Court Opinion

ID: 9621701
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:03:51.190037+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:41:07.637242
License: Public Domain

Justice KITTREDGE.
I respectfully dissent. Two guiding principles shape our State’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. First, in a Fourth Amendment fact-based challenge, we are constrained by the “any evidence” standard of review. A trial court’s ruling in Fourth Amendment search and seizure cases must be upheld if there is any evidence to support the ruling. State v. Brockman, 339 S.C. 57, 66, 528 S.E.2d 661, 666 (2000) (“[W]e *525will review the trial court’s ruling like any other factual finding and reverse if there is clear error. We will affirm if there is any evidence to support the ruling.”). Second, the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is “reasonableness.” Michigan v. Fisher, — U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 546, 548, 175 L.Ed.2d 410 (2009) (“ ‘[T]he ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment,’ we have often said, is ‘reasonableness.’ ”) (quoting Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006)). Today’s decision ignores these principles. The Court simply substitutes its preferred findings and construes the Fourth Amendment in a manner that places unnecessary and unreasonable constraints on law enforcement.
I.
Terry T. Tindall was paid $1,500 to transport a large quantity of cocaine from Atlanta, Georgia, to Durham, North Carolina. Tindall was apprehended in Oconee County, South Carolina. He was convicted and sentenced for trafficking cocaine in excess of 400 grams. The trial court denied Tindall’s motions to suppress the drugs and his statement to police. The court of appeals properly applied the “any evidence” standard of review and affirmed. State v. Tindall, 379 S.C. 304, 309, 665 S.E.2d 188, 191 (Ct.App.2008) (recognizing that a trial court’s factual rulings are reviewed under the “clear error” standard and the appellate court will affirm if any evidence supports the ruling) (citing Brockman, 339 S.C. at 66, 528 S.E.2d at 666).
II.
Sergeant Dale Colegrove of the Oconee County Sheriffs Office was patrolling Interstate 85 the morning of April 15, 2004. At 7:05 a.m., Colegrove conducted a traffic stop on a Jeep Cherokee traveling northbound on the interstate after the vehicle crossed from Georgia into South Carolina, near mile-marker three. The vehicle was speeding and following another vehicle too closely. The vehicle was driven by Tindall.
As a result of Tindall’s nervousness and delay in following initial instructions, Colegrove, an experienced officer, “sense[d] that something wasn’t right with what [Tindall] was *526thinking.” Colegrove’s suspicions grew when he learned Tindall was driving a rental car from Atlanta. The car had been rented by another individual, Lee Braggs, the day before and had to be returned to Atlanta that day, April 15. Tindall was named as a permissive user in the rental agreement.
Colegrove promptly began the process of checking Tindall’s driver’s license and vehicle registration, while engaging Tindall in conversation. According to Colegrove, “while waiting on the check to come back, I really started just observing behavior changes.” Colegrove requested backup. When Colegrove received information from dispatch that Tindall’s driver’s license was valid at approximately 7:15 a.m., he informed Tindall that he would receive a warning ticket.
Colegrove began to write the warning ticket while continuing to talk with Tindall. When the warning ticket was completed at 7:20 a.m. and the ticket was issued to Tindall, Colegrove asked for, and received, Tindall’s consent to search the vehicle. Fifteen minutes elapsed from the initial stop to the issuance of the ticket to the search of the vehicle. At 7:29 a.m., 2,380 grams of cocaine were found hidden in three packages in the rear undercarriage of the vehicle.
Tindall was placed in custody and given Miranda warnings at 7:34 a.m., after which he gave a statement to Colegrove. Sergeant Colegrove testified:
[Tindall] stated that he was traveling to Durham, leaving Atlanta going to Durham for Lee Braggs. He stated again that he was being paid $1,500 — once his Miranda and everything else was read, he stated to me he was being paid $1,500 to take that Jeep from Atlanta to Durham where Mr. Braggs was flying to meet him in Durham to pick that vehicle up and that his brother was going to return him back to Atlanta and that he was getting $1,500 for driving that vehicle from Atlanta to Durham. That’s exactly what he said.
Tindall was indicted for trafficking cocaine in excess of 400 grams. He moved to suppress the cocaine and his statement to police. The trial court denied the motions, and Tindall was convicted and sentenced. The court of appeals applied the proper standard of review and affirmed in a thorough and well-reasoned opinion.
*527III.
There is evidence to support a finding that the officer had objectively reasonable and articulable suspicion that Tindall was engaged in criminal activity. This is the basis of the court of appeals’ affirmation. Viewing the “whole picture,” I join the court of appeals and would hold the standard of review requires an affirmance. More to the point, I cannot say that under the totality of the circumstances there is no evidence to support the ruling of the trial court.
In addition, contrary to the majority’s implication, the Constitution does not foreclose further conversation between a motorist and law enforcement during the process of writing a traffic summons. See Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 125 S.Ct. 1465, 161 L.Ed.2d 299 (2005) (holding mere police questioning while individual was detained did not constitute an independent Fourth Amendment violation and such questioning was not additional seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment). There is ample evidence to affirm the denial of Tindall’s Fourth Amendment challenge, as the court of appeals recognized.
The Fourth Amendment is measured through a lens of reasonableness. See Fisher, 130 S.Ct. at 548; Brigham City, Utah, 547 U.S. at 403, 126 S.Ct. 1943. Fourth Amendment challenges are typically fact-intensive. As observed in State v. Pichardo, “[rjeasonableness is measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances. As a result, the nature of the reasonableness inquiry is highly fact-specific.” 367 S.C. 84, 101, 623 S.E.2d 840, 849 (Ct.App.2005) (citations omitted). The fact-specific nature of the inquiry explains why this Court determined the deferential “any evidence” standard of review is appropriate in Fourth Amendment cases in Brock-man.
The court of appeals cited to what, prior to today, was a sound rule — “Under the ‘clear error’ standard, an appellate court will not reverse a trial court’s finding of fact simply because it would have decided the case differently.” Tindall, 379 S.C. at 309, 665 S.E.2d at 191 (citing Pichardo, 367 S.C. at 95-96, 623 S.E.2d at 846). I vote to affirm the court of appeals.
Acting Justice JAMES E. MOORE, concurs.