Court Opinion

ID: 9893321
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-26 16:12:46.677426+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:01:54.928247
License: Public Domain

J-S15033-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  DONALD P. DEIHL                              :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 589 MDA 2022

              Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 17, 2022
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County
              Criminal Division at No(s): CP-21-CR-0000496-2019

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.:                         FILED: OCTOBER 26, 2023

       Donald P. Deihl (“Deihl”) appeals from the order denying his petition for

relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 We affirm.

       The PCRA court summarized the factual background of this appeal as

follows:

              [L.W., born in September 2003,] reported [an] assault to
       the Pennsylvania State Police around Thanksgiving of 2018.
       [L.W.] was only [fourteen] years old when she and [Deihl, then
       thirty-six years old,] had sexual relations in a camper on his
       parents’ property. [Deihl] had been a longtime friend of [L.W.]’s
       family as well as a father-figure to her. [L.W.] explained that they
       had been painting the roof of the camper. They went inside the
       camper to take a break, at which point they had sex. She
       eventually told her cousin about the incident, which led to [L.W.]’s
       mother learning of it as well. It was then that the Pennsylvania
       State Police became involved.

____________________________________________

1 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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             The Pennsylvania State Police arranged for [L.W.] to call
       [Deihl]. The call was recorded.[2] . . .

PCRA Court Opinion, 10/19/22, at 2.

       During the phone call recorded by the state police (“the recorded phone

call”), L.W. led Deihl to believe she was pregnant. See id.; see also N.T.,

8/19-20/20, at 104-05; Commonwealth’s Exhibit 21 at 1.3 Deihl responded

that he could not have impregnated her because “that’s been months ago”

and she “had [her] period since then.” Commonwealth’s Exhibit 21 at 1-2.

Additionally, Deihl asked whether L.W. was sexually active with her boyfriend.

See id. at 2. L.W. responded that Deihl was “the only one [she] slept with

and had sex with.”       See id.     Deihl did not deny this assertion or offer an

explanation. See id. at 1, 2.

       Deihl later gave a statement to the state police. See N.T., 8/19-20/20,

at 269; see also Commonwealth’s Exhibit 24 at 1.4 He denied having sex

with L.W. and explained that L.W. had told him she had “mess[ed] around”

with him, sexually, when he was sleeping. See Commonwealth’s Exhibit 24

at 3-4.

       Deihl retained counsel (“trial counsel”) and proceeded to a jury trial on

charges on indecent assault, corruption of minors, and statutory sexual

assault. The Commonwealth presented testimony from L.W., L.W.’s cousin,
____________________________________________

2 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5704(2).

3 Commonwealth’s Exhibits 21 was a transcript of the recorded phone call.

4 Commonwealth Exhibit 23 was a transcript of Deihl’s statement to the state

police.

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and the investigating Pennsylvania State Police trooper. The Commonwealth

also played the recorded phone call to the jury. See N.T., 8/19-20/20, at

105.    Deihl presented testimony from his mother, L.W.’s stepfather and

mother, and other character witnesses. Deihl also testified and maintained

that L.W. had told him she had touched him sexually when he was sleeping.

See id. at 220. He explained that during the recorded phone call, he thought

L.W. insinuated he impregnated her because she told him she had touched

him when he was asleep. See id. at 226.

       In addition to L.W.’s testimony that Deihl had intercourse with her, the

Commonwealth presented testimony that Deihl gave a condom to L.W. at her

fifteenth birthday party, which occurred approximately two months after the

assault and two months before L.W. reported the assault to the state police.5

       The jury found Deihl guilty of all charges, and, in November 2020, the

trial court sentenced Deihl to an aggregate term of one to five years of

incarceration. Deihl timely filed post sentence motions, which the trial court

partially dismissed in January 2021. Diehl did not attempt to take a direct

appeal, but in January 2022, timely filed the instant PCRA petition alleging

____________________________________________

5 Specifically, the Commonwealth elicited L.W.’s testimony that Deihl gave her

a keychain with a condom in it. See N.T., 8/19-20/20, at 37. During the
defense’s case, L.W.’s stepfather and mother described the condom as a gift
to L.W.’s stepfather. See id. at 164, 189. Deihl denied ever giving L.W. a
keychain with a condom. See id. at 280. During the Commonwealth’s
rebuttal case, L.W.’s grandmother testified that Deihl gave the keychain and
condom to L.W. See id. at 310.

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trial counsel’s ineffectiveness.6 See PCRA Petition, 1/4/22, at unnumbered 3-

4.

       The PCRA court held a hearing at which L.W.’s sister, Deihl’s mother,

Deihl, and trial counsel testified. In relevant part, L.W.’s sister, J.W., testified

that before trial, L.W. told J.W. that Deihl did not do anything to her. See

N.T., 3/14/22, at 5. Deihl’s mother testified she watched Deihl and L.W. when

they were together on her property and did not see them acting

inappropriately. See id. at 11. Deihl testified he was surprised when at trial,

L.W.’s grandmother stated he gave L.W. a condom at L.W.’s birthday party

and trial counsel refused his request to challenge the testimony. See id. at
____________________________________________

6 Deihl’s present counsel entered his appearance after sentencing and filed
the post-sentence motions. Present counsel alleged the ineffectiveness of
Deihl’s prior counsel (“trial counsel”) and challenged the weight of the
evidence. The trial court dismissed the post-sentence claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel; however, the court did not expressly deny the
remaining weight of the evidence claim or enter an order memorializing the
withdrawal of the remaining post-sentence motion. See Order 1/22/21.
There is no indication that the clerk of the court issued an order formally
denying the post-sentence motion by operation of law. See Pa.R.Crim.P.
720(B)(3)(a), (c); cf. Commonwealth v. Borrero, 692 A.2d 158, 160 (Pa.
Super. 1997) (quashing a direct appeal where because the trial court did not
finalize the judgment of sentence by denying the defendant’s post-sentence
motion and the clerk of the court did not issue an order denying the post-
sentence motion by operation of law); Commonwealth v. Williams, 215
A.3d 1019, 1022-23 (Pa. Super. 2019) (noting a petitioner may only file a
PCRA petition after the waiver or exhaustion of his direct appeal rights).
Despite these irregularities, it is clear that Deihl’s judgment of sentence should
have become final when the time for ruling on the post-sentence motions
expired. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B). Furthermore, Deihl filed his PCRA petition
within one year of the partial denial of his post-sentence motions and asserted
he “resolved to proceed with a PCRA petition.” PCRA Petition, 1/4/22, at 2
(unnumbered). Under these circumstances, we consider Deihl’s judgment of
sentence final and his PCRA petition timely.

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14-15. Trial counsel testified in defense of her trial decisions, although she

asserted she should have objected to L.W.’s grandmother’s testimony about

Diehl giving L.W. a condom at her birthday party as improper Pa.R.E. 404(b)

evidence. See id. at 23, 28. The PCRA court denied relief on March 17, 2022,

and Deihl timely appealed.7 Both Deihl and the court complied with Pa.R.A.P.

1925.

        Deihl raises the following issue for our review:

        1. Whether the [PCRA c]ourt erred in denying [his PCRA petition];
        specifically [where]:

              a. [Deihl] introduced a new witness that did not get called
              to testify at trial and served to impeach the alleged victim’s
              credibility.

              b. [Deihl] argued that evidence of a party was a prior bad
              act and should have been excluded at trial. Trial counsel
              conceded that she should have objected to the admission of
              this testimony, but did not do so.

              c. [Deihl] also showed that [his] mother had exculpatory
              information showing that the contact between Appellant and
              victim was not sexual, but was never asked this information
              at trial. . . ..

Deihl’s Brief at 4.

        Our standard of review of an order dismissing a PCRA petition is well-

settled:

        Our review of a PCRA court’s decision is limited to examining
        whether the PCRA court’s findings of fact are supported by the
____________________________________________

7 The thirtieth day following the March 17, 2022 entry of the order denying

PCRA relief fell on a Saturday, and Deihl filed his notice of appeal on the
following Monday. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908.

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      record, and whether its conclusions of law are free from legal
      error. We view the record in the light most favorable to the
      prevailing party in the PCRA court. We are bound by any
      credibility determinations made by the PCRA court where they are
      supported by the record. However, we review the PCRA court’s
      legal conclusions de novo.

Commonwealth v. Staton, 184 A.3d 949, 954 (Pa. 2018) (internal citation

and quotations omitted). The PCRA petitioner “has the burden to persuade

this Court that the PCRA court erred and that such error requires relief.”

Commonwealth v. Wholaver, 177 A.3d 136, 144–45 (Pa. 2018) (internal

citations omitted).

      Generally, to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a

PCRA petitioner must demonstrate:

      (1) that the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) that no
      reasonable basis existed for counsel’s actions or failure to act; and
      (3) that the petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s
      error.    To prove that counsel’s chosen strategy lacked a
      reasonable basis, a petitioner must prove that an alternative not
      chosen offered a potential for success substantially greater than
      the course actually pursued. Regarding the prejudice prong, a
      petitioner must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability
      that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different
      but for counsel’s action or inaction. Counsel is presumed to be
      effective; accordingly, to succeed on a claim of ineffectiveness[,]
      the petitioner must advance sufficient evidence to overcome this
      presumption.

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 139 A.3d 1257, 1272 (Pa. 2016) (internal

citations and quotations omitted). “Failure to establish any prong of the test

will defeat an ineffectiveness claim.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 995 A.2d

1143, 1151 (Pa. 2010) (internal citation omitted).

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      Deihl’s first issue concerns trial counsel’s decision not to call L.W.’s

sister, J.W., to testify at trial.

      A claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to call a potential witness

requires the petitioner to establish: (1) the witness existed; (2) the witness

was available to testify; (3) counsel knew of, or should have known of, the

witness; (4) the witness was willing to testify; and (5) the absence of the

testimony of the witness was so prejudicial as to have denied the defendant a

fair trial. See Commonwealth v. Sneed, 45 A.3d 1096, 1108-09 (Pa. 2012).

The failure to call a witness, other than the defendant, involves a matter of

trial tactics. See id. at 1109; Commonwealth v. Brown, 18 A.3d 1147,

1158 (Pa. Super. 2011) (distinguishing trial counsel’s authority to make

tactical decisions from a defendant’s right to exercise or waive trial rights such

as the defendant’s decision to testify). The petitioner bears the burden of

showing trial counsel had no reasonable basis for failing to call a particular

witness. See Commonwealth v. Small, 980 A.2d 549, 560 (Pa. 2009).

      Deihl asserts he established: (1) the proposed witness, J.W., existed;

(2) J.W. was available to testify; (3) trial counsel knew of J.W.’s existence;

(4) J.W. was willing to testify for the defense; and (5) the absence of J.W.’s

testimony was so prejudicial as to have denied him of a fair trial.         Deihl

acknowledges trial counsel’s explanations for declining to call J.W. but argues

“he should have been part of th[e] decision . . . not to call an important

witness.” Deihl’s Brief at 10-11.

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      The PCRA court analyzed this issue as follows:

            Trial counsel decided that calling [J.W.] to testify would hurt
      [Deihl’s] defense more than it would help. Her versions of the
      supposed fabrication had been inconsistent during their interviews
      in preparation for trial. [Trial counsel] believed that [J.W.] would
      not be able to withstand cross-examination. Furthermore, given
      the poor state of the relationship between the two sisters, trial
      counsel was concerned the jury might think that the defense was
      concocting stories about [L.W.]. Finally, [trial counsel] felt that
      the testimony concerning the veracity of [L.W.]’s allegations from
      [L.W.]’s own mother would be damning enough to the
      Commonwealth’s case without the risks associated with having
      [J.W.] testify.

PCRA Court Opinion, 10/11/22, at 4 (footnotes omitted).

      Following our review, we discern no abuse of discretion or error of law

in the PCRA court’s reasoning. Trial counsel testified that she met with J.W.,

who was thirteen years old at the time of trial. See N.T., 3/14/22, at 18-19.

Trial counsel discussed J.W.’s proposed testimony in the presence of other

adults, and she also questioned J.W. alone with a critical eye toward her

viability as a witness. See id. at 18-19, 29. After meeting with J.W. alone,

trial counsel determined that calling J.W. would be more harmful than

beneficial to the defense. See id. at 19. Trial counsel explained that when

speaking with J.W. alone, J.W. was very emotional and inconsistent about how

she learned of L.W.’s alleged recantation. See id. at 19, 28. Trial counsel

noted there was evidence that J.W. and L.W. had a poor relationship, and

presenting J.W. as a witness could lead the jury to believe that J.W. concocted

evidence against L.W. See id. at 20. Trial counsel also stated J.W. appeared

in court for the trial dressed in a “little romper suit” with high heels, which

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trial counsel thought would be “a poor optic” for the jury. Id. at 19-20. Based

on the foregoing, we conclude there was ample record support for the PCRA

court’s conclusions. We agree with the PCRA court that trial counsel stated

reasonable bases for her tactical decision not to call J.W. as a witness. Thus,

Deihl’s first issue merits no relief. See Sneed, 45 A.3d at 1108-09; Small,

980 A.2d at 560; see also Brown, 18 A.3d at 1158.

      In his second issue, Deihl asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to object to testimony based on Pa.R.E. 404. As stated in his PCRA

petition, this claim involved Deihl’s assertion that,

      [L.W.’s grandmother] testified as a rebuttal witness at trial as to
      prior events involving [Deihl] that allegedly occurred in
      September 201[8] wherein [Deihl] allegedly gave the victim a
      condom at her birthday party. These prior events could have been
      considered prior bad acts. There was not a 404(b) motion filed in
      respect to these events. Trial [c]ounsel should have objected to
      the admission of this testimony, yet failed to do so. The admission
      of this testimony affected the verdict of the jury. Even if
      admissible, [Deihl] would have testified that this event did not
      occur. Trial counsel did not recall [Deihl] to rebut this testimony.
      This affected the verdict.

PCRA Petition, 1/4/22, at unnumbered 3 (record citation omitted). Similarly,

at   the   evidentiary   hearing,   Deihl   focused   his   testimony   on   L.W.’s

grandmother’s rebuttal testimony, the alleged lack of notice of this testimony,

and his assertion that he could have denied the alleged incident. See N.T.,

3/14/22, at 14-15.

      Deihl’s claim, as stated in his PCRA petition and developed at the

evidentiary hearing, misconstrued the trial record. The testimony about Deihl

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giving a condom to L.W. at her birthday party was not limited to L.W.’s

grandmother’s testimony. Rather, L.W. testified about the incident on direct

and cross examination. See N.T., 8/19-20/20, at 37, 71-72 (cross-examining

L.W. about Deihl giving a “jokey” gift along with other gifts, including a book).

Additionally, L.W.’s stepfather, during cross-examination, and L.W.’s mother,

during direct and cross-examination, testified that Deihl gave a condom to

L.W.’s stepfather and only joked about giving it to L.W. See id. at 164, 177,

189. Contrary to Deihl’s claims, he also had an opportunity to and, in fact,

denied the entire incident.   See id. at 280.     Thus, Deihl’s claim that trial

counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the rebuttal testimony from

L.W.’s grandmother is wholly frivolous.       To the extent Deihl attempts to

broaden the focus of his ineffectiveness claim concerning the admission of all

testimony about his giving L.W. a condom at her birthday party, we could find

Deihl’s issue waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).

      In any event, we would discern no basis to disturb the PCRA court’s

ruling that Deihl failed to establish prejudice.    See PCRA Court Opinion,

10/11/22, at 4-5 (concluding that Deihl did not establish prejudice because

the trial did not involve a case of “he-said-she-said”). As noted by the PCRA

court, the trial evidence was not limited to L.W.’s testimony that the assault

occurred but included Deihl’s own statements during the recorded phone call.

See id.   Those statements included his implied admission to having had

intercourse with L.W. when he stated L.W. could not be pregnant because she

had her “period since then,” as well as his failure to deny the possibility that

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he could have fathered a child with L.W. See id.; see also Commonwealth’s

Exhibit 21 at 1-4. We acknowledge Deihl’s attempts at trial to explain his

statements during the recorded phone call. However, the evidence about his

giving a condom to L.W. at her birthday party did not prejudice a fair

determination of the critical issues at trial: the credibility of Deihl’s and L.W.’s

testimony concerning the assault and Deihl’s attempted explanations for his

statements in the recorded phone call. Accordingly, Deihl did not establish a

reasonable possibility that the outcome at trial would have been different had

he had notice of the testimony about his giving a condom to L.W. or had trial

counsel objected to this testimony.      Thus, Deihl’s second issue fails.     See

Johnson, 139 A.3d at 1272.

      In his third and final issue, Diehl contends that trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to elicit additional testimony from his mother, whom the

defense called as a witness at trial. He contends that his mother would have

testified that she would watch over Deihl and L.W. when they were on her

property and saw nothing inappropriate in their interactions. Deihl claims that

the absence of this testimony resulted in prejudice because it would have

demonstrated the absence of grooming behaviors typically associated with

sexually assaulting a minor.

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       The PCRA court rejected this claim and concluded that Deihl failed to

establish prejudice. See PCRA Court Opinion, 10/11/22, at 6-7. We agree.8

The proposed testimony did not establish Deihl’s mother constantly watched

Deihl and L.W., nor did Deihl’s mother suggest she would watch them when

they were inside the trailer where the assault occurred. See N.T., 3/14/22,

at 9-12. Additionally, as noted by the PCRA court, upon cross-examination at

the evidentiary hearing, Deihl’s mother also volunteered potentially harmful

testimony, namely, that she spied on Deihl and L.W. when they were in the

barn out of her concern they may have been secretly engaging in

inappropriate activities. See PCRA Court Opinion, 10/11/22, at 6 n.11; see

also N.T., 3/14/22, at 11.          Thus, the record supports the PCRA court’s

determination that Deihl did not prove a reasonable possibility that the

outcome of trial would have been different.

       We add that evidence concerning grooming behaviors was not at issue

at trial. L.W. did not testify that Deihl acted inappropriately with her before

the assault.       See N.T., 8/19-20/20, at 25-26, 63 (discussing L.W.’s

relationship with Deihl before the assault, noting that Deihl did nothing of a

sexual nature to her before the assault, but testifying they did joke around on

____________________________________________

8 Our review of the record, however, constrains us to disagree with the PCRA

court’s finding that the proposed testimony was similar to Deihl’s mother’s
trial testimony. At trial, trial counsel did not elicit Deihl’s mother’s proposed
testimony that she watched Deihl and L.W. closely and did not see Deihl act
inappropriately with L.W.. See N.T., 8/19-20/20, at 136-37 (indicating Deihl’s
mother’s testimony that she often saw Deihl and L.W. on her property and she
would be outside gardening or checking on her animals).

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adult topics). Rather, as stated above, the critical issues at trial were L.W.’s

testimony about the assault, Deihl’s own statements during the recorded

phone call, implicitly admitting to sexual contact with L.W. and failing to deny

having intercourse with L.W., and Deihl’s own explanations for his statements.

Additional testimony that Deihl’s mother did not see Deihl and L.W. act

inappropriately would not have changed the outcome of trial. Accordingly, we

agree with the PCRA court that Deihl’s third and final issue fails because he

did not prove prejudice. See Johnson, 139 A.3d at 1272.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 10/26/2023

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