Court Opinion

ID: 9751721
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 16:55:28.048609+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:57.735040
License: Public Domain

SCHWELB, Associate Judge,
concurring:
I join Judge Pryor’s opinion for the court, but add a few words to explicate further the reasons for my disagreement with Ms. Smith’s position.
As Judge Pryor notes, maj. op. at 382 n. 4, Ms. Smith asserts that the statute applies only to three kinds of situations, rather than to four. She bases this contention on the theory that the language “willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or harasses” modifies the clause “places another person in reasonable fear of death or bodily injury,” but not the earlier clause “engages in conduct with the intent to cause emotional distress to another person.” I am unable to agree with this construction. To suggest that conduct which is intended to cause emotional distress violates the statute, where that conduct does not include following or harassing, would make the statute apply to a situation which has nothing to do with stalking, as that word is commonly understood. Moreover, as Judge Pryor demonstrates, id. at 384-85, the construction urged on us by Ms. Smith is refuted by the legislative history-
In addition, I think it important to emphasize that the anti-stalking law uses a variety of phrases — “on more than one occasion,” “repeatedly,” and “course of conduct” — all of which are designed to exclude from the ambit of the statute isolated acts. Because isolated *389acts are so excluded, it is unreasonable to suppose, as Ms. Smith asserts, that the statute is violated only where there have been repeated courses of conduct. As a matter of common sense, repeated acts are sufficient; so is a single course of conduct. Plural plurals are not required.