Court Opinion

ID: 9722379
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:28:06.909645+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:34.715883
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE BARRY, dissenting: In my view the evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for unlawful possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver, and on that basis, I dissent. This is a case where actual physical possession cannot be demonstrated and, therefore, where constructive possession must be established in order to convict defendant of the crime charged. Constructive possession has been held to exist where there is an intent and capability to maintain control and dominion over the narcotics in question, and such constructive possession may be proved by showing that defendant controlled the premises where the narcotics were found. (People v. Morrison (1988), 178 Ill. App. 3d 76, 532 N.E.2d 1077.) Constructive possession may be established where the defendant is the driver of a vehicle in which drugs were found, even if there is a passenger in the vehicle, if defendant has knowledge and control over what happens in the interior of the vehicle. (People v. McNeely (1981), 99 Ill. App. 3d 1021, 426 N.E.2d 296.) Whether there is possession and knowledge are questions of fact to be determined by the trial judge, and as is true of all factual determinations, his findings will not be disturbed on review unless the evidence is so palpably contrary to the findings or so unreasonable, improbable or unsatisfactory as to create a reasonable doubt of guilt. People v. Gallagher (1990), 193 Ill. App. 3d 566, 550 N.E.2d 255. My colleagues have, in my opinion, substituted their judgment for that of the trial judge and in doing so, have rejected certain relevant evidence which must be considered. It is not for the reviewing court to decide the credibility of the witnesses, but rather to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. People v. Collins (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 237, 478 N.E.2d 267. Here the trial judge heard one of the men arrested with defendant, Charles Collins, testify that he was a drug dealer, that the jacket, pagers, telephone, and drugs were his and that defendant had no knowledge of the presence of cocaine in the jacket. Defendant did, however, have knowledge of the pagers which he himself removed from the car, and the jacket, telephone and money which Collins displayed. One of the arresting officers testified that Adrian Johnson, the third codefendant, told him that the jacket was not his and that the jacket was already in the car before the three men entered the car. It was not disputed that defendant instructed Johnson and Collins to remove their property from the car and that Johnson took the jacket with him and then discarded it on the ground. The trial judge could have reasonably decided not to believe Collins’ statement that the jacket and cocaine were his and that defendant did not know what was in the jacket. Defendant could reasonably be found to have known what the jacket contained. The totality of the circumstances here could properly be found to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was engaged in a common scheme with Collins and Johnson to sell the cocaine which defendant had transported within the car he had been driving, and that the three men planned to utilize the pagers he was carrying together with the cellular phone and money carried by Collins for the transaction of drug sales. (According to the evidence, drug dealers often carry cash in order to make change.) Lastly, defendant was plainly in charge of the automobile he was driving, and, therefore, the trial court correctly concluded that defendant was in control of the premises where the cocaine had been located just prior to the discovery of it. I would affirm defendant’s conviction.