Court Opinion

ID: 9894827
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-03 11:09:41.294404+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:10:49.124185
License: Public Domain

IN THE
                         TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

                                   No. 10-22-00169-CR

MARY ALICE MASON,
                                                          Appellant
v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,
                                                          Appellee

                         From the 361st District Court
                             Brazos County, Texas
                       Trial Court No. 15-01613-CRF-361

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Mary Alice Mason appeals her conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly

weapon, causing bodily injury and involving family violence. Mason was accused of

cutting her boyfriend with a box cutter. Because Mason’s evidentiary complaint on

appeal does not comport with counsel’s argument at trial and because this Court will not

revisit a decision by the Court of Criminal Appeals, the trial court’s “Judgment of

Conviction by Jury” is affirmed.
ISSUES—EXCLUDED TESTIMONY

         Mason first complains on appeal that the trial court deprived Mason of the right

to present a complete defense when it excluded the testimony of a licensed clinical social

worker during the guilt/innocence phase of the trial. Specifically, Mason wanted the

social worker to testify that Mason had Post-Traumatic-Stress-Disorder because of her

history of abuse by her boyfriend, and thus, Mason was more susceptible to a fight or

flight response which, Mason argues, supports her justification for assaulting the same

boyfriend with a box cutter.

         We review a trial court's decision to admit or exclude expert testimony for an

abuse of discretion, and we may not reverse those rulings unless they fall outside the

zone of reasonable disagreement. Blasdell v. State, 384 S.W.3d 824, 829 (Tex. Crim. App.

2012).    The proponent of evidence ordinarily has the burden of establishing the

admissibility of the proffered evidence. White v. State, 549 S.W.3d 146, 152 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2018); Lester v. State, 366 S.W.3d 214, 215 (Tex. App.—Waco 2011, pet. ref'd).

         A hearing was held outside the presence of the jury to determine if the social

worker’s testimony was admissible. After initial questioning by the parties, the State

objected to the social worker’s proposed testimony because it was “not relevant to

whether or not her actions were reasonable and whether or not her use of force was

reasonable….”     At trial, Mason argued and solely relied on the Court of Criminal

Appeals’ opinion in Fielder v. State, 756 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) for the

proposition that the social worker’s testimony was admissible. After hearing extensive

arguments from the parties and taking time to conduct its own research, the trial court

Mason v. State                                                                        Page 2
ultimately determined:

       Here is the deal. She cannot testify in the guilt/innocence phase as to the
       diagnosis of PTSD or that she's more susceptible to fight or flight response.
                                               ***
       I'm saying you cannot put [the social worker] up there…. Period, at this
       stage. Mitigation, yes.
                                               ***
       I still find that [the social worker’s] testimony is not relevant…. However,
       understanding Fielder -- and just so the record is clear if there is an appeal,
       Fielder is 756 S.W.2d 309…. There is a subsequent case, Osby v. State[,] 939
       S.W.2d 787. That is a Court of Appeals out of Fort Worth case that has a
       lengthy discussion about Fielder. It explains in that case the codification of
       Fielder in 38.36. It further explains that in 1991 Section B was added to 38.36.
       In comparing 38.36, which is evidence in prosecuting him for murder and
       where Fielder followed, it talks about the facts and circumstances which is
       in Section A of 38.36 being relevant. That's in line with what 38.371 says,
       which is relevant to this case because this is evidence in a prosecution of an
       offense related to a member of defendant's family or household or in a
       dating relationship. However, in 38.36 they've added a Section B which
       allows for B2 which allows for relevant expert testimony regarding the
       condition of the mind of the defendant at the time. That section was not
       added in 38.371. When you compare 38.36 and 38.371, that's the only major
       difference I see. The facts and circumstances are allowed in murder cases,
       expert testimony is allowed in 38.371. In this type of case that we are before
       in Ms. Mason's case, there is no statutory allowed ability for expert
       testimony, and for that reason I am not allowing [the social worker] to
       testify.

       On appeal, Mason does not discuss Fielder and does not challenge the reasoning

the trial court used in excluding the testimony—that the language of Fielder was codified

in section 38.36 and as such, the testimony provided by the social worker would have

been admissible in a murder case; but the same language was not included in section

38.371, the assault/family violence provision, and thus, was inadmissible in this case—

was an abuse of discretion. Instead, now on appeal, Mason only asserts that the social

worker’s testimony would assist the fact finder in determining whether Mason acted

Mason v. State                                                                            Page 3
reasonably.

       Mason’s issue on appeal does not comport with counsel’s argument for

admissibility made at trial or in response to the trial court’s discussion and ruling. See

Pena v. State, 285 S.W.3d 459, 464 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). We are not tasked with making

appellants’ arguments for them. See Lucio v. State, 351 S.W.3d 878, 896 (Tex. Crim. App.

2011); Busby v. State, 253 S.W.3d 661, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Neville v. State, 622

S.W.3d 99, 104 (Tex. App.—Waco 2020, no pet.). Accordingly, Mason’s first issue is not

preserved for our review and is overruled.

       — ROYSTER-ROUSSEAU TEST

       Mason complains in her second issue that the trial court erred in including a lesser-

included-offense instruction in the court’s charge to the jury over Mason’s objection.

Specifically, Mason argues that the State cannot meet the second prong of the two-

pronged Royster-Rousseau test for a lesser-included offense instruction. See Rousseau v.

State, 855 S.W.2d 666, 672 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Royster v. State, 622 S.W.2d 442, 444

(Tex. Crim. App. 1981). Mason acknowledges that the State is not bound by the second

prong of the test, see Grey v. State, 298 S.W.3d 644, 645 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); however

Mason believes the Court of Criminal Appeals wrongfully decided Grey and asks us to

revisit the issue in this appeal.

       As an intermediate appellate court, we are required to follow binding precedent

in cases decided by the Court of Criminal Appeals. Holloway v. State, 621 S.W.3d 753, 761

(Tex. App.—Waco 2020, no pet.). Thus, we are not persuaded by Mason’s argument to

disregard the Court of Criminal Appeals’ opinion in Grey and revisit whether the State is

Mason v. State                                                                        Page 4
bound by the second prong of the Royster-Rousseau test.

        Mason’s second issue is overruled.

CONCLUSION

        Having overruled each of Mason’s issues on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s

“Judgment of Conviction by Jury.”

                                                TOM GRAY
                                                Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,
       Justice Johnson, and
       Justice Wright 1
Affirmed
Opinion delivered and filed November 2, 2023
Do not publish
[CR25]

1
  The Honorable Jim R. Wright, Senior Chief Justice (Retired) of the Eleventh Court of Appeals, sitting by
assignment of the Chief Justice of the Texas Supreme Court. See TEX. GOV'T CODE §§ 74.003, 75.002, 75.003.

Mason v. State                                                                                     Page 5