Court Opinion

ID: 9842916
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 02:21:39.266407+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:19.617278
License: Public Domain

CRAVEN, Circuit Judge
(dissenting):
My brothers hold that the sixth amendment compels the dismissal of the only prosecution ever begun against Dr. MacDonald. One need know very little about military law to understand that a charge of homicide can be disposed of finally only by court-martial. None was ever convened. Instead, the Army, pursuant to Article 32, Uniform Code of Military Justice,1 simply conducted a “thorough and impartial investigation” to determine whether the charge might be referred to a general court-martial, and concluded that the evidence was insufficient to justify the convening of a general court. It is true that the hearing was protracted and made newspaper headlines. But it is also true, it seems to me (my brothers do not reach the question), that Captain MacDonald has never been put to trial by either a civil or military court. What happened to him in the Army is the substantial equivalent of an open grand jury proceeding resulting in the failure to return a true bill, and that is all.2
My brothers hold that the sixth amendment’s guarantee of the right to a speedy trial as interpreted by the Supreme Court *210in Marion,3 Barker,4 and Dillingham,5 is triggered by the Army proceedings. I think not and respectfully dissent.
I.
In Marion the Supreme Court defined the point at which the sixth amendment becomes applicable:
On its face, the protection of the Amendment is activated only when a criminal prosecution has begun and extends only to those persons who have been “accused” in the course of that prosecution. These provisions would seem to afford no protection to those not yet accused, nor would they seem to require the Government to discover, investigate, and accuse any person within any particular period of time.
404 U.S. at 313, 92 S.Ct. at 459 (emphasis added).
It is now settled that a civilian becomes an “accused” when he is arrested and charged with a crime. This is so, the Supreme Court tells us, because:
To legally arrest and detain, the Government must assert probable cause to believe the arrestee has committed a crime. Arrest is a public act that may seriously interfere with the defendant’s liberty, whether he is free on bail or not, and that may disrupt his employment, drain his associations, subject him to public obloquy, and create anxiety in him, his family and his friends.
Marion, supra at 320, 92 S.Ct. at 463. See Dillingham v. United States, 403 U.S. 64, 96 S.Ct. 303, 46 L.Ed.2d 205 (1975) (quoting Marion).
Thus, “it is either a formal indictment or information or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge that engage the particular protections of the speedy trial provision of the Sixth Amendment.” Dillingham, supra; Marion, supra.
It is significant to me that the Court equates “either a formal indictment . . . or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest ... to answer a criminal charge . . . .” It does not suggest that the amendment is triggered when the prosecutor presents the bill to the grand jury. Instead, the period of time for measuring the speed of the trial runs from the return of a true bill into the court. Charge is not enough. At most, Dr. MacDonald was “charged.” Also, under the specific language of Marion, I do not believe the sixth amendment’s speedy trial guarantee would be brought into play by an arrest without warrant by a federal drug enforcement officer, for example, if, upon presentation to a magistrate, the arrestee were released because no probable cause was shown. I do not believe my brothers would contend otherwise.6
My analysis of the facts of this case is that the procedure in which MacDonald was involved falls somewhere between an unsuccessful presentation to a grand jury and an arrest and subsequent release because of a failure to demonstrate probable cause for the arrest. Neither, I believe, warrants an application of the sixth amendment’s speedy trial guarantee.7
MacDonald was charged with the murder of his wife and children by Colonel Francis Kane, his immediate commander. These charges were preferred under Article 30, *211U.C.M.J.8 That article makes clear that a finding of “probable cause” is not required to “charge” an individual under the Code.9 Indeed, anyone subject to the U.C.M.J. can prefer charges against anyone else who is also under the Code.10 A determination of probable cause, or its “functional equivalent,” is only made under military procedure at the Article 32 proceedings.11
In MacDonald’s ease, at the close of the Article 32 proceedings Major General Edward M. Flanagan, Jr., acting on the report of Colonel Warren V. Kock, who presided at those proceedings, dismissed the charges because “[i]n [his] opinion, there [was] insufficient evidence available to justify reference of the charges to trial by court-martial.”
It is therefore clear that no finding of probable cause was made in Dr. MacDonald’s case at the Article 32 proceedings. My brothers are of the view, however, that we should presume such a finding was made because it should have been made prior to “arrest” under 10 U.S.C. § 810.
Whether a finding of probable cause was made is a question of fact. If there were such a finding I should think it would be supported by the record, but the majority makes no reference to any orders, either written or oral, to indicate that a finding of probable cause was made. We are not told when the finding was made, who made it, or what procedures he followed in doing so. Instead, as I have said, a presumption is created.
First, my brothers reason that since MacDonald was relieved of his duties, his status must be that of “arrest” rather than “restriction to quarters in lieu of arrest.” Secondly, they correctly note that under 10 U.S.C. § 810 MacDonald was subject to arrest or confinement when charged with the murders by Colonel Kane on May 1. And finally, they infer that since 10 U.S.C. § 809 purports to require that all arrests be supported by probable cause that probable cause must have been found in MacDonald’s case.
I do not believe it is necessarily the case that because MacDonald was relieved of his duties, he was arrested. I read Paragraphs 20a and b of the Manual for Courts-Martial only to say that an officer under “arrest” may not be required to perform his duties and that an officer restricted to quarters in lieu of arrest may be required to do so. These two provisions do not forbid the Army from relieving one restricted to his quarters of any or all of his duties. That MacDonald was relieved of all duties is not, I believe, conclusive as to this status.
I agree with my brothers, as I have previously said, that MacDonald was subject to arrest or confinement under 10 U.S.C. § 810 when charged with homicide. But I cannot agree that the power to do a thing requires a finding that it was done. Whatever the logic of such a presumption, I believe Paragraph 18b of the Manual of Courts-Martial destroys it for that paragraph explicitly states that the arrest and confinement pro*212visions, although couched in terms of requirements, are “not mandatory and [their] exercise rests within the discretion of the person vested with the power to arrest or confine.”12
I think the Manual of Courts-Martial will take us just so far and that we are driven back to the facts, and the facts are that Dr. MacDonald was verbally restricted to quarters by Colonel Kane on April 6, 1970, and there is nothing whatsoever in the record to suggest any change in his status when he was formally charged on May 1. If MacDonald was ever arrested it must have been on April 6 when he was first restricted to quarters and his duties lifted, and on that date I do not believe that anyone suggests the existence of probable cause for arrest, let alone a specific finding to that effect.13
My brothers and I agree, I think, that arrest without more is not enough to trigger the sixth amendment. There must be a lawful arrest, i. e., with probable cause. It is fair to say, I think, that there is not one word in the record to even suggest that anyone, much less the equivalent of an impartial magistrate, ever purported to find probable cause to arrest Dr. MacDonald. I believe we can be fairly sure that this is the first instance in the long history of the doctrine of probable cause in which a court has assumed that there must have been such a finding because it should have been made.
Finally, I cannot agree with my brothers that Colonel Kane’s charge was the functional equivalent of a civilian arrest warrant. I am not sure to what it should be equated, but it is equally plausible to view it as the functional equivalent of the complaint of the prosecutor who then must seek an arrest warrant from an impartial magistrate.
Based on the above analysis I believe it is clear that a finding of probable cause was never made in Dr. MacDonald’s case. Unless we ignore as surplusage the Supreme Court’s language in Marion, which it repeated in Dillingham, that to “arrest and detain, the Government must assert probable cause to believe the arrestee has committed a crime,” I do not understand how this case can be fitted within the rule of law established by those cases. Furthermore, I do not believe that the policy underpinnings of Marion allow us to ignore the significance of a finding of probable cause. The Supreme Court concentrated on the impact of the public act of arrest on the defendant. I believe that fundamental to that impact is the fact that, in the civilian arrest context with which Marion was concerned, an arrest must be supported by probable cause. With reference to public obloquy, contrast instead, what happened to Dr. MacDonald: after the equivalent of the return of “not a true bill,” he was honorably discharged. I, therefore, think that Dr. MacDonald’s case is clearly distinguishable from any of the cases cited by the majority.
My brothers find this case to closely parallel Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 87 S.Ct. 988, 18 L.Ed.2d 1 (1967), differing from it in only one respect; “there an indictment remained potentially effective during the period of delay; here, MacDonald was not indicted until the end of the period.”14 I agree that that is the major difference between the cases, but I find the distinction to constitute the centerpiece of the Supreme Court’s holding in that case *213that Klopfer’s sixth amendment rights had been violated.
The pendency of the indictment may subject him to public scorn and deprive him of employment, and almost certainly will force curtailment of his speech, associations and participation in unpopular causes. By indefinitely prolonging this oppression, as well as the “anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation,” the criminal procedure condoned in this ease by the Supreme Court of North Carolina clearly denied the petitioner the right to a speedy trial which we hold is guaranteed to him by the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.
386 U.S. at 222, 87 S.Ct. at 993 (footnote omitted and emphasis added).
During this four-year period MacDonald stood under no “public accusation.” The charges had been dismissed by the Army, and this action was made irrevocable by his discharge from the Army. I find this claim therefore to be one of double jeopardy, which I do not believe is meritorious, and which issue my brothers do not reach.
II.
Under my brothers’ reasoning, we must determine that military arrest is the functional equivalent of civilian arrest for the purposes of triggering the right to a speedy trial. I conclude that MacDonald was never “arrested” in the sense required under Marion.
MacDonald was restricted to his room in the Bachelor Officers’ Quarters.15 An armed MP was placed outside his door. An escort officer accompanied him when he left the quarters.16 While Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564, 5 S.Ct. 1050, 29 L.Ed. 277 (1885) is, as my brothers say, no longer the law as to the degree of “confinement” necessary to support issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, I believe it is fully applicable to the majority’s search for the functional equivalent of a civilian arrest. In that respect, I believe it is still sound precedent and demands a conclusion that MacDonald was not in a civilian sense under the “actual restraints required by arrest and holding to answer to a criminal charge.”
In Wales a Navy officer who had been ordered to appear for trial at general court-martial was given the following order by the Secretary of the Navy: “You are hereby placed under arrest, and you will confine yourself to the limits of the City of Washington.” 114 U.S. at 566, 5 S.Ct. at 1051. While the majority may be correct that the cases differ with respect to “the greater limitations placed on [MacDonald's] liberty,” 17 I believe, like those in Wales, the restraints imposed on MacDonald did not constitute “actual confinement or the present means of enforcing it.” 114 U.S. at 572, 5 S.Ct. at 1053. The restraints were, under the Supreme Court’s terminology, simply “moral.” As I read Wales, the critical point was not that the petitioner in that case was free to walk the streets of Washington, D. C., alone. The Supreme Court focused on the fact that if he had wished to leave the District, he was free to do so, “[a]nd though it is said that a file of marines or some proper officer could have been sent to arrest, and bring him back, this *214could only be done by another order of the secretary, and would be another arrest, and a real imprisonment under another distinct order.” 114 U.S. at 572, 5 S.Ct. at 1054.
Neither side has provided this court with the orders directed to MacDonald or others concerning his restriction to quarters. At oral argument, however, we were told by the government attorney arguing the case that the MP stationed outside MacDonald’s door was given specific instructions NOT to stop him if he tried to leave. The escort officer who accompanied MacDonald, according to my understanding of the facts, was not armed. I find nothing in the record to indicate that his orders included a direction to stop MacDonald from any conduct he undertook. I therefore find the present case indistinguishable from Wales. Any actual confinement would have required an additional order, and there was therefore no “actual confinement or the present means of enforcing it.” Wales, supra at 572, 5 S.Ct. at 1053.
III.
Having concluded that the sixth amendment’s guarantee of speedy trial does not apply in MacDonald’s case, he may still prevail if it were found that the delay violated his right to due process under the fifth amendment. See, e. g., Marion, supra, 404 U.S. at 324, 92 S.Ct. 455; Ross v. United States, 121 U.S.App.D.C. 233, 349 F.2d 210 (1965). But to grant relief under the fifth amendment requires a showing of substantial prejudice, and I find none. Id.
The majority finds prejudice in the fact that MacDonald’s witnesses, as Army personnel, have scattered around the world with resulting difficulty in locating them and conducting pretrial interviews. In addition, my brothers agree with MacDonald’s argument that the memories of these witnesses will be dulled by time. But all that is speculative. In a wholly circumstantial type of case, it is improbable that guilt or innocence will turn upon accurate recollection of the facts. It is not suggested that any defense witness who knows the truth now cannot be produced, or if found, cannot now remember what he once knew.
But if it be assumed that these factors may supply the requisite prejudice under the sixth amendment’s more specific guarantees, I do not believe they require dismissal of the indictment under the fifth amendment’s guarantee of due process. Certainly that question need not be anticipated, and could best be left for determination at trial.
I would affirm.

. 10 U.S.C. § 832.

. My brothers premise their analysis on an application of a civilian court of the sixth amendment speedy trial guarantee to events which occurred while MacDonald was in the military.
That the sixth amendment’s speedy trial guarantee applies to the military is an appealing assumption but should be recognized as such. The criminal trial provisions of both the fifth and sixth amendments are clearly aimed at procedure in the civil courts. The fifth expressly excludes cases arising in the land or naval forces from prosecutions requiring grand jury indictment, and it is settled that neither the fifth nor sixth amendments can “be taken to have extended the right to demand a jury to trials by military commission . . .” Ex Parte Quinn, 317 U.S. 1, 40, 63 S.Ct. 1, 17, 87 L.Ed. 3 (1942). It is true that the Supreme Court once assumed the application of the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment in a military context, but in doing so it is significant that it denied relief. Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 69 S.Ct. 834, 93 L.Ed. 974 (1949). I think my brothers’ decision would rest on firmer ground if it were pitched on the fundamental fairness doctrine implicit in the due process clause, which has been applied time and again to an infinite variety of matters not restricted to criminal procedure in the civilian courts, as is, I think, the sixth amendment right to speedy trial. See generally, O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 272-73, 89 S.Ct. 1683, 23 L.Ed.2d 291 (1969); Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470, 474, 76 S.Ct. 886, 100 L.Ed. 1342 (1956); Duncan v. Kahanamoka, 327 U.S. 304, 309, 66 S.Ct. 606, 90 L.Ed. 688 (1946); Burns v. Lovett, 91 U.S. App.D.C. 208, 202 F.2d 335, 341-42 (1952), aff'd sub nom., Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 73 S.Ct. 1045, 97 L.Ed. 1508 (1953).

. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971).

. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972).

. Dillingham v. United States, 403 U.S. 64, 96 S.Ct. 303, 46 L.Ed.2d 205, 44 U.S.L.W. 3327 (U.S., Dec. 1, 1975).

. I note that Dillingham was arrested on a warrant. United States v. Palmer, 502 F.2d 1233, 1234 (5th Cir. 1974), rev’d sub nom. Dillingham v. United States, 403 U.S. 64, 96 S.Ct. 303, 46 L.Ed.2d 205, 44 U.S.L.W. 3327 (1975).

. This case differs from both my examples in that during these proceedings MacDonald was neither as free from restraints as a person under grand jury investigation nor as restricted as someone under civilian arrest. See part II, infra.

. 10 U.S.C. § 830.

. Article 30 reads as follows:
(a) Charges and specifications shall be signed by a person subject to this chapter under oath before a commissioned officer of the armed forces authorized to administer oaths and shall state—
(1) that the signer has personal knowledge of, or has investigated, the matters set forth therein; and
(2) that they are true in fact to the best of his knowledge and belief.
(b) Upon the preferring of charges, the proper authority shall take immediate steps to determine what disposition should be made thereof in the interest of justice and discipline, and the person accused shall be informed of the charges against him as soon as practicable.

. U 29b, Manual for Courts-Martial (U.S. 1969 rev. ed.).

. Article 32, 10 U.S.C. § 832 reads in relevant part:
(a) No charge or specification may be referred to a general court-martial for trial until a thorough and impartial investigation of all the matters set forth therein has been made. This investigation shall include inquiry as to the truth of the matter set forth in the charges, consideration of the form of charges, and a recommendation as to the disposition which should be made of the case in the interest of justice and discipline.

. b. Basic considerations. (1) Any person subject to the code accused of an offense under the code shall be ordered into arrest or confinement, as circumstances may require; but when accused only of an offense normally tried by a summary court-martial, he shall not ordinarily be placed in confinement (Art. 10). The foregoing provision is not mandatory and its exercise rests within the discretion of the person vested with the power to arrest or confine. No restraint need be imposed in cases involving minor offenses. A failure to restrain does not affect the jurisdiction of the court.

. All the majority tells us about that event is that on April 6 the CID informed MacDonald that “he was under suspicion.” At 200. I find nothing in their treatment of this encounter nor anything in the record to indicate that on that day probable cause was found.

. At 205.

. The majority opinion attaches significance to the fact that had MacDonald been an enlisted man he would have probably been confined in the stockade. At 203. The fact is that he was an officer and was not so confined.

. The government describes MacDonald’s restrictions as follows:
He was to remain in his room except when he was visiting his lawyers, dining at the officers club, or making parachute jumps for pay qualification purposes. The general, though unenforced, limitation on Captain MacDonald’s movement was the requirement that he be accompanied by an escort officer while on post. He was permitted to sun bathe in the vicinity of the BOQ, to play golf on post, to attend the post chapel as well as the post theatre, post liquor (Class VI) store, commissary, post exchange and the bowling alley.
Brief for Appellee at 5-6.
In the context of the military where a person is subject normally to the orders of his superiors, I do not find this the type of serious “interfere[nce] with his liberty” which I believe brings the right to speedy trial into play.

. At 203-204.