Court Opinion

ID: 9728810
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:16:51.939226+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:51.477461
License: Public Domain

Douglas, J.,
dissenting.
This court declines to discard an outmoded rule of law by not imposing more stringent limitations on the use of prior convictions to attack credibility. In light of recent initiatives by the federal system and various state courts, I am compelled to reexamine the posture of this court.
Since the enactment of RSA 516:33, which permits the admission of evidence of certain prior crimes for impeachment purposes, this court has held that the use of such evidence was subject only to “the close control of the Trial Court in the exercise of its discretionary powers.” State v. Cote, 108 N.H. 290, 297, 235 A.2d 111, 116(1967); see generally State v. Lavallee, 119 N.H. 207, 400 A.2d 480 (1979). Although RSA 516:33 refers only to “infamous crimes,” in practice this has been liberally construed to justify admission of all crimes except misdemeanors. State v. Cote supra; see State v. Travis, 82 N.H. 220, 131 A. 598 (1926). Such a standardless policy places many criminal defendants in a difficult situation.
Due process includes the right of an accused to testify in his own behalf. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948). For those criminal defendants with prior records, the possibility that past convictions will be used to impeach credibility and that undue prejudice might result is a major concern in the decision whether or not to take the stand.
The accused, who has a “record” but who thinks he has a defense to the present charge, is thus placed in a grievous dilemma. If he stays off the stand, his silence alone will prompt the jury to believe him guilty. If he elects to testify, his “record” becomes provable to impeach him, and this again is likely to doom his defense. Where does the balance of justice lie?
McCormack, Evidence § 43 (2d ed. 1972).
If the accused testifies and his prior record is divulged, the jury *21might draw what Justice Stevens once referred to as the legally impermissible inference that the defendant “is more likely to have committed the offense for which he is being tried than if he had led a blameless life.” See United States v. Harding, 525 F.2d 84, 89 (7th Cir. 1975). See generally I WlGMORE, EVIDENCE § 57 (3d ed. 1940). The effect of this impermissible inference on the jury was extensively studied by Kalven and Zeisel in an authoritative study of the American jury system. The study revealed that when the prosecutor’s evidence contained contradictions favoring the defendant, the acquittal rate for those with no record was 65%. This compared with an acquittal rate of only 38% when the same evidentiary contradictions existed, but the defendant either had a record or failed to testify. Kalven and Zeisel, The American Jury 160 (1966). This is significant because 47% of all defendants studied had prior records. Id. at 145. Statistical evidence and common sense support the conclusion that the possibility of prejudice from admission of a prior record has a “chilling effect” on defendants who might otherwise take the stand. When the evidence strongly favored the defendants, those with a record testified 53% of the time; those without a record took the stand 90% of the time. Id. at 146.
Some defendants elect to bring out the prior record on direct examination in a tactical effort to soften its impact. Regardless of how the evidence gets in, however, the impact on the jury is substantial. Other studies have confirmed that jurors fail to utilize impeachment evidence merely in assessing credibility; rather they tend to regard it as an indication that the defendant’s guilt is more likely because he has been guilty in the past. See Comment, Other Crimes Evidence At Trial: Of Balancing and Other Matters, 70 YALE L.J. 763, 777 (1961).
Although clearly recognizing “that prior convictions have an inherent prejudicial effect,” this court continues to rely on the “discretion” of the trial court and the curative effect of limiting instructions. State v. Lavallee, 119 N.H. 207, 400 A.2d at 483 (1979); State v. Black, 116 N.H. 836, 837, 368 A.2d 1177, 1178 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906 (1977). Instructing the jury to disregard a prior record when assessing guilt is similar to the experience writer Leo Tolstoy described when as a boy he was asked to stand in a corner for five minutes and not think about a white bear. Of course, such a feat of psychological wizardry cannot be done. Jeans, TRIAL ADVOCACY, p. 237 (1975). As the Supreme Court stated in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968): “[TJhere are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored.” Id. at 185.
Responding to cries for reform at the federal level, Congress *22enacted Rule 609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which admits only crimes of “dishonesty or false statement,” or felonies where the probative value outweighs any possible prejudice. Rule 609 also imposes a remoteness limitation of ten years on the use of crimes for impeachment purposes.
Reform is also taking place at the state court level. The Iowa Supreme Court has ruled that evidence of a prior conviction is admissible to attack credibility only if the conviction involves “dishonesty or false statement,” and the judge finds that probative value outweighs prejudicial effects. See State v. Martin, 217 N.W.2d 536, 542 (Iowa 1974). That court also indicated that decisions on the admissibility of the prior crimes should be made at pretrial hearings. Id. at 543.
The Supreme Court of Alaska adopted a rule of procedure similar to that required by the Iowa Supreme Court holding in Martin. In addition, the Alaska court placed a remoteness limitation of five years on the use of any prior crime for impeachment purposes. See Lowell v. State, 574 P.2d 1281 (Alaska Sup. Ct. 1978).
Labeling the use of prior crimes to impeach the accused, “a remnant from a barbaric past,” the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals recently held that except for convictions involving perjury or false swearing, evidence of prior crimes was inadmissible to impeach the defendant. See State v. McAboy, 236 S.E.2d 131 (W.Va. Sup. Ct. App. 1977).
The Hawaii Supreme Court in State v. Santiago, 53 Haw. 254, 492 P.2d 657 (1971) decided totally to bar admission of all evidence of prior crimes to impeach'a defendant regardless of probative value. Basing the decision on due process grounds, the court held “that to convict a criminal defendant where prior crimes have been introduced to impeach his credibility as a witness violates the accused’s constitutional right to testify in his own defense.” Id. at 53 Haw. 260, 492 P.2d 661. To my knowledge, this was the first state to bar the impeachment use of prior crimes on such a broad constitutional footing.
Although I would not go as far as the Hawaii court in Santiago, I am convinced that Cote is out of step with current legal thinking and with the reality of the jury system and human nature. I prefer to chart a middle course. I believe that the “balance of justice” allows the admission of only those prior felonies that bear on the defendant’s truth-telling ability. See State v. Lavallee supra (Douglas, J. concurring). This would encompass such crimes as false swearing, perjury, criminal fraud, embezzlement, false pretense or any other felony probative of the accused’s ability to tell the truth. Crimes of violence would be inadmissible; I see no rational relationship between *23violent behavior and truth-telling. Murder and assault may evince a vicious disposition but they are not necessarily indicative of dishonesty. See Ladd, Credibility Tests — Current Trends, 89 U. PA. L.R. 166, 178 (1940). See generally 3A WlGMORE § 926 (Chadbourne rev.).
Such a policy does not deprive the prosecutor of his right to resort to careful cross-examination and to use prior inconsistent statements to challenge a defendant’s credibility. Nor is the jury precluded from using the defendant’s witness-stand demeanor to help it assess credibility. Most importantly, because it has not already inferred guilt from a prior record, the jury more carefully scrutinizes the accused’s testimony. The benefit derived from the defendant’s testimony concerning his version of the facts far outweighs any State interest of which I am aware. Of course, prior conviction would be permitted for impeachment if a defendant voluntarily asserted that he had no prior record when he in fact did.
Once a prior crime is determined to be probative of the defendant’s veracity, the next inquiry centers on remoteness. Presently, the determination of remoteness is left to the discretion of the trial court. State v. Cote, 108 N.H. at 297, 235 A.2d at 116; State v. Duke, 100 N.H. at 294, 123 A.2d at 745. As a result, defendants have few guidelines in assessing the possibility of the admission of past crimes. For example, in Cote, a 15-year-old conviction for breaking and entering and larceny was admitted over defense objection. Such a practice fails to recognize that “old convictions are not a meaningful index of a propensity to lie.” See United States v. Puco, 453 F.2d 539, 543 (2d Cir. 1971). This also might prejudice the defendant who aside from a single transgression committed years ago may have a blemish-free record. While a circuit judge, Chief Justice Burger addressed the issue of remoteness in Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1029 (1968). There he stated that “[t]he nearness or remoteness of the prior conviction is also a factor of no small importance. Even one involving fraud or stealing, for example, if it occurred long before and has been followed by a legally blameless life, should generally be excluded on the ground of remoteness.” Id. at 940.
I note that the New Hampshire Legislature has chosen five years as an indication of remoteness for prior offenses under both RSA 318-B:4 III (Supp. 1977), the Controlled Drug Act, and RSA 262-B:2 I, the Habitual Offender Statute. For DWI convictions, the legislature chose seven years as an indication of remoteness. RSA 262-A:62. These statutory limits are instructive concerning the legislature’s view as to when a prior crime becomes too remote. Accordingly, I would admit no crimes, whether or not indicative of veracity, to impeach the defendant if the crime was more than seven years old.
*24Further, no prior crime evidence should be admitted unless the state files a motion containing specific, underlying facts indicative of the conviction’s relationship to the defendant’s veracity. A pretrial hearing in limine should then be held in which the court should make specific, on the record findings regarding admissibility. See Superior Court Rule 68. This should facilitate appellate review. The First Circuit Court of Appeals recently approved of such pretrial hearings because they enable the accused to make a more informed decision on whether to testify. See United States v. Oakes, 565 F.2d 170, 171-72 (1st Cir. 1977); State v. Bennett, 405 A.2d 1181 (R.I. Sup. Ct. 1979).
Though I agree that one object of a trial is “to discover the truth,” this inquiry must not be so open-ended that the defendant is subjected to undue prejudice. “Where viable alternatives do exist, it is deceptive to rely on the pursuit of the truth to defend a clearly harmful practice.” Bruton v. United States supra at 134. The rules of evidence, and especially the hearsay rule, are meant to deny certain “truths” to the jury, not because they weren’t heard, but because the testimony may be unreliable. “The Continental system has no such restraints. The witness takes the stand, recites his name and everything he wishes about the matter at hand.” Jeans, Trial Advocacy, p. 212 (1975). Generally one’s juvenile or school records are not admitted. Thus the “truth” is, to that extent, withheld from the jury. Even a polygraph examination directly relevant to the defendant’s credibility was recently barred by this court (over my dissent), thereby limiting the jury’s access to the total “truth” concerning a defendant. See State v. French, 119 N.H. 500, 403 A.2d 424 (1979).
Accordingly, on due process grounds I would reverse and remand this case for a new trial because of the potential use of defendant’s two prior burglary convictions that deterred him from testifying as to his version of the incident.