Court Opinion

ID: 9838437
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-06 14:08:09.33147+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:24.567872
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Alan Schmukler,                                :
                       Petitioner              :
                                               :
               v.                              :
                                               :
Pennsylvania Public Utility                    :
Commission,                                    :    No. 1102 C.D. 2019
                  Respondent                   :    Submitted: April 21, 2023

BEFORE:        HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
               HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
               HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge

OPINION BY
JUDGE COVEY                                                FILED: September 6, 2023

               Alan Schmukler (Petitioner) petitions this Court pro se for review of
the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission’s (Commission) July 23, 2019 Final
Order denying Petitioner’s Exceptions to the Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ)
Initial Decision (Decision) that denied Petitioner’s formal complaint against PPL
Electric Utilities Corporation (PPL) (Complaint). There are three issues before this
Court: (1) whether the Commission properly interpreted Act 129 of 20081 (Act 129)
as not including a smart meter opt-out for customers where the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court later held that Section 2807(f)(2) of the Public Utility Code (Code)2
mandates the system-wide installation of smart meter technology, including smart
meters; (2) whether the Commission properly determined that Petitioner failed to
prove that the installation of advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) meters on his

      1
          Act of October 15, 2008, P.L. 1592, No. 129.
      2
          66 Pa.C.S. § 2807(f)(2).
property violates Section 1501 of the Code,3 where Petitioner did not meet the
preponderance of evidence standard; and (3) whether the Commission’s
determination was within its administrative discretion and supported by substantial
evidence in accordance with Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Law
(Law).4, 5 After review, this Court affirms.

                                               Facts
               On August 11, 2017, Petitioner filed the Complaint challenging PPL’s
planned installation of a new AMI meter at Petitioner’s service address, and alleging
that smart meters are a health hazard and cause fires. On March 9, 2018, the ALJ
held a telephone evidentiary hearing. On August 16, 2018, the ALJ issued the
Decision dismissing the Complaint because Petitioner failed to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the AMI meter installation constitutes unsafe or

       3
          66 Pa.C.S. § 1501 (relating to character of service and facilities).
       4
          2 Pa.C.S. § 704 (relating to disposition of appeals).
        5
          Petitioner presented eight issues in his “QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED” in his brief: (1)
whether the Commission and PPL are legally restrained from offering an accommodation to
Petitioner; (2) whether a violation of Section 1501 of the . . . Code requires service that is both
unsafe and unreasonable; (3) whether the required standard of evidence, i.e., conclusive causal
connection, as ruled on by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Povacz v. Pennsylvania Public
Utility Commission, 280 A.3d 975 (Pa. 2022), was properly conceived, and must Petitioner prove
a conclusive causal connection to harm for all of humanity; (4) whether Petitioner proved by a
preponderance of evidence that there is a conclusive causal connection between the smart meter’s
radio frequency fields and his adverse health effects; (5) whether Petitioner established that he has
suffered from Electromagnetic Hypersensitivity for over 30 years; (6) whether the standard of
evidence (conclusive causal connection) that Petitioner was held to is vastly higher than the
standard to which the Commission and PPL were held; (7) whether the Commission and PPL are
recipients of federal funds, and therefore required to abide by federal law as it overlaps with
Pennsylvania law; and (8) whether moving a smart meter farther from Petitioner’s home is a true
and safe accommodation of his disability. Petitioner Suppl. Br. at 3. Because the Commission’s
“COUNTER[]STATEMENT OF THE QUESTIONS INVOLVED” encompass the pertinent issues before
this Court, Commission Suppl. Br. at 4, and the issues presented in Petitioner’s initial brief are
subsumed in those issues, see Petitioner Br. at 14 (because the pages are not numbered in
Petitioner’s brief, the page numbers referenced herein reflect electronic pagination), this Court will
address those issues accordingly.
                                                  2
unreasonable service under Section 1501 of the Code. The Decision also contained
certain fire safety recommendations for PPL based on judicially noticed materials.
Both parties filed Exceptions to the Decision. On July 24, 2019, the Commission
filed its Final Order denying Petitioner’s Exceptions, granting PPL’s Exceptions,
adopting the Decision as modified, and dismissing the Complaint. On July 24, 2019,
Petitioner appealed to this Court.6 On September 3, 2019, PPL filed a Notice of
Intervention.7
              On January 15, 2020, this Court stayed the proceedings in the instant
matter pending the disposition of three consolidated appeals pending before this
Court involving the same or similar issues. Those consolidated appeals were Povacz
v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 492 C.D. 2019, filed
October 8, 2020), Murphy v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (Pa. Cmwlth.
No. 606 C.D. 2019, filed October 8, 2020), and Randall v. Pennsylvania Public
Utility Commission (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 607 C.D. 2019, filed October 8, 2020)
(collectively, Povacz appeals). On October 8, 2020, this Court affirmed in part,
reversed and remanded in part, and vacated and remanded in part the Commission’s
Orders underlying the Povacz appeals. See Povacz v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 241
A.3d 481 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020) (Povacz - Cmwlth.), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, Povacz

       6
              This Court’s review of a [Commission] adjudication determines
              “whether constitutional rights have been violated, an error of law
              has been committed, or the Commission’s findings and conclusions
              are, or are not, supported by substantial evidence.” Barasch v. [Pa.]
              Pub[.] Util[.] Comm[’n], . . . 493 A.2d 653, 655 ([Pa.] 1985). As to
              questions of law, this Court’s scope of review is plenary, and its
              standard of review is de novo. See Popowsky v. [Pa.] Pub[.] Util[.]
              Comm[’n], 910 A.2d 38 . . . ([Pa.] 2006).
Twin Lake Utils., Inc. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 281 A.3d 384, 389 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022).
       7
         On January 10, 2020, Petitioner filed a Petition to Include Petitioner's Original 27
Looseleaf Binder Exhibits in the Certified Record (Application to Include Exhibits).
                                               3
v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 280 A.3d 975 (Pa. 2022) (Povacz). In Povacz - Cmwlth.,
this Court ruled:

             [W]e affirm the [Commission’s] rejection of [the
             c]onsumers’ constitutional challenge. We reverse the
             [Commission’s] conclusion that it lacks authority to
             accommodate [the c]onsumers’ desire to avoid [radio
             frequency (]RF[)] emissions from smart meters and vacate
             the    [Commission’s]       determination    that   such
             accommodation would not be reasonable. We affirm the
             [Commission’s] determination of the burden of proving
             harm. We affirm the [Commission’s] findings of fact. We
             remand this matter to the [Commission] for determinations
             of whether accommodations are appropriate for each of
             the [c]onsumers, and if so, what those accommodations
             should be.
Id. at 494-95. All parties to the Povacz appeals filed Petitions for Allowance of
Appeal (Appeal Petitions) in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Due to the status of
the Povacz appeals, on December 15, 2020, this Court stayed the proceedings in the
instant matter and the other pending smart meter appeals.
             On May 12, 2021, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted the Appeal
Petitions in part. See Povacz v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 253 A.3d 220 (Pa. 2021)
(Povacz - Allocatur). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review as to the
following issues:

             (1) Did the Commonwealth Court commit an error of law
             by concluding that the statute does not mandate universal
             deployment of smart meters, which is contrary to the plain
             and unambiguous statutory language of Section 2807(f)(2)
             of the . . . Code . . . ?
             (2) On a question of first impression involving Act 129’s
             smart meter deployment mandate, did the Commonwealth
             Court abuse its discretion by interpreting the . . . Code in
             a manner that violated the rules of statutory construction
             and disregarded the legislative intent of the General
             Assembly?

                                          4
            (3) Did the Commonwealth Court commit an error of law
            by articulating a burden of proof under Section 1501 of the
            . . . Code . . . that could result in a utility being found in
            violation of the Code without evidence of harm?
            ....
            [(4)] Did the [Commonwealth] Court err when it
            concluded that Act 129 allows individual [c]onsumers to
            reject or “opt-out” of smart meter technology, on the
            grounds that Act 129 requires that “[e]lectric distribution
            companies [(EDCs)] shall furnish smart meter
            technology,” [where] Webster’s Dictionary defines
            “furnish” as meaning “to provide with what is needed; . . .
            supply, give,” and that this definition of “furnish” does not
            imply that the recipient is forced to accept that which is
            offered?
            ....
            [(5)] Did the [Commonwealth C]ourt err as a matter of law
            by upholding the [Commission’s] interpretation of Section
            1501 of the . . . Code as requiring[,] as to issues of safety[,]
            proof of a “conclusive causal connection” between RF
            exposure from smart meters and harm to [the p]etitioners,
            when this heavy and unprecedented burden is not
            compelled by the language of the statute, where the
            statutory and dictionary definition of the word “safe”
            includes protection from the possibility of harm, not just
            the conclusively proven certainty of harm, and where
            imposition of this burden would render it impossible for
            [the p]etitioners to prove their cases?

Povacz - Allocatur, 253 A.3d at 221.
            On August 16, 2022, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued its
Opinion in the Povacz appeals. See Povacz. The Povacz Court held:

            [W]e reverse the Commonwealth Court’s ruling that Act
            129 does not mandate the installation of smart meters. We
            affirm the Commonwealth Court’s conclusion that the
            [Commission] did not err in finding that [the c]ustomers
            failed to meet their burden of proving, by a preponderance
            of the evidence, a conclusive causal connection between
            RF emissions from smart meters and adverse human

                                           5
               health effects. We reverse the Commonwealth Court’s
               remand to the [Commission] for consideration of whether
               [the c]ustomers established that smart meter service is
               unreasonable under Section 1501 [of the Code].

Id. at 1014.
               By October 6, 2022 Order, this Court lifted the stay in the instant matter
and directed Petitioner to file a supplemental brief addressing the Povacz decision,
including its effect on his pending petition for review, by November 7, 2022. This
Court further directed the Commission and PPL to file briefs within 30 days of
service of Petitioner’s supplemental brief. All briefs have been filed and the matter
is ripe for disposition.

                                       Discussion
   1. Act 129
               Initially, Act 129 added Section 2807(f) of the Code which provides, in
relevant part:

               Smart meter technology and time of use rates.--
               (1) Within nine months after the effective date of this
               paragraph, [EDCs] shall file a smart meter technology
               procurement and installation plan with the [C]ommission
               for approval. The plan shall describe the smart meter
               technologies the [EDC] proposes to install in accordance
               with paragraph (2).
               (2) [EDCs] shall furnish smart meter technology as
               follows:
                   (i) Upon request from a customer that agrees to
                   pay the cost of the smart meter at the time of the
                   request.
                   (ii) In new building construction.
                   (iii) In accordance with a depreciation schedule
                   not to exceed 15 years.

                                            6
            ....
            (5) By January 1, 2020, or at the end of the applicable
            generation rate cap period, whichever is later, a default
            service provider shall submit to the [C]ommission one or
            more proposed time-of-use rates and real-time price plans.
            The [C]ommission shall approve or modify the time-of-
            use rates and real-time price plan within six months of
            submittal. The default service provider shall offer the
            time-of-use rates and real-time price plan to all
            customers that have been provided with smart meter
            technology under paragraph (2)(iii). Residential or
            commercial customers may elect to participate in time-
            of-use rates or real-time pricing. The default service
            provider shall submit an annual report to the price
            programs and the efficacy of the programs in affecting
            energy demand and consumption and the effect on
            wholesale market prices.
            ....
            (7) An [EDC] may recover reasonable and prudent
            costs of providing smart meter technology under
            paragraph (2)(ii) and (iii), as determined by the
            [C]ommission. . . .

66 Pa.C.S. § 2807(f) (text emphasis added).
            Act 129 defines “smart meter technology” as follows:

            [T]he term “smart meter technology” means technology,
            including    metering     technology     and    network
            communications technology capable of bidirectional
            communication, that records electricity usage on at least
            an hourly basis, including related electric distribution
            system upgrades to enable the technology.            The
            technology shall provide customers with direct access to
            and use of price and consumption information. The
            technology shall also:
            (1) Directly provide customers with information on their
            hourly consumption.
            (2) Enable time-of-use rates and real-time price programs.

                                        7
             (3) Effectively support the automatic control of the
             customer’s electricity consumption by one or more of the
             following as selected by the customer:
                 (i) the customer;
                 (ii) the customer’s utility; or
                 (iii) a third party engaged by the customer or the
                 customer’s utility.

66 Pa.C.S. § 2807(g).
             In its Final Order, the Commission explained:

             While Act 129 does not provide customers a general “opt-
             out” right from smart meter installation at a customer’s
             residence, a customer’s formal complaint that raises a
             claim under Section 1501 of the Code . . . related to the
             safety of a utility’s installation and use of a smart meter at
             the customer’s residence is legally sufficient to proceed to
             an evidentiary hearing before an ALJ.
             As the party seeking affirmative relief from the
             Commission, the complainant in a formal complaint
             proceeding has the burden of proof. [See Section 332(a)
             of the Code,] 66 Pa.C.S. § 332(a). The burden of proof is
             the “preponderance of the evidence” standard. To
             establish a fact or claim by a preponderance of the
             evidence means to offer the greater weight of the evidence,
             or evidence that outweighs, or is more convincing than, by
             even the smallest amount, the probative value of the
             evidence presented by the other party.

Final Order at 9 (citations omitted).
             In Povacz, our Supreme Court concluded:

             Act 129 does mandate that EDCs furnish smart meters to
             all electric customers within an electric distribution
             service area and does not provide electric customers the
             ability to opt out of having a smart meter installed. An
             electric customer with concerns about smart meters may
             seek an accommodation from the [Commission] or
             EDC,[FN]5 but to obtain one the customer must establish by
             a preponderance of the evidence that installation of a smart

                                           8
              meter violates Section 1501 [of the Code]. In this case,
              the electric customers did not prove that installation of a
              smart meter at their premises violates Section 1501 [of the
              Code]; therefore, the [Commission] was not required to
              prescribe any remedial action. Having so concluded, we
              reverse the Commonwealth Court’s ruling that Act 129
              does not mandate the installation of smart meters.
              Additionally, we clarify the use of the conclusive causal
              connection standard for proving a violation under Section
              1501 [of the Code] and hold that a preponderance of the
              evidence is the standard that applies to claims brought
              under Section 1501 [of the Code]. Finally, we reverse the
              Commonwealth Court’s remand of the case to the
              [Commission].
                   [FN]5
                         This holding does not preclude an electric
                   utility    from    providing      a    reasonable
                   accommodation to an electric customer in the
                   absence of a Section 1501 [of the Code] violation
                   pursuant to a customer service policy.

Povacz, 280 A.3d at 983-84.
              The Povacz Court explained:

              Contrary to [the c]ustomers’ claim that [Section
              2807](f)(5) [of the Code] supports their notion of customer
              opt-out, providing a customer with optional money-saving
              services makes sense only in the context of the mandatory
              system-wide installation of smart meter technology. The
              language highlighted above indicates that time-of-use
              rates and real-time price plans are optional services
              available to all customers whose Legacy meters[8] have
              been replaced with smart meters.               If [Section
              2807](f)(2)(iii) [of the Code] applies only to smart meters
              furnished to early technology adopters and new
              construction customers, then all other customers
              connected to the electric distribution system would not
              have smart meters and, therefore, could not elect to
              participate in the optional services. That result conflicts
              with the purpose of the [Energy Efficiency and

       8
        Legacy meters are the traditional meters that suppliers cannot communicate with or access
remotely.
                                               9
             Conservation] program to reduce electric consumption
             and demand across the Commonwealth.
             ....
             [Further,] [t]he recovery of costs by EDCs makes sense
             only in the context of a mandatory system-wide
             installation of smart meter technology, as one such cost
             would include the removal and depreciation of Legacy
             meters. The lack of a reference in [Section 2807](f)(7) [of
             the Code] to early technology adopters identified in
             [Section 2807](f)(2)(i) [of the Code] is obvious - a
             customer who requests the installation of smart meter
             technology in advance of the schedule in a [Commission]-
             approved plan must pay for the smart meter at the time of
             request. Thus, there is no cost for EDCs that furnish smart
             meters to early technology adopters to recover. 66 Pa.C.S.
             § 2807(f)(2)(i). If [Section 2807](f)(2)(iii) [of the Code]
             applies only to smart meters furnished to new building
             construction, then the reference to [Section 2807](f)(2)(ii)
             [of the Code] in [Section 2807](f)(7) [of the Code] is
             superfluous.

Povacz, 280 A.3d at 997-98. Accordingly, because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
later held that Section 2807(f)(2) of the Code mandates the system-wide installation
of smart meter technology, including smart meters, the Commission properly
interpreted Act 129 that it does not include a smart meter opt-out for customers.

   2. Section 1501 of the Code
      Section 1501 of the Code provides, in relevant part:

             Every public utility shall furnish and maintain adequate,
             efficient, safe, and reasonable service and facilities, and
             shall make all such repairs, changes, alterations,
             substitutions, extensions, and improvements in or to
             such service and facilities as shall be necessary or
             proper for the accommodation, convenience, and
             safety of its patrons, employees, and the public.

66 Pa.C.S. § 1501 (emphasis added).

                                         10
             The Povacz Court instructed:

             A customer seeking affirmative relief from the
             [Commission] must prove by a preponderance of the
             evidence that the named utility was responsible or
             accountable for the problem described in the complaint
             and that the offense was a violation of the Code, a
             [Commission] regulation or [o]rder, or a violation of a
             [Commission]-approved tariff. [See] 66 Pa.C.S. §§
             332(a), 701; Samuel J. Lansberry, Inc. v. Pa. Pub. Util.
             Comm’n, . . . 578 A.2d 600 ([Pa. Cmwlth.] 1990)[.] . . .
             Although Act 129 does not provide an electric customer
             with the right to opt-out of the installation of a smart meter
             at their residence, they [sic] may file a complaint raising a
             claim that installation of a smart meter violates Section
             1501 of the Code.
             ....
             Pursuant to [] [S]ection [1501 of the Code], an EDC (as a
             public utility) must provide service that is, inter alia, both
             safe and reasonable. To carry their [sic] burden of proof
             on a Section 1501 [of the Code] claim, a smart meter
             challenger may be required to present medical
             documentation and/or expert testimony demonstrating
             that the furnishing of a smart meter constitutes unsafe
             or unreasonable service in violation of Section 1501 [of
             the Code] under the circumstances presented.

Povacz, 280 A.3d at 999-1000 (italics and bold emphasis added; footnote omitted).
             In its Final Order, the Commission explained:

             [I]n order to prevail in a Section 1501 [of the Code] claim
             against an EDC alleging that an AMI meter caused or will
             cause adverse health effects or harm to human health, the
             [c]omplainant must demonstrate by a preponderance of the
             evidence a “conclusive causal connection” between the
             harm to human health and the RFs from the AMI meter.

Final Order at 14.

                                          11
               The Povacz Court expounded:

               “Conclusive causal connection” means that the proffered
               evidence must support the conclusion that a causal
               connection existed between a service or facility and the
               alleged harm. It is not possible for evidence that is
               inconclusive to be sufficient to meet the preponderance of
               the evidence standard. Inconclusive means that the
               evidence does not lead to a conclusion of a definite result
               one way or the other. While the preponderance of the
               evidence standard is not stringent, it does require that the
               plaintiff’s evidence ever so slightly (like, with the weight
               of a feather) supports the plaintiff’s contention. Evidence
               that does not support a conclusion (or is inconclusive)
               cannot meet that minimal burden. Accord Ethan Habrial
               v. Metro[.] Edison Co[.], No. C-2018-3005907, 2020 WL
               3840469, at *3 (Pa. P.U.C. June 29, 2020) (“The decision
               of the Commission must be supported by substantial
               evidence. 2 Pa.C.S. § 704. ‘Substantial evidence’ is such
               relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
               adequate to support a conclusion. More is required than a
               mere trace of evidence or a suspicion of the existence of a
               fact sought to be established.”). Thus, where scientific
               evidence is required to establish the safety of a service or
               facility, use of the evidentiary standard of “conclusive
               causal connection” to assess the evidence is correct.

Povacz, 280 A.3d at 1006-07.
               Here, Petitioner argues:

               [] [P]etitioner here asserts that he has demonstrated a
               conclusive causal connection of harm to himself from
               smart meter radiation, and that he need not demonstrate
               harm to all of humanity. He has a disability of
               Electromagnetic Hypersensitivity (EHS) which is
               protected under law by the Americans with Disabilities
               Act [(ADA)][,][9] (also [t]he Fair Housing [Amendments]
               Act [of 1988])[,][10] [t]he [ADA] Amend[ments Act of
               2008] (ADAA) and [t]he United States [(U.S.)] Access

      9
          42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213.
      10
           42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631.
                                           12
              Board[11] [sic] includes electromagnetic sensitivity in its
              guidelines: (See Petitioner[] Br[.] . . . [at] 51-53.)
              The ADA as amended does not require, nor should the
              [Commission], that a situation be unsafe for all of
              humanity, but only for someone with a disability who
              belongs to a protected class. An analogy will clarify.
              Epilepsy is a disability that can be aggravated by exposure
              to flashing lights. A person with epilepsy who requests an
              accommodation in a work or housing situation[] does not
              have to prove that flashing lights trigger epilepsy in all
              people, just those with epilepsy.

Petitioner Suppl. Br. at 8-9 (italics added).

              In its Final Order, the Commission concluded:
              Upon review of the record on this issue, the [] Decision
              and the applicable law, we affirm the ALJ’s conclusion
              that [Petitioner] did not meet his burden of proof
              regarding his claim that PPL’s smart meter caused or
              will cause adverse health effects for [Petitioner].
              Specifically, we affirm the ALJ’s finding that [Petitioner]
              failed to demonstrate a conclusive causal connection
              between the low-level RF fields from a PPL smart
              meter and adverse health effects for [Petitioner].

Final Order at 43 (bold and underline emphasis added). Thus, the Commission did
not require Petitioner to prove that use of a smart meter is “unsafe for all of
humanity[,]” only that it is unsafe for Petitioner.            Petitioner Suppl. Br. at 9.
Accordingly, the Commission properly determined that Petitioner failed to prove
that AMI meter installation on his property violated Section 1501 of the Code, when
he did not meet the preponderance of evidence standard.

       11
          “The [U.S.] Access Board is an independent federal agency that promotes equality for
people with disabilities through leadership in accessible design and the development of
accessibility guidelines and standards.” https://www.access-board.gov/about/ (last visited Sept.
5, 2023).
                                              13
   3. Section 704 of the Law

            Section 704 of the Law provides, in relevant part:
            The court shall hear the appeal without a jury on the record
            certified by the Commonwealth agency. After hearing,
            the court shall affirm the adjudication unless it shall
            find that the adjudication is in violation of the
            constitutional rights of the appellant, or is not in
            accordance with law, or that the provisions of Subchapter
            A of Chapter 5 (relating to practice and procedure of
            Commonwealth agencies) have been violated in the
            proceedings before the agency, or that any finding of fact
            made by the agency and necessary to support its
            adjudication is not supported by substantial evidence.

2 Pa.C.S. § 704 (emphasis added). “Evidence that does not support a conclusion (or
is inconclusive) cannot meet that minimal burden. Accord Ethan Habrial . . . , . . .
at *3 . . . (‘The decision of the Commission must be supported by substantial
evidence. 2 Pa.C.S. § 704. . . .’).” Povacz, 280 A.3d at 1007 (emphasis added).
            Petitioner argues:

            The [Commission] dismissed [Petitioner’s] [C]omplaint
            for failure of [Petitioner] to prove by a preponderance of
            the evidence that the installation of the smart meter
            constitutes unsafe or unreasonable service under [Section
            1501 of the Code]. But how could [Petitioner] prove his
            [C]omplaint by a preponderance of the evidence if
            virtually all of his credible evidence was excluded? The
            exclusions were based on manifestly unreasonable
            judgements by the ALJ. They included, but were not
            limited to, rejecting letters from [four] doctors[,] as well
            as the doctors’ vitae and evidence from [Petitioner’s]
            credible witness, William Bathgate [(Bathgate)], while
            relying on evidence from PPL[’s] [] witnesses, one of
            whom[,] [Dr.] Mark Israel [(Dr. Israel),]) was not
            qualified[,] and the other[,] [Dr.] Christopher Davis [(Dr.
            Davis),] was not credible. In ruling against all of
            [Petitioner’s] Exceptions, the ALJ and the [Commission]
            relied on testimony from PPL’s witness [Dr.] Israel, who
            was unqualified as an expert in the matter of EHS (by his
            own admission)[,] and therefore that testimony was
                                        14
                unreliable and his evidence was neither substantial nor
                competent.

Petitioner Br. at 62 (internal record citation omitted).
                Here, with respect to Petitioner’s evidence, the Commission opined in
its Final Order:

                [W]e acknowledge that [Petitioner’s] case included his
                competent lay testimony as to the health symptoms he has
                experienced historically and since the time an AMI meter
                ha[d] been installed at his [n]eighbor’s [a]ddress.
                [Petitioner] also presented the expert testimony of
                Bathgate, whom the [ALJ] accepted as an expert in
                electrical engineering but not as a medical expert, for the
                purpose of explaining [] Bathgate’s theories as to how the
                RF fields from PPL’s AMI meters will cause harm to
                human health. [Petitioner] did not present a qualified
                expert to testify on the issue of the cause of his medical
                issues in this proceeding. [Petitioner] did, however,
                present numerous exhibits, i.e., [Petitioner] Exhibit Nos.
                1-10, and 12-27, for the purpose of corroborating his
                claims about his health problems and to support his claims
                that RF fields from PPL’s AMI meters caused,
                exacerbated or will cause or exacerbate his health
                problems. Included in these [e]xhibits, among other
                things, was a letter from a family medicine practitioner
                and three letters from homeopathy practitioners stating
                that [Petitioner] has EHS[];[12] however, no actual medical
      12
           Regarding the letters, the Commission noted:
                Even if we were to give the four letters more weight, . . . [PPL’s
                expert,] Dr. Israel testified that “[n]one of these letters provide any
                useful diagnostic medical information.” Rather, Dr. Israel found
                that “they have the appearance of reiterating information that likely
                was provided by the patient.” For example, Dr. Israel testified that
                the letter from the family medicine practitioner “does not say when
                the diagnosis was made, who made it, what medical examination
                and medical criteria were involved in the diagnosis, or what course
                of treatment, if any, has been provided by medical professionals
                since the diagnosis[,] including by the author of the letter.” These
                are all important factors related to any diagnosis, because there are
                [sic] no established medical criteria for the diagnosis or treatment of
                [idiopathic environmental intolerance].

                                                 15
               records were submitted by [Petitioner] to corroborate his
               claims of EHS symptoms.

Final Order at 45 (emphasis added).
               Relative to Dr. Israel’s testimony, the Commission expounded:

               Dr. Israel[] was the only expert qualified in this
               proceeding in medicine and medical research, particularly
               regarding RF fields and human health. Dr. Israel testified
               to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that there is no
               reliable medical basis to conclude that RF fields from the
               AMI meters being used by PPL will cause or contribute to
               the development of illness or disease. Dr. Israel’s
               unequivocal opinion was offered to a reasonable degree of
               medical certainty based upon his review of available
               scientific studies, research and reports on the impacts of
               RF fields on [idiopathic environmental intolerance],
               insomnia, and adverse health effects. Dr. Israel’s
               testimony was not rebutted or contradicted by any expert
               in this proceeding. Dr. Israel’s expert opinion meets
               PPL’s required burden of production and constitutes
               legally competent evidence to support a finding of fact that
               there is no causal connection between RF fields from a
               PPL AMI meter and adverse human health effects.

Final Order at 49 (footnote and record citations omitted).
               Relative to Dr. Davis’ testimony, the Commission explicated:

               Dr. Davis was qualified as an expert witness in the area of
               electrical engineering, among other areas.              The
               [Petitioner’s] Exceptions do not present any reason to
               disqualify Dr. Davis or question the credibility of his
               testimony in this proceeding.           Dr. Davis testified
               credibility [sic] that the new AMI meter is not a fire risk
               due to inadequate surge protection, as alleged by
               [Petitioner] and his expert witness, [] Bathgate. Dr. Davis’
               opinion was further bolstered by [Scott] Larson’s
               [(Larson)][13] testimony that the new digital meter, as

Final Order at 46 n.17 (record citations omitted).

       13
               [] Larson holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Electrical
               Engineering Technology from the Pennsylvania College of
                                                16
               compared to the analog meter, can better withstand
               damage from a surge because of the padding materials that
               are utilized when building transformers. [] Larson
               testified that the padding materials are tested to withstand
               up to 6,000 volts. [] Larson testified that the new AMI
               meter’s surge protection is not functionally different than
               the current meter.
               Moreover, Dr. Davis credibility [sic] testified that the
               smart meters can actually help people from having a fire
               because of the temperature alarms. Regarding such
               alarms, [] Larson’s unrebutted testimony showed that the
               new AMI meters are equipped with software and
               mechanisms that better alert PPL if there is an issue with
               overheating. Specifically, there is a heat alarm set within
               the meter software program that alerts the [EDC] when the
               temperature of the meter hits an established level. []
               Larson testified that PPL takes [15]-minute interval
               temperature readings from the meter in order to track the
               meter’s temperature and identify any current issues or
               problematic trends. If PPL detects an issue with the
               meter’s temperature, the [EDC] will dispatch a technician
               to investigate.

Final Order at 61 (quotation marks and internal citations omitted).
               The Commission concluded:

               [Petitioner] had the burden of proving that the smart
               meters used by PPL [] present a fire safety hazard, and he
               did not carry this burden. Rather, PPL [] established that
               there is no fire hazard created by the installation of its
               smart meters, and [Petitioner] failed to overcome the
               evidence presented by [PPL].

Final Order at 61-62. This Court discerns no error in the Commission’s conclusion.
Accordingly, the Commission’s determination was within its administrative

               Technology. [] Larson is a Senior Engineer at PPL’s Meter Shop in
               Hazleton, Pennsylvania, where he deals with the day-to-day meter
               testing operations at the facility. Prior to joining PPL, [] Larson
               worked for Lockheed Martin’s field service team as an Electrical
               Engineer in charge of fire repair and radar systems.
Final Order at 6.

                                               17
discretion and is supported by substantial evidence in accordance with Section 704
of the Law.

                                           Conclusion
                For all of the above reasons, the Commission’s Final Order is
affirmed.14

                                              _________________________________
                                              ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

Judge Fizzano Cannon did not participate in the decision in this matter.

      14
           Petitioner’s Application to Include Exhibits is dismissed as moot.
                                                18
            IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Alan Schmukler,                       :
                  Petitioner          :
                                      :
            v.                        :
                                      :
Pennsylvania Public Utility           :
Commission,                           :   No. 1102 C.D. 2019
                  Respondent          :

                                  ORDER

            AND NOW, this 6th day of September, 2023, the Pennsylvania Public
Utility Commission’s July 23, 2019 Final Order is AFFIRMED. Alan Schmukler’s
(Petitioner) Application to Include Petitioner’s Original 27 Looseleaf Binder
Exhibits in the Certified Record is DISMISSED as moot.

                                    _________________________________
                                    ANNE E. COVEY, Judge