Court Opinion

ID: 9889579
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-10 18:08:49.137484+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:18.211950
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/10/23 P. v. Blackburn CA2/4
            NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

         IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                  SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION FOUR

 THE PEOPLE,                                                            B320078

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                    (Los Angeles County
                                                                         Super. Ct. No. TA150229)
           v.

 DIONTRE BLACKBURN,

           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
John J. Lonergan, Judge. Affirmed in part, vacated and remanded for
resentencing.
         Steven Schorr, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Idan
Ivri, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Gabriel Bradley, Deputy
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                               INTRODUCTION
      Defendant was charged with murder, attempted murder, and other
crimes in connection with a car-to-car shooting. A jury determined he was
the shooter and found him guilty on all counts. Before the jury rendered its
verdict, the court became aware that three spectators associated with
defendant had interacted with the jury outside the courtroom, which made
several jurors uncomfortable. The court also discovered the jurors had
discussed the spectators’ conduct with each other. After examining each
juror individually in chambers, the court found the jurors credible when they
stated the interactions with the three spectators would not impact their
ability to be fair and impartial to defendant. Also found credible were the
jurors’ assurances that the spectators’ conduct would not factor into their
determination of the charges against defendant. The court denied
defendant’s motions for a mistrial and new trial based on juror misconduct
and ultimately sentenced him to a prison term of 50 years to life plus 24
years.
      Defendant timely appealed. On appeal, he challenges the trial court’s
denial of his motions for a mistrial and new trial. He also argues the trial
court committed several sentencing errors. We affirm the trial court’s denial
of the posttrial motions, vacate defendant’s sentence, and remand the matter
to the trial court for resentencing.

             FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      A.    Background Facts and Charging Allegations
      On March 10, 2019, Kalease Patterson (Patterson) and Abdelhameed
Ibrahim (Ibrahim) were driving through the Imperial Courts Housing Project
in Los Angeles. At a stop sign, a white car pulled alongside the driver’s side

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of their car. A series of gunshots were fired from the white car into their car,
killing Patterson, the driver, and injuring Ibrahim, who had been sitting in
the front passenger seat.
      In an information filed by the Los Angeles County District Attorney,
defendant and appellant Diontre Blackburn (Blackburn) was charged with
murder (Pen. Code § 187, subd. (a), count 1),1 attempted murder (§§ 664/187,
subd. (a), count 2), shooting at an occupied motor vehicle (§ 246, count 3),
shooting from a motor vehicle (§ 26100, subd. (d), count 4), and possession of
a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1), count 5). The information alleged
a firearm enhancement under 12022.5, subdivision (a) in connection with
each of the first four counts. It was also alleged that Blackburn had
previously been convicted of burglary (§ 459), a serious felony constituting a
“strike” under the “Three Strikes” law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(j); 1170.12).

      B.    Evidence at Trial
            1.    Abdelhameed Ibrahim
      Ibrahim testified he was sitting in the passenger seat of a black2 car
being driven by Patterson. As they reached a stop sign near a hospital, he
heard between eight and ten gunshots coming from his left. He was struck
on his left arm and right wrist. He said the shots came from a “bright”
colored four-door car that had pulled up next to the driver’s side of
Patterson’s car. There was more than one person in the shooter’s car, and the

1     All further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2     Witnesses alternatively described the victims’ car as black, green, dark
green, or “dark colored.”

                                        3
person in the front passenger seat was shooting at Patterson’s car. The
shooter’s car drove off down the street.
      After the shooting, Ibrahim looked at Patterson in the driver’s seat and
asked him several questions, but Patterson only replied, “I don’t know, bro,”
to each question before falling over in his seat.3 The police arrived about a
minute later.

             2.   Detective Aaron Harrington
      Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) Detective Aaron Harrington
was one of the primary investigating officers. He interviewed Ibrahim after
the shooting at Martin Luther King Hospital. During the interview, Ibrahim
told him the gunshots came from the passenger seat of a white car with two
occupants.

             3.   Amadeo Sanchez Ayala
      Amadeo Sanchez Ayala (Ayala) lived near the intersection where the
shooting occurred. Ayala testified he was inside when the shots were fired
and came out to see what was going on. When he came outside, he saw a
white car stopped next to a black car. He said there were two people in each
car, and the passenger in the white car shot multiple times at the driver in
the black car. He observed the passenger in the white car was an African-
American male in his twenties with long hair. The white car drove away
after the shooting. Police officers showed him photographs of different
individuals, but he was unable to identify any of them as the shooter.

3     An autopsy revealed Patterson had been shot three times and died from
the resulting gunshot wounds.
                                       4
            4.    Officer Darryl Danaher
      LAPD Officer Darryl Danaher (Officer Danaher) was assigned to the
Southeast Division Camera Task Force, which monitors surveillance cameras
in housing developments in southeast Los Angeles, including Imperial
Courts. Officer Danaher looked at the recorded surveillance footage from the
time of the shooting. Surveillance footage from multiple cameras was played
for the jury and Officer Danaher testified as to the content of what was
displayed in the footage. The footage showed a dark sedan passing by a
group of people congregating in front of the Imperial Courts gymnasium
shortly before the shooting. As it passed, the individuals gathered around
the gymnasium started walking towards the car. Several of these people
then got into cars and drove off in the same direction as the sedan. One of
the vehicles was a white car with a male passenger dressed in black.

            5.    Sergeant Robert Martinez
      LAPD Sergeant Robert Martinez (Sergeant Martinez) was assigned to
gang enforcement detail in the Imperial Courts housing projects for four or
five years. Over that time, Imperial Courts was his primary assignment and
he was there daily. He became familiar with different members of the PJ
Watts Crips gang in that area, including Blackburn, who went by the
nickname “Dummy.” He testified members of the gang would congregate
outside the Imperial Courts gymnasium.
      After responding to the scene of the shooting, Sergeant Martinez
reviewed the surveillance footage from Imperial Courts. He said the footage
showed Patterson’s car briefly stop in front of the gymnasium before driving
away. An individual dressed in black then got out of a white car, walked
down the street in the direction of Patterson’s car, and re-entered the white

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car. He acknowledged the man in black was very far away from the camera,
but he stated there was a “high probability” that the footage depicted
Blackburn because the individual in the footage “fit the physical descriptions
of Mr. Blackburn” in terms of height, hairstyle, and stature. He was able to
identify other members of the gang from the footage based on his experience
in the area.
      Sergeant Martinez returned to Imperial Courts later that night and
spoke to Blackburn, who was wearing clothing that was identical to what
Sergeant Martinez had seen on the surveillance footage. Sergeant Martinez’s
body-worn camera captured this encounter with Blackburn, and the footage
was shown to the jury.

               6.   Ezekiel Gamboa
      Ezekiel Gamboa (Gamboa) is a convicted felon. About three days after
the shooting he was in police custody on a drug charge and asked to speak to
the police about the shooting. Detective Harrington interviewed Gamboa and
the video of that interview was played for the jury. In the interview, Gamboa
said one of his neighbors, Kevin Sanchez, was friends with the person who
did the killing. He said he was standing next to his neighbor while he spoke
to the killer using his speakerphone. He heard the killer confess to the
shooting during the phone call. The killer said he was in front of the
gymnasium before jumping in a car to pursue the victims. He told Detective
Harrington that the killer planned to leave for Las Vegas soon. He also said
he recognized the killer because they had known each other for more than ten
years and identified him by the nicknames “Chapo” and “Dummy.” Gamboa
knew the murder weapon was a .380 caliber pistol, which was information

                                       6
the police had not made public. He identified a photograph of Blackburn as
the killer.
      At trial, Gamboa testified he did not recall making the statements in
his interview because he was high on drugs when he made them. After the
initial interview, Gamboa stopped cooperating with the police. He was
detained and escorted to the preliminary hearing and trial. Gamboa also
tried to leave the courthouse before taking the stand to testify at trial and
was escorted back by Detective Harrington. On the stand, he acknowledged
that individuals who testify at trial are labeled as “snitches” who get “dealt
with” or “beat up.” He said these consequences are “automatic . . . once you
sit on the stand.”

              7.     Kevin Sanchez
      Kevin Sanchez (Sanchez) lived near the Imperial Courts housing
project for several years. He and Gamboa were next-door neighbors. They
saw each other nearly every day for over three to four years. Gamboa
claimed to be associated with the PJ Watts Crips. Sanchez said Blackburn
went by the nicknames “Dummy” and “El Chapo.”
      Sanchez was from the nearby Jordan Downs housing project and said
he had formerly been associated with a criminal street gang in that area
called the Southside Watts Varrio Grape. He said he had been physically
assaulted while living near Imperial Courts and felt people in the
neighborhood were trying to drive him out based on his affiliation with this
other gang. He testified that Blackburn interceded on his behalf to stop the
attacks against him.
      A day or two before the shooting, Sanchez saw Blackburn in the
neighborhood in the passenger seat of a white car. Police showed Sanchez a

                                       7
photograph of a white car and he said he thought it was the same car he had
seen Blackburn in before the shooting. The photo of the car came from
surveillance footage of the incident.
      Sanchez communicated with Blackburn through phone calls, text
messages, and Instagram messages. The night of the shooting or the next
day, Blackburn called Sanchez and told him, “I got into some shit,” and said
he needed to leave town and go to Las Vegas. Sanchez denied that Blackburn
ever said he had shot someone. Sanchez also said Gamboa was not with him
when this call occurred, but he told Gamboa about it afterward.
      Months after the shooting, Sanchez was shot on the porch outside his
house and thereafter moved to a different neighborhood out of fear that the
PJ Watts Crips were going to kill him.

            8.    Social Media Evidence
      Detective Harrington obtained a search warrant for Blackburn’s
Instagram account. “El Chapo” was one of the names associated with his
account. Right before the shooting, Blackburn sent a message saying he was
on his way to the area near the gymnasium at Imperial Courts. About an
hour after the shooting, Blackburn received a message on Instagram that
said, “what u on fool” and Blackburn responded, “gang shit.” About six days
after the shooting, Blackburn sent a message on Instagram saying he “got
into a jamb” and “had 2 chill out for a few days” but was otherwise fine. One
of the Instagram messages sent by Blackburn contained his phone number.

            9.    Cellular Phone Evidence
      Jeff Bennett (Bennett) worked for the Federal Bureau of Investigation
in the Cellular Analysis Survey Team. Using a technique called historical

                                         8
cell site analysis, Bennett was able to determine that Blackburn’s phone was
near the crime scene about 45 minutes before the shooting. The analysis also
indicated Blackburn’s phone moved away from the crime scene shortly after
the shooting. Bennett’s analysis showed that from the evening of March 11,
until the morning of March 13, Blackburn’s phone was identified in Las
Vegas.

            10.   Defense Evidence
      Blackburn’s counsel cross-examined the prosecution’s witnesses but
otherwise did not call any defense witnesses. Blackburn elected not to
testify.

      C.    Jury Examination
            1.    Juror No. 7
      On March 9, 2022, after both sides had rested, the court received a note
from the courtroom judicial assistant stating Juror No. 7 reported hearing
spectators associated with Blackburn calling out “not guilty” as he was
leaving the courthouse the previous day. The court informed counsel of the
note and advised it would hold Juror No. 7 back after dismissing the jury for
the day so the court and counsel could discuss the note with him.
      Juror No. 7 was examined outside the presence of the jury with a court
reporter present. He explained that as he was leaving the courthouse the
previous day he heard voices behind him calling out “not guilty” trying to get
his attention. He identified the speakers as two men who had been watching

                                      9
the proceedings in the courtroom that day.4 Juror No. 7 did not respond and
kept walking. He did not believe the men were trying to intimidate him and
told the court, “[W]ell, it could have been an intimidation thing or whatever.
But I wasn’t taking it like that.” He brought the issue up with the court
because at the lunch recess that afternoon he had been talking to an
attorney5 in the courthouse cafeteria, and that attorney told him that he
might want to inform the court of what had happened.
      The court asked Juror No. 7 if the encounter would impact his ability to
base his decision in this case only on the evidence he heard in the courtroom.
Juror No. 7 said he was “very, very certain” that he would be able to do so
and assured the court the encounter “would not cause me not to do my due
diligence here with you.” Counsel for Blackburn asked Juror No. 7 “Do you
feel okay safetywise?” Juror No. 7 answered, “Oh, yeah.” Counsel asked if
Juror No. 7 would hold the incident against Blackburn and Juror No. 7 said
that he would not.
      Counsel for the prosecution asked Juror No. 7 if he would allow
anything that happened outside of the courtroom to affect his decision about
the evidence and Juror No. 7 affirmed that he would not. When instructed by
the court not to discuss the event with the other jurors, Juror No. 7 stated he
had already done so, and indicated other jurors had interactions with a
female spectator who had been invading jurors’ space and walking unusually

4      These two men were never identified by name, and the nature of their
affiliation with Blackburn is not clear from the record. However, it appears
the court and counsel understood them to be supporters of Blackburn who
had come to watch his trial with some regularity.

5     The attorney was not identified, but Juror No. 7 made it clear he was
not one of the attorneys involved in this case.

                                      10
close to them in the hallways. This woman was later identified outside the
presence of the jury as Blackburn’s girlfriend, Tamera Russ (Russ).6 Juror
No. 7 also said he had previously noticed the same two men in the area where
the jury congregated in the hallway outside the courtroom.
      The court dismissed Juror No. 7 and discussed the matter with counsel,
stating they would poll each juror the next day and “go from there.”

             2.   Remaining Jurors
      On March 10, the court called each of the remaining eleven jurors
individually into chambers with counsel and with a court reporter present.
Each examination began with the court generally asking the jurors whether
they had witnessed any statements or conduct that made them feel
uncomfortable, such as individuals speaking to them about the case or
walking unusually close to them. What follows is a summary of each
examination.

                  a.     Juror No. 1
      Juror No. 1 stated she thought Russ may have taken a photograph
outside of the courtroom but did not know who she had photographed. Juror
No. 1 stated, “I’m a little leery,” but otherwise said she would be able to set
aside the incident. It would not impact her job as a juror, and she would
decide the case solely based on the evidence put before the jury in the
courtroom.

6     The jurors were not informed of Russ’s name or connection to
Blackburn. For the sake of clarity, we will use Russ’s name in summarizing
the reports of the jurors, though no juror identified her by name.
                                       11
                  b.     Juror No. 2
      At the beginning of questioning, Juror No. 2 stated she was feeling
“nervous,” and the court noted that she was “getting a little bit emotional
here.” Juror No. 2 informed the court that Russ had been walking very close
to her outside the courtroom during breaks in the trial. Russ would also walk
directly at her and force Juror No. 2 to move out of the way to avoid a
collision. At first, Juror No. 2 assumed Russ was simply distracted by her
phone and was not paying attention to where she was walking, but it
happened every day, and Juror No. 2 began to take note. She mentioned that
on three occasions she went into the courthouse restroom and noticed Russ
using the stall right next to her. Juror No. 2 also said she ate her lunch in
her car in the courthouse parking lot. On one occasion, Juror No. 2 noticed
Russ was parked right behind her. She did not know if Russ knew she was
parked in front of her. However, Juror No. 2 decided to wait until Russ left
the parking lot to get out of her car to return to court because she felt
uncomfortable.
      Juror No. 2 did not raise these issues with the court because she was
not sure if she was “being paranoid or overthinking it” and decided to just “let
it go.” She figured these incidents were unimportant because her job was to
base her decision on the evidence introduced in court and nothing else. She
initially did not talk about the spectators to any other jurors until the issue
came up the day before. Juror No. 2 indicated she understood Russ’s conduct
“has nothing to do with Mr. Blackburn” and stated, “I will not let that have
anything to do with my decision based on the facts and the evidence.”

                  c.     Juror No. 3
      Juror No. 3 did not have any incidents to report to the court.

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                  d.     Juror No. 4
      Juror No. 4 said the only time she felt uncomfortable was when the two
gentlemen identified by Juror No. 7 came towards the area where the jury
assembled in the hallway and started playing music on a phone while sitting
nearby. She was confused by their behavior and described it as “just
awkward” but stated they did not do anything “directly to me.” She said their
conduct would not influence her decision as a juror; she would decide the
facts only on the evidence presented in the courtroom. She also stated she
understood Blackburn and his counsel did not have anything to do with the
conduct of these two men.
      At one point Juror No. 4 indicated she was “very emotional” and stated,
“It’s too much.” She explained these feelings were not as a result of the
conduct she had witnessed from the two spectators. The case had caused
memories to resurface of a time when she was “falsely accused” of a crime as
a juvenile solely because of the clothing she had worn. She said she failed to
mention this experience during jury selection because she had blocked it out.
She assured the court this experience would not impact her ability to be
impartial, stating, “I need to set it aside which is what I said from the get-go.
I’m setting it aside. I’m saying that’s what’s making it hard. But we are
looking at all the evidence. That’s what I’m focusing on. I said that’s why I’m
emotional. It came back when I had blocked that out.”

                  e.     Juror No. 5
      Juror No. 5 heard from the other jurors of their own experiences but
had no personal contact with the spectators.

                                       13
                  f.     Juror No. 6
      Juror No. 6 saw Russ walking near Juror No. 11 in the hallway and
stated Russ “shouldered” Juror No. 11. Juror No. 6 described this as
“offensive body language” and “derogatory” but stated it was “not going to
affect me in any way.” Juror No. 6 understood the incident had nothing to do
with Blackburn.

                  g.     Juror No. 8
      Juror No. 8 witnessed the two male spectators in the vestibule taking
pictures of the interior of the courtroom after the jury had left for lunch.
Juror No. 8 stated the incident would not affect his ability to be a juror and
that he would decide the case based only on the evidence presented in the
courtroom. Juror No. 8 also agreed the spectators’ behavior had nothing to do
with Blackburn.

                  h.     Juror Nos. 9 and 10
      Jurors Nos. 9 and 10 had not observed anything unusual or any
conduct that made them uncomfortable.

                  i.     Juror No. 11
      Juror No. 11 corroborated Juror No. 4’s report that on one occasion, the
two male spectators had sat in the hall playing music, near the area where
the jury congregated. Juror No. 11 felt from their body language that they
were speaking to each other about the jurors and were playing music so no
one would hear what they were saying. She acknowledged there was also an
incident where Russ got close to her in the hallway, but contrary to Juror No.
6’s report, Juror No. 11 said Russ “accidentally just hit my bag. She didn’t

                                        14
really shoulder bump me but I thought it was my bag.” She said neither
incident would affect her ability to do her job as a juror and understood they
had nothing to do with Blackburn.

                  j.    Juror No. 12
      Juror No. 12 saw the two male spectators briefly enter the hallway
where the jurors gathered before leaving “right away.” Juror No. 12
indicated the incident would not prevent him from serving as a juror and
would not be considered when deciding the case.

      D.    Motion for Mistrial
      After the court completed its examination of the jurors, Blackburn’s
counsel made an oral motion for mistrial, arguing that while no single
incident reported by an individual juror required a mistrial, their
experiences, taken cumulatively, must have biased the jurors against
Blackburn. Alternatively, he requested jurors 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, and 11 be
excused, which would require a declaration of a mistrial as there were not
enough alternate jurors to replace them. The court denied the motion and
noted “each and every juror after [having been] asked several times indicated
it would have no influence on their role as a juror,” and that every juror had
stated “they could be fair and impartial on this case.”

      E.    Examination of Tamera Russ
      While the jury was deliberating, the court questioned Russ outside the
presence of the jury, with counsel present. Russ identified herself to the
court. The court noted it admonished all spectators, including Russ, to have
no contact with the jury or congregate near the jury in the courthouse

                                       15
hallway. The court advised Russ that several jurors had indicated Russ had
been brushing up against them in the hall or walking very close to them and
had potentially been photographing jurors. The court asked Russ to turn
over her phone so the court could examine it for photographs. Russ denied
photographing jurors but turned her phone over to the court.
         The court examined the phone but noted “I can’t tell how this is
organized.” The court concluded “[W]hile I did look at her phone, it was not
formatted in the type of phone that I’m used to as far as photos, but
everything that I saw had nothing to do with court. And I don’t know if it
was the proper file.”7 The court returned the phone to Russ and ordered her
to leave the courthouse for the remainder of the trial.

         F.    Verdict
         The jury returned a verdict finding Blackburn guilty on all five counts.
The jury also found true the allegations as to counts 1 through 4 that he used
a firearm under section 12022.5, subdivision (a). The court dismissed the
jury and scheduled a sentencing hearing and prior conviction (or “strike”)
trial.

         G.    Motion for New Trial
         After the jury rendered their verdict, Blackburn filed a motion for a
new trial alleging insufficient evidence under section 1181, subdivision (6)
and juror bias under subdivision (3). The court rejected both bases for the
motion. In its ruling, the court explained it found the jurors were credible in

7     At a subsequent hearing, the court noted Russ’s phone showed she had
been taking photographs in the courthouse and courtroom vestibule, but
these photos were self-portraits which did not include jurors.
                                         16
stating the conduct of Russ and the two male spectators would not impact
their ability to be fair and impartial in deciding the case: “I can’t be more
clear that the court inquired, looked at their demeanor, asked them
questions, how they felt and not one juror exhibited a feeling of fear for being
a juror on this case based on what they may have observed outside the
courtroom or from spectators in the courtroom. They voiced certain concerns,
but when follow-up questions were added, each and every one said yes,
perhaps they were misinterpreting, overexaggerating, et cetera. But at the
end of the day the court felt that each and every juror—the court was
satisfied they could perform their job.”
      The court also noted it was in the best position to judge the credibility
of the jurors and had made this determination “after seeing them in person,
not on the transcript, not trying to interpret what they meant on a transcript,
but being close to them in chambers with counsel asking them the questions,
making sure that they can still do their job in every day of this trial.”

      H.    Sentencing
      At the sentencing hearing on April 28, Blackburn admitted the prior
burglary conviction as a prior strike and waived any trial on this issue. On
the first count for first-degree murder, the court sentenced Blackburn to 25
years to life, which was doubled to 50 years to life due to the admitted prior
strike, and said the ten-year firearm enhancement under section 12022.5,
subdivision (a), was stayed or would run concurrently. On the second count
for attempted murder, Blackburn was sentenced to seven years, which was
doubled to 14 years because of the prior strike. Ten years were then added
for the section 12022.5 enhancement for a total sentence of 24 years to run
consecutive to his term under count 1. The court imposed additional prison

                                       17
terms for counts 3, 4, and 5, but ordered each of them stayed under section
654.

       I.   Appeal
       Blackburn filed a timely notice of appeal on April 28, 2022. On appeal,
Blackburn challenges the denial of his motion for mistrial, or alternatively, to
dismiss jurors 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, and 11. He also challenges the denial of his
motion for a new trial but only as to his claim of juror bias under section
1181, subdivision (3). Blackburn also alleges sentencing error, and the
parties agree remand for resentencing is appropriate.

                                 DISCUSSION
       A.   Legal Standards Governing Allegations of Juror Misconduct
       When a juror “shares improper information with other jurors, the event
is called juror misconduct.” (In re Hamilton (1999) 20 Cal.4th 273, 294
(Hamilton).) “Misconduct by a juror, or a nonjuror’s tampering contact or
communication with a sitting juror, usually raises a rebuttable ‘presumption’
of prejudice.” (Id. at p. 295.) “A sitting juror’s involuntary exposure to events
outside the trial evidence, even if not ‘misconduct’ in the pejorative sense,
may require similar examination for probable prejudice.” (Id. at pp. 294–
295.) However, “prejudice is not presumed when spectators misbehave
during trial; rather, the defendant must establish prejudice.” (People v.
Cornwell (2005) 37 Cal.4th 50, 88, disapproved on other grounds in People v.
Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22.)
       The actions taken by Russ and the two males, taken in isolation, would
constitute spectator misconduct which does not give rise to a presumption of
prejudice. However, it became clear during Juror No. 7’s examination that

                                       18
the jurors had discussed among themselves their own experiences with Russ
and the two males. By discussing these outside events among themselves,
the jurors shared improper information, which is misconduct giving rise to a
presumption of prejudice. (Hamilton, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 294.)
      This “presumption of prejudice is rebutted, and the verdict will not be
disturbed, if the entire record in the particular case, including the nature of
the misconduct or other event, and the surrounding circumstances, indicates
there is no reasonable probability of prejudice, i.e., no substantial likelihood
that one or more jurors were actually biased against the defendant.”
(Hamilton, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 296.) This test is a “pragmatic one” which
acknowledges it is “‘virtually impossible to shield jurors from every contact or
influence that might theoretically affect their vote’ [citation].” (Ibid.) The
entire record must be reviewed to determine whether there is a substantial
likelihood of bias, including “the nature of the juror’s conduct, the
circumstances under which the information was obtained, the instructions
the jury received, the nature of the evidence and issues at trial, and the
strength of the evidence against the defendant.” (In re Carpenter (1995) 9
Cal.4th 634, 654.) “‘[A] finding of “inherently” likely bias is required when,
but only when, the extraneous information was so prejudicial in context that
its erroneous introduction in the trial itself would have warranted reversal of
the judgment.’ [Citation.] Moreover, we do not reverse unanimous verdicts
because there is some possibility the juror was improperly influenced.”
(People v. Danks (2004) 32 Cal.4th 269, 305.)
      “As we have consistently stated in numerous contexts we generally
presume that jurors are capable of following, and do follow, the trial court’s
instructions.” (People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335,
447.) As a result, courts have held this presumption of prejudice may also be

                                       19
rebutted through admonitions or instructions given by the court. (See, e.g.,
People v. Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 927 [admonition to the jury was
sufficient to rebut the presumption of prejudice arising from juror’s
misconduct, disapproved on other grounds by People v. Williams (2010) 49
Cal.4th 405, 459; People v. Craig (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 905, 919 (Craig)
[immediate admonishment cured potential prejudice]; People v. Harper (1986)
186 Cal.App.3d 1420, 1426–1430 [prompt admonition not to consider
extraneous material rebutted the presumption of prejudice].)

      B.    Motion for Mistrial
      “A mistrial should be granted if the court is apprised of prejudice that it
judges incurable by admonition or instruction. Whether a particular incident
is incurably prejudicial is by its nature a speculative matter, and the trial
court is vested with considerable discretion in ruling on mistrial motions.”
(People v. Dalton (2019) 7 Cal.5th 166, 240, internal citation and quotation
marks omitted.) On appeal, the determination of whether jury misconduct
was prejudicial presents a mixed question of law and fact “‘subject to an
appellate court’s independent determination.’” (People v. Danks, supra, 32
Cal.4th at p. 303.) “We accept the trial court’s factual findings and credibility
determinations if supported by substantial evidence.” (People v. Tafoya
(2007) 42 Cal.4th 147, 192.)
      The totality of the circumstances convinces us there was no substantial
likelihood that the jury was prejudiced against Blackburn. It bears repeating
that the only misconduct by the jury was in discussing the conduct of the
spectators. The record before us does not suggest the jury discussed this
conduct as a basis for determining Blackburn’s guilt, but rather because the
conduct of Russ and the two unidentified men was so de minimis that the

                                       20
jurors were unsure it rose to the level of improper conduct or if they were
reading too much into vague albeit unusual behavior on the part of these
spectators.
      We note the jurors did not conceal these discussions from the court.
Juror No. 7 readily admitted he had already discussed the incident with
fellow jurors and volunteered the other discussions the jurors had without
prompting from the court. All of the jurors were examined by the court with
counsel present, and all agreed these events were not attributable to
Blackburn, that Blackburn had no control over the conduct of these
individuals, and the behavior would not impact their determination of
Blackburn’s guilt or innocence. The trial court was in the best position to
judge the credibility of the jurors. On review we defer to the trial court’s
credibility determinations on such issues when they are supported by
substantial evidence. In this instance, the court’s credibility determinations
were supported by substantial evidence in the form of the assurances
provided by each juror during the court’s examination. (People v. Harris
(2008) 43 Cal.4th 1269, 1305 [a juror’s “emphatic and repeated assurances” of
impartiality are “substantial evidence” supporting a trial court’s credibility
determination].)
      Important here, the court immediately took curative action as soon as it
became aware of the potential misconduct. It examined each juror in
chambers with counsel and a court reporter present to make a record.
During its investigation, the court expressly reminded the jurors the actions
of the spectators could not be attributed to Blackburn and that Blackburn
had no control over them. The jurors clearly and unequivocally indicated
they understood this distinction. The court also admonished the jury not to
consider these events in deliberating on the charges against Blackburn, and

                                       21
the jurors agreed the circumstances would not prevent them from deciding
the case based only on the evidence introduced at trial and the instructions
on the law from the court. “[T]he court’s immediate admonition, along with
the jury’s negative response sufficiently shows nonprejudice. Any misconduct
being sufficiently cured, there was no error in denying a motion for mistrial.”
(Craig, supra, 86 Cal.App.3d at p. 919.)
      Whether it is analyzed as juror misconduct or spectator misconduct, the
actions at issue here fall well below the level of conduct which has been held
insufficient to create a substantial likelihood of prejudice. In Hamilton, a
juror witnessed the defendant’s sister and her boyfriend parked in the alley
outside her house in the evening after trial. (Hamilton, supra, 20 Cal.4th at
p. 304.) The two sped away when they saw the juror. The juror did not
report the incident to the court but called her friend, who worked as a police
dispatcher, to request increased police patrols near her home. (Ibid.) The
juror admitted she was afraid of the defendant’s family, including his sister,
and that “other jurors had expressed such concerns among themselves.” (Id.
at p. 287.) The juror “avoided going to the courthouse restroom alone, and
jurors tended to band together to walk to the parking lot.” (Ibid.) The
California Supreme Court found that under the totality of these
circumstances, there was “no substantial likelihood” that the incident caused
the juror to develop actual bias against the defendant. (Id. at p. 306.)
      In People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395 “some supporters of defendant
were following or ‘shadowing’ the jurors during breaks in their deliberations,
while others, including his mother, were clustering near the jury while it was
assembling on breaks.” (Id. at p. 480.) A juror told the bailiff “she felt
intimidated by the presence of defendant’s supporters, particularly his
mother. The bailiff noted that he had also overheard a male juror express

                                       22
relief that the jury no longer had to assemble ‘on the sixth floor,’ presumably
to avoid contact with defendant’s supporters.” (Ibid.) The California
Supreme Court nonetheless found no evidence of bias or prejudice by the
jurors, finding “There is no evidence the jury was biased against defendant,
his mother, or his supporters, much less that such bias infected its
deliberations. . . . The jurors’ understandable concern does not amount to
misconduct, and there is nothing on the record to support defendant’s claim
that he was denied an impartial jury.” (Ibid.)
      In Brown v. Terhune (N.D. Cal. 2001) 158 F.Supp.2d 1050, a trial
observer had entered an elevator with several jurors and told them, “‘You
better not convict an innocent man. You better not convict an innocent
man.’” (Id. at p. 1081.) The district court rejected a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus based, in part, on this incident. The court noted the California
appellate court had properly determined any potential prejudice was cured by
the trial court’s admonition to the jury, even in the absence of any
evidentiary hearing or investigation into bias by the court. (Id. at pp. 1081–
1082.)
      In People v. Currie (1934) 3 Cal.App.2d 31, a witness accosted two
jurors during a break in trial and pleaded with them to find defendant guilty,
saying she was a widow and had lost all her money because of defendant’s
false representations. (Id. at p. 33.) The court learned of the incident before
the case was submitted to the jury but did not admonish the jurors to
disregard the remarks in deciding the case. (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal
affirmed the denial of defendant’s motion for new trial, holding that, while
the judge should have admonished the jury, it could not say the verdict was
the result of prejudice. (Id. at p. 34.)

                                           23
      Blackburn assigns undue importance to the events reported by the
jury. He claims the spectator’s conduct made the jurors feel intimidated or
fearful. These characterizations are wholly speculative and unsupported by
the record. None of the jurors stated they were afraid of Blackburn or that
the incidents with Russ and the two men made them feel intimidated. The
juror who had the most contact with the spectators, Juror No. 7, expressly
stated he did not feel they were trying to intimidate the jury and said he did
not have any concerns about his safety.
      While the record indicates Juror No. 2 was “emotional” and “nervous”
during her examination by the court, it is unclear from the record what,
precisely, she was nervous about. She could have been referring to the
general stress of being a juror in a murder trial, or she could have been
describing the anxiety of being called into chambers for a transcribed
interrogation with the court and two attorneys. Neither the court,
prosecution, nor Blackburn’s counsel felt it necessary to interrogate the
meaning or cause of her nervousness, and Juror No. 2 ultimately stated she
would not let the spectators’ conduct influence her deliberations. As we have
stated, the trial court was in the best position to judge Juror No. 2’s
credibility in making this statement, and its determination that she was
credible is supported by substantial evidence in the form of her assurances of
impartiality. The record does not support the conclusion that she harbored a
hidden bias against Blackburn.
      Juror No. 1 stated she was “leery” of the situation. This indicates
suspicion, not fear. The record indicates the spectators acted in an unusual
and inappropriate manner, and the jurors and court were right to be
suspicious of their conduct. The record before us does not permit the

                                       24
conclusion that this suspicion was attributable to bias against Blackburn or
that there was a substantial likelihood the jury was prejudiced against him.
      Blackburn argues the jury was biased against him because it was
aware of his gang connections. Blackburn contends that because the
evidence introduced at trial indicated he was in a gang, the jurors all
assumed that Russ and two male spectators were associated with a gang as
well, and must have understood their conduct as attempts to threaten or
intimidate them. This too is unsupported by the record. The jury did not act
in a way that indicated they were intimidated or fearful. They voted to
convict Blackburn, which itself is incompatible with the notion that they felt
scared of Blackburn or his associates. None of the jurors made any reference
to gangs or Blackburn’s gang affiliation in their examinations in chambers.
None of the jurors indicated they felt scared or intimidated.
      In the absence of any overt statements or actions even suggesting such
juror bias, Blackburn in essence argues that we must assume a jury is
irrefutably prejudiced against any defendant who has connections to a gang.
If we were to accept Blackburn’s reasoning, a gang member could effectively
avoid any criminal conviction by simply testifying that he or she was a
member of a gang and having associates make contact with the jury. Under
Blackburn’s reasoning, the court in such a situation would be forced to find
this knowledge had irrevocably prejudiced the jury against the defendant and
declare a mistrial. We decline Blackburn’s invitation to immunize gang
members from criminal prosecution in this manner.
      For this precise reason, the California Supreme Court has noted it
remains an open question as to whether such misconduct can ever be grounds
for relief: “[W]e question whether a convicted person can ever overturn the
verdict on grounds that persons acting in his behalf deliberately sought to

                                      25
influence the jury. Certainly no such claim could ever be valid where the
accused himself had instigated the incident; a party cannot profit by his or
her own wrongdoing. But even where, as here, there is no evidence petitioner
was directly involved, recognition of such a claim suggests tempting
opportunities for accuseds’ allies to manufacture challenges against
subsequent convictions.” (Hamilton, 20 Cal.4th at p. 305.) Ultimately, we
need not resolve this question as we find the jurors’ unequivocal assurances
and the trial court’s admonitions and instructions rebut any potential
prejudice flowing from the actions of the spectators.
      Finally, Blackburn argues that even if no individual instance of
misconduct was sufficient to show bias or prejudice, the cumulative effect of
the spectators’ conduct must have influenced the jury. We reject this
contention. “We likewise hold the cumulative effect of claimed juror and
spectator misconduct insufficient to constitute a denial of a fair trial. There
simply was no showing of prejudice, other than by speculation of defense
counsel, which speculation was easily overcome by the actions of the trial
court.” (Craig, supra, 86 Cal.App.3d at p. 920.)
      On these facts, we find no substantial likelihood that the jury’s verdict
was the result of bias against Blackburn and affirm the trial court’s denial of
his motion for a mistrial.

      C.    Motion for New Trial
      “[A] new trial will not be granted simply because remarks were made
during the trial to jurors, or within range of their hearing, by strangers to the
litigation, where neither the successful party nor the jurors were at fault,
unless such remarks probably influenced the verdict.” (People v. Slocum
(1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 867, 884.) While “[c]ourts have stressed the particular

                                       26
need for independent review of the trial court’s reasons for denying a new
trial motion in juror bias cases,” this rule has not been consistently applied
and some modern authorities suggest a deferential abuse of discretion
standard applies instead. (People v. Ault (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1250, 1262 and fn.
7 [collecting cases].) We do not need to resolve this question, as we find the
trial court’s denial of Blackburn’s motion for a new trial would be affirmed
under an independent review standard.
      Section 1181 sets forth various grounds on which a motion for a new
trial may be made. Section 1181, subdivision (3) provides a new trial may be
granted “[w]hen the jury has separated without leave of the court after
retiring to deliberate upon their verdict, or been guilty of any misconduct by
which a fair and due consideration of the case has been prevented.”
Subdivision (6) allows for a new trial where the “verdict or finding is contrary
to law or evidence.” Blackburn’s motion below asserted both bases for relief.
On appeal, Blackburn only challenges the trial court’s denial of the motion
under subdivision (3).
      Blackburn concedes the motion for a new trial under section 1181,
subdivision (3) is based on the same grounds and arguments as his motion for
a mistrial. However, in his briefing on this motion, Blackburn raises two
additional arguments we have not already addressed in connection with his
motion for mistrial: (1) the jury must have been biased against him because it
returned a guilty verdict within a few hours of deliberation, and (2) the
evidence presented by the prosecution did not dispositively prove Blackburn
was the shooter. In other words, Blackburn argues the evidence was not
strong enough to support such a short deliberation, and the short deliberation
must instead be attributed to jury prejudice. We reject this claim.

                                       27
      There was no footage of the shooting itself, nor were there any
eyewitnesses who identified Blackburn as the shooter. The evidence
presented by the prosecution was circumstantial, but it was not so weak as to
suggest bias had any role in the jury’s verdict. There was ample evidence
pointing to Blackburn as the shooter. While the interview of Gamboa and
testimony of Sanchez raised credibility issues, each was corroborated to some
extent by the social media and cellphone evidence presented by the
prosecution, which showed Blackburn was in the area at the time of the
shooting and shortly thereafter went to Las Vegas. Gamboa was also able to
correctly identify the caliber of handgun used in the shooting, even though
that was not public information. Even if the quality of the surveillance
footage did not allow for a dispositive identification of Blackburn as the
individual who entered the passenger seat of the white car, it was not
unreasonable for the jury to credit Sergeant Martinez’s identification of
Blackburn based on his many years of interactions with him. This
identification was also corroborated by the cellular phone analysis, which
showed Blackburn was in the area at that time. There was also the
testimony of Alaya, who stated the shots came from the passenger seat of the
white car and offered a description of the shooter which was consistent with
Sergeant Martinez’s identification of Blackburn.
      Even upon an independent review, we find this circumstantial evidence
was sufficient to support a guilty verdict after only a few hours of
deliberation and do not find any basis to conclude it was the result of juror
bias or prejudice against Blackburn. For these reasons, we affirm the trial
court’s denial of Blackburn’s motion for a new trial under section 1181,
subdivision (3).

                                       28
      D.    Sentencing Error
      The parties agree the trial court committed sentencing error and that
remand for resentencing is appropriate, though they disagree as to what
those errors were. We agree remand for resentencing is appropriate.

            1.     Counts 3 and 4
      At the April 28, 2022, sentencing hearing, the court issued the
following sentences on count 3 (shooting at an occupied motor vehicle) and
count 4 (shooting from a motor vehicle): “As to count 3, that 20 years is
imposed and stayed pursuant to 654 of the Penal Code. [¶] Same thing with
count 4. Fourteen years is imposed and stayed pursuant to Penal Code
section 654.” The record does not indicate how the trial court arrived at the
20- and 14-year sentences on these counts, but it appears the court adopted
the proposals in the prosecution’s sentencing memorandum. The sentencing
memorandum proposed a middle term of five years on count 3, which was
doubled to ten years for the prior strike, with an additional ten years imposed
for the firearm enhancement under section 12022.5, subdivision (a), for a
total sentence of 20 years. As to count 4, the sentencing memorandum
proposed the middle term of two years, doubled to four years for the prior
strike, with an additional ten years imposed for the firearm enhancement
under section 12022.5, subdivision (a), for a total of 14 years.
      Subject to exceptions that are not applicable here, a section 12022.5,
subdivision (a) “enhancement does not apply if firearm use is an element of
the underlying offense.” (People v. Kramer (2002) 29 Cal.4th 720, 723, fn. 2.)
Firearm use is an element of both count 3 and count 4. (§ 246 [“Any person
who shall maliciously and willfully discharge a firearm at an . . . occupied
motor vehicle . . . is guilty of a felony”]; § 26100, subd. (d) [“any person who

                                        29
willfully and maliciously discharges a firearm from a motor vehicle is guilty
of a public offense”].) The trial court thus erred in imposing ten-year firearm
enhancements on counts 3 and 4 under section 12022.5, subdivision (a).

            2.    Count 1
      On count 1 (murder), the trial court sentenced Blackburn to 25 years to
life, which was doubled to 50 years to life due to the prior strike. The court
also imposed a ten-year enhancement under section 12022.5, subdivision (a).
Initially, the court indicated the ten-year enhancement would run
concurrently with the sentence of 50 years to life, then later stated it was
staying the enhancement under section 12022.5.
      By its express terms, section 12022.5, subdivision (a) provides for “an
additional and consecutive term of imprisonment” and does not permit a
court to impose this enhancement concurrently. Section 12022.5, subdivision
(c) gives the court the discretion to “strike or dismiss an enhancement
otherwise required to be imposed by this section” in the interest of justice.
(§ 12022.5, subd. (c).) Read together, subdivisions (a) and (c) gave the court
the option of imposing a consecutive term on the enhancement or exercising
its discretion to dismiss or strike it. However, the trial court could not stay
the enhancement or impose it concurrently. (People v. Lopez (2004) 119
Cal.App.4th 355, 364 [“[t]he trial court has no authority to stay an
enhancement, rather than strike it . . . when the only basis for doing either is
its own discretionary sense of justice”].) We conclude the trial court erred in
its sentencing on count 1 by attempting to stay the section 12022.5
enhancement or impose it concurrently.

                                       30
            3.    Count 5
      It also appears the trial court may have erred in imposing its sentence
on count 5 for possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)). At
Blackburn’s sentencing hearing, the court imposed a sentence of six years on
count 5, which it then stayed under section 654. In imposing this sentence,
the trial court did not explain how it arrived at this term. A violation of
section 29800 is punishable by a term of imprisonment of 16 months, two
years, or three years.8 (§§ 29800; 18, subd. (a).)
      The prosecution’s sentencing memorandum proposed a term of six
years on count 5, though this was the result of a mathematical error. The
memorandum proposed the middle term of two years, which then would be
doubled due to Blackburn’s prior strike. However, it mistakenly calculated
this would result in a total sentence of six years rather than four years.
Alternatively, the court could have correctly imposed the upper term of three
years on this count, which would then be doubled to six years for the prior
strike.
      We cannot determine on the record before us whether the court
intended to impose a sentence on the upper term of count 5, or if it
mistakenly adopted the mathematical error contained in the prosecution’s
sentencing memorandum. As it appears the court followed the prosecution’s
sentencing memorandum on counts 3 and 4, we cannot discount the
possibility that the court similarly followed the memorandum in issuing the
sentence on count 5 and mistakenly adopted the prosecution’s mathematical

8     The minute order issued after the sentencing hearing conflicts with the
sentence as announced by the court at the April 28 hearing. Rather than a
term of six years, the order reflects a sentence of 16 months on count 5, which
was calculated as one-third of the middle term of two years—or 8 months—
which was then doubled to 16 months due to the prior strike.
                                       31
error. Because we find remand for resentencing is appropriate due to the
errors concerning counts 1, 3, and 4, we need not determine whether the
sentence on count 5 was the result of error.

            4.     Remand is Appropriate
      As we have found the trial court erred in imposing its sentences on
counts 1, 3, and 4, we vacate Blackburn’s sentence and remand for
resentencing as requested by both sides. Given the need for resentencing, we
decline to reach Blackburn’s remaining claims of sentencing error. On
remand, Blackburn may raise these issues before the trial court. (People v.
Valenzuela (2019) 7 Cal.5th 415, 424–425 [“the full resentencing rule allows a
[trial] court to revisit all prior sentencing decisions when resentencing a
defendant”]; People v. Ramirez (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 55, 64; accord, People v.
Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893.)

                                DISPOSITION
      We affirm the trial court’s rulings on Blackburn’s motions for a mistrial
and new trial. We also vacate Blackburn’s sentence and remand this matter
to the trial court for resentencing.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                            ZUKIN, J.

      WE CONCUR:

      CURREY, P. J.                         MORI, J.

                                       32