Court Opinion

ID: 9409583
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-18 19:03:31.087019+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:51.581501
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                               FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

 AMERICA FIRST LEGAL FOUNDATION,

                          Plaintiff,
                                                          Civil Action No. 22-3029 (BAH)
                          v.
                                                          Judge Beryl A. Howell
 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,
 et al.

                          Defendants.

                                       MEMORANDUM OPINION

        Plaintiff, America First Legal Foundation, challenges the response of defendants,

fourteen federal agencies, to its June 10, 2022 requests submitted pursuant to the Freedom of

Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552, for the strategic plans each had prepared in response

to an Executive Order regarding promoting access to voting. See generally Compl., ECF No. 1.

The Executive Order instructed each agency to prepare such a plan evaluating ways in which the

agency could promote voter registration and participation, and to submit the plan to the White

House for consideration. Upon receiving plaintiff’s FOIA requests, defendant agencies

concluded that the strategic plans were exempt from disclosure under FOIA Exemption 5, as

they were covered by the presidential communications privilege. Defendants have now moved

for summary judgment. Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 21. For the reasons set forth below,

defendants’ motion is granted.

I.      BACKGROUND

        Pertinent background underlying plaintiff’s FOIA requests is briefly described, followed

by review of the requests and each federal agency defendant’s response thereto, both before and

after initiation of this lawsuit.

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   A. President Biden’s Executive Order 14019

         In early 2021, President Biden issued Executive Order 14019, Exec. Order No. 14,019,

Promoting Access to Voting, 86 Fed. Reg. 13623 (Mar. 7, 2021) (“EO 14019”). The Order

tasked federal agencies with “consider[ing] ways to expand citizens’ opportunities to register to

vote and to obtain information about, and participate in, the electoral process.” Id. at 13623. To

that end, the head of each federal agency was to “evaluate ways in which the agency can, as

appropriate and consistent with applicable law, promote voter registration and voter

participation.” Id. Specifically, each agency was asked to consider ways that it can “provide

relevant information . . . about how to register to vote, how to request a vote-by-mail ballot, and

how to cast a ballot in upcoming elections,” “facilitate seamless transition from agencies’

websites directly to State online voter registration systems or appropriate Federal websites,”

“provide access to voter registration services and vote-by-mail ballot application,” “promote and

expand access to multilingual voter registration and election information,” and “promote equal

participation in the electoral process for all eligible citizens of all backgrounds.” Id. at 13623–

24. The Order required each agency to submit to the Assistant to the President for Domestic

Policy, within 200 days of the Order’s issuance, “a strategic plan outlining the ways

identified . . . that the agency can promote voter registration and voter participation.” Id. at

13624.

         As instructed by EO 14019, the fourteen agencies named as defendants in this case—

namely, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (“USDA”), U.S. Department of Education (“ED”),

U.S. Department of Energy (“DOE”), U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), U.S.

Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”), U.S. Department of Homeland Security

(“DHS”), U.S. Department of the Interior (“DOI”), U.S. Department of Labor (“DOL”), U.S.

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Small Business Administration (“SBA”), U.S. Department of State (“DOS”), U.S. Department of

Transportation (“DOT”), U.S. Department of the Treasury (“Treasury”), U.S. Department of

Veterans Affairs (“VA”), and U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”)

(collectively, “defendants”)—submitted the requested strategic plans to the Assistant to the

President for Domestic Policy and head of the Domestic Policy Council (“DPC”) within the

White House, Ambassador Susan Rice. Defs.’ Mot., Ex. B, Decl. of White House Special

Counsel Richard A. Sauber (“Sauber Decl.”) ¶¶ 7, 12, ECF No. 21-2. The strategic plans were

initially reviewed by Ambassador Rice’s staff members, who then compiled information for

Ambassador Rice’s and senior White House advisors’ use in creating briefing materials and

formulating advice for the President. Id. ¶ 12.

   B. Plaintiff’s FOIA Requests

       On June 10, 2022, plaintiff submitted the at-issue FOIA requests to each defendant.

Defs.’ Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute (“Defs.’ SMF”) ¶ 2, ECF No. 21-16. The

requests sought production of each agency’s strategic plan as submitted to the White House

pursuant to EO 14019. Id. Defendants Treasury, VA, and HUD gave initial responses to the

requests by informing plaintiff that responsive documents were located but were withheld in full

under FOIA Exemption 5. Defs.’ SMF ¶ 3; see also Defs.’ Mot., Ex. I, Decl. of Ryan Law

(“Ryan Law Decl.”) ¶ 5, ECF No. 21-9; id., Ex. J, Decl. of Lyndon B. Johnson (“Johnson Decl.”)

¶ 13, ECF No. 21-10; id., Ex. K, Decl. of Benjamin B. Klubes (“Klubes Decl.”) ¶ 6, ECF No. 21-

11. Plaintiff administratively appealed all three agencies’ initial decisions. Ryan Law Decl. ¶ 5;

Johnson Decl., ¶ 14; Klubes Decl. ¶ 7. In September and October, 2022, Treasury, VA, and

HUD issued final agency decisions informing plaintiff that these agencies, too, would withhold

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the responsive documents under Exemption 5. Ryan Law Decl. ¶ 5; Johnson Decl., ¶ 15; Klubes

Decl. ¶ 9.

       Defendant SBA initially responded to plaintiff’s request on June 24, 2022, Defs.’ SMF

¶ 4; see also Defs.’ Mot., Ex. A, Decl. of Eric S. Benderson (“Benderson Decl.”) ¶ 5, ECF No.

21-1, after interpreting the request as seeking an “approved” strategic plan representing actions

the agency had “decided to implement” but, given that no such plan existed, SBA informed

plaintiff that responsive document was located. Benderson Decl. ¶ 5. Plaintiff then filed an

administrative appeal and, on December 20, 2022, SBA corrected its response by informing

plaintiff that a responsive document had been located, but, like other agencies, SBA was

withholding it under Exemption 5. Defs.’ SMF ¶ 4; see also Benderson Decl. ¶¶ 7, 12.

       By the time plaintiff initiated the instant suit, the remaining defendants, USDA, ED,

DOE, EPA, HHS, DHS, DOI, DOL, DOS, and DOT, had not yet provided a substantive response

to the requests. Defs.’ SMF ¶ 5.

   C. Procedural History and Withholdings of Requested Records

       On October 6, 2022, plaintiff initiated the instant litigation, challenging defendants’

responses, or lack thereof, to the FOIA requests at issue. Defs.’ SMF ¶ 6; see also Compl., ECF

No. 1; Compl., Am. First Legal Found. v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, No. 22-cv-3034 (BAH)

(D.D.C. 2022), ECF No. 1 (“Treasury Compl.”). Plaintiff initially brought those challenges in

two separate suits. The first targeted those defendants who had responded by withholding the

responsive document, namely Treasury, VA, and HUD. Defs.’ SMF ¶ 7; see also Treasury

Compl. ¶¶ 10–11, 13. The second––the instant case––named defendant SBA, which had initially

indicated it could not locate any responsive document, and the remaining defendant agencies that

had not responded to plaintiff’s requests. Defs.’ SMF ¶ 7; see also Compl. ¶¶ 12–13.

                                                 4
       After defendants filed answers to both complaints, defendants’ counsel informed

plaintiff’s counsel that the remaining defendants had searched for and located each agency’s

requested strategic plan, which was being withheld by each agency in full under FOIA

Exemption 5. Defs.’ SMF ¶ 7; see also Joint Mot. to Consolidate Cases at 2, ECF No. 19.

Specifically, all defendants withheld the responsive document based on Exemption 5’s

presidential communications privilege. Benderson Decl. ¶¶ 13, 15; Defs.’ Mot., Ex. C, Decl. of

Alexis R. Graves (“Graves Decl.”) ¶¶ 8, 16, ECF No. 21-3; id., Ex. D, Decl. of Catherine

McConnell (“McConnell Decl.”) ¶ 11, ECF No. 21-4; id., Ex. E, Decl. of Rosemary Law

(“Rosemary Law Decl.”) ¶ 12, ECF No. 21-5; id., Ex. F, Decl. of Leah Fairman (“Fairman

Decl.”) ¶ 10, ECF No. 21-6; id., Ex. G, Decl. of Katherine Swain-Smith (“Swain-Smith Decl.”)

¶¶ 10–11, ECF No. 21-7; id., Ex. H, Decl. of Vincent White (“White Decl.”) ¶ 9, ECF No. 21-8;

Ryan Law Decl. ¶¶ 6, 11; Johnson Decl. ¶¶ 15, 17; Klubes Decl. ¶¶ 16, 18–19; Defs.’ Mot., Ex.

L, Decl. of Susan C. Weetman ¶ 18, ECF No. 21-12; id., Ex. M, Decl. of Alesia Y. Williams

¶ 20, ECF No. 21-13; id., Ex. N, Decl. of Susan Beard ¶¶ 11, 13, ECF No. 21-14; id., Ex. O,

Decl. of Victoria Arroyo ¶ 15, ECF No. 21-15. Some defendants provided additional

justification for withholdings based on Exemption 5’s deliberative process privilege. Benderson

Decl. ¶¶ 13, 17–25; Graves Decl. ¶¶ 8, 18–21; McConnell Decl. ¶¶ 12–15; Rosemary Law Decl.

¶¶ 15–19; Fairman Decl. ¶¶ 12–19; Swain-Smith Decl. ¶¶ 12–21; White Decl. ¶¶ 11–13; Ryan

Law Decl. ¶¶ 6, 13–21; Johnson Decl. ¶¶ 15, 18–22; Klubes Decl. ¶¶ 16, 20–26.

       Given now entirely overlapping factual circumstances and legal issues, the two lawsuits

were consolidated upon the parties’ joint motion. Joint Mot. to Consolidate Cases at 1–2; Min.

Order (Nov. 29, 2022). Defendants have now moved for summary judgment, Defs.’ Mot., which

                                               5
motion is ripe for resolution, see Defs.’ Reply Supp. Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. (“Defs.’ Reply”),

ECF No. 30; Pl.’s Mem. Supp. Pl.’s Sur-Reply (“Pl.’s Sur-Reply”), ECF No. 33.

II.    LEGAL STANDARD

       Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, “[a] party is entitled to summary judgment

only if there is no genuine issue of material fact and judgment in the movant’s favor is proper as

a matter of law.” Soundboard Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 888 F.3d 1261, 1267 (D.C. Cir.

2018) (quoting Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 452 F.3d 798, 805

(D.C. Cir. 2006)); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). “In FOIA cases, ‘summary judgment may be

granted on the basis of agency affidavits if they contain reasonable specificity of detail rather

than merely conclusory statements, and if they are not called into question by contradictory

evidence in the record or by evidence of agency bad faith.’” Aguiar v. Drug Enf't Admin., 865

F.3d 730, 734–35 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 726 F.3d

208, 215 (D.C. Cir. 2013)); see also Students Against Genocide v. Dep’t of State, 257 F.3d 828,

833 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“[A]n agency is entitled to summary judgment if no material facts are in

dispute and if it demonstrates ‘that each document that falls within the class requested either has

been produced . . . or is wholly exempt from the Act’s inspection requirements.’” (omission in

original) (quoting Goland v. CIA, 607 F.2d 339, 352 (D.C. Cir. 1978))). Most FOIA cases “can

be resolved on summary judgment.” Brayton v. Off. of U.S. Trade Representative, 641 F.3d 521,

527 (D.C. Cir. 2011).

       “The fundamental principle animating FOIA is public access to government documents.”

Waterman v. Internal Revenue Serv., 61 F.4th 152, 156 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (quoting Valencia-

Lucena v. U.S. Coast Guard, 180 F.3d 321, 325 (D.C. Cir. 1999)) accord DiBacco v. U.S. Army

(“DiBacco I”), 795 F.3d 178, 183 (D.C. Cir. 2015). Agencies are therefore statutorily mandated

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to “make . . . records promptly available to any person” who submits a request that “reasonably

describes such records” and “is made in accordance with [the agency’s] published rules.” 5

U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A). “Congress, however, did not ‘pursue transparency at all costs[;]’ [r]ather,

it recognized that ‘legitimate governmental and private interests could be harmed by release of

certain types of information.’” Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Washington v. United States Dep't

of Just. (“CREW II”), 45 F.4th 963, 967 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (first quoting Hall & Assocs. v. EPA,

956 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 2020); and then quoting AquAlliance v. U.S. Bureau of

Reclamation, 856 F.3d 101, 102 (D.C. Cir. 2017)). To balance those competing interests, “FOIA

exempts nine categories of documents from ‘the government's otherwise broad duty of

disclosure.’” Waterman, 61 F.4th at 156 (quoting AquAlliance, 856 F.3d at 103). “[T]hese

limited exemptions do not obscure the basic policy that disclosure, not secrecy, is the dominant

objective of the Act.” Dep’t of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976).

       FOIA authorizes federal courts “to enjoin the agency from withholding agency records

and to order the production of any agency records improperly withheld from the complainant.” 5

U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). When an agency invokes an exemption to disclosure, district courts must

“determine de novo whether non-disclosure was permissible.” Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t

of Homeland Sec., 777 F.3d 518, 522 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The statute “places the burden ‘on the

agency to sustain its action,’ and the agency therefore bears the burden of proving that it has not

‘improperly’ withheld the requested records.” Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Washington v. U.S.

Dep’t of Justice, 922 F.3d 480, 487 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (first quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B); and

then quoting U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 142 n.3 (1989)); see also U.S.

Dep’t of Justice v. Landano, 508 U.S. 165, 171 (1993) (“The Government bears the burden of

establishing that the exemption applies.”); DiBacco v. U.S. Dep’t of Army (“DiBacco II”), 926

                                                 7
F.3d 827, 834 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“‘An agency withholding responsive documents from a FOIA

release bears the burden of proving the applicability of claimed exemptions,’ typically through

affidavit or declaration.” (quoting DiBacco I, 795 F.3d at 195)).

       The agency may sustain “this burden ‘by submitting a Vaughn index, along with

affidavits from agency employees that describe the justifications for nondisclosure with

reasonably specific detail, demonstrate that the information withheld logically falls within the

claimed exemption, and are not controverted by either contrary evidence in the record nor by

evidence of agency bad faith.’” Waterman, 61 F.4th at 158 (quoting Am. Immigr. Laws. Ass’n v.

Exec. Off. Immigr. Rev., 830 F.3d 667, 673 (D.C. Cir. 2016)); see also Poitras v. Dep’t of

Homeland Sec., 303 F. Supp. 3d 136, 150 (D.D.C. 2018) (“An agency may carry its burden of

showing an exemption was properly invoked by submitting sufficiently detailed affidavits or

declarations, a Vaughn index of the withheld documents, or both, to demonstrate that the

government has analyzed carefully any material withheld and provided sufficient information as

to the applicability of an exemption to enable the adversary system to operate.”). “‘Ultimately,

an agency’s justification for invoking a FOIA exemption is sufficient if it appears “logical” or

“plausible.”’” Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 715 F.3d 937, 941 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (per

curiam) (quoting ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 628 F.3d 612, 619 (D.C. Cir. 2011)).

III.   DISCUSSION

       FOIA Exemption 5, the only exemption at issue in this case, protects from disclosure

“inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters that would not be available by law to a

party other than an agency in litigation with the agency.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5). Two conditions

must be met for a record to qualify for this exemption: (1) “its source must be a Government

agency;” and (2) “it must fall within the ambit of a privilege against discovery under judicial

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standards that would govern litigation against the agency that holds it.” Dep’t of Interior v.

Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1, 8 (2001); see also Nat’l Inst. of Military

Justice v. U.S. Dep’t of Def. (“NIMJ”), 512 F.3d 677, 682 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Stolt-Nielsen Transp.

Grp. Ltd. v. United States, 534 F.3d 728, 733 (D.C. Cir. 2008). The second condition

“incorporate[s] privileges . . . recognized as components of executive privilege, including the

deliberative process privilege and presidential communications privilege.” Protect Democracy

Project, Inc. v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 10 F.4th 879, 885 (D.C. Cir. 2021); see also Judicial Watch,

913 F.3d at 1109; Abtew v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 808 F.3d 895, 898 (D.C. Cir. 2015).

Here, the parties only dispute whether the second condition for invocation of Exemption 5 is

satisfied, as required to justify the agencies’ withholding their strategic plans.

       The strategic plans at issue in this case contain both existing agency actions and pre-

decisional and deliberative policies or ideas. See Defs.’ Mem. P. & A. Supp. Mot. Summ. J.

(“Defs.’ Mem.”) at 11–13, ECF No. 21; Pl.’s Opp’n Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. (“Pl.’s Opp’n”) at 4–

5, ECF No. 26. All defendants invoke Exemption 5 based on the applicability of the presidential

communications privilege, which is “a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications.”

Protect Democracy Project, 10 F.4th at 885 (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708

(1974)); see Defs.’ Mem. at 6–10. Defendants contend that the strategic plans “fall squarely

within the scope of the presidential communications privilege,” because they were solicited by

the President through EO 14019 and received by immediate White House advisors and their staff

members, namely Ambassador Susan Rice and her staff, for briefing and formulating advice to

the President regarding voting rights issues. See Defs.’ Mem. at 6–8. Relying on both the text of

EO 14019 and the White House Special Counsel’s declaration, defendants emphasize that

President Biden expressly requested the at-issue strategic plans as part of his direct presidential

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decision-making on his administration’s strategy on voting access. See Defs.’ Reply at 1–3.

Defendants argue more broadly that, as a clear and consistent legal principle followed by the

D.C. Circuit, the presidential communications privilege applies to entire documents, including

factual portions. See Defs.’ Mem. at 6–7; Defs.’ Reply at 3–5. Thus, they contend that the

strategic plans are privileged in their entirety and warrant no segregability analysis. See Defs.’

Mem. at 6–7; Defs.’ Reply at 3–5. Disclosure of the strategic plans, defendants suggest, would

lead to specific foreseeable harm by undermining the quality of presidential decision-making and

causing public confusion about the President’s policies and positions on voting rights issues. See

Defs.’ Mem. at 14–16.

       Several defendants, namely SBA, USDA, ED, DHS, DOI, DOL, DOT, Treasury, VA,

and HUD, also invoke the deliberative process privilege to justify additional, overlapping

withholdings of portions of their strategic plans representing policies that have not been

implemented or ideas that have been decided against. See id. at 10–14. These defendants argue

that disclosure of pre-decisional and deliberative portions of the strategic plans would cause

foreseeable harm in terms of public confusion about the agencies’ policies and chilling effects on

the agencies’ candid correspondence with the White House. See id. at 14–15.

       Plaintiff, on the other hand, primarily focuses on final, post-decisional portions of the

strategic plans and argues that they do not call for further direct presidential decision-making and

therefore cannot be shielded by the presidential communications privilege. See Pl.’s Opp’n at

12–14. Plaintiff draws a distinction between section 3 of EO 14019, which requested the

strategic plans, and section 6, which separately sought presidential “recommendations” on

expanding voting access for federal employees. See Pl.’s Sur-Reply at 1–4. Based on this

purported textual distinction, plaintiff contends that the strategic plans were requested as reports

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of agency plans and actions, not as recommendations as part of an ongoing presidential decision-

making process. See id. Plaintiff also argues that the strategic plans have not been used in actual

communications with the President and thus fall outside the scope of the presidential

communications privilege. See id. at 4–5.

         Plaintiff does not address defendants’ additional, overlapping withholdings based on the

deliberative process privilege. See generally Pl.’s Opp’n; Pl.’s Sur-Reply. Instead, plaintiff

focuses on attacking application of the presidential communications privilege to entire

documents, particularly the final, post-decisional portions, and effectively calls for a

segregability analysis. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 12–17. Plaintiff concedes that the D.C. Circuit has

taken an entire-document approach to applying the presidential communications privilege but

contends that the approach is “dicta” and yields to the “key limiting principle” that the privilege

can solely protect confidential presidential decision-making processes. See id. at 15–17. The

entire-document rule should not be applied in this case, plaintiff argues, because that would

result in shielding final agency policies and actions from public scrutiny, which is tantamount to

“undermin[ing] FOIA” and “creat[ing] secret law.” See id. Plaintiff further contends that

defendants fail to demonstrate the specific foreseeable harm arising from disclosure of completed

agency actions, having only relied on “generic” and “boilerplate” statements from a single

affidavit from the White House Special Counsel. See id. at 18–21.

         Defendants have the better arguments under binding precedent, for the reasons explained

below.

         A. PRESIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS PRIVILEGE APPLIES TO THE
            STRATEGIC PLANS IN FULL

         The presidential communications privilege “applies to ‘documents or other materials that

reflect presidential decisionmaking and deliberations and that the President believes should

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remain confidential.’” Protect Democracy Project, 10 F.4th at 885 (quoting In re Sealed Case,

121 F.3d 729, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). This species of executive privilege thus “protects

‘communications directly involving and documents actually viewed by the President,’ as well as

documents ‘solicited and received’ by the President or his ‘immediate White House advisers

[with] . . . broad and significant responsibility for investigating and formulating the advice to be

given the President.’” Loving v. Dep’t of Def., 550 F.3d 32, 37 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (alteration and

omission in original) (quoting Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Dep’t. of Justice, 365 F.3d 1108, 1114

(D.C. Cir. 2004)). The presidential communications privilege is broader than the deliberative

process privilege and encompasses final or post-decisional portions as well as deliberative or

advice portions of documents. In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 745 (citing Nixon, 418 U.S. at

709). As the D.C. Circuit has explained, the former privilege “covers documents reflecting

‘presidential decisionmaking and deliberations,’ regardless of whether the documents are

predecisional or not, and it covers the documents in their entirety.” Loving, 550 F.3d at 37–38

(quoting In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 744–45); accord Protect Democracy Project, 10 F.4th at

885–86. Given that the presidential communications privilege affords greater protection against

disclosure than the deliberative process privilege, a court need only address the latter if the

withheld document is determined not to find protection under the former. In re Sealed Case, 121

F.3d at 746.

       The purpose of the presidential communications privilege is to “preserve[ ] the

President’s ability to obtain candid and informed opinions from his advisors and to make

decisions confidentially.” Loving, 550 F.3d at 37. As such, the privilege protects “the need for

confidentiality to ensure that presidential decisionmaking is of the highest caliber,” In re Sealed

Case, 121 F.3d at 750, so that the President may “effectively and faithfully carry out his Article

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II duties and ‘to protect the effectiveness of the executive decision-making process,’” Judicial

Watch, 365 F.3d at 1115 (quoting In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 742) (internal quotation marks

omitted). The privilege is “‘fundamental to the operation of Government and inextricably rooted

in the separation of powers under the Constitution’ because it ‘relates to the effective discharge

of a President’s powers.’” Judicial Watch, 913 F.3d at 1110 (quoting Nixon, 418 U.S. at 708,

711); see also In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 745 (describing the presidential communications

privilege as “rooted in constitutional separation of powers principles and the President’s unique

constitutional role.”).

            1. Presidential Communications Privilege Protects the Strategic Plans Because
               They Were Solicited by President Biden and Received by His Immediate White
               House Advisors to Formulate Advice for Direct Presidential Decision-Making on
               Voting Rights Issues

        The presidential communications privilege applies in this case because the strategic plans

were solicited by President Biden through EO 14019 and received by his immediate White

House advisors for use in briefing and advising him on voting rights issues. As part of the

“policy of [his] Administration to promote and defend the right to vote,” the President tasked the

agencies with “outlining the ways identified under [the required] review that [they] can promote

voter registration and voter participation.” EO 14019 at 13623, 13624. The Order included

specific instructions for each agency to submit “a strategic plan” to the Assistant to the President

for Domestic Policy. Id. at 13624. Pursuant to the Order, the at-issue strategic plans were

submitted to Ambassador Rice, who was and remains the Assistant to the President for Domestic

Policy as well as head of the DPC, which “drives the formulation and implementation of the

President’s domestic policy agenda, including advice on voting rights matters.” Sauber Decl.

¶ 7. Ambassador Rice’s staff members compiled information from the strategic plans, and senior

White House advisors relied on the information to brief the President on agency actions and

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proposals and to advise the President on further executive decision-making regarding voting

matters. Id. ¶ 12. Thus, the strategic plans were “solicited” by the President and “received” by

his “immediate White House advisers [with] . . . broad and significant responsibility for

investigating and formulating the advice to be given the President,” falling squarely within the

protective scope of the presidential communications privilege. Loving, 550 F.3d at 37 (alteration

in original) (quoting Judicial Watch, 365 F.3d at 1114).

       Plaintiff counters that “[t]he President had already made his decisions [regarding voting

rights issues], publicly announced them, and directed the agencies to act,” making the strategic

plans merely “reports on final [agency] actions” that had nothing further to do with confidential

presidential decision-making. Pl.’s Opp’n at 12. Plaintiff supports this argument by noting the

absence of the word “recommendations” or other advice-related language in section 3 of EO

14019’s request for submission of strategic plans. Pl.’s Sur-Reply at 1–4. Analogizing to the

Supreme Court’s directives regarding the interpretation of agency regulations, plaintiff then

argues that no deference should be given to the White House Special Counsel’s affidavit

explaining the meaning of section 3 where the executive order’s language is “unambiguous” in

not soliciting advice or recommendations. Id.

       In reality, however, section 3 of EO 14019 is not plainly “unambiguous,” and plaintiff’s

reading that this provision constitutes a final presidential directive for agencies to act and report

back only on already completed actions is not an obvious one. Section 2 of EO 14019 suggests

that the President made all solicitations and requests under the executive order as part of “the

policy of [his] Administration to promote and defend the right to vote.” EO 14019 at 13623.

Consistent with this language, the Special Counsel’s affidavit suggests that “[t]he White House

solicited the strategic plans in order to inform future policy developments on voting access.”

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Sauber Decl. ¶ 11. As defendants rightfully note, within this context of on-going executive

policymaking, section 3 is more reasonably read as tasking agencies to brainstorm and identify

ways that they “can promote voter registration and voter participation” with future possible

actions, not merely to report on actions already taken. EO 14019 at 13624 (emphasis added).

Indeed, upon making the request for submission, the White House also provided agencies with a

template for developing their strategic plans. Sauber Decl. ¶ 8. Tellingly, the template included

disclaimers that “[l]isting an action in this strategic plan does not commit your agency to

implementing the action” and that “most agencies will pursue additional actions not listed in this

plan.” Id. (alteration and emphasis in original). No part of section 3 or the affidavit suggests

that the President was requesting “[a] catalog of final agency policies and actions.” Pl.’s Opp’n

at 12. Instead, the record consistently indicates that the President had asked agencies to submit a

subset of potential actions and ideas that may inform the policy developments of his

administration. Thus, the strategic plans, even if some of them describe existing agency actions,

are not “information regarding governmental operations that do not call ultimately for direct

decisionmaking by the President.” In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 752. Protecting the strategic

plans under the presidential communications privilege does not create an “endless feedback

loop” shrouding agency actions as plaintiff warns, see Pl.’s Opp’n at 13, because the protective

scope remains limited to information directly relevant for presidential decision-making.

       Plaintiff further contends that defendants cannot extend the presidential communications

privilege to cover strategic plans that “might hypothetically be used in ‘potential future decisions

on voting rights issues.’” Pl.’s Sur-Reply at 4 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Defs.’ Reply at 2).

As support for this contention, plaintiff attempts to distinguish this case from Loving and

Judicial Watch (D.C. Cir. 2004), both upholding applications of the privilege, by asserting that

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the strategic plans were never used in actual communications with the President. Id. at 4–5.

Once again, this is inaccurate. The Special Counsel’s affidavit states in past tense that “senior

White House advisors relied on the strategic plans in formulating advice . . . [that] informed the

President on the extent of agency actions and proposals on relevant voting matters and on areas

where further Executive Branch action might be needed or considered within the scope of the

President’s executive authority.” Sauber Decl. ¶ 12. The President expressly solicited the

strategic plans through his executive order and then communicated with his immediate advisors

about information compiled from the strategic plans. As the D.C. Circuit held in Loving, the

strategic plans are privileged because “the President solicited and received [them] in a manner

sufficient to bring [them] within the presidential communications privilege,” and they “d[id] not

lose [their] privileged status simply because [they] traveled up the chain of command before the

President received [them].” 550 F.3d at 40.

       The strategic plans thus fall squarely into the ambit of the presidential communications

privilege, and plaintiff cannot avoid this conclusion by mischaracterizing the text of EO 14019

and the ongoing nature of the President’s decision-making process regarding voting rights issues.

           2. Presidential Communications Privilege Protects the Strategic Plans in Their
              Entirety

       Plaintiff next contends that even if applicable, the presidential communications privilege

should not shield the strategic plans in their entirety, but that position runs contrary to the proper

application of the privilege as covering entire documents. The entire-document rule for applying

the presidential communications privilege is not “dicta,” as plaintiff characterizes it, but

“precedent” consistently applied by the D.C. Circuit and courts in this district. Protect

Democracy Project, 10 F.4th at 887 (“[U]nder existing precedent, the presidential

communications privilege applies to documents in their entirety.” (internal quotation omitted));

                                                  16
see also, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 744–45 (holding that “unlike the deliberative

process privilege, the presidential communications privilege applies to documents in their

entirety, and covers final and post-decisional materials as well as pre-deliberative ones”); Loving,

550 F.3d at 37–38 (holding that the presidential communications privilege “covers [] documents

in their entirety,” “regardless of whether the documents are predecisional or not”); Judicial

Watch, 913 F.3d at 1111 (holding that “[o]nce the [presidential communications] privilege

applies, the entirety of the document is protected”); Ctr. for Effective Gov’t v. U.S. Dep’t of

State, 7 F. Supp. 3d 16, 22 (D.D.C. 2013) (acknowledging the entire-document principle);

Buzzfeed, Inc. v. FBI, 613 F. Supp. 3d 453, 466–67 (D.D.C. 2020) (applying the entire-document

principle); Cause of Action Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Com., No. 19-cv-2698 (DLF), 2022 WL

4130813, at *5 (D.D.C. Sept. 12, 2022) (same). The D.C. Circuit has emphasized that because

the presidential communications privilege must ensure the President’s “full access to facts,” the

privilege must protect factual information “revelatory of the President’s deliberations,” including

reports regarding implementation of a particular course of action that the President has decided

to pursue. In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 745–46.

       Plaintiff argues that the entire-document principle is “not an iron rule,” and that portions

of the strategic plans stating final or completed agency actions are unrelated to direct presidential

decision-making and thus segregable from the rest of the strategic plans. Pl.’s Opp’n at 15–17.

This argument is untenable, for it mischaracterizes the entire-document rule as well as the

strategic plans’ role in the President’s decision-making process. As explained supra, both EO

14019 and the White House Special Counsel’s affidavit show that the President solicited the

strategic plans and received their information as an integral part of his direct presidential

policymaking on voting rights issues. See supra Part III.A.1. Furthermore, as defendants

                                                 17
rightfully note, plaintiff has not identified a single case where a segregability analysis is applied

to materials otherwise directly related to confidential presidential decision-making. Defs.’ Reply

at 4–5; see generally Pl.’s Opp’n; Pl.’s Sur-Reply. This is unsurprising, for the D.C. Circuit has

squarely rejected similar attempts to apply segregability analysis to documents protected by the

presidential communications privilege. See Protect Democracy Project, 10 F.4th at 888

(explaining that “FOIA’s segregability requirement presumes that some part of a document is not

exempt,” and therefore cannot apply as the presidential communications privilege, by its nature,

covers an entire document). Thus, the strategic plans, including portions stating existing agency

actions, are protected by the presidential communications privilege in their entirety. 1

         B. FORESEEABLE HARM

         Plaintiff next contends that, even if the at-issue strategic plans are exempt from

disclosure, defendants have not met their burden to show that disclosure “will foreseeabl[y] harm

the interests protected by the presidential communications privilege.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 18. The

FOIA Improvement Act provides that “[a]n agency shall withhold information . . . only if the

agency reasonably foresees that disclosure would harm an interest protected by” one of the nine

FOIA exemptions. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(8)(A). This provision requires agencies withholding

information under an exemption to show not only that a withheld record “falls within a FOIA

exemption,” but also that “the agency ‘reasonably foresees that disclosure would harm an interest

protected by [the] exemption.’” Machado Amadis v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 971 F.3d 364, 370

(D.C. Cir. 2020) (alteration in original) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(8)(A)(i)(I)).

1
         Accordingly, defendants’ additional argument for partial, overlapping withholdings of the strategic plans
based on the deliberative process privilege need not be addressed. See In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 746
(concluding that deliberative process argument did not need to be addressed after finding full coverage of the at-
issue document under the presidential communications privilege); see also Cause of Action Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of
Com., 513 F. Supp. 3d 116, 130 n.3 (D.D.C. 2021) (same); Cause of Action Inst., 2022 WL 4130813, at *9 n.6
(same).

                                                         18
         An agency successfully makes this second, “heightened” showing, Judicial Watch, Inc. v.

Dep’t of Com., 375 F. Supp. 3d 93, 100 (D.D.C. 2019), by “‘identify[ing] specific harms to the

relevant protected interests that it can reasonably foresee would actually ensue from disclosure of

the withheld materials’ and ‘connect[ing] the harms in [a] meaningful way to the information

withheld,’” Ctr. for Investigative Reporting v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot., 436 F. Supp. 3d 90,

106 (third alteration in original) (quoting Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Dep’t of Justice, No. 17-cv-

0832 (CKK), 2019 WL 4644029, at *5 (D.D.C. Sept. 24, 2019)); see also H.R. Rep. No. 114-

391, at 9 (2016) (“An inquiry into whether an agency has reasonably foreseen a specific,

identifiable harm that would be caused by a disclosure would require the ability to articulate both

the nature of the harm and the link between the specified harm and specific information

contained in the material withheld.”). Agencies therefore “must provide more than ‘nearly

identical boilerplate statements’ and ‘generic and nebulous articulations of harm.’” Ctr. for

Investigative Reporting, 436 F. Supp. 3d at 106 (quoting Judicial Watch, 2019 WL 4644029, at

*4–5).

         Of course, the agency’s burden to demonstrate that harm would result from disclosure

may shift depending on the nature of the interests protected by the specific exemption with

respect to which a claim of foreseeable harm is made. See, e.g., Rosenberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Def.,

442 F. Supp. 3d 240, 259 (D.D.C. 2020) (“The degree of detail necessary to substantiate a claim

of foreseeable harm is context-specific.”); S. Rep. No. 114-4, at 328 (2015) (anticipating that

foreseeable harm determinations would turn on “whether the agency reasonably foresees that

disclosing that particular document, given its age, content, and character, would harm an interest

protected by the applicable exemption”). The purpose of the attorney-client privilege

encompassed by Exemption 5, for example, is to provide an “assurance of confidentiality” to

                                                 19
clients, Animal Welfare Inst. v. Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., 370 F. Supp. 3d 116, 130

(D.D.C. 2019) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), such that disclosure of privileged

information is a harm in and of itself. When invoking the attorney-client privilege, then, an

agency likely does not need to reach far beyond the fact of disclosure to show foreseeable harm.

By contrast, foreseeable harm under the deliberative process privilege requires the withholding

agency to show more. The agency “cannot simply rely on generalized assertions that disclosure

could chill deliberations.” Machado Amadis, 971 F.3d at 371 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Rather, the agency must “provide ‘context or insight into the specific decision-making processes

or deliberations at issue, and how they in particular would be harmed by disclosure.’” Ctr. for

Investigative Reporting, 436 F. Supp. 3d at 107 (Judicial Watch, 2019 WL 4644029, at *5).

       While the D.C. Circuit has yet to consider the adequacy of an agency’s foreseeable harm

showing under the presidential communications privilege, Judges on this Court have consistently

credited declarations describing the potential chilling effects on confidential and candid

presidential decision-making as sufficient identification of foreseeable harm. See Wash. Post

Co. v. Special Inspector Gen. for Afg. Reconstruction, No. 18-cv-2622 (ABJ), 2021 WL

4502106, at *23 (D.D.C. Sept. 20, 2021) (citing Leopold v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 487 F. Supp.

3d 1, 10 n.4 (D.D.C. 2020)). In Washington Post, an agency’s declaration that disclosure of the

at-issue information “burdens the ability of the President and his advisors to engage in a

confidential and frank decision-making process and chills or inhibits their ability to have candid

discussions” was found to be an adequate showing of foreseeable harm under the presidential

communications privilege. Id. In Leopold, an agency’s representations that disclosure of the at-

issue information “would jeopardize the ability of future Presidents-elect to have full and candid

discussions with their advisers” and “would undermine the ability to protect the

                                                20
confidentiality . . . and further damage the quality of presidential decision-making” were likewise

sufficient for establishing foreseeable harm. Leopold, 487 F. Supp. 3d at 10 n.4.

       In this case, the agencies have made similarly adequate showings of foreseeable harm.

The White House Special Counsel’s affidavit clearly states that “release of the plans would

impose a chilling effect on presidential decisionmaking, as such disclosure would hinder the

ability of the President and senior presidential advisors to obtain frank, unfettered information

and advice from Defendants and other Executive Branch agencies on important policy issues

such as voting access.” Sauber Decl. ¶ 14. This statement of foreseeable harm is similar in

content and level of detail to representations of harm made by agencies in Washington Post and

Leopold. Plaintiff presents no persuasive reasons why this case should come out differently.

Here, as in those previous cases, the description provided in the affidavit of the “chilling effect

on presidential decisionmaking,” see Sauber Decl. ¶ 14, is more than “generic” or “boilerplate,”

see Ctr. for Investigative Reporting, 436 F. Supp. 3d at 106; Pl. Opp’n at 19, and thus sufficient

to support the presidential communications privilege. See Wash. Post Co., 2021 WL 4502106, at

*23; Leopold, 487 F. Supp. 3d at 10 n.4; Pl. Opp’n at 19.

       Finally, plaintiff argues that, at least concerning portions of the strategic plans describing

existing agency actions, defendants have identified no cognizable harm because final and post-

decisional information “could [not] possibly have any impact on confidential presidential

decisionmaking.” Pl. Opp’n at 20. Again, this is inaccurate. As explained supra, the strategic

plans were solicited by the President to inform his administration’s policymaking on expanding

voting access and directly relevant for the presidential decision-making process. See supra Part

III.A.1. Factual portions of the strategic plans are thus “revelatory of the President’s

deliberations” and squarely protected by the presidential communications privilege. In re Sealed

                                                 21
Case, 121 F.3d at 745–46. Indeed, the White House Special Counsel made such a showing in his

affidavit when he referenced both factual “information” and pre-decisional “advice” in his

statement of the “chilling effect on presidential decisionmaking.” Sauber Decl. ¶ 14. The

affidavit adequately explains that disclosure of the strategic plans would foreseeably undermine

candid, informed, and high-caliber presidential decision-making, interests that the presidential

communications privilege has always intended to protect. See Loving, 550 F.3d at 37; In re

Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 750.

       Additionally, protecting the strategic plans in full under the presidential communications

privilege would not harm the public interest as plaintiff claims. See Pl.’s Opp’n at 15–17.

Plaintiff contends that application of the presidential communications privilege to the strategic

plans would “keep[] otherwise unclassified government operations secret from the American

people.” Id. at 17. As defendants rightfully note, however, the strategic plans “do not constitute

or establish ‘law’ in the sense of setting forth a decision that binds subordinates or a regulated

party.” Judicial Watch, 913 F.3d at 1113. Rather, the strategic plans document information and

advice “given up the chain to someone (the President) who then made a decision.” Id. The D.C.

Circuit has clarified that the “secret law” doctrine should be limited to “opinions and

interpretations which embody the agency’s effective law and policy.” Id. (quoting NLRB v.

Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 153 (1975)). As materials prepared for presidential

decision-making, the strategic plans are distinct from working policies and laws of the agencies,

which are separately mandated by FOIA to be disclosed to the public. See Sears, 421 U.S. at 153

(interpreting FOIA to “require disclosure of documents which have the force and effect of law”

(internal quotation omitted)). Thus, affording protection of the presidential communications

                                                 22
privilege to the strategic plans does not constitute creating “secret law” that harms the interests

of the American public.

       Defendants have therefore met their burden of establishing that foreseeable harm to the

interests protected by the presidential communications privilege would ensue if the strategic

plans were disclosed, as required to withhold the documents pursuant to Exemption 5.

IV.    CONCLUSION

       For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. An

order consistent with this memorandum opinion will be entered contemporaneously.

       Date: July 18, 2023

                                                      __________________________
                                                      BERYL A. HOWELL
                                                      United States District Court Judge

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