Court Opinion

ID: 9461835
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:25:50.525207+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:17.238912
License: Public Domain

SWYGERT, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
On March 31, 1970 and for at least ten days before that William Chrobak was not on vacation or sick leave. Rather, he was on duty status. Each day during that period he had worked eight or nine hours and had been subject to being called to work at hours of the day other than his regular shift. He had worked on Monday and Tuesday of the week of March 30, 1970. On Wednesday at 2:30 a. m. he was killed in an automobile accident; he was scheduled to work later in the day. The last paycheck covering the employment of William Chrobak included eight hours for April 1, 1970. (This recorded time does not represent that Chrobak actually worked on April 1, but only that he was on pay status for that day.)
The pertinent part of the governmental regulations (incorporated in the policy) provided: “The effective date of the optional insurance ... is the first day the employee actually enters on duty in a pay status on or after April 1, 1970.” (Emphasis added.) The court rules that this provision required that Chrobak be physically on the job on April 1, 1970 if the policy were to become effective. I do not believe this narrow interpretation of the regulation is required.
There is nothing in the record to contradict the presumption that the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company charged a premium for coverage for the full twenty-four hours of April 1, 1970. In other words, it did not prorate, on an hourly basis, its premium for the first day of April 1970 even when an employee who applied for the optional insurance actually “punched in” for duty at some point in time after midnight, March 31. Except for the fortuitous circumstances of his fatal accident, Chrobak would have gone to work at his regular hour on April 1. Moreover, he was subject to be called to work at any time after midnight, March 31, that is, even prior to his regular shift on April 1. All these circumstances leave no doubt in my mind that the regulation should be interpreted so as to permit recovery. The defendant’s position, to my way of thinking, is hypertechnical. It clings to formalities, choosing to overlook the intended meaning of the regulation in relation to the facts of this case.
I would affirm the judgment of the district court.