Court Opinion

ID: 9398160
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-30 15:07:56.856784+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:31.304628
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Van Den Eynde, 2023-Ohio-1790.]

                      IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                          THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                              HANCOCK COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,
                                                        CASE NO. 5-22-38
       PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

       v.

BONNIE VAN DEN EYNDE,                                   OPINION

       DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

                Appeal from Hancock County Common Pleas Court
                          Trial Court No. 2021 CR 192

                      Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded

                             Date of Decision: May 30, 2023

APPEARANCES:

        W. Alex Smith for Appellant

        Phillip A. Riegle for Appellee
Case No. 5-22-38

WILLAMOWSKI, J.

       {¶1} Defendant-appellant Bonnie R. Van Den Eynde (“Van Den Eynde”)

appeals the judgment of the Hancock County Court of Common Pleas, arguing the

trial court erred by imposing a prison sanction for a community control violation

without having expressly reserved a stated range of prison terms at her original

sentencing hearing in compliance with R.C. 2929.19(B)(4). For the reasons set forth

below, the judgment of the trial court is reversed.

                           Facts and Procedural History

       {¶2} On June 1, 2021, Van Den Eynde was indicted on two counts of

trafficking in cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A), felonies of the fourth degree.

She pled guilty to both charges as felonies of the fifth degree. At a sentencing

hearing on January 13, 2022, the trial court ordered her to serve five years of

community control. The trial court then issued its judgment entry of sentencing on

February 11, 2022. However, on November 8, 2022, the trial court found that Van

Den Eynde had violated the terms of her community control and revoked this

sanction. The trial court then imposed an eleven-month prison term for each of Van

Den Eynde’s convictions and ordered these sentences to be served consecutively.

                                Assignment of Error

       {¶3} Van Den Eynde filed her notice of appeal on December 8, 2022. On

appeal, she raises the following assignment of error:

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Case No. 5-22-38

       The trial court erred by imposing a prison sanction for a
       community control violation when no prison term was reserved at
       sentencing.

Van Den Eynde argues that the trial court did not reserve a stated prison term while

imposing a community control sanction at her original sentencing hearing. For this

reason, she argues that the trial court could not order her to serve a prison term after

finding that she had committed a community control violation.

                                   Legal Standard

       {¶4} “[T]he proper scope of felony sentence review by Ohio appellate courts

is set forth in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2).” State v. Brill, 2023-Ohio-404, --- N.E.3d ---, ¶

7 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Redmond, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-18-1066, 2019-Ohio-

309, ¶ 15. See also State v. Lyle, 3d Dist. Allen Nos. 1-13-16, 1-13-17, 2014-Ohio-

751, ¶ 12. Pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), “an appellate court may reverse a

sentence ‘only if it determines by clear and convincing evidence that the record does

not support the trial court’s findings under relevant statutes or that the sentence is

otherwise contrary to law.’” State v. Runion, 3d Dist. Wyandot No. 16-22-07, 2023-

Ohio-254, ¶ 7, quoting State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59

N.E.3d 1231, ¶ 1.

       Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof
       which is more than a mere ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ but not
       to the extent of such certainty as is required ‘beyond a reasonable
       doubt’ in criminal cases, and which will produce in the mind of the
       trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be
       established.

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Case No. 5-22-38

State v. Sullivan, 2017-Ohio-8937, 102 N.E.3d 86, ¶ 12 (3d Dist.), quoting Cross v.

Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118, paragraph three of the syllabus (1954).

        {¶5} R.C. 2929.19(B)(4) governs the imposition of community control

sanctions and reads, in its relevant part, as follows:

        If the sentencing court determines at the sentencing hearing that a
        community control sanction should be imposed and the court is not
        prohibited from imposing a community control sanction, the court
        shall impose a community control sanction. The court shall notify the
        offender that, if the conditions of the sanction are violated, * * * the
        court may impose a longer time under the same sanction, may impose
        a more restrictive sanction, or may impose a prison term on the
        offender and shall indicate the range from which the prison term may
        be imposed as a sanction for the violation, which shall be the range
        of prison terms for the offense that is specified pursuant to section
        2929.14 of the Revised Code and as described in section 2929.15 of
        the Revised Code.

(Emphasis added.) R.C. 2929.19(B)(4). See also R.C. 2929.15(B)(1). Thus,

“[w]hen a trial court imposes community control, it must notify the offender of the

possible results of a violation of those sanctions.” Lyle at ¶ 12.

        {¶6} “The court must strictly comply with this requirement and specifically

state what the possible prison term may be to the offender orally at the time of

sentencing.” Lyle at ¶ 19. “[C]ompliance with R.C. 2929.19(B)([4]) must come at

the sentencing hearing * * *.”1 State v. Angers, 2023-Ohio-369, --- N.E.3d ---, ¶ 13

(8th Dist.), quoting State v. Brooks, 103 Ohio St.3d 134, 2004-Ohio-369, 814

1
 At the time that Brooks was decided, the provision currently located in R.C. 2929.19(B)(4) was located in
R.C. 2929.19(B)(5). State v. Howard, 162 Ohio St.3d 314, 2020-Ohio-3195, 165 N.E.3d 1088, fn. 3. This
provision was relocated on September 30, 2011. Id.

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Case No. 5-22-38

N.E.2d 837, ¶ 17. For this reason, “notification generally is deficient when the trial

court’s statements to an offender of a possible term of imprisonment occurs at a plea

hearing and is not repeated at a later sentencing hearing.” Angers at ¶ 13, quoting

Brooks at ¶ 17. Further, “notification given in a court’s journal entry issued after

the sentencing does not comply with R.C. 2929.19(B)[(4)].” State v. Yauger, 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111734, 2023-Ohio-815, ¶ 11, quoting Brooks at ¶ 11.

          {¶7} “Compliance with R.C. 2929.19(B)(4) is a prerequisite to imposing a

prison term for a community control violation.”             State v. Clinton, 2d Dist.

Montgomery No. 29267, 2022-Ohio-717, ¶ 14. “When a sentence fails to include a

mandatory provision, such as the notification provision under R.C. 2929.19(B)(4),

it may be appealed because such a sentence is ‘contrary to law’ and is also not

‘authorized by law.’” State v. Batty, 2014-Ohio-2826, 15 N.E.3d 347, ¶ 22 (4th

Dist.).

          [W]hen a trial court fails to provide proper notice of a specific term to
          the offender, ‘[t]he matter must be remanded to the trial court for a
          resentencing under that provision with a prison term not an option.’ *
          * *. Although a prison term is not an option at the resentencing, the
          trial court may choose to impose a longer time under the same
          sanction or impose a more restrictive sanction.

(Citations omitted.) State v. Goldsberry, 3d Dist. Union No. 14-07-06, 2009-Ohio-

6026, ¶ 11, quoting Brooks at ¶ 33.

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Case No. 5-22-38

                                  Legal Analysis

       {¶8} At the sentencing hearing on January 13, 2022, the trial court imposed

a community control sanction. However, the trial court did not reserve a prison term

because it failed to expressly state that Van Den Eynde could receive a prison term

for a community control violation and failed to indicate the range of prison terms

that was to be reserved for a community control violation. The trial court made

several vague references that alluded to the possibility of Van Den Eynde serving

time in prison. But it is not clear that the trial court, in making these vague

references, was speaking of prison as a consequence for a community control

violation, as opposed to being a consequence of a further criminal violation.

       {¶9} Further, the trial court nowhere indicated the potential duration of this

possible prison term or even alluded to a range of prison terms for Van Den Eynde’s

convictions that was previously discussed at a prior hearing. See Brooks, supra, at

¶ 32. A trial court is required to do more than mention the mere possibility of

serving time in prison for a community control violation. R.C. 2929.19(B)(4)

directs trial courts to “indicate the range from which the prison term may be

imposed as a sanction for the violation * * *.”          (Emphasis added.)      R.C.

2929.19(B)(4).

       {¶10} Nebulous references to the possibility of some form of future

imprisonment do not “indicate the range” of the prison sentences that may be

imposed for a community control violation. R.C. 2929.19(B)(4). See Brooks,

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Case No. 5-22-38

supra, at ¶ 19 (holding that the trial court shall make this notification “in

straightforward and affirmative language”). See also State v. Johnson, 6th Dist.

Lucas No. L-04-1120, 2005-Ohio-319, ¶ 15-16. At the original sentencing hearing

in this case, there was no notification containing the information that the text of R.C.

2929.19(B)(4) expressly requires a trial court to provide to a defendant. To hold

otherwise would be to omit the phrase describing what the trial court “shall indicate”

from the text of R.C. 2929.19(B)(4). See Brooks at ¶ 24.

       {¶11} The judgment entry of sentencing does state that “[a]ny violation of

this sentence [the community control sanction] shall lead to a more restrictive

sanction, a longer sanction, or a reserved prison term * * *.” (Doc. 35). However,

courts have repeatedly held that a later journal entry cannot correct the failure to

make the required R.C. 2929.19(B)(4) notification at the original sentencing

hearing. Brooks, supra, at ¶ 18; State v. Hatfield, 164 Ohio App.3d 338, 2005-Ohio-

6259, 842 N.E.2d 128, ¶ 8 (2d Dist.); Batty, supra, at ¶ 35; State v. Mobley-Melbar,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92314, 2010-Ohio-3177, ¶ 46-47; State v. Pari, 9th Dist.

Summit No. 28098, 2017-Ohio-4165, ¶ 40. See also Lyle, supra, at ¶ 19. Further,

even if a later journal entry could cure the absence of an R.C. 2929.29(B)(4)

notification at the sentencing hearing, the judgment entry in this case still does not

“indicate the range” of the potential prison term that is reserved for a potential

community control violation. R.C. 2929.19(B)(4).

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Case No. 5-22-38

       {¶12} On appeal, the State argues that a recent revision to R.C.

2929.19(B)(4) affects the disposition of this particular issue.        Former R.C.

2929.19(B)(4) read, in its relevant part, as follows:

       The court shall notify the offender that, if the conditions of the
       sanction are violated, * * *, the court may impose * * * a prison term
       on the offender and shall indicate the specific prison term that may be
       imposed as a sanction for the violation, as selected by the court from
       the range of prison terms for the offense pursuant to section 2929.14
       of the Revised Code * * *.

(Emphasis added.) R.C. 2929.19(B)(4). The current version of R.C. 2929.19(B)(4)

became effective on September 30, 2021 and reads, in its relevant part, as follows:

       The court shall notify the offender that, if the conditions of the
       sanction are violated * * *, the court may impose * * * a prison term
       on the offender and shall indicate the range from which the prison
       term may be imposed as a sanction for the violation, which shall be
       the range of prison terms for the offense that is specified pursuant to
       section 2929.14 of the Revised Code * * *.

(Emphasis added.) R.C. 2929.19(B)(4). The State argues that, in place of a strict

compliance standard, this issue should be reviewed under a substantial compliance

standard because now the potential “penalty is * * * a defined range of potential

prison time for each and every offense * * *.” Appellee’s Brief, 5. The State then

asserts that the cursory references to a prison term at the sentencing hearing and in

the judgment entry constituted substantial compliance with R.C. 2929.19(B)(4).

       {¶13} We find this argument to be unpersuasive. In State v. Brooks, the Ohio

Supreme Court concluded that a strict compliance standard should generally be

applied to the exact challenge brought in this appeal. Brooks, supra, at ¶ 32. The

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Case No. 5-22-38

State points to the fact that the Ohio Supreme Court noted that its conclusion in

Brooks “square[d] with a dominant purpose of current sentencing procedures, truth

in sentencing, which aims to eliminate indefinite sentences in favor of specific

terms.” Id. at ¶ 25. For this reason, the State asserts that Brooks should not be

applied herein now that R.C. 2929.15(B)(4) requires the trial court to “indicate [a]

* * * range” rather than a “specific prison term.” R.C. 2929.19(B)(4).

       {¶14} However, the Ohio Supreme Court did not decide Brooks on the basis

of a contemporary trend towards imposing specific prison terms. Brooks at ¶ 24-

25, 27. Rather, Brooks was decided on the basis of the text of R.C. 2929.19(B)(4).

Id. The statutory language that was relevant to the analysis in Brooks remains

largely the same. After the revisions, R.C. 2929.19(B)(4) still “uses the word ‘shall’

to indicate the mandatory nature of this provision.” Brooks at ¶ 24. This statute is

still “clear on its face,” unambiguously requiring the trial court to indicate the

potential prison sentence that might be imposed for a community control violation.

Id. at ¶ 24, 25. Finally, the fact that the time reserved is now a range rather than a

specified term does not significantly impact the importance of informing an offender

of the most severe consequences that a community control violation may carry. Id.

at ¶ 23, 33.

       {¶15} While changing the content of the notification from an announcement

of a “specific prison term” to a recitation of the “range of prison terms for the

offense,” the revisions to R.C. 2929.19(B)(4) have not changed the fact that a trial

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Case No. 5-22-38

court is still required to “indicate” the reserved prison term that may be imposed for

a community control violation. R.C. 2929.19(B)(4). In other words, the revisions

may affect the content of the notification but do not affect the necessity or manner

of the notification. Since the foundations of the Brooks decision remain intact, we

will continue to follow its directives. Thus, we conclude that the existing case law

that explains the steps a trial court must take to “indicate” the reserved prison term

remain in force. Because the trial court did not take these required steps in this case,

the prison term imposed for Van Den Eynde’s community control violation was

clearly and convincingly contrary to law.

                                     Conclusion

       {¶16} In this case, the trial court did not reserve a prison term by

“indicat[ing] the range from which the prison term may be imposed as a sanction

for the violation.” R.C. 2929.19(B)(4). In the absence of such a reservation, the

trial court did not have a reserved prison term to impose for the instant community

control violation. See also State v. Fraley, 105 Ohio St.3d 13, 2004-Ohio-7110, 821

N.E.2d 995, ¶ 17-19. Because the trial court did not take the steps required to

comply with R.C. 2929.19(B)(4), the prison term imposed for the community

control violation is a sentence that is clearly and convincingly contrary to law. Pari,

supra, at ¶ 40. Accordingly, Van Den Eynde’s sole assignment of error is sustained.

       {¶17} Having found error prejudicial to the appellant in the particulars

assigned and argued, the judgment of the Hancock County Court of Common Pleas

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Case No. 5-22-38

is reversed. Further, the prison sentence imposed in this case for Van Den Eynde’s

community control violation is vacated. State v. Lenhart, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.

108938, 2020-Ohio-2727, ¶ 29-30. This cause of action is remanded to the trial

court for a resentencing hearing at which the trial court may impose a longer term

for the community control sanctions or may impose a more restrictive sanction.

Brooks, supra, at fn. 2, citing R.C. 2929.15. See also Fraley at ¶ 17-19.

                                                               Judgment Reversed
                                                             And Cause Remanded

MILLER, P.J. and WALDICK, J., concur.

/hls

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