Court Opinion

ID: 9381729
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-23 16:08:11.066665+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:34.187667
License: Public Domain

J-S04006-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    SONNY L. THOMAS                            :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1671 EDA 2022

               Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 3, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County Criminal Division
                       at No(s): CP-48-CR-0000622-2005

BEFORE:      MURRAY, J., KING, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                               FILED MARCH 23, 2023

        Sonny L. Thomas (Appellant) appeals pro se from the order denying as

untimely his fourth petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act

(PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

        In 2006, a jury convicted Appellant of first-degree murder and related

offenses, after he murdered a man with a sword. The trial court sentenced

Appellant to life in prison on February 13, 2006.        This Court affirmed the

judgment of sentence.         Commonwealth v. Thomas, 918 A.2d 792 (Pa.

Super. 2006) (unpublished memorandum). Appellant did not seek allowance

of appeal with the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S04006-23

       Appellant filed a first PCRA petition in March 2008.1 The PCRA court

denied relief, and this Court affirmed. See Commonwealth v. Thomas, 981

A.2d 323 (Pa. Super. 2009) (unpublished memorandum). Our Supreme Court

later denied allowance of appeal. See Commonwealth v. Thomas, 986 A.2d

150 (Pa. 2009).

       Thereafter, this Court affirmed the PCRA court’s dismissal of Appellant’s

second and third pro se petitions. See Commonwealth v. Thomas, 46 A.3d

813 (Pa. Super. 2009) (unpublished memorandum); Commonwealth v.

Thomas, 1907 EDA 2014, 2015 WL 7587375 (Pa. Super. 2015) (unpublished

memorandum).

       On December 27, 2021, Appellant pro se filed the instant PCRA petition,

his fourth. He conceded it was facially untimely, where Appellant’s “judgment

of sentence became final on January 26, 2007.” PCRA Petition, 12/27/21, at

1 (unnumbered). However, Appellant asserted he met the requirements of

the newly-discovered fact exception to the PCRA’s time bar, codified at 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii). Appellant claimed he “has only recently obtained

[the notes of testimony from] his [t]rial [] on approximately May 12, 2021[,]

from the Clerk of [] court.” Id. at 3 (unnumbered); see also id. (vaguely

asserting there “is a credible explanation for [Appellant’s] failure to present

____________________________________________

1Appellant subsequently initiated numerous actions in the federal courts.
See, e.g., Thomas v. Iatarola, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8765 (E.D. Pa. 2007).

                                           -2-
J-S04006-23

these issues earlier.”). Appellant’s petition raised various claims of his trial

counsel’s ineffectiveness, which we explain further below.

      The PCRA court appointed counsel (PCRA counsel) for Appellant’s fourth

PCRA petition. PCRA counsel thereafter filed a no-merit letter and petition to

withdraw, pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988),

and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).

PCRA counsel detailed Appellant’s claims:

      [Appellant] alleges that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to
      secure a jury instruction [with respect to] voluntary manslaughter
      owing to trial counsel’s various errors, namely in advising
      [Appellant] not to testify in his own defense, failing to reopen the
      trial to develop more evidence in support of said jury instruction,
      and failing to object to the trial court’s abuse of discretion in
      denying said instruction. [Appellant] only became aware of trial
      counsel’s ineffectiveness upon a review of transcripts of the
      charging conference between trial counsel, the assistant district
      attorney and the trial judge.

Turner/Finley Letter, 4/4/22, at 4 (unnumbered) (some capitalization

modified). According to PCRA counsel, Appellant failed to establish the newly-

discovered fact timeliness exception, because “the trial transcripts [] would

have been available to [Appellant] well prior to May 2021, and, indeed, should

have been obtained during any of [Appellant’s] previous appellate filings….”

Id. at 6-7 (unnumbered).

      On May 9, 2022, the PCRA court issued Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of intent

to dismiss Appellant’s petition without an evidentiary hearing (Rule 907

notice). The court opined that it lacked jurisdiction because the petition was

                                     -3-
J-S04006-23

untimely, and Appellant did not meet the newly-discovered fact exception,

where the

      “newly-discovered evidence” referenced by [Appellant] has been
      available in the trial transcripts. Additionally, the alleged failure
      of trial counsel to have a voluntary jury instruction has been
      waived and is also time[-]barred, since this issue could have been
      determined by a review of the trial transcript in 2008.

Rule 907 Notice, 5/9/22, at 1. Appellant did not respond.

      The PCRA court denied Appellant’s PCRA petition on June 3, 2022. The

court also granted PCRA counsel’s request to withdraw, finding he complied

with Turner/Finley. Order, 6/3/22, at 1 n.1. Appellant timely appealed.

      On July 5, 2022, the PCRA court ordered Appellant to file a concise

statement of errors complained of on appeal (concise statement) (Rule 1925

Order), “no later than twenty-one (21) days from the date of this Order,”

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Rule 1925 Order, 7/5/22, at 1 (unnumbered).

Nine days later, Appellant filed a motion for extension of time to file his concise

statement, asserting as follows:

            On July 9, 2022[, Appellant] … did receive via the legal mail
      system at SCI Mahanoy [the PCRA court’s Rule 1925] Order …
      ordering that Appellant file[] of record … a concise statement …
      no later than twenty-one (21) days from the date of the order.

            On June 23, 2022[,] Appellant had mailed a motion to [the
      PCRA] court regarding the fact he did not receive [the Rule 907]
      notice … and that he wanted to appeal the court[’]s order …
      denying his PCRA without a hearing and he would need the …
      [Rule] 907 notice, in order to properly base his [concise]
      statement … on the facts.

                                       -4-
J-S04006-23

Motion, 7/14/22, at 1 (unnumbered) (citation to exhibit omitted; some

capitalization modified).     The PCRA court denied Appellant’s motion,

reasoning:

      In his [motion, Appellant] … acknowledges that he received this court’s
      [Rule] 1925(b) [Order] on July 9, 2022. As such, [Appellant] has ample
      time to file his concise statement….

Order, 7/18/22, n.1. Appellant never filed a concise statement.

      The PCRA court, in its opinion, “respectfully submitted that the instant

appeal should be dismissed” for Appellant’s failure to timely file his concise

statement.     PCRA Court Opinion, 9/1/22, at 2 (unnumbered).            In the

alternative, the court requested that this Court affirm the denial of Appellant’s

PCRA petition, because it was untimely and Appellant failed to meet the

requirements    of   the   newly-discovered   fact   exception.    Id.   at   2-3

(unnumbered).

      On September 9, 2022, Appellant filed an application in this Court, again

claiming he did not receive the Rule 907 notice “prior to the PCRA court[’]s

denial of his PCRA, and was not … able to properly articulate to the PCRA court

a concise statement….” Application, 9/9/22, at 1 (unnumbered). We denied

the application without prejudice to Appellant’s right to re-raise the issue

before the merits panel. Order, 10/13/22.

      Appellant presents five issues for review:

      I.   Was trial counsel ineffective for erroneously advising
           Appellant not to testify in his own defense, prejudicing his
           defense[?]

                                      -5-
J-S04006-23

      II.   Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it denied
            counsel[’]s request for the charge of Voluntary Manslaughter-
            unreasonable belief[,] 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2503(b)[,] when
            evide[n]ce of the record supports such a charge[] and is this
            arguably meritor[i]ous[?]

      III. Timely filling of petition. Has [A]ppellant plead and proved
           one of the exceptions to overcome the PCRA time-bar[?]

      IV. Is [Appellant] entitled to an evidentiary hearing? Was the
          PCRA court[’]s dismissal of Appellant[’]s petition without a
          hearing an error because newly discovered evidence will
          demonstrate [Appellant’s] innocence of First-degree
          murder[?]

      V.    Effective assistance of PCRA counsel[.] Did the PCRA court
            error in failing to reject counsel[’]s No-Merit Letter when it
            neglected to satisfy the Turner/Finley requirements[?]

Appellant’s Brief at 5.

      Preliminarily, we must address Appellant’s failure to file a concise

statement.

      [I]n order to preserve their claims for appellate review, appellants
      must comply whenever the trial court orders them to file a
      Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal pursuant to
      Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Any issues not raised in a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
      statement will be deemed waived.

Commonwealth v. Castillo, 888 A.2d 775, 780 (Pa. 2005) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Lord, 719 A.2d 306, 309 (Pa. 1998)); see also PCRA

Court Opinion, 9/1/22, at 2 (unnumbered), supra (finding waiver). Appellant

claims he never received the Rule 907 notice, and that he

      had made attempts to obtain the document. The PCRA court
      refused to send a copy. Therefore, [A]ppellant was not able to
      respond[] to the court[’]s reasons for the dismissal of the PCRA in
      his [concise s]tatement….

                                      -6-
J-S04006-23

Appellant’s Brief at 8-9.

      Notably, the PCRA court docket contained in the certified record is

incomplete, and does not reflect the entry of the PCRA court’s Rule 907 notice,

and whether it was served on Appellant. We deem this to be a breakdown of

the PCRA court’s operation. In light of this breakdown, we will not penalize

Appellant for his failure to comply with the Rule 1925 Order.       See, e.g.,

Commonwealth v. Leatherby, 116 A.3d 73, 79 (Pa. Super. 2015) (an

appellant “should not be precluded from appellate review based on what was,

in effect, an administrative breakdown on the part of the trial court.”);

Commonwealth v. Davis, 867 A.2d 585, 588 (Pa. Super. 2005) (en banc).

      We are mindful of our standard of review:

      Appellate review of a PCRA court’s dismissal of a PCRA petition is
      limited to the examination of whether the PCRA court’s
      determination is supported by the record and free of legal error.
      The PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no
      support for the findings in the certified record. This Court grants
      great deference to the findings of the PCRA court, and we will not
      disturb those findings merely because the record could support a
      contrary holding. In contrast, we review the PCRA court’s legal
      conclusions de novo.

Commonwealth v. Maxwell, 232 A.3d 739, 744 (Pa. Super. 2020) (en banc)

(citations omitted).

      All PCRA petitions, including a second or subsequent petition, must be

filed within one year of the date that the petitioner’s judgment of sentence

becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1); Commonwealth v. Derrickson,

923 A.2d 466, 468 (Pa. Super. 2007). A judgment of sentence becomes final

                                     -7-
J-S04006-23

“at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the

Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,

or at the expiration of time for seeking the review.”           42 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 9545(b)(3).   “If a PCRA petition is untimely, neither this Court nor the

[PCRA] court has jurisdiction over the petition.” Commonwealth v. Chester,

895 A.2d 520, 522 (Pa. 2006) (citation omitted).

      Appellant concedes his judgment of sentence became final in 2007, after

the expiration of time to file a petition for allowance of appeal with the

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); Appellant’s

Brief at 22-23. Thus, Appellant’s petition is untimely unless he has satisfied

one of the PCRA’s three exceptions contained in Section 9545(b)(1)(i – iii).

Any petition invoking an exception “shall be filed within one year of the date

the claim could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).

      Appellant invokes the newly-discovered fact exception in Section

9545(b)(1)(ii). We have explained this exception

      requires a petitioner to demonstrate he did not know the facts
      upon which he based his petition and could not have learned those
      facts earlier by the exercise of due diligence. Due diligence
      demands that the petitioner take reasonable steps to protect his
      own interests. A petitioner must explain why he could not
      have learned the new fact(s) earlier with the exercise of
      due diligence. This rule is strictly enforced. Additionally, the
      focus of this exception is on the newly discovered facts, not on a
      newly discovered or newly willing source for previously known
      facts.

Commonwealth v. Brown, 111 A.3d 171, 176 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citations

omitted; emphasis added).

                                    -8-
J-S04006-23

       Appellant argues he satisfied the newly-discovered fact exception,

because he only recently acquired the notes of testimony from the charging

conference. See Appellant’s Brief at 22-24; see also id. at 25 (“the fact of

what transpired in the Chambers [during the charging conference was]

unknown to [Appellant] because his trial counsel never discussed the

particulars of the conversation with him[, and this fact] could not have been

ascertained by the exist[e]nce of due diligence….”). Appellant raises various

claims of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. See Appellant’s Brief at 15-22, 23;

see also Turner/Finley Letter, 4/4/22, at 4 (unnumbered), supra

(explaining Appellant’s ineffectiveness claims). Finally, Appellant argues he is

entitled to relief because PCRA counsel was ineffective in concluding Appellant

raised no meritorious claims pursuant to Turner/Finley. See id. at 29-35.

       The Commonwealth counters:

       Appellant contends that the “newly-discovered evidence”
       exception[2] applies because he did not previously possess the
       transcripts related to a charging conference in chambers. See
       Brief for Appellant, at 24. However, as noted by the PCRA court
       and PCRA counsel, the transcripts in question were available to
       Appellant well before 2021, at least at the time of the direct
       appeal. See [PCRA Court] Opinion, 09/01/22, at 2-3; No[-]Merit
       Letter, 04/04/22, at unnumbered pages 7-8. Moreover, a review
       of the docket sheet reflects that the trial transcripts in questions
____________________________________________

2 We observe “the newly-discovered facts exception to the time limitations of
the PCRA, as set forth in subsection 9545(b)(1)(ii), is distinct from the after-
discovered evidence basis for relief delineated in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2).”
Commonwealth v. Burton, 158 A.3d 618, 629 (Pa. 2017) (emphasis
added); see also id. (explaining distinction). In the instant appeal, we deem
the Commonwealth’s reference to “newly-discovered evidence” as an
inadvertent misstatement.

                                           -9-
J-S04006-23

      were filed on July 31, 2006, during the pendency of the direct
      appeal and more than fifteen years before the instant PCRA
      petition was filed. Appellant has not explained why he did not
      obtain these materials prior to 2021 and how these trial
      transcripts were previously unavailable to him.                  See
      Commonwealth v. Pew, 189 A.3d 486, 489-90 (Pa. Super.
      2018) (finding appellant did not adequately prove [the newly-
      discovered fact exception] where he did not establish how
      documents filed of record decades before were unavailable to
      him). The Commonwealth contends that by failing to explain how
      trial transcripts filed of record in 2006 were previously unavailable
      to him[,] and failing to show that he exercised any diligence in
      obtaining these transcripts in the nearly 15 years before filing the
      instant PCRA petition, Appellant has failed to prove that the
      [newly]-discovered         [fact]    exception   applies.        See
      Commonwealth v. Brown, 111 A.3d 171, 176 (Pa. Super. 2015)
      (determining that due diligence requirement is “strictly enforced”
      and “demands that the petitioner take reasonable steps to protect
      his own interests”).

Commonwealth Brief at 11-12. We agree. See id.; see also Brown, supra

(“A petitioner must explain why he could not have learned the new fact(s)

earlier with the exercise of due diligence.”).     We further observe that “a

petitioner’s claims [] couched in terms of ineffectiveness will not save an

otherwise untimely petition from the application of the time restrictions of the

PCRA.” Commonwealth v. Lesko, 15 A.3d 345, 367 (Pa. 2011).

      Appellant, however, may claim PCRA counsel’s ineffective assistance for

the first time on appeal. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth

v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381 (Pa. 2021), restructured the procedure by which a

PCRA petitioner must assert claims of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness to

“allow[] a PCRA petitioner to raise claims of ineffective assistance of counsel

at the first opportunity to do so, even when on appeal.” Id. at 401.

                                     - 10 -
J-S04006-23

      Our Supreme Court recently expanded on Bradley, stating:

      We recognized that the structure of appeal and collateral review
      “places great importance on the competency of initial PCRA
      counsel,” and reasoned that “it is essential that a petitioner
      possess a meaningful method by which to realize his right to
      effective PCRA counsel.” Bradley, 261 A.3d at 401. We stated
      that “this approach best recognizes a petitioner’s right to effective
      PCRA counsel while advancing equally legitimate concerns that
      criminal matters be efficiently and timely concluded.” Id. at 405.
      We further explained:

          In some instances, the record before the appellate court
          will be sufficient to allow for disposition of any newly-
          raised ineffectiveness claims.       Commonwealth v.
          Holmes, 79 A.3d 562, 577 (Pa. 2013). However, in
          other cases, the appellate court may need to remand to
          the PCRA court for further development of the record and
          for the PCRA court to consider such claims as an initial
          matter. Consistent with our prior case law, to advance a
          request for remand, a petition would be required to
          provide more than mere “boilerplate assertions of PCRA
          counsel’s ineffectiveness,” Commonwealth v. Hall, 872
          A.2d 1177, 1182 (Pa. 2005); however, where there are
          “material facts at issue concerning claims challenging
          counsel’s stewardship and relief is not plainly unavailable
          as a matter of law, the remand should be afforded[.]”
          Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726, 740 n.2 (Pa.
          2002) (Saylor, J., concurring).

      Id. at 402. We also stated that [Pa.R.A.P.] 302(a), which provides
      that “[i]ssues not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot
      be raised for the first time on appeal,” Pa.R.A.P. 302(a), “does not
      pertain to these scenarios.” Id. at 405.

Commonwealth v. Parrish, 273 A.3d 989, 1002 (Pa. 2022) (some brackets

omitted; citations modified).

      Instantly, Appellant argues PCRA counsel’s “no-merit letter is seriously

deficient. PCRA counsel did not discuss two issues claimed by the [A]ppellant

and why they do not have merit….” Appellant’s Brief at 34. However, these

                                     - 11 -
J-S04006-23

claims do not entitle Appellant to relief, because relief is “plainly unavailable

as a matter of law.” Bradley, 261 A.3d at 402. Appellant merely raises a

general claim of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness, and fails to identify and

develop the two issues counsel purportedly ignored. See Parrish, 273 A.3d

at 1002 (“boilerplate assertions of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness” are

insufficient to warrant a remand to the PCRA court under Bradley) (citation

omitted).

      Our review of Counsel’s Turner/Finley letter belies Appellant’s claims

of its inadequacy.   Moreover, Appellant fails to address the three-pronged

ineffectiveness test announced in Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 973,

975-76 (Pa. 1987). See Commonwealth v. Franklin, 990 A.2d 795, 797

(Pa. Super. 2010) (holding counsel is presumed to be effective, and a PCRA

petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating counsel’s ineffectiveness); see

also Commonwealth v. Tielsch, 934 A.2d 81, 93 (Pa. Super. 2007) (holding

undeveloped claims will not be considered on appeal).

      Based on the foregoing, the PCRA court properly denied Appellant’s

untimely PCRA petition.

      Order affirmed.

                                     - 12 -
J-S04006-23

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/23/2023

                          - 13 -