Court Opinion

ID: 9647446
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:36:49.32883+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:42.804350
License: Public Domain

*199KELLY, Judge,
concurring:
I join in the majority’s opinion except with respect to its disposition of appellant’s allegation that the prosecution exercised its peremptory challenges to discriminate on the basis of race contrary to the mandate of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). As to the disposition of that issue, I concur in the result.
Upon careful review of the limited record presented for review, I have concerns regarding the manner in which the Batson claim was treated in the trial court. No determination was made by the trial court as to whether appellant had presented a prima facie case so as to require a response by the Commonwealth to the allegation of discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. Rather, the prosecution offered its response without waiting for such a determination. (N.T. 6/17/86 at 3).
Following the prosecution’s statement of its purported reasons for its peremptory challenges, the following exchange occurred:
MR. KANE: Your Honor, again, there [are] 26 people that we are actually looking at and eight of them are black. Five are gone now and it is a greater percentage of what is shown in the whole jury panel and I think that the ultimate reason is, was because they are black and everybody can make faces at me and that doesn’t mean I will necessarily get rid of them.
MR. CARMODY: She was also discussing the case with the juror who knows the Defendant.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. KANE: I don’t know how you would know that.
MR. CARMODY: Not discussing the case but openly talking with her and fratenizing [sic] with that juror.
MR. KANE: There are a lot of people talking and I think that we can say that right now and I think the ultimate issue is we are entitled to a jury of our peers and I don’t care if the witnesses are black or green.
*200THE COURT: That is not what the case you cited says and it just says that once you are from an identifiable minority group and the state removes members of that group, they better have a good reason for it. And there is nothing in what Mr. Carmody said that would indicate anything other than trial tactics on his part as the reason for the removal of the blacks. So your motion is denied.
(N.T. 6/17/86 at 6-7). (Emphasis added). What is disturbing about this excerpt is that the trial court appears to have simply accepted the statements of the prosecutor at face value without making an independent assessment of whether the proffered reasons were legitimate and genuine rather than merely pretextual. I am of the opinion that the trial court must make a specific decision upon this issue. Accord State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18, 22 (Fla.1988) (“a judge cannot merely accept the reasons proffered at face value, but must evaluate those reason as he or she would weigh any disputed fact. In order to permit the questioned challenge, the trial judge must conclude that the proffered reasons are, first, neutral and reasonable, and second, not a pretext”); Wiltz v. State, 749 S.W.2d 519, 520 (Tex.App. 1988) (rejecting prosecution’s claim that proffered reasons must be accepted at face value), following remand 746 S.W.2d 303 (Tex.App.1988).
Nonetheless, I agree that the record presented on appeal is wholly inadequate to provide meaningful appellate review of appellant’s claims of pretext. Consequently, I agree with the majority that appellant’s claim must fail. Even after Batson, discriminatory animus must be proven rather than merely asserted or assumed. Appellant has failed to preserve an adequate record from which we could conclude he has proven discrimination in this case. Hence, I concur in the disposition of this issue despite the aforementioned concerns.