Court Opinion

ID: 9407234
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-06 13:01:12.914607+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:35.927558
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-2117   Document: 55     Page: 1   Filed: 06/21/2023

        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                 ______________________

                   YOLDAS ASKAN,
                   Plaintiff-Appellant

                            v.

            FARO TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
                 Defendant-Appellee
               ______________________

                       2022-2117
                 ______________________

    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
 Middle District of Florida in No. 6:21-cv-01366-PGB-DCI,
 Judge Paul G. Byron.
                  ______________________

                 Decided: June 21, 2023
                 ______________________

    YOLDAS ASKAN, Birmingham, United Kingdom, pro se.

     ASHLEY BOLAND SUMMER, Nelson Mullins Riley & Scar-
 borough LLP, New York, NY, for defendant-appellee. Also
 represented by JOHN BAUER; LLOYD GARRETT FARR, At-
 lanta, GA; NICOLETTE VILMOS, Orlando, FL.
                 ______________________

 Before CHEN, HUGHES, and CUNNINGHAM, Circuit Judges.
 CHEN, Circuit Judge.
Case: 22-2117     Document: 55       Page: 2   Filed: 06/21/2023

 2                           ASKAN   v. FARO TECHNOLOGIES, INC.

      Yoldas Askan appeals an order by the United States
 District Court for the Middle District of Florida that dis-
 missed his patent-infringement complaint against FARO
 Technologies, Inc. (FARO) on two independent grounds:
 (1) as a sanction for failing to comply with a court order,
 and (2) as precluded under the Kessler doctrine 1. Askan v.
 FARO Techs. Inc., Case No. 6:21-cv-1366, 2022 WL
 12058559, at *1, 4 (M.D. Fla. July 8, 2022) (Order). Be-
 cause the district court did not abuse its discretion in sanc-
 tioning Mr. Askan and correctly applied the Kessler
 doctrine, we affirm.
                       BACKGROUND
     We previously considered a dismissal with prejudice in
 a prior litigation between Mr. Askan and FARO because of
 Mr. Askan’s behavior during discovery. Askan v. FARO
 Techs., Inc., 809 F. App’x 880, 883–84 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (per
 curiam) (Askan I). There, Mr. Askan alleged that FARO’s
 Focus 3D scanner product infringed claims of U.S. Patent
 Nos. 8,705,110 (’110 patent); 9,300,841 (’841 patent); and
 10,032,255 (’255 patent). Id. In eight months, Mr. Askan
 was sanctioned twice and failed to respond to an order to
 show cause, timely file a case management report, appear
 for a hearing, comply with a court order compelling discov-
 ery, and respond to three separate motions by FARO. Id.
 According to the district court, “dismissal with prejudice
 was warranted” because Mr. Askan’s “repeated violations
 establish[ed] a clear record of delay or willful contempt, far
 beyond mere negligence or confusion.” Id. at 884 (cleaned
 up). The district court further found that Mr. Askan had
 “willfully, in bad faith, and in disregard of his responsibili-
 ties” failed to comply with its order requiring him to re-
 spond to FARO’s requests for production (RFPs).
 Mr. Askan appealed, and we affirmed. Id. at 884–85.

     1   This doctrine finds its origin in the Supreme
 Court’s decision in Kessler v. Eldred, 206 U.S. 285 (1907).
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 ASKAN   v. FARO TECHNOLOGIES, INC.                           3

     In April 2021, Mr. Askan filed a new complaint in the
 United States District Court for the Eastern District of
 Pennsylvania, this time alleging that FARO’s Focus 3D
 scanner product and SCENE software product infringed
 the same claims of the ’841 and ’255 patents that were at
 issue in Askan I. Order, 2022 WL 12058559, at *1, 4. The
 district court transferred the case to the Middle District of
 Florida under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Id. at *1.
      After the transfer, FARO served RFPs on Mr. Askan.
 Id. at *2. The same day, Mr. Askan served RFPs that were
 “identical word by word” to FARO’s RFPs. Id. Mr. Askan
 subsequently failed to produce any documents in response
 to FARO’s RFPs, instead objecting to each RFP with the
 assertion that because Mr. Askan requested the same doc-
 uments from FARO, any production by FARO satisfied
 Mr. Askan’s duty to produce. Id. Finding Mr. Askan’s re-
 sponses deficient and his objections waived, the magistrate
 judge ordered Mr. Askan to respond to FARO’s RFPs by
 May 25, 2022. Id. On May 27, 2022, Askan filed a motion
 for reconsideration that included the same arguments pre-
 viously rejected by the magistrate judge and the same ob-
 jections previously deemed waived. Id. Mr. Askan then
 filed a motion for enlargement of time to comply with the
 district court’s order. Id. Before the district court ruled on
 the motion, however, Mr. Askan responded to FARO’s
 RFPs by again requesting production of the same docu-
 ments requested by FARO, again failing to produce any
 documents, and again asserting the same general objection
 to each RFP. Id.
     FARO moved for Rule 37 sanctions, seeking dismissal
 with prejudice of Mr. Askan’s complaint, and, separately,
 requested dismissal under the Kessler doctrine. Id. at *1.
 The district court dismissed Mr. Askan’s complaint with
 prejudice on both grounds. Id. at *1 n.1, 7. First, as to the
 Rule 37 sanctions, the district court found that Mr. Askan’s
 “willful disobedience of the Court’s order compelling the
 production of discovery” was neither “excusable” nor “justi-
 fied,” that Mr. Askan “engaged in conduct delaying or
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 4                           ASKAN   v. FARO TECHNOLOGIES, INC.

 disrupting the litigation and hampering enforcement of a
 Court Order,” and that “this conduct [was] part of a pattern
 tha[t] began in the prior litigation, resulted in dismissal
 and the imposition of attorney’s fees in favor of [FARO],
 and which has failed to deter [Mr. Askan].” Id. Second, the
 district court held that the Kessler doctrine applies to a dis-
 missal with prejudice and does not require that the issue
 of noninfringement or invalidity be “actually litigated.” Id.
 at *3–4 (citing In re PersonalWeb Techs. LLC, 961 F.3d
 1365, 1376–77, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2020)).
                         DISCUSSION
     On appeal, Mr. Askan challenges both the district
 court’s dismissal under Rule 37 and dismissal under the
 Kessler doctrine. We review these issues in turn.
                    I.   Rule 37 Dismissal
     We apply regional circuit law when reviewing a district
 court’s sanction decision. United Constr. Prod., Inc. v. Tile
 Tech, Inc., 843 F.3d 1363, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The Elev-
 enth Circuit’s review of a sanction decision is “sharply lim-
 ited to an abuse-of-discretion standard and a
 determination that the findings of the trial court are fully
 supported by the record.” Circuitronix, LLC v. Kinwong
 Elec. (Hong Kong) Co., 993 F.3d 1299, 1303 (11th Cir. 2021)
 (cleaned up).
     Rule 37 authorizes a district court to “dismiss[] the ac-
 tion or proceeding in whole or in part” or “render[] a default
 judgment” against a party that disobeys a discovery order.
 Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A). The Eleventh Circuit has found
 that Rule 37 sanctions are appropriate “only if noncompli-
 ance with discovery orders is due to willful or bad faith dis-
 regard for those orders,” such that “the party’s conduct
 amounts to flagrant disregard and willful disobedience of
 discovery orders.” United States v. Real Prop. Located at
 Route 1, 126 F.3d 1314, 1317 (11th Cir. 1997) (cleaned up).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion in dis-
 missing Mr. Askan’s complaint due to his discovery
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 ASKAN   v. FARO TECHNOLOGIES, INC.                           5

 misconduct. Mr. Askan failed to produce any documents in
 response to FARO’s RFPs and counter-served identical
 RFPs to FARO, claiming that this negated any need for
 him to produce documents. Order, 2022 WL 12058559, at
 *2. Despite the magistrate judge’s warning that this re-
 sponse was deficient, Mr. Askan still did not comply with
 FARO’s RFPs. Id. Mr. Askan, instead, filed a belated mo-
 tion for reconsideration and resubmitted the same objec-
 tions to the RFPs that the district court already found
 deficient. Id. Worse yet, these discovery violations were a
 repeat from the prior litigation, and Mr. Askan thus had
 notice as to the potential consequence of noncompliance.
 Id. Mr. Askan’s deficient response to FARO’s initial dis-
 covery requests and his subsequent disregard of the mag-
 istrate judge’s order to comply amounted to a “bad faith,”
 “flagrant disregard and willful disobedience of discovery or-
 ders.” Real Prop. Located at Route 1, 126 F.3d at 1317
 (cleaned up).
     Mr. Askan argues otherwise, contending that he served
 the identical RFPs on FARO to “get [FARO] to participate
 in the discovery process” after FARO allegedly ignored
 Mr. Askan’s emails and communications informally re-
 questing information from FARO. Appellant’s Br. 39–40.
 Mr. Askan further asserts the documents that FARO
 sought corresponded to those from Mr. Askan’s production
 in the prior litigation. Id. at 40.
     Mr. Askan’s arguments are unpersuasive. The evi-
 dence establishes that FARO complied with the court-or-
 dered discovery process. Mr. Askan offers no support from
 the record indicating that FARO was required to comply
 with Mr. Askan’s informal requests for documents and in-
 formation. Nor does FARO’s alleged noncompliance excuse
 Mr. Askan from producing materials in response to FARO’s
 RFPs or from complying with the court’s order. And
 Mr. Askan’s production in the prior litigation does not ex-
 cuse Mr. Askan from producing those documents in the
 current litigation. Indeed, even if FARO may have pos-
 sessed documents that Mr. Askan produced in the prior
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 6                           ASKAN   v. FARO TECHNOLOGIES, INC.

 litigation, the district court in the prior litigation held that
 production to be deficient. Suppl. App. 3385 (Askan
 v. FARO Techs, Inc., No. 6:18-cv-1122, (M.D. Fla. Dec. 21,
 2018), ECF No. 93).
     In view of Mr. Askan’s discovery violations in the cur-
 rent litigation, the district court did not abuse its discretion
 by dismissing Mr. Askan’s complaint under Rule 37.
                     II. Kessler Doctrine
     We also agree with the district court that the dismissal
 with prejudice in the prior litigation precluded Mr. Askan’s
 infringement claims in the current litigation and thus af-
 firm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in fa-
 vor of FARO. See Order, 2022 WL 12058559, at *2, 5. We
 review the grant of summary judgment under the law of
 the regional circuit in which the district court sits. Classen
 Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Elan Pharm., Inc., 786 F.3d 892,
 896 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In the Eleventh Circuit, such review
 is de novo. Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1325 (11th Cir.
 2005). In assessing whether summary judgment is proper,
 we “view all evidence and make all reasonable inferences
 in favor of the party opposing summary judgment.” Haves
 v. City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th Cir. 1995) (citation
 omitted).
     We apply the law of the regional circuit to general prin-
 ciples of claim preclusion but apply Federal Circuit law to
 determine whether two causes of action for patent infringe-
 ment are the same in the context of preclusion. In re Per-
 sonalWeb, 961 F.3d at 1374. Two patent actions are
 considered the same if the accused devices in the first ac-
 tion and the accused devices in the second action are “es-
 sentially the same.” Id. at 1375; Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co.,
 947 F.2d 469, 479–80 (Fed. Cir. 1991). We consider the
 Kessler doctrine to be “a close relative to claim preclusion”
 but without the temporal limitation that prevents claim
 preclusion from being “appl[ied] to acts of alleged infringe-
 ment that occur after the final judgment in the earlier
 suit.” In re PersonalWeb, 961 F.3d at 1376–77.
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 ASKAN   v. FARO TECHNOLOGIES, INC.                           7

     Under the Kessler doctrine, “an adjudged non-in-
 fringer” can “avoid repeated harassment for continuing its
 business as usual post-final judgment in a patent action
 where circumstances justify that result.” Id. at 1376. The
 Kessler doctrine then “grant[s] a ‘limited trade right’ that
 attaches to the product itself.” Id. at 1378 (quoting Speed-
 Track, Inc. v. Office Depot, Inc., 791 F.3d 1317, 1323 (Fed.
 Cir. 2015)). This status also applies to accused products
 that are “essentially the same” as the products at issue in
 the earlier patent action. See Brain Life, LLC v. Elekta
 Inc., 746 F.3d 1045, 1057–58 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
      We agree with the district court that (1) the dismissal
 with prejudice of Mr. Askan’s prior complaint has a preclu-
 sive effect under the Kessler doctrine and (2) Mr. Askan
 failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that the
 products in the prior litigation and the current litigation
 were not essentially the same.
      First, the with-prejudice dismissal in the prior litiga-
 tion operates as an adjudication of non-liability for in-
 fringement under the Kessler doctrine. Mr. Askan argues
 otherwise, contending that the Kessler doctrine does not
 apply because the dismissal with prejudice in the prior lit-
 igation did not reach the issue of infringement. See Appel-
 lant’s Br. 27–29. We expressly rejected this argument in
 In re PersonalWeb¸ instead holding that the with-prejudice
 “dismissal operated as an adjudication on the merits for
 claim preclusion purposes” and therefore “operated as an
 adjudication of non-liability for infringement for purposes
 of invoking the Kessler doctrine.” In re PersonalWeb, 961
 F.3d at 1376–79; see Hallco Mfg. Co. v. Foster, 256 F.3d
 1290, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (stating that “a dismissal with
 prejudice . . . is a judgment on the merits”); accord Citi-
 bank, N.A. v. Data Lease Fin. Corp., 904 F.2d 1498, 1501
 (11th Cir.1990) (holding that in the context of claim preclu-
 sion, “dismissal of a complaint with prejudice satisfies the
 requirement that there be a judgment on the merits.”);
 Hart v. Yamaha-Parts Distributors, Inc., 787 F.2d 1468,
 1470 (11th Cir. 1986) (“A dismissal with prejudice operates
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 8                          ASKAN   v. FARO TECHNOLOGIES, INC.

 as a judgment on the merits unless the court specifies oth-
 erwise.”). Here, we affirmed the district court’s with-prej-
 udice dismissal of Mr. Askan’s prior litigation. Askan I,
 809 F. App’x at 885. This dismissal, in the context of the
 Kessler doctrine, operated as an adjudication of non-liabil-
 ity for infringement.
      Mr. Askan nevertheless argues that his involuntary
 dismissal should not have the same preclusive effect as the
 stipulated dismissal at issue in In re PersonalWeb. See Ap-
 pellant’s Br. 31–34; Appellant’s Reply Br. 24–25, 28. The
 stipulation in In re PersonalWeb, however, has no bearing
 on whether the prior, involuntary dismissal of Mr. Askan’s
 complaint is covered under the Kessler doctrine. In In re
 PersonalWeb, we determined that the stipulation had no
 contingencies, and thus held that the “stipulated dismissal
 with prejudice . . . operated as an adjudication on the mer-
 its for claim preclusion purposes.” 961 F.3d at 1379 (citing
 Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co.,
 719 F.3d 1367, 1372–73 (Fed. Cir. 2013)). Like the dismis-
 sal in In re PersonalWeb, the district court’s prior dismissal
 of Mr. Askan’s complaint did not carry any contingencies.
 Thus, this dismissal with prejudice was an adjudication on
 the merits for claim preclusion purposes, and the fact that
 it was involuntary is irrelevant to its preclusive effect.
     Second, we agree that the record below does not estab-
 lish a genuine dispute that the products in the first and
 second litigation are “essentially the same.” The district
 court relied on (1) testimony from FARO’s technical wit-
 ness explaining that the differences between the products
 at issue in the prior litigation and the current litigation
 were immaterial to the asserted patent claims, and
 (2) Mr. Askan’s identical infringement contentions in both
 cases. Order, 2022 WL 12058559, at *4–5; see, e.g.,
 Huang v. Huawei Techs. Co., 787 F. App’x 723, 726 & n.1
 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (explaining that identical in-
 fringement charts in prior and subsequent actions con-
 firmed that the accused products were the same).
 Mr. Askan did not dispute any of FARO’s factual assertions
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 ASKAN   v. FARO TECHNOLOGIES, INC.                            9

 in the district court proceedings.        Order, 2022 WL
 12058559, at *5. And now before us, Mr. Askan does not
 cite to any part of the record on appeal that undermines or
 otherwise casts doubt on the evidence supporting the dis-
 trict court’s reasoning. 2 This unrebutted evidence of record
 shows that there is no genuine dispute that the products in
 the prior and current litigations are essentially the same.
      Mr. Askan asserts that the district court failed to con-
 sider that the current litigation involves a new product, os-
 tensibly suggesting that any preclusive effect of the prior
 litigation does not extend to the accused products in the
 current litigation. See Appellant’s Br. 30–31, 38, 46–47;
 Appellant’s Reply Br. 26–28. Mr. Askan did not raise this
 argument before the district court and, instead, only ar-
 gued that the Kessler doctrine did not apply because there
 was no judgment of non-infringement in the prior litiga-
 tion. See Order, 2022 WL 12058559, at *5 (explaining that
 Mr. Askan “does not attempt to rebut [FARO]’s factual as-
 sertions and opts instead to stand on the argument that the
 Kessler doctrine does not apply because the 2018 case was
 not decided on the merits”); Suppl. App. 2191–209 (failing
 to challenge the products being essentially the same in
 both cases). Thus, Mr. Askan forfeited this argument. In
 re Google Tech. Holdings LLC, 980 F.3d 858, 862 (Fed. Cir.
 2020).
     To the extent Mr. Askan contends that the district
 court needed to order further discovery to determine

     2   Mr. Askan, in a footnote, refers to a website that he
 never introduced into the record in the district court pro-
 ceedings. Appellant’s Br. 38 n.6. We do not consider this
 website to be part of the record on appeal. Fed. R. App.
 P. 10(a)(1) (stating the record on appeal contains “the orig-
 inal papers and exhibits filed in the district court”); see also
 Biery v. United States, 818 F.3d 704, 710 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
 (“In general, an appellate court’s review is limited to the
 record presented at the court below.”).
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 10                         ASKAN   v. FARO TECHNOLOGIES, INC.

 whether products are essentially the same, Mr. Askan for-
 feited this argument as well. Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
 dure 56(d) explains that a party opposing summary
 judgment may request the court to allow discovery if it
 “shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified rea-
 sons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposi-
 tion.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d); City of Miami Gardens v. Wells
 Fargo & Co., 956 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2020) (stating
 that it is the nonmoving party’s obligation to comply with
 Rule 56(d) and that a party that fails to comply with
 Rule 56(d) consents to adjudication of the issues on the ex-
 isting record). Mr. Askan never made such a request under
 Rule 56(d), and any argument based on needing further
 discovery is forfeited.
     In sum, Mr. Askan in the current litigation seeks to as-
 sert the same patent claims against essentially the same
 product at issue in the prior litigation. 3 We agree with the
 district court that the Kessler doctrine precludes him from
 doing so.

      3  Mr. Askan argues that the district court erred in
 its characterization of the amended complaint as involving
 the ’110 patent. Appellant’s Br. 25. The ’110 patent is not
 implicated in the present litigation, and thus whether the
 amended complaint included an allegation of infringement
 with respect to the ’110 patent is not relevant to whether
 the Kessler doctrine precludes the infringement claims in
 the present litigation. Compare Suppl. App. 2685–87
 (Askan v. FARO Techs., Inc., No. 6:18-cv-01122 (M.D. Fla.
 June 21, 2018), ECF No. 1) (alleging infringement of the
 ’110, ’841, and ’255 patents) with Suppl. App. 2917–22
 (Askan v. FARO Techs., Inc., No. 6:18-cv-01122 (M.D. Fla.
 June 21, 2018), ECF No. 59) (alleging infringement of the
 ’841 and ’255 patents).
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 ASKAN   v. FARO TECHNOLOGIES, INC.                        11

                        CONCLUSION
      We have considered Mr. Askan’s remaining arguments
 and find them unpersuasive. 4 We therefore affirm the dis-
 trict court’s dismissal.
                         AFFIRMED
                            COSTS
 Costs to FARO.

     4    After initial briefing, Mr. Askan filed a Memoran-
 dum in Lieu of Oral Argument, ECF No. 44. FARO subse-
 quently filed a Motion to Strike, ECF No. 47, to remove
 Mr. Askan’s filing from the docket and replace that filing
 with a redacted version, and Mr. Askan filed a Response to
 the Motion, ECF No. 54. The portion of Mr. Askan’s Mem-
 orandum that FARO seeks to redact refers to information
 that is outside of the record on appeal and that undermines
 the strong policy interest in keeping the contents of settle-
 ment negotiations confidential. See Fed. R. App. P. 10(a)(1)
 (stating the record on appeal contains “the original papers
 and exhibits filed in the district court”). In addition,
 Mr. Askan fails to establish how the information is mate-
 rial to the dispositive issues on appeal. We therefore grant
 FARO’s Motion to Strike.