Court Opinion

ID: 9544972
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:04:07.67995+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:13:49.699365
License: Public Domain

STERNBERG, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
Application of the doctrine of waiver requires a finding that there was an intentional relinquishment of a known right. Ewing v. Colorado Farm Mutual Casualty Co., 133 Colo. 447, 296 P.2d 1040 (1956). See also Shoemaker v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co., 38 Colo.App. 321, 559 P.2d 721 (1976). Intent is a question of fact. Williams v. Gulick, 170 Colo. 347, 461 P.2d 211 (1969). Thus, the majority begs the question in addressing waiver as a matter of law.
The majority opinion substitutes its own findings of fact for that of the trial court on the contested issue of whether there was an intention to waive a known right by the lessor. Based upon disputed testimony, the trial court concluded that the lessor did not intend to waive or relinquish the paragraph in the lease terminating the tenancy upon the premises becoming uninhabitable. Hence, the trial court’s resolution of that question of fact should be accepted on review. Page v. Clark, 197 Colo. 306, 592 P.2d 792 (1979). We are not at liberty to substitute our conclusions, drawn from conflicting evidence, for that of the trial court. Linley v. Hanson, 173 Colo. 239, 477 P.2d 453 (1970). Inferences to be drawn from evidence are also a trial court function. Peterson v. Ground Water Commission, 195 Colo. 508, 579 P.2d 629 (1978).
The statement of facts in the majority opinion omits presentation of evidence which would serve as a foundation for the trial court’s decision. The contractor was on the premises at the behest of the insurance adjuster. Both lessor and lessee carried insurance with the same company, and thus, it cannot be inferred that the adjuster was, as a matter of law, the lessor’s agent. There is evidence that the lessor did not authorize any communications between the contractor and the manager. There is no support in the record for the statement in the majority opinion that the lessor talked to the manager concerning the work or that the lessor knew that the lessee was incurring expenses: the lessor was in touch with the lessee’s manager only once— right after the fire — but her salary and the rent was being paid by the insurance company under Sung’s policy. Evidence of contacts between lessor’s son and the lessee’s manager is limited to two “conversations” during which the manager asked that changes be made in construction but the lessor’s son refused. In this regard, the court made no finding that the son was the agent for the lessor. Also, there is evidence that the lessor attempted to contact her attorney immediately after the fire to give notice of termination but was unable to do so because he was out of town. Thus, in my view there is evidence to serve as a basis of the trial court’s conclusions: therefore, they should be binding on review.
Furthermore, the provision in the lease terminating it if the premises become uninhabitable is clear and unambiguous, and thus, it is error to attempt to interpret the language to arrive at the intention of the parties. Radiology Professional Corp. v. Trinidad Area Health Ass’n, Inc., 195 Colo. 253, 577 P.2d 748 (1978). The lease says it is terminated under the circumstances found by the court to have occurred: a fire rendered the premises uninhabitable. The majority opinion adds to the clear language of the lease a requirement that the lessor notify the lessee that it intends to terminate the lease. And, where, as here, the provision of the lease itself requires the result, the mere general policy of looking upon forfeitures with disfavor is no reason to refuse to enforce the lease as written. School District RE-2(J) v. Panucci, 30 Colo.App. 184, 490 P.2d 711 (1971).
The trial court’s resolution of the complex factual issues presented should be affirmed.