Court Opinion

ID: 9552213
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:06:23.527101+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:25:45.495905
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION OF
KIDWELL, J.
I disagree with the conclusion of the majority that the record contains circumstantial evidence which satisfies the *241State’s burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant “unlawfully” distributed cocaine.
The indictment under which Appellant was tried charged that he “did knowingly and unlawfully distribute the dangerous drug cocaine ” in violation of HRS § 712-1242(1) (c) as it read before its amendment in 1975. The statute then read:
(1) A person commits the offense of promoting a dangerous drug in the second degree if he knowingly and unlawfully:
* * * *
(c) Distributes any dangerous drug in any amount.
The following relevant definitions were contained in § 712-1240:
“Unlawfully” was defined as follows:
(13) “Unlawfully” means:
(a) To possess or distribute a Schedule I, II, III, IV or V substance, a marijuana concentrate, marijuana, or intoxicating compound, when not authorized by law to do so by an apothecary, physician, dentist, podiatrist, practitioner, or veterinarian;
“Practitioner” was defined as follows:
(10) “Practitioner” means:
(a) A physician, dentist, veterinarian, scientific investigator, or other person licensed, registered, or otherwise permitted to distribute, dispense, conduct research with respect to or to administer a controlled substance in the course of professional practice or research in this State.
(b) A pharmacy, hospital, or other institution licensed, registered, or otherwise permitted to distribute, dispense, conduct research with respect to or to administer a controlled substance in the course of professional practice or research in this State.
At the close of all of the evidence, Appellant moved for a judgment of acquittal on the ground that the State had faded to introduce any evidence that Appellant distributed the sub*242stance unlawfully, in that there was no showing that he was not licensed. The trial court indicated doubt but denied the motion. The court first construed the statute so as to substitute “as” for “by”, and thus to read “authorized by law to do so as an apothecary”, etc. The court then (apparently) held that Appellant’s testimony that he was employed in a small establishment engaged in the sale of sea shells and similar articles enabled the jury to conclude that he was not an apothecary, physician, dentist, podiatrist, practitioner or veterinarian.
It seems too clear for argument that the construction which the trial court placed upon the statute must be rejected and that the statute must be read according to its text.1 Doubtless, distribution as an apothecary, etc. would be embraced within the exclusion from unlawful distribution. However, the State has not suggested in this appeal that authorization by a member of the named professional categories would not also constitute a defense. The State’s entire argument on this point, as contained in its brief, is as follows:
As defined above, the State was compelled to prove a negative without being able to compel the accused to *243testify. In reality, to prove “unlawfulness” was a practical impossibility because the State would have to show that the accused was not lawfully authorized to distribute drugs or narcotics by an enumerated professional person. In order to show “unlawfulness,” the State would be required literally to call upon hundreds of persons to inquire whether he had lawfully authorized the accused to possess or distribute a drug or narcotic. This is not the intent of the Hawaii Penal Code. Therefore, the only conclusion is that the word “unlawfully” is mere surplusage and was not required to be shown by the State in its case against Defendant. Hence, the trial court did not commit error in denying Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal.
I agree with the majority that the rather startling contention on which the State seeks to affirm the conviction is without merit and that the question before us is whether the trial judge was correct in submitting the question of unlawfulness to the jury.2 My disagreement is with the majority’s finding, in which they showed more ingenuity in reading the record than did counsel for the State, that proof of unlawfulness was not only possible but had been accomplished by the State in this case. The essential facts are not substantially in dispute.
At the time of the transaction, Appellant was and had for probably seven months been employed by Sea Treasures, Unlimited, a firm which manufactured a product having something to do with shells. The establishment was located at 2869 Oahu Avenue, on two and a half acres of land, in Manoa. *244Appellant lived on these premises and managed the inventory, but was not one of the owners of the firm. Appellant earned about $50 a week. Prior to this employment, Appellant had worked as a bartender at two establishments and had his own furniture laminating businesses. Appellant testified that he had “done a great many things as far as employment are concerned.” He had been in Hawaii for 13 years and attended the University of Hawaii for half a semester when he first graduated from high school. He spent a great deal of his time playing frisbee in Kapiolani Park.
Appellant became acquainted with an undercover police officer in early 1975 and engaged in backgammon games with him, playing in a step van which Appellant parked adjacent to Kapiolani Park. During the backgammon games, Appellant asked the officer if he wanted to buy some “coke” for $50 per gram. When the officer said he would like to do so, around sevén o’clock in the evening, the two drove in the officer’s car to several locations looking for a man identified by Appellant váriously as Don or Ed. After stopping at a Jack-in-the-Box restaurant in Waikiki and an apartment house on Wilder Avenue, and after Appellant made a phone call, they stopped near Ohua Avenue in Waikiki. Appellant received $100 from the officer, walked up Ohua Avenue and returned in a few minutes with a glassine bag containing cocaine, which he told the officer had cost $60. Appellant asked the officer if he still wanted the cocaine at that price. Upon the officer’s acceptance, Appellant gave him $40 in change from the $100.
The officer testified that Appellant informed him that the man with the cocaine was at his girl friend’s house. Appellant testified that he had been told by “Ed” that he was living in the Kalamalama Apartments and that Appellant purchased the cocaine there. The officer testified that Appellant asked the officer to wait while he went for the cocaine, saying that he wasn’t too sure whether or not his “man” would want him to bring the officer with him, and that Appellant used the words “man” and “connection”, which the officer had heard as part of the vernacular of drug traffickers. The officer also testified that, after the described transaction, he several *245times requested Appellant to obtain drugs and on one occasion Appellant agreed to do so, but was unsuccessful.
Appellant admitted obtaining the cocaine for the officer in the described transaction but denied making any other attempts to do so. Appellant’s testimony disagreed with that of the officer in some details and was subject to some confusion and evasion. Appellant denied that he had initiated the transaction and claimed that he had agreed to obtain the cocaine after much urging and after he had become concerned and frightened by the officer’s appearance. Appellant testified that he was not a doctor and had never gotten drugs for anybody before when they were in that condition.
As we said in State v. Laurie, 56 Haw. 664, 669, 548 P.2d 271, 275 (1976):
It is well settled that to deny a motion to acquit there must be sufficient evidence to support a prima facie case; the evidence must enable a reasonable mind fairly to conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, giving full play to the right of the fact finder to determine credibility, weigh the evidence and draw justifiable inferences of fact. State v. Cannon, 56 Haw. 161,163, 532P.2d391,394 (1975); State v. Rocker, 52 Haw. 336, 345-46, 475 P.2d 684, 690 (1970). This test applies to both direct testimony and circumstantial evidence.
When this test is applied to circumstantial evidence, it is not enough that the circumstances permit an inference of guilt. As we held in State v. Benton, 56 Haw. 409, 538 P.2d 1206 (1975), if an inference of fact which establishes innocence may also, within reason, be drawn from the circumstances a motion to acquit must be granted. A typical statement of the rule is found in Commonwealth v. Burke, 339 Mass. 521, 527, 159 N.E. 2d 856, 860 (1959): “[T]he circumstances must be such as to produce a moral certainty of guilt, and to exclude any other reasonable hypothesis”. This is, of course, only another way of saying that if there is a reasonable inference of innocence which a reasonable mind could draw from the circumstantial evidence, a reasonable doubt of guilt necessarily exists.
*246It is somewhat difficult to conceptualize and articulate the application of this principle where the evidentiary problem involves the establishment of a negative fact. Here the statute places upon the State the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was not authorized to distribute the drug by an apothecary, physician, dentist, podiatrist, veterinarian or practitioner, which term is defined as meaning, in addition to persons already categorized, a scientific investigator or other person, or a pharmacy, hospital or other institution, licensed, registered or otherwise permitted to distribute, dispense, conduct research with respect to or to administer a controlled substance in the course of professional practice or research in this State. The State might carry this burden by proof that Appellant was not authorized by anyone to distribute the drug, or by proof that anyone by whom he was authorized was not within the statutory categories.
On the first question, whether Appellant was authorized by anyone to distribute the drug, the circumstantial evidence rather strongly suggests that Appellant acted as the agent and with the authority of the mysterious “Don” or “Ed” from whom the drug was obtained. Appellant left the officer with $100 of the officer’s funds and with an authorization to purchase the drug for $50. Appellant returned with the drug and informed the officer that he could have it for $60. Although Appellant had delivered $60 of the officer’s funds to the supplier, there is a strong implication that Appellant was acting for the supplier in offering the drug to the officer and was in a position to return the drug and regain possession of the officer’s funds if the increased price was not acceptable to the officer. I would conclude that the circumstantial evidence permitted a reasonable inference that Appellant had been authorized by his supplier to distribute the drug and, consequently, that the State could sustain its burden only by showing that the supplier was not in one of the statutory categories.
In turning to this aspect of the evidentiary problem, it is important to point out an aspect of the analysis which is present only because the evidence is offered to prove a negative fact. Proof is doubtless not required to enable the jury to recognize that most persons who might have been present in *247Waikiki at the time of this transaction were not within the categories described in the statute. Thus, the mere fact that the supplier was unidentified and undescribed was enough to create a possibility and to permit a logical inference that he was not an apothecary, physician, dentist, or in any other described category. But to accept merely this inference as sufficient proof would be to hold that no proof is necessary to establish a fact which is an exception to the ordinary condition. The legislature placed the burden upon the State of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant’s supplier was not one of the excepted persons described in the statute. To permit a finding to tbat effect on no stronger showing than the inference that Appellant’s supplier would not ordinarily have been within the exceptions would effectively shift the burden of proof to the Appellant. It follows, I believe, that the circumstances must substantially strengthen the logical inference which denies the existence of an exception from the ordinary condition, in order to sustain the State’s burden in this case.
The record provides meager information about the mysterious supplier. There is evidence that the supplier had told Appellant that he was prepared to sell cocaine, that he could perhaps be found at the Jack-in-the-Box restaurant, that he had a house on Wilder Avenue and lived with a girl friend in a house or apartment in Waikiki, and that he supplied an envelope of cocaine for a price of $60. I am aware of no other circumstances which cast any light on the question whether the supplier was an apothecary, physician, dentist, podiatrist, veterinarian or a scientific investigator or other person licensed, registered or otherwise permitted to distribute, dispense, conduct research with respect to or administer a controlled substance in the course of professional practice or research in this State. 'Th.e fact that the supplier may have been engaged in an illicit transaction in the disposition of this envelope of cocaine, which the circumstances at least suggest, is virtually neutral with respect to whether he was in possession of the drug as an apothecary, physician, dentist, podiatrist, veterinarian, scientific investigator or in another licensed capacity. It is common experience that much illicit *248drug distribution is carried on by persons who are licensed to possess and dispense the drug. So far as Appellant is concerned, the statute draws no line between a licit and an illicit distribution, if the authorization to distribute was extended to Appellant by a licensed person.
At the conclusion of this analysis, I find myself wondering whether the permissible inference, from these circumstances, that Appellant’s supplier was not within one of the statutory categories was not too weak to support a conviction, regardless of what alternative inferences were also permissible. In any event, it seems clear that the circumstances permitted an inference that Appellant’s supplier was a licensed person selling drugs in the more profitable illicit market. The reasonableness of this inference depends, I believe, in part on the strength of any contrary inference. Where the inference of guilt is nearly matched in weight by the inference of innocence, as it is here, I would conclude that the circumstances do not exclude a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The motion to acquit should have been granted.
I would reverse the conviction.

 No matter how absurd the statute might appear to be, neither the trial court nor this court may reword a statute so as to make criminal what the statute excludes. The words “when not authorized by law to do so by” are not free from difficulty, but I consider their fair intendment to be that a person (such as a salesman, assistant or other agent), who has been authorized by one who is licensed or otherwise permitted to distribute a drug, does not unlawfully distribute the drug when disposing of it as so authorized. The substitution of “as” for the second “by” in the quoted phrase, as was done by the trial court and in the majority opinion, would deprive this large class of affected persons of the protection which the statute seems clearly to intend. Accordingly, I would test the circumstantial evidence in this case by its tendency to prove that Appellant was not authorized by a member of the designated categories to distribute the drug to the undercover officer, rather than by its tendency to prove that he was not authorized as a member of the designated categories. Nevertheless, if the statute were given the construction which the trial court and the majority opinion have adopted, I would remain unable to find, in the circumstances disclosed in the record, evidence from which a jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was not a member of a class which included any “person licensed, registered, or otherwise permitted to distribute, dispense, conduct research with respect to or administer a controlled substance in the course of professional practice or research” (§ 1240 (10)). To so conclude, on this record, would have the effect of shifting to the Appellant the burden of proving that the distribution was lawful. However, I do not see this question as before this court.

 Appellant’s counsel argued in support of the motion to acquit that the State had not shown that Appellant was not licensed to distribute cocaine, and subsequently consented to an instruction to the effect.that the distribution was “unlawful unless authorized to do so as a distributor registered with the State Department of Health. ’ ’ In view of the trial court’s announcement of its construction of the statute, which made it evident that the court had considered and rejected the argument that lack of authorization by a licensed distributor was required to be shown by the State, it was not necessary for Appellant’s counsel to reiterate the argument to preserve it for our consideration. The consent to the instruction came later and has no bearing on the motion to acquit.