Court Opinion

ID: 9863065
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 03:01:52.455387+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:46:47.225194
License: Public Domain

On Petition to Rehear
An able and earnest petition to rehear has been filed by Mrs. Sadler. She first complains of our holding that she waived her motion for a directed verdict (made and overruled at the close of plaintiff’s case) by not renewing it at the close of all the evidence. It is said that, as shown by the Hargis and Marsh cases, supra, no set form of words is required to renew such a motion; and that Mrs. Sadler’s counsel made clear their intention not to waive her motion.
In both of those cases it appeared that counsel for the moving defendant intended to renew his motion at the *26close of the case; that the proof pat in by his co-defendant did not touch the question of his liability; and in both cases the Court treated the motion as renewed at the end of the case and disposed' of it upon a survey of all the evidence.
It does not appear, however, that Mrs. Sadler intended to renew her motion. While it may be conceded she did not intend to waive it, it seems clear on the record that she intended not to renew it but to stand upon it, and disclaim responsibility for evidence adduced to discharge her co-defendant Foxall as servant, and at the same time get the benefit of such evidence, knowing* a discharge of him as servant would also discharge her as master. Loveman Co. v. Bayless, supra.
So, we thought, and still think, she waived her motion; but. assuming she did not, we considered the.motion upon all the evidence and reached the conclusion expressed, in our former opinion, that the proof made a case for the jury (1) upon the' statutory presumption and (2) for negligence in entrusting the car to an incompetent driver. Jones v. Agnew, supra, 197 Tenn. 499, 502, 274 S. W. (2d) 825, 827.
Petitioner complains of this holding as to the statutory presumption. It is said that the presumption merely supplies the place of proof and disappears upon the introduction of proof contrary to the fact presumed; that the driver Crenshaw, who was called as a witness by plaintiff and “for whose credibility plaintiff vouches”, proved he was using the car for his own purpose and not in the service of Sadler, and thus displaced the presumption. ’ •
*27 This presumption, however, is not dispelled, as a matter of law, for the purpose of directing a verdict, by the introduction of evidence contrary to the fact presumed, unless such evidence is uncontradicted and comes, from a witness whose credibility is not in question. McConnell v. Jones, supra; McParland v. Pruitt, supra, and cases there cited; Jones v. Agnew, supra.
Nor is it correct to say that a party “vouches for the credibility” of a witness he introduces. While it is a rule that a party cannot impeach his own witness, as by proving his bad character, etc., he is not bound by the the witness ’ testimony or precluded from showing it to be untrue. 1 Morgan, Basic Problems of Evidence (1954) 63, 64; Hewgley v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 39 Tenn. App. 553, 559, 286 S. W. (2d) 355.
As pointed out in our former opinion, all the witnesses, including the driver Crenshaw, who testified as to the circumstances under which he was using the car, were contradicted or impeached by cross-examination- so as to involve their credibility and leave it for the jury- to say what part of their testimony should be accepted and what part rejected, and to find in accord with the statutory presumption.
Petitioner also complains of our holding that the evidence made a case for the jury against Sadler as master for the negligence of his servant Poxall in entrusting the car to Crenshaw, knowing he was unfit to drive it. It is urged that Poxall had no authority to lend the car, and that however negligent he may have been in doing so, such negligence was outside the course and scope of his employment and Sadler could not be held liable therefor.
*28It may be conceded that Foxall, as Sadler’s servant in charge of his car, had no authority to lend the car to any other person and that if he had lent it to any person not known to he unfit to have or drive it, Sadler would not have been liable for such person’s negligence; but it does not follow that Sadler is not liable for Foxall’s negligence in lending the car to Crenshaw, knowing he was drunk, reckless, and unfit to drive it.
We think that while Foxall, as Sadler’s servant in charge of his car, had no authority to lend the car, he was under a duty not to entrust it to an unfit person, or rather to prevent such person from driving it, and such duty was within the course and scope of his employment; and that both the master and servant are liable for a breach of duty causing injuries to another person, or so the jury might find.
An automobile, in proper condition and in competent hands, is not a dangerous instrumentality, but, in defective condition or in incompetent hands, is a thing of danger to the lives of others on the highway; and an owner who, by himself or his agent or servant, entrusts his automobile to a person known to be incompetent or unfit to drive it, is liable for damages caused by such person’s negligence in operating the automobile. Vaughn v. Millington Motor Co., 160 Tenn. 197, 201, 22 S. W. (2d) 226; Grant v. Knepper, supra; V. L. Nicholson Const. Co. v. Lane, supra; Jones v. Agnew, supra; 2 Rest., Torts, sec. 390; Annotation, 98 A. L. R. 1051; 134 A. L. R. 982.
In Grant v. Knepper, supra, an owner sent his motor truck with a driver and salesman to deliver goods. The driver permitted the salesman, who was incompetent, to *29drive, and Re ran the truck into a parked car beside the road. In an opinion by Cardozo, it was held that though the driver had no authority to permit the salesman to drive, still the owner was liable for the damages caused. Numerous supporting authorities were cited, including the English cases of Englehart v. Farrant & Co. [1897], 1 Q. B. 240-C. A.; and Ricketts v. Thos. Tilling [1915], 1 K. B. 644, 6 B. R. C. 683-C. A.
Likewise, in V. L. Nicholson Const. Co. v. Lane, supra, an agent or servant of defendant Company had the driver of its automobile to take him to his home after working* hours and he directed the driver to take the car back to the Company’s place of business. Instead, the driver went on a lark of his own, got drunk, and negligently caused the injuries sued for. It was held that, since the driver was known to be an habitual drunkard, the Company was liable for the negligence of its agent or servant in entrusting the car to such an incompetent driver.
Finally, petitioner complains of our overruling her sixth assignment of error, based on that part of the charge in which the Trial Judge submitted plaintiff’s theory that Sadler was liable for entrusting his car to Foxall, knowing him to be unfit because of his habits of drunkenness and recklessness. It is said this was error because there was no evidence of such habits and because the latter paragraph of this part of the charge assumed that Foxall was unfit.
On the former hearing we fully considered this assignment and concluded that there was no prejudicial error in this part of the charge. We are still satisfied with our ruling on this matter.
The petition to rehear is denied at petitioner’s cost.