Court Opinion

ID: 9929331
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-02 15:05:08.409441+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:06:48.259724
License: Public Domain

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                STATE OF FLORIDA
                  _____________________________

                       Case No. 5D23-3533
                     LT Case No. 2022-CF-986
                  _____________________________

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILIES,

    Petitioner,

    v.

DEBORAH KIRSHNER and STATE
OF FLORIDA,

    Respondents.
               _____________________________

Petition for Certiorari Review of Order
from the Circuit Court for Seminole County.
Donna Goerner, Judge.

Logan Bartholomew, Assistant Regional Counsel for Department
of Children and Families, Orlando, for Petitioner.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Douglas T.
Squire, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for
Respondent, State of Florida.

No Appearance for Other Respondent.

                        February 2, 2024

LAMBERT, J.
      The Department of Children and Families (“DCF”) petitions
this court for the issuance of a writ of certiorari. It requests that
the trial court’s order involuntarily committing Deborah Kirshner
to its care be quashed because there was no competent substantial
evidence that Kirshner met the criteria under section 916.13,
Florida Statutes (2023), for commitment. We grant the petition.

     In May 2022, Kirshner was charged by the State of Florida
with committing the crime of aggravated battery upon a person
sixty-five years of age or older, a first-degree felony. 1 Based upon
concerns that Kirshner may not have been competent to proceed to
trial, the lower court appointed an expert to evaluate Kirshner’s
competency. The evaluation took place on July 18, 2022; and the
expert issued her report on July 29, 2022, opining that Kirshner
was not competent to proceed but that she did not meet the criteria
for involuntary commitment.

     On December 14, 2022, the trial court entered an order
adjudging Kirshner incompetent to proceed. The court did not
involuntarily commit Kirshner to DCF for treatment; and, in fact,
it specifically acknowledged that Kirshner did not currently meet
the criteria for involuntary commitment. The trial court placed
Kirshner on conditional release and, among other things, ordered
Kirshner to “not be arrested for any new crimes while on
conditional release.”

     Kirshner failed to comply with this aspect of the order; she
was arrested on five different occasions while on conditional
release. In October 2023, the trial court held what it referred to as
a competency status hearing. The court found it unnecessary to
order any further competency evaluations; and, on November 15,
2023, it rendered the subject order involuntarily committing
Kirshner to DCF for care and treatment. The order found that
Kirshner remained incompetent to proceed due to mental illness
but that she now met the criteria for involuntary placement under
section 916.13(1). 2 It is from this order that DCF seeks certiorari

    1 See § 784.08(2)(a), Fla. Stat.

    2 Section 916.13(1) provides:

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(1) Every defendant who is charged with a felony and who
is adjudicated incompetent to proceed may be
involuntarily committed for treatment upon a finding by
the court of clear and convincing evidence that:

  (a) The defendant has a mental illness and because
  of the mental illness:

  1. The defendant is manifestly incapable of surviving
  alone or with the help of willing and responsible family
  or friends, including available alternative services,
  and, without treatment, the defendant is likely to
  suffer from neglect or refuse to care for herself or
  himself and such neglect or refusal poses a real and
  present threat of substantial harm to the defendant’s
  well-being; or

  2. There is a substantial likelihood that in the near
  future the defendant will inflict serious bodily harm
  on herself or himself or another person, as evidenced
  by recent behavior causing, attempting, or
  threatening such harm;

  (b) All available, less restrictive treatment
  alternatives, including treatment in community
  residential facilities, community inpatient or
  outpatient settings, and any other mental health
  services, treatment services, rehabilitative services,
  support services, and case management services as
  described in s. 394.67, which would offer an
  opportunity for improvement of the defendant’s
  condition have been judged to be inappropriate; and

  (c) There is a substantial probability that the mental
  illness causing the defendant’s incompetence will
  respond to treatment and the defendant will regain
  competency to proceed in the reasonably foreseeable
  future.

Before issuing a commitment order, the court shall
review the examining expert’s report to ensure

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relief.

     “As a general rule, certiorari is the proper vehicle for seeking
this court’s review of orders committing an individual
involuntarily.” Dep’t of Child. & Fams. v. Despaigne, 348 So. 3d
1221, 1222 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022) (quoting Dep’t of Child. & Fams.
v. Lotton, 172 So. 3d 983, 985 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015)). To obtain
certiorari relief, DCF’s burden here is to show that the trial court’s
November 15, 2023 nonfinal order is “(1) a departure from the
essential requirements of the law, (2) resulting in material injury
for the remainder of the case, (3) that cannot be corrected on
postjudgment appeal.” Williams v. Oken, 62 So. 3d 1129, 1132
(Fla. 2011) (quoting Reeves v. Fleetwood Homes of Fla., Inc., 889
So. 2d 812, 822 (Fla. 2004)). The latter two prongs are frequently
referred to as “irreparable harm,” and they are jurisdictional. Fla.
Dep’t of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v. Mahon, 293 So. 3d 1091, 1095
(Fla. 5th DCA 2020) (citing Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. v.
Prevratil, 120 So. 3d 573, 575 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013)).

     We have previously ruled that DCF establishes the requisite
irreparable harm or injury under these second and third prongs
when it has been ordered to accept a defendant for involuntary
commitment who does not meet the criteria. See Dep’t of Child. &
Fams. v. Campbell, 295 So. 3d 868, 870 (Fla. 5th DCA 2020) (“We
also conclude that DCF established the second and third prongs
for certiorari relief—the second because DCF suffers material
injury as it is responsible for expending its appropriated funds in
accordance with the laws governing the agency and the third
because DCF has no direct right of appeal.”). Accordingly, as DCF
has raised the same argument here that it did in Campbell, we find
that it has demonstrated the requisite irreparable harm for this
court to exercise jurisdiction.

     Turning to the first prong of our certiorari analysis, under
section 916.13(1) there must be clear and convincing evidence that
the criteria under this statute are met before a felony defendant
adjudicated incompetent to proceed due to mental illness may be

     alternative treatment options have been fully considered
     and found insufficient to meet the needs of the defendant.

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involuntarily committed to DCF for treatment. The only expert
report regarding Kirshner’s competency and qualifications, or lack
thereof, for involuntary commitment is dated approximately
sixteen months before the entry of the subject order. Simply
stated, a stale evaluation such as the one here does not constitute
competent substantial evidence of a defendant’s present level of
competency. See Washington v. State, 162 So. 3d 284, 289–90 (Fla.
4th DCA 2015) (holding that the evaluations of the defendant’s
competency that were six months to a year old were stale).

     Under these circumstances, with no competent substantial
evidence before the trial court of Kirshner’s current level of
competency or whether she presently met the criteria for
involuntary commitment, we hold that the trial court departed
from the essential requirements of law by ordering that Kirshner
be involuntarily committed to DCF. See Dep’t of Child. & Fams. v.
J.G., 373 So. 3d 957, 960 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023) (“On this record,
therefore, the circuit court lacked any competent evidence that
could justify its commitment of the [minor charged with felony-
level delinquent acts]. Its commitment thus departed from the
essential requirements of the law, and a writ of certiorari is
warranted.”); Despaigne, 348 So. 3d at 1223 (“Therefore,
Despaigne did not meet the criteria for involuntary commitment,
and the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law
by doing so.”). 3

    3  DCF also correctly points out that under the conditional
release statute, codified at section 916.17, Florida Statutes, certain
prerequisites must be met before a defendant who has failed to
comply with the terms of conditional release may be involuntarily
committed to its care. Pertinent here, a trial court, after the
appointment and report of experts, may return the defendant to
DCF if it finds that the person meets the statutory criteria for
involuntary commitment. § 916.17(2), Fla. Stat. This required
process was not followed, as Kirshner was involuntarily committed
following her violation of conditional release without the court
having the benefit of an expert’s report opining that she qualified
for commitment. See Lotton, 172 So. 3d at 987–88 (“Without
reports or testimony from experts who examined and evaluated the
defendant, no trial court can be in a position to make appropriate
findings [necessary for involuntary commitment], supported by

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    PETITION GRANTED; ORDER QUASHED; REMANDED for further
proceedings.

EDWARDS, C.J., and EISNAUGLE, J., concur.

                 _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
               _____________________________

clear and convincing evidence.”). We agree with DCF that the trial
court’s order cannot be affirmed under a “tipsy coachman” analysis
as the violation of the procedural requirements of section 916.17
here constituted a departure from the essential requirements of
law because it results in DCF having to expend funds to care for
and treat an individual who may not qualify for commitment.

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