Court Opinion

ID: 9748828
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:14:25.166648+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:39.823635
License: Public Domain

LORD, Senior Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority properly states:
We have held many times that the propriety of a criminal conviction may not be collaterally attacked in a civil license suspension hearing. See, e.g., Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Greene, 112 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 413, 535 A.2d 306 (1988). The proper focus of the trial court’s inquiry is whether the motorist was in fact convicted, not whether he should have been convicted. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Adams, 53 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 636, 419 A.2d 233 (1980).
The majority then proceeds to examine not only the March 15, 1988 conviction — the one involved in this appeal, for which Diamond paid the fine on February 9, 1990 — but also the citation that was issued on October 11,1986 for driving with a suspended license. Diamond was found guilty in Philadelphia Traffic Court of the October 1986 citation; however, on his appeal to the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, the conviction was overturned. The majority bases its decision on the October 1986 citation which is not before us. This, to me, is a collateral attack and is proscribed under our prior cases.
This case is governed by Greene. In that case, Greene received a ticket for following too closely behind another *360vehicle. He testified that he paid the fine and figured everything was all right. Subsequently, he was stopped for driving while his license was under suspension. Like Diamond, Greene paid the fine for driving while his license was under suspension. The trial court sustained Greene’s appeal from the department’s revocation.
We stated the issue as follows:
Greene appealed the suspension of his operating privilege, arguing that, despite the fact that he did pay the fine and costs for violating Section 1543, the conviction could not support the later revocation of his operating privilege because he should not have been under suspension on the date that he was so cited. Greene, 112 [Pa.Commonwealth Ct.] at 415, 535 A.2d at 307.
We then ruled as follows:
The trial court erred as a matter of law in sustaining Greene’s appeal. This Court has held repeatedly that the propriety of a criminal conviction cannot be attacked collaterally in a subsequent civil suspension proceeding. See Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Williamson, 91 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 84, 496 A.2d 910 (1985). This Court, in the case of Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Valentine, 71 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 8, 10, 453 A.2d 742, 743 (1982), held that “[i]t is clear that in a license suspension appeal the only issues are whether the license was in fact convicted and whether the Bureau has acted in accordance with applicable law. The underlying criminal conviction may not be challenged in a suspension appeal, which is civil in nature.” The trial court clearly exceeded its scope of review in this case. Therefore, we reverse the order of the trial court and reimpose the six-month suspension. Id. [112 Pa.Commonwealth Ct.] at 415, 535 A.2d at 307-308.
I fail to see any meaningful distinction between Greene and this case. In both cases, the motorist attempted to attack a later charge of driving under a suspended license by contending that the earlier conviction and suspension were unwarranted.
*361Although at first blush the majority opinion has some equitable appeal, since Diamond was eventually found not guilty of the October 1986 charge of driving with a suspended license, he is in a dilemma of his own making. He had ample opportunity to contest the suspension of May 29, 1987. He did not do so, but continued to drive. He never notified the department of his acquittal and he did not contest the March 15, 1988 citation, which is the subject of the appeal presently before us. Instead, he paid the fine and assumably continued to drive.
Moreover, from the certified record submitted by the department it is apparent Diamond has been under an indefinite suspension since 1985 for failing to pass an exam which, according to the majority, “apparently was required because of an excessive accumulation of points.” Notwithstanding the majority’s reliance on Diamond’s acquittal of the October 1986 citation, his license was still under an indefinite suspension when he was issued the citation on March 15, 1988.
I would reverse and adhere to this Court’s well-established rule that “the propriety of a criminal conviction [i.e., the March 18, 1988 conviction] on appeal here cannot be attacked collaterally in a subsequent civil suspension hearing.”