Court Opinion

ID: 9940245
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-13 18:09:35.855938+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:44:40.299023
License: Public Domain

[J-47-2023]
                    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
                                MIDDLE DISTRICT

      TODD, C.J., DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, BROBSON, JJ.

 IVY HILL CONGREGATION OF                        :   No. 65 MAP 2022
 JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES,                            :
                                                 :   Appeal from the Order of the
                      Appellant                  :   Commonwealth Court at No. 316
                                                 :   MD 2020 dated May 10, 2022.
                                                 :
               v.                                :   ARGUED: September 14, 2023
                                                 :
                                                 :
 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,                   :
 DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,                   :
                                                 :
                      Appellee                   :

                                        OPINION

CHIEF JUSTICE TODD                                      DECIDED: February 13, 2024
       In this direct appeal, we consider whether the Commonwealth Court, in dismissing

a petition filed by Ivy Hill Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses (hereinafter, “Appellant”)

under the Declaratory Judgments Act (“DJA”), 1 violated the coordinate jurisdiction rule.

For the following reasons, we hold that it did, and, accordingly, we vacate the

Commonwealth Court’s order and remand this matter to that court for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

       Appellant is a congregation of approximately 140 individuals in Philadelphia,

Pennsylvania, who follow the tenets of the Jehovah’s Witnesses religion.             Every

Jehovah’s Witnesses congregation is led by a body of elders, which consists of a group

of five to seven volunteers.      The elders are authorized to hear and respond to a

1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 7531-7541.
congregant’s confession of sin, and, under their beliefs, are obliged to maintain the

confidentiality of confessions. According to Appellant, its elders may receive confessions

involving child abuse, which would implicate the mandatory reporting requirements of the

Child Protective Services Law (“CPSL”). 2

       Specifically, the CPSL identifies certain individuals who are deemed to be

“[m]andated reporters.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 6311(a). Mandated reporters are required to make

a report of suspected child abuse to the Commonwealth’s Department of Human Services

(“DHS”) if they have “reasonable cause” to suspect that a child has been a victim of abuse.

Id. In addition to doctors and school employees, the list of mandated reporters includes

“[a] clergyman, priest, rabbi, minister, Christian Science practitioner, religious healer or

spiritual leader of any regularly established church or other religious organization.” Id. §

6311(a)(6). Under Section 6319 of the CPSL, mandated reporters who fail to report a

case of suspected child abuse are subject to criminal penalties. Id. § 6319.

       Further, Section 6311.1(a) of the CPSL specifies that otherwise-privileged

communications between a mandated reporter and a patient or client of the mandated

reporter are not privileged if they involve child abuse, and a mandated reporter is not

relieved of the duty to make a report of suspected child abuse. Id. § 6311.1(a). However,

Section 6311.1(b), which often is referred to as the “clergyman privilege,” specifies that

“[c]onfidential communications made to a member of the clergy” are protected pursuant

to Section 5943 of the Judicial Code, which provides:

              No clergyman, priest, rabbi or minister of the gospel of any
              regularly established church or religious organization, except
              clergymen or ministers, who are self-ordained or who are
              members of religious organizations in which members other
              than the leader thereof are deemed clergymen or ministers,
              who while in the course of his duties has acquired information

2 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 6301-6388.

                                      [J-47-2023] - 2
              from any person secretly and in confidence shall be
              compelled, or allowed without consent of such person, to
              disclose that information in any legal proceeding, trial or
              investigation before any government unit.
42 Pa.C.S. § 5943.

       On May 20, 2020, Appellant filed in the Commonwealth Court’s original jurisdiction

a “Petition for Review in the Nature of a Complaint for Declaratory Relief” (hereinafter,

“Petition”) against DHS, alleging that uncertainty as to whether its elders fall within the

class of individuals covered by the clergyman privilege negatively impacts its ability to

practice the Jehovah’s Witnesses faith. 3 Accordingly, in Count I of its Petition, Appellant

sought a declaration that its elders are entitled to protection under Section 6311.1(b) of

the CPSL and Section 5943 of the Judicial Code because they are ministers of the gospel

of a regularly established church, who are neither self-ordained, nor members of religious

organizations in which members other than the leader thereof are deemed clergymen or

ministers.   In Count II of its Petition, Appellant argued that, in the event the court

determined that the clergymen privilege does not apply to its elders, the court should

declare Section 5943 unconstitutional, and sever the offending portion of the statute.

       On May 22, 2020, Appellant filed an Application for Summary Relief, claiming the

case presented a pure question of law as to whether the clergyman privilege applies to

its elders, and that, to the extent the case implicates issues of fact, such facts are not the

proper subject of dispute because they relate to the elders’ ecclesiastic functions of the

Jehovah’s Witnesses faith.

       On July 31, 2020, DHS filed preliminary objections to Appellant’s Petition,

asserting: (1) the Petition should be dismissed because Appellant lacked standing, in

3 Appellant asserts that its concerns arose after it learned of a criminal complaint filed

against a bishop in the Amish community of Lancaster County, which alleged that the
bishop’s failure to report a confession of child abuse by a member of the Amish
community constituted a violation of Section 6319 of the CPSL. Appellant’s Brief at 32.

                                       [J-47-2023] - 3
that it failed to allege it has been aggrieved or that there is an actual controversy between

the parties; (2) the Petition should be dismissed because Appellant failed to join

indispensable parties, including law enforcement officials such as the Attorney General,

who are responsible for investigating and prosecuting individuals who fail to report; (3)

Count I of the Petition should be dismissed because Appellant failed to exhaust its

administrative remedies; (4) Count I of the Petition should be dismissed because the

requested relief will not terminate the alleged uncertainty regarding future enforcement

actions; 4 and (5) Count II of the Petition should be dismissed because it lacks merit. 5

          With respect to Appellant’s Application for Summary Relief, DHS maintained that

relief should be denied because: (1) although DHS receives reports of child abuse and

maintains a report database, it does not investigate the reports or enforce the criminal

statutes, and, thus, Appellant does not have a clear right to judgment against DHS; (2)

there exists a genuine issue of material fact concerning the role of Appellant’s elders; and

(3) declaring that Appellant’s elders are entitled to invoke the clergyman privilege would

equate to an improper adjudication of the validity of a defense to a potential future lawsuit.

          Following oral argument, the Commonwealth Court, in a unanimous, unpublished

en banc memorandum decision authored by then- President Judge, now-Justice Brobson,

overruled DHS’s preliminary objections, but denied Appellant’s application for summary

relief.    See Ivy Hill Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses v. Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania, Dep’t of Human Services, 2021 WL 2472274 (Pa. Cmwlth. filed June 17,

4 The DJA provides that a court may refuse to enter a declaratory judgment or decree

where such judgment or decree, if entered, “would not terminate the uncertainty or
controversy giving rise to the proceeding.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 7537.
5 Parties may raise questions regarding standing, ripeness, and the political question

doctrine, all of which “give body to the general notions of case or controversy and
justiciability,” by filing preliminary objections to a petition for review filed in the original
jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Court. Robinson Township, Washington County v.
Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 916-17 (Pa. 2013).

                                       [J-47-2023] - 4
2021) (en banc) (“Ivy Hill I”). 6 After setting forth the relevant language of the CPSL and

Section 5943 of the Judicial Code, the court addressed DHS’s assertion that Appellant

lacked standing.

       The Commonwealth Court recognized that, under Pennsylvania law, “an

association has standing as representative of its members to bring a cause of action even

in the absence of injury to itself, if the association alleges that at least one of its members

is suffering immediate or threatened injury as a result of the action challenged.” Ivy Hill

I, 2021 WL 2472274, at *5 (quoting Robinson Township, 83 A.3d at 922). It further

observed that “existing jurisprudence permits pre-enforcement review of statutory

provisions in cases in which petitioners must choose between equally unappealing

options and where the third option . . . is equally undesirable.” Id. (quoting Robinson

Township, 83 A.3d at 924). 7

       The court determined that the interest of Appellant’s elders in the outcome of the

litigation “is sufficiently substantial, direct, and immediate to confer standing upon

[Appellant] as their representative under Robinson Township and FOAC ” because “[t]he

uncertainty regarding the meaning and, alternatively, the validity of the clergyman

privilege as preserved in the CPSL with respect to its coverage of the elders,” leaves the

elders with the “equally unappealing options” of: (1) reporting suspected child abuse of

6 In Ivy Hill I, the en banc panel of the Commonwealth Court was composed of then-

President Judge, now-Justice Brobson, and Judges Cohn Jubelirer, McCullough, Covey,
Wojcik, Fizzano Cannon, and Ceisler.
7 The Commonwealth Court additionally relied on its decision in Firearm Owners Against

Crime v. City of Harrisburg, 218 A.3d 497 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019) (en banc) (“FOAC”),
wherein it held that individual gun owners and a political action committee had standing
to challenge certain city ordinances regulating the use, possession, ownership, and
transfer of firearms within the city because the plaintiffs were faced with the “equally
unappealing options” of curbing their conduct to conform to the ordinance, or willfully
violating the law and facing criminal prosecution. Id. at 513. On appeal, this Court
affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s decision. See Firearm Owners Against Crime v. City
of Harrisburg, 261 A.3d 467 (Pa. 2021).

                                       [J-47-2023] - 5
which they become aware through the course of a confidential communication, thereby

violating their promise of confidentiality; (2) failing to report the suspected child abuse,

thus risking criminal prosecution; or (3) abstaining from fully performing their

ecclesiastical responsibilities as they relate to hearing confessions and providing spiritual

guidance and counseling. Id. at *7.

       The court further found that the interest of Appellant’s elders is “not remote,” 8 as

resolution of the matter “may affect how the elders perform their ecclesiastical functions,

such as hearing confessions and providing spiritual guidance and counseling, and it will

impact their reporting obligations under the CPSL.” Id. Thus, the court concluded that

pre-enforcement review was proper.

       Regarding DHS’s contention that Appellant’s Petition should be dismissed

because it failed to join indispensable parties − including law enforcement parties, such

as the Attorney General, who are responsible for “investigating and prosecuting the

criminal offenses arising out of the CPSL, including instances of failing to report,” id. at *8

− the court first recognized that, pursuant to Section 7540(a) of the DJA, “[w]hen

declaratory relief is sought, all persons shall be made parties who have or claim any

interest which would be affected by the declaration, and no declaration shall prejudice the

rights of persons not parties to the proceeding.” Id. The court noted, however, that the

provision is “subject to limiting principles,” and “joinder may not be required ‘where the

interest involved is indirect or incidental.’”       Id. (quoting City of Philadelphia v.

Commonwealth, 838 A.2d 566, 582 (Pa. 2003)).

       Emphasizing that Appellant sought only a declaration as to whether its elders are

required to report suspected abuse to DHS under the CPSL, and that the other parties

identified by DHS are not entities to whom mandated reporters are required to report, the

8 It would appear that, in using the phrase “not remote,” the court intended to state that

Appellant’s elders’ interest was direct and/or immediate.

                                       [J-47-2023] - 6
court concluded that the law enforcement agencies identified by DHS were not

indispensable parties, reasoning:

              To the extent this matter implicates a law enforcement interest
              in whether the privilege can be invoked in a particular future
              enforcement action that is held by the parties DHS identifies,
              we conclude that interest is “indirect and incidental” to the
              claims and relief sought by [Appellant] relating to its elders’
              initial reporting obligations herein. In other words, we do not
              believe that the law enforcement officials identified have rights
              “so connected with the claims of the litigants that no relief can
              be granted without infringing on those rights,” nor do we
              believe that justice cannot be done in the absence of those
              parties. City of Philadelphia, 838 A.2d at 581. To be clear,
              this case is not about the role of the prosecutor in charging a
              particular mandated reporter; rather, it is about whether the
              privilege preserved in the CPSL is available to [Appellant’s]
              elders such that there may be occasions where they are not
              required to report instances of child abuse to DHS. Ultimately,
              courts, not prosecutors, decide whether a privilege attaches.
              We, therefore, overrule DHS’s preliminary objection.

Id.
       Next, with respect to Appellant’s alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies

as to Count I, the Commonwealth Court overruled DHS’s preliminary objection on the

ground that, inter alia, DHS failed to identify a specific remedy Appellant could pursue to

challenge the CPSL. Id. at *9 (citing United Sportsmen of Pa. v. Pa. Game Comm’n, 90

A.2d 1129 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008) (overruling preliminary objection of Pennsylvania Game

Commission asserting sportsmen’s group’s failure to exhaust available administrative

remedies because, inter alia, the Commission did not identify a specific remedy the

sportsmen’s group could pursue to challenge the Commission’s deer management

policies and practices)).

       Finally, the court addressed DHS’s claims that Count I of Appellant’s Petition

should be dismissed because the requested relief would not terminate the alleged

uncertainty regarding future enforcement actions, and Count II of the Petition should be

                                      [J-47-2023] - 7
dismissed because it lacked merit. As to DHS’s argument that a grant of relief would not

terminate the alleged uncertainty because the applicability of clergyman privilege does

not turn solely on the status of the individual asserting the privilege, but, rather, must be

determined by a court on a case-by-case basis with consideration of the nature of the

underlying communication at issue, the court held:

              Here, there is a present controversy concerning whether
              [Appellant’s] elders fall within the group of individuals entitled
              to invoke the clergyman privilege under Section 5943 of the
              Judicial Code, such that the elders may avail themselves of
              the protections afforded under Section 6311.1(b)(1) of the
              CPSL. A declaration from this Court, on either the statutory
              construction grounds asserted in Count I of the Petition or the
              constitutional grounds asserted in Count II of the Petition,
              regarding whether [Appellant’s] elders are so entitled, would
              terminate that controversy. Additionally, this uncertainty
              concerning the elders’ “rights” or “status” under the provisions
              at issue is the sole uncertainty “giving rise to the [instant]
              proceeding.” 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 7533, 7537. In other words, we
              agree with [Appellant] that this case pertains only to “who” –
              specifically, [Appellant’s] elders – may assert the privilege, not
              “what” content may be protected. Thus, it is of no moment
              that application of the clergyman privilege is case-specific and
              dependent on the particular communication at issue, as those
              circumstances do not operate to foreclose an end to the
              present controversy, nor do they render [Appellant’s]
              constitutional claims with respect to that controversy
              meritless.
Id. at *10. Accordingly, the court overruled DHS’s final two preliminary objections.

       Turning to Appellant’s Application for Summary Relief, the court reiterated that the

central issue in the case is whether Appellant’s elders can assert the clergyman privilege,

which requires a determination of whether, under Section 5943, the elders are

“clergym[e]n, priest[s], rabbi[s] or minister[s] of the gospel of any regularly established

church or religious organization,” but are not “clergymen or ministers, who are self-

ordained or who are members of religious organizations in which members other than the

leader thereof are deemed clergymen or ministers.” Id. at *11 (quoting 42 Pa.C.S. §

                                       [J-47-2023] - 8
5943). Observing that there “is no evidentiary record at this juncture concerning matters

such as the doctrine and organization of [Appellant] or Jehovah’s Witnesses upon which

to make such a determination,” the court held that Appellant’s right to relief was not clear,

and thus denied its Application for Summary Relief. Id. Thereafter, DHS filed an answer

and new matter to Appellant’s Petition, and the parties proceeded to discovery.

       On September 21, 2021, Appellant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, again

requesting a declaration that its elders are entitled to invoke the clergyman privilege under

23 Pa.C.S. § 6311.1(b) and 42 Pa.C.S. § 5943, and, in the event the court determined

that Section 5953 does not apply to its elders, that Section 5943 be deemed

unconstitutional. On October 29, 2021, DHS filed a brief in opposition to Appellant’s

Motion for Summary Judgment, asserting:          (1) DHS is not an antagonistic party to

Appellant because it has not sued or threatened to sue Appellant; (2) because DHS does

not investigate violations of the CPSL, it is not an appropriate defendant in the underlying

action; (3) Appellant improperly seeks an advisory opinion and validation of a defense to

a potential future lawsuit; and (4) Appellant’s action is barred by the statute of limitations.

       Appellant filed a reply brief, suggesting, inter alia, that DHS failed to dispute either

the facts or the law as set forth in Appellant’s Motion for Summary Judgment; that the

Commonwealth Court previously rejected DHS’s claim that it is not an antagonistic party

to Appellant; and that DHS’s newly asserted statute of limitations defense was both

waived and without merit. The Commonwealth Court heard oral argument on Appellant’s

Petition and Motion for Summary Judgment.

       On May 10, 2022, in a unanimous, en banc unpublished memorandum decision

authored by Judge Dumas, the Commonwealth Court denied Appellant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment and dismissed its Petition.             Ivy Hill Congregation of Jehovah’s

Witnesses v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Dep’t of Human Services, 2022 WL

                                       [J-47-2023] - 9
1464353 (Pa. Cmwlth. filed May 10, 2022) (en banc) (“Ivy Hill II”). 9 The court began by

discussing its “jurisdiction” under the DJA, recognizing that the DJA provides courts with

the “power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief

is or could be claimed.” Id. at *3 (quoting 42 Pa.C.S. § 7532).       The court continued:

“[W]hether a court should exercise jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment proceeding is

a matter of sound judicial discretion. Thus, the granting of a petition for a declaratory

judgment is a matter lying within the sound discretion of a court of original jurisdiction.”

Id. (quoting Brouillette v. Wolf, 213 A.3d 341, 357 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019)).

       The court additionally observed:

              Courts “may refuse to render or enter a declaratory judgment
              or decree where such judgment or decree, if rendered or
              entered, would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy
              giving rise to the proceeding . . . .” 42 Pa.C.S. § 7537; Dechert
              LLP v. Pa. Dep’t of Cmty. & Econ. Dev., 234 A.3d 911, 916
              (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020) (stating, “Declaratory relief is suitable
              when litigation is both imminent and inevitable and the
              declaration sought will practically help to end the conflict
              between the parties.” (cleaned up)).
Id. Explaining that it has “construed imminent and inevitable litigation as requiring the

presence of antagonistic claims,” the court determined that “imminent and inevitable

litigation” does not exist in the instant case because the record “does not establish that

DHS opposes, has sued, or threatened to sue [Appellant],” and, indeed, DHS “cannot

even initiate litigation regarding the CPSL.” Id. at *4. In support of its determination, the

court cited its decision in Ruszin v. Dep’t of Labor & Industry, Bur. of Workers’ Comp.,

675 A.2d 366, 371 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996), in which it held that the plaintiff could not raise a

claim for compensation for total hearing loss before he actually suffered total hearing loss.

9 In Ivy Hill II, the en banc panel consisted of President Judge Cohn Jubelirer, and Judges

McCullough, Covey, Wojcik, Ceisler, Dumas, and Wallace.

                                      [J-47-2023] - 10
       The court further concluded that a grant of declaratory relief would not terminate

the controversy “because DHS does not enforce the CPSL,” and “[e]ither the

Commonwealth or one of its agencies tasked with enforcing the reporting privilege . . .

would address whether [Appellant’s] elders are ‘clergymen’ such that they are immune

from” penalties for non-reporting. Ivy Hill II, 2022 WL 1464353, at *4. Moreover, the

court reasoned that granting Appellant declaratory relief would not terminate the

controversy because “the CPSL reporting privilege implicates the evidentiary privilege at

Section 5943,” which “is not based solely on the clergy’s status, but [on] whether the

communication was made in confidence in the context of a penitential or spiritual matter,”

and a court or appropriate agency still would be required to review the communication at

issue to determine whether Section 5943 applies in a given instance.              Id. (citation

omitted). Thus, the court ordered that “Appellant’s petition for review and motion for

summary relief are dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.” Id. at *5 (order). 10

       In its present appeal to this Court, Appellant argues that the Commonwealth Court

erred in holding it did not have jurisdiction to address Appellant’s Petition, and, further,

that the Commonwealth Court’s decision and order dismissing Appellant’s Petition

conflicted with its decision in Ivy Hill I, and, so, violated the coordinate jurisdiction rule.

Appellant additionally maintains that, to the extent the lower court addressed issues

relating to justiciability, including whether Appellant’s claims were sufficiently

antagonistic, and whether the grant of declaratory relief would terminate the controversy,

it erred in concluding Appellant’s claims were not justiciable.        Finally, based on its

assertion that the lower court did not reach the merits of Appellant’s underlying claims,

Appellant asks this Court to forgo remanding this case to the Commonwealth Court for

10 In its opinion, the court likewise stated:  “[b]ecause we dismiss [Appellant’s] petition for
review for lack of jurisdiction, we need not summarize the various arguments regarding
the statute of limitations.” Ivy Hill II, 2022 WL 1464353 at *3 n.6.

                                       [J-47-2023] - 11
further proceedings, and instead issue a declaration that its elders may invoke the

clergyman privilege to the mandatory reporting requirements of Section 6311 of the CPSL

if they become aware of otherwise-reportable information as a result of hearing a

confidential religious confession. We address these arguments seriatim.

       Appellant first contends that the Commonwealth Court’s decision reveals a

fundamental misunderstanding regarding the court’s jurisdiction over Appellant’s Petition.

Appellant emphasizes that Section 761(a) of the DJA provides that the Commonwealth

Court shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions or proceedings against the

Commonwealth.         Appellant points to several instances, however, where the

Commonwealth Court purported to dismiss its Petition on the basis of a lack of jurisdiction.

See, e.g., Ivy Hill II, 2022 WL 1464353, at *1 (“we dismiss [Appellant’s] petition for review

and motion for summary relief for lack of jurisdiction”); id. at *3 n.6 (“we dismiss

[Appellant’s] petition for review for lack of jurisdiction”); id. at *4 (“we agree with DHS that

we may decline to exercise our jurisdiction under the DJA”); id. at *5 (order) (stating that

“[Appellant’s] petition for review and motion for summary relief are dismissed for lack of

jurisdiction”).   Nevertheless, Appellant observes that, notwithstanding the court’s

repeated references to a lack of jurisdiction, the court considered factors which pertain to

justiciability, such as standing, ripeness, and mootness. Appellant’s Brief at 51.

       In response, DHS maintains that, despite the Commonwealth Court’s statements

indicating that it was dismissing Appellant’s Petition and Motion for Summary Judgment

for “lack of jurisdiction,” it is evident from the cases cited by the court, as well as the

court’s overall analysis, that it dismissed Appellant’s Petition on “prudential grounds,”

specifically, its finding of a “lack of ripeness,” which, according to DHS, “was entirely

appropriate because DHS does not enforce Section 6319 and so did not take a position

antagonistic to [Appellant].” DHS’s Brief at 14; see also id. at 25-29.

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       Jurisdiction relates solely to the competence of a particular court or administrative

body to determine controversies of the general class to which the case presented for

consideration belongs. See Commonwealth v. Donahue, 98 A.3d 1223, 1233 (Pa. 2014).

In contrast to jurisdiction, standing and ripeness are questions relating to justiciability.

Issues of justiciability are threshold matters generally resolved before a court addresses

the merits of the parties’ dispute. Robinson Township, 83 A.3d at 916-17.

       The Commonwealth Court has original jurisdiction over any action brought against

the Commonwealth government. 42 Pa.C.S. § 761(a); see also Donahue, 98 A.3d at

1233. The “Commonwealth government” includes departments, boards, commissions,

authorities, officers, and agencies of the Commonwealth. 42 Pa.C.S. § 102; see also

Donahue, 98 A.3d at 1233. As DHS is part of the Commonwealth government, the lower

court clearly had jurisdiction over Appellant’s declaratory judgment action against DHS.

       Our review of the Commonwealth Court’s opinion in Ivy Hill II suggests that,

notwithstanding certain language to the contrary, the court did not dismiss Appellant’s

Petition for lack of jurisdiction under 42 Pa.C.S. § 761(a).        Rather, despite several

misstatements that it lacked jurisdiction over Appellant’s Petition, the court ultimately

indicated that it was “exercis[ing its] discretion to dismiss [Appellant’s] petition for review

and the motion for summary relief,” Ivy Hill II, 2022 WL 1464353, at *5, because “imminent

and inevitable litigation does not exist,” and “the requested declaratory relief would not

terminate the controversy,” id. at *4. These factors relate to “general notions of case or

controversy and justiciability,” and do not involve a court’s jurisdiction. See Robinson

Township, 83 A.3d at 916-17. Accordingly, we conclude Appellant is not entitled to relief

                                      [J-47-2023] - 13
on its claim that the Commonwealth Court improperly dismissed its Petition based on a

lack of jurisdiction. 11

        Appellant next argues that the Commonwealth Court’s decision in Ivy Hill II violated

the coordinate jurisdiction and law of the case doctrines because the court disregarded

its prior rulings in Ivy Hill I on the same issues – specifically, whether Appellant has

standing, and whether granting the requested relief would terminate the controversy.

Appellant further contends that, even if this Court concludes there was no violation of the

coordinate jurisdiction rule, we should reverse the Commonwealth Court’s decision in Ivy

Hill II because its findings were erroneous. In this regard, Appellant asserts that, contrary

to the lower court’s determination, its claims against DHS are antagonistic, and, further,

that a declaratory judgment will terminate the existing uncertainty as to whether

Appellant’s elders “are ever entitled to invoke the clergymen privilege.” Appellant’s Brief

at 62 (emphasis original).

        DHS responds that there was no violation of the coordinate jurisdiction rule

because the Commonwealth Court’s dismissal of Appellant’s Petition did not conflict with

its prior rulings in Ivy Hill I. In support of its argument, DHS posits that there was no

violation because the court in Ivy Hill II based its decision on a lack of ripeness, a factor

DHS asserts it did not raise on preliminary objections, and, therefore, was not considered

by the court in Ivy Hill I. See DHS’s Brief at 30 (“[N]owhere in the decision on preliminary

objections will this Court find the words, ‘antagonistic,’ ‘imminent and inevitable,’ or

11 The Commonwealth Court’s confusing of the concepts of jurisdiction and justiciability

in Ivy Hill II seemingly stems from its reference to language from its decision in Brouillette,
213 A.3d at 357 (“[W]hether a court should exercise jurisdiction over a declaratory
judgment proceeding is a matter of sound judicial discretion. . . . Thus, the granting of a
petition for a declaratory judgment is a matter lying within the sound discretion of a court
of original jurisdiction.”). However, for the reasons we have explained, the court’s
language in Brouillette also was imprecise. We reiterate that, while the grant or denial of
declaratory relief is a discretionary matter, the exercise of jurisdiction over a declaratory
judgment petition is not. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 761(a); Donahue, 98 A.3d at 1233.

                                      [J-47-2023] - 14
‘ripeness.’”). DHS further maintains that, while the court in Ivy Hill I considered whether

a grant of declaratory relief would terminate the controversy between the parties, that is

not the same issue as ripeness. Id. Finally, DHS asserts that the lower court did not

violate the coordinate jurisdiction rule because the decisions in Ivy Hill I and Ivy Hill II

addressed motions that differed in kind. Id. at 31.

       In its reply brief, Appellant suggests that DHS uses the term “ripeness” for the first

time in its brief to this Court in an attempt to “sidestep the coordinate jurisdiction rule

simply by employing a different term for the same exact legal concept,” namely, “whether

a sufficiently concrete controversy exists between the parties to warrant declaratory

relief.” Appellant’s Reply Brief at 5. Indeed, Appellant observes that the term “ripeness”

also was not used by the court in Ivy Hill II, and that, even in its brief in opposition to

Appellant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, DHS framed its argument not in terms of

“ripeness,” but in terms of whether there are antagonistic claims between Appellant and

DHS, such that there exists a controversy between them. Id.

       Preliminarily, under the coordinate jurisdiction rule, “judges of coordinate

jurisdiction   sitting   in   the   same   case    should    not   overrule   each   others’

decisions.” Commonwealth v. Starr, 664 A.2d 1326, 1331 (Pa. 1995). Beyond promoting

the goal of judicial economy, the coordinate jurisdiction rule, which we have explained

falls within the more general “law of the case” doctrine, serves “(1) to protect the settled

expectations of the parties; (2) to insure uniformity of decisions; (3) to maintain

consistency during the course of a single case; (4) to effectuate the proper and

streamlined administration of justice; and (5) to bring litigation to an end.” Id.

       Departure from the coordinate jurisdiction rule “is allowed only in exceptional

circumstances such as where there has been an intervening change in the controlling

law, a substantial change in the facts or evidence giving rise to the dispute in the matter,

                                      [J-47-2023] - 15
or where the prior holding was clearly erroneous and would create a manifest injustice if

followed.” Id. at 1332. The issue of whether a court’s order or decision violates the

coordinate jurisdiction rule is a question of law. Thus, our standard of review is de novo.

Zane v. Friends Hospital, 836 A.2d 25, 30 n.8 (Pa. 2003).

       Upon review, it is evident that the Commonwealth Court’s decision below violates

the coordinate jurisdiction rule. As discussed above, the court in Ivy Hill II concluded that

DHS was not a proper defendant because the record “does not establish that DHS

opposes, has sued, or threatened to sue [Appellant]”; DHS “cannot even initiate litigation

regarding the CPSL”; and “imminent and inevitable litigation” requires the presence of

“antagonistic claims.” Ivy Hill II, 2022 WL 1464353, at *4.

       However, in Ivy Hill I, in the context of addressing DHS’s argument that Appellant

failed to join indispensable parties, the court rejected those same concerns, emphasizing

that “this case is not about the role of the prosecutor in charging a particular mandated

reporter; rather, it is about whether the privilege preserved in the CPSL is available to

[Appellant’s] elders such that there may be occasions where they are not required to

report instances of child abuse to DHS. Ultimately, courts, not prosecutors, decide

whether a privilege attaches.” Ivy Hill I, 2021 WL 2472274, at *8. Thus, the court in Ivy

Hill II effectively overruled the Ivy Hill I court’s determination on this issue.

       Additionally, the court in Ivy Hill II determined that granting the requested

declaratory relief would not terminate the controversy because DHS does not enforce the

CPSL, and “declaratory relief binding DHS to an interpretation that [Appellant’s] elders

qualify as ‘clergymen’ would not terminate the ongoing controversy because the

declaration would not bind the Commonwealth or its agencies designated to enforce the

CPSL.” Ivy Hill II, 2022 WL 1464353, at *4. Along these lines, the Ivy Hill II court further

reasoned that, because the CPSL implicates Section 5943, and because application of

                                       [J-47-2023] - 16
Section 5943’s clergyman privilege “is not based solely on the clergy’s status, but whether

the communication was made in confidence in the context of a penitential or spiritual

matter,” it would still be necessary for a trial court or agency to review the specific

communication at issue. Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Stewart, 690 A.2d 195, 200 (Pa.

1997)).

       The Commonwealth Court in Ivy Hill I, however, addressed these identical

arguments by DHS and expressly rejected them:

              Here, there is a present controversy concerning whether
              [Appellant’s] elders fall within the group of individuals entitled
              to invoke the clergyman privilege under Section 5943 of the
              Judicial Code, such that the elders may avail themselves of
              the protections afforded under Section 6311.1(b)(1) of the
              CPSL. A declaration from this Court, on either the statutory
              construction grounds asserted in Count I of the Petition or the
              constitutional grounds asserted in Count II of the Petition,
              regarding whether [Appellant’s] elders are so entitled, would
              terminate that controversy. Additionally, this uncertainty
              concerning the elders’ “rights” or “status” under the provisions
              at issue is the sole uncertainty “giving rise to the [instant]
              proceeding.” 42 Pa. C.S. §§ 7533, 7537. In other words, we
              agree with [Appellant] that this case pertains only to “who”—
              specifically, [Appellant’s] elders—may assert the privilege, not
              “what” content may be protected. Thus, it is of no moment
              that application of the clergyman privilege is case-specific and
              dependent on the particular communication at issue, as those
              circumstances do not operate to foreclose an end to the
              present controversy . . . .
Ivy Hill I, 2021 WL 2472274, at *10. Thus, again, the court in Ivy Hill II disregarded the

ruling of the court in Ivy Hill I on the same issue.

       We are also unpersuaded by DHS’s argument that the court in Ivy Hill II did not

violate the coordinate jurisdiction rule because it based its decision on a lack of ripeness,

an issue DHS contends was not addressed by the court in Ivy Hill I. As Appellant

observes, in its brief in opposition to Appellant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, DHS

never argued that Appellant should be denied relief based on a lack of ripeness, and,

                                       [J-47-2023] - 17
indeed, the words “ripe” and “ripeness” do not appear anywhere in the Ivy Hill II Court’s

opinion. More importantly, however, as we explained in Robinson Township,

              [g]enerally, the doctrine of standing is an inquiry into whether
              the petitioner filing suit has demonstrated aggrievement, by
              establishing “a substantial, direct and immediate interest in
              the outcome of the litigation.” There is considerable overlap
              between the doctrines of standing and ripeness, especially
              where the contentions regarding lack of justiciability are
              focused on arguments that the interest asserted by the
              petitioner is speculative, not concrete, or would require the
              court to offer an advisory opinion. In this sense, a challenge
              that a petitioner's interest in the outcome of the litigation is
              hypothetical may be pled either as determinative of
              standing or restyled as a ripeness concern although the
              allegations are essentially the same. Standing and ripeness
              are distinct concepts insofar as ripeness also reflects the
              separate concern that relevant facts are not sufficiently
              developed to permit judicial resolution of the dispute. Pure
              questions of law . . . do not suffer generally from development
              defects and are particularly well suited for pre-enforcement
              review.
83 A.3d at 917 (citations omitted).

       In the case sub judice, we find the doctrines of standing and ripeness are

overlapping. As discussed supra, in its brief in opposition to Appellant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment, DHS argued, inter alia, that Appellant lacked standing because it

failed to allege that there is an actual controversy between the parties, contending that

DHS is not antagonistic to Appellant, and because Appellant sought an advisory opinion.

Notably, DHS did not allege that the relevant facts were not sufficiently developed to

permit judicial resolution. Consistent with the arguments of DHS, the court in Ivy Hill II

held, as a matter of law, that a declaration that Appellant’s elders fall within the group of

individuals entitled to invoke the clergyman privilege would not terminate the existing

controversy; the court did not suggest that the facts were not sufficiently developed to

allow for a determination on the merits.        Thus, notwithstanding DHS’s attempt to

                                      [J-47-2023] - 18
recharacterize its own challenge, as well as the basis for the court’s decision in Ivy Hill II,

as one of ripeness, it is evident that its claim is, in substance, a challenge to Appellant’s

standing. Accordingly, we reject DHS’s argument that the court in Ivy Hill II did not violate

the coordinate jurisdiction rule because it based its decision on the distinct basis of

ripeness.

       Finally, we turn to DHS’s argument that the Commonwealth Court in Ivy Hill II did

not violate the coordinate jurisdiction rule because the decisions in Ivy Hill I and Ivy Hill II

addressed motions that differed in kind. Specifically, DHS notes that “the first decision

resolved DHS’s application on preliminary objections [to Appellant’s application for

summary relief].    The second decision resolved [Appellant’s] second application for

summary relief.” DHS’s Brief at 31. In support of its argument, DHS cites, inter alia, this

Court’s decisions in Ryan v. Berman, 813 A.2d 792 (Pa. 2002) (holding coordinate

jurisdiction rule did not prevent trial judge from allowing defendants, who were doctors, to

amend their pleadings to include a release that the plaintiff had entered into a separate

lawsuit, despite a prior trial judge’s denial of the defendants’ previous request to amend

their pleadings); Riccio v. American Republic Ins. Co., 705 A.2d 422 (Pa. 1997) (holding

that coordinate jurisdiction rule did not preclude a new judge hearing post-trial motions

from ordering a new trial to correct a mistake made by the original trial judge); and Goldey

v. Trustees of Univ. of Pa., 813 A.2d 762 (Pa. 1996) (a motion should not be entertained

or granted when a motion of the same kind has previously been denied, unless

intervening changes in facts or the law clearly warrant a new look at the question).

       DHS also relies on the Commonwealth Court’s decisions in Bates v. Del. Cnty.

Prison Emps.’ Indep. Union, 150 A.3d 121, 127 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (holding that the

coordinate jurisdiction rule did not preclude a judge from granting summary judgment on

issues that had previously been raised and denied by another judgment on preliminary

                                       [J-47-2023] - 19
objections), and Gardella v. Borough of Dunmore, 62 A.3d 486 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013)

(holding trial court’s summary judgment ruling, which was inconsistent with prior ruling on

preliminary objections, did not violate collateral jurisdiction rule because, at preliminary

objection stage, court was required to accept the allegations as true).

       DHS concedes that “preliminary objections and a motion for summary relief could

potentially address the same legal question if a defendant did not dispute any of the facts

in the petition/complaint,” but suggests that is not the case here. DHS’s Brief at 31.

Specifically, DHS suggests that, after the court in Ivy Hill I overruled DHS’s preliminary

objections, “important facts emerged,” including that “there were not ‘antagonistic claims’

between the parties,” and that these facts “became the basis for DHS’s request for

dismissal on ripeness grounds in response to [Appellant’s] second application for

summary relief.” Id. at 32.

       In response to DHS’s assertion that there was no violation of the coordinate

jurisdiction rule because the rulings in Ivy Hill I and Ivy Hill II were made in different

procedural postures, Appellant observes that this Court specifically rejected this premise

in Rellick-Smith v. Rellick, 261 A.3d 506 (Pa. 2021) (plurality). In Rellick-Smith, we

considered whether a trial court’s order allowing one party to file an amended answer to

include the affirmative defense of the statute of limitations, when a different trial judge

previously ruled that the defense was waived, violated the coordinate jurisdiction rule. In

an Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court (“OAJC”), we rejected the appellees’

argument that, because the two rulings were issued at different procedural postures – the

first in response to a motion for judgment on the pleadings, and the second following

discovery and prior to trial − the coordinate jurisdiction rule was not implicated.

       The OAJC examined each of the cases relied on by the appellees in support of

their position, including Riccio, supra; Ryan, supra; and Gerrow v. John Royle & Sons,

                                      [J-47-2023] - 20
813 A.2d 778 (Pa. 2002) (plurality) (holding coordinate jurisdiction rule did not bar second

trial judge, in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, from considering an expert report

that was attached to the response to the motion, even though prior judge had denied joint

motion to extend discovery deadline). We observed that, in each case, it was not the

different procedural posture alone that exempted the cases from the coordinate

jurisdiction rule, but, rather, the presence of one of the other exceptions to the rule − a

change in the law or facts, or a determination that the earlier ruling was clearly erroneous

and that following it would create a manifest injustice.

       For example, in Riccio, we held that the first ruling was clearly erroneous and, if

allowed to stand, would create an injustice. In Gerrow, we likewise determined that the

first ruling was erroneous and unreasonable, such that it would result in a “manifest

injustice” if permitted to stand. 813 A.2d at 782-83. In Ryan, this Court noted that

substantial evidence was presented between the first and second rulings such that the

coordinate jurisdiction rule did not apply. Thus, in Rellick-Smith, finding that the first

judge’s ruling was not erroneous, and discerning no intervening change in the controlling

law or substantial change in the facts or evidence, the OAJC concluded that the second

judge’s ruling allowing the appellees to amend their answer to include a statute of

limitations defense, which the prior judge found to be waived, violated the coordinate

jurisdiction rule.

       The OAJC in Rellick-Smith did not garner a majority. The late Chief Justice Baer

filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices Saylor and Mundy. Additionally,

Justice Donohue filed a concurring opinion in which she emphasized her view that the

procedural posture of a case has no relevance in a coordinate jurisdiction analysis. See

Rellick-Smith, 261 A.3d at 522 (Donohue, J., concurring). Justice Donohue highlighted

that, in the cases discussed by the OAJC, it was the “exceptional circumstances” which

                                     [J-47-2023] - 21
“negated the applicability of the coordinate jurisdiction rule; the change in their procedural

postures was irrelevant.” Id.

       Further, Justice Donohue described the incongruity of a finding that the coordinate

jurisdiction rule does not apply simply because the conflicting rulings occur at different

procedural stages of a case:

              In Riccio, this Court stated that when determining whether the
              coordinate jurisdiction rule applies, “this Court looks to where
              the rulings occurred in the context of the procedural posture
              of the case.” Riccio, 705 A.2d at 425. This statement is a
              recognition that a different procedural posture reflects the
              progression of a case which may give rise to exceptional
              circumstances making the coordinate jurisdiction rule
              inapplicable. To read this otherwise is to suggest, for
              example, the following. A party files an unsuccessful motion
              for judgment on the pleadings. Immediately thereafter,
              without a change in the law or engaging in any discovery to
              further develop the evidence, the same party files a motion for
              summary judgment on the same basis as the prior motion. If
              the procedural posture controls the applicability of the
              coordinate jurisdiction rule, a new judge could grant the
              summary judgment motion. This is decidedly impossible
              under the coordinate jurisdiction rule. The sum of our
              precedent establishes that the coordinate jurisdiction rule
              applies regardless of the procedural posture of the case
              unless there has been a change in the law, a change in the
              facts or the initial ruling was clearly erroneous and following it
              creates a manifest injustice.
Id. at 523.

       Although the OAJC in Rellick-Smith determined that a difference in procedural

posture alone is insufficient to evade application of the coordinate jurisdiction rule, it did

not go so far as expressly declaring that the procedural posture of a case is irrelevant to

determining whether there has been a violation of the rule.           Further reflection and

consideration of our precedent leads us to take that step now. We hold that the coordinate

jurisdiction rule applies unless there has been a change in the law; a change in the facts;

or a conclusion that the initial ruling was clearly erroneous, and that following it would

                                      [J-47-2023] - 22
create a manifest injustice. While a ruling issued at a different stage of the proceedings

may give rise to one of the limited exceptions to the coordinate jurisdiction rule – for

example, a change in the facts – it is the demonstration of the exceptional circumstance,

not the distinct procedural posture, which renders the coordinate jurisdiction rule

inapplicable.

       In the case sub judice, DHS has not demonstrated any change in the law or facts,

nor has it demonstrated that the ruling in Ivy Hill I was clearly erroneous. Rather, the

court in Ivy Hill II seemingly justified its refusal to adhere to the rulings of the court in Ivy

Hill I as follows: “Unlike Ivy Hill I, we are resolving [Appellant’s] summary relief motion.”

Ivy Hill II, 2022 WL 1464353, at *5 n.8 (citing Bates, supra, for the proposition that “a prior

ruling on preliminary objections does not preclude a contrary ruling . . . on a subsequent

motion for summary judgment”). Thus, consistent with our discussion above, we find

such reasoning insufficient and so hold that the court in Ivy Hill II violated the coordinate

jurisdiction rule.

       In its final argument, Appellant suggests that, notwithstanding the fact that the

Commonwealth Court in Ivy Hill II did not reach the underlying legal issues in this case, if

this Court concludes that the court below violated the coordinate jurisdiction rule, we

should forego remanding the matter to the Commonwealth Court for further consideration,

and instead decide, in the first instance, whether Appellant’s elders may invoke the

clergymen privilege under the CPSL, and, if not, whether Section 5943 is unconstitutional.

As Appellant recognizes, however, such an approach would be atypical and contrary to

our usual practice and procedure.         See, e.g., Robinson Township, 83 A.3d at 925

(remanding to the Commonwealth Court for a merits decision on the substantive issues

after reversing the court’s decision regarding standing). We see no reason to depart from

our traditional procedure in this case.

                                       [J-47-2023] - 23
      To reiterate, we vacate the lower court’s order dismissing Appellant’s Petition and

its Motion for Summary Relief, as we conclude the court’s determinations that Appellant

does not have standing, and that a grant of declaratory relief would not terminate the

controversy, violated the coordinate jurisdiction rule. Accordingly, we remand the case

for further proceedings.

      Order reversed. Case remanded.

      Justices Donohue, Dougherty, Wecht and Mundy join the opinion.

      Justice Brobson did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.

                                    [J-47-2023] - 24