Court Opinion

ID: 9370306
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-12 15:07:37.263565+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:20.999181
License: Public Domain

Supreme Court of Texas
                             ══════════
                              No. 21-0643
                             ══════════

   Virendra Patel, Premier West Hospitality Corp., Zeal Hotels
     Group LLC, The Colony Hospitality Corp., and Huntley
                       Construction, LLC,
                               Petitioners,

                                     v.

                       Nations Renovations, LLC,
                               Respondent

   ═══════════════════════════════════════
               On Petition for Review from the
       Court of Appeals for the Second District of Texas
   ═══════════════════════════════════════

                              PER CURIAM

        Justice Lehrmann did not participate in this decision.

        Final judgments necessarily resolve all claims for all parties to a
case.    Multiple jurisdictional consequences follow from whether a
judgment is final. For one thing, a final judgment starts the clock for
when a trial court loses its plenary power—its jurisdiction to revise its
judgment or, with some exceptions, see, e.g., TEX. R. APP. P. 24.3, to take
any other actions in the case. This mandamus proceeding1 concerns
whether a judgment that described itself as final really was final. We
hold that it was. Therefore, the district court’s plenary power had long
expired before it undertook to revise its final judgment, and the order
modifying the judgment was void. We conditionally grant mandamus
relief directing the district court to withdraw that order.
       This case arises from a construction-project dispute involving a
hotel, but the underlying facts are largely immaterial. All that matters
for present purposes is that the parties agreed to and did resolve their
complicated dispute via arbitration. Specifically, the Colony Hospitality
Corporation (CHC), one of the relators in this Court, is a property-
holding company that had a construction project on a hotel. CHC hired
Huntley Construction—another relator—as a general contractor, and
Huntley hired real party in interest Nations Renovations, LLC as a
subcontractor. A dispute arose between Nations, CHC, and Huntley
regarding the extent and quality of the work that was performed.
       Nations filed two lawsuits—one in Dallas County and the other
in Denton County. Rather than litigate in multiple forums, Nations,
Huntley, and CHC broadly submitted “all claims, controversies, and
demands by and between them arising out of and related to the disputes
set forth in the Litigation to binding arbitration.” The parties agreed
that the “Award rendered by the Arbitrator is final and binding and
shall be subject to entry of judgment by a court having jurisdiction to

       1 Relators filed a petition for review that requested mandamus relief as
an alternative. We refer to “petitioners” as relators and to the “respondent” as
the real party in interest.

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enter judgment.” The Denton County lawsuit became the vehicle for
that judgment; the Dallas County lawsuit was non-suited.
      The arbitrator issued a final arbitration award in January 2019,
describing it as a “full and final settlement of all claims submitted to
this arbitration.” Nations was awarded $85,000 against Huntley, and
CHC was awarded $10,000 in attorney’s fees. As a result, Nations
sought $75,000 from Huntley.
      On February 22, 2019, before the district court entered its
judgment confirming the award, Nations added Virendra Patel and Zeal
Hotels Group as additional defendants. Nations alleged that Zeal, CHC,
and Patel were alter egos of Huntley and asserted vicarious-liability
claims against the parties for fraudulent transfer and sham to
perpetrate a fraud, based on transactions Nations discovered after the
close of evidence.
      On April 5, 2019, at Nations’ request, the district court entered
its judgment confirming the arbitration award. The judgment stated:
      IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
      DECREED that the Award is hereby confirmed, and
      Nations, Huntley, and CHC are therefore bound by the
      terms therein[,] . . . that Nations have all writs and
      processes to aid in execution of this judgment[,] . . . that all
      relief not granted herein is denied[,] . . . [and] that this is a
      final judgment and appealable.
This language was drafted by Nations, which moved for entry of
judgment.2 To minimize confusion, we refer to this judgment as the
“Judgment.”

      2 Twelve days later, on April 17, 2019, Nations added Premier West
Hospitality Corporation as yet another defendant. Nations further added a

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       Approximately a year and a half later, on October 22, 2020,
Nations moved the district court to modify the Judgment to clarify that
it was not truly a “final judgment” but was merely interlocutory.
Nations asserted that the Judgment’s language relating to finality
referred only to the judgment against Huntley. On January 21, 2021,
unsure of whether the Judgment was, in fact, final, the district court
hesitantly granted Nations’ motion and modified the Judgment to reflect
that it was interlocutory. Because of its doubt that it had jurisdiction to
act, the district court sua sponte certified the question for interlocutory
appeal. Both parties agreed that the court of appeals should address
this jurisdictional question, but the court of appeals refused to do so.
2021 WL 2461798, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 17, 2021).
       We therefore proceed to our analysis of whether the Judgment is
final. By definition, a final judgment must dispose of all parties and all
claims in the underlying case. The parties dispute the applicability of
“[t]he presumption that a judgment rendered after a conventional trial
on the merits is final and appealable.” Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39
S.W.3d 191, 199 (Tex. 2001).        The judgment here was not one on
technical grounds, like a plea to the jurisdiction, a default, a summary
judgment, or the like. See id. at 199-200. It was an arbitration on the
merits with proceedings that substituted for those a court would have
held but for the arbitration agreement. This Court, however, has not
previously addressed whether such an arbitration proceeding in a

conspiracy claim regarding the alleged fraudulent transfers—stating that
Zeal, CHC, Premier, and Patel were jointly and severally liable for the amount
set forth in the arbitration award against Huntley.

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context like this one would implicate the presumption of finality. We
need not resolve that question today, either, because regardless of how
we might answer it, finality can be and is established in other ways.3
Solely for argument’s sake, therefore, we assume that this Judgment did
not follow a comprehensive arbitration equivalent to a conventional trial
on the merits.
       Specifically, courts will deem a judgment without a trial to be
final “(1) [when the judgment] actually disposes of every pending claim
and party or (2) [when] it clearly and unequivocally states that it finally
disposes of all claims and parties, even if it does not actually do so.” In
re Guardianship of Jones, 629 S.W.3d 921, 924 (Tex. 2021) (citing
Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 205). If the judgment clearly and unequivocally
states that it finally disposes of all claims and parties, the assessment
is resolved in favor of finding finality, and the reviewing court cannot
review the record.      In re Elizondo, 544 S.W.3d 824, 827 (Tex. 2018).4
Therefore, we begin by determining whether the Judgment is clearly
and unequivocally final on its face.

       3   Relators argue that the parties agreed to a final and binding
arbitration of “all claims, controversies, and demands by and between them
arising out of and related to the disputes set forth in the Litigation,” so the
district court’s confirmation of that final arbitration award satisfies the
Lehmann presumption. Nations argues that the secondary claims—those that
were added after the conclusion of the arbitration—prevent a presumption of
finality from applying in this case because, it contends, the Judgment did not
and could not address those claims. We need not resolve any of the embedded
questions presented by this aspect of the parties’ dispute given our resolution
on other grounds.
       4“[R]eviewing courts . . . look at the record only if the order [i]s not clear
and unequivocal.” Elizondo, 544 S.W.3d at 827 (internal quotation marks
omitted).

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       This   Court’s   jurisprudence   contains   many    examples     of
statements that, standing alone, cannot satisfy the clear-and-
unequivocal standard. On its own, merely stating that the order is
“final” is not enough. Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 203-05. Stating that the
order is “appealable” is also not enough when standing alone.          Id.
Including a Mother Hubbard clause that “all relief not granted is denied”
is not enough by itself. Id. at 203-04. To determine what are sufficient
indicia of finality, the Court opined that “there must be some other clear
indication that the trial court intended the order to completely dispose
of the entire case.” Id. at 205. The question then becomes how this
“clear indication” standard can be satisfied.
       As we have made clear, no magic language is required. Bella
Palma, LLC v. Young, 601 S.W.3d 799, 801 (Tex. 2020). Instead, “a trial
court may express its intent to render a final judgment by describing its
action as (1) final, (2) a disposition of all claims and parties, and
(3) appealable.”   Id. (citing In re R.R.K., 590 S.W.3d 535, 543 (Tex.
2019)). This standard provides an outline of several statements that,
while insufficient when standing alone, together form a clear indication
of finality. The Judgment in this case provides a similar combination of
statements.
       Several statements listed in the Judgment constitute indicia of
finality.   And while we agree that each statement alone would not
necessarily be enough, together they must be. Without a doubt, the
Judgment lists two of the three finality statements referenced above:
that the judgment is “final” and that the judgment is “appealable.” The
Judgment does not explicitly include the third statement—that all

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claims and parties are disposed of—but provides two additional
statements that compensate for any lack of that precise formulation:
“that Nations have all writs and processes to aid in execution of this
judgment” and “that all relief not granted herein is denied.” Together,
these statements provide the basis for determining that the Judgment
did effectively convey that all claims and parties are disposed of. To hold
otherwise would require the very magic words that we disclaim in
undertaking an analysis of finality. These four statements clearly and
unequivocally express that the Judgment was final.
       Further, nothing supports the claim that the single Judgment
could have been “final” as to some parties and interlocutory as to others.
A judgment cannot be “partially final” or “sometimes final and
sometimes not.”      Chaos would follow from such a rule, in which a
supposed final judgment in a single case turns out, years later, to have
been interlocutory all along. That would be the consequence if the
judgment was final as to some parties or some claims. The judgment is
either final or it is not.
       We emphasize that we do not charge Nations with making
improper arguments or with any subjective intent to violate the
integrity of the judicial process. Quite the contrary. We hold only that
the Judgment rendered was clearly and unequivocally final. Whether it
was error to render a final judgment is of no consequence because
Nations did not appeal the Judgment within the statutory timeframe.
Given that Nations prepared the Judgment, this is unsurprising—but
also makes it less justifiable to depart from our normal rules even if we

                                    7
were so inclined.5 “If the order contains a ‘clear and unequivocal’ finality
phrase disposing of the entire case, the order is final, and the failure to
actually dispose of all claims and parties renders the order erroneous
but not interlocutory.” Jones, 629 S.W.3d at 924.
       As we have stated before, “[a] party who is uncertain whether a
judgment is final must err on the side of appealing or risk losing the
right to appeal.” Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 196. Nations’ delayed motion
for modification of the Judgment “request[ed] that the Court . . . clarify
and confirm that it is an interlocutory judgment and d[id] not dispose of
the entire case.” But the time to request clarity had long passed. “Even
if [Nations] disagreed that the order was final, [it] should have treated
it as though it was.” Elizondo, 544 S.W.3d at 827.
       Accordingly, without hearing oral argument, TEX. R. APP. P.
52.8(c), we treat the petition for review as a petition for writ of
mandamus, see CMH Homes v. Perez, 340 S.W.3d 444, 453-54 (Tex.
2011), and conditionally grant the petition. The order granting the
motion to modify the Judgment is void, and we direct the district court

       5  Relators also assert that we could reach the same bottom line by
holding that, whether the Judgment was in fact final or not, Nations is
judicially estopped from contesting its finality. This argument relies on a
multitude of representations that Nations has made throughout the course of
these proceedings in which it received relief (like a post-judgment writ of
garnishment without bond) that was available only based on its assurance that
the Judgment was in fact final. The doctrine of “[j]udicial estoppel precludes
a party who successfully maintains a position in one proceeding from
afterwards adopting a clearly inconsistent position in another proceeding to
obtain an unfair advantage.” Ferguson v. Bldg. Materials Corp. of Am., 295
S.W.3d 642, 643 (Tex. 2009). Because we hold that the Judgment was final,
we need not assess the applicability of judicial estoppel (or any other doctrine)
that would lead to the same effective outcome.

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to withdraw it. The writ will issue only if the district court does not
comply.

OPINION DELIVERED: February 10, 2023

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