Court Opinion

ID: 9672645
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:58:21.103618+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:17.645931
License: Public Domain

John I. Purtle, Justice, dissenting. I respectfully dissent from that part of the majority opinion which discusses the evidence relating to other fire losses experienced by Charles E. Johnson. He was not charged with the responsibility of causing the other fires which destroyed property in which he held an interest. We held in Houston General Ins. Co. v. Arkla Gas Co., 267 Ark. 544, 592 S.W.2d 445 (1980) that evidence of similar occurrences is admissible only when it is demonstrated that the events arose out of the same or substantially similar circumstances. In Houston we also held that the burden rests on the party offering such evidence to prove that the necessary similarity of conditions exists. There was no attempt to comply with this holding in the case here under consideration. If the insurance carrier has evidence that Charles E. Johnson was the author of the previous fire losses, it should be allowed to introduce that evidence at the next trial. However, the fact that fire losses occurred on property in which Johnson had an interest is, in and of itself, not proper evidence. It will be necessary to show that Charles E. Johnson set the fires or caused them to be set before the exclusion in the policy is applicable. Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Staples, 8 Ark. App. 224, 650 S.W.2d 244(1983). Certainly such losses would not be relevant unless it were shown that Johnson received pecuniary gain from them. There is no such evidence in the present record. The majority state: “Where the issue is whether a fire was set deliberately to claim insurance, the existence of other fires, if not too remote in time or dissimilar in circumstances, may be admissible without showing the same or substantially similar circumstances.” This statement is not supported by any type of authority and I am of the opinion that it is simply pulled out of the air. Even if it were provén that Charles E. Johnson deliberately set fire to this property, the insurance company would still be obligated to pay Laura M. Johnson the face amount of the policy. No one disputes that she had an insurable interest. The fact that she asked her son to obtain the insurance in no manner reflects any intention on her part to cause the property to be destroyed by fire. In Satterfield v. State, 245 Ark. 337, 432 S.W.2d 472, (1968), where a person was charged with arson, we stated: “Evidence of other incidents of arson would not be admissible unless that evidence can be shown to meet the test announced in many decisions.” The court then cited Alford v. State, 223 Ark. 330, 266 S.W.2d 804 (1954) and approved language from C.J.S. as follows: “[E]vidence which shows or tends to show that accused has committed another crime wholly independent of, and unconnected with, that for which he is on trial, even though it is a crime of the same sort, is irrelevant and inadmissible.” I believe the valued policy law is applicable to the faqts of this case.