Court Opinion

ID: 9774590
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:25:50.742961+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:51:20.078431
License: Public Domain

ON APPELLANT’S motion for rehearing
*311McDonald, Judge.
In his motion for rehearing, appellant contends that this court erred in holding that the fact that he had previously been adjudicated a juvenile delinquent, and still was at the time of indictment and trial, did not deprive the district court of jurisdiction to try him so long as at the time of said indictment and trial he was seventeen years of age. Appellant urges that the provisions of Sec. 5 of Art. 2338-1, V.A.C.S., constitute authority for his contention.
That section of the article does state that when jurisdiction shall have been obtained by the court (meaning the juvenile court) in the case of any child, such child shall continue under the jurisdiction of the court until he becomes twenty-one (21) years of age, unless discharged prior thereto.
Appellant further contends that a holding that the above statute is not pertinent to a proper determination of this case would result in placing a juvenile delinquent under a different status at the time of trial than would be any other minor who might be brought to trial under indictment. He further contends that if the juvenile delinquent were acquitted as an adult, then he could be returned to the Gatesville State School for Boys for punishment —as a delinquent child— for the same offense for which he was acquitted by the district court.
We think this contention has heretofore been decided adversely to appellant, in Dearing v. State, 151 Tex. Cr. Rep. 6, 204 S.W. 2d 983, which held as follows:
“* * * the trial court had the legal right to try appellant for the offense with which he stood charged, it also had the right to take him from the State’s training school and bring him before the bar of justice to be dealt with as provided by the Penal Code of this State. Otherwise, he would be immune from prosecution until he had reached the age of 21 years.”
In his concurring opinion in the Dearing case, Judge Hawkins stated:
“When a boy passes the age of 17, or a girl passes the age of 18, it ceases to be a delinquent child.”
*312While my two able colleagues concur with me in the disposition of this case, the writer desires to express his personal views:
I would here hold that once a boy past the age of seventeen, or a girl past the age of eighteen, has been tried for a criminal offense in a county or district court of this state, said boy or girl ceases to be amenable to the terms of the Juvenile Delinquency Act, Art. 2338-1, V.A.C.S.
I say this despite the provision of the Juvenile Delinquency Act, Sec. 5 of Art. 2338-1, supra, for the reason that the trial of the child by a criminal court divests the jurisdiction of the juvenile court over the child. The trial in the criminal court makes operative the discharge of the child by the juvenile court.
Although I know that this court has never heretofore expressed itself on this exact question, I recognize the importance of the question here raised. I have no doubt as to the right of the state to try a seventeen-year-old boy for a crime, though committed while under the age of seventeen years.
If the state is successful in securing a conviction in a felony case, the seventeen-year-old boy goes to the penitentiary. If he is tried for a misdemeanor, he goes to jail or pays a fine, or both.
The writer thinks the juvenile court ceases to have jurisdiction when the trial is had in a criminal court, regardless of the results of the trial —whether it be a conviction or an acquittal. One who has once acquired the status of an, adult under the penal laws of this state and has come under the jurisdiction of a criminal court, by being put to trial in a crimmaLcourt, can never revert to the status of a juvenile, whether it be a juvenile or a “juvenile delinquent.”
I think the purpose of the Juvenile Act is laudable. But, while many of the provisions are practical, there is no escaping the fact that some of the provisions are illogical. I do not feel that the legislature of this state intended to give to the juvenile courts an advantage over a boy or girl, previously adjudged to be a “delinquent child,” who is tried as an adult in a criminal court, to still be, if acquitted, subject to the jurisdiction of a juvenile court.
*313I trust that this personal expression will focus attention upon what I feel to be an inequitable situation.
Appellant also insists that this court erred in holding that he was not punished twice for the same act.
We remain convinced that this contention was correctly disposed of in our original opinion.
Lastly, appellant says that the court erred in holding that he was not denied a speedy trial, as guaranteed by the Constitution.
We think this contention is without merit. Bearing v. State, supra. See, also, Peterson v. State, 156 Tex. Cr. Rep. 105, 235 S.W. 2d 138.
Remaining convinced that the case was correctly disposed of in our original opinion, appellant’s motion for rehearing is in all things denied and overruled.