Court Opinion

ID: 9895717
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-08 16:01:26.407795+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:58.011197
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-40790     Document: 00516959604        Page: 1    Date Filed: 11/07/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                             United States Court of Appeals
                                                                              Fifth Circuit

                               ____________                                 FILED
                                                                     November 7, 2023
                                No. 22-40790                           Lyle W. Cayce
                               ____________                                 Clerk

   Su Min Kim; Ji Hun Kim,

                                                          Plaintiffs—Appellees,

                                      versus

   American Honda Motor Company, Incorporated,

                                           Defendant—Appellant.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Eastern District of Texas
                            USDC No. 4:19-CV-332
                  ______________________________

   Before Higginbotham, Smith, and Elrod, Circuit Judges.
   Patrick E. Higginbotham, Circuit Judge:
          Su Min Kim and Ji Hun Kim (“the Kims”) were injured in a side-
   impact car accident in a 2014 Honda CR-V and sued American Honda Motor
   Company, Inc., asserting strict liability and negligence defective design
   product liability claims. A jury found Honda liable and found $21,430,808.74
   in damages. After apportioning, the court awarded the Kims nearly $5
   million.
          In the course of litigation, Honda moved to exclude Plaintiffs’ two
   liability experts, moved for a new trial and a judgment as a matter of law
Case: 22-40790        Document: 00516959604              Page: 2      Date Filed: 11/07/2023

                                         No. 22-40790

   (“JMOL”), and objected to the want of a jury instruction regarding a
   presumption of nonliability (“the presumption”). On appeal, Honda argues
   the district court erred in denying the motions and rejecting the requested
   instruction. We AFFIRM.
                                               I.
                                              A.
           On June 30, 2018, 17-year-old Ji Hun Kim was driving a 2014 Honda
   CR-V in an eastbound direction on Warren Parkway in Frisco, Texas, with
   his 20-year-old sister, Su Min Kim, in the front passenger seat. At the same
   time, Trae Michael Hubbard was driving northbound on Dallas Parkway. As
   Ji Hun drove through the intersection of Warren Parkway and Dallas
   Parkway at a speed of approximately 34 mph, Hubbard ran a red light, driving
   into the intersection traveling 45–50 mph and T-boning the front passenger
   side of the Kims’ CR-V.1
           Ji Hun suffered only a minor concussion, but Su Min was seriously
   injured. Her skull was crushed, and she sustained permanent injuries to her
   brain, skull, face, and left eye that have left her unable to live independently.
           The force of the collision caused Ji Hun’s upper body to move to the
   right, toward the impact on the passenger side. He rolled out of the shoulder
   belt portion of his seatbelt, which crossed over his left shoulder, and his head
   intruded into the passenger space. At the same time, Su Min moved to the
   left, rebounding after hitting the side airbags. Consequently, the right side of
   Ji Hun’s head struck the left side of Su Min’s head.

           _____________________
           1
              There was a third vehicle involved in the crash, but it did not cause any of the
   injuries at issue and is not relevant to this litigation.

                                               2
Case: 22-40790      Document: 00516959604           Page: 3   Date Filed: 11/07/2023

                                     No. 22-40790

           This injury is typed as a “far-side impact injury,” which Honda’s
   engineer and corporate representative defined as “occur[ing] when the
   occupant on the other side of the impact hits something inside the vehicle on
   the side where the impact occurred.” That is, Su Min’s injury did not result
   directly from being hit by Hubbard’s car. It occurred because the accident
   caused Ji Hun to slip out of his seatbelt and crash his head against Su Min’s
   head.
           At trial, Plaintiffs’ expert Neil Hannemann explained that the crash
   should have been “a survivable accident without serious injury” because the
   “configuration and severity” of the accident were below the parameters of
   testing by the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety. However, Hannemann
   said, and Honda’s corporate representative admitted, that “prior to the
   manufacturing of the 2014 Honda CR-V,” Honda did not “run a side impact
   test with a far side crash test dummy in the test vehicle.”
                                          B.
           On May 7, 2019, the Kims filed a product liability design defect lawsuit
   against Honda, bringing both strict liability and negligence claims. They
   sought damages for, inter alia, emotional distress, medical expenses, physical
   pain and suffering, physical and mental impairment, and lost earnings
   capacity. They argued Honda could have used either of two alternative,
   extant designs that would have prevented Su Min’s injuries: a center airbag
   or a reverse geometry seatbelt.
           Honda moved to exclude the testimony of Plaintiffs’ two experts: Dr.
   Mariusz Ziejewski, a biomechanical engineer and accident reconstructionist,
   and Neil Hannemann, an automotive engineer. The Kims sought to offer
   their opinion of how the accident occurred, how Su Min sustained her
   injuries, and whether the center airbag or reverse geometry seatbelt designs
   would have likely prevented them. After a Daubert hearing, the district court

                                          3
Case: 22-40790         Document: 00516959604              Page: 4    Date Filed: 11/07/2023

                                         No. 22-40790

   denied both motions, concluding that Honda’s challenges to Ziejewski’s and
   Hannemann’s opinions went to their weight, not their admissibility.2
           At trial, Honda requested a jury instruction pursuant to Texas Civil
   Practice and Remedies Code § 82.008, which provides a rebuttable
   presumption of nonliability to manufacturers and sellers in product liability
   actions if they complied with federal regulations that govern the product risk
   that allegedly caused the harm.3 Honda posited that the relevant product risk
   was “the risk of injury in a side-impact collision,” and that there was a federal
   standard with which Honda complied that governed the risk. But the district
   court rejected Honda’s definition of product risk, opting instead for a more
   case-specific one: “the risk of injury from a far-side impact during a near-side
   collision.” Because there was no federal standard governing that product
   risk, the district court denied Honda’s requested instruction.
           The jury found Honda liable for a defective design and awarded Su
   Min $21,180,808.74 and Ji Hun $250,000. After the jury assigned 77% of the
   responsibility to Hubbard (the driver of the other car) and the court adjusted
   the award in its final judgment, Honda owed Su Min $4,871,586.01 and Ji
   Hun $57,500.
           After trial, Honda filed a renewed motion for a JMOL and a motion
   for a new trial, raising numerous grounds for relief. The district court denied
   these motions in a 61-page published opinion.

           _____________________
           2
             See generally Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). These
   asserted errors were preserved under Federal Rule of Evidence 103(b). FED. R. EVID.
   103(b) (“Once the court rules definitively on the record—either before or at trial—a party
   need not renew an objection or offer of proof to preserve a claim of error for appeal.”).
           3
               TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 82.008(a).

                                               4
Case: 22-40790           Document: 00516959604                  Page: 5   Date Filed: 11/07/2023

                                            No. 22-40790

           Honda reiterates most of these arguments on appeal: that (1) the
   district court abused its discretion by denying Honda’s motions to exclude
   Plaintiffs’ experts; (2) the district court erred by denying Honda’s JMOL
   motion; and (3) the district court erred by ruling the nonliability presumption
   did not apply and, therefore, not instructing the jury about the presumption.
                                                  II.
           The district court had jurisdiction over this diversity case under
   28 U.S.C. § 1332(a),4 and there is no challenge to the application of Texas
   law in this case. This Court has jurisdiction over the district court’s final
   judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
           We review a district court’s decision to admit or exclude expert
   testimony “for an abuse of discretion,”5 accepting that “[d]istrict courts
   enjoy wide latitude in determining the admissibility of expert testimony, and
   the discretion of the trial judge and his or her decision will not be disturbed
   on appeal unless manifestly erroneous.”6 “‘Manifest error’ is one that is ‘plain
   and indisputable, and that amounts to a complete disregard of the controlling
   law.’”7 If this Court finds an abuse of discretion, it must then conduct a
   harmless error analysis and “affirm[] the judgment, unless the ruling affected
   substantial rights of the complaining party.”8

           _____________________
           4
             There is complete diversity between the parties, as Plaintiffs are both Texas
   residents, and Honda is a resident of Canada. The amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.
           5
               Hodges v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 474 F.3d 188, 194 (5th Cir. 2006).
           6
               Id. (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
           7
              Bear Ranch, L.L.C. v. Heartbrand Beef, Inc., 885 F.3d 794, 802 (5th Cir. 2018)
   (citation omitted).
           8
               Knight v. Kirby Inland Marine, Inc., 482 F.3d 347, 351 (5th Cir. 2007) (citation
   omitted).

                                                   5
Case: 22-40790            Document: 00516959604               Page: 6       Date Filed: 11/07/2023

                                             No. 22-40790

           By contrast, this Court reviews a district court’s denial of a JMOL
   motion de novo, and it applies the same deferential standard as the district
   court does in reviewing the jury’s verdict.9 A JMOL “is proper only when ‘a
   reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for
   the party on that issue.’”10 This standard is met only “if the facts and
   inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in the movant’s favor that
   jurors could not reasonably have reached a contrary verdict.”11 In other
   words, this Court will not reverse the denial of a JMOL motion unless there
   is no “substantial evidence” to support the verdict, “or if the legal
   conclusions implied from the jury’s verdict cannot in law be supported by
   those findings,”12 as courts of appeal are “wary of upsetting jury verdicts.”13
   When evaluating whether there is substantial evidence to support the verdict,
   this Court “must consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to
   the nonmovant, drawing all factual inferences in favor of the non-moving
   party, and leaving credibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and
   the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts to the jury.” 14

           _____________________
           9
                Janvey v. Dillon Gage, Inc. of Dallas, 856 F.3d 377, 384 (5th Cir. 2017).
           10
             Id. (quoting Abraham v. Alpha Chi Omega, 708 F.3d 614, 620 (5th Cir. 2013));
   FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a).
           11
                Abraham, 708 F.3d at 620 (citation omitted).
           12
             Baisden v. I’m Ready Prods., Inc., 693 F.3d 491, 499 (5th Cir. 2012) (citations
   omitted). “Substantial evidence is defined as evidence of such quality and weight that
   reasonable and fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different
   conclusions.” Threlkeld v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 211 F.3d 887, 891 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing
   Gaia Techs. Inc. v. Recycled Products Corp., 175 F.3d 365, 374 (5th Cir. 1999)).
           13
            Goodner v. Hyundai Motor Co., Ltd., 650 F.3d 1034, 1039 (5th Cir. 2011);
   Abraham, 708 F.3d at 620.
           14
                 Price v. Marathon Cheese Corp., 119 F.3d 330, 333 (5th Cir. 1997) (citations
   omitted).

                                                    6
Case: 22-40790           Document: 00516959604            Page: 7     Date Filed: 11/07/2023

                                           No. 22-40790

                                               III.
           Plaintiffs asserted a design defect claim, which required them to
   prove: “(1) the product was defectively designed so as to render it
   unreasonably dangerous; (2) a safer alternative design existed; and (3) the
   defect was a producing cause of the injury for which the plaintiff seeks
   recovery.”15 A safer alternative design exists if an alternative design “would
   have prevented or significantly reduced the risk of the claimant’s personal
   injury, property damage, or death without substantially impairing the
   product’s utility,” an element Honda calls “risk-utility.”16 At trial, Plaintiffs
   offered Ziejewski’s and Hannemann’s testimony as evidence of these
   elements. Honda contends the district court erred by failing to exclude
   Plaintiffs’ two experts. We disagree.
                                                A.
           This Court applies the Federal Rules of Evidence (“FRE”) to
   evaluate questions of admissibility, reliability, and competency of evidence.17
   Regarding expert evidence, the district court serves as a gatekeeper to ensure
   that scientific evidence is relevant and reliable.18 Parties offering expert
   testimony must prove the expert is qualified and will offer relevant and
   reliable testimony.19

           _____________________
           15
            Goodner, 650 F.3d at 1040 (citing Timpte Indus., Inc. v. Gish, 286 S.W.3d 306, 311
   (Tex. 2009)).
           16
                TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 82.005(b)(1).
           17
                Wackman v. Rubsamen, 602 F.3d 391, 400 n.2 (5th Cir. 2010).
           18
            Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590–93; Atlantic Specialty Ins. Co. v. Porter, Inc., 742 F.
   App’x 850, 852 (5th Cir. 2002).
           19
                Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590–91.

                                                 7
Case: 22-40790           Document: 00516959604            Page: 8   Date Filed: 11/07/2023

                                           No. 22-40790

          Under FRE 702, a person may be “qualified as an expert by
   knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education” if:
          (a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized
          knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence
          or to determine a fact in issue;
          (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
          (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and
          methods; and
          (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods
          to the facts of the case.20
           Courts deciding whether to admit expert testimony may also consider
   additional relevant factors.21 In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
   the Supreme Court offered the following, non-exclusive list of factors that
   courts may use when evaluating the reliability of expert testimony: (1)
   whether the expert’s theory or technique can be or has been tested; (2)
   whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and
   publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error of the challenged
   method; and (4) whether the theory or technique is generally accepted in the
   relevant scientific community.22 The courts must focus “on [the expert’s]
   principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.”23
   However, the Daubert factors are not “a definitive checklist or test,” and the

          _____________________
          20
               FED. R. EVID. 702.
          21
               Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
          22
               Id. at 593–94.
          23
               Id. at 595.

                                                8
Case: 22-40790           Document: 00516959604             Page: 9      Date Filed: 11/07/2023

                                          No. 22-40790

   analysis is “flexible.”24 As a result, the district court has discretion under
   Daubert to allow or exclude experts from testifying.25
                                                B.
           Before trial, Honda moved to exclude Ziejewski and Hannemann on
   several grounds. First, Honda argued Ziejewski’s testimony was not reliable
   because he “failed to perform a risk-utility analysis” independently and,
   instead, relied on and co-signed Neil Hannemann’s alternative designs
   analysis. Second, Honda said Hannemann’s testimony should be excluded
   because he also failed to perform a risk-utility analysis. Finally, Honda
   claimed that Hannemann offered no evidence the proposed alternative
   designs were economically feasible.
           The district court denied both motions. Regarding Ziejewski, the
   court held that Honda’s complaint “attacks the merits of the design defect
   claim,” not Ziejewski’s reliability as an expert witness. In other words, the
   court explained that Ziejewski’s testimony was one way Plaintiffs hoped to
   establish the existence of a safer alternative design, but it was not the only
   method available, and Ziejewski’s testimony did not itself need to meet the
   preponderance standard to be admissible. Instead, the jury would decide how
   much, if any, weight to assign his testimony.
           The district court also denied Honda’s motion to exclude
   Hannemann, finding Hannemann sufficiently reliable. The district court
   noted that although Hannemann did not perform his own crash tests,
   Hannemann “rests his opinion on tests performed by reputable agencies,
   including the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, the National Highway
           _____________________
           24
                Id. at 594–95.
           25
              St. Martin v. Mobil Expl. & Producing U.S., Inc., 224 F.3d 402, 405 (5th Cir. 2000)
   (citations omitted).

                                                 9
Case: 22-40790        Document: 00516959604                Page: 10        Date Filed: 11/07/2023

                                           No. 22-40790

   Safety Administration, and other vehicle manufacturers.” The court also
   considered that Hannemann inspected the accident vehicle, reviewed
   literature and patents, and “relied on the automotive literature on testing
   reverse geometry belts with a load limiter without serious neck injuries and
   reviewed automotive literature and Honda’s internal documents which
   showed that a specific type of seatbelt would be effective means to prevent
   far-side impacts.” Ultimately, the district court held that Honda’s
   “argument attacks the merits of the design defect” claim, as it “rests on an
   element that Plaintiffs must prove under Texas law to succeed on a design
   defect claim—that a safer alternative existed.” Thus, the court determined
   that, despite Honda’s critique of Hannemann’s methods and conclusions, it
   was the jury’s province to “determine the weight and credibility, if any, to
   assign to Hannemann’s opinion.”
                                                 C.
           The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Honda’s
   motions to exclude the expert testimony from Ziejewski or Hannemann.26
           On appeal, Honda makes two central arguments that the district court
   erred by admitting Ziejewski’s testimony. First, Honda contends Ziejewski’s

           _____________________
           26
              In addition, Plaintiffs argue that this Court should review the propriety of the
   district court’s decision to admit the experts by reviewing the record in its entirety—
   including post-Daubert testimony. They cite Hodges v. Mack Trucks for this proposition,
   arguing this Court in that case conducted a “review of the record” to decide whether it was
   manifestly erroneous to admit the expert testimony. Hodges, 474 F.3d at 195. This
   interpretation is incorrect. The scope of the “record” considered by the Court in that case
   is unclear. In fact, there is no evidence this Court reviewed post-Daubert testimony when
   deciding whether the district court was correct in Hodges. And in Tanner v. Westbrook, this
   Court reviewed a Daubert denial by considering only “the materials the trial court had
   before it.” 174 F.3d 542, 546 (5th Cir. 1999), superseded in part by rule on other grounds, FED.
   R. EVID. 103(a). Therefore, this Court will review the district court’s decision to admit the
   experts’ testimony by considering only the evidence before the district court.

                                                 10
Case: 22-40790        Document: 00516959604              Page: 11        Date Filed: 11/07/2023

                                          No. 22-40790

   testimony about the existence of “safer alternative designs” should have
   been excluded because his opinions were conclusory and unsupported.
   Specifically, because Ziejewski did not conduct a formal risk-utility analysis
   and relied on Hannemann’s testing analysis instead of conducting his own,
   Honda argues Ziejewski could not show that the proposed alternative designs
   would have likely prevented the injuries. Second, Honda argues the district
   court “did not analyze relevancy and reliability.”
           These arguments are unconvincing. The district court did not abuse
   its discretion when it found Ziejewski did more than “co-sign”
   Hannemann’s claims. It analyzed the relevancy, reliability, and potential
   helpfulness of Ziejewski’s report, which indicated that Ziejewski applied
   principles of accident reconstruction, biomedical engineering, and body
   kinematics to the facts of the case. The district court found, for example, that
   Ziejewski applied his “education, training, and experience” in body
   kinematics, “engineering principles and methodologies generally accepted,”
   and biomechanics to explain that “[t]he alternative seatbelt designs would
   not have allowed Mr. Kim’s shoulder slip-out and would have prevented
   excursion of his head, neck, and upper torso from the safety of his seat,” and
   that “[a] center airbag, side impact containment, and offset packaging would
   have provided an effective means of preventing occupants’ head impact with
   one another.” Moreover, Honda’s complaint that Ziejewski failed to conduct
   a formal risk-utility analysis speaks to a question of substantive law—not the
   requirements of FRE 702.27 Ultimately, it is not difficult to imagine how these
   findings could be helpful to the jury when assessing whether proposed
   alternative designs would have prevented the injuries at issue.

           _____________________
           27
               See infra Section IV (describing the substantive requirements for a product
   liability defective design case). This requirement, however, is not part of the admissibility
   analysis under FRE 702 or Daubert.

                                                11
Case: 22-40790     Document: 00516959604           Page: 12   Date Filed: 11/07/2023

                                    No. 22-40790

          Next, regarding Hannemann: on appeal, Honda makes three
   arguments to support its claim that the district court abused its discretion in
   admitting his expert testimony. Honda emphasizes Hannemann’s (1) failure
   to perform a formal “risk-utility analysis” and urges that he (2) failed to
   prove the alternative designs would have produced a better outcome in the
   accident at issue. Honda also contends (3) Hannemann should have been
   excluded because he “offered only conclusory opinions about the economic
   feasibility of the proposed alternatives.”
          These contentions are not persuasive given the high degree of
   deference this Court gives to evidentiary rulings. First, Honda’s complaint
   that Hannemann failed to conduct a formal risk-utility analysis is relevant to
   the substantive requirements for relief, not the admissibility of expert
   testimony. Second, Hannemann’s report included sufficient information for
   the district court to find he could provide reliable testimony about whether
   an alternative design could lead to a better outcome. The report was thorough
   and relied on Hannemann’s 40 years of experience in automotive
   engineering, design, and crash testing. Hannemann detailed how he
   personally inspected the Kims’ vehicle, followed accepted scientific testing
   methods, relied on reputable agencies’ methods of testing, and applied his
   engineering judgment to the facts of the case. As such, the district court did
   not commit “manifest error” in finding Hannemann met FRE 702.
   Hannemann’s perspective on automotive design and expertise in engineering
   could help the jury understand the nature of the accident; the testimony is
   based on sufficient facts and data (e.g., inspecting the vehicle, reliable
   studies, and relevant tests); and he used and applied reliable and accepted
   methods of engineering analysis to form his conclusions.
          Third, we reject Honda’s contention that Hannemann provided only
   conclusory evidence of economic feasibility. Hannemann said reverse
   geometry seatbelts likely cost “next to nothing” if a manufacturer has

                                         12
Case: 22-40790         Document: 00516959604               Page: 13    Date Filed: 11/07/2023

                                            No. 22-40790

   “already committed to an ABTS [all belts to seat] seat design,” which is used
   in the rear seats of other vehicles.28 And Honda’s corporate representative
   stated in his deposition that “the Honda airbag would cost less than the one
   [General Motors] made in 2013.” Thus, Honda cannot plausibly claim that
   Hannemann offered only conclusory statements when its own expert
   confirmed the substance of Hannemann’s statement. At bottom,
   Hannemann had decades of experience in automotive engineering and
   applied that expertise to opine that the alternative designs would have
   reduced the likelihood of injury in this accident and would not be cost
   prohibitive, testimony meeting FRE 702 and Daubert.
                                                IV.
          Next, Honda argues the district court erred by denying its JMOL
   motion. Again, we disagree.
          To succeed on a design defect claim in Texas, “a plaintiff must prove
   that (1) the product was defectively designed so as to render it unreasonably
   dangerous; (2) a safer alternative design existed; and (3) the defect was a
   producing cause of the injury for which the plaintiff seeks recovery.” 29 A
   safer alternative design refers to:
          a product design other than the one actually used that in
          reasonable probability:
          (1) would have prevented or significantly reduced the risk of
          the claimant’s personal injury, property damage, or death
          without substantially impairing the product’s utility; and
          (2) was economically and technologically feasible at the time the
          product left the control of the manufacturer or seller by the

          _____________________
          28
               Hannemann provided more exact costs for each alternative design at trial.
          29
               Goodner, 650 F.3d at 1040.

                                                 13
Case: 22-40790          Document: 00516959604                Page: 14         Date Filed: 11/07/2023

                                             No. 22-40790

            application of existing or reasonably achievable scientific
            knowledge.30
            In its initial JMOL motion and its motion for a new trial, Honda argued
   Plaintiffs failed to prove all elements of their design defect claims. On appeal,
   Honda has focused its argument on the district court’s denial of its JMOL
   motion and, specifically, on whether there was sufficient evidence to
   establish a safer alternative design. Honda attacks both prongs of the “safer
   alternative design” analysis, arguing: (1) “Plaintiffs’ two liability experts
   offered no ‘substantial’ evidence as support for a safer alternative design, but
   instead (a) did not perform the required risk-utility analysis, and (b)
   ultimately offered only their mere ipse dixit about whether the two
   alternatives would have prevented the injuries in this crash[;]”31 and (2)
   Hannemann provided only conclusory opinions about the economic
   feasibility of the two alternative designs—a center airbag and a reverse
   geometry seatbelt.
                                                   A.
            Honda argues there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find that
   either alternative design would prevent or significantly reduce the risk of
   Plaintiffs’ personal injuries without substantially impairing the CR-V’s
   utility. Honda first asserts that Texas law required Plaintiffs to conduct a
   formal “risk-utility analysis” and then claims there was insufficient evidence
   that either design—the center airbag or the reverse geometry seatbelt—
   would have likely reduced the risk of injury.

            _____________________
            30
                 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 82.005(b) (emphasis added).
            31
              Although Honda did not contest the feasibility of either alternative design (center
   airbags or reverse geometry seatbelts), it did not stipulate to feasibility, so the Plaintiffs still
   had the burden to introduce sufficient evidence of feasibility at trial.

                                                   14
Case: 22-40790          Document: 00516959604               Page: 15        Date Filed: 11/07/2023

                                             No. 22-40790

                                                   1.
           First, Honda argues that Casey v. Toyota Motor Engineering &
   Manufacturing North America, Inc.32 added what is essentially a sub-
   requirement to prong (1): that the expert “perform a risk-utility analysis of
   the proposed alternative.” This argument overstates Plaintiffs’ burden.
           Texas law requires plaintiffs demonstrate that the “safety benefits
   from [the] proposed design are foreseeably greater than the resulting costs,
   including any diminished usefulness or diminished safety.”33 But this Court
   has held that “[t]he burden is minimal: plaintiffs need only offer ‘some
   evidence that their alternative design . . . would not have introduced other
   dangers of equal or greater magnitude.’”34 In Sims v. Kia Motors of America,
   Inc., for example, this Court analyzed an expert’s statements—“the use of a
   fuel tank shield would not have hindered the performance of the vehicle” and
   “the benefits [of the fuel tank shield] far outweigh any impairment in
   utility”—along with the expert’s acknowledgement of a potential minor
   impairment, and said these statements would “probably meet [the] minimal
   burden to show the risk-utility of the alternative designs.”35 By contrast,
   alternative designs that would “eliminate whole categories of useful products
   from the market” in the name of increasing safety would likely be
   insufficient.36 Thus, Plaintiffs did not need to conduct a formal risk-utility
   analysis to prove there was a safer alternative design available; they needed

           _____________________
           32
                770 F.3d 322 (5th Cir. 2014).
           33
                Id. at 331 (citing Hodges, 474 F.3d at 196) (cleaned up).
           34
              Sims v. Kia Motors of America, Inc., 839 F.3d 393, 406 (5th Cir. 2016) (internal
   citations omitted).
           35
                Id.
           36
                Caterpillar, Inc. v. Shears, 911 S.W.2d 379, 385 (Tex. 1995).

                                                   15
Case: 22-40790     Document: 00516959604            Page: 16    Date Filed: 11/07/2023

                                     No. 22-40790

   only to offer some evidence the center airbag or reverse geometry seatbelt
   would not have significantly increased the risk of injury or impaired utility.
                                          2.
          Second, Honda argues Plaintiffs put forth insufficient evidence that
   the center airbag design would have likely reduced the risk of injuries in this
   crash without overly sacrificing the CR-V’s utility. This argument is not
   persuasive. There was sufficient evidence for the jury to find Honda liable for
   not installing a center airbag. Of course, that other manufacturers have
   installed the missing reverse geometry seatbelt and center airbag is itself
   evidence of risk-utility. But there is more.
          Hannemann offered sufficient evidence of the center airbag’s
   promise—as well as its relevant risks and potential impact on utility. He
   testified the center airbag could be installed in the front of the car, on either
   the driver’s or passenger’s side (or both). Hannemann further illustrated
   how the center airbag would inflate and protect occupants in a far-side impact
   such as the one that occurred in this case. Then, he showed how these
   features would have reduced the risk of injury in this case by relying on work
   and crash tests that General Motors and Takata performed when designing,
   testing, and installing a front center airbag in their 2013 vehicles.
          In particular, Hannemann testified that a side impact accident would
   cause a front center airbag to “deploy[] outward initially” and then to “wrap
   around the driver” as he moves into it, causing “cushioning between the
   driver and front passenger” to prevent their heads from striking.
   Importantly, Hannemann explained that this alternative design “would have
   prevented [Su Min’s] serious injury” because the “configuration and
   severity” of the accident were below the parameters of testing by the
   Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, meaning that the crash should have
   been “a survivable accident without serious injury.” And Hannemann

                                          16
Case: 22-40790       Document: 00516959604         Page: 17    Date Filed: 11/07/2023

                                    No. 22-40790

   explained (and Honda’s corporate representative admitted) that “prior to
   the manufacturing of the 2014 Honda CR-V,” it did not “run a side impact
   test with a far side crash test dummy in the test vehicle.” This testimony
   provided a basis for the jury to find Honda did not sufficiently test or design
   its CR-V to account for this accident, which should have survivable without
   serious injury.
          Next, Honda argues the General Motors testing on which
   Hannemann relied was unreliable and insufficient for two reasons. First, it
   argues the testing did not “correlate to the circumstances of the subject
   accident,” and that, if anything, the testing showed only a “possible benefit”
   in a “purely lateral” side impact such that the testing cannot support the
   verdict. This argument is unconvincing. Plaintiffs presented evidence that
   General Motors conducted multiple tests under different crash modes that,
   by implication, addressed the circumstances of this crash, as it was “pretty
   typical.” Thus, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to “conclude that
   [General Motors] would not have designed, tested, patented, and equipped
   its vehicles with a center airbag that would protect occupants from head-to-
   head contact in just one crash mode.”
          Second, Honda contends Hannemann could not rely on the General
   Motors testing because he did not know the size, timing, or fill rate of the
   airbag used in the studies. But this assertion also fails. Hannemann said the
   airbag was “fairly tall” and extended “from the lowest part of the seat all the
   way to the top,” while Honda’s own experts’ testimonies showed that the
   center airbag in those tests would deploy and fill in about 61 milliseconds—
   well before Ji Hun moved to the passenger’s side of the CR-V at
   approximately 90-105 milliseconds. Moreover, Honda’s testing, as well as
   Hannemann’s testimony, addressed the potential risk that the airbag would
   not be fully tethered and would allow the driver’s head to slide past the airbag
   into the passenger’s space.

                                          17
Case: 22-40790      Document: 00516959604            Page: 18    Date Filed: 11/07/2023

                                      No. 22-40790

          Lastly, Hannemann presented sufficient evidence about the utility of
   the center airbag alternative design. He explained that installing the airbag
   would not reduce the utility of the CR-V because “until there is a crash that
   signals it . . . you wouldn’t even know it’s there.” Hannemann also
   addressed concerns that occupants could be injured when the center airbag
   inflates, citing his automotive engineering experience and General Motors’
   testing and published articles. Honda’s expert agreed, explaining that
   General Motors addressed these concerns by having the center airbag delay
   shortly after the initial airbag deployment to avoid injuries.
          In sum, Honda’s contentions that the center airbag evidence is
   insufficient are meritless and address the weight of the evidence, not its
   sufficiency. Honda raised these arguments during proceedings before the
   district court. It failed to persuade the jury, the district court, and this Court.
                                           3.
          Third, Honda attacks the sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ evidence that a
   reverse geometry seatbelt would, in reasonable probability, significantly
   reduce the risk of Su Min’s injury without substantially impairing the CR-
   V’s utility. This argument fails for reasons similar to Honda’s contentions
   about the sufficiency of evidence of the center airbag design.
          As the district court noted, “Hannemann and Ziejewski discussed in
   detail the purpose and engineering behind reverse geometry seatbelts.” They
   explained the relevant risks, the potential impact on utility, and the benefits
   of the reverse geometry seatbelts. To start, the experts used demonstrations
   and 3D animations to show the jury how reversing the direction of the
   seatbelts—such that the shoulder belt crosses over the driver’s right
   shoulder, and the passenger’s left shoulder—would “prevent[] the driver[]
   from slipping out of the belt, and restrain[] them” during a far-side impact.

                                           18
Case: 22-40790     Document: 00516959604            Page: 19    Date Filed: 11/07/2023

                                     No. 22-40790

          Hannemann also testified that these alternative seatbelts have
   undergone “a significant amount of testing” and have been installed on
   Dodge Vipers, an experimental Honda vehicle, and in the rear seats of
   BMWs. Although one of the tests supporting Hannemann’s opinion involved
   a rollover and not a T-bone crash, Hannemann concluded that the reverse
   seatbelt would still provide the same benefits in the Kims’ side-impact crash
   because “the non-leading side occupant [in a rollover crash] . . . would be
   similar to the person on the far side” of a side impact, as the same forces
   would “make [the occupant] slip out of the belt.” Hannemann’s testimony
   and the studies on which he relied provided sufficient evidence for the jury
   to find that the reverse geometry seatbelt design would have prevented or
   reduced the risk of Su Min’s injury. As the Plaintiffs explain:
          To prevent or reduce the risk of the head-to-head contact that
          caused Su Min’s injury, the reverse geometry seatbelt on the
          driver’s side only needed to restrain Ji Hun’s upper torso just
          enough to restrict his head from moving all the way into Su
          Min’s passenger space. And the evidence established a
          reasonable probability that a reverse geometry seatbelt would
          have done just that, especially in light of Hannemann’s further
          testimony that the “configuration and severity” of this
          accident were below the parameters of IIHS’s testing and the
          accident was therefore “survivable . . . without serious
          injury.”
          On appeal, Honda argues the reverse geometry seatbelts would impair
   the CR-V’s utility because they could (1) cause neck injuries; (2) allow an
   occupant to move toward the near-side impact; (3) be rejected by the public;
   (4) cause the buckle to open in a near-side impact; or (5) require the
   installation of all-belts-to-seat systems, which have their own disadvantages.
   But there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that all of these concerns
   could be mitigated or outweighed by the benefits of the alternative design.

                                          19
Case: 22-40790     Document: 00516959604           Page: 20    Date Filed: 11/07/2023

                                    No. 22-40790

          First, Hannemann explained that load limiters can “eliminate” the
   risk of neck injuries from these reverse geometry seatbelts. He also detailed
   how the CR-V’s door panels and side curtain airbags would prevent
   occupants from slipping out and protect them from near-side impacts, and
   that conventional seatbelts do little to address this concern, so that “you’re
   not really losing any protection” by installing reverse geometry seatbelts.
   Furthermore, Hannemann noted that reverse geometry seatbelts have been
   used for decades and that public rejection is not a significant risk because the
   belts use “the same type of ergonomics” as conventional seatbelts. This
   opinion was based on Hannemann’s engineering judgment and decades of
   automotive design experience, as well as a published paper authored by
   BMW in 1987 that describes increased belt usage from reverse geometry
   seatbelts in backseats. Hannemann also addressed Honda’s fourth concern,
   explaining that buckle designs have improved and that there have been no
   reports of any issues with the buckles’ locations in BMW’s vehicles that have
   reverse geometry seatbelts.37 Lastly, Hannemann addressed the potential
   disadvantages of an all-belts-to-seat system (which is required to mount
   reverse geometry seatbelts), explaining there were also significant
   advantages—i.e., “[t]he seatbelt . . . moves with you as you adjust the seat”
   while the belt remains in the “optimal location.” He also said these seats
   have been produced since the late 1990s, and the risks associated with them
   have been addressed.
          Considering this evidence in the light most favorable to the Kims,
   there is sufficient evidence for the jury to find that both the reverse geometry
   seatbelt and the center airbag would be a safer alternative within the meaning

          _____________________
          37
           Notably, Honda’s expert acknowledged the buckle is “designed to overcome
   some compressive forces” and doubted it “would release from accelerations.”

                                         20
Case: 22-40790     Document: 00516959604           Page: 21   Date Filed: 11/07/2023

                                    No. 22-40790

   of § 82.005(b). Thus, the district court was correct to deny Honda’s motion
   for a JMOL.
                                         B.
          Additionally, Honda challenges whether Plaintiffs provided sufficient
   evidence for the jury to determine that either alternative design—the center
   airbag or reverse geometry seatbelt—was economically and technologically
   feasible.
          After reviewing the record, this Court finds Plaintiffs presented
   sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable juror to find there were feasible,
   available alternative designs. Hannemann opined that Honda could install the
   airbag in the CR-V because the center airbag had already been used in three
   vehicles manufactured by General Motors (which Honda’s expert
   acknowledged on cross-examination) and would cost only twenty to thirty
   dollars per vehicle. Hannemann further testified that using reverse geometry
   seatbelts was also feasible: the seatbelt had been tested in the 1970s and
   1980s, and it had been used in the front seats of a late 1990s BMW vehicle (as
   well as in the rear seat of a pre-2014 vehicle). Finally, Hannemann explained
   that adding the seatbelts, along with the required all-belts-to-seat design,
   would increase the cost of each vehicle by only about thirty dollars.
          This evidence, considered in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs,
   is sufficient for the jury to find at least one of these alternative designs
   economically and technologically feasible. While Honda may dispute the cost
   of these alternatives, it may not plausibly claim there was insufficient
   evidence.
                                         V.
          Finally, Honda argues the district court erred in finding the Texas
   presumption of nonliability inapplicable and not instructing the jury about it.

                                         21
Case: 22-40790         Document: 00516959604            Page: 22       Date Filed: 11/07/2023

                                         No. 22-40790

   To be clear, Texas tort law provides a rebuttable presumption of nonliability
   in certain product liability actions:
           In a products liability action brought against a product
           manufacturer or seller, there is a rebuttable presumption that the
           product manufacturer or seller is not liable for any injury to a
           claimant caused by some aspect of the formulation, labeling, or
           design of a product if the product manufacturer or seller
           establishes that the product’s formula, labeling, or design
           complied with mandatory safety standards or regulations adopted
           and promulgated by the federal government, or an agency of the
           federal government, that were applicable to the product at the time
           of manufacture and that governed the product risk that allegedly
           caused harm.38
           The last portion of the presumption—that there were federal
   standards governing the product risk allegedly causing the harm—was the
   only one disputed at trial. Meeting this element is a prerequisite to receiving
   a jury instruction about the presumption: defendants are not entitled to the
   instruction if they fail to establish “compliance ‘with mandatory [federal]
   safety standards . . . that governed the product risk that allegedly caused the
   harm.’”39 The task is identifying the product risk and any connection to
   federal safety standards, as the Texas legislature’s purpose in enacting the
   presumption was to address situations where “manufacturers and sellers
   were being held liable in products liability cases even though the products at
   issue complied with all applicable federal safety standards.”40

           _____________________
           38
                TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 82.008(a) (emphasis added).
           39
             Trenado v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 465 F. App’x 375, 379 (5th Cir. 2012) (per
   curiam) (unpublished) (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 82.008(a)).
           40
             Kia Motors Corp. v. Ruiz, 432 S.W.3d 865, 869 (Tex. 2014) (emphasis added).
   Once the presumption is found applicable, it may be rebutted if plaintiffs show either “(1)
   the mandatory federal safety standards or regulations applicable to the product were
   inadequate to protect the public from unreasonable risks of injury or damage; or (2) the

                                               22
Case: 22-40790          Document: 00516959604               Page: 23    Date Filed: 11/07/2023

                                           No. 22-40790

           Treating the applicability of the presumption as a question of law, the
   district court defined the product risk allegedly causing Plaintiffs’ injuries as
   “the risk of injury from a far-side impact during a near-side collision,”
   finding no federal standard applied (governed the product risk as defined by
   the district court). The district court denied Honda’s requested jury
   instruction.41
           Honda agrees that, under the district court’s conception of the
   product risk, there is no applicable federal standard. In other words, it does
   not dispute that the presumption is inapplicable given the district court’s
   definition of the product risk. Nonetheless, on appeal, Honda argues (1) the
   jury, not the district court, should have decided whether the presumption
   applied; and (2) the district court erred by defining the product risk narrowly.
           After reviewing the statutory text, the precedent of this Court, and
   Texas state court case law, this Court finds the district court committed no
           _____________________
   manufacturer, before or after marketing the product, withheld or misrepresented
   information or material relevant to the federal government’s or agency’s determination of
   adequacy of the safety standards or regulations at issue in the action.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
   REM. CODE § 82.008(b).
           41
                Honda’s requested jury instructions read:
           You are entitled to presume that American Honda is not liable for any
           injury to the Plaintiffs if the evidence establishes that the 2014 Honda CR-
           V complied with mandatory safety standards or regulations adopted and
           promulgated by the federal government, or an agency of the federal
           government, that were applicable to the 2014 Honda CR-V at the time of
           its manufacture that governed the product risk that allegedly caused harm.
           Plaintiffs may rebut the presumption by evidence establishing that (1) the
           mandatory federal safety standards or regulations applicable to the product
           were inadequate to protect the public from unreasonable risks of injury or
           damage; or (2) the manufacturer, before or after marketing the product,
           withheld or misrepresented information or material relevant to the federal
           government’s or agency’s determination of adequacy of the safety
           standards or regulations at issue in the action.

                                                23
Case: 22-40790         Document: 00516959604                Page: 24      Date Filed: 11/07/2023

                                             No. 22-40790

   error. The district court was correct to treat the instruction’s applicability as
   a question of law, to define the product risk in a case-specific way, and to rule
   the presumption inapplicable because no federal standard governed the
   appropriately-defined product risk at issue.42
                                                 A.
           To start, Honda’s assertion that the jury, not the court, should have
   decided whether the presumption applies is meritless. Honda relies on three
   intermediate appellate cases to support its contentions, but these arguments
   are foreclosed by the Texas Supreme Court’s holding in Kia Motors
   Corporation v. Ruiz, to which this Court must adhere.
           Kia illustrates the principle that whether the statutory presumption is
   applicable is a question of law.43 The Kia court thoroughly analyzed the
   statute, the product risk, and potential federal regulations before holding that
   no federal standard governed the product risk, such that the presumption was
   inapplicable.44 Its discussion made no mention or insinuation that these
   questions were fit for a jury. Moreover, the court decided to review the
   applicability of the presumption de novo, further supporting the conclusion

           _____________________
           42
              Parties have offered competing standards of review for these questions. Plaintiffs
   assert this Court should apply an abuse of discretion standard, as this Court reviews
   preserved claims of errors in jury instructions for an abuse of discretion. See Wright v. Ford
   Motor Co., 508 F.3d 263, 268 (5th Cir. 2007). Honda argues the Court should apply two
   standards: de novo review as to whether the presumption applies (considering the question
   to be one of statutory interpretation) and abuse of discretion as to whether the district court
   erred by not instructing the jury about the presumption. See, e.g., Janvey, 856 F.3d at 388
   (“Jury instructions are reviewed for abuse of discretion. . . . Instructions that hinge on a
   question of statutory construction are reviewed de novo.”). Under either standard,
   Honda’s arguments fail.
           43
                Kia, 432 S.W.3d at 869–74.
           44
                Id.

                                                 24
Case: 22-40790           Document: 00516959604              Page: 25        Date Filed: 11/07/2023

                                            No. 22-40790

   that the question is one of law.45 Thus, Texas treats the question of whether
   the presumption applies as one of law, and we must do so here.46
           Moreover, this Court’s analysis in Wright v. Ford Motor Company
   tacitly supports this conclusion.47 In Wright, this Court analyzed whether the
   presumption was applicable and then explained that a “fact question as

           _____________________
           45
                Id. at 869.
           46
               Although not binding on this Court, we address the three cases Honda cites
   (erroneously) to support its contentions. First, Honda cites Trenado v. Cooper Tire Rubber
   & Co., an unpublished case in this Circuit where the district court submitted a jury
   instruction about the presumption that allowed the jury to decide whether it applied. 465
   F. App’x at 378–80. But Trenado is not instructive: it does not speak to whether, as a matter
   of law, it was correct for the jury to decide the statute’s applicability. Instead, the plaintiffs
   failed to object on the ground that no federal standard governed the product risk, triggering
   only a plain error review of that question. Id. This Court found it was not plain error to
   submit the instruction because the product risk was expressly governed by a federal
   standard.
            Second, Honda misreads Hamid v. Lexus, where the Court of Appeals of Texas
   held that “[u]nder the plain language of Section 82.008(a) . . . the threshold determination
   of whether the presumption applies turns on the relevant product risk, not the particular
   defect alleged by the plaintiff.” Hamid v. Lexus, 369 S.W.3d 291, 300 (Tex. App.—Houston
   [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.). Honda claims Hamid shows that the applicability of the
   presumption can be a jury question because the court affirmed the jury instruction that
   included the presumption. However, Honda overlooks that the question before the Texas
   appellate court was whether the product risk or the product defect controls the applicability
   of the presumption, not when the jury is to receive an instruction about the presumption or
   what is fit for the jury to decide. Id. at 296–97. It is true that the trial court in Hamid
   provided the jury with an instruction allowing it to decide whether the presumption
   applied, but that decision is neither binding nor persuasive on this Court.
           Third, Honda’s reliance on American Honda Motor Co. v. Milburn is misplaced. No.
   05-19-0850-CV, 2021 WL 5504887, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 24, 2021, pet. granted)
   (mem. op.). In that case, the trial court did allow the jury to decide whether the
   presumption was met; however, this unpublished opinion is not binding on this Court. Id.
   Moreover, the parties in Milburn did not assert on appeal that the question should have
   been left for the courts, so the state court did not address that question. Id. at *12–17.
           47
                508 F.3d at 274.

                                                  25
Case: 22-40790           Document: 00516959604          Page: 26       Date Filed: 11/07/2023

                                         No. 22-40790

   whether the presumption has been rebutted will be submitted to the jury.”48
   This approach implies that whether the presumption is applicable is a
   question of law for the court, and whether the presumption has been rebutted
   is a question of fact for the jury.
                                               B.
           Honda further attacks the district court’s definition of the product
   risk. Honda argues the product risk should have been defined as “the risk of
   injury in a side-impact collision.” The district court rejected Honda’s
   definition, opting instead for a more specific one: “the risk of injury from a
   far-side impact during a near-side collision.” After reviewing Texas
   precedent and this Circuit’s case law, we find no error in the district court’s
   analysis.
           This Court has addressed the presumption directly in two cases, and
   in each, the Court has looked carefully at how the issue and risks were framed
   throughout the litigation. First, in Wright, the Plaintiffs filed a product
   liability wrongful death and survival action against Ford, arguing that a design
   and manufacturing defect caused their son’s death. 49 The Court found that
   “[t]he risk that caused the harm and forms the basis of the Wrights’ suit is
   the rear blindspot” of the vehicle.50 Second, this Court in Trenado considered
   the different federal standards at issue, and how the witnesses and parties

           _____________________
           48
             Id. (second emphasis added); see also Trenado, 465 F. App’x at 379 (noting that a
   defendant is not entitled to the presumption unless the defendant illustrates adherence to
   “mandatory [federal] safety standards . . . that governed the product risk that allegedly
   caused the harm.”). Wright and Trenado suggest that the court, not the jury, must decide
   whether a defendant is entitled to a jury instruction that provides the rebuttable
   presumption.
           49
                508 F.3d at 266.
           50
                Id. at 270.

                                               26
Case: 22-40790          Document: 00516959604            Page: 27     Date Filed: 11/07/2023

                                          No. 22-40790

   framed the relevant risks and defects, in order to properly define the product
   risk. 51 It found the risk that caused the harm was “tire failure” related to
   durability, rather than the Plaintiff’s suggestion of the tire’s “undue
   propensity for late-life catastrophic tread separation failure.”52
           District courts in this Circuit have also conducted a fact-intensive
   inquiry to identify the relevant product risk, and they have considered the
   nature and purposes of different federal standards at issue when determining
   how to define the risk. In Hinson v. Dorel Juvenile Group, Inc., the court held
   the product risk causing injuries to Hinson’s child riding in a forward-facing
   car seat was the “‘potential risk of enhanced and serious injury to very young
   children resulting from being positioned in the subject forward facing car
   seat’ as opposed to a rear-facing car seat” instead of “injury for a child in
   forward versus rear-facing car seats, as well as the seating criteria for that
   risk.”53 And in Ramos v. Stellantis North American, the court held the product
   risk was “fire spread[ing] into the passenger compartment at a rate that
   prevented the occupants from safely exiting the vehicle” rather than “fire
   entering the vehicle from outside via the rear vent flap.” 54
           Texas courts have also preferred case-specific conceptions of product
   risk. In Kia, a Texas Court of Appeals reviewed the legislative history of the
   statute and held that the legislature did not intend to create overly broad
   constructions of risk.55 In doing so, it determined that the product risk in the
           _____________________
           51
             465 F. App’x at 380. Notably, this Court in Trenado applied only a plain error
   standard of review.
           52
                Id. at 379–81.
           53
                No. 2:15-CV-713-JRG-RSP, 2016 WL 3361480, at *2–3 (E.D. Tex. June 9, 2016).
           54
                No. 2:21-CV-00099, 2022 WL 3595140, at *11 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2022).
           55
             348 S.W.3d 465, 471–475 (Tex. App. 2011), rev’d on other grounds, 432 S.W.3d
   865 (Tex. 2014).

                                               27
Case: 22-40790        Document: 00516959604            Page: 28   Date Filed: 11/07/2023

                                        No. 22-40790

   case was “the failure of a frontal airbag to deploy” and not the broader “risk
   of occupant injury in a crash.”56 It adopted a case-specific description of the
   risk that specified how a person may be harmed by a design defect.57
          Case-specific definitions of the product risk also comport with the
   statutory language, which calls for the court to consider the specific “product
   risk that allegedly caused harm” in a given action. 58 As explained in Kia: “the
   plain language of [S]ection 82.008 requires that a safety regulation govern
   product risk, not a particular product defect,” and the court “must closely
   examine both the product risk arising from an alleged design defect and the
   parameters of the regulation at issue in evaluating whether the
   manufacturer’s compliance with that regulation entitles it to a presumption
   of nonliability to an injured claimant.”59
          Kia, as well as other case law previously discussed, support the district
   court’s fact-specific definition of product risk. Indeed, characterizing the risk
   as “injury in a side-impact collision” (as Honda requests) disregards the crux
   of this case: Plaintiffs presented unrefuted evidence that the side-impact
   collision itself was not the cause of Su Min’s injuries, and that restraint
   systems addressing the risk of side-impact collisions (e.g., the side structure,
   the side airbags, the door panel, and the passenger’s seatbelt) performed
   properly and were not defective. Rather, the injuries were the result of a far-
   side impact—Ji Hun’s head hitting Su Min’s head. These injuries align
   closely with the district court’s careful description of the product risk.
   Moreover, characterizing the risk as broadly as Honda argues would

          _____________________
          56
               Id.
          57
               Id.
          58
               TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 82.008(a).
          59
               432 S.W.3d at 873–74.

                                             28
Case: 22-40790          Document: 00516959604       Page: 29    Date Filed: 11/07/2023

                                     No. 22-40790

   erroneously allow the presumption “to apply in every case involving any type
   of side-impact collision, regardless of plaintiff’s alleged harm,” in direct
   contradiction to the text of the statute that emphasizes a consideration of the
   plaintiff’s harm in every application. Finally, it signifies that before this
   accident other manufacturers had seen this risk and made the needed
   changes—that is, the industry, Honda apart, had seen the very risk that
   brought the horrific injuries here.
                                          C.
          After defining the product risk to reflect the cause of harm and the
   specific facts at issue here, the next step in the analysis is to consider whether
   there is a federal regulation or standard that governs the risk. The answer is
   no.
          Kia is instructive. After first defining the product risk narrowly, the
   Texas Supreme Court then sought an equally specific federal standard that
   would govern that risk.60 It found, ultimately, that “[n]othing in [the federal
   standard] suggests a purpose of reducing the likelihood of an air bag’s failure
   to deploy under circumstances in which everyone agrees it should have
   deployed,” so no federal standard governed the product risk, and the
   presumption thus did not apply.61
          Here, the district court was correct to conclude that no federal
   standard governed the product risk of a far-side impact injury during a side-
   impact collision. As the district court observed, “every single expert who
   testified at trial . . . agreed” that no federal regulation or standard is
   “designed to protect the near-side occupant in a collision from far-side

          _____________________
          60
               Id.
          61
               Id. at 874.

                                          29
Case: 22-40790     Document: 00516959604            Page: 30    Date Filed: 11/07/2023

                                     No. 22-40790

   impact injuries.” This assessment even includes Honda’s corporate
   representative, who agreed on cross-examination that there are no
   government standards requiring manufacturers to design technologies
   addressing countermeasures for far-side impact injuries or to address the risk
   of occupant-to-occupant injuries in a side impact. Despite these admissions,
   the district court still evaluated four potential federal standards and ruled that
   none “govern the product risk at issue.” Specifically, it engaged in a
   comprehensive analysis of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards 208, 210,
   211, and 214 before finding that none addressed the risk of a far-side impact
   injury in a side-impact crash; instead, they were focused on, inter alia, seat
   belt failure, front-crashes, assembly anchorages, and side doors.
          Because there is no applicable federal standard that applies to the
   properly defined product risk, the district court properly rejected the
   instruction about the presumption.

                                       *****
          Honda attempts to escape this jury verdict by arguing the district
   court erred in three ways: by admitting Plaintiffs’ experts, denying its JMOL
   motion, and denying its proposed instruction about the nonliability
   presumption. But it is incorrect on all fronts. The Plaintiffs’ experts based
   their opinions on reliable methodologies and provided relevant, helpful
   testimony. As such, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find Honda
   liable for the Kims’ injuries. The district court’s application of the Texas
   statutory presumption of nonliability was also faithful to the statutory text,
   the precedent of Texas, and the precedent of this Court. We AFFIRM.

                                          30