Court Opinion

ID: 999784
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-07-04 17:30:48.624469+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:17:03.906981
License: Public Domain

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

DONNA E. HOLLAR,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
                                                                   No. 98-2748
COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of North Carolina, at Statesville.
Richard L. Voorhees, District Judge.
(CA-96-138-5-V)

Submitted: July 30, 1999

Decided: September 23, 1999

Before WIDENER and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER,
Senior Circuit Judge.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Donna E. Hollar, Appellant Pro Se. Joseph L. Brinkley, OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for
Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

In this case, the Commissioner of Social Security found that Donna
E. Hollar was disabled from December 30, 1990 to June 12, 1992,
when her disability ceased. Hollar now appeals the district court's
order upholding the Commissioner's decision. We affirm.

Hollar alleged that she became disabled on December 30, 1990 due
to complications from an automobile accident. Her application was
denied initially and on reconsideration. After the ALJ issued his deci-
sion, Hollar sought review before the Appeals Council. The Appeals
Council considered additional evidence submitted by Hollar but found
that the evidence did not provide a basis for changing the ALJ's deci-
sion. The ALJ's decision therefore became the final decision of the
Commissioner.

Hollar then filed the subject action in the district court. See 42
U.S.C. § 405(g) (1994). A magistrate judge found that substantial evi-
dence supported the Commissioner's decision. Hollar, through coun-
sel, objected to the magistrate judge's findings. The district court
found her objections to be without merit, adopted the recommenda-
tion of the magistrate judge, and entered summary judgment for the
Commissioner. Hollar timely appeals.

We review the Commissioner's decision to determine whether it is
supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct law was
applied. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Hays
v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990). In this case, our
review is further restricted to consideration of the two issues that
counsel raised in the objections to the magistrate judge's report. See
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 155 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d
841, 845-46 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91,
94 (4th Cir. 1984). In her objections, Hollar complained that the

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Appeals Council failed to consider and make explicit findings con-
cerning the evidence submitted in support of her claim after the ALJ's
decision. Second, Hollar contended that the magistrate judge erred in
conducting a de novo review of the evidence, including the additional
evidence submitted to the Appeals Council.

The Appeals Council in its decision did not engage in extensive
analysis of the additional evidence but simply identified the evidence,
stated that it had considered the evidence, and concluded that the evi-
dence did "not provide a basis for changing the Administrative Law
Judge's decision." At least one court of appeals has specifically
rejected the claim that the Appeals Council must"articulate its own
assessment of the additional evidence." Browning v. Sullivan, 958
F.2d 817, 822 (8th Cir. 1992). We agree with this conclusion and fur-
ther note that the regulation addressing additional evidence does not
direct that the Appeals Council announce detailed reasons for finding
that the evidence did not warrant a change in the ALJ's decision. See
20 C.F.R. § 404.970(b) (1999).

In her second objection, Hollar contended that the magistrate judge
erroneously engaged in a de novo review of the additional evidence.
To the contrary, the magistrate judge correctly analyzed the entire
record. He found that substantial evidence supported the Commis-
sioner's decision and that the additional evidence submitted to the
Appeals Council did not change his finding. See Browning, 958 F.2d
at 822-23.

Our review of the record and the district court's opinion adopting
the recommendation of the magistrate judge discloses no reversible
error. We therefore affirm on the reasoning of the district court. See
Hollar v. Commissioner, No. CA-96-138-5-V (W.D.N.C. Sept. 18,
1998).* We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
_________________________________________________________________
*Although the district court's judgment or order is marked as "filed"
on September 17, 1999, the district court's records show that it was
entered on the docket sheet on September 18, 1999. Pursuant to Rules 58
and 79(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is the date that the
judgment or order was entered on the docket sheet that we take as the
effective date of the district court's decision. See Wilson v. Murray, 806
F.2d 1232, 1234-35 (4th Cir. 1986).

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contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court
and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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