Court Opinion

ID: 9529336
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:49:56.006035+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:44.566265
License: Public Domain

BAKER, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I fully concur with the majority's holding that the trial court properly modified custody as to Kr.W. and the holding as to the child support order. However, I cannot agree with its finding that Trial Rule 58.8 operated to preclude the trial court's authority to grant Mother's motion to correct error.
In my view, three reasons exist for affirming the trial court's determination: 1) The existing case law does not impose a "bright-line rule" that would render all belatedly granted motions void; 2) Father did not object to the later settings, and, notably, the first postponement was at Father's request; thus, Father acquiesced in and invited any error; and 3) the trial court's determination as to Mother's ar-rearage was incorrect, and its continuing jurisdiction over child support matters would extend to arrearage determinations.
First, the current state of the law, as expressed in Cavinder Elevators, Inc. v. Hall, 726 N.E.2d 285, 288 (Ind.2000), provides that "enforcement of the 'deemed denied' provision of Trial Rule 58.3(A)" is not self-executing so as to render the belated grant of a motion to correct error a nullity. Rather, a belated grant of the motion is "voidable" if the opposing party promptly appeals. Id. When a defendant fails "to promptly appeal this belated grant, such failure would constitute waiver and would have precluded a subsequent appellate claim that the motion to correct error was denied under Trial Rule 53.83(A)." Id. Further, the court recognized that "[wlhen a trial court considers and grants a motion to correct error, even if done belatedly, we perceive that such a decision will typically be correct on the merits and will result in expeditious further proceedings, without an interirening appeal." Id.
I believe the overarching theme in Ca-vinder is that form should not be elevated over substance. Here, the trial court's decision granting the motion acknowledged such; the court specifically stated: "fundamental fairness © trumps sharp practice...." Tr. March 831, 2004 p. 5. Moreover, as was noted in Cavinder, the trial court in this instance granted the motion because its original order was incorrect. Accordingly, while I do not subscribe to the view that Trial Rule 58.3 establishes a "bright-line" rule, even if such a rule is well-advised, this would not be the case in which to advance its virtues.
Second, there is no indication that Father objected to the trial court's continuances of the hearing on Mother's motion to correct error. In fact, the first setting of the hearing was continued at Father's behest. A party may. not take advantage of an error that he commits, invites, or which is the natural consequence of his own ne-gleet or misconduct. Batterman v. Bender, 809 N.E.2d 410, 412 (Ind.Ct.App.2004). Invited error is not subject to review by this court. Id. Here, Father acquiesced in and invited any error that could have been predicated upon the time constraints within Trial Rule 53.3.
Third, we have held that a trial court has continuing jurisdiction over matters of child support. See Hoehn v. Hoehn, 716 *49N.E.2d 479, 481 (Ind.Ct.App.1999). As observed in Straub v. B.M.T., 645 N.E.2d 597, 599-600 (Ind.1994), parents cannot contract away the child support benefits of their children-a right that lies exclusively with the child. Thus, some of the-conven: tional temporal limitations applicable to most actions will not apply to child support rights. That concept applies here. By logical extension, the trial court enjoys continuing jurisdiction over child support arrearages. The strict application of time limitations on the trial court's ruling on a matter-at the heart of which lies a ruling on child support-would be an affront to the continuing jurisdiction afforded trial courts.
For these reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court in all respects.