Court Opinion

ID: 9776255
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:28:44.820324+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:36.312271
License: Public Domain

SHANNON, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent.
Appellant Martha M. Holliman seeks to set aside a take-nothing judgment of the district court of Travis County rendered in a workers’ compensation suit after trial to a jury. Appellee is the Leander Independent School District, a self-insurer.
On November 21, 1978, Mrs. Holliman was an employee of the school district, working as the manager of the school cafeteria. On that date in the course of her employment she slipped and fell, injuring herself.
Mrs. Holliman prosecuted a claim for workers’ compensation benefits. At trial, the parties joined issue regarding (1) the extent and duration of Mrs. Holliman’s incapacity and (2) her average weekly wage.
The jury answered in response to special issues that as a result of the fall, Mrs. Holliman suffered a period of temporary total incapacity and thereafter she suffered permanent partial incapacity. By its answer to special issue six, the jury refused *97to find there was another employee of the same class as Mrs. Holliman who worked at least two hundred and ten days in the year immediately preceding November 21, 1978, in the same or similar employment and in the same or a neighboring place. Mrs. Holliman did not request an issue inquiring of a just and fair average weekly wage as of November 21, 1978.
Based upon the jury’s answers, the district court rendered judgment that Mrs. Holliman take nothing.
Mrs. Holliman’s appellate assault upon the judgment centers upon the question of average weekly wage. It is, of course, the injured employee’s burden to establish average weekly wage under one of the three subsections of Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 8309 § 1 (1967).1 Texas Employers’ Insurance Association v. Shannon, 462 S.W.2d 559 (Tex.1970); Texas Employers’ Insurance Association v. Roberts, 135 Tex. 123, 139 S.W.2d 80 (1940).
Under subsection 1 of art. 8309 § 1, if the injured employee has worked two hundred and ten days in the same or similar employment (as described in the statute), then his wages are to be used to establish his wage rate and the amount of his recovery.
Under subsection 2, if the injured employee has not worked for two hundred and ten days but other employees of the same class have worked at least two hundred and ten days in similar employment in the same or neighboring place, then the wages of such other employee or employees are to be used to determine the injured employee’s wage rate.
If neither of the factual requirements of subsections 1 or 2 are present and applicable, resort must be had to subsection 3 which provides for the fixing of the injured employee’s wage rate in a manner which is “just and fair” to both parties. The burden is upon the injured employee to establish by competent evidence that his wages cannot be computed pursuant to subsections 1 or 2 before resort may be had to the “just and fair” provisions of subsection 3. Texas Employers’ Insurance Association v. Ford, 153 Tex. 470, 271 S.W.2d 397 (1954).
As it was stipulated that Mrs. Holliman had not worked two hundred and ten days in the year preceding her injury, subsection 1 was unavailable to compute her average weekly wage. She expressly waived submission of wage rate pursuant to subsection 3. Counsel for Mrs. Holliman stated:
I do at this time waive the pleadings on fair and just and ask the Court not to submit the issue [just and fair] on the basis that there’s no pleading to support it and that there is no evidence to support it.
Mrs. Holliman undertook to prove wage rate pursuant to subsection 2. She, of course, requested a special issue submit*98ting the subsection 2 method of wage rate computation. In response, the district court submitted special issues “six” and “seven”:
SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 6.
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that another employee of the same class as Martha Holliman worked at least 210 days of the year immediately preceding November 21, 1978, in the same or similar employment and in the same or a neighboring place?
Answer “We do” or “We do not.”
ANSWER: We do not
If you have answered Special Issue No. 6 “We do,” then answer Special Issue No. 7; otherwise do not answer Special Issue No. 7.
SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 7.
Find from a preponderance of the evidence the average daily wage which such other employee earned during the days he or she actually worked in such year.
Answer in dollars and cents.
ANSWER: _
As is obvious by the jury’s answer to special issue six, Mrs. Holliman failed to discharge her burden to persuade the jury that there was another employee of the same class who had worked at least two hundred and ten days in similar employment in the same or neighboring place. In point of error one, Mrs. Holliman attacks the refusal of the jury to so find as being “against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.”
In reviewing factual sufficiency points of error, the appellate court considers all of the evidence to determine whether the findings are so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust. In re King’s Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660 (1951).
For another worker to be of the “same class” as the injured or deceased worker, it is not necessary that every detail of their daily tasks be identical, but only that the work be similar in nature. Pan American Ins. Co. v. Stokes, 370 S.W.2d 955 (Tex.Civ. App.1963, no writ); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Woodall, 356 S.W.2d 344 (Tex.Civ.App. 1962, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Texas Employers’ Insurance Association v. Butler, 287 S.W.2d 198 (Tex.Civ.App.1956, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Texas Employers’ Insurance Association v. Robison, 241 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. Civ.App.1951, writ ref d n.r.e.).
In an effort to discharge her burden to prove that there was another employee of the same class as she who worked two hundred and ten days of the year immediately preceding the date of her injury in the same or similar employment and in the same or a neighboring place, Mrs. Holliman called Kenneth Odiorne.
Odiorne, a wholesale meat salesman at trial time, had previously been the cafeteria manager at St. Edwards University in Austin. He had worked sixteen or seventeen years as cafeteria manager at Wyatts Cafeteria, Jester Dormitory at the University of Texas, Texas Instruments, and at St. Edwards University.
Counsel for Mrs. Holliman, through Od-iorne, sought to prove the similarities between the tasks and responsibilities of the cafeteria manager at St. Edwards University and the cafeteria manager at the Leander school district. On the other hand, counsel for the school district undertook on cross-examination to demonstrate the differences between the two jobs. Odiorne opined, based upon an examination of Mrs. Holliman’s job description, that such job description characterized the position of cafeteria manager with the possible exception that under her job description, Mrs. Holliman could not hire and fire personnel. He concluded further that her job description was a very standard one and that he performed at St. Edwards the same tasks as those in her job description except that his job was more comprehensive.
Odiorne was supervised by the Dean of Students, while Mrs. Holliman worked under the direction of the Food Service Director. The Food Service Director of the school district, Mrs. Naida Weed, also filled in when other employees were absent and spent some time in the kitchen with Mrs. Holliman. Odiorne’s title was Food Service *99Director and, at times, Food Service Manager. As of late he had been called “Director.” Mrs. Holliman was supervised by the Food Service Director, Mrs. Weed. The need for a Food Service Director in the school district was explained by the existence of several units in need of supervision and coordination.
Odiorne performed at St. Edwards University many of the tasks reserved for Mrs. Weed, the Food Service Director at the school district. For example, Odiorne planned menus, he hired and fired personnel, and he was authorized to call for outside repair of equipment if necessary. Mrs. Weed, the Food Service Director at the school district, and not Mrs. Holliman, planned menus; hired and fired personnel, after consulting with Mrs. Holliman; and called outside for repair of equipment.
As previously written, Odiorne had worked sixteen or seventeen years as a cafeteria manager whereas Mrs. Holliman had worked only about one year as manager of a school cafeteria. Mrs. Holliman’s prior experience in food service had been as a waitress and as an employee at a movie concession stand. The administration at St. Edwards preferred a Food Service Director with a bachelor’s degree, although a minimum of five years experience in food service would suffice. The school district required no educational prerequisites and no managerial experience—only experience in food service. Although Odiorne held no bachelor’s degree, he had earned one hundred and seventy-two hours of college credit. He had attended professional seminars and workshops in food service, and he was a member of the National Association of College and University Food Services and the Texas Restaurant Association. Mrs. Holliman, to the contrary, did not finish the ninth grade, and she had not taken any other educational courses. She had attended workshops concerning cleanliness. Cooks and other kitchen help were invited to such workshops. Finally, Mrs. Holliman did not belong to any professional food service associations.
Both Odiorne and Mrs. Holliman supervised maintenance of food preparation and service standards; ordered, received and stored food and supplies; kept an inventory of foodstuffs; kept weekly or daily records; and enforced the rules and regulations of the food service department. Both Odiorne and Mrs. Holliman trained subordinates, although Odiorne had many more full-time and part-time employees than did Mrs. Holliman.
Odiorne scheduled employees’ hours, while Mrs. Holliman did not. He selected the recipes for the food served; Mrs. Holli-man did not. Odiorne was responsible for the service of three meals each day for seven days a week whereas Mrs. Holliman served breakfast and lunch five days each week. Odiorne was provided an assistant manager and a student supervisor. Mrs. Holliman had an assistant, also, but the assistant was another employee who performed her usual tasks unless Mrs. Holli-man was absent.
From a review of all of the evidence, In re King’s Estate, supra, it is fair to conclude that while there are many similarities between Odiorne’s and Mrs. Holliman’s employment, there are more than a few differences. From all of the evidence, the jury could well have concluded there was another employee of the same class as Mrs. Holliman engaged in the same or similar employment in the same or neighboring place. On the other hand, the jury under these facts could have reasonably concluded that the two employments were not similar. Under such facts, it is basic to our system of jurisprudence that a reviewing court may not substitute its view of the facts for that of the fact-finder. Benoit v. Wilson, 150 Tex. 273, 239 S.W.2d 792 (1951); Alley v. Booth, 16 Tex. 94, 95 (1856). This Court should overrule point of error one.
As basis for reversal of the judgment the majority advances the following postulate:
In a situation as here where the jury failed to find that there was another employee of the same class as appellant who worked at least 210 days in the *100preceding year in the same or similar employment and in the same or neighboring place, it then becomes the duty of the trial court to compute the average weekly wages in a manner which may seem “just and fair” to both parties under subsection 3 of Sec. 1 of this article. Texas Employers’ Insurance Assn. v. Wade, 288 S.W.2d 284 (Tex.Civ.App.1956, writ ref d n.r.e.).
The most cursory reading of Wade demonstrates that it is no authority at all for the asserted proposition. In Wade the case was tried to the court, not to a jury as in the case at bar. Certainly, in a bench tried case, if the injured employee establishes that his wages cannot be computed pursuant to subsections 1 or 2, then based upon the evidence, the trial court, as the fact finder, computes wage rate pursuant to subsection 3, “just and fair.” In the case at bar, the case was submitted to the jury as fact-finder for determination of wage rate. Mrs. Holliman expressly waived submission of wage rate pursuant to subsection 3, and she failed to obtain a finding enabling the court to compute wage rate pursuant to subsection 2.
In a case tried to a jury, the trial court, of course, does not make findings of fact except for omitted issues in support of the judgment. Tex.R.Civ.P.Ann. 279 (1977). No contention is made that the subsection 3 issues are “omitted issues” in face of Mrs. Holliman’s express waiver of their submission.
Under the facts of this case, the trial court would have been without authority to proceed to find the “just and fair” wage rate pursuant to subsection 3 as suggested by the majority. Moreover, Mrs. Holliman does not even contend that the trial court should have made such findings.
In response to other points of error, the majority has held that the answer of the jury that the duration of Mrs. Holli-man’s partial incapacity was permanent is in conflict with the jury’s answer refusing to find that another employee of the same class as Mrs. Holliman worked two hundred and ten days in the preceding year in the same or similar employment and in the same or a neighboring place. The claimed authority of Mrs. Holliman for this holding is Employers Reinsurance Corp. v. Holland, 162 Tex. 394, 347 S.W.2d 605 (1961), although the majority does not assert any authority in support of its holding.
Holland stands for no such proposition. Holland was an original proceeding in mandamus filed in the Supreme Court. Petitioner sought a writ of mandamus directing a district judge to set aside a mistrial declared in a workers’ compensation case pending in Harris County. In the workers’ compensation suit the parties had stipulated the average weekly wage of the injured employee before and at the time of his injury to be $100.00. The jury answered in response to special issue 2 that the injury was a producing cause of partial incapacity in the employee. The jury answered further in response to special issue 6 that the average weekly wage earning capacity during the existence of his partial incapacity was $100.00 (the exact sum as his average weekly wage before and at the time of his injury, as stipulated by the parties).
The Supreme Court concluded in Holland that the answer of the jury to special issue 6, considered along with the stipulation of the parties, was in fatal conflict with its answer to special issue 2, and that the order of mistrial was therefore proper.
In the case under consideration, the jury answered that Mrs. Holliman’s injury was a producing cause of permanent partial incapacity. It answered further that Mrs. Holliman’s average weekly earning capacity during her partial incapacity was $164.80. However, the jury by their answer to special issue 6 refused to find that there existed another employee in the same class as Mrs. Holliman who had worked two hundred and ten days of the preceding year. Special issue 7 was conditioned upon an affirmative answer to special issue 6. Because the jury did not answer special issue 6 affirmatively, it did not answer 7. Therefore, in this case, unlike Holland, there is a “non-finding” by the jury as to a *101critical wage rate inquiry pursuant to art. 8309 § 1.
Where is the conflict? Mrs. Holliman’s average weekly earning capacity during the partial incapacity was $164.80. Because the jury failed to find there was another employee in the same class as Mrs. Holliman who had worked two hundred and ten days preceding the date of injury, it did riot answer special issue 7 and find the average daily wage of that non-existent employee. This Court does not know, nor does anyone else know, what sum the jury would have assigned as an average weekly wage in response to special issue 7. Hence, there is no jury finding which could be in conflict with its finding of average weekly earning during Mrs. Holliman’s partial incapacity.
It is plain that there is no conflict in the jury’s answers and there is no need even to refer to those authorities which set out the applicable procedures for the resolution of an actual conflict. Little Rock Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Dunn, 148 Tex. 197, 222 S.W.2d 985, 991 (1949); Pearson v. Doherty, 143 Tex. 64, 183 S.W.2d 453, 456 (Tex.1944).
In reply to the concurring opinion, the settled rule is that the burden is on the worker to obtain an affirmative finding eliminating the applicability of subsection 2 before he may have the jury determine a “just and fair” wage rate pursuant to subsection 3. Texas Employers’ Insurance Association v. Ford, supra. For reasons of her own, Mrs. Holliman did not even request a submission to eliminate the applicability of subsection 2 and a submission to establish a “just and fair” wage rate. In fact, she expressly waived the submission of issues pursuant to subsection 3. As a result, surely she is not entitled to a reversal of the judgment and a new trial.
The judgment should be affirmed.

. Texas Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 8309 § 1 provides in part:
"Average weekly wages” shall mean:
(1) If the injured employee shall have worked in the employment in which he was working at the time of the injury, whether for the same employer or not, for at least two hundred ten (210) days of the year immediately preceding the injury, his average weekly wage shall consist of three hundred (300) times the average daily wage or salary which he shall have earned during the days that he actually worked in such year, divided by fifty-two (52).
(2) If the injured employee shall not have worked in the employment in which he was working at the time of the injury, whether for the same employer or not, for at least two hundred ten (210) days of the year immediately preceding the injury, his average weekly wage shall consist of three hundred (300) times the average daily wage or salary which an employee of the same class, working at least two hundred ten (210) days of such immediately preceding year, in the same or in a similar employment, in the same or a neighboring place, shall have earned during the days that he actually worked in such year, divided by fifty-two (52).
(3)When by reason of the shortness of the time of the employment of the employee, or other employee engaged in the same class of work in the manner and for the length of time specified in the above Subsections 1 and 2, or other good and sufficient reasons, it is impracticable to compute the average weekly wages as above defined, it shall be computed by the Board in any manner which may seem just and fair to both parties, as of the date of injury.