Court Opinion

ID: 9868656
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 18:46:50.812726+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:52.386079
License: Public Domain

On Appellee’s Motion for Rehearing.
Appellee insists we have misconstrued the record; that the suit was tried upon the conceded theory that the lease was *225valid, the basis of suit being that the son in constructing fences on the property was committing waste and violating the express requirement of the lease, to deliver the premises to lessor at its expiration “in as good condition as the same were in when received, reasonable wear and tear thereof excepted”; and that the suit did not involve the right of possession of real estate, but was merely to protect the property from waste by the tenant, the amount of injury involved being within the county court’s jurisdiction.
There are three reasons why this theory cannot be maintained.
First. The record not only does not show, but refutes the assertion that appellee recognized the validity of the lease. His petition asserted specifically that he (not the son) was “entitled to the possession” of the property. True, he testified that he signed the lease; but the son testified without contradiction that, the father had refused to accept the $200 instalment of rent due January 1, 1948; and the father testified: “* * * I understood that I was to get a third of the feed and a fourth of the cotton in addition to the cash. I am suing Carl for all the land involved herein in the district court.” This showed a clear repudiation of the lease, the inference being that it did not embody the terms agreed upon. The cited case of Turner v. McNutt, Tex.Civ.App., 197 S.W.2d 143, merely held that the tenant might be enjoined from committing waste or otherwise injuring the property. It originated in the district court, and no issue of jurisdiction was involved.
Second. Even were the validity of the lease conceded, the right to construct or change location of fences — a right asserted by the son, but denied by the father — was one which concerned the use and enjoyment of possession incident to the lease. The son testified: the previous year he worked this and other contiguous land on the third and fourth; at the father’s request he moved off the other land and just had this 200 acres; the previous lease was verbal; the father wanted a written lease and cash rental, and had the lease drawn; his father employed a surveyor whom he agreed to pay; he was commencing to build a fence where the surveyor fixed the line “between the land I have leased and my father’s land.” The father testified: “Carl put the fence on the low ground, and I wanted it on the hill. I did not agree to hire á surveyor.” Clearly the right to construct the fence was the bone of contention. The district court alone had jurisdiction to determine the existence vel non of that right.
Third. Even conceding, arguen-do, that the county court in other respects would have jurisdiction, the record both as to pleading and proof, is void of any showing that the amount in controversy was within that court’s jurisdiction (in excess of $200 and not of $1,000). Under Rule 90, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, this defect as to pleading is waived if not raised in the trial court. Erminger v. Daniel, Tex.Civ.App., 185 S.W.2d 148, 149. We do not understand that this rule dispenses with proof of essential jurisdictional facts. In fact the Erminger opinion states: “The evidence showed that the property involved was worth several thousand dollars.” Here there was no evidence whatever of the amount involved. In fact the only evidence of any injury to the father was his testimony that: “His action in building such fence was injurious to my health, and it worried and annoyed me, and if he should continue to build said fence his action will be injurious to my health and will worry me.” The findings of the trial court that building the fence will 1) damage the land in an amount within the jurisdiction of the court, and 2) will injure the father’s health in an amount within the jurisdiction of the court, has no support in the evidence. We did not discuss this issue in our original opinion because it is immaterial under our other holdings. We discuss it now only because our failure to do so is assigned as error in the motion.
The motion is overruled.
Overruled.