Court Opinion

ID: 9793709
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:51:47.345168+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:41.399442
License: Public Domain

BROWN, Justice,
concurring.
I concur only in the result of the majority opinion.
ROONEY, Justice, specially concurring, with whom RAPER, Retired Justice, joins.
I agree with the majority opinion with reference to the first three issues there treated, and I agree with the result reached by the majority opinion on the fourth issue,1 but I cannot agree with the reasoning by which such result is reached.
The majority opinion attempts to sidestep the illogical position in which the Court placed itself with the decision in Westmark v. State, Wyo., 693 P.2d 220 (1984), but only creates another improbable situation. Westmark held that any comment on silence is per se reversible error. The majority opinion remarks that it will not concern itself “with whether the response [to the officer] was a ‘comment’ ” and elects to limit the Westmark holding to comments upon silence of the accused “either after his arrest or after he has been advised of his constitutional right to remain silent.” Subsequent language in the opinion infers that Westmark’s holding of per se reversible error for comment on silence would also apply if the accused stated affirmatively, even before being arrested or being advised of his constitutional right, that he was exercising such right. The opinion *1050recites, “[t]his holding contemplates only that silence prior to the arrest of an accused will not be presumed to be an exercise of the accused’s rights,” and, “[t]here is no reason to presume that a person under no official compulsion to speak is asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege in not speaking.” At this point, it must be pointed out that Westmark and its progeny did not apply a presumption to the comment on a right to remain silent. West-mark made the comment per se reversible error. I will note infra the impropriety of presuming a failure to exercise a constitutional right.
The holding of the majority opinion then is that silence before the time of arrest and the giving of the Miranda warning, unless appellant said, “I am exercising my right to silence,” can be emphasized by the prosecution through testimony to a jury to show that the accused did not say “my defense to a homicide charge is self-defense” in establishing the fact that self-defense is an afterthought. I believe the reverse is proper law: The constitutional right to silence exists at all times — before arrest, at arrest and after arrest; before a Miranda warning and after it. If there is a presumption relative to the exercise of the right, it should be in favor of its exercise and not to the contrary. An impermissible comment on the exercise of the right is error, the only question being whether or not the comment is reversible error — i.e., whether or not it is harmless error.
Under the majority opinion, it will be permissible to comment all one wants to about the silence of the accused before an arrest was made and before the Miranda warning was given to him. It is, thus, profitable for the prosecution to delay making the arrest and giving the warning as long as possible in anticipation of not only a voluntary incriminating statement by the accused which could be subject of comment at trial but also the failure on the part of the accused to give explanations of incriminating factors, upon which explanations he later bases his defense, so that comment thereon can be made at trial.
Of course, an accused can waive his constitutional right to remain silent, making a statement made by him to be proper evidence and subject to comment by the prosecution. In effect, the appellant did so in this case by immediately volunteering the information, “ T shot him.’ ” A distinction must be carefully made in this case in this respect. The defense at trial was self-defense. Appellant does not object to the police officer’s testimony that appellant told him, “ T shot him.’ ” He objects to the inference conveyed to the jury by the subsequent question and answer to the effect that his contention of self-defense was an afterthought. He contends that the question, “Did he tell you at that point why he shot him?” (emphasis added) was for the purpose of informing the jury that appellant’s failure to then assert self-defense— his exercise of a constitutional right to remain silent — infers that his actions were not in self-defense. Following are the pertinent questions and answers upon which the issue is based:
“A * * * And I walked over and I said, ‘What’s going on here?’ And he said, ‘I shot him.’
“Q Who said that?
“A The Defendant, Mr. Summers.
“Q Where was he when [he] said, ¶ shot him.’
“A He was seated inside the car.
“Q Had you asked him any questions at that point?
“A No, I just asked him what was going on.
“Q That’s the first thing he told you?
“A Yes, sir.
“Q Did he tell you at that point why he shot him?
“A No, sir.
“Q Just ‘I shot him. ’
“A Yes, sir. ” (Emphasis added.)
The emphasized portion of the testimony is not much different from one of the comments held impermissible in Westmark:
“ ‘ * * * At that point, did the Defendant, or any time during the course of your conversation with the Defendant, *1051raise the issue that he had been acting in self defense?’ ” 693 P.2d at 221.
I believe the comment in this case was an impermissible comment on silence. If it was not intended to draw the jury’s attention to appellant’s failure to assert self-defense at the scene of the crime — i.e., “at that point” — there was no purpose for the question at all.
However, I concur with the result reached by the majority opinion, since I find the error to be harmless. It would serve no useful purpose to again repeat the logic of Richter v. State, Wyo., 642 P.2d 1269 (1982); the dissent of Justice Brown in which I joined in Westmark v. State; my dissenting opinion in Brewster v. State, Wyo., 712 P.2d 338 (1985), in which Justice Brown joined; my special concurring opinion in Gomez v. State, Wyo., 718 P.2d 53 (1986), in which Justice Brown joined; and my specially concurring opinion in Cheatham v. State, Wyo., 719 P.2d 612 (1986). Applying that logic to this case, the facts as recited in the majority opinion were such that there was no reasonable probability that the verdict might have been more favorable to appellant absent the error in allowing the question and answer relative to the exercise of appellant’s right to silence. The undisputed facts before the jury relative to the incidents preceding and at the time of the shooting reflect that upon which the contention of self-defense was based, and the impermissible comment cannot reasonably be said to have any impact on the verdict. As recited in my special concurrence in Gomez v. State, 718 P.2d at 58:
“* * * Rule 49(a), W.R.Cr.P., defines harmless error as:
“‘Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.’ “Rule 7.04, W.R.A.P., provides:
“ ‘Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.’
“We have held that before a constitutional error can be held harmless, the burden is on the State to demonstrate, and the Court must be able to declare a belief, that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Campbell v. State, Wyo., 589 P.2d 358 (1979). There must be a reasonable possibility that in the absence of the error the verdict might have been more favorable to the defendant. Reeder v. State, Wyo., 515 P.2d 969 (1973); Hoskins v. State, Wyo., 552 P.2d 342, reh. denied 553 P.2d 1390 (1976), cert. denied 430 U.S. 956, 97 S.Ct. 1602, 51 L.Ed.2d 806 (1977).”
In summation, I believe the constitutional right to remain silent exists before and after arrest, before and after a Miranda-type warning, and whether articulated by the accused or not. I believe the accused can waive the right, expressly or impliedly such as by volunteering information. I believe a comment on the exercise of such right is impermissible absent “opening of the door” by the defense, or some similar circumstance, but that it is not per se reversible error and that it can be harmless. In this case, I believe that the comment was impermissible, but the resulting error was harmless.

. Appellant words the fourth issue:
"Did the tried court err in refusing to grant a mistrial on the ground that the prosecutor impermissibly commented upon Appellant’s right to remain silent?”
Appellee words the fourth issue:
"DID THE PROSECUTOR’S QUESTIONING OF A POLICE OFFICER WHO INVESTIGATED THE SHOOTINGS CONSTITUTE AN IMPERMISSIBLE COMMENT ON APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT?”