Court Opinion

ID: 9795256
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:23:57.691595+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:28:23.883644
License: Public Domain

Nuss, J.:
Concurring. I write separately only to distinguish my analytical path from that of the majority opinion concerning our standard of review for the admission of the photographs. One who did not read the majority opinion’s cited cases might conclude that the standard of review is entirely for abuse of discretion. In my opinion, review for abuse of discretion is the second step along the analytical path. The first step is to review for relevance.
As stated in the majority opinion:
“The defendant argues the district court abused its discretion by admitting seven gruesome and shocking photographs of Ward’s body which graphically showed the impact of the gunshot wounds to her head. He argues that these photographs were repetitious, had no probative value, and did not prove any contested elements of the offense.”
My analysis of these contentions begins with this court’s statement in State v. Meeks, 277 Kan. 609, 618, 88 P.3d 789 (2004):
“Generally, all relevant evidence is admissible. K.S.A. 60-407(f). Relevant evidence is defined as ‘evidence having any tendency in reason to prove any material fact.’ K.S.A. 60-401(b). Where the probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice, even relevant evidence may be excluded by the judge. State v. Dreiling, 274 Kan. 518, 549, 54 P.3d 475 (2002); see also State v. Kingsley, 252 Kan. 761, 770, 851 P.2d 370 (1993) (noting that despite the wording of K.S.A. 60-445, the element of surprise does not get factored into the equation).
“Our standard of review of otherwise relevant evidence which arguably should have been excluded after this particular weighing is abuse of discretion. Kingsley, 252 Kan. at 770. As mentioned, discretion is abused only when no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court; the burden of proof is on the party alleging that the discretion is abused. See Bey, 270 Kan. 546.”
*680This two-step analytical path is recognized and codified in K.S.A. 60-445, discretion of judge to exclude admissible evidence. It states:
“Except as in this article otherwise provided, the judge may in his or her discretion exclude evidence if he or she finds that its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk that its admission will unfairly and harmfully surprise a party who has not had reasonable opportunity to anticipate that such evidence would be offered.”
As noted and as applied by this court in State v. Kingsley, 252 Kan. 761, 770, 851 P.2d 370 (1993), despite the wording of the statute, the element of surprise does not get factored into the equation (citing Comments, 1 Card’s Kansas C. Civ. Proc. 2d Annot. § 60-445 [1979]). Among other times, the trial court also would have discretion to exclude otherwise relevant evidence if it is cumulative or repetitious. See State v. Boyd, 216 Kan. 373, 377-78, 532 P.2d 1064 (1975), as cited by the majority.
Based upon our defendant’s own contentions, the court therefore first must have determined whether the photographs were relevant. I agree with the majority opinion that they were because, among other things, they:
“corroborate the testimony of the officer as to the condition Ward was found and the testimony of the coroner that die victim was shot twice in the head at close range. Further, the photographs were relevant to proving the identity of the shooter, as the defendant told Searcy Üiat he ‘domed the bitch in the head.’ This was an execution style killing because Ward was going to inform the police of the defendant’s drug activities.”
The photographs also were relevant because, according to the majority opinion, they “showed the position in which the body was found, the two separate gunshot wounds, and the stippling effect on Ward’s shoulder and clothing.”
Having found as a threshold matter that the photographs were relevant, this court next must determine whether they should nevertheless have been excluded because they were repetitious or because their probative value was outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. I agree with the majority that, because not more than two photographs of each point depicted were shown to the jury, they were not repetitious. However, the majority did not address *681what, in my view, is the defendant’s remaining argument under the second step. Specifically, we must determine whether the prejudice inherent in the “gruesome and shocking photographs of Ward’s body which graphically showed the impact of the gunshot wounds to her head” substantially outweighed their probative value.
Having examined the photographs, I cannot say that no reasonable person would have taken the view adopted by the trial court. See Meeks, 277 Kan. at 618. Because there was no abuse of discretion, I would, like the majority, therefore affirm the photographs’ admission into evidence.
Beier, J., joins in the foregoing concurring opinion.