Court Opinion

ID: 9401044
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-09 19:14:52.428955+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:50.305910
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA

                                  January 2023 Term                              FILED
                                                                             June 9, 2023
                                     No. 21-0806                              released at 3:00 p.m.
                                                                          EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
                                                                          SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                               OF WEST VIRGINIA

                         STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA,
                          Plaintiff Below, Respondent,

                                          v.

                                 HENRY JO WARD,
                             Defendant Below, Petitioner.

                 Appeal from the Circuit Court of Fayette County
                        The Honorable Paul M. Blake, Jr.
                               Case No. 21-F-150

        AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED
        ________________________________________________________

                             Submitted: March 21, 2023
                                Filed: June 9, 2023

Troy N. Giatras, Esq.                                       Lindsay S. See, Esq.
Phillip A. Childs, Esq.                                     Solicitor General
The Giatras Law Firm, PLLC                                  Patrick Morrisey, Esq.
Charleston, West Virginia                                   Attorney General
Counsel for Petitioner                                      R. Todd Goudy, Esq.
                                                            Assistant Attorney General
                                                            Charleston, West Virginia
                                                            Attorneys for the Respondent
JUSTICE ARMSTEAD delivered the Opinion of the Court.

JUSTICE HUTCHISON concurs in part and dissents in part, and reserves the right to file
a separate opinion.

JUSTICE WOOTON concurs in part and dissents in part, and reserves the right to file a
separate opinion.
                              SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

              1.     “‘The Supreme Court of Appeals reviews sentencing orders . . . under

a deferential abuse of discretion standard, unless the order violates statutory or

constitutional commands.’ Syllabus point 1, in part, State v. Lucas, 201 W. Va. 271, 496

S.E.2d 221 (1997).” Syllabus Point 1, State v. Byers, 247 W. Va. 168, 875 S.E.2d 306

(2022).

              2.     “The function of an appellate court when reviewing the sufficiency of

the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial

to determine whether such evidence, if believed, is sufficient to convince a reasonable

person of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the relevant inquiry is

whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proved beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Syllabus Point 1, State v. Guthrie, 194 W. Va. 657, 461 S.E.2d 163

(1995).

              3.     “‘The action of a trial court in admitting or excluding evidence in the

exercise of its discretion will not be disturbed by the appellate court unless it appears that

such action amounts to an abuse of discretion.’ Syllabus Point 10, State v. Huffman, 141

W. Va. 55, 57, 87 S.E.2d 541, 544 (1995), overruled on other grounds by State ex rel. R.L.

v. Bedell, 192 W. Va. 435, 452 S.E.2d 893 (1994).” Syllabus Point 2, State v. Harris, 230

W. Va. 717, 742 S.E.2d 133 (2013).
                                              i
              4.     “Double jeopardy claims are reviewed de novo.” Syllabus Point 1, in

part, State v. Sears, 196 W. Va. 71, 468 S.E.2d 324 (1996).

              5.     “A criminal defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to

support a conviction takes on a heavy burden. An appellate court must review all the

evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, in the light most favorable to the prosecution

and must credit all inferences and credibility assessments that the jury might have drawn

in favor of the prosecution. The evidence need not be inconsistent with every conclusion

save that of guilt so long as the jury can find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Credibility

determinations are for a jury and not an appellate court. Finally, a jury verdict should be

set aside only when the record contains no evidence, regardless of how it is weighed, from

which the jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. To the extent that our prior

cases are inconsistent, they are expressly overruled.” Syllabus Point 3, State v. Guthrie,

194 W. Va. 657, 461 S.E.2d 163 (1995).

              6.     “‘The action of a trial court in admitting or excluding evidence in the

exercise of its discretion will not be disturbed by the appellate court unless it appears that

such action amounts to an abuse of discretion.’ Syllabus Point 10, State v. Huffman, 141

W. Va. 55, 57, 87 S.E.2d 541, 544 (1955), overruled on other grounds by State ex rel. R.L.

v. Bedell, 192 W. Va. 435, 452 S.E.2d 893 (1994).” Syllabus Point 2, State v. Harris, 230

W. Va. 717, 742 S.E.2d 133 (2013).

                                              ii
              7.     “Under the ‘plain error’ doctrine, ‘waiver’ of error must be

distinguished from ‘forfeiture’ of a right. A deviation from a rule of law is error unless

there is a waiver. When there has been a knowing and intentional relinquishment or

abandonment of a known right, there is no error and the inquiry as to the effect of a

deviation from the rule of law need not be determined. By contrast, mere forfeiture of a

right – the failure to make timely assertion of the right – does not extinguish the error. In

such a circumstance, it is necessary to continue the inquiry and to determine whether the

error is ‘plain.’ To be ‘plain,’ the error must be ‘clear’ or ‘obvious.’” Syllabus Point 8,

State v. Miller, 194 W. Va. 3, 459 S.E.2d 114 (1995).

              8.     “The first inquiry under the ‘plain error rule’ codified in Rule 52(a) of

the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure is whether ‘error’ in fact has been

committed. Deviation from a rule of law is error unless it is waived. Waiver is the

intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right. When there has been such a

knowing waiver, there is no error and the inquiry as to the effect of the deviation from a

rule of law need not be determined.” Syllabus Point 6, State v. Crabtree, 198 W. Va. 620,

482 S.E.2d 605 (1996).

              9.     “To trigger application of the ‘plain error’ doctrine, there must be (1)

an error; (2) that is plain; (3) that affects substantial rights; and (4) seriously affects the

fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” Syllabus Point 7, State

v. Miller, 194 W. Va. 3, 459 S.E.2d 114 (1995).

                                              iii
              10.    “The offense of brandishing as defined by West Virginia Code § 61-

7-11 is a lesser included offense within the definition of wanton endangerment under West

Virginia Code § 61-7-12.” Syllabus Point 5, State v. Bell, 211 W. Va. 308, 565 S.E.2d 430

(2002).

              11.    “Where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two

distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two

offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other

does not.” Syllabus Point 8, State v. Zaccagnini, 172 W. Va. 491, 308 S.E.2d 131 (1983).

              12.    “‘‘The test of determining whether a particular offense is a lesser

included offense is that the lesser offense must be such that it is impossible to commit the

greater offense without first having committed the lesser offense. An offense is not a lesser

included offense if it requires the inclusion of an element not required in the greater

offense.’ Syllabus Point 1, State v. Louk, [169] W. Va. [24], 285 S.E.2d 432 (1981)

[overruled on other grounds, State v. Jenkins, 191 W. Va. 87, 443 S.E.2d 244 (1994)].’

Syllabus Point 1, State v. Neider, 170 W. Va. 662, 295 S.E.2d 902 (1982).” Syllabus Point

5, State v. Wright, 200 W. Va. 549, 490 S.E.2d 636 (1997).

              13.    “Under plain error analysis, an error may be ‘plain’ in two contexts.

First, an error may be plain under existing law, which means that the plainness of the error

is predicated upon legal principles that the litigants and trial court knew or should have

                                             iv
known at the time of the prosecution. Second, an error may be plain because of a new legal

principle that did not exist at the time of the prosecution, i.e., the error was unclear at the

time of trial; however, it becomes plain on appeal because the applicable law has been

clarified.” Syllabus Point, 6, State v. Myers, 204 W. Va. 449, 513 S.E.2d 676 (1998).

              14.    “The plain language of Rule 614(b) of the West Virginia Rules of

Evidence authorizes trial courts to question witnesses – provided that such questioning is

done in an impartial manner so as to not prejudice the parties.” Syl. Pt. 3, State v. Farmer,

200 W. Va. 507, 490 S.E.2d 326 (1997).

                                              v
ARMSTEAD, J.:

              Petitioner appeals his convictions, following a jury trial in the Circuit Court

of Fayette County, of attempted murder in the second degree, two counts of wanton

endangerment, malicious assault on a law enforcement officer, use or presentment of a

firearm during the commission of a felony, obstructing an officer, and brandishing a deadly

weapon. On appeal, Petitioner asserts that: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support

his conviction for malicious assault on a law enforcement officer; (2) the principles of

double jeopardy were violated by his convictions for wanton endangerment (involving

Deputy Pierson), malicious assault on a law enforcement officer and use or presentment of

a firearm during the commission of a felony; and (3) the circuit court abused its discretion

by favoring the State throughout his trial.

              Upon careful review of the briefs, the appendix record, the arguments of the

parties, and the applicable legal authority, we conclude that the double jeopardy prohibition

was violated in this case with respect to Petitioner’s convictions for brandishing and

wanton endangerment involving Deputy Pierson, but we find no merit to his other

assignments of error. Based on our holdings, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand

this case for resentencing consistent with this opinion.

                                              1
                   I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

              On November 29, 2020, Deputy Coty Pierson (hereinafter “Deputy Pierson”)

was contacted by his second cousin, Jeffrey Barnhouse, about a stolen trail camera.

According to the trial testimony of Deputy Pierson, Mr. Barnhouse’s trail camera captured

a picture of the person who stole the camera, and that picture had been sent to Mr.

Barnhouse’s cell phone. Deputy Pierson looked at the picture and identified the individual

in the picture as Petitioner. 1 Thereafter, Deputy Pierson and Mr. Barnhouse went to

Petitioner’s camper to follow up on the stolen trail camera.2

              It is undisputed that Deputy Pierson was not on duty at the time he went to

Petitioner’s camper. Deputy Pierson testified that he did not wait to follow up on the stolen

trail camera until he was on duty again because he was close, and he had concerns that

Petitioner would get rid of the evidence. At the time Deputy Pierson arrived at Petitioner’s

camper, he was wearing civilian clothes and he was unarmed with no badge and no

handcuffs. When Deputy Pierson and Mr. Barnhouse were about forty (40) yards from the

camper, Deputy Pierson testified that the camper door swung open, and Petitioner came

out and said “how you doing officer – or what are you doing Officer Pierson.” At that

       1
       Prior to the trail camera being stolen, it was located on a hunting lease that was
approximately 200-300 yards behind Petitioner’s camper.
       2
         In addition to Mr. Barnhouse, Deputy Pierson’s son and Travis Carte, a longtime
friend, also accompanied him, but his son and Mr. Carte remained at the vehicle while
Deputy Pierson and Mr. Barnhouse went to Petitioner’s camper.

                                             2
time, Deputy Pierson realized that Petitioner was wearing the same clothes the person was

wearing in the last picture from the trail camera.

              Thereafter, Petitioner and Deputy Pierson got into a physical altercation.

According to Deputy Pierson’s trial testimony, following the altercation and after

Petitioner had “chilled out,” Petitioner asked if he could smoke, and Deputy Pierson told

him yes. Petitioner walked over to his truck to get a cigarette and made a comment about

Deputy Pierson being “lucky to still be breathing” and that Deputy Pierson’s badge didn’t

scare him. Petitioner then pulled out a gun, and another altercation ensued. Although the

parties do not agree about the details regarding the second altercation, it is undisputed that

the gun discharged during such second altercation.3 Deputy Pierson testified that as the

gun fired, it “kicked the barrel up into [his] hand,” and his instinct was to grab the barrel.

While Deputy Pierson and Petitioner were fighting for the gun, Mr. Barnhouse intervened

and tried to help. During this time, Deputy Pierson testified that Petitioner began reaching

for a deer rifle that was in his truck. Eventually, Deputy Pierson was able to gain control

of Petitioner, and he sat on him until officers arrived.

              Deputy Pierson further testified that he had metal shavings in his hand as a

result of grabbing the gun when it discharged. He sought medical treatment at Plateau

       3
        Although Petitioner testified that he did not have a recollection of the gun
discharging, he admitted “but due to evidence, yes, it did discharge.”

                                              3
Medical Center after the altercation. An x-ray was taken of his hand, and he was told to

scrape it.

                Petitioner testified in his own defense and stated that although he knew

Deputy Pierson from prior interactions, he did not initially recognize him. Further,

Petitioner testified that he was “under the impression that [Deputy Pierson] was no longer

employed by Fayette County Deputy Sheriffs because he had been off work for a

considerable amount of time.” According to Petitioner, he asked Deputy Pierson and Mr.

Barnhouse to leave his property several times, but they refused. He tried to go back inside

his camper, but Deputy Pierson would not let him. He alleged that Deputy Pierson kicked

his legs out from underneath him and pinned him down. Thereafter, Petitioner admitted to

pulling out a .357, which accidentally went off when Deputy Pierson grabbed it.

                Petitioner was convicted of (1) attempted murder in the second degree; (2)

two counts of wanton endangerment;4 (3) malicious assault on a law enforcement officer;

(4) use or presentment of a firearm during the commission of a felony; (5) obstructing an

officer; and (6) brandishing a deadly weapon.5 By order entered on September 29, 2021,

Petitioner was sentenced as follows:

Count One (attempted murder in the second degree) – An indeterminate term of not less

than one nor more than three years;

       4
        Petitioner was found guilty of wanton endangerment involving Deputy Pierson
(Count 2) and wanton endangerment involving Jeffrey Barnhouse (Count 3).
       5
           Petitioner was found not guilty on the charges of trespassing and petit larceny.
                                               4
Count Two (wanton endangerment involving Deputy Pierson) – A determinate term of five

years;

Count Three (wanton endangerment involving Jeffrey Barnhouse) – A determinate term of

five years and fine of $1,000;

Count Four (malicious assault on a law enforcement officer) – An indeterminate term of

not less than three nor more than fifteen years;

Count Five (use or presentment of a firearm during the commission of a felony) – A

determinate term of ten years;

Count Six (obstructing an officer) – A term of one year; and

Count Seven (brandishing a deadly weapon) – An indeterminate term of not less than

ninety days nor more than one year.6

              Petitioner now appeals his conviction and sentencing.

                              II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

              “‘The Supreme Court of Appeals reviews sentencing orders … under a

deferential abuse of discretion standard, unless the order violates statutory or constitutional

commands.’ Syllabus Point 1, in part, State v. Lucas, 201 W. Va. 271, 496 S.E.2d 221

(1997).” Syl. Pt. 1, State v. Byers, 247 W. Va. 168, 875 S.E.2d 306 (2022).

         6
        The sentences for the five felony convictions were ordered to run consecutively,
and the sentences for the misdemeanor convictions were ordered to run concurrently with
one another and concurrently with the sentence for Count Five – use or presentment of a
firearm during the commission of a felony.
                                            5
                “The function of an appellate court when reviewing the sufficiency of the

evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to

determine whether such evidence, if believed, is sufficient to convince a reasonable person

of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the relevant inquiry is whether,

after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier

of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonable

doubt.” Syl. Pt. 1, State v. Guthrie, 194 W. Va. 657, 461 S.E.2d 163 (1995).

                “‘The action of a trial court in admitting or excluding evidence in the exercise

of its discretion will not be disturbed by the appellate court unless it appears that such

action amounts to an abuse of discretion.’ Syllabus Point 10, State v. Huffman, 141 W. Va.

55, 57, 87 S.E.2d 541, 545 (1955), overruled on other grounds by State ex rel. R.L. v.

Bedell, 192 W. Va. 435, 452 S.E.2d 893 (1994).” Syl. Pt. 2, State v. Harris, 230 W. Va.

717, 742 S.E.2d 133 (2013). “[D]ouble jeopardy claims are reviewed de novo.” Syl. Pt.

1, in part, State v. Sears, 196 W. Va. 71, 468 S.E.2d 324 (1996).

                                      III. DISCUSSION

                In his appeal before this Court, Petitioner argues that his procedural and

substantive due process rights were violated, and the combination of various errors during

his trial requires the reversal of his convictions.7 In the instant appeal, Petitioner assigns

       7
           Petitioner also seeks a remand for a new trial.

                                                6
three (3) separate errors that he maintains entitle him to have his convictions reversed and

his case remanded for a new trial. The assignments of error are: (1) insufficient evidence

to support a conviction for malicious assault on a law enforcement officer; (2) double

jeopardy; and (3) alleged abuse of discretion by the trial court by favoring the State. We

will address each of these assignments below.

A.     MALICIOUS ASSAULT ON A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER

                Plaintiff’s first assignment of error focuses on his conviction for malicious

assault on a law-enforcement officer. The statute at issue contains four (4) separate crimes

for assault and battery against the following groups of individuals:            government

representatives, health care workers, utility workers, emergency service personnel,

correctional employees, or law-enforcement officers who are acting in their official

capacities at the time of the assault or battery. W. Va. Code § 61-2-10b.

                Petitioner was indicted, 8 tried, convicted and sentenced for the crime of

malicious assault on a law enforcement officer pursuant to West Virginia Code § 61-2-

10b(b), which provides as follows:

       8
           Indictment No. 21-F-150:

                COUNT FOUR

               And the Grand Jurors, upon their oaths and aforesaid, do further present that
HENRY JO WARD, on or about the 29th of November 2020, in the said County of Fayette,
committed the offense of “malicious assault on a law enforcement officer,” in that he did
(continued . . .)
                                            7
              Malicious assault. --- Any person who maliciously shoots,
              stabs, cuts or wounds or by any means causes bodily injury
              with intent to maim, disfigure, disable or kill a government
              representative, health care worker, utility worker, emergency
              service personnel, correctional employee or law-enforcement
              officer acting in his or her official capacity, and the person
              committing the malicious assault knows or has reason to know
              that the victim is acting in his or her official capacity is guilty
              of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be confined in a
              correctional facility for not less than three nor more than fifteen
              years.

Petitioner challenges his conviction of this charge initially by alleging that insufficient

evidence existed for a jury to convict him of malicious assault on a law enforcement officer.

In addressing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction, we

have held:

              [t]he function of an appellate court when reviewing the
              sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is
              to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether
              such evidence, if believed, is sufficient to convince a
              reasonable person of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable
              doubt. Thus, the relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the
              evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
              rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
              the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

Syl. Pt. 1, State v. Guthrie, 194 W. Va. 657, 461 S.E.2d 163 (1995). We have further

determined:

unlawfully, feloniously, and maliciously shoot, stab, cut and/or wound Coty Pierson, a law
enforcement officer acting in his official capacity, with the intent to permanently maim,
disfigure, disable, and/or kill, and the said HENRY JO WARD knew or had reason to know
that Coty Pierson was a law enforcement officer, against the peace and dignity of the State.
       W. Va. Code § 61-2-10b(b)

                                              8
                [a] criminal defendant challenging the sufficiency of the
                evidence to support a conviction takes on a heavy burden. An
                appellate court must review all the evidence, whether direct or
                circumstantial, in the light most favorable to the prosecution
                and must credit all inferences and credibility assessments that
                the jury might have drawn in favor of the prosecution. The
                evidence need not be inconsistent with every conclusion save
                that of guilt so long as the jury can find guilt beyond a
                reasonable doubt. Credibility determinations are for a jury and
                not an appellate court. Finally, a jury verdict should be set
                aside only when the record contains no evidence, regardless of
                how it is weighed, from which the jury could find guilt beyond
                a reasonable doubt. To the extent that our prior cases are
                inconsistent, they are expressly overruled.

Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.

                Initially, Petitioner argues that Deputy Pierson was not shot, stabbed, cut or

wounded. He concedes that the State presented evidence that Deputy Pierson had metal

shavings in his hand following the discharge of Petitioner’s firearm, but he argues that

“[t]he receipt of a splinter in an altercation involving a discharged firearm simply cannot

be what the Legislature contemplated as the actus reus of malicious assault.” We disagree.

The statute requires only that a defendant inflict bodily injury “by any means.” Deputy

Pierson testified that he received metal shavings in his hand as a result of grabbing the gun

as it was going off. Deputy Pierson sought treatment at Plateau Medical Center on the

same day, and an x-ray was taken of his hand. He was told to scrape his hand, and he

further testified that little scratches remained at the time of the trial. Despite Petitioner

characterizing Deputy Pierson as sustaining a “splinter,” the jury was presented with

                                               9
evidence that Deputy Pierson sustained bodily injury and determined that the State had met

its burden in this regard.

                Petitioner next argues that Deputy Pierson was not acting in his official

capacity at the time of the events that resulted in Petitioner’s conviction for malicious

assault on a law enforcement officer. In support of this argument, Petitioner asserts that

Deputy Pierson was just accompanying his family member in an attempt to intimidate

Petitioner. It is undisputed that Deputy Pierson was not “on the clock” at the time of the

altercation with Petitioner. Deputy Pierson testified that he was wearing civilian clothes

and that he did not have his badge, handcuffs or service weapon. However, these facts are

not dispositive on this issue. Indeed, Petitioner concedes that “[t]here is no single issue

that is dispositive, and a law enforcement officer’s attire at the time of the incident in

question is simply a factor to consider when making such a determination.”9

                A law enforcement officer is “considered to be under a duty to act in [his]

lawful and official capacity twenty-four hours a day.” Syl. Pt. 5, in part, State v. Phillips,

205 W. Va. 673, 520 S.E.2d 670 (1999). Further, “[i]t is general law that where a public

peace officer, within his territorial jurisdiction, undertakes to discharge a duty which comes

within the purview of his office, he is presumed to act in his official capacity. . . .” Id. at

Syl. Pt. 4, in part. Deputy Pierson was made aware of the theft of a trail camera, and he

proceeded to investigate the theft. He testified that he did not wait to investigate the theft

       9
           Petitioner’s Reply Brief, at p. 6.
                                                10
until he was back on the clock because: (1) he was close to Petitioner’s residence; and (2)

he was concerned that Petitioner would get rid of the evidence before he could investigate

when he was back on duty. Investigating a theft is within the purview of a deputy sheriff.

              With respect to whether or not Petitioner “knew or had reason to know” that

Deputy Pierson was acting in his official capacity, the jury heard conflicting testimony.

Deputy Pierson testified that Petitioner referred to him as “Deputy,” but Petitioner denied

making this statement and testified that “to [his] knowledge Coty Pierson was not an officer

at that point in time.” However, Petitioner concedes that he had prior dealings with Deputy

Pierson as a police officer. Accordingly, the jury was presented with sufficient evidence

from which to conclude that Petitioner “knew or had reason to know” that Deputy Pierson

was acting in his official capacity.

              Finally, Petitioner questions whether Deputy Pierson was a “valid law

enforcement officer” on November 29, 2020. Deputy Pierson testified that at the time of

the trial he was employed as a Deputy Sheriff with the Fayette County Sheriff’s Office and

that he had been so employed for a little over three years. In addition, he testified that on

the day of the events at issue in this case, he was on vacation. Specifically, he testified that

his vacation began on October 25, 2020, and he would return from vacation on December

6, 2020. Counsel for Petitioner attempted to ask a question about Deputy Pierson’s

                                              11
vacation, but the State objected on the grounds of relevance, and the circuit court sustained

the objection.10

                Before this Court, Petitioner argues that Deputy Pierson’s claim that he was

on vacation for six weeks is suspicious. Petitioner speculates that Deputy Pierson might

have been suspended at the time of their altercation or he might not have been employed

as a police officer at the time in question. Petitioner argues that by sustaining the State’s

objection, the circuit court cut off a line of questioning that directly relates to the charge of

malicious assault on a law enforcement officer, warranting reversal of his conviction.

                “The action of a trial court in admitting or excluding evidence in the exercise

of its discretion will not be disturbed by the appellate court unless it appears that such

action amounts to an abuse of discretion. Syllabus Point 10, State v. Huffman, 141 W. Va.

       10
            Q   When would you have worked next if you recall?
            A   I was on vacation. My next day of work was December 6.
            Q   Had you been on vacation leading up to that point or had you just gone on
                vacation?
         A      I had been on vacation since October 25.
         Q      You’d been on vacation for –

       The State: Your Honor, this is irrelevant.

       The Court: I don’t see the relevancy of it. Well, its been established he was not on
duty; he was off duty – maybe for deer season or whatever reason. I think that’s been
established.

        Counsel for Petitioner: Well, it has to do with whether my client thought he was
still a police officer or not. Your Honor, it was my understanding that he’d been off for
some period of time that’s why I asked him.

       The Court: All right. I’ll sustain the objection.
                                             12
55, 57, 87 S.E.2d 541, 544 (1955), overruled on other grounds by State ex rel. R.L. v.

Bedell, 192 W. Va. 435, 452 S.E.2d 893 (1994).” Syl. Pt. 2, State v. Harris, 230 W. Va.

717, 742 S.E.2d 133 (2013). Therefore, we must now determine whether the circuit court

abused its discretion by sustaining the State’s objection and preventing further questioning

of Deputy Pierson regarding his absence from work. The reason that Petitioner’s trial

counsel gave the circuit court for wishing to pursue the line of questioning about his

vacation was that it had “to do with whether my client thought he was still a police officer

or not. Your Honor, it was my understanding that he’d been off for some period of time

that’s why I asked him.” Although Petitioner now speculates that Deputy Pierson might

have been suspended at the time of their altercation, his counsel made no such assertion to

the circuit court. The circuit court indicated that it did not “see the relevancy” because it

had already been established that Deputy Pierson was off duty at the time of the events

giving rise to Petitioner’s criminal charges, and we do not find that it abused its discretion

in doing so.11

       11
         Although not directly asserted in this assignment of error, Petitioner alleges that
“although his trial attorney acted astutely in pursuing this line of questioning, he
unfortunately proved ineffective when he failed to fight more vehemently to continue it
over the State’s objection and the trial judge’s patently incorrect ruling.” We remind
Petitioner that:

               [i]t is the extremely rare case when this Court will find
               ineffective assistance of counsel when such a charge is raised
               as an assignment of error on a direct appeal. The prudent
               defense counsel first develops the record regarding ineffective
               assistance of counsel in a habeas corpus proceeding before the
(continued . . .)
                                             13
              Pursuant to the standard set forth in State v. Guthrie, we find that the record

contains sufficient evidence from which the jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt, and for this reason, the jury verdict finding Petitioner guilty of malicious assault on

a law enforcement officer should not be set aside.

B.     DOUBLE JEOPARDY

              In his second assignment of error, Petitioner asserts that he “suffered a

multitude of violations of his constitutional protection against double jeopardy.” To

summarize Petitioner’s alleged violations, he argues: (1) brandishing is a lesser included

offense of wanton endangerment of Deputy Pierson; (2) wanton endangerment of Deputy

Pierson is a lesser included offense of malicious assault on a law enforcement officer; and

(3) his conviction of the crime of use or presentation of a firearm during the commission

of a felony constitutes double jeopardy.

              As an initial matter, the State argues that Petitioner waived any challenges

based on double jeopardy. Petitioner concedes that he failed to object at trial, but he argues

that such failure did not constitute waiver and that this Court should continue its inquiry to

determine whether such double jeopardy violations constitute plain error. These arguments

              lower court, and may then appeal if such relief is denied. This
              Court may then have a fully developed record on this issue
              upon which to more thoroughly review an ineffective
              assistance of counsel claim.

Syl. Pt. 10, State v. Triplett, 187 W. Va. 760, 421 S.E.2d 511 (1992).
                                              14
require this Court to determine whether Petitioner “waived” or “forfeited” his right to assert

a double jeopardy violation.

              Under the “plain error” doctrine, “waiver” of error must be
              distinguished from “forfeiture” of a right. A deviation from a
              rule of law is error unless there is a waiver. When there has
              been a knowing and intentional relinquishment or
              abandonment of a known right, there is no error and the inquiry
              as to the effect of a deviation from the rule of law need not be
              determined. By contrast, mere forfeiture of a right – the failure
              to make timely assertion of the right – does not extinguish the
              error. In such a circumstance, it is necessary to continue the
              inquiry and to determine whether the error is “plain.” To be
              “plain,” the error must be “clear” or “obvious.”

Syl. Pt. 8, State v. Miller, 194 W. Va. 3, 459 S.E.2d 114 (1995). We have likewise held

that:

              [t]he first inquiry under the “plain error rule” codified in Rule
              52(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure is
              whether “error” in fact has been committed. Deviation from a
              rule of law is error unless it is waived. Waiver is the intentional
              relinquishment or abandonment of a known right. When there
              has been such a knowing waiver, there is no error and the
              inquiry as to the effect of the deviation from a rule of law need
              not be determined.

Syl. Pt. 6, State v. Crabtree, 198 W. Va. 620, 482 S.E.2d 605 (1996).

              In Crabtree, this Court determined that a criminal defendant waived any

argument that he was denied his constitutional right to be present during every critical stage

of the proceedings because he “voluntarily relinquished any right he had regarding his

presence” when the trial judge communicated with the jury, and the defendant

“affirmatively approved the trial judge’s request that he be permitted to engage in

                                             15
discussions with the jury without the defendant being present.” Id. at 631, 482 S.E.2d 605,

616.   In the instant case, Petitioner failed to timely assert a double jeopardy violation,

which operated admittedly as a forfeiture.            However, we find no intentional

“relinquishment” of this right and, thus, review for plain error is appropriate in this case.

              “To trigger application of the ‘plain error’ doctrine, there must be (1) an

error; (2) that is plain; (3) that affects substantial rights; and (4) seriously affects the

fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. Syl. Pt. 7, State v.

Miller, 194 W. Va. 3, 459 S.E.2d 114 (1995). Petitioner argues that several of his

convictions violate his Constitutional protections against double jeopardy as set forth in

the United States Constitution and the West Virginia Constitution. 12            Specifically,

Petitioner complains that his convictions for malicious assault on a law enforcement

officer, wanton endangerment, brandishing, and use and presentation of a firearm during

the commission of a felony constitute double jeopardy.

              First, Petitioner maintains, and the State concedes, that brandishing is a lesser

included offense within the definition of wanton endangerment. This Court has previously

held that “[t]he offense of brandishing as defined by West Virginia Code § 61-7-11 is a

lesser included offense within the definition of wanton endangerment under West Virginia

       12
          “See W. Va. Const. art. 3, § 5 (‘No person shall … be twice put in jeopardy of life
or liberty for the same offence.’); see also U.S. Const. amend. V (‘[N]or shall any person
be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life and limb.’)” n. 15 State
v. Duke, 246 W. Va. 336, 873 S.E.2d 867 (2022).

                                             16
Code § 61-7-12.” Syl. Pt. 5, State v. Bell, 211 W. Va. 308, 565 S.E.2d 430 (2002). Based

on this holding, the circuit court erred in convicting and sentencing Petitioner for both

brandishing and wanton endangerment.

              Secondly, Petitioner argues that his convictions for both wanton

endangerment and malicious assault on a law enforcement officer constitute double

jeopardy. In support of this argument, Petitioner relies upon this Court’s prior decision in

State v. Wright, 200 W. Va. 549, 490 S.E.2d 636 (1997) in which this Court held that

wanton endangerment was a lesser included offense of malicious assault. The decision in

Wright involved the crime of malicious assault. While not the specific crime of malicious

assault on a law enforcement officer, which is the crime of which Petitioner in the instant

case was convicted, we nonetheless find the Wright case to be persuasive.

              In Wright, we held:

              “‘[t]he test of determining whether a particular offense is a
              lesser included offense is that the lesser offense must be such
              that it is impossible to commit the greater offense without first
              having committed the lesser offense. An offense is not a lesser
              included offense if it requires the inclusion of an element not
              required in the greater offense.’ Syllabus Point 1, State v.
              Louk, [169] W. Va. [24], 285 S.E.2d 432 (1981) [, overruled
              on other grounds, State v. Jenkins, 191 W. Va. 87, 443 S.E.2d
              244 (1994)].” Syllabus Point 1, State v. Neider, 170 W. Va.
              662, 295 S.E.2d 902 (1982).

                                             17
Id. at Syl. Pt. 5. After reviewing the elements of the crimes of wanton endangerment

involving a firearm13 and malicious assault, this Court determined that, under the facts of

that case, wanton endangerment was a lesser included offense of malicious assault

“because it would have been impossible for [the defendant] to have committed malicious

assault without first having committed wanton endangerment.” Id. at 554, 490 S.E.2d at

641.

              Petitioner in this case and the defendant in Wright were both convicted of

wanton endangerment involving a firearm.14 The State correctly points out, though, that

Petitioner in the instant case and the defendant in the Wright case were convicted of

different crimes of malicious assault. Petitioner was convicted of a violation of West

Virginia Code § 61-2-10b(b), which states, in part:

              Any person who maliciously shoots, stabs, cuts or wounds or
              by any means causes bodily injury with intent to maim,
              disfigure, disable or kill a government representative, health
              care worker, utility worker, emergency service personnel,
              correctional employee or law-enforcement officer acting in his
              or her official capacity, and the person committing the
              malicious assault knows or has reason to know that the victim
              is acting in his or her official capacity is guilty of a felony….

       13
         Petitioner in the Wright case was convicted of violating W. Va. Code § 61-7-12.
The elements of that crime include: “(1) the defendant (2) did wantonly perform (3) with a
firearm (4) an act (5) creating substantial risk of (6) death or serious bodily injury to
another.” Wright, 200 W. Va. at 553, 490 S.E.2d at 640.
       14
        W. Va. Code § 61-7-12 has not been amended since 1994 so Petitioner and the
defendant in the Wright case were convicted of the same version of the crime of wanton
endangerment involving a firearm.

                                            18
The defendant in Wright was convicted of a violation of West Virginia Code § 61-2-9(a),

which states, in part:

              If any person maliciously shoots, stabs, cuts or wounds any
              person, or by any means cause him or her bodily injury with
              intent to maim, disfigure, disable or kill, he or she, except
              where it is otherwise provided, is guilty of a felony.

              The convictions in the Wright case were “predicated on a single act involving

a single gunshot.” Wright, 200 W. Va. at 554, 490 S.E.2d at 640. Likewise, here the act

that resulted in Petitioner being charged with wanton endangerment involving a firearm

and malicious assault on a law enforcement officer arise from the same act – the discharge

of a firearm in the presence of Deputy Pierson. Because Petitioner committed a single act,

we must determine if that act constitutes one or two offenses. The test we employ for

making that determination is commonly referred to as the Blockburger test, which

provides:

              “Where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of
              two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to
              determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is
              whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other
              does not.”

Syl. Pt. 8, State v. Zaccagnini, 172 W. Va. 491, 308 S.E.2d 131 (1983).15

       15
         Syllabus Point 8 of State v. Zaccagnini, 172 W. Va. 491, 308 S.E.2d 131 (1983)
adopted the test of Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306
(1932).
                                            19
                Certainly, “[i]n the abstract, convictions of both wanton endangerment and

malicious assault do not always constitute double jeopardy because wanton endangerment

with a firearm requires proof” of the use of a firearm, and “[m]alicious assault does not

necessarily require use of a firearm.” Wright, 200 W. Va. at 553, 490 S.E.2d at 640. The

same is true of Petitioner’s convictions for wanton endangerment with a firearm involving

Deputy Pierson and malicious assault on a law enforcement officer because the malicious

assault on a law enforcement statute does not require the use of a firearm. Therefore, we

must now determine, under the facts of this case, whether the crime of wanton

endangerment as it relates to Deputy Pierson is a lesser included offense of malicious

assault on a law enforcement officer.

                This Court’s prior decision in State v. Neider, 170 W. Va. 662, 295 S.E.2d

902 (1982), outlines the test for determining if one crime is a lesser included offense of

another:

                “The test of determining whether a particular offense is a lesser
                included offense is that the lesser offense must be such that it
                is impossible to commit the greater offense without first having
                committed the lesser offense. An offense is not a lesser
                included offense if it requires the inclusion of an element not
                required in the greater offense.” Syllabus Point 1, State v. Louk,
                [169]W. Va. 24, 285 S.E.2d 432 (1981) [overruled on other
                grounds, State v. Jenkins, 191 W. Va. 87, 443 S.E.2d 244
                (1994)].

Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.

                Much like in the Wright case, it would have been impossible for Petitioner

to have committed malicious assault on a law enforcement officer without first committing

                                               20
wanton endangerment of Deputy Pierson with a firearm. For this reason, we find that,

given the circumstances of this case, wanton endangerment (of Deputy Pierson) is a lesser

included offense of malicious assault on a law enforcement officer. Based on this holding,

we find that the circuit court erred in convicting and sentencing Petitioner for both wanton

endangerment of Deputy Pierson and malicious assault on a law enforcement officer.

              Finally, Petitioner alleges that, in light of his other convictions, his

conviction for use or presentment of a firearm during the commission of a felony offends

double jeopardy. We disagree. With regard to an allegation of double jeopardy, “[t]he

[Blockburger test] is not controlling where there is a clear indication of contrary legislative

intent.” Syl. Pt. 6, in part, Mirandy v. Smith, 237 W. Va. 363, 364, 787 S.E.2d 634, 635

(citing Syl. Pt .5, State v. Gill, 187 W. Va. 136, 416 S.E.2d 253 (1992)). We made clear in

Mirandy that a “clear indication” of legislative intent that a crime is to be treated as a

separate crime from other statutory crimes places it outside of a Blockburger analysis with

regard to double jeopardy. The language of West Virginia Code § 61-7-15a constitutes

such “clear indication” of legislative intent, providing:

              As a separate and distinct offense, and in addition to any
              and all other offenses provided for in this code, any person
              who, while engaged in the commission of a felony, uses or
              presents a firearm shall be guilty of a felony and, upon
              conviction, shall be imprisoned in a state correctional facility
              for not more than ten years.

W. Va. Code § 61-7-15a (emphasis added). Petitioner acknowledges that the Legislature

“made an obvious carve-out to avoid” this type of double jeopardy challenge but believes

that this carve-out is unconstitutional. We disagree. The legislature’s intent is clear that
                                            21
the use of a firearm during the commission of a felony constitutes a “separate and distinct

offense” in addition to “any and all” other offenses provided for under West Virginia law.

Enactments by the legislature are presumed to be constitutional absent a showing that they

violate constitutional principles. West Virginia Code § 61-7-15a, as adopted by the

Legislature, enjoys such presumption of constitutionality, and Petitioner has provided no

basis for overcoming such presumption. Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Petitioner’s

claim that his conviction and sentencing for the crime of use or presentation of a firearm

during commission of a felony violated his constitutional protection against double

jeopardy.

                While we have found that the circuit court committed error with respect to

Petitioner’s convictions for brandishing and wanton endangerment involving Deputy

Pierson, such finding does not, by itself, trigger the application of the “plain error” doctrine.

We must now determine whether the error was plain, affected Petitioner’s substantial rights

and seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial

proceedings.16

                Under plain error analysis, an error may be “plain” in two
                contexts. First, an error may be plain under existing law, which
                means that the plainness of the error is predicated upon legal
                principles that the litigants and trial court knew or should have
                known at the time of the prosecution. Second, an error may be
                plain because of a new legal principle that did not exist at the
                time of the prosecution, i.e., the error was unclear at the time

       16
            See Syl. Pt. 7, State v. Miller, 194 W. Va. 3, 456 S.E.2d 114 (1995).

                                               22
                of trial; however, it becomes plain on appeal because the
                applicable law has been clarified.

Syl. Pt. 6, State v. Myers, 204 W. Va. 449, 513 S.E.2d 676 (1998).

                The offense of brandishing has been considered a lesser included offense of

wanton endangerment in West Virginia since 2002. 17 Further, this Court’s analysis of

whether the crime of wanton endangerment is a lesser included offense within the

definition of malicious wounding dates back to 1997.18 Therefore, the errors in this case

meet the first standard of plain error set forth in Myers, because such errors were predicated

upon legal principles that the litigants and trial court knew or should have known at the

time of the prosecution. Id.

                Moreover, in order for the error to affect Petitioner’s substantial rights, it

must be prejudicial. Syl. Pt. 9, in part, State v. Miller, 194 W. Va. 3, 459 S.E.2d 114 (1995).

Petitioner was erroneously sentenced for two crimes which we have determined to

constitute double jeopardy. There is no doubt that this error was not only prejudicial to

Petitioner, but it also affected the fairness and integrity of the judicial proceedings. For

these reasons and under the facts of this case, it was plain error for Petitioner to have been

convicted and sentenced for brandishing and wanton endangerment of Deputy Pierson

because such crimes are lesser included offenses of the offense of malicious assault on a

       17
            See Syl. Pt. 6, State v. Bell, 211 W. Va. 308, 565 S.E.2d 430 (2002).
       18
            See State v. Wright, 200 W. Va. 549, 490 S.E.2d 636 (1997).

                                              23
law enforcement officer. Based on our holding, we remand this case with directions to the

circuit court to resentence Petitioner consistent with this opinion.19

C.     FAVORABLE TREATMENT TO THE STATE

              In his final assignment of error, Petitioner alleges that the trial court abused

its discretion by favoring the State throughout his trial. Within this assignment of error,

Petitioner complains of perceived “injustices” that entitle him to a new trial. We find no

merit to Petitioner’s arguments in this regard.

              Despite the State’s position that Petitioner waived this assignment of error,

we believe that it is appropriate to address Petitioner’s arguments in this regard. Petitioner

argues that an exchange during voir dire between the trial court and a potential juror

regarding police officer testimony tainted the entire jury pool.20 A review of this exchange

reveals that in response to a question about whether a police officer’s testimony carries

more weight than any other witness, a potential juror indicated that a police officer’s

testimony would be “golden.” However, the prospective juror qualified this statement by

indicating that he held this belief “if they are honest and true gentlemen of the law.”

       19
         Because we find no merit to Petitioner’s other assignments of error, remand for
resentencing consistent with this opinion is proper for the same reasons we found such
resentencing proper in State v. Wright, 200 W. Va. 549, 490 S.E.2d 636 (1997).
       20
          Petitioner states in his brief that “no juror who heard the exchange between the
potential juror and the trial court judge could possibly proceed in the trial in an impartial
manner.” Petitioner’s Brief at 19.
                                               24
(emphasis added). Counsel for Petitioner moved to strike the prospective juror. Before

ruling on this request, the trial court followed up by asking whether the prospective juror

would automatically assume that a police officer who testified was truthful and that a lay

person who testified was not truthful. The prospective juror responded that he was “big on

truth and honesty” and acknowledged that he understood that it was the jury’s function to

determine the credibility of witnesses.21 This exchange ended with the prospective juror

indicating that he did not believe that Petitioner was guilty just because he had been

charged by law enforcement and that Petitioner “is innocent until proven guilty [because]

I’m a firm believer in that also.”22

       21
         Petitioner points out that the prospective juror mentioned “reasonable doubt,” but
at the end of that particular comment, the prospective juror stated “whoever is telling the
truth and its provable ---then it’s the truth.”
       22
            The full exchange during voir dire of which Petitioner complains is below. The

prospective juror’s name has been removed, and the individual will be referred to as

“prospective juror”:

                Mr. Moorehead: Okay, thank you. Anybody here thinks that
                just because a witness may be a police officer that their
                testimony carries more weight than any other witness that were
                to testify from the witness stand under oath?
                Sir. [].

                Prospective Juror: They swear an oath to the Constitution, to
                the State, to the law; if they are honest true gentlemen of the
                law their witness statement is golden as far as I’m concerned.

(continued . . .)
                                              25
              Mr. Moorehead: Well, Your Honor, I would move to strike
              [the prospective juror].

              The Court: Well, let me ask you this, sir; it appears you’re
              going to hear testimony from law enforcement officers, you’re
              going to hear testimony from private citizens and a jury is
              obligated to consider that testimony from law enforcement and
              citizens – lay citizens equally. If a law enforcement officer
              were to testify in this matter would you automatically –
              because he is a law enforcement officer assume he’s telling the
              truth and the other person is not being truthful?

              Prospective Juror []: When you put it that way – I’m big on
              truth and honesty. Now if it can be proved without a
              reasonable doubt that the officer had lied also or vice versa –
              whoever is telling the truth and its provable – then it’s the truth.

              The Court: All right.

              Prospective Juror []: That’s how I see that. That’s why I said
              if law enforcement officer is true to this oath, I believe his word
              should stand good ground.

              The Court: All right. And, of course, you understand that it is
              a jury function to determine the believability credibility of all
              the witnesses in the case – law enforcement and lay witnesses,
              do you understand that sir?

              Prospective Juror []: Yes, sir.

               The Court: All right. All right, so, the basic thing is, you know
               – certainly people that take an oath to uphold the law and the
               Constitution should be truthful when they take that oath. Just
(continued . . .)
                                             26
              In his briefs before this Court, Petitioner appears to argue that the entire jury

was tainted by the exchange with the prospective juror and that the prospective juror should

have been dismissed for cause. The prospective juror at issue was struck and did not serve

as a juror during Petitioner’s trial. In support of this argument, Petitioner relies upon State

v. Newcomb, 223 W.Va. 843, 679 S.E.2d 675 (2009), in which this Court held that

              [w]hen considering whether to excuse a prospective juror for
              cause, a trial court is required to consider the totality of the
              circumstances and grounds relating to a potential request to
              excuse a prospective juror, to make a full inquiry to examine
              those circumstances and to resolve any doubts in favor of
              excusing the juror.”

Id. at Syl. Pt. 5. A review of the record reveals that such full inquiry was made, and the

circuit court appeared satisfied that the prospective juror could impartially fulfill his duty

as a juror. We find no error in the circuit court’s holding in this regard.

              Petitioner further asserts that the circuit court abused its discretion by not

properly responding to a juror’s indication that she was having trouble hearing. A review

              because this case involves law enforcement do you feel that the
              Defendant is automatically guilty of something?

              Prospective Juror []: No sir, once again, he is innocent until
              proven guilty. I’m a firm believer in that also.

              The Court: All right. All right, you can have a seat sir. The
              motion to exclude the juror is denied.
                                             27
of the transcript reveals that a juror raised her hand during the time that the circuit court

was instructing the jury. The Circuit Clerk made the circuit court aware that a juror had

raised her hand. Specifically, the following exchange occurred:

              CIRCUIT CLERK WHISMAN: [speaking to the Court] The juror held up
her hand she can’t hear.

              THE COURT: Do what?

              CIRCUIT CLERK WHISMAN: One of the jurors held up their hand they
can’t hear.

              THE COURT: All right.

              The circuit court continued instructing the jury. There is no indication that

an objection was made by Petitioner. Further, Petitioner cites no legal authority in support

of his argument that circuit court should have inquired as to what the juror “heard and did

not hear” or that the juror’s indication that she was having difficulty hearing up to that

point “prejudiced the juror.” In City of Philippi v. Weaver, 208 W. Va. 346, 540 S.E.2d

563 (2000), this Court addressed whether a juror, who was unable to understand a question,

was coerced into saying “guilty” during the polling of the jury. Much like the present case,

the petitioner in Weaver did not raise an objection regarding the juror’s inability to hear or

understand the court’s question. In Weaver, we found that the petitioner in that case failed

to preserve the alleged error. Moreover, we found that, even if she had preserved the error,

she “failed to generate a showing of prejudice by th[e] juror’s conduct” and, thus, she failed

                                             28
to establish reversible error. Id. at 350, 540 S.E.2d at 567. In the instant case, Petitioner

failed to object and failed to present any evidence of what the juror heard or did not hear.

The record provides no factual basis other than the Circuit Clerk’s comment that the juror

was having difficulty hearing. Accordingly, Petitioner failed to establish prejudice in this

regard, and we find the circuit court committed no error.

              Petitioner also alleges error based on the trial court’s decision to question

Petitioner and Deputy Pierson during the trial. Petitioner concedes that Rule 614(b) of the

West Virginia Rules of Evidence permits trial courts to ask questions of witnesses,

specifically providing that the judge may “interrogate witnesses, whether called by itself

or by a party, but in jury trials the court’s interrogation shall be impartial so as not to

prejudice the parties.” Id. However, Petitioner asserts that the trial court’s questioning

“highlighted facts that were favorable to the State” and “abandoned any notion of

impartiality.” We disagree.

              “The plain language of Rule 614(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence

authorizes trial courts to question witnesses – provided that such questioning is done in an

impartial manner so as to not prejudice the parties.” Syl. Pt. 3, State v. Farmer, 200 W.

Va. 507, 490 S.E.2d 326 (1997). “A trial judge, who is after all the only disinterested

lawyer connected with the proceeding, has the duty to help make clear to the jury the facts

and circumstances pertinent to the case.” Id. at 513, 490 S.E.2d 326, 332 (citing United

States v. Ostendorff, 371 F.2d 729, 732 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 982, 87 S.Ct. 1286,
                                             29
18 L.Ed.2d 229 (1967). A review of the record reveals that the circuit court attempted to

clarify the testimony of Deputy Pierson about whether he hit or grabbed the gun. The

circuit court further inquired of Petitioner as to whether he made a comment about Deputy

Pierson being lucky to still be breathing. When Petitioner indicated that he made such

comment but “[n]ot in that text [sic],” the circuit court asked Petitioner to please explain

the context in which he made that comment. The record reflects that the circuit court posed

its questions in an impartial manner and did not commit error in making such inquiries.

                Petitioner also asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in not

permitting a photograph to be shown to the jury even though it allowed the State’s

witnesses to offer testimony about the photograph. Although Petitioner does not identify

the exhibit number to which he refers, it appears that his argument is directed towards

Exhibit No. 11, which is purported to be the last picture taken by the trail camera and sent

by text to Mr. Barnhouse’s phone. Exhibit No. 11 was admitted into evidence during the

testimony of Officer Hylton after the foundation for the photograph had been established.

Petitioner did not object to the admission of this photograph, and Petitioner’s complaint

that the jury was not permitted to see the picture is without merit as he did not request that

it be published to the jury.23

       23
            The relevant portion of the transcript provides:

(continued . . .)
                                               30
              Finally, we find no error in the circuit court’s failure to clear the courtroom

of police officers. Petitioner relies upon “accounts from parties present at the trial” in

support of his belief that the majority of the people present in the courtroom during the trial

were police officers.24 Petitioner cites no authority in support of his assertion that the

presence of police officers who were “able to stare at jury members as they left to

deliberate,” was reversible error.

              It is clear that, absent a legally justifiable reason to restrict access, trials are

to be open to the public. “The requirement of a public trial is for the benefit of the accused;

that the public may see he is fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned, and that the

presence of interested spectators may keep his triers keenly alive to a sense of their

responsibility and to the importance of their functions . . . .” Gannett Co., Inc. v.

DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 380 (1979). Petitioner does not provide any citation to the

appendix record indicating that he objected to the presence of the police officers, sought to

close the trial or have the officers removed. It is not clear if Petitioner believes that all law

enforcement officers should have been removed, only a certain number should have been

              MS. CRANE: Your Honor, at this time I’d move for the
              admission of State’s 9, 10, and 11.
              THE COURT: Any objection Mr. Moorehead?
              MR. MOOREHEAD: No, Your Honor, I don’t object I guess;
              two of them are Mr. Barnhouse’s photographs, but I have no
              objection.
              THE COURT: All right.
       24
         Petitioner acknowledges that facts supporting this assertion are not contained in
the record before this Court.
                                           31
removed or if the trial should have been closed to the public. Regardless, the trial court

did not err in allowing police officers, as members of the public, to attend the trial.

              For the foregoing reasons, we find that the trial court did not favor the State

during Petitioner’s trial and as such, did not commit reversible error in this regard.

                                    IV. CONCLUSION

              Therefore, for the reasons set forth herein, the decision of the Circuit Court

of Fayette County is affirmed, in part, reversed, in part, and remanded for resentencing of

Petitioner consistent with this opinion.

                     Affirmed in part, Reversed in part, and Remanded for Resentencing.

                                              32