Court Opinion

ID: 9950694
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-14 16:15:29.434691+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:35:43.222002
License: Public Domain

No. 5                     March 14, 2024                               81

            IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
                  STATE OF OREGON

           MATTHEW DWIGHT THOMPSON,
                       Appellant,
                           v.
                   Corey FHUERE,
                   Superintendent,
               Oregon State Penitentiary,
                     Respondent.
        (CC 20CV29516) (CA A179314) (SC S070162)

   En Banc
   On certification from the Court of Appeals under ORS
19.405.*
   Argued and submitted September 19, 2023.
   Jeffrey E. Ellis, Law of Office of Alsept & Ellis, Portland,
argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant.
   Timothy A. Sylwester, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause and filed the briefs for respondent. Also on
the briefs were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, and
Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
   GARRETT, J.
   The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

______________

   * Appeal from Marion County Circuit Court, Thomas M. Hart, Judge.
82   Thompson v. Fhuere
Cite as 372 Or 81 (2024)                                   83

        GARRETT, J.
         Petitioner committed capital crimes in 1994 and
was sentenced to death. Decades later, petitioner filed a
successive petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that
his death sentence and two of the penalty-phase ques-
tions that had been posed to the jury at sentencing were
unconstitutional. Because of then-recent changes in the
law, the parties agreed that petitioner’s death sentence
had to be vacated. However, the parties disagreed about
the proper remedy. The superintendent requested that the
post-conviction court modify petitioner’s sentence to life
without the possibility of parole, while petitioner sought to
remand the case for resentencing. The post-conviction court
vacated petitioner’s death sentence, modified his sentence
to life without the possibility of parole, and ruled that his
remaining claims concerning the penalty-phase questions
were procedurally barred.
         Petitioner appealed the judgment to the Court
of Appeals, arguing, among other things, that the post-
conviction court had erred by failing to remand the case
for resentencing. While petitioner’s appeal was pending,
then-Governor Kate Brown commuted the death sentences
of 17 individuals—including petitioner—to sentences of life
without the possibility of parole. We accepted certification
from the Court of Appeals to consider, among other issues,
the effect of the Governor’s commutation on this case. See
ORS 19.405 (describing procedures for certification of an
appeal). For reasons that we will explain, we conclude that
petitioner has presented no basis for reversing the post-
conviction court’s judgment. Petitioner’s argument that he
is entitled to a remand for resentencing because the death
sentence that he originally received was unconstitutional
fails because, as a result of the Governor’s commutation,
petitioner is not serving a death sentence. Further, peti-
tioner failed to preserve his challenge to the post-conviction
court’s ruling that his constitutional challenges to the two
penalty-phase questions were procedurally barred, and, for
that reason, we do not reach the merits of petitioner’s con-
stitutional challenges to those questions. Accordingly, we
affirm.
84                                                      Thompson v. Fhuere

     I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. History of the Case
         The basic procedural facts are undisputed. Petitioner
was convicted of four counts of aggravated murder involving
the murder of two victims in 1994. Two counts were based
on the aggravating circumstance that petitioner had com-
mitted multiple murders as part of the same criminal epi-
sode. ORS 163.095(1)(d) (1993). The other two counts were
based on the aggravating circumstance that he had “person-
ally and intentionally committed” murder in the course of
and in furtherance of committing or attempting to commit
a statutorily enumerated felony (i.e., first-degree burglary in
one count and first-degree robbery in the second count). ORS
163.095(2)(d) (1993); ORS 163.115(1)(b)(C), (G) (1993).
         During the penalty phase, the jury was instructed
that there were three possible penalties: death, life impris-
onment without the possibility of parole, and life imprison-
ment with the possibility of parole. As described in more
detail below, 372 Or at 85-86, 85 n 3, the jury answered cer-
tain questions that were legally required at that time for the
imposition of a death sentence, including two pertaining to
whether petitioner posed a “continuing threat” and whether
he “deserved death.” Petitioner was sentenced to death.1
         On automatic and direct review, this court affirmed
the judgment of conviction and sentence of death. State v.
Thompson, 328 Or 248, 971 P2d 879, cert den, 527 US 1042
(1999). Petitioner then sought post-conviction relief, chal-
lenging his convictions and sentence on numerous grounds.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the post-conviction court’s
judgment denying petitioner relief, and this court denied
review.2 Thompson v. Belleque, 268 Or App 1, 341 P3d 911
(2014), rev den, 357 Or 300 (2015).

    1
      Petitioner was sentenced to death on each of the four counts of aggravated
murder. State v. Thompson, 328 Or 248, 253 n 2, 971 P2d 879, cert den, 527 US
1042 (1999). For convenience, however, we refer to those sentences collectively as
either petitioner’s “sentence” or “death sentence.”
    2
      Petitioner then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district
court. Thompson v. Premo, No 6:15-cv-01313-SI (D Or 2015). That case is cur-
rently stayed pending the outcome of this appeal.
Cite as 372 Or 81 (2024)                                                   85

B.    Senate Bill 1013
         Several years later, in 2019, the legislature passed
Senate Bill (SB) 1013, which significantly changed Oregon’s
death penalty statutes. Or Laws 2019, ch 635; see State v.
Bartol, 368 Or 598, 496 P3d 1013 (2021) (describing SB 1013,
its legislative history, and its effects). As pertinent here,
SB 1013 “created a new category of murder, ‘murder in the
first degree’; reclassified all the forms of murder that previ-
ously had been ‘aggravated murder’ as ‘murder in the first
degree’; and provided a maximum sentence of life impris-
onment without the possibility of parole for ‘murder in the
first degree.’ ” Bartol, 368 Or at 601 (citing Or Laws 2019,
ch 635, §§ 1, 3(1), (2)). Thus, SB 1013 eliminated the death
penalty for all the forms of murder that previously had been
eligible for it, which included the forms that petitioner had
committed.
          “SB 1013 did not eliminate the death penalty
entirely[,]” however. Id. at 601. Instead, SB 1013 “redefined
‘aggravated murder’ to include different forms of murder,
most of which are more serious forms of murder than those
* * * previously * * * classified as ‘aggravated murder[,]’ ” and
provided that those forms of aggravated murder can be pun-
ished by death. Id. 601-02; see id. at 602 n 2 (describing con-
duct constituting aggravated murder under SB 1013).
         In addition, SB 1013 changed the requirements for
imposing a death sentence. “Prior to SB 1013, the jury had to
answer four questions in the affirmative in order for a defen-
dant to be sentenced to death.” Bartol, 368 Or at 602 n 3
(citing ORS 163.150(1)(b) (2013), amended by Or Laws 2019,
ch 635, § 5).3 Specifically, ORS 163.150(1)(b) (2013) provided:
        “Upon the conclusion of the presentation of the evidence,
     the court shall submit the following issues to the jury:
        “(A) Whether the conduct of the defendant that caused
     the death of the deceased was committed deliberately and
     with the reasonable expectation that death of the deceased
     or another would result;

    3
      The penalty-phase questions in ORS 163.150(1)(b) (2013) that we discussed
in Bartol were same questions that had applied when petitioner was sentenced
to death.
86                                           Thompson v. Fhuere

        “(B) Whether there is a probability that the defendant
     would commit criminal acts of violence that would consti-
     tute a continuing threat to society;
        “(C) If raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of
     the defendant in killing the deceased was unreasonable in
     response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased; and
        “(D) Whether the defendant should receive a death
     sentence.”
Under that statute, if the jury answered any of those four
questions in the negative, a death sentence could not be
imposed. Instead, the trial court was required to sentence
the defendant to life imprisonment without the possibil-
ity of parole, unless “10 or more members of the jury fur-
ther [found] that there [were] sufficient mitigating circum-
stances” to warrant life imprisonment with the possibility of
parole, in which case the trial court was required to impose
that lesser sentence. ORS 163.150(2)(a) (2013).
         SB 1013 eliminated the second of the four questions,
ORS 163.150(1)(b)(B) (2013), relating to whether a defendant
constitutes a “continuing threat.” Bartol, 368 Or at 602 n 3.
The bill also added a “ ‘proof beyond a reasonable doubt’ ”
standard to the question of whether a defendant “should
receive a death sentence.” Id.
         Significantly, the legislature did not make SB 1013
retroactive as to sentences imposed before the effective date
of the bill. Instead, SB 1013 applied “only to sentencings
that occur after its effective date, regardless of when the
crime was committed.” State v. Rogers, 368 Or 695, 700, 499
P3d 45 (2021) (citing Or Laws 2019, ch 635, § 30). This court
construed that applicability provision in Bartol to demon-
strate that “the legislature did not regard conduct commit-
ted before the effective date as more culpable than conduct
committed after it.” Bartol, 368 Or at 624. Thus,
     “[a]lthough the legislature did not make SB 1013 retroac-
     tive as to sentences imposed before its effective date, the
     enactment of the bill itself reflect[ed] a judgment that con-
     duct that [had been] previously classified as ‘aggravated
     murder’ [did] not fall within the narrow category of conduct
     that [could] be punished by death, as opposed to lesser sen-
     tences, including life imprisonment.”
368 Or at 625.
Cite as 372 Or 81 (2024)                                                      87

         Bartol held that, so understood, SB 1013 created a
proportionality problem under Article I, section 16, of the
Oregon Constitution, which provides, in part, that “all pen-
alties shall be proportioned to the nature of the offense.” Id.
at 624. That was so, because SB 1013 allowed “the execution
of persons whose conduct the legislature has determined is
not the worst of the worst and whose culpability is no dif-
ferent from those who cannot be executed.” Id. (emphases in
original). Put simply, “whether a person who committed con-
duct that was previously classified as ‘aggravated murder’
but is now classified as ‘murder in the first degree’ can be
sentenced to death depends on the person’s sentencing date,
not on the relative gravity of the conduct.” Id.
         Accordingly, in Bartol—a death penalty case on
automatic and direct review—we explained that carrying
out that defendant’s death sentence
   “would allow the execution of a person for conduct that the
   legislature has determined no longer justifies that unique
   and ultimate punishment, and it would allow the execution
   of a person for conduct that the legislature has determined
   is no more culpable than conduct that should not result in
   death.”
Id. at 625. Having concluded that the defendant’s death
sentence violated Article I, section 16, we vacated the sen-
tence and remanded the case for resentencing. Id. at 626; see
Rogers, 368 Or at 701 (same).
C. Petitioner’s Post-Conviction Proceeding
        Following the enactment of SB 1013 and the issu-
ance of our decisions in Bartol and Rogers, petitioner filed
the successive post-conviction petition that is the subject of
this appeal. He raised the following three claims for relief.4
        In his first claim, petitioner asserted that his death
sentence was unconstitutional. He explained that, pursu-
ant to SB 1013, the conduct that he had been found guilty
of committing was no longer classified as aggravated mur-
der and was no longer punishable by death; thus, under
the holdings in Bartol and Rogers, his death sentence was
unconstitutional.
   4
       Petitioner alleged two additional claims that were voluntarily dismissed.
88                                       Thompson v. Fhuere

         In his second claim, petitioner contended that the
“continuing threat” question that had been posed to the jury
in his case was unconstitutional (i.e., the second penalty-
phase question, ORS 163.150(1)(b)(B) (2013) (“[w]hether there
is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal
acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat
to society”)). According to petitioner, that question failed
to serve its constitutionally required function to rationally
“narrow the class of death-eligible criminal defendants.” In
support of that proposition, petitioner referred to empirical
evidence, including research pertaining to jurors’ ability to
predict future dangerousness. He further asserted that the
elimination by SB 1013 of the “continuing threat” question
was an acknowledgment that the question “did not comport
with the current understanding of modern circumstances
and contemporary standards of decency.”
        In his third claim, petitioner challenged the consti-
tutionality of the version of the “deserves death” question
that was posed to his jury (i.e., the fourth penalty-phase
question, ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) (2013) (“[w]hether the defen-
dant should receive a death sentence”)). As noted above, that
version of the question did not require proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, which, according to petitioner, made the ques-
tion inconsistent both with “[m]odern circumstances and
contemporary standards of decency,” and with the intent of
the voters when they reinstated the death penalty in 1984.
Again, petitioner cited SB 1013 in support of that claim.
        As a remedy for each of those three claims, peti-
tioner asked the post-conviction court to vacate his death
sentence and remand the case to the trial court for resen-
tencing under the provisions of SB 1013.
          The parties filed cross-motions for summary judg-
ment. See ORCP 47 C (providing that summary judgment
shall be granted if “there is no genuine issue as to any mate-
rial fact and * * * the moving party is entitled to prevail as a
matter of law”). With regard to petitioner’s first claim, they
agreed that petitioner’s death sentence had to be vacated, but
disagreed as to the remedy. Petitioner argued that a remand
for resentencing under the provisions of SB 1013 was required;
the superintendent countered that the post-conviction court
Cite as 372 Or 81 (2024)                                     89

could modify petitioner’s sentence to life without the possi-
bility of parole because that was the only legally permissible
sentence—that is, it was “the next lower sentence that [was]
both statutorily authorized and constitutionally permissible”
based on the jury’s findings. The parties also had differing
views about petitioner’s remaining two claims concerning the
“continuing threat” and “deserves death” questions, which the
post-conviction court would need to address if it declined to
remand for resentencing on petitioner’s first claim. Petitioner
contended that, if the post-conviction court concluded that
either question was unconstitutional, a remand for resentenc-
ing was required; the superintendent argued that the claims
were procedurally barred, were moot in light of the parties’
agreement that the death sentence had to be vacated, and, in
all events, lacked merit.
          Following a hearing, the post-conviction court granted
petitioner summary judgment, in part, on his first claim
(i.e., the court vacated petitioner’s death sentence). But, as
the superintendent had requested, instead of remanding, the
court modified the judgment of conviction pursuant to ORS
138.520 to impose a sentence of life without the possibility of
parole on each of petitioner’s four aggravated murder convic-
tions. See ORS 138.520 (providing that the relief that a post-
conviction court may order “shall include * * * modification of
sentence”). As to petitioner’s remaining two claims concern-
ing the penalty-phase questions, the post-conviction court
granted summary judgment to the superintendent, conclud-
ing that petitioner’s claims were procedurally barred under
ORS 138.510(3) and ORS 138.550(3). See ORS 138.510(3)
(providing, as pertinent here, that “[a] petition * * * must
be filed within two years” of the date of the denial of cer-
tiorari “unless the court on hearing a subsequent petition
finds grounds for relief asserted which could not reasonably
have been raised in the original or amended petition”); ORS
138.550(3) (providing, in part, that “[a]ll grounds for relief
* * * must be asserted in the original or amended petition,
and any grounds not so asserted are deemed waived unless
the court on hearing a subsequent petition finds grounds for
relief asserted therein which could not reasonably have been
raised in the original or amended petition”). Specifically,
the court ruled that the constitutionality of those questions
90                                                       Thompson v. Fhuere

previously had been challenged in this court and upheld, and
that petitioner had “had direct appeal, post-conviction * * *,
and other options” to challenge them.
D. The Governor’s Commutation
          While petitioner’s appeal of the post-conviction
court’s judgment was pending in the Court of Appeals,
then-Governor Brown commuted petitioner’s death sen-
tence to life in prison without the possibility of parole. The
Governor’s order stated that it was “limited to reducing
[petitioner’s] death sentence to life in prison without the pos-
sibility of parole” and did “not in any way affect the under-
lying criminal conviction.” According to the Governor, her
action “remove[d] the possibility” that petitioner would be
“put to death” and brought “all of us a significant step closer
to finality.” However, the order explicitly stated that “[n]oth-
ing in [the] Commutation Order [was] intended to preclude
[petitioner] from seeking other or further relief from the
courts that [he] may be entitled to.”5
E. The Parties’ Appellate Contentions
         Despite the fact that the Governor had issued her
commutation around the time that the parties were fil-
ing their briefs in the Court of Appeals, that briefing paid
relatively little, if any, attention to the legal effect of the
commutation on this case. Petitioner’s briefing focused on

    5
      In the same commutation order, Governor Brown also commuted the death
sentences of 16 other people. The order provided, in pertinent part:
     “[B]y virtue of the authority vested in me under Article V, Section 14, of the
     Oregon Constitution, I, Kate Brown, Governor of the State of Oregon, hereby
     commute the death sentence of each Commutee, in the respective case refer-
     enced in Exhibit A, to life in prison without the possibility of parole, effective
     as of the 14th day of December, 2022. This Commutation Order is limited
     to reducing each Commutee’s death sentence to life in prison without the
     possibility of parole, and shall not in any way affect the underlying crimi-
     nal conviction. Nothing in this Commutation Order is intended to preclude
     a Commutee from seeking other or further relief from the courts that they
     may be entitled to. Although in many cases commutations are granted in
     recognition of extraordinary reform on the part of the individual, that is not
     the basis for my actions here. Instead, the sole basis for commuting the death
     sentences of each Commutee to life in prison without the possibility of parole
     is that the death penalty is dysfunctional and immoral, in all circumstances.
     My action today removes the possibility that any of these Commutees will
     be put to death by the State and brings all of us a significant step closer to
     finality in each of these cases.”
Cite as 372 Or 81 (2024)                                   91

the post-conviction court’s rulings and raised four assign-
ments of error, contending that the post-conviction court
had erred in (1) summarily modifying petitioner’s sentence
to life without parole instead of remanding for resentencing
after it vacated his unconstitutional death sentence; (2) con-
cluding that his claims concerning the penalty-phase ques-
tions were “untimely” when the state had “conceded other-
wise”; (3) failing to remand for resentencing because the
“continuing threat” question was unconstitutional as mea-
sured by evolving standards of decency and events that had
occurred after petitioner’s trial, direct appeal, and prior
post-conviction proceeding; and (4) failing to remand for
resentencing because the “deserves death” question was
unconstitutional for similar reasons. Petitioner’s briefing
did not mention the Governor’s commutation.
         The superintendent called the court’s attention to
the commutation in his answering brief, noting that the
Governor’s order made it “unnecessary to address the effect
of the Bartol decision on the validity of the death sentence
imposed in petitioner’s case.” The superintendent also con-
tended that the commutation order “effectively moot[ed]”
petitioner’s claims concerning the penalty-phase questions
and that the court should not consider them. In support of
that contention, the superintendent reiterated his argu-
ment that the jury’s answers to the penalty-phase questions
necessarily established that life without the possibility of
parole is the proper sentence now that the death sentence
cannot be carried out. The Court of Appeals then certified
the appeal to this court, and we accepted the certification
and received supplemental briefing.
         Again, however, the parties’ briefing did not devote
much attention to the legal effect of the Governor’s commuta-
tion. Petitioner explained that, although this court’s rulings
in Bartol and Rogers “likely made all then-existing death sen-
tences unconstitutional,” the commutation had “ended any
uncertainty when [the Governor] commuted those sentences”
and expressly “preserve[d] all existing rights for every com-
mutee.” In other words, petitioner acknowledged that, as a
result of the commutation, he is serving the commuted sen-
tence of life without parole, but, nonetheless, contended that
92                                       Thompson v. Fhuere

the express terms of the Governor’s commutation permitted
him to “seek[ ] other or further relief from the courts that
[he] may be entitled to”—including relief that could result in
an even lesser sentence than his commuted one.
         The relief to which petitioner claims an entitlement
is a remand for resentencing, based, as we understand his
argument, on four distinct theories. First, because the jury
had found petitioner guilty of aggravated murder based on
conduct that (under SB 1013) can no longer be punished by
death, there is a heightened possibility that his death sen-
tence was influenced by the classification of his conduct as
“the worst form of murder” and so created a “bias in favor
of the death penalty,” and, for that reason, he is entitled
to a remand for resentencing. Second, because this court
vacated the defendants’ unconstitutionally disproportion-
ate death sentences in Bartol and Rogers and remanded
those cases for resentencing, petitioner is entitled to the
same remedy for the same constitutional violation. Third,
because the post-conviction court had vacated petitioner’s
death sentence (as both parties had agreed was necessary),
he was subject to being resentenced under the provisions
of SB 1013. Fourth, because the “continuing threat” and
“deserves death” penalty-phase questions that were posed to
petitioner’s jury were unconstitutional, petitioner is entitled
to a remand for resentencing as would be the case with any
other prejudicial penalty-phase error.
         In his supplemental brief, the superintendent argued
that the parties’ dispute about the post-conviction court’s
authority to modify petitioner’s sentence had been rendered
moot by the Governor’s commutation, because petitioner “is
no longer subject to a death sentence or the possibility of
one, and he is now serving a true-life sentence instead.” As a
consequence, the superintendent reasoned, “this court need
not consider whether ORS 138.520 authorized the post-
conviction court to modify the judgment * * * to impose a
true-life sentence.” The superintendent also contended that
petitioner was not entitled to a resentencing, because the
theories that he had advanced lacked merit.
         During oral argument, we sought to further clarify
the parties’ positions about the legal effect of the commutation
Cite as 372 Or 81 (2024)                                         93

on this case. Both parties agreed that, as a result of the
commutation, petitioner is serving a life sentence without
the possibility of parole. According to the superintendent,
the commutation rendered moot the parties’ dispute about
the post-conviction court’s authority to modify petitioner’s
sentence, because the Governor did that herself. However,
the superintendent conceded that, if we conclude that there
was a penalty-phase error that requires a remand for resen-
tencing, the terms of the commutation order do not preclude
that relief.
         As discussed further below, the Governor’s com-
mutation order fundamentally changed the circumstances
of this case and the nature of what had been litigated, up
to that point, in the post-conviction court. In this appeal
of the post-conviction court’s judgment resolving petition-
er’s claims for post-conviction relief, our task is to address
whether petitioner’s assignments of error present a basis for
reversing that judgment—now that petitioner’s death sen-
tence has been commuted.
                       II. ANALYSIS
         To resolve the parties’ contentions in this case, we
must determine the legal effect of the Governor’s commuta-
tion order. Accordingly, we begin there.
        The Governor has the power to grant clemency,
including commutations, under Article V, section 14, of the
Oregon Constitution, which provides, in part:
   “[The Governor] shall have power to grant reprieves, com-
   mutations, and pardons, after conviction, for all offences
   [sic] except treason, subject to such regulations as may be
   provided by law. Upon conviction for treason he shall have
   power to suspend the execution of the sentence until the
   case shall be reported to the Legislative Assembly, at its
   next meeting, when the Legislative Assembly shall either
   grant a pardon, commute the sentence, direct the execution
   of the sentence, or grant a farther [sic] reprieve.”
The Governor is the “sole repository” of this constitutional
clemency power. Eacret et ux v. Holmes, 215 Or 121, 126, 333
P2d 741 (1958). This court has repeatedly concluded that “ ‘it
is not within judicial competency to control, interfere with,
94                                                    Thompson v. Fhuere

or even to advise the Governor when exercising [her] power
to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons.’ ” Haugen v.
Kitzhaber, 353 Or 715, 720, 306 P3d 592 (2013), cert den, 571
US 1167 (2014) (quoting Eacret, 215 Or at 125-26); see also
Eacret, 215 Or at 127 (“Where the constitution thus confers
unlimited power on the Governor to grant reprieves, com-
mutations and pardons, his discretion cannot be controlled
by judicial decision.”).6
         A Governor’s grant of clemency is not a “ ‘private act
of grace from an individual happening to possess power.’ ”
Haugen, 353 Or at 742 (quoting Biddle v. Perovich, 274 US
480, 486, 47 S Ct 664, 71 L Ed 1161 (1927) (emphases in
Haugen)). Instead, it is “an important part of the constitu-
tional scheme envisioned by the framers” that “permits the
chief executive to determine that ‘the public welfare will be
better served’ by clemency.” Id. (quoting Biddle, 274 US at
486). Ultimately, “[t]he Governor’s ability to grant clemency is
a direct and complete check on specific actions of the judicial
branch that is entrusted to the chief executive.” Id. at 726.
         One form of clemency is a “commutation,” which is
what petitioner received in this case. See State v. Link, 367
Or 625, 663, 482 P3d 28 (2021) (“Commutation * * * is an
ad hoc exercise of executive clemency.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.)). A commutation is “a change of punishment
to which a person has been condemned to one less severe.”
Fehl v. Martin, 155 Or 455, 459, 64 P2d 631 (1937); see Black’s
Law Dictionary 350 (11th ed 2019) (defining “commutation”
    6
      “[T]o the extent that limits are imposed on the clemency power, those limits
must come from the constitution itself, or from the people.” Haugen, 353 Or at 726.
As we have previously stated, “[t]he most fundamental limit [on the Governor’s
power] is imposed through the actions of the people, if they choose not to reelect
the Governor.” Id. at 742; see Eacret, 215 Or at 128 (noting that, if a Governor
abuses the clemency power, the people have recourse “at the polls”). The “text,
history, and case law surrounding Article V, section 14,” also demonstrate that
“the Governor’s power may be checked by the legislative branch, as in cases of
treason convictions and through the legislature’s authority to establish regula-
tions regarding the Governor’s power.” Haugen, 353 Or at 742-43. The legislature
has enacted a few statutory provisions addressing the Governor’s clemency power.
ORS 144.649 - 144.670. “Most of those provisions address procedural issues, such
as the procedure for reporting acts of clemency to the legislature and the proce-
dure for applying for clemency.” Haugen, 353 Or at 727 n 7. The one statutory pro-
vision that addresses the scope of the Governor’s power, ORS 144.649, “restates
the Governor’s constitutional power, but also expresses the legislature’s intent to
defer to the Governor’s judgment regarding the exercise of that power[.]” Id.
Cite as 372 Or 81 (2024)                                    95

to include “[t]he executive’s substitution in a particular case
of a less severe punishment for a more severe one that has
already been judicially imposed on the defendant”); see
also Duehay v. Thompson, 223 F 305, 307-08 (9th Cir 1915)
(explaining that, in commuting a sentence, “the executive
has superimposed its mind upon the judgment of the court;
but the sentence remains, nevertheless, the judgment of the
court, and not of the executive, and is subject to the regula-
tions of law respecting its enforcement”).
          In addition, “[a] commuted sentence has the same
legal effect as though the sentence had originally been for the
commuted term.” Pardon and Parole, 67A CJS § 6 (2023); see
also, e.g., Pardon and Parole, 59 Am Jur 2d § 52 (2023) (“In
effect, a commuted sentence replaces the sentence imposed
by the original judgment. Since it is a mere substitution
of a lesser for a greater punishment, it has the same legal
effect, and the status of the prisoner is the same as though
the sentence had originally been for the commuted term.”
(Footnote omitted.)). The Court of Appeals has recognized
that principle—that is, that a commuted sentence has the
same legal effect as though the sentence had originally been
for the commuted term—for almost 50 years. See Marteeny
v. Brown, 321 Or App 250, 288, 517 P3d 343, rev den, 370 Or
303 (2022) (explaining that a “commuted sentence stands as
though it had originally been for the commuted term, and
entitles the offender to benefits of the commuted term—for
example good time” (citing Ferguson v. Cupp, 23 Or App
122, 124-25, 541 P2d 489 (1975) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); see also Ferguson, 23 Or App 122 (concluding that,
after the Governor unconditionally commuted the petition-
er’s life sentence for murder to a term of 25 years in 1974,
the petitioner was entitled to credits resulting in the reduc-
tion of his commuted sentence computed from the date of
his original life sentence in 1957 (citing State ex rel. Murphy
v. Wolfer, 127 Minn 102, 148 NW 896 (1914)); Murphy, 127
Minn at 103, 148 NW at 897 (“A few principles applicable
to the case are, however, well settled. It is well settled that
a commutation of a sentence is a substitution of a less for
a greater punishment. After commutation[,] the commuted
sentence is the only one in existence, and the only one to be
considered. After commutation, the sentence has the same
96                                       Thompson v. Fhuere

legal effect, and the status of the prisoner is the same, as
though the sentence had originally been for the commuted
term.”)). Thus, the issuance of a commutation significantly
affects the trajectory of a case and the cognizable challenges
to the originally imposed judicial sentence.
          Applying those general principles is complicated
because this case comes to us in an unusual posture. At the
time that the Governor commuted petitioner’s death sen-
tence to a sentence of life without the possibility of parole,
the following key events already had occurred: (1) SB 1013
had been enacted; (2) this court had issued its decisions in
Bartol and Rogers, vacating the defendants’ death sentences
and remanding their cases so that new sentences could be
imposed; (3) petitioner had sought post-conviction relief,
claiming that his death sentence and two of the penalty-
phase questions were unconstitutional; (4) the parties had
agreed that defendant’s unconstitutional death sentence had
to be vacated but disagreed as to how a new sentence would
be determined (i.e., whether the case should be remanded
for resentencing or whether the post-conviction court should
modify petitioner’s sentence to life without the possibility of
parole); and (5) petitioner had appealed the post-conviction
court’s judgment, challenging several of that court’s rulings.
Nonetheless, while the appeal was pending, the Governor
exercised her constitutional authority to commute petition-
er’s death sentence and to substitute, in its place, a sentence
of life without the possibility of parole. Thus, following the
commutation, petitioner’s sentence of life without the possi-
bility of parole has been imposed, not by judicial decree, but
as a function of the Governor’s constitutional authority.
          However, the commutation order expressly reserved
to petitioner the right to seek other or further relief from the
courts: “Nothing in this Commutation Order is intended to
preclude a Commutee from seeking other or further relief
from the courts that they may be entitled to.” Therefore, the
timing of the Governor’s commutation gives rise to the ques-
tion whether, as petitioner contends in his first assignment
of error, he would be entitled to a remand for resentencing
if we were to conclude on appeal that the post-conviction
court erred in imposing a modified sentence rather than
Cite as 372 Or 81 (2024)                                     97

remanding for a new sentence to be imposed. For the inter-
related reasons that follow, we conclude that, in light of the
commutation, petitioner is not entitled to such relief.
          In response to petitioner’s first claim for post-
conviction relief, in which he challenged his death sentence
as unconstitutional, the post-conviction court vacated the
death sentence and modified petitioner’s sentence to life
without the possibility of parole, rather than remanding for
resentencing. On appeal, petitioner contends that the post-
conviction court’s ruling was erroneous and that his case
should have been remanded for a resentencing, where, theo-
retically, a different and lesser sentence of life with the pos-
sibility of parole could be imposed. The problem with peti-
tioner’s theory is that, even if we were to assume that the
post-conviction court erred at the time that it made its rul-
ing and should have remanded for resentencing, petitioner
would not be entitled to that relief on appeal. That is so
because the Governor has since exercised her constitutional
authority to impose a sentence of life without the possibil-
ity of parole. As previously explained, the legal effect of the
commutation is that the sentence of life without the possi-
bility of parole stands as if it had been originally imposed.
Following the Governor’s exercise of her constitutional
clemency power, petitioner’s judicially imposed sentence is
deemed not to have existed, and a new sentence, derived
from a different source, became effective as if it were the
original sentence.
          It is plain that, if the Governor had commuted peti-
tioner’s sentence before he petitioned for post-conviction
relief, or even during the pendency of the post-conviction
proceeding, his challenge to the constitutionality of his
death sentence would not have been cognizable, because
there would have been no death sentence to challenge. The
post-conviction court would have had no death-sentence
claim to dispose of, and petitioner consequently would have
had no opportunity to assign error to any such disposition
on appeal. As it happened, the Governor’s commutation did
not occur until after petitioner had filed his appeal, but that
does not change the fact that we must now proceed as if peti-
tioner had received a sentence of life without the possibility
98                                       Thompson v. Fhuere

of parole from the beginning. If a post-conviction claim
challenging the constitutionality of a nonexistent death sen-
tence is not cognizable, it follows that no assignment of error
to the disposition of such a claim can be cognizable, either.
         Essentially, petitioner is asking us to resolve this
appeal as though the Governor had not stepped in and
commuted his sentence to life without the possibility of
parole and to ignore the legal effects of that exercise of con-
stitutional authority. We cannot do so. The validity of the
Governor’s action has not been challenged here—or, to our
knowledge, in any other proceeding. The parties agree that
petitioner is serving the Governor’s commuted sentence.
Thus, for present purposes, we must treat the commutation
as a valid exercise of the Governor’s constitutional authority
to impose a new sentence that stands as if it had been the
sentence originally imposed.
         To the extent that petitioner argues that, regard-
less of the commutation, he nonetheless remains entitled to
a resentencing because that is what SB 1013 required or
because he is entitled to the same remedy that the defen-
dants in Bartol and Rogers received, we disagree. “[T]he
legislature did not make SB 1013 retroactive as to [death]
sentences imposed before its effective date[.]” Bartol, 368
Or at 625. Instead, SB 1013 applied only to sentencings
that occurred thereafter. Rogers, 368 Or at 700. Thus, SB
1013 itself did not provide an entitlement to a resentencing.
Instead, that entitlement must be found elsewhere. As to
petitioner’s argument concerning Bartol and Rogers, the cir-
cumstances of this case are qualitatively different. In those
cases, the defendants were serving unconstitutional death
sentences, and, on direct appeal, we vacated those sentences
and remanded for resentencing so that a new sentence could
be imposed. Here, unlike the defendants in Bartol and
Rogers, petitioner is not serving a death sentence. Instead,
he is serving the commuted sentence of life without parole.
Petitioner’s argument that he is entitled to the same remedy
as the defendants in Bartol and Rogers ignores the fact that
the Governor commuted his sentence.
         In sum, in his first assignment of error on appeal,
petitioner contends that, having vacated his death sentence,
Cite as 372 Or 81 (2024)                                      99

the post-conviction court erred in declining to remand for
resentencing so that a new sentence could be imposed.
However, the Governor has since exercised her constitu-
tional authority to commute petitioner’s death sentence
and impose a new sentence of life without the possibility
of parole. The legal effect of the commutation is that the
commuted sentence is treated as though it had been origi-
nally imposed, and it has been substituted for the judicially
imposed death sentence that had been the focus of the post-
conviction court’s inquiry. Petitioner’s first assignment of
error is predicated on a sentence that does not exist and,
for all relevant purposes, is deemed never to have existed.
Accordingly, even if the post-conviction court erred at the
time that it granted relief from the death sentence, petition-
er’s first assignment of error does not present a basis for
reversing that court’s ruling.
          We emphasize that this resolution of petitioner’s
first assignment of error is a product of how petitioner
pleaded his first claim for post-conviction relief. Unlike his
other claims for relief, which essentially challenge the judi-
cial proceeding that led to his death sentence, petitioner’s
first claim for relief challenges the sentence itself. Petitioner
alleges that it violates the constitution for petitioner to be
“under a death sentence,” and, therefore, that his “death sen-
tence should be vacated.” As we have explained, the death
sentence that the first claim for relief purports to challenge
does not exist. Because of the commutation, any claim chal-
lenging the constitutionality of the death sentence per se
necessarily fails. That is not to say that the commutation in
this case precludes other claims for relief that challenge the
underlying judicial proceeding that ultimately resulted in
petitioner’s sentence. Petitioner’s later claims for relief are
of that nature. As we next explain, petitioner is not entitled
to relief as to those claims, but for reasons unrelated to the
commutation of petitioner’s sentence.
        Petitioner’s remaining assignments of error con-
cern the post-conviction court’s resolution of his claims that
the “continuing threat” and “deserves death” questions, pre-
sented to the jury in his original sentencing proceeding,
were unconstitutional. Unlike petitioner’s first claim for
100                                                    Thompson v. Fhuere

post-conviction relief, which challenged the constitutional-
ity of a death sentence that subsequently was commuted,
the gravamen of his other post-conviction claims is that the
jury’s consideration of unconstitutional questions in deter-
mining which sentence to impose (i.e., death, life without
parole, or life with the possibility of parole) amounted to
a prejudicial penalty-phase error that entitled him to a
remand for resentencing. We agree with the parties that, if
petitioner is correct that he suffered such a prejudicial error
and was entitled to a remand for resentencing, the express
terms of the Governor’s commutation order do not preclude
that result.7 That is so even though any sentencing proceed-
ing would now occur under the provisions of SB 1013 and, at
least in the abstract, could result in an even lesser sentence
of life with the possibility of parole. Accordingly, we turn
to the parties’ contentions concerning the penalty-phase
questions.
          At the outset, we reject the superintendent’s argu-
ment that we need not consider petitioner’s assignments of
error concerning those questions because, even if petitioner’s
claims concerning the constitutionality of the penalty-phase
questions had merit, he would not be entitled to a remand
for resentencing. Specifically, the superintendent argues
that, if petitioner
    “were correct that either of the trial jury’s ‘yes’ verdicts on
    the second and fourth questions must be converted into a
    ‘no’ because the question that was answered was ‘unconsti-
    tutional,’ that would provide a basis only to invalidate the
    death sentence; but it would not undermine the factual and
    legal basis for imposition of a true-life sentence instead.
        “In other words, once the death sentence is eliminated,
    the jurors’ determination of whether to impose either a
    true-life sentence or a sentence of life imprisonment with
    the possibility of parole depends, under ORS 163.150(2), on
    whether ‘10 or more members of the jury further find that
    there are sufficient mitigating circumstances to warrant
    life imprisonment.’ Because the trial jury unanimously

     7
       Because the Governor’s commutation order expressly permitted petitioner
to “seek[ ] other or further relief from the courts that [he] may be entitled to,” we
need not decide, and express no opinion about, the effects of a commutation that
lacks such wording.
Cite as 372 Or 81 (2024)                                                      101

    found that those mitigating circumstances did not warrant
    a sentence less than death, the jurors’ verdict necessarily
    included within it their determination that fewer than ten
    of them believed that * * * those mitigating circumstances
    warranted a sentence less than true life.”
(Emphases in original.)
         In short, the superintendent contends that, once
the death sentence was vacated, the only legally permissible
sentence was life without the possibility of parole, because
the jury’s answers to the penalty-phase questions demon-
strated that, as between a sentence of life without parole
and life with the possibility of parole, the jury would have
chosen the former. But that argument rests on an internal
contradiction. The superintendent’s position on appeal is
predicated on the assumption that the “continuing threat”
and “deserves death” questions are unconstitutional and, as
a result, the jury’s unanimous “yes” answers to those ques-
tions must be disregarded.8 But, if that is so, then one cannot
simultaneously rely on those same answers—as the super-
intendent does—to infer that, if the jury had been required
to choose between life with parole and “true life,” the jury
would have chosen the latter. Without those answers, no
other basis exists for assuming that the necessary number
of jurors would have declined to find sufficient mitigating
circumstances to impose a sentence of life with parole.9
Accordingly, we reject the superintendent’s threshold argu-
ment and turn to petitioner’s remaining assignments of
error concerning his claims that the “continuing threat” and
“deserves death” questions are unconstitutional.
         As we will explain, however, petitioner failed to pre-
serve his second assignment of error challenging the post-
conviction court’s ruling that those claims were procedurally
     8
       See ORS 163.150(1)(e) (providing now, as it did when defendant was con-
victed and sentenced, that the court shall instruct the jury that it may not
answer any of the death penalty questions “yes” unless “it agrees unanimously”).
     9
       See ORS 163.150(2)(a) (providing now, as it did when defendant was con-
victed and sentenced, that, if the jury answered any of the death-penalty ques-
tions in the negative, the trial court was required to sentence the defendant to
“life imprisonment without the possibility of release or parole,” unless “10 or more
members of the jury further find that there are sufficient mitigating circum-
stances to warrant life imprisonment,” in which case the trial court is required
to sentence the defendant to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole).
102                                                 Thompson v. Fhuere

barred. Because that failure obviates the need for us to con-
sider petitioner’s third and fourth assignments concerning
the merits of those claims (i.e., whether each question was
unconstitutional), we do not address them further and limit
our discussion to petitioner’s second assignment.
         In that assignment, petitioner contends that the
post-conviction court erred in ruling that his claims concern-
ing the “continuing threat” and “deserves death” questions
were “untimely” when the state had “conceded otherwise.”
Petitioner’s entire argument in support of that assignment
of error in his opening brief is as follows:
   “The [superintendent] could have but did not assert that
   [petitioner’s] petition was untimely. In fact, it expressly
   conceded timeliness. In any event, the issue was waived.
       “[‘The state] could have raised the Statute of Limitations
       as an affirmative defense in an answer or in a motion to
       dismiss. ORCP 19 B; ORCP 21 A(9). [The state] did nei-
       ther, and thereby waived that defense. ORCP 21 G(2).
       “[‘Allowing [the state] to raise the Statute of Limitations
       for the first time on appeal would deprive petitioner of
       any opportunity to present evidence that would show
       why the petition raises grounds for relief that could not
       reasonably have been raised in a timely fashion. ORS
       138.510(2). [The state] may not do so.[’]”
   “Palmer v. State [of Oregon], 121 Or App 377, 380, 854 P2d
   955 * * * (1993), aff’d [in part on other grounds], 318 Or 352,
   867 P2d 1368 (1994).”10
As we will explain, the fundamental problem for petitioner
is that he never raised those bases (i.e., concession and
waiver) in the post-conviction court, and they are therefore
unpreserved.
        “The general requirement that an issue, to be raised
and considered on appeal, ordinarily must first be pre-
sented to the trial court is well-settled in our jurisprudence.”
Peeples v. Lampert, 345 Or 209, 219, 191 P3d 637 (2008).
Among other things, “[p]reservation gives a trial court the
chance to consider and rule on a contention, thereby possibly
    10
       ORCP 21 A(9) is now set out at ORCP 21 A(1)(i), and ORS 138.510(2) is now
set out at ORS 138.510(3).
Cite as 372 Or 81 (2024)                                   103

avoiding an error altogether or correcting one already made,
which in turn may obviate the need for an appeal,” and it
“also ensures fairness to an opposing party, by permitting
the opposing party to respond to a contention and by other-
wise not taking the opposing party by surprise.” Id. Here, to
demonstrate that petitioner failed to preserve his appellate
contention that the post-conviction court erred in ruling that
his claims concerning the penalty-phase questions were pro-
cedurally barred, we describe the pleadings and proceedings
before the post-conviction court in some detail.
          In his successive petition for post-conviction relief,
petitioner conceded that the petition had been “filed more
than two years after finality,” but he contended that,
because it was “premised” on SB 1013, Bartol, and Rogers,
“the grounds for relief * * * could not reasonably have been
raised previously or in [his] previous [post-conviction] peti-
tion.” Put simply, petitioner alleged that his claims “were
not available previously” and were “timely, not improperly
successive, and meritorious pursuant to ORS 138.530(1)(c),”
which provides, in part, that post-conviction relief shall be
granted when a petitioner establishes the “unconstitution-
ality of [his] sentence.” The superintendent admitted, in his
answer, that petitioner’s death sentence could not be main-
tained and that “petitioner could not reasonably have raised
the claims based on SB 1013 and [Bartol] in his previous
petition for post-conviction relief and within the time limita-
tion set by ORS 138.510(3).” (Emphasis added.) However, the
superintendent “otherwise denie[d]” petitioner’s allegation
that “the grounds for relief * * * could not reasonably have
been raised previously or in [his] previous [post-conviction]
petition.” In other words, as the superintendent explained,
he “agreed that petitioner ‘could not reasonably have raised’
in his previous petition the claims that he alleged in this
petition but only to the extent that those actually are ‘based
on SB 1013 and * * * Bartol.’ ” (Emphasis in original.)
         In moving for summary judgment on the claims
concerning the penalty-phase questions, petitioner clari-
fied that, although his arguments drew “support from the
legislative changes brought about by SB 1013,” his claims
were “founded on the contention that both questions were
104                                      Thompson v. Fhuere

unconstitutional at the time of [petitioner’s] trial—before
SB 1013 became law.” (Emphasis added.) Petitioner sub-
sequently filed a memorandum in support of his motion,
explaining why, in his view, those penalty-phase questions
were unconstitutional.
         In his cross-motion, the superintendent asserted
that—“[a]s explained in [his] supporting memorandum,”
which also served as his response to petitioner’s summary
judgment motion—petitioner’s claims concerning the two
penalty-phase questions did not provide “any legal basis
for [the] court to grant petitioner post-conviction relief.”
Specifically, in the supporting memorandum, the superin-
tendent argued, among other things, that those two claims
were procedurally barred under ORS 138.510(3) and ORS
138.550(3), and, in all events, lacked legal merit. Petitioner
did not file a response to the superintendent’s cross-motion
or seek to file a reply to the superintendent’s response to
his summary judgment motion, explaining why, in his view,
the superintendent had conceded timeliness (or otherwise
waived that issue).
          At the summary judgment hearing, the parties’
arguments focused on whether the post-conviction court
had authority to modify petitioner’s sentence or whether a
remand for resentencing was required. At the conclusion of
the hearing, the post-conviction court ruled that the “con-
tinuing threat” and “deserves death” questions were “both
time-barred and procedurally barred,” noting that those
questions had been “on numerous occasions challenged at
the Oregon Supreme Court and upheld as appropriate,”
and that petitioner had had “direct appeal, post-conviction
relief, and other options to challenge that.” Again, petitioner
did not alert the post-conviction court that, in his view,
the superintendent had conceded timeliness (or otherwise
waived that issue).
         Following the hearing, the superintendent, as
directed, prepared an order and judgment for the post-
conviction court’s signature; however, the parties disagreed
about the court’s ruling as to the claims concerning the
penalty-phase questions. In a letter to the court, the super-
intendent explained, “Petitioner’s counsel has informed me
Cite as 372 Or 81 (2024)                                  105

that he believes [the court] ruled that [those claims] have
no merit. My recollection of the ruling is that those claims
are procedurally barred. Because of counsels’ disagreement
as to your ruling, I have prepared two different orders.”
Even at that point, petitioner did not seek to alert the post-
conviction court to the contentions that he now raises on
appeal.
        Ultimately, the post-conviction court issued an order
providing that the superintendent was entitled to summary
judgment on petitioner’s second and third claims for relief,
explaining, as it had at the conclusion of the hearing, that
those claims were “procedurally barred by ORS 138.510(3)
and ORS 138.550(3).” See ORS 138.510(3) (generally pre-
cluding untimely petitions); ORS 138.550(3) (generally pre-
cluding improperly successive petitions).
         In sum, petitioner’s successive petition included an
allegation that his claims could not reasonably have been
raised earlier. Thereafter, the superintendent disputed that
assertion, yet petitioner did nothing to alert the post-
conviction court to his view that the superintendent none-
theless had somehow “waived” or “conceded” that issue, as
petitioner now asserts. On review, in contending that the
post-conviction court erred, petitioner relies on the superin-
tendent’s concession that petitioner’s claims were timely to
the extent that they were based on SB 1013 and Bartol, and
on his related assertion that the claims could not “be subject
to any procedural bar” because SB 1013’s elimination of the
“continuing threat” question and its imposition of a “beyond
a reasonable doubt” standard on the “deserves death” ques-
tion demonstrate that both questions are unconstitutional
as measured by evolving standards of decency and events
that occurred after petitioner’s trial, direct appeal, and
prior post-conviction proceeding. (Emphasis added.) But
that argument disregards the fact that the superintendent
expressly argued to the post-conviction court that petition-
er’s claims could have been raised even before SB 1013 and
Bartol, and that the procedural bars therefore applied. In
light of those arguments, it was incumbent on petitioner
to inform the post-conviction court of his position that the
106                                       Thompson v. Fhuere

superintendent had conceded timeliness or, in all events,
had waived the issue. He did not do so.
          Accordingly, petitioner did not preserve his chal-
lenge to the post-conviction court’s ruling that his claims
for relief concerning the penalty-phase questions were pro-
cedurally barred under ORS 138.510(3) and ORS 138.550(3).
                     III.   CONCLUSION
         After the post-conviction court entered its judgment
resolving petitioner’s first claim for post-conviction relief by
vacating his death sentence and modifying the sentence to
life without the possibility of parole instead of remanding
for resentencing, the Governor stepped in and commuted
petitioner’s death sentence to a sentence of life without the
possibility of parole. As we have explained, even if the post-
conviction court erred at the time that it made its ruling,
petitioner is not entitled to the relief that he requests on
appeal (i.e., a reversal of the post-conviction court’s judg-
ment and a remand for resentencing). That is so because the
Governor’s commuted sentence became the operative sen-
tence, as though it had been the sentence originally imposed,
and, as a result, petitioner is not entitled to relief concerning
the judicially imposed sentence that had been the focus of
the post-conviction court’s inquiry. In addition, petitioner
failed to preserve his challenge to the post-conviction court’s
ruling that his claims concerning two of the penalty-phase
questions were procedurally barred. Accordingly, we affirm.
         The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.