Court Opinion

ID: 9750860
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 15:41:22.610802+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:25.689342
License: Public Domain

Davidson, J.,

concurring:

I agree with the majority’s holding that under Rule 735 d, the election of a court trial is not effective unless there is an affirmative showing on the record that the defendant himself has asserted that “he has the right to be tried by a jury of *46512 persons or by the court without a jury; that whether trial is by a jury or by the court, Ms guilt must be found to be beyond a reasonable doubt; and that in a jury trial all 12 jurors must agree that he is so guilty but in a court trial the, judge may so find.” I therefore concur that on the facts of the cases before us, there was not compliance with Rule 735 d.
The majority, however, not content with deciding the questions raised, briefed, and argued here, has also decided, in dicta, a question that was not raised, briefed, or argued, by stating that a defendant’s election to be tried by the court “may be voiced by his counsel in the presence of the defendant.” I cannot agree with this proposition.
In my view, there is no viable authority in Maryland to support the majority’s position. In Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 50 S.Ct. 253 (1930), the United States Supreme Court held for the first time that a defendant could waive a jury trial. With respect to the standard for an effective waiver, it said:
“Not only must the right of the accused to a trial by a constitutional jury be jealously preserved, but the maintenance of the jury as a fact finding body in criminal cases is of such importance and has such a place in our traditions, that, before any waiver can become effective, the consent of government counsel and the sanction of the court must be had, in addition to the express and intelligent consent of the defendant. And the duty of the trial court in that regard is not to be discharged as a mere matter of rote, but with sound and advised discretion, with an eye to avoid unreasonable or undue departures from that mode of trial or from any of the essential elements thereof, and with a caution increasing in degree as the offenses dealt with increase in gravity.” (Emphasis added.) [Patton, 281 U.S. at 312-13, 50 S.Ct. at 263.]
Thus, under the Patton waiver standard, the express consent of the defendant is required for an effective waiver of a defendant’s right to a jury trial.
*466Subsequently, in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 (1938), the Supreme Court established a standard for the effective waiver of a defendant’s right to counsel. With respect to that standard, the Supreme Court indicated that when fundamental constitutional rights are involved, acquiescence in their loss cannot be presumed. Relying on the Patton waiver standards, that Court required that there be “an intelligent and competent waiver by the accused ” which must "appear upon the record.” (Emphasis added.) Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464-65. 58 S.Ct. at 1023.
Thereafter, in a series of cases beginning with Rose v. State, 177 Md. 577, 581, 10 A.2d 617, 619 (1940), this Court stated that a defendant’s election to be tried by a court rather than by a jury could be voiced by the defendant’s attorney and that “nothing else [was] required under the law and regular practice.” See Chislom v. Warden, 223 Md. 681, 683, 164 A.2d 912, 913 (1960); Byrd v. Warden, 210 Md. 662, 663-64, 124 A.2d 284, 285 (1956); Cullings v. State, 205 Md. 22, 24-25, 106 A.2d 69, 70-71 (1954); Cumberland v. Warden, 205 Md. 646, 648, 109 A.2d 66, 67 (1954); Raynes v. Warden, 193 Md. 700, 702, 65 A.2d 790, 791 (1948). Manifestly, at the time these cases were decided, the Patton and Johnson v. Zerbst waiver standards were not regarded as being applicable in Maryland.
Subsequently, in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 1447 (1968), the Supreme Court held that the sixth amendment right to trial by jury was a fundamental constitutional right guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. As a result, the Patton and Johnson v. Zerbst waiver standards became applicable to the states. Because the Maryland cases before Duncan had not decided the question whether, under those standards, an attorney may voice a defendant’s election for a court trial, they do not constitute viable authority for the majority’s position.
In 1971, this Court in State v. Zimmerman, 261 Md. 11, 11, 273 A.2d 156, 156, considered the sole question “of the proper time and place to raise a contention that a defendant in a criminal case did not knowingly waive — or, more properly under Maryland procedure, elect — a jury trial.” This Court held that because the question whether the defendant had *467knowingly waived a jury trial had not been raised in the trial court, it could not be raised on appeal. Rather, the proper time and place for it to be raised was in a post conviction proceeding. This Court noted that “[t]here was before the [trial] court an election of a court trial by counsel in the presence of the accused, the exact situation which appeared in Rose.” Zimmerman, 261 Md. at 23, 273 A.2d at 162. It did not, however, have before it, and therefore did not decide, the question whether it was appropriate under the Patton and Johnson v. Zerbst waiver standards for a defendant’s election of a court trial to be voiced by his attorney. Thus, Zimmerman, like the Maryland cases decided before Duncan, does not constitute viable authority for the majority’s position.
Indeed, the language and the purpose of Rule 735 itself support the contrary proposition — that a defendant himself, and not his attorney, must voice the defendant’s election of a court trial. The primary purpose of Rule 735 is to protect the defendant’s constitutional right to determine for himself whether to waive his right to a jury trial. Obviously, that right can best be protected by ascertaining from the defendant himself that he has waived it.
Rule 735 d is designed to implement the purpose of protecting the defendant’s right to himself elect a court trial by assuring that he fully understood the nature of a jury trial, and that he made his election knowingly and voluntarily. It provides:
“d. When Court Trial Elected.
“If the defendant elects to be tried by the court, the trial of the case on its merits before the court may not proceed until the court determines, after inquiry of the defendant on the record, that the defendant has made his election fora court trial with full knowledge of his right to a jury trial and that he has knowingly and voluntarily waived the right. If the court determines otherwise, it shall give the defendant another election pursuant to this Rule.” (Emphasis added.)
*468It is unclear from this language whether the purpose of the inquiry is to establish both that the defendant himself elected a court trial and that he had full knowledge of his right to a jury trial, or whether the purpose of the inquiry is to establish only whether the defendant had full knowledge of his right to a jury trial. If the ultimate purpose of Rule 735 is to be achieved, the 735 d inquiry cannot rationally be limited to the single question of the defendant’s knowledge of his right to a jury trial. Unless it is also established that he himself made the election, his right is not protected. Accordingly, Rule 735 d must be read to require that there be an inquiry of the defendant on the record which affirmatively shows that the defendant elected a court trial.
The majority interprets Rule 735 d as requiring that the defendant himself indicate nothing more than that he understands that “he has a right to be tried by a jury of 12 persons or by the court without a jury; that whether the trial is by a jury or by a court, his guilt must be found to be beyond a reasonable doubt; and that in a jury trial all 12 jurors must agree that he is so guilty but in a court trial the judge may so find.” While this information is sufficient to establish that the defendant has knowledge of his right to a jury trial, it is insufficient to establish that he himself has elected a court trial. As a result, there can be no affirmative showing on the record that the defendant himself has elected a court trial. In the absence of such a showing, there can not be compliance with Rule 735 d.
Moreover, the majority recognizes that when the Rule requires that there be an “inquiry of the defendant” to establish that the defendant understands the nature of a jury trial, the inquiry “must be addressed to the defendant” and that “the responses must come from the defendant’s own mouth.” Similarly, when the Rule requires that there be an inquiry of the defendant to establish that he elected a court trial, the inquiry must be addressed to the defendant and the response must come from his own mouth.
The conclusion that Rule 735 d requires that the defendant’s election of a court trial be voiced by the defendant himself is supported by Rule 735 b. This Rule, like *469Rule 735 d, is designed to implement the purpose of protecting the defendant’s right to himself elect a court or jury trial by assuring that he fully understands the nature of a jury trial, and that he makes his election knowingly and voluntarily. Rule 735 b provides:
“b. Form of Election.
An election of a court or jury trial shall be in writing, signed by the defendant, witnessed by his counsel, if any, and filed with the clerk of the court in which the case is pending. It shall be substantially in the following form:
I know that I have a right to be tried by a jury of 12 persons or by the court without a jury. I am aware that before a finding of guilty in a jury trial all 12 jurors must find that I am guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. I am aware that before a finding of guilty in a .court trial the judge must find that I am guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
I hereby elect to be tiled by:-

(insert ‘the court’ or ‘a jury’)

I make this election knowingly and voluntarily and with full knowledge that I may not be permitted to change this election.
Witness:
Signature of Counsel Signature of Defendant
Date: _”
(Emphasis added.)
It is clear from this language that the form is intended to establish, insofar as here relevant, both that the defendant made an election of a court or a jury trial, and that he had full knowledge of his right to a jury trial. Section b of Rule 785 is the only section which defines by whom the election must be voiced. Specifically, it requires that the defendant himself, and not his attorney, sign the form by which he elects *470to be tried by a court or by a jury. Thus, it specifically requires that a defendant, and not his attorney, must “voice” the defendant’s election.
Because the purposes of Rule 735 b and 735 d are the same, and because the facts required to be established under each are the same, Rule 785 d must be read to require that the election of a court trial should be voiced by the defendant himself and not by his attorney.
In the light of the fact that there is no authority to support the majority’s position; that both the language and the purpose of the Rule support a contrary position; that courts in other jurisdictions which have considered the question are divided;1 and that the question was not raised, briefed or argued, I believe it is premature and unnecessary to decide in these cases whether a defendant’s election of a court trial can be voiced by the defendant’s attorney. Accordingly, I am unable to agree with my colleagues on this point.

. Some jurisdictions require that a defendant’s election of a court trial must be voiced by the defendant himself. E.g., Walker v. State, 578 P.2d 1388, 1389-90 (Alas. 1978); People v. Holmes, 5 Cal.Rptr. 871, 872-73, 353 P.2d 583, 584 (1960); Hawkins v. United States, 385 A.2d 744, 746 (D.C. 1978). Others recognize that it is preferable practice to have the election voiced by the defendant himself. E.g., Leisure v. State, 254 Ark. 961, 966, 497 S.W.2d 1, 5 (1973); People v. Murrell, 60 Ill.2d 287, 289-291, 326 N.E.2d 762, 764-65 (1975); Scruggs v. State, 161 Ind.App. 666, 668, 317 N.E.2d 807, 809 (1974). Still others permit the defendant’s attorney to voice the defendant’s election for him. E.g., Little v. Stynchcombe, 227 Ga. 311, 312, 180 S.E.2d 541, 542 (1971); State v. Kahalewai, 54 Hawaii 28, 29, 501 P.2d 977, 979 (1972); State v. Svitak, 193 Neb. 660, 661-63, 228 N.W.2d 306, 308-09 (1975).