Court Opinion

ID: 9396423
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-22 16:07:49.386294+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:16.850300
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. McCaulley, 2023-Ohio-1711.]

                 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                           ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                  LAKE COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,                                     CASE NO. 2022-L-105

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,
                                                   Criminal Appeal from the
        - vs -                                     Court of Common Pleas

DEON MCCAULLEY, II,
                                                   Trial Court No. 2021 CR 001037
                 Defendant-Appellant.

                                                OPINION

                                       Decided: May 22, 2023
                                        Judgment: Affirmed

Charles E. Coulson, Lake County Prosecutor, and Jennifer A. McGee, Assistant
Prosecutor, Lake County Administration Building, 105 Main Street, P.O. Box 490,
Painesville, OH 44077 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).

Aaron A. Schwartz, Joseph C. Patituce, and Catherine A. Purdum, Patituce &
Associates, LLC, 16855 Foltz Parkway, Strongsville, OH 44149 (For Defendant-
Appellant).

JOHN J. EKLUND, P.J.

        {¶1}     Appellant, Deon McCaulley, II, appeals his convictions in the Lake County

Court of Common Pleas for Operating a Motor Vehicle While Under the Influence of

Alcohol, a Drug of Abuse, or Combination of Them (OVI), a first-degree misdemeanor, in

violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a), and Improperly Handling Firearms in a Motor Vehicle,

a fourth-degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2923.16(D)(1). Appellant raises three

assignments of error which assert: (1) the trial court erred by failing to admit the arresting

officer’s police report under Evid.R. 803(8)(b); (2) the trial court erred by admitting
testimony about the vertical gaze nystagmus (VGN) test; and (3) that appellant’s

convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence.

         {¶2}   Having reviewed the record and the applicable caselaw, we find appellant’s

assignments of error to be without merit. First, the statements contained in the police

report appellant sought to admit through Evid.R. 803(8)(b) were statements made by

appellant’s healthcare providers and were not based on the arresting officer’s own

firsthand knowledge or observations and the healthcare providers were under no duty to

report the information. Second, appellant did not file a motion to suppress the evidence

of the VGN test and has waived a challenge to whether the test was performed in

substantial compliance with relevant standards and procedures on appeal and appellant

suffered no harm from the admission of the evidence because the results of the test were

negative. Finally, the State produced sufficient evidence to convict appellant of all

charges.

         {¶3}   Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Lake County Court of Common

Pleas.

                              Substantive and Procedural History

         {¶4}   On June 13, 2021, appellant crashed his vehicle into a ditch on Prouty Road

in Lake County. He was indicted on four counts arising from the incident: Count 1,

Violation of a Protection Order, a third-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2919.27(A)(1);

Count 2, Improperly Handling Firearms in a Motor Vehicle, a fourth-degree felony in

violation of R.C. 2923.16(B); Count 3, Improperly Handling Firearms in a Motor Vehicle,

a fourth-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2923.16(D)(1); and Count 4, Operating a

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Case No. 2022-L-105
Vehicle Under the Influence of Alcohol, a Drug of Abuse, or a Combination of Them (OVI),

a first degree-misdemeanor in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a).

       {¶5}   Appellant pled not guilty to the charges and the matter proceeded to jury

trial. On the morning of trial, the State dismissed Counts 1 and 2.

       {¶6}   The following evidence was adduced at trial:

       {¶7}   The Ohio State Highway Patrol received a report of a reckless driver in the

area of I-90 at mile post 197. The vehicle was described as blue with a partial license

plate “JIA.” Greg Smith testified that later he was driving on Ravenna Road in Lake

County. At the intersection of Ravenna Road and Prouty Road he saw a blue sedan

driving at a high rate of speed with “tires almost screeching.” He turned onto Prouty Road

and followed the vehicle where he continued to watch the vehicle’s erratic maneuvering

as it nearly struck a car in the oncoming lane of travel. Smith, who drives for a living,

described it as the most dangerous driving he had ever seen. At the time, he believed the

driver was either intoxicated or suffering from a medical emergency and planned to call

911 to report the driver.

       {¶8}   Smith then saw the vehicle crest a hill at a curve in the road and as he

followed over the hill, saw that it had crashed into the ditch on the oncoming side of the

road. Smith called 911 to report the crash and said he believed the driver was intoxicated.

Smith testified he saw appellant throwing glass bottles (which he assumed were beer

bottles) out of the car window into the woods near the ditch. He approached appellant to

check his condition and smelled the odor of alcohol. Appellant got out of the vehicle and

Smith noticed him staggering and unable to speak coherently.

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      {¶9}    Lieutenant Michael Fearing of the Concord Township Fire Department

responded to the scene of the accident. When Fearing approached appellant, he said

that appellant was seated in his vehicle with the door open and was talking on his cell

phone. Fearing heard appellant talking on the cell phone and noticed he had slurred

speech and seemed “out of it.” Fearing said he saw no indication of trauma which would

cause this response from appellant. He believed appellant “was under the influence of

something.”

      {¶10} Appellant handed Fearing his phone and said, “dad’s cell.” Fearing took the

phone, began talking to an individual on the line and walked around the back of the vehicle

to assess the scene. Fearing continued walking around the vehicle and approached the

passenger side. Now at the passenger door, Fearing looked in the window and saw

appellant holding a gun in his right hand. He ran to a safe distance and radioed that

appellant had a weapon.

      {¶11} Deputy Robert Rowland of the Lake County Sheriff’s Office responded to

the scene shortly after Fearing radioed about the presence of the gun. When Rowland

arrived, he saw appellant standing on the driver’s side of the vehicle near the trunk. He

was about 70 to 100 yards away. Rowland said appellant complied with his directions to

walk away from the vehicle unarmed. Officers detained appellant and determined he was

unarmed. Rowland then searched appellant’s vehicle and discovered a cloth holster on

the driver’s side floor and recovered the loaded handgun from the vehicle’s glove box.

The gun was later test fired and found to be operational.

      {¶12} Firefighter Sterling Black assessed appellant for injuries after he was

detained. Black performed an alertness test on appellant and found him to be alert and

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Case No. 2022-L-105
oriented but noted he was slurring his words and was hard to understand. Black asked

appellant if he had consumed alcohol and appellant said, “Yes, I had a little bit of some

Henny earlier” referring to Hennessey brand liquor. After Black performed appellant’s

patient assessment, appellant refused further treatment from EMS and transport to the

hospital.

       {¶13} Trooper John Kronander of the Ohio State Highway Patrol testified that he

has conducted approximately 100 OVI investigations and that he received training in

alcohol and drug detection in individuals. Kronander initially responded to the call of an

erratic vehicle on I-90 but did not make contact. He was later called to the scene of

appellant’s crash and verified appellant’s vehicle matched the partial plates for the

reported erratic driver.

       {¶14} Kronander assessed the crash scene and observed appellant had struck a

mailbox on the right side of the road, overcorrected, lost control of the vehicle and crashed

into the ditch in the oncoming lane of travel. He did not observe any signs of braking.

Kronander then made contact with appellant and noted mumbled speech, a slight odor of

alcoholic beverage and bloodshot, glassy eyes.

       {¶15} Kronander then administered Standardized Field Sobriety Tests (SFSTs).

He testified that SFSTs are standardized tests designed by the National Highway Traffic

Safety Administration (NHTSA) used to detect whether someone is under the influence

of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both. He said he received training in the

administration of the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN), the One Leg Stand (OLS), and

the Walk and Turn (WAT) tests. Kronander testified to the procedure for administering

each test and said he administered the tests in accordance with his training.

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Case No. 2022-L-105
       {¶16} Kronander said the HGN test has a pre-test and three parts, which require

the subject to follow a stimulus with their eyes. Kronander said the purpose of the pre-

test check is to assess whether a head injury or eye issues in general would indicate a

subject cannot perform the test.

       {¶17} At trial, Kronander explained the three phases of the HGN. He said the first

phase of the HGN is to check for lack of smooth pursuit as the subject’s eyes follow the

stimulus moved horizontally back and forth 12-15 inches slight above the subject’s eye

level. The administrator looks for nystagmus – the involuntarily movement of the eyes –

which looks like a jerking movement similar to a windshield wiper on a dry windshield.

The second phase of the test is distinct and sustained nystagmus at maximum deviation.

During this phase, the administrator of the test moves the stimulus as far as the person

can track with their eye and holds it in that position for four seconds to observe if

nystagmus remains. The third phase of the test is onset of nystagmus prior to 45 degrees.

Here, the administrator moves the stimulus to a 45-degree angle to see if the onset of

nystagmus occurs prior to reaching the 45-degree angle. If it does occur before 45-

degrees, the stimulus is held at that point for 4 seconds and if nystagmus continues, it

constitutes a clue.

       {¶18} Kronander said the pre-test did not show any reason why appellant could

not perform the HGN. He observed appellant to have six out of six clues present, which

he said indicates a high probability of intoxication.

       {¶19} Kronander also performed a Vertical Gaze Nystagmus (VGN) test, which

he said does not count as a clue on the HGN but is used as an observation to help gauge

a person’s relative intoxication. Kronander explained the procedure for administering the

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Case No. 2022-L-105
VGN test involves the subject tracking a stimulus 12-15 inches above eye level. The

administrator moves the stimulus vertically until the subject cannot look up any farther. If

the subject has nystagmus, this observation indicates the person has consumed a high

amount of alcohol for that person’s tolerance level.

       {¶20} Appellant objected to the admission of Kronander’s testimony on the VGN.

However, the trial court overruled the objection and Kronander testified that appellant did

not have VGN present. Appellant performed the WAT and OLS tests and Kronander

observed multiple clues during each of those tests which indicated appellant was

intoxicated.

       {¶21} Kronander arrested appellant and took him to the Lake County Jail,

however, appellant was refused entry due to injuries from his accident. Kronander brought

appellant to TriPoint Hospital. While there, Kronander asked appellant to submit to a urine

test, but appellant refused.

       {¶22} Appellant sought to admit a statement that Kronander heard at the hospital

that appellant had a fractured hip. The trial court ruled that this statement was hearsay

and inadmissible. Appellant argued that Evid.R. 803(8) was an exception that would allow

admission of the medical statement through Kronander’s written police report. The trial

court inquired of Kronander and he stated he could not specifically remember who told

him that appellant had a fractured hip, but he believed it was one of appellant’s healthcare

providers. The trial court concluded that a certified medical record or other non-hearsay

source of appellant’s medical diagnosis would be admissible but said it would not admit

the hearsay statement contained in Kronander’s report because Kronander did not have

personal knowledge of appellant’s medical condition. Appellant made a proffer for the

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Case No. 2022-L-105
record that he would have asked Kronander how his knowledge of appellant’s injuries

would affect his assessment of appellant’s performance of the WAT and OLS tests.

       {¶23} On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Kronander about appellant’s

ability to perform SFSTs. Kronander said that appellant had been cleared by EMTs and

appellant denied having any problems to prevent him from performing them. He said the

first time appellant complained of hip pain was in his cruiser on the way to the jail. He also

acknowledged that appellant was discharged from the hospital with crutches.

       {¶24} The State rested and appellant made a Crim.R. 29 Motion for Acquittal,

which the trial court denied.

       {¶25} Appellant called one witness, his father, Deon McCaulley Sr., to testify in

his case in chief. McCaulley Sr. testified that appellant called to tell him he had been in

an accident and McCaulley Sr. went to the scene. When he arrived, appellant was being

treated by EMTs. McCaulley Sr. said appellant was speaking clearly with no delay in his

responses and there was no odor of alcohol. He also said he had previously seen

appellant while under the influence of alcohol and did not believe he was intoxicated at

the time. On cross-examination, McCaulley Sr. acknowledged that he did not see

appellant at the crash scene while he was standing up.

       {¶26} Appellant rested and renewed his Crim.R. 29 motion, which the trial court

denied. The jury returned a guilty verdict on both counts.

       {¶27} On September 29, 2022, the trial court sentenced appellant to 45 days jail,

one year community control, and a one-year license suspension.

       {¶28} Appellant timely appealed and raises three assignments of error.

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Case No. 2022-L-105
                              Assignments of Error and Analysis

       {¶29} Appellants first assignment of error states:

       {¶30} “[1.] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE

DEFENDANT IN FAILING TO PERMIT THE DEFENSE TO ENTER THE TROOPER’S

POLICE REPORT AS EVIDENCE UNDER EVIDENCE RULE 803(8)(b), AND THAT

REFUSAL CONSTITUTES A DENIAL OF THE RIGHT TO PRESENT A DEFENSE.”

       {¶31} Appellant argues that the trial court should have allowed the admission of

Kronander’s police report, which indicated appellant suffered from a fractured hip after

his accident. Appellant believes this information was necessary to his defense because

his injury undermined the reliability of the OLS and WAT SFSTs.

       {¶32} This court has held that whether evidence constitutes inadmissible hearsay

is a question of law subject to de novo review. Morford v. Morford, 2018-Ohio-3439, 118

N.E.3d 937, ¶ 12 (11th Dist.). “Determining whether the evidence is offered for an

impermissible purpose does not involve the exercise of discretion * * *, an appellate court

should scrutinize the [trial court's] finding under a de novo standard of review.” State v.

Hartman, 161 Ohio St. 3d 214, 2020-Ohio-4440, 161 N.E.3d 651, ¶ 22, citing State v.

Williams, 134 Ohio St.3d 521, 2012-Ohio-5695, 983 N.E.2d 1278, ¶ 17. This is because

Evid.R. 802 specifically provides that “hearsay is not admissible.” Therefore, “the trial

court’s decision to admit hearsay is not governed by the test of abuse of discretion, which

the Supreme Court applies to instances where the trial court's evidentiary rulings relate

to matters expressly or implicitly within its discretion, as in rulings on relevancy (Evid.R.

402 and 403) or expert testimony (Evid.R. 702).” State v. Sorrels, 71 Ohio App.3d 162,

165, 593 N.E.2d 313 (1st Dist.1991). We review the trial court’s decision relating to

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Case No. 2022-L-105
hearsay “in light of Evid.R. 103(A) and the standard established in Crim.R. 52(A),

providing that such errors are harmless unless the record demonstrates that the errors

affected a party's substantial right.” Id.

       {¶33} Hearsay is defined as a “statement, other than one made by the declarant

while testifying at trial, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter

asserted.” Evid.R. 801(C). It is well established that police reports are generally

inadmissible hearsay. State v. Williams, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2005-T-0123, 2006-Ohio-

6689, ¶ 23, citing State v. Leonard, 2104 Ohio St.3d 54, 818 N.E.2d 229, 2003-Ohio-

6235, ¶ 111. Evid.R. 803(8)(b) is one exception to this general rule. Id.

       {¶34} Evid.R. 803(8)(b) provides the following public records, reports, and

statements are not hearsay, even though the declarant is available as a witness:

       matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which
       matters there was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal
       cases matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement
       personnel, unless offered by defendant, unless the sources of
       information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.

       {¶35} Under this rule a police report is potentially admissible evidence and the

statements are not hearsay if the observations in the report are the firsthand observations

of the official making the report or the observations of a person with a duty to report to a

public official. State v. Gau, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2000-L-109, 2002-Ohio-4216, ¶ 19, citing

Petti v. Perna, 86 Ohio App.3d 508, 514, 621 N.E.2d 580 (3rd Dist.1993). “‘All persons

furnishing and recording information must be under an official duty to do so.’” Gau at ¶

19, quoting State v. York, 115 Ohio App.3d 245, 248, 685 N.E.2d 261 (4th Dist.1996). “‘If

the supplier of information is not under a duty to do so, an essential link in Evid.R.

803(8)(b) is broken.’” Id. This rule does not embrace statements made by private citizens.

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Case No. 2022-L-105
Gau, citing Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 41 Ohio App.3d 239, 242,

535 N.E.2d 702 (10th Dist.1987).

       {¶36} A statement in a police report from a person who does not have a duty to

make a report and acting as a private citizen is not admissible. Id. at ¶ 20. This is because

it breaks an essential link in the analysis under Evid.R. 803(8)(b). Id. Evid.R. 803(8)(b)

provides an exception which allows the defendant to admit statements in a report

involving “matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel” if

there is no indication of a lack of trustworthiness. Id. at ¶ 21. However, this exception

does not apply to statements in a report where the information is not based on firsthand

observations of the officer. Id.

       {¶37} Here, the statements appellant sought to introduce at trial were made by

appellant’s healthcare providers and recorded in Kronander’s police report. During the

evidence proffer, Kronander was unable to identify who specifically told him appellant had

a fractured hip. This out of court statement was offered to prove the truth of the matter

asserted – that appellant had been diagnosed with a hip fracture.

       {¶38} Kronander did not record appellant’s fractured hip in his report based on his

own firsthand knowledge. Gau at ¶ 21. He included appellant’s medical diagnosis in his

report as he received it from appellant’s healthcare professionals rather than his own

observations.

       {¶39} Further, we are unaware of any authority – and appellant cites none – which

indicates that a healthcare provider has a duty to report a patient’s medical status to the

police. As York explained, this lack of duty to report breaks an essential link in the Evid.R.

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Case No. 2022-L-105
803(8)(b) analysis. York, supra, at 248. Therefore, even though appellant offered the

report, it was not admissible. Id.

       {¶40} Assuming arguendo that the statements about appellant’s medical

diagnosis should have been admitted, we would still find no reversible error. Where, as

here, the defendant has objected to a claimed error in the trial court, an appellate court

reviews error under a harmless error standard set forth in Crim.R. 52(A). State v. Perry,

101 Ohio St.3d 118, 2004-Ohio-297, 802 N.E.2d 643, ¶ 15; Sorrels, 71 Ohio App.3d 162,

165, 593 N.E.2d 313.

       {¶41} The harmless error standard is “‘significantly more favorable to the

defendant.’” Id., quoting United States v. Curbelo, 343 F.3d 273, 286 (4th Cir. 2003).

Under a harmless error standard, the government bears the burden of demonstrating that

the error did not affect the substantial rights of the defendant. Id. “An appellate court must

reverse a conviction if the government does not satisfy this burden * * *.” Id. “Whether the

defendant's substantial rights were affected depends on whether the error was prejudicial,

i.e., whether it affected the outcome of the trial.” State v. Jones, 160 Ohio St.3d 314,

2020-Ohio-3051, 156 N.E.3d 872, ¶ 18, citing State v. Fisher, 99 Ohio St.3d 127, 2003-

Ohio-2761, 789 N.E.2d 222, ¶ 7. Where the State fails to meet its burden, the appellate

court must reverse the conviction. Perry at ¶ 15.

       {¶42} Although evidence of appellant’s hip fracture could have undermined the

reliability of the OLS and WAT tests, this would not warrant reversal. Appellant refused

transport to the hospital and was only taken to the emergency room because the jail

refused to admit him until he had been medically cleared. Kronander’s dash camera

shows that he asked appellant if “you have any problems with your legs at all?” Further,

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Case No. 2022-L-105
appellant did not begin to complain of hip pain until after his arrest. While appellant claims

that his OLS test was compromised by him supporting his weight on his fractured hip, the

OLS test allows the subject to choose either leg to stand on and Kronander instructed

appellant to choose whichever leg he felt more comfortable with using for the test. This

undermines appellant’s claim that his hip fracture was so severe that he could not perform

these tests and that their reliability was compromised.

       {¶43} One factor tending to undermine the reliability of the OLS and WAT tests

was that appellant was discharged from the hospital with crutches. However, the jury was

made aware of this through Kronander’s testimony. Therefore, regardless of whether

appellant’s specific medical diagnosis was made part of the record, testimony made the

jury aware of his need for crutches and thus the potential that his injuries compromised

the reliability of the OLS and WAT tests. This ameliorates much of appellant’s concern

that the jury assessed his performance on the WAT and OLS tests without regard to

injuries sustained in the crash.

       {¶44} More importantly, the totality of the evidence was indicative of appellant’s

impairment. Appellant was driving so erratically that Smith described it as the worst he

had ever seen, and he believed appellant was intoxicated. Smith said he saw appellant

throwing glass bottles from the car after he crashed. Appellant admitted consuming

Hennessey to Black. Several witnesses stated he had an odor of alcoholic beverage

emanating from his person, had glassy, bloodshot eyes, and seemed “out of it.” Further,

the HGN test revealed six out of six possible clues which indicates a high probability of

intoxication. These factors indicate exclusion of the police report offered by appellant was

harmless.

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Case No. 2022-L-105
         {¶45} Accordingly, appellant’s first assignment of error is without merit.

         {¶46} Appellant’s second assignment of error states:

         {¶47} “[2.] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE STATE OF OHIO

TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE OF THE VERTICAL GAZE NYSTAGMUS TEST AFTER

THE STATE OF OHIO FAILED TO ESTABLISH SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE

PURUSUANT TO R.C. 4511.19.”

         {¶48} Appellant argues that the trial court erred by allowing Kronander to testify

as to appellant’s VGN results. He asserts that Kronander’s testimony about the purpose

of the test was incorrect by suggesting that a positive VGN result could be indicative that

an individual had consumed a large amount of alcohol based on that person’s tolerance

level.

         {¶49} R.C. 4511.19(D)(4)(b) requires the State to show by clear and convincing

evidence that a law enforcement officer administering field sobriety tests “administer the

test in substantial compliance with the testing standards for any reliable, credible and

generally accepted field sobriety tests that were in effect at the time the tests were

administered, including, but not limited to, any testing standards then in effect that were

set by the national highway traffic safety administration[.]” If the State meets its burden,

then the officer may testify concerning the results of the SFST, the State may introduce

the results of the SFST, and the admissible evidence or testimony shall be admitted and

given appropriate weight by the trier of fact. R.C. 4511.19(D)(4)(b).

         {¶50} However, we are unable to assess whether Kronander’s description of the

VGN was accurate or not because the NHTSA Manual, which Kronander was trained on

and which describes the purpose and methodology of each of the SFSTs, was not

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Case No. 2022-L-105
admitted into evidence. Appellant offers no basis for us to conclude that Kronander’s

description was incorrect based on the testing standards for reliable field sobriety tests in

effect at the time the tests were administered. Although appellant cites several trial court

decisions suggesting the VGN is not an appropriate test to assess alcohol consumption,

each of those cases was decided more than twenty years ago. In State v. Wright, 11th

Dist. No. 2013-L-088, 2015-Ohio-2600, 38 N.E.3d 485, we concluded that where an

officer substantially complied with the procedures for performing the VGN outlined in the

NHTSA manual, the results of the VGN are admissible. Id. at ¶ 67.

       {¶51} More importantly, appellant did not challenge the admissibility of the VGN

test in a pre-trial motion to suppress. The proper method to challenge the admissibility of

the State’s evidence to prove an OVI charge, claiming the State did not procure evidence

according to applicable standards or regulations, is through a Crim.R. 12(C)(3) motion to

suppress evidence. State v. Beavers, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2019-A-0028, 2020-Ohio-

69, ¶ 15; City of Defiance v. Kretz, 60 Ohio St.3d 1, 5, 573 N.E.2d 32 (1991). As applied

to the HGN test, a defendant who “seeks to challenge whether the test was administered

in substantial compliance with NHTSA standards * * * has waived that challenge by not

filing a motion to suppress.” Beavers at ¶ 17; See State v. French, 72 Ohio St.3d 446,

450, 650 N.E.2d 887 (1995) (holding that a failure to challenge the admissibility of a

chemical test through a pretrial motion waives the requirement on the State to lay a

foundation for the admissibility of the test results at trial.) We see no reason why the same

standard should not similarly apply to the VGN portion of the SFSTs, resulting in

appellant’s waiver.

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Case No. 2022-L-105
       {¶52} At trial, Kronander testified as to how to administer the VGN test and stated

he administered all of the SFSTs based on his training in accordance with NHTSA

standards. He also said the VGN test is used as “more of just an observation than a clue,”

that the VGN does not factor into the administration of the HGN test, and that he did not

observe any nystagmus while performing the VGN. Therefore, assuming arguendo the

trial court erred in admitting testimony about the VGN, such error would be harmless.

       {¶53} Accordingly, appellant’s second assignment of error is without merit.

       {¶54} Appellant’s third assignment of error states:

       {¶55} “[3.] APPELLANT WAS CONVICTED UPON INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE

TO DETERMINE HE WAS UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL WHILE

OPERATING A MOTOR VEHICLE, AND THUS WAS NOT CARRYING A FIREARM

IMPROPERLY.”

       {¶56} “‘Sufficiency’ is a term of art meaning that legal standard which is applied to

determine whether the case may go to the jury or whether the evidence is legally sufficient

to support the jury’s verdict as a matter of law.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380,

386, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997), citing Black's Law Dictionary (6 Ed.1990) 1433. The

appellate court’s standard of review for sufficiency of evidence is to determine, after

viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, whether a rational trier

of fact could find the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus.

       {¶57} When evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not consider its

credibility or effect in inducing belief. Thompkins at 387. Rather, we decide whether, if

believed, the evidence can sustain the verdict as a matter of law. Id. This naturally entails

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Case No. 2022-L-105
a review of the elements of the charged offense and a review of the State’s evidence.

State v. Richardson, 150 Ohio St.3d 554, 2016-Ohio-8448, 84 N.E.3d 993, ¶ 13.

       {¶58} R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a) provides: “No person shall operate any vehicle,

streetcar, or trackless trolley within this state, if, at the time of the operation, any of the

following apply: (a) The person is under the influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse, or a

combination of them.”

       {¶59} R.C. 2923.16(D)(1) provides: “No person shall knowingly transport or have

a loaded handgun in a motor vehicle if, at the time of that transportation or possession,

any of the following applies: (1) The person is under the influence of alcohol, a drug of

abuse, or a combination of them.”

       {¶60} Here, a rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of each count

proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The elements of each offense were supported by the

testimony of multiple witnesses and those witnesses’ testimony was further bolstered by

the corroborating dash camera and body camera evidence which demonstrated

appellant’s state of impairment and that he transported a handgun in his vehicle while

impaired.

       {¶61} As described under our analysis of the first assignment of error, appellant’s

driving was erratic, and Smith believed he was intoxicated. Smith said he saw appellant

throwing glass bottles from the car after he crashed, and appellant admitted to consuming

alcohol. The HGN test revealed six out of six possible clues, which indicates a high

probability of intoxication. The evidence demonstrates appellant operated a motor vehicle

while under the influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse, or a combination of both. Further,

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Case No. 2022-L-105
the State presented evidence that appellant had a loaded, operable, firearm which he

transported in his vehicle while under the influence.

       {¶62} Accordingly, appellant’s third assignment of error is without merit.

       {¶63} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Lake County Court of

Common Pleas is affirmed.

MARY JANE TRAPP, J.,

EUGENE A. LUCCI, J.,

concur.

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Case No. 2022-L-105