Court Opinion

ID: 9532421
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:21:07.768924+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:45.674391
License: Public Domain

Clinton, J.,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. Section 42-365, R. R. S. 1943, provides that alimony orders shall terminate upon the death of either party or remarriage of the recipient, except as otherwise agreed by the parties in writing or by order of the court. The majority opinion holds that, in this case, the order directed “otherwise” in the case of remarriage by using the language, “and said provisions for alimony and property settlement are final and complete and not subject to revision or amendment.”
The language of the statute is the “alimony orders shall terminate.” This indicates to me that the statute is self-executing, and the obligation to pay ends by operation of law when the event occurs, in this instance, remarriage of the recipient. No action by the court is necessary for the termination to take place. An order of the court “otherwise” in an alimony decree should be specific and in clear terms negate the specific condition or conditions which do not operate to terminate the obligation. In this case the decree did not mention remarriage as an occurrence which would not operate to terminate the alimony obligation. It used the terms, “final and complete and not subject to revision or amendment.” (Emphasis supplied.) Further, the quoted language refers not only to alimony, but to property settlement as well. Section 42-365, R. R. S. 1943, obviously does not pertain to property settlements. Revision and modification are terms related to court action and clearly do not refer to “termination” by operation of law. It is not difficult to draw an unambiguous decree. How the language the court used in this case permits a summary judgment to be entered for *679the appellant is beyond my understanding. I would affirm the judgment of the District Court.