Court Opinion

ID: 2964192
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:21:56.224155+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:37:23.493215
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            United States Court of Appeals
                                For the First Circuit
                                 ____________________

        No. 95-2032

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                                   ROBERT M. JOOST,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

                       [Hon. Mary M. Lisi, U.S. District Judge]
                                           ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                 Lynch, Circuit Judge,
                                        _____________
                            Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                    ____________________
                            and Cummings,* Circuit Judge.
                                           _____________

                                 ____________________

            Thomas G. Briody for appellant.
            ________________
            Margaret  E. Curran,  Assistant United States  Attorney, with whom
            ___________________
        Sheldon Whitehouse,  United States  Attorney, and  Kenneth P.  Madden,
        __________________                                 __________________
        Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief for appellee.

                                 ____________________

                                    August 7, 1996
                                 ____________________

                            
        ____________________

             *Of the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation.

               COFFIN,  Senior  Circuit  Judge.    Defendant  Robert  Joost
                        ______________________

          appeals  his conviction  for being  a  felon in  possession of  a

          firearm and  ammunition, in violation of 18  U.S.C.   922(g).  He

          raises four  issues: (1) whether  the court erred in  refusing to

          give  an  entrapment  instruction,  (2)  whether   the  felon-in-

          possession statute exceeds Congress's  Commerce Clause authority,

          (3) whether  the court  properly relied on  three convictions  as

          predicates for application of an enhanced penalty under the Armed

          Career  Criminal  Act,  and  (4)  whether  the  court  erred   in

          dismissing  a challenge  to the  jury  composition and  selection

          procedures.

               Only  the first  issue merits  extended  discussion in  this

          opinion.    We  discuss  briefly our  reasons  for  affirming the

          court's handling  of the second  and third issues, and  we uphold

          the  court's action  on the  jury challenge  for the  reasons set

          forth in an  unpublished opinion issuing simultaneously  with the

          present one,  see United States  v. Joost, No. 95-2031  (1st Cir.
                        ___ _____________     _____

          July x, 1996).  After careful consideration, we conclude that the

          evidence merited a jury instruction  on entrapment.  We therefore

          reverse and remand for a new trial.

                                      Entrapment 
                                      __________

               The Record.   Whether  an instruction  on entrapment  should
               __________

          have been  given here presents both a close and an unusual issue.

          While  most entrapment  cases  focus  on  the  question  whether,

          assuming improper inducement, the defendant carried the burden of

          showing an unreadiness  to commit the crime at  issue, the ruling

                                         -2-

          here was the  threshold one that there  had been, as a  matter of

          law, no showing of improper inducement.  Moreover, the conduct of

          the law enforcement  officers did not involve any single incident

          that could be said to be  overbearing.  And the defendant,  while

          no stranger to criminal activities,  was pursuing them in a field

          unrelated to dealing in firearms when this saga begins.

               This, therefore, is a  case out of the  ordinary.  Since  an

          entrapment instruction was refused, we must have before us all of

          the significant  evidence that  the jury heard.   While  we shall

          condense as  much as we  fairly can, we recognize  that sometimes

          "the devil  is in the  details" and that  too skeletal  a summary

          risks  overlooking something that could have persuaded a rational

          jury.  Here is our effort.

               (1)  The  first  month  -  a  counterfeiting  investigation.
                    ______________________________________________________

          Government efforts in this case occupied a period of four months,

          from  March 23  to July  24,  1994.   One Tracy  had  been caught

          passing counterfeit tokens at the Foxwoods Casino in Connecticut;

          he turned informant and volunteered to give information to  Rhode

          Island authorities  about  the counterfeiting  activities of  his

          partner, defendant.   Tracy introduced defendant to  Rhode Island

          State  Police detectives DelPrete and O'Donnell, who pretended to

          be petty  thieves,  one of  them  having a  cousin  strategically

          employed in the cashier's cage at the casino.

               Defendant had been  convicted thirty years earlier  of three

          breaking and  entering felonies  and had  been imprisoned  during

          most of the 1970's and 1980's.  Since his release in 1987, he had

                                         -3-

          held  jobs  for  only  short  periods.    He  had  commenced  his

          counterfeiting  activity  in  February 1994.    His  only current

          legitimate source of income, and a poor one at that,  was helping

          to fabricate costume jewelry components.

               His  counterfeiting enterprise had  suffered a  setback when

          slot machines  at the casino  were altered so that  they rejected

          the fraudulent tokens.  When  the detectives offered to pay fifty

          cents for each  dollar token after they supposedly  cashed in the

          tokens at the cashier's cage,  defendant was delighted.  Over the

          next four months he realized  between $5,000 and $6,000 from this

          activity.

               (2) The  Second Month -  The Focus Changes.   The detectives
                   ______________________________________

          began  to extend  their  visits  to defendant,  in  the words  of

          DelPrete, "because he was bringing up other things for us to do."

          Defendant talked of many criminal ventures, some past, and others

          future  possibilities.    They  included  a  vault  robbery  that

          defendant said he  had helped plan while in  prison, a warehouse-

          tractor/trailer   job   in   Pennsylvania,   and   robberies   of

          supermarkets,  a  novelty  shop, a  Ground  Round  restaurant, an

          armored car, a  UPS truck, a VFW hall, and a night club ("Mustang

          Sally's").

               The  detectives said that  they had broken  into houses, and

          defendant spoke  of being a  safecracker in the 1960's  and early

          1970's.  But, the  detectives acknowledged, defendant represented

          that he himself did not  do armed robberies.  Defendant exhibited

          considerable  criminal know-how as he critiqued various plans the

                                         -4-

          detectives brought forward and demonstrated how to use weapons in

          a robbery.

               Defendant testified that  most of the  stories he told  were

          just stories, that they sprang from his imagination, his reading,

          or  fiction he  had written  in  prison, that  he "talked  tough"

          because he was dealing with  "tough people" and wanted to sustain

          their interest in him because they were his only means to realize

          income from his counterfeiting.

               On  April 24,  a month after  the first  meeting, defendant,

          according to the  detectives, introduced the subject  of firearms

          in discussing  the possibility of  doing an armored  car robbery,

          which  might  require   them  to  shoot  guards.    According  to

          defendant,  the detectives had  been introduced  to him  as "guys

          doing stick-ups,"  but he acknowledged  that he was the  first to

          talk  about doing  a specific  robbery.   He  also mentioned  the

          warehouse-tractor/trailer job possibility.

               During the month following this conversation, the detectives

          visited defendant on  May 10 and May 13  and obtained counterfeit

          tokens.   Defendant said there  were from twenty to  thirty phone

          calls during the entire four-month  period.  On May 20, defendant

          once  again  mentioned the  use  of firearms  in  connection with

          robbing an armored car facility.

               (3) The  Third Month  - Dialogue and  Diversion.   The third
                   ___________________________________________

          month  of  defendant's  interactions   with  the  detectives  was

          characterized  by  a   number  of  unavailing  requests   by  the

          detectives that  defendant procure a  gun for use in  Fall River,

                                         -5-

          attempted dissuasion on the part of defendant, and numerous trips

          to look over scenes of possible crimes.

               On May 27 the detectives told defendant that one of them had

          been harassed  by a man in Fall River.   They wanted defendant to

          find them a gun so  that they could shoot out some windows in the

          assailant's house.  Defendant responded  that this was not a good

          idea;  bullets could be traced to firearms.   A better idea would

          be to burn or blow up the person's car.  He also advocated use of

          a shotgun, which  would be harder to  trace, and said he  had one

          "stashed."

               On June  2, O'Donnell reminded  defendant of his need  for a

          gun for the Fall River matter; defendant replied that he had seen

          one person, but that that person did not have a gun.  On June 11,

          DelPrete,  sporting a  black eye  from  playing basketball,  told

          defendant that the Fall River assailant  had given it to him  and

          again asked for a firearm.  The request was repeated on  June 16,

          defendant  replying that  he  had  unsuccessfully approached  two

          people.  Finally, on  June 27, defendant was  told that the  Fall

          River project was off; DelPrete told defendant that he had gotten

          his revenge by smashing his adversary's car with a bat.

               Meanwhile, defendant  and the  detectives took  a number  of

          automobile  trips.   They  drove   to  Pennsylvania   to  rob   a

          tractor/trailer, defendant  having brought  along some  burglar's

          tools.    The operation  was  aborted  when,  as planned  by  the

          detectives, they  were stopped  but not arrested  by police.   On

          another occasion they followed a UPS  truck but did not stop  it.

                                         -6-

          On still another occasion. they drove to southern Rhode Island to

          look over a  VFW hall that supposedly  had a safe to  be cracked.

          And on the  night of June  29-30, they spent  hours in the  woods

          near the Meehan Armored Car facility.

               Defendant described the  "pattern" that he said  he followed

          in almost any conversation with the detectives:

                    I would first tell them the story, flush [sic] out
               the details, then  I would find perhaps some fault with
               it and say,  "We would have to go up there and check it
               out."  Ride,  stall, talk, stall and then  get them off
               on to something else.

               (4) The  Fourth Month -  Denouement.  The record  reveals no
                   _______________________________

          action or  talk about firearms  between the end of  June and July

          21.  DelPrete testified that  the detectives kept in contact with

          defendant, who was still producing counterfeit coins, and that he

          apparently  had only limited  resources and expected  an imminent

          foreclosure on his house.

               On  Thursday, July 21,  the detectives visited  defendant at

          his home, where he was soldering some costume jewelry.  Defendant

          said he made three dollars an hour but that his supplier, to whom

          he owed money, was not going to pay  him.  O'Donnell interjected,

          "By  Monday you could have -  - we owe you,  Bob.  We really do."

          Then the detectives  told defendant that their casino contact was

          quitting the  following month,  but that he  would make  one last

          exchange of money for 2500 counterfeit coins.

               The conversation then turned to the detectives' plans to rob

          a nightclub on  Cape Cod, where  they expected to  get "12  grand

                                         -7-

          easy."  Since  they understood that the bartender  carried a gun,

          they wanted defendant to obtain a firearm for them.

               Then  followed  lengthy   discussion  about  the   planning.

          Defendant  asked when the  detectives would accost  the bartender

          and how they  would make their getaway.  He also suggested a trip

          to the  nightclub.  O'Donnell  replied that this would  delay the

          heist for two  more weeks.  They did  not want to wait  that long

          since they needed the money.  Defendant then suggested making the

          trip the following night.  O'Donnell said they would stay down on

          the Cape  since the  robbery would take  place only  a day  or so

          after such a trip.  They recognized that defendant  had to return

          and decided to  go without him.   At this point, after  some nine

          pages of transcribed  taped conversation in which  the detectives

          mentioned their  need for  a gun some  six times,  defendant said

          that he could probably obtain a "piece."

               They then  discussed  how  to  share  the  proceeds  of  the

          robbery.  They asked what  defendant thought was fair.  Defendant

          said they did not have to give him anything, then said "I think I

          can get  a 38, 38."   O'Donnell said that they would  give him "a

          piece of  it" but  if he came  along he  would get "33"  [i.e., a

          third].  Defendant replied that he  was so broke that he couldn't

          pay his  bills and  would take something.   Once  again, however,

          defendant suggested driving down to  look at the nightclub.  Once

          again the detectives refused, saying that the bartender was "ripe

          for  the picking."   After more speculation  from defendant about

          what could go wrong, O'Donnell finally reaffirmed their intent to

                                         -8-

          do the job on  Sunday.  Defendant then  said he could "get you  a

          piece."  O'Donnell wondered if defendant were "serious about it."

          Defendant  at this point  spoke without any  qualification, "I'll

          get you a piece."

               All of the above discussion was recorded on tape.  Defendant

          testified at trial that, on learning of the imminent departure of

          the casino contact,  he "panicked" at the prospect  of losing the

          only  income he could  get.  He  said that he wanted  to delay so

          that he  could "talk  [the detectives] back  into trying  to talk

          this guy  out of leaving the  casino until we could  do something

          else."  He added, "I was afraid I was going to lose them and lose

          the opportunity to get some more money out of them."

               Defendant testified that the next  day, Friday, July 22,  he

          "ran into someone and mentioned to him that [he] was  looking for

          a  gun."   The "person,"  who turned  out to be  informant Tracy,

          supplied defendant with  a gun.  On  the same day the  detectives

          called  defendant,  who  said,  "All  set.   No  problem."    The

          detectives called again on Saturday and defendant said he had the

          weapon.    On  Sunday,  the  day of  the  supposed  robbery,  the

          detectives went to defendant's house,  where he handed them a 25-

          caliber Barretta, which he said  he had borrowed, together with a

          clip and seven rounds of ammunition.

               Defendant was  arrested and subsequently indicted  and tried

          before a jury. 

               The  Court's Rulings.   At  the end  of the  case, defendant
               ____________________

          moved  for  an entrapment  instruction.    The court  orally  and

                                         -9-

          succinctly  summarized the evidence, not failing to identify five

          occasions  on  which  the   government  initiated  discussion  of

          firearms.   It did  not, however, make  mention of  any financial

          difficulty  facing defendant or  defendant's testimony as  to his

          "pattern" or strategy in dealing with the detectives. 

               The gist of her ruling is as follows:

                    Even if I were to take into account the cumulative
               effect  of the four contacts  between May 27th and June
               16th  and the  fifth contact  on  July 21st,  I do  not
               believe  that  those conversations,  those  promptings,
               those fabrications as stated by the detectives, rise to
               the level of an improper  inducement.  That is not what
               the case law stands for.

                    I  think I cited  [United States v.]  Gendron[, 18
                                       _____________      _______
               F.3d 955, 960 (1st Cir. 1994),] wherein then Judge, now
               Justice Brier [sic] enumerates the types of things that
               the First  Circuit considers to be  improper Government
               inducement.  I  do not see the  sort of urgency.   I do
               not see the  insistence.  I do not  see intimidation or
               threats, even  taking all  of those  statements in  the
               light most favorable to the defendant.

                    In   short,   given   the   Defendant's   criminal
               proclivities which  were announced by him  and admitted
               to by him as being in place  even prior to the May 27th
               initiation by the detectives, of discussion of guns and
               given  my  finding that  the  Government's through  the
               state troopers['] actions in this case do not amount to
               improper or  undue influence, I do not believe that the
               evidence in this  case shows anything more  [than] that
               the  Government created an opportunity for Mr. Joost to
               become criminally involved and to possess the weapon in
               question.1

               The  court  made a  second  ruling  in  response to  a  jury

          request.   The jury had left the courtroom  at 2:40 p.m.  At 3:10
                              
          ____________________

               1 In fairness,  we must acknowledge the  anomalous situation
          confronting  the judge, who  had previously presided  over United
                                                                     ______
          States v.  Joost, No. 95-2031 (1st Cir.  July xx, 1996), in which
          ______     _____
          defendant consistently invoked the Fifth Amendment in refusing to
          answer questions about the statements that he was now saying were
          merely "stories."

                                         -10-

          it returned with a note saying, "Is entrapment a legal defense in

          this  case?   And  if so,  could  you please  define  it?"   This

          request, as the court  acknowledged, was entirely understandable.

          Counsel for defendant had devoted his entire opening to picturing

          the defendant as concededly a felon who had knowingly possessed a

          firearm but who had been led into the crime by the  blandishments

          of  the  detectives.   He  had  concluded  his remarks  with  the

          statement that he would ask for an instruction on entrapment.

               The court again refused to instruct on entrapment and simply

          notified the jury  that that defense did not apply  in this case.

          The jury finally  reported its verdict at  4:30 p.m.  In  view of

          the stipulation and concessions of defendant, made in conjunction

          with  his entrapment  defense strategy,  it is  a matter  of some

          wonder what the jury had  to consider after receiving the court's

          ruling.

               Legal Discussion.   The principles governing  entitlement to
               ________________

          an entrapment instruction are well known.  The standard of review

          is  plenary.  United States v. Rodriguez,  858 F.2d 809, 812 (1st
                        _____________    _________

          Cir. 1988).   The policy  behind the entrapment defense  seeks to

          deter the government from such zeal in pursuing a conviction that

          its efforts result in the commission of a crime that likely would

          not  have occurred  if  the suspect  had  been  left to  his  own

          devices.  Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 553-54 (1992).
                    ________    _____________

          The  principle  protects  both citizens  who  are  completely law

          abiding and those who have violated laws but whose unreadiness to

          commit  a particular  type  of crime  was  overcome by  excessive

                                         -11-

          governmental efforts.   The  question is  whether the  government

          "induced the defendant to perform a  criminal act that he was not

          predisposed to commit."  Rodriguez, 858 F.2d at 814.
                                   _________

               There are two  elements to the entrapment  defense: improper

          government  inducement to  commit  the  offense  and  a  lack  of

          predisposition  on  the  part  of  defendant to  commit  such  an

          offense.  United States  v. Gendron, 18 F.3d  955, 960 (1st  Cir.
                    _____________     _______

          1994).  In order to be entitled to an entrapment instruction, the

          defendant  has the  burden of producing  "some evidence"  on both

          elements "sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether he

          `was an  "unwary innocent"  rather than  an "unwary  criminal."'"

          United States  v. Hernandez,  995 F.2d 307,  313 (1st  Cir. 1993)
          _____________     _________

          (citations omitted). 

               A court assessing  the sufficiency of a  defendant's showing

          must be able to find more than a scintilla of evidence, more than

          mere creation of an opportunity for criminal activity. See United
                                                                 ___ ______

          States v. Coady,  809 F.2d 119, 122  (1st Cir. 1987).   A "sting"
          ______    _____

          operation  is not  improper inducement if  it merely  provides an

          opportunity  to commit  a crime,  but proof  of opportunity  plus

          "something else"  may be adequate  to meet a  defendant's burden.

          Examples found  sufficient by  courts  include threats,  forceful

          solicitation and  dogged insistence,  playing upon sympathies  or

          the past relationship of a war buddy, and repeated suggestions at

          a  time  when  defendant  had  lost his  job  and  needed  money.

          Gendron, 18 F.3d at 961. 
          _______

                                         -12-

               Moreover, while  conclusory and self-serving statements by a

          defendant  are not  sufficient,  Rodriguez, 858  F.2d  at 813,  a
                                           _________

          defendant's  account, though self serving,  may have weight if it

          "is   interlaced   with   considerable   detail  and   has   some

          circumstantial  corroboration  in  the  record."    Id.  at  815.
                                                              __

          Indeed,  as  we   stated  in  Rodriguez,  "[W]e   recognize  that
                                        _________

          Rodriguez's  soliloquy was self-serving -- but realistically, how

          better than  through his own  testimony can a defendant  meet his

          entry-level burden?"  Id.
                                __

               In applying the above principles  to this case, we emphasize

          that we are not considering the sufficiency of a  verdict for the

          government on this  record, if an entrapment instruction had been

          given, but the closer question whether a rational jury could have

          found entrapment if  allowed to consider that defense.   We first

          review the most relevant precedents in this circuit.

               In  Rodriguez, 858 F.2d  at 811, 815-16,  a government agent
                   _________

          had designed a lucrative drug  deal, made the initial approach to

          defendant,  and  solicited forcefully  with  "dogged insistence,"

          making  four calls in  one day.   The defendant  had testified in

          what the court characterized as a self-serving soliloquy, but one

          in considerable detail  and with some corroboration.   We held it

          error  for  the  district  court  to  have  refused  to  give  an

          entrapment charge.   A year later, in United  States v. Campbell,
                                                ______________    ________

          874 F.2d 838,  845 (1st Cir. 1989), where the  government had set

          up a drug  deal through an  informant who had been  befriended by

          defendant, we  upheld the language  of the entrapment  charge and

                                         -13-

          rejected the  government's suggestion  that the  charge need  not

          have been given.

               In Gendron, 18  F.3d at 961, then Chief  Judge Breyer listed
                  _______

          the various  examples of  improper inducement  we have  mentioned

          above, including a reference to Rodriguez's  "dogged insistence,"
                                          _________

          and also noted United States v. Kessee, 992 F.2d 1001, 1003  (9th
                         _______________________

          Cir.  1993).  In  Kessee, defendant, after  initially refusing an
                            ______

          informant's request  to enter  an illegal  drug deal,  yielded to

          further requests after he lost two jobs and needed money for food

          and rent.  Defendant had initiated several calls and had proposed

          selling drugs to  the informant, and had claimed  to have engaged

          in over fifty drug deals.  He testified that he  lied to obtain a

          sentence reduction for cooperation, that he carried a gun because

          of fear,  and that he  had tried to  impress the informant.   The

          court  reversed the  trial  court,  holding  that  an  entrapment

          instruction  should have been given, because only the jury should

          have assessed the truth of defendant's testimony.  Id. at 1003-4.
                                                             __

               Most recently, in United States  v. Acosta, 67 F.3d 334, 338
                                 _____________     ______

          (1st Cir. 1995),  an informant, seeking to obtain  a firearm from

          defendant,  engaged in  "a campaign  of  persistent calls  . .  .

          before [defendant]  responded, apparently  several weeks  later."

          There  were no threats, appeals to sympathy, relentless trickery,

          or   extravagant rewards.  While we held the evidence withstood a

          challenge to sufficiency, we observed that the facts occupied the

          "middle ground between what is plainly proper and what is plainly

                                         -14-

          improper."   We said that if the issue  had not been submitted to

          the jury, we would have reversed.  

               In the  light of these  precedents, we now consider  some of

          the evidence favorable to an entrapment defense.  First, there is

          the extended period of  time, three months, before the  defendant

          produced a firearm,  the latter two  months consisting of  active

          solicitation by  the detectives  following their  requests for  a

          weapon.   A  jury might  have  believed  that what  began  as  an

          investigation of counterfeiting was transformed into an effort at

          entrapment  once the detectives perceived that possibility.  When

          defendant failed to  take the bait the first  time, they repeated

          their effort with even more urgency. 

               Second, the jury could have found that  the detectives, with

          full knowledge of the  dire financial straits in which  defendant

          found himself,  deliberately created a dependency relationship in

          their  continuing practice  of paying  substantial  sums for  his

          counterfeit  tokens.   The lure  of continuing  payment could  be

          looked on as more than the "`greed or  . . . lure of easy money'"

          found unpersuasive as evidence of  entrapment in United States v.
                                                           _____________

          Panet-Collazo,  960 F.2d 256, 259 (1st  Cir. 1992) (citing Coady,
          _____________                                              _____

          809 F.2d at 121).

               A third factor  that the jury could consider  as evidence of

          "urgency"  and "insistence,"  contrary  to  the district  court's

          reaction,   is  the  number,  frequency,  and  immediacy  of  the

          detectives' contacts, involving  both personal  visits and  phone

          calls.   A fourth factor,  which might well have  been considered

                                         -15-

          the "plus" added  to "opportunity," was the  detectives' renewal,

          in a context of urgency  (the insistence on robbing the nightclub

          on Cape Cod  within several days'  time), of their request  for a

          firearm,   conjoined  with  the  jolting  news  of  the  imminent

          departure of  their casino contact  source of funds.   In denying

          the request for an entrapment  charge, the district court made no

          mention of  defendant's  financial  stringency  or  the  arguable

          impact of the news of this formidable threat to continued income.

               A  fifth  factor  entering  our  assessment  is  defendant's

          testimony  about his motive,  strategy, and "pattern"  of "stall,

          talk, ride, and change the subject."  The district court included

          defendant's "discussion of  guns" in her  reasons for finding  no

          basis for  a  rational conclusion  of improper  inducement.   But

          defendant's  story of inventing escapades, finding holes in them,

          suggesting  exploratory trips,  and  inventing  excuses  for  not

          producing  a  gun  is  both  detailed  and  corroborated  by  the

          evidence.  It may well  be that a jury would dismiss  all of this

          as a  pack of lies, but it  seems to us that this  was a task for

          the jury, not the judge.

               We therefore conclude that enough evidence of inducement was

          introduced to meet defendant's burden  on this first prong of the

          entrapment defense.  As for the absence  of predisposition prong,

          much of what we have pointed to is relevant.  We must acknowledge

          that defendant was certainly  predisposed to commit the  crime of

          counterfeiting, but the question is whether he was predisposed to

          commit the crime of procuring and possessing a firearm before the
                                                                 ______

                                         -16-

          government intervened.   See Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 549.  The span
                                   ___ ________

          of  time that  elapsed before  a gun  was produced,  the excuses,

          delays, and defendant's  explanation of his strategy  persuade us

          that  defendant  met  his  burden  on this  prong  as  well.   He

          therefore must be retried. 

                                         -17-

                                   Remaining Issues
                                   ________________

               Constitutionality.  Defendant   challenges    the   district
               _________________

          court's  denial of his pretrial  motion to dismiss the indictment

          on  the  ground  that  18  U.S.C.    922(g)  exceeded  Congress's

          Commerce Clause authority under the reasoning of United States v.
                                                           _____________

          Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624  (1995).  This issue is no longer  open in
          _____

          this circuit.   See United  States v. Abernathy,  83 F.3d 17,  20
                          ___ ______________    _________

          (1st  Cir. 1996); United  States v. Bennett, 75  F.3d 40, 49 (1st
                            ______________    _______

          Cir. 1996).  The district court ruled correctly.

               Validity of predicate convictions.  Defendant challenges the
               _________________________________

          court's  imposition of an enhanced thirty-year sentence under the

          authority of  18 U.S.C.    924(e), claiming error in  its holding

          valid  three 1964  Rhode  Island  convictions  for  breaking  and

          entering.   Although discussion  of sentencing  at  this time  is

          unnecessary  in   light  of   our  conclusion  that   defendant's

          conviction must be vacated, we briefly respond.  

               Defendant  offered his  own signed,  but unsworn,  statement

          that  he did  not have  counsel when  he entered  nolo contendere

          pleas on the  three state convictions.   The government, however,

          introduced  docket cards maintained by the Attorney General, each

          indicating, following the printed word "Counsel," the name of Leo

          McGowan, now deceased, then a part-time public  defender.  Police

          records also showed  representation by McGowan in  the complaints

          and  warrants.   In  addition, the  face sheets  accompanying the

          convictions  bore, in  pencil,  the  name  "Bevilacqua,"  then  a

          prominent criminal defense lawyer.

                                         -18-

               The district court  found nothing in the records  to hint of

          invalidity  and viewed  defendant's  statement  to be  completely

          incredible.  The  court noted, as well, that  the convictions had

          been entered  more than  a year after  Gideon v.  Wainwright, 372
                                                 ______     __________

          U.S. 335  (1963), had required  counsel in felony cases  and that

          Rhode  Island  had,  for  more  than   twenty  years  before  the

          convictions,  followed the practice of appointing counsel in such

          cases.  We detect no  error in the court's ruling that  defendant

          failed  to  produce  sufficient credible  evidence  to  rebut the

          presumption   of   constitutional   validity  that   arose   from

          introduction of certified copies of the convictions.   See United
                                                                 ___ ______

          States v. Tracy, 36 F.3d 187, 197 (1st Cir. 1994).
          ______    _____

               For reasons stated, the judgment is reversed and the case is
               ____________________________________________________________

          remanded for a new trial.
          _________________________

                                         -19-