Court Opinion

ID: 9614002
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:21:37.011381+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:33.464014
License: Public Domain

SIMMS, Justice,
dissenting:
The opinion of the majority reverses the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Court which found that petitioner failed to provide statutory notice of injury within the time constraints of § 24.2 and failed to show good cause for not providing such notice. From this, I must respectfully dissent.
The trial court determined that the accidental injury occurred on August 19, 1987, and that Anglen had not given proper notice of injury. The trial court also found that Anglen had not shown good cause for *1371failing to give notice. I believe that the record contains competent evidence to support each of these determinations. Oklahoma City v. Alvarado, 523 P.2d 1073 (Okla.1974); Parks v. Norman Mun. Hosp., 684 P.2d 548 (Okla.1984).
Anglen admitted that he did not seek medical attention for the back injury within sixty days and uses this as an excuse for failing to give notice of his injury to Powell within the required time period. He testified that his failure to seek medical attention was because he thought he had simply pulled a muscle in his back and later thought that the pain was due to a kidney infection. Such reasons are not good cause excuses because Anglen was aware that some injury had occurred.
In McDonald v. TIME-DC, Inc., 773 P.2d 1252 (Okla.1989), this Court rejected an argument similar to Anglen’s assertion that he did not know the cause and extent of his injury until after the sixty day period had run. In McDonald, the claimant argued that the statute of limitations of the Worker’s Compensation Act, 85 O.S.1971, § 43, does not begin to run until the claimant discovers the full extent of his injury. We disagreed, holding at page 1256 as follows:
“Conversely, where there is a single event (like an automobile accident), the injurious occurrence itself is far from latent. Some ill effect, however trivial, will be or should be recognizable immediately.
When the worker knows that a single event industrial accident has taken place, he (or she) is charged with awareness of its occurrence. This, in turn, raises legal awareness of compensable injury, present or potential. Awareness of potential injury, much like that of immediate harm, imposes a duty upon the worker to protect his rights by filing a timely claim.” (Citations omitted) (Emphasis in original)
The rationale applied to the statute of limitations in McDonald equally applies to the notice requirement in the case at bar. At the time of the injury, Anglen knew that he had sustained some harm. Indeed, he testified that he thought he had pulled a muscle and that he mentioned the injury to the dispatcher when he returned from his run. Clearly, he recognized some “ill effect, however trivial.” McDonald, supra. He then had the affirmative duty of notifying his employer of his injury. Failing to so notify because he thought it was a minor injury is not good cause and does not excuse Anglen from the strictures of Section 24.2. Nor does waiting until a doctor fully diagnosed the injury excuse Anglen. Anglen knew he was injured, yet failed to notify Powell.
The majority places much emphasis upon my writing in B.K. Daniel Motor Co. v. Washington, 530 P.2d 1016 (1974), yet they miss the facts which distinguish it from the case at bar. B.K. Daniel Motor Co. involved an injury which “did not become apparent until some time after the accident.” 530 P.2d at 1019. In fact, in that case, the claimant testified that he initially did not think he was injured from the accident. I stand by the holding therein that notice was not required until the injury had become apparent. Yet, in the case at bar, the injury became apparent at the time of the accident, and though Anglen was perhaps unaware of the extent of his injury, he still was obligated to give notice within sixty days after the accident.
Moreover, the applicable law in B.K. Daniel Motor Co. was § 24 which required the respondent to prove they were prejudiced by the failure of notice. As the majority herein notes, the statute which applies in this case, § 24.2, places the burden upon the claimant to prove that he either gave notice or his failure to give such notice is excused for good cause. In my opinion, the competent evidence supports the trial court’s determination that Anglen failed to prove either. Parks v. Norman Mun. Hosp., supra.
In short, in the case at bar, the injury was manifest immediately while in B.K. Daniel Motor Co., the injury did not be*1372come apparent until some time after the accident. Additionally, the trial judge in B.K. Daniel Motor Co. weighed all the facts and found in favor of claimant, whereas, in the case at bar, the trial judge held against claimant. I believe the evidence presented in both eases supports the rulings of the respective trial judges.
I would sustain the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Court.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Opala, and Justice Hargrave join with me in the views expressed herein.