Court Opinion

ID: 9777056
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:53:04.135939+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:46.809190
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON STATE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
TOM G. DAVIS, Judge.
On original submission, reversal resulted (1) for failure of the trial judge to substantially comply with the requirements of Art. 26.13, V.A.C.C.P. and (2) the failure of the record to “reflect an affirmative showing that the guilty plea was intelligently and voluntarily given” as required by Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). We granted the State’s *458motion for leave to file a motion for rehearing and now conclude that substantial compliance with Art. 26.13, supra, is shown, and that appellant was not deprived of any federal constitutional right Under Boykin v. Alabama, supra.
The record reflects appellant was admonished in pertinent part as follows:
“You understand that you have a right to be tried by a Jury and be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, do you understand that?
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
“THE COURT: By your plea now, you have made an admission of guilt, and if you insist on pleading guilty the Court is going to instruct the Jury to find you guilty and assess a punishment accordingly, do you understand that?
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
“THE COURT: All right.
“You understand that the law is that you do not have to testify against yourself, but if you do take the stand that’s a decision between you and your attorney? “THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
“THE COURT: Have you been promised anything to cause you to make this plea? “THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
“THE COURT: All right.
“Then, do you understand the punishment, during the voir dire examination awhile ago the attorneys talked about the range of punishment being two years to twenty years in the State Penitentiary, together with a $10,000.00 fine, either one or both of them, do you understand that? “THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.”
Article 26.13, supra, in effect at the time of appellant’s plea, reads as follows:
“(a) Prior to accepting a plea of guilty or a plea of nolo contendere, the court shall admonish the defendant of:
(1) the range of punishment attached to the offense; and
(2) the fact that the recommendation of the prosecuting attorney as to punishment is not binding on the court. .
“(b) No plea of guilty or plea of nolo contendere shall be accepted by the court unless it appears that the defendant is mentally competent and the plea is free and voluntary.
“(c) In admonishing the defendant as herein provided, substantial compliance by the court is sufficient, unless the defendant affirmatively shows that he was not aware of the consequences of his plea and that he was misled or harmed by the admonishment of the court. (Acts 1975, 64th Leg., p. 909, ch. 341, § 3, eff. June 19, 1975.)”1
Appellant does not suggest that he was misled in any way or that he was not fully aware of the consequences of the plea or that he was harmed in any manner by the admonishment given by the court. An examination of the record reflects that no such objection was voiced in the trial court. There is no suggestion on appeal that the plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made. Rather, counsel argues that the inquiry “Have you been promised anything to cause you to make this plea?” failed to track the language formerly found in Art. 26.13, V.A.C.C.P.
We cannot agree that there must be an express inquiry as to whether a defendant is freely and voluntarily entering a plea of guilty to constitute substantial compliance with Art. 26.13, supra. There being no showing that appellant was misled or harmed by the admonishment, and finding that the trial court was in substantial compliance with the requirements of Art. 26.13, supra, we conclude that no error is shown. See Pinson v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 530 S.W.2d 946; Guster v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 522 S.W.2d 494; Tellez v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 522 S.W.2d 500.
Further, we find no constitutional problem as in Boykin v. Alabama, supra, where *459it was held that a state trial judge should not accept a plea of guilty without an affirmative showing that a plea of guilty was intelligently and voluntarily given.
In Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970), the Supreme Court set forth the standard used to determine if a guilty plea were voluntarily and knowingly made as follows:
“The standard as to the voluntariness of guilty pleas must be essentially that defined by Judge Tuttle of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit:
‘[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, including the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor’s business . .’ ” (Footnotes omitted.)
In Williams v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 522 S.W.2d 483, we noted with respect to the requirements of Boykin v. Alabama, supra, that:
“The Supreme Court’s requirement for the determination of voluntariness is the consideration of the entire record. The review of the voluntariness of the guilty plea should not be based solely on questions and answers in the statement of facts, but on the record as a whole.”
We find that the record here meets the requirements of Boykin v. Alabama, supra.
Lastly, appellant contends that the court erred in receiving a fatally defective jury verdict which assessed no punishment.
The verdict form, as it was submitted to the jury, reads in pertinent part:
“We the jury ... do hereby assess his punishment at _ years in the Texas Department of Corrections and in addition to such imprisonment assess a fine of $_
Foreman of the Jury”
The jury wrote the number “15” in the blank space before years and the verdict was signed by the foreman. Appellant appears to argue that the jury should have written the word “years” after “15.” The intention of the jury can be easily ascertained and we reject appellant’s contention that the verdict was defective. See Ainsworth v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 517 S.W.2d 274.
The State’s motion for rehearing is granted. The judgment is affirmed.
Before the court en banc.
YOLLER, J., not participating.

. As noted in the original opinion, the record reflects that the court admonished the appellant as to his mental competency. Plea of guilty was before a jury and therefore obviates the necessity of admonishing appellant that the prosecuting attorney’s recommendation was not binding on the court.