Court Opinion

ID: 9521125
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:58:02.154556+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:47:49.382519
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE LINN, dissenting: I must respectfully dissent since I believe that the majority, while correctly reciting the standard of review in a criminal case, appears to have disregarded the verdict of guilt rendered by the jury in the instant case and has determined de novo whether the evidence sufficiently established the defendant’s guilt. Admittedly, the evidence presented by the State was circumstantial. However, “there is no legal distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence as to the weight and effect thereof.” (People v. Robinson (1958), 14 Ill. 2d 325, 331, 153 N.E.2d 65, 68.) The majority correctly states that “[w]here the only evidence in a prosecution for homicide is circumstantial evidence the guilt of the accused must be so thoroughly established as to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis.” (People v. Lewellen (1969), 43 Ill. 2d 74, 78, 250 N.E.2d 651, 654.) However, this precept should not be interpreted as requiring the prosecution to prove guilt beyond any possibility of a doubt. (People v. Williams (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 478, 363 N.E.2d 801; People v. Murdock (1971), 48 Ill. 2d 362, 270 N.E.2d 21, cert. denied (1971), 404 U.S. 957, 30 L. Ed. 2d 274, 92 S. Ct. 323; People v. Mackins (1974), 17 Ill. App. 3d 24, 308 N.E.2d 92, cert. denied (1975), 419 U.S. 1111, 42 L. Ed. 2d 808, 95 S. Ct. 786.) Unless there are circumstances contradicting the reasonable inferences and conclusions drawn by the jury from such circumstantial evidence, the determination should not and cannot be disturbed. People v. Stone (1977), 46 Ill. App. 3d 729, 361 N.E.2d 330. Without reciting the State’s evidence in this case at great length, it is sufficient to note that defendant had a motive for the murder in that Vivian Patterson had threatened to separate her son from defendant by taking him to California. Defendant was also in possession of a .38-caliber revolver during the time that the murder was committed. It was unnecessary for the jury to make great leaps in logic to conclude that defendant had a reason to murder Vivian Patterson and the means by which to accomplish the crime. That defendant offered his own explanation as to the events does not vitiate the jury’s determination that defendant was guilty of the crime. The jury was entitled to disbelieve his explanation and to discount the credibility of his witnesses, especially in view of the fact that he told a different story immediately after his arrest. See People v. Mackins (1974), 17 Ill. App. 3d 24, 308 N.E.2d 92. I believe credence must be given to the reasonable inferences of guilt drawn by the jury. It is perfectly proper for the majority to make an exhaustive search of the record to determine whether the defendant received a fair trial. However, where, as here, the jury’s verdict is supported by the evidence, the jury’s independent judgment as to the weight to be given the testimony of the witnesses, and the conclusion drawn therefrom as to the defendant’s guilt, must be accepted. It is for the jury to ferret out the truth and determine whether or not there exists a reasonable doubt of guilt. See People v. Stanley (1976), 44 Ill. App. 3d 85, 358 N.E.2d 69. The majority has also negated the jury’s judgment that defendant was proved sane at the time of concealment of the homicidal death. Again, after correctly reciting the applicable law, the evidence which would support a finding of sanity is rejected. Specifically, the majority suggests that a connotation favorable to defendant can be gleaned from the fact that he did not accompany his accomplices during the transporting of the victim’s body. It seems that if this fact is given its natural meaning — that defendant was fearful of being seen with the body — it cannot then be argued that defendant’s absence was due to his grief for Vivian’s death. It is also maintained that although defendant removed the “license-applied-for” sticker from the car which contained his name and could directly implicate him in the crime, he did not obliterate the car dealer’s sticker or the vehicle identification number. While this may be proof which might negate any notion that defendant was a master criminal, it certainly can be implied that defendant was rational and not insane at the time. From the record, the jury could fairly have decided that defendant was sane when he committed the offense, and to reject the testimony of Dr. Mehlinger. The evidence also indicated that defendant suggested keeping watch at the window for the police. It might be supposed that this was due to fear of discovery of the body and the resulting apprehension of defendant and his accomplices as the perpetrators of the crime. The majority chooses to attribute a more innocent purpose to the defendant’s concern, being of the opinion that defendant feared apprehension because it would force him to reveal the true murderer’s name, and thereby place Vivian’s children in danger. Finally, the majority is of the opinion that the denial of defendant’s pretrial motion for a competency examination and fitness hearing requires reversal. Initially, it should be emphasized that there was a complete failure to preserve this point for review. There was neither a post-trial motion directed to this contention or any argument pertaining to the denial of the motion in defendant’s brief on appeal. This issue was raised for the first time at oral argument. Furthermore, I believe a defendant is not entitled to a fitness hearing until the trial court has notice of facts raising a bona fide doubt as to a defendant’s fitness to stand trial. (People v. McCullum (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 306, 362 N.E.2d 307.) The record in the instant case is entirely devoid of any suggestion as to what facts, if any, might lead the trial court to suppose that there was a bona fide doubt as to whether defendant was fit to stand trial. The motion itself merely recited that defense counsel had cause to believe that defendant was not presently fit, and there is no record of what transpired at the hearing on the motion. Consequently, it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion in denying a fitness hearing. (See People v. Nettles (1975), 32 Ill. App. 3d 1082, 338 N.E.2d 199.) Also, even at oral argument, defense counsel failed to inform this court as to the reasons for his belief that defendant was not fit. I believe that more than an idle assertion is necessary to cause this court to find error in the denial of a fitness hearing. For these reasons, I would not disturb the jury’s decision. Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent from the judgment of this court.