Court Opinion

ID: 9626552
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:16:16.26911+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:17:02.684884
License: Public Domain

SLOAN, J.,
dissenting.
It is no longer practicable or advisable to attempt to make fine distinctions about the “critical stage” of *256a criminal proceeding: The Supreme Court has not decided a case similar to this one involving the waiver of indictment and the consent to a charge by information. However, it is implicit in all of the pertinent Supreme Court decisions developing the scope of the right to counsel as well as in our own that the need for counsel is compelled whenever the state confronts the accused in any situation in which counsel may be of assistance. The Supreme Court has said that the “accused is guaranteed that he need not stand alone against the state at any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where counsel’s absence might derogate from the accused’s right to a fair trial.*” (Footnote omitted). United States v. Wade, 1967, 388 US 218, 226, 87 S Ct 1926, 18 L Ed 2d 1149, 1157.
In the abstract it can be said that nothing takes place at the waiver of an indictment which impairs the accused’s ability to have a fair trial, that the accused still possesses every defense that would be available if he were indicted. In practice, however, we know that an attorney can be of a material assistance in protecting his client at and before a waiver proceeding. In most instances a waiver of indictment and the consent to an information is part and parcel of a plea of guilty, as in the instant case. When an information is filed, in the usual setting, the prosecutor is the only person who has any way of knowing whether the evidence will ¡justify the charge stated in the information. It would be impossible for an unassisted accused to know whether or not he ma.y have committed the degree of the crime charged in the information nor could he know if the crime is properly charged at all. Counsel may later find that his client has consented to a more serious charge than *257would be justified. In some eases this cannot help but make the defense more difficult. It is possible, of course, for an indictment to charge first degree murder, for example, when the evidence would justify nothing more than manslaughter. However, when a ease is presented to the grand jury the evidence is at least screened by the members of the jury and it is certainly not uncommon for the grand jury to refuse to follow the prosecutor’s recommendations. Assuming that the grand jury properly performs its duties, it is not bound by the judgment of the prosecutor.
Common knowledge and experience tells me that an attorney can frequently be of important assistance before and during the grand jury process. It can and does happen that with the aid of counsel an accused is discharged by the grand jury or a less serious offense is charged. Certainly, the absence of counsel at this stage reduces the prospect of plea bargaining, a process that is now accorded respectability. See The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, a Eeport by the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, p 135. At the same cite this statement is made:
“Prosecutors should be available to defense counsel from the beginning of the case for the purpose of discussing the possibility of a disposition by plea of guilty. Except in the most petty eases, such discussion should be had with counsel rather than directly with the defendant. These discussions should thoroughly assess the facts underlying the prosecution’s case, consider information on the offender’s background and correctional needs, and explore all available correctional alternatives as well as review the charge to which the plea will be entered. * *
In the Oregon practice this could best be accom*258plished by pre-indictment negotiations and, if successful, would result in the filing of an information. This could not be done without counsel.
If, as we recently held, it is necessary to have counsel in the traffic court, Stevenson v. Holzman, 1969, 254 Or 94, 458 P2d 414 it seems unrealistic and incongruous to say that an attorney is not necessary when a waiver of indictment is made. It is not possible for me to agree that this is not a critical act. In spite of the one case cited by the majority, Commonwealth v. Phillips, 208 Pa Super 121, 220 A2d 345 (1966), Supreme Court cases such as Powell v. Alabama, 257 US 45, 53 S Ct 55, 77 L Ed 159 (1932), Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 US 52, 82 S Ct 157, 7 L Ed 2d 114 (1961), and White v. Maryland, 373 US 59, 83 S Ct 1050, 10 L Ed 2d 193 (1963), the majority and concurring opinion in Miranda v. Arizona, 1966, 384 US 436, 86 S Ct 1602, 16 L Ed 2d 694, 10 ALR3d 974, and United States v. Wade, supra, and others lead me to the conclusion that the practical as well as legal need of an accused for an attorney at the -waiver proceeding is, indeed, critical.
In Clark v. Gladden, 1967, 247 Or 629, 638, 432 P2d 182, we held that any conviction obtained with a denial of counsel will render the conviction void. This is such a case and we should so hold.