Court Opinion

ID: 9912623
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-22 21:00:33.660218+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:01:15.006903
License: Public Domain

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                                            UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 23-4240

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                            Plaintiff - Appellee,

                     v.

        DAVID ANTHONY TAYLOR,

                            Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at
        Roanoke. Michael F. Urbanski, Chief District Judge. (7:12-cr-00043-MFU-1)

        Submitted: December 19, 2023                                Decided: December 21, 2023

        Before HARRIS, QUATTLEBAUM, and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: Juval O. Scott, Jr., Federal Public Defender, Charlottesville, Virginia, Randy
        V. Cargill, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC
        DEFENDER, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellant. Christopher R. Kavanaugh, United States
        Attorney, Jonathan Jones, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
        STATES ATTORNEY, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

              David Anthony Taylor appeals from his 240-month sentence, imposed at

        resentencing. On appeal, Taylor asserts that the sentencing judge gave undue consideration

        to the judgment imposed by a different judge at Taylor’s original sentencing hearing.

        Finding no error, we affirm.

              In 2013, a jury convicted Taylor of two counts of attempted Hobbs Act robbery and

        one count of possessing or using a firearm in furtherance of one of the robberies, in

        violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). * The district court sentenced Taylor to imprisonment for

        336 months, consisting of 252 months for each robbery to run concurrently and 84 months

        for the firearm count to run consecutively. We affirmed the convictions and sentence.

        United States v. Taylor, 754 F. 3d 217 (4th Cir. 2014), aff’d, 579 U.S. 301 (2016).

               Taylor thereafter filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion seeking to reverse his firearm

        conviction, arguing that his Hobbs Act robbery offense was not a valid predicate offense

        to support his conviction under § 924(c). Following rejection of the motion by the district

        court, the Government agreed that attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a valid

        predicate offense under § 924(c). See United States v. Justin Taylor, 142 S. Ct. 2015,

        2025-26 (2022). Thus, we granted the Government’s motion to remand, vacated Taylor’s

        sentence, and remanded the case for resentencing.

               *
                 The original judgment showed two convictions for Hobbs Act conspiracy. The
        district court later corrected its clerical error and amended the judgment to indicate
        convictions for substantive Hobbs Act robberies. However, the parties now agree that
        Taylor was convicted of attempted Hobbs Act robberies.

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               On remand, the district court, without objection, calculated a Sentencing Guidelines

        range of 235-293 months in prison and noted that the statutory maximum for each Hobbs

        Act robbery conviction was 240 months. The Government sought reimposition of the

        336-month sentence, to be accomplished by running the two Hobbs Act robbery sentences

        partially consecutive. The Government relied on the undisputed heinous and violent nature

        of the underlying crimes and Taylor’s serious criminal history prior to the offenses of

        conviction. Taylor sought a sentence of 120 months, citing his post-offense remorse and

        rehabilitation and the shorter sentences of his codefendants.

               The district court considered at length the parties’ arguments and the sentencing

        factors. While doing so, the court briefly mentioned that the lengthy sentence imposed at

        Taylor’s first sentencing was “reflective of the crime.” (J.A. 167). The court also noted

        that, in choosing to run the sentences concurrently, he was “going to do the same thing [the

        prior judge] did, who heard the trial in this case.” (J.A. 176).

               We find that the court properly and adequately assessed the sentencing factors and

        explained its reasoning for imposing the within-Guidelines sentence. The court explicitly

        balanced Taylor’s mitigating arguments against his violent offense conduct, his criminal

        history, and the court’s obligation to protect the public interest.      The district court

        considered the original sentencing court’s reasoning and conclusions only in passing and

        in further support of its conclusions regarding the severity of the underlying crimes. In

        addition, the court did not consider the original sentence as an “initial benchmark” at

        Taylor’s resentencing. See United States v. Abed, 3 F.4th 104, 118 (4th Cir. 2021)

        (approving consideration of prior sentencing when it sheds light on appropriate sentencing

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        factors). Accordingly, any mention of the original sentencing court’s conclusions did not

        render Taylor’s sentence either substantively or procedurally unreasonable. See Gall v.

        United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007) (standard of review).

               As such, we affirm Taylor’s sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the

        facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and

        argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                      AFFIRMED

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