Court Opinion

ID: 9643782
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:40:33.869872+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:03.763540
License: Public Domain

POPOVICH, Judge,
dissenting:
I must dissent from the majority’s unwarranted approval of a delay which violates the Rule 1100 run date under the guise of following a rule of law reaffirmed in a recent case.
According to the majority, “there was no need for the Commonwealth to provide further testimony” because “a hearing court may properly take judicial notice of uncontested notations in the court record” in deciding (1) whether the prosecution has exercised due diligence in attempting to bring an accused to trial and (2) whether the requirements for an extension based on judicial delay have been established by the prosecution, quoting Commonwealth v. Harris, 315 Pa.Super. 544, 462 A.2d 725 (1983).
To begin with, the notations in the record were not uncontested. At the hearing, the following dialogue occurred between defense counsel and the trial court:
“THE COURT: 4-11 with a normal run date of 10-8.
[Attorney for Appellant] MS. RAKINIC: I believe on that date, Judge, the complaining witness failed to appear, at least my file so indicates.
*40THE COURT: It doesn’t say it here. Strike that, it says, ‘Bench warrant BOSO rescinded, defendant appeared late, Commonwealth not ready.
6-21 to 8-3, Commonwealth witness not present.
8-31 to 10-3, [Arresting officer on vacation.’
Is there anything prior to that? That’s all I have.
MS. RAKINIC: No. I think that the Preliminary Hearing was held at the first listing on 4-21, Judge. 5-5 was just the trial arraignment date. So that there are three continuances at which the Commonwealth was unprepared and that would be 6-21, 8-31 and 10-3.
THE COURT: And there’s one in which your defendant arrived late.
MS. RAKINIC: That’s the same as the one where the complaining witness was not there at any rate.
THE COURT: I’m going to find enough to give them one more opportunity.
It's now listed for what date?
MS. RAKINIC: 11-8, Room 475.
THE COURT: 11-8 on a must be tried basis.” (N.T. 10/27/78, at 2-3) (Emphasis added).
Thus, the record shows that defense counsel contended that there were “three continuances at which the Commonwealth was unprepared.” Id. Defense counsel further contended that the one day delay which was caused by the appellant’s late appearance in court occurred at the same time as the delay where “the complaining witness was not there.” Id.
The court never responded to this assertion made by defense counsel but instead stated, “I’m going to find enough to give them [the prosecution] one more opportunity.” Id. The trial court also failed to address the Rule 1100 issue in its opinion. As a result, this factual matter remains unresolved. Additionally, this writer notes that the prosecutor did not contradict the defense counsel’s representation since the prosecutor did not utter a single word at the hearing.
*41This is significant because according to the majority, a trial court need not resolve the factual discrepancies or articulate the facts in support of its ruling to grant a prosecution’s petition for extension, as long as there is some evidence in the record that the court has examined the notations in the record at the Rule 1100 hearing. Moreover, although the majority has cited Commonwealth v. Harris, supra, that case is inapposite. To begin with, in Harris, we said that “a hearing court may properly take judicial notice of uncontested notations in the court.” 315 Pa.Superior Ct. at 551, 462 A.2d at 729. (Emphasis added). In this writer’s mind, the notations were not uncontested. In Harris, the record contained “three continuances for which the court was responsible, one defense continuance and no Commonwealth continuances:” At 550. (Footnote omitted) (Emphasis added). The first continuance was requested by the public defender, the second and third continuances were charged to the court because the wrong defendant was transported from the prison for the trial and because a judge recused himself upon the advice of the district attorney who advised the judge of a previous trial which involved the defendant. Id. at 552 and 553. On these facts, this Court held that “the record of the combined hearing reveals that despite diligent efforts, the Commonwealth could not bring appellant to trial on August 14, 1979 or August 22, 1979, although it was ready to proceed to trial on both of these dates and had been ready to proceed to trial on several listing dates prior to the original run date of August 6, 1979.” At 556. (Emphasis added).
In the instant case, unlike Harris, the prosecution requested the continuances, except for the one day which was due to the defendant’s late appearance in court. Additionally, there was no indication as to “why, despite the unavailability of its witness ... the case could still not be commenced on or before [the run date].” Commonwealth v. Postell, 280 Pa.Super. 550, 553-554, 421 A.2d 1069, 1070 (1980).
*42It is obvious that, in the instant case, existing case law fails to support the majority’s bootstrap logic. Hence, my dissent.