Court Opinion

ID: 9930119
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-06 14:02:16.524448+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:03:36.925765
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

                                                   Decided: February 6, 2024

                      S23A1166. MORRELL v. THE STATE.

       PETERSON, Presiding Justice.

       Karonta Morrell appeals his convictions related to the shooting

death of Jonathan Lang. 1 On appeal, Morrell argues that the

       1 The crimes against Lang occurred in March 2016. Morrell was charged

in a 21-count indictment for various crimes related to the deaths of Lang and
Roquan Scarver, as well as various crimes against Harry Rawls, III, and Tonya
Murcherson. The Scarver counts were severed, Morrell was found guilty of
those counts at a trial, and we affirmed his convictions. See Morrell v. State,
313 Ga. 247 (2022).
       Relevant to this appeal, Morrell was charged as follows: malice murder
(Count 9); two counts of felony murder (Counts 10-11); criminal attempt to
murder Harry Rawls, III (Count 12); three counts of aggravated assault, one
against Lang (Count 13), one against Rawls (Count 14), and the other against
Tonya Murcherson (Count 15); five counts of possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony (Count 16-20); and one count of possession of a firearm
by a convicted felon (Count 21). At an April 2018 trial on Counts 9-21, the jury
found Morrell guilty on all counts. The trial court sentenced Morrell to life in
prison without the possibility of parole on Count 9, a consecutive 30-year term
in prison on Count 12, a consecutive 20-year prison term on Count 15, and four
consecutive five-year terms in prison for Counts 16, 18, 20, and 21. The
remaining counts were merged or vacated by operation of law. Morrell filed a
timely motion for new trial, which he later amended. In an order entered on
May 23, 2023, following a hearing, the trial court denied Morrell’s motion for
new trial, and he timely appealed. His appeal was docketed to this Court’s
August 2023 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. He also argues

that he cannot obtain full and fair appellate review because the

record contains several deficiencies. We affirm because the evidence

was sufficient to support Morrell’s malice murder conviction, and

Morrell fails to show how any deficiencies in the record have harmed

him.

       The evidence at trial showed the following. On March 1, 2016,

Kovasa Lindsay was visiting her mother, Tonya Murcherson, who

lived with Ashley Lindsay, Kovasa’s sister. Lang was there, and at

some point he got into an argument with Harry Rawls, III, Kovasa’s

boyfriend, who was drunk and had been cursing at the family.

       Morrell heard Lang and Rawls arguing, approached the house,

and asked Lang, “cuz, you okay?”2 Rawls jumped off the porch and

told Morrell, “you ain’t got nothing to do with this.” Rawls and

Morrell began arguing, and Morrell pulled a gun from the back of

his pants and pointed it at Rawls’s head. The family told Kovasa

that she “better go get” Rawls because Morrell would shoot Rawls.

       2 Trial testimony indicated that Morrell and Lang were family friends.

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     As Kovasa tried to pull Rawls away, he threw a drink at her

face. Murcherson left the porch, approached Rawls, and slapped

him; he responded by slapping her to the ground. Lang and Ashley

then left the porch and tried to pull Rawls away. When Rawls began

to walk toward Morrell, Morrell fired his gun, but hit Murcherson

and Lang instead of Rawls. Murcherson was struck in the shoulder.

Lang collapsed and told Morrell, “oh, cuz, you shot me.” Morrell

apologized, saying he did not mean to shoot Lang, and Lang told him

to leave before the police arrived. Morrell was the only person with

a gun during the argument.

     Police arrived and found Lang lying on the sidewalk. Lang told

a police officer that he was walking across the street when someone

shot him, and Lang claimed not to know who shot him. Lang died

later that day from a single gunshot that entered his arm and struck

his torso.

     Morrell met with Lang’s mother about a day after the shooting

and admitted to pulling out a gun and shooting Lang by mistake.

Lang’s mother urged Morrell to turn himself in to the police.

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     Quantina Bostic knew Morrell from the neighborhood. Bostic

witnessed the shooting, was interviewed by police the day after, and

identified Morrell in a photo lineup as the person who shot and killed

Lang. During the interview, which was recorded, Morrell called

Bostic on her cell phone and said that he needed to “get to” a witness

who was talking to the police. Morrell talked about being on the run

and said that he would get “his people” to talk to this witness, who

was likely staying at Murcherson’s house. Morrell said that he did

not want to “hit them folks,” which a detective testified meant that

Morrell did not want to shoot or kill them if he did not have to and

was instead willing to pay for the witness’s refusal to cooperate with

police. Another detective testified that he listened to recorded phone

calls Morrell made from jail and overheard Morrell threaten to “do

away with” Kovasa, which the detective interpreted as killing her.

Kovasa testified that she heard Morrell made threats against her for

cooperating with the police, and she and her children were put under

police protection and relocated due to Morrell’s threats. During the

recorded call with Bostic, Morrell said that he was hiding at his

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girlfriend’s house, and police later found and arrested him there.

      About a week before his trial was originally set to begin,

Morrell called Bostic, attempting to get her not to testify. Morrell

acknowledged that Bostic could get into legal trouble for refusing to

go to court to testify and discussed ways he could help get her out of

such trouble. Morrell also discussed the other witnesses who would

testify against him and said the prosecutor “ain’t going to be able to

do s**t” if he “gets to” those witnesses.

      1. Morrell argues that the evidence was insufficient as a matter

of federal constitutional due process to support his murder

conviction.3 He argues that he was not present during the

altercation leading to Lang’s death. He alternatively argues that,

even if he were present, the trial evidence shows that his actions

were justified or that, at most, he was guilty only of voluntary

      3  Although Morrell refers to “convictions” in his appellate brief, his
argument regarding the sufficiency of the evidence focuses exclusively on his
malice murder conviction. Because we generally do not review evidentiary
sufficiency sua sponte in non-death-penalty cases, we address the sufficiency
of the evidence only on the malice murder count. See Montanez v. State, 311
Ga. 843, 848 n.10 (1) (a) (860 SE2d 551) (2021) (limiting sufficiency review to
counts actually argued on appeal) (citing Davenport v. State, 309 Ga. 385, 391-
392 (4) (846 SE2d 83) (2020)).
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manslaughter based on provocation. We disagree.

     When evaluating the sufficiency of evidence as a matter of

federal constitutional due process, the proper standard of review is

whether a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,

319 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). We do not resolve conflicts

in the evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses; instead, we

view the evidence in the “light most favorable to the verdict, with

deference to the jury’s assessment of the weight and credibility of

the evidence.” Hayes v. State, 292 Ga. 506, 506 (739 SE2d 313) (2013)

(citation and punctuation omitted).

     With respect to Morrell’s first argument, the jury could easily

find that Morrell was present during the crime, as several

eyewitnesses placed him there. Morrell’s own statements also placed

him there, as Lang’s mother testified that he apologized to her for

firing the shot that killed Lang.

     As for his alternative argument, it likewise has no merit.

Morrell argues that the evidence showed that he acted in defense of

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self or others or committed voluntary manslaughter. But he did not

present a justification defense to the jury, arguing only that the

State’s witnesses were not credible and that his alleged actions

amounted to voluntary manslaughter.4 And, in any event, the

evidence that Morrell acted in defense of self or others was not so

strong that the jury was required to find justification. See, e.g.,

Williams v. State, 316 Ga. 147, 150 (1) (886 SE2d 818) (2023)

(although the State bears the burden of disproving a defendant’s

claim that his actions were justified, it is the jury’s role to determine

whether that burden has been met, and the jury is free to reject any

evidence in support of a justification defense).

      The trial court thoroughly charged the jury on voluntary

manslaughter, stating that to find Morrell guilty of that offense,

rather than murder, it had to find that he acted solely as a result of

sudden, violent, and irresistible passion resulting from the serious

provocation sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable person.

      4 Morrell makes no claim on appeal that his trial counsel was ineffective

for failing to raise a justification defense or that the trial court erred in failing
sua sponte to charge the jury on justification.
                                         7
See OCGA § 16-5-2 (a). Morrell argues that the altercation between

Rawls and Lang, which also involved Murcherson, was sufficient

provocation. But we have made clear that fighting is not the type of

provocation that would support a voluntary manslaughter jury

charge, see e.g., Wilkerson v. State, 317 Ga. 242, 247 (2) (892 SE2d

737) (2023), much less demand a voluntary manslaughter

conviction, see, e.g., Burke v. State, 302 Ga. 786, 790-791 (809 SE2d

765) (2018) (explaining that “acting out of fear of bodily harm is not

the same as acting in the heat of passion, and only evidence of the

latter supports a voluntary manslaughter conviction”). Based on the

evidence recounted above, the jury was authorized to find Morrell

guilty of malice murder.

     2. Morrell argues that the trial record is incomplete and does

not allow for meaningful appellate review. Morrell does not argue

that any part of the record is missing, and so his claim fails.

     In preparing his motion for new trial, Morrell requested that

the court reporter prepare a transcript of certain recordings

admitted into evidence at trial— jail phone calls from Morrell,

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Bostic’s recorded interview, and a 911 call following the shooting.

The court reporter provided such a transcript, but Morrell complains

that periodic “indiscernible” notations make the record “incomplete”

and that this precludes meaningful appellate review and amounts

to a due process violation. 5

      His claim fails because the appellate record is complete. All of

the transcripts from the trial and the exhibits at issue are included

in the appellate record, and Morrell makes no claim that he has been

denied access to any of the appellate record. See Gadson v. State,

303 Ga. 871, 878 (3) (a) (815 SE2d 828) (2018) (a defendant can

      5 Morrell argues that the record he characterizes as inadequate deprives

him of his due process rights under both the Georgia and United States
Constitutions. Morrell cites several of our cases which ultimately rely on
federal authority guaranteeing the right to a transcript as a matter of federal
due process. See, e.g., Sheard v. State, 300 Ga. 117, 120 (2) (793 SE2d 386)
(2016) (citing Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (76 SCt 585, 100 LEd 891 (1956)).
He cites no authority interpreting the Georgia Constitution’s Due Process
Clause (Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I. Par. I) and makes no argument that
his claim would be analyzed differently under this provision. Accordingly, we
consider his claim only through the analytical lens of the federal due process
clause. See, e.g., State v. Holland, 308 Ga. 412, 413 n.3 (841 SE2d 723) (2020)
(declining to consider whether Georgia constitutional due process clause
provides a rule substantively different from federal due process clause where
parties made no argument they should be applied differently).

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obtain a new trial where (1) all or an important part of the transcript

is lost or materially inadequate or (2) when the verbatim transcript

is missing only one or a few parts of trial and he has been specifically

has been specifically harmed by the omission). Morrell’s claim

centers exclusively on the transcripts of those exhibits, but he cites

no authority requiring court reporters to transcribe the contents of

recordings admitted as exhibits. See Griffin v. State, 311 Ga. 579,

585 (4) (858 SE2d 688) (2021) (rejecting a similar claim in part

because   the   defendant    cited        no   authority   mandating   the

transcription of text messages admitted into evidence and viewed by

the jury). He was not entitled to a transcript of the exhibits, and the

fact that he was given something more than he was due does not

support a due process violation.

     Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

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