Court Opinion

ID: 9624972
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:23:32.086715+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:58.003414
License: Public Domain

Miller, Justice,

concurring:

Although I concur in the results of this decision, I do not believe the characterization of probation as being “a matter of grace” serves as an adequate basis for the finding that the respondent judge exceeded his legiti*34mate powers by placing a defendant on probation in contravention of a statutory prohibition.
It is argued by Respondent Payne that to require judicial adherence to W.Va. Code, 62-12-2, in this case would constitute cruel and unusual punishment and would create a penalty disproportionate to the character or degree of the offense in violation of both the United States and the West Virginia Constitutions. The claimed violation of constitutional rights ought not to be denied merely by considering probation as “a matter of grace.” We have, in Louk v. Haynes, W.Va., 223 S.E.2d 780, 787 (1976), abandoned the notion that characterizing probation as an act of grace insulates it from further inquiry. Constitutional rights do not “turn upon whether a governmental benefit is characterized as a ‘right’ or as a ‘privilege’”. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374, 29 L. Ed. 2d 534, 91 S. Ct. 1848 (1971). See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 36 L. Ed. 2d 656, 93 S.Ct. 1756 (1973); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548, 92 S.Ct. 2701 (1972); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484, 92 S.Ct. 2593 (1972); Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 79 L. Ed. 1566, 55 S.Ct. 818 (1935).
I am not persuaded by the argument of Respondent Payne that to deny her probation would constitute cruel and unusual punishment or would create a penalty disproportionate to the character or degree of the offense.
The underlying offense of forgery for which the defendant was indicted carries a penalty of one to ten years in the penitentiary or, in the court’s discretion, confinement in jail for not more than one year and a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars. W. Va. Code 61-4-5. This Court discussed at length the concept of cruel and unusual punishment in State ex rel. Pingley v. Coiner, 155 W. Va. 591, 186 S.E.2d 220 (1972). The standards set in Pingley do not warrant striking down the forgery penalty as cruel and unusual punishment or a penalty disproportionate to the character or degree of the offense. West Virginia Constitution, Article III, Section 5.
*35An additional argument advanced by Respondent Payne is that the sentencing of criminal offenders is the function of the courts. Consequently, the removal of the alternative of probation by the Legislature, under W. Va. Code, 62-12-2, from the power of the sentencing judge is an unconstitutional infringement of the inherent power of the court in violation of the separation of powers provision of Article V, Section 1 of the West Virginia Constitution.
We have consistently held that subject to certain constitutional limitations there exists in the Legislature the broad right to define crimes and their punishment. State ex rel. Cogar v. Kidd, W.Va., 234 S.E.2d 899 (1977); State ex rel. Heck’s v. Gates, 149 W.Va. 421, 141 S.E.2d 369 (1965); State v. Painter, 135 W.Va. 106, 63 S.E.2d 86 (1950).
As to the inherent power of a court to grant probation, I am of the view that such power does not exist. In Ex parte Fisher, 95 W. Va. 397, 121 S.E. 287 (1924), it was held that while the courts of this State under the Constitution have inherent power and discretion in the trial of criminal cases and imposition of the penalties fixed by law, such power and authority does not extend to mitigation or nullification of the penalties imposed by law. Specifically, the Court held that courts have no inherent power to suspend a lawful sentence imposed as punishment for crime except for short periods, in which proceedings may be had to test the legality of the judgment. 95 W.Va. at 401, 121 S.E. at 289. Accord, State ex rel. Calandros v. Gore, 126 W.Va. 614, 617, 29 S.E.2d 476, 478 (1944).
Ex parte Fisher, supra, relied heavily on Ex parte United States, Petitioner, 242 U.S. 27, 61 L. Ed. 129, 37 S. Ct. 72 (1916), where Chief Justice White, in examining the common law, concluded that:
“[I]t is, we think, to be conceded: (a) That both suspensions of sentence and suspensions of the enforcement of sentences temporary in character were often resorted to on grounds of error or *36miscarriage of justice which, under our system, would be corrected either by new trials or by the exercise of the power to review, (b) That not infrequently where the suspension either of the imposition of a sentence or of its execution was made for the purpose of enabling a pardon to be sought or bestowed, by a failure to further proceed in the criminal cause in the future, although no pardon had been sought or obtained, the punishment fixed by law was escaped. But neither of these conditions serve to convert the mere exercise of a judicial discretion to temporarily suspend for the accomplishment of a purpose contemplated by law into the existence of an arbitrary judicial power to permanently refuse to enforce the law.” [Emphasis added]
While recognizing that the facts of Ex parte Fisher, supra, are distinguishable from those of the present case, in that here the circuit judge suspended the imposition of sentence, rather than the execution of sentence, I believe the distinction is of no consequence as it relates to whether such power is inherent in the courts of this State. A study of the authorities relied upon by Chief Justice White in Ex parte United States, Petitioner, supra, particularly 2 Hale Pleas of the Crown 412 (1st American ed. 1847), and 4 Blackstone, Commentaries of The Laws of England (1803), convinces me that courts possess no inherent power to place a defendant on probation.
Consequently, the right of probation arises from legislative enactment and there is no violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.
It therefore follows that the trial court, by not possessing any independent power to grant probation and by exceeding the probation power conferred upon it by statute, was acting beyond its jurisdiction. Prohibition will therefore lie to prevent the trial court from granting probation.
I am authorized to state that Justice Harshbarger joins with me in this concurring opinion.