Court Opinion

ID: 9838886
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-08 16:09:08.959647+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:02:25.513700
License: Public Domain

J-A13035-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  JAKE DOUGLAS BYLSMA                          :
                                               :
                       Appellant               : No. 897 MDA 2022

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 18, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Adams County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-01-CR-0000223-2021

BEFORE:      BOWES, J., LAZARUS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                    FILED: SEPTEMBER 8, 2023

       Appellant Jake Douglas Bylsma appeals from the judgment of sentence

entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Adams County after the trial court

convicted Appellant of disorderly conduct. After careful review, we affirm.

       The trial court summarized the factual background of this case as

follows:

             The instant case arises out of an incident that occurred at
       the Adams County Courthouse (hereinafter “Courthouse”) on the
       afternoon of January 8, 2021. At that time, due to concerns
       associated with the COVID-19 pandemic, public access to the
       Courthouse was limited per an order from the President Judge of
       Adams County issued on December 9, 2020.1 Specifically, only
____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 In light of the global COVID-19 pandemic, in March 2020, our Supreme Court

declared a statewide judicial emergency and authorized the president judges
of each district to declare local judicial emergencies. In re General
Statewide Judicial Emergency, 228 A.3d 1281 (Pa. Mar. 16, 2020). Even
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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       direct parties to a proceeding and their counsel were permitted to
       enter the Courthouse for courtroom proceedings. Non-parties
       were not permitted to physically be present in the courtroom for
       proceedings, but with advance permission from Court
       administration, a non-party could go to the County’s Human
       service building to view proceedings via a video platform called
       WebEx.

             On the afternoon of January 8, 2021, Appellant, who was
       not a party to a proceeding and did not have permission to enter
       the Courthouse, entered the front lobby area of the Courthouse
       with his cell phone mounted on his chest for video recording
       purposes. Adams County Security Director Mark Masemer
       (“Masemer”), who testified at the summary appeal hearing, was
       in his office adjacent to the front lobby when Appellant first
       entered the Courthouse. When he heard Appellant’s voice,
       Masemer went out to the lobby to speak with him. At this time,
       other security officers were asking Appellant why he was there
       and telling him to turn off his recording device. Appellant
       explained that he was there for a particular hearing, and Masemer
       explained that he did not have permission to be in the building but
       could have sought permission to watch the proceeding remotely if
       he desired. Masemer asked Appellant to leave the building and
       asked Appellant to turn his phone off but Appellant refused to do
       both. Appellant argued to Masemer that he felt his rights were
       being violated because he was being denied access to the
       Courthouse and because he was not permitted to take any video.
       Appellant became agitated and began speaking with other officers
       and showing them various papers.

              Shortly after Appellant began arguing with Masemer and the
       other officers, a female desk officer went out the front doors of
       the Courthouse to alert incoming courthouse visitors, including a
       litigant and an attorney, of the altercation occurring inside. To
       conduct a security screening of that litigant and attorney, the
____________________________________________

after the statewide judicial emergency had ceased, the Supreme Court
empowered the president judge of each district to enter self-effectuating
declarations of judicial emergency and take appropriate measures including
“limit[ing] in-person access and proceedings in order to safeguard the health
and safety of court personnel, court users, and members of the public.” In re
General Statewide Judicial Emergency, 234 A.3d 408, 409 (Pa. May 27,
2020).

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      female officer escorted them around the normal security
      checkpoint into a side area of the lobby where screening usually
      does not occur. This was done to avoid the area in which Appellant
      was arguing with the officers. Meanwhile, other prospective
      courthouse visitors were forced to stand outside the building and
      wait, and some chose to simply leave the Courthouse rather than
      try to gain access.

            Appellant continued to try to convince the officers that he
      should be granted access to the Courthouse, and as more and
      more officers converged on Appellant and told him to leave the
      Courthouse building, he became increasingly louder and
      argumentative. Ultimately, Masemer touched Appellant’s right
      arm to try to get him to leave, and Appellant resisted and caused
      himself to drop to the floor. At that point, Corporal Samuel
      Shipley, who also testified at the summary appeal hearing, told
      Appellant that he was under arrest and placed him in handcuffs.
      Officers then took Appellant in a service elevator to an area
      containing holding cells. After reviewing the surveillance video of
      the incident,[FN1] this Court determined that the entire encounter
      between Appellant and the officers lasted approximately 12 or 13
      minutes.

         [FN1:] The Courthouse surveillance video of the incident
         was entered into evidence as Commonwealth’s Exhibit #2.
         Appellant’s own video of the encounter, which he recorded
         with his cell phone and later posted on YouTube, was
         entered into evidence as Commonwealth’s Exhibit #3.

Trial Court Opinion (T.C.O.), 8/23/22, at 2-4 (citations omitted).

      Appellant was charged by criminal complaint with defiant trespass,

disorderly conduct, and institutional vandalism. Shortly thereafter, the

Commonwealth referred the case to the Attorney General’s Office. The

Commonwealth asserts that the referral was appropriate as Appellant had filed

a lawsuit against an assistant district attorney in Adams County and had

accused various county officials of a racketeering scheme to retaliate against

Appellant.

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      On January 15, 2021, the Honorable Michael George, President Judge of

Adams County, issued an order providing that all the Court of Common Pleas

judges and magisterial district judges in the Fifty-First Judicial District recused

from this matter and directing the matter be referred to another Court of

Common Pleas judge. As discussed infra, the Supreme Court ultimately

appointed the Honorable Richard A. Lewis to preside over the case.

      On February 25, 2021, the Attorney General’s Office entered its

appearance as counsel for the Commonwealth. On March 5, 2021, the

Commonwealth filed a criminal information charging the same offenses as

listed in the criminal complaint. On March 18, 2022, at a pretrial motions

hearing, the Commonwealth filed an amended information reducing the

disorderly conduct charge to a summary offense and withdrawing the

remaining charges. Notes of Testimony (N.T.), 3/18/22, at 26-27.

      In an order dated April 29, 2021, the trial court authorized Appellant to

proceed as a pro se litigant after finding Appellant knowingly and voluntarily

waived his right to counsel. After a summary trial was held on May 18, 2022,

the trial court convicted Appellant of disorderly conduct and sentenced him to

pay a $200.00 fine and “all fees, fines, and costs mandated by law.”

Sentencing order, 5/18/23, at 1. The trial court placed Appellant on ninety

days of probation to ensure payment of the fine and costs.

      Appellant retained counsel to file this timely appeal and complied with

the trial court’s directions to file a concise statement of errors complained of

on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

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      Appellant raises the following issues for review on appeal:

      1. Whether the Attorney General lacked authority to prosecute
         [Appellant] under the Commonwealth Attorneys’ Act.

      2. Whether the trial court lacked capacity to hear the case.

      3. Whether the evidence supported the trial court’s implicit finding
         that the evidence was sufficient to prove that [Appellant]
         created a hazardous or physically offensive condition and that
         his actions served no legitimate purpose.

      4. Whether costs by the Clerk of Courts exceed the costs allowed
         for a non-vehicle summary conviction under 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
         1725.1(b) and are consequently illegal.

Appellant’s Brief, at 4-5 (footnotes omitted).

      First, Appellant claims the Attorney General’s Office lacked authority to

prosecute him under the Commonwealth Attorneys Act (71 P.S. § 731-101 et

seq.) as the Attorney General failed to tender proof of its authority to

prosecute this case.

      As an initial matter, we address the Commonwealth’s claim that

Appellant waived his challenge to the Attorney General’s authority to

prosecute the case as Appellant failed to raise this issue in his pretrial motion.

Appellant first raised this argument at his summary trial.

      Our Supreme Court has held that a challenge to the authority of the

Attorney General to prosecute a case should be presented to the trial court in

a defendant’s omnibus pretrial motion. Commonwealth v. Cosgrove, 680

A.2d 823, 826 (Pa. 1996). A defendant’s failure to raise an issue in an omnibus

pretrial motion waives the argument when relief is available via such a motion.

See Commonwealth v. Caulk, 220 A.3d 1102, 1112 (Pa.Super. 2019)

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(finding the defendant waived his venue challenge by failing to object to venue

in a pretrial motion).

      In response, Appellant alleges that he has presented a non-waiveable

challenge to prosecutorial jurisdiction. In support of this claim, Appellant cites

to Commonwealth v. Khorey, 555 A.2d 100 (Pa. 1989) for the proposition

that “[a]n attack on the authority of the attorney general is non-waiveable,

for an objection to the lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived.”

Id. at 106 n. 10.

      However, Appellant misinterprets the Khorey opinion which actually

contains a holding contrary to his argument. In that case, Khorey filed a

pretrial motion claiming the attorney general lacked authority to initiate the

prosecution under the Attorneys Act. Khorey also claimed that the criminal

information was legally invalid as the assistant attorney general that signed

the information could not show the Commonwealth had the authority to

prosecute Appellant.

      However, Khorey subsequently pled guilty to all the charged crimes and

withdrew his motion in exchange for the Commonwealth’s recommendation of

a sentence of probation. Nevertheless, after the trial court dismissed similar

charges against Khorey’s co-defendant who successfully challenged the

attorney general’s authority to prosecute his case, Khorey attempted to

withdraw his guilty plea. Khorey claimed his plea was unknowing as he was

not informed his charges would have been dismissed had the trial court

granted his petition challenging the authority of the attorney general.

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      The Supreme Court determined that Khorey’s challenge to the

prosecutorial authority of the attorney general was a waivable argument which

Khorey did in fact waive when he entered a guilty plea in exchange for the

prosecution’s recommendation of a probationary sentence. Id. at 12 (noting

that Khorey’s “[w]aiver of the right to challenge the authority of the attorney

general “was part of the price which he paid for the sentence of probation”).

      However, the Supreme Court found Khorey also raised a non-waivable

challenge to the trial court’s jurisdiction in claiming the “attorney general’s

lack of authority to initiate the prosecution under the Attorneys Act deprived

the Court of Common Pleas of subject matter jurisdiction” based on the validity

of the criminal information. Id. (emphasis added). The Supreme Court

observed that “couched in these terms, Khorey’s attack on the authority

general is non-waivable, for an objection to lack of subject-matter jurisdiction

can never be waived.” Id. n. 10 (emphasis added).

      Ultimately, the Supreme Court rejected Khorey’s suggestion that the

trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction simply because the criminal

information was signed by an assistant attorney general rather than a district

attorney. The Supreme Court acknowledged there is a rebuttable presumption

that a facsimile signature on a criminal information is legally valid, Khorey

waived the right to challenge the signature’s validity by entering a guilty plea,

and Khorey did not claim that the information failed to provide notice of the

charges against him. Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded that neither

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the Attorneys Act nor the criminal information deprived the trial court of

jurisdiction to accept Khorey’s guilty plea.

      In this case, Appellant did not challenge the trial court’s jurisdiction over

this matter but limited his claim to assert that the Attorney General did not

provide adequate proof of authority to prosecute this case under the Attorneys

Act. Appellant waived this specific argument challenging the prosecutorial

authority of the Attorney General when he failed to raise it in his omnibus

pretrial motion. Caulk, supra.

      Even assuming this claim has not been waived, it is clearly meritless.

The Attorneys Act specifically provides the Attorney General with the power

to prosecute in any county criminal court in various circumstances which

include “upon the request of a district attorney … who represents that there is

a potential for an actual or apparent conflict of interest on the part of the

district attorney or his office.” 71 P.S. § 732-205(a)(3).

      The Commonwealth indicates that it referred this case to the Attorney

General due to civil and criminal allegations Appellant had brought against a

county prosecutor and other local authorities. Appellant stated on the record

at the summary appeal hearing that he had filed a civil action against an

assistant district attorney in the Adams County District Attorney’s Office. N.T.,

5/18/22, at 32. Appellant also repeatedly argued that several county officials

worked in concert to engage in a racketeering scheme and had lodged the

instant charges against Appellant in retaliation for his actions against these

officials. Id. at 32-34, 40.

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      Thus, we agree that it was reasonable for the Adams County District

Attorney to find there was potential for an apparent conflict of interest on the

part of the district attorney that warranted the referral of the case to the

Attorney General’s office. Appellant is not entitled to relief on this claim.

      Second, Appellant claims that Judge Lewis lacked capacity to hear the

case. To analyze this issue, we must review the procedural history of the Judge

Lewis’s appointment.

      As noted above, after charges were filed in this case, all of the Court of

Common Pleas judges and magisterial district judges in the Fifty-First Judicial

District recused from this matter. Two additional judges, the Honorable Albert

H. Masland and the Honorable Joseph C. Madenspacher, also recused.

      On January 6, 2022, President Judge George filed a request with the

Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts (AOPC), asking that a judge be

temporarily assigned to preside over this case. However, Judge George

indicated that he was requesting a judge “[t]o sit as directed for the period

01/10/2022 to 01/10/2022.” Request for Assignment of Judge, 1/6/22, at 1.

The Court Administrator recommended Judge Lewis for the assignment and

certified that Judge Lewis was available to preside in this matter. Id.

      On January 13, 2022, this request was approved by the late Chief Justice

Max Baer of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, who certified that Judge Lewis

“is vested with the same power and authority of the requesting district for the

purposes and period set forth.” Order, 1/13/22, at 1.

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      Appellant argues that Judge Lewis lacked capacity to preside over his

trial which was held on May 18, 2022 as the Supreme Court’s order granting

him authority to preside in this case was only valid for one day (January 10,

2022), as this was the period requested by Judge George. Appellant contends

that Judge Lewis’s authority did not extend beyond this date.

      Judge Lewis rejected Appellant’s claim as it found that “[r]egardless of

the precise wording of the order, it is clear that the undersigned’s assignment

to this matter took effect on January 10, 2022, and it is beyond reason to

suggest that the undersigned’s assignment would last for merely one day.”

T.C.O. at 5.

      When reading Judge George’s request for an appointment of a judge to

preside in this case from January 10, 2022 to January 10, 2022 in conjunction

with the January 13, 2022 approval of this request, the order contains an

obvious typographical error. The courts could not have approved Judge Lewis

to preside in this matter for a single day that occurred three days in the past.

      Moreover, the order appointing Judge Lewis was issued pursuant to the

Pennsylvania Rules of Judicial Administration which specifically provide the

following:

      Duration of Assignment: Unless otherwise provided in the order of
      assignment, the order shall continue in effect after its stated
      expiration date until unfinished business pending before the
      assigned judge is completed.

Pa.R.J.A. 301(C)(3) (emphasis added).

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      Thus, although the order stated a specific period of time for Judge

Lewis’s appointment, it did not prohibit Judge Lewis’s appointment from

continuing after the stated expiration date to complete unfinished business,

which included Appellant’s motions and trial. As such, we conclude that Judge

Lewis did not err in finding he had the capacity to preside over this matter.

      Third, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting

his conviction for disorderly conduct. Our standard of review for a challenge

to the sufficiency of the evidence is well-established:

      In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we must
      determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, as well as all
      reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in the light
      most favorable to the verdict winner, are sufficient to support all
      elements of the offense. Commonwealth v. Moreno, 14 A.3d
      133 (Pa.Super. 2011). Additionally, we may not reweigh the
      evidence or substitute our own judgment for that of the fact
      finder. Commonwealth v. Hartzell, 988 A.2d 141 (Pa. Super.
      2009). The evidence may be entirely circumstantial as long as it
      links the accused to the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
      Moreno, supra at 136.

Commonwealth v. Juray, 275 A.3d 1037 (Pa.Super. 2022) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Koch, 39 A.3d 996, 1001 (Pa.Super. 2011)).

      To sustain a conviction for disorderly conduct, the prosecution must

prove that the individual, “with intent to cause public inconvenience,

annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof”:

      (1) engages in fighting or threatening, or in violent or tumultuous
      behavior;J

      (2) makes unreasonable noise;

      (3) uses obscene language, or makes an obscene gesture; or

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      (4) creates a hazardous or physically offensive condition by any
      act which serves no legitimate purpose of the actor.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5503 (emphasis added).

      Appellant specifically claims there was insufficient evidence to sustain

his conviction under Section 5503(a)(4) as the prosecution did not prove he

created   “a   hazardous   or   physically   offensive   condition.”   Appellant

characterizes his actions as a “peaceful audio and video recording as a citizen

journalist” that did not threaten any member of the public or any property.

Appellant’s Brief, at 26-27. We disagree.

      Appellant ignores the fact that he attempted to enter the courthouse in

the midst of a judicial emergency declared during the COVID-19 pandemic

during which access to the courthouse was restricted for limited purposes and

only permitted with prior approval. Even after authorities explained to

Appellant that he was not authorized to be in the courthouse but could

alternatively seek permission to view court proceedings virtually, Appellant

engaged in a heated altercation with court security and refused to comply with

their repeated requests that he leave the premises.

      Appellant’s antics affected members of the public, including a litigant

and attorney who were scheduled to appear in court at that time. These

individuals had to be escorted by security personnel around the normal

security checkpoint to avoid the altercation with Appellant. Other individuals

who sought to gain legitimate access to the premises were told to wait outside

the courthouse until the altercation had ended. As such, multiple individuals

chose to leave the courthouse instead of continuing to wait to gain access.

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      Thus, we conclude that Appellant intentionally or recklessly created a

risk of causing public inconvenience, annoyance, and alarm. Appellant’s

attempt to gain unauthorized access to the courthouse also created “a

hazardous or physically offensive condition” due to the risk of transmission of

COVID-19 as well as the perception Appellant created for those who were

legitimately on the premises.

      We also reject Appellant’s claim that his actions were permissible

because they served a “legitimate purpose” including “constitutionally-

protected activity.” Appellant’s Brief, at 27. Appellant does not specifically

enumerate which constitutionally protected right he was deprived of during

the events at issue, but simply argues that he had the right to access the

courthouse and videorecord the lobby with his phone camera. In addition,

Appellant does not challenge the constitutionality of the Supreme Court’s

order allowing districts to limit in-person access to courthouses in the interest

of public health and safety during the COVID-19 pandemic.

      As noted above, at the time of the events in question, access to the

courthouse was limited to those individuals who obtained prior approval for

limited purposes. It is undisputed that Appellant did not have authorization to

be on the premises to view court proceedings as a non-party.

      As such, Appellant has not demonstrated that he had a legitimate

purpose for his actions or even the right to be in the courthouse at that time.

Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying his sufficiency claim.

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        Lastly, Appellant claims that the trial court clerk of courts illegally

assessed him numerous individual fees that totaled $819.75 in court costs.

This Court has held that “[c]osts must not be assessed except as authorized

by law, and that the burden of justifying, by a preponderance of the evidence,

costs    imposed    upon   a   defendant    rests    upon    the    Commonwealth.”

Commonwealth v. Gill, 432 A.2d 1001, 1004 (Pa.Super. 1981) (citing

Commonwealth          v.   Coder,   415    A.2d     406,    410    (Pa.   1980)   and

Commonwealth v. Houck, 335 A.2d 389 (Pa.Super. 1975)). A challenge to

the authority of the court to impose costs challenges the legality of his

sentence. Commonwealth v. Childs, 63 A.3d 323, 325 (Pa.Super. 2013)

(citing Commonwealth v. Garzone, 993 A.2d 306 (Pa.Super. 2010)).

        In this case, the trial court indicated in its opinion that in sentencing

Appellant on May 18, 2022, it ordered Appellant to pay a $200 fine and the

costs of prosecution. However, the calculation of the costs of prosecution were

made by the Adams County Clerk of Court’s Office and docketed in an itemized

account on May 24, 2022. The trial court found “no reason to question the

calculations of the Clerk of Court, but … defer[red] to the Superior Court for

resolution of this final issue raised by Appellant.” T.C.O. at 9.

        Appellant does not challenge any of the individual fees listed in the Clerk

of Courts’ itemized list of costs. Instead, Appellant claims his costs were

limited by statute under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 1725.1:

        (b) Criminal cases.--Subject to subsection (f), the costs to be
        charged by the minor judiciary or by the court of common pleas

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       where appropriate in every criminal case, except as otherwise
       provided in this section, shall be as follows:

       (1) Summary conviction, except motor vehicle cases --- $28.50

       (2) Summary conviction, motor vehicles cases, other than
       paragraph (3) --- $22.50

       (3) Summary conviction, motor vehicle cases, hearing demanded-
       --- $27.50

       (4) Misdemeanor --- $32.50

       (5) Felony --- $37.50

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 1725.1. Section 1725.1(f) provides for an annual increase in

costs for inflation.

       We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that pursuant to Section

1725.1, his costs of prosecution could not have exceeded $28.50, the amount

designated for non-vehicle summary matters. The amounts set forth in

Section 1725.1 are mandatory county court costs, the amount of which varies

depending on the grading of the criminal offense. See Sherwood v.

Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 268 A.3d 528, 545 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2021).2

Section 1725.1 does not limit the Clerk of Courts from imposing certain fees

or from establishing a fee schedule to collect funds for the services it performs.

See 42 P.S. § 21061.

____________________________________________

2 We have recognized that “[a]lthough decisions of the Commonwealth Court

are not binding on this Court, we may rely on them if we are persuaded by
their reasoning.” In re Walker, 208 A.3d 472, 475 n. 3 (Pa.Super. 2019)
(quoting NASDAQ OMX PHLX, Inc. v. PennMont Secs., 52 A.3d 296, 308
n.7 (Pa.Super. 2012)).

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      In this case, we observe that the majority of the fees in the itemized list

of costs of prosecution were clerk of court “filing fees,” charged in connection

with the vast number of filings Appellant submitted while representing himself

pro se before the lower court.

      Therefore, we conclude there is no merit to Appellant’s claim that the

clerk of courts illegally imposed unauthorized court costs.

      For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 9/08/2023

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