Court Opinion

ID: 9956085
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-01 08:10:03.016983+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:17.301806
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued March 28, 2024

                                     In The

                             Court of Appeals
                                    For The

                         First District of Texas
                            ————————————
                             NO. 01-22-00195-CR
                           ———————————
                 WILLIAM TRAVIS KITCHENS, Appellant
                                       V.
                      THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                   On Appeal from the 178th District Court
                           Harris County, Texas
                       Trial Court Case No. 1502983

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

      A jury convicted appellant William Travis Kitchens of murder in 2018 and

assessed his punishment at 15 years’ confinement. He appealed, and this Court

affirmed the conviction but remanded for a new punishment hearing so that the

jury could be instructed regarding sudden passion. See Kitchens v. State, No. 01-
18-00518-CR, 2019 WL 6482408, *13–14 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 3,

2019, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). His punishment was

retried in 2021, and the jury rejected his sudden-passion claim and assessed his

punishment at 25 years’ confinement. Kitchens now appeals that sentence, arguing

that: (1) the trial court erred in overruling Kitchens’s objections to the State’s

emphasis on the race of the complainant during closing argument; (2) the State

engaged in prosecutorial misconduct that violated Kitchens’s due process rights by

injecting race into the trial proceedings via its comments during closing argument;

and (3) the trial court erred in failing to hold a hearing on Kitchens’s motion for

new trial.

      We conclude that the trial court did not err in denying Kitchens’s various

complaints regarding the State’s closing arguments, nor did the trial court err in

failing to hold a hearing on the motion for new trial. Accordingly, we affirm.

                                   Background

      The facts underlying Kitchens’s murder conviction are set out thoroughly in

this Court’s 2019 opinion. See id. at *1–3. Kitchens was convicted of murder in the

March 7, 2016 shooting death of Hipolito Desoto. Id. at *1. On that morning, 44-

year-old Desoto rode his motorcycle to Kitchens’s auto-repair shop, IDB Racing,

which provided repair and restoration services for high-end cars. Kitchens was in

his office when he saw Desoto ride by on his motorcycle just before 10:00 a.m. Id.

                                         2
Kitchens, who was age twenty-nine, five feet and seven inches tall, and 160

pounds at the time, opened his desk drawer to make sure his pistol was available.

Kitchens had never met Desoto, who was five feet and seven inches tall and 280

pounds. Desoto entered IDB Racing’s office and began talking with Kitchens. Id.

The entire incident was recorded on IDB Racing’s surveillance video, which did

not record audio. Id.

      According to Kitchens, Desoto was looking for a “long-haired hippy

machinist” and became angry when Kitchens told him that no one fitting that

description worked at IDB Racing. Id. Kitchens testified that Desoto became angry

and agitated. Id. As Desoto was opening the door, apparently to leave, Kitchens

testified that Desoto said, “[S]hit like this is why we will be back to beat your ass.”

Id. at *2. Kitchens testified that he reacted to Desoto’s threat to “come back and

beat [Kitchens’s] ass” by responding back “the same thing he said, out of

disbelief.” Id. Kitchens said that Desoto then pulled the door closed, took the ear

buds out of his ears, turned as if to enter back into the office, and “yelled that he

was actually going to fuck me up right now.” Id.

      Desoto was unarmed during the entire incident, but because of his size and

demeanor, Kitchens felt terror and believed he was about to be beaten to death by

Desoto. Id. Kitchens drew his pistol from his desk drawer and shot Desoto, who

fell to the floor. Id. As Kitchens walked forward to leave the office, Desoto started

                                          3
to push himself up and looked at Kitchens. Id. Kitchens fired additional shots at

Desoto, one of which struck Desoto just above the right eye. Id. Kitchens shot

Desoto a total of five times. Id. Desoto died as the result of gunshot wounds to the

head, chest, and back. Id.

      The entire interaction between Kitchens and Desoto occurred over the

course of approximately two minutes and was captured on the security video for

IDB Racing. Id. The video showed both parties’ movements as related by

Kitchens, but it did not provide any sound. Id. Following the shooting, Kitchens

called 9-1-1 to request police and an ambulance. Id. He then called Texas Law

Shield, a program he had joined, to speak to an attorney. Id. Police responded, and

Kitchens was eventually charged with murder. Id.

      The jury in Kitchens’s first trial was instructed in the charge on the law of

self-defense and the use of deadly force, but it found Kitchens guilty of murder. Id.

at *3. On appeal, this Court determined that the trial court erred in refusing

Kitchens’s request for a sudden-passion instruction and that some harm resulted

from the error. See id. at *13–14. The Court observed that “[a] sudden-passion jury

finding in the punishment phase reduces the first-degree felony offense of murder,

[which carries a punishment range of five to ninety-nine years,] to a second-degree

felony, which carries a punishment range of two to twenty years.” Id. at *9 (citing

TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 12.33(a), 19.02(d)).

                                         4
      We further observed:

      A defendant is entitled to a sudden-passion jury instruction if the
      record “at least minimally” supports the following inferences:
      1. that the defendant was acting under the immediate influence of
      passion, such as terror, anger, rage, or resentment;

      2. that his sudden passion was in fact induced by some provocation by
      the deceased, which provocation would commonly produce such a
      passion in a person of ordinary temper;

      3. that he committed the murder before regaining his capacity for cool
      reflection; and

      4. that a causal connection existed “between the provocation, passion,
      and homicide.”

Id. at *9–10 (citing Wooten v. State, 400 S.W.3d 601, 605 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013);

McKinney v. State, 179 S.W.3d 565, 569 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)). Finally, we

observed that “[a] defendant has the burden to prove the issue of sudden passion

arising from an adequate cause at the punishment hearing by a preponderance of

the evidence.” Id. at *10 (citing TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.02(d)).

      We concluded that Kitchens was entitled to the sudden-passion instruction

and remanded the case for a new punishment hearing. Id. at *13–14.

      In the punishment hearing on remand, the State reintroduced the evidence

from the guilt-innocence trial that had been affirmed on appeal. It presented details

about the offense itself, including identifying the complainant—Hipolito Thomas

Desoto, known as “Tommy”—and presenting his autopsy report identifying him as

a Hispanic man. The State further introduced the video from the day of the murder

                                         5
showing the events from the time Desoto entered IDB Racing until after Kitchens

shot him.

      Kitchens relied primarily on his assertion that he shot Desoto under the

influence of sudden passion, specifically that he was so filled with terror due to

Desoto’s appearance and mannerisms that he felt in fear of his life when he shot

Desoto. Kitchens began setting out his defensive theory during voir dire, when his

counsel asked questions supporting this strategy. Counsel asked the venire panel

questions like, “[D]o you think someone’s appearance can affect your impression

of their intentions?” One of the potential jurors responded, “I have a problem with

your statement. That’s implicit bias, and I have an issue with that . . . [because]

you’re prejudging someone when you don’t even know them.” Defense counsel

asked further, “But have you ever seen someone that you were afraid of by just

their impression?” The venireperson responded, “Yeah, but it doesn’t drive me to

take their life.” The defense also asked the venire panel about their feelings

regarding motorcyclists, specifically asking, “When you hear the word ‘bandito

and motorcycles’ what do you think about?” Venire members answered, “cartel,”

“gang member,” and “stereotype.”

      During opening statements, defense counsel again advanced Kitchens’s

defensive theory by describing what the evidence would show regarding Desoto’s

appearance, stating that Kitchens and his employees “saw a big man, riding a

                                        6
motorcycle, wearing sunglasses and no helmet.” Defense counsel informed the jury

that Kitchens would testify that he had never seen Desoto before and had no idea

who he was, and he “didn’t look like one of [Kitchens’s] normal customers.” He

pointed out the difference in size between Kitchens and Desoto, who weighed over

100 pounds more than Kitchens.

      As the State presented its case, Kitchens’s counsel elicited testimony from a

law enforcement officer who testified that Desoto rode his motorcycle with his

hands “up high” on the motorcycle’s handlebars and that he was wearing

sunglasses at the time he rode up to Kitchens’s business. At defense counsel’s

prompting, another State’s witness testified that Desoto was dressed “like a

mechanic” and “wasn’t dressed . . . like he owned a Jaguar or Lamborghini or

high-end Mercedes.” The witness also described Desoto as “substantially bigger”

than Kitchens. In other portions of his cross-examination, Kitchens’s counsel

described Desoto as a “big, menacing man riding a motorcycle”

      Kitchens’s expert, clinical and forensic psychologist Dr. Gerald Harris,

testified about the fight-or-flight response when someone perceives a threat. He

testified that fear or a perceived threat triggers the brain to react strongly in a way

that the person’s “ability to control their behavior in that short period of time” is

reduced. When asked whether the threat has to be “real or perceived” to trigger the

fight-or-flight response, Dr. Harris testified that “it doesn’t matter” and that the

                                          7
“reaction can be set off by the perception,” including “phobias.” He testified,

“Some people, when they see a spider or a dog, they go berserk immediately. The

spider is really not a threat to them, but that’s what they perceive.” Defense

counsel asked whether “[s]omeone riding a motorcycle with high handlebars,

wearing dark sunglass—big and wearing a dark shirt and comes into a business

who you’ve never seen before, would that description of someone be—could

someone perceive that as being a concerning feature?” Dr. Harris agreed that being

confronted by someone like that “could be perceived as a potential threat,” stating,

“Well, yeah, in this culture, that would be concerning to most people, I would

think. Yeah.” He further testified that “the physical size of a person does affect the

perception of a threat or strength.”

      Kitchens’s employees also testified on his behalf. Chad Finch testified that

he met Kitchens through a shared interest in motorcycles. They used to ride and

race motorcycles together. He eventually began working for Kitchens at IDB

Racing, working in various capacities over several years. Finch testified regarding

Desoto’s appearance at the shop on the day of the shooting. He stated that it was

“very odd” seeing “a big, burly guy on a Harley,” which was “not a thing you

normally see pulling up to our shop.” He testified that the shop worked on high-

end cars rather than motorcycles, and customers generally appeared by

appointment only. He further testified that Desoto looked “a little rough” was “just

                                          8
not our normal clientele.” Jonathan Bell testified that Desoto was “an unexpected

visitor with a frightening appearance” who “[j]ust looked scary and angry and

didn’t look like the typical person we deal with.”

      Kitchens testified regarding his thoughts and actions at the time of the

shooting. He testified that the shop was in “not a very nice” neighborhood because

he could not afford to rent space in a better location. He testified that there were

several bullet holes in one of the garage bay doors and that he felt it was necessary

to put security cameras around his shop. When he saw Desoto drive by on his

motorcycle, his first reaction to seeing “a big, burly biker without a helmet that

[he] didn’t recognize” was to be “a little uneasy.” He testified that he opened the

desk drawer where he kept his firearm to check that it was there before Desoto

walked into the shop. Kitchens described the way Desoto appeared to him at the

time, stating, “From where I was sitting down, it looked like he was at least two to

three times bigger than me.”

      Kitchens testified that the first thing Desoto asked upon coming into the

shop was “where the long-haired-hippy machinist is.” Kitchens told Desoto that he

did not know anything about a machinist and asked if he might be at one of the

other nearby businesses. Kitchens knew of a man who had long hair and worked at

a machine shop across from IDB Racing, but he did not share this information with

Desoto. Kitchens described Desoto’s tone of voice as “angry and irritable when he

                                          9
first came in.” Kitchens stated that Desoto again demanded to know the location of

the “long-haired hippy,” and Kitchens “was becoming scared.” He testified, “There

was a big, angry guy. He was looking for somebody. I didn’t know who he was

talking about. And his immediate reaction was to tell me that I didn’t fucking get

it. That’s not how I’ve ever talked to somebody when I went looking for a person.”

      Kitchens testified that Desoto got “more angry and more animated,” and his

tone of voice got “louder and angrier progressively.” Kitchen repeated to Desoto

that he did not know who Desoto was looking for and asked him to leave. Kitchens

testified that Desoto then said, “Shit like this is why they were going to come back,

and they were going to beat [Kitchens’s] ass.” Kitchens testified that, after hearing

that, he “was terrified” and “had visions in [his] head of 20 bikers rolling up with

shotguns and clubs.” Kitchens testified that he initially felt relief when he thought

Desoto was leaving; however, Desoto pushed the door open and then stopped,

telling Kitchens, “Actually, I’m going to fuck you up right now.” At that point,

Kitchens “thought [Desoto] was about to beat me to death,” so he pulled out his

pistol and shot him. He testified that he thought Desoto was “getting back up off

the ground” to beat him, and he “didn’t understand” how Desoto “didn’t stop,” so

he shot him again. Describing the two-and-a-half-minute encounter, Kitchens

testified that his feelings “went from being curious to uneasy, to scared, to

                                         10
terrified, to thinking I was about to die. I wouldn’t have shot him, otherwise. I

thought he was going to kill me. I didn’t understand.”

      During closing arguments, the State argued that sudden passion did not

apply, in part, because there was no evidence that Desoto provoked Kitchens. The

State pointed to evidence that Desoto entered an open business during daylight

hours. Despite the fact that he rode a Harley-Davidson motorcycle and was “not a

small guy,” he was unarmed and did not engage in any overtly threatening acts

when he entered the business, interacted with Kitchens, and turned to leave.

Without objection, the State argued, “Any predispositions of the defendant, any

biases that the defendant has are not [Desoto’s] fault. Remember provocation has

to be directly caused by [Desoto].”

      Defense counsel, during closing arguments, again emphasized Desoto’s

appearance, pointing out that he was a “biker” who weighed 280 pounds who

“disrupted” Kitchens’s business. The defense further described Desoto as

“menacing,” arguing that his appearance and words were enough to “terrorize an

ordinary person” like Kitchens. The defense further referred to Desoto as an

“outlaw biker,” stating that he “wasn’t where he was supposed to be.”

      In its closing rebuttal, the State made the following comments:

      Now, [Kitchens] taught you a lot about sudden passion. So I’m not
      going to belabor and waste your time going back through the points
      [Kitchens] already made.

                                        11
             I do want to talk to you about something that, for whatever
      reason, we haven’t talked about. And in the five-and-a-half years
      since this happened, we’ve used code words to signify it. But no one
      has actually explicitly said it. Let’s talk about the code words they
      used: “He’s overweight.”
             He’s 280 pounds.
             “He was a biker.”
             And he suddenly turned into an “outlaw biker,” during closing
      arguments.
             That he rode a “Harley Davidson motorcycle with his handle
      bars that were up here.”
             That he had “facial hair.”
             That he was “scary.”
             They’re all just saying he was scary because of what? He was
      scary because he was a Hispanic guy. That’s what they’re not saying.

      The defense objected “to any race injected into this trial,” and the trial court

asked the parties to approach to discuss the objection. At the bench, the defense

clarified that it was making a legal objection “of race,” stating that “[i]t violates the

Fourteenth Amendment for any purpose under the United State. And Buxton v.

Collins, specifically chastises the State of Texas for the injection of race.” Defense

counsel further stated that the suggestion that Kitchens shot Desoto “because of

race is offensive and repulsive” and “violates the Eighth Amendment and the Fifth

Amendment.” The State responded that Desoto’s race was “something that we can

see on the video. It’s seen in the pictures that he’s Hispanic.” The State also

argued:

      I don’t think it’s a negative inference. But it’s the fact that he’s
      Hispanic and that could have played a part in whatever alleged fear
      and the provocations that occurred in this case based on the defendant.

                                           12
      I’m not commenting on the defendant’s race; I’m commenting on the
      race of the complainant.

      The defense argued that it was not permissible to suggest that Desoto “was

shot because he was a large Hispanic man” because “this isn’t a racial shooting”

and “there’s no evidence at all.” The trial court observed that a lot of evidence was

introduced regarding Desoto’s appearance throughout the trial and asked the State

whether it was commenting on Desoto’s appearance. The State responded, “Yes.

He was Hispanic, Judge.” The trial court then overruled the defense’s objection,

and the State continued its closing argument to the jury:

      [State]:      The complainant was Hispanic. It’s not a shock to
                    anyone, right? You can see it in his picture. Why do you
                    think they keep calling him “Hipolito Desoto?” It’s
                    “Tommy Desoto.” The defendant’s own prejudices—

      [defense]:    Your Honor, I object. There’s been no evidence of any
                    prejudice by Mr. Kitchens.

      [Court]:      Overruled.

      [State]:      Don’t let the defendant’s own prejudices become your
                    own.

      The jury determined that Kitchens did not prove that he acted under the

influence of sudden passion. It assessed his punishment at 25 years’ confinement.

This appeal followed.

                                 Closing Argument

      In his first issue, Kitchens argues that the trial court erred “in failing to

sustain [his] several objections to the injection of race into the trial” during closing
                                          13
argument. In his second issue, he argues that the State engaged in prosecutorial

misconduct and violated his due process rights when it commented on Desoto’s

race during closing argument.

A.    Standard of Review

      We review a trial court’s rulings on objections during closing argument for

an abuse of discretion. Milton v. State, 572 S.W.3d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App.

2019).

      “The purpose of closing argument is to facilitate the jury in properly

analyzing the evidence presented at trial so that it may ‘arrive at a just and

reasonable conclusion based on the evidence alone, and not on any fact not

admitted in evidence.’” Id. at 239 (quoting Campbell v. State, 610 S.W.2d 754, 756

(Tex. Crim. App. 1980)). Proper closing argument “should not ‘arouse the passion

or prejudice of the jury by matters not properly before them.’” Id. Thus, proper

closing argument generally falls within one of four areas: (1) summation of the

evidence, (2) reasonable deduction from the evidence, (3) answer to an argument

of opposing counsel, and (4) plea for law enforcement. Id. We consider a challenge

to the State’s closing argument in the context of the entire record, including the

complete arguments of both parties, to determine whether the contested statements

fall within the scope of these four categories. Klock v. State, 177 S.W.3d 53, 64

                                       14
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d); see Gaddis v. State, 753 S.W.2d

396, 398 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).

      A prosecuting attorney is permitted wide latitude in argument to draw all

inferences from the facts in evidence which are reasonable, fair, and legitimate,

and offered in good faith. Mims v. State, 434 S.W.3d 265, 275 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.); see Brown v. State, 270 S.W.3d 564, 572 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2008) (citing Gaddis, 753 S.W.2d at 398); Cantu v. State, 939 S.W.2d

627, 633 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).

B.    Improper Jury Argument

      Kitchens complains that the trial court erred in overruling his objections to

the State’s closing argument, during which the prosecutor restated the evidence

providing details of Desoto’s appearance and said, “They’re all just saying he was

scary because of what? He was scary because he was a Hispanic guy. That’s what

they’re not saying.” Kitchens further objects to the prosecutor’s subsequent

reference to Desoto’s identity as a Hispanic man and the appeal not to let “the

defendant’s own prejudices become your own.”1

1
      The State argues that Kitchens failed to preserve his complaint to the prosecutor’s
      statement not to “let the defendant’s own prejudices become your own” because
      he failed to object again. However, the record reflects that after the State began the
      statement—“The defendant’s own prejudices”—the defense then objected to the
      reference to Kitchens’s prejudice, and the trial court overruled the objection,
      allowing the State to make the statement Kitchens now complains of on appeal—
      “Don’t let the defendant’s own prejudices become your own.” We conclude that
      this was sufficient to preserve Kitchens’s complaint regarding this closing
                                            15
      The State, however, contends that the arguments were proper. The State

points out that Desoto’s race was a fact in evidence. It also pointed out that the

testimony of Kitchens and other witnesses regarding Desoto’s appearance and

mannerisms—given to support Kitchens’s sudden-passion issue—demonstrated

“that the complainant’s appearance played a role in [Kitchens’s] decision to

murder the complainant.” The State thus asserts that the prosecutor’s statements

during closing argument made reasonable inferences from Kitchens’s own

testimony. The State argues that, because Kitchens put his perceptions of Desoto at

issue by asserting that he acted under the influence of sudden passion, the

prosecutor was responding to an argument of opposing counsel in pointing out that

the part of Desoto’s appearance that provoked terror in Kitchens’s mind was

Desoto’s identity as a Hispanic man. We agree with the State.

      Kitchens essentially argues that the State left the jury with the impression

that Kitchens’s shooting of Desoto was racially motivated, rather than being

motived by Kitchens’s terror based on Desoto’s threats. This mischaracterizes both

the evidence and the State’s closing arguments. The evidence presented at trial

demonstrated that Kitchens had never met or seen Desoto prior to the shooting.

Thus, Kitchens’s impressions about the level of danger Desoto posed were based

      argument. See Hernandez v. State, 538 S.W.3d 619, 622 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018)
      (holding that “[e]rroneous jury argument must be preserved by objection pursued
      to an adverse ruling”).
                                         16
on his observations of Desoto’s appearance and actions during the approximately

two-and-a-half minutes between when Desoto entered Kitchens’s shop and when

Kitchens shot him. Desoto was unarmed when he entered IDB Racing during

business hours. Kitchens and other witnesses testified that Desoto rode to the store

on a motorcycle that had high handlebars. Kitchens himself also rode motorcycles,

but he testified that his business focused on restoring high-end cars. The video

showed that Kitchens and Desoto were dressed similarly, in tennis shoes and dark

shorts. Desoto had sunglasses pushed up onto his forehead. Desoto was

approximately the same height as Kitchens, but Desoto weighed significantly

more.

         In addition to describing these facts about Desoto, Kitchens and his

employees testified that Desoto was dressed “like a mechanic” rather than being

dressed “like he owned a Jaguar or Lamborghini or high-end Mercedes” and that it

was “very odd” seeing “a big, burly guy on a Harley,” which was “not a thing you

normally see pulling up to [Kitchens’s] shop.” Another witness testified that

Desoto looked “a little rough” and was “just not [Kitchens’s] normal clientele,”

and described Desoto as “an unexpected visitor with a frightening appearance”

who “[j]ust looked scary and angry and didn’t look like the typical person we deal

with.”

                                        17
      In his own testimony, Kitchens testified that Desoto’s appearance made him

“a little uneasy.” Kitchens described Desoto as “angry” and “animated.” During

closing arguments, defense counsel again emphasized Desoto’s appearance,

pointing out that he was a “biker” who weighed 280 pounds and who “disrupted”

Kitchens’s business. The defense further described Desoto as “menacing,” arguing

that his appearance and words were enough to “terrorize an ordinary person” like

Kitchens. The defense referred to Desoto as an “outlaw biker,” stating that he

“wasn’t where he was supposed to be.” Defense counsel argued that Desoto’s

appearance and threats so terrified Kitchens that he acted in sudden passion when

he shot Desoto repeatedly. Thus, Kitchens’s own evidence and defensive theory

put his impressions of Desoto at the center of the punishment hearing.

      Kitchens acknowledges that Desoto’s race was a matter already in evidence.

It was apparent in the video and included in the autopsy report. He argues,

however, that “nothing in the record suggests nor supports the assertion by State’s

counsel that [Kitchens] harbored any racial prejudice towards the deceased or acted

because the deceased was [a] Hispanic man.” But the crux of Kitchens’s defense

was that he judged the degree of danger that Desoto posed based on Desoto’s

appearance as a large biker who rode up to the business on a Harley and based on

Desoto’s angry and threatening manner when Kitchens could not help him find the

machinist. Kitchens argued that he was so terrified by Desoto’s appearance and

                                        18
threats to beat him that he acted under sudden passion when he fired his weapon.

Desoto’s race was an obvious part of his appearance, as was the fact that Desoto

rode a motorcycle and was more than 100 pounds heavier than Kitchens. The State

did not belabor the references to Desoto’s race, mentioning it just twice in its

closing argument, in addition to repeating multiple aspects of Kitchens’s evidence

regarding Desoto’s appearance. The State’s argument that Kitchens acted based on

a bias or prejudice formed during his limited interaction with Desoto is a

reasonable inference from that evidence. See Milton, 572 S.W.3d at 239 (holding

that proper argument includes reasonable deductions from evidence); Klock, 177

S.W.3d at 64 (holding that courts determine whether contested statement falls

within proper scope of closing argument in context of entire record, including

complete arguments of both parties). This includes the State’s argument that one

aspect of Desoto’s appearance—his identity as a Hispanic man—played a role in

Kitchens’s judgment that Desoto was, as defense counsel argued, a “menacing,”

“outlaw biker” who “disrupted” business by not being “where he was supposed to

be.” Defense counsel contrasted this description of Desoto by describing Kitchens

as an “ordinary” person who was terrified by Desoto’s appearance and threats.

      Kitchens cites numerous cases to “demonstrate[] the nation’s abhorrence of

the injection of race into court proceedings” and to demonstrate that the State’s

reference to Desoto’s race and its implication that Kitchens’s own prejudice played

                                        19
a role in the shooting violated his due process and equal protection rights under the

Fourteenth Amendment. The cases relied upon by Kitchens are materially

distinguishable, primarily because none of the cases cited by Kitchens involved a

situation, as here, where the issue of race arose in response to the defendant’s own

testimony and defensive theory. For example, Kitchens cites United States v. Grey

for the propositions that “[a]ppeals to racial prejudice are foul blows and the courts

of this country reject them” and that when “such prejudicial tactics may have had a

substantial influence upon the result of a trial, reversal for new trial is ordered.”

422 F.2d 1043, 1046 (6th Cir. 1970).

      The racial prejudice in Grey involved a question asked by the prosecutor

while cross-examining one of defendant Grey’s character witnesses: the prosecutor

asked whether the witness “knew that Grey, a Negro, and a married man was

‘running around with a white go-go dancer.’” Id. at 1044–45. The court noted that

it found the evidence less-than-adequate to support the jury’s finding of guilt

against Grey and observed that, because of the lack of direct support, “the claim of

deliberate injection of race prejudice into the United States Attorney’s cross-

examination of one of Grey’s character witnesses takes on greater significance.”

Id. at 1045. The court found “no nonprejudicial explanation for the ‘white go-go

dancer’ question,” noting that “[a]t best, the entire question” was irrelevant

because no witness had put the defendant’s marital fidelity at issue, and “[a]t

                                         20
worst, the gratuitous reference to the race of the go-go dancer may be read as a

deliberate attempt to employ racial prejudice to strengthen” the government’s case.

Id.

      Here, in contrast to Grey, Kitchens had already been convicted of murder,

and the evidence supporting the jury’s finding against sudden passion during the

sentencing phase was based on significant evidence, including review of video

footage of the shooting and the testimony of numerous witnesses, including

Kitchens himself. The complained-of statements were made during closing

argument, rather than seeking admission of potentially racially-biased evidence. As

already discussed, there was a nonprejudicial explanation for the State’s reference

to the race of the complainant. Kitchens’s own strategy—starting with defense

counsel’s “bandito” question during voir dire and continuing through the rest of the

case—placed Kitchens’s personal feelings about and reactions to Desoto’s

appearance and mannerisms at the center of the trial. Thus, the State’s comment

during closing argument was not “gratuitous” as was the question in Grey, but was

instead relevant to addressing Kitchens’s own defensive issue.

      Likewise, McCleskey v. Kemp, is materially different. See 481 U.S. 279, 309

n.30 (1987) (recognizing that U.S. Constitution prohibits racially-biased

prosecutorial arguments and that prosecutorial discretion cannot be exercised on

basis of race). In McCleskey, the Supreme Court considered whether it was

                                        21
appropriate to use a statistical analysis of more than 2,000 murder convictions in

Georgia in addressing a complaint that Georgia’s capital-sentencing process was

administered in a racially discriminatory manner. Id. at 286. The Supreme Court

ruled that the study, which concluded that the State of Georgia imposed the death

penalty more often on black defendants and killers of white victims than on white

defendants and killers of black victims, failed to demonstrate that any party in

defendant’s case acted with discriminatory purpose. Id. at 298–99. It further

concluded that the study did not establish a violation of the defendant’s Eighth

Amendment rights. Id. at 312–13 (holding that, “[a]t most, the Baldus study

indicates a discrepancy that appears to correlate with race,” and that “the Baldus

study does not demonstrate a constitutionally significant risk of racial bias

affecting the Georgia capital sentencing process”). Here, rather than research

regarding racial bias generally, the State’s closing argument addressed the specific

facts of the case and drew inferences from those facts in order to respond to the

defensive issue of sudden passion.

      In Buck v. Davis, Buck’s own counsel called an expert to the stand knowing

that the expert viewed “Buck’s race [as] competent evidence of an increased

probability of future violence.” 580 U.S. 100, 107 (2017). The expert testified

regarding “statistical factors” that were “know[n] to predict future dangerousness,”

identifying race as one of those factors. Id. (also observing that expert’s report

                                        22
stated that defendant’s identity as black man led to “[i]ncreased probability” of

future dangerousness, stating, “There is an over-representation of Blacks among

the violent offenders”; and pointing to expert’s testimony that “[i]t’s a sad

commentary . . . that minorities, Hispanics and black people, are over-represented

in the Criminal Justice System”). The Supreme Court held that, under the

circumstances of that case, the trial court abused its discretion in denying Buck’s

motion to reopen a judgment on grounds that included “the risk of injustice to the

parties” and “the risk of undermining the public’s confidence in the judicial

process.” Id. at 123. The Supreme Court determined that Buck’s counsel’s

ineffective assistance in admitting the expert report “makes clear that Buck may

have been sentenced to death in part because of his race,” noting that such a result

“is a disturbing departure from a basic premise of our criminal justice system: Our

law punishes people for what they do, not who they are.” Id. at 123–24.

      Here, by contrast, the reference to the race of the complainant, Desoto, was

materially different. The State looked to what Kitchens himself actually said and

did in making its inference that Kitchens’s perception of the threat Desoto posed

was informed, at least in part, by the fact that Desoto was a large Hispanic male.

Thus, unlike the expert report admitted into evidence in Buck, the State’s closing

argument here did not pose a risk of encouraging the jury to punish Kitchens for

who he is, rather than what he did. See id.; see also, e.g., U.S. v. Vue, 13 F.3d 1206,

                                          23
1212–13 (8th Cir. 1994) (witness testified about connection between opium trade

and people of Hmong descent, stating that “95 percent” of opium smuggling cases

in area “related to Hmong individuals”; court held that admission of evidence tying

ethnicity of defendant to “the ethnic characteristics of drug dealers in a specifical

geographic area or a specific type of drug trade” is “highly improper”).2

      Here, the trial court could have concluded that the State was responding to

Kitchens’s own defensive argument when the prosecutor suggested that Kitchens’s

bias or prejudice—whether based on Desoto’s identity as a Hispanic man, a biker,

an overweight man, or some other obvious characteristic identified in the

evidence—influenced his state of mind and his perception that he was in serious

danger from Desoto. Thus, the State’s argument drew a reasonable inference from

Kitchens’s own testimony about Desoto’s appearance, and the argument was also a

reasonable response to Kitchens’s defensive issue that he acted under the influence

of sudden passion. See Milton, 572 S.W.3d at 239 (holding that proper argument

includes answers to argument of opposing counsel); Garcia v. State, 126 S.W.3d

2
      Kitchens’s case is more like Alonzo v. John, which is a civil case but places the
      issue of race in a context more similar to this case. 647 S.W.3d 764, 785 (Tex.
      App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2022, pet. filed). The Alonzo court viewed the
      reference to the plaintiff’s gender and race “in the context of the discussion during
      voir dire about juries awarding smaller damage awards to women,” and it
      “agree[d] with appellees that their argument was not a suggestion that appellants
      were racist or sexist, but a request of the jurors to not let implicit racial or gender
      bias impact their deliberations. It was not an ‘appeal to racial prejudice in
      language clear and strong,’ but rather an appeal to impartiality.” Id.
                                            24
921, 925 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (holding that arguments directed at defense

counsel’s arguments and theories in case are not improper).

          Given Kitchens’s own emphasis on Desoto’s appearance and mannerisms,

the trial court could have concluded that the evidence supported the State’s

inference that Desoto’s race was a factor in the effect his appearance had on

Kitchens. Given the entire context of the hearing and the closing arguments, the

State’s argument did not seem likely to “arouse the passion or prejudice of the jury

by matters not properly before them.” See Milton, 572 S.W.3d at 239. Rather, the

State’s argument here falls within the wide latitude afforded a prosecuting attorney

to draw all inferences from the facts that Kitchens himself put into evidence and

made relevant to his sudden-passion issue. See Mims, 434 S.W.3d at 275 (attorney

can draw inferences which are reasonable, fair, and legitimate, and offered in good

faith).

          We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling

Kitchens’s objections to the State’s closing argument. See Milton, 572 S.W.3d at

240.

          We overrule Kitchens’s first issue.

C.        Prosecutorial Misconduct

          In his second issue, Kitchens argues that these same comments constituted

prosecutorial misconduct.

                                            25
          To preserve error in cases involving prosecutorial misconduct, the appellant

must have (1) made a timely and specific objection; (2) requested an instruction

that the jury disregard the matter improperly placed before the jury; and (3) moved

for a mistrial. Jimenez v. State, 240 S.W.3d 384, 402 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007,

pet. ref’d). However, in cases where the misconduct “so infected the trial with

unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process,” error

preservation is not required. Id. (quoting Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181

(1986)). The prosecutorial misconduct must have denied the defendant a fair trial.

Id. “It is not enough that the prosecutors’ remarks were undesirable or even

universally condemned.” Id. (quoting Darden, 477 U.S. at 181).

          Here, Kitchens did not object on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct.

Thus, we can only consider whether any misconduct “so infected the trial with

unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” See id. As

stated above, however, we concluded that the State’s closing argument was not

improper. The prosecutor did not engage in misconduct in making proper jury

argument, and nothing in the record indicated that the prosecutor made a willful or

calculated effort to deprive Kitchens of a fair trial. See, e.g., Cantu, 939 S.W.2d at

633 (holding that argument is extreme or manifestly improper if there was willful

and calculated effort on prosecutor’s part to deprive appellant of fair and impartial

trial).

                                           26
      We overrule Kitchens’s second issue.

                                New Trial Hearing

      In his third issue, Kitchens argues that the trial court erred by “failing to

afford [him] a hearing on his new trial motion.” The trial court sentenced Kitchens

in open court on December 20, 2021. He filed his motion for new trial on January

12, 2022, and that motion did not request a hearing. Kitchens filed his amended

motion for new trial on January 18, 2022, requesting a hearing for the first time.

On February 11, 2022, Kitchens filed a motion requesting a hearing.3 The record

contains a form titled, “Acknowledgment of Presentment of Defendant’s Motion

for New Trial and Order Setting Hearing Date,” but the form is blank and

unsigned. The record shows that these motions were served on the State. The

docket sheet reflects only that the motions for rehearing and motion requesting a

hearing were filed.

A.    Relevant Law

      Although a criminal defendant has a right to move for a new trial, see TEX.

R. APP. P. 21, he does not have an “absolute right” to a hearing on his motion for

new trial, Hobbs v. State, 298 S.W.3d 193, 199 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). We

review the denial of a hearing on a motion for new trial for an abuse of discretion

3
      The motion requesting a hearing was titled, “Motion Requesting a Hearing on
      Motion for New Trial Finding of Guilt,” but the substance of the motion requested
      a hearing on the motion for new trial filed after the punishment hearing on
      remand.
                                          27
and will reverse only if the trial court’s ruling falls outside the zone of reasonable

disagreement. Smith v. State, 286 S.W.3d 333, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). The

failure to hear the motion constitutes an abuse of discretion only if the motion and

accompanying affidavits (1) raise matters that are not determinable from the record

and (2) establish reasonable grounds showing that the defendant could potentially

be entitled to relief. Id. at 338–39.

      The issue is preserved by a timely filed and presented motion for new trial

that requests a hearing. See Rozell v. State, 176 S.W.3d 228, 230–31 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2005) (holding that issue of trial court’s failure to hold hearing on motion for

new trial not preserved where motion for new trial did not request hearing; also

holding that “[p]resenting the motion, along with a request for a hearing, is

required to let the court know that the defendant wants the trial court to act on the

motion and whether the defendant would like a hearing on the motion”).

      A motion for new trial must be presented to the trial court within 10 days of

its filing. TEX. R. APP. P. 21.6; Obella v. State, 532 S.W.3d 405, 407 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2017). “This means the defendant must give the trial court actual notice that

he timely filed a motion for new trial and requests a hearing.” Obella, 532 S.W.3d

at 407 (“A reviewing court does not reach the question of whether a trial court

abused its discretion in failing to hold a hearing if no request for a hearing was

presented to it.”) (quoting Rozell, 176 S.W.3d at 230).

                                         28
B.     Analysis

       Here, nothing in the record indicates that Kitchens gave the trial court actual

notice of his motion, his amended motion, or his request for a hearing. The record

contains no notice of hearing, docket sheet entry setting a hearing date, order

resetting or denying the motion, “or other proof that the trial court was actually

aware of” Kitchens’s request for a hearing on his motion for new trial. See Harris

v. State, 668 S.W.3d 83, 92 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2022, pet. ref’d)

(quoting Arrellano v. State, 555 S.W.3d 647, 655 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2018, pet. ref’d)). The record contains a file-stamped copy of Kitchens’s motions

and certificates indicating service of the motions to the State. Thus, the record

shows only that Kitchens’s motion was timely filed, which is insufficient to show

that the motion, including the request for a hearing, was timely presented. See id.;

Stokes v. State, 277 S.W.3d 20, 21 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (“Merely filing the

motion is not sufficient alone to show presentment.”); Arrellano, 555 S.W.3d at

655 (“Presentment requires the defendant to go beyond simply filing the motion

for new trial with the trial court clerk.”).

       Accordingly, Kitchens’s complaint that the trial court erred in failing to hold

a hearing on his motion for new trial was not preserved. See Rozell, 176 S.W.3d at

230–31.

       We overrule Kitchens’s third issue.

                                               29
                                   Conclusion

      We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                Richard Hightower
                                                Justice

Panel consists of Justices Kelly, Hightower, and Countiss.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

                                           30