Court Opinion

ID: 9672099
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:49:02.625616+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:11.964363
License: Public Domain

BLEIL, Justice,
dissenting.
Gibraltar appeals by writ of error from a default judgment. In order to succeed, it must show four elements: (1) the appeal must be brought within six months of the date of judgment; (2) by a party to the suit; (3) who did not participate in the trial; and (4) the error must be apparent from the face of the record. Brown v. McLennan County Children’s Protective Servic*19es, 627 S.W.2d 390 (Tex.1982). There can be no doubt that the first three elements are shown — no question about these elements has been raised by any party or the majority of this Court. Thus one critical question is before this Court, namely, whether there exists error on the face of the record. In assessing whether this element exists, courts have required that strict compliance with the service requirements affirmatively appear on the face of the record. McKanna v. Edgar, 388 S.W. 2d 927 (Tex.1965). Gibraltar argues that the record fails to show strict compliance with the rules concerning service of process.
In answering this question, certain standards of review apply. When a direct attack is made upon a default judgment, no presumptions are made in support of the judgment. Unless strict compliance with the service of process requirements affirmatively appears on the face of the record, the judgment is invalid. See Id.; Flynt v. City of Kingsville, 125 Tex. 510, 82 S.W.2d 934 (1935); Roberts v. Stockslager, 4 Tex. 307 (1849).
With these standards in mind, I turn to the “face of the record.”1 The citation directed the sheriff or constable to deliver the citation and petition, as follows:
Gibraltar Savings Association may be served by serving its Chief Executive Officer J. Livingston Kosberg 13401 North Freeway Houston, Texas 77067
The deputy constable returned the citation to the court saying that he executed it by summoning:
Gibraltar Savings Association, a corporation, by delivering to Milton W. Cowden, in person, Senior Vice President of the said Corp (sic) a true copy of this writ, together with accompanying certified copy plaintiff’s original petition.
The record clearly shows that the “Association” could be served by serving J. Livingston Kosberg. A “corporation” was served by serving Milton W. Cowden, in person, a vice-president of “said Corp (sic).” I cannot join in holding that, indulging no presumptions in support of the validity of the service of process, the face of the record shows strict compliance with the service of process requirements.2
I dissent.

. The majority, in examining what the "face of the record" shows, proceeds to examine the evidence adduced at the default judgment hearing and the law governing savings and loan associations, Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 852a (Vernon 1964 & Supp.1989).

. I do not choose to engage in legal niceties of organizational structure or an interpretation of Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 852a to determine the legal status of a savings and loan association formed pursuant to that statute. The face of the record shows that Gibraltar was not even alleged to be a corporation; when Gibraltar ultimately did appear in this proceeding by petition for writ of error, it alleged that it was not a corporation. Gibraltar Savings Association alleged that it was a Texas savings and loan association. It appears curious that when no one claims — in the record — that Gibraltar is a corporation, the majority nevertheless finds it to be a corporation, on the "face of the record.” Assuming the majority’s position in this regard to be correct, a defect still exists. The most closely analogous case to the one now before us is Allied Bank of Dallas v. Pleasant Homes, Inc., 757 S.W.2d 460 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1988, n.w.h.), which arrives at exactly the opposite conclusion as does today’s majority, which dismisses the Allied decision without comment.