Court Opinion

ID: 9776737
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:43:32.086141+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:42.143602
License: Public Domain

MORRISON, Judge
(dissenting).
I am thoroughly in accord with the holding of the Supreme Court of the United States in Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104. I have concluded that the circumstances in the case at bar, though similar to those in Gig-lio, supra, are, nonetheless, factually distinguishable.
Giglio, supra, revolves around the jury’s right to know “of any understanding or agreement as to future prosecutions” between a witness and the State as an aid in judging the witness’ credibility. In Giglio, supra, there was a consummated agreement between the witness and the prosecution. The jury was not only ignorant of the agreement, but the witness, Taliento, lied to them about its existence.
In the case at bar, there is no evidence to indicate that the witness Whitehurst knew he would be granted immunity or that he had lied to the jury about his prospects for receiving it. The majority claims that the court erred in failing to permit the jury to hear testimony which would have shown the State planned to grant Whitehurst immunity. However, the prosecution’s intention is not the critical factor. The rationale for permitting the jury to hear testimony about an “arrangement” is that such information may be a factor in determining the witness’ credibility. The witness’ motives and bias, then, are the controlling element. It, therefore, follows that the jury need not be given more information than the witness himself actually possesses.
Further, it cannot be said the jury was unaware of Whitehurst’s position and possible motives. Appellant’s vigorous cross-examination of Whitehurst included thorough questioning about the possibility that his testimony might earn him a dismissal of charges against him. Certainly these various references to immunity, dismissal, and other cases pending against White-hurst, including an indictment for Pendle-ton’s murder, were sufficient to alert the jury to Whitehurst’s interest in the case.1
*220In United States v. Blackwood, (2 Cir.) 456 F.2d 526, the. U. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered a similar situation stating:
“ . . .A defendant’s major weapon when faced with inculpatory testimony of an accusing witness often is to discredit such testimony by proof of bias or motive to falsify. . . . The rule is that [in] attempting to establish the motives or bias of a witness against him, a defendant may . . . elicit evidence showing that the government made explicit promises of leniency in return for cooperation.

“A defendant’s right to elicit such evidence, however, is not boundless, but is subject to reasonable limitations imposed by the trial judge in the exercise of sound discretion. The test for determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion is whether ‘the jury was otherwise in possession of sufficient information concerning formative events to make a “discriminating appraisal” of a witness’ motives and bias.’ ”
The Court there concluded, as I do here:
“We are satisfied that the circumstances from which the jury could decide whether [the witness] might have been inclined to testify falsely in favor of the government were adequately presented to the jury in this case.”
The only suggestion that more existed than was made known to the jury comes from the defense. Whitehurst’s testimony was critical to the prosecution, perhaps determinative. It is reasonable to assume that appellant’s trial strategy would include an effort to discredit the witness’ testimony. It is not surprising that appellant’s attorney cross-examined Whitehurst extensively concerning his prospects for immunity. Counsel concentrated particularly on Whitehurst’s conversation with “a lawyer who came to see him the other night. .[He] gave his name as Phil Green.” 2
Who was Phil Green? He was not on the prosecutor’s staff nor was he appointed by the court to represent Whitehurst. The record does not reflect his exact connection with the case. The record does, however, suggest he played a role in the defense’s effort to discredit Whitehurst’s testimony by attempting to compromise him. Whitehurst testified that Green came to see him shortly before he was scheduled to testify and told him that if he demanded immunity during the trial, he, Green, would arrange to have Warren Burnett, Burkhalter’s trial attorney, and another, represent him in the cases pending against him.3 Burnett, himself, confirmed Green’s *221visit to Whitehurst during his argument to the jury. A demand for immunity by Whitehurst, particularly during the trial, would have placed the State in the position of either granting the immunity or dismissing the prosecution. If immunity were granted the defense could launch an unrestrained attack on the reliability of the witness’ testimony.
It is obvious from the record that the jury knew of the possibility of immunity and that they were in a position to judge his credibility accordingly. I would, therefore, reject appellant’s effort to hoodwink the jury and this Court. Certainly the logic and rationale of Giglio, supra, should not be read to permit or encourage the defense tactics in evidence here.4 I respectfully dissent.
DOUGLAS, J., joins in this dissent.

. Some of the evidence brought out before the jury included:
“[Prosecutor] You are the same Del Monte Whitehurst that has been indicted for the killing of Robert Pendle-ton, is that correct?
“[Whitehurst] Yes, sir”
In addition to the testimony in Footnote (3), infra, Defense Counsel Burnett argued to the jury:
“One must wonder what will become of Del Monte Whitehurst as a result of *220the perjury that he gave in this case. One must wonder what advantage he has earned. One must wonder what will become of him in the days and in the weeks to come after this trial is concluded. One must wonder what will become of the charges against Del Monte Whitehurst. One must wonder whether they will be dismissed. One must wonder whether or not he will go scot-free. One must wonder if his plan so wicked and so beyond description has worked. One must wonder if he succeeded in his effort to earn advantage for himself. One must ask to receive this earning, if when this trial is over, if there will be a dismissal of all of the murder charges against Whitehurst.”

. This name is variously spelled Green and Greene.

. Burnett’s cross-examination of White-hurst concluded with the following:
“Q. You did not have a conversation yesterday with the Special Prosecutor in the case, Mr. Jimmy James?
“A. Well, it was a lawyer who come up to visit me the other night who wanted to represent me. He told me that he would get me immunity out of this murder case and would handle all of the other charges for me. He almost demanded that I come down here and take immunity. It took me two hours last night to run him off.
“Q. You fully expect that when this case is finally concluded, that you will be out, don’t you?
“A. No, sir. That is what the lawyer wanted to get done for me last night.
*221“Q. And you fully expect that when this case is over, not only will you be out of this case but all other charges against you?
“A. No, sir.
“Q. You deny that you are expecting that?
“A. I was offered that last night. I turned it down.
“Q. He wanted you to do it in open court, didn’t he?
“A. Well, I give a statement and agree to testify and then wait until the trial got halfway through and come on down and demand that I wasn’t going to get on the stand unless I get immunity.
“Q. He wanted you to do it in open court, didn’t he?
“A. He wanted me to do it when I come down for them to put me on the stand.”
In answer, Prosecutor James questioned Whitehurst on redirect examination:
“Q. Let’s talk about this lawyer that came up to see you: Do you know what his name is?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. What is it?
“A. He gave it to me as Phil Green.
“Q. Some time late last night did he tell you he wanted to represent you?
‘‘A. He told me that if I would let him come to the courtroom and demand immunity this morning, that Bob Tarrant and Mr. Burnett would represent me on the rest of my cases that I have pending against me.
“Q. So this was the good deal he offered you, to represent you — if you got immunity in this case — on your other eases, is that correct?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Did you send for this lawyer?
“A. No, sir.

“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. He is going to do wonders for you along with Mr. Burnett and Tarrant, is that correct?
“A. Yes, sir.”

. Robert D. Tucker, Jr.’s, 99-year conviction was affirmed by this Court (461 S.W.2d 630) on Del Monte Whitehurst’s testimony.