Court Opinion

ID: 9884162
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:40:15.410825+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:36.027191
License: Public Domain

RANDALL, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I do not find this complicated case at this time, on this record, appropriate for disposition by a Rule 12 motion for judgment on the pleadings and/or summary judgment.
The voluminous record contains numerous disputed fact issues and allegations by appellant that key facts were known, but omitted or slanted. Appellant argues vigorously that a jury is entitled to see the entire picture, and that if they resolve certain inferences in his favor actual malice could be found. There are several key areas in dispute. What did appellant actually know; what did appellant actually do; and what did respondents really know about what appellant did or did not do, as opposed to what they actually published.
Relative to appellant’s allegations that were dismissed on respondents’ motion for summary judgment, the record discloses disputed fact issues concerning who, if anyone, from appellant’s office put pressure on Dr. McGee not to change a death certificate from undetermined to homicide. Did appellant do it? Did appellant authorize someone else to do it? Was it “pressure” or just a common sense decision not to make a hurried change just because of publicity? Did respondents know that appellant never personally talked to Dr. McGee? Did respondents know this but continue to intentionally imply that the pressure or suggestion not to change the death certificate came from appellant himself?
*505On the issues disposed of by granting respondents’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, I find it difficult to hold, as a matter of law, that appellant could not produce facts which, if proven, could lead a reasonable jury to find defamation. On the issue of whether appellant contacted the attorney general’s office to remove an investigator from the case, there is a dispute over whether the investigator was actually “removed” and a dispute as to whether appellant deliberately requested a “removal,” if one occurred.
Relative to the search warrant, did appellant “block” it in the pejorative sense or was the decision made based on reasonable judgment by a prosecuting attorney that probable cause for a search warrant could not be found. Did respondents subsequent “clarification” remove all taint or did the implication linger that appellant deliberately hindered an ongoing investigation? On the issue of the suspect’s political contributions, were the amounts so insignificant and their timing such that respondents, with years of experience covering local, state, and national elections, knew that the minimal amount in question could not influence a homicide investigation. If they knew that, did they intentionally broadcast a partial story to imply otherwise? I am not in a position to weigh the merits of appellant’s ultimate case to a jury. However, I can say with reasonable conviction that if all factual disputes and all questions are answered by a jury in appellant’s favor, the high threshold a public official needs to meet to prove actual malice could be satisfied.
Appellant makes out a reasonable case that at every juncture, the broadcasts put him in as bad a light as possible. Did respondents actually know facts which would have dramatically changed the slant they were putting on the story? If they knew, then, did they intentionally withhold them with “reckless disregard for truth or falsity?”
The majority correctly points out that a public official has a heavy burden of proof in a defamation case.
Actual malice requires proof that the statement was made with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279, 84 S.Ct. [710] at 726 [11 L.Ed.2d 686] (1964).
Reckless conduct is not measured by whether a reasonable prudent person would have published or would have investigated before publishing; rather, there must be sufficient evidence to conclude that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of its publication. Publishing with such doubts shows reckless disregard for truth or falsity and demonstrates actual malice.
St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731, 88 S.Ct. 1323, 1325, 20 L.Ed.2d 262 (1968).
However, I find that this burden of actual malice can be met short of proof that there were out and out deliberate lies. In a case presently before the Minnesota Supreme Court, Diesen v. Hessburg, 437 N.W.2d 705 (Minn.Ct.App.1989), this court, relying on a Tennessee Supreme Court case, Memphis Publishing Co. v. Nichols, 569 S.W.2d 412 (Tenn.1978), found that statements, even if true taken in their literal context could amount to defamation. In Diesen we said:
In Nichols, a private citizen was allegedly defamed by the implication that she was having an adulterous affair with a neighbor’s husband. If all the facts had been printed by the paper, this defamatory and false implication would not have been created. The court in Nichols stated that the defendant’s reliance on the truth of the facts was misplaced because the question was “whether libel as published would have a different effect on the mind of the reader from that which the pleaded truth would have produced.” Id. at 420 (quoting Fleckenstein v. Friedman, 266 N.Y. 19, 23, 193 N.E. 537, 538 (1937)). The publication of the complete facts could have conceivably led the reader to conclude that there was no adulterous relationship.
The published statement, therefore, so distorted the truth as to make the en*506tire article false and defamatory. It is no defense whatever that individual statements within the article were literally true. Truth is available as an absolute defense only when the defamatory meaning conveyed by the words is true.

Id.

We agree with the holding in Nichols. There may be defamation by implication, where known facts are omitted, which could have changed the defamatory implication of the article. It is clear that this is a half-truth, which amounts to merely a lie.
Diesen, 437 N.W.2d at 709.
Respondents argue vigorously that in all respects truth is a complete defense. However, I find that the defense of “truth” is not confined to an examination of just the five alphabetical components of the word.1
Here, appellant may be able to prove a case of defamation by implication discovered in Diesen. The thrust of respondents’ broadcasts was that appellant, a prominent elected official, had intentionally stonewalled and interfered with a homicide investigation because a suspect was a political contributor. The content and slant of the broadcasts permit no other inference. This inference was intentionally and deliberately created by respondents. The allegations are extremely serious. They are in a proper area, governmental activity, for the media to scrutinize, but the media’s privileges are not unbounded. The first amendment is a high and mighty wall, but does not stretch to infinity.
When hearing motions for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted or summary judgment, courts are not asked to weigh evidence, determine credibility, resolve factual disputes, and decide the merits of a plaintiff’s case. Instead, a court’s duty is simply to determine if a claim could ever lie, and as to summary judgment, our duty is simply to determine whether genuine issues of material fact exist, “not how such issues should be resolved.” Vacura v. Haar’s Equipment, Inc., 364 N.W.2d 387, 391 (Minn.1985) (emphasis added). To make this determination, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and “all doubts and factual inferences must be resolved against the moving party.” Nord v. Herreid, 305 N.W.2d 337, 339 (Minn.1981). Summary judgment “is not intended as a substitute for trial * * Vacura, 364 N.W.2d at 391 (citation omitted). Because summary judgment is a “blunt instrument,” its use should be limited to cases in which “it is perfectly clear that no issue of fact is involved.” Donnay v. Boulware, 275 Minn. 37, 45, 144 N.W.2d 711, 716 (1966). This is not such a clear case; consequently, disposition by summary judgment is inappropriate, as is disposition by dismissal for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted.
Appellant’s status as a public figure2 prevents him from receiving any damages absent proof of actual malice, New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279, 84 S.Ct. at 725, but I suggest at this stage enough of a case *507exists to present to a jury. Although the New York Times standard of actual malice is high, we need to avoid getting hung up on the term “actual malice.” In reality, media people (unless they are looking for another job and want to draw unemployment compensation during the search) do not come right out and start a story by stating, “I have malice against you and intend to publish deliberate falsehoods.” Rather, defamation is concocted out of truth taken out of context, omitted facts, unbalanced reporting, and slants designed to do injury. Generally, in all civil cases the plaintiffs burden of proof is rarely made easy by frank admissions by a defendant to all the essential elements that a plaintiff needs to make a case. The purpose for factfinders is often to sift through half truths and distortions. Plaintiff is entitled to build a case, carefully laid eviden-tiary block upon block, and strive to convince a jury that the implications and inferences he wants.drawn were so intended by defendant.
I do not find the broad shield of the first amendment impervious to appellant’s attack at this pretrial stage. Ultimately at trial, respondents could prevail but sufficiency of the evidence is not now the issue on appeal. Based on this record, I believe that if a jury resolved all factual disputes in appellant’s favor, and resolved all inferences for appellant and against respondents, it could find actual malice.
The trial court did a conscientious job on setting up and analyzing the issues. But I cannot escape the feeling that the trial court, in effect, conducted a “mini trial” on the issues, weighed evidence and credibility, and came to the conclusion that appellant probably would not prevail at trial. Summary judgment is not the proper forum to resolve disputed issues, but rather to see if genuine issues of material fact exist. See Hinrichs v. Farmers Cooperative Grain & Seed Association, 333 N.W.2d 639, 641 (Minn.1983).
If this case proceeds to trial, the trial court still has three stages at which it can exercise discretion to prevent an unjust result. The trial court can direct a verdict for defendant at the close of plaintiff’s case or at the close of all the evidence, but before the case goes to the jury. Additionally, the trial court can grant a judgment notwithstanding the verdict if the case goes all the way to a jury verdict, but the court feels a manifest injustice has been done. Each of these dispositions, although as drastic as summary judgment, display an inherent fairness to a plaintiff that summary judgment and pretrial dismissals do not, as these three alternatives at least allow the plaintiff to present a case. If, upon the conclusion of plaintiff’s presentation, the trial court decides that the plaintiff cannot prevail, as a matter of law, and dismisses, the plaintiff had a day in court. Summary judgment and dismissal on the pleadings have a legitimate place in the legal system, but should not be a substitute for trial and were never meant to be a calendar control device in jurisdictions with high case loads.
In conclusion, I would find that appellant has at least presented claims upon which relief could be granted. As to the propriety of summary judgment, I find unresolved material and substantial fact questions. I would order the parties to complete pretrial discovery, and proceed to trial on the merits.

. The following story is likely apocryphal but serves to illustrate the point. Supposedly years ago in a small southern town, the editor of the local newspaper chose up sides against the may- or running for re-election and threw his newspaper support behind the challenger. On the evening before election day, the editor bannered the headline "Mayoral Incumbent Caught Eating a Dead Female Thigh.” The predictable happened. The next day the town had a new mayor and the defeated incumbent, not being at all convinced of his participation in such a dastardly deed, hired a law firm to investigate and bring suit. Upon completion of the investigation, it came out that at a Sunday church social one month before the election the mayor, his wife, his two children, and his grandparents were in attendance where the main course was roast turkey with all the trimmings. The newspaper editor, sitting at an adjoining table, observed the mayor holding a napkin in front of his face (because his socially conscious mother disapproved of adults eating in public with their fingers) while avidly chomping on a hen turkey drumstick. At trial, when the “fowl” facts came to light, over the editor’s protestations that every word in the headline was defendable, the judge did find that a suit did lie.

. Generally, false allegations which attack a person’s professional conduct are defamatory per se. Becker v. Alloy Hardfacing & Engineering Co., 401 N.W.2d 655, 661 (Minn.1987); Lee v. Metropolitan Airport Commission, 428 N.W.2d 815, 819 (Minn.Ct.App.1988).