Court Opinion

ID: 9791090
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:05:13.797012+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:33.940142
License: Public Domain

Fontron, J.,
dissenting: I find myself wholly unable to agree with the majority opinion which adopts a technical viewpoint unsupported, in my opinion, by our prior decisions.
The sole point to be determined on this appeal is, as stated by *637Justice Wertz in the court’s opinion, whether the plaintiff’s mechanic’s lien statement is properly verified. The verification reads:
“State of Kansas, Allen County, ss:
I do solemnly swear that I am the claimant above named and that the foregoing statement is true in every particular.
_W. L. Johnston_
“Subscribed and sworn to before me this 31st day of July, 1962.
Com. Exp: 5-3-65 _Berenice Dobie_
(Seal) Notary Public”
In its memorandum decision directing summary judgment in the defendant’s favor, the trial court stated, “The conclusion is unavoidable that the lien statement was not verified by claimant Ekstrom United Supply Company.” This conclusion I believe to be untenable. The statute under which the plaintiff claims its Hen, G. S. 1961 Supp., 60-1403, provides only that the lien statement is to be “verified by affidavits.” Neither the form of the vertification nor the contents of the affidavits are specified. Nor does the statute direct by whom the verification is to be executed.
It is obvious, of course, that a corporate lien claimant, such as the plaintiff in this case, cannot, as a corporation either sign a lien statement or verify one. Both statement and verification must be signed and executed by some individual acting for and on behalf of the corporation.
In the early case of Delahay v. Goldie, 17 Kan. 263, this court held that a mechanic’s hen statement may be verified by án agent of a claimant and this much, I assume, would be conceded by the defendant. However, it is contended that W. L. Johnston, in signing the verification, acted not as tire agent of Ekstrom, but as a claimant on his own behalf. This contention overlooks two salient facts: First, that in the lien statement itself, Ekstrom United Supply Company is named as the claimant, and second, that the hen statement is executed in the name of Ekstrom by Johnston, as shown by the attached signature, as follows:
“Witness the hand of said claimant this 31st day of July, 1962.
Ekstrom United Supply Company
By_W. L. Johnston_
Claimant”
The hen statement must be considered in its entirety, both body and verification together. Its validity must be ascertained from its four comers. When the instrument is so construed, it is obvious that Johnston is not the claimant himself, but acts simply as an agent, *638and that his verification is executed in a representative capacity only.
I find no Kansas cases directly in point, but a few of our early decisions are illuminating and persuasive. In Deatherage v. Woods, 37 Kan. 59, 14 Pac. 474, the sufficiency of a verification was questioned, and in holding the hen to be properly verified, the court said:
“It is claimed, however, that the statement is not properly verified by affidavit. The verification may be a little irregular, or a little informal, and yet we think it is sufficient. It was verified by William I. Ewart. He is one of the plaintiffs in this action, and is one of the partners who furnished the building materials for which this action is brought, and for which this lien is claimed. His name indicates who he is, and the evidence shows it. The verification itself shows that he verified the statement ‘for Deatherage & Ewart, claimant.’ This we think is sufficient. . . .” (pp. 62, 63.)
A somewhat similar situation was considered in Lumber Co. v. Osborn, 40 Kan. 168, 19 Pac. 656, in which the court said:
“The final objection is, that the verification of the statement is not sufficient. It is not verified by the claimants, or any member of the firm, but was sworn to by Jos. M. Eck, who signed the same in behalf of the claimants as manager. The statute does not prescribe by whom the verification shall be made, but it has been held that a verification by an agent satisfies the statutory requirement, and certainly the word ‘manager’ denotes agency as clearly as if the term ‘agent’ had been used. (Delahay v. Goldie, 17 Kan. 263.) The verification was signed ‘Jos. M. Eck, manager claimant.’ It would have been more certain and satisfactory if the preposition ‘of or ‘for’ had preceded the word ‘claimant,’ but no one could be misled by the omission. The claim was made in behalf of the Chicago Lumber Company, and is presented and verified by Jos. M. Eck, who signs himself as manager. Attached to the statement and made a part thereof is the bill of items purchased by Osborn from the Chicago Lumber Company, and which is signed by Eck as manager. It is obvious that the word ‘of’ or ‘for’ was accidentally omitted; but that Eck was the manager for claimant is almost as clearly implied and well understood, when the whole instrument is taken together, as if the omission had not occurred.” (pp. 172, 173.)
I believe that in the instant case the implication of Johnston s agency is clear and may not he misunderstood.
Of special significance is the language found in Hentig v. Sperry, 38 Kan. 459, 17 Pac. 42, in which the sufficiency of a mechanic’s lien was involved. In this case neither the statement nor the verification was signed and, in holding the statement insufficient to establish a lien, the court stated:
“. . . The statement filed by Whaley was not signed, nor was the affidavit signed. It does not appear from the statement, or the papers with it connected, that the claimant ever verified the same. The notary certified that the statement was subscribed and sworn to on the 23d day of March, 1881, *639but he does not state who subscribed the same, or swore to the same; and in fact, as before stated, the affidavit was not subscribed by the claimant, or any other person. If it had been shown upon the trial that the claimant had signed his name to the affidavit, the objection to the alleged lien would be insufficient. . . .” (p. 461.) (Emphasis supplied.)
In the present case, plaintiff’s second amended petition alleges that Johnston was at all times the agent of plaintiff, and so signed the statement. If such were to be shown upon trial of this action, surely that would be sufficient, under the language of the above case, to remedy whatever irregularity may have inhered in the verification.
None of the cases cited in the majority opinion appear to be squarely in point. Not one of them presents a factual situation comparable to that before us. In Reeves v. Kansas Coöp. Wheat Mk’t. Ass’n., 136 Kan. 306, 15 P. 2d 446, on which the court seems chiefly to rely, the statement was not verified at all: it was acknowledged. The distinction between a verification and an acknowledgment is too well recognized and understood to require extensive comment. It is enough to say that the two are not equivalents; an acknowledgment serves a quite different purpose than does a verification.
The rule in this state has long been that in the enforcement of mechanics’ liens, a liberal construction of the law must be applied. In Nixon v. Cydon Lodge, 56 Kan. 298, 43 Pac. 236, it was said: “. . . The law is entitled to a liberal interpretation in its application to all persons . . . who are within the protection of the statute . . .” (p. 304.) (See also Bassett, Trustee, v. Carpenter, 114 Kan. 828, 220 Pac. 1028; Bridgeport Machine Co. v. McKnab, 136 Kan. 781, 18 P. 2d 186.)
When judged in the light of the foregoing rule, the plaintiff’s lien statement, considered from its four comers, appears to be adequate. In my opinion, this cause should be remanded for trial on its merits and I, therefore, respectfully dissent.
Robb, J., joins in the foregoing dissenting opinion.