Court Opinion

ID: 9617383
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:54:43.126647+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:35.530912
License: Public Domain

LACY, J.,
dissenting.
The majority rejects the use of expert testimony in this case because the testimony failed to establish that each and every factor forming the basis of the opinion was identical to the factors existing in the accident itself. Without such identity, the majority holds the expert testimony deficient.
In my opinion, the Virginia General Assembly, by enacting Code § 46.1-195, entitled “Tables of Speed and Stopping Distances,” has recognized the need for expert evidence on stopping distances. This is the first test set out in Grasty v. Tanner, 206 Va. 723, 146 S.E.2d 252 (1966). The expert testimony in this case was no more than an extension of the chart contained in that statute. Certainly the factors assumed by both experts here were substantially similar to those involved in the accident. The weight of the logging truck, angle of the grade, and road conditions closely resembled the conditions at the time of the accident. The speed assumed was the lawful maximum, although alternative stopping distances were testified to for differing speeds. The record does not disclose any evidence regarding the decedent’s actual speed. The evidence did show the decedent’s brakes were sufficient to pass state inspection, and the owner of the vehicle testified that the brakes were in good condition. The experts’ testimony was based upon the same assumption.
My review of the record indicates that neither expert witness opined whether the specific truck of the decedent did, could, or should have stopped within 271 feet. Both testified that a hypothetical truck could stop in a stated distance under assumed conditions. The circumstances, or factors, were sufficiently similar to the conditions surrounding the actual event to provide legitimate assistance to the jury. The testimony also clearly indicated to the jury that other factors, such as the driver’s actual response time and the speed of the truck, would also impact what actually happened. The jury was entitled to weigh the conclusions of the experts in the light of the actual conditions existing at the time of the accident, as shown by the evidence.
*235The admissibility of expert testimony is within the sound discretion of the trial court. See Thorpe v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. at 614, 292 S.E.2d at 326; Noll v. Rahal, 219 Va. 795, 800, 250 S.E.2d 741, 744 (1979). Neither expert ignored brake conditions in formulating his opinion. In this case, the experts disagreed about the impact various brake conditions would have had on the truck’s stopping distance. I do not agree that the brake condition was a “missing variable” as contemplated in Grasty. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the expert testimony of Trooper Howell and Mr. Kirk, and I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.
RUSSELL, J., joins in dissent.