Court Opinion

ID: 9632572
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:19:25.380708+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:18.947647
License: Public Domain

Gunderson, J.,
dissenting:
I, too, must respectfully dissent.
Our respected brethren in the majority correctly note that, pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), a district judge must consider four factors when determining whether a defendant’s right to a speedy trial has been violated. Our brethren also correctly recite that a district judge is obligated to consider all of the aforesaid factors together, and that no single factor is to be considered either necessary or sufficient. Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25 (1973). Notwithstanding these unquestioned legal premises, however, our brethren then proceed in the instant case to reverse the district judge’s admittedly discretionary ruling.
I would be pleased to join our brethren if I could discern the legal principles which license their mandate.