Court Opinion

ID: 9795198
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:22:06.447782+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:26:46.677161
License: Public Domain

WERDEGAR, J., Dissenting.
In this case we are concerned not with petitioner’s guilt or innocence or with the competence of his counsel, but with petitioner’s fundamental constitutional right to put on a defense at trial.
The majority holds petitioner was not denied this fundamental constitutional right. I respectfully dissent. In my view, a defendant who has repeatedly told his attorney he did not commit the crime and wants to contest the charges; who has asserted his confession was false; who has provided the attorney, through the defense investigator, with names of alibi witnesses and eyewitnesses to support his innocence claim; who has responded negatively to his attorney’s suggestion that the guilt phase trial could not be won, thereby creating an issue of strategy that the attorney acknowledges was constantly present between them; and who before trial moved four times to have the attorney relieved, complaining in open court, with the attorney present, that the attorney had accepted the prosecution allegations as incontestable and had no interest in investigating the defendant’s alibi, is a defendant who has “clearly expressed [his] desire to present a defense” at the guilt phase of trial. (People v. Frierson (1985) 39 Cal.3d 803, 815 [218 Cal.Rptr. 73, 705 P.2d 396] (Frierson).)
*229In Frierson, we held that a criminal defense attorney’s ordinary authority to decide strategy and tactics does not extend, in a capital case, to the fundamental decision of whether to attempt a defense to guilt or reserve the defense efforts for the penalty phase. We agreed with the defendant that “the decision whether to present any defense at all at the guilt/special circumstance phase of a capital case is so fundamental, and has such serious consequences for a defendant, that it is one that cannot properly be taken from him by his counsel.” (Frierson, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 812.) In light of that principle, this court concluded, “we do not think counsel could properly refuse to honor defendant’s clearly expressed desire to present a defense.” (Id. at p. 815.)
Neither Frierson nor our more recent cases discussing this principle articulate how “clearly” or “openly” (People v. Milner (1988) 45 Cal.3d 227, 246 [246 Cal.Rptr. 713, 753 P.2d 669]) the defendant’s objection to his attorney’s no-defense strategy must be expressed. But as the attorney’s obligation is to refrain from “overrid[ing] defendant’s decision to present a defense” (Frierson, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 817, fn. 7), the principle logically applies whenever defense counsel would reasonably know, from the defendant’s statements understood in light of the circumstances known to counsel, that the defendant has decided in favor of presenting a defense. At oral argument in this case, both parties agreed with this “reasonable trial attorney” standard.1
The present habeas corpus record shows that from the statements petitioner made in open court with his attorney, Ronald Slick, present—understood in light of the circumstances known to Slick—no reasonable attorney in Slick’s position could have failed to understand that petitioner opposed Slick’s strategy of presenting no defense to the charges. I discuss this evidence in detail below.
In an undated letter, apparently written soon after Slick’s appointment, petitioner informed Slick of his insistence he was innocent, his belief he was being framed, and his expectation of being exonerated at trial. From the *230subsequent report of his investigator, Kristina Kleinbauer, Slick learned petitioner had provided the investigator with a detailed alibi and the names of pertinent witnesses, some of whom Kleinbauer had interviewed. Slick testified that on review of the prosecution’s likely evidence and investigation of the potential defense witnesses (which included misidentification as well as alibi witnesses) he determined the defense of innocence would not persuade a jury and was not strategically smart, and he “believe[dj” that he so informed petitioner. Slick further testified he “can’t tell [petitioner’s current attorney]” what petitioner’s reaction was to this information about his strategic choice. However, he did remember that when he told petitioner “we’re going to lose the thing” (apparently referring to the guilt phase trial), petitioner reacted negatively, becoming uncooperative; after that the two never had a “good conversation.” Although Slick had made no notes of their discussions and could not remember when or how many times they discussed the issue of a guilt phase defense, the issue was, in his words, “always there” between him and petitioner.
With that factual background—all of it known to Slick—petitioner’s in-court comments clearly expressed his opposition to Slick’s no-defense strategy. Though petitioner, as he had been advised, framed his complaints within a repeated request for self-representation,2 Slick could not reasonably have failed to understand that petitioner continued to object to his chosen strategy; the issue that was “always there” between them clearly had not disappeared.
In court, shortly before jury selection, petitioner began by complaining Slick had shown a “lack of interest as far as the investigation is concerned” because “it is not worth it to him,” though petitioner insisted that “to me it is worth it” because “I don’t want to take the fall for the real person in this crime.” The next day, petitioner explained that the investigation he had seen did not reflect “the realness about my alibi.” Slick, petitioner asserted, “don’t want to inform the court and let the people see” that petitioner was being framed and that he was “not the person who should be takin’ the fall.” Petitioner accused Slick of disloyalty (he and the district attorney “is up to somethin’ ”); as evidence, petitioner observed that Slick continued to articulate only the prosecution version of events: “I see Ron Slick every time I come to the court and I am tellin’ him the real, but all I am gettin’ is the fake, *231the frame. And I know for sure that I shouldn’t take the fall in this case.” Petitioner recounted Slick’s having told him, in a brief meeting at the county jail, “ T don’t think you are going to win this case and there is nothing I can do about it.’ ” Petitioner then expressly, clearly and succinctly indicated his continued dissatisfaction with this approach: “I don’t need a lawyer like that.”
In short, on the first two days of trial Slick heard petitioner say, in court, that he was innocent; that he had told his lawyer so, but his lawyer did not believe him and did not consider the case worth his time; that the lawyer consequently had not truly investigated the case, including petitioner’s alibi; that the lawyer repeatedly displayed his disloyalty by echoing the prosecution’s version of the facts and by refusing to bring the truth out in court; that the lawyer had told him they could not win the case and there was nothing the lawyer could do; and, finally, that petitioner preferred going to trial without a lawyer to being represented by a lawyer who took for granted petitioner’s conviction. Slick heard all this while knowing, consistent with it, that he had indeed told petitioner they could not win at the guilt phase and he did not intend to put on a defense, that petitioner had reacted negatively, and . that the issue had remained “always there” between them. Given their past conversations, I am at a loss to comprehend how Slick could reasonably have understood petitioner’s in-court comments to reflect agreement with his planned no-defense strategy. To the contrary, they could reasonably have been understood only as a clear statement that petitioner had not acceded to Slick’s strategic plan.
The majority insists that the issue Slick testified was “always there” between him and his client was not whether Slick should forgo a guilt phase defense, but only whether the defense had any chance of success in light of the strong prosecution case on guilt. The record does not support the majority’s view. Slick testified expressly that his decision not to call guilt phase witnesses was a “topic” that “came up more than one time” and indeed was “always there” between him and petitioner.3 And while Slick stated he “struggled” with whether or not to call witnesses, the record does not support the majority’s claim that the decision not to do so came later than, and was separate from, Slick’s determination that the People’s case on guilt could not be effectively opposed. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 226.) Slick testified the two *232points were linked in Ms tMnking about the case.4 Indeed, the strength of the People’s case was, according to Slick, the “reason” for his strategic choice not to present a defense.5 Moreover, Slick was unable to recall when he told petitioner of his strategic decision, including whether it was before or after receiving the results of the defense investigator’s work. (See fin. 3, ante.) The majority’s view that while preparing for trial Slick and petitioner were in conflict only over the strength of the prosecution case, and that only later did the two discuss trial strategy, is thus contradicted in several respects by Slick’s own testimony.
The referee found Slick had reason to understand petitioner’s in-court remarks as intended only to delay trial, rather than reflecting dissatisfaction with Slick’s intended trial strategy. The majority accepts this assessment. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 222.) In contrast, I would reject this finding as plainly inconsistent with the trial record. WMle petitioner certainly indicated in connection with Ms four Faretta6 motions on August 10 tMough 17 that he was not ready to go to trial in propria persona and did not believe the defense case had yet been fully investigated, to read Ms comments as reflecting only a desire to delay trial, unrelated to any concern over the nature and quality of the representation Slick was providing, is objectively unreasonable. As discussed above, petitioner clearly and repeatedly stated that he wanted to dismiss Ms attorney because Slick was committed to the prosecution version of events and therefore would not defend Mm properly. Slick, who knew he had told petitioner they could not win the guilt phase, who knew that petitioner had objected, and who acknowledged that from that point on the issue of whether to defend was “always there” when he talked to petitioner, could not have failed to understand the dissatisfaction with his trial strategy expressed in petitioner’s Faretta-hearing comments.
*233The majority reasons that Slick’s failure to inform the trial court, during the Faretta hearings, of a conflict with his client over strategy tends to show that no such conflict existed. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 221-222.) As the majority points out, the defense attorney in Frierson conscientiously disclosed the existence of a conflict when Frierson asked for a new attorney. (Frierson, supra, 39 Cal.3d at pp. 810-811.)
But Frierson’s attorney was not Ron Slick. Slick’s performance as counsel in this case suggests he was less concerned with assuring petitioner zealous representation than with expeditiously concluding the trial. His no-defense strategy, for example, went beyond declining to call witnesses in the guilt phase trial; Slick also made no meaningful argument to the jury against conviction on all charges. Instead, he simply shared some very brief (four transcript pages long) thoughts about reasonable doubt in general, making absolutely no reference to the facts or evidence in the case. He urged the jury to “pile the evidence up” and see whether it could be viewed as showing petitioner not to be guilty. “But see if you can do that. And if you can’t do that, so be it. You can’t do it.” He made no effort whatsoever to even so much as suggest how the evidence could be viewed to reach a not guilty verdict; indeed, he did not discuss the evidence at all. While a desire to maintain credibility with the jury may justify counsel’s forgoing the presentation of a vigorous guilt phase defense of misidentification and alibi, it is difficult to see how merely pointing to the weaker points of the prosecution case and urging the jury to consider whether that evidence raises reasonable doubts risks a loss of credibility with the jury.
Moreover, having effectively admitted his client’s guilt in order, as he asserts, to retain credibility for the penalty phase, Slick actually presented only the bare minimum of a defense on penalty. He called petitioner’s mother, who testified that she had had difficulty providing for her nine children, that petitioner’s father had died when petitioner was five, that petitioner was well behaved at home and got along with his siblings but got into trouble at school for fighting, and that she loved petitioner. The only other defense witness was a deputy sheriff from the Los Angeles County jail who testified that petitioner was a backup trusty on his cell row and, as far as the witness knew, had not been involved in any negative incidents at the jail. Slick did not investigate or present to the jury any information regarding petitioner’s neglectful and abusive family background, even though several members of petitioner’s family were prepared to testify to the violence, alcoholism and drug use rampant in petitioner’s childhood environment. The defense investigator, whom Slick had initially directed to interview petitioner’s family members, had not yet done so when she learned that Slick had already taken petitioner to trial, conviction and a death sentence. (The entire *234trial, guilt, special circumstances and penalty phases together, was conducted over portions of four days; the proceedings occupy only one volume [348 pages] of reporter’s transcript.) This record does not suggest Slick was such a conscientious guardian of his client’s interests that, like counsel in Frierson, he would voluntarily reveal to the court petitioner’s dissatisfaction with his chosen strategy.7
The majority views the Frierson issue as turning on a credibility contest between Slick and petitioner—or, more exactly, between Slick, on the one hand, and petitioner, petitioner’s two later attorneys and the defense trial investigator, on the other. In particular, the majority, like the referee, focuses on the question whether the evidence at the hearing shows petitioner objected, during pretrial private meetings with Slick, to Slick’s intended no-defense strategy. (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 215-219, 223-224.) But in my view no such credibility contest need be resolved, because petitioner’s on the record remarks at trial, understood in light of circumstances admittedly known to Slick, clearly articulated petitioner’s disagreement with Slick’s no-defense strategy. Nevertheless, I note two significant reasons for doubting Slick’s credibility as to the details of his interactions with petitioner. First, Slick understood that his performance as trial counsel was under significant scrutiny in these proceedings; indeed, he admitted he felt he was the “defendant” here. Second, while he generally disclaimed any memory about *235most events of the period, he simultaneously professed the ability to remember certain details favorable to his version of events.8 Together with the long passage of time since the events in question and the absence of recordings or notes of the private conversations between attorney and client, the evident bias of both petitioner and Slick militates in favor of resolving this case primarily by reference to practically the only thing that is certain: petitioner’s on the record remarks at the Faretta hearings.
The majority, quoting dictum from our decision in petitioner’s automatic appeal, reasons that in his Faretta hearing comments petitioner did not “ ‘insist on presenting any particular defense’ ” or “ ‘allege that there was a particular piece of evidence he wanted presented that counsel refused to present.’ ” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 221.) Given what we now know from the habeas corpus record, I disagree that Slick could reasonably have dismissed petitioner’s explanation of his desires as insufficiently specific. Again, Slick knew not only that petitioner maintained his innocence of the shootings, but also that he had provided the defense investigator with alibi witnesses. Slick was also aware the investigator had interviewed other witnesses who might have cast doubt on the eyewitness identifications. How Slick, other than through willful blindness, could have failed to understand petitioner’s in-court insistence that his lawyer should present “the realness about my alibi” and “inform the court and let the people see” that petitioner was “not the person who should be takin’ the fall” as not referring to a defense of innocence, including at least the presentation of alibi witnesses, is incomprehensible.
To the extent the majority implies that Frierson required petitioner to use correct legal labels or to state in open court the exact parameters of the defense he wanted presented, I disagree. Petitioner was a poorly educated 20 year old whose verbal IQ has been measured as 74, in the borderline mentally retarded range. Moreover, even if he were of exceptional intelligence and trained in the law, he could not have known of his right to demand that a guilt phase defense be presented, as at the time of his trial that right had not yet been recognized by Frierson. I would not hold Frierson requires greater specificity of petitioner under these circumstances.
I agree with the majority (maj. opn., ante, at p. 225) that a general “protestation[] of innocence” during an interview with defense counsel should not be sufficient to make a Frierson claim. But petitioner did much more. While petitioner consistently maintained his innocence, i.e., that he was not *236responsible for killing Gulshakar Khwaja, he also provided names of witnesses to support his alibi.9 Having privately responded negatively to Slick’s assertion that the prosecutor’s charges could not be contested, which Slick acknowledged created an issue that was “always there” between attorney and client, petitioner then repeatedly renewed his objections in court up to and during the trial itself.
Nor does the fact petitioner complained, inter alia, of inadequate investigation (maj. opn., ante, at p. 225) tend to negate his claim. His disagreement with Slick’s intended course of going to trial immediately with no defense to the charges was no less clear simply because he expressed himself in terms of the belief his defense had not yet been fully investigated. Slick could, perhaps, have believed from petitioner’s in-court comments that petitioner would prefer further investigation to an immediate trial with only the defense witnesses who had already been interviewed (though in fact Slick professes to believe simply that petitioner wanted to delay the trial for emotional reasons). In no way, however, could Slick have reasonably understood petitioner’s comments as indicating agreement with an immediate no-defense trial. Petitioner’s objection to that course should, especially given the prior dealings between them, have been amply clear to Slick.
Because the majority concludes petitioner has not shown he clearly expressed his desire to present an identifiable guilt phase defense, the majority does not address whether “some credible evidence to support the defense” existed. (Frierson, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 812.) Below, I briefly explain why I would find there was some credible evidence of misidentification and alibi. In so doing, I do not suggest this evidence would necessarily have altered the outcome, a conclusion irrelevant to a Frierson inquiry.
Kleinbauer’s pretrial defense investigation identified three potential alibi witnesses and two eyewitnesses (one a former police officer) whose descriptions of the gunman were inconsistent with petitioner’s appearance. To be sure, these witnesses’ potential testimony was open to impeachment and qualification in various ways: the alibi witnesses bore probable biases for petitioner, and the times at which they remembered seeing him were approximate; the eyewitnesses had limited opportunity to observe the shooter, and, in one case, the pertinent description did not appear in the police report of the witness’s initial interview. But nothing about the information these witnesses *237could have provided was inherently unbelievable or implausible. This is not a case in which petitioner claims he had a right “to insist on the presentation of a defense which has no credible evidentiary support or on which no competent counsel would rely.” (Frierson, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 815, fn. 3.)
The referee found this evidence “would not have been sufficiently credible or probative to call into question the tactical decision of Mr. Slick to focus on the penalty phase of the trial.” But the supportability of counsel’s tactical decision is not the standard. To make a Frierson claim, the petitioner need not show trial counsel acted incompetently in failing to present a defense; indeed, this court in Frierson noted counsel there “may well have had sound reasons” for his strategic choice. (Frierson, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 814.) Rather, a Frierson claim requires only that the defense have been supported by “some credible evidence” (id. at p. 812), evidence that was not so weak that “no competent counsel would rely” on it (id. at p. 815, fn. 3).
At the reference hearing, Slick testified he thought alibi evidence would not be credited in light of the full confession petitioner had made to police. Slick also observed that he would have been hampered in any attempt to attack the confession as fabricated by petitioner’s general disinclination to take the stand. Without petitioner’s testimony and with no evidence of a motive for detectives to have fabricated a confession from petitioner, Slick believed, he could not effectively challenge the confession.
I agree the strong evidence of petitioner’s guilt, prominently including his confession, made an acquittal unlikely even if Slick had presented a defense at the guilt phase. Frierson itself did not expressly consider the strength of the prosecution case in concluding that credible evidence existed to support a diminished-capacity defense. (See Frierson, supra, 39 Cal.3d at pp. 814—815.) But even assuming it is relevant, the strong prosecution evidence against petitioner does not warrant a conclusion that “no competent counsel” {id. at p. 815, fn. 3) would have presented a guilt phase defense in this case. The confession was not recorded and, according to the police witnesses, petitioner recanted it within a few days of making it, facts Slick could have used to argue the confession was, if not fabricated, then partly or wholly false. (See People v. Burton, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 851.) Even if, as was very likely, petitioner was nonetheless convicted, Slick would have been in a reasonable position to argue at the penalty phase for residual or lingering doubt as a factor in mitigation. That the choice not to present a guilt phase defense may have been a competent one does not mean the choice to present a defense would have been incompetent.
*238For the reasons explained above, I would grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus on the ground that petitioner was denied his right to present a defense at the guilt phase trial.
Moreno, J., concurred.

 The majority (maj. opn., ante, at p. 213) cites People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1332 [65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259], as holding that Frierson applies only in the case of an “express” conflict between the defendant and his or her attorney. Both the discussion in Bradford and the footnote in Frierson on which it draws (Frierson, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 818, fn. 8), however, concern the trial court’s obligation to inquire or advise the defendant regarding his or her right to testify or to put on a defense, not counsel’s obligation to refrain from overriding a decision by the defendant that has been clearly conveyed to counsel. (See People v. Burton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 843, 858 [258 Cal.Rptr. 184, 771 P.2d 1270] [“Indeed, in Frierson itself we emphasized that in the absence of an explicit indication of a conflict over whether to present a defense, the court has no duty to inquire into the defendant’s concurrence with his attorney’s actions”].)

 According to Kleinbauer’s uncontradicted account, she (relying on advice from an attorney with whom she was acquainted) had recommended a motion for self-representation as the best way for petitioner to get the court’s attention for his complaints about Slick’s approach to the case.

 Slick’s testimony, on questioning by petitioner’s attorney, was as follows: “Q: Did you tell petitioner at any point in time that you were not going to call any witnesses at the guilt phase? [ID A: I’m sure I did. [1] Q: Okay. And, again, we don’t have any notes that would help us pin down the time, [ft] A: Correct, [ft] Q: And we don’t know whether or not you told him this before or after the investigation by Ms. Kleinbauer was received? [ft] A: Correct. The topic, I’m sure, came up more than one time. The topic was a—was always there.” (Italics added.)

 “Q [by petitioner’s attorney]: And did your assessment of the prosecution’s case play a part in your decision not to put on any of the witnesses that are mentioned in the report. . . ? []□ A: Yes.”
The link between these topics was apparently so strong that Slick sometimes conflated them. Asked by petitioner’s attorney to recall petitioner’s “reaction ... to your informing him of your intending not to call witnesses or put on a guilt-phase defense,” Slick answered he recalled only petitioner’s “reaction ... in general during the entire time I represented him.” Following up, the attorney asked Slick to describe petitioner’s “response to your defense during the whole time you represented him.” Slick answered by recounting his having told petitioner that they were “going to lose” the guilt trial and petitioner having reacted negatively.

 “The Court [Referee]: You indicated that your assessment of the case in 1983, as best as you can reconstruct it, was that the People had a strong case. [][] The Witness: Yes. [][] The Court: And for that reason, you decided that the strategic choice that would best suit your client, Mr. Burton, would be to put on a defense at the penalty phase instead of the guilt phase. [$ The Witness: Yes.”

 Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [45 L.Ed.2d 562, 95 S.Ct. 2525],

 In these respects, Slick’s performance was of a piece with his representation of other capital and noncapital murder defendants, which has been deemed incompetent in several cases. Representing Robert Paul Wilson on capital murder charges, Slick failed to object to admission of conversations with a government agent that constituted “the strongest evidence” against Wilson. (In re Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 945, 957 [13 Cal.Rptr.2d 269, 838 P.2d 1222].) On habeas corpus, we determined that this failure “was not based on an informed and considered tactical determination but resulted instead from ignorance or an erroneous interpretation” of precedent. (Id. at p. 955.) Representing Paul Tuilaepa on capital murder charges, Slick failed to present available evidence that an accomplice, rather than Tuilaepa, was the gunman and did not object to having his client shackled during trial. (People v. Tuilaepa (1992) 4 Cal.4th 569, 582-586 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d 382, 842 P.2d 1142]; Rohrlich, The Case of the Speedy Attorney, L.A. Times (Sept. 26, 1991) p. A1.) On automatic appeal, the majority in this court held only that Tuilaepa had not shown Slick’s decision not to challenge his shackling was prejudicial (Tuilaepa, at pp. 583-584), but Justice Mosk added that “counsel’s performance . . . failed to satisfy an objective standard of professional reasonableness” (id. at p. 596 (conc. opn. of Mosk, J.)). Representing Robert Glover on noncapital murder charges, Slick gave his client what the trial court characterized as “a shabby defense,” in particular by failing to call available exculpatory witnesses. In an unpublished decision included in the present habeas corpus record, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s grant of a new trial on grounds of Slick’s ineffective assistance of counsel. These practices have, to Slick’s critics at least, made his name virtually a byword for haste and indifference. (See Mintz, Lawyer Noted for Speedy Defense, S.J. Mercury News (Apr. 22, 2002) p. A12; Barbieri, Death Row Suicide Puts Trial Counsel on Spot, S.F. Recorder (July 22, 1992) p. 1; Rohrlich, The Case of the Speedy Attorney, L.A. Times, supra, at p. A1.)

 When Slick was asked how he could remember specifically that petitioner never said he wanted Slick to call the alibi witnesses Kleinbauer interviewed, when he was unable to recall other events even after his memory was refreshed with records, Slick responded, implausibly, that “it’s easier to remember something that didn’t happen than something that did.”

 In that sense, petitioner did specify the “particular defense” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 221) he wanted presented: noninvolvement in the killing, as opposed, for example, to self-defense, provocation, or lack of the alleged mental state.