Court Opinion

ID: 9619898
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:34:39.53497+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:45.411914
License: Public Domain

Smith, Judge,
concurring specially.
While I concur fully in the majority opinion, I write separately for two reasons: first, to describe some of the procedural history of this case on appeal, and second, to acknowledge the assistance given to this Court by the Supreme Court’s opinion in Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735 (493 SE2d 403) (1997).
I wrote the first majority opinion in this case, in which Chief Judge Andrews, Presiding Judge Birdsong, and Senior Appellate Judge Banke concurred. Judge Ruffin concurred in the judgment only, and Judge Beasley and Judge Eldridge wrote strong dissenting opinions. After issuance of the original opinion, the Supreme Court of Georgia decided Robinson. In light of this decision and its significant alteration of summary judgment practice in slip-and-fall cases, I felt constrained to withdraw the original majority and join Judge Beasley’s dissent. She has now recast that dissent as the new majority, adding appropriate analysis based upon Robinson.
As we apply the Robinson decision here, I believe it is also appro*512priate to note this case as a very early example of the assistance the Supreme Court’s opinion gives this Court. For years, this Court and trial courts throughout Georgia have struggled to apply properly — and with justice for both plaintiffs and defendants — the principles set out by the Supreme Court in Alterman Foods v. Ligon, 246 Ga. 620 (272 SE2d 327) (1980), and Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491 (405 SE2d 474) (1991). In Robinson, the Supreme Court has given much-needed direction through the unequivocal statement that the decision’s purpose is to “lighten the load placed on plaintiffs by more recent judicial opinions.”
Without Robinson and its modification of the Alterman Foods standard, this case might well have been another in the large number of slip-fall cases that have caused disagreement among members of this Court. But with the aid of Robinson and the clear-cut policy choice made by the Supreme Court to take a new direction in these cases, the appropriate disposition becomes clear. That will also be true in the future with the vast majority of slip-fall appeals and applications for interlocutory review.
As the appellate court judge who was reversed by the Supreme Court in Robinson, I welcome it. The Supreme Court, in its role as lawgiver, has resolved a long-standing controversy which this Court, as a court for the correction of errors, was unable to address. This gives me hope that this Court will soon no longer be largely defined by this single type of case and will no longer be identified first and foremost by lawyers and trial judges as the court that cannot, give clear, consistent direction in slip-fall cases. These are important cases and deserve careful consideration, but I look forward to the opportunities Robinson affords us. The Supreme Court’s decision may make it possible for us to reduce substantially the disproportionate amount of time and effort expended on these cases in the past, and to end the increasing polarization of this Court they have produced.