Court Opinion

ID: 9675249
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:46:50.735148+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:32.700006
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
PER CURIAM.
Employer, in its motion for rehearing contends that material matters of law and fact were overlooked “or misinterpreted by the Court” in applying Section 287.210 (3) and (5), RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S. to the medical records of the St. Louis Independent Packing Company in ruling that Doctor Cozart could not testify. In this connection it stresses the point that employer’s medical records show that Doctor Cozart was not an examining or treating physician within the meaning of Section 287.210(3) and (5), RSMo 1959. It argues that claimant knew that the doctors of the employer were not treating or examining him for his back for which he was making a claim. It may be conceded that employer’s doctors were not treating plaintiff, but, if they were not medical examiners of claimant, what were they? Certainly they were not acting in the role of mere investigators for employer and insurer. If they had any personal contact with claimant at the request of employer it must have been in the role and capacity of professional medical men. This must have been true of Doctor Cozart’s contact with claimant when he obtained the statement excluded by the Commission. Employer’s counsel in his initial questions propounded to Doctor Cozart qualified him as a medical expert. The initial questions pertained to the medical background of the witness. He was questioned by employer’s counsel as to his medical education, internship, nature and length of private practice and the medical societies to which he belonged. Obviously, he was offered by employer as a medical witness. When claimant objected to his testimony on the ground that claimant had not been furnished a medical report by the witness or employer’s counsel, counsel for employer told the Referee “ * * * the testimony is relative to the medical condition of this man, * * * ” thereafter adding, “ * * * Doctor Coz-art is offered in rebuttal by virtue of impeaching testimony as to a conversation *705he has had with the claimant in this case. * * * >» In an offer of proof counsel for employer said that if Doctor Cozart was permitted to testify he would say that “ * * * he had a conversation with the claimant on or about April 17,1964 * * * ” and “ * * * that at that time the claimant stated the recurrent back pain is a (sic) illness not due to any on plant injury. * * * ” It should be pointed out that this conversation alleged to have taken place between claimant and Doctor Cozart did not appear on the medical record kept in the employer’s plant. It is admitted by employer in its suggestions in support of its motion for a rehearing that Doctor Cozart is a company doctor. Doctor Cozart did admit that he made entries on the card contained in the employer’s medical record. However, they were not entries concerning the aforesaid conversation. It is abundantly clear from the record before us that Doctor Cozart, at the time he had the conversation with claimant on April 17, 1964 was acting in the capacity of an examining physician for employer. Therefore, it was incumbent upon employer after receipt of notice of the setting of a date for the hearing to furnish claimant with a copy of a medical report of this examination, which report would and should contain any history given to the examining physician by the claimant. We think the statement sought to be elicited from Doctor Cozart by employer is a part of the patient’s history obtained by the doctor when making the examination and would have been a part of a medical report of this examining physician.
Section 287.210 is one of the discovery statutes under the Workmen’s Compensation Act which calls for “ * * * an -exchange of all medical reports, including those made both by treating and examining physician or physicians, to the end that the parties may be commonly informed of all medical findings and opinions. * * " The intent and purpose of this statute, as its language so clearly indicates, is that both employer and employee be commonly informed of all medical findings and opinions and receive a report of all treating and examining physicians. In the instant case claimant asked employer to furnish him with all medical reports of examining physicians. No report was furnished of the examination made by Doctor Cozart, nor was any report furnished in connection with the treatment and examination of claimant by Doctor Magee, as shown by the medical record kept in employer’s plant. As we pointed out in the opinion a failure or refusal to furnish claimant with these medical reports of the examining physicians barred the physicians from testifying at the hearing upon objection made by the party who was not provided with the required medical reports.
Employer contends that Doctor Cozart’s proffered testimony of the conversation with claimant did not involve medical findings and opinions. It is a well known fact that all doctors take the history of a person they are examining, whether for purposes of treating or merely examining the person, in order to arrive at a correct diagnosis and prognosis. It is important for the examining doctor to know the circumstances under which the injury was received and the force applied to the injured part of the body by the accident. Another of employer’s examining physicians, who testified, was Doctor Harry C. Morgan. He testified that it was important to obtain the history of an individual in the case of an injury to know the mechanism of the injury in assessing the extent of the injury and to learn something of the forces which were involved which produced it and something of the severity of the injury. We think the statement obtained by Doctor Cozart in his examination of claimant was a part of his effort to obtain a history of claimant’s injury and therefore had a relationship to any medical findings or opinions that he may have formed as a result of his examination. The history obtained by a physician is a necessary part of the treatment or examination of the patient by the physician.
*706Employer also contends that Doctor Cozart and the registered nurse employed in the medical department of the employer should have been permitted to testify as to the content of the medical record kept in employer’s plant on the ground that this record only contained “ * * * brief, cryptic entries made on four by six inch cards to be kept in the medical department of * * * ” the company. It contends that this is not a complete medical report as required to be furnished under subparagraph 3 of the aforesaid section of the statute. It makes little difference where the medical rec-' ord was prepared and kept; whether in the office of the physician or in the plant of the employer. Additionally, it is unimportant that the record kept is of a brief and cryptic nature. There is little doubt that most, if not all, medical reports made by physicians are prepared from a medical record kept by the physician which contains only brief or cryptic entries as to the patient’s history, complaints and the findings of the examining physician. There is little doubt that the medical reports required under the provisions of the statute in question are usually prepared from such a medical record kept in the physician’s office or elsewhere. The physician in his medical report usually enlarges upon the cryptic notes contained in his medical record. The medical record in question kept in the plant of the employer shows that it was either prepared by or made under the supervision of Doctor J. S. Magee, who was one of employer’s physicians. This record contained a history of how the accident occurred as given by claimant to the doctor and the emergency treatment furnished to claimant. While it is true that Doctor Magee was not offered as a witness for employer at the hearing, we think under the language of the statute involved, that it was incumbent upon employer to furnish a copy of a report from Doctor Magee of his examination and treatment as shown on the company’s medical record, inasmuch as the statute called “ * * * for an exchange of all medical reports
Employer makes a further contention that this is not only a medical record but a business record and is admissible if properly identified as a business record. Doctor Magee was not called as a witness and to permit employer to fail or to refuse to furnish a report of the history obtained from claimant and the treatment administered and to have Doctor Cozart or a registered nurse testify from the medical record as a business record would be a circumvention of the clear intent and purpose of the statute which provides for an exchange of all medical reports to the end that the parties may be commonly informed of all medical findings and opinions. In this connection we think it is of no significance whether the medical record is prepared in the employer’s plant or in the office of the employer’s physician. The language of the statutory provision does not leave employer or for that matter claimant free to determine what medical reports should be furnished and what should not be furnished. The statutory language clearly provides for an exchange of all medical reports. We think the statute provides a workable method for a full and complete revelation of all medical facts to all parties. We recognize that such a requirement interferes with the element of surprise, but we can not forget that the purpose of compensation hearings and all judicial hearings for that matter is a quiet search for the truth and records that may be of assistance in that process can not be made the subject of a game of hide and seek. We have extended our discussion of this point raised by the employer in its motion for rehearing because this section of the statutes has not been construed heretofore. Motion of employer and insurer for a rehearing and in the alternative to transfer the cause to the Supreme Court is overruled.