Court Opinion

ID: 9769459
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 14:51:26.27958+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:03.987618
License: Public Domain

John I. Purtle, Justice, dissenting. For the reasons stated in the majority opinion I must respectfully dissent. The work load has apparently overtaken my brothers on the Court because they have in this opinion seated themselves in the jury box instead of on the bench. It amazes me that we stated in Higgins v. General Motors Corp., 250 Ark. 551, 465 S.W. 2d 898 (1971) that if we had strict liability in a case like this we would approve it, then the General Assembly enacted Ark. Stat. Ann. § 85-2-318.2 (Supp. 1977) to cover the subject, and now we say we really didn’t mean what we said in Higgins. The statute has been set out in the majority opinion and in the interest of brevity will not be repeated. There is no dispute that appellee was the supplier of the product which proximately caused appellant’s injury. Neither is it disputed that the supplier was engaged in selling this product nor that the defective condition was the proximate cause of the harm to appellant. After setting out an almost perfect case against appellee, the majority then turn around and quote from a decision “to support a verdict the evidence must be of a convincing nature, importing qualities of reasonable certainty.” This, I contend, is for the jury to decide. I find no fault in the law as stated by my brothers but I strongly disagree with the results reached. All we know about the manufacturer is that the case was dismissed. There is not a speck in the record which speaks of a settlement having been reached. It should not make any difference in this case how the manufacturer got out of the case. Maybe appellant thought his proof against them was no more than conjecture or speculation and the best strategy was to go against a single defendant. Appellant’s expert found the grinder on which the disc was used not to be defective. The shop foreman testified that the disc had been properly stored and correctly attached to the grinder. Appellant’s witnesses effectively negated any defect occurring after the disc was delivered by appellee. The expert testified, eseentially, as follows: I did examine the disc fragments that were brought me. Assuming that Johnnie Cockman on May 30, 1974, was injured at his place of employment when a grinding disc exploded; that the disc was a 9 inch by 1 /4 inch type 27 grinder disc, type 27 which means depressed center wheel mounted on a portable grinding machine; that a previously unused disc was mounted even before the accident; that it had not been used; that it was first utilized for 20 to 30 minutes on the morning of the accident; that the disc was purchased August 9, 1973 from a truck operated by Welder’s Supply; that the discs were carried loose on the trailer of the truck; that it was transported after it leaves Malvern to the Benton Crawler Works in Benton; that it was stored after purchase in a storage area of Benton Crawler Works and was not disturbed from the time of purchase until the day before the accident happened when it was mounted on the machine; that it was properly mounted and attached and was being used flat against the track of a crawler type dozer to remove or smooth down excess welding material; that it was not put into a bin; that the grinder did not over-rev as Í have previously testified, it is my opinion that the disc was defective and was defective when sold by Welder’s Supply Company. It is my opinion that if it was properly used and so forth and since there was no problem with the grinder, the only opinion I can derive is that the disc was defective. And that it was defective when delivered by Welder’s Supply to Benton Crawler Works. This testimony, when considered with his testimony that he could find no defect in the manufacturing process, clearly carries possible liability to the supplier and the purchaser. The purchaser’s witnesses at least made a case for the jury against appellee when they testified that the disc was not damaged while in custody of the purchaser. The testimony also pointed to the driver for the seller by showing he hauled the disc in a manner likely to cause a defect. Any type of major impact would probably inject a defect into the disc thereby rendering it likely to explode when placed into service or use. My brothers misinterpret the expert’s testimony when he testified that he could find no manufacturing defect and that he could find no defect in the grinder and further that he could not say with any “real certainty” that it was defective when delivered by appellee. Of course, he could not say it was defective when delivered. Only a fool would so testify to such under the circumstances. All he was saying was that he found no defect in the manufacture of the disc nor in the grinder. This left only two other probabilities: It was damaged by the seller or the purchaser. He had no knowledge of how it was handled by the parties except for the testimony offered by the witnesses. However, the purchaser’s witnesses eliminated him by showing exactly how it was stored and handled before use. I need not cite authority for the proposition that we are supposed to give the evidence its strongest probative force when reviewing a directed verdict. The expert’s testimony, standing alone, created a jury question as to the seller and purchaser although the purchaser was not a named defendant because his liability was limited to worker’s compensation benefits. Appellant offered substantial evidence, whcch, if believed by the jury, would meet every element set out in Ark. Stat. Ann. § 85-2-318.2 regarding strict liability. Therefore, I ask whether or not we meant it when we stated in Higgins: In the absence of direct proof that the product is defective because of a manufacturing flaw or inadequate design, plaintiff must negate the other possible causes of failure of the product for which the defendant would not be responsible in order to raise a reasonable inference that the dangerous condition existed while the product was still in the control of the defendant. Apparently the majority still holds that even after enactment of the strict liability statute a plaintiff still may not recover on circumstantial evidence. I do not so interpret the law or the decisions made in the past. For these reasons, and many more, I would reverse and remand with directions to allow the jury to decide the fact questions, assuming, at least, the same amount of circumstantial evidence is presented at the new trial. I am authorized to state that Byrd, J., joins me in this dissent.