Court Opinion

ID: 849118
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-03-01 23:54:19.872037+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:20:32.756324
License: Public Domain

Michigan Supreme Court
                                                                        Lansing, Michigan 48909
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
                                                                C hief Justice                   Justices
                                                                Maura D. Cor rigan	              Michael F. Cavanagh

Opinion
                                                                                                 Elizabeth A. Weaver
                                                                                                 Marilyn Kelly
                                                                                                 Clifford W. Taylor
                                                                                                 Robert P. Young, Jr.
                                                                                                 Stephen J. Markman

____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

                                                                                      FILED JULY 24, 2001

                CONNIE FANE and CHARLES FANE,

                        Plaintiffs-Appellants,

                v	                                                                               No. 116708

                DETROIT LIBRARY COMMISSION,

                     Defendant-Appellee.

                ___________________________________

                KAREN L. COX and NORMAN W. COX,

                        Plaintiffs-Appellants,

                v	                                                                               No. 116711

                BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE 

                UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN,

                     Defendant-Appellee.

                ___________________________________

                BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH

                KELLY, J.

       These consolidated cases question the scope of the public

building exception to governmental immunity1 in light of this

Court's ruling in Horace v City of Pontiac, 456 Mich. 744; 575

NW2d 762 (1998).         The parties in Fane dispute whether the

elevated terrace where plaintiff fell is part of Detroit's

main       public   library   building.   In   Cox,    this   Court   must

determine whether a portable ramp placed at a doorstep is part

of the Fairlane Estate building in Dearborn. 

       We conclude that the public building exception can apply

to parts of a building that extend beyond the walls.              We hold

the public building exception applicable under the undisputed

facts in Fane v Detroit Library Commission, because the

terrace is part of the building.               Hence, we reverse the

decision of the Court of Appeals. 

       In Cox v Board of Regents of the University of Michigan,

applying the undisputed facts, we find that the ramp is not

part of the building.          Because the public building exception

does not apply, we affirm the Court of Appeals decision.

                        I.    FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

                A.    FANE v DETROIT LIBRARY COMMISSION

       On October 21, 1995, Connie Fane was walking toward the

main entrance of the Detroit Public Library.                  She climbed

several stairs to a broad stone terrace that gives access to

       1
           MCL 691.1406.

                                     2

the doors of the library.    After she had taken several steps

on the terrace, the heel of her shoe caught on a raised

portion of the stonework.        She fell as a result and was

injured.   She and her husband, Charles, filed a complaint

against the Detroit Library Commission.        They alleged that,

under the public building exception to governmental immunity,

the commission violated its statutory duty to repair and

maintain the terrace in a safe condition. 

     The   commission   sought   summary   disposition   under   MCR

2.116(C)(7) and (C)(10), arguing that governmental immunity

bars plaintiffs' claim.      The parties disputed whether the

terrace was part of the building for the purpose of the public

building exception.     They agreed that the fall did not occur

in the building itself but on the terrace approximately

thirty-five yards from the entrance.         Plaintiffs contended

that the terrace is part of the permanent structure of the

library building; it is physically attached to the building,

and it provides the sole access to the main entrance. 

     When the trial court denied the commission's motion, the

commission filed an appeal.      In lieu of granting leave, the

Court of Appeals, citing Horace, remanded for entry of an

order granting summary disposition for the commission.2          This

     2
      Unpublished order, entered May 8, 1998 (Docket No.

211232).

                                 3

Court vacated the Court of Appeals decision and remanded the

case for consideration with Cox.       459 Mich. 944 (1999).3

       On remand, the Court of Appeals reversed the lower

court's denial of summary disposition, again relying on this

Court's decision in Horace.4       The Court concluded that the

trial court had erred as a matter of law in finding that the

terrace was part of the building.       It noted that Connie Fane

was not alleged to have fallen in the building, and it

determined that the elevated terrace was "merely contiguous"

and not part of the building itself. 

       The appeals court remanded the case to the trial court

with instructions to enter an order of summary disposition in

favor of the commission.      This Court granted leave to appeal,

ordering the case to be argued and submitted with Cox.          463
Mich. 911 (2000).

  B.       COX v BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

       On August 21, 1994, Karen Cox was visiting the Henry Ford

estate to attend her niece's wedding.      As she walked from the

building to an outdoor porch, she stepped on a ramp that had

been positioned at the doorstep.       The heel of her shoe caught

       3
      The order also consolidated Maskery v Univ of Mich Bd of

Regents (Docket No. 109065).    Maskery is not part of this

appeal.

       4
      Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued March 24, 2000

(Docket No. 211232).

                                  4

in a space between the door and the ramp, and the ramp

slipped, causing her to fall. 

     In a multicount complaint, Karen and her husband, Norman,

sued the Board of Regents of the University of Michigan, the

owners of the property.    They alleged that the ramp was a

dangerous or defective condition and that the board breached

its duty under the public building exception to governmental

immunity by failing to secure it in a proper fashion.

     The board moved for summary disposition, arguing that the

public building exception did not apply.   The board contended

that, because it was not affixed to the building, the ramp was

not part of the building itself.   Plaintiffs responded that a

reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the ramp was part

of the building, notwithstanding that it was portable and

unattached. 

     The trial court granted the board's motion for summary

disposition, citing MCR 2.116(C)(7).     The Court of Appeals

denied plaintiffs' delayed application for leave to appeal.5

This Court remanded to the Court of Appeals for consideration

as on leave granted.   459 Mich. 883 (1998).

     On remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of

     5
      Unpublished order, entered July 2, 1998 (Docket No.

208644).

                              5

summary disposition in favor of the board.6        Relying on this

Court's decision in Horace and a fixtures analysis, the court

determined that the ramp was not a fixture or an integral part

of the building.

     The Court concluded that the trial court had properly

found that the public building exception was not applicable.7

This Court granted leave to appeal, ordering the case to be

argued and submitted with Fane.       463 Mich. 911 (2000).

                     II.     LEGAL PRINCIPLES

                    A.     STANDARDS OF REVIEW

     In both cases, the Court of Appeals upheld summary

disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7).        We review decisions on

summary disposition motions de novo.      Sewell v Southfield Pub

Schs, 456 Mich. 670, 674; 576 NW2d 153 (1998).           Under MCR

2.116(C)(7), summary disposition is proper when a claim is

barred by immunity granted by law.      To survive such a motion,

the plaintiff must allege facts justifying the application of

an exception to governmental immunity.            Wade v Dep't of

Corrections, 439 Mich. 158, 164; 483 NW2d 26 (1992).             We

consider all documentary evidence submitted by the parties,

     6
      Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued March 24, 2000

(Docket No. 215337).

     7
      The decision also addressed the issue of proprietary

function, which is not presented in this appeal pursuant to

this Court's order granting leave to appeal.

                                 6

accepting    as     true   the    contents     of    the    complaint   unless

affidavits     or       other    appropriate        documents     specifically

contradict them.         Sewell, supra at 674; MCR 2.116(G)(5). 

                   B.    THE PUBLIC BUILDING EXCEPTION

     Under MCL 691.1407(1), a government agency is generally

immune from suit for actions undertaken in the performance of

its governmental functions.           However, this broad immunity is

limited by some narrowly drawn exceptions. Jackson v Detroit,

449 Mich. 420, 427; 537 NW2d 151 (1995).                    The present appeal

involves     the    public      building     exception       to   governmental

immunity, which provides in pertinent part:

          Governmental agencies have the obligation to

     repair and maintain public buildings under their

     control when open for use by members of the public.

     Governmental agencies are liable for bodily injury

     and property damage resulting from a dangerous or

     defective condition of a public building if the

     governmental agency had actual or constructive

     knowledge of the defect and, for a reasonable time

     after acquiring knowledge, failed to remedy the

     condition or to take action reasonably necessary to

     protect the public against the condition.      [MCL

     691.1406.]

     To determine whether the public building exception is

applicable, this Court has set forth a five-pronged test.

Under the test, a plaintiff is required to prove that

     (1) a governmental agency is involved, (2) the

     public building in question is open for use by

     members of the public, (3) a dangerous or defective

     condition of the public building itself exists, (4)

     the governmental agency had actual or constructive

     knowledge of the alleged defect, and (5) the

     governmental agency failed to remedy the alleged

                                      7

     defective condition after a reasonable period of

     time or failed to take action reasonably necessary

     to protect the public against the condition after a

     reasonable period.     [Kerbersky v Northern Mich

     Univ, 458 Mich. 525, 529; 582 NW2d 828 (1998),

     citing Jackson, supra at 428.]

It is the third element of this test that is at issue in the

present appeal, whether a dangerous or defective condition of

the public building itself exists.

                III.    HORACE V CITY OF PONTIAC

     The Court of Appeals determined that neither the terrace

nor the ramp is part of the buildings in question, relying on

this Court's decision in Horace.        Horace was a consolidated

appeal involving two different sets of facts, both of which

involved   injuries    from   defects   in   walkways.8   The   first

concerned a hole or crack eighteen to twenty-eight feet from

the entrance doors of the Silverdome in Pontiac.          The second

involved a hole in a walkway leading to the entrance of a

building at a rest area on I-75. 

     The issue in Horace was whether the public building

exception applies to dangerous or defective conditions of

areas outside and adjacent to entrances or exits of public

buildings.   Horace, supra at 746.       The Court concluded that

"the ground adjacent to a public building is [not] a public

'building,' statutorily speaking . . . ."         Id. at 757.   Thus,

     8
      The decision in Horace also resolved its companion case,

Adams v Dep't of State Highways & Transportation.

                                  8

the core holding of Horace is that mere sidewalks and walkways

are    clearly   outside   the   scope   of   the   public   building

exception.

       However, the Court added in a footnote that the decision

is not an absolute bar to injuries occurring from defective or

dangerous conditions located outside the four walls of a

building.     The footnote states:

            The dissent suggests that our opinion may cut

       off liability for injuries resulting from the

       collapse of an outside overhang on a public

       building, stairs leading up to or down from an

       elevated building entrance, an underground tunnel

       leading into a building, an attached external ramp

       or railing. While it is not necessary for us to

       resolve these hypothetical situations in the case

       at bar, we note that an outside overhang is a

       danger presented by a physical condition of a

       building itself and that some stairs may also fit

       the test we adopt today if they are truly part of

       the building itself. [Id. at 756-757, n 9.]

We are now asked to further clarify the extent to which

something outside a building falls within the exception.

                           IV.   ANALYSIS

       As an initial matter, we conclude that the Court of

Appeals reading of Horace was overly broad. The appeals court

decision mistakenly portrays Horace as stating a bright-line

rule    precluding   liability    for    injuries   occurring    from

dangerous or defective conditions of building parts outside an

entrance or exit.     By imposing an absolute bar on liability

for injuries arising from something outside the four walls of

                                  9

a building, the opinion precludes the possibility that an

external part might be "truly part of the building itself."

     While such an interpretation would be warranted by the

words "in a public building," the Legislature did not choose

that phrase.      Rather, it referred to injuries resulting from

dangerous or defective conditions "of a public building,"

which implies that the conditions could pertain to parts of a

building outside its walls.        We presume that "of" rather than

"in" was carefully chosen to reflect legislative intent.              See

Reardon v Dep't of Mental Health, 430 Mich. 398, 410; 424 NW2d

248 (1988).

     It is consistent with Horace and its treatment of the

word "of" to consider the characteristics of the building and

the item in question.9        If it must be determined whether the

building        possesses    the   item,     surely        the   relative

characteristics of both must be evaluated.

     In some cases, a fixtures analysis will be helpful in

determining whether an item outside the four walls of a

building is "of a public building."          As recognized in Velmer

v Baraga Area Schs,10 a dangerous or defective fixture can

support     a   claim   of   liability   under    the   public   building

     9
      Horace      indicated that     "of"    is    "used    to   indicate

possession."      456 Mich. 756.

     10
          430 Mich. 385, 394; 424 NW2d 770 (1988).

                                   10

exception. 

     However, the fixtures analysis is limited to items of

personal property that have a possible existence apart from

realty.     Wayne Co v Britton Trust observes that "[t]he term

'fixture' necessarily implies something having a possible

existence apart from realty, but which may, by annexation, be

assimilated into realty."      Wayne Co v Britton Trust, 454 Mich.
608, 614-615; 563 NW2d 674 (1997) (citation omitted).           Where

the facts do not lend themselves to a fixtures analysis

because the item causing the injury has no existence apart

from realty, the courts must look beyond the fixtures analysis

to determine whether an item or area outside the four walls of

a building is "of a public building." 

     Under the fixtures analysis, an item is considered part

of the building if it is found to be a fixture.         An item is a

fixture if (1) it is annexed to realty, (2) its adaptation or

application to the realty is appropriate, and (3) it was

intended as a permanent accession to the realty.         Id. at 615.

     When a fixtures analysis does not apply, in determining

whether an item or area outside the four walls of a building

is "of a public building," the courts should consider whether

the item or area where the injury occurred is physically

connected    to   and   not   intended   to   be   removed   from   the

                                  11

building.11

               A.   FANE v DETROIT LIBRARY COMMISSION

     A fixtures analysis is not applicable to the elevated

library terrace in Fane because the terrace does not have an

existence      apart   from   the   library.   Therefore,   we   must

determine whether it is physically connected to and not

intended to be removed from the building, making the terrace

part "of a public building." 

     The terrace is a large stone area that is physically

abutting and built into the library building.            It is not

intended to be removed from the rest of the building in the

foreseeable future. Normally, to reach the main entrance, one

walks along a sidewalk, up stairs to the elevated terrace,

across the terrace, and up additional stairs.       If the terrace

were removed, the doors to the library would be located

approximately four feet off the ground.

     We conclude that the elevated terrace is physically

connected to and not intended to be removed from the library.

Accordingly, we are persuaded that the terrace is part of the

building within the meaning of the public building exception.

     11
      A temporary object or structure is normally not part of

a building. Consider, for example, scaffolding attached to a

building only for the period necessary to complete

construction. Because it is clearly intended to be removed

from the building, the scaffolding could not be considered

part of the building.

                                    12

The Court of Appeals erred in finding that the Fanes' claim

was precluded by the holding in Horace.

  B.    COX v BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

       The characteristics of the portable ramp indicate that it

is personal property with a possible existence apart from the

doorstep of the Fairlane Estate building.                      As such, the

fixtures analysis is applicable.

       There is no dispute that the portable ramp was not

physically attached to the building and could readily be

removed.    Wayne Co states that annexation can be actual or

constructive.      Constructive annexation occurs where the item

cannot be removed from the building without impairing the

value of both the item and the building.                 Wayne Co, supra at

615-616.    However, there is no evidence that removal of the

ramp   would   impair    the    value    of     either   the   ramp   or   the

building.         Therefore,    the      ramp     was    not   actually    or

constructively annexed to the building.

       Although    the   ramp   was     adapted    appropriately      to   the

entrance, there is no evidence that it was intended as a

permanent accession to the building.                We conclude that the

ramp   is   not   a   fixture   and,     therefore,      not   part   of   the

building. Because it does not fall within the public building

exception, the appeals court correctly determined that summary

disposition was proper in Cox.

                                      13

                          V.   CONCLUSION

       Horace   acknowledges      that    injuries     occurring    from

dangerous or defective conditions of building parts outside

the walls of a building can fall within the public building

exception. In determining whether an item or area outside the

walls of a building is "of a public building," the courts must

consider the characteristics of the building and of the item

in question.     A fixtures analysis should be used where the

item   is   personal   property    that    could     possibly    have   an

existence apart from the realty.           However, where the facts

indicate that the fixtures analysis does not apply, the courts

should consider whether the item or area where the injury

occurred is physically connected to and not intended to be

removed from the building. 

       Applying this analysis to the undisputed facts in Fane,

we conclude that the elevated terrace is part of the library

building itself because the terrace is physically connected to

and not intended to be removed from the library.            Hence, the

Fanes are not precluded from pursuing their claim.              The Court

of Appeals order instructing the trial court to enter summary

disposition in favor of the commission is reversed. 

       However, we affirm in Cox.          Applying the undisputed

facts, the ramp is personal property that could possibly have

an existence apart from the building. Therefore, the fixtures

                                   14

analysis is applicable.         However, the ramp is not a fixture

because it is not annexed to the building and was not intended

as a permanent accession to the building. Therefore, the ramp

is not part of the building. 

     Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Court of

Appeals in Cox and reverse in Fane.

     CORRIGAN ,   C.J.,   and   CAVANAGH , WEAVER , TAYLOR , YOUNG ,   and

MARKMAN , JJ., concurred with KELLY , J.

                                   15