Court Opinion

ID: 9486538
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 11:51:34.609621+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:46.904050
License: Public Domain

EBEL, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to uphold the Appellant’s convictions for Counts One through Six, and I join in the majority’s decision to reversé the sentences imposed for Counts One through Six and to remand the case for resentencing on those counts.
I would reverse the Appellant’s convictions for Counts One through Six, which were predicated on the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, because I do not think that the government met its burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the robberies “affected interstate commerce” as that term is defined in the jury instructions that were given in this ease. The interstate commerce element of a Hobbs Act violation is not superfluous — it is the hook by which the Federal Government gains jurisdiction.1
The Supreme Court held in Stirone that “[b]oth elements [interference with commerce and robbery] have to be charged. Neither is surplusage and neither can be treated as surplusage.” Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218, 80 S.Ct. 270, 274, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960) (“The charge that interstate commerce is affected is critical since the Federal Government’s jurisdiction of this crime rests only on that inference.”). Moreover, the government must meet the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard for each element of a criminal offense. Therefore, for the government to have jurisdiction over an alleged Hobbs Act offense, it must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that interstate commerce was affected. United States v. Boston, 718 F.2d 1511, 1516 (10th Cir.1983) (“the jury was instructed that the government was required to prove that Boston ‘actually or potentially obstructed, delayed or affected interstate commerce or attempted to do so’ ”) cert. denied, 466 U.S. 974, 104 S.Ct. 2352, 80 L.Ed.2d 825 (1984).
The Hobbs Act’s jurisdictional predicate can be satisfied if a mere de minimis effect on interstate commerce is shown. See, e.g., Boston, 718 F.2d at 1516-1517; United States v. Norris, 792 F.2d 956, 958 (10th Cir.1986) (“[a] de minimis effect on commerce has been held to be enough to violate § 1951”); United States v. Whitt, 718 F.2d 1494, 1500 (10th Cir.1983); United States v. Lotspeich, 796 F.2d 1268, 1270 (10th Cir.1986). However, as this Court noted in Lotspeich, the “nexus between the extortionate conduct and interstate commerce may be de minimis but it must nonetheless exist.” Lotspeich, 796 F.2d at 1270; see also United States v. Staszcuk, 517 F.2d 53, 59 (7th Cir.) (“Nor may we disregard the statutory language which requires the prosecutor to prove some connection with interstate commerce in every ease.”) cert. denied, 423 U.S. 837, 96 S.Ct. 65, 46 L.Ed.2d 56 (1975).
The government may prove an effect on interstate commerce by direct or indirect *496evidence. An example of direct proof is evidence of the obstruction of a specific product from crossing interstate lines. For example, evidence that a defendant extorted a kickback from an out-of-state supplier is direct evidence that the extortion affected the movement of that supplier’s interstate sale of his or her product. An example of indirect proof is evidence of a company’s inability to purchase the same amount of out-of-state products because extortion or robbery reduced its assets. Proof of an indirect effect on interstate commerce can be upheld only if the jury is presented with evidence sufficient to make a reasonable inference — beyond a reasonable doubt — that interstate commerce was affected. Esperti v. United States, 406 F.2d 148, 150 (5th Cir.) (“It is a depletion of the resources of the business which permits the reasonable inference that its operations are obstructed or delayed.”) cert. denied, 395 U.S. 938, 89 S.Ct. 2005, 23 L.Ed.2d 458 (1969).
The Tenth Circuit has approved the indirect method of proving an effect on interstate commerce by inferring such an effect from a diminution of assets. We have held “that evidence of depletion of assets may establish the requisite [de minimis ] effect on commerce.” Boston, 718 F.2d at 1516 (emphasis added); see also Norris, 792 F.2d at 958 (“[a] mere ‘depletion of assets’ of a firm engaged in interstate commerce will meet the [de minimis ] requirement”).2 However, like any other factual inference, this one can be allowed to substitute for direct proof only if, under all the facts, such an inference is reasonable. Cf. United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136, 139, 86 S.Ct. 279, 281, 15 L.Ed.2d 210 (1965), where the Supreme Court held that a statutory presumption will not be sustained if there was
“no rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed, if the inference of the one from proof of the other is arbitrary because of lack of connection between the two in common experience.... [WJhere the inference is so strained as not to have a reasonable relation to the circumstances of life as we know them, it is not competent for the legislature to create it....” (quoting Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 63 S.Ct. 1241, 87 L.Ed. 1519 (1943)).
A de minimis depletion of the assets of a business engaged in interstate commerce does not necessarily support a conclusion that interstate commerce has been affected. Instead, the government must provide enough evidence to support a reasonable inference of such an effect. The jury may draw such an inference, but only if it is provided sufficient evidence to support its conclusions. The question before this court is whether the jury was provided adequate evidence to conclude that the Appellant stole sufficient assets from his victims that it is likely, beyond a reasonable doubt, that each of the robberies affected interstate commerce.3 And, this question must be asked as to each count.
Given the small sums of money robbed from each business in this case, in my judgment, the jury could not make a reasonable inference that interstate commerce was affected without knowing more than this record proves. The government could have met its evidentiary burden by showing that the relationship between the money stolen and the businesses’ gross revenues or profits was such that interstate commerce likely or necessarily was affected. The government could have shown that the ratio of assets stolen to total company assets was such that the robbery likely or necessarily affected interstate commerce. Evidence of the company’s inability to fund purchases of interstate goods from other sources could also have been shown. However, some evidence of this type *497was necessary for the jury to make a reasonable inference that interstate commerce was affected.
This record is devoid of any testimony or other evidence of each businesses’ gross revenues, profitability, assets, credit lines, or other means of purchasing interstate goods. Thus, the government provided the jury with no predicate from which it could infer that interstate commerce was likely to be affected by the de minimis reduction in assets that each experienced by these robberies. Moreover, there was direct testimony in at least two of the counts, Counts Five and Six, that the companies’ ability to purchase interstate goods was not adversely affected, or not known to be adversely affected, by the robberies and that no fewer goods were purchased as a result of the robberies.
The majority opinion attempts to overcome this lack of evidence by relying on our earlier decisions in Boston and Whitt. However, this reliance is misplaced because the jury instruction in this case differed from those used in Boston or Whitt.4 In Boston, the court instructed the jury that the government had to prove that Boston “actually or potentially obstructed, delayed or affected interstate commerce or attempted to do so.” Boston, 718 F.2d at 1516. The district court in Boston further instructed that:
while it is not necessary to prove that the defendant specifically intended to interfere with interstate commerce, or attempted to do so, it is necessary as to this issue that the government prove that the natural consequences of the acts or attempted acts alleged in the indictment would be to delay, interrupt or affect “interstate commerce,” which means the flow of commerce or business activities between two or more States.
Id. The court then instructed the jury that the government could meet its burden of proof on this element if it proved any of the following:
(1) that the vendor was engaged in interstate commerce and depletion of the vendor’s assets would be the natural consequence of the alleged extortion; (2) that Major County was engaged in interstate commerce and that a depletion of its assets would be a natural consequence of the alleged extortion; or (3) that the vendor purchased supplies from outside the State of Oklahoma which were then brought into the State and delivered to Major County as a result of the alleged extortion.
Id. at 1516-17.5
Similarly, in Whitt, the court instructed the jury that the government had to prove “that the natural consequences of the acts alleged ... would be to delay, interrupt, or adversely affect commerce.” Whitt, 718 F.2d at 1500. The jurors were further told that the government could meet this burden by showing:
(1) that the vendor was engaged in commerce and that depletion of the vendor’s assets would be the natural consequence of the alleged extortion; (2) that Seminole County was engaged in commerce and that depletion of its assets would be a natural consequence of the alleged extortion; or (3) that the vendor purchased supplies from outside the State of Oklahoma which were then brought into the State and delivered to Seminole County as a result of the alleged extortion.
Id.6
*498In contrast to the Boston and Whitt instructions, the jury in the instant case was instructed as follows:7
The term “obstructs, delays, or affects commerce” means any action which, in any manner or to any degree, interferes with, changes, or alters the movement or transportation or flow of goods, merchandise, money, or other property in interstate commerce (commerce between any place in a state and any place outside that state).
It is not necessary for the government to prove that the defendant actually intended to obstruct, delay, or affect interstate commerce. The government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, however, that the defendant deliberately performed an act, the ordinary and natural consequences of which would be to obstruct, delay, or affect interstate commerce, and that interstate commerce was, in fact, obstructed, delayed or affected.
You aré instructed that the law requires no more than a small or minimal effect on interstate commerce.
Rec., vol. I, doe. 21 at 18. The jury instruction in the instant case guides our inquiry with respect to the jury’s understanding of interstate commerce and the requisite government proof on that issue. The jury was not given the broad “depletion of assets” instruction that was given in Boston and Whitt.
Here, the jury had to assess whether the amounts taken were significant as to each business such that the depletion of assets “obstructed, delayed or affected interstate commerce.” As discussed above, absent direct evidence that interstate commerce was affected, the jury must be given some context within which to evaluate the impact of the loss for each of the businesses robbed. In this case, I cannot conclude that the jury could make such a determination from simply knowing that the businesses involved were convenience stores, restaurants, and gas stations and the minor amounts of money taken in most instances.
Because the government did not meet its burden of proof, the convictions for Counts One through Six should be reversed.

. The Hobbs Act's jurisdictional predicate is based on Congress' authority to regulate interstate commerce. The Hobbs Act provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
(b) As used in this section—
(3) The term 'commerce' means commerce within the District of Columbia, or any Territory or Possession of the United States; all commerce between any point in a State, Territory, Possession, or the District of Columbia and any point outside thereof; all commerce between points within the same State through any place outside such State; and all other commerce over which the United States has jurisdiction.
18 U.S.C. § 1951.

. Norris was convicted as an accessory after the fact to a robbery of a Brinks armored car. The interstate commerce nexus was not described in Norris. However, it is not unreasonable to allow a jury to find an effect on interstate commerce when an armored car has been robbed because the armored car is in the business of facilitating the movement of cash from one business to another. The secure movement of cash among business enterprises is an essential component of interstate commerce.

. There are undoubtedly cases in which the amount stolen was so large that a jury, without more, could make a reasonable inference that interstate commerce was affected. The amounts here do not rise to that level.

. Neither Boston nor Whitt discussed the extent to which a firm's assets must be depleted before an effect on interstate commerce reasonably can be inferred beyond a reasonable doubt.

. Although we found no error in this instruction, that observation appears to have been dicta because the issue in that case was whether the evidence was sufficient to establish the inferences permitted by the instruction. The validity of the instructions as a matter of law does not appear to have been at issue. Appellant did argue that the instruction was a variance from the indictment, but the legal sufficiency of the jury instruction was not otherwise at issue.

.Once again, the legal validity of the instructions was not at issue in Whitt, and so the court's approval of the instructions was dicta. Indeed, the court noted that the Appellant did not even argue that the instruction was spurious in that case. Instead, the issues there, as in Boston, •were only the adequacy of the evidence and whether the instruction was a variance from the indictment.

. Because neither party objected to the jury instructions' at issue, for the purposes of this case we must assume that they were proper.