Court Opinion

ID: 9560137
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:43:41.978814+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:12.101182
License: Public Domain

McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I do not disagree with my colleagues in their assessment that each of the warrants authorizing a search of defendant West’s van was based on a weak showing of probable cause. However, the notion that the second affidavit, the December 2, 2002 affidavit of Detective Sam Steger, is so deficient as to be labeled “bare bones,” rendering the Leon good faith exception inapplicable, is a conclusion that can be reached only by ignoring controlling Sixth Circuit precedent. For this reason, I respectfully dissent. In my opinion, the Steger affidavit, whether supported by a sufficient showing of probable cause or not, is not “bare bones.” Therefore, the Leon good faith exception should be deemed applicable and the district court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress the seized ammunition should be upheld.
I
The majority labels the Steger affidavit “bare bones” without explaining why. The sufficiency of an affidavit is assessed in a practical, common-sense, rather than hypertechnical, manner. United States v. Greene, 250 F.3d 471, 479 (6th Cir.2001). The sufficiency of an affidavit, like the determination of an officer’s good faith reliance on it, is an assessment confined to the four corners of the affidavit. United States v. Hython, 443 F.3d 480, 487 (6th Cir.2006); United States v. Laughton, 409 F.3d 744, 752 (6th Cir.2005). A “bare bones” affidavit, an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable, United States v. Washington, 380 F.3d 236, 241 (6th Cir.2004), is one “that states suspicions, beliefs, or conclusions, without providing some underlying factual circumstances regarding veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge.” United States v. Weaver, 99 F.3d 1372, 1378 (6th Cir.1996).
Detective Steger’s affidavit is based primarily on the statement he took from James Towery. The affidavit is admittedly short on indicia of Towery’s veracity, but it did not ask the reviewing judge to *613issue a warrant based on a mere guess or suspicion that incriminating evidence would be found in West’s van. The Steger affidavit is based on a damning confession purportedly made in a state of visible distress (“very upset and crying”) by the suspect West himself. West’s confession represents an admission against interest by the former boyfriend of missing person Sonya Bradley, the last person known to have seen her before she disappeared weeks earlier. The confession was made to and reported by a named informant (not an anonymous informant), on a stated date and at an identified place. The confession included sufficient detail to enable officers to find and search the general location where West said he transported and disposed of Bradley’s body. Further, the affidavit identified the vehicle owned by West in which he could be expected to have transported the body, establishing the nexus between evidence of the suspected crime and the vehicle to be searched. In other words, the affidavit attests to the “basis of knowledge” (i.e., a statement to the affiant by the recipient of the suspect’s confession); and “reliability” (i.e., a suspect’s admission against interest in a state of visible distress). In my opinion, this affidavit, viewed not in a hypertechnieal manner, but in a practical, common-sense manner, is not so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render it “bare bones.”
II
What the majority finds problematic is not what is in the Steger affidavit, but what is not. The majority is troubled by Steger’s failure to apprise the reviewing judge of two circumstances arguably bearing on Tower/s veracity: (1) that Towery was a federal inmate awaiting sentencing who may have been motivated by self-interest to cooperate with police; and (2) that attempts to corroborate Towery’s statement about West’s admission had been fruitless. Steger’s failure to include this information is said to evidence a “reckless disregard for the truth.”
These omissions, being beyond “the four corners of the affidavit,” are generally irrelevant to our assessments of probable cause and good faith. “Whether an objectively reasonable officer would have recognized that an affidavit was so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to preclude good faith reliance on the warrant’s issuance can be measured only by what is in the affidavit.” Laughton, 409 F.3d at 751-52. The Laughton court explained:
“[T]he relevant question is whether the officer reasonably believed that the warrant was properly issued, not whether probable cause existed in fact.” ... To hold otherwise would clearly perch a reviewing court at the edge of the proverbial slippery slope, with courts forced to determine not only how much affiants knew, but also when and from whom they learned it. It would also lead to the very kind of subjectivity that the Supreme Court has repeatedly and explicitly rejected. Given both Supreme Court precedent and our own, we hold that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not permit consideration of information known to a police officer, but not included in the affidavit, in determining whether an objectively reasonable officer would have relied on the warrant.
Id. at 752 (citation omitted). “This bright line rule is in harmony with the objective nature of the good-faith test and prevents reviewing courts from delving into an analysis of the subjective knowledge of affiants.” Hython, 443 F.3d at 487. Hence, the majority’s reliance on information not included in the affidavit to assess the objective reasonableness of Steger’s reliance *614on the search warrant issued by Judge Royce Buck is contrary to controlling Sixth Circuit authority.
Ill
Moreover, the conclusions drawn from the omissions by the majority appear to be unjustified. None of the omitted facts indicates that Towery’s statement or West’s confession was in any respect untrue. The record shows that Detective Steve Bryan (1) had the impression that Mary Moody had not overheard the conversation between West and Towery in her driveway, and (2) could not recall whether Moody was able to confirm that West talked to Towery. The record, however, does not suggest that the conversation did not take place. Similarly, the officers’ inability to find Sonya Bradley’s body in the area where West purportedly said he placed it weeks earlier does not negate the probability that he transported the body to that or another location in his Chevy van.
Yes, the omitted information might have been useful to the reviewing judge in assessing veracity and reliability, but Steger was not obliged to include everything he knew in the affidavit. For instance, Steger knew that West had admitted seeing Bradley on the day she allegedly disappeared but had denied any knowledge of her whereabouts. Even though this statement by West contradicted Towery’s statement, arguably bearing on Towery’s veracity, no court would hold that an affiant is obliged to include a suspect’s denial in his affidavit. This underscores the reason why probable-cause and good-faith determinations are based on what is included in, not what is left out of, the affidavit.
Indeed, in the very case cited by the majority, United States v. Atkin, 107 F.3d 1213 (6th Cir.1997), the Sixth Circuit recognized “that an affidavit which omits potentially exculpatory information is less likely to present a question of impermissible official conduct than one which affirmatively includes false information.” Id. at 1217 (emphasis added). This is so, the court explained, because an allegation of omission ‘“potentially opens officers to endless conjecture about investigative leads, fragments of information that might, if included, have redounded to defendant’s benefit.” Id. (quoting United States v. Martin, 920 F.2d 393, 398 (6th Cir.1990)). See also United States v. Graham, 275 F.3d 490, 505 (6th Cir.2001). The court’s obligation, per Atkin, to consider the omitted information in evaluating the sufficiency of the affidavit, is triggered only if the defendant has made a preliminary showing “that the government engaged in ‘deliberate falsehood’ or ‘reckless disregard for the truth’ in omitting information from the affidavit.” Atkin, 107 F.3d at 1217.
For instance, if Mary Moody had told Steger that she was with West during his entire visit and never heard West tell Towery or anyone else that he accidentally killed Bradley, and that she overheard Towery planning the fabrication of the story in order to win favor with law enforcement officials, then Steger would have had knowledge of facts demonstrating the falsity of information included in his affidavit. Under those circumstances, the inclusion of Towery’s statement in the affidavit without inclusion of Moody’s statement would suggest a deliberate attempt to mislead or reckless disregard of the truth. If such a showing were made, then the sufficiency of the affidavit would have to be evaluated with consideration of the omitted material.
Here, however, we find no false or misleading statement in the Steger affidavit. The record gives us no reason to believe other than that the affidavit accurately recounts the statement Steger received from Towery. Further, consideration of the contents of West’s reported confession *615to Towery and the circumstances under which it was made support a finding of reliability. The fact that Steger’s efforts to corroborate Towery’s statement proved fruitless does not mean the statement was false; only that it remained uncorroborated.
Further, Steger’s efforts to corroborate Towery’s statement evidence the good-faith thoroughness of his investigation before seeking a warrant to search the van. When his efforts to corroborate came up empty, Steger reasonably took what information he had and presented it to the assistant county prosecutor for preparation of the warrant application. This consultation with the local prosecutor evidences objective good faith. Laughton, 409 F.3d at 753 (J. Gilman dissenting) (citing Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 989, 104 S.Ct. 3424, 82 L.Ed.2d 737 (1984); United States v. Bynum, 293 F.3d 192, 198 (4th Cir.2002)). The prosecutor did not reject the information as patently insufficient. Rather, he helped prepare the application for presentation to Judge Royce Buck. Judge Buck read the affidavit and did not reject it as insufficient, but issued the warrant.1
As to why we should hold Detective Steger to have seen, in objectively reasonable good faith, what Judge Buck and the prosecutor did not, i.e., that the affidavit apparently did not include sufficient indicia of probable cause, the majority relies on Steger’s subjective knowledge. This is precisely the sort of inquiry we are not allowed to make, per Laughton and Hython. The good faith test is an objective one. Again, “[w]hether an objectively reasonable officer would have recognized that an affidavit was so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to preclude good faith reliance on the warrant’s issuance can be measured only by what is in the affidavit.” Laughton, 409 F.3d 744, 751-52. By going outside the four corners of the affidavit to disqualify the seized ammunition from the protection of the Leon good faith exception, the majority has, in my opinion, gone outside our well-established precedent.
IV
Considering the totality of the circumstances evident from the affidavit, and mindful of our duty to afford deference to the issuing judge’s determination unless made arbitrarily, I continue to believe that the Steger affidavit was not so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render reb-anee on it objectively unreasonable. In relying on the search warrant issued upon his own affidavit, which contains no falsity or misleading statement or inherent defect, and had been prepared by the assistant prosecutor, Steger should be deemed to have acted in objective good faith. The Leon good faith exception should therefore be deemed applicable to protect the seized ammunition from exclusion even if probable cause were actually lacking. Accordingly, I would affirm the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress.

. In the evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress, Judge Buck confirmed that he believed the affidavit was sufficient to establish probable cause and that his assessment would not have changed had he been advised that Towery was in federal custody when he gave the statement to Steger.