Court Opinion

ID: 9604405
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:21:17.114139+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:22.070182
License: Public Domain

Bobbitt, J.,
concurring in result: I concur in the result. As to one feature, my ideas differ from those expressed in the Court’s opinion.
Where the husband purchases property and causes it to be conveyed to his wife, the law presumes that it is a gift and no resulting trust arises. Shue v. Shue, 241 N.C. 65, 84 S.E. 2d 302, and cases cited. This, in my opinion, is a true presumption. Although rebuttable, the significance of this true presumption is that the fact is deemed established unless and until it is rebutted by clear, strong, cogent and convincing evidence. Stansbury, N. C. Evidence, sec. 215 et seq.; Shue v. Shue, supra.
True, in Carlisle v. Carlisle, 225 N.C. 462, 35 S.E. 2d 418, and in other cases, we have referred to such presumption as a presumption of fact; but, upon analysis of such cases, I think it clear that the phrase, a presumption of fact, as used therein, signifies only that the fact of gift is presumed. Its status as a true presumption casts the burden of proof upon any person who asserts that the true fact is otherwise. Stansbury, N. C. Evidence, sec. 215 et seq.
We have here a different situation from that considered in Carlisle v. Carlisle, supra, and similar cases. In that case, the husband caused the deed to be made to his wife. He undertook to rebut the true presumption of gift by evidence tending to show that he directed the deed to be so made pursuant to their agreement that she was to hold title for their joint benefit.
Here there is no allegation or evidence that the deed was made to plaintiff’s wife under such an agreement. Therefore, if in fact plaintiff caused the deed to be made to his wife, there is no evidence to rebut the aforesaid true presumption.
The difference here is that plaintiff’s case rests on two elements, first, that he paid the entire purchase price, and second, that the deed *681was made to his wife, rather than to husband and wife, by mistake, without his knowledge or consent.
In the absence of testimony tending to show that he caused the deed to be made to his wife, this question arises: What presumption, if any, arises from the fact, standing alone, that the deed was made to his wife? In my opinion, the greatest significance that can be given thereto is that it gives rise to a presumption of fact, but only in the sense of an inference that he caused the deed to be so made. Such inference constitutes evidence for consideration by the jury.
Under the facts of this case, the burden of proof was not on defendant to establish that the deed was a deed of gift. The court properly placed upon plaintiff the burden of establishing the aforesaid two elements of his case by clear, strong, cogent and convincing evidence; and the jury found that he had done so.
In Flanner v. Butler, 131 N.C. 155, 42 S.E. 547, the distinction I am now considering was not drawn into focus; and the Court may well have used the phrase, “presumption of fact,” in the sense so often used, to wit, an inference of fact. Too, in view of the jury’s verdict, to wit, that the deed was made to the wife without the husband’s knowledge and consent, the expression, if used in a sense different from that indicated, did not materially affect the decision and may well be regarded as a dictum. Moreover, the case cited in Flanner v. Butler, supra, in support of the statement that, nothing else appearing, “the law, owing to the relation of the parties, will presume that the husband intended it as a gift or present to his wife,” is Thurber v. LaRoque, 105 N.C. 301, 11 S.E. 460. In that case, it was established that the deed was made to the wife “at the instance and request of” the husband. The question involved was whether such deed of gift should be set aside as a fraudulent conveyance at the instance of the husband’s creditors.
In short, my view is that the fact, standing alone, that the deed was made to the wife gave rise to no more than an inference of gift. If this be true, it was a subsidiary feature of the case; and, certainly so in the absence of a special request therefor, no instruction relating to the nature of this inference was required.
Hence, in respect of the feature here concerned, I reach the same conclusion by a different course of reasoning.
RodmaN, J., concurs in concurring opinion.