Court Opinion

ID: 9483516
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:22:51.731956+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:04.244586
License: Public Domain

COFFEY, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the majority’s decision upholding the defendant police officers’ seizure of the plaintiffs’ illegal lottery tickets and other items associated with the sale of lottery tickets as within the scope of the search warrant. I am forced to write separately to express my disagreement with the majority’s attempt to unnecessarily expand the plain view doctrine, thus permitting police officers to seize items not authorized in the warrant or items which are beyond the legal parameters of the recognized plain view exception to the Fourth Amend*306ment warrant requirement. The majority states that the officer can exercise his or her own discretion when executing the warrant and seize items not authorized in the warrant or items not incriminating on their face “because items not in fact necessary for proceedings against the owner can always be returned whereas items not seized are unlikely to be found the next time the police go looking for them. ” Maj.Op. at 302 (citing United States v. Blakeney, 942 F.2d 1001, 1028 (6th Cir.1991)). I respectfully disagree, and emphasize that it is the magistrate who is authorized under present case law to exercise discretion in the issuance of the warrant and “nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.” Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 144, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 2312, 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990) (quoting Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 48 S.Ct. 74, 72 L.Ed. 231 (1927)); see also Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480, 96 S.Ct. 2737, 2748, 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976); United States v. Shoffner, 826 F.2d 619, 630-31 (7th Cir.1987) (the warrant should describe with reasonable specificity the categories of items to be seized, so that officers are not called upon to exercise discretion when executing the warrant); United States v. Somers, 950 F.2d 1279, 1285 (7th Cir.1991) (search warrant should describe the objects of the search with reasonable specificity and need not be elaborately detailed).1
After holding that the “defendants were entitled to rely on the warrant,” the majority utilizes the Blakeney decision to conclude that law enforcement officers “were not obliged to interpret [the warrant] narrowly, and it would have been a mistake for them to do so ...” because irrelevant items or “items not in fact necessary for proceedings against the owner can always be returned_” Maj.Op. at 302. The majority’s use of the Blakeney decision to permit police officers to exercise discretion when invoking the plain view doctrine is inappropriate because Blakeney is a case limited to its unique set of facts and should not apply to the search warrant executed in Hessels’ restaurant. In Blakeney, the Sixth Circuit found the plain view doctrine applicable to the seizure of a suitcase containing both incriminating and non-incriminating documents. Blakeney, 942 F.2d at 1028. The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Blakeney permitting the seizure of items not specified in the warrant but in plain view is limited to its facts: “Agent Sadow-ski testified that the brown suitcase contained a ‘tremendous amount of paperwork and other items.... ’ He sifted through the items and ... decided to seize the suitcase in its entirety.” Id. at 1028 n. 13. Because the Blakeney court reasoned that it was impracticable for the police officer to “inventory and record at the site of the search the numerous contents of the suitcase ...,” the Sixth Circuit concluded the “seizure of irrelevant items within the suitcase along with the relevant items does not violate the fourth amend-ment_” Id. at 1028 & n. 13. I have no disagreement with the Blakeney decision as applied to its particular and unique set of facts.2 However, the Blakeney decision did not state that police officers may use discretion in executing a warrant, rather it held that
“under the circumstances of this case, probable cause was both immediate and apparent to the executing officers. The incriminating nature of these documents relating to the methamphetamine production was readily apparent to the executing officers who were aware that Blake-*307ney was a fugitive from methamphetamine conspiracy charges. For the foregoing reasons, the seizure of these items was not unlawful.”
Blakeney, 942 F.2d at 1028. Thus, the agent in Blakeney did not engage in a general exploratory search in seizing documents related to the drug conspiracy because the items’ incriminating nature was immediately apparent. Id. Under the unique circumstances of the Blakeney case, the seizure of irrelevant items along with the seizure of relevant items to the drug conspiracy did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Id. (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 464-69, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2037-40, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) (plurality opinion)). The majority misapplies Blakeney in stating that items “not in fact necessary for proceedings against the owner [can be seized since they] can always be returned_” Maj.Op. at 302. Blakeney does not stand for the proposition that non-incriminating items may be seized within the plain view doctrine even though they are determined to be irrelevant and can be returned to the owner at a later date. I read Blakeney to hold that only those items whose incriminating nature is immediately apparent may be seized under the plain view doctrine. In its attempt to expand the authority of law enforcement officers beyond the plain view exception’s permissible limits, the majority has mis-characterized Blakeney as permitting the seizure of any non-incriminating items as they could always be returned to the Hes-sels.
It is well established that a seizure of evidence in plain view is permitted under the requirements of Coolidge v. New Hampshire. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 465, 91 S.Ct. at 2037. Initially, Coolidge states that the police officer must have prior justification for being on the premises in the course of executing a warrant. Id. Next, the officer may seize an item in plain view only when he or she inadvertently comes across a piece of evidence and it is immediately apparent to the officer that the evidence is of an incriminating nature. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 134-36, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 2307, 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990) (citing Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 465-66, 91 S.Ct. at 2037-38).
“[T]he extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the ‘plain view’ doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges.”

Id.

Despite this accepted precedent, the majority pursues an unjustified line of reasoning without legal support, and takes a giant leap in stating that police officers may seize “items seen during the search but not incriminating on their face, and items that are not seen but that a more extensive search would bring to light.” Maj.Op. at 302 (emphasis added). If the majority’s new and expanded interpretation of the plain view doctrine becomes the law, then the “immediately apparent ” requirement will cease to exist. The Supreme Court in Coolidge and most recently in Horton explained that “not only must the item be in plain view, its incriminating character must also be ‘immediately apparent. ’ ” Horton, 496 U.S. at 136-38, 110 S.Ct. at 2308 (quoting Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 491, 91 S.Ct. at 2038) (emphasis added). Without the “immediately apparent” requirement, police officers unauthorized to exercise discretion now would be free to exercise discretion and seize items in plain view even if the items’ incriminating nature were not immediately apparent. See Horton, 496 U.S. at 136-38, 110 S.Ct. at 2308; Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 491, 91 S.Ct., at 2038. Thus, I disagree with the majority that police officers should be able to use their discretion in seizing items in plain view and later “winnow the wheat from the chaff.” Maj.Op. at 302. Rather, as stated earlier, I understand the plain view doctrine to mean that law enforcement officers may only seize those items that almost “jump out” at them and immediately exhibit an incriminating character when inadvertently discovered in plain view. Horton, 496 U.S. at 134-36, 110 S.Ct. at 2307; Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 588, 100 *308S.Ct. 1371, 1380, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980); see Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 327, 107 S.Ct. 1149, 1153, 94 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987) (Sca-lia, J.). For example, if the law enforcement officers have a search warrant authorizing the seizure of stolen merchandise, fruits of a crime, i.e. a Motorola television from a home, but upon executing the warrant they discover it is a Zenith T.Y. with serial and/or identification numbers corresponding to those described in the warrant and it immediately appears to be connected with the criminal activity detailed in the warrant, the seizure of the Zenith television would be permissible. See, e.g., United States v. Jefferson, 714 F.2d 689, 694 (7th Cir.1983) (where the furs, jewelry and firearms seized under the plain view exception possessed an immediately incriminating character as fruits of the illegal drug dealing operation); cf. Hicks, 480 U.S. at 324, 107 S.Ct. at 1152 (where the police seized two sets of expensive stereo equipment in a squalid apartment after verifying they were stolen from the equipment’s serial numbers).
On the one hand, the majority recognizes that there are limits to the police officers’ powers and would “not like to be understood as suggesting that a search warrant gives the executing officers a blank check.” Maj.Op. at 302. The majority further gives police officers a “blank check” and permits them to seize items that were neither inadvertently discovered nor immediately apparent to them as being connected with criminal activity. Maj.Op. at 302 (citing United States v. Jefferson, 714 F.2d 689, 694 (7th Cir.1983); United States v. Blakeney, 942 F.2d 1001, 1028 (6th Cir.1991); cf Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 479-82, 96 S.Ct. 2737, 2748, 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976)). The panel, in justifying its giving of discretion to police officers, considers that unless the warrant is “flexibly interpreted” those items not incriminating on their face or not seen in plain view would evade seizures. Maj.Op. at 302. The panel’s reasoning that the plain view doctrine should be expanded to include those non-incriminating items that would evade seizure is unnecessary in the 1990s considering the fact that the police officer today, including federal and many local law enforcement officials, can obtain a search warrant via the telephone in many jurisdictions. United States v. Cuaron, 700 F.2d 582, 586-88 (10th Cir.1983); Adam K. Peck, The Securing of the Premises Exception: A Search for the Proper Balance, 38 Vand.L.Rev. 1589, 1601-10 & n. 75 (1985). In fact, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure authorize a magistrate to issue warrants based on telephone communications if (1) the officer provides sworn oral testimony over the phone; (2) the officer prepares a “duplicate original warrant” that will reflect verbatim what is read over the phone to the magistrate who prepares the “original warrant;” and (3) the magistrate issues the warrant, after finding probable cause, “by directing the person requesting the warrant to sign the Federal magistrate’s name on the duplicate original warrant.” Cuaron, 700 F.2d at 588 (quoting Fed. R.Crim.P. Rule 41(c)(2)). Alternatively, the police may “secure the premises” with another officer standing guard and perform the search of the dwelling or building upon the arrival of the search warrant. United States v. Agapito, 620 F.2d 324, 337 (2d Cir.1980); United States v. Diaz, 577 F.2d 821, 824 (2d Cir.1978); Adam K. Peck, The Securing of the Premises Exception: A Search for the Proper Balance, 38 Vand. L.Rev. 1589, 1603-05 (1985). In Diaz, the court noted that because the police were without probable cause to arrest the defendant’s wife and children, the only practical means of preserving the evidence consisting of $14,000 and a telephone book related to the drug conspiracy was for the police to stand watch over the occupants and the premises until a warrant arrived and then seize the evidence. Diaz, 577 F.2d at 824 n. 3. Because the “securing of the premises” is often the most practical means of preserving possibly incriminating items, as in Diaz, the police should secure the premises and/or wait the arrival of an officer to seize the incriminating items described in the warrant. See id.
There is a reason the plain view doctrine limits the seizure of inadvertently discover*309ed items (in the Hessels’ case, illegal lottery tickets, the ticket proceeds, business records, and an adding machine) to items that possess an incriminating character. See United States v. Jefferson, 714 F.2d 689, 694-95 (7th Cir.1983). The rationale for the plain view exception is that a plain view seizure “will not turn an initially valid (and therefore limited) search into a ‘general’ one_” Horton, 496 U.S. at 136-38, 110 S.Ct. at 2308 (quoting Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 469-71, 91 S.Ct. at 2040-41). As the Seventh Circuit in Jefferson stated, a “logical nexus” must exist between seized but unnamed items and those items listed in the warrant to permit the seizure of the unnamed items within the plain view doctrine. Jefferson, 714 F.2d at 695. Were we to expand the scope of the plain view doctrine beyond the logical nexus the court described in Jefferson, search warrants could be interpreted so broadly that officers would be seizing items outside the scope of the warrant.
I write separately to emphasize my concern with the court’s unwarranted expansion of the plain view doctrine to include the seizure of irrelevant and non-incriminating items not described in the search warrant. “A man’s home is his castle” into which “not even the King may enter.” Cf. Rowan v. United States Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728, 738, 90 S.Ct. 1484, 1491, 25 L.Ed.2d 736 (1970); City of Watseka v. Illinois Public Action Council, 796 F.2d 1547, 1571 (7th Cir.1986); see also Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 1541, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983) (police officers may seize items in the course of executing a search warrant that they honestly and sincerely believe is part of the criminal activity); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1325, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (“the search must be limited in scope to that which is justified by the particular purposes served by the exception”). Thus, I concur in the majority’s result, but disagree with the majority’s expansion of the plain view doctrine.

. "[T]he warrant must be sufficiently definite so that the officer executing it can identify the property sought with reasonable certainty." La-Fave & Israel, Criminal Procedure § 3.4(f), at 227 (1984) (quoting State v. Muldowney, 60 NJ. 594, 292 A.2d 26 (1972)).

. The items seized in the instant case are distinguishable from the facts and items seized in Blakeney. Unlike the items seized in Blakeney, the seized illegal lottery tickets and proceeds of the ticket sales, business records, an adding machine, a number of glasses, jars, and bags containing small sums of money came within the scope of the search warrant (lottery tickets not sanctioned by the State — tear tab tickets, money, fruit of a crime, or money used in the commission of a crime, documents constituting evidence of crime). In seizing these items, the law enforcement officers’ invocation of the plain view doctrine was proper.