Court Opinion

ID: 9693681
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:56:54.305196+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:49.733153
License: Public Domain

*544RAKER, J.,
dissenting, in which HARRELL, J., joins.
To reverse this case would be a travesty upon justice. Petitioner received a fair trial before a fair judge, and was not deprived of due process in any way. In addition, petitioner was not denied his right to be present at every critical stage of the trial when, in petitioner’s absence, the trial judge received a proffer of the State’s proposed evidence to determine whether a witness for the State would be permitted to testify before the jury. I agree with the Court of Special Appeals that the judgments of conviction should be affirmed. Kelly v. State, 162 Md.App. 122, 873 A.2d 434 (2005).
I.
Holding that the trial court denied petitioner the right to put on a defense, the majority reverses the judgments of conviction and holds that “the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to allow the petitioner to present his witnesses.” Maj. op. at 516-17, 898 A.2d at 422. The majority reasons as follows:
“When the court assumes the role of a party by ruling on the admissibility of evidence in the absence of appropriate objections, the court departs from the adversarial nature of our system where the State, not the court, bears the burden of objecting to the testimony offered by the opposing party. Should the State fail to object, otherwise inadmissible evidence sometimes maybe admitted to the detriment of its case because—explained supra—such a failure to object is considered a waiver. This is not to say that the defendant will be allowed to present properly objected to testimony that violates the rules of evidence or procedure. It merely requires that exclusion take place at the appropriate time and in the appropriate manner. The responsibility of the trial court to control the proceedings before it does not extend to the right to take over a party’s case. When that occurs, as it occurred here, the court risks denying to a defendant the fair trial guaranteed to him by both the United States Constitution and Maryland’s Constitution.”
*545Maj. op. at 542-43, 898 A.2d at 437-38. The majority holds that “[ujnder the circumstances here present, his refusal constitutes an abuse of discretion, requiring that petitioner be granted a new trial.” Id. at 543, 898 A.2d at 437-38.
I have difficulty understanding the majority’s basis for reversing this conviction. It appears that the Court is reversing the convictions solely because the trial judge required defense counsel to proffer the relevance of witnesses testimony rather than to permit the defendant to call the witnesses before the jury. The majority states that reversal is necessary because “the court’s error was not in the nature of the evidence as hearsay, but instead in how it determined that the testimony would be hearsay.” Maj. op. at 532-33, 898 A.2d at 431 (emphasis added). The majority seems to be grossly offended that the trial court required defense counsel to proffer the relevancy of the testimony he wished to present to the jury and that such a procedure, in and of itself requires reversal and a new trial. Without any discussion of the relevancy of the proposed evidence, the majority decides that petitioner “was effectively denied the only defense available to him—the witnesses he hoped would provide favorable testimony.” Id. at 533, 898 A.2d at 431-32. The majority notes that the right to compulsory process includes the right to subpoena witnesses to compel their attendance at trial and the right to present a defense, i.e., the defendant’s version of the facts to the jury. Id. at 532-38, 898 A.2d at 431-35. Following this protracted discussion of the constitutional right to compulsory process, the majority concludes that petitioner was denied the right to assert a defense, apparently because “the trial court required defendant to make a proffer and then denied him the right to call the witnesses....” Id. at 537-38, 898 A.2d at 434-35.
The majority focuses solely on the procedure employed by the trial court in excluding the testimony of Officer Patel and Ms. Blizzer. The majority never analyzes the admissibility of the proffered testimony, and effectively concedes that the testimony of petitioner’s witnesses would have been properly excluded as hearsay. See maj. op at 532-33, 898 A.2d at 431. The majority’s argument for reversal, then, appears to be that (1) the trial court used an impermissible procedure in exclud*546ing the testimony of petitioner’s witnesses, thereby depriving petitioner of his constitutional right to present a defense, and (2) that petitioner was prejudiced by the trial court’s use of this procedure because the testimony of his proposed witnesses, even though it was hearsay, may have nonetheless aided his case because the prosecution may have neglected to object to its admission into evidence. See maj. op. at 540-41, 898 A.2d at 436-37. This argument is unpersuasive.
To the extent that the majority’s decision rests on the premise that the rules of trial practice and evidence do not permit a trial court to employ the procedure used by the trial court to exclude the testimony of petitioner’s witnesses, it is mistaken.1 Cf. Md. Rules 5-103, 5-104, and 5-602. The majority recognizes that the trial judge has discretion to control the trial. See maj. op. at 530-32, 898 A.2d at 430-31 (quoting Cooley v. State, 385 Md. 165, 175-76, 867 A.2d 1065, 1071 (2005)). It is well-established that a trial judge’s discretion to control the conduct of the trial gives a trial court the authority to exclude inadmissible evidence sua sponte. See, e.g., Weaver v. United States, 374 F.2d 878, 882 (5th Cir.1967); United States v. Clarke, 390 F.Supp.2d 131, 135 (D.Conn.2005) (“[a]n objection is not ... a precondition to the exclusion of evidence”); People v. Sturm, 37 Cal.4th 1218, 39 Cal.Rptr.3d 799, 129 P.3d 10, 23 (2006) (observing that “it is well recognized that the trial judge ... may sua sponte exclude irrelevant evidence”); Morris ex rel. Morris v. Thomson, 130 Idaho 138, 937 P.2d 1212, 1218 (1997) (“trial court may exclude evidence offered by a party on its own authority, without a motion to strike or an objection made by the opposing part/’); Barber v. State Highway Comm’n, 80 Wyo. 340, 342 P.2d 723, 727 (1959) (noting that trial judge, being “more than a mere referee,” has a duty to control the conduct of the trial so that *547“the true facts in a given litigation” may be ascertained, and that a trial judge may rule sua sponte on the admissibility of evidence to accomplish this end).
It is equally well-established that it is not necessary for witness testimony to be presented before the jury in order for the testimony to be excluded legitimately from evidence, and that a trial judge may exclude inadmissible testimony prior to presentation to the jury on the basis of a proffer of the testimony. See, e.g., State v. Martinez, 824 A.2d 443, 448 (R.I.2003) (observing that exclusion of evidence by means of a motion in limine “has become widely recognized as a salutary device to avoid the impact of unfairly prejudicial evidence upon the jury and to save a significant amount of time at the trial” (internal quotations omitted)).
Maryland Rules 5-103, 5-104, and 5-602 inferentially suggest that hearings outside the presence of the jury to determine admissibility are appropriate. Rule 5-103(c) provides as follows:
“(c) Hearing of jury. Proceedings shall be conducted, to the extent practicable, so as to prevent inadmissible evidence from being suggested to a jury by any means, such as making statements or offers of proof or asking questions within the hearing of the jury.”
Rule 5-104 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
“(a) Questions of admissibility generally. Preliminary questions concerning ... the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court....
(c) Hearing of the jury. Hearings on preliminary matters shall be conducted out of the hearing of the jury when required by rule or the interests of justice.”
In tandem, Rules 5-103(c) and 5-104 plainly permit, and sometimes require, a trial court to rule on the admissibility of evidence2 prior to its presentation to the jury. As the Martinez court observed, permitting trial courts to exclude evi*548dence prior to presentation of the evidence to the jury serves the dual purposes of preventing the jury from examining unfairly prejudicial evidence and of saving time and expense at trial. See Martinez, 824 A.2d at 448. To promote these ends, Rule 5-103(c) provides that “[proceedings shall be conducted, to the extent practicable, so as to prevent inadmissible evidence from being suggested to a jury by any means----”
In addition to permitting preliminary evidentiary rulings outside the presence of the jury on most matters, Maryland law requires a trial court to make an advance ruling outside of the presence of the jury on the admissibility of some types of evidence. For example, Rule 4-252 requires a criminal defendant to raise in a pretrial motion objections to the admission of evidence on grounds that it was obtained by “[a]n unlawful search, seizure, interception of wire or oral communication, or pretrial identification,” or by “[a]n unlawfully obtained admission, statement, or confession.” Rule 4-252(a)(3), (a)(4). If these issues are not timely raised by preliminary motion, ordinarily they are waived. Rule 4-252(a). The trial court is required to rule on these motions in advance of trial. Rule. 4-252(g)(1) (providing that “[mjotions filed pursuant to [Rule 4-252] shall be determined before trial, and, to the extent practicable, before the day of trial”). In addition, Maryland’s rape shield law requires advance ruling outside the presence of the jury on the admissibility of evidence (including testimony) of prior sexual conduct of a victim towards a defendant in prosecutions for rape and certain other sexual offenses. See Md.Code (2002, 2005 Cum.Supp.), § 3-319(c) of the Criminal Law Article (prohibiting presentation of prior sexual history evidence to a jury “unless the court has first held a closed hearing and determined that the evidence is admissible”). Furthermore, trial courts are required to make an advance determination outside the presence of the jury on the admissibility of evidence “of other crimes, wrongs, or acts” under Md. Rule 5-404(b). See State v. Faulkner, 314 Md. 630, 633-35, 552 A.2d 896, 897-98 (1989) (detailing the procedure trial court must follow in determining the admissibility of such evidence).
*549A trial court does not exceed its authority when it raises the admissibility of the testimony of a witness sua sponte, and decides that issue on the basis of a proffer of the witness’ testimony. Consequently, the trial judge in the instant case did not act without authority when he employed such a procedure to exclude the testimony of petitioner’s witnesses. The only real question of procedure and evidence before us is whether the trial court excluded the testimony of the witness improperly, and the proper focus should be on the substance of the trial court’s rulings, not the procedure it employed in making these rulings.
The majority is equally misguided in its contention that the procedure used by the trial court in excluding the testimony of petitioner’s proposed witnesses violated petitioner’s constitutional right to present a defense. The Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution grants to the defendant the right to effective cross-examination of witnesses whose testimony is adverse. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1111, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974). The right granted by the Compulsory Process Clause of the United States Constitution is fundamental and essential to achieving a fair trial. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294-95, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 1045, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973). Together, the two rights grant defendants a constitutional right to present evidence and a defense. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 1923,18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967).
The right to present evidence is not absolute, however. A defendant does not have the constitutional right to present any and all evidence in support of a claim. See Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302, 93 S.Ct. at 1049; Wilson v. State, 345 Md. 437, 448, 693 A.2d 344, 349-50 (1997). A defendant in a criminal case “does not have an unfettered right to offer testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence.” Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410, 108 S.Ct. 646, 653, 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988); see also United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308-309, 118 S.Ct. 1261, 1264-65, 140 L.Ed.2d 413 (1998) (noting that the right to present evidence is subject to the reasonable restrictions of evidentia*550ry rules that serve legitímate interests, including “ensuring that only reliable evidence is introduced at trial”); United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867, 102 S.Ct. 3440, 3446, 73 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1982) (holding that to establish a violation of the compulsory process clause, the defendant “must at least make some plausible showing of how [the] testimony would have been both material and favorable to his defense”); Wilson, 345 Md. at 448-49, 693 A.2d at 350-51.
As discussed above, the majority essentially concedes that the Court of Special Appeals did not err in concluding that the proffered testimony of petitioner’s proposed witnesses was excludable from evidence as hearsay not subject to an exception. Because this testimony is evidence that does not meet the requirements of the rules of evidence for admissibility, petitioner was not deprived of any constitutional right by the trial court’s conclusion that he could not present the testimony of his proposed witnesses.
Finally, even if the majority were correct that trial court’s exclusion of the testimony of his proposed witnesses was error, the error must be both wrong and injurious.3 As this Court has often stated, an error by the trial court does not warrant reversal “unless that error is both manifestly wrong and substantially injurious.” Lawson v. State, 389 Md. 570, 580, 886 A.2d 876, 882 (2005) (internal citations and quotations omitted); Rule 5-103 (stating in relevant part that “[e]rror may not be predicated upon a ruling that admits or excludes evidence unless the party is prejudiced by the ruling”). Consequently, the Court does not reverse a conviction on the basis of an erroneous evidentiary ruling if that ruling does not prejudice the defendant. Id.; Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 659, 350 A.2d 665, 678 (1976).
The majority, however, seems content to reverse simply on the basis that it is possible that if petitioner’s witnesses were permitted to testify, the prosecution would have failed to raise *551a hearsay objection and the testimony would have been admitted. The majority notes that “the court risks denying to a defendant the fair trial guaranteed to him by both the United States Constitution and Maryland’s Constitution.” Maj. op. at 543, 898 A.2d at 437-38. What is the standard applied by the majority? Is it the mere risk of denying a defendant a fair trial, or is it whether a defendant was prejudiced and was denied a fair trial that requires a new trial? The universal rule has always been that, absent structural error, it is not the risk of prejudice, but actual prejudice, that justifies a new trial. Judge Greene, wilting for this Court in Crane v. Dunn, 382 Md. 83, 854 A.2d 1180 (2004), reiterated this principle as follows:
“The exclusion of competent, relevant and material evidence may constitute prejudice and result in reversible error. It is the policy of this Court not to reverse for harmless error and the burden is on the appellant in all cases to show prejudice as well as error. Prejudice will be found if a showing is made that the error was likely to have affected the verdict below. ‘It is not the possibility, but the probability, of prejudice which is the object of the appellate inquiry.’ ‘Courts are reluctant to set aside verdicts for errors in the admission or exclusion of evidence unless they cause substantial injustice.’ Substantial prejudice must be shown. To justify the reversal, an error below must have been ‘... both manifestly wrong and substantially injurious.’ ”
Id. at 91-92, 854 A.2d at 1185 (internal citations omitted). The majority, abandoning this well-established approach, fails to adequately establish that the trial court’s purported error in refusing to permit petitioner’s proposed witnesses to testify was not harmless.
II.
I would also hold that petitioner’s constitutional right to be present at all critical stages of the proceedings against him was not violated when he was excluded from a conference addressing the question of whether the prosecution committed a discovery violation by failing to disclose the identity of a witness it intended to call at trial.
*552Judge Barbera, writing for the Court of Special Appeals, summarized the facts surrounding the discovery conference as follows:
“Defense counsel brought the alleged discovery violation to the attention of the trial court ... during a break in proceedings after the jury was selected but before it was sworn. In the presence of appellant, defense counsel informed the court that the State had included one Christian Phillips on its witness list. Counsel reported that she had asked the prosecutors about Phillips’s identity and was told that he was a ‘jailhouse snitch’ who had come to the State’s attention two weeks before trial. The prosecutors told defense counsel that Phillips was prepared to testify that appellant confessed to Phillips his involvement in the shootings. Defense counsel denied receiving any information about Phillips before trial and objected to the State’s calling him as a witness.
“The prosecutors in turn explained that they had learned of appellant’s statement to Phillips through Phillips’s counsel. After interviewing Phillips, they informed defense counsel by letter that he might be called as a witness. Defense counsel denied receiving the letter. Before the matter was resolved, the prosecutors said that they had not yet decided whether they would be calling Phillips to testify. The court therefore tabled further discussion until such time as the State decided that it wanted Phillips to testify.
“The jury was sworn soon thereafter and trial began. On the evening of the second day of trial, after the jury had been excused for the day, the prosecutors notified the court that the State wanted Phillips to testify. The defense again objected. As the court prepared to take up the issue, defense counsel asked that appellant, who was then still in the courtroom, be permitted to be present for the discussion. The court denied the request, reasoning that no testimony would be taken; the question for decision was simply whether, based on the State’s proffer of what Phillips might say, the State would be permitted to call him; and, if *553Phillips were permitted to testify, appellant would have his right of cross-examination. The court then told the sheriffs that they could ‘take [the defendant] because it is close to 6:00.’
“The discussion turned to whether and when the State had informed the defense that Phillips might be a State’s witness. While explaining how Phillips had come to the State’s attention, the prosecutors proffered what he would say if permitted to testify.
“The defense again disputed the State’s assertion that it had informed the defense promptly upon learning that Phillips might be a State’s witness. Defense counsel argued that it was ‘patently unfair’ to allow the State to call Phillips, pointing out that the defense had been given no opportunity to interview him.
“The court ruled that Phillips could testify, but only after the defense had a chance to speak with him.”
Kelly, 162 Md.App. at 130-31, 873 A.2d at 438-39 (footnote omitted) (alteration in original).
Once the trial court found that there was no discovery violation and that Phillips, the State’s witness, would be permitted to testify, the trial court considered the extent to which petitioner would be permitted to impeach Phillips’s testimony on the basis of Phillips’s recently entered guilty pleas and his pending sentencing hearing on the charges to which he plead guilty, scheduled to take place before the same judge that presided over petitioner’s trial. The trial court ruled that the defense could impeach Phillips with his guilty pleas and the potential sentences he was facing on the charges to which he plead guilty.
After this ruling, defense counsel again argued for the exclusion of Phillips’s testimony, this time apparently arguing that Phillips’s testimony should be excluded on grounds other than as a sanction for a discovery violation.4 The following exchange ensued between the trial court and defense counsel:
*554“[Defense Counsel:] Also secondly, I think there is a bottom threshold issue here. You have to make a decision for any evidence that comes in. You have to do a balancing test on the credibility or the reliability of that evidence as—the permanent [sic] value versus the prejudicial effect.” In a case like this,—
“[The Court:] As opposed to expert witnesses, you think a trial judge has to make a threshold decision in every case about whether a lay witness can testify and if the trial judge doesn’t believe him, you think it is not admissible?
“[Defense Counsel:] If we can generate the issue that there is substantial prejudice involved in a witness testifying,—
“[The Court:] Let’s say this argument. You find me the case that says that a trial judge determines the admissibility of lay testimony based upon a threshold even of credibility determination and then I will listen to your argument.
“[Defense Counsel:] It is not testimony. It is the rules. It is all evidence that comes in and more than that,—
“[The Court:] Okay. Give me the rule cite.
“[Defense Counsel:] [Md. Rule] 5-602 says also, the State has to—I will read it. The State—” a witness may not testify on a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support finding that the witness has personal knowledge about the matter he is testifying about.’ We have got a witness coming in here who has extensive motivation to fabricate this. I think there should be a threshold issue here of them establishing how this witness has personal knowledge of what he is testifying about.
“[The Court:] He is incarcerated with the defendant.”
After some additional discussion of the impeachment issue, the trial court revisited the objections raised by defense counsel, and indicated again that it would refrain for the time being *555from ruling on his objections. The trial court then recessed for the day.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the right to personal presence at all critical stages of the trial is a fundamental right of a criminal defendant. Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 117-18, 104 S.Ct. 453, 455-56, 78 L.Ed.2d 267 (1983) (per curiam). The federal constitutional right of an accused to be present during all critical stages of the trial has two bases. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees an accused the right “to be present in the courtroom at every stage of his trial.” Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1058, 25 L.Ed.2d 353, 356 (1970).
The second basis for the constitutional right to be present is provided by the federal Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Supreme Court has recognized that the defendant’s right to be present is protected by the Due Process clause in some circumstances where the defendant is not actually confronting witnesses against him or her. An accused has a due process right to be present at any proceeding related to the charges against the accused if the accused’s “presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fulness of his opportunity to defend against the charge.” Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-06, 54 S.Ct. 330, 332, 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934). In United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 105 S.Ct. 1482, 84 L.Ed.2d 486 (1985) (per curiam), the Supreme Court noted that “[t]he presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by is absence, and to that extent only.” Id. at 526, 105 S.Ct. at 1484 (internal quotations omitted). Accordingly, an accused has a constitutional right to be present at any proceeding where “his presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure.” Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2658, 2667, 96 L.Ed.2d 631 (1987). In determining whether an accused’s due process right to be present has been violated, a reviewing court should be careful to consider the accused’s exclusion from a part of *556the proceedings “in light of the whole record.” Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 526-27, 105 S.Ct. at 1484.
Maryland law has long recognized that an accused has a right to be present at every critical stage of the trial. See Tweedy v. State, 380 Md. 475, 490, 845 A.2d 1215, 1224 (2004). An accused’s right to be present was recognized at common law, and is protected also by Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Id. at 490-91, 845 A.2d at 1224. Rule 4-2315 implements an accused’s federal and state constitutional rights to be present. Id. at 491, 845 A.2d at 1224.
Petitioner presents two arguments that his absence during the conference violated his constitutional right to be present. First, petitioner maintains that, to the extent that the court restricted itself to consideration of the discovery violation issue, petitioner had a right to be present because the trial court’s ruling on the discovery issue was based in part on the prosecution’s proffer of Phillips’ testimony, which petitioner could have aided his counsel in challenging had he been present. Second, petitioner argues that, even assuming his constitutional right to be present would not have been violated if the trial court had restricted itself to consideration of the discovery issue while petitioner was not present, the trial court violated his right to be present when it proceeded to consider the other grounds for exclusion of Phillips’ testimony raised by petitioner. Neither argument withstands scrutiny.
Petitioner’s first argument is belied by examination of the discovery issue before the trial court, and the grounds upon which it rested its conclusion that there was no violation. The discovery issue before the trial court was whether the prosecution violated Rule 4-263(b). Rule 4-263(b)(l) requires the prosecution, upon request, to “[d]isclose to the defendant the *557name and address of each person then known whom the State intends to call as a witness at the hearing or trial to prove its case in chief or to rebut alibi testimony.” Rule 4-263(h) provides that “[a] party who has responded to a request or order for discovery and who obtains further material information shall supplement the response promptly.” Rule 4-263(i) states that “[i]f at any time during the proceedings the court finds that a party has failed to comply with this Rule or an order issued pursuant to this Rule, the court may order” a range of enumerated sanctions, including the striking of testimony, or any other sanctions which are “appropriate under the circumstances.”
The discovery issue before the trial court was whether the prosecution had violated Rule 4-263(b)(l) and (h) by failing to timely supplement its original disclosure of its witnesses under Rule 4-263(b)(l) once it learned of Phillips and decided to offer him as a witness. In the course of reaching its conclusion that the prosecution did not violate the rule, the trial court relied principally on the representations of the attorneys. The prosecutors told the trial court that they interviewed Phillips in jail on May 7, and, after having decided to offer his testimony at trial on the basis of this interview, notified defense counsel of their intention to call Phillips by means of a letter sent on May 8. Defense counsel told the trial court that they did not read this letter, but conceded that they may have received it, explaining that they would have expected the prosecution to notify them by other means on the basis of their prior communications with the prosecution. On the basis of these representations by the parties’ attorneys, the trial court found that the prosecution did not violate Rule 4-263(h), explaining its reasoning as follows:
“I don’t find on the based upon the record that has been disclosed that it is a discovery violation. The information didn’t become known apparently until the 7th. You were notified by mail on the 8th. I have no reason to believe that it wasn’t sent. Why you didn’t get it is unclear to me. I guess you, yourself suggest it might be in your in-box somewhere at your office.”
*558Shortly thereafter, the trial court reiterated its conclusion, stating that “I don’t find that there was any discovery violation. I don’t find that there was any intentional concealing of the information by the State.” As the colloquy makes clear, the trial court’s conclusion rested on a credibility finding as to when the prosecution learned of Phillips, the steps it took to notify the defense of its intention to call him as a witness, and the defense attorneys’ actions in monitoring their incoming mail. Clearly, because petitioner’s presence could not have aided the trial court in any appreciable way in its making of these findings, there was no violation of petitioner’s constitutional right to be present.
Courts have held that a defendant’s constitutional right to be present is not ipso facto violated when the trial court has conducted conferences, at the bench or in chambers, in the defendant’s absence. For example, in Haywood v. Portuando, 288 F.Supp.2d 446, 465-66 (S.D.N.Y.2003), the court held that a defendant’s constitutional right to be present was not violated by his absence from a hearing on the issue of whether the defense’s use of peremptory strikes violated Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). See also State v. Smulls, 935 S.W.2d 9, 17 (Mo.1996) (en banc) (holding that defendant’s absence from hearing on whether the prosecution had violated Batson did not violate his constitutional right to be present), cert. denied 520 U.S. 1254, 117 S.Ct. 2415-16, 138 L.Ed.2d 180 (1997). The rationale offered by the Haywood court for its holding was that, because the determination as to whether the prosecution had committed a Batson violation depended upon the trial court’s assessment of the reasons offered by the defendant’s attorney, not the defendant himself, for the use of the peremptory strikes at issue, the defendant’s presence “would not have had a ‘reasonably substantial’ relation to his opportunity to defend against the charges,” and so did not violate his constitutional right to be present. Haywood, 288 F.Supp.2d at 466 (quoting Snyder, 291 U.S. at 105-06, 54 S.Ct. at 332); see also Smulls, 935 S.W.2d at 17 (concluding that defendant’s absence from hearing on Batson violation did not violate his right to be present *559because the defendant “had nothing to do or gain from his presence”). Similarly, the resolution of the discovery issue before the trial court during the hearing from which petitioner was absent required the trial court to make a factual determination about the conduct and reasons therefor of petitioner’s counsel, not petitioner. Petitioner’s presence “would not have had a ‘reasonably substantial’ relation to his opportunity to defend against the charges,” and his absence did not violate his constitutional right to be present. Haywood, 288 F.Supp.2d at 466 (quoting Snyder, 291 U.S. at 105-06, 54 S.Ct. at 332).
As for petitioner’s second argument, it rests on an incorrect reading of the record. The trial court did not rule on the other objections raised by defense counsel, but declined to rule on them in advance of trial. The trial court was within its discretion to do so. See, e.g., Martinez, 824 A.2d at 448; cf. Rule 5-103(c) (requiring “[proceedings [to] be conducted, to the extent practicable, so as to prevent inadmissible evidence from being suggested to a jury by any means”). Because the trial court did not make such a ruling, and left defense counsel’s evidentiary objections to Phillips’ testimony at trial, petitioner’s defense was not harmed by his absence when these objections were first raised by his counsel. Inasmuch as the trial court reserved ruling on the evidentiary objections raised by defense counsel, this case is distinguishable from those in which courts have held that a defendant’s constitutional right to be present was violated because of the defendant’s absence during a conference on the admissibility of evidence. Compare, e.g., Robinson v. Commonwealth, 445 Mass. 280, 837 N.E.2d 241, 246-47 (2005) (holding that in the specific case, defendant waived his right to be present at the suppression hearings, but that a suppression hearing is critical stage of proceedings and that because the hearing “would have required the taking of evidence and also involved the admissibility of substantial evidence that could determine the outcome of the case, the defendant was entitled ... to be present”).
*560For these reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.
III.
Finally, I turn to the majority’s tone and criticisms of the trial judge. The record does not support thé majority’s conclusions. Not content to reverse petitioner’s conviction on constitutional grounds, the majority then proceeds to admonish, unfairly, the trial judge’s rulings and his conduct of the trial. The majority accuses the judge of taking over the party’s case and of “becoming an advocate for the State.” Maj. op. at 541-42, 898 A.2d at 436-37. I do not agree that the trial judge “[took] over the party’s case.” Id. at 543, 898 A.2d at 437-38. As discussed above, a trial court has the responsibility to control the trial, and, incident to this responsibility, has the authority to request a proffer of evidence.
Requesting a proffer was not an abuse of discretion, but rather, under the circumstances of this case, simply a prudent step taken to save trial time and expense, and was well within the discretion of the trial court. See Martinez, 824 A.2d at 448. It is important to remember that this case was tried before a jury, and the trial judge was cognizant that he had a jury waiting to come into the courtroom. The judge was coming up against the 3 day weekend—Memorial Day holiday, and was trying to avoid stretching the case over the long weekend.6 At the prompting of the Assistant State’s Attorney, the trial judge requested a proffer as to the substance of the witnesses testimony. This action, in and of itself, is not error. Indeed, the trial court reviewed the admissibility of the State’s evidence out of the jury’s presence when it reviewed the transcript and videotape of Officer Mercer’s deposition. The trial judge was patient with defense counsel, and repeatedly tried to understand the purpose for which counsel *561wished to present Officer Patel and Ms. Blizzer. This conclusion is supported by the transcript.
The trial court had difficulty understanding the purpose for which defense counsel wished to call the witnesses. I can understand the trial court’s difficulty. Defense counsel’s response to the court’s questions as to relevancy was a moving target. For example, counsel alluded to a videotape on the bus. When pressed by the court, defense counsel conceded that the tape was inoperable on the night in question, and therefore “there [was] a benign reason for [it not being presented].” She told the court as follows:
“Right, and I am not suggesting that I am asking for a missing evidence rule or anything, instruction on that particular issue; but I still think that I am entitled to ask him which bus route he would have—what time the bus would have been there, that he sought out that bus—.”
The court then ruled as follows:
“[W]ith respect to the issue of the tape, it would appear to me that the only potential relevance would be if you could fashion [some] argument that the Government failed to do something that they should have done, but the proffer is that they did locate a bus that they believed to be the bus, they tried to get the tape but the tape was inoperable. So, in light of that proffer, ... if the explanation were presented to the jury, it would have no evidentiary significance and it could not be held against the State for a failure to conduct an adequate investigation mindful of their burden. So I will not permit that either.”
On this issue, the trial judge was correct.
As to Officer Wells, defense counsel conceded that he had never been subpoenaed as a witness and had not been included by defense counsel on the list of witnesses the court identified to the jury before trial during voir dire. Nonetheless, the judge went beyond any required measures and gave the defense an opportunity overnight to locate the witness. The court told defense counsel as follows:
“With respect to Wells, what I will do, if he is the only witness that you have remaining, in light of your client’s *562statement that he is not going to testify—elects not to testify in this case—we will simply, because we are going to have to review instructions anyway, I will leave the case open until tomorrow morning, and you can try and track down Wells and see if you can get him in here; but, again, if Wells is only—if your only purpose in calling Wells is to have him testify about what other people told him, then I am not going to admit that through Wells.”
The majority notes that Officer Wells would not have been available to testify and that counsel conceded at oral argument that Officer Wells would have been unavailable. Maj. op. at 527, n. 9, 898 A.2d at 428, n. 9.
Considering all the circumstances and the entire record, I find no basis for the majority’s contentions that the trial judge co-opted petitioner’s case and became an advocate for the prosecution.
Judge HARRELL has authorized me to state that he joins in the views expressed in this opinion.

. The majority seems to hold that an accused has an absolute right to put witnesses before the jury, irrespective of whether the witness has any admissible testimony to offer. Consequently, the majority seems to be saying that the trial court has no discretion to require a proffer of the testimony of a criminal defense witness when the witness is present at court and able to testify. For the reasons stated above, I disagree.

. The exception is found in Rule 5-104(b), which leaves questions of conditional relevance for the jury.

. See Rule 8—131(b)(1), providing that the Court of Appeals may consider the issue of harmless error even if not raised in a petition for writ of certiorari.

. This line of argument was to some extent repetitive of some of the arguments defense counsel made during discussion of the discovery *554issue. In ruling on the discovery issue, the trial court observed that these arguments raised "issues that go to the credibility of the witness which is for the jury to assess and not the Court to assess."

. Rule 4-231(b) provides as follows:
"(b) Right to be present—Exceptions. A defendant is entitled to be physically present in person at a preliminary hearing and every stage of the trial, except (1) at a conference or argument on a question of law; (2) when a nolle prosequi or stet is entered pursuant to Rules 4-247 and 4-248."

. To be sure, the impending holiday and juror schedules do not trump due process concerns. They are, however, legitimate concerns of the trial court and under the circumstances presented herein, the court did not abuse its discretion in the procedure employed.