Court Opinion

ID: 9884113
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:38:51.966072+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:47.468187
License: Public Domain

Jacobs, J.
(with whom Burling, J., agrees, dissenting). The Port Authority, acting with the full approval of the Governors of New York and New Jersey, has embarked on an *581enlargement of the Lincoln Tunnel which contemplates the construction of a third tube. No one seems to deny that the enlargement has been well and carefully planned and is desperatety needed for the welfare of the people of our state. Nevertheless, the court strikes it down for lack of further legislative approval which, as we read the terms of the governing statute, is wholly unnecessary.
In section 2, chapter 4 of the Laws of 1931 the Port Authority was "authorized and empowered to construct, own, maintain and operate an interstate vehicular tunnel or tunnels,” called the Midtown Hudson (now the Lincoln) Tunnel together with such approaches and connections with highways as the Port Authority may deem necessary or desirable. The Legislature did not provide that the tunnel shall consist of one, two or three tubes; on the contrary, it deliberately used the general language which authorized the operation of an interstate vehicular tunnel or tunnels to be known as the Midtown Hudson (now the Lincoln) Tunnel and to be constructed within the geographic limits set forth in the statute. It may hardly be disputed that this language, standing alone, is ample authority for the first tube which was completed in 1937, for the second tube which was completed in 1945, and for the proposed third tube scheduled for completion in 1957. It is true that a second paragraph in section 2 provides that the Port Authority shall make studies to determine the necessity and practicability of "additional vehicular bridges and tunnels” and shall not proceed with the construction of any "additional vehicular bridges and tunnels” until expressly authorized by both States. But it seems to us that here the Legislature was referring to any new proposed crossings over or under the waters in the Port of New York district, wholly apart from the Lincoln Tunnel. The reference to additional vehicular bridges could have no relation whatever to the Lincoln Tunnel and indicates that the Legislature was then concerned with new and unrelated crossings; and the conjunctive use of the word "tunnels” at that particular point would appear to refer equally to new proposed crossings unrelated to the Lincoln Tunnel. Nosciiur a sociis— *582language may be known by “the company it keeps.” Ben Ali v. Towe, 30 N. J. Super. 19 (App. Div. 1954). Cf. Absecon v. Vettese, 13 N. J. 581, 588 (1953).
In support of its contrary construction the majority opinion goes beyond the terms of the statute and refers extensively to legislative history. Where there is no ambiguity there is ordinarily no necessity for judicial construction; however, we in no wise question the use of the history if it actually sheds light on the meaning of the statutory language. See United States v. Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp., 344 U. S. 218, 221, 73 S. Ct. 227, 97 L. Ed. 260 (1952). The report which preceded the 1931 legislation did recommend a twin-tube tunnel and it may be assumed that such construction was expected by the Legislature. But much more significant is the fact that the Legislature deliberately did not bind the Port Authority to the construction of a twin-tube tunnel but used broad, general phraseology which evidenced its intent to leave the matter to the expert discretionary judgment of the Authority. As Judge Learned Hand has so often stressed, the words actually employed bjr the Legislature are still “the most important single factor in ascertaining its intent.” See Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Ickelheimer, 132 F. 2d 660, 662, 45 A. L. R. 556 (C. C. A. 2 1943). If the Authority had built no more than a single tube upon the view that the public interest warranted no further construction, there could be no suggestion that it had improperly disregarded the legislative contemplation of twin tubes; similarly, we fail to see how the Authority’s conclusion that the public interest requires three tubes can be said to constitute an improper disregard of legislative contemplation. Many great constitutional provisions and social enactments couched in general terms were actually brought about by narrow situations confronting the deliberative bodies. Yet it is clear that to meet changing needs they are properly given life and vigor in accordance with the sweep of their terms and are not confined to their narrower antecedents. As expressed in Professor Horack’s revision of Sutherland, statutes embodying general terms are to be applied not only *583to pre-existing situations but also to conditions that later come into existence, and general legislation is to be given “elastic operation if it is to cope with changing economic and social conditions.” 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction (3d ed. 1943), § 5102.
The majority opinion suggests that since the construction of the new tube involves not only financial costs but other social matters such as the relocation of families, specific approval should be in legislative hands. This point of view may equally be expressed as to additions and improvements not involving the construction of a tube but there it is conceded by all that no such specific legislative approval is required. As we view the matter, the Legislature effectively vested the public responsibility directly in the Port Authority acting with the approval of the Governor who, as the elected representative of all of our people, was deemed to be peculiarly equipped to evaluate and protect the interests of the entire State.
If we are to discharge our function faithfully we must seek and effectuate the overriding legislative plan. When the 1931 statute was enacted a primary legislative objective was to entrust to the Port Authority comprehensive and continuing power to construct and operate the Lincoln Tunnel in such manner as to meet the vital traffic needs of future as well as present generations; that such needs might call for the enlargement of the Lincoln Tunnel by the addition of a tube within the geographic limits prescribed may readily be assumed to have been envisioned. Wholly consistent with and complementary to the foregoing objective was the legislative purpose to have the Port Authority study the needs for new and unrelated additional crossing projects, either bridges or tunnels, and submit them for approval. The statutory language was appropriately expressed to achieve both of these ends and should be given such effect. Although we are not entirely in accord with Judge Drewen’s restrictive approach to the use of extrinsic materials as interpretative aids, we adopt generally the views which are expressed fully and persuasively in his opinion below. See Port of New *584York Authority v. Weehawken, 27 N. J. Super. 328 (Ch. Div. 1953).
We would affirm the judgment for plaintiffs entered in the Chancery Division.
For reversal — Chief Justice Vanderbilt, and Justices Heher, Oliphant and Brennan — 4.
For affirmance — Justices Burling and Jacobs — 2.