Court Opinion

ID: 9644632
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:01:04.077249+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:11:08.153866
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-10985   Document: 52-1     Date Filed: 08/22/2023   Page: 1 of 25

                                                            [PUBLISH]
                                  In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                               No. 22-10985
                         ____________________

        D.H. PACE COMPANY, INC.,
        d.b.a. Overhead Door Company of
        Atlanta,
        d.b.a. Overhead Door Company of
        Kansas City,
                                                      Plaintiff-Counter
                                                  Defendant-Appellant,
        versus
        OGD EQUIPMENT COMPANY, LLC,

                                                    Defendant-Counter
                                                    Claimant-Appellee.
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                 22-10985

                             ____________________

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Northern District of Georgia
                      D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cv-00410-TCB
                            ____________________

        Before BRANCH and BRASHER, Circuit Judges, and WINSOR,∗
        District Judge.
        BRANCH, Circuit Judge:
               At issue in this case is whether Plaintiff D.H. Pace Company,
        Inc. (“Pace”), a trademark licensee, can bring a claim against a third
        party for unfair competition under the Lanham Act when its
        licensing agreement does not expressly authorize it to do so. Under
        the facts of this case, we conclude that it can.
               This appeal involves three entities, although only two are
        parties to this lawsuit. Pace (a company that sells and services
        garage doors) sued a competitor, Overhead Garage Door (“OGD”)
        (a company that also offers garage door services), alleging a host of
        federal and state law violations relating to OGD’s trade practices.
        Pace and Overhead Door Corporation (a garage door
        manufacturer that is not a party to this case but that has a name
        noticeably similar to Defendant OGD, its competition) have a

        ∗ The Honorable Allen C. Winsor, United States District Judge for the
        Northern District of Florida, sitting by designation.
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        22-10985              Opinion of the Court                       3

        licensing agreement in which Pace is the licensee and Overhead
        Door Corporation is the licensor. As part of this agreement, Pace
        uses Overhead Door Corporation’s marks.
              Before Pace brought this suit, Overhead Door Corporation
        and OGD had been in litigation involving OGD’s alleged
        trademark infringement and unfair trade practices (much like
        Pace’s instant allegations), which culminated in a settlement
        agreement between Overhead Door Corporation and OGD.
               In the instant lawsuit, the district court granted summary
        judgment to OGD on all of Pace’s claims, concluding in large part
        that Pace could not bring suit because Pace was a nonexclusive
        licensee that lacked sufficient ownership rights in Overhead Door
        Corporation’s marks, and because OGD and Overhead Door
        Corporation’s settlement agreement extinguished Pace’s claims.
        Pace timely appealed.
                After careful review of the record and with the benefit of
        oral argument, we conclude that Pace may bring its federal and
        state law claims. Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s order
        to the extent it is inconsistent with this opinion and remand for
        further proceedings.
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                22-10985

                                  I.      Background
                  a. Factual Background
                         i. The Parties
              Pace is a garage door company based in Olathe, Kansas. For
        nearly a century, Pace and its predecessors have been in the
        business of selling, installing, and servicing garage doors in the
        greater Atlanta and Kansas City areas and using the trade names
        “Overhead Door Company of Atlanta” and “Overhead Door
        Company of Kansas City.” Pace has spent millions of dollars
        advertising and promoting these trade names through its websites,
        on social media, through search engines, and at trade shows.
              Overhead Door Corporation, Pace’s licensor, manufactures
        garage doors and garage door openers. Overhead Door
        Corporation owns a federally registered trademark (a red ribbon
        with the words “Overhead Door”) and uses that mark, as well as
        several others, in connection with the promotion and sale of its
        products.
                Pace’s competitor, OGD, is a Texas-based company that
        offers residential and commercial property owners “overhead door
        service[s] across the nation,” including “installations, repairs, and
        maintenance for overhead doors and dock equipment.” OGD
        started operating as “Overhead Garage Door” in 2011 and first
        entered the Atlanta and Kansas City markets in 2019.
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        22-10985                   Opinion of the Court                                5

                            ii. The Licensing Agreement
               In certain markets, including Atlanta and Kansas City, Pace
        operates under distribution and licensing agreements 1 (the
        “licensing agreement”) with Overhead Door Corporation. Under
        their agreement—in which Overhead Door Corporation is the
        licensor and Pace is a nonexclusive licensee 2—Overhead Door
        Corporation granted Pace the right to sell its products and, with its
        permission, to use certain trade names in connection with the
        promotion and sale of its products, including “Overhead Door”
        and “Overhead” (collectively, the “marks”). Although the licensing
        agreement spells out the terms and conditions for using Overhead
        Door Corporation’s marks and trade names, it does not address
        trademark enforcement or either party’s ability to sue.
                           iii. OGD and Overhead Door Corporation’s
                                Previous Litigation
               In 2017, Overhead Door Corporation’s in-house counsel
        sent OGD a letter that accused OGD of false advertising. The letter
        asserted that OGD’s use of the term “Overhead Door—Official
        Website” in a paid internet advertisement was causing confusion

        1 Pace’s right to use Overhead Door Corporation’s marks derives from two
        nonexclusive license agreements. The agreements are identical in all material
        respects. Accordingly, like the district court and the parties, we refer to these
        contracts collectively as the “licensing agreement.”
        2 On top of selling and servicing Overhead Door Corporation products, Pace
        also sells products from other garage door manufacturers.
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        6                       Opinion of the Court                   22-10985

        among consumers who were mistakenly believing that the
        advertisement was for Overhead Door Corporation’s website.
        Then, a few months later, Overhead Door Corporation sent OGD
        a demand letter “on matters involving trademark infringement and
        unfair competition.” Ultimately, the friction between the two
        companies came to a head when OGD won the race to the
        courthouse, suing Overhead Door Corporation and one of its
        distributors in federal court in Texas. 3 OGD alleged that Overhead
        Door Corporation was engaging in unfair competition under state
        and federal law and sought a declaration that Overhead Door
        Corporation’s trademark and trade name were invalid or
        unenforceable. OGD also asked the court to declare that
        “overhead,” “overhead door,” and “overhead doors” were generic
        terms and thus not subject to trademark protection.
                Overhead Door Corporation counterclaimed, alleging that
        the term “Overhead Door” was closely associated with Overhead
        Door Corporation and its licensees and that OGD was knowingly
        and wrongfully passing itself off as an Overhead Door Corporation
        affiliate. As a result, Overhead Door Corporation argued, OGD
        was confusing and deceiving Overhead Door Corporation’s
        current and prospective customers into the mistaken belief that
        OGD was affiliated with or endorsed by Overhead Door
        Corporation.

        3 In the Texas lawsuit, OGD sued one of Overhead Door Corporation’s Texas
        distributors—not Pace.
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        22-10985                  Opinion of the Court                             7

               In November 2019, after two years of litigation, OGD and
        Overhead Door Corporation entered into a settlement agreement
        that resolved all their claims and contained mutual releases. Under
        the agreement, OGD could use a redacted version of the
        settlement agreement as a defense in any legal action brought by
        an Overhead Door Corporation distributor or licensee.
        Importantly, however, the agreement also stated that it was not
        binding on any “current and future licensees . . . of [Overhead
        Door Corporation].”
                   b. Procedural History
               On January 28, 2020, Pace filed this lawsuit, suing OGD for
        unfair competition in violation of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15
        U.S.C. § 1125(a); deceptive trade practices in violation of the
        Georgia Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“GUDTPA”),
        O.C.G.A. § 10-1-370 et seq.; unfair competition in violation of
        O.C.G.A. § 23-2-55, as well as Georgia and Kansas common law;
        and trademark infringement in violation of Georgia common law.4
        Pace alleged that OGD, in directly competing with Pace,
        intentionally misled and confused consumers into believing that
        OGD was the same company as, or otherwise affiliated with, Pace
        and Overhead Door Company of Atlanta and Overhead Door
        Company of Kansas City. Pace also alleged that it owned common
        law rights in the trade names “Overhead Door Company of

        4 Pace amended its complaint twice over the course of litigation, reasserting
        the same causes of action in each amended complaint.
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                22-10985

        Atlanta” and “Overhead Door Company of Kansas City” and that
        OGD’s use of “Overhead Door LLC” was designed to mislead and
        confuse customers in violation of federal and state law. Pace
        sought a permanent injunction, corrective advertising, and lost
        profits, among other damages.
              In response, OGD asserted numerous affirmative defenses
        against Pace’s claims and filed a counterclaim against Pace, seeking
        a declaratory judgment that the terms “overhead,” “overhead
        door,” and “overhead doors” are generic and thus not protected
        under trademark law.
              Extensive discovery followed, and OGD eventually moved
        for summary judgment on its counterclaim and all of Pace’s claims.
        Pace then moved for partial summary judgment on 15 of OGD’s
        affirmative defenses, arguing that they either lacked supporting
        evidence, failed as a matter of law, or did not constitute a defense.
                After hearing oral argument on the parties’ motions, the
        district court granted OGD’s motion for summary judgment on all
        of Pace’s claims and denied Pace’s motion for partial summary
        judgment. As to OGD’s counterclaim, although the district court
        found that there was a genuine and material dispute about the
        genericness of the terms “overhead” and “overhead door(s),” it
        dismissed the counterclaim as moot. As relevant to this appeal, the
        district court divided its reasoning into roughly four parts.
               First, the district court concluded that Pace met the
        statutory requirements to bring a Lanham Act cause of action after
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        22-10985                    Opinion of the Court                                 9

        observing that Pace produced “scores” of examples of “confusion—
        largely caused by OGD and its technician and corporate practices—
        and [finding that] Pace’s goodwill and company reputation [fell]
        squarely within the Lanham Act’s zone of protection.” 5
               Second, notwithstanding its finding that Pace fell within the
        Lanham Act’s purview, the district court, relying on our precedent
        in Kroma Makeup EU, LLC v. Boldface Licensing + Branding, Inc.,
        920 F.3d 704 (11th Cir. 2019), concluded that the licensing
        agreement between Pace and Overhead Door Corporation stood
        as a “contractual bar” to Pace bringing suit. Specifically, the district
        court reasoned that because the licensing agreement did not

        5 The district court describes Pace’s ability to bring a claim under the Lanham
        Act as meeting the “requirements for standing under the statute.” This
        verbiage suggests that the district court may be referring to “prudential
        standing,” a doctrine that the Supreme Court has deemed a “misnomer”
        because it is “not derived from Article III.” Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control
        Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 126 (2014) (quotation omitted). Instead, the
        more accurate and precise inquiry is whether Pace “has a cause of action under
        the statute.” Id. at 128 (explaining that courts “do not ask whether in our
        judgment Congress should have authorized [a plaintiff’s] suit, but whether
        Congress in fact did so,” reasoning that a court “cannot limit a cause of action
        that Congress has created merely because ‘prudence’ dictates”); see also
        Highland Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Minjares, 74 F.4th 1352, 1359 (11th Cir.
        2023) (explaining that the “prudential standing” label is misleading because the
        absence of a valid cause of action does not implicate subject matter-jurisdiction
        and that under Lexmark, “the question is whether the plaintiff has a cause of
        action under the statute” (quotation omitted)). Accordingly, we characterize
        the district court’s conclusion in these terms—namely, whether Pace has a
        cause of action under the statute.
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        10                     Opinion of the Court               22-10985

        affirmatively grant Pace a right to sue, Pace lacked such a right
        under Kroma. The district court also concluded that Pace, “as a
        non-exclusive licensee, [did] not possess sufficient rights in the
        marks to bring its claims.”
               Third, the district court concluded that Pace’s state law and
        common law claims for trademark infringement, unfair
        competition, and deceptive trade practices failed to withstand
        summary judgment for similar reasons: because the licensing
        agreement did not grant Pace a right to sue on the marks and
        “[b]ecause Pace’s rights in the marks derive from its licensing
        agreement with [Overhead Door Corporation], Pace may not
        independently maintain its claims.”
               Fourth, the district court concluded that OGD and
        Overhead Door Corporation’s settlement agreement provided a
        “further” independent bar to Pace’s claims. The district court
        reasoned that because “Pace’s rights in the marks are derived
        entirely from its licensing agreement with [Overhead Door
        Corporation], [Overhead Door Corporation’s] voluntary discharge
        of those rights in the [s]ettlement [a]greement acts to discharge
        Pace’s rights as well.”
                 Pace now appeals the district court’s summary judgment
        order.
                              II.   Standard of Review
              We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment
        de novo. Kroma, 920 F.3d at 707. Summary judgment is proper
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        22-10985               Opinion of the Court                      11

        when the evidence shows “that there is no genuine dispute as to
        any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
        of law.” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). When reviewing a grant
        of summary judgment, we view the evidence in the light most
        favorable to the non-moving party and resolve all reasonable
        doubts about the facts in favor of the non-movant. Id.
                                  III.   Discussion
               On appeal, Pace argues that the district court correctly
        determined that it has a cause of action under the Lanham Act but
        erred by concluding that the licensing agreement, Pace’s status as
        a nonexclusive licensee, and the settlement agreement all
        independently bar Pace from bringing its claims. Pace also argues
        that, for the same reasons, the district court erred by granting
        summary judgment on its state law and common law claims. We
        agree with Pace.
              Pace brought an unfair competition claim under the
        Lanham Act, which “mak[es] actionable the deceptive and
        misleading use of marks in . . . commerce” and provides several
        enforcement mechanisms to that end. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static
        Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 131 (2014) (quoting 15
        U.S.C. § 1127); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (explaining that the
        Lanham Act “mak[es] actionable the deceptive and misleading use
        of marks in such commerce,” “protect[s] persons engaged in such
        commerce against unfair competition,” and “prevent[s] fraud and
        deception in such commerce by the use of reproductions, copies,
        counterfeits, or colorable imitations of registered marks”).
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        12                          Opinion of the Court                         22-10985

                Under § 32(1) of the Lanham Act, a trademark registrant
        may bring a civil action to protect its mark. 6 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1).
        But Congress did not limit “the [statutory] remedies given” in the
        Lanham Act to owners alone. Id. § 1114(2). Section 43(a)
        separately empowers “any person who believes that he or she is or
        is likely to be damaged” to sue “[a]ny person” using “any word,

        6 Section 32(1) provides, in relevant part:

             (1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant—

                (a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or
                    colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with
                    the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any
                    goods or services on or in connection with which such use
                    is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
                    deceive; or

                (b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a
                    registered mark and apply such reproduction, counterfeit,
                    copy, or colorable imitation to labels, signs, prints,
                    packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements
                    intended to be used in commerce upon or in connection
                    with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising
                    of goods or services on or in connection with which such
                    use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
                    deceive,

                shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies
                hereinafter provided.

        15 U.S.C. § 1114(1).
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        22-10985                   Opinion of the Court                               13

        term, name, symbol, or device” or “any . . . false or misleading
        description [or misleading representation] of fact” in ways “likely
        to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the
        affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another
        person.”7 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1). Pace brought its claim under
        § 43(a).

        7 Section 43(a)(1) provides:

           (1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or
               services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any
               word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
               thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading
               description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact,
               which—

                (A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
                    deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of
                    such person with another person, or as to the origin,
                    sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or
                    commercial activities by another person, or

                (B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents
                    the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin
                    of his or her or another person’s goods, services, or
                    commercial activities,

                shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that
                he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.

        15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1).
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        14                        Opinion of the Court                      22-10985

                The Supreme Court has explained that the reach of § 43(a)
        is broad. Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 129 (noting that, when “[r]ead
        literally, [§ 43(a)’s] broad language might suggest that an action is
        available to anyone who can satisfy the minimum requirements of
        Article III” but that it is unlikely that Congress “meant to allow all
        factually injured plaintiffs to recover” (quotation omitted)).
        Indeed, only a zone-of-interests test and a proximate-cause
        requirement supply the limits on who may sue. 8 Id. at 129–33.
              Considering the “scores” of examples of customer confusion
        and that “Pace’s goodwill and company reputation [fell] squarely
        within the Lanham Act’s zone of protection,” the district court
        concluded that Pace met the requirements for bringing a claim
        under the statute. And, notably, the district court’s conclusion is
        not challenged on appeal.
               Pace does, however, challenge the district court’s holding
        that, despite falling “squarely within the Lanham Act’s zone of
        protection,” Pace’s claims were nonetheless barred by (1) the
        licensing agreement; (2) Pace’s status as a nonexclusive licensee;
        and (3) OGD and Overhead Door Corporation’s settlement
        agreement. After careful review, we conclude that none of these

        8 The zone-of-interests limitation refers to the presumption “that a statutory
        cause of action extends only to plaintiffs whose interests fall within the zone
        of interests protected by the law invoked.” Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 129
        (quotation omitted). And the proximate-cause limitation refers to the
        presumption “that a statutory cause of action is limited to plaintiffs whose
        injuries are proximately caused by violations of the statute.” Id. at 132.
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        22-10985               Opinion of the Court                       15

        considerations impedes Pace’s ability to bring its claims and address
        each in turn.
                   a. The licensing agreement does not bar Pace from
                      suing
               The district court concluded that Pace was barred from
        bringing its Lanham Act claim because under our precedent in
        Kroma, the licensing agreement between Pace and Overhead Door
        Corporation acted as a contractual bar to Pace’s suit. Pace argues
        that the district court erred, and we agree.
                In Kroma, we affirmed the district court’s grant of summary
        judgment based on its finding that the licensing agreement did not
        give the licensee “sufficient rights in the mark to sue under the
        Lanham Act.” 920 F.3d at 706. Kroma Makeup EU, LLC (“Kroma
        EU”), the plaintiff and a cosmetics distributor, had licensed the
        federally registered mark “KROMA” from By Lee Tillett, Inc.
        (“Tillett”), the owner and registrant of the mark. Id. Tillett (the
        licensor) granted Kroma EU (the licensee) an exclusive license to
        import, sell, and distribute KROMA products in Europe and to use
        the KROMA mark to further the plaintiff’s business. Id. Their
        licensing agreement “afford[ed] rights and impose[d] obligations
        on the parties relating to the enforcement of any trademark
        claims.” Id. at 709. Importantly, the agreement (1) reserved to
        Tillett “all ownership and enforcement rights” and (2) required
        Tillett to protect the trademark from any illegal use and, if any
        infringement did occur, to “guarantee” Kroma EU against any
        claims concerning intellectual property rights. Id. The Kroma
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        16                      Opinion of the Court                 22-10985

        Court explained that these “two integral provisions,” “read
        together[,] indicate[d] that Tillett [(the licensor)] alone ha[d] the
        exclusive right to sue for infringement.” Id. at 709–10; see id. at 709
        (using “basic principles of contract interpretation” to conclude that
        the “plain language of the agreement” demonstrated “the parties’
        intent for Tillett to retain all ownership and enforcement rights”
        (quotations omitted)).        Accordingly, due to the licensing
        agreement’s reservation of enforcement power in the licensor, we
        concluded that Kroma EU, the licensee, did “not have sufficient
        rights in the mark to sue under the Lanham Act.” Id. at 706, 709–
        10.
               Here, the district court erroneously interpreted Kroma as
        imposing a “contractual bar” to Pace’s ability to sue. The district
        court acknowledged that the language in the licensing agreement
        at issue in Kroma is not present in the licensing agreement between
        Pace and Overhead Door Corporation. But it nonetheless
        explained that “Kroma requires the [c]ourt to analyze what rights
        were given to the licensee, not what rights were withheld.” Using
        that metric, the district court concluded that, absent a right to sue
        provision, Pace lacked sufficient rights under the licensing
        agreement to bring its claims against OGD.
               The district court misreads Kroma. Rather than requiring a
        licensing agreement to contain a right to sue provision before a
        licensee can bring a Lanham Act claim, Kroma simply
        acknowledges that a licensing agreement between two parties can
        limit a licensee’s otherwise broad ability to bring a claim under the
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        22-10985                   Opinion of the Court                                17

        Lanham Act and explains that we must use “basic principles of
        contract interpretation” to determine what rights and obligations a
        licensing agreement may otherwise impose on parties. 920 F.3d at
        709–10 (explaining “the general sentiment that a license agreement
        between two parties can limit a licensee’s ability to bring a Lanham
        Act claim”). Here, rather than interpret Pace and Overhead Door
        Corporation’s licensing agreement, the district court read Kroma
        as requiring a right to sue provision. Not finding one, it concluded
        that the lack of such a provision in the licensing agreement here
        was fatal to Pace’s claim. But Kroma never instituted such a
        positive requirement. And here, in contrast to the licensing
        agreement in Kroma, both Pace and OGD agree that the licensing
        agreement between Pace and Overhead Door Corporation is silent
        on the topic of trademark enforcement and on Pace’s ability to sue.
        Thus, contrary to the district court’s conclusion, there is no
        “contractual bar [to sue] dictated by Kroma” because—unlike the
        licensing agreement in Kroma—nothing in the licensing agreement
        bars Pace from bringing a Lanham Act claim. 9

        9 The district court highlights Kroma’s statement that “that a licensee’s right
        to sue to protect the mark largely depends on the rights granted to the licensee
        in the licensing agreement” when concluding that Pace does not have
        sufficient rights in the marks to bring its claim. 920 F.3d at 708 (quotation
        omitted). But this language in Kroma does not change our analysis. Kroma
        merely acknowledged that a licensee’s rights may be limited by a licensing
        agreement and instructs courts to use basic contract interpretation to
        determine the contours of each party’s rights. Id. at 709. Further confirming
        our reading, Kroma also notes that our sister circuits similarly look to licensing
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        18                         Opinion of the Court                      22-10985

                OGD argues that we should not conclude that Pace can
        bring a Lanham Act claim because, in so holding, we necessarily
        must rewrite the licensing agreement to give Pace the right to sue.
        But this argument fails to consider the Lanham Act’s backdrop and
        misconstrues Kroma. As Lexmark makes clear, § 43(a) of the
        Lanham Act grants broad authority to sue. 572 U.S. at 129. And,
        as explained above, Pace falls within that broad grant of authority.
        Although Kroma explains that a licensing agreement can restrict
        that broad right to sue, the licensing agreement at issue here does
        not do so. Thus, rather than reading a right to sue into the licensing
        agreement, as OGD contends, we merely decline to read in a
        restriction on Pace’s right to sue when the licensing agreement is
        silent and does not impose one. Simply put, without the licensing
        agreement posing a contractual bar to Pace’s ability to sue, Pace is
        free to bring a Lanham Act claim, subject to the statute’s
        restrictions as explained by Lexmark. 10

        agreements only for express limitations on a licensee’s otherwise broad rights:
        “Our sister courts of appeals have agreed with the general sentiment that a
        license agreement between two parties can limit a licensee’s ability to bring a
        Lanham Act claim.” Id. at 710.
        10 Relatedly, OGD protests that a “licensee like Pace possesses rights only as
        a result of its license,” meaning that if a licensing agreement does not include
        the right to sue, “then a licensee-plaintiff has no right within the ‘zone of
        interests’ that § 43(a) of the Lanham Act protects.” But Kroma, § 43(a) of the
        Lanham Act, and the precedent interpreting the Lanham Act do not support
        that proposition. To the contrary, § 43(a) provides broad authority to sue, and
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        22-10985                  Opinion of the Court                            19

                   b. Pace’s status as a nonexclusive licensee does not bar
                      Pace from suing
              The district court, relying on several non-binding cases, also
        concluded that “Pace, as a non-exclusive licensee, simply [did] not
        possess sufficient rights in the marks to bring its claims.” We are
        not persuaded.
               As an initial matter, none of the out-of-circuit and district
        court cases that the district court cited (and that OGD relies on) are
        binding on us. See Quabaug Rubber Co. v. Fabiano Shoe Co., 567
        F.2d 154 (1st Cir. 1977); Shell Co. v. Los Frailes Serv. Station, Inc.,
        596 F. Supp. 2d 193 (D.P.R. 2008), aff’d sub nom. The Shell Co.
        (Puerto Rico) v. Los Frailes Serv. Station, Inc., 605 F.3d 10 (1st Cir.
        2010); Aceto Corp. v. TherapeuticsMD, Inc., 953 F. Supp. 2d 1269,
        1280 (S.D. Fla. 2013).
                Further, these cases are readily distinguishable. Most
        critically, all three cases rely on § 32(1) of the Lanham Act—which
        permits a trademark registrant to bring a civil action—when
        analyzing whether a nonexclusive licensee can bring a claim under
        the Lanham Act. See, e.g., Quabaug, 567 F.2d at 159–60 (observing
        that courts have permitted exclusive licensees, in addition to
        trademark registrants, to bring a claim under § 32(1) of the Lanham
        Act but noting that “[t]here appear to be no cases where a
        nonexclusive licensee has been permitted to maintain a trademark

        the district court’s conclusion that Pace meets the statutory requirements to
        bring such a claim is unchallenged on appeal.
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        20                      Opinion of the Court                 22-10985

        infringement suit in the absence of the ‘registrant’”); Shell, 596 F.
        Supp. 2d at 201–02 (explaining that § 32(1) restricts relief to
        trademark registrants, which may include exclusive licensees, but
        “certainly does not include nonexclusive licensees”); Aceto Corp.,
        953 F. Supp. 2d at 1280 (explaining that although trademark
        licensees typically do not have the ability to sue under § 32(1),
        exclusive licensees may sue under § 32(1)). These analyses are
        irrelevant here. Pace, which is not the trademark registrant,
        brought a claim under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act—not § 32(1).
        Indeed, when discussing a nonexclusive licensee’s ability to bring a
        claim under § 43(a), the very same cases conclude that
        nonexclusive licensees are free to bring suit under § 43(a). See e.g.,
        Quabaug, 567 F.2d at 160 (concluding that the nonexclusive
        licensee could maintain a claim under the Lanham Act, even
        without the licensor’s presence in the suit, because § 43(a) “permits
        ‘any person who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged’ to
        bring a ‘civil action’” (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a))); id. (explaining
        that § 43(a) of the Lanham Act “is to be broadly construed” and that
        “one who may suffer adverse consequences from a violation of
        [§ 43(a)] has [the ability] to sue regardless of whether he is the
        registrant of a trademark”); Shell, 596 F. Supp. 2d at 204 (holding
        that the nonexclusive licensee “ha[d] a reasonable interest to be
        protected and ha[d] properly asserted a basis [to sue] pursuant to
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        22-10985                   Opinion of the Court                               21

        section 43(a)”). Accordingly, we decline to affirm the district court
        based on these inapposite cases. 11
                    c. OGD and Overhead Door Corporation’s settlement
                       agreement does not bar Pace from suing
              The district court also concluded that OGD and Overhead
        Door Corporation’s settlement agreement provided an
        independent bar to Pace’s ability to sue. Again, we disagree.
              The settlement agreement between OGD and Overhead
        Door Corporation—which OGD and Overhead Door Corporation
        entered into before Pace filed this lawsuit—resolved all their claims
        and contained mutual releases that prevent OGD and Overhead

        11 Like Pace’s Lanham Act claim, the district court also granted summary
        judgment on Pace’s common law and state law claims because “those claims
        are based on Pace’s derivative rights in the marks” and “[b]ecause Pace’s rights
        in the marks derive from its licensing agreement with [Overhead Door
        Corporation], Pace may not independently maintain its claims.” But this
        conclusion is erroneous for the reasons we already explained. Pace’s status as
        a nonexclusive licensee does not bar Pace from suing and neither does the
        licensing agreement.
                 On appeal, OGD argues that Pace waived its argument “that the
        district court erred by holding its state-law claims fell with its federal claim”
        because Pace never made this argument below. Moreover, to the extent that
        the district court erred in ruling on Pace’s state law claims, OGD argues that
        Pace invited such error “by failing to make any argument to the contrary,”
        meaning that the district court’s conclusion is unreviewable on appeal. After
        reviewing the record, we conclude that Pace has actively litigated its state law
        claims at each stage of the proceedings and has not invited error. Thus, we do
        not find merit in either of these arguments.
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        22                      Opinion of the Court                 22-10985

        Door Corporation “from raising new claims relating to the actions
        of [the other] occurring after the” settlement agreement’s effective
        date. We turn first to the provision in the settlement agreement
        addressing its scope:
               This Agreement shall be binding upon, and shall
               inure to the benefit of, (1) OGD and its current and
               future Affiliates; (2) [Overhead Door Corporation’s]
               business unit doing business under the
               trademark/service mark and/or trade name
               ‘Overhead Door’ and current and future Affiliates of
               such business unit; and (3) [Overhead Door] Lubbock
               and its current and future Affiliates. The Parties
               expressly acknowledge that this Agreement shall not
               be binding on (1) current and future divisions of
               [Overhead Door Corporation’s] business that do not
               do business under the trademark/serve mark and/or
               trade name ‘Overhead Door,’ or (2) current and
               future licensees, distributors, and resellers of
               [Overhead Door Corporation] except OD Lubbock.
        (Emphasis added.)
               Thus, although the agreement may prevent OGD and
        Overhead Door Corporation from suing each other, the settlement
        agreement is “not . . . binding on . . . current and future licensees.”
        As such, the settlement agreement is not binding on licensees like
        Pace and does not prevent Pace from suing. See, e.g., Great Am.
        Ins. Co. v. Primo, 512 S.W.3d 890, 893 (Tex. 2017) (explaining that
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        22-10985                  Opinion of the Court                            23

        “[t]he goal of contract interpretation is to ascertain the parties’ true
        intent as expressed by the plain language they used” in the
        contract); see also Whittlesey v. Miller, 572 S.W.2d 665, 669 (Tex.
        1978) (holding that a release generally cannot bind a party who did
        not sign it). 12 This conclusion is confirmed by another section of
        the settlement agreement, entitled “Potential Distributor
        Lawsuits,” which contemplates future lawsuits against OGD by
        Overhead Door Corporation’s distributors and licensees:
               [Overhead Door Corporation] shall not direct any of
               its distributors or licensees to take legal action against
               OGD if the acts of OGD that are the basis for such
               legal action would not amount to breach of this
               Agreement. For clarity, this limitation shall not apply
               to any claims of any [Overhead Door Corporation]
               distributor or licensee that are based on conduct of
               OGD that is not the subject of this Agreement. 13
        (Emphasis added.)
                Notwithstanding the settlement agreement’s language, the
        district court reasoned, and OGD argues on appeal, that
        “[Overhead Door Corporation’s] voluntary discharge of [the]

        12 The settlement agreement provides that “[t]he construction, interpretation
        and enforcement of [the agreement] shall be governed by the laws of the state
        of Texas.”
        13 We do not address whether Pace’s claims are based on conduct that is the
        subject of the settlement agreement because that question is not before us.
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        24                        Opinion of the Court                    22-10985

        rights in the [s]ettlement [a]greement acts to discharge Pace’s rights
        as well.” For support, OGD emphasizes Pace’s admission that,
        according to the terms of its settlement agreement with OGD,
        Overhead Door Corporation would be barred from asserting the
        claims that Pace is asserting in this case. But although the terms of
        the settlement agreement may bar Overhead Door Corporation
        from bringing the claims in this case, the settlement agreement is
        clear that its terms do not bar licensees like Pace. Indeed, the
        agreement expressly contemplates future lawsuits against OGD by
        Overhead Door Corporation licensees. And although OGD again
        relies on Kroma and emphasizes that “a licensee’s rights are
        derivative of the licensor’s,” OGD provides no authority to support
        its argument that a licensee’s § 43(a) claim under the Lanham Act
        is barred if the registrant’s claim is otherwise barred by a separate
        contract between the registrant and a third-party. 14 Thus, applying
        the plain language of the settlement agreement to this case and
        finding no other authority that would bar Pace from bringing its
        claims, we conclude that the settlement agreement does not
        prohibit Pace from bringing suit.

        14 OGD cites Biosyntec, Inc. v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 746 F. Supp. 5 (D.
        Or. 1990), as support for its argument that because Overhead Door
        Corporation cannot pursue the claims that Pace asserts, neither can Pace. But
        Biosyntec is not binding on us and does not require a different result in any
        event because Biosyntec involved a patent infringement claim—not a Lanham
        Act claim. See 746 F. Supp. at 10 (explaining that claimants under the patent
        statute must be “owners”).
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        22-10985               Opinion of the Court                       25

                                  IV.    Conclusion
               In sum, we conclude that the licensing agreement, Pace’s
        status as a nonexclusive licensee, and the settlement agreement do
        not bar Pace from bringing its claims under the Lanham Act, state
        law, or common law. Accordingly, we VACATE the district
        court’s order to the extent that it is inconsistent with this opinion
        and REMAND for further proceedings.