Court Opinion

ID: 9589740
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:47:57.173978+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:34:28.981976
License: Public Domain

Hall, Justice,
dissenting.
The question before this court in the present case, in White v. Ga. Power Co., 237 Ga. 341 (227 SE2d 385) (1976) and in Bowers v. Fulton County, 227 Ga. 814 (183 SE2d 347)(1971) is whether the framers of our State Constitution intended the words "just and adequate compensation” to include attorney fees incurred by a condemnee in an eminent domain case. In deciding this *486issue, the jurist.. is not a knight-errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from consecrated principles. He is not to yield to spasmatic sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence.” Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 141 (1922). Alexander Hamilton, a strong advocate of judicial review, conceded that if the judiciary "... should be disposed to exercise will instead of judgment, the consequences would ... be the substitution of their pleasure to that of the legislative body.” The Federalist, No. 78 (Hamilton).
What is a "principled decision” in constitutional law? It ". . . is one that rests on reasons with respect to all the issues in the case, reasons that in their generality and their neutrality transcend any immediate result that is involved. When no sufficient reasons of this kind can be assigned for overturning value choices of the other branches of the government or of a state, those choices must, of course, survive. Otherwise, as Holmes said in his first opinion for the court, 'a constitution, instead of embodying only relatively fundamental rules of right, as generally understood by all English-speaking communities, would become the partisan of a particular set of ethical or economical opinions. . .’ ” Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1,19 (1959). The judicial branch of government should ground its decisions in reason, and not merely in power.
In considering the question of possible constitutional attorney fees, it is common knowledge that during our two centuries of experience as a state they were never granted as part of the constitutional mandate for "just and adequate compensation” in condemnation cases. It has always been the law of Georgia as well as the common law that attorney fees for litigation may be awarded only by statute. Ball v. Vason, 56 Ga. 264 (1876). This is also true in other jurisdictions throughout the country. The leading treatise on the subject states the rule and then adds: "Unless provision is made therefor by statute, a claimant is not entitled to reimbursement either for loss of time consumed in prosecuting his claim or for counsel fees.” 4A Nichols on Eminent Domain § 14.249[4] (Rev. 3d Ed. *4871976).
Prior to the adoption of the Georgia Constitution of 1945, it was also settled federal constitutional law that" 'attorneys’ fees and expenses are not embraced within just compensation for land taken by eminent domain.’ Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U. S. 362, 368 (1929). The proceedings before the Georgia Constitutional Commission of 1943-1944 show the following discussion concerning the language ''just and adequate compensation”: Mr. Carmichael, one of the members, stated that the language "follows the language of our Federal Constitution with reference to right of eminent domain and the payment of just compensation.” Chairman Arnall, in discussing this language, also stated, "As the chair understands it, in effect, that is the Federal provision. . .” Records of the Constitutional Commission of 1943-1944, at pp. 214 and 215 (1946). It is therefore apparent that the Constitutional Commission understood and intended the words "just and adequate compensation” to have the same meaning as the words "just compensation” in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution under which attorney fees were not part of "just compensation.”
What empirical or historical evidence does the majority opinion, here and in White, marshal against our law of two centuries? How do they come to the conclusion that their new precept is a fundamental rule of right as understood by all English-speaking communities? I respectfully submit that those judicial officers who concur in the majority opinion rely upon nothing but their own personal predilections. If we act as ''the highest legislative body in the ...” state (Hutchins, Center for Study of Democratic Institutions, The Case for Constitutional Change, 3 Center Report 1 (Dec. 1970)), or as "the revolutionary committee in the Supreme Court...” of Georgia, (A. Berle, Power 342 (1969)), it will be true that, as Justice Cardozo is said to have put it, "We are no longer a Court.”
The question whether attorney fees can be awarded in a condemnation case and the procedures to be followed is a value judgment to be made by the legislature. If I were sitting in the legislative branch of government, I would *488probably vote to provide some form of attorney fees. However, I am not there; I am in the judicial branch of government. The majority say that the court must take an activist position on this because the legislature will not act. My response is that this is what representative government and the separation of powers is all about. A leading authority on constitutional law has said that "All too many federal judges have been induced to view themselves as holding roving commissions as problem solvers, and as charged with a duty to act when majoritarian institutions do not.” Bickel, The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress 134 (1970). The Georgia legislature is a legitimate majoritarian body. Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186 (1962); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533 (1964).
My comments are made not against but in support of the independence of the judicial power. "'The independence of each power,’ said James Wilson [one of the founding fathers], 'consists in this,’ it 'should be free from the remotest influence of each of the other two powers. But further than this, the independency of each power ought not to extend.’ ” Statement by Professor Raoul Berger, Before the Senate Sub-committee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery, Washington, D. C., February 26, 1976. The judicial branch will prevent the executive branch from exercising legislative power. Howell v. State, 238 Ga. 95 (230 SE2d 853) (1976). It will prevent the legislative branch from exercising executive power. Greer v. State of Ga., 233 Ga. 667 (212 SE2d 836) (1975); Fuller v. State of Ga., 232 Ga. 581, 586 (208 SE2d 85)(1974). It is also equally important that it prevent itself from exercising either legislative or executive power. As Mr. Justice Brandéis said, "The doctrine of the separation of the powers was adopted .. ., not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was, not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of governmental powers among three departments, to save the people from autocracy.” Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926).