Court Opinion

ID: 9554498
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-09 14:00:38.12042+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:34:40.720889
License: Public Domain

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                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-14305
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        JASMIN MARRERO,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Georgia
                     D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cr-00449-MLB-1
                           ____________________
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        2                     Opinion of the Court                 22-14305

        Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
                Defendant Jasmin Marrero appeals her 24-month sentence
        imposed for violating the terms of her supervised release, pursuant
        to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). Marrero does not dispute that she
        violated multiple terms of her supervised release. Rather, she
        argues that her sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the
        district court demonstrated a personal bias against her. After
        review, we affirm Marrero’s revocation sentence.
                               I. BACKGROUND
        A. Marrero’s Conviction and Supervised Release
               In 2013, defendant Marrero pled guilty to one count of
        possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, in
        violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(viii). The district
        court imposed a 78-month sentence, followed by ﬁve years of
        supervised release.
              In 2019, defendant Marrero began her supervised release
        term. While residing at a halfway house, Marrero met Michael
        Robinson, also on supervised release for federal drug crimes.
        Marrero and Robinson married and had a child. The same
        probation oﬃcer supervised them.
        B. 2019 and 2020 Domestic Abuse and Recantations
              In July 2019 and in February 2020, the police arrested
        Robinson for domestic battery against Marrero at their home after
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        22-14305              Opinion of the Court                      3

        she said Robinson attacked her. Twice, the probation oﬃcer ﬁled
        a petition to revoke Robinson’s supervised release but then
        withdrew it because Marrero later changed her story.
        C. Marrero’s First Revocation in 2020
                 In March 2020, defendant Marrero admitted violating her
        supervised release by: (1) not complying with her home detention
        program; (2) failing to maintain the batteries in her GPS tracker;
        (3) failing to produce a urine sample and tampering with the urine
        sample; and (4) unlawfully possessing a controlled substance by
        taking a coworker’s Adderall and by testing positive for
        amphetamines and marijuana. The district court revoked
        Marrero’s supervised release and imposed a 12-month sentence,
        followed by 36 months of supervised release.
        D. 2022 Domestic Abuse and Recantation
               In 2021, defendant Marrero was released from prison and
        was on supervised release. Later, Marrero’s supervision was
        transferred to the Northern District of Georgia. Ultimately, the
        same district court judge and prosecutor handled both Marrero’s
        and Robinson’s revocation cases.
              In January 2022, the police again arrested Robinson for
        domestic battery after Marrero said he attacked her at their home.
        The probation oﬃcer ﬁled a petition to revoke Robinson’s
        supervised release. Both the probation oﬃcer and prosecutor
        spoke with Marrero, who conﬁrmed she was truthful about
        Robinson’s attack.
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                 22-14305

               The probation oﬃcer also obtained the police report,
        photographs, and body camera footage, which showed that when
        police arrived, Marrero had bruises on her face and arms and a cut
        on the side of her face. Later, however, Robinson’s defense counsel
        informed the probation oﬃcer that at Robinson’s state bond
        hearing, Marrero recanted and testiﬁed that she was the aggressor
        during the ﬁght.
        E. Robinson’s April 14, 2022 Revocation Hearing
               The district court set a hearing on Robinson’s revocation
        petition for April 14, 2022. The prosecutor subpoenaed Marrero,
        who said she would come but failed to appear. The prosecutor
        advised the court that Marrero had again recanted and the
        prosecutor might have Jencks material. Ultimately, the district court
        agreed to continue Robinson’s revocation hearing.
              Before doing so, the district court judge made some
        comments that Marrero claims are inconsistent with what the
        same judge said in her later revocation hearing when he found
        Marrero untruthful. We list them. After reviewing the body
        camera footage, the district court observed that: (1) there was
        “undisputed evidence . . . that [Robinson] beat her”; (2) “there [was]
        suﬃcient evidence for [the court] to ﬁnd by a preponderance that
        [Robinson] committed battery against Ms. Marrero”; and (3)
        Marrero’s recantation “would not change that” because it was “not
        uncommon for a battered woman to do that.”
                After the probation oﬃcer’s testimony, the district court
        said: (1) it had “no doubt” that Robinson beat Marrero on July 2,
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        22-14305               Opinion of the Court                         5

        2019, February 9, 2020, and January 8, 2022; (2) stated it was “very
        obvious” that Robinson controlled Marrero, that he “beat on her”
        and then “ha[d] her recant”; and (3) it was “inclined to ﬁnd that
        there’s a violation” and to revoke Robinson’s supervised release.
              Nonetheless, the district court continued Robinson’s
        revocation hearing. Yet, concerned about their three-year-old
        daughter’s exposure to domestic violence, the district court
        ordered Robinson to have no contact with Marrero.
        F. Marrero’s April 14, 2022 Car Accident and Arrest
                As it turned out, on the day of Robinson’s April 14
        revocation hearing, Marrero was in a car accident. Marrero was
        speeding and driving recklessly when she rear-ended a U-Haul
        trailer, left the I-85 highway, and drove into a ravine. In her car, a
        state trooper found a “UPass device” that is “used to cheat on
        urinalysis tests.” Another state trooper transported Marrero in his
        car and later found an aspirin bottle containing methamphetamine
        where she was sitting. The state trooper arrested Marrero and
        obtained a blood sample.              The blood test conﬁrmed
        methamphetamine was in Marrero’s system.
        G. Petition to Revoke Marrero’s Supervised Release
              The probation oﬃcer ﬁled a petition for revocation of
        Marrero’s supervised release, which was twice amended. The
        second amended petition alleged numerous violations.
            As to her car accident, the petition charged that Marrero
        committed ten state oﬀenses: (1) possessing a Schedule III
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        6                     Opinion of the Court                22-14305

        controlled substance; (2) possessing drugs not in their original
        container; (3) failing to maintain a lane; (4) did not exercise due
        care; (5) following another vehicle too closely; (6) driving on an
        expired tag; (7) driving too fast for conditions; (8) speeding;
        (9) driving without a license; and (10) driving under the inﬂuence
        of a drug.
              As to Marrero’s false reports of domestic abuse, the petition
        charged that Marrero: (11) failed to answer truthfully her probation
        oﬃcer’s questions about her January 8, 2022 abuse report to police;
        and (12) committed the state oﬀenses of falsely reporting a crime
        on February 9, 2020 and January 8, 2022.
                As to Marrero’s drug use, the petition alleged that Marrero:
        (13) failed to submit to drug testing eight times from December
        2021 to July 2022; (14) unlawfully used methamphetamine based
        on positive drug tests on April 14 and July 6, 2022; (15) failed to
        report on June 9, 2022 for an already missed drug test; and
        (16) failed to participate in weekly substance abuse counseling on
        June 15 and July 8, 2022.
              When Marrero did not appear at her July 26, 2022,
        revocation hearing, the district court issued a bench warrant.
        Marrero was arrested.
        H. Marrero’s December 5, 2022 Revocation Hearing
               At the revocation hearing, the government withdrew
        Violations 11 and 12 about Marrero’s false crime reports to the
        probation oﬃcer and police. The prosecutor explained that,
        although Marrero admitted lying to police, she was not suﬃciently
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        22-14305              Opinion of the Court                       7

        credible to prove those violations because Marrero had changed
        her story several times. The district court questioned the
        government’s decision, suggesting it was giving up and “taking the
        easier path” rather than trying to prove Marrero’s false statements
        using her own admissions. Nonetheless, the district court
        permitted the government to withdraw Violations 11 and 12.
               Although admitting her four drug-use violations, Marrero
        denied the ten car-accident violations because her case was “still
        pending in state court.” The district court then accepted evidence,
        including police reports, and heard the probation oﬃcer’s
        testimony about the car accident and Marrero’s arrest.
               The probation oﬃcer also testiﬁed about Marrero’s text
        messages admitting various lies. In her text messages to the
        probation oﬃcer, Marrero stated that: (1) Robinson beat her, but
        she understood the probation oﬃcer might not believe her because
        she lied so much; (2) she hit Robinson ﬁrst during one domestic
        incident; (3) she lied to the police after another incident because
        she knew she was going to jail for violating the GPS-monitoring
        term of her supervised release; (4) she faked a recorded telephone
        call with Robinson (while he was in custody) that was played at his
        revocation hearing to help him beat the battery charge; and (5) she
        lied about not living with Robinson when his bond condition
        prohibited contact with Marrero.
              Marrero objected to the government’s questions about her
        text messages because it had withdrawn Violations 11 and 12 about
        her false crime reports. The government responded that the
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        8                       Opinion of the Court                  22-14305

        district court could still consider Marrero’s “pattern of
        manipulation and dishonesty.” Although overruling Marrero’s
        objection, the district court agreed with Marrero that the text
        evidence was no longer relevant, and the government was just
        trying to make Marrero look bad. The district court said it could
        “compartmentalize and decide what I think I can consider.” In this
        revocation-sentence appeal, Marrero does not challenge this
        evidentiary ruling.
                Ultimately, the district court found that the government
        proved the ten car-accident violations and the four drug-use
        violations. The district court opined that the government probably
        could have proven the two withdrawn violations (11 and 12) about
        false reports. The district court said it “regret[ted] the fact that the
        government ha[d] decided not to do that and to allow somebody
        who is, by all accounts, fundamentally untrustworthy to evade
        being held accountable for their lies.” The district court
        acknowledged that “in the end, we just can’t tell which one is a lie
        because [Marrero is] such a big liar . . . that makes a lot of false
        statements and we can’t tell which ones are the false statements.”
        The district court continued that “it sure undermines the process
        when you can just tell so many lies that eventually you become
        immune to any prosecution or supervised release violation for
        lying.”
              As to the revocation sentence, the district court found that
        the advisory guidelines range was 18 to 24 months’ imprisonment,
        with a 36-month statutory maximum. The parties jointly
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        22-14305              Opinion of the Court                        9

        requested that Marrero be released on bond to attend a
        methamphetamine treatment program.              The government
        acknowledged Marrero’s serious violations but argued that drug
        treatment aﬀorded the most likely long-term protection for the
        public against Marrero’s severe drug addiction.
               In mitigation, Marrero stressed her diﬃcult childhood,
        during which both parents died from HIV-related complications,
        her teenage addiction to methamphetamine, and Robinson’s
        domestic abuse. Marrero said she relapsed in January 2022 when
        she learned Robinson had “cheated on her on Christmas Eve,” and
        “it was a spiral from there.”
               Marrero’s defense counsel acknowledged Marrero’s calling
        the police, recanting, and failing to appear in court. But defense
        counsel pointed out that at Robinson’s April 14, 2022, revocation
        hearing, the district court repeatedly said it believed Marrero’s
        abuse allegations were true and that abused women often recant
        and refuse to proceed with prosecution. While Marrero may not
        have been truthful with her probation oﬃcer, defense counsel
        contended that Robinson threatened and manipulated her and used
        their child as leverage over her.
              The district court responded that Marrero “put too much”
        emphasis on its statements at Robinson’s April 14, 2022, revocation
        hearing. The district court explained that, at Robinson’s revocation
        hearing, it was dealing with the government’s reluctance to present
        evidence of “a clearly toxic domestic relationship, in which there
        [was] pretty strong video [evidence] of abuse, maybe going both
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        10                    Opinion of the Court                22-14305

        ways, all of which [was] done in the presence of their daughter.”
        The district court clariﬁed that at Robinson’s hearing, it had not
        “reached a ﬁnal decision that Ms. Marrero had been truthful when
        she reported [Robinson]” because the hearing was postponed. The
        district court said it did not know now “where [it] would have gone
        that day had [it] made a decision as to whether or not Mr. Robinson
        actually abused Ms. Marrero.” The court stressed that the parties
        should not “read too much into my strong words to Mr. Robinson
        when I felt like I was trying to make sure that everybody
        understood the importance of them being away from each other
        because of the [parties’] daughter.”
              In allocution, Marrero apologized for her and Robinson’s
        “madness” and accepted responsibility for using drugs. She had
        turned to drugs to deal with her experiences with Robinson and
        promised she would not get high again for her daughter’s sake.
        Marrero asked the district court to give her another chance and
        then give her the maximum sentence if she failed.
              The district court asked why the prosecutor believed
        Marrero would now comply with a drug-treatment requirement.
        The prosecutor responded that she was not sure Marrero would
        comply and that “[i]t’s really more of a hope.”
              The district court said it was “perplexed” by the
        government’s position that Marrero was a good candidate for drug
        treatment. The district court asked for the probation oﬃcer’s
        recommendation. The probation oﬃcer recommended a prison
        sentence at the high end of the advisory guidelines range. The
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        22-14305               Opinion of the Court                       11

        probation oﬃcer explained that the government and probation
        oﬃce had invested heavily in Marrero’s recovery, including the
        Bureau of Prisons’ 500-hour drug treatment program; multiple
        outpatient drug programs; two six-month drug-screening
        programs; location monitoring; a cognitive skills program; and a
        12-month sentence after her last revocation, none of which had
        changed her conduct.
        I. District Court’s Explanation of the Sentence
                After considering the relevant factors under 18 U.S.C.
        §§ 3582 and 3553(a), the district court imposed a 24-month
        sentence. The district court rejected the parties’ request to release
        Marrero on bond to obtain drug treatment. The district court said
        it did not expect Marrero to do anything other than what she had
        done in the past, which included not obtaining the required drug
        treatment, not following her probation oﬃcer’s instructions, not
        meeting other obligations of supervision, and failing to appear for
        her revocation hearing, which resulted in a bench warrant. The
        district court also recalled that when Marrero failed to appear at
        Robinson’s April 14, 2022, revocation hearing, “she was calling her
        lawyer and saying she was near the courthouse, when she was
        actually racing down the highway somewhere else.”
              The district court expressed consternation at the
        government’s view that Marrero could be trusted to get treatment,
        ﬁnding Marrero was “fundamentally untrustworthy,”
        “manipulative,” “dangerous,” and “selﬁsh.” The district court
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        12                    Opinion of the Court               22-14305

        concluded Marrero had shown she did not want, and was incapable
        of receiving, help.
                As for the choice of a 24-month prison term, the district
        court stressed that Marrero was “stoned on meth when she was
        driving” and “there needs to be protection of the public
        immediately from Ms. Marrero.” The district court opined that
        there was no way to deter Marrero and protect the public merely
        by allowing her to get treatment again. The district court
        discounted Marrero’s claim that her problems started with
        Robinson, noting she had an extensive criminal history before she
        met him. Marrero already served a 78-month sentence and a 12-
        month revocation sentence, and neither sentence had deterred her.
        To the district court, “the question [was] whether or not the
        statutory maximum [of 36 months] was appropriate,” but the
        district court decided to “follow the guidelines” of 24 months.
              Marrero’s only objection was “for reasonableness of the
        sentence.”
                                II. DISCUSSION
        A. Plain Error Review
                On appeal, Marrero’s argues that her 24-month sentence is
        unreasonable because the district court was biased against her and
        should have disqualiﬁed itself. Marrero did not raise this recusal
        issue at the revocation hearing. Instead, Marrero objected only to
        the “reasonableness” of her sentence. She did not raise any issue
        as to the district court’s impartiality or move to disqualify the
        district court judge.      Marrero’s general objection to the
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        22-14305                Opinion of the Court                         13

        reasonableness of her sentence was not suﬃcient to preserve a
        recusal challenge.
               Marrero contends that she adequately raised the recusal
        issue when her defense counsel pointed out that the district court
        previously found Marrero’s claims of domestic abuse credible
        during Robinson’s revocation hearing. We disagree. Defense
        counsel’s observation on this point was far from enough to alert
        the district court that Marrero was raising a claim of personal bias
        requiring recusal. See United States v. Brown, 934 F.3d 1278, 1306
        (11th Cir. 2019) (“[T]o preserve an objection to a sentencing
        determination, a party must raise that point in such clear and
        simple language that the trial court may not misunderstand it.”).
               Alternatively, Marrero argues that she was not required to
        move for recusal because the district court judge did not reveal his
        bias until he pronounced Marrero’s sentence. This ignores that
        after the district court pronounced the sentence, Marrero could
        have raised bias or recusal but did not do so.
               Because Marrero raises this recusal issue for the ﬁrst time on
        appeal, our review is for plain error. See United States v. Vandergrift,
        754 F.3d 1303, 1307 (11th Cir. 2014); United States v. Berger, 375 F.3d
        1223, 1227 (11th Cir. 2004) (reviewing for plain error, rather than
        abuse of discretion, a district court’s failure to recuse sua sponte
        based on alleged bias). To show plain error, the defendant must
        show (1) that the district court erred; (2) that the error was plain;
        and (3) that the error aﬀected her substantial rights. Vandergrift, 754
        F.3d at 1307. If these three conditions are met, we decide whether
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        14                     Opinion of the Court                22-14305

        the error seriously aﬀected the fairness, integrity, or public
        reputation of judicial proceedings. Id.
        B. Reasonableness of the Sentence
                A district court may revoke a defendant’s supervised release
        term and impose a term of imprisonment if it ﬁnds by a
        preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a
        condition of supervised release. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). Before
        imposing a revocation sentence, the district court must consider
        certain factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), as well as the policy
        statements in Chapter 7 of the Sentencing Guidelines, including
        non-binding ranges of imprisonment. Id. § 3583(e); United States v.
        Silva, 443 F.3d 795, 799 (11th Cir. 2006).
               Ordinarily, we review such a sentence for reasonableness,
        applying the deferential abuse of discretion standard. Vandergrift,
        754 F.3d at 1307. Under this standard, we employ a two-step
        process, ﬁrst examining whether the district court committed any
        signiﬁcant procedural error and then whether the sentence is
        substantively unreasonable in light of the relevant § 3553(a) factors
        and the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Trailer, 827
        F.3d 933, 335-36 (11th Cir. 2016). At both steps, the party
        challenging the sentence has the burden of showing it is
        unreasonable. Id.
               Marrero’s sole argument—that the district court should
        have recused based on personal bias—is a claim of procedural error
        that we review for procedural reasonableness. And in Marrero’s
        appeal we review that claim only for plain error.
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        22-14305               Opinion of the Court                        15

        C. Marrero’s Recusal Claim
               1. 28 U.S.C. § 455
              Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), a judge “shall disqualify himself in
        any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be
        questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). The question under § 455(a) “is
        whether an objective, disinterested, lay observer fully informed of
        the facts underlying the grounds on which recusal was sought
        would entertain a signiﬁcant doubt about the judge’s impartiality.”
        United States v. Scrushy, 721 F.3d 1288, 1303 (11th Cir. 2013)
        (quotation marks omitted).
               In addition, under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b), a judge must recuse
        himself where, among other things, “he has a personal bias or
        prejudice concerning a party.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1). “The bias or
        prejudice must be personal and extrajudicial; it must derive from
        something other than that which the judge learned by participating
        in the case.” United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 828 (11th Cir.
        2007) (quotation marks omitted). “[O]pinions formed by the judge
        on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course
        of the current . . . [or] prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis
        for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated
        favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment
        impossible.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555, 114 S. Ct.
        1147, 1157 (1994); see also Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th
        Cir. 2000) (“[E]xcept where pervasive bias is shown, a judge’s
        rulings in the same or a related case are not a suﬃcient basis for
        recusal.”). “Thus, judicial remarks during the course of a trial that
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        16                     Opinion of the Court                  22-14305

        are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the
        parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality
        challenge.” Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555, 114 S. Ct. at 1157.
               2. Analysis of Marrero’s Claim
              Marrero contends the district court demonstrated personal
        bias when it found she was “an aggressor” and “was dishonest and
        manipulative about her being the victim of domestic abuse by her
        husband.” Marrero claims this ﬁnding is inconsistent with and
        “fundamentally opposed” to the district court’s earlier ﬁnding at
        Robinson’s revocation hearing that Marrero “was a victim of
        domestic abuse at th[e] hands of her husband.”
                There is a threshold ﬂaw with Marrero’s recusal claim.
        Marrero mischaracterizes the district court’s ﬁndings at her own
        revocation hearing. As we read the transcript of her hearing, the
        district court did not ﬁnd that Marrero lied about being a domestic
        abuse victim. Nor did it ﬁnd that Marrero was “an aggressor” in
        the domestic abuse incidents with Robinson. At most, the district
        court observed that “pretty strong video” evidence of abuse,
        “maybe going both ways,” was presented at Robinson’s revocation
        hearing, but the court also stated it did not know what it would
        have found at Robinson’s revocation hearing had it been necessary
        to do so.
               To be sure, the district court allowed the government to ask
        the probation oﬃcer about the texts, domestic abuse incidents, and
        Marrero’s changing stories. Yet, the court agreed with Marrero
        that whether she had lied to either the police or her probation
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        22-14305               Opinion of the Court                       17

        oﬃcer about those abuse incidents was not relevant given that the
        government had withdrawn Violations 11 and 12. The district
        court also stated that it could “compartmentalize” what it could
        and could not consider. Although dismayed by the prosecutor’s
        decision to withdraw Violations 11 and 12, the district court did not
        make any ﬁndings about whether Marrero lied about Robinson’s
        abuse to police or her probation oﬃcer.
               Rather, the district court found, based on Marrero’s other
        well-proven conduct while on supervision, that she was generally
        too dishonest and manipulative to be trusted to comply with a plan
        of more drug treatment. The district court noted that: (1)
        Marrero’s prior revocation resulted from positive drug tests and
        her attempt to manipulate a urine sample; (2) Marrero lied to her
        attorney about being near the courthouse on April 14, 2022;
        (3) Marrero previously failed to obtain required drug treatment, to
        follow her probation oﬃcer’s instructions or comply with her other
        obligations of supervision; and (4) Marrero did not appear in court
        even when under subpoena. The district court described all of this
        conduct as “blatant untruthfulness” and “absurd manipulation of
        people.”
               On the merits, Marrero cannot show the district court
        abused its discretion, much less plainly erred, by failing to recuse.
        As to § 455(a), a fully informed, objective lay observer would not
        have a signiﬁcant doubt about the district court’s impartiality. At
        Marrero’s revocation hearing, ample evidence established that,
        apart from her abuse reports, Marrero’s repeated violations of her
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        18                    Opinion of the Court                22-14305

        supervised release conditions included dishonest and manipulative
        conduct and breaches of trust.
               For example, Marrero’s 2020 violations included, among
        other things, positive drug tests, tampering with a urine sample,
        not complying with her home detention program, and failing to
        participate in drug treatment and testing.
               Marrero’s deceptive behavior continued with her new
        violations in 2022. Although under subpoena, Marrero did not
        appear at Robinson’s revocation hearing. Marrero also lied to her
        own attorney (who was present at the hearing) that she was driving
        to the courthouse. Instead, she was driving under the inﬂuence of
        methamphetamine on an interstate highway, where she caused a
        serious accident. A state trooper even found in Marrero’s car a
        UPass device, which is used to avoid positive drug tests. After
        transporting Marrero, the state trooper found a bottle of
        methamphetamine in his vehicle.
               Later, Marrero sent text messages to her probation oﬃcer
        about how she and Robinson recorded a fake jail call and how she
        had lied about not living with Robinson while the court ordered
        him to have no contact with her.
               It is patently clear here that the district court’s comments—
        that Marrero was fundamentally untrustworthy, manipulative,
        dangerous, and selﬁsh and could not be trusted to comply with a
        drug treatment requirement—were supported by the evidence and
        would not cause an objective, fully informed lay observer to
        question the district court’s impartiality.
USCA11 Case: 22-14305       Document: 29-1        Date Filed: 08/09/2023       Page: 19 of 19

        22-14305                 Opinion of the Court                            19

                As to § 455(b), the district court’s opinion of Marrero’s
        trustworthiness was properly formed based on information it
        learned during Marrero’s and Robinson’s revocation proceedings.
        The district court’s opinion did not display any kind of “deep-
        seated . . . antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.”
        See Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555, 114 S. Ct. at 1157. And the district court’s
        comments were certainly not extrajudicial. See Amedeo, 487 F.3d at
        828.
              Accordingly, Marrero has not shown that her 24-month
        revocation sentence is procedurally unreasonable. 1
               AFFIRMED.

        1 Marrero’s counseled brief does not argue that her 24-month sentence is

        substantively unreasonable. But even if it had, we would have little trouble
        concluding that the district court’s choice of a 24-month sentence was
        reasonable given the extent and severity of Marrero’s violations.