Court Opinion

ID: 9776353
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:31:23.975519+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:37.729303
License: Public Domain

MEYERS, J.,
concurring.
I concur in the result. I write separately to address three issues.
First, the majority states, “[a]s we have subsequently held, the evidence is not to be held insufficient because of a defect in the court’s charge. Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234 (Tex.Crim.App.1997).” In Ma-lik, this Court changed the measure used to review claims of legally insufficient evidence. Prior to Malik, the sufficiency of the evidence was measured by the indictment, as incorporated into the jury charge. See Benson v. State, 661 S.W.2d 708(Tex.Crim.App.l982) (opinion on State’s second motion for r’hrg), cert, denied 467 U.S. 1219, 104 S.Ct. 2667, 81 L.Ed.2d 372 (1984), overruled by Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 239 (Tex.Crim.App.1997); Boozer v. State, 717 S.W.2d 608 (Tex.Crim. App.1984), overruled by Malik, supra. Malik created a new measure for sufficiency of the evidence based on the “elements of the offense as defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge for the case.” Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240. As such, the majority is correct to state that the evidence presented to the jury was not legally insufficient to convict based on the paragraphs naming the victims. The “hypothetically correct jury charge” for this case would have included an instruction on transferred intent in the application paragraph that was missing from the actual jury charge.
Second, the majority errs to assume that the State needed the theory of transferred intent in order to obtain convictions based on the indictment counts which named the victims. Also making this assumption, the Court of Appeals mixed evidentiary sufficiency review and double jeopardy analysis — two processes of appellate review with entirely separate purposes.
Addressing Appellant’s claim that “there was no evidence of intent to murder the complainants specified,” the Court of Appeals noted:
Appellant points out that the doctrine of transferred intent (Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 6.04(b)) was given to the jury in the abstract portion of the court’s charge but was not applied to the facts in the application paragraph. Thus he argues that the theory of transferred intent is not available to the state to support the conviction. With this premise the state concedes [sic], and we agree. See Garrett v. State, 749 S.W.2d 784, 788-89 (Tex.Crim.App.1986). Therefore, we will only consider the sufficiency of the evidence as it relates to the allegation of attempted murder of a person or persons unknown to the grand jury in Paragraph A of each indictment.
943 S.W.2d at 118 n. 6 (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals conducted a legal *649sufficiency analysis as to the paragraphs listing unknown persons only, and apparently assumed the evidence would not support convictions as to the named complainants unless the State could rely on the doctrine of transferred intent. This assumption is erroneous.
Murder is defined, in relevant part, by section 19.02(b)(1) and (2) of the Texas Penal Code: “A person commits an offense if he (1) intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual, or (2) intends to cause serious bodily injury and commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual!)]” Criminal attempt is defined by section 15.01(a) of the Penal Code: “A person commits an offense if, with specific intent to commit an offense, he does an act amounting to more than mere preparation that tends but fails to effect the commission of the offense intended.” One type of attempted murder then is when a person knows that his conduct may cause serious bodily injury or death, does an act clearly dangerous to human life, and yet that act does not actually cause death.
The Penal Code defines the culpable mental states of “intentionally” and “knowingly”:
(a) A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.
(b) A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to the nature of his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or that the circumstances exist. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.
Tex. Penal Code § 6.03(a), (b). Intent and knowledge are fact questions for the jury, and are almost always proven through evidence of the circumstances surrounding the crime. Robles v. State, 664 S.W.2d 91, 94 (Tex.Crim.App.1984); Mouton v. State, 923 S.W.2d 219, 223 (TexApp. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no pet.).
A jury may infer intent from any facts which tend to prove its existence, including the acts, words, and conduct of the accused, and the method of committing the crime and from the nature of wounds inflicted on the victims. Hernandez v. State, 819 S.W.2d 806, 810 (Tex.Crim.App.1991), cert, denied 504 U.S. 974, 112 S.Ct. 2944, 119 L.Ed.2d 568 (1992) (acts, words, conduct); Dues v. State, 634 S.W.2d 304, 305 (Tex.Crim.App.1982) (same); Beltran v. State, 593 S.W.2d 688, 689 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980) (same); Cordova v. State, 698 S.W.2d 107, 112 (Tex.Crim.App.1985), cert, denied, 476 U.S. 1101, 106 S.Ct. 1942, 90 L.Ed.2d 352 (1986) (method and wounds). A jury may also infer knowledge from such evidence. See, e.g., Martinez v. State, 833 S.W.2d 188, 196 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1992, pet. ref'd). Stahle v. State, 970 S.W.2d 682, 687 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1998). This has been the rule in Texas for over 100 years.1
In addition, as the State argued in its brief to this Court:
Initially, it must be remembered that when an individual is identified as a *650victim in an indictment charging a crime such as murder or assault, the identity of such victim does not become a part of the defendant’s mens rea. In other words, the defendant does not have to know the identity of the victim, nor [sic] does the State have to prove that the defendant knew such identity. Even though the identity of the victim in such a case becomes an element of proof for the State, and the failure to so prove will result in an acquittal, the identity of the victim does not become an element of the offense to which the culpable mental state of the defendant attaches.
For example, if a person picks out a particular individual named Joe Smith from a crowd of strangers, whose identity he does not know, and he then shoots that individual, the indictment charging the defendant with murder or some other assaultive offense will specifically name Joe Smith as the. person shot. However, that does not mean that, in order to obtain a conviction, the State will have to prove that the defendant knew this identity. Instead, such an allegation effectively means that the defendant intentionally or knowingly assaulted a particular individual, who happened to be Joe Smith.
Thus, the fact that the indictments in the case at bar specifically named the victims of the attempted murders does not mean that the State had to prove that the appellant knew the identity of his victims at the time of the offense.
I agree. The identity of the victim is not an element of the crime to which the culpable mental state attaches.
The record shows Appellant fired multiple shots from an AK-47 into a house located in a residential area at 4:00 a.m. There is evidence that Appellant saw at least one person in the house while he was firing. In addition, there is evidence that Appellant knew the house was occupied as he was firing. Based on this circumstantial evidence the jury could reasonably infer that Appellant had either intent to kill the persons in the house or knowledge that his actions might reasonably lead to the death of persons in the house. “Edward Avilez” and “Donnie Avilez” are the names of the persons in the house who were hit by Appellant’s gunfire. The State therefore presented evidence from which a jury could logically conclude that Appellant either had intent to kill Edward and Donnie Avilez, or knew that his actions might reasonably lead to the death of Edward and Donnie Avilez. The fact that Appellant did not know the identity of the persons at whom he was shooting is irrelevant. See Salisbury v. State, 90 Tex.Crim. 438, 235 S.W. 901, 902 (1921) (defendant can be found guilty of murder where he shoots into a car or building he knows to be occupied).
While the evidence would support convictions based on the theory of transferred intent, that theory was by no means necessary. The evidence in some cases will support a conviction regardless of whether the State decides to pursue a transferred intent theory. See also Norris v. State, 902 S.W.2d 428, 436 (Tex.CriimApp.1995) (evidence supported capital murder conviction with or without application of transferred intent). The Court of Appeals thus erred to commingle the evidentiary sufficiency review and double jeopardy analysis; it was incorrect to disregard the paragraphs of the indictments naming Edward and Donnie Avilez as victims.
Third, our recent decision in Ex parte Goodbread, 967 S.W.2d 859 (Tex.Crim. App.1998) also supports the conclusion that there is no double jeopardy bar to prosecuting Appellant for two acts of attempted murder in the absence of the indictment paragraphs naming the victims. In Goodbread, we considered “whether prosecution upon the initial indictment creates a double jeopardy bar to prosecution upon the subsequent indictments [which include the same offense, same manner of commission, and dates within the same statute of limitations period] merely because the subsequent indictments would *651support convictions for offenses that would also have been supported under the language of the initial indictment.” Goodb-read, 967 S.W.2d at 860. Relying on Luna v. State, 493 S.W.2d 854 (Tex.Crim.App. 1973), which stated that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars a second prosecution for the identical criminal act and not the same offense by name, and Walker v. State, 473 S.W.2d 499 (Tex.Crim.App. 1971), which provided that Double Jeopardy bars prosecution only for offenses for which proof was offered at trial, we concluded that “trial upon an indictment does not bar every offense that could be prosecuted under its language; instead, trial upon the indictment bars prosecution only for offenses for which proof was offered at trial.” Goodbread, 967 S.W.2d at 861. In the context of Goodbread, that means that each instance of sexual assault of a child is a separate crime and may be prosecuted separately. In the context of Appellant’s case, that means that each instance of attempted murder is a separate crime and may be prosecuted separately. So long as the proof offered at trial shows two separate instances of attempted murder, the fact that the indictments are identically worded is irrelevant.2
With these comments, I concur in the result.

. When in a case the question arises as to whether the accused intended to kill, the means used by him may be looked to. If a deadly weapon is used in a deadly manner, the inference is almost conclusive that he intended to kill; on the other hand, if the weapon was not a dangerous one, or was not used in a deadly manner, the evidence must be established by other facts.
Hatton v. State, 31 Tex.Crim. 586, 21 S.W. 679 (1893). While the 1974 Penal Code does not include the 1925 Code’s statutory presumption regarding intent to kill, this Court has have cited Hatton with approval since the adoption of the 1974 Code. Flanagan v. State, 675 S.W.2d 734, 749 (Tex.Crim.App.1982). See also Womble v. State, 618 S.W.2d 59, 64 (Tex.Crim.App.1981) (law presumes an intent to kill where deadly weapon is fired at close range and death results).

. In my concurring opinion in Goodbread, I raised concerns about the new measure of evidentiary sufficiency: "The problem is, how can we ascertain that the separately alleged offenses are distinct from one another, given that the face of the subsequent indictments would support the same convictions that would also have been supported under the initial indictment.” In the present case, this problem does not exist because each of the two alleged offenses has a different victim.