Court Opinion

ID: 9843043
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 02:24:59.589665+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:26.785391
License: Public Domain

PIERCE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I agree with the majority that, “[generally speaking, in the absence of a specific agreement, the decision by the prosecutor to forego a downward departure motion in a particular case is not subject to judicial review.” I also generally agree that where a cooperation agreement “provides for a downward departure motion pursuant to the guidelines and incorporates the ‘substantial assistance’ language of the statute, then the prosecutor’s discretion determines whether the defendant’s conduct has risen to the level of ‘substantial assistance.’ ” My dissent is thus not based upon any disagreement with the majority’s interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e); rather, I believe the majority has erred in its application of the contract principles that apply in this case.
Here, the government expressly agreed to file a motion for a downward departure “if it is determined by this Office that Domingo Rexach has made a good faith effort to provide substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense.” The majority correctly notes that three drug-related arrests were made as a result of information provided by Rexach. This information was given by Rexach at a proffer session before the formal plea agreement was signed; whether or not it was contemplated by the parties that it was to be included within the “substantial assistance” calculation is unclear from the face of the agreement or the district court’s ruling, and is a question of fact I would leave to be decided upon remand. However, assuming such information was intended by the parties to be included, applying an objective standard, I would hold that Rexach’s assistance constitutes “substantial assistance” within the meaning of the subject plea agreement.
It is true that the government’s promise to file a § 3553(e) motion was expressly made dependent upon the government’s judgment that Rexach fulfilled his part of the bargain. However, even under such circumstances, “if the contractor’s performance is one that can be judged by objective standards ... the courts have very generally interpreted the promise of the contractor as one to perform to the satisfaction of a reasonable man_” 1 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 150, at 670 (1963). In this instance, the “objective standard” required to be met to trigger the government’s obligation is supplied by the agreement itself, i.e., so much assistance as to substantially assist the government “in the investigation or prosecution of another person." By incorporating such specific language into the agreement, the government, in large part, defined away the potentially broad discretion it might otherwise have possessed.
In sum, the government here did more than merely promise to file a motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) if Rexach cooperated to the government’s satisfaction; here, it generally agreed in advance as to how much and what kind of assistance would satisfy it. Since it apparently is undisputed that the information provided by Rexach led to three arrests, I do not see how the government can assert in good faith that Rexach did not substantially assist “in the investigation or prosecution of another person.” Therefore, I believe the district court’s judgment that Rexach is not entitled to specific performance should be vacated, and we should remand for a determination as to whether information supplied prior to the signing of the cooperation agreement was intended by the parties to be included within the “substantial assist-*716anee calculus. If it were determined upon remand that such was contemplated, I would instruct the district court to grant Rexach’s motion for specific performance.
I respectfully dissent.