Court Opinion

ID: 9591897
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:08:42.281962+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:17.687814
License: Public Domain

McCOMB, J.
I dissent. In my judgment the majority opinion is erroneous in holding that it was not prejudicial error for the trial court to instruct the jury as follows:
“In determining the intention of the defendant at the time of the transaction complained of, it is important to consider *699the means used to accomplish the killing. The intent or intention is manifested by the circumstances connected with the offense, and the sound mind and discretion of the accused. All persons are of sound mind who are neither idiots, nor lunatics, nor affected with insanity.
“The willful use of a deadly weapon without excuse or provocation, in such a manner as to imperil life, generally indicates a felonious intent. ’ ’
This identical language was condemned by the Supreme Court in People v. Peterson, 29 Cal.2d 69, 77 et seq. [173 P.2d 11], the court, speaking through Mr. Justice Schauer, saying at page 78, “. . . that the instruction . . . should not be given in a case such as this, where a defendant does not concede participation in the transaction.” The erroneous instruction did not cause a reversal of the judgment in the Peterson case for the reason as stated by the court that the ease was not “a close one and no miscarriage of justice is shown as a result of the giving of the instruction. ’ ’
In the instant case defendant specifically denied participation in the crime, and in my judgment such erroneous instruction was prejudicial in view of the fact that the evidence was entirely circumstantial and the only evidence identifying defendant as a participant in the crime was given by the witness Farmer, an admitted perjurer.
That this conclusion is unavoidable, that is, that the case was a close one and that the coneededly erroneous instruction was prejudicial, is supported by the following facts:
First: It is conceded that all of the evidence is circumstantial with the exception of the testimony of the witness Farmer a self-confessed perjurer, who at the time he testified was on probation after conviction of a criminal offense, and who had testified before the grand jury in November, 1943 that in looking out of his window on April 5, 1943 into the Oh Johnnie Cafe he had seen only a part of an arm of a man and that the man’s voice he had heard was not that of defendant. He gave similar testimony at a prior trial of the present case in January, 1944. Likewise, on December 15, 1943, he stated to Mr. Hyde and Mr. Mason that defendant was not the man whose voice he had heard on the evening of April 5, 1943. Again in March, 1945, and in 1946, he made a similar statement to Mrs. Elsie Weatherford.
In the ease of People v. Weatherford, 27 Cal.2d 401 [164 P.2d 753], our Supreme Court held on evidence substantially the *700same as that set forth in the majority opinion, with the exception of the? testimony of the perjurer Parmer, that such did not constitute sufficient evidence to make applicable the provisions of article VI, section 4½ of the Constitution relative to an erroneous instruction which had been given.
It should be borne in mind that the only material addition to the evidence in the instant case over that appearing in People v. Weatherford, 27 Cal.2d 401 [164 P.2d 753], is the testimony of the witness Parmer.
Second : The justices of this court, men trained in evaluating evidence and the conclusions to be drawn therefrom, have differed as to the conclusions to be reached from the present record. It is therefore self-evident that an untutored lay jury must have had extreme doubt as to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction, and clearly this court should not say that a concededly erroneous instruction in a case where the evidence is entirely circumstantial, and the defendant denied participation in the crime is not prejudicial to the substantial rights of the defendant, and that a “miscarriage of justice” did not result from the erroneous instruction.
Third: The extreme length of the majority opinion illustrates the extreme tenuousness of the evidence of guilt in the present case.
It has been held in many cases the phrase “miscarriage of justice ’ ’ as used in article VI, section 4% of the Constitution does not mean simply that a guilty man has escaped, or that an innocent man has been convicted. It is equally applicable as pointed out by Mr. Justice Carter in People v. Weatherford, supra, 420, to cases where the conviction has resulted from some form of trial in which an essential right of the defendant has been disregarded or denied.
I therefore adhere to the former opinion* of this court and believe that the judgment should be reversed and a new trial granted.
Appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied April 17, 1947. Carter, J., and Sehauer, J., voted for a hearing.

The opinion concurred in by all members of this court reversing the judgment and granting a new trial, filed on January 14, 1947, appears in 77 A.C.A. 708 [176 P.2d 382].