Court Opinion

ID: 9533070
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:28:02.362364+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:54.441554
License: Public Domain

Wertz, J.
(dissenting): I am unable to agree with the majority opinion of the court, and I will set forth my views wherein I differ.
A few of the pertinent facts relating to plaintiff’s extensive permanent injuries, disability and terrible suffering going to justify the verdict returned by the jury are as- follows:
Donn Slocum, an active twelve-year-old boy at the time of his accident, came into contact with a noninsulated power line carrying 13,800 volts of electricity. The current entered his left hand, charred to a crisp the muscle, fascia, fat and tendons of that hand and wrist, passed through his body and came out the anterior thighs of both legs and the back of the knee and calf of the left leg, leaving burns on his legs that went to the bone. His right hand was also affected by the charge.
He was taken to Stormont-Vail hospital and confined there for a total of eighty-seven days, during which time he underwent two operations of two to three hours’ duration for skin grafts and amputation of the middle finger of the right hand. As testified to by the attending physician, the boy suffered shock most of the time he was in the hospital and “a terrific amount of pain.” When asked to compare the pain in this type of case with other pain that people suffer the doctor testified, “I don’t think there is anything worse, I think this is one of the worst pains that we have.” The doctor further testified it is rather remarkable, with burns as extensive as this boy had and as deep as he had, that he survived; also, that his progress was very slow and very painful.
For a period of well over two months after his release from Stormont-Vail until the time he was taken to the Kansas University Medical Center in January, 1960, the boy had to be returned to the hospital two or three times a week for dressings, during which time, according to the testimony, his legs and arm were still painful. In February, 1960, he was again taken to the KU Medical Center at which time, by surgical procedure, the ring and middle fingers of his left hand were amputated. Because the hand was bent in a turned-*755over position the ligamentous attachment between the bones of the forearm was cut and a pin was driven across the two bones to hold the hand in a more supinated position. Then his wrist was sewed to his stomach for the purpose of skin graft. This operation forced the boy to remain in an uncomfortable humped position for more than a month, after which time he was returned to surgery, cut free from this position, and a piece of loose skin was sewed to his arm and additional skin was taken from his leg and grafted to his abdomen.
The boy underwent three additional operations at the KU Medical Center, one of which was a nerve graft. The ulnar nerve was borrowed as a cable out of the forearm, which necessitated extending the incision back up the forearm another six to eight inches, and was pieced into the missing gap of the median nerve across the big defect, operating through the abdominal wall flap that had been applied to the wrist. This operation was performed in an attempt to restore feeling to any part of the hand, the hand being totally anesthetic on its palmar side. Six months after the nerve graft operation a muscle transplant was performed whereby the plantaris tendon was borrowed out of his leg, hooked into the flexor motor mechanism of the left forearm, a tunnel made for it under the abdominal graft on the wrist and hooked into the remains of the tendons in the wrist. Four months later another muscle transplant operation was performed whereby a tendon was transferred from the back of the hand into the index finger. These operations were performed in an endeavor to restore motion to the fingers in order that the boy could have some use of his hand.
There was testimony that each of the five operations was from four to seven hours in duration. As shown by the doctors testimony, the operations were very disappointing. The usefulness of the plaintiff’s left hand compared to a normal hand is, in the words of the doctor, “practically zero.” And the doctor further testified, “As to the importance, of course, for the doing of bi-manual jobs, the way the hand is now, he is not going to be able to use it for a bimanual job. I would consider it practically 100 per cent disability.” Further testimony brought out the fact there were scars from the burns on both legs and the abdomen, and the possibility exists of having to amputate the entire left arm in the future; that there was atrophy of the thighs and calves of both legs; that the medical expense incurred by the plaintiff to the date of the trial amounted to $7,305.32; and that the boy at *756the time of the trial had a life expectancy of 57.72 years. The doctor testified that in the event of a later amputation the total cost, including an artificial arm, would run between $700 and $1,100.
As shown by the record, Donn Slocum suffered severe electrical shock; has undergone surgery seven times; was confined in the hospital for a total of 160 days; made innumerable trips to the hospital as an out-patient for dressings, treatments and observation; suffered injuries described as among the most painful that can be endured by man; has permanently lost the use of his left arm, wrist and hand; suffered deep burns on both legs and permanent scars thereto; lost the middle finger of the right hand and suffered injury to the index and ring fingers of that hand; missed one full year of school and the major part of another, and because of his disability was unable to take courses in industrial arts; faces future possibility of amputation of his left arm and the need of an artificial limb; and must bear for his lifetime injuries that are disfiguring and unsightly as well as severly and permanently disabling.
With this and other evidence before it, the jury returned a general verdict in favor of plaintiff for $95,000. The trial court found that the jury was not under what it would call passion and prejudice. Plowever, the trial court ordered the remittitur or a new trial on the question of damages only. The rule of law in this state is that after a jury returns a verdict for the plaintiff in a personal injury action absent passion and prejudice, the trial court or this court may order a remittitur or a new trial at the option of the plaintiff, but only when the evidence will not support the sum allowed or the sum itself is so large as to shock the conscience of the court. (Watson v. Parker Township, 113 Kan. 130, 136, 213 Pac. 1051; Blackman v. Honer, 119 Kan. 404, 406, 239 Pac. 750; Green v. Fleming, 126 Kan. 560, 562, 268 Pac. 825.) In the instant case the trial court used neither of these rules. The trial court reasoned that the verdict was excessive, not because the evidence did not support the verdict or that his judicial conscience had been shocked, but because the jury was generous with someone else’s money and they were possibly motivated by the fact defendant was a large corporation, or perhaps the jury felt the judgment would be paid by the stockholders instead of the utility rate payers, and damages were three and one-half times that allowable for death.
The ancient rule followed by this court for the assessment of damages is just compensation for the loss or damage sustained. *757No verdict is right which more than compensates; none which fails to compensate. (Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Milliken, 8 Kan. 647, 655.) A verdict is excessive when it overcompensates a plaintiff. The excessiveness of a verdict is not measured by the ability of a defendant to respond or pay or the fact that the economy might be changed or, as in the instant case, that electric light bills might be increased. It is of no concern to the jury or the trial court how or by whom the judgment will be paid.
In the words of Justice Musmanno of the supreme court of Pennsylvania in Spangler v. Helm's N. Y.-Pgh. M. Express, 396 Pa. 482, 485, 153 A. 2d 490:
“It is not acceptable to say that a jury has no comptometer with which to total up values assignable to economy, industry, attention and tender solicitude. Difficulty of computation is not a barrier to full recovery. The commission of a wrong carries with it the duty to make amends. And if the mending process is additionally expensive because of problems encountered in ascertaining the cost of the rehabilitating agents, that process becomes part of the obligation the tort-feasor must assume. As between the innocent victim of a wrong and the person who accomplished the wrong, the law imposes on the malfeasor the obligation to make the victim whole in every phase in which the victim has suffered, to the extent that rehabilitation is possible in terms of money. And when the jury has made its calculation and has spoken that calculation through its verdict, the verdict is not to be disturbed unless there comes to light some misconduct or misapprehension on the part of the jury, none of which, of course, is evident in the case at bar.”
Early in the history of our country (1812) Chief Justice Kent in Coleman v. Southwick, 9 Johns., N. Y., 45, 6 Am. Dec. 253, stated the rule applicable to the question involved in this case.
“The question of damages was within the proper and peculiar province of the jury. It rested in their sound discretion, under all the circumstances of the case, and unless tire damages are so outrageous as to strike every one with the enormity and injustice of them, and so as to induce the court to believe that the jury must have acted from prejudice, partiality or corruption, we cannot, consistently with the precedents, interfere with the verdict. It is not enough to say, that in the opinion of the court, the damages are too high, and that we would have given much less. It is the judgment of the jury, and not the judgment of the court, which is to assess the damages in actions for personal torts and injuries.
“The damages, therefore, must be so excessive as to strike mankind, at first blush, as being beyond all measure, unreasonable and outrageous, and such as manifestly show the jury to have been actuated by passion, partiality, prejudice, or corruption. In short, the damages must be flagrantly outrageous and extravagant, or the court cannot undertake to diraw the line; for they have no standard by which to ascertain the excess.”
*758This court recognized the logic and reason enunciated by the celebrated Chancellor Kent in the case of Domann v. Pence, 183 Kan. 135, 141, 325 P. 2d 321, where it said:
Pain and suffering have no known dimensions, mathematical or financial. There is no exact relationship between money and physical or mental injury or suffering, and the various factors involved are not capable of proof in dollars and cents. For this very practical reason the only standard for evaluation is such amount as reasonable persons estimate to be fair compensation for the injuries suffered, and the law has entrusted the administration of this criterion to the impartial conscience and judgment of jurors, who may be expected to act reasonably, intelligently and in harmony with the evidence.” [Emphasis supplied.]
An award of damages, though liberal, will not be set aside as excessive where it is not disproportionate to the injuries suffered and it does not appear that the jury acted under bias, prejudice, improper influence or some mistake of fact or law. (Pearson v. Hanna, 145 Me. 379, 70 A. 2d 247, 16 A. L. R. 2d 1.)
As was said in the Pennsylvania case, while there is no standard voltage for judicial shock, the situation which so upsets the judge’s equanimity as to justify the upsetting of a jury’s verdict must be one which would disturb a person of average sensibilities — not one of exaggerated reflexes. The standard of shockability depends upon normal reactions. It is how the person conscious of commodity prices would apply an announced amount of money to necessary purchases. These values naturally must be considered in terms of present purchasing power and not that of decades ago. It was further stated in the Pennsylvania case:
“The person who shocks in 1959 al what he must expend for a good meal or a night’s lodging as against what he paid for the same items 20 years ago will find himself living in a state of constant concussion because the cost of everything is higher today than it was before the silver dollar began its Cape Canaveral ascent into the spiral spaces of inflation.”
Attention is invited to an article written by Judge David Prager on Computation of Damages in Personal Injury Cases, 4 Kan. L. Rev. 91, wherein Judge Prager reviews some of our Kansas cases including the elements of damage in personal injury cases covering medical and hospital expenses, loss of time, physical pain and suffering including fright, terror, grief and shock accompanied by personal injury, mental anguish resulting from mutilation or disfigurement and personal disability or loss of future earning capacity. What is said with reference thereto on pages 94 and 95 *759will suffice here, and what he has to say in his introductory remarks are fitting in the instant case:
“In the wake of crippling injuries comes pain, family hardship, mental anguish and suffering, brooding, feelings of shame, embarrassment, humiliation, fears of pity and poverty, and loss of the ability to support one’s self and family. At the same time the flow of earnings to the family reservoir ceases. If the man is so badly injured that he cannot return to work, or if he can only do the work of part of a man, tiren the injured and his family may soon be cast as parasites upon their relatives and friends, or as beggars upon charity and the community.
“In this time of great adversity, the injured person turns to the courts to protect his rights and to grant him- whatever remedies the justice of his case allows.”
It is noted the majority opinion says that there was no evidence of anticipated future loss of earnings as a result of plaintiff’s injury. All that need be said on this issue is that this court unequivocally has stated in Ladd v. Railway Co., 97 Kan. 543, 155 Pac. 943, that a person whose capacity to labor has been permanently diminished by physical injury wrongfully inflicted upon him by another can recover damages therefor, notwithstanding there may not have been any proof as to what such person’s earnings were before or after the injury. If proof of actual earnings before and after an injury were required, then an injured child, as in this case, could not re-^ cover for loss of future earning capacity, which, of course, would be neither equitable nor just. The plaintiff’s permanent injuries, as related, stand as sufficient proof of his inability to adequately compete in any respect in the open market in future years.
This court has stated that where a judgment is rendered for the plaintiff in a personal injury action and there is nothing in the record to indicate passion or prejudice other than the amount of the verdict, this court will not require the plaintiff to accept a remittitur or grant a new trial unless under the facts disclosed by the record the judgment is so large that it cannot in reason be allowed to stand. (Blevins v. Weingart Truck & Tractor Service, 186 Kan. 258, 263, 349 P. 2d 896.) In this jurisdiction juries today are composed of men and women of standing in the community. They are farmers, merchants, scientists, bankers, engineers, industrialists, laborers, professional tradesmen and businessmen of all kinds. They come from all walks of life and are a cross section of the citizenry of our community. They possess the senses of justice and right between man and man. They recognize their sworn duty to follow the trial court’s instructions as to the law *760applicable to the facts in the case; and, as this court has said, until the contrary is shown it will be presumed that a jury acted fairly, reasonably, intelligently and in harmony with the evidence. (Henderson v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 188 Kan. 283, 289, 362 P. 2d 60.)
When a jury has conscientiously weighed the evidence and in accord with their sworn duty has returned, absent passion and prejudice, a verdict they believe fully compensates an injured plaintiff, a trial judge should not tamper with the verdict or order a remittitur unless the verdict transcends all reason. Every time a judge orders a remittitur he is impinging upon the province of the jury, and our judicial system of trial by jury necessarily suffers.
The right to a jury trial is part of the birthright of every free man. It is a right that is justly dear to the American people. To say in one breath that the jury is the ultimate trier of fact that weighs the evidence and assesses damages for wrongs committed but tlrat a judge can reduce the amount of a verdict for any insignificant reason is abhorrent to our system of jurisprudence. The verdict in the instant case was certainly reasonable under the evidence, but the reasons assigned for reducing the verdict were not judicially sufficient and, in fact, were contrary to the rules followed by this court.
I am of the opinion not only did the trial court abuse its judicial discretion but also usurped, under its finding, the sole function of the jury. I am of the further opinion that the judgment of the trial court should be reversed and the case remanded with instructions to enter judgment on the verdict of the jury.
Robb and Fatzer, JJ., join in the foregoing dissent.