Court Opinion

ID: 9674822
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:35:58.689608+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:29.850334
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
Appellant contends that this Court erred in affirming the judgment of the trial court *200in spite of the fact that the jury was allowed to assess punishment under a statute which, along with its applicable range of punishment, has been held to be unconstitutional. In support of his argument appellant relies on Moss v. State, 574 S.W.2d 542 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); he argues that by affirming the lower court’s judgment we have engaged in speculation on the punishment that the jury would have assessed had it been properly charged. We have reviewed Moss and find it distinguishable from the facts before us today.
In Moss, the Court of Criminal Appeals re-examined its ruling in Jones v. State, 532 S.W.2d 596 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), and found it to be erroneous. Both Jones and Moss involved convictions for burglary of a residence, however, the Court determined that the evidence was only sufficient to support a conviction for the lesser included offense of burglary of a building. The Court in Moss, further determined that it would be improper to assume, “that the same jury would assess the same punishment for burglary of a building as it assessed for burglary of a residence....”
In the case before us today we have found the evidence sufficient to support the conviction for offense as alleged in the indictment; i.e., delivery of marijuana of more than fifty but less than two hundred pounds. We reiterate that this indictment alleged an offense under the pre-amended Act. Furthermore, under the pre-amended version an- indictment would have been sufficient had it merely alleged delivery of more than one-fourth ounce of marijuana. The jury assessed punishment based upon its finding that appellant had in fact delivered between fifty and two hundred pounds of marijuana. Unlike in Jones and Moss, here both the evidence and the indictment support the jury’s conviction of appellant. While we may not speculate on what sentence a jury will impose for an offense, in the case at bar we know exactly what sentence the jury intended to impose and did impose. The jury imposed neither the maximum nor the minimum punishment authorized by the charge. Instead, it weighed the evidence and arrived at an appropriate sentence for the offense appellant was shown to have committed. As that sentence was within the allowable range of punishment under the pre-amend-ed version, we find no reversible error. See Harvey and Sulak. (cited in our original opinion). See also Doucette v. State, 166 Tex.Cr.R. 596, 317 S.W.2d 200 (1958).
Appellant’s Motion for Rehearing is Denied. The judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.