Court Opinion

ID: 9896287
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-09 21:05:21.952953+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:44.633451
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/9/23 Ruggiero v. 2003 Bouquet Canyon CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

 LAUREN RUGGIERO,                                             B324445

           Plaintiff and Appellant.                           (Los Angeles County
                                                              Super. Ct. No. 21STCV02274)
           v.

 2003 BOUQUET CANYON LLC,

           Defendant and Respondent.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Audra Mori, Judge. Reversed.
      Law Offices of Samer Habbas & Associates and Adam
Kocaj for Plaintiff and Appellant.
      Finch Tetzlaff and David W. Tetzlaff for Defendant and
Respondent.

                        _________________________________
                       INTRODUCTION

       Lauren Ruggiero tripped and fell on a sidewalk displaced
by the roots of a tree on property owned by 2003 Bouquet
Canyon LLC. The trial court granted a motion by Bouquet
Canyon for summary judgment, ruling a one-inch height
differential between two raised sidewalk slabs was a trivial defect
that, as a matter of law, did not create a dangerous condition.
Ruggiero argues the trial court failed to consider evidence of
other factors that, together with the one-inch height differential,
could lead a reasonable factfinder to conclude the sidewalk defect
created a dangerous condition. Because Ruggiero submitted
admissible evidence creating a triable issue of material fact, we
reverse.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      A.     Ruggiero Trips and Falls on a Sidewalk and Files
             This Action
      Bouquet Canyon owns an apartment building on property
that includes a tree with roots growing under an adjacent
sidewalk. The tree roots lifted two concrete sidewalk panels into
a peak, with one panel higher than the other. The City of Los
Angeles repaired the sidewalk twice, once in 2016 and again in
2018. As a result of these repairs, a black asphalt patch on one
side of the peaked sidewalk created a slope that reduced the
height differential between the two sidewalk panels from over
seven inches to approximately one inch.
      One “beautiful” sunny morning in June 2020, Ruggiero
decided to take a jog. It was her first time jogging. While

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traversing the sidewalk adjacent to Bouquet Canyon’s property,
Ruggiero ran across the asphalt patch and tripped on the one-
inch height differential between the two sidewalk panels. She
fell and broke her leg.
       Ruggiero filed this negligence action against Bouquet
Canyon and the City. Among other things, Ruggiero alleged
Bouquet Canyon and the City created a dangerous condition by
allowing tree roots on Bouquet Canyon’s property to lift the
sidewalk panels. Ruggiero alleged the sidewalk where she fell
was “uneven, dangerous and highly raised off the ground and was
fragmented with various differentials in height due to overgrown
tree roots underneath it.”

      B.    Bouquet Canyon Files a Motion for Summary
            Judgment
      Bouquet Canyon moved for summary judgment, arguing it
did not owe a duty to Ruggiero because the defect in the sidewalk
was open and obvious and created only a minor, trivial, or
insignificant risk of injury.1 Bouquet Canyon relied on Ruggiero’s
deposition testimony and photographs taken by Ruggiero’s expert
that Ruggiero produced in discovery. In her deposition Ruggiero
stated that she could differentiate between the black asphalt
patch and the gray concrete sidewalk, but that she could not see
the one-inch height differential between the two sidewalk panels
because the asphalt patch “camouflaged” it. Bouquet Canyon,
however, argued the photographs of the sidewalk showed there
were no “broken pieces, or jagged edges or other conditions of the
sidewalk that were dangerous or hazardous, only that the black

1     The City did not move for summary judgment and is not a
party to this appeal.

                                3
asphalt patch had a height differential of one inch with the gray
concrete.” Bouquet Canyon also argued the photographs showed
“there was nothing to hide or obstruct the condition of the
sidewalk.” Bouquet Canyon urged the trial court to “simply
review the photographs” and conclude the one-inch differential
between the sidewalk panels was not a dangerous condition as a
matter of law.
       In opposing the motion for summary judgment, Ruggiero
argued the alleged dangerous condition included the one-inch
differential between the sidewalk panels, as well as “a large
elevated slope” created by the asphalt patch. Regarding the
height differential, Ruggiero’s expert, Mark Burns, stated his
opinion that such an “abrupt height differential” has “the
substantial possibility of causing a pedestrian . . . to trip and fall
or misstep if the height [differential] is not conspicuous and
readily observable in advance.” Regarding the slope created by
the asphalt patch, Burns stated the sidewalk where Ruggiero
tripped “had concrete panels that were lifted and converged at a
peak which constituted 7-5/16 inches above the adjacent grass,
producing running slopes as large as 39.5 percent, cross slopes as
large as 7.4 percent, and an abrupt height differential of . . .
approximately 1 inch between the two lifted concrete panels.”
Ruggiero argued Bouquet Canyon addressed only the height
differential and “completely ignore[d] the slope of the sidewalk
which is what created the tripping hazard.”
       Citing photographs showing the sidewalk shaded by the
tree whose roots were lifting the concrete panels, Ruggiero also
argued the one-inch height differential was “not conspicuous and
readily observable.” Relying on the photographs and
“astronomical data,” Burns stated that, at the time of the

                                  4
accident, “there most likely would have been shadows cast on
and/or around the subject defect from the adjacent tree, further
obscuring the hazard.” According to Burns, the combination of
the slope, the shadows, and Ruggiero’s speed as she traversed the
sidewalk “would have made the subject condition difficult to
perceive at the time of the incident.”2
       In its reply, Bouquet Canyon argued neither Ruggiero nor
her experts contended she could not see the black asphalt patch,
despite the presence of a high slope. Bouquet Canyon argued
“any danger associated with the black asphalt patch was obvious
or should have been in the exercise of reasonable care.” Bouquet
Canyon further argued that any argument “there were most
likely shadows cast on/or around the black asphalt patch is pure
speculation” and that there was “no testimony presented that
would support the improper conclusion that shadows prevented
[Ruggiero] from observing the condition, where she testified to
the opposite.”

      C.    The Trial Court Grants Bouquet Canyon’s Motion for
            Summary Judgment, and Ruggiero Appeals
      The trial court ruled the sidewalk where Ruggiero tripped
did not create a dangerous condition. The court first found, based
on photographs produced by Ruggiero that showed a ruler beside

2     Ruggiero also argued Bouquet Canyon had actual notice of
the sidewalk’s condition because the apartment building’s
property manager complained to the City on several occasions
about the sidewalk’s condition and asked the City to repair it.
The trial court did not address this argument because it found
the defect trivial as a matter of law. Because we reverse the
judgment on that ground, we do not address this argument
either.

                                5
the displaced sidewalk, the height differential between the
sidewalk panels was “approximately one inch.” Citing Stathoulis
v. City of Montebello (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 559 (Stathoulis) and
similar cases, the court ruled that the size of the defect alone did
not render it trivial as a matter of law and that the court also had
to consider “‘the nature and quality of the defect’” and “‘the time
of day and lighting conditions when the accident occurred.’”
       Referring to Ruggiero’s evidence of the slopes created by
the asphalt patch, the trial court stated it “reviewed the photos of
the sidewalk and does not find that the slopes rendered the
sidewalk dangerous.” The court also stated Ruggiero’s expert
witnesses failed to explain “how the slopes alone are what caused
[Ruggiero] to trip and fall, or how they could have caused a trip
and fall absent the height differential.”
       The trial court rejected Ruggiero’s evidence that shadows
likely obscured Ruggiero’s ability to see the one-inch height
differential because Ruggiero did not submit evidence, such as a
declaration, “that her vision of the defect was obstructed by
shadows or that there were in fact shadows present at the time of
the incident.” Instead, the court observed that Ruggiero said in
her deposition no trash, leaves, or other object covered the defect
in the sidewalk at the time of the accident. “The evidence thus
shows,” the trial court concluded, “the height differential and
slopes were in plain sight and did not pose a substantial risk of
injury to a pedestrian using due care.” The court ruled Ruggiero
failed “to raise a triable issue of material fact as to the triviality
of the defect.”
       The trial court granted Bouquet Canyon’s motion for
summary judgment on August 23, 2022. The court did not enter
judgment, however, until May 2023. In the meantime, Ruggiero

                                  6
filed on November 2, 2022 a notice of appeal from the trial court’s
order granting the motion for summary judgment (incorrectly
stating she was appealing from a judgment after an order
granting a summary judgment motion).3

                          DISCUSSION

       A.    Summary Judgment Law
       “A court may grant a motion for summary judgment only
when all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.” (Fajardo v. Dailey (2022)
85 Cal.App.5th 221, 225, internal quotation marks omitted
(Fajardo); see Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c); Regents of
University of California v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607,
618.) “‘A defendant moving for summary judgment has the initial
burden of presenting evidence that a cause of action lacks merit
because the plaintiff cannot establish an element of the cause of
action or there is a complete defense.’” (Long Beach Memorial
Medical Center v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 710,
716; see Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Aguilar v. Atlantic

3     Although an order granting a motion for summary
judgment is not appealable, and thus Ruggiero’s notice of appeal
was premature, we deem her notice of appeal as timely filed from
the subsequent judgment. (See Champlin/GEI Wind Holdings,
LLC v. Avery (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 218, 223; North American
Title Co., Inc. v. Gugasyan (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 380, 388, fn. 4;
Valdez v. Seidner-Miller, Inc. (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 600, 607; Lat
v. Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 191,
193.)

                                 7
Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) “‘Where, as here, the
defendant moves for summary judgment on the grounds that one
or more elements of the plaintiff’s [cause of action] cannot be
established, the defendant must present evidence that either
“conclusively negate[s] an element of the plaintiff’s cause of
action” or “show[s] that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot
reasonably obtain,” evidence needed to establish an element.’”
(Long Beach Memorial Medical Center, at p. 716; see Aguilar, at
pp. 853-855.)
       “‘“Only after the defendant carries that initial burden does
the burden shift to the plaintiff ‘to show that a triable issue of
one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action.’”’”
(Long Beach Memorial Medical Center v. Allstate Ins. Co., supra,
95 Cal.App.5th at p. 716; see Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2);
Fajardo, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at pp. 225-226.) “There is a
triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would
allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor
of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the
applicable standard of proof.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850; see Long Beach Memorial Medical
Center, at p. 716.)
       We review de novo an order granting a motion for summary
judgment and decide whether the facts not subject to dispute
warrant judgment for the moving party as a matter of law.
(Fajardo, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 226; see Long Beach
Memorial Medical Center v. Allstate Ins. Co., supra,
95 Cal.App.5th at p. 716.) “We ‘liberally construe the evidence in
support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve
doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.’” (Fajardo,

                                 8
at p. 226; see Huckey v. City of Temecula (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th
1092, 1103 (Huckey).)

       B.     Trivial Defect Law
       “Property owners are required ‘“to maintain land in their
possession and control in a reasonably safe condition” . . . and to
use due care to eliminate dangerous conditions on their property.’
[Citation.] But ‘“a property owner is not liable for damages
caused by a minor, trivial, or insignificant defect” on its
property.’” (Fajardo, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 226; see Nunez
v. City of Redondo Beach (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 749, 757; Taylor
v. Trimble (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 934, 943-944.) “The so-called
‘trivial defect doctrine’ recognizes that ‘“persons who maintain
walkways, whether public or private, are not required to
maintain them in an absolutely perfect condition. The duty of
care imposed on a property owner, even one with actual notice,
does not require the repair of minor defects.”’” (Fajardo, at
p. 226; see Nunez, at p. 757; Kasparian v. AvalonBay
Communities, Inc. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 11, 26-27.)
       “In limited circumstances a court may determine a
walkway defect is trivial as a matter of law.” (Fajardo, supra,
85 Cal.App.5th at p. 226; see Huckey, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1104; Stathoulis, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 567.) “‘“Where
reasonable minds can reach only one conclusion—that there was
no substantial risk of injury—the issue is a question of law,
properly resolved by way of summary judgment.”’” (Fajardo, at
p. 226; see Stack v. City of Lemoore (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 102,
110 (Stack).) “But where ‘“sufficient evidence has been presented
so that reasonable minds may differ as to whether the defect is

                                 9
dangerous,”’ summary judgment is inappropriate.” (Fajardo, at
p. 226; see Stack, at p. 110.)
      Whether a particular sidewalk defect creates a dangerous
condition depends on the facts and circumstances of the case.
(Stack, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 110.) The size of the defect is
one of the most relevant factors. (See Fajardo, supra,
85 Cal.App.5th at p. 227; Huckey, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1105; Stathoulis, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 568.) In
general, “‘when the size of the [defect] begins to stretch beyond
one inch the courts have been reluctant to find that the defect is
not dangerous as a matter of law,’ i.e., that it is minor or trivial.”
(Stack, at p. 112 & fn. 8.) But “whether the defect is dangerous
as a matter of law does not rest solely on the size of the crack in
the walkway, [because] a tape measure alone cannot be used to
determine whether the defect was trivial.” (Fajardo, at p. 227,
internal quotations omitted; see Nunez v. City of Redondo Beach,
supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 757; Huckey, at p. 1105; Caloroso v.
Hathaway (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 922, 927.) A court also must
consider “‘all of the circumstances surrounding the accident that
might make the defect more dangerous than its size alone would
suggest.’” (Fajardo, at p. 227; see Caloroso, at p. 927.) Among
the other factors and circumstances indicating a sidewalk defect
is dangerous to a reasonably careful person are “the nature and
quality of the defect (including whether it has jagged breaks or
cracks)” and “the lighting and weather conditions at the time of
the incident.” (Stack, at p. 115; see Nunez, at pp. 757-758;
Huckey, at p. 1105; Stathoulis, at p. 567; Caloroso, at p. 927.)4

4     Ruggiero cites the following statement in a footnote to the
court’s opinion in Stack: “When two slabs of a sidewalk are
nonaligned horizontally, by a significant depression, such a defect

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      C.     The Trial Court Erred in Granting Bouquet Canyon’s
             Motion for Summary Judgment
      Ruggiero argues the trial court erred by weighing the
evidence and ruling the defect was trivial as a matter of law. She
contends reasonable minds could differ about whether the defect
was dangerous. Because the evidence Ruggiero submitted
created a triable issue of material fact, the trial court erred in
granting the motion for summary judgment.

             1.     The Nature and Quality of the Defect
       The trial court fundamentally mischaracterized the nature
of the defect in this case. Citing a statement in Ruggiero’s
opposition to the motion for summary judgment, the court
described Ruggiero’s position as that “the slopes of the sidewalk
‘is what created the tripping hazard.’” The court then stated
Ruggiero’s expert witnesses failed to explain how the slopes
“could have caused a trip and fall absent the height differential.”
The court’s descriptions of both Ruggiero’s position and the
expert’s testimony were inaccurate. Ruggiero argued and
submitted evidence showing that the totality of the
circumstances, including (i.e., not only) the slope of the sidewalk
and the height differential between the concrete slabs, created a
dangerous condition.

may not be found to be trivial as a matter of law unless there are
no aggravating circumstances attending the defect.” (Stack,
supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 114, fn. 9.) In Stack, however, the
defect was one and three-quarter inches, “nearly double the one-
inch threshold where courts grow reluctant to take the issue [of
triviality] from the jury.” (Id. at p. 114.) Because the height
differential here was approximately one inch, the footnote
statement in Stack does not apply.

                                11
       As stated, Ruggiero alleged the sidewalk where she tripped
was “uneven, dangerous and highly raised off the ground” with
“various differentials in height.” In her deposition, Ruggiero
testified she tripped on “a piece of the sidewalk that was sticking
up,” where “the black asphalt gravel meets the . . . light side of
the sidewalk.” She acknowledged she could distinguish between
the black asphalt and the gray concrete, but she said the asphalt
“camouflaged” the one-inch height differential. Ruggiero did not
explain further, and counsel for Bouquet Canyon did not ask her
to elaborate. In her opposition to the motion for summary
judgment, however, Ruggiero argued “the two pieces of concrete
come together and form a hidden and abrupt one-inch height
differential, as well as a large elevated slope, creating a
dangerous condition at the subject area. This dangerous
condition caused [Ruggiero] to trip and fall.”
       Ruggiero’s expert stated the defect in the sidewalk included
both the black asphalt slope and the one-inch height differential.
As discussed, Burns stated: “[T]he concrete panels within the
incident area are both lifted and converge at a peak. The peak
formed between the subject concrete panels is lifted 7-5/16 inches
above the adjacent grass, producing running slopes as large as
39.5 percent, cross slopes as large as 7.4 percent, and an abrupt
height differential of approximately 1 inch between the two lifted
concrete panels.” Burns gave his opinion that “an abrupt height
differential of this magnitude has the substantial possibility of
causing a pedestrian to trip and fall or misstep if the height
differential is not conspicuous and readily observable in
advance.” Burns further stated the height differential Ruggiero
tripped on was not conspicuous and readily observable because it

                                12
was “high enough to cause a trip or misstep event, but low
enough that it would not be readily apparent.”
       Bouquet Canyon did not submit any evidence to contradict
the testimony of Ruggiero or Burns. The trial court, in
concluding without explanation the asphalt slopes did not render
the sidewalk dangerous, referred only to photographs submitted
with Burns’s declaration. The photographs relied on by the trial
court, however, did not support its ruling the defect was trivial as
a matter of law.5 One photograph shows the slope created by the
black asphalt patch that Ruggiero ran across and the uplift in the
sidewalk panel where she tripped.6 The photograph shows that
the front edge of the patch is extremely uneven and that a large
crack runs horizontally across the patch just below the one-inch
differential with the adjoining sidewalk panel. Other

5     We independently review photographs relied on by the trial
court in finding a defect trivial as a matter of law. (See
Kasparian v. AvalonBay Communities, Inc., supra,
156 Cal.App.4th at p. 24 [“It is incumbent on the reviewing court
to examine the photographs for itself and make its own
determinations.”]; see, e.g., Stack, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 117
[concluding based on photographs that a “fact finder could
reasonably view the roughness of the lip [of a sidewalk panel] as
increasing the risk of catching a pedestrian’s toe”]; Barone v. City
of San Jose (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 284, 291 [concluding based in
part on photographs depicting a one-inch sidewalk elevation with
an “irregular and jagged break” that summary judgment was not
appropriate].)
6     In support of its motion for summary judgment, Bouquet
Canyon submitted 92 numbered photographs, which Ruggiero
had produced in discovery, of the sidewalk and its surroundings.
The trial court did not identify which specific photographs it
relied on in concluding the defect was trivial as a matter of law.

                                13
photographs show the difference in the slope from one side of the
patch to the other, demonstrating the patch was not smooth or
uniform. In addition, Ruggiero testified that the patch was not
“smooth” and that parts of the patched sidewalk “were still a
little higher” than others. Although Ruggiero testified she
tripped on the one-inch uplift and not the asphalt patch, courts
have found sidewalks with cracks or jagged edges can “‘make [a]
defect more dangerous than its size alone would suggest.’”
(Fajardo, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 227; see Stack, supra,
91 Cal.App.5th at p. 115; Caloroso v. Hathaway, supra,
122 Cal.App.4th at p. 927.) The nature and quality of the defect
here do not support a finding it was trivial as a matter of law.
(See Stack, at p. 115 [the “scope of the condition” of the subject
sidewalk included two defects the plaintiff encountered at the
same time, even though he tripped on only one of them].)

             2.    The Lighting and Shadows on the Defect
      Ruggiero argued and submitted evidence showing that at
the time of the accident the tree whose roots uplifted the
sidewalk also cast shadows on the sidewalk. Burns stated
“astronomical data . . . indicates that there most likely would
have been shadows cast on and/or around the subject defect from
the adjacent tree, further obscuring the hazard.” Ruggiero did
not say that shadows affected her ability to perceive the uplifted
sidewalk, but she did say that the black asphalt patch
“camouflaged” the uplift and that a photograph showing the
sidewalk in shadows “accurately depict[ed] how the sidewalk
looked on the day of the accident.” The photograph Ruggiero
identified shows how the combination of the shadows and the
black asphalt “camouflaged” the uplift as she approached it.

                                14
Burns opined that the combination of the magnitude of the height
differential (high enough that it could cause a person to trip but
low enough that it was not readily apparent), the shadows cast on
the sidewalk, and Ruggiero’s speed as she ran across the
sidewalk “would have made the subject condition difficult to
perceive at the time of the incident.”7
       The trial court ruled Ruggiero’s evidence did not create a
triable issue of material fact because Ruggiero did not say in her
declaration that “her vision of the defect was obstructed by
shadows or that there were in fact shadows present at the time of
the incident.” But Ruggiero presented uncontradicted evidence
that shadows were likely present at the time of the accident, and
a reasonable trier of fact could easily infer from the photographs
that shadows made it more difficult for her to see the defect. (See
Huckey, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 1103 [in reviewing an order
granting a motion for summary judgment, an appellate court
considers reasonable inferences from the evidence]; Caloroso v.
Hathaway, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 929 [court reasonably
inferred from the evidence that “dappled light blinded [the
plaintiff’s] view of the crack” in the sidewalk where she tripped].)
       The trial court also stated that photographs showed “the
height differential was in plain sight, the black asphalt was color
contrasted from the adjacent concrete slab, and the shadows in
the photos did not obstruct the defect.” A review of the
photographs shows otherwise. One photograph shows the defect
as Ruggiero approached it. The shadows cast by the large tree,

7     Bouquet Canyon objected to the paragraph of Burns’s
declaration that included this phrase, but the trial court
sustained the objection only to Burns’s statement “the subject
sidewalk defect constituted a dangerous condition.”

                                15
combined with the black asphalt patch, make it difficult to
discern the one-inch uplift, even though it is a different color than
the asphalt patch. Indeed, when counsel presented Ruggiero
with a photograph that shows the gray uplift and the black
asphalt patch, Ruggiero said, “You can’t really tell [that] unless
you’re, like, staring, like we are, at [the photograph].” She
stated: “You would never be able to see that just looking at it
from above.” A reasonable trier of fact could conclude shadows
made it more difficult for Ruggiero to see the one-inch height
differential in the sidewalk. (See Johnson v. City of Palo Alto
(1962) 199 Cal.App.2d 148, 150, 152 [reasonable factfinder could
find a sidewalk defect was dangerous where “trees partially
shaded the [lighted] sidewalk, causing it to be shadowy”].) In
light of all the evidence submitted in connection with the motion
for summary judgment, reasonable minds could differ about
whether the defect—including the sloping asphalt patch, the one-
inch height differential, and lighting conditions that could have
made the defect difficult to perceive—“‘presented a substantial
risk of injury.’” (Fajardo, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 230; see
Stathoulis, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 570.)

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                         DISPOSITION

     The judgment is reversed. Ruggiero is to recover her costs
on appeal.

                                    SEGAL, Acting P. J.

We concur:

             FEUER, J.              MARTINEZ, J.

                               17