Court Opinion

ID: 9694017
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 17:18:37.692739+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:54.395211
License: Public Domain

Justice McCAFFERY,
Dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the result reached by the Majority. I believe that as a matter of law, Appellant has not made and could not make, under any circumstances, a strong prima facie showing that the denial of this serial PCRA petition resulted in a miscarriage of justice. Specifically, he cannot demonstrate that the proceedings which resulted in his being sentenced to death were so unfair that no civilized society could tolerate the outcome. Without such a showing, I believe that relief under the PCRA is not warranted. Therefore, I depart from both the analysis engaged in and the result reached by the Majority in awarding Appellant relief. Rather, I would affirm the order denying relief from the 1981 jury verdict that Appellant be sentenced to death for this murder, Appellant’s third.
*494The Majority remands this matter primarily for the PCRA court to consider Appellants claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present mental-health/psychiatric mitigation evidence at the penalty phase of trial, and relies upon the decision in Commonwealth v. Gibson, 597 Pa. 402, 951 A.2d 1110, 1122-23, for doing so. See op. at 482-85, 967 A.2d at 391-92. However, Gibson involved a first post-conviction request for collateral relief in which the petitioner was not required to establish that a miscarriage of justice had occurred.
I believe the Majority accords insufficient weight to the fact that Appellant has already had the benefit of collateral review of his death sentence. The consequences of this are of great significance: in the context of a serial PCRA petition, unless Appellant can make a strong prima facie showing that a miscarriage of justice has resulted, he is not entitled to any relief from his judgment of sentence. Commonwealth v. Lawson, 519 Pa. 504, 549 A.2d 107, 112 (1988) (holding that a second request for collateral relief “will not be entertained unless a strong prima facie showing is offered to demonstrate that a miscarriage of justice may have occurred.”)- A petitioner makes a prima facie showing if he “demonstrates that either the proceedings which resulted in his conviction were so unfair that a miscarriage of justice occurred which no civilized society could tolerate, or that he was innocent of the crimes for which he was charged.” Commonwealth v. Carpenter, 555 Pa. 434, 725 A.2d 154, 160 (1999) (quoting Commonwealth v. Morales, 549 Pa. 400, 701 A.2d 516, 520-21 (1997)). The Lawson miscarriage of justice standard also applies to the analysis of claims of counsel’s ineffectiveness during the penalty phase of a capital case. See Commonwealth v. Szuchon, 534 Pa. 483, 633 A.2d 1098 (1993).
Here, Appellant does not assert that he is actually innocent of the murder. Therefore, in order to establish that a miscarriage of justice occurred, he would have to show that the proceedings which resulted in his being sentenced to death were so unfair that no civilized society could tolerate the outcome.
*495In the context of “successive, abusive or defaulted” applications for federal habeas corpus relief from persons sentenced to the penalty of death, the United States Supreme Court has held that a claim of counsel’s ineffectiveness based upon failure to present additional mitigating evidence cannot meet the miscarriage of justice standard. Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, at 345-347, 112 S.Ct. 2514, 120 L.Ed.2d 269 (1992), construed in Bell v. Thompson, 545 U.S. 794, 812, 125 S.Ct. 2825, 162 L.Ed.2d 693 (2005). Only evidence that affects a defendant’s eligibility for the death penalty can support a miscarriage of justice claim in the capital sentencing context:
The psychological evidence petitioner alleges was kept from the jury due to the ineffective assistance of counsel does not relate to petitioner’s guilt or innocence of the crime. Neither does it relate to either of the aggravating factors found by the jury that made petitioner eligible for the death penalty. Even if this evidence had been before the jury, it cannot be said that a reasonable juror would not have found both of the aggravating factors that make petitioner eligible for the death penalty. Therefore, as to this evidence, petitioner has not shown that there would be a fundamental miscarriage of justice for the Court to fail to reexamine the merits of this successive claim.
Sawyer at 348-49, 112 S.Ct. 2514 (footnotes omitted).1
In Pennsylvania, in order to find a defendant eligible for the death penalty, a jury must unanimously find at least one aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(c)(1)(iv); Commonwealth v. Roney, 581 Pa. 587, 866 A.2d 351, 360 (2005).2 Thus, if the alleged ineffective*496ness of trial counsel pertains to trial counsels failure to introduce additional mitigating evidence, by definition it does not pertain to an aggravating circumstance, and thus does not and cannot affect the defendant’s eligibility for the death penalty. I believe our High Court’s determination that a federal petitioner sentenced to death is entitled to no relief from that sentence despite his claim of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to adduce additional mitigating evidence conclusively refutes any notion that such a claim may result in proceedings that are so unfair as to constitute a miscarriage of justice that no civilized society could tolerate. That is the basis for my belief that Appellant cannot sustain his burden in this serial PCRA petition.
I am not advocating a sua sponte change in our review paradigm, as suggested by the Majority (see op. at 394). Rather, I am suggesting that this Court place proper emphasis upon the heavy burden that a serial PCRA petitioner bears in establishing a strong prima facie showing of a miscarriage of justice under Lawson. In the present case, I believe that Appellant cannot meet that burden, for the reasons outlined above. In addition, the Commonwealth has brought to this Court’s attention the fact that Appellant has not so much as acknowledged his burden under Lawson, and the Commonwealth urges that on this basis alone, the denial of relief should be summarily affirmed. See Commonwealth’s Brief at 8-9. Appellant has had ample opportunity to avail himself of advocacy that could have served as an aid to this Court’s resolution of his claim of error in the denial of his request for *497post-conviction relief. However, while I believe it is a burden that is, in this instance, insurmountable, Appellant has simply-chosen to ignore his burden.3
In light of the United States Supreme Court’s definitive holding that the failure to present additional mitigating evidence at the penalty phase of a capital case does not and cannot be considered a miscarriage of justice, I believe it is a waste of judicial resources to remand this case for any further proceedings. Accordingly, I would affirm the PCRA court’s denial of relief. Because the Majority remands for further proceedings on Appellant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and does not consider whether Appellant would ever be able to meet the miscarriage of justice test, I respectfully dissent.

. See also Szuchon v. Lehman, 273 F.3d 299, 324 (3rd Cir.2001) (holding that the miscarriage of justice test is not met where the basis for the claim is that an alleged constitutional error prevented additional mitigating evidence from being introduced at a penalty phase hearing).

. See also Commonwealth v. Hughes, 581 Pa. 274, 865 A.2d 761, 798, n. 41 (2004) ("The capital sentencing process implicates two discrete determinations; the first is eligibility, in which the statutory scheme narrows the class of persons who may be subject to the death penalty; the second is selection, at which point the sentencer decides whether a person who is eligible for the death penalty should receive such punishment. Aggravating circumstances provide the means of narrowing the *496class for purposes of eligibility and, under the Pennsylvania statute, along with mitigating circumstances and victim impact evidence, serve as the bases for the selection decision.”) (citation omitted); Commonwealth v. Boczkowski, 577 Pa. 421, 846 A.2d 75, 101 (2004) (“In the eligibility determination, the statutory scheme must narrow the class of persons for whom the death penalty applies and justify the imposition of such penalty as compared to others found guilty of murder. One means of narrowing the class is by prescribing aggravating circumstances that must exist before the death penalty can be imposed, which serves to appropriately channel the sentencer's discretion. The selection decision is implicated when the sentencer decides whether a defendant who is eligible for the death penalty should in fact receive that sentence.”) (citations omitted).

. I disagree with the Majority that Appellant adequately addresses his burden of making a strong prima facie showing that he is the victim of a miscarriage of justice (see op. at 488 n. 21, 967 A.2d at 395 n. 21). Rather, Appellant’s single-sentence reference to a "miscarriage of justice” on page 15 of his principal brief is made in the context of his argument that none of the issues he currently raises has been waived. Appellant does not cite Lawson or in any manner refer to his enhanced burden as a serial PCRA petitioner. Similarly, Appellant's belated citation to Lawson in his reply brief is unaccompanied by any developed argument concerning his burden. I find these cursory allusions to a "miscarriage of justice” to be precisely the type of issue presented in a "boilerplate fashion” that the Majority attributes to deficient stewardship. See op. at 474 n. 7, 967 A.2d at 386 n. 7.