Court Opinion

ID: 9554823
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-09 21:01:02.59338+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:36:41.675547
License: Public Domain

In the

    United States Court of Appeals
                 For the Seventh Circuit
                     ____________________
No. 21-3010
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                   Plaintiff-Appellee,
                                 v.

HECTOR CASTANEDA,
                                               Defendant-Appellant.
                     ____________________

         Appeal from the United States District Court for the
                     Central District of Illinois.
           No. 2:97-cr-20037 — Michael M. Mihm, Judge.
                     ____________________

   ARGUED SEPTEMBER 29, 2022 — DECIDED AUGUST 9, 2023
                ____________________

   Before SYKES, Chief Judge, and ROVNER and JACKSON-
AKIWUMI, Circuit Judges.
    JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge. Hector Castaneda asks to
be resentenced because the district court committed two pro-
cedural errors at his sentencing, both related to the court’s
mistaken belief that statutory mandatory minimum penalties
applied to his case. The record supports Castaneda’s claims of
error, so we vacate and remand to the district court for resen-
tencing.
2                                                     No. 21-3010

                                 I
    In 1997, Hector Castaneda was arrested for his role in a
large-scale heroin conspiracy. Once released on bond, Cas-
taneda fled the United States, severed all communication with
his family in Chicago, and lived as a fugitive in Mexico for
over 20 years. He returned to the United States in 2019 and
the following year he was rearrested for his 1997 offense. Cas-
taneda entered guilty pleas to two charges: attempt to possess
with the intent to distribute more than a kilogram of heroin,
and conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute more
than a kilogram of heroin. Penalties for both charges included
a statutory mandatory minimum of 10 years’ imprisonment
and a statutory mandatory minimum of 5 years’ supervised
release.
    At sentencing, the parties agreed that Castaneda qualified
for what is known as the “safety valve”—a sentencing provi-
sion codified by Congress to ensure that low-level players in
large drug organizations are not subject to punishments dis-
proportionate to their criminal conduct. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(f). A defendant is eligible for the safety valve if five cri-
teria are met. The first—related to the sentencing guidelines’
system of assigning “points” to prior convictions—requires
the court to find that the defendant does not have: (1) more
than 4 criminal history points, (2) a prior 3-point offense, and
(3) a prior 2-point violent offense. Id. § 3553(f)(1). Second, the
court must find that the defendant did not use violence, make
credible threats of violence, or possess a firearm or dangerous
weapon in connection with the underlying offense. Id.
§ 3553(f)(2). Third, the court must find that the “offense did
not result in death or serious bodily injury to any person,” id.
§ 3553(f)(3), and, fourth, that “the defendant was not an
No. 21-3010                                                   3

organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of others in the of-
fense,” id. § 3553(f)(4). Fifth and finally, the defendant must
have provided the government all the truthful information
and evidence the defendant has regarding the offense, before
the sentencing hearing. Id. § 3553(f)(5). When all five criteria
are met, the safety valve kicks in and a sentencing court is ob-
ligated to impose a sentence pursuant to the sentencing
guidelines without regard to any statutory minimums.
   Because Castaneda met all of the safety valve require-
ments, the statutory minimum of 10 years’ imprisonment and
5 years’ supervised release attached to his offenses no longer
applied. The district court was free to impose any sentence
within its discretion. However, as we will discuss later, it is
not clear at all whether the court understood as much. Ulti-
mately, the court sentenced Castaneda to 12 years in prison
and 5 years of supervised release.
    Castaneda now appeals, asserting that the district court (1)
miscalculated the advisory sentencing guidelines range for
his supervised release term, and (2) failed to address his pri-
mary arguments in mitigation and explain the rationale for
the sentence imposed. Both errors, Castaneda points out, stem
from the district court’s failure to appreciate that Castaneda
qualified for the safety valve and was therefore not subject to
any statutory mandatory minimum penalties.
                               II
    We begin with Castaneda’s claim of error regarding his
supervised release term. He argues the term is based on a mis-
calculated advisory sentencing guidelines range. We review
de novo procedural challenges to a defendant’s sentence, in-
cluding claims of miscalculated guideline ranges. United
4                                                   No. 21-3010

States v. Wylie, 991 F.3d 861, 863 (7th Cir. 2021). However, if a
defendant accidentally or negligently fails to object to an er-
roneous guideline range, we review for plain error. Id.
    Before Castaneda’s sentencing hearing, the United States
Probation Office prepared a Presentence Investigation Report
that identified the statutory mandatory minimums for both
counts to which Castaneda pleaded guilty. The PSR also
noted that Castaneda appeared to meet the safety valve crite-
ria established by Congress, thus requiring the court to im-
pose “a sentence in accordance with the applicable [Sentenc-
ing Guidelines] without regard to any statutory minimum
sentence.”
    For the recommended term of supervised release, the PSR
concluded that the applicable guideline range was five years
to life. On appeal, both parties now recognize that the actual
range should have been two to five years, not five years to life.
Castaneda entered guilty pleas for two Class A felonies,
which carry a recommended supervised release term of only
two to five years. See U.S.S.G. § 5D1.2(a)(1). However, this can
increase when the underlying offense is attached to a statuto-
rily required minimum term that exceeds the recommended
guideline range. Id. § 5D1.2(c). Ordinarily, Castaneda’s con-
victions would statutorily require a minimum term of five
years’ supervised release, which would convert the initial rec-
ommended two-to-five-year guideline range to a minimum of
five years. But, as recognized by all parties, any such mini-
mum penalties should not have applied to Castaneda given
his eligibility for the safety valve. Again, the PSR acknowl-
edged that Castaneda satisfied the criteria for safety valve el-
igibility but nonetheless incorrectly concluded that the
No. 21-3010                                                            5

guideline range for Castaneda’s term of supervised release
was five years to life rather than the usual two to five years.
    Although Castaneda objected to a different portion of the
PSR,1 he did not object to the PSR’s incorrect guideline range
for supervised release. Nor did the government or the district
court notice the PSR’s mistake. Ultimately, the district court
imposed a supervised release term of five years.
    The government argues that Castaneda’s failure to object
to the PSR’s miscalculation at his sentencing hearing consti-
tutes waiver, thus precluding appellate review. This argu-
ment is unconvincing. “Waiver occurs when a party inten-
tionally relinquishes a known right.” United States v. Hyatt, 28
F.4th 776, 781 (7th Cir. 2022). We recently and unequivocally
held that a “mere failure to object to part of a PSR is not
enough to support a finding of waiver.” Id. at 782. Even if a
defendant “repeatedly states that he has no objections to the
PSR … those statements are not dispositive.” Id.
    The government attempts to bolster its waiver argument
by speculating that Castaneda intentionally failed to lodge
objections to the PSR as part of an overarching sentencing mit-
igation strategy. This argument, too, does not pass muster.
“The waiver principle is construed liberally in favor of the de-
fendant and this court is cautious about interpreting a defend-
ant’s behavior as intentional relinquishment.” United States v.
Hammond, 996 F.3d 374, 399 (7th Cir. 2021) (cleaned). We must
treat Castaneda’s failure to object as a forfeiture, meaning the
plain error standard of review applies.

    1 Castaneda initially objected to the obstruction of justice enhance-

ment in the PSR, but later withdrew the objection.
6                                                     No. 21-3010

    To show plain error, Castaneda must demonstrate “(1) an
error that (2) is clear or obvious, and (3) affected [his] substan-
tial rights.” Wylie, 991 F.3d at 863. The government concedes
that, if plain error review applies, the error here is clear, obvi-
ous, and affects Castaneda’s substantial rights. Given that
Castaneda satisfies all three prerequisites, we have discretion
to reverse the judgment to avoid “seriously affect[ing] the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceed-
ings.” Id. We held in Wylie that when a court imposes an erro-
neous supervised release term as a result of a miscalculated
guideline range, the error calls into question the very integrity
that the judiciary seeks to uphold and protect. Id. at 864. This
rationale applies with full force to Castaneda’s case and com-
pels us to vacate and remand for resentencing.
                                III
   We turn to Castaneda’s second claim of procedural error.
During sentencing, a court must address the defendant’s prin-
cipal arguments in mitigation and state in open court its rea-
son for imposing a particular sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c).
Castaneda argues that the district court failed to do so. We
review de novo the question of whether a district court ade-
quately explained its chosen sentence and addressed a de-
fendant’s principal arguments in mitigation. United States v.
Barr, 960 F.3d 906, 914 (7th Cir. 2020).
    Our circuit does not require a district court to respond to
every mitigation argument raised by a defendant during a
sentencing hearing. For example, we have held that “stock ar-
guments” in mitigation that are routinely seen by sentencing
courts, such as difficult family circumstances, can often “be
rejected with little or even no explanation.” United States v.
Gary, 613 F.3d 706, 709 (7th Cir. 2010). But a district court
No. 21-3010                                                      7

cannot pass over in silence a defendant’s principal mitigation
arguments. United States v. Starko, 735 F.3d 989, 992 (7th Cir.
2013).
    In his sentencing memorandum and at the sentencing
hearing, Castaneda advanced three arguments for mitigating
his sentence. He pointed out his eligibility for the safety valve,
which meant the district court was free to impose a sentence
below the mandatory minimums associated with his convic-
tions. He also emphasized his desire to spend the rest of his
life with his family, and he highlighted his advanced age,
which statistically lowered his risk of recidivism.
    The district court’s words were few indeed, but the sen-
tencing transcript supports a conclusion that the court ad-
dressed Castaneda’s final two arguments, related to his age
and family ties. The court was “not real concerned about ad-
equate deterrence” to Castaneda, but it did have “some con-
cern about adequate deterrence to others” given the unique
circumstances of Castaneda’s case. This first part—the court’s
lack of concern about the need to deter Castaneda—reads, at
the very least, as the court acknowledging Castaneda’s argu-
ment that his age lowered his risk of recidivism. As for Cas-
taneda’s family ties argument, the district court did express
astonishment at how Castaneda fled—the court found it
“striking” that he “left behind [his] wife and two children,”
and remarked that Castaneda “basically abandoned [his] re-
sponsibilities to [his] family.” The district court did not explic-
itly reject Castaneda’s argument about the strength of his fam-
ily ties, but this disapproving language suggests an implicit
rejection. Gary, 613 F.3d at 709 (holding that so-called “stock”
arguments in mitigation can be rejected with little to no ex-
planation); United States v. Bustos, 912 F.3d 1059, 1063 (7th Cir.
8                                                     No. 21-3010

2019) (acknowledging the district court’s implicit rejection of
a defendant’s mitigation argument).
    By contrast, the district court skipped over entirely Cas-
taneda’s safety valve argument. And what little engagement
there is by the court on the subject suggests it did not appre-
ciate how the provision should have been applied to Cas-
taneda. First, the district court misstated that a mandatory
minimum of 120 months’ imprisonment applied to Cas-
taneda; it did not. Then, when the government reminded the
court that Castaneda qualified for the safety valve, so the
mandatory minimum did not apply, the government mis-
stated the law. Here is the exchange:
       The Court: There’s a guideline range of 121 to
       151, but there’s also a mandatory minimum of
       120.
       […]
       [Government]: And then it is correct that the
       mandatory minimum would ordinarily apply,
       but the defendant does qualify for the safety
       valve. Therefore, the Court may sentence him
       without regard to that mandatory minimum.
       The Court: Oh, okay.
Sentencing Tr. at 8:1-8:17 (emphasis added). The government
represented that the safety valve’s application was permissive
rather than mandatory. The court’s only response to the mis-
statement was “Oh, okay,” so it is unclear whether the district
court understood that, if it indeed found Castaneda to have
satisfied all five safety valve criteria, then it would be required
to sentence Castaneda without regard to any mandatory
No. 21-3010                                                             9

minimums. It could not, as the government depicted, treat
disregarding the mandatory minimums as optional.2
    All of this, coupled with the fact that the district court sen-
tenced Castaneda to a term well above the statutory mini-
mum—without any explanation for the increase—further
supports Castaneda’s claim that the court failed to address his
principal argument in mitigation that he qualified for the
safety valve. When a district court sentences a defendant to
more than 24 months, and within the guidelines range, the
court is “obligated to state ‘the reason for imposing a sentence
at a particular point within the range.’” United States v. Wash-
ington, 739 F.3d 1080, 1081 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting 18 U.S.C. §
3553(c)(1)). The district court provided no such explanation,
making it impossible for this Court to undertake the “mean-
ingful appellate review” required of us. Gall v. United States,
552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007).
                                   IV
    The district court applied an incorrect guideline range and
failed to provide any explanation for its rejection of Cas-
taneda’s principal mitigation argument—one that, in any
event, the court appears not to have understood. Either error

    2 The district court also completed a Statement of Reasons for Impos-

ing Sentence in Castaneda’s case. The form included three options the
judge could select from as the applicable scenario. The court ultimately
selected the option that said: “One or more counts of conviction carry a
mandatory minimum term of imprisonment and the sentence imposed is
at or above the applicable mandatory minimum term.” Though not dis-
positive, this form further emphasizes that the district court did not ap-
pear to understand that Castaneda qualified for the safety valve.
10                                         No. 21-3010

warrants reversal. We VACATE and REMAND for resentenc-
ing.