Court Opinion

ID: 9863807
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 05:54:22.723253+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:04:19.816880
License: Public Domain

BACA, Justice (Dissenting). {22} I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to reverse Defendant Reed’s conviction. Sufficient evidence in the record clearly permitted a rational juror to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In reviewing sufficiency of the evidence, this Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, drawing all reasonable inferences from the facts to support the verdict. See State v. Apodaca, 118 N.M. 762, 766, 887 P.2d 756, 760 (1994); State v. Bankert, 117 N.M. 614, 618, 875 P.2d 370, 374 (1994). The ultimate question is whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support a finding of all the elements of the crime. See State v. Becerra, 112 N.M. 604, 607, 817 P.2d 1246, 1249 (Ct.App.1991). A court should grant a directed verdict only when no reasonable inferences or circumstances present a jury question. State v. Aranda, 94 N.M. 784, 786, 617 P.2d 173, 175 (Ct.App.1980). {23} To find Defendant guilty of possession of a controlled substance, here cocaine, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) Defendant had cocaine in his possession, (2) Defendant knew it was cocaine, and (3) the crime occurred in New Mexico. UJI 14-3102 NMRA 1998. With regard to the second element, the majority concludes that there is insufficient evidence to prove that Reed knowingly possessed the cocaine. The majority focuses on the amount of cocaine found in the cellophane wrapper, contending that only a residue of cocaine was present, so little that it was not readily visible to the human eye. From this questionable observation, the majority displaces the jury verdict and concludes that nothing in the record suggests that Reed knew about the cocaine. I disagree. {24} Reed had only a small amount of cocaine on his person. However, possession of even a trace of illegal drugs will support a conviction. See State v. Wood, 117 N.M. 682, 686, 875 P.2d 1113, 1117 (Ct.App.1994) (finding that knowledge of possession may be inferred where a defendant had a syringe on his person that tested positive for .0001 grams of contraband). Here, the record clearly permitted the jury to infer that Reed knowingly possessed cocaine. Contrary to the majority’s suggestion, the cocaine residue was not invisible. The arresting officer testified that he saw the residue in the bag when Reed handed it to him. (T. 4A/0237-0277). The prosecutor asked the officer directly whether he could see the white residue, to which the officer responded ‘Tes, ma'am.” Id. The prosecutor also asked the officer specifically, “There was enough that you could see it?” Id. Again, the officer responded affirmatively, noting that enough cocaine existed to run three separate field and lab tests and still leave some visible cocaine in the wrapper. Id. If the officer could see the cocaine, the jury was free to infer that Reed also could see it and that Reed knew the cocaine was there when he put the wrapper in his pocket. See Wood, 117 N.M. at 686, 875 P.2d at 1117; Aranda, 94 N.M. at 786, 617 P.2d at 175 (holding that a jury may consider circumstantial evidence, from which inferences may be drawn, when it decides whether the burden of proof has been met). {25} Apart from the arguments addressing the amount of cocaine, the majority also states that no other evidence in the record corroborates that Reed knew of the cocaine’s existence. For example, the majority contends that Reed would have fled, acted nervously, or not handed over the wrapper if he knew that it had cocaine in it. However, the arresting officer noted in his testimony that, when stopped by officers, arrestees commonly hand over illicit drugs upon request without fleeing or exhibiting noticeable changes in their behavior. (T. 4A/0237-0277). Thus, the lack of some noticeable response or behavioral reaction to the officer’s request for Reed to empty his pockets provides no guidance in this inquiry. {26} The majority also discounts the cellophane wrapper itself as a piece of corroborating evidence. It reasons that the wrapper cannot be considered a piece of drug paraphernalia since it has a common purpose— carrying cigarettes. However, the majority cannot discount all drug paraphernalia used for carrying or preparing drugs merely because the object might have a common use. Syringes, spoons, and cellophane wrappers, to name just a few, all have common uses. That does not mean they are not commonly used as drug paraphernalia. {27} Furthermore, the jury may consider the training and experience of the arresting officer. On numerous occasions, the prosecutor premised her questions to the officer with the phrase, “On the basis of your training and experience.” Id. The jury is permitted to consider that the officer was particularly interested in examining the cellophane wrapper. They are also free to deduce that his training and experience led him particularly to suspect such a wrapper as a transport case for drugs. Hence, from the officer’s experience and his actions in this case, the jury could infer the corroborating nature of the cellophane wrapper as drug paraphernalia. A jury is permitted to put two and two together. The majority decision denies the jury its power to make such inferences from the evidence in the record, and it incorrectly takes this case out of the jury’s hands. {28} For these reasons, I respectfully DISSENT.