Court Opinion

ID: 9550606
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:38:12.820784+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:21:58.366331
License: Public Domain

KEETON, Chief Justice.
This proceeding is here to review an order of the Industrial Accident Board allowing claimant (respondent) unemployment compensation under the Employment Security Law, Sec. 72-1301 et seq., I.C. The proceeding was initiated before the Employment Security Agency, which denied the claim. Claimant appealed to the Appeals Examiner, who, after a hearing, affirmed the decision of the Employment Security Agency. On appeal to the Industrial Accident Board, it reversed the determination made by the Appeals Examiner.
The material facts are not in dispute. Claimant had been employed by S. H. Kress & Company from August, 1954, until she was discharged December 26, 1955. In 1955 Christmas fell on Sunday. December 26th was by gubernatorial proc*546lamation designated a holiday. In her claim for unemployment benefits claimant stated: “I was discharged for refusing to work on Monday, December 26, 1955, a legal holiday”.
On December 21st or 22nd the store manager. Mr Osborne, called a meeting of the employees at which claimant was present, and stated in substance that all employees would be required to work on December 26th, the day after Christmas. This was in accordance with the policy of the company extending over a period of at least fifteen years. Employees over a period of years had worked on that day and claimant had worked on Sunday, December 26, 1954. All employees reported for work as requested except those who were excused by Mr. Osborne and claimant who was not excused. Employees working that day were paid double time, and additionally, an hour extra.
The necessity for working the Monday in question was explained to the employees at the meeting, that is, that the inventory had to be in by December 31st, shelves had to be cleared, and seasonal stock put away.
Claimant did not approach Mr. Osborne, manager, and ask to be excused from work, or indicate to him that she would not be present and work. Following the meeting above referred to, claimant testified:
“Q. Following this meeting did you discuss this matter with the floor lady? A. Yes, I told Mrs. Waddell I wasn’t going to be there.
“Q. Was she your supervisor? A. iTes.”
She also testified:
“I told several of the girls that I wasn’t going to show up and they said Well, you’Jl get fired anyway,’ I told them that I guessed if I could I would just have to draw my unemployment compensation until I could find something else.”
One excuse given by claimant for not working December 26th was that she had invited her grandmother to dinner and had to stay home and cook dinner for her. Mr. Osborne testified, and the testimony is affirmed by claimant:
“Q. Did the claimant report to work after that time? [December 26, 1955] A. She called me at the store and I learned she’d gone by my home. * * * So she phoned me at the store asking if she was to report for work the next day. I advised her that she wasn’t * * * I told her that we weren’t going to need her any longer.
“Q. You told her briefly why? A. I asked her why she hadn’t reported for work that day and she said she didn’t believe in working on holidays.
* * * * * *
“A. * * * she said that nobody else worked that day. And I named off a few of the stores around town that *547were working and she said ‘Well, Mrs. Johns didn’t work.’ I said, ‘Yes, but Mrs. Johns doesn’t have a job any longer.’ ”
The Board defined the issue as follows: “Whether refusing to work on a legal holiday constitutes misconduct on the part of the employee” and ruled:
“When a contract of hiring does not expressly require work on a legal holiday, the refusal of an employee to work on such a holiday is not ‘misconduct in connection with his employment,’ within the meaning of that term as used in Section 72-1366(f), Idaho Code Supplement.”
No authority to sustain this conclusion made by the Board is cited.
In enacting the Employment Security Law, Sec. 72-1301 et seq., I.C., the public policy and reason for its enactment is set forth in Sec. 72-1302, I.C. which requires the compulsory setting aside of unemployment reserves to be used for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own.
Sec. 72-1366, I.C. as last amended, 1955 S.L. Ch. 18, Sec. 9, page 33, enumerates numerous personal eligibility conditions for unemployment benefits, and subdivision (f) provides:
“His unemployment is not due to the fact that he left his employment voluntarily without good cause, or that he was discharged for misconduct in connection with his employment * * * ”
It thusly appears that one discharged for misconduct in connection with his employment is not entitled to the benefits of the Act.
The Act is social legislation, designed to alleviate economic insecurity and to relieve hardships resulting from involuntary unemployment; to encourage employers to provide more stable employment. The Act does not cover those who are unemployed resulting from their own fault. The Act was clearly intended to provide benefits for those unemployed under prescribed conditions who are able and willing to work, but unable to secure suitable employment on the labor market.
Where one has suitable employment and refuses to work under reasonable regulations and conditions, and pursuant to reasonable directives of management, such person is not within the terms of the Act, allowing benefits.
A directive of the management to work the day after Christmas, which fell on a Monday, even though it was by gubernatorial proclamation declared a holiday was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable, and was in accord with the proof and with well-recognized business practice in the community. The necessity for working on that *548day was shown to exist and was pursuant to a long-established policy with which the claimant was familiar. Her excuse for not appearing for work, that she did not believe in working on holidays, or that she wanted to stay home and cook dinner for her grandmother, was in effect a positive, arbitrary refusal to comply with the terms of the contract of employment.
While the term “discharged for misconduct” as used in Sec. 72-1366(f), I.C. has been variously defined, we think the term should be interpreted as meaning wilful, intentional disregard of the employer’s interest; a deliberate violation of the employer’s rules; or a disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has a right to expect of his employees.
The discharge of an employee for intentional, wilful misconduct deprives him of the right to unemployment compensation.
In the situation before us, claimant was advised by her fellow employees that if she refused to work she would be discharged, and she stated in substance that at any rate she would be entitled to unemployment benefits.
Upholding such a claim as is here made would not serve the purpose for which the Fund is created.
The order of the Industrial Accident Board is reversed with instructions to affirm the determination made by the Appeals Examiner.
TAYLOR and SMITH, JJ., concur.