Court Opinion

ID: 9616205
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:44:19.026478+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:56.111749
License: Public Domain

SCHWAB, C. J.,
dissenting.
The majority opinion presents substantial reasons for the result it reaches, and states a position that is not without merit. However, I think that requiring literal compliance with the sworn-report statute, and not requiring any showing of prejudice because of noncompliance, is inconsistent with decisions in numerous analogous situations.
I think it safe to generalize that Oregon cases have only required substantial compliance with statutes, and have required the party claiming noncompliance to establish prejudice. See, e.g., Stroh v. SAIF, 261 Or 117, 492 P2d 472 (1972). Some cases have required *398even less. In State v. Shipley, 232 Or 354, 375 P2d 237 (1962), cert denied 374 US 811, rehearing denied 375 US 872 (1963), the court held noncompliance with statutes requiring officers to take an arrestee before a magistrate to be advised of certain rights to be without legal consequence. In State v. Mathis, 24 Or App 53, 544 P2d 170, Sup Ct review denied (1976), we held noncompliance with a statute requiring recording information presented to a warrant-issuing magistrate to be without legal consequence, at least absent a showing of prejudice.
The interests protected by the statutes involved in Shipley and Mathis are obvious and substantial. The interest protected by the sworn-report statute here in question is relatively obscure and ephemeral. I cannot rationalize a system of jurisprudence that excuses statutory violations in Shipley and Mathis, while insisting on literal compliance with a statute in the present situation.
Rationalization would be easier if petitioner’s license had been suspended on the basis of the arresting officer’s report. Factually, that is not the case. Petitioner’s license was suspended because of the arresting officer’s sworn testimony at an administrative hearing. See, City of Portland v. Olson, 4 Or App 633, 636-37, 481 P2d 641 (1971):
"Defendant contends * * * that the court must have had a written report of probation violation before it could set revocation proceedings in motion. * * * [D]efendant cites us no statute or precedent which prescribes a written report. The sworn testimony the court took was adequate basis for the warrant.”
I would hold that violation of the sworn-report statute is irrelevant to the validity of a license suspension based upon sworn testimony at an administrative hearing. Alternatively, I would hold there was substantial compliance with the sworn-report statute. Under either holding, the judgment of the circuit court should be reversed.
I respectfully dissent.