Court Opinion

ID: 9600673
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:30:01.999784+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:55.164561
License: Public Domain

*289HUNSTEIN, Presiding Justice,
dissenting.
“A contract of insurance should be strictly construed against the insurer and read in favor of coverage in accordance with the reasonable expectations of the insured. [Cit.]” Roland v. Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 265 Ga. 776, 777 (1) (462 SE2d 623) (1995). Thus, where a baldly literal interpretation of the words in an insurance policy would lead to a result no reasonable insured would expect, we have rejected such interpretation. See id. (though plain language of homeowners’ policy predicated coverage on condition that subject residence was “the only premises where the named insured or spouse maintains a residence,” wife’s coverage was effective even after she had moved out of residence upon couple’s separation). Whether or not the terms “pollutant,” “irritant,” or “contaminant” in this context are characterized as ambiguous — which, simply by virtue of the impressive number of reported cases in which courts have struggled to construe these terms, I would posit they are9 — the bottom line is that a purchaser of commercial general liability insurance would not reasonably expect based on the broadly defined pollution exclusion that injuries caused by carbon monoxide released within the insured’s own premises would be excluded from coverage.
Indeed, the interpretation advanced by Auto-Owners and adopted by the majority
stretches the plain meaning of the policy exclusion. When viewed in isolation, the terms “irritant” and “contaminant” are “virtually boundless, for there is no substance or chemical in existence that would not irritate or damage some person or property.”
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Regional Bank of Colorado v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 35 F3d 494, 498 (10th Cir. 1994) (carbon monoxide from residential heater not within meaning of pollution exclusion). Take, for example, a scenario in which a malfunctioning dishwasher overflows, flooding the kitchen and warping its floor; is the water, by virtue of its ability to damage the floor, a “contaminant” or “irritant” falling within the pollution exclusion? Under the majority’s holding, the answer, absurdly, would seem to be yes.
In short, as construed by the majority, the pollution exclusion *290functions as a gaping loophole into which the insurer can seek haven in situations in which no reasonable insured would have envisioned the exclusion to apply. The majority’s failure in this instance to “read [the policy] as a layman would read it” and “strictly construe[ the exclusion] against the insurer and in favor of coverage,” York Ins. Co. v. Williams Seafood of Albany, Inc., 273 Ga. 710, 712 (1) (544 SE2d 156) (2001), makes for neither good law nor good public policy. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
Decided September 22, 2008.
Beck, Owen & Murray, Charles D. Jones, Johnston, Owen & Bullard, William G. Johnston III, for appellants.
Talley, French & Kendall, Michael C. Kendall, for appellee.
Wiley Rein, William T. Maxson III, Laura Foggan, amici curiae.
I am authorized to state that Justice Carley joins in this dissent.

 The Court of Appeals below identified at least 17 state and federal cases construing similar pollution exclusions, with roughly half cited in favor of the majority’s position and half supporting the dissent. See Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Reed, 286 Ga. App. 603, 606, 608, n. 8 (649 SE2d 843) (2007).