Court Opinion

ID: 9630379
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:09:55.552963+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:54.972247
License: Public Domain

*619URBIGKIT, Justice,
specially concurring.
I concur in the holding of the majority to affirm the decision of the trial court and also to reject the expansion of intentional interference as a class of tort from the demonstrable to the arguable. I write further to define the philosophy for care before expansion of this tort and to recognize the lessons which should be accordingly learned from the Texas West cases: Texas West Oil and Gas Corp. v. Fitzgerald, 726 P.2d 1056 (Wyo.1986) (Texas West I) and Texas West Oil and Gas Corp. v. First Interstate Bank of Casper, 743 P.2d 857 (Wyo.1987), aff'd 749 P.2d 278 (Wyo.1988) (Texas West II). In Texas West I, two members of this court found tortious conduct when a guarantor interfered with a contract between a borrower and equipment purchasers, two members of this court found no actionable tort, and the fifth member of this court found interference with a prospective contract “for intentional, interference with a contractual expectancy.” Texas West II, 743 P.2d at 867 (Thomas, J. dissenting).
In Texas West II, a majority of this court found the lender when sued by the borrower had not committed any tortious offense in loan collection activities by recoursing the obligation to the guarantor. One dissenting member of this court again found an arguable tort, not only against the lender, but against a director of the contracting party for wrongful interference with an expectancy (to contract). The second dissenting member of this court had a procedural objection to the decision of the trial court achieved by order sustaining a motion to dismiss.
The first lesson from the Texas West cases is the membership of this court did not even agree as to the nature of the basic tort for which recovery should or should not be available. A multiplication of problems for both bench and bar should be expected if not even a breach or denial of contract is required for institution of this character of tort litigation.
A further lesson in commercial activities springs from the nature of competition which is indigenous to free enterprise. Competition inflicts burdens on competitors. The pursuit of conflicting economic interests is the essence of free enterprise. Extending protection from competition, under the guise of actionable tort, works to our economic disadvantage because such protection is antithetical to our economic requirements for vibrancy and expansion. Consequently, I find continued justification for a conservative perspective before expanding any theories of intentional interference torts. Much of what any active person does can be said to adversely affect someone else, whether rightfully or wrongfully. The legal issue presented here is direct and pervasive. Prior to Texas West I, Wyoming had adopted intentional interference with a performance of a contract which included the following elements:
“(1) the existence of a valid contractual relationship;
“(2) knowledge of the contractual relationship on the part of the interferor;
“(3) intentional and improper interference inducing or otherwise causing a breach or termination of the relationship; and
“(4) resultant damage to the party whose relationship has been disrupted.” * * * Dehnert v. Arrow Sprinklers, Inc., supra, 705 P.2d [846] at 850 [ (Wyo.1985) ].
Texas West I, 726 P.2d at 1073 (Urbigkit, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis in original).1
By the concurrence in Texas West I as following Martin v. Wing, 667 P.2d 1159 (Wyo.1983), this court had also adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766B (1979) proviso of inducing and causing the *620non-entry into a contract or preventing achievement of the relationship as the interference with the expectancy claim. Elements of that cause of action are identical with Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 766, the conventional interference tort, except the claim relates to denial' of another contract and not causing the breach of an existing contract.
This present case advances appellant’s request to expand the scope of liability to include damage recovery from increase in burden of performance of an existing contract — activity which does not cause a contract to be breached or result in a failure to enter into a contract. Any adverse activity can “cause an increased cost in performance.” I could find that tort in almost every kind of head-to-head competition. There is a place in tort litigation for damage recovery when someone improperly causes a contract between two other actors to be broken or the performance denied. Cf. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 626 F.Supp. 250 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd and modified 784 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir.1986), rev’d 481 U.S. 1, 107 S.Ct. 1519, 95 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987); Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 748 S.W.2d 631 (Tex.App.1988); Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex.App.1987), cert. denied 485 U.S. 994, 108 S.Ct. 1305, 99 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988); and Note, The Ultimate Expansion of the Younger Doctrine: Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 41 S.W.L.J. 1055 (1987). I see no justification in expanding tort liability to include an increase in the costs of performance since that liability can potentially reach the ends of free enterprise.
Collection agencies, as was appellant’s Mountain States Adjustment, are subject to the slings and arrows of angered debtor response. In absence of the actions that cause a loss of business, the performance of collection agencies should be adequately adjusted to business responsibilities without implementation of tort litigation against debtors or their attorneys.2
The generic nature of the differences between Wyoming’s previously adopted intentional interference theories and the addition urged by appellant is apparent in this appeal and constitutes the difference between the easily determinable and specific to be compared with the non-specific and conjectural. The tort subject of Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 766 results from a breach of a third-party contract and Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 766B from denial of achieving the contract; so that the case consequently starts with a broken contract or a denied contract. Conversely, Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 766A addresses the intangible or conjectural increased burden for performance within a contract which is neither breached nor denied. As a predicate for litigation, it is “relatively” simple to initially demonstrate that a contract was breached or never made. Conversely, any claim of increased burden in performance directly attracts consideration of the functionality factors of economics and competition’s competitive conflict. The abrasive edge of economic competition is not so neatly confined to propriety and impropriety. See Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 767. Making someone liable for making another’s contract “more expensive or burdensome” is too imprecise to presently justify the addition of Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 766A into the litigation arsenal of economic activities.
Consequently, in accord with the lessons of the Texas West cases, I concur with the court’s decision.

. California and some other jurisdictions have included a clarifying fifth factor of proximate cause: "' "(5) resulting in damage to the plaintiff. * * *.” Abrams & Fox, Inc. v. Briney (1974), 39 Cal.App.3d 604, 608, 114 Cal.Rptr. 328, 331.’ International Wood Processors v. Power Dry, Inc., 593 F.Supp. 710, 729 (D.S.C.1984), aff'd 792 F.2d 416 (4th Cir.1986).” Texas West I, 726 P.2d at 1073. This "but for” threshold causative requirement was recently applied in Technology For Energy Corp. v. Scandpower, A/S, 880 F.2d 875 (6th Cir.1989).

. There is another section of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra, § 766C which clarifies the tort cannot be negligently induced since consisting only of intentional conduct.