Court Opinion

ID: 9375136
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-24 22:02:11.494038+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:56.251542
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/24/23 P. v. Wallace CA2/2

   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

 THE PEOPLE,                                                            B319120

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                    (Los Angeles County
                                                                        Super. Ct. No. BA009423)
           v.

 NATHANIEL DEON WALLACE,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County. Ray G. Jurado, Judge. Affirmed.
      Eric R. Larson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Nikhil Cooper, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
               _________________________________
       Nathaniel Deon Wallace appeals the denial of his petition
for resentencing under Penal Code1 section 1172.6 (former
§ 1170.95).2 Appellant was convicted in 1990 by jury of one count
of willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder
(§§ 664/187, subd. (a)), one count of attempted murder
(§§ 664/187, subd. (a)), and four counts of second degree robbery
(§ 211). Following an evidentiary hearing pursuant to section
1172.6, subdivision (d)(3), the superior court ruled appellant
ineligible for resentencing on both counts of attempted murder,
finding beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was the actual
shooter and acted with intent to kill. Appellant challenges the
denial of the petition on the ground that the superior court
erroneously relied on the summary of the evidence set forth in
this court’s prior opinion on direct appeal to conclude that
appellant harbored the requisite intent to kill. We agree with
appellant that to the extent the superior court relied on the
appellate opinion’s summary of the evidence, the court erred.
However, based upon our review of the trial record in this case,3
any error was harmless. We therefore affirm the denial of
appellant’s resentencing petition.

      1   Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
      2 Effective June 30, 2022, Penal Code section 1170.95 was
renumbered section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats. 2022,
ch. 58, § 10.)
      3  We granted respondent’s request to take judicial notice of
the file from the direct appeal, which consists of a compact disc
containing nine volumes of reporter’s transcripts and two
volumes of clerk’s transcripts.

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      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND4
       On December 2, 1989, around 6:45 p.m., Debra Rosenbaum
parked her Volkswagen Rabbit on the street near her home.
When she exited the vehicle, she noticed another car with three
people in it parked nearby. Two men, identified by Rosenbaum
as appellant and codefendant Martin Roberson, got out of the car
and approached Rosenbaum, while the driver remained in the
car. One of the men, whom Rosenbaum believed was appellant,
was carrying “a big gun,” about 18 or 19 inches long. Rosenbaum
gave the men “everything [she] had”⎯her purse, book bag, and
workout clothes. The men began to struggle with Rosenbaum,
and she was shot in the back of the head. Rosenbaum survived,
but suffered mental and physical impairment requiring long-term
treatment.
       Around 6:25 p.m. that evening, Cesar Morales was in his
car parked on the street about three or four car lengths in front of
Rosenbaum’s Volkswagen. Morales had just delivered a pizza
and was sitting in the driver’s seat with the car door open and
the interior light on. A scream drew his attention, and he turned
to see a man assaulting a young woman as she lay on the ground.
A gray Buick was parked alongside the Volkswagen facing in the
same direction. Morales observed two other men get out of the
Buick and stand nearby. As the woman struggled, the man who
had been assaulting her lifted her up and appeared to throw her

      4 Because the instant appeal pertains only to the propriety
of the superior court’s denial of appellant’s petition for
resentencing under section 1172.6, we limit our factual summary
to the evidence relevant to the attempted murder charges
contained in the trial record.

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into the back seat of the Buick. He then shot at her twice with a
long-barreled gun, about 18 to 24 inches in length.
        Morales closed his car door. When he turned to look behind
him again, he saw the Buick driving slowly up the street toward
him. As the Buick drove past Morales’s car, the passenger in the
front seat who had shot the woman fired twice at Morales.
Morales himself was not hit, but bullets struck the driver’s and
rear driver’s side doors of his car. Morales attempted to follow
the Buick as it drove away, but lost sight of it after several
blocks.
        Appellant’s fingerprints were found on the inside and
outside of the driver’s window of Rosenbaum’s car. Appellant’s
fingerprints were also found on a sawed-off .22-caliber Ruger rifle
recovered from a search of appellant’s residence. Morales
identified the weapon as similar to the firearm he saw being used
to shoot Rosenbaum, and bullet casings recovered from the scene
of the shooting matched that particular Ruger rifle.
        Following a jury trial, appellant was convicted of the
willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder of Cesar
Morales (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a); count 4) and the attempted
murder of Debra Rosenbaum (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a); count 3). As
to both counts, the jury found the allegation that appellant
personally used a firearm to be true. (§ 12022.5.) The jury also
found true the allegation that appellant intentionally and
personally inflicted great bodily injury on Debra Rosenbaum.
(§ 12022.7.) Appellant was sentenced to a term of 21 years 8
months, plus life with the possibility of parole. (People v. Adkins
et al. (Oct. 27, 1992, B052827) [nonpub. opn.] (Adkins).) This
court affirmed the judgment on direct appeal.

                                4
      Appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus on
April 11, 2019, in which he sought resentencing pursuant to
Senate Bill No. 1437’s amendments to the law of murder. The
superior court construed the petition as a resentencing petition
under section 1172.6 and appointed counsel. After numerous
delays and following the passage of Senate Bill No. 775 (Stats.
2021, ch. 551, § 2), the superior court determined that appellant
had made a prima facie case for relief, set an evidentiary hearing,
and ordered the People to “file copies of the Court of Appeal
opinion and the jury instructions.” Before the evidentiary
hearing, appellant filed an additional brief in which he argued
that he was convicted of the attempted murder of Cesar Morales
based upon the natural and probable consequences doctrine, and
there was insufficient evidence to prove his guilt under any
theory of attempted murder that remains viable under current
law.
      At the start of the evidentiary hearing, the superior court
stated it had read and considered appellant’s brief, the Court of
Appeal opinion, and portions of the trial transcripts submitted by
the People. The court added, “[B]ased on my review of the Court
of Appeal opinion, which denied Mr. Wallace’s appeal, it appears
that he was the actual shooter.” The prosecutor then offered into
evidence a compact disc containing the full set of clerk’s and
reporter’s transcripts from the trial as well as the prior opinion
from the direct appeal.5
      The People argued that appellant was not entitled to relief
under section 1172.6 because the evidence at trial established he

      5 The compact disc was marked as an exhibit and admitted
into evidence.

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was the actual shooter in both attempted murders. Further, the
jury found appellant had personally used a firearm in both
counts, it found the attempted murder in count 4 was willful,
deliberate, and premeditated, and it found true the personal
infliction of great bodily injury allegation as to count 3.
Appellant countered by arguing that the instructions on natural
and probable consequences allowed the jury to convict appellant
of the attempted murder of Morales (count 4) without finding he
had the requisite intent to kill.
       Following argument, the superior court denied the petition.
The court stated, “I do find that the evidence, as reflected in the
Court of Appeal opinion, demonstrates that the defendant was
the actual shooter and had the intent to kill beyond a reasonable
doubt in both attempted murder convictions.”
                            DISCUSSION
The Superior Court Correctly Denied Appellant’s Petition
for Resentencing
    A. Applicable legal principles
       The Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018
Reg. Sess.) in 2018, effectively abolishing the natural and
probable consequences doctrine in cases of murder and limiting
the application of the felony-murder doctrine. (Stats. 2018,
ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f); People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957
(Lewis).) With one narrow exception (§ 189, subd. (f)), Senate Bill
No. 1437 effectively eliminated murder convictions premised on
any theory of imputed malice—that is, any theory by which a
person can be convicted of murder for a killing committed by
someone else, such as felony murder or the natural and probable
consequences doctrine—unless the People also prove that the
nonkiller defendant personally acted with the intent to kill or

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was a major participant who acted with reckless disregard to
human life. (§§ 188, subd. (a)(3) & 189, subd. (e).) Specifically,
the Legislature amended section 188 to require that, when the
felony-murder rule does not apply, a principal in the crime of
murder “shall act with malice aforethought” and “[m]alice shall
not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her
participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3); People v. Gentile
(2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842–843 (Gentile).) Effective January 1,
2022, Senate Bill No. 775 amended section 1172.6 to expand its
coverage to individuals convicted of “attempted murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine.” (§ 1172.6,
subd. (a); People v. Saibu (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 709, 747.)
       Senate Bill No. 1437 also enacted former section 1170.95
(now § 1172.6), which established a procedure for vacating the
murder convictions of defendants who could no longer be
convicted of murder because of the amendments to sections 188
and 189. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4; Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
pp. 957, 959, 971; Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 843.) Section
1172.6, subdivision (c) requires the court to appoint counsel when
requested upon the filing of a properly pleaded petition for
resentencing. (Lewis, at pp. 963, 966.) The court must then
conduct a prima facie analysis with briefing to determine the
petitioner’s eligibility for relief, and, if the requisite prima facie
showing is made, issue an order to show cause. (§ 1172.6, subd.
(c); Lewis, at p. 971; People v. Nieber (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 458,
469–470.)
       At the evidentiary hearing following issuance of an order to
show cause, the superior court acts as an independent fact finder,
and the prosecution bears the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that the petitioner is guilty of murder or

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attempted murder under California law as amended by Senate
Bill No. 1437. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3); People v. Garrison (2021) 73
Cal.App.5th 735, 745; People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698,
709.) The petitioner and the prosecutor may offer new or
additional evidence, and the court may consider evidence
“previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial that is
admissible under current law,” including witness testimony.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3); see Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 853–
854.)
       While “[t]he [superior] court may also consider the
procedural history of the case recited in any prior appellate
opinion” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3)) at the evidentiary hearing stage,
the court may not rely on facts recited by the appellate court in
its prior decision to resolve a petition for resentencing. (People v.
Cooper (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 393, 400, fn. 9 [superior court may
rely on procedural history but not the factual summary contained
in the prior appellate decision]; People v. Flores (2022) 76
Cal.App.5th 974, 988 [“the factual summary in an appellate
opinion is not evidence that may be considered at an evidentiary
hearing to determine a petitioner's eligibility for resentencing”];
People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 292 [in enacting
Senate Bill No. 775, “the Legislature has decided trial judges
should not rely on the factual summaries contained in prior
appellate decisions when a section [1172.6] petition reaches the
stage of a full-fledged evidentiary hearing”].)
    B. The superior court improperly relied on the facts
       recited in the prior appellate opinion to deny the
       petition, but the error was harmless
       Appellant contends the superior court erred by relying on
this court’s summary of the evidence in the Adkins opinion, and

                                 8
the matter must be remanded for a new evidentiary hearing.
While we agree that the superior court erred in relying on the
facts summarized in the prior opinion to deny the petition, we
conclude that that error was harmless.
       Contrary to respondent’s assertion that the superior court
based its ruling on the whole trial record, it does appear that the
superior court improperly relied on the facts recited in the Adkins
decision to find appellant ineligible for relief under section
1172.6. At the outset of the hearing, the court stated it had read
and considered the parties’ briefs, “some trial transcripts,” and
the Court of Appeal opinion. Although the trial record was in
evidence and available to the court when the court ultimately
denied the petition, at no time did the court pause the
proceedings to actually review the evidence from appellant’s trial
before issuing its ruling. Instead, the superior court cited the
Court of Appeal opinion as the only source of evidence to support
its findings that appellant was the actual shooter and had the
intent to kill. Under section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3), as
amended by Senate Bill No. 775, the superior court erred in
relying on the facts recited in this court’s prior decision to deny
the petition.
       The error, however, is one of state evidentiary law only,
subject to harmless error analysis under People v. Watson (1956)
46 Cal.2d 818, 836. (People v. Epps (2001) 25 Cal.4th 19, 29
[error based solely on state law is subject to Watson harmless
error analysis]; see Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 957–958
[failure to appoint counsel under § 1172.6, subd. (b)(3) is “state
law error only, tested for prejudice under [Watson]”].) Thus, the
error requires reversal in this case only if appellant can show a
reasonable probability that his petition would not have been

                                9
denied had the superior court reviewed the trial record. (People
v. Mena (2012) 54 Cal.4th 146, 162 [“under Watson, a defendant
must show it is reasonably probable a more favorable result
would have been obtained absent the error”]; Epps, supra, 25
Cal.4th at pp. 29–30; People v. Owens (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th
1015, 1027 (Owens).)
       Appellant cannot show prejudice here. He concedes that
the factual summary in the prior opinion does not differ
substantively from the trial evidence (“[appellant] is not
contending the prior summary of evidence in the direct appeal
opinion was somehow wrong or improper”), and he does not
challenge the evidence in the record that he personally used a
firearm and was the only shooter in both attempted murders.
       At the evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6,
subdivision (d)(3), the superior court was charged with
determining, beyond a reasonable doubt, if appellant may be
found guilty of attempted murder under a theory that remains
valid after the amendments to the substantive definition of
murder. (People v. Vargas (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 943, 952.) The
uncontroverted evidence at trial showed appellant was the sole
actual shooter in both attempted murders, thus establishing his
guilt as the actual perpetrator of both crimes, whose criminal
liability was based on his own acts and mental state, not any
theory of vicarious liability.
       Because the evidence presented at appellant’s trial
unequivocally establishes that he was the sole actual shooter, the
superior court’s error in relying on the Court of Appeal opinion
instead of the admissible trial record to draw that conclusion was
harmless. (See Owens, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 1027.) And
based on our own independent review of the record, we conclude

                                10
that the superior court correctly determined appellant is
ineligible for any relief under section 1172.6. (See People v.
Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 233.)
                           DISPOSITION
       The order denying appellant’s petition for resentencing
under Penal Code section 1172.6 is affirmed.
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                     LUI, P. J.
We concur:

      ASHMANN-GERST, J.

      CHAVEZ, J.

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