Court Opinion

ID: 9865023
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 16:21:01.556024+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:36:55.154017
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Francis E. Bouck
specially concurring.
I concur in the conclusion, but solely on the ground that the district court’s attempted modification herein of its original decree could not properly be made in view of the uncontradicted facts presented by the record, to which there will be more specific reference hereinafter.
It is impossible for me to agree with the statements in the court opinion that the decree provision based upon the so-called property settlement agreement of March 3, 1932, does not involve alimony, and that the agreement is inviolate so as forever to deprive the district court of the usual inherent power of Colorado divorce tribunals to modify their decrees in regard to permanent alimony; a power expressly recognized by this court in numerous cases. See Huff v. Huff, 77 Colo. 15, 234 Pac. 167.
The settlement agreement and related formal documents were incorporated verbatim in the interlocutory decree for the obvious purpose of providing for the support and maintenance of the wife thereafter, that is, for alimony, whether this term is used or not. The agree*242ment provided for securing the quarterly payment to the wife of $450, beginning February 7, 1934, out of the income of a trust fund which had been established in the husband’s favor by his grandfather’s last will and testament, under which the corresponding portion of the principal would, in the absence of the agreement, have been payable absolutely to the husband on the day mentioned, when he attained the age of twenty-five years. The agreement also provided that “in order to provide support money for said wife until February 7, 1934 [namely during the period when the husband was not entitled to the principal as such], said husband simultaneously herewith has executed an assignment” of $3500 out of the original trust income, which during this preliminary period was the extent of the husband’s entire interest in the fund. Evidently because of the possibility of the husband’s premature death he provided the additional but merely temporary security of a $30,000 life insurance policy which was to be kept in force for her benefit until the permanent arrangement should become effective on February 7, 1934.
The wife, in her cross complaint, had prayed for “temporary and permanent support money” of $250 per month. The incorporation of the above described provisions in the original decree was thus for all purposes the allowance of alimony. The decree therefore did not differ in principle from the simple type of a decree for alimony with such security as seems reasonable to the trial court at the time of entering the decree. The court automatically retains power to modify the decree, however, according to the changed circumstances of the parties. It cannot deprive itself of this power. See ’35 C. S. A., c. 56, §8, and annotations and citations found in connection therewith.
As I view it, the record before us presents a single question, namely, Do the facts justify the modification here made by the lower court? The answer depends *243upon the showing made concerning the former wife’s need and concerning the former husband’s ability.
As regards the need of the former wife, her condition and station in life have not been proved to have substantially changed so as to require less than the sums originally stipulated by the parties, averaging $150 per month. As regards the ability of the former husband, his inability to earn the aforesaid sums is not involved, inasmuch as their payment was and still is secured by the trust arrangement referred to in the court’s opinion, and his own testimony reveals that he is earning about $130 a month, not shown to be insufficient for his own present support.
Where a formal alimony arrangement has been made by the parties, a court should not lightly change the resulting alimony provisions in the decree. Under the evidence before us, interpreted most favorably to the former husband, it would be in my opinion inequitable to make any change in the original decree at this time.
For the reasons given, I concur in the judgment of this court, reversing the judgment of the district court with directions to dismiss the petition of the defendant in error.