Court Opinion

ID: 9891688
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-19 15:08:01.096883+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:00:06.279213
License: Public Domain

2023 IL 128398

                                          IN THE
                                 SUPREME COURT
                                              OF
                           THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

                                     (Docket No. 128398)

                 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee,
                       v. JESSICA R. LIGHTHART, Appellant.

                               Opinion filed October 19, 2023.

        JUSTICE OVERSTREET delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

        Chief Justice Theis and Justices Neville, Cunningham, Rochford, and O’Brien
     concurred in the judgment and opinion.

        Justice Holder White took no part in the decision.

                                           OPINION

¶1       Petitioner, Jessica R. Lighthart, appeals the judgments of the circuit and
     appellate courts, which found that her petition, brought pursuant to the Post-
     Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2006)), is untimely,
     resulting in its dismissal at the second stage of proceedings. In this appeal, the court
     must determine whether the filing of an ineffective notice of appeal from a
     negotiated plea of guilty, which is dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction due
     to failure to follow the procedural requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule
     604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017), triggers a six-month limitations period for bringing a
     postconviction petition or whether, in such a case, the petitioner has three years
     from the date of her conviction to file such a petition. See 725 ILCS 5/122-1(c)
     (West 2022). 1 For the following reasons, we find that the six-month limitation
     period applies. However, we find that, under the circumstances presented here, the
     petitioner could not have been culpably negligent in the untimely filing of her
     petition. Thus, we reverse the judgments of the courts below and remand to the
     circuit court with directions that petitioner be permitted to amend the petition to
     reflect our findings regarding her lack of culpable negligence and for further
     proceedings consistent with this opinion, to be conducted without further delay.

¶2                                         I. BACKGROUND

¶3                             A. Plea Proceedings in the Circuit Court

¶4      Petitioner was charged with multiple counts of first degree murder based on the
     shooting death of the victim by her codefendant, which occurred during an armed
     robbery. On June 15, 2004, she entered a partially negotiated plea of guilty to one
     count in the indictment, in exchange for the State’s dismissal of all other charges
     and a sentencing cap of 35 years in the Department of Corrections, with 3 years of
     mandatory supervisory release. The factual basis for the plea was stated as follows.

¶5       Petitioner, who was 23 years old at the time of her plea, had dated the victim,
     as well as her codefendant, Markus Buchanan, “on and off.” The victim was known
     to have access to large amounts of money. Petitioner drove the victim to a
     residence, knowing that Buchanan was there intending to rob the victim. Petitioner
     asked the victim to carry a laundry basket into the residence, where Buchanan was
     armed with a handgun. Buchanan beat the victim while demanding money and
     eventually shot the victim to death. At some point in time following the shooting,

         1
          While section 122-1 of the Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West 2022)) has undergone amendment
     since the time the petition at issue in the case was filed in 2006, the language of subsection (c) has
     not changed in that timeframe, and except when outlining the history of subsection (c) in our
     analysis, we cite the current version in the remainder of this opinion.

                                                     -2-
       Petitioner either injected the victim with a solution that contained Drano or
       attempted to do so. Petitioner then participated, along with Buchanan, with a
       woman who lived at the residence, and with the woman’s friend who was visiting
       at the time, in cleaning the scene to remove evidence and disposing of the body, by
       setting it on fire inside the victim’s Jeep in a rural field.

¶6                                        B. Sentencing

¶7         During the sentencing hearing on August 17, 2004, petitioner presented three
       witnesses who testified that Buchanan had abused, stalked, and isolated petitioner
       over the two years preceding the crime and introduced a photo into evidence of
       petitioner depicting substantial bruising of her face following one of the incidents.
       The woman who owned the residence testified that Buchanan had threatened to kill
       the woman and her friend if they did not participate in cleaning the scene and
       disposing of the body. After hearing this evidence, along with other factors in
       aggravation and mitigation, the circuit court sentenced petitioner to 35 years, which
       was the cap on sentencing required by the terms of the plea agreement.

¶8                    C. Plea Counsel’s Postjudgment Motion to Reduce Sentence

¶9         Immediately following the sentencing hearing, petitioner, through plea counsel,
       filed a motion to reconsider the sentence, arguing it was excessive, which the circuit
       court denied on October 1, 2004.

¶ 10       Although counsel assured the circuit court that petitioner understood “her right
       to appeal and the time limits on filing those choices,” at the time the circuit court
       denied the motion to reconsider sentence, petitioner had already lost her right to
       directly appeal from both the conviction and the sentence because counsel did not
       file a motion to withdraw her guilty plea within 30 days of the imposition of
       sentence. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. Nov. 1, 2000) (no appeal from a plea of
       guilty shall be taken unless a motion to withdraw guilty plea is filed within 30 days
       of sentence)

¶ 11            D. Petitioner’s Untimely Pro Se Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea

                                               -3-
¶ 12       On October 14, 2004, petitioner filed a pro se motion to withdraw her guilty
       plea. In her motion, she alleged she received ineffective assistance of counsel who
       refused to cooperate with her, denied her access to her court records and discovery,
       advised her not to accept a 27-year fully negotiated plea offer, but then advised her
       to take the open plea because she would receive a lighter sentence. At a status
       hearing on November 24, 2004, the State informed the circuit court that the motion
       to withdraw the guilty plea was untimely because it was not filed within 30 days of
       the sentence. See id. Noting that it had only denied the motion to reconsider
       sentence on October 1, 2004, the circuit court stated that it was going to “allow”
       petitioner to file the motion to withdraw and appoint conflict counsel for her due to
       the allegation that she pled guilty due to the ineffective assistance of counsel.
       Appointed counsel sought repeated continuances to prepare an amendment to the
       pro se motion, culminating in the eventual filing of an amended motion to withdraw
       the guilty plea on February 14, 2006, with an evidentiary hearing held the same
       day.

¶ 13               E. Evidentiary Hearing on Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea

¶ 14       At the hearing, petitioner testified more specifically about the abuse she
       suffered at the hands of Buchanan and that she had wished to pursue a compulsion
       defense to the charges based on Buchanan’s use of a gun to make her participate.
       After a preliminary investigation, defense counsel told petitioner “there was
       nothing left to do” and assured her if she took the plea for 20 to 35 years’
       incarceration, she would “get the minimum.” Plea counsel testified that she
       discussed the compulsion defense with petitioner based on the long underlying
       history of domestic violence between petitioner and Buchanan but counseled her
       that trials are inherently uncertain. Finding petitioner was “not credible,” the circuit
       court denied the amended motion to withdraw. However, despite these extensive
       proceedings, the circuit court had no subject-matter jurisdiction to extend the time
       for filing the motion to withdraw or to consider the merits thereof because, when
       petitioner filed the motion, more than 30 days had elapsed since her sentence was
       imposed and the circuit court did not extend the deadline within the 30 days. See
       People v. Flowers, 208 Ill. 2d 291, 303 (2003).

                                                -4-
¶ 15                    F. Counsel Files an Ineffective Notice of Appeal

¶ 16        On February 21, 2006, appointed counsel filed a notice of appeal on behalf of
       petitioner, and the Office of the State Appellate Defender (OSAD) was appointed
       to represent petitioner in that appeal. However, the notice of appeal was ineffective
       to perfect an appeal on the merits of the motion to withdraw because of the failure
       of counsel to file a motion to withdraw the guilty plea within 30 days of the
       sentence. See id. (no appeal from a plea of guilty shall be taken unless a motion to
       withdraw guilty plea is filed within 30 days of sentence). In addition, the notice of
       appeal was untimely because the proceedings on the motion to withdraw the plea
       did not extend the time for filing the appeal past the 30 days following the denial
       of the timely motion to reconsider the sentence. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 606(d) (eff. Dec.
       13, 2005) (notice of appeal must be filed with the clerk within 30 days of disposition
       of timely filed postjudgment motion).

¶ 17       The appellate court ordered OSAD to show cause why the appeal should not be
       dismissed for a lack of appellate jurisdiction. OSAD unsuccessfully argued that,
       because the State acquiesced to the untimely proceedings on the motion to
       withdraw the guilty plea, the circuit court was revested with jurisdiction to consider
       the motion, which resulted in the appellate court having jurisdiction to consider it
       on the merits. The appellate court rejected OSAD’s revestment argument and
       dismissed the appeal on September 19, 2006. People v. Lighthart, 367 Ill. App. 3d
       1103 (table) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23).
       Accordingly, a petition for leave to appeal the order dismissing the appeal was due
       in this court on October 24, 2006. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(b) (eff. Aug. 15, 2006)
       (unless a timely petition for rehearing is filed, the party seeking review must file
       the petition for leave to appeal within 35 days of the entry of the appellate court’s
       judgment).

¶ 18        OSAD did not petition this court for leave to appeal the appellate court’s
       decision dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. OSAD sent petitioner a letter
       on November 6, 2006, after the deadline for filing a petition for leave to appeal to
       this court had passed, informing her that her appeal was dismissed because her
       “guilty plea was filed too late.” The letter informed petitioner that she would need
       to file a postconviction petition to challenge her conviction and sentence. However,

                                               -5-
       it did not inform her of the time requirements for filing the petition.

¶ 19                    G. Petitioner Files Pro Se Postconviction Petition

¶ 20        On August 10, 2007, petitioner filed a pro se postconviction petition alleging
       that she received ineffective assistance of counsel. She faulted her plea counsel for
       failing to investigate and present a compulsion defense based on the domestic
       violence she endured from Buchanan and restated her allegations regarding
       ineffective assistance in the negotiation of the plea. In addition, she alleged
       ineffective assistance of plea counsel for failing to file a timely motion to withdraw
       the guilty plea, which culminated in the loss of her right to appeal her conviction
       and sentence. On October 22, 2007, the circuit court dismissed the petition at the
       first stage, finding it to be frivolous and patently without merit.

¶ 21       On June 12, 2009, the appellate court reversed the circuit court’s decision,
       finding that the postconviction petition states the gist of a constitutional claim that,
       because of the ineffective assistance of counsel, petitioner lost her right to challenge
       the voluntariness of her guilty plea and, consequently, her right to appeal her
       conviction. People v. Lighthart, 391 Ill. App. 3d 1129 (table) (unpublished order
       under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23). The appellate court remanded the
       postconviction petition to the circuit court for second stage proceedings under the
       Act. Id. In so doing, the appellate court observed that petitioner “may well wish to
       resurrect the other arguments she advanced in her petition, as the Act does not
       recognize the partial dismissal of postconviction petitions.” Id. (citing People v.
       Rivera, 198 Ill. 2d 364, 371 (2001). The mandate issued on August 26, 2009.

¶ 22                  H. Unconscionable Delay in Second Stage Proceedings

¶ 23       Upon remand to the circuit court, counsel was appointed to represent petitioner
       on September 11, 2009. A review of the record reveals that there was an
       inexcusable and unconscionable 11½-year delay in the second stage proceedings
       following that initial appointment of counsel. Between September 2009 and March
       2014, the circuit court held approximately 25 status conferences, in which counsel
       requested and was granted continuances, stating, at different times, that counsel
       needed more time to review the case, time to amend the petition, and time to

                                                -6-
       correspond with petitioner. In March 2014, counsel withdrew because he was
       appointed as an associate judge and, by that time, had not filed an amended petition
       or otherwise moved the proceedings forward.

¶ 24       A second attorney was appointed to represent petitioner in May 2014. After
       requesting and receiving six continuances, counsel filed an amended postconviction
       petition on May 27, 2015. The State was then granted four continuances so that it
       could prepare a response. Before a response was filed, the second appointed counsel
       withdrew due to an unspecified conflict on May 13, 2016. A third attorney was
       appointed to represent petitioner the same day.

¶ 25       Although the amended postconviction petition drafted by prior counsel
       remained pending without response by the State, the third appointed counsel
       requested and received approximately 12 continuances between May 2016 and
       August 2018, before filing a second amended postconviction petition. The State
       then requested and received continuances to draft the response until May 24, 2019,
       when private counsel entered an appearance on behalf of petitioner. Private counsel
       received continuances to file a supplemental postconviction petition, which he filed
       on January 3, 2020.

¶ 26                         I. Supplemental Postconviction Petition

¶ 27       In the supplemental petition, petitioner further developed her allegations of
       ineffective assistance of trial counsel, alleging that, prior to advising her to plead
       guilty to first degree felony murder, counsel failed to investigate and interview
       available witnesses regarding the repeated physical abuse she suffered at the hands
       of Buchanan, which would have supported a compulsion defense, prior to advising
       petitioner to plead guilty to first degree felony murder instead of proceeding to trial.
       In addition, the supplemental petition reiterated the allegations regarding the
       ineffective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations, as well as ineffective
       assistance in postjudgment proceedings, which resulted in her inability to pursue a
       direct appeal. Between the original, amended, and supplemental petitions, there are
       several affidavits attesting to the history of severe abuse petitioner suffered at the
       hands of Buchanan, as well as petitioner’s affidavit regarding the facts and
       circumstances surrounding her involvement with Buchanan on the date in question.

                                                -7-
¶ 28                              J. The State’s Motion to Dismiss

¶ 29       The State sought and received three further continuances to draft a response to
       the supplemental petition. On December 7, 2020, the State filed a motion to dismiss
       the postconviction petition, arguing, inter alia, the petition is untimely pursuant to
       section 122-1(c) of the Act. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(c) (West 2006). According to the
       motion, because petitioner filed a direct appeal from her conviction but did not file
       a petition for leave to appeal from the order dismissing that appeal, she was required
       to file a postconviction petition by April 23, 2007, six months from the date the
       petition for leave to appeal was due in this court. Because she did not file the
       petition until August 10, 2007, the State argued her petition was required to be
       dismissed. In support, the State cited People v. Byrd, 2018 IL App (4th) 160526,
       which held that if a petitioner files a notice of appeal, regardless of its effectiveness,
       the six-month limitation period applies.

¶ 30       In response, petitioner argued that, due to the ineffective assistance of counsel,
       petitioner lost her right to directly appeal her conviction and sentence when counsel
       failed to file a timely motion to withdraw her guilty plea as required by Rule 604(d).
       Petitioner argued that, as a result, the notice of appeal filed by counsel was a nullity
       before it was filed and should not be considered the filing of a direct appeal for
       purposes of section 122-1(c) of the Act. Petitioner argued that, because she could
       not, and thus did not, file a direct appeal from her conviction, her postconviction
       petition was required to be filed within three years of the August 17, 2004,
       judgment of conviction, rendering the August 10, 2007, petition timely.

¶ 31       In support of her position, petitioner cited People v. Ross, 352 Ill. App. 3d 617
       (2004), a Third District decision holding that, in a case where Rule 604(d) precludes
       a defendant from filing an appeal due to the failure to file a timely motion to
       withdraw a guilty plea, the filing of a notice of appeal does not constitute the filing
       of a direct appeal for purposes of section 122-1(c). The circuit court agreed with
       the State and dismissed the postconviction petition for untimeliness on April 15,
       2021, 11½ years after the petition was remanded by the appellate court for second
       stage proceedings under the Act.

¶ 32                              K. Appellate Court Proceedings

                                                 -8-
¶ 33       Before the appellate court, focus centered on whether Ross or Byrd governed
       the issue of the timeliness of the postconviction petition. The appellate court found
       the Byrd case controlled, and following Byrd, petitioner’s counsel’s filing of the
       ineffective notice of appeal on February 21, 2006, constituted the filing of a direct
       appeal for the purposes of section 122-1(c) of the Act. 2022 IL App (2d) 210197,
       ¶ 43. The appellate court reasoned that, under the plain language of the statute, only
       the “filing” of an appeal is required and to hold that an appeal is only filed if it is
       resolved on its merits would be to add language to the statute that is not present. Id.
       The appellate court agreed with Byrd, finding that, pursuant to Illinois Supreme
       Court Rule 606(a) (eff. Mar. 12, 2021), the only requirement for “ ‘perfecting’ ” an
       appeal is to file a notice of appeal and that the timeliness element set forth in Rule
       606(b) was not relevant to the question of whether an appeal had been “ ‘filed.’ ”
       2022 IL App (2d) 210197, ¶ 44. Finally, the appellate court found that this court’s
       use of the phrase “ ‘notice of appeal’ ” interchangeably with “ ‘direct appeal’ ” in
       discussing section 122-1(c) of the Act in People v. Johnson, 2017 IL 120310, ¶ 23,
       “strongly support[s] Byrd’s holding.” 2022 IL App (2d) 210197, ¶ 45.

¶ 34       As for the prior Ross decision, the appellate court found that the decision “was
       not well reasoned.” Id. ¶ 46. The court found Ross addressed a prior version of
       section 122-1(c), which was effective from July 1, 1997, to November 18, 2003. Id.
       Moreover, the appellate court found that, although noncompliance with Rule 604(d)
       “precluded the appellate court from reaching the merits of the defendant’s direct
       appeal,” this did not preclude petitioner from filing a petition for leave to appeal to
       this court, which would trigger the six-month period. Id.

¶ 35       Finally, the appellate court rejected the notion that Ross controlled the deadline
       for filing a postconviction petition in her situation. Id. ¶ 48. The court reasoned that
       the version of the statute that Ross interpreted had been amended “over two years
       prior,” and there was no indication in the record that petitioner was relying on Ross
       in the first place. Id. Finally, the appellate court did not address the issue of whether
       petitioner was culpably negligent in the delay in filing her petition because she did
       not argue the issue. Id. ¶ 49. Thus, the appellate court affirmed the circuit court’s
       dismissal of the postconviction petition as untimely. This court granted petitioner
       leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Oct. 1, 2021).

                                                 -9-
¶ 36                                      II. ANALYSIS

¶ 37                                  A. Standard of Review

¶ 38       The primary substantive legal issue presented by this appeal is whether the
       courts below erred in applying the six-month time limit set forth in section 122-1(c)
       of the Act, which applies in a case where petitioner has filed a direct appeal,
       although the notice of appeal was untimely and thus the appellate court lacked
       jurisdiction, and petitioner had lost the right to appeal due to the failure to file a
       timely motion to withdraw a guilty plea as required by Rule 604(d). The standard
       for our review of issues of timeliness as it pertains to a postconviction petition at
       the second stage of proceedings have been set forth by this court as follows:

              “The Act provides a method by which persons under criminal sentence in
          this state can assert that their convictions were a result of a substantial denial of
          their rights under the United States Constitution or the Illinois Constitution or
          both. [Citation.] In a noncapital case, a postconviction proceeding contains
          three stages. *** When reviewing a motion to dismiss at the second stage of
          proceedings, we accept as true all factual allegations that are not positively
          rebutted by the record. [Citation.] Our review of a petition dismissed at this
          stage is de novo.” Johnson, 2017 IL 120310, ¶ 14.

¶ 39        Our review of the order dismissing petitioner’s postconviction petition presents
       an issue involving the interpretation of section 122-1(c) of the Act. In addressing
       this issue, “our primary objective is ‘to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the
       legislature.’ ” Brunton v. Kruger, 2015 IL 117663, ¶ 24 (quoting Gaffney v. Board
       of Trustees of the Orland Fire Protection District, 2012 IL 110012, ¶ 56). “The best
       indication of that intent is the language of the statute itself, which must be given its
       plain and ordinary meaning.” Id. (citing People v. Hammond, 2011 IL 110044,
       ¶ 53). “ ‘We will not depart from the plain statutory language by reading into it
       exceptions, limitations, or conditions that conflict with the expressed intent of the
       legislature.’ ” Id. (quoting Gaffney, 2012 IL 110012, ¶ 56). “Further, we will not
       utilize extrinsic aids of statutory interpretation unless the statutory language is
       unclear or ambiguous.” Id. “ ‘A statute is ambiguous if it is capable of being
       understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more different ways.’ ”
       Id. (quoting Krohe v. City of Bloomington, 204 Ill. 2d 392, 395-96 (2003)).
       “Because interpretation of a statute is a question of law, our review is de novo.” Id.

                                                - 10 -
       (citing In re Commitment of Fields, 2014 IL 115542, ¶ 32). Having set forth the
       standards relevant to our review, we turn to the issue of the timeliness of the
       postconviction petition in this case.

¶ 40                   B. Section 122-1(c) of the Act Is a Statute of Limitations

¶ 41        This court has said that timeliness is not an inherent element of the right to bring
       a postconviction petition and, thus, is not a jurisdictional prerequisite. People v.
       Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d 89, 101 (2002). As such, the time limitations set forth in section
       122-1(c) of the Act should be considered as an affirmative defense akin to a statute
       of limitations and can be raised, waived, or forfeited by the State. Id. Thus, “[i]f an
       untimely petition demonstrates that a defendant suffered a deprivation of
       constitutional magnitude, a dutiful prosecutor may waive that procedural defect
       during the second stage of post-conviction proceedings.” Id. at 101-02.

¶ 42                                   C. Statutory Language

¶ 43        The legislature has frequently amended the limitations periods governing the
       filing of postconviction petitions. See People v. Harris, 224 Ill. 2d 115, 125 (2007).
       The version that governs this case is the one in effect at the time the petition was
       filed on August 10, 2007. See id. This version, which remains effective as of this
       date, provides, in relevant part, as follows:

               “When a defendant has a sentence other than death, no proceedings under
           this Article shall be commenced more than 6 months after the conclusion of
           proceedings in the United States Supreme Court, unless the petitioner alleges
           facts showing that the delay is not due to his or her culpable negligence. If a
           petition for certiorari is not filed, no proceedings under this Article shall be
           commenced more than 6 months from the date for filing a certiorari petition,
           unless the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was not due to his or
           her culpable negligence. If a defendant does not file a direct appeal, the post-
           conviction petition shall be filed no later than 3 years from the date of
           conviction, unless the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was not
           due to his or her culpable negligence.” 725 ILCS 5/122-1(c) (West 2022).

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¶ 44        As the appellate court aptly noted in Byrd, and further explained infra, this court
       in Johnson inserted a requirement into this section that, in a case where a petitioner
       does not file a petition for leave to appeal in this court, a postconviction petition be
       filed within six months of the due date of a petition for leave to appeal. Byrd, 2018
       IL App (4th) 160526, ¶ 45 (citing Johnson, 2017 IL 120310, ¶ 24). Accordingly, if
       petitioner is held to the six-month statute of limitations, her petition was due six
       months from the date a petition for leave to appeal the appellate court’s dismissal
       order was due in this court, and it is thus untimely. If petitioner is held to the “3
       years from the date of conviction” statute of limitations set for those who do not
       file a direct appeal, her petition is timely. Based on the statutory language, which
       provision applies depends on whether petitioner “filed a direct appeal.” It is to this
       question that we now turn.

¶ 45        It is undisputed that petitioner filed a notice of appeal in the appellate court after
       the circuit court, without subject-matter jurisdiction over her untimely motion to
       withdraw her guilty plea, denied the motion. The courts below, following the Fourth
       District decision in Byrd, held that filing a notice of appeal constitutes the filing of
       a direct appeal for purposes of section 122-1 of the Act because, based on the plain
       meaning of the word “file,” all that is required to “file a direct appeal” is the act of
       filing the notice of appeal. 2022 IL App (2d) 210197, ¶¶ 42-43 (citing Byrd, 2018
       IL App (4th) 160526, ¶ 52). In addition, the appellate court below and the Byrd
       court emphasized the fact that this court in Johnson, while unnecessary to the
       holding in that case, stated that section 122-1(c) “ ‘even provides a three-year
       deadline for filing a petition when no notice of appeal is filed.’ ” (Emphasis in
       original.) Id. ¶ 42 (quoting Johnson, 2017 IL 120310, ¶ 23, and citing Byrd, 2018
       IL App (4th) 160526, ¶ 52). Finally, the courts found support for their holding in
       the language of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 606(a) (eff. Mar. 20, 2009), which
       provides that, “appeals shall be perfected by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk
       of the trial court.” For the following reasons, as we consider each of these points of
       reasoning in turn, we disagree with the Lighthart and Byrd courts and find the
       language of the statute to be ambiguous, as the meaning of “file a direct appeal” is
       subject to at least two reasonable interpretations.

¶ 46                             D. Dictionary Definition of “File”

                                                 - 12 -
¶ 47       The appellate court found that the word “file” in section 122-(c) is
       unambiguous. 2022 IL App (2d) 210197, ¶ 43. In so doing, though, it quoted from
       Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, which, in relation to law and the courts,
       presents several potentially relevant definitions: (1) to place among official records
       as prescribed by law; (2) to return to the office of the clerk of a court without action
       on the merits; and (3) to initiate (something, such as legal action) through proper
       formal procedure. Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.
       merriamwebster.com/dictionary/file (last visited Aug. 31, 2023) [https://perma.cc/
       8WNM-AGPH]. Of these three definitions, two of them refer to the adherence to
       law or procedure. Considering the reference in section 122-1(c) to “filing a direct
       appeal,” the definition that makes the most sense is the third, which is to initiate
       (something, such as legal action) through proper formal procedure. Thus, a
       reasonable interpretation of the phrase “file a direct appeal” is to initiate an appeal
       through proper formal procedure. However, a review of the definition of “file” in
       Black’s Law Dictionary provides greater support for the appellate court’s
       conclusion than does the regular dictionary definition. Black’s Law Dictionary 772
       (11th ed. 2019). The primary definition therein is “[t]o deliver a legal document to
       the court clerk or record” and makes no reference to a requirement that such a
       document be delivered in conformance with proper procedure. Id.

¶ 48       Based on the various uses of the word “file” in conjunction with the legal
       process, both in ordinary meaning and in legal terms, we conclude that, while
       equating “file a direct appeal” with “file a notice of appeal” as did the courts below
       and the court in Byrd is a reasonable interpretation of the statutory language,
       petitioner’s interpretation, which requires the notice of appeal to be effective (i.e.,
       to initiate the appeal through proper formal procedure), is also reasonable,
       especially when the legislature could have used the phrase “file a notice of appeal”
       in order to clearly convey its intent. Accordingly, we find the phrase to be
       ambiguous. See Dynak v. Board of Education of Wood Dale School District 7, 2020
       IL 125062, ¶ 16 (a statute is ambiguous if it is subject to more than one reasonable
       interpretation). When considering the court’s statements in Johnson and the
       language of Rule 606(a), we find further support for the conclusion that the
       differing interpretations of this language set forth by the parties are both reasonable,
       thus supporting the conclusion that the language creates an ambiguity.

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¶ 49                          E. This Court’s Statements in Johnson

¶ 50       As the State and the courts below point out, in Johnson, this court made a
       statement that “[t]he statute even provides a three-year deadline for filing a petition
       when no notice of appeal is filed” and that “[w]e see no reason for the legislature
       to provide a deadline when no notice of appeal has been filed but not to include one
       when no petition for leave to appeal has been filed.” (Emphases added.) 2017 IL
       120310, ¶ 23. Accordingly, this court in Johnson seemed to equate the filing of an
       appeal with the filing of the notice of appeal, lending support for an interpretation
       of that provision that would impose a six-month statute of limitations in any case
       where a notice of appeal is filed in the appellate court, regardless of whether it is
       filed “through proper formal procedure.” However, in Johnson, the court was called
       on to consider whether there was any deadline imposed on someone who filed an
       appeal in the appellate court but no petition for leave to appeal in this court. Id.
       ¶ 17. Because petitioner in that case did not contend that he had not filed a direct
       appeal, the court had no need to interpret the phrase because it was not germane to
       the court’s analysis. Accordingly, the characterization of the statutory language as
       providing a three-year deadline when “no notice of appeal has been filed” is
       obiter dictum, as it was not essential to the outcome of the case, is not an integral
       part of the opinion, and thus is not binding authority or precedent within the
       stare decisis rule. See Lebron v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital, 237 Ill. 2d 217, 236
       (2010). Thus, this court’s statement in Johnson does not clarify the ambiguity
       presented by the language of section 122-1(c) of the Act.

¶ 51                                       F. Rule 606(a)

¶ 52       Illinois Supreme Court Rule 606(a) (eff. Mar. 12, 2021) provides that “[a]ppeals
       shall be perfected by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial court” and
       that “[n]o step in the perfection of the appeal other than the filing of the notice of
       appeal is jurisdictional.” The State argues, and the courts below found, that this
       language supports a finding that the filing of a notice of appeal is to be considered
       the filing of a direct appeal for purposes of section 122-1. Again, this is a reasonable
       interpretation of the statutory language and is indeed supported by the language of
       Rule 606(a).

                                                - 14 -
¶ 53        Nevertheless, Rule 606(b) goes on to place a time limit on the filing of the notice
       of appeal and excepts from that time limit appeals from motions to withdraw guilty
       pleas, for which it references Rule 604(d). Rule 604(d) provides that no appeal shall
       be taken in such a case without the filing of a timely motion to withdraw the guilty
       plea. Accordingly, these provisions lend credence to our conclusion that it is also a
       reasonable interpretation of section 122-1 to find that, to file a direct appeal, a
       timely notice of appeal is required, as is compliance with Rule 604(d) when
       necessary. As further illustration of this conclusion, we note that the courts often
       interchangeably refer to the “filing of a notice of appeal” and the “filing of a timely
       notice of appeal” when describing the requirements for triggering the jurisdiction
       of the appellate court. See, e.g., People v. Smith, 228 Ill. 2d 95, 104 (2008) (“The
       filing of a notice of appeal ‘is the jurisdictional step which initiates appellate
       review.’ ” (quoting Niccum v. Botti, Marinaccio, DeSalvo & Tameling, Ltd., 182
       Ill. 2d 6, 7 (1998))); cf. People v. Patrick, 2011 IL 111666, ¶ 20 (“The timely filing
       of a notice of appeal is the only jurisdictional step for initiating appellate review.”).

¶ 54       For the foregoing reasons, we find that the language in section 122-1 of the Act,
       which sets forth a three-year statute of limitations for the filing of a postconviction
       petition when defendant “does not file a direct appeal,” is subject to more than one
       reasonable interpretation and is thus ambiguous, and we will resort to extrinsic aids
       of statutory interpretation to determine legislative intent. See Krohe, 204 Ill. 2d
       392, 395 (2003). In so doing, we turn to the history of section 122-1 of the Act and
       any discernible legislative debates, as a statute’s legislative history and debates are
       “ ‘[v]aluable construction aids in interpreting an ambiguous statute.’ ” Id. at 397
       (quoting Advincula v. United Blood Services, 176 Ill. 2d 1, 19 (1996)).

¶ 55                            G. Legislative History and Debates

¶ 56       This court outlined the early history of section 122-1(c) of the Act in Johnson,
       noting that the legislature has gradually decreased the time period in which a
       postconviction petition may be filed. 2017 IL 120310, ¶ 21. By 1995, the time had
       been decreased to a period of three years from the date of conviction, unless a
       petition for leave to appeal to this court or a petition for writ of certiorari was either
       due to be filed or filed and denied, in which case the petition was due six months
       from the due date or denial date. Id. (citing Pub. Act 86-1210, § 2 (eff. Jan. 1, 1992),

                                                 - 15 -
       Pub. Act 87-580, § 1 (eff. Jan. 1, 1992), and Pub. Act 88-678, § 15 (eff. July 1,
       1995)).

¶ 57       The version of section 122-1(c) that was in effect between 1997 and 2003
       omitted a deadline that was tied to certiorari petitions in the United States Supreme
       Court and added a deadline in cases where a petition for leave to appeal had been
       allowed in this court, but with a three-year “statute of repose,” thus providing:

           “No proceedings under this Article shall be commenced more than 6 months
           after the denial of a petition for leave to appeal or the date for filing such a
           petition if none is filed or more than 45 days after the defendant files his or her
           brief in the appeal of the sentence before the Illinois Supreme Court (or more
           than 45 days after the deadline for the filing of the defendant’s brief with the
           Illinois Supreme Court if no brief is filed) or 3 years from the date of conviction,
           whichever is sooner, unless the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay
           was not due to his or her culpable negligence.” (Emphasis added.) Pub. Act 90-
           14, art. 2, § 2-240, (eff. July 1, 1997).

¶ 58       Effective November 19, 2003, as part of a legislative package toward “death
       penalty reform,” section 122-1(c) was amended to provide a specific statute of
       limitations for cases involving death sentences, with accrual tied to direct appeal
       proceedings before the United States Supreme Court, providing:

           “Except as otherwise provided in subsection (a-5),[2] if the petitioner is under
           sentence of death, no proceedings under this Article shall be commenced more
           than 6 months after the denial of a petition for certiorari to the United States
           Supreme Court on direct appeal, or more than 6 months from the date for filing
           such a petition if none is filed, unless the petitioner alleges facts showing that
           the delay was not due to his or her culpable negligence.” Pub. Act 93-605, § 15
           (eff. Nov. 19, 2003).

           2
             Subsection (a-5) of section 122-1 of the Act provides for the filing of a postconviction petition
       in cases involving newly discovered evidence establishing a substantial basis to believe the
       petitioner is actually innocent in cases involving the death penalty, to be commenced “within a
       reasonable period of time after the person’s conviction.” 725 ILCS 5/122-1(a-5) (West 2022).

                                                       - 16 -
¶ 59       In contrast, cases that did not involve the death penalty continued with a statute
       of limitations accrual tied directly to proceedings before this court, but with
       simplified language tying such accrual solely to the petition for leave to appeal:

              “When a defendant has a sentence other than death, no proceedings under
          this Article shall be commenced more than 6 months after the denial of the
          Petition for Leave to Appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, or more than 6
          months from the date for filing such a petition if none is filed, unless the
          petitioner alleges facts showing the delay is not due to his or her culpable
          negligence.” Id.

¶ 60       Noticeably absent from this version of the statute is the three-year “repose”
       period that was included in the prior versions. This amendment to the provision was
       short-lived, however, as it was amended by the legislature effective August 20,
       2004, culminating in the version that remained in effect at the time petitioner filed
       her postconviction petition in 2007. See Pub. Act 93-972, § 10 (eff. Aug. 20, 2004).
       This version left the distinction between death penalty and non-death-penalty cases
       intact. Id. As to cases involving the death penalty, the language was changed to
       clarify the applicable statute of limitations whether a petition for writ of certiorari
       is granted or denied by the United States Supreme Court. Thus, this version
       applicable to death penalty cases provided:

          “Except as otherwise provided in subsection (a-5), if the petitioner is under
          sentence of death and a petition for writ of certiorari is filed, no proceedings
          under this Article shall be commenced more than 6 months after the conclusion
          of proceedings in the United States Supreme Court, unless the petitioner alleges
          facts showing that the delay was not due to his or her culpable negligence. If a
          petition for certiorari is not filed, no proceedings under this Article shall be
          commenced more than 6 months from the date for filing a certiorari petition,
          unless the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was not due to his or
          her culpable negligence.” 725 ILCS 5/122-1(c) (West 2004).

¶ 61       Thus, in a case involving the death penalty, the amendment clarified that a
       postconviction petition is required to be filed within six months after conclusion of
       any direct appeal before the United States Supreme Court or, if there is no such
       direct appeal, six months from the date a petition for writ of certiorari would be
       due to effectuate such a direct appeal. Id. Inexplicably though, the provision

                                               - 17 -
       regarding cases not involving the death penalty was likewise amended, deleting any
       reference to proceedings before this court and inserting reference to proceedings
       before the United States Supreme Court. See id. This is the provision in effect when
       the petitioner’s direct appeal was dismissed and when she filed her postconviction
       petition, and we repeat it here, in relevant part, for convenience:

               “When a defendant has a sentence other than death, no proceedings under
           this Article shall be commenced more than 6 months after the conclusion of
           proceedings in the United States Supreme Court, unless the petitioner alleges
           facts showing that the delay is not due to his or her culpable negligence. If a
           petition for certiorari is not filed, no proceedings under this Article shall be
           commenced more than 6 months from the date for filing a certiorari petition,
           unless the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was not due to his or
           her culpable negligence. If a defendant does not file a direct appeal, the post-
           conviction petition shall be filed no later than 3 years from the date of
           conviction, unless the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was not
           due to his or her culpable negligence.” (Emphases added.) 725 ILCS 5/122-1
           (West 2004).

¶ 62       Pursuant to this amendment, in a non-death-penalty case, the plain language of
       the statute seemed to tie accrual of a six-month statute of limitations solely to
       proceedings before the United States Supreme Court, or the due date of a petition
       for writ of certiorari if no such proceedings were had, and inserted a three-year
       limitations period, but only for those cases where a defendant did not file a direct
       appeal. As this court explained in Johnson, however, for defendants who appealed
       to the appellate court but did not file a petition for leave to appeal in this court, there
       was no way to calculate the due date of a petition for writ of certiorari. 2017 IL
       120310, ¶ 20. This is because (except in death penalty cases) the United States
       Supreme Court only has jurisdiction to consider a petition for writ of certiorari
       when an appeal has been taken to the state court of last resort. Id. As such, United
       States Supreme Court Rule 13 provides that a petition for certiorari must be filed
       within 90 days of this court’s judgment. Johnson, 2017 IL 120310, ¶ 20.

¶ 63       In Johnson, this court rejected the petitioner’s argument that, because he did
       not file a petition for leave to appeal in this court, he was not subject to a statute of
       limitations for the filing of a postconviction petition at all, finding a literal reading

                                                 - 18 -
       of that section of the statute is at odds with its purpose, which is to provide a
       deadline for filing a postconviction petition, and created an absurd result. Id. ¶ 21.
       Accordingly, this court “inserted” the petition for leave to appeal language into the
       statute, which “the legislature omitted by oversight,” thus providing that a
       postconviction petition must be filed within six months of (1) the conclusion of
       proceedings before the United States Supreme Court or, if none, (2) the date for
       filing a petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court or, if none, the
       date for filing a petition for leave to appeal to this court. Id. ¶ 24.

¶ 64       A review of legislative debate of this amendment is unhelpful to this court.
       According to a brief description given by Senator Cullerton when describing an
       unrelated floor amendment during the bill’s second reading, it was considered to be
       “a cleanup of the *** death penalty reform bill” from the year before. 93d Ill. Gen.
       Assem., Senate Proceedings, May 12, 2004, at 43 (statement of Senator Cullerton).
       A discussion in the House when debating the adoption of the bill considering the
       Senate amendment reveals a lot of confusion on the part of a cosponsor of the bill
       and others as to the meaning of the change to section 122-1(c). See 93d Ill. Gen.
       Assem., House Proceedings, May 27, 2004, at 19-22. The following colloquy took
       place between one of the cosponsors and a representative:

               “[Representative]: And then if. . . if. . . I guess an inmate decides to file a
           petition, he has 3 years to file it?

               [Cosponsor]: In death penalty cases he has 3 years.[3] I think in a nondeath
           penalty case this would allow. . . right. He has 3 years if he chooses not to file
           a direct appeal. So this would extend the time.

               [Representative]: So, this last appeal that has to be filed within 3 years, is
           that an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court or. . .?

              [Cosponsor]: What happens is, once a verdict has been issued the person
           can either file a direct appeal or he can. . .

           3
             As set forth above, there is no three-year deadline set forth in this version of section 122-1(c)
       of the Act for death penalty cases.

                                                       - 19 -
       [Representative]: But who is. . . who is. . . the 3-year deadline is for him to
    appeal to whom or what organization or what authority?

         [Cosponsor]: It’s. . . it’s the period of time that he has to file the petition.
    So, he has 3 years to file for a post-conviction hearing on that particular case,
    to go back into his case. So in other words, if there was new evidence or
    something that came about during his appeal, that first appeal, this would still
    allow them the 3 year[s’] time framework to then bring that new evidence up
    to. . .[4]

         “[Representative]: Currently, what’s the time frame?

         [Cosponsor]: Currently, it’s 3 years.[5]

         [Representative]: It’s…it’s 3 years now?

         [Cosponsor]: Right. It’s 3 years currently.

         [Representative]: So, we’re. . . we’re. . .

       [Cosponsor]: “It doesn’t change that. . . it doesn’t expand that length of
    time. But it’s when the 3 years start.

        [Representative]: We’re not lengthening it and we’re not shortening it, is
    that correct?

         [Cosponsor]: No. We’re just clarifying it, that’s correct.

         [Representative]:Do you think 3 years is enough time?

         ***

        [Cosponsor]: Well, that’s. . . that’s been agreed upon between defense
    attorneys and prosecutors at the same time.

    4
       As set forth above, the three-year period only applies when a defendant does not file a direct
appeal, and a six-month period is applicable when an appeal has been filed, so this statement is
incorrect.
     5
       Again, prior to the passage of this amendment, any three-year period had been eliminated from
the section, and the amendment being debated was reintroducing the three-year period in a non-
death-penalty case where a defendant does not file a direct appeal.

                                               - 20 -
               [Cosponsor]: And the public defender’s office is approving?

               [Representative]: Right, they’re all onboard with this.” Id. at 21-22
           (statements of Representatives M. Davis and Turner).

       Without further discussion on the issue of the amendment to section 122-5 of the
       Act, the bill was passed into law. Id. at 25.

¶ 65                    H. This Court’s Conclusion Regarding Legislative Intent

¶ 66       The debates on the applicable amendment to section 122-1 of the Act do not
       assist the court in determining whether the legislature intended the filing of a notice
       of appeal, regardless of its effectiveness in conferring appellate jurisdiction on the
       court of review, to trigger the six-month provision or whether the legislature
       intended the three-year provision to operate only in cases where no notice of appeal
       had been filed at all, because the statements made during the debate conflict with
       the plain language of section 122-1. However, we do find some guidance in the
       history of the statute, as outlined above.

¶ 67       Considering the overall legislative trend of shortening the statute of limitations
       down to a three-year statute with a series of amendments designed to ensure the
       relevant process of appeal is complete prior to the running of a shorter, six-month
       limitations period, we find that the legislature intended that a six-month limitations
       be applied where a deadline for filing a petition for leave to appeal or petition for a
       writ of certiorari can be ascertained by reference to the entry of an order by a court
       of review. As such, we find the legislature intended that the three-year statute of
       limitations be applicable only where neither this court nor the United States
       Supreme Court has jurisdiction to consider a petition for leave to appeal or for a
       writ of certiorari, and thus there is no method of calculating a six-month deadline.
       For these reasons, we hold that a petitioner is to be found to have “filed a direct
       appeal” if he or she files a notice of appeal that culminates in an appellate court
       order disposing of the appeal, whether by dismissal or on the merits. 6

           6
             Of course, this court would not have jurisdiction over a petition for leave to appeal from an
       order striking a notice of appeal as premature due to a pending postjudgment motion as set forth in
       Illinois Supreme Court Rule 606(b) (eff. Sept. 18, 2003), and an appellate court order striking the

                                                     - 21 -
¶ 68       We are confident that this bright-line rule will ultimately make it easier for self-
       represented, incarcerated litigants to ascertain the appropriate deadline for filing a
       postconviction petition because it will be unnecessary for them to differentiate
       between effective and ineffective notices of appeal or to inquire for the meaning of
       the disposition of their appeal, whether on the merits, on jurisdictional grounds, or
       for failure to comply with rules requiring a condition precedent, such as Rule
       604(d). Once an incarcerated, self-represented litigant is in receipt of an order of
       the appellate court disposing of her appeal, she will be able to either file a petition
       for leave to appeal with this court within 35 days pursuant to Rule 315, or she will
       have six months from the date such a petition would be due in which to file a
       postconviction petition.

¶ 69                           I. Application of Our Holding to Petitioner

¶ 70       Here, petitioner lost her right to appeal due to counsel’s failure to comply with
       Rule 604(d), and her notice of appeal was untimely because her untimely motion
       to withdraw her guilty plea did not toll the deadline for filing a notice of appeal.
       However, she did, in fact, file a notice of appeal, although ineffective, which
       culminated in an appellate court order dismissing her appeal on September 19,
       2006. This dismissal order triggered this court’s jurisdiction to consider a petition
       for leave to appeal pursuant to Rule 315 (Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Aug. 15, 2006)),
       with a 35-day deadline for filing the petition expiring on October 24, 2006. At that
       point, she had the option to file a petition for leave to appeal in this court within 35
       days or to file a postconviction petition within six months of the deadline for filing
       a petition for leave to appeal, which was April 24, 2007. Because she did not file a
       petition for leave to appeal and did not file her postconviction petition until August
       10, 2007, her petition is untimely pursuant to section 122-1(c) of the Act, as
       interpreted by this court in Johnson and in this opinion. Thus, we agree with the
       appellate court on the issue of the construction and application of section 122-1(c).
       Having found the petition to be untimely, we turn to consider whether the circuit
       court erred in finding petitioner culpably negligent for the delay in filing.

       notice of appeal does not constitute a dismissal of the appeal. Thus, an order of the appellate court
       striking a notice of appeal as premature does not trigger the six-month period.

                                                      - 22 -
¶ 71                                   J. Lack of Culpable Negligence

¶ 72       The appellate court declined to consider the issue of petitioner’s culpable
       negligence because she did not argue that she was not culpably negligent in filing
       her petition beyond the deadline. 2022 IL App (2d) 210197, ¶ 49. 7 However,
       petitioner has taken the position from the start that her petition is timely, a position
       that, as explained above, represented a reasonable interpretation of section 122-1(c)
       of the Act. From the time the appellate court mandated that petitioner’s claims
       advance to the second stage of proceedings, she has had three appointed attorneys
       and one privately retained attorney, and none of them appeared to recognize a
       timeliness issue with the petition until the State filed its motion to dismiss the
       petition on December 7, 2020. Regardless, this court has held Rule 651(c) (Ill. S.
       Ct. R. 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017)) requires counsel to amend an untimely pro se
       petition to allege any available facts necessary to establish that the delay was not
       due to the petitioner’s culpable negligence. People v. Perkins, 229 Ill. 2d 34, 49
       (2007). Thus, in light of our holding regarding the untimeliness of the petition, this
       court must, at a minimum, remand this cause to the circuit court to allow for counsel
       to consult with petitioner and to amend the petition to allege facts establishing
       petitioner’s lack of culpable negligence. See id. However, for the following reasons,
       we decline to do so in the interests of judicial economy and in light of the
       inordinately long procedural history in this case, because we find petitioner could
       not have been culpably negligent in the late filing of her petition under the
       circumstances as they existed in 2007 when she filed her petition.

¶ 73       This court has held that culpable negligence in the context of section 122-1(c)
       of the Act contemplates something greater than ordinary negligence and is akin to
       recklessness. Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d at 106-08. While ignorance of the law will not
       excuse any delay in bringing a postconviction petition (see Johnson, 2017 IL
       120310, ¶ 26 (citing Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d at 104-05)), this court has upheld a finding

           7
             Petitioner has alleged a lack of culpable negligence in her briefs submitted to this court and, to
       the extent that waiver or forfeiture of that issue could be found, considering her argument with
       respect to timeliness and the vast amount of time that has passed since she filed her postconviction
       petition, we choose to overlook it under the unique circumstances presented here. See Walworth
       Investments-LG, LLC v. Mu Sigma, Inc., 2022 IL 127177, ¶ 94 (“waiver and forfeiture are
       limitations on the parties and not on the court, and a court may overlook forfeiture where necessary
       to reach a just result or maintain a sound body of precedent”).

                                                       - 23 -
       that delay was not due to a postconviction petitioner’s culpable negligence where
       the law and legal doctrine governing petitioner’s claims was evolving and was not
       clarified by this court until after the deadline, pursuant to the version of section
       122-1(c) that was applicable at that time, had passed (see People v. Hernandez, 296
       Ill. App. 3d 349 (1998)).

¶ 74       Here, we find that, at the time that petitioner filed her postconviction petition
       on August 10, 2007, she had no way of knowing her petition was untimely. First,
       at the time she filed her petition, as described in detail above, section 122-1(c) of
       the Act had been amended to omit any reference to a petition for leave to appeal in
       this court when setting forth a six-month deadline for filing a postconviction
       petition, and the text was replaced with a six-month deadline tied to the conclusion
       of proceedings before the United States Supreme Court or the deadline for filing a
       petition for a writ of certiorari. See Pub. Act 93-972, § 10 (eff. Aug. 20, 2004).
       However, as this court pointed out in Johnson, there is no way to calculate a
       deadline for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme
       Court in a non-death-penalty case unless a petition for leave to appeal in this court
       were filed and denied or allowed with an opinion from this court on the merits.
       2017 IL 120310, ¶ 20. While this court found the omission of the petition for leave
       to appeal was legislative oversight and inserted that language into the statute by
       judicial opinion, this did not happen until 10 years after petitioner filed her petition,
       so she did not have the benefit of this court’s decision in Johnson. See id.

¶ 75       In addition to the foregoing, at the time petitioner filed her petition, Ross was
       the only reported opinion in Illinois addressing the timing of a postconviction
       petition in a situation where a petitioner has lost the right to directly appeal the
       conviction due to the failure to file a timely motion to withdraw a guilty plea
       pursuant to Rule 604(d). See 352 Ill. App. 3d at 619. Contrary to the finding of the
       appellate court, we do not see how the August 2004 amendment to section 122-1
       of the Act impacted the Ross holding as it relates to petitioner. Under both versions
       of the statute, the six-month period was tied to the appellate process. See Pub. Act
       93-972, § 10 (eff. Aug. 20, 2004). The Ross court held that, “[f]or postconviction
       purposes, a direct appeal dismissed for failure to file a timely postplea motion
       pursuant to Rule 604(d) is tantamount to no appeal at all.” 352 Ill. App. 3d at 620.
       Thus, although the petitioner had filed a notice of appeal, it was dismissed for
       failure to comply with Rule 604(d), so the six-month limitation period was not

                                                - 24 -
       triggered, and petitioner had three years from the date of conviction to file a timely
       petition for postconviction relief. Id. This was petitioner’s situation at the time she
       filed her postconviction petition, and circuit courts were bound to follow Ross until
       the Fourth District issued its decision in Byrd in 2018, creating a split in authority.
       See People v. Carpenter, 228 Ill. 2d 250, 259-60 (2008) (“ ‘decisions of an
       appellate court are binding precedent on all circuit courts regardless of locale,’ ”
       and “until this court says otherwise, an applicable appellate court decision must be
       followed by the circuit courts of this state” (quoting People v. Harris, 123 Ill. 2d
       113, 128 (1988))).

¶ 76       Based on the unique situation petitioner was in at the time she filed her
       postconviction petition, where it was impossible to calculate a six-month deadline
       based on the statutory language at the time and where the only existing precedent
       established that, because of her counsel’s failure to comply with Rule 604(d), her
       notice of appeal from her conviction was “tantamount to no appeal at all” in the
       context of the postconviction statute of limitations and she filed her petition within
       three years of her conviction, we find that petitioner cannot be found to have been
       culpably negligent for failing to file her postconviction petition within six months
       of the appellate court’s dismissal of her notice of appeal. Thus, despite our holding
       today, clarifying the applicable period is six months in all cases where an appellate
       court order triggers this court’s jurisdiction to entertain a petition for leave to
       appeal, we reverse the circuit court’s order dismissing the postconviction petition
       on grounds of untimeliness.

¶ 77        Having found that petitioner could not have been culpably negligent in the late
       filing of her petition under the circumstances presented here, we remand with
       instructions that she be permitted to amend her supplemental postconviction
       petition to include such allegations and for further proceedings consistent with this
       opinion. In addition, we would be remiss if we did not express our strong
       disapproval of the delay in these proceedings brought about by appointed counsel
       and condoned by the circuit court by the granting of no less than 30 continuances
       spanning over a decade during the second stage of proceedings. Thus, we direct
       that the proceedings on remand be conducted without further delay.

                                               - 25 -
¶ 78                                  III. CONCLUSION

¶ 79       For the foregoing reasons, we hold that pursuant to section 122-1(c) of the Act,
       in any case where a notice of appeal is filed by a defendant following a conviction,
       whether that notice of appeal is dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, for
       noncompliance with Rule 604(d), or heard on its merits, the six-month statute of
       limitations for filing a postconviction petition applies. Pursuant to this holding,
       petitioner’s postconviction petition was untimely. However, under the unique
       circumstances presented in this case, petitioner could not have been culpably
       negligent in failing to file her petition within that six-month period. Accordingly,
       we reverse the order of the circuit court that dismissed the postconviction petition
       as untimely, and we remand with directions that petitioner be permitted to amend
       her supplemental postconviction petition to reflect her lack of culpable negligence
       and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, to be conducted without
       further delay.

¶ 80      Judgements reversed.

¶ 81      Cause remanded with directions.

¶ 82       JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE took no part in the consideration or decision of
       this case.

                                              - 26 -