Court Opinion

ID: 9781168
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 16:18:26.734319+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:10:37.314205
License: Public Domain

BLACKWELL, Judge,
dissenting.
The majority announces a new rule today: when a defendant claims that his killing of another was justified, he can testify about an instance in which, he says he believed, his victim had done violence to others as evidence of what the defendant was thinking when he killed the victim, notwithstanding that no competent evidence shows that the victim actually did the things that the defendant testifies about. Although this rule has some logical appeal, existing precedent of our Supreme Court rejects it, and we, therefore, should reject it too. Because the majority does not, I respectfully dissent.
The opinion of the majority conflicts with the decision of our Supreme Court in Hill v. State, 272 Ga. 805 (537 SE2d 75) (2000). In Hill, the defendant shot and killed a man who, the defendant said, appeared to be reaching for a gun. The defendant claimed justification based on self-defense, and in connection with this claim, the defendant sought leave to testify about prior acts of violence by the victim against third persons, arguing that this testimony was relevant to his state of mind at the time he killed the victim. Id. at 807 (3). The trial court disallowed this testimony, and the defendant argued on appeal that the trial court erred when it did so. The Supreme Court held, however, that the defendant’s “hearsay testimony was not competent to establish evidence of [the victim’s] prior violent acts,” and the exclusion of such testimony, therefore, was not error. Id.
The majority pays little attention to Hill, notwithstanding that it is the principal precedent on which the State relies, and I think the cursory discussion of Hill in the majority opinion makes clear that the majority misunderstands it. The majority correctly observes that cases “addressing the procedures and evidence required to establish the victim’s state of mind or character or prior acts or propensity toward violence” — as opposed to those cases involving evidence offered to show the defendant’s state of mind — “do not answer the questions in this case.” But, then, in a footnote, the majority misidentifies Hill as such a case. Hill, the majority says, “did not *52address directly the defendant’s ‘state of mind argument.’ ” But that is precisely the argument that the Supreme Court said it was addressing in Hill: “Hill argues that the trial court erred in refusing to allow him to testify concerning [the victim]’s prior violent acts against third parties, maintaining that his testimony was relevant to his state of mind at the time of the shooting.” Id. at 807 (3). A decision of our Supreme Court deserves more careful consideration than the majority gives Hill.
To my knowledge, the Supreme Court has never overruled or disavowed its decision in Hill,4 and “we are constitutionally bound by the decisions of our own Supreme Court.” Williamson v. Ward, 192 Ga. App. 857, 858 (1) (386 SE2d 727) (1989); see also State v. Smith, 308 Ga. App. 345, 352 (1), n. 21 (707 SE2d 560) (2011). Perhaps Hill is unsound, but that is for the Supreme Court, not this Court, to decide. Hill involved testimony offered by the defendant for the same purpose as the testimony that Hodges offered in this case. Because Hill is not distinguishable from this case, this Court is bound to reject the claim that the court below abused its discretion when it refused to permit Hodges to testify that he had been informed that his victim had shot at two other people.
The refusal of the majority to decide this case consistent with Hill has the potential, of course, to cause confusion in the law.5 A trial judge faced with a similar issue will wonder whether she should follow this decision or the decision of the Supreme Court in Hill. Perhaps our Supreme Court will grant review in this case and resolve the uncertainty the majority has created. If it does not, a trial judge can find the right answer to her question in our Constitution: “The decisions of the Court of Appeals insofar as not in conflict with those of the Supreme Court shall bind all courts except the Supreme Court as precedents.” Ga. Const., Art. VI, Sec. V, Par. Ill (emphasis supplied). Because we ought not, however, create this uncertainty in the first place, I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Ellington joins in this dissent.
*53Decided July 14, 2011
Lee W. Fitzpatrick, for appellant.
Patrick H. Head, District Attorney, Jason R. Samuels, Anna G. Cross, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.

 The Supreme Court recently had an opportunity to disapprove Hill, but it did not do so. See Render v. State, 288 Ga. 420 (704 SE2d 767) (2011).

 Another implication of today’s decision is that defendants now can put prior bad acts of the victim before the jury without satisfying the procedural protections imposed by Chandler v. State, 261 Ga. 402 (405 SE2d 669) (1991), and its progeny, including notice to the prosecution. See, e.g., Render, 288 Ga. at 422 (2) (a); Owens v. State, 270 Ga. 199, 202 (2) (509 SE2d 905) (1998); Laster v. State, 268 Ga. 172, 174 (2) (486 SE2d 153) (1997). Whether we should permit trial of the victim by ambush is something we should leave to the Supreme Court.