Court Opinion

ID: 9598245
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:07:02.576286+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:38:22.059290
License: Public Domain

WOLLHEIM, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in that part of the majority opinion that holds that plaintiff is entitled to attorney fees under ORS 20.080. However, I dissent from the majority’s holding that plaintiff is entitled to attorney fees on only one of the two actions she filed. Instead, I would hold that plaintiff is entitled to attorney fees on both actions.
The majority interprets the “pre-suit demand [as] seeking $4,000 for a single claim, not $4,000 for two claims.” 165 Or App at 726.1 disagree. The pre-suit demand clearly identifies two causes of action, one for false imprisonment *734and one for malicious prosecution. The demand also vexy clearly demands only a $4,000 settlement “as a result of all the above.” (Emphasis added.) Defendants had notice that they could settle two causes of action for a total of $4,000, causes of action that could, legally, be brought in two separate lawsuits.
I concede that the pre-suit demand stated that plaintiff would file a lawsuit. However, plaintiffs threat to file “a lawsuit” does not diminish notice to defendants of their opportunity to settle two causes of action for $4,000. First, even considering plaintiffs threat of “a lawsuit,” the letter identifies that a lawsuit will be filed for “such damages,” not for “all of the above.” Thus, contrary to the majority’s conclusion, there is no necessary connection between the threat to file “a lawsuit” and the settlement demand of $4,000 for two causes of action. It is plausible to interpret that sentence as a threat to file “a lawsuit” for damages resulting out of either, both, or each of the claims identified above, and it does nothing to diminish notice to defendants that they could settle “all of the above” for a total of $4,000.
Second, there is no express language in ORS 20.080 requiring a separate letter for each action filed or requiring identification of the number of lawsuits in which a plaintiff intends to pursue causes of action. The statute requires only a “written demand” for “such claim.” “Such claim” refers to “any action” requesting $4,000 or less in damages. Landers v. E. Texas Motor Frt. Lines, 266 Or 473, 476, 513 P2d 1151 (1973). I read this requirement as the court in Landers read the damages requirement in the demand letter: that the letter must only provide sufficient notice “to give the defendant an opportunity to settle the case.” Id at 475.
Support for this reading of ORS 20.080 comes from both the text of the statute and its purpose. The statute requires only that a plaintiff make a written demand concerning her claims for any action. That is distinguished from a requirement that a plaintiff make a demand concerning her claims in each action. The former requires that a written demand explain the claims that are subsequently pursued for $4,000 or less. The latter requires that a single written demand explain the claims that are subsequently pursued for *735a total of $4,000 or less. Plaintiff should not be penalized where she made a good faith reasonable offer to settle all claims for $4,000. Here, plaintiff made such an offer to settle, thereby furthering the statutory goal to encourage settlement. Plaintiff should not lose the benefit of ORS 20.080 because her claims were identified in a single demand. There is no requirement that plaintiff must barrage defendants with multiple pre-suit demands. And nothing in ORS 20.080 or the pre-suit demand can be interpreted as foreclosing plaintiff from her legally available choice to pursue two distinct lawsuits because she offered one low settlement.1
Last, defendants argue that failure to aggregate the two claims for relief would be contrary to the legislative intent because it would encourage a multiplicity of lawsuits and enable plaintiffs to make exorbitant demands and receive attorney fees. I disagree. The Supreme Court interpreted ORS 20.080 in Johnson v. White, 249 Or 461, 464, 439 P2d 8 (1968):
“If the total demand, regardless of the number of causes of action, is [the statutory maximum] or less, attorney fees are allowable on each cause of action if plaintiff recovers and other requirements are met. If the total demand is over [the statutory maximum] attorney fees may not be allowed under any cause of action.” (Emphasis added.)
In Johnson, the Supreme Court concluded that the purpose of ORS 20.080 is two-fold: The first purpose is to “prevent insurance companies and others having liability for torts from refusing to settle and pay just claims therefor,” id. at 462-63, and the second purpose is “a warning to plaintiffs not to inflate small claims beyond just amounts, in order that the tort-feasor may in good faith make settlement of such claims without resorting to the courts,” id. at 464. The court went on to note “[t]he fact that the wording of the statute may cause a multiplicity of actions to be filed in some * * * cases * * * may be a reason for further amendment of the statute. But, that is of legislative, not judicial, concern.” Id.
*736Armstrong, J., joins in this concurring and dissenting opinion.

 The offer to settle two claims before trial for $4,000, but to seek $4,000 for each claim if the offer is not accepted, should not be surprising to a retailer. Basically, plaintiff was willing to settle both claims, if there was no trial, for the wholesale price of $4,000. However, if plaintiff was forced to try both claims, then plaintiff would seek the retail price of $4,000 for each claim.