Court Opinion

ID: 9363208
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-13 18:57:57.834997+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:30.004951
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       DEC 23 2022
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ERIC T. MITCHELL, an individual, on             No.    22-55107
behalf of himself and all others similarly
situated,                                       D.C. No.
                                                2:20-cv-10455-SB-PD
                Plaintiff-Appellant,

 v.                                             MEMORANDUM*

SPECIALIZED LOAN SERVICING LLC, a
Delaware limited liability company,

                Defendant-Appellee.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Central District of California
                 Stanley Blumenfeld, Jr., District Judge, Presiding

                    Argued and Submitted November 14, 2022
                              Pasadena, California

Before: WARDLAW and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges, and KORMAN,**
District Judge.

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The Honorable Edward R. Korman, United States District Judge for
the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
      Eric T. Mitchell appeals from an order granting summary judgment to

Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC (“SLS,” the defendant-appellee), dismissing

Mitchell’s complaint arising out of SLS’s alleged inaccurate credit reporting, and

denying his motion for class certification as moot. We have jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.

      On April 7, 2020, Mitchell sought forbearance relief from the servicers of

his two residential loans, one of which was SLS. Through an automated

interactive voice response (“IVR”) telephone system, Mitchell “indicate[d] that he

sought the forbearance agreement due to the negative economic impact of the

Covid-19 pandemic.” SLS approved the forbearance plan in early April 2020 and

extended it for an additional three months in June 2020 at Mitchell’s request.

      During the forbearance plan, SLS reported Mitchell’s account status as

current with no reported date of first delinquency and no past due balance. On the

same reporting form, however, SLS used the code “D” in Mitchell’s payment

history profile (“PHP”). The “D” code means no payment history, no data, or

unknown. By contrast, a “0” code in the PHP field indicates “0 payments past due

(current account).”

      Mitchell argues that SLS’s use of the “D” code rather than the “0” code in

his PHP field during the period of forbearance violated the Fair Credit Reporting

Act (“FCRA”). Specifically, Mitchell bases his principal argument on the March

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2020 Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (“CARES”) amendment

to the FCRA. This amendment required furnishers to “report [a consumer’s] credit

obligation or account as current” if the furnisher agreed to provide forbearance or

other relief on a consumer’s loan. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)(1)(F)(ii)(I). Mitchell

also alleges violations of the California Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act

(“CCRAA”), California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), and a claim for

breach of contract.

      The district court granted summary judgment for SLS, dismissed Mitchell’s

claims, and denied Mitchell’s motion for class certification. We review a grant of

summary judgment de novo. Pavoni v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 789 F.3d 1095, 1098

(9th Cir. 2015). “Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party . . . and drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor, we must

determine whether the district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law

and whether there are any genuine issues of material fact.” Clicks Billiards, Inc. v.

Sixshooters, Inc., 251 F.3d 1252, 1257 (9th Cir. 2001).

      1.     The district court did not err in granting summary judgment for SLS

on each of Mitchell’s causes of action. The fact that SLS reported Mitchell’s

“account status” as “current account” shows that SLS complied with the FCRA

requirement to “report [a consumer’s] credit obligation or account as current.” 15

U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)(1)(F)(ii)(I). The use of “D” rather than “0” in the PHP field

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does not change that conclusion. We agree with the district court that guidance

from the Consumer Data Industry Association (“CDIA”) supports the inference

that using the “D” character “is an acceptable option” when reporting the account

status as current. While a nonbinding Compliance Aid issued by the Consumer

Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) says that a furnisher “should consider all of

the trade line information they furnish that reflects a consumer’s status as current

or delinquent,” it does not specifically mention the PHP. The CFPB guidance does

not persuade us that reporting the PHP as “D” violates the FCRA’s requirement to

report the account as current. We therefore agree with the district court that SLS’s

“investigation and response to [Mitchell’s] complaints of inaccuracies . . . were not

unreasonable.” Mitchell also cannot “make a prima facie showing that” SLS’s

reporting was inaccurate, as he must to state a FCRA claim. Gross v.

CitiMortgage, Inc., 33 F.4th 1246, 1251 (9th Cir. 2022).

      While the district court did not reach several issues raised on summary

judgment, even if we assumed some inaccuracy in SLS’s reporting, the facts

highlighted by Mitchell do not show that SLS acted willfully or negligently in

conducting its investigation after receiving the notice of dispute. Gorman v.

Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 584 F.3d 1147, 1154 (9th Cir. 2009). Moreover, the

language of this provision of the FCRA is “‘less than pellucid’” and no appellate

court has interpreted the language of the FCRA at issue here, so “[u]nder either the

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negligence or willfulness standard . . . a defendant will nearly always avoid

liability.” Marino v. Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC, 978 F.3d 669, 673–74 (9th Cir.

2020) (quoting Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 70 (2007)). And even

if SLS did act negligently, Mitchell has not provided admissible evidence of actual

damages.

      Mitchell’s failed effort in August 2020 to finance the purchase of a Range

Rover for $96,000, just a few months after requesting forbearance from SLS, does

not evidence that he was damaged. Two banks declined to provide Mitchell with

an auto loan for the purchase of the Range Rover. The record reflects, however,

that the denials were for reasons unrelated to SLS’s credit reporting or late

mortgage payments. Instead, the denials appear to be related, at least in part, to

Mitchell’s prior bankruptcy, for which he filed in December 2013.

      We also affirm the district court’s holding that the CCRAA and UCL claims

fail because SLS’s reporting was accurate and complied with the FCRA. See

Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 890 (9th Cir. 2010)

(assuming that “California courts would interpret the FCRA and CCRAA

consistently”); Aleksick v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 140 Cal. Rptr. 3d 796, 801 (Ct. App.

2012) (holding that if “a statutory claim fails, a derivative UCL claim also fails”).

As with the FCRA claim, even if Mitchell could show some inaccuracy in SLS’s

credit reporting, he has not provided admissible evidence of damages.

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      2.     The district court also did not err in dismissing Mitchell’s breach of

contract claim. We agree with the district court that, under these circumstances,

the forbearance plan was not an enforceable contract because it lacked

consideration. Mitchell’s case is unlike Sutcliffe v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 283

F.R.D. 533 (N.D. Cal. 2012) and Ansanelli v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. C

10-03892, 2011 WL 1134451 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2011), where “plaintiffs

expended time and energy and made financial disclosures in furtherance of the

agreement, which they would not have been required to do under the original

contract.” Ansanelli, 2011 WL 1134451, at *4; accord Sutcliffe, 283 F.R.D. at

553. Mitchell secured the forbearance plan by calling SLS and choosing options

through its IVR system. SLS did not request any additional information or

documents before entering into the forbearance plan. Mitchell’s action does not

amount to consideration because it did not confer a benefit or cause Mitchell to

suffer prejudice; nor was there a bargained-for exchange. See Steiner v. Thexton,

226 P.3d 359, 366 (Cal. 2010). It was substantially less effort than the time and

energy at issue in Sutcliffe and Ansanelli. Once more, even if there were an

enforceable contract here, SLS likely did not breach it because SLS appropriately

reported the account. Nor did Mitchell prove damages from SLS’s conduct.

      Nor did the district court err in declining to address the merits of Mitchell’s

promissory estoppel argument. Mitchell did not separately allege a count for

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promissory estoppel in his Amended Complaint. Mitchell only mentions

promissory estoppel in one line of the joint summary judgment briefing and in his

Reply in Support of Motion for Class Certification. We decline to address an issue

that Mitchell failed to raise sufficiently for the trial court to rule on it. Broad v.

Sealaska Corp., 85 F.3d 422, 430 (9th Cir. 1996).1

      3.     The district court did not err in denying Mitchell’s class certification

motion as moot because it properly dismissed all claims against SLS.

      AFFIRMED.

1
  We assume, without deciding, that the contract claim is not preempted by the
FCRA. See Gorman, 584 F.3d at 1167 (“In the end, we need not decide this issue.
As we conclude below, even if Gorman could bring a state law libel claim under §
1681h(e), and such a claim were not preempted by § 1681t(b)(1)(F), he has not
introduced sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on this claim.”).

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