Court Opinion

ID: 9915865
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-08 21:00:51.556493+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:21:15.556762
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 21-14454      Document: 35-1        Date Filed: 01/08/2024   Page: 1 of 21

                                                                  [PUBLISH]
                                        In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                           For the Eleventh Circuit

                             ____________________

                                      No. 21-14454
                             ____________________

        KENNETH BAILEY,
                                                           Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        SHAWN T. SWINDELL,
        In his individual capacity,

                                                         Defendant-Appellee,

        MICHAEL RAMIREZ, et al.,

                                                                 Defendants.

                             ____________________
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        2                         Opinion of the Court                       21-14454

                    Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Northern District of Florida
                     D.C. Docket No. 3:15-cv-00390-MCR-HTC
                             ____________________

        Before LAGOA and BRASHER, Circuit Judges, and BOULEE,* District
        Judge.
        LAGOA, Circuit Judge:
               This Section 1983 case is before us for a second time. See
        Bailey v. Swindell, 940 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2019) (“Bailey I”). After
        being arrested at his parents’ home, Kenneth Bailey filed suit
        against the arresting officer, alleging that Deputy Shawn Swindell
        violated his civil rights when Swindell tackled him through the
        door of the house and then arrested him. In Bailey I, the district
        court granted summary judgment in favor of Swindell on qualified
        immunity grounds. We reversed the district court and held that
        when the evidence was viewed in the light most favorable to Bai-
        ley, the non-moving party, Swindell violated clearly established
        law when he entered Bailey’s parents’ home to arrest him without
        a warrant or exigent circumstances. See id. at 1298. And we con-
        cluded that Swindell was not entitled to qualified immunity for his
        violation of Bailey’s Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at 1303–04.

        * Honorable J. P. Boulee, United States District Judge for the Northern District

        of Georgia, sitting by designation.
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        21-14454                    Opinion of the Court                                  3

                Following remand, the case went to trial. 1 The jury re-
        turned a verdict for Bailey and awarded Bailey $625,000 for his in-
        juries. In a post-trial motion, Swindell moved for judgment as a
        matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b). The
        district court granted Swindell’s motion for judgment as a matter
        of law and set aside the jury’s verdict.
               Bailey appeals the district court’s order granting judgment
        as a matter of law for Swindell on his false arrest claim under 42
        U.S.C. § 1983. On appeal, Bailey argues that: (1) the district court
        erred by granting Swindell qualified immunity after the jury found
        that the hot pursuit exigency did not apply to his warrantless arrest,
        and (2) the district court erred in considering exigent circumstances
        when it was not one of the grounds for Swindell’s earlier motion
        for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
        dure 50(a).
              After careful review, and with the benefit of oral argument,
        we reverse the district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law

        1 To be clear, this was the second trial in this case. Before Bailey I, the district

        court granted summary judgment in favor of Swindell as to Bailey’s false arrest
        claim. The case then went to trial only on the issue of excessive force, which
        had not been resolved on summary judgment. Following trial, Bailey ap-
        pealed the earlier grant of summary judgment on the false arrest claim but not
        the verdict on the excessive force claim. After we issued Bailey I and re-
        manded the case to the district court, the parties proceeded to a second trial
        on questions of probable cause and exigent circumstances to justify warrant-
        less entry into Bailey’s home.
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        4                          Opinion of the Court                       21-14454

        for Swindell on Bailey’s unlawful arrest claim and reinstate the
        jury’s verdict in favor of Bailey.
            I.     FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
               In September 2014, Bailey and his wife, Sherri Rolinger,
        were going through a divorce. On the night of September 11, 2014,
        Deputy Shawn Swindell received a call from Deputy Andrew Mag-
        dalany, who had responded to a call at Bailey’s former marital
        home following a verbal altercation between Rolinger and Bailey.
        Magdalany relayed Rolinger’s complaints that Bailey was harassing
        her, including coming to the home unannounced, turning photo-
        graphs face down, leaving cigarette butts, and even installing cam-
        eras in the home without Rolinger’s knowledge. Magdalany also
        explained that Rolinger stated that Bailey was not “acting right”
        and “had snapped.” At the time of the call, Magdalany had not yet
        determined whether Bailey had committed any crime. Swindell
        headed to Bailey’s parents’ residence, where he was living at the
        time, to investigate.
               Bailey voluntarily came out of his parents’ home onto the
        front porch to talk with Swindell. Although Bailey repeatedly
        asked Swindell why he was there, Swindell never explained what
        he was investigating, but rather insisted that they go to his patrol
        car to talk. At some point, Bailey said “Okay, if you’re not going

        2 Because this case arises on the appeal of the district court’s judgment as a

        matter of law for Swindell, we take and construe the facts in the light most
        favorable to Bailey. See Bishop v. City of Birmingham Police Dep’t, 361 F.3d 607,
        609 (11th Cir. 2004).
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        21-14454               Opinion of the Court                          5

        to tell me why you’re here, I’m going to turn around and go in-
        side.” Bailey crossed the threshold of the door and went inside the
        house. At trial, Bailey and his family testified that Swindell then
        ran toward Bailey and tackled him through the doorway of the
        house while exclaiming, “I am going to tase you.” At trial, Swindell
        testified to a different version of events, stating that he put his arm
        on Bailey’s shoulder and told him he was not free to leave because
        he could be arrested on charges of domestic violence, all before
        Bailey entered the house. Swindell also testified that Bailey struck
        Swindell with his arm while they were still on the front porch.
               Once inside the house, Swindell and Bailey ended up on the
        floor. After a physical conflict, more deputies arrived on scene, ar-
        rested Bailey, and took him to the Santa Rosa County jail. As a
        result of the arrest, Bailey suffered injuries, including herniated
        disks in his neck.
               The second trial focused on the moments before Bailey’s ar-
        rest. On the third day of trial, the jury was instructed on the law of
        exigent circumstances. The district court explained that “[e]xigent
        circumstances justify a law enforcement officer’s warrantless entry
        into a home without an occupant’s consent where either the arrest
        was set in motion in an area that is open to public view, which in-
        cludes a front porch, and the person flees into a home, and the of-
        ficer immediately follows the fleeing suspect into the home from
        the scene of the crime.” At the conclusion of the trial, the jury was
        given a verdict form that combined general questions and special
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        6                       Opinion of the Court                  21-14454

        interrogatories. 3 Because the verdict form included a question on
        where the arrest was “initiated,” Swindell’s counsel requested a
        definition for “initiate” from the district court. The district court
        denied the request, reasoning that there is no legal definition of the
        word and that the word “initiate” is a “commonly understood
        term.”
               Before deliberations, the district court instructed the jury
        that they “are the judges of the facts in this case.” The first question
        on the verdict form asked, “Did Deputy Shawn T. Swindell have
        reasonable suspicion to detain Mr. Kenneth Bailey for a law en-
        forcement investigation?” The jury answered yes. The verdict
        form next asked, “Did Deputy Swindell have probable cause to ar-
        rest Mr. Bailey?” The jury answered yes, which prompted them to
        indicate which of the following supported their finding of probable
        cause: (1) “Willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly following, harass-
        ing, or cyberstalking another person;” (2) “Knowingly resisting, ob-
        structing, or opposing a law enforcement officer who was engaged
        in the lawful execution of a legal duty;” (3) “Knowingly and will-
        fully resisting, obstructing, or opposing a law enforcement officer
        who was engaged in the lawful execution of a legal duty by offering
        to violence or doing violence to the officer;” and/or (4) “Battery on
        a law enforcement officer.” Given the choice to select multiple op-
        tions, the jury checked only the second: “Knowingly resisting,

        3 See Appendix.
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        21-14454               Opinion of the Court                         7

        obstructing, or opposing a law enforcement officer who was en-
        gaged in the lawful execution of a legal duty.”
                The next question asked, “Where was the arrest initiated?”
        with choices: (1) “Outside the home” or (2) “Inside the home.” The
        jury chose “Outside the home.” The verdict form next asked, “If
        you determined that the arrest was initiated outside the home, did
        exigent circumstances justify Deputy Swindell’s warrantless entry
        into the home?” The jury answered no. Because the jury found
        that exigent circumstances did not justify the warrantless entry into
        the home, they were prompted to skip the next question identify-
        ing which of the following exigent circumstances justified the en-
        try: (1) “Hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect into the home;” (2) “Urgent
        need to enter the home to prevent the imminent destruction of ev-
        idence;” (3) “Specific and articulable facts supported a belief that
        the suspect was armed and immediate entry into the home was
        necessary for safety.”
               Because the jury found that no exigent circumstances justi-
        fied Swindell’s warrantless entry into the home, they proceeded to
        answer the next question: “Did Deputy Shawn T. Swindell’s con-
        duct cause Kenneth Bailey’s injuries?” and “Do you find that Ken-
        neth Bailey should be awarded compensatory damages?” The jury
        answered that Swindell did cause the injuries and that Bailey
        should be awarded damages in the form of $625,000.00. There
        were no objections to the jury’s verdict.
               After the clerk read the verdict, Swindell asked for a ruling
        on a previously raised motion for judgment as a matter of law. The
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                  21-14454

        district court denied it as moot but advised that the parties could
        file post-trial motions. A judgment in accordance with the jury’s
        verdict was entered on June 7, 2021.
                Swindell filed a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of
        law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b), arguing that the
        jury’s finding that Swindell initiated the arrest of Bailey outside the
        home compelled entry of judgment in Swindell’s favor on qualified
        immunity grounds. Because the jury found that the arrest was ini-
        tiated outside the house, Swindell argued it was “inexplicabl[e]” for
        the jury to also conclude that there were not exigent circum-
        stances. Bailey opposed the motion, arguing that the jury had ex-
        pressly rejected exigency. Given the jury’s finding that Swindell’s
        actions violated a constitutional right, Bailey contended that the
        only question remaining was whether that right was clearly estab-
        lished.
                On this question, the district court reasoned that it must de-
        cide whether the law on the date of the incident gave Swindell clear
        notice that his conduct was unconstitutional for purposes of quali-
        fied immunity. And because “[t]he contours of the hot pursuit doc-
        trine in the context of fleeing misdemeanants was an open legal
        question at that time,” the district court determined that the law
        was not clearly established and granted Swindell’s motion. The
        district court vacated the jury’s judgment in favor of Bailey and en-
        tered judgment as a matter of law in favor of Swindell. This appeal
        followed.
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        21-14454                  Opinion of the Court                          9

                         II.      STANDARD OF REVIEW
               We review a district court’s granting of a motion for judg-
        ment as a matter of law de novo, considering only the evidence that
        may properly be considered and the reasonable inferences drawn
        from it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
        Rossbach v. City of Miami, 371 F.3d 1354, 1356 (11th Cir. 2004). Judg-
        ment as a matter of law is appropriate when a court ﬁnds that “a
        reasonable jury would not have a legally suﬃcient evidentiary basis
        to ﬁnd for [a] party on [an] issue.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1). “We will
        not second-guess the jury or substitute our judgment for its judg-
        ment if its verdict is supported by suﬃcient evidence.” EEOC v.
        Exel, Inc., 884 F.3d 1326, 1329 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Lambert v.
        Fulton Cnty., 253 F.3d 588 594 (11th Cir. 2001)). “In determining
        whether a government oﬃcial is entitled to qualiﬁed immunity fol-
        lowing a jury verdict, we view the evidence in the light most favor-
        able to the party that prevailed at trial.” Oladeinde v. City of Birming-
        ham, 230 F.3d 1275, 1290 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing Priester v. City of
        Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d 919, 925 n.3 (11th Cir. 2000)). “In so doing,
        we give deference to the jury’s ‘discernible resolution of disputed
        factual issues.’” Id. (quoting Iacobucci v. Boulter, 193 F.3d 14, 23 (1st.
        Cir. 1999)).
                                    III.   ANALYSIS
               Although qualiﬁed immunity presents a question of law,
        “resolution of this question can sometimes turn on issues of fact.”
        Simmons v. Bradshaw, 879 F.3d 1157, 1163 (11th Cir. 2018). When it
        is not evident from the allegations of the complaint alone that the
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                  21-14454

        defendants are entitled to qualiﬁed immunity, the case will proceed
        to the summary judgment stage. Johnson v. Breeden, 280 F.3d 1308,
        1317 (11th Cir. 2002). “Even at the summary judgment stage, not
        all defendants entitled to the protection of the qualiﬁed immunity
        defense will get it.” Id. As relevant here, “if the evidence at the
        summary judgment stage, viewed in the light most favorable to the
        plaintiﬀ, shows there are facts that are inconsistent with qualiﬁed
        immunity being granted, the case and the qualiﬁed immunity issue
        along with it will proceed to trial.” Id. A defendant in those cir-
        cumstances is, however, “not foreclosed from asserting a qualiﬁed
        immunity defense at trial.” Vaughan v. Cox, 343 F.3d 1323, 1333
        (11th Cir. 2003). At trial, the jury itself decides issues of fact that
        are determinative of the qualiﬁed immunity defense but does not
        apply the law of qualiﬁed immunity to those facts. Breeden, 280
        F.3d at 1318.
               In Bailey I, this Court, accepting Bailey’s version of events as
        true, reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Swindell
        because Swindell arrested Bailey without a warrant, consent, or ex-
        igent circumstances. 940 F.3d at 1300. The case went to trial, where
        the jury resolved the factual disputes surrounding Bailey’s arrest
        and determined that the arrest was initiated outside the home but
        that no exigent circumstances existed allowing for a warrantless en-
        try into the home. It is these factual ﬁndings made expressly by the
        jury that the district court should have used in reaching its conclu-
        sions of law about qualiﬁed immunity. See Simmons, 879 F.3d at
        1164 (“[T]he question of what circumstances existed at the time of
        the encounter is a question of fact for the jury––but the question
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        21-14454               Opinion of the Court                        11

        of whether the oﬃcer’s perceptions and attendant actions were ob-
        jectively reasonable under those circumstances is a question of law
        for the court.”).
               When reviewing a district court’s decision on qualiﬁed im-
        munity following a jury verdict, we give deference to the jury’s dis-
        cernable resolution of disputed factual issues. Oladeinde, 230 F.3d
        at 1290. Here, the jury was asked to determine whether exigent
        circumstances existed to allow Swindell to enter the home without
        violating Bailey’s constitutional rights. Particularly, the jury was
        instructed that exigent circumstances exist where “the arrest was
        set in motion in an area that is open to public view, which includes
        a front porch, and the person ﬂees into a home, and the oﬃcer im-
        mediately follows the ﬂeeing suspect into the home from the scene
        of the crime.” The jury expressly found that exigent circumstances
        did not justify Swindell’s warrantless entry into the home. Despite
        the jury’s clear rejection of exigent circumstances, Swindell insists
        such a conclusion is impossible because the arrest began outside
        and ended inside--facts which, Swindell seems to believe, compel a
        ﬁnding of “hot pursuit.” But the jury, as the trier of fact, expressly
        found the opposite: that no exigent circumstances (hot pursuit or
        otherwise) justiﬁed Swindell's warrantless entry into the home,
        even though the arrest was initiated from outside.
               The jury, which was not instructed on the meaning of “ini-
        tiated,” simply believed the testimony from the Bailey family that
        Swindell was outside the house, while Bailey was already inside,
        when Swindell formed the intention to arrest Bailey and set it in
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        12                          Opinion of the Court                          21-14454

        motion. As commonly understood, the word initiate applies logi-
        cally to this version of events. 4 Although Bailey was inside the
        house, Swindell was outside when he started or initiated his charge
        toward Bailey. Far from inexplicable, the jury’s factual ﬁnding that
        the arrest was initiated outside the home and that no exigent cir-
        cumstances applied is consistent with the testimonies given at trial.
               And as evidenced by the jury’s verdict form, the jury found
        Bailey’s version of events more credible than Swindell’s testimony.
        Despite Swindell’s testimony that Bailey struck Swindell outside
        the house prior to his arrest, the jury explicitly rejected such a ﬁnd-
        ing when it concluded on the verdict form that neither “Battery on
        a law enforcement oﬃcer” nor “Knowingly and willfully resisting
        [a law enforcement oﬃcer]. . . by oﬀering to violence or doing vio-
        lence to the oﬃcer” supported probable cause. The jury chose to
        believe Bailey’s testimony. We are not at liberty to second guess
        their decision.
               Swindell argues that the jury’s ﬁnding was legal, not factual,
        because the jury did not answer whether hot pursuit existed, but
        rather that exigency did not justify entry into the home. Swindell’s
        argument is without merit. The district court instructed the jury
        that exigent circumstances would apply and “justify a law enforce-
        ment oﬃcer’s warrantless entry into a home without an occupant’s
        consent” if the person “ﬂees [from arrest] into a home, and the

        4 “To begin, commence, enter upon; to introduce, set going, give rise to, orig-

        inate, ‘start’ (a course of action, practice, etc.)” Initiate, Oxford English Diction-
        ary (2d ed. 1989).
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        21-14454               Opinion of the Court                         13

        oﬃcer immediately follows the ﬂeeing suspect into the home.” At
        trial, Bailey testiﬁed that he was not running away from the scene
        and that Swindell had given no indication that he was under arrest
        until Bailey was inside the home. By answering “no” to the exigent
        circumstances question in the special interrogatories and by not
        checking the box for “[h]ot pursuit of a ﬂeeing suspect into the
        home,” the jury found that this circumstance did not exist. Simply
        put, the jury found that the arrest was initiated outside the house,
        but that there was no hot pursuit. There is no confusion that the
        jury answered a question of fact. Indeed, after the verdict, neither
        side claimed that the jury’s ﬁndings were inconsistent, nor did they
        seek to return the matter to the jury before it was discharged.
               Given the jury’s binding factual ﬁndings, the correct ques-
        tion for the district court to ask in deciding whether qualiﬁed im-
        munity applied was whether it was clearly established that an of-
        ﬁcer violates the Constitution when he “initiates” an arrest outside
        of a home and then enters the home without a warrant to com-
        plete the arrest in the absence of exigent circumstances. And the
        answer is yes.
                “A right is clearly established when the state of the law gives
        the defendants fair warning that their alleged conduct is unconsti-
        tutional.” Patel v. Lanier Cnty., 969 F.3d 1173, 1186 (11th Cir. 2020)
        (cleaned up). The Supreme Court has “repeatedly told courts not
        to deﬁne clearly established law at too high a level of generality.”
        City of Tahlequah v. Bond, 595 U.S. 9, 11 (2021). The contours of the
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        14                     Opinion of the Court                 21-14454

        rule must be so well-deﬁned that it is obvious to a reasonable oﬃcer
        that his conduct was unconstitutional under the circumstances. Id.
               Bailey’s right to be free from a warrantless arrest in his par-
        ents’ home absent exigent circumstances was clearly established.
        The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to
        be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and eﬀects, against un-
        reasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” As the text
        suggests, “the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is
        ‘reasonableness.’” Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006).
        And the Constitution generally requires that oﬃcers obtain judicial
        warrants before entering a home without permission. Groh v.
        Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559 (2004). There are, however, exceptions
        to that warrant requirement. Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403.
               The relevant exception is for exigent circumstances. This ex-
        ception applies when “‘the exigencies of the situation’ make the
        needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless
        search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”
        Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978) (quoting McDonald v.
        United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948)); see also Payton v. New York,
        445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment has drawn a
        ﬁrm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circum-
        stances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a
        warrant.”).
               The Supreme Court has identiﬁed several exigencies that
        may justify a warrantless search of a home. See Brigham City, 547
        U.S. at 403. For example, an oﬃcer “may ‘enter a home without a
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        21-14454                Opinion of the Court                           15

        warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant[,]
        to protect an occupant from imminent injury,’ or to ensure his own
        safety.” Lange v. California, 141 S.Ct. 2011, 2017 (2021) (alteration
        in original) (quoting Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403). An oﬃcer may
        also make a warrantless entry to “prevent the imminent destruc-
        tion of evidence.” Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403; see also United States
        v. Holloway, 290 F.3d 1331, 1334 (11th Cir. 2002) (noting that the ex-
        igent circumstances doctrine extends to situations involving “dan-
        ger of ﬂight or escape, loss or destruction of evidence, risk of harm
        to the public or the police, mobility of a vehicle, and hot pursuit”).
        In those circumstances, the delay required to obtain a warrant
        would bring about “some real immediate and serious conse-
        quences” and so the absence of a warrant is excused. Welsh v. Wis-
        consin, 466 U.S. 740, 751 (1984). But as this Court explained in the
        case’s ﬁrst appeal: “Unless a warrant is obtained or an exigency ex-
        ists, ‘any physical invasion of the structure of the home, by even a
        fraction of the inch, [is] too much.’” Bailey I, 940 F.3d at 1302 (al-
        teration in the original) (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27,
        37 (2001)). This rule is “not only ﬁrm but also bright.” Kyllo, 533
        U.S. at 40.
               On the question of whether the Constitution forbids war-
        rantless arrests absent exigent circumstances, the law speaks clearly.
        The line against such arrests “was drawn unambiguously in Payton,
        traces its roots in more ancient sources, and has been reaﬃrmed
        repeatedly since.” Bailey I, 940 F.3d at 1303; see also Kirk v. Louisiana,
        536 U.S. 635, 636 (2002); Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40; Welsh, 466 U.S. at 754;
        Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15 (1948) (all reaﬃrming the
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        16                         Opinion of the Court                        21-14454

        unconstitutionality of warrantless in-home arrests absent exigent
        circumstances). “As Payton makes plain, police oﬃcers need either
        a warrant or probable cause plus exigent circumstances in order to
        make a lawful entry into a home.” Kirk, 536 U.S. at 638. And “the
        Supreme Court has re-inked Payton’s ﬁrm line on numerous subse-
        quent occasions.” McClish v. Nugent, 483 F.3d 1231, 1242 (11th Cir.
        2007). Because the law on this question is clearly established and
        gave Swindell fair warning that his treatment of Bailey was uncon-
        stitutional, Swindell was not entitled to qualiﬁed immunity and the
        district court erred in holding otherwise.
                                  IV.      CONCLUSION
               For these reasons, we reverse the district court’s grant of
        judgment as a matter of law for Swindell and reinstate the jury’s
        verdict for Bailey.5
              REVERSED and REMANDED for reinstatement of jury
        verdict.6

        5 Because we reverse the district court’s judgment on these grounds, it is un-
        necessary to address Bailey’s argument that the district court improperly heard
        Swindell’s motion for judgment as a matter of law.
        6  Swindell also argues for a remittitur for damages in a footnote. Because a
        jury in Bailey I found that he did not use excessive force, Swindell argues that
        even if we reverse, the only damages available are the damages flowing from
        the unlawful entry alone, which would be de minimis nominal damages.
        Swindell is mistaken. Section 1983 defendants “are, as in common law tort
        suits, responsible for the natural and foreseeable consequences of their ac-
        tions.” Jackson v. Sauls, 206 F.3d 1156, 1168 (11th Cir. 2000). Swindell might
        not be liable for the excessive force claim, but he is liable for any and all rea-
        sonably foreseeable damages caused by his unlawful entry. As the district
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        21-14454                  Opinion of the Court                              17

                                         Appendix

        court instructed the jury before deliberations, “any force that Deputy Swindell
        used to effectuate the unlawful arrest was a violation of the Fourth Amend-
        ment.” Injuries resulting from a physical arrest are certainly foreseeable con-
        sequences of an unlawful arrest in someone’s home.
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        21-14454           Opinion of the Court                    19
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        20                 Opinion of the Court              21-14454
USCA11 Case: 21-14454   Document: 35-1   Date Filed: 01/08/2024   Page: 21 of 21

        21-14454           Opinion of the Court                    21