Court Opinion

ID: 9391158
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-01 09:08:56.429209+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:39.756858
License: Public Domain

In the
        Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
         at Fort Worth
    ___________________________

         No. 02-22-00171-CR
    ___________________________

   DAYVONTE JACKSON, Appellant

                     V.

         THE STATE OF TEXAS

  On Appeal from the 371st District Court
         Tarrant County, Texas
       Trial Court No. 1597801D

   Before Bassel, Wallach, and Walker, JJ.
    Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion
                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Appellant Dayvonte Jackson appeals from the trial court’s revocation of his

deferred-adjudication community supervision, adjudication of his guilt, and sentence

of four years’ confinement. We agree with Appellant’s appointed counsel that his

appeal is meritless and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

      Pursuant to a plea bargain, Appellant pleaded guilty to possession of four

grams or more but less than 200 grams of a controlled substance (PCP) in exchange

for four years’ deferred adjudication.          See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann.

§ 481.115(d). The trial court followed the bargain and placed Appellant on deferred

adjudication for four years.

      During the years that followed, Appellant violated his community-supervision

conditions multiple times. As a result, the State filed various petitions to proceed to

adjudication but dismissed them after the trial court amended Appellant’s community-

supervision conditions (including adding a condition that required Appellant’s

participation in the court’s SWIFT 1 program). After Appellant was discharged from

SWIFT for program violations, the State filed another petition to proceed to

adjudication, alleging that Appellant had violated his community-supervision

      1
        SWIFT stands for “Supervision With Immediate enForcemenT.” According
to the “SWIFT Court Warning,” there are two reasons that probationers can be
selected for the program: “(1) You are new to probation[,] and you were assessed as
an individual who poses a high risk to reoffend[; or] (2) You have been on probation
for some time, you haven’t been following the conditions of supervision[,] and your
supervision officer thinks you are headed for probation revocation.”

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conditions by failing to report during January to March 2020 and February to May

2022 and by intentionally giving false or fictitious identifying information to a peace

officer. After a hearing at which Appellant pleaded “true” to the alleged violations,

the trial court found the allegations true, revoked Appellant’s community supervision,

adjudicated him guilty, and sentenced him to four years’ confinement with credit for

time served. See generally Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.33.

       Appellant’s court-appointed counsel has filed a motion to withdraw and a brief

in support. In the brief, counsel avers that, in his professional opinion, this appeal is

frivolous. Counsel’s brief and motion meet the requirements of Anders v. California,

386 U.S. 738, 744–45, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967), by presenting a professional

evaluation of the appellate record demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds

for relief. See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510–11 & n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

       In compliance with Kelly v. State, counsel (1) notified Appellant of counsel’s

motion to withdraw; (2) provided Appellant a copy of both the motion and the brief;

(3) informed him of his right to file a pro se response; (4) informed him of his pro se

right to seek discretionary review should this court hold the appeal frivolous; and

(5) took concrete measures to facilitate his review of the appellate record. See 436

S.W.3d 313, 319 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).                 This court afforded Appellant the

opportunity to file a response on his own behalf, but he did not do so. The State filed

a letter stating that it would not be filing a brief.

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      After an appellant’s court-appointed counsel files a motion to withdraw on the

ground that an appeal is frivolous and fulfills the requirements of Anders, this court is

obligated to undertake an independent examination of the record to see if there is any

arguable ground that may be raised on his behalf. See Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 511.

Only then may we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75,

82–83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988).

      We have carefully reviewed counsel’s brief and the appellate record. We agree

with counsel that this appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit; we find nothing in

the appellate record that arguably might support this appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178

S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see also Meza v. State, 206 S.W.3d 684, 685

n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and

affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                      Per Curiam

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: April 27, 2023

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