Court Opinion

ID: 9376549
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-03 01:00:33.116576+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:07.516092
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-40530        Document: 00516664033             Page: 1      Date Filed: 03/02/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                     United States Court of Appeals
                                                                              Fifth Circuit
                                      No. 22-40530
                                                                            FILED
                                    Summary Calendar                    March 2, 2023
                                                                       Lyle W. Cayce
   Doctor Madhavan Pisharodi,                                               Clerk

                                                                   Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                            versus

   Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,

                                                                  Defendant—Appellee.

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Southern District of Texas
                               USDC No. 1:19-CV-41

   Before Stewart, Duncan, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
         Dr. Madhavan Pisharodi appeals the district court’s summary
   judgment in favor of Wells Fargo Bank (“Wells Fargo”) in a dispute over
   personal belongings that disappeared from his security drop box with the
   bank. Because the second agreement that Pisharodi entered with Wells Fargo
   controls this dispute and expressly time-bars his claims, we AFFIRM.

         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-40530        Document: 00516664033             Page: 2      Date Filed: 03/02/2023

                                         No. 22-40530

                                    I.      Background
         A.      Pisharodi Agrees to Lease a Safe Deposit Box with Wells Fargo
            In March 1989, Pisharodi executed a lease agreement (“the 1989
   lease”) for a safe deposit box (the “SDB”) with Wells Fargo at its 835 East
   Levee Street location in Brownsville, Texas.1 The SDB went largely unused
   for the next twenty years, until a fire that damaged his home prompted him
   to consider using the SDB to safeguard his valuables. On July 20, 2009, He
   stored some of his personal belongings—including gold coins, gold bars, and
   jewelry valued at $897,412.60—in the SDB. The same day, he signed another
   lease agreement (“the 2009 lease”). The new agreement contained a merger
   clause, providing that Pisharodi’s new contract “supersede[d] any prior oral
   or written agreements regarding [the SDB].” The new contract also stated:
   “This Agreement replaces a Lease/Agreement with a commencement date
   of _____ for Box Number ___.” The document was signed by all relevant
   parties without filling in the details on when the 2009 lease replaced the 1989
   lease.
            On May 14, 2015, Wells Fargo mailed a notice to Pisharodi informing
   him of an upcoming branch relocation to 744 East Elizabeth Street in
   Brownsville, Texas. In the notice, it explained that the SDB would remain
   unopened throughout the move. It confirmed Pisharodi’s receipt of the
   notice and agreement to the relocation by obtaining the signature of an
   individual named Veronica Pisharodi. Wells Fargo made the move, with the
   SDB in tow, on June 13, 2015.

            1
           Pisharodi claims that he did not keep a copy of the 1989 lease agreement and Wells
   Fargo was unable to produce it. So, it is absent from the record.

                                               2
Case: 22-40530       Document: 00516664033         Page: 3    Date Filed: 03/02/2023

                                    No. 22-40530

          B.      The Contents of Pisharodi’s Safe Deposit Box Disappears
          On April 13, 2017, Pisharodi returned to Wells Fargo and accessed his
   box. To his surprise, he found that the SDB had some documents, but none
   of his personal belongings. At first, he told Wells Fargo that he must have
   only kept documents in the SDB. But that story later changed after some
   recollection by him. Ultimately, he filed a police report and opened an
   investigation with Wells Fargo. The police investigation was largely fruitless,
   proffering no evidence of an illegal break in or drilling of the SDB. The
   investigation only discovered a stray fingerprint, but it was of insufficient
   quality for the department to use.
          Wells Fargo also investigated Pisharodi’s claim and denied it in June
   2017. Its investigation rendered the following conclusions: (1) the SDB was
   intact, having never been drilled before or after the relocation process; (2)
   had the SDB been drilled at any point it would not be accessible by
   Pisharodi’s keys; (3) Pisharodi accessed the SDB with the same set of keys in
   August 2013 and April 2017 and he admits that he never lost the keys
   throughout this period; and (4) the police found no evidence of drilling or
   forced entry into the SDB. Dissatisfied with the results of the investigation,
   Pisharodi sued.
                             C.      Procedural History
          Pisharodi sued in a Texas state trial court, alleging breach of contract,
   Texas Deceptive and Trade Practices Act (“DTPA”) violations, negligence,
   and conversion. Wells Fargo removed the case on diversity jurisdiction
   grounds. It later moved for summary judgment, requesting a dismissal of all
   claims. The district court assigned the case to a magistrate judge, who issued
   a report and recommendation (“R&R”) in favor of granting Wells Fargo’s
   motion. The district court adopted the R&R and held that Pisharodi take
   nothing in his suit against Wells Fargo. Pisharodi subsequently filed a motion

                                          3
Case: 22-40530           Document: 00516664033             Page: 4      Date Filed: 03/02/2023

                                           No. 22-40530

   for a new trial, which the district court also denied. He timely appealed the
   district court’s determination that Wells Fargo was entitled to summary
   judgment.2
            On appeal, Pisharodi asks us to consider whether the district court
   erred in determining that the 2009 lease was a valid and enforceable
   agreement between the parties, and that there was no genuine dispute of
   material fact concerning the contract’s enforceability. After that threshold
   inquiry, he asks us to consider whether the district court erred in granting
   summary judgment on his various tort theories and DTPA claims.
                                  II.     Standard of Review
            “We review grants of summary judgment de novo, applying the same
   standard as the district court.” In re La. Crawfish Producers, 852 F.3d 456,
   462 (5th Cir. 2017). Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no
   genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
   as a matter of law.” Davidson v. Fairchild Controls Corp., 882 F.3d 180, 184
   (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). “Where the record taken
   as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving
   party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
   Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 564, 587 (1986) (citation omitted).
            “All reasonable inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable
   to the party opposing summary judgment, and any doubt must be resolved in
   favor of the non-moving party.” La. Crawfish Producers, 852 F.3d at 462.
   However, summary judgment “may not be thwarted by conclusional
   allegations, unsupported assertions, or presentation of only a scintilla of
   evidence.” McFaul v. Valenzuela, 684 F.3d 564, 571 (5th Cir. 2012). We may

            2
                His appeal does not mention the district court’s denial of his motion for a new
   trial.

                                                  4
Case: 22-40530        Document: 00516664033              Page: 5      Date Filed: 03/02/2023

                                         No. 22-40530

   affirm “on any ground supported by the record, including one not reached by
   the district court.” Gilbert v. Donahoe, 751 F.3d 303, 311 (5th Cir. 2014)
   (internal quotations and citation omitted).
                                     III.    Discussion
                 A.      Whether The 2009 Lease Controls This Dispute
           Pisharodi argues that the district court erred in granting Wells Fargo’s
   motion for summary judgment because it relied on an invalid and
   unenforceable agreement. In support of his contention, he highlights that the
   2009 lease failed to expressly state that it replaced the 1989 lease because that
   specific provision was left blank in the agreement. With that provision blank,
   he asserts that there is a genuine factual dispute as to whether the 2009 lease
   controls this dispute. We disagree.
           At its core, this issue can be reduced to one fact: Pisharodi entered a
   lease agreement with Wells Fargo in 1989 and then entered another in 2009.
   By asserting that the 2009 lease does not control, he necessarily argues that
   the 1989 lease must. Neither party disputes that they agreed to contract with
   one another on two separate occasions.3 Rather, Pisharodi asserts that there
   is no proof—or at least a genuine factual dispute—that he intended for the
   2009 lease to supersede the 1989 lease. But his intent for one agreement to
   supplant the other is irrelevant under Texas law. In Texas, where two leases
   conflict with one another, the later agreement applies to any inconsistencies
   between the two. See Hall v. Prof. Leasing Assoc.’s, 550 S.W.2d 392, 394 (Tex.
   App.—Dallas 1977, no writ) (“[W]hen two contracts between the same
   parties are inconsistent, the later contract is conclusively presumed to have

           3
             The record is replete with evidence that Pisharodi understood that the 2009 lease
   was a legally binding contract when he signed it. Indeed, he conceded as much in his
   briefing.

                                               5
Case: 22-40530      Document: 00516664033            Page: 6   Date Filed: 03/02/2023

                                      No. 22-40530

   superseded the earlier.”); see also Adam Tech. Int’l S.A. de C.V. v. Sutherland
   Glob. Servs. Inc., 2010 WL 11470723 at *3 (N.D. Texas Oct. 18, 2010)
   (“Under Texas law, when parties have entered into two contracts with
   inconsistent terms that cannot subsist together, the rule of contracts
   conclusively presumes that the latter contract supersedes the earlier
   contract.”). Because the 2009 lease is a valid contract that was entered into
   after the 1989 lease, it supersedes the 1989 lease by operation of law, and is
   the controlling instrument for the purposes of this dispute. See id.
                  B.      The 2009 Lease Bars Pisharodi’s Claims
          Wells Fargo argues that the 2009 lease renders Pisharodi’s claims
   untimely and that serves as an adequate, independent basis for granting
   summary judgment in its favor. We agree. Here, the 2009 lease expressly
   provides that Pisharodi has one year to commence legal action against Wells
   Fargo after a cause of action accrues. Under Texas law, a cause of action
   accrues “when facts come into existence that permit a plaintiff to recover.”
   Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Rincones, 520 S.W.3d 572, 593 (Tex. 2017). Pisharodi
   first discovered that his valuables were missing on April 13, 2017. Thus, a
   timely suit would have been filed on April 13, 2018. But he did not sue Wells
   Fargo until February 2019. His only defense to Wells Fargo’s timeliness
   argument is that the limitation stems from an agreement that was allegedly
   invalid and unenforceable. We have already determined the controlling effect
   of the 2009 lease. See supra Part III.A. Therefore, we hold that his claims
   against Wells Fargo are time-barred.
                                IV.      Conclusion
          For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s summary
   judgment for Wells Fargo.

                                           6