Court Opinion

ID: 9393119
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-09 15:00:45.527676+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:51.205683
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-12820    Document: 17-1     Date Filed: 05/09/2023   Page: 1 of 6

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-12820
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       CARLTON EUGENE HOOKER, JR.,
                                                     Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
       versus
       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                                   Defendant-Appellee.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Middle District of Florida
                  D.C. Docket No. 8:22-cv-00537-KKM-MRM
                           ____________________
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       2                      Opinion of the Court                 22-12820

       Before WILSON, NEWSOM, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               Carlton Hooker, Jr., appeals pro se the district court’s order
       dismissing his pro se civil complaint that alleged damages under the
       Federal Torts Claims Act based on the Department of Veterans Af-
       fairs’ (VA) decision to ban him from Bay Pines Veterans Affairs
       Healthcare System (Bay Pines) and alleging damages related to his
       future employment opportunities. In a prior action, the district
       court enjoined Hooker from “filing any new action, complaint, or
       claim for relief against the Secretary of Veterans Affairs related to
       his employment . . . without a signature from a member of the
       Florida Bar who is admitted to practice in the Middle District of
       Florida.” In the instant case, the district court dismissed the com-
       plaint as violative of the pre-filing injunction and modified the
       pre-filing injunction to enjoin Hooker from filing any additional
       lawsuits against any agency of the United States related to his em-
       ployment or the ban, unless signed by an attorney.
              Hooker argues that the district court erred in dismissing his
       complaint, as Judge Tom Barber, the judge who signed the order
       in the instant case, was not the judge initially assigned to the case.
       He further contends that the court erred in modifying his pre-filing
       injunction to more comprehensively cover Hooker’s vexatious
       claims based on the VA’s decision to ban him from Bay Pines. After
       careful review of the record, we AFFIRM.
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       22-12820                   Opinion of the Court                               3

                                              I.

               We review for abuse of discretion a dismissal, pursuant to
       Rule 41(b), based on the violation of a court order. Gratton v. Great
       Am. Commc’ns, 178 F.3d 1373, 1374 (11th Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
       We review an injunction against litigants who abuse the court sys-
       tem for an abuse of discretion. Harrelson v. United States, 613 F.2d
       114, 116 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).1 In general, a legal claim or
       argument not briefed on appeal is deemed forfeited, and its merits
       will only be addressed in extraordinary circumstances. United
       States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 873 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc).
              Federal courts have the power to manage their own dockets.
       Smith v. Psychiatric Solutions, Inc., 750 F.3d 1253, 1262 (11th Cir.
       2014) (“District courts have unquestionable authority to control
       their own dockets.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). That
       power “includes broad discretion in deciding how best to manage
       the cases before them.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Ac-
       cording to the Middle District of Florida Local Rules, judges may
       transfer actions “at any time and for any reason” if the transferee
       judge consents. M.D. Fla. R. 1.07(a)(2)(A).
              In addition to the power to manage their dockets, district
       courts possess the power to issue prefiling injunctions “to protect
       against abusive and vexatious litigation.” Martin-Trigona v. Shaw,

       1 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc),
       we adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit
       handed down prior to October 1, 1981.
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       4                       Opinion of the Court                 22-12820

       986 F.2d 1384, 1387 (11th Cir. 1993) (per curiam). We have ex-
       plained that a court has “a responsibility to prevent single litigants
       from unnecessarily encroaching on the judicial machinery needed
       by others” and that a litigant “can be severely restricted as to what
       he may file and how he must behave in his applications for judicial
       relief” as long as he is not “completely foreclosed from any access
       to the court.” Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1074 (11th Cir.
       1986) (en banc).
                                         II.
              Hooker identifies only one issue on appeal: “Plaintiff com-
       plains of a violation of Canon 3(A)(2) of the Code of Conduct of the
       United States Judges by the District Court . . . .” He does not brief
       or address the merits of the district court’s decision to dismiss his
       complaint as a violation of the pre-filing injunction. So as an initial
       matter Hooker has abandoned any argument that we should find
       reversible error in the district court’s decision.
               However, to be crystal clear for Hooker, the district court
       did not abuse its discretion. The original pre-filing injunction
       barred Hooker from filing a “any new action, complaint, or claim
       for relief against the Secretary of Veterans Affairs related to his em-
       ployment . . . .” Though Hooker couched his complaint in terms
       of the “ban” and medical services, the district court was not bound
       to accept Hooker’s evasive pleading. Indeed, the district court was
       within its discretion to judicially notice the long history of
       Hooker’s complaints regarding Bay Pines and to notice that the
       “ban” was imposed as a result of Hooker’s interactions with Bay
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       22-12820                Opinion of the Court                          5

       Pines following the termination of his employment there. United
       States v. Rey, 811 F.2d 1453, 1457 n.5 (11th Cir. 1987) (“A court may
       take judicial notice of its own records and the records of inferior
       courts.”). Here, the district discussed Hooker’s history of abusive
       litigation and found no meaningful distinction between those prior
       cases challenging the ban directly and this case seeking damages for
       the enforcement of the ban. D.E. 16 at 2–3. Further, Hooker’s
       complaint by its terms also sought damages for “denial of employ-
       ment opportunities.” D.E. 1 ¶ 36. Thus, the district court did not
       abuse its discretion in dismissing under the pre-filing injunction be-
       cause Hooker’s complaint “related to his employment.”
              Turning to Hooker’s allegations of violations of the judicial
       Code of Conduct, his arguments are without merit. First, because
       Judge Barber was not disqualified from this case, he cannot have
       violated Canon 3(A)(2). Second, we find no reversible error in the
       fact that Judge Barber signed the order dismissing Hooker’s com-
       plaint rather than Judge Mizelle. “District judges may by rule, or-
       der or consent transfer cases between themselves. Each judge of a
       multi-district court has the same power and authority as each other
       judge. Moreover, District Judges have the inherent power to trans-
       fer cases from one to another for the expeditious administration of
       justice.” United States v. Stone, 411 F.2d 597, 598 (5th Cir. 1969) (in-
       ternal citations omitted). And the applicable local rules authorize
       the district judges to transfer cases “at any time and for any reason.”
       M.D. Fla. Local R. 1.07(a)(2)(A); see also Stone, 411 F.2d at 598
       (“[The] contention that a district judge cannot transfer his arraign-
       ment calendar to another district judge without the consent of the
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       6                         Opinion of the Court                      22-12820

       [parties] is patently frivolous.”). Accordingly, we find no error in
       Judge Barber’s actions.
               Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in mod-
       ifying the pre-filing injunction. The district court amply recounted
       Hooker’s history of abusive litigation, as well as his more recent
       attempts to evade the pre-filing injunction by artful pleading. The
       district court was within its discretion to modify the pre-filing in-
       junction to better protect its jurisdiction. Martin-Trigona, 986 F.2d
       at 1387. And the modification does not “completely foreclose[]”
       Hooker from access to the courts. Procup, 792 F.2d at 1074. The
       modified injunction is limited solely to Hooker’s claims about his
       employment and ban relating to Bay Pines, and Hooker may still
       file these claims with an attorney’s signature. 2 Thus, the district
       court did not abuse its discretion in modifying the injunction. Be-
       cause we find no error in the district court’s actions, we AFFIRM.
              AFFIRMED.

       2 As Hooker is not incarcerated, this case is distinguishable from Procup where
       we held a similar pre-filing injunction requiring attorney sign off for a pris-
       oner’s pleadings was too onerous. Procup, 792 F.2d at 1071, 1074. Hooker has
       a much greater ability to seek counsel to bring his claims than the prisoner in
       Procup did.