Court Opinion

ID: 9738155
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:43:36.221166+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:04.027372
License: Public Domain

SCHLEGEL, Judge
(dissenting).
I must respectfully dissent.
The issue raised in this case that needs to be addressed is whether the actions of a Dell Oil employee violated a reasonable interpretation of the term “dispense” in Iowa Code section 123.49(2)(b). The district court concluded that the agency made an error of law in construing the term “dispense” to cover the action of an employee who returned after 2:00 a.m. to a service station which sold beer and removed alcoholic beverages purchased earlier in the evening.
The majority bases its conclusion on what it finds to be “legislative intent” in regards to actions such as this. I think that neither Iowa Code section 123.1 or Black’s Law Dictionary lends support to this analysis. I believe our case law more directly and accurately addresses the issue of legislative intent concerning the “traffic” in alcoholic liquors. Even appellants agree that the manifest meaning of section 123.49(2)(b) is that all “trafficking” in alcohol is to stop at the appointed time. In DeMore by DeMore v. Dieters, 334 N.W.2d 734, 737-38 (Iowa 1983), the Supreme Court of Iowa, in addressing the term “trafficking” and “otherwise supplying” said that the words “sell” and “supply” and “traffic” are active verbs requiring a person to “affirmatively deliver or transfer liquor or beer” before a violation can occur.
I believe it is not reasonable to find that, under the terms of the statutory provisions, Dell Oil actively delivered or transferred alcoholic beverages. I would affirm the district court’s ruling and clarify that, as our case law provides, an affirmative act of distribution is necessary to constitute a violation of 123.49(2)(b).
OXBERGER, C.J., joins this dissent.