Court Opinion

ID: 9558988
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:19:59.641089+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:41.880492
License: Public Domain

ZIMMERMAN, Justice,
concurring and dissenting:
¶ 71 I join in the reversal of the conviction. However, I do so on only some of the grounds stated in the opinion of Justice Stewart. Because of the length of the opinion and its many analytical subparts, I will set out my points of agreement and disagreement by reference to the organization of Justice Stewart’s opinion. I do not join in any part of Justice Stewart’s opinion not expressly mentioned in this separate opinion.
¶ 72 With respect to the admissibility of the October 1991 evidence, considered in part II subsection B2, I agree that defendant did not “open the door” to the 1991 uncharged conduct. Therefore, it should not have been admitted.
¶73 With respect to the prosecution’s closing argument based on the prior crime evidence considered in part II subsection. C, I agree that the closing argument was improper and constituted error. I also agree that this argument constituted plain error.
¶ 74 Regarding the voir dire questioning, considered in part III, I concur in the result reached in subsection A — that the trial court should have permitted questions regarding specialized knowledge of two jurors concerning child sexual abuse, and I also agree that failing to permit the questioning was an abuse of discretion. With respect to the refusal to grant a for-cause challenge, addressed in subsection B, I dissent. I do not agree that the trial court erred in refusing *969the challenge to a prospective juror who, after full disclosure of her sexual abuse by a boyfriend some years earlier, responded that she could be fair and impartial although she might be uncomfortable. The juror was quite clear under questioning that “uncomfortable memories ... would not affect my ability to be fair and keep in remembrance he is innocent until proven guilty.” The trial court saw the juror and judged her demean- or. This court is in no position to conclude from the cold record that the juror was mistaken and could not in fact fairly judge the case.
¶ 75 Defendant is entitled to a fair jury, not a perfect one. It is the trial judge’s duty to assure that the jury is fair and this court’s duty only to reverse the trial judge for an abuse of discretion.
¶ 76 Regarding the discussion of State v. Menzies in subpart C, I concur that Menzies does apply to this case. However, because I do not agree that the failure to strike for cause the prospective juror was error, I cannot agree that it is reversible error. I also dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the cumulative error in the jury selection process was sufficient under Menzies to warrant reversal because while I agree that it was error to refuse to permit in-depth questioning about the specialized sexual abuse knowledge of the two other prospective jurors, that error is not enough alone to be prejudicial under Menzies.
¶ 77 Regarding the analysis in part IV of article I, section 10 of the Utah Constitution and the claim that the jury instruction on unanimity was plain error and a basis for reversal, I dissent.
¶ 78 The test for plain error was spelled out by this court in State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993). We held that:
to establish the existence of plain error and to obtain appellate relief from an alleged error that was not properly objected to, the appellant must show the following: (i) An error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (in) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant, or phrased differently, our confidence in the verdict is undermined.
Id. at 1208-09. To meet that test, the law on jury unanimity would need to be clear so that the trial judge can properly be charged with knowledge of it. No fair review of our case law regarding juror unanimity could result in the conclusion that the proper rules are obvious. Absent true clarity in our law, a trial judge should not be reversed because we later conclude, as Justice Stewart has, that there is some way to reconcile our various prior decisions. This is particularly true in an area where, as here, the majorities in our prior cases have been badly fractured. See State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah 1989) (holding that the obviousness of an error is hard to determine where there is no settled appellate law on point); State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 786 (Utah 1992) (relying on the “clarity of the law in this area” to find that error should have been obvious); State v. Baker, 963 P.2d 801, 805 (Utah Ct.App.1998) (refusing to find plain error where there is no settled case law in the state).
¶ 79 In conclusion, I concur in the result. I would reverse the conviction on the grounds that the evidence of the 1991 conduct should not have been admitted and that it was reversible error to permit closing argument to the jury based on that evidence. I would not reverse on the basis of any errors in the voir dire process.