Court Opinion

ID: 9670143
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:15:34.197563+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:02.838153
License: Public Domain

*8BIEGELMEIER, J.
(dissenting). Much has been written on the effect of statements of an expert witness as to his qualifications. A reading of the cases cited by the majority shows they involve hypothetical questions, are comments and expressions of dictum. Only Fisher v. Flanagan Coal Co., 86 W.Va. 460, 103 S.E. 359, reversed the trial court's ruling. By their result they are in agreement With our holding in State ex rel. Helgerson v. Riiff, 73 S.D. 467, 44 N.W.2d 126. Other authorities are: 20 Am.Jur., Evidence, § 786; 22 C.J. Evidence § 609, p. 526; 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 458, p. 99, n. 70; Jones v. Tucker, 41 N.H. 546; Boardman v. Woodman, 47 N.H. 120, 135; State v. Boyce, 24 Wash. 514, 64 P. 719; Christman v. Pearson, 100 Iowa 634, 69 N.W. 1055; Walker v. Scott, 10 Kan. App. 413, 61 P. 1091; Crow v. State, 33 Tex.Cr. 264, 26 S.W. 209. See especially Glover v. State, 129 Ga. 717, 59 S.E. 816 at 819 which contains excellent reasoning. These cases hold the qualification and competency of an expert witness is in the discretion of the trial court and his ruling upheld only in case of a clear abuse as the opinion states. Nearly all the decisions uphold the trial judge's rulings. We should do so here and not lend more weight to the one quoted statement of the witness than to others. In Waterhouse v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 16 S.D. 592, 94 N.W. 587 and Borneman v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co., 19 S.D. 459, 104 N.W. 208, this court held it was for the trial court to determine if the witness possessed the requisite qualifications to testify on the subject and its ruling should not be reversed "in the absence of palpable error". Later in State v. Riiff, supra, it wrote:
"The qualifications and competency of a witness to give opinion evidence is primarily in the discretion of the trial court and his ruling in determining qualifications will not be disturbed unless there is no evidence that the witness had the qualifications of an expert or the trial court has proceeded upon erroneous legal standards."
Wigmore contends "it cannot be doubted that the rule of the future ought to be: The experiential qualifications of a particular witness are invariably determined by the trial judge, and will not be reviewed on appeal." Wigmore, Evidence, 3rd Ed. § 561.
*9We need not go so far but only accept, as indeed the majority avers, the State v. Riiff pronouncement that the trial court's "ruling in determining qualifications (of a witness) will not be disturbed unless there is no evidence that the witness had the qualifications of an expert * * The majority opinion refers to her education, training and experience. The evidence shows more in detail she took courses in histology, bacteriology, hemotology and all courses pertaining to medical technology that would qualify her to recognize various tissues and organisms under a microscope and do chemistries and bacteriologies, hemotology, urology and all laboratory procedures at the medical center; that she knew the proper procedure for staining and preparation of samples, including the Gram method of testing; that her training taught her to recognize spermatozoa under a microscope and in her years of experience she had conducted many such examinations. Three times before she was permitted to testify to the presence of spermatozoa, defendant's attorney asked and was granted permission to cross-examine her as to her qualifications and procedures. On this foundation and because for 6V2 years she had been and was then employed as a medical technician at a medical clinic, the trial judge concluded she had the necessary qualifications. State v. Riiff, supra, requires this court to affirm this ruling if there was any evidence to support it.
A jury and a reviewing court should consider all the testimony of a witness, not the one isolated answer. After the foundation was laid, the record continues:
"Q. Now, Phyllis * * * wjii you tell what you saw under the microscope? A. * * * I found what I felt to be human sperm, or what I thought appeared to be human sperm.
"Q. A considerable number of sperm? A. No, they were very few.
"Q. Now did you advise Dr. Bailey the results of your examination? A. Yes. * * *
"Q. Now, Phyllis, I notice that you very carefully qualified your answer by saying what appeared to be human *10sperm. Does that mean that you are not exactly sure what you saw was human sperm? A. I am not qualified to say whether it was sperm or not."
Defendant then made his motion to strike her testimony dealing with human sperm which the trial court denied. This is the ruling this court declares erroneous. Not content to rely on that record, defendant then proceeded to add to it. After further questions and answers as to how many sperm she saw, defendant's counsel asked:
"Q. Phyllis, this organism which you say appeared to be human sperm, would it also be safe to say, or could we just as well say that they appeared to be white cells also? A. No.
"Q. Could we say that they could have been anything else other than human sperm? A. To me they couldn't have been, no."
This evidence adduced by defendant remains without a motion to strike it. Such is the record — the weight and value of her testimony was for the jury. The jury and the trial court could observe the manner and demeanor of the witness and consider that she had been through a thorough and battering cross-examination directed to disparaging her education and status. Included were questions as to her education in a school not recognized by some medical association, that she was not a member of some national association or registered or accredited by it. None of these were necessary requirements for her to testify. We must be realistic enough to know diagnoses are rendered, medicines prescribed, operations performed and the very lives of patients are in the balance based on the reports of this technician. The doctors in the clinic rely on and have faith and confidence in her training and ability. The trial court concurred. This reviewing court declines to do so.
All the answers should be read together, not one to the exclusion of others. If the answer quoted in the majority opinion be held to limit her previous testimony, it did not qualify her later answer positively given that it couldn't "have been anything else other than human sperm."
*11Other evidence fit together to amply prove defendant's guilt. SDC 1960 Supp. 34.2902 directs this court to disregard error which does not affect a substantial right of defendant. See State v. Poppenga, 76 S.D. 592, 83 N.W.2d 518. Defendant did not testify on his own behalf. The reason was evident for after the trial, an information was filed under the Habitual Criminal Act charging him with having committed a similar indecent molestation offense upon his eight-year-old sister-in-law in Minnesota which, with other sex crimes, he admitted. None of this was before the jury, nor is it material here for the innocent and guilty are entitled to a fair trial. Indicative of this after a conference with counsel, a pathologist was called as a witness to testify as to his examination of the slides for sperm made some months later. He was the last witness — called and examined by the court as its expert witness.
In regard to the mother's evidence of her son's identification of the defendant there was other evidence defendant said he thought he was the little boy he picked up in the Robbinsdale area that morning and he drove him to a place on a dirt road about a block from his home. The mother's testimony was cumulative and thus not prejudicial.
I cannot concur in 'setting aside this conviction for the reasons stated and therefore dissent.