Court Opinion

ID: 9412085
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-28 20:03:58.183714+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:31.280596
License: Public Domain

Filed 7/28/23 Laysion v. Macias CA2/3
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION THREE

LAYSION, LLC,                                                  B319551

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                             Los Angeles County
                                                               Super. Ct. No.
         v.                                                    21CHCV00339

GUILLERMO MACIAS et al.,

         Defendants and Appellants.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Stephen P. Pfahler, Judge. Affirmed.

     Fisher, Klein & Wolfe and David R. Fisher for Defendants
and Appellants.

         Michael W. Atkin for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                     _________________________
      Defendants Guillermo Macias and Colt International
Clothing Inc. dba Colt LED (Colt) appeal an order denying
their motion to enjoin plaintiff Laysion, LLC (Laysion) from
retaining an email communication they contend is protected by
the attorney-client privilege. Based on a declaration offered by
Laysion’s managing member, Yajun Zhang, the trial court found
Macias intentionally forwarded and disclosed the communication
to Zhang and Laysion, thereby voluntarily waiving the privilege.
Substantial evidence supports the court’s finding. We affirm.
            FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1.    Complaint
      Laysion sued defendants for breach of contract, fraud,
and other claims stemming from defendants’ alleged agreement
to purchase stage lighting equipment from Laysion. Under
the alleged agreement, defendants were to make the following
installment payments after taking delivery of the equipment:
(a) $800,000 to be paid by a series of post-dated checks; and
(b) $200,000 to be paid by bank-to-bank wire transfers. The
complaint alleges defendants made the required wire transfers
and delivered to Laysion seven post-dated checks totaling
$800,000. However, when Laysion presented the checks to
defendants’ bank on the specified dates, the bank rejected
the checks due to insufficient funds.
2.    Defendants’ Motion for Injunction
      After a partially successful demurrer to the first amended
complaint, defendants moved for an injunction to compel Laysion
to return all copies of an email communication sent from their
attorney Bradley Brunon to Colt’s president, Macias. As part of
their motion, defendants also requested an order disqualifying
Laysion’s counsel from the litigation. They argued the Brunon

                               2
email had been inadvertently forwarded to Laysion, and Laysion
had improperly used the email in the pending litigation despite
defendants’ efforts to claw it back.
       Macias offered a supporting declaration. He said Brunon
had been defendants’ attorney for about 20 years and he had
always “intended to keep [his] communications with Mr. Brunon
confidential and protected by the attorney-client privilege.”
He had received the email from Brunon in connection with
consulting the attorney about acquiring lighting equipment
from Laysion. A redacted copy of the email attached as an
exhibit to Macias’s declaration showed it had been sent from
the email address “brunonlaw@verizon.net” and included a
signature block for the “Law Office of Bradley Wm. Brunon.”
Macias acknowledged the email “came to be forwarded to Zhang’s
email address,” but he maintained he had “no recollection of
forwarding any emails from Mr. Brunon to Zhang.” If he “did
in fact forward the email to Zhang,” Macias declared, “it would
have been unintentional and inadvertent.”
       Defendants’ litigation counsel, David Fisher, offered a
declaration describing his efforts to claw back the Brunon email.
Fisher said Laysion had attached the email as an exhibit to its
first amended complaint and then “relied” on the email in its
opposition to defendants’ demurrer. Three days after Laysion
filed its opposition, Fisher emailed plaintiff’s counsel to notify
him of the email’s privileged nature and to request return of “all
materials in his possession that might be considered attorney-
client communications.” According to Fisher, Laysion’s counsel
refused to return the Brunon email, stating only that Laysion
“disagreed” with defendants’ “analysis.”

                                3
3.    Laysion’s Opposition
      Laysion opposed the motion, arguing defendants
voluntarily waived the privilege when Macias forwarded
the email to Zhang.
      Zhang offered a supporting declaration. According to
Zhang, in “late 2018 [to] early 2019,” Macias special ordered
500 units of lighting equipment, at a price of $2,000 per unit,
and “verbally promised to pay cash in full against invoice
upon delivery.” Laysion completed the order and shipped
the equipment from its factory in China on March 30, 2019,
with a scheduled arrival date in the Port of Los Angeles on
April 29, 2019.
      On April 23, 2019, Macias informed Zhang that he could
not pay upon delivery and asked Zhang for “terms that included
two installment payments.” At Macias’s request, Zhang provided
an invoice for 200 units of the equipment for the first installment
payment. Macias told Zhang the invoice “had to be submitted to
Bradley Brunon for his approval” and he “did not have authority
to make such a payment without Bradley Brunon’s approval.”
      On April 26, 2019, Zhang and Macias had a face-to-face
meeting at Macias’s office to discuss payment terms. According
to Zhang, Macias said he could not make the invoiced installment
payment, but he had “recently discussed the timing of payment
with Bradley Brunon and Mr. Brunon had approved a different
payment schedule” consisting of two $500,000 installments
on May 19, 2019 and June 19, 2019. Zhang said Macias then
“forwarded Mr. Brunon’s email . . . to me.” Macias told Zhang
his “purpose in forwarding Mr. Brunon’s email was to confirm
that Mr. Brunon was aware of the obligation to pay for the
Equipment, and to confirm when payment would be made.”

                                 4
Macias reiterated that “Mr. Brunon’s authorization was required
to pay for the Equipment.”
       Zhang received the forwarded email within a minute and
began reading it on his mobile phone. Macias waited for Zhang
to finish reading, then urged Zhang to accept the new payment
schedule. According to Zhang, following some discussion, he
“reluctantly agreed, and verbally stated [his] acceptance to
Mr. Macias as [they] sat in [Macias’s] office.” Zhang said the
Brunon email was the “only . . . written evidence of [Laysion’s]
agreement with Mr. Macias regarding payment,” and he had
“received no other written confirmation of the payment schedule”
that the parties had agreed to during the meeting.
       Laysion’s counsel, Michael Atkin, offered a declaration
responding to defense counsel’s account of the privilege dispute.
Atkin declared that, by examining the “format” of the email
correspondence he received from his client, he had “reasonably
ascertained that the Brunon Email was not inadvertently
provided to plaintiff, but rather forwarded by Defendant Macias
in the course of business negotiations with plaintiff.” He said he
had spoken with defense counsel at least three times regarding
“the privilege issue,” but their discussions regarding privilege
and waiver were “inconclusive.”
4.     Defendants’ Reply
       In reply, defendants asserted Zhang’s declaration was false.
They maintained it was “utterly irrational” that Macias would
have “forward[ed] his counsel’s [e]mail as a foundational basis
for [an] offer” and it was completely implausible that Zhang
would have accepted the offer without confirming the agreement
by email or “other form of correspondence.” The absence of “such
follow-up or confirming email,” defendants argued, was itself

                                5
“evidence that the communications between Macias and Zhang
did not take place as [Zhang] asserted.”
      In a second supporting declaration, Macias denied that he
had ordered the “large quantities” of lighting equipment stated
in Zhang’s declaration. He also denied that he had asked to
make installment payments or that he had requested an invoice
for 200 units. He said he never advised Zhang that he lacked
authority to make payments without Brunon’s approval,
reiterating that Brunon had been his and Colt’s attorney for
20 years. He declared Brunon was “not an owner in Colt in
any manner,” nor did Brunon have “control over the finances,
management, or overall decision making of Colt.”
      Macias did not deny meeting with Zhang at his office on
April 26, 2019, but he maintained he would have had “no reason”
to make any of the statements attributed to him in Zhang’s
declaration. He likewise said he “would have no reason to have
forwarded the [Brunon email] to Zhang.” Because he “had
the ability to confirm or reject a transaction on behalf of Colt,”
Macias said Zhang’s assertion that he forwarded the email
to confirm Brunon was aware of the obligation to pay for
the equipment was “false.”
5.    The Trial Court’s Ruling
      The trial court denied defendants’ motion, concluding
Macias voluntarily waived the attorney-client privilege by
intentionally forwarding the Brunon email to Zhang. Without
examining the contents of the email, the court found “the Zhang
declaration specific and credible for purposes of establishing
waiver . . . when weighed against the Macias declarations.”1

1     Defendants objected to peripheral portions of the Zhang
declaration—e.g., regarding shipping/arrival dates and the

                                6
      Regarding disqualification, the trial court observed
disqualification is “ ‘ “proper as a prophylactic measure to prevent
future prejudice to the [privilege holder] from information
the attorney should not have possessed.” ’ ” Because Macias
made an “intentional waiver” and there was no “actual impact”
from Laysion’s failure to notify defendants of what amounted to
a voluntary disclosure, the court concluded there was no basis
to disqualify Laysion’s counsel or to impose an injunction.
                            DISCUSSION
1.    Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court’s
      Waiver Finding
      “The attorney-client privilege is a legislative enactment,
which courts have no power to expand or limit by creating
exceptions.” (McDermott Will & Emery LLP v. Superior Court
(2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1083, 1100 (McDermott), citing Costco
Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court (2009) 47 Cal.4th 725, 739
(Costco).) Subject to certain statutory exceptions, “the client,
whether or not a party, has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and
to prevent another from disclosing, a confidential communication
between client and lawyer.” (Evid. Code, § 954.)2

rejection of postdated checks by defendants’ bank—on lack of
foundation and lack of personal knowledge grounds. However,
defendants did not object to Zhang’s account of the critical
April 26, 2019 meeting where Macias forwarded the Brunon
email to Zhang. Accordingly, we need not entertain defendants’
argument that the trial court abused its discretion by rejecting
their evidentiary objections. Even if the objections should have
been sustained, it is not reasonably probable that defendants
would have achieved a more favorable outcome. (See Poniktera
v. Seiler (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 121, 142.)
2     Statutory references are to the Evidence Code.

                                 7
       Section 952 defines a “ ‘confidential communication
between client and lawyer’ ” as “information transmitted between
a client and his or her lawyer in the course of that relationship
and in confidence by a means which, so far as the client is aware,
discloses the information to no third persons other than those
who are present to further the interest of the client in the
consultation or those to whom disclosure is reasonably necessary
for the transmission of the information or the accomplishment
of the purpose for which the lawyer is consulted.”
       The attorney-client privilege may be waived, but only by
the holder of the privilege. (McDermott, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th
at p. 1101; DP Pham LLC v. Cheadle (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 653,
668 (DP Pham).) Under section 912, a waiver results when the
holder of the privilege, without coercion, (1) discloses a significant
part of the communication, or (2) consents to the disclosure made
by anyone else. (§ 912, subd. (a).)
       Although section 912 declares that “any uncoerced
‘disclosure’ creates a waiver, courts have consistently held that
inadvertent disclosures do not.” (Newark Unified School Dist.
v. Superior Court (2015) 245 Cal.App.4th 887, 900; McDermott,
supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 1101.) As our Supreme Court
explained, “the disclosure contemplated in Evidence Code
section 912 [requires] some measure of choice and deliberation
on the part of the privilege holder” amounting to a “voluntary
and knowing disclosure” to waive privilege. (Ardon v. City
of Los Angeles (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1176, 1188–1189 (Ardon).)
       “The privilege holder’s characterization of his or her
intent in disclosing a privileged communication is an important
consideration in determining whether the holder waived the
privilege, but is not necessarily dispositive. [Citation.] When

                                  8
determining whether an inadvertent disclosure waived the
attorney-client privilege, a trial court must examine both the
subjective intent of the privilege holder and any manifestation
of the holder’s intent to disclose the information.” (McDermott,
supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1101–1102, citing Ardon, supra,
62 Cal.4th at pp. 1190–1191.)
       The substantial evidence standard governs our review
of the trial court’s waiver determination under section 912.
(McDermott, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1101–1102.)
“ ‘ “When the facts, or reasonable inferences from the facts,
shown in support of or in opposition to the claim of privilege are
in conflict, the determination of whether the evidence supports
one conclusion or the other is for the trial court, and a reviewing
court may not disturb such finding if there is any substantial
evidence to support it.” ’ ” (DP Pham, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th
at p. 664.) Consistent with these principles, we must defer to the
trial court’s credibility findings when witnesses offer conflicting
accounts, and this “ ‘is true whether the trial court’s ruling is
based on oral testimony or declarations.’ ” (Hiott v. Superior
Court (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 712, 717 (Hiott), quoting Shamblin
v. Brattain (1988) 44 Cal.3d 474, 479.)
       Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
determination that Macias intentionally waived the attorney-
client privilege with respect to the Brunon email. Zhang offered
a declaration, under penalty of perjury, recounting a face-to-face
meeting with Macias, during which Macias voluntarily forwarded
the Brunon email to Zhang for the stated purpose of persuading
Zhang to accept an arrangement that would allow Colt to
take delivery of the equipment on a deferred payment schedule.
According to Zhang, Macias watched Zhang receive the email

                                 9
and read it on his mobile phone before again urging Zhang
to accept the arrangement. For his part, Macias offered a
declaration acknowledging he may have been at his office when
Zhang said the meeting occurred, but he denied any recollection
of forwarding the email to Zhang or that he would have had any
reason to forward Zhang the Brunon email as Zhang claimed.
Inasmuch as the declarations were in conflict, the trial court
resolved the differing accounts in favor of Zhang, expressly
finding “the Zhang declaration specific and credible for purposes
of establishing waiver . . . when weighed against the Macias
declarations.” Because the Zhang declaration supports the trial
court’s determination, we are not authorized to second guess
its resolution of the conflicting evidence. (DP Pham, supra, 246
Cal.App.4th at p. 664; Hiott, supra, 16 Cal.App.4th at p. 717.)
       Defendants’ objections to the trial court’s waiver finding
ignore our governing standard of review. Defendants contend
Zhang’s declaration is “self-serving,” but that argumentative
characterization was for the trial court to assess—it is not a
proper ground for a reviewing court to disregard evidence that
the fact finder credited. Defendants also argue Zhang’s narrative
is “not plausible” and “no waiver should have been found”
because “neither [Laysion] nor Zhang ever wrote back to confirm
the alleged oral agreement, even though Zhang claims that he
was sitting right next to Macias.” But again, defendants’ avowed
incredulity over Zhang’s account is not a permissible basis for
an appellate court to invade the exclusive province of the trial
court to determine the credibility of witnesses. (See People v.
Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 403; People v. Dees (1972) 27
Cal.App.3d 922, 926.)

                               10
       Our conclusion is consistent with McDermott. The trial
court in that case found the plaintiff did not waive the attorney-
client privilege when he “inadvertently and unknowingly”
forwarded a confidential email he received from his personal
attorney to his sister-in-law, who, along with other members of
the family, was involved in a probate dispute over a multimillion-
dollar investment portfolio that belonged to plaintiff’s late-wife.
(McDermott, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1091, 1093–1095.) On
appeal, the defendants argued the trial court erred by “ ‘treat[ing]
[the plaintiff’s] own post-hoc characterization of his intent as
dispositive, while ignoring (or declining to consider) the objective,
contemporaneous evidence of [the plaintiff’s] intent’ ” to forward
the email and waive the privilege. (Id. at p. 1102.) The
McDermott court rejected the argument, concluding it
“mischaracterize[d] the trial court’s ruling and ignore[d]
the substantial evidence supporting the court’s conclusion
[the plaintiff] did not waive the privilege.” (Ibid.) Specifically,
the trial court “cited [the plaintiff’s] ‘unequivocal[ ]’ testimony
that he did not intend to forward the [privileged] e-mail to [his
sister-in-law], and he did not know how it happened.” (Ibid.)
Although other evidence suggested the plaintiff may have
intentionally made the disclosure to help mediate the dispute,
the McDermott court observed that evidence at most “create[d]
a conflict . . . or support[ed] additional inferences the trial court
could have drawn,” but “the governing substantial evidence
standard of review require[d] [the reviewing court] to resolve
all conflicts and draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence
in favor of the trial court’s order.” (Id. at pp. 1104–1105.)
       The same is true here. Although Macias’s declaration
or defendants’ implausibility argument could have supported

                                 11
a finding that Macias did not intentionally waive the attorney-
client privilege as Zhang claimed, neither required the trial court
to reach that conclusion given Zhang’s declaration, under oath,
that Macias voluntarily forwarded the Brunon email. Under
the substantial evidence standard of review, defendants have
not satisfied their burden to demonstrate reversible error. (See
McDermott, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 1106.)
2.     The Trial Court Reasonably Exercised Its Discretion
       to Deny Defendants’ Request to Disqualify Laysion’s
       Counsel
       The trial court denied defendants’ request to disqualify
Laysion’s counsel, reasoning Macias’s voluntarily disclosure
of the Brunon email negated any appropriate ground for
disqualification. Defendants contend the court erred. They
argue common law and ethical rules requiring opposing counsel
to refrain from examining plainly privileged materials apply
regardless of whether there has been an inadvertent disclosure,
and disqualification is therefore mandated to the extent
Laysion’s counsel used the privileged document in litigation
before consulting the trial court to resolve the privilege dispute.
(See State Comp. Ins. Fund v. WPS, Inc. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th
644, 656–657 (State Fund); McDermott, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th
at p. 1113.) While we agree certain ethical obligations attached
once Laysion’s counsel determined (or should have determined)
the Brunon email was privileged, we conclude the trial court
reasonably exercised its discretion in denying the disqualification
request.
       “A disqualification motion involves a conflict between
a client’s right to counsel of his or her choice, on the one hand,
and the need to maintain ethical standards of professional

                                12
responsibility, on the other.” (Clark v. Superior Court (2011)
196 Cal.App.4th 37, 47 (Clark), citing City and County of
San Francisco v. Cobra Solutions, Inc. (2006) 38 Cal.4th 839,
846.) “Protecting the confidentiality of communications between
attorney and client is a fundamental principle of our judicial
process and an opposing attorney who breaches that principle
may be disqualified from further participation in the litigation.”
(McDermott, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1119–1120; see Rico
v. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 807, 819 (Rico).)
Nevertheless, notwithstanding the sanctity of the attorney-client
privilege, “whenever a lawyer seeks to hold another lawyer
accountable for misuse of inadvertently received confidential
materials, the burden must rest on the complaining lawyer to
persuasively demonstrate inadvertence. Otherwise, a lawyer
might attempt to gain an advantage over his or her opponent
by intentionally sending confidential material and then bringing
a motion to disqualify the receiving lawyer.” (State Fund, supra,
70 Cal.App.4th at p. 657.)
       In an effort to balance these competing concerns, the
court in State Fund articulated a standard to govern the ethical
obligations of an attorney upon receiving another party’s
attorney-client privileged materials:
             “When a lawyer who receives materials that
             obviously appear to be subject to an attorney-
             client privilege or otherwise clearly appear
             to be confidential and privileged and where
             it is reasonably apparent that the materials
             were provided or made available through
             inadvertence, the lawyer receiving such
             materials should refrain from examining

                                13
              the materials any more than is essential to
              ascertain if the materials are privileged, and
              shall immediately notify the sender that he
              or she possesses material that appears to be
              privileged. The parties may then proceed to
              resolve the situation by agreement or may
              resort to the court for guidance with the
              benefit of protective orders and other judicial
              intervention as may be justified.” (State Fund,
              supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at pp. 656–657.)
       In Rico, our Supreme Court adopted the State Fund rule
as “a fair and reasonable approach” that “addresses the practical
problem of inadvertent disclosure” in the context of modern
discovery practices. (Rico, supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 817–818.)
Our high court recognized the State Fund rule establishes “an
objective standard” that asks “whether reasonably competent
counsel, knowing the circumstances of the litigation, would have
concluded the materials were privileged, how much review was
reasonably necessary to draw that conclusion, and when counsel’s
examination should have ended.” (Rico, at p. 818.)
       Under the State Fund rule, as adopted in Rico, “ ‘ “[m]ere
exposure” ’ to an adversary’s confidences is insufficient, standing
alone, to warrant an attorney’s disqualification.” (Rico, supra,
42 Cal.4th at p. 819, citing State Fund, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th
at p. 657.) As the State Fund court expressly recognized,
“ ‘[p]rotecting the integrity of judicial proceedings does not
require so draconian a rule [because it] would nullify a party’s
right to representation by chosen counsel any time inadvertence
or devious design put an adversary’s confidences in an attorney’s
mailbox.’ ” (State Fund, at p. 657; Rico, at p. 819.) Nonetheless,

                                14
“ ‘in an appropriate case, disqualification might be justified
if an attorney inadvertently receives confidential materials
and fails to conduct himself or herself in [accordance with
his or her State Fund duties], assuming other factors compel
disqualification.’ ” (Rico, at p. 819, quoting State Fund, at p. 657,
italics added; see McDermott, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 1120.)
       In assessing whether disqualification is warranted, the
critical question “ ‘is whether there exists a genuine likelihood
that the status or misconduct of the attorney in question
will affect the outcome of the proceedings before the court.’ ”
(McDermott, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 1120; see also id. at
p. 1124.) “[D]isqualification is proper as a prophylactic measure
to prevent future prejudice to the [privilege holder] from
information [opposing counsel] should not have possessed.”
(Clark, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 55; McDermott, at p. 1124.)
“A trial court, however, may not order disqualification ‘ “simply
to punish a dereliction that will likely have no substantial
continuing effect on future judicial proceedings.” ’ ” (McDermott,
at p. 1120.)
       “We review the court’s disqualification order for abuse of
discretion.” (Rico, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 819.) “ ‘An abuse of
discretion may be found only if “ ‘no judge could have reasonably
reached the challenged result. [Citation.] “[A]s long as there
exists ‘a reasonable or even fairly debatable justification, under
the law, for the action taken, such action will not be . . . set
aside . . . .’ ” ’ ” ’ [Citation.] We may not substitute our judgment
for that of the trial court, and provided the trial court properly
applied the law, we may reverse the trial court’s exercise of its
discretion only when the facts required the trial court to reach a
different result.” (McDermott, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 1124.)

                                 15
       Relying on McDermott, defendants argue Laysion’s counsel
violated his ethical obligations under State Fund by “personally
determin[ing] that the privilege had been waived,” while
“employing the clearly privileged document for litigation
purposes.” In McDermott, the defendants’ counsel challenged
the trial court’s disqualification order, arguing it was not
“reasonably apparent” that a privileged email had been
“inadvertently disclosed” by the privilege holder. (McDermott,
supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 1110.) The McDermott court rejected
the argument, holding it would “create an exception that would
swallow the State Fund rule” to allow “opposing counsel to
avoid their State Fund obligations any time they can fashion
a colorable argument for overcoming the privilege.” (McDermott,
at p. 1113.) The appellate court explained:
             “[A]n attorney’s obligation [under State Fund]
             is to review the materials no more than
             necessary to determine whether they are
             privileged, and then notify the privilege
             holder’s counsel. At that point, the parties may
             confer about whether the material is privileged
             and whether there has been a waiver. If the
             parties are unable to reach an agreement either
             side may seek guidance from the trial court.
             [Citations.] The attorney receiving the
             material, however, is not permitted to
             act as judge and unilaterally make that
             determination.” (Ibid.)
       We agree with the McDermott court (and defendants).
Regardless of whether there is reason to doubt privileged
materials were inadvertently disclosed, an attorney’s ethical

                               16
obligations under State Fund attach once counsel knows
or should know materials in counsel’s possession likely are
privileged. At that point, counsel is obligated to notify the
presumptive privilege holder and confer about whether the
communication is privileged or whether the privilege has been
waived. If the parties are unable to reach an agreement, the
dispute must be presented to the court for resolution before
counsel takes any further action contrary to the confidentiality
of the presumptively privileged material. This is the “objective
standard” our Supreme Court endorsed in Rico. (Rico, supra,
42 Cal.4th at p. 818.)
       Here, the trial court found the Brunon email was
presumptively privileged—a finding supported by, among other
things, the email’s signature block which disclosed it had been
sent from the “Law Office of Bradley Wm. Brunon.” Under State
Fund, once Laysion’s counsel obtained the email and recognized
it might be privileged, he had an ethical obligation to notify
defendants’ counsel and to present the privilege dispute to
the court for resolution.
       Notwithstanding this transgression, we conclude the trial
court reasonably exercised its discretion in denying defendants’
request to disqualify Laysion’s counsel. As the trial court
correctly recognized, disqualification is “ ‘proper as a prophylactic
measure to prevent future prejudice to the [privilege holder]
from information the attorney should not have possessed,’ ” and
a trial court “may not order disqualification ‘ “simply to punish
a dereliction that will likely have no substantial continuing
effect on future judicial proceedings.” ’ ” (McDermott, supra,
10 Cal.App.5th at p. 1120, italics added.) Here, the court found
Laysion’s counsel possessed the Brunon email because Macias

                                 17
intentionally disclosed it to Zhang. In view of that finding,
the trial court reasonably determined there was “insufficient
evidence of prejudice,” “even assuming a violation of the [State
Fund] rule,” and disqualification would serve only to punish
Laysion for a dereliction that threatened no future harm. (See
State Fund, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 657 [disqualification
is warranted only if the privilege holder can “persuasively
demonstrate inadvertence,” otherwise a party “might attempt
to gain an advantage over his or her opponent by intentionally
sending confidential material and then bringing a motion to
disqualify the receiving lawyer”]; see also Rico, supra, 42 Cal.4th
at p. 819; McDermott, at p. 1120; Clark, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th
at p. 55.)
       Defendants do not identify any future prejudice they will
suffer. Instead, they attempt to bootstrap opposing counsel’s
infraction to attack the trial court’s waiver finding by arguing
Laysion’s possession of the Brunson email “so tainted” the
proceedings that it made a “reasonable inquiry” into the privilege
dispute “impossible.” In defendants’ telling, Laysion’s counsel
“employed” the Brunon email to “fashion” the Zhang declaration
by “clearly and cleverly” “mimic[ing]” the email’s contents to
present a “persuasive” account of “the context” in which Macias
“allegedly” sent it to Zhang. Consequently, defendants contend
Laysion effectively caused the court to base its credibility and
waiver determinations on the contents of the Brunon email,
in violation of the settled prohibition against reviewing the
contents of a confidential communication to determine whether
the attorney-client privilege protects it. (See § 915, subd. (a)
[“the presiding officer may not require disclosure of information
claimed to be privileged . . . in order to rule on the claim of

                                18
privilege”]; Costco, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 736 & fn. 4; DP Pham,
supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 659 [a court “may not review the
contents of a communication to determine whether the attorney-
client privilege protects that communication”].)
       Defendants’ argument begs the question. The trial court
could not have based its credibility determination on some
purported consistency between the Brunon email and Zhang’s
account, unless the court had in fact reviewed the email’s
contents to ascertain the purported consistency. But the
trial court expressly repudiated that necessary assumption
undergirding defendants’ argument. As the court explained in its
written order, a court is “precluded” from examining the contents
of a confidential communication to determine if it is privileged,
and “[t]he court also finds no reason to examine the [Brunon]
e-mail contents for purposes of determining a waiver, even
if allowed.” Because the basis for its waiver finding—Zhang’s
account of his meeting with Macias—exclusively concerned
“the negotiations and e-mail exchange . . . between the parties
[Zhang and Macias] themselves,” the court emphasized “the
conduct of Brunon” had “[n]othing” to do with its “consideration
of the waiver” issue.
       The record does not support defendants’ contention that
opposing counsel’s dereliction prevented the trial court from
engaging in a “reasonable inquiry.” The court did not abuse
its discretion in denying the disqualification request.

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                        DISPOSITION
     The order is affirmed. Plaintiff Laysion is entitled to costs.

     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                     EGERTON, J.

We concur:

             LAVIN, Acting P. J.

             HEIDEL, J.


      Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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