Court Opinion

ID: 9409265
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-17 16:08:25.857323+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:49.702721
License: Public Domain

J-S13042-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    ALONZO HILL                                :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 2307 EDA 2022

             Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 16, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-51-CR-0303621-2001

BEFORE:      NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                            FILED JULY 17, 2023

        Alonzo Hill (“Appellant”) appeals from the order entered in the Court of

Common Pleas of Philadelphia County dismissing as untimely his second

petition for relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

        We glean the procedural history and pertinent facts from our

independent review of the certified record.1 On August 18, 2003, Appellant

entered a counseled guilty plea to first-degree murder, two counts of
____________________________________________

*   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 The Appeals Unit of the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas’ Trial Division
notified this Court on 10/24/22 that the case file for Defendant/Appellant
Alonzo Hill is missing from its file room. Accordingly, the Appeals Unit has
prepared a reconstructed record from available documents from the Court
Document Management System. The notice advises that once the record is
located, a supplemental record will be sent to this Court. Nevertheless, the
notice confirms that the record includes the docket entries and the judicial
opinion for the present PCRA petition and appeal.
J-S13042-23

attempted murder, one count of kidnapping, sexual assault, arson, and

conspiracy for his involvement in the 2000 shooting death of Kevin Williams

and the aftermath of violence that culminated with his fatal shooting of

Maurice Edwards.         On the same date, Appellant was sentenced to life

imprisonment and concurrent sentences. His judgment of sentence became

final 30 days later, on September 17, 2003, when his time for filing a direct

appeal expired. See § 9545(b)(3); Pa.R.A.P. 903(a).

       On June 14, 2006, Appellant filed his first PCRA petition, and the PCRA

court appointed counsel to represent him. On June 25, 2007, counsel filed a

Turner/Finley2 no-merit letter contending that Appellant’s pro se PCRA

petition was untimely filed, and on the following day the PCRA court issued its

dismissal notice under Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. On July 26, 2007, the PCRA court

entered an order dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition for relief. No appeal

was filed.

       On March 2, 2020, Appellant filed the instant PCRA petition, his second,

in which he made several assertions. First, he asserted “facts [he knows] to

be true of his own personal knowledge” that he was “the person that was

forced and coerced into Plea[ding] Guilty to a murder I did not commit. But

ADA Roger King when he new [sic] I was in Vermont at the time of the crime.”

PCRA Petition, 3/2/20, at p.4 ¶¶ 6(A); p.8 ¶15.

____________________________________________

2Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth
v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).

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       Appellant’s petition also claimed there were facts made known to him

by means other than his own personal knowledge, namely, through his recent

use of the prison library and reading the Philadelphia Daily News, that

constituted what he termed “newly discovered evidence” of “prosecutorial

misconduct, in that Roger King suppressed evidence[,]” and that he intended

to seek withdrawal of his guilty plea on such facts. Id. at p. 4 ¶ 6(B) and (C).

Finally, the petition asked the PCRA court to consider the following argument,

“I was coerced by Roger King, as well there are new newspaper work that

came out 2019 on Roger King. And new by [sic] FBI paperwork show I was

in Vermont at the time of the crime. Which Roger King was told this. And he

still falsely accused me for the crime.” Id. at p.8 ¶ 15.3

       On April 7, 2022, the PCRA court issued Rule 907 Notice of Intent to

Dismiss Appellant’s second petition because it was patently untimely and did

not invoke an exception to the timeliness provision of the PCRA found at §

9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Acting under an apparent assumption that he was entitled

to continued representation by counsel from his first PCRA action,4 Appellant
____________________________________________

3 Neither the referenced newspaper articles nor any FBI paperwork was
attached to Appellant’s May 2, 2020, petition.

4A petitioner is generally not entitled to court-appointed counsel on a second
or subsequent PCRA petition. See Commonwealth v. Priovolos, 746 A.2d
621, 624 (Pa. Super. 2000) (although first-time PCRA petitioner is entitled to
appointment of counsel, there is no such entitlement on second and
subsequent petitions). But see Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(D) (providing rule-based
entitlement to counsel on a second or subsequent PCRA petition when an
evidentiary hearing is required as provided in Rule 908) and Rule 904(E)
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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filed a response complaining that the PCRA court had not informed him why it

had issued a notice to dismiss instead of a Finley letter. Appellant’s Response

filed 4/19/22.      On August 16, 2022, the PCRA Court entered an order

dismissing his second PCRA petition and notifying him of his appeal rights.

This timely appeal followed.

       In Appellant’s pro se brief, he asks whether the PCRA court erroneously

dismissed his untimely petition when, he maintains, the petition qualified for

an exception to the PCRA’s one-year time-bar.         In support of this issue,

however, Appellant offers only a single, conclusory statement that his petition
____________________________________________

(judge shall appoint counsel whenever the interests of justice require it). We
find no error with the PCRA court’s application of the general rule in the case
sub judice.

Nevertheless, Appellant has raised in his brief the apparent claim that
appointed counsel who represented him in his first PCRA action in 2007 has
provided ineffective assistance of counsel and/or abandoned him in the
present PCRA action by failing to either act in reply to correspondence he sent
to her in relation to the present petition or file a Turner/Finley notice of
withdrawal from representation. See Brief for Appellant at 6. Appellant’s
claim affords him no relief.

In Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381 (Pa. 2021), a decision
Appellant cites as supportive of his claim, our Supreme Court held that a
defendant may raise claims of ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel for the
first time during an appeal from the denial of a timely filed first PCRA petition
where the PCRA counsel in question represented the defendant until the
appeal. Bradley, 261 A.3d at 401-05. In contrast to the operative facts in
Bradley, however, Appellant filed no appeal from the denial of his first PCRA
petition in which appointed counsel represented him, nor has he been
represented by any counsel in this, his second, PCRA petition. Accordingly,
Bradley is inapposite to his case, and his claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel fails.

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is reviewable under the Newly Discovered Fact Exception at Section

9545(b)(1)(ii).     Brief of Appellant at 2.     Moreover, in his reply brief,5 he

expands on his position with the lone assertion, “on 3/1/2020, Appellant filed

a post-conviction [sic] alleging Newly Discovered Evidence in the form of

newspaper articles in addition to federal documents that indicate Appellant

was not in the city when the murder occurred. See Exhibit “B”.” Reply Brief

at 4 (unpaginated).

       Exhibit B of Appellant’s reply brief consists of a photocopied segment of

an unattributed and undated newspaper article reporting that police obtained

arrest warrants for Appellant in connection with the death of Maurice Edwards

and that Appellant “also is under federal investigation for running a drug

trafficking ring with connections to Vermont, police said.” Appellant’s Reply

Brief, Exhibit B. Relatedly, Appellant avers that Exhibit A of the reply brief

shows that he submitted to prior counsel in 2021 purported newly discovered

evidence from the FBI indicating that he was not in Philadelphia on the day

Maurice Edwards was murdered.              Exhibit A consists of a Department of

Corrections “Cash Slip” dated 10/29/21 upon which Appellant wrote “for my

attorney information, federal information” and included the name of PCRA

counsel who represented him 14 years earlier.

       The Commonwealth responds that neither the referenced newspaper

articles alluding to ADA Roger King’s misconduct in other cases nor the yet to
____________________________________________

5 We grant Appellant’s April 13, 2023, Application for Extension of Time to
File a Reply Brief.

                                           -5-
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be revealed FBI paperwork supposedly offering exculpatory proof of his

whereabouts on the day of Maurice Edwards’ murder was ever attached to

Appellant’s second PCRA petition or submitted to the PCRA court prior to the

court’s order dismissing the petition. Likewise, the Commonwealth asserts

that Appellant failed to allege either in his petition or appellate briefs any “new

fact” about how he was allegedly coerced or forced to plead guilty while

represented by counsel during plea negotiations.6

       Initially, we address the adequacy of Appellant’s briefs. Appellate briefs

must conform to the briefing requirements set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules

of Appellate Procedure. See Pa.R.A.P. 2101. Where an appellant's brief

contains substantial defects, we may quash or dismiss the appeal.

Commonwealth v. Adams, 882 A.2d 496, 497-98 (Pa. Super. 2005)

(citation omitted).

       “Although this Court is willing to construe liberally materials filed by a

pro se litigant, a pro se appellant enjoys no special benefit.” Commonwealth

v. Tchirkow, 160 A.3d 798, 804 (Pa. Super. 2017). “This Court will not act

as counsel and will not develop arguments on behalf of an appellant.”

Commonwealth v. Hardy, 918 A.2d 766, 771 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation

omitted).

____________________________________________

6 The record contains Appellant’s March 21, 2001, Written Guilty Plea Colloquy
that both he and his counsel signed. In it, Appellant represented that nobody
had threatened or forced him to plead guilty.

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       “[I]t is an appellant's duty to present arguments that are sufficiently

developed for our review. The brief must support the claims with pertinent

discussion, with references to the record and with citations to legal

authorities.”    Id. (citations omitted); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a)-(c).    As

such, “[w]hen issues are not properly raised and developed in briefs, when

the briefs are wholly inadequate to present specific issues for review, a court

will not consider the merits thereof.” Commonwealth v. Sanford, 445 A.2d

149, 150 (Pa. Super. 1982) (citations omitted).

       However, because we can discern the crux of one argument offered in

support of Appellant’s “newly discovered fact” exception-based challenge, we

decline to quash the present appeal because of briefing deficiencies.

Specifically, we review Appellant’s contention that newspaper articles

regarding ADA Roger King’s prosecutorial misconduct in other cases supplies

a “new fact” enabling Appellant to claim an exception to the time-bar under

Section 9545(b)(1)(ii).7
____________________________________________

7 With respect to Appellant’s remaining issues, we find he has waived them
for his failure to develop them sufficiently to permit meaningful appellate
review. See Hardy, 918 A.2d at 771 (“When briefing the various issues that
have been preserved, it is an appellant's duty to present arguments that are
sufficiently developed for our review. The brief must support the claims with
pertinent discussion, with references to the record and with citations to legal
authorities. ... [W]hen defects in a brief impede our ability to conduct
meaningful appellate review, we may dismiss the appeal entirely or find
certain issues to be waived.”).

Even if we did not find such claims waived for briefing deficiencies, we would
find they fail to establish that Appellant provided predicate “newly discovered”
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       In reviewing an order denying a PCRA petition, our standard of review

is well settled:

       [O]ur standard of review from the denial of a PCRA petition is
       limited to examining whether the PCRA court's determination is
       supported by the evidence of record and whether it is free of legal
       error.    The PCRA court's credibility determinations, when
       supported by the record, are binding on this Court; however, we
       apply a de novo standard of review to the PCRA court's legal
       conclusions.

Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 203 A.3d 1033, 1043 (Pa. Super. 2019)

(citations omitted and formatting altered). The timeliness of a post-conviction

petition is jurisdictional. Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 79 A.3d 649, 651

(Pa. Super. 2013). Generally, a petition for relief under the PCRA, including

a second or subsequent petition, must be filed within one year of the date the

judgment becomes final unless the petition alleges, and the petitioner proves,

that an exception to the time for filing the petition is met. Id.

____________________________________________

facts in his petition. For example, in Appellant’s petition, he states in the most
general terms that ADA King “coerced and forced” him to plead guilty. This
claim as stated, however, necessarily implies that the alleged fact of ADA
King’s “coercion and force” were known to Appellant prior to his guilty plea
and, thus, are not newly discovered.

The same is true of Appellant’s claim that he presents new facts—namely, the
newspaper article attached in Exhibit “B” of his brief—that indicate he was in
Vermont on the day Maurice Edwards was murdered in Philadelphia. Setting
aside that the attached article does not address Appellant’s whereabouts on
the day of the murder but, instead, reports only that he was under federal
investigation for running a drug trafficking ring with connections to Vermont,
the most that can be said of the article is that it is a newly-discovered source
of a “fact” that Appellant would be presumed to have known all along: his
own whereabouts on the day of the murder.

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J-S13042-23

      The three narrow statutory exceptions to the one-year time bar are as

follows: “(1) interference by government officials in the presentation of the

claim; (2) newly discovered facts; and (3) an after-recognized constitutional

right.” Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51 A.3d 231, 233-34 (Pa. Super. 2012)

(citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii)). In addition, exceptions to the PCRA's

time bar must be pleaded in the petition and may not be raised for the first

time on appeal. Commonwealth v. Burton, 936 A.2d 521, 525 (Pa. Super.

2007); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing that issues not raised before the

lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal).

Moreover, a PCRA petitioner must file his petition “within one year of date the

claim could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).

      Finally, if a PCRA petition is untimely and the petitioner has not pleaded

and proven an exception, “neither this Court nor the [PCRA] court has

jurisdiction over the petition. Without jurisdiction, we simply do not have the

legal authority to address the substantive claims.” Commonwealth v.

Derrickson, 923 A.2d 466, 468 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted).

      Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on September 17, 2003.

Therefore, he had until Friday, September 17, 2004, to file a timely petition.

Because he filed the petition at issue in 2020, it is patently untimely unless he

has satisfied his burden of pleading and proving that one of the enumerated

exceptions applies. See Hernandez, supra.

                                      -9-
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        Appellant argues that his petition comes under the newly discovered

facts exception at Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) to the jurisdictional time-bar. This

exception

        “renders a petition timely when the petitioner establishes that
        [‘]the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to
        the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise
        of due diligence.[’]” Commonwealth v. Small, 238 A.3d 1267,
        1271 (Pa. 2020) (quoting 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii)). A PCRA
        court must first determine “whether the facts upon which the
        claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner[.]” Id. at 1282
        (original quotation marks omitted). If the PCRA court concludes
        that the facts were unknown, then the PCRA court must next
        examine whether “the facts could have been ascertained by the
        exercise of due diligence, including an assessment of the
        petitioner's access to public records.” Id. (citation omitted).

Commonwealth v. Trivigno, 262 A.3d 472, at *3 (Pa. Super. filed Aug. 6,

2021).8

        Under the newly discovered facts exception, the focus is “on [the] newly

discovered facts, not on a newly discovered or newly willing source for

previously known facts.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 863 A.2d 423, 427

(Pa. 2004) (emphasis in original). Similarly, in the context of media reports

____________________________________________

8   Rule 126(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure provides:

        (1) As used in this rule, “non-precedential decision” refers to an
        unpublished non-precedential memorandum decision of the
        Superior Court filed after May 1, 2019 ...

        (2) Non-precedential decisions as defined in (b)(1) may be cited
        for their persuasive value.

Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (effective May 1, 2019).

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offered under the exception, our decisional law instructs that it is not the

source of the facts, e.g., a press release or a newspaper article, but, rather,

the information contained in those media sources which may satisfy the

exception.     Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 173 A.3d 617, 628 (Pa. 2017)

(observing, “facts are not what a reader gleans from media reports or

newspaper articles but, instead, facts are the substantive events . . . which

prompted the report by the media.”).9

       Applying such precedent, this Court has recognized that when a

newspaper reports on admissions or conclusive findings of wrongdoing in other

criminal cases committed by a law enforcement officer or prosecutor who also

was involved in the petitioner’s case, the petitioner still must demonstrate that

such wrongdoing may be linked to his case. Trivigno, 262 A.3d 472 at *4

(discussing Chmiel ).10
____________________________________________

9 In Chmiel, the appellant asserted that his conviction and death sentence
relied heavily on a Commonwealth forensic expert’s presentation of an FBI-
approved method of microscopic hair analysis that the FBI subsequently
rejected publicly for the first time, through a new press release, as erroneous
in the vast majority of cases. Recognizing his PCRA petition was untimely,
petitioner Chmiel relied upon the timeliness exception for newly discovered
facts under Section 9545(b)(1)(ii). Our Supreme Court acknowledged that
the newly discovered facts consisted not of the press release and Washington
Post article in and of themselves, but of the FBI’s public admission “that the
testimony and statements provided by its analysts about microscopic hair
comparison analysis were erroneous in the vast majority of cases” and that
“the FBI had trained many state and local analysts to provide the same
scientifically flawed opinions in state criminal trials.” Id. at 625.

10 To link the newly discovered fact to his case, petitioner Chmiel asserted in
his petition that the Pennsylvania State Police expert who presented the
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       For example, in Trivigno, the petitioner offered as a newly discovered

fact a newspaper article concerning improper investigatory methods of a

detective who had worked on his case. The article, however, did not mention

or relate to petitioner’s case, as it described ongoing investigations into

misconduct committed by the detective in other cases.             Distinguishing

petitioner Trivigno’s case from Chmiel, we observed:

       [Here,] [a]lthough the newspaper article reports instances of
       alleged misconduct by [the subject detective] in his investigation
       of other criminal cases, the newspaper article, unlike the FBI press
       release in Chmiel, does not specifically cite any admissions or
       conclusive findings of wrongdoing by [the detective] that may be
       linked to Appellant's case. Id. ... Therefore, Appellant failed to
       demonstrate that the newspaper article contained a fact that
       triggered the newly-discovered facts exception set forth at 42
       Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii).

Trivigno, 262 A.3d at *4 (citation omitted).

       In Appellant’s PCRA petition, he alleged that the newly discovered facts

upon which he sought PCRA review consisted of newspaper articles addressing

instances of prosecutorial misconduct committed by ADA Roger King in other

cases. Nowhere in either his petition or appellate briefs, however, are the

articles identified, attached as exhibits, or described with any specificity, nor

does he explain how the other cases and conduct described therein are

connected to his case.

____________________________________________

forensic hair analysis results and provided expert testimony on the reliability
of the process had been trained by the FBI and “provided the same
scientifically unsupportable testimony that the FBI now disclaims.” Id. at 623.

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      Therefore, Appellant has failed to plead and prove that the referenced

newspaper articles regarding ADA King’s prosecutorial misconduct in other

cases contained a fact that triggered the newly discovered facts exception to

support the present petition. Accordingly, we discern no error with the Order

denying Appellant relief under his untimely second PCRA petition.

      Order affirmed. Appellant’s Application for Extension of Time to File a

Reply Brief is granted.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 7/17/2023

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