Court Opinion

ID: 9758112
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 23:12:14.030536+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:59:09.290251
License: Public Domain

*848KELLER, Justice,
Concurring.
This matter is before the Court on the Commonwealth’s motion for certification of a question of law pursuant to Kentucky Constitution § 1151 and Civil Rule 76.37(10).2 In accordance with CR 76.37’s procedural requirement that such motion set forth “[t]he questions of law to be answered,”3 the Commonwealth stated:
The question of law to be answered is whether an instruction on Assault Fourth Degree was properly given as a “lesser included offense” in the jury trial of Commonwealth v. William Hager, Jr., Case No. 99CR267, wherein the Defendant was tried by the jury for Murder, KRS 507.020.
Accordingly, the sole argument raised by the Commonwealth in its brief reads: “The Respondent was not entitled to an instruction of Assault in the Fourth Degree where the evidence was undisputed that the victim was deceased.”
As the evidence submitted at Hager’s trial for murder required the trial court to instruct the jury regarding both self-defense and lesser included, unintentional homicide crimes, this Court granted certification in order to eliminate the confusion resulting from Elliott v. Commonwealth4 by clarifying how KRS 503.120(1) applies to the offenses of second degree manslaughter and reckless homicide.5 Although the scope of the opinion would suggest otherwise, we did not grant certification to engage in a “top-to-bottom” review 6 of all the jury instructions given in the case. Approximately two-thirds of the majority opinion criticizes alleged deficiencies in the instructions which were not even briefed by the parties and which are unrelated to either the narrow question framed for certification or the ancillary KRS 503.120(1) issue. Because I can see no legitimate reason for this needless criticism, I write separately.
In the first two paragraphs of its opinion, the majority fully and correctly answers the certified question: “[A] conviction of fourth-degree assault can only be obtained if the result of the assault is physical injury, not death.”7 After focusing upon unrelated instructions for the *849bulk of the opinion, the majority returns to an issue before us in Section II and explains how KRS 503.120(1) applies to the offenses of second degree manslaughter and reckless homicide. Although I have few substantive objections to the majority’s analysis of the issues actually before this Court, I strongly object to the remaining portion of the majority opinion, which I can only rationalize as the majority’s attempt to characterize the verdict in this case as a result of trial court error. If the purpose of this opinion is to allocate fault, I submit that this Court should accept its share.
It was this Court’s failure to adequately address the issues before it in Elliott which requires us now to answer the questions we should have answered over two years ago.8 At Hager’s trial, the judge and all of the attorneys recognized that Elliott should govern the issue before them.9 After turning to Elliott, however, everyone remained confused about one important question: What crime does a defendant who would otherwise be guilty of reckless homicide commit when he acts pursuant to a recklessly erroneous belief in his need for self-protection? I believe the trial court was unable to make this determination largely because this Court avoided this exact question in Elliott and, instead, unrealistically expected the trial courts of the Commonwealth to deduce the “correct” result without any precedential analysis which would allow them to do so.10 This Court, therefore, shares the blame for the result in this case.
I write separately also to offer a suggestion which I believe would improve Form Verdict No. 2 as set out in the majority opinion. Although the majority opinion does not discuss the evidence introduced at trial in this case, it is important to note that the evidence would have supported a verdict of either intentional or wanton murder.11 Accordingly, the trial court could properly combine both theories in one instruction. In another case where the evidence supports only intentional murder or only wanton murder, however, the murder instruction should include only the theory justified by the evidence. Because jury verdicts must be unanimous, *850combination instructions increase the risk of reversible error. In fact, this Court has reversed convictions in combination instruction cases where the instructions submit a theory not justified by the evidence and the jury’s verdict does not indicate the theory upon which it found the defendant guilty.12 A verdict form similar to the following can reduce this risk:
We, the jury, find the defendant guilty of_under Instruction No._[MURDER under Instruction No. 3B(1) or 3B(2); FIRST-DEGREE MANSLAUGHTER under Instruction No. 4B(1) or 4B(2); SECOND-DEGREE MANSLAUGHTER under Instruction No. 5 or 7B(2); or RECKLESS HOMICIDE under Instruction No.6 or 7B(1) ]
FOREPERSON
STUMBO, J., joins this concurring opinion.

. "In all cases, civil and criminal, there shall be allowed as a matter of right at least one appeal to another court, except that the commonwealth may not appeal from a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case, other than for the purpose of securing a certification of law....” Ky. Const. § 115.

. "A request by the Commonwealth of Kentucky pursuant to Section 115 of the Constitution of Kentucky shall be initiated in the Supreme Court. The request shall be initiated within thirty (30) days of a final order adverse to the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth shall initiate the certification procedure by motion requesting the Supreme Court to accept the question(s) for review....” CR 76.37(10).

. See CR 76.37(10) ("The motion shall contain the same elements as provided in this Rule, Section (3) for a certification order.” Id.)-, CR 76.37(3) ("A certification order shall set forth (a) The questions of law to be answered." Id.).

. Ky., 976 S.W.2d 416 (1998).

. The parties in this case acknowledge that the KRS 503.120 issue is intertwined with the question framed for certification: “The Commonwealth also requests that the Court set forth how the erroneous belief qualification should be applied to the crime of recldess homicide." Brief for Movant at 7.

. The majority, without any request for certification, ruminates upon topics such as: the quality of instructions regarding the presumption of innocence; the breadth of terms to be defined within a separate instruction for definitions; the sequence in which instructions should be presented; the use of interrogatories, and the trial court’s grammar.

. Majority Opinion at 41 S.W.3d 837.

.Although the majority asserts that this Court “has not specifically addressed how KRS 503.120(1) affects the defense of self-protection when asserted as a defense to an offense having wantonness or recklessness as a culpable mental state ... because it was not asserted in Elliott that the defendant was mistaken in his belief that he needed to act in self protection,” Majority Opinion at 41 S.W.3d 842, the evidence in Elliott, an appeal from a conviction and indictment for reckless homicide, unquestionably raised an issue of whether Elliott reasonably believed “the degree of force used” was necessary: "There was evidence that Appellant then stomped [the victim], kicked him in the head, and otherwise beat him in excess of that necessary for his own self-protection.” Elliott v. Commonwealth, Ky., 976 S.W.2d 416, 418 (1998). KRS 503.120, on its face, applies to wanton or reckless beliefs regarding "the degree of force used.” KRS 503.120. Nonetheless, this Court reversed and remanded Elliott without instructing the trial court as to how it should instruct the jury with regard to the erroneous belief qualification upon retrial of this reckless homicide charge. In the infamous footnote 3, however, this Court was kind enough to explain the effect of a recklessly erroneous belief in the need for self protection upon every other degree of criminal homicide.

. The video trial record is clear on this point, and the attorneys and trial judge actually take turns reading the Elliott opinion on videotape.

. In fact, it appears the trial court attempted to apply the scant analysis contained in Elliott ⅛ footnote 3 as it searched for a crime to which reckless homicide could be "reduced.”

. The evidence also supported both theories for first-degree manslaughter, and they were also combined in one instruction.

. See Barbour v. Commonwealth, Ky., 824 S.W.2d 861 (1992); Ice v. Commonwealth, Ky., 667 S.W.2d 671 (1984); Hayes v. Commonwealth, Ky., 625 S.W.2d 583 (1981).