Court Opinion

ID: 9914235
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-29 20:09:03.175638+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:10:46.120087
License: Public Domain

J-S40010-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  MICHAEL T. MCLOUGHLIN                        :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 217 EDA 2023

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 29, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division
                     at No(s): CP-46-CR-0003572-2020

BEFORE:      NICHOLS, J., SULLIVAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                           FILED DECEMBER 29, 2023

       Appellant Michael T. McLoughlin appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed following his convictions for involuntary deviate sexual intercourse

(IDSI) and related offenses. Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of

his sentence and the legality of the lifetime registration requirement under

Subchapter H of the Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act1

(SORNA). We affirm.

       The underlying facts of this matter are well known to the parties. See

Trial Ct. Op., 4/28/23, at 1-2.          Briefly, Appellant was convicted of IDSI,

indecent assault, and sexual assault2 after he sexually assaulted a female

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10-9799.42.

2 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3123(a)(3), 3126(a)(4), and 3124.1, respectively.
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complainant in 2019. On August 29, 2022, the trial court sentenced Appellant

to an aggregate term of five and a half to eleven years’ incarceration followed

by three years of probation.3 The Sexual Offender Assessment Board (SOAB)

concluded that Appellant was not a sexually violent predator (SVP). However,

Appellant was designated a Tier III offender and ordered to comply with

Subchapter H’s lifetime registration requirement.      Appellant filed a post-

sentence motion challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence, which

the trial court denied.

       Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b) statement.4 The trial court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion addressing

Appellant’s claims.

       On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for review:

       1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed
          an eleven year prison sentence on [] Appellant for [IDSI] where
          he had a prior record score of zero, was not found to be a risk
          to reoffend, and the trial court only considered the gravity of

____________________________________________

3 Specifically, the trial court sentenced Appellant to five and a half to eleven

years’ incarceration and three years’ probation for IDSI and a concurrent term
of five-to-ten months’ incarceration for indecent assault. Both sentences were
within the standard guideline range. The trial court concluded that Appellant’s
conviction for sexual assault merged with IDSI for sentencing purposes.

4 The record reflects that Appellant initially retained private counsel (prior
counsel) who filed a timely Rule 1925(b) statement on Appellant’s behalf.
However, while this appeal was pending, prior counsel moved to withdraw
from representation.     This Court subsequently granted new counsel’s
application to remand the matter to the trial court for a supplemental Rule
1925(b) statement.

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         the offense and neither the protection of the public nor
         Appellant’s rehabilitative needs?

      2. Whether Appellant having to register as a sex offender for the
         rest of his life constitutes an illegal sentence because Act 29
         violates Appellant’s Due Process rights and unconstitutionally
         imposes a punishment upon him?

Appellant’s Brief at 6.

      In his first claim, Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of his

sentence. Id. at 23. Specifically, Appellant argues that although his sentence

was within the sentencing guidelines, it “is more excessive than what is

necessary to achieve consistency with the gravity of the offense as it relates

to the impact on [the victim’s] life, as well as the protection of the public and

[Appellant’s] rehabilitative needs.” Id. at 25. Appellant argues that “[t]he

only mention of these factors during the sentencing proceeding in this matter

came when the trial court recited the mandates of [42 Pa.C.S. §] 9721(b)”

and that “[n]either the protection of the public nor [Appellant’s] rehabilitative

needs were discussed again.”      Id.    Therefore, Appellant requests that we

vacate his judgment of sentence and remand for resentencing. Id. at 32.

      “[C]hallenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not entitle

an appellant to review as of right.” Commonwealth v. Derry, 150 A.3d 987,

991 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted). Before reaching the merits of such

claims, we must determine:

      (1) whether the appeal is timely; (2) whether Appellant preserved
      his issues; (3) whether Appellant’s brief includes a [Pa.R.A.P.
      2119(f)] concise statement of the reasons relied upon for
      allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of
      sentence; and (4) whether the concise statement raises a

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      substantial question that the sentence is inappropriate under the
      sentencing code.

Commonwealth v. Corley, 31 A.3d 293, 296 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations

omitted).

      “To preserve an attack on the discretionary aspects of sentence, an

appellant must raise his issues at sentencing or in a post-sentence motion.

Issues not presented to the sentencing court are waived and cannot be raised

for the first time on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Malovich, 903 A.2d 1247,

1251 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citations omitted); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a)

(stating that “[i]ssues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be

raised for the first time on appeal”).

      “The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be

evaluated on a case-by-case basis.” Commonwealth v. Battles, 169 A.3d

1086, 1090 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).      “A substantial question

exists only when the appellant advances a colorable argument that the

sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific

provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms

which underlie the sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. Grays, 167 A.3d

793, 816 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).

      Here, the record reflects that Appellant preserved this issue by raising

it in his post-sentence motion, filing a timely notice of appeal and a court-

ordered Rule 1925(b) statement, and including a Rule 2119(f) statement in

his brief. See Corley, 31 A.3d at 296. Further, Appellant’s claim raises a

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substantial question for our review. See Commonwealth v. Derry, 150 A.3d

987, 992 (Pa. Super. 2016) (reiterating that a claim that a sentencing court

failed to consider the Section 9721(b) factors presents a substantial question

for our review); see also Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1253

(Pa. Super. 2014) (stating “an excessive sentence claim-in conjunction with

an assertion that the court failed to consider mitigating factors raises a

substantial question” (citation omitted)). Therefore, we will review the merits

of Appellant’s claims.

      Our well-settled standard of review is as follows:

      Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
      sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal
      absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse
      of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather,
      the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the
      sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its
      judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or
      arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

      Additionally, our review of the discretionary aspects of a sentence
      is confined by the statutory mandates of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c) and
      (d). Subsection 9781(c) provides:

         The appellate court shall vacate the sentence and remand
         the case to the sentencing court with instructions if it finds:

            (1) the sentencing court purported to sentence within
            the sentencing guidelines but applied the guidelines
            erroneously;

            (2) the sentencing court sentenced within the
            sentencing guidelines but the case involves
            circumstances where the application of the guidelines
            would be clearly unreasonable; or

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            (3) the sentencing court sentenced outside the
            sentencing   guidelines and  the  sentence   is
            unreasonable.

         In all other cases the appellate court shall affirm the
         sentence imposed by the sentencing court.

      42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c).

      In reviewing the record, we consider:

         (1) The nature and circumstances of the offense and the
         history and characteristics of the defendant.

         (2) The opportunity of the sentencing court to observe the
         defendant, including any presentence investigation [(PSI)].

         (3) The findings upon which the sentence was based.

         (4) The guidelines promulgated by the commission.

      42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(d).

Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1253 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation

omitted).

      “When imposing a sentence, the sentencing court must consider the

factors set out in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b), [including] the protection of the public,

[the] gravity of offense in relation to impact on [the] victim and community,

and [the] rehabilitative needs of the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Fullin,

892 A.2d 843, 848 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted and formatting

altered). “A sentencing court need not undertake a lengthy discourse for its

reasons for imposing a sentence or specifically reference the statute in

question, but the record as a whole must reflect the sentencing court’s

consideration of the facts of the crime and character of the offender.”

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Commonwealth v. Schutzues, 54 A.3d 86, 99 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations

omitted).

      Additionally, the trial court “must consider the sentencing guidelines.”

Id. (citation omitted). However, “where the trial court is informed by a PSI

[report], it is presumed that the court is aware of all appropriate sentencing

factors and considerations, and that where the court has been so informed,

its discretion should not be disturbed.” Commonwealth v. Edwards, 194

A.3d 625, 637-38 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citations omitted and formatting

altered).

      The balancing of the sentencing factors is the sole province of the

sentencing court, which has the opportunity to observe the defendant and all

witnesses firsthand. See Commonwealth v. Kurtz, 294 A.3d 509, 536 (Pa.

Super. 2023), appeal granted on other grounds, --- A.3d ---, 289 MAL 2023,

2023 WL 7123941 (Pa. filed Oct. 30, 2023). In conducting appellate review,

this Court “cannot reweigh sentencing factors and impose judgment in place

of [the] sentencing court where [the] lower court was fully aware of all

mitigating factors[.]” Id. (citation omitted).

      Here, in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court explained:

      Instantly, [Appellant’s] aggregate sentence of five and one-half (5
      1/2) to eleven (11) years of imprisonment consists of a standard
      range sentence with respect to the [IDSI] - person unconscious
      charge. Thus, to the extent [Appellant] contends his aggregate
      sentence is excessive and unreasonable, this claim has no merit.

      The court also had the benefit of a PSI report and considered all
      of the mitigating factors related to [Appellant]. N.T. Sentencing
      Hr’g, 8/29/22, at 6. Additionally, the court considered all other

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     factors required under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b), such as the
     sentencing guidelines. Id. The court also had the benefit of
     memorand[a] prepared by the Commonwealth and defense
     counsel and letters written in support of [Appellant] by his friends
     and family members. Id. [Appellant’s] sister-in law also offered
     testimony at the sentencing hearing referencing [Appellant’s]
     alcoholism and his efforts to treat this disorder by participating in
     Alcoholics Anonymous and “take his own inventory daily and work
     on his shortcomings.” Id. at 23. Therefore, the record indicates
     the court was aware of relevant information regarding
     [Appellant’s] character, including rehabilitative needs and
     mitigating factors, and weighed this information when it imposed
     sentence.    The combination of [Appellant’s] standard range
     sentence and the court’s analysis of the PSI [report], therefore,
     resulted in a sentence which cannot be considered excessive or
     unreasonable.

     [Appellant] committed a sexual assault on an individual while she
     was asleep in her own bed. In her victim impact statement, [the
     victim] indicated that she has had trouble sleeping since the
     incident due to the “fear that every little movement or noise is
     someone in my apartment coming to attack me.” N.T. Sentencing
     Hr’g, 8/29/22, at 8-9. [The victim] further testified that she has
     “constant nightmares of assault and rape” and has developed a
     fear of strangers which causes her to feel unsafe in public places.
     Id. at 9.     During his allocution at the sentencing hearing,
     [Appellant] demonstrated a lack of remorse for his conduct by
     challenging the evidence which was presented at trial and stating
     that “I take ownership in my part in this case. I recklessly
     consumed alcohol and wandered into the wrong room mistakenly.
     This caused enough fright where someone was able to accuse me
     of a crime.” Id. at 36. (emphasis added). [Appellant] further
     demonstrated a lack of remorse by submitting a character letter
     to the court which challenged [the victim’s] integrity: “[W]hat kind
     of person is the victim? Like [Appellant], I would wager a fair sum
     that she has problems with alcohol just like [Appellant]. One
     wonders if this was simply a case of consensual relations with next
     morning remorse coupled with some existing difficulty the two
     were having as recent roommates.”

                                *     *      *

     The record demonstrates the court considered the magnitude of
     [Appellant’s] actions and determined that a high-end standard

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      range sentence was appropriate. In reaching this decision, the
      court took mitigating factors and [Appellant’s] rehabilitative needs
      into account and determined that these factors did not justify a
      decreased sentence in light of [Appellant’s] assault on [the victim]
      and his failure to acknowledge any responsibility or demonstrate
      any remorse.

Trial Ct. Op. at 6-9.

      Based on our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion by

the trial court. See Raven, 97 A.3d at 1253. As noted previously, the trial

court ordered a PSI report, which it reviewed prior to sentencing. See N.T.

Sentencing Hr’g, 8/29/22, at 6; see also Trial Ct. Op. at 6. Therefore, we

presume that the trial court was fully aware of the mitigating factors and

considered them when imposing Appellant’s sentence. See Edwards, 194

A.3d at 637; see also Kurtz, 294 A.3d at 536. Further, we will not re-weigh

those factors on appeal. See Commonwealth v. Macias, 968 A.2d 773, 778

(Pa. Super. 2009) (explaining that the appellate court cannot reweigh

sentencing factors and impose judgment in place of sentencing court where

lower court was fully aware of all mitigating factors).           Under these

circumstances, we have no basis to conclude that the trial court abused its

discretion in imposing Appellant’s sentence. See Edwards, 194 A.3d at 637.

Therefore, Appellant is not entitled to relief.

                    SORNA Registration Requirements

      In his remaining claim, Appellant argues that Subchapter H’s lifetime

registration requirement is an illegal sentence. Appellant’s Brief at 33. In

support, Appellant argues that his claims “directly mirror those” set forth in

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Torsilieri, and asserts that SORNA’s lifetime registration requirement

“deprives him of his right to reputation and it creates an irrebuttable

presumption that he poses a high risk to reoffend. . . . is unconstitutional

because it is punitive” and “violates the separation of powers doctrine, is cruel

and unusual, and violates his right to a jury trial.”     Id. at 18.    Therefore,

Appellant requests that we vacate his judgment of sentence and remand for

resentencing.

      Appellant’s claims “raise questions of law for which our standard of

review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” Torsilieri, 232 A.3d

at 575 (citation omitted). In resolving such claims, our Supreme Court has

explained that

      [i]n   addressing      constitutional    challenges    to   legislative
      enactments, we are ever cognizant that “the General Assembly
      may enact laws which impinge on constitutional rights to protect
      the health, safety, and welfare of society,” but also that “any
      restriction is subject to judicial review to protect the constitutional
      rights of all citizens.” In re J.B., 107 A.3d 1, 14 (Pa. 2014). We
      emphasize that “a party challenging a statute must meet the high
      burden of demonstrating that the statute clearly, palpably, and
      plainly violates the Constitution.”

Id. (some citations omitted).

      Initially, we note that Appellant’s instant claims are identical to those

raised by the defendant in Torsilieri. In Torsilieri, the defendant claimed

that the registration and notification provisions in Subchapter H were

unconstitutional and violated his right to due process, as they utilized an

irrebuttable presumption of future dangerousness and recidivism.                See

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Torsilieri, 232 A.3d at 574-75. The defendant also argued that Subchapter

H was punitive and “violated Alleyne and Apprendi[5] by allowing the

imposition of enhanced punishment based on an irrebuttable presumption of

future dangerousness that is neither determined by the finder of fact nor

premised upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 575 (citation and

quotation marks omitted).

       In Torsilieri, the trial court conducted a hearing at which the defendant

introduced three expert affidavits to establish his claim.       However, the

Commonwealth did not offer any evidence to the contrary.           Id. at 574.

Ultimately, after the trial court issued an order declaring Subchapter H

unconstitutional, the Commonwealth appealed directly to our Supreme Court,

which has exclusive jurisdiction over matters in which courts of common pleas

declare statutes unconstitutional. Id. at 572; see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 722(7).

       On appeal before our Supreme Court, the Commonwealth introduced

evidence to dispute the defendant’s irrebuttable presumption claim.          In

reviewing the trial court’s order, the Torsilieri Court separated the

defendant’s claims into two categories: (1) the irrebuttable presumption

challenge; and (2) whether Subchapter H’s lifetime registration provisions

violated the requirements of Apprendi and Alleyne, imposed sentences in

excess of the statutory maximum sentence, constituted cruel and unusual

punishment, and violated the separation of powers doctrine by preventing trial
____________________________________________

5 See Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013), and Apprendi v. New

Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).

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courts from imposing individualized sentences. Torsilieri, 232 A.3d at 581-

82.

      With respect to the irrebuttable presumption claim, the Torsilieri Court

concluded that the defendant raised “colorable constitutional challenges” to

Subchapter H based on the evidence presented to and relied on by the trial

court. Id. at 584. However, the Torsilieri Court explained:

      Nevertheless, we are unable to conclude based upon the record
      currently before this Court whether [the defendant] has
      sufficiently undermined the validity of the legislative findings
      supporting . . . Subchapter H’s registration and notification
      provisions, especially in light of the contradictory scientific
      evidence cited by the Commonwealth during this appeal which
      may refute the [the defendant’s] experts. It is not the role of an
      appellate court to determine the validity of the referenced studies
      based on mere citations rather than allowing the opportunity for
      the truths to develop through a hearing on the merits of the
      evidence. Accordingly, a remand is appropriate to allow the
      parties to address whether a consensus has developed to call into
      question the relevant legislative policy decisions impacting
      offenders’ constitutional rights.

Id. at 585 (footnote omitted).

      After Torsilieri was decided, this Court has remanded cases for further

proceedings   in   matters    where   the    defendant     raised   an   irrebuttable

presumption claim, but did not have an opportunity to develop those claims

at a hearing before the trial court. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Asher 244

A.3d 27, 33 (Pa. Super. 2020); Commonwealth v. Mickley, 240 A.3d 957,

961-62 (Pa. Super. 2020).

      More    recently,   a   panel   of    this   Court   issued   a    decision   in

Commonwealth v. Wolf, 276 A.3d 805 (Pa. Super. 2022). In Wolf, the

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appellant claimed that Subchapter H “violate[d] his due process rights, and

constitute[d] an illegal sentence, because it [was] ‘impermissibly punitive,

based on an irrebuttable false presumption, and [did] not require a finding of

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. at 808 (citation omitted). Although

the appellant’s substantive claims were identical to the issues raised in

Torsilieri, the Wolf Court noted that, unlike the defendant in Torsilieri, the

appellant sought relief “as a matter of law without further evidentiary

development.” Id. (citations omitted).

      In rejecting the appellant’s claim, the Wolf Court explained:

      We will not venture beyond our Supreme Court’s holding in
      Torsilieri. In Torsilieri, the Supreme Court concluded that the
      defendant’s scientific evidence “presented a colorable argument
      that the General Assembly’s factual presumptions have been
      undermined by recent scientific studies” – and, even though the
      Commonwealth did not present any contrary evidence during the
      post-sentence motion hearing – the Supreme Court still concluded
      that “the evidence of record does not demonstrate a consensus of
      scientific evidence as was present to find a presumption not
      universally true in J.B., nor the ‘clearest proof’ needed to overturn
      the General Assembly’s statements that the provisions are not
      punitive, which we have noted ‘requires more than merely
      showing disagreement among relevant authorities.’” Torsilieri,
      232 A.3d at 594 (citations omitted). In the case at bar, [the
      a]ppellant simply asks that we hold Revised Subchapter H’s
      registration provisions unconstitutional as a matter of law. Given
      that our Supreme Court, in Torsilieri, refused to hold Revised
      Subchapter H unconstitutional despite uncontradicted evidence
      presented by the defendant, we too refuse to hold the statutes
      unconstitutional where [the a]ppellant has presented no evidence,
      whatsoever, to “demonstrate a consensus of scientific evidence as
      was present to find a presumption not universally true in J.B., nor
      the ‘clearest proof’ needed to overturn the General Assembly’s
      statements that the provisions are not punitive.” See id. at 594
      (citations omitted).

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Id. at 812-13 (some citations omitted).

       Here, as in Wolf, Appellant does not request that we remand the matter

for the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing, nor does he present any

evidence of a scientific consensus in support of his claims. Instead, Appellant

asks this Court to conclude that SORNA is unconstitutional and vacate his

“illegal” lifetime registration requirement.       See Appellant’s Brief at 43.

However, without any evidence of scientific studies, Appellant cannot make “a

colorable argument that the General Assembly’s factual presumptions have

been undermined by recent scientific studies[.]” See Torsilieri, 232 A.3d at

594. Therefore, Appellant has failed to satisfy his burden to prove that the

Revised Subchapter H provisions applicable to him “clearly, palpably, and

plainly” violate the constitution. See id. at 575; see also Wolf, 276 A.3d at

813. Therefore, Appellant is not entitled to relief.6
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6 We note that although Appellant did not raise his SORNA claims before the

trial court, our Supreme Court has held that our “legality of sentencing
jurisprudence—i.e., that challenges implicating the legality of a sentence
cannot be waived—applies equally to constitutional challenges to Revised
Subchapter H of SORNA” and cannot be waived. Commonwealth v. Thorne,
276 A.3d 1192, 1194 (Pa. 2022). The Thorne Court also explained that its
holding “would have no meaning if individuals seeking to challenge Revised
Subchapter H on constitutional grounds were required to present evidence in
support thereof during his/her underlying criminal proceedings in order to
preserve the issue.” Id. at *10 n.3 (emphasis added).

Here, we do not find that Appellant waived his Subchapter H claims, nor do
we conclude that he failed to adequately preserve his issues because he did
not raise his claims before the trial court. Instead, we conclude that because
Appellant did not present any evidence to establish his claims, either before
the trial court or on appeal, he has failed to meet his burden to prove that
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       For these reasons, we affirm.

       Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Date: 12/29/2023

____________________________________________

Subchapter H is unconstitutional. Therefore, we conclude that Thorne is
distinguishable. Compare Thorne, 20 WAP 2021 at *1, with Torsilieri, 232
A.3d at 594, and Wolf, 2022 WL 1698704 at *6.

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