Court Opinion

ID: 9646321
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 12:57:01.897197+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:37.267603
License: Public Domain

*271Dissenting Opinion by
Me. Chief Justice Bell:
I very strongly dissent.
The minor plaintiff was semi-paralyzed as the result of diving in defendant’s swimming pool. Anyone who is badly hurt deserves our sympathies, but that is not and should not be sufficient to justify a verdict which is contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence or the law, or both. In this case it was contrary to both, and in the interest of Justice it is imperative that a new trial be granted.
The trial Judge correctly summarized the pertinent facts: “He was athletically inclined and wrestled during his sophomore year. He swam in defendant’s pool during the summers of 1959, 1960, 1961, 1962 and 1963, until the date of the accident [on July 30, 1963]. During the summers of 1961, 1962 and 1963 Darrel used both the one-meter diving board and the diving tower which was 11 feet high. Darrel used the pool at least 20 times* per summer and for the past two or three summers used the diving hoard approximately 8 or 10 times per day. He performed various dives, including a ‘running front dive,’ a ‘cannon ball’ and ‘can opener’ which he described as more of a splash than a dive, a ‘sloppy swan’ and a ‘kamikaze’ in which the diver enters the water head first with arms outstretched in a horizontal manner in imitation of the wings of a descending airplane.”
The Borough of Nazareth employed at least four lifeguards, able, ready and eager at all times to speed to those who faltered or weakened in the water, or had any reason at all to need assistance.
It is crystal clear (a) that plaintiff, an exceptionally experienced diver, undoubtedly should have been and actually was aware of the risks, if any, that he and every other diver took in this pool with which he was *272so familiar, and (b) that he voluntarily assumed the risk of injury from diving off this board which he had done a myriad times before in this very pool. Podvin v. Somerton Springs Swim Club, 406 Pa. 384, 178 A. 2d 615; Schentzel v. Philadelphia, National League Club, 173 Pa. Superior Ct. 179, 96 A. 2d 181; Amon v. Shemaha, 419 Pa. 314, 214 A. 2d 238; Rauch v. Pa. Sports and Enterprises, Inc., 367 Pa. 632, 81 A. 2d 548.
The evidence most strongly relied upon by the appellees was the opinion evidence of two “swimming pool experts” as to the proper construction of this and every other swimming pool. Their testimony is so contrary to the actual facts in the instant case—5,000 dives without any injury in this pool for the entire twenty-eight years of its existence—as well as to the common knowledge of every layman who ever swam in private or public pools, as to be entitled to little or no weight. The law is well settled that an opinion of an expert is entitled to little weight as against actual facts: Girsh Trust, 410 Pa. 455, 189 A. 2d 852; Sommerville Will, 406 Pa. 207, 177 A. 2d 496; Kadilak Will, 405 Pa. 238, 174 A. 2d 870. Cf. also Richette v. Pennsylvania R.R., 410 Pa. 6, 187 A. 2d 910; Commonwealth v. Ahearn, 421 Pa. 311, 323, 218 A. 2d 561; Commonwealth v. Woodhouse, 401 Pa. 242, 164 A. 2d 98.
In Girsh Trust, 410 Pa., supra, the Court aptly said (page 471) : “. . . ‘opinion evidence is generally considered of a low grade, and not entitled to much weight against positive testimony of actual facts! . . .”
Moreover, five witnesses testified to statements made by plaintiff which were inconsistent with his testimony at the trial. What we said in Bohner v. Eastern Express, Inc., 405 Pa. 463, 471, 175 A. 2d 864, is pertinent, relevant and controlling: “With respect to a new trial, ‘[w]here a trial Judge or Court sees and hears the witnesses, it has not only an inherent *273fundamental and salutary power, but it is its duty, to grant a new trial when it believes the verdict was capricious or was against the weight of the evidence and resulted in a miscarriage of justice [citing numerous recent cases] . . .
“ Moreover, in such circumstances, namely, where the jury’s verdict is capricious or against the weight of the evidence or results in a miscarriage of justice, it should not be allowed to stand, no matter how many new trials must be granted in the interest of justice: Elia v. Olszewski, 368 Pa., supra, and Maloy v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 Pa., supra’: Clewell v. Pummer, 388 Pa. 592, 598, 599, 131 A. 2d 375. See to the same effect: Sherman v. Manufacturers Light and Heat Company, 389 Pa. 61, 68, 132 A. 2d 255; Greco v. 7-Up Bottling Company, 401 Pa. 434, 165 A. 2d 5; Hartigan v. Clark, 389 Pa. 283, 288, 289, 133 A. 2d 181; Lupi v. Keenan, 396 Pa. 6, 8, 151 A. 2d 447; Coward v. Ruckert, 381 Pa. 388, 393, 113 A. 2d 287; Frank v. Losier & Co., Inc., 361 Pa. 272, 276, 64 A. 2d 829.”
This was reaffirmed in Frisina v. Stanley, 409 Pa. 5, 7, 185 A. 2d 580.
For these reasons, I very strongly dissent and would grant a new trial, and, if Justice requires, additional new trials until a jury renders a verdict in accordance with Justice.

 Italics throughout, ours.