Court Opinion

ID: 9446657
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 22:00:40.568683+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:44.092087
License: Public Domain

BIGGS, Chief Judge
(dissenting).
If it be the case — and I agree with the majority that it is — that what the appellant Browne did constituted the solicitation of Atomic Energy Commission contracts within the purview of paragraph 5 of Title II of Executive Order No. 9001, I do not see how the services rendered by Browne can be broken down into two categories: Services for which he can be compensated legally and services for which he cannot because of the Executive Order and the decisional law. Mitchell v. Flintkote Co., 2 Cir., 1951, 185 F.2d 1008.
As I read the record, substantially all of the services rendered by. Browne for which he presently seeks compensation, were rendered by him in attempts to procure Atomic Energy Commission contracts for R & R.
The principle enunciated by the majority seems an unfortunate one for it will be an unusual case where the ingenuity of counsel and the imagination of a plaintiff will not be able to cull out services which, it can be asserted, were not rendered in connection with the solicitation or procurement of a government contract. In my opinion if the majority view prevails the salutary effect of the Executive Order and of the decisions interpreting it will be practically abrogated. For these reasons I must respectfully dissent.