Court Opinion

ID: 9853074
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:41:57.897911+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:40.546324
License: Public Domain

Blackburn, Judge,
dissenting.
Because Kroger did not present evidence piercing Blake’s allegations of negligent inspection and cleaning, I respectfully dissent. The evidence construed in Blake’s favor shows that, while walking down an aisle, he slipped on a small spot of liquid which the employee who cleaned it up surmised was detergent. The only viable issue in this case is whether Kroger exercised reasonable care in inspecting and keeping its premises safe for customers. See Brown v. Piggly Wiggly Southern, 210 Ga. App. 459, 460 (436 SE2d 513) (1993).
Under the analysis required by Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491 (405 SE2d 474) (1991), Kroger was required to negate this claim by presenting evidence that it had reasonable inspection and cleaning policies and that it carried out those policies on the day of Blake’s fall. Daniel v. John Q. Carter Enterprises, 218 Ga. App. 223, 224-225 (460 SE2d 838) (1995). See also Mallory v. Piggly Wiggly Southern, 200 Ga. App. 428, 430 (1) (408 SE2d 443) (1991). Until Kroger made that showing, Blake was not required to come forward with evidence showing how long the liquid had remained on the floor, which under the Lau’s Corp. test would constitute the showing of facts creating a triable issue. Sheriff v. Hosp. Auth. of Houston County, 221 Ga. App. 14, 15 (471 SE2d 3) (1996); Daniel, supra at 225.
The affidavit of Kroger’s manager establishes the grocer had policies to inspect and sweep its aisles on a regular basis. But nowhere in that affidavit does the manager state that any employee carried out those duties on the day of Blake’s fall. See Food Giant v. Cooke, 186 Ga. App. 253, 255 (1) (366 SE2d 781) (1988). Because Kroger has not presented evidence that it complied with its own policies, we cannot exclude the possibility that the liquid had been on the floor an unreasonable period of time. See Edwards v. Wal-Mart Stores, 215 Ga. App. 336, 337 (449 SE2d 613) (1994) (employee’s affidavit not conclusive). Compare J. H. Harvey Co. v. Johnson, 211 Ga. App. 809 (440 SE2d 548) (1994) and Daniel, supra at 225-226, in which the defendants made the required showing. Furthermore, unlike the defendants in Johnson v. AutoZone, 219 Ga. App. 390 (465 SE2d 463) (1995), Kroger made no evidentiary showing that the liquid had been on the floor such a brief period of time that employees engaged in reasonable inspection procedures would not have discovered it.
I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that Kroger’s failure to establish that it had in fact swept the premises as required by its policy is immaterial.
In making its determination, the majority addresses only the *152inspection requirements of Kroger’s procedure and ignores the requirement to sweep the aisles. The Kroger policy required “that the floors were to be swept and inspected on a regular basis.” (Emphasis supplied.) While it may well be true that a visual inspection might not have brought the spot to Kroger’s attention, there is no question that such spot existed based on the employee’s comments to Blake after the fall, i.e., “no wonder you couldn’t see it. I don’t know what it is myself. . . . Oh, it’s some kind of detergent or something. I don’t remember what she said, verbatim.” Blake’s honest admission on his uncertainty of the exact language used by the employee goes to the weight of his testimony, not its admissibility. In any event, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to Blake as the non-moving party in a summary judgment action.
Nowhere in the record does Kroger establish that it did in fact follow its required procedure on the date in question of sweeping the aisles. It is reasonable to presume that the purpose to be served by sweeping the aisles is to clean up small spills that might otherwise be difficult to detect. The policy requires both inspection and sweeping. The majority’s interpretation requires only a visual inspection and would make sweeping a requirement only upon a visual determination of the existence of a defect.
While Kroger policy requires “regular” inspection and sweeping, nothing in the record establishes the frequency of these regular events. The reasonableness of the policy can be determined only by evaluating both the regularity and the frequency of the sweeping and the inspection. After all, leap year comes around on a “regular” basis every fourth year, but it is not frequent. The reasonableness of the policy itself cannot be shown in the absence of evidence of the frequency of the required events. Absent a discharge of its burden by Kroger, no burden shifts to Blake under Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins, supra. Because Kroger did not pierce the plaintiff’s pleadings on this issue, a jury question remains as to whether it breached its duty to inspect and maintain the premises in a safe condition for its customers.
On summary judgment, the fact that Kroger established a policy which required it to inspect and sweep, but has not shown it complied with that policy, should be construed most strongly against it. The violation of a privately imposed policy such as this, while not negligence itself, is “illustrative of what is considered reasonable behavior for employees.” Schofield v. Hertz Corp., 201 Ga. App. 830, 831 (1) (412 SE2d 853) (1991); see also Callaway v. Pickard, 68 Ga. App. 637, 650 (8) (23 SE2d 564) (1942). See Alterman Foods v. Ligon, 246 Ga. 620, 622 (272 SE2d 327) (1980) (issue of whether store exercised reasonable care in keeping premises safe). A breach of the duty to inspect or sweep, especially where required by its own policy, cre*153ates an inference that the customer’s fall was caused by that breach. Food Giant, supra at 255. Unless the evidentiary record shows without issue of material fact that the defendant complied with its duty, or otherwise shows that a breach of that duty did not proximately cause the plaintiff’s injury, the defendant is not entitled to summary judgment. In this case, the trial court’s detailed opinion erroneously concludes that the affidavit of Kroger’s manager negated an essential element of Blake’s case. Therefore, summary judgment is not warranted and the trial court’s decision should be reversed.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Pope joins in this dissent.
On Motion for Reconsideration.