Court Opinion

ID: 9905557
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-29 18:03:11.873974+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:43.251394
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                                  NOV 29 2023
                          NOT FOR PUBLICATION
                                                                              SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK
                                                                                U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL
                                                                                OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
          UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL
                    OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

 In re:                                             BAP No. OR-23-1085-CFB
 RITA KATHERINE LUETKENHAUS,
              Debtor.                               Bk. No. 3:22-bk-31915-DWH

 RITA KATHERINE LUETKENHAUS,
              Appellant,
 v.                                                 MEMORANDUM*
 CAREY SMITH; RICHARD
 LUETKENHAUS,
              Appellees.

               Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court
                          for the District of Oregon
               David W. Hercher, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding

Before: CORBIT, FARIS, and BRAND, Bankruptcy Judges.

                                 INTRODUCTION

      Chapter 13 1 debtor, Rita Katherine Luetkenhaus (“Rita 2”) appeals the

      *
        This disposition is not appropriate for publication. Although it may be cited for
whatever persuasive value it may have, see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, it has no precedential
value, see 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8024-1.
      1
         Unless specified otherwise, all chapter and section references are to the
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532, all “Rule” references are to the Federal Rules
of Bankruptcy Procedure, and all references to “ORS” are to the Oregon Revised
Statutes.
       2 For ease of reading and clarity we refer to the parties by their first name, no
bankruptcy court’s order overruling her objections to the proof of claim

filed by her first ex-husband Carey Smith (“Carey”) and the proof of claim

filed by her second ex-husband Richard Luetkenhaus (“Richard”). Because

we find no error, we AFFIRM.

                                      FACTS

A.    History

      1.     Rita’s first marriage and divorce

      Rita and Carey were married in 1993 and had two children together.

In 2008, Rita and Carey divorced 3 (“Rita and Carey Dissolution and Child

Custody Action”). Initially, Rita was awarded primary custody.

      In May 2011, Carey filed a motion in the Rita and Carey Dissolution

and Child Custody Action for an order to show cause why custody should

not be changed to him. In December 2011, after an evidentiary hearing,

Carey was awarded primary custody of the children and, in a

supplemental judgment, Carey was awarded $15,000 in attorneys’ fees and

costs as the prevailing party pursuant to ORS 20.075 and ORS 107.135

(“State Court Judgment”). The State Court Judgment would “bear simple

interest at the rate of 9 percent (9%) per annum until paid in full.”

      Rita appealed both the custody order and the attorneys’ fees

judgment. In August 2015, the Oregon Court of Appeals “affirmed without

opinion” the change in custody and the attorneys’ fees awarded in the Rita

disrespect is intended.
       3 Smith v. Smith, No. C06-2236-DRC, Circuit Court, Washington County, Oregon.

                                         2
and Carey Dissolution and Child Custody Action. The Oregon Court of

Appeals also awarded Carey $8,327.75 in attorneys’ fees and costs as the

prevailing party in the appeal (“State Appellate Judgment”).

      2.     Rita’s second marriage and divorce

      Rita married Richard in August 2008. Rita and Richard had one child

together. In 2011, Richard petitioned for divorce. The divorce was finalized

in May 2014 (“Rita and Richard Dissolution and Child Custody Action”).4

Richard sought $84,000 in attorneys’ fees and costs and was awarded

$60,000 (“Richard’s State Court Judgment”). The judgment stated that it

would bear simple interest at the rate of 9 percent per annum.

B.    Rita’s bankruptcies

      1.     Rita’s 2012 bankruptcy

      On October 24, 2012, while the Rita and Richard Dissolution and

Child Custody Action was still pending, Rita filed a chapter 13 bankruptcy

petition, case no. 12-38042 (“2012 Bankruptcy”). Rita did not identify Carey

as a creditor nor the State Court Judgment as a claim on any of her

schedules. Rita’s chapter 13 plan did not propose to pay any amount

toward the State Court Judgment.5

      4
         Luetkenhaus v. Luetkenhaus, C11-2468-DRC, Circuit Court, Washington County,
Oregon.
       5 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b), we exercise our discretion to take

judicial notice of materials electronically filed in the underlying cases. See Atwood v.
Chase Manhattan Mortg. Co. (In re Atwood), 293 B.R. 227, 233 n.9 (9th Cir. BAP 2003).
                                            3
     Carey filed a proof of claim in the amount of $15,629.35 (State Court

Judgment plus interest) for “Domestic Relations Orders.” In section 5 of the

proof of claim, Carey indicated that $629.35 was a domestic support

obligation (“DSO”) entitled to priority pursuant to § 507(a)(1)(A).

     Rita objected to the proof of claim, stating that she was appealing the

$15,000 judgment and the $629.35 was for medical bills, not a DSO. The

bankruptcy court granted Rita’s objection in part by entering an order

allowing Carey’s proof of claim in the amount of $15,000 as a nonpriority,

unsecured claim. There was no explanation or rationale included in the

bankruptcy court’s order. Because no part of Carey’s proof of claim was

entitled to priority, Rita was not obligated to provide for payments of the

claim in her chapter 13 plan. The bankruptcy court confirmed Rita’s

chapter 13 plan on January 4, 2013.

     In September 2014, Rita sought to dismiss her chapter 13 case because

she was not making the plan payments as required, and she alleged that

her financial circumstances were such that she was “unable to propose a

feasible modified plan.” The bankruptcy court granted the dismissal

motion on September 8, 2014. At the time Rita’s 2012 Bankruptcy was

dismissed, it had been pending for 25 months, and the total amount Rita

had paid through the plan was $2,819.66 ($943 in attorneys’ fees and costs

and $1,876.49 to the Oregon Department of Revenue).

                                      4
      2.     Rita’s 2014 bankruptcy

      Rita filed another chapter 13 petition on September 17, 2014, case no.

14-35273 (“2014 Bankruptcy”). By this time, both divorces were final, and

Carey and Richard had each recovered money judgments against Rita.

      Richard and Carey each filed a proof of claim for their respective

attorneys’ fees awards. Richard filed a proof of claim in in the amount of

$60,192.27 for “Attorney Fees Awarded in a Dissolution” and claimed it as

a DSO entitled to priority under § 507(a). The supporting documents

demonstrated the claim arose from Richard’s State Court Judgment plus

interest. Carey filed a proof of claim for a DSO in the amount of $73,589.00 6

for “fees and costs from family court litigation.”

      Both Richard and Carey also filed objections to confirmation of Rita’s

plan. Rita’s chapter 13 plan was not confirmed, and her case was

dismissed.

      3.     Rita’s 2016 bankruptcy

      On February 10, 2016, Rita filed another chapter 13 bankruptcy

petition, case no. 16-30474 (“2016 Bankruptcy”). Rita also filed a proposed

chapter 13 plan on the same day.

      Again, Richard and Carey each filed a proof of claim. Richard filed a

proof of claim in the amount of $61,183.25 for a “judgment for attorney fees

awarded in dissolution of marriage involving a child.” The supporting

      6
       The amount of Mr. Smith’s proof of claim included additional anticipated
awards of attorneys’ fees.
                                          5
documents demonstrated the claim arose from Richard’s State Court

Judgment plus interest. Richard alleged that the entire amount was a DSO

entitled to priority pursuant to § 507(a)(1).

      Carey filed a proof of claim in the amount of $28,163.50 for “DSO

attorney fees awarded in state court concerning child welfare.” The

supporting documents indicated that the claim was comprised of the State

Court Judgment plus interest and the State Appellate Judgment plus

interest.

      Rita objected to both claims, arguing that neither claim was a DSO

and, therefore, neither claim was entitled to priority. On August 23, 2016,

after an evidentiary hearing, the bankruptcy court entered a letter ruling on

Rita’s objection to Richard’s proof of claim. The bankruptcy court allowed

Richard’s proof of claim as a DSO in the reduced amount of $48,946.60 (the

bankruptcy court determined that 80% of the $61,183.25 was related to

custody matters).

      Because 80 percent of Richard’s claim was allowed as a DSO entitled

to priority, the bankruptcy court determined that Rita was obligated to pay

that portion of the claim in full through the plan pursuant to § 1322(a)(2).

Rita’s proposed plan, however, treated both Richard’s and Carey’s claims

as general unsecured claims and did not provide for payment on either

claim. Accordingly, the bankruptcy court entered an order denying

confirmation of the plan and gave Rita the option of amending her plan to

provide payment of Richard’s proof of claim or converting to a chapter 7.

                                       6
      On December 12, 2016, after another evidentiary hearing, the

bankruptcy court entered a letter ruling on Rita’s objection to Carey’s proof

of claim. The bankruptcy court determined that Carey was precluded from

asserting that the State Court Judgment was a DSO, because he had not

appealed the bankruptcy court’s determination in the 2012 Bankruptcy that

the State Court Judgment was a general unsecured claim, not a DSO.

However, the bankruptcy court determined that the part of Carey’s proof

of claim related to the State Appellate Judgment was not, and could not

have been, included in the 2012 Bankruptcy proof of claim. After

considering the evidence, the bankruptcy court determined the portion of

Carey’s proof of claim related to the State Appellate Judgment would be

allowed as a DSO, entitled to priority and full payment under the plan.

      In the letter ruling, the bankruptcy court explained that it would give

Rita additional opportunity to propose an amended plan that provided for

payment of the DSO portions of Carey’s and Richard’s claims and that it

would “not enter any orders on the claim objections or plan confirmation

until that time has run.” The letter ruling further advised the parties that

“[i]f no request for hearing is filed, claimants should submit orders on the

claim objections consistent with this ruling.” However, no party ever

requested that the bankruptcy court enter an order consistent with its letter

rulings on the claim objections.

      Rita did not file an amended plan. Rather, she filed a motion to

convert her chapter 13 case to a chapter 7 case. On January 5, 2017, the

                                       7
bankruptcy court granted Rita’s motion to convert. In Rita’s post-

conversion schedules, she listed both Richard and Carey as holding claims

entitled to DSO priority. On April 12, 2017, Rita was granted a discharge.

      4.    Rita’s 2022 bankruptcy

      On November 22, 2022, Rita filed her most recent chapter 13 petition,

case no. 22-31915 (“2022 Bankruptcy”).

      Richard and Carey each filed a proof of claim. Richard filed a proof of

claim in the amount of $88,085.99 for the “judgment for attorney fees”

awarded in the Rita and Richard Dissolution and Child Custody Action.

The proof of claim indicated that 80 percent of the amount ($70,468.79) was

a DSO entitled to priority.

      Carey filed a proof of claim in the amount of $38,575.85 for a “state

court judgment money award.” Carey asserted that the entire amount of

the claim was entitled to priority as a DSO. The supporting documents

demonstrated that Carey’s proof of claim was comprised of the State Court

Judgment totaling $28,601.20 ($15,000 plus $13,601.20 in accrued interest)

and the State Appellate Judgment in the amount of $9,974.65 ($8,686.50

award plus $1,288.15 in accrued interest).

      Rita objected to both claims. In her objection to Carey’s proof of

claim, Rita disagreed with the characterization and amount of the claim.

Rita asserted that Carey had incorrectly calculated the accrued interest. Rita

                                      8
asserted that Carey’s claim should be allowed as a priority claim for

$4,415.89 and as a nonpriority, unsecured claim for $34,147.60. 7

      Rita also objected to the characterization and amount of Richard’s

proof of claim. Rita did not dispute that 80 percent of Richard’s proof of

claim should be entitled to priority. Rather, Rita disputed the calculation of

interest and asserted that Richard had failed to credit several of her

garnished-wage payments. According to Rita’s calculations, Richard

should be allowed a priority claim for $31,829.41 and a nonpriority,

unsecured claim for $7,957.35.

      Rita later filed amended objections to both claims. In her supporting

memoranda, Rita argued that the full amount of both Carey’s and

Richard’s claims had been discharged in her 2016 Bankruptcy, because the

creditors had “not file[d] an adversary proceeding” and there was “no legal

determination that the debt was nondischargeable.”

      Rita’s proposed plan for the 2022 Bankruptcy treated both Richard’s

and Carey’s claims as general unsecured claims and did not provide for

payment on either claim. Both Richard and Carey filed objections to the

confirmation of the proposed chapter 13 plan.

      7  Although Rita argued that Carey calculated the accrued interest incorrectly, her
alleged total amount of the claim was only $12.36 less than the proof of claim filed by
Carey ($38,563.49 is Rita’s asserted total amount of the claim and the total amount of the
claim filed by Carey was $38,575.85).
                                            9
C.    Bankruptcy court’s memorandum decision

      On April 28, 2023, after an evidentiary hearing, the bankruptcy court

entered a memorandum decision overruling Rita’s objections to each proof

of claim (“Decision”).

      The bankruptcy court began by acknowledging that the allowance or

disallowance of each proof of claim was a separate issue, but because there

was significant overlap in issues of fact and law, the bankruptcy court

would rule on both claims in the same decision. In the Decision, the

bankruptcy court determined: (1) what amount, if any, of the debt

represented in each proof of claim was discharged in Rita’s previous

bankruptcies; (2) what amount, if any, of the debt represented in each proof

of claim was a § 523(a)(5) DSO debt entitled to priority; and (3) the correct

amount of each proof of claim.

      1.    Effect of prior bankruptcies

           a.     2012 Bankruptcy

      The bankruptcy court determined that Carey was precluded from

asserting that the portion of his proof of claim relating to the State Court

Judgment was a DSO entitled to priority, because the issue had been

previously presented and ruled on by the bankruptcy court in Rita’s 2012

Bankruptcy.

      The 2012 bankruptcy court did not make any rulings as to Richard,

because Richard’s State Court Judgment (creating the debt identified in his

later filed proof of claim) was not awarded until 2014. Therefore, the
                                      10
bankruptcy court found that the 2012 Bankruptcy had no effect on

Richard’s proof of claim filed in the 2022 Bankruptcy.

           b.     2016 Bankruptcy

      The bankruptcy court determined that the letter rulings in the 2016

Bankruptcy did not constitute an order and, therefore, had no preclusive

effect in the current bankruptcy as to the amount or characterization of

either proof of claim.

      The bankruptcy court also determined that because Carey’s and

Richard’s claims were of the type described in § 523(a) (but not § 523(a)(2),

(4), or (6)), the claims were “not discharged in the 2016 case, even though

no adversary proceeding ha[d] yet determined their dischargeability.”

      2.    DSO determinations

            a.     Carey’s proof of claim

      The bankruptcy court examined and summarized the evidence

supporting Carey’s proof of claim (copies of the judgments and the order

allowing attorneys’ fees and costs and disbursements). The bankruptcy

court then analyzed current case law relating to § 523(a)(5) (DSO) and

§ 523(a)(15) (other debts incurred in the course of a divorce).

      Based on its review, the bankruptcy court summarized its

understanding of current case law, stating that “attorney fees from

litigation over support of a child are in the nature of child support

whenever they were incurred in a proceeding to determine the child’s best

interest.” The bankruptcy court also found that financial need was not

                                      11
determinative when characterizing the nature of an attorneys’ fees award.

Rather, “in child-custody proceedings, all fees incurred by any participant

are child support, regardless of which party has custody and regardless of

which ex-spouse is in greater need of support.”

      The bankruptcy court determined that from the evidence presented,

the State Appellate Judgment would be allowed as a DSO. The bankruptcy

court explained that because Rita’s appeal was from a judgment changing

child custody, the appeal was effectively an extension of a child-custody

proceeding begun in the Rita and Carey Dissolution and Child Custody

Action, “making the court of appeals’ attorney-fee award against Rita a

debt to Smith for child support nondischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(5)

and entitled to priority pursuant to § 507(a).”

            b.    Richard’s proof of claim

      The bankruptcy court found that neither of Rita’s objections to

Richard’s proof of claim challenged his entitlement to priority of 80 percent

of his claim. Therefore, 80 percent of Richard’s proof of claim would be

allowed as a DSO entitled to priority pursuant to § 507(a).

      3.    Bankruptcy court’s calculation of each proof of claim

      Because Rita objected to the amount of each proof of claim, the

bankruptcy court was tasked with determining the correct amount for each

claim. The bankruptcy court rejected Rita’s argument that simple interest

required that all her payments be first applied to the principal rather than

accrued interest. The bankruptcy court found that Rita provided no legal

                                      12
support for her proposition. Furthermore, the bankruptcy court found that

Rita’s proposed method of calculation was contrary to the “United States

[R]ule,” which directed partial payments to apply first to the interest due,

and if the payment exceeded the interest, then the surplus would be

applied toward principal, as explained in First Nat. Bank of Portland v.

Courtright, 161 P. 966, 967-68 (1916), and Ainslie v. Spolyar, 926 P.2d 822, 828

(Or. App. 1996).

      As to the amount of each proof of claim, the bankruptcy court

summarized the calculations and evidence supporting each party’s

position as argued in their briefing and through their testimony at the

evidentiary hearing.

      a.    Carey’s proof of claim

      The bankruptcy court found that based on the evidence, Rita was not

challenging the amount of Carey’s proof of claim related to the State Court

Judgment, which was $28,601.20 ($15,000 plus accrued interest of 9% per

annum). Therefore, the bankruptcy court determined that $28,601.20 was

accurate and allowed as to the amount owing on the State Court Judgment.

      As to the remaining part of Carey’s proof of claim, that which related

to the State Appellate Judgment, the bankruptcy court found Carey’s

testimony and evidence more credible, stating, “I credit his testimony and

not hers,” with the exception of $1.00 that Carey had failed to credit. The

bankruptcy court determined that if Carey had credited the $1.00, then

$0.45 of interest would not have accrued. Based on its review of the record

                                       13
and its own calculations, the bankruptcy court determined that the DSO

part of Carey’s proof of claim would be “reduced from $9,974.65 by $1.45 to

$9,973.20.”

      Based on the foregoing, the bankruptcy court allowed Carey’s proof

of claim as “(1) claim with 507(a)(1) priority for $9,973.20, which is the

petition-date balance” under his State Appellate Judgment, and “(2) as a

nonpriority, unsecured claim for $28,601.20, which is the petition-date

balance” under his State Court Judgment.

           b.       Richard’s proof of claim

      Both Rita and Richard provided the bankruptcy court with

spreadsheets explaining their calculations. After reviewing the

spreadsheets and supporting documentation and taking testimony, the

bankruptcy court conducted its own calculations and determined that at

the petition date, the balance due under Richard’s State Court Judgment

was $83,264.55. 8 Based on its previous determination that 80 percent of

Richard’s claim would be allowed as a priority claim, the bankruptcy court

allowed Richard’s proof of claim in the total amount of $83,264.55, with

$66,611.64 allowed as a DSO entitled to priority and the remaining

$16,652.91 allowed as a general unsecured claim.

      Rita timely appealed.

      8
       The bankruptcy court created a spreadsheet detailing its calculations and
included it as an attachment to the Decision.
                                          14
                               JURISDICTION

      The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and

157(b)(2)(A) and (B). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158.

                                    ISSUES

      Did the bankruptcy court err in determining that part of each proof of

claim was a DSO?

      Did the bankruptcy court err in its calculations as to the amount of

each proof of claim?

      Did the bankruptcy court err when it determined that the debts were

not discharged in the 2016 Bankruptcy?

                         STANDARDS OF REVIEW

      In the context of claim objections, we review the bankruptcy court’s

legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error. See Pierce

v. Carson (In re Rader), 488 B.R. 406, 409 (9th Cir. BAP 2013) (“An order

overruling a claim objection can raise legal issues (such as the proper

construction of statutes and rules) which we review de novo, as well as

factual issues[,] . . . which we review for clear error.”) (citation omitted);

Seixas v. Booth (In re Seixas), 239 B.R. 398, 401 (9th Cir. BAP 1999) (“We

review the bankruptcy court’s factual determination that a debt was for

alimony, maintenance, or support for clear error.”).

      A factual finding is clearly erroneous if it is illogical, implausible, or

without support in the record. United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1261–

62 & n.21 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). “Where there are two permissible views

                                       15
of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly

erroneous.” Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985).

      We review the bankruptcy court’s legal conclusions, including its

interpretation of provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and state law, de novo.

Roberts v. Erhard (In re Roberts), 331 B.R. 876, 880 (9th Cir. BAP 2005), aff'd,

241 F.App’x 420 (9th Cir. 2007). De novo review requires that we consider a

matter anew, as if no decision has been rendered previously. United States

v. Silverman, 861 F.2d 571, 576 (9th Cir. 1988).

                                 DISCUSSION

A.    The bankruptcy court did not commit clear error in determining
      that a portion of each proof of claim was a DSO.

      On appeal, Rita argues that the bankruptcy court erred in

determining that part of each of Carey’s and Richard’s proof of claim was a

DSO entitled to priority pursuant to § 507(a)(1). Rita argues the bankruptcy

court did not have sufficient evidence to find that any part of either proof

of claim was “in the nature of support.” Rita asserts that the only evidence

the bankruptcy court relied upon was the 2016 bankruptcy court letter

rulings. We disagree.

      1.    The bankruptcy court did not err in determining that
            80 percent of Richard’s proof of claim was a DSO entitled to
            priority.

      Prior to this appeal Rita disputed the total amount of Richard’s claim

but she did not dispute that 80 percent of the total claim was a DSO

entitled to priority. Yet, Rita now argues for the first time that there was
                                        16
insufficient evidence for the bankruptcy court to make that determination.

      Generally, an issue will be “deemed waived on appeal if the

argument was not raised sufficiently for the trial court to rule on it.”

Mercury Interactive Corp. Sec. Litig. v. Mercury Interactive Corp. (In re Mercury

Interactive Corp. Sec. Litig.), 618 F.3d 988, 992 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). Because Rita did not argue to the

bankruptcy court that there was insufficient evidence to determine that 80

percent of Richard’s claim was a DSO entitled to priority, we are not

required to address the issue on appeal. As such, we will not review or

disturb the bankruptcy court’s determination that 80 percent of Richard’s

claim was a DSO entitled to priority.

      2.    Carey’s State Appellate Judgment was entitled to priority.

      As to Carey’s proof of claim, contrary to Rita’s argument, the

bankruptcy court did not rely on the 2016 bankruptcy court letter rulings

when deciding what part, if any, of the claim was entitled to priority.

Indeed, the bankruptcy court specifically determined that the 2016 letter

rulings were not orders, were “not preclusive either as to priority or

amount,” would not be considered evidence, and were not part of the

bankruptcy court’s Decision.

      Rather, the bankruptcy court relied upon the testimony and

documents (including copies of the judgments) provided by the parties in

their briefing and at the evidentiary hearing. The bankruptcy court also

looked to Oregon state law regarding a state court’s discretion to award
                                        17
attorneys’ fees as part of child custody hearings and federal bankruptcy

law interpreting and applying § 523(a)(5) and (a)(15).

      Section 523(a)(5) excepts from discharge any child or spousal support

payment resulting from a separation or divorce agreement.9 Cases in the

Ninth Circuit and in other circuits generally hold that attorneys’ fees

awarded in connection with a dissolution proceeding are nondischargeable

in bankruptcy under § 523(a)(5) as alimony, maintenance, or support.

Gionis v. Wayne (In re Gionis), 170 B.R. 675, 682–84 (9th Cir. BAP 1994), aff’d,

92 F.3d 1192 (9th Cir. 1996).

      Similarly, “the vast majority of reported decisions dealing with an

award of attorneys’ fees in a child custody proceeding have concluded that

the fees were in the nature of the child’s support within the meaning of

§ 523(a)(5).” Rehkow v. Lewis (In re Rehkow), BAP No. AZ-05-1395-AMoS,

2006 WL 6811011, *3 (9th Cir. BAP Aug. 17, 2006) (collecting cases), aff'd,

239 F. App’x 341 (9th Cir. 2007). Courts have reached this conclusion

because “determination of child custody is essential to the child’s proper

‘support,’ [and] attorney fees incurred and awarded in child custody

litigation should likewise be considered as obligations for ‘support,’ at least

in the absence of clear indication of special circumstances to the contrary.”

Id. at *4. “The legal question is not whether repayment of the debt will

      9
        Congress has defined a domestic support obligation as a debt “in the nature of
alimony, maintenance, or support[,] . . . without regard to whether such debt is
expressly so designated.” § 101(14B).
                                          18
benefit the children, but whether the basis of the debt benefitted the

children.” Leibowitz v. Cnty. of Orange (In re Leibowitz), 217 F.3d 799, 803 (9th

Cir. 2000).

       In this case, Carey’s State Court Judgment indicated that Carey was

awarded attorneys’ fees and costs as the prevailing party in the Rita and

Carey Dissolution and Child Custody Action pursuant to ORS 20.075 and

ORS 107.135. 10

       The appellate order affirming the State Court Judgment explained the

money award and described the appealed judgment as “changing custody

of the parties’ children from mother to father.” The Oregon Court of

Appeals subsequently entered the State Appellate Judgment which

awarded Carey attorneys’ fees and costs as the prevailing party in the

appeal.

       The bankruptcy court did not clearly err in determining that the

appeal was a continuation of the child custody proceedings that started in

the Rita and Carey Dissolution and Child Custody Action. There was

sufficient evidence for the bankruptcy court to find that the attorneys’ fee

debt was incurred while litigating child custody proceedings in which

       10In Oregon, ORS 107.135(1)(a) allows a party to move to modify support,
custody, and parenting time based on a substantial change in circumstances if it would
be in the child’s best interests. See In re Travis, 237 P.3d 868, 870 (2010) (applying factors
from ORS 107.137(1)). And, when a party seeks to modify the custody arrangement, the
court has discretion to award “a reasonable attorney fee and costs for the benefit of the
other party” pursuant to ORS 107.135(8). Dickson v. Abrams (In re Abrams), No. 20-61372-
TMR13, 2021 WL 4483102, at *4 (Bankr. D. Or. Sept. 30, 2021).
                                              19
issues involving the best interests of the child were in dispute, and

therefore, the proceedings were in the nature of support and thus, non-

dischargeable in bankruptcy. In re Rehkow, 2006 WL 6811011, at *4 (“We . . .

hold that attorneys’ fees incurred in child custody proceedings in which

issues involving the best interests of the child are in dispute are in the

nature of support and, thus, non-dischargeable in bankruptcy.”); see also

Beaupied v. Chang (In re Chang), 163 F.3d 1138, 1141 (9th Cir. 1998)

(explaining the nature of the debt was determinative and holding guardian

ad litem fees were DSOs pursuant to § 523(a)(5) because the fees were

incurred for the child’s benefit and were in the nature of support for that

child).

      The bankruptcy court did not commit clear error in determining that

the portion of Carey’s proof of claim relating to the State Appellate

Judgment, including accrued interest, was a DSO.

B.    The bankruptcy court did not commit clear error in determining
      that the claims were not discharged in Rita’s 2016 Bankruptcy.

      On appeal, Rita also argues that the bankruptcy court erred in

allowing Richard’s and Carey’s claims because both claims were

discharged in her 2016 Bankruptcy. According to Rita, there was no

adversary proceeding as to the nondischargeability of the debts identified

in either Richard’s or Carey’s proof of claim. Therefore, she concludes that,

“with the absence of such a proceeding, the logical conclusion is that the

debts were discharged” in the 2016 Bankruptcy. Rita points to no law

                                       20
supporting her argument.

      Generally, § 523(a), the statute pertaining to debts excepted from

discharge, states that a discharge under chapter 7 and chapter 13 does not

discharge a debtor from debts of the kind described in nineteen

subsections. These include § 523(a)(5), which covers debts for domestic

support obligations, and § 523(a)(15), which applies to any debt to a spouse

or former spouse incurred by the debtor in the course of a divorce.

      Section 523(c) provides that debts of the kind described in

subsections (2), (4), or (6) of § 523(a) are discharged unless a creditor brings

a timely adversary action and the court determines such debt to be

excepted from discharge. There is no comparable requirement for any

other subsection.

      Contrary to Rita’s assertions, the dischargeability of § 523(a)(5) and

(a)(15) debts is solely dependent upon the nature of the debt, not upon

whether the creditor files an adversary action. Rita’s argument attempts to

add § 523(a)(5) and (a)(15) to § 523(c). The statute does not support this

argument. Adam v. Dobin (In re Adam), BAP No. CC-14-1416-PaKiTa, 2015

WL 1530086, at *6 (9th Cir. BAP Apr. 6, 2015) (“After [BAPCPA], debts

falling under section § 523(a)(15) are no longer included in the category of

debts that are discharged automatically if a party does not request a

determination from the bankruptcy court.”), aff'd, 677 F. App’x 353

(9th Cir. 2017).

      Therefore, there is no merit to Rita’s allegation that a debt described

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in § 523(a)(5) and/or (a)(15) is somehow discharged, even temporarily or

conditionally, until the debt is determined to be nondischargeable in an

adversary proceeding. The bankruptcy court did not err in finding that

Richard’s and Carey’s claims were not discharged in Rita’s 2016

Bankruptcy.

C.    The bankruptcy court did not commit clear error in determining the
      amount of each claim.

      On appeal, Rita argues that the bankruptcy court erred in its

calculations as to the amounts of the claims. Rita simply repeats the same

arguments and presents the same evidence that she presented to the

bankruptcy court at the evidentiary hearing.

      Contrary to Rita’s assertions, the bankruptcy court carefully

considered all of the evidence and testimony when determining that both

Carey and Richard were more credible than Rita as to when payments

were made and the amounts of such payments. Accordingly, the

bankruptcy court’s findings are entitled to great deference. See Wolfe v.

Jacobson (In re Jacobson), 676 F.3d 1193, 1201 (9th Cir. 2012) (“When factual

findings are based on determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses,

we give great deference to those findings.”) (alterations omitted).

      Although Rita does not agree with the bankruptcy court’s findings,

she fails to identify specific factual findings that constitute error. Based on

the record provided, we cannot find the bankruptcy court’s factual findings

were illogical or without support. Therefore, the bankruptcy court did not

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commit clear error in calculating the amounts of the claims including the

calculation of interest.

                             CONCLUSION

      Based on the foregoing, we AFFIRM.

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