Court Opinion

ID: 9909096
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-12 16:03:53.903022+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:50:03.457988
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

                                        Docket No. 49714

 STATE OF IDAHO,                                 )
                                                 )    Filed: December 12, 2023
        Plaintiff-Respondent,                    )
                                                 )    Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
 v.                                              )
                                                 )    THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
 RYAN JAMES KURKOWSKI,                           )    OPINION AND SHALL NOT
                                                 )    BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
        Defendant-Appellant.                     )
                                                 )

       Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho,
       Kootenai County. Hon. John T. Mitchell, District Judge.

       Judgments of conviction for possession of a controlled substance and possession of
       drug paraphernalia, affirmed.

       Erik R. Lehtinen, Interim State Appellate Public Defender; Emily M. Joyce, Deputy
       Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

       Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Justin R. Porter, Deputy Attorney
       General, Boise, for respondent.
                 ________________________________________________

LORELLO, Chief Judge
       Ryan James Kurkowski appeals from his judgments of conviction for possession of a
controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. We affirm.
                                                 I.
                     FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       An officer attempted to stop Kurkowski for traffic offenses.            Kurkowski did not
immediately pull over and, instead, continued driving for approximately thirty-three seconds.
After Kurkowski pulled over, the officer approached the vehicle, made contact with Kurkowski,
and collected his driver’s license and proof of insurance. Initially, Kurkowski could not locate his
vehicle registration information. The officer suggested some locations Kurkowski could look for
the registration information, including the center console. While Kurkowski was searching for the

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registration, the officer observed a plastic straw on the passenger floorboard that was altered in a
manner which the officer believed gave it the appearance of a snort tube. The officer also observed
Kurkowski wearing a bracelet with marijuana leaves on it. When Kurkowski opened the center
console to look for his registration, the officer observed a black bag containing the silhouette shape
of what the officer believed to be a marijuana pipe. Kurkowski quickly shut the console after
opening it. The officer asked Kurkowski what was inside the console and informed him it appeared
to be a marijuana pipe. The officer then asked Kurkowski to re-open the console, but he refused.
A subsequent search of the vehicle yielded a methamphetamine pipe and a small baggie containing
methamphetamine, both located within the black bag observed by the officer.
       The State charged Kurkowski with possession of a controlled substance, I.C.
§ 37-2732(c)(1), and possession of drug paraphernalia, I.C. § 37-2734A(1). Kurkowski moved to
suppress the evidence obtained during the search, arguing that the search was unlawful. The
district court denied the motion, finding probable cause existed to search the vehicle. Kurkowski
entered into a conditional plea agreement whereby he pled guilty to both charges while reserving
the right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress. Kurkowski appeals.
                                                 II.
                                   STANDARD OF REVIEW
       The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion
to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by
substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts
as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a
suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts,
weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina,
127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d
659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999).
                                                 III.
                                            ANALYSIS
       Kurkowski argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress.
Specifically, Kurkowski contends that the search of his vehicle was unlawful because neither the
automobile nor plain view exceptions to the warrant requirement justified the search. The State

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responds that the district court correctly concluded that the search was supported by probable cause
that Kurkowski’s vehicle contained contraband or other drug-related evidence. We hold that
Kurkowski has failed to show the district court erred in concluding the officer had probable cause
to believe the vehicle contained contraband or other drug-related evidence.1
        The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches
and seizures. Warrantless searches are presumed to be unreasonable and therefore violative of the
Fourth Amendment. State v. Weaver, 127 Idaho 288, 290, 900 P.2d 196, 198 (1995). The State
may overcome this presumption by demonstrating that a warrantless search either fell within a
well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement or was otherwise reasonable under the
circumstances. Id.
        One well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement is the automobile exception.
State v. Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894, 898, 821 P.2d 949, 953 (1991). In determining whether a search
is authorized pursuant to the automobile exception, the question is whether there is probable cause
to believe that the automobile holds contraband or evidence of a crime. Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132, 155-56 (1925). Probable cause is established when the totality of the circumstances
known to the officer at the time of the search would give rise--in the mind of a reasonable
person--to a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular
place. State v. Anderson, 154 Idaho 703, 706, 302 P.3d 328, 331 (2012). Probable cause is a
flexible, common-sense standard.         A practical, nontechnical probability that incriminating
evidence is present is all that is required. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983); State v.
Johnson, 152 Idaho 56, 61, 266 P.3d 1161, 1166 (Ct. App. 2011).
        The district court concluded there was probable cause to search Kurkowski’s car pursuant
to the automobile exception. In support of this conclusion, the district court made several factual
findings regarding Kurkowski’s behavior, including that he delayed pulling over, had an altered
straw on the floor, was wearing a bracelet with indicia of marijuana, and was reluctant to look in
the center console for his registration and then quickly closed it after briefly opening it. The district
court also found the officer’s testimony was credible, including his testimony that he observed the

1
       Because we hold that probable cause existed to search the vehicle under the automobile
exception, we do not address Kurkowski’s argument regarding the plain-view exception.

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silhouette shape of a pipe when the console was open. Kurkowski argues that neither the items
observed nor his conduct during the traffic stop supported a finding of probable cause to search.
We disagree.
       Kurkowski challenges each individual fact supporting the district court’s probable cause
finding, but a determination of probable cause requires a totality of the circumstances analysis.
See Anderson, 154 Idaho at 706, 302 P.3d at 331. Moreover, proffered innocent explanations for
Kurkowski’s behavior do not foreclose a probable cause determination. See District of Columbia
v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 61 (2018) (explaining “probable cause does not require officers to rule out
a suspect’s innocent explanation for suspicious facts”). The facts found by the district court,
considered in light of the totality of the circumstances known to the officer, support the conclusion
that probable cause existed to justify the officer’s search of Kurkowski’s vehicle. See, e.g., State
v. Veneroso, 138 Idaho 925, 929-30, 71 P.3d 1072, 1076-77 (Ct. App. 2003) (holding that presence
of item recognized as paraphernalia and defendant’s behavior supported search of vehicle based
on automobile exception). Kurkowski has failed to show error in the district court’s denial of his
motion to suppress.
                                                 IV.
                                         CONCLUSION
       Kurkowski has failed to show that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress.
Accordingly, Kurkowski’s judgments of conviction for possession of a controlled substance and
possession of drug paraphernalia are affirmed.
       Judge GRATTON and Judge HUSKEY, CONCUR.

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