Court Opinion

ID: 9391083
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-29 17:10:45.982173+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:39.193077
License: Public Domain

NUMBER 13-22-00030-CV

                              COURT OF APPEALS

                    THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                      CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

CHRISTOPHER SHAUN PRATT,                                                      Appellant,

                                                v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS FOR THE
PROTECTION OF TAHANA PRATT-LOPEZ,                                               Appellee.

                    On appeal from the 274th District Court
                          of Comal County, Texas.

                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

    Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Longoria and Silva
              Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria

       Appellant Christopher Shaun Pratt appeals the trial court’s denial of his “Motion to

Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, and Motion to Set Aside a Void Order, and Alternatively,

Motion to Dismiss Protective Order Due to Death of Applicant.” In two issues, appellant

argues that the default family violence protective order (1) was void because the trial court
did not have subject matter jurisdiction and (2) alternatively, was “extinguished” upon the

death of the applicant. We affirm. 1

                                           I.      BACKGROUND

        On May 16, 2019, the State filed its “Application for Protective Order” pursuant to

Chapter 85 of the Texas Family Code, seeking a protective order and a temporary ex

parte order for the protection of Tahana Pratt-Lopez. The application alleged that Tahana

and appellant were mother and son. In its “grounds for application” section, the application

incorporated by reference two attached affidavits by Richard Britz and Marie Noblett.

Notably, Britz’s affidavit averred that he was a paramedic and had assisted Tahana and

her husband Ignacio Lopez in the course of his employment. In his affidavit, Britz stated

that appellant was sentenced to six years confinement on November 7, 2018, after having

been convicted of three counts of injury to the elderly for assaulting Tahana and Ignacio. 2

The application also included three attached judgments of conviction indicating that

appellant pleaded guilty to three counts of injury to the elderly, a third-degree felony, and

was assessed six years confinement as to each count. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 22.04(f).

        On August 30, 2019, the trial court signed and entered its “Default Family Violence

        1 This case is before this Court on transfer from the Third Court of Appeals in Austin pursuant to a

docket-equalization order issued by the Supreme Court of Texas. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001.
          2 In his affidavit, Britz further averred that Tahana had symptoms consistent with dementia and had

“no basis in reality.” Britz stated that he had been called out to Tahana and Ignacio’s house multiple times
in March 2019, and was told that “[Appellant] was on his way out of prison” and that appellant had been
calling Ignacio “non-stop” on the phone. Britz overhead appellant yell at Ignacio on the phone, “curse, call
[Ignacio] names, and be very threatening.” Appellant was “very clear that [Tahana and Ignacio] needed to
get him parole so he could come home,” and appellant “said that when he got out of prison that [Tahana’s
and Ignacio’s] house would be the first place that he will go.” Britz further noted that he received a call from
Ignacio at 2:00 a.m. on May 1, 2019, because Tahana had fallen, and Ignacio had told him that appellant
had still been calling multiple times a day.
                                                       2
Protective Order” (default protective order). In particular, the order stated the following:

        The Court finds, under Chapter 85 of the Family Code, that family violence
        has occurred and is likely to occur again in the future and that the [appellant]
        has committed family violence and the following orders are necessary for
        the safety, welfare, and protection of Tahana Pratt-[L]opez and the
        members of her family and household.

                ....

                IT IS ORDERED that this Chapter 7A Protective Order shall continue
        in full force and effect for the duration of the lifetimes of both applicant[
        Tahana] and [appellant].

The default protective order also included multiple conditions that were expressly for the

protection of Tahana and Ignacio.

        On September 13, 2021, appellant filed his “Motion to Dismiss for Lack of

Jurisdiction and Motion to Set Aside a Void Order” (original motion to vacate). In said

filing, appellant alleged that the trial court was without jurisdiction to “grant the State’s

relief under Chapter 7A since the relief sought was not pled in [the State’s] Application

[for Protective Order] and [appellant] had not been convicted of or placed o[n] deferred

adjudication community supervision for the offense[s] enumerated under Art. 7A.01 of

Chapter 7A.” See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. ch. 7B. 3 Appellant requested that the trial

court “dismiss the pending proceedings and set aside the [default protective order].”

        On October 22, 2021, the State filed its “Motion for Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc”

pursuant to Rule 316 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 316. The State’s

        3Chapter 7A of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure was repealed by the Texas Legislature in
2019, and its provisions were recodified without substantive amendment in Chapter 7B, which took effect
on January 1, 2021. See Act of May 21, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., ch. 469, § 4.01, 2019 Tex. Gen. Laws 1065,
1152 (“This Act is intended as a codification only, and no substantive change in the law is intended by this
Act.”).
                                                     3
motion alleged that the default protective order “contains a clerical error in that the order

states the incorrect type of protective order on the duration of the order paragraph[:] The

order reads Chapter 7A Protective Order instead of Family Violence Protective Order.”

The State sought to correct the alleged clerical error and requested the trial court to grant

the motion and sign a judgment nunc pro tunc.

       On October 25, 2021, appellant filed his “Supplemental Motion to Dismiss for Lack

of Jurisdiction and Motion to Set Aside a Void Order and Alternatively, Motion to Dismiss

Protective Order Due to Death of Applicant” (supplemental motion to vacate). In said

filing, appellant alleged that the State was without standing to file its application for

protective order without Tahana’s consent. In addition, appellant requested in the

alternative for the default protective order to be dismissed on the basis that the order was

“extinguished” upon the death of Tahana on November 16, 2019.

       At a hearing on October 28, 2021, the trial court heard arguments by the parties

regarding appellant’s original and supplemental motions to vacate, as well as the State’s

motion for judgment nunc pro tunc. A death certificate, indicating that Tahana had passed

away on November 16, 2019, was admitted into evidence. The trial court did not make a

ruling regarding any of the matters discussed during the hearing.

       On November 19, 2021, the trial court signed its “Order on State’s Motion for

Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc”. The order stated the following:

       After considering State[’s] Motion for Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc,
       [appellant]’s response, if any, and argument by the parties, the Court
       GRANTS the State[’s] motion and hereby ORDERS that the Default[
       ]Protective Order be amended as follows: The Order referencing the
       Chapter 7A Protective Order is struck from the Default[ ]Protective Order.

                                             4
             It is ORDERED that all other conditions of the Default[ ]Protective
       Order signed on August 30, 2019[,] are still valid and in effect.

Appellant appealed.

                                   II.    JURISDICTION

       As a threshold issue, the State contends we do not have jurisdiction to review

appellant’s issues. “Appellate jurisdiction is never presumed.” Brashear v. Victoria

Gardens of McKinney, L.L.C., 302 S.W.3d 542, 546 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.).

“Unless the record affirmatively shows the propriety of appellate jurisdiction, we must

dismiss.” Id.

A.     Appellant’s Notice of Appeal was Timely

       The State points out that appellant’s notice of appeal was filed over two years after

the default protective order was entered and argues that appellant cannot attack a void

judgment in an untimely appeal.

       Generally, appellate courts have jurisdiction only over appeals from final

judgments. See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). And in civil

cases, a notice of appeal must generally be filed within thirty days after the judgment is

signed. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1. A family-violence protective order that gives injunctive

relief and disposes of all issues and parties is a final, appealable order. Ulmer v. Ulmer,

130 S.W.3d 294, 296 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.); see Vongontard v.

Tippit, 137 S.W.3d 109, 110 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.). The Texas

Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a trial court has plenary power for thirty days after

the judgment is signed to grant a new trial or to vacate, modify, correct, or reform the

judgment. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(d). After the trial court’s plenary power expires, the

                                             5
trial court normally cannot set its judgment aside except by a bill of review for sufficient

cause. See id. R. 329b(f).

       However, “[u]nlike general civil judgments . . . Chapter 85 extends a trial court’s

jurisdiction over protective orders issued under that chapter for the limited purpose of

reviewing a request to determine whether there is a continuing need for the order.”

Jackson v. Cave, 632 S.W.3d 107, 107 (Tex. App.—El Paso, 2021 no pet.). Section

85.025 provides in relevant part:

       (b)    A person who is the subject of a protective order may file a motion
              not earlier than the first anniversary of the date on which the order
              was rendered requesting that the court review the protective order
              and determine whether there is a continuing need for the order.

       (b-1) Following the filing of a motion under Subsection (b), a person who
             is the subject of a protective order . . . that is effective for a period
             that exceeds two years may file not more than one subsequent
             motion requesting that the court review the protective order and
             determine whether there is a continuing need for the order. The
             subsequent motion may not be filed earlier than the first anniversary
             of the date on which the court rendered an order on the previous
             motion by the person.

       (b-2) After a hearing on a motion under Subsection (b) or (b-1), if the court
             does not make a finding that there is no continuing need for the
             protective order, the protective order remains in effect until the date
             the order expires under this section. Evidence of the movant’s
             compliance with the protective order does not by itself support a
             finding by the court that there is no continuing need for the protective
             order. If the court finds there is no continuing need for the protective
             order, the court shall order that the protective order expires on a date
             set by the court.

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 85.025(b), (b-1), (b-2) (emphasis added). Thus, § 85.025 extends

a trial court’s plenary power and permits the trial court to vacate an existing protective

order. See id. In order to invoke the trial court’s extended plenary power for the purpose

                                             6
of determining whether there is a continuing need for the protective order, a movant must

demonstrate as a threshold matter as follows: (1) the protective order was rendered at

least one year before the motion was filed; and (2) if the duration of the protective order

exceeds two years, no more than one previous motion to vacate has been filed and ruled

upon the trial court. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 85.025(b), (b-1); see Jackson, 632 S.W.3d at

107.

        In this case, the default protective order was rendered more than two years before

appellant’s motions to vacate were filed; the duration of the default protective order

exceeds two years; and the trial court had not previously ruled on any filed motion to

vacate pursuant to § 85.025(b). Thus, appellant’s original and supplemental motions to

vacate—which argued in part that there was no continuing need for the protective order

because of Tahana’s death—timely and properly invoked the trial court’s extended

plenary power under § 85.025(b). See Jackson, 632 S.W.3d at 107. Furthermore,

appellant timely filed a notice of appeal after the trial court entered its order granting the

State’s motion for judgment nunc pro tunc and implicitly denying appellant’s motions to

vacate the default protective order. 4 See TEX. R. APP. P. 4.3(a) (“If a judgment is modified

          4 While the November 19, 2021 order does not explicitly reference appellant’s supplemental motion

to dismiss, we look to the entire substance of the order in construing it. See In re Alsenz, 152 S.W.3d 617,
621 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (citing Surgitek, Bristol–Myers Corp. v. Abel, 997 S.W.2d
598, 601 (Tex.1999)). The November 19, 2021 order states: “It is ORDERED that all other conditions of the
Default[ ]Protective Order signed on August 30, 2019[,] are still valid and in effect.” (Emphasis added).
Given this language in the order, we hold that the November 19, 2021 order not only granted the State’s
motion for judgment nunc pro tunc, but implicitly denied appellant’s supplemental motion to vacate by which
appellant alleged that the order was void, or alternatively, “extinguished” upon Tahana’s death. See Trevino
v. City of Pearland, 531 S.W.3d 290, 299 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.) (noting that an
implicit ruling is “one that, though unspoken, reasonably can be inferred from something else”); Thomas v.
Long, 207 S.W.3d 334, 339–40 (Tex. 2006) (“Because a trial court cannot reach the merits of a case without
subject matter jurisdiction, a trial court that rules on the merits of an issue without explicitly rejecting an
asserted jurisdictional attack has implicitly denied the jurisdictional challenge.” (citation omitted)).
                                                      7
in any respect while the trial court retains plenary power, a period that, under these rules,

runs from the date when the judgment is signed will run from the date when the modified

judgment is signed.”).

B.     Appellate Review is Not Limited in the Manner Suggested by the State

       The State also argues that we only have jurisdiction regarding the trial court’s grant

of the State’s motion for judgment nunc pro tunc. We observe that the issues raised in

appellant’s brief do not pertain to the trial court’s grant of the State’s motion for judgment

nunc pro tunc. Instead, appellant argues that the default protective order was (1) void

because the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction and (2) alternatively, was

“extinguished” upon the death of Tahana. The claims were raised to the trial court in

appellant’s supplemental motion to vacate as well as at the October 28, 2021 hearing.

       A trial court may always correct clerical errors, but not judicial errors, by using a

judgment nunc pro tunc. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 316, 329b(f); see also Escobar v. Escobar,

711 S.W.2d 230, 231 (Tex. 1986); In re Heritage Operating, L.P., 468 S.W.3d 240, 247

(Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, orig. proceeding). Rule 306a of the Texas Rules of Civil

Procedure governs the beginning of the period prescribed by those rules for the court’s

plenary power and for filing post-trial motions. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 306a(1). Rule 306a(6)

pertains to nunc pro tunc orders:

       When a corrected judgment has been signed after expiration of the court’s
       plenary power pursuant to Rule 316, the periods mentioned in paragraph
       (1) of this rule shall run from the date of signing the corrected judgment with
       respect to any complaint that would not be applicable to the original
       document.

TEX. R. CIV. P. 306a(6) (emphasis added). Rule 4.3(b) of the Texas Rules of Appellate

                                              8
Procedure mirrors Rule 306a(6)’s provision pertaining to correction or reformation of a

judgment pursuant to Rule 316 after expiration of plenary power:

       (b)    After Plenary Power Expires. If the trial court corrects or reforms the
              judgment under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 316 after expiration
              of the trial court’s plenary power, all periods provided in these rules
              that run from the date the judgment is signed run from the date the
              corrected judgment is signed for complaints that would not apply to
              the original judgment.

TEX. R. APP. P. 4.3(b) (emphasis added).

       “Rule 316 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure permits a trial court to correct

clerical mistakes in a judgment after notice has been provided to the interested parties.”

Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 86 S.W.3d 721, 726 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2002, no pet.) (citing

TEX. R. CIV. P. 316). A trial court’s correction of a clerical error during the period of plenary

power extends the appellate timetables. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(h) (“If a judgment is

modified, corrected[,] or reformed in any respect, the time for appeal shall run from the

time the modified, corrected, or reformed judgment is signed.”); Lane Bank Equip. Co. v.

Smith S. Equip., Inc., 10 S.W.3d 308, 313 (Tex. 2000). “Pursuant to civil Rules 306a(6)

and 329b(h), and appellate Rule 4.3 . . . if the trial court corrects a clerical error after the

court’s plenary power has expired, no complaint can be made on appeal that could have

been presented in an appeal from the original judgment.” Gutierrez, 86 S.W.3d at 726

(citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(h)).

       In his second amended notice of appeal, appellant claims to be appealing the trial

court’s denial of his “Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and Motion to Set Aside a

Void Order and Alternatively, Motion to Dismiss Protective Order Due to Death of

Applicant.” We construe appellant’s second amended notice of appeal as referencing his

                                               9
October 25, 2021 supplemental motion to vacate, as appellant’s arguments on appeal

derive from said motion and not his September 13, 2021 original motion to vacate. In

addition, appellant’s second amended notice of appeal stated as follows: “Order for which

this appeal has been perfected was entered on November 19, 2021.” See TEX. R. APP. P.

25.2(d)(2) (requiring a notice of appeal to state the date of the judgment or order appealed

from). The only order rendered by the trial court on November 19, 2021 was its order

granting the State’s motion for judgment nunc pro tunc and implicitly denying appellant’s

motions to vacate. The record does not contain a separate written order by the trial court

denying appellant’s supplemental motion to vacate.

       As discussed supra, appellant’s original and supplemental motions to vacate timely

and properly invoked the trial court’s extended plenary power under § 85.025(b). See

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 85.025(b); Jackson, 632 S.W.3d at 107. In these circumstances,

we hold that civil Rules 306a(6) and 329b(h) and appellate Rule 4.3 do not apply to the

November 19, 2021 order’s implicit denial of appellant’s supplemental motion to vacate.

Therefore, we have jurisdiction to review the merits of appellant’s issues.

                                     III.   STANDING

       In his first issue, appellant argues that the default protective order is void because

the trial court did not have jurisdiction when it signed and entered the order. Specifically,

appellant claims that the State lacked standing to file an application for protective order

on Tahana’s behalf.

A.     Standard of Review & Applicable Law

       We review a challenge to the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction de novo. Tex.

                                             10
Dept. of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 228 (Tex. 2004). A judgment

entered without subject matter jurisdiction is void. In re D.S., 602 S.W.3d 504, 520 (Tex.

2020). Standing is a component of subject matter jurisdiction and is thus “a constitutional

prerequisite to suit.” Heckman v. Williamson County, 369 S.W.3d 137, 150 (Tex. 2012)

(citing Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Mktg. on Hold Inc., 308 S.W.3d 909, 915 (Tex. 2010)).

“Standing focuses on who may bring an action.” United Fire Lloyds v. Tippin ex rel. Tippin,

396 S.W.3d 733, 735-36 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (citing Patterson

v. Planned Parenthood of Hous., 971 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tex. 1998)). “In Texas, the

standing doctrine requires a concrete injury to the plaintiff and a real controversy between

the parties that will be resolved by the court.” Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 154. “A court has

no jurisdiction over a claim made by a plaintiff who lacks standing to assert it.” Id. at 150

(citing DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Inman, 252 S.W.3d 299, 304 (Tex. 2008)). “Thus, if a

plaintiff lacks standing to assert one of his claims, the court lacks jurisdiction over that

claim and must dismiss it.” Id. (citing Andrade v. NAACP of Austin, 345 S.W.3d 1, 14

(Tex. 2011)). “Similarly, if the plaintiff lacks standing to bring any of his claims, the court

must dismiss the whole action for want of jurisdiction.” Id. at 150–51 (citing Crown Life

Ins. v. Casteel, 22 S.W.3d 378, 392 (Tex. 2000)). “[S]tanding cannot be waived and may

be raised for the first time on appeal.” Meyers v. JDC/Firethorne, Ltd., 548 S.W.3d 477,

484 (Tex. 2018) (cleaned up).

       Chapter 82 of the family code governs family-violence protective orders, and

includes the following provisions regarding who may file an application for such an order:

       (a)    With regard to family violence under Section 71.004(1) . . . an adult
              member of the family or household may file an application for a

                                              11
              protective order to protect the applicant or any other member of the
              applicant’s family or household.

              ....

       (d)    In addition, an application may be filed for the protection of any
              person alleged to be a victim of family violence by:

              (1)    a prosecuting attorney; or

              (2)    the Department of Family and Protective Services.

       (e)    The person alleged to be the victim of family violence in an
              application filed under Subsection (c) or (d) is considered to be the
              applicant for a protective order under this subtitle.

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 82.002.

B.     Discussion

       In his brief, appellant points out that the State’s application for protective order did

not contain any affidavit from Tahana in compliance with § 82.009 of the Texas Family

Code, and that Tahana suffered from dementia at the time the application was filed as

evidenced by its two attached affidavits. Appellant argues that the State lacked standing

to file its application because it did not have explicit consent from Tahana and acted as

an “applicant” without authority under the Texas Family Code—therefore, according to

appellant, the trial court’s default protective order was void. Appellant characterizes his

issue as a challenge to standing, however, we construe his argument as a challenge to

the local district attorney’s authority to represent Tahana.

       Our primary goal in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the

legislature’s intent. MCI Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Hinton, 329 S.W.3d 475, 499 (Tex. 2010).

“Where [the] text is clear, text is determinative of that intent.” Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v.

                                              12
Summers, 282 S.W.3d 433, 437 (Tex. 2009) (citing State v. Shumake, 199 S.W.3d 279,

284 (Tex. 2006)). “This general rule applies unless enforcing the plain language of the

statute as written would produce absurd results.” Id. (citing Fleming Foods of Tex., Inc. v.

Rylander, 6 S.W.3d 278, 284 (Tex. 1999)). In determining legislative intent, we look to the

statute as a whole and not isolated portions. In re M.N., 262 S.W.3d 799, 802 (Tex. 2008).

       Here, the State’s application for protective order sought the issuance of a

protective order pursuant to Chapter 85 of the Texas Family Code as well as a temporary

ex parte order. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 85.001–.065 (governing issuance of

protective orders under the Family Code), 83.001–.006 (governing temporary ex parte

protective orders under the Family Code). Under § 82.009 of the Texas Family Code, an

application that requests the issuance of a temporary ex parte order under Chapter 83

must, among other things, be signed by each applicant under an oath that the facts and

circumstances contained in the application are true to the best knowledge and belief of

each applicant. See id. § 82.009(a)(2). Though appellant points out that the State’s

application was not in compliance with § 82.009, appellant’s substantive complaints on

appeal do not pertain to the trial court’s temporary ex parte order issued under Chapter

83 or its extensions thereof. See id. §§ 83.001–.006. Rather, appellant’s first issue relates

only to the trial court’s default protective order, which appellant in his brief “agrees . . . is

a Chapter 85 protective order under Title 4 of the Family Code.” Thus, the requirements

of § 82.009 for an application for issuance of temporary ex parte orders are not relevant.

See id. § 82.009.

       As noted, under § 82.002, a prosecuting attorney may file an application for

                                               13
protective order for the protection of any person alleged to be the victim of family violence,

who is still considered the “applicant.” See id. § 82.002(d)(1), (e). Nothing in the plain

language of Chapter 82, including § 82.002, requires the State to have the applicant’s

explicit consent when filing an application for protective order for the applicant’s

protection. Appellant does not argue that enforcing the plain language of the statute as

written would produce absurd results. See Summers, 282 S.W.3d at 437.

        We note that the purpose of the family-violence protective order statute is not to

correct past wrongs or establish liability but to give immediate protection to the applicant.

See Roper v. Jolliffe, 493 S.W.3d 624, 634 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, pet. denied).

Chapter 85 is remedial in nature and should be broadly construed to “effectuate its

humanitarian and preventative purposes.” Boyd v. Palmore, 425 S.W.3d 425, 430 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.). We observe that reading into the statute an

explicit consent requirement in the manner that appellant suggests would frustrate the

statute’s purpose in providing an expedited procedure for victims of domestic violence,

particularly those who are incapable or without capacity to provide consent, such as a

child or an adult with a mental disability. 5 Accordingly, the trial court’s default protective

order was not void due to lack of standing, nor was the State unauthorized to file a

protective order on Tahana’s behalf. We overrule appellant’s first issue.

         5 In his brief, appellant cites Chapter 7B of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, which allows

the State to file a protective order on behalf of victims of certain criminal offenses. See TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 7B.001–.008. Chapter 7B, effective January 1, 2021, was not in effect at the time the default
protective order here was rendered, but former Chapter 7A was. Act of May 21, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., ch.
469 §§ 1.02, 3.01(2), 4.03, 2019 Tex. Gen. Laws 1066, 1069, 1152. In any event, the provisions of Chapter
7A are inapplicable because the default protective order here was rendered pursuant to the Texas Family
Code.
                                                    14
               IV.     EXPIRATION OF ORDER UPON THE APPLICANT’S DEATH

       In his second issue, appellant claims that the trial court’s default protective order

“extinguished” upon the death of applicant Tahana. Appellant specifically argues that the

“default protective order under Chapter 85 of the Texas Family Code does not survive the

death of applicant”, “Chapter 85 of the Family Code does not address survivability of a

protective order,” and “If it were the intent of the Legislature to have the protective order

survive the applicant, they would have written the statute to reflect it.”

       A court’s ruling on a motion to vacate is reviewed under an abuse of discretion

standard. Enviropower, L.L.C. v. Bears, Stearns & Co., 265 S.W.3d 16, 19 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st. Dist.] 2008, no pet.). The trial court abuses its discretion if it acts “without

reference to any guiding rules and principles.” Indus. Specialists, LLC v. Blanchard Ref.

Co., 652 S.W.3d 11, 16 (Tex. 2022).

       Under certain circumstances, § 85.025 of the Texas Family Code provides a trial

court with discretion to render a protective order “sufficient to protect the applicant and

members of the applicant’s family or household” that exceeds two years in duration. See

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 85.025(a-1). Here, the duration of the default protective order was

for the “duration of the lifetimes of both applicant[ Tahana] and [appellant].”

       Evidence admitted at the hearing demonstrated that Tahana passed away on

November 16, 2019, approximately two and a half months after the default protective

order was signed. Chapter 85 contains no provision whereby a protective order is

“extinguished” upon the death of an applicant. “We presume the Legislature ‘chooses a

statute’s language with care, including each word chosen for a purpose, while

                                             15
purposefully omitting words not chosen.’” Cadena Comercial USA Corp. v. Texas

Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 518 S.W.3d 318, 325–26 (Tex. 2017) (quoting TGS–

NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs, 340 S.W.3d 432, 439 (Tex. 2011)). “In that vein, we

take statutes as we find them and refrain from rewriting the Legislature’s text.” Id. at 326

(citing Summers, 282 S.W.3d at 443). Thus, we presume that the Legislature purposefully

omitted words from § 85.025 that would effectively “extinguish” a protective order upon

the death of an applicant, and we refrain from “rewriting” the statute to include them. See

id. at 325-26. Consequently, the default protective order did not “extinguish” upon

Tahana’s death.

        Furthermore, under the plain language of § 85.025(b), a protective order remains

in effect until its stated expiration date, absent a trial court’s finding that protection is no

longer needed upon review of a timely filed motion under that section. Here, the trial court

denied appellant’s motion; thus, even though applicant Tahana is deceased, the

protective order remains in effect for the lifetime of appellant. 6 Appellant raises no other

argument. 7 Accordingly, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying

appellant’s motions to vacate. 8 See Enviropower, L.L.C., 265 S.W.3d at 19; Indus.

         6 Family members can be “protected parties” of a protective order exceeding two-years duration

and the grounds justifying the extended duration do not have to be directed at the family members. See
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 85.025 (a-1) (authorizing a court to issue a protective order sufficient to protect
“members of the applicant’s family or household”). In this case, the default protective order expressly stated
the order was “necessary for the safety, welfare, and protection of Tahana Pratt-[L]opez and the members
of her family and household” and was effective for a duration exceeding two years. It is undisputed that
Ignacio, Tahana’s husband, is a family member of applicant Tahana. Because the default protective order
did not “extinguish” upon Tahana’s death, Ignacio remains a “protected party” of the order. We note that, in
rejecting appellant’s motion, the trial court could have found that the protective order needed to remain in
force for the protection of Ignacio.
        7 Appellant does not argue that the default protective order expired on its own terms and we do not
address that issue as it is not properly before us.
        8   We note that appellant is not precluded from filing a subsequent motion for review under
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Specialists, LLC, 652 S.W.3d at 16. We overrule appellant’s second issue.

                                       V.      CONCLUSION

       We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                                      NORA L. LONGORIA
                                                                      Justice

Concurring Memorandum Opinion
by Justice Silva.

Delivered and filed on the
27th day of April, 2023.

§ 85.025(b-1), provided the motion complies with the appropriate time requirements. See TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 85.025 (b-1).
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