Court Opinion

ID: 9635336
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:47:36.148436+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:24.577132
License: Public Domain

Justice CASTILLE
concurring.
I join the Majority Opinion in its entirety. I agree that appellee failed to overcome the presumption of counsel effectiveness and that the courts below erred in finding that he proved the merit in his claim. I write separately to further address the governing law on trial references to a defendant’s silence as well as the proper standard for assessing claims of counsel ineffectiveness in such instances.
Counsel’s course of action in this case obviously opened the door to proper responsive testimony concerning Trooper Fetzner’s pre-arrest interaction with appellee and his counsel. But, that testimony was not offered in order to allow the prosecution to argue that appellee had remained silent in the face of an accusation or that the jury should view his silence as incriminating. Rather, the testimony was elicited for the distinct and narrow purpose of rebutting defense counsel’s suggestion to the jury that the trooper had automatically credited the victim’s accusation and focused exclusively upon appellee as the perpetrator, without conducting a complete investigation—a not unheard of, and a potentially successful defense which appellate courts do not encounter often, since acquittals are not appealable.
A consideration of the purpose for which evidence is offered is essential to evaluating its propriety; thus, evidence which might be prohibited if introduced for one purpose may be relevant and admissible when introduced for another. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Spotz, 562 Pa. 498, 756 A.2d 1139, 1152 (2000). The mere fact that evidence reveals that a defendant *565decided not to speak with police during an investigation does not mean that the evidence is being proffered to burden, or ineluctably acts to burden, the right against self-incrimination enshrined in the Constitution; or the prophylactic Miranda1 right to silence in the post-custody but pre-trial stage; or even, as is advanced here, some yet-to-be-recognized constitutional right to be silent in all of one’s interactions with the police, so that reference to that silence can never be made.2
In this case, the Commonwealth did not argue that the trooper’s testimony and appellee’s decision to decline the trooper’s interview request should be deemed a tacit admission of guilt to an accusation the trooper had yet to make. Nor did the Commonwealth proffer the evidence for some other reason which would burden the exercise of the constitutional right to remain silent. Rather, as the Majority correctly notes, the Commonwealth introduced and employed the evidence for the distinct and sole purpose of rebutting the suggestion that the trooper’s investigation was biased and incomplete. The prosecutor never argued to the jury that appellee’s response to the request for an interview tacitly suggested his guilt; nor did the trial court charge the jurors that they could consider the evidence for such a purpose. In short, nothing in the introduction or use of the disputed evidence in this case triggers the constitutional concerns which have led to the prohibition of those references to pre-trial silence which impermissibly burden the exercise of one’s con*566stitutional right to remain silent.3 As this Court noted in its unanimous opinion in Commonwealth v. Whitney, 550 Pa. 618, 708 A.2d 471, 478 (1998): “Even an explicit reference to silence is not reversible error where it occurs in a context not likely to suggest to the jury that silence is the equivalent of a tacit admission of guilt.” Thus, in my view, the notion that counsel was ineffective because he opened the door to constitutionally suspect evidence of his clients pre-arrest silence lacks arguable merit.
Of course, the fact that references to pre-arrest silence are not prohibited by the Constitution does not automatically render it reasonable for counsel to open the door to evidence of such silence. There are more dangers at trial than constitutional ones. However, it is apparent that the responsive evidence counsel invited here was not prejudicial. In addition to the fact that this evidence concerned the pre-arrest phase and was not introduced for the purpose of burdening appellee’s right to remain silent, the evidence in fact did not establish a tacit admission, nor did it otherwise trigger the constitutional concerns which powered the change in the law represented by Doyle, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91, and its progeny. Appellee did not respond to the trooper’s interview request with stony silence, giving rise to an inference of guilt. Instead, he advised the trooper that he wished to consult with a lawyer before speaking with him. Appellee’s lawyer consequently contacted police and relayed “that he had spoke[n] with [appellee] regarding these allegations, and that he [appellee] adamantly denied that they had occurred.” Counsel also advised that he (not appellee) saw no point in his client giving police a statement, since “he already denied the allegations and ... it would just, it would be redundant information.” Thus, appellee’s hindsight second-guessing of counsel in this case involves a strategy which opened the door to the jury learning that, far from remaining “silent” in the face of a criminal accusation and thereby impliedly admitting *567the accusation, appellee effectively and strongly denied it, albeit through counsel.4
Accordingly, even if it were assumed that the jury must have considered the evidence for a purpose other than the narrow purpose for which it was actually proffered, there is no basis for a further assumption that the jury must have concluded that appellee tacitly admitted his guilt in his pre-arrest dealings with police. If the jury was prone to speculation, the trial record at best provided a basis for speculating that appellee cooperated with a police investigation, but on his own terms, ie., he elected to speak to police through his lawyer, just as criminal defendants routinely do at trial; unequivocally and vehemently denied the accusation; and declined to speak further. Because the jury here heard evidence of an explicit denial of guilt and not a tacit admission, in my view, the trial court clearly was correct the first time around when it found that the claim of counsel ineffectiveness fails. Since counsel did not do what he was accused of doing—ie., he did not open the door to prejudicial evidence in the form of a tacit admission—the claim of ineffectiveness fails irrespective of counsel’s subjective reasons for questioning the trooper.
The mistake made by the Superior Court in this case consisted of its misapprehending federal law as banning all references to pre-arrest silence, except for the single circumstance where that silence “is probative of the defendant’s credibility and the defendant will not be unduly prejudiced by its admission.” Commonwealth v. DiNicola, 797 A.2d 966, 971 (Pa.Super.2002) (en banc). As the Majority Opinion aptly notes, this is not the law. Op. at 559-61, 866 A.2d at 335 (“the United States Supreme Court has also recognized that a defendant’s silence may bear relevance to, and be admissible to establish, other issues arising in a criminal proceeding;” citing, as an example, the fair response doctrine).
Throughout the majority of Pennsylvania’s venerable legal history, relevant implied or tacit admissions were admissible *568at trial, including criminal trials where the tacit admission was made by the defendant. This Court described the operation of this evidentiary rule as follows:
The rule of evidence is well established that, when a statement made in the presence and hearing of a person is incriminating in character and naturally calls for a denial but is not challenged or contradicted by the accused although he has opportunity and liberty to speak, the statement and the fact of his failure to deny it are admissible in evidence as an implied admission of the truth of the charges thus made.
Commonwealth v. Vallone, 347 Pa. 419, 32 A.2d 889, 890 (1943), overruled in part by Commonwealth v. Dravecz, 424 Pa. 582, 227 A.2d 904, 906 (1967). This was also the general rule followed in the United States. 1 John W. Strong, et al, McCormick on Evidence, § 161 (5th ed. 1999). The basis for permitting tacit admissions is grounded in human experience and was the same in criminal trials as in civil trials: “as in civil litigation, admission is based upon the assumption that human nature is such that innocent persons will usually deny false accusations.” McCormick on Evidence, supra § 161 at 569. See also Commonwealth v. Cull, 540 Pa. 161, 656 A.2d 476, 481 n. 5 (1995) (plurality opinion by Castille, J.) (“The justification of this rule is to be sought in the age-long experience of mankind that ordinarily an innocent person will spontaneously repel false accusations against him, and that a failure to do so is therefore some indication of guilt. Its probative force is derived not from the credibility of the accuser but from the silence of the accused in response to it.”) (citing Vallone, supra).
Although some courts and commentators have called into question the assumption about human nature which powers the tacit admission rule, and particularly in criminal cases,5 evidence of tacit admissions is still permitted in Pennsylvania—except in the single narrow circumstance where such introduction and use might burden the constitutional right to *569remain silent. Commonwealth v. Coccioletti, 493 Pa. 103, 425 A.2d 387, 392 (1981) (“implied admissions made while free from custody, with no police present, are still admissible”); Commonwealth v. Schmidt, 452 Pa. 185, 299 A.2d 254, 265-66 & n. 15 (1973) (plurality opinion by Pomeroy, J.) (collecting cases). Accord Cull, supra. The party against whom a tacit admission is offered, of course, is free to dispute the inference that results either directly at trial or indirectly through jury instructions.
Thus, the approach to claims deriving from alleged improper references to pre-trial silence cannot be monolithic—it must focus instead upon whether this recent exception to the historic rule of admissibility applies to the situation at issue. As this case reveals, not all references to a suspect’s interactions with police imply acquiescence in a criminal accusation, otherwise burden the constitutional right to remain silent, or otherwise prejudice the accused. It is wrong to view all references to pre-trial silence as if they automatically trigger the concerns which powered Doyle and its progeny. The Superior Court erred in failing to appreciate the history and controlling subtleties in this area of law.
In addition to lacking arguable merit, appellee’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails as a matter of law for the narrower reason ultimately deemed dispositive by the Majority Opinion, i.e., he has not demonstrated Strickland/Pierce prejudice.6 I am aware that, in Commonwealth v. Clark, 533 Pa. 579, 626 A.2d 154 (1993)—a case involving a claim of ineffective assistance in failing to object to a classic Doyle violation involving impeachment of the accused with his post-arrest silence—this Court found improper references to post-arrest silence to be “innately prejudicial,” in the process failing to see any distinction between the direct appeal harm*570less error standard and the prejudice which is required to prove ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 158.7 The Majority Opinion is wise to explicitly reject an “innate prejudice” test in this instance, not only because Clark involved a post-arrest silence scenario, but more fundamentally because the vitality of Clark’s broad and unexplained pronouncement on ineffectiveness prejudice is obviously wrong given controlling federal law, as well as subsequent decisions by this Court such as Commonwealth v. Howard, 538 Pa. 86, 645 A.2d 1300, 1307-08 (1994), and Commonwealth v. Williams, 566 Pa. 553, 782 A.2d 517, 524-25 (2001), which have recognized the crucial distinction in the tests. See also Commonwealth v. Gribble, 580 Pa. 647, 674-78, 863 A.2d 455, 471-73, 2004 WL 2952611, at *14-15 (2004).
In addition, it is notable that the Clark Court recognized that Pierce, 515 Pa. 153, 527 A.2d 973, provided the governing *571standard for assessing prejudice in the context of ineffective assistance of counsel. 626 A.2d at 157. Pierce, of course, explicitly held that the Pennsylvania approach to claims of counsel ineffectiveness is the same as the Strickland test, including the test for prejudice. See 527 A.2d at 976-77 (construing tests as establishing “an identical rule of law in this Commonwealth”). To the extent Clark may be read as seeing no distinction in the tests, it is squarely at odds with Pierce, and via Pierce, squarely at odds with governing precedent from the U.S. Supreme Court, which has held that prejudice will be presumed in conjunction with claims of ineffective assistance of counsel only in three narrow categories of cases, i.e., situations involving (1) an actual denial of counsel, (2) state interference with counsel’s assistance, or (3) an actual conflict of interest burdening counsel. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 695-96 n. 3, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 1850-51 n. 3, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002); Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 166, 122 S.Ct. 1237, 1240-41, 152 L.Ed.2d 291 (2002); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658-59, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 2046-47, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984). None of those situations is implicated here. Thus, appellee is required to prove actual Strickland prejudice, i.e., he must demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068.8
The Majority Opinion correctly finds that no Strickland prejudice can be sustained upon this trial record. The evi*572dence concerning appellees interaction with police before his arrest was neither introduced nor argued in a fashion which was at all likely to burden appellees constitutional right to remain silent. Moreover, the evidence revealed an actual denial of the accusation, rather than a tacit admission of guilt. The revelation to the jury that, consistently with his denial at trial, appellee had denied the accusation pre-trial, probably advanced, rather than hurt, appellees cause. Certainly, there is no reasonable probability that, if the jury had only heard appellee deny it once, rather than twice, he would have been acquitted.
Finally, I write to emphasize that the issue decided today is one of federal law. See Majority op. at 559 n. 3, 866 A.2d at 334 n. 3. The Pennsylvania constitutional test for counsel ineffectiveness is the same as the federal Strickland test— albeit we further refíne the Strickland performance and prejudice approach into a three-part inquiry of arguable merit and absence of objective reasonable basis (performance component), and prejudice. E.g., Commonwealth v. Bomar, 573 Pa. 426, 826 A.2d 831, 855 & n. 19 (2003); Commonwealth v. Bond, 572 Pa. 588, 819 A.2d 33, 41-42 (2002); Pierce, swpra. I think it is particularly important to make clear that appellee’s Strickland/Doyle issue concerns federal law only. This Court has invoked the Pennsylvania Constitution to reach beyond the U.S. Supreme Court in extending the temporal coverage of the Doyle proscription. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Turner, 499 Pa. 579, 454 A.2d 537, 539 (1982) (rejecting Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 102 S.Ct. 1309, 71 L.Ed.2d 490 (1982) under aegis of Pennsylvania Constitution and extending Doyle to post-arrest, pre-Miranda scenario). The present claim, however, sounds in ineffective assistance of counsel and it is settled that the test in that instance, including the test for prejudice, is coterminous. To the extent Clark suggests otherwise, it is erroneous and should not be followed.

. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

. Neither this Court nor the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized a ' protected constitutional interest in the decision to remain silent in a pre-arrest, pre-Miranda situation. The U.S. Supreme Court has determined only that comment at trial on post-arrest, post-Miranda silence may violate due process. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976); Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 106 S.Ct. 634, 88 L.Ed.2d 623 (1986) (use at trial of post-arrest, post-Miranda silence as evidence of defendant’s sanity violated due process). Both this Court and the U.S. Supreme Court have determined that there is no violation of due process when pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence is used at trial to impeach the defendant’s testimony. See Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 100 S.Ct. 2124, 65 L.Ed.2d 86 (1980); Commonwealth v. Bolus, 545 Pa. 103, 680 A.2d 839 (1996).

. There is no suggestion by appellee here that the challenged evidence burdened the right to remain silent other than to the extent it might be deemed a tacit admission.

. That appellee elected to speak through his lawyer does not render this a tacit admission scenario any more applicable than employing a lawyer at trial where a defendant has an actual constitutional right to counsel.

. See McConvick on Evidence, supra § 161 at 569; Dravecz, 227 A.2d at 906.

. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (to prove ineffectiveness of counsel, appellant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense); Commonwealth v. Pierce, 515 Pa. 153, 527 A.2d 973 (1987) (counsel's performance is evaluated in light of its reasonableness if the underlying claim is of arguable merit; counsel is presumed to have acted effectively; appellant must demonstrate how the ineffectiveness prejudiced him).

. It is worth noting that this Court's conclusion of innate prejudice arising from references to the exercise of Miranda rights was based upon assumption, rather than empirical evidence. I am concerned that, in continuing to rely upon this mere assumption, we have strayed from the federal standard and the task of judging. The assumption of prejudice dates to 1972, when the Miranda decision was but six years old, and was based upon a non-controlling Circuit Court decision which was decided even nearer in time to Miranda. See Commonwealth v. Haideman, 449 Pa. 367, 296 A.2d 765, 767 (1972) (" 'We would be naive if we failed to recognize that most laymen view an assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege as a badge of guilt.' ") (quoting Walker v. United States, 404 F.2d 900, 903 (5th Cir.1968)). Given the recency of the Miranda decision and its revolutionary effect upon police practice and criminal procedure, perhaps there was a basis for such assumption-based jurisprudence in 1968 and 1972. But, in this day and age, the naiveté consists in accepting that the old assumption arising from the very newness of Miranda should retain validity. In this regard, it is notable that one of the reasons why the U.S. Supreme Court recently declined to reconsider or overrule Miranda was precisely because "Miranda has become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part of our national culture.” Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 2336, 147 L.Ed.2d 405 (2000) (citation omitted). Given the national familiarity with the Miranda incantation, and nightly examples on television and in movies of suspects invoking, or not invoking, their Miranda rights, it defies common sense to unthinkingly assume, and deem determinative, that "most'' laypeople would view an exercise of constitutional rights as a badge of guilt. I would jettison this antiquated assumption and return to judging cases on their merits.

. The federal courts have specifically employed the Strickland prejudice test in analyzing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to object to a Doyle violation. See Hook v. Iowa, 307 F.3d 756, 758 (8th Cir.2002) (given strength of evidence, no Strickland prejudice when counsel failed to object to admission of testimony that appellant had exercised right to remain silent after being read Miranda rights, so court did not reach question of whether counsel’s performance was deficient); Pitts v. Anderson, 122 F.3d 275 (5th Cir.1997) (analyzing ineffective assistance of counsel claim under Strickland and concluding that prosecutor's questions, used to impeach defendant with post-arrest silence, did not violate Doyle, so court did not reach question of prejudice); Stokes v. Procunier, 744 F.2d 475, 483 (5th Cir.1984) (assuming that counsel’s failure to object to questions and comments on defendant’s silence violated Doyle, there was no prejudice under Strickland given strength of evidence).