Court Opinion

ID: 9865673
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 19:21:55.388088+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:11.236890
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING.
The plaintiff in error, in its motion for a rehearing, now contends that the evidence demanded a finding that the plaintiff was employed as a policeman under the provisions of section 44 of the city charter, which provides in part: “Be it further enacted that said-Mayor and Council of the City of Butler shall have power and authority . . to enforce law, peace and order in said city, and for this purpose to appoint, when necessary, a police force sufficient to, assist the city marshal; to fix their terms of service and compensation, to require bonds from them when deemed necessary conditioned for the faithful performance of their duties.”
There was sufficient evidence to support the finding of the trial judge that the plaintiff was elected to the office of marshal, or deputy marshal, under the provisions of section 14 of the city charter: -While the ordinance or- resolution of February 2, 1943,. “retaining” the plaintiff in his position with the defendant city referred to him as a “policeman,” the other ordinance or resolution passed on the same day, which purported to terminate his employment with the city, referred to the plaintiff as the “day marshal” and as the “city-marshal,” and the .ordinance-passed by the city, purporting to abolish -the office held by- the plaintiff, provided in part: “And to make the matter entirely clear, it is ordained . . that the office of marshal occupied by G. J. Hortman prior to June 1, 1943, is .specifically abolished.” On'the trial, the mayor .and one of the aldermen of the city testified; and nowhere in their testimony is there any contention that the -plaintiff was employed as a policeman; but their testimony relate's entirely to the office of marshal of the defendant' city: The plaintiff sued to recover his *855salary as city marshal, and in its . answer the city did not deny that he had been an officer of the city, but contended it had the right to “discharge-at any time it sees fit, any officer, in any office created by it, and in the-'exercise of its legal rights,'for .entirely sufficient cause which it is ndt' necessary here to allege, did on the 4th day of May, 1943, dismiss 6. J. Hortman from his said office to become effective June 1, 1943.”
This case was appealed to the superior court and there tried before the judge without the intervention of a jury; and it is well-established law that where a jury is waived and the case is submitted to the trial judge, his findings as to the facts are conclusive upon this court, where supported by evidence. There was evidence to support the judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and that judgment upon the facts will not be interfered with by this court.
There was nothing in the pleadings or the evidence to indicate any contention on the part of the defendant that the plaintiff was employed as a policeman under the provisions of section 44 of the city charter. In the original briefs of the plaintiff in error filed in this court it was stated: “Defendant in error filed suit for $50 against plaintiff in error in justice court claiming a montffis salary as city marshal. Plea was filed alleging that said marshal was removed May 4, 1943, under authority of the acts of 1919, p. 853,” which refers to section 14 of said charter. The assignments of error in the bill of exceptions are set out and discussed in this brief, and they refer to and deal with section 14, and not with section 44, of the city charter.
The issues of the case as raised by the pleadings and the evidence have been carefully considered, and we are of the opinion that the decision rendered is correct. Therefore the motion for rehearing. is denied.