Court Opinion

ID: 9638790
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:54:06.455958+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:35:31.405890
License: Public Domain

Sam Robinson, J. (dissenting). Our Workmen’s Compensation Law defines the terms “employer” and “employee.” Ark. Stats., § 81-1302(a) provides: “ ‘Employer’ means any individual, partnership, association, or corporation carrying on any employment, or the receiver or trustee of the same, or the legal representative of a deceased employer.” Paragraph (b) provides: “‘Employee ’ means any person, including a minor, whether lawfully or unlawfully employed, in the service of an employer under any contract of hire or apprenticeship, written or oral, expressed or implied. . . .” In Scobey, Adm., v. Southern Lumber Company, 218 Ark. 671, 238 S. W. 2d 640, 243 S. W. 2d 754, we quoted from Triebsch v. Athletic Mining & Smelting Co., 218 Ark. 379, 237 S. W. 2d 26, as follows: “We.have many times held that the Workmen’s Compensation Law should be broadly and liberally construed; and that doubtful cases should he resolved in favor of the claimant. Hunter v. Summerville, 205 Ark. 463, 169 S. W. 2d 579; Elm Springs Canning Co. v. Sullins, 207 Ark. 257,180 S. W. 2d 113; Nolen v. Wortz Biscuit Co., 210 Ark. 446, 196 S. W. 2d 899, and Batesville White Lime Co. v. Bell, 212 Ark. 23, 205 S. W. 2d 31. ” Was Youngman an employee of the partnership within the meaning of the statute? The definition of an employee is broad: “ ‘Employee’ means any person . . . in the service of an employer under any contract of hire . . . expressed or implied. ’ ’ The statute says “any person” and does not except a partner who is in the employment of the partnership. In my opinion the fact that Youngman owned an interest in the partnership did not preclude him from being an employee. He did the same hard manual labor as other employees of the firm, while the other partners did no similar work for the partnership. It is true that he also acted in the capacity of foreman, but the Workmen’s Compensation Law does not exempt a foreman from its benefits. The majority, while conceding that it is possible for a partner to contract with the partnership, contend that in this instance there was no special agreement whereby Youngman could be said to be working for the partnership in the capacity of an employee. I do not agree. The partners contracted that for his work Youngman was to receive 25% of the gross profits of the business; he was to receive this amount for his work regardless of the fact that he, as a partner in the business, and the other partners might not receive one dime by reason of their investment in the partnership. It can hardly be said that this arrangement was not the result of a special agreement. In fact, Youngman had been receiving about $300 a month by drawing against the 25% of gross profits as compensation for his labor. He was to receive 25% of the gross profits in addition to the same amount that would be received by the other partners on the net income. Most of the cases which hold that a partner is not entitled to compensation under Workmen’s Compensation Laws are bottomed on the theory that one cannot recover against himself, and to allow a partner to recover against a partnership would in effect violate that principle. This might be a good theory under the common law, but it is not sound in connection with a modern Workmen’s Compensation Law. The Workmen’s Compensation Law is not based on the theory of negligence or non-negligence. In many instances an employee has the right to compensation under the compensation law where there would be no liability whatever on the part of the employer under the common law. Workmen’s Compensation Laws are based on public policy and humanitarian purposes, and not on the theory of liability or non-liability under the common law. ‘ ‘ The liability is based not upon any act or omission of the employer, but upon the existence of the relationship which the employee bears to the employment, because and in the course of which he has been injured.” McGregor & Pickett v. Arrington, 206 Ark. 921, 175 S. W. 2d 210. In the very recent case of Glassco v. Glassco, 195 Va. 239, 77 S. E. 2d 843, decided hy the Supreme Court of Virginia on October 12,1953, it was held that even though it is a settled doctrine in that state that a wife cannot maintain a tort action against her husband, she is entitled to compensation for the death of her son while he was an employee of the husband and father. “This contention (of non-liability under the compensation law) is based on a misconception of the right to, and liability for, compensation benefits under the Act. A proceeding under the Act is not one to recover damage for a wrong, for the employer’s liability is not based upon tort. Burlington Mills Corp. v. Hagood, 177 Va. 204, 13 S. E. 2d 291; Fauver v. Bell, 192 Va. 518, 65 S. E. 2d 575. It is a proceeding to enforce a liability imposed by statute for an injury received by, or death of, an employee in the course of and arising out of his employment. As to an employer coming within its terms the Act imposes a legal obligation to compensate financially the injured employee for such an injury, or the employee’s dependents, in case of death. Thus, the statute reads into every contract of employment within the purview of the Act the obligation of the employer to pay, and the right of the employee or his dependents to recover, such benefits.” Then the Court points out the definitions of “employer” and “employee” as set out in the Act, which definitions are substantially the same as those in our statute, and mentions the fact that no exception is made because of family relationship between employer and employee; likewise in the case at bar our statute makes no exception as to a partner. The majority in the case at bar refuses to follow the Oklahoma case of Ohio Drilling Co. v. State Industrial Commission, 86 Okla. 139; 207 Pac. 314, 25 A. L. R. 367; that case holds that in circumstances similar to the facts in the case at bar a partner is entitled to compensation. The law announced in that case is sound; and to give effect to our announced policy of construing the Workmen’s Compensation Act in favor of the claimant, the Oklahoma case should be followed in this state. For the reason set out herein, I respectfully dissent from that part of the opinion which reverses the cause as to Brinkley. Justices McFaddin and Millwee join in this dissent.