Court Opinion

ID: 9632380
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:12:43.180342+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:37:48.573474
License: Public Domain

ROBERT L. Brown, Justice, dissenting. I dissent because the reasoning of the majority is flawed. At issue in this case is the following exclusion in State Farm’s insurance policy: SECTION II — EXCLUSIONS Coverage L and Coverage M do not apply to: A. Bodily injury or property damage; (1) which is either expected or intended by an insured; or (2) to any person or property which is the result of wilful and malicious acts of an insured. The majority holds that this section of the policy is ambiguous. According to the majority, to be absolutely clear the exclusions should read this way: SECTION II — EXCLUSIONS Coverage L and coverage M do not apply to: A. Bodily injury or property damage; (1) which is either expected or intended by an insured; or (2) to any person or property which is the result of wilful and malicious acts of an insured which result is specifically intended by an insured. The majority’s conclusion is illogical. Section A(2) excludes all willful and malicious acts committed against a person, irrespective of whether the insured intended to actually inflict the precise injury. Why is that unclear? What the majority seeks to do is limit the exclusion only to malicious acts where the result of bodily injury is specifically intended by the insured. But that is not how the exclusion reads. And that is not what the policy provides or what Ms. Norris agreed to. This is not the situation we dealt with in Talley v. MFA Mut. Ins. Co., 273 Ark. 269, 620 S.W.2d 260 (1981), where this court interpreted the language in A(l). In that case, the issue under Section A(l) was whether the “accident” policy covered unintended results from intentional acts of the insured. We held that the policy was ambiguous on that point. In the instant case, Section A(2) is clear that all results from willful and malicious acts are excluded. It does not make any difference whether those results were subjectively intended by the insured or not. Our holding today makes our jurisdiction a minority of one. No other jurisdiction has interpreted comparable language to Section A(2) as ambiguous; nor has any jurisdiction added the limiting language that the majority seeks to add to the policy exclusion. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Martin, et al, 710 N.E.2d 1228 (Ill. 1999) (exclusion in liability policy for bodily injury that is the result of willful and malicious acts of the insured was not ambiguous and did not depend on the subjective intent of the insured); McCauley v. Estes, 726 So.2d 719 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998) (exclusion in homeowner’s policy for bodily injury resulting from willful or malicious acts of the insured focuses on the acts of the insured and not on whether the insured intended to cause the injury); Jeansonne v. Detillier, 656 So.2d 689 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (exclusion in homeowner’s policy for bodily injury resulting from willful and malicious acts of insured excludes damages for such injury regardless of whether the insured intended the specific injury or not); Keathley v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 594 So.2d 963 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (reversed the trial court and held that exclusion in homeowner’s policy for bodily injury resulting from willful and malicious acts applied, even though insured did not intend the severity of the bodily injuries caused by his blow to plaintiff’s head). Rather, all of these jurisdictions refused to read into the exclusionary language a requirement that the insured specifically intend to cause the resulting bodily injury. The majority does attempt to cite authority for its unique interpretation, but the cases cited are clearly distinguishable. In Baugh v. Redmond, 565 So.2d 953 (La. Ct. App. 1990), the court interpreted language similar to A(l), but not language similar to A(2). The Louisiana Court of Appeals specifically distinguished the Baugh case for that reason in Keathley v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., supra, and held in favor of State Farm’s position as has already been shown. The same is true of the second and third cases cited by the majority in that the appellate courts in those cases interpreted language that is not even remotely similar to the A(2) language in the instant case. See Vermont Mut. Ins. Co. v. Singleton, 446 S.E.2d 417 (S.C. 1994). Schexnider v. McGuill, 526 So.2d 513 (La. Ct. App. 1988). The majority stands alone in its unprecedented interpretation, which is a patent rewrite of the policy language. I would affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. Imber and SMITH, JJ., join.