Court Opinion

ID: 9431582
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:32:38.311862+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:29.195141
License: Public Domain

Justice White,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
I join Parts I, II, and III of Justice O’Connor’s opinion. Otherwise, I concu,r only in the judgment.
*317Our opinion in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U. S. 293, 297 (1967), authored by Justice Brennan, articulated a three-factor formula for determining the retroactivity of decisions changing the constitutional rules of criminal procedure. The formula, which applied whether a case was on direct review or arose in collateral proceedings, involved consideration of the purpose of the new rule, the extent of reliance on the old rule, and the effect on the administration of justice of retroactive application of the new rule. In a series of cases, however, the Court has departed from Stovall and has held that decisions changing the governing rules in criminal cases will be applied retroactively to all cases then pending on direct review, e. g., United States v. Johnson, 457 U. S. 537 (1982); Shea v. Louisiana, 470 U. S. 51 (1985); Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U. S. 314 (1987). I dissented in those cases, believing that Stovall was the sounder approach. Other Justices, including the Chief Justice and Justice O’Connor, joined my dissents in those cases. The Chief Justice indicated in Shea and Griffith, and Justice O’Connor has now concluded, that the Stovall formula should also be abandoned in cases where convictions have become final and the issue of retroactivity arises in collateral proceedings.
I regret the course the Court has taken to this point, but cases like Johnson, Shea, and Griffith have been decided, and I have insufficient reason to continue to object to them. In light of those decisions, the result reached in Parts IV and V of Justice O’Connor’s opinion is an acceptable application in collateral proceedings of the theories embraced by the Court in cases dealing with direct review, and I concur in that result. If we are wrong in construing the reach of the habeas corpus statutes, Congress can of course correct us; but because the Court’s recent decisions dealing with direct review appear to have constitutional underpinnings, see e. g., Griffith v. Kentucky, supra, at 322-323, correction of our error, if error there is, perhaps lies with us, not Congress.