Court Opinion

ID: 9585680
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:02:45.019798+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:52.286591
License: Public Domain

Marshall, Justice,
concurring specially as to Division 1 and dissenting as to Division 4.
1. I agree with the holding in Division 1 of the majority opinion that the appellant’s substantive and procedural double jeopardy arguments are controlled adversely to him by our decision in Potts. However, I would add the following to what has been stated in Division 1 of the court’s opinion:
I believe that our decision in Potts signaled a shift from the method of analysis previously used by this court in determining whether a crime is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of another crime, within the meaning of Code Ann. § 26-505 (a). In making this determination, Estevez, and a line of cases following it (Allen v. State, 233 Ga. 200 (3) (210 SE2d 680) (1974); Burke v. State, 234 Ga. 512 (2) (216 SE2d 812) (1975); Zilinmon v. State, 234 Ga. 535 (8) (216 SE2d 830) (1975); Williams v. State, 238 Ga. 244 (7) (232 SE2d 238) (1977); Pryor v. State, 238 Ga. 698 (1) (234 SE2d 918) (1977)), look to the actual evidence introduced at trial. These cases hold, in effect, that if the state uses up all the evidence that the defendant committed one crime in establishing another crime, the former crime is included in the latter as a matter of fact under Code Ann. § 26-505 (a).
However, in Potts, we looked not to the actual evidence adduced at trial, but to the evidence required to establish each element of the crime, in determining whether two crimes are included under the first prong of Code Ann. § 26-505 (a).
*606Concededly, in the vast majority of cases, utilization of one or the other approach would produce the same result. However, the difference in the two approaches, albeit subtle, has the potential for producing drastically different results, as in Potts where it could have meant the difference between the affirmance or setting aside of a death sentence. For in Potts we held, correctly I believe, that even though the kidnapping-with-bodily-injury indictment alleged the killing of the victim as the bodily injury sustained, the offense of murder was not established by proof of less than all the facts required to establish the offense of kidnapping with bodily injury, since the state had to prove malice aforethought in order to convict the defendant of murder. However, as we are all aware, the element of malice aforethought, which must be present before a killing can constitute murder, can be either express or implied. The evidence of malice in Potts may well have been implied, in which case there would have been no independent evidence of malice other than the circumstances surrounding the defendant’s killing of the victim. In this latter event, under Estevez and its progeny, the evidence required to convict of kidnapping with bodily injury would have been the only evidence showing the defendant’s murder of the victim; therefore, murder would have been included in the crime of kidnapping with bodily injury under Code Ann. § 26-505 (a).
Furthermore, under traditional double jeopardy analysis, the "distinct elements” test is the standard used in determining whether one crime is included in another as a matter of law. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U. S. 299 (52 SC 180, 76 LE 306) (1932); Gavieres v. United States, 220 U. S. 338 (31 SC 421, 55 LE 489) (1911); Burton v. United States, 202 U. S. 344 (26 SC 688, 50 LE 1057) (1906). This is the test this court adopted in Potts for determining included crimes under the first prong of Code Ann. § 26-505 (a) as a matter of fact. In my opinion, continuing to speak of Code Ann. § 26-505 (a) as setting out the rules for determining included crimes as a matter of fact and Code Ann. § 26-505 (b) as setting out the rules for determining included crimes as a matter of law, becomes somewhat muddlesome. I would hold, quite *607simply, that the first prong of Code Ann. § 26-505 (a) establishes the "same evidence” test as one of several alternative tests for determining the limitations for multiple punishments for crimes arising from the same conduct of the accused, and Code Ann. § 26-507 adopts the "same transaction” test for determining limitations upon successive prosecutions for such crimes.
The "same evidence” test and the "same transaction” test are the predominant tests used by the courts in this country in resolving double jeopardy questions as a matter of constitutional law. The great deal of confusion which has been engendered by the double jeopardy proscriptions of the Federal and State Constitutions is largely attributable to the fact that the courts have adopted either one or the other test for determining both substantive and procedural double jeopardy questions. In my opinion, the first prong of Code Ann. § 26-505 (a) adopts the "same evidence” test for the resolution of substantive double jeopardy questions, and Code Ann. § 26-507 adopts the "same transaction” test for the resolution of procedural double jeopardy questions. As to the procedural aspect of the double jeopardy bar, the 1968 Criminal Code thus extends to the accused more protection than the Constitution requires. Compare Brown v. Ohio, 432 U. S. 161 (97 SC 221, 53 LE2d 187) (1977) (Brennan and Marshall, JJ., concurring); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 429 U. S. 1053 (97 SC 768, 50 LE2d 770) (1977) and cits.
2. In Division 4, the appellant argues that one of the statutory aggravating circumstances under which the death penalty was imposed is not supported by the evidence. The statutory aggravating circumstance complained of is found in Code Ann. § 27-2534.1 (b) (1), which provides in pertinent part, that: "[t]he offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was committed by a person with a prior record of conviction for a capital felony. . .” The convictions of the appellant for other capital felonies were not obtained until after the appellant committed the murder of Roy Asbell. Therefore, the murder of Roy Asbell was not committed by a person with a prior record of conviction for a capital felony, as clearly specified in the statute. In holding that it was, a *608majority of this court violate the cardinal rule of statutory construction that where a statute is plain and susceptible of but one natural and reasonable construction, the court has no authority to place a different construction upon it, but must construe it according to its terms. Rayle Elec. Membership Corp. v. Cook, 195 Ga. 734 (2) (25 SE2d 574) (1943); State Revenue Comm. v. Brandon, 184 Ga. 225, 228 (190 SE 660) (1937) and cits.; Barnes v. Carter, 120 Ga. 895, 898 (48 SE 387) (1904); Ezekiel v. Dixon, 3 Ga. 146, 158 (1847).
The majority arrive at this construction of the statute by envisioning a hypothetical situation in which an offender with no prior record commits numerous separate murders before being apprehended. The majority note that if we construe this statutory aggravating circumstance as referring to the defendant’s record at the time the crime was committed, rather than at the time of the trial, the defendant in the hypothetical situation could not receive the death penalty (unless of course, another statutory aggravating circumstance was present). The majority deem this an "intolerable result” and, therefore, conclude that the legislature did not intend it. What the majority ignore is that another portion of Code Ann. § 27-2534.1 (b) (1) authorizing imposition of the death penalty where "[t]he offense of murder . . . was committed by a person... who has a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions” would cover the hypothetical situation, had it not been for the fact that it was struck down by this court in Arnold v. State, supra. The majority construe the portion of Code Ann. § 27-2534.1 (b) (1) under review to mean neither what it says nor what the legislature intended it to mean. The majority construe it to mean what the legislature intended by the enactment of that portion of the statute struck down in Arnold. In so doing, I think that this court invades the province of the legislature. I respectfully dissent as to Division 4.