Court Opinion

ID: 9713631
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:19:06.864654+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:19.687591
License: Public Domain

PEDERSON, Justice,
concurring specialty-
I concur with the conclusion that the case must be reversed and remanded but, primarily, for a reason not discussed in the opinion authored by Chief Justice Erick-stad. It is my understanding of the School District’s position that it absolutely disputes that Loney constitutes the Grass Lake Education Association, but it has little bearing, under the circumstances, on the issues in the case.
The statute, as a whole (Chapter 15-38.1, NDCC), is unrealistic in many respects but is not ambiguous in distinguishing between school board “negotiations” with one teacher individually and with more than one by a representative. We defined the word “negotiate” in Fargo Ed. Ass’n v. Paulson, 239 N.W.2d 842, 846-847 (N.D.1976). When one teacher “presents his views directly to the school board” (§ 15-38.1-08, NDCC), that can be considered negotiation. Even members of N.D.E.A. have the right to do that. However, as we said in Petition of Dengler, 246 N.W.2d 758, 764 (N.D.1976), see also, 287 N.W.2d 637 (Minn.1979), the law may even permit a person to use a number for a name but will not force its acceptance. Accordingly, the School District here may insist that Loney is not Grass Lake Education Association, but it may not deprive Loney of any substantive right which is granted by Chapter 15-38.1 to organizations of groups of teachers, including being represented by an attorney or other person. That would be invidious discrimination and an unconstitutional classification, contrary to Art. I, §§ 1, 12, 21 and 22, Constitution of North Dakota, which we have considered many times. See, e.g., Benson v. N. D. Workmen’s Comp. Bureau, 283 N.W.2d 96 (N.D.1979).
Unfortunately, in this case, constitutional questions were not briefed or argued, so the best we can do (for this case only) is to adopt a construction of the statute to avoid making the statute invalid. See State v. Duis, 17 N.D. 319, 116 N.W. 751 (1908). That should not be construed to be a deterrent to a future holding, in a case which appropriately addresses the question, that the statute is unconstitutional.
During oral argument Loney’s counsel stated that Loney is willing to “negotiate” under the name Loney. The trial court should limit the injunction in such manner as to prevent the School District from depriving Loney of substantive rights granted by Chapter 15-38.1, NDCC.