Court Opinion

ID: 9745473
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 23:01:18.985901+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:26:26.457808
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE JOHNSON, dissenting: I am cognizant that the trial court’s decision as to whether defendant has established purposeful discrimination is given great deference. However, after a review of the record, I am left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made in this case. (Hernandez v. New York (1991), 500 U.S. 352, 370, 114 L. Ed. 2d 395, 412-13, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 1871-72.) Therefore, I respectfully dissent. The State must give a clear and reasonably specific explanation of its legitimate reasons for exercising its peremptory challenges. (Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79, 98 n.20, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69, 88 n.20, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1724 n.20.) I believe the majority opinion errs in stating that the prosecutor gave a detailed explanation to justify the exclusion of seven out of eight African-American venire members. After the trial judge postulated reasons for excluding the seven venire members, he then asked the prosecutor to give some reasons he had for the exclusions. The majority correctly recognized that at that point the prosecutor “explained in very general terms” why he excluded the African-American venire members. The State contends the “initial characteristic” which the excluded venire persons had in common was that they all lived on the south side of Chicago. The State reasons: “The potential exists that jurors who become aware during trial that they live in defendant’s neighborhood may become fearful of retaliation and would, therefore, be preoccupied and uncooperative.” The trial court also found that “people who live in a particular area may actually know more about the case than the jurors are supposed to know.” I find this logic, as applied to the facts in this case, to be absurd. The incident occurred on the north side of Chicago. The venire persons resided anywhere from the near south side of Chicago to the far southern suburb of Harvey, Illinois. The south side of Chicago encompasses a significant area within the Chicago city limits; to apply the trial court’s logic would mean that everyone living on the south side of Chicago would have more than a passing knowledge of this case. Furthermore, using the State’s rationale, all persons residing on the south side would be fearful of retaliation by someone who lived not even remotely near them. This reasoning would be more applicable to persons living within defendant’s immediate community or the community in which the incident actually occurred. Notwithstanding the impropriety of this rationale, what I find most disturbing is that I have heard this same general explanation from the State time and time again as to why certain persons of African-American descent are excluded by peremptory challenges. While the State’s explanation may have been legitimate in certain limited instances, it is certainly inappropriately applied to the facts in the instant case. The second reason the State offered for its exclusion of three of the venire persons was that they were active in religious or charitable organizations. The trial court observed that such people have “a propensity towards seeing the best in people, instead of seeing the worst in people, or seeing the truth in people.” However, after reviewing the record, I find that 5 of the 12 jurors admitted to being active with their church. Furthermore, the State did not ask the jurors with what organizations they were affiliated on a consistent basis. Contrary to what the State now argues, I find that there was no true concern with excluding persons active with religious organizations. Additionally, as defendant observes, the State at the Batson hearing did not provide explanations for each of the potential jurors it excused. The State has not met its burden of providing “clear and reasonably specific” explanations of its “legitimate reasons” for exercising the challenges. (Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79, 98 n.20, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69, 88 n.20, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1724 n.20.) Moreover I find that the prosecutor’s stated reasons for the exclusions were merely a pretext for the base indignity of racial discrimination. I also believe the trial court failed to “give appropriate weight to the disparate impact of the prosecutor’s criterion in determining whether the prosecutor acted with a forbidden intent.” (Hernandez v. New York (1991), 500 U.S. 352, 353, 114 L. Ed. 2d 395, 401, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 1863.) In determining whether discriminatory intent exists, the following factors should be considered: “[A] ‘pattern’ of strikes against black jurors; *** [citation]; the disproportionate use of peremptory challenges against blacks [citations]; the level of black representation in the venire as compared to the jury [citations]; [and] whether the excluded blacks were a heterogeneous group sharing race as their only common characteristic [citations]; ***.” People v. Evans (1988), 125 Ill. 2d 50, 63-64. “If a prosecutor articulates a basis for a peremptory challenge that results in the disproportionate exclusion of members of a certain race, the trial judge may consider that fact as evidence that the prosecutor’s stated reason constitutes a pretext for racial discrimination.” (Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 363, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 408, 111 S. Ct. at 1868.) “ ‘[A]n invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact *** that the [classification] bears more heavily on one race than another.’ ” Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 363, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 408, 111 S. Ct. at 1868, quoting Washington v. Davis (1976), 426 U.S. 229, 242, 48 L. Ed. 2d 597, 608-09, 96 S. Ct. 2040, 2048-49. In the instant case, as defendant observed, the State peremptorily challenged six of the nine African-American venire members tendered by the defense, whereas the State only challenged one of the white venire members tendered by the defense. The State also used 87% (seven out of eight) of its peremptory challenges to exclude African-Americans. Clearly, there was a disproportionate use of peremptory challenges against African-Americans. Evidence of racial discrimination was also apparent in the heterogeneity of the excluded African-American jurors. As defendant notes, the excluded African-American jurors included both males and females of varying marital status. The range in age was from 23 to 59 years of age and their occupations were varied. It appears that the only characteristic shared by all of these particular venire persons was their race. While we acknowledge that “the mere number of black venire members peremptorily challenged, without more, will not establish a prima facie case of discrimination ]” (People v. Garrett (1990), 139 Ill. 2d 189, 203), the number of African-Americans excluded still remains a significant indicia of discriminatory practices. Disparate impact is evidence of discriminatory purpose. (See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. (1977), 429 U.S. 252, 265-66, 50 L. Ed. 2d 450, 464-65, 97 S. Ct. 555, 563-64; Washington v. Davis (1976), 426 U.S. 229, 242, 48 L. Ed. 2d 597, 609, 96 S. Ct. 2040, 2048.) The number of African-Americans excluded is “unquestionably very relevant to establishing defendant’s case, because, justifiably or not, it represents] a gross racial imbalance in jury selection.” People v. Hope (1990), 137 Ill. 2d 430, 464. I believe that the disproportionate use of peremptory challenges against the African-American venire members, coupled with the fact that the excluded African-American venire members were of a heterogeneous group, creates a strong presumption of purposeful discrimination in this case. Moreover, I believe the totality of all the relevant facts conclusively established that the prosecutor acted with invidious discriminatory purpose. The relatively unfettered power to exclude African-American jurors is one of the most effective means of practicing racial discrimination in the criminal justice system. The practice of racial discrimination under the guise of “trial strategy” has a profound effect on not only the defendant but also the excluded venire persons. The Supreme Court recently explained this phenomena in Powers v. Ohio: “Both the excluded juror and the criminal defendant have a common interest in eliminating racial discrimination from the courtroom. A venireperson excluded from jury service because of race suffers a profound personal humiliation heightened by its public character. The rejected juror may lose confidence in the court and its verdicts, as may the defendant if his or her objections cannot be heard. This congruence of interests makes it necessary and appropriate for the defendant to raise the rights of the juror. And, there can be no doubt that petitioner will be a motivated, effective advocate for the excluded venirepersons’ rights. Petitioner has much at stake in proving that his jury was improperly constituted due to an equal protection violation, for we have recognized that discrimination in the jury selection process may lead to the reversal of a conviction.” Powers v. Ohio (1991), 499 U.S. 400, 414, 113 L. Ed. 2d 411, 427, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1372. The judiciary must cease endorsing discriminatory “trial tactics.” As I stated in my special concurrence in People v. Loggins (1985), 134 Ill. App. 3d 684: “A criminal trial is a public event whose significance reaches beyond the truth or falsity of the accusation. A trial includes the ceremonial trappings of history, the appearance of justice, and the participation of citizens in passing judgment. Our entire society, therefore, is represented at a criminal trial. [Citation.] * * * *** [There is an] appearance of injustice when courts appear to condone racial discrimination through the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges. As Chief Justice Robert N.C. Nix of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court asked in his dissenting opinion in Commonwealth v. Martin (1975), 461 Pa. 289, 299, 366 A.2d 290, 295, ‘[i]s justice to sit supinely by and be flaunted in case after case before a remedy is available? Is justice only obtainable after repeated injustices are demonstrated? Is there any justification within the traditions of the Anglo-Saxon legal philosophy that permits the use of presumption to hide the existence of an obvious fact?’ The judiciary must stop this discrimination in its courts to avoid appearing to be an accomplice to it.” Loggins, 134 Ill. App. 3d at 698. We must not be an accomplice to a discriminatory jury selection process. After reviewing the record, I find that defendant has clearly established a case of purposeful discrimination. The trial court’s finding was clearly erroneous. For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the decision of the trial court.