Court Opinion

ID: 9551736
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:58:26.848191+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:24:27.832915
License: Public Domain

SIMMS, Justice,
dissenting:
The only error made by the trial judge in this case was his belief that this Court meant what it said in Gibbons v. Gibbons, Okl., 442 P.2d 482 (1968), and the plethora of cases following it.
It did not occur to the trial judge that he should be rendering judgments affecting the lives of these three children based on his own individualized notions of morality. He thought the test for changing custody was one of law, specifically:
(1) Whether this father’s evidence showed that there had been a permanent, substantial and material change in conditions which directly affected the welfare of the children to a substantial or material extent; and
(2) Whether as a result of such change in conditions, the children would be substantially better off, with respect to their mental, temporal and moral welfare, if the requested change in custody was ordered. See, Gibbons, supra.
Under our existing guidelines, the trial judge decided the question correctly. No evidence was presented showing that this relationship had any adverse effect on the children.
This Court, on the other hand, abandons these and all other guidelines in its rush to agree with applicant father that a custodial parent’s nonmarital cohabitation in and of itself creates a presumption that a change of custody is justified.
In doing so, the Court misstates the law as being simply a “best interests of the child” test. This is more significant, of course, than a mere misstatement: it is the pronouncement by this Court of a new rule. This new rule rejects years of established precedent by dispensing first with the burdens imposed by Gibbons, and then with the requirement that all relevant factors affecting a child’s welfare be weighed. This requirement recognized that only rarely would one factor be conclusive and that stability of environment and a minimum of disruption are salient factors to consider. See, e.g., Rice v. Rice, Okl., 603 P.2d 1125 (1979); Pirrong v. Pirrong, Okl., 552 P.2d 383 (1976); David v. David, Okl., 460 P.2d 116 (1969); Irwin v. Irwin, Okl., 416 P.2d *1226853 (1966); Fletcher v. Fletcher, Okl., 362 P.2d 691 (1961).
This new test announced today depends on the movant being able to show that some aspect of the custodial parent’s moral code does not coincide with that of a majority of this Court.
By removing the burdens of Gibbons and changing the focus of these actions from children, and how they are affected by circumstances, to parents, and how “nice” various judges think they are, we are indeed opening the floodgates and inviting ceaseless litigation. We do the children of divorced parents a disservice.
We have also stated on uncountable occasions that we will not modify a decision of the trial court in a custody matter unless it is so clearly against the weight of the evidence as to constitute an abuse of discretion.
We should follow that rule here and affirm the trial court.
I am authorized to state that Justices LAVENDER and DOOLIN join in the views expressed in this opinion.