Court Opinion

ID: 9588398
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:34:07.52929+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:00:58.667133
License: Public Domain

MILLER, Chief Justice,
concurring, in part, and dissenting, in part:
I agree with the Court’s holding that the Gazette’s abuse of process cause of action *281was not timely filed, but I disagree with its conclusion that the malicious prosecution was timely filed. As the majority acknowledges, it is generally held that the right to bring a malicious prosecution action arises when there has been a termination of the underlying suit in favor of the party now bringing the malicious prosecution action. (Majority p. 276). Annot., 87 A.L.R.2d 1047, 1049 (1963). Furthermore, the majority correctly notes that there is a one-year statute of limitations for a malicious prosecution action, as we held in Syllabus Point 10 of Porter v. Mack, 50 W.Va. 581, 40 S.E. 459 (1901):
“An action for malicious prosecution sounding in consequential and punitive damages, although affecting business and property is such a personal action as does not survive to the personal representative, and is barred by the statute of limitations after one year from the time when the right to bring the same first accrued.”
See also Duffy v. Ogden Newspapers, Inc., 170 W.Va. 318, 294 S.E.2d 121 (1982).
The majority does not take the date of the dismissal orders as being the date the cause of action arose. These orders were entered under Rule 41(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure (R.C.P.), which permits a dismissal for failure to prosecute civil actions.1 Instead, the majority adds three more terms of court from the date of dismissal on the theory that the plaintiffs could have revived the suits under Rule 41(b), R.C.P., during this period.
It seems to me that the majority’s reasoning is flawed for several reasons. First, the right to revive a Rule 41(b), R.C.P., dismissal is not automatic, but discretionary since the term “may” is used, and we have historically said that good cause must also be shown. Snyder v. Hicks, 170 W.Va. 281, 294 S.E.2d 83 (1982); Nibert v. Carroll Trucking Co., 139 W.Va. 583, 82 S.E.2d 445 (1954). Second, the right to revive rests with the plaintiff in the original action. This right is analogous to his right to appeal from an adverse termination of his case. However, we have direct authority which holds that time for filing a malicious prosecution suit is not extended because the plaintiff in the underlying suit had an appeal period. Allen v. Burdette, 89 W.Va. 615, 109 S.E. 739 (1921).2 The majority’s attempt to distinguish Allen is unpersuasive to me.
Finally, the majority ignores credible law from other jurisdictions that have dealt with this issue of a Rule 41(b) dismissal in the context of later malicious prosecution actions and have stated that such a dismissal is an adjudication on the merits. See, e.g., Minasian v. Sapse, 80 Cal.App.3d 823, 145 Cal.Rptr. 829 (1978); Brodie v. Hawaii Automotive Retail Gasoline Dealers Ass’n, Inc., 2 Hawaii App. 316, 631 P.2d 600, rev’d. on other grounds, 65 Hawaii 598, 655 P.2d 863 (1982); Nagy v. McBurney, 120 R.I. 925, 392 A.2d 365 (1978). The rationale most commonly advanced is that a Rule 41(b) dismissal is on the merits because ordinarily a plaintiff does not *282abandon a meritorious case, as stated in Minasian v. Sapse, 80 Cal.App.3d at 827, 145 Cal.Rptr. at 832: “A dismissal for failure to prosecute under [Rule 41(b) ] ... does reflect on the merits of the action, and that reflection is favorable to the defendant in the action. The reflection arises from the natural assumption that one does not simply abandon a meritorious action once instituted.” We have adopted the same rule in Perlick & Co. v. Lakeview Creditor’s Trustee Comm., 171 W.Va. 195, 298 S.E.2d 228, 235 (1982), that a “dismissal [under Rule 41(b) ], unless the court otherwise specified, operates as an adjudication upon the merits. (Footnote omitted.)” Although Perlick did not involve a malicious prosecution problem, it does represent the general view that a Rule 41(b) dismissal order operates as an adjudication on the merits.
Furthermore, the rule itself provides that “[ujnless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision ... other than for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue, operates as an adjudication upon the merits.” Rule 41(b), R.C.P. Thus to me it is apparent that once the Rule 41(b), R.C.P., dismissal orders were entered in the libel suits brought against the Gazette, it had one year from the date of the entry of the orders to bring its malicious prosecution action against the original plaintiffs in the libel action and their attorney. The last of the orders was entered in August, 1979, and this malicious prosecution action was not filed until almost two years later in July, 1981. Clearly, it should be barred from such prosecution by the one-year stat-' ute of limitations.

. The material portion of Rule 41(b), R.C.P., states:
"Any court in which is pending an action wherein for more than two years there has been no order or proceeding but to continue it, or wherein the plaintiff is delinquent in the payment of accrued court costs, may, in its discretion, order such action to be struck from its docket; and it shall thereby be discontinued. The court may direct that such order be published in such newspaper as the court may name. The court may, on motion, reinstate on its trial docket any action dismissed under this rule, and set aside any nonsuit that may be entered by reason of the nonappearance of the plaintiff, within three terms after entry of the order of dismissal or nonsuit; but an order of reinstatement shall not be entered until the accrued costs are paid.”

. The Court’s language in Burdette, 89 W.Va. at 621, 109 S.E. at 741, was:
“[W]here a judgment has been rendered by a court in which a suit has been instituted which finally disposes of that suit adversely to the plaintiff, the defendant may maintain a suit for the malicious prosecution of such suit without waiting for the time to expire within which appellate proceedings may be instituted, and this being true, of course, it follows that the Statute of Limitations begins to run against him from the entry of the judgment finally disposing of the suit alleged to be maliciously prosecuted_”