Court Opinion

ID: 9633728
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:58:13.677293+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:40.851340
License: Public Domain

BROUSSARD,J.
—I dissent for the reasons stated by Justice Mosk in part II of his dissenting opinion.
I must also dissent for an additional reason. It is manifestly unfair for the majority to change the rules after the votes are in. In People v. Smith (1983) 34 Cal.3d 251 [193 Cal.Rptr. 692, 667 P.2d 149], we established that multifaceted criminal law reform initiatives would be applied only to crimes committed on or after the effective date of the initiative. There is no ambiguity, uncertainty or confusion as to the application of the Smith rule to Proposition 115.
*314Our Smith decision in effect told the proponents and the opponents of Proposition 115 that its provisions would apply prospectively and would not apply to crimes committed prior to its effective date. More importantly, we in effect told the voters that they need not consider whether some provisions might be applied to pending matters and, if so, the fairness of such application.
We break faith with the voters when we repudiate the Smith rule and apply new rules after the voters have adopted the initiative.
We must presume that the voters fully understood that the provisions of Proposition 115 would not apply to crimes committed before its effective date. Certainly the drafters so understood. That understanding is repudiated by today’s decision.
Many people object to changing rules in the midst of the game. But all should object to changing the rules after the game is over—after the votes are in.