Court Opinion

ID: 9684181
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:49:44.611386+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:51.326185
License: Public Domain

Riley, J.
(dissenting).
i
We are called upon to decide whether the trial court properly granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition. The majority found the answer to this question to be no. I respectfully dissent.
n
The majority argues that summary disposition was improperly granted.
We hold that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the circuit court’s grant of Chrysler/Jeep Eagle’s motion for summary disposition. Ghrist made out a facially valid claim on which relief can be granted. Whether the die that caused Ghrist’s injury was defectively designed is a question of fact for the jury to decide. [Ante at 252.]
*253I disagree. The Court of Appeals concluded that summary disposition was proper, citing Fredericks v General Motors Corp, 411 Mich 712; 311 NW2d 725 (1981), and White v Chrysler Corp, 421 Mich 192; 364 NW2d 619 (1984), for support.
Under the holdings of Fredericks and White, there is no duty for an automobile manufacturer to place guards on a die or to warn the component manufacturer of hazards attendant with its use. Fredericks held that there is no cause of action for negligence or for breach of implied warranty for an unguarded die. Likewise, White determined that negligently supplying an unguarded die failed to state a claim.
It is implicit under Fredericks and White that there is no cause of action for negligent design and manufacture of a die. It is not sufficient to allege negligent design and manufacture as opposed to negligent supply. Nor is a claim stated merely by asserting that the die had pinch points rather than that it was unguarded. Regardless of the theory, plaintiffs employer had the duty to provide safe working conditions and the failure to do so was not foreseeable. [Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued January 26, 1994 (Docket No. 143681), slip op at 2.]
In Fredericks, the plaintiff suffered nearly the complete loss of his left hand when it was crushed by an unguarded power press. He sued General Motors, who owned the die in the press at the time of the accident, claiming that the die was unreasonably dangerous and defective because it was not guarded.1 *254This Court found that the directed verdict was properly granted.
A product is defective if it is not reasonably safe for its foreseeable uses. An unguarded die may be used in a reasonably safe manner in a guarded press or in an unsafe maimer in an unguarded press. At the time of plaintiff’s ipjury 1967 PA 282 required that “[ejach employer shall establish and maintain conditions of work which are reasonably safe and healthful for employees.” In light of this statutory duty imposed on Manistee Drop Forge we cannot hold as a matter of law that it was foreseeable to defendant that the product it supplied would be used in an unsafe manner rendering it defective. [Id. at 720-721.]
In both Fredericks and the present matter, the die causing the injury was owned by an automotive company and was being used by another corporation for stamping purposes.2 In both cases, the plaintiffs alleged that these dies contained design defects. In Fredericks, the alleged defect was the lack of a safety guard, and here the alleged defect was a T-bar kicker that created a pinch point.
Plaintiff attempts to distinguish Fredericks by arguing that, in the present case, a safety device could not have been added to the die in order to make it completely safe. However, Fredericks could not state with certainty that a guard on the press would have prevented the injury, only that it might have.
Plaintiff’s injury may well have resulted from the absence of guarding; however, this accident might have been pre*255vented by guarding on the press instead of the die. There are numerous methods of guarding the point of operation on a power press. Die guards are merely one. [Id. at 720 (emphasis added).]
Similarly, it cannot be said that removing the T-bar in this case would insure absolute safety. Even if the alleged design defects were cured, injuries of the type suffered by the plaintiff in Fredericks and this case remain a possibility. Hence, Fredericks is directly on point, and the Court of Appeals properly relied on it.
The Court of Appeals also correctly relied on White. In White, the plaintiffs were injured when their hands were caught in power presses.3 Although the power presses were owned by the plaintiffs’ employers, they were being utilized to provide component parts for Ford and Chrysler, who had designed the dies used for the project. This Court, in a unanimous decision, found for the defendants.
We would not be justified in so transforming the responsibility for the observance of job safety precautions. The common law and the Legislature impose responsibility for job safety on the contractor, not on the employer of the contractor. However, because of the bar of the exclusive remedy provision of the workers’ compensation act, there generally is no tort liability for failure to provide workplace safety. The proposed theory of liability would evolve a special rule for the benefit only of employees of a contractor injured as a result of the use of chattels in production pursuant to an out-source contract. A common-law cause of action should not be evolved solely or primarily to avoid a statutory limitation. We are not persuaded that such a special rule for the benefit only of a discrete class of seriously injured workers is justified. [White, supra at 204.]
*256Another case that is directly on point and persuasive is Bradford v General Motors Corp, 123 Mich App 641; 333 NW2d 109 (1983). In Bradford, General Motors sent a die to the plaintiffs place of employment, Wyandotte Tool Company. Unfortunately, while testing this die, the plaintiff was injured when her hand was caught and crushed inside the die.4 The plaintiff brought suit against General Motors on the ground that the die was defective because it did not contain the proper guards.5 The Court of Appeals explicitly referenced Fredericks:
Fredericks controls this case. When Bradford was injured in 1973, the statute referred to in Fredericks was still in effect. . . . Gm, then, was justified in expecting Wyandotte to fulfill its statutory duty to provide a safe workplace, including machines properly guarded under OSHAt[6] and miosha.[7] Under F~edericks, the dies involved here were not unsafe for their foreseeable uses. The plaintiff did not establish a prima facie case that gm knew or should have known of Wyandotte’s dangerous work site, which would render the dies unsafe. The granting of a directed verdict was proper. [Bradford, supra at 645.]
This decision closely parallels the facts presented here. In both the present case and Bradford, the plaintiffs were injured in press accidents. The presses *257were owned by an outsource company, the dies were provided by an automotive corporation, and both plaintiffs alleged defects in the design of the dies.8
in
The majority argues that the manufacturer of the die was under a duty to make the die safe for its intended use.
A manufacturer has a duty to design its product to eliminate “any unreasonable risk of foreseeable injury.” Prentis v Yale Mfg Co, 421 Mich 670, 693; 365 NW2d 176 (1984). While this Court accepts that a die, standing alone, is an inert object only capable of causing injury when teamed with a working press, this in itself does not insulate die *258manufacturers from liability under all circumstances. [Ante at 248.]
I agree that a manufacturer has a duty to design a product safely, but in the present case defendant only provided a die that was to be used in a much greater press system. The die, standing alone, could not cause any injury, and there is no guarantee that the absence of the T-bar on the die would prevent all injuries once incorporated in the press.
In any event, in order for the risk of injury to arise, the die had to be included in a press system. Under MCL 408.1011(a); MSA 17.50(ll)(a), it is the responsibility of the employer who is utilizing this press system to make sure that the system as a whole is safe for its employees.
An employer shall:
(a) Furnish to each employee, employment and a place of employment which is free from recognized hazards that are causing, or are likely to cause, death or serious physical harm to the employee.
The majority argues that this analysis will encourage manufacturers to rely on MIOSHA as a shield.
Were this Court to hold otherwise, manufacturers would be free to rely on the MIOSHA as a shield and to manufacture products girded with only the bare minimum of safety features. [Ante at 250-251.]
I disagree. Fredericks, White, Villar v E W Bliss Co, 134 Mich App 116; 350 NW2d 920 (1984), and Bradford do stand for the proposition that the employer is the one who has the onus of guaranteeing that a press syst'em is safe when it utilizes a die. However, *259manufacturers are still required to make safe products. If the manufacturer provided a die that was so negligently designed and assembled that it exploded after its first use, then obviously the manufacturer would not be able to hide behind the shield of miosha. Those facts, however, were not the ones presented here.
IV
Although my decision would limit plaintiffs recovery to worker’s compensation, I do not believe that this is the wrong result. Moreover, if this result is deemed to be incorrect, it should be left to the Legislature to correct. Thus, I concur with this Court’s statement in White, supra at 206:
The absence of tort liability or other reparations for loss not covered by workers’ compensation benefits caused by the failure to observe job safety precautions results in the undercompensation of many seriously injured workers. The larger problem of uncompensated loss for industrial injury or disease remains unresolved, and a solution may be impeded, by allowing a finite number of seriously injured workers to recover for loss not covered by workers’ compensation benefits. This social problem deserves a broader solution than patchwork by this Court.
V
Defendant merely provided a die to be used by Aetna Industries in its larger press system. It was Aetna’s responsibility under miosha to make sure that this press system, as a whole, was safe for the use of its employees.
While Aetna may have failed in this duty, Aetna’s negligence is not the issue before this Court. Instead, plaintiff’s action is against defendant on the ground *260that it supplied an allegedly defective die. The type of fact pattern in the matter before us is directly akin to the facts presented in Fredericks, White, Bradford, and Villar. Although plaintiff attempts to distinguish these cases, I am not persuaded. In these actions, one constant joining thread exists — a plaintiff attempting to hold a die supplier liable on the ground that the die is somehow defective. Whether that defect is the lack of a safety device or the presence of a T-bar, there is still the same allegation — a defect in the design of a die. Consequently, Fredericks, White, Villar, and Bradford are directly on point with the facts here. I would affirm the Court of Appeals decision finding summary disposition appropriate.
Weaver, J., concurred with Riley, J.

 [P]laintiff contends that an unguarded die is unreasonably dangerous and should, therefore, be considered “defective,” giving rise to products liability on the part of the supplier for personal injuries sustained by its use. Plaintiff argues that his iiyury was a result of the absence of a guard on this particular die, that General Motors could have provided a guard, and that the failure to provide a guard should result in liability. [Id. at 720.]

 This is not an uncommon occurrence. Generally, the automotive companies maintain ownership of these dies so as to guarantee production. If an outsourcing company goes bankrupt or cannot continue to produce the finished product, the automotive companies can simply reacquire the dies and send them to another outsourcing company for production.

 White and Buschlen v Ford Motor Co, supra.

 Wyandotte Tool Company does not produce parts for General Motors. Instead, it performs tests on their dies.
Wyandotte does not produce parts for gm. Instead, gm’s dies are only tested at Wyandotte’s facility. When new dies are made, gm tests them for quality of the products stamped. [Id. at 644.]

 According to testimony, the machine was not guarded according to OSHA standards and the dies did not have built-in guards. [Id.]

 29 USC 651 et seq.

 MCL 408.1001 et seq.; MSA 17.50(1) et seq.

 Another case that I believe is persuasive is Villar v E W Bliss Co, 134 Mich App 116; 350 NW2d 920 (1984). In Villar, the plaintiff was injured while operating a press manufactured by the defendant. The press was manufactured in 1930 and did not have sufficient safety guards. However, the specific press was included in a much larger press system. The Court of Appeals found:
Because Fredericks shows that it was not foreseeable that plaintiff’s employer would fail to incorporate the press into a press system containing adequate safety devices, the trial court erred by declining to grant defendant’s motion for a directed verdict. [Id. at 121.1
The Court arrived at this decision because the press manufactured by the defendant was a component included in a larger press system.
The press manufactured by defendant here, like the dies at issue in Fredericks, was only a part of a press system. The press at issue here could only be used in coryunction with dies, a power source, and some method of feeding materials into the press, whether manual, semi-automatic, or automatic. The press was harmless and inoperable unless incorporated into such a system. [Id. at 120.]
If, in Villar, an entire press included in a press system did not invoke liability on the manufacturer of the press, then certainly the simple die component included in a much larger press and press system cannot invoke liability either.