Court Opinion

ID: 9726124
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:32:11.056361+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:12:47.843488
License: Public Domain

PIVARNIK, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I concur with the majority in its disposition of Issues 2 and 3, but dissent as to Issue 1 wherein it was their conclusion that Respondent's conduct here did not violate Rule 1-102(A)(8) since it did not involve illegal conduct involving moral turpitude. I cannot join the majority in its conclusions that driving an automobile on a public highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquors is a crime lacking in a demonstration of moral turpitude subjecting the violator to disciplinary action by this Court. Failure to recognize the gravity and oftentimes tragic results of this conduct places this Court in remission of its duties and responsibilities to the profession and to the citizens of this State.
The facts are not in dispute here. The Respondent admits his guilt at this point and did so in the Morgan County Court by entering a plea of guilty. There is, therefore, a proof of the violation by "clear and convincing evidence" and the Hearing Offi-eer found this to be so. The only questions remaining before us are whether the conduct constitutes a violation of any of our rules and what, if any, discipline is warranted. Any findings by the Hearing Officer in this latter regard are merely suggestions and recommendations that do not bind us. In Re: Jones (1984), Ind. 464 N.E.2d 1281, reh. denied; In re: Crumpacker (1978) 269 Ind. 630, 383 N.E.2d 36, cert. denied 444 U.S. 979, 100 S.Ct. 481, 62 L.Ed.2d 406; In re: Murray (1977) 266 Ind. 221, 362 N.E.2d 128; In re: Pawlowski (1959) 240 Ind. 412, 165 N.E.2d 595, reh. denied.
I agree with the definition of moral turpitude as the majority has very clearly defined it. Let us then examine the Respondent's violation here in view of that definition. Respondent drove a motor vehicle on a State highway in a state of intoxication that indicated a concentration of alcohol in his system an hour after the accident to be *1244that of .28. This is a very high concentration of alcohol that severely impaired his ability to safely and effectively operate the automobile. This was demonstrated by the fact that he did, in fact, fail to negotiate a turn and left the roadway, striking a tree. This result was not only predictable but one that happens all too often in our society. It is not a matter of speculation that driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquors, more commonly referred to in our society "drunken driving", is one of the most serious problems in our society today that accounts for countless numbers of injuries, deaths, and property damage. The gravity of this problem is common knowledge, to be found in the daily records of police files, court records, and on the pages of our daily newspapers. Though I have no actual numbers before me, statistical research indicates more people suffer loss of life, limb and/or property damage from drivers under the influence of alcohol than from those who commit purposeful, serious crimes, such as murder, robbery, rape, and the other well known violent acts readily described as involving moral turpitude. It is therefore unrealistic for this Court to say that a member of the Bar who commits this act did not violate Rule 1-102(A)(8).
It is the privilege of this Respondent to practice law and be a member of the Bar, that is under consideration in a cause such as this. The privilege is granted by the State and it is the duty and responsibility of this Court to decide when that privilege has been abused. We cannot ignore the fact that this privilege is extended and this action based on Respondent's status as a trained, experienced, and professional lawyer. He well knew that driving a vehicle while in a state of intoxication was a violation of the criminal law. Furthermore, he was familiar with the potential for tragic results and, more importantly, was fully familiar, through his daily practice, that these tragic results do occur from conduct such as this. I have no doubt but that the judgment of the community upon Oliver's conduct referred to by the majority would be that the crime he committed involved moral turpitude.
I fail to find the comfort the majority does in the fact Respondent apparently did not receive a conviction. The Legislature has denominated driving under the influence of alcohol a criminal act: namely, a class A misdemeanor which involves a range of penalties including a suspension of driving privileges of the violator. It is true, Respondent's charge was handled in an unusual way by the court and the prose-ecution. Respondent entered a plea of guilty but the trial judge withheld acceptance of that plea on condition that he perform fifty (50) hours of community service, attend alcohol education school, contribute $250.00 to an appropriate charity and commit no further offense for one year. Finding that Oliver had met all of these requirements, the trial judge dismissed the cause after one year. The majority finds this disposition to be within the discretion and authority of the trial judge. I do not. Ind. Code § 35-88-1 and 2 (Burns Repl.1985) authorizes a court to place a person on probation and sets out the terms of probation the judge can use. These sections contemplate that the judge first find the person guilty of a crime and then sentence him accordingly. There is no authority for a judge to "withhold acceptance of a guilty plea" or in any manner fail to find him guilty of the crime and then impose penalties or set conditions of probation. The judgment also fails to refer to disposition of fine and costs as provided for in Ind. Code § 85-50 ef. seq. (Burns Repl.1985). The trial judge further permitted Respondent to drive on a restricted license pursuant to Ind. Code § 9-4-1-54 and § 9-11-3-2 (Burns Repl.1980). This would not have been required had the defendant not been convicted of the violation and yet all that appears is that no guilty plea was accepted, no judgment of conviction was entered, and the cause was dismissed without objection from the State a year later. Although this unusual disposition is difficult to define, we are not faced with a situation where the guilt of the Respondent is in question. He readily entered a plea of *1245guilty in the trial court, accepted the punishment imposed by the trial judge and does not deny that he committed this violation. Hence the fact that Respondent did not receive a proper "conviction" is not significant to our determination here.
I do consider the sanction imposed by the majority to be appropriate. This is an isolated incident, there is no evidence to suggest Respondent has engaged in similar conduct in the past and Respondent's conduct during this procedure has indicated that future acts of similar misconduct are unlikely to occur since he has accepted sole responsibility and is generally remorseful. I therefore find that a public reprimand is an appropriate sanction.
GIVAN, C.J., concurs.