Court Opinion

ID: 9838905
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-08 18:00:37.841352+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:49.242124
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-10795         Document: 00516888162             Page: 1      Date Filed: 09/08/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                                              United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                               Fifth Circuit

                                      ____________                                           FILED
                                                                                      September 8, 2023
                                        No. 22-10795                                    Lyle W. Cayce
                                      ____________                                           Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                                       Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                             versus

   Shaquille Dewayne Smith,

                                               Defendant—Appellant.
                      ______________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Northern District of Texas
                                USDC No. 2:22-CR-18-1
                      ______________________________

   Before Jones, Stewart, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
          Shaquille Dewayne Smith (“Smith”) appeals his guilty plea
   conviction and sentence for possession of a firearm by a felon. See 18 U.S.C.
   § 922(g)(1). Because he fails to demonstrate that his guilty plea was invalid
   or that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional, we AFFIRM.

          _____________________
          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-10795         Document: 00516888162            Page: 2   Date Filed: 09/08/2023

                                         No. 22-10795

          I.      FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
          In 2016, Smith was sentenced to five years in prison after pleading
   guilty in state court to two felony offenses: (1) evading arrest in a motor
   vehicle1, and (2) taking a weapon from a peace officer.2 In 2022, a few months
   before completing parole for both convictions, Smith was stopped by police
   officers for a traffic violation. During the stop, officers saw a firearm on the
   passenger’s seat and arrested and charged Smith for being a felon in
   possession of a firearm. See id. Subsequently, a grand jury indicted Smith as
   charged.
          Pursuant to a written plea agreement, Smith pleaded guilty to
   possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of § 922(g)(1). As part of the
   plea agreement, Smith waived his right to appeal or collaterally challenge his
   conviction or sentence, with the exception of a sentence imposed in excess of
   the statutory maximum or resulting from an arithmetic error. He further
   waived his right to challenge the voluntariness of his plea or waiver, or to
   bring claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court accepted
   the plea agreement, and sentenced Smith to 60 months of imprisonment,
   followed by a one-year term of supervised release. Smith timely appealed.
                         II.     STANDARD OF REVIEW
          Because Smith did not raise a constitutional challenge, or otherwise
   object to his conviction and sentence before the district court, we review for
   plain error. “Plain error is clear or obvious error that affects substantial rights
   of the defendant and seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public
   reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Sanchez, 325 F.3d 600,

          _____________________
          1
              See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 38.04.
          2
              See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 38.14.

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   603 (5th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). To demonstrate plain
   error, Smith must show that: (1) an error occurred, (2) the error is clear and
   obvious, and (3) the error affected his substantial rights. Puckett v. United
   States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). Upon making such a showing, this court has
   the discretion to remedy the error only if it “seriously affect[s] the fairness,
   integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v.
   Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936). Where an issue is disputed or unresolved,
   or where there is an absence of controlling authority, there can be no clear or
   obvious error. United States v. Rodriguez-Parra, 581 F.3d 227, 230–31 (5th
   Cir. 2009).
                             III.     DISCUSSION
          On appeal, Smith advances two primary arguments to support his
   position that his guilty plea conviction is invalid. First, he argues that the facts
   to which he pleaded were insufficient to show the requisite interstate nexus.
   He further asserts that § 922(g) is unconstitutional because it does not have
   a substantial effect on interstate commerce and thus exceeds Congress’s
   authority under the Commerce Clause. Second, Smith argues that the
   Supreme Court’s recent decision in N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen,
   142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022), supports a finding that § 922(g)(1) infringes upon his
   Second Amendment right to bear arms and is, therefore, unconstitutional.
   We are unpersuaded by either argument.
          A. § 922(g)(1) and the Commerce Clause
          As a preliminary matter, Smith rightly concedes that his first
   argument is foreclosed by Fifth Circuit precedent. United States v. Alcantar,
   733 F.3d 143, 145 (5th Cir. 2013) (concluding that this court is bound by prior
   precedent establishing that § 922(g)(1) is a valid exercise of Congress’s
   authority under the Commerce Clause). For this reason, we reject his nexus

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   and Commerce Clause arguments as meritless and do not discuss them
   further herein.
          B. Enforcement of the Appellate Waiver
          Smith next argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in Bruen
   supports his assertion that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional because it
   encroaches on an individual’s right to bear arms as guaranteed by the Second
   Amendment. The Government argues that Smith’s plain-error challenge to
   the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is waived by the terms of his appeal waiver
   in his plea agreement. Although the Government advances a compelling
   argument regarding the applicability of Smith’s appeal waiver, we
   nevertheless elect to evaluate his argument on the merits. See United States
   v. Douglas, No. 22-10385, 2023 WL 2264199 (5th Cir. Feb. 28, 2023).
          C. § 922(g)(1) and the Second Amendment Right to Bear Arms
          Recall that to establish plain error, Smith must show a forfeited error
   that is clear or obvious and that affected his substantial rights. Puckett, 556
   U.S. at 135. This court then has the discretion, not the obligation, to correct
   the error, but “only if the error ‘seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or
   public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” Id. (quoting United States v.
   Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993)). An error is not clear or obvious where an
   issue is disputed or unresolved, or where there is an absence of controlling
   authority. Rodriguez-Parra, 581 F.3d at 230–31.
          In Bruen, the Supreme Court found that the State of New York’s
   public-carry licensing regime was unconstitutional because New York issued
   licenses “only when an applicant demonstrate[d] a special need for self-
   defense,” thus preventing law-abiding citizens with ordinary self-defense
   needs from exercising their Second Amendment right to bear arms. Bruen,
   142 S. Ct. at 2122. Prior to the Court’s issuance of Bruen, this court and our
   sister circuits employed “a ‘two-step’ framework for analyzing Second

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   Amendment challenges that combine[d] history with means-end scrutiny.”
   Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2125. Under this framework, we first determined whether
   the challenged law impinged upon a right protected by the Second
   Amendment. Hollis v. Lynch, 827 F.3d 436, 446 (5th Cir. 2016). If not, the
   law passed constitutional muster. Id. at 446–47. But if it did, we moved on to
   the second step which was to determine “whether to apply intermediate or
   strict scrutiny to the law, and then to determine whether the law survived the
   proper level of scrutiny.” Id. at 447.
          In Bruen, the Court declined to adopt this two-step framework,
   instead opting to establish a new test for assessing the constitutionality of a
   statute under the Second Amendment. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2125–26, 2129–
   30.   “When      the   Second     Amendment’s       plain    text   covers   an
   individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct.
   The [G]overnment must then justify its regulation by demonstrating that it
   is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Id.
   at 2129-30. Only if the Government meets its burden “may a court conclude
   that the individual’s conduct falls outside the Second Amendment’s
   ‘unqualified command.’” Id. at 2130 (internal citation omitted).
          Prior to Bruen, this court routinely rejected Second Amendment
   challenges to § 922(g)(1). See, e.g., United States v. Darrington, 351 F.3d 632,
   633–34 (5th Cir. 2003); United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir.
   2001); United States v. Ybarra, 70 F.3d 362, 364 (5th Cir. 1995). We recently
   stated on de novo review, however, that “Bruen clearly fundamentally
   change[d] our analysis of laws that implicate the Second Amendment” and
   rendered our previously adopted two-step framework precedent “obsolete.”
   United States v. Rahimi, 61 F.4th 443, 450–61 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 143
   S.Ct. 2688 (2023) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Our
   reasoning in Rahimi demonstrated our analytical shift after the Bruen
   decision. Relying on the Bruen framework, we held in Rahimi that §

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   922(g)(8), which bans the possession of a firearm by a person subject to a
   domestic violence restraining order, was unconstitutional. Id. at 450–51.
          Here, Smith argues that Bruen supports his assertion that Congress
   exceeded its powers by enacting § 922(g)(1), thus rendering it
   unconstitutional under the Second Amendment. He further contends that
   the district court’s failure to advise him on § 922(g)(1)’s unconstitutional
   infringement constituted reversible error. Nevertheless, he concedes in his
   reply brief on appeal that he cannot show clear or obvious error at this time.
   We agree.
          Post Bruen, the Eighth Circuit recently concluded that § 922(g)(1)
   remains constitutional when applied to convicted felons. United States v.
   Jackson, 69 F.4th 495, 502 (8th Cir. 2023). Likewise, this court recently held
   in an unpublished opinion that, in the absence of binding precedent post-
   Bruen—§ 922(n)’s prohibition of the possession of firearms while under
   indictment—“is not consonant with a finding of plain error.” United States
   v. Avila, No. 22-50088, 2022 WL 17832287, at *2 (5th Cir. Dec. 21, 2022)
   (per curiam). Moreover, in another unpublished opinion, a panel of this court
   observed that “there is no binding precedent explicitly holding that §
   922(g)(1) is unconstitutional on its face.” United States v. Garza, 22-51021,
   2023 WL 4044442, at *1 (5th Cir. June 15, 2023) (per curiam).
          Consequently, given the lack of binding authority deeming § 922(g)(1)
   unconstitutional, Smith cannot demonstrate an error that is clear or obvious.
   Rodriguez-Parra, 581 F.3d at 230–31. Accordingly, we hold that the district
   court did not plainly err by accepting Smith’s guilty plea.
                           IV.     CONCLUSION
          For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s judgment is
   AFFIRMED.

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