Court Opinion

ID: 9401303
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-12 18:00:47.198284+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:51.953820
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-30761      Document: 00516782736         Page: 1     Date Filed: 06/12/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                         United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                  Fifth Circuit

                                                                                FILED
                                                                            June 12, 2023
                                   No. 21-30761                            Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                Clerk

   Lynn Barrosse; Raegan Holloway; Makenzie Stricker,

                                                            Plaintiffs—Appellants,

                                       versus

   Huntington Ingalls, Incorporated, formerly known as
   Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding, Incorporated, formerly
   known as Northrop Grumman Ship Systems, Incorporated,
   formerly known as Avondale Industries, Incorporated,

                                                            Defendant—Appellee.

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Eastern District of Louisiana
                           USDC No. 2:20-CV-2042

   Before Richman, Chief Judge, and Ho and Engelhardt, Circuit
   Judges.
   Kurt D. Engelhardt, Circuit Judge:
          Federal law is the “supreme Law of the Land.” U.S. Const. art.
   VI. When a state law looks like it might conflict with a federal statute or
   regulation, courts consider preemption to see if the state law in question must
   yield. Perry v. Mercedes Benz of N. Am., Inc., 957 F.2d 1257, 1261 (5th Cir.
   1992). Here, Defendant-Appellee argues that Plaintiffs-Appellants’ state-law
   tort claims are preempted by the federal Longshore and Harbor Workers’

                                          1
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                                         No. 21-30761

   Compensation Act (“LHWCA” or “the Act”). But, under the specific facts
   of this case and applicable Supreme Court caselaw, they are not. We
   therefore REVERSE and REMAND.
                                               I
                                               A
           Ronald Barrosse1 worked for Defendant-Appellee Huntington Ingalls
   (formerly “Avondale”) as a shipyard electrician from February 1969 to June
   1977. In March 2020, Barrosse was diagnosed with mesothelioma. Following
   his diagnosis, he filed a state-law tort suit in the Civil District Court for the
   Parish of Orleans alleging that Avondale, among other defendants, caused
   Barrosse to contract mesothelioma by exposing him to asbestos in a negligent
   manner. Because Barrosse primarily worked on United States Navy ships
   when he was exposed, Avondale removed the case to federal district court
   under the federal officer removal statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1442; Latiolais v.
   Huntington Ingalls, Inc., 951 F.3d 286, 296 (5th Cir. 2020) (en banc). Barrosse
   never claimed benefits under the LHWCA, which provides a no-fault
   compensation remedy to injured workers. 33 U.S.C. § 904.
           Avondale moved for summary judgment. Relevant here, Avondale
   argued that Barrosse’s state-law tort claims were preempted by the
   LHWCA because they directly conflicted with and frustrated the purposes
   of the Act. The district court agreed and held that the claims are preempted.
   Barrosse v. Huntington Ingalls Inc., 563 F. Supp. 3d 541, 559 (E.D. La. 2021).
   Barrosse appeals.

           1
             Barrosse unfortunately passed away mid-litigation, so his survivors substituted
   themselves as Plaintiffs-Appellants. To avoid confusion, they will collectively be referred
   to herein as “Barrosse.”

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                                                B
           While cases about statutes typically begin with the text, recounting the
   development of federal maritime compensation law is necessary to
   understand the nuances presented in this case. In 1917, the Supreme Court
   “declared that States were constitutionally barred from applying their
   compensation systems to maritime injuries.” Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylvania,
   447 U.S. 715, 717 (1980) (citing S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917)).
   After failed efforts to delegate compensation matters to the states, Congress
   passed the LHWCA in 1927 to provide compensation for maritime workers.
   Id. The original LHWCA expressly limited its application to those cases
   where state worker’s compensation laws did not apply. Id. at 717–18.
           But that limited application caused problems because it was unclear
   where “the boundary at which state remedies gave way to federal remedies”
   was. Id. at 718. Injured workers had to guess whether to file a claim under
   state or federal law, and “the price of error was unnecessary expense and
   possible foreclosure from the proper forum.” Id. The Supreme Court
   responded with the creation of the so-called “twilight zone,” an area of
   concurrent jurisdiction that applies on a case-by-case basis. Id. (discussing
   Davis v. Dep’t of Labor, 317 U.S. 249, 253–56 (1942)).2 Notably, it did so over
   a strong dissent which argued that the plain language of the Act “left no room
   for an overlapping dual system” of concurrent jurisdiction. Davis, 317 U.S.
   at 261 (Stone, C.J., dissenting). According to the dissent, the majority
   interpreted the LHWCA to “not mean what it says”—that “[i]f there is
   liability under the federal act, that liability is exclusive.” Id.

           2
             The district court noted that “there appears to be no genuine [dispute] of material
   fact that this is a twilight zone case,” and the parties do not contest that conclusion on
   appeal. Barrosse, 563 F. Supp. 3d at 556.

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           Nevertheless, the twilight zone prevailed. Among other cases, the
   Supreme Court decided Hahn v. Ross Island Sand & Gravel Co., 358 U.S. 272,
   273 (1959) (per curiam). In Hahn, the plaintiff brought a state-law tort claim.
   Id. Because the plaintiff was in the twilight zone and compensation “could
   have been, and in fact was, validly provided by [s]tate law,”3 the LHWCA
   “did not bar” the claim. Id. (quotation marks omitted). Like Davis, Hahn was
   decided over a dissent which argued that the twilight zone’s regime of
   concurrent jurisdiction extended only to “a state workmen’s compensation
   act or the [LHWCA],” and not to torts. Id. at 274 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
           “In 1972, Congress . . . extend[ed] the LHWCA landward beyond the
   shoreline of the navigable waters of the United States.” Sun Ship, 447 U.S.
   at 719. Rather than “resurrecting the jurisdictional monstrosity” of pre-
   Davis longshore compensation law, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
   twilight zone because it remained unclear where federal jurisdiction ended
   and state jurisdiction began, even though that point “is fixed upon land.” Id.
   at 719–20. The upshot is that despite the text of the Act expressly providing
   that employer liability for injuries falling under its ambit is “exclusive and in
   place of all other liability of such employer to the employee . . . at law or in
   admiralty,” the Supreme Court has limited that exclusivity to cases outside
   the so-called twilight zone. 33 U.S.C. § 905(a).

           3
              This particular phrase is in reference to the pre-1972 version of the LHWCA,
   which extended LHWCA coverage only if the state does not—and could not—validly
   provide recovery. See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Dep’t of Labor, 583 F.2d
   1273, 1277 (4th Cir. 1978) (discussing the language and its subsequent removal). The
   district court held that the post-1972 version of the LHWCA applies here, and Barrosse
   does not challenge that holding on appeal. Barrosse, 563 F. Supp. 3d at 548–52.

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                                                C
           The pertinent development of Louisiana compensation law is shorter,
   but just as relevant in this case of concurrent jurisdiction. Louisiana passed
   the applicable version of its Workers’ Compensation Act (“WCA”) in 1952.
   See La. Rev. Stat. § 23:1031.1 (1952). Like most workers’ compensation
   statutes, the WCA gave an injured worker a remedy that was “exclusive of
   all other rights and remedies.” Id. The pertinent portion of the statute took
   a schedule approach, only covering the diseases listed in the statutory text.
   See Rando v. Anco Insulations Inc., 16 So. 3d 1065, 1072–73 (La. 2009). If a
   disease was not listed, an afflicted worker could only bring a tort suit as
   neither the compensation nor the exclusivity provisions of the WCA applied.
   Id. at 1071.
           Barrosse is one of those workers. Mesothelioma, the disease Barrosse
   suffered from, was not covered by the WCA until it was amended in 1975.
   Id.; see Williams v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 990 F.3d 852, 864 (5th Cir. 2021).
   When survivors of a decedent bring state-law claims “based on asbestos
   exposure,” we apply “the law in effect when the exposure occurred.” Savoie
   v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc., 817 F.3d 457, 464 (5th Cir. 2016), overruled on other
   grounds Latiolais, 951 F.3d at 296 n.9.4 Barrosse’s claims are based on alleged
   exposure, as mesothelioma injuries in Louisiana are deemed to occur “at the
   time of significant exposure to asbestos, not later when [the] disease . . .
   manifest[s] itself.” Rando, 16 So. 3d at 1083; see Williams, 990 F.3d at 865.
   Barrosse claims that his significant exposure first occurred vis-à-vis Avondale
   in 1969. Thus, the applicable version of the WCA does not cover the injury

           4
             We do not address the district court’s interpretation of Savoie or its holding that
   the post-1972 LHWCA applies to this dispute. Those issues are not presented here.

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   he suffered. See Rando, 16 So. 3d at 1071.5 As a result, Barrosse’s only state-
   law remedy is a tort suit. Id.
           The upshot of these parallel events and their timing6 is that once
   Barrosse discovered his injury, he could seek relief under either the LHWCA
   or state tort law.7 The question presented in this case is whether state tort law

           5
             The plaintiff in Rando was injured in 1970, but the 1952 WCA applied. Rando, 16
   So. 3d at 1072.
           6
               Condensing these developments, the following timeline emerges:
           • 1927: Congress passes the LHWCA, providing workers’ compensation
           remedies to maritime workers.
           • 1942: The Supreme Court decides Davis, creating a regime of concurrent
           jurisdiction in twilight zone cases.
           • 1952: Louisiana passes the applicable version of the WCA, which neither covers
           mesothelioma nor prohibits tort claims based on mesothelioma injuries.
           • 1959: The Supreme Court decides Hahn, permitting a state-law tort claim in a
           twilight zone case when that tort claim was included in the state-law regime.
           • 1969: Barrosse begins working for Avondale and suffers injury in the twilight zone
           for purposes of his present claims.
           • 1972: Congress amends the LHWCA, expanding its coverage landward.
           • 1975: Louisiana amends the WCA to cover mesothelioma injuries.
           • 1980: The Supreme Court decides Sun Ship, reaffirming Davis and its twilight-
           zone progeny after the 1972 LHWCA amendment.
           • 2020: Barrosse is diagnosed with mesothelioma and brings this suit.
           7
             We do not address whether a plaintiff who brings a tort claim could subsequently
   obtain relief under the LHWCA. On at least one occasion, the Supreme Court has
   sanctioned LHWCA compensation after the beneficiary received state-law compensation,
   but only when the state payments were credited against LHWCA relief. See Calbeck v.
   Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114, 131 (1962) (upholding compensation payments under both
   the LHWCA and state law where the state payments were credited against the LHWCA
   payments so “no impermissible double recovery [wa]s possible”). Whether that holding
   extends to tort remedies is a question we leave for another day.

                                                6
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                                     No. 21-30761

   is preempted by the LHWCA in the twilight zone under those
   circumstances.
                                          II
          We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo
   and affirm if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
   movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a);
   Renfroe v. Parker, 974 F.3d 594, 599 (5th Cir. 2020). Here, the sole issue is
   preemption, which “is a question of law.” Baker v. Farmers Elec. Co-op., Inc.,
   34 F.3d 274, 278 (5th Cir. 1994). “Preemption of state law may be the result
   of either express preemption, field preemption, or conflict preemption.”
   Wright v. Allstate Ins. Co., 415 F.3d 384, 389 (5th Cir. 2005).
          Express preemption applies “[w]here Congress expresses an explicit
   intent to preempt state law.” Hetzel v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 50 F.3d 360, 363
   (5th Cir. 1995). “Conflict preemption applies (1) where complying with both
   federal law and state law is impossible; or (2) where the state law creates an
   unacceptable obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
   purposes and objectives of Congress.” Janvey v. Democratic Senatorial
   Campaign Comm., Inc., 712 F.3d 185, 200 (5th Cir. 2013) (quotation omitted).
   Courts may not conduct “a freewheeling judicial inquiry into whether a state
   statute is in tension with federal objectives [because] such an endeavor would
   undercut the principle that it is Congress rather than the courts that pre-
   empts state law.” Chamber of Com. v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 607 (2011)
   (quotation omitted). For a state law to be conflict preempted, “a high
   threshold must be met.” Id. (quotation omitted).
                                         III
          Avondale argues that both express and conflict preemption bar
   Barrosse’s claims.

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                                             A
          Express preemption does not apply. There is no dispute that this is a
   twilight zone case. Id. at 556. In the twilight zone, “although the LHWCA’s
   exclusivity language would seem to express congressional intent to preempt
   state law, the Supreme Court has found that total preemption was not
   intended.” Hetzel, 50 F.3d at 363.8 Thus, despite the clear proclamation of
   exclusivity in the LHWCA’s text that prohibits any liability “at law or in
   admiralty” for injuries covered by the Act, there is no express preemption
   here. 33 U.S.C. § 905(a).
          Fundamental tension between the plain text of the Act and twilight-
   zone concurrent jurisdiction has been apparent and controversial from the
   very beginning. Indeed, Davis itself created the twilight zone over a dissent
   which argued that the twilight zone “is plainly not permissible” and
   “controverts the words of the statute,” which “left no room for an
   overlapping dual system” of concurrent jurisdiction. Davis, 317 U.S. at 261–
   64 (Stone, C.J., dissenting). Avondale would have us agree, but a dissent is
   just that. Perhaps time and Supreme Court reconsideration will ultimately
   conclude that the twilight zone’s creation was beyond “judicial
   competence,” id. at 260, but until then, there is no express preemption in the
   twilight zone. Hetzel, 50 F.3d at 363.
                                             B
          Neither does conflict preemption apply under these circumstances.
   The Supreme Court has recognized that LHWCA remedies exist

          8
              It is apparent from context that the Hetzel panel was discussing express
   preemption despite using the phrase “total preemption.” See Hetzel, 50 F.3d at 363. We
   clarify this point only to ensure that Hetzel’s imprecise language is not confused with
   “complete” preemption, an entirely different doctrine. See Mitchell v. Advanced HCS,
   L.L.C., 28 F.4th 580, 585 n.2 (5th Cir. 2022).

                                             8
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   concurrently with state-law remedies, including at least some state-law tort
   claims, in the twilight zone. Consistent with that binding recognition, we
   cannot find that the limited and unusual circumstances that gave rise to
   Barrosse’s state-law tort claims pose “an unacceptable obstacle to the
   accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
   Congress.” Janvey, 712 F.3d at 200. A contrary holding would, at least as far
   as Barrosse and similarly situated plaintiffs are concerned, have the LHWCA
   “supplant” rather than “supplement” state law by effectively eliminating
   the twilight zone and contradicting the Supreme Court’s instruction in Sun
   Ship, 447 U.S. at 720. Indeed, Avondale concedes that if Barrosse’s claims
   are preempted, his “exclusive remedy for any injury he suffered working for
   Avondale was—and is—available under the LHWCA.” State law is nowhere
   to be found.
           We begin our analysis by noting that existing caselaw is of little
   assistance. Numerous cases address LHWCA preemption of tort claims, but
   none address the situation before us—an injured employee, in the twilight
   zone, who declines to invoke the LHWCA but, under state law, is limited to
   a tort claim for relief.9
           The most on-point case is Hahn, but Hahn neither prohibits nor
   endorses the claims at issue here. Hahn does not endorse claims like
   Barrosse’s because it did not address a freestanding tort claim. The state
   statute in Hahn permitted employers to “elect[] to reject” the statute’s
   “automatic compensation provisions,” in which case an injured employee
   could bring “a negligence action for damages.” Hahn, 358 U.S. at 273. Thus,

           9
             Some district court cases address a similar fact pattern but neither acknowledge
   nor analyze the complications presented by a concurrent-jurisdiction regime where the only
   state-law remedy is a tort claim. See, e.g., Hulin v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc., 2020 WL
   6059645, at *5–7 (E.D. La. Oct. 14, 2020).

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   Hahn only sanctioned a state-law tort claim that was expressly contemplated
   by state statute. Here, Barrosse’s tort claims arise under state law because
   they are not included in the relevant statute, i.e., the WCA. Barrosse cannot
   obtain automatic compensation for mesothelioma, but neither does the
   WCA’s exclusivity provision apply to any tort claims he might bring for that
   injury. Hahn does not prohibit claims like Barrosse’s either. Nothing in Hahn
   holds that tort claims are only permissible when expressly contemplated by
   state compensation statutes. Hahn clearly opens the door to at least some tort
   claims, but it is ultimately inapposite.
          Avondale would nevertheless have us read Hahn to limit state-law tort
   claims in the twilight zone to claims “provided for by state workers’
   compensation law” as a sanction for failing to secure coverage. But Hahn
   doesn’t say that, and the lone federal court of appeals case that Avondale
   cites for that proposition is distinguishable. In Peter v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands
   Corp., the Third Circuit considered an injured worker’s negligence action
   under Virgin Islands law. 903 F.2d 935, 936–37 (3d Cir. 1990). The employer
   had obtained coverage under both the LHWCA and the relevant Virgin
   Islands workers’ compensation act. Id. at 953. The court held that “where an
   employer has obtained workmen’s compensation coverage for its LHWCA
   employee under both [the] LHWCA and the state or territorial statute,” tort
   claims are preempted. Id. On its own terms, Peter does not apply where, as
   here, an employer has obtained coverage under the LHWCA but not under
   a state or territorial statute. Thus, contrary to Avondale’s assertion at oral
   argument, permitting Barrosse’s claims under these circumstances does not
   create a circuit split.10

          10
            The district court supposed that Barrosse “could have sought compensation
   under Louisiana’s Workers’ Compensation Act.” Barrosse, 563 F. Supp. 3d at 556. If that

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           Other cases likewise do not bear on the question before us. Some
   permit claims against alleged third-party tortfeasors, not employers. Norfolk
   Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp. v. Garris, 532 U.S. 811, 819–20 (2001)
   (permitting general maritime negligence claim against a third party);
   McLaurin v. Noble Drilling (US) Inc., 529 F.3d 285, 292–93 (5th Cir. 2008)
   (holding that plaintiff did not have a vessel negligence claim but could bring
   a state-law tort claim against the vessel owner as a third-party tortfeasor).
   Others address injuries that occurred on the Outer Continental Shelf, which
   is outside the twilight zone. Hebron v. Union Oil Co., 634 F.2d 245, 246 (5th
   Cir. 1981) (per curiam); Gaudet v. Exxon Corp., 562 F.2d 351, 354 (5th Cir.
   1977); see LeSassier v. Chevron USA, Inc., 776 F.2d 506, 509 (5th Cir. 1985)
   (noting that Outer Continental Shelf claims do not involve the twilight zone
   or any other “confusing concurrent jurisdictional realm”).
           Most of Avondale’s cited cases concern plaintiffs attempting to obtain
   both LHWCA compensation and damages in tort. See Hetzel, 50 F.3d at 367;
   Levene v. Pintail Enters., Inc., 943 F.2d 528, 530 (5th Cir. 1991) (plaintiff filed
   suit under the LHWCA); Rosetti v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 821 F.2d 1083,
   1084 (5th Cir. 1987) (plaintiff received LHWCA benefits from his nominal
   employer then sued his borrowing employer); White v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,
   222 F.3d 146, 148 (4th Cir. 2000) (same); Langfitt v. Fed. Marine Terminals,
   Inc., 647 F.3d 1116, 1119 (11th Cir. 2011) (same); In re Buchanan Marine, L.P.,
   874 F.3d 356, 362 (2d Cir. 2017) (plaintiff received LHWCA benefits but
   filed a tort suit anyways). But an injured worker cannot eat his cake and have
   it too. Once a worker “receives LHWCA benefits,” he “may not sue his
   employer under state law for any additional compensatory damages.” Jowers

   were true, Peter would be applicable and potentially persuasive authority. But the district
   court’s assumption was incorrect. See Rando, 16 So. 3d at 1071.

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   v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 617 F.3d 346, 357 (5th Cir. 2010). Instead, once a worker
   “elect[s] the LHWCA remedy, he is bound by the provisions of the Act,”
   including the exclusivity provision of § 905(a). Hetzel, 50 F.3d at 367. That
   comports with the Supreme Court’s instruction that § 905(a)’s exclusivity
   provision “gains meaning only after a litigant has been found to occupy one
   side or the other of the doubtful jurisdictional line.” Davis, 317 U.S. at 256;
   see Sun Ship, 447 U.S. at 722 n.4 (clarifying that, in the twilight zone, § 905(a)
   “does not exclude remedies offered by other jurisdictions”); see also Calbeck
   v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114, 131 (1962) (upholding compensation
   payments under both the LHWCA and state law where the state payments
   were credited against the LHWCA payments, so “no impermissible double
   recovery [wa]s possible”); Hahn, 358 U.S. at 273 (holding that the exclusivity
   provision did not “prevent[] recovery” via a state-law tort claim). Barrosse
   did not engage in double-dipping. He has eschewed the LHWCA entirely and
   is only seeking compensation in tort.
           Thus, even considering the cases raised by the parties and the district
   court, this is a sui generis case. We resolve this issue of first impression by
   holding that, on these facts and pursuant to binding jurisprudential authority,
   Barrosse’s state-law tort claims are not preempted. As a preliminary matter,
   we emphasize that the category of claims we address here is small. Our
   holding concerns only: 1) maritime workers; 2) injured in the twilight zone;
   3) in Louisiana; 4) who neither seek nor obtain LHWCA compensation; and
   5) whose injuries are not covered by the relevant version of the WCA.11
           Recall that “[c]onflict preemption applies (1) where complying with
   both federal law and state law is impossible; or (2) where the state law creates

           11
             The situation presented here, where a plaintiff’s choices are the LHWCA or
   state-law tort, may arise under other states’ laws. Whether such claims are preempted
   should be determined on a case-by-case and state-by-state basis, so our holding is limited.

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   an unacceptable obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
   purposes and objectives of Congress.” Janvey, 712 F.3d at 200. But we may
   not conduct “a freewheeling judicial inquiry” to find such an obstacle, and
   the threshold for finding conflict preemption is “high.” Whiting, 563 U.S. at
   607. This dispute concerns only the second species of conflict preemption,
   so we look to whether the operation of state tort law in this case “creates an
   unacceptable obstacle” to the purpose of the LHWCA. Janvey, 712 F.3d at
   200. And, in the twilight zone, the Supreme Court has interpreted the
   LHWCA to avoid “resurrecting the jurisdictional monstrosity that existed”
   prior to Davis. Sun Ship, 447 U.S. at 720. Thus, we consider conflict
   preemption with the understanding that the LHWCA “supplements, rather
   than supplants, state compensation law” and runs “concurrently with state
   remedies.” Id.
          The purpose that Barrosse’s tort claims must not unacceptably
   obstruct is the “balance” between employer and employee wherein
   “[e]mployers relinquish[] their defenses to tort actions in exchange for
   limited and predictable liability,” while “[e]mployees accept the limited
   recovery because they receive prompt relief without the expense,
   uncertainty, and delay that tort actions entail.” Morrison-Knudsen Constr. Co.
   v. Dep’t of Labor, 461 U.S. 624, 636 (1983) (citations omitted). Permitting
   Barrosse’s claims upsets that balance to some extent. But conflict
   preemption is not triggered by ordinary incongruities or minor annoyances,
   only by “unacceptable obstacle[s].” Janvey, 712 F.3d at 200. Here, the
   Supreme Court has expressly carved out space for concurrent operation of
   often-asymmetrical state and federal law in the twilight zone, lessening any
   concern that obstacles posed by state law are “unacceptable.” Id.; see Sun
   Ship, 447 U.S. at 723–25 (noting that “state remedial schemes” often differ
   from the LHWCA).

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           Indeed, if tort claims themselves visited any inherent frustration on
   Congress’ goals sufficient to trigger conflict preemption, the Supreme Court
   would have sided with the dissent in Hahn, which argued that permitting tort
   claims in the twilight zone would “frustrate th[e] very purpose” of the
   LHWCA. Hahn, 358 U.S. at 275 (Stewart, J., dissenting). But it did not.
   Given the limited circumstances permitting Barrosse’s claims under
   Louisiana law, they pose little, if any, greater obstacle to congressional
   purpose than the category of tort claims permitted by Hahn. The only
   difference is that the Oregon legislature in Hahn expressly permitted
   negligence claims under certain circumstances, while the Louisiana legislature
   implicitly permitted negligence claims for certain injuries by excluding those
   injuries from the expressed schedule of covered diseases in the WCA.
           What is more, that distinction simply reflects the differing policy
   choices of different states, a feature of any concurrent-jurisdiction regime.
   Accepting Avondale’s arguments is, therefore, tantamount to eliminating
   concurrent jurisdiction in cases like Barrosse’s.12 We do not think that
   mesothelioma’s exclusion from the pre-1975 WCA’s schedule of covered
   diseases “mandate[s] the result that [Barrosse] can only seek recovery under
   the federal compensation scheme.” DiBenedetto v. Noble Drilling Co., 23 So.
   3d 400, 406 (La. Ct. App. 2009).13 Instead, because the LHWCA does not
   “supplant[]” state law, Sun Ship, 447 U.S. at 720, Barrosse may pursue the

           12
                As noted above, Avondale effectively concedes this point.
           13
              Although DiBenedetto is a state court case and not binding here, we find it
   persuasive as it is the only case that we or the parties are aware of that addresses the factual
   scenario before us head on. In DiBenedetto, the plaintiff was injured in Louisiana, in the
   twilight zone, before 1975, was diagnosed with mesothelioma, did not seek LHWCA
   benefits, and brought a tort suit. Id. at 404–05. Like Avondale, the defendants argued that
   the LHWCA preempted his claims. Id. at 404. The court held that it did not. Id. at 405.

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                                     No. 21-30761

   remedy available to him under that law which, as state law applies here, is
   only a tort claim. See DiBenedetto, 23 So. 3d at 406.
          The Supreme Court has already rejected the principal arguments to
   the contrary. Writing separately, Justices in Davis and Hahn criticized the
   twilight zone as illogical, contrary to the text, beyond the power of the
   judiciary to create, and unfair to employers who are deprived of the benefits
   of the LHWCA’s quid pro quo and must instead secure compensation
   coverage under both federal and state law. Hahn, 358 U.S. at 275 (Stewart,
   J., dissenting) (characterizing the twilight zone as “illogic”); Davis, 317 U.S.
   at 259 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (same); id. at 260–62 (Stone, C.J.,
   dissenting) (arguing that recognizing the twilight zone is not “within judicial
   competence . . . [,] controverts the words of the statute,” and “imposes an
   unauthorized burden on the employer” who will be subject to liability under
   state law). These 80-year-old objections have yet to overcome the twilight
   zone. We cannot hold that they do.
          In sum, our conclusion that conflict preemption does not apply is
   supported by the existence of concurrent jurisdiction and the acceptable
   incongruity inherent therein, the Supreme Court’s consistent rejection of
   arguments resisting that regime, the LHWCA’s role of supplementing
   rather than supplanting state law, the limited category of claims at issue here,
   and the similarity between these claims and those the Supreme Court has
   already permitted in Hahn.
                                         IV
          The Supreme Court has recognized a twilight zone of concurrent
   jurisdiction, permitted by the LHWCA, in cases like this one. We are duty-
   bound to interpret and apply the law consistent with that guidance. Here, that
   means preserving concurrent jurisdiction in the twilight zone and avoiding
   the resurrection of a “jurisdictional monstrosity” by allowing Barrosse’s

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   state-law tort claims to proceed. Sun Ship, 447 U.S. at 720. We reiterate the
   highly unusual fact pattern that brought Barrosse to this point and
   reemphasize that our holding is narrow. It is only through the peculiar nature
   and application of Louisiana’s pre-1975 worker’s compensation statute,
   combined with the other characteristics of this case listed above, that
   Barrosse’s claims survive preemption. We accordingly REVERSE and
   REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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