Court Opinion

ID: 9927900
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-30 16:00:53.144979+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:29:13.013129
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-9582       Document: 010110992011       Date Filed: 01/30/2024     Page: 1
                                                                                    FILED
                                                                        United States Court of Appeals
                         UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         Tenth Circuit

                                 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                        January 30, 2024
                             _________________________________
                                                                            Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                                Clerk of Court
  MARIO GUZMAN-CORONA,

        Petitioner,

  v.                                                            No. 22-9582
                                                            (Petition for Review)
  MERRICK B. GARLAND, Untied States
  Attorney General,

        Respondent.
                             _________________________________

                                          ORDER*
                             _________________________________

 Before TYMKOVICH, McHUGH, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.
                  _________________________________

        An Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied Petitioner Mario Guzman-Corona’s

 application for cancellation of removal. The Board of Immigration Appeal (“BIA”)

 dismissed his appeal. Petitioner has filed a petition for review. We dismiss the petition

 for lack of jurisdiction.

        *
          After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
 this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 ordered submitted without oral argument. This order is not binding precedent, except
 under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be
 cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and
 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 22-9582    Document: 010110992011        Date Filed: 01/30/2024       Page: 2

                                            I.

       In 1997, Petitioner, a citizen and native of Mexico, entered the United States

 without authorization. Twenty years later, the United States government began

 removal proceedings. Petitioner applied for Cancellation of Removal for Certain

 Nonpermanent Residents under § 240A(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act

 (“INA”), codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). During the proceedings, Petitioner

 testified that he saw his children almost daily and paid child support. Petitioner

 expressed concern that he would never see his children again as their mother, his ex-

 wife, made no effort to have the children visit him while he was in detainment. And

 he feared emotional and financial harm for his children upon his removal. The IJ

 denied Petitioner’s application because he did not establish that his children would

 suffer exceptional and extremely unusual hardship upon his removal.

       Petitioner appealed the IJ’s denial and requested to remand the record for

 additional consideration of his application. Petitioner presented new evidence that,

 after his ex-wife moved to another city, his oldest child decided to live with him. He

 also claimed that his oldest child cannot pay for his college and living expenses

 alone, and thus will be unable to attend college. Despite the additional evidence, the

 BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision and denied Petitioner’s request for remand,

 concluding that Petitioner’s children would not experience exceptional and extremely

 unusual hardship. Petitioner appeals.

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Appellate Case: 22-9582    Document: 010110992011         Date Filed: 01/30/2024     Page: 3

                                            II.

       Because a single member of the BIA issued an order affirming the IJ's decision,

 we review both the BIA's decision and any parts of the IJ's decision upon which the BIA

 relied. Dallakoti v. Holder, 619 F.3d 1264, 1267 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Razkane v.

 Holder, 562 F.3d 1283, 1287 (10th Cir.2009)). We lack jurisdiction to review the

 BIA’s discretionary decision on whether a petitioner’s qualifying relative will suffer

 an exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. Galeano-Romero v. Barr, 968 F.3d

 1176, 1182–83 (10th Cir. 2020) (discussing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)). But under

 “§ 1252(a)(2)(D), we retain jurisdiction over questions of law that arise from the

 [BIA’s] hardship determination.” As such, “we have jurisdiction to review a claim

 that the [BIA] departed from its own adopted hardship standard, by ignoring it or

 favoring some other inapplicable standard.” Id. (citing Aburto-Rocha v. Mukasey,

 535 F.3d 500, 503 (6th Cir. 2008)). We review questions of law de novo.

 Martinez-Perez v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1273, 1277 (10th Cir. 2020) (citing Sosa-

 Valenzuela v. Holder, 692 F.3d 1103, 1109 (10th Cir. 2012)).

       Petitioner argues that the BIA departed from its legal precedent when the BIA

 and the IJ failed to account for the totality of the circumstances. Petitioner is

 incorrect. The BIA did not depart from its legal precedent. For cancellation of

 removal, the IJ must consider all hardship factors in the aggregate. Monreal-

 Aguinaga, 23 I&N Dec. 56, 64 (2001). Here, the IJ determined that “none of

 [Petitioner’s hardship] factors individually rise to the level of exceptional and

 extremely unusual hardship. And in the aggregate, they do not meet that burden as

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Appellate Case: 22-9582    Document: 010110992011        Date Filed: 01/30/2024     Page: 4

 well.” The BIA also asserted that the IJ “considered the aggregate effect of the

 relevant factors.” We agree with the BIA and conclude that the IJ considered the

 aggregate effect of the relevant factors. Thus, the IJ and the BIA did not depart from

 legal precedent.

       Petitioner also argues that his situation is indistinguishable from Recinas,

 23 I&N Dec. 467 (BIA 2002), where the petitioner—a single mother of four children

 with United States citizenship and who carried the family’s financial burden—was

 entitled to cancellation of removal. But we lack jurisdiction if “the [IJ and BIA]

 acknowledges its standard and exercises its discretion within the bounds of its

 precedents’ cabining of such discretion.” Galeano-Romero, 968 F.3d at 1183. Here,

 the IJ and BIA considered Recinas in their decision and exercised their discretion

 within the bounds of said precedent. The IJ discussed how Petitioner’s situation was

 more like Monreal-Aguinaga than Recinas. “That the [BIA] has announced a

 standard to aid its hardship determination does not create jurisdiction for us to review

 the [BIA’s] application of that standard.” Galeano-Romero, 968 F.3d at 1183.

 Because the BIA and IJ did not depart from legal precedent, we find no legal error.

 As such, we lack jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s claim and DISMISS his appeal.

                                             Entered for the Court

                                             Joel M. Carson III
                                             Circuit Judge

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