Court Opinion

ID: 9545286
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:09:34.404485+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:14:28.631891
License: Public Domain

CROCKETT, Justice
(concurring separately).
I concur in affirming the ruling of the district court that there is no proper foundation for charging the defendant with a crime for possession of “demerol” as a controlled substance. But I have reservations about some aspects of the main opinion and therefore state my own reasons for my conclusion.
It is to be conceded that the legislature cannot delegate legislative powers to executive or administrative officers or departments. However, it is also to be realized that due to the complexities of human society, which are ever increasing, the function of the legislative branch must necessarily be that of a general policy making body and that it cannot spell out all of the details of the administration and application of law. Consequently, it is necessary that the executive branch (e.g., administrative agencies such as the Public Service Commission, the Industrial Commission and the Tax Commission), in order to carry out the responsibilities imposed upon them, have the power to make rules and regulations that must be complied with, and that failure to comply must have sanctions or penalties, and that they therefore must have the force of law.
Even though the legislature cannot delegate the power to make laws to an executive officer,1 it may enact laws which take effect upon the ascertainment of certain facts and conditions, and may delegate the duty to determine the existence of such facts to executive or administrative officers.2 Whether a particular delegation of power is valid depends upon whether the legislature has prescribed sufficient standards or limitations to guide the exercise of that power in accordance with its will.3
It is a cardinal principle of due process that a person is entitled to reasonable notice, or a means of knowing, what conduct is prohibited before he can be held criminally responsible for engaging in it.4 In conformity therewith the procedure for the adoption of such a rule, and the rule itself, must be of such a nature and sufficiently clear and definite that persons of ordinary intelligence who would abide by the law will know how to conform to its requirements.5
Consistent with the foregoing, the legislature has authorized the Attorney General to carry out the policy of the Act under appropriate safeguards. U.C.A.1953, sections 58-37-3 through 7 list various factors for the Attorney General to consider in determining whether to control a substance. These include the potential of the substances for abuse, or a history and current pattern of *691abuse, whether the substance is controlled under federal law and whether it is an immediate precursor of a substance already controlled under the Act; and the current state of scientific knowledge of the substance and the effects of its use.
In regard to the requirement of notice to the public, Section 58-37-5(3) provides:
. every substance controlled by the attorney general to have effect shall be certified and filed with the office of the secretary of state. The secretary of state shall keep a permanent register of the rules or controls certified. [Emphasis added.]
It should be obvious to anyone reading those statutes, conferring such powers on the Attorney General, that in order to meet the requirements of due process of law, there must be compliance with the requirements, both as to the certification, and the filing in the office of the Secretary of State the statement as to any drug so prohibited, so that there is notice in that public office, where it can be examined by anyone who has an interest therein.
As indicated in the main opinion, the State did not establish that the statutory requirements above referred to had been complied with; and particularly it was not shown that there had been the filing with the Secretary of State; but there was some evidence indicating to the contrary. In view of that failure there is no foundation upon which to conclude that the Attorney General’s designation of demerol as a controlled substance provides a valid basis for charging and prosecution for crime. For these reasons I join in affirming the trial court’s decision.

. Young v. Salt Lake City, 24 Utah 321, 67 P.2d 1066 (1902); Rowell v. State Board of Agriculture, 98 Utah 353, 99 P.2d 1 (1940).

. Id.; 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 138.

. Rowell v. State Board of Agriculture, supra note 1.

. State v. Timmons, 12 Wash.App. 48, 527 P.2d 1399 (1974).

. Greaves v. State, Utah, 528 P.2d 805 (1974); U. S. v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 74 S.Ct. 808, 98 L.Ed. 989.