Court Opinion

ID: 9690289
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 19:03:09.920228+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:54.963265
License: Public Domain

ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.

(dissenting).

¶ 57. I agree with the majority that Gloria Thompson cannot be held responsible for the conduct of her tenant. I also agree that she cannot be held responsible for the conduct of the wolf hybrid dogs. Unlike the majority, however, I believe that both the law and public policy support the conclusion that she can be held responsible for her own conduct. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 58. The facts of this case are troublesome. On June 15, 1999, three-year-old Tatum Smaxwell was attacked by three wolf hybrids. That morning, Tatum, her mother, and her aunt, were visiting her grandmother's home. The three adults were inside and Tatum was allowed to go outside with her five-year-old cousin Nick, who offered to watch her.
¶ 59. After a short time, Nick came running back into the house, screaming that the dogs were hurting Tatum. Three of the wolf hybrids, each weighing ap*317proximately 75 pounds, were on top of Tatum attacking her. The adults succeeded in getting Tatum away from the dogs, but not before she sustained serious injury.1
¶ 60. The assault took place on property that Thompson owned and on which she resided. She also owned the adjacent lot that Melva Bayard, the dogs' owner, used for a wolf hybrid breeding enterprise. Thompson let Bayard kennel the dogs there without charging her any rent for the use of that property.
¶ 61. Prior to the attack, there had been more than 70 complaints from neighbors about Bayard's dogs. Many of the complaints expressed fear over the threatening nature of the dogs and concern over the dogs being allowed to run at large.
¶ 62. Although Thompson did not know the exact number of dogs kept on the property, she was aware of the complaints and knew that several of the dogs were wolf hybrids. Thompson was also aware that law enforcement personnel had made several visits concerning the dogs, and that one of the dogs had bitten a police officer.
¶ 63. Thompson received a citation in connection with the dogs in the mid-1990s. The record reflects that the tenant, Bayard, received a number of citations regarding the dogs. Many of the citations she received involved not maintaining a proper kennel and allowing the dogs to run at large.
¶ 64. The majority concedes that the facts of this case are egregious. Majority op., ¶ 2. Nevertheless, it *318holds, based on public policy factors, that common-law liability of landowners and landlords for negligence associated with injuries caused by dogs is limited to situations where the landowner or landlord is also the owner or keeper of the dog causing injury. Id. Contrary to the majority, I would not immunize Thompson from responsibility for her own conduct.
¶ 65. As the majority correctly recognizes, Thompson, as a landowner, owed a general duty to exercise ordinary care to all those who legally came upon her property. Id., ¶ 35. Holding landowners responsible for their own conduct is deeply embedded in our common law.
¶ 66. In Antoniewicz v. Reszczynski, 70 Wis. 2d 836, 856-57, 236 N.W.2d 1 (1975), this court abolished some of the common-law immunities available to landowners. There, the plaintiff had gone to the home of the defendant to give the defendant's daughter a ride. Id. at 840. While at the residence, he slipped on some ice, which was known to the defendant but unknown to the plaintiff. Id. The defendant maintained that he owed no duty to warn the plaintiff of hidden dangers because the plaintiff was a licensee. Id.
¶ 67. The circuit court in Antoniewicz determined that, although the existing law precluded the plaintiff from recovery, that law was archaic and had no rational basis for denying liability. Id. at 839. This court agreed, concluding that the required duty of the land occupier be one of ordinary care under the circumstances. Id. It explained:
The duty toward all persons who come upon property with the consent of the occupier will be that of ordinary care. By such standard of ordinary care, we mean the standard that is used in all other negligence cases in *319Wisconsin.... Under that test, as we have repeatedly stated, negligence is to be determined by ascertaining whether the defendant's exercise of care foreseeably created an unreasonable risk to others.
Id. at 857.
¶ 68. In Shannon v. Shannon, 150 Wis. 2d. 434, 443, 442 N.W.2d 25 (1989), this court extended the Antoniewicz framework beyond the physical premises. The circuit court had concluded that without a showing that the plaintiffs injury was related to a defect or condition on the defendants' property, the defendants were entitled to summary judgment. Id. at 442. This court disagreed, observing that the duty of a landowner was not limited to defects or conditions on the premises:
Contrary to the circuit court's conclusion, the duty of the owner or possessor of land toward persons who come upon property with the consent of the owner or possessor does not relate solely to defects or conditions which may be on such premises. Rather, the duty of an owner or possessor of land toward all persons who come upon property with the consent of the owner or occupier is that of ordinary care.
Id. at 443.
¶ 69. Accordingly, in Wisconsin, a landowner's duty to exercise reasonable care is not limited to defects in or conditions on the physical premises. Rather, a landowner must always use ordinary care under the existing circumstances unless specifically limited by law. Applying this principle to the facts of this case, I conclude that summary judgment was erroneously granted on the issue of Thompson's common-law negligence.
¶ 70. Here, Thompson had a duty to maintain her property in a reasonably safe condition and protect *320guests on her property from unreasonable risk of harm. She knew about the dangerous wolf hybrids and that they were periodically running at large on her property. Moreover, it had become clear that Bayard was not going to take action to control her dogs. Yet, Thompson did nothing to protect her three-year-old granddaughter from harm.
¶ 71. I believe that a jury could determine that it was reasonably foreseeable that her failure to act would cause harm to her grandchild. Thus, summary judgment should not have been granted. The question of negligence should have gone to a jury.
¶ 72. The majority, however, does not allow the case to go to a jury. Instead, it assumes negligence and precludes liability on the basis of public policy. Majority op., ¶ 39. The majority reasons that allowing liability where the landowner or landlord is neither the owner nor keeper of the dogs causing injury would enter a field that has no sensible or just stopping point. Id., ¶ 2.
¶ 73. I conclude that the majority errs in employing public policy considerations to arrive at its blanket rule of immunity from liability. Properly applied, public policy considerations should not limit liability here, but rather public policy should encourage holding landowners responsible for their own acts of negligence.
¶ 74. Limitation of liability based on public policy is a fact-intensive inquiry. A variation in the facts can render a different public policy conclusion. Yet, the majority employs a blanket limitation, which by definition eschews the fact-intensive inquiry that normally attends the limitation of liability analysis.
¶ 75. I am not persuaded by the majority's fear that there would be no just stopping point to liability were Smaxwell to prevail. The majority contends that exposing landowners to such liability would essentially *321force all landowners to fence in their property. Id., ¶ 48. This concern is overstated. This case did not involve the wanderings of a run-of-the-mill neighborhood dog. Rather, this involved a unique danger, of which Thompson was aware. It emanated from within the confines of the property where she resided.
¶ 76. There were a number of measures Thompson could have taken to protect others short of erecting a fence to enclose her entire property. For example, she could have required her grandchildren to play in her already fenced-in backyard. She could have evicted Bayard from the premises for her repeated citations. She could have prohibited such a large kennel enterprise in the first place. Finally, she could have warned her guests against allowing children to play outside unattended.
¶ 77. Similarly, I am not persuaded of the need for a blanket rule of immunity based on the majority's other hypotheticals. I am mindful that it may be necessary to preclude liability in some cases on grounds of public policy. For instance, preclusion based on public policy may be proper in the case of a landlord renting multiunit apartment complexes to hundreds of tenants. Id., ¶ 52. Likewise, public policy may be used in appropriate cases to preclude a landowner's liability as a neighbor. Id., ¶ 48.2 In some cases, to impose liability *322on the landlord could place too unreasonable a burden. But those are not the facts here.
¶ 78. This is a case about a woman who knowingly permitted on her property a poorly-managed wolf hybrid breeding enterprise. To hold Thompson liable need not result in the parade of horribles the majority invokes.
¶ 79. A proper public policy analysis in this case would not result in Thompson fencing in her property. Rather, it would result in Thompson taking the necessary measures to prevent dangerous wolf hybrids from running at large on her property when her young grandchildren are outside, unsupervised, at play. The majority's blanket rule would deter rather than encourage responsible behavior.
¶ 80. We have previously stated that "[t]he cases in which a causally negligent tort-feasor has been relieved of liability are infrequent and present unusual and extreme considerations." Stewart v. Wulf, 85 Wis. 2d 461, 479, 271 N.W.2d 79 (1978). This case does not fit into that narrow category. Although we have a list of factors upon which we preclude liability, the decision to impose liability requires that a court exercise fair judgment given the unique circumstance of each case.
¶ 81. I conclude that holding Thompson immune for negligence associated with her own conduct goes against public policy. This decision encourages landowners to turn a blind eye toward the presence of dangerous wolf hybrids on their property.3 In doing *323nothing, a reasonable jury could conclude that Thompson failed to exercise ordinary care under the circumstances.
¶ 82. In sum, this case is not about holding Thompson responsible for the conduct of her tenant or her tenant's wolf hybrids. Rather, it is about holding Thompson responsible for her own conduct. Because I believe that both the law and public policy support Thompson's exposure to liability, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 83. I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON joins this opinion.

 This court has grappled with line drawing determinations in other contexts involving the liability of a neighbor. In Physicians Plus Ins. Corp. v. Midwest Mut. Ins. Co., 2002 WI 80, 254 Wis. 2d 77, 646 N.W.2d 777, we were required to determine upon which, if any, of several parties liability might be imposed. "Because responsibility is strictly based on the facts of this case...," we rejected the argument that no sensible or just stopping point could be found. Id., ¶ 51. Indeed, we later noted that public policy considerations precluded the imposition of *322liability on a neighbor in that case, who merely had notice of the dangerous condition. Id., ¶ 63, n. 34.

 Counsel for Thompson acknowledged at oral argument that the issue here is a narrow one and applies to dogs only — not to dangerous animals in general.