Court Opinion

ID: 9581352
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:14:05.32029+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:53.102476
License: Public Domain

*34Chief Judge HEDRICK
concurring in the result in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority decision reversing the conviction in 85CRS47980 wherein defendant was convicted of willfully damaging an object of art in violation of G.S. 14-398, but I do not agree with the majority’s reasoning. I dissent from the majority decision finding no error in the case wherein defendant was convicted in 85CRS47981 of willfully damaging real property in violation of G.S. 14-127. In this case, I do not agree with the majority’s reasoning or result.
In my opinion, the majority overlooks the significance of the word “willful” as used in both statutes. “The word wilful, used in a statute creating a criminal offense, means something more than an intention to do a thing. It implies the doing the act purposely and deliberately, indicating a purpose to do it without authority — careless whether he has the right or not —in violation of law, and it is this which makes the criminal intent without which one cannot be brought within the meaning of a criminal statute.” In re Adoption of Hoose, 243 N.C. 589, 594, 91 S.E. 2d 555, 558 (1956) (citation omitted). “Willful” as used in criminal statutes means the wrongful doing of an act without justification or excuse, or the commission of an act purposely and deliberately in violation of law. State v. Brackett, 306 N.C. 138, 291 S.E. 2d 660 (1982).
The evidence in these cases shows nothing more than that defendant had the “intention to do a thing”; that is, that he intended to put the paper towels in the toilet. While the evidence is sufficient to raise an inference that defendant put the paper towels in the toilet “purposely and deliberately” it does not follow that this act was in violation of law. There is nothing in the evidence in these cases to show that defendant willfully or wantonly damaged the tapestry or the art museum. Although the jury could find from the evidence that defendant’s act in putting the towels into the toilet proximately caused the damage to the art and the museum, the evidence falls short of showing any willfulness to do such damage and thus the record fails to disclose any criminal intent upon the part of defendant within the meaning of these criminal statutes.
In State v. Maines, 301 N.C. 669, 273 S.E. 2d 289 (1981), the defendant was tried and convicted of felonious breaking and en*35tering and felonious larceny. The defendant had been arrested after he was seen driving an automobile with the owner and two other people riding as passengers, wherein was found a blue coat, one of the items which had been stolen from the property broken into.
The defendant’s conviction was based on the theory that since the evidence disclosed that the defendant was the driver of the vehicle it raised the inference that he was in constructive possession of recently stolen goods, and since he was in possession of recently stolen goods, he was the thief. In writing for the Supreme Court, Justice Huskins said, “We hold this criminal conviction cannot stand because it is based on stacked inferences. ‘Inference may not be based on inference. Every inference must stand upon some clear or direct evidence, and not upon some other inference or presumption.’ ” Id. at 676, 273 S.E. 2d at 294 (citation omitted).
The convictions in these cases cannot stand, because they are based on stacked inferences, the first inference being that defendant willfully put the paper towels in the toilet and the second inference, stacked on the first, being that defendant thereby willfully or wantonly damaged the tapestry and the art museum. There is no direct evidence giving rise to an inference that defendant willfully or wantonly damaged an object of art or real property.
In its opinion the majority correctly states, “It is not necessary for a person to know that he is breaking the law for an act to be ‘wilful.’ State v. Coal Co., 210 N.C. 742, 188 S.E. 412 (1936). Further, a person is presumed to intend the natural and foreseeable consequences of his unlawful acts. State v. Ferguson, 261 N.C. 558, 135 S.E. 2d 626 (1964).” (Emphasis mine.) While the foregoing statements are legally correct, they have no application whatsoever in the present cases, because it is not unlawful to put paper towels into a toilet. The problem in these cases, in my opinion, is simply that the State has failed to offer any evidence of criminal intent upon the part of defendant to damage the art or real property. Criminal intent is lacking in these cases because the State has failed to offer any direct evidence that defendant willfully damaged the tapestry or the real property. Had the act of putting the paper towels in the toilet been a criminal act, the *36criminal intent embodied in the violation of that law would carry over and provide the criminal intent necessary to show a violation of the statutes making it a crime to willfully damage an object of art or real property. It is not a violation of law to put paper towels in a toilet, even if the intent is to cause the toilet to overflow. Such an act is or may be fatuous, negligent or wrongful, making the perpetrator of that act liable in damages proximately resulting from such act. Damage willfully done to the toilet would be a violation of G.S. 14-127, but, contrary to the majority’s assertion, there is no evidence in this case that defendant willfully damaged the toilet by putting paper towels into it. The damage done resulted not to the toilet, but to the electrical fixtures in the museum and to the tapestry.
I vote to reverse both cases.