Court Opinion

ID: 9385664
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-07 19:02:37.816273+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:03.637256
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/7/23
                       CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

               COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                DIVISION ONE

                           STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 THE PEOPLE,                               D079712

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.                                (Super. Ct. No. SCD142894)

 BOUNTHANOM DIDYAVONG,

         Defendant and Appellant.

       APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
John M. Thompson, Judge. Affirmed.
       Kimberly J. Grove and Pauline E. Villanueva, under appointment by
the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
       Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Lynne G.
McGinnis, Melissa Mandel, Robin Urbanski, Alan Amann, and Minh U. Le,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                               INTRODUCTION
       In February 2001, a jury convicted Bounthanom Didyavong of first
degree murder for his role in the 1998 gang-related beating and shooting
death of David D. In May 2019, following California’s adoption of Senate Bill
No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.), Didyavong petitioned the superior court for
resentencing, alleging he was not the actual killer or a major participant who
acted with a reckless disregard to human life, and he did not act with intent

to kill. (See Pen. Code,1 § 1172.6.2) The superior court denied the petition at
the prima facie stage. We reversed the denial and directed the superior court
to issue an order to show cause. (People v. Didyavong (Apr. 14, 2021,
D077933) [nonpub. opn].) On remand and following a hearing that complied
with section 1172.6, the superior court concluded that the People proved
beyond a reasonable doubt that Didyavong committed second degree implied
malice murder. It denied the petition for resentencing. Didyavong appealed
that determination, contending there was not substantial evidence to support
the court’s conclusion.
      We requested supplemental briefing as to whether a trial court could
reduce a first degree murder conviction to second degree murder in the
context of a section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing. In his supplemental brief,
Didyavong argued that the trial judge should have reduced the count and
resentenced him because it determined the evidence was sufficient to find
him guilty of second degree murder on that basis. The Attorney General
argued that section 1172.6 does not provide a mechanism for reducing a first
degree murder conviction to second degree murder; thus, the proper approach
was for the court to deny the petition, as it did.
      We agree with the Attorney General that section 1172.6 does not
provide a mechanism to reduce a first degree murder conviction to second

1     Undesignated section references are to the Penal Code.

2     Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered section 1170.95 to
section 1172.6 with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 50, § 10.) We refer to
the statute by its current number only.
                                        2
degree murder. We further conclude there was substantial evidence to
support the court’s denial of Didyavong’s petition. Thus, we affirm.
                            BACKGROUND FACTS
      We recite the facts as they appear in our unpublished decision on
Didyavong’s direct appeal (People v. Didyavong (July 30, 2002, D037601)):
      “On the evening of September 12, 1998, Ryan L[.] had a party at his
residence on Bell Bluff Avenue in San Diego. Roughly 25 to 30 teenagers
were at the party. About 11:30 p.m., a number of the teenagers were outside
when Osa Inthavong passed them in his white Honda Civic hatchback.
Jordan W[.], who had been drinking, was angered because he perceived that
the Honda swerved toward the group and he kicked the front passenger side
fender of the car as it passed. Mistakenly thinking he knew the driver,
[Jordan] ran after the car, which stopped briefly and then drove off.
      “About an hour later, Inthavong drove the Honda back to Bell Bluff
Avenue, followed by several other vehicles, and stopped in the middle of the
street. Fifteen to twenty Asian men got out of the cars and a tall one,
wearing a white shirt and baggy blue pants and sporting a distinctive

hairstyle, took a small baseball bat[3] out of the trunk of the Honda. Six or
seven of the Asian[ ] [men] surrounded partygoer David [D.], who was across
the street smoking a cigarette, and attacked him. The rest of the Asian [men]
formed a shield around the attackers, who were holding [David] down on the
ground; one of the attackers used a miniature baseball bat, and another used
a lead pipe, to beat [David].

3      The size of the baseball bat was disputed during the hearing on the
petition for resentencing. Didyavong’s attorney argued it was a “miniature
wooden little league bat.” The People replied that the bat was roughly 12
inches long.
                                       3
      “When the other teenagers started coming outside to see what was
happening, one of the Asian[ ] [men] challenged them, asking if anyone else
‘wanted any of what they had.’ No one responded. As the attackers held
[David] down, one of the Asian[ ] [men] at the center of the group fired five or
six gunshots, causing the partygoers to scatter or seek cover. The assailant
with the bat hit [David], who was lying in the street, in the head one last
time as the rest of the Asian[ ] [men] ran back to their cars. The attacker
rejoined the rest of his group, which then drove away.
      “[David] was unconscious and did not respond to efforts by the
partygoers, or subsequent attempts by paramedics, to revive him. He was
transported to a hospital, where he was pronounced dead at 1:27 a.m. An
autopsy showed that he died from two gunshot wounds to the chest that
damaged his heart, lungs and liver. He also suffered a third gunshot wound,
a skull fracture and six puncture wounds consistent with having been
stabbed with a Phillips-head screwdriver. Police investigating the scene
found a metal pipe in the grass, a baseball bat hidden in the bushes and five
shell casings on the ground.
      “Shortly thereafter, the police arrested Sonxai Rasakhamdee,
Phonemala Phomthavong and Didyavong, who were affiliated with an Asian
gang called the OKB, in connection with the incident. Officers interviewed
Rasakhamdee and Phomthavong, who admitted their participation in the
attack and also indicated that Didyavong had been involved. (The evidence
of these interviews was not introduced at Didyavong’s trial.) Thereafter, the
police put Didyavong and Rasakhamdee together in a holding cell at the
police station. The men had a conversation, surreptitiously recorded by
police, in which Didyavong urged Rasakhamdee to recant Rasakhamdee’s
prior statements to the police implicating him in the incident.

                                       4
      “Several days after the incident, a friend of [David]’s who witnessed the
attack gave a description of the bat-wielding assailant to the police. The
witness subsequently chose Didyavong’s photo, taken at the time of arrest,
from an 18-item photographic lineup and identified Didyavong based on his
clothing, physical build and hairstyle as the person who used the bat. The
witness also chose a photograph of OKB member Phitikhoun Phanbandith,
who he identified as one of the people that he saw get out of the Honda.
      “In June 1999, the District Attorney charged Didyavong with murder.
(Prosecutors also charged Phanbandith, Inthavong, Rasakhamdee,
Phomthavong and several others with murder in connection with the attack.)
Phomthavong reached an agreement with prosecutors to plead guilty to
voluntary manslaughter arising out of [David]’s death and to testify
truthfully in the criminal trials against the other defendants, in exchange for
a maximum sentence of 11 years in prison. Although he had repeatedly lied
to police, investigators and his own attorney about the incident, he decided to
provide truthful testimony because he felt badly about what had happened.
      “At Didyavong’s trial, Phomthavong testified that on the evening of the
attack, he was ‘hanging out’ by a canyon with several other members and
affiliates of the OKB or a closely allied gang known as the Oriental Mobster
Crips (‘OMC’). Inthavong, who was driving his Honda Civic, stopped to tell
the group that a white guy had kicked his car and said[,] ‘[L]et’s go get him.’
Most of the group got into five cars and followed Inthavong to Bell Bluff
Avenue. Phomthavong drove Didyavong and Didyavong’s cousin in his car.
Phomthavong testified that he believed that the group was going to Bell Bluff
Avenue only for a fistfight; however, he admitted that he had a gun in the
glove compartment of his car for safety reasons. He testified that

                                       5
Rasakhamdee and Phanbandith were the only other members of the group
who knew about the gun.
      “When the group arrived at Bell Bluff Avenue, Inthavong got out of his
car and hit [David]. Shortly thereafter Phanbandith, Didyavong and two or
three others joined in the attack, kicking and beating [David], while the
others stood around. Phanbandith separated from the attackers and asked
Phomthavong where the gun was; Phomthavong responded, “You know
where it is.” Phanbandith retrieved the gun from Phomthavong’s car,
approached the group of attackers as they were beating [David], shot [David]
three times and then fired several more shots at the other partygoers. The
group ran back to the cars and left.
      “San Diego Police Department Gang Detective Michael Gallivan
testified for the prosecution as an expert on Asian gangs, as follows: Based
on Didyavong’s attire on the night of the attack (which was consistent with
OKB gang colors) and his past affiliations, it appeared that he was an OKB
member. Respect is very important to the OKB and the OMC. If a person
showed disrespect to a member of these gangs, the gang would feel compelled
to retaliate in some fashion, often a violent confrontation, because a failure to
respond would be seen as a sign of weakness. If a person kicked an OKB
gang member’s car, this would be a sign of disrespect, or a challenge, that
would require a response. The people who went along with the gang member
would be expected to participate in the response in some manner, either
through direct involvement or support through their presence at the scene. A
beating of the type involved here, including the use of weapons, was a typical
gang response to the perceived disrespect that had been shown, although an
attack resulting in a death would be a ‘severe’ response and one that ‘doesn’t
happen every day.’

                                        6
         “In his defense, Didyavong called retired professor emeritus Malcolm
Klein, who testified that Asian gang members are most commonly involved in
minor offenses (such as theft, vandalism and drugs), rather than more
serious offenses (such as robbery, auto theft, rape or murder). Dr. Klein also
testified that a shooting would not be an expected response to someone
having kicked a gang member’s car and that it would be inappropriate to
expect that an assault would result in a homicide. Didyavong’s father
testified that he did not recognize the shirt his son was wearing at the time of
his son’s arrest.
         “A jury convicted Didyavong of first degree murder and, after he made
various unsuccessful posttrial motions, the court sentenced him to 25 years to
life.”
                            PROCEDURAL HISTORY
         In May 2019, Didyavong filed a petition for resentencing under
section 1172.6. The court appointed counsel and received briefing. After
considering the record of conviction and this court’s previous opinion, the
superior court concluded Didyavong failed to state a prima facie case for relief
and denied his petition.
         Didyavong appealed, contending the court engaged in impermissible
judicial factfinding. The Attorney General agreed, and we accepted the
People’s concession. In April 2021, we reversed the superior court’s order,
remanding the matter with directions to issue an order to show cause and to
conduct further proceedings as required by statute.
         On remand, the superior court conducted an evidentiary hearing. (See
§ 1172.6, subd. (d).) The People introduced three theories of liability: aiding
and abetting in first degree murder, second degree murder via direct action

                                        7
with implied malice, and aiding and abetting in second degree murder
committed by a fellow gang member.
      The court considered the trial record and transcript, the appellate
opinion in case No. D037601, and counsels’ arguments. Its order also quoted
from the opinion in case No. D077933: “Dr. Klein acknowledged that he had
no specific information on Asian gangs in San Diego, had never spoken to an
Asian gang member from San Diego, had never done research on Asian gang
members in San Diego, and was not familiar with a number of other
shootings that had occurred in San Diego between Asian gangs.”
      The superior court denied the petition, concluding the People proved
beyond a reasonable doubt that Didyavong was guilty of murder as an aider
and abettor under an implied malice theory. The court did not explicitly
reach a conclusion regarding first degree murder.
      Didyavong timely appealed.
      We invited the parties to provide supplemental briefs on the issue of
whether the superior court has the authority, under section 1172.6, to reduce
a first degree murder sentence to second degree and resentence the defendant
for the lesser offense.
                                  DISCUSSION
                               A. Legal Principles
                1. Senate Bill No. 1437 and Senate Bill No. 775
      Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437) was
enacted to “ ‘amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability
is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with intent
to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with
reckless indifference to human life.’ (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).)”

                                         8
(People v. Martinez (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 719, 723.) Senate Bill 1437 did this
by amending section 188, which defines malice, and section 189, which
defines the degrees of murder. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §§ 2 & 3.) Amended
section 188 states: “Except as stated in subdivision (e) of Section 189, in
order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice
aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or
her participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) Amended section 189
states: “A participant in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a
felony listed in subdivision (a) in which a death occurs is liable for murder
only if one of the following is proven: [¶] (1) The person was the actual killer.
[¶] (2) The person was not the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided,
abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the
actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree. [¶] [or] (3) The
person was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with
reckless indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d) of
Section 190.2.” (§ 189, subd. (e).)
      Senate Bill 1437 also established resentencing relief for eligible
defendants. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a); People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707-
708.) Under section 1172.6, subdivision (a), “[a] person convicted of felony
murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory may
file a petition” with the sentencing court to have his or her murder conviction
vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts “when all of the
following conditions apply: [¶] (1) A complaint, information, or indictment
was filed against the petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed under
a theory of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. [¶] (2) The petitioner was convicted of first degree or
second degree murder following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a

                                        9
trial at which the petitioner could be convicted for first degree or second
degree murder. [¶] (3) The petitioner could not be convicted of first or second
degree murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective
January 1, 2019” under Senate Bill 1437. After receiving a petition
containing the required information, “the court must evaluate the petition ‘to
determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief.’ ”
(Strong, at p. 708, citing § 1172.6, subd. (c).) If the defendant makes a prima
facie showing of entitlement to relief, the court must issue an order to show
cause and hold an evidentiary hearing. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c), (d)(3).)
      Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 775 (2020-2021 Reg. Sess.)
(Senate Bill 775) amended section 1172.6 to clarify certain aspects of the law,
including that (1) the burden of proof at a resentencing hearing under this
section is “on the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
petitioner is guilty of murder” under California law as amended by Senate
Bill 1437 and (2) “[a] finding that there is substantial evidence to support a
conviction for murder . . . is insufficient to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the petitioner is ineligible for resentencing.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3); see
also Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 1, subd. (c).) Senate Bill 775 clarified that the
trial court’s role in a section 1172.6 proceeding is to act as an independent
fact finder and determine, in the first instance, whether the petitioner
committed murder under the law as amended by Senate Bill 1437. (People v.
Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 294, 297 (Clements).)
                2. Implied Malice Aiding and Abetting Murder
      Although Senate Bill 1437 amended the felony murder rule to ensure
that murder liability would be imposed only on perpetrators with malice
aforethought, it did not change the definition of malice. (People v. Gentile
(2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 844.) Express malice exists “when there is a manifest

                                        10
intent to kill.” (Ibid., citing § 188, subds. (a)(1) and (2).) It is shown when the
defendant either desires the victim’s death or knows to a substantial
certainty that death will occur. (§ 188, subd. (a)(1); People v. Saille (1991) 54
Cal.3d 1103, 1114.) Implied malice exists if “someone kills with ‘no
considerable provocation . . . or when the circumstances attending the killing
show an abandoned and malignant heart.’ ” (Gentile, at p. 844, citing § 188,
subd. (a)(2).) “ ‘In short, implied malice requires a defendant’s awareness of
engaging in conduct that endangers the life of another . . . .’ ” (People v.
Cravens (2012) 53 Cal.4th 500, 507 (Cravens).)
      Aider and abettor liability is “ ‘based on a combination of the direct
perpetrator’s acts and the aider and abettor’s own acts and own mental
state.’ ” (People v. Powell (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 689, 710 (Powell), quoting
People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1117.) In other words, “ ‘[a]n
aider and abettor must do something and have a certain mental state.’ ”
(Powell, at p. 712.) “For the direct aider and abettor, the [act] includes
whatever acts constitute aiding the commission of the life endangering act.
Thus, to be liable for an implied malice murder, the direct aider and
abettor must, by words or conduct, aid the commission of the life-
endangering act, not the result of that act.” (Id. at p. 713.) Further, “the
aider and abettor of implied malice murder need not intend the
commission of the crime of murder. Rather . . . he or she need only intend
the commission of the perpetrator’s act, the natural and probable
consequences of which are dangerous to human life, intentionally aid in
the commission of that act and do so with conscious disregard for human
life.” (Id. at p. 714.)

                                        11
                 B. Discretion to Reduce a Murder Conviction
      We review the interpretation of a statute de novo. (People v. Lewis
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 961.) We “ ‘ “ ‘ “begin by examining the statute’s
words, giving them a plain and commonsense meaning.” ’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.) If the
plain language is clear and unambiguous, we end our inquiry. (People v.
Johnson (2002) 28 Cal.4th 240, 244.) If the statute’s language is
unambiguous, we presume the Legislature meant what it said, and the plain
meaning of the statute governs. (Ibid.)
      The prosecution meets its burden under section 1172.6 if it proves
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant “is guilty of murder . . . under
California law as amended by the changes to Section 188 or 189 made
effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) In that instance, the
defendant is not entitled to relief, and the court denies the petition for
resentencing. (Ibid.) “If the prosecution fails to sustain its burden of proof,
the prior conviction, and any allegations and enhancements attached to the
conviction, shall be vacated and the petitioner shall be resentenced on the
remaining charges.” (Ibid.) In that instance, the conviction “shall be
redesignated as the target offense or underlying felony for resentencing
purposes” if “murder or attempted murder was charged generically . . . .” (Id.
at subd. (e).)
      The statute does not detail eligible degrees of murder. For relief it
simply requires the defendant to have been convicted of “murder, attempted
murder, or manslaughter” in a situation in which the petitioner “could not
presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder” because of changes to
sections 188 or 189. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(2), (3).) Like our colleagues in
People v. Gonzalez (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 869, at page 881, we conclude this
language is reasonably clear. It treats all murder as a single, generic crime

                                       12
and requires resentencing when a defendant could not now be convicted of

murder, generically.4 The statute authorizes the court to take one of two
actions: deny the petition for relief or grant the petition for relief. (Gonzalez,
at p. 881.) In granting the petition, the court vacates the murder conviction
and redesignates it as the target offense or the underlying felony. In
directing the court to redesignate the murder conviction to the target offense
or the underlying felony, the statute provides no mechanism for the court to
reduce a first degree murder conviction to second degree.
      It seems significant that if the defendant did not commit murder under
the amended sections 188 or 189, section 1172.6 does not allow the People to
retry the defendant on a lesser homicide offense even if the evidence would
support it. Thus, the statute would appear to achieve rough justice rather
than perfect justice under the revised law. But if the Legislature intended to
ensure that no defendant remains convicted of a crime greater than what he
or she would be guilty of under the revised statutes, it is free to amend
section 1172.6 to say so.
      Here, the defendant was charged generically with murder in count 1
and convicted of that crime. To deny the defendant relief, the statute
required the prosecutor to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the

4      A “generic murder” is a murder charge that does not specify a degree.
(People v. Jones (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 373, 377.) A murder charged
generically does not limit the prosecution to any particular theories of
liability. (People v. Flores (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 974, 987; People v. Eynon
(2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 967, 977-978.)
                                       13
defendant was still guilty of murder, and the prosecutor successfully did so.

Thus, the defendant was not entitled to have his murder conviction vacated.5
                          C. Section 1172.6 Analysis
      We review the trial court’s factfinding on the question of whether a
defendant committed a murder under a still-valid theory for substantial
evidence. (Clements, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 298.) We analyze the record
in the light most favorable to the trial court’s finding and determine if there
is sufficient substantial evidence to find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. (People v. Becerrada (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1009, 1028; People v.
Bascomb (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 1077, 1087.) “Our job on review is different
from the trial judge’s job in deciding the petition. While the trial judge must
review all the relevant evidence, evaluate and resolve contradictions, and
make determinations as to credibility, all under the reasonable doubt
standard, our job is to determine whether there is any substantial evidence,
contradicted or uncontradicted, to support a rational fact finder’s findings
beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Clements, at p. 298.) We will not reverse
unless there is no hypothesis upon which sufficient substantial evidence
exists to support the trial court’s decision. (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th
297, 331.) We must “presume in support of the judgment the existence of
every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” (People v.
Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 314.) “The same standard applies when the
conviction rests primarily on circumstantial evidence.” (People v. Kraft
(2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.) “An appellate court must accept logical

5     We note that the court did not reach a conclusion regarding whether
the prosecution proved Didyavong was guilty of first degree murder. It
explained a finding of any degree of murder would be sufficient, and it
discussed only its findings regarding second degree murder.
                                       14
inferences that the [trier of fact] might have drawn from the circumstantial
evidence.” (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 396.)
      At issue is whether Didyavong acted in a way that demonstrated an
awareness that he was “ ‘engaging in conduct that endangers the life of
another’ ” (Cravens, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 507), and whether he acted “with
conscious disregard for human life” (Powell, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 714).
      The People’s gang expert testified that respect was important to the
gang Didyavong associated with, and failure to respond to disrespectful
conduct would have been a sign of weakness. Those who accompanied the
gang member in an act of retaliation were expected to participate in the
activity. Thus, Didyavong’s presence at the scene suggests he was there to
participate in David’s beating. Although there was testimony that an attack
resulting in death would be a “severe” response that “doesn’t happen every
day,” there was also testimony that the firing of a gun and the use of other
weapons in a beating would not be an unusual response from this gang
because they are extremely violent and “go to win.” As the court explained,
based on the history of this gang and Didyavong’s participation in the assault
with a baseball bat, he would know weapons could be involved in a
confrontation like this one.
      Didyavong identifies Phanbandith’s shooting David as the life-
endangering act and emphasizes that he did not know a gun was present
before the shots were fired and so could not have been aware of or shared
Phanbandith’s intent. Specifically, he argues there was no evidence that
David suffered three shots “point blank,” that anyone was positioned between
Phanbandith and David immediately before or during the shooting, or that
there was any time lag between the gun’s appearance and the shooting.

                                      15
         However, there was evidence in the record to support such inferences.
For example, Phomthavong testified that the shooter was “right on top of
David,” suggesting that the shots were fired “point blank.” Moreover, David
was lying on the ground when he was shot, and others, including Didyavong,
were kicking and beating him. This indicates that there was some passage of
time from when Phanbandith retrieved the weapon and the time he began
shooting because the other attackers had to move out of the way to make
space for Phanbandith to use the gun “right on top of David.” Thus, even if
he were not initially aware of Phanbandith’s intent, he became aware of it.
         Further, Didyavong’s argument presumes a lack of knowledge that a
gun could be used, a conclusion contradicted by the history and culture of this
gang’s retaliatory conduct according to Detective Gallivan. It also presumes
that an attack could only be deadly with the use of a gun, which is simply
false.
         Insofar as Didyavong means to suggest that his conduct does not show
he harbored the requisite intent because the life-endangering act was the
shooting and not the physical damage imposed by his use of a bat, we
disagree. Although the cause of death was gunshot wounds, Didyavong aided
the commission of the life-endangering act of the violent, life-threatening
retaliation. David was kicked, beaten with a bat and a lead pipe, and stabbed
multiple times with a screwdriver. Didyavong actively participated by
beating David with a bat while David was held down. Even if Didyavong did
not plan for murder to occur, his participation in the violent attack and his
use of a weapon to beat David demonstrates his participation in the
commission of a crime for which the natural consequences are dangerous to
human life. Moreover, Didyavong’s use of a bat to smack David’s skull after
David had been shot, even as the other gang members ran back to their cars,

                                        16
demonstrates an awareness that he was endangering David’s life. (See
Cravens, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 507; see also Powell, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 713.) Thus, substantial evidence supports the superior court’s
conclusion that Didyavong’s acts and mental state reflect that he was an
aider and abettor whose conduct demonstrated an abandoned and
malignant heart.
                               DISPOSITION
     The order is affirmed.

                                                     HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

DATO, J.

DO, J.

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