Court Opinion

ID: 9575623
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:15:30.284521+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:17.543072
License: Public Domain

*838THOMAS, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent and would reverse the trial court’s granting of summary judgment. I am satisfied there is a genuine issue of material fact that initially must be resolved by a trial in this case. That question is whether there was a bona fide transfer of the property to the two sons. If a finder of fact were to conclude that the transfer of the property to the sons was not a gift made in good faith, but was accomplished for some ulterior or improper reason, then a number of the majority’s rules shift substantially.
The record demonstrates both Mr. and Mrs. Walsh feared foreclosure upon the four-plex and a possible deficiency judgment that might impact their marital assets. In anticipation of foreclosure, the couple made gifts of their Casper residence and their Dubois cabin to their two sons, with the conveyances being accomplished by execution and recordation of quitclaim deeds. Mr. Walsh and the two sons argue in their brief there is no allegation or evidence in this case that either of the sons, individually, or in concert with their father, was guilty of any wrongdoing, fraud, or misconduct of any nature that induced their mother to convey the property to them. Nevertheless, if these properties were transferred in fraud of creditors, that arguably would invalidate the gifts to the sons as fraudulent conveyances.
Wyoming’s version of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, Wyo.Stat. § 34-14-108 (1990) provides:
Every conveyance made and every obligation incurred with actual intent, as distinguished from intent presumed in law, to hinder, delay, or defraud either present or future creditors, is fraudulent as to both present and future creditors [emphasis added].
Whether a conveyance is, or is not, fraudulent as to creditors is largely a question of fact. Credit Union of America v. Myers, 234 Kan. 773, 676 P.2d 99 (1984). The elements comprising a fraudulent conveyance are first, an intent on the part of the grantor to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors and second, the participation of the grantee in such fraudulent scheme, or such knowledge of facts and circumstances on the part of the grantee as would import knowledge of the fraud on him. Myers.
Wyoming’s case law interpreting § 34-14-108 of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act is minuscule. In Matter of Estate of Reed, 566 P.2d 587 (Wyo.1977), the issue was whether a legatee could renounce a bequest made to him under the will of a testatrix following the filing of the executor’s final account and petition for redistribution. The renunciation was filed the same day judgment was entered against the legatee by a judgment creditor, which was four days prior to the date fixed for final settlement. Reed. The court held that, in the absence of any explanation of good faith or any showing of consideration, and using the badges of fraud analysis, the transfer was a fraudulent conveyance intended to hinder and delay judgment creditors. Reed. The court adopted the reasoning of Justice Traynor, stating that:
[U]nder the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act in effect in California, a transfer of property to defeat a creditor can be set aside; a renunciation by a legatee is a transfer of property in that it causes title to his share of the estate to pass to another legatee; and is a fraudulent conveyance when done to defeat a creditor. Reed, 566 P.2d at 589. ■
The facts in this case are similar. Mr. and Mrs. Walsh conveyed property to their sons in anticipation of a foreclosure proceeding with the potential of a deficiency lien. The Walsh’s tried to protect marital assets by placing them out of reach of their creditors.
In order to determine whether a conveyance was made with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors, six badges or indicia of fraud should be examined.1 “A *839badge of fraud is a fact tending to throw suspicion upon the questioned transaction, excites distrust as to bona fides, raises an inference that a conveyance is fraudulent and by its presence usually requires a showing of good faith.” Reed, 566 P.2d at 589. The enumerated badges or indicia of fraud generally recognized to prove a fraudulent conveyance are: “(1) a relationship between the grantor and grantee; (2) the grantee’s knowledge of litigation against the grantor; (3) insolvency of the grantor; (4) a belief on the grantee’s part that the contract was the grantor’s last asset subject to a[n] execution; (5) inadequacy of consideration; and (6) consummation of the transaction contrary to normal business procedures.” Myers, 676 P.2d at 104. This court has said that a single badge of fraud may stamp a transaction as fraudulent. Reed (citing Payne v. Gilmore, 382 P.2d 140 (Okl.1963)).
The first badge of fraud is a relationship between grantor and grantee. The parental relationship between Mr. and Mrs. Walsh and the grantees, Thomas Walsh, Jr. and Kenneth Edward Walsh, satisfies the first badge of fraud. The facts and circumstances surrounding a transfer or conveyance of property between members of a family are properly subjected to a more strict scrutiny as to their bona fides than a similar transfer or conveyance between strangers, where the rights of creditors are, or may be, thwarted thereby. City of Arkansas City v. Anderson, 243 Kan. 627, 762 P.2d 183 (1988), cert. denied sub nom., Louisburg Grain Company v. City of Arkansas City, Kansas, 490 U.S. 1098, 109 S.Ct. 2449, 104 L.Ed.2d 1004 (1989). The more strict scrutiny was not invoked in the summary judgment proceeding.
The second badge of fraud is the grantee’s knowledge of litigation against the grantors. In Kenneth Edward Walsh’s affidavit he states, “7. During early 1987 I was out of town a great deal on my job and I am not familiar with the ownership, foreclosure upon, or disposition of the 4-plex which my parents owned.” Thomas Walsh, Jr. did not mention the possible foreclosure proceeding in his initial affidavit. However, in his response affidavit, Thomas Walsh, Jr. said, “4. * * * There was never any such discussion and I wasn’t aware of any problem with any four-plex.”
The third badge of fraud is insolvency of the grantor. Mrs. Walsh in her complaint and Mr. Walsh in his answer both admit the possibility of a deficiency lien. The complaint reads:
2 * * * [T]o convey the above-described real property to the parties’ sons, Thomas Walsh, Jr., and Kenneth Edward Walsh, for no consideration and for the purpose of avoiding the potentiality of a deficiency judgment lien upon said property because other real property belonging to Plaintiff and Defendant Thomas Walsh had gone into foreclosure from which there was the potentiality of a deficiency.
Mr. Walsh’s answer reads:
B. That during the early part of 1987 it appeared to the Plaintiff and this Defendant that the real property investment was not a good investment, was not productive as had been expected and there was a serious possibility that said investment, property would be foreclosed upon and a possible deficiency judgment obtained against the Plaintiff and this Defendant * * *.
It appears that insolvency of the grantors was believed by them to be imminent.
The fourth badge of fraud is a belief on the grantee’s part that the contract was the grantor’s last asset subject to an execution. Such a belief on the part of either son is not clear from the record. In considering the bona fide nature of the transaction, we cannot consider any matter upon which the record is silent. Reed.
The fifth badge of fraud is inadequacy of consideration. The majority concedes the *840transaction in this case was accomplished without Mrs. Walsh receiving monetary consideration. There is no evidence from the record that the Walshes received anything of value for the conveyance of the property to their two sons.
The sixth badge of fraud is the consummation of the transaction contrary to normal business procedures. Donald J. Smith, a realtor in Casper, submitted an affidavit stating he managed the real property owned by Mr. and Mrs. Walsh, namely the four-plex. Mr. Smith said he had been acquainted with Mr. and Mrs. Walsh for five years, and he had drawn up, and discussed with them, the quitclaim deed transferring the property to their sons. The transfer of property from parents to their children is not, absent other circumstances, an unusual business transaction. We, however, must look at the obvious result of the transfers. Mr. and Mrs. Walsh conveyed property to their sons as a gift which effectively placed the property beyond the reach of their personal creditors. It is arguable that a finder of fact could find the transfer of a parent debtor’s property to his or her children a fraudulent conveyance when the parents are faced with foreclosure proceedings on other property owned, with insufficient funds to pay the debts.
After reviewing the record in the light most favorable to Mrs. Walsh and granting her all favorable inferences which can properly be drawn from the evidence, Allmaras v. Mudge, 820 P.2d 533 (Wyo.1991), there is evidence in the record that could lead to conflicting interpretations and cause reasonable minds to differ, making summary judgment improper. Wyoming Game and Fish Com’n v. Mills Company, 701 P.2d 819 (Wyo.1985). The disputed facts cast suspicion upon the transaction. Those same disputed facts could support an inference that the conveyances were fraudulent. The grantees might be able to rebut such an inference at trial, however, where they would have the opportunity to prove the properties were transferred in good faith.
I recognize the propositions espoused by the majority with respect to not only the role of the sons, but also the application of-Zullig v. Zullig, 502 P.2d 198 (Wyo.1972). Those propositions assume a bona fide transfer to the two sons by the gift of the property, and that assumption is the focus of my concern. In arriving at that assumption, the majority determines the question of whether a confidential relationship existed between Mr. and Mrs. Walsh. The existence of a confidential relationship is a question of fact. Perry v. Vaught, 624 P.2d 776 (Wyo.1981); Brug v. Case, 600 P.2d 710 (Wyo.1979); Baldwin v. Birchby, 346 P.2d 278 (Wyo.1959).
There is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether or not the transfer of the property from Mr. and Mrs. Walsh to their sons was a bona fide gift. This genuine issue of material fact entitles Mrs. Walsh to a trial on the merits.' If the conveyances were not bona fide transfers, then the sons became alter egos of the husband who may well have been in a position to exercise undue influence over his wife. Mr. Walsh and the two sons were not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. The trial court’s order granting the summary judgment in this case should be reversed.

. Matter of Estate of Reed, 566 P.2d 587 (Wyo.1977); City of Arkansas City v. Anderson, 243 Kan. 627, 762 P.2d 183 (1988), cert. denied sub nom., Louisburg Grain Company v. City of Arkansas City, Kansas, 490 U.S. 1098, 109 S.Ct. 2449, 104 L.Ed.2d 1004 (1989); Dahnken, Inc. of Salt Lake City v. Wilmarth, 726 P.2d 420 (Utah 1986); Credit Union of America v. Myers, 234 *839Kan. 773, 676 P.2d 99 (1984); Montana National Bank v. Michels, 193 Mont. 295, 631 P.2d 1260 (1981); Payne v. Gilmore, 382 P.2d 140 (Okl.1963); Royal Indemnity Company v. McClendon, 64 N.M. 46, 323 P.2d 1090 (1958); Evans v. Trude, 193 Or. 648, 240 P.2d 940 (1952); Territorial Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Baird, 781 P.2d 452 (Ut.App.1989); Cashion Gin Company v. Kulikov, 1 Ariz.App. 90, 399 P.2d 711 (1965).