Court Opinion

ID: 9518823
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:02:58.856321+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:36:55.721092
License: Public Domain

Read, J. (dissenting).
While the majority’s interpretation of the “interplay” between Domestic Relations Law § 117 (2) (a) and EPTL 3-3.3 is certainly not fanciful, it strikes me as implausible in light of relevant statutory language and history. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
Prior to its amendment in 1986, subdivision (1) of section 117 of the Domestic Relations Law provided that an adopted person could not inherit in intestacy from or through his biological family, except where the biological parent remarried and consented to adoption by the spouse. Subdivision (2) of section 117, however, specified that
“[t]his section [117] shall apply only to the intestate descent and distribution of real and personal property and shall not affect the right of any child to *43distribution of property under the will of his natural parents or their natural or adopted kindred . . . or under any inter vivos instrument.”
In Matter of Best (116 Misc 2d 365 [Sur Ct, Westchester County 1982]), the Surrogate was faced with the question whether, in light of subdivision (2), a child adopted out of the family by a nonrelative could inherit as a member of a class of beneficiaries (i.e., “issue”) identified in his biological grandmother’s will. The Surrogate concluded that he could. Recognizing the jurisdictional problems presented by his interpretation of section 117 (2) as well as the risk to the confidentiality of adoption proceedings, he urged legislative study and amendment to
“limit the adopted-out child’s interest in decedents’ estates to the bloodline of his adoptive parents except in those instances when a will of a biological kindred discloses in clear language an intention to distribute a portion of the estate to the adopted-out child. To continue the existing statute without amendment will give rise to litigation, delays in the settlement of estates and the distribution of property to persons not only unknown to a testator but to unintended beneficiaries” (id. at 375).
In 1984, the Law Revision Commission drafted and recommended adoption of a bill to cure the so-called Best problem by creating a statutory default rule for construing gifts made to a class to which an adopted-out child belonged in his biological relationship prior to adoption (see 1984 NY Senate-Assembly Bill S 8325, A 10131). This bill amended section 117 of the Domestic Relations Law so as to permit an adopted-out child to inherit under either intestacy (subdivision [1]) or a will or inter vivos instrument (subdivision [2]) from biological kindred as he would have prior to adoption, but only if adopted by a stepparent, a birth grandparent or a descendant of a birth grandparent. The bill concomitantly amended subdivision (b) of EPTL 3-3.3, the anti-lapse statute, so that “issue,” “surviving issue” and “issue surviving” included adopted-out children “to the extent they may inherit under the provisions of section one hundred seventeen of the domestic relations law” (that is, from a stepparent, a birth grandparent or the descendant of a birth grandparent under the terms of the bill). In short, the bill created a symmetrical standard that gave adopted-out children the right to inherit in both intestacy and testacy from identical and limited categories of close kindred.
*44Although passed, by both houses of the Legislature, the 1984 bill ultimately foundered on the shoals of strong opposition from the New York State Bar Association’s Trust and Estates Law Section, which had developed a competing proposal (see Proposed Legislation to amend Domestic Relations Law [“DRL”] § 117 and Estates, Powers and Trusts Law [“EPTL”] §§ 2-1.3 and 3-3.3, Bill Jacket, Veto 106 of 1984, at 50). Governor Mario M. Cuomo vetoed the bill, noting ambiguities and “the substantial lack of consensus within the legal community,” which argued “for further deliberate review” (Governor’s Veto Mem 106, 1984 NY Legis Ann, at 403).
In 1985, we reversed the Appellate Division’s order in Best and remitted to Surrogate’s Court, concluding that “[o]nly if a child adopted out of the family is specifically named in a biological ancestor’s will, or the gift is expressly made to issue including those adopted out of the family, can the child take” (Matter of Best, 66 NY2d 151, 156 [1985]). We left open the question of the “hybrid cases,” where a child was adopted by a stepparent or a member of the biological family and different policy considerations might therefore apply (id. at 155 n 1).
In 1986, the Law Revision Commission drafted and recommended adoption of another version of a bill related to the Best dilemma (see 1986 NY Senate-Assembly Bill S 8366, A 10462).1 This bill recast former subdivision (2) of section 117 as paragraph (h) of subdivision (l),2 and added a new subdivision (2) to govern dispositions under wills and inter vivos instruments. The new subdivision (2) read in relevant part as follows:
“(a) As to the wills of persons dying after the thirty-first day of August, nineteen hundred eighty-six, or to inter vivos instruments executed after such date, a designation of a class of persons based upon natural relationship shall, unless the will or instrument expresses a contrary intention, be deemed to include *45an adoptive child who was a member of such class prior to adoption only if:
“(1) an adoptive parent (i) is married to the child’s natural parent, (ii) is the child’s natural grandparent, or (in) is a descendant of such grandparent, and
“(2) the testator or creator is the child’s natural grandparent or a descendant of such grandparent.”
The 1986 bill thus limited an adopted-out child’s rights to inherit from biological kindred under a will or inter vivos instrument to the identical limited categories of close biological relatives as was the case in the vetoed 1984 bill (i.e., a stepparent, a birth grandparent or a descendant of a birth grandparent). The 1986 bill also amended subdivision (b) of EPTL 3-3.3 to provide that “issue,” “surviving issue” and “issue surviving” included adopted-out children “to the extent they may inherit under the provisions of section one hundred seventeen of the domestic relations law.”
This time around, the Law Revision Commission and the State Bar Committee on Estate and Trust Administration struck a deal. The State Bar Committee endorsed the 1986 bill so long as certain “technical changes” were made (see Legislation Report, Bill Jacket, L 1986, ch 408, at 65). As relevant to this case, one of those technical changes called for a new subdivision (2) (a) of section 117 and the relettering of proposed subdivision (2) (a) as (2) (b). This new subdivision (2) (a), modeled on a provision of the Uniform Adoption Act, specified that *46Chapter 408 of the Laws of 1986 reflected the technical changes required by the State Bar Committee as the price of its endorsement, including the new section 117 (2) (a).
*45“[e]xcept as hereinafter stated, after the making of an order of adoption, adopted children and their issue thereafter are strangers to any natural relatives for the purpose of the interpretation or construction of a disposition in any instrument, whether executed before or after the order of adoption, which does not express a contrary intention or does not expressly include the individual by name or by some classification not based on a parent-child or family relationship.”3
*46Thus, in the 1984 bill and in the initial version of the 1986 bill, subdivision (2) (a) of section 117 consisted only of what was subsequently relettered subdivision (2) (b) in the bill enacted as chapter 408—the provision confining an adopted-out child’s rights to inherit from biological kindred under a will or inter vivos instrument to specified categories of close relatives. There is nothing in the legislative history of chapter 408 to suggest that the Legislature intended the addition of the refashioned subdivision (2) (a) to accomplish anything other than what the State Bar Committee envisioned; namely, a technical, not a substantive change to the original bill. There is certainly no basis for concluding that this technical change caused EPTL 3-3.3, the anti-lapse statute, to bear on Domestic Relations Law § 117 (2) in the way advocated by Clair Manning’s children and adopted by the majority. Under the majority’s interpretation, however, by making a bequest to an adopted-out child by name, a testator restores the adopted-out child to his preadoption rights of inheritance as biological kindred with respect to that bequest. Thus, the child adopted out by strangers, merely by being named in a will, achieves inheritance rights on a par with the child adopted out by close kindred. A testator will have to express the contrary intention in order to avoid this result whenever making a bequest to an adopted-out child by name. This cuts against the grain of chapter 408, which presumes that the average testator would likely only intend for the issue of a child adopted out by specified close kindred to qualify as substituted takers under the anti-lapse statute.
Nor does section 117 (2) (a) lack meaning and effect unless interpreted in conjunction with EPTL 3-3.3 in the way suggested by the majority. It is under subdivision (2) (a) that the bequests to two of Clair Manning’s four children pass. Under section 117 (2) (a), as issue of an adopted-out child they were made strangers to their birth grandmother for purposes of interpreting the dispositions in her will. Subdivision (2) (a), then, simply makes clear that notwithstanding this, these two *47grandchildren may take by name as would any other stranger. Further, testator could have, for example, provided in her will that she intended to make her bequests to “My child, Clair Manning, as though he had never been adopted”; or she could have directed that the adoption of Clair Manning was to be disregarded for purposes of construing the dispositions in her will. In either event, she would have “express[ed] a contrary intention” under subdivision (2) (a), thus contradicting the legislative presumption that adopted-out children and their issue are strangers to their biological relatives for purposes of inheritance, except as specified in subdivision (2) (b). But, of course, she did not do this. Finally, subdivision (2) (a) also preserves bequests to an adopted-out child as a member of some classification not based on the parent-child or family relationship; for example, testator might have made a bequest to the members of her Saturday afternoon bridge club. Assuming that Clair Manning was a member of this classification, the majority’s interpretation creates some odd results. Presumably, this gift to him would not lapse if ÉPTL 3-3.3, in fact, saves gifts to an adopted-out child taking a bequest under the terms of Domestic Relations Law § 117 (2) (a). If the testator had made the bequest to “Clair Manning, John Doe and Jane Roe, with whom I have enjoyed playing bridge on Saturday afternoon for 25 years,” and both Clair Manning and John Doe predeceased her, the bequest to Clair Manning clearly would not lapse under the majority’s interpretation (because Clair Manning was named and because he was biological issue), but the bequest to John Doe would.
Additionally, the majority’s interpretation of Domestic Relations Law § 117 (2) (a) ignores some of its language. Section 117 (2) (a), as relevant in this case, applies to “adopted children and their issue” unless “the individual” is included by name (emphasis added). The phrase “and their issue” is superfluous under the majority’s reading of section 117 (2) (a), for the majority reads the word “individual” as synonymous with the phrase “adopted child[ ].” The majority’s reading of section 117 (2) (a) also does not treat the issue of adopted-out children comparably under the laws of intestacy and testacy, the Legislature’s avowed purpose when it amended Domestic Relations Law § 117 (1) in 1987 (see generally, Bill Jacket, L 1987, ch 499).
Finally, although this appeal turns on statutory interpretation, nothing on the face of testator’s will indicates any intention to favor Clair Manning’s four children over her Beckman *48relatives. In the will’s “Ninth” paragraph decedent makes 16 separate bequests to 13 named individuals and three churches, charities or societies. Only two of Clair Manning’s four children are included in any of the 13 bequests to named individuals, one for $5,000 and the other for $3,000; at least four of these 13 bequests (and perhaps more—it is not apparent from the face of the will or otherwise from the record) are made to Beckman relatives, two for $10,000, the most of any of the individual bequests, and two for $5,000. The will’s executors are Beckman relatives.
In sum, statutory language and legislative history belie the notion that Domestic Relations Law § 117 (2) (a) is dependent on EPTL 3-3.3 for its meaning and effect. Clair Manning’s children should not take under section 117 (2) (a) except to the extent that two of them are the named beneficiaries of specific bequests; they should not take under EPTL 3-3.3 because their father was not adopted by any of the limited categories of close kindred specified in Domestic Relations Law § 117 (2) (b). Accordingly, I would affirm the order of the Appellate Division.
Chief Judge Kaye and Judges G.B. Smith, Ciparick, Graffeo and R.S. Smith concur with Judge Rosenblatt; Judge Read dissents and votes to affirm in a separate opinion.
Order reversed, with costs to all parties appearing separately and filing separate briefs payable out of the estate, and matter remitted to Surrogate’s Court, Steuben County, for further proceedings in accordance with the opinion herein.

. The Law Revision Commission’s 1985 bill (see 1985 NY Senate-Assembly Bill S 5535, A 7455) on this topic, like the vetoed 1984 bill, applied both to intestacy and to class gifts under testamentary and inter vivos instruments. This bill was never acted on in either house.

. This was the language that caused the lower courts in Best to conclude that the rights of an adopted-out child were terminated only with respect to intestate descent and distribution, and not under a will or inter vivos instrument. Most of this language in former subdivision (2)/new subdivision (1) (h) was deleted in the bill subsequently enacted as chapter 408 of the Laws of 1986.

. Section 14 of the Uniform Adoption Act provides that adoption decrees generally
“terminate all legal relationships between the adopted individual and his relatives, including his natural parents, so that the adopted individual thereafter is a stranger to his former relatives *46for all purposes including inheritance and the interpretation or construction of documents, statutes, and instruments, whether executed before or after the adoption is decreed, which do not expressly include the individual by name or by some designation not based on a parent and child or blood relationship” (Uniform Adoption Act § 14 [a] [1] [emphasis added]).