Court Opinion

ID: 9920885
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-19 00:02:34.172929+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:46:03.887515
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/18/24 P. v. Allegheny Casualty Co. CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

 THE PEOPLE,                                             B320719;
                                                         B320481
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                         (Los Angeles County
           v.                                            Super. Ct. Nos. OSJ2579; OSJ2580)

 ALLEGHENY CASUALTY
 COMPANY,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Natalie P. Stone, Judge. Affirmed.
      Law Office of John Rorabaugh and John Mark Rorabaugh
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Richard P. Chastang,
Assistant County Counsel, and Michael J. Gordon, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                ________________________
                       INTRODUCTION

      Allegheny Casualty Company (Allegheny) appeals from two
orders denying its motions to vacate forfeiture and exonerate two
bail bonds and from the subsequent summary judgments entered
against it. Allegheny contends the trial court lost jurisdiction
over the bonds by failing to declare a forfeiture pursuant to Penal
Code section 1305, subdivision (a),1 when defendant Sharon
Denise Huff failed to appear at a hearing in her criminal case on
February 24, 2021. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in concluding that Huff was not ordered to personally
appear on that date. Accordingly, we affirm the orders denying
Allegheny’s motions to vacate forfeiture and exonerate the bail
bonds, and the orders entering summary judgment.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A.    Allegheny Posts a Bond to Secure Huff’s Release from
      Custody for Two Separate Incidents
      In July 2018 Huff was charged by complaint in case
No. 8LB0765001 with one count of misdemeanor willful infliction
of corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition upon a

1    Statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise noted.

                                 2
victim2 (§ 273.5, subd. (a).)3 Huff pleaded no contest, and the
trial court placed her on three years’ probation, including the
condition that she obey all laws.
       In April 2020 Huff was charged by complaint in case
No. NA114285 with one felony count of willful infliction of
corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition upon a victim
(§ 273.5, subd. (a)), one felony count of assault upon the person of
another with a deadly weapon or instrument other than a firearm
(§ 245, subd. (a)(1)), and one misdemeanor count of a willful and
knowing violation of a protective order or stay-away court order
(§ 166, subd. (c)(1).) The trial court set bail at $120,000.
       As a result of the new allegations against Huff, the trial
court revoked probation in case No. 8LB0765001 and set Huff’s
bail at $50,000. In June 2020 Allegheny, by and through its
agent Sunrise Bail Bonds, posted bond No. ASIM-1801 in the
amount of $120,000 for the release of Huff from custody in case
No. NA114285, and posted bond No. AS50K-96045 in the amount
of $50,000 in case No. 8LB0765001. Accordingly, there are two
bonds in this case involving Huff totaling $170,000.
       Both cases were considered together by the trial court.
Following several continuances, counsel for Huff informed the
trial court4 on January 21, 2021 that the “case is ready to resolve”
but that “it’s just been difficult bringing Ms. Huff into court due

2     We grant the People’s request to augment the record to
include the complaint in case No. 8LB0765001. (Rules of Court,
rule 8.155(a)(1)(A).)
3     Section 273.5, subdivision (a), is a wobbler, and is
punishable as either a felony or misdemeanor. (People v. Villalba
(2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 659, 667.)
4     Judge Chet L. Taylor.

                                 3
to her age and high risk. My request would be to return for
preliminary setting [i.e., the date for setting the preliminary
hearing] on February 24th with the necessary time waiver. I’m
going to try my very best to have her before the court.” The trial
court confirmed that counsel was appearing under section 977,
subdivision (b), and continued the hearing. The reporter’s
transcript does not reflect the trial court ordered in open court
that Huff was to appear at the next hearing date. But its minute
order entered on January 21, 2021 states, “[t]he court orders the
defendant to appear on the next court date,” which was
February 24, 2021.
       On February 24, 2021 counsel for Huff appeared, stated
that he filed a section 977, subdivision (b) waiver, and requested
the hearing be continued to April 13, 2021 because he was “just
trying to get Ms. Huff in the building so she can take the people’s
offer.” The trial court5 indicated on the record that “I think under
Emergency Rule 5(c)6 I can allow you to waive the 60-day rule
today based on the fact that you’re 977(b),” and continued the
matter to April 13, 2021.
       On April 13, 2021 counsel for Huff advised the court that
“we’re ready to resolve this case. We have been for a very long
time, but Ms. Huff’s medical needs have prevented her from
coming into court along with the risk of COVID. . . . At this point,
I would ask for another setting date so I can try to get her in. . . .

5     Judge Debra A. Cole.
6     Under Emergency Rule 5(c)(3) the court was required to
“accept defense counsel’s representation that the defendant
understands and agrees with waiving any right to appear unless
the court has specific concerns in a particular matter about the
validity of the waiver.”

                                  4
This case has been ready to resolve for a long time. It’s just
getting her into court. She lives in Vegas right now because she’s
getting medical attention there.” In response, the People argued
that “the People do want a [preliminary hearing] because we
want her to come to court. . . . So at this point we either need to
set it for prelim or I’d ask for a bench warrant or something
because she’s not coming to court even though we do want to
resolve the case.”
       The trial court agreed with the People and set May 26,
2021 as the preliminary hearing date. The trial court advised
Huff’s counsel that “there is not going to be more time,
counsel. . . . The defendant must be present on that court
date. . . . Probation remains revoked. Bond to stand on that.
We’ll set it for probation violation hearing setting on that same
day, May 26, 2021.”

B.      After Huff Fails To Appear, the Trial Court Orders Bail
        Forfeited, Denies the Motions to Discharge the Forfeiture
        Order and Exonerate Bail, and Enters Summary Judgment
        On May 26, 2021 counsel for Huff appeared and notified
the trial court that he “lost contact with her.” The trial court
ordered bail forfeited in both cases because Huff did not appear
despite the court’s April 13, 2021 order directing her to appear on
May 26. The court clerk mailed notice of the forfeiture orders to
Allegheny and Sunrise Bail Bonds on June 4, 2021.
        On November 5, 2021 Allegheny moved to discharge the
forfeiture orders and exonerate bail. In its motions, Allegheny
argued that the trial court lost jurisdiction over each bond when
it failed to declare a forfeiture on February 24, 2021. (See § 1305,
subd. (a)(1)(D) [“A court shall in open court declare forfeited the

                                 5
undertaking of bail or the money or property deposited as bail if,
without sufficient excuse, a defendant fails to appear” on “[a]ny
other occasion prior to the pronouncement of judgment if the
defendant’s presence in court is lawfully required”].) Allegheny
filed supplemental briefs on January 25, 2022 arguing that “[t]he
mere presence of a 977 waiver is not an excuse for the
defendant’s failure to appear” where the trial court ordered a
defendant to appear. The record does not reflect the People filed
an opposition brief to either motion, but the People were present
at the hearing on Allegheny’s motions.7
       On March 11, 2022 the trial court8 heard argument and
denied the motions to vacate forfeiture and exonerate bail, and
then subsequently entered summary judgment against
Allegheny. (See § 1306, subd. (a) [“When any bond is forfeited
and the period of time specified in Section 1305 has elapsed
without the forfeiture having been set aside, the court which has
declared the forfeiture shall enter a summary judgment against
each bondsman named in the bond in the amount for which the
bondsman is bound.”].)9 The clerk’s notice of entry of judgments

7     The People’s failure to file a written opposition did not
relieve Allegheny of its burden as the moving party to show it
was entitled to relief. “Burden is upon the bonding company
seeking to set aside the forfeiture to establish by competent
evidence that its case falls within the four corners of these
statutory requirements.” (People v. American Bankers Ins. Co.
(1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 348, 354; accord, People v. American Surety
Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 719, 726.)
8     Judge Natalie P. Stone.
9     “‘Summary judgment following a declaration of forfeiture is
a consent judgment entered without a hearing pursuant to the
terms of the bail bond.’” (People v. Financial Casualty & Surety,

                                6
on the forfeited bonds and demand for payment were entered on
March 15, 2022 (case Nos. OSJ2579 and OSJ2580).10
      Allegheny timely appealed. Because both appeals raise the
identical issue, although as to two different bonds involving the
same person, we consider the appeals together.

                         DISCUSSION

A.     Governing Law and Standard of Review
       A bail bond “‘“‘is a contract between the surety and the
government whereby the surety acts as a guarantor of the
defendant’s appearance in court under the risk of forfeiture of the
bond.’”’” (People v. Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. (2016)
2 Cal.5th 35, 42.) When a person for whom a bail bond has been
posted and against whom a criminal complaint has been filed
fails to appear as required by law, the court must declare the bail
forfeited. (§ 1305, subd. (a); see County of Los Angeles v.
Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 309, 312;
People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th
653, 657.)

Inc. (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 33, 37, quoting People v. The North
River Ins. Co. (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 559, 567.) “The only issue in
a challenge to the summary judgment is whether it was entered
pursuant to the terms of the consent, which requires compliance
with Penal Code sections 1305 and 1306.” (People v. American
Contractors Indemnity Co. (2004) 238 Cal.App.4th 653, 1047.)
10    “While bail bond proceedings occur in connection with
criminal prosecutions, they are independent from and collateral
to the prosecutions and are civil in nature.” (People v. American
Contractors Indemnity Co., supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 657.)

                                 7
       Section 1305, one of the provisions governing bail
forfeiture, provides: “(a)(1) A court shall in open court declare
forfeited the undertaking of bail or the money or property
deposited as bail if, without sufficient excuse, a defendant fails to
appear for any of the following: [¶] (A) Arraignment.
[¶] (B) Trial. [¶] (C) Judgment. [¶] (D) Any other occasion
prior to the pronouncement of judgment if the defendant’s
presence in court is lawfully required. [¶] (E) To surrender
himself or herself in execution of the judgment after appeal.”
       Once the court declares forfeiture as provided in
section 1305 the surety that posted the bond has 180 days (plus
five days for mailing) after the clerk of court mails a notice of
forfeiture to move to vacate forfeiture and exonerate the bond.
(§ 1305, subd. (c)(1); People v. Lexington National Ins. Co. (2007)
147 Cal.App.4th 1192, 1198 [“‘When the bail has served its
purpose, the surety will be “exonerated,” i.e., released from the
obligation. Exoneration normally occurs on termination of the
proceedings in some manner or on return of the defendant to
custody.’”].) Upon a showing of good cause, the court may extend
this appearance period by no more than 180 days from the date
the trial court orders the extension. (§ 1305.4; People v.
Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc., supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 44.)
       If the forfeiture has not been set aside by the end of the
appearance period, including any extension, “the court which has
declared the forfeiture shall enter a summary judgment against
each bondsman named in the bond in the amount for which the
bondsman is bound.” (§ 1306, subd. (a); People v. American
Contractors Indemnity Co., supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 657 [“The
surety that posted the bond . . . has a statutory ‘appearance’
period in which either to produce the accused in court and have

                                  8
the forfeiture set aside, or to demonstrate other circumstances
requiring the court to vacate the forfeiture. If the forfeiture is not
set aside by the end of the appearance period, the court is
required to enter summary judgment against the surety.”].)
       If the trial court does not declare a forfeiture when required
by section 1305, it loses jurisdiction over the bail bond and lacks
authority to enter summary judgment against the bail bond
company. (See People v. Amwest Surety Ins. Co. (2004)
125 Cal.App.4th 547, 550 [“We conclude the trial court’s failure to
declare a forfeiture in open court, as mandated by section 1305,
subdivision (a), resulted in the court’s loss of jurisdiction over the
bail bond. Because the court did not have fundamental
jurisdiction when it entered the summary judgment, the
judgment was necessarily void, and subject to collateral attack at
any time.”]; accord, People v. United Bonding Ins. Co. (1971)
5 Cal.3d 898, 907 [“It follows from the foregoing that the court’s
failure to declare a forfeiture upon a nonappearance without
sufficient excuse, either where no excuse is offered or where the
finding of an excuse constitutes an abuse of discretion, deprives
the court of jurisdiction to later declare a forfeiture.”]; see also
§ 1305, subd. (a)(1)(D).) We strictly construe the applicable
forfeiture statutes in favor of the surety in order to avoid the
“harsh results” of forfeiture. (People v. International Fidelity Ins.
Co. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 345, 354; People v. The North River
Ins. Co. (2018) 31 Cal.App.5th 797, 804.)
       A trial court’s order granting or denying a motion to vacate
the forfeiture of a bail bond is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
(See People v. Bankers Ins. Co. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 582, 586-
588 [applying abuse of discretion standard to “a record in conflict”

                                  9
where reporter’s transcript and clerk’s minutes differed on
whether forfeiture was ordered in open court].)

B.     The Trial Court Properly Denied Allegheny’s Motions
       Because Huff Was Not Required to Personally Appear on
       February 24, 2021
       Allegheny argues Huff was ordered to appear personally in
court on February 24, 2021 by the trial court’s January 21, 2021
minute order. In Allegheny’s view, the trial court’s failure to
declare a forfeiture on February 24, 2021 resulted in the court’s
loss of jurisdiction over the bail bond and the summary judgment
against it on March 11, 2022. We are unpersuaded. The trial
court did not err in ruling that, notwithstanding the January 21,
2021 minute order, Huff had not been ordered to appear
personally at the preliminary hearing setting date on
February 24, 2021.

      1.      Huff Was Not Required By Statute To Be Present for
              the Preliminary Hearing Setting Date and Appeared
              Through Counsel
       “‘[S]ection 977 requires a defendant to be present at the five
fundamental proceedings and entitles [her] to be present at all
others.’” (People v. Gutierrez (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1196, 1203,
quoting People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 435.) Section 977,
subdivision (b)(1), provides: “Except as provided in
subdivision (c), in all cases in which a felony is charged, the
accused shall be physically present at the [1] arraignment, [2] at
the time of plea, [3] during the preliminary hearing, [4] during
those portions of the trial when evidence is taken before the trier
of fact, and [5] at the time of the imposition of sentence. The

                                 10
accused shall be physically or remotely present at all other
proceedings unless they waive their right to be physically or
remotely present, with leave of court and with approval by
defendant’s counsel.”
       Subdivision (b)(2) of section 977 further provides that,
“[t]he waiver of a defendant’s right to be physically or remotely
present may be in writing and filed with the court or, with the
court’s consent, may be entered personally by the defendant or by
the defendant’s counsel of record.” (People v. Safety National
Casualty Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 703, 716 [“with respect to ‘all
other proceedings’ at which the defendant seeks to be absent, the
standard waiver form set out in section 977, subdivision (b)(2)
contemplates a situation where a defendant is absent from
court”].)
       In this case, February 24, 2021 was the date for the setting
of the preliminary hearing. A preliminary hearing setting date is
not one of the five mandatory hearings where a defendant is
required to be present. (See § 977, subd. (a); People v. Safety
National Casualty Corp., supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 716 [“The five
mandatory proceedings described in the preceding sentence of
section 977(b)(1) (arraignment, plea, preliminary hearing, trial,
sentencing) reflect the Legislature’s concern that the felony
defendant be present at case-related proceedings that occur in
open court.”].) Further, there is no dispute that Huff’s counsel
had entered a valid section 977 waiver excusing Huff’s absence at
that hearing.
       Huff’s appearance could only be mandatory if she had been
ordered to appear personally in court on February 24, 2021. As
explained in People v. Ranger Ins. Co. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1301,
1304: “A defendant’s presence is ‘lawfully required’ when there is

                                11
‘a specific court order commanding his appearance at a date and
time certain’ [citation] or when a defendant has notice because he
or she is present when the date and time for a mandatory
appearance are set, even though the court did not specifically
order his or her personal presence.” Accordingly, we turn to
whether Huff had been ordered to appear at the preliminary
hearing setting date.

      2.     Under the Circumstances Presented, the Reporter’s
             Transcript Was Entitled to “Greater Credence” Than
             the January 21, 2021 Minute Order
       The minute order of January 21, 2021 states that, “[t]he
court orders the defendant to appear on the next court date.” But
that is not the end of the analysis. As further explained below, in
determining whether the minute order accurately reflected the
proceedings for purposes of a bail forfeiture motion, the trial
court could properly examine the reporter’s transcript (which
does not order Huff’s personal appearance) to determine whether
Huff was ordered to appear in court on the date in question.
       In this context, a trial court is entitled to resolve a conflict
between the clerk’s minute order and the court reporter’s
transcript to determine which is “entitled to greater credence.”
(People v. Bankers Ins. Co. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 582, 586; id. at
p. 588 [“We have a record in conflict on that issue, with a
reporter’s transcript, which does not indicate any bail forfeiture
and clerk’s minutes, which do”; resolving conflict in favor of
reporter’s transcript]; see People v. Thompson (2009)
180 Cal.App.4th 974, 978 [“When the record is in conflict and
cannot be harmonized, “‘. . . that part of the record will prevail,
which, because of its origin and nature or otherwise, is entitled to

                                  12
greater credence.”’”]; In re Evans (1945) 70 Cal.App.2d 213, 216
[“whether the recitals in the clerk’s minutes should prevail as
against contrary statements in the reporter’s transcript, must
depend upon the circumstances of each particular case”];
People v. Smith (1983) 33 Cal.3d 596, 599 [same].)
       The trial court’s order denying Allegheny’s motions to
vacate forfeiture and exonerate the bail bonds does not explain
its reasoning. But when the trial court denied Allegheny’s
motions, it necessarily determined Huff had not been ordered to
appear on February 24, 2021. The trial court did not err. Aside
from the January 2021 minute order, there was nothing in the
record before the trial court indicating that Huff had been
ordered to appear at the February 24, 2021 preliminary hearing
setting date. The reporter’s transcript for January 21, 2021 does
not indicate the trial court verbally ordered Huff to appear
personally at the next hearing date; that is, the trial court did not
make such an order in open court with counsel present. Further,
as noted by the People, the January 21, 2021 transcript “includes
what appears to be the entirety of the hearing . . . including the
court calling the matter, the initial[] stated appearances by the
parties, a short discussion about the status of the case, a request
to continue the setting hearing to the next month, the court
continuing the hearing to February 24, 2021, and farewell
statements.” As in People v. Bankers Ins. Co., supra,
182 Cal.App.4th at p. 587, “There is nothing which suggests the
reporter’s transcript is in any way incomplete.” And Allegheny
does not dispute the reporter’s transcript is complete.
       Under this scenario, the trial court reasonably concluded
that where there is a conflict between the minute order and the
reporter’s transcript, that “the reporter’s transcript [was] entitled

                                 13
to greater credence” than the clerk’s minute order. (People v.
Bankers Ins. Co., supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 586; see In re P.A.
(2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 23, 30, fn. 4 [“‘[c]onflicts between the
reporter’s and clerk’s transcripts are generally presumed to be
clerical in nature and resolved in favor of the reporter’s transcript
unless the particular circumstances dictate otherwise’”]; see also
In re T.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 275, 298 fn. 20 [“Throughout our
review of the record in these appeals, however, we have
encountered minute orders that include findings that were not
made or, on occasion, are in direct conflict with the statements as
reported in the hearing transcripts. Even under better
circumstances the record of the court’s oral pronouncements
prevails over conflicting minute orders.”].)
       Allegheny contends “the record is not in conflict,” and that
“[n]othing in the record conflicts with th[e] order to appear,” but
it does not persuasively explain why the trial court abused its
discretion in ruling otherwise in light of the reporter’s transcript.
Allegheny further contends that “the minutes are ‘no less a part
of the record than the transcript of the oral proceedings,’ and . . .
are generally more accessible than a reporter’s transcript.”
(People v. Allegheny Casualty Co. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 704, 713
fn. 3.) But as People v. Bankers Ins. Co. at page 587 to 588
observed, “the court in Allegheny was faced with a situation in
which there was no reporter’s transcript because no court
reporter was present at the forfeiture of bail proceeding. The
clerk’s minutes reflected bail had been declared forfeited, but not
that the declaration had been made in open court. . . . Thus, our
case is distinguishable from Allegheny. We do not have a record
silent on the issue of whether the declaration was made in open
court. We have a record in conflict on that issue, with a

                                 14
reporter’s transcript, which does not indicate bail forfeiture and
clerk’s minutes, which do.” As we explained above, the trial court
here was entitled to resolve the conflict in the record between the
reporter’s transcript and the minute order on the issue of
whether Huff was ordered on January 21, 2021 to appear at the
February 26 hearing and determine the reporter’s transcript was
entitled to greater credence.
       Indeed, the trial court could reasonably have concluded the
January 21, 2021 minute order was simply incorrect.11 By way of
contrast, the trial court on April 13, 2021 unequivocally stated on
the record that “[t]he defendant must be present” at the next
hearing on May 26, 2021. This affirmative statement, which is
consistent with the April 13, 2021 minute order requiring her to
appear, was sufficient to “lawfully require” Huff’s presence at the
next hearing date. (See People v. Lexington National Ins. Corp.
(2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1144, 1149.) Thus, when Huff failed to
appear on May 26, 2021 only then did the trial court order
forfeiture of the bonds.

C.    The Trial Court Properly Entered the Summary Judgments
      Against Allegheny
      As outlined above, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in concluding Huff was not ordered to personally

11     The record before us reflects that at least one other minute
order was erroneous. The February 24, 2021 minute order states
that, “Defendant is present in court.” But the reporter’s
transcript clearly indicates Huff was not present and her counsel
was “appearing 977(b) for defendant.” In deciding the underlying
motions, the trial court was entitled to resolve such conflicts in
favor of the reporter’s transcript.

                                15
appear at the preliminary hearing setting date on February 24,
2021. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied Allegheny’s
motions to discharge forfeiture and exonerate bail, and properly
entered summary judgment against Allegheny in each matter.
(See § 1306, subd. (a); People v. American Contractors Indemnity
Co., supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 657; People v. American Contractors
Indemnity Co., supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at p. 1047; People v.
Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 369, 378
[“If the forfeiture is not vacated, the trial court must then enter
summary judgment against the surety for ‘the amount of the
bond plus costs.’”].)

                         DISPOSITION

      We affirm the orders of summary judgment and the trial
court’s orders denying Allegheny’s motions to discharge forfeiture
and exonerate bail. The People are awarded their costs on
appeal.

                                     MARTINEZ, J.
We concur:

      SEGAL, Acting P. J.            EVENSON, J.*

*     Judge of the Alameda County Superior Court, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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