Court Opinion

ID: 9373513
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:05:34.464159+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:42.406400
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     DAVETTE G. BUCHANAN,                            DOCKET NUMBER
                   Appellant,                        DC-1221-21-0390-W-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS                          DATE: August 3, 2022
       AFFAIRS,
                 Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Davette G. Buchanan, Black Mountain, North Carolina, pro se.

           Erin Brady Rega, Winston Salem, North Carolina, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                     REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed her individual right of action (IRA) appeal for lack of jurisdiction. For
     the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for review,

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                       2

     VACATE the initial decision, and REMAND the case to the Washington Regional
     Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

                                        BACKGROUND
¶2        The appellant is a GS-7 Medical Instrument Technician at the Charles
     George Veterans Affairs (VA) Medical Center in Asheville, North Carolina.
     Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 1. She filed an IRA appeal with the Board and
     requested a hearing.   Id. at 1.    In her initial filing, she alleged that she was
     stabbed with a used hypodermic needle by a VA nurse in January 2018, the
     agency and the VA police failed to conduct a proper investigation of the incident,
     and agency employees mocked her and told her to get over it.         Id. at 2. The
     administrative judge issued two show cause orders , which notified the appellant
     that the Board might not have jurisdiction over her appeal, informed her of her
     jurisdictional burden, and directed her to file evidence and argument on the issue.
     IAF, Tabs 3, 9.
¶3        After the record on jurisdiction closed, the administrative judge is sued an
     initial decision dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction without holding the
     appellant’s requested hearing. IAF, Tab 1 at 1, Tab 15, Initial Decision (ID) at 1,
     19. She determined that the appellant had exhausted with the Office of Special
     Counsel (OSC) her claims that she made protected disclosures when she reported
     the needle-stick incident and an alleged threat of gun violence by the same nurse
     colleague who stabbed her with the used needle and that she engaged in protected
     activity when she complained to the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) about
     the needle-stick incident. ID at 7-8. The administrative judge also concluded
     that the appellant had nonfrivolously alleged that she made disclosures that a
     reasonable person in her position would believe evidenced a violation of law in
     connection with these two events.       ID at 9-10.    Specifically, she found the
     appellant’s allegation that a nurse intentionally stuck her with a needle disclosed
     an assault and the appellant’s allegation that a nurse threatened her with gun
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     violence disclosed a misdemeanor threat under North Carolina statute, N.C. Gen.
     Stat. § 14-277.1.   ID at 9-10; 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A)(i).     Additionally, she
     determined that the appellant had nonfrivolously alleged that she engaged in
     protected activity when she filed a complaint with the OIG for the Department of
     Health and Human Services (DHHS).          ID at 10-11.    In that complaint, the
     appellant raised concerns about the agency’s response to the needle-stick
     disclosure, arguing that the police investigation into the incident was inadequate
     and that the agency endangered her safety by allowing the nurse who assaulted
     her to remain employed with the agency. IAF, Tab 12 at 6-9.
¶4         Regarding the purported personnel actions, the administrative judge
     concluded that the appellant exhausted with OSC the following allegations:
     (1) she had been subjected to a hostile work environment, (2) her duties and
     working conditions were changed, and (3) she had been denied a promised raise
     or promotion. ID at 8, 15. Nevertheless, she determined that the appellant failed
     to nonfrivolously allege facts sufficient to establish that any of these incidents
     amounted to a personnel action.       ID at 11-16.   She also concluded that the
     appellant neither exhausted her claim that she had been subjected to a negative
     suitability determination nor nonfrivolously alleged she was subjected to such a
     determination. ID at 8 & n.3. She found that the appellant, therefore, failed to
     establish jurisdiction over her appeal.
¶5         Alternatively, the administrative judge determined that even assuming the
     appellant made a nonfrivolous allegation that she was subjected to personnel
     actions in connection with these claims, she failed to nonfrivolously allege that
     her protected disclosures or activities were a contributing factor in the agency ’s
     decision to take or not take these alleged actions, based on either the
     knowledge/timing test or other evidence. ID at 16-18. Specifically, she found
     that the appellant’s pleadings did not provide sufficient details concerning who
     took the alleged actions against her and whether any such individuals were aware
     of her disclosures or activities. ID at 16-17. Consequently, she concluded that,
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     despite being provided two opportunities to do so, the appellant “failed to identify
     any specific acting agency official or officials, what personnel actions they took,
     failed to take or threatened to take and why the y did so,” and so, she failed to
     establish that any of the appellant’s disclosures or activities were a contributing
     factor in any of the challenged personnel actions. ID at 17-18.
¶6         The appellant has filed a petition for review and a supplement to her
     petition for review. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 1-2. The agency has
     filed a response in opposition to the petition for review. PFR File, Tab 4. The
     appellant has not filed a reply.

                      DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶7         On review, the appellant argues that she would be able to establish her
     claims if she were permitted a hearing and the ability to call witnesses and
     reargues that the agency’s investigation into the needle-stick incident was
     insufficient and flawed. PFR File, Tab 1 at 3-7. Additionally, she asserts that
     she has newly discovered evidence in the form of emails from a former agency
     employee showing that he contacted agency administrators and supervisors
     several times on her behalf and told them about the hostile actions being taken
     against the appellant, and she provides copies of those emails in her supplemental
     petition for review. PFR File, Tab 1 at 3-4, Tab 2 at 2-8. The appellant also has
     included an additional narrative statement setting forth a timeline of events
     starting with the January 2018 needle-stick incident and the subsequent
     investigation and running through June 2020, when she purportedly was denied a
     title change and a corresponding pay increase. PFR File, Tab 2 at 9-12. In this
     pleading, she also asserts that she was subjected to a negative suitability
     determination when she was stabbed by the agency employee with the used
     syringe. Id. at 9.
                                                                                              5

      The administrative judge properly determined that the appellant nonfrivolously
      alleged she made protected disclosures and engaged in protected activity and that
      she exhausted those claims with OSC.
¶8          The Board has jurisdiction over an IRA appeal if the appellant exhausts her
      administrative remedies before OSC and makes nonfrivolous allegations th at
      (1) she made a disclosure described under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or engaged in
      protected activity described under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),
      and (2) the disclosure or protected activity was a contributing factor in the
      agency’s decision to take or fail to take a personnel action as defined by 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(a)(2)(A). Linder v. Department of Justice, 122 M.S.P.R. 14, ¶ 6 (2014).
¶9          The administrative judge concluded that the appellant made a nonfrivolous
      allegation that she made protected disclosures that a nurse (1) stuck her with a
      needle on January 28, 2018, and (2) threatened her with gun violence on
      February 23, 2018.      ID at 9-10; IAF, Tab 7 at 4, 10, Tab 12 at 7-9.              The
      administrative judge also concluded that the appellant made a nonfrivolous
      allegation that she engaged in protected activity when she sent a complaint to the
      OIG for DHHS detailing the needle-stick incident and her belief that the agency’s
      investigation into the incident was inadequate. ID at 10-11; IAF, Tab 12 at 6-9.
      She found the appellant exhausted these disclosures and activity. ID at 8. The
      parties have not challenged these findings on review, and we discern no basis to
      disturb them.
¶10         In the initial decision, the administrative judge interpreted the appellant ’s
      pleadings to find that she had identified three purported personnel actions taken
      against her: (1) she was subjected to a hostile work environment, (2) her duties
      and working conditions were changed, and (3) she was not granted a raise she had
      been promised. 2 ID at 11-16. She found the appellant exhausted these claims.

      2
        The appellant does not challenge the administrative judge’s determination that she
      failed to meet her jurisdictional burden regarding an alleged suitability determination.
      In fact, on review the appellant alleges that “[m]y negative suitability determina tion is
      based on [the] misconduct [of the nurse who stuck the appellant with a needle and
                                                                                          6

      ID at 7-8.   The parties do not dispute the administrative judge’s exhaustion
      finding on review, and we discern no basis for the Board to disturb it.          The
      administrative judge then found that the appellant failed to nonfrivolously allege
      that her protected disclosures and activity were contributing factors in these
      personnel actions. ID at 16-18. We turn now to consider those findings.

      The appellant nonfrivolously alleged that she was denied a promised promotion
      but still failed to nonfrivolously allege that her disclosure of the n eedle-stick
      incident contributed to this personnel action.
¶11        Regarding the appellant’s claim that she was not granted a promised
      promotion, the administrative judge considered this claim as a potential personnel
      action under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(ix), regarding a “decision concerning pay,
      benefits, or awards,” but determined that the appellant failed to provide any
      explanation regarding the potential promotion or any evidence that a raise or
      promotion was actually promised. ID at 15-16. Consequently, she determined
      that the appellant had only provided “conclusory, vague, and unsupported
      allegations” for a lack of a promised raise, and so she failed to make a
      nonfrivolous allegation that she was denied a promised raise. ID at 16.
¶12        The appellant has provided some additional detail regarding this claim in
      her petition for review, alleging that she lost the promotion position “and any
      inclination of promotions” as a result of her coming forward regarding the
      needle-stick incident. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5. She also provides a supplemental
      pleading with an email dated January 18, 2019, from a doctor in the Cardiology
      Department (the appellant’s department), proposing that the appellant’s title be
      changed to “Head of Outpatient Holter and Ambulatory Electrocardiographic
      Testing,” along with a response from another agency employee suggesting that
      her title should be changed to “Administrative and Clinical Officer to

      threatened her]” because the nurse was under the influence of “mind altering drugs.”
      PFR File, Tab 2 at 9. We agree with the administrative judge that the appellant failed
      to prove she exhausted this personnel action with OSC and failed to nonfrivolously
      allege she was subjected to a suitability determination. ID at 8 & n.3.
                                                                                            7

      Cardiovascular Stress Testing.” 3 PFR File, Tab 2 at 8. Finally, she states that she
      was told that the promotion would include a “good raise and a new job title” and
      that she deserved the promotion, and she identifies three individuals she believed
      “would have input on” her new title. Id. at 11. Based on the additional evidence
      the appellant has provided on review, we conclude that she nonfrivolously alleg ed
      that she was subjected to a personnel action under section 2302(a)(2)(A)(ix)
      regarding a decision concerning pay when she was denied a potential title change
      and a resulting increase in pay.
¶13         Nevertheless, we still conclude that she failed to nonfrivolously allege that
      her disclosure of the needle-stick incident and the inadequate investigation (the
      only disclosure she alleges contributed to this personnel action) contributed to the
      agency’s decision not to grant her the proposed title change and pay increase.
      PFR File, Tab 1 at 4-5. To satisfy the contributing factor criterion, an appellant
      need only raise a nonfrivolous allegation that the fact or content of her disclosure
      or protected activity was one factor that tended to affect the personnel actio n in
      any way.    See Salerno v. Department of the Interior, 123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶ 12
      (2016). One way to establish this criterion is the knowledge/timing test, under
      which an appellant may nonfrivolously allege that the disclosure or activity was a
      contributing factor in a personnel action through circumstantial evidence, such as
      evidence that the official taking the personnel action kn ew of the disclosure or
      activity and that the personnel action occurred within a period of time such that a
      reasonable person could conclude the disclosure or activity was a contributing
      factor in the personnel action. 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1); see Salerno, 123 M.S.P.R.

      3
        The Board will consider evidence submitted on review concerning jurisdiction, even if
      the evidence was previously available, because jurisdiction may be raised at any time
      during Board proceedings. Pirkkala v. Department of Justice, 123 M.S.P.R. 288, ¶ 5
      (2016); Stoglin v. Department of the Air Force, 123 M.S.P.R. 163, ¶ 7 (2015), aff’d,
      640 F. App’x 864 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Because the emails could bear on whether the
      appellant met her jurisdictional burden of proving that she was subjected to a personnel
      action in connection with the failure to promote her, we have considered them.
                                                                                         8

      230, ¶ 13. The Board has held that a personnel action take n within approximately
      1 to 2 years of an appellant’s disclosures satisfies the timing portion of the
      knowledge/timing test; so, the approximately 1-year period between when the
      appellant disclosed the needle-stick incident in January 2018 and when she was
      promised but never received a potential promotion in January 2019 would meet
      the timing portion of the test. IAF, Tab 12 at 2-3; PFR File, Tab 2 at 11; see
      Skarada v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 2022 MSPB 17, ¶ 19 (observing that a
      personnel action taken within approximately 1 to 2 years of the appellant ’s
      disclosure satisfies the contributing factor knowledge/timing test) ; Mastrullo v.
      Department of Labor, 123 M.S.P.R. 110, ¶ 21 (2015) (same).
¶14        Regarding the knowledge portion of the test, although the appellant has
      provided some additional context regarding the potential promotion and the
      discussions related thereto, she still has not identified any individual that she
      believes was responsible for preventing the promotion from taking place; so, it is
      unclear whether any of the agency officials allegedly responsible for denying the
      potential promotion are the same individuals to whom the appellant alleges that
      she disclosed the needle-stick incident. The Board will not infer knowledge of an
      appellant’s protected disclosures and activities to any agency official based only
      on a closeness in time between a disclosure or activity and a personnel action and
      the appellant’s conclusory allegation that the action was retaliatory. See Kerrigan
      v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 833 F.3d 1349, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (noting
      that, even at the jurisdictional phase when the employee’s burden is significantly
      lower than at the merits stage, it is not appropriate to infer knowledge on the part
      of any agency officials based only on the closeness in timing and the appellant ’s
      conclusory allegation that their actions were done in retaliation). Accordingly,
      we conclude that the appellant’s allegation that the decision not to promote her
      was in retaliation for her disclosure, without identifying any of the individuals
      she believes were responsible for that decision, does not meet the nonfrivolous
      pleading standard required to establish jurisdiction over her IRA appeal. See El
                                                                                          9

      v. Department of Commerce, 123 M.S.P.R. 76, ¶ 6 (2015) (stating that vague,
      conclusory, unsupported, and pro forma allegations of alleged wrongdoing do not
      meet the nonfrivolous pleading standard needed to establish the Board ’s
      jurisdiction over an IRA appeal), aff’d per curiam, 663 F. App’x 921 (Fed. Cir.
      2016); Keefer v. Department of Agriculture, 82 M.S.P.R. 687, ¶ 10 (1999).
¶15         The knowledge/timing test is not the only way for an appellant to satisfy the
      contributing factor element. 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1); Dorney v Department of the
      Army, 117 M.S.P.R. 480, ¶ 15 (2012). If the appellant fails to satisfy that test, the
      Board must consider other evidence, such as that pertaining to the st rength or
      weakness of the agency’s reasons for taking the personnel action, whether the
      whistleblowing was personally directed at the proposing or deciding officials, and
      whether those individuals had a desire or motive to retaliate against the appellant.
      Dorney, 117 M.S.P.R. 480, ¶ 15.
¶16         For the same reasons discussed above, we also conclude that the appellant
      failed to make a nonfrivolous allegation that the decision not to promote her was
      in retaliation for her disclosure, even considering evidence other than
      knowledge/timing evidence.      Here, even if we are to take at face value the
      appellant’s claim that she was promised a promotion that she subsequently never
      received, her conclusory allegation that the decision not to promote her was in
      retaliation for her disclosure, without more, makes it difficult to assess her claim.
      The additional email the appellant provided on review identifies the name of the
      proposed title change, but it does not provide any information regarding who was
      responsible for determining whether to grant the title change, identify any
      potential motive by any agency official for blocking the promotion, or offer an
      explanation for when or why the title change never came to fruition. PFR File,
      Tab 2 at 8. Accordingly, we conclude that she also failed to nonfrivolously allege
      that the decision not to promote her was in retaliation for her protected
      disclosures, based on nonknowledge/timing evidence, such as the strength or
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      weakness of the agency’s reasons for doing so or whether any agency official
      involved in the decision had a motive to retaliate against the appellant.

      The appellant failed to nonfrivolously allege that her protected activity of filing
      an OIG complaint was a contributing factor in the agency’s decision to take any
      of the challenged personnel actions.
¶17         The administrative judge found that the appellant failed to nonfrivolously
      allege that her DHHS OIG complaint was a contributing factor in a personnel
      action.   ID at 17.    We agree.    The appellant did not allege her DHHS OIG
      complaint was a contributing factor in the agency’s decision to take any of the
      contested personnel actions based on either the knowledge/timing test or other
      nonknowledge/timing evidence.
¶18         On review, the appellant states only that she asked for the OIG’s contact
      information from a Human Resources (HR) official and that, after she mailed her
      complaint to the provided contact (presumably, the DHHS OIG), she received a
      letter back stating they did not handle situations like hers . PFR File, Tab 1 at 6.
      She expresses her belief that the HR official intentionally gave her the wrong
      contact information.     Id.    The appellant has not provided any additional
      information regarding her OIG complaint or alleged that any official responsible
      for any of the purported personnel actions, or any other agency management
      official, was aware of the complaint.
¶19         As such, the appellant has not produced any evidence by which she might
      be able make a connection between her protected activity and any of the
      challenged personnel actions.      See, e.g., Sherman v. Department of Homeland
      Security, 122 M.S.P.R. 644, ¶ 9 n.5 (2015) (finding that the appellant’s assertion
      that his first- and second-line supervisors were likely among the many people
      who knew of his disclosure amounted to conjecture unsupported by any record
      evidence and, thus, did not amount to a nonfrivolous allegation); Jones v.
      Department of the Treasury, 99 M.S.P.R. 479, ¶ 8 (2005) (finding that an
      appellant’s insinuation that an individual might have known of his prior
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      whistleblowing    activity   amounted   to   unsubstantiated   speculation,   not    a
      nonfrivolous allegation of jurisdiction); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(s) (defining a
      nonfrivolous allegation generally as an allegation that is more than conclusory) .
¶20         Thus, even if the appellant established that she engaged in protected activity
      when she filed a complaint with the OIG for DHHS that was subsequently
      forwarded to her own agency’s OIG, we nevertheless conclude that she failed to
      make a nonfrivolous allegation that it was a contributing factor in any of the
      challenged personnel actions based on either the knowledge/timing test or
      nonknowledge/timing evidence.

      The appellant nonfrivolously alleged that she was subjected to a hostile work
      environment in retaliation for her disclosure of the needle -stick incident and the
      gun violence threat.
¶21         We turn now to the issue of whether the appellant nonfrivolously alleged
      that she suffered a personnel action when she was subjected to a hostile work
      environment, in light of additional details and documentation the appellant has
      provided on review.    The administrative judge considered as separate, alleged
      personnel actions the appellant’s claims that (1) she was subjected to a hostile
      work environment, and (2) her duties and working conditions were changed . We
      find that this interpretation is an overly narrow view of the appellant’s
      allegations.
¶22         Although the appellant has not challenged the administrative judge’s
      characterization of these personnel actions on review, we conclude that there is
      no basis to distinguish a “hostile work environment” from a change in duties and
      working conditions.     Both of these terms are different ways of framing the
      personnel action identified in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(xii) as any “significant
      change in duties, responsibilities, or working conditions. ” Skarada, 2022 MSPB
      17, ¶¶ 14-16. By parsing the hostile work environment claim into two, separate
      personnel actions, the administrative judge may have unintentionally diminished
      the seriousness of the appellant’s claims.     See Hamley v. Department of the
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      Interior, 122 M.S.P.R. 290, ¶ 7 (2015) (observing, in the title VII context, that
      hostile work environment claims are different from discrete acts of discrimination
      or retaliation because, by their nature, they involve repeated conduct, a single
      incident of which may not be actionable on its own).
¶23        On review, the appellant reasserts that actions by various agency officials
      amounted to a hostile work environment that continued until at least June 2020.
      PFR File, Tab 1 at 3-7, Tab 2 at 9-12. Taking the appellant’s pleadings below
      and on review together, and treating her hostile work environment claim as one,
      rather than two, personnel actions, the appellant’s allegations appear quite
      serious. IAF, Tab 7 at 7-9, Tab 12 at 8-9, 44-46; PFR File, Tab 2 at 9-12.
¶24        To prevail on an allegation concerning a hostile work environment,
      an employee must show that the complained-of conduct was severe or pervasive
      enough to create a working environment that a reasonable person would find
      hostile or abusive.    See, e.g., Godesky v. Department of Health & Human
      Services, 101 M.S.P.R. 280, ¶ 14 n.* (2006) (finding that an appellant’s
      allegations did not establish hostile work environment discrimina tion under title
      VII because he did not show that the complained-of conduct was sufficiently
      severe or pervasive to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment);
      see also Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 754 (1998) (finding
      that a hostile work environment under title VII requires a showing of severe or
      pervasive conduct). In determining whether an appellant has b een subjected to a
      hostile work environment sufficient to rise to the level of a personnel action, the
      Board must consider the alleged agency actions both collectively and
      individually. Skarada, 2022 MSPB 17, ¶ 16.
¶25        The Board has found that undermining the supervisory authority of an
      employee may constitute a significant change in duties, responsibilities, and
      working conditions. McDonnell v. Department of Agriculture, 108 M.S.P.R. 443,
      ¶ 23 (2008). Further, the Board also has found that an appellant nonfrivolously
      alleged he was subjected to a personnel action when an agency excluded him
                                                                                        13

      from meetings and conversations, subjected him to multiple investigations,
      accused him of fabricating data violating the Privacy Act, refused his request for
      a review of his position for possible upgrade, yelled at him on three occasions,
      and failed to provide him the support and guidance needed to successfully
      perform his duties. Skarada, 2022 MSPB 17, ¶ 18.
¶26         The appellant, here, alleges that after a nurse threatened her with gun
      violence on February 23, 2018, the agency immediately placed her department on
      lockdown, and on February 26, 2018, an agency official called all department
      staff to a meeting to discuss the situation. IAF, Tab 7 at 8; PFR File, Tab 2 at 9.
      However, an individual she identifies as the “Lead in Cardio,” whom the
      appellant alleges was a friend of the nurse that threatened her, refused to go to the
      meeting, stating to the appellant in front of others , “all this shit is your fault.”
      IAF, Tab 7 at 8, 10, Tab 12 at 57-59; PFR File, Tab 2 at 9. Despite a continuing
      instruction that the department was to be kept locked, this same individual
      “continued to unlock the doors,” causing the appellant and her coworkers to fear
      that the nurse who threatened the appellant would “come in the clinic and shoot
      us all.” PFR File, Tab 2 at 9-10. On one occasion, after the appellant locked the
      doors after the Cardio Lead entered the department on March 2, 2018, the Cardio
      Lead allegedly responded, “you are the stupidest bitch I have ever seen, if you
      hadn’t of [sic] reported [the nurse] for the needle stick, none of this would be
      happening.” PFR File, Tab 2 at 10. Not until February 19, 2019, almost a year
      after the agency put in place the requirement of locking the appellant’s
      department, did the department install a door with a code lock, apparently
      resolving the concerns caused by the Cardio Lead leaving the door unlocked.
      PFR File, Tab 2 at 11.
¶27         Further, the appellant reported that “every few days” the Cardio Lead
      continued to call her a “bitch and other things,” through May 2018. IAF, Tab 7 at
      8, Tab 12 at 8. According to the appellant, despite the agency’s awareness of the
      Cardio Lead’s hostility, it did not take sufficient action to correct the situation.
                                                                                        14

      PFR File, Tab 2 at 10. While a doctor expressed to the appellant that he was
      frustrated by the lack of action from hospital administration, the Director of
      Nursing told the appellant to “get over it, let it go, no one died,” and laughed. Id.
      For the first time on review, the appellant also provides emails the former Chief
      of Cardiology sent to the Chief of Medicine and the VA Chief of Police
      expressing concerns about the “toxic environment” in the Cardiology department
      and the alleged “behind the back, behind the scenes” campaign against the
      appellant. PFR File, Tab 1 at 3-4, Tab 2 at 2-5.
¶28         In sum, as described by the appellant, after a threat to her life by a
      coworker, for almost a year the agency allowed another coworker to undermine
      security efforts designed to protect her from the threat, made light of the incident,
      and permitted her to be insulted on a regular basis for reporting the threat. The
      appellant’s allegations here are at least as serious as those in McDonnell and
      Skarada and rise to the level of a nonfrivolous allegation of hostile working
      environment sufficient to constitute a significant change in her duties or working
      conditions. See Skarada, 2022 MSPB 17, ¶¶ 15-18.
¶29         Having determined that the appellant nonfrivolously alleged that she was
      subjected to a personnel action in connection with her hostile work environment
      claim, we must now consider whether she nonfrivolously alleged that her
      protected disclosures of the needle-stick incident and the gun violence threat were
      contributing factors in the creation of the hostile work environment. Skarada,
      2022 MSPB 17, ¶¶ 16, 19.        As previously noted, the appellant disclosed the
      needle-stick incident to agency officials in January 2018 and the gun violence
      threat in February 2018, and she alleges that the events that caused the hostile
      work environment began shortly thereafter in late January 2018 and co ntinued
      until at least February 2019, when the agency finally addressed her concerns
      regarding the gun threat and inadequate security. IAF, Tab 7 at 7-8, 10, Tab 12
      at 50-54, 57-59; PFR File, Tab 2 at 9-11. Thus, the appellant has met the timing
                                                                                     15

      prong of the knowledge/timing test. Skarada, 2022 MSPB 17, ¶ 19; Mastrullo,
      123 M.S.P.R. 110, ¶ 21.
¶30         Regarding the knowledge portion of the test, although the appellant does
      not clearly identify which of the management officials to whom she disclosed the
      needle-stick and gun threat incidents were within her supervisory chain, she does
      allege that she disclosed the needle-stick incident to several supervisors within
      her department, including the Chief of Cardiology, the Cardiology Supervisor,
      and the Nurse Supervisor, and she provides copies of VA Police incident reports
      reflecting the same. IAF, Tab 12 at 2, 13, 20-31. She also appears to allege that
      higher-level managers, including the Acting Director of the facility, the Director
      of Nursing, and the Nursing Supervisor, were all aware of the gun threat incident
      disclosure. IAF, Tab 7 at 10, Tab 10 at 2-3; PFR File, Tab 2 at 9-10. Similarly,
      she alleges that high-level agency supervisors, including the Chief Doctor and
      Nurse Supervisor of her department and the Chief of Medicine for her hospital,
      were aware of at least some of the incidents that contributed to the hostile work
      environment, including the repeated verbal harassment by the “Lead in Cardio”
      and management’s failure to enforce the door locking safety protocols, and that
      management nevertheless failed to adequately address her concerns or, in some
      cases, laughed them off. IAF, Tab 12 at 48-51, 54, 57-59; PFR File, Tab 2 at 2-7,
      9-12 (stating that the Director of Nursing laughed at the appellant when
      she complained about harassment by the” Lead in Cardio” and that another doctor
      informed her that management was aware of the harassment but would not do
      anything about it).
¶31         Based on the foregoing, we conclude that, under the knowledge/timing test,
      the appellant has made a nonfrivolous allegation that her January 2018
      disclosures concerning the needle-stick incident, and the related investigation,
      and the February 2018 gun violence threat, were a contributing factor in the
      hostile work environment that agency management permitted, unabated, from
      January 2018 onward, resulting in a significant change in the appellant’s duties,
                                                                                        16

      responsibilities, and working conditions. See Skarada, 2022 MSPB 17, ¶ 19. To
      the extent the appellant has raised what appear to be additional incidents in
      support of her hostile work environment claim on review, e.g., PFR File, Tab 2
      at 12, the administrative judge should address on remand the issue of the Board’s
      jurisdiction over those incidents and, if appropriate, the merits.

      The appeal must be remanded for adjudication on the merits.
¶32         In summary, because the appellant proved that she exhausted her
      administrative remedies as set forth above and made a nonfrivolous allegation
      that she made protected disclosures in connection with the needle-stick incident
      and the gun violence threat that were a contributing factor in the creation of the
      hostile work environment, she has established jurisdiction over her appeal and is
      entitled to the merits hearing that she requested. IAF, Tab 1 at 1; see Herman v.
      Department of Justice, 115 M.S.P.R. 386, ¶¶ 6-8 (2011).              On remand, the
      administrative judge shall afford the appellant an opportunity to prove by
      preponderant evidence that the January 2018 needle-stick and February 2018 gun
      threat disclosures were a contributing factor in a hostile work environment. See
      Runstrom v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 123 M.S.P.R. 169, ¶ 12 (2016). If
      the administrative judge finds that the appellant proved her case in chief, she
      must determine whether the agency has proved by clear and convincing evidence
      that it would have taken these same personnel actions even in the absence of the
      appellant’s disclosures. See id.; 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e). Because the appellant has
      requested a hearing, she is entitled to one. See Graves v. Department of Veterans
      Affairs, 123 M.S.P.R. 434, ¶ 22 (2016) (explaining that while an appellant is not
      entitled to a jurisdictional hearing in an IRA appeal, he is entitled to a hearing on
      the merits once he establishes jurisdiction).
                                                                                       17

                                          ORDER
¶33        For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the Washington
      Regional Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

      FOR THE BOARD:                          /s/ for
                                              Jennifer Everling
                                              Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.