Court Opinion

ID: 9540234
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:13:56.138966+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:59:44.952430
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION
Mote, J.
I wish to render a dissent herein. It seems to me that the majority labors under a misapprehension concerning the burden of a plaintiff in an action when, by his complaint, he establishes the theory upon which he proceeds. As the majority opinion here states, the complaint was founded on an action ex contractu and not in tort, and thus, if the plaintiff (appellee) were entitled to recover it would necessitate proving the material allegations of his complaint by a preponderance of the evidence on the theory therein adopted. I take no stock in the proposition that one may bring an action ex contractu and recover in tort, particularly in light of the record before us herein. The law books are full of opinions and decisions on this question.
It is said that the lease between the parties is not in evidence. On whom does the responsibility rest for introducing and making a part of the record the lease between the parties?
We may admit that the plaintiff (appellee herein) did introduce evidence of damages to the building on which appellant’s sign rested, and without objection; however, at the close of plaintiff’s evidence the defendant (appellant) moved for finding and judgment and we think it was entitled to a finding in its behalf and a judgment accordingly, for the reason that the appellee had not sustained the burden of proof and the theory of its complaint. As we view the matter, a de*271fendant is not absolutely required to object to proffered testimony or evidence which is not designed to prove the material allegations of a complaint. As in the case before us, we conclude that appellee made a sufficient record by its motion for finding and judgment at the conclusion of appellee’s evidence, and that upon the overruling of said motion, it very properly could offer evidence to rebut appellee’s evidence on tort, thus establishing at least two theories of defense, either one of which would be sufficient.
■One of the more recent cases on this point is Michel v. Forde (1963), 135 Ind. App. 360, 191 N. E. 2d 507. The Supreme Court refused transfer thereof. A number of authorities were cited therein which hold, in effect:
“ ‘That a complaint must proceed on some definite theory, which must be adhered to throughout the trial and upon appeal, is so thoroughly settled that the citation of authorities is unnecessary.’ ”
And in Indianapolis Real Estate Board v. Willson et al. (1933), 98 Ind. App. 72, 187 N. E. 400, in reversing the trial court, it was said that:
“The evidence given by the appellees in the trial of the case should sustain the cause of action and verdict upon the theory of the complaint, . . .”
In Michel v. Forde, supra, there is a quotation from Louisville N. A. & C. Ry. Co. v. Renicker (1893), 8 Ind. App. 404, 35 N. E. 1047, which states:
“ ‘It is not sufficient to say that the evidence is sufficient to entitle the appellee to recover upon some theory; but the question is, does it entitle her to recover upon the theory of the issues? The evidence must establish the case made by the complaint, and, if there is no evidence to sustain the cause of action upon the theory of the complaint, the verdict is contrary to law. As said by the court in Bosseker v. Cramer, supra [18 Ind. 44] : “We think a verdict which is contrary to law is one which is contrary to the principles of law as applies to the facts which the jury were called upon to try, — contrary to the principles of law which should *272govern the cause. Robinson Machine Works v. Chandler [1877], 56 Ind. 575. In the case of Boardman v. Griffin [1875], 52 Ind. 101, the court said: “When the trial of a cause is by the court, instead of a jury, whether the court is required to find the facts specially or not, it cannot, any more than a jury, go outside of the case made by the pleadings. In such cases, as well as in others the parties must recover upon the allegations of the pleadings. They must recover secundum allegata et probata, or not at all. It must be so, in the nature of things, so long as our mode of administering justice prevails. It would be folly to require the plaintiff to- state his cause of action, and the defendant to disclose his grounds of defense, if, on the trial, either or both might abandon such grounds, and recover lipón others, which are substantially different from those alleged.” ’ See also: Discher et al. v. Klapp et al., etc. (1954), 124 Ind. App. 563, 117 N. E. 2d 753.”
I am also of the opinion, notwithstanding my conviction that the appeal should be reversed for the reasons set forth above, that there is a lack of competent, substantial, pertinent, relevant evidence in the record concerning damages.
Likewise, I think it ought to be presumed that if an owner of a building is to lease the roof for the installation of an outdoor sign thereon, there is an implication that the building and the roof are adaptable and sufficiently sound engineering-wise to withstand the load of the sign. But returning to the first and foremost reason for reversal of the judgment below, in light of what has been stated, we conclude that the trial court should have sustained the motion at the conclusion of the appellee’s evidence for finding and judgment, and also, that the verdict and judgment are contrary to law as not sustained by sufficient evidence upon the theory of the complaint.
Note. — Reported in 218 N. E. 2d 141.