Court Opinion

ID: 9564295
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:57:36.768845+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:20.302081
License: Public Domain

Smith, Judge,
concurring specially.
I agree with Mize v. State, 140 Ga. App. 17 (3) (230 SE2d 81) (1976), which states that evidence of other offenses is inadmissible when the defendant has been acquitted of the other offenses. However, Taylor v. State, 174 Ga. 52 (7) (162 SE 504) (1931), decrees to the contrary.
The Taylor line of reasoning follows the reasoning put forth in cases dealing with probation revocations. See Johnson v. State, 142 Ga. App. 124 (235 SE2d 550) (1977) (Judge Smith dissenting); affd. 240 Ga. 526 (242 SE2d 53) (1977), which held that the same evidence presented on the trial of Johnson for burglary, wherein he was acquitted, could be used to revoke his probation. However, I feel an acquittal amounts to a conclusive determination that there is insufficient evidence to convict. Therefore, once the defendant has been adjudged "innocent,” he should forever be treated as innocent. I believe that once a person has been found innocent of a given offense by his or her peers, evidence of such a prior offense of a similar nature should be inadmissible, even for the purpose of showing identity, motive, plan, scheme, bent of mind or course of conduct of the accused. Evidence as to the acquittal would not be admissible in a civil case (Webb v. McDaniel, 218 Ga. 366 (2) (127 SE2d 900) (1962)), and neither should it be admissible in a criminal case. Due to *21Taylor v. State, supra, I am powerless to do anything about it. For this reason only, I concur with the majority.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Quillian joins in this special concurrence.