Court Opinion

ID: 9645763
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:34:29.276539+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:31.274355
License: Public Domain

CONCURRING OPINION ON APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
CLINTON, Judge,
concurring:
While agreeing that pursuant to the authority granted by Article 42.12, § 5(a), V.A.C.C.P., a trial court may defer further proceedings without entering an adjudication of guilt, and place the defendant on probation for a term not exceeding ten years, regardless of the range of punishment for the alleged offense, I write to suggest that an understanding of the legislative objective might well illuminate the concept underlying the procedure.
Early on the Court observed that “§ 4.12 of the Controlled Substances Act, Article 4476-15, V.A.C.S. [since repealed] is conceptually similar to § 3d [now § 5] of the Adult Probation, Parole and Mandatory Supervision Law, Art. 42.12, V.A.C.C.P.” McIntyre v. State, 587 S.W.2d 413, at 414 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); see Crutchfield v. State, 560 S.W.2d 685, at 686 (Tex.Cr.App.1978) (language of two provisions “very similar”); McDougal v. State, 610 S.W.2d 509, at 510 (Tex.Cr.App.1981) (Clinton, J., concurring) (Conceptually “probation” during deferred adjudication similar to “probation” following conditional discharge); see generally McNew v. State, 608 S.W.2d 166, at 170-172, 174-176 (Tex.Cr.App.1978-*6961980) (deferred adjudication constitutional form of “probation”).
Accordingly, the legislative objective in both deferred adjudication and conditional discharge is substantially the same, viz:
[T]he true objective ... is to divert the accused from the rest of the gauntlet run of the criminal justice system and the function of the trial court is to enter into a clearly understood pact with the accused that will induce and persuade him to follow the diversionary road. That the Legislature authorized the trial court as an inducement and encouragement to utilize ‘probation’ does not necessarily mean that the Legislature had ‘regular’ probation in mind for it prescribed only ‘such reasonable conditions’ as the trial court ‘may require’ and for ‘such period’ as the court may prescribe [not to exceed two years for conditional discharge and ten years for deferred adjudication]. Meanwhile, a judgment of guilt is not entered, punishment, as such, is not assessed and, of course, sentence has neither been imposed nor suspended. In essence, what has happened is that the movement of the course of developments in the criminal action has been temporarily stilled and the accused has been permitted to demonstrate his capacity for prescribed good behavior during a specified period. If he succeeds, the movement is reversed and disappears; however, should he fail, the movement in the criminal action continues with the normal incidents of trial.”
McIntyre, supra, at 417.
Obviously the Legislature was of the opinion that “the best interest of society and the defendant will be served” when a promising offender concedes guilt and proceeds successfully to demonstrate an ability to conform to societal notions of acceptable behavior for the period prescribed— notwithstanding the seriousness of the offense and related potential punishment for those offenders who are otherwise situated.