Court Opinion

ID: 9662095
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:59:26.06346+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:36.749667
License: Public Domain

Steele Hays, Justice, dissenting. I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the legislature intended the first degree battery statute to require a life-threatening injury. The majority finds the phrase, “under conditions manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life” as distinguishing first degree battery from second degree battery. A comparison of the pertinent second degree battery statute demonstrates an existing difference between the two degrees of battery: Ark. Code Ann. § 5-13-202(a) (1987). A person commits battery in the second degree if (1) With the purpose of causing physical injury to another person, he causes serious physical injury to any person. Second degree battery requires a mental state of purposefully causing physical injury. First degree battery requires a mental state of purposefully causing serious physical injury, under subsections (a) 1, 2, and 3. See Tarrentino v. State, 302 Ark. 55, 786 S.W.2d 584 (1990), and Ark. Code Ann, § 5-2-203(c) (1987). We stated in Tarrentino: The main way in which first degree battery [under sections -201(a) 1, 2 and 3] differs from second and third degree battery is the state of mind of the actor. To be convicted of first degree battery, a defendant must act with the purpose of causing serious physical injury to another person. In other words, under second degree, while the victim must have suffered serious physical injury, the defendant’s mental state need only be with the purpose of causing simple physical injury. In first degree, the injury is the same but the defendant must have acted with the purpose of causing serious physical injury. Because there is already this existing distinction in the mental states between first and second degree, it is not necessary to interpret the “extreme indifference language” to distinguish the two degrees of battery. Indeed, while I have found no agreement on the definition of the “extreme indifference” language, there is general agreement that when added to an existing mental-state requirement in a statute, that language elevates the offense by adding something to the mental requirement in the nature of wickedness, wantonness or depravity, and does not necessarily refer to the results of the conduct. See State v. Boone, 661 P.2d 917 (Or. 1983). Further, contrary to the majority’s claim, the Commentary does not support its decision. The Commentary states: For the most part, battery in the first degree comprehends only life-endangering conduct. This language does not provide that all injuries for first degree battery must be life-threatening, but only “for the most part.” That language clearly implies there will be injuries under certain circumstances that will not be life-threatening. There is nothing else in the Commentary that contradicts this obvious interpretation and if the legislature had wanted all first degree batteries to be life-threatening, it could have easily said so. Finally, the aggravated assault offense under the Model Penal Code uses the “extreme difference to human life” language but does not address whether it requires life-endangering conduct or injury. However, all the battery statutes of other states containing the “extreme indifference” language, which I have found are in agreement that the language does not require life-threatening injury. See e.g. State v. Joseph, 597 A.2d 805 (Vt. 1991); State v. Saucier, 128 N.H. 291, 512 A.2d 1120 (1986); State v. Dodd, 503 A.2d 1302 (Me. 1986). Glaze, J., joins in this dissent.