Court Opinion

ID: 9913140
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-26 22:01:44.039326+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:07:29.811650
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/26/23 P. v. Jones CA1/5
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                  DIVISION FIVE

 THE PEOPLE,
           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                     A165177
 v.
 THOMAS DEAN JONES,                                                      (Mendocino County
           Defendant and Appellant.                                      Super. Ct. No.
                                                                           SCUKCRCR2036203)

         Defendant, who represented himself at trial, was convicted by a jury of
first degree murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189; count one)1 and
attempted first degree murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664; count two). As to the
murder count, the jury found true the special circumstances that the murder
was committed for financial gain (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(1)) and by lying in wait
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15)). The jury also found true the allegation that
defendant personally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury or
death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)) and that defendant had suffered six prior
serious felony convictions. On appeal, defendant argues he was not
competent to represent himself and he did not make a knowing waiver of his
right to counsel. He also argues there was insufficient evidence to support

         1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise

stated.

                                                               1
the financial gain and lying-in-wait special circumstances. Finally, he
contends, and the People concede, that the trial court erred in calculating the
sentencing enhancements for his prior convictions.2
      We affirm the conviction but remand to the trial court for correction of
the conceded sentencing error regarding defendant’s prior convictions.
                               BACKGROUND
      Before we address the evidence presented at the murder/attempted
murder jury trial, we first discuss the background of the proceedings
regarding defendant’s competency to stand trial and his request to represent
himself.
I.    Competency Hearing
      On November 17, 2020, defendant’s trial counsel declared a doubt as to
defendant’s competency to stand trial. The trial court suspended the
proceedings and appointed two doctors to evaluate defendant. Dr. Jessica
Ferranti’s report concluded that defendant was not competent to stand trial.
Dr. Kevin Kelly’s report concluded defendant was competent to stand trial.
Following receipt of the conflicting reports, the trial court conducted a jury
trial on the issue of defendant’s competency to stand trial. (§ 1369.)
      Defendant testified that he “claimed to hold some titles in the people’s
portion of the civil government” and that he was “head of the psychological
warfare division” and the “New Guard . . . .” He believed he has “[d]iplomatic
immunity” from prosecution as “the people’s chair.” His primary motivation

      2 We acknowledge that on May 27, 2022, December 27, 2022,

February 17, 2023, and May 15, 2023, this court received letters from the
defendant in propria persona. We decline to file these documents because
defendant is represented by counsel. A criminal defendant does not have a
right to appear before this court in propria persona or as cocounsel. (People v.
Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 173; People v. Scott (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 550,
579.)

                                        2
for going to trial “has always been to get the government to call for
conventions of the people . . . to ratify . . . gun control, abortion, freedom of
religion, freedom of speech, [and] all of the things that have been taken away
recently and for the last hundred years.” He acknowledged that his political
beliefs did not contribute to the crime and that he could separate the crime
from his political views. Defendant had talked with his attorney about the
specifics of the case and possible defenses. He stated he was willing to work
with his attorney to find the strongest possible defense.
      Dr. Ferranti, a forensic psychiatrist, testified that she diagnosed
defendant with delusional disorder, grandiose type. She found that
defendant did not have a communication deficit; nor did he have cognitive
problems, a developmental delay, or a mental disability. He understood the
criminal proceedings. However, Dr. Ferranti did not believe defendant was
able to rationally assist his attorney because his delusions prevent him from
being able to do so. During her discussions with defendant, he focused on his
political and religious views and went on tangents about the government and
quoted from the Federalist Papers. Defendant told Dr. Ferranti that he was
not interested in defending his case but, rather, was focused on conveying a
political message. He believed he should have immunity because he is the
leader of an organization he refers to as “the sphere of people’s action . . . .”
Dr. Ferranti opined that because defendant is preoccupied with grandiose
fantasies, he is not able to consult rationally with an attorney.
      Dr. Kelly, a forensic psychologist, testified that defendant understood
the status and circumstances of the case against him. He was able to talk
about the facts and issues. Dr. Kelly described essays defendant wrote as
similar in content to talk radio shows and Internet sites in that they referred
to conspiracy, governmental overreach, infringement of individual rights and

                                         3
necessary changes to the system. Defendant understood that his beliefs were
not necessarily shared by the general public. Dr. Kelly was able to redirect
defendant when he veered off topic during their discussions. Dr. Kelly
acknowledged there was grandiosity in defendant’s writings, but he did not
see defendant display grandiosity in their discussions. Dr. Kelly did not
believe that defendant’s grandiosity was at a level that is a mental health
disorder. Based on tests Dr. Kelly administered to defendant and Dr. Kelly’s
own observations of defendant, Dr. Kelly found no evidence of a mental
disorder. Defendant had schizoid and paranoid personality characteristics,
but they were not at a level that impaired his competency to stand trial.
Dr. Kelly believed that defendant had the capacity to assist in his defense
and would be able to separate his political ideas from his legal defense. On
August 13, 2021, the jury found defendant mentally competent to stand trial.
Defendant does not contest this finding.
II.   Faretta Hearings
      On September 20, 2021, defendant asked to represent himself. On
October 5, 2021, defendant filed a Faretta3 form stating that he understood
his constitutional rights and the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation. At the hearing on defendant’s motion to represent himself,
Judge Shanahan confirmed with defendant that he understood his right to
counsel, his right against self-incrimination and his right to a speedy trial.
She then told defendant that “representing yourself is never wise” and that
he would be expected to comply with the Evidence Code. She further stated
that she reviewed some of the documents from defendant’s case and knew he
had “some ideas about the government,” and then she explained that “if it
doesn’t follow proper rules of evidence, some of that information may not be

      3 Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [45 L.Ed.2d 562].

                                        4
allowed to come in at trial.” Defendant confirmed that he understood. Judge
Shanahan then explained that defendant would be opposing the prosecutor,
who was a very experienced trial attorney. Defendant again confirmed that
he understood. Defendant also told the judge that he understood the
maximum sentence was 137 years to life without parole. Judge Shanahan
again referred to some of defendant’s letters regarding his ideas about the
government and told him that they might not be admitted at trial and then
stated: “I’m advising you that if you represent yourself, you may not be able
to have the platform that you think you’re going to have as far as your issues
with the case.” Defendant said he understood. Judge Shanahan granted
defendant’s motion to represent himself.
      On December 2, 2021, at a pretrial conference before Judge Faulder,
defendant filed two motions entitled: “Notice of Motion and Motion for
Discovery” and “Notice of Motion Points Introduction and Motion of 995, to
dismiss charges not legally made.” Judge Faulder described the motions as
follows: “[O]ut of 24 pages only one paragraph relates to anything of
substance and most of the rest, if not all of the rest of the motion, are [sic]
quotes from the Constitution and from historical figures, including numerous
quotes from Alexander Hamilton, none of which helps the Court ensure that
it’s doing its duty in making sure that you are getting a fair trial in this
matter.” Judge Faulder stated he was concerned about defendant’s
competence to represent himself “despite the findings of Judge Shanahan on
October 5th” and that he intended to reevaluate whether defendant should
continue self-representation.
      At the continued pretrial conference on December 28, 2021, Judge
Faulder again expressed concern about defendant’s self-representation and
asked him a series of questions, including what charges defendant faced and

                                         5
whether he understood that he would be trying his case against an
experienced trial attorney and that he would be held to the same standards of
preparedness, professionalism and decorum as the prosecutor. Defendant
correctly stated that he was charged with murder and attempted murder and
that he understood Judge Faulder’s admonitions.
      On January 14, 2022, Judge Faulder held a hearing after receiving two
additional motions filed by defendant, entitled: “Notice of Motion and Motion
for Change of Venue” and “Motion for Discovery of Jurisdiction.” The
prosecutor responded to the motions by stating that he anticipated making
motions in limine asking the court to “strongly admonish the defendant that
the issues will be whether he committed the murder, whether he used a
firearm, whether he attempted to murder the second man, whether he had
the six strikes. [¶] . . . [N]ot whether he holds the People’s Chair in the
People’s Sphere of Action.” Judge Faulder stated that the motions’ headings
listed real issues but that the bodies of the pleadings were essays of
defendant’s political beliefs and views and did not ask the court for relief or
provide authority for the court to act. He again stated his concern about
defendant’s competency to represent himself and appointed Dr. Kelly to
evaluate that issue.
      On January 27, 2022, Dr. Kelly submitted his evaluation of defendant’s
competency to represent himself. The report explains that Dr. Kelly
reviewed defendant’s motions and the transcript of the January 14, 2022
hearing, including the prosecutor’s reference to anticipated motions to
exclude references to “the People’s Chair in the People’s Sphere of Action,”
and met with defendant on January 27, 2022. Dr. Kelly opined that
defendant’s mental status and behavior had not changed since he had been in
custody. He did not observe any symptoms of psychosis but found that

                                        6
defendant had a personality disorder and that strong schizoid personal traits
accounted for defendant’s difficulties representing himself. Defendant’s
mental status did not negatively impair his daily activities; nor did it require
medication. Dr. Kelly found that defendant was “acting knowingly,
intelligently, voluntarily, and that he is aware of the general dangers of self-
representation.” He also stated that defendant “anticipates in limine orders
that he will disagree with, and he states that he will ‘probably not’ respect
the orders because he is entitled to be ‘truthful’ in presenting all of his
defense.” Dr. Kelly opined that defendant “is presently acting in an
ineffectual manner in his self-representation,” and Dr. Kelly believed
defendant was highly likely to continue to be ineffectual. Dr. Kelly explained,
“[Defendant] is ineffectual despite the fact that he is capable of
understanding the nature of the proceedings and he is capable of researching
and learning how to represent himself in an effective manner. He has made
appropriate motions, at times, but the idiosyncrasies of his Schizoid
personality traits and his verbose communication style buries [sic] what
would be a pertinent legal motion within highly distracting and repetitive
political posturing thereby sabotaging the credibility and impact of his
motion. [¶] The fact that he persists in bringing up ideas that are not directly
relevant to the allegations is, in my opinion, the strongest evidence of lacking
competency to represent himself.” Dr. Kelly further stated that if defendant
was not permitted to represent himself, he would continue to press his ideas
at trial either through defense counsel or by testifying.
      On February 2, 2022, Judge Faulder held a hearing on the question of
defendant’s competency to represent himself. Defendant confirmed that he
reviewed Dr. Kelly’s January 27th report and that he wished to continue
representing himself. Defendant stated that he understood he would be

                                        7
facing an experienced prosecutor and, “No lawyer can make any defense that
would be better than me.” Judge Faulder summarized Dr. Kelly’s conclusion
as finding that “while [defendant] may not be qualified to represent [himself]
or maybe even competent to represent [himself], [defendant is] competent to
choose to represent [himself].” Judge Faulder then asked defendant to state
the charges, including the special allegations, which he did. Defendant
stated that if he were found guilty he would face “199 years to life without
parole.” Judge Faulder reminded defendant that by representing himself he
was giving up the right to appeal based on ineffective assistance of counsel
and that if he were disruptive at trial the court could relieve him of the right
to represent himself. Multiple times, Judge Faulder told defendant that self-
representation was “unwise” and against the court’s advice. Judge Faulder
concluded by stating: “[I]f the question were do I think you are qualified to
represent yourself or even competent in the sense of knowing the law or
knowing how to represent yourself as a trained attorney would, I would find
that you are not competent. But that is not the standard I have to follow.
[¶] The standard I have to follow is whether or not you are competent to
choose to represent yourself knowing the risks and consequences to self-
representation. And in good conscience, I cannot make that finding. [¶] I find
that you are, as Dr. Kelley [sic] pointed out, competent to choose to represent
yourself.”
III.   Evidence in Murder/Attempted Murder Trial
       At trial, among other evidence, the prosecution played recorded
interviews defendant gave to the police following the murder. Defendant
lived in a motor home on family property. Jamie Wilcox was defendant’s
stepson. Wilcox and his husband, Jayme G., lived in a house on the family
property, and Wilcox owned an interest in the property. Defendant believed

                                        8
Wilcox and Jayme G. planned to sell their part of the property and “screw
everybody.”
      On September 23, 2020, at 6:30 a.m., defendant put a gun in his
waistband and waited for Wilcox and Jayme G. to come out of their home and
get into their car. When they did, defendant approached the car with the gun
behind his back. Defendant asked them whether there was anything he
could do to change their mind, and Jayme G. said no. Defendant then shot
them both. The police were dispatched to the scene at 8:09 a.m. in response
to Jayme G.’s 911 call. Wilcox had a gunshot wound to his head and to his
neck. He was pronounced dead at the scene. Jayme G. was shot in his upper
right arm, his hand, and his head. He suffered a fractured wrist and a
fractured skull.
                                 DISCUSSION
I.    Waiver of Right to Counsel
      A.      Legal Principles
      Faretta holds that the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution gives criminal defendants the right to represent themselves
when the defendant knowingly and intelligently elects to do so. (Faretta,
supra, 422 U.S. at pp. 819–820, 835–836.) A self-represented defendant need
not meet the standards of an attorney or even be capable of conducting “an
effective defense.” (People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181, 206.) “[T]he cost of
recognizing a criminal defendant’s right to self-representation may result ‘ “in
detriment to the defendant, if not outright unfairness.” ’ ” (Ibid.) A
defendant’s decision to present no defense is a valid exercise of the right to
control the defense. (Id. at p. 209.)
      A criminal defendant also has the constitutional right not to stand trial
while he or she is mentally incompetent. (Indiana v. Edwards (2008) 554

                                        9
U.S. 164, 169–170 [171 L.Ed.2d 345].) The constitutional test for mental
competence to stand trial is “(1) ‘whether’ the defendant has ‘a rational as
well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him’ and
(2) whether the defendant ‘has sufficient present ability to consult with his
lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding.’ ” (Ibid.) Section
1367, subdivision (a) similarly precludes prosecution while a defendant, “as a
result of a mental health disorder or developmental disability . . . is unable to
understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the
conduct of a defense in a rational manner.”
      Indiana v. Edwards, supra, recognized the existence of “gray-area
defendants” who are mentally competent to stand trial but “who still suffer
from severe mental illness to the point where they are not competent to
conduct trial proceedings by themselves.” (554 U.S. at pp. 172–174, 178.)
Edwards held that the Constitution permits states to impose a higher
standard of mental competence for self-representation. (Id. at p. 178.) In
2009, the California Supreme Court explained the permissive nature of the
Edwards holding: “Edwards does not mandate the application of such a dual
standard of competency for mentally ill defendants. In other words, Edwards
did not alter the principle that the federal constitution is not violated when a
trial court permits a mentally ill defendant to represent himself at trial, even
if he lacks the mental capacity to conduct the trial proceedings himself, if he
is competent to stand trial and his waiver of counsel is voluntary, knowing,
and intelligent. [Citation.] Edwards thus does not support a claim of federal
constitutional error in a case like the present one, in which defendant’s
request to represent himself was granted.” (People v. Taylor (2009) 47
Cal.4th 850, 878.)

                                       10
      In People v. Johnson (2012) 53 Cal.4th 519, the California Supreme
Court decided “whether California courts may accept Edwards’s invitation
and deny self-representation to gray-area defendants.” (Id. at p. 527.) It held
that they could and that “the standard that trial courts considering
exercising their discretion to deny self-representation should apply is simply
whether the defendant suffers from a severe mental illness to the point where
he or she cannot carry out the basic tasks needed to present the defense
without the help of counsel.” (Id. at p. 530.) “Trial courts must apply this
standard cautiously” given that criminal defendants generally have a Sixth
Amendment right to self-representation. (Id. at p. 531.) “Self-representation
by defendants who wish it and validly waive counsel remains the norm and
may not be denied lightly. A court may not deny self-representation merely
because it believes the matter could be tried more efficiently, or even more
fairly, with attorneys on both sides. Rather, it may deny self-representation
only in those situations where Edwards permits it.” (Ibid.) Determinations
regarding self-representation are reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Ibid.)
The trial court’s competency determination must be upheld if supported by
substantial evidence. (Ibid.)
      B.    Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It
            Permitted Defendant to Represent Himself
      Defendant argues he was not competent to waive his right to counsel.
He concedes that there was evidence that he was capable of understanding
the law and was capable of “mentally separating his views from the
applicable California law.” However, he contends, without record citations,4

      4 Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 990

[“California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) requires every reference to a
matter in the appellate record be supported with a citation to the volume and

                                      11
that “the record also demonstrates that he not only would not, but due to his
delusional mental state could not, act in any manner that meaningfully
advanced a defense based on California law.” We find the trial court did not
abuse its discretion when it permitted defendant to continue self-
representation after it reviewed an additional court-ordered evaluation of
defendant’s competency to represent himself.
      Dr. Kelly’s January 27, 2022, report found defendant was not suffering
from psychosis but had a personality disorder. Although Dr. Kelly opined
that defendant was “presently acting in an ineffectual manner in his self-
representation”; he also stated that defendant was capable of understanding
the nature of the proceedings, researching and learning to represent himself
effectively. Dr. Kelly also reported that defendant was acting knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily; that he understood the dangers of self-
representation; and that he even anticipated that the trial court would not
allow him to present his political beliefs. Although defendant did not present
an effective defense, that is not the standard for determining whether a
defendant may represent him- or herself. (People v. Mickel, supra, 2 Cal.5th
at p. 206 [“the critical question is not whether a self-represented defendant
meets the standards of an attorney, or even whether a defendant is capable of
conducting an effective defense” because the risks are “a cost that we allow
defendants the choice of paying”].) Although Dr. Kelly’s January 27, 2022,
report concluded that defendant was acting in an “ineffectual manner in his
self-representation,” it also stated that defendant understood the proceedings
and was capable of researching and learning to represent himself effectively.
The record indicates that the trial court carefully considered, and

page number of the record where the matter appears. The rule applies
wherever a reference to a matter in the record appears in a brief”].)

                                       12
reconsidered, whether defendant should be permitted to represent himself.
The court agreed with Dr. Kelly and specifically found defendant was
competent to choose to represent himself. There was no abuse of discretion.
      Nor are we persuaded that the trial court did not understand its
discretion to revoke defendant’s right to self-representation under Edwards.
The record here is distinguishable from People v. Shiga (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th
22, 40, which found the trial court erred in granting the defendant’s Faretta
motion because the record revealed that the trial court erroneously believed
that a finding the defendant was competent to stand trial “ ‘tied’ ” its hands
as to the determination of whether the defendant was also competent to
represent himself. Shiga found the defendant made an affirmative showing
that the court was unaware of its discretion “both to conduct an inquiry
regarding whether defendant was mentally incapable of representing himself
and, if necessary, to deny defendant’s Faretta request on that ground.” (Ibid.)
This affirmative showing rebutted the general rule that the trial court is
presumed to have been aware of and followed applicable law. (Ibid.)
      Here, the record demonstrates that the trial court understood its
discretion to both conduct an inquiry into whether defendant was mentally
competent to continue representing himself and to revoke self-representation.
Most significantly, on multiple occasions, the trial court voiced concerns
about defendant’s mental capacity to represent himself based on the motions
he filed. The court then proceeded to actually conduct an inquiry as to
whether defendant should be permitted to continue self-representation. As
part of the trial court’s inquiry, it obtained a second report from Dr. Kelly on
the issue of defendant’s competency to represent himself.
      Defendant is incorrect in suggesting that the record does not indicate
Judge Faulder was aware of Edwards or Johnson, which permit a court to

                                       13
find that “gray-area defendants” may not represent themselves. Although
Judge Faulder did not specifically mention Edwards or Johnson during the
February 2, 2022 hearing, at a preceding hearing on January 31, 2022, the
prosecutor asked the trial court to review People v. Best (2020) 49
Cal.App.5th 747, which discusses both Edwards and Johnson. (People v.
Best, at p. 757.) The trial court noted the case citation and arranged for the
prosecutor to provide a copy of the case to the defendant. The fact that the
trial court did not specifically mention Edwards or Johnson in stating its
decision to permit defendant to continue to represent himself does not
warrant a departure from the general rule that the trial court is presumed to
have been aware of and followed applicable law. (People v. Shiga, supra, 6
Cal.App.5th at p. 40.)
      C.    Defendant’s Waiver of the Right to Counsel Was Knowing
      Defendant argues his waiver of the right to counsel was not knowing.
We review a Faretta waiver de novo and examine the record as a whole to
determine whether defendant understood the consequences of waiving the
right to counsel. (People v. Mickel, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 211.) Specifically,
defendant claims that he did not know that if he waived counsel and
represented himself, he would not be allowed to present the immunity
defense based on his position in the New Guard. According to defendant, he
was “led to believe that he could present the immunity defense if he
represented himself.” Our review of the record belies defendant’s claim.
      Defendant filed a Faretta form stating he understood his constitutional
rights and the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. At the first
Faretta hearing, on October 5, 2021, Judge Shanahan confirmed on the
record that defendant understood his rights, and she told him self-
representation is “never wise.” She also specifically referred to defendant’s

                                       14
“ideas about the government” and cautioned that such information may not
be allowed at trial and that “you may not be able to have the platform that
you think you’re going to have . . . .” Defendant said he understood. At the
pretrial hearing on December 28, 2021, Judge Faulder again admonished
defendant regarding the dangers of self-representation and confirmed that
defendant understood. At a pretrial hearing on January 14, 2022, the
prosecutor stated that he anticipated making motions in limine to preclude
defendant from referencing “whether he holds the People’s Chair in the
People’s Sphere of Action.” Dr. Kelly’s January 27, 2022 evaluation of
defendant states that defendant was “acting knowingly, intelligently,
voluntarily, and that he is aware of the general dangers of self-
representation.” It also states that defendant “anticipates in limine orders
that he will disagree with, and he states that he will ‘probably not’ respect
the orders because he is entitled to be ‘truthful’ in presenting his defense.” At
the February 2, 2022, hearing on the question of defendant’s competency to
continue self-representation, Judge Faulder again confirmed that defendant
wished to continue to represent himself. Judge Faulder asked defendant to
state the charges against him and the penalty he faced if he were found
guilty, and defendant did so. Judge Faulder again reminded defendant that
self-representation meant he was giving up the right to appeal based on
ineffective assistance of counsel and that if defendant were disruptive at
trial, the court could relieve him of the right to represent himself. Finally,
Judge Faulder told defendant multiple times that self-representation was
“unwise” and against the court’s advice. On this record, defendant’s waiver of
the right to counsel was knowing.

                                       15
II.   Special Circumstances Findings
      A.     Substantial Evidence Supports Finding the Murder Was
             Carried Out for Financial Gain
      Defendant argues that the jury’s finding that he committed the murder
for financial gain is not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree. The
financial gain required to support a special circumstance finding does not
need to be “the ‘ “ ‘dominant,’ ‘substantial,’ or ‘significant’ motive for the
murder.” ’ ” (People v. Parker (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1, 63.) Nor is it required that
the intended financial benefit from the murder actually materialize. (Ibid.)
Further, the special circumstance applies if the defendant carries out the
murder for the financial gain of a third person. (People v. Michaels (2002) 28
Cal.4th 486, 520.)
      The evidence, including defendant’s statements to the police following
the shooting, is that defendant convinced his sister to give Wilcox “resident
tenancy on the property.” Jayme G., the surviving victim, testified that
Wilcox had an interest in the property on which defendant and his sister and
other family members also lived. The day before the shooting, defendant
learned that Jayme G. and Wilcox intended to sell what he described as
“their quarter” of the property. Defendant wanted “to protect the property.”
He shot the victims because “they were going to destroy my family” and “sell
[the property] out from under [his sister] and tear it apart.” Defendant
stated Wilcox “had to be dead to get off of the . . . deed.”
      Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we find
that a reasonable jury could conclude that defendant killed Wilcox to protect
his family’s ownership of, and interest in, the property. (People v. Parker,
supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 58.)

                                         16
      B.    Substantial Evidence Supports Lying-in-wait Finding
      The lying-in-wait special circumstance instruction states: “A person
commits a murder by means of lying in wait if: [¶] 1. He or she concealed his
or her purpose from the person killed; [¶] 2. He or she waited and watched for
an opportunity to act; [¶] 3. Then he or she made a surprise attack on the
person killed from a position of advantage; [¶] AND [¶] 4. He or she intended
to kill the person by taking the person by surprise.” (CALCRIM No. 728.)
Defendant concedes there was sufficient evidence of elements 3 and 4.
However, he contends there was insubstantial evidence of elements 1 and 2.
Defendant argues that his “true ‘purpose’ ” in approaching the victims’ car
was not simply to kill Wilcox but, rather, to ask him if he had changed his
mind about selling the property. We find sufficient evidence to support the
jury’s finding.
      The evidence included defendant’s statement to the police that he
armed himself with a loaded gun around 6:30 a.m. the morning of the
murder. He then “waited till they came out to get in the car . . . .” Defendant
cocked the gun before approaching the car. He approached the victims with
his gun hidden behind his back. Jayme G. testified that he did not see
defendant’s gun as he approached them. Defendant asked the victims, “ ‘Are
you going to stop this?’ ” Jayme G. did not know what defendant was talking
about and said, “ ‘Stop what?’ ” Defendant then immediately shot Wilcox and
then Jayme G. Jayme G. called 911, and the police responded to the scene at
8:09 a.m.
      The evidence is sufficient to support a finding of lying in wait. The jury
could reasonably conclude that defendant concealed his purpose, and waited
and watched for an opportunity to act, when he armed himself with a gun at
6:30 a.m.; waited for over an hour until the victims got into their car;

                                       17
approached the car with a concealed, loaded gun behind his back; and then
shot the victims immediately after Jayme G. expressed confusion about what
defendant had asked them.
      Nor are we persuaded that People v. Becerrada (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1009,
which defendant cites, requires reversal of the lying-in-wait finding. In
Becerrada, the Supreme Court reversed a lying-in-wait special circumstance
for insufficient evidence. (Id. at pp. 1028–1029.) The defendant threatened
to kill the victim if she did not dismiss rape charges against him. (Id. at pp.
1015, 1029.) After a phone call from the defendant, the victim went to his
house, where she was murdered. (Id. at p. 1029.) The prosecution’s theory to
support the lying-in-wait special circumstance was that defendant lured the
victim to his home, intending to kill her after learning she would not drop the
rape charges. (Id. at pp. 1028–1029.) The evidence supported a finding that
defendant intended to kill the victim if she failed to drop the rape charges;
however, the court emphasized there was no evidence “defendant learned
before [the victim’s] fatal trip to his home that [the victim] had not dropped
the charges.” (Id. at p. 1029, italics omitted.) The court concluded there was
insufficient evidence to establish the requisite period of watching and waiting
because there was no evidence to support a finding that defendant lured the
victim to his home intending to kill her. (Ibid.)
      Here, there is evidence that defendant planned to kill Wilcox “to get
[him] off of the . . . deed” and that he armed himself and waited until the
victims were in their car before approaching them with a gun behind his
back. The fact that he asked, “ ‘Are you going to stop this?’ ” before shooting
Wilcox does not negate the lying-in-wait finding. Notably, Jayme G. testified
that his response to defendant’s question was, “ ‘Stop what?’ ” which did not
definitely indicate any intention or imminent plan to sell a share of the

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property. Nonetheless, without any further discussion, defendant
immediately shot the victims. In defendant’s statement to the police, he said
that he asked whether there was anything he could do to change their minds,
and Jayme G. said no. However, it is for the jury to determine which
evidence to credit. (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206.) In
reviewing for substantial evidence, we do not reverse simply because the
circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.
(People v. Westerfield (2019) 6 Cal.5th 632, 713.) Sufficient evidence supports
the jury’s finding.
III.   Sentencing Error
       Defendant was sentenced as follows: (1) life without parole on count
one; (2) 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement on count one; (3) 14
years to life on count two; (4) 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement on
count two; (5) 30 years for the prior serious felony convictions as to count one;
and (6) 30 years for the prior serious felony convictions as to count two.
Defendant contends, and the People agree, that the trial court erred in its
calculation of the prior serious felony conviction enhancements.
       Section 667, subdivision (a)(1) states: “A person convicted of a serious
felony who previously has been convicted of a serious felony in this state . . .
shall receive, in addition to the sentence imposed by the court for the present
offense, a five-year enhancement for each such prior conviction on charges
brought and tried separately. The terms of the present offense and each
enhancement shall run consecutively.” Defendant has six prior felony
convictions for robbery in 1979. However, the six convictions arose from only
two separately brought and tried cases: the one in Sonoma County that
resulted in three convictions and the other in Lake County that also resulted
in three convictions. Defendant’s six prior felony convictions are the result of

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only two cases that were “brought and tried separately,” and, therefore,
under section 667, subdivision (a)(1) only two five-year enhancements should
be imposed for each count. (People v. Jones (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1411,
1416.) Accordingly, we will remand for the trial court to vacate the
additional five-year enhancements.
                                      DISPOSITION
       The matter is remanded with directions that the trial court vacate the
erroneously imposed additional five-year prior serious felony enhancements
and correct the abstract of judgment to reflect imposition of two five-year
prior serious felony enhancements on count one and two five-year prior
serious felony enhancements on count two. In all other respects, the
judgment is affirmed.

                                               Jackson, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

Simons, J.
Burns, J.

A165177/People v. Thomas Dean Jones

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