Court Opinion

ID: 9387216
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-16 15:00:26.786256+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:12.247628
License: Public Domain

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             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit                             United States Court of Appeals
                                                                             Fifth Circuit

                                                                           FILED
                                                                       April 14, 2023
                                 No. 20-40138
                             consolidated with                        Lyle W. Cayce
                                No. 22-40433                               Clerk

   Perry Bonin; Ace Chandler; Michael Manuel; Robert
   Acreman; Jacqueline Acreman, Et al.,

                                                          Plaintiffs—Appellees,

                                      versus

   Sabine River Authority, State of Louisiana,

                                                        Defendant—Appellant.

                   Appeals from the United States District Court
                         for the Eastern District of Texas
                              USDC No. 1:19-cv-527

   Before Richman, Chief Judge, * and Dennis and Haynes, Circuit
   Judges.
   James L. Dennis, Circuit Judge:
         This appeal presents the sole issue of whether the Sabine River
   Authority, State of Louisiana (“SRA-L”) is an “arm of the state” entitled to
   sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States

         *
             Chief Judge Richman dissents.
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   Constitution. After applying our circuit precedent’s six-factor test in Clark
   v. Tarrant County, 798 F.2d 736, 744–45 (5th Cir. 1986), we conclude that
   SRA-L is not an arm of the state. Accordingly, the district court’s order
   denying SRA-L’s Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter
   jurisdiction on sovereign immunity grounds is AFFIRMED.
                                          I.
          The “Sabine River Authority, State of Louisiana”(“SRA-L”) was
   created, as a conservation and reclamation district lying within the watershed
   of the Sabine River, by an act of the Louisiana legislature in 1950, see La. R.S.
   38:2321 et seq. The SRA-L subsequently entered into a joint venture with the
   Sabine River Authority, Texas (“SRA-T”) (collectively “the SRAs”). See
   La. R.S. 38:2329 editors’ note (West 2022) (including “Sabine River
   Compact”); Stallworth v. McFarland, 350 F. Supp. 920, 926 (W.D. La. 1972).
   “The designated purpose of this venture was the creation of a dam and
   reservoir to provide electrical power, promote industrial development in both
   States, conserve water for agricultural purposes, and create fishing,
   recreation, and commercial development.” Stallworth, 350 F. Supp. at 926.
          Plaintiffs are Louisiana and Texas property owners who alleged that
   the SRAs violated their federal Fifth Amendment constitutional rights. Their
   complaints allege that the SRAs deliberately released water from the Toledo
   Bend reservoir into the Sabine River by opening spillway gates to relieve high-
   water levels in the reservoir during a rain event in March of 2016 and in doing
   so flooded their properties, causing significant property damage. Plaintiffs
   further alleged that the opening of the spillway gates was the “last straw” in
   a years-long pattern of mismanagement of water levels in the reservoir
   preceding the March 2016 event that contributed to the flooding and its
   severity, and claim that defendants had knowledge of the severe risk of
   downstream flooding.

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          Plaintiffs filed their lawsuit in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
   SRA-L filed a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter
   jurisdiction, arguing that it was entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign
   immunity as an arm of the state of Louisiana and had not waived that
   immunity. The district court denied the motion. Applying the Clark factors,
   that district court determined SRA-L was not an arm of the state and
   therefore was not entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.
   SRA-L appealed.
                                          II.
          “Denials of motions to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds fall
   within the collateral order doctrine, and are thus immediately appealable.”
   Texas v. Caremark, Inc., 584 F.3d 655, 658 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing McCarthy
   ex rel. Travis v. Hawkins, 381 F.3d 407, 411–12 (5th Cir. 2004)). Whether an
   entity is entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity is a question
   of law reviewed de novo by the appellate court. Hudson v. City of New Orleans,
   174 F.3d 677, 682 (5th Cir. 1999). Generally, “[t]he burden of proof for a
   Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is on the party asserting jurisdiction.”
   Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001) (citation
   omitted). However, there are exceptions. Relevant here, an entity asserting
   sovereign immunity bears the burden of demonstrating that it is an “arm of
   the state.” Skelton v. Camp, 234 F.3d 292, 297 (5th Cir. 2000); Cutrer v.
   Tarrant Cnty. Loc. Workforce Dev. Bd., 943 F.3d 265, 270 (5th Cir. 2019), as
   revised (Nov. 25, 2019).
                                          III.
          “The Eleventh Amendment has been interpreted by the Supreme
   Court to bar suits by individuals against nonconsenting states.” McCarthy
   381 F.3d at 412 (citing Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356,
   363 (2001)). Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity “encompasses not

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   only actions in which a State is actually named as the defendant, but also
   certain actions against state agents and state instrumentalities.” Regents of
   the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997) (citations omitted).
   “[I]dentifying when the state is a real, substantial party in interest is often
   not an easy task.” Hudson, 174 F.3d at 681. Among state entities, there is a
   distinction between “arm[s] of the state” and those entities “possess[ing] an
   identity sufficiently distinct from that of the State of Louisiana to place it
   beyond [the Eleventh Amendment’s] shield.” Milton v. St. Bernard Par. Sch.
   Bd., 803 F.2d 129, 131 (5th Cir. 1986). The question is “whether the
   defendant being sued is better described as an arm of the state partaking in
   the privileges of Eleventh Amendment immunity or whether the defendant
   is actually part of a political subdivision unprotected by the Eleventh
   Amendment.” Hudson, 174 F.3d at 681.
          “Whether a particular political entity is an arm of the state is a
   question of federal law.” Vogt v. Board of Com’rs of Orleans Levee Dist., 294
   F.3d 684, 690 n.4 (5th Cir. 2002).        “There is no bright-line test for
   determining whether a political entity is an ‘arm of the state’ for purposes of
   Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Id. at 689. Rather, we must make a
   “reasoned judgment” whether the suit is “effectively against the sovereign
   state” despite the nominal defendant. Earles v. State Bd. of Certified Public
   Accountants of La., 139 F.3d 1033, 1037 (5th Cir. 1998). “Our analysis must
   consider the particular nature of the entity, including its powers and duties,
   the nuances of its organizational structure, and its interrelationship with
   other organs of the state.” Id. In this Circuit, we use the six factors from
   Clark v. Tarrant County to guide our analysis. See 798 F. 2d at 744–45. Clark
   is one of this Circuit’s foundational Eleventh Amendment cases which
   identified from our case law the factors relevant to determining whether an
   entity is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Daves v. Dallas

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   Cnty., 22 F.4th 522, 533 (5th Cir. 2022) (en banc) (describing our Eleventh
   Amendment case law); Clark, 798 F. 2d at 744–45. The six Clark factors are:
          (1) whether state statutes and case law characterize the agency
          as an arm of the state; (2) the source of funds for the entity; (3)
          the degree of local autonomy the entity enjoys; (4) whether the
          entity is concerned primarily with local, as opposed to
          statewide, problems; (5) whether the entity has authority to sue
          and be sued in its own name; and (6) whether the entity has the
          right to hold and use property.
   Vogt, 294 F.3d at 689; see also Hudson, 174 F.3d at 681.
          “A defendant need not possess each of the above attributes to benefit
   from the Eleventh Amendment. Nor are these factors necessarily equal to
   one another.” Hudson, 174 F.3d at 681–82. “[T]he most significant factor
   in assessing an entity’s status is whether a judgment against it will be paid
   with state funds,” Delahoussaye v. City of New Iberia, 937 F.2d 144, 147–48
   (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting McDonald v. Board of Miss. Levee Comm’rs, 832 F. 2d
   901, 907 (5th Cir. 1987)), while the last two factors “weigh significantly less”
   in the “balance of equities.” Cozzo v. Tangipahoa Parish Council, 279 F.3d
   273, 281 (5th Cir. 2002). We consider each factor in turn.
                       A. Characterization under state law
          The first Clark factor considers whether state statutes and case law
   characterize the entity as an arm of the state. The district court found this
   factor weighed in favor of finding SRA-L an arm of the state. State statute
   characterizes SRA-L as “an agency and instrumentality of the state of
   Louisiana required by the public convenience and necessity for the carrying
   out of the functions of the state.” La. R.S. 38:2324(A). Although this
   classification may suggest that SRA-L is an arm of the state, we have
   cautioned that the description “creature or agency of the state . . . is far too
   inclusive to be useful for Eleventh Amendment analysis.” Vogt, 294 F.3d at

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   690. Indeed, in the same sentence, the SRA-L is also characterized as “a
   corporation and body politic and corporate, with power of perpetual
   succession, invested with all powers, privileges, rights, and immunities
   conferred by law upon other corporations of like character including but not
   limited to port authorities, port commissions, and port, harbor, and terminal
   districts within the state.” 1           La. R.S. 38:2324(A).            This inconsistent
   characterization proves unhelpful in classifying SRA-L. On-point state case
   law is scarce and sheds no additional light on the question, as the cases also
   describe the SRA-L’s legal status, in dicta, inconsistently. Compare Slowinski
   v. England Econ. and Indus. Develop. Dist., 828 So. 2d 520, 528 n.7 (La. 2002)
   (“an instrumentality of the state of Louisiana”), with Crump v. Sabine River
   Authority, 737 So. 2d 720, 722 n.1 (La. 1999) (“a corporation and political
   subdivision of the State of Louisiana”).
           SRA-L argues that at some point after its creation as an independent
   authority, SRA-L was “placed within the Department of Transportation and
   Development,” an executive branch department. La. R.S. 36:509(F)(1). It
   is true that some of our decisions have “suggest[ed] ‘that all Louisiana
   executive departments have Eleventh Amendment immunity.’” Vogt, 294
   F.3d at 692 (quoting Champagne v. Jefferson Par. Sheriff’s Off., 188 F.3d 312,

           1
             A brief survey of state statutes related to “port authorities, port commissions, and
   port, harbor, and terminal districts” reveals that at least some of those entities are referred
   to as “political subdivision[s] of the state,” rather than “agenc[ies] and
   instrumentalit[ies]” of the state. See, e.g., La. R.S. 34:201 (Lake Charles Harbor and
   Terminal District); § 34:241 (Port of Iberia District); § 34:1351 (Plaquemines Parish Port
   Authority). The “political subdivision” designation is typically juxtaposed as opposite an
   “arm of the state,” and the two may even be “mutually exclusive.” See Vogt, 294 F.3d at
   692 (citing La. R.S. 13:5102(B); Cozzo, 279 F.3d at 281–82). Although, “this may not be a
   hard-and-fast rule, virtually every . . . government entity classified as a political subdivision
   has been denied Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Id. & n.5 (citation omitted). Thus, if
   the SRA-L were analogized to a “political subdivision,” this factor would weigh against
   sovereign immunity.

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   313 (5th Cir. 1999)). However, we have avoided pronouncing similar “hard-
   and fast rule[s]” in the Eleventh Amendment arm-of-the-state context, as we
   must “examine the particular entity” at issue. See id. (quoting Richardson v.
   S. Univ., 118 F.3d 450, 452 (5th Cir. 1997)). Indeed, in finding a similar
   Louisiana port commission was not an arm of the state, we afforded little
   weight to its description under Louisiana law as “an executive department of
   the state” and “agency” of the state. Jacintoport Corp. v. Greater Baton Rouge
   Port Comm’n, 762 F.2d 435, 439–40 (5th Cir. 1985). This description under
   state law was “devoid of any language expressing or implying that this agency
   status [wa]s sufficiently broad based to make the Commission an ‘alter ego’
   of the state,” and the court therefore “decline[d] to afford the Commission
   . . . immunity under the Eleventh Amendment when it ha[d] simply been
   described, without more, as an ‘agency’ of the State.” Id. at 439. In the
   present case, SRA-L’s belated placement in the executive branch is partly
   undercut by SRA-L’s retention of significant operational autonomy, as the
   law placing it in the executive branch itself explicitly provided that SRA-L
   “shall exercise [its] powers, duties, functions, and responsibilities . . .
   independently of the secretary, the undersecretary, and any assistant
   secretary.” La. R.S. 36:509(F)(1), 801.1(E).
          Thus, while the language in the state statutes describing SRA-L as “an
   agency and instrumentality of the state” and as a member of the executive
   branch means this factor weighs in favor of finding SRA-L an arm of the state,
   we also note the factor’s limited utility in this case given the inconsistent
   descriptions in the same statutes and the lack of a more-definitive
   characterization in either statute or case law.
                               B. Source of funding
          The second Clark factor concerns the entity’s source of funds.
   Because one of the goals of the Eleventh Amendment is to protect state

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   treasuries, “it is well established that [this factor] is the most important.”
   Hudson, 174 F.3d at 687. “In assessing this second factor, we conduct
   inquiries into, first and most importantly, the state’s liability in the event
   there is a judgment against the defendant, and second, the state’s liability for
   the defendant’s general debts and obligations.” Id. at 682.
          Whether the state is liable for a money judgment against the entity is
   the “most significant” consideration. Delahoussaye, 937 F.2d at 147–48. This
   first prong of the second Clark factor’s analysis generally involves review of
   “a state’s statutes regarding indemnification and assumption of debts.” Vogt,
   294 F.3d at 693. SRA-L cites the Louisiana Constitution’s command that
   “[n]o judgment against the state, a state agency, or a political subdivision
   shall be exigible, payable, or paid except from funds appropriated therefor by
   the legislature or by the political subdivision against which the judgment is
   rendered.” La. Const. art. XII, § 10(C). Under article XII, section 10(C),
   the legislature pays judgments against a state agency, while a political
   subdivision pays judgments against itself. See Newman Marchive P’ship, Inc.
   v. City of Shreveport, 979 So. 2d 1262, 1266 (La. 2008); Vogt, 294 F.3d at 693.
   SRA-L presumes it is a state agency such that the state legislature would pay
   any judgment against it, but as our analysis of the first Clark factor makes
   evident, state law refers to SRA-L as both an “agency and instrumentality of
   the state” and “a corporation and body politic and corporate,” La. R.S.
   38:2324(A), including case law that describes SRA-L as a “political
   subdivision,” Crump, 737 So. 2d at 722 n.1. There were no jurisdictional facts
   adduced in the district court as to how payment of judgments against SRA-L
   actually operates. SRA-L has not met its burden of showing the state is
   directly liable for judgments against SRA-L.
          “The next step is to determine whether the state will indirectly fund
   a judgment against the levee district because the state either is responsible
   for general debts and obligations or provides the lion’s share of the levee

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   district’s budget.” Vogt, 294 F.3d at 693. SRA-L appears to have near-total
   financial independence. “The authority shall operate from self-generated
   revenues and shall not be a budget unit of the state.” La. R.S. 38:2324(B)(1).
   It “shall establish its own operating budget . . . subject to majority approval
   of the board of commissioners of the authority,” though its “budget shall be
   submitted to the Joint Legislative Committee on the Budget for review and
   approval.” Id. SRA-L “may . . . receive state appropriations at any time it is
   deemed advisable by the legislature, and only the expenditure of such
   appropriated funds shall be subject to budgetary controls or authority of the
   division of administration.” Id. (emphasis added). Importantly, state law
   mandates that SRA-L pay its own debts from its self-generated revenues:
   SRA-L “shall have the power . . . [t]o incur debts and borrow money, but no
   debt so incurred shall be payable from any source other than the revenues to
   be derived by the authority.” Id. § 2325(A)(5). In sum, while the legislature
   has the discretion to appropriate state funds to the SRA-L, the SRA-L is
   financially autonomous—it generates its own revenues, can incur debts and
   borrow money, and is obligated to pay its debts out of its own funds, without
   drawing on state resources.
          Given SRA-L’s financial independence—in particular SRA-L’s
   liability for its own debts—and absent a showing by SRA-L that the
   legislature pays judgments against SRA-L, we cannot conclude at this
   juncture that the state would be liable for a money judgment levied against
   SRA-L. It seems equally likely that SRA-L self-insures or pays its own
   judgments out of its own funds. Thus, because SRA-L, as the entity asserting
   sovereign immunity, bears the burden of demonstrating that it is an “arm of
   the state,” we ultimately weigh this factor against immunity. See Cutrer, 943
   F.3d at 271-72.

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                                  C. Autonomy
          The third Clark factor considers the “entity’s degree of authority
   independent from the state.” Voisin’s Oyster House, Inc. v. Guidry, 799 F.2d
   183, 187 (5th Cir. 1986). This factor involves consideration of the entity’s
   “independent management authority” and, to a lesser degree, “the
   independence of the individual commissioners.” Vogt, 294 F.3d at 694–95
   (quoting and citing Jacintoport, 762 F.2d at 442).
          The district court found this factor weighed against finding SRA-L an
   arm of the state, noting that SRA-L “has considerable management
   authority” given to it by statute, including “the power to ‘do all things
   necessary or convenient to carry out its functions.’” See La. R.S.
   38:2325(A)(9)). SRA-L also has the power, inter alia, to acquire property
   (§ 2325(A)(2)), enter into contracts (§ 2325(A)(3)), incur debts and borrow
   money (§ 2325(A)(5)), and even “establish and maintain a law enforcement
   division within the Authority” (§ 2325(A)(17)). But ultimately SRA-L’s
   powers are in service of its functions of maintaining, conserving, and
   supervising the dam, reservoir, rivers, and streams within the Sabine River
   watershed. See § 2325.
          In response, SRA-L maintains that it is a “budget unit” of the state,
   and thus subject to executive branch oversight. For support, it cites a 1997
   Louisiana Attorney General Opinion. But the SRA-L’s statute declares the
   exact opposite, that it “shall not be a budget unit of the state”; rather, it
   “shall operate from self-generated revenues” and “shall establish its own
   operating budget . . . subject to majority approval of the board of
   commissioners of the authority,” though its budget “shall be submitted to
   the Joint Legislative Committee on the Budget for review and approval.” La.
   R.S. 38:2324(B)(1).      Clearly, SRA-L has a high degree of budgetary
   autonomy.

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          SRA-L also argues that its independent authority is counterweighted
   by the governor’s role in appointing the board. SRA-L is governed by a
   thirteen-member board of commissioners appointed by the governor. Id.
   § 2322(A)(1). There are parish residency requirements for board members,
   but no other limits or qualifications in the statute. Id. Most significantly,
   Board members “shall serve at the pleasure of the governor,” though their
   nominations must be “submitted to the Senate for confirmation.” Id.
   § 2322(A)(2). The district court determined that, while board members
   were “vulnerable” because they served at the pleasure of the governor, the
   board was still autonomous because the governor’s discretion was limited by
   the statutory requirement that members reside in certain parishes. We
   disagree.
          The district court cited Vogt v. Board of Commissioners of the Orleans
   Levee District, 294 F.3d 684, and Pendergrass v. Greater New Orleans
   Expressway Commission, 144 F.3d 342 (5th Cir. 1998), for support, but both
   cases are factually distinguishable. In Vogt, the governor appointed six of
   eight levee district commissioners, subject to a requirement that his
   appointees be residents of the district and be recommended by the local
   legislative delegation.   294 F.3d at 684.        In Pendergrass, the governor
   appointed three of five commissioners, subject to similar residency and local
   recommendation requirements, and further, those appointees served for a set
   term and not at the governor’s pleasure. 144 F.3d at 347. Additionally, the
   other two members were appointed by local parish governing bodies. Id.
   Here, by contrast, there is no requirement that members be recommended by
   local legislators or local governing bodies; board members serve solely at the
   governor’s pleasure and not for set terms; and all thirteen board members are
   gubernatorial appointments, with no board members appointed by local
   governing bodies.

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          Considering these circumstances, then, we think this factor weighs
   minimally against finding SRA-L an arm of the state. On one hand, the entire
   board is appointed by and serves at the pleasure of the governor; on the other
   hand, the SRA-L has significant management autonomy. To the degree that
   independent management authority weighs more heavily in the analysis than
   the independence of commissioners, this factor tilts against SRA-L being an
   arm of the state.
                            D. Local or statewide focus
          The fourth Clark factor considers whether the entity is concerned
   primarily with local, as opposed to statewide, problems—in other words,
   “whether the entity acts for the benefit and welfare of the state as a whole or
   for the special advantage of local inhabitants.” Pendergrass, 144 F.3d at 347.
   State law describes SRA-L as a “conservation and reclamation district” that
   encompasses “all the territory . . . lying within the watershed of the Sabine
   River and its tributary streams” in six enumerated parishes. La. R.S. 38:2321.
   Limited territorial boundaries suggest that an entity is not an arm of the state.
   Vogt, 924 F.3d at 695; Cozzo, 279 F.3d at 282. Focusing on the SRA-L’s
   territorial limits, the district court found that this factor weighed against
   finding SRA-L an arm of the state.
          But SRA-L argues that its statewide purpose makes it an arm of the
   state, notwithstanding its territorial jurisdiction. SRA-L points to statutory
   language that says it is “required by the public convenience and necessity for
   the carrying out of the functions of the state” and “will be performing an
   essential public function under the constitution.” La. R.S. 38:2324(A), (D).
   Thus, it argues in its brief that it “serves the important functions of water
   conservation, water management, hydropower generation, and recreational
   opportunities which benefits the entire state, not just local inhabitants.” For
   support, it cites Delahoussaye v. City of New Iberia, a case involving a state

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   university whose statutory purpose was to serve the higher education needs
   of people statewide. 937 F.2d at 148.
          We think that this factor weighs against finding the SRA-L an arm of
   the state. Though SRA-L surely generates some statewide benefits, its
   activities are localized, and it has a territorial jurisdiction. In these important
   respects, SRA-L is distinguishable from a state university that is a part of a
   system of higher education intended to serve the entire state. See Vogt, 924
   F.3d at 695-96.
                         E. Authority to sue in own name
          The fifth Clark factor asks whether the entity has authority to sue and
   be sued in its own name. According to state law, SRA-L “shall have and
   possess the authority to sue and be sued.” La. R.S. 38:2324(B)(2). The
   district court found this factor weighed against finding SRA-L an arm of the
   state. SRA-L does not contest this factor, other than to correctly note that
   the fifth and sixth Clark factors “weigh significantly less” in the analysis.
   Cozzo, 279 F.3d at 281. We agree that this factor weighs against finding SRA-
   L an arm of the state, and also that the last two factors are properly afforded
   less weight than the others.
                         F. Right to hold and use property
          Last, the sixth Clark factor asks whether the entity has the right to
   hold and use property. Based on state law, the district court found this factor
   weighed against finding SRA-L an arm of the state. La. R.S. 38:2325(A)(2).
   SRA-L contends on appeal that this factor weighs in favor of its immunity
   because state law says it holds property “as an instrumentality of the State of
   Louisiana.”    La. R.S. 38:2325(B).       We disagree.      The same statutory
   provision also says that “[t]itle to all property acquired by the Authority shall
   be taken in its corporate name.” Id. In Vogt, we rejected an argument that
   an entity’s right to hold property was “limited” because “all of its property

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   ultimately belong[ed] to the state.” 294 F.3d at 696. That argument
   “misse[d] the point; the relevant question is whether the [entity] has the
   right to hold property in its own name, and it clearly does,” which “points
   away from Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Id. The same applies here.
                                        IV.
          To summarize, we find that the first Clark factor weighs in favor of
   sovereign immunity, but only modestly; the remaining five factors weigh
   against sovereign immunity, to varying degrees. Crucially, the second factor
   leans against immunity given SRA-L’s financial autonomy and because SRA-
   L failed to carry its burden of establishing that the state would be liable for
   any judgment rendered against it. The third factor, and especially the fourth,
   weigh against immunity for the reasons explained above. The fifth and sixth
   factors also weigh against immunity, but those two factors weigh less in the
   analysis. That said, the Clark factors are only meant to guide the court’s
   analysis, not to be tallied up to generate a mechanical result. Not all the
   factors need to be present for an entity to be entitled to sovereign immunity,
   nor are all the factors weighed equally. Hudson, 174 F.3d at 681–82.
          Based on the forgoing, we conclude that the SRA-L is not an arm of
   the state and is not entitled to sovereign immunity. The district court’s order
   denying SRA-L’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is
   AFFIRMED. SRA-L’s unopposed motion for supplemental briefing is
   DENIED.

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