRUZ V. GARLAND

prosecutions, but are civil in nature.”); Villegas-Valenzuela
v. INS, 103 F.3d 805, 813 (9th Cir. 1996); Alderete-Deras,
743 F.2d at 648; Tejeda-Mata v. INS, 626 F.2d 721, 724 n.3
(9th Cir. 1980); Cordon De Ruano v. INS, 554 F.2d 944, 946
(9th Cir. 1977) (explaining that Trias-Hernandez
“completely foreclosed” the argument that evidence was
inadmissible in a deportation hearing due to the lack of
Miranda warnings).
    As far as we are aware, every circuit to have addressed
the issue agrees. See, e.g., Navia-Duran v. INS, 568 F.2d
803, 808 (1st Cir. 1977); Avila-Gallegos v. INS, 525 F.2d
666, 667 (2d Cir. 1975); Bustos-Torres v. INS, 898 F.2d
1053, 1056 (5th Cir. 1990); Chavez-Raya v. INS, 519 F.2d
397, 402 (7th Cir. 1975); Puc-Ruiz v. Holder, 629 F.3d 771,
779 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Valdez, 917 F.2d 466,
469 (10th Cir. 1990); see also Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at
1039 (noting that “[t]he Court of Appeals have held . . . that
the absence of Miranda warnings does not render an
otherwise voluntary statement by the [alien] inadmissible in
a deportation case”).
    Against this tower of precedent, Zuniga asks us to forge
an exception. He claims that because he was arrested
pursuant to an administrative warrant, see 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a), his un-Mirandized statements in the Form I-213
should have been excluded in his removal proceedings. In
Zuniga’s view, “an arrest pursuant to an administrative
immigration warrant is closer to a criminal arrest which
require Miranda warnings be given.”
    Zuniga’s focus on the use of the administrative warrant
is misplaced.      In determining whether Miranda’s
exclusionary rule applies, it is the nature of the proceeding
in which the inculpatory statements are to be used (criminal
                ZUNIGA DE LA CRUZ V. GARLAND               11

vs. civil immigration), and not the nature of the arrest
(warrantless vs. with a warrant) that is relevant. As we have
explained, “[a]lthough a lack of Miranda warnings might
render [an alien’s] statements inadmissible in a criminal
prosecution for violation of the immigration laws, the failure
to give Miranda warnings d[oes] not render them
inadmissible in deportation proceedings.” Alderete-Deras,
743 F.2d at 648. Zuniga’s effort to obscure the fundamental
distinction between criminal cases and civil immigration
proceedings—and the varying rights that attach in each—
must be rejected. See United States v. Nicholas-Armenta,
763 F.2d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 1985) (“Criminal convictions
are the result of a proceeding with all the constitutional
safeguards. Respondents in a civil deportation hearing,
however, are not entitled to the same constitutional rights
afforded a criminal defendant.”). We have never suggested
that the use of an administrative warrant transforms a civil
immigration proceeding into a criminal trial subject to
Miranda’s prophylactic rules. Nor would such a rule be
consistent with established law.
   For these reasons, the IJ and BIA did not err in rejecting
Zuniga’s motion to suppress. Nor was any further discovery
necessary.
   PETITION DENIED.
12               ZUNIGA DE LA CRUZ V. GARLAND

BRESS, Circuit Judge, concurring:

    Judge Mendoza’s separate concurrence agrees that under
our precedents, Mr. Zuniga was not entitled to Miranda
warnings or the benefits of Miranda’s exclusionary rule. But
Judge Mendoza suggests we should consider whether to
require aliens to be informed of rights that they do have.
Setting aside that this issue is not presented in this case, it is
not clear what basis we would have to impose such general
disclosure obligations.
    The lone authority Judge Mendoza’s concurrence cites,
Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 549 (9th Cir.
1990), affirmed a district court injunction requiring
immigration officials to inform Salvadorians of their right to
apply for asylum and to be represented by counsel at no cost
to the government. Id. at 551, 567–68. But that injunction
was based on an “overwhelming” factual record of
government “coercion and interference,” coupled with “a
strong likelihood of future violations.” Id. at 557, 559, 564;
see also Valencia v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 1261, 1263 (9th Cir.
2008) (distinguishing Orantes-Hernandez because it
involved “a demonstrated pattern and practice of abuses by
the INS against members of the class”).
     Orantes-Hernandez, a remedial decision based on
extreme facts, provides no support for any broader, court-
created duties to inform aliens of their rights. There is no
apparent legal basis for courts to order immigration officers
to give general, Miranda-style prophylactic warnings of the
kind Judge Mendoza’s concurrence appears to endorse. Nor
is there any apparent legal basis to impose exclusionary rule-
type consequences for immigration officers’ failure to
comply with these general court-made disclosure rules.
                ZUNIGA DE LA CRUZ V. GARLAND                13

Miranda, which does not apply here, is not authority for
creating new versions of itself in the immigration context.

MENDOZA, Circuit Judge, concurring:

    In the summer of 2018, several law enforcement officers
began investigating Petitioner Jose Maria Zuniga De La
Cruz. They obtained a warrant for his arrest and tracked him
down in the early hours of June 13. Two officers stopped
him as he was driving, detained him, and peppered him with
questions about his immigration status. Mr. Zuniga was
understandably rattled and confused. He wanted the officers
to explain the gravity of the situation; the potential
consequences of his actions; and what rights he had, if any
at all. He now asks us to find that “his right to counsel and
to remain silent attached at the moment of his arrest,” and
that ICE was required to advise him of his rights under
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
     Our precedent compels us to deny his request.
Miranda’s well-known prophylactic advisements only apply
in criminal proceedings. See Trias-Hernandez v. INS, 528
F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1975). Mr. Zuniga was investigated by a
civil ICE officer; arrested pursuant to a civil administrative
warrant; placed in civil removal proceedings; and subjected
to the civil penalty of removal from the country. From Mr.
Zuniga’s perspective, these are distinctions without a
difference: nothing appears to distinguish legal proceedings
initiated by ICE from those initiated by the police, other than
federal officials sticking a “civil” label on one and a
“criminal” label on the other. Nonetheless, Mr. Zuniga was
not entitled to a Miranda warning, nor the full set of rights
14              ZUNIGA DE LA CRUZ V. GARLAND

afforded to criminal defendants. See Trias-Hernandez, 528
F.2d at 368.
    But Mr. Zuniga, like all noncitizens, has constitutional
rights. “[A]liens facing deportation from this country are
entitled to due process rights under the Fifth Amendment.”
Walters v. Reno, 145 F.3d 1032, 1037 (9th Cir. 1998). They
have the right to be represented by counsel at their own
expense. See Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d
549, 554 (9th Cir. 1990). They cannot be detained solely for
the purpose of verifying their immigration status. See
Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 413 (2012). And
they have the right to remain silent, although this silence can
be used against them in civil proceedings. See United States
v. Alderete-Deras, 743 F.2d 645, 647 (9th Cir. 1984).
    In keeping with our constitutional principles, I see no
reason not to inform noncitizens of their rights. In Orantes-
Hernandez, we did just that—affirming an injunction
requiring immigration agents to inform noncitizens of their
right to apply for political asylum and their Fifth
Amendment right to be represented by counsel. 919 F.2d at
554. And though Mr. Zuniga’s Miranda argument fails, it
raises important questions: when should immigration
officers advise noncitizens of their rights, and what exactly
should this prophylactic warning look like? We have not had
the opportunity to fully address these questions; but to
ensure that noncitizens know their rights when they matter
most, perhaps it is time we did.