Court Opinion

ID: 9580283
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:03:44.421994+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:11.199071
License: Public Domain

WARREN, P. J.,
dissenting.
I cannot join in the majority’s opinion. In my view, plaintiff has not shown that he is entitled to rescind the release agreement under any of his theories. The release bars all of his claims. Therefore, I would reverse.
The majority concludes that plaintiff may rescind because of economic duress. The gravamen of that claim is the deprivation of a party’s free will by the wrongful act of another party. See Capps v. Georgia-Pacific, 253 Or 248, 453 P2d 935 (1969). The majority’s error is in its global view of what constitutes a “wrongful act.” 121 Or App at 31. It considers as pertinent all of defendant’s conduct throughout the dealership relationship. However, what is relevant is defendants’ conduct at the time the termination agreement, which contains the release, was signed. It is plaintiffs agreement to that release that is at issue, and it is defendants’ conduct as related to that agreement that is pertinent. Thus, the focus must be on whether the conduct that resulted in the signing of the termination agreement was wrongful.
Plaintiff asserts that it was wrongful to require him to sign the termination agreement before he could receive a refund for his tools. However, under the dealership agreement, Snap-On was not required to buy back plaintiffs tools. The agreement provided:
“In the event of termination of this Agreement * * *, the Dealer may* * * with the consent ofthe Company,* * * sell to the Company at the price paid by the Dealer any of the Products which have been purchased by the Dealer and which remain in its possession in new, saleable condition.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Doing what a person has a legal right to do is not wrongful conduct. Oregon Bank v. Nautilus Crane & Equip. Corp., 68 Or App 131, 143, 683 P2d 95 (1984). Because Snap-On had no legally enforceable duty to repurchase the inventory from a terminating dealer, Snap-On and its agents were justified in insisting on a release of all claims plaintiff might have against *46them in return for the agreement to repurchase. There was nothing legally wrongful in that conduct.
Further, the majority is wrong in concluding that plaintiff had no reasonable alternatives to signing the termination agreement. The test, as the majority says, is whether, given a choice between doing what defendants required or not doing it, there was a reasonable third alternative; that is, would a reasonably prudent person have taken the alternative course. The termination agreement provided that Snap-On would buy back plaintiffs inventory at current dealer cost. Under the dealer agreement, plaintiff had the option on termination of keeping the inventory and selling it outside the dealership, which would have allowed him to recoup his inventory investment.1 Plaintiff also could have refused to sign the agreement, reserving his rights, or could have taken the termination agreement home with him and sought legal advice before he signed it. “The whole point of an economic duress claim is that the plaintiff had no reasonable choice but to enter into the contract.” Gruver v. Midas Intern. Corp., 925 F2d 280, 283 n 1 (9th Cir 1991). Plaintiff had not one, but at least three, reasonable alternatives to signing the termination agreement. Accordingly, I would conclude that his agreement to the release was not a result of economic.duress.2
Plaintiff also asserts that the release should be rescinded because of mistake. “In order to avoid a contract on account of a unilateral mistake it is necessary that there be a mistake, that the mistake is basic and known to the other party, or that circumstances are such that the other party, as a reasonable person, should have known of the mistake.” Gardner v. Meiling, 280 Or 665, 674, 572 P2d 1012 (1977). Plaintiff asserts that he signed the termination agreement not knowing that it contained the release and, therefore, was mistaken as to the existence of the release.
*47The evidence is that, when plaintiff signed the termination agreement, it was one of numerous documents that he was told to sign. He did not read all of the documents, although he was not prevented from doing that. Neither did he ask to take any of the documents home with him to study before he signed them. Although he did not read the termination agreement, Park read it to him. Park did not explain or specifically point out the release provision. Having had the opportunity to read the release and having had it read to him, plaintiff cannot be said to have been mistaken as to the existence of the release provision. It is not enough that plaintiff may not have fully understood the legal effect of the release. See Shell Oil Co. v. Boyer, 234 Or 270, 277, 381 P2d 494 (1963).
Plaintiffs attempt to rescind based on undue influence is likewise flawed. Under that theory, plaintiff must show that he was “ ‘under the domination of [defendants] or by virtue of the relation between them [was] justified in assuming that [defendants would] not act in a manner inconsistent’ ” with his welfare. Egr v. Egr et al, 170 Or 1, 7, 131 P2d 198 (1942) (quoting Restatement of the Law, Contracts § 497). The evidence here was that, far from being under defendants’ domination, plaintiff was acting contrary to their advice in terminating the dealership. The relationship had by this time become adversary, and there was no evidence that plaintiff believed that defendants were recommending the termination agreement for his, but not their, best interest. There was no undue influence.
Finally, plaintiff asserts that he may rescind because the agreement was one of adhesion, or because it lacked consideration. The release is not avoidable as an adhesion contract. There was consideration given for the release, in the form of the mutual release of claims and defendants’ agreement to repurchase the tool inventory. The dealer agreement gave defendant the option to repurchase or not. In exchange for agreeing to repurchase plaintiffs inventory at current dealer cost and to release any claims it may have had against plaintiff, it was entitled to extract the release agreement.
I would hold that the release is enforceable and that it bars all of plaintiffs claims. Accordingly, I dissent.

 Plaintiff argues that, pursuant to a consignment agreement, he was required on termination to return all goods consigned to him, and therefore he did not have the option to keep the tools. That argument is not persuasive, because there is no evidence that plaintiff had any consigned tools in his possession on the date of termination.

 In addition, plaintiff testified that, when he signed the termination agreement, he just wanted to get out of the office and get his money back. That is not evidence that his agreement to the release was coerced; indeed, the evidence is that he wanted to sign it in order to recoup some of his investment.