Court Opinion

ID: 9690166
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:55:35.578465+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:53.880499
License: Public Domain

White, J.,
dissenting in part.
I disagree with the majority’s interpretation of the Nebraska *172Wage Payment and Collection Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 48-1228 et seq. (Reissues 1984 & 1988) in regard to Waite’s claim for attorney fees under the act.
Section 48-1229(3) (Reissue 1984) defines wages as “compensation for labor or services rendered by an employee, including fringe benefits, when previously agreed to and conditions stipulated have been met by the employee, whether the amount is determined on a time, task, fee, commission, or other basis.”
The majority’s analysis of the statute is limited to a discussion of whether Waite’s bonus constitutes a fringe benefit. I agree that it does not. However, the majority has failed to apply the plain language of the statute, in that Waite’s bonus may be considered “compensation for labor or services . . . whether the amount is determined on a time, task, fee, commission, or other basis” (Emphasis supplied.)
Waite’s bonus certainly fits within this definition. His bonus was part of his compensation for labor or services and was previously agreed to by Waite and the corporation. Waite met the conditions for payment of the bonus, and the bonus was calculated on a basis not specifically mentioned, but not excluded by the statute. The fact that Waite’s bonus agreement included risk assumption on his part does not summarily exclude him from the statutory definition.
The majority’s statement that this type of business relationship “is certainly not the typical employment relationship embodying a disparity of economic power that the statute seeks to regulate” is not supported by any authority delineating the intent or legislative history of the statute. Absent clear legislative intent to the contrary, we must follow the plain language of the statute. Waite’s claim for his bonus fits within the statutory definition, and he should be awarded attorney fees as mandated by § 48-1231 (Reissue 1988).
Shanahan, J., joins in this dissent.