Court Opinion

ID: 9595333
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:38:51.355922+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:36.536488
License: Public Domain

Duckworth, Chief Justice,
dissenting. In Smith v. Equitable Mortgage Co., 98 Ga. 240 (25 SE 423), it was held that the superior court is a court of record. At page 241 of the opinion after stating motions made during the trial seeking privileges or the adjudication of rights which “fall within the pleadings” may be made orally, and if the judgment thereon is registered upon the minutes of the court this will suffice, then the court said: “But where it is sought to invoke the powers of the court touching matters which lie outside the pleadings, though in some sense pertinent to the cause, the court can acquire jurisdiction for that purpose only through the means of a written application or motion for the relief desired.” It can not with logic and reason be said an application under 1Code Ann. § 6-804 (Ga. L. 1965, pp. 18, 21) for an order extending the time beyond the 30 days for filing the transcript is not “outside the pleadings,” hence jurisdiction to issue such extension order must be acquired “only through the means of a written application or motion for the relief desired.”
The definition of a court of record stated in DeKalb County v. Deason, 221 Ga. 237 (144 SE2d 446), would require such applications or motions to be in writing. The 1965 Appellate Practice Act (Code Ann. § 6-804) provides that: “Any application to any court, justice or judge for an extension must be made before expiration of the period for filing as originally prescribed.” That same section says further that “The order granting an extension of time shall be promptly filed with the clerk of the trial court,” thus unmistakably showing that it is the court order and not the application that extends the time.
*504The record in this case shows no semblance of a written application for an extension of time made before the expiration of the period for filing as originally prescribed. To those who say there was such an application I make a request for a recital of the content of such application. What were the grounds therein stated for granting an extension? The only possible reply is inevitably thunderous silence.
I am mindful of the constitutional mandate that bills of exceptions must not be dismissed because of delays, unless it is the fault of the party or his counsel, and I would apply it to appeals. But when the law plainly demands that when an application for an extension of time is made in the superior court it must be in writing, and must be made before the fixed time expires, and counsel does neither of these, the fault rests squarely upon counsel. But taking the majority view that in some mysterious way the purported order which the judge did not sign comprehends and satisfies all the law, the indispensable court order of extension is totally absent in this procedure.
The only application for an extension in the record was made not before but after the expiration of the period for filing, and hence it has no sanction in the statute. It is revealing in other respects. It shows that the lawyer drawing it knew the court was one of record, and that in such a court the application must be in writing. It also shows that he knew the application must set forth reasons for granting it. But not having been filed in time it is a nullity, and this court has no right even to consider it.
Finally the majority of necessity hold that the mere making of the application works an extension because no order on any motion, oral or written, before the original period for filing expired was issued, and if this is to be the rule then all legislative attempt to expedite by fixing time limits is put at nought. If there are to be extensions in this manner, to what time does the extension go? By this indefiniteness and confusion the party who perhaps after large expenditure of time and money to obtain his judgment is denied the fruits of his judgment because this court’s ruling enables the loser in the trial to cause the judgment to remain indefinitely suspended in the air. By fixing time limits for taking the various steps to perfect an appeal, the *505statute must and can only mean that absent such steps within the time prescribed, no appeal exists. If the legislature chooses to remove all time limits this court would abide by that law and decide all cases thus appealed, regardless of the time consumed in getting the appeal to us, provided the case had not in the meantime become moot.
For the foregoing reasons I dissent.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Almand and Justice Nichols concur in this dissent.