Court Opinion

ID: 9403367
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-20 22:03:28.124721+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:34.469166
License: Public Domain

Filed 6/20/23 Kramer v. Accuride Internat. CA2/4
             NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
 opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This
 opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).

    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
               SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                      DIVISION FOUR

 ANN MARIE KRAMER,                                                  B320283
        Plaintiff and Appellant,                                    (Los Angeles County
        v.                                                          Super. Ct. No. VC066075)

 ACCURIDE INTERNATIONAL,

      Defendant and Respondent.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Olivia Rosales, Judge. Affirmed.
     Pearman Law Corporation, Kim H. Pearman and Garo
Hagopian for Plaintiff and Appellant.
     CE Smith Law Firm and Clifton E. Smith for Defendant
and Respondent.
                       INTRODUCTION

      Ann Marie Kramer’s complaint was dismissed without
prejudice for failure to appear in the action. After an unexplained
delay of almost three years, Kramer moved to set aside the
dismissal. The trial court denied that motion. Kramer then
moved for reconsideration, and the court denied that motion as
well. Her sole argument on appeal is the trial court abused its
discretion by denying her motion for reconsideration of the order
denying her motion to set aside the dismissal of her complaint
without prejudice. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      On January 20, 2017, Kramer filed a complaint for
wrongful termination against Accuride International (Accuride).
On January 11, 2019, the court issued a minute order dismissing
the action without prejudice based on Kramer’s failure to appear,
without good cause, at the hearing on the court’s order to show
cause regarding dismissal.
      Almost three years later, on October 29, 2021, Kramer
moved to set aside the dismissal without prejudice.1 In support of
the motion, Kramer’s counsel declared that in 2018, his wife died
of cancer and he was battling his own health issues, including the
removal of his gall bladder. He further declared, however, that
during this time, he “still maintained his law offices and his staff
but he had to retain outside counsel to make appearances for him

1     Kramer also filed a motion to set aside the dismissal
without prejudice a few months earlier on June 30, 2021, but
according to Accuride, Kramer withdrew the motion without
explanation.

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and help with his calendar” and “[f]or some reason this matter
was not calendared by [his] employees and was not scheduled in
[his] calendar.” Accuride opposed the motion, arguing the motion
was untimely under Code of Civil Procedure section 473,
subdivision (b), because it was filed more than six months after
the dismissal was entered.2 Alternatively, Accuride argued the
motion should be denied because Kramer failed to show
excusable neglect for her failure to appear for nearly three years.
       Following a hearing on the motion, the trial court denied
Kramer’s motion to set aside the dismissal, concluding the motion
was time-barred: “The [m]otion is untimely under [section] 473,
[subdivision] (b). The dismissal was entered on January 22, 2019.
This [m]otion was filed well beyond six months of that date.”
       Kramer then filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial
court’s order denying her motion to set aside the dismissal under
section 1008.3 Kramer argued, for the first time, that although
she filed the motion to set aside the dismissal more than six

2      All further undesignated references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure. Section 473, subdivision (b), provides, in relevant
part: “The court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a
party or his or her legal representative from a judgment,
dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her
through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect. Application for this relief shall be accompanied by a copy
of the answer or other pleading proposed to be filed therein,
otherwise the application shall not be granted, and shall be made
within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after
the judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding was taken.”

3     Section 1008, subdivision (a), provides, in relevant part: An
application for reconsideration of a prior order must be based on
“new or different facts, circumstances, or law.”

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months after dismissal was entered, the trial court should have
granted relief on equitable grounds, specifically “extrinsic
mistake.” She argued the “extrinsic mistake” was her counsel’s
excusable neglect. Kramer’s counsel attached a declaration,
which again explained his medical issues in 2017 and 2018 (like
his previous declaration), and also included a description of his
hospitalizations in 2019 for gastrointestinal problems, and stated
he had been battling cancer since 2009. He again declared,
however, that he still maintained his law office and staff, and
retained outside counsel to make appearances and help with his
calendar, but “[f]or some reason this matter had not been
scheduled in the calendar.” Kramer also attached a declaration of
her counsel’s treating physician, who declared he had been
treating Kramer’s counsel for cancer and the “treatment will
require some absences from his practice.”
      The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration,
finding Kramer “failed to establish any ‘new or different facts,
circumstances, or law.’ [Citation.] Relief from default pursuant to
equitable grounds is not new law, and could have been made in
the prior motion.” The trial court further stated that “even if
reconsidered, the motion would be denied.”
      On March 30, 2022, Kramer filed a notice of appeal from
“the Judgment of March 1, 2022, which was entered on March 1,
2022.”

                          DISCUSSION

A.    Appealability
      Kramer’s notice of appeal purports to appeal from “the
Judgment of March 1, 2022, which was entered on March 1,
2022.” The only document in the record issued on March 1, 2022,
however, is the trial court’s order denying Kramer’s motion for

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reconsideration. The order denying the motion for reconsideration
is not an appealable order. (Reese v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (1999)
73 Cal.App.4th 1225, 1242.) The order denying the motion to set
aside the dismissal, however, is appealable. (See Generale Bank
Nederland v. Eyes of the Beholder Ltd. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th
1384, 1394 [“‘[I]n cases where the law makes express provision
for a motion to vacate such as under . . . section 473, an order
denying such a motion is regarded as a special order made after
final judgment and is appealable under . . . section 9041,
subdivision (b) [see now § 904.1, subd. (a)(2)]’”]; see also § 1008,
subd. (g) [“An order denying a motion for reconsideration made
pursuant to subdivision (a) is not separately appealable.
However, if the order that was the subject of a motion for
reconsideration is appealable, the denial of the motion for
reconsideration is reviewable as part of an appeal from that
order”].)
       “Generally, we must liberally construe a notice of appeal in
favor of its sufficiency. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.100(a)(2),
8.405(a)(3).) A notice of appeal shall be ‘“liberally construed so as
to protect the right of appeal if it is reasonably clear what [the]
appellant was trying to appeal from, and where the respondent
could not possibly have been misled or prejudiced.”’” (In re J.F.
(2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 70, 75, original italics.) Accordingly, we
exercise our discretion to construe the notice of appeal to include
the order denying the motion to set aside the dismissal, and, in so
doing, we review the order denying Kramer’s motion for
reconsideration. (§ 1008, subd. (g).)
       We note an additional issue of appealability that has been
ignored by the parties. The only order of dismissal in the record is
the minute order dated January 11, 2019. There is no signed

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order of dismissal in the record on appeal. (See § 581d [an order
not signed by the trial court does not qualify as a judgment of
dismissal].) Thus, it appears Kramer’s motion to set aside the
dismissal was technically premature in that there was no
judgment yet to set aside. We are not required to dismiss the
appeal, however. The merits of the appeal have been fully briefed
by both parties and no prejudice to Accuride would result from
considering the merits. “Under these circumstances, ‘[to] dismiss
the appeal “merely to have a judgment formally entered below
with a new appeal would be a useless waste of judicial and
litigant time.”’” (Donohue v. State of California (1986) 178
Cal.App.3d 795, 800.) Accordingly, we order the trial court to
enter, nunc pro tunc as of the date of the minute order dismissing
the complaint without prejudice, a signed order of dismissal, and
we construe the notice of appeal to refer to such order. (See ibid.)

B.     The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion
       Turning to the merits of the appeal, Kramer contends the
trial court abused its discretion by denying her motion for
reconsideration of the order denying her motion to set aside the
dismissal because: (1) a trial court may still set aside a dismissal
on equitable grounds even if the motion is untimely under section
473, subdivision (b); and (2) her counsel was unable to obtain a
declaration from his treating doctor regarding his cancer
diagnosis and treatment until after she filed the motion to set
aside the dismissal. We agree with the trial court that neither of
these points constitute new or different law or facts.
       As noted above, a motion for reconsideration of a prior
order under section 1008, subdivision (a), must be based on “new
or different facts, circumstances, or law.” A party seeking

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reconsideration must also provide “a satisfactory explanation for
the previous failure to present the allegedly new or different
evidence or legal authority offered in the second application.”
(Kerns v. CSE Ins. Group (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 368, 383.) Here,
Kramer’s reconsideration motion consisted of a belated legal
argument, i.e., that her motion to set aside the default was timely
(even though it was filed more than six months after the
dismissal) because a trial court may still vacate a default on
equitable grounds even if statutory relief under section 473,
subdivision (b) is unavailable. That a party may seek relief from
default on equitable grounds more than six months after the
dismissal, however, is not new law. (See Rappleyea v. Campbell
(1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 981 [“After six months from entry of
[dismissal], a trial court may still vacate a [dismissal] on
equitable grounds even if statutory relief is unavailable. . . . [¶]
One ground for equitable relief is extrinsic mistake–a term
broadly applied when circumstances extrinsic to the litigation
have unfairly cost a party a hearing on the merits”].) Thus,
Kramer could have, and should have, made the argument in her
original motion to set aside dismissal.4
      Moreover, Kramer failed to establish why she could not
obtain the declaration from her counsel’s treating doctor

4     We agree with the trial court that, even if it were to
consider Kramer’s argument that the motion to set aside
dismissal should have been granted on the ground of extrinsic
mistake, Kramer’s argument fails because neither her motion for
reconsideration nor her motion to set aside the dismissal
demonstrates (or even attempts to demonstrate) that she has a
meritorious case—an element that must be satisfied to set aside a
dismissal based on extrinsic mistake. (See Aldrich v. San
Fernando Valley Lumber Co. (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 725, 738.)

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regarding his cancer diagnosis and treatment at the time of the
motion to set aside the dismissal. Even if she could, however,
nothing in the declaration supports granting the motion for
reconsideration. The motion to set aside the default was still
untimely under section 473, subdivision (b)—the only ground on
which Kramer sought to set aside the dismissal in her original
motion. And, even if the trial court were to consider the
declaration, nothing in it explains Kramer’s failure to appear for
three years. Rather, the declaration merely states that Kramer’s
counsel requires treatment that will “require some absences from
his practice” and he will “not be physically capable of continuing
to practice law full time and needs to make other arrangements
at this time for representation on his cases so that he can
continue to obtain necessary medical treatment.”
       Accordingly, we conclude Kramer failed to make the
showing required to warrant reconsideration, and the trial court
properly denied her motion.

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                           DISPOSITION
       The trial court is directed to enter, nunc pro tunc as of
January 11, 2019, a signed order dismissing the action without
prejudice. That dismissal order is affirmed, as well as the orders
denying Kramer’s motion to set aside the dismissal and motion
for reconsideration. Accuride is awarded its costs on appeal.

    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                             CURREY, Acting P. J.
We concur:

COLLINS, J.

ZUKIN, J.*

*     Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to Article VI, section 6, of the California
Constitution.

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