Court Opinion

ID: 9961550
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-19 12:03:36.744317+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:55.486521
License: Public Domain

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         2                          ,0                            0 Conn. App. 1
                                         In re Zayden J.

                                  IN RE ZAYDEN J.*
                                      (AC 46639)
                               Suarez, Westbrook and Bear, Js.

                                            Syllabus

         The respondent mother appealed to this court from the judgment of the
            trial court terminating her parental rights with respect to her minor
            child, Z. The mother had an IQ of 64 and had received assistance from
            state agencies, including, but not limited to, daily living services and
            financial support, for the majority of her life. She had a history with
            the Department of Children and Families dating back to 2015 because
            of her ongoing mental health issues. On the day Z was born, a hospital
            social worker reported concerns regarding the mother’s mental health
            to the department, including that she had been diagnosed with bipolar
            disorder, attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder, intellectual disability,
            autism spectrum disorder, and psychosis, and that, throughout the moth-
            er’s pregnancy, she had been seen at various hospitals for treatment or
            intervention due to her unstable mental health and suicidal ideations.
            After Z had been adjudicated neglected, the court ordered specific steps
            to facilitate the return of Z to the mother and vested the care and custody
            of Z in the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families. The
            petitioner thereafter filed a petition for termination of the mother’s
            parental rights with respect to Z. Three days prior to the start of trial
            on the petition, the mother filed a motion for a sixty day continuance,
            stating that a putative father for Z had been identified and that he was
            scheduled to take a DNA test. The court denied the mother’s motion
            for a continuance and moved forward with the trial. In its memorandum
            of decision terminating the parental rights of the mother as to Z, the
            court found by clear and convincing evidence that the department had
            made reasonable efforts to reunify the mother with Z and that the mother
            was unwilling or unable to progress toward reunification. The court
            found that, although the department had offered the mother mental
            health and medication management services, offered her in-home ser-
            vices to assist with her daily living skills, and made arrangements to
            ensure that the mother had visitation with Z, the mother consistently
            refused the mental health services, did not consistently engage in her
            individual therapy, stopped taking needed medication, and revoked all
            releases for the department to communicate directly with her providers.

           * In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142
         (b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this
         appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open
         for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon
         order of the court.
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                                       In re Zayden J.
           The court further found that, although the mother participated routinely
           with her allotted visitation, she was not able to progress in her parenting
           skills. In the portion of the memorandum of decision addressing the
           seven mandatory factors articulated in the statute (§ 17a-112 (k)) govern-
           ing the termination of parental rights, the court emphasized that the
           mother never consistently engaged in therapy and medication manage-
           ment, thus making limited, if any, progress toward stabilizing her mental
           health; that the mother could not regulate her own conduct and focus on
           Z’s well-being during visitation sessions; and that she routinely disrupted
           visitations by being rude to the staff and requiring emergency personnel
           intervention. In addition, the court found that there was limited evidence
           as to Z’s ties with the mother, that he had been in the care of his foster
           parents since birth, and that he was bonded to his foster family. The
           court ultimately found that it was in Z’s best interest to terminate the
           mother’s parental rights. Held:
       1. The respondent mother could not prevail on her claim that the trial court
           erroneously determined that the department made reasonable efforts
           to reunify her with Z, this court having found that her claim was moot;
           although the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence both
           that the department made reasonable efforts to reunify the mother with
           Z and that she was unwilling or unable to progress toward rehabilitation,
           the mother failed to challenge on appeal the court’s finding that she
           was unwilling or unable to progress toward rehabilitation, and, therefore,
           even if this court were to agree with her claim, it could not provide
           her with any relief because there was a second independent basis for
           upholding the court’s determination.
       2. The trial court’s conclusion that the termination of the respondent moth-
           er’s parental rights was in Z’s best interest was not clearly erroneous:
           although there was evidence in the record that the mother loved Z
           and attended many of her supervised visits with him, this court has
           recognized that love and a biological bond is not enough to avoid the
           termination of parental rights; moreover, there was evidence that when
           the mother attended her supervised visits with Z, she was often unable
           to control her behavior during these visits, which raised serious concerns
           for Z’s safety, these facts, in addition to the court’s other findings in its
           memorandum of decision, were grounded in the evidence and strongly
           supported the court’s best interest determination, and this court would
           not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.
       3. The respondent mother could not prevail on her claim that the trial court
           improperly denied her motion for a continuance: although the mother
           asserted that the trial court’s denial of her motion deprived her of her
           constitutional due process right to a fair trial, this court’s careful review
           of the grounds stated in support of the mother’s motion for a continuance
           revealed that they related to the putative father’s potential parental
           rights as to Z and that they did not interfere with the parental rights of
           the mother or her ability to effectively challenge the allegations in the
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                                          In re Zayden J.
             petition for termination of her parental rights; moreover, the mother’s
             written motion and her arguments before this court failed to demonstrate
             that, even if the putative father’s rights were adversely affected by
             the court’s denial of the motion for a continuance, the adverse ruling
             somehow affected fundamental rights personal to her, and, therefore,
             her claim was not of constitutional magnitude; furthermore, for the
             same reasons that her claim was not of constitutional magnitude, her
             claim failed under the abuse of discretion standard of review, under
             which it was appropriate for this court to review the claim.

                   Argued January 25—officially released April 18, 2024**

                                      Procedural History

            Petition by the Commissioner of Children and Fami-
         lies to terminate the respondents’ parental rights with
         respect to their minor child, brought to the Superior
         Court in the judicial district of Fairfield, Juvenile Mat-
         ters, where the court, McLaughlin, J., denied the
         respondent mother’s motion for a continuance; there-
         after, the case was tried to the court, McLaughlin, J.;
         judgment terminating the respondents’ parental rights,
         from which the respondent mother appealed to this
         court. Appeal dismissed in part; affirmed.

           David B. Rozwaski, assigned counsel, for the appel-
         lant (respondent mother).

           Alma Rose Nunley, assistant attorney general, with
         whom, on the brief, were William Tong, attorney gen-
         eral, and Nisa Khan, assistant attorney general, for the
         appellee (petitioner).

                                             Opinion

            SUAREZ, J. The respondent mother, Tabitha M.,
         appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered
         in favor of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children
         and Families, terminating her parental rights as to her
            ** April 18, 2024, the date that this decision was released as a slip opinion,
         is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
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                                       In re Zayden J.

       biological son, Zayden J. (Zayden).1 On appeal, the
       respondent claims that the court erred in (1) determin-
       ing that reasonable efforts were made to reunify her
       with Zayden, 2 (2) concluding that it was in the best
       interest of Zayden to terminate her parental rights, and
       (3) denying her motion for a continuance. We conclude
       that the appeal is moot as to the first claim and dismiss
       that portion of the appeal. With respect to the remaining
       claims in the appeal, we affirm the judgment of the
       court.
         The following facts, as found by the court, and proce-
       dural history are relevant to our resolution of this
       appeal. ‘‘The [respondent] was born . . . in June of
       1989. She is now thirty-three years old. . . . She has
       an IQ of 64 and has received assistance, including, but
       not limited to, daily living services and financial sup-
       port, from the Department of Developmental Services
         1
             We note that the court also terminated the parental rights of John Doe
       in the underlying proceeding because, at the time of trial, the identity of
       Zayden’s biological father was unknown. Following trial, Lee Roy B. came
       forward as a putative father and submitted to a DNA test that confirmed
       he was the biological father of Zayden. On March 30, 2023, the petitioner
       moved to cite in and amend the neglect petition to include Lee Roy B., which
       the court granted. The parental rights of Lee Roy B. were not terminated
       in the underlying proceeding, and he is not a party to this appeal. Accordingly,
       all references in this opinion to the respondent are to Tabitha M. only.
           2
             We note that the respondent labeled her first claim as ‘‘[t]he trial court
       erred in its findings that the respondent had failed to rehabilitate.’’ The
       respondent specifically argues in her first claim, however, that ‘‘the petitioner
       did not do everything reasonable in this case to effectuate reunification’’ and
       that ‘‘the petitioner failed to properly engage the respondent in meaningful
       services.’’ The respondent concludes her first claim by asserting that ‘‘the
       trial court erred in finding that the respondent . . . failed to rehabilitate
       because the trial court did not take into consideration that [she] required
       much more intensive services to help her address her mental health issues
       . . . .’’ After a careful review of the respondent’s appellate brief, we consider
       the substance of her argument in her first claim to be challenging the court’s
       finding that reasonable efforts were made to reunify the respondent with
       Zayden. See In re Aurora H., 222 Conn. App. 307, 326 n.10, 304 A.3d 875
       (‘‘[i]n our consideration of claims raised on appeal, this court is customarily
       mindful to evaluate their substance rather than to be bound by imprecise
       form’’), cert. denied, 348 Conn. 931, 306 A.3d 1 (2023).
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                                        In re Zayden J.

         (DDS) for the majority of her life. [The respondent’s]
         grandmother primarily raised her due to [her] mother’s
         unstable mental health and her father’s numerous incar-
         cerations.
            ‘‘[The respondent] has a history with [the Department
         of Children and Families (department)] dating back to
         2015 because of her ongoing mental health issues. In
         2016, the court adjudicated the [respondent’s] oldest
         son, Tyshawn, neglected. At first, the court ordered
         joint guardianship of Tyshawn with the [respondent]
         and the maternal grandaunt; however, in 2018, after
         several negative incidents between the [respondent]
         and the grandaunt and the continuation of intimate
         partner violence between the [respondent] and her part-
         ners,3 the [respondent] lost custody of Tyshawn. Tys-
         hawn remains in the sole care and custody of the mater-
         nal grandaunt.’’ (Footnote in original.)
            Zayden was born in October, 2020. ‘‘[The day Zayden
         was born], a hospital social worker reported concerns
         regarding the [respondent’s] mental health to [the
         department]. The hospital social worker told [the
         department] that the [respondent] was diagnosed with
         bipolar disorder, [attention deficit/hyperactivity disor-
         der], intellectual disability, [autism spectrum disorder],
         and psychosis. The social worker went on to explain
         that throughout the [respondent’s] pregnancy, [she] had
         been seen at various hospitals . . . for treatment or
         intervention due to her unstable mental health and sui-
         cidal ideations. . . . The hospital social worker noti-
         fied [the department] that it would not be in [Zayden’s]
             ‘‘The [respondent] has a history of intimate partner violence . . . with
             3

         several past partners. In 2018, [the department] received a report that the
         [respondent’s] then partner . . . struck the [respondent] several times with
         a coat hanger while [she] was unclothed. A woman who was present during
         the assault recorded the incident and showed the video to [the department].
         The woman also uploaded the video of the incident to a social media plat-
         form. In addition, the [respondent] reported to [the department] that she
         suffers from migraines as a result of the physical abuse she endured at the
         hands of her older child’s father . . . .’’
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                                      In re Zayden J.

       best interest to be returned to [the respondent’s] care
       because of her unstable mental health and inability to
       make rational decisions.’’
         ‘‘In October, 2020, the [respondent] was residing at
       [a residential treatment program for individuals with
       both mental health and substance abuse disorders (pro-
       gram)]. This residence was part of a court order associ-
       ated with a criminal case.4 . . . In November, 2020,
       the [respondent] left [the program] against medical
       advice and court orders. The [respondent] failed to com-
       plete the program prior to leaving.’’ (Footnote in origi-
       nal.)
          On October 30, 2020, the petitioner filed a neglect
       petition and an order of temporary custody (OTC) with
       respect to Zayden. The court, Wilkerson Brillant, J.,
       granted the OTC ex parte and ordered preliminary spe-
       cific steps to facilitate the return of Zayden to the
       respondent. On November 6, 2020, the court sustained
       the OTC, reconfirmed the specific steps, and vested the
       care and custody of Zayden in the petitioner.
          ‘‘In 2021, the [respondent] was brought to hospital
       emergency rooms on several occasions for observation
       or assessment due to her suicidal ideations or depres-
       sion, including on March 22 and 24, April 5, May 15,
       August 3 and 4, September 27 and 28, and October 10.
       The [respondent] also had intervention from emergency
       personnel, not always leading to transport to the hospi-
       tal, for suicidal ideations on June 13 and 14, August 3
       and 31, September 17 and 28, and October 10 and 19.’’
         4
           ‘‘The [respondent] has a criminal history from 2017 until 2020. Charges
       include assault in the third degree, breach of the peace, violation of protec-
       tive orders, and violation of probation. In August, 2020, she was incarcerated
       for a violation of probation. The [respondent’s] residence at [the program]
       was a condition of her probation. She was ordered to stay at [the program]
       until January, 2021. When the [respondent] left the program early, the court
       issued an arrest warrant for [her] for failure to appear and a violation of
       probation. The court eventually vacated the warrant, and the [respondent]
       remained on probation.’’
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                                  In re Zayden J.

            On February 24, 2022, the petitioner filed a termina-
         tion of parental rights petition with respect to Zayden.
         On March 17, 2022, the respondent filed a motion for
         a transfer of guardianship to Zayden’s cousin, T. The
         court thereafter consolidated the trial on the respon-
         dent’s motion to transfer guardianship and the petition
         to terminate parental rights.
            ‘‘On May 25, 2022, the court, Maronich, J., adjudi-
         cated [Zayden] neglected, based on the [respondent’s]
         nolo contendere plea, and committed [him] to [the peti-
         tioner’s] care and custody. The court also ordered final
         [specific] steps for the [respondent]. These [specific]
         steps were similar in sum and substance to the prelimi-
         nary [specific] steps that the court ordered at the OTC
         proceeding in October, 2020. At the adjudication hear-
         ing, the court canvassed the [respondent] on her deci-
         sion to file a written nolo contendere plea, on the dispo-
         sition of commitment, and on the specific steps.’’ On
         July 12, 2022, the court, Reid, J., approved a perma-
         nency plan of termination of the respondent’s parental
         rights as to Zayden.
           On February 6, 2023, three days prior to the start of
         the consolidated trial on the petition to terminate the
         respondent’s parental rights and the motion to transfer
         guardianship, the respondent filed a motion for a sixty
         day continuance, stating that a putative father for
         Zayden had been identified and that he was scheduled
         to take a DNA test. The court, McLaughlin, J., denied
         the respondent’s motion for a continuance. The court
         then held the consolidated trial on February 9 and 16,
         2023. The court heard testimony from multiple wit-
         nesses, including the respondent, and several exhibits
         were admitted into evidence.
            On April 28, 2023, the court issued a memorandum
         of decision terminating the parental rights of the respon-
         dent as to Zayden and denying her motion to transfer
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                                     In re Zayden J.

       guardianship. In its memorandum of decision, the court
                         5

       found by clear and convincing evidence that ‘‘[the
       department] made reasonable efforts to locate the
       [respondent]’’ and that ‘‘[the department] made reason-
       able efforts to reunify the [respondent] and [Zayden].
       Further, the [respondent] proved unwilling or unable
       to progress toward reunification.’’ The court reasoned
       that, ‘‘[a]t every turn, [the department] offered the
       [respondent] mental health and medication manage-
       ment services. DDS also offered the [respondent] in-
       home services to assist with her daily living skills. [The
       department] made arrangements to ensure that the
       [respondent] had visitation with [Zayden]. The [respon-
       dent] consistently refused and hindered her mental
       health services. She did not consistently engage in her
       individual therapy and stopped taking needed medica-
       tion. The [respondent] revoked all releases for [the
       department] to communicate directly with her provid-
       ers. Although the [respondent] did participate routinely
       with her allotted visitation, she was not able to progress
       in her parenting skills. [The department] made reason-
       able efforts to reunify the [respondent] with [Zayden].
       Despite these reasonable efforts, the [respondent] was
       unwilling or unable to make sound progress toward
       mental health stability and competent parenting.’’ The
       court further found by clear and convincing evidence
       after consideration of the seven mandatory factors
       articulated in General Statutes § 17a-112 (k) that it was
       in Zayden’s best interest to terminate the respondent’s
       parental rights and that a transfer of guardianship was
       not in his best interest. This appeal followed. Additional
       facts and procedural history will be provided as neces-
       sary.
          5
            The court also terminated John Doe’s parental rights as to Zayden;
       however, the court did not appoint the petitioner as Zayden’s statutory
       parent because of the pending paternity test for the newly disclosed putative
       father. The respondent did not appeal the court’s denial of the motion to
       transfer guardianship.
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                                In re Zayden J.

            Before turning to the respondent’s claims, we first
         set forth the legal principles that govern our review.
         ‘‘Proceedings to terminate parental rights are governed
         by § 17a-112. . . . Under [that provision], a hearing on
         a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two
         phases: the adjudicatory phase and the dispositional
         phase. During the adjudicatory phase, the trial court
         must determine whether one or more of the . . .
         grounds for termination of parental rights set forth in
         § 17a-112 [(j) (3)] exists by clear and convincing evi-
         dence. The [petitioner] . . . in petitioning to terminate
         those rights, must allege and prove one or more of the
         statutory grounds. . . . Subdivision (3) of § 17a-112 (j)
         carefully sets out . . . [the] situations that, in the judg-
         ment of the legislature, constitute countervailing inter-
         ests sufficiently powerful to justify the termination of
         parental rights in the absence of consent. . . . Because
         a respondent’s fundamental right to parent his or her
         child is at stake, [t]he statutory criteria must be strictly
         complied with before termination can be accomplished
         and adoption proceedings begun.’’ (Internal quotation
         marks omitted.) In re A’vion A., 217 Conn. App. 330,
         336–37, 288 A.3d 231 (2023). ‘‘If the trial court deter-
         mines that a statutory ground for termination exists,
         then it proceeds to the dispositional phase. During the
         dispositional phase, the trial court must determine
         whether termination is in the best interests of the child.
         . . . The best interest determination also must be sup-
         ported by clear and convincing evidence.’’ (Internal quo-
         tation marks omitted.) In re Autumn O., 218 Conn.
         App. 424, 431, 292 A.3d 66, cert. denied, 346 Conn. 1025,
         294 A.3d 1026 (2023).
                                      I
            The respondent first claims that the court erred in
         determining that the department made reasonable
         efforts to reunify her with Zayden. Specifically, she
         argues that ‘‘the [department] did not offer nor provide
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                              In re Zayden J.

       meaningful services to the respondent which would
       have enabled her to better understand [Zayden’s] needs
       and be able to address and meet those needs of
       [Zayden]. While there were some existing services in
       place already, not enough was done to determine if the
       services were useful and beneficial to the respondent
       in helping her address her mental health issues.’’ The
       respondent further asserts that ‘‘the trial court did not
       take into consideration that [she] required much more
       intensive services to help her address her mental health
       issues . . . .’’ We conclude that the respondent’s
       appeal is moot with respect to this claim.
          ‘‘Mootness is a question of justiciability that must be
       determined as a threshold matter because it implicates
       [this] court’s subject matter jurisdiction . . . .
       Because courts are established to resolve actual contro-
       versies, before a claimed controversy is entitled to a
       resolution on the merits it must be justiciable. . . . A
       case is considered moot if [the] court cannot grant the
       appellant any practical relief through its disposition of
       the merits . . . . In determining mootness, the disposi-
       tive question is whether a successful appeal would ben-
       efit the plaintiff or defendant in any way. . . . Our
       review of the question of mootness is plenary. . . .
         ‘‘Section 17a-112 (j) (1) provides in relevant part that
       the Superior Court may grant a petition [for termination
       of parental rights] if it finds by clear and convincing
       evidence that . . . the [department] has made reason-
       able efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child
       with the parent . . . unless the court finds . . . that
       the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunifi-
       cation efforts . . . . In construing that statutory lan-
       guage, our Supreme Court has explained that, [b]ecause
       the two clauses are separated by the word unless, this
       statute plainly is written in the conjunctive. Accord-
       ingly, the [petitioner] must prove either that it has made
       reasonable efforts to reunify or, alternatively, that the
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                                 In re Zayden J.

          parent is unwilling or unable to benefit from reunifica-
          tion efforts. . . . [E]ither showing is sufficient to sat-
          isfy this statutory element. . . .
             ‘‘Because either finding, standing alone, provides an
          independent basis for satisfying § 17a-112 (j) (1) . . .
          in cases in which the trial court concludes that both
          findings have been proven, a respondent on appeal must
          demonstrate that both determinations are improper. If
          the respondent fails to challenge either one of those
          independent alternative bases . . . the trial court’s
          ultimate determination that the requirements of § 17a-
          112 (j) (1) were satisfied remains unchallenged and
          intact. . . . In such instances, the appeal is moot, as
          resolution of a respondent’s claim of error in her favor
          could not [afford] her any practical relief.’’ (Citations
          omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks
          omitted.) In re A’vion A., supra, 217 Conn. App. 354–55.
            In the present case, the court found by clear and
          convincing evidence that the department made reason-
          able efforts to locate the respondent and to reunify her
          with Zayden and that she was unwilling or unable to
          progress toward rehabilitation. In her appellate brief,
          the respondent challenges only one of the two separate
          and independent bases for upholding the court’s deter-
          mination that the requirements of § 17a-112 (j) (1) had
          been satisfied. Specifically, the respondent does not
          challenge the court’s finding that she was unwilling or
          unable to progress toward rehabilitation. See footnote
          2 of this opinion. Therefore, even if we were to agree
          with her claim that the department did not make reason-
          able efforts to address her mental health issues in order
          to reunify her with Zayden, we could not provide her
          with any relief in connection with this claim because
          there is a second independent basis for upholding the
          court’s determination, which she does not challenge.
          See In re Natalia M., 190 Conn. App. 583, 588, 210 A.3d
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                                      In re Zayden J.

       682, cert. denied, 332 Conn. 912, 211 A.3d 71 (2019).
       Accordingly, we dismiss this claim as moot.
                                             II
          The respondent also claims that the court erred in
       concluding that it was in Zayden’s best interest to grant
       the petition for termination of her parental rights. Spe-
       cifically, the respondent argues that ‘‘[she] clearly loves
       her son and she has brought food and clothing for him
       to the visits, she has, in her own way, tried to teach
       him his ABCs and 123s, and she has tried to help him
       maintain a relationship with his older brother and other
       extended family members who could not attend the
       visits that the respondent had with Zayden.’’ The
       respondent also contends that she has ‘‘offered other
       family members and the putative father as resources
       for Zayden while she works on her mental health
       issues.’’ The petitioner argues that there was ample
       evidence to support the court’s best interest determina-
       tion.6 We agree with the petitioner.
          ‘‘In the dispositional phase of a termination of paren-
       tal rights hearing, the emphasis appropriately shifts
       from the conduct of the parent to the best interest of
       the child. . . . It is well settled that we will overturn
       the trial court’s decision that the termination of parental
       rights is in the best interest of the [child] only if the
       court’s findings are clearly erroneous. . . . The best
       interests of the child include the child’s interests in
       sustained growth, development, well-being, and conti-
       nuity and stability of [his] environment. . . . In the
       dispositional phase of a termination of parental rights
       hearing, the trial court must determine whether it is
       established by clear and convincing evidence that the
       continuation of the [respondent’s] parental rights is not
         6
           We note that the attorney for Zayden filed a letter with this court adopting
       the brief of the petitioner.
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                                  In re Zayden J.

          in the best interest of the child. In arriving at this deci-
          sion, the court is mandated to consider and make writ-
          ten findings regarding seven statutory factors deline-
          ated in [§ 17a-112 (k)]. . . . The seven factors serve
          simply as guidelines for the court and are not statutory
          prerequisites that need to be proven before termination
          can be ordered. . . . There is no requirement that each
          factor be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
          . . .
             ‘‘It is axiomatic that a trial court’s factual findings
          are accorded great deference. Accordingly, an appellate
          tribunal will not disturb a trial court’s finding that termi-
          nation of parental rights is in a child’s best interest
          unless that finding is clearly erroneous. . . . A finding
          is clearly erroneous when either there is no evidence
          in the record to support it, or the reviewing court is
          left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake
          has been made. . . . On appeal, our function is to
          determine whether the trial court’s conclusion was fac-
          tually supported and legally correct. . . . In doing so,
          however, [g]reat weight is given to the judgment of
          the trial court because of [the court’s] opportunity to
          observe the parties and the evidence. . . . We do not
          examine the record to determine whether the trier of
          fact could have reached a conclusion other than the
          one reached. . . . [Rather] every reasonable presump-
          tion is made in favor of the trial court’s ruling.’’ (Citation
          omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re
          Anthony S., 218 Conn. App. 127, 152–53, 290 A.3d
          901 (2023).
             In its memorandum of decision, the court considered
          and made findings under each of the seven statutory
          factors in § 17a-112 (k) before determining, by clear
          and convincing evidence, that it was in Zayden’s best
          interest to terminate the respondent’s parental rights.
          In the dispositional portion of its memorandum of deci-
          sion, the court emphasized that the respondent ‘‘never
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                              In re Zayden J.

       consistently engaged in therapy and medication man-
       agement, thus making limited, if any, progress toward
       stabilizing her mental health. . . . Further, while the
       [respondent] always attended her visitation sessions
       with Zayden, she did not gain any insight into her parent-
       ing. The [respondent] never understood portion control
       for [Zayden] and never was able to properly soothe
       [him]. The [respondent] could not regulate her own
       conduct and focus on [Zayden’s] well-being. Moreover,
       the [respondent] routinely disrupted visitations in that
       she was rude to the staff and required emergency per-
       sonnel intervention.’’
          In addition, the court found that ‘‘[t]here was limited
       evidence as to [Zayden’s] ties with the [respondent].
       . . . [Zayden] has been in the care of his foster parents
       since birth. He is now two. All he has known are his
       current foster parents. The foster family cares for
       Zayden and ensures his health, education, and every
       need are tended to. He is bonded to this family.’’ Fur-
       thermore, the court credited the testimony of the
       respondent’s case manager at the department, Sherene
       Williams, who supervised some of the respondent’s vis-
       its with Zayden. Specifically, Williams testified at trial
       that the department assessed each of the six relative
       resources identified by the respondent and determined
       that they were not appropriate for placement for various
       reasons: T became ill and stated that she could not be
       a resource at this time; one was not able to pass the
       department’s checks; one had an active department
       case against her; one told the department that she did
       not want to be a resource for Zayden; and two were
       not employed at the time and only wanted guardianship
       of Zayden instead of being a foster parent to him.
          The court’s finding that the termination of the respon-
       dent’s parental rights is in Zayden’s best interest is
       supported by the evidence in the record. Although there
       is evidence in the record that the respondent loves
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                                        In re Zayden J.

          Zayden and attended many of her supervised visits with
          him, this court has recognized that ‘‘love and a biologi-
          cal bond is not enough.’’ In re Emily S., 210 Conn. App.
          581, 628, 270 A.3d 797, cert. denied, 342 Conn. 911, 271
          A.3d 1039 (2022). Moreover, there was evidence that
          when the respondent attended her supervised visits
          with Zayden, she was often unable to control her behav-
          ior during these visits, which raised serious concerns
          for Zayden’s safety. For example, Williams testified that
          the police had to be called three times during the
          respondent’s supervised visits at the department. Two
          of those instances were because the respondent refused
          to relinquish Zayden to department personnel at the
          conclusion of her visits.7 Williams also testified that
          Zayden has lived with his foster parents since birth,
          has developed a strong bond with them, and refers to
          them as mom and dad. Furthermore, the court credited
          Williams’ testimony that the department evaluated each
          of the relative resources provided by the respondent
          and deemed each of them inappropriate as a relative
          placement resource for Zayden. It is well established
          that ‘‘we must defer to the [trier of fact’s] assessment
          of the credibility of the witnesses based on its firsthand
          observation of their conduct, demeanor and attitude.
          . . . In a case that is tried to the court . . . the judge
          is the sole arbiter of the credibility of witnesses, and the
          weight to be given to their specific testimony.’’ (Internal
          quotation marks omitted.) In re Christina C., 221 Conn.
          App. 185, 221, 300 A.3d 1188, cert. denied, 348 Conn.
          907, 301 A.3d 1056 (2023).
             These facts, which are grounded in the evidence,
          strongly support the court’s best interest determination,
             7
               Williams also testified that, during the last supervised visit where the
          police had to be called, the respondent threatened to jump out of a fourth
          floor window when Zayden was out of her hands. After this incident, the
          department moved the supervised visits to a third-party provider due to
          safety concerns.
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       and we will not substitute our judgment for that of the
       trial court. Accordingly, we conclude that the court’s
       conclusion that the termination of the respondent’s
       parental rights is in Zayden’s best interest was not
       clearly erroneous.
                                   III
           Finally, the respondent claims that the court improp-
       erly denied her motion for a continuance. She asserts
       that the denial of her motion violated her fundamental
       ‘‘right of family integrity.’’ We disagree.
          As set forth previously in this opinion, on February
       6, 2023, three days prior to the scheduled beginning of
       the consolidated trial on the petition to terminate the
       respondent’s parental rights and the respondent’s
       motion to transfer guardianship, the respondent filed
       a motion for a sixty day continuance, stating that a
       putative father for Zayden had been identified and that
       he was scheduled to take a DNA test. As grounds for
       her motion, the respondent asserted that ‘‘[a putative]
       father, [Lee Roy B.], has been identified and a DNA test
       [has been] scheduled. The DNA test has been delayed.
       [The putative] father needs to be given reasonable
       efforts. In addition, several relatives have been identi-
       fied for a [transfer of guardianship] but [the department]
       has refused all relatives.’’ The court denied the respon-
       dent’s motion for a continuance. The court then held
       a trial on February 9 and 16, 2023.
          In raising a challenge of constitutional dimension
       with respect to the court’s denial of the motion for a
       continuance, the respondent asserts a deprivation of
       her due process right to a fair trial. The petitioner argues
       that we should not review the respondent’s constitu-
       tional claim and, in the alternative, argues that the trial
       court properly exercised its discretion in denying the
       respondent’s motion for a continuance.
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             It is necessary to consider whether to review the
          respondent’s claim as a claim of constitutional dimen-
          sion, as the respondent argues, or whether we should
          review the court’s ruling for an abuse of its discretion,
          as the petitioner argues. ‘‘The due process rights of the
          fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution
          apply in proceedings brought by the state to terminate
          parental rights. . . . A reviewing court ordinarily ana-
          lyzes a denial of a continuance in terms of whether the
          court has abused its discretion. . . . This is so where
          the denial is not directly linked to a specific constitu-
          tional right. . . . If, however, the denial of a continu-
          ance is directly linked to the deprivation of a specific
          constitutional right, some courts analyze the denial in
          terms of whether there has been a denial of due process.
          . . . Even if the denial of a motion for a continuance
          on the ground of lack of due process can be directly
          linked to a claim of a denial of a specific constitutional
          right, if the reasons given for the continuance do not
          support any interference with the specific constitu-
          tional right, the court’s analysis will revolve around
          whether the trial court abused its discretion. . . . In
          other words, the constitutional right alleged to have
          been violated must be shown, not merely alleged.’’ (Cita-
          tions omitted; emphasis added; footnote omitted.) In
          re Shaquanna M., 61 Conn. App. 592, 601–603, 767 A.2d
          155 (2001).
             Our careful review of the grounds stated in support
          of the respondent’s motion for a continuance reveals
          that they relate to the putative father’s potential paren-
          tal rights as to Zayden. The reasons stated in the motion
          for a continuance do not interfere with the parental
          rights of the respondent, her ability to effectively chal-
          lenge the allegations in the termination of parental
          rights petition, or her ability to pursue her motion to
          transfer guardianship. Specifically, the motion relates
          to Lee Roy B.’s right to have the department make
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                              In re Zayden J.

       reasonable efforts to reunify him with Zayden, if he
       was found to be the biological father. In neither the
       respondent’s written motion nor her arguments before
       this court does the respondent demonstrate how the
       grounds of the motion implicated the adjudication of
       her parental rights. ‘‘[I]t bears emphasis that termina-
       tion of parental rights proceedings concern only the
       rights of the respondent parent.’’ (Emphasis in original;
       internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Deboras S.,
       220 Conn. App. 1, 39, 296 A.3d 842 (2023). Lee Roy B.
       was not a party to the underlying termination proceed-
       ing and the respondent is unable to demonstrate that,
       even if his rights were adversely affected by the court’s
       denial of the motion for a continuance, the adverse
       ruling somehow affected fundamental rights personal
       to her. The respondent’s claim is not of constitutional
       magnitude, and thus it is proper to analyze the claim
       under the abuse of discretion standard of review.
          ‘‘The determination of whether to grant a request for
       a continuance is within the discretion of the trial court,
       and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of
       discretion. . . . A reviewing court is bound by the prin-
       ciple that [e]very reasonable presumption in favor of
       the proper exercise of the trial court’s discretion will
       be made. . . . To prove an abuse of discretion, an
       appellant must show that the trial court’s denial of a
       request for a continuance was arbitrary. . . . [Our
       Supreme Court has] articulated a number of factors
       that appropriately may enter into an appellate court’s
       review of a trial court’s exercise of its discretion in
       denying a motion for a continuance. Although resistant
       to precise cataloguing, such factors revolve around the
       circumstances before the trial court at the time it ren-
       dered its decision, including: the timeliness of the
       request for continuance; the likely length of the delay;
       the age and complexity of the case; the granting of
       other continuances in the past; the impact of delay on
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          the litigants, witnesses, opposing counsel and the court;
          the perceived legitimacy of the reasons proffered in
          support of the request; [and] the [party’s] personal
          responsibility for the timing of the request . . . .’’ In
          re Na-Ki J., 222 Conn. App. 1, 15–16, 303 A.3d 1206,
          cert. denied, 348 Conn. 929, 304 A.3d 860 (2023).
             Having determined that the respondent’s claim is not
          of constitutional magnitude, and is therefore reviewed
          under an abuse of discretion standard, we conclude
          that she has failed to show how the court abused its
          discretion in denying her motion for a continuance
          given her failure to demonstrate how the grounds of
          the motion implicated the adjudication of her paren-
          tal rights.
             The appeal is dismissed with respect to the respon-
          dent’s claim that the department did not make reason-
          able efforts to reunify her with Zayden; the judgment
          is affirmed.
               In this opinion the other judges concurred.