Court Opinion

ID: 9530405
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:59:33.902033+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:05.912365
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE JONES, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. The defendants in their brief allude to “certain picket line activities” in their attack upon the issuance of the temporary restraining order by the trial court. It is now months following the incident which gave rise to this action and with the view in retrospect it is easy to refer to the incident by the ameliorative expression “certain picket line activities.” But this court must review the case as it was presented to the trial judge through the complaint, the affidavits and the testimony of witnesses. At the time they were considered by the trial judge there was definitely a sense of urgency present. The court was faced with what could have become an explosive and dangerous situation. It was precisely for such situations that section 3 — 1 of the Injunction Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 69, par. 3 — 1) was designed. In express terms it authorizes the issuance of temporary restraining orders, without notice. It is a matter which lies within the broad discretion of the trial court to require or waive notice. (Toushin v. City of Chicago, 23 Ill. App. 3d 797, 320 N.E.2d 202; Gentile v. Wilkins, 8 Ill. App. 3d 413, 290 N.E.2d 672.) It is the function of this court only to review the exercise of discretion by the trial court and we may reverse only when we find that that discretion has been abused. In my opinion there was no abuse of discretion. However, the majority has found that there was, stating that there was a total absence of specific facts indicating that immediate and irreparable injury would result before notice could be given. I believe the majority to be overly technical in its interpretation of the language used. Plaintiff s pleadings allege that mass picketing occurred, that the entrance to plaintiff s premises was blocked and that there was intimidation and threats of violence to plaintiffs employees. It would be difficult to be more precise in presenting the situation by the use of words. Defendants could, and presumably did, understand precisely what was meant by the wording of the order. There would be no prejudice or detriment to defendants by the language used. Particular note should be taken that the temporary restraining order did not enjoin either picketing or striking; defendants’ first amendment rights were carefully and fully protected and the Illinois statute prohibiting the use of injunctions against strikes (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 48, par. 2a) was not violated in any way. The temporary restraining order was directed solely at the intimidation, threatened violence and illegal activity that interfered with the rights of others. There is reflected in the facts of this case the wisdom of the legislature in providing for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, without notice, but at the same time also providing assurance that there be a prompt hearing with adversary participation. Acting upon the information supplied to him the trial judge issued a temporary restraining order, without notice, directed solely at suppressing violent and illegal acts. What appeared to the trial judge to be an explosive situation was thereby defused. Yet, after further adversary hearing, the same judge permitted the temporary restraining order to expire under the terms of the statute without elevating it to a preliminary injunction. Order was maintained. Rights of both parties were protected. Justice prevailed. I would find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the temporary restraining order.