Court Opinion

ID: 9371195
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-15 18:03:06.514137+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:26.057198
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/14/23 P. v. Smith CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                     FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

    THE PEOPLE,
                                                                                             F082143
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                               (Super. Ct. No. BF175303A)
                    v.

    NATHAN MIKEL WAYNE SMITH,                                                             OPINION
           Defendant and Appellant.

                                                   THE COURT*
         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Eric Bradshaw,
Judge.
         Gordon B. Scott, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General,
Julie A. Hokans and Galen N. Farris, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-

*        Before Hill, P. J., Levy, J. and Meehan, J.
                                    INTRODUCTION
       Appellant and defendant Nathan Mikel Wayne Smith was convicted by a jury of
two first degree burglaries with persons present in the residence at the time of the
offenses. In his companion case, case No. F081895, defendant was convicted of multiple
counts of possession of a stolen vehicle, felon in possession of a firearm, felon in
possession of ammunition, possession of a concealable firearm while not the registered
owner, carrying a loaded firearm in a public place, and possession of stolen property.
       On appeal, defendant contends the case should be remanded for resentencing in
light of the recent amendment to Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b),1 which
generally mandates the middle term as the presumptive sentence for a term of
imprisonment unless certain circumstances, other than a prior conviction, have been
stipulated to or found true beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant also requests that this
court review the trial court’s Pitchess2 motion ruling to determine whether the trial court
abused its discretion by declining to disclose any records. The People agree that the case
should be remanded for the trial court to conduct a resentencing hearing consistent with
section 1170, subdivision (b), as amended, and they also agree that this court can
independently review the sealed materials in connection with defendant’s Pitchess
motion.
                              FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Prosecution Evidence
       On December 24, 2018, Joseph M. was awakened by his wife, April M., at
approximately 5:00 a.m. Joseph rolled out of bed and grabbed a firearm after he
observed a flashlight shining into their bedroom. Joseph walked to the garage attached to
his residence and found the main garage door and side door were both open. The main

1      Further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.
2      Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531.

                                             2.
residence and garage were both described as a “mess,” and Joseph noticed he was
missing his mountain bike, tools, and a locked case containing ammunition. April stayed
in the bedroom and dialed “911” while Joseph looked throughout the residence. Joseph
later confirmed that some of his missing property was recovered by law enforcement.
       Later that same morning, L.L. was contacted by Bakersfield Police Officers
Timothy McIrvin and Justin Garcia. The officers showed L.L. an audio system for a
television that was normally kept in L.L.’s garage. L.L. noticed that his garage door was
open when the officers arrived, but he recalled closing the garage door prior to going to
bed. McIrvin found the audio system outside of Joseph and April’s residence, and he
also found Joseph and April’s locked ammunition case in the driveway of another home.
       The officers continued to circulate the area after returning the recovered property
to L.L. and Joseph. Defendant was observed riding a bicycle that matched the
description of Joseph’s mountain bike. The officers made contact with defendant, who
was sweating profusely despite the morning being described as “very cold.” Garcia
searched defendant, and he found a backpack containing iron sights for a rifle and
.22-caliber bullets.
       Defendant initially claimed that he had the mountain bike for a week, but he
eventually admitted that he entered a residence to help his friend take items. Defendant
told Garcia that he left Joseph and April’s residence when the homeowners woke up.
Defendant acknowledged that he forced entry into L.L.’s residence, but he did not believe
there was much to take from that residence. Defendant provided the name of Cole Allen
Davis as the person who committed the burglary of Joseph and April’s residence and
L.L.’s residence. Law enforcement attempted to contact Davis, however, they were
unable to locate him.
Defense Evidence
       Defendant testified on his own behalf. Defendant testified that Davis made a
decision to enter a house when defendant was with Davis. After an argument with Davis,

                                             3.
defendant claimed that he went to a drug store instead. Davis rode up to the drug store on
a mountain bike with items that defendant assumed to be stolen. Defendant rode off with
the mountain bike and other items before he was contacted by McIrvin and Garcia.
Defendant testified that the officers made threats to injure him with a baton, and he
denied telling the officers that he entered the garage to help Davis. Defendant also
admitted to being under the influence of methamphetamine at the time of his arrest.
                                       DISCUSSION
I. Senate Bill No. 567
       Prior to its amendment by Senate Bill No. 567 (2021−2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate
Bill 567), section 1170 provided, in relevant part: “When a judgment of imprisonment is
to be imposed and the statute specifies three possible terms, the choice of the appropriate
term shall rest within the sound discretion of the court.” (§ 1170, former subd. (b).)
With the passage of Senate Bill 567, effective January 1, 2022, section 1170 provides, in
part: “When a judgment of imprisonment is to be imposed and the statute specifies
three possible terms, the court shall, in its sound discretion, order imposition of a
sentence not to exceed the middle term, except as otherwise provided in paragraph (2).”
(§ 1170, subd. (b)(1).)
       The exceptions provided in paragraph (b)(2) of section 1170 provide, in part, that
the court may exceed the middle term “only when there are circumstances in aggravation
of the crime that justify” the greater sentence and where “the facts underlying those
circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant, or have been found true beyond a
reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.” (§ 1170,
subd. (b)(2).) Except in the case of enhancements, a court is also permitted to “consider
the defendant’s prior convictions in determining sentencing based on a certified record of
conviction without submitting the prior convictions to a jury.” (Id., subd. (b)(3).) A
court continues to have the discretion (and, in some cases, is mandated) to impose the
lower of the three specified terms when sentencing a defendant for a crime. (Id.,

                                              4.
subd. (b)(6), (7).) Thus, Senate Bill 567 confers a substantial benefit on a defendant at
the time of sentencing. (Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3.)
       We conclude defendant is entitled to the benefit of Senate Bill 567. Senate
Bill 567 amends section 1170 to make the middle term the presumptive sentence for a
term of imprisonment unless certain circumstances exist. The probation officer
recommended the trial court find true three circumstances in aggravation and no
circumstances in mitigation. The circumstances in aggravation related to defendant’s
prior convictions, unsatisfactory probation performance, and two prior prison terms. The
trial court stated, “I’m looking more at the nature of these crimes, at night while homes
are occupied and the circumstances of this man’s life,” in response to the prosecutor’s
arguments regarding aggravating circumstances.
       The record indicates the trial court sentenced defendant to the upper term on
count 1. However, the trial court made no findings regarding whether defendant’s violent
conduct indicated a serious danger to society, and defendant did not admit to the
aggravating factors. Senate Bill 567 now requires that either the jury find any
aggravating factors true beyond a reasonable doubt or that defendant stipulate to them.
Thus, the sentence imposed on defendant is contrary to the provisions of the newly
amened statute. Moreover, nothing in Senate Bill 567 suggests an intent that the
legislation apply prospectively only. Because defendant’s case is not yet final, he is
entitled to the benefit of Senate Bill 567. Accordingly, resentencing is necessary.
II. Denial of Pitchess Motion
       Before trial, defendant made a Pitchess motion requesting disclosure of the
personnel records of Garcia and McIrvin relevant to complaints for dishonesty and other
misconduct. The trial court granted the motion for an in camera review, and after
reviewing the records, the court found no records were required to be disclosed. We have
reviewed the records and see no abuse of discretion.

                                             5.
       A trial court’s decision on a Pitchess motion is reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard. (People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1285.) The exercise of
that discretion “must not be disturbed on appeal except on a showing that the court
exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted
in a manifest miscarriage of justice.” (People v. Jordan (1986) 42 Cal.3d 308, 316.) We
review the record for “materials so clearly pertinent to the issues raised by the Pitchess
discovery motion that failure to disclose them was an abuse of Pitchess discretion.”
(People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 827.) The record of the trial court’s in
camera hearing is sealed, and appellate counsel are not allowed to see it. (See People v.
Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 330.) Thus, on request, the appellate court must
independently review the sealed record. (See Prince, at p. 1285.)
       “A criminal defendant has a limited right to discovery of a peace officer’s
personnel records. [Citation.] Peace officer personnel records are confidential and can
only be discovered pursuant to Evidence Code sections 1043 and 1045.” (Giovanni B. v.
Superior Court (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 312, 318.) “[O]n a showing of good cause, a
criminal defendant is entitled to discovery of relevant documents or information in the
confidential personnel records of a peace officer accused of misconduct against the
defendant. [Citation.] Good cause for discovery exists when the defendant shows both
‘ “materiality” to the subject matter of the pending litigation and a “reasonable belief”
that the agency has the type of information sought.’ [Citation.] … If the defendant
establishes good cause, the court must review the requested records in camera to
determine what information, if any, should be disclosed. [Citation.] Subject to certain
statutory exceptions and limitations [citation], ‘the trial court should then disclose to the
defendant “such information [that] is relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending litigation.” ’ ” (People v. Gaines (2009) 46 Cal.4th 172, 179, last bracketed
insertion in original.)

                                              6.
       We have reviewed the personnel records of Garcia and McIrvin, and we find no
relevant information in them. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
deciding not to disclose any records.
                                        DISPOSITION
       The judgment of conviction is affirmed. The matter is remanded to the trial court
for a full resentencing, consistent with the legislative changes discussed herein, effective
January 1, 2022. At the resentencing hearing, the trial court shall resentence defendant
consistent with the changes made by Senate Bill 567. In all other respects, we affirm.

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