Court Opinion

ID: 9604867
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:27:37.750349+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:07:24.189205
License: Public Domain

SHEPARD,
Justice, dissenting.
The facts in this action are not in dispute. Merritt owns a corner lot in Caldwell, Idaho, one side of which directly abuts on Tenth Avenue and one side abuts on Free-port Street which intersects with Tenth Avenue. Merritt had access to Freeport Street and also access to Tenth Avenue which was represented by an 18-foot curb cut. The State, in conjunction with the construction of a portion of the Interstate highway, designated Tenth Avenue as a feeder for traffic to and from the Interstate highway. The State improved Tenth Avenue within the limits of the existing right-of-way. In conformance with federal regulations the State designated that portion of Tenth Avenue as non-access and placed a fence along the highway right-of-way, thus shutting off Merritt’s existing access to Tenth Avenue. On a third side of Merritt’s property, paralleling Freeport, was an alley which also intersected Tenth Avenue. The State erected a barrier at that intersection, thus prohibiting traffic from the alley to Tenth Avenue.
I do not believe this Court has previously squarely faced the issued presented here, i.e., may an owner of property which abuts upon and has access to a public street suffer the closure of that access and receive no compensation therefor only because he has access to another street.
In Hughes v. State, 80 Idaho 286, 328 P.2d 397 (1958), the Court was faced with a similar set of facts but engaged in little analysis. There, the State reconstructed Third Street in St. Maries which previously descended a hill and at the bottom thereof intersected with Railroad Avenue. It then crossed over railroad tracks and a bridge over the St. Joe River. The Hughes’ property lay at the intersection of Third Street *146and Railroad Avenue with frontage on both streets. The State placed a fill on Third Street, thereby overpassing the railroad tracks and Railroad Avenue, and continuing on that level on a new bridge across the river. Thereafter the Hughes’ property was denied access to Third Street by a five to six foot nearly vertical bank of earth. However, the access to Railroad Avenue remained. The Court ruled that the Hughes’ access to Third Street was taken and therefore compensable. Since Crane v. City of Harrison, 40 Idaho 229, 232 P. 578, had held that damage resulting from a change of grade was not compensable, it was overruled.
The Court stated, “The easement ... of access, possessed by an owner of land abutting on a street or highway, constitute property of which he cannot be deprived without compensation, ... although he does not own the fee of the street.”
In State ex rel. Rich v. Fonburg, 80 Idaho 269, 328 P.2d 60 (1958), the defendant’s property abutted on, and had access to, U.S. Highway 95 at the point where the highway began to ascend Culdesac Hill. The State condemned a portion of the Fonburg property for the purpose of constructing a new highway which diverged from the old route at the point of the Fonburg property. Fonburg sought damages for the taking of his property, the denial of access to the old highway, and the denial of access to the new highway location. He, of course, received damages for the property actually taken. The Court also allowed damages for the taking of his access to the old highway, but refused damages for denial of access to the new highway stating, “ ... nor is the condemnee entitled to damages because he is not granted unrestricted access to the new part of the road being constructed. There is no inherent right of access to a newly relocated highway____ The condemnee never having had access to the new highway there is no easement of access taken in this proceeding. There can only be compensable damages for an existing easement, and when one does not exist, there is none to take.”
In Mabe v. State, 86 Idaho 254, 385 P.2d 401 (1963), no property was actually taken, but a claim was made for damages for failure to provide access to a new highway which was located approximately one-half mile away and parallel to the old highway. Mabe’s property abutted on and had access to the old highway. The old highway continued in existence and continued to provide access from the Mabe property to the Interstate highway, but only by way of travel to Mountain Home. Although the argument was made that Mabe suffered merely a circuity of traffic damage, the Court disagreed without setting forth any rationale therefor. Hence, Mabe was awarded damages for a taking of access.
In State ex rel. Moore v. Bastian, 97 Idaho 444, 546 P.2d 399 (1976), the State condemned a portion of a commercial corner lot which abutted on both Addison and Washington Streets in Twin Falls. On one of those streets the State placed a raised centerline median to prohibit traffic from turning left. The condemnee sought damages for denial of access to that street. The Court said:
“While it is true that defendants have a property interest in access to public streets (citations) nevertheless not all impairments of that right by the state are compensable or per se unreasonable. (Citations) That right of access does not encompass a right to any particular pattern of traffic flow or a right of direct access to or from both directions of traffic and we find no compensable impairment of access here. All who wish to reach defendant’s property could do so with relatively minor inconvenience.” (emphasis supplied)
Curiously, Donaldson, C.J., with whom Bakes, J. concurred, dissented, stating:
“The right of access of a property owner to an abutting public street has long been the subject of judicial discourse in Idaho. A thorough review of authority reveals it is a right which Idaho courts have been particularly careful to protect____ Nor is interference with access merely an element of severance damages to be considered in an action for condem*147nation, but is in itself a property right the taking of which may be compensated in an action for inverse condemnation, that is ‘whether or not accompanied by a taking of physical property.’ ” (Citing both Hughes and Mabe).
Although our previous cases are not totally clear, I believe the law of Idaho is, or should be, that a landowner whose property abuts a public street or road and enjoys access thereto cannot be summarily deprived of that property right without compensation. This I believe regardless of what the law may be in other jurisdictions. Although the public necessity and convenience may demand the taking of property, such may not be done without an award of just compensation. No argument regarding the safety or convenience of the general public justifies the taking of such a property right absent just compensation.
If the Merritt property was an interior lot on the same block and was left totally inaccessible because of the fence built along Tenth Avenue, I doubt we would deny compensation. See Weaver v. Village of Bancroft, 92 Idaho 189, 439 P.2d 697 (1968), wherein the Court awarded damages stating: “It is undisputed in the instant case that appellant was cut off from all vehicular access both to and from his property and that this property is in effect isolated from the public right-of-way.” If the Merritt property was an interior lot bounded on the rear by an alley, I likewise doubt that the Court would deny compensation in that case. Here, by the mere fortuity that Merritt’s property is a corner lot with access remaining to Freeport Street, we nevertheless deny him compensation, albeit at this juncture we must assume that the value of his property has been severely diminished by the action of the State. It is clear to me that by the denial of the previously existing easement of access to Tenth Avenue, the State has taken a portion of Merritt’s property just as surely as if they had physically appropriated half of his lot.
I believe the foregoing result is mandated although governmental entities have and should continue to exercise authority over the flow of traffic. If, for example, left turns were prohibited from Tenth Avenue onto Merritt’s property, I would hold that such was not a taking of a property right and therefore not compensable. If Tenth Avenue were designated a one-way street I would hold that a claim for diminishment of traffic was noncqmpensable. If a barrier were placed at the intersection of Freeport and Tenth Avenue to prohibit traffic entering Tenth from Freeport, I would hold that such resulted in circuity of traffic and was not compensable. If the size or number of curb cuts providing access from Tenth Avenue to Merritt’s property were reasonably limited, I would hold that was not a denial of access but merely reasonable regulation, and would hence deny compensation.
Thus, I believe any discussion of the closure of the alley entrance to Tenth Avenue falls within the above categories, within the authority of the government entity, constitutes mere circuity of traffic, and is hence noncompensable.
The ultimate question presented here, however, falls in none of the above categories. Squarely presented is the taking of Merritt’s previously existing access to Tenth Avenue without any compensation therefor. There is not here presented any argument that such access presents any danger to foot traffic on the sidewalks paralleling Tenth Avenue. It is simply a matter of attempting to speed up traffic along Tenth Avenue by the elimination of Merritt’s right of access. I would affirm the order of the trial court denying the State’s motion for summary judgment.