Court Opinion

ID: 9688356
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 17:44:32.820001+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:37.791359
License: Public Domain

Cavanagh, J.
(dissenting).
i
MCL 764.13; MSA 28.871(1) commands police officers who arrest a person without a warrant to take that person "without unnecessary delay” before a judicial officer, at which time a complaint shall be made stating the charges against the person arrested. In the vulgate of our profession, *350this is called the prompt-arraignment statute.1 The statute, first enacted as 1927 PA 175,2 is not a departure from prior practice. It codifies a venerable common-law rule which has existed in England for centuries3 and which is enforced by most of the fifty states.4 In Oxford v Berry, 204 Mich 197, 212-213; 170 NW 83 (1918), this Court described the requirement of prompt arraignment as an "elementary” principle of common law:
It is elementary that, even in criminal cases, when the officer has made the arrest it is his duty, as soon as possible, to bring the party before the court according to the import of the warrant; and if the officer be guilty of unnecessary delay in so doing, it is a breach of his duty; and his duty is the same whether the arrest was made with, or without process. He must take him before the court as soon as he reasonably can._
*351As the majority notes, in People v Hamilton, 359 Mich 410; 102 NW2d 738 (1960), this Court became the first state to adopt the rule of exclusion for violations of the prompt-arraignment statute which the United States Supreme Court promulgated in McNabb v United States, 318 US 332; 63 S Ct 608; 87 L Ed 819 (1943), and refined in Mallory v United States, 354 US 449; 77 S Ct 1356; 1 L Ed 2d 1479 (1957). In People v White, 392 Mich 404; 221 NW2d 357 (1974), cert den sub nom Michigan v White, 420 US 912 (1975), this Court clarified that not every confession or statement obtained during an unreasonable delay in violation of the statute is excluded:
Only when the delay has been employed as a tool to extract a statement has an exclusionary rule been imposed under these sections. [392 Mich 424.]
In both People v Bladel (After Remand), 421 Mich 39, 73; 365 NW2d 56 (1984), aff'd sub nom Michigan v Jackson, 475 US 625; 106 S Ct 1404; 89 L Ed 2d 631 (1986), and People v Mallory, 421 Mich 229, 241-243; 365 NW2d 673 (1984), we found that several statements had been obtained through exploitation of an unreasonable delay and thus were inadmissible at trial. In People v Mallory, we explained:
These statements are excluded, even if they were given voluntarily, because they might never have been made by the detainee but for the illegal prearraignment delay. [421 Mich 240.]
Court-imposed sanctions are useful to encourage police officers to respect the rights of citizens with whom they come in contact in the course of their profession. The common sanction imposed is exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of a defendant’s right. When exclusion is appropriate, it is done not to allow a guilty person to go free, but *352"to deter future unlawful police conduct . . . .”5 Before adopting an exclusionary rule, a court must carefully consider the social cost of such a rule and balance it against the social cost of not enforcing the underlying protected interest, whether it be freedom from unlawful search, the right to counsel, the right against self-incrimination, or, as in the present cases, the right to be free from extended and unnecessary detention without a warrant.
In Michigan, we have already weighed these concerns and have determined that exclusion is appropriate where a confession or statement is obtained by the police by exploiting their violation of the prompt-arraignment statute. People v Hamilton, People v Bladel, and People v Mallory, supra. The majority has accepted the people’s invitation to overrule Hamilton and its progeny. It rejects an exclusionary rule which is based solely on violations of the prompt-arraignment statute, no matter how long the delay. The majority instead limits its inquiry to whether the confession was voluntary. We do not join the majority for several reasons, the first of which is respect for the principles of stare decisis.
A
Adherence to sound judicial precedent gives continuity and predictability to the law. It assures that judicial decisions will be the result of reason rather than the whim of the judge before whom a case is tried. Only compelling reasons justify a court in disregarding longstanding precedent.6 Our nearly thirty-year experience with Hamilton does *353not persuade us that holding the police to the requirements of the prompt-arraignment statute has "exact[ed] a heavy toll on our system of justice.” Ante, p 332.
The three cases we decide today demonstrate the need for judicial firmness on this point. Hamilton was decided in 1960, and its rule has been reaffirmed in this Court several times since. Yet in all three cases before us, defendants were arrested without warrants and their arraignments were delayed for two days or more. While this Court is divided on whether Hamilton should survive today, we all agree that the police clearly violated the command of the prompt-arraignment statute.
In rejecting the McNabb-Mallory rule, on which Hamilton was founded, the majority asserts that the "rule was not applied with enthusiasm by all of the federal courts.” Ante, p 320. In support of that assertion, however, it cites but two cases, both of which were decided more than ten years before Mallory. Only one, United States v Haupt, 136 F2d 661 (CA 7, 1943), expressed disagreement with McNabb.7 The persuasiveness of such early criticism of a new rule dims with time. For example, Weeks v United States, 232 US 383, 392; 34 S Ct 341; 58 L Ed 652 (1914), a landmark decision, directed that all evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment be excluded from evidence. Despite the initial reaction of some who saw the rule as saying that "[t]he criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered,”8 the Weeks *354rule of exclusion is now widely recognized as an effective deterrent of Fourth Amendment violations by the police.9
B
In the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, specifically 18 USC 3501(c), Congress modified10 the McNabb-Mallory rule with the following language:
[A] confession made or given by a person who is a defendant . . . shall not be inadmissible solely because of delay in bringing such person before a magistrate ... if such confession is found by the trial judge to have been made voluntarily and if the weight to be given the confession is left to the jury and if such confession was made or given by such person within six hours immediately follow*355ing his arrest or other detention: Provided, That the time limitation contained in this subsection shall not apply in any case in which the delay in bringing such person before such magistrate or other officer beyond such six-hour period is found by the trial judge to be reasonable .... [Emphasis added.]
It is not accurate to say that through § 3501(c) either Congress or most federal courts "in effect, overrul[ed] McNabb-Mallory(Ante, p 322.)11 Mc-Nabb-Mallory is still alive in federal courts, despite the confusion surrounding the modifying language of § 3501(c).12 Even an authority relied on by the majority concluded that § 3501(c) affects the McNabb-Mallory rule only for delays which last six hours or less:
Mallory continues to govern the admissibility of confessions obtained more than six hours after arrest and, therefore, a post-sixth-hour confession will be inadmissible if it follows a period of unnecessary prearraignment delay. Section 3501 only prohibits the application of Mallory’s exclusionary rule to confessions obtained within six hours of arrest.[13]
Similarly, we are not persuaded by the significance the majority places on § 3501(c):
*356The act reflected a strong reaction on the part of Congress to what it regarded as "illogical and unrealistic court decisions resulting from the application” of the McNabb-Mallory rule. [Ante, pp 320-322.]
If § 3501(c) represented an adverse congressional reaction to McNabb-Mallory, it was only to the extent that even brief delays in arraignment resulted in exclusion of evidence. The majority presents examples of the "illogical and unrealistic court decisions” in two cases where a five-minute and a thirty-minute delay each were held to violate the prompt-arraignment statute. Ante, p 322, n 6. We agree that those two federal cases have gone to the extreme in enforcing McNabb-Mallory and that they should not be incorporated into Michigan jurisprudence. However, more instances of such rigid application of the rule are rare.
In Michigan, we have advised the police that they may take the time to "book” the defendant and briefly delay arraignment as circumstances may require in order to determine whether to release the defendant or make a complaint. Hamilton, 359 Mich 416-417; Bladel, 421 Mich 69-70. We have never held that the suspect must be brought to the judicial officer on a drop-everything-else basis.
c
The majority asserts that Michigan’s prompt-arraignment statute is ambiguous and difficult to follow:
Enforcing the rule by means of a standard of "unnecessary” or "unreasonable” delay causes confusion for courts and law enforcement officials *357alike. These criteria are not capable of precise definition .... [Ante, p 330, n 17.]
Even if we were to agree with the majority’s criticism, we could not change the standard because we did not create it; it was given to us by the Legislature. Moreover, the phrase "without unnecessary delay” has credentials too impressive to be rejected as causing confusion or lacking precision. It is the language used in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure;14 the phrase is also used in the Model Penal Code’s Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure;15 it is likewise found in the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice;16 and it is the language of the common law. By now, any police officer should comprehend within narrow limits what constitutes unnecessary delay.17
Citing Culombe v Connecticut, 367 US 568; 81 S *358Ct 1860; 6 L Ed 2d 1037 (1961),18 the majority proposes a substitute criterion: whether the confession is voluntary in "the totality of all the surrounding circumstances.” (Ante, pp 333-334.) This indeed is an amorphous standard, as acknowledged in 3 Wigmore, Evidence (Chadbourn rev), §826, p 348:
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in his extensive opinion in Culombe v Connecticut, sums up by pointing to the "ultimate test . . . established ... in Anglo-American courts for two hundred years: the test of voluntariness.”
Of course, the learned Justice does not intend to suggest, nor is it true, that "voluntariness” in this context is either a simple idea or one capable of exact definition.
Wigmore then quotes from the American Law Institute, Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure 166-167 (Tentative Draft No 1, 1966), p 349, which also highlighted the confusion surrounding a "voluntariness” standard:
"To the extent 'voluntariness’ has made a determination of the state of an individual’s will the crucial question, it has not assisted analysis. Except where a person is unconscious or drugged or otherwise lacks capacity for conscious choice, all incriminating statements — even if made under brutal treatment — are 'voluntary’ in the sense of representing a choice between alternatives.”
Likewise, in Miller v Fenton, 474 US 104, 116, n 4; 106 S Ct 445; 88 L Ed 2d 405 (1985), the Supreme Court noted:
The voluntariness rubric has been variously con*359demned as "useless,” . . . "perplexing,” . . . and "legal 'double-talk
Voluntariness is not only a difficult standard to apply, it is a quality essential to every confession admitted in evidence. Nonetheless, the majority argues that the concerns which troubled the Mc-Nabb Court in 1943 have been addressed and remedied for the most part by subsequent changes in constitutional doctrine, beginning with Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966). Ante, p 330. However, even the Miranda Court clarified that the giving of the Miranda warnings does not excuse an unnecessary delay in arraignment:
Our decision today does not indicate in any manner, of course, that [the requirement of prompt arraignment] can be disregarded. When federal officials arrest an individual, they must as always comply with the dictates of the congressional legislation and cases thereunder. [384 US 463, n 32.]
Thus, the command of prompt arraignment is not served sufficiently by the majority’s limited inquiry regarding whether the prisoner acted voluntarily even though illegally detained. We discussed this point in Bladel, supra, 421 Mich 74, n 27:
If voluntariness were the only relevant inquiry, there would be no reason to analyze whether a prearraignment delay occurred and was used as a tool, since involuntary statements have always been held inadmissible regardless of when they are obtained. Prompt arraignment serves several important functions apart from preventing improper custodial interrogations.
It is telling that in creating an exclusionary rule *360for violations of other rights, the United States Supreme Court has distinguished voluntariness from the right allegedly violated. In Taylor v Alabama, 457 US 687; 102 S Ct 2664; 73 L Ed 2d 314 (1982), for instance, the Court excluded the petitioner’s confession because it was the fruit of his illegal arrest. The Court explained why the confession was invalid notwithstanding the three Miranda warnings which the petitioner received prior to confessing:
In Brown [v Illinois, 422 US 590; 95 S Ct 2254; 45 L Ed 2d 416 (1975)] and Dunaway [v New York, 442 US 200; 99 S Ct 2248; 60 L Ed 2d 824 (1979)], this Court firmly established that the fact that the confession may be "voluntary” for purposes of the Fifth Amendment, in the sense that Miranda warnings were given and understood, is not by itself sufficient to purge the taint of the illegal arrest. In this situation, a finding of "voluntariness” for purposes of the Fifth Amendment is merely a threshold requirement for Fourth Amendment analysis. The reason for this approach is clear: "[t]he exclusionary rule, . . . when utilized to effectuate the Fourth Amendment, serves interests and policies that are distinct from those it serves under the Fifth” Amendment. If Miranda warnings were viewed as a talisman that cured all Fourth Amendment violations, then the constitutional guarantee against unlawful searches and seizures would be reduced to a mere " 'form of words.’ ” [457 US 690. Citations omitted.]
We perceive no functional difference between suppressing a confession made during unlawful detention following an illegal arrest and suppressing a confession obtained during a detention made illegal because of unnecessary delay in arraignment.
The majority asserts that "the prompt-arraignment requirement was never elevated by the *361United States Supreme Court to the level of a constitutional right.” (Ante, p 332.) That Court has determined, however, that the right to prompt arraignment is significant enough to warrant an exclusionary rule to enforce it. Furthermore, the majority’s substitute standard, voluntariness under the totality of the surrounding circumstances (with prearraignment delay being only one consideration), improperly equates the requirement of prompt arraignment with other factors which the Legislature has not seen fit to codify as a statutory right.
D
The majority contends that the McNabb-Mallory rule "provides no protection at all” for the defendant who was properly arrested and promptly arraigned, but who cannot post bail. Ante, p 332, n 21. In drawing such a conclusion, the majority overlooks at least three important purposes of prompt arraignment.
First, there is a vast difference between the temporary facilities of a police precinct where the suspect is kept prior to arraignment and the facilities of a county jail where the unbonded defendant resides after arraignment. The police station typically is ill-equipped to serve food, provide adequate sleeping facilities, or allow any movement outside the jail cell itself. A county jail, on the other hand, is designed for longer-term detention. It has adequate food and bedding facilities, and allows movement at least within the block of cells.19
Second, even if a defendant is unable to post bail, he will receive from a judicial officer an *362enumeration of his constitutional rights in clear and easily understandable language. He will be told the exact nature and details of the charges against him, and will have an opportunity to make a statement or explain his conduct in open court.20 All of this will be done on the record by a judicial officer, rather than perfunctorily and perhaps incompletely by a police officer in the station house.
Finally, and most importantly, an attorney will be appointed for the defendant at or shortly after the arraignment. Delaying the arraignment necessarily delays the appointment of counsel. Once counsel is appointed, the defendant has a right not to be interrogated without notice of his counsel. Massiah v United States, 377 US 201, 206; 84 S Ct 1199; 12 L Ed 2d 246 (1964); Brewer v Williams, 430 US 387, 400-401; 97 S Ct 1232; 51 L Ed 2d 424 (1977).21
Having expressed our disagreement with the majority’s abandonment of the McNabb-Mallory exclusionary rule, we now consider the three cases before us.
ii
A
The majority sufficiently reviews the facts of each case, and we need not repeat them. In People v Dean, it appears that during the twenty-six hours from arrest to confession, defendant was *363interrogated on four separate occasions, totaling approximately fourteen hours. The defendant was detained under a "reverse writ” issued in the Recorder’s Court. The prosecutor argues that the writ was necessary to further investigate the case. However, the reverse writ procedure does not negate or suspend the requirement of a prompt arraignment. In People v Casey, 411 Mich 179, 181-182; 305 NW2d 247 (1981), the Court held that a reverse writ proceeding has no validity:
It is a nullity. Its constitutional and statutory bases cannot be examined for it has none.
The principles governing the detention of a citizen may be located in a host of constitutional, statutory, and judicial sources; whether a citizen is being legally or illegally held is a determination which must be made by reference to those principles. We today neither add to nor subtract from that body of law. A detention which is otherwise illegal is not cleansed of its illegality by the issuance of a reverse writ or by the pendency of such proceedings.
The statute provides that a police officer who arrests a person "without a warrant shall without unnecessary delay take the person arrested before a magistrate . . . and shall present to the magistrate a complaint stating the charge against the person arrested.” MCL 764.13; MSA 28.871(1).
A court rule provides that at the arraignment on the complaint, the court shall advise the defendant that he is entitled to the assistance of an attorney and that if he is financially unable to provide an attorney and wants an attorney, the court will appoint one at public expense. MCR 6.101(C)(1); GCR 1963, 785.4.
Dean was in court during the reverse-writ pro*364ceeding. Thus, as required by the statute, the police did take him before a magistrate without unnecessary delay. They did not, however, as also required by the statute, present to the magistrate a complaint stating a charge against Dean.
Prior to obtaining the reverse writ — and, a few hours later, a confession — the police had sufficient circumstantial evidence to arraign Dean. It appears from the length of the delay that the police sought to obtain something more concrete — Dean’s admission. Before the reverse-writ proceeding, Dean had been identified as the last person seen with the victims, and matched the description of the person who was seen leaving the residence immediately after the shootings and driving away in an orange Cougar. Dean had admitted being with the victims and to frequently driving his girl friend’s orange Cougar.
We have not been provided with a transcript of the reverse-writ proceeding. It does not appear whether the magistrate was made aware of the evidence the police had already obtained or whether there was any discussion of whether Dean desired representation by counsel. If, when the reverse writ was granted by the magistrate, the gist of the Miranda warnings was not repeated, what occurred in that proceeding may have led Dean, contrary to the spirit of Miranda, to believe that he was expected to cooperate with the police during the additional time granted by the magistrate for further investigation.
B
Cipriano was subjected to multiple interrogations on the day he was arrested and on two succeeding days. Eight hours after Cipriano’s arrest, a magistrate opened court (located in the *365same building as the jail) at 11:00 p.m. and issued three search warrants. A transcript of the hearing on the issuance of the search warrants established that by that time the police had obtained ample evidence, as the officer in charge conceded at the preliminary examination, to charge Cipriano with having murdered the victims. That officer testified at the search warrant hearing that earlier in the day, at 2:00 p.m., a woman arrived at the home of neighbors and informed them that Cipriano had just shot her husband. They overheard her telephone the state police. They observed her returning to a dwelling contrary to their advice. They observed no one enter or leave the dwelling except that Cipriano ran from the rear of the dwelling when police officers arrived. He was immediately apprehended. Both the husband and the wife had been shot and killed. No one else was on the premises. There was blood on Cipriano’s right pants leg. There was a cut on his right forearm. On the basis of this evidence, the officer sought and obtained from the magistrate search warrants to obtain blood samples from Cipriano and at the scene.
c.
In Dean and Cipriano, it appears, on the basis of proceedings in magistrate’s courtrooms, that the police failed to comply with the requirements of the statute and were delaying arraigning the defendants before magistrates on complaints — when the magistrates would have been obliged by the court rule to advise the defendants of their rights to counsel and to inquire whether they desired the appointment of counsel if financially unable to obtain counsel on their own.
In both Dean and Cipriano, the defendants *366sought and obtained the appointment of counsel when they were eventually arraigned on complaints. Had this occurred at the reverse-writ proceeding in Dean or the search warrant proceeding in Cipriano, the police could not have initiated further interrogation of Dean or Cipriano. See People v Paintman, 412 Mich 518; 315 NW2d 418 (1982).
Statements obtained from Dean after his courtroom appearance during the reverse-writ proceeding and from Cipriano after the 11:00 p.m. search warrant proceeding should be suppressed because magistrates were available to arraign Dean and Cipriano on complaints and they thus could and should have been arraigned when those proceedings took place.
We would reverse and remand for a new trial in Dean because the statement obtained from him after his courtroom appearance during the reverse-writ proceeding,22 at which he should have been arraigned and offered an opportunity to obtain counsel, may have significantly added to the other evidence tending to show that he was the killer.
In Cipriano, we would reduce the conviction to second-degree murder and remand for resentencing with an option on the part of the prosecutor to retry him for first-degree murder. The evidence tending to show that Cipriano was the killer, other than the statements obtained from him after the search warrant proceeding, was overwhelming. The statements obtained from him after the *367search warrant proceeding, at which he should have been arraigned and offered an opportunity to obtain counsel, may, however, have significantly added to other evidence tending to show that the killings were premeditated and deliberate.
D
In Harrison, we agree with the majority that Harrison’s conviction of manslaughter should be affirmed. Harrison had engaged private counsel before he made the statement sought to be suppressed. He underwent the polygraph examination with the consent of his counsel. The delay in arraigning Harrison did not deprive him of legal representation, nor was his right to counsel otherwise impeded by the police.
E
We would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals in People v Harrison.23 In People v Dean, we would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand for a new trial. In People v Cipriano, we would reduce the conviction to second-degree murder with an option on the part of the prosecutor to retry the defendant for first-degree murder.24
Levin and Archer, JJ., concurred with Cavanagh, J._

 MCL 764.13; MSA 28.871(1) provides:
A peace officer who has arrested a person for an offense without a warrant shall without unnecessary delay take the person arrested before a magistrate of the judicial district in which the offense is charged to have been committed, and shall present to the magistrate a complaint stating the charge against the person arrested.
See also MCL 764.26, 780.581; MSA 28.885, 28.872(1), where the command is repeated as to felony arrests with warrants and arrests of misdemeanor offenders.

 Specifically, ch IV, § 13 of Act 175.

 In Gerstein v Pugh, 420 US 103, 114; 95 S Ct 854; 43 L Ed 2d 54 (1975), the Court noted:
At common law it was customary, if not obligatory, for an arrested person to be brought before a justice of the peace shortly alter arrest. 2 M Hale, Pleas of the Crown 77, 81, 95, 121 (1736); 2 W Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown 116-117 (4th ed, 1762).
See also Gerstein at 114-115, n 14.

 McNabb v United States, 318 US 332, 342, n 7; 63 S Ct 608; 87 L Ed 819 (1943), collected the prompt arraignment statutes of the states.

 United States v Calandra, 414 US 338, 347; 94 S Ct 613; 38 L Ed 2d 561 (1974).

 See, e.g., Miller v Fenton, 474 US 104, 115; 106 S Ct 445; 88 L Ed 2d 405 (1985).

 The Haupt court also noted that the prearraignment delay which resulted in the confession occurred prior to announcement of the McNabb decision. 136 F2d 668.

 People v Defore, 242 NY 13, 21; 150 NE 585 (1926). In Defore, Justice Cardozo observed that of the forty-five states which had considered Weeks (it was not binding on the states under the constitutional doctrine of that day), thirty-one states had rejected the opinion while only fourteen followed it.

 In Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643; 81 S Ct 1684; 6 L Ed 2d 1081 (1961), the Supreme Court held that the Weeks exclusionary rule was applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court observed that prior to its holding, states which previously had not been bound to apply the Weeks rule and had been reluctant to do so, later adopted the rule voluntarily:
While in 1949, prior to the Wolf[v Colorado, 338 US 25; 69 S Ct 1359; 93 L Ed 1782 (1949)] case, almost two-thirds of the States were opposed to the use of the exclusionary rule, now, despite the Wolf case, more than half of those since passing upon it, by their own legislative or judicial decision, have wholly or partly adopted or adhered to the Weeks rule. See Elkins v United States, 364 US 206, Appendix, pp 224-232 [80 S Ct 1437; 4 L Ed 2d 1669 (1960)]. Significantly, among those now following the rule is California, which, according to its highest court, was "compelled to reach that conclusion because other remedies have completely failed to secure compliance with the constitutional provisions . . . .” People v Cahan, 44 Cal 2d 434, 445; 282 P2d 905, 911 (1955). [367 US 651.]

 The federal statute was the result of the political process and twice was rejected by Congress. There were amendments offered on the floor substantially altering § 3501, and some were adopted immediately, thus resulting in inexact language. See, e.g., note, 18 USC § 3501 and the admissibility of confessions obtained during unnecessary prearraignment delay, 84 Mich L R 1731, 1732, n 7 (1986); note, Admissibility of confessions in the federal courts and the Hobbs bill, 38 J Crim L & Criminology 136, 137 (1947).

 Of course, lower federal courts cannot overrule the United States Supreme Court.

 Compare, for example, United States v Halbert, 436 F2d 1226, 1232-1234 (CA 9, 1970), with United States v Perez, 733 F2d 1026, 1032-1033 (CA 2, 1984). Since § 3501(c) regulates only federal practice, we need not decide whether Halbert or Perez represents the better view of congressional intent in enacting 18 USC 3501(c). Suffice it to say that we would not adopt the standard within that provision for Michigan practice even if we understood it because we want the police to understand it as well.

 Note, 18 USC §3501 and the admissibility of confessions, n 10 supra, p Í734.

 An officer making an arrest under a warrant issued upon a complaint or any person making an arrest without a warrant shall take the arrested person without unnecessary delay before the nearest available federal magistrate .... [FR Crim P 5(a).]

 Rule 311 of the Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
An arrested person who is not sooner released shall be brought before a [magistrate] without unnecessary delay. [10 ULA 62.]

 Unless the accused is released on citation or in some other lawful manner, the accused should be taken before a judicial officer without unnecessary delay. [2 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice (2d ed), Pretrial Release, 10-4.1, p 10-43.]

 In many areas of the law, both civil and criminal, courts adopt standards having no bright line, leaving the limits to be set case by case. That is the beauty of the common law and the reason it excels over the rigidity of code systems of jurisprudence. For example, 2 Restatement Contracts, 2d, §§ 205, 208, pp 99, 107, does not define good faith or unconscionable contract. Also, criminal sentences which shock the judicial conscience continue to be defined case by case. People v Coles, 417 Mich 523; 339 NW2d 440 (1983).

 The majority derives this standard from the opinion of Justice Frankfurter, in which only one other justice joined.

 See the regulations implemented by the Department of Corrections, Bureau of Correctional Facilities, Jails, Lockups, and Security Camps, 1979 AC, R 791.501 et seq.

 See People v Mallory, 421 Mich 239. See also 2 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice (2d ed), Pretrial Release, 10-4.2, p 10-50.

 In People v Green, 405 Mich 273; 274 NW2d 448 (1979), the police interrogated the defendant without notifying his appointed counsel, and obtained a confession. The Court was divided in rationale with respect to whether exclusion was a proper remedy (no opinion bore more than two signatures), but was in total agreement that the prosecution acted improperly. Further, the case was decided under the Code of Professional Responsibility and not on the basis of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

 We recognize that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel may not attach until a complaint is filed. Moran v Burbine, 475 US 412; 106 S Ct 1135; 89 L Ed 2d 410 (1986).

 In agreeing with the majority in affirmance, we do not adopt the analyses employed therein.

 Id.