Court Opinion

ID: 9955129
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-27 18:03:39.179063+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:16.509021
License: Public Domain

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                 STATE OF FLORIDA
                  _____________________________

                         No. 1D2022-0574
                  _____________________________

GARY CORNEL MELTON,

    Appellant,

    v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

    Appellee.
                  _____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambia County.
Jennie Kinsey, Judge.

                          March 27, 2024

PER CURIAM.

    Appellant was charged by information with burglary of a
structure with assault or battery. He was convicted of the
permissive lesser included offense of burglary of an occupied
structure. He raises two issues on appeal. First, Appellant claims
that his conviction is improper because the information failed to
properly plead the permissive lesser included offense. Second,
Appellant argues that the charges against him should have been
dismissed due to a discovery violation by the State. Finding no
reversible error, we affirm Appellant’s judgment and sentence.

     Appellant represented himself at a bench trial after waiving
his right to a jury trial. Prior to trial, Appellant filed a motion to
dismiss, arguing dismissal was proper because the State failed to
provide him discovery in the case. The State had provided
Appellant with discovery for one of his other pending cases, but not
for the instant case that was proceeding to trial. At a hearing on
the matter, the State explained that the discovery violation was an
oversight and not intentional and pointed out that discovery was
provided to his previously appointed counsel. The State provided
Appellant with an additional copy of the discovery at the hearing.
Due to the alleged discovery violation, the trial court conducted a
Richardson 1 hearing. The trial court found there was a discovery
violation, but that the violation was not willful nor intentional. The
trial court offered Appellant additional time to prepare for trial as
a remedy, but Appellant refused to withdraw his request for
speedy trial.

    At trial, evidence established that Appellant pushed the
owner of Central Bail Bonds aside to enter the business uninvited
through the back door. Upon entry, Appellant began yelling for the
owner’s stepdaughter and chased her. The owner heard his
stepdaughter screaming, and when he got to her, she had a large
gash across her forehead and some bruising on her legs.

     The trial court found Appellant guilty of the lesser-included
offense of burglary of an occupied structure and sentenced him to
fifteen years in prison. Thereafter, Appellant filed a motion to
correct sentencing error under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure
3.800(b)(2). Appellant, now represented by counsel, argued that
the trial court erred in sentencing him to fifteen years in prison
because the information was not sufficient to support the
conviction. Specifically, Appellant argued that because burglary of
an occupied structure is a permissive lesser included offense to the
burglary with assault, all the elements of the offense had to be
charged in the information, and the State failed to allege that the
structure was occupied when Appellant entered. The trial court
denied Appellant’s motion, finding that the information was
sufficient.

    1 Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1971).

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                                  I.

    Appellant’s first issue on appeal is whether the information
supported his conviction on the permissive lesser included offense.
The State claims this issue is not preserved for appeal because it
was raised for the first time in Appellant’s rule 3.800(b)(2) motion,
and this issue is not cognizable under such motions.

     The following have been recognized as “sentencing errors”
subject to rule 3.800(b): defendant was improperly habitualized;
the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum; the scoresheet was
inaccurate; a departure sentence was improperly imposed; the
written order deviated from the oral pronouncement; costs were
improperly assessed; defendant improperly sentenced to
simultaneous incarceration and probation; credit for time served
was not awarded; decision to impose adult sanctions was not
addressed in writing; and that a sentencing statute was
unconstitutional. Jackson v. State, 983 So. 2d 562, 572–73 (Fla.
2008).

     To counter the State’s argument that the issue is not
preserved, Appellant cites case law holding that a defendant may
preserve the issue of whether the trial court erred in enhancing a
defendant’s sentence where the information did not support the
enhancement via a 3.800(b)(2) motion. See Anderson v. State, 988
So. 2d 144 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008); Freudenberger v. State, 940 So. 2d
551 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). While we do not disagree with the
proposition, we find the alleged error in the instant case
distinguishable. The issue here is whether a defendant convicted
of a permissive lesser included offense, which was not properly
charged in the information, can preserve the issue for appeal by
filing a 3.800(b) motion. This is not an issue of sentencing
enhancement.

     Here, Appellant was charged with burglary of a structure with
assault or battery, a first-degree felony punishable by
imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment.
See § 810.02(2)(a), Fla. Stat. Appellant argues that the highest
necessarily lesser included offense of the charged crime is burglary
of an unoccupied structure, a third-degree felony. See § 810.02(4),
Fla. Stat. If the structure is occupied, it is a second-degree felony.

                                  3
See § 810.02(3)(c), Fla. Stat. It may appear at first glance that a
finding that a structure is occupied is an enhancement to the crime
of burglary of an unoccupied structure. However, Appellant is
challenging his conviction, not a sentencing enhancement.
Accordingly, Appellant could not raise this claim by motion under
rule 3.800(b). See Profit v. State, 49 Fla. L. Weekly D201, *1 (Fla.
1st DCA Jan. 17, 2024) (holding that a 3.800(b) motion “is not the
correct procedural vehicle for attacking the merits of an underlying
criminal conviction” (quoting Echeverria v. State, 949 So. 2d 331,
335 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007))). Appellant could have but failed to object
to the alleged error at the time of conviction. 2

     Because the issue is not preserved, Appellant would only be
entitled to relief if fundamental error occurred. Appellant did not
argue this issue constituted fundamental error, but even if he had,
we would reject the argument.

     “Fundamental error is ‘error which goes to the foundation of
the case or goes to the merits of the cause of action.’” Jackson, 983
So. 2d at 568 (quoting Hopkins v. State, 632 So. 2d 1372, 1374 (Fla.
1994)).

    [I]t is not fundamental error to convict a defendant under
    an erroneous lesser included charge when he had an
    opportunity to object to the charge and failed to do so if:
    1) the improperly charged offense is lesser in degree and
    penalty than the main offense or 2) defense counsel
    requested the improper charge or relied on that charge as
    evidence by argument to the jury or other affirmative
    action.

Nesbitt v. State, 889 So. 2d 801, 803 (Fla. 2004) (quoting Ray v.
State, 403 So. 2d 956, 960 (Fla. 1981)).

    Again, Appellant was charged with burglary of a structure
with a battery, a first-degree felony punishable by imprisonment

    2 We reject Appellant’s claim that he had no ability to object

to the court’s decision to find him guilty of burglary of an occupied
structure.

                                 4
for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment and was found
guilty of burglary of an occupied structure, a second-degree felony.
Appellant does not contend that the evidence was insufficient to
find that the structure was occupied. Nor does Appellant contend
that he lacked sufficient notice that the State was alleging that the
structure was occupied. See Anderson v. State, 291 So. 3d 531, 538
(Fla. 2020) (noting that “the purpose of a charging instrument is
to put the defendant on notice, not to allege all of the facts that will
ultimately support the essential elements of the charge” (citation
omitted)). Indeed, it is difficult to conclude that Appellant was
unaware that the information was alleging that he burglarized an
occupied structure, inasmuch as it charged him with battering a
person in course of burglarizing the structure. Under these
circumstances, we cannot say that Appellant’s conviction was
infected with fundamental error because he was found guilty of
burglary of an occupied structure.

     In reaching this conclusion, we do not suggest that burglary
of an occupied structure is a necessarily-included offense of
burglary of a structure with a battery, simply because it is possible
to commit burglary with a battery when the battery occurs “in
flight after . . . commission” of the burglary. See § 810.011(4), Fla.
Stat. But the person Appellant allegedly battered was indisputably
inside the structure when the burglary occurred. Cf. State v. Delva,
575 So. 2d 643, 645 (Fla. 1991) “[f]ailing to instruct on an element
of the crime over which the record reflects there was no dispute is
not fundamental error . . . .”). Whether or not this discrepancy
constitutes an error, it certainly did not “reach down into the
validity of the trial” such that would constitute fundamental error.
Brown v. State, 124 So. 2d 481, 484 (Fla. 1960).

                                  II.

     In his second issue on appeal, Appellant argues that the trial
court erred in denying his motion to dismiss because the State
committed a discovery violation when it failed to provide him
discovery in the case. A trial court’s ruling on a request for
sanctions for a discovery violation is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. See Delhall v. State, 95 So. 3d 134, 160 (Fla. 2012);
Plummer v. State, 454 So. 2d 61, 62 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).

                                   5
     Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220(b)(1) requires the
State to provide to a defendant, within fifteen days after service of
a notice of discovery, a written discovery exhibit. Appellant does
not address the State’s claim he had failed to establish that any
discovery violation occurred here given the State provided
discovery to appointed counsel prior to Appellant choosing to
proceed pro se, even though it did not timely respond to Appellant’s
subsequent discovery request. Instead, he focuses on what
sanction would be appropriate based on the alleged discovery
violation. But no sanction is warranted if there is no discovery
violation. It is not that discovery was not provided to Appellant
here; it was provided through his appointed counsel. Rather, it is
simply that discovery was not provided a second time after
Appellant chose to proceed pro se. We agree with the State that
this does not amount to a discovery violation.

     Even if we were to find the State violated the rules of
discovery, dismissal of a case due to a discovery violation “is a
drastic remedy which should only be used sparingly and in
extreme situations.” State v. Gillis, 876 So. 2d 703, 705 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2004). Appellant is unable to demonstrate the prejudice
necessary to show that the extreme sanction of dismissal of the
charges was warranted. See Hunter v. State, 660 So. 2d 244, 250
(Fla. 1995). First, the trial court offered Appellant additional time
to prepare for trial after he received discovery, and Appellant
declined. Second, Appellant fails to allege how having the
discovery materials sooner would have affected his trial
preparation. Lastly, Appellant could have asked his prior counsel
for the discovery materials, and thus, the State’s failure to provide
the materials to him would have had no impact. Under these facts,
we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Appellant’s motion to dismiss.

    Finding no reversible error, we affirm Appellant’s judgment
and sentence.

    AFFIRMED.

LEWIS, WINOKUR, and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., concur.

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                 _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
               _____________________________

Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Victor D. Holder, Assistant
Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Adam B. Wilson, Assistant
Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

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