Court Opinion

ID: 9950838
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-14 20:11:39.994688+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:36:53.231300
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Ahmed, 2024-Ohio-904.]

             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                             SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                  BELMONT COUNTY

                                            STATE OF OHIO,

                                            Plaintiff-Appellee,

                                                    v.

                                            NAWAZ AHMED,

                                       Defendant-Appellant.

                        OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
                                           Case No. 22 BE 0049

                                   Criminal Appeal from the
                        Court of Common Pleas of Belmont County, Ohio
                                    Case No. 99 CR 192

                                            BEFORE:
            William A. Klatt, Retired Judge of the Tenth District Court of Appeals,
                                     Sitting by Assignment,
                          Carol Ann Robb, Mark A. Hanni, Judges.

                                          JUDGMENT:
                                Reversed, Vacated and Remanded.

 Atty. J. Kevin Flanagan, Belmont County Prosecutor, Atty. Stephen Maher and Atty.
 Brenda Leikala, Special Assistant Belmont Prosecutors, Senior Assistant Attorneys
 General, for Plaintiff-Appellee and

 Atty. John P. Laczko and Atty. Wesley A. Johnston, for Defendant-Appellant.

                                           Dated: March 11, 2024
                                                                                       –2–

 KLATT, J.

       {¶1}    Defendant-Appellant, Nawaz Ahmed, appeals the dismissal of his Petition
for Post-Conviction Relief based on Serious Mental Illness (“SMI petition”), filed pursuant
to R.C 2953.21(A)(1)(a)(iv) and 2929.025, by the Belmont County Court of Common
Pleas. The SMI petition and a motion for appointment of counsel were filed by Attorney
S. Adele Shank, Appellant’s federal habeas corpus counsel, without Appellant’s prior
authorization, due to Appellant’s previously-diagnosed mental illness and the imminent
expiration of the statutory limitations period.
       {¶2}    Appellant filed pro se pleadings to terminate Attorney Shank’s
representation because she filed the petition without his consent. Despite Appellant’s
mental illness, and over the strenuous objection of Attorney Shank based on Appellant’s
competency to waive counsel and to understand the effect of the dismissal of the petition,
the trial court terminated Attorney Shank’s representation and dismissed the petition.
Contrary to Appellant’s initial ire over Attorney Shank’s decision to file the SMI petition,
which was predicated upon his belief the SMI petition would negatively impact his federal
habeas corpus proceeding, he filed a pro se motion to stay the SMI petition prior to the
trial court’s dismissal, as well as a timely pro se notice of appeal of the trial court’s
judgment entry dismissing the petition.
       {¶3}    Appellant,   through    appointed   appellate   counsel,    advances    four
assignments of error in this appeal. First, he argues the trial court erred in allowing him
to represent himself absent a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of counsel.
Second, Appellant contends the trial court erred in allowing him to dismiss the petition
without first ordering a competency examination. Third, he argues the SMI statute is
unconstitutional as applied in this case. Lastly, Appellant argues the trial court erred as
a matter of law in failing to maintain a proper record for appeal purposes.
       {¶4}    For the following reasons, the September 22 and 30, 2022 judgment entries
of the trial court finding Appellant competent to waive counsel and dismissing the SMI
petition are reversed and vacated, and this matter is remanded for the appointment of
new counsel.

Case No. 22 BE 0049
                                                                                       –3–

                        FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

      {¶5}   Following the dismissal of the SMI petition, Attorney Shank filed a motion
for attorneys’ fees, which was overruled by the trial court. We reversed the judgment
entry overruling the motion for attorneys’ fees last year in State v. Ahmed, 7th Dist.
Belmont No. 22 BE 0071, 2023-Ohio-3464. We provided the following recitation of the
facts, procedural history, and governing law:

      In 1999, days before [Appellant’s] trial in a hostile divorce case, the bodies
      of [Appellant’s] estranged wife, her father, her sister, and the sister’s two-
      year old daughter were discovered at the wife’s house near St. Clairsville.
      The victims each suffered a large slash to the neck and skull fractures.
      [Appellant’s] electronic work badge was found by the bodies, and he last
      used the badge at his Columbus work place not long before his wife
      retrieved her family from the Columbus airport. Hours later, [Appellant]
      purchased a ticket to Pakistan and picked it up at a travel agent’s house
      near a New York City airport. He signed over his car to the agent and asked
      the agent to watch his children, writing a note on the back of his marriage
      certificate stating he was leaving his children to be handed over to his wife.
      When [Appellant] was arrested at the airport, he had approximately $7,000
      in cash, $7,500 in traveler’s checks, his will, and a large cut on his right
      thumb. His DNA was found in blood recovered from the wife’s kitchen (with
      a 1 in 7.6 quadrillion probability of someone else matching). State v. Ahmed,
      103 Ohio St.3d 27, 2004-Ohio-4190, 813 N.E.2d 637, ¶ 2-20.

      A jury convicted Appellant of four aggravated murders (three with prior
      calculation and design and one for purposely killing a victim under 13 years
      old). See R.C. 2903.01(A),(C). He was sentenced to death. (2/2/01 J.E.;
      3/2/01 J.E.). The Supreme Court affirmed his convictions and death
      sentence. Ahmed, 103 Ohio St.3d 27, 2004-Ohio-4190, 813 N.E.2d 637.

Case No. 22 BE 0049
                                                                                           –4–

      [Appellant’s] initial petition for post-conviction relief set forth 17 grounds for
      relief and requested a ruling on the petition be stayed pending a
      competency determination (also requesting funds for an independent
      psychiatric evaluation). State v. Ahmed, 7th Dist. Belmont No. 05-BE-15,
      2006-Ohio-7069, 2006 WL 3849862, ¶ 25. Among other holdings, we held
      a post-conviction petitioner is not entitled to a competency determination in
      the absence of a statute providing this right. Id. at ¶ 53-54.

      On April 12, 2021, a statute went into effect applicable to an aggravated
      murder offender who had a “serious mental illness” (SMI), which is defined
      as a diagnosis of Schizophrenia, Schizoaffective disorder, Bipolar disorder,
      or Delusional disorder where the illness significantly impaired the person’s
      capacity to exercise rational judgment to either conform the person’s
      conduct to the law or to appreciate the nature, consequences, or
      wrongfulness of the conduct. R.C. 2929.025(A)(1) (even if not meeting the
      standard to be found not guilty by reason of insanity or the standard to be
      found incompetent to stand trial). The statute made such person ineligible
      for a death sentence. R.C. 2929.025 (E)(2). Where an argument under the
      SMI statute is raised, a court shall order an evaluation. R.C. 2929.025(C).
      However, if the defendant “refuses to submit to an evaluation ordered under
      this division, the court shall issue a finding that the person is not ineligible
      for a sentence of death due to serious mental illness.” R.C. 2929.025(F)(1).

      For those already convicted, these amendments permitted a post-
      conviction SMI petition to be filed by “any person who has been convicted
      of aggravated murder and sentenced to death for the offense and who
      claims that the person had a serious mental illness at the time of the
      commission of the offense and that as a result the court should render void
      the sentence of death, with the filing of the petition constituting the waiver
      described in division (A)(3)(b) of this section.” R.C 2953.21(A)(1)(a)(iv). The
      cited division explains, “the act of filing the petition constitutes a waiver of
      any right to be sentenced under the law that existed at the time the offense

Case No. 22 BE 0049
                                                                                           –5–

      was committed and constitutes consent to be sentenced to life
      imprisonment without parole under division (A) of section 2929.06 of the
      Revised Code.” R.C. 2953.21(A)(3)(b). For older cases, “a petition under
      division (A)(1)(a)(iv) of this section shall be filed not later than three hundred
      sixty-five days after the effective date of this amendment.” R.C.
      2953.21(A)(2)(b).

      The post-conviction statute also provides: “If a person sentenced to death
      intends to file a petition under this section, the court shall appoint counsel
      to represent the person upon a finding that the person is indigent and that
      the person either accepts the appointment of counsel or is unable to make
      a competent decision whether to accept or reject the appointment of
      counsel.” R.C. 2953.21(J)(1). “The court may decline to appoint counsel for
      the person only upon a finding, after a hearing if necessary, that the person
      rejects   the   appointment     of   counsel   and    understands     the   legal
      consequences of that decision or upon a finding that the person is not
      indigent.” R.C. 2953.21(J)(1). The appointed attorney shall be capital-
      certified and not the same counsel who represented the defendant at trial
      (unless expressly requested by both the defendant and the attorney). R.C.
      2953.21(J)(1)-(2).

      Attorney Shank had been appointed as co-counsel in [Appellant’s] federal
      habeas proceedings. On April 12, 2022, Attorney Shank filed a motion for
      appointment of counsel for the pursuit of an SMI petition, noting she was
      capital-certified and was not [Appellant’s] trial counsel. Explaining she
      represented [Appellant] in the “last leg” of his federal habeas proceedings,
      Attorney Shank pointed out he “has not been satisfied with any lawyer from
      the time of trial to present” (citing 2005 trial court findings confirming his
      past complaints). Her motion opined (in bold and all capital letters):
      “[Appellant] is incompetent and almost certainly will not accept the
      appointment of counsel and thus will be required appointment under the
      SMI provisions for incompetent defendants.”

Case No. 22 BE 0049
                                                                                        –6–

      The motion for appointment of counsel opined [Appellant] had “diminished
      capacity” and “counsel reasonably believes, given [Appellant’s] serious
      mental illness, that [Appellant] lacks sufficient capacity to make adequately
      considered decisions with regard to pursuing his SMI claim.” Citing Ohio
      Professional Conduct Rule 1.14(a), Comment 5, she explained she
      simultaneously filed the SMI petition to protect [Appellant] rights, as the day
      of her filing was [Appellant] last day to file a timely petition under the new
      statute, which could prevent his execution.

      The April 12, 2022 post-conviction SMI petition filed by Attorney Shank
      asked to vacate [Appellant’s] death sentence under R.C. 2953.21 and R.C.
      2929.025. The petition cited the expert’s trial testimony concluding
      [Appellant] suffered “delusional disorder, persecutory type” during the time
      the murders were committed (Tr. 121, 131) and cited the 2001 sentencing
      findings where the trial court agreed [Appellant] suffered from this mental
      disease. With attached cases in support, it was noted SMI relief can be
      granted without additional evaluation or hearing if pre-existing evidence
      meets the petitioner’s burden. Attorney Shank also said appointment of an
      SMI examiner with further amendments to the petition [sic], pointing out the
      petition can be amended without leave within 180 days.

      The SMI petition reiterated counsel’s opinion that [Appellant] was not
      competent to proceed with SMI litigation because he lacked the ability to
      consult with counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and
      lacked a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings
      against him. Attorney Shank disclosed [Appellant] refused to leave his cell
      to speak to her after she traveled to the prison to discuss the new statute
      with him. It was opined, “Despite a superficial appearance of ability, he
      cannot understand basic legal concepts or the function of court processes.
      He files many inexplicable pro se pleadings. Although he is not cooperative,
      he has never expressed a desire to die.” She concluded [Appellant’s]
      “incompetence” should not deprive him of the benefit of Ohio’s new law due

Case No. 22 BE 0049
                                                                                      –7–

      to a missed deadline, reciting the statutory provision stating the petitioner
      accept appointment of counsel or be found unable to make a competent
      decision whether to accept or reject the appointment of counsel. R.C.
      2953.21(J)(1).

      The petition concluded by asking the court to vacate the death sentence or
      grant leave to pursue discovery with an order for an evaluation and a
      hearing. (SMI Pet. 15-16). The court was also asked to stay the proceedings
      until [Appellant] was competent to act in his own best interest or hold a
      hearing on competence and then appoint a guardian ad litem or counsel as
      [Appellant’s] next friend upon granting the simultaneously filed motion to
      appoint counsel. (SMI Pet. 12-13, 16).

      On April 14, 2022, the trial court set a telephone status conference on the
      SMI petition and sustained the motion to appoint counsel to pursue that
      petition. The prosecutor filed a motion to appoint two special assistant
      prosecutors from the Ohio Attorney General’s office to assist the state,
      which the trial court granted. (5/2/22 J.E.).

      On April 27, 2022, [Appellant] sent a letter to the clerk, which was filed in
      the case, stating he did not consent to the filing of the SMI petition and
      asking the clerk to refuse further items filed without his specific
      authorization. [Appellant] rationalized he was pursuing federal habeas
      corpus and was “not raising the SMI claim at this stage of my federal courts
      proceedings.” He expressed: “I must focus on winning my legal case in
      federal courts. Try to overturn my conviction. * * * SMI will always be
      available via the clemency proceedings as well.” He believed a federally
      appointed attorney was prohibited from filing state motions (except
      clemency) and expressed concern he would “lose his right to counsel in
      federal court” due to this “foolishly devised SMI statute.” [Appellant]
      declared he was competent, stating an attorney cannot claim a person is

Case No. 22 BE 0049
                                                                                           –8–

      incompetent without court adjudication and no court declared him
      incompetent.

      Noting receipt of [Appellant’s] letter, the trial court directed the clerk to send
      a copy to the attorneys and said the status conference (where [Appellant]
      would appear by video) would address whether [Appellant] authorized the
      documents filed on his behalf, whether he requires the appointment of
      counsel, and whether he wants to proceed with the SMI claim. (5/6/22 J.E.).

      A week before the status conference, the state filed a “pretrial brief” stating
      in part [Appellant] had a constitutional right to decide whether to pursue SMI
      relief and the court need not determine if [Appellant] is competent to decide
      this. The state asked the court to conduct a proposed colloquy (attached to
      the brief), asking the court to explain the SMI evaluation to [Appellant],
      determine his intentions, and ask what exactly each sentence in his letter
      means.

      Attorney Shank responded by stating if the status conference has been
      changed to an adjudicative proceeding, then she was asking for a
      continuance and a competency evaluation, citing R.C. 2953.21(J)(1). She
      said the proposed colloquy would not show competence and cited testimony
      saying [Appellant’s] appearance of normality on most encounters did not
      negate the irrational thinking with regard to the subject of his delusions. (Tr.
      125-126). She noted [Appellant’s] filing confirmed his intent to pursue SMI
      relief (at some point) and demonstrated his incompetence, as it showed he
      could not understand the expiring SMI relief would not be available in the
      future or the difference between executive grace and statutory rights. She
      also attached four cases [Appellant] claimed he had pending in federal court
      to show they had been dismissed without a certificate of appealability.

      In opposition, the state argued R.C. 2953.21 did not require a competency
      hearing (of the type before a trial), pointing out (J)(1) says the court is to

Case No. 22 BE 0049
                                                                                             –9–

      determine if the defendant understands the legal consequences of the
      decision to decline the appointment of counsel to file an SMI petition.

      At the first hearing, the participants initially discussed the court’s inability to
      proceed because [Appellant] filed an interlocutory appeal in the case. The
      prosecutor said the issue (when they reconvened) would be whether
      [Appellant] wanted the petition to proceed. (5/27/22 Tr. 8-9). Attorney Shank
      pointed out [Appellant’s] competence would need to be addressed under
      the SMI statute before the court could adopt any decision by him to refuse
      to proceed; she also noted his delusional disorder diagnosis was accepted
      by the trial court at his sentencing and she filed the SMI petition to preserve
      his expiring rights. (5/27/22 Tr. 10-11).

      [Appellant] suggested the new statute was interpreted by a 1991 Supreme
      Court case. (5/27/22 Tr. 21). He also said it was absurd to argue he was
      incompetent, quoting the direct appeal from his capital case. (5/27/22 Tr.
      11-13, 15-16). In overruling an argument on the denial of a pro se mid-trial
      competency request, the cited decision observed: Dr. Smalldon testified
      [Appellant] suffered from a severe mental illness; this did not necessarily
      meet the definition of legal incompetency; a defendant may be emotionally
      disturbed or even psychotic and still be capable of understanding the
      charges against him and of assisting his counsel; trial counsel never
      questioned his competency; and he prepared his own mid-trial motion for a
      competency evaluation using correct legal terms. Ahmed, 103 Ohio St.3d
      27, 2004-Ohio-4190, 813 N.E.2d 637 at ¶ 66-67.

      We stop to note in reviewing [Appellant’s] death sentence in the cited case,
      the Supreme Court additionally observed:

      Smalldon concluded that [Appellant] is not insane, but suffers from a
      delusional disorder, persecutory type; a depressive disorder; and a
      paranoid personality disorder. In addition, [Appellant] has several prominent
      personality     traits:   narcissistic   trait   –   a   pattern   of   grandiosity,

Case No. 22 BE 0049
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      presumptuousness, and a sense of entitlement; passive-aggressive trait –
      a pervasive negativistic attitude, seeing the glass half-empty, and feeling
      that he is getting “a raw deal”; and obsessive-compulsive trait – a
      preoccupation with control, order, typically at the expense of flexibility and
      spontaneity. According to Smalldon, [Appellant’s] paranoid-personality
      disorder is characterized by a pervasive suspicion of other people, a too
      quick tendency to believe that people are out to humiliate or demean him.

      Smalldon testified that [Appellant] was experiencing delusional disorder of
      the persecutory type while committing the murders. Smalldon asserted that
      [Appellant] has a severe mental illness that impaired his capacity to
      accurately perceive reality and think logically. However, Smalldon declined
      to state that because of [Appellant’s] mental illness, he lacked the capacity
      to understand the wrongfulness of his conduct. Rather, Smalldon stated that
      [Appellant’s] mental illness was of such severity that it could have
      substantially impaired his ability to conform his conduct to the requirements
      of law.

      Id. at ¶ 177-178. Although the trial court found [Appellant’s] mental illness a
      factor under division (B)(3) of R.C. 2929.04 (“lacked substantial capacity” to
      appreciate the criminality of the offenders conduct or to conform due to the
      mental disease), the Supreme Court said the testimony did not rise to this
      standard but would be a mitigation factor under [the general catchall
      subsection of (B)(3)]. Id. at ¶ 183.

      After [Appellant] cited this Supreme Court decision, the trial court adjourned
      pending [Appellant’s] interlocutory appeals. (5/31/22 J.E.). Once the
      appeals were dismissed, [Appellant] filed a pro se motion to stay and
      indefinitely continue the SMI proceedings until the conclusion of his federal
      habeas proceedings, asking “what is the rush?” This motion stated, “As Trial
      court knows from the record, [Appellant] is likely to prevail in his SMI claims.”
      He mentioned losing certain rights if he were to be downgraded from a

Case No. 22 BE 0049
                                                                                        – 11 –

      capital defendant. Although seeking to stay the SMI petition (which was filed
      by Attorney Shank on the last day of the statutory deadline and where a
      state filing agreed the petition was timely), [Appellant] nevertheless
      complained Attorney Shank lacked authority to file the SMI petition and
      suggested he was not entitled to court-appointed counsel under the statute
      (as he already filed a post-conviction petition in 2001). He claimed he had
      a legal malpractice claim against Attorney Shank for abandoning him in
      federal court and said she was on a “personal Anti-Muslim Crusade” against
      him. [Appellant] also declared he was competent and not indigent (citing to
      funds existing in 1999, such as money taken when he was arrested).

      The hearing reconvened on September 19, 2022. The state argued the only
      issues were whether [Appellant] wished the petition to proceed and whether
      he wanted Attorney Shank to represent him, claiming the court was
      originally unaware she did not have his consent to act as counsel. (Tr. 3-5).
      The prosecutor also claimed [Appellant] would be giving up his claims of
      innocence if he proceeded with the SMI petition, citing arguments in
      [Appellant’s] prior notice of appeal filed in this court to show [Appellant’s]
      reasoning. (Tr. 5, 13-14).

      Attorney Shank pointed out the motion for appointment of counsel and the
      SMI petition filed on the same day disclosed [Appellant] may not accept her
      appointment and she was filing to protect his rights. She emphasized the
      issue at a hearing should be [Appellant’s] competency to reject counsel,
      pointing out his delusional disorder at the time of the crime was already part
      of the trial record (including his appearance of normality in most
      interactions) and she noticed certain delusional thoughts manifesting in
      more recent court proceedings. (Tr. 6-8, 20-21). Attorney Shank
      emphasized this was a one-time opportunity to be removed from death row,
      but [Appellant] was still insisting he had active chances in the Sixth Circuit.
      (Tr. 11-12).

Case No. 22 BE 0049
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      Speaking by video from prison, [Appellant] pointed to his latest filing as
      setting forth his position seeking a stay pending his federal suits. (Tr. 9-10).
      The court and the attorneys indicated they had not received his filing.
      [Appellant] again cited the Supreme Court’s 2004 decision (in his direct
      appeal from his 2001 trial) to support his position that he was currently
      competent. (Tr. 16). He complained: Attorney Shank failed to file appeals
      for him in federal court; she was “disbarred by the Sixth Circuit to represent
      [Appellant] in any appeal”; and the Sixth Circuit was incorrect in dismissing
      his appeals. (Tr. 16-118). Attorney Shank pointed out she was still his
      habeas counsel if there were any options to pursue. (Tr. 19).

      The court ruled [Appellant] was “not incompetent” and “shall proceed on his
      own.” After [Appellant] continued to argue a party has the right to proceed
      on their behalf, the court explained a ruling was just made in his favor on
      that issue. (Tr. 22). The court asked the state to draft an entry and to set the
      matter for a scheduling conference with [Appellant].

      On September 21, 2022, Attorney Shank filed a motion to withhold signing
      any judgment proposed by the state pending a competency evaluation,
      citing [Appellant’s] misrepresentations to the court on his federal
      proceedings as evidence he was incompetent to reject counsel (and
      incompetent to withdraw the SMI petition). It was noted he was incapable
      of evaluating the status of his federal arguments or the need to proceed in
      state court for preservation purposes. The court overruled her motion.
      (9/23/22 J.E.).

      On September 22, 2022, the trial court filed a journal entry overruling the
      SMI petition and asked the state to prepare a judgment entry encompassing
      the ruling, citing the September 19 hearing. The court thereafter signed an
      entry submitted by the prosecutor, which said: [Appellant] testified he did
      not wish to be represented by counsel; the court determined [Appellant] was
      not incompetent; the court relieved Attorney Shank of further responsibility

Case No. 22 BE 0049
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        of representing him in these proceedings; and the SMI petition filed without
        authorization or approval of [Appellant] was dismissed. (9/30/22 J.E.).

        [Appellant] filed a motion for findings of fact and conclusions of law. On
        November 7, 2022, the trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions of
        law (after ordering the state to propose them). The court recited its
        September 30, 2022 order as granting [Appellant’s] request to discharge
        Attorney Shank and dismissing the unauthorized SMI petition filed without
        [Appellant] knowledge or consent. The court then stated: “Having no reason
        to suspect irregularity, the Court, by docket entry dated April 14, 2022,
        summarily granted the motion for appointment of counsel filed by Attorney
        Shank on April 12, 2002, purportedly on behalf of defendant [Appellant], to
        represent him” in an SMI petition.

        The court then made findings on [Appellant’s] competency to act on his own
        behalf, citing the pro se pleadings and [Appellant’s] “affect and demeanor”
        at the hearing. The court said the decision to file the SMI petition belonged
        to the defendant and thus the April 12, 2022 pleadings filed by Attorney
        Shank “are held for naught and dismissed.” Citing McCoy v. Louisiana, 584
        U.S. 414, 138 S.Ct. 1500, 200 L.Ed.2d 821 (2018) and State v. Berry, 80
        Ohio St.3d 371, 686 N.E.2d 1097 (1997). In reiterating the discharge of
        counsel, the court similarly concluded, “Where [Appellant] did not request
        the appointment of counsel, the Court’s prior summary appointment of
        Attorney Shank is revoked and held for naught.”

Id. at ¶ 2-30.

        {¶6}       The foregoing facts require some elucidation. Attorney Shank plainly stated
in the SMI petition and motion for appointment of counsel that she filed both pleadings
without Appellant’s authorization, due to Appellant’s severe mental illness and the
impending expiration of the statute of limitations. Attorney Shank’s actions were
undertaken in conformance with Ohio Rule of Professional Conduct 1.14(b), which reads
in its entirety:

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       When the lawyer reasonably believes that the client has diminished
       capacity, is at risk of substantial physical, financial, or other harm unless
       action is taken, and cannot adequately act in the client’s own interest, the
       lawyer may take reasonably necessary protective action, including
       consulting with individuals or entities that have the ability to take action to
       protect the client and, in appropriate cases, seeking the appointment of a
       guardian ad litem, conservator, or guardian.

       {¶7}   Shortly after Attorney Shank filed the SMI petition, Appellant filed a pro se
pleading captioned, “Unauthorized Filings in my case 99-CR-192.”                The pleading
requested legal advice regarding the effect of the pending SMI petition on his statutory
right to counsel in his federal habeas corpus proceeding. The pleading also espoused
unsupported legal conclusions regarding Ohio’s clemency procedure.
       {¶8}   Specifically, the handwritten pleading reads in relevant part, “[b]efore I take
further action I need to know all the facts about: * * * Fed. Statute 18 U.S.C.S.
3995(a)(2)(e) [actually 3599(a)(2)(e)] allow [sic] right to counsel as statutory [sic] right for
state prisoners who are on death row. Non-death row state prisoners have no statutory
right to counsel in federal courts.” (4/27/22 Notice, p. 1-2.)
       {¶9}   Appellant was clearly irate that Attorney Shank filed the SMI petition. He
argued incorrectly that SMI relief will “always be available via the clemency proceedings
* * *,” then asked “so why would any stupid Jewish bitch want me to file for SMI claim,
when she knows I have nothing to loose [sic] by.” (Id. at 5.)
       {¶10} The trial court scheduled a hearing for May 27, 2022. According to the
scheduling entry, the hearing was set to determine three issues: (1) whether Attorney
Shank was authorized to file pleadings on Appellant’s behalf; (2) whether Appellant
sought the appointment of counsel; and (3) whether Appellant wanted to proceed with the
petition.
       {¶11} Prior to the May 27, 2022 hearing, Appellant filed a pro se interlocutory
appeal. In his amended notice of appeal, Appellant argued that he did not “intend” to file
the SMI petition, quoting R.C. 2953.21(J)(1). Appellant speculated Attorney Shank filed
the SMI petition because she suffers from “ ‘delusions as ambulance-chaser’ to make
some money because she never had a successful law practice and she has never won

Case No. 22 BE 0049
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any criminal trial, any criminal appeal and any federal habeas corpus claim in her entire
life.”   (5/27/2022 Amended Notice of Appeal, p. 4.)           The foregoing accusations
demonstrate Appellant’s animosity toward Attorney Shank, as well as his failure to
appreciate the running of the statute of limitations.
         {¶12} Attorney Shank asserted at the May 27, 2022 hearing that Appellant’s
competency had deteriorated during the roughly fifteen years she represented him in
federal court. She cited his countless pro se pleadings in both federal and state court to
demonstrate his inability to understand legal concepts and process. Appellant, who
appeared by videoconference, countered the trial court had never adjudged him to be
incompetent and he was capable of self-representation. He further argued the trial court
was currently without jurisdiction to rule on any arguments because of his pending appeal.
         {¶13} The trial court inquired, “[s]o you deny the ability to have an evaluation of
yourself, correct?” Appellant responded, “[w]ell, since Court [sic] has no jurisdiction, I
refuse to answer any other questions.” (5/27/22 Hrg., p. 12.) The trial court ultimately
granted Appellant’s request to stay the proceedings pending the outcome of his appeal.
         {¶14} Appellant filed two additional pro se notices of appeal in this case following
the May 27, 2022 hearing. We dismissed all three of the interlocutory appeals due to the
lack of a final appealable order. The hearing was rescheduled for September 19, 2022.
         {¶15} On September 6, 2022, Appellant filed a pro se “Motion to Stay and
Abeyance/Set Aside the PCR-SMI Claim Proceedings in Case No. 99-CR-192, Until All
Federal Constitutional Habeas Corpus Proceedings Have Finally Concluded to Avoid
Interference with U.S. CONST. Art. I, Section 9, Clause 2, [29 U.S.C. 2241 and 2254],
and Motion for Indefinite Continuance of PCR-SMI Proceedings in Case No. 99-CR-192.”
In the motions, Appellant argued the federal court’s jurisdiction over his habeas corpus
petition required a stay of the state court proceedings. Although he cited no relevant case
law supporting his argument, he nonetheless requested a stay rather than a dismissal of
his SMI petition. He asserted that an indefinite stay would protect his statutory rights to
counsel and funding in his federal habeas corpus proceedings.
         {¶16} At the September 19, 2022 hearing, the state argued that two issues were
before the trial court: (1) did Appellant want Attorney Shank’s representation, and, if not,
(2) should the petition be dismissed. Confronted with the foregoing inquiries, Appellant

Case No. 22 BE 0049
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did not request dismissal of the SMI petition, but instead, a stay of the proceedings
pending the resolution of his federal habeas corpus proceedings. Appellant stated:

       I had mailed on first of this month of [sic] a pro se motion for stay and
       abeyance of this * * * proceeding; and number two motion was to grant
       indefinite continuous [sic], like my federal habeas jurisdiction stays there,
       because Court of Common Pleas and federal jurisdiction, those, they start
       with the presumption * * * but then higher jurisdiction require [sic] the Court
       which acquired jurisdiction after the first court already – like the federal
       court has already acquired the jurisdiction, then it is the duty of the Court of
       Common Plea [sic] to set aside this case and wait for the conclusion of the
       federal jurisdiction.

(9/19/22 Hrg., p. 9-10.) Neither the trial court nor counsel had received a copy of the pro
se motion for stay.

       {¶17} The trial court did not engage in a colloquy with Appellant regarding his
apparent change of heart regarding dismissal of the SMI petition. Attorney Shank likewise
did not acknowledge Appellant’s shift in position.
       {¶18} In response to Appellant’s request for stay, Attorney Shank asserted, “[w]ith
regard to competency, I think [that is] the critical issue before the Court today and that is
the one thing I [do not] want to slip through the cracks because regardless of [Appellant’s]
position about having filed a motion to stay and abey [sic],the critical factor is that this is
a one-time opportunity for those already on death row * * * At the very least, if there is
something the Court thinks requires stay and abeyance in the federal courts, I think we
should verify it before a decision is made.” (Id., at p. 11-12.)
       {¶19} The state countered Appellant would have to forego his claim of innocence
in federal court if the SMI petition was not dismissed. The state relied on Appellant’s
argument that he would be required to abandon his actual innocence claim in federal
court to demonstrate Appellant “underst[ood] the proceedings.” (Id., at p. 14.)
       {¶20} Attorney Shank correctly replied that for every cogent argument advanced
by Appellant, there were numerous legally unsupportable assertions in his pro se

Case No. 22 BE 0049
                                                                                         – 17 –

pleadings. Attorney Shank further argued Appellant could not waive counsel, based on
the trial court’s prior finding that Appellant suffered from severe mental illness and
delusional disorder, absent a determination of his competence pursuant to R.C.
2953.21(J)(1).
       {¶21} In response to Attorney Shank’s argument that a competency determination
was required before Appellant could waive counsel, Appellant himself argued:

       First of all, let me address all the false claims and false allegations [that
       Attorney Shank] is making. Federal law from U.S. Supreme Court and Ohio
       Supreme Court says that if the jurisdiction was acquired by false statements
       and those statements are proven false, then there is no longer jurisdiction
       to continue with counsel because counsel was (unintelligible) bad faith,
       fraud and other counsel misconduct.

       In this situation on the last hearing, I had read all the decision [sic] of the
       Ohio Supreme Court which clearly said [Appellant] was neither incompetent
       at trial nor was incompetent was the Court rule on the direct appeal [sic].

       After that, I have listed in the motion, which I have filed in the Court of
       Appeals Seventh District – this Court may have not read them, but it list [sic]
       a case, list all [sic] the relevant cases which I proceeded pro se in the Sixth
       Circuit, at least six cases, in which – one of which [Attorney Shank] was
       appointed * * * but she did not file even the appeals and due to that, she is
       disbarred by [the] Sixth Circuit to represent [Appellant] in any case in any
       appeal.

(9/19/22 Hrg., p. 16-17.)

       {¶22} There is no entry on the docket in Appellant’s federal habeas case that
establishes Attorney Shank’s representation was terminated for any reason. Further, as
of the date of this opinion and judgment entry, Appellant’s federal habeas rights have
been fully adjudicated.

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                                                                                       – 18 –

       {¶23} With respect to Appellant’s competency to stand trial, it is important to clarify
Appellant’s trial counsel did not request a competency determination prior to the trial.
However, near the end of the guilt phase, Appellant filed a handwritten motion requesting
a competency examination. He asserted he was experiencing “extreme pain in the brain
and head and * * * frequent blackouts and vertigo attacks.” The trial court asked the jail’s
physician to examine Appellant, but Appellant would only submit to an examination by his
own doctor from Columbus.
       {¶24} The trial court conducted a hearing, outside the presence of the jury, in
which Appellant and several employees of the Belmont County Jail testified. Appellant
claimed he had vertigo and painful headaches, and he had been suffering from these
problems during the 16 months he had been in jail. Employees at the jail who saw him on
a daily basis rebutted his testimony. They testified Appellant had never complained of any
medical, mental, or psychological conditions until the day he filed the motion for the
competency evaluation.
       {¶25} The trial court concluded Appellant had not established good cause.
Appellant unsuccessfully challenged the trial court’s refusal to order a competency
examination in both his direct appeal and his original post-conviction petition.
       {¶26} Attorney Shank explained at the September 19, 2022 hearing that
Appellant’s diagnosis of delusional disorder was among the mental illnesses specifically
listed in the subsequently-enacted SMI statute. The following colloquy took place at the
September 19, 2022 hearing:

       ATTORNEY SHANK: * * * I realize [it is] in the record, but the delusional
       disorder of which he has been diagnosed does allow for the kinds of things
       that the prosecuting attorney pointed out. It is only in the areas of the
       delusion that the incompetency becomes apparent. That was testified to at
       trial[.] Dr. Jeffrey Smalldon [it is] [sic] a typical –

       THE COURT: But the jury [did not] go with that route.

       ATTORNEY SHANK: Well, the Court found it. They did not – they gave
       him the death penalty, but that [does not] mean –

Case No. 22 BE 0049
                                                                                     – 19 –

       APPELLANT: No. The Court did not find it. * * * Ohio Supreme Court very
       clearly stated [Appellant] is not incompetent.

       THE COURT: Thank you. This Court does rule that [Appellant] is not
       incompetent. This Court sustains the position of the State of Ohio and the
       defendant himself, personally, and not [Attorney Shank]. He shall proceed
       on his own. Thank you.

(Id., p. 21-22.)

       {¶27} Appellant responded, “Ohio Statute 4705.01 Supreme Court decision say
[sic] that every person has inherent right to proceed pro se.” The trial court replied, “I
have already ruled in your behalf.”
       {¶28} Attorney Shank added:

       Your Honor, I want to make clear the differences between incompetency at
       the time that the Ohio Supreme Court addressed it and the incompetency
       that we are dealing with today and the statutory requirement that
       competency be determined with an evaluation if necessary. And because
       the Court has before it, an already finding [sic] that he suffers from
       delusional disorder, I [do not] see why we cannot * * * implement the
       statutory evaluation process for competency [to waive counsel], not SMI.
       There are two different steps.

(Id., p. 23-24.)

       {¶29} The trial court requested a proposed entry prepared by the state and
reviewed by Attorney Shank and instructed the bailiff set the matter for another
conference at which time Appellant, acting pro se, could dismiss the petition:

       PROSECUTOR: Judge, if [he is] going to proceed pro se, essentially he
       will have the option to withdraw what has already been filed by [appointed]
       counsel.

       ***

Case No. 22 BE 0049
                                                                                            – 20 –

       THE COURT: Set this matter for scheduling conference. Thank you.

(Id., p. 24-25.)

       {¶30} Attorney Shank interceded:

       You Honor, could we just put on the record at least an opportunity to
       discuss, or do it right now, that should this be reversed, the initial filing date
       remains in effect that whatever comes to next relates back, because under
       the statute, if he – he [cannot] start again. It [cannot] be done on over [sic].

       It has to be filed by the date upon which it was filed, and one of the great
       concerns and one of the reasons that we brought this case was because
       without that having been done, he losses [sic] this opportunity forever.

(Id., p. 25-26.) The trial court responded, “Thank you.”

       {¶31} No other conference or hearing was conducted. Appellant did not file a
motion to dismiss. Instead, the trial court issued a docket and journal entry on September
22, 2022 “overrul[ing] the [SMI petition] filed by [Attorney Shank] on behalf of [Appellant],”
and instructing the state to submit a proposed judgment entry. On September 30, 2022,
the trial court issued its judgment entry finding Appellant competent to waive counsel,
authorizing Appellant to proceed pro se, and dismissing the SMI petition because it was
filed without the authorization or approval of Appellant.
       {¶32} On October 6, 2022, Appellant filed an amended pro se motion for “stay and
abeyance” and “indefinite continuance.” Similar to the original motion, albeit longer in
form, Appellant’s motion sought a stay of the SMI petition during the pendency of his
federal habeas proceedings.
       {¶33} On October 7, 2022, Appellant’s pro se motion for findings of fact and
conclusions of law and request for ruling on motion for stay or continuance, as well as his
pro se notice of appeal was docketed. In his motion for findings of fact and conclusions
of law, Appellant asserted the SMI petition was dismissed without explanation. He also
inquired why the state had not filed an answer to the SMI petition and “why [Appellant]
was not asked to speak about the petition and [the hearing] was terminated by the court

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                                                                                            – 21 –

only asking [the] Prosecutor to speak.” (10/7/22 Mot., p. 2.) The motion continues, “[t]his
court conducted a sham hearing and failed to allow [Appellant] without counsel to speak
about the petition.” (Id., p. 4.)    Appellant argued the trial court erred in effectively
overruling the amended motion for stay. Appellant amended the foregoing pleadings and
the amended pleadings were filed on November 17, 2022.
       {¶34} The trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law on November
7, 2022. The trial court summarizes Appellant’s statements at both the May 27, 2022
pretrial and the September 19, 2022 hearing as follows:

       During the pretrial conference of May 27, 2022, the Court took testimony
       from [Appellant] by video. In a manner consistent with the pro se pleading
       he filed on April 27, 2022, [Appellant] testified that the SMI filing on April 12,
       2022 was done without his knowledge and without his consent. In addition,
       [Appellant] testified that he did not authorize [Attorney Shank] to act on his
       behalf.   [Appellant] testified that he was not asking for counsel and
       disavowed any intention to seek the relief requested in the SMI petition that
       [Attorney Shank] filed on April 12, 2022.

       ***

       At the status conference on September 19, 2022, the Court took testimony
       from [Appellant] by video.       [Appellant] again testified that he did not
       authorize [Attorney Shank] to act on his behalf. [Appellant] again testified
       that he was not asking for counsel and disavowed any intention to seek the
       relief requested in the SMI petition that Attorney Shank filed on April 12.
       2022, purportedly on behalf of [Appellant.]

(11/7/22 J.E., p. 3-4.)

       {¶35} To the contrary, Appellant did not “disavow[ ] any intention to seek the relief
requested in the SMI petition” at the September 19, 2022 hearing. Appellant argued in
favor of a stay of the SMI petition, in order to allow him to resolve his habeas corpus
proceedings without suffering any potential prejudice to his federal case.

Case No. 22 BE 0049
                                                                                          – 22 –

        {¶36} The findings of fact and conclusions of law continue:

        At all times during his testimony, [Appellant] was lucid and appropriately
        engaged with his surroundings. [Appellant] did not display resistance or
        non-compliance, but rather followed the directions of the Court, starting and
        stopping his arguments and testimony as directed by the Court.
        [Appellant’s] testimony was not disorganized or abstract, but rather
        reflected a linear thought process that was engaged with and responsive to
        pertinent topics at the time of his testimony. [Appellant’s] conduct during the
        proceedings was consistent with the expectations for behavior in a
        courtroom setting. [Appellant] did not display any speech or behavior that
        would cause the Court to doubt his ability to properly and competently act
        on his own behalf in these proceedings.

        Based upon [Appellant’s] pro se pleadings, and based on the testimony
        from the May 27, 2022 and September 19, 2022, [sic] proceedings, this
        Court finds that [Appellant] did not authorize Attorney Shank to file the SMI
        petition on his behalf. This Court additionally finds that [Appellant] is not
        seeking relief under R.C. 2929.025 but rather that the application filed on
        his behalf by [Attorney Shank] was done without his knowledge or consent.

        ***

        Since the Court has granted [Appellant’s] request to discharge [Attorney
        Shank] and to hold for naught and dismiss the SMI petition, [Appellant’s]
        pro se motion to stay proceedings filed on September 6, 2022, is moot and
        accordingly denied. Any additional motions by [Appellant] have also been
        rendered moot and are accordingly denied.

(Id., p. 4-6.)

        {¶37} The trial court once again misstates Appellant’s statements at the
September 19, 2022 hearing. Appellant did not request dismissal of the SMI petition, but

Case No. 22 BE 0049
                                                                                       – 23 –

instead requested a stay of the state court proceedings pending the resolution of his
federal court proceedings.

                                     ANALYSIS

                        ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO .1

       THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED
       STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE 1, SECTION 10 OF THE OHIO
       CONSTITUTION FORBID A TRIAL COURT FROM ALLOWING A
       CAPITAL DEFENDANT WITH A QUESTIONABLE MENTAL HEALTH
       HISTORY TO DECIDE TO REPRESENT HIMSELF ABSENT A
       KNOWING, VOLUNTARY OR INTELLIGENT WAIVER PER OHIO
       CRIMINAL RULE 44.

       {¶38} A postconviction proceeding is not an appeal of a criminal conviction, but a
collateral civil attack on a criminal judgment. State v. Steffen, 70 Ohio St.3d 399, 410,
639 N.E.2d 67 (1994). “Indeed, post-conviction state collateral review itself is not a
constitutional right, even in capital cases.” Id., citing Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1,
109 S.Ct. 2765, 106 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989). Accordingly, in a postconviction proceeding, a
convicted defendant has only the rights granted him by the legislature. State v. Moore, 99
Ohio App.3d 748, 751, 651 N.E.2d 1319 (1994).
       {¶39} Although the state correctly argues in its brief there is no constitutional right
to counsel in post-conviction proceedings, there is a statutory right to counsel in death
penalty post-conviction relief petitions. R.C. 2953.21(J)(1) reads in its entirety:

       If a person sentenced to death intends to file a petition under this section,
       the court shall appoint counsel to represent the person upon a finding that
       the person is indigent and that the person either accepts the appointment
       of counsel or is unable to make a competent decision whether to accept or
       reject the appointment of counsel. The court may decline to appoint counsel
       for the person only upon a finding, after a hearing if necessary, that the
       person rejects the appointment of counsel and understands the legal

Case No. 22 BE 0049
                                                                                    – 24 –

      consequences of that decision or upon a finding that the person is not
      indigent.

(Emphasis added.)

      {¶40} In Ohio, the competency standard for waiving the right to counsel is the
same as the competency standard for standing trial, that is, whether the defendant has
sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding and a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings. State
v. Wilkerson, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 22 MA 0034, 2023-Ohio-3596, ¶ 5, citing State v.
Bolin, 128 Ohio App.3d 58, 62, 713 N.E.2d 1092 (8th Dist.1998). A criminal defendant is
rebuttably presumed to be competent to stand trial. State v. Barton, 108 Ohio St.3d 402,
2006-Ohio-1324, 844 N.E.2d 307, ¶ 56, citing R.C. 2945.37(G)
      {¶41} Ohio courts conduct a de novo review of a criminal defendant’s waiver of
his right to counsel. State v. Godley, 3rd Dist. Hancock No. 5-17-29, 2018-Ohio-4253, ¶
9; State v. Yeager, 9th Dist. Summit Nos. 28604 and 28617, 2018-Ohio-574, ¶ 7;
Lakewood v. Lane, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104534, 2017-Ohio-1039, ¶ 10, quoting
Columbus v. Abrahamson, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 13AP-1077, 2014-Ohio-3930, ¶ 6;
State v. Alexander, 4th Dist. Ross No. 15CA3492, 2016-Ohio-5015, ¶ 4, citing State v.
Mootispaw, 4th Dist. Highland No. 09CA33, 2010-Ohio-4772, ¶ 21; State v. Griffin, 10th
Dist. Franklin No. 10AP-902, 2011-Ohio-4250, ¶ 26 (noting that “[i]n the leading cases on
the issue of waiver of the right to counsel, the Supreme Court of Ohio appears to have
undertaken a de novo review without expressly reciting this standard of review”).
      {¶42} Turning to the facts in this case, we must determine whether Appellant
“reject[ed] the appointment of counsel and underst[ood] the legal consequences of that
decision.” R.C. 2953.21(J)(1). Insofar as the interpretation of the foregoing statutory
language is a matter of first impression, and involves a petitioner whose competency to
waive counsel was in question, we apply the two-part test for competency to waive
counsel in a criminal case.
      {¶43} We must first determine whether Appellant had sufficient present ability to
consult with Attorney Shank with a reasonable degree of rational understanding.
However, the uncontroverted evidence in the record establishes that Appellant did not

Case No. 22 BE 0049
                                                                                      – 25 –

consult with counsel at all, as Appellant refused to meet with Attorney Shank when she
visited the prison to advise him of his rights under the new statute.
       {¶44} Appellant’s refusal to consult with Attorney Shank was predicated upon a
deep-seated mistrust of Attorney Shank, which finds no rational explanation in the record.
Attorney Shank attributed Appellant’s belief that she was (at best) ineffective and (at
worst) actively working against his interests to his mental illness.
       {¶45} Appellant’s diagnoses include delusional disorder, persecutory type, and a
paranoid personality disorder. Dr. Smalldon further observed Appellant’s mental illness
is marked by a narcissistic trait and grandiosity. There is no evidence in the record
Appellant has undergone any therapy or treatment during his incarceration. At the May
27, 2022 hearing, Attorney Shank observed that Appellant’s competency had deteriorated
over their fifteen-year relationship.
       {¶46} The record is replete with examples of Appellant’s mistrust of Attorney
Shank, which includes unfounded accusations of ineffective assistance during her
previous representation, as well as her alleged “personal anti-Muslim crusade” against
him. Attorney Shank correctly predicted Appellant would reject her appointment.
       {¶47} Nonetheless, the trial court did not engage in a colloquy with Appellant to
determine whether his desire to terminate Attorney Shank’s representation was
predicated upon a logical understanding of the effect of his waiver of counsel, or a product
of a paranoid delusion that the SMI petition was part of Attorney Shank’s “crusade” to
strip him of his right to counsel in federal court. Despite a complete breakdown of the
attorney-client relationship, and the representation by Attorney Shank that Appellant had
received no legal counsel regarding his rights under the new statute, the trial court did not
offer to appoint new counsel.
       {¶48} In summary, Appellant refused to consult with appointed counsel based on
an irrational mistrust of Attorney Shank, which was unsupported based on her previous
representation and consistent with his diagnosed mental disorders. Accordingly, we find
Appellant did not have sufficient present ability to consult with counsel with a reasonable
degree of rational understanding.
       {¶49} We further find Appellant did not have a rational as well as factual
understanding of the effect of his waiver of counsel. First, the trial court did not engage

Case No. 22 BE 0049
                                                                                        – 26 –

in a colloquy with Appellant regarding his statutory right to counsel, despite the fact that
Appellant specifically requested legal counsel regarding the interplay between the new
statute and his federal habeas corpus case in his “unauthorized filings” pleading. Second,
Appellant received no legal counsel regarding his waiver of counsel or the SMI petition,
because he refused to speak with Attorney Shank. Finally, Appellant was not informed
by the trial court that the termination of Attorney Shank’s representation would result in a
de facto dismissal of the SMI petition, based on the trial court’s conclusion that an SMI
petition filed without consent is a nullity.
       {¶50} Significantly, Appellant never filed a written motion to dismiss the petition or
made an oral motion to dismiss at the hearings. While Appellant asserted in his early pro
se pleading that the SMI petition would negatively impact his federal habeas corpus
petition, Appellant was never given the opportunity to consult with legal counsel regarding
the impact of the SMI petition on the federal proceedings.
       {¶51} Further, the trial court mischaracterized Appellant’s testimony regarding the
SMI petition in its findings of fact and conclusions of law. After Appellant’s interlocutory
appeals failed, he filed his pro se motion to stay the SMI petition pending the outcome of
his federal habeas corpus proceedings. While the legal basis for his argument may have
been invalid, the motion for stay indicates Appellant did not want to dismiss the SMI
petition. The trial court’s dismissal of the petition was directly at odds with Appellant’s pro
se motions to stay the SMI petition pending the outcome of his federal habeas corpus
proceedings. The foregoing conclusion is buttressed by Appellant’s arguments advanced
in his pro se motion for findings of fact and conclusions of law, as well as his pro se notice
of appeal of the trial court’s dismissal of the petition.
       {¶52} Most troubling, Appellant was led to believe he would be given the
opportunity to address the SMI petition after the issuance of the judgment entry
terminating Attorney Shank’s representation. Rather than conducting a hearing with
Appellant informing him of his right to counsel as well as the fact that dismissal of the SMI
petition would foreclose him from pursuing his rights under the new statute, the trial court
sua sponte dismissed the SMI petition. Further, the trial court failed to disabuse Appellant
of his belief that he could refile the petition following the resolution of his federal habeas
corpus proceeding, or that the standard articulated in the SMI statute would be applied in

Case No. 22 BE 0049
                                                                                      – 27 –

his clemency proceedings. As a consequence, we find Appellant did not have a rational
and factual understanding of the proceedings.
       {¶53} Finally, the Court predicated its conclusion that Appellant was competent to
waive counsel based on his courtroom decorum. Because Appellant did not speak out of
turn or act disruptively, the trial court concluded he was competent to waive counsel.
However, the trial court’s conclusion ignores Attorney Shank’s admonition that Appellant
was capable of articulating the law and speaking authoritatively, thereby concealing his
delusional thinking. Further, the trial court did not engage in any colloquy with Appellant
regarding the effect of the termination of counsel at the September 19, 2022 hearing, but
instead allowed him to make irrelevant arguments related to the dismissal of his appeals.
       {¶54} Accordingly, we find that Appellant did not understand the legal
consequences of his decision to waive Attorney Shank’s counsel. Because Appellant’s
waiver of his statutory right to counsel was invalid, we reverse and vacate the September
30, 2022 judgment entry of the trial court finding Appellant competent to waive counsel.

                            ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2

       THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW TO THE
       PREJUDICE OF APPELLANT BY ALLOWING APPELLANT TO
       REPRESENT HIMSELF AND DISMISS HIS SMI POSTCONVICTION
       PETITION WITHOUT ORDERING A COMPETENCY EVALUATION OF
       [APPELLANT] PURSUANT TO R.C. 2929.025(C)(F)(1) AND R.C. 2953.21.

       {¶55} Having concluded in the first assignment of error that Appellant’s waiver of
counsel was invalid, we further find the trial court’s dismissal of the SMI petition was an
error of law. As previously stated, Appellant did not understand and was never apprized
by the trial court of the consequences of the dismissal of the petition. He appeared to
believe that he could refile the petition in the event his federal habeas corpus and request
for clemency failed. Moreover, Appellant’s initial concerns regarding the effect of the SMI
petition on his federal habeas corpus proceedings were ultimately supplanted by his
request to stay the petition pending the outcome of his federal habeas corpus
proceedings. Accordingly, we find Appellant’s second assignment of error has merit and

Case No. 22 BE 0049
                                                                                         – 28 –

we reverse and vacate the September 22 and 30, 2022 judgment entries of the trial court
dismissing the SMI petition.

                             ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 3

       THE SMI SCHEME AS ENACTED BY THE STATE OF OHIO AS APPLIED
       TO APPELLANT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

       {¶56} All legislation enjoys a presumption of constitutionality and where a matter
can be resolved on other grounds, the constitutional question should not be determined.
State, ex rel. Purdy v. Clermont Cty. Bd. of Elections, 77 Ohio St.3d 338, 345-46, 673
N.E.2d 1351, 1997-Ohio-278; Rispo Realty & Dev. Co. v. City of Parma (1990), 55 Ohio
St.3d 101, 105, 564 N.E.2d 425 (1990). As we have resolved this appeal on other
grounds, we do not reach the constitutional challenge. Accordingly, we find Appellant’s
third assignment of error is moot.

                             ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 4

       THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW TO THE
       PREJUDICE OF APPELLANT BY FAILING TO MAINTAIN A PROPER
       RECORD ON APPEAL WHEN THE TRANSCRIPTS OF PROCEEDINGS
       FROM THE COURT HEARINGS WERE NOT TRANSCRIBED AND
       PREPARED PURSUANT TO OHIO CRIMINAL RULE 22 AND R.C.
       2301.20.

       {¶57} In his final assignment of error, Appellant contends the transcripts from the
hearings on May 27, 2022 and September 19, 2022 violate Ohio statutes and rules due
to the transcribed testimony being “unintelligible, incomplete, and contains crosstalk of
the parties.” (Appellant’s Brf., p. 13.) In support of the foregoing argument, Appellant cites
the court reporter’s certification, which reads in relevant part, “[t]he foregoing transcript of
proceedings is a transcript of verbatim stenotype notes taken in open court during the
hearing(s) of this case before the court and said transcript of proceedings constitutes all
of the testimony taken during these proceedings to the best of my ability.” (Emphasis

Case No. 22 BE 0049
                                                                                    – 29 –

added.) Based on our resolution of the first two assignments of error, we find Appellant’s
fourth assignment of error is moot.

                                      CONCLUSION

      {¶58} For the foregoing reasons, the September 22 and 30, 2022 judgment entries
of the trial court finding Appellant competent to waive counsel and dismissing the SMI
petition are reversed and vacated, and this matter is remanded for the appointment of
new counsel.

Robb, P.J., concurs.

Hanni, J., concurs.

Case No. 22 BE 0049
[Cite as State v. Ahmed, 2024-Ohio-904.]

         For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, the judgment entries of
 the Court of Common Pleas of Belmont County, Ohio finding Appellant competent to
 waive counsel and dismissing the SMI petition are reversed and vacated. We hereby
 remand this matter to the trial court for the appointment of new counsel. Costs to be
 taxed against the Appellee.
         A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate
 in this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that
 a certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into
 execution.

                                       NOTICE TO COUNSEL

         This document constitutes a final judgment entry.