Court Opinion

ID: 9715959
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:21:35.417138+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:40.245095
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE CLARK, dissenting: Because the State failed to meet its burden of proof with respect to the existence of a statutory aggravating factor, and because the prosecutor made erroneous comments during his arguments at the sentencing hearing, I would vacate defendant’s death sentence. In order to enhance a murder to a capital offense, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an aggravating factor exists. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 9 — 1(b).) In this case, the State attempted to prove that the murder was committed pursuant to a contract. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 9 — 1(b)(5).) The only evidence the State presented to meet its burden with respect to the aggravating factor is Benjamin’s testimony regarding defendant’s confession to him. While the confession is adequately corroborated with respect to the commission of the murder itself, there is no evidence to corroborate the State’s claim that defendant was hired to commit the murder. As the majority notes, the State produced enough evidence to corroborate certain statements contained in defendant’s confession. For example, the details in defendant’s confession are consistent with the name of the victim, the location of the shooting, the presence of a bag of flour, the presence of Evans and Lockridge, and the number of shots fired. These facts sufficiently corroborate defendant’s confession, such that the confession, when taken as a whole, supports defendant’s conviction for murder. However, when considered individually, not every statement contained in defendant’s confession to Benjamin is consistent with other evidence. In fact, at least one statement is directly contradicted by the physical evidence in the case. According to Benjamin’s testimony, defendant stated that he used a .357 pistol in the killing. Although there was no direct testimony regarding the caliber of bullets removed from the victim, testimony tends to show the bullets could not have come from a .357 pistol. The pathologist who performed the autopsy on the victim’s body testified that the victim’s head was intact, that there were five bullet entry wounds but no exit wounds, and that six bullets were removed from the victim’s body. Two of the bullets entered the victim through the same entry wound, which indicates that the shots were fired from an extremely close range. This testimony indicates that the bullets did not come from a large caliber gun, such as a .357 pistol. It is inconceivable that the victim’s head would be left intact if the victim received six shots from a .357 pistol at close range. Moreover, a gun that powerful could be expected to produce exit wounds. Therefore, the manifest weight of the evidence shows that, contrary to defendant’s statement in his confession, a .357 pistol was not used in the murder. The fact that a .357 pistol was not used in this murder does not of course mandate a reversal of defendant’s conviction. Rather the fact defendant lied with respect to this portion of his confession points out that he may have also lied with respect to the money he was to receive for the killing. If, as the State argues, defendant was boasting of his crimes in order to enhance his status among his fellow inmates, it is very possible that he embellished the facts to enhance the story. This is one possible explanation for the inaccurate description of the gun used. Indeed the State specifically argues that defendant “in all likelihood was boasting about the size of the gun he used.” Such an explanation can be applied equally to that portion of the confession dealing with the contract. That is, defendant may have lied about the contract in order to enhance his status among fellow inmates. The fact defendant’s confession contained lies is especially relevant because the State produced no evidence to corroborate the specific statement that defendant was to receive money for his role in the murder. Given the fact that at least one other statement in the confession was false, I believe the State had the burden of producing evidence to corroborate the individual statement regarding the contract. Because no such evidence was produced, I believe a reasonable doubt exists as to whether the murder was committed pursuant to a contract. Therefore, I would reverse defendant’s death sentence. As support for their finding that the State met its burden, the majority relies on evidence of the steps taken to lure the victim to a vacant apartment, the number of shots fired into the victim, and the fact an El Rukn general witnessed the killing. The majority contends these facts support a finding that the murder was committed pursuant to a contract. This reasoning is tenuous at best. This evidence supports a finding that the murder was premeditated, that defendant had accomplices who may have witnessed the murder, and that defendant took steps to avoid detection. However, it does not in any way indicate the motive for the killing, or that defendant received money for the murder. In addition to the lack of evidence to corroborate the existence of a contract, numerous statements by the prosecutor during his closing argument at the first phase of the sentencing hearing warrant reversal of the death sentence. The majority concludes that defendant waived objections to these errors because he did not object at trial or include the errors in a post-trial motion. Moreover, the majority concludes that the errors were not plain error because the evidence was not closely balanced. (142 Ill. 2d at 466.) Because I believe the evidence was closely balanced with respect to the existence of a contract, I would apply the plain error doctrine and review the alleged errors. People v. Young (1989), 128 Ill. 2d 1, 47. The erroneous arguments arose in the sentencing hearing, which is a proceeding separate from the guilt or innocence phase of the trial. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 9 — 1(d).) Therefore, the only relevant question is whether the evidence was closely balanced with respect to the existence of "a contract. The fact that the confession was corroborated in respects other than the existence of a contract is irrelevant to a determination of whether the evidence was closely balanced in regard to the aggravating factor. During its opening argument at the sentencing hearing, the State argued that the jury’s guilty verdict was equivalent to a finding that the murder was committed pursuant to a contract. Specifically the State argued: “With regard to the second propositions, second issue, whether or not the defendant committed the murder as a result of a contract agreement or an understanding whereby he was to receive money, this you have already decided in your guilty verdict. By your guilty verdict you have told the witnesses who were on the stand that, ‘We believe those witnesses and we believe what they say.! So, don’t go back there and try to rehash your own guilty verdict. * * * You have already decided these issues. You have already decided the fact that what William Benjamin told you was backed up, re-enforced [sic] corroborated by what LaShone Joyner told you, what the medical examiner told you and what the evidence from Peter Poole and the scene photo showed you. Don’t go back and rehash that, ladies and gentlemen. You[r] duty is easy at this point. You have already found that the second statutory factor, that being that he was convicted of a murder pursuant to a contract agreement or understanding is in place.” Defendant argues these comments misstate the law in that a guilty verdict does not necessarily encompass a finding that the murder was committed pursuant to a contract. I agree. Initially, I note that there are certainly instances in which a jury’s verdict necessarily means that it has also found the existence of an aggravating factor. For example, it is possible for a jury to convict a defendant with armed robbery and murder arising out of the same incident. In such a case, the jury has necessarily determined that the murder occurred in the course of committing another felony. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 9— 1(b)(6).) However, in this case no such conclusion may be drawn from the jury’s guilty verdict. Motive is not an element of murder, and as such, the jury need not have even considered why the victim was killed. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 9 — 1(a).) Therefore, the State’s comments that the jury had already decided the issue is not supported by the evidence. At best, these comments could have confused the jurors, and at worst could have misled them. Defendant contends a second error was made during the State’s rebuttal argument when the prosecutor stated: “Why did the murder happen? There was no logical explanation given. Mr. Benjamin’s testimony has given the facts and circumstances of the case and it was a contract.” Defendant argues that this statement improperly shifted the burden of proof to defendant with respect to the aggravating factor. I agree. There is a legal presumption that this murder was not committed pursuant to a contract. This is implicit in the fact that the State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that an aggravating factor exists. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 9 — 1(f).) Therefore, defendant need not have produced any evidence on the issue. The State’s comment implies that because no other “logical explanation” was presented, Benjamin’s testimony must be true. Such a comment misstates the burden of proof in this case. The impact of the error is compounded by the fact defendant has maintained throughout the entire proceeding that he did not commit the murder or confess to Benjamin. Accordingly, defendant could not be expected to put on evidence that he had a different motive for the killing. The combined effect of the State’s improper comments may have misled the jury into believing that it had already decided the existence of an aggravating factor, and that defendant had the burden of disproving this factor. Taken alone each of these comments is reversible error. Together the effect is even more apparent. Therefore, I would reverse defendant’s death sentence and remand for a new sentencing hearing. JUSTICE FREEMAN joins in this dissent.