Court Opinion

ID: 9706737
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:50:47.218766+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:24.697776
License: Public Domain

Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE GEORGE J. MORAN dissenting: The will in question reads as follows: “ROGER C. YOUNG Real Estate Broker 222 North Broadway Salem, Illinois March 16, 1946 I, Roger C. Young being of sound mind make this my last will and testament as follows: I bequeath to my son Louis H Young One Dollar, to my daughter Dorothy Floella Young house and lot together with household goods located at 509 South Jefferson St. Salem, Illinois, to my daughter Mrs. Margaret Elizabeth Erwin house and lot located at 508 South Washington St. Salem, Illinois and to my other daughter Mrs. Agnes Evelyn McCullah house and lot located at 512 South Washington St. Salem, Illinois. All other property both real and personal I bequeath to my beloved wife Ruby Muriel Young consisting of Royalties, lands in Illinois and Texas, Bonds if any, Postal Savings, Cash in Banks and all interest held in houses and other Real Estate owned by me. I make the above bequests of my own free will and appoint my wife Ruby Muriel Young Administrator without bond. (Signed) Roger C. Young Salem, Illinois this 16th day of March, 1946 Witnesses Mrs. Walter Atkins Mr. Howard Hunter Edgar B. Kagy” Because there was no formal attestation clause and none of the witnesses could remember whether or not the will was signed by the testator when they signed it, the majority holds the evidence was insufficient to prove the will was signed by the testator in the presence of two of the witnesses or that he acknowledged it to them as his act. This rationale does not follow the majority rule in this country and particularly does not follow the rule in Illinois. 57 Am. Jur. Wills § 867 (1948), at page 577, reads: “Although there is some authority to the contrary, the better rule is that a presumption of due execution may arise on proof of the genuineness of the signatures of the testator and the attesting witnesses, notwithstanding the attestation clause of the will is incomplete or defective in failing to recite the observance of some formality required by statute in the execution of wills. In fact, according to many authorities, the due and proper execution of a will may be presumed on proof of the circumstances stated above, even though there is no attestation clause, as where the witnesses are merely indicated to be such by the word ‘witnesses’ appended to their signatures.14  * * * In Mead the supreme court held that a will in the handwriting of the testator and found among his papers, duly signed by him and attested by witnesses who wrote the word “witness” after their names, was entitled to probate, even though there was no formal attestation clause and the witnesses, although they remembered signing the will, did not recollect whether they signed the will at the testator’s request and in. his presence and the presence of each other or what was said at the time of the transaction, where other evidence clearly established the genuineness of the will and signatures and that the testator was of sound mind and memory. The genuineness of Young’s will, the signatures thereon and the fact that Young was of sound mind and memory are undisputed. Mead was quoted with approval in the case of In re Will of Hamilton, 408 Ill. 187, where the court stated that “the fact that witnesses cannot remember the details concerning the form of the will is not in itself suspicious after a lapse of 17 years.” (408 Ill. 187, 193.) In the present case there was a lapse of 27 years. The majority interprets the case of In re Estate of Willavize, 21 Ill.2d 40, to mean that where a will does not contain a complete attestation clause, there is no presumption in favor of its proper execution. The Willavize case actually held that there is a presumption in either case, but where the attestation clause is complete, the presumption is even stronger. The supreme court said, at page 44: “It is, of course, a well-established rule that every reasonable presumption will be indulged in in favor of the execution and attestation of a will. This is an even stronger presumption in those instances where the will was apparently executed in due form and the signatures are admitted to be genuine. [Citation.]” More v. More, 211 Ill. 268, involved a case where the supreme court reversed a circuit court ruling that there was insufficient evidence to admit a will to probate. The will was signed by the testator and witnesses as follows: “George More. (L.S.) Witnesses: Wm. Fuller, of Clinton, Illinois. Jas. A. Wilson, Clinton, Illinois.” Both witnesses predeceased the testator. The proof disclosed that the signature of the testator and the witnesses were genuine; that the body of the will was in the handwriting of the testator; that the word “witnesses” was also in the handwriting of the testator; and that the testator transacted his business competently. Appellee contended there was no proof that testator was of sound mind and memory when he signed the will or that the witnesses signed in the presence of each other or in the presence of the testator or at his request. The supreme court said at pages 271-72: “Out of the evidence in this case the presumption arose that the witnesses duly attested the will in the presence of the testator. If a perfect and formal attestation clause, reciting that all statutory requirements had been complied with, had been signed by the attesting witnesses, the presumption of regularity and compliance with statutory requirements would have arisen, and warranted the admission of the will to probate. . * * * It is not indispensable, however, that the witnesses shall sign a formal clause of attestation. # * « The attestation clause may consist of a single word, as witness,’ ‘attest’ or ‘test,’ or there may be no words at all. * * * In case of the death of the witnesses to a will which on the face thereof appears to have been regularly executed and is shown to bear the genuine signatures of the testator and the witnesses, compliance with the statutory requirement is to be presumed, in the absence of express recitals to that effect. *** The act of attestation of a will is not merely to witness the mere fact that the testator signed the will or acknowledged that he had signed the same, but the attention of the witnesses, is called, by the act of attestation, to the mental, condition of . the testator and as to whether he is possessed of a sound, disposing mind, and, therefore, if the will appears on the face thereof to have been duly executed and it is proven that the signatures thereto are the genuine writing of the maker and the witnesses, if the attesting witnesses be dead an inference arises, from the mere fact of attestation, that the witnesses believed that the testator possessed testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of the will, though there be no formal recital to that effect. *** This inference fairly arose in the case at bar, and was supplemented by the testimony which disclosed that the deceased, at the time of making the will, transacted, intelligently, ordinary business affair's of life. It was therefore established prima facie by the proof, and the inferences and presumptions legally arising therefrom, that said George More signed the said will in the presence of the said witnesses; that they signed it as witnesses in the presence of the testator and in the presence of each other as attesting witnesses; that they believed him to be of sound and disposing mind and that he in fact had sufficient mental capacity to execute a will.” In my opinion this will should be admitted to probate.   Mead v. Presbyterian Church, 229 Ill. 526, 82 N.E. 371, 14 LRA(NS) 255, 11 Ann Cas 426; German Evangelical Bethel Church v. Reith, 327 Mo 1098, 39 SW2d 1057; 76 ALR 604 (dictum). Anno: 76 ALR 622. ***"