Court Opinion

ID: 9566310
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:36:36.173576+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:35:43.682413
License: Public Domain

HODGES, Vice Chief Justice
(dissenting).
The majority opinion holds the will is unambiguous on its face and, therefore, extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to determine the intention of the testator. I believe this perpetuates a misinterpretation of the applicable statute, 84 O.S.1971, § 132.1
It is generally recognized that preter-mitted heir statutes are not intended to limit a testator’s power to dispose of his property by will, or to require him to bestow any part of his estate on any child *954or descendant. The purpose of the statute is to protect such heirs against omission due to unintentional oversight, forgetfulness or mistake. Two broad general classifications of such statutes are recognized: (1) The “Massachusetts-type” statutes, which are usually considered to emphasize the intention of the testator as the material factor in determining whether a child or descendant is disinherited; and (2) “Missouri-type” statutes which omit reference to intention and provide for a total or partial revocation of the will if a child is not named or provided for therein.2
Our statute, a “Massachusetts-type” statute, was adopted from the Dakotas. Under comparable statutes providing an omitted child or issue of a deceased child should be entitled to a portion of the testator’s estate, “unless it appears that such omission was intentional,” the courts of North and South Dakota and the majority of jurisdictions, with the exception of California and Oklahoma, have consistently held since 1868, that extrinsic evidence was admissible to prove that the testator intended to disinherit an omitted child.3 The pretermitted heir statute raises the presumption that children are not intentionally omitted from a will. However, the presumption is rebuttable by extrinsic evidence and parol testimony.4
The purpose and legislative intent of the statute is to protect children unintentionally omitted from the will. It is not to be construed to alter the testamentary intent of the testator by including children he intentionally excluded from his estate.
I would therefore overrule all cases in conflict with the traditional interpretation of the pretermitted heir statute.
Assuming arguendo, the majority view is correct, I further believe the will is ambiguous on its face, and that the testator’s intention to disinherit appears from the will itself. The statute which guides our interpretation of intention, 84 O.S.1971 § 1525 permits introduction of extrinsic evidence to show the circumstances under which the will was executed.
This court in In Re Adams’ Estate, 203 Okl. 377, 222 P.2d 366 (1950) held that the question of the intention to omit may be drawn from inference of the language as well as the face of the will, and that the drawing of such inference is not only within the power of the court, but is the duty of the court. The court held at page 369:
“In determining whether the omission of a child is intentional or not, no set form of words, indicating testator’s intention to omit such child, is requisite. The will is to be taken as a whole; and if it appears from the entire instrument that testator intended to omit such child, the statute does not apply. * * *
“It is not necessary that testator should name his child, or even refer, in terms, to the fact that it is his child.”
Extrinsic evidence should have been admissible because by omitting the daughter *955from the will she thereby is entitled to her statutory share, while the son who was mentioned in the will receives nothing. Thus on the face of the will an uncertainty is created and extrinsic evidence should be allowed. This extrinsic evidence which was offered, but rejected by the trial court, definitely shows the testator intentionally omitted the daughter. She would not visit her father or even allow her child to visit him. They had not seen each other for some'time because of their strained relationship.
I believe a construction which permits a child not mentioned in the will to participate in the distribution of the estate while the other child who is mentioned and designated the contingent beneficiary takes nothing, is a tortured interpretation of the will and the Oklahoma Statutes regarding testamentary intent,6 and reaches a result totally unintended and uncontem-plated by the testator or the statute.
The cause should be remanded to the trial court for determination of the factual question of whether the omission of the daughter was intentional.
I, therefore, respectfully dissent.

. 84 O.S.1971 § 132 provides :
When any testator omits to provide in his will for any of his children, or for the issue of any deceased child unless it appears that such omission was intentional, such child, or the issue of such child, must have the same share in the estate of the testator, as if he had died intestate, and succeeds thereto as provided in the preceding section. (Emphasis Supplied)

. See 88 A.L.R.2d 616, 623.

. See Loring v. Marsh, 6 Wall. 337, 18 L.Ed. 802 (1868); Hedderich v. Hedderich, 18 N.D. 488, 123 N.W. 276 (1909); Schultz v. Schultz, 19 N.D. 688, 125 N.W. 555 (1910); Lowery v. Hawker, 22 N.D. 318, 133 N.W. 918 (1911); Re Baur’s Estate, 79 N.D. 113, 54 N.W.2d 891 (1952); Re Swenson’s Estate, 57 S.D. 90, 230 N.W. 884 (1930).

. In Re Estate of Blank, 219 N.W.2d 815 (N.D.1974).

. 84 O.S.1971 § 152 provides:
In case of uncertainty, arising upon the face of a will, as to the application of any of its provisions, the testator’s intention' is to be ascertained from the words of the will, taking into view the circumstances under which it was made, exclusive of his oral declarations.
The syllabus of Dilles v. Carson, 197 Okl. 128, 168 P.2d 1020 (1946) holds:
“Where the language of a will gives rise to an uncertainty as to whether a testator intentionally omitted to provide for a child or the issue of deceased child, the intention of the testator may be ascertained by interpreting such language in the light of the circumstances under which the will was made, excluding the oral declarations of testator.”

. 84 O.S.1971 § 151 provides:
A will is to be construed according to the intention of the testator. Where his intention cannot have effect to its full extent, it must have effect as far as possible.