Court Opinion

ID: 9582250
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:24:10.939672+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:34.603193
License: Public Domain

COATS, Judge,
dissenting.
The defendant in this case contended that the male complaining witness, W.K., had consented to sexual intercourse. According to his offer of proof, the defendant’s theory of the case was that W.K. consented to sexual intercourse with him in return for his protection from other inmates and other favors.
In making his offer of proof Kvasnikoff conceded that generally in rape cases the complaining witness’ prior sexual conduct is irrelevant. He argued that the usual rape case, however, involves a male defendant and a female complaining witness. In those cases the jury would almost certainly assume that the complaining witness would have a sexual interest in men. It would therefore be unnecessary and totally irrelevant to prove that a female complaining witness had prior consensual intercourse. However, in the instant case the defendant argued that unless the jury knew that the complaining witness was homosexual, the jury would likely assume that if the defendant had sexual intercourse with the complaining witness, the intercourse was not consensual. Since W.K. denied being homosexual, Kvasnikoff wanted to attempt to establish that W.K. was homosexual and that W.K. was willing to trade sexual favors for protection. Kvasnikoff intended to establish this through testimony of other inmates who would testify to W.K.’s alleged recent homosexual behavior in jail, including testimony that W.K. offered another inmate sexual favors in return for that inmate’s protection.
I agree with the majority opinion that the question in this case is whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs the prejudicial effect. I also agree that the decision on this matter is for the trial judge in the first instance and that his decision should be reversed only for an abuse of discretion. I also agree that there are strong policy arguments to protect witnesses from unnecessary inquiries into sexual matters. Witnesses may not wish to testify if they are faced with a searching inquiry into their prior sexual history. There are also the dangers that the time of the jury will be wasted by the exploration of irrelevant issues and that a jury may be biased against a complaining witness by the accusation that he is homosexual. Still, the defendant in a criminal trial has the right to fully defend his case and to cross examine the witnesses against him. This right is of such central importance that it is set forth as a constitutional right.1
I believe that the defendant’s offer of proof shows that at least some of the evidence which he wished to introduce at trial was relevant to support his theory that W.K. consented to sexual intercourse in return for protection. However, there is still the issue of whether the probative value of this evidence outweighed the prejudicial effect. I would find that the trial judge abused his discretion in refusing to allow this testimony in a case where consent truly was an issue. Otherwise I think that the trial judge could properly exclude the evidence as being unduly prejudicial.
*309Unfortunately, the record on appeal in this ease consists essentially of only the testimony of W.K. We don’t even know whether Kvasnikoff testified, although it appears he may not have. Since this alleged rape took place in a dormitory of prisoners, I assume that there were many potential witnesses. Viewed in the context of the evidence which was available at trial, it may very well be that the evidence which Kvasnikoff wished to introduce was of limited probative value. The evidence concerning whether W.K. consented may have been so improbable in context that the trial judge could have concluded that consent was not truly in issue.2 In that case the trial judge could conclude that the evidence concerning the alleged homosexual incidents was unduly prejudicial because it would serve to prejudice the jury against W.K. and would lead to a confusion of the issues. On the other hand, because the evidence concerning whether or not W.K. consented may have been ambiguous, the probative value of the evidence which Kvas-nikoff wished to introduce may have been great. I would therefore order the record in this case to be supplemented so that we could determine whether the defense of consent was truly in issue in this case. If it was, I would reverse Kvasnikoff’s conviction.

. United States Const., Sixth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment; Alaska Const, art. 1 § 11 and art. 1 § 7.

. In arriving at this conclusion the trial judge would look at the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, considering the evidence presented at trial and considering the evidence which was the subject of the offer of proof.