Court Opinion

ID: 9518901
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:04:44.683256+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:38:20.273848
License: Public Domain

Burns, J.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of murder in the second degree. CL 1948, § 750.317 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.549). He appeals claiming the trial court erred in its instructions.
Two witnesses for the prosecution testified that they saw the deceased, Lendora Clark, backed against some kitchen cabinets and the defendant standing with a knife in front of the deceased who had no weapon. One of these witnesses had also seen the defendant twice lunge toward the deceased with the knife. The defendant testified on his own behalf and cited prior occasions when the deceased had threatened the defendant with a knife in the course of arguments. Defendant claimed that on the day of the killing, June 17, 1964, another dispute arose, and the deceased attacked the defendant with a knife. Defendant allegedly fought in self-defense and during the fight Lendora Clark was accidentally stabbed.
Defendant claims on appeal that the following-jury instruction erroneously took from the jury the consideration of the effect of prior altercations on defendant’s state of mind as he was allegedly being-attacked by the deceased:
“I charge you that ill-will of the deceased and former quarrels and affrays could have nothing *83whatever to do with defendant, Bobert Bell, however hostile the deceased may have been, and the many quarrels and affrays the parties may have had, if the deceased, by his act, did not threaten peril to the defendant on that day. Now, the reason for that is, many people are quarrelsome— many people are quarrelsome, but are they assaultive and the test is, what happened that day? The test is, was he in danger of losing his life, that day? Was he justified in the slaying because of what he believed, at that moment, was about to happen? Because a defendant is not authorized, by law, to infer peril on account of ill-will, or prior contests. People act differently on different occasions. Sometimes they are angry and quarrelsome, and sometimes just like lambs, and that’s the reason.”
The two eases cited by the defendant, Hurd v. People (1872), 25 Mich 405, and People v. Tillman (1902), 132 Mich 23, sustain defendant’s position that prior arguments can be considered in determining the state of mind of the accused. However, in those cases self-defense was an excuse or justification for the criminal act upon which the prosecution was based. In the present case defendant’s own testimony and claim was that the act of killing must have been accidental. The defendant testified as follows:
[Direct examination] “He jumped up from the table with a knife in his hand, and I grabbed a chair, and Mr. Clark struck at me with the knife, and we struggled, and he went around me, and I put my right hand across his, and held his right hand, and we were locked up. I don’t know what happened between the cutting, and something I know, Mr. Clark was cut like that, and I am very sorry it happened * * *
*84[Cross-examination] “I grabbed it [the knife] with my left arm, and that’s when I got cut here (indicating), so I put my hand up like this (demonstrating), and pushed him, and me and him was tussling there, and I don’t know what happened there in the tussle. I don’t know what happened. I knew he was cut.”
The role of self-defense in this case was to show that the defendant was not the aggressor and to supply a justification or excuse for engaging in a struggle which resulted in accidental death. Defendant’s testimony and that of his own brother demonstrate that the deceased’s previous threats with a knife were harmless and engendered no reasonable apprehension of danger which would influence the conflict in question. In prior arguments the deceased never touched the defendant with a knife. On several occasions it appears that the deceased pulled out his knife to protect himself from the defendant who had an approximate 100 pound weight advantage.
Cross-examination of defendant:
“Q. Now, you say that Mr. Clark threatened you with a knife many times, is that right?
“A. That’s right.
“Q. Ever cut you with a knife ?
“A. No.
“Q. Not one time?
“A. Ain’t never cut me.
“Q. Did the deceased ever pull a knife out to protect himself from you?
“A. He pulled that knife every time me and him had an argument. That’s how I know he had it.
“Q. And he threatened you with it, is that right?
“A. If I tried to do something to him, he would do something to me.
“Q. He told you, if you do something to me, what he was going to do with you?
“A. That is right.”
*85Cross-examination of defendant’s brother:
“Q. And you testified that the deceased did not point the knife at your brother, is that right?
‘‘A. No, I didn’t see him point it.
“Q. And you testified that he never threatened your brother with a knife, is that right?
"A. No.
“Q. No, what?
“A. He didn’t threaten — I didn’t see him threaten him with a knife.
“Q. You saw him with it, is that right?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. And you also testified that he had the knife for protection, isn’t that what you said, to defend himself against your brother ?
“A. Yes, sir, he had it to defend himself. I imagine everybody would grab a knife to defend themselves.
"Q. Hid you ever see an actual fight between your brother and the deceased, Lendora Clark?
"A. No.
'“Q. Never saw them fight ?
“A. No.”
The court’s instructions, supra, conditioned jury consideration of prior hostility on defendant’s sense of immediate fear for his life. This was not prejudicial error in light of the testimony regarding the nature and extent of the defendant’s encounters with the deceased and regarding the claimed accidental cause of death. Reading the charge as a whole, it fairly sets forth the applicable law and the claims of the People and the defense.
Defendant also alleges the court erred by failing to instruct the jury that since the affray occurred in defendant’s own residence (it was also the residence of the deceased) he was under no duty to retreat before he could resort to self-defense. This *86instruction was never requested. Furthermore, the element of retreat was never an issue during the course of the trial, and the trial court’s instructions did not intimate the erroneous proposition* that defendant was under a duty to retreat. Therefore, the desired charge was not legally necessary and its absence did not render the instructions erroneous or misleading. See CL 1948, § 768.29 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.1052), and People v. Guillett (1955), 342 Mich 1.
Affirmed.
Dalton, J., concurred with R. B. Burns, J.

 People v. McGrandy (1967), 9 Mich App 187.