Court Opinion

ID: 9953563
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 14:20:52.500517+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:01:49.650500
License: Public Domain

RECORD IMPOUNDED

                                NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-2160-22

S.I.,1

          Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

M.I.,

     Defendant-Respondent.
_________________________

                   Argued March 5, 2024 – Decided March 22, 2024

                   Before Judges Smith and Perez Friscia.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
                   Chancery Division, Family Part, Morris County,
                   Docket No. FM-14-0735-17.

                   Ira Treuhaft argued the cause for appellant (Treuhaft &
                   Zakarin, LLP, Boaz I. Cohen (Kramer Levin Naftalis &
                   Frankel LLP), Jonathan M. Wagner (Kramer Levin
                   Naftalis & Frankel LLP) of the New York bar, admitted
                   pro hac vice, and Daria Schieferstein (Kramer Levin
                   Naftalis & Frankel LLP) of the New York bar, admitted
                   pro hac vice, attorneys; Ira Treuhaft, Boaz I. Cohen,

1
     We use initials to protect the privacy of the parties.
            Jonathan M. Wagner, and Daria Schieferstein, on the
            briefs).

            M.I., respondent, argued the cause pro se.

PER CURIAM

      Plaintiff S.I. appeals from the February 17, 2023 Family Part order

denying her motion to confirm an arbitration award entered after attending

binding arbitration pursuant to the parties' memorandum of understanding

(MOU). The arbitration award required defendant M.I. to provide plaintiff a

get.2 Having reviewed the record, the parties' contentions, and the applicable

law, we reverse and remand.

                                       I.

      The parties were married in December 1984 and share eight children.

After almost twenty years together, the parties separated. Plaintiff thereafter

sought a divorce from defendant. On May 21, 2019, on the eve of trial and after

extensive negotiations, the parties appeared before the trial judge advising they

had settled their marital issues and entered into an MOU. The parties agreed to

a divorce from bed and board, in addition to resolving custody, child support,

2
  A "get" is a written document, "which is a religious divorce granted by a
husband to a wife." Abdelhak v. Jewish Press Inc., 411 N.J. Super. 211, 218
(App. Div. 2009). "Unless granted a [g]et, an observant Orthodox Jewish
woman is not free to marry again" under Jewish law. Ibid.
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                                       2
alimony, and equitable distribution issues.           The MOU also specifically

addressed plaintiff's request for a get; provision thirteen stated the parties "both

. . . agreed" to attend a "[b]eit [d]in"3 and "both will cooperate." The parties'

attendance at a beit din provided plaintiff the opportunity under Jewish

rabbinical law to obtain a get from defendant permitting her to remarry.

      Before the judge, the parties placed the terms of the MOU on the record

and were extensively questioned by counsel confirming their understanding and

agreement.    The following colloquy regarding the get occurred between

defendant and his counsel:

             DEFENSE COUNSEL: Both parties agree that they
             will . . . appear before . . . a beit din . . . and that's on
             the issue of the get[]. First they will try Rabbi
             Herbst . . . and if he accepts the parties into his
             jurisdiction and his beit din, that's great.

                   If he refuses, they're going to ask him for a
             recommendation as to another beit din and if he does
             not give them a recommendation for another beit din,
             then I will contact Rabbi Baldamelski . . . down in
             Crown Heights and get the name of a beit din for both
             to appear before and both will cooperate to appear
             before that beit din.

                   ....

3
  A "beit din," also known as beth din or bais din, "is a rabbinical court
composed of a minimum of three rabbis." Abdelhak, 411 N.J. Super. at 219 n.2.

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                                          3
            DEFENSE COUNSEL: Do you believe that under the
            circumstances, [the MOU is] a fair and reasonable
            agreement?

            DEFENDANT: Yes I do.

            DEFENSE COUNSEL: Do you understand what was
            agreed to?

            DEFENDANT: Yes I do.

            DEFENSE COUNSEL: Have I been able to answer all
            your questions about it?

            DEFENDANT: Yes you have.

            DEFENSE COUNSEL: Did anyone force you to -- you
            actually signed this, correct, that's your signature on --

            DEFENDANT: Right there.

                  ....

            DEFENSE COUNSEL: [The MOU] [e]ven includes
            items like the beit din --

            DEFENDANT: Correct.

            DEFENSE COUNSEL: . . . and the [get].

            DEFENDANT: Correct.

Defendant confirmed his highest level of education was an LL.M. On June 4,

2019, the judge granted the parties a divorce from bed and board incorporating

their handwritten MOU.

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                                        4
       After the parties began the arbitration process, in a letter dated December

3, 2019, Rabbi Herbst advised that he was "unable to do anything" and would

not see the parties "until [defendant] g[ave] . . . [the parties' daughter] to a group

home." The parties did not return to complete the get arbitration with Rabbi

Herbst.4

       Plaintiff moved to compel defendant to attend arbitration in accordance

with the MOU, which was granted.              Defendant had previously signed an

arbitration agreement with Rabbi Duvid Twersky on April 26, 2021, and

plaintiff thereafter signed on December 29 while the motion was pending. On

January 3, 2022, after argument, a different judge ordered that the parties attend

arbitration with Rabbi Twersky, "sign the standard arbitration agreement," and

abide by Rabbi Twersky's ruling. Defendant did not appeal the judge's order

enforcing the parties' agreement to attend binding arbitration.

       Thereafter, in his January 25, 2022 email to plaintiff's counsel, defendant

confirmed he had "already signed" the arbitration agreement with Rabbi

Twersky. Defendant asserted he always "accepted [Rabbi Twersky], his bei[t]

din and his protocol. [Plaintiff] had refused to accept him, his bei[t] din and his

protocol for [two] years." The parties' signed "AGREEMENT TO SUBMIT TO

4
    The parties acknowledged at argument that Rabbi Herbst had passed away.
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                                          5
ARBITRATION"         provided     they    "agree[d]     to   submit     to   binding

arbitration . . . [to] be conducted under the auspices of Rabbi . . . Twersky" who

could "decide if he s[aw] fit at any time to arrange for a [beit din] of three

[r]abbis of his choice to adjudicate the controversies." Further, the agreement

provided the arbitration shall "commence" and "continue until a final award is

made."

      On August 22, 2022, after multiple sessions with the parties, Rabbi

Twersky issued his arbitration decision directing defendant to provide plaintiff

a get. The written decision provided:

                   [T]hey signed an arbitration agreement to litigate
            before me. They also accepted my authority to deal
            with their marital harmony. I held ten sessions with
            them, of one hour each, for a total of ten hours, and after
            hearing their words and examining the nature of
            relations between them from all the angles I see no
            opportunity for blessing to come to them, and I am
            therefore forced to express my opinion that as far as I
            can see it is clear that there is no prospect of restoring
            peace between them and it is not at all possible for them
            to live together. In order to preserve and spare their
            dignity I shall not go into details here . . . at any rate it
            is an argument in favor of a finding that in such
            circumstances they have a duty to divorce.

            . . . [T]he aforementioned legal authorities are of the
            opinion that the parties must divorce each other, and
            especially in the current case, where according to these
            authorities the husband is required to divorce his wife.

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                                         6
                   ....

             . . . I have also presented the content of the matter last
             night before the world-renowned genius Rabbi
             Menachem Mendel haCohen Shafran and he approved
             it, and even said that you may be told in his name that
             you should certainly present your opinion and
             conclusions before the [civil court] judge. To which I
             affix my signature on Monday Menachem-Av 25, 5782
             [Aug-22-2022] [signature] Rabbi Tzvi Gertner

After receiving the ruling, however, defendant refused to provide plaintiff the

get.

       On November 4, 2022, plaintiff moved to confirm the arbitration award.

Defendant cross-moved to vacate the award. On February 17, 2023, the judge

denied the motions, finding the court lacked "jurisdiction to confirm an award

which would in effect order somebody to give a get—a religious divorce in the

Jewish faith." He reasoned "the effect of that confirmation [would] . . . put the

State of New Jersey Superior Court['s] stamp on an arbitration award telling one

person they have to do something that . . . in their religion that is really beyond."

Further, the judge found no precedent "would compel [him] . . . to order anyone

of the Jewish faith to give another person of the Jewish faith a get."

       On appeal, plaintiff contends the judge erroneously denied confirmation

of the arbitration award because:        the parties have a binding arbitration

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                                         7
agreement; and Rabbi Twersky's award granting her a get did not violate either

the Establishment or Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment.

                                       II.

      "We accord deference to Family Part judges due to their 'special

jurisdiction and expertise in family [law] matters.'" Gormley v. Gormley, 462

N.J. Super. 433, 442 (App. Div. 2019) (alteration in original) (quoting Cesare v.

Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998)). Our scope of review of Family Part orders

is limited. Cesare, 154 N.J. at 411. We reverse "only when a mistake must have

been made because the trial court's factual findings are 'so manifestly

unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably

credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice.'"         Spangenberg v.

Kolakowski, 442 N.J. Super. 529, 535 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting Rova Farms

Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)).

      We review de novo questions of law. Amzler v. Amzler, 463 N.J. Super.

187, 197 (App. Div. 2020). The "[i]nterpretation and construction of a contract

is a matter of law." Steele v. Steele, 467 N.J. Super. 414, 440 (App. Div. 2021)

(alteration in original) (quoting Fastenberg v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 309

N.J. Super. 415, 420 (App. Div. 1998)).         Thus, the enforceability of an

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                                        8
arbitration agreement is reviewed de novo. Skuse v. Pfizer, Inc., 244 N.J. 30,

46 (2020); Perez v. Sky Zone LLC, 472 N.J. Super. 240, 247 (App. Div. 2022).

      It is well-established that settlement of "matrimonial disputes[] is

encouraged and highly valued in our system." Quinn v. Quinn, 225 N.J. 34, 44

(2016). "The prominence and weight we accord such [settlements] reflect the

importance attached to individual autonomy and freedom, enabling parties to

order their personal lives consistently with their post-marital responsibilities."

Weishaus v. Weishaus, 180 N.J. 131, 143 (2004) (quoting Konzelman v.

Konzelman, 158 N.J. 185, 193 (1999)). "Indeed, there is a 'strong public policy

favoring stability of arrangements in matrimonial matters.'" Satz v. Satz, 476

N.J. Super. 536, 550 (App. Div. 2023) (quoting Quinn, 225 N.J. at 44), certif.

denied, 256 N.J. 352 (2024). Matrimonial settlement agreements are governed

by basic contract principles and, as such, courts should discern and implement

the parties' intentions. J.B. v. W.B., 215 N.J. 305, 326 (2013). "[W]hen the

intent of the parties is plain and the language is clear and unambiguous, a court

must enforce the agreement as written, unless doing so would lead to an absurd

result." Quinn, 225 N.J. at 45.

      "[T]he scope of review of an arbitration award is narrow. Otherwise, the

purpose of the arbitration contract, which is to provide an effective, expedient,

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                                        9
and fair resolution of disputes, would be severely undermined." Fawzy v.

Fawzy, 199 N.J. 456, 470 (2009). "Arbitration is a 'creature of contract.'"

Minkowitz v. Israeli, 433 N.J. Super. 111, 132 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting Kimm

v. Blisset, LLC, 388 N.J. Super. 14, 25 (App. Div. 2006)). "It is well-settled

that New Jersey's strong public policy favors settlement of disputes through

arbitration."   Id. at 131.   This "strong public policy" also favors "using

arbitration in family litigation." Id. at 131-32.

      "The object of arbitration is the final disposition, . . . and perhaps less

formal manner[] of the controversial differences between the parties." Id. at 132

(quoting Hojnowski v. Vans State Park, 187 N.J. 323, 343 (2006)). Our Supreme

Court has held that, like other contracts, "[w]hen a court in New Jersey is 'called

on to enforce an arbitration agreement, [its] initial inquiry must be . . . whether

the agreement to arbitrate . . . a dispute is "the product of mutual assent, as

determined under customary principles of contract law."'" Flanzman v. Jenny

Craig, Inc., 244 N.J. 119, 137 (2020) (quoting Kernahan v. Home Warranty

Adm'r of Fla., Inc., 236 N.J. 301, 319 (2019)). "Thus, 'there must be a meeting

of the minds for an agreement to exist before enforcement is considered.'"

Skuse, 244 N.J. at 48 (quoting Kernahan, 236 N.J. at 319). In determining the

enforceability of an arbitration agreement, "[n]o particular form of words is

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                                       10
necessary to accomplish a clear and unambiguous waiver of rights." Atalese v.

U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., L.P., 219 N.J. 430, 444 (2014). Under the New Jersey

Arbitration Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-1 to -36, "arbitration is fundamentally a

matter of contract." Perez, 472 N.J. Super. at 247.

                                      III.

      Plaintiff contends the arbitration award requiring defendant to give her a

get is enforceable pursuant to the parties' binding MOU and signed arbitration

agreement. We agree. The parties, represented by counsel, entered into the

MOU compromising and in consideration of their respective positions.            In

hearing the terms of their agreement on the record, the judge recognized the

parties' extensive negotiations and long-term litigation, stating, "We've been in

court numerous times. . . . The matter has a very long history, I think dat[ing]

back to late 2016." The parties' MOU provided that "both [parties] agreed" to

appear before a beit din and "cooperate." Through comprehensive questioning,

defense counsel clearly established defendant's understanding and assent to the

MOU's provision to arbitrate the issue of a get. Further, the record demonstrated

defendant agreed to be bound and abide by the arbitrator's decision. The plain

language of the parties' handwritten MOU arbitration provision thirteen, and the

memorialized terms stated on the record, established defendant submitted to the

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                                      11
jurisdiction of a rabbi and beit din. The parties' decision to arbitrate a religious

marital matter was their right. See Satz, 476 N.J. Super. 552

         Further, defendant did not appeal the judge's January 2022 order, which

enforced the parties' MOU requiring them to arbitrate the issuance of the get

before Rabbi Twersky and abide by his ruling. Indeed, defendant confirmed by

email he had signed the arbitration agreement prior to the motion filing and

agreed to accept Rabbi Twersky's decision, "his bei[t] din[,] and his protocol."

Defendant's assertion that he later withdrew his signature after plaintiff signed

the agreement is unsupported. Defendant has failed to posit any foundation for

his alleged permissive withdrawal. Therefore, defendant was bound to arbitrate

not only based on the signed arbitration contract, but also pursuant to the parties'

MOU and the judge's order. "[A] court should not rewrite a contract or grant a

better deal than that for which the parties expressly bargained." Quinn, 225 N.J.

at 45.

         Plaintiff correctly argues the parties were free to enter into a contract with "the

provision of a get" after the parties had "spent several years negotiating" their

divorce agreement. The arbitration terms were sufficiently established by the

parties. See N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-4 ("[A] party to an agreement to arbitrate or to an

arbitration proceeding may waive or, the parties may vary the effect of, the

                                                                                     A-2160-22
                                            12
requirements of this act to the extent permitted by law."); see also Kernahan, 236

N.J. at 24.

      Defendant's assertion that the judge correctly denied enforcement of the award

because there was no verbatim record is misplaced. Again, defendant submitted to

arbitration with Rabbi Twersky, consenting "that the arbitration be held and

commence with the jurisdiction of the arbitrator(s) to continue until a final award is

made." Our Supreme Court has determined that "the absence of a verbatim transcript

[i]s not fatal." Johnson v. Johnson, 204 N.J. 529, 534 (2010). Here, defendant had

not requested transcripts of the proceedings and had agreed to accept Rabbi

Twersky's "protocol." The parties attended ten one-hour sessions before Rabbi

Twersky, who issued a written decision directing defendant to provide plaintiff a

get. As contemplated by the MOU, the written decision memorialized completion

of the matter, as it was presented "before the world-renowned genius Rabbi

Menachem Mendel haCohen Shafran and he approved it," and it was approved by

Rabbi Tzvi Gertner for "present[ation] . . . before the [civil court] judge." For these

reasons, we part ways with the judge's reasoning that the arbitration required "some

sort of record of the proceeding."

      We next turn to plaintiff's argument that enforcement of the award does

not violate the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First

                                                                                A-2160-22
                                         13
Amendment. The "Establishment Clause bars a state from placing its support

behind a religious belief, while the Free Exercise Clause bars a state from

interfering with the practice of religion." Satz, 476 N.J. Super. at 552 (citing

U.S. Const. amend. I). The United States Supreme Court has held "that the

Establishment Clause must be interpreted by 'reference to historical practices

and understandings.'" Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 597 U.S. 507, 535

(2022) (quoting Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 576 (2014)).

Indeed, our "civil courts may resolve controversies involving religious groups

if resolution can be achieved by reference to neutral principles of law, but that

they may not resolve such controversies if resolution requires the interpretation

of religious doctrine." Satz, 476 N.J. Super. at 533 (quoting Ran-Dav's Cnty.

Kosher v. State, 129 N.J. 141, 162, (1992)). The New Jersey Supreme Court

has recognized "that parties should be granted as much autonomy as possible in

the ordering of their personal lives" and therefore "[i]t is fair and reasonable that

parties who have agreed to be bound by arbitration in a formal, written

separation agreement should be bound." Faherty v. Faherty, 97 N.J. 99, 107

(1984). Unquestionably, New Jersey has a strong public policy in favor of

settling disputes through arbitration, including in family litigation. Minkowitz,

433 N.J. Super. at 131-32.

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                                        14
       Here, confirmation of the award can be granted under neutral principles

of law and without interpretation of religious doctrine. We therefore conclude

the Establishment Clause is not violated because the parties' arbitration

agreement regarding a get serves the "purpose of enforcing the parties'

contractual obligations" and "encouraging divorce litigants to resolve disputes

by negotiating and entering" into marital agreements. Satz, 476 N.J. Super. at

553.

       Additionally, enforcement does not infringe on the Free Exercise Clause

as the parties voluntarily entered into the MOU arbitration provision and

agreement. The record demonstrates the parties freely and knowingly agreed to

resolve the issuance of the get through arbitration; thus, we conclude there is no

interference with their practice of religion.

       In summary, we conclude confirmation of the award pursuant to the

parties' MOU and separately signed arbitration agreement falls squarely within

"principles of civil contract law, not rabbinical law." Ibid. Rabbi Twersky's

decision to grant plaintiff the get under rabbinical law "remained solely within

the province of the bei[t] din" and did not require interpretation by the judge.

See ibid.   Confirmation of the award strictly required a determination of

defendant's contractual obligation. Therefore, we are constrained to reverse.

                                                                            A-2160-22
                                       15
The parties' MOU, arbitration agreement, and Rabbi Twersky's decision

mandate confirmation of the award requiring defendant provide plaintiff with a

get in accordance with the beit din. For these reasons, we reverse and remand

for the entry of an order consistent with this opinion.

      To the extent that we have not addressed any of the parties' arguments, it

is because they lack sufficient merit to be discussed in a written opinion. R.

2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

      Reversed and remanded. We do no retain jurisdiction.

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