Court Opinion

ID: 9677265
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:47:51.985128+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:54.857749
License: Public Domain

Neff, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I respectfully dissent from the holding of part mA of the majority opinion. I concur in all other respects.
MCL 600.6303(1); MSA 27A.6303(1) provides that the trial court is to reduce a plaintiff’s recovery by an amount determined pursuant to subsection 2. MCL 600.6303(2); MSA 27A.6303(2) provides:
*308The court shall determine the amount of the plaintiffs expense or loss which has been paid or is payable by a collateral source.
Thus, in order for a court to perform its task under subsection 2, it must know the type of expenses and losses for which a payment from a collateral source was made to a plaintiff. In other words, the court could not reduce a plaintiff’s jury award by $5,000 received from a worker’s compensation provider for past medical expenses, if the jury award did not provide a recovery for past medical expenses.
Here, Mr. Heinz’ redemption agreement did not account for any allocation of the payment. Defendant argues that because the money came from a wage-loss reserve, it is clear that the redemption amount is lost wages. Defendant, however, cites no authority, and I know of none, that holds this Court bound by the accounting practices of a worker’s compensation provider. To the contrary, it is probable that the redemption included at least medical expenses, and most likely other expenses and losses, in addition to wage loss. However, on the record presented below there is no way to determine what the redemption payment covered or in what proportion.
I recognize that by refusing to allow the $80,227.25 redemption amount to be offset from plaintiffs’ recovery, the possibility exists that plaintiffs will be twice paid for some of the same expenses or injuries. I also recognize defendant’s seemingly valid public policy arguments in favor of creating a rule disallowing double recovery under these circumstance. However, we clearly do not have the authority to create such a rule, a constraint the majority overlooks. We are not permitted to pass on the wisdom or fairness of a leg*309islative enactment or, in essence, to enact correcting legislation to rectify a perceived inequity; our task is simply to apply the law as written.1 See Allstate Ins Co v Dep’t of Ins, 195 Mich App 538, 547; 491 NW2d 616 (1992).
I would affirm.

 Except, of course, in those instances where we determine that the Legislature has acted in violation of the state or federal constitution.