Court Opinion

ID: 9668801
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:27:06.932634+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:48.432998
License: Public Domain

DONNELLY, Judge
(dissenting).
I believe prejudicial error occurred at trial when witness Sibbe Adell was permitted to testify, in the presence and hearing of the jury, that he identified appellant at a lineup conducted while appellant was in the custody of the Juvenile Court.
The pertinent portion of the transcript reads as follows:
“Q (By Mr. Fitzgerald) At this Juvenile Home what took place ?
“A They took me inside — they took me inside this little door, after we went upstairs and asked me to see if I could identify the guy that I saw in the lineup. They had six guys there.
“MR. SCHWARZ: May my objection be shown?
“THE COURT: It will be a continuous objection.
“Q (By Mr. Fitzgerald) And how were the six guys in the lineup dressed?
“A Had on white T-shirts and blue jeans, looked like blue jeans. I can’t recall correctly whether it was blue jeans or not.
“Q And did you pick someone out of the lineup ?
“A Yes, I picked the one that was fifth — second from my right or fifth from my left.
“Q And the person that you picked out of the lineup is the person that you saw firing the shot into the car on October 5th, 1970 ? A It is.
“Q And that is the defendant here in the courtroom today ?
“A Yes, sir.”
In my opinion, the action of our General Assembly in 1969, in amending V.A.M.S. 211.271(3), evidences deference to the insistence on the part of the United States Supreme Court, as restated on June 21, 1971, in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 1985, 29 L.Ed.2d 647, “that the applicable due process standard in juvenile proceedings, as developed by Gault and Winship, is fundamental fairness.”
The problem is one of reconciling the concept of “preservation of the integrity of the juvenile system, lest it become a mere adjunct to the regular criminal processes” (Edwards v. United States, 117 U.S.App.D.C. 383, 330 F.2d 849, 851), with the necessity for preservation of “the safety and security of the law-abiding public” (State v. Gullings, 244 Or. 173, 416 P.2d 311, 314).
I agree that we should not construe § 211.271 so as to “unnecessarily handicap proper police and juvenile officer investigation.” Accordingly, I would not insulate a juvenile from a lineup while he is in the custody of the Juvenile Court. Further, I would not prohibit a witness who has attended such a lineup from making an in-court identification of an accused at a trial under the general law. However, I believe *442the standard of “fundamental fairness” requires that a witness who has attended a lineup conducted under the auspices of the Juvenile Court not be permitted- to testify, at the trial under the general law, that he identified the juvenile at such lineup. “Only a per se exclusionary rule as to such testimony can be an effective sanction to assure that law enforcement authorities” (Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 273, 87 S.Ct. 1951, 1957, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178), not be allowed to make the juvenile system “a mere adjunct to the regular criminal processes.” (Edwards v. United States, supra, 330 F.2d 849, 851.)
I respectfully dissent.