Court Opinion

ID: 9898093
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:28:25.486426+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:28.975950
License: Public Domain

Filed
                                                                                      Washington State
                                                                                      Court of Appeals
                                                                                       Division Two

                                                                                      November 7, 2023
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

                                        DIVISION II
 STATE OF WASHINGTON,                                              No. 55305-8-II

                               Respondent,

        v.                                                  UNPUBLISHED OPINION

 MICHAEL LEE WOLFENBERGER,

                               Appellant.

       MAXA, J. – Michael Wolfenberger appeals his convictions and sentence following his

guilty plea to attempted second degree child molestation, felony communication with a minor for

immoral purposes, and commercial sexual abuse of a minor. Wolfenberger does not attempt to

withdraw his guilty plea, but he challenges the circumstances surrounding the plea and his

sentence.

       Wolfenberger originally was charged with attempted second degree child rape and felony

communication with a minor for immoral purposes after being caught in a sting operation when

he arranged to have sex with a law enforcement officer posing as a 13-year-old girl. As part of a

plea agreement, Wolfenberger pled guilty to the amended charges of attempted second degree

child molestation and commercial sexual abuse of a minor as well as felony communication with

a minor for immoral purposes. For the attempted second degree child molestation conviction, the

court imposed 42 months in confinement and reduced the required 36 month term of community

custody to 18 months because the statutory maximum for that offense is 60 months. But the
No. 55305-8-II

court noted that any earned early release time would be converted to additional community

custody.

         Wolfenberger argues that (1) the trial court’s notation converting earned early release

time to community custody rendered the sentence unlawfully indeterminate; (2) his guilty plea to

the amended charge of attempted second degree child molestation was a Barr1 plea and was

unlawful under Barr; (3) his guilty plea to the amended charge of commercial sexual abuse of a

minor was unlawful under Barr because (a) there was no factual basis for the original attempted

second degree child rape charge, and (b) there was no factual basis for the commercial sexual

abuse of a minor charge; and (4) the amended information was inadequate because it failed to

include the element that the three offenses were separate and distinct from one another.

         We hold that (1) the trial court’s notation that the community custody term would be

increased by earned early release time up does not constitute an indeterminate sentence, (2)

Wolfenberger’s guilty plea to the amended charge of attempted second degree child molestation

was not made under Barr and therefore his arguments regarding that plea have no merit, (3)

Wolfenberger’s guilty plea to the amended charge of commercial sexual abuse of a minor was

not unlawful under Barr, and (4) the amended information was adequate because the three

offenses were separate and distinct from one another is not an essential element of the charged

offenses.

         Accordingly, we affirm Wolfenberger’s convictions and sentence.

                                               FACTS

         Wolfenberger communicated through social media and text messages with a law

enforcement officer posing as a 13-year-old girl. Wolfenberger ultimately arranged to engage in

1
    In re Pers. Restraint of Barr, 102 Wn.2d 265, 684 P.2d 712 (1984).

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No. 55305-8-II

sexual activity with the girl. He traveled to the girls’ purported residence with condoms in his

pocket and a Slurpee drink that the girl had requested he bring. He was arrested when he arrived

at the residence.

       The State originally charged Wolfenberger with attempted second degree child rape and

communication with a minor for immoral purposes. The probable cause statement included the

facts stated above.

       Wolfenberger entered into a plea agreement with the State. The State agreed to file an

amended information charging Wolfenberger with attempted second degree child molestation,

felony communication with a minor for immoral purposes, and commercial sexual abuse of a

minor. Wolfenberger agreed to plead guilty to those charges. The plea agreement included a

joint sentencing recommendation.

       In his guilty plea statement, Wolfenberger stated that he was interested in sex with the

girl. In addition, he acknowledged that his actions “could be interpreted as substantial steps

toward committing the crime of Attempted Child Molest in the Second Degree, and when I drove

to the house, I was intending to have sexual contact with [the girl].” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 12-

13. He also admitted that the text messages were electronic communication and that he sent

them “for an immoral purpose of a sexual nature.” CP at 12.

       However, Wolfenberger stated,

       I did not commit the completed crime of Commercial Sexual Abuse of a Minor, but
       I have reviewed the evidence the State has against me with my lawyer, and I believe
       I would be convicted of the charges originally filed, so I want to plead guilty to a
       crime I did not commit in exchange for the opportunity to get the original charges
       reduced to the ones in the Amended Information.

CP at 13.

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No. 55305-8-II

       Wolfenberger asked the trial court to consider the facts he admitted and the probable

cause statement to find a factual basis for his plea. Both Wolfenberger and his counsel signed

the guilty plea. The trial court found that the plea was made knowingly, intelligently and

voluntarily, and found a factual basis for the plea.

       The trial court sentenced Wolfenberger to 42 months for attempted second degree child

molestation, 22 months for communication with a minor for immoral purposes, and 67 months

for commercial sexual abuse of a minor. The sentences ran concurrently, making the total

confinement 67 months. The court also imposed 36 months of community custody. However,

the court included the following notation regarding the attempted second degree child

molestation conviction: “Actual term imposed today: 18 months, which can increase by earned

early release time up to a max of 36 [months].” CP at 93.

       Wolfenberger appeals his convictions and his sentence.

                                            ANALYSIS

A.     CONVERSION OF EARNED EARLY RELEASE TIME TO COMMUNITY CUSTODY

       Wolfenberger argues that the court imposed an indeterminate sentence by stating that

earned early release time would be converted to community custody time, which was an amount

unknown at the time of sentencing. We disagree.

       Under RCW 9.94A.701(1)(a), a person convicted of a sex offense must be sentenced to

three years of community custody. This statue “require[s] trial courts to impose fixed terms of

community custody.” State v. Bruch, 182 Wn.2d 854, 861, 346 P.3d 724 (2015). Indeterminate

terms of community custody are invalid. State v. LaBounty, 17 Wn. App. 2d 576, 583, 487 P.3d

221 (2021).

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No. 55305-8-II

       However, trial courts cannot impose total terms of confinement and community custody

that exceed the statutory maximum sentence. Id. at 582. Therefore, RCW 9.94A.701(9) states

that if the total terms would be above the statutory maximum, the trial court must reduce the

community custody term accordingly. Under this statute, an offender may not be required to

serve an otherwise mandatory community custody term. LaBounty, 17 Wn. App. 2d at 583.

       Under RCW 9.94A.729(1)(a), the Department of Corrections (DOC) may reduce an

offender’s sentence by “earned release time” based on good behavior and good performance.

RCW 9.94A.729(5)(a) states that an offender who will be supervised by DOC pursuant to RCW

9.94A.501 “shall be transferred to community custody in lieu of earned release time.” RCW

9.94A.501(4)(a) provides that DOC shall supervise any person convicted of a “sex offense” who

is sentenced to community custody. And the term “sex offense” includes second degree child

molestation. RCW 9.94A.030(47)(a)(i); RCW 9A.44.086(1).

       In Bruch, the Supreme Court held that a provision converting earned early release time to

community custody does not create an invalid indeterminate sentence as long as RCW

9.94A.729(5) applies. 182 Wn.2d at 862-71; see also LaBounty, 17 Wn. App. 2d at 586-88. In

fact, RCW 9.94A.729(5) – if applicable – mandates that earned early release time be converted

to community custody regardless of a notation in the judgment and sentence. Bruch, 182 Wn.2d

at 867-68 & n.5; LaBounty, 17 Wn. App. 2d at 588.

       Here, Wolfenberger was convicted the sex offense of attempted second degree child

molestation. Therefore, RCW 9.94A.729(5) applies, and the trial court was required to convert

Wolfenberger’s earned early release time to community custody. And under Bruch and

LaBounty, the trial court’s notation did not make Wolfenberger’s sentence indeterminate.

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No. 55305-8-II

       We reject Wolfenberger’s argument that the trial court imposed an indeterminate

sentence.

B.     VALIDITY OF GUILTY PLEAS

       Wolfenberger argues that his guilty pleas to second degree child molestation and

commercial sexual abuse of a minor were unlawful under Barr for various reasons.2 We

disagree.

       1.   Legal Principles

       The general rule is that a trial court cannot accept a guilty plea unless there is a factual

basis for the plea. CrR 4.2(d). However, under a Barr plea, a defendant can plead guilty to an

amended charge for which there is no factual basis as long as there is a factual basis for the

original charge. State v. Wilson, 16 Wn. App. 2d 537, 542-43, 481 P.3d 614, rev. denied, 197

Wn.2d 1018 (2021) (citing In re Pers. Restraint of Barr, 102 Wn.2d 265, 270, 684 P.2d 712

(1984)).

       The Supreme Court explained this rule:

       Since the factual basis requirement, both in case law and in this court’s rule is founded on
       the concept of voluntariness, we hold that a defendant can plead guilty to amended
       charges for which there is no factual basis, but only if the record establishes that the
       defendant did so knowingly and voluntarily and that there at least exists a factual basis
       for the original charge, thereby establishing a factual basis for the plea as a whole. Doing
       so supports a flexible plea bargaining system through which a defendant can choose to
       plead guilty to a related charge that was not committed, in order to avoid near certain
       conviction for a greater offense.

State v. Zhao, 157 Wn.2d 188, 200, 137 P.3d 835 (2006).

2
 Wolfenberger does not appear to challenge his guilty plea to communication with a minor for
immoral purposes, which was not amended from the original charge and clearly had a factual
basis.

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No. 55305-8-II

       2.    Guilty Plea to Attempted Second Degree Child Molestation

       Wolfenberger argues that his guilty plea to the amended charge of attempted second

degree child molestation was unlawful under Barr because (1) attempted second degree child

molestation is not a lesser included offense of the original charge of attempted second degree

child rape, and (2) there was no factual basis for the original charge of attempted second degree

child rape. However, we need not consider these arguments because Wolfenberger’s guilty plea

to the amended charge of attempted second degree child molestation was not made under Barr.

       As noted above, a Barr plea occurs when a defendant pleads guilty to an amended charge

for which there is no factual basis. Wilson, 16 Wn. App. 2d at 542-43. Here, the State amended

its original charge of attempted second degree rape so Wolfenberger could plead guilty to

attempted second degree child molestation.

       However, Wolfenberger expressly acknowledged that there was a factual basis for the

amended charge. In his guilty plea statement, Wolfenberger stated that he was 26 years old and

was interested in sex with a 13-year-old girl. And he stated that his actions “could be interpreted

as substantial steps toward committing the crime of Attempted Child Molest in the Second

Degree, and when I drove to the house, I was intending to have sexual contact with [the girl].”

CP at 12-13.

       In his reply brief, Wolfenberger argues that there was no factual basis for a finding that

he acted for the purpose of sexual gratification. A required element of second degree child

molestation is “sexual contact,” RCW 9A.44.086, which is defined as “any touching of the

sexual or other intimate parts of a person done for the purpose of gratifying sexual desire of

either party or a third party.” RCW 9A.44.010(13). The intent to have sexual intercourse is a

sufficient factual basis for the sexual gratification requirement.

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No. 55305-8-II

          Because there was a factual basis for Wolfenberger’s guilty plea, the Barr rule is not

implicated. Therefore, we need not consider Wolfenberger’s challenge to his attempted second

degree child molestation conviction based on Barr.

          3.   Guilty Plea to Commercial Sexual Abuse of a Minor

          Wolfenberger argues that his guilty plea to the amended charge of commercial sexual

abuse of a minor was unlawful under Barr because (1) there was no factual basis for the original

charge of attempted second degree child rape, and (2) there was no factual basis for the

commercial sexual abuse of a minor charge. We disagree.

               a.   Factual Basis for Original Charge

          The State originally charged Wolfenberger with attempted second degree child rape.

RCW 9A.44.076 states that a person is guilty of second degree child rape “when the person has

sexual intercourse with another who is at least twelve years old but less than fourteen years old

and the perpetrator is at least thirty-six months older than the victim.” Under RCW

9A.28.020(1), “[a] person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, with intent to commit a

specific crime, he or she does any act which is a substantial step toward the commission of that

crime.”

          Here, the probable cause declaration established that Wolfenberger, who was 24 years

old, arranged to have sex with a girl who told him that she was 13 years old. Wolfenberger then

arrived at the girl’s purported residence with condoms in his pocket. Further, Wolfenberger

admitted in his guilty plea statement that when he drove to the house, he was intending to have

sexual contact with the girl.

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No. 55305-8-II

         We conclude that there was a factual basis for the original charge as required for a Barr

plea.3

              b.   Factual Basis for Guilty Plea

         Wolfenberger argues that his guilty plea to commercial sexual abuse of a minor was

unlawful because there were no facts that supported the amended information charging that

offense and there was no factual basis for his plea. But these arguments have no merit because

Wolfenberger’s guilty plea to commercial sexual abuse of a minor was a Barr plea.

         As noted above, under a Barr plea, a trial court can accept a guilty plea to an amended

charge that is not supported by a factual basis as long as there is a factual basis for the original

charge. Wilson, 16 Wn. App. 2d at 542-43. We conclude above that there was a factual basis for

the original charge. Therefore, Wolfenberger’s Barr plea was valid regardless of whether there

was a factual basis for the commercial sexual abuse of a minor charge.

C.       ADEQUACY OF AMENDED INFORMATION RE SEPARATE AND DISTINCT CHARGES

         Wolfenberger argues that the amended information was inadequate because it failed to

include the essential element that the three charged offenses were separate and distinct from

another. We disagree.

         To be constitutionally sufficient an information must state “every essential statutory and

nonstatutory element of the crime.” State v. Pry, 194 Wn.2d 745, 751, 452 P.3d 536 (2019). An

essential element is one that must be specified to establish the illegality of the charged behavior.

3
 Wolfenberger also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for the commercial sexual abuse
of a minor charge based on the fact that the victim was not a real person. However, a guilty plea
waives a defendant’s right to appeal the sufficiency of the evidence. In re Pers. Restraint of
Bybee, 142 Wn. App. 260, 268, 175 P.3d 589 (2007).

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No. 55305-8-II

Id. at 752. However, the information is not required to provide definitions of essential elements.

Id.

       Here, the amended information listed all essential elements for each charged offense.

That the three charged offenses were separate and distinct from another is not a statutory element

of any of the offenses. And there is no authority for the proposition that a nonstatutory element

is that multiple charged offenses be separate and distinct from another.

       We hold that the amended information was not inadequate.

                                         CONCLUSION

       We affirm Wolfenberger’s convictions and sentence.

       A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW

2.06.040, it is so ordered.

                                                     MAXA, J.

 We concur:

 LEE, J.

 CRUSER, A.C.J.

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