Court Opinion

ID: 9719180
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:45:11.294472+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:04.972461
License: Public Domain

MORGAN, Justice
(dissenting).
I join in Justice Sabers’ dissent, but I write to express my frustration in reviewing this case.
First of all, I am appalled by the failure of the DCI agents to record the interrogation proceedings of April 7, 1987. It is inconceivable to me that they would gather a team of agents from across the state, with two sets of polygraph equipment, and not have any form of tape recorder available. Thus, we are left with the testimony of the agents and Debra for the details of an extended interrogation and that testimony was not given until some nine months later, on January 6, 1988. It is of further interest to me that the authorities did not *725seek an indictment until over four and one-half months after the interview.
The trial court, in its findings of fact for the suppression hearing, set the scene for this interview. It described the examination/interrogation room as being 12 by 14 feet, furnished with a table, 3 or 4 chairs, and a filing cabinet, with no windows to the outside and a one-way glass window for observation into the room. The room was bugged for listening but not recording and had no clock, radio or taping equipment. This was the milieu in which Debra found herself for some six or seven hours of interrogation except for two occasions when she went to the bathroom, the location of which we are not apprised of in the record.
Justice Sabers has detailed the interrogation procedures used on Debra, and I shall not repeat them except for two points that I wish to make.
First, the trial court finds certain instances where Debra talked of “psyching out” and suggested hypnotism, truth serum or psychiatry. This is relied on heavily by the majority to demonstrate cooperation on Debra’s part. I suggest, however, that the trial court and the majority ignore the fact, as found by the trial court, that both Deva-ney and Giegling had planted the seed in Debra’s mind that “there is a rational Debbie and an irrational Debbie,” and “a good Debbie and a bad Debbie.” Again the trial court and the majority stress Debra’s statement to her husband, Lynn, when he was brought into the room: “I did it, I did it. Did you help me?” When Lynn said that he did not help her, as the record shows, Debra then recanted. That recantation is entirely overlooked in the finding as is the fact that the agents had previously lied to Debra that Lynn had told them that she had done it.
One of the trial court’s findings is enigmatic in that it first finds that neither of the Jenners were advised of their Miranda rights and, further, that neither requested counsel, or that the questioning stop and never refused to answer a question. It is incomprehensible that any court could conclude that Debra’s cooperation could be evidenced by her failure to exercise her Miranda rights when she had not been advised of those rights.1 Nor can I agree with Justice Henderson that his writing in State v. Meek, 444 N.W.2d 48 (S.D.1989), is totally distinguishable because Meek was a DUI case and this is a murder case. The Fifth Amendment does not distinguish between the crimes involved. One suspected of murder, even as heinous an offense as this is, is surely entitled to the same constitutional rights as a drunk-driving suspect. We cannot chip away constitutional protections for murder suspects and strenuously enforce them for drunk-driving suspects.
The majority stresses that Debra testified that nothing prevented her from leaving; however, I note in her testimony, when asked by her counsel: “Did you feel you had any right to leave if you wanted to?” She responded: “No.”
Justice Potter Stewart, writing in Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978), warned that: “Determination of whether a statement is involuntary ‘requires more than a mere color matching of cases.’ ” 437 U.S. at 401, 98 S.Ct. at 2418, 57 L.Ed.2d at 306 (citation omitted). That is what I think that the majority has done. The opinion cites numerous cases to support the various factors individually, e.g., failure to give the Miranda warning, polygraph testing, emotional state, cooperation, and interrogation methods. However, I find no citation for the proposition that the voluntariness of a confession must be judged by the “totality of circumstances” test; that is, the whole of the events is distinct from the parts. *726Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973).
Though the majority makes passing reference to “totality of the circumstances” and the trial court obviously tried to apply the rule, neither seems to understand the rule's import. The reason a court examines the totality of factors is that individually the factors may not in themselves be enough to overbear a person’s will. But combined, they react with one another and produce a synergistic evil, one greater than its individual parts. Here, Debra’s lack of sleep, or her inexperience, or lies told to her by DCI agents, or the yelling and screaming at her, or the length of the interrogation, each in itself may have not been enough to overbear her will and render her statement involuntary. But combined, all these factors produced a greater evil than their parts and overbore her will and rendered her statements involuntary.
Finally, although I agree with Justice Sabers and would reverse under the clearly erroneous scope of review, I think that it is time to recognize the need for a change to what the federal courts denominate a “plenary review,” because the ultimate issue of voluntariness is a mixed question of law and fact that should be reviewed as a question of law. Granted, as the majority toil-somely points out, our precedent for standard of review on the issue of voluntariness is the clearly erroneous standard as applicable to any factual issue. That is not to say that for good reason that standard cannot be changed. Justice Henderson has gone to great length to enumerate the cases wherein the various members of this court have written or voted in support of the present scope of review. I acknowledge those votes and writings attributed to me, but that does not mean that I cannot alter my position when the proper case comes along. I so indicated in my special concurrence in Walz v. City of Hudson, 327 N.W.2d 120 (1982), wherein this court overruled past precedent, particularly Griffin v. Sebek, 90 S.D. 692, 245 N.W.2d 481 (1976), and created a right of action for negligent sale of alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated person. Then Chief Justice Fosheim authored that opinion and was joined by Justices Dunn and Henderson. Justices Wollman and Morgan concurred specially. I then stated that “I am not loath to fly in the face of stare decisis and overrule a bad decision or one that is outdated.” Justice Wollman’s writing is especially pertinent in explaining his reversal of his stance in Griffin by quoting Justice Frankfurter’s aphorism that “[wjisdom too often never comes, and so one ought not to reject it merely because it comes late.” Henslee v. Union Planters National Bank & Trust Co., 335 U.S. 595, 600, 69 S.Ct. 290, 293, 93 L.Ed. 259, 264 (1949) (Frankfurter, J. dissenting).
And, as we said earlier in State v. Nuwi Nini, 262 N.W.2d 758, 761 (1978):
If there is to be stability and an evenhanded administration of justice, this court must follow its own precedent until convinced that its earlier decision was wrong, not in result, but in principle.
It is my position that the principle of considering voluntariness as a factual question is wrong. It should be considered as a mixed question of fact and law. The trial court does find such underlying factual issues as length and circumstances of interrogation, the size of the interrogation room, Debra’s age and experience, and it is entitled to be upheld on those factual determinations unless they are clearly erroneous in the light of the entire record. However, once these determinations are made, the trial court is in no better position than we are to judge the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the confession was obtained in violation of the due process clause of the 14th Amendment. Fenton II, 474 U.S. at 117,106 S.Ct. at 453, 88 L.Ed.2d at 415. These latter determinations are legal in nature and viewing the witness is unnecessary in arriving at the proper decision.. We can give deference to the trial court’s findings of fact where supported by the record under the clearly erroneous standard, but the question of how those facts combine to produce lack of vol-untariness and deprivation of due process is a legal question that requires de novo review.
*727Further, there is a question of playing on an even-playing field. The majority cites numerous federal cases for various positions to uphold the voluntariness of Debra’s statements, but those cases' were decided using a plenary review. In the event of appeal or petition for habeas corpus, this decision would be reviewed by plenary standards. That is mandated, as stated in Miller v. Fenton, (Fenton II)2 wherein the United States Supreme Court said:
Without exception, the Court’s confession cases hold that the ultimate issue of ‘voluntariness’ is a legal question requiring independent federal determination. ... As recently as 1978, the Court reaffirmed that it was ‘not bound by’ a state-court voluntariness finding and reiterated its historic ‘duty to make an independent evaluation of the record.” (Citations omitted.)
474 U.S. at 110, 106 S.Ct. at 450, 88 L.Ed.2d at 411. The federal courts use this standard in habeas corpus proceedings as well as direct appeals. Id. As Justice O’Con-nor stated in Fenton II:
[T]he nature of the inquiry itself lends support to the conclusion that ‘voluntariness’ is a legal question meriting independent consideration in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. Although sometimes framed as an issue of ‘psychological fact,’ ... the dispositive question of the voluntariness of a confession has always had a uniquely legal dimension.... This hybrid quality of the voluntariness inquiry, subsuming, as it does, a ‘complex of values,’ ... itself militates against treating the question as one of simple historical fact.
474 U.S. at 115-16, 106 S.Ct. at 453, 88 L,Ed.2d at 411-15 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted). While it may be that the federal court decisions on standards of review are only persuasive and not binding precedent, and the federal courts will still make an independent examination, it seems logical to me that we should take advantage of playing on a level field.
I would reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial.

. The majority citation to Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 102, 96 S.Ct. at 326, 46 L.Ed.2d at 320, is likewise incomprehensible inasmuch as Mosley dealt with the issue of interrogation after a defendant had been properly warned and had exercised his right not to talk. In the context of this case, the references to "informed and intelligent assessment" is ludicrous because Debra was never given any warning. The quotation from Justice White’s concurrence was with respect to a person’s right to make an informed waiver of Miranda rights. Read in that context, I have no quarrel with the statement.

. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 106 S.Ct. 445, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985) (Fenton II), was an appeal from Miller v. Fenton, 741 F.2d 1456 (3rd Cir. 1984) (Fenton I), and directed the remand that 451 N.W.2d — 17 resulted in Miller v. Fenton, 796 F.2d 598 (3rd Cir.1986) (Fenton III), quoted frequently in the majority opinion.