Court Opinion

ID: 9662074
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:58:56.89948+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:36.632104
License: Public Domain

LAMBERT, Justice,
dissenting.
Contrary to the tenor of the majority opinion, only a most pedestrian issue appears here. That issue is whether the language of *818KRS 160.345(2)(c) permits a district board of education to require its prior approval of school policies established by the school council.
The statute in question is as follows:
The school council shall have the responsibility to set school policy consistent with district board ‘policy which shall provide an environment to enhance the students’ achievement and help the school meet the goals established by KRS 158.645 and 158.645(1). (Emphasis added.)
In reliance upon this statute, appellant, the Board of Education of Boone County, Kentucky, adopted a policy which required each school council to submit for its review and approval the council’s school year goals and objectives, its implementation plans, and its method of evaluation. Objecting to the board’s policy on grounds that it was ; I to act autonomously, the council sought declaratory and injunctive relief.
In my view, the language of the statute grants the district board of education a right of prior approval of school council policies. The majority virtually admits this to be so (at 814-15), but finds a greater meaning in the “framework of KERA” by which to avoid the plain language of the statute. Such an approach is at odds with the accepted methodology of statutory construction as it is well described in Gateway Construction Co. v. Wallbaum, Ky., 356 S.W.2d 247, 249 (1962):
The best way in most cases to ascertain such intent or to determine the meaning of a statute is to look to the language used, but no intention must be read into the statute not justified by the language. The primary rule is to ascertain the intention from the words employed in enacting the statute and not to guess what the Legislature may have intended but did not express. (Citations omitted.
The majority has gone far beyond that which is necessary to decide this case and delivered an analytical treatise on the Kentucky Education Reform Act. As tempting as it is to attempt definitive writing in cutting-edge areas of law, we should stick with the issue and decide no more than is necessary for the case. Here, we must determine what meaning shall be ascribed to the statutory language quoted hereinabove and in my view, that language is too plain to permit the result achieved by the majority.
For these reasons, I dissent.
SPAIN, J., joins this dissenting opinion.