Court Opinion

ID: 9898434
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:30:40.803004+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:18.702769
License: Public Domain

Filed
                                                                                         Washington State
                                                                                         Court of Appeals
                                                                                          Division Two

                                                                                           June 27, 2023

    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

                                         DIVISION II
 STATE OF WASHINGTON,                                                No. 56543-9-II

                                Respondent,

        v.

 NATHAN LOWELL ABBITT,                                        UNPUBLISHED OPINION

                                Appellant.

       GLASGOW, C.J. — Nathan Lowell Abbitt had his pants off in front of his two young

stepdaughters, and the girls touched his penis until he ejaculated. After one of the girls disclosed

the incident years later, the State charged Abbitt with two counts of first degree child molestation.

       Before jury selection began, the trial judge addressed a pool of prospective jurors in the

jury administration room. There, the trial judge read introductory instructions, placed the

prospective jurors under oath, and handed out preliminary questionnaires. The parties later

discussed excusing prospective jurors and conducted voir dire in open court.

       In closing arguments at trial, the prosecutor repeatedly asked the jury to hold Abbitt

accountable by convicting him. The jury then convicted Abbitt of both charges. The judgment and

sentence included boilerplate language imposing community custody supervision fees.

       Abbitt appeals. He argues that the proceeding in the jury administration room violated his

right to a public trial. He further asserts that the prosecutor committed misconduct and that there
No. 56543-9-II

was insufficient evidence to convict him. He also contends, and the State concedes, that the

community custody supervision fees must be stricken from his judgment and sentence.

        We affirm Abbitt’s convictions, but we accept the State’s concession and remand for the

trial court to strike the supervision fees.

                                                 FACTS

                                              I. BACKGROUND

        Abbitt began dating KB in 2010. The couple moved in together in 2011 and married in

2013. KB had two young daughters, EB and MB, who were approximately six years old and three

years old when KB began dating Abbitt. Abbitt and KB had two more children together. The

couple then separated in 2019. While dissolution proceedings were ongoing, EB told KB that

Abbitt sexually abused her and MB years earlier. The State initially charged Abbitt with one count

of first degree child molestation, then later added a second count.

                                      II. PRETRIAL PROCEEDINGS

        Before jury selection began, the trial court informed the parties that there were 70

prospective jurors waiting in the jury administration room. The trial court intended to go down to

the jury administration room to read the prospective jurors a preliminary instruction introducing

the parties and explaining the process of a criminal trial. See 11 WASHINGTON PRACTICE:

WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL 1.01 (5th ed. 2021) (WPIC). The trial court

would also inform the prospective jurors of the charges, then place them under oath and have them

complete a questionnaire addressing possible biases or hardships the prospective jurors would face

if selected to serve on the jury. The trial court told the parties that they were “welcome to come

down and watch.” 1 Verbatim Rep. of Proc. (VRP) at 9. The trial court stated that it then expected

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No. 56543-9-II

to discuss with the parties which prospective jurors they would excuse for hardship. Neither party

objected to the trial court’s suggested procedure. The parties also reviewed the questionnaire and

other preliminary information that the prospective jurors would receive on the record in open court.

       When the pool of prospective jurors assembled in the jury administration room, the trial

court again informed the parties of its plan to read preliminary instructions, swear in the

prospective jurors, and distribute questionnaires. The trial court stated, “[Y]ou’re welcome to come

down to [the jury administration room], if you wish, but you’re not required to.” 1 VRP at 43.

Again, neither party objected.

       The trial judge then went to the jury administration room. Neither party attended. Along

with other courtroom staff, the judge introduced the court reporter to the prospective juror pool

and explained, “She’s over here diligently taking down everything that is said while court is in

session. And we are currently in session on this case.” 1 VRP at 48. The judge then read

preliminary instructions about the process of a trial and explained the purpose and process of voir

dire. The judge also placed the prospective jurors under oath and distributed a preliminary

questionnaire.

       That afternoon, the trial court and counsel reconvened in open court to discuss which

prospective jurors they would excuse without individual questioning. The parties agreed to excuse

15 prospective jurors without further questioning based on their answers to the questionnaire. Only

one prospective juror was excused for cause, and the others were excused for hardship. The juror

excused for cause was excused because she was a victim of sexual assault and reported on the

questionnaire that it would be difficult to “remove [her] experience from the facts” of the case. 1

VRP at 73. The parties agreed to excuse another prospective juror for hardship reasons before

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No. 56543-9-II

noting that there was an “obvious bias” challenge as well. 1 VRP at 59. The trial court excused

that juror for hardship. And the parties identified several other prospective jurors as having

potential biases, but kept those jurors in the pool for further questioning.

       The next day, the parties individually questioned prospective jurors about hardships they

would face if they were to serve on a jury. The day after that, once individual questioning about

hardships concluded, the trial court reread the same set of instructions it had read in the jury room

to the remaining pool of prospective jurors, this time in the courtroom with the parties present. The

trial court again placed the prospective jurors under oath before beginning formal voir dire to ask

prospective jurors questions about their potential biases.

                                              III. TRIAL

A.     Evidence Presented

       EB, who was in high school at the time of the trial, testified that the charged incident

occurred one night when Abbitt was putting EB and MB to bed. EB believed that she was seven

years old and MB was four years old at the time of the incident.

       EB testified that the girls slept in bunk beds in a shared bedroom. That night, EB climbed

onto Abbitt’s shoulders from the top bunk, then down his body. She remembered Abbitt wearing

jeans and a shirt. Abbitt’s pants were down by the time EB reached the floor. EB testified that she

and MB sat on the lower bunk bed and rubbed Abbitt’s erect penis. Afterwards, there was

something wet and sticky on her hands. Abbitt then left the room and never discussed the incident

with the girls. MB had no recollection of the incident.

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No. 56543-9-II

       A forensic child interviewer, who interviewed EB, explained that delayed disclosures are

common in child sex abuse cases. In particular, children frequently disclose abuse after the abuser

has left the household or when there is a custody dispute.

       Abbitt testified that on the night in question he put the girls to bed while wearing a towel

wrapped around his waist. He stated that EB was 10 years old and MB was 7 years old at the time

because he remembered that KB was pregnant with the couple’s first child.1 He testified that EB

began roughhousing with him and that the towel fell from his waist while he was holding EB

upside down. He said that MB poked at his penis and EB pulled on it for roughly 3 seconds. He

also testified that KB walked in on the incident as it was occurring. And he denied ejaculating but

said that he believed ejaculate could have leaked from his penis because he suffered from a “leaky

plumbing” condition after years of withholding ejaculation, which he had discussed with KB. 7

VRP at 750.

       KB testified that she never walked in on any scene where Abbitt had his penis exposed in

front of her daughters. She also testified that Abbitt regularly ejaculated when they had sex, that

he never mentioned any problem related to “‘leaky plumbing’” and had full control of his

ejaculatory response, and that he never told her that the girls saw his penis. 5 VRP at 567. And EB

had no recollection of KB entering the room during the incident.

       A detective, who spoke with Abbitt several times, testified that Abbitt repeatedly changed

his assessment of how long the touching occurred, although he consistently maintained that it

occurred for less than one minute. Although MB did not recall the incident, when Abbitt asserted

1
  The State amended the dates in the information to reflect the time period when Abbitt testified
the incident occurred.

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No. 56543-9-II

that he was a victim and the detective asked what charges he would like to file against the girls,

Abbitt said, “‘Penis touching on both of them.[2]’” 6 VRP at 687.

B.     Jury Instructions, Closing Arguments, Verdict, and Sentencing

       The jury instructions emphasized that the attorneys’ statements were not evidence and told

the jurors to “disregard any remark, statement, or argument that is not supported by the evidence

or the law in [the jury] instructions.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 39. The instructions explained that to

convict Abbitt of first degree child molestation, the jury had to find beyond a reasonable doubt

that Abbitt had sexual contact with EB and MB when they were less than 12 years old and were

not married to him. See former RCW 9A.44.083(1) (1994).3 The instructions stated, “Sexual

contact means any touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of a person done for the purpose

of gratifying sexual desires of either party.” CP at 48; see RCW 9A.44.010(13).4

       At the beginning of closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury that because of EB’s

disclosure, “the State has been given the opportunity to prove the defendant’s guilt.” 8 VRP at 872.

“Today, I ask you to hold [Abbitt] accountable for what he did to [EB] and [MB].” Id. The

prosecutor then explained the elements of first degree child molestation. She also addressed the

jury instructions and the evidence presented, including EB’s stated reasons for her delay in

disclosing the incident.

2
 The parties stipulated that this statement and others Abbitt made to the detective were admissible
under CrR 3.5.
3
 The legislature has since removed the requirement that the defendant and victim not be married.
LAWS OF 2021, ch. 142, § 5.
4
 We cite to the current version of the statute because the relevant language has not changed since
Abbitt’s offense.

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No. 56543-9-II

       While discussing the credibility of the witnesses, the prosecutor reminded the jury that they

could consider witnesses’ motives: “In this case, the defendant has the biggest motive to lie so that

you don’t find him guilty [and] so that you don’t hold him accountable for what he did to these

girls.” 8 VRP at 880. She then explained how Abbitt’s testimony was contradicted by other

evidence and testimony, including his own prior statements. At the end of closing, the prosecutor

reminded the jury that it was the trier of fact and contended that, “based on the facts and the law .

. . the State has proven all of the elements beyond a reasonable doubt.” 8 VRP at 889. “I am going

to ask that you find Nathan Abbitt guilty as charged and hold him accountable for what he did to

[EB] and [MB].” Id. Defense counsel did not object at any point during the State’s closing

argument.

       Defense counsel’s closing argument primarily emphasized the presumption of innocence

and the State’s burden of proof.

       The State began rebuttal by discussing the jury instructions, arguing that Abbitt’s leaky

plumbing defense did not create a reasonable doubt about whether he was sexually gratified by the

incident. The prosecutor emphasized that Abbitt had mostly corroborated EB’s version of the

incident. After asking the jurors to review their instructions, the prosecutor said, “Again, I’m going

to ask that you hold Mr. Abbitt accountable for what he did to [EB] and [MB] and find him guilty.”

8 VRP at 909. Defense counsel did not object.

       The jury convicted Abbitt of both counts of first degree child molestation. At sentencing,

the State sought, and the trial court imposed, a sentence of 75 months, near the middle of the

standard sentencing range. The trial court stated that it would waive all nonmandatory legal

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No. 56543-9-II

financial obligations. The judgment and sentence imposed mandatory legal financial obligations

as well as community custody supervision fees. CP at 60, 62.

          Abbitt appeals his convictions and sentence.

                                                ANALYSIS

                                       I. RIGHT TO A PUBLIC TRIAL

          Abbitt argues that the trial court violated his state and federal constitutional right to a public

trial when it “read the advance oral pattern jury instruction, including the details of Mr. Abbitt’s

case, and administered the oath to the jury venire” in the jury administration room, because there

was “no indication” that the public had access to the jury administration room.” Br. of Appellant

at 35, 40. Abbitt contends that the trial court should have conducted a State v. Bone-Club, 128

Wn.2d 254, 906 P.2d 325 (1995), analysis on the record before beginning proceedings in the jury

administration room and that failing to do so was reversible error. We disagree.

A.        Public Trial Principles

          Both the state and federal constitutions guarantee criminal defendants the right to a public

trial. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; WASH. CONST. art. I, §§ 10, 22. In general, this right requires that

certain proceedings be held in open court. State v. Parks, 190 Wn. App. 859, 864, 363 P.3d 599

(2015).

          There are three steps to analyzing a claimed violation of the public trial right. “First, we

ask if the public trial right attaches to the proceeding at issue. Second, if the right attaches we ask

if the courtroom was closed. And third, we ask if the closure was justified.” State v. Love, 183

Wn.2d 598, 605, 354 P.3d 841 (2015). The defendant bears the burden of proof for the first two

questions and the State bears it for the third. Id. For the State to justify a closure, the trial court

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No. 56543-9-II

must either conduct a Bone-Club analysis or otherwise effectively weigh the defendant’s public

trial right against the interests favoring closure. State v. Effinger, 194 Wn. App. 554, 559-60, 375

P.3d 701 (2016).

          The first step of the closure test requires assessing whether the right to a public trial

attached to a proceeding. If a proceeding was not one that the Washington Supreme Court has

already recognized the public trial right attaches to, we “must apply the experience and logic test

to determine whether the public trial right is implicated.” State v. Miller, 184 Wn. App. 637, 644,

338 P.3d 873 (2014). The experience and logic test asks whether a proceeding’s “process and place

. . . historically have been open to the press and general public,” and “whether access to the public

plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the proceeding.” Id. “If the answer to both is

yes, the public trial right attaches” and the court must consider the Bone-Club factors before

closing the proceeding to the public. State v. Sublett, 176 Wn.2d 58, 73, 292 P.3d 715 (2012). It is

the defendant’s burden to show that the public trial right attaches to a proceeding. Love, 193 Wn.2d

at 605.

B.        When the Right to a Public Trial Attaches During Jury Selection

          This court has explained that the public trial right does not apply “to every component of

the broad ‘jury selection’ process,” which “includes the initial summons and administrative culling

of prospective jurors from the general adult public and other preliminary administrative

processes.” State v. Wilson, 174 Wn. App. 328, 338, 298 P.3d 148 (2013). Instead, the public trial

right relates to only “the ‘voir dire’ of prospective jurors who form the venire (comprising those

who respond to the court’s initial jury summons and who are not subsequently excused

administratively).” Id.

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No. 56543-9-II

       CrR 6.4(b) states that voir dire “shall be conducted for the purpose of discovering any basis

for challenge for cause and for the purpose of gaining knowledge to enable an intelligent exercise

of peremptory challenges.” The rule does not mention excusing prospective jurors for hardship

reasons.

       In State v. Russell, the Supreme Court held that the public trial right did not attach to in-

chambers work sessions to excuse potential jurors for hardship. 183 Wn.2d 720, 730, 357 P.3d 38

(2015). The Supreme Court noted that “[d]etermining whether a juror is able to serve at a particular

time or for a particular duration (as in hardship and administrative excusals) is qualitatively

different from challenging a juror’s ability to serve as a neutral fact finder in a particular case (as

in peremptory and for-cause challenges).” Id. at 730-31. The Supreme Court later elaborated that

“hardship determinations do not implicate the concerns underlying the public trial right, at least

where no juror was excused for hardship without further (on-the-record) proceedings.” State v.

Schierman, 192 Wn.2d 577, 608, 438 P.3d 1063 (2018) (lead opinion of McCloud, J.); id. at 747

(Madsen, J., concurring); id. at 763-64 (Yu, J., concurring/dissenting in part).

       Division Three concluded that the defendant’s public trial right did not attach to a

proceeding similar to the one at issue in this case. Parks, 190 Wn. App. at 866-67. In Parks, the

trial court “swore in the venire and gave the venire questionnaires in the jury assembly room

because the venire would not fit in the courtroom.” Id. at 862. Because the Supreme Court had not

previously indicated whether the proceeding implicated a defendant’s public trial right, Division

Three applied the experience and logic test. Id. at 865.

       For the first prong, whether a proceeding has historically been open to the public, the Parks

court emphasized that it had not been able to find any case holding that “swearing in a venire has

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No. 56543-9-II

historically been open to the public,” or that “the public trial right attaches to any component of

jury selection that does not involve ‘voir dire’ or a similar jury selection proceeding involving the

exercise of peremptory challenges and for cause juror excusals.” Id. at 866. Division Three further

noted that the instruction read to the jury, WPIC 1.01, specifies that “it is to be read before the jury

is selected and contains basic educational information the venire needs to know before voir dire

begins.” Id. And Division Three considered the reading of WPIC 1.01 to be analogous to “an

administrative component of the jury selection process to which the public trial right does not

attach.” Id. at 866-67.

        For the second prong, whether public access plays a significant role in the proceeding’s

function, Division Three held that Parks failed to demonstrate that “public access plays a

significant positive role in the functioning of the swearing in a venire,” that “swearing in a venire

is a proceeding similar to the trial itself, or [that] openness during swearing in would enhance the

basic fairness of his trial and the appearance of fairness.” Id. at 867. Thus, Parks could not show

that the public trial right attached to the challenged proceeding. The Supreme Court denied review.

State v. Parks. 185 Wn.2d 1032, 377 P.3d 732 (2016).

C.      Whether the Public Trial Right Attached Here

        Abbitt asserts, “[I]t is well settled that public trial rights apply to voir dire,” which he

contends included the challenged proceedings in both this case and in Parks. Reply Br. of

Appellant at 13. He asserts that the trial court telling the prospective jurors “‘we are currently in

session on this case,’” constituted beginning voir dire. Br. of Appellant at 40. Because he believes

voir dire began at this point, he insists that the public trial right automatically attached “and further

inquiry is therefore unnecessary” because the trial court did not conduct a Bone-Club analysis

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No. 56543-9-II

before going to the jury administration room. Reply Br. of Appellant at 13. He also argues that

voir dire began in the jury administration room because the distributed questionnaire constituted

“‘juror questioning,’” because the parties agreed to excuse one prospective juror for cause due to

her answers to the questionnaire. Reply Br. of Appellant at 21. We disagree.

       1.      Whether the public trial right automatically attached

       Abbitt has not carried his burden to establish that the public trial right automatically

attached to the challenged proceeding in this case. First, the criminal rules establish that voir dire

commences when jurors are questioned so that the parties may exercise peremptory and for-cause

challenges. CrR 6.4(b). Formal voir dire—the process of questioning jurors to discover “any basis

for challenge for cause” and to “enable an intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges”—

occurred entirely on the record in open court in this case, as did any discussion of jurors’ answers

to the questionnaire, which were read aloud in open court if the juror was excused. Id. Although

the prospective jurors received a preliminary oath in the jury administration room, voir dire had

not yet commenced. Abbitt does not cite, and we cannot find, any Supreme Court case that holds

that the public trial right automatically attaches to swearing in a pool of prospective jurors before

they answer a questionnaire. Thus, this proceeding was not “within a specific category that our

Supreme Court already has recognized for application of the public trial right.” Miller, 184 Wn.

App. at 644.

       2.      Whether the public trial right attached under the experience and logic test

       For purposes of analyzing whether the public trial right attached under the experience and

logic test, the challenged proceeding in this case is very similar to the one in Parks. The trial court

was on the record in the jury administration room when it read the same pattern instruction as the

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No. 56543-9-II

court in Parks and a short summary of the charges, swore in the prospective jurors, and distributed

questionnaires. See 190 Wn. App. at 864. The parties then met in open court to discuss which

jurors they would excuse for hardship or bias based on their answers to the questionnaires and

which of the jurors required more questioning. Like in Schierman, no juror was excused without

discussion on the record, including a description of the questionnaire answer that led to the

dismissal. See 192 Wn.2d at 608. Only one juror was excused for cause; both parties and the court

agreed that her history as a victim of sexual abuse, and her written statement about why she could

not separate her own experience from the facts warranted dismissal. Abbitt also asserts that two

prospective jurors were dismissed for “a combination of hardship and bias” without questioning.

Reply Br. of Appellant at 17. But one juror’s bias was raised only after the parties had each moved

to excuse them for hardship, and the trial court excused that juror for hardship, while two other

potentially biased jurors were kept in the pool for additional questioning.

       Abbitt argues that Parks is “fundamentally dissimilar” from his case “and legally flawed”

because he believes that the proceeding in that case also constituted voir dire. Br. of Appellant at

43. We disagree.

       The Supreme Court denied review of Parks and has not reviewed any case citing its

reasoning that public trial rights do not attach when a judge swears in a pool of prospective jurors

and distributes questionnaires. 185 Wn.2d 1032. As discussed above, Abbitt has failed to cite any

precedent holding that the public trial right automatically attaches to swearing in prospective jurors

before they fill out a questionnaire. Abbitt does not cite any case where a Washington court has

held that the parties’ discussions of hardship determinations implicate the public trial right. Indeed,

the case law points to the contrary, with the Supreme Court holding that “hardship determinations

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No. 56543-9-II

do not implicate the concerns underlying the public trial right” as long as jurors are excused on the

record. Schierman, 192 Wn.2d at 608. Moreover, the parties’ discussion of both the hardship

excusals and the single excusal for cause based on written answers to the questionnaires, occurred

on the record in open court. Therefore, we follow Parks and hold that the public trial right did not

attach to the challenged proceeding in this case.

       Abbitt also relies on State v. Slert, 181 Wn.2d 598, 608, 334 P.3d 1088 (2014) (plurality

opinion), to argue that because the trial court placed the prospective jurors under oath, voir dire

had begun. But in Slert, the parties agreed to dismiss four prospective jurors in an in-chambers

conference. Id. at 602. In that case, the Supreme Court emphasized the drastic lack of information

in the record about whether a courtroom closure had occurred, including whether voir dire had

commenced. Id. at 608. Without such evidence, the justices who signed the lead opinion declined

to infer that the proceeding constituted a courtroom closure. Id. Here, all discussions about the

dismissals related to the questionnaires occurred on the record in open court before formal voir

dire began the next day. Because we hold that the public trial right did not attach to the proceeding

at issue here, we need not address whether a courtroom closure occurred.

                                 II. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

       Abbitt argues that the prosecutor’s closing and rebuttal arguments improperly appealed to

the passion and prejudice of the jury, constituting misconduct that violated his right to a fair trial.

He reasons that asking a jury to hold a defendant accountable is similar to asking the jury to

“‘declare the truth’” by convicting the defendant. Br. of Appellant at 53 (quoting State v. Anderson,

153 Wn. App. 417, 429, 220 P.3d 1273 (2009) (holding that prosecutor’s comments were improper

but not prejudicial)). We disagree.

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No. 56543-9-II

       A criminal defendant’s right to a fair trial “is guaranteed under the Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution and under article I, section 22 of the Washington

Constitution.” State v. Gouley, 19 Wn. App. 2d 185, 200, 494 P.3d 458 (2021), review denied, 198

Wn.2d 1041, 502 P.3d 854 (2022). We review the prosecutor’s challenged conduct “‘in the context

of the whole argument, the issues of the case, the evidence addressed in argument, and the

instructions given to the jury.’” Id. (quoting State v. Scherf, 192 Wn.2d 350, 394, 429 P.3d 776

(2018)).

       To demonstrate a violation of the right, a defendant who objected to a prosecutor’s remarks

need only show that the statements were improper and that there is a substantial likelihood the

statements affected the verdict. State v. Emery, 174 Wn.2d 741, 760, 278 P.3d 653 (2012). When

a defendant did not object to a prosecutor’s remarks, they must show that the statements were

flagrant and ill-intentioned as well as improper, that no curative instruction could have remedied

the prejudice from the statements, and that there is a substantial likelihood the statements affected

the verdict. Id. at 760-61. “In evaluating whether the defendant has overcome waiver in cases

where an objection was not lodged, we will ‘focus less on whether the prosecutor’s misconduct

was flagrant or ill intentioned and more on whether the resulting prejudice could have been

cured.’” Gouley, 19 Wn. App. 2d at 201 (quoting Emery, 174 Wn.2d at 762).

       Where the defendant objected below, this court held that it was improper for a prosecutor

to repeatedly ask a jury to “‘declare the truth’” by convicting the defendant. Anderson, 153 Wn.

App. at 429. However, the improper comments in Anderson did not require a new trial because

they were made “in the context of jury instructions that clearly lay out the jury’s actual duties and

of thorough discussion of the evidence by both counsel during [closing] argument.” Id. And

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No. 56543-9-II

requests that the jury “‘do[] justice’” and “return a ‘just verdict’” were not improper, despite a

defense objection, when the statements were “clearly made in the context of [pattern] jury

instructions that explained what ‘justice’ would be.” Id.

         Here, the prosecutor asked the jury to hold Abbitt accountable four times, and defense

counsel did not object to any of these statements. First, asking the jury to hold a defendant

accountable is akin to asking the jury to find the defendant guilty, which is permissible. State v.

Jarvis, No. 56086-1-II, slip op. at 20 (Wash. Ct. App. June 13, 2023)5. It’s different from asking

the jury “to declare the truth, which is akin to telling the jury that its role is to solve the crime and

conduct an investigation, and is a misstatement of the jury’s true duty of determining whether the

State had proved its allegations against the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. “Asking the

jury to hold a defendant responsible by finding them guilty in no way misstates the jury’s duty.”

Id. Moreover, in context, the prosecutor’s comments were based on the evidence presented at trial,

argument about witness credibility, and the assertion that the State had carried its burden beyond

a reasonable doubt.

         In addition, viewing the prosecutor’s comments in the context of the whole argument,

evidence presented, and jury instructions, we conclude that any prejudice could have been

remedied by an immediate curative instruction reminding “the jury that its purpose was to

determine whether the State had met its burden to prove all the elements of the charged offenses.”

Jarvis, slip op. at 20-21. Further, the trial court’s instructions to the jury clearly identified the

burden of proof and the elements of first degree child molestation.

5
    https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/D2%2056086-1-II%20Published%20Opinion.pdf.

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No. 56543-9-II

       The trial court’s instructions also warned that the attorneys’ statements were not evidence

and directed the jurors to “disregard any remark, statement, or argument that is not supported by

the evidence or the law in [the jury] instructions.” CP at 39. We presume that a jury followed the

trial court’s instructions, “absent evidence proving the contrary.” State v. Kirkman, 159 Wn.2d

918, 928, 155 P.3d 125 (2007). Abbitt has not demonstrated that the prosecutor’s remarks were

flagrant or ill intentioned, or that a curative instruction would not have remedied any ensuing

prejudice. We hold that the prosecutor’s remarks did not constitute misconduct.

                               III. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

       Abbitt argues that the State did not offer sufficient evidence to prove that he acted for

purposes of sexual gratification as required to convict him of first degree child molestation. He

cites to cases from Wisconsin, Maine, and Massachusetts to argue that the State must prove “that

the accused induced the contact or allowed the contact to occur for a prolonged period of time.”

Br. of Appellant at 27. He reasons that “uncontroverted evidence” showed that the incident lasted

less than six seconds and that he “was disgusted at the idea of any sexual contact with children.”

Br. of Appellant at 31, 33. And he asserts that evidence he presented established that he did not

have an erection, did not intentionally expose himself, and could not have stopped the children

from touching him because he would have dropped EB on her head. We disagree.

       As a preliminary matter, the State has asked us to strike or disregard evidence outside the

record that Abbitt submitted with his opening brief, including several medical articles. Our record

on review is limited to the report of proceedings, clerk’s papers, and exhibits from the trial. RAP

9.1(a). We decline to consider the evidence Abbitt submitted that is outside this record.

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No. 56543-9-II

       To convict Abbitt of first degree child molestation, the jury had to find beyond a reasonable

doubt that Abbitt had sexual contact with a child who was less than 12 years old. Former RCW

9A.44.083(1). “‘Sexual contact’ means any touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of a

person done for the purpose of gratifying sexual desire of either party or a third party.” RCW

9A.44.010(13). Abbitt argues solely that the State failed to prove that the touching in the incident

was for sexual gratification.

        When addressing a claim of insufficient evidence, we consider whether, viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Dreewes, 192 Wn.2d 812, 821, 432 P.3d 795

(2019). We take the State’s evidence as true, and we consider circumstantial evidence equally

reliable as direct evidence. State v. Scanlan, 193 Wn.2d 753, 770, 445 P.3d 960 (2019). “Further,

we must defer to the trier of fact for purposes of resolving conflicting testimony and evaluating

the persuasiveness of the evidence.” State v. Homan, 181 Wn.2d 102, 106, 330 P.3d 182 (2014).

       EB testified that Abbitt removed his jeans and that she and MB sat on the lower bunk bed

and touched his erect penis, which resulted in EB getting something wet and sticky on her hands.

In contrast, Abbitt testified that he had been wearing a towel that EB pulled off while roughhousing

with him, that the girls poked at and pulled on his penis before KB walked into the room, and that

ejaculate may have leaked out of his penis because of a preexisting condition he claimed he had

discussed with KB.

       EB testified she did not remember KB walking in on the incident and KB testified that she

had never found Abbitt with his penis exposed in front of the girls. KB also had no memory of

Abbitt withholding ejaculation, having any problems with ejaculation, or mentioning leaking

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No. 56543-9-II

ejaculate at any point during their nine-year relationship. Taking the State’s evidence as true and

drawing all inferences in the light most favorable to the State, a reasonable jury could have found

that Abbitt had EB and MB, both undisputedly under the age of 12, touch his penis for Abbitt’s

sexual gratification. See Dreewes, 192 Wn.2d at 821. Thus, we hold that the State provided

sufficient evidence to convict Abbitt of both counts of first degree child molestation.

                                       IV. SUPERVISION FEES

       Abbitt argues, and the State concedes, that community custody supervision fees are

discretionary fees that may be waived by the trial court. While Abbitt’s case was pending on

appeal, the legislature removed the authorization for trial courts to impose community custody

supervision fees. See LAWS OF 2022, ch. 29, § 8. The statutory amendment eliminating community

custody supervision fees became effective in 2022. The statutory amendment applies because

Abbitt’s case was still pending on review when the amendment became effective. See State v.

Ramirez, 191 Wn.2d 732, 748-49, 426 P.3d 714 (2018). We accept the State’s concession and

remand for the trial court to strike the supervision fees.

                                          CONCLUSION

       We affirm Abbitt’s convictions, but we remand for the trial court to strike the supervision

fees from Abbitt’s judgment and sentence.

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No. 56543-9-II

        A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,

it is so ordered.

                                                    Glasgow, C.J.
 We concur:

 Veljacic, J.

 Che, J.

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