Court Opinion

ID: 9710745
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:16:41.46181+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:59.576698
License: Public Domain

SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON PETITION FOR REHEARING MR. PRESIDING JUSTICE DEMPSEY delivered the opinion of the court. In a petition for rehearing the defendants assert that despite the language in section 11-13-15, chapter 24, Ill Rev Stats 1967, an owner of property in the same contiguous zoning district as the alleged zoning violation does not have a right to obtain injunctive relief without a showing of individual damage and that the plaintiff in this case neither alleged nor proved such damage. In interpreting the predecessor to this section (Ill Rev Stats 1955, c 24, § 73-9) this court has held that equitable principles applied and that to entitle one to injunctive relief he must establish, as against the defendant, an actual and substantial injury — not merely a technical, inconsequential wrong entitling him to nominal damages. In 222 East Chestnut St. Corp. v. LaSalle Nat. Bank, 15 Ill App2d 460, 146 NE2d 717 (1957), the property of the plaintiff was 184.5 feet from the property of the defendant, and it was there held that the location of the properties in the same contiguous zoning district was not sufficient to prove an actual and substantial injury. However, in the case of 222 East Chestnut St. Corp. v. Board of Appeals, 10 Ill2d 132, 139 NE2d 218 (1956) which involved the same two buildings, the court implied that in some instances the location of property could justify an inference of injury. The plaintiff brought an action in the Superior Court of Cook County seeking to reverse a decision of the Chicago Zoning Board of Appeals granting the defendant’s application for a zoning variation. The plaintiff alleged that the variation would substantially injure its property with regard to light, air, traffic congestion and real estate values. The trial court affirmed the board’s ruling and the plaintiff appealed. In affirming the trial court, the Supreme Court found that there was no evidence in the record that the plaintiff was injured. The court further noted that nothing in the physical situation of the two properties justified an inference that the plaintiff’s building would be damaged by the variation. The implication that in some situations an injury can be presumed is also found in another case where the same plaintiff complained about the granting of a building permit for a split-level parking garage 293 feet away from its property. The plaintiff claimed that the proposed structure would interfere with its light and air, congest traffic and reduce the value of its property. 222 East Chestnut St. Corp. v. Board of Appeals, 10 Ill2d 130, 139 NE2d 221 (1956). The reviewing court stated that "mere proximity without proof of actual damage is not sufficient” and held that there was neither evidence nor presumption to show that the garage would have an adverse effect on the plaintiff’s property.  In the present case the plaintiff’s complaint and motion for summary judgment alleged that her single-family residence was immediately adjacent to the defendants’ property; that the attached 3-story garage exceeded the limitation of the zoning ordinance by 9 feet, 6 inches, and that its construction would cause her irreparable injury. While it has been held that mere location in the same contiguous district is not sufficient to show actual damage, the facts of this case create a reasonable inference of injury. The addresses of the plaintiff and the defendants indicate that their properties either touch each other or that there is no extensive space between them. A garage 18 feet high attached to a tall apartment building would interfere with the light and air reaching the plaintiff’s residence although it would not violate the zoning ordinance. A 27 foot, 6 inch high attached garage would cause additional interference and, according to the Board of Zoning Appeals, would violate the ordinance. This additional interference would be actual injury and is sufficient to enable the plaintiff to maintain her action. The petition for rehearing is denied. Petition denied. SCHWARTZ and McNAMARA, JJ., concur.