Court Opinion

ID: 9554276
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-08 16:04:19.150588+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:22:56.038101
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
  UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                  AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                     IN THE
              ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                 DIVISION ONE

 IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO J.T., T.T., N.G.,
                       N.G., and L.G.

                              No. 1 CA-JV 22-0284
                               FILED 8-08-2023

            Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
                              Nos. JD34010
                                    JS20762
              The Honorable Pamela Hearn Svoboda, Judge

                                   AFFIRMED

                                    COUNSEL

Denise L. Carroll, Esq., Scottsdale
By Denise Lynn Carroll
Counsel for Appellant Cristina M.

Czop Law Firm, PLLC, Higley
By Steven Czop
Counsel for Appellant Isaac G.

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson
By Jennifer R. Blum
Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

Thomas Vierling Attorney at Law, Phoenix
By Thomas A. Vierling
Counsel for Appellees J.T., N.G., T.T., N.G., and L.G.
          IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO J.T. et al.
                       Decision of the Court

                      MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Angela K. Paton delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Judge D. Steven Williams joined.

P A T O N, Judge:

¶1            Cristina M. (“Mother”) and Isaac G. (“Father”) appeal from
the superior court’s order terminating their parental rights. We affirm.

                FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2            Mother is the biological parent of the five children who are
parties to this appeal, the youngest three of which are also Father’s
biological children. Two of Father’s children who are parties to this appeal
have special needs requiring, among other things, immunology therapy
and feeding therapy.

¶3           The Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) took custody of the
four oldest children in July 2018 and petitioned for dependency as to
Mother on allegations of substance abuse, neglect, and failure to treat her
mental health. As to Father, DCS petitioned for dependency on allegations
of neglect and substance abuse. DCS took custody of the fifth child one
month after her birth and petitioned for her dependency as to both parents
on the same respective allegations. The superior court adjudicated all five
children dependent as to Mother and the younger three as to Father.

¶4             About a year later, in September 2020, the children’s guardian
ad litem petitioned to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights based
on fifteen months’ out-of-home placement grounds. The parents contested
the termination petition. The superior court denied the petition in July 2021
based on its finding that DCS failed to provide services to the parents that
accounted for their intellectual disabilities.

¶5           In March 2022, the children’s guardian ad litem again moved
to terminate the parents’ parental rights alleging grounds of substance
abuse for Mother and fifteen months’ out-of-home placement for both
parents. The superior court granted the motion in December 2022, and
found the substance-abuse statutory termination ground as to Mother and
out-of-home placement ground as to both parents proven by clear and
convincing evidence and that termination was in the children’s best

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            IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO J.T. et al.
                         Decision of the Court

interests. Mother and Father timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction
under Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and Arizona Revised
Statutes (“A.R.S.”) Sections 8-235(A) and 12-120.21(A)(1).

                               DISCUSSION

¶6             In order to grant a motion to terminate parental rights, the
superior court must find (1) by clear and convincing evidence that at least
one statutory ground for termination exists and (2) by a preponderance of
the evidence that termination is in the children's best interests. Alma S. v.
Dep't of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 149–50, ¶ 8 (2018); see also A.R.S. § 8-
533(B) (listing grounds for termination). As the trier of fact, the superior
court “is in the best position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties,
judge the credibility of witnesses, and resolve disputed facts.” Ariz. Dep’t
of Econ. Sec. v. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, 334, ¶ 4 (App. 2004). Accordingly,
we affirm the superior court’s factual findings if supported by reasonable
evidence. Denise R. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 221 Ariz. 92, 93–94, ¶ 4 (App.
2009).

I.     Termination of Mother’s Parental Rights

¶7            Mother argues that the superior court violated her
constitutional right to parent by denying her a fair opportunity to
participate in the three specific reunification services it directed DCS to
provide when it denied the petition to terminate her parental rights in 2021.
She also contends that the superior court failed to make findings of fact that
termination of her parental rights would be in the children’s best interests.

       A.      Reasonable evidence supports the superior court’s finding
               that DCS provided reasonable reunification services to
               Mother.

¶8             Termination based on the substance abuse ground requires a
finding that DCS made reasonable efforts to reunify the family. Jennifer G.
v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 211 Ariz. 450, 453, ¶ 12 (App. 2005). DCS must
provide the time and opportunity for parents to participate in programs
directed toward reunification but need not provide every conceivable
service. Mary Ellen C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 193 Ariz. 185, 192, ¶ 37
(App. 1999). Nor must DCS ensure parent participation in provided
services, Maricopa Cnty. Juvenile Action No. JS-501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 353
(App. 1994), or leave the remediation window open indefinitely, see
Maricopa Cnty. Juvenile Action No. JS-501568, 177 Ariz. 571, 577 (App. 1994).

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          IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO J.T. et al.
                       Decision of the Court

¶9            As previously mentioned, the superior court denied the first
termination petition because it found that DCS needed to engage service
providers who were aware of, trained to deal with, and able to adapt
treatment to the parents’ intellectual limitations. Specifically, for Mother,
this included a new psychological evaluation, a master’s level therapist to
provide trauma therapy if the previous doctor who treated her was unable
to provide her trauma therapy, and a new Nurturing Parenting Program
(NPP) parent aide referral. Mother now contends that she did not have a
fair opportunity to participate in these three specific services.

¶10            We first note that in the fifteen months between the court’s
July 2021 termination petition denial and the October 2022 termination
hearing that is the subject of this appeal, Mother participated in periodic
Report and Review Hearings and pretrial conferences. As the superior
court noted in its termination order, Mother did not object to the adequacy
of services at these proceedings. Although we could find Mother waived
any objection to the adequacy of services by raising it for the first time on
appeal, Bennigno R. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 233 Ariz. 345, 350, ¶ 19 (App.
2013), we choose not to and instead conclude that the record supports the
superior court’s finding that DCS provided Mother reasonable
reunification services.

¶11           Mother challenges the reasonableness of the three services the
court identified in its 2021 termination order, arguing they are the only
services that matter because they “actually would reunify [her] with her
child.” But aside from that conclusory statement, she offers no argument
as to why only these services mattered, or how the superior court’s findings
related to these three services were insufficient, other than stating her
participation was hampered by DCS’s delay. But, as discussed below, the
record shows she delayed and/or failed to meaningfully participate in
these and other numerous services DCS offered. She also offers no legal
authority or argument as to why, as a matter of law, we should only
consider the reasonableness of these services and disregard the numerous
reunification services Mother was offered and declined to meaningfully
participate in.

¶12            The same superior court judge who directed DCS to provide
the three services Mother now challenges concluded that in the fifteen
months between the two termination hearings, DCS made the requisite
efforts towards family reunification and that Mother had adequate time and
opportunity to participate in reunification services. Specifically, the court
found that “[t]he issues of not addressing the parents’ borderline
intellectual capacities have been remedied since June 2021 and the Court

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          IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO J.T. et al.
                       Decision of the Court

finds DCS made reasonable efforts to provide services designed to reunify
the family, but the parents have not made necessary behavioral changes
which puts the Children at risk.”

¶13           The court made extensive findings as to the reunification
services DCS provided to Mother between the termination hearings and the
extent of her participation or lack of participation in each one. These
services included substance abuse testing and treatment, visitation
assistance, regular “Child and Family Team” meetings, and Families
Connect.

¶14           Further, the record shows that Mother did not seriously
engage with a first therapy provider, was dropped from a second provider
after a month and a half of non-attendance, and ultimately received three
months of counseling from a therapist referred by a master’s-level intake
counselor who knew of Mother’s need for trauma counseling. The court
noted that Mother’s NPP provider was made aware of her diagnoses but
Mother was closed out of that service due to non-participation. Specifically,
the record showed that Mother refused to engage with the NPP aide over
five months of repeated DCS referrals and attempts by the provider to
accommodate Mother’s reported illnesses she claimed prevented her from
keeping appointments. Although DCS delayed referring Mother for an
updated psychological examination until April 2022, Mother then delayed
the evaluation for almost two more months by failing to attend her
appointments. Mother rarely attended regularly scheduled Child and
Family Team meetings where her children’s special needs were discussed,
and she tested positive for methamphetamine in January 2022 and February
2022. She participated only sporadically in mandated drug testing and had
large gaps between completed tests during the five months before the
October 2022 trial. Accordingly, we find that reasonable evidence
supported the superior court’s findings that DCS provided reasonable
reunification services to Mother. See Denise R., 221 Ariz. at 93–94, ¶ 4.

¶15            We affirm the court’s termination on the substance abuse
ground, and therefore decline to analyze Mother’s arguments regarding the
out-of-home placement ground.              See A.R.S. § 8-533(B) (To justify
termination, a court need only find “any one” of the listed grounds exists.);
Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280, ¶ 3 (App. 2002).

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            IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO J.T. et al.
                         Decision of the Court

       B.      Reasonable evidence supports the superior court’s finding
               that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the
               children’s best interests.

¶16            Termination is in a child’s best interests if the child would
either benefit from the termination or be harmed by the continuing parent-
child relationship. Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 4, ¶ 16 (2016)
(citation omitted). The superior court may consider a child’s adoptability
as part of its best-interests analysis. Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 150–151, ¶ 13.
Although the court must consider the totality of the circumstances,
“prospective adoption is a benefit that can support a best-interests finding”
in a termination case. Id. (quoting Demetrius L., 239 Ariz. at 4, ¶ 16). Indeed,
termination may be in a child’s best interests when the child’s placement is
meeting the child’s needs and the child’s adoption is otherwise legally
possible and likely. Id. at 151, ¶ 14 (quoting Demetrius L., 239 Ariz. at 151,
¶ 14).

¶17           The court heard testimony that the children were in adoptive
placements that met their needs and were otherwise adoptable. One of the
prospective adoptive parents testified that she and the other children’s
prospective adoptive parents are “a unit” who work together to make sure
the five children can spend time together. Conversely, the DCS case
manager testified that Mother could not safely parent during visitation and
required a second case aide to ensure the children’s safety. Mother also
repeatedly failed to bring L.G.’s necessary foods to visits, which led to L.G.
not eating for several hours, including during dinnertime. Reasonable
evidence thus supports the superior court’s finding that termination was in
the children’s best interests because their adoptive placements were
meeting their needs and Mother could not safely parent the children and
placed them at risk.

II.    Termination of Father’s Parental Rights

¶18          The fifteen months’ out-of-home placement ground requires
clear and convincing evidence that (1) the child has been in court-ordered
out-of-home placement for at least a cumulative fifteen months, (2) DCS has
made a “diligent effort to provide reunification services,” (3) the parent has
been unable to remedy the circumstances that cause the child to be in the
placement, and (4) there is substantial likelihood that the parent will be
incapable of proper and effective parental care and control in the near
future. A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8) (element 2) and 8-533(B)(8)(c) (elements 1, 3,
and 4).

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          IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO J.T. et al.
                       Decision of the Court

¶19             Father challenges the sufficiency of evidence supporting the
superior court’s findings as to elements (3) and (4) above. “[C]ircumstances
that cause the child to be in an out-of-home placement” refers to the
circumstances existing at the time of termination. See Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep’t
of Econ. Sec., 223 Ariz. 86, 99 n.14 (App. 2009). The superior court found that
at the time of termination, neither parent could safely parent the children
and that the children would be at risk of not receiving necessary medical
and mental care, not being kept safe under parental control, and—in one
child’s case—not receiving adequate food for an eating condition that
requires feeding therapy.

¶20             The superior court noted that one child has a genetic
condition that requires substantial medical attention and that Father missed
the majority of that child’s medical appointments. The child’s placement
testified that Father attended only six of forty immunology injection
appointments. Father’s only testimony describing one child’s complex
medical condition related to an effect on the child’s eyes. As to the other
child’s eating condition, Father testified that he received and understood
the list of the child’s preferred foods, but the case manager testified that for
most of the visits that included dinner, neither parent brought foods from
the list. The court heard testimony that the parents could not safely handle
their children without help and required an additional case aide to assist
during visits.

¶21            Father cites evidence of his ability to parent his youngest child
(who is not a party to this appeal) to support his argument that the superior
court failed to consider Father’s progress in parenting after he received the
correct services. But Father’s ability to parent a child without significant
medical issues is of limited, if any, relevance in evaluating his ability to
parent his children who have significant medical needs. See Maricopa Cnty.
Juvenile Action Nos. JS-5209 and JS-4963, 143 Ariz. 178, 186–87 (App. 1984)
(“[T]he fact that appellant is able to minimally act as an adequate parent for
one child does not mean that she would be able to care for the other four
children.”). Regardless, we do not reweigh the evidence on appeal. See
Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 151, ¶ 18. Reasonable evidence supported the superior
court’s findings that Father was unable to remedy the circumstances
causing his children to be placed outside the home and that a substantial
likelihood existed that he would be incapable of proper and effective care
and control in the near future.

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      IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO J.T. et al.
                   Decision of the Court

                         CONCLUSION

¶22      We affirm.

                      AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                      FILED:    JT
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