Court Opinion

ID: 9952914
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-20 21:00:57.614328+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:42:32.511600
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-11799    Document: 39-1      Date Filed: 03/20/2024   Page: 1 of 13

                                                              [PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-11799
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        ADAM JOSEPH OWENS,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Alabama
                    D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cr-00122-TFM-28
                           ____________________

        Before GRANT, ABUDU, and ED CARNES, Circuit Judges.
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        2                       Opinion of the Court               22-11799

        GRANT, Circuit Judge:
                Adam Joseph Owens was arrested as part of a federal-state
        task force’s investigation into a massive drug ring. He was charged
        with several crimes but ultimately pleaded guilty to one count,
        possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. The
        district court imposed 120-months’ imprisonment, which doubled
        the 60-month total recommended by the Sentencing Guidelines.
        The district court concluded that this upward variance was
        appropriate for Owens because he had been planning to sell drugs
        while in jail awaiting sentencing and had also caused the overdose
        death of one of his buyers. Owens challenges both findings.
        Because we conclude that they were not clearly erroneous, we
        affirm his sentence.
                                         I.
               Owens was one of forty-two defendants charged in a
        sprawling indictment targeting the Crossley Hills Drug Trafficking
        Organization. Beginning in 2016, the drug ring dealt heroin,
        fentanyl, methamphetamine, Xanax, and oxycodone in and around
        Mobile County, Alabama. Where the drug ring went, overdoses,
        hospitalizations, and deaths followed—Crossley Hills dealers killed
        so many unwary customers with fentanyl-laced heroin that their
        product earned the nickname “Grey Death.” Many transactions
        took place in hotels and motels around Mobile, but dollars were
        not the only currency. Sexual favors were also in play, and the
        dealers sometimes even incapacitated female customers with
        fentanyl-laced drugs so they could take advantage of them. See
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        22-11799                   Opinion of the Court                                3

        United States v. William Owens, No. 22-12420, 2023 WL 7182353, at
        *1–2 (11th Cir. Nov. 1, 2023).
                Owens was arrested on an outstanding warrant by officers
        involved in the Crossley Hills investigation. Their search of his
        vehicle paid off, uncovering several unlabeled pill bottles, over 150
        pills (including oxycodone), and a small bag of ecstasy. On top of
        all that, the officers found two loaded handguns, one of which was
        stolen from the local sheriff’s office. Originally charged in four
        counts, Owens ultimately pleaded guilty to one—possession of a
        firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. As part of his
        plea, Owens admitted that he had trafficked in opioid-based
        prescription pills, that the pills were in his vehicle so he could sell
        them, and that he had possessed the two firearms in his vehicle to
        further his drug trafficking. In exchange, he got the government’s
        recommendation that he be sentenced to the mandatory minimum
        for the offense, 60 months in prison.
                The arrest, however, had not deterred Owens. The
        presentence investigation report (PSI), entered during the
        sentencing process, stated that while Owens was in jail he managed
        to acquire items including a cell phone and several 8-milligram
        strips of a narcotic called Suboxone. 1 This combination meant he
        could keep dealing drugs—even from jail. The PSI also indicated
        that Owens was linked to the death of at least one of Crossley

        1 Suboxone is a controlled substance that may be prescribed by doctors to treat

        opioid addiction, but it carries serious risk of abuse. United States v. Abovyan,
        988 F.3d 1288, 1296 (11th Cir. 2021).
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        4                     Opinion of the Court                 22-11799

        Hills’s victims. That man, a buyer the report refers to as B.B.,
        bought oxycodone from Owens on November 30, 2017, and died
        later that same night. B.B.’s autopsy showed that he had overdosed
        on fentanyl and several fentanyl analogues.
               At Owens’s initial sentencing hearing, the district court
        specifically highlighted B.B.’s death, along with Owens’s apparent
        efforts to deal drugs from jail, as uniquely troubling. Explaining
        that it might depart from the government’s recommended
        sentence of 60 months, the court set a hearing to take evidence on
        both allegations.
               At that second hearing, the court began by adopting the PSI
        and its 60-month Sentencing Guidelines calculation. Neither
        Owens nor the government objected to the PSI; nor did either
        party challenge the Guidelines calculation. The district court then
        heard testimony.
               The government first called James Ward to testify about the
        contraband found in Owens’s possession at the jail. Ward was
        warden of the Conecuh County Detention Center where Owens
        had been held, and testified that while watching a cell phone search
        from a live video feed in his office, he saw Owens remove several
        items from his hair. An officer supervising the cell phone search
        seized the items, turning up a cell phone, a phone charger,
        cigarettes, earplugs, and Suboxone strips. All of these were
        brought to Ward, who emphasized on the stand the difficulties he
        faced in slowing the drug trade in his jail.
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        22-11799              Opinion of the Court                        5

               The government next called Mobile Police Sergeant
        Nicholas Vegliacich to testify about B.B.’s death. He explained that
        police had found extensive text message history between Owens
        and B.B., with the last messages between the two dated November
        30, 2017—the day of B.B.’s death. They had set up a drug sale, and
        geolocation data from their phones put them together at the
        proposed time and place. Six or seven hours later, B.B. was found
        dead.
               Vegliacich also reviewed B.B.’s autopsy report, which listed
        the cause of death as a fentanyl overdose. Owens had been charged
        with distributing oxycodone (not fentanyl), and B.B. had arranged
        to buy oxycodone (not fentanyl). Even so, Vegliacich’s testimony
        connected the drugs Owens sold to B.B.’s death. He explained that
        the illicit drug market had “a huge problem with counterfeit
        pills”—specifically, pills that were often laced with fentanyl even
        though they looked like legitimate oxycodone.
               At the close of the hearing, the district court found that
        Owens had possessed Suboxone for sale while he was in jail and
        that he had sold B.B. the drugs that caused his death. The court
        emphasized with frustration that, even while incarcerated, Owens
        had “continued to flout the drug laws of this country.” The court
        also decried the destructive social harm caused by the illegal trade
        in prescription opioids and highlighted the public-safety imperative
        for an increased sentence. B.B.’s death, the court added, was “a
        powerful factor” that was “not adequately taken into account by
        the guidelines.”       Rejecting the government’s Guidelines
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                 22-11799

        recommendation of 60 months, the court instead imposed a
        sentence of 120 months. Even so, it credited Owens for pleading
        guilty, and explained that the sentence was a show of mercy
        because it was lighter than the 30 years the court would ordinarily
        impose for a drug trafficking case involving the death of a
        customer.
               Owens objected to the court’s reliance on its factual findings
        about the Suboxone and B.B.’s death. For the former, he argued
        that the government had not shown that the seized strips were
        really Suboxone because it did not offer a toxicology report. For
        the latter, he said that he could not have caused B.B.’s fentanyl-
        overdose death because he had only been charged with dealing
        oxycodone. The district court overruled both objections and
        finalized the sentence. Owens now appeals.
                                         II.
              Defendants can claim procedural error in sentencing even if
        the overall sentence is substantively reasonable. See United States v.
        Shaw, 560 F.3d 1230, 1237 (11th Cir. 2009). Such errors include
        miscalculating the Sentencing Guidelines range, treating the
        Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
        sentencing factors, relying on clearly erroneous facts, and failing to
        adequately explain the sentence issued. Id.
               We ordinarily review the procedural reasonableness of a
        sentence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Waters, 937 F.3d
        1344, 1358 (11th Cir. 2019). One way a district court abuses its
        discretion is if the factual findings it uses in a sentencing
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        22-11799                Opinion of the Court                            7

        enhancement are clearly erroneous. Id. But if a defendant fails to
        object at the time of sentencing, our review is only for plain error,
        a much tougher standard. Id. To reverse an error raised for the
        first time on appeal, a defendant must show not only “that the error
        was ‘plain’” but also that it “affected his substantial rights.” United
        States v. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 1303, 1307 (11th Cir. 2014) (alteration
        adopted) (quotation omitted). Even then, we exercise our
        discretion to correct an error only if it seriously affects “the fairness,
        integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States
        v. Turner, 474 F.3d 1265, 1276 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted).
                This high standard reflects the “careful balance” that must
        be set “between judicial efficiency and the redress of injustice.”
        Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). The plain-error
        rule disincentivizes “sandbagging,” where a defendant remains
        “silent about his objection and belatedly rais[es] the error only if
        the case does not conclude in his favor.” Id. at 134. But more
        fundamentally, requiring a contemporaneous objection gives the
        district court the first opportunity to consider—and resolve—a
        defendant’s objections, which can often help parties and courts
        alike “avoid the costs of reversal and a retrial.” Turner, 474 F.3d at
        1275. After all, the district court “is ordinarily in the best position
        to determine the relevant facts and adjudicate the dispute.” Puckett,
        556 U.S. at 134. But it is often impossible to do so without a party
        raising an issue or developing a factual record about it. That
        failure, in turn, can impede this Court’s ability to fairly decide the
        issue on appeal.
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                 22-11799

                                         III.
               Here, Owens raises two challenges to the district court’s
        decision to vary upward from the Sentencing Guidelines’
        recommendation based on uncharged conduct. That choice is
        allowed as a general matter because uncharged conduct can be
        “directly germane to several § 3553(a) factors,” which the court is
        required to consider when determining a sentence. United States v.
        Overstreet, 713 F.3d 627, 637–38, 638 n.14 (11th Cir. 2013). Those
        factors include “the ‘history and characteristics of the defendant,’
        and the need for the sentence to ‘promote respect for the law,’
        ‘afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct,’ and ‘protect the
        public from further crimes of the defendant.’” Id. at 637–38
        (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)–(2)). The district court’s relevant
        factual findings can be based on “facts admitted by the defendant’s
        guilty plea, undisputed statements in the PSI, or evidence
        presented at the sentencing hearing.” United States v. Matthews, 3
        F.4th 1286, 1289 (11th Cir. 2021). Reasonable inferences from this
        evidence are allowed. Id.
                If a defendant challenges one of the factual bases of the
        sentence, the government bears the burden of proving that fact by
        a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Philidor, 717 F.3d
        883, 885 (11th Cir. 2013). “A preponderance of the evidence is
        evidence which is more convincing than the evidence offered in
        opposition to it.” United States v. Watkins, 10 F.4th 1179, 1184 (11th
        Cir. 2021) (en banc) (quotation omitted). “It simply requires the
        trier of fact to believe that the existence of a fact is more probable
        than its nonexistence.” Id. at 1184–85 (quotation omitted).
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        22-11799              Opinion of the Court                      9

                                       A.
               Owens first challenges the district court’s finding that he
        possessed Suboxone for distribution while in the county jail
        awaiting sentencing. His argument on appeal, however, reaches
        further than his objection at the sentencing hearing. There, he
        objected that the government never produced a toxicology report
        showing that the confiscated strips were Suboxone—essentially, an
        argument that while he may have been in possession of something,
        the government had not shown that it was a controlled substance.
        On appeal, however, he also contests the predicate finding that he
        possessed any contraband at all.
               We begin with Owens’s preserved objection. Warden
        James Ward’s testimony was the only evidence taken at the hearing
        on the Suboxone strips. Ward admitted that he was not sure
        whether the strips had been tested, but seemed certain that they
        were Suboxone based on his experience at the jail. He also
        explained that the drug trade was a huge problem in his prison,
        emphasizing that the jail “struggle[d] every day to keep [drugs]
        out,” and that inmates were “making money on cash apps left and
        right.” For his part, Owens never suggested what else the strips
        could be besides Suboxone. In fact, his counsel referred to the
        “Suboxone strips” when asking Ward if they had been tested.
               The district court was entitled to make the reasonable
        inference from this testimony that Ward could recognize, based on
        his experience and on the circumstances surrounding the search,
        that the strips seized from Owens were Suboxone. The court saw
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                  22-11799

        Ward’s conclusion as credible, and that finding is entitled to
        substantial deference—especially considering that Owens offered
        no contrary explanation for what the confiscated strips might be.
        See United States v. Pham, 463 F.3d 1239, 1244–45 (11th Cir. 2006).
        Where the government presents unrebutted, credible firsthand
        testimony and the defendant presents no evidence at all, we do not
        hesitate to find that, “in light of all the evidence,” the government
        has proved its version of events “is more likely true than not.”
        Watkins, 10 F.4th at 1185 (quotation omitted). We find no error.
               Owens did not preserve his new challenge—that the district
        court erred in finding that he possessed any contraband at all
        (including the strips) in jail—so we review it only for plain error.
        This challenge likewise fails, again because of Ward’s testimony.
        He explained that in an effort to eliminate illicit cell phones, he had
        purchased a special cell phone detector for the jail. Ward testified
        that he observed real-time surveillance video while the inmates
        waited to walk through the scanner, and that he saw Owens
        remove several items from his hair—a cell phone, a phone charger,
        cigarettes, earplugs, and Subxone strips. Ward testified that the
        items had been dropped off in his office shortly after they were
        confiscated, but had since been handed over to the state of
        Alabama. Ward also explained that the jail’s surveillance system
        was live-feed only, meaning no recordings could be maintained.
               Owens says Ward’s testimony alone is not enough. He
        objects that the district court needed to view the security camera
        footage, examine the contraband, or at least hear testimony from
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        22-11799               Opinion of the Court                       11

        the officer who originally found it. We disagree. Ward’s account
        of the search is clear and logical, and the district court deemed it
        credible. Again, Owens did not offer any evidence that casts doubt
        on Ward’s testimony. Nor did he offer any evidence at all to rebut
        that testimony. We find no error, much less plain error.
                                         B.
               Owens next challenges the district court’s finding that he
        sold the drugs to B.B. that caused his death. As with his attack on
        the district court’s Suboxone finding, Owens preserved only one
        argument on this front. Below, he objected that he could not have
        been responsible for B.B.’s fentanyl-overdose death because he was
        only charged with selling oxycodone. He now adds that the
        government failed to show that he sold any drugs to B.B. on the
        day in question.
               The district court did not clearly err by finding that Owens’s
        drugs caused B.B.’s death. To start, the timing of B.B.’s death
        points to Owens, who sold B.B. drugs when the two met on
        November 30, 2017. Six to seven hours later, B.B. was dead of an
        overdose, with no evidence suggesting that he got drugs from any
        other source before his death.
              The autopsy report’s conclusion that B.B. died from a
        fentanyl overdose does not mean that Owens’s oxycodone pills
        were not the cause of death. To the contrary, it fits the available
        evidence—Sergeant Vegliacich testified to a “huge problem” with
        counterfeit oxycodone pills that were contaminated with fentanyl.
        What’s more, the factual background of Owens’s PSI, which he did
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        12                        Opinion of the Court                       22-11799

        not challenge, reflected that Crossley Hills dealers regularly cut
        various drugs with fentanyl—increasing both the drugs’ potency
        and the dealers’ profits. And other unwitting Crossley Hills
        customers had died from fentanyl overdoses after taking laced
        drugs from the gang. These factual allegations offer additional
        support for the district court’s conclusion that Owens was
        responsible for B.B.’s death, and by failing to object to them in his
        PSI, Owens admitted them for sentencing purposes. United States
        v. Wade, 458 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir. 2006). We see no error.
               As for the unpreserved challenge to the court’s finding that
        Owens sold B.B. any drugs in the first place, once again, we review
        only for plain error. And, once again, we find it wanting. Sergeant
        Nicholas Vegliacich testified that he personally reviewed “at least
        50 pages of text messages” showing constant drug sales from
        Owens to B.B. Those communications included messages
        arranging a sale on the day of B.B.’s death, and geolocation data
        confirmed that Owens and B.B.’s cell phones were at the
        prearranged place at the scheduled time.
               Owens argues that the district court erred by relying on this
        hearsay evidence to conclude that he sold drugs to B.B. But it “is
        well established in this circuit that the sentencing court may rely
        on reliable hearsay.” United States v. Polar, 369 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th
        Cir. 2004). 2 This cell phone evidence fits the bill. The district court

        2 After oral argument, Owens directed this Court’s attention to United States v.

        Lee, 68 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir. 1995), which he argues required the district court
        to make express findings stating why it found the hearsay evidence reliable.
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        22-11799                    Opinion of the Court                                 13

        did not err, plainly or otherwise, by concluding the government
        had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Owens sold
        B.B. drugs on the day he died.
                                        *        *       *
              Because the district court’s factual findings at sentencing
        were not clearly erroneous, we AFFIRM Owens’s sentence.

        As we have explained before, Lee does not always require explicit credibility
        findings. In cases “where the record and the circumstances of the case
        demonstrate adequate indicia of reliability, [credibility] findings are not strictly
        necessary.” United States v. Baptiste, 935 F.3d 1304, 1316 (11th Cir. 2019)
        (quotation omitted). The testimony of Sergeant Vegliacich, a law-
        enforcement officer, about his investigation of Owens exhibits none of the
        suspicious characteristics we have previously identified as warranting separate
        credibility findings. See id. at 1316–17.