Court Opinion

ID: 9837061
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 03:16:11.71609+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:20.140482
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge
(dissenting):
In 1987, James Murphy had a problem— he had two wives. Initially, he was married to a German woman, Petra Murphy, and he was living in Germany with her and two small children — a 5 year-old boy named Tim (Petra’s son before she married James) and James, Jr. (his natural son and namesake). However, James’ and Petra’s marriage was on the rocks, and divorce proceedings had been started in a German court. James Murphy decided he wanted out of this marriage quickly. In June 1987, he married another German woman, Beatra. In July 1987, appellant visited his home state, North Carolina, where he obtained a divorce from *27Petra without her knowledge. In August 1987, James was back in Germany and received orders transferring him to Redstone Arsenal, Alabama. Sometime between August 16th and August 20th, when he left Germany for the United States, James Murphy took a hammer and went to the apartment where Petra was living. At that apartment he smashed Petra’s head with the hammer and killed her.
Now Murphy had another problem. The two boys were in the apartment and would report him for the murder of their mother. James Murphy drowned each of the boys in the bath tub at the apartment before he left. The bodies were discovered on August 23rd, for the most part, because of the unusual odor coming from the hot apartment. I know the above facts primarily through Murphy’s several confessions. In those confessions, he details three separate murders using two separate modes of killing.
The military attorneys assigned to defend Murphy now had a problem. Several detailed and corroborated confessions, as well as a series of incriminating acts showing the motive and intent of their client, gave them an uphill battle to save Murphy’s life in a capital murder case.
First, the attorneys attempted to use the affirmative defense of insanity, after Murphy was mentally examined. However, a sanity board (one medical doctor and a Ph.D.) reported that Murphy was mentally responsible at the time of the crimes and had the mental capacity to stand trial. Without insanity as a defense, and doing the best they could with an overwhelming case against them, Murphy’s lawyers tried the case, ultimately relying on a defense to the death penalty based on Murphy’s utter remorse. See Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F.2d 1497, 1524 (9th Cir.1990) (within wide range of professionally competent assistance to not present a psychiatric defense theory but to rely on remorse in capital case), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 910, 112 S.Ct. 1275, 117 L.Ed.2d 501 (1992). He was found guilty by a jury and received the death penalty in December of 1987.
Now, 11 years after these murders, the majority reverses the death penalty because of the “lack of training and experience” of his trial defense counsel in the defense of capital cases, 50 MJ at 13, and because 3 doctors, hired for money by the defense appellate team over 5 years after Murphy’s conviction, have stated in affidavits that, in their opinion, Murphy could not have formed the intent necessary for premeditated murder. One of these doctors also held that appellant, as a result of that mental defect, was not mentally responsible for his crimes. Two other doctors would not hold Murphy liable for the crimes because his mother drank too much when he was in her womb. Based on this material, the majority sets aside the death penalty in this case.
Now I, as an appellate judge, have a problem. I see no legal basis upon which the majority can reverse this case because the defense attorneys might have been better trained. Moreover, I do not agree with the majority that this case should be remanded, just because some defense-selected doctors, many years after the crime and a valid pretrial sanity board under RCM 706, Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1984, say Murphy did not intend to commit premeditated murder. The facts in the record and the law do not justify a reversal and remand on this basis. See United States v. Young, 43 MJ 196 (1995) (newly acquired psychiatric evidence does not require remand to Court of Criminal Appeals); Vasquez, supra at 1515-16 (post-trial defense psychiatric evidence in capital case where defense of remorse relied on at trial does not constitute colorable showing of factual innocence). The record overwhelmingly demonstrates a cold and calculating series of acts by Murphy, which show no defect of reason. The acts of Murphy show he planned and understood the nature and quality of his acts in killing three humans.
First, let us look at the record, which tells us the following facts:
1. James Murphy was a Sergeant, a non-commissioned officer in the U.S. Army.
2. Murphy was a good soldier serving in Germany.
*283. Murphy participated in legal divorce proceedings in a German court.
4. Murphy planned and executed international travel to procure a divorce in a North Carolina court.
5. Murphy traveled back to Germany to successfully out-process his unit.
6. Murphy took a hammer to meet with Petra, right before he was about to leave Germany.
7. Murphy successfully killed three people using two modes of killing, and successfully escaped the scene of the crime.
8. Murphy left the scene in such a manner that the murders were not discovered until 3 days after he left Germany.
9. Murphy’s defense counsel successfully pursued and were granted a sanity board before the trial.
10. Despite several confessions and much incriminating evidence of motive, intent, and execution of planning the murders, the defense team mounted a reasonable and credible defense, attempting to put suspicion on Murphy’s 2d wife, Beatra Murphy.
11. The defense called no witnesses on findings, but called 7 witnesses and offered 28 exhibits on sentencing, including appellant’s unsworn statement of remorse.
In light of the above, the entire record shows a competent defense by counsel, and a proper resolution of the issue of Murphy’s sanity at the time of the offenses. Federal law for civilians, under the facts in this case, would not allow partisan medical-opinion evidence to be controlling at this late stage of the appellate process, so as to reverse a death penalty case. Sellers v. Ward, 135 F.3d 1333, 1339 (10th Cir.1998); Shaw v. Delo, 971 F.2d 181, 187 (8th Cir.1992); Harris v. Vasquez, supra; see also Moody v. Johnson, 139 F.3d 477, 482 (5th Cir.1998). Neither does our own case law. In Young, 43 MJ at 199 (Sullivan, J., dissenting), I indicated that it might be proper to remand a ease to the Court of Criminal Appeals when such evidence could bear on an appellant’s lack of mental responsibility at the time of the offenses, but only if this issue was raised for the first time on appeal in our Court. However, in appellant’s case, the sanity issue was raised and settled pretrial. See RCM 706. The record of trial in this ease shows no evidence that Murphy failed in any way to appreciate the nature and quality of his acts of murder. At trial, there was no hint of defect in his capacity to reason. Finally, no contrary, post-trial evidence was brought within the 2-year period allowed for “newly discovered” evidence. See RCM 1210(f).
Now, the majority suddenly exalts defense-selected psychiatric evidence brought in years after the crime, while ignoring facts which clearly show that Murphy did, in a cold and calculating manner, plan and execute three murders. See Shaw v. Delo, supra at 186 (appellate court can consider accuser’s actions on day of murder in determining whether a reasonable juror could still reject new psychiatric evidence).
The law that the majority establishes in this case generally allows mental responsibility to be an open question, practically forever. Contra Harris, supra at 1517-18, quoting Silagy v. Peters, 905 F.2d 986, 1013 (7th Cir.1990). Could we not find a paid doctor today to give an affidavit to prove John Wilkes Booth did not intend to murder President Lincoln? What if Murphy is sent back to a new judge and jury and sentenced to death again? Would we allow another sanity attack to be mounted post-trial and post-period of newly-acquired evidence? Death penalty cases must, of course, be closely scrutinized; however, they should not be allowed to continue forever.
The majority opinion more particularly holds that appellant had unqualified military lawyers representing him in this capital case. It also holds that their representation raised “too many questions” with respect to his death sentence. 50 MJ at 15. Finally, it holds that the post-trial information filed in this case has an uncertain impact on the findings of guilt. The bottom line of the majority is that these circumstances justify a remand to the Court of Criminal Appeals, with a strong suggestion that a findings and sentence rehearing be ordered.
I disagreed with the majority’s position in United States v. Curtis, 46 MJ 129 (1997), *29that military lawyers are, in effect, unqualified to act in capital cases. I disagree with its holding here today to the same effect. Moreover, in light of the cumulative-evidence holding of the majority, what questions are raised with respect to sentence that are not also raised with respect to findings? I do not understand how cumulative evidence of appellant’s good motive in confessing would impact on his death sentence in any way.
I also disagree with the majority’s “too many questions” standard of appellant review. This standard is entirely inconsistent with federal law (cf. Art. 36, UCMJ, 10 USC § 836), which requires an accused to meet a much higher standard to reverse a conviction or death sentence based on post-trial acquired psychiatric evidence. See Harris, supra at 1515; Sellers, 135 F.3d at 1339 (considering the new evidence with the old evidence, no reasonable juror would still convict). Moreover, it conflicts with the majority opinion in Young, because it avoids the requirement for a careful evaluation of the quality of the proffered evidence in light of evidence already in the record of trial. See 43 MJ at 199 (evidence in record showing mental state at time of offense). Finally, in view of the particular factual record before us (see United States v. Cosner, 35 MJ 278, 280 (CMA 1992) (no reasonable person would change his verdict)), I conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that no different result would be obtained in this case, based on the defense post-trial psychiatric materials.* See United States v. Young, supra (newly acquired psychiatric evidence not sufficient to produce more favorable result); Harris v. Vasquez, supra (newly acquired psychiatric evidence not sufficient to probably produce an acquittal).
Accordingly, I dissent.

. This material, of course, could be submitted to the Chief Executive or other authorities for consideration in clemency as suggested by the Second and Tenth Circuits. Torres v. United States, 140 F.3d 392, 405 n. 7 (2d Cir.1998); Sellers v. Ward, 135 F.3d 1333, 1339-40 (10th Cir.1998).