Court Opinion

ID: 9945332
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-27 18:10:50.969244+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:26.746119
License: Public Domain

J-A29027-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :
 HERMAN L. EDMONDSON                      :
                                          :
                    Appellant             :   No. 884 WDA 2023

            Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 30, 2023
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Criminal Division at No(s):
                         CP-25-CR-0000038-2018

BEFORE: BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:                   FILED: February 27, 2024

      Herman L. Edmondson appeals pro se from the order denying his latest

request for post-conviction relief.   The lower court treated this as a serial

petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-

46. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

      The pertinent facts and procedural history are as follows: In 2018, a

jury convicted Edmondson of conspiracy to commit aggravated assault. These

convictions arose after Edmondson conspired with Lawrence Johnson to shoot

two people thereby causing them serious bodily injury.      On December 10,

2018, the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of 84 to 164 months

in prison. Edmondson filed a timely post-sentence motion, which was granted

only as to a time credit issue. Edmondson appealed. On November 22, 2019,

this Court affirmed his judgment of sentence.            Commonwealth v.
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Edmondson, 224 A.3d 791 (Pa. Super. 2019) (non-precedential decision).

Edmondson did not seek further review.

       On November 30, 2020, Edmondson filed a timely pro se PCRA petition.

The PCRA court appointed counsel. On April 21, 2021, PCRA counsel filed an

amended petition.          In this petition, PCRA counsel opined that the

ineffectiveness claims raised by Edmondson in his pro se petition were

meritless. Instead, PCRA counsel raised a claim of after-discovered evidence

based on an affidavit from Lawrence Johnson.

       On May 5, 2021, the PCRA court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its

intent to dismiss the petition without a hearing. Edmondson did not file a

timely response.      By order entered June 2, 2021, the PCRA court denied

Edmondson’s amended petition. Edmondson did not file an appeal.

       On March 24, 2023, Edmondson filed a pro se “Reinstatement of

[Appellate] Rights Nunc Pro Tunc and Request to Pursue [PCRA] Counsel’s

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim Pursuant to Commonwealth v.

[Bradley].”1 By separate memorandum and order, the PCRA court denied the

request for reinstatement of appellate rights.2 The PCRA court treated the

remaining portion of Edmondson’s filing as a subsequent PCRA petition. On

May 10, 2023, the PCRA court issued a Rule 907 notice of its intent to dismiss

the petition without a hearing because it was untimely-filed, and Edmondson
____________________________________________

1 Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381 (Pa. 2021).

2 Edmondson did not appeal this order.

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failed to establish an exception to the PCRA’s time bar. Edmondson filed a

pro se response. By order entered June 30, 2023, the PCRA court dismissed

Edmondson’s petition. This appeal followed. Both Edmondson and the PCRA

court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

      Edmondson raises four issues on appeal which we cite verbatim:

      I.     Did the PCRA court erred as matter of law in dismissing
             PCRA petition without a hearing?

      II.    Was Petitioner denied his rights under Article I, Section 9 of
             the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Sixth and Fourteenth
             Amendments to the United States Constitution when PCRA
             counsel failed to properly present and preserve trial
             counsel’s ineffective assistance to the PCRA court.

      III.   Did the PCRA court erred as a matter of law in dismissing
             Petitioner’s claim of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness in failing
             to interview of call as a witness Lawrence “Larry” Johnson
             in violation of the 6th and 14th Amendment to the United
             States Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the
             Pennsylvania Constitution wherein PCRA counsel failed to
             make the proper and correct argument to the PCRA court?

      IV.    Were the PCRA court’s factual findings and legal conclusions
             in denying Petitioner’s lack effective assistance of counsel
             and access to the PCRA process in violation of the 6th and
             14th Amendments to the United States Constitution and
             Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution?

Edmondson’s Brief at 4.

      Before discussing these issues, however, we must first address whether

the PCRA court properly considered Edmondson’s latest filing for post-

conviction relief as a second PCRA petition.         See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542

(providing that the PCRA “shall be the sole means of obtaining collateral relief

and encompasses all other common law and statutory remedies for the same

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purpose . . . including habeas corpus”); Commonwealth v. Descardes, 136

A.3d 493, 499 (Pa. 2016) (explaining that “claims that could be brought under

the PCRA must be brought under that Act. . . . A claim is cognizable under

the PCRA if the . . . conviction resulted from one of seven enumerated errors

set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)”).

      In his 2023 filing, Edmondson raised layered claims of ineffective

assistance of PCRA counsel. These challenges constitute a cognizable claim

under the PCRA.     See   Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii).    Thus, the PCRA court

properly considered Edmondson’s filing at issue here as a serial PCRA petition.

      Treating Edmondson’s latest filing as a PCRA petition, we next determine

whether the PCRA court correctly concluded that it was untimely filed, and

that Edmondson failed to establish a time-bar exception. The timeliness of a

post-conviction petition is jurisdictional. Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 79

A.3d 649, 651 (Pa. Super. 2013). Generally, a petition for relief under the

PCRA, including a second or subsequent petition, must be filed within one year

of the date the judgment becomes final unless the petition alleges, and the

petitioner proves, that an exception to the time for filing the petition is met.

      The three narrow statutory exceptions to the one-year time bar are as

follows: “(1) interference by government officials in the presentation of the

claim; (2) newly discovered facts; and (3) an after-recognized constitutional

right.” Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51 A.3d 231, 233-34 (Pa. Super. 2012)

(citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii)). In addition, exceptions to the PCRA’s

time bar must be pled in the petition and may not be raised for the first time

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on appeal.        Commonwealth v. Burton, 936 A.2d 521, 525 (Pa. Super.

2007); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing that issues not raised before the

lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal).

Moreover, a PCRA petitioner must file his petition “within one year of the date

the claim could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).

       Finally, if a PCRA petition is untimely and the petitioner has not pled and

proven an exception, “neither this Court nor the [PCRA] court has jurisdiction

over the petition.      Without jurisdiction, we simply do not have the legal

authority    to    address   the    substantive   claims.”   Commonwealth      v.

Derrickson, 923 A.2d 466, 468 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted).

       Here, Edmondson’s judgment of sentence became final on December

23, 2019, thirty days after he failed to file a petition for allowance of appeal

with our Supreme Court.            See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3).3     Therefore,

Edmondson had until December 22, 2020, to file a timely PCRA petition. As

Edmondson filed the petition at issue in 2023, it is patently untimely unless

he has satisfied his burden of pleading and proving that one of the enumerated

exceptions applies. See Hernandez, supra.

       Edmondson has failed to plead and prove any exception to the PCRA’s

time bar.    Indeed, in both his latest filing and brief he fails to acknowledge

the statutory time restrictions, and proceeds to argue his substantive issues.
____________________________________________

3 Because the thirtieth day fell on a Sunday, Edmondson had until the following

Monday to file a timely petition for allowance of appeal. See generally, 1
Pa.C.S.A. § 1908.

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Instead, Edmondson asserts that his March 2023 filing was actually his pro se

response to the PCRA court’s Rule 907 notice for his November 2020 PCRA

petition.

      Edmondson’s pro se response was filed after the PCRA court had already

entered its order denying his 2020 PCRA petition. Thus, the 2023 filing was

treated as a second PCRA petition.     Edmondson contends that even if his

response is treated as a second PCRA petition, “it should be treated as a timely

filed second petition based on the newly discovered fact exception, i.e., PCRA

counsel’s abandonment.” Edmondson’s Brief at 10. We cannot agree.

      The PCRA court held that our Supreme Court’s decision in Bradley,

supra, does not permit Edmondson to raise a claim of PCRA counsel’s

ineffectiveness in an untimely serial PCRA Petition. The court explained:

            [Edmondson] predicates his claim for PCRA relief on
      [Bradley, supra]. However, the reason for this is unclear on the
      face of the Petition. To the extent [Edmondson] implies a new
      exception to the timeliness rule was carved out by [Bradley],
      [Edmondson’s] reliance upon the case is misplaced. Bradley did
      not abrogate the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision of
      Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 223 (Pa. 1999) (claim
      of ineffective assistance of counsel does not save an otherwise
      untimely petition for review on the merits). As the majority in
      Bradley stated,”[u]nder the PCRA, ineffective assistance of
      counsel is one of the enumerated errors entitling a defend to relief
      so long as the other conditions of the PCRA are met.” [Bradley,
      261 A.3d at 390]. The jurisdictional timeliness requirement is one
      such condition of the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).

Rule 907 Notice, 5/10/23, at 3-4.

      Our review of recent precedent supports the PCRA court’s conclusions.

This Court has held that “[n]othing in Bradley creates a right to file a second

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PCRA outside the PCRA’s one-year time limit as a method of raising

ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel or permits recognition of such a right.”

Commonwealth v. Stahl, 292 A.3d 1130, 1136 (Pa. Super. 2023).              The

Stahl court clarified that “our Supreme Court in Bradley unambiguously

rejected the filing of a successive untimely PCRA petition as a permissible

method of vindicating the right to effective representation by PCRA counsel.”

Id.   Therefore, Bradley does not excuse the facial untimeliness of

Edmondson’s second PCRA petition.       Additionally, PCRA counsel’s alleged

abandonment is not a “newly-discovered” fact concerning the crime for which

he was convicted. As such, this alleged abandonment does not satisfy a time-

bar exception.

      In sum, Edmondson’s latest filing is cognizable under the PCRA, but it is

untimely, and he has failed to establish a time-bar exception. As such, both

the PCRA court and this Court lack jurisdiction to consider his substantive

claims.   Derrickson, supra.    We therefore affirm the PCRA court’s order

denying him post-conviction relief.

      Order affirmed.

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2/27/2024

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