Court Opinion

ID: 9372765
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:00:22.037878+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:37.225759
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                       MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
                                       2022 MSPB 34
                              Docket No. DC-0752-15-0431-I-1

                                        Calvin Chin,
                                         Appellant,
                                              v.
                                 Department of Defense,
                                          Agency.
                                       October 7, 2022

           Paul Y. Kiyonaga, Washington, D.C., for the appellant.

           J. Michael Sawyers, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, for the agency.

                                          BEFORE

                            Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                             Raymond A. Limon, Member
                              Tristan L. Leavitt, Member
                    Member Leavitt issues a separate dissenting opinion.

                                  OPINION AND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     sustained the larceny charge, affirmed the agency’s removal action, and found
     that the appellant did not prove his affirmative defenses . For the reasons set forth
     below, we GRANT the petition for review. We MODIFY the initial decision to
     find that the appellant is disabled, but we agree with the administrative judge that
     he did not prove this affirmative defense. We FURTHER MODIFY the initial
     decision to mitigate the removal action to a 90-day suspension.
                                                                                        2

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2        Effective January 25, 2015, the agency removed the appellant from his
     GS-14 Security Specialist position with the Security and Counterintelligence
     Office of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) at Fort Belvoir,
     Virginia, based on a charge of larceny. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 6 at 15-18,
     25. The charge stems from the appellant’s actions on June 23, 2014. Id. at 25-27,
     32-35.   In relevant part, the appellant went to the Defense Logistics Agency
     (DLA) cafeteria at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, put some food from the cafeteria’s
     self-serve breakfast buffet in a container, paid for the food, and put the container
     in a bag. Id. at 33. The appellant then returned to the breakfast buffet, removed
     the container from the bag, put more food in the container, returned the container
     to the bag, and left the cafeteria without paying for the additional food, which
     was valued at $5.00. Id. at 33, 37. These actions were captured on videotape by
     surveillance cameras in the cafeteria. IAF, Tab 7.
¶3        A cafeteria employee who witnessed the incident reported it to her
     supervisor, IAF, Tab 6 at 40, and the matter was ultimately referred to DTRA’s
     Office of Inspector General (OIG) for investigation, id. at 32. OIG investigators
     interviewed the appellant and the cafeteria employee, reviewed the video
     surveillance footage, and concluded that the appellant knowingly took food from
     the cafeteria without rendering payment. Id. at 34.
¶4        The agency then proposed the appellant’s removal based on a charge of
     larceny in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 661, which makes it unlawful to take and carry
     away the personal property of another with the intent to steal. Id. at 26-27. After
     considering the appellant’s oral and written respons es to the proposed removal,
     id. at 15, the deciding official sustained the charge 1 and imposed the removal
     penalty, IAF, Tab 6 at 15-18.

     1
      The notice of proposed removal charged the appellant with violating 18 U.S.C. § 661,
     which pertains to private property. IAF, Tab 6 at 26. However, the decision letter
                                                                                              3

¶5         The appellant filed a Board appeal in which he denied the charge and
     asserted, among other things, that his failure to pay for his second helping of food
     was inadvertent and occurred as a result of his medical condition. IAF, Tab 1,
     Tab 14 at 6. Specifically, the appellant, who has type 2 diabetes, stated that he
     urgently needed to eat because his blood sugar level was l ow, and that his fixation
     on eating caused him to lose focus on paying for the additional food. IAF, Tab 14
     at 5-6. He also raised affirmative defenses of race and disability discrimination,
     harmful procedural error, and violations of his due process rights and the
     statutory provisions found at 5 U.S.C. §§ 2302(b)(10) and (12). 2 IAF, Tab 1 at 7,
     Tab 20 at 2.     He further asserted that the agency did not properly consider
     mitigating factors in deciding to remove him. IAF, Tab 1 at 7.
¶6         Following a hearing, the administrative judge issued an initial decision that
     affirmed the appellant’s removal. IAF, Tab 25, Initial Decision (ID) at 1, 40.
     The administrative judge found that the agency proved the charge by
     preponderant evidence, the appellant did not prove any of his affirmative
     defenses, and the agency established a nexus between the appellant’s misconduct
     and the efficiency of the service.       ID at 3-34.    The administrative judge also
     found that the agency properly considered the relevant factors in deciding to

     identified the charge as a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641, which prohibits the theft of
     public property. Id. at 15. It is undisputed that the food sold in the DLA cafeteria is
     owned by Sodexho, a private company that provides food services to the cafeteria. IAF,
     Tab 13 at 28; Hearing Transcript, Day 1 at 46 (testimony of Sodexho’s general
     manager). For the reasons discussed herein, infra ¶¶ 17-19, this discrepancy does not
     change our analysis of this appeal.
     2
       The provision at 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(10) makes it a prohibited personnel practice for
     an agency to “discriminate for or against any employee or applicant for employment on
     the basis of conduct which does not adversely affect the performance of the employee
     or applicant or the performance of others[.]” The provision at subsection 2302(b)(12)
     makes it a prohibited personnel practice for an agency to “take or fail to take any other
     personnel action if the taking of or failure to take such action violates any law, rule, or
     regulation implementing, or directly concerning, the merit system principles contained
     in subsection 2301 of [Title 5][.]”
                                                                                         4

      remove the appellant and that the penalty of removal was reasonable.             ID
      at 34-39.
¶7         The appellant has filed a petition for review and a motion to add evidence in
      support of the petition. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 3-4. The agency
      has responded to the petition and the motion. PFR File, Tabs 6 -7. The appellant
      has replied to the agency’s responses. PFR File, Tabs 10-11.

                                          ANALYSIS
      We deny the appellant’s motion to add evidence in support of his petition for
      review.
¶8         The appellant seeks to submit as evidence a report summarizing the results
      of a polygraph examination that he took after the initial decision was issued. PFR
      File, Tab 4. Under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(d), the Board normally will not consider
      evidence submitted for the first time with the petition for review absent a showing
      that it was unavailable before the record was closed despite the party’s due
      diligence. Avansino v. U.S. Postal Service, 3 M.S.P.R. 211, 214 (1980).
¶9         The record closed below on July 30, 2015, the initial decision was issued on
      May 13, 2016, and the appellant submitted to the polygraph examination on
      July 11, 2016. Hearing Transcript, Day 2 (HT 2) at 204-05 (statement of the
      administrative judge); ID at 1; PFR File, Tab 4. The appellant claims on review
      that the report could not have been obtained with due diligence before the record
      closed because the initial decision was the first indication that his testimony had
      been perceived as “not credible.” PFR File, Tab 4 at 7.
¶10        This argument is unpersuasive. The appellant should have known that his
      credibility would be a key issue in this appeal, particularly because his defense to
      the charge is that he did not intend to steal the food. IAF, Tab 14 at 6. The
      appellant apparently believed that the administrative judge would credit his
      testimony that he did not intend to steal and discovered that he was mistaken
      when he received the initial decision. However, the Board has held that a party
      may not correct such an error of judgment after the fact.          Mojica-Otero v.
                                                                                           5

      Department of the Treasury, 30 M.S.P.R. 46, 48-49 (1986). Because we find that
      the appellant did not exercise due diligence in submitting to a polygraph
      examination and providing the results to the administrative judge before the
      record closed, we deny his motion.

      The administrative judge correctly found that the agency proved the larceny
      charge.
¶11        On review, the appellant argues that the administrative judge did not
      adequately consider evidence and hearing testimony indicating that his failure to
      pay for his second helping of food was inadvertent. PFR File, Tab 3 at 12 -14.
      For example, the appellant argues that the administrative judge discounted his
      physician’s testimony that the appellant’s urgent need to eat due to his low blood
      sugar would have momentarily distracted him from paying for his second helping
      of food. Id. at 12-13; Hearing Transcript, Day 1 (HT 1) at 170-72 (testimony of
      the appellant’s physician).    This argument is unavailing.      The administrative
      judge thoroughly discussed the physician’s testimony in the initial decision. ID
      at 6-7, 14-15.    The Board will not reconsider the factual findings of a n
      administrative judge based on an allegation that the administrative judge failed to
      give sufficient weight to the evidence introduced on behalf of one party and gave
      too much credence to the evidence submitted by the other. Meier v. Department
      of the Interior, 3 M.S.P.R. 247, 256 (1980).
¶12        We    similarly   find   unavailing   the   appellant’s   contention   that   the
      administrative judge failed to consider letters from two Federal officials attesting
      to the appellant’s trustworthiness or the fact that he was under police surveillance
      for about 3 weeks after the incident and he did not commit any similar
      misconduct. PFR File, Tab 3 at 13-14; HT 1 at 235, 283-87 (testimony of the
      proposing official); IAF, Tab 22 at 1, 5. The appellant asserts that this evidence
      demonstrates that his conduct on June 23, 2014, was out of character and, thus,
      inadvertent. PFR File, Tab 3 at 14. Although the administrative judg e did not
      discuss this evidence in the initial decision, it is well settled that an
                                                                                        6

      administrative judge’s failure to mention all of the evidence of record does not
      mean that she did not consider it in reaching her decision.            Marques v.
      Department of Health & Human Services, 22 M.S.P.R. 129, 132 (1984), aff’d,
      776 F.2d 1062 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Table). Thus, the appellant’s argument provides
      no basis for disturbing the initial decision.
¶13         In concluding that the agency proved the charge, the administrative judge
      reviewed the record evidence, summarized the hearing testimony of the witnesses,
      and made credibility determinations consistent with Hillen v. Department of the
      Army, 35 M.S.P.R. 453, 458 (1987).         ID at 3-15.   Noting that the appellant
      admitted to taking a second helping of food without paying for it and that the
      video surveillance footage supported this finding, the administrative judge
      determined that the appellant was not credible when he testified that his diabetic
      status and low blood sugar explained his actions. ID at 14. Importantly, t he
      administrative judge found that the appellant failed to exhibit a clear, direct, or
      straightforward demeanor during his testimony and his testimony was not
      consistent with the record evidence.      ID at 14.   The Board must defer to an
      administrative judge’s credibility determinations when they are based, explicitly
      or implicitly, on observing the demeanor of witnesses testifying at a hearing; the
      Board may overturn such determinations only when it has “sufficiently sound”
      reasons for doing so. Haebe v. Department of Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1301 (Fed.
      Cir. 2002) . The appellant has not presented such sufficiently sound reasons.
¶14         In sum, the Board will not disturb an administrative judge’s credibility
      findings when she considered the evidence as a whole, drew appropriate
      inferences from the evidence, and made reasoned conclusions.       Crosby v. U.S.
      Postal Service, 74 M.S.P.R. 98, 105-06 (1997). We therefore discern no basis for
      disturbing the administrative judge’s finding that the agency proved the larceny
      charge.
                                                                                              7

      The administrative judge correctly found that the appellant failed to prove his
      affirmative defenses. 3
            Disability discrimination

¶15         Although not raised by the appellant on review, we address his disability
      discrimination claims. In the initial decision, the administrative judge determined
      that the appellant failed to prove that he has an impairment that substantially
      limits him in any major life activity and, thus, he did not prove that he is disabled
      pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1)(i) or (ii).         ID at 23.      As set forth in
      42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B), however, the term “major life activity” includes the
      operation of the endocrine function.         Moreover, the regulation at 29 C.F.R.
      § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii) advises that “it should easily be concluded that . . . diabetes
      substantially limits endocrine function.”         Therefore, we modify the initial
      decision to conclude that the appellant has an impairment that substantially limits
      him in a major life activity, and we conclude that he is disabled. Notwithstanding

      3
        The appellant does not challenge the administrative judge’s findings that h e failed to
      prove his claim that the agency’s action violated 5 U.S.C. §§ 2302(b)(10) and (12).
      ID at 31-34. We discern no reason to disturb the administrative judge’s findings in this
      regard.
      Further, the appellant does not challenge the administrative judge’s conclusion that he
      did not prove his race discrimination claim. ID at 16 -22. In the initial decision, the
      administrative judge applied the evidentiary standards set forth in Savage v. Department
      of the Army, 122 M.S.P.R. 612, ¶¶ 42-43, 48-49, 51 (2015), discussed the various types
      of direct and circumstantial evidence, and evaluated the relevant evidence. ID at 16-22.
      After the initial decision was issued, the Board clarified that the types of evidence set
      forth in Savage are not subject to differing evidentiary standards and explained that “all
      evidence belongs in a single pile and must be evaluated as a whole.” Gardner v.
      Department of Veterans Affairs, 123 M.S.P.R. 647, ¶ 29 (2016) (quoting Ortiz v.
      Werner Enterprises, Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 766 (7th Cir. 2016)), clarified by Pridgen v.
      Office of Management & Budget, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶¶ 23-24. Regardless of the
      administrative judge’s characterization of the evidence relating to the appellant’s race
      discrimination claim, she properly considered the evidence as a whole in finding that
      the appellant failed to prove this affirmative defense. ID at 16 -22. Consequently, as
      mentioned above, we discern no reason to disturb the administrative judge’s ultimate
      finding that the appellant failed to establish his race discrimination claim.
                                                                                        8

      this modification, we agree with the administrative judge that the appellant failed
      to prove a reasonable accommodation claim because he admitted during the
      hearing that he never requested an accommodation for his medical condition. ID
      at 25-26; HT 2 at 138 (testimony of the appellant).
¶16        Moving to the appellant’s disparate treatment disability discrimination
      claim, in a similar vein, we agree with the administrative judge that he failed to
      prove this affirmative defense. ID at 26-28. When the appellant was asked at the
      hearing, “Are you saying that DTRA removed you from federal service because
      you have diabetes?” he responded, “No, no.”       HT 2 at 139 (testimony of the
      appellant). Moreover, on petition for review, the appellant has not challenged the
      administrative judge’s conclusion that he did not prove his disparate treatment
      disability discrimination claim because he failed to present any evidence
      supporting such a claim. Accordingly, the appellant failed to prove this claim.

            Harmful Procedural Error and Due Process

¶17        On review, the appellant reiterates his argument below that the agency
      committed harmful procedural error and violated his due process rights by stating
      in the notice of proposed removal that it was charging him with larceny in
      violation of 18 U.S.C. § 661, but stating in the decision letter that it was
      removing him for violating 18 U.S.C. § 641. PFR File, Tab 3 at 19-21; IAF,
      Tab 14 at 11-12.
¶18        The essential requirements of constitutional due process for a tenured public
      employee are notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the evidence,
      and an opportunity for him to present his account of events. Cleveland Board of
      Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985).         As for the appellant’s
      harmful procedural error claim, the Board may not sustain an agenc y decision if
      there was harmful error in the application of its procedures.            5 U.S.C.
      § 7701(c)(2)(A). Harmful error cannot be presumed; an agency error is harmful
      only when the record shows that the procedural error was likely to have caused
                                                                                       9

      the agency to reach a conclusion different from the one it would have reached in
      the absence or cure of the error.        Stephen v. Department of the Air Force,
      47 M.S.P.R. 672, 681, 685 (1991). It is the appellant’s burden to prove that a
      procedural error occurred and that the error substantially prejudiced his rights
      such that the outcome was probably affected. Mercer v. Department of Health
      & Human Services, 772 F.2d 856, 859 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Stephen, 47 M.S.P.R.
      at 681, 685; 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(c)(1).
¶19        Applying these standards, the administrative judge rejected the appellant’s
      harmful procedural error and due process claims.            ID at 28 -31.     The
      administrative judge found that the evidence demonstrated that the agency
      intended to charge the appellant with violating 18 U.S.C. § 661, and that the
      statement in the decision letter—that he had been charged with violating
      18 U.S.C. § 641—appeared to be an administrative error.       ID at 30-31.    The
      administrative judge found that this error was harmless because there was no
      evidence that citing the incorrect statute caused the agency to reach a conclusion
      different from the one it would have reached in the absence or cure of the error.
      ID at 31. We agree with the administrative judge’s conclusion in this regard. We
      also discern no error with the administrative judge’s conclusion that the
      appellant’s due process rights were not violated because the notice of proposed
      removal provided him with the specific facts and circumstances underlying the
      charge against him, and he had an opportunity to make a meaningful response.
      ID at 28-31; see Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542-46.
¶20        The appellant also raises new allegations of harmful error on review. PFR
      File, Tab 3 at 15-19. For example, he alleges that the agency committed harmful
      procedural error by failing to provide him before his OIG interview with the
      warnings set forth in Garrity et al. v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967), and
                                                                                            10

      Kalkines v. United States, 473 F.2d 1391 (Ct. Cl. 1973). 4           PFR File, Tab 3
      at 17-18. He also contends that the agency failed to comply with the policies set
      forth in its Civilian Disciplinary and Adverse Actions Manual. Id. at 15-17; IAF,
      Tab 22, Exhibit (Ex.) K at 30.
¶21         The Board generally will not consider an argument raised for the first time
      in a petition for review absent a showing that it is based on new and material
      evidence not previously available despite the party’s due diligence.            Banks v.
      Department of the Air Force, 4 M.S.P.R. 268, 271 (1980). As the appellant has
      not made such a showing regarding the allegations of harmful procedural error he
      raises for the first time on review, the Board need not consider them. To the
      extent that the appellant’s arguments are challenges to the penalty determination,
      rather than claims of harmful procedural error, we have considered them in
      evaluating the reasonableness of the penalty.

      The administrative judge correctly found that there is a nexus between the
      appellant’s misconduct and the efficiency of the service.
¶22         In addition to the requirement that the agency prove its c harge, it also must
      prove that there is a nexus, i.e., a clear and direct relationship between the
      articulated grounds for an adverse action and either the appellant’s ability to
      accomplish his duties satisfactorily or some other legitimate Government interest.
      Ellis v. Department of Defense, 114 M.S.P.R. 407, ¶ 8 (2010). On review, the
      appellant contends that the agency failed to meet its burden to prove nexus
      because of his “post-incident superior performance evaluation.” PFR File, Tab 3
      at 24-25.

      4
       Garrity and Kalkines set forth various procedural protections for employees who may face
      criminal prosecution.
                                                                                             11

¶23         We disagree. An agency may establish nexus between off-duty misconduct 5
      and the efficiency of the service by preponderant evidence by showing that the
      misconduct adversely affects the appellant’s or coworkers’ job performance or the
      agency’s trust and confidence in the appellant’s job performance.                   Ellis,
      114 M.S.P.R. 407, ¶ 9.      The appellant’s subsequent performance evaluation is
      inconsequential because an agency is not required to demonstrate a specific
      impact on the appellant’s job performance or service efficiency to establish a
      nexus between the appellant’s off-duty misconduct and the efficiency of the
      service. Jordan v. Department of the Air Force, 36 M.S.P.R. 409, 414 (1988),
      aff’d, 884 F.2d 1398 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (Table). Further, the Board previously has
      found that off-duty misconduct involving an offense of theft can reasonably cause
      an agency to lose trust or confidence in an employee’s ability to function in his
      position. See, e.g., Fouquet v. Department of Agriculture, 82 M.S.P.R. 548, ¶ 18
      (1999).   Here, the administrative judge found that the appellant occupied a
      position of public trust and his collateral responsibilities included “identifying
      and protecting information, personnel, property, facilities, operations [,] or
      material from unauthorized disclosure, misuse, theft, assault, vandalism,
      espionage, sabotage[,] or loss.”       ID at 36; IAF, Tab 6 at 29.            Given the
      seriousness of the appellant’s actions and his responsibilities as a Security
      Specialist, we find that the appellant’s misconduct adversely affected the

      5
        In his prehearing submission, the appellant asserted that he was off duty at the time of
      the misconduct. IAF, Tab 22, Ex. M. However, in his testimony, he stated that he
      came into work that morning, “was in the office for an hour or so to check emails,”
      went to the gym, took a shower, and then went to the cafeteria to get something to eat.
      HT 2 at 63-64 (testimony of the appellant). The record further reflects that employees
      are given up to 3 hours of administrative leave per week to accomplish fitness
      activities. HT 1 at 103 (testimony of the OIG investigator). Thus, while it appears that
      the misconduct occurred during a routine meal break, we cannot discern whether the
      appellant was on duty or off duty at the time of the misconduct. However, even i f we
      determined that it was on-duty misconduct, removal would not be an appropriate
      penalty for the reasons described herein.
                                                                                        12

      agency’s trust and confidence in his ability to perform his job. HT 1 at 327-30
      (testimony of the deciding official).    Therefore, we find that there is a nexus
      between the sustained misconduct and the efficiency of the service warranting
      disciplinary action.

      Because the deciding official failed to appropriately consider the relevant factors,
      the agency’s penalty determination is not entitled to deference.
¶24         On review, the appellant challenges the administrative judge’s finding that
      removal is a reasonable penalty. PFR File, Tab 3 at 1, 21-28; ID at 39. When the
      agency’s charge has been sustained, the Board will review an agency-imposed
      penalty only to determine if the agency considered all of the relevant factors and
      exercised management discretion within tolerable limits of reasonableness.
      Stuhlmacher v. U.S. Postal Service, 89 M.S.P.R. 272, ¶ 20 (2001); Douglas v.
      Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 306 (1981). In Douglas, 5 M.S.P.R.
      at 305-06, the Board listed 12 nonexhaustive factors that are relevant in assessing
      the penalty to be imposed for an act of misconduct, including: the nature and
      seriousness of the offense, and its relation to the appellant’s duties, position, and
      responsibilities; the appellant’s job level and type of employment; his past
      disciplinary record; and his past work record, including his length of service and
      performance history. In determining whether the selected penalty is reasonable,
      the Board gives due weight to the agency’s discretion in exercising its managerial
      function of maintaining employee discipline and efficiency.            Stuhlmacher,
      89 M.S.P.R. 272, ¶ 20. The Board will modify a penalty only when it finds that
      the agency failed to weigh the relevant factors or that the penalty the agency
      imposed clearly exceeded the bounds of reasonableness.         Id.   However, if the
      deciding official failed to appropriately consider the relevant factors, the Board
      need not defer to the agency’s penalty determination. Id.
¶25         Based on our review of the record, including the deciding official’s analysis
      of the Douglas factors, we find that the deciding official failed to appropriatel y
      consider all of the relevant factors in determining the penalty.             As the
                                                                                      13

      administrative judge noted, the Board and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
      Federal Circuit have found that the de minimis nature of a theft may be a
      significant mitigating factor when, as in this appeal, the appellant has a
      satisfactory work record and no prior discipline.     ID at 36 (citing Miguel v.
      Department of the Army, 727 F.2d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 1984), and Underwood
      v. Department of Defense, 53 M.S.P.R. 355, aff’d, 980 F.2d 744 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
      (Table)).    The deciding official’s testimony shows that she did not treat the
      de minimis nature of the theft as a mitigating factor. For instance, she testified
      that she “dismissed” the de minimis nature of the theft in deciding what penalty
      to impose because “what matters is the action,” i.e., the misconduct, which, in her
      view, demonstrated a “lack of character” and caused her not to trust the appellant.
      HT 1 at 328 (testimony of the deciding official). She further stated that someone
      who steals “has a character flaw” and “should not be working as a senior security
      professional . . . with a security clearance in the Department of Defense.” Id.
      at 374.
¶26         Additionally, the record shows that the deciding official failed to consider
      the appellant’s lengthy service (30 years) and his satisfactory work record as
      mitigating factors. In her written Douglas factors analysis, the deciding official
      identified these factors as “NEUTRAL” and stated that she considered them
      “irrelevant vis-à-vis the offense.” IAF, Tab 6 at 21. In her hearing testimony, the
      deciding official explained that she considered these factors irrelevant because
      stealing “shows a character flaw.”     HT 1 at 376 (testimony of the deciding
      official).
¶27         We find that the de minimis nature of the theft, the appellant’s 30 years of
      service, and his satisfactory work record are relevant mitigating factors in this
      case; however, the deciding official did not treat them as mitigating factors in
      determining the penalty.     Instead, as discussed above, the deciding official
      deemed these factors “irrelevant.” We therefore find that the deciding official’s
      treatment of the mitigating factors was not sufficiently substantive, and we do not
                                                                                        14

      defer to her penalty determination.      See Stuhlmacher, 89 M.S.P.R. 272, ¶ 24
      (finding that it was appropriate not to defer to the deciding official’s penalty
      determination because his treatment of the mitigating factors was not sufficiently
      substantive); Omites v. U.S. Postal Service, 87 M.S.P.R. 223, ¶ 11 (2000) (finding
      that the administrative judge correctly did not defer to the agency’s penalty
      determination because the agency failed to seriously consider the relevant
      Douglas factors). Accordingly, we will review the penalty imposed in light of the
      considerations articulated in Douglas to determine whether the penalty exceeds
      the bounds of reasonableness. Brown v. Department of the Treasury, 91 M.S.P.R.
      60, ¶ 17 (2002).

      A 90-day suspension is the maximum reasonable penalty for the appellant’s
      misconduct in light of all of the attendant circumstances.
¶28         The most important factor in assessing whether the agency’s chosen penalty
      is within the tolerable bounds of reasonableness is the nature and seriousness of
      the misconduct and its relation to the employee’s duties, positi on, and
      responsibilities. Edwards v. U.S. Postal Service, 116 M.S.P.R. 173, ¶ 14 (2010).
      As previously discussed, the appellant’s misconduct is very serious, especially
      considering that it involved the violation of a criminal statute.           Mann v.
      Department of Health & Human Services, 78 M.S.P.R. 1, 12 (1998).                 The
      misconduct also is related to the appellant’s duties, position, and responsibilities,
      as his collateral responsibilities included protection of information and property
      from theft or misuse, IAF, Tab 6 at 29, and his position required him to exercise
      good judgment, id. at 19. Further, the appellant’s misconduct was intentional and
      committed for the purpose of achieving a private gain. In addition, because he
      occupied a position of trust and, therefore, owed the agency and the public a
      fiduciary duty, IAF, Tab 6 at 20, the Board may hold him to a higher standard of
                                                                                             15

      conduct than other employees in reviewing the propriety of the penalty, Fowler v.
      U.S. Postal Service, 77 M.S.P.R. 8, 13 (1997). 6
¶29         There are, however, several mitigating factors in this appeal. The appellant
      has 30 years of discipline-free Federal service. IAF, Tab 6 at 25; HT 2 at 43
      (testimony of the appellant); see Wentz v. U.S. Postal Service, 91 M.S.P.R. 176,
      ¶ 18 (2002) (finding that 13 years of discipline-free service was a significant
      mitigating factor). He also performed his job duties successfully, even after his
      misconduct. HT 1 at 287-88 (testimony of the appellant’s immediate supervisor),
      HT 2 at 43 (testimony of the appellant). In addition, the value of the items taken
      was de minimis, IAF, Tab 6 at 37, and his misconduct was not repeated. See,
      e.g., McNeil v. Department of Justice, 117 M.S.P.R. 533, ¶ 16 (2012) (finding
      that the fact that the charge represented a single, isolated incident was a
      mitigating factor); Skates v. Department of the Army, 69 M.S.P.R. 366, 368
      (1996) (noting that the Board and courts have long held that the de mi nimis value
      of stolen items is a factor to be considered in a penalty determination depending
      on the “unique circumstances of each case”); Douglas, 5 M.S.P.R. at 305 (stating
      that a relevant penalty consideration is whether the offense was “frequently
      repeated”).
¶30         Further,   although    not   addressed    by   the   deciding    official   or   the
      administrative judge, another mitigating factor in this case is that the appellant
      did not have custody or control over the stolen items as part of his official duties.
      Our reviewing court and the Board have treated this as a significant mitigating
      factor in cases involving de minimis theft, including cases in which the appellant
      occupied a position of trust.         See, e.g., Miguel, 727 F.2d at 1082, 1084

      6
        Although the deciding official identified the notoriety of the appellant’s misconduct as
      an aggravating factor, IAF, Tab 6 at 21-22, we find no evidence in the record to suggest
      that the appellant’s misconduct resulted in any adverse publicity outside the agency (or
      Sodexho) or that the offense had any impact on the agency’s reputation or its mission.
      See, e.g., Brown, 91 M.S.P.R. 60, ¶ 21.
                                                                                      16

      (remanding for a determination of a lesser penalty after concluding that removal
      was too harsh for a commissary cashier who took two bars of soap valued at
      $2.10); Skates, 69 M.S.P.R. at 368-69 (mitigating a removal to a 14-day
      suspension for the appellant’s theft of left-over food of a de minimis value from
      the dining room where he worked when there was no specific evidence that he
      was in control over the food that he took); Chauvin v. Department of the Navy,
      66 M.S.P.R. 590, 592-93 & n.1 (1995) (mitigating to a 30-day suspension the
      demotion of a shipfitter foreman for the unauthorized possession and attempted
      removal of scrap metal valued at $2.60 because, among other things, the appellant
      did not have custody and control over the property as part of his official duties);
      Kelly v. Department of Health & Human Services , 46 M.S.P.R. 358, 359, 362-63
      (1990) (mitigating to a 90-day suspension the removal of a claims representative
      who was convicted of off-duty shoplifting, finding that the items she took did not
      come into her possession as a result of her position). Conversely, the Board and
      our reviewing court have found that mitigating the agency’s chosen penalty for
      de minimis theft is inappropriate when the employee gained control over the
      stolen item as a direct result of his position. See, e.g., DeWitt v. Department of
      the Navy, 747 F.2d 1442, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (sustaining a commissary
      worker’s removal for taking $14.00 worth of groceries because “[w]here the
      employee takes unauthorized personal possession of property entrusted to his care
      and responsibility, the breach of trust is difficult to repair”); Underwood,
      53 M.S.P.R. at 359 (sustaining a material worker’s removal for the attempted
      theft of two jars of cinnamon that she was responsible for loading and, thus, came
      within her custody and control).
¶31        In sum, although the appellant committed a serious act of misconduct, he
      had no history of prior discipline, he did not repeat the misconduct, the value of
      the stolen items was de minimis, and the items were not in his custody and
      control. In addition, his performance record during his 30 -year Federal career,
      both before and after the incident, has been very good.              Given these
                                                                                         17

      circumstances, we find that removing the appellant would be contrary to the
      agency’s policy of imposing the “lowest possible penalty reasonably expected to
      correct the employee’s behavior.”       IAF, Tab 22, Ex. K at 30.      Thus, while a
      significant disciplinary action is necessary to impress upon the appellant the
      wrongfulness of his conduct, we find that the penalty of removal exceeds the
      tolerable limits of reasonableness. 7
¶32         Under the facts and circumstances of this case, we find that the maximum
      reasonable penalty is a 90-day suspension.         Such a penalty recognizes the
      seriousness of the offense and its severity will impress upon the appellant and
      other DTRA employees that such conduct will not be tolerated. See Ciulla v. U.S.
      Postal Service, 37 M.S.P.R. 627, 628-29, 631 (1988) (mitigating to a 90-day
      suspension the removal of a Postal Distribution Clerk for taking items of
      de minimis value from salvage mail).
¶33         This is the final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board in this
      appeal. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.113 ( 5 C.F.R.
      § 1201.113).

                                              ORDER
¶34         We ORDER the agency to cancel the removal action and substitute a 90-day
      suspension and to restore the appellant effective January 25, 2015. See Kerr v.
      National Endowment for the Arts, 726 F.2d 730 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The agency
      must complete this action no later than 20 days after the date of this decision.
¶35         We also ORDER the agency to pay the appellant the correct amount of back
      pay, interest on back pay, and other benefits under the Office of Personnel
      Management’s regulations, no later than 60 calendar days after the date of this
      decision. We ORDER the appellant to cooperate in good faith in the agency ’s

      7
         We have considered the appellant’s remaining arguments regarding the penalty
      factors, including the impact of his diabetes on the misconduct. E.g., PFR File, Tab 3
      at 22. We are not persuaded that any lesser penalty is warranted.
                                                                                        18

      efforts to calculate the amount of back pay, interest, and benefits due, a nd to
      provide all necessary information the agency requests to help it carry out the
      Board’s Order. If there is a dispute about the amount of back pay, interest due,
      and/or other benefits, we ORDER the agency to pay the appellant the undisputed
      amount no later than 60 calendar days after the date of this decision.
¶36         We further ORDER the agency to tell the appellant promptly in writing
      when it believes it has fully carried out the Board’s Order and of the actions it has
      taken to carry out the Board’s Order. The appellant, if not notified, should ask
      the agency about its progress. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.181(b).
¶37         No later than 30 days after the agency tells the appellant that it has fully
      carried out the Board’s Order, the appellant may file a petition for enforcement
      with the office that issued the initial decision in this appeal if the appellant
      believes that the agency did not fully carry out the Board’s Order. The petition
      should contain specific reasons why the appellant believes that the agency has not
      fully carried out the Board’s Order, and should include the dates and results of
      any communications with the agency. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.182(a).
¶38         For agencies whose payroll is administered by either the National Finance
      Center of the Department of Agriculture (NFC) or the Defense Finance and
      Accounting Service (DFAS), two lists of the information and documentation
      necessary to process payments and adjustments resulting from a Board decision
      are attached. The agency is ORDERED to timely provide DFAS or NFC with all
      documentation necessary to process payments and adjustments resulting from the
      Board’s decision in accordance with the attached lists so that payment can be
      made within the 60-day period set forth above.

                             NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT
                         REGARDING YOUR RIGHT TO REQUEST
                             ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
            You may be entitled to be paid by the agency for your reasonable attorney
      fees and costs. To be paid, you must meet the requirements set out at Title 5 of
                                                                                     19

the United States Code (U.S.C.), sections 7701(g), 1221(g), or 1214(g).             The
regulations may be found at 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.201, 1202.202, and 1201.203. If
you believe you meet these requirements, you must file a motion for attorney fees
and costs WITHIN 60 CALENDAR DAYS OF THE DATE OF THIS DECISION.
You must file your motion for attorney fees and costs with the office that issued
the initial decision on your appeal.

                          NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 8
      You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
review and the appropriate forum with which to file.              5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
jurisdiction.   If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.

8
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                       20

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit   your   petition    to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review    of   cases      involving    a   claim     of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so , you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.      5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).                If you have a
                                                                                21

representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                         Office of Federal Operations
                  Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                               P.O. Box 77960
                          Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via com mercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                         Office of Federal Operations
                  Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                              131 M Street, N.E.
                                Suite 5SW12G
                          Washington, D.C. 20507
                                                                                     22

      (3) Judicial    review     pursuant    to   the   Whistleblower       Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 9 The court of appeals must receive your
petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                                U.S. Court of Appeals
                                for the Federal Circuit
                               717 Madison Place, N.W.
                               Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.

9
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction e xpired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                             23

      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:

/s/
Jennifer Everling
Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.
                                 DEFENSE FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING SERVICE
                                           Civilian Pay Operations

                          DFAS BACK PAY CHECKLIST
The following documentation is required by DFAS Civilian Pay to compute and pay back pay
pursuant to 5 CFR § 550.805. Human resources/local payroll offices should use the following
checklist to ensure a request for payment of back pay is complete. Missing documentation may
substantially delay the processing of a back pay award. More information may be found at:
https://wss.apan.org/public/DFASPayroll/Back%20Pay%20Process/Forms/AllItems.aspx.

NOTE: Attorneys’ fees or other non-wage payments (such as damages) are paid by
vendor pay, not DFAS Civilian Pay.

☐ 1) Submit a “SETTLEMENT INQUIRY - Submission” Remedy Ticket. Please identify the
       specific dates of the back pay period within the ticket comments.

Attach the following documentation to the Remedy Ticket, or provide a statement in the ticket
comments as to why the documentation is not applicable:

☐ 2) Settlement agreement, administrative determination, arbitrator award, or order.

☐ 3) Signed and completed “Employee Statement Relative to Back Pay”.

☐ 4) All required SF50s (new, corrected, or canceled). ***Do not process online SF50s
       until notified to do so by DFAS Civilian Pay.***

☐ 5) Certified timecards/corrected timecards. ***Do not process online timecards until
       notified to do so by DFAS Civilian Pay.***

☐ 6) All relevant benefit election forms (e.g. TSP, FEHB, etc.).

☐ 7) Outside earnings documentation. Include record of all amounts earned by the employee
       in a job undertaken during the back pay period to replace federal employment.
       Documentation includes W-2 or 1099 statements, payroll documents/records, etc. Also,
       include record of any unemployment earning statements, workers’ compensation,
       CSRS/FERS retirement annuity payments, refunds of CSRS/FERS employee premiums,
       or severance pay received by the employee upon separation.

Lump Sum Leave Payment Debts: When a separation is later reversed, there is no authority
under 5 U.S.C. § 5551 for the reinstated employee to keep the lump sum annual leave payment
they may have received. The payroll office must collect the debt from the back pay award. The
annual leave will be restored to the employee. Annual leave that exceeds the annual leave
ceiling will be restored to a separate leave account pursuant to 5 CFR § 550.805(g).
NATIONAL FINANCE CENTER CHECKLIST FOR BACK PAY CASES
Below is the information/documentation required by National Finance Center to process
payments/adjustments agreed on in Back Pay Cases (settlements, restorations) or as ordered by
the Merit Systems Protection Board, EEOC, and courts.
   1. Initiate and submit AD-343 (Payroll/Action Request) with clear and concise information
      describing what to do in accordance with decision.
   2. The following information must be included on AD-343 for Restoration:
       a.   Employee name and social security number.
       b.   Detailed explanation of request.
       c.   Valid agency accounting.
       d.   Authorized signature (Table 63).
       e.   If interest is to be included.
       f.   Check mailing address.
       g.   Indicate if case is prior to conversion. Computations must be attached.
       h.   Indicate the amount of Severance and Lump Sum Annual Leave Payment to be
            collected (if applicable).
Attachments to AD-343
1. Provide pay entitlement to include Overtime, Night Differential, Shift Premium, Sunday
   Premium, etc. with number of hours and dates for each entitlement (if applicable).
2. Copies of SF-50s (Personnel Actions) or list of salary adjustments/changes and amounts.
3. Outside earnings documentation statement from agency.
4. If employee received retirement annuity or unemployment, provide amount and address to
   return monies.
5. Provide forms for FEGLI, FEHBA, or TSP deductions. (if applicable)
6. If employee was unable to work during any or part of the period involved, certification of the
   type of leave to be charged and number of hours.
7. If employee retires at end of Restoration Period, provide hours of Lump Sum Annual Leave
   to be paid.
NOTE: If prior to conversion, agency must attach Computation Worksheet by Pay Period and
required data in 1-7 above.
The following information must be included on AD-343 for Settlement Cases: (Lump Sum
Payment, Correction to Promotion, Wage Grade Increase, FLSA, etc.)
       a. Must provide same data as in 2, a-g above.
       b. Prior to conversion computation must be provided.
       c. Lump Sum amount of Settlement, and if taxable or non-taxable.
If you have any questions or require clarification on the above, please contact NFC’s
Payroll/Personnel Operations at 504-255-4630.
                     DISSENTING OPINION OF TRISTAN L. LEAVITT

                                               in

                              Calvin Chin v. Department of Defense

                             MSPB Docket No. DC-0752-15-0431-I-1

¶1         For the reasons explained below, I respectfully dissent from the majority
     opinion in this case.
¶2         The agency removed the appellant from his GS-14 Security Specialist
     position with the Security and Counterintelligence Office of the Defense Threat
     Reduction Agency at Fort Belvoir, Virginia.       Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1
     at 10-13. As the Foreign Disclosure Officer and Chief of the Foreign Disclosure
     Branch, the appellant recommended to his second-line supervisor what classified
     and other sensitive national security information should be released to foreign
     governments regarding the combating of weapons of mass destruction.             IAF,
     Tab 6 at 28-31.     The position required liaising and negotiating with positional
     counterparts in other Federal defense agencies, id. at 31; Hearing Transcript, Day
     1 (HT 1) at 246-47 (testimony of the appellant’s supervisor), as well as
     “identifying and protecting information, personnel, property, facilities, operations
     or material from unauthorized disclosure, misuse, theft, assault , vandalism,
     espionage, sabotage or loss,” IAF, Tab 6 at 29. The appellant’s job required him
     to   maintain   a    Top    Secret/SCI   (Sensitive   Compartmented    Information)
     security clearance. Id. at 31.
¶3         The removal was based on a charge of larceny in violation of 18 U.S.C.
     § 641. Id. at 15-18, 25. Specifically, the agency charged that the appellant left a
     cafeteria on the military base where he worked without first paying for all the
     food he took. His actions were captured on videotape by surveillance cameras in
     the cafeteria. IAF, Tab 7. The surveillance footage shows the appellant: filling a
     container at a self-serve food bar when a police officer entered the cafeteria to get
     food as well; going to a cashier, paying for an initial amount of food while
                                                                                       2

     looking around for the police officer, and placing the container of food into a
     plastic bag; immediately returning to the food bar and, upon e nsuring no one was
     watching, removing the container from the plastic bag, adding additional food,
     and placing the container back in the plastic bag; beginning to leave the cafeteria
     but then, on noticing the police officer standing at the cashier, abruptly stopping,
     turning around to hide at the back of the cafeteria near an emergency exit door,
     and waiting until the police officer exited; and then leaving the cafeteria without
     paying for the additional food, passing one other individual standing at the
     cashier. Id.
¶4        A cafeteria employee observed the appellant’s actions and reported what
     happened to his manager. HT 1 at 87-88 (testimony of the cafeteria employee).
     The incident was eventually referred for investigation to the agency’s Office of
     Inspector General (OIG), which interviewed the appellant 2 ½ months later. IAF,
     Tab 6 at 32, 34. During the interview, one of the OIG investigators specifically
     asked the appellant if he ever took food from the cafeteria without paying for it,
     which he denied. Id. at 34. When the OIG investigator approached a television
     and asked the appellant to explain the video he was about to see, the appellant
     immediately interrupted him to admit he failed to pay once, explaining, “I was
     impatient and there must have been a line.” Id. at 34; HT 1 at 104-05. A few
     hours after the interview, the appellant returned to the OIG’s office to explain
     that his blood sugar might have been low the day he took the food, and that might
     have been why he did not pay. HT 1 at 109-10; Hearing Transcript, Day 2 (HT 2)
     at 106-07.     However, the OIG investigator testified at the hearing that the
     appellant displayed no symptoms of having low blood sugar in the surveillance
     video. HT 1 at 150-53.
¶5        The agency subsequently suspended the appellant ’s security clearance, HT 2
     at 136-37, and the appellant’s first-line supervisor proposed to remove him,
     noting that his conduct “demonstrates a lack of judgment and honesty that is
     required for [his] position” and that “as a GS-14 [he is] expected to set the
                                                                                          3

     example for junior personnel to follow,” IAF, Tab 6 at 26. In his oral and written
     replies, the appellant argued, among other things, that due to his diabetes his
     blood sugar needed immediate attention at the time of the incident.         Id. at 15.
     The appellant’s second-line supervisor (the deciding official) sustained the
     appellant’s removal.      Id.   In an accompanying worksheet, she outlined her
     consideration of each of the 12 Douglas factors, noting among other things that
     the appellant’s position requires that he use good judgment to make sound
     decisions to protect sensitive national security information; that he is a leader of a
     team of Security Specialists for whom he is expected to lead by example, and that
     as a GS-14 Senior Security Specialist, he is held to a higher standard than
     lower-graded employees; that the video shows an offense that “was intentional
     and willful, not inadvertent or the result of an immediate need to eat” —in other
     words, “a deliberate intent to steal”; that he initially lied abou t his actions to
     investigators; that, even after admitting the offense, he failed to take
     responsibility for his actions; that both the offense and his subsequent statements
     and behavior were indicative of criminal, questionable judgment; and that both
     his and the agency’s credibility were key in working successfully with partner
     agencies in the Federal Government. Id. at 19-24. She also underscored that the
     appellant’s “actions and inactions display a basic lack of integrity,” and
     concluded: “The single most important factor in promoting the good order,
     discipline, efficiency, effectiveness of service, and esprit de corps is trust.
     Managers must be able to trust employees . . . . Ultimately, I do not trust [the
     appellant].” Id. at 24.
¶6         On appeal to the Board, the administrative judge held two days of hearings
     and issued a thorough and comprehensive initial decision in which she found the
     charge sustained and determined that removal was a reasonable penalty under the
     circumstances. IAF, Tab 25, Initial Decision (ID) at 1, 35, 39. She found that
     several claims the appellant made to the OIG and later to the agency were belied
     by the evidence (for instance, claiming the line at the cashier was too long for
                                                                                          4

     him to wait to pay, despite the video plainly showing only one person standing in
     line, and later claiming “a sudden need to ingest food” because of his diabetes
     when he did not eat the food immediately after stealing it).           ID at 12-13.
     Significantly, she also made a demeanor-based determination that the appellant’s
     testimony lacked credibility—precisely the same qualification at issue in the
     agency’s contention that it could no longer fully trust the appellant given his
     critical duties. ID at 14. Among other things, the administrative judge also cited
     the appellant’s lack of remorse and denial of his actions until the OIG was about
     to show him video evidence, ID at 15; the deciding official’s testimony that the
     surveillance video of the incident was critical in her decision to remove the
     appellant, ID at 10, that she no longer trusted him with classified information, ID
     at 33, and that her lack of trust in him overrode any rehabilitation potential, id.;
     and the fact that he held the highest security clearance level available to a
     civilian, id.    The administrative judge, moreover, dedicated 5 ½ pages of her
     decision to assessing the reasonableness of the imposed penalty.           ID at 34-39.
     She concluded: “While I believe the appellant’s lengthy service history and
     absence of a disciplinary record are worthy of serious consideration, I find the
     appellant’s position, duties, and responsibilities, and the agency’s mission[,]
     make returning him to the position of record impossible despite the de minimis
     value of the items he stole.” ID at 39.
¶7            In the majority opinion, my colleagues agree the administrative judge
     correctly found the agency proved the larceny charge, but voted to mitigate the
     removal to a 90-day suspension.           In situations such as this when the
     administrative judge sustains the charges brought by the agency, the Board
     reviews the agency-imposed penalty only to determine if the agency considered
     all the relevant factors and exercised management discretion “within the tolerable
     limits    of    reasonableness.”   Singletary v.   Department   of   the     Air Force,
     94 M.S.P.R. 553, ¶ 9 (2003), aff’d, 104 F. App’x 155 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Douglas v.
     Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 305-06 (1981). As our reviewing court
                                                                                        5

     held 35 years ago, “It is well established that the determination of the proper
     disciplinary action to be taken to promote the efficiency of the service is a matter
     peculiarly and necessarily within the discretion of the agency.” Parker v. U.S.
     Postal Service, 819 F.2d 1113, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1987).           “Indeed,” the court
     continued, “deference is given to the agency’s judgment unless the penalty
     exceeds the range of permissible punishment specified by statute or regulation, or
     unless the penalty is ‘so harsh and unconscionably disproportionate to the offense
     that it amounts to an abuse of discretion.’” Id. (quoting Villela v. Department of
     the Air Force, 727 F.2d 1574, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). Thus, it is decidedly not
     the Board’s role to decide what penalty we would impose if we were the de ciding
     officials. We held in the case of Douglas, our first major consideration of this
     issue after the Board’s creation:
           Management of the federal work force and maintenance of discipline
           among its members is not the Board’s function. Any margin of
           discretion available to the Board in reviewing penalties must be
           exercised with appropriate deference to the primary discretion which
           has been entrusted to agency management, not to the Board. Our
           role in this area, as in others, is principally to assure th at managerial
           discretion has been legitimately invoked and properly exercised.
     5 M.S.P.R. at 300-01.
¶8         Here, the administrative judge considered the deciding official’s testimony,
     finding it consistent with the agency’s decision letter and the Douglas factors
     checklist she completed.       IAF, Tab 6 at 19-24.        As outlined above, the
     considerations most important to the deciding official were the seriousness of the
     appellant’s willful and intentional misconduct, his display of poor judgment, his
     public trust position as a Senior Security Specialist (which carries the highest
     civilian clearance level at the agency and thereby causes him to be held to a
     higher standard, such as requiring him to self-report all incidents of an
     unfavorable, a disqualifying, or a derogatory nature), the fact that he only
     admitted to the theft after being confronted with video evidence of the incident,
     the embarrassment and lack of trust that his misconduct caused, and the
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      deleterious effect the dishonest behavior would have upon his ability to perform
      his duties at a satisfactory level.
¶9          Although my colleagues state that the deciding official failed to adequately
      consider the appellant’s 30 years of service and the de minimis nature of the
      offense, I cannot agree. For instance, the removal decision letter, addressed to
      the appellant, clearly reads, “You highlighted in your argument that the amount of
      food stolen was di minimis, . . . your years of experience in the federal
      government, and your work history.” IAF, Tab 6 at 15. The deciding official
      also testified at the hearing that she did in fact consider the appellant’s lengthy
      service when she assessed which penalty to impose. HT 1 at 313, 374-75. Yet as
      she recorded on her Douglas factor worksheet, this factor was outweighed b y “the
      level of responsibility, the fiduciary responsibilities, and the expectation of
      exemplary personal conduct.” IAF, Tab 6 at 21.
¶10         Furthermore, a considerable amount of time was spent discussing the
      de minimis issue at the hearing, during direct examination and especially during
      cross-examination of the deciding official. HT 1 at 313, 327-29, 356-66, 368,
      376-79. In particular, the deciding official testified that, although she considered
      the de minimis amount of stolen food as a factor, in her judg ment, “a person who
      will take shortcuts, lie, cheat, and steal . . . on something as miniscule as $5.00 of
      food is more apt to take those steps with things that are more important . . . .” Id.
      at 328-29. She further testified that “a kind of person who would take a shortcut
      and not pay for something, in other words steal it, is the kind of person who
      would take a shortcut in the performance of other duties which are assigned to
      [him].”    Id. at 364.    She emphasized that, given the critical nature of the
      appellant’s position and the importance of the agency’s mission, i.e., to prevent
      the spread and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, “[t]hose shortcuts
      could result in a national security event.” Id.
¶11         Likewise, the deciding official testified that she reviewed and discussed
      with agency counsel the “squib sheet” or summary of court and Board decisions —
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      specifically dealing with the mitigation of removal actions for employees accused
      of offenses of a de minimis nature—that the appellant’s counsel presented to her
      during the oral reply.    Despite her review and evaluation of this case law,
      however, the deciding official still believed that the holdings in those cases
      did not warrant mitigating the removal penalty in this matter. Id. at 377-79. To
      me, the deciding official clearly demonstrated that she considered all specific,
      relevant mitigating factors before determining the penalty and showed that the
      agency’s judgment to impose a removal did not clearly exceed the limits of
      reasonableness. Lopez v. Department of the Navy, 108 M.S.P.R 384, ¶ 22 (2008).
¶12         The administrative judge reviewed the same factors the deciding official
      considered, as well as the fact that, as part of his duties, the appellant was
      responsible for “protecting information, personnel, property, facilities, operations
      or material from unauthorized disclosure, misuse, theft . . . .”       ID at 33, 39
      (emphasis in original). She also considered other critical issues not mentioned in
      the majority opinion, such as the appellant’s initial dishonesty in his dealings
      with OIG investigators, which goes to the heart of the issue of trust the deciding
      official cited in finding the appellant incapable of rehabilitation. ID at 12-13, 15.
      Further making the agency’s point, the administrative judge concluded that the
      appellant displayed a lack of credibility in his hearing testimony, finding that he
      “failed to exhibit a clear, direct, or straightforward demeanor during his
      testimony and his testimony does not support the evidence of record.” ID at 14;
      see Haebe v. Department of Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
      (holding that the Board must defer to an administrative judge’s credibility
      determinations when they are based, explicitly or implicitly, on observing the
      demeanor of witnesses testifying at a hearing; the Board may overturn such
      determinations only when it has “sufficiently sound” reasons for doing so).
¶13         To me, these factors are quite convincing.         The administrative judge
      determined that the deciding official—the official most responsible in the
      Government for relying on the good judgment of the appellant, as the second -line
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supervisor to whom he makes recommendations on releasing classified and other
sensitive information—properly considered the Douglas factors most relevant to
this case and reasonably exercised her management discretion.         I believe the
administrative judge also properly considered the de minimis nature of the
appellant’s theft and his 30 years of service, but agreed with the deciding official
that those factors were outweighed by the numerous other aggravating factors. I
acknowledge that if I were the deciding official at the agency, I might have
considered this case a “very close call,” as did the administrative judge. ID at 39.
However, I cannot find that the agency’s penalty determination was outside of the
tolerable limits of reasonableness, and thus I firmly agree with the administrative
judge that it should not be disturbed.

/s/
Tristan L. Leavitt
Member