Court Opinion

ID: 9485949
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 11:34:23.567529+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:27.453875
License: Public Domain

ALARCON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The majority has decided that the district court did not err in concluding that the totality of the circumstances did not justify a warrantless entry and search of Gooch’s tent based upon exigent circumstances requiring immediate action to protect the officers from harm. I cannot join in their opinion because the district court erroneously found that the officers were told prior to the entry that Gooch was asleep. The majority, while conceding that this finding was clearly erroneous, has failed to discuss the impact of this error regarding an essential fact on the district court’s conclusion that there were no exigent circumstances. Without a remand, this court cannot determine whether, when informed of its error, the district court would reverse its determination that there were no exigent circumstances, especially in light of the fact that it stated that the issue of exigent circumstances created a “difficult question” for the court.
I.
To appreciate the gravity of the district court’s factual error, it is necessary to consider the totality of circumstances known to the officers. At approximately 4:00 a.m. on July 29, 1990, Stevens County Sheriffs Deputies Ted Campbell and Ed Burns responded to a call from a man claiming to have been shot at the State of Washington Department of Natural Resources (“DNR”) campground on Long Lake. While proceeding to the campground, the deputies encountered an automobile. The occupants of the car informed the deputies that Ken Gooch was “hurting people” at the DNR campground on Long Lake. The occupants also indicated that shots had been fired, but did not inform the deputies that Gooch fired the shots. While proceeding to the campground, the deputies encountered Marc Cole walking alongside the road. Mr. Cole stated that Gooch fired shots in his direction after they engaged in a family dispute. These events occurred between midnight and 2:00 a.m.
*681Deputies Campbell and Burns arrived at the campground at around .5:00 a.m., where they were subsequently joined by Deputy Steve Bruchman and a reserve deputy. Without a warrant, the deputies ordered Gooch from his tent. Gooch was searched and placed under arrest. After placing Gooch in a patrol ear, the deputies ordered Mary Baker, Gooch’s companion, from the tent. Approximately fifteen minutes later, the deputies conducted a warrantless search of the tent and located a loaded handgun under a mattress.
II.
The district court found that upon arriving at the campground the deputies determined that Gooch was sleeping in his tent. During oral argument, we requested that counsel for Gooch file a supplemental brief indicating the portion of the record that supported this finding.
In his supplemental brief, Gooch asserts that the record shows that Sergeant Burns spoke with a pedestrian along the roadside on his way to the campground. According to Gooch, the pedestrian informed Sergeant Burns that Gooch was sleeping in the tent he shared with his girlfriend. Gooch acknowledges, that Sergeant Burns did not testify, but explains that Deputies Campbell and Bruchman testified that Sergeant Burns had been informed that Gooch was asleep. Counsel for Gooch has misrepresented the evidence produced in the trial court. The record does not support the district court’s finding that any of the officers were informed prior to the search that Gooch was asleep.
I agree with the majority that the district court’s finding was clearly erroneous. After acknowledging the district court’s error in footnote 1, the majority proceeds to make its own findings regarding whether exigent circumstances justified the search for the handgun without discussing whether the district court’s clearly erroneous understanding of the facts caused it to grant the motion. Therefore, I assume that the majority has made a finding that it didn’t matter what the officers were told regarding whether Gooch was asleep. This determination invades the province of the district court, which has the responsibility to determine factual matters.
III.
Rule 12(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which governs motions to suppress, requires that “[wjhere factual issues are involved in determining a motion, the [district] court shall state its essential findings on the record.” While Rule 12(é) does not address the precise issue presented here, i.e., what remedy is available to the Government when the district court has made a clearly erroneous finding on a material issue, clearly the drafters of Rule 12(e) assumed that the district court would make accurate factual determinations. A contrary conclusion would impute to Congress an intent to enact an absurd rule. We would be required to hold that Rule 12(e) is satisfied if findings are madé by the trial court, regardless of the fact that there is no evidence in the record to support them.
I would hold that if a reviewing court determines that the district court has made a clearly erroneous factual determination on a material issue, a remand is required for further factual findings that reflect on the true state of the record. The district court must determine, in the first instance, whether the fact that the officers did not know whether Gooch was asleep before they ordered him out of the tent was a factor in persuading them that it was necessary to locate his firearm immediately to protect themselves and others at the campground from lethal force.
My conclusion that this court cannot substitute itself for the trial court in weighing the effect of the true circumstances relied upon by the officers in believing that exigent circumstances required a warrantless search is supported by the Supreme Court’s analysis in Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 108 S.Ct. 2529, 101 L.Ed.2d 472 (1988). In Murray, federal law enforcement agents conducted a warrantless entry into a Boston warehouse where they observed bales of marijuana. Id. at 535, 108 S.Ct. at 2532. The agents placed the warehouse under surveillance and applied for a search warrant, without informing the magistrate of the ini*682tial entry or the marijuana they observed. Id. at 535-36, 108 S.Ct. at 2532. At issue was whether the second search was truly independent from the initial warrantless search. Id. at 542, 108 S.Ct. at 2535. The district court denied the motion and the appellate court affirmed, concluding that it was “absolutely certain that the warrantless entry in no way contributed in the slightest either to the issuance of a warrant or to the discovery of the evidence during the lawful search that occurred pursuant to the warrant.” Id. at 542-43, 108 S.Ct. at 2536.
The Supreme Court determined that the record did not support the Court of Appeals’ findings on the application of the independent source doctrine and remanded for further factual findings on the contested issue. Id. at 543-44, 108 S.Ct. at 2536. The Court concluded that “it is the function of the District Court rather than the Court of Appeals to determine the facts.” Id. at 543, 108 S.Ct. at 2536. In a case such as this, where the district court has made erroneous factual findings, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the district court and make a factual finding that the totality of the circumstances did not establish exigent circumstances justifying the warrantless search of Gooch’s tent and the seizure of his firearm.
We have previously relied on Murray in determining that Rule 12(e) requires the district court to make essential findings of fact when ruling upon a motion to suppress. See United States v. Prieto-Villa, 910 F.2d 601 (9th Cir.1990). In Prieto-Villa, the defendant was arrested while the police searched a co-defendant’s apartment in the process of investigating a drug conspiracy. Id. at 602. Prieto filed a pre-trial motion to suppress the introduction of cocaine and post-arrest statements made to the police. Id. at 603. The district court denied his motion but failed to make sufficient factual findings to permit appellate review. Id. at 605-06. We held that Rule 12(e) required the district court to make appropriate factual findings and remanded for the development of an adequate record. Id. at 607. In determining that Rule 12(e) imposed a mandatory requirement on the district court, we cited Murray for the proposition that the district court, and not the appellate court, is responsible for making factual findings. Id. at 608-610.
I believe it is particularly important that we remand this matter to the district court to rectify its unsupportive finding, because of the consequences of the district court’s clear error. We have previously noted that a suppression hearing is “often as important as the trial itself.” Prieto-Villa, 910 F.2d at 609 (quoting Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 2215, 81 L.Ed.2d 31 (1984)). This observation is particularly important in this case, as the Government has conceded that it would be unable to sustain its burden of proof in the absence of the physical evidence seized from Gooch’s tent. In light of the fact that the district court stated that whether the facts in this case demonstrated a “difficult question,” the district court resolved that question against the Government based on an erroneous factual finding. A remand is mandatory under the Supreme Court’s decision in Murray, and the law of this circuit as explained in Prieto-Villa.
IV.
The Government has also raised serious questions concerning Gooch’s alleged violations of numerous Washington state regulations prohibiting the use of campground property primarily for residential purposes. The Government cites California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 106 S.Ct. 1809, 90 L.Ed.2d 210 (1985) for the proposition that a person must have a legitimate expectation of privacy to invoke the protection of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 211, 106 S.Ct. at 1811. If these regulations were indeed violated, Gooch may not be able to demonstrate that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his tent. The Government, however, failed to raise this argument before the district court. Under the law of this circuit, “[ijssues not presented to the trial court cannot generally be raised for the first time on appeal.” United States v. Flores-Payon, 942 F.2d 556, 558 (8th Cir.1991). Because I believe the Supreme Court’s decision in Murray requires that we remand this ease to the district court, the question whether Gooch had a legitimate expectation of privacy in a tent used as a *683residence in violation of Washington law should be resolved in the district court.