Court Opinion

ID: 9952099
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-19 18:02:11.295596+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:38:01.794938
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/19/24 In re Andrew A. CA2/3
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                      SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                  DIVISION THREE

 In re ANDREW A. et al., Persons                                   B326745
 Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
 _____________________________________
 LOS ANGELES COUNTY                                                (Los Angeles County
 DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND                                        Super. Ct. No. 19CCJP04588A-
 FAMILY SERVICES,                                                  B)

          Plaintiff and Respondent,

          v.

 MARIA A.,

          Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Pete Navarro, Commissioner. Affirmed.
     Michelle E. Butler, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Brian Mahler, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                 ‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗

       Maria A. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s
February 1, 2023 order summarily denying her Welfare and
Institutions Code1 section 388 petition, and its April 12, 2023
order denying her request for conjoint counseling and additional
visitation with her children. With regard to the February 1
order, mother contends (1) she made a prima facie showing of
changed circumstances and that the requested order was in the
children’s best interests, and thus the juvenile court erred by
denying her request for an evidentiary hearing, and (2) the
juvenile court violated her due process rights by considering her
children’s statements to the court without permitting her to
introduce additional evidence or to cross-examine the children.
Mother makes no claim of error with regard to the April 12, 2023
order.2 As we discuss, we find no error, and thus we affirm the
orders.

1     All subsequent statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

2     Because mother makes no claim of error as to the April 12,
2023 order, any such claim is forfeited. (Wright v. City of
Los Angeles (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 683, 689 [“asserted grounds for
appeal that . . . merely complain of error without presenting a
coherent legal argument are deemed abandoned and unworthy of
discussion”]; Singh v. Lipworth (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 813, 817

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      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      Mother has three children: Andrew A. (born in 2009),
Gladys A. (born in 2011), and Allison A. (born in 2013). Raul A.
(father) is the father of all three children. The present appeal
concerns only Andrew and Gladys, and father is not a party to
the appeal.
I.    2019 proceedings.
       In June 2019, the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS) received a report that
father had kicked mother and locked her out of the family’s home
in the children’s presence. The following month, DCFS filed a
section 300 petition alleging the children were at substantial risk
of physical harm due to domestic violence between the parents.
The juvenile court ordered the children detained with the
parents.
       In September 2019, there were two additional incidents of
serious domestic violence between the parents. In one incident,
father pulled mother’s hair and choked her; in the other, mother
lost control of her vehicle during an argument with father and
crashed into a parked car. The children were in the car’s back
seat, and Andrew and Gladys were injured. The children were
detained from the parents and placed in foster care.
       In October 2019, DCFS filed an amended petition alleging
that mother abused marijuana and alcohol, and father abused
methamphetamines. On November 7, 2019, the court sustained a
single count of the petition pursuant to section 300, subdivision
(b), and dismissed the remaining counts. Mother was ordered to

[appellate contentions forfeited if “unsupported by ‘adequate
factual or legal analysis’ ”].)

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submit to 10 on-demand drug tests and to participate in a
domestic violence program and individual counseling. She was
granted weekly monitored visits with the children.
II.   2020 proceedings.
      A.    Children’s return to mother’s custody.
      In January 2020, DCFS reported that mother and father
were living separately. Mother had been consistently attending a
domestic violence support group and individual counseling, was
testing negative for all drug use, and was visiting the children
regularly. She had been permitted unmonitored eight-hour visits
with the children on weekends since December 2019.
      On February 6, 2020, the court found mother had made
substantial progress with her case plan, and it ordered the
children returned to her care under DCFS supervision.
      B.    Subsequent petition and detention.
       DCFS filed a subsequent petition in September 2020. It
alleged that mother engaged in violent altercations with her
boyfriend, Anthony M., in the children’s presence, and in
August 2020, while heavily intoxicated, mother threw a brick
through the window of Anthony’s home and punched Anthony’s
sister in the face (counts a-1, b-1). The petition further alleged
that mother abused alcohol, rendering her unable to care for the
children (count b-2). The children were detained from mother
and placed in foster care. Mother was charged with vandalism
and public intoxication.
       On October 15, 2020, the juvenile court sustained the
allegations of the petition and ordered the children removed from
mother. Mother was ordered to complete a full drug/alcohol
program with aftercare, submit to random drug testing, engage

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in individual and conjoint counseling, and complete an anger
management program. Mother was granted monitored visits
with the children.
III.   2021 proceedings.
       In April 2021, DCFS reported that the children were
thriving in foster care and wished to be adopted by their foster
parents. Mother had not had any face-to-face visits with the
children and phoned them inconsistently. She refused to drug
test and had not complied with her case plan. The foster mother
had to terminate some video calls between mother and the
children because mother appeared to be under the influence of a
substance.
       On May 4, 2021, the juvenile court terminated the parents’
reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing.
       In July 2021, DCFS reported that the foster parents were
not interested in adoption, and potential adoptive parents had
not been identified. In August 2021, father filed a section 388
petition requesting that his reunification services be reinstated
and the children returned to his care. The juvenile court
reinstated father’s reunification services in October 2021.
IV.    2022 proceedings.
       In March 2022, DCFS reported that the children continued
to thrive in their foster care placement. Mother was jailed from
October 2021 through March 2022 and had no visits or phone
calls with the children during that period. Upon mother’s
release, the children refused to see or speak to her. The children
visited regularly with father, as well as with the maternal
grandmother and the paternal great-aunt and great-uncle.
Allison wished to live with father if she could not be adopted by

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the foster parents, but Andrew and Gladys refused to live with
father.
       In April 2022, the juvenile court terminated father’s
reunification services, but ordered Allison to have overnight and
weekend visits with father. In August, Allison was placed with
father.
       During an August 2022 hearing, children’s counsel reported
that Andrew and Gladys had been declining visits with both
parents for several months and wished to have visits suspended.
The caregiver told the court that the parents called weekly but
the children had refused to speak with them for months, and
Andrew hid in the bathroom or the laundry room to avoid phone
calls. The caregiver put calls on speaker phone so the children
could hear the parents’ voices, but the children would walk away.
In the past, mother sometimes had been inappropriate during
phone calls, telling the children she was incarcerated or making
false promises, including that the children would live with her
again. Both Andrew and Gladys seemed very nervous when the
parents called. The court found that contact with mother was
detrimental to the children, and it ordered that mother’s contact
be suspended.
       Andrew and Gladys were matched with a potential
adoptive family and had an overnight visit with them in
November 2022. The children were placed with the prospective
adoptive parents on December 22, 2022.
V.   2023 proceedings.
      Mother filed a section 388 petition on January 26, 2023,
seeking reinstatement of her reunification services or,
alternatively, visits with Andrew and Gladys. In support, mother
stated that she had been in an intensive recovery program since

                               6
March 2022, had completed domestic violence counseling and
drug/alcohol counseling, and was actively involved in parenting
and anger management classes. She believed that the requested
court order would be in the children’s best interests because she
was “determined to parent all her children again. [Mother] has
maintained consistent contact with . . . Allison and has kept up
with her health and education and their relationship is described
as positive and patient. Mother has attempted to call her
children once a week for nearly an entire year. Such request
would help strengthen the bond between the children and
parents and allow [mother] to reunify with her children.”
       At a February 1, 2023 hearing, mother’s counsel asked the
juvenile court to set the section 388 petition for an evidentiary
hearing. The children’s counsel opposed the request, urging that
mother had not made a prima facie showing of changed
circumstances or that the requested order was in the children’s
best interests. DCFS joined in the children’s opposition to
mother’s request for an evidentiary hearing.
       The court stated that it wanted to hear from Andrew and
Gladys directly before ruling on mother’s request for an
evidentiary hearing. The court then questioned the children
briefly outside of mother’s presence without placing them under
oath. Andrew told the court he did not want to visit mother or
father because he did not feel safe or comfortable around them.
When the court asked why, Andrew said he felt anxious about
being alone with his parents because he did not know “if . . . they
are going to scream at me or scream at . . . my sisters or they are
going to, like, fall asleep or do something.” His fear was based on
his past experiences with his parents, “on them hitting each other

                                7
[and] screaming.” Gladys gave a similar answer, saying she was
“not comfortable seeing [mother and father] because of the past.”
      After hearing from the children, the court noted that both
seemed highly intelligent and expressed “in no uncertain terms
their positions on . . . reunifying.” It thereafter denied mother’s
request to set her section 388 petition for a hearing.
      Mother timely appealed from the order denying her section
388 petition.
      On April 12, 2023, the juvenile court held a review hearing
at which it denied the mother’s request for conjoint counseling
and visitation. The court continued the section 366.26 hearing to
August 2023. Mother appealed from the April 12, 2023 order.
                          DISCUSSION
      Mother contends the juvenile court (1) abused its discretion
by denying her section 388 petition without an evidentiary
hearing, and (2) violated her due process rights by accepting
evidence from the children without a full hearing. As we discuss,
mother’s contentions lack merit.
I.    The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by
      denying mother’s section 388 petition without an
      evidentiary hearing.
      A juvenile court order may be changed, modified or set
aside under section 388 “if the petitioner establishes by a
preponderance of the evidence that (1) new evidence or changed
circumstances exist and (2) the proposed change would promote
the best interests of the child. [Citation.] A parent need only
make a prima facie showing of these elements to trigger the right
to a hearing on a section 388 petition and the petition should be
liberally construed in favor of granting a hearing to consider the

                                 8
parent's request.’ (In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799,
806.)
       “ ‘However, if the liberally construed allegations of the
petition do not make a prima facie showing of changed
circumstances and that the proposed change would promote the
best interests of the child, the court need not order a hearing on
the petition. [Citations.] The prima facie requirement is not met
unless the facts alleged, if supported by evidence given credit at
the hearing, would sustain a favorable decision on the petition.’
(In re Zachary G., supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 806.)” (In re Mary
G. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 184, 205; see also In re Jeremy W.
(1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1407, 1413–1414 [§ 388 petition may be
denied without a hearing “if the [petition] fails to reveal any
change of circumstance or new evidence which might require a
change of order”].) (§ 388, subd. (d) [“If it appears that the best
interests of the child . . . may be promoted by the proposed
change of order . . . , the court shall order that a hearing be
held”].) We review the summary denial of a section 388 petition
for an abuse of discretion. (In re Mary G., at p. 205; In re
Anthony W. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 246, 250.)
       In support of her section 388 petition, mother made a prima
facie showing of changed circumstances—namely, that she had
completed approximately 10 months of a one-year intensive
recovery program, had begun mentoring others in her program,
and had completed domestic violence and drug/alcohol
counseling. However, the juvenile court correctly concluded that
mother did not make a prima facie showing that reinstating her
reunification services and permitting her to visit the children was
in their best interests. In support of her petition, mother
asserted that a change of order would benefit the children

                                9
because it “would help strengthen the bond between the children
and parents and allow [mother] to reunify with her children.”
But neither child expressed a desire for visits with mother—to
the contrary, both children had been refusing visits and phone
calls with mother for more than a year, and both told the social
worker they did not wish to have any further contact with either
parent. It therefore is highly unlikely that the children would
have participated in visits with mother even had the court
ordered them. In any event, even were mother correct that
further visits would have fostered a bond between her and the
children, it is unclear how such a bond would have served the
children’s interests given mother’s failure to reunify with the
children and their impending adoption.
       Moreover, the statutory time to reunify had long since
passed. Our Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed that “to
promote the prompt resolution of the child’s custody status and
her permanent and stable placement, the law sets a presumptive
18-month limit on reunification services.” (Michael G. v. Superior
Court (2023) 14 Cal.5th 609, 627.)3 This time limit “reflects a
considered legislative choice: ‘[I]n order to prevent children from
spending their lives in the uncertainty of foster care, there must
be a limitation on the length of time a child has to wait for a
parent to become adequate.’ (In re Marilyn H. [(1993)] 5 Cal.4th
[295,] 308.) If the child has already been out of the parent’s
custody for 18 months and still cannot be safely returned, the
statute instructs that the court ordinarily must proceed to
schedule a permanency planning hearing under section 366.26, at

3    Under some limited circumstances, services may be
extended for an additional six months. (Michael G., supra,
14 Cal.5th at pp. 628–629.)

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which the court decides whether to terminate parental rights and
place the child for adoption or else select another permanent
plan. (§ 366.22, subd. (a)(3); see Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15
[‘ “Shall” ’ is mandatory and “may” is permissive’].)” (Michael G.,
at p. 627.) In the present case, the children had been under court
supervision for more than three-and-a-half years, and mother
had already received nearly two years of family preservation
and/or reunification services. The children had thrived in foster
care and recently had been placed with a family who wished to
adopt them. Under these circumstances, permitting mother
additional reunification services would only have delayed
permanency for her children, which was not in their best
interests. (See In re Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 309 [once
parent has been given reasonable period of time to reunify with
children and has been unsuccessful, “the child’s interest in
permanency and stability takes priority”]; In re J.C. (2014)
226 Cal.App.4th 503, 527 [child’s best interests “are not to
further delay permanency and stability in favor of rewarding
Mother for her hard work and efforts to reunify”].)
       After reunification services have been terminated, “the
parents’ interest in the care, custody and companionship of the
child are no longer paramount.” (In re Stephanie M. (1994)
7 Cal.4th 295, 317.) Instead, “ ‘the focus shifts to the needs of the
child for permanency and stability’ [citation], and in fact, there is
a rebuttable presumption that continued foster care is in the best
interest of the child.” (Ibid.) Because mother failed to make a
prima facie showing sufficient to rebut the statutory presumption
and to demonstrate that the proposed change of order was in the
children’s best interests, the juvenile court did not abuse its
discretion by summarily denying mother’s section 388 petition.

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II.   The juvenile court did not violate mother’s due
      process rights.
       Alternatively, mother contends that the juvenile court
violated her due process rights by considering the children’s
statements at the January 26, 2023 hearing without allowing her
to cross-examine the children or to produce additional evidence.
We need not decide whether the court erred by considering the
children’s statements because any such error necessarily was
harmless. Assuming for the sake of argument that considering
the children’s statements was constitutional error, reversal still
would not be required if we could conclude “beyond a reasonable
doubt that the [result] would have been the same absent [the]
error.” (People v. Harrison (2005) 35 Cal.4th 208, 239.) We so
conclude here. As discussed above, had the court not considered
the children’s statements, it nonetheless would have been
required to deny her an evidentiary hearing because she failed to
make a prima facie showing that granting her additional
visitation or reunification services was in the children’s best
interests. (§ 388, subd. (d); In re R.F. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 718,
728.) Because mother was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing,
the juvenile court’s consideration of the children’s statements
could not have prejudiced her.

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                       DISPOSITION
     The February 1 and April 12, 2023 orders are affirmed.

    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

                                   EDMON, P. J.

We concur:

                EGERTON, J.

                ADAMS, J.

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