Court Opinion

ID: 9644573
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:59:45.999345+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:15.396418
License: Public Domain

James R. Cooper, Judge, dissenting. I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion because, first, I think the issue decided is, to me, clearly moot, and secondly, this Court is far too busy to issue advisory opinions on questions which are moot. The Attorney General has not appealed the Commission’s approval of the incentive rate agreement between AP&L and St. Vincent, and therefore any action this Court takes can have no possible effect on the outcome of this case. A case becomes moot when any judgment rendered would have no practical legal effect upon a then-existing legal controversy. Frisby v. Strong School District, 282 Ark. 81, 82, 666 S.W.2d 391, 392 (1984). This is such a case. Nevertheless, the majority has remanded this case for the Commission to make findings of fact as to whether the protective order should be lifted. The majority acknowledges that it is this Court’s duty to decide actual controversies that can be carried into effect. It justifies its ruling here, however, by stating the question of the appropriateness of a protective order is likely to arise in future proceedings. I agree that the Commission is likely to be faced with future requests for protective orders, in the case at bar, and it is likewise true that we do sometimes render decisions despite the mootness of the issue when doing so might avert future litigation. See Bynum v. Savage, 312 Ark. 137, 847 S.W.2d 705 (1993). I fail to understand, however, how any decision of this Court can avoid future litigation surrounding these orders when the majority readily admits the issue of whether certain information in a particular proceeding should be protected will depend on the facts of each case. Under these circumstances, the special criteria favoring decision of moot issues are absent, and the case should therefore be dismissed. Westark Christian Action Council v. Stodola, 312 Ark. 249, 848 S.W.2d 935 (1993). Clearly, the only effect of this appeal is to cause this Court to waste valuable time on an issue which is moot. For the foregoing reasons, I would dismiss. Mayfield, J., joins in this dissent.