Court Opinion

ID: 9903912
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 16:09:40.696468+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:46.450542
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Youngstown v. Newton, 2023-Ohio-4250.]

            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                            SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                MAHONING COUNTY

                                 CITY OF YOUNGSTOWN,

                                        Plaintiff-Appellee,

                                                  v.

                                    GERARD A. NEWTON,

                                     Defendant-Appellant.

                       OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
                                       Case No. 23 MA 0006

                                 Civil Appeal from the
                    Youngstown Municipal Court, Mahoning County, Ohio
                                Case No. 15 CVF 4044

                                        BEFORE:
                Mark A. Hanni, Carol Ann Robb, David A. D’Apolito, Judges.

                                            JUDGMENT:
                                              Affirmed.

Atty. Samuel F. Jordan, Millstone & Kannensohn, for Plaintiff-Appellee and

Gerard A. Newton, Pro se, Defendant-Appellant.

                                    Dated: November 21, 2023
                                                                                     –2–

HANNI, J.

      {¶1}   Defendant-Appellant, Gerard A. Newton (Appellant), appeals from a
Youngstown Municipal Court judgment denying his motion to vacate a default judgment
and contempt orders. For the following reasons, two of the orders appealed from are not
final and appealable and all assignments of error are otherwise without merit.
      {¶2}   On December 4, 2015, the City of Youngstown (Appellee) filed a complaint
against Appellant alleging that he owed $150 for grass cutting and weed removal services
that occurred at his described property in Youngstown, Ohio on July 28, 2015. The
complaint stated that grass cutting and weed removal services were rendered under the
Ohio Revised Code and City of Youngstown ordinances for the abatement of nuisances
under R.C. 1749.01 through 1749.05. The summons mailed with the complaint informed
Appellant that he had to answer the complaint within 28 days. It warned that if Appellant
failed to appear or defend against the complaint, he could face judgment by default. The
complaint was served by certified U.S. Mail.
      {¶3}   The complaint was subsequently returned to sender as unclaimed and
unable to forward. Consequently, it was mailed by ordinary U.S. Mail with a certificate of
mailing to the same address on March 1, 2016. It was not returned.
      {¶4}   On June 27, 2017, counsel for Appellee filed an application for default
judgment in Youngstown Municipal Court. Counsel indicated that Appellant failed to
appear and answer. Counsel also filed an affidavit attesting that: Appellant owed a
balance of $150 with interest; no payments were made on the account; and research did
not show that Appellant was on active military service, incompetent, or a minor.
      {¶5}   On July 10, 2017, the court granted default judgment in favor of Appellee
and ordered Appellant to pay $150 with interest from July 28, 2015, and court costs.
      {¶6}   Despite the July 10, 2017 default judgment, a September 29, 2017 text
docket entry from Youngstown Municipal Court stated that the case had been pending
since December 4, 2015, with no activity since March 1, 2016. The entry stated that it
served as notice that the case would be dismissed for lack of prosecution unless good
cause was shown before October 11, 2017.
      {¶7}   The next docket entry is dated March 24, 2022. It indicates that Appellee
filed a debtor’s exam. A second March 24, 2022 docket entry indicates that a hearing

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was scheduled for a debtor’s exam on March 31, 2022.             It also states “RESULT:
DEFENDANT FAILED TO APPEAR.” Further, Appellee’s motion for supplementary
proceedings to schedule a debtor’s exam is time-stamped April 1, 2022. The court
granted the motion and scheduled the debtor’s exam for May 31, 2022. The order
cautioned that failure to appear was punishable by a contempt order.
       {¶8}   Records show that Appellant signed for certified mail delivery of the court
order on April 2, 2022. The docket indicates that certified mail was issued on April 1,
2022 and accomplished on April 2, 2022.
       {¶9}   On May 31, 2022, the magistrate issued an order indicating that service was
perfected on Appellant and he failed to appear for the debtor’s exam. The court continued
the case for Appellee to file a motion to show cause. Appellee filed the motion to show
cause on July 12, 2022.
       {¶10} On July 14, 2022, the court issued an order to show cause for Appellant to
appear before the court on August 23, 2022 to show why he should not be punished for
contempt of court. Records show that Appellant’s wife signed for the certified mail
delivery of the order on July 15, 2022.
       {¶11} On August 23, 2022, the magistrate held a hearing on Appellee’s motion to
show cause. The magistrate found that service was perfected on Appellant and he failed
to appear for the hearing.
       {¶12} On September 26, 2022, the court issued a contempt order for Appellant’s
failure to appear at the August 23, 2022 hearing. The court found Appellant in contempt
and granted him 30 days to purge the contempt by appearing before the court with all
relevant financial information. The order is dated September 23, 2022 and time-stamped
September 26, 2022.
       {¶13} On October 28, 2022, Appellant filed a motion to vacate the default
judgment and contempt order. He alleged that the judgment and order were void because
he received no pre-abatement or collection letter from the City of Youngstown and the
City’s ordinance imposing abatement without written notice conflicted with Ohio Revised
Code 731.51, which required notice. Accompanying the motion was Appellant’s sworn
affidavit stating that he never received a pre-abatement letter, collection letter, or other
demand for payment of $150.

Case No. 23 MA 0006
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      {¶14} On December 6, 2022, the court denied the motion to vacate, finding that it
was untimely filed. The court signed the journal entry on December 6, 2022 and it was
time-stamped on December 6, 2022. The entry was docketed December 8, 2022.
      {¶15} On January 9, 2023, Appellant filed the instant appeal. He asserts four
assignments of error.

                      APPEAL OF NUMEROUS COURT ORDERS

      {¶16} In his notice of appeal, Appellant attempts to appeal four separate municipal
court orders. Those are: (1) the court’s December 6, 2022 order denying Appellant’s
motion to vacate the default judgment against him; (2) the court’s July 10, 2017 default
judgment order; (3) the court’s July 14, 2022 order to show cause; and (4) the court’s
September 26, 2022 contempt order.
      {¶17} For the following reasons, we find that the municipal court’s July 14, 2022
and September 26, 2022 orders are not final appealable orders. We further find that
Appellant’s assignments of error lack merit.

                        LACK OF FINAL APPEALABLE ORDERS

      {¶18} An appellate court has authority to review only final orders and the court
lacks jurisdiction over any order that is not final.   Stewart v. Solutions Community
Counseling and Recovery Ctrs., Inc., 168 Ohio St.3d 96, 2022-Ohio-2522, 195 N.E.3d
1035, ¶ 4, citing Supportive Solutions, L.L.C. v. Electronic Classroom of Tomorrow, 137
Ohio St.3d 23, 2013-Ohio-2410, 997 N.E.2d 490, ¶ 10.
      {¶19} The Ohio Supreme Court has held that, “[a] court order finding a party in
contempt and imposing a sentence conditioned on the failure to purge is a final,
appealable order on the issue whether the party is in contempt of court.” Docks Venture,
L.L.C. v. Dashing Pacific Group, Ltd., 141 Ohio St.3d 107, 2014-Ohio-4254, 22 N.E.3d
1035, ¶ 23. Thus, the court order of contempt must include both a finding of contempt
and a sentence that activates if the party does not purge the contempt.
      {¶20} In the instant case, neither the July 14, 2022 nor the September 26, 2022
orders imposed a sentence conditioned on Appellant’s failure to purge the contempt. The
July 14, 2022 order to show cause directed Appellant to appear before the court on

Case No. 23 MA 0006
                                                                                       –5–

August 23, 2022 to explain why he should not be found in contempt and sanctioned for
his disobedience of a prior court order. Since the order lacked a contempt finding and a
sanction, it is not a final appealable order and we lack jurisdiction to review it. The same
applies to the court’s September 26, 2022 order of contempt. While the court found
Appellant in contempt for his failure to appear at the show cause hearing, the court did
not impose a sanction. Rather, the court granted Appellant 30 days in which to purge the
contempt.   Without a corresponding sanction, this also does not constitute a final
appealable order.
       {¶21} Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to consider Appellant’s appeal of the July
14, 2022 and September 26, 2022 judgment entries because they are not final appealable
orders.
                        MERITS OF ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

       {¶22} We take the four assignments of error out of order for ease of analysis. In
his second and third assignments of error, Appellant asserts:

       2.     The Court Disregarded its Responsibilities Under Rule 12 (H)(3)
       When It Failed To Address its Subject Matter Jurisdiction (Including
       Standing To Sue Under Section 1749.04(b))[sic] When Presented With
       A Credible Demonstration Of Jurisdictional Deficiency By The
       Defendant And Vacate Its Default Judgment And Ancillary Contempt
       Proceedings, Where The City Failed To Answer The Defendant’s
       Motion And Fulfill Its Obligation To Establish The Court’s Subject
       Matter Jurisdiction And The City’s Standing To Sue Under Its Own
       Legislation.

       3.     The Court Erroneously Failed To Require The City To Undertake
       Its Burden To Establish The Court’s Subject Matter Jurisdiction And
       The City’s Standing To Sue Under Section 1749.04(b) And Instead Sua
       Sponte Erroneously Pre-Empted The City’s Duty To Answer The
       Jurisdictional Challenge By Offering A Defense Of Untimely Filing
       which The City Chose Not [to] Assert And Relying Upon A Void

Case No. 23 MA 0006
                                                                                       –6–

       Judgment To Establish A deadline For Seeking Relief From The Void
       Judgment.

       {¶23} Appellant asserts that Appellee disregarded its burden under Civ. R.
12(H)(3) to establish the subject matter jurisdiction of the municipal court. He further
asserts that the municipal court erred by offering Appellee the defense of untimely filing
of his motion to vacate the default judgment instead of requiring Appellee to establish the
court’s subject matter jurisdiction.
       {¶24} Appellee does not specifically address these assertions. Rather, Appellee
acknowledges that a party may raise the subject matter jurisdiction of a court at any time.
Appellee asserts that the municipal court possessed subject matter jurisdiction.
       {¶25} Civ. R. 12(H) is entitled “Waiver of Defenses and Objections” and Civ. R.
12(H)(3) states that, “[w]henever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that
the court lacks jurisdiction on the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action.”
Subject matter jurisdiction can never be waived and can be challenged at any time. Pratts
v. Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, 806 N.E.2d 992, ¶ 11. The subject-matter
jurisdiction of a court is its “power to hear and decide cases.” Fifth Third Bank, N.A. v.
Maple Leaf Expansion, Inc., 188 Ohio App.3d 27, 2010-Ohio-1537, ¶ 15 (7th Dist.), citing
Pratts, 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, 934 N.E.2d 366, ¶ 11.
       {¶26} Municipal courts are statutorily created under R.C.1901.01, and the subject
matter jurisdiction of those courts is set forth by R.C. 1901.18. Cheap Escape Co., Inc.
v. Haddox, L.L.C., 120 Ohio St.3d 493, 900 N.E.2d 601, 2008-Ohio-6323, ¶ 7. Municipal
courts have subject matter jurisdiction of those matters identified in R.C. 1901.18 that are
within its territories. Id. R.C. 1901.17 establishes the $15,000 monetary limit of the
municipal court’s jurisdiction.    R.C. 1901.02(A) provides that the municipal courts
established under R.C. 1901.01 “have jurisdiction within the corporate limits of their
respective municipal corporations.”
       {¶27} The Ohio Supreme Court holds that “[w]hen a court has the constitutional
or statutory power to adjudicate a particular class or type of case, that court has subject-
matter jurisdiction.” Ostanek v. Ostanek, 166 Ohio St.3d 1, 2021-Ohio-2319, 181 N.E.3d
1162, ¶ 36, citing Corder v. Ohio Edison Co., 162 Ohio St.3d 639, 2020-Ohio-5220, 166
N.E.3d 1180, ¶ 14. The Court recognizes that “there is a distinction between a court that

Case No. 23 MA 0006
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lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over a case and a court that improperly exercises that
subject-matter jurisdiction once conferred upon it.” Pratts, supra, at ¶ 10.
         {¶28} The instant case concerns a complaint in contract against Appellant to pay
$150 in fees expended by the City in hiring a service to mow grass on Appellant’s property
located in Youngstown, Ohio, that exceeded the height allowed in the City ordinance.
The municipal court has subject matter jurisdiction over such matters. The case involved
the violation of a City Ordinance concerning property located in the City of Youngstown
and an attempt to collect $150 for abatement of the nuisance on the property owned by
Appellant in the City of Youngstown.
         {¶29} For these reasons, Appellant’s assignments of error numbers 2 and 3 lack
merit.
         {¶30} In his first assignment of error, Appellant asserts:

         1.     Enforcement Of The City’s Chapter 1749 Abatement Legislation
         Violated The Provisions Of Title VII Section 731.51 et seq. And Was
         Invalid Under The Requirement Under Section 3, Article XVII Of The
         Ohio Constitution That Municipal Police Power Enactments Not Be In
         Conflict With Applicable State Statutes.

         {¶31} Appellant asserts that the City failed to provide him notice before it
summarily abated the weeds and grasses on his property. He contends that this violated
his constitutional procedural due process rights and conflicts with R.C. 731.51, which
requires written notice to a property owner to cut noxious weeds within 5 days of service
of the notice. Appellant challenges Youngstown City Ordinance Section 1749, et seq.,
which concern public nuisances. He maintains that the amendments to this section made
on April 1, 2015 (through Ordinance 15-90) violate and conflict with procedural due
process and Ohio Rev. Code 731.51, because Council removed the notice provisions that
were previously found in Section 1749.
         {¶32} Appellant explains that these prior sections required the City to provide the
property owner with a warning and citation before entering his property, abating the
nuisance, and charging a removal fee. Appellant also challenges the absence of a
hearing before the City abated and the City’s failure to issue him a collection letter before

Case No. 23 MA 0006
                                                                                        –8–

suing him. He concludes that these violations establish that the municipal court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to grant default judgment and find him in contempt.
       {¶33} Appellee responds that Appellant waived the issue of the validity of the civil
complaint on appeal because he failed to raise it before the municipal court. Appellee
further asserts that municipal courts have subject matter jurisdiction over actions not
exceeding $15,000 that have a territorial connection.         R.C. 1901.17; R.C. 1901.18.
Appellee also contends that the municipal court did not abuse its discretion by denying
Appellant’s motion to vacate because the motion was untimely filed.
       {¶34} We note that the record before us lacks documentation of any notice issued
to Appellant informing him of a nuisance violation, a citation to cut or remove the offending
grasses, or a collection letter preceding a civil suit. The civil complaint in the municipal
court appears to be the first filing in the record before this Court.
       {¶35} Section 3, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution is entitled “Municipal powers
of self-government” and provides that “[s]ubject to the requirements of Section 1 of Article
V of this constitution, municipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers of local
self-government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary
and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general laws.”
       {¶36} The City ordinances at issue govern its procedures upon finding and abating
noxious weeds and grasses over eight inches on parcels of land within the City.
Youngstown City Ordinance 1749.01 describes the weeds and grasses over eight inches
and declares them “unlawful as a public nuisance and detrimental to the health, safety
and welfare of the general public.”
       {¶37} Youngstown City Ordinance 1749.02 prohibits a property owner from
allowing noxious weeds and grasses over eight inches in height to stand and further
provides:

       (b) The City may issue a citation to the owner or tenant to cut or remove the
       grass, weeds, and/or plants specified under Section 1749.01. The City, in
       its sole discretion, may issue or post a warning notice to the owner or tenant
       prior to issuing a citation. Posted notices shall be in at least twelve-point
       type and prominently posted on or near the property.

Case No. 23 MA 0006
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      (c) A violation of this Section is a nuisance per se pursuant to Section
      1749.01, and as such the City may enter said lot of land to abate the
      nuisance without issuing or posting notice in order to protect the health,
      safety and welfare of the general public.

      {¶38} Youngstown City Ordinance 1749.03 allows the City to remove the grasses
and weeds and continue to maintain the property until the growing season ends and to
“recover the total cost for all services.” Youngstown City Ordinance 1749.04(a) provides
that the removal costs are the obligation of the property owner and sets the cost at a
minimum of $150.
      {¶39} Youngstown City Ordinance 1749.04(b) provides that:

      (b) The City of Youngstown may collect the costs or charges for such
      removal or abatement from the property owners. At any time after such
      costs are incurred, subject to limitations as provided by law, the City of
      Youngstown or a duly retained agent or attorney at law shall send a letter
      attempting to collect such costs to the property owner at the property
      owner's last known address, via regular U.S. mail. If the property owner
      fails to pay within 30 days of the date of the letter, then the City of
      Youngstown or a duly retained agent or attorney at law may collect the cost
      or charges from the property owners by any of the following methods:

      (1) The City of Youngstown may certify the total costs, together with a
      proper description of the lands, to the County Auditor who shall place the
      costs upon the tax list and duplicate. The costs are a lien upon such lands
      from and after the date the costs were incurred. The costs shall be collected
      as other taxes and returned to the City of Youngstown.

      ***

      Such certification shall not, however, preclude other methods of recovery of
      such cost as may be authorized generally by law; and/or

Case No. 23 MA 0006
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       (2) The City of Youngstown or a duly retained agent or attorney at law may
       commence a civil action to recover the total costs from the owner.

       {¶40} Appellant contends that he received no notice of a nuisance violation,
citation, letter of abatement, or collection letter for abatement fees. He asserts that
Youngstown Ordinance 1749.02 conflicts with R.C. 731.51 because the ordinance allows
the City discretion to issue notice, while the statute mandates notice.
       {¶41} R.C. 731.51(A) is entitled “Notice to cut noxious weeds or remove litter,”
and provides that:

       (A) Upon written information that noxious weeds are growing on lands in a
       municipal corporation, and are about to spread or mature seeds, the
       legislative authority shall cause a written notice to be served upon the
       owner, lessee, agent, or tenant having charge of such land, notifying him
       that noxious weeds are growing on such lands and that they must be cut
       and destroyed within five days after the service of such notice.

       {¶42} R.C. 731.53 provides that the legislative authority of a municipal corporation
shall remove the noxious weeds and bill the property owner if the property owner fails to
comply with the notice sent under R.C. 731.51.
       {¶43} It is true that the language in Youngstown City Ordinance 1749.02(b) is
discretionary as it states that the City “may issue a citation” and the City has “sole
discretion” to issue or post a warning notice before issuing a citation.             Further,
Youngstown City Ordinance 1749.02(c) provides that the City may abate the nuisance
without providing notice because such a violation is a nuisance per se and abatement
can be made “to protect the health, safety and welfare of the general public.”
       {¶44} However, even accepting this discretionary language, it appears that
Appellee violated its own ordinance. Since no documentation preceding the complaint is
present in the record before us, it appears that the City violated Youngstown Ordinance
1749.04(b) by failing to send Appellant a letter notifying him that the City was seeking to
collect its costs for abating the grass. The language in this section is mandatory, stating
that before filing a civil suit or assessing the removal fee to the auditor, the City agent or
an attorney “shall” send the property owner a letter by mail informing him that the City is

Case No. 23 MA 0006
                                                                                          – 11 –

seeking to collect the costs of abatement on the property. Youngstown City Ordinance
1749.04(b). It continues that, “[i]f the property owner fails to pay within 30 days of the
date of the letter,” then the City may collect the fees from the property owner either by
certification to the auditor or by filing a civil suit to recover the fees. Id.
       {¶45} Although Appellee may have violated its ordinance, we find that Appellant
has waived this issue on appeal. “A failure to preserve an issue in the trial court waives
the issue for purposes of appeal.”         Mauldin v. Youngstown Water Dept., 7th Dist.
Mahoning No. 19 MA 0010, 2019-Ohio-5065, 150 N.E.3d 433, citing Wynn v.
Waynesburg Rd LLC, 7th Dist. Carroll No. 17 CA 0921, 2018-Ohio-3858, ¶ 11; and
Stanton v. Marc's Store, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 15 MA 49, 2015-Ohio-5551, ¶ 35, citing
Schade v. Carnegie Body Co., 70 Ohio St.2d 207, 210, 436 N.E.2d 1001 (1982) (“the
fundamental rule is that an appellate court will not consider any error which could have
been brought to the trial court's attention”). The Ohio Supreme Court has held that, “[t]he
failure to challenge the constitutionality of a statute in the trial court forfeits all but plain
error on appeal, and the burden of demonstrating plain error is on the party asserting it.”
State v. Quarterman, 140 Ohio St.3d 464, 2014-Ohio-4034, 19 N.E.3d 900, ¶ 2 (2014).
       {¶46} Appellant had plenty of opportunities to raise the issue of notice before the
trial court well before he filed his motion to vacate the default judgment. He failed to
answer, respond, or defend in this action for over 5 years after the default judgment was
issued against him. He could have raised this issue with a motion to dismiss the complaint
or defended against it after filing an answer. Appellant does not complain about a failure
to receive a copy of the complaint. Since Appellant failed to respond or answer, or
otherwise indicate his intention to defend against the complaint, he was not entitled to
notice of the application for default judgment. See Civ. R. 55(A). Moreover, the record
shows that Appellant was served with notice of a debtor’s examination, the order to show
cause, the show cause hearing date, and the order in contempt when he failed to appear.
       {¶47} For these reasons, Appellant’s first assignment of error lacks merit.
       {¶48} In his fourth assignment of error, Appellant asserts:

       4.      In Any Case, Defendant’s Vacation Motion Was Timely Filed,
       Since his Motion Was Filed On October 23, 2022, Well Within The
       Thirty-Day[sic] from September 26, 2022 deadline.

Case No. 23 MA 0006
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       {¶49} Appellant asserts that he timely filed his motion to vacate the default
judgment and contempt orders. He contends that the trial court incorrectly used the date
of the court’s signature on the September 23, 2022 journal entry, rather than the date that
the order was entered upon the judgment journal, which was September 26, 2022. He
claims that he was also entitled to three additional days to answer under Civ. R. 6(D) for
mail service, which would allow him to file by October 26, 2022. He notes that he filed
his motion on October 23, 2022.
       {¶50} Appellee counters that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying
Appellant’s untimely motion to vacate. Appellee notes that Civ. R. 60(B) allows for the
filing of a motion to vacate “within a reasonable time.” Appellee contends that the motion
to vacate was not filed within a reasonable time because the default was issued on July
10, 2017 and Appellant filed the motion to vacate on October 23, 2022.
       {¶51} In his motion to vacate the default judgment, however, Appellant asserted
the motion was not based upon Civ. R. 60(B). Rather, he stated that it was based upon
the inherent authority of the court to vacate void judgments. (See Mot. to Vacate at page
3). He submits that the “reasonable time” requirement of Civ. R. 60(B) therefore does not
apply to his motion.
       {¶52} Appellant is correct that trial courts have inherent authority to vacate a void
judgment and a party who asserts a lack of jurisdiction based on a lack of service does
not need to meet Civ. R. 60(B) requirements. Patton v. Diemer, 35 Ohio St.3d 68, 518
N.E.2d 941 (1988), paragraph four of the syllabus (“The authority to vacate a void
judgment is an inherent power of the court and is not derivative of Civ.R. 60(B)[.]”).
       {¶53} However, just as with a Civ. R. 60(B) motion, we review a trial court’s
decision on a motion to vacate a default judgment under an abuse of discretion standard.
See During v. Quoico, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 11AP-735, 2012-Ohio-2990, 973 N.E.2d
838, ¶ 16. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion to
vacate the default judgment based upon untimeliness.
       {¶54} In its application for default judgment on June 27, 2017, Appellee included
a document dated March 1, 2016 and signed by the postmaster, which showed regular
mail with certificates of mailing, and included service to Appellant’s address with a
tracking number. The court granted the application for default judgment, finding that

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Appellant was duly served with process in accordance with Civ. R. 4 and Appellant failed
to plead, appear, or otherwise respond to the complaint. The court granted Appellee
judgment in the amount of $150 plus interest on July 10, 2017.
       {¶55} Nearly five years later, the municipal court ordered a debtor’s exam to occur
on May 31, 2022 and Appellant failed to appear. A record dated April 4, 2022 from the
U.S. Post Office indicated that Appellant signed for the debtor’s exam order as it was sent
by certified mail. On July 14, 2022, the municipal court issued an order to show cause
for Appellant to appear on August 23, 2022 to explain why he should not be found in
contempt of court for his prior failures to obey the court’s orders. The record shows that
the court order was mailed to Appellant on the same date and on July 15, 2022, certified
mail delivery was signed.
       {¶56} Yet again, Appellant failed to appear. Consequently, the municipal court
issued a contempt order on September 26, 2022 indicating Appellant’s latest failure to
appear. The court ordered that Appellant appear with his financial information within 30
days to purge his contempt.
       {¶57} On October 28, 2022, Appellant filed his motion to vacate the default
judgment order and order of contempt, challenging the court’s subject matter jurisdiction
and the constitutionality of the Youngstown City Ordinances.
       {¶58} This record shows that service of the complaint was perfected on Appellant,
as well as nearly every other order in this case.
       {¶59} As discussed, infra, the municipal court possessed subject matter
jurisdiction over the case. Further, the City did not lack standing to sue. And even if it
had, the Ohio Supreme Court has held that “a particular party's standing, or lack thereof,
does not affect the subject-matter jurisdiction of the court in which the party is attempting
to obtain relief.” Bank of Am. v. Kuchta, 141 Ohio St. 3d 75, 2014-Ohio-4275, 21 N.E.3d
1040, ¶ 23, citing State ex rel. Tubbs Jones v. Suster, 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 77, 701 N.E.2d
1002 (1998).
       {¶60} If Appellant wished to challenge the complaint due to lack of notice of an
abatement letter, he should have answered or responded. If he wished to challenge the
default proceedings, the debtor’s exam, and the contempt orders, he should have
answered, responded, appeared, or otherwise defended against these filings. He should

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not have waited over five years to challenge the court order granting default judgment. In
light of Appellant’s repeated inaction and lack of compliance in the municipal court, we
find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion to vacate the
default judgment or other orders against him.
       {¶61} For these reasons, Appellant’s fourth assignment of error lacks merit.
       {¶62} Based on the above, all of Appellant’s assignments of error lack merit.

Robb, J., concurs.

D’Apolito, P.J., concurs.

Case No. 23 MA 0006
[Cite as Youngstown v. Newton, 2023-Ohio-4250.]

        For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, Appellant’s assignments of
error are overruled and the judgment of the Youngstown Municipal Court, Mahoning
County, Ohio is affirmed. Costs to be taxed against the Appellant.
        A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate in
this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that a
certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into execution.

JUDGE MARK A. HANNI

JUDGE CAROL ANN ROBB

JUDGE DAVID A. D’APOLITO

                                      NOTICE TO COUNSEL

        This document constitutes a final judgment entry.