Court Opinion

ID: 9824943
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 11:46:22.419304+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:40:16.205369
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
The court has been furnished with several briefs in support of the application for rehearing, and some new questions have been presented on this argument which are not improper, if not necessary, for us to answer. While the case has been well and fully briefed by able counsel for appellant, we still adhere to the original opinion and decision.
It is insisted by counsel for appellant that appellant bank 'is not liable to appellee bank, for the reason that appellant bank acted in good faith; that there is nothing to show that appellant acted in bad faith. While it is true that the agreed statement of facts probably does not show bad faith of any one except the impostor, it shows no bad faith on the part of the appellee bank; but it does indisputably show negligence and failure to comply with the law on the part of both of the banks.
[2] The impostor is the man who profited by all the transactions shown by the admitted statement of facts. The question for' decision in the trial court and this court is which of these two banks must suffer the loss of the amount which was gained thus by the impostor. It is not a question of bad faith on the part of either of the banks. It is a question of negligence and a failure to observe the law relative to the transactions in question, and whose negligence or failure to observe the law proximately contributed to the loss, or, in other words, that enabled the impostor to gain $400 by the transaction. It seems to the court that this *194question is certainly and conclusively answered by 'saying and bolding that the negligence or failure of the appellant bank to observe the law resulted in the impostor gaining and obtaining the $400; in other words, that the negligence or failure of the appellant bank to observe the law directly and proximately resulted in the impostor obtaining the $400. It is the undoubted commercial law of this state that as to a negotiable instrument, and especially a check like the one in question, if not payable to bearer, but to a named person, it is the duty of drawee bank, or any one who buys the same, to procure a genuine indorsement; and the fact that the forged indorsement is the name of a nonexisting person does not afford relief against a noncompliance with the plain legal duty.
It is shown by the agreed statement of facts in this case that the cashier of ap-pellant bank did not know the party who presented the ‘check for payment; did not know whether he was the payee or not; and did not require any identification of him; but paid the cheek upon the statement of said party that he was the payee named in the check, and wrote the name of the impostor, he making his cross mark only, and that the appellant indorsed the check expressly • guaranteeing that indorsement. It is conceded or admitted that the person receiving the money was not the payee named in the check, and that the payee had authorized no one to indorse it for him, and consequently the appellant bank would be liable to the payee if the check had been genuine. In other words, the appellant bank would have to lose the money if the check had been genuine. It is certainly difficult to see how the appellant bank can profit or be saved from loss because the check was in fact a forgery. On the other hand, if the appellee bank had been guilty of no negligence and had discovered the forgery, still the appellant bank would have lost the $400. IVe are unable to see how in law, equity, or justice the fact that appellee bank was guilty of negligence in- failing to discover that the check was a forgery could have the effept to restore to the appellant bank the $400 which it had already lost.
As stated in the original opinion, the orrly possible damages that could have resulted to the appellant was in the failure of appellee bank to promptly notify it of the forgery in order that it might have recovered the money back from the impostor. No such action, however, has been brought. No such action was presented to the trial court, and none has been presented to this court. There is neither claim nor evidence to show that if appellee bank had discovered the forgery as soon as the check was presented, and bad then notified- appellant bank it could have then at that time recovered its money back from the impostor. We cannot see how the fact that the payee of this forged check was a real person and not a fictitious one can distinguish this case from the one of Robinson Banking Co. v. Brasfield, 202 Ala. 167, 79 South. 651. We cannot accede or consent to the argument of appellant which attempts to distinguish these two cases for the reason that the payee of one was fictitious and the payee of the other was real. It was paying without obtaining identification and a genuine indorsement which rendered the payee liable in each case.
The fact, if it be a fact, that the appellee bank informed appellant bank that Albert Findley’s check was good, if drawn on his savings or time deposit, or that they did not so inform them, can make no difference. If the appellee bank is willing to pay Albert Findley’s check for $550 drawn upon it, and it did pay such check, the account upon which it was drawn could make no difference in this case, and can in no wise help the position of the appellant bank.
Application overruled.