Court Opinion

ID: 9731801
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:58:33.739245+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:21.340898
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE CRAVEN, concurring in part, dissenting in part: I agree with the majority that the instruction error requires a reversal and remandment for a new trial. My only disagreement with the majority opinion relates to the discussion concerning discovery. As I view this record, the trial court was in error in denying the defendant access to the impounded material under the rules relating to the discovery. This court then compounded the error by imposing upon appellate counsel the impossible task of briefing the issue of the discoverability of the impounded material and concurrently denying access to that material. There is no reasonable way that the action of the trial court can be examined by appellate counsel without having access to the material. I take it under the majority opinion and the interlocutory order of this court that I am precluded from discussing with any specificity the content of the material denied to trial and appellate counsel. It is fair to say, however, that the particular material denied was not a work product, did not relate to informants nor national security, and were items not precluded from discovery under our rules. Indeed, it appears to me that tire only plausible reason to deny discovery was the cumulative nature of the information rather than any compelling reason to keep it a secret. Such circumstance clearly mandates discovery, not the impoundment of the reports. The object and purpose of discovery in criminal cases is to give the defendant a fair trial, to seek the truth, and to eliminate tactical advantage. Under the Supreme Court Rules applicable to discovery and upon the authority of People v. Bassett, 56 Ill.2d 285, 307 N.E.2d 359, and People v. Schmidt, 56 Ill.2d 572, 309 N.E.2d 557, it was error to deny discovery at trial and in this court.