Court Opinion

ID: 9828216
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 18:13:10.380153+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:46.023354
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
It is earnestly insisted by counsel for appellant in an able and ingenious motion for rehearing that there is no evidence in the record showing that the ground over which plaintiff was walking at the time of his injury was part of the yards of appellant and used in furtherance of its business; and no evidence that it was necessary for plaintiff to use the same in the performance of his work. Counsel must have overlooked the testimony of the plaintiff himself, wherein he stated that it was common practice for the employés of appellant to go straight across this plot of ground in thp performance of their work, and that he himself would often pass that way. He further stated that it was customary and common for himself and helpers, and other employés, to go across that yard. “There was no other way in the world of getting material to these cars without going across these plats of ground between the track's, because the tracks were always full of cars, and we could not go up and down them, but always went across, just anywhere we could get to a ear with the stuff we had to repair it with. We have always done that.” He further stated that he could not follow that path (the one that appellant contends he should have traveled) from the freight depot and make the turn with the 32-foot rod; that he stopped and looked and could not make the circuit It was shown that said rod was long, very heavy, and difficult to carry.
Johnson, a witness who had worked at the hotel up to 1907, testified that he had seen several employés of the company go across this plot of ground connected with the hotel, such as brakemen, but it was not a frequent occurrence, and that section men cut the grass on this plot out as far as the drainway.
Robinson, an employé of the company and witness for appellant, testified that frequently he and his foreman went across that plot of ground east of the wagon road “where that drain box is situated, jus't working there in the ear department”; that they went across that whole yard sometimes.
Gaché, whose evidence was relied upon by appellant, testified that he left there in 1908, and that -what he said had relation to conditions prior to that time. The accident in question occurred in 1911.
Under this evidence it was proper for the court to refuse the peremptory charge requested by appellant, and to submit the issue raised thereby for the consideration of the jury.
Appellant contends that, since the plot of ground over which appellee was walking at the time of the injury was no part of its yards, the court erred in submitting the doctrine of comparative negligence. This assumes that the evidence of Williams was untrue, which was a matter for the determination of the jury, because, if said plot had been used in the manner and to the extent as testified to by him, then it was a question of fact whether said company so acquiesced in such use as to make it a part of such yard.
Whether the drainway in question was included within the lease to the hotel company was also a question of fact, and as such was properly submitted to the jury. Notwithstanding the drainway was in fact used in connection with the hotel, still, if it did not come within the terms of the lease, and the railroad company also used the plot of ground, or permitted its employés to do so for a long period of time with its knowledge or acquiescence, the same would be regarded as a part of its yards, and appellant would be responsible for failure to keep it in reasonably safe condition. There was pleading to the effect that the receiver of the company had knowledge that said plot of ground was commonly used by plaintiff and other em-ployés in the performance of their work. There was evidence upon this issue. Hence the court did not err in charging the jury thereon. It was alleged that the plaintiff did not know of the condition of the ditch, and that the defendant did, and that it also knew that its employés were using this plot of ground for their work, and negligently *644failed to cover up said ditch, or advise or notify plaintiff of its dangerous condition.
After a full consideration of appellant’s motion for rehearing, we are of the opinion that the same is not well taken, and should be overruled.
Motion overruled.