Court Opinion

ID: 9394911
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-16 16:08:21.821067+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:04.107094
License: Public Domain

J-A08001-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    RACHEL M. PARKS                            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellant               :
                                               :
                                               :
                 v.                            :
                                               :
                                               :
    EZEKIEL KOCH                               :   No. 1065 WDA 2022

                 Appeal from the Order Entered August 18, 2022
                  In the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County
                      Civil Division at No: No. 2021 GN 287

BEFORE:      STABILE, J., SULLIVAN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                                 FILED: May 16, 2023

        Appellant, Rachel M. Parks (“Mother”) appeals from the order entered

on August 18, 2022, in the Blair County Court of Common Pleas, denying her

request    for   relocation    from    Duncansville,   Pennsylvania   to   Kingston,

Tennessee, with her daughter, P.J.K. (“Child”), born in November 2018. The

order also, inter alia, maintained shared legal and shared physical custody

between Mother and Appellee, Ezekiel Koch (“Father”). After careful review,

we affirm.

        The factual background and procedural history as set forth in this Court’s

Memorandum filed on February 8, 2022 is as follows.

              Mother and Father never married. They are the natural
        parents of Child, born in November of 2018. The parties resided
        together with Child in Hollidaysburg, Pennsylvania, until
____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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        approximately January of 2020, when the parties separated and
        Mother moved in with her family in Duncansville, Pennsylvania.
        After the parties’ separation, Mother and Father began following
        an informal 3/4/4/3 rotating custody schedule, which allowed
        each party equal time with Child.

               On February 4, 2021, Mother filed a complaint seeking sole
        legal custody and primary physical custody of Child, followed by a
        relocation petition on March 5, 2021, seeking permission to
        relocate with Child to Kingston, Tennessee. Father oppose[d]
        Mother’s proposed relocation to Tennessee with Child. [1]        A
        custody relocation hearing was held on April 28, 2021, during
        which both parties testified.

             Following the hearing, the trial court issued an opinion, in
        which it set forth the following factual findings:

                                          MOTHER

              Mother is twenty-three years old and resides in
              Duncansville, Pennsylvania with the subject minor
              [C]hild along with Mother’s father[, R.P. (“Maternal
              Grandfather”)] and Mother’s siblings.[2] Mother is
              employed full[-]time as an assistant manager at [a]
              retail store. [Child] attends the YMCA Early Learning
              Center when Mother is working. Although Mother has
              immediate family in Blair County, Mother is seeking to
              relocate with [Child] to Kingston, Tennessee, where
              she also has extended family. Mother testified that
              her father, along with her siblings[,] are also planning
              on relocating to Tennessee. Mother indicated she
              believes she can obtain employment at [a] store in
              Tennessee.     Mother indicates she has taken her
              daughter to Tennessee several times and their lives
              will improve with the relocation. If the relocation is
              granted, Mother suggests Father could receive periods
              of custody with [Child], such as one long weekend

____________________________________________

1Mother contemporaneously filed a notice of proposed relocation on February
4, 2021. In response, Father filed a counter-affidavit objecting to the
proposed relocation and a petition requesting a hearing on February 24, 2021.

2   Mother’s mother passed away in 2020. N.T., 4/28/21, at 11.

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            each month or in weekly increments over the
            summer.

                                       FATHER

            Father is twenty-five years old and resides in
            Hollidaysburg, Pennsylvania, by himself and [with] his
            daughter when he has his periods of custody. Father
            works full[-]time as a mechanic [at a local car
            dealership], working 7:00 [a.m.] to 4:00 [p.m.]
            Father testified that he was first made aware that
            Mother was seeking to relocate to Tennessee with the
            parties’ daughter in February 2021, after he received
            the relocation notice in the mail. Father was surprised
            by Mother’s petition to relocate[] and was under the
            impression that the parties would continue to share
            an equal custody rotation with ... [C]hild. Father
            believes that his relationship with his daughter would
            diminish if Mother was granted permission to relocate
            with ... [C]hild to Tennessee. Father states that all of
            his family lives in Blair County, and [C]hild sees these
            family members on a regular basis. Father further
            states that he is financially stable in Blair County[]
            and[,] while Mother intends to relocate, her
            employment in Tennessee is speculative.

      Trial Court Opinion [], 6/10/21, at 2-4 (unnecessary capitalization
      and citations to record omitted).

            In conjunction with its opinion, the trial court issued an
      order awarding shared legal custody and shared physical custody
      of Child and denying Mother’s petition for relocation. See Trial
      Court Order [], 6/10/21, at 2. The trial court directed that, as
      long as Mother chooses to remain in Blair County, Pennsylvania,
      the parties shall maintain an equal[] physical custody schedule.
      However, if Mother chooses to relocate without Child, she shall
      immediately notify the court so an appropriate schedule can be
      formulated. Id.

R.M.P. v. E.K., 273 A.3d 1030 (Pa. Super. 2022) (unpublished memorandum

at 1-2) (some brackets in original).

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        Thereafter, Mother filed a timely appeal. Pursuant to Mother’s appeal,

as the trial court failed to address the custody factors, this Court vacated the

trial court’s order and remanded for the trial court to “consider the custody

factors in conjunction with the relocation factors and issue a new order

addressing the parties’ custody and relocation requests.” Id. at 11-12.

        Following remand, the trial court conducted a hearing (“remand

hearing”) on June 8, 2022. Mother and Father, represented by counsel, each

testified on their own behalf. In addition, Mother presented the testimony of

Maternal Grandfather. Father presented the testimony of his live-in girlfriend,

B.P.3

        At the time of the remand hearing, Mother still resided in her family

home, owned by Maternal Grandfather, in Duncansville and worked as an

assistant manager in a retail store in the local mall without the ability for

advancement. N.T., 6/8/22, at 7, 11-12, 162. All of her immediate family

had relocated to Tennessee. Id. at 4. Mother explained,

        [b]oth of [her parents] were from the Tennessee area and have
        relatives residing there. In fact, if Mother were permitted to
____________________________________________

3  The trial court “denied Father’s request to limit and/or exclude testimony
regarding relocation and directed the ‘best interest of the child’ standard
allowed the [c]ourt to hear testimony that had occurred since the previous
hearing.” Trial Court Opinion, 8/18/22, at 2. The court explained, “The
[c]ourt just simply agrees that it is standard -- it is always best interest and,
in fact, if there has been some differences are any changes that have occurred,
it would feel like it would be inappropriate to ignore them.” N.T., 6/8/22, at
3.

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       relocate[,] she would live with her grandmother.[4]        Mother
       indicate[d] . . . this home . . . would be provided to her in the
       event of [her] grandmother’s death. . . . Mother testified that all
       of her family now lives in the Tennessee area and that her
       daughter is familiar with these family members but particularly
       those who previously lived in Blair County and have since moved
       to Tennessee. Those specific members were the immediate family
       members of Mother’s, such as her sister and two brothers[,] as
       well as [Maternal Grandfather].[5]

Trial Court Opinion, 8/18/22, at 5-6. Maternal Grandfather testified that he

would be selling the Pennsylvania family home. N.T., 6/8/22, at 163-64, 171.

       As to her employment,

       Mother . . . testified and submitted documentation that her job
       prospects in Tennessee would be better. She relie[d] on the fact
       there are multiple Manager positions in similar retail stores in
       Tennessee and that the promotion to Manager would allow her
       more flexibility and a greater income. . . .[6] Father . . . also . . .
       indicated that there are substantial jobs locally in Blair County that
       would allow for similar opportunities.
____________________________________________

4 Similar to the situation in Pennsylvania, this would be without payment of
rent or utilities. Id. at 7, 10, 171.

5 Mother testified to a strong bond between Child and her immediate family
and indicated that Child “does ask for them quite often” now that they have
moved. N.T., 6/8/22, at 5-7. Although Maternal Grandfather still traveled
back and forth between Pennsylvania and Tennessee, he had changed his
residency to Tennessee. Id. at 7, 55-56, 163-64.

6 Mother presented an internet job search through Indeed showing managerial
positions available in Tennessee for which she indicated she would be qualified
and would receive a better salary, better benefits, and better flexibility. Id.
at 14-21; see also Plaintiff’s Exhibit 2, 6/8/22. Mother conceded portions of
this job search document were duplicative. N.T., 6/8/22, at 59-50. While
Mother testified that she applied for and was offered employment in
Tennessee, she failed to disclose any specifics. Id. at 76. Again, without
specifics, she also stated that there were “very, very few” similar type
managerial positions available in Blair County. Id. at 96.

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Trial Court Opinion, 8/18/22, at 5.

       Father was still employed as a mechanic at a car dealership.           N.T.,

6/8/22, at 128-29. Since the prior hearing, he was additionally pursuing a

lawncare business. Id. at 107-08, 129, 144. Father had recently moved from

the home in Hollidaysburg, which he previously shared with Mother, to a home

owned by his new girlfriend in Altoona, where he resided with his girlfriend

and her five-year-old daughter.7 Id. at 103-05. He indicated that their plan

is to purchase a home in Hollidaysburg in the future. Id. at 106.

       In its opinion subsequent to the hearing, the trial court set forth the

following additional factual findings.

       Father has established a good foundation and relationship with his
       daughter[,] and, it is apparent that they have a close bond. Father
       testified that he has substantial family members in Blair County
       who have developed a relationship with his daughter. The [c]ourt
       finds that the family relationship of both families are positive for
       [C]hild.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/18/22, at 6-7.

       By order dated August 17, 2022, and entered August 18, 2022, the trial

court denied Mother’s proposed relocation.       The court further awarded the

parties shared legal custody and shared physical custody.             While not

establishing a physical custody schedule, the court provided, “The parties shall

____________________________________________

7 Father testified, “It’s a better house, more room for [C]hild to grow, do
activities. The yard is a lot bigger with a lot more availability to put a swing
set, a pool, a trampoline. . ., whatever you would like.” N.T., 6/8/22, at 165.

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continue to share custody on an equal basis.” Order, 8/18/22, at ¶ 3. The

court issued a contemporaneous opinion in which the court addressed and

analyzed both the relocation and custody factors.

       On September 15, 2022, Mother, through counsel, filed a timely notice

of appeal, along with a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).8

       On appeal, Mother raises the following issues for our review:

       I. Did the trial court err and/or abuse its discretion by entering an
       order denying Mother’s petition for relocation when said order was
       contrary to the child’s best interest and when the [c]ourt did not
       properly apply the custody relocation factors set forth in 23
       Pa.C.S.A. § 5337(h), (1)-(10) and the custody factors set forth in
       23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a), (1)-(16)?

       II. Did the trial court err and/or abuse its discretion in its analysis
       of the relocation factor set forth in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5337(h)(1)
       when it found this factor favors Father instead of Mother and by
       finding that Mother’s family’s move to Tennessee has a negative
       impact on this factor?

       III. Did the trial court err and/or abuse its discretion when it found
       that the relocation factor set forth in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5337(h)(3)
       weighs against relocation by merely assessing the travel time to
       Mother’s intended new residence and without considering Mother’s
       testimony regarding suitable custody arrangements for Father?

       IV. Did the trial court err and/or abuse its discretion by improperly
       applying the custody relocation factors set forth in 23 Pa.C.S.A. §
       5337(h)(7)?

       V. Did the trial court err and/or abuse its discretion by placing no
       weight on the relocation factor set forth in 23 Pa.C.S.A. §
       5337(h)(7) when a proper analysis of the testimony, when applied

____________________________________________

8 By letter dated September 20, 2022, the trial court advised of its reliance on
its prior opinion and order.

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      to this factor, should have resulted in this factor favoring Mother’s
      request to relocate?

      VI. Did the trial court err and/or abuse its discretion by setting
      forth and applying an improper legal burden on the Mother when
      it stated the following on page 5 of its Opinion and Order: “In all
      instances where a custodial parent seeks to relocate and a non-
      custodial parent opposes the move, the burden is on the custodial
      parent to establish a significant improvement in the quality of life
      for that parent and child.”?

      VII. Did the trial court err and/or abuse its discretion when it found
      that the custody factor set forth in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a)(1)
      favors Father and against relocation and by finding that Mother
      placing the child on her health insurance through her employment
      had a negative impact on this factor?

      VIII. Did the trial court err and/or abuse its discretion by finding
      that the custody factor set forth in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a)(4)
      favors Father, instead of Mother?

      IX. Did the trial court err and/or abuse its discretion by not finding
      that the custody factor set forth in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a)(12)
      favors Mother?

Mother’s Brief at 7-9 (unnecessary capitalization omitted; trial court answers

omitted; internal citations cleaned up).

      The relevant scope and standard of review for cases arising under the

Child Custody Act (“the Act”), 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5321-5340, is as follows:

      In reviewing a custody order, our scope is of the broadest type
      and our standard is abuse of discretion. We must accept findings
      of the trial court that are supported by competent evidence of
      record, as our role does not include making independent factual
      determinations. In addition, with regard to issues of credibility
      and weight of the evidence, we must defer to the presiding trial
      judge who viewed and assessed the witnesses first-hand.
      However, we are not bound by the trial court’s deductions or
      inferences from its factual findings. Ultimately, the test is whether
      the trial court’s conclusions are unreasonable as shown by the
      evidence of record. We may reject the conclusions of the trial
      court only if they involve an error of law, or are unreasonable in
      light of the sustainable findings of the trial court.

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C.R.F. v. S.E.F., 45 A.3d 441, 443 (Pa. Super. 2012) (quoting A.D. v. M.A.B.,

989 A.2d 32, 35-36 (Pa. Super. 2010)); see also E.R. v. J.N.B., 129 A.3d

521, 527 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted).

      This Court has consistently held:

      [t]he discretion that a trial court employs in custody matters
      should be accorded the utmost respect, given the special nature
      of the proceeding and the lasting impact the result will have on
      the lives of the parties concerned. Indeed, the knowledge gained
      by a trial court in observing witnesses in a custody proceeding
      cannot adequately be imparted to an appellate court by a printed
      record.

Ketterer v. Seifert, 902 A.2d 533, 540 (Pa. Super. 2006) (quoting Jackson

v. Beck, 858 A.2d 1250, 1254 (Pa. Super. 2004)). In addition,

      [a]lthough we are given a broad power of review, we are
      constrained by an abuse of discretion standard when evaluating
      the court’s order. An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of
      judgment, but if the court’s judgment is manifestly unreasonable
      as shown by the evidence of record, discretion is abused. An
      abuse of discretion is also made out where it appears from a
      review of the record that there is no evidence to support the
      court’s findings or that there is a capricious disbelief of evidence.

M.A.T. v. G.S.T., 989 A.2d 11, 18-19 (Pa. Super. 2010) (en banc) (citations

omitted).

      The paramount concern in any custody case decided under the Act is

the best interests of the child. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5328, 5338. “The best-

interests standard, decided on a case-by-case basis, considers all factors that

legitimately have an effect upon the child’s physical, intellectual, moral, and

spiritual wellbeing.” Saintz v. Rinker, 902 A.2d 509, 512 (Pa. Super. 2006)

(citation omitted). Section 5328(a) sets forth the best interest factors that

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the trial court must consider in awarding custody. See E.D. v. M.P., 33 A.3d

73, 79-80 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2011). It provides as follows:

     § 5328. Factors to consider when awarding custody

     (a) Factors.—In ordering any form of custody, the court shall
     determine the best interest of the child by considering all relevant
     factors, giving weighted consideration to those factors which
     affect the safety of the child, including the following:

              (1) Which party is more likely to encourage and permit
        frequent and continuing contact between the child and
        another party.

              (2) The present and past abuse committed by a party
        or member of the party’s household, whether there is a
        continued risk of harm to the child or an abused party and
        which party can better provide adequate physical
        safeguards and supervision of the child.

              (2.1) The information set forth in section 5329.1(a)(1)
        and (2) (relating to consideration of child abuse and
        involvement with protective services).

              (3) The parental duties performed by each party on
        behalf of the child.

             (4) The need for stability and continuity in the child’s
        education, family life and community life.

              (5) The availability of extended family.

              (6) The child’s sibling relationships.

              (7) The well-reasoned preference of the child, based
        on the child’s maturity and judgment.

               (8) The attempts of a parent to turn the child against
        the other parent, except in cases of domestic violence where
        reasonable safety measures are necessary to protect the
        child from harm.

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               (9) Which party is more likely to maintain a loving,
         stable, consistent and nurturing relationship with the child
         adequate for the child’s emotional needs.

               (10) Which party is more likely to attend to the daily
         physical, emotional, developmental, educational and special
         needs of the child.

               (11) The proximity of the residences of the parties.

                (12) Each party’s availability to care for the child or
         ability to make appropriate child-care arrangements.

                (13) The level of conflict between the parties and the
         willingness and ability of the parties to cooperate with one
         another. A party’s effort to protect a child from abuse by
         another party is not evidence of unwillingness or inability to
         cooperate with that party.

             (14) The history of drug or alcohol abuse of a party or
         member of a party’s household.

             (15) The mental and physical condition of a party or
         member of a party’s household.

               (16) Any other relevant factor.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a).

      With respect to a request for relocation, the Act provides, “The party

proposing the relocation has the burden of establishing that the relocation will

serve the best interest of the child as shown under the factors set forth in

subsection (h).”   Id. at § 5337(i)(1).       Furthermore, “Each party has the

burden of establishing the integrity of that party’s motives in either seeking

the relocation or seeking to prevent the relocation.”      Id. at § 5337(i)(2).

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Therefore, the trial court must also consider the following ten relocation

factors set forth within Section 5337(h) of the Act:

      (h) Relocation factors.—In determining whether to grant a
      proposed relocation, the court shall consider the following factors,
      giving weighted consideration to those factors which affect the
      safety of the child:

         (1) The nature, quality, extent of involvement and duration
         of the child’s relationship with the party proposing to
         relocate and with the nonrelocating party, siblings and other
         significant persons in the child’s life.

         (2) The age, developmental stage, needs of the child and
         the likely impact the relocation will have on the child’s
         physical, educational and emotional development, taking
         into consideration any special needs of the child.

         (3) The feasibility of preserving the relationship between the
         nonrelocating party and the child through suitable custody
         arrangements, considering the logistics and financial
         circumstances of the parties.

         (4) The child’s preference, taking into consideration the age
         and maturity of the child.

         (5) Whether there is an established pattern of conduct of
         either party to promote or thwart the relationship of the
         child and the other party.

         (6) Whether the relocation will enhance the general quality
         of life for the party seeking the relocation, including, but not
         limited to, financial or emotional benefit or educational
         opportunity.

         (7) Whether the relocation will enhance the general quality
         of life for the child, including, but not limited to, financial or
         emotional benefit or educational opportunity.

         (8) The reasons and motivation of each party for seeking or
         opposing the relocation.

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         (9) The present and past abuse committed by a party or
         member of the party’s household and whether there is a
         continued risk of harm to the child or an abused party.

         (10) Any other factor affecting the best interest of the child.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5337(h); see also A.M.S. v. M.R.C., 70 A.3d 830, 836 (Pa.

Super. 2013) (stating that, when making a decision on relocation that also

involves a custody decision, “the trial court must consider all ten relocation

factors and all sixteen custody factors” outlined in the Act.).

      The trial court must consider all of the custody and relocation factors.

       “All of the factors listed in [S]ection 5328(a) are required to be
      considered by the trial court when entering a custody order.”
      J.R.M. v. J.E.A., 33 A.3d 647, 652 (Pa. Super. 2011) (emphasis
      in original). Section 5337(h) requires courts to consider all
      relocation factors. E.D., supra at 81. The record must be clear
      on appeal that the trial court considered all the factors. Id.

A.V. v. S.T., 87 A.3d 818, 822-23 (Pa. Super. 2014) (emphasis in original).

However, this Court has emphasized that the trial court, as the finder of fact,

determines “which factors are most salient and critical in each particular case.”

M.J.M. v. M.L.G., 63 A.3d 331, 339 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal denied, 620

Pa. 710, 68 A.3d 909 (2013) (citing A.D., 989 A.2d at 35-36)). Further, we

have explained that Section 5323(d) of the Act “requires the trial court to set

forth its mandatory assessment of the [. . .] factors prior to the deadline by

which a litigant must file a notice of appeal.” A.V., 87 A.3d at 823 (citations

omitted). This Court has stated:

      In expressing the reasons for its decision, “there is no required
      amount of detail for the trial court’s explanation; all that is
      required is that the enumerated factors are considered and that
      the custody decision is based on those considerations.” M.J.M.[,

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       63 A.3d at 336]. A court’s explanation of reasons for its decision,
       which adequately addresses the relevant factors, complies with
       Section 5323(d). Id.

Id. at 822-823.

       Instantly, the trial court addressed and analyzed the custody factors

pursuant to Section 5328(a) and the relocation factors pursuant to Section

5337(h). See Trial Court Opinion, 8/18/22, at 7-16. The court determined

that Section 5337(h)(1), (3), and (4) favor Father and (6) favors Mother. The

court found the remaining factors to be equal and/or neutral or not applicable.

Further, the court found that Section 5328(a)(1), (4), and (11) favor Father,

while (3) and (10) favor Mother. The court found the remaining factors to be

equal and/or neutral or not applicable.9 Most critical to the court were Section

5337(1), (2), and (7), as well as Section 5328(a)(1) and (4), under which it

concluded that any perceived benefit to Mother from relocation, which would

flow to Child, was outweighed by the stability of the current custodial

arrangement. See id. at 17 (“[I]n consideration of all the factors . . . and the

best interest consideration of [Child], the [c]ourt finds that the proposed

relocation by Mother and the possible benefits which may attach do not

outweigh the current stability which [Child] now enjoys with an equal

apportionment of time between her parents.”).

____________________________________________

9 While not directly stated therein, with its analysis, the trial court suggests
that Section 5328(a)(11) is weighted in favor of Father and (12) and (13) are
neutral.

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      With her first issue, Mother broadly alleges that the trial court’s order is

contrary to Child’s best interests and that the court improperly applied both

the custody and relocation factors. Mother’s Brief at 41-47. Mother also notes

that, prior to separation, she was Child’s primary caretaker. Id. at 42. Mother

indicates that she and Father had discussed relocation to Kingston, Tennessee

prior to their separation, and acknowledged its benefits. Id. at 43. Mother

states that, following separation, she and Child moved in with her immediate

family and recognizes the close relationships and daily contact Child has had

with her family. Id. While initially maintaining her role as Child’s primary

caretaker, Mother asserts that she “encouraged and permitted frequent and

continuous contact between Father and [C]hild and promoted his relationship.

. . by agreeing to gradually move to a 50/50 custody arrangement.” Id. at

44. Mother indicates that her situation has not changed but for her family

moving to Tennessee and her father needing to sell the home in Blair County.

Id. at 44-45.     She, however, emphasizes Father’s alleged recent lack of

stability,   referencing   his   new   living    arrangements   and   supplemental

employment. Id. at 45-46.

      In her second through fifth and seventh through ninth issues, Mother

then assails the court’s findings as to Section 5337(h)(1), (3), (7), and (8)

and Section 5328(a)(1), (4), and (12).           Id. at 48-64, 66-77. As to these

factors, the trial court stated:

      RELOCATION FACTORS 23 Pa.C.S.[] § 5337:

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     1. The nature, quality, extent of involvement and duration of the
     child's relationship with the party proposing to relocate and with
     the non-relocating party, siblings and other significant persons in
     the child’s life.

            As the parties have had an equal custody arrangement with
     their daughter, this is a very close factor as they both have a
     positive relationship with her. However, that close relationship
     with both families will change and has in fact already changed.
     Mother’s family has chosen to relocate to Tennessee. That move
     has certainly impacted their relationship with the part[ies’]
     daughter. Mother’s family has been gone for more than a year
     and their interaction has been reduced.

            Meanwhile, Father’s family’s relationship, based on
     proximity, has remained constant. The [c]ourt found Father more
     credible than Mother in his testimony regard[ing] family contacts.
     The family living in the closer proximity will almost certainly have
     significantly more contact with [Child] than those living Boo miles
     greater distance.

           [Child] is doing very well under the current situation residing
     with Mother in Blair County with her current relationships in place.
     The [c]ourt finds this status to be an advantage for Father and
     against relocation.

                                    ...

     3. The feasibility of preserving the relationship between the non-
     relocating party and the child through suitable custody
     arrangements,      considering    the    logistics  and   financial
     circumstances of the parties.

          This is a factor against relocation. Based on the distance
     (approximately eight hours of driving), it is impractical to believe
     Father’s present close relationship could be maintained.

           In light of the foregoing, we find that this factor weighs
     against relocation.

                                    ...

     7. Whether the relocation will enhance the general quality of life
     for the child, including, but not limited to, financial or emotional
     benefit or educational opportunity.

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           This is very difficult as the fact is that the improvement in
     Mother’s life should improve a portion of the daughter’s life.
     However, the daughter would lose the proximity of Father and the
     emotional support balance that has been achieved over time
     would be fractured. The [c]ourt finds that [Child] enjoys greater
     benefits from this equal sharing. If relocation were allowed, there
     is no doubt that the father-daughter relationship would be
     negatively impacted, with Father not being able to enjoy the
     frequent personal contact that he currently has.

           The [c]ourt finds there are two significant changes if the
     relocation is permitted. They are (1) Mother would have a better
     paying job that allows flexibility which would also improve
     daughter’s life and (2) Mother would be residing with her family,
     including several relatives who her daughter knows well.
     However, these advantages are, in a sense, speculative in that
     these are Mother’s best-case scenarios.

           Contrastingly, what will be lost is the current stability of both
     parents having equal time with their child which has already been
     in place for her entire life and is proven to be very positive.

           In light of the foregoing, we find this factor is equal to both
     parties.

     8. The reasons and motivation of each party for seeking or
     opposing the relocation.

          The [c]ourt believes that both parties go into this with
     honest motivations. Mother’s motivation to move is appropriate
     and Father’s opposition is also appropriate.

           Therefore, the [c]ourt places no weight on this factor.

                                     ...

     CUSTODY FACTORS 23 Pa.C.S.[] § 5328:

     1. Which party is more likely to encourage and permit frequent
     and continuing contact between the child and another party.

           This is a major concern because it would require Mother’s
     continuing cooperation. If Mother were allowed to relocate, she
     would simply have to promote continuing contact with Father.
     Father’s testimony was that Mother does not do this well now
     when the parties live very close to each other and, therefore, the
     substantially greater distance between Pennsylvania and

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     Tennessee would make this less likely. An example is Mother
     unilaterally changing health care insurance and taking [C]hild to
     Tennessee over the 2022 Memorial Day holiday without informing
     Father. The [c]ourt found Father’s testimony in this regard more
     credible than Mother’s.

           This factor favors Father and against relocation.

                                    ...

     4. The need for stability and continuity in the child’s education,
     family life and community life.

            Mother’s relocation will challenge the current stability. Their
     daughter is three years old and the [c]ourt believes she is flexible
     and could adjust. However, the stability which she now seems to
     have found would certainly be diminished. The [c]ourt must note,
     however, that Father’s recent move (although geographically still
     very close to Mother) did impact the stability as [C]hild was taken
     from a home where she lived exclusively with just Father to a
     different location where she now shares the home with Father, his
     paramour and the paramour’s daughter. However, based on the
     current chaotic schedule the parties follow, this stability has room
     for improvement but there is no doubt that the current situation
     would be drastically altered by a move eight hundred miles away
     from a parent who now has that child fifty percent of the time.
     This child is doing well in her current environment.

           This factor favors Father and against relocation.

                                    ...

     12. Each parent’s ability to care for the child or ability to make
     appropriate child-care arrangements.

     Both parties would require assistance based on [C]hild’s age.
     Both parties seem to have substantial contacts to assist them,
     with Mother having her entire family in Tennessee and Father
     having numerous relatives in Blair County. It should be noted if
     relocation is denied, Mother’s familial contacts will not be
     available.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/18/22, at 7-8, 10-14, 16.

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      As to Section 5337(h)(1), the nature, quality, extent of involvement and

duration of the child's relationship with the party proposing to relocate and

with the non-relocating party, siblings and other significant persons in the

child’s life, Mother argues that the trial court erred in finding this factor in

favor of Father. Mother’s Brief at 48. She states that the court’s indication

that Child’s “close relationship with both families will change and has, in fact,

already changed” is incorrect, noting that the evidence suggests that Child

continues to have a positive relationship with Mother’s extended family,

despite their relocation to Tennessee. Id. at 48-49. Mother challenges the

court’s finding that Father’s family’s relationship, based merely upon

proximity, remained constant. Id. at 49. She further suggests that the court

was incorrect with its reference to contacts and its bald determination that

Father was more credible as it relates to contacts. Id. at 49-51.

      As to Section 5337(h)(3), the feasibility of preserving the relationship

between the non-relocating party and the child through suitable custody

arrangements, considering the logistics and financial circumstances of the

parties, Mother argues that the trial court erred in determining this factor

weighed in favor of Father. Id. at 51. Mother maintains that the court merely

considered travel time, failing to consider finances and logistics. Id. at 52.

Mother states, “It is clear from the record that the [c]ourt failed to properly

apply the mandates of this factor. The [c]ourt was to consider whether or not

the relationship between the nonrelocating party and the child could be

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preserved through suitable custody arrangements and it was to consider

logistics and financial circumstances of the parties. All the [c]ourt considered

was the travel time. This fell far short of what this statute requires.” Id. She

indicates that the court neglected her testimony as to her expected flexibility

and proposed custodial arrangement with Father. Id. at 53-55.

       As to Section 5337(h)(7), whether the relocation will enhance the

general quality of life for the child, including, but not limited to, financial or

emotional benefit or educational opportunity, Mother argues that the trial

court improperly applied this factor. Id. at 56. Mother asserts that the court’s

finding that this factor favors Father is inconsistent with its finding that Section

5337(h)(6) favors Mother. Id. Mother states, “The [c]ourt made the finding

that any advantages to [C]hild in Mother’s move are, in a sense, speculative

in that these are Mother’s best care scenarios. The [c]ourt did not make such

a statement when it analyzed the same benefits to Mother.”10 Id. at 56-57.

____________________________________________

10 In analyzing Section 5337(h)(6), whether the relocation will enhance the
general quality of life for the party seeking the relocation, including, but not
limited to, financial or emotional benefit or educational opportunity, the court
stated:

       Based on Mother’s testimony the relocation would assist her both
       financially and emotionally. A promotion to a manager in the retail
       atmosphere would provide her with greater income and her
       general quality of life would be improved being able to live close
       to her family.

       In light of the foregoing, we find that this factor weighs in favor of
       relocation.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/18/22, at 9-10.

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She continues, “In its analysis of [Section 5337(h)(7)], the [c]ourt minimized

the very positive impact upon the general quality of [C]hild’s life if Mother is

able to move to Tennessee.       The [c]ourt failed to address the foregoing

benefits to Mother that will also benefit [C]hild.” Id. at 58. Mother further

reasons that the court’s focus on maintaining Father and Child’s relationship

is more appropriate to Section 5337(h)(3) and ignored her willingness to

encourage and promote their relationship and provide Father custodial time.

Id. at 59-61. Moreover, with this, Mother suggests that the court considered

the impact on Father, not Child. Id. at 61.

      As to Section 5337(h)(8), the reasons and motivation of each party for

seeking or opposing the relocation, Mother argues that the court erred in

failing to give weight to this factor. Id. at 62. Mother claims that this factor

weighs in her favor and then points to her “compelling” reasons for seeking

relocation to Tennessee, which are consistent with the prior intentions of the

parties. Id. at 62-63. In so stating, she then notes that Father’s intentions

have shifted and that his focus is now on his perceived loss of time with Child.

Id. at 63-64.

      As to Section 5328(a)(1), which party is more likely to encourage and

permit frequent and continuing contact between the child and another party,

Mother argues that the trial court erred in finding this factor favored Father.

Id. at 66. Mother notes that the court cites Mother’s changing Child’s health

insurance and taking Child to Tennessee over Memorial Day in support of its

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determination. Id. at 67. She states that, not only does the evidence not

support this finding, but the issue of unilaterally placing child on her health

insurance is unrelated. Id. at 67-68. Mother argues evidence supports that

she encourages and permits Father’s frequent contact with Child and has done

so since separation. Id. at 68-71.

      As to Section 5328(a)(4), the need for stability and continuity in the

child’s education, family life and community life, Mother argues that the trial

court erred in finding this factor weighed in favor of Father. Id. at 72. Mother

asserts “major changes in [Father’s] life [] have affected [C]hild significantly

since the first relocation hearing.” Id. Mother references Father’s move to

the home of his new girlfriend in a different school district and his starting of

a lawncare business. Id. at 72-75.

      As to Section 5328(a)(12), each parent’s ability to care for the child or

ability to make appropriate child-care arrangements, Mother argues that the

trial court erred in not finding that this factor favored Mother.     Id. at 75.

Mother contends that the court “misstated” this factor and incorrectly failed

to analyze the parties’ availability. Id. at 75-76. Mother contends that, rather

than the parties’ availability, the court “focused on people that are available

to help each of the parties regarding childcare arrangements rather than how

available each of the parties will be if the relocation is granted.” Id. Mother

then proceeds to emphasize her availability and flexibility if relocation to

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Tennessee is granted.     Id. at 76.   She further suggests Father’s lack of

availability due to starting his lawncare business. Id. at 76-77.

      As stated above, with regard to the custody and relocation factors, we

have stated that the trial court is required to consider all such factors. A.V.,

87 A.3d at 822-23.      Although the court is required to give “weighted

consideration to those factors which affect the safety of the child” pursuant to

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a) and 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5337(h), we have acknowledged

that the amount of weight a court gives any one factor is almost entirely

discretionary. M.J.M., 63 A.3d 331 at 339. As we stated in M.J.M.,

      It is within the trial court’s purview as the finder of fact to
      determine which factors are most salient and critical in
      each particular case. See A.D.[, 989 A.2d at 35-36] (“In
      reviewing a custody order ... our role does not include making
      independent factual determinations.... In addition, with regard to
      issues of credibility and weight of the evidence, we must defer to
      the presiding trial judge who viewed and assessed the witnesses
      first-hand.”). Our decision here does not change that.

M.J.M., 63 A.3d 331 at 339 (emphasis added). Further, while a parent’s role

in caring for a child may be considered in light of the statutory factors, “the

primary caretaker doctrine, insofar as it required positive emphasis on the

primary caretaker’s status, is no longer viable.” Id.

      As we construe Mother’s claims, we interpret the issues raised at their

core as disputes to the trial court’s findings of fact and determinations

regarding credibility and weight of the evidence.         Mother, in essence,

questions the trial court’s conclusions and assessments and seeks this Court

to re-find facts, re-weigh evidence, and/or re-assess credibility to his view of

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the evidence.   This we cannot do.    Under the aforementioned standard of

review applicable in custody matters, the trial court’s findings of fact and

determinations regarding credibility and weight of the evidence are not

disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. See C.R.F., 45 A.3d at 443; see

also E.R., 129 A.3d at 527. As we stated in King v. King, 889 A.2d 630, 632

(Pa. Super. 2005), “It is not this Court’s function to determine whether the

trial court reached the ‘right’ decision; rather, we must consider whether,

‘based on the evidence presented, given [sic] due deference to the trial court’s

weight and credibility determinations,’ the trial court erred or abused its

discretion. . . .” (quoting Hanson v. Hanson, 878 A.2d 127, 129 (Pa. Super.

2005)). After a thorough review of the record, we find no abuse of discretion.

Further, to the extent Mother challenges the weight attributed to any factor

by the trial court, we likewise find no abuse of discretion. As stated above,

the amount of weight that a trial court gives to any one factor is almost

entirely within its discretion. See M.J.M., 63 A.3d at 339.

      Instantly, the trial court analyzed and addressed each of the custody

and relocation factors pursuant to Section 5328(a) and Section 5337(h). See

Trial Court Opinion, 8/18/22, at 7-16. After careful review of the record, we

determine that the trial court’s findings and determinations regarding the

custody and relocation factors set forth in Section 5328(a) and Section

5337(h) are supported by competent evidence in the record, and we will not

disturb them. See C.R.F., 45 A.3d at 443; see also E.R., 129 A.3d at 527.

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       Lastly, with her sixth issue, Mother additionally contends that the trial

court erred in imposing an improper legal burden. Mother’s Brief at 64-66.

Mother references the court’s statement, made after a discussion of Gruber

v. Gruber, 583 A.2d 434 (Pa. Super. 1990),11 “In all instances where a

custodial parent seeks to relocate and a noncustodial parent opposes the

move, the burden is on the custodial parent to establish a significant

improvement in the quality of life for that parent and child.” Mother’s Brief at

65 (referencing Trial Court Opinion, 8/18/22, at 5).         Mother argues that

Section 5337(h)(6) and (7), which address the quality of life of the relocating

parent and the child, do not require significant improvement. She states,

       This statement is contrary to the [r]elocation [f]actors set forth in
       23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 5337(h). In particular, the specific factor that
       discusses the quality of life for the parent and child, appear in
       factors 6 and 7 where, in both instances, the statute does not
       require the relocating party to establish a significant improvement
       in the quality of life for that parent and child, but instead only
       requires the [c]ourt to determine whether the relocation will
       enhance the general quality of life for the moving party and the
       child.

Id. at 65-66.

       This claim is without merit. Here, upon review, the court applied the

relocation factors pursuant to Section 5337(h) and not Gruber. See Trial

Court Opinion, 8/18/22, at 7-11. The court’s analysis of Section 5337(h)(6)

____________________________________________

11While Gruber v. Gruber, 583 A.2d 434, 439 (Pa. Super. 1990), required a
substantial improvement to the lives of the relocating parent and child, that
decision has been supplanted by the statutory factors of the
Act. See Commonwealth v. Childs, 142 A.3d 823, 832 (Pa. 2016).

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and (7) reveals a focus on the enhancement of the general quality of life, not

a significant improvement, as suggested. See id. at 9-11 (stating, in part, as

to Mother, “A promotion to a manager in the retail atmosphere would provide

her with greater income and her general quality of life would be improved

being able to live close to her family.”). Moreover, the court properly noted

the burden of proof as set forth in Section 5337(i)(1) (“The party proposing

the relocation has the burden of establishing that the relocation will serve the

best interest of the child as shown under the factors set forth in subsection

(h).”). Trial Court Opinion, 8/18/22, at 3.

      For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 5/16/2023

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