Court Opinion

ID: 9597772
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:02:45.440643+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:39.269958
License: Public Domain

Miller, Justice,

dissenting:

The record in this case is uncontroverted that the applicant, Harley E. Warrick, dba Warrick Trucking, a resident of Pennsylvania, was seeking a common carrier certificate of convenience and necessity to haul certain products in the territory of Hancock, Brooke and Ohio Counties, in which area the appellants, Weirton Ice and Coal Supply Company and Don Swart Trucking, Inc., held similar certificates covering the same type of products.
While these latter two companies elected to appeal the Commission’s order, the record shows that there were six other common carriers hauling the same type of commodities in the same three-county area which had initially protested the application of Warrick.
The majority concludes that W.Va. Code, 24A-2-5, only requires the Public Service Commission to find that the public convenience and necessity require the proposed service. W.Va. Code, 24A-2-5(a), in addition to the public convenience and necessity standard, requires that:
“Before granting a certificate to a common carrier by motor vehicle the commission shall take into consideration existing transportation facilities in the territory for which a certificate is sought, and in case it finds from the evidence that the service furnished by existing transportation facilities is reasonably efficient and adequate, the commission shall not grant such certificate.”
This Court has always recognized that a finding of public convenience and necessity is not alone sufficient to warrant the granting of a certificate to a common *150carrier, since the statute also requires the further finding that there is an inadequacy in the existing service. Moreover, this further finding was required when authority to issue certificates was vested in the State Road Commission. Under W.Va. Code, 17-6-4 (1931), the pertinent language was: “... and that the service so proposed to be rendered by the applicant is not being adequately performed at the time of such application by any other person, partnership or corporation.”
In Monongahela West Penn Public Service Co. v. State Road Commission, 104 W. Va. 183, 192, 139 S.E. 744, 748 (1927), this Court summarized the point as follows:
“Courts and Commissions construing statutes similar to ours have uniformly held that the necessity and convenience referred to is that of the public generally as distinguished from that of a number of individuals or a community, and that the inadequacy of the existing service and the convenience or necessity of the proposed service must both affirmatively appear from the evidence.”
As previously noted, parallel language exists under W.Va. Code, 24A-2-5 (a), and has been recognized to require the further finding that the existing service is not adequate. Atlantic Greyhound Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 132 W. Va. 650, 54 S.E.2d 169 (1949).
There is an express legislative policy set out in W.Va. Code, 24A-1-1, which requires the Commission to consider not only the public convenience and necessity, but also the subsidiary goal of protecting existing certificate holders against unnecessary duplication or competition. As aptly stated by a unanimous Court speaking through Judge Browning in Charleston Transit co. v. Public Service Commission, 142 W. Va. 750, 759, 98 S.E.2d 437, 442-43 (1957):
“While the convenience of the public is the paramount consideration of the law, if it is accompanied by necessity, this Court has always recognized that an incident to the regulation of a public monopoly is the protection of a certificate *151holder against unnecessary duplication or competition.”
Until the Legislature sees fit to change this policy, it seems to me that we are required to see that the Public Service Commission enforces it.
This brings me to the heart of my dissent. As the majority openly admits: “The order does not recite specific findings of fact but ... it did find ‘that the public convenience and necessity requires [sic] the proposed service.’7,1
In two recent cases this Court reversed orders of the Public Service Commission in part because they contained no express factual findings which would enable intelligent judicial review. In Mountain Trucking Company v. Daniels, 156 W. Va. 855, 860, 197 S.E.2d 819, 822 (1973), this was stated: “There was no finding of facts by the Commission; nor was an opinion written which, upon appellate review, would make known to the Court the motivating circumstances which influenced the decision.”
If this message was not clear, the Court, again by a unanimous decision in Mountain Trucking Company v. Public Service Commission, W. Va., 216 S.E.2d 566 (1975), stated in Syllabus Three:
“Where an administrative agency is required to find facts or state reasons as a basis for its or*152der, the order must contain findings of facts, rather than conclusory statements, so as to withstand judicial scrutiny.”
The majority states, however, that Mountain Trucking Company v. Public Service Commission, supra, is inapposite to the instant case because findings and reasons are required “only where ‘an administrative agency is required to find facts or state reasons as a basis for its order.’ ” The majority then concludes that an examination of the pertinent statutes reveals that the only finding necessary in a common carrier order is that the Commission find from the evidence that the public convenience and necessity require the proposed service. Thus, the majority holds that the Public Service Commission is required to include in its order only the ultimate finding of public convenience and necessity.
But the “finding” made by the Commission is a conclusion of law, or at least a determination of a mixed question of law and fact. Consideration of the evidence adduced at the hearing required the Public Service Commission to determine which facts of a basic and underlying nature controlled the issues to be decided. It was only from these facts that the ultimate finding of public convenience and necessity could be inferred.
I am of the opinion that it is not enough for the Public Service Commission to make only the ultimate finding. Basic findings or basic facts enable a reviewing court to determine whether the Commission has acted arbitrarily. See, Jaffe, Administrative Findings or the Ameer in America, 34 Cornell Law Quarterly 473, 492-93 (1949).
Moreover, basic findings alert the parties to the reason for the decision, thereby allowing them to prepare accordingly for a rehearing or judicial review. “Furthermore, a disappointed party, whether he plans further proceedings or not, deserves to have the satisfaction of knowing why he lost his case.” 2 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 16.05 at 448 (1958).
Basic findings can also serve to help the Commission avoid careless or arbitrary action. There is no assurance *153that an administrative agency has made a reasoned analysis if it need state only the ultimate finding of public convenience and necessity. Undoubtedly, if the Commission had been required to set down its findings, it would have realized the paucity of the evidence.
The applicant, Warrick, supplied no evidence since he had no occasion to call for hauling services. His only information was hearsay which indicated that some of his customers mentioned that they had difficulty getting hauling services, but he could not identify either the customers or the hauler by name or approximate date.
Warrick presented five witnesses. One owned a mobile home court and testified that on one occasion she had difficulty getting some material hauled. A second individual testified that on one occasion he needed slag and unsuccessfully called three companies to obtain hauling, none of which were the eight protestants involved in this case.
A third witness had been in the home building business on a small scale some four to five years prior to the hearing. He could remember calling only one of the carriers and having difficulty getting delivery. He was not aware of the current situation.
The fourth witness was a home owner who claimed to have trouble getting top soil delivered for his front lawn. His testimony revealed that he had only called one of the eight haulers involved. The final witness was a full-time employee of Weirton Steel Company, who engaged in home construction in his spare time. His testimony was that while he could get trucking services, it was not as rapid as he wanted.
Appellants’ testimony was that the eight existing haulers’ services were not fully utilized. They denied turning customers away, although they acknowledged that on occasion it was not possible to give one-day service.
It seems incredible to me, under the evidence as presented, that there could be any finding that the public *154convenience and necessity warranted the issuance of another certificate or that the existing eight carriers were not rendering adequate service.
I am authorized to state that Justice McGraw joins with me in this dissent.

 The order, after reciting the appearance of the parties and counsel, merely concluded as follows:
“UPON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF the Commission is of opinion and finds that the public convenience and necessity requires the service which the applicants proposes [sic] to render and that a certificate of convenience and necessity should be issued to him, as hereinafter set forth, and in all other respects said application should be denied.
“IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that there be, and hereby is, issued unto the applicant, Harley E. Warrick, doing business as Warrick Trucking, a certificate of convenience and necessity designated P.S.C. M.C. Certificate No. F-5895 to operate two (2) trucks as a common carrier in the transportation of dirt, slag, coal and asphalt in the Counties of Hancock, Brooke and Ohio.”