Court Opinion

ID: 9942519
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-21 15:03:37.288321+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:48:10.645017
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                              FOURTH DISTRICT

                            SBP HOMES, LLC,
                    a Florida limited liability company,
                                 Appellant,

                                      v.

                         84 LUMBER COMPANY,
                               Appellee.

                             No. 4D2022-2603

                            [February 21, 2024]

   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit,
Indian River County; Janet Carney Croom, Judge; L.T. Case No.
312020CA000046.

  Christopher N. Bellows of Holland & Knight LLP, Miami, and Daniel
Mahfood of Holland & Knight LLP, Jacksonville, for appellant.

  Raymond T. Elligett, Jr. and Shirley T. Faircloth of Buell & Elligett, P.A.,
Tampa, and Hardy L. Roberts of Carey, O’Malley, Whitaker, Mueller,
Roberts & Smith, P.A., Tampa, for appellee.

WARNER, J.

   Appellant SBP Homes, LLC, challenges the dismissal with prejudice of
its breach of contract and negligence complaint against appellee for
defective installation of windows and doors on a home for which SBP was
general contractor. The trial court dismissed all claims, relying on a
document to which the complaint referred, but which was not attached to
the complaint. We conclude that the court erred in relying on the
agreement, because the document did not compel dismissal of the
negligence and breach of implied contract counts as pled. We therefore
reverse the dismissal of those two counts. We affirm the dismissal of the
contractual indemnity count.

                                Background

   SBP subcontracted with 84 Lumber to provide and install windows,
doors, and hardware at a home for which SBP was the general contractor.
SBP was sued by the homeowners for construction defects and damages.
SBP in turn sued 84 Lumber, along with several other subcontractors, in
a third-party complaint which was amended several times. SBP filed a
Fourth Amended Third-Party Complaint against 84 Lumber, which 84
Lumber moved to dismiss, and the court granted the motion. This appeal
is based on the dismissal of the Fourth Amended Third-Party Complaint.

    SBP’s operative complaint against 84 Lumber alleged causes of action
for breach of a contract implied in fact, negligence, and contractual
indemnity. 1 As to the breach of implied contract count, SBP alleged that
it had contracted with 84 Lumber for purchase and installation of the
windows with the contractual obligations being based on both writings and
the conduct of the parties. Specifically, the complaint alleged: “Pursuant
to both verbal and written negotiations with Third-Party Defendant, 84
LUMBER, SBP executed a ‘Subcontract Agreement’ on or about May 26,
2017 as well as a credit agreement. (See, Exhibit ‘F’ attached hereto).”
Exhibit F consisted of a subcontract agreement between SBP and 84
Lumber, signed only by SBP, and a cost proposal from 84 Lumber,
accepted by SBP for the windows and doors plus installation. The Credit
Agreement, however, was not attached to the Fourth Amended Third-Party
Complaint.

    SBP claimed that the homeowner plaintiffs had alleged the doors and
windows were defective and improperly installed. While SBP had denied
those allegations, SBP alleged that “[t]o the extent that Plaintiffs’
allegations are found to be true, Third-Party Plaintiff has been damaged
by Third-Party Defendant, 84 LUMBER’s, material breach of contract
implied in fact.”

   As to the negligence count, SBP alleged that 84 Lumber supplied and
installed materials which it had an obligation to assure were in compliance
with “the manufacturer’s recommendations, the approved plans and
specifications and proper construction practices.” SBP alleged that 84
Lumber breached its duty of care by supplying defective windows and
doors and installing them contrary to recommendations, building codes,
and proper construction practices.

   In moving to dismiss the operative complaint, 84 Lumber alleged that
it had not signed the subcontract agreement, or the Credit Agreement
referred to in the complaint, precluding SBP’s causes of action. The Credit
Agreement, attached to the motion, was dated several months prior to the

1 The complaint also alleged a common law indemnity claim that SBP dismissed

voluntarily.

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unsigned subcontract and was signed by both parties. The Credit
Agreement states that it is a “Credit Application,” and by signing SBP
agrees “to accept credit extended by 84 Lumber . . . subject to the terms
and conditions set forth herein.” The agreement did not specify that it
applied to a particular construction project. On the front of the Credit
Agreement, SBP is listed as the applicant and two individuals signed as
the owners of SBP and as guarantors of payment. The signors also
acknowledged agreement to the list of terms on the back of the one page
agreement. Most of the provisions on the back dealt with how future
delivery of products, invoices, and payments would be made. Importantly,
the agreement’s paragraph 12 states:

      The entire agreement of the parties is set forth in this written
      document and there are no other oral or written
      understanding, promises, representation, or agreements.
      This Agreement cannot be modified or amended except that
      84 may change the terms and conditions of this Agreement as
      set forth in Paragraph 8 above; and this Agreement shall
      supersede all previous communications, representations, or
      agreements, either verbal or written, between the parties
      hereto. This Agreement shall take precedence, supersede and
      control over any conflicting or additional terms contained in
      purchase orders, contracts or other similar documents issued
      by the parties and no such documents shall be binding upon
      84 unless approved and signed by an authorized officer of
      84 . . . .

Also, the agreement’s paragraph 14 also provided:

      In no event shall 84 be liable for liquidated, incidental,
      punitive or consequential damages in connection with
      building materials or installation purchased by Applicant, 84
      disclaims    any     express    or   implied    warranties   of
      merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose on building
      materials or installation purchased by Applicant. In no event
      shall 84’s liability exceed the replacement cost of building
      materials or installation.

   Based upon the Credit Agreement and argument of 84 Lumber, the trial
court dismissed SBP’s complaint. It did so with prejudice, not providing
SBP the ability to amend. After the trial court denied SBP’s motion for
rehearing, this appeal was filed.

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                                  Analysis

  A motion to dismiss presents an issue of law that is reviewed de novo.
Robert J. Hanopole, D.C., P.A. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 345 So. 3d
303, 306 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022).

          Reliance on Document Not Attached to Complaint

    SBP contends that the trial court erred in dismissing its breach of
implied contract claim, because SBP had pled the essential elements of
the claim by stating that a contract existed between the parties based upon
the subcontract proposal, the invoices sent by 84 Lumber to SBP, and the
conduct of 84 Lumber in performing based upon those documents. SBP
argues that the court went outside the four corners of the pleading when
it relied on the language of the Credit Agreement which was not attached
to the complaint.

    Generally, “[t]o rule on a motion to dismiss, a court’s gaze is limited to
the four corners of the complaint, including the attachments incorporated
in it, and all well pleaded allegations are taken as true.” U.S. Project Mgmt.,
Inc. v. Parc Royale E. Dev., Inc., 861 So. 2d 74, 76 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)
(quoting Alevizos v. John D. & Catherine T. MacArthur Found., 764 So. 2d
8, 9 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)). However, “where the terms of a legal document
are impliedly incorporated by reference into the complaint, the trial court
may consider the contents of the document in ruling on a motion to
dismiss.” One Call Prop. Servs. Inc. v. Sec. First Ins. Co., 165 So. 3d 749,
752 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015); see also Veal v. Voyager Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 51
So. 3d 1246, 1249 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (rejecting argument that the trial
court erred by considering the contents of a settlement agreement that was
attached to the motion to dismiss when the agreement served as basis for
standing to bring suit, and the complaint impliedly incorporated the terms
of the agreement by reference”); Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.130(b).

    In One Call, we found that the trial court did not err in considering the
contents of the insurance policy filed with the insurer’s motion to dismiss,
because the complaint referred to the policy upon which the plaintiff’s
standing depended. Id. at 752. Thus, the complaint incorporated the
policy by reference, and the trial court could rely on the policy in ruling on
the motion.      Id.; Cf. Landmark Funding, Inc. on Behalf of Naples
Syndications, LLC v. Chaluts, 213 So. 3d 1078, 1080 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017)
(determining that the trial court erred by considering records from
proceedings, where only one of the proceedings was mentioned in the
derivative complaint, and neither the plaintiff’s “standing nor the merits of
its claims as pleaded” were “in any way based or dependent upon the

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records from [the entire proceedings]” and it was “premature” to resolve
the issues on the motions to dismiss). Because SBP’s complaint referred
to the Credit Agreement as part of the contract between the parties, the
trial court did not err in considering the Credit Agreement.

                    Contract Implied in Fact Count

   However, the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint because of
the Credit Agreement, which did not negate SBP’s breach of implied
contract claim. As SBP argued, the Credit Agreement had “nothing to do”
with SBP’s claims. While the Credit Agreement stated that its terms
superseded terms in any other contracts or purchase orders and stated
that only documents signed by 84 Lumber would be binding on 84
Lumber, the agreement did not negate a contract implied in fact based
upon other documents and conduct of the parties.

   We explained a contract implied in fact in Commerce Partnership 8098
Ltd. Partnership v. Equity Contracting Co., Inc., 695 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1997):

      A contract implied in fact is one form of an enforceable
      contract; it is based on a tacit promise, one that is inferred in
      whole or in part from the parties’ conduct, not solely from their
      words. 17 Am. Jur. 2d “Contracts” § 3 (1964); 1 Arthur Linton
      Corbin, Corbin on Contracts §§ 1.18–1.20 (Joseph M. Perillo
      ed. 1993). Where an agreement is arrived at by words, oral or
      written, the contract is said to be “express.” 17 Am. Jur. 2d
      “Contracts” at § 3. A contract implied in fact is not put into
      promissory words with sufficient clarity, so a fact finder must
      examine and interpret the parties’ conduct to give definition
      to their unspoken agreement. Id.; 3 Corbin on Contracts § 562
      (1960). It is to this process of defining an enforceable
      agreement that Florida courts have referred when they have
      indicated that contracts implied in fact “rest upon the assent
      of the parties.” Policastro v. Myers, 420 So. 2d 324, 326 (Fla.
      4th DCA 1982); Tipper v. Great Lakes Chemical Co., 281 So.
      2d 10, 13 (Fla. 1973). The supreme court described the
      mechanics of this process in Bromer v. Florida Power & Light
      Co., 45 So. 2d 658, 660 (Fla. 1950):

         [A] [c]ourt should determine and give to the alleged
         implied contract “the effect which the parties, as fair
         and reasonable men, presumably would have agreed
         upon if, having in mind the possibility of the situation

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         which has arisen, they had contracted expressly
         thereto.” 12 Am. Jur. 766.

Id. at 385–86 (alteration in original).

    Applying these principles to this case, the complaint alleged that the
contract consisted of verbal and written negotiations after which SBP
executed a “Subcontract Agreement.” SBP attached documents in support
of the allegations; 84 Lumber’s purchase proposal (an offer); SBP’s
“acceptance” through its subcontract; and invoices rendered by 84 Lumber
for the products and services rendered. SBP also alleged that the parties
performed under this contract implied in fact, when 84 Lumber furnished
and installed the doors and windows for which it was paid compensation.
SBP thereby also alleged reliance on the parties’ conduct.           These
allegations were sufficient to support SBP’s theory of breach of a contract
implied in fact.

   84 Lumber argues the Credit Agreement is the only express agreement
between the parties, and that it negates any contract implied in fact based
on the general proposition that “a plaintiff cannot pursue an implied
contract theory . . . if an express contract exists.” F.H. Paschen, S.N.
Nielsen & Assocs. LLC v. B&B Site Dev., Inc., 311 So. 3d 39, 49 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2021). We find that the exception to that rule applies in this case.
“Reliance upon a theory of implied contract is barred only if an express
contract concerns the same subject matter as the implied contract.” Id.
Further:

      The proposition that “the law will not imply a contract where
      a valid express contract exists” has been described by
      Professor Corbin as “misleading.” S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
      Acme Elec. Contractors, Inc., 418 So. 2d 1187, 1189 (Fla. 4th
      DCA 1982). The real meaning of this statement is the
      following:

         [W]here the parties have made an express contract, the
         court should not find a different one by “implication”
         concerning the same subject matter if the evidence does
         not justify an inference that they intended to make one
         . . . . [T]he fact that an express contract has been made
         does not prevent the parties from making another one
         tacitly, concerning the same subject matter or a
         different one.

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      Id. (quoting 3 A. L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 564 (1960
      ed.)).

Id. (alteration in original).

   As SBP argued, the Credit Agreement did not involve the specific
undertaking in this case. The proposal submitted by 84 Lumber applied
specifically to the SBP project upon which the complaint was based. The
proposal provided a signature line for acceptance of the proposal, which
the SBP representative signed. 84 Lumber made a definite proposal to
furnish and install windows and doors for SBP on the construction of the
homeowners’ residence. 84 Lumber performed and was paid, as alleged
in the complaint. From the documents, as well as the conduct of the 84
Lumber in supplying and installing the doors and windows, it can be
inferred that a contract implied in fact existed. And it is for the trial court
to give effect to the contract. See Bromer, 45 So. 2d at 660. Thus, SBP’s
complaint alleged a different agreement than the Credit Agreement.

    Moreover, the Credit Agreement itself does not negate a contract
implied in fact for the installation of the windows and doors on this
particular construction project. In fact, the Credit Agreement assumes
that other undertakings will occur between the parties. The Credit
Agreement only precludes relying on terms in documents not expressly
agreed to by 84 Lumber, certain categories of damages, and liability based
upon breaches of warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular
purpose. But SBP’s complaint does not seek compensation for “liquidated,
incidental, punitive or consequential damages,” and the Credit Agreement
itself contemplates some liability when it provides that “[i]n no event shall
84’s liability exceed the replacement cost of building materials or
installation.” Thus, even considering the Credit Agreement as part of the
contract, the agreement does not negate the breach of implied contract
count or liability for any damages.

                                Negligence Count

   Nor does the Credit Agreement negate SBP’s alternate theory of
negligence. See Samuels v. King Motor Co. of Fort Lauderdale, 782 So. 2d
489, 494 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (“[a]sserting inconsistent allegations in a
complaint is permissible”); Belz Investco Ltd. P’ship v. Groupo Immobiliano
Cababie, S.A., 721 So. 2d 787, 788 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (the rules of
procedure permit a plaintiff to state causes of action in the alternative
“even where the alternative allegations are completely inconsistent with
one another”). SBP contends that if the parties were not in privity and/or

                                       7
the duties undertaken by 84 Lumber were independent of a contract, then
the negligence claim was viable.

   A negligence claim has four elements: “(1) a duty by defendant to
conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a breach by defendant of that
duty; (3) a causal connection between the breach and injury to plaintiff;
and (4) loss or damage to plaintiff.” Bartsch v. Costello, 170 So. 3d 83, 86
(Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (citing Clay Elec. Co–Op., Inc. v. Johnson, 873 So. 2d
1182, 1185 (Fla. 2003)).

   SBP alleged that 84 Lumber was “under a duty to ensure the materials
and work were compliant with the manufacturers’ recommendations, the
approved plans and specifications and proper construction practices.”
SBP then alleged that “[s]pecifically, Third-Party Defendant, 84 LUMBER’S
the scope of work is defined by the Subcontract Agreement[] attached
hereto as Exhibit ‘F.’” SBP next alleged that 84 Lumber breached its duty
“by supplying, installing, inspecting, or approving both defective”
materials “and/or providing labor for the installation” of the materials that
was “not in accordance with applicable building codes, manufacturers’
recommendations, approved plans and specifications or proper
construction practices.” And SBP alleged that it was damaged as a direct
and proximate cause of 84 Lumber’s breach. Thus, SBP alleged all the
elements of a negligence claim.

    84 Lumber contends that the independent tort doctrine precludes the
negligence claim because the claim was related to and dependent upon
breach of contractual duties. “As a general principle of law, ‘a plaintiff
may not recover in tort for a contract dispute unless the tort is
independent of any breach of contract.’” Un2jc Air 1, LLC v. Whittington,
324 So. 3d 1, 3 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021) (quoting Island Travel & Tours, Ltd.,
Co. v. MYR Indep., Inc., 300 So. 3d 1236, 1239 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020)). This
principle applies to parties to the contract and is “rooted in the notion that,
when a contract is breached, the parameters of a plaintiff’s claim are
defined by contract law, rather than by tort law.” Id. (quoting Peebles v.
Puig, 223 So. 3d 1065, 1068 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017)). Here, SBP alternatively
alleged duties separate from the parties’ contract implied in fact, the terms
of which have not yet been settled. Accepting all well-pleaded allegations
as true, SBP’s operative pleading was sufficient, and the trial court
improperly dismissed the negligence claim.

    We affirm as to the dismissal of the contractual indemnity count which
specifically relied upon the unsigned subcontract terms. Because the
Credit Agreement precluded reliance on terms in documents not signed by
its officers, the contractual indemnity count is barred.

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                                 Conclusion

    The trial court relied on the terms of a Credit Agreement not attached
to the complaint in granting 84 Lumber’s motion to dismiss. While we
agree the trial court could review the Credit Agreement referred to in the
complaint, we conclude the Credit Agreement’s terms did not negate the
counts for contract implied in fact and negligence. We also find that the
trial court did not err in dismissing the contractual indemnity count based
on the Credit Agreement. We therefore affirm as to that count but reverse
as to the other two counts.

   Affirmed in part; reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings.

CIKLIN and KUNTZ, JJ., concur.

                           *         *        *

   Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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