Court Opinion

ID: 9855364
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:23:29.422992+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:55.821544
License: Public Domain

Chief Justice Mitchell
dissenting.
I disagree with the majority that the trial court is not to consider the relative estates of the parties in determining whether defendant *59has “insufficient means to defray the expense of the suit.” N.C.G.S. § 50-13.6. The majority correctly concludes that a spouse has insufficient means to defray the expense of a custody and support action if he or she is “unable to meet the other spouse as litigant in the suit.” Meeting a spouse “as litigant,” however, implies that both spouses have the resources necessary to adequately assert and defend claims on substantially equal terms. See Clark v. Clark, 301 N.C. 123, 135-36, 271 S.E.2d 58, 67 (1980). This determination necessarily requires an evaluation of the relative estates of the parties.
The majority relies in part on the trial court’s finding that defendant’s monthly income exceeded her monthly expenses, excluding attorneys’ fees, by approximately $477. At the same time, however, the trial court found that plaintiff’s monthly income exceeded his monthly expenses by approximately $28,000. Thus, while defendant’s net financial condition is substantial, it may not be adequate to enable her to meet plaintiff in court on relatively equal terms. In fact, defendant’s attorneys’ fees, which have exceeded $100,000, indicate the enormous resources she has exhausted to meet plaintiff on substantially even terms and the numerous barriers defendant “as litigant” has faced in resolving this case. Therefore, I would affirm the Court of Appeals’ decision to remand the issue of attorneys’ fees to the trial court for consideration of the relative estates of the parties.
Justices Whichard and Parker join in this dissenting opinion.
Justice Whichard
dissenting.
I have joined in Chief Justice Mitchell’s dissenting opinion, and I write separately only to say the following:
The rationale of the Chief Justice’s dissent rests entirely on this Court’s interpretation of the statute governing payment of attorney’s fees in alimony cases. As the majority opinion notes, that statute requires a determination that one spouse is a supporting spouse and the other a dependent spouse, which, in turn, usually requires a comparison of the parties’ estates.
The child support attorney’s fee statute, N.C.G.S. § 50-13.6 (1995), contains no such requirement. Applied with literal starkness, that statute’s phrase “who has insufficient means to defray the expense of the suit” would limit an award of attorney’s fees to parties whose liabilities would exceed their assets upon payment of their attorney’s fees. Like the Chief Justice, however, and like this Court when it *60interpreted the attorney’s fee statute applicable to alimony cases, I do not believe this was the intent of the legislature.
In Clark, this Court stated:
It would be contrary to what we perceive to be the intent of the legislature to require a dependent spouse to meet the expenses of litigation through the unreasonable depletion of her separate estate where her separate estate is considerably smaller than that of the supporting spouse .... Furthermore, it flies in the face of common sense and fair play to so require. While in the abstract, it would seem that defendant has ample resources to do battle in the courts, close analysis suggests that such is the case only through unreasonable depletion of her relatively small resources.
Clark v. Clark, 301 N.C. 123, 137, 271 S.E.2d 58, 68 (1980). This reasoning is just as pertinent in child support cases as it is in alimony cases, and it is just as probable that the legislature intended it to apply in the one as in the other. The intent would appear to be, as the Chief Justice states, to assure that both spouses can adequately assert and defend claims on substantially equal terms. This determination necessarily requires an evaluation of the relative income and estates of the parties.
The majority’s consideration of the duration of the parents’ relationship as a pertinent factor in interpreting the statute is misguided. Child support actions protect the same interests whether the child is the product of a single encounter or a lengthy marital relationship. Those are the interests of the child in being adequately supported and the interests of the State in having the child supported by a solvent parent or parents rather than by the taxpayers. The duration of the parents’ relationship has no bearing on these interests. Considerations as to “the estate to which [the parent seeking support and attorney’s fees] has contributed in some way during the familial relationship that is now being dissolved” are appropriate in an equitable distribution action but not in answering the question of whether the legislature intended that relative estates be weighed in determining entitlement to attorney’s fees in a child support action.
In the interest of symmetry in the law and, more importantly, fairness to litigants and fulfillment of perceived legislative intent, I would resolve the question presented by affirming the Court of Appeals’ decision to remand to the trial court for a redetermination of the *61attorney’s fee issue, considering the relative incomes and estates of the parties. I therefore dissent.
Chief Justice Mitchell and Justice Parker join in this dissenting opinion.