Court Opinion

ID: 9464127
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 23:25:46.600923+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:28.345739
License: Public Domain

MULLIGAN, Circuit Judge
(concurring):
I concur in the judgment of reversal. Judge Frankel found that the procedure set forth in 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a) offended the First Amendment because it deprived the claimants and their local communities of the freedom to read and see things in accordance with their own standards of what is or is not obscene. However, here the claimants have imported into the United States matter which is allegedly obscene and the criterion of obscenity to be applied is a federal question. This distinction was emphasized in Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 97 S.Ct. 1756, 1768, 52 L.Ed.2d *192324 (1977), decided after the opinion of the district court was filed.
Just as the individual’s right to possess obscene material in the privacy of his home, however, did not create a correlative right to receive, transport or distribute the material, the State’s right to abolish all regulation of obscene material does not create a correlative right to force the Federal Government to allow the mails or the channels of interstate or foreign commerce to be used for the purpose of sending obscene material into the permissive State.
Therefore, the issue of whether the material is in violation of 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a) is clearly not to be determined by the Mayor’s Committee of Lancaster, Pennsylvania or even the legislature of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania but by the Congress which concededly has “plenary power” to proscribe the importation of obscene material. United States v. 12 200 ft. Reels of Super 8 mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 126, 93 S.Ct. 2665, 37 L.Ed.2d 500 (1973).
The offense is the importation of the material, not the reading of it. The statute here evinces a clear congressional intent that the venue for the judicial determination of the obscenity of the imported material shall be the port of seizure. It logically follows that the community standard must be that of the situs of the court and not that of the residence of the addressee. Congress may determine “what articles may be imported into this country and the terms upon which importation is permitted.” Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois v. United States, 289 U.S. 48, 57, 53 S.Ct. 509, 77 L.Ed. 1025 (1933). That this congressional determination may increase the expense or inconvenience of the claimant in contesting the seizure does not result in any constitutional infirmity. Cf. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 96 S.Ct. 2440, 49 L.Ed.2d 310 (1976); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 93 S.Ct. 1172, 35 L.Ed.2d 572 (1973). See also Person v. Association of the Bar, 554 F.2d 534 (2d Cir. 1977).
I therefore agree with the majority that the only community standard which can be applied is that of the Southern District of New York. The finder of fact, however, is not free to determine the issue on the basis of his personal, idiosyncratic reaction to it. “[JJuries must be instructed properly so that they consider the entire community and not simply their own subjective reactions, or the reactions of a sensitive or of a callous minority.” Smith v. United States, supra, 431 U.S. at 305, 97 S.Ct. at 1766. How difficult the determination of this issue will be obviously depends upon how blatantly offensive the material may be. See United States v. Cangiano, 491 F.2d 906, 914 (2d Cir. 1976). I cannot agree that it is “unfortunate” that these matters have to come before the court. It is unfortunate that the hard core pornography industry is apparently flourishing despite the efforts of national, state and local communities to curb it. When violations of the restrictions against pornography occur it is the duty of the prosecutor to enforce the law and the courts to apply it. I see no reason to flinch from the exercise.