Court Opinion

ID: 9493910
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:23:09.470076+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:06.965519
License: Public Domain

KISER, Senior District Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur and dissent. I believe that Boone was not entitled to two attorneys under 18 U.S.C. § 3005. Therefore, I concur with all of the majority’s opinion with the exception of Part II, to which I respectfully dissent.
To begin, I disagree with the manner in which the majority frames the § 3005 issue. It claims that “the dispute surrounds the triggering event of application of § 3005,” and concludes that indictment for an offense punishable by death is the critical event that triggers the two-attorney requirement. I think this analysis is problematic for two reasons.
First, I think it misconstrues the meaning of § 3005. The expression “Whoever is indicted for ... [a] capital crime” serves as a restrictive phrase, stating the prerequisites for defendants who seek two attorneys. As I view the matter, indictment is simply the first step in determining whether the defendant will be prosecuted for a capital crime. The offense does not become a “capital crime” until the prosecution gives notice that it will seek the death penalty.1 It is therefore only at this juncture that the defendant’s right to additional counsel under § 3005 vests.
*365Second, I think the majority’s “triggering event” analysis diverts attention from the true issue in this case: whether an offense punishable by death loses its character as a “capital crime” when the prosecution does not actually seek the death penalty. The majority treats the phrase “capital crime” as if its meaning were self-evident. I am less confident in my analysis. I believe that there are at least two plausible constructions of “capital crime”: (1) a crime for which the law authorizes the death penalty, and (2) a crime for which the prosecution actively seeks the death penalty. Although this Court’s opinion in Watson opted for the first definition, all other courts that have addressed the issue have rejected it. See United States v. Grimes, 142 F.3d 1342, 1347 (11th Cir.1998); United States v. Steel, 759 F.2d 706, 710 (9th Cir.1985); United States v. Dufur, 648 F.2d 512, 514-15 (9th Cir.1980); United States v. Shepherd, 576 F.2d 719 (7th Cir.1978); United States v. Weddell, 567 F.2d 767, 770 (8th Cir.1977); United States v. Davidson, 1992 WL 165825, *1-*5 (N.D.N.Y.1992).
Because of its obvious importance to this case, I think the Watson decision merits close scrutiny. The historical context of that case was peculiar. This Court decided Watson shortly after the Supreme Court handed down Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972). The defendant in Watson had been convicted under a statute indistinguishable from that under which the Fur-man defendants had been convicted. 496 F.2d at 1126. Thus, any death sentence imposed on defendant Watson would have been constitutionally void. Prior to trial, defendant had requested the appointment of additional counsel. The district court denied this request. Id. On appeal, the defendant claimed that this refusal to grant additional counsel violated the command of § 3005. The government, in turn, claimed that § 3005 did not apply, as the death penalty had been deemed by the Supreme Court to be unconstitutional in cases like the one at bar-. Id. The question before the court in Watson therefore was a stark one: did Furman judicially repeal the statutorily-conferred procedural safeguards vouchsafed defendants in capital cases?
Noting its extreme reluctance to encroach on the territory of the legislative branch, a divided panel declared that defendant Watson was entitled to two attorneys under § 3005 even though Furman had foreclosed the possibility of his being-sentenced to death. Id. at 1128-29. The majority’s analysis hinged on its guess as to the legislative intent underlying § 3005. After noting the dearth of legislative history relating to that provision, the court declared:
Were we convinced that defendant’s exposure to the risk of imposition of the death penalty was the sole reason for the two-attorney requirement in § 3005, we would be inclined to agree with the government. However, we believe that there is a significant chance that other considerations also underlay the two-attorney requirement.
Id. at 1128. The court then opined that because crimes punishable by death are typically difficult to try, Congress may have intended § 3005 to “buttress the defense” so as better to protect defendant’s rights:
[I]t seems to us that it is more likely than not that an alleged offense of the type for which Congress has purportedly continued the death penalty will be a complex and difficult case to prepare and try.... It is not unlikely that Congress may have also sought to buttress the defense with two attorneys to provide greater assurance that a defen*366dant’s rights would be fully observed. As a consequence, we are unable to say, absent a clear legislative expression, that the possibility of imposition of the death penalty was the sole reason why Congress gave an accused the right to two attorneys. It follows that we cannot say that Furman effects a judicial repeal of § 3005.
Id. at 1128. In dissent, District Judge Herbert Murray (sitting by designation) expressed his opinion that the sole reason Congress provided additional counsel in capital cases was the nature of the punishment:
In adding the right to additional counsel in capital cases, it seems obvious that the reason for it was the finality of the punishment involved, not any inherent complexity of capital cases. Many such cases are much simpler and easier to try from the point of view of counsel than, for example, a multi-defendant narcotics conspiracy trial. The writer of this opinion believes that in a desire to guard against human error, the first Congress felt it desirable to have two lawyers keeping watch on each other when the life of the client was at stake.
Id. at 1130-31. Thus, he argued that the defendant’s right to additional counsel under § 3005 evaporated once Furman abrogated the death penalty in cases like his.
I believe that Watson was wrongly decided. I agree with Judge Murray that it is the finality of the punishment, not the complexity of the offense, that undergirds the two-attorney requirement of § 3005. Nevertheless, had Congress been silent on the matter in the intervening years, principles of stare decisis might require that I join with the majority in finding that Defendant was entitled to two attorneys. Congress, however, has not been silent.
In 1994 Congress amended § 3005 in conjunction with the enactment of the Federal Death Penalty Act. The amendment changed the wording from:
Whoever is indicted for treason or other capital crime shall be allowed to make his full defense by counsel learned in the law; and the court ... shall immediately, upon his request, assign to him such counsel, not exceeding two, as he may desire....
to the language that appears in the current § 3005:
Whoever is indicted for treason or other capital crime shall be allowed to make his full defense by counsel; and the court before which the defendant is to be tried, or a judge thereof, shall promptly, upon the defendant’s request, assign 2 such counsel, of whom at least 1 shall be learned in the law applicable to capital cases ....
Federal Death Penalty Act (Title VII of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994) § 60026, Pub.L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (emphasis added). I think the changes wrought by the amendment reveal the majority’s construction of “capital crime” to be erroneous. The requirement that counsel be “learned in the law applicable to capital cases” clearly refers to the simultaneously-enacted sentencing and appeal provisions of the Federal Death Penalty Act. See 18 U.S.C. § 3592 (identifying aggravating and mitigating factors to be considered in determining whether sentence of death is justified); 18 U.S.C. § 3593 (specifying that the prosecutor must give notice of intent to seek death penalty and outlining the unique post-conviction procedure for sentencing in a capital case); 18 U.S.C. § 3595 (providing procedures for appeal of sentence of death). In a given case, these provisions come into play only after the government has decided to pursue the death penalty and apprised the court of its intention to do so. Where the government *367decides not to seek the death penalty, the sentencing and appeal provisions of the Federal Death Penalty Act simply do not apply. As the Government notes, it would be pointless to require that defense counsel be “learned in the law applicable to capital cases” if such erudition were irrelevant to the issues raised in the case. But that is exactly what the majority interprets § 3005 to require here. By construing “capital crime” to encompass even those cases where the prosecution specifically indicates that it will not seek the death penalty, the majority requires appointment of counsel “learned in the law applicable to capital cases” where expertise in the sentencing and appeal provisions of the Federal Death Penalty Act is wholly unnecessary. On remand, Defendant will have to be appointed counsel “learned in the law applicable to capital cases” even though there is no chance that such law will be applied to his particular case. I think that this incongruous result reveals the majority’s construction of “capital crime” to be in error. The amendment makes sense only if one construes “capital crime” to denote only those offenses for which the government actually seeks the death penalty.
Responding to these arguments, the majority points out that it is the present policy of the Department of Justice to allow defense counsel to participate in the process whereby it determines whether it will seek the death penalty. This policy, it argues, shows that appointing a death penalty expert would be of help to a defendant even “prior to the government’s decision to seek the death penalty. I think that this is irrelevant. The current practices of the Department of Justice shed no light on the Congressional purpose in providing two attorneys in capital cases. The Death Penalty Act itself gives defendants no right to participate in the process by which the Justice Department determines whether to seek the death penalty. The Act specifies only that “[i]f ... the attorney for the government believes that the circumstances of the offense are such that a sentence of death is justified under this chapter” he shall notify the court and the defendant of this intention. § 3593(a). The decision to treat the matter as a capital crime is a matter of pure prosecutional discretion. United States v. McVeigh, 944 F.Supp. 1478, 1483-84 (1996) (“The issuance of these notices is essentially a prosecutor’s charging decision.”). That the Department of Justice has chosen to exercise this discretion in such a way as to allow defense input is of no moment to the interpretation of the two-attorney provision of § 3005. By giving this argument credence, the majority makes the interpretation of this section depend in part on the happenstance of internal Department of Justice policy. This strikes me as letting the tail wag the dog.
The majority also observes that the operative language “Whoever is indicted for ... [a] capital crime” was not changed in the 1994 amendment. However, words— like people — are known by the company they keep. An alteration in one part of a statute, therefore, can prompt a court to reexamine its construction of an unaltered portion of that statute. For the reasons stated above, I believe the 1994 amendments showed that the Watson court was mistaken in believing that Congress intended defendants to get the special protections of § 3005 even where the government does not actually seek the death penalty. I believe that the natural interpretation of “applicable to capital cases” indirectly reveals that “capital crime” refers only to those offenses for which the prosecution actively seeks the death penalty.
Finally, I think it is important to emphasize that Watson is an outlier case — both within and without the Fourth Circuit. As noted above, every other■ court that has *368addressed the specific issue of right to counsel under § 3005 has held that additional counsel is not required where the prosecution does not seek to impose the death penalty. Thus, had Congress surveyed the pertinent law at the time of the 1994 amendments, it would have found the courts to be in unison on the issue — with the lone exception of Watson’s Furman-era asterisk. Congressional silence generally is not a reliable guide to statutory interpretation. When Congress reenacts a statute, however, it is presumed to endorse the “settled judicial interpretation” of it. Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 921, 114 S.Ct. 2581, 129 L.Ed.2d 687 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring); Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 185, 114 S.Ct. 1439, 128 L.Ed.2d 119 (1994). The present case, where Congress has tinkered with a specific provision, falls somewhere between Congressional silence and the reenactment rule. I believe that when Congress amended § 3005 to include “learned in the law” but did not further define “capital crime,” it acquiesced in the line of circuit court decisions holding that a defendant is not entitled to two attorneys where the government does not actually seek the death penalty.
Even in the Fourth Circuit, Watson is an aberration. An earlier case, not mentioned by the Watson court, held that the procedural protections generally afforded capital defendants do not apply when there is no chance that the death penalty will be imposed. Hall v. United States, 410 F.2d 653, 660 (4th Cir.1969). In Hall, as here, the defendant was indicted for a crime that was punishable by death. At trial, defense counsel complained that he had not been given the government’s witness list three days in advance of trial as required for “capital offenses” by 18 U.S.C. § 3432. In response, the government disavowed any intention to seek the death penalty. The district judge allowed the trial to proceed. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that “the procedural safeguards normally provided in capital cases” are not required where the prosecution states in open court2 that it will not ask for the death penalty.
For all of these reasons, I believe that Boone was not entitled to two attorneys under 18 U.S.C. § 3005. I therefore respectfully dissent from Part II of the majority opinion. I would affirm Boone’s conviction on both Count I and Count II.

. If the government seeks the death penalty, 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a) requires it to file a notice with the court "a reasonable time before trial” stating its intention to seek the death penalty' and identifying the aggravating factors' that the government believes justify a sentence of death.

. Given the notice requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 3593, the government’s silence in this case is the functional equivalent of the prosecu-lion’s declaration not to seek the death penalty in Hall.