Court Opinion

ID: 9539189
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 09:08:59.54511+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:32.580337
License: Public Domain

In the
                         Court of Appeals
                 Second Appellate District of Texas
                          at Fort Worth
                       ___________________________

                            No. 02-22-00145-CR
                            No. 02-22-00146-CR
                       ___________________________

         ANTHONY NICO STARNESOSORIA A/K/A NICO ANTHONY
                    STARNESOSORIA, Appellant
                                     V.

                           THE STATE OF TEXAS

                 On Appeal from Criminal District Court No. 3
                            Tarrant County, Texas
                    Trial Court Nos. 1606372D, 1657815R

               Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr, J.; and Fahey, J.1
   Memorandum Opinion by Visiting Judge Megan Fahey, Sitting by Assignment

     1
       The Honorable Megan Fahey, Judge of the 348th District Court of Tarrant
County, sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice of the Texas Supreme Court
pursuant to Section 74.003(h) of the Government Code. See Tex. Gov’t Code
Ann. § 74.003(h).
                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

      In a consolidated trial, a jury convicted Appellant Anthony Nico Starnesosoria2

of the offense of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon and assessed punishment

at ten years’ confinement; the jury also convicted him of aggravated robbery with a

deadly weapon and assessed punishment at fifty years’ confinement and a $5000 fine.

The trial court ordered the sentences to run concurrently. In his sole issue, Appellant

argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it concluded that he had

voluntarily absented himself from his trial, yielding a Sixth Amendment violation. We

affirm.

                                I. BACKGROUND

      Appellant was present when his trial began on June 27, 2022. He entered a

not-guilty plea, after which three witnesses testified. At day’s end, the trial court

instructed the parties to report at 9:30 the following morning for the trial’s

continuation. But as of 10:00 a.m., Appellant was not there. Even after a sheriff’s

deputy called Appellant’s name three times in the hallway, looked for him in the halls

and on other floors, and checked the restrooms, Appellant was not located. In

addition, defense counsel stated that he was unable to communicate with Appellant at

that time.

      2
        The judgments state Appellant’s name as Starnesosoria, but he is also referred
to in the record as Starnes-Osoria.

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       The trial court found that Appellant had been present when trial started, he had

entered his plea to both indictments, and he had voluntarily absented himself that

second morning.      The trial court revoked Appellant’s bonds and, over defense

counsel’s objection, instructed that the trial would proceed without Appellant. The

State then called its next witness.

       After the lunch recess, Appellant’s counsel notified the trial court that,

according to his legal assistant, Appellant had contacted his office and left a voicemail

message stating that he was “really sick” and was going to the doctor. Asking counsel

to gather more information, the trial court said that Appellant would need a doctor’s

note and a COVID-19 test. During the short break that followed, counsel learned

from his assistant that Appellant’s voicemail indicated that he had a rash and a swollen

eye. Counsel’s legal assistant did not speak directly with Appellant and had not been

able to reach him by phone. The trial court again recessed the proceedings and asked

the State to contact the warrants division to try and locate Appellant.

       After that break, Appellant’s counsel informed the trial court that someone

from his office had finally spoken with Appellant, who said that he was going to an

urgent-care facility and would send pictures afterward to show his condition. Another

lengthy recess later, Appellant’s counsel told the trial court of a text he had received

stating that Appellant was at Medical City Dallas. The State called that facility—but it

had no record of Appellant’s presence. The State also advised the trial court that,

according to its investigator, the phone from which Appellant was contacting his

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counsel appeared to be a “burner phone”3 not associated with anyone.              After

recounting the sequence of events to that point, the trial court stated, “We’re going to

proceed without him,” and the State then put on three more witnesses during the

afternoon of June 28.

      When the trial continued the next day, June 29, Appellant again did not appear.

A deputy again called Appellant’s name three times and searched the hallway and

restroom. Appellant’s counsel reported that he had lost communication with his

client. The trial once more continued in Appellant’s absence, and the jury convicted

him of both offenses and assessed his punishment. Appellant was arrested on July 5,

2022, and appeared for a July 8, 2022 sentencing hearing.

      Appellant filed a motion for new trial arguing that he was unlawfully tried in

absentia because he was under the care of a medical doctor and was advised not to

return to work or other activity for two days. At the new-trial hearing, defense

counsel testified that he was not given an opportunity to investigate Appellant’s

absence from trial. He further testified that Appellant was prejudiced and was denied

effective assistance of counsel at trial because counsel could not communicate with

      3
       “A ‘burner phone’ is a cheap, prepaid mobile phone that you can destroy or
discard when you no longer need it.” Tim Brookes & Chris Hoffman, “What Is a
Burner      Phone,        and        When    Should     You       Use      One?”
https://www.howtogeek.com/712588/what-is-a-burner-phone-and-when-should-
you-use-one/ (last visited July 26, 2023).

                                           4
Appellant to get his real-time input on “what witnesses [were] saying, what they [were]

alleging occurred[,] and whether his perception of that [was] correct or not.”

      Appellant introduced the affidavit of his mother, who stated that when she got

home from work at 4:30 p.m. on June 28, 2022, Appellant was very ill: he was

“nauseous and throwing up” and “had a severe headache.” She took him to the

hospital that evening and brought him back to her house upon his release. Appellant

did not testify at the new-trial hearing but offered his own affidavit, which stated that

when he woke up on June 28, his ankles were swollen, he was nauseous, and he

vomited several times. Appellant said he was unable to leave his house due to illness

and called his attorney’s office to let him know. When his mother returned from

work, she took him to Medical City Dallas. According to his affidavit, Appellant was

not voluntarily absent from his trial and had wanted to be there.

      Appellant also offered his Medical City records at the hearing on his new-trial

motion. Those records indicate that Appellant was admitted at 10:20 p.m. on June 28

chiefly complaining of a rash and swelling and was released a little more than three

hours later, at 1:39 a.m. on June 29. The records note that Appellant was not in

immediate distress and the swelling and rash were “very mild.” The discharge notes

reflect that Appellant would follow up with a primary-care physician and was stable

and appropriate for discharge. The patient-information sheet given to Appellant

states that he could return to work in two days and advised caution because he might

have been given medicine that causes drowsiness or dizziness, although in fact he was

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given only a topical steroid cream. The patient-information sheet further advised not

to make important legal decisions or perform jobs requiring concentration.

       The State countered with the affidavit of Appellant’s treating physician at

Medical City. In addition to stating that he had provided Appellant with a mild

steroid cream for a very mild rash, the doctor offered his “medical opinion that there

was no medical reason that [Appellant] could not have attended court based on [the

doctor’s] medical evaluation, patient history provided, and labs.” The doctor also

noted that the instruction about not returning to work for two days was “auto-

populated,” and he saw “no reason why” Appellant could not have come to court.

                                   II. DISCUSSION

       Appellant argues in his sole issue that he was denied his right under the Sixth

Amendment of the United States Constitution to be present at his trial when the trial

court concluded that he had voluntarily absented himself. The Sixth Amendment

guarantees that an accused has the right to be present in the courtroom at every stage

of his trial. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338, 90 S. Ct. 1057, 1058 (1970). But a

defendant who voluntarily absents himself from trial waives that right. See Taylor v.

United States, 414 U.S. 17, 19, 94 S. Ct. 194, 195 (1973).

       Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 33.03 states that in all felony

prosecutions, the defendant must be present in person at the trial, but “when the

defendant voluntarily absents himself after pleading to the indictment or information,

or after the jury has been selected when trial is before a jury, the trial may proceed to

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its conclusion.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 33.03; Moore v. State, 670 S.W.2d 259,

260–61 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); Cartwright v. State, No. 02-20-00121-CR, 2021 WL

2006403, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 20, 2021, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not

designated for publication).    When some evidence supports a conclusion that a

defendant’s absence is voluntary, a trial court does not abuse its discretion by denying

a motion for continuance and proceeding with trial as Article 33.03 authorizes. Moore,

670 S.W.2d at 261. In reviewing such a decision, we may consider not only the

evidence before the trial court at the time it ruled but also any later-developed

evidence. Id. We will not disturb the trial court’s finding unless the defendant

presents evidence that refutes the trial court’s determination. Id.

      Several cases with similar facts support the conclusion that Appellant

“voluntarily absent[ed] himself” under Article 33.03. In Cartwright, on the second day

of trial the defendant was present, and the State called five witnesses before resting its

case just ahead of the lunch recess. 2021 WL 2006403, at *1. The defendant did not

come back after lunch, and neither the bailiff nor defense counsel could find or

contact him. Id. On appeal, we held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

finding that the defendant was voluntarily absent from trial. Id. at *3. Our holding

drew heavily from Moore, whose facts we summarized:

      In that case, after the appellant appeared in court and entered a plea of
      not guilty and the jury was selected and sworn, the trial court recessed
      until the next morning. [Moore, 670 S.W.2d at 260]. Although the
      appellant’s counsel told the appellant when and where to appear the next
      day, the appellant, who was out on bond, did not appear when court

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       resumed the next morning. Id. The trial court had the bailiff call the
       appellant’s name in the hall, and the appellant’s counsel informed the
       trial court that he had not spoken with the appellant since the prior
       evening and did not know his whereabouts. Id.

              When the trial court decided to proceed with the case under
       Article 33.03, the appellant’s counsel objected and moved for a 24-hour
       continuance to try to locate the appellant, who had no phone and “no
       fixed place of abode” and had a history of heart problems. Id. The trial
       court replied that there was no evidence as to why the appellant was
       absent and that a motion for mistrial would be entertained if the
       appellant had fallen ill from a heart attack but “right now the Court has
       nothing before it as to why this case should not continue under Article
       33.03.” Id. The appellant remained absent for the rest of the trial, and
       the jury found him guilty and assessed his punishment; six months later,
       he was extradited from Illinois and sentenced. Id.

Id. at *3.

       The facts of Cartwright and Moore are directly on point. Like those defendants,

Appellant was out on bond, had appeared for trial, and was told when and where to

appear when court reconvened. See Moore, 670 S.W.2d at 260; Cartwright, 2021 WL

2006403, at *3. At the time the trial court determined that Appellant’s absence was

voluntary, some evidence supported that conclusion. See Moore, 670 S.W.2d at 261.

       Also squarely on point is a case from our sister court in Austin that similarly

involved a defendant who sought medical care during trial and did not return. In Reed

v. State, the defendant was present for jury selection and was instructed to return the

following morning. No. 03-02-00720-CR, 2004 WL 34831, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin

Jan. 8, 2004, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). After the defendant

failed to appear, the trial court learned that he was in the emergency room and

                                          8
recessed the proceedings until the afternoon. Id. The defendant still did not appear

but left a voicemail message with the court coordinator stating that he was going to a

“lung specialist” that afternoon. Id. The trial court confirmed that although the

defendant had been at the emergency room, he was discharged after being treated not

for any pulmonary problems but for an upset stomach. Id. The emergency-room

nurse testified that the defendant was “alert, oriented, and ambulatory” at his

discharge, and nothing in the record showed that the defendant had a valid medical

reason for skipping his trial. Id. Holding that the defendant’s “vague assertions [in

the voicemail message] about medical treatment” were not enough to show that the

trial court abused its discretion by proceeding in his absence, the appellate court

affirmed the judgment. Id.

      Appellant argues that he presented evidence—his affidavit, his mother’s

affidavit, and his medical records—that refuted the trial court’s finding that he was

voluntarily absent. The two affidavits reflect that Appellant went to the hospital on

the evening of June 28; the medical records indicate that Appellant was admitted at

10:20 p.m. and released at 1:39 a.m. on June 29. But Appellant told his attorney that

he was at Medical City on the afternoon of June 28, while the trial was in session.

      According to the medical records, Appellant’s condition was “very mild,” and

he was not in immediate distress. These records do not support Appellant’s and his

mother’s affidavits, which averred that Appellant was nauseous and vomiting.

Appellant’s treating physician stated in his affidavit that there was no medical reason

                                           9
Appellant could not return to the trial. That doctor also explained that the instruction

about not returning to work was essentially boilerplate and generic and that Appellant

could have returned to court.

      Although he had been released from Medical City several hours before trial was

to resume, Appellant did not appear on June 29 or contact anyone to say that he

could not be there. In fact, Appellant’s attorney told the trial court on June 29 that he

had lost contact with his client. Nothing in the record indicates that Appellant ever

contacted his attorney or the trial court after his release from Medical City on June 29;

he next resurfaced when arrested on July 5.

      As in Reed, Appellant’s assertions about his medical treatment are not enough

to show that the trial court abused its discretion by proceeding without him. And

Appellant’s evidence does not refute the trial court’s finding that he was voluntarily

absent from trial. We overrule Appellant’s issue.

                                III. CONCLUSION

      Having overruled Appellant’s sole issue on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s

judgments.

                                                      /s/ Megan Fahey

                                                      Megan Fahey
                                                      Visiting Judge

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: August 3, 2023

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