Court Opinion

ID: 6350550
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-06-16 20:00:37.693962+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:49:30.545527
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                            FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         JUN 16 2022
                                                                       MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                        U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       No.    21-30020

                Plaintiff-Appellee,             D.C. No.
                                                2:16-cr-00007-RSM-1
 v.

LONNIE EUGENE LILLARD,                          MEMORANDUM*

                Defendant-Appellant.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Western District of Washington
                Ricardo S. Martinez, Chief District Judge, Presiding

                             Submitted June 9, 2022**
                                Portland, Oregon

Before: SCHROEDER and SUNG, Circuit Judges, and ANTOON,*** District
Judge.

      Defendant-Appellant Lonnie Eugene Lillard appeals the district court’s

denial of his second compassionate release motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
      ***
            The Honorable John Antoon II, United States District Judge for the
Middle District of Florida, sitting by designation.
3582(c)(1)(A)(i). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Reviewing for

abuse of discretion, United States v. Keller, 2 F.4th 1278, 1281 (9th Cir. 2021) (per

curiam), we affirm.

      The district court denied Lillard’s motion on the ground that the sentencing

factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) did not warrant Lillard’s requested relief.

The district court thus declined to consider whether Lillard’s motion set forth

“extraordinary and compelling reasons” warranting his release. See 18 U.S.C. §

3582(c)(1)(A)(i).

      Lillard’s sole claim on appeal is that § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) required the district

court to determine whether “extraordinary and compelling reasons” existed before

denying his motion based on the § 3553(a) factors. That argument is now

foreclosed. See Keller, 2 F.4th at 1284 (“As the government correctly argues,

although a district court must perform this sequential inquiry before it grants

compassionate release, a district court that properly denies compassionate release

need not evaluate each step.”).

AFFIRMED.

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