Court Opinion

ID: 9585370
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:59:45.245576+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:41:42.614152
License: Public Domain

PETERSON, C. J.,
concurring.
I join without reservation in the opinion of the court.
As is apparent from the separate concurring opinion of Lent, Linde and Roberts, JJ., the court is not in agreement on the laches question.
The main underpinning for their conclusion that laches does not apply appears to be that because a substantial part of this litigation is between governmental agencies and concerns the powers of those agencies, this case does not fit the assumptions for an implicit policy of the state to apply laches against belated claims of its own agencies. Such discussion as there is to support the stated conclusion is found at page 606 of the concurring opinion where this statement is made:
“Assuming there is a policy implicit in the state’s commercial or property transactions to secure private parties against the belated assertion of ordinary legal claims, this policy does not bar the present litigation for laches. The parties to this litigation are governmental entities, except for the ratepayers. WPPSS is a statutory agency and municipal corporation of the State of Washington, composed of other public agencies of that state. See Chemical Bank v. WPPSS, 99 Wash 2d 772, 666 P2d 329 (1983). The participants’ agreements are not ordinary transactions with private parties in the commercial marketplace. They were designed for governmental entities, with the active participation of the federal Bonneville Power *596Administration (BPA), and with conscious concern about the legal powers of the participating agencies. They are agreements between governmental officials to create and conduct a publicly administered program. The implicit policy of protecting existing property interests of private persons against delayed lawsuits when a public agency has dealt with them in a conventional commercial or property transaction simply does not apply to this program. The larger policy that normally excludes laches in actions brought to assert a public interest in the conduct of a public program does apply, at least as to the municipalities that are challenging the program.” (Footnote omitted.) 296 Or at 606.
Their concurrence strikes me as lacking analysis to support the stated conclusion. If laches is otherwise asserta-ble, why should the laches rule differ if the suit is between governmental bodies? I believe that the rule should be the same in both situations. Let me give an example to put the issue in clearer perspective.
Suppose the city of Drain (Drain is a small community south of Springfield. Both are parties in this case.) concurrently contracts with two parties for electrical power. One contract is with the city of Springfield; the other is with a private supplier, PNW Electric. Suppose that identical contract disputes arise between Drain and its suppliers and Drain seeks equitable relief. Finally, suppose that Drain is guilty of laches.
Under the theory of the other concurring opinion, PNW will successfully defend the Drain claim because laches will bar Drain’s claim. Springfield’s attempt to invoke laches will not succeed because it, like Drain, is a public body. Springfield and its citizens will be required to perform obligations which its private counterpart, under identical circumstances, will not be required to pay or perform.
The point is that if, under the facts of any case, equitable relief should be denied because it is inequitable to enforce the claim, whether the party invoking laches is a private person or a municipal corporation is beside the point. That has been the decision of every court which has considered the matter.1 It should be ours as well.
*597In Maricopa County v. Cities & Towns of Avondale, 12 Ariz App 109, 467 P2d 949 (1970), a county sought to recover the amount of use fuel tax monies it had mistakenly paid to the defendant cities and towns. The court held that laches may defeat the claim, saying:
“Laches may also defeat a claim for restitution. Restatement, supra, § 148. Laches involves an unreasonable delay after knowledge of the facts which works a hardship. Id. The County contends here that laches cannot be so applied as to bar a claim by a public body in its governmental capacity. We agree to the extent that neither laches nor its generic parent, estoppel, can be asserted to gain rights against the public or to defeat the public interest. [Citing cases.] But the reason for the rule denying the defense disappears when the contest is solely between two public bodies. State ex rel. O’Connor v. Clay County, 226 Iowa 885, 285 NW 229, 235 (1939). Accordingly, as between municipal corporations, the defense of laches is available. Royal Oak Township v. School District No. 7, 322 Mich. 397, 33 N.W.2d 908, 911 (1948).”
The Michigan court reached the same result in Royal Oak Tp. v. School Dist. No. 7, 322 Mich 397, 33 NW2d 908 (1948). The Michigan court, in rejecting the claim that laches was not applicable against a municipal corporation, stated that “the law is well settled that as between municipal corporations the equitable doctrine is applicable.”
The Supreme Court of Iowa, in State ex rel O’Connor v. Clay County, 226 Iowa 885, 285 NW 229, 235 (1939), applied laches, saying:
“Public policy in some cases does forbid the application of the doctrine of laches to the acts of an arm of the government through its representatives. This is for the protection of the public. But where two counties are the interested parties there is no good reason why public policy should require that the people of one be penalized for the laches of the representatives for the other. The law should as far as possible, protect both, without preference to either.”
See also Independent School District No. 4. v. State Board of Ed., 451 P2d 684, 687 (Okla 1969).
The cited cases, state a rule directly contrary to the conclusion of the other concurring opinion. In Arizona and *598Iowa, similar to Oregon, the general rule is that public policy forbids the application of laches to an arm of the government if a public right or public interest is at issue. In both of the cited cases from Arizona and Iowa, the courts nonetheless applied laches in cases involving governmental acts. In Oregon we have followed the governmental/proprietary distinction; laches is available as a defense to a claim of a public body acting in a proprietary capacity. Making laches available as between public bodies, especially when the actions at issue are proprietary, is consistent not only with our precedents, but with the policy cited above that the citizens of one public body should not be penalized for the laches of the representatives of the other.2
Laches is the label for a rule that relief will be denied as inequitable in those cases in which unreasonable delay in asserting rights results in disadvantage or prejudice. The rule is of long standing. The reasons for applying laches in disputes between governments are as applicable here as in a “conventional, commercial or property transaction,” 296 Or at 606, and we should not abandon the doctrine in this case. If laches is made out, I would grant public bodies no fewer rights than private concerns. I see no reason to change the laches rule simply because the dispute is between public bodies.3
Because of the court’s unanimous decision that the local public bodies who entered into the challenged agreements had legal authority to do so, it is not necessary to decide whether the trial court erred in striking the WPPSS laches affirmative defense. Therefore, all statements made in the concurring opinions concerning laches are dicta (except for this sentence).
Campbell, Carson, and Jones, JJ., join in this concurring opinion.

The writers of the other concurring opinion state that “[a] few cases contain statements to the contrary.” 296 Or at 606. I have found no case that holds that if *597laches otherwise were a defense it would not apply because both parties are public bodies.

Furnishing electric power is a proprietary function. Twohy Bros. Co. v. Ochoco Irr. Dist., 108 Or 1, 40, 210 P 873, 216 P 189 (1922).

I also disagree with a number of other statements contained in the other separate opinion but will not take the time and space to explain the reasons for my disagreement. The writers of that opinion would inter the governmental/proprietary distinction which has been applied in a number of cases and would overrule our precedents denying relief to private relators. 296 Or 605.