Court Opinion

ID: 9528703
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:43:15.835079+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:13.138405
License: Public Domain

COATS, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s disposition regarding Ridgely’s confessions. Judge Carlson made the following findings in concluding that Ridgely’s statements were voluntary:
(1) Ridgely was not under the influence of drugs or lack of sleep to the extent he was impaired in understanding what occurred or in asserting his rights on August 22, 1982.
(2) Ridgely’s father was present at all “critical stages” on August 22 and 23.
(3) The police assiduously respected Ridgely’s rights.
(4) Ridgely’s father was not an agent of the police and was not enlisted by the police to help them. Ridgely was not pressured into confessing by his father.
(5) Ridgely has greater capacity to cope with and understand the ways of the world than the evidence presented would suggest.
I have conducted an independent review of the record and conclude that Judge Carlson’s findings are supported by the record. Although Ridgely’s age and low intelligence are a cause for concern, it appears that he was capable of understanding his situation and of waiving his rights. He appears to have had prior experience with the police and courts as a juvenile. See Sovalik v. State, 612 P.2d 1003, 1007 (Alaska 1980). He was able to consult with his father and to have him present during questioning. See S.B. v. State, 614 P.2d 786 (Alaska 1980).1
*936From the testimony of Officer Feichtinger, it appears that Ridgely’s father was made aware of the possibility that the incident which the police were investigating could be very serious. I believe that Judge Carlson’s finding concerning the nature of Ridgely’s father’s participation in the questioning is supported by the record.
I also believe Judge Carlson could rely on police testimony in the record to conclude that even if Ridgely was under the influence of alcohol or drugs he was not impaired to the point that he could not voluntarily waive his rights. See Mallott v. State, 608 P.2d 737, 743 (Alaska 1980); Hampton v. State, 569 P.2d 138 (Alaska 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1056, 98 S.Ct. 1225, 55 L.Ed.2d 757 (1978). Feichtinger described Ridgely as “rational” at the scene of the stop. Taylor described him as “unconcerned.” Taylor testified Ridgely cried prior to the interview, that he had dilated pupils and was “partially under the influence of drugs.” Ridgely had told him that he was coming down off an LSD trip. Taylor, however, also testified that Ridgely was entirely lucid.
The record reflects that Ridgely asked about whether he had a right to have an attorney present. However, it does not appear from the questions Ridgely asked that he was actually requesting an attorney. According to the police testimony, when Ridgely subsequently asked questions about the availability of an attorney at MYC, he was assured that if he wanted and asked for an attorney all questioning would stop. After being told this Ridgely indicated that he wanted to continue to talk.2 The record further indicates that when Ridgely did unequivocally say that he wanted an attorney, the police stopped questioning him even though Ridgely volunteered that he wanted to continue to talk.3 On this record Judge Carlson could properly find that the police fully respected Ridgely’s right to counsel. I also conclude, based upon an independent review of the record, that Ridgely’s confessions were voluntary. I would affirm the conviction.

. S.B. v. State was another matter concerning a juvenile confession. S.B. was fourteen years old at the time he gave a confession. In that case, the court said:
S.B.’s age and indicated lack of maturity for his age are grounds for questioning his capacity for making a reasoned decision by himself as to whether to confess. However, his parents were present with him throughout the interrogation, and were thus informed as well as he of the nature of the charges against their son and his Miranda rights. S.B. was able to consult with his parents in private prior to *936talking to the police officer. S.B.’s father’s testimony indicates his understanding of his son’s Miranda rights. These factors would lead us to conclude that the waiver was made knowingly and intelligently.
S.B. v. State, 614 P.2d at 789 (footnotes omitted).

. See Giacomazzi v. State, 633 P.2d 218, 222-23 (Alaska 1981), where the supreme court held that it was not error to tell a suspect that it would take some time before an attorney would be appointed, provided the accused is adequately informed that he has a right to remain silent until an attorney is present.

. It is apparent from the record that Ridgely knew how to exercise his right to have an attorney present during questioning.