Court Opinion

ID: 9861067
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:40:21.173064+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:27:09.591272
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE SCHOSTOK, concurring in part and dissenting in part: While I am sympathetic to the majority’s effort to find a basis on which to affirm the trial court’s grant of the defendant’s final fee petition in this case, I do not believe that the Act authorizes payment of child-representative fees for services rendered after the child representative has been discharged. The defendant incurred $1,470 in fees prior to her discharge, and the plaintiff does not contest the award of these fees on appeal. I therefore concur in the majority’s disposition insofar as it relates to these predischarge fees. However, there is nothing in the Act that allows the defendant to be paid as a child representative for the services she rendered when she was no longer the child representative. I therefore respectfully dissent from the majority’s affirmance of the trial court’s award of the postdischarge fees. The majority concedes that the plain language of the Act contemplates the payment of fees for work done by a child representative only during the course of his or her representation. 386 Ill. App. 3d at 351. It is uncontested that the defendant’s representation of the children in this case ceased on December 19, 2006, when the trial court granted her motion to withdraw and discharged her. Nevertheless, the majority affirms the grant of the defendant’s postdischarge fees on the tenuous ground that, because the trial court could have reappointed the defendant for the purpose of responding to the plaintiff’s subpoena (thereby permitting her to recover her fees under section 506 of the Act), its failure to do so should be considered an oversight that unfairly penalized the defendant. 386 Ill. App. 3d at 352. This is a perilous approach to appellate review. The record does not disclose why the trial court simultaneously ordered the defendant to comply with the plaintiffs subpoena and discharged her from her representation of the children. In the absence of evidence on this point, it is not our role to speculate. Nor can such speculation justify departing from the plain strictures of the Act: “The most fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is that a court must give effect to the intent of the legislature. King v. First Capital Financial Services Corp., 215 Ill. 2d 1, 26 (2005). The best indicator of legislative intent is the language used in the statute itself, and, where possible, that language must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. King, 215 Ill. 2d at 26. A court may not ‘ “supply omissions, remedy defects, annex new provisions, substitute different provisions, add exceptions, limitations, or conditions, or otherwise change the law” ’ if doing so would depart from the plain language of the statute. King, 215 Ill. 2d at 26, quoting In re Marriage of Beyer, 324 Ill. App. 3d 305, 309-10 (2001). If the language of the statute is clear, a court must follow it without resorting to other aids of construction. King, 215 Ill. 2d at 26.” Millineum Maintenance Management, Inc. v. County of Lake, 384 Ill. App. 3d 638, 644-45 (2008). Here, the language of the Act is clear: a child’s representative may recover fees for work done only during the course of representation. The Act simply does not support awarding fees for work performed after discharge from representation. The majority is concerned that denying the defendant her postdischarge fees could discourage attorneys from serving as child representatives. 386 Ill. App. 3d at 351. There is no reason, however, why a child representative cannot avoid all danger by simply waiting until all services have been rendered before seeking discharge. Other attorneys involved in dissolution proceedings face similar limitations on their ability to recover for their services. See, e.g., 750 ILCS 5/503(j)(l) (West 2006) (petitions for contribution to attorney fees must be filed within 30 days of the dissolution judgment). In addition, other types of witnesses responding to subpoenas face similar challenges in ensuring that they are adequately compensated for their time and expenses. These witnesses, many of whom are professionals whose time is equally valuable as the defendant’s time, commonly find ways to achieve reasonable compensation without resort to statutory compensation schemes such as section 506 of the Act. Here, the defendant’s postdischarge fees result either from complying with document production requests and the plaintiff’s subpoena (expenses faced by multitudes of other witnesses in civil suits each day) or from her own efforts to avoid such compliance (expenses typically borne by witnesses seeking to avoid having to comply). While I am not unsympathetic to the defendant’s plight, I do not find it to be the type of “absurd result” that would justify a departure from the plain language of the Act. People v. McCarty, 223 Ill. 2d 109, 126 (2006). Accordingly, I would reduce the defendant’s child-representative fee award from $3,115 to $1,470, for services rendered through her December 19, 2006, discharge date, and affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Winnebago County as modified.