Court Opinion

ID: 9737115
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:16:24.904892+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:23:56.611087
License: Public Domain

MASON, Justice.
I dissent.
The parties make opposite contentions that the phrase, “legal and ethical performance of his profession” is and is not so vague that due process of law is violated.
In People v. Nunn, 46 Cal.2d 460, 296 P.2d 813, 817-818, certiorari denied and appeal dismissed, 352 U.S. 883, 77 S.Ct. 126, 1 L.Ed.2d 82, the defendant, a physician, was convicted of prescribing narcotics for a person not under his treatment for a pathology and prescribing a narcotic for a person who represented himself to be an *304addict. The statute prohibited prescribing narcotics to or for a person not under treatment for a pathology or condition other than a narcotic condition — “except in the regular practice of his profession.”
On appeal defendant contended: “That section 11163 of the Health and Safety Code is unconstitutional because the term ‘except in the regular practice of his profession’ is too vague, indefinite and uncertain to give notice of what constitutes the act sought to be prohibited.”
In holding the contention to be without merit the court said, “ * * * To comply with the constitutional requirement of due process of law, the crime for which defendant is being prosecuted must be clearly defined, but it is only necessary that the words used in the statute be well enough known to enable those within its purview to understand and correctly apply them. * * * ”
“ * * *
“ * * * Thus the ‘regular practice of his profession’ is a term clearly to be understood from the statutes, and it is well enough known to enable a person practicing as a physician and surgeon to understand and apply it. * * * ” (Emphasis added)
In McKenzie v. State, Tex.Cr., 383 S.W.2d 177, 180, the court upheld a statute proscribing delivery of dangerous drugs by a practitioner except “in the course of his practice.” Defendant insisted the section was so indefinite as to render the statute. void and wholly inoperative because it did not define the phrase “in the course of his practice.”
Relying on the earlier Texas case of King v. State, 166 Tex.Cr.R. 231, 312 S.W.2d 501, the court held the statute was not subject to the objection of indefiniteness as urged by defendant.
In Marks v. Frantz, 179 Kan. 638, 298 P.2d 316, 322, a statute proscribing practice of optometry “in any unethical manner” was upheld as against the contention that the statute was unconstitutional on the ground that it failed to fix any standard or define with any clarity and exactness the term “unethical manner.”
Looking at section 155.30, everyone is prohibited from selling prescription drugs but the general proscription is later made inapplicable to certain professional people, one of whom is a pharmacist. They are exempted from proscription only for sale of prescription drugs when such sale is necessary in the ethical and legal performance of their profession, they should be held accountable for knowledge of the ethics of their own profession. As to what he may legally do in the performance of his profession may not be completely known to him, but by virtue of Code section 155.20’s long standing he knew or should have known he is not to sell prescription drugs to persons not bearing a prescription.
“A statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and is animated by one general purpose and intent. Consequently, each part or section should be construed in connection with every other part, or section so as to produce a harmonious whole. Thus it is not proper to confine interpretation to the one section to be construed.” Sutherland, Third Ed., (by Horack), Statutory Construction, section 4703. See also 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 580 and Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391-392, 46 S.Ct. 126, 127, 70 L.Ed. 322.
I would affirm.
GARFIELD, C. J., and RAWLINGS, J., join in this dissent.