Court Opinion

ID: 9632823
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:25:50.87481+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:00:12.566610
License: Public Domain

WALTERS, Judge (specially concurring). I concur. N.M.R.Evid. 609, N.M.S.A. 1978, does not permit questioning about conviction unless the crime can be established, on defendant’s denial, by public record, and then only if (1) the conviction concerned a crime punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year and the court determines that admission of the evidence is justified because its probative value outweighs its prejudice; or (2) the crime involved dishonesty or false statement. Here, one question asked about an arrest; the other referred to an alleged prior bad act. If a prosecutor may not inquire about a conviction except in narrowly circumscribed instances and then must be prepared to prove it by a public record if denied (see also State v. Williams, 76 N.M. 578, 417 P.2d 62 (1966)), it is wholly illogical to assume he may be permitted to inquire about an arrest, much less that he may rely upon hearsay information to establish his good faith in asking such a question. State v. McCabe, 41 N.M. 428, 70 P.2d 758 (1937), long ago held that testimony regarding an arrest is not admissible for impeachment or to affect a defendant’s credibility. Rule 404(b), N.M.R.Evid., N.M.S.A. 1978, prohibits admission of prior bad acts to prove a defendant’s character and that he acted in conformity therewith, except for certain purposes. The trial court felt the exception of “mistake or accident” would apply since defendant pleaded self-defense. I cannot agree that a claim of self-defense may be equated with a claim of mistake or accident. The plain meanings of “mistake” and “accident” have nothing in common with a defense that may be translated as stating the first law of nature, the right of self-preservation: “I used such force as was necessary in defense of my own life and person.” The exception to rule 404(b) relied on by the trial court is not inherent in the law of self-defense, and unless an exception exists, the rule prohibits the question. There was no evidence at all that the second improper set of questions regarding a fight in the jail had any basis in fact. Consequently those questions could not have been asked in good faith. State v. Rowell, 77 N.M. 124, 419 P.2d 966 (1966), imposes the burden on the State of proving that it proceed ad in good faith when it is challenged for propounding improper questions which tend to prejudice the defendant in the minds of the jury. With regard to the question of a prior arrest, I agree wholeheartedly with what Justice Moise had to say in the Rowell case, and I quote: We are convinced that the damage implicit in the asking of the question was in no way repaired by virtue of the fact that the objection was sustained. Neither was it overcome by the admonitions given the jury. We would be deluding ourselves if we were to believe that human nature being what it is, at least some of the jurors would not assume because of the form of the question, that indeed appellant had been * * * [arrested] as stated by the district attorney. Whether or not * * * [he] had was irrelevant in this case and, accordingly a reversal and new trial are inevitable. The inadmissibility of evidence of prior bad conduct, the State’s failure to establish a factual predicate for such questions concerning an alleged fight at the jail, and defendant’s objection to those inquiries, all combine to bring that set of questions as well within the censure of the Rowell decision. As Justice Moise pointed out: Here, we are not dealing with evidence admitted and withdrawn. Rather, the question is one of prejudice to the defendant arising out of the asking of an improper question for the ostensible purpose of planting ideas or thoughts in the minds of the jury. * * * [T]he question was in a grossly improper form to prove anything. It could not possibly establish or accomplish anything but prejudice.