Court Opinion

ID: 9382588
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-28 12:08:32.426109+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:40.330051
License: Public Domain

Fourth Court of Appeals
                                         San Antonio, Texas
                                    MEMORANDUM OPINION

                                             No. 04-22-00657-CV

                        IN THE INTEREST OF J.R.V. AND J.Y.V., Children

                      From the 131st Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
                                   Trial Court No. 2021-PA-01946
                         Honorable Charles E. Montemayor, Judge Presiding

Opinion by:       Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

Sitting:          Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice
                  Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
                  Beth Watkins, Justice

Delivered and Filed: March 22, 2023

AFFIRMED; MOTION TO WITHDRAW AND SUBSTITUTE COUNSEL DENIED

           Appellant J.L.G. appeals the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights to her

children, J.R.V. and J.Y.V. 1 The challenged order includes findings, by clear and convincing

evidence, stating termination of J.L.G.’s parental rights is in the children’s best interest and

supported by three independent grounds listed in section 161.001(b)(1) of the Texas Family Code. 2

The trial court’s order also designates the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services as

the children’s permanent managing conservator. J.L.G. timely appealed the order.

1
  To protect the identity of the minor children, we refer to the parent and children by their initials. See TEX. FAM.
CODE § 109.002(d); TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8.
2
  TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(N) (constructively abandoned child); (O) (failed to comply with court ordered
services); (P) (continued to abuse a controlled substance after completion of drug treatment program).
                                                                                      04-22-00657-CV

       J.L.G.’s court-appointed appellate attorney filed an Anders brief containing a professional

evaluation of the record and concluding there are no arguable issues to raise on appeal. See Anders

v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 742–44 (1967); In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 n.10 (Tex. 2016) (per

curiam) (stating that Anders procedures protect indigent parents’ statutory right to counsel on

appeal in parental rights termination cases and apply in those cases). Counsel also filed a “Motion

to Allow Withdrawal of Attorney of Record and Substitute Counsel for Purposes of Pursuing a

Petition for Review with the Texas Supreme Court,” explaining he sent a letter to J.L.G. enclosing

copies of the brief and motion. See Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 319 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014);

In re A.L.H., No. 04-18-00153-CV, 2018 WL 3861695, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 15,

2018, no pet.) (mem. op.). The letter informed J.L.G. of her right to review the record and to file

a pro se brief. The letter also advised J.L.G. if she wanted to review the record, she must file a

motion in this court. Counsel further provided J.L.G. with a form to request access to the record.

We issued an order setting a deadline for J.L.G. to file a pro se brief. J.L.G. did not request access

to the record and did not file a pro se brief. After thoroughly reviewing the record and counsel’s

Anders brief, we conclude the brief satisfies the requirements of Anders v. California, and there

are no arguable grounds for appeal. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 742-44 (1967); P.M., 520 S.W.3d at

27. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s termination order.

       In support of his motion to withdraw, counsel asserts the appeal is frivolous, and he has

complied with the requirements for an Anders brief. He also requests the substitution of counsel,

arguing due process suggests J.L.G. should be appointed a new lawyer because he has concluded

her appeal is frivolous and will inevitably file an Anders petition for review with the Texas

Supreme Court. After reviewing the motion, we conclude the stated basis for his request to

withdraw does not rise to good cause, and his stated basis for substitution is premised on the same

basis as his request to withdraw. Under In re P.M., counsel’s belief the appeal is frivolous without

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                                                                                      04-22-00657-CV

more is not a basis for withdrawal. See P.M., 520 S.W.3d at 27–28 (explaining “counsel’s belief

that the client has no grounds to seek further review” is not basis for withdrawal); see also D.N. v.

Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 03-22-00601-CV, 2023 WL 402991, at *2 n.2 (Tex.

App.—Austin Jan. 26, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (denying counsel’s motion to substitute counsel,

which was “just a reformulation of his basis for withdrawal,” in Anders parental termination).

Counsel’s duty to his client extends through the exhaustion or waiver of all appeals, including the

filing of a petition for review in the Texas Supreme Court. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 107.016(2);

P.M., 520 S.W.3d at 26-28.       We therefore deny counsel’s motion.         See TEX. FAM. CODE

§ 107.016(2); P.M., 520 S.W.3d at 26-28.

                                                  Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

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