Court Opinion

ID: 9616247
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:44:42.86778+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:56.344888
License: Public Domain

Haymond, Judge:
I concur in the syllabus, as prepared by Judge Fox, which reverses the judgment of the Circuit Court of Min-go County and remands this proceeding to that court for further consideration. I do not, however, agree with the views expressed in the opinion filed by him with respect to the amount of the accounts to be assigned by the defendant to the plaintiffs, or the reasons stated by him in determining such amount, or the division which he would make of the proceeds of the accounts between the respective parties. Any method, such as that indicated by Judge Fox, or that adopted by the circuit court in its final judgment, by which the amount of the accounts, existing at the termination of the lease, is limited or reduced, except to the extent necessary to pay from them the amount of $5,050.59 on the bills incurred by the defendant, disregards and departs from the plain and unambiguous provision of the lease relating to the accounts and substitutes a provision entirely different from that agreed to by the parties themselves. In short, Judge Fox, as I understand his opinion, would modify or rewrite the contract of the .parties, to the extent necessary to conform to his idea of a fair and equitable contract between them instead of giving full force and effect to the clear and express terms of the contract which, upon full consideration, they themselves entered into and adopted. To that disposition of this case I can not agree, for the reason that it would violate the sound principles of law governing the interpretation of written contracts which are clearly stated in 12 Am. Jur., Contracts, Section 228, in this language: “Interpretation of an agreement does not include its modification or the creation of a new or different one. A court is not at liberty to revise an agreement while professing to. construe it. Nor does it have the right to make a contract for the parties- — -that is, a contract different from that actually entered into by them. Neither abstract justice nor the rule of liberal construction justifies the creation of a contract *655for the parties which they did not make themselves or the imposition upon one party to a contract of an obligation not assumed. Courts cannot make for the parties better agreements than they themselves have been satisfied to make or rewrite contracts because they operate harshly or inequitably as to one of the parties. If the parties to a contract adopt a provision which contravenes no principle of public policy and contains no element of ambiguity, the courts have no right, by a process of interpretation, to relieve one of them from disadvantageous terms which he has actually made.”
The judgment entered by the able and experienced judge of the circuit court, based on his obvious desire and effort to do what he considers equity between the parties, changes and rewrites the provision of the contract to an even greater extent than the opinion of Judge Fox indicates that he would do. As the judgment of the circuit court departs from the applicable provision of the contract, it is clearly erroneous and should be reversed. 12 Am. Jur., Contracts, Section 228.
As stated in the opinion of Judge Fox paragraph 12 (e) of the lease contains this provision:
“ (e) At the expiration of the lease, original or as extended, the Lessee will, in turn, assign unto the Lessors, or their nominee, any bills or accounts receivable which may be owing unto him, in an amount not less than the amount of the bills and accounts receivable, hereby assigned or to be assigned unto him, as hereinbefore recited. The writing of assignment shall be without warranty as to the validity of the demands, and without recourse either in law or in equity as to the assignor; in which event the assignees of the Lessee shall assume the payment of such amounts as the said Lessee shall be owing on account of labor and supplies, but the amount so assumed by the Lessors shall not exceed the amount paid out by the Lessee, as provided in paragraph (d).”
The subsection of the paragraph just quoted is free from ambiguity and its meaning, it seems to me, is entirely clear. It means, first, that the accounts owing to the lessee, the defendant, at the expiration of the lease, *656shall be assigned to the lessors or their nominee. It is clear, also, that the words “any bills or accounts” mean all the accounts owing to the lessee at that time. In its broad sense the word “any” means “every” or “all”. 3 C. J. S., Any, pages 1400 and 1401. See Roedler v. Vandalia Bus Lines, 281 Ill. App. 520; Newcomb v. Kloeblen, 77 N. J. L. 791, 74 A. 511, 39 L. R. A., N. S., 724; West Jersey Traction Company v. Camden Horse Railway Company, 52 N. J. Eq. 452, 29 A. 333; West Jersey Traction Company v. Camden Horse Railway Company, 53 N. J. Eq. 163, 35 A. 49; Powell v. Allan, 70 Cal. App. 663, 234 P. 339; Southern Railway Company v. Gaston County, 200 N. C. 780, 158 S. E. 481. The words immediately following “in an amount not less than the amount of the bills and accounts receivable, hereby assigned or to be assigned unto him, as hereinbefore recited.” mean that the lessee shall carry bills and accounts receivable in an amount not less than the amount of the bills and accounts receivable assigned to him, which was the sum of $114,714.85. It is evident from the lease in its entirety that the parties intended that the unpaid accounts receivable, then assigned by the lease, should be collected and used by the lessee as capital assets in a continuing fund to enable him to operate the hospital and pay the expenses incurred from time to time in its operation, and that the accounts receivable existing at its termination, after deducting the amount of the debts of the lessors, which were paid by the lessee, and which then amounted to $5,050.59, should “in turn” be assigned by the lessee to the lessors or their nominee to be used by them or their assignee in the operation of the hospital as they were used by the lessee.
The words relating to the accounts receivable “in an amount not less than the amount of the bills and accounts receivable, hereby assigned or to be assigned” to the lessee, mean exactly what they say, and they mean that the lessee should have bills and accounts receivable, at the end of the lease “in an amount not less than” $114,-714.85, which was the amount of the accounts receivable assigned to him. They do not mean, as Judge Fox ap*657parently considers them to mean, that the accounts receivable to be assigned should be “equal to” or “not to exceed” or “limited to” $114,714.85, the amount of the accounts receivable assigned to the lessee. They clearly place a limit on the minimum amount of the accounts receivable but just as clearly they do not limit the maximum amount of the accounts receivable if they should, as they actually did, exceed the amount of $114,714.85, at the termination of the lease. By acquiring and holding accounts receivable owing to him in the amount of $223,-429.94, the lessee has satisfied the requirement that the accounts receivable should be “in an amount not less than the amount of the bills and accounts receivable” assigned to him, and as the lease imposed no limitation on the amount of the accounts receivable to be assigned by him in excess of $114,714.85 and required him to assign “any bills or accounts receivable which may be owing unto him”, which at the termination of the lease amounted to $223,429.94, the lessee is required to assign them in that amount to the lessors or their nominee, subject to the provision that they should assume “the payment of such amounts as the said Lessee shall be owing on account of labor and supplies, but the amount so assumed by the Lessors shall not exceed the amount paid out by the Lessee, as provided in paragraph (d)”, which amount was the sum of $5,050.59. The plainly expressed intention of the parties to the lease is that all the accounts receivable at the termination of the lease should be assigned to the lessors, or their nominee, and that the amount of such accounts should not be less than the amount of the accounts when the lease was made which was $114,714.85.
It is clear to me that the parties to the lease, by the terms of paragraph (e), intended to impose a minimum amount, but not a maximum amount, of the accounts receivable to be assigned at the termination of the lease, and did not impose the requirement that the accounts receivable to be assigned should be “equal to” or should not “exceed” the amount of the accounts receivable assigned to the lessee. If they had so intended they easily *658could, and no doubt would, have stated in the lease that the accounts receivable to be assigned should “equal” or “not exceed” the amount assigned to the lessee. Instead they used the words “in an amount not less than the amount of the” accounts receivable assigned to the lessee, which have a distinct and contrary meaning from that of either of the suggested expressions that could have been used. The words “in an amount not less than” do not mean “in an amount equal to” or “in an amount not to exceed”; and no sound or justifiable interpretation can give them any such meaning or effect. It is significant too, and, I think, sustains the view I have indicated of the meaning of the provision, that in limiting the amount assumed by the lessors, the language is “but the amount so assumed by the Lessors shall not exceed the amount paid out by the Lessee.” instead of the words “in an amount not less than” the amount paid by him. (Emphasis supplied). The use of these different phrases in the same short subsection of the paragraph of the lease clearly shows that they were intended to have a different, and not the same, meaning or effect.
The meaning which I would place upon the language of subsection (e) of the paragraph gives effect to each of its words when used in its common and usual sense and significance, and accords with the well established rule that words of an unambiguous written contract should be given their ordinary, usual and commonly accepted meaning and significance when it does not appear that they are used in a different sense or that such meaning will produce an absurd or unreasonable result. 12 Am. Jur., Contracts, Section 236; Farber v. Mutual Life Insurance Company, 250 Mass. 250, 145 N. E. 535, 36 A. L. R. 806. It also avoids the confusion and the uncertainty which would necessarily result from any attempt to divide or distribute the accounts receivable, or their proceeds when collected, between the plaintiffs and the defendant which, it seems to me, must be done if the views expressed by Judge Fox in his opinion should be followed. In my judgment there is no way, except by agreement between the parties, who are unwilling to *659agree, by which any fair or practical division of the accounts can be accomplished. If all the accounts receivable are not required to be assigned by the lessee, as provided by the lease, subject to the assumption by the lessors of the limited amount paid by the lessee for labor and supplies, some division of the accounts, or their proceeds as and when collected, between the parties is the only other alternative to dispose of them. It is manifest to me, however, that no such division was intended by the parties to the lease, for which it fails to make provision, and that, under the contract, such accounts can not be divided or distributed between parties claiming any part of them on any equal valuation basis, or otherwise, or collected by the lessee, or assigned to the lessors to be collected, and their proceeds divided between them and the lessee. The undesirability of any division or distribution of the different accounts receivable, or their proceeds, in any fixed or determinable amount was no doubt recognized by the parties to the lease who, by omitting from the .contract any provision to that effect, indicated clearly that they did not desire or intend that any such division or distribution of the accounts or their proceeds should be made or undertaken in connection with the assignment of the accounts by the lessee. On the contrary they intended to avoid a situation which would render necessary any division or distribution of the accounts receivable or their proceeds among them or their successors. Moreover, the case as presented in the circuit court, and as it now stands in this Court, admittedly has not been developed to the extent necessary to permit any attempt to divide or distribute the accounts receivable which amounted to $223,429.94 at the termination of the lease, or their proceeds as and when collected, and as the lease clearly contemplates no such division, there is no justification or excuse to attempt it by further development of the case.
As already pointed out, the language of subsection (e) of the paragraph of the lease is clear and unambiguous and its meaning as expressed by the parties is plain. When a written contract expresses the intent of the par-*660lies in clear and. unambiguous language, the courts will not resort to construction but will give full force and effect to the instrument according to its provisions, in the absence of fraud or other grounds which affect its enforcement as provided by its terms. Kanawha Banking and Trust Company v. Gilbert, 131 W. Va. 88, 46 S. E. 2d 225; Babcock Coal and Coke Company v. Brackens Creek Coal Land Company, 128 W. Va. 676, 37 S. E. 2d 519, 163 A. L. R. 871. It is not the province of the court to alter, pervert or destroy the clear meaning and intent of the parties as plainly expressed in a written contract, or, by judicial interpretation of the instrument or otherwise, to make a new contract for them, Kanawha Banking and Trust Company v. Gilbert, 131 W. Va. 88, 46 S. E. 2d 225; Continental Coal Company v. Connelsville ByProduct Coal Company, 104 W. Va. 44, 138 S. E. 737; Griffin v. Fairmont Coal Company, 59 W. Va. 480, 53 S. E. 24, 2 L. R. A., N. S., 1115; Page v. Sun Insurance Office, (CCA 8th), 74 F. 203, 33 L. R. A. 249; Michigan Pipe Company v. Michigan Fire and Marine Insurance Company, 92 Mich. 482, 52 N. W. 1070, 20 L. R. A. 277; McQuillan v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Association, 112 Wis. 665, 87 N. W. 1069, 88 N. W. 925, 56 L. R. A. 233, 88 Am. St. Rep. 986; and full force and effect will be given to the language used by the parties when the terms of the instrument are clear and unambiguous. Kanawha Banking and Trust Company v. Gilbert, 131 W.Va. 88, 46 S.E. 2d 225; Hanford v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 131 W. Va. 227, 46 S. E. 2d 777; Adkins v. Aetna Life Insurance Company, 130 W. Va. 362, 43 S. E. 2d 372; Babcock Coal and Coke Company v. Brackens Creek Coal Land Company, 128 W. Va. 676, 37 S. E. 2d 519, 163 A. L. R. 871; Strother, Sale, Curd and St. Clair v. McDowell County National Bank, 113 W. Va. 75, 166 S. E. 818; Griffin v. Fairmont Coal Company, 59 W. Va. 480, 53 S. E. 24, 2 L. R. A., N. S., 1115; Uhl v. Ohio River Railroad Company, 51 W. Va. 106, 41 S. E. 340.
For the reasons stated, I would reverse the judgment of the circuit court and hold that, under the plain and *661unambiguous terms of subsection (e) of the lease, the plaintiffs are entitled to the assignment by the defendant of the full amount of the accounts receivable of $223,-429.94, and that the plaintiffs are required to assume the payment of such amount as the defendant owes for labor and supplies, not to exceed the amount paid by him on the indebtedness owing at the date of the lease, which amount is shown to be the sum of $5,050.59.
I am authorized to state that Judge Riley concurs in the views set forth in this opinion.