Court Opinion

ID: 9931312
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-08 19:02:05.871465+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:17:14.322257
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-11027     Document: 39-1      Date Filed: 02/08/2024   Page: 1 of 20

                                                     [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                     In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                          For the Eleventh Circuit

                            ____________________

                                  No. 23-11027
                            Non-Argument Calendar
                            ____________________

        JOSE J. AYALA, JR.,
        JEFF SANTOS,
        on behalf of themselves and as representatives
        of other class members similarly situated,
                                                      Plaintiﬀs-Appellants,
        versus
        NISSAN NORTH AMERICA, INC.,
        a California corporation, and wholly owned
        subsidiary of Nissan Motor Company of Japan,
        d.b.a. Nissan USA,

                                                      Defendant-Appellee.
USCA11 Case: 23-11027        Document: 39-1        Date Filed: 02/08/2024       Page: 2 of 20

        2                        Opinion of the Court                     23-11027

                               ____________________

                    Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Middle District of Florida
                     D.C. Docket No. 6:20-cv-01625-RBD-RMN
                              ____________________

        Before WILSON, LUCK, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Jose Ayala and Jeff Santos (“Technicians”) appeal the district
        court’s denial of their motions for class certification and FLSA col-
        lective action and its grant of the Nissan North America’s (“Nis-
        san”) motion for summary judgment in this Fair Labor Standards
        Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201, case. On appeal, the Technicians
        argue that the district court erred in granting summary judgment
        because it failed to consider all admissible record evidence that
        they presented. They also argue that the court erred in denying
        their motions for collective action 1 and class certification.
               We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, apply-
        ing the same legal standards as the district court. Alvarez v. Royal
        Atl. Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1263 (11th Cir. 2010). Summary
        judgment is proper if the evidence shows “that there is no genuine
        dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judg-
        ment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A factual dispute is

        1 The FLSA authorizes collective actions against employers accused of violat-
        ing the FLSA. 29 U.S.C.A. § 216(b).
USCA11 Case: 23-11027       Document: 39-1      Date Filed: 02/08/2024      Page: 3 of 20

        23-11027                Opinion of the Court                          3

        genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return
        a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
        477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evi-
        dence in support of the plaintiff’s position will be insufficient; there
        must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the
        plaintiff.” Id. at 252. We review a district court’s § 216(b) certifica-
        tion for abuse of discretion. Morgan v. Fam. Dollar Stores, Inc., 551
        F.3d 1233, 1260 (11th Cir. 2008). We review the denial of class cer-
        tification under Rule 23 for abuse of discretion, reviewing factual
        determinations for clear error and legal determinations de novo.
        Cherry v. Dometic Corp., 986 F.3d 1296, 1300 (11th Cir. 2021).
               We write only for the parties who are already familiar with
        the facts. Accordingly, we include only such facts as are necessary
        to understand our opinion. Briefly, the Technicians filed suit
        against Nissan, alleging violations of the FLSA and the Florida Min-
        imum Wage Act (“FMWA”), Fla. Stat. § 448.110, for failure to pay
        wages as required by law. They also sought treatment as a collec-
        tive action pursuant to the FLSA and as a Class Action pursuant to
        Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.
               Technicians were automotive service employees working at
        Florida Nissan dealerships, where they allege they performed vehi-
        cle repair and maintenance on behalf of Nissan but allegedly were
        not compensated as required by law. Specifically, they point to
        Nissan’s Assurance Products Resource Manual (“APRM”) and
        Dealership Agreements which determine how much Nissan will
        pay dealerships for warranty work conducted by technicians,
USCA11 Case: 23-11027       Document: 39-1      Date Filed: 02/08/2024      Page: 4 of 20

        4                       Opinion of the Court                  23-11027

        regardless of how long the work takes. Pursuant to the APRM and
        the Dealership Agreements, Nissan agrees with each dealership to
        reimburse the dealership according to the “flat-rate” system. Un-
        der those contractual arrangements, Nissan and each dealership
        agree upon an “approved labor rate” (negotiated with each dealer-
        ship). Nissan determines how long each specific repair service usu-
        ally takes, the “flat-rate time.” Nissan agrees with each dealership
        to reimburse the dealership for warranty work by multiplying the
        “flat-rate time” by the “approved labor rate.” The Technicians ar-
        gue that—when the warranty work takes longer than the “flat-rate
        time” determined by Nissan, thus limiting Nissan’s reimbursement
        to the dealership—the result is that they are underpaid by the deal-
        ership. The Technicians argue that Nissan is a joint employer,
        along with each technicians’ dealership, and thus are also liable for
        violations of the FLSA.
                Nissan argues, and the district court agreed, that it is not the
        joint employer along with the respective dealerships, and thus it
        has no liability for any FLSA violations that might have resulted
        from the dealerships’ independent decisions with respect to wage
        payments to their employees, the Technicians. We address first
        this dispositive issue with respect to the Technicians’ challenge to
        the district court’s summary judgment ruling, and then their chal-
        lenge to the district court’s denial of their motions for collective
        action and class certification.
                                        I. Discussion
        A. Joint Employer
USCA11 Case: 23-11027       Document: 39-1      Date Filed: 02/08/2024      Page: 5 of 20

        23-11027                Opinion of the Court                          5

                The Fair Labor Standards Act provides that an employer is
        “any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an em-
        ployer in relation to an employee,” and that an entity is an em-
        ployer if it “suffer[s] or permit[s]” a person to work. 29 U.S.C. §
        203(d), (g). To determine whether an entity is an employer “we
        ask if, as a matter of economic reality, the individual is dependent
        on the entity.” Layton v. DHL Express (USA), Inc., 686 F.3d 1172,
        1175 (11th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under
        the FLSA, a person may have more than one employer as a matter
        of economic reality. Id. Whether there is “joint employment . . .
        depends upon all the facts in the particular case.” Id. (internal quo-
        tation marks omitted). We have developed an eight-factor test that
        is guided by five principles for evaluating whether an employment
        relationship exists under the Act. Id. at 1176–77.
                Those five principles that have guided our use of the factors
        are as follows. “First, the question . . . is not whether the worker is
        more economically dependent on the independent contractor or
        the alleged employer with the winner avoiding responsibility as an
        employer;” rather, “the focus . . . must be on each employment
        relationship . . . between the worker and the . . . asserted . . . joint
        employer.” Id. at 1177 (internal quotation marks omitted) (altera-
        tion adopted). Second, no factor controls the outcome. Id. Third,
        because the factors “are indicators of economic dependence[,] . . .
        the weight of each factor depends on” how probative the factor is
        of the worker’s economic dependence on the asserted joint em-
        ployer. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Fourth, we do not
        tally the factors up in a “mathematical formula” to determine the
USCA11 Case: 23-11027      Document: 39-1      Date Filed: 02/08/2024     Page: 6 of 20

        6                      Opinion of the Court                 23-11027

        outcome. Id. at 1178 (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather,
        “[t]he purpose of weighing the factors is not to place each in either
        the contractor or the [alleged employer’s] column, but to view
        them qualitatively to assess the evidence of economic dependence,
        which may point to both.” Id. at 1176. Fifth, we must focus on
        economic dependence and not the common law of employment.
        Id. at 1178.
               With those principles in mind, we turn to the eight factors.
        First, we look to “[t]he nature and degree of control of the work-
        ers.” Id. at 1176 (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, we
        evaluate “[t]he degree of supervision, direct or indirect, of the
        work.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Third, we examine
        “[t]he power to determine the pay rates or the methods of payment
        of the workers.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Fourth,
        we determine whether the asserted joint employer has “[t]he right,
        directly or indirectly, to hire, fire, or modify the employment con-
        ditions of the workers.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
        Fifth, we consider whether the asserted joint employer
        “[p]repar[es] [the] payroll and . . . payment of wages.” Id. (internal
        quotation marks omitted). Sixth, we consider the “ownership of
        the facilities where work occurred.” Id. Seventh, we consider
        whether the worker “perform[s] . . . a specialty job integral to the
        [asserted joint employer's] business.” Id. Finally, we “evaluate the
        relative investments” of the asserted joint employer “in equipment
        and facilities” used by the workers. Id.
USCA11 Case: 23-11027       Document: 39-1      Date Filed: 02/08/2024      Page: 7 of 20

        23-11027                Opinion of the Court                          7

               The Technicians argue that the district court erred by failing
        to consider evidence they submitted. While the court is required
        to consider all of the evidence submitted, “[t]he mere existence of
        a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position will be
        insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could rea-
        sonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Accord-
        ingly, we look to their arguments on each factor to assess whether
        the district court did indeed fail to consider the evidence.
                As a preliminary matter, we note that the district court is
        not required to parse the record “‘to search out facts or evidence
        not brought to the court’s attention.’” Coquina Invs. v. TD Bank,
        N.A., 760 F.3d 1300, 1314 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Atlanta Gas Light
        Co. v. UGI Utils., Inc., 463 F.3d 1201, 1208 n. 11 (11th Cir. 2006)). In
        this case, in their brief before this court, the Technicians cited the
        entire APRM (233 pages), Santos’ declaration (22 pages), and
        Ayala’s declaration (21 pages) without pinpoint cites to support
        their argument on Factor One; we note that they did the same be-
        low. See, e.g., Doc. 154 at 11, citing 6 extensive exhibits without
        pinpoint cites. Repeatedly throughout the Technicians’ initial
        brief, they refer to the APRM or other such documents as contain-
        ing evidence that the district court failed to consider, but they have
        failed to identify the substantive content thereof. In other words,
        with very few exceptions, the Technicians have not identified any
        actual substantive evidence that they assert the district court failed
        to consider. And, as noted above, neither the district court nor this
        Court is required to search these documents to find some favorable
        evidence for the Technicians. Indeed, we suspect that they have
USCA11 Case: 23-11027       Document: 39-1      Date Filed: 02/08/2024      Page: 8 of 20

        8                       Opinion of the Court                  23-11027

        identified for us the very few favorable items of evidence; our brief
        review of the documents supports this.
                As mentioned above, there were very few exceptions—i.e.
        the Technicians’ brief does identify a few items of substantive evi-
        dence that were allegedly ignored by the district court. However,
        our careful review of that brief reveals that the very few items of
        substantive evidence allegedly ignored that were specifically iden-
        tified in that brief were actually recognized explicitly by the district
        court—e.g. that the APRM did require “that mechanics clock on to
        one project at a time for warranty work,” Dist. Ct. Doc. 194 at 4;
        and did “require mechanics to be certified,” id. at 5. Moreover,
        contrary to the Technicians’ conclusory assertion that the district
        court did not consider the APRM or Dealership Agreements, the
        district court expressly recognized the “gravamen” of the Techni-
        cians’ argument as Nissan’s “flat-rate system.” Id. at 6. The district
        court explained that system, and explained that it determines Nis-
        san’s reimbursement to the dealership—not what the dealership
        pays its employee, the Technician. The district court explained:
        “The amount Nissan pays a dealer for a particular repair is separate
        from what the dealer pays the mechanics; indeed, Nissan typically
        pays dealers over $100 an hour for warranty work but dealers only
        pay the mechanics between $14 and $30 an hour.” Id.
              For these reasons, we reject as wholly without merit the
        Technicians’ primary argument on appeal—i.e. that the district
        court failed to consider relevant evidence. Nevertheless, we
USCA11 Case: 23-11027          Document: 39-1          Date Filed: 02/08/2024          Page: 9 of 20

        23-11027                    Opinion of the Court                                  9

        proceed to analyze the eight factors for evaluating the joint em-
        ployer issue.
               The Technicians also argue that the district court improp-
        erly weighed the evidence. However, the weighing of the eight
        factors is conducted by the court as a question of law. 2 As we held
        in Aimable v. Long & Scott Farms, 20 F.3d 434 (11th Cir. 1994):
                Because the determination of joint employment is a
                question of law, . . . we analyze de novo each of the .
                . . factors to determine which apply to the present
                case as well as to discern the direction in which each
                of the relevant factors points.

        2 The Technicians also argue, in conclusory fashion, that the district court re-

        solved credibility issues and failed to recognize that there were genuine issues
        of material fact that should have precluded summary judgment. We reject
        this argument as wholly without merit. In their brief to this Court, the Tech-
        nicians again fail to identify any subsidiary fact relied upon by the district court
        which is disputed; although they assert in conclusory fashion that there are
        such disputed facts, they fail to identify them or explain how and why they are
        disputed. Also, they fail to identify any subsidiary fact relied upon by the dis-
        trict court which they challenge as clearly erroneous. Because the relevant
        subsidiary facts in this case are largely contained in written documents, like
        the APRM and the Dealership Agreements, they are undisputed. As noted,
        the Technicians point to no subsidiary fact, drawn by the district court from
        such written documents or otherwise, which is either disputed or clearly erro-
        neous.
        And, as noted above, the actual weighing of the factors—such as the nature
        and degree of control exercised by the alleged joint employer over the techni-
        cians—is a question of law for the court to decide.
USCA11 Case: 23-11027      Document: 39-1      Date Filed: 02/08/2024     Page: 10 of 20

        10                     Opinion of the Court                  23-11027

        20 F.3d at 440 (internal citation omitted). We proceed now to
        weigh the eight factors. As stated above, the eight-factor test is not
        a mathematical formula; rather the court is to weigh the factors to
        assess the evidence of economic dependence. Layton, 686 F.3d at
        1178. We repeat: in the context of the joint employer test, we have
        held that the weighing of the factors in the summary judgment
        context is a question of law. See, e.g., Martinez-Mendoza v. Champion
        Int’l Corp., 340 F.3d 1200, 1204 (11th Cir. 2003); Aimable, 20 F.3d at
        436; accord Layton, 686 F.3d at 1175;
               1. The nature and degree of control of the workers
                We have stated that “[c]ontrol arises . . . when the [pur-
        ported joint employer] goes beyond general instructions . . . and
        begins to assign specific tasks, to assign specific workers, or to take
        an overly active role in the oversight of work.” Aimable, 20 F.3d at
        441. “[A]n overly active role in the oversight of work” occurs when
        an entity makes decisions like “(1) for whom and how many em-
        ployees to hire; (2) how to design the employees’ management
        structure; (3) when work begins each day; (4) when the laborers
        shall start and stop their work throughout the day; and (5) whether
        a laborer should be disciplined or retained.” Layton, 686 F.3d at
        1178 (quoting Martinez-Mendoza, 340 F.3d at 1209–10).
               In Layton, we rejected the appellant’s evidence of control of
        the workers’ days as being abstract control, not the sort of control
        exercised by an employer. Id. Specifically, Layton argued that
        DHL “dictated what time the packages were available for pick-up
        each morning, thereby limiting how early Drivers’ workdays could
USCA11 Case: 23-11027      Document: 39-1      Date Filed: 02/08/2024     Page: 11 of 20

        23-11027               Opinion of the Court                         11

        begin.” Id. Further, “DHL occasionally had erratic pick-up orders
        to which Drivers had to respond, resulting in Drivers working
        longer hours.” Id. DHL employees also would often inspect the
        drivers’ vehicles and uniforms to ensure that they conformed to the
        standards specified. Id. at 1174. We reasoned that DHL had certain
        objectives that the employer and its drivers were tasked with ac-
        complishing but “it did not apportion tasks to individuals, specify
        how many individuals should be assigned to each delivery route,
        or structure the chain of command among Drivers.” Id. at 1178.
               In Amiable, the employees pointed to the putative em-
        ployer’s decision making as evidence of control. Specifically, the
        alleged employer decided which crops to grow, how much to
        plant, and how to grow the plants as well as when and which fields
        to harvest; these decisions determined how much work was avail-
        able and how many workers thus needed. We rejected this evi-
        dence because factor one is “properly limited to specific indicia of
        control.” 20 F.3d at 440. The alleged employer did not directly
        control the number of employees, hire or fire employees, or select
        specific employees for certain jobs. Id.
                For the first factor, the Technicians point to several of their
        filings below where they cited Nissan’s APRM, which outlines the
        technicians’ requirements when completing a work order, directs
        the number of vehicles that a technician may work on, and specifies
        the requirements for claimed work to be paid. The Technicians
        also point to Nissan’s Anomalous Repair Control program,
        whereby Nissan could identify specific technicians that performed
USCA11 Case: 23-11027     Document: 39-1      Date Filed: 02/08/2024     Page: 12 of 20

        12                     Opinion of the Court                 23-11027

        any anomalous repairs and “seek to provide corrective measures to
        prevent any future anomalous repairs,” as evidence of Nissan’s
        control. Doc. 153 at 11.
                Citing depositions and declarations that discussed the
        APRM, the district court found that this factor weighed in favor of
        Nissan not being a joint employer. It acknowledged that Nissan
        required that the technicians clock into one project at a time for
        warranty work and defined the general requirements dealers must
        follow to be paid for that warranty work, but found that Nissan did
        not handle the hiring, terms of employment, and assignment of
        tasks that are required under this factor. We agree. There is noth-
        ing in the APRM or other evidence that they cite that supports the
        Technicians’ arguments on this factor. All of the strictures in the
        APRM are macro in nature and are aimed at ensuring uniformity
        and quality in the warranty repairs. Indeed, the nature and degree
        of control exercised by Nissan over the Technicians is considerably
        less than that found to be insufficient in Layton and Aimable.
              2. The degree of supervision, direct or indirect, of the work
               We have stated that supervision can be present regardless of
        whether orders are communicated directly to the alleged employee
        or indirectly through the contractor. Aimable, 20 F.3d at 441. How-
        ever, “infrequent assertions of minimal oversight do not constitute
        the requisite degree of supervision.” Martinez–Mendoza, 340 F.3d at
        1211 (discussing “degree of supervision” factor set forth in Aimable).
             In Layton, the drivers argued that DHL managers oversaw
        and critiqued the drivers loading their trucks at the DHL
USCA11 Case: 23-11027     Document: 39-1      Date Filed: 02/08/2024     Page: 13 of 20

        23-11027               Opinion of the Court                        13

        warehouse. The managers also audited the drivers’ trucks and uni-
        forms to ensure they complied with DHL-imposed standards and
        communicated with the drivers via scanners in unusual situations.
        We agreed that these constituted a small amount of supervision
        but disagreed that these scanners, which gathered information and
        sent it to the DHL headquarters at the end of the day, amounted
        to supervision. 686 F.3d at 1179. We concluded that the amount
        of supervision was insufficient and that this factor did not weigh
        strongly in favor of joint employment. Id.
               The Technicians combine their discussion of factors one and
        two in their filings below and thus their arguments are recounted
        above. See Doc. 153 at 9-12; Doc. 169 at 10-13. Again relying on
        depositions and declarations, the district court found this factor did
        not weigh in favor of joint employment. What the Technicians
        point to in the APRM are standards that Nissan required for war-
        ranty and service work in order for the dealership to receive reim-
        bursement; this does not amount to supervision. While Nissan did
        have the Anomalous Repair Control program to determine if any
        of the technicians was frequently producing inadequate work, this
        was considerably less in scope and frequency than the level of over-
        sight seen in Layton and/or Aimable, which we rejected as insuffi-
        cient supervision and thus not enough to weigh in favor of joint
        employment.
             3. The power to determine the pay rates or the methods of
        payment of the workers
USCA11 Case: 23-11027      Document: 39-1      Date Filed: 02/08/2024      Page: 14 of 20

        14                      Opinion of the Court                  23-11027

               The Technicians argue Nissan has the power to determine
        their pay rates and compensation through the flat rate program.
        They argue that the APRM states that if certain requirements are
        not met by the technician, Nissan may chargeback or not approve
        warranty claims, which, they argue, affects their earnings. In short,
        the Technicians argue that Nissan’s flat-rate program affects what
        they are paid.
               Although the Technicians baldly claim that the flat rate pro-
        gram dictates their pay, they point to no evidence other than their
        own conclusory statements that it does. The APRM does not state
        this and neither do the bulletins—they merely set the amount Nis-
        san will pay the dealers. Conclusory, uncorroborated allegations
        by a plaintiff in an affidavit or deposition will not create an issue of
        fact for trial sufficient to defeat a well-supported summary judg-
        ment motion. Earley v. Champion Int’l Corp., 907 F.2d 1077, 1081
        (11th Cir. 1990). Nissan provided evidence that dealerships pay
        their technicians separately from the flat-rate program which de-
        termines the amount that Nissan reimburses the dealership for
        warranty work; it does not determine the wage that the dealership
        pays its employee, even if that employee happens to be a technician
        working on a warranty job. The dealerships determine the rate
        they will pay the technicians. This is how the district court de-
        scribed the flat-rate program and the separate, independent pay-
        ment of wages to the Technicians by the dealerships. The Techni-
        cians have failed to show that these are facts that are either clearly
        erroneous or disputed. Accordingly, we agree with the district
        court that the undisputed evidence shows that the dealers
USCA11 Case: 23-11027      Document: 39-1      Date Filed: 02/08/2024     Page: 15 of 20

        23-11027               Opinion of the Court                         15

        determined the pay for the Technicians, not Nissan. See Doc. 194
        at 6-7.
              4. The right, directly or indirectly, to hire, fire, or modify
        the employment conditions of the workers
               The Technicians argue that Nissan required the mechanics
        be certified before performing work and in order to be paid. They
        point to the APRM’s classification of different jobs and their specific
        duties, and Nissan’s requirements that the dealerships have such
        employees and can demand they attend specific training. Through
        these means, the Technicians argue that Nissan directly and indi-
        rectly controls the hiring of technicians at the dealerships and their
        employment conditions.
               In Layton, we noted that the only involvement DHL had in
        the hiring process was by requiring that all drivers pass a back-
        ground check. 686 F.3d at 1179. Additionally, we stated that DHL
        decisions that impacted the drivers’ hours was a modification of
        their employment conditions. Id. However, we concluded that
        this control was insufficient and thus the factor weighed against
        joint employment.
               Here, there is some involvement in the dealership employ-
        ment process because of Nissan’s requirements about qualifica-
        tions for the technicians who performed warranty work (although
        not for those who did not perform such work). And the required
        follow-up training for those warranty-work performing mechanics
        does evince some modification of the employment conditions.
        However, the dealerships ultimately control the hiring, firing and
USCA11 Case: 23-11027     Document: 39-1      Date Filed: 02/08/2024     Page: 16 of 20

        16                     Opinion of the Court                 23-11027

        promotions of the employees as well as the bulk of their employ-
        ment conditions. We cannot conclude that Nissan’s involvement
        in the employment process with respect to the Technicians is any
        more substantial than that held insufficient in Layton and Aimable.
        For these reasons, this factor does not weigh in favor of joint em-
        ployment.
              5. Preparation of the payroll and payment of wages
               The Technicians do not contest the district court’s conclu-
        sion that because Nissan only occasionally paid the Technicians di-
        rectly (via a voluntary incentive program that would simply add
        some to the dealership’s core wage), this factor weighed against
        finding joint employment but not strongly.
              6. Ownership of the facilities where work occurred
                “[O]wnership of the [] laborers’ worksite [is] relevant to our
        inquiry because ‘without the land, the worker might not have
        work, and because a business that owns or controls the worksite
        will likely be able to prevent labor law violations, even if it dele-
        gates hiring and supervisory responsibilities to labor contractors.’”
        Id. at 1180 (quoting Antenor v. D & S Farms, 88 F.3d 925, 937 (11th
        Cir. 1996)). In Layton, we rejected the argument that DHL’s sti-
        pend to cover maintenance, fuel, and insurance of the employer-
        owned vans demonstrated control over the vans. Id.
               Here, the Technicians argue that Nissan controls the dealer-
        ships even if it does not own them and it even attempts to prevent
        labor law violations, although they do not explain how. They ar-
        gue that the Dealership Agreement demonstrates control over the
USCA11 Case: 23-11027     Document: 39-1     Date Filed: 02/08/2024    Page: 17 of 20

        23-11027              Opinion of the Court                       17

        location, appearance, layout, equipment, and signage of the deal-
        ership, evincing a level of control.
                Under Florida law, manufacturers cannot own dealerships.
        Fla. Stat. § 320.696. While the Dealership Agreement does contain
        the strictures on the dealerships that the Technicians recount re-
        garding usage and location, these do not relate to the prevention of
        labor law violations. And to the extent that the Agreement does
        contain a clause stating the dealerships should comply with all fed-
        eral, state, and local laws, this is too general to demonstrate the
        type of control that could prevent labor law violations. Thus this
        factor weighs against joint employment.
               7. Performance of a specialty job integral to the asserted
        joint employer’s business
              We stated in Layton that:
                      This factor is derived from Rutherford [Food
              Corp. v. McComb], in which the Supreme Court found
              that meat boners recruited by a labor contractor to
              work at a slaughterhouse were, under the FLSA, joint
              employees of the slaughterhouse. 331 U.S. [722,] 729,
              67 S. Ct. [1473,] 1476 [1947]. Although the workers
              brought their own tools and were labeled as inde-
              pendent contractors, see id. at 724–25, 67 S. Ct. at
              1474, the Court focused on the fact that the workers
              completed one process in the middle of a series of in-
              terdependent steps at the slaughterhouse. The facts
              led the Court to conclude that the workers “did a spe-
              cialty job on the production line” that was “more like
              piecework than an enterprise that actually depended
USCA11 Case: 23-11027      Document: 39-1      Date Filed: 02/08/2024     Page: 18 of 20

        18                     Opinion of the Court                  23-11027

               for success upon the initiative, judgment or foresight
               of the typical independent contractor.” Id. at 730, 67
               S. Ct. at 1477. Because the workers were “part of the
               integrated unit of production” of the slaughterhouse,
               the Court found them to be employees of the estab-
               lishment. Id. at 729, 67 S. Ct. at 1476.
        686 F.3d at 1180. In the farming context, we have stated that “[t]his
        factor is probative of joint employment because a worker who per-
        forms a routine task that is a normal and integral phase of the
        grower’s production is likely to be dependent on the grower’s over-
        all production process.” Antenor, 88 F.3d at 937.
               The Technicians assert that their role as Nissan certified and
        trained mechanics and Nissan’s advertisements emphasizing their
        training shows that they had a specialty job that was integral to
        Nissan’s business. Although Nissan touts the training of the tech-
        nicians as a selling point for their vehicles, the job that the techni-
        cians do is also performed by non-Nissan trained mechanics in gar-
        ages outside of the dealerships. Because their job is thus not inte-
        gral to the production of the vehicles, this factor does not weigh in
        favor of joint employment.
             8. The relative investments of the asserted joint employer in
        equipment and facilities used by the workers
              As we noted in Antenor, we consider this factor because
        workers are more likely to be economically dependent on the per-
        son who supplies the equipment or the facilities. 88 F.3d at 937. In
        Layton we stated that the factor was a wash because the driver’s
        employer owned the vans while DHL owned the warehouses
USCA11 Case: 23-11027      Document: 39-1      Date Filed: 02/08/2024   Page: 19 of 20

        23-11027                Opinion of the Court                      19

        where the drivers loaded goods in the vans. 686 F.3d at 1181. Here,
        the dealerships are owned by the dealers, not Nissan, and tools
        used by the Technicians are owned either by the technicians them-
        selves or the dealerships. Payments made by Nissan to the dealer-
        ships for warranty services rendered and the provision technical
        bulletins and other support for warranty work do not amount to
        investment in equipment or facilities. Thus this factor weighs
        against joint employment.
                Because none of the factors weigh in favor of joint employ-
        ment, the district court did not err in finding that Nissan was not a
        joint employer of the Technicians. Indeed, the instant case falls far
        short of rising to the status of joint employment. The relevant fac-
        tors in this case weigh more heavily against joint employment than
        in Layton, Martinez-Mendoza, or Aimable. Further, as detailed
        above, there is no evidence that the district court ignored the Tech-
        nicians’ evidence.

        B. FLSA Collective Action/Rule 23 Class Certification
               The FLSA authorizes collective actions against employers
        accused of violating the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). To maintain a
        collective action under the FLSA, plaintiffs must demonstrate that
        they are similarly situated. Morgan, 551 F.3d at 1258. Under Rule
        23, class certification is appropriate when, among other things,
        there are questions of law or fact common to the class.
        Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a).
USCA11 Case: 23-11027         Document: 39-1         Date Filed: 02/08/2024         Page: 20 of 20

        20                         Opinion of the Court                        23-11027

               We have rejected the idea that summary judgment in favor
        of a defendant on the joint employer issue automatically resolves
        the issue of class certification. Martinez-Mendoza, 340 F.3d at 1215-
        16. The district court recognized this in its opinion. We do not
        think that the court abused its discretion when it held that certifi-
        cation of a class action or a collective action was not appropriate.
        The putative class members would be employed by different deal-
        ers, making the inquiries about their pay highly individualized and
        unwieldy. We agree with the district court that the employees of
        the several different dealerships would not be similarly situated (as
        required for a collective action) and that there would not be suffi-
        cient common facts (as required for a class action).
                Because we agree with the district court that the facts do not
        support a finding that Nissan is a joint employer and because class
        certification and collective action would be inappropriate, the judg-
        ment of the district court is
                AFFIRMED. 3

        3 The district court also granted summary judgment, rejecting the Techni-

        cians’ unjust enrichment claim. We doubt that the Technicians’ initial brief
        on appeal fairly raised a challenge to the district court’s ruling in this regard,
        but, in any event, we agree with the district court that the Technicians failed
        to adduce evidence of a benefit to Nissan from the Technicians as required by
        Florida law.