Court Opinion

ID: 9444790
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 21:11:51.796531+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:59.873819
License: Public Domain

MAGRUDER, Chief Judge
(concurring in part).
' [1 — 8] Though the case is obviously on the'border line, I concur in the conclusions'reached by Judge Hartigan (1) "that the' defendant was not entitled to .a 'directed verdict, (2) that the. trial judge 'committed no error in ruling .that the 'status of /Conley in the water division ■ shop was that of a gratuitous licensee rather than a trespasser, and (3) that «whether Conley was contributorily negligent presented an issue of fact for.the jury. T also agree with Judge Hartigan that other alleged errors in rulings of. the trial judge .(withpne exception about,to be noted) presented no ground for; reversal. ’: ■ ■ ■ ’ ,'
However, Í do think that the district court committed reversible' error in its charge to the jury for not accurately differentiating between the duty which the railroad, as occupier of the premises, would owe to an invitee, or business visitor, in respect of a possibly dangerous ■ condition on the premises, and the much lesser duty which the occupier owed to Conley as a gratuitous licensee. This distinction is made clear in Am.L.Inst., Rest, of Torts §§ 342, 343, and Comments thereto. I gather that the law of New'Hampshire is no different in this respect. See Mitchell v. Legarsky, 1948, ;95 N.H. 214, 216, 60 A.2d 136; Cook v. 177 Granite Street, Inc., 1949, 95 N.H.
.Thus, in .the case of .a'gratuitous licensee, Who is present on the premises as a donee of a privilege rather than for a purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings .between the licénsee and the occupier, the railroad ha|s no duty to prepare in advance á sáfe ■place for the reception of such licensee. Hence, as' against the possibility that some gratuitous- licensee might take a swig of sulphuric acid oút of the beer bottle, it certainly could not have been ■ found, as the district court permitted the jury to find, that the railroad “ought, in : the exercise of due care, to have either ■ made rules to govern the proper handling of acid or given suitable instructions to • its employees with respect to such a matter”. As stated in Rest. § 342, the railroad-is subject to liability to gratuitous ■licensees only if it knows of the condition causing the harm, and “realizes” — not ■ should realize in the exercise of due care, but sübjectively realizes — that the condition-involves an unreasonable risk to such licensees, and has reason to realize that such licensees, including Conley, would not discover the condition or realize, the risk, and yet notwithstanding this invites or permits the- licensees to enter or remain upon the premises, without exer*459cising care either to make the condition reasonably safe or to warn licensees of the condition and the risk involved therein.
In the case at bar it is of course clear that defendant’s employee Gately actually knew of the condition, i. e., he knew of the presence of the sulphuric acid in the beer bottle kept in the water division shop for a proper use and purpose. It was Gately’s testimony that the same old beer bottle had been used for this purpose for three years and that the practice of using old beer bottles for such purpose had been one of long standing. Hence it might well have been that it had never occurred to Gately that this old practice and condition constituted any danger of bodily injury through unwitting imbibing of the sulphuric acid by a licensee like Conley who might upon occasion enter the shop. If so, the jury would have been warranted in finding that Gately, who represented the company in this instance, never subjectively realized that the presence of the acid in the old beer bottle constituted a condition involving an unreasonable risk to gratuitous licensees. In the absence of such realization, there would be no duty of care on the part of the occupier either to remove the dangerous condition or to warn prospective licensees of the condition and the risk involved therein. Yet the trial court told the jury that it was the duty of the railroad to give the licensee “reasonable information as to existing dangerous conditions, not open to his observation, of which the defendant knows or should know”. (Italics added.)
On principle, I think the present case is not dissimilar to Higgins v. Mason, 1930, 255 N.Y. 104, 174 N.E. 77, 79, where the administratrix of a deceased gratuitous guest in an automobile was suing his host on account of bodily injuries and death suffered in an accident occurring while his host was driving the car. The plaintiff obtained a verdict and judgment in the trial court; but the court of appeals upheld a judgment by the appellate division reversing as a matter of law the judgment in plaintiff’s favor and directing the dismissal of the complaint. It appeared that the accident was caused not by negligence of the host in the ordinary operation of the car but by the overturning of the car due to a mechanical defect in the steering mechanism. Referring to the New York authorities, the court of appeals pointed out that “the defendant host, George Mason, was not liable for the death of his guest, Robert Higgins, because of a mechanical defect in his car, although Mason, by inspection, might have discovered the fault, since Higgins, in accepting the invitation to ride, must have taken the car as he found it, and no duty of inspection rested upon Mason. Mason would be liable only if he knew of the dangerous condition; realized that it involved an unreasonable risk; believed that the guests would not discover the condition or realize the risk; and failed to warn them of the condition and the risk involved.” There was testimony to the effect that the host knew that there was something wrong with the car but he did not know what, and he thought that they would be able to get home. This evidence, the court thought, was insufficient “to warrant the inference that there was actual knowledge on Mason’s part that the car was in a dangerous condition, or actual realization that there was an unreasonable risk to his guests involved in a continuance of the journey. Even if Mason knew that something was wrong with the ear, that it was ‘logy’ on hills, that it did not steer well, this was far from being realization of the fact that a serious mechanical defect, making further travel dangerous, was involved. Mason’s own conduct in exposing his wife and himself to the peril of traveling farther in the car indicates that he was not conscious of the peril. If Mason thought the car safe for himself, he could not have realized that it was unsafe for his guests. * * * Therefore we think no obligation rested upon Mason to warn his guests of a peril involved in a continuance of the journey.”
*460It follows, in iriy opinion, that the judgment for the plaintiff in the present case should be vacated and that the case should be remanded to the District Court for’a new trial, with appropriate instruction's as above indicated.