Court Opinion

ID: 9552777
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:16:29.123109+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:28:56.103896
License: Public Domain

O’NEAL, J.
(dissenting). I am unable to concur in majority opinion herein insofar as it holds that under the provision of section 2, Title 85, S. L. 1943, a permanent partial disability to the foot may not be combined with a previous disability to the back so as to fix liability on the Special Indemnity Fund in less than permanent total disability cases.
There can be no doubt that claimant was a “physically impaired person” as defined in Title 85, sec. 1, S. L. 1943. Claimant suffered an accidental injury to his back December 31, 1940, for which he was awarded compensation. The second injury occurred January 20, 1945. That injury was to claimant’s right foot, 10% permanent partial disability to the foot, and also injury to the chest and shoulders, 10% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The State Industrial Commission found that as a result of combining the injuries of January 20, 1945, and the injuries of 1940, claimant has a 35% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole which is materially greater than the disability due to the last injury alone, and entered an award against the Special Indemnity Fund accordingly. There is ample evidence to sustain the finding of the State Industrial Commission.
The majority opinion states that we have consistently held that disabilities from injuries to unclassified and unscheduled parts of the body, such as the shoulder, chest and back (“Other Cases” injuries) cannot be combined with disabilities resulting from injury to classified and scheduled members of the body, such as the legs and feet, unless in permanent total disability cases. In support of this statement the majority opinion cites Special Indemnity Fund v. Lee et al., 200 Okla. 327, 193 P. 2d 305; Special Indemnity Fund v. McMillin, 198 Okla. 412, 179 P. 2d *244475; Special Indemnity Fund v. Wade et al., 199 Okla. 547, 189 P. 2d 609, and Special Indemnity Fund v. Bonner et al., 198 Okla. 491, 180 P. 2d 191.
I submit that neither the McMillin case, nor the Bonner case, has any application. The question here involved was not involved in either the McMillin case, or the Bonner case. We did so hold in the Lee case, supra, and the Wade case, supra, and also in Henry Schafer, Inc., v. Mitchell, 200 Okla. 510, 198 P. 2d 397, and in Special Indemnity Fund v. McWhorter, 200 Okla. 469, 196 P. 2d 689. The Lee case, supra, the Schafer case, supra, and the McWhorter case, supra, are all based on Special Indemnity Fund v. Wade, supra.
I am firmly convinced that the Wade case misconstrues the law as it now exists. The only authority for the statement in the Wade case, supra, is Mudge Oil Co. v. Wagnon, 193 Okla. 466, 145 P. 2d 185. In turn the Mudge Oil Company case is based almost entirely upon Eubanks v. Barnsdall Oil Co., 169 Okla. 31, 35 P. 2d 873. The previously impaired person statute was not involved in either of said cases. They both involved multiple injuries sustained in the same accident. The principal reason for holding that disability arising out of an injury to a specific or classified member could not be combined with disabilities arising out of an injury of the “other cases” class, was because, as the law then stood, disability of the one class was not compensable on the same basis as disabilities of the other class, in that disability arising out of the total or partial loss of a specific member was the arbitrary number of weeks’ compensation specified in 85 O. S. 1941 §22, while compensation under the “other cases” clause was based upon the difference between the claimant’s average weekly wage and his wage-earning capacity after the injury.
In 1941, Title 85, sec. 3, S. L. 1941, page 478, the Legislature amended the “other cases” clause so as to make compensation therefor 66 2/3% of the average weekly wage during that portion of the number of weeks which the partial disability of the employees bears to ' the permanent total disability. In other words, compensation under the “other cases” clause is now based upon the percentage of total disability the same as other injuries. That entirely removed any reason for holding that disabilities arising under the “other cases” clause may not be combined with disabilities arising from the loss or partial loss of a specific member. That amendment renders the Mudge Oil Co. case, supra, and the Eubanks case, supra, entirely inapplicable.
In addition thereto, sec. 2, Title 85, Special Indemnity Act of 1943, specifically provides that if an employee who is a “physically impaired person” receives an accidental personal injury compensable under the Workmen’s Compensation Law, which results in additional permanent disability so that the degree of disability is materially greater by the combination of both disabilities than that which would have resulted from the subsequent injury alone, the employee shall receive compensation on the basis of such combined disabilities as is provided by law. That Act makes no exceptions, and there are no distinctions between injury to specific members and “other cases” injuries. That, as I view it, is specific authority, is not specific direction, for the combination of physical disabilities.
My view is that the Wade case, supra, establishes a rule in cases such as the one here involved which was not contemplated by the Legislature, is impracticable, and is not supported by logic, reason or authority and works an injustice to those entitled to the benefits of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. See opinion of Mr. Justice Arnold, concurring in part and dissenting in part, in Trigg Drilling Co. et al. v. Daniels, 193 Okla. 644, 145 P. 2d 944. Special Indemnity Fund v. Wade, supra, and all subsequent cases based thereon should be overruled insofar as they *245hold that in no case can disabilities arising from injury to a specific member be combined with disabilities arising from injuries in the “other cases” class.
There is another matter which I think should be considered in this case. The Wade case holds that though an injury to the hip and back, whether old or new, may not be combined with a leg injury, but the State Industrial Commission should disregard the back or hip injury altogether, and could consider an injury to the leg which grew out of or was caused by the hip or back injury, and combine such injury to, or disability of, the leg. In the instant case the majority opinion holds that an order could be made, if medical testimony on the point justified it, as to combined disability resulting from the old and new injury to the body, that is, the back, shoulder and chest. The case was not considered from that standpoint by the Commission. In view of the holding of the court on that matter justice requires that the cause should be remanded to the State Industrial Commission, with directions to permit the claimant, if he so desires, to present evidence going to the question of subsequent injury to the back, shoulder and chest, separate and apart from any injury to the foot.
For the reasons above stated, I respectfully dissent.