Court Opinion

ID: 9752130
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 17:38:21.877869+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:08.256020
License: Public Domain

PRICE, Judge
(dissenting).
As I perceive the sole issue before this Court to be whether or not there were sufficient facts in the record to support the lower court’s finding of deprivation, I must dissent from the majority’s conclusion. This record amply supports the lower court’s conclusions and the facts, as found and properly applied by the lower court, are more than sufficient to find from clear and convincing evidence that the child is deprived.
I would not quarrel with the majority’s summary of the record, and I concur in those portions of the majority opinion designated as Section I and Section II.
I disagree with, and dissent from, all of that portion designated as Section III.
The order of the lower court should be affirmed where the lower court applies the proper standard in evaluating *189the evidence and the proof is clear and convincing that the child is without proper parental care. Since I am convinced that these criteria are met, I believe the order of the lower court should be affirmed.
Appellate review in cases of deprived children must be complete and of the broadest scope. That is not to say, however, that by the use of word-play an appellate court should substitute its judgment for that of the lower court. We have previously recognized the distinction between clear necessity occasioned by the inability of parents to provide proper care and the best interests of the child in determining the question of custody. We have also commented upon the fact that as a matter of logic the two concepts are intertwined. The majority would hold the lower court to a standard of perfection absolutely impossible to achieve. This standard is but another step in the search for perfect justice, a quest that is resulting in increasingly confusing and contradictory results in our courts. It is a quest that is decreasing the effectiveness and validity of our whole judicial process.1 There is no perfect trial.
The majority concludes that the lower court improperly applied the best interest test. I conclude that it properly applied the clear necessity test. Of course the juvenile court judge discusses the interest of the child. How could it be avoided ? But equally clear is his holding of clear necessity. I am satisfied that the proper test was applied, and that under that test the evidence was clear and convincing. And in the matter of judgment I am not willing, nor do I believe we should, freely substitute our judgment for the lower court. The majority is not so constrained. So be it!
I would affirm the order of the lower court.

. For examples of the adverse consequences of current legal doctrine on the American courtroom see “The Price of Perfect Justice” by Macklin Fleming.