Court Opinion

ID: 9949203
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-09 06:25:51.195503+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:28:48.898622
License: Public Domain

Opinion filed March 7, 2024

                                               In The

            Eleventh Court of Appeals
                                           __________

                                    No. 11-22-00354-CR
                                        __________

                             JOE STARKS, JR., Appellant
                                                  V.
                         THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                    On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2
                                Taylor County, Texas
                          Trial Court Cause No. 2-462-21

                                           OPINION
        The legislature recently codified the offense of mail theft into Section 31.20
of the Penal Code, which addresses the rising rates of “porch piracy,”1 the scourge

        1
         See Porch Pirate, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, https://www.oed.com/search/dictionary/?q=p
orchpirate (last visited March 6, 2024) (“A person who steals parcels that have been delivered and left
unattended outside the intended recipient’s home, business, etc.”); see also Drew McKay, The Porch Pirate
Problem, 59 HOUSTON L. REV. 455 (2021) (discussing the enactment of Section 31.20).
of e-commerce vendors and patrons everywhere. 2 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 31.20 (West Supp. 2023). Appellant, Joe Starks, Jr., 3 was charged by information
for the offense of mail theft by appropriating “mail” from fewer than ten addresses,
a Class A misdemeanor. Id. § 31.20(c)(1). Appellant waived his right to a jury trial
and pleaded not guilty to the charged offense. After a bench trial, the trial court
convicted Appellant of the offense and sentenced him to confinement for 365 days
in the Taylor County Detention Center.
       In a single issue, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
support his conviction on the ground that the evidence is insufficient to establish that
he stole another person’s mail or packages as delivered by a common carrier or
delivery service. He contends that the language and intent of Section 31.20 does not
criminalize the theft of mail or other packages that are delivered by the United States
Postal Service (USPS), which he alleges is not a common carrier or delivery service
under the statute. We affirm.
                                     I. Factual Background
       Ricky Holguin, a USPS mail carrier, delivered a package and two envelopes
to the home of Latisha Martinez. In doing so, Holguin placed these items on the step
of Martinez’s residence and rang the doorbell. Shortly thereafter, Holguin observed
Appellant take those same envelopes and the package from the front porch of
Martinez’s residence and take them into his residence. Holguin could see Appellant
through the glass screen door of Appellant’s residence, and he saw Appellant begin
opening the items. Holguin then called 9-1-1.

       2
        Section 31.20 became effective on September 1, 2019.

       3
         In a separate appeal, we recently affirmed Appellant’s conviction and sentence for the second-
degree felony offense of possession of methamphetamine. See Starks v. State, No. 11-22-00236-CR, 2024
WL 479370 (Tex. App.—Eastland Feb. 8, 2024, no pet. h.).

                                                  2
      Officer Jay Shafer Young of the Abilene Police Department was dispatched
to Appellant’s residence to investigate this incident. When she arrived, the front
door to Appellant’s residence was open and Officer Young was able to see the stolen
packages inside Appellant’s residence through the glass screen door. Martinez
testified that she did not give Appellant permission to take her delivered envelopes
and packages, and she authenticated security footage that showed Appellant taking
them from her front porch.
      Appellant testified and denied that he committed the offense, that he was the
person shown on the security footage, and that he was the person who was arrested
for this offense. In that regard, Appellant further testified that he did not remember
the day that the theft was alleged to have occurred and that neither the security
footage nor the testimony presented at trial refreshed his recollection.
                              II. Standards of Review
      We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence under the standard
of review set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Brooks v. State, 323
S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Polk v. State, 337 S.W.3d 286, 288–89
(Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. ref’d). Under the Jackson standard, we review all
of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the charged offense
beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Garcia v. State, 667 S.W.3d
756, 761 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023); Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2010).
      Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict requires that
we consider all of the evidence admitted at trial, including improperly admitted
evidence. Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Clayton v.
State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). As such, we defer to the

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factfinder’s credibility and weight determinations because the factfinder is the sole
judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight their testimony is to be
afforded. Winfrey, 393 S.W.3d at 768; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899; Clayton, 235
S.W.3d at 778. This deference accounts for the factfinder’s duty to resolve conflicts
in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from
basic facts to ultimate facts. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Garia, 667 S.W.3d at
762; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. We may not reevaluate the weight and credibility
of the evidence to substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. Dewberry v.
State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Therefore, if the record supports
conflicting inferences, we presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor
of the verdict, and we defer to that determination. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Garcia,
667 S.W.3d at 762; Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525–26 (Tex. Crim. App.
2012); Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778.
      Because the standard of review is the same, we treat direct and circumstantial
evidence equally. Isassi, 330 S.W.3d at 638; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778; Hooper v.
State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Ruiz v. State, 631 S.W.3d 841, 851
(Tex. App.—Eastland 2021, pet. ref’d). It is not necessary that the evidence directly
prove the defendant’s guilt. Rather, circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct
evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor and can, without more, be sufficient to
establish his guilt. Carrizales v. State, 414 S.W.3d 737, 742 (Tex. Crim. App.
2013) (citing Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13). A guilty verdict does not require that
every fact must directly and independently prove a defendant’s guilt. Hooper, 214
S.W.3d at 13. Instead, the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances
is sufficient to support the conviction. Id. Therefore, in evaluating the sufficiency
of the evidence, we must consider the cumulative force of all the evidence. Villa v.

                                          4
State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d
446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).
      When, as here, the sufficiency of the evidence turns on the meaning of a
statute, we review the statutory-construction question de novo. Delarosa v. State,
677 S.W.3d 668, 674 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023). When we construe a statute, we must
“seek to effectuate the ‘collective’ intent or purpose of the legislators who enacted
the legislation.” Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). We
first examine the literal text of the statute. McMillian v. State, 388 S.W.3d 866, 871
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.). “[W]e read words and phrases in
context and construe them according to the rules of grammar and usage.” Harris v.
State, 359 S.W.3d 625, 629 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (quoting Lopez v. State, 253
S.W.3d 680, 685 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)). “We must ‘presume that every word in
a statute has been used for a purpose and that each word, phrase, clause, and sentence
should be given effect if reasonably possible.’” Id. (quoting State v. Hardy, 963
S.W.2d 516, 520 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). “Only if the statutory language is
ambiguous, or leads to absurd results that the Legislature could not have possibly
intended, may we consult extra-textual sources.” Id. (citing Boykin, 818 S.W.2d at
785). Further, “[i]f the language of the statute is plain, we follow that language
unless it leads to absurd results that the legislature could not have possibly intended.”
Sims v. State, 569 S.W.3d 634, 640 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). A statute is ambiguous
in those situations where reasonable, well-informed persons might understand the
statute to have two or more different meanings. Cortez v. State, 469 S.W.3d 593,
598 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).
                                     III. Analysis
      Appellant contends that (1) Section 31.20 only criminalizes the theft of mail
and other items that are delivered by a common carrier or delivery service, and

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(2) the USPS is not a common carrier or delivery service within the meaning of the
statute. He asserts, therefore, that the theft of “mail” as defined in the statute
excludes any theft of “mail” that the USPS delivers.
      The State responds that the USPS is a delivery service. It also points out that,
under federal law, a mailbox may only contain United States mail on which postage
has been paid. As such, because the statute criminalizes theft of mail “from another
person’s mailbox,” it necessarily criminalizes the theft of United States mail. See
18 U.S.C.A. § 1725.
      Under Section 31.20, “[a] person commits an offense if the person
intentionally appropriates mail from another person’s mailbox or premises without
the effective consent of the addressee and with the intent to deprive that addressee
of the mail.” PENAL § 31.20(b) (emphasis added). “Mail” is defined as “a letter,
postal card, package, bag, or other sealed article that: (A) is delivered by a common
carrier or delivery service and not yet received by the addressee; or (B) has been left
to be collected for delivery by a common carrier or delivery service.”              Id.
§ 31.20(a)(3) (emphasis added). Here, the information charged Appellant with
intentionally appropriating packages and envelope bags from Martinez’s premises
without her consent.
      A. The Meaning of Section 31.20
      We first construe the statute based on the plain meaning of the words used.
Section 31.20 does not define the term “delivery service.” Therefore, we must “turn
to the common, ordinary meaning of that [term].” Hines v. State, 535 S.W.3d 102,
110 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2017, pet. ref’d) (quoting Williams v. State, 270 S.W.3d
140, 146 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (consulting dictionary definitions for the term
“conceal” in the absence of a statutory definition)).

                                          6
      Merriam-Webster defines “delivery” as “the act or manner of delivering
something.” Delivery, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed.
2003). It defines “deliver” as “to take and hand over to or leave for another.”
Deliver, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003). The term
“service” is defined in many ways—“the work performed by one that serves,”
“useful labor that does not produce a tangible commodity,” such as professional
services, or “a facility suppling some public demand.”              Service, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003). This last example best
describes the United States Postal Service—the “facility supplying some public
demand.” The term “service” is also included in its title. Moreover, the public
demand being supplied by the USPS is the delivery of mail and other items. See 39
U.S.C.A. § 404(a)(1) (Providing that the USPS is empowered to “provide for the
collection, handling, transportation, delivery, forwarding, returning, and holding of
mail, and for the disposition of undeliverable mail.”).
      We also note that restrictions exist for the use of mailboxes. Section 31.20(b)
makes it an offense for a person to appropriate “mail” from another person’s
mailbox. Additionally, federal law provides that only mailable matter—United
States mail—may be placed in a mailbox:
      Whoever knowingly and willfully deposits any mailable matter such as
      statements of accounts, circulars, sale bills, or other like matter, on
      which no postage has been paid, in any letter box established, approved,
      or accepted by the Postal Service for the receipt or delivery of mail
      matter on any mail route with intent to avoid payment of lawful postage
      thereon, shall for each such offense be fined under this title.
See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1725. The USPS Domestic Mail Manual, which is posted on its
website,   provides    further   guidance       that   reaffirms   the   exclusivity   of
mailboxes and United States mail: “[E]very letterbox or other receptacle
intended or used for the receipt or delivery of mail . . . is designated an

                                            7
authorized depository for mail within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. . . . 1725,” and
“the receptacles . . . may be used only for matter bearing postage.”             UNITED
STATES POSTAL SERV., MAILING STANDARDS, DOMESTIC MAIL MANUAL 508.3.1.1,
508.3.1.3 (2024), https://pe.usps.com/cpim/ftp/manuals/dmm300/full/mailingStand
ards.pdf (last visited March 6, 2024).
      Considering the foregoing principles and our construction of the text and
intent of Section 31.20, we conclude that (1) the USPS is a “delivery service” under
Section 31.20, (2) the term “mail” as it is defined and used in Section 31.20
encompasses mail and other items that are delivered to an addressee by the USPS,
and (3) Section 31.20 criminalizes the intentional appropriation of mail and other
items delivered by the USPS and which are confiscated by a person from another
person’s premises or mailbox—mailboxes that contain letters, cards, packages,
bags, or other sealed articles that bear postage, that is, United States mail.
      Appellant attempts to focus on the definition of “common carrier” as it is used
in the statute, and its distinction from the USPS. But Appellant does not explain
why the USPS is not a delivery service; he simply asserts that it is not. Irrespective
of this argument, Appellant misinterprets the intent of Section 31.20. As we have
explained, nothing in the text of Section 31.20 reasonably excludes the USPS from
its scope—it is undoubtedly a delivery service within the common, ordinary meaning
of that phrase.
      We have reviewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s
verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at
319; Garcia, 667 S.W.3d at 761; Isassi, 330 S.W.3d at 638. Because Section 31.20
criminalizes the theft of United States mail as it is defined in Section 31.20 and
because Appellant does not dispute on appeal that he stole United States mail in this

                                           8
instance from Martinez’s premises, we conclude that the record contains sufficient
evidence from which a rational trier of fact could have concluded beyond a
reasonable doubt that Appellant committed mail theft under Section 31.20 as
charged in the information. Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s sole issue.
                               IV. This Court’s Ruling
      We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                              W. STACY TROTTER
                                              JUSTICE

March 7, 2024
Publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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