Court Opinion

ID: 9963775
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-26 06:06:23.273246+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:59.246567
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                             COURT OF APPEALS

YOVANI LAMAS-NAVARRO, Minor, by next                               UNPUBLISHED
friend, SILVIA LAMAS,                                              April 25, 2024

               Plaintiff-Appellant,

v                                                                  No. 359537
                                                                   Kent Circuit Court
SPECTRUM HEALTH, also known as SPECTRUM                            LC No. 21-004151-NH
HEALTH SYSTEM, SPECTRUM HEALTH
BUTTERWORTH HOSPITAL, also known as
SPECTRUM HEALTH HOSPITALS, SPECTRUM
HEALTH MEDICAL GROUP, also known as
SPECTRUM HEALTH PRIMARY CARE
PARTNERS, DENISE R. GROSTICK, R.N., MARY
S. ABBOTT, R.N., LEA K. HARMS, M.D., LORI J.
DAY, M.D., AREA-WIDE OB-GYN SERVICES,
PC, REBECCA A. VANVALKENBURG, D.O., and
DORSEY LIGON, M.D.,

               Defendants-Appellees,
and

GRAND RAPIDS WOMENS HEALTH, and
ADAM B. BLICKLEY, M.D.,

               Defendants.

                                         ON REMAND

Before: M. J. KELLY, P.J., and JANSEN and CAMERON, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

       Our Supreme Court’s order in Lamas-Navarro v Spectrum Health, 997 NW2d 38 (Mich,
2023) (Lamas-Navarro II), directs this Court to reconsider this case in the context of the Court’s

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recent opinion in Ottgen v Katranji, 511 Mich 223; 999 NW2d 359 (2023). We affirm, in part,
reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

                I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

        In Lamas-Navarro v Spectrum Health, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of
Appeals, issued March 23, 2023 (Docket No. 359537), p 2 (Lamas-Navarro I), we summarized
the relevant facts of this case as follows:

              In 2011, defendants provided prenatal and birthing care to plaintiff’s
       mother, Silvia. This case arises from a number of medical conditions plaintiff
       allegedly sustained at birth. Plaintiff’s conditions are significant and he requires
       extensive medical care.

               Shortly after his ninth birthday, on November 5, 2020, plaintiff mailed
       defendants notices of intent to file this lawsuit. He requested that defendants
       produce his and Silvia’s medical records related to his birth. Plaintiff filed this
       lawsuit on May 10, 2021, his tenth birthday. Along with his complaint plaintiff
       filed an ex parte motion to extend the filing of his [affidavit of merit (AOM)].
       According to plaintiff’s motion, defendants had not provided all the medical
       records he requested, leaving him unable to file an AOM. He included with the ex
       parte motion a proposed order. The trial court returned the proposed order with the
       word “denied” on the signature line. Plaintiff never filed an AOM.

               Several months after the complaint was filed, the Spectrum defendants and
       the Area-Wide defendants each moved for summary disposition. Both motions
       argued the case should be dismissed because plaintiff never filed an AOM. The
       Area-Wide defendants’ motion offered the additional argument that summary
       disposition was proper because they were improperly served.

       The trial court agreed summary disposition was proper for lack of an AOM and that it
would dismiss this case. It also entertained a request from the Spectrum defendants that the
dismissal should be with prejudice:

               [Spectrum Defendants]: Your Honor, that dismissal is with prejudice,
       correct?

              The Court: With respect to—let’s see—

               [Spectrum Defendants]: As the period of limitations has expired, so the
       cases should be dismissed with prejudice.

              The Court: Any objection to that, [plaintiff’s counsel]?

              [Plaintiff]: No, that’s the correct ruling.

              The Court: Yes. Okay. Yes, [counsel for the Spectrum defendants].

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The trial court granted summary disposition in defendants’ favor.

        On appeal to this Court, plaintiff argued the trial court erred in granting summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (8). To this issue, we wrote:

       In this case, there are several facts that are not at issue: (1) that plaintiff could not
       file the complaint until after May 6, 2021, once the 182-day notice period had
       expired; (2) that the statute of limitations[, MCL 600.5851(7),] expired on May 10,
       2021, plaintiff’s tenth birthday; and (3) that plaintiff timely filed the complaint on
       May 10, 2021. When plaintiff filed the complaint, he did not include with it an
       AOM. Under a straightforward analysis of MCL 600.2912d, the trial court
       correctly dismissed his complaint because an AOM was not filed with the
       complaint.

                Even so, plaintiff draws our attention to MCL 600.2912b(5), which again,
       provides, in part: “[W]ithin 56 days after receipt of notice under this section, the
       health professional or health facility shall allow the claimant access to all medical
       records related to the claim that are in the control of the health professional or health
       facility.” Plaintiff claims that because defendants did not allow him access to all
       his medical records before the expiration of the 56-day period, the trial court should
       have granted his ex parte motion and permitted him a 91-day extension to file the
       AOM under MCL 600.2912d(3).

               We considered a similar argument in Zarzyski v Nigrelli, 337 Mich App
       735, 737; 976 NW2d 916 (2021). Like this case, the Zarzyski plaintiff filed the
       complaint without an AOM. Id. at 739. The plaintiff maintained they were not
       required to file an AOM under MCL 600.2912d because the defendants failed to
       allow the plaintiff access to all their medical records within the 56-day timeframe
       of subsection 2912b(5). Id. The defendants disagreed that they did not allow timely
       access to the medical records, asserting the plaintiff failed to complete the necessary
       releases of information. Id. This Court did not decide the issue of whether the
       defendant allowed access to the medical records within the 56-day period. Id. at
       742. Instead, this Court determined that summary disposition was appropriate
       because “[the] plaintiff nevertheless failed to file an AOM within 91 days of the
       complaint for purposes of MCL 600.2912d(3).” Id.

               In this case, plaintiff argues that summary disposition was not appropriate
       because defendants failed to allow him access to all his medical records within the
       56-day timeframe. But, like in Zarzyski, plaintiff failed to file an AOM within the
       91-day grace period under subsection 2912d(3). Plaintiff attempts to distinguish
       his failure to file an AOM from Zarzyski, stating the filing of the AOM during the
       91-day grace period would have amounted to an “empty gesture” because the trial
       court had denied his motion to extend the filing of the AOM. He notes that the trial
       court in Zarzyski decided the issue of the 91-day grace period after the period had
       lapsed. And, by contrast, the trial court in this case decided the issue of the grace
       period on the same day the case was filed.

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              We are not persuaded the late-filing of an AOM in this case would have
       amounted to an “empty gesture” because plaintiff never did file an AOM. Indeed,
       our holding in Zarzyski was clear that “because [the] plaintiff did not file an AOM
       within 91 days of filing her complaint, summary dismissal is the proper result
       regardless of whether defendants violated MCL 600.2912b(5).” Zarzyski, 337
       Mich App at 738. Stare decisis requires this Court to follow its published decisions.
       MCR 7.215(C)(2); Dana Corp v Dep’t of Treasury, 267 Mich App 690, 698; 706
       NW2d 204 (2005) (“The rule of stare decisis mandates that published decisions of
       this Court are precedential and binding on lower courts and tribunals.”). Therefore,
       dismissal in this case was proper because plaintiff failed to file an AOM. [Lamas-
       Navarro I, unpub op at 6-7.]

        We further considered the Area-Wide defendants’ argument that they were improperly
served, and therefore, MCR 2.116(C)(3) was an alternative basis for summary dismissal. We
concluded that, because summary disposition was proper under MCL 2.116(C)(7) and (8), the
issue of improper service of process was “irrelevant” and “it [did] not matter whether the trial court
properly granted summary disposition under [MCR 2.116](C)(3) because summary disposition
would have been granted anyway.” Lamas-Navarro I, unpub op at 8.

        Later, our Supreme Court issued its opinion in Ottgen, 511 Mich 223, which concerns the
effect of a failure to file an AOM alongside a complaint for medical malpractice. The Court then
vacated our judgment in this case and remanded it to this Court for reconsideration in light of
Ottgen. Lamas-Navarro II, 997 NW2d at 38.

                                            II. OTTGEN

       On remand to this Court, plaintiff contends that, under Ottgen, the trial court erred in
dismissing his case with prejudice. Plaintiff argues that the failure to file an AOM does not dictate
whether a complaint was timely filed, and, therefore, the trial court erred in dismissing this case
with prejudice on the basis of the statute of limitations. We agree, in part, and disagree, in part.

                                  A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

       This Court reviews de novo the grant or denial of a motion for summary disposition. Zehel
v Nugent, 344 Mich App 490, 498; 1 NW3d 387 (2022). Relevant to this issue, defendants1 moved
for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (8).

        Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) is appropriate if a claim is barred by the
statute of limitations. With respect to(C)(7) motions for summary disposition, “a court accepts as
true the plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations of fact, construing them in the plaintiff’s favor. The
Court must consider affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and any other documentary

1
 The Spectrum defendants’ motion for summary disposition only moved for summary disposition
under MCR 2.116(C)(7). However, the Spectrum defendants later joined in the Area-Wide
defendants’ motion for summary disposition, which included a motion for summary disposition
under MCR 2.116(C)(8).

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evidence submitted by the parties, to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists.”
Nuculovic v Hill, 287 Mich App 58, 61; 783 NW2d 124 (2010) (citation omitted).

        The purpose of a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) is to “test[] the
legal sufficiency of the complaint.” Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 119; 597 NW2d 817
(1999).

       All well-pleaded factual allegations are accepted as true and construed in a light
       most favorable to the nonmovant. A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) may be
       granted only where the claims alleged are so clearly unenforceable as a matter of
       law that no factual development could possibly justify recovery. When deciding a
       motion brought under this section, a court considers only the pleadings. [Id. at 119-
       120 (quotation marks and citations omitted).]

        This issue also involves a question of statutory interpretation, which this Court also reviews
de novo. PNC Nat’l Bank Ass’n v Dep’t of Treasury, 285 Mich App 504, 505; 778 NW2d 282
(2009).

               The paramount rule of statutory interpretation is that we are to effect the
       intent of the Legislature. To do so, we begin with the statute’s language. If the
       statute’s language is clear and unambiguous, we assume that the Legislature
       intended its plain meaning, and we enforce the statute as written. In reviewing the
       statute’s language, every word should be given meaning, and we should avoid a
       construction that would render any part of the statute surplusage or nugatory.
       [Wickens v Oakwood Healthcare Sys, 465 Mich 53, 60; 631 NW2d 686 (2001)
       (citations omitted).]

                                    B. LAW AND ANALYSIS

        This case concerns the commencement of a medical malpractice complaint and the effect
of a plaintiff’s failure to file an AOM alongside his complaint. “A civil action is commenced by
filing a complaint with the court.” MCL 600.1901. The complaint must also be filed within the
prescribed statute of limitations. MCL 600.5805(1). Medical malpractice cases involving claims
of birth trauma should “commence[] on or before [the plaintiff’s] tenth birthday[.]” MCL
600.5851(7). So long as a complaint is filed in compliance with the applicable court rules, Ottgen,
511 Mich at 231, the statute of limitations is tolled from “the time the complaint is filed[.]” MCL
600.5856(a).

       Along with these requirements, medical malpractice actions have the additional
requirement of an AOM. Under MCL 600.2912d(1) the plaintiff, or their attorney, “shall file with
the complaint an [AOM] signed by a health professional who the plaintiff’s attorney reasonably
believes meets the requirements for an expert witness under [MCL 600.2169].” MCL
600.2912d(1). In cases where a defendant has failed to allow the plaintiff timely access to the
medical records, the AOM “may be filed within 91 days after the filing of the complaint.” MCL
600.2912d(3).

       In Scarsella v Pollak, 461 Mich 547, 549; 607 NW2d 711 (2000), overruled in part by
Ottgen, 511 Mich at 223, our Supreme Court held that “for statute of limitations purposes in a

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medical malpractice case, the mere tendering of a complaint without the required [AOM] is
insufficient to commence the lawsuit.” By extension, because a lawsuit never commenced, the
statute of limitations is not tolled. Id. at 550.

       This proposition outlined in Scarsella was overruled by our Supreme Court in Ottgen. The
Ottgen court asked: “[W]hen does a medical malpractice action begin?” Ottgen, 511 Mich at 228.
In answering this question, the Court overruled Scarsella, and determined that:

       Filing an AOM under MCL 600.2912d(1) is not required to commence a medical
       malpractice action and toll the statutory limitations period. Instead, the normal
       tolling rules apply to medical malpractice actions, and tolling occurs upon the filing
       of a timely served complaint. Nevertheless, failure to comply with MCL
       600.2912d(1) can still be a basis for dismissal of a case—just not on statute-of-
       limitations grounds. [Ottgen, 511 Mich at 228-229.]

        As is noted in in our earlier opinion, the parties agree that, although it lacked an AOM, the
complaint in this case was timely-filed. Lamas-Navarro I, unpub op at 6. Under Ottgen, the timely
filing of the complaint tolled the statute of limitations, and the complaint could not be dismissed
on timeliness grounds. Ottgen, 511 Mich at 228-229. Even so, the trial court’s on-the-record
statements demonstrate its belief that that plaintiff’s failure to file the AOM caused the statute of
limitations to expire, and therefore plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed. This is obviously
an error, because, under Ottgen, the failure to file an AOM should not cause a dismissal on statute-
of-limitations grounds. Ottgen, 511 Mich at 229.

         Although the trial court’s reason for granting the motions for summary disposition was in
error, this Court “will not reverse where the right result is reached for the wrong reason.” Glazer
v Lamkin, 201 Mich App 432, 437; 506 NW2d 570 (1993). Thus, we must consider whether the
trial court nevertheless reached the correct result. Defendants also moved for summary disposition
under MCR 2.116(C)(8), arguing “the requirements of MCL 600.2912d have not been met,” and
therefore, “the Complaint is ‘ineffective’ to state a claim for medical malpractice[.]” Ottgen held
that “medical malpractice plaintiffs must file an [AOM] along with their complaint under MCL
600.2912d(1)[.]” 511 Mich at 228. Therefore, a medical malpractice complaint filed without the
required AOM is plainly insufficient. Here, it is undisputed plaintiff never filed the necessary
AOM under MCL 600.2912d(1). Because plaintiff’s complaint lacked the AOM, it was
insufficient, and, therefore, summary disposition was proper under MCL 2.116(C)(8).

         Even so, Ottgen also included a discussion regarding whether a dismissal caused by the
failure to file an AOM should result in a dismissal with or without prejudice. Ottgen, 511 Mich at
238-239. The Court expressly declined to answer whether a plaintiff’s failure to file an AOM
should result in a dismissal with or without prejudice, noting that this decision is a “fact-bound”
analysis which is usually litigated in the trial court. Id. In this case, it appears the trial court
decided to dismiss the case with prejudice on the basis of its determination that the statute of
limitations expired. But, the failure to file an AOM is no longer a basis for dismissal on statute-
of-limitations grounds. Ottgen, 511 Mich at 228-229. The trial court’s decision to grant dismissal
with prejudice was fundamentally flawed, because it was predicated on a now-overruled principle
of law. As such, it is necessary in this case to examine the trial court’s dismissal with prejudice.

                                                -6-
        “Dismissal is a drastic step that should be taken cautiously.” Vicencio v Ramirez, 211 Mich
App 501, 506; 536 NW2d 280 (1995). Courts should “carefully evaluate all available options on
the record and conclude that the sanction of dismissal is just and proper.” Id. On remand to this
Court, plaintiff argues dismissal was not the “just and proper” outcome given defendants’
purported failure to remit the necessary medical records. Without these records, plaintiff was
unable to obtain the AOM as required. Whether defendants properly remitted plaintiff’s medical
records is a “fact-bound” question that is simply not sufficiently developed in this record. Because
the factual record is insufficient, it is appropriate to remand this case to the trial court for the
limited question of whether the case should be dismissed with or without prejudice. See, e.g.,
Dextrom v Wexford Co, 287 Mich App 406, 432; 789 NW2d 211 (2010) (remanding to the trial
court for further factual development).

         While we agree summary disposition was proper under MCR 2.116(C)(8), we do not agree
with the trial court’s reasons for dismissing this case with prejudice. Therefore, we affirm in part
the trial court’s orders granting summary disposition, but remand the case to the trial court for
consideration of defendants’ remittance of the relevant medical records. The trial court’s analysis
of this issue should inform the court whether to dismiss the case with or without prejudice.

                                   III. IMPROPER SERVICE

      On remand, plaintiff also asks this Court reexamine its decision with respect to the Area-
Wide defendants’ claims of improper service of process. But, this issue is outside the scope of our
Supreme Court’s order, and therefore this Court’s review of this issue is inappropriate.

       Our Supreme Court’s order on remand directs this Court to reconsider the case in light of
Ottgen. Lamas-Navarro II, 997 NW2d at 38. Summary disposition was appropriate under Ottgen,
and the only remaining question is whether that dismissal should be with or without prejudice.
Thus, the issue of whether defendants were improperly served is outside the scope of the Court’s
order and should not be considered by this Court on remand. See K & K Constr, Inc v Dep’t of
Environmental Quality, 267 Mich App 523, 544; 705 NW2d 365 (2005) (“[W]hen an appellate
court gives clear instructions in its remand order, it is improper for a lower court to exceed the
scope of the order.”).

        Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.

                                                             /s/ Michael J. Kelly
                                                             /s/ Kathleen Jansen
                                                             /s/ Thomas C. Cameron

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