Court Opinion

ID: 9830106
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:52:23.491269+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:12.740604
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
While we are inclined to believe that our original opinion is sufficiently full to negative the idea that any error was committed in the affirmance of the judgment in this case, still, in view of the strenuous contention made by appellant in its motion for rehearing, to the effect that the court erred in not sustaining its second, fifth, sixth, and eleventh assignments of error, relating to alleged misconduct of counsel for appellee in presenting the case to the jury, the admission of certain evidence, as well as the charge of the court with reference to the measure of damages, we desire to add the following:
[10] 1. That the remarks of counsel for plaintiff were not abusive toward nor de-nunciatory of appellant; nor is it shown that they were not' provoked by or in response to argument of counsel for defendant. For all that we know, these remarks may have been justified by something said by counsel on the other side. It is true that the rules require that counsel confine themselves to the evidence, and to argument of opposing counsel. Rule 39 (67 S. W. xxiii). It must be presumed, however, in the absence of a showing to the contrary, that counsel for plaintiff did this. The bill of exceptions merely states the remarks made, without negativing the idea that they may have been called forth either by the evidence on in response to argument by opposing counsel. The bill is.fatally defective in these particulars, merely stating the remarks of counsel. To be sufficient, it must state enough of the evidence or the facts proved in the ease to make intelligible the ruling of the court excepted to. Rule 59 (67 S. W. xxiv). While our statute prescribes that no particular form of words shall be required in the bill of exception, still the objection to the ruling or action of the court shall be' stated with such circumstances or so much of the evidence as may be necessary to explain the ruling. Rev. Stat. art. 1361. To the same effect is the case of Griffin v. Chadwick, 44 Tex. 408, where it is said: “When objections are taken to the ruling of the court which do not ordinarily form a part of the record, not only must the exception be taken and presented by a formal bill of exception, but all the facts and circumstances pertinent to the exception and necessary to enable this court to properly understand and determine the questions decided by the court below should be set forth in the bill.”
[11] The bill must disclose sufficient facts to show that the supposed error of the court is not merely an abstract one. See Litten v. Thompson, 2 U. C. 577.
[12] 2. With reference to the question raised by the fifth assignment, we desire to say, in addition to what has already been stated in the original opinion, that the question propounded was not objectionable for the reason that, as finally asked, it did not call for any expression of opinion from the witness West with reference to reasonable care in handling said shipment; and with this phase eliminated, it in effect sought to elicit his opinion as to the market value of the cattle at Mary Neal, when they were handled in the ordinary way, it appearing that he was an experienced cattleman, familiar with such shipments, and therefore did not invite any expression by him as to what was or was not reasonable care, for which reason we think the case is distinguishable from the cases of H. & T. C. Ry. Co. v. Roberts, 101 Tex. 418, 108 S. W. 808, and H. & T. C. Ry. Co. v. Davis, 50 Tex. Civ. App. 74, 109 S. W. 423.
3. While the court did charge as complain*211ed of by appellant with reference to the measure of damages, still, immediately following the expressions complained of, the court said in this connection: “If you believe that any of said cattle died from the injuries they sustained, you will award to plaintiff the reasonable value of said cattle at said town of Mary Neal, Tex., at the time of their arrival there, and in the condition in which they would have arrived, but for defendant’s negligence, if any; and, if you believe from the evidence that any other of said cattle were injured, you will award to plaintiff the difference in the value at said town of -Mary Neal of said eattle so injured at the time of their arrival there,' and in the condition in which they arrived, and their value at said time and place in the condition in which they would have arrived there, but for the defendant’s negligence, if any.” In view of this direct application of the law to the facts, we think the statement preceding this could not have misled the jury.
After mature consideration of the matters presented by the motion for rehearing, we regard it as not well taken, for which reason the same is in all things overruled.
Motion overruled.