Court Opinion

ID: 9542947
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:40:36.47786+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:09:20.701131
License: Public Domain

STATON, Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent. The unique Lake County juvenile procedure which fuses a dispositional waiver hearing with an adjudicatory hearing to determine delinquency violates the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy. Bey was required to defend his liberty at this Lake County juvenile proceeding or be adjudged a delinquent. Later, Bey was required to defend his liberty again for the same act in the Lake Criminal Court where he finally lost his liberty. The majority opinion chooses to ignore this unconstitutional fusion of dispositional and adjudicatory proceedings. Its litmus test for constitutionality is incorrect, since it looks only to what the Lake County Juvenile Court could have done under the law and to what the Lake County Juvenile Court did at the conclusion of the proceeding. Instead, it should have looked at what the Lake County Juvenile Court actually did by holding a fused proceeding and what this fused hearing required Bey to do if he was to retain his liberty. If Bey’s liberty was in jeopardy during the first proceeding in juvenile court where he could have been adjudged a delinquent, then, a second proceeding in an adult criminal court where he was adjudged guilty of an adult crime, would constitute double jeopardy. Constitutional guarantees such as double jeopardy must be held sacred. Hard facts are the litmus tests for constitutional principles. I think that the litmus test is red in Bey’s case. It shows that this fused Lake County juvenile proceeding will erode the sacred constitutional principle of double jeopardy; therefore, I dissent.
The State concedes that the juvenile referee held a fused proceeding, and it assumes the same test adopted by the majority opinion. In the State’s Brief at page eight, it states:
“To be sure, the referee who conducted the hearing entertained the erroneous opinion that he had authority to determine the issue of waiver at an ‘adjudicatory’ hearing, and thought that that was what he was doing. But the State submits that the referee’s opinions as to the state of the proceedings and the alternatives open to him, although certainly relevant, are not determinative. The issue is not what the referee thought his alterni-tives [sic] were. Rather, the issue is the validity of what he actually did. Under the law, he could not waive at an ‘adjudicatory’ hearing, nor could he adjudicate at a ‘waiver’ hearing and the instant hearing was either one or the other.”
*1159The “erroneous opinion” referred to by the State in its brief is gleaned in part from the cross-examination of the juvenile referee. After explaining the separate trial procedure for adjudicating delinquency and the separate waiver hearing procedure, the referee gave these answers on cross-examination as to how the hearing is actually conducted:
“Q. Do you then conduct a delinquency hearing?
“A. That is correct sir.
“Q. You then — in other words it’s a separate hearing to determine delinquency?
“A. No, same hearing whereby after hearing all the evidence we determine to what you call deny the waiver petition, we retain jurisdiction and then proceed with the case from that end.
“Q. What do you do after that?
“A. We find the youngster or minor to be delinquent and then either commit him to boy’s school depending upon the type of crime or repetitive action that the minor has done and depend on type of crime he has performed and not crime but delinquency action.”
Judge Letsinger then questioned the referee as follows:
“Q. Was evidence taken by witnesses who were subjected to cross examination intending to prove that the respondent or the defendant regardless of what you want to call him committed what amounted to a criminal offense had he been an adult?
“A. That is correct sir.
“Q. Now, did you have to make a finding as a judicial officer at the conclusion of that hearing that he in fact did commit the acts alleged in the petition or the instrument no matter what you want call him?
“A. We took that into consideration, we didn’t find—
“Q. Answer this question, did you as a judicial officer make a finding that Robert Bey did in fact do those things alleged in the instrument instituting the proceedings?
“A. We did not make a finding to that correct.
“Q. You did not?
“A. No, sir.
“Q. Well, can you then find that there was probable cause that he was the one?
“A. Oh, yes we did, yes.
“Q. You did?
“A. Yes.
“Q. So your [s/c] saying then that all you confined yourself to finding on that today — day was that he probably was the one who did it?
“A. No. Not probably but facts turned out that he — or from the information from the evidence we found enough facts to waive him to the criminal court.
“Q. What facts did you find?
“A. Well, as a matter of fact your honor we found facts that he was the one that from the evidence that he was the one that committed the crime of shooting in this case. [Emphasis added.]
“Q. Now, had you chosen to do so, you could have sent him to Boy’s School as a result of that finding could you not?
“A. Not for that type of serious crime sir. This woman lost her eye if I am not mistaken.
“Q. Are you saying that only the serious nature of offense is what kept you from sending Robert Bey to Boy’s School?
“A. That is one of the reasons sir.” and later:
“Q. You could have found him delinquent if you had not found all the serious nature offenses?
“A. That is right.”
After the close of questioning, Judge Let-singer commented on the situation as he saw it:
“Well, you can see what is happening. A man is put to trial in a Juvenile Court *1160and he must present his defense otherwise he may be held to be a delinquent and his liberty is deprived. If he does not put on his defense and bring on witnesses who would prove that he was not the one who did it, he could very well lose his liberty for years.”
He further commented:
“Now, there are certain preliminary proceedings which do not — which have no jeopardy attached. That is a preliminary hearing as to define whether there was probable cause that this was the man that probably was the man that committed the act. Now, in those cases the defendant may put on a defense and varify [sic] probable cause hearing. He may put on a defense although he is not required to because as a result of it he will not be deprived of his liberty. That could be done only after trial. That is not the way we are running juvenile waiver hearings in Lake County.”
Although Judge Letsinger denied the belated motion to correct errors, he did so with less than absolute certainty. He remarked:
“I am charged here with making a case by case determinations, [sic] Not announcing broad sweeping legal generalities. I think Indiana certainly needs a statement in such situations. I am therefore going to hold that jeopardy did not attach to whatever proceedings [sic] it might have been called in Juvenile Court with little confidence that it will be sustained on appeal.”
The waiver statute, IC 1971, 31-5-7-14, (Burns Code Ed., Supp.1978) § 9-3214, does not explicitly provide for separate hearing before an adjudication proceeding on delinquency. Guidelines for a separate hearing are set forth in Summers v. State (1967), 248 Ind. 551, 230 N.E.2d 320. See also Kent v. United States (1966), 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84.
“He should have the right to counsel at such hearing; the right to confrontation of the witnesses against him; and the right to present evidence, if any be available to him, of any circumstances that would entitle him to the benefits that might be afforded to him by the provisions of the Juvenile Act. And it is only after such a hearing that a waiver and order of transfer to the Lake Criminal Court may be lawfully made.”
Summers v. State, supra, 230 N.E.2d at 325. The waiver hearing must be held and concluded before a separate adjudicatory trial on delinquency. Breed v. Jones (1975), 421 U.S. 519, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 44 L.Ed.2d 346.
Seay v. State (1976), Ind.App., 340 N.E.2d 369 does not support the majority’s rationale that even though the proceedings are understood to be adjudicatory by the juvenile and the referee, jeopardy does not attach if the referee who is also considering waiver at the same time decides to waive the juvenile. In Seay, the question was much more narrow than the majority opinion proposes. The pre-petition to find a juvenile delinquent and the subsequent “full investigation” were held to be separate and non-adjudicatory. The pre-petition or request to find a juvenile delinquent is jurisdictional and necessary to initiate the “full investigation.” Furthermore, “Seay faced no such burden [of double jeopardy] inasmuch as waiver from juvenile court was sought and granted prior to any findings in juvenile court on the merits of the delinquency petitions. In terms of Breed, there was no ‘adjudicatory’ proceeding prior to waiver which would have presented the issue of double jeopardy once trial was begun in adult court.” Seay v. State, supra, 340 N.E.2d at 370.
In Bey’s case, the adjudicatory proceeding to determine delinquency or waiver to an adult court are held at the same time. This is double jeopardy where a second adjudicatory trial is held in an adult court. Seay qualified the extent of its holding by stating: “Clearly, Seay was not subjected to a hearing in juvenile court to determine whether he had in fact committed certain alleged acts. The finding that certain acts would be crimes if committed by an adult should not be confused with a finding that such acts were actually committed by the accused.” Seay v. State, supra, 340 N.E.2d at 370. If the juvenile referee had not decided to waive Bey, he could have found him a delinquent and sent him to Boy’s *1161School. These alternatives, delinquency and Boy’s School or waiver and trial in an adult court, are held at the same time and in the same proceeding. When the referee decided to waive Bey to an adult court, Bey was placed in double jeopardy in the adult court, since he had the burden for a second time of defending his liberty.
I strongly disapprove of the Lake County Juvenile proceedings held in the Bey case which fuses a dispositional waiver hearing with an adjudicatory delinquency trial. This fused proceeding violates not only Bey’s constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy, but every other juvenile’s constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy who is subjected to the same fused proceeding. I would reverse the trial court’s judgment.1

. Bey’s fused proceeding took place approximately a year before Breed v. Jones, supra, was decided by the United States Supreme Court. Therefore, any dissent would not be complete without some discussion devoted to retroactive application of Breed.
The State relies on Linkletter v. Walker (1965), 381 U.S. 618, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 to bolster its argument against the retroactive application of Breed. Linkletter differs from Breed in two important ways: (1) the Linkletter court did not view the exclusionary rule as explicitly derived from the Fourth Amendment; and (2) the Court had implicitly approved the continuing rejection of the exclusionary rule in state cases through its refusal to reconsider its own earlier rejection of the exclusionary rule in state cases. (See also, Berry v. State (1974), 162 Ind.App. 626, 321 N.E.2d 207 for retroactive application of procedural rules.)
In 1973, Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505, 93 S.Ct. 876, 35 L.Ed.2d 29 concluded that double jeopardy cases were “not readily susceptible of analysis under the Linkletter line of cases.” 409 U.S. at 508, 93 S.Ct. at 878. Robinson placed limits on the Linkletter line of analysis, noting that prior to the Linkletter decision, “[Tjhere would have been less doubt concerning the retroactivity of the Waller holding.” [Referring to Waller v. Florida (1970), 398 U.S. 387, 90 S.Ct. 1184, 25 L.Ed.2d 435, 409 U.S. at 507, 93 S.Ct. at 877.] The Robinson Court concluded:
“The guarantee against double jeopardy is significantly different from procedural guarantees held in the Linkletter line of cases to have prospective effect only. While this guarantee, like the others, is a constitutional right of the criminal defendant, its practical result is to prevent a trial from taking place at all, rather than to prescribe procedural rules that govern the conduct of a trial. A number of the constitutional rules applied prospectively only under the Linkletter cases were found not to affect the basic fairness of the earlier trial, but to have been directed instead to collateral purposes such as the deterrence of unlawful police conduct, Mapp v. Ohio, supra [367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081]. In Waller, however, the Court’s ruling was squarely directed to the prevention of the second trial’s taking place at all, even though it might have been conducted with a scrupulous regard for all of the constitutional procedural rights of the defendant.
“We would not suggest that the distinction that we draw is an ironclad one that will invariably result in the easy classification of cases in one category or the other. The element of reliance embodied in the Linkletter analysis will not be wholly absent in the case of constitutional decisions not related to trial procedure . . . .”
409 U.S. at 509, 93 S.Ct. at 878. See also, Blackledge v. Perry (1974), 417 U.S. 21, 94 S.Ct. 2098, 40 L.Ed.2d 628.
In Holt v. Black, 550 F.2d 1061 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied 432 U.S. 910, 97 S.Ct. 2960, 53 L.Ed.2d 1084, the Circuit Court of Appeals held Breed retroactive. The court rejected the Linkletter line of analysis urged by the state, and instead relied on Robinson as more relevant, and considered its language to be disposi-tive of the appeal, requiring reversal. The Holt Court noted that it would have reached the same result even if Linkletter were used in its determination, since
“[T]he fundamental changes in constitutional law which require reversal of this case occurred well before appellant’s trial in 1973. In Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966), and In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967), the Supreme Court decisively rejected any Constitutional distinction between the ‘civil’ law nature of Juvenile Court proceedings and the ‘criminal’ law nature of courts of general adult jurisdiction. When in 1969 the Supreme Court held for the first time that the double jeopardy clause was applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, the constitutional ban upon two prosecutions — one in a juvenile court adjudication and the other (after waiver) in the adult criminal court — was complete. Since Benton [Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707] *1162and before Breed a number of states have held that the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution applied to juveniles.” [Citations omitted.]
550 F.2d at 1064. After considering the body of case law, the court stated:
“[I]n 1973 when appellant was tried twice for the same offense in the state courts of Kentucky, there was then no basis for reliance upon any United States Supreme Court opinion which could be read as allowing that practice in the face of the double jeopardy clause.”
550 F.2d at 1065.
The Supreme Court of California likewise held Breed retroactive, in In re Bryan (1976), 16 Cal.3d 782, 129 Cal.Rptr. 293, 548 P.2d 693. The Supreme Court of California followed the Robinson analysis. It briefly referred to Link-letter, noting that Robinson approved considering as not wholly absent the reliance element of the Linkletter test. There was no significant reliance on the concept of continuing jeopardy, noting:
“To the contrary, ever increasing constitutional protections have been granted juveniles.”
129 Cal.Rptr. at 296, 548 P.2d at 696. The Supreme Court of California concluded:
“that the general rule of retroactivity is applicable without a Linkletter or similar test in the case of a decision compelled by constitutional prohibitions against multiple jeopardy [such as Breed]."
Id. And further noted that
“Nothing in Breed precludes a further disposition by the juvenile court in a suitable case.”
129 Cal.Rptr. at 297, 548 P.2d at 697.
The constitutional rights guaranteed to adult criminal defendants have been applicable to juveniles for a decade. I can not conclude that Breed was an abrupt departure with serious consequences. Furthermore, the clear language of the Fifth Amendment makes the retroactive application of Breed mandatory.