Court Opinion

ID: 9588745
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:38:06.684976+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:47:52.556900
License: Public Domain

EAGLES, Judge.
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the factors in aggravation outweigh the factors in *68mitigation and imposing the maximum sentence of ten years for the Class H felony, the presumptive sentence for which is three years.
Pursuant to G.S. 15A-1340.4(a)(l), the trial court found the following facts in aggravation:
6. The offense was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.
15. The defendant has a prior conviction or convictions for criminal offenses punishable by more than 60 days’ confinement.
16. Additional written findings of factors in aggravation.
a. The defendant on his own admission was associated with people who was (sic) members of a motorcycle gang, who had had records for dealing in drugs.
b. The defendant conspired with others to commit the crime.
c. That the defendant went there with a baseball bat, and shotgun, and went over to do revenge.
d. That [although] the defendant was not charged with conspiracy, there was strong evidence of a conspiracy . . . with others, who were sentenced to life sentences for 1st Degree murder [and who] went there for the purpose of recovering drugs and money taken from Regina Deadmon.
The following factor was found in mitigation:
3. The defendant was a passive participant or played a minor role in the commission of the offense.
Defendant first argues that the trial judge erred in finding that the crime was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel. At the sentencing hearing, the trial judge stated that he based his findings of this factor of aggravation upon the defendant’s action of “going over there at that lady’s house and knocking the door in at 11:30 at night . ...” We agree with the defendant that this circumstance falls far short of the “excessive brutality” or “conscienceless, pitiless or unnecessarily tortuous” [sic] conduct necessary to categorize a crime as heinous, atrocious or cruel. *69See, State v. Ahearn, 307 N.C. 584, 599, 300 S.E. 2d 689, 698 (1983), quoting State v. Pinch, 306 N.C. 1, 34, 292 S.E. 2d 203, 228 (1982).
In the second finding of an aggravating factor, the record reveals that defense counsel stipulated that defendant had a prior conviction for a criminal offense punishable by more than 60 days’ confinement, i.e., driving under the influence of an intoxicating beverage. However, there is no evidence as to whether the defendant was indigent at the time of this prior conviction and if so, whether he was represented by counsel. In the absence of this supporting evidence, the trial judge’s finding of a prior conviction cannot be upheld. See, State v. Thompson, 60 N.C. App. 679, 300 S.E. 2d 29 (1983).
We agree with the defendant that the trial judge erred in finding as an aggravating factor that the defendant associated with members of a motorcycle gang who had dealt in drugs. This finding of “culpability by association” bears no relation to the stated purposes of the Fair Sentencing Act. See, G.S. 15A-1340.3.
We also agree with defendant’s argument that the trial judge violated the prohibition of G.S. 15A-1340.4(a)(l) against using the same item of evidence to prove more than one factor in aggravation. Two of the aggravating factors, set out at 16(b) and (d), are essentially restatements of each other, i.e., that defendant conspired with others in his participation in the events of the crime which took place on 29 November 1981.
Error has also occurred in the trial judge’s finding as an aggravating factor that “defendant went there with a . . . shotgun . . . to do revenge.” G.S. 15A-1340.4(a)(l) mandates that “(e)vidence necessary to prove an element of the offense may not be used to prove any factor in aggravation . . . .” Defendant was indicted for first degree burglary, i e., the nighttime breaking and entering of an occupied apartment with the intent to commit the felony of “assault(ing) two black males with a deadly weapon, a shotgun, with intent to kill.” Defendant was convicted of an attempt to commit this crime. Evidence that defendant traveled to the apartment in question with a shotgun for the purpose of revenge ^?as an essential part of the State’s proof of the charged offense.
*70Because of the errors committed in the sentencing phase of defendant’s trial, the case is remanded for resentencing in accordance with this opinion.
Remanded for resentencing.
Judge WEBB concurs.
Chief Judge VAUGHN dissents.