Court Opinion

ID: 9495024
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:52:54.840332+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:46.549656
License: Public Domain

EVANS, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
The bottom line here is that Beverly Coleman loses her race discrimination case on a technicality. Now it’s admittedly hard to feel too sorry for her because she contributed to her predicament by waiting until close to the end of a 120-day period to get this case moving, and for that she has no one but herself (actually, her lawyer or her process server) to blame. But the law prefers that cases be resolved on their merits, not technicalities, and for that reason I would hold that the district judge abused his discretion when he decided not to give Ms. Coleman a few extra days to perfect service.
If a defendant is a natural person, the service of process is easy. It gets a bit more complicated when the defendant is a corporation. When the defendant is a governmental entity, the service of process can get very tricky, and in this case it was not a walk in the park. Chapter 801 of the *936Wisconsin Statutes,' entitled “Commencement of Action and Venue,” is the starting point for learning how to properly get a case going in Wisconsin. Section 801.11 covers the “manner of serving” a summons on almost everyone and everything. For instance, the statute tells us that in an action against a city, service on the mayor, city manager, or clerk will suffice. In an action against a technical college, service on the district board chairperson or the secretary will do. But there’s a bit of a trap, because the Milwaukee School Board has its own service statute lurking three volumes away from Chapter 801 in § 119.12(2). That statute provides, as the majority notes, for service of a summons and complaint to be made on the president of the school board and the superintendent. Why both, when most all other entities allow service on either one person or office? Who knows. Logic, at least, does not seem to provide the answer.
So we start here with a unique service statute with which, I agree, Coleman did not comply. But what she did do was a “right church, wrong pew” sort of thing: she delivered her summons and complaint to the Milwaukee School Board’s “Office of the Board of Governance.” This office is in the headquarters of the school board, and for all we know it may be on the same floor as the offices of the board’s president and superintendent. For this reason, the defendant school board (to its credit) does not hide the fact that it had prompt actual notice of Coleman’s claim. And because it had actual notice, the board cannot in any way, shape, or form complain that it was prejudiced by Coleman’s deficient service.
Given these circumstances — the preference for resolving cases on their merits, a very unique service law (unlike the simple service requirement the plaintiff blew in Troxell v. Fedders of North America, Inc., 160 F.3d 381 (7th Cir.1998)), plus actual notice and no prejudice to the defendant— the district court, even if this did not add up to “good cause,” should have given Coleman a little more time to dot her “i’s” and cross her “i’s.” Panaras v. Liquid Carbonic Indus. Corp., 94 F.3d 338, 340-41 (7th Cir.1996). I think most courts, given these circumstances, would have exercised discretion favorable to Ms. Coleman. And because her claim would be (and is now) forever barred by a very short statute of limitations, I believe all but a tiny fraction of district courts would have exercised discretion favorable to Ms. Coleman. For these reasons, I would find an abuse of discretion and reverse the judgment of the district court.