Court Opinion

ID: 9456750
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 20:01:22.681976+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:05.464433
License: Public Domain

LAY, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
I cannot approach the legal issue on the purely factual basis of who said what, to whom, and what did they mean. The examiner and the Board differ on the factual resolution of whether the company voluntarily recognized the union at the time the latter demanded recognition. The majority opinion places emphasis on the testimony of the company president as to whether the company would find it “convenient” to recognize the union. I fail to see the relevancy of this testimony. Under the previously existing collective bargaining contract between the parties, recognition of any majority status of the union did not further depend on the company’s voluntary acquiescence. Section 3.4 of the collective bargaining agreement reads:
“It is further agreed that, upon proof that a majority of an unaffiliated department has become affiliated with this Union, wages, hours of work and conditions of employment for that department shall be incorporated in this Contract.” (My emphasis.)
The Company’s consent to union recognition had been contractually given “upon proof that a majority of an unaffiliated department has become affiliated with this Union.” Card authorization, unless contested in good faith as to authenticity constitutes such “proof.” NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 89 S.Ct. 1918, 23 L.Ed.2d 547 (1969). Once the union based its demand for recognition on a proper showing of its majority card status, and as long as that majority status of the union was not otherwise challenged,1 recognition under the contract did not depend on the company’s consent or convenience. Presumably, under Gissel, the company could have requested an election to verify the union’s majority ; but it did not do so. The only doubt it ever raised was to the appropriate size of the unit. This issue the Board resolved against the company. Under these circumstances, the company’s failure to affirmatively manifest voluntary recognition to the union as viewed by the trial examiner is, in my judgment, irrelevant. On “proof” of majority status, without a valid challenge to such status and without a request for election, the collective bargaining agreement mandated the company’s recognition of the union as bargaining agent. The employee’s withdrawal after legitimate proof of majority status had been shown did not alter the company’s duty to bargain.
The Board relies on the principle of NLRB v. Richman Bros. Co., 387 F.2d 809, 814 (7 Cir. 1967), which I find applicable here:
“Just as industrial stability requires that the collective bargaining relationship, once established by Board certification, be continued for a reasonable time, Brooks v. N. L. R. B., 348 U.S. 96, 75 S.Ct. 176, 99 L.Ed. 125 (1954); Franks Bros. Co. v. N. L. R. B., 321 U.S. 702, 64 S.Ct. 817, 88 L.Ed. 1020 (1944); N. L. R. B. v. John S. Swift Co., Inc., 7 Cir., 302 F.2d 342 (1962), it also requires that collective bargaining begin once a proper foundation is laid by the union. When all genuine doubt of the union’s majority status in an appropriate unit has been erased, the employer’s duty to bargain collectively becomes fixed. The employer may not evade that duty by marking time until the union’s majority is lost through its own efforts, N. L. R. B. v. Mid-West Towel & Linen Service, *1103Inc., 7 Cir., 339 F.2d 958 (1964); N. L. R. B. v. Philamon Laboratories, Inc., 2 Cir., 298 F.2d 176, cert. den., 370 U.S. 919, 82 S.Ct. 1555, 8 L.Ed.2d 498 (1962); Joy Silk Mills v. N. L. R. B., 87 U.S.App.D.C. 360, 185 F.2d 732 (1950), cert. den., 341 U.S. 914, 71 S.Ct. 734, 95 L.Ed. 1350 (1951), or through forces for which it is not accountable, Retail Clerks Union, etc. v. N. L. R. B., 9 Cir., 376 F.2d 186 (1967); Snow v. N. L. R. B. [308 F.2d 687 (9 Cir. 1962)].” (My emphasis).
I would grant enforcement of the Board’s order in its entirety.

. No contention is made that at the time of the demand the union did not possess “proof that a majority of an unaffiliated department has become affiliated” with the union. The company’s president raised only a doubt that the union may not have represented all of the men related to the department. However, it is well settled that when the dispute relates only to the size of the unit, the company must risk unfair practice charges if it is proven wrong. See NLRB v. Bardahl Oil Co., 399 F.2d 365 (8 Cir. 1968) ; NLRB v. Burroughs Corp., 261 F.2d 463 (2 Cir. 1958).