Court Opinion

ID: 9464778
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 23:42:08.358828+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:48.512719
License: Public Domain

ALDISERT, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
There was obiter dictum in Baerga v. Richardson, 500 F.2d 309, 312-13 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 931, 95 S.Ct. 1133, 43 L.Ed.2d 403 (1975), articulating the panel’s view as to what should be contained in the report to be filed by an examiner at the conclusion of a Social Security hearing. The panel said that “where appropriate, [the findings] should include a statement of subordinate factual foundations on which ultimate factual conclusions [sic] are based.” The panel’s suggestion did not acquire the dignity of a ratio decidendi because the panel’s conclusion in Baerga was that the examiner’s findings were “sufficient to satisfy the substantial evidence test.” 500 F.2d at 313.
But the dictum in Baerga has now been elevated to a “standard” in this case by the majority, who believes that this suggestion now is a controlling legal precept of sufficient dignity as to command a reversal if not followed by a hearing examiner. Because I believe we have no authority to promulgate procedural rules for the executive branch requiring subordinate factual foundations (whatever this means) to support findings of fact, I dissent.

I.

I note that the majority agrees that Congress has not mandated such a requirement. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Nor has attention been directed to any executive order that requires it. A case could be made, and I think it would be persuasive, that hearing examiners in an executive agency branch do not come under the supervisory power of the judicial branch. Under such a view, we may not promulgate mandatory procedural rules to govern the conduct of their hearings and reports. We may neither do this as a court of appeals nor as a judicial council. See 28 U.S.C. § 332(d).
If, on the other hand, the judiciary could be said to possess such rule-making authority, it seems to me that only the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States has the power to initiate the drafting of new procedural rules, and even these rules do not acquire coercive force until three discrete approvals of the proposed rules are then forthcoming: first, from the Judicial Conference; next, from the Supreme Court; and finally, from Congress. 28 U.S.C. §§ 331, 2072.
Moreover, I doubt that even the Judicial Conference has the power to request nationwide rules in this field, because Congress has already legislated on this subject and specifically delegated rule-making power: “The Secretary shall have full power and authority to make rules and regulations and to establish procedures . . . and shall adopt the reasonable and proper rules and regulations to regulate and provide for the nature and extent of the proofs and evidence and the method of taking and furnishing the same in order to establish the right to benefits hereunder.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(a). Thus, I have serious doubts about *439the power of this court to promulgate procedural rules regulating the manner of finding facts in the Social Security Administration.
I perceive the role of courts of appeals to be extremely limited in the review of fact findings in Social Security cases. By statute, the first judicial review of a final decision of the Secretary is relegated to the district court. If that court determines that the findings of the Secretary as to any fact are “supported by substantial evidence”, the district court has no leeway to disturb them, because Congress has demanded that those findings “shall be conclusive”. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The role of the court of appeals, I perceive to be even more restricted: we determine only if the district court erred in applying appropriate law in its review of the case, including the law pertaining to the review of fact-finding. If it has, we affirm; if it has not, we reverse. We are authorized only to adjudicate a specific case or controversy; as a court, we are not entrusted with rule-making authority.

II.

Like my brothers of the majority, I am extremely sympathetic to the plight of this appellant. Had I been the hearing examiner, I probably would have made findings of fact leading to a conclusion of permanent disability because there does exist evidence to support such a result. But I am not the examiner, nor am I a superior staff member in the hierarchy of HEW. And neither are my distinguished brothers on this court.
It is often an agonizing temptation for judges who are moved by sympathy from the evidence in deserving cases to involve themselves in fact-finding. But reviewing judges cannot convert evidence presented to a factfinder into facts. In a jury trial that is solely the province of a jury; in a Social Security case, that of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare or his designate. 42 U.S.C. § 405(a) and (b). What we cannot do directly, we should not be able to do indirectly. It is obvious that the majority (and I) disagree with the product of the examiner’s fact-finding process in this case. But that officer, like any fact-finder, is given the discretion to evaluate evidence. We should respect his independent exercise of this function, and not interfere with it in the guise of formulating procedural rules which in reality are tailored to produce a particular fact-finding result which we desire. As judges in a reviewing hierarchy, we have important responsibilities to ensure that the appropriate law is applied. We do not have the authority, and it is contrary to the American appellate tradition, to become enmeshed in the fact-finding process. Thus, in my view it is improper to command or instruct a hearing examiner: “If on remand the hearing examiner adheres to his original ultimate findings, his opinion should include subsidiary findings . . . and should address the evidence we have discussed.” And although the implied threat of reversal is very real, I suggest that it is only sound and fury with no truly coercive effect. All. that this court can do, even if constrained to respect the Baerga dictum, supra, is to remand to the Secretary if his procedures do not meet the majority’s requirement of a statement of “subordinate factual foundations” to support findings of fact. I believe the majority opinion could be taken to allow this appellate court to give a credibility rating on discrete pieces of “evidence we have discussed”. We cannot assume this role with respect to fact-finding by our district courts; a fortiori we cannot assume it with respect to the executive branch. We have no power under the law to reverse the fact-finding so long as there is substantial evidence on the record to support it.
Accordingly, I would affirm the district court’s acceptance of the well reasoned analysis prepared by the magistrate in these proceedings.