Court Opinion

ID: 9729842
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:50:08.710673+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:01.592938
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE TRAPP, dissenting: I would affirm the judgments of the trial court for the reason that the authorities do not support either the theory of double jeopardy or of collateral estoppel. Mr. Justice Mills would bar, upon double jeopardy grounds, both a prosecution for the sale made on August 2, and the subsequent revocation of probation imposed for aggravated battery by reason of the conviction for that sale. The rationale appears to be that the prosecution alleged drug sales on two dates in the petition to revoke probation upon the conviction for aggravated battery, but failed to present evidence or further proceed with regard to the second sale (August 2) at the probation revocation hearing held. It is said that a doctrine designated “sanctity in pleadings” requires that the prosecution thereafter be barred from any further action. This is not double jeopardy under the authorities. The separate drug sales were not the same act of the same offense requiring compulsory joinder under section 3 — 3 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 3 — 3). Nor are they within the statutory provisions for double jeopardy provided in section 3 — 4 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 3 — 4). In People v. Vahle (1978), 60 Ill. App. 3d 391, 376 N.E.2d 766, appeal denied, it is said that the rule of double jeopardy does not apply to the revocation of probation by reason of the offense for which defendant was also convicted. The revocation hearing concerns violation of the provisions of probation separate from the trial of the subsequent substantive offense. The respective proceedings are separate and distinct, and the several punishments encompass different factors. In People v. Kondo (1977), 51 Ill. App. 3d 874, 876, 366 N.E.2d 990, 991, the court quoted People v. Howell (1977), 46 Ill. App. 3d 300, 302, 360 N.E.2d 1212, 1213: ‘A sentence imposed upon revocation of probation is not considered punishment for the offense which led to the revocation proceedings, but for the original crime. Thus there is no question of double jeopardy, or of being punished twice for the same offense.” (51 Ill. App. 3d 874, 876, 366 N.E.2d 990, 991.) Kondo, in fact, made such statement under circumstances where the trial court had refused to revoke probation for the failure to prove an element of the revoking offense. In People v. Golz (1977), 53 Ill. App. 3d 654, 368 N.E.2d 1069, cert, denied (1978), 437 U.S. 905, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1134, 98 S. Ct. 3091, the court pointed out the broad discretion of the State’s Attorney in determining how to prosecute. The court stated: “It is clear that each probationer alleged to have committed a further criminal offense could be prosecuted in one of several ways. Each of them could be tried first on the petition to revoke probation, then on the substantive criminal offense, or first on the substantive criminal offense and then on the petition to revoke probation. Each could also be tried on only the petition to revoke probation or on only the substantive criminal offense. In addition, the State’s Attorney may in the exercise of his discretion choose not to prosecute at all. Each probationer accused of a subsequent criminal offense, therefore, is at the discretion of the State ultimately placed in one of these five classifications; that fact alone does not raise an equal protection issue.” (53 Ill. App. 3d 654, 658, 368 N.E.2d 1069, 1072.) Mr. Justice Mills suggests that the State’s Attorney could “withdraw the charges” at the probation revocation if he did not wish to proceed. This, in fact, is what was done when the prosecution rested without introducing evidence of the second sale alleged in the petition to revoke. In a second aspect, the record does not support the application of collateral estoppel as stated by Mr. Justice Green. In the context of the sale on August 2, the issue is whether the trial court at the first probation revocation determined “an issue of ultimate fact” which cannot thereafter be litigated in the prosecution of defendant. In Ashe v. Swenson (1970), 397 U.S. 436,25 L. Ed. 2d 469, 90 S. Ct. 1189, and People v. Grayson (1974), 58 Ill. 2d 260, 319 N.E.2d 43, it was concluded that jury verdicts of acquittal necessarily determined and established the fact that defendant was not one of the robbers. In People v. Kondo (1977), 51 Ill. App. 3d 874, 366 N.E.2d 990, a hearing upon revocation of probation established that defendant was not carrying a weapon as defined by statute and it was held that prosecution upon the substantive charge was barred. As shown in the facts stated here, no evidence was heard upon the substantive charge of a drug sale on August 2. I cannot equate the dismissal of the initial petition to revoke probation under the circumstance that no evidence was introduced with the acquittals in Ashe and Grayson. As stated in People v. Warne (1976), 39 Ill. App. 3d 894, 896, 350 N.E.2d 836, 838, cert, denied (1977), 429 U.S. 1107, 51 L. Ed. 2d 559, 97 S. Ct. 1139, the doctrine of collateral estoppel is á narrow one. It requires the judicial determination of a single ultimate fact negating guilt. This record does not disclose such a determination.