Court Opinion

ID: 9893649
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-28 17:10:56.981077+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:49.815721
License: Public Domain

NUMBER 13-22-00328-CR

                            COURT OF APPEALS

                   THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                     CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

ALTON CURRIE,                                                             Appellant,

                                              v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                                        Appellee.

                    On appeal from the 85th District Court
                         of Brazos County, Texas.

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION
                  Before Justices Tijerina, Silva, and Peña
                  Memorandum Opinion by Justice Tijerina

      Appellant Alton Currie appeals his conviction for two counts of aggravated assault

against a public servant. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02(b)(2)(B). Appellant received

two concurrent twenty-five-year terms of incarceration. By five issues that we have

reorganized and renumbered, appellant contends that the trial court (1) should have

granted his request to include the lesser-included offense of deadly conduct in the jury
charge, (2) improperly admitted evidence of extraneous acts in the guilt/innocence phase

of trial, (3) improperly admitted inadmissible photographs during the punishment phase

of his trial, (4) erred by dismissing a juror after the jury had been empaneled and sworn,

and (5) abused its discretion in denying appellant’s motion for mistrial. By a sixth issue,

appellant contends that he was denied a fair trial due to cumulative error. We affirm.1

                                        I.       DEADLY CONDUCT

           By his first issue, appellant contends that he was entitled to a jury instruction on

the lesser-included offense of deadly conduct. Specifically, appellant argues that the jury

could have inferred from the evidence that he did not intentionally point his weapon at

officers and instead acted recklessly. See id. (providing that a person commits the offense

of deadly conduct if he recklessly places another person in danger of serious bodily

injury).

A.         Applicable Law and Standard of Review

           Upon the defendant’s request, a lesser-included offense instruction shall be
           included in the jury charge if:

           (1)     the requested charge is for a lesser-included offense of the charged
                   offense; and

           (2)     there is some evidence that, if the defendant is guilty, he is guilty only
                   of the lesser offense.

Guzman v. State, 188 S.W.3d 185, 188 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (cleaned up).

           Whether one offense is a lesser offense of another is a question of law, which does

not depend on the evidence. Rice v. State, 333 S.W.3d 140, 144 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).

           1 This appeal was transferred to this Court from the Tenth Court of Appeals pursuant to a docket-

equalization order issued by the Supreme Court of Texas. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001.

                                                      2
We determine if deadly conduct is a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault against

a public servant by comparing the elements “to determine whether, in proving [aggravated

assault against a public servant,] as it was alleged in the indictment, the State necessarily

had to prove all of the elements of deadly conduct, plus something more.” See Guzman,

188 S.W.3d at 189. We review the pleadings, and we compare the statutory elements as

charged in the indictment to the requested lesser offense’s elements. Amaro v. State, 287

S.W.3d 825, 828 (Tex. App.—Waco 2009, pet. ref’d). If deadly conduct is a lesser-

included offense of aggravated assault against a public servant, the first prong of the test

is met, and we then analyze the second prong. Guzman, 188 S.W.3d at 189.

       Under the second prong, we must determine if the record contains some evidence

that would support a jury’s rational finding that if appellant is guilty, “he is guilty only of

deadly conduct, not [aggravated assault against a public servant].” See id. at 190. This

prong is met if there is “(1) evidence that directly refutes or negates other evidence

establishing the greater offense and raises the lesser-included offense or (2) evidence

that is susceptible to different interpretations, one of which refutes or negates an element

of the greater offense and raises the lesser offense.” Ritcherson v. State, 568 S.W.3d

667, 671 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).

       “An instruction on a lesser-included offense is required only when there is some

admitted evidence directly germane to that offense.” Roy v. State, 509 S.W.3d 315, 317

(Tex. Crim. App. 2017). We perform our analysis of the second prong by reviewing all the

evidence “without regard to the evidence’s credibility or potential contradictions or

conflicts.” Id. The instruction on the lesser-included offense is required if there is more

                                              3
than a scintilla of affirmative evidence establishing “that the lesser-included offense is a

valid, rational alternative to the charged offense.” Id. (citing Goad v. State, 354 S.W.3d

443, 446 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (internal quotations omitted)). “Meeting this threshold

requires more than mere speculation—it requires affirmative evidence that both raises

the lesser-included offense and rebuts or negates an element of the greater offense.”

Cavazos v. State, 382 S.W.3d 377, 385 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).

       As charged here, to convict appellant of aggravated assault against a public

servant, the State had to prove that he committed the offense of assault and used or

exhibited a deadly weapon during the commission of the assault. See TEX. PENAL CODE

ANN. § 22.02. Appellant committed the offense of assault as charged in the indictment, if

he intentionally or knowingly threatened a person that he knew was a public servant while

lawfully discharging his official duty with imminent bodily injury, and he used a deadly

weapon. Id. at § 22.01. To have committed deadly conduct, appellant must have

recklessly engaged in conduct that placed another person in imminent danger of serious

bodily injury. Id. at § 22.05(a). Reckless conduct occurs when the person is aware of the

risk but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances

exist or that the result will occur. See id. § 6.03(c).

B.     Pertinent Facts

       Officers Alexander Tran and Caleb Sanders testified that on August 24, 2020, they

responded to reports of a potential shooting or shots being fired. Officer Tran stated that

the officers set up a perimeter of the area where shots were heard to prevent the public

from entering.

                                               4
       Officer Tran testified that appellant drove a truck to his position, rolled down his

window, mumbled something to Officer Tran, and appellant turned his body towards the

vehicle’s center console. Officer Tran observed appellant pick up a gun and point it at

him. Specifically, Officer Tran said that he “observed” appellant “grab the pistol and then

turn it towards [him].” Officer Tran continued, “The barrel was facing towards my chest at

which point I identified it was a gun.” Officer Tran stated, “He points it at me to where if

he were to pull the trigger, the bullet would have entered my body—would have caused

me bodily harm.”

       Officer Tran testified that he commanded appellant to “drop the gun”; Officer Tran

“grabbed the gun in an attempt to move the barrel out of [his] direction.” Officer Tran

stated that a short struggle ensued through the truck’s window. Officer Tran pushed the

gun, broke contact with the gun, and appellant retreated to the “back of the truck.” The

trial court admitted State’s Exhibit 5, which is a recording of the incident from Officer

Tran’s body camera. Officer Tran testified that the video shows appellant “reaching

towards a pistol that’s . . . on top of the center console of the truck.” The trial court

admitted State’s Exhibits 7 and 8, which Officer Tran described as “a splice of [his] video

recording where it slows down enough to where you can actually see the gun.” Officer

Tran said that State’s Exhibit 7 shows “where [appellant] presented the gun . . . .” State’s

Exhibit 8 shows “[a] magnified snapshot of the gun,” which shows that appellant’s finger

is on the gun’s trigger while pointing the gun at Officer Tran. The State asked Officer Tran

to describe what he felt when appellant pointed the gun at him; Officer Tran replied, “I

was thinking I was going to get shot and not make it home to my family.” Officer Tran

                                             5
agreed with the State that he was in fear for his life “[a]s well as [his] teammates’ life.”

       Officer Tran stated that appellant then drove his truck towards Officer Sanders’s

position, who was “further down the road.” Officer Tran broadcasted that a person with a

gun was approaching Officer Sanders. According to Officer Sanders, he heard the

broadcast, while observing appellant driving his vehicle in his direction. Officer Sanders

testified that he moved to the back of his patrol car for cover, and as appellant approached

his position, he saw appellant pointing the gun at him. Specifically, Officer Sanders said,

“I saw the barrel of a handgun pointed in my direction.” Officer Sanders demonstrated for

the jury how appellant held the gun and explained, “It was being held over the dashboard

by [appellant], held up and down; barrel was pointed directly at me.” According to Officer

Sanders, the reason the video of the incident shows him jumping back when appellant

passed by him was “[b]ecause seeing that gun pointed at me startled me just a little.”

Officer Sanders testified that he knew that appellant saw him because appellant “was

looking at” him. Officer Sanders said, “I can say I’m pretty confident that [the gun] was

aimed at me, yes, because I could see down the barrel.”

       Appellant then drove his truck off the road and drove through a pasture. Officers

Tran and Sanders pursued appellant, and Officer Austin Garretson joined the pursuit.

Eventually, appellant stopped and exited his truck, and the officers took him into custody.

Officer Garretson testified that he saw the gun on top of the truck’s center console.

       Officers Tran and Sanders transported appellant to the hospital, where according

to Officer Tran, appellant was “very threatening, non-compliant.” Specifically, Officer Tran

said, “[appellant] made threats to harm my children, my wife; to get a large amount of

                                              6
people to come against me and hurt me and my partners as well as, again, the medical

clinicians that were trying to provide him medical services.” The State asked Officer Tran

if appellant made “statements . . . that he was going to kill” him; Officer Tran replied, “Yes,

he did.” According to Officer Tran, appellant also threatened to kill Officer Sanders. Officer

Tran testified that appellant “was trying to pull [his handcuffs] at its maximum extension,

trying to free himself from those handcuffs as well as on multiple occasions attempt[ing]

to strike me while he was restrained.” Officer Sanders relayed that appellant said that “he

was going to take the handcuffs and bash my skull in.”

       On redirect examination by the State, Officer Tran stated that appellant said, “Ya’ll

F’ed up by not killing me,” and explained appellant said,

       once he frees himself from the handcuffs he’s going to use the handcuffs to
       stab me in the eye; he’s going to hurt Officer Sanders; he’s going to get 60
       of his local buddies to come jump on me, my family; he mentioned that he
       was part of another organization that had 30,000 or so people that will come
       to his aid, free him from his arrest, and then take vengeance upon me and
       my partner Officer Sanders.

       Officers Tran and Sanders eventually transported appellant to the jail. The forensic

crime scene unit collected a loaded Kimber .45 caliber semiautomatic handgun with the

hammer fully back and the safety off from the top of appellant’s truck’s console, and the

unit found two magazines loaded with “.45 caliber ACP bullets” inside the truck’s center

console. According to Officer Eric Henderson, someone would have had to have

“consciously pull[ed] the hammer back or cock it so the hammer locks back to fire.” Officer

Henderson testified that someone not prepared to use the gun would not have had his

finger on the trigger, and instead, the person would have put his finger “usually above the

trigger parallel with the slide.” Officer Henderson said, “That’s where I would hold it until I

                                              7
had it—thought I was going to have to fire it, yes.”

C.     Analysis

       Deadly conduct has been determined to be a lesser-included offense of

aggravated assault against a public servant. See Amaro, 287 S.W.3d at 829. Thus, we

will analyze whether the second prong is met.

       The evidence at trial established that appellant intentionally or knowingly pointed

a gun at Officer Tran, who testified that appellant pulled out a gun, and pointed it at him.

Additionally, Officer Sanders stated that appellant pointed the gun directly at him with his

finger on the trigger. Moreover, there is nothing in the record supporting a finding that

appellant merely acted recklessly. See Cavazos, 382 S.W.3d at 385. On appeal,

appellant argues that he may have accidently pointed the gun at the officers. However,

there is no evidence supporting such a finding. See id. Instead, the evidence shows that

appellant pointed a loaded gun with his finger on the trigger at two officers, appellant

struggled with Officer Tran for control of the gun, appellant attempted to flee from the

officers, and later threatened to kill both officers and their families.

       We are unable to conclude that appellant’s actions were merely reckless, and

Officers Tran’s and Sanders’s testimonies that appellant pointed a loaded gun with his

finger on the trigger would have precluded a rational jury from finding him guilty only of

deadly conduct. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03(c); see also Benavides v. State, No.

08-07-00193-CR, 2009 WL 3031175, at *1 (Tex. App.—El Paso Sept. 23, 2009, pet. ref’d)

(mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding that the defendant was not entitled

to an instruction for deadly conduct as a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault

                                               8
because the evidence established that the defendant intentionally pointed the gun at the

victim). While on appeal appellant suggests that he did not intend to harm anyone or

threaten the officers because he accidently pointed the gun at them, the evidence that

appellant pointed the loaded gun at both officers allowed the jury to find that appellant

intended to cause or knew that he would cause the officers to fear imminent bodily injury.

See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 6.03(b); 22.02(a)(2); Godsey v. State, 719 S.W.2d 578,

584 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (explaining that when we are determining whether the

evidence supports a finding of recklessness, even a statement that a defendant did not

intend to kill the victim “cannot be plucked out of the record and examined in a vacuum”);

Martinez v. State, 16 S.W.3d 845, 847 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. ref’d).

The only evidence regarding appellant’s mental state was presented by the State and

included witnesses who stated that he pointed a loaded gun at them with his finger on the

trigger while the officers were attempting to detain appellant. There was no evidence

negating that appellant acted knowingly or intentionally.

       Because the evidence shows that appellant acted intentionally or knowingly when

he pointed the gun at the officers, and there is no evidence that appellant merely acted

recklessly, we conclude that appellant was not entitled to an instruction on the lesser-

included offense of deadly conduct. See Guzman, 188 S.W.3d at 188; Dixon v. State, 358

S.W.3d 250, 259 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d) (explaining that the

defendant had not testified “about any lack of intent to strike [the complainant], nor does

any evidence from any source show he lacked the intentional or knowing mental state”

and that “[i]nstead, the only evidence shows he argued with [the complainant] and chased

                                            9
her in his truck while she ran away screaming, narrowly missing her as she rolled out of

the way into a hole under a house that he struck”); see also Stephenson v. State, No. 04-

22-00031-CR, 2023 WL 4337711, at *5–6 (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 5, 2023, no pet.

filed.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (relying on Dixon, 358 S.W.3d at 258,

and overruling the appellant’s complaint that the trial court should have provided the

lesser-included offense instruction for reckless conduct because “there is no evidence

that [the appellant] lacked the intentional or knowing mental state; and, when viewed in

the context of the entire record, the statements that [the appellant] highlights do not

negate intent”); Benavides, 2009 WL 3031175, at *1 (concluding that the appellant acted

intentionally and was not entitled to an instruction on deadly conduct because the

evidence showed that the appellant pointed a gun at the victim in order for the victim to

let him go and leave him alone and then pointed the gun at the victim again to scare the

victim away). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of deadly conduct. See Dixon,

358 S.W.3d at 258 (“We decline to hold that the trial court abused its discretion . . . when

the testimony as a whole does not negate intent.”). We overrule appellant’s first issue.

                        II.    ADMISSION OF EXTRANEOUS EVIDENCE

       By his second issue and several sub-issues, appellant contends that the trial court

erred by allowing evidence of extraneous acts in the guilt/innocence phase of trial.

Specifically, appellant complains that during the guilt/innocence phase of the trial, the trial

court improperly admitted extraneous evidence that (1) there had been either “shots fired”

                                              10
or a “shooting”2; and (2) a murder had occurred.

A.      Applicable Law

        Evidence that a defendant may have committed other crimes or bad acts “cannot

be introduced at the guilt-innocence phase to show that the defendant acted in conformity

with his criminal nature and therefore committed the crime for which he is on trial.”

Lockhart v. State, 847 S.W.2d 568, 570 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). However, extraneous

offense evidence may be admissible for another purpose such as to prove motive, intent,

absence of mistake, opportunity, preparations, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of

mistake or lack of accident. TEX. R. EVID. 404(b). To show that an act constitutes evidence

of an extraneous offense, the evidence must show that a crime or bad act occurred and

that the defendant was connected to that crime or bad act. Lockhart, 847 S.W.2d at 573;

Johnson v. State, 190 S.W.3d 838, 839–40 (Tex. App.—Forth Worth 2006, no pet.)

(holding that the trial court did not err in admitting audiotape because the appellate court

was “unable to identify any evidence of an extraneous offense or bad act on the

audiotape”).

B.      Evidence of a Shooting or that Shots Had Been Fired

         2 Appellant in a first sub-issue to his second issue, also argues that evidence of shots being fired

or of a shooting occurring was not relevant. Appellant does not cite to any portion of this voluminous record
wherein he objected to this evidence on that ground. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i).

          Moreover, the pre-trial hearing held by the trial court concerned whether the trial court should grant
or deny appellant’s motion in limine. However, appellant’s motion merely requested that the State not be
permitted to mention any evidence of extraneous offenses or acts of misconduct to the jury until the
admissibility of such evidence had been established outside the jury’s presence. “That is precisely the
proper purpose of a motion in limine.” Geuder v. State, 115 S.W.3d 11, 14–15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). “A
trial judge’s grant or denial of a motion in limine is a preliminary ruling only and normally preserves nothing
for appellate review.” Id. Therefore, appellant has not shown that his relevance objection was preserved.
See id. We overrule appellant’s first sub-issue to his second issue.

                                                      11
      Here, the evidence presented at trial merely showed that Officers Tran and

Sanders had been dispatched to the area due to reports of either shots being fired or a

shooting occurring. The trial court did not admit any evidence during the guilt/innocence

phase of appellant’s trial either showing that appellant was involved in the shooting or

that appellant had been accused of firing the shots that had been reported to the officers.

“If the evidence fails to show . . . that the accused was connected to the offense, then

evidence of an extraneous offense is not established.” McKay v. State, 707 S.W.2d 23,

32 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (en banc). Therefore, because the evidence did not show that

appellant committed the crime or bad act of either firing shots or shooting a gun, no

improper extraneous offense evidence was admitted. See id.; see also Montemayor v.

State, No. 13-14-00173-CR, 2016 WL 4272384, at *4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–

Edinburg Aug. 11, 2016, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding

that “no extraneous evidence was offered or admitted because neither the witness nor

the State referenced either a crime or bad act committed by [the appellant]”).

      Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the complained-

of evidence in this manner. See Lockhart, 847 S.W.2d at 573 (explaining that because a

“‘diary’ did not tend to connect [the] appellant to any prior bad acts or crimes appellant

may have committed” and “it did not depict any criminal activity or bad acts, let alone

those offered at his trial,” the “[diary] was not excludable as an extraneous offense”);

Johnson, 190 S.W.3d at 839–40; see also Wood v. State, No. 13-10-00556-CR, 2013 WL

388150, at *6 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Jan. 31, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.,

not designated for publication) (following Lockhart and determining that recorded

                                            12
jailhouse phone calls did not tend to connect the appellant “to any prior bad acts or crimes

that he may have committed,” and therefore, the phone calls did not constitute evidence

of an extraneous offense or bad act). We overrule appellant’s second issue.

       By a second sub-issue to his second issue, appellant contends the evidence that

the officers were responding to a call that shots were fired or a shooting occurred “should

have been excluded because its probative value is substantially outweighed by the

danger of unfair prejudice.” Appellant bases his argument on an assertion that the

evidence constituted extraneous offense evidence and acknowledges in his brief that

there is no evidence “that [a]ppellant was the person involved in the shooting incident or

that he fired any shots during this event.” Appellant then claims, without citation to any

authority, that “[e]vidence concerning a matter the State is not required to prove can have

little, if any, probative value.” According to appellant, the jury could have reasonably

inferred that “the prior shooting somehow involved [a]ppellant and misled the jury into

believing that the charged offenses were somehow related to the introduced evidence of

the shooting.” Without proper argument and citation to appropriate authority, we are

unable to conclude that appellant’s assertions require reversal. See TEX. R. APP. P.

38.1(i); see also Lockhart, 847 S.W.2d at 571 (“[E]vidence of extraneous offenses that

are indivisibly connected to the charged offense and necessary to the State’s case in

proving the charged offense may be admissible as relevant evidence to explain the

context of the offense for which the defendant is on trial.”). Accordingly, we overrule

appellant’s second sub-issue to his second issue.

                                            13
C.     Evidence that a Murder Occurred

       Next, by a third sub-issue to his second issue, appellant complains that the trial

court admitted evidence that a murder occurred or evidence “pertaining to the murder.”

However, appellant does not specifically identify in his brief which evidence was

introduced during the guilt/innocence phase of the trial that a murder occurred or that

pertained to a murder. Our review of the record cites provided by appellant shows that at

his trial, after the State published a video to the jury, he objected to it on the basis that

someone can be heard on an officer’s radio stating, “I have one that’s unconscious. One

that’s unresponsive.” However, appellant did not object to admission of this video prior to

the trial court’s admission and publication to the jury. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1.

       Nonetheless, assuming without deciding that the issue is preserved and these

statements pertained to a murder or are evidence that a murder occurred, appellant does

not specifically state that the complained-of evidence connected him to the murder. And,

upon our review of this evidence, there is nothing in the record connecting him to a

murder. See McKay, 707 S.W.2d at 32. Therefore, because the evidence did not show

that appellant committed the murder, no improper extraneous offense evidence was

admitted about the murder. See id.; see also Montemayor, 2016 WL 4272384, at *4.

Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting this evidence. We

overrule appellant’s third sub-issue to his second issue.

             III.    ADMISSION OF PHOTOGRAPHS AT THE PUNISHMENT PHASE

       By what we construe as appellant’s third issue and multiple sub-issues, appellant

contends that at the punishment phase, the trial court improperly admitted evidence

                                             14
related to the offense of murder, an offense for which according to appellant, he has not

been tried. Specifically, appellant complains about State’s Exhibits 32, 33, 45, 46, and 47,

which are photographs of the murder scene and of the victim.

A.      Pertinent Facts

        During the punishment phase of appellant’s trial, evidence was presented that after

fleeing from Officers Tran and Sanders, appellant eventually turned onto a residential

driveway (the murder scene) where he was arrested and placed in custody. The trial court

admitted State’s Exhibit 21, a recording of a 911 call made by Jarrell Currie wherein he

reported that appellant, his cousin, shot his friend, James Zikus.3 Jarrell reported that he

left the murder scene because appellant had pointed the gun at him. Jarrell stated that

appellant was still in the area, and he did not want to go back to the murder scene.

According to Jarrell, appellant used a .45 caliber gun to shoot Zikus, and he was not sure

if Zikus was alive. Jarrell stated that when appellant pulled out his gun, he told appellant

to put the gun away and that is when appellant shot Zikus.4

        Officer Jared Watkins testified that he went to the murder scene on the same date

that appellant committed the offenses of aggravated assault against a public servant.

Officer Watkins stated that he had been dispatched to the murder scene due to a report

that “shots had been fired and possibly someone was injured.” Officer Watkins testified

that he parked his patrol vehicle, and he encountered Jarrell. Officer Watkins stated that

once appellant had been removed from the murder scene, he discovered a “deceased

        3 The record shows that Jarrell died prior to appellant’s trial.

        4 Appellant objected to State’s Exhibit 21 based on hearsay, the right of confrontation, and the right

to due process. The trial court overruled appellant’s objections, which he does not challenge on appeal.

                                                      15
individual.”

       The State offered State’s Exhibit 22, which was the video taken from Officer

Watkins’s body camera. Appellant objected based on hearsay, the confrontation clause,

and argued that it was cumulative. The State argued for admission and then explained

that Officer Watkins’s body camera “shows him going in, finding the victim, removing the

victim from the scene because it’s still an active scene when [appellant] arrives back to

the [murder scene] and parks right outside the doors where he’s still in direct line of sight

and [has the] ability to fire his weapon.” Appellant’s trial counsel replied, “We don’t object

to that part. We don’t object to that part of the video,” and stated that the objection was in

reference to “[Jarrell’s] statement.” The trial court overruled appellant’s objections and

admitted State’s Exhibit 22.

       State’s Exhibit 22 shows Officer Watkins’s body-camera video, wherein Jarrell

explains to Officer Watkins that a shooting had occurred. Officer Watkins instructed Jarrell

to write down the name of the shooter and the victim; Jarrell reported that appellant was

the shooter and Zikus was the victim. Officer Watkins’s body-camera video captured

when appellant parked his truck at the murder scene prior to being arrested. The video

shows Officer Watkins dragging Zikus’s body from where he was lying down.

       The State then offered State’s Exhibits 23 through 48, which are “stillshots” taken

from State’s Exhibit 22. State’s Exhibit 23 through 26 show various angles of the scene,

with portions of Zikus’s body shown. State’s Exhibits 27 through 30 are pictures of the

property where the murder occurred. However, there is nothing in State’s Exhibits 27

through 30 showing Zikus’s body. State’s Exhibit 31 through 33 are pictures of the

                                             16
property, which show a blue blanket covering Zikus’s body. State’s Exhibits 34 through

44 are pictures of the murder scene, and Zikus’s body is not shown.

       State’s Exhibit 45 is a picture of what appears to be blood stains leading to where

Zikus’s body was located. Zikus’s body is not shown in the picture; however, a portion of

the blue blanket covering Zikus’s body is partially shown. State’s Exhibit 46 is a picture of

Zikus’s body showing what appears to be a bullet wound to the upper portion of the left

side of his chest. State’s Exhibit 47 is a close-up picture of Zikus’s face.

       As to State’s Exhibit 45, appellant said, “[W]e object on the basis that this particular

photograph has no value to the jury, only to peak their emotions or inflame them. Just

shows a drag mark when the cops removed [Zikus] from where he was to the outside.

Object to that being inflammatory.” As to State’s Exhibits 46 and 47, appellant explained

that those photographs, which are photos “of [Zikus] outside where the officers had

moved him” do not serve a “purpose other than to appeal to [the] jury’s emotions or

inflame the jury. No evidential value to those photographs.” The State responded that it

had to prove that Zikus was murdered and that Zikus “is the person that an autopsy was

done on” and that “he was the person that was shot.” The State explained that one of the

objected-to pictures was the “[o]nly picture of his face up close to identify him.” As to

State’s Exhibit 45, the State argued that the video had already shown Officer Watkins

dragging Zikus’s body. The trial court then overruled appellant’s objections to State’s

Exhibits 45, 46, and 47, which were then admitted.

       Officer Watkins testified that when he moved Zikus’s body, Zikus did not respond

and that it was “highly possible that he was” already deceased. Officer Watkins stated

                                             17
that once he knew that appellant had been taken into custody, he looked at Zikus’s body

and “observed a—what appeared to be a bullet hole in his chest.” According to Officer

Watkins, when the paramedics arrived, he “observed” Zikus’s back “to see if there was

an exit wound”; however, Officer Watkins did not see one.

       Officer Henderson testified that he processed the murder scene, and he observed

Zikus’s body lying “on the ground deceased in front of a Ford pickup truck that was at one

of the entrances to the shed.” Officer Henderson stated that State’s Exhibit 39 shows

among other things “[a] .45 caliber cartridge casing,” while State’s Exhibit 41 is a picture

of “the cartridge casing.” Officer Henderson agreed that he had previously testified during

the guilt/innocence portion of the trial that he found a .45 caliber handgun in appellant’s

truck where the .45 caliber casing would have fit inside.

       Officer Henderson testified that he was present when Zikus’s body was removed

by the funeral home from the murder scene. Officer Henderson said that he observed a

gunshot wound “toward the left side” of Zikus’s chest, “not too far from the heart I would

imagine”; however, when Zikus’s body was turned over, he did not observe an exit wound.

According to Officer Henderson, he subsequently “learn[ed]” that Zikus’s body did have

an exit wound.

       Mike Fleeman, a “drywall finisher,” testified that he had known Zikus since his

teenage years and that he had met appellant “at a biker bar” in 2009. The three men all

rode Harley-Davidson bikes. According to Fleeman, the men would congregate at Jarrell’s

property to do mechanical work on their motorcycles, play dice, and to drink alcohol.

Fleeman testified that appellant stayed at Jarrell’s property in a camper that was located

                                            18
next to the garage, while Jarrell stayed in a home on the property. Fleeman stated that

every time that he saw appellant, “he had a gun on him,” which “was always within reach

if it wasn’t on his person” and which appellant kept “[i]n a Versacarry holster.” Fleeman

identified appellant’s holster as that shown in State’s Exhibit 59.

       The State showed Fleeman State’s Exhibit 64, which is a picture of Zikus’s face

taken after his death. Appellant did not object. The State asked Fleeman to identify the

person shown in the picture, and Fleeman replied, “James Zikus.” Fleeman identified

appellant’s holster shown in State’s Exhibit 62, and appellant’s gun found in his truck as

shown in State’s Exhibit 18. Fleeman relayed that on an occasion prior to the murder he

and Jarrell were sitting and “talking, and [appellant] just pulled—just pulled—pointed a

gun at [him]. Pointed it right at [his] face.” The State asked, “[W]hich gun did he point at

you?” Fleeman replied, “That Kimber that you just showed me.” Fleeman testified that the

pair had not been arguing when appellant “pointed [the gun] right at [his] face.” Fleeman

said that he grabbed the gun “and took it,” and he then “emptied the

magazine . . . emptied the chamber, and handed those to Jarrell . . . and . . . stuck the

pistol between [his] legs.”

       Ryan Mudd, a firearms and tool mark examiner with the Department of Public

Safety crime lab in Austin, Texas, testified that he examined the gun found in appellant’s

truck, a .45 caliber cartridge case found at the murder scene and what was marked State’s

Exhibit 61, which was “a plastic bag containing a fired bullet . . . .” Mudd testified that the

“cartridge [found at the murder scene] was fired in [appellant’s] firearm.” Mudd further

determined that the bullet had been fired from appellant’s gun.

                                              19
       Vickie Willoughby, the Travis County Medical Examiner, testified that she

performed an autopsy on Zikus’s body. During Willoughby’s testimony, the State offered

State’s Exhibits 63 through 71, which are pictures of Zikus’s face and of his body where

the bullet entered and where the bullet exited.

B.     State’s Exhibits 45, 46, and 47

       By his third issue, appellant argues that the trial court improperly admitted State’s

Exhibits 45, 46, and 47 because “[t]he State had no compelling need for the exhibits to

which [a]ppellant objected.” During the trial, appellant objected to State’s Exhibit 45 on

the basis “that this particular photograph has no value to the jury, only to peak their

emotions or inflame them. Just shows a drag mark when the cops removed [Zikus] from

where he was to the outside. Object to that being inflammatory.” Although appellant

generally cites authority that evidence must be relevant, appellant does not provide a

legal analysis explaining why State’s Exhibit 45 has no value to the jury or is inflammatory.

See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). Likewise, although appellant objected to State’s Exhibits 46

and 47 on the basis that they did not serve a “purpose other than to appeal to [the] jury’s

emotions or inflame the jury” and have no “evidential value,” appellant does not provide

legal analysis with citation to appropriate authority explaining how these exhibits were

inadmissible. See id. Therefore, we conclude that this issue is inadequately briefed. See

id.

       Moreover, as to State’s Exhibits 46 and 47, appellant acknowledges that autopsy

photos showing the entry wounds and Zikus’s face were admitted without objection.

State’s Exhibit 63 is a picture of Zikus’s face and torso with his shirt lifted showing his

                                             20
chest. State’s Exhibit 64 is a picture of Zikus’s face. State’s Exhibit 66 is a picture of

Zikus’s nude torso. State’s Exhibits 67 and 68 are close-up pictures of the entry wound

on Zikus’s chest. Appellant does not challenge admission of these exhibits on appeal,

and these images are cumulative of the objected-to exhibits. See Leday v. State, 983

S.W.2d 713, 718 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en banc) (“[O]verruling an objection to [the

admission of] evidence will not result in reversal when other such evidence was received

without objection, either before or after the complained-of ruling.”). Thus, admission of

State’s Exhibits 47 and 48 does not constitute reversible error because the same

evidence was properly admitted elsewhere. See id.

        Additionally, appellant has not shown on appeal that even assuming error, the trial

court’s admission of State’s Exhibits 45 through 47 caused the rendition of an improper

verdict. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b); Pawlak v. State, 420 S.W.3d 807, 811 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2013) (remanded the case to the court of appeals for a harm analysis after

determining that the trial court violated Rule 403); Motilla v. State, 78 S.W.3d 352, 355

(Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (explaining that non-constitutional error does not occur if the

defendant’s substantial rights are not affected by the erroneous admission of evidence

and that substantial rights are not affected “if the appellate court, after examining the

record as a whole, has fair assurance that the error did not influence the jury, or had but

a slight effect.”).5 We overrule appellant’s third issue.

        5 Appellant does not state that his substantial rights were affected, and he does not explain with

citation to pertinent authority how his substantial rights were affected after reviewing the record as a whole.
See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i).

                                                     21
C.      State’s Exhibits 32 and 33

        By what we construe as a first sub-issue to his third issue, appellant states in his

brief that “each photograph [labeled State’s Exhibits 32 and 33 was] taken after the body

[was] removed from its original location at the scene,” and implies by citing Taylor v. State,

that the trial court improperly admitted those exhibits because “[o]rdinarily, admitting a

photograph taken during a police officer’s investigation would be admissible if it is taken

before the body is removed from the scene of the killing.” 491 S.W.2d 922, 923 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1973). However, in the trial court, appellant offered no objection to State’s

Exhibits 32 and 33. Therefore, this issue is not preserved for our review. See TEX. R. APP.

P. 33.1(a). We overrule appellant’s first sub-issue to his third issue.6

D.      State’s Exhibit 61

        Finally, by a second sub-issue to his third issue, appellant contends that the trial

court improperly admitted State’s Exhibit 61. Specifically, appellant argues that State’s

Exhibit 61 was not material. The State responds that State’s Exhibit 61 was relevant to

whether appellant shot and killed Zikus.

        1.       Pertinent Facts

        State’s Exhibit 61 is a “spent bullet,” which the State “conditionally offer[ed]” during

Officer Henderson’s testimony. Appellant first objected to the admission of State’s Exhibit

61 on the basis that “[t]here’s no foundation laid for where that bullet was found, how it

was recovered. Nothing.” The trial court overruled appellant’s objection.

        6 Appellant also argues that the photographs were not relevant, or if relevant, the probative value

was substantially outweighed by the “danger of one or more matters identified in Rule 103.” However, at
trial, appellant did not object to State’s Exhibits 32 and 33 on the basis that they were not relevant or based
on Rule 103. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1.

                                                     22
        After Officer Henderson testified that he received State’s Exhibit 61 from Jarrell,

the State offered it “conditionally,” and appellant “Renew[ed his] objections from earlier.”

The trial court “conditionally accepted” but instructed, “It’s not been entered as an exhibit

yet.”

        Subsequently, the State asked Mudd to look at State’s Exhibit 61, and Mudd

indicated that he recognized it. The State offered State’s Exhibit 61, and appellant

generally objected that it was not relevant and said, “There’s nothing on the record here,

there’s nothing before this jury that that bullet even came from this scene, had anything

to do with this case.” Appellant stated, “We would object to relevance for this particular

bullet that just appeared.” The trial court overruled appellant’s objections and admitted

State’s Exhibit 61 “for all purposes.”

        2.     Applicable Law

        Evidence is relevant if it makes the existence of a “fact more or less probable than

it would be without the evidence” and if it is material. TEX. R. EVID. 401. For evidence to

be considered relevant, it “must be both material—that is, it must be offered for a

proposition that is of consequence to the determination of the case—and probative, such

that it makes the existence of the fact more or less probable than it would otherwise be

without the evidence.” Boudreaux v. State, 631 S.W.3d 319, 332 (Tex. App.—Houston

[14th Dist.] 2020, pet. ref’d) (citing Henley v. State, 493 S.W.3d 77, 83 (Tex. Crim. App.

2016)).

        During the punishment phase of trial, evidence of extraneous offenses is

admissible for any relevant purpose “but only if the State can offer proof that would allow

                                             23
a reasonable fact-finder to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant

could be held criminally responsible for that act.” Delgado v. State, 235 S.W.3d 244, 252

(Tex. Crim. App. 2007); see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07 (providing that

at the punishment phase, “evidence may be offered by the state and the defendant as to

any matter the court deems relevant to sentencing, including but not limited to the prior

criminal record of the defendant, his general reputation, his character, an opinion

regarding his character, the circumstances of the offense for which he is being tried, and,

notwithstanding Rules 404 and 405, Texas Rules of Evidence, any other evidence of an

extraneous crime or bad act . . . regardless of whether he has previously been charged

with or finally convicted of the crime or act”).

       3.     Analysis

       Appellant specifically argues on appeal that State’s Exhibit 61 is not material and

therefore not relevant. At trial, appellant objected to admission of State’s Exhibit 61 on

the basis that it lacked a foundation and that it was not relevant.

       As previously set out, evidence of extraneous offenses is admissible during the

punishment phase of trial for any relevant purpose. Delgado, 235 S.W.3d at 252; see also

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07. The State offered State’s Exhibit 61, the spent

bullet, to prove that appellant committed the extraneous offense of murder by shooting

Zikus. Thus, State’s Exhibit 61 was offered for a proposition that is of consequence to the

determination of the case, and it was therefore material. See Boudreaux, 631 S.W.3d at

332. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting it. See Rhomer v. State,

569 S.W.3d 664, 669 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019) (setting out that we review the trial court’s

                                              24
decision to admit evidence for an abuse of discretion).

       Nonetheless, even if it were error, appellant was not harmed by the admission of

the spent shell casing because there was other evidence linking appellant to Zikus’s

murder. See Wishert v. State, 654 S.W.3d 317, 332 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2022, pet. ref’d)

(citing TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b) (“The trial court’s erroneous admission of evidence does

not result in constitutional error; therefore, it will be disregarded if the error did not affect

the defendant’s substantial rights.”)). The trial court admitted the recording of the 911 call

wherein Jarrell told the dispatcher that appellant had shot Zikus. In addition, the trial court

admitted body camera footage wherein Jarrell reported to Officer Watkins that appellant

shot Zikus with his gun, which the evidence showed was a .45 Kimber. Given that the trial

court admitted other evidence that appellant murdered Zikus, we cannot conclude that

State’s Exhibit 61 influenced the jury’s determination of punishment. See id. (“A

substantial right is implicated when the trial court’s error had a substantial or injurious

effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict,” and we must only reverse if after

reviewing the whole record, we do not have a fair assurance that the error did not affect

the jury’s verdict). We overrule appellant’s second sub-issue to his third issue.

                                IV.    MOTIONS FOR MISTRIAL

       By his fourth issue, appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by

denying his motion for a mistrial because during voir dire, a juror failed to disclose that

she was related to a person who is a law enforcement officer. By his fifth issue, appellant

contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for mistrial on

the basis that the “jury heard prejudicial extraneous offense statements contained in

                                               25
State’s Exhibit 5A.”

A.     Applicable Law

       The trial court may grant a mistrial in “‘extreme circumstances’ for a narrow class

of highly prejudicial and incurable errors.” Ocon v. State, 284 S.W.3d 880, 884 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2009) (quoting Hawkins v. State, 135 S.W.3d 72, 77 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)). The

trial court should grant a mistrial “‘only when residual prejudice remains’ after less drastic

alternatives are explored.” Id. at 884–85 (quoting Barnett v. State, 161 S.W.3d 128, 134

(Tex. Crim. App. 2005)). “Less drastic alternatives include instructing the jury ‘to consider

as evidence only the testimony and exhibits admitted through witnesses on the stand,’

and, questioning the jury ‘about the extent of any prejudice, if the instructions alone do

not sufficiently cure the problem.’” See id. at 885 (quoting Arizona v. Washington, 434

U.S. 497, 522 (1978)). We review the denial of a motion for mistrial for an abuse of

discretion. Id. at 884.

B.     Dismissed Juror

       1.     Applicable Law

       A defendant is entitled to a trial before an impartial jury. U.S. CONST. amend. VI;

Franklin v. State, 138 S.W.3d 351, 354 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). The parties are denied

an opportunity to exercise peremptory challenges and challenges for cause when jurors

fail to disclose material information during the voir dire process. Franklin, 138 S.W.3d at

354 (citing Salazar v. State, 562 S.W.2d 480, 482 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978)). The failure to

disclose material information during voir dire hampers the parties’ selection of a

disinterested and impartial jury. Id.

                                             26
       Any information that has “any potential for prejudice or bias” constitutes material

information. Decker v. State, 717 S.W.2d 903, 907 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); see also TEX.

CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 35.16(a)(9) (authorizing challenge for cause for jurors with

bias or prejudice in favor of or against the defendant). We determine whether withheld

information is material by analyzing if the information “would likely reveal the juror

harbored a bias or prejudice to such a degree that the juror should have been excused

from jury service.” Sypert v. State, 196 S.W.3d 896, 900 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006,

pet. ref’d). “[I]f a situation arises where material information was withheld by a juror during

voir dire, and if the appellant’s subsequent motion for mistrial is denied, on appeal the

denial of that motion will be reviewed for constitutional error.” Id.

       2.      Pertinent Facts

       After Officer Tran testified, the trial court notified appellant that one of the jurors

had not disclosed that her uncle was a member of the College Station Police Department.

The juror informed the bailiff that her uncle’s status as law enforcement officer would not

affect her ability to serve as a juror.

       Nonetheless, appellant’s trial counsel said, “[I[f we had been aware of that

yesterday, [she] might have been somebody we would [have wanted to] strike . . . for

obvious reasons.” The trial court asked if appellant’s trial counsel wanted to question the

juror, and he replied that he did not think that talking further with the juror would be helpful.

Appellant’s trial counsel said, “I think we could have used a strike on her if we had known

that information[,] and we did not know it so we were unable to do that. In fact, I can

almost guarantee if I knew that” the juror was related to this specific officer, “I would have

                                               27
struck her for the same reasons that I would have struck some of the other members of

the jury panel for that same reason.” The State replied that other members of the jury also

had family members who were in law enforcement. Appellant insisted that he would have

first stricken the complained-of juror had he known she was related to a law enforcement

officer, and he requested a mistrial.

       The trial court replied that the alternate juror could replace the complained-of juror.

The State agreed with the trial court’s recommendation. The trial court asked appellant if

he objected to the remedy. Appellant said, “I don’t have an objection to it, but I do move

for a mistrial.” The trial court denied the request and replaced the complained-of juror with

the alternate juror.

       3.     Analysis

       In Decker, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that mere familiarity with a

witness is not necessarily material information. 717 S.W.2d at 907. The juror in Decker

recognized the complaining witness when the witness was called to testify and informed

the trial court that he knew the witness. Id. The Decker court stated that there was no

evidence that the juror intentionally gave false information to the attorneys during voir

dire. Id. The Decker court further explained that the fact that the juror merely knew the

complaining witness as an acquaintance was not material as “[t]here was no evidence

that the two men” had ever “socialized together or had any type of friendship.” Id. Thus,

there was no evidence that the juror’s relationship with the witness had any potential for

prejudice or bias. Id.

                                             28
       Likewise, here, there is no evidence that the complained-of juror intentionally failed

to disclose that her uncle worked as a law enforcement officer. In addition, the juror’s

prejudice or bias must “touch[] on some fundamental component of the charged crime or

personal characteristic of the accused.” Sypert, 196 S.W.3d at 901. Here, there is nothing

in the record showing that the complained-of juror harbored any prejudice or bias on some

fundamental component of the charged crime or against appellant merely because her

uncle was a law enforcement officer. See id. Therefore, we cannot conclude that

information that the complained-of juror’s uncle was a law enforcement officer was

material. See id. (providing an example as follows: “if the defendant is charged with an

intoxication offense, it is material information that the prospective juror has a prejudice

against persons who use alcohol”). Accordingly, because there is no showing that

appellant was deprived of an impartial jury or denied a fair trial in any way because of the

trial court’s refusal to grant a mistrial on the basis that the complained-of juror failed to

disclose during voir dire that she was related to a law enforcement officer, we find that

the trial court did not abuse its discretion. See Decker, 717 S.W.2d at 907; see also

Allbright v. Smith, 5 S.W.2d 970, 971 (Tex. Comm. App. 1928) (“The mere fact that a juror

knows, or is a neighbor, or an intimate acquaintance of, and on friendly relations with,

one of the parties to a suit, is not sufficient basis for disqualification, or ordinarily even

ground for challenge for cause.”).

       Moreover, the complained-of juror did not serve on the jury to determine

appellant’s guilt or punishment, and appellant has not provided any authority, and we find

none, which requires for a trial court to grant a mistrial in this scenario, especially when

                                             29
appellant did not object to the trial court’s replacement of the complained-of juror with an

alternate juror. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). Therefore, we cannot conclude that appellant

was entitled to a mistrial, and we conclude that the trial court cured error, if any, by

replacing the complained-of juror with the alternate juror. See Sypert, 196 S.W.3d at 900

(explaining that if we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the juror’s failure to

disclose “material information did not contribute to the defendant’s conviction or

punishment,” we are not required to reverse). We overrule appellant’s fourth issue.

C.     State’s Exhibit 5A

       By his fifth issue, appellant argues that he was entitled to a mistrial because when

the State published State’s Exhibit 5A, the jury heard a statement from radio traffic

excerpt: “I have one that’s unconscious. One that’s unresponsive” which appellant argued

“refers to the murder.” Appellant bases his argument on a claim that this evidence

constituted “prejudicial extraneous offense statements.”

       There is nothing in the record connecting appellant to a murder or to an injured

individual during the guilt/innocence portion of the trial. See McKay, 707 S.W.2d at 32.

Therefore, this evidence does not constitute extraneous offense evidence. See id. Thus,

the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not granting a mistrial on this basis. We

overrule appellant’s fifth issue.

                                    V.   CUMULATIVE ERROR

       By his sixth and final issue, appellant contends that he was denied a fair trial due

to cumulative error. However, we have overruled all of appellant’s issues. Therefore, his

cumulative-error complaint lacks merit because there is no error to cumulate. See Jenkins

                                             30
v. State, 493 S.W.3d 583, 613 & n.82 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (“Though it is possible for a

number of errors to cumulatively rise to the point where they become harmful, we have

never found that ‘non-errors may in their cumulative effect cause error.’” (footnotes

omitted) (citing Gamboa v. State, 296 S.W.3d 574, 585 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009))).

Accordingly, we overrule sixth issue.

                                   VI.   CONCLUSION

      We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                                    JAIME TIJERINA
                                                                    Justice

Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed on the
26th day of October, 2023.

                                              31