Court Opinion

ID: 9892289
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-23 07:09:23.123431+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:03:09.283360
License: Public Domain

In the
        Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
         at Fort Worth
     ___________________________

          No. 02-23-00215-CR
     ___________________________

       EX PARTE DIVINE BURTON

  On Appeal from the 396th District Court
         Tarrant County, Texas
       Trial Court No. C-0011723

  Before Birdwell, Womack, and Wallach, JJ.
  Memorandum Opinion by Justice Birdwell
                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

         Appellant Divine Burton appeals from the trial court’s denial of the relief

requested in her pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus. Because the trial court

did not abuse its discretion by denying Burton’s request, we affirm the trial court’s

order.

                                   I. Background

         Burton was arrested and charged by indictment with aggravated assault of a

family member with a deadly weapon. Following a competency evaluation, the trial

court signed an agreed order finding Burton incompetent to stand trial and

committing her for competency restoration services for a period not to exceed 120

days. 1 After Burton was successfully discharged from the jail-based competency

restoration program, the trial court adjudged her mentally competent to stand trial.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Burton pled guilty to the offense of aggravated assault

with a deadly weapon in exchange for the State’s recommending two years’ deferred

adjudication community supervision on the MHMR caseload and waiving the family-

violence enhancement. On November 8, 2021, the trial court entered an order of

deferred adjudication in accordance with the parties’ agreement.

        The trial court ordered that Burton first participate in a jail-based competency
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restoration program for a period not to exceed 60 days. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc.
Ann. art. 46B.091. Then, if Burton had not been restored to competency by the end
of the 60th day after the date she began to receive services in the program, the trial
court ordered that she be transferred “without unnecessary delay” to the first available
mental health facility. See id. art. 46B.073(b)(2), (c).

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      The State subsequently filed a petition to proceed to adjudication alleging that

Burton had violated several terms and conditions of her community supervision,

including assaulting EMS personnel, and a warrant was issued for her arrest. On April

18, 2023, following another competency evaluation, the trial court signed an agreed

order finding Burton incompetent to stand trial, committing her to a mental health

facility for competency restoration, and directing the Sheriff of Tarrant County to

transport Burton from jail to a state mental health facility designated by the Texas

Health and Human Services Commission for appropriate treatment for a period of

not more than 120 days. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 17.032(a)(8), 46B.054,

46B.073(b)(2), (c). The Tarrant County District Clerk issued a writ of commitment the

next day.

      On August 3, 2023, Burton filed a “Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus for

Person Ordered into Hospitalization but Left in Jail.” The trial court heard the matter

on August 10, 2023, and denied habeas relief. This appeal followed.

                                   II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

      We review a trial court’s ruling on a pretrial application for writ of habeas

corpus for an abuse of discretion. Ex parte Todman, Nos. 02-23-00061-CR, 02-23-

00062-CR, 02-23-00063-CR, 02-23-00064-CR, 2023 WL 4942026, at *4 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth Aug. 3, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing

Ex parte Wheeler, 203 S.W.3d 317, 324 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)). In conducting our

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review, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and

defer to the trial court’s fact findings supported by the record. See Ex parte Wheeler,

203 S.W.3d at 324. If we conclude the grounds asserted in the application for writ of

habeas corpus are not cognizable, then we must affirm the trial court’s denial of relief.

Ex parte Walsh, 530 S.W.3d 774, 778 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2017, no pet.) (citing

Ex parte Schoolcraft, 107 S.W.3d 674, 676 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, no pet.)).

B. Habeas Corpus Relief

      Pretrial habeas relief is an extraordinary remedy. Ex parte Perry, 483 S.W.3d 884,

895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). To be entitled to relief, an applicant or petitioner must

establish that she was either “confined” or “restrained” unlawfully. Ex parte Limberger,

No. 01-21-00532-CR, 2023 WL 2655749, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar.

28, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (first citing Tex. Code

Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.01; and then citing State v. Collazo, 264 S.W.3d 121, 125–26

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d)). In general, relief is available only

for “jurisdictional defects and violations of constitutional and fundamental rights.”

Ex parte Johnson, 541 S.W.3d 827, 829 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (quoting Ex parte Moss,

446 S.W.3d 786, 788 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)). Due process claims, however, are not

generally cognizable for pretrial habeas relief. Ex parte Walsh, 530 S.W.3d at 778

(citing In re Shaw, 204 S.W.3d 9, 16 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, pet. ref’d)).

      The purpose of an application for pretrial habeas relief is to remove an illegal

restraint on the applicant’s liberty. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.01. Thus,

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pretrial habeas relief is appropriate only when resolution of the question presented, if

resolved in the petitioner’s favor, results in the petitioner’s immediate release. See Ex

parte Hammons, 631 S.W.3d 715, 716 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (holding a pretrial

application for writ of habeas corpus is appropriate only when granting relief would

result in the applicant’s release); Ex parte Weise, 55 S.W.3d 617, 619 (Tex. Crim. App.

2001) (“[A] pretrial writ application is not appropriate when resolution of the question

presented, even if resolved in favor of the applicant, would not result in immediate

release.”); Ex parte Walsh, 530 S.W.3d at 778 (“[P]retrial habeas relief . . . is reserved

for cases in which resolution of a legal issue in the applicant’s favor must result in the

applicant’s immediate release.”).

C. Defendant’s Incompetency

      When a defendant is found incompetent to stand trial, the trial court must

either (1) commit the defendant to a mental health facility or residential care facility

for treatment to restore competency or (2) release (or continue the release of) the

defendant on bail, subject to participation in outpatient mental health treatment. Tex.

Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 46B.071, 46B.072, 46B.073; see Ex parte McVade, Nos. 03-

17-00207-CR, 03-17-00208-CR, 03-17-00209-CR, 2017 WL 4348151, at *2 (Tex.

App.—Austin Sept. 28, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). But

a defendant charged with a “violent offense” as listed in Article 17.0322 is not eligible

      2
       Both family-violence assault and aggravated assault are listed as “violent
offenses” under Article 17.032. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.032(6), (8).

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for release on bail, and the trial court must commit the defendant to a mental health

facility designated by the commission. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.073(b)(2),

(c). A commitment order issued under Article 46B.073 “must place the defendant in

the custody of the sheriff for transportation to the facility . . . in which the defendant

is to receive competency restoration services.” Id. art. 46B.075.

D. Analysis

      Burton’s claims were not cognizable for pretrial habeas relief. In her petition

for writ of habeas corpus, Burton asserted that she was illegally confined and

restrained “in her liberty” in the Tarrant County Jail due to the Tarrant County

Sheriff’s failure to transport her to the appropriate state mental health facility “in a

timely manner.” Specifically, it had been over 90 days since the trial court found

Burton incompetent to stand trial and ordered her transportation to the state mental

health facility, but she remained in jail, which she characterized as a violation of her

due process rights. Burton requested that the trial court grant a writ of habeas corpus

ordering the Tarrant County Sheriff to transport her to the state mental health facility

and ordering the facility to receive her for treatment.

      While Burton’s petition also requested, in the alternative, her immediate release,

the record demonstrates that she sought to enforce the trial court’s order of

incompetency and transportation to the state mental health facility. At the hearing on

Burton’s habeas petition, her counsel argued that the trial court’s order directing the

Tarrant County Sheriff to transport her to a state mental health facility had not been

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complied with, which was “just as wrong as it could possibly be.” He asserted that

Burton’s continued confinement violated the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments.

       In support of his argument, Burton’s counsel offered, and the trial court

admitted, two exhibits into evidence that showed a list of approximately 70 people,

including Burton, who had been confined in the Tarrant County Jail awaiting

transport to an appropriate state mental health facility—some of whom had been

waiting for two years—and described the situation as “a wholesale problem.” He

closed his argument by requesting that the trial court, again, order the Tarrant County

Sheriff to transport Burton to the state hospital, and if the sheriff’s department failed

to do so within 30 days, that the trial court conduct another hearing requiring the

Tarrant County Sheriff to explain to the trial court the reason for the failure. The

State conceded and agreed with Burton’s counsel that Burton needed to be

transferred to the state mental health facility, pursuant to the trial court’s signed order.

The trial court denied Burton’s requested relief on the writ because it was

“redundant,” as “[t]he order to transport ha[d] already been signed.”

       The record indicates that Burton did not actually seek release from

confinement or restraint but, instead, sought enforcement of the trial court’s order

directing the sheriff’s department to transport her to the state mental health facility.

Thus, a writ of habeas corpus is not the appropriate vehicle for the relief sought. See

Ex parte Hammons, 631 S.W.3d at 716; Ex parte Weise, 55 S.W.3d at 619; Ex parte Walsh,

530 S.W.3d at 778; see, e.g., Ex parte Thompson, No. 10-22-00162-CR, 2022 WL

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5239730, at *4 (Tex. App.—Waco Oct. 5, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated

for publication) (rejecting appellant’s argument that he was entitled to habeas pretrial

release due to trial court’s failure to promptly transport him to mental health facility);

Ex parte McVade, 2017 WL 4348151, at *4 (concluding writ of habeas corpus

inappropriate when appellant sought enforcement of trial court’s commitment order).

      Moreover, Burton did not challenge the validity of the trial court’s finding of

incompetency, her initial arrest, her commitment, or the order to transport her to a

state mental health facility; did not allege that the trial court had violated any

applicable statutory procedures; and did not challenge the statutory provisions under

which she had been confined. 3 Rather, she asserted that, due to the Tarrant County

Sheriff’s failure to “timely” comply with the trial court’s order—the terms upon which

she and the State had agreed—her continued confinement was illegal and violated her

due process rights. In other words, Burton appears to have asserted a fundamental

right to speedy transport to a mental health facility, i.e., transportation “in a timely

manner.” However, there is no fundamental right to being transported to a mental

health facility “in a timely manner.” See Ex parte Valero, No. 08-22-00172-CR, 2023

WL 1972016, at *4 (Tex. App.—El Paso Feb. 13, 2023) (mem. op., not designated for

      3
         Even if she had challenged the applicable statutory procedures or provisions
and sought immediate release, there is no statutory provision that entitled Burton to
release. Burton was charged with a “violent offense,” see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann.
art. 17.032(a)(8), so the trial court was required to commit her to a mental health
facility and place her in custody to await transport. See id. arts. 46B.073(b)(2), (c),
46B.075.

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publication), pet. dism’d, No. PD-0123-23, 2023 WL 4611749 (Tex. Crim. App. July 19,

2023); Ex parte Thompson, 2022 WL 5239730, at *4; Ex parte McVade, 2017 WL

4348151, at *3. Indeed, neither the U.S. Constitution nor the U.S. Supreme Court has

identified such a fundamental right, and Burton cites no authority to the contrary.

And aside from her conclusive assertion that her continued confinement was “just as

wrong as it could possibly be,” Burton failed to establish how her incarceration while

awaiting transport to a mental health facility violated any of her constitutional rights.

Accordingly, Burton did not demonstrate that her continued confinement was

unlawful.

                                    III. Conclusion

       We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Burton’s

requested habeas relief and affirm the trial court’s order denying that relief.

                                                        /s/ Wade Birdwell

                                                        Wade Birdwell
                                                        Justice

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: October 19, 2023

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