Court Opinion

ID: 9528719
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:43:21.859415+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:14.752677
License: Public Domain

VAN HOOMISSEN, J.,
concurring in part; dissenting in part.
The only question the trial judge addressed in this case was whether the seizure of the paperfold was lawful. The judge concluded that it was not. Accordingly, he allowed defendant’s motion to suppress. I agree with the majority that the trial judge erred in that respect. The majority should have stopped there.
The judge was not asked to address, and he did not consider, whether the subsequent opening of the paperfold and the testing of its contents were lawful. Therefore, the majority is premature in addressing those issues. They should not be addressed by this court before they have been raised in the trial court and, if raised, ruled on by the trial judge. See City of Portland v. Tuttle, 62 Or App 62, 659 P2d 1010 (1983); State v. Wyman, 59 Or App 542, 651 P2d 195 (1982); State v. Johnson/Imel, 16 Or App 560, 519 P2d 1053, rev den on Imel (1974). I would reverse the trial judge’s erroneous ruling and remand this case for trial.
On the merits, the state appeals from an order granting defendant’s motion to suppress. ORS 138.060(3). The majority holds that the seizure of the paperfold was lawful, because Officer Yokum had probable cause to believe that the paperfold contained contraband. I agree. I read the majority opinion to hold that the seizure was independently lawful under the “plain view” exception to the warrant requirement. Again, I agree.
The majority also holds that the police needed a warrant to “search” the paperfold.1 For the reasons given in my dissenting opinion in State v. Westlund, 75 Or App 43, 705 P2d 208 (1985), I disagree and therefore respectfully dissent.
*117Warden, J. and Rossman, J. concur in this concurrence and dissent.

 It is not clear to me whether this “search” involves (1) the opening of the closed paperfold, (2) the testing of the paperfold’s contents or (3) both of the above. The Supreme Court should tell us whether opening and testing constitute one or two discrete constitutional events. See State v. Lowry, 295 Or 337, 346, 667 P2d 996 (1983).