Court Opinion

ID: 9692526
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 15:56:34.394649+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:35.123621
License: Public Domain

Pashman, J.
(dissenting). In this case, the trial judge granted defendants’ motion for judgment at the close of all the evidence, thereby defeating plaintiff’s action based on strict liability in tort. This review is concerned with the propriety of that ruling.
Pursuant to R. 4:40-1, the court must accept as true all the evidence which supports the position of the party (plaintiff herein) defending against the motion and must accord him the benefit of all legitimate inferences which can be deduced therefrom. If reasonable minds could differ, the motion must be denied. Sabloff v. Yamaha Motor Co., Ltd., 113 N. J. Super. 279, 281 (App. Div.), aff’d 59 N. J. 365 (1971); Dolson v. Anastasia, 55 N. J. 2, 5 (1969).
According to the majority’s recitation of claimant’s case, the following factual scenario unfolds. Plaintiff purchased a new station wagon from defendant dealer in July 1968 and had the automobile serviced by the dealer in October 1968 and February 1969, at which time the vehicle had been driven only 2995 miles. After approximately 1,000 additional miles, the bizarre accident occurred resulting in this litigation.
Plaintiff was traveling at about 25 miles per hour in the left northbound lane of a four-lane asphalt roadway. The weather was clear and the road was dry. After going down an incline with his foot on the brake pedal, plaintiff depressed the accelerator approximately 25% of the way to the floor. He was in the process of passing a slower moving vehicle. His car then “took off at an awful pace” and “started to go *602erratic.” The brakes failed to slow the vehicle which achieved a speed of at least 50 to 60 miles per hour. The vehicle swerved from the left northbound lane across both southbound lanes, going partially onto the sidewalk, swerved back across the entire roadway and collided with a telephone pole east of the northbound side of the highway. The vehicle left skidmarks measuring 563 feet.
Plaintiff’s expert witness, Jesse Pisher, advanced a theory of the accident in response to hypothetical questions. He testified as to his familiarity with the type of carburetor on plaintiff’s car and that it has “had a problem.” He did not examine the actual carburetor on plaintiff’s vehicle. The defect alleged in his report was that the plastic fast-idle cam “broke and jammed the carburetor linkage” so that the accelerator remained open. In testifying, Mr. Pisher noted that something “had to go wrong in that acceleration mechanism of that vehicle.” This remark, however, was stricken from the record in limiting Mr. Pisher to the specific theory of defect alleged in his pretrial report. On cross-examination, he testified that the throttle could be jammed open only to the extent that it already was open at the time the cam broke.
The thrust of General Motors’ defense was to show not only that the plastic fast-idle cam was in one piece subsequent to the accident, but also that the cam in plaintiff’s vehicle was original equipment. The owner of Acme Auto Repairs, purchaser of the damaged automobile, testified that there was no repair work on the carburetor, although he did not work on the car himself and did not produce records as to what was done before the car was sold to a John Rittweger. One Lloyd Dimm testified that at this time, he examined the vehicle and found the cam to be in one piece. This cam was subsequently removed from the vehicle and produced in court.
Por our purposes, in reviewing the grant of a motion for judgment, it is of no significance that the answers to plaintiff’s hypothetical questions may have been refutted by defendants’ expert. Before either Mr. Pisher or Mr. Dimm testified, the court instructed the jury that the weight and credibility *603to be given their testimony remained with the jury. As this Court specifically pointed out in affirming Sablof, supra, so long as “the facts permit an inference that the harmful event ensued from some defect (whether identifiable or not) in the product, the issue of liability is for the jury, and the plaintiff is not necessarily confined to the explanation his expert may advance.” 59 N. J. at 366. That plaintiff herein advanced a theory refuted by defendants does not preclude him from having a jury pass upon his claim if the facts and all legitimate and reasonable deductions therefrom may still allow reasonable men to differ. That is why we reversed the trial judge who took the ease from the jury on a motion under R. 4:40-1 and ordered a new trial in Sablof.
The majority notes that the Court “did not grant certification to decide this case upon such a narrow issue” as to whether Sabloff, supra, came too late for plaintiff’s benefit, having been decided six weeks after the trial below. They then proceed to do just that by binding plaintiff to his expert’s explanation of the accident under the guise that plaintiff “undertook voluntarily to confine himself.”
The facts as set forth by plaintiff and the majority include a vehicle being subjected to sudden uncontrolled acceleration, ineffective heavy braking, and uncontradicted evidence of extensive skid marks. The majority points out various shortcomings in plaintiff’s case: the vehicle had been driven 4,000 miles; plaintiff may not have had exclusive control of vehicle maintenance in that his wife was the principal driver; plaintiff admittedly could not testify as to whether his wife had ever had the carburetor adjusted; and plaintiff did not negate other possibilities for causes of the accident. While these factors may partially undermine the inferences which reasonable men may draw from the behavior of the car and the skid marks, they do not serve to deprive plaintiff of a jury determination. The majority took these facts and inferences together with the experts’ testimony and concluded that plaintiff’s theory “was so destroyed by the end of the case as to leave nothing to go to the jury.” This was an unwarranted *604factual finding on the part of the trial judge and the majority.
Our concern is not the ultimate conclusion to which each of us may come after reviewing plaintiff’s factual proofs to show the elements of a strict liability action. That the absence of the wife’s testimony could be considered “fatal to plaintiff’s case” or that plaintiff could have subpoenaed service station records, indicates what plaintiff might have done differently to make a stronger case, but are irrelevant in deciding whether or not the case goes to the jury. It is not for this Court to decide how a case could be more convincingly presented. Our focus in considering a motion for judgment pursuant to R. 4:40-1 by defendants herein is essentially whether plaintiff’s position and all reasonable inferences therefrom allow reasonable men to differ. I strongly believe there is a substantial area of difference. It is the jury which passes on what “human experience tells us” as to why an accident such as this occurred, given whatever ambiguities and gaps exist in a plaintiffs case. That defendant’s case is stronger or that plaintiff’s case is inconclusive or, at best, weak, does not justify taking a case from the jury.
On one hand the majority states that an automobile “is not a simple uncomplicated instrumentality.” Yet this very complexity then serves as the majority’s basis for requiring plaintiff consumer to outline other possible causes of the accident. The more liberal and modern view of finding liability in favor of a purchaser of a mass-produced article who is injured in its use, Sabloff, supra, 113 N. J. Super, at 287, is incompatible with an assertion that given the complexity of the product, it is the consumer who must “outline the various possible mechanical causes for the accident.” This Court’s holding in Sabloff is to the contrary.
In a strict liability action, plaintiff must show that the defect or dangerous condition originated when the instrumentality was in the manufacturer’s control. This can be accomplished by direct evidence that the product is defective because of a manufacturing flaw, or by other evidence per*605mitting such an inference, or by negating other causes of product failure. Jakubowski v. Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co., 42 N. J. 177, 184 (1964). We are not faced here with merely the happening of an accident. Sudden uncontrolled acceleration followed by heavy brake application and 563 feet of skid marks surpass “mere surmise or conjecture.” Jakubowski, supra at 182. These undisputed facts are consistent with a product defect and more than sufficient to support a finding by a Jury in strict liability. There is ample evidence permitting an inference that a dangerous condition existed prior to sale, while the automobile was under the manufacturer’s control. Plaintiff need not negate other possible causes of the accident, even though doing such would strengthen his position. Oases are not taken from Juries because they could have been more forcefully presented. Weakness in plaintiff’s ease and factors favorable to the defense are for the Jury to evaluate as to weight and credibility.
Many years passed before courts held the manufacturer strictly liable for his product thereby relieving a plaintiff from the necessity of proving negligence in the making of that product. Realizing that the leverage of the automobile manufacturers on the consumer was enormous, this Court ushered in the era of protection to the public against the manufacture and sale of defective products. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N. J. 358 (1960). Two and one-half years after taking such an additional timely step forward in Sabloff, this Court should continue in its support of the liberal and modern view favoring a Jury trial for a purchaser injured in the use of a mass-produced article.
I would affirm the Judgment of the Appellate Division and order a new trial.
For reversal — Chief Justice Hushes and Justices Jacobs, Sullivan' and Clifford — 4.
For affirmance — Justice Pashman — 1.