Court Opinion

ID: 9929714
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-03 18:11:39.117814+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:44:47.005581
License: Public Domain

NUMBER 13-22-00613-CR

                             COURT OF APPEALS

                    THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                      CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

ENEDEL BARRIOS A/K/A
ENEDEL BARRIOS-CATANO,                                                        Appellant,

                                            v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                                            Appellee.

                     On appeal from the 18th District Court
                          of Johnson County, Texas.

                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

 Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Benavides and Tijerina
         Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Contreras

       Appellant Enedel Barrios a/k/a Enedel Barrios-Catano was convicted of two counts

of sexual assault of a child and two counts of indecency with a child by sexual contact, all

second-degree felonies. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 21.11(d), 22.011(a)(2). The jury

assessed punishment at twenty years’ imprisonment for the sexual assault counts, and
ten and fifteen years’ imprisonment for the two indecency counts, respectively. The

sentences were ordered to run concurrently. On appeal, Barrios raises six issues:

(1–4) the evidence was legally insufficient to support conviction on each of the four

counts; (5) the trial court erred by excluding evidence that the complainant “previously

made false allegations of abuse”; and (6) the trial court erred by admitting evidence that

Barrios “had sex with his [current] wife when she was 16 years old and he was married

to her mother.” We affirm. 1

                                        I.      BACKGROUND

        The indictment alleged that Barrios, on or about March 9, 2021, intentionally or

knowingly: (1) caused the penetration of the sexual organ of Victoria Williams, 2 his

fourteen-year-old granddaughter, with his sexual organ; (2) caused the penetration of

Victoria’s mouth with his sexual organ; (3) touched Victoria’s genitals with the intent to

arouse or gratify his sexual desire; and (4) touched Victoria’s breast with the intent to

arouse or gratify his sexual desire. See id. §§ 21.11(a)(1), 22.011(a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(B).

        Trial testimony established that on March 10, 2021, when Victoria was in eighth

grade, she made a report of abuse to a resource officer at her middle school in Burleson.

Burleson Police Department detectives took Victoria to be interviewed at the Children’s

Advocacy Center (CAC) in Cleburne, and then to be examined by a sexual assault nurse

examiner (SANE) at Cook Children’s Medical Center in Fort Worth. At both the forensic

        1 This appeal was transferred from the Tenth Court of Appeals in Waco pursuant to an order issued

by the Texas Supreme Court. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001.

        2 To protect the identity of the complainant, we refer to her by the pseudonym given to her in the

indictment. See TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 30(a)(1) (providing that a crime victim has “the right to be
treated . . . with respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy throughout the criminal justice process”).

                                                    2
interview and the SANE exam, Victoria reported that she had been sexually abused by

Barrios the previous evening, while her grandmother Laura Barrios was at her aunt’s

house. The SANE nurse performed a physical examination which revealed petechiae, or

broken blood vessels, around Victoria’s breasts; and “redness and irritation,” but no injury,

around her genitals. The nurse collected oral, abdominal, breast, perianal, vulvar, and

buccal swabs, which were sent to a lab for analysis. Police later executed a search

warrant at the residence where Barrios, Laura, and Victoria lived, and they collected a

quilt and some articles of clothing.

       Initial forensic testing of the abdominal and breast swabs revealed the presence

of genetic material from a foreign contributor, though the presence of semen was not

confirmed. Police then arrested Barrios and obtained a DNA sample from him via buccal

swab. After additional testing, Barrios could not be excluded as a contributor to the genetic

material found on the abdominal and breast swabs. According to the analyst’s report,

assuming no identical twin, the data indicated “with a high degree of confidence” that

Barrios was the source of the foreign DNA on the swabs.

       Victoria testified at trial that, in March of 2021, she lived in a house in Burleson

with her father Benjamin and her paternal grandparents, Barrios and Laura. She said she

did not like living at that house because it was “infested with cockroaches and rats,”

“smelled really bad,” and had a ceiling which “was only held up by planks of wood.” One

night in early March around 8:00 p.m., when her grandmother was out visiting her aunt,

Barrios repeatedly asked Victoria to bring him beer while he was watching TV in his room.

After the “second beer,” around 8:30 p.m., Barrios kissed Victoria on the cheek “really

close to [her] mouth.” Later, he asked for another drink, and he kissed her on the cheek

                                             3
again, but this time also put his tongue into her mouth. Victoria said Barrios then “put [her]

onto the bed” and touched her on her breasts, both over and under her clothing. Victoria

recalled that, after she brought Barrios another beer, he “kissed [her] with [his] tongue

again” and he “began to suck [her] breasts.” She said: “After that he continued to suck

my breasts and then he got really close to my vaginal area with his fingers.” Victoria

testified that Barrios “put his finger in my vagina” and “put his penis in [my vagina] at least

once or twice.” She said he stopped only when he realized Laura was returning home.

Victoria later stated that, on that same day, Barrios “made [her] put his penis in [her]

mouth,” though she could not recall whether that happened before or after the other

abuse. She stated that, at the time of trial, she was living with her maternal grandmother.

       Laura testified that she lives at the house in Burleson with Barrios, her husband;

Benjamin, her son; and Virginia Ann Williams, her mother. When she first became

romantically involved with Barrios in around 1987, she was sixteen years old and Barrios

was twenty-four years old and was married to Virginia. Over defense counsel’s objection,

Laura said she had intercourse with Barrios, and became pregnant with Benjamin, when

she was sixteen years old. She married Barrios shortly after Benjamin was born. Several

years later, they had a daughter, Nicole.

       According to Laura, Victoria came to live with her, Barrios, and Benjamin in 2012,

and she continued to live there up until her outcry of abuse in March of 2021. In the

evening of March 9, 2021, Laura left the house to pick up Nicole. When she returned at

around 10:30 p.m., Barrios and Victoria were at the house. Laura said Victoria seemed

“very okay” and “hunky-dory.”

       On cross-examination, Laura explained that, when she was at Nicole’s house

                                              4
earlier in the day, she and Nicole had a discussion in Victoria’s presence about

“Benjamin . . . terminating his parental rights” to Victoria. Laura said Victoria “did not want

that.”3 Laura also agreed with defense counsel that, at the time she and Barrios began

their sexual relationship, her mother “grant[ed her] the authority to conduct [her] life as an

18 years old, an adult” and gave her permission to marry Barrios, though there were no

documents signed to that effect. Laura further stated that, since 2020, Barrios has not

been able to have sexual relations with her due to the variety of prescribed medications

he was taking.

       Testifying for the defense, Benjamin stated he lived with Laura, Barrios, and

Victoria from January to March 2021. He never saw his father commit any inappropriate

conduct or make any inappropriate remarks to Victoria. Benjamin’s girlfriend Melissa

Weller testified that Victoria stayed with her and Benjamin at a hotel after the SANE exam.

According to Weller, during a discussion with Victoria about why she had been returned

to Benjamin’s custody, Victoria repeatedly referred to Barrios as a “wetback,” and she

said that Barrios had touched her “[o]n the butt.” On cross-examination, Weller agreed

that Victoria was “angry” and “[a] little overwhelmed” at the time. Later, Weller stated that

Victoria seemed “happy” and “joyful” on March 10 and 11, 2021.

       Janice Wagner, an investigator with the Texas Department of Family and

Protective Services (the Department), testified that Victoria accused Laura of “emotional

abuse and physical abuse” in June of 2020, and Wagner was assigned to investigate the

       3 Nicole also testified that she and Laura had a conversation in Victoria’s presence about “Benjamin

terminating his parental rights.” She said that, when the conversation started, Victoria’s “face and
demeanor” changed and she “started tearing up.”

                                                    5
case. 4 After conducting various interviews, Wagner and her supervisor “ruled out” the

allegations because they “did not meet the standard of physical abuse and emotional

abuse.” 5 However, the Department determined that the family should be provided family-

based safety services because they “need[ed] some extra resources to keep the child

safe.”

         Nicole’s husband Jonathan testified that, at a picnic outside Barrios and Laura’s

home on Father’s Day in 2019, multiple police officers arrived and began interviewing

people. According to Jonathan, police were there to investigate a complaint made by

Victoria that Laura was abusing her, but the Department eventually concluded that Laura

was “not guilty” of the allegations. He said, since that time, he does not feel comfortable

being around Victoria and avoids being alone with her.

         Barrios was convicted as charged and was sentenced as set forth above. This

appeal followed.

                                            II.     DISCUSSION

A.       Sufficiency of the Evidence

         1.      Standard of Review and Applicable Law

         To satisfy constitutional due process requirements, a criminal conviction must be

         4 Specifically, according to Wagner, Victoria reported that Laura “slapped her in the face” and “yells

at her excessively.”

         5 At a hearing outside the presence of the jury, when asked whether Victoria was being untruthful

when she made her allegations in 2020, Wagner explained:

         When I spoke to [Victoria], she said that [Laura] had slapped her in the face but couldn’t
         recall all the circumstances around it. And [the Department] has a definition for physical
         abuse. And, like, for example, if a parent slaps a child in the face but it doesn’t leave a
         mark or a bruise, it depends on how old the child is whether it will fit in the definition of
         physical abuse.

                                                      6
supported by sufficient evidence. See Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 517 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2009). “Evidence is sufficient to support a criminal conviction if a rational jury could

find each essential element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Stahmann v.

State, 602 S.W.3d 573, 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.

307, 319 (1979)). In a sufficiency review, we view the evidence in the light most favorable

to the verdict and consider all of the admitted evidence. Id. We consider both direct and

circumstantial evidence as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the

evidence and are not mere speculation. See id.; Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2017); Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). “The

jury is the sole judge of credibility and weight to be attached to the testimony of the

witnesses”; therefore, “[w]hen the jury could reasonably draw conflicting inferences, we

presume that the jury resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict.” Stahmann, 602 S.W.3d

at 577; see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.04.

       Sufficiency is measured by the elements of the offense as defined by a

hypothetically correct jury charge. Curlee v. State, 620 S.W.3d 767, 778 (Tex. Crim. App.

2021) (citing Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). A

hypothetically correct charge “accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment,

does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the

State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the

defendant was tried.” Id. (citing Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240). “The law ‘authorized by the

indictment’ consists of the statutory elements of the offense as modified by the indictment

allegations.” Id.

       Here, a hypothetically correct charge would instruct the jury that Barrios is guilty:

                                             7
(1) of sexual assault as alleged in Count I if he intentionally or knowingly caused the

penetration of Victoria’s sexual organ with his sexual organ, see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 22.011(a)(2)(A); (2) of sexual assault as alleged in Count II if he intentionally or

knowingly caused the penetration of Victoria’s mouth with his sexual organ, see id.

§ 22.011(a)(2)(B); (3) of indecency with a child as alleged in Count III if he touched any

part of Victoria’s genitals, including touching through clothing, with the intent to arouse or

gratify his sexual desire, see id. § 21.11(a)(1), (c)(1); and (4) of indecency with a child as

alleged in Count IV if he touched Victoria’s breast with the intent to arouse or gratify his

sexual desire. See id. 6

        A person acts intentionally with respect to a result of his conduct when it is his

conscious objective or desire to cause the result. Id. § 6.03(a). A person acts knowingly

with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably

certain to cause the result. Id. § 6.03(b). Intent may generally be inferred from

circumstantial evidence such as acts, words, and the conduct of the appellant. Guevara

v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).

        2.      Analysis

        By his first four issues on appeal, Barrios contends the evidence was insufficient

to sustain the verdicts of guilt. He does not dispute that Victoria provided testimony at trial

which, if believed, would directly support each element of each of the four counts. See

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 21.11(a)(1), 22.011(a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(B). Instead, he argues that

Victoria’s testimony was “incredible and illogical.”

        6 It is undisputed that, at the time of the alleged offenses, Victoria was under the age of seventeen,

which is an essential element of all four counts. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 22.011(c)(1), 21.11(a).

                                                     8
       First, he contends that “the fact that anyone would return to an abuser three

separate times after the increasingly offensive alleged conduct describe[d] by [Victoria] is

illogical and a highly improbable response by any alleged victim under these

circumstances.” Second, he claims that “[t]he fact that the alleged incidents occurred

suddenly, and in the home, without any prior misconduct of any kind by [Barrios] against

[Victoria], makes it even more improbable and unlikely” that Victoria’s testimony was

truthful. He observes that, in 2020, Victoria made allegations of physical abuse against

Laura which were “ruled out” by the Department. The jury also heard Laura’s testimony

that Barrios has not been physically able to engage in sexual relations with her since

2020. Barrios further notes that, although DNA matching his own was found on Victoria’s

abdomen, the forensic analyst did not know how any DNA could have been transferred

there. Finally, he emphasizes that Victoria “had a motive to make a false allegation”

against Barrios because she did not like living in his house, and she instead wanted to be

with her father Benjamin. In this regard, he notes that, the day before making her outcry,

Victoria overheard Laura and Nicole discussing the potential termination of Benjamin’s

parental rights. He also points to Weller’s testimony that Victoria referred to Barrios as a

“wetback” and argues that, according to Weller, Victoria “said that [Barrios] only touched

her on the butt.”7

       We disagree with Barrios that Victoria’s testimony was “incredible and illogical” or

that no reasonable juror could have believed her. Her trial testimony was clear, direct,

free from internal contradictions, and consistent with the reports she made to the forensic

interviewer and the SANE nurse. Moreover, Victoria’s testimony was at least partially

       7 We note that, according to the trial transcript, Weller did not use the word “only.”

                                                     9
corroborated by evidence from the SANE exam that she had irritation on her genitals and

petechiae on her breasts, and by evidence that DNA matching Barrios was found on

swabs taken from Victoria’s abdomen and breasts.

       In any event, the jury found Victoria to be a credible witness in this case, and

because it is the sole judge of witness credibility, Stahmann, 602 S.W.3d at 577, we may

not disturb that determination on appeal. The code of criminal procedure specifically

provides that a conviction for sexual assault of a child or for indecency with a child “is

supportable on the uncorroborated testimony of the victim” alone. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.

ANN. art. 38.07(a); see Saldivar-Lopez v. State, 676 S.W.3d 851, 859 (Tex. App.—Corpus

Christi–Edinburg 2023, no pet.); Wishert v. State, 654 S.W.3d 317, 328 (Tex. App.—

Eastland 2022, pet. ref’d). “Courts give wide latitude to testimony given by child victims

of sexual abuse.” Gonzalez Soto v. State, 267 S.W.3d 327, 332 (Tex. App.—Corpus

Christi–Edinburg 2008, no pet.) (citing Villalon v. State, 791 S.W.2d 130, 134 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1990)). “The victim’s description of what happened to her need not be precise, and

she is not expected to express herself at the same level of sophistication as an adult.” Id.

And, though there was at least some probative physical evidence in this case, “[t]here is

no requirement that the victim’s testimony be corroborated by medical or physical

evidence.” Id. (citing Lee v. State, 176 S.W.3d 452, 458 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.]

2004), aff’d, 206 S.W.3d 620 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (noting that “[t]he lack of physical or

forensic evidence is a factor for the jury to consider in weighing the evidence”)).

       For the foregoing reasons, the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions.

See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 21.11(a)(1), 22.011(a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(B). We overrule

Barrios’s first four issues.

                                            10
B.      Evidentiary Rulings

        By his final two issues, Barrios argues the trial court erred in its ruling on the

admissibility of evidence. “We review a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence

under an abuse of discretion standard, and we must uphold the trial court’s ruling if it was

within the zone of reasonable disagreement.” Wells v. State, 611 S.W.3d 396, 427 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2020).

        1.        Exclusion of Victoria’s Prior Sexual Abuse Allegations

        On the final day of testimony, 8 defense counsel called Victoria and Wagner in order

to make an offer of proof outside of the presence of the jury. Victoria explained that, after

she made the allegation of physical abuse against Laura in 2020, she went to the CAC

for an interview on June 25, 2020. Victoria agreed that, in that CAC interview, she

accused three people of having sexually abused her: her mother, a man named Joshua

Florence, and an unnamed individual wearing a police officer’s uniform. Victoria also

recalled that she made a complaint of abuse by her mother and Florence in 2012, when

she was around six years old, and she was interviewed at CAC then as well. 9 Wagner

said she was informed by police that the notes from the 2012 interview “stated ‘coached.’”

However, Wagner was not aware what specific allegation that note referred to, and she

could not say the allegations were false. She observed that, as a result of the 2012 CAC

interview, Victoria’s mother was convicted and placed on probation for causing injury to

        8 Prior to trial, the State filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude, among other things, “[a]ny

reference that the alleged victim has made a prior outcry of sexual abuse or any allegation that the prior
outcry was false.” The record reflects that defense counsel agreed not to make any such reference until the
court could rule on its admissibility.

        9 It is unclear whether Victoria’s 2012 complaint was based on the same alleged conduct as the

2020 complaint.

                                                   11
a child.

       Following the offer of proof, the trial court sustained the State’s relevance and Rule

403 objections to testimony regarding Victoria’s prior allegations of sexual abuse. 10 See

TEX. R. EVID. 401, 403. However, the court permitted counsel to inquire about Victoria’s

prior allegations that Laura slapped her and yelled at her and caused her to feel unsafe

at the home. As noted above, Victoria conceded at trial that she alleged in 2020 that Laura

emotionally and physically abused her, but the Department ruled out those allegations.

       By his fifth issue on appeal, Barrios argues that the evidence about Victoria’s prior

sexual abuse allegations should have been admitted. He contends this evidence was

offered “not as general evidence of truthfulness, but rather to support [his] theory that

[Victoria] had a motive to falsely accuse [him], be removed from [his] house, and live with

her father.” He argues that the evidence was more probative than prejudicial and was

therefore admissible under Rule 403. He further contends that, as a result of the trial

court’s ruling, he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses.

       Evidence is relevant if “(a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable

than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining

the action.” TEX. R. EVID. 401. But “[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its

probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice, confusing

the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative

       10 The court stated:

       I find that the prior allegations of abuse are too remote, not sufficiently related, relevant,
       tied to, or otherwise connected to the current allegation against this defendant and not
       necessarily false, and that regardless of any limited relevance they may have, that
       relevance is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusing the
       issues for the jury, and misleading the jury . . . .

                                                    12
evidence.” TEX. R. EVID. 403. 11 Under the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, a

defendant has the right to attack a witness’s credibility, and a trial court may not “prevent

a defendant from pursuing his proposed line of cross examination when it can be said

that a reasonable jury might have received a significantly different impression of the

witness’s credibility had counsel been permitted to do so.” Johnson v. State, 490 S.W.3d

895, 909 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (cleaned up). But “the right to cross-examine is not

unqualified” and “[t]rial judges retain wide latitude under the Confrontation Clause to

impose restrictions on cross-examination based on such criteria as harassment,

prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’s safety, or interrogation that is repetitive

or only marginally relevant.” Id. at 909–10 (cleaned up).

        Barrios argues on appeal that the excluded evidence “supported [his] theory that

[Victoria] had a motive to falsely accuse [him] of sexual abuse and has done so in the

past against others,” and was therefore “admissible to prove motive under [] Rule 404(b),

Rule 613(b), and Rule 412.” We disagree. The excluded evidence indicated that Victoria

        11 Evidence regarding “specific instances of a victim’s past sexual behavior” is inadmissible unless

the court determines after an in-camera hearing that the probative value of the evidence outweighs the
danger of unfair prejudice and that the evidence:

        (A)     is necessary to rebut or explain scientific or medical evidence offered by the
                prosecutor;

        (B)     concerns past sexual behavior with the defendant and is offered by the defendant
                to prove consent;

        (C)     relates to the victim’s motive or bias;

        (D)     is admissible under Rule 609 [regarding evidence of a criminal conviction offered
                to attack a witness’s character for truthfulness]; or

        (E)     is constitutionally required to be admitted.

TEX. R. EVID. 412. The State did not object to the subject evidence on these grounds.

                                                     13
accused three people of sexual abuse in 2020, and she also made unspecified allegations

of abuse against two people in 2012. The notes from Victoria’s 2012 forensic interview

“stated ‘coached,’” but no witness was able to clarify what this note actually meant or to

which specific allegations it pertained. Even assuming the 2012 allegations were based

on exactly the same conduct as the 2020 allegations, there was no other evidence

indicating that these allegations were false or fabricated. Further, because the allegations

of sexual abuse in particular did not involve Laura or Barrios, the evidence did not

demonstrate that Victoria harbored a bias or animus against them, nor did it tend to

establish that Victoria had a motive to fabricate allegations against Barrios so as to affect

the credibility of her testimony in this case. 12 We conclude the trial court did not abuse its

discretion by excluding this evidence on relevance grounds. See TEX. R. EVID. 401. We

further conclude that Barrios’s Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses was not

violated by the trial court’s ruling. See Johnson v. State, 490 S.W.3d at 909–10. Barrios’s

fifth issue is overruled.

        2.       Admission of Barrios’s Sexual Relationship with Laura as a Minor

        By his sixth and final issue, Barrios argues the trial court erred by admitting

evidence that he had sexual relations with Laura when Laura was sixteen years old and

while he was still married to Laura’s mother.

        Rule 404(b) states that “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible

        12   Though Barrios claims the excluded evidence was offered to establish Victoria’s motive to
fabricate allegations against him, we observe that may have also been offered in a general attempt to
impeach Victoria’s character for truthfulness. In that regard, we note that, “[e]xcept for a criminal conviction
under Rule 609 [regarding impeachment by evidence of a criminal conviction], a party may not inquire
into . . . specific instances of the witness’s conduct in order to attack or support the witness’s character for
truthfulness.” TEX. R. EVID. 608(b). Victoria was not convicted of a crime; therefore, the excluded testimony
was not admissible to impeach her credibility. See id.

                                                      14
to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person

acted in accordance with the character.” TEX. R. EVID. 404(b). However, notwithstanding

Rule 404, evidence that a defendant accused of a sexual offense has committed a

separate sexual offense 13 “may be admitted . . . for any bearing the evidence has on

relevant matters, including the character of the defendant and acts performed in

conformity with the character of the defendant.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.37,

§ 2(b). Prior to trial, the State notified Barrios that it would be offering the subject evidence,

and as required by the statute, the court held a hearing outside of the presence of the jury

to determine its admissibility. See id. § 2-a(2). At the hearing, the State argued that the

testimony was admissible under the statute because it showed that Barrios committed

sexual assault of a child against Laura. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(a)(2)(A). The

State further argued that the affirmative defenses to sexual assault of a child contained

in penal code § 22.011(e) did not apply because: (1) Barrios was not married to Laura at

the time; (2) Barrios was more than three years older than Laura; and (3) Barrios was

prohibited from marrying or having sexual relations with Laura because she was his

stepdaughter. See id. § 22.011(e); see also id. §§ 25.01, 25.02(a)(2). 14 Finally, the State

        13 The sexual offenses to which the statute applies include sexual assault of a child and indecency

with a child. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.37, § 2(a)(1)(C), (D).

        14 Section 22.011(e) states that the following are affirmative defenses to sexual assault of a child:

        (1)     that the actor was the spouse of the child at the time of the offense; or

        (2)     that:

                (A)     the actor was not more than three years older than the victim and at the
                        time of the offense:

                        (i)      was not required under Chapter 62, Code of Criminal Procedure,
                                 to register for life as a sex offender; or

                                                     15
argued the evidence is relevant because it shows Barrios “has a history of having sexual

relations and sexually abusing people who are too young to consent to that.” The trial

court found that “the evidence likely to be admitted at trial will be adequate to support a

finding by the jury that the defendant committed the separate offense beyond a

reasonable doubt” and therefore admitted the testimony under Article 38.37. See TEX.

CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.37, § 2-a(1).

       Barrios appears to argue that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony under

Article 38.37. We disagree. Laura’s testimony that she had sex with Barrios when she

was sixteen years old was clear and unequivocal, and it is undisputed that Barrios was

married to Virginia at the time. Therefore, Laura’s testimony would have been adequate

to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Barrios committed sexual assault of

a child against her. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(a)(2)(A). And, as the State

observes, Laura’s testimony was relevant insofar as it demonstrated that Barrios acted in

conformity with his character when he committed sexual assault of Victoria, a child of a

                      (ii)    was not a person who under Chapter 62, Code of Criminal
                              Procedure, had a reportable conviction or adjudication for an
                              offense under this section; and

               (B)    the victim:

                      (i)     was a child of 14 years of age or older; and

                      (ii)    was not:

                              (a)     a person whom the actor was prohibited from marrying or
                                      purporting to marry or with whom the actor was prohibited
                                      from living under the appearance of being married under
                                      Section 25.01; or

                              (b)     a person with whom the actor was prohibited from
                                      engaging in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual
                                      intercourse under Section 25.02.

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(e).

                                                 16
similar age. See TEX. R. EVID. 401; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.37, § 2(b). The

trial court did not err by concluding the evidence was admissible under Article 38.37.

       Barrios further contends that, even if the evidence was admissible under Article

38.37, it violated Rule 403 because it was unfairly prejudicial and too remote in time to be

of probative value. See TEX. R. EVID. 403. He cites caselaw establishing that, “[w]hen

evidence of a defendant’s extraneous acts is relevant under Article 38.37, [§] 2(b), the

trial court is still required to conduct a Rule 403 balancing test upon proper objection or

request.” Hitt v. State, 53 S.W.3d 697, 706 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, pet. ref’d) (emphasis

added); see Belcher v. State, 474 S.W.3d 840, 847 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2015, no pet.).

However, Barrios does not point to any location in the hearing or trial record, and we find

none, in which his counsel actually made any “proper objection or request” based on Rule

403 regarding this testimony. Accordingly, we may not reverse the trial court’s decision

on this basis. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a). Barrios’s sixth issue is overruled.

                                    III.   CONCLUSION

       We affirm the trial court’s judgments.

                                                                DORI CONTRERAS
                                                                Chief Justice

Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2 (b).

Delivered and filed on the
1st day of February, 2024.

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