Court Opinion

ID: 9567409
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:53:36.318536+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:00:35.820280
License: Public Domain

QUINN, Justice,
dissenting in part and concurring in part:
I dissent from that part of the court’s opinion which upholds the initial entry into the defendant’s apartment and approves the use of observations acquired in the course of that entry. In my view the war-rantless entry into the defendant’s home cannot be justified under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. However, I believe that when the references to the officer’s observations upon the initial entry are excluded from the affidavit, probable cause was established for the issuance of the warrant and the subsequent search and seizure complied with constitutional principles.
I.
The predominant lesson to be learned from Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is that the warrantless entry into a home to arrest, search or seize is presumptively invalid. E.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971).
“The Fourth Amendment protects the individual’s privacy in a variety of settings. In none is the zone of privacy more clearly defined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual’s home — a zone that finds its roots in clear and specific constitutional terms: ‘The right of the people to be *976secure in their ... houses .. . shall not be violated.’ That language unequivocally establishes the proposition that ‘[a]t the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.’ ” Payton v. New York, supra, 445 U.S. at 589-90, 100 S.Ct. at 1381-82, 63 L.Ed.2d at 653.
Only when there is an appropriate showing of an emergency may governmental officers cross the threshold of a home without a warrant. See, e.g., United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 96 S.Ct. 2406, 49 L.Ed.2d 300 (1976); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967). We recently summarized the type of emergencies encompassed by the exigent circumstances exception in McCall v. People, Colo., 623 P.2d 397 (1981):
“Exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless arrest generally have been limited to those situations involving a bona fide pursuit of a fleeing suspect, e.g., Warden v. Hayden [387 U.S. 294, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967) ]; United States v. Scott, 520 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1056, 96 S.Ct. 788, 46 L.Ed.2d 645 (1976), or the risk of immediate destruction of evidence, e.g., United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 96 S.Ct. 2406, 49 L.Ed.2d 300 (1976); People v. Williams, Colo., 613 P.2d 879 (1980), or a colorable claim of emergency threatening the life or safety of another, e.g., People v. Amato, 193 Colo. 57, 562 P.2d 422 (1977). The scope of the doctrine, however, must be ‘strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation,’ Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2413, 57 L.Ed.2d 290, 300 (1978), quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25-26, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1882, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 908 (1968), and the burden is on the prosecution to establish that those exigencies render the warrantless entry truly imperative. E.g., Mincey v. Arizona, supra; Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971); Warden v. Hayden, supra; Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948).”
In this case the record is devoid of any facts amounting to a reasonable expectation on the part of the officers that any delay in entry would result in the destruction of evidence by the defendant or his flight from the apartment. The undisputed testimony at the suppression hearing established that Leingang’s arrest took place approximately one block south of the defendant’s apartment. Detective Barnhill, who made the warrantless entry into the defendant’s apartment, conceded at the suppression hearing that the defendant was totally unaware of Leingang’s arrest. The majority, however, places no significance in this testimony but instead focuses on Lein-gang’s statement to the defendant, made while leaving the defendant’s apartment and overheard by the police, that he would return in a few minutes. To construct exigent circumstances from this one statement the majority piles inference upon inference, each of which becomes progressively more speculative than its predecessor. The reasoning apparently goes as follows: Lein-gang’s failure to return would have caused the defendant to believe he had been arrested; the defendant’s belief that Leingang had been arrested would prompt him either to destroy whatever contraband remained in the apartment or to flee; this danger of immediate loss of evidence or flight presented the police with an emergency justifying their warrantless entry into the apartment. If the evidence here is sufficient to satisfy the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, then indeed the exception has swallowed the rule. Simply stated, I believe the record here is devoid of evidence establishing the type of emergency contemplated by the exigent circumstances doctrine.1
*977II.
The warrantless entry in this ease resulted in the officer’s visual observations of the sifter and cardboard box top containing marijuana seeds. However, the core of the affidavit recites facts which occurred prior to the illegal entry, which could not have been tainted in any manner by the illegal entry, and which, when severed from the illegal conduct, provided independent probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant. See, e.g., United States v. Grummel, 542 F.2d 789 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied 429 U.S. 1051, 97 S.Ct. 763, 50 L.Ed.2d 767 (1977). Under the circumstances of this case I believe the district court properly suppressed the sifter and the cardboard box containing marijuana seeds as the product of the illegal entry and I would affirm that part of the court’s ruling. However, I agree with the majority that all other items were properly seized as either within the scope of the warrant or demonstrably connected with criminal activity, see, e.g., People v. Franklin, Colo., 640 P.2d 226 (1982), and I concur in this aspect of the court’s decision.
I am authorized to say that Justice ERICKSON and Justice DUBOFSKY join me in this opinion.

. People v. Williams, Colo., 613 P.2d 879 (1979), on which the majority relies, is distinguishable from the instant case in several particulars. Williams was aware that a drug sale involving one pound of cocaine for $30,400 was taking place outside his residence. The sale was being negotiated by the defendants Salnajs and Sullivan, who were acting as middlemen on *977behalf of Williams, and police undercover agents. After obtaining the cocaine from Williams inside the residence, Salnajs brought it to the officers and informed them that one ounce had been removed as compensation to him for arranging the sale. Sullivan at this time was inside the residence with Williams. The cocaine was then exchanged on the street and the officers immediately arrested Salnajs and decided to secure the residence while a search warrant was sought. As they approached the house an individual was seen looking out a window next to the front door. The police forcibly entered the residence and secured it. In upholding the warrantless entry, we stated:
“Here, the urgent need for prompt arrest to prevent escape and possible destruction of contraband is manifest. Salnajs had brought almost a pound of cocaine to the agents and was to receive $30,400 as the purchase price. The officers had probable cause to believe that Salnajs and Sullivan were middlemen; that their compensation was to be one ounce of cocaine; and that the money for the purchase of the cocaine would be paid to someone else. It was reasonable to believe that Salnajs would be expected by his companions to return promptly to the residence with the money. Salnajs’ failure to return promptly could be expected to alarm the other participants. In turn, their alarm would likely lead to the removal or destruction of contraband, escape, or retaliation against the agents. Prompt action to arrest Sullivan and Williams was imperative in the course of sound police work. We conclude that exigent circumstances existed to enter the residence to make the arrests.” Colo., 613 P.2d at 882.
The facts in Williams created a reasonable expectation on the part of the officers that any delay in entry would result in the destruction of evidence or escape. In my opinion our decision there represents an appropriate application of the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. From the standpoint of exigent circumstances the facts of the instant case are much closer to those in McCall v. People, Colo., 623 P.2d 397 (1981), where wé suppressed a confession as the product of an unconstitutional warrantless arrest of the defendant in his home, noting that prior to the entry there was “no indication of any attempted flight by the defendant . .. nor is there any demonstration that the loss or destruction of crucial evidence was imminent.” See, e.g., United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 72 S.Ct. 93, 96 L.Ed. 59 (1951); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 69 S.Ct. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153 (1948); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 46, 68 S.Ct. 391, 92 L.Ed. 468 (1948).