Court Opinion

ID: 9911615
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-20 16:03:21.23101+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:53:05.275454
License: Public Domain

Third District Court of Appeal
                               State of Florida

                      Opinion filed December 20, 2023.
       Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                            ________________

                             No. 3D23-1759
                      Lower Tribunal No. F06-30750
                          ________________

                              Walter Bailey,
                                  Appellant,

                                     vs.

                         The State of Florida,
                                  Appellee.

      An Appeal under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(b)(2) from
the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Marisa Tinkler Mendez, Judge.

     Walter Bailey, in proper person.

     Ashley Moody, Attorney General, for appellee.

Before LOGUE, C.J., and EMAS and BOKOR, JJ.

     PER CURIAM.
      Affirmed. See § 775.087(2)(a)3., Fla. Stat. (2006) (providing that any

person convicted of an enumerated felony (including attempted murder) and

“during the course of the commission of such felony such person discharged

a firearm. . . and, as the result of the discharge, death or great bodily harm

was inflicted upon any person, the convicted person shall be sentenced to

a minimum term of imprisonment of not less than 25 years and not more than

a term of imprisonment of life in prison”) (emphasis added); State v. Waldron,

835 So. 2d 1217 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (reversing 15-year sentence because

jury expressly found defendant used and discharged a firearm during the

commission of an aggravated battery, resulting in great bodily harm, and

therefore requiring the trial court to impose a 25-year minimum mandatory

under the 10/20/Life statute, section 775.087(2)); State v. R.F., 648 So. 2d

293, 294 n.1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (“Where, as here, the trial court imposes a

sentence which is shorter than a required mandatory minimum sentence, the

sentence is not within the limits prescribed by law and is properly viewed as

an ‘illegal’ sentence”); State v. Lopez, 408 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982);

State v. Scanes, 973 So. 2d 659 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (reversing three-year

minimum mandatory sentence as illegal and remanding for imposition of

statutorily required ten-year minimum mandatory sentence; holding that

when a trial court imposes a sentence that is shorter than the required

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mandatory minimum sentence, the sentence is properly viewed as “illegal”)

(additional citations omitted); Allen v. State, 853 So. 2d 533, 534 (Fla. 5th

DCA 2003) (affirming trial court's modification of sentence from a three-year

minimum mandatory sentence to a ten-year minimum mandatory sentence

where sentencing statute required the imposition of a ten-year minimum

mandatory sentence, and therefore, three-year minimum mandatory

sentence was illegal). See also Kelsey v. State, 206 So. 3d 5, 11 (Fla. 2016)

(“In 2012, we clarified that jeopardy attaches only to a legal sentence”) (citing

Dunbar v. State, 89 So. 3d 901, 905 (Fla. 2012)); State v. Swider, 799 So.

2d 388, 391 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (“A trial court may vacate an illegal

sentence and impose a harsher sentence without violating the defendant's

double jeopardy rights”); Spatcher v. State, 228 So. 3d 1162, 1164 (Fla. 1st

DCA 2017) (“We reject Spatcher's suggestion that the oral-pronouncement-

controls rule applies only when it benefits the defendant. That is tantamount

to arguing that the lesser punishment always controls, a rule we have never

recognized. The rule that oral pronouncements control operates whether it

helps or hurts a defendant.”)

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