Court Opinion

ID: 9893811
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-30 17:09:23.1811+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:50.869170
License: Public Domain

J-S35034-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :          PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  LANE BOBBY REIGLE                            :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :     No. 150 MDA 2023

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 5, 2023
                In the Court of Common Pleas of Perry County
           Criminal Division at No(s): CP-50-CR-0000009-2022

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and COLINS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.:                          FILED: OCTOBER 30, 2023

       Lane Bobby Reigle appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed

following his open guilty plea to one count of corruption of minors and four

counts of selling or furnishing alcohol to a minor.1 For these offenses, Reigle

received an aggregate sentence of four to twenty-three months of house

arrest to be followed by a twelve-month period of probation. In addition,

stemming from his corruption of minors conviction, although he was found not

to be a sexually violent predator, Reigle was required to register as a Tier I

sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act

(“SORNA”) and maintain annual reporting on the statewide sexual offender

registry for fifteen years. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.10, et seq.

____________________________________________

 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 See 18 Pa.C.S. § 6301(a)(1)(ii); and 18 Pa.C.S. § 6310.1, respectively.
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      On appeal, Reigle singularly challenges the constitutionality of SORNA

as applied to him, specifically arguing that the Act’s legislative finding that sex

offenders “pose a high risk of committing additional sexual offenses,” 42

Pa.C.S.   §   9799.11(a)(4),    is   unconstitutional   because   it   creates   an

“irrebuttable presumption” against him and “unlawfully restricts his liberty and

privacy without notice and an opportunity to be heard.” Appellant’s Brief, at

7. We find that Reigle has failed to demonstrate at least one of the prongs

enumerated in Commonwealth v. Muhammad, 41 A.3d 1149, 1155 (Pa.

Super. 2020) (outlining the three-part test for evaluating whether an

irrebuttable presumption is unconstitutional), and therefore affirm his

judgment of sentence.

      As gleaned from the affidavit of probable cause, Reigle had been

employed as a school bus driver, working for a bus company that was under

contract with the local school district. In this capacity, Reigle was tasked with

picking up and dropping off high school students.

      In December 2021, after receiving a report that multiple students

received alcohol and drugs from a current bus driver, Pennsylvania State

Trooper Tre’ S. Nelson went to the source of the report, West Perry High

School, to investigate. When the Trooper arrived at that High School, its Dean

of Students conveyed that he had obtained an email from a student stating

that she had acquired tobacco and alcohol from Reigle. Further inquiry led to

additional confirmation from other students that Reigle had purchased alcohol

for minors to consume. In addition, those same students indicated that Reigle

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had sexual intercourse with a minor, M.D.

      When the Trooper tracked M.D. down, M.D. told him that Reigle was her

daily bus driver. M.D. also admitted that she messaged Reigle on Facebook

Messenger, a social media application, and told him that she wanted him in a

sexual manner. In November 2021, Reigle picked M.D. up from her house and

drove her to his house. Ultimately, the two engaged in sexual intercourse

inside of a camper in his garage. Reigle then dropped her off at her house,

and, according to M.D., the two did not speak to each other after that incident.

M.D. had been seventeen at the time, while Reigle was twenty-two.

      During a recorded interview with the Trooper, Reigle admitted to buying

alcohol for one minor on more than one occasion but denied having purchased

any alcohol for another minor whose name had also been mentioned as a

possible recipient. Reigle further admitted to having sexual intercourse with

M.D., materially confirming M.D.’s recollection of them having sexual

intercourse in a camper on Reigle’s property. See Affidavit of Probable Cause,

12/17/21, at 1-2.

      Reigle pleaded guilty to the abovementioned offenses in October 2022

and was sentenced in January 2023 to house arrest to be followed by

probation. The court also ordered Reigle to register as a Tier I sex offender.

Reigle timely filed a notice of appeal from the court’s imposition of his

judgment of sentence, and the relevant parties have complied with their

respective obligations under Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925.

Accordingly, this appeal is ready for disposition.

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      Reigle raises one issue for our consideration:

      1. Did the lower court err in overruling his objection to the
         imposition and constitutionality of SORNA’s mandatory
         registration requirements?

See Appellant’s Brief, at 4.

      Reigle’s “constitutional challenge is a question of law for which our

standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.”

Muhammad, 241 A.3d at 1154 (citation omitted).

      When addressing constitutional challenges to legislative
      enactments, we recognize that the General Assembly may enact
      laws which impinge on constitutional rights to protect the health,
      safety, and welfare of society, but also that any restriction is
      subject to judicial review to protect the constitutional rights of all
      citizens. A party challenging a statute must meet the high burden
      of demonstrating that the statute clearly, palpably, and plainly
      violates the Constitution.

Id., at 1154-55 (citations and quotation marks omitted).

      There are two types of constitutional challenges, facial and as-
      applied. A facial attack tests a law’s constitutionality based on its
      text alone without considering the facts or circumstances of a
      particular case. The court does not look beyond the statute’s
      explicit requirements or speculate about hypothetical or imaginary
      cases. An as-applied attack on a statute is more limited. It does
      not contend that a law is unconstitutional as written, but that its
      application to a particular person under particular circumstances
      deprives that person of a constitutional right. While as-applied
      challenges require application of the ordinance to be ripe, facial
      challenges are different, and ripe upon mere enactment of the
      ordinance. It is permissible to raise both facial and as-applied
      challenges to a statute.

Id., at 1155 (citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).

      Here,   Reigle   argues   that   SORNA’s    registration   requirement   is

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constitutionally infirm as applied to him.2 See, e.g., Appellant’s Brief, at 12

(“[T]his Court should find that the irrebuttable presumption that [Reigle] is

likely to reoffend sexually is unconstitutional as applied to him.”). Reigle

claims that when he was found to be a Tier I sex offender, inherently

subjecting him to SORNA’s fifteen-year registration requirements, it “created

an irrebuttable presumption that [he] pose[d] a high risk of committing

additional sexual offenses[.]” Id., at 7. As such, he was unconstitutionally

“depriv[ed] … of his fundamental right to reputation.”3 Id.

       “An irrebuttable presumption is unconstitutional when it (1) encroaches

on an interest protected by the due process clause, (2) the presumption is not

universally true, and (3) reasonable alternative means exist for ascertaining

the presumed fact.” Muhammad, 241 A.3d at 1155 (citation omitted).

       We agree with Reigle that reputation is a constitutionally protected

interest and further that “registration as a sex offender creates a presumption

… that [he] is a dangerous adult who is likely to commit further sexual

____________________________________________

2 We note that Reigle has not provided any scientific evidence nor expert
reports in support of his argument before the lower court. Cf.
Commonwealth v. Torsilieri, 232 A.3d 567 (Pa. 2020) (remanding to court
of common pleas to allow parties to introduce scientific evidence concerning
defendant’s facial constitutional challenge to SORNA’s presumption of
recidivism).

3 The Pennsylvania Constitution provides that “[a]ll men are born equally free

and independent, and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among
which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring,
possessing and protecting property and reputation, and of pursuing their own
happiness.” Pa. Const. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added).

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offenses.” Id., at 1158 (citation omitted). Moreover, Reigle “will not have any

opportunity to challenge this designation or claim that []he has been

rehabilitated throughout the fifteen-year registration period.” Id.

      However, Reigle’s support for the second prong of the irrebuttable

presumption analysis falls short of meeting the “high burden” necessary to

demonstrate a constitutional violation. See id., at 1155. In Muhammad,

stemming from a custody dispute, the appellant was convicted of “interference

with custody of children, false imprisonment, unlawful restraint, and

conspiracy to commit these offenses.” Id., at 1151 (footnote omitted). This

Court found that, based on the facts that were presented, SORNA’s recidivist

presumption was not true as applied to the appellant: in addition to the

appellant having no prior criminal history, there was no evidence that she

“committed or intended to commit any acts of a sexual nature.” Id., at 1158.

Therefore, given the nature of her crimes, because of “the absence of any

sexual misconduct[,] … she [was] not a high risk to commit additional (or any)

sexual offenses.” Id., at 1159.

      Muhammad is clearly distinguishable. Despite, too, having no prior

criminal record, Reigle, having admitted to having had sexual intercourse with

a minor, was convicted of a crime involving sexual misconduct. See 18 Pa.C.S.

§ 6301(a)(1)(ii) (“Whoever, being of the age of 18 years and upwards, by any

course of conduct in violation of Chapter 31 (relating to sexual offenses)

corrupts or tends to corrupt the morals of any minor less than 18 years of age

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… [.]”); see also Appellant’s Brief, at 10 (“Although the charge of corruption

of minors that [Reigle] plead[ed] guilty to        [has] underlying sexual

connotations … [.]”).

      While we acknowledge that M.D. “contacted [Reigle] via social media …

[and] informed [Reigle] that she had sexual interest in him,” id., that does

not, ipso facto, demonstrate Reigle’s lack of propensity to commit additional

sexual acts. Even if Reigle’s actions “do not indicate that he engaged in

behavior that was predatory in nature,” id., the irreputable presumption test

requires this Court to ascertain whether the presumption that Reigle will

recidivate is true. Other than providing a few sentences casting Reigle as one

who was effectively a “passenger” when he had sexual intercourse with a

minor, Reigle has failed to demonstrate, with any kind of authority, how his

admitted sexual misconduct provides obvious evidence that he does not have

a high risk of recidivating. Unlike the facts underpinning Muhammad, which

featured a “clear” absence of sexual misconduct, Reigle’s actions were

inherently sexual in nature. As Reigle has presented nothing beyond the

Muhammad case to evidence his lack of propensity to engage in further

sexual offenses and he has failed to demonstrate how Muhammad is

analogous to the present case despite the distinguishable facts here, Reigle

has not shown that SORNA, as applied to him, is unconstitutional.

      Accordingly, we affirm Reigle’s judgment of sentence.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

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Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 10/30/2023

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