Court Opinion

ID: 9797929
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:32:40.793079+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:59:52.174393
License: Public Domain

Justice TROUT,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in all parts of the Court’s opinion with the exception of the holding in Part III *926A and B, relating to whether evidence of an alternative route should have been admitted. I agree in principle with the holding in Part III A that evidence of a safe alternative route is relevant to the jury’s determination of whether Kelleher breached a duty of due care by failing to select an available route which would have been safer under the circumstances presented to him at the time he was returning home on his tractor. However, unless the threshold determination is made that there is indeed a safe and available alternate route, the evidence is not relevant. The question remains in this case whether Kelleher’s counsel properly objected to that evidence so as to preserve the issue for this Court’s consideration on appeal.
As noted in the Court’s opinion, there were extensive discussions between court and counsel before voir dire commenced, before opening statements were made and again on the second day of trial about whether evidence about the dirt road running alongside Highway 19 should be admitted. Kelleher’s attorney’s principal objection was that the evidence of another route was irrelevant. However, in objecting to evidence of the route coming in, Kelleher’s attorney also said:
But, your Honor, there is no foundation that this is a safer route. Obviously, it goes through parking lots and commercial areas. There’s not foundation that it is permissible to be there. In fact, Simplot’s manager is going to come to this court and say that’s trespassing. That’s my property. That’s our property. And so the foundational elements of introducing this are not in existence, and it shouldn’t be used, Your Honor, in addition to all the other arguments as to why we believe that this is inappropriate testimony. So along with everything else, there’s inadequate foundation to testify that anybody can legally use this road other than Simplot personnel or Simplot invitees or licensees.
Thereafter, the trial court ruled as follows:
All right. Well, as far as the — my ruling on this is going to be as follows. As far as the presentation of evidence concerning the choices that the plaintiff — or the defendant had available, the court is going to ;permit testimony or evidence concerning this as one of the factors because of — this alternate route, because the court believes that a reasonable jury, after viewing this videotape — or, I mean a jury could find that a reasonable person would have considered that. Certainly it’s subject to argument because the defendant also has the opportunity to explain why a reasonably careful person would not use that. But it is one of the factors and one of the circumstances that the court believes is relevant to this issue of duty, of due care and duty to use ordinary care for the safety of the plaintiff and other persons on the roadway, (emphasis added)
Apparently the trial court thought that evidence of any other road was relevant and defendant’s counsel could challenge whether it was an available alternative route through the presentation of his own witnesses; that is, that whether the route was legally available to Kelleher to use was simply one of the factors the jury should weigh in analyzing Kelleher’s duty of due care. That is not correct. The jury should only be analyzing the other route if it is indeed an available safer route. The fact that there was another road running alongside Highway 19 is irrelevant unless it was available for Kelleher to use and thus, would be relevant to the issue of whether he exercised due care under the circumstances.
Kelleher’s counsel could have done a better job of articulating his objection, could have continued to object and could have asked the court to clarify its ruling. I don’t believe that’s necessary under these circumstances. The attorney objected to the relevance and to the lack of foundation for admission of any evidence relating to the availability of the alternative route absent proof that it was available for public use. Kelleher’s attorney obtained a ruling from the court — not just an indication that the objection was premature and should be renewed when testimony was presented. Indeed, immediately after her ruling, she inquired if Slack’s counsel was going to move the admission of the videotape that morning or just the testimony about the route; a clear indication that she had ruled on the objections made and was anticipating *927the evidence would be forthcoming, have held that “if the motion in limine is made, and the trial court unqualifiedly rules on the admissibility or inadmissibility of the evidence prior to trial, no further objection at trial is required in order to preserve the issue for appeal.” St. v. Hester, 114 Idaho 688, 700, 760 P.2d 27, 39 (1988). While counsel here did not characterize his objection as a “motion in limine”, there is no doubt he was objecting prior to the admission of evidence on an issue which he believed should not be heard or considered by the jury. He obtained his ruling and I think the issue is preserved for appeal. We
As indicated above, there was no testimony presented by Slack that this dirt road was open to the public and available for use, which was her burden. Equivocal statements about the fact that there was no gate and no “no trespassing” signs is not sufficient to submit to the jury to consider this an available safe route. I therefore believe this evidence was properly objected to and should not have been considered by the jury. I respectfully dissent from that portion of the Court’s opinion.