Court Opinion

ID: 9778241
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:56:43.135744+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:05.567375
License: Public Domain

Wendell L. Griffen, Judge, concurring in part, dissenting in part. I agree with the decision to affirm the chancellor in this adverse possession case to the extent that actual and continuous possession is proved for the disputed area north of the concrete drainage structure. However, I write to explain my view that the decree must be reversed in part and remanded to the chancellor so that it can be reformed to reflect the true extent of the appellee’s actual (“pedal”) possession. The decree was drafted by counsel for appellee at the direction of the chancellor in an opinion letter dated August 24, 1994. That letter stated, in pertinent part: The primary issue in this case, after one has examined the property, is whether or not there was sufficient adverse possession or maintenance on the property to meet the requirements of adverse possession concerning that property NORTH OF THE VISIBLE CONCRETE DRAINAGE STRUCTURE. The testimony of the Plaintiff [appellee] and her son indicates that they presumed their encumbrances are proper and immediately took action when these encroachments were challenged by defendants [appellants]. Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s son testified that the concrete drain had existed for over seven years and that the other encroachments leading to the road had existed well over seven years. Mrs. Dautartas and her son testified to the following facts: she purchased the property in 1976; she mowed and raked and built the garage with her son’s help which encroached on the disputed property; she utilized the disputed area to stack wood or to store construction materials. Plaintiff is only claiming the disputed area of which she has maintained ACTUAL POSSESSION. This AREA IS THE AREA FROM THE CONSTRUCTED DRAINAGE STRUCTURE NORTH TO Atkinson’s Road. Mr. Hickam [counsel for appellee/plaintiff] is requested to prepare a precedent for entry by the court, complete with the PROPER LEGAL DESCRIPTION OF PLAINTIFF’S ACQUIRED PROPERTY AND INCLUDING THE FINDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS LETTER DECISION. (Emphasis added.) It is beyond question in actions for adverse possession that where one enters with neither color of title nor enclosure she is unaided by constructive possession, and her claim is limited to that area over which she maintains actual pedal possession. Clark v. Clark, 4 Ark. App. 153, 632 S.W.2d 432 (1982). Appellee claimed no tide by color of tide, and conceded the appellant’s legal tide. Thus, she was a trespasser who claimed title by adverse possession. Both the evidence at trial and the chancellor’s letter opinion limited the area of appellee’s pedal possession to land north of the concrete drainage structure. There was no evidence of pedal possession south of that point. The chancellor did not find that there was evidence of pedal possession south of that improvement. Therefore, the decree is clearly erroneous because the legal description of the property that appellant acquired by adverse possession includes land south of the concrete drainage structure. Reversal and remand is necessary if the decree is to be consistent with the trial proof, and if the result is to be consistent with established notions of justice regarding the extent that a trespasser can acquire tide by adverse possession. I am authorized to state that Judge Neal joins in this opinion.