Court Opinion

ID: 9852951
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:39:41.916582+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:38.447333
License: Public Domain

THOMPSON, Justice,
dissenting.
A majority of this Court today holds that it is not reversible error for a trial court to fail to instruct a jury, when requested, as to the State’s burden of proof with regard to an affirmative defense. Because this holding is contrary to our case law and authorizes juries *581to determine the guilt or innocence of a defendant with no direction as to the evidentiary burden applicable to an affirmative defense, I dissent.
In Bishop v. State, 271 Ga. 291 (2) (519 SE2d 206) (1999), this Court resolved a three-decade long conflict in our cases concerning whether the failure to give a charge on the State’s burden to disprove an affirmative defense constitutes reversible error. We resolved the conflict by holding that the failure to give the charge is reversible error and rejecting the ruling of previous cases which concluded that the failure to give the charge is not error when the charge as a whole is correct. We have not deviated from the ruling of Bishop in subsequent cases, instead making it absolutely clear that when a trial court fails to instruct a jury, when requested, on the State’s burden of proof with regard to an affirmative defense, the defendant is entitled to a new trial. See Griffin v. State, 267 Ga. 586 (1) (481 SE2d 223) (1997); State v. Shepperd, 253 Ga. 321 (320 SE2d 154) (1984).
The majority opinion rejects this authority and distinguishes this case based on the fact that the trial court did not refuse to give the charge but committed its omission by a “slip of the tongue.” Contrary to the majority opinion, however, our decisions on this issue turn not on whether the omission of the essential charge resulted from the court’s refusal to give the charge or an inadvertent “slip of the tongue,” but on the fact that in the absence of such a charge, the jury is improperly left either to guess as to the applicable burden of proof or to infer the State’s burden from other general charges. We thus have held that the failure to charge the jury on the State’s burden of disproving the affirmative defense is reversible error even where, as in this case, the jury was instructed on the general burden of proof and counsel stated the correct burden of proof during closing argument. Stinson v. State, 273 Ga. 519, 520 (2) (544 SE2d 118) (2001). See also Shepperd, supra; Dubose v. State, 187 Ga. App. 293 (1) (369 SE2d 924) (1988) (if defendant had not requested instruction regarding State’s burden to disprove self-defense, the charge as given, including general instruction on State’s burden of proof, would have been sufficient). Simply put, until today the rule of this Court has been that regardless of whatever else a jury may be told by the court or counsel, if the court fails, when requested, to give a specific instruction correctly informing the jury of the State’s burden with regard to an affirmative defense, it is reversible error.5
*582Decided June 1, 2009 —
Reconsideration denied June 29, 2009.
Zell & Zell, Rodney S. Zell, for appellant.
Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, David A. Zisook, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
It follows that I also disagree with the majority opinion’s characterization of the trial court’s failure to give the charge as a “slip of the tongue” which clearly could not have misled or confused the jury. Rather than a “mere verbal inaccuracy” preceded and followed by correct instructions, the trial court’s omission of the essential language constitutes a complete failure to charge the jury on the State’s evidentiary burden to disprove the asserted affirmative defense, leaving the jury with no direction as to the applicable law. Compare Davenport v. State, 283 Ga. 171 (4) (656 SE2d 844) (2008) (slip of tongue as to particular issue which is preceded and followed by correct instruction on that issue will not vitiate otherwise correct instruction); Siegel v. State, 206 Ga. 252 (2) (56 SE2d 512) (1949) (jury not misled by slip of tongue regarding “doubt” where court gave full and accurate instruction on law of “reasonable doubt”).
Finally, I cannot agree with the majority opinion’s determination that the jury in this case was informed of the correct burden of proof by way of the written charges. No written jury charges are included in the record on appeal, and therefore, the habeas court’s finding that the written charges were “apparently” included in the full charge, and the majority’s reliance on this finding, is not supported by the record.
Because this case is controlled by our decisions in Bishop and Stinson and Arthur would have been entitled to a new trial had appellate counsel raised this issue on appeal, I would find appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance and reverse.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Hunstein and Justice Benham join this dissent.

 This position was consistent with our holding in Conklin v. State, 254 Ga. 558, 571 (10) (331 SE2d 532) (1985), in which we emphasized that a jury should receive the law from the *582court, not the attorneys, and held that there is no justification for “allowing an attorney to supplement the court’s charge by reading, in the jury’s presence, law that the court is not going to charge.”