Court Opinion

ID: 9499271
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:42:53.626165+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:59:23.264117
License: Public Domain

SUHRHE INRICH, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the reasoning and result of Judge Gilman’s opinion. I write separately merely to point out the absurdity of postulating that the Tennessee parole board would, could, ever conclude that Dyer’s “release is not incompatible with the welfare of society,” Tenn Code Ann. § 40-8614 (1974); Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-28-117(a) (1998), or that his release would not “depreciate the seriousness of the crime of which the defendant stands convicted.” Tenn Code Ann. § 40-35-503(b) (1998). In 1975, Dyer was convicted in the Criminal Court of Hamilton County of two counts of Murder in the First Degree and sentenced to death by electrocution in each case. Dyer, III v. State, No. 1182, 1991 WL 44978, at *1 (Tenn.Crim.App. Apr.4, 1991). In 1977, his death sentences were commuted to life sentences after the mandatory death penalty statute then in effect was declared unconstitutional, id. a fortuitous event from Dyer’s standpoint, unrelated to the nature of his crimes and the State’s judgment of them. In short, in my view, sometimes the technical legal arguments obscure common sense.