Court Opinion

ID: 9529912
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:55:26.19297+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:57.075810
License: Public Domain

VAIDIK, Judge,
concurring in result.
I agree with Judge Crone's conclusion that Windhorst's sentence is not inappropriate. However, I write separately to express my disagreement with the suggestion that this Court's opinion in McMahon v. State, 856 N.E.2d 743 (Ind.Ct.App.2006), which I authored, "will resurrect the very Sixth Amendment problems that the legis*680lature sought to eliminate with its amendment of Indiana's sentencing scheme." Op. at 678 n. 2.
I understand the concern. We held in McMahon that "if a trial court relies upon aggravating or mitigating cireumstances to impose a sentence other than the advisory, it must: (1) identify all significant mitigating and aggravating cireumstances; (2) state the specific reason why each cireum-stance is determined to be mitigating or aggravating; and (8) articulate the court's evaluation and balancing of the cireum-stances." 856 N.E.2d at 749-50. My colleagues apparently equate this requirement with the former requirement, found unconstitutional by the Indiana Supreme Court in Smylie v. State, that a "trial court judge ... must engage in judicial fact-finding during sentencing if a sentence greater than the presumptive fixed term is to be imposed." 823 N.E.2d 679, 683 (Ind.2005). The distinction between the two requirements-requiring a court to explain the reasons for the sentence it imposes and requiring a court to find aggravating circumstances if it imposes a sentence above the presumptive-is certainly narrow. Nonetheless, it is a distinction of constitutional dimension, as the United States Supreme Court has recognized.
The United States Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines") were the subject of the high court's serutiny in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). In Booker, the Court, in a majority opinion penned by Justice Stevens, found unconstitutional two applications of the Guidelines because the Guidelines were mandatory. Id. at 233-34, 125 S.Ct. 738. That is, a sentencing judge was required to impose a sentence within the Guidelines range unless he found circumstances justifying a sentence outside the range. In this regard, the Guidelines were unconstitutional for the same reason that Indiana's presumptive sentencing scheme was unconstitutional: both prohibited sentencing judges from exceeding certain limits unless they found cireumstances justifying sentences in excess of those limits, ie., aggravating cireumstances. Translated into affirmative terms, judges were allowed to increase penalties based on judicial fact-finding. As such, both schemes violated the rule from Apprendi v. New Jersey that, "Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000); see also Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004).
To remedy the constitutional flaw in the Guidelines scheme, the Booker Court, in a separate majority opinion authored by Justice Breyer, simply made the Guidelines advisory. Id. at 245, 125 S.Ct. 738. The Court then discussed the role of appellate courts under the advisory system, holding that despite the newly-advisory nature of the Guidelines, the federal sentencing statute continues to provide for appeals from sentencing decisions. Id. at 260, 125 S.Ct. 738; see also id. at 262, 125 S.Ct. 738 (eliminating appellate review of sentences entirely "would eut the statute loose from its moorings in congressional purpose"). The Court thereafter undertook to determine the appropriate standard of appellate review. Looking to the "related statutory language, the structure of the statute, the 'sound administration of justice,'" and "the past two decades of appellate practice involving departures [from the Guidelines range}," id. at 260-61, 125 S.Ct. 738, the Court settled on a single standard: unreasonableness. Id. at 261, 125 S.Ct. 738.
While appellate review of sentences on the federal level is now limited to whether *681sentences are unreasonable, the United States Supreme Court made clear that the sentencing statutes still require district courts to "consult [the] Guidelines and take them into account when sentencing," even though they are "not bound to apply the Guidelines|[.]" Id. at 264, 125 S.Ct. 738 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 8558(a)(4d)). The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has interpreted this holding to require district courts to explain the reasons for the sentences they impose in order to facilitate appellate review of sentences, even though they are technically free to impose a sentence anywhere within the statutory range. See United States v. Dean, 414 F.3d 725, 729 (7th Cir.2005) (applying Booker's "unreasonableness" standard).
Likewise, though Indiana's trial courts, like those in the federal system, are technically free to impose a sentence anywhere within the statutory range, see Ind.Code § 35-838-1-7.1(d), a sentencing statement requirement will facilitate our review of sentences for inappropriateness under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). The majority implies that McMahon constitutes an end-run around the Sixth Amendment requirements of Apprendi and Blakely and that requiring sentencing statements will create a de facto presumptive scheme, identical to that found unconstitutional by the Indiana Supreme Court in Smylie. The same criticisms have been made about Justice Breyer's remedial majority opinion in Booker. See M.K.B. Darmer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines after Blakely and Booker: The Limits of Congressional Tolerance and a Greater Role for Juries, 56 S.C. L.Rev. 533, 564 (2005) (positing that remedial Booker effectuated "end-run" around Sixth Amendment requirements of Apprendi and Blakely); United States v. Kondirakis, 441 F.Supp.2d 282, 297 (D.Mass.2006) (citing Darmer's article); see also Booker, 548 U.S. at 313, 125 S.Ct. 738 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (predicting that Guidelines, as construed by Booker remedial majority, will become de facto mandatory); United States v. McDonald, 461 F.3d 948, 959 (8th Cir.2006) (Bye, J., dissenting) (same); United States v. Cage, 458 F.3d 537, 544 (6th Cir.2006) (Clay, J., dissenting) (same). However, even Justice Scalia, whose disdain for Justice Breyer's remedial majority opinion in Booker is virtually palpable, apparently acknowledges that judicial factfinding under this new regime does not violate the Sixth Amendment. Booker, 543 U.S. at 313, 125 S.Ct. 738 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (writing about the "newly restored discretion" of trial court judges).
In criticizing McMahon, I believe my colleagues are in effect criticizing Booker. And while that case, with its multiple majorities and splintered opinions, is certainly ripe for criticism, it is the supreme law of the land. Therefore, I stand by the conclusion in McMahon that the trial court must provide a sentencing statement anytime it imposes a sentence other than the advisory sentence under the new statutes. 856 N.E.2d at 749-50. This requirement serves two very important purposes: to guard against arbitrary sentences and to provide an adequate basis for appellate review. Id. (quoting Bryant v. State, 841 N.E.2d 1154, 1156 (Ind.2006)).