Court Opinion

ID: 9637539
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:09:43.413357+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:57.576532
License: Public Domain

OLSZEWSKI, Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. The majority concludes that the offer of proof was “adequate”. After reviewing the record and the briefs, I am constrained to disagree.
*265The offer when made must disclose all facts necessary to establish the admissibility of the testimony sought to be elicited. Further, the party making the offer must state its purpose in such a manner that the court may perceive its relevance. Cockcroft v. Metropolitan Ins. Co., 133 Pa.Super. 598, 3 A.2d 184 (1938); Hill v. Truby, 117 Pa. 320, 11 A. 89 (1887); see Weinstein on Evidence Sec. 103(03) (“counsel must first be prepared to explain the substantive point before he can show that the proffered evidence is properly admissible as proof on that point.”). It is no error to reject an offer of proof which fails to disclose the evidence is competent. Zubrod v. Kuhn, 357 Pa. 200, 53 A.2d 604 (1947).
It seems clear from the record before us that appellant’s offer failed of its essential purpose. The lower court in its opinion stated:
In addition the Defendant contends that it was precluded from showing that Plaintiff also admitted to Mr. Pierantozzi that there was nothing wrong with the motorcycle and that he simply lost control of the cycle. The record clearly shows that the offer of proof for Randy, Inc. was simply to elicit testimony from Mr. Pierantozzi that the Plaintiff allegedly admitted to him that he had been travelling 100 m.p.h. at the time of the accident. No mention was made of anything else in this offer of proof.
As plaintiff explained, speed as evidence of contributory negligence “would be the worst prejudicial error in this case.”
I note that appellant nowhere introduced or attempted to introduce the deposition into evidence. Nor did he explain that he wanted testimony of speed not to show contributory negligence but rather to establish an independent cause for the accident. Admission or exclusion of evidence lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge. Finding no abuse of that discretion, I would dismiss appellant’s first claim.
In rejecting the claim, I am mindful of the important ends served by an offer of proof. Backlogged courts should not be required to repeat trials, especially civil trials, because *266counsel has failed to make his position clear for the record. The fact that appellant lays out the argument for the first time on appeal does not excuse his failure to present it at trial.
A second problem follows the majority’s resolution of appellant’s first claim. The majority assumes without deciding that one defendant, under guise of cross-examination of a co-defendant, may establish a defense common to both. Counsel for defendant East Coast Supply had called Pierantozzi to the stand. When he concluded, appellant’s counsel questioned the witness. Our Supreme Court has held that prejudicial error results when counsel for one defendant is permitted to introduce a defense, common to both, through leading questions directed to another defendant who is, in fact, part and parcel of the same cause. In re Rogan Estate, 404 Pa. 205, 171 A.2d 177 (1961). “The fact that it was counsel for a defendant, other than the party-defendant being interrogated, is of no moment. The substantialities of the situation must be considered, not mere technicalities.” Id., 404 Pa. at 215, 171 A.2d at 181.
With respect to the remaining issues, I adopt the thoughtful and well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable William Toal, Jr.
I would affirm the order of the court below.