Court Opinion

ID: 9476119
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:47:43.729361+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:08.019006
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The supplemental Allen charge urging the jury to reach a verdict and the Bras-field inquiry into the jury’s numerical division have no place in the sentencing phase of a death penalty case. A jury considering whether to impose a life or death sen*300tence is likely to interpret these actions of the judge as a suggestion or command to choose death. With great deference to the opinion of the majority, I therefore respectfully dissent.
A.
The Allen charge, deriving its name from Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 17 S.Ct. 154, 41 L.Ed. 528 (1896), refers to “supplemental instructions urging a jury to forego their differences and come to a unanimous decision.”1 The charge, so often criticized for its coercive tendencies,2 has been upheld 3 as not per se unconstitutional in the usual criminal case.4 Nevertheless, the appellate court must scrutinize5 an Allen charge for compliance with “two requirements”: “(1) the semantic deviation from approved ‘Allen’ charges cannot be so prejudicial to the defendant as to require reversal, and (2) the circumstances surrounding the giving of an approved ‘Allen’ charge must not be coercive.”6 We proceed on a case by case basis7 under a totality of the circumstances test.8 The “potential for coercion is present in even the most mild supplemental instructions,”9 and an Allen charge wholly unobjectionable in its content may nonetheless be coercive in light of the circumstances under which it was given.10 Finally, although we should not grant habeas corpus relief to a state defendant merely because the state trial court made minor deviations from approved Allen charges,11 the defendant may show in federal habeas corpus proceedings that the charge was unconstitutionally coercive 12 under the totality of the circumstances.13
Trial judge inquiry into the numerical division of the jury is similarly coercive. In Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S. 448, 449-50, 47 S.Ct. 135, 135-36, 71 L.Ed. 345 (1926), the Supreme Court condemned this practice as a ground for reversal. In Brasfield, the practice was condemned, even though the jury had not revealed “which number favored a conviction.” A Bras-*301field inquiry, especially in conjunction with an Allen charge, requires reversal.14 Debate has been sparked elsewhere over the question whether the Brasfield inquiry alone is a ground for relief in a federal habeas corpus proceeding.15 At the very least, however, the presence of a Brasfield inquiry tends to show unconstitutional coercion under the totality of the circumstances.16
B.
The “effect upon a divided jury” of an Allen charge or Brasfield inquiry “will often depend upon circumstances which cannot properly be known to the trial judge or to the appellate courts.”17 We cannot enter the jury room during deliberations; we cannot see into the mind of the deliberating juror. Thus, when we examine a case and test it for trial judge coercion of the jury under the totality of the circumstances, we must resort to reasonable inference and supposition.18
In the present case, the jury deliberated some thirteen hours in the guilt-innocence phase. The jury began deliberating in the guilt-innocence phase on May 14,1984. After further deliberations on May 15, 1984, the jury reached its verdict at 3:05 p.m. in this phase of the trial. That same day, May 15, 1984, at 6:05 p.m., over defense counsel objection,19 the trial judge began the sentencing phase of trial. He conducted the sentencing hearing, instructed the jury on sentencing, and directed the jury to begin deliberating on the question of life or death. Deliberations began at 8:17 p.m. After deliberating until 11:55 p.m. that evening, the jury complained that it was hungry and tired and that it had already come up with one verdict that day.20 Only then did the trial judge recess for the night. The next day, May 16, 1984, at 9:40 a.m., the jury continued deliberating. It continued its deliberations for more than five hours before telling the trial judge, in a note, that it was unable to agree upon a recommendation.
In his initial sentencing charge to the jury, the trial judge had explained that, in accordance with article 905.8 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure, if “the jury is unable to unanimously agree on a recommendation, the court shall impose a sentence of life imprisonment without benefit of probation, parole or suspension of sentence.”21 Nevertheless, upon the jury’s representation of deadlock in its note to the judge, the trial judge for the first time declined to invoke the article 905.8 procedure. Instead, the judge had the jury return to the courtroom and instructed it again on the article 905.8 procedure. The judge then asked the jury “if further deliberations would be helpful in obtaining a verdict.” The judge determined that four jurors felt further deliberations would not be helpful; eight jurors stated that further deliberations would be helpful. For the second time, the judge declined to accept the deadlock and apply the article 905.8 procedure. The judge then, purporting to rephrase the question, determined to ask the same question again. He asked, “Do you feel that any further deliberations will enable you to arrive at a verdict?” This *302time, eleven jurors answered yes; one juror, however, persisted in saying that further deliberations would not be helpful. For the third time, the judge declined to accept the deadlock. Instead, he gave the Allen charge, urging the jurors “to reexamine your own views and to change your opinion if you are convinced you are wrong” “with the objective of reaching a just verdict,” and directed further deliberations. Within thirty minutes, the jury returned a verdict recommending death.
This sequence of events gives rise to a strong inference of coercion at the sentencing phase of trial. Taking the guilt-innocence and sentencing phases together, the jury had deliberated without meaningful break for approximately twenty-two or more hours.22 When the jury first indicated its deadlock, the trial judge declined to impose life imprisonment under article 905.8, which the judge had stated would apply in the event of deadlock. The jurors dissenting from the recommendation of death might well have understood that the judge favored the death penalty. The judge then reinforced this understanding by twice polling the jury and delivering the Allen charge.
Four jurors were isolated by the first polling as being opposed to further deliberations. To be sure, the judge had asked, not directly about the jury’s numerical division on the question of life versus death, but about its division over the helpfulness of further deliberations. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to conclude that the four jurors opposing further deliberations also opposed the recommendation of death; those jurors who would produce a deadlock by opposing further deliberations knew from what the trial judge had told them about article 905.8 that a deadlock would result in life imprisonment. Clearly, these four knew that the same logic was apparent to the trial judge.
Then, in quick succession to his first polling, the judge, while purporting to rephrase the question, effectively rejected the jurors’ responses to the first polling by posing the same question. With their position on the ultimate question exposed, the four jurors might well have understood the second polling on the same question as a signal from the judge that he favored the death penalty. The result of the second polling was predictable: Four dissenters had been whittled down to one. By then rejecting this deadlock, the judge again signalled with inescapable clarity to the one remaining hold-out juror that the bench favored the death penalty. At this point, the judge urged the jurors to return a unanimous verdict. Within thirty minutes,23 they complied.
The conjunction of the Brasfield inquiry and an Allen charge is especially condemned because
the coercive impact of even a modest Allen charge is heightened when preceded by any inquiry as to the jury’s numerical division. When that is done, the impression is inherently conveyed to the jury that the revelation of their division prompted the giving of the subsequent verdict-urging instruction and that it is, therefore, directed toward the minority jurors.[24]
In practical effect, a trial judge thereby tells minority jurors, especially when their position is known to the judge, to abandon that position. That occurred here: first to the four dissenting jurors and then a second time to the last dissenting juror.
C.
Were this an ordinary criminal case, the coercive practices outlined above would perhaps be constitutionally permissible. This is not, however, an ordinary case. Here a man has been condemned to death. Because of the “qualitative difference” between death and all other punishments, *303“there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.”25 Consequently, the Supreme Court “ ‘has condemned procedures in capital cases that might be completely acceptable in an ordinary case.’ ”26
In addition to the need for extreme reliability in capital cases, the capital sentencing jury is peculiarly vulnerable to coercion, intended or effective, from the bench. In the usual criminal case, the jurors apply common legal norms supplied by the court’s instructions. By contrast, the breadth of mitigating evidence and considerations available to capital sentencing jurors27 especially contributes to make theirs a “‘highly subjective, “unique, individualized judgment regarding the punishment that a particular person deserves.” ’ ”28 Unlike jurors in the usual case, capital sentencing jurors do not necessarily apply the same norms to mitigating evidence. Under these circumstances, deadlock may readily result and persist with no available means of resolution — unless by coercion.
As a society we have evolved too far to permit such coercion of jurors in death penalty cases. Given the critical need for caution in capital cases as well as the particular vulnerability of capital sentencing jurors, the inherently coercive Allen and Brasfield practices implemented at the sentencing phase of Lowenfield’s trial must be condemned as constitutionally repugnant.29 Because the majority declines to do so, I must dissent.

. United States v. Bottom, 638 F.2d 781, 786 n. 4 (5th Cir.1981); see also United States v. Taylor, 530 F.2d 49, 51 n. 5 (5th Cir.1976) (“The term 'Allen Charge’ is commonly used to refer to supplemental charges given to deadlocked juries encouraging jurors to reconsider their position").

. E.g., United States v. Blevinal, 607 F.2d 1124, 1128-29 (5th Cir.1979) (Godbold, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 928, 100 S.Ct. 1315, 63 L.Ed.2d 761 (1980); United States v. Amaya, 509 F.2d 8, 12-13 (5th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1101, 97 S.Ct. 1125, 51 L.Ed.2d 551 (1977); United States v. Vigo, 435 F.2d 1347, 1350 (5th Cir.1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 908, 91 S.Ct. 2214, 29 L.Ed.2d 684 (1971); Thaggard v. United States, 354 F.2d 735, 739-41 (5th Cir.1965) (Coleman, J., concurring), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 958, 86 S.Ct. 1222, 16 L.Ed.2d 301 (1966); Walker v. United States, 342 F.2d 22, 27-29 (5th Cir.) (Brown, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 859, 86 S.Ct. 117, 15 L.Ed.2d 97 (1965); Green v. United States, 309 F.2d 852, 854-56 (5th Cir.1962); Andrews v. United States, 309 F.2d 127, 129-30 (5th Cir.1962) (Wisdom, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 946, 83 S.Ct. 939, 9 L.Ed.2d 970 (1963); Huffman v. United States, 297 F.2d 754, 755-59 (5th Cir.) (Brown, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 955, 82 S.Ct. 1605, 8 L.Ed.2d 820 (1962).

. United States v. Bailey, 480 F.2d 518, 518 (5th Cir.1973) (en banc).

. See Bailey, 480 F.2d at 520 (Goldberg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

. Blevinal, 607 F.2d at 1126.

. Bottom, 638 F.2d at 787; see also United States v. Cheramie, 520 F.2d 325, 328 (5th Cir.1975).

. United States v. Kimmel, 777 F.2d 290, 294 (5th Cir.1985), cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 106 S.Ct. 1947, 90 L.Ed.2d 357 (1986).

. United States v. Fossler, 597 F.2d 478, 484-85 (5th Cir.1979).

. Blevinal, 607 F.2d at 1126.

. Fossler, 597 F.2d at 483-85; United States v. Williams, 447 F.2d 894, 899-900 (5th Cir.1971).

. See Cheramie, 520 F.2d at 330 n. 6.

. Bryan v. Wainwright, 511 F.2d 644, 646 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 837, 96 S.Ct. 63, 46 L.Ed.2d 55 (1975).

. The majority opinion suggests that Lowenfield has not challenged the Allen charge. Supra at 293-94. Though he has not explicitly challenged the wording of the Allen charge, Lowenfield does contend that the circumstances at sentencing, including the fact that an Allen charge was given, show that the jury was coerced. Petitioner’s Memorandum of Law at 29-33.

. United States v. Chanya, 700 F.2d 192, 193-94 (5th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 943, 104 S.Ct. 1925, 80 L.Ed.2d 471 (1984); Cheramie, 520 F.2d at 331 n. 8; United States v. Hayes, 446 F.2d 309, 312 (5th Cir.1971); Cook v. United States, 254 F.2d 871, 873-75 (5th Cir.1958).

. Compare, e.g., Ellis v. Reed, 596 F.2d 1195, 1197 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 973, 100 S.Ct. 468, 62 L.Ed.2d 388 (1979), with id. at 1201-02 (Winter, J., dissenting).

. Ellis, 596 F.2d at 1200; Jones v. Norvell, 472 F.2d 1185, 1185-86 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986, 93 S.Ct. 2275, 36 L.Ed.2d 964 (1973).

. Brasfield, 272 U.S. at 450, 47 S.Ct. at 135-36.

. See Cheramie, 520 F.2d at 331-32; Amaya, 509 F.2d at 12-13; Williams, 447 F.2d at 900.

. ‘1 request a twenty-four to forty-eight hour delay for purposes to give them time to cool, the jury to cool from the verdict and also in preparation."

. “I think what’s happening, Your Honor, is the jury is tired. We’ve come up with one verdict. We haven’t eaten since noon by our own choice and the group is getting quite tired."

. La.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 905.8 (West 1984).

. See Kimmel, 777 F.2d at 295 (length of deliberations as factor).

. See Fossler, 597 F.2d at 485 (shortness of time from delivery of Allen charge to rendering of verdict as factor).

. Cornell v. Iowa, 628 F.2d 1044, 1048 n. 2 (8th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126, 101 S.Ct. 944, 67 L.Ed.2d 112 (1981); see also United States v. Sae-Chua, 725 F.2d 530, 531-32 (9th Cir.1984).

. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2991, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, Stevens, JJ.) (footnote omitted).

. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 705, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2073, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 913, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3405, 77 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).

. Hitchcock v. Dugger, _ U.S. _, 107 S.Ct. 1821, 1822-24, 95 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987); Skipper v. South Carolina, _ U.S. _, 106 S.Ct. 1669, 1670-71, 90 L-Ed.2d 1 (1986); see La.Code Crim. Proc.Ann. art. 905.5(h) (West 1984).
This was particularly so in the present case. As the majority opinion explains supra at 288-89, the single valid aggravating circumstance supporting Lowenfield’s sentence had been found at the guilt-innocence phase of the trial. At sentencing, there remained only mitigating evidence to consider.

. Turner v. Murray, _ U.S. _, 106 S.Ct. 1683, 1687, 90 L.Ed.2d 27 (1986) (opinion of White, Blackmun, Stevens, O’Connor, JJ.) (quoting Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 2645 n. 7, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985) (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 900, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2755, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment))).

. See Rush v. State, 491 A.2d 439, 448-54 (Del.1985); Patten v. State, 467 So.2d 975, 975, 979-80 (Fla.), cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 106 S.Ct. 198, 88 L.Ed.2d 167 (1985); Rose v. State, 425 So.2d 521, 524-25 (Fla.1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 909, 103 S.Ct. 1883, 76 L.Ed.2d 812 (1983).