Court Opinion

ID: 9388209
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-20 00:00:32.574633+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:18.848715
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-30678         Document: 00516718445             Page: 1      Date Filed: 04/19/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                                        United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                         Fifth Circuit

                                      ____________                                     FILED
                                                                                   April 19, 2023
                                        No. 21-30678
                                                                                  Lyle W. Cayce
                                      ____________                                     Clerk

   Troy Autin,

                                                                       Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                             versus

   Robert Goings, Sergeant; Lance Wallace, Sergeant; Jonathan
   Stringer, Lieutenant,

                                              Defendants—Appellants.
                      ______________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Eastern District of Louisiana
                               USDC No. 2:20-CV-1214
                      ______________________________

   Before Wiener, Stewart, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
          Troy Autin, an inmate at Rayburn Correctional Center (“RCC”),
   filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit against several prison officers claiming that
   they violated his Eighth Amendment rights during two incidents that
   happened during his incarceration. The officers moved for summary
   judgment, arguing that the suit was barred by Heck v. Humphrey and that they

          _____________________
          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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                                    No. 21-30678

   were entitled to qualified immunity. 512 U.S. 477 (1994). The district court
   denied their motion. The officers appealed. For the following reasons, we
   REVERSE the district court’s order denying the officers’ motion for
   summary judgment and VACATE the district court’s amended order.
                               I.    Background
             A. Use of Force Incidents
          In his complaint, Autin alleged that two separate use of force incidents
   took place at RCC involving Sergeant Robert Goings, Lieutenant Lance
   Wallace, and Lieutenant Jonathan Stringer (collectively “the officers”). As
   to the first, he alleged that Goings escorted him into the Wind Unit
   Lieutenant’s Office which is an office, without cameras. Goings told Autin
   that he would be strip-searched unless he gave him any drugs he had. Autin
   gave Goings the pills in his sock and turned to leave the office. Goings then
   allegedly lost his temper and put Autin “in a choke hold and choked him and
   told him he was going to kill him.” Goings then “viciously beat” Autin.
   Autin alleged that Stringer entered the room and was informed by Goings
   that Autin had tried to swallow something. Stringer allegedly joined the
   attack. Goings then handcuffed Autin and escorted him from the office to
   the infirmary and back to his unit via a corridor called the Sun Unit Walk.
   Autin alleged that the second use of force incident took place at this time.
          While being escorted back to his cell through the Sun Unit Walk,
   Stringer allegedly noticed blood on his pants, became angry, threw Autin to
   the ground, and began to hit him. Wallace then entered the room and began
   kicking Autin in the ribs. Both Wallace and Stringer “viciously stomped on”
   Autin, causing injuries. Autin alleged that he sustained broken ribs, neck
   damage, loss of blood, two black eyes, facial swelling, organ failure, and he
   was unable to either walk or defecate. It was later determined that Autin had
   not swallowed anything.

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             B. Disciplinary Hearing
          With respect to the first incident involving Goings and Stringer, Autin
   received a disciplinary report which claimed that he had contraband, hit and
   struggled with corrections officers, and disobeyed their orders. Autin also
   received a disciplinary report for the second incident involving Stringer and
   Wallace which stated that Autin struggled with corrections officers and
   disobeyed orders. Autin’s position, as stated in his various complaints and
   deposition, is that he was factually innocent of the charges. The prison
   disciplinary board held separate hearings regarding the disciplinary reports
   and found Autin guilty of all charged rule violations. As a result of the first
   incident, Autin forfeited 30 days of good-time, was transferred to extended
   lockdown for 90 days, and was ordered to pay restitution. He forfeited 120
   days of good-time for the second incident.
             C. District Court Proceedings
          Autin filed a civil rights suit in Louisiana state court against RCC,
   Goings, and Wallace, claiming that the officers violated his Eighth
   Amendment rights through the use of excessive force during the two above-
   described incidents. Autin subsequently amended his complaint, adding
   claims against Stringer. The officers removed the case to the United States
   District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana and asserted qualified
   immunity as a defense.
          In November 2020, Goings and Wallace moved for summary
   judgment on the grounds that Autin’s claims were barred by Heck.           On
   March 31, 2021, the district court denied Goings and Wallace’s motion for
   summary judgment (“March order”), concluding that Autin’s claims were
   not barred by Heck. In support of its ruling, the district court reasoned that
   Autin “adequately alleged a claim for excessive force that occurred after he

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   was restrained during both incidents.”           Goings and Wallace did not
   immediately appeal that order.
          Instead, Goings, Wallace, and Stringer moved for summary judgment
   for a second time in August 2021, contending that Autin’s claims were Heck-
   barred and that they were entitled to qualified immunity. On September 30,
   2021, the district court denied the officers’ second summary judgment
   motion (“September order”). It construed their second motion for summary
   judgment as a motion for reconsideration of its March 31, 2021 order and did
   not revisit the merits of the issues related to Heck or address the issue of
   qualified immunity. The officers then appealed the Heck and qualified
   immunity rulings in the March 31 and September 30 orders. On November
   17, 2021, the district court entered an amended order specifically addressing
   the merits of the Heck-bar as to Stringer and the issue of qualified immunity
   as to all three officers (“November order”). The officers timely amended
   their notice of appeal to include the November order. Fed. R. App. P.4
   (a)(1)(A).
                         II.    Standard of Review
          We review a denial of summary judgment de novo. See Boudreaux v.
   Swift Transp. Co., Inc., 402 F.3d 536, 540 (5th Cir. 2005). We review a
   denial of a motion to reconsider for abuse of discretion. Austin v. Kroger Tex.,
   L.P., 864 F.3d 326, 329 (5th Cir. 2017). “A trial court abuses its discretion
   when its ruling is based on an erroneous view of the law or a clearly erroneous
   assessment of the evidence.” Id. (internal citation omitted).

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                                III.    Discussion
              A. Jurisdiction
          We begin with jurisdiction. There are three orders relevant to this
   appeal: the March, September, and November orders. The first is the March
   order denying Goings and Wallace’s motion for summary judgment which
   only addressed whether Autin’s claims were Heck-barred. While that order
   was immediately appealable, Goings and Wallace did not timely appeal this
   order, so we cannot review it. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A).
          After Autin amended his complaint to add Stringer, all three officers
   moved again for summary judgment on the ground that Autin’s claims were
   Heck-barred, and they raised qualified immunity as an affirmative defense.
   The district court construed this as a motion for reconsideration and, in its
   September order, held that the claims were not Heck-barred but was silent as
   to qualified immunity. The officers timely appealed the September order.
   Finally, the district court entered the November order, which was an
   amended order, where it provided more reasoning and discussed qualified
   immunity for the first time. The officers timely appealed the November order
   as well.
          The collateral order doctrine vests us with jurisdiction over the
   officers’ appeal of the September order for two reasons. First, the district
   court declined to rule on qualified immunity in its September order when it
   was so obligated. See Armstrong v. Ashley, 918 F.3d 419, 422 (5th Cir. 2019);
   see also Ramirez v. Guadarrama, 3 F.4th 129, 133 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam)
   (holding that the district court’s failure to decide qualified immunity “at the
   earliest possible stage of the litigation” is “immediately appealable”).
   Second, the September order rejected the officers’ argument that the case
   was Heck-barred. Sappington v. Bartee, 195 F.3d 234, 236 (5th Cir. 1999); see
   also Poole v. City of Shreveport, 13 F.4th 420, 426 (5th Cir. 2021) (“[A] district

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   court’s denial of summary judgment is reviewable and subject to reversal if
   the claim is barred under Heck.”) (quotation and citation omitted).
   Defendants raised qualified immunity in their second summary judgment
   motion, but the district court did not address the issue until it rendered its
   November order when it no longer had jurisdiction. See Alice L. v. Dusek, 492
   F.3d 563, 564 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that “[a] notice of appeal from an
   interlocutory order does not produce a complete divestiture of the district
   court’s jurisdiction over the case,” but it does divest it “of jurisdiction over
   those aspects of the case on appeal”).
          We now turn to the merits of the officers’ second motion for summary
   judgment.
               B. Application of Heck
          Under Heck, a plaintiff is barred from bringing a § 1983 suit for
   damages if success on the claim would necessarily “imply the invalidity of his
   conviction or sentence.” 512 U.S. at 487. A plaintiff may only bring a § 1983
   claim for damages if the prior conviction is “reversed on direct appeal,
   expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized
   to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s
   issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Id. at 486–87.
          Autin argues that the Supreme Court did not intend for Heck to apply
   to prison disciplinary hearings. He further argues that the Heck line of cases
   does not apply to a § 1983 action which does not seek a judgment at odds with
   the prisoner’s conviction or sentence to be served. See Muhammad v. Close,
   540 U.S. 749, 750–52 (2004)). “Thus, where the remedy did not set aside
   a disciplinary hearing with restoration of good-time credits, the Edwards

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   line of cases was not implicated.” 1 Autin contends that he did not allege that
   the “disciplinary charges against [him] resulted in a forfeiture of any
   good-time credits” or “otherwise affect[ed] the length of [his] prison
   sentence.” He avers that because he is not seeking to reduce his sentence,
   there is no legal or factual basis to apply Heck to this case and urges this court
   to affirm the district court’s denial of summary judgment.
          The officers argue the opposite. They contend that they are entitled
   to qualified immunity from Autin’s Eighth Amendment excessive force
   claims because those claims are Heck-barred. They aver that Autin’s Eighth
   Amendment claims have not yet accrued and, therefore, he fails to state a
   claim for the violation of a constitutional right. Citing Edwards, the officers
   argue that even though Heck arose out of a criminal prosecution, the Supreme
   Court extended the doctrine to cover prison disciplinary actions. Edwards v.
   Edwards, 520 U.S. 641, 648 (1997) (holding that a claim for damages that
   implied the invalidity of a disciplinary hearing conviction [was] not
   cognizable under § 1983). They point out that this court has routinely “held
   that the Heck doctrine applies to prison disciplinary actions where the inmate
   lost good time.” See Clark v. Stalder, 154 F.3d 186, 189 (5th Cir. 1998) (en
   banc) (holding a prisoner cannot bring a § 1983 suit that implies the invalidity
   of a “conviction,” including “the finding of guilt on the disciplinary charge”
   in a prison disciplinary proceeding).
          We are persuaded by the officers’ argument on this issue. This court
   has repeatedly held that “[f]or purposes of Heck, a conviction . . . includes a
   ruling in a prison disciplinary proceeding that results in a change to the
   prisoner’s sentence, including the loss of good-time credits.” Gray v. White,
   18 F.4th 463, 467 (5th Cir. 2021) (quotation and citation omitted).

          _____________________
          1
              Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997).

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   “Therefore, Heck precludes § 1983 litigation in the prison-disciplinary-
   proceeding context where it would ‘negate [the prisoner’s] disciplinary
   conviction’ if negating that conviction would ‘affect[] the duration of his
   sentence by restoring his good-time credits.’” Id. (quoting Bourne v. Gunnels,
   921 F.3d 484, 491 (5th Cir. 2019)). “Whether the plaintiff in fact seeks the
   restoration of good-time credits, rather than another remedy such as
   damages, is immaterial.” Id. (citing Aucoin v. Cupil, 958 F.3d 379, 383 (5th
   Cir. 2020)).
          Our decision in Santos is also instructive. See Santos v. White, 18 F.4th
   472 (5th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 213 L. Ed. 2d 1040, 142 S. Ct. 2817 (2022).
   There, we first concluded that, because the plaintiff’s disciplinary violations
   resulted in the loss of good-time credits, those findings were “convictions”
   for purposes of Heck. Id. at 475. We “considered the contradictions between
   [the plaintiff’s] allegations and the reports that had accompanied [his]
   disciplinary sanctions and concluded that a ruling in his favor ‘would directly
   challenge the validity of his convictions.’” Id. (quoting Santos v. White, No.
   16-00598, 2020 WL 86445, at *3 (M.D. La. Jan. 7, 2020)). Heck thus barred
   the consideration of some of the plaintiff’s claims in his § 1983 suit. Id. We
   also determined that there was confusion as to which facts applied to the
   convictions, and because there were different remedies sought, it was not
   sufficient to deem all of the plaintiff’s claims “‘intertwined’ with his loss of
   good-time credits.” Id. at 476. Rather, in applying Heck, we reasoned that “a
   court must bar only those claims that are ‘necessarily at odds with’ the
   disciplinary rulings, and only with those rulings that resulted in the loss of
   good-time credits.” Id. at 476–77 (citing Aucoin, 958 F.3d at 383).
   Consequently, we held that a fact-specific analysis informed by the elements
   was necessary to establish those violations. Id.
          Here, Autin’s claims are Heck-barred because any judgment in his
   favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of the deprivation of his good-

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   time credits. Id. The basis for the loss of his good-time credits are the
   disciplinary convictions being challenged. See Edwards, 520 U.S. at 646. To
   prevail in his § 1983 suit, Autin would be required to negate his conviction
   which would result in the reinstatement of good-time credits, which in turn,
   is prohibited under Heck. See Bourne, 921 F.3d at 491.
           Although Autin does not outright request the reinstatement of his
   good-time credits, by maintaining his complete innocence as to all charges,
   he directly challenges an element of each criminal offense and proof of fact.
   See Aucoin, 958 F.3d at 383 (holding that maintaining innocence was
   “necessarily inconsistent with the validity of the [administrative]
   conviction.”). Unlike in Santos, there is no confusion as to which facts apply
   to the convictions. Each of Autin’s alleged excessive force claims directly
   relate to his charges that underly his disciplinary convictions, thus
   intertwining his § 1983 claim with his loss of good-time credits. Santos, 18
   F.4th at 476. A judgment in his favor would mean that the elements of the
   charges against him were not satisfied. 2 Furthermore, all of Autin’s claims
   implicate Heck because they challenge the validity of his conviction rather
   than the circumstances or conditions of his confinement. See Id. at 476.
           In sum, the district court abused its discretion by holding that Autin’s
   claims were not Heck-barred. See Austin, 864 F.3d at 329 (citing United States
   v. Yanez Sosa, 513 F.3d 194, 200 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that “[a] trial court
   abuses its discretion when its ruling is based on an erroneous view of the

           _____________________
           2
              Neither Aucoin v. Cupil, 958 F.3d 379, 384 (5th Cir. 2020), nor Bush v. Strain, 513
   F.3d 492, 498–99 (5th Cir. 2008), call for a different result. In those cases, the plaintiffs
   “surrendered” before the officer exercised force, and the force was “discrete” from the
   plaintiffs’ conduct that resulted in the sentence. Aucoin, 958 F.3d at 383–84; see also Bush,
   513 F.3d at 497–98. Thus, we held that the basis of the plaintiffs’ convictions was
   “temporally and conceptually distinct from the excessive force claims.” Aucoin, 958 F.3d
   at 384 (quoting Bush, 513 F.3d at 498).

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   law.”). Moreover, because Heck plainly requires dismissal of Autin’s claims,
   we need not reach the question of qualified immunity.
          Finally, with respect to the November order, we note that the district
   court entered it after the officers filed their notice of appeal. But the district
   court was without jurisdiction to do so because the order purported to decide
   “aspects of the case on appeal”—i.e., the qualified immunity and Heck
   issues. Alice, 492 F.3d at 564. Consequently, we vacate the district court’s
   November order.
                               IV.     Conclusion
          For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE its September 30, 2021
   order denying the officers’ second motion for summary judgment and
   VACATE its November 17, 2021 amended order.

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