Court Opinion

ID: 9376979
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-06 16:03:55.772416+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:10.892396
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (1st) 200462
                                              No. 1-20-0462
                                                                    FIRST DIVISION
                                                                       March 6, 2023
     ______________________________________________________________________________

                                         IN THE
                             APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                                     FIRST DISTRICT
     ______________________________________________________________________________

     THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                          )   Appeal from the
                                                                   )   Circuit Court of
              Plaintiff-Appellee,                                      Cook County.
                                                                   )
        v.                                                         )   No. 91 CR 22152
                                                                   )   No. 91 CR 22460
     GEORGE ANDERSON,
                                                                   )
                                                                       Honorable
              Defendant-Appellant.                                 )   William H. Hooks,
                                                                   )   Judge, presiding.

              JUSTICE PUCINSKI delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
              Justice Hyman concurred in the judgment and opinion.
              Justice Hyman also specially concurred, with opinion.
              Justice Lavin specially concurred, with opinion.

                                                OPINION

¶1           Defendant-appellant George Anderson submitted a claim to the Illinois Torture Inquiry and

       Relief Commission (TIRC) under the Illinois Torture Inquiry and Relief Commission Act

       (TIRC Act) (775 ILCS 40/1 et seq. (West 2018)), alleging that his convictions in two

       underlying cases resulted from his torture by Chicago police in August 1991, over the course
     No. 1-20-0462

        of 30 hours in police custody. He alleged that the two inculpatory statements he signed were

        coerced, and he sought suppression of those statements and new trials.

¶2         The TIRC found sufficient evidence of torture to refer the matter to the circuit court for

        judicial review. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing over the course of four years,

        at which it heard testimony from numerous witnesses and considered voluminous “pattern and

        practice” evidence of prior allegations against the detectives who interrogated defendant. In its

        posthearing decision, the trial court credited the accused detectives, determined that none of

        the pattern and practice evidence was relevant, and found that defendant fabricated his claims

        of police torture. The court thus denied defendant any relief.

¶3         We conclude the trial court erred because it did not apply the proper initial inquiry, i.e.,

        whether defendant showed that newly discovered evidence would likely have altered the result

        of a suppression hearing. Given the voluminous evidence of past police abuse, defendant met

        that initial burden. Moreover, we find that the State could not meet its corresponding burden

        to prove that the statements were, in fact, voluntary. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for

        new trials, at which defendant’s inculpatory statements will be excluded.

¶4                                         I. BACKGROUND

¶5                                     A. The Underlying Crimes

¶6         This appeal concerns two separate cases, case No. 91 CR 22152 (the Miles case) and case

        No. 91 CR 22460 (the Miggins case), which arose from separate shootings in 1991.

¶7         In June 1991, 14-year-old Kathryn Miles was killed, and three others were wounded in a

        shooting. Defendant (along with codefendant Jerome Johnson) was charged in the Miles case

        with counts of first degree murder and other offenses.

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       No. 1-20-0462

¶8           In August 1991, 11-year-old Jeremiah Miggins was killed by a stray bullet during a

          shootout between rival gang members. Two men, Anthony Wilson and Steven Crosby, suffered

          gunshot wounds in that incident. Defendant, Johnson, and Michael Sutton were charged with

          murder, attempted murder, and aggravated battery with a firearm in the Miggins case. 1

¶9                                 B. Defendant’s Inculpatory Statements

¶ 10         On August, 21, 1991, defendant was arrested by Chicago police and brought to the Area 3

          station, where he was interrogated regarding the Miggins shooting. At 7:45 a.m. on August 22,

          1991, defendant signed a statement in the presence of Detective Michael Kill and an assistant

          state’s attorney, Joseph Brent. In that statement, defendant admitted that he drove Johnson to

          and from the scene of the shooting.

¶ 11         Other detectives interrogated defendant regarding the Miles shooting. In the evening of

          August 22 (after being in police custody for over 30 hours), defendant signed a separate

          statement regarding Miles’s shooting that was handwritten by another assistant state’s attorney,

          Brian Grossman.

¶ 12                                   C. Motion to Suppress Hearing

¶ 13         Defendant moved to suppress his written statements in both the Miles and Miggins cases,

          on the ground that he was tortured by police. On January 24, 1994, the trial court (Hon. Joseph

          Urso) held a suppression hearing.

¶ 14                           1. Defendant’s Suppression Hearing Testimony

¶ 15         Defendant testified that on the afternoon of August 21, 1991, he and Sutton were pulled

          over by police. In the late evening, he was taken to 39th Place and California Avenue, where

             1
               Johnson was a codefendant in both the Miles and Miggins cases. Johnson has similarly alleged
          that detectives at Area 3 interrogated and beat him until he signed confessions in both cases.

                                                      -3-
       No. 1-20-0462

          he was brought to a room and handcuffed by his left hand to a wall. Kill attempted to question

          him and “ignored” his request for an attorney. Kill left after defendant refused to answer his

          questions. About an hour later, Kill and another officer returned and asked if he was “ready to

          talk.” Defendant again requested an attorney. Kill then “kicked the handcuffs that was on my

          left hand to the wall”, which was painful. Defendant also testified that the other officer (whom

          he did not name) used his hands to hit defendant twice in the face. Kill came back alone after

          45 minutes and asked if he was “ready to talk.” Defendant repeated that he wanted an attorney,

          and Kill left again.

¶ 16          Kill returned with a state’s attorney, later identified as Brent. Defendant said he wanted an

          attorney, but Brent “didn’t say anything.” Defendant refused to answer their questions and was

          again left handcuffed to the wall. When Kill and Brent returned and urged defendant to “tell

          them what happened” in the Miggins shooting, defendant still did not talk, so he was left alone

          again. When they returned yet again, defendant answered their questions. At that point, Kill

          and Brent told him they would speak to Johnson and return.

¶ 17          Kill later took defendant to another room, where Brent questioned him and wrote out a

          statement. Defendant was shown the statement, but he could not read it because Kill was

          “moving the pages” too quickly. Kill told defendant where to sign the document, but the

          statement was not read to him before he signed it. Defendant had not slept or eaten from his

          arrest to when he signed the Miggins statement.

¶ 18          After he signed the Miggins statement, he was taken to a new room with lockers, where he

          was left handcuffed to the radiator. Around two hours later, two different detectives (later

          identified as James O’Brien and Joseph Stehlik) asked him about a separate incident.

          Defendant said he wanted an attorney, but they did not respond. When defendant refused to

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       No. 1-20-0462

          answer questions, he was taken back to the locker room, where they handcuffed his hands

          above his head. 2 He was left in that room for about two hours.

¶ 19         When O’Brien and Stelick returned and asked him about the Miles shooting, defendant

          said he did not know what they were talking about. O’Brien slapped defendant in the face.

          Stehlik brought out a “rubber hose or pipe.” O’Brien placed a book on defendant’s left side,

          then used the pipe to hit him through the book five or six times. They left him “hanging” there.

¶ 20         About an hour later, he was taken to another room, where he was cuffed to a radiator. The

          room became very cold. O’Brien and Stehlik returned a number of times, but defendant

          declined to speak with them.

¶ 21         Stehlik later returned to the room with an assistant state’s attorney (later identified as

          Grossman). When defendant he said he wanted a lawyer, Grossman did not respond, and

          defendant was left alone in the room. Defendant recalled that Stehlik and Grossman repeatedly

          asked if he was ready to talk but left him in the room (still handcuffed) when he declined.

¶ 22         Eventually, Stehlik brought defendant to a room where Grossman was waiting with “a

          paper written out sitting on the desk.” Stehlik asked him to sign the paper. Defendant was not

          given a chance to review the statement, and he was not told its contents. At Stehlik’s direction,

          defendant signed the document and initialed it on several pages. He did so because he “was

          tired of being in that freezing room.” Defendant had not eaten or slept.

¶ 23         On cross-examination with respect to Miggins statement, defendant answered negatively

          when asked if Detective Kenneth Boudreau struck him. He acknowledged he signed and

             2
               He could not see what the cuffs were attached to above him but said it “might have been a pole”
          or a “hook.”

                                                       -5-
       No. 1-20-0462

          initialed the statement at several points, including where it stated that he had not been

          threatened. He maintained that he did not know that was included in the statement.

¶ 24          On cross-examination regarding the Miles statement, defendant recalled O’Brien put the

          book on defendant’s side “and hit me with the rubber thing on my left side, but he hit the

          book.” Defendant was taken to the room with air conditioning and left there for about “seven

          hours.” He maintained that he never told Grossman anything about the Miles shooting and that

          the statement “was already written” when Grossman presented it to him.

¶ 25                     2. Detectives’ Testimony at the Motion to Suppress Hearing

¶ 26          Detective Kill testified that he and his partner, Detective John Halloran, investigated the

          Miggins shooting. At approximately 10 p.m. on August 21, 1991, Kill and Halloran

          interviewed defendant. Kill said that he unhandcuffed defendant from a ring on the wall and

          that, to his knowledge, defendant was not handcuffed after that point.

¶ 27          Kill read defendant Miranda warnings (see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)), and

          defendant said he understood them and wished to answer questions. After a 30-minute

          conversation, Kill and Halloran left the room. Kill returned at about 2:15 a.m. with Brent, who

          gave Miranda warnings. After a conversation of 25 to 30 minutes, Kill left with Brent and

          defendant still in the room.

¶ 28          At about 7:45 a.m., Kill brought defendant to a room with a desk. At that time, the prior

          conversation “was reduced to writing” by Brent, and defendant signed the statement and

          initialed corrections.

¶ 29          Kill denied that Boudreau was present for either the 2:15 a.m. or 7:45 a.m. conversations.

          Kill denied he or any other detective ever kicked or slapped defendant. Kill said it was

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       No. 1-20-0462

          “impossible” for defendant to have been cuffed with his hands above his head. Kill said

          defendant was given food from McDonald’s before his statement was reduced to writing.

¶ 30          Kill acknowledged that on the same night he was also interviewing codefendants Johnson

          and Sutton regarding the Miggins shooting. Kill denied that he referenced Johnson’s statements

          when he spoke to defendant. Kill specifically denied ever telling defendant that they knew he

          was not the shooter or telling him that he would “die in Joliet” if he did not talk.

¶ 31          Kenneth Boudreau testified he was Kill’s partner and was at Area 3 on the night of

          defendant’s arrest. Boudreau helped interview other witnesses for the Miggins shooting

          investigation but denied he was present for any interviews with defendant. Boudreau recalled

          that he bought food for the arrestees sometime in the early morning, but he denied any other

          contact with defendant.

¶ 32          Detective Joseph Stehlik testified that on August 22, 1991, he interviewed defendant in

          connection with Miles’s June 1991 shooting. Stehlik and his partner, James O’Brien, brought

          defendant to an interview room around 1:15 p.m. Defendant indicated he understood his

          Miranda rights and agreed to speak with them.

¶ 33          Stehlik was present when Assistant State’s Attorney (ASA) Grossman spoke with

          defendant around 5 p.m. and again at around 7 p.m. At approximately 8:30 p.m., Grossman

          took defendant’s handwritten statement and reviewed it with defendant. Defendant signed each

          page of the statement, as did Stehlik and Grossman. Stehlik denied that defendant ever

          complained of abuse by any detective. He specifically denied that O’Brien hit the defendant in

          the ribs.

¶ 34          Detective James O’Brien testified he and Stehlik interviewed defendant around 1:15 p.m.

          and they spoke for about 30 minutes. O’Brien stated that he did not participate in any other

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       No. 1-20-0462

          interview of defendant. O’Brien denied that he struck defendant or that he saw anyone else

          kick, slap, or punch defendant. He never saw defendant handcuffed on that day.

¶ 35          Grossman testified that, in connection with the Miles shooting investigation, he went to the

          station on August 22, 1991. With Stehlik and O’Brien present, Grossman advised defendant

          of his Miranda rights, after which they had a conversation. Later that evening, Grossman had

          a second conversation with defendant, again with the detectives present. After that

          conversation, Grossman asked defendant if he wanted to keep his statement as an oral

          statement, if he wanted Grossman to reduce it to writing, or if he wanted to have a court reporter

          take his statement. Defendant indicated he wanted a handwritten statement.

¶ 36          Around 8:30 p.m., Grossman met with defendant outside the presence of detectives.

          Grossman asked defendant if he needed anything and asked how he had been treated.

          Defendant said he did not need anything and that “he’s been treated fine.” Defendant never

          told Grossman that anyone had hit him or that he was left in a cold room.

¶ 37          Grossman took defendant’s handwritten statement with Stehlik present. Grossman

          presented defendant with printed Miranda warnings, which defendant read and signed to

          indicate his understanding. 3 Grossman then questioned defendant and wrote out a statement,

              3
                The record shows that the statements in both the Miggins case and the Miles case were written on
          forms that included the following preprinted paragraph: “I understand I have the right to remain silent
          and that anything I say can be used against me in a court of law. I understand that I have the right to
          talk to a lawyer and have him present with me during questioning, and if I cannot afford to hire a lawyer
          one will be appointed by the court to represent me before any questioning. Understanding these rights,
          I wish to give a statement.” Defendant’s signature appears directly below that paragraph on both
          statements. Following these preprinted warnings, the substance of the statements was handwritten by
          Brent and Grossman.
               The record does not reflect that defendant was asked to sign a preprinted Miranda waiver form that
          was wholly separate from the forms containing the incriminating statements about the murders. Use of
          such an additional signed waiver document gives courts and reviewing courts extra evidence from
          which to determine that a defendant’s statement to police was, in fact, voluntary. See, e.g., People v.
          Buschauer, 2022 IL App (1st) 192472 (finding waiver memorialized by signed waiver form was valid

                                                          -8-
       No. 1-20-0462

          which he reviewed with defendant. Defendant signed at the bottom of each page and initialed

          corrections. Within the statement, defendant acknowledged that he had been treated well.

¶ 38          Brent testified that as of August 1991, he was an assistant state’s attorney. He met with

          defendant and Kill around 2:15 a.m. on August 22, 1992. After Brent advised defendant of his

          Miranda rights, they spoke for about half an hour with Kill present. When Kill left, Brent asked

          defendant how he was treated. Defendant said he was treated “fine” and had no complaints.

¶ 39          Defendant asked Brent to write down his statement. At about 7:45 a.m., Brent met with

          defendant with Kill present. Brent asked defendant to read and sign a preprinted statement of

          his Miranda rights, and defendant complied. With Kill present, Brent wrote down what

          defendant told him. Brent went over the statement with defendant, who made a number of

          corrections. Defendant signed every page of the statement.

¶ 40                                    3. Ruling on Motion to Suppress

¶ 41          The trial court denied the motion to suppress, finding that defendant was advised of his

          Miranda rights and that he never asked for an attorney. The court found that defendant was not

          “physically coerced” and that the statements were not the product of psychological or mental

          coercion.

¶ 42                             D. Defendant’s Guilty Plea in the Miles Case

¶ 43          In May 1994, defendant pleaded guilty in the Miles case to first degree murder and three

          counts of attempted first degree murder. As part of the factual basis, the State noted that

          despite the fact that suspect did not know that police had already obtained warrant for his arrest). We
          encourage the use of such additional documentation to better ensure that a defendant’s waiver of his
          Miranda rights is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. See People v. Braggs, 209 Ill. 2d 492, 515 (2003)
          (“A valid waiver of Miranda rights must be knowingly and intelligently made.”).

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       No. 1-20-0462

          defendant gave inculpatory oral and written statements. The court sentenced defendant to 40

          years for murder and concurrent sentences of 20 years on each of the attempted murder counts.

¶ 44                    E. Defendant’s Testimony at the Trial of the Miggins Case

¶ 45         In the Miggins case, the State proceeded to trial on charges of felony murder, attempted

          murder of Anthony Wilson and Steven Crosby, and aggravated battery with a firearm.

          Defendant testified at his bench trial in November 1994. He recalled that on the date of the

          shooting, Eric Clark told him and Johnson that Clark was driving Johnson’s “Delta 88” vehicle

          when Clark was shot at by someone named Lamont. Johnson asked defendant to help him

          retrieve the Delta 88 vehicle. Defendant drove them to the area in a Chevrolet, where they saw

          the Delta 88 in an alley. When Johnson exited the Chevrolet, defendant saw that Johnson had

          a gun. Defendant heard shots and saw Johnson shoot at “Mike.” Johnson ran back to the

          Chevrolet, and defendant drove them away as Mike shot at them. Defendant testified the only

          reason he went to the scene was to help find Johnson’s vehicle.

¶ 46         On cross-examination, defendant acknowledged that he spoke to ASA Brent and signed a

          statement on August 22, 1991. The following exchange ensued:

                                    “Q. Now, let me ask you at the end of that statement

                                *** you told the state’s attorney in there you had been

                                treated well by the police and the assistant state’s

                                attorney, right?

                                    A. Yes.

                                    Q. That was true, right?

                                    A. Yes.

                                                    - 10 -
No. 1-20-0462

                   Q. You also stated that you weren’t made any

                promises in return for the statement nor you weren’t

                threatened in any way. You told that to the state’s

                attorney?

                   A. Yes.

                   Q. That was true, right?

                   A. Yes.

                   Q. You told the state’s attorney you were offered

                both food and water and they were, brought food from

                McDonald’s, right?

                   A. Yes.

                   Q. That was true?

                   A. Some of it.

                   Q. Some of it.

                   A. Yes.

                   Q. You told the state’s attorney that you were free

                from the effects of drugs and alcohol, that was true?

                   A. Yes.

                   Q. So you weren’t treated badly by the police?

                   A. No.”

                                     - 11 -
       No. 1-20-0462

¶ 47          The trial court found defendant guilty of first degree murder, attempted first degree murder,

          and aggravated battery with a firearm. The court sentenced defendant to natural life for first

          degree murder, as well as 25 years for attempted first degree murder.

¶ 48                              F. Direct Appeal of the Miggins Conviction

¶ 49          On direct appeal in the Miggins case, we affirmed over defendant’s contention that the

          State failed to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Anderson, 277 Ill. App. 3d

          1100 (1996) (table) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23).

¶ 50                                    G. Prior Collateral Proceedings

¶ 51          Defendant filed four unsuccessful petitions, which are summarized in the May 2010

          opinion affirming dismissal of his fourth postconviction petition. People v. Anderson, 401 Ill.

          App. 3d 134 (2010). In June 2010, defendant filed a pro se motion to vacate the murder

          conviction in the Miggins case. On May 20, 2013, this court affirmed the dismissal of that

          petition on res judicata grounds. People v. Anderson, 2013 IL App (1st) 111059-U.

¶ 52          On March 2, 2011, defendant filed a “Combined Petition for Relief Under the Post-

          Conviction Hearing Act and for Relief From Judgment under Section 2-1401 of the Code of

          Civil Procedure,” which corresponded to both the Miles and Miggins cases. 4 On the same date,

          he filed a “Motion for Leave to File a Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.”

          Defendant’s March 2011 filings largely consisted of claims of police torture. With respect to

          the Miggins case, defendant additionally asserted a claim of actual innocence premised on a

          new eyewitness affidavit from Bertrum Anderson, as well as the State’s failure to disclose

          evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

              4
               On April 26, 2011, defendant informed the court that he wished the combined petition to apply to
          the Miles case as well as the Miggins conviction.

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       No. 1-20-0462

¶ 53         On November 23, 2011, the trial court entered an order in the Miles case that dismissed the

          section 2-1401 petition but advanced the postconviction petition for second stage proceedings.

          The court stated it was doing so only because it was unable to locate the file for the Miles case

          number and 90 days had elapsed since the filing. Defendant subsequently moved to hold that

          petition “in abeyance” pending the outcome of TIRC proceedings.

¶ 54         On November 23, 2011, the trial court issued an order in the Miggins case denying leave

          to file a successive petition and dismissing the section 2-1401 petition. In appeal No. 1-12-

          1321, defendant challenged the denial of leave to file a successive petition, insofar as it relied

          on the new affidavit and the alleged Brady violation. That appeal did not raise any argument

          concerning defendant’s claims of police torture. On September 6, 2022, this court issued an

          order reversing the denial of defendant’s motion for leave to file a successive postconviction

          petition, remanding for further proceedings with respect to defendant’s actual innocence and

          Brady claims. People v. Anderson, 2022 IL App (1st) 121321-U.

¶ 55                           H. Defendant’s TIRC Claim and TIRC Referral

¶ 56         In May 2011, defendant submitted a claim of torture with the Torture Inquiry and Relief

          Commission (TIRC) pertaining to his convictions in both the Miles and Miggins cases. In

          support, he submitted an eight-page affidavit describing abuse by detectives, including Kill,

          Boudreau, Halloran, Stehlik, and O’Brien. He alleged that Kill kicked his handcuffs and that

          Boudreau and Halloran slapped and punched him before he signed the statement in the Miles

          case. Elsewhere in the affidavit, defendant recalled that O’Brien took a pipe from Stehlik, put

          a telephone book on defendant’s left side, and struck the book several times. Defendant further

          averred that he experienced pain in his left side and blood in his urine in the following months.

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       No. 1-20-0462

          He stated that he was diagnosed with “UPJ obstruction” caused by trauma to his left kidney,

          for which he underwent surgery in March 1993.

¶ 57          The TIRC issued its disposition in June 2012 and issued an amended disposition in March

          2014, in which it found defendant’s “[c]laim is credible and merits judicial review.” The TIRC

          found that defendant had “consistently claimed since his motion to suppress to have been

          tortured in the manner alleged” and that his claim was “strikingly similar to other claims of

          torture” documented in investigations of Jon Burge and officers under his command.

¶ 58          The TIRC noted that the detectives identified by defendant were accused of abuse by

          numerous other claimants. Specifically, TIRC records showed that O’Brien was accused by

          over 30 individuals of physical abuse and coercion, Boudreau was accused by over 35

          individuals, Kill was accused by 20 persons, and Halloran was accused by over 35 individuals.

          The TIRC noted that one claimant, Ivan Smith, alleged that O’Brien and Stehlik beat him

          through a phonebook, which was “strikingly similar” to defendant’s allegations.

¶ 59                    I. Circuit Court Evidentiary Hearing Following TIRC Referral

¶ 60          Following the TIRC’s referral to the circuit court, the matter was assigned to Hon. William

          H. Hooks. Judicial review of defendant’s TIRC claim was consolidated with the review of

          Anthony Jakes’s TIRC claim, in which Jakes alleged Kill and Boudreau coerced his

          confession. 5 The circuit court conducted an evidentiary hearing that commenced in July 2015

          and included testimony by a number of witnesses, including defendant and several of the

              During the course of the evidentiary hearing, Jakes’s claim was resolved when the State moved to
              5

          vacate his conviction and dismissed the charges against him. Jakes eventually obtained a certificate of
          innocence. People v. Plummer, 2021 IL App (1st) 200299, ¶ 91.

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       No. 1-20-0462

          accused officers, over the next few years. 6 Defendant asked that the court vacate his

          convictions, order new trials, and suppress his statements.

¶ 61              1. Defendant’s Evidentiary Hearing Testimony Regarding the Miggins Statement

¶ 62          Defendant testified that when he was brought to Area 3 on August 21, 1991, Kill

          handcuffed him to a ring on the wall and left him alone for what seemed like “hours.” When

          Kill returned, defendant asked what he was being charged with. Kill told him he had “killed

          that little boy.” Defendant denied that he killed anyone and said that he wanted an attorney.

          Kill did not respond and left.

¶ 63          Some time later, Kill, Halloran, and Boudreau entered the room and asked if he was ready

          to talk. Defendant, still handcuffed, said he wanted an attorney. The detectives then left him

          for what seemed like “hours.” When they returned, Kill “kicked the handcuffs and my arm,

          and Halloran and Boudreau punched me in the chest and hand” before leaving him again.

¶ 64          At some point, the same three detectives returned, and Kill told defendant that he would

          “die in Joliet” if he did not cooperate. The detectives left again and returned with ASA Brent.

          When defendant told Brent that he wanted a lawyer, he was left alone again. Some time later,

          the same three detectives returned and told defendant to “tell [Brent] what happened.” When

          Brent came into the room, defendant again requested an attorney. At that point, Kill “told me

          in front of the State’s attorney that I was going to die in Joliet if I didn’t talk to him.”

¶ 65          The detectives later moved him to a room with a desk, where Brent was waiting. When

          defendant again said he wanted an attorney, Brent left. Kill told defendant that he was going

          to talk to Brent “or else” and directed defendant as to what he should say.

              6
               The record reflects that Kill did not testify regarding defendant’s allegations at the evidentiary
          hearing and that he is now deceased.

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       No. 1-20-0462

¶ 66         Kill, Halloran, and Boudreau remained in the room when Brent returned. Kill put his hand

          on defendant’s shoulder, and defendant felt pressured and scared. Defendant spoke to Brent,

          who wrote out the statement. Defendant did not have an opportunity to read the statement but

          signed it “[b]ecause Detective Kill and Boudreau and Halloran told me to.” Defendant had not

          slept or eaten from the time of his arrest.

¶ 67                    2. Defendant’s Testimony Regarding the Miles Interrogation

¶ 68         Defendant testified that, after he signed the Miggins statement, he was taken to a different

          room with lockers and handcuffed to a radiator. After what seemed like hours, three different

          detectives (O’Brien, Stehlik and Smith) entered the room and questioned him about the Miles

          shooting that occurred in June 1991. Defendant said he did not know what they were talking

          about and asked for an attorney. He was then left alone for two hours.

¶ 69         O’Brien and Stehlik eventually brought him to a different room and asked if he was “ready

          to tell them what happened on June 9th.” Defendant again requested an attorney. The detectives

          took him back to the room with lockers and “handcuffed me with both hands over my head.”

¶ 70         When the detectives returned, defendant saw Stehlik with a “black pipe,” which he gave to

          O’Brien. O’Brien placed a telephone book on defendant’s left side and struck the book five or

          six times with the pipe. Meanwhile, Stehlik “was in my ear telling me to talk to him.”

¶ 71         O’Brien and Stehlik later brought him to another room, handcuffed him to a radiator, and

          turned the air conditioner on. He was left for a “long time” before they returned with Grossman.

          When defendant told Grossman he wanted an attorney, he was left alone in the room. At one

          point he told the detectives he was cold; they responded that they would turn off the air

          conditioning “once [he] got through with the state’s attorney.”

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       No. 1-20-0462

¶ 72          After a number of hours, O’Brien and Stehlik eventually brought him to another room

          where Grossman was waiting. There was a paper on the table. Grossman told defendant “this

          is what Detectives Stehlik and O’Brien believe went on out there that day” and that defendant

          was going to sign it. Defendant signed and initialed it where Grossman directed him to, because

          he did not want to go back to the cold room. He did not have a chance to review the statement.

¶ 73                                   3. Defendant’s Medical Testimony

¶ 74          Defendant recalled that, when he was brought to jail, he told a “medical person” that he

          had been attacked by police. That person told him that, because he did not have bruises, there

          was “nothing [he] can do.”

¶ 75          After about a week in jail, defendant had pain where he was struck on his left side, as well

          as blood in his urine and a high fever. He was prescribed antibiotics and felt better for a “little

          while.” Some time later, he again experienced blood in his urine, fever, and nausea. Defendant

          recalled three incidents where he “passed out” after similar symptoms. After the third instance

          in December 1992, he was hospitalized. In March 1993, he had surgery for a ureteropelvic

          junction (UPJ) obstruction on his left side. 7 Defendant testified that he had not mentioned the

          UPJ obstruction or surgery when he testified at the suppression hearing, because he was

          advised by his counsel that the judge would not believe it.

¶ 76          Defendant testified that he plead guilty in the Miles case to avoid the death penalty and

          because he “didn’t feel I could win at trial after [the judge] denied the motion to suppress.”

          Regarding the Miggins case, defendant acknowledged he did not describe police abuse in his

              7
               “Ureteropelvic junction obstruction is a condition where blockage occurs at the junction where the
          ureter attaches to the kidney.” Ureteropelvic Junction Obstruction, Johns Hopkins Med., https://
          www.hopkinsmedicine.org/health/conditions-and-diseases/ureteropelvic-junction-obstruction         (last
          visited Feb. 22, 2023) [https://perma.cc/T383-CM6B].

                                                        - 17 -
       No. 1-20-0462

          trial testimony. Defendant said he and his trial attorney decided “not to bring it up because he

          was trying to save my life” and avoid the death penalty. Defendant testified that he was

          surprised when the State cross-examined him about how he had been treated by police and that

          he made a “mistake” when he agreed on cross-examination that he had been treated well.

¶ 77                          4. Testimony from Defendant’s Former Counsel

¶ 78         Hon. Stuart Katz testified that in 1991 he worked for the Cook County Public Defender’s

          Office. He had no independent recollection of representing defendant but acknowledged that

          he drafted the motion to suppress. Judge Katz acknowledged that the motion to suppress did

          not reference defendant being struck with a pipe or suffering any medical problems. The case

          was assigned to another public defender before the hearing on the motion to suppress.

¶ 79         Hon. Thomas J. O’Hara, an associate judge of the circuit court of Cook County, testified

          that he was a public defender in 1991 and represented defendant in the Miles and Miggins

          cases. He recalled that defendant was facing the death penalty. Regarding defendant’s trial

          testimony in the Miggins case, O’Hara recalled telling defendant that “we would not go into”

          his claims of police abuse on direct examination, because the same trial judge had denied the

          motion to suppress. O’Hara had no recollection of defendant telling him that he was treated at

          a hospital or had surgery for injuries caused by police.

¶ 80                               5. Lay Witnesses Called by Defendant

¶ 81         Robert Tenny testified that he was in Cook County Jail with defendant in 1992. Tenny

          recalled an occasion where defendant passed out in jail and was “stretched out on the floor.”

¶ 82         Anna Anderson testified that she is defendant’s cousin. She testified that, when she visited

          him in jail sometime after his arrest, he told her that detectives kicked his hands while

          handcuffed, “hung him up like a slave and beat him,” put a “phone book on his side and beat

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       No. 1-20-0462

          him with something black,” and left him in a room that was “freezing.” He later told her about

          an incident where he “passed out” and was treated at Cermak hospital.

¶ 83         Rosalyn Anderson, defendant’s wife, similarly testified that during a jail visit defendant

          told her that police “hung him from a pole with his handcuffs,” beat him in the side with the

          telephone book and a pole, and put him in a “freezing” room. He later complained about pain

          in his side and problems urinating.

¶ 84         Brenda Hoover testified that, when she visited defendant a few days after his arrest, he was

          in pain and holding his left side. He told her that police had beaten him up. Joanne Goldman,

          the mother of one of defendant’s children, similarly testified that defendant appeared to be in

          pain when she visited him in jail. Defendant told her that he had been “questioned for hours

          and handcuffed to a wall and was jumped on.”

¶ 85                          6. Ivan Smith’s Pattern and Practice Testimony

¶ 86         Defendant called Ivan Smith (Ivan) as a pattern and practice witness. Ivan recalled that in

          November 1991, when he was 20 years old, he was arrested in Tennessee in connection with

          a murder in Chicago. While jailed in Tennessee, he was interrogated by Detectives O’Brien

          and Stehlik as well as Mike Smith, an assistant state’s attorney. When Ivan said he wanted his

          attorney present, O’Brien slapped him in the face. The detectives told him they wanted him to

          testify against another individual. When Ivan refused, O’Brien slapped him in the back of the

          head. When Ivan tried to stand up, he was handcuffed behind his back. When he said he wanted

          his lawyer, O’Brien “started punching me in my chest.”

¶ 87         The detectives then forced Ivan to lie on his back. Stehlik placed a phone book on his chest

          and then struck the book with an object that looked like a wooden stick. As Stehlik was hitting

          him, O’Brien was asking if he was ready to cooperate. Stehlik and O’Brien later switched

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       No. 1-20-0462

          places, with O’Brien striking him in the chest until he agreed to provide a statement. Ivan said

          he did not have any marks on his body after the beating.

¶ 88                         7. Martin Reeves’s Pattern and Practice Testimony

¶ 89         Martin Reeves testified that he had been convicted of murder in 1988 but was later

          exonerated and won a wrongful conviction suit.

¶ 90         Reeves recalled that on August 26, 1988, officers brought him to Area 3, where he was

          cuffed to a ring on the wall. Detective Kill and another officer (whom Reeves did not name)

          showed him photos of crime victims, including a “charred body.” Reeves denied knowing the

          victims, but the unnamed officer told him that “you did this, and you’re going to pay for it.”

¶ 91         Reeves was transported by an officer to another location for a lie detector test. On the way

          back, the officer told him he failed the test and struck him in the face. He was brought back to

          a room at Area 3 and handcuffed to the wall. Reeves recalled that officers Dowley and Peteck

          beat him as he was cuffed to the wall and that Dowley threatened to shoot him. At another

          point, Peteck kicked him in the chest and walked out.

¶ 92         Eventually, Kill came in and asked Reeves if he was hungry. When Reeves answered yes,

          Kill handed him a piece of paper and told him that, if he signed it, he could eat and go home.

          Reeves read the paper, which contained a confession. Kill left when Reeves refused to sign the

          paper. Reeves heard Kill tell the other officers: “That n*** can read.”

¶ 93                           8. Documentary Pattern and Practice Evidence

¶ 94         In addition to Ivan Smith and Reeves’s testimony, defendant submitted voluminous

          documentary “pattern and practice” evidence relating to allegations in other cases by numerous

          other individuals claiming abuse or coercion. The documentary evidence includes prior hearing

          and deposition testimony, motions to suppress, witness affidavits, expert reports, and

                                                     - 20 -
       No. 1-20-0462

          postconviction filings relating to allegations made by individuals including Cortez Brown (also

          known as Victor Safforld), Harold Hill, Daniel Young, Nicholas Escamilla, Tyrone Reyna,

          Jerry Gillespie, Jason Gray, Peter Williams, Oscar Gomez, Eric Gomez, Johnnie Plummer,

          Ronald Kitchen, Terrill Swift, Kilroy Watkins, Jesse Clemon, Marcus Wiggins, Clayborn

          Smith, Samhan Ali, Glen Dixon, Bobby Spencer, Gregory Logan (also known as Gregory

          Reed), Andre Altman, Eric Jackson, and Maurice Lane.

¶ 95         Many of those complaints alleged involvement by one or more of the detectives accused

          by defendant and in the same time period as defendant’s August 1991 interrogation. For

          example, Altman and Jackson filed a federal lawsuit in which they alleged that O’Brien and

          Stehlik beat and struck them in November 1991 after they refused to stand in a lineup. Watkins

          testified that in January 1992 Boudreau struck and choked him during an interrogation.

          Watkins testified that Boudreau, Halloran, and an assistant state’s attorney gave him a

          “prepared statement” that they asked him to sign. Harold Hill testified that Halloran and

          Boudreau struck him and that Boudreau told him the information to include in his inculpatory

          statement in March 1992. Maurice Lane alleged that O’Brien choked, kneed, and slapped him

          in July 1992. In a deposition related to Hill’s federal lawsuit, Clayborn Smith testified that

          Halloran hit and kicked him during interrogations in October 1992.

¶ 96         The pattern and practice evidence also included James O’Brien’s November 2008

          deposition testimony in Hill’s federal litigation, Hill v. City of Chicago, No. 06 C 6772, 2011

          WL 2637214 (N.D. Ill. July 6, 2011)). O’Brien invoked the fifth amendment dozens of times

          when asked if he interrogated, threatened, or used force against numerous individuals in police

          custody. O’Brien likewise invoked the fifth amendment when asked if he placed a telephone

          book on Ivan Smith’s chest and struck the book with a nightstick.

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        No. 1-20-0462

¶ 97          The record also includes Halloran’s deposition in Hill’s lawsuit. Halloran took the fifth

           amendment in response to virtually every question, including when asked whether he,

           Boudreau, O’Brien or other detectives struck numerous individuals in the 1990s.

¶ 98          The evidence also included O’Brien’s May 2009 testimony from Cortez Brown’s

           postconviction proceedings. O’Brien invoked the fifth amendment when asked whether he

           learned to abuse detainees without leaving a mark on their bodies and whether he coerced

           confessions of several individuals in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

¶ 99                                   9. Defendant’s Medical Witness

¶ 100         Dr. John Cudecki testified that in 1993 he performed surgery on defendant at Cook County

           Hospital for UPJ obstruction, which is a “blockage of the kidney where the renal pelvis

           becomes the ureter.” A UPJ obstruction has a number of possible causes, including trauma. He

           testified that, if someone is struck on the side with his arms raised, it could increase the

           likelihood of a UPJ obstruction. Dr. Cudecki agreed it was “possible” that the trauma defendant

           allegedly suffered by detectives could be related to his UPJ obstruction.

¶ 101                   10. The State’s Witness Testimony Regarding the Miggins Statement

¶ 102                                              Boudreau

¶ 103         Boudreau testified that on the evening of August 21, 1991, he and Kill became involved in

           investigating the Miggins shooting. Detectives Halloran and Smith handled the investigation

           “during the day shift.” Boudreau and Kill were asked to assist due to the number of victims,

           witnesses, and suspects.

¶ 104         Boudreau interviewed other suspects, but he denied that he interviewed defendant or that

           he was involved in taking defendant’s statement. He denied seeing Kill or Halloran kick or hit

                                                      - 22 -
        No. 1-20-0462

           defendant. Boudreau recalled buying food for detainees, but he denied any other contact with

           defendant.

¶ 105                                                 Halloran

¶ 106         Halloran testified that he and his partner, John Smith, investigated the Miggins murder on

           August 21, 1991. Halloran and Smith moved defendant into an interview room around 8:30

           p.m. Halloran recalled he handcuffed defendant to a ring on the wall because the door to the

           room was not secure.

¶ 107         Around 10 p.m., Halloran and Kill reentered the room. After Kill read defendant his

           Miranda rights, they had a conversation of about 30 minutes regarding the events surrounding

           Miggins’s shooting. Halloran testified that defendant did not ask for an attorney. Halloran

           denied that he or Kill ever kicked, struck, or otherwise abused defendant. Halloran testified

           that Boudreau was not present when he met with defendant. Halloran was not present when

           defendant signed his statement.

¶ 108                                                  Brent

¶ 109         The court considered Brent’s June 2018 deposition testimony. Brent recalled meeting with

           defendant and Kill. After Brent informed defendant of his Miranda rights, they had an initial

           conversation for about a half hour. Kill subsequently left Brent in the room alone with

           defendant. Brent asked defendant how he was treated by police, and defendant “had no

           complaints.” Brent denied that defendant ever said he was struck or abused by any detective

           or that defendant asked for an attorney.

¶ 110         Brent recalled that Kill was the only other detective who was present when defendant’s

           statement was taken and that there was “no intimidation whatsoever.” Brent reviewed the

                                                        - 23 -
        No. 1-20-0462

           statement with defendant before defendant signed it. He did not see any detective strike, kick,

           or threaten defendant.

¶ 111                   11. State’s Witness Testimony Regarding the Miles Statement

¶ 112                                               O’Brien

¶ 113         O’Brien recalled that he was investigating the Miles shooting when defendant became a

           person of interest. On August 22, 1991, he learned that defendant was in custody. O’Brien and

           Stehlik interviewed defendant that afternoon for about half an hour. O’Brien denied that he or

           Stehlik ever threatened, kicked, slapped, or otherwise made contact with defendant. He denied

           that any object was used to strike him. O’Brien also testified there was no air conditioning in

           the Area 3 building.

¶ 114         O’Brien acknowledged that he and Stehlik interviewed Ivan Smith in Tennessee, but he

           denied that Ivan Smith was mistreated.

¶ 115         On cross-examination, O’Brien acknowledged that he asserted his fifth amendment rights

           when asked in prior proceedings whether he had mistreated numerous other detainees,

           including Ivan Smith.

¶ 116                                               Stehlik

¶ 117         Stehlik acknowledged that he was present when Grossman questioned defendant. Stehlik

           said defendant “was never cuffed.” Stehlik recalled that defendant agreed to have his statement

           reduced to writing by Grossman and that defendant had a chance to review the statement.

           Stehlik denied that defendant was ever struck or threatened or that he asked for a lawyer.

           Stehlik said the air conditioner was broken in the room where defendant gave his statement.

                                                     - 24 -
        No. 1-20-0462

¶ 118         Stehlik recalled going to Tennessee with O’Brien to extradite Ivan Smith. He recalled that

           he and O’Brien interviewed Ivan Smith but denied that they threatened or struck him.

¶ 119                                           ASA Grossman

¶ 120         Brian Grossman recalled that on the afternoon of August 22, 1991, he met with defendant

           and advised him of his Miranda rights. He then had an initial conversation with defendant for

           about an hour regarding the Miles homicide. At about 7 p.m., Grossman met with defendant

           and Stehlik. During that conversation, defendant indicated he wanted Grossman to write up his

           statement. At one point, Grossman spoke to defendant outside the presence of detectives and

           asked how the police had treated him. Defendant “acknowledged they treated him well.” Later

           that evening, Grossman took defendant’s statement with Stehlik present. Grossman reviewed

           each page with defendant and gave him an opportunity to make corrections. Defendant said he

           had been treated well and denied that he had been threatened.

¶ 121                              12. The State’s Medical Expert Witness

¶ 122         The State called Dr. Mark Jonathan Schacht as an expert witness. Dr. Schacht opined that

           defendant had a “bilateral UPJ obstruction” which is congenital, meaning he was born with it.

           Dr. Schacht opined that trauma did not cause defendant’s bilateral UPJ obstruction. Dr.

           Schacht testified that trauma to the kidney significant enough to cause bleeding would do so

           within the first 36 hours, not weeks later as indicated by defendant’s affidavit. He

           acknowledged defendant’s March 1993 surgery but testified that the medical records did not

           reflect the number of infections and hospitalizations defendant described in the affidavit.

¶ 123                           13. The State’s Testimony to Rebut Ivan Smith

¶ 124         The State called additional witnesses to rebut Ivan Smith’s testimony that he was abused

           in Tennessee by Stehlik and O’Brien.

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        No. 1-20-0462

¶ 125         The Hon. Charles Burns testified that in 1991 he was an assistant’s state’s attorney when

           he was contacted regarding Ivan Smith in connection with a homicide. He went to Tennessee

           with O’Brien, Stehlik, assistant state’s attorney Michael Smith, and a court reporter. Burns

           spoke to Ivan Smith in the presence of Stehlik and O’Brien. Ivan Smith agreed to give a

           statement after being read his Miranda rights. Burns recalled that Ivan Smith did not appear to

           be in pain or complain that he was harmed. Burns never saw O’Brien or Stehlik harm Ivan

           Smith.

¶ 126         Michael Smith testified that he was an assistant state’s attorney when he traveled to

           Tennessee, along with Stehlik, O’Brien, and Burns. ASA Smith was not present for Ivan

           Smith’s initial questioning and did not take Ivan’s statement. ASA Smith said Ivan Smith’s

           demeanor was relaxed and that he did not complain about how he had been treated. However,

           ASA Smith acknowledged he did not know what happened during the detectives’ questioning

           of Ivan.

¶ 127                              14. Defendant’s Posthearing Submission

¶ 128         Defendant’s posthearing brief argued that, in light of the new evidence, defendant was

           entitled to new trials in both the Miles and Miggins cases and that the State should be prohibited

           from using his custodial statements. Defendant argued that he had met his burden to show that

           the new pattern and practice evidence impeached the officers’ credibility to the extent “a

           suppression motion would have reached a different result.” Defendant also noted that “it is the

           State who, in the suppression context, bears the burden of showing voluntariness.”

¶ 129         In arguing the detectives’ credibility was impeached by the pattern and practice evidence,

           defendant contended that the prior allegations were relevant because they involved the same

           detectives who interrogated defendant and involved allegations of physical abuse between the

                                                       - 26 -
        No. 1-20-0462

           late 1980s and mid-1990s. Defendant noted that the convictions of several of those accusers

           were ultimately overturned. Defendant also argued that an adverse inference was warranted in

           light of Halloran, O’Brien, and Boudreau’s invocation of the fifth amendment in prior

           proceedings. Defendant elsewhere argued that his core testimony was consistent since the

           January 1994 motion to suppress hearing, notwithstanding that he “did not know the identities

           of all of the officers” when the motion to suppress was filed and notwithstanding any minor

           discrepancies in his recollection of “the exact things that Detective Boudreau and Halloran did

           and when they did them.”

¶ 130                               J. The Trial Court’s Posthearing Decision

¶ 131          The trial court initially entered an order denying defendant relief on January 16, 2020. On

           March 16, 2020, the court entered a 49-page amended order containing its posthearing

           conclusions of law and facts, which is the focus of this appeal. 8 The written order contains a

           number of discrete sections.

¶ 132          In the section titled “Legal Standard,” the court recognized that defendant’s initial burden

           under the TIRC Act was not to prove his confession actually resulted from coercion but to

           show that “newly discovered evidence would likely have altered the result of a suppression

           hearing.” The court further recognized that, if the defendant met that initial burden, then the

           burden “shifts to the State of proving the statement was voluntary.”

¶ 133                                  1. The Trial Court’s Findings of Fact

               8
                Defendant commenced this appeal on February 10, 2020, by filing a notice of appeal from the
           January 16, 2020, order. However, in light of the trial court’s amended order in March 2020, this court
           allowed defendant leave to file an amended notice of appeal that challenged the trial court’s amended
           order. At oral argument, defendant’s counsel confirmed that the March 2020 amended order is the focus
           of this appeal.

                                                         - 27 -
        No. 1-20-0462

¶ 134         The court proceeded to list its “Findings of Fact” over 147 numbered paragraphs. In so

           doing, it consistently credited the State’s witnesses while finding defendant’s account

           untruthful. With respect to the Miggins case, the court credited Halloran’s hearing testimony,

           including his denials that he or Kill kicked or struck defendant. The court separately credited

           Boudreau’s testimony that he did not interview defendant. The court also credited Brent’s

           testimony that he advised defendant of his Miranda rights and that defendant had “no

           complaints” about how he was treated by police. The court specifically found that defendant’s

           claim that he told Brent he wanted an attorney was a “lie.”

¶ 135         The court further found that defendant elected to give a statement and that Brent wrote

           down what defendant stated in Kill’s presence. The court found that there “were not multiple

           detectives in the room” and that Kill “was not hovering over” defendant when he gave the

           statement. The court also made findings that Kill did not tell Brent what to include in the

           statement and that Brent reviewed the statement with defendant.

¶ 136         The court found “no credible evidence” that Kill, Boudreau, or Halloran punched, hit, or

           kicked defendant in connection with the Miggins case. The court emphasized its finding that

           the Miggins statement was voluntary, not coerced.

¶ 137         The court similarly found no abuse or coercion with respect to the Miles statement. The

           court specifically found “no credible evidence” that defendant “was hung by handcuffs from

           the top of a locker”, that he was forced to stay in a cold room, or that O’Brien or Stehlik struck

           a phone book held to his side. The court credited Grossman’s testimony that he advised

           defendant of his Miranda rights, that defendant did not ask for an attorney, and that defendant

           said he was treated well by the police. The court also credited Dr. Schact’s testimony that

           defendant’s UPJ obstruction was congenital and not caused by trauma.

                                                       - 28 -
        No. 1-20-0462

¶ 138         In separate subsection titled “George Anderson’s Judicial Admissions,” the court noted

           that at trial in the Miggins case defendant agreed that he told Brent that he was treated well by

           the police and was not threatened. The court emphasized that, when defendant was asked “So

           you weren’t treated badly by the police,” he answered “No.”

¶ 139                         2. The Trial Court’s Pattern and Practice Findings

¶ 140         The trial court’s decision made additional findings in which it discounted all of the

           evidence that the accused detectives abused other individuals. The court rejected Ivan Smith’s

           testimony about his interrogation in Tennessee, citing the State’s witness testimony and finding

           “Ivan Smith was not physically abused by either Detective O’Brien or Detective Stehlik.”

¶ 141         With respect to the numerous other individuals who alleged abuse by the police officers

           who interrogated defendant, the court determined that such evidence was either irrelevant, that

           defendant had “waived” reliance on such evidence, or that there was insufficient evidence to

           support the claims of abuse or coercion. The court found any other claimants’ allegations

           against Boudreau were “irrelevant” because defendant testified at the hearing on his motion to

           suppress that Boudreau never touched him. The trial court also disregarded any pattern and

           practice evidence alleging misconduct by Halloran, because Halloran was not identified in

           defendant’s motion to suppress.

¶ 142         The court further disregarded as irrelevant any claims of abuse that were deemed by the

           Office of Professional Standards (OPS) to be unfounded or “not sustained.” The court also

           found that defendant had “waived” reliance on any prior claimant’s accusations, if defense

           counsel had not specifically asked the accused officer about the specific claim during the

           evidentiary hearing.

¶ 143                             3. The Trial Court’s “Conclusions of Law”

                                                      - 29 -
        No. 1-20-0462

¶ 144         In the portion of the order entitled “Conclusions of Law,” the court did not state whether

           defendant had met his initial burden (previously mentioned in its “Legal Standard” section) to

           show that the new evidence would likely have resulted in suppression. Instead, the court

           indicated that its only role was to determine whether defendant’s statements were coerced:

                        “The issue for determination at a hearing convened pursuant to 775

                        ILCS 40 is whether petitioner has met his burden of proving by a

                        preponderance of evidence that his confession was a result of

                        physical coercion or torture. This is the sole issue to be determined

                        by the Court at the hearing.”

¶ 145         The court proceeded to find “no evidence of medical injury” consistent with defendant’s

           claims of abuse. The court reiterated its findings that defendant had not asked for an attorney,

           that he read the statements before he signed them, and that he did not complain to Brent or

           Grossman about any abuse.

¶ 146         With respect to the Miggins case, the court again emphasized that defendant testified at

           trial “that he was treated well by the police,” finding this testimony was a judicial admission

           and “demonstrated that his statements were voluntarily given and that his statements were not

           coerced.” (Emphasis in original.) With respect to the Miles case, the court found that

           defendant’s claims that he was “handcuffed to the top of a locker for several hours” or “forced

           to stay in a freezing room” were “not credible,” citing the detectives’ contrary testimony.

¶ 147         Elsewhere in the “Conclusions of Law,” the court stated that defendant “did not submit any

           pattern and practice evidence relevant under People v. Patterson, 192 Ill. 2d 93 (2000),” with

           respect to either the Miggins or Miles case. The court then stated that “the uncorroborated

                                                        - 30 -
        No. 1-20-0462

           testimony of petitioner, with his later-added embellishing details, does not meet his burden of

           proof in face of the volume and quality of the evidence standing in opposition.”

¶ 148                                    4. The Trial Court’s Conclusion

¶ 149          In its conclusion, the court emphasized its view that defendant’s testimony was not credible

           and that he “attempted to deliberately tailor his testimony” to obtain relief under the TIRC Act.

           The court compared defendant to a “Ghost Rider” who falsely claims to have been a passenger

           in a bus accident to fraudulently seek compensation, remarking that he “falsely claimed to have

           ridden on the Burge[ ] torture bus.” The court concluded that defendant “has not shown that he

           was abused either physically or psychologically” by police and thus “failed to meet his burden

           by a preponderance of the evidence.” Accordingly, the court denied him any relief.

¶ 150                                             II. ANALYSIS

¶ 151          On appeal, defendant claims that he is entitled to suppression of the statements and a new

           trial due to a number of errors by the trial court. 9 He primarily claims that the trial court applied

           the wrong legal standard by engaging in a “personal, subjective adjudication of the evidence”

           rather than evaluating whether the new evidence would be likely to change the result at a new

           trial or suppression hearing. That is, he suggests the trial court improperly denied him relief

           because it “personally disbelieved” defendant’s testimony and supporting evidence.

¶ 152          Defendant further argues the trial court erred in deeming all of the pattern and practice

           evidence irrelevant. Defendant urges that the trial court disregarded such evidence for a

           number of improper reasons.

               9
                 While this appeal was pending, we granted the motion of “Persons Concerned About the Illinois
           Criminal Justice System” to file a brief amicus curiae pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 345(a)
           (eff. Sept. 20, 2010).

                                                        - 31 -
        No. 1-20-0462

¶ 153         Defendant additionally asserts that the trial court erred by not drawing an adverse inference

           from detectives’ invocation of the fifth amendment in prior proceedings, that the court ignored

           medical evidence that corroborated his claims, and that the court erroneously found that a

           “judicial admission” arose from his trial testimony in the Miggins case. Finally, defendant

           asserts the trial court “failed to adjudicate” the claim that he was denied his right to counsel.

¶ 154         For the reasons below, we agree that the court applied the wrong legal standard when it

           focused on whether it believed defendant’s torture allegations, rather than deciding the proper

           initial inquiry, i.e., whether the outcome of the suppression hearing would likely have been

           different, in light of the new pattern and practice evidence. The court also erred in ruling that

           none of the voluminous pattern and practice evidence was relevant. To the contrary, we find

           this new evidence was relevant and satisfied defendant’s initial burden to show that it would

           likely have resulted in suppression of his statements.

¶ 155         Moreover, we recognize that the evidentiary hearing in this case functioned as a

           “simultaneous hearing” on defendant’s request to suppress the statements. See People v.

           Wilson, 2019 IL App (1st) 181486, ¶ 50. Thus, once defendant met his initial burden to show

           a likelihood of suppression, the burden shifted to the State to prove that the statements were,

           in fact, voluntary. See id. ¶ 54. We recognize that, with respect to this suppression inquiry, the

           court was permitted to make factual findings, including as to credibility. Nonetheless, the trial

           court’s factual findings in favor of the State were against the manifest weight of the evidence.

           That is, the State could not meet its burden to show voluntariness. Accordingly, defendant is

           entitled to suppression of the statements and new trials.

¶ 156                   A.The TIRC Act and Governing Standard at an Evidentiary Hearing

                                                       - 32 -
        No. 1-20-0462

¶ 157          The TIRC Act “establishes an extraordinary procedure to investigate and determine factual

           claims of torture.” 775 ILCS 40/10 (West 2018). The TIRC consists of eight voting members

           (id. § 20(a)), who conduct inquiries into claims of torture and make “recommendations to the

           trial court at the completion of each inquiry” (id. § 35(5)). After hearing evidence, if a majority

           of TIRC members “conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that there is sufficient

           evidence of torture to merit judicial review,” the case is referred to the chief judge of the circuit

           court of Cook County. Id. § 45(c). Following a TIRC referral, the circuit court is to conduct an

           evidentiary hearing, at which it “may receive proof by affidavits, depositions, oral testimony,

           or other evidence.” Id. § 50(a).

¶ 158          The TIRC Act broadly describes the relief that may be granted after such hearing:

                        “[I]f the court finds in favor of the petitioner, it shall enter an

                        appropriate order with respect to the judgment or sentence in the

                        former proceedings and such supplementary orders as to

                        rearraignment, retrial, custody, bail or discharge, or for such relief

                        as may be granted under a petition for a certificate of innocence, as

                        may be necessary and proper.” Id.

           We have interpreted this to mean the circuit court “has a variety of remedies at its disposal,”

           including ordering suppression of a statement instead of merely remanding for a new

           suppression hearing. Wilson, 2019 IL App (1st) 181486, ¶¶ 48-50. As explained in Wilson, the

           TIRC Act’s legislative history indicated it was “intended to definitively and expeditiously

           decide whether a petitioner was tortured and provide appropriate relief” and that “these goals,

           as well as judicial economy, are furthered by permitting the trial court to simultaneously

                                                        - 33 -
        No. 1-20-0462

           consider a petitioner’s claim under the [TIRC] Act and his request to suppress his statement.”

           Id. ¶ 50.

¶ 159          The record in this case reflects that the evidentiary hearing in this case functioned as a

           simultaneous suppression hearing. Indeed, defendant explicitly sought outright suppression of

           the custodial statements, rather merely seeking a new suppression hearing. Moreover, as the

           parties have acknowledged, the evidence considered at the evidentiary hearing is the very same

           evidence that would be considered upon any new suppression hearing. Our analysis is thus

           guided by Wilson, which set forth the “appropriate burden to be applied at a simultaneous

           hearing.” Id.

¶ 160          Wilson recognized that an evidentiary hearing following a TIRC disposition is analogous

           to a third-stage evidentiary hearing under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. Id. ¶ 51 (citing

           People v. Christian, 2016 IL App (1st) 140030, ¶ 78).

¶ 161          Wilson then explained that, while a TIRC claimant seeking suppression at the evidentiary

           hearing “has the opportunity to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that his

           confession resulted from coercion,” “a petitioner’s initial burden does not require him to prove

           that his confession actually resulted from coercion.” Id. This follows from the similarity

           between judicial review of a TIRC claim and a hearing under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act:

                        “[E]ven an evidentiary hearing under the Post-Conviction Act is not

                        intended to decide the ultimate issue of whether the petitioner’s

                        confession was coerced. See People v. Whirl, 2015 IL App (1st)

                        111483, ¶ 80. Instead, the petitioner has the burden of showing only

                        that newly discovered evidence would likely have altered the result

                        of a suppression hearing. See id.; see also People v. Galvan, 2019

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        No. 1-20-0462

                        IL App (1st) 170150, ¶ 74 (finding the trial court’s denial of

                        postconviction relief was against the manifest weight of the

                        evidence where new evidence of abusive tactics that an officer used

                        in interrogating others would likely have led to a different outcome

                        at the suppression hearing).” (Emphasis in original.) Id. ¶ 52.

¶ 162          Accordingly, where a defendant merely requests that the circuit court conduct a TIRC

           hearing to determine whether defendant is entitled to a new motion to suppress hearing, the

           only inquiry is whether he can show the result would likely have been different with the new

           evidence. See id. (“The legislature clearly did not create a new form of postconviction relief

           with the intent that a petitioner satisfy a heavier burden than that imposed by the Post-

           Conviction Act.”).

¶ 163          However, when a TIRC Act petitioner additionally seeks outright suppression of the

           statement, the TIRC Act evidentiary hearing simultaneously functions as a suppression

           hearing. See id. ¶ 50. Under these circumstances, the usual standard for a motion to suppress

           also applies. See id. ¶¶ 52-53. “At a motion to suppress hearing, ‘the State bears the burden of

           proving the confession was voluntary by a preponderance of the evidence.’ ” Id. ¶ 53 (quoting

           People v. Slater, 228 Ill. 2d 137, 149 (2008)). If the State does so, the burden shifts to defendant

           to prove that the confession was involuntary. Id. (citing People v. Richardson, 234 Ill. 2d 233,

           254 (2009))). If the defendant meets that burden, the burden reverts to the State to prove

           voluntariness. Richardson, 234 Ill. 2d at 254.

¶ 164          Wilson thus instructs as follows regarding the parties’ respective burdens at a TIRC Act

           evidentiary hearing where, as here, defendant simultaneously seeks outright suppression:

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        No. 1-20-0462

                        “[A]fter a petitioner satisfies his initial burden of showing that new

                        evidence would likely have resulted in the suppression of his

                        confession, the State has the burden of proving petitioner’s

                        statement was voluntary, just as it would at a motion to suppress

                        hearing. The burden shifting provisions involved in a motion to

                        suppress likewise apply.” Wilson, 2019 IL App (1st) 181486, ¶ 54.

¶ 165                         B. The Trial Court Applied the Wrong Legal Standard

¶ 166         Keeping in mind the foregoing, we turn to defendant’s primary argument—that the trial

           court applied the wrong legal standard in denying him relief. Defendant claims the court

           engaged in a “personal, subjective” evaluation of the evidence, rather than assessing the proper

           question: whether the new evidence would be likely to change the result at a new trial or

           suppression hearing. The State maintains that the trial court “acted exactly as precedent

           dictated it should” and that a trial court’s analysis in such cases is “necessarily dependent” on

           credibility determinations. At oral argument, the State maintained that the trial court did apply

           the correct standard and concluded defendant did not meet his burden to show that the new

           evidence would likely have led to suppression. The State recognized that the court’s decision

           included numerous witness credibility findings. However, the State argued that such

           factfinding was merely an “extra step” that, while perhaps unnecessary, did not constitute error.

¶ 167         We recognize there is a rebuttable presumption that the court applied the law correctly. See

           People v. Hernandez, 2012 IL App (1st) 092841, ¶ 41. Nonetheless, after careful review of the

           trial court’s lengthy decision, we agree with the defendant that the trial court erred.

           Specifically, the decision indicated the court did not consider whether defendant met his initial

           burden, as it did not decide whether “newly discovered evidence would likely have altered the

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        No. 1-20-0462

           result of a suppression hearing.” (Emphasis in original.) Wilson, 2019 IL App (1st) 181486,

           ¶ 52. Rather than attempt to analyze the new evidence under this proper initial inquiry, the

           court skipped this step and reframed the standard to indicate that its sole role was to decide

           whether defendant proved that he was, in fact, abused by police. That is, the court proceeded

           directly to the question of suppression and related factual findings, without first addressing the

           “initial burden” described in Wilson. Id. ¶ 54.

¶ 168         In this regard, the posthearing decision was internally inconsistent as to the governing

           inquiries that the court needed to resolve. In the “Legal Standard” portion of the decision, the

           court correctly noted that the defendant was not required to prove that his statements resulted

           from coercion in order to obtain relief under the TIRC Act. Indeed, the trial court accurately

           cited Wilson and stated: “If the petitioner satisfies his initial burden of showing that new

           evidence would likely have resulted in the suppression of his confession, the burden shifts to

           the State of proving the statement voluntary.”

¶ 169         Nevertheless, the remainder of the decision gave no indication that the trial court ever

           sought to analyze the evidence under the proper initial inquiry—whether defendant’s new

           evidence met his initial burden to show a likelihood of suppression. Id. Instead, the court

           focused on whether it believed defendant’s factual allegations. In its “Conclusions of Law”

           section, the court said its role was “to decide whether petitioner has proved that his confession

           was the result of torture.” In the following paragraph, the court reiterated: “The issue for

           determination at a hearing convened pursuant to 775 ILCS 40 is whether petitioner has met his

           burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence that his confession was a result of physical

           coercion or torture. This is the sole issue to be determined by the Court at the hearing.”

           (Emphasis added.) These assertions misstated the law, insofar as they suggested that defendant

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        No. 1-20-0462

           could not obtain any relief under the TIRC Act unless he proved that he was, in fact, abused.

           Elsewhere in the decision, the court repeatedly indicated that the only relevant question was

           whether defendant proved that he was tortured.

¶ 170          To be clear, we recognize that, to the extent defendant sought outright suppression, the

           court ultimately needed to make factual findings, under the “burden shifting provisions

           involved in a motion to suppress.” Id. The problem with the trial court’s analysis was that it

           entirely skipped analysis of the “initial burden,” which did not require defendant to prove the

           ultimate question of whether he was tortured. See id. That is, the court failed to address the

           threshold question of whether the new pattern and practice evidence “would likely have

           resulted in the suppression of the confession.” Id. Instead, the court erroneously indicated that

           the sole relevant question was whether defendant proved he was tortured. Thus, while the court

           initially recited the proper inquiries under Wilson, its subsequent statements demonstrate that

           it failed to assess the proper initial burden and proceeded directly to its assessment of

           defendant’s credibility.

¶ 171          The question then becomes whether the trial court’s failure to address the proper initial

           inquiry requires reversal, or if we must further assess the propriety of the court’s additional

           findings with respect to the pattern and practice evidence. We believe the latter approach is

           correct, given our decision in People v. Whirl, 2015 IL App (1st) 111483, which addressed a

           similar situation.

¶ 172          In Whirl, the trial court conducted a combined hearing under the Post-Conviction Hearing

           Act and the TIRC Act pertaining to Whirl’s claim that a police officer, Pienta, coerced his

           confession. Id. ¶ 52. Whirl testified as to how Pienta forced him to confess in 1990. Id. ¶ 53-

           57. Whirl also called two witnesses who testified they were arrested and tortured, although

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        No. 1-20-0462

           they did not specify whether Pienta was merely present or if he physically tortured them. Id.

           ¶ 67. In denying relief, the trial court in Whirl incorrectly stated that “the central issue in the

           case was whether ‘Pienta in fact tortured Mr. Whirl and coerced his confession.’ ” Id. ¶ 81.

           Similar to the instant case, the trial court stated “ ‘that [Whirl] needed to be credible in order

           to sustain his burden,’ ” found he was not credible, and thus concluded he “ ‘did not establish

           that he was abused or tortured by Detective Pienta.’ ” Id.

¶ 173          On appeal, we recognized that “the trial court appears to have used the incorrect standard,”

           as it was “not the trial court’s role to determine whether Whirl’s confession was, in fact,

           coerced.” Id. ¶ 82. Nevertheless, we reasoned: “because the trial court also made findings

           related to the new evidence, and its comments regarding credibility could also be interpreted

           to relate to those findings, we will examine all of the trial court’s findings in detail.” Id.

¶ 174          Our decision in Whirl discussed the trial court’s findings related to Whirl’s credibility

           before discussing the “new evidence,” finding it was sufficient to establish a pattern and

           practice of torture. Id. ¶¶ 101-03. Whirl proceeded to conclude that the new evidence was

           “conclusive enough that the outcome of the suppression hearing likely would have been

           different if Pienta had been subject to impeachment” with evidence that he abused other

           suspects. Id. ¶ 110. This court concluded that Whirl was entitled to a new suppression hearing.

           Id. ¶ 113. 10

¶ 175          Whirl is instructive regarding the proper course for our analysis in this case. Whirl confirms

           that it is error for the court to focus on defendant’s credibility, instead of assessing whether the

                We determined that Whirl was “entitled to a new suppression hearing under the Postconviction
               10

           Act” and thus “need not address Whirl’s claim for the identical relief under the [TIRC] Act.” Whirl,
           2015 IL App (1st) 111483, ¶ 111.

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        No. 1-20-0462

           new evidence would likely have altered the result of the suppression hearing. See id. (“the

           credibility findings made by the court were not relevant to the issue of whether Pienta’s

           credibility at the suppression hearing might have been impeached as a result of the new

           evidence”). Nevertheless, Whirl indicates that this error does not end our review where, as

           here, the trial court also made specific findings regarding the new evidence offered to show a

           “pattern and practice” of abuse and coercion. That is, we still need to evaluate whether

           defendant met his initial burden to show the new evidence would be likely to have led to a

           different outcome at a suppression hearing.

¶ 176             C. The Trial Court Erred in Finding All Pattern and Practice Evidence Irrelevant

¶ 177         In this case, the trial court disregarded all of the pattern and practice evidence as irrelevant,

           including Ivan Smith’s and Reeves’s hearing testimony and the voluminous documentary

           exhibits. We agree with defendant that the court abused its discretion in disregarding this

           evidence, which was certainly relevant to show a pattern of abuse and coercion by the accused

           detectives. Moreover, we find that this evidence met defendant’s initial burden to show that it

           would likely have resulted in suppression.

¶ 178         “It is within the discretion of the circuit court to decide whether evidence is relevant and

           admissible, and a reviewing court will not disturb the circuit court’s decision absent a clear

           abuse of that discretion.” Peach v. McGovern, 2019 IL 123156, ¶ 25. An abuse of discretion

           occurs “where no reasonable person would take the position adopted by the circuit court.” Id.

¶ 179         “Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of a fact that is of

           consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without

           the evidence.” People v. Patterson, 192 Ill. 2d 93, 115 (2000). In assessing whether prior

           allegations of police abuse are relevant to a postconviction claim of coercion, Patterson

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        No. 1-20-0462

           instructs that “relevancy is a determination to be made by the trial court after a consideration

           of, inter alia, the defendant’s allegations of torture and their similarity to the prior allegations.”

           Id. at 144-45. Prior allegations of police abuse may be relevant when they involve the same

           officers, involve similar methods of torture, and occur near the time of the current allegations.

           Id. at 115 (citing Wilson v. City of Chicago, 6 F.3d 1233, 1238 (7th Cir. 1993)).

¶ 180          Our supreme court recently described the inquiry as follows:

                        “[S]imilarity is a critical factor to consider when determining

                        whether new evidence of police misconduct in other cases

                        establishes a pattern and practice of certain behavior. However, the

                        test is not one of exact or perfect identity. Rather, the critical inquiry

                        is simply whether there is sufficient similarity between the

                        misconduct at issue in the present case and the misconduct shown in

                        other cases, such that it may fairly be said the officers were acting

                        in conformity with a pattern and practice of behavior.” People v.

                        Jackson, 2021 IL 124818, ¶ 34 (citing Patterson, 192 Ill. 2d at 144-

                        45).

¶ 181          Recent decisions by this court illustrate that prior incidents of abuse have greater relevance

           where the manner of alleged abuse is similar. See People v. Plummer, 2021 IL App (1st)

           200299, ¶ 109 (reversing second-stage dismissal of successive postconviction petition where

           new evidence showed “pattern of systemic abuse by Detectives Kill and Boudreau,” where the

           cited prior incidents were relevant “not only because the abuse was similar *** but they were

           also perpetrated by some of the same officers from the same police stations and were incredibly

           close in time to one another”); see also People v. Tyler, 2015 IL App (1st) 123470, ¶ 190

                                                          - 41 -
        No. 1-20-0462

           (defendant made substantial showing of constitutional violation where “the type of abuse in

           many of the cases cited by defendant is similar to the type of beating that defendant claimed

           he received from the detectives”).

¶ 182          Here, the trial court’s posthearing decision cited various reasons for finding that none of

           the pattern and practice evidence was relevant. Yet, the decision contained virtually no

           discussion of whether the numerous prior allegations were factually similar to defendant’s

           alleged abuse. 11 The trial court apparently conflated the question of whether prior allegations

           were relevant with whether it found they were credible, disregarding much of the pattern and

           practice evidence based on its credibility determinations. Likewise, the trial court disregarded

           any complaints that were not sustained by OPS. The court also found defendant “waived” any

           reliance on pattern and practice allegations that the officers were not specifically asked about

           at the evidentiary hearing. These rulings constituted an abuse of discretion.

¶ 183                   D. The Court’s Flawed Analysis of Ivan Smith’s and Reeves’s Testimony

¶ 184          The court’s flawed approach is exemplified by its discussion of Ivan Smith’s pattern and

           practice testimony. There can be no doubt that Ivan Smith’s testimony was relevant, as he

           described two of the same detectives harming him in nearly the exact same manner that

           defendant alleged. Ivan Smith testified that in November 1991 (only a few months after

           defendant’s arrest), Stehlik and O’Brien took turns holding a phonebook on him and striking

           the book with a stick. Clearly, this testimony was similar enough to be relevant under the

           standard in Jackson, 2021 IL 124818, ¶ 34. Yet, the trial court simply did not believe Ivan

               11
                 The court did state that the “settlement or resolution or disposition of the Anthony Jakes case”
           was irrelevant because, “Jakes was a minor and alleges action taken by officer dissimilar to the case at
           bar.” Yet at no other point did the court discuss whether there was similarity between any of the prior
           allegations of abuse and defendant’s allegations.

                                                         - 42 -
        No. 1-20-0462

           Smith, stating: “Contrary to Ivan Smith’s testimony, Ivan Smith was not physically abused by

           either Detective O’Brien or Detective Stehlik.” Thus, rather than assess the relevance of Ivan

           Smith’s testimony, the court made a factual finding that Ivan Smith’s claim was incredible.

           This was improper.

¶ 185          We have similar concerns with the trial court’s stated reason for disregarding Martin

           Reeves’s testimony. The court emphasized that Reeves did not testify that Kill physically

           abused him, but only that Kill stood by while other officers abused Reeves. The court then

           indicated that it found Reeves’s testimony irrelevant because it did not believe defendant’s

           testimony that Kill abused him:

                        “Martin Reeves is not a pattern and practice witness for petitioner

                        because Reeves did not accuse Michael Kill of physically abusing

                        him in any way. To the extent that he testified that Michael Kill

                        stood by while he was abused by other police officers, there is no

                        credible testimony that Michael Kill was present when George

                        Anderson claims he was abused.” (Emphasis added.)

           Thus, the court apparently found Reeves’s testimony irrelevant simply because the court

           disbelieved defendant. 12

¶ 186          Although Reeves did not accuse Kill of actually beating him, that did not render Reeves’s

           testimony irrelevant; it was enough that Kill participated in Reeves’s coercion. See People v.

               12
                 We recognize the possibility that this sentence in the trial court’s decision meant to refer to Reeves
           instead of “George Anderson,” i.e., that the court concluded there was no credible testimony that Kill
           was present when Reeves claims he was abused. Yet that line of reasoning would also be flawed,
           because it would reflect that the court decided Reeves was not credible instead of assessing whether his
           allegations were similar enough to be relevant as pattern and practice evidence.

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        No. 1-20-0462

           Harris, 2021 IL App (1st) 182172, ¶ 50 (in deciding whether pattern and practice evidence

           would have affected the outcome of the suppression hearing, the court considers “whether any

           of the officers who interrogated defendant may have participated in systemic interrogation

           abuse” (citing Patterson, 192 Ill. 2d at 144-45)). Indeed, evidence of an officer’s “silent

           acceptance” of torture committed by other officers is still relevant. Whirl, 2015 IL App (1st)

           111483, ¶ 103 (“even if the new evidence established only that Pienta stood by and did nothing

           while other officers committed acts of torture and abuse, silent acceptance is still relevant to

           the issue of whether Pienta’s credibility may have been impeached as a result of this

           evidence”). Here, Reeves testified that Kill worked with other officers who threatened him and

           physically coerced his false confession. Indeed, Reeves testified that Kill handed him a

           statement and told him that if he signed it, he could eat and go home. This is not dissimilar

           from defendant’s testimony that Kill pressured him into signing a false statement. Reeves’s

           testimony was clearly relevant to showing Kill’s pattern of participation in systematic abuse.

           The court abused its discretion in declining to find either Ivan Smith’s or Reeves’s testimony

           relevant.

¶ 187                   E. The Court Erred in Disregarding Claims That Were Not Sustained by OPS

¶ 188         The trial court also abused its discretion when it relied on OPS determinations to disregard

           certain complaints of abuse as irrelevant. The trial court noted that numerous complaints were

           deemed unfounded or “not sustained” by OPS. These included complaints against O’Brien by

           Samhan Ali, Glen Dixon, Maurice Lane, Luis Martinez, David Torrentt Jr., and Gregory

           Logan; Bobby Spencer’s complaint against Kill; Andre Altman and Eric Jackson’s complaint

           against O’Brien and Stehlik; Emmett White’s complaint against O’Brien and Halloran; and

           Marcus and Joseph Jackson’s complaint against Halloran and Boudreau. The trial court

                                                      - 44 -
        No. 1-20-0462

           similarly noted that the Independent Police Review Authority (IPRA) did not sustain Stanley

           Gardner’s complaint that O’Brien, Halloran, and other officers beat Gardner and left him in a

           cold room.

¶ 189         Whether a prior allegation was deemed unfounded by OPS does not indicate whether it has

           “sufficient similarity” to defendant’s alleged abuse, which is the pertinent relevance inquiry.

           Jackson, 2021 IL 124818, ¶ 34 (citing Patterson, 192 Ill. 2d at 144-45). We are aware of no

           authority that allows the trial court to deem prior allegations irrelevant on this basis. In fact,

           our court has relied on such pattern and practice evidence. See Tyler, 2015 IL App (1st) 123470

           (finding defendant was entitled to third-stage evidentiary hearing on claim of coerced

           confession under Post-Conviction Hearing Act). The Tyler decision summarized many prior

           claims of abuse, noting that three of those claimants’ cases (those of Eric Johnson, Sandy

           Curtis, and Emmett Smith) were closed by OPS. See id. ¶¶ 67, 70-71. Nevertheless, Tyler

           subsequently referred to those three claimants in discussing the evidence of systemic abuse

           that, if presented at trial, could have reasonably undermined the detectives’ credibility. Id.

           ¶¶ 170, 172-73, 186.

¶ 190         We also find persuasive a recent unpublished decision regarding an evidentiary hearing on

           a TIRC Act claim alleging abuse by Boudreau, Halloran, and O’Brien. People v. Smith, 2022

           IL App (1st) 201256-U. Similar to this case, the Smith defendant submitted numerous exhibits

           relating to allegations of abuse by the same officers. Id. ¶ 79. The trial court found the evidence

           unpersuasive because, inter alia, “many of the claims included in defendant’s evidence

           resulted in losing efforts for those claimants, or were simply civil complaints that had (at least

           as of yet) not resulted in a finding of abuse by Boudreau, Halloran, or O’Brien.” Id. ¶ 83.

¶ 191         This court in Smith held that the trial court “improperly weighed” such evidence:

                                                       - 45 -
        No. 1-20-0462

                        “Generally, the court discounted much of defendant’s evidence

                        because none of the defendants in cases presented achieved a

                        specific finding from a court on the merits that they were abused by

                        the subject detectives. However, neither the circuit court nor the

                        State has cited to any authority that a previous judicial determination

                        of torture is required. We reject the existence of such a requirement,

                        as it does not appear in the language of the [TIRC] Act and would

                        make it exceedingly difficult for a defendant to obtain relief. This

                        result would be impossible to square with the Act’s extraordinary

                        remedial purposes.” Id. ¶ 98.

           Similarly, we see no reason why the relevance of a prior allegation depends on any OPS

           determination.

¶ 192         Although the State insists the trial court properly considered whether OPS sustained prior

           allegations of abuse, it does not cite any TIRC Act decisions in support. The State refers us to

           People v. Porter-Boens, 2013 IL App (1st) 111074, which affirmed a ruling that quashed a

           defendant’s subpoena for prior complaints against the arresting officer. The State points out

           Porter-Boens’s statement: “The trial court may properly exclude evidence of prior allegations

           of misconduct involving different officers if the prior allegation is factually dissimilar to the

           officer’s conduct in the pending case, and if the officer did not receive discipline from his

           department.” (Emphasis added.) Id. ¶ 17. The State also refers to the decision’s statement that

           allegations of misconduct, “without evidence the officer was disciplined, are not admissible as

           impeachment.” Id. ¶ 20. However, Porter-Boens is not a TIRC action and did not involve any

           claim of a coerced confession. In any event, that decision makes clear that the primary inquiry

                                                        - 46 -
        No. 1-20-0462

           in deciding the relevance of prior allegations is whether they are “factually dissimilar to the

           officer’s conduct in the pending case.” Id. ¶ 17. Clearly, the similarity of past allegations of

           police misconduct does not depend on whether the officer was ever disciplined.

¶ 193         In short, the pertinent relevance inquiry is one of similarity, which did not depend on how

           OPS handled a prior complaint. Thus, the court erred insofar as it deemed pattern and practice

           evidence irrelevant based on OPS’s treatment of past claims of police coercion.

¶ 194              F. The Trial Court Erred in Crediting Police Officer Denials to Determine That Prior

                                        Claims of Abuse Were Irrelevant

¶ 195         For similar reasons, the trial court also erred to the extent it found prior claims of abuse

           irrelevant because it believed the officers’ evidentiary hearing testimony denying the prior

           instances of abuse. The court’s decision reflects that it consistently made credibility

           determinations to find that the alleged abuse did not happen, in the course of finding the

           claimant’s allegations irrelevant. Among other examples, the trial court:

                   (1) found “O’Brien did not abuse” either Tyrone Reyna or Oscar Gomez, citing

              O’Brien’s denials in this proceeding;

                   (2) found a “lack of evidence” or “insufficient evidence” that Boudreau abused Jerry

              Gillespie, Peter Williams, Harold Hill, or Joseph Jackson, citing Boudreau’s denials;

                   (3) found “John Halloran never physically abused Clayborn Smith,” citing Halloran’s

              testimony in this hearing; and

                   (4) found “insufficient evidence that Detective James O’Brien kicked” Glen Dixon,

              citing O’Brien’s denial that he kicked Dixon. 13

              13
                O’Brien acknowledged in his testimony that he “fought with” Dixon.

                                                      - 47 -
        No. 1-20-0462

           In this manner, the trial court simply credited the officers’ testimony at this hearing whenever

           an officer denied one of the allegations of abuse.

¶ 196          This was improper, at least insofar as the court made credibility findings to determine the

           threshold question of whether the new evidence was relevant, whether defendant met his

           “initial burden of showing that new evidence would likely have resulted in the suppression of

           his confession.” Wilson, 2019 IL App (1st) 181486, ¶ 54. 14 The court apparently conflated the

           question of whether prior allegations of abuse were relevant—which turns on their similarity—

           with whether it found those prior allegations were credible, in light of the officers’

           contradicting testimony. It is hardly surprising that the officers consistently denied abusing any

           of the pattern and practice claimants, just as they denied abusing defendant. Yet such denials

           do not impact whether the other claims of abuse were relevant, i.e., “whether there is sufficient

           similarity between the misconduct at issue in the present case and the misconduct shown in

           other cases.” Jackson, 2021 IL 124818, ¶ 34.

¶ 197               G. Pattern and Practice Evidence Was Not “Waived” Merely Because Officers Were

                                       Not Asked About Specific Allegations

¶ 198          We also agree with defendant that the trial court erred when it found that defendant

           “waived” reliance on prior allegations of abuse as pattern and practice evidence, if defendant’s

           counsel did not specifically ask the officer about the specific allegations at the evidentiary

           hearing. For example, the court found that, because defendant’s counsel “did not question

               14
                 We recognize that credibility findings would be appropriate, to the extent that the court was
           determining the question of whether suppression was warranted. However, the court’s decision
           indicates that it deemed pattern and practice evidence irrelevant based on whether it believed the past
           allegations.

                                                         - 48 -
        No. 1-20-0462

           Detective James O’Brien about any allegations of coercion made by Dan Young,” “any attempt

           to use Young’s testimony as pattern and practice with respect to O’Brien has been waived.”

¶ 199         The State’s brief contends that the failure to ask an officer about a past allegation of abuse

           is a “perfectly valid’ reason to find such evidence irrelevant, yet it does not cite any precedent

           for this point. Although we are not aware of a decision directly addressing this question, we

           agree with defendant. The relevance of evidence of prior alleged incidents of abuse depends

           on their similarity to defendant’s allegations. That inquiry is not contingent on whether the

           officers were specifically asked about such prior claims at the evidentiary hearing. In any event,

           it is hard to imagine a scenario in which an officer asked about such past allegations would

           admit to the prior abuse. That is, just as the trial court could not disregard evidence of prior

           abuses merely because the officers denied it, such evidence could not be disregarded merely

           because officers were not asked about it at the evidentiary hearing. The trial court’s ruling that

           defendant “waived” such evidence was an abuse of discretion.

¶ 200             H. The Trial Court Erred in Disregarding Any Prior Allegations Against Halloran

¶ 201         We also agree with the defendant that the trial court erred when it indicated it would

           disregard any pattern and practice evidence against Halloran, on the ground that defendant’s

           original motion to suppress did not identify Halloran as one of the officers who abused him.

¶ 202         We acknowledge that the motion to suppress did not name Halloran. However, it alleged

           that an unnamed officer, together with Kill, struck defendant in the course of coercing his

           confession in the Miggins case. Significantly, there is no dispute that Halloran was, in fact,

           working with Kill to interrogate defendant on the date in question. At the hearing on the motion

           to suppress, Kill testified that he and Halloran interviewed defendant. And at the post-TIRC

                                                       - 49 -
        No. 1-20-0462

           referral evidentiary hearing, Halloran acknowledged that he handcuffed defendant to a ring on

           a wall before interviewing him with Kill.

¶ 203          Although defendant apparently did not know or recall Halloran’s name when the motion

           to suppress was drafted and argued in the early 1990s, that is hardly surprising. See People v.

           Gibson, 2018 IL App (1st) 162177, ¶ 121 (Recognizing that “maybe [defendant] was never

           sure, to begin with, exactly who threw which punch, slap, or kick in what order. It does not

           strike us [as] implausible that someone experiencing a stressful encounter would struggle to

           keep those kinds of facts straight, not immediately afterward and certainly not decades later”).

           Moreover, defendant has consistently alleged for decades that an officer working with Kill

           struck him in the course of interrogating him about the Miggins shooting. And it has now been

           established that Halloran helped interrogate defendant on the night in question. 15 The court

           abused its discretion in disregarding past claims against Halloran merely because he was not

           explicitly named in the initial motion to suppress.

¶ 204          I. The Trial Court Erred in Disregarding Any Prior Allegations Against Boudreau Based

                                 on Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Testimony

¶ 205          We similarly agree with defendant that the court erred in disregarding any evidence of past

           abuse allegations against Boudreau. The court indicated its belief that such evidence was

           irrelevant because defendant testified at the 1994 motion to suppress hearing that Boudreau

           did not hit him. Again, it would not be surprising if defendant did not have a clear

               15

                                                                      -
                 Moreover, we note there are now many documented complaints of Halloran abusing detainees
           within the same time period. See Smith, 2022 IL App (1st) 201256-U, ¶ 99 (noting the “sheer number
           of allegations” against Halloran, Boudreau, and O’Brien, including that “at least eight defendants were
           later exonerated, acquitted, awarded a certificate of innocence, or had their charges dropped even
           though some combination of Boudreau, Halloran, or O’Brien allegedly extracted a confession from
           them using torture”).

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        No. 1-20-0462

           understanding at that time as to which officer committed each specific act. See id. In any event,

           defendant accused Boudreau of striking him in his TIRC affidavit and his subsequent

           evidentiary hearing testimony. 16 And there is no factual dispute that Boudreau was working

           with Kill and Halloran on August 21, 1992. Simply put, defendant’s TIRC claim accused

           Boudreau of working with Kill and Halloran to coerce defendant’s confession. In turn, prior

           allegations that Boudreau participated in similar coercion are relevant to show a pattern of such

           conduct. See Tyler, 2015 IL App (1st) 123470, ¶ 181 (“Since the vast majority of the cases

           presented by defendant involve allegations of police misconduct by two or more detectives, it

           is crucial to consider the claims of a systemic pattern of abuse in the context of several officers

           working together to obtain a false confession in the case at bar.”); see also People v. Galvan,

           2019 IL App (1st) 170150, ¶ 68 (in assessing pattern and practice evidence, “the questions are

           (1) whether any of the officers who interrogated petitioner may have participated in systematic

           and methodical interrogation abuse and (2) whether those officers’ credibility at petitioner’s

           suppression hearing or at trial might have been impeached as a result”). Accordingly, the court

           erred in disregarding the ample pattern and practice evidence implicating Boudreau.

¶ 206          In sum, the various reasons given by the trial court to disregard pattern and practice

           evidence were improper. Accordingly, the court abused its discretion when it found there was

           no relevant pattern and practice evidence.

¶ 207          Having concluded that the court erred in disregarding the pattern and practice evidence, we

           must determine whether that evidence “would likely have resulted in the suppression of

                Even if Boudreau did not actually strike defendant but merely acquiesced while other officers
               16

           abused him, evidence regarding Boudreau’s prior conduct would still be relevant. As previously
           mentioned, even an officer’s “silent acceptance” of torture committed by other officers is still relevant.
           Whirl, 2015 IL App (1st) 111483, ¶ 103.

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        No. 1-20-0462

           [defendant’s] confession” in order to meet defendant’s initial burden to obtain relief. Wilson,

           2019 IL App (1st) 181486, ¶ 54. Before we do so, however, we briefly address the State’s

           arguments that defendant was independently barred from relief due to (1) his plea in the Miles

           case or (2) his prior testimony in connection with the Miggins case. Neither contention has

           merit.

¶ 208               J. Defendant’s Plea in the Miles Case Did Not Waive Relief Under the TIRC Act

¶ 209         First, in its brief, the State contended that defendant’s guilty plea in the Miles case

           “waived” his claim for postconviction relief under the TIRC Act, citing case law holding that

           a voluntary guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional errors. See, e.g., People v. Anderson, 375

           Ill. App. 3d 121, 133 (2006) (finding waiver of police coercion claim in successive

           postconviction petition); People v. Peeples, 155 Ill. 2d 422, 491 (1993) (guilty plea underlying

           prior convictions barred defendant from challenging the State’s use of his confession to those

           prior crimes as aggravating evidence at his sentencing hearing).

¶ 210         At oral argument, however, the State conceded that this argument is unavailing in light of

           our decision in People v. Johnson, 2022 IL App (1st) 201371, in which we held that Jerome

           Johnson’s plea in the Miles case did not waive his TIRC Act claim. We emphasized that waiver

           of a statutory right must be “ ‘voluntary, knowing, and intelligent’ ” and with a “ ‘full

           awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision

           to abandon it.’ ” Id. ¶ 89 (quoting People v. Lesley, 2018 IL 122100, ¶¶ 50-51). We reasoned

           that Johnson “could not possibly have had a ‘full awareness’ that he was abandoning any right

           under the TIRC Act when he pleaded guilty in 1992, for the simple reason that the TIRC Act

           was not yet enacted at that time.” Id. Our decision in Johnson applies here with equal force.

           As the TIRC Act was not yet in effect at the time of defendant’s plea in the Miles case, that

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        No. 1-20-0462

           plea “could not have constituted ‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known

           right’ to seek relief under the TIRC Act.” Id. ¶ 99 (quoting Lesley, 2018 IL 122100, ¶ 36).

¶ 211                   K. Defendant’s Prior Testimony Was Not A “Judicial Admission”

¶ 212         We next address the State’s contention that defendant made “judicial admissions” in prior

           testimony concerning the Miggins case that preclude him from obtaining relief. The State avers

           there are two such instances. First, the State emphasizes defendant’s cross-examination in the

           Miggins case, in which he gave the following one-word responses to the State’s questions:

                        “Q. Now, let me ask you at the end of that statement *** you told

                        the state’s attorney in there you had been treated well by the police

                        and the assistant state’s attorney, right?

                        A. Yes.

                        Q. That was true, right?

                        A. Yes.

                        Q. You also stated that you weren’t made any promises in return

                        for the statement nor you weren’t threatened in any way. You told

                        that to the state’s attorney?

                        A. Yes.

                        Q. That was true, right?

                        A. Yes.

                        Q. You told the state’s attorney you were offered both food and

                        water and they were, brought food from McDonald’s, right?

                        A. Yes.

                        Q. That was true?

                                                         - 53 -
        No. 1-20-0462

                        A. Some of it.

                        Q. Some of it.

                        A. Yes.

                        Q. You told the state’s attorney that you were free from the effects

                        of drugs and alcohol, that was true?

                        A. Yes.

                        Q. So you weren’t treated badly by the police?

                        A. No.”

¶ 213         The State posits that defendant’s responses constituted a “clear and unequivocal judicial

           admission” that he was “treated well by the police.” The State suggests that, in light of this

           testimony, defendant cannot now claim that he was mistreated.

¶ 214         Separately, the State argues that defendant’s testimony at the 1994 motion to suppress

           hearing was a “clear and unequivocal admission that Detective Boudreau never hit him.” The

           State refers to the following exchange:

                        “Q. Now, the other detective that testified here, Detective

                        Boudreau, Detective [Kill’s] partner, you testified that he also

                        kicked you and slapped you with his hands on your face?

                        A. No, ma’am.

                        Q. He never hit you?

                        A. No, ma’am.”

¶ 215         The State refers us to a number of civil, non-TIRC Act cases concerning judicial

           admissions, primarily In re Estate of Rennick, 181 Ill. 2d 395 (1998). Rennick explains that

           “[o]rdinary evidentiary admissions may be contradicted or explained” but these “should be

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        No. 1-20-0462

           distinguished from judicial admissions, which conclusively bind a party.” Id. at 406. Our

           supreme court proceeded to explain: “Judicial admissions are defined as deliberate, clear,

           unequivocal statements by a party about a concrete fact within that party’s knowledge.

           [Citation.] Where made, a judicial admission may not be contradicted in a motion for summary

           judgment [citation] or at trial [citation].” Id. at 407.

¶ 216          This court has also cautioned that “[t]he doctrine of judicial admissions requires thoughtful

           study for its application so that justice not be done on the strength of a chance statement made

           by a nervous party.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) North Shore Community Bank & Trust

           Co. v. Sheffield Wellington LLC, 2014 IL App (1st) 123784, ¶ 115. Because the doctrine is not

           intended to penalize “confusion or an honest mistake,” a judicial admission will be found only

           if “the party making the statement had no reasonable possibility of being mistaken.” (Internal

           quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 126.

¶ 217          We are not persuaded by the State’s reliance on the judicial admission doctrine.

           Significantly, the State cites no precedent suggesting that prior testimony from a criminal

           proceeding has ever been construed as a binding judicial admission. Thus, there is no support

           for the suggestion that defendant’s prior testimony could ever qualify as a judicial admission.

           Further, the State does not cite any case finding that a judicial admission can operate to bar a

           claim for relief under the TIRC Act. This is not surprising, since the TIRC Act “establishes an

           extraordinary procedure to investigate and determine factual claims of torture.” (Emphasis

           added.) 775 ILCS 40/10 (West 2018).

¶ 218          Moreover, even assuming that the concept of judicial admissions could apply, we would

           not be convinced that the two cited portions of defendant’s testimony would qualify. First, we

           cannot say defendant’s one-word answers to the State’s line of cross-examination at the

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        No. 1-20-0462

           Miggins trial were unequivocal statements that defendant was treated well by police. This is

           especially so given defendant’s explanation at the evidentiary hearing that he was surprised by

           this line of cross-examination, since he and his trial counsel had decided not to discuss his

           abuse by police. Defendant’s explanation was consistent with the testimony of his former trial

           counsel, Judge O’Hara, who acknowledged that he told defendant they would “not go into” his

           allegations of police abuse at trial.

¶ 219          With respect to defendant’s testimony at the 1994 motion to suppress that Boudreau did

           not hit him, we emphasize that a judicial admission should not be found if it could be the

           product of mistake or confusion. North Shore Community Bank & Trust Co., 2014 IL App (1st)

           123784, ¶ 126. Given the circumstances of the 1991 interrogation (which lasted 30 hours and

           involved numerous officers), there is a reasonable likelihood that the cited testimony regarding

           Boudreau was the product of understandable confusion or mistake on defendant’s part. See

           Gibson, 2018 IL App (1st) 162177, ¶ 121 (explaining it would not be surprising if a coerced

           defendant was “never sure, to begin with, exactly who threw which punch, slap, or kick in

           what order”). We thus reject the State’s contention that the prior testimony operated as a

           binding judicial admission.

¶ 220                             L. Defendant’s Evidence Satisfied His Initial

                                  Burden to Show a Likelihood of Suppression

¶ 221          We have now determined that the trial court abused its discretion in rejecting the pattern

           practice evidence as irrelevant and that relief was not otherwise barred by the defendant’s

           guilty plea in the Miles case or his prior testimony in the Miggins case. We now return to the

           question of whether defendant “satisfie[d] his initial burden of showing the new evidence

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        No. 1-20-0462

           would likely have resulted in the suppression of his confession.” Wilson, 2019 IL App (1st)

           181486, ¶ 54. We answer that question in the affirmative.

¶ 222         As discussed, defendant presented ample relevant pattern and practice evidence, including

           numerous prior complaints against the detectives he now accuses of abusing him to coerce his

           statements in the Miles and Miggins cases. This is certainly true with respect to his claim that

           O’Brien and Stehlik coerced the Miggins statement. As the TIRC recognized, O’Brien has

           been subject to approximately 50 claims of coercion, many of which were documented in

           defendant’s submissions to the trial court. Among those claims is that of Ivan Smith, who

           testified at the evidentiary hearing that O’Brien and Stehlik struck him with a phonebook in a

           virtually identical manner to what defendant has consistently alleged since his motion to

           suppress. Clearly, this evidence would significantly undermine O’Brien and Stehlik’s

           testimony denying their mistreatment of defendant while interrogating him about the Miggins

           case. We conclude that Smith’s testimony and the other pattern and practice evidence regarding

           O’Brien and Stehlik would likely lead to suppression of the Miggins statement.

¶ 223         The same is true with respect to the ample pattern and practice evidence offered regarding

           the detectives who allegedly coerced defendant’s statement about the Miles shooting: Kill,

           Boudreau, and Halloran. As the TIRC’s decision noted, Kill has been named in about 40

           complaints of coercion, Halloran in more than 50, and Boudreau “is notorious for having

           obtained confessions in cases where the individual was in jail at the time of the offense to

           which he confessed, cases which were later undermined by DNA evidence, and more than a

           dozen cases where charges were dropped or the individual was acquitted at trial.” Many of

           those prior complaints are described in the pattern and practice evidence, including claims by

           Harold Hill, Dan Young, Nick Escamilla, Tyrone Reyna, Peter Williams, Clayborn Smith, and

                                                      - 57 -
        No. 1-20-0462

           Oscar Gomez that they were abused by Halloran and Boudreau. 17 The pattern and practice

           evidence also shows several other individuals alleged abuse by Boudreau, either individually

           or in concert with Kill, including Imari Clemons, Jesse Clemons, Damoni Clemons, Johnny

           Plummer, and Anthony Jakes, whose conviction was vacated in 2018. See Sarah Schulte, 2

           Men Wrongly Imprisoned as Teens Have Convictions Vacated, ABC Chicago (Apr. 30, 2018),

           https://abc7chicago.com/wrongly-convicted-convictions-vacated-murder-conviction-chicago-

           exoneration/3410907/ [https://perma.cc/RTH7-TD49]. And Reeves testified at the evidentiary

           hearing how Kill pressured him to sign a false confession in a similar manner that defendant

           alleged with respect to the Miles statement.

¶ 224         We note that evidence regarding several of the same claimants was also relied upon by

           Clayborn Smith in connection with his TIRC claim alleging abuse by Boudreau, Halloran, and

           O’Brien. See Smith, 2022 IL App (1st) 201256-U, ¶ 79. In that case, we found that Smith

           “produced sufficient evidence of a pattern [of] physical abuse by the detectives in question”

           and that “the outcome of the suppression hearing likely would have been different had the

           detectives been impeached with the new evidence of torture.” Id. ¶¶ 99, 101. We reach the

           same conclusion here, given the voluminous evidence implicating the detectives who

           interrogated defendant. As this court stated in Smith, “we find it difficult to imag[ine] a

           scenario in which the detectives’ testimony is not viewed in a new light given the numerous

           torture allegations made by other defendants, which was not available at the time of the original

              17
                 Codefendants Hill and Young were ultimately exonerated by DNA testing. See Rob Warden,
           Harold Hill, The Nat’l Registry of Exonerations, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/
           Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3296#:~:text=Harold%20Hill%20and%20his%20co,found%20had
           %20been%20set%20ablaze (last visited Feb. 24, 2023) [https://perma.cc/G8RH-9MY2]; see also Tyler,
           2015 IL App (1st) 123470, ¶ 65 (recognizing “Hill was exonerated through DNA evidence” and was
           released from prison).

                                                      - 58 -
        No. 1-20-0462

           suppression hearing.” Id.¶ 102. In the same manner, we conclude that the pattern and practice

           evidence satisfied defendant’s “initial burden of showing that new evidence would likely have

           resulted in the suppression of his confession.” Wilson, 2019 IL App (1st) 181486, ¶ 54.

¶ 225             K. The State Could Not Meet Its Burden to Prove the Statements Were Voluntary

¶ 226         Our analysis is not yet complete, as we recognize that the trial court essentially conducted

           a “simultaneous hearing” at which it considered both defendant’s claim under the TIRC Act

           and defendant’s request to suppress the statements. See id. ¶ 50. That is, after defendant

           satisfied his initial burden of showing that new evidence would likely have resulted in the

           suppression of his confession, “the State ha[d] the burden of proving [defendant’s] statement

           was voluntary, just as it would at a motion to suppress hearing.” Id. ¶ 54. If the State could

           prove the confessions were voluntary by a preponderance of the evidence, then the burden

           would shift back to defendant to prove involuntariness. Id. ¶¶ 53-54. As defendant requested

           suppression in conjunction with the evidentiary hearing, we assess whether the State could

           meet its corresponding burden.

¶ 227         In doing so, we keep in mind that a two-part standard of review applies to a ruling on a

           motion to suppress. People v. Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d 530, 542 (2006). “[W]e give great

           deference to the trial court’s factual findings, and we will reverse those findings only if they

           are against the manifest weight of the evidence.” Id. However, the reviewing court “remains

           free to undertake its own assessment of the facts in relation to the issues and may draw its own

           conclusion when deciding what relief should be granted.” Id. Thus, “we review de novo the

           trial court’s ultimate legal ruling as to whether suppression is warranted.” Id. at 542-43. Under

           the record, we find that suppression was warranted, as the trial court’s factual findings were

           against the manifest weight of the evidence.

                                                      - 59 -
        No. 1-20-0462

¶ 228          We recognize that the trial court consistently made explicit findings of fact in the State’s

           favor and against defendant. That is, the court elected to believe substantially all of the State’s

           proffered testimony at the hearing, including whenever the accused detectives denied that they

           mistreated defendant or the numerous other pattern and practice claimants. The court also

           emphasized that it found defendant untruthful, concluding he had fabricated his allegations and

           testimony to “rid[e] on the [sic] Burge’s torture bus.”

¶ 229          Notwithstanding the deferential standard of review, under the totality of the record, we find

           the trial court’s credibility determinations were against the manifest weight of the evidence.

           The evidence shows that, as the TIRC decision noted, defendant’s core allegations of abuse

           and coercion relating to both the Miles and Miggins cases have remained consistent for nearly

           30 years. Specifically, he has consistently alleged that (1) Kill kicked his handcuffs, (2) Kill’s

           partner struck him, (3) O’Brien and Stehlik handcuffed his hands above his head, (4) O’Brien

           struck him in the side with an object cushioned by a book, and (5) he was placed in a cold air-

           conditioned room. And while the detectives have consistently denied the abuse and maintained

           that defendant confessed voluntarily to the crimes during his 30 hours in custody, their

           credibility is substantially (if not completely) undermined by the plethora of similar allegations

           against them from the same time period. As discussed, defendant submitted voluminous

           evidence establishing that the accused officers engaged in a pattern and practice of coercing

           confessions using techniques similar to, if not identical to, what defendant has consistently

           alleged. Under the totality of the record, we conclude the State could not meet its burden to

           show that defendant voluntarily made the statements in either the Miles or Miggins case. 18

               18
                  We reach this conclusion independent of defendant’s additional contentions that the trial court
           should have drawn a negative inference from the officers’ prior invocation of the fifth amendment, that
           the trial court “ignored” Dr. Cudecki’s medical testimony, or that the trial court “failed to adjudicate”

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        No. 1-20-0462

¶ 230                            L. The Proper Remedy Is Remand for New Trials

¶ 231          We thus conclude that (1) defendant met his “initial burden of showing that new evidence

           would likely have resulted in the suppression of his confession[s]” and (2) that the State did

           not meet its burden of proving defendant’s statements were voluntary. Wilson, 2019 IL App

           (1st) 181486, ¶ 54. Thus, defendant is entitled to suppression of his statements at new trials,

           rather than merely remand for a new suppression hearing.

¶ 232          We also recognize that judicial economy is served by this outcome. As the parties

           recognized at oral argument, the trial court’s evidentiary hearing following the TIRC referral

           functioned as a second motion to suppress hearing. The trial court, as well as this court, has

           now had the opportunity to consider all evidence relevant to defendant’s claim that his

           inculpatory statements were involuntary. Remanding for a third suppression hearing (at which

           the very same evidence would be presented) would be a waste of judicial resources.

¶ 233          We also note that defendant’s TIRC Act claim has been pending for over a decade, and it

           has been over 30 years since the alleged police coercion. Thus, it is in the interest of justice to

           remand for new trials without the inculpatory statements, rather than to prolong proceedings

           with a duplicative suppression hearing.

¶ 234          We acknowledge that our decision to remand for new trials may be painful for the families

           of the young victims in the underlying cases, especially as it has now been more than three

           decades since the 1991 murders. We are sympathetic to the fact that they had no control over

           whether police officers abused defendant, or the length of time it has taken for the TIRC claim

           his claim that he was denied his right to counsel. As none of those arguments could undermine our
           conclusion that defendant is entitled to suppression and new trials, we do not separately discuss them.

                                                         - 61 -
        No. 1-20-0462

           to be litigated. However, we are bound to apply the TIRC Act and our caselaw to guard against

           use of a confession obtained through torture, regardless of whether a defendant is guilty. See

           People v. Wrice, 2012 IL 111860, ¶ 71 (recognizing that use of a physically coerced confession

           as substantive evidence of guilt “is never harmless error”).

¶ 235         Finally, as we are mindful of the credibility determinations made by the trial judge in the

           evidentiary hearing, we find it is in the interest of justice for a different judge (or judges) to

           preside over subsequent trial proceedings in both the Miggins and Miles cases. See Smith, 2022

           IL App (1st) 201256-U, ¶ 111 (in remanding for new suppression hearing, finding the

           “interests of justice would be best served if the matter were assigned to a new judge on remand

           in light of the credibility determinations already made by the previous judge”); Harris, 2021

           IL App (1st) 182172, ¶ 62 (remanding for suppression hearing with a different judge where the

           trial judge’s rulings “expressed a tendency to affirm the officers’ credibility while giving little

           weight to defendant’s new evidence”).

¶ 236                                            CONCLUSION

¶ 237         For the reasons stated, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court, vacate defendant’s

           convictions in both the Miggins case (No. 91 CR 22460) and the Miles case (No. 91 CR 22152),

           and remand for new trials in those cases. The State shall be precluded from using the

           defendant’s written inculpatory statements in either trial. A different circuit court judge (or

           judges) shall preside over proceedings on remand.

¶ 238         Reversed and remanded with directions.

¶ 239         JUSTICE HYMAN, specially concurring:

¶ 240         Asked at oral argument about the delay in this case, Anderson’s counsel did not explain

           other than indicate that delay is one of the tragedies of our legal system. Anderson was 28

                                                       - 62 -
        No. 1-20-0462

           years old in 1991. Twenty-one years later, the Torture Inquiry and Relief Commission found

           Anderson’s claims credible and recommended further litigation. Anderson, now 60 years old,

           has waited over three decades for this day.

¶ 241         Redress of an injustice like that experienced by Anderson and more than 100 others

           should have provoked an urgent reaction from the beginning. Instead, for far too many of

           these victims of police brutality, delay has immeasurably deprived them of their liberty,

           compounded their suffering, impeded their healing.

¶ 242         An injustice never ceases to be an injustice until justice prevails.

¶ 243         PRESIDING JUSTICE LAVIN, specially concurring:

¶ 244         I concur in the judgment only.

                                                      - 63 -
No. 1-20-0462

                    People v. Anderson, 2023 IL App (1st) 200462

Decision Under Review:     Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, Nos. 91-CR-
                           22152, 91-CR-22460; the Hon. William H. Hooks, Judge,
                           presiding.

Attorneys                  Russell Ainsworth, David B. Owens, and Debra Loevy, of The
for                        Exoneration Project at the University of Chicago Law School,
Appellant:                 of Chicago, for appellant.

Attorneys                  Elisabeth Gavin, Myles P. O’Rourke, Andrew N. Levine, and
for                        Ariel Y. Hodges, Assistant Special State’s Attorneys, of
Appellee:                  O’Rourke & Moody, of Chicago, for the People.

Amicus Curiae:             Michael A. Scodro, Elaine Liu, Clare Myers, and Sara Norval,
                           of Mayer Brown LLP, of Chicago, for amicus curiae Persons
                           Concerned About the Illinois Criminal Justice System.

                                       - 64 -