Court Opinion

ID: 9877669
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-27 16:15:45.605266+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:46:56.301599
License: Public Domain

Friedman, J.P., and Webber, J.,
dissent in a memorandum by Webber, J., as follows: I respectfully dissent. In my opinion, the motion court properly denied defendant’s speedy trial motion.
In this case, the People were required to be ready for trial within 183 days after the commencement of the action. The motion court denied defendant’s 30.30 motion, finding that the People were chargeable with 181 days. On appeal, the People concede that they should have been charged with additional days that, if added to the total charged by the court, would require dismissal. The People argue, and I agree, that the judgment should nevertheless be affirmed because the court *424overcharged them by including periods that should have been excluded.
This Court has the authority to review the calculations presented to the motion court and to decide whether the court’s calculations and determinations were correct (see People v Mena, 29 AD3d 349 [1st Dept 2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 792 [2006]; see also People v Salgado, 27 AD3d 71 [1st Dept 2006], lv denied 6 NY3d 838 [2006]). In doing so, I find that while there were errors in calculation, defendant’s motion pursuant to CPL 30.30 was properly denied.
On October 11, 2012, the People stated that they were not ready to proceed because the arresting officer was unavailable. They requested the case be adjourned to October 16, 2012. Defense counsel indicated that October 16, 2012 was inconvenient and requested that the case be adjourned to November 1, 2012.
Hurricane Sandy struck the New York Metropolitan area on or about October 29, 2012. As a result, all courts were closed from October 29, 2012 through November 5, 2012. All cases appearing on the calendar during this period were adjourned. The instant case was administratively adjourned to November 20, 2012. While the motion court correctly excluded the period after October 29, 2012, as a delay due to an exceptional circumstance, it charged the People from October 11, 2012 to October 29, 2012, a total of 18 days. Clearly, the People should only have been charged from October 11, 2012 to October 16, 2012. Thus, 13 days should have been excluded.
In computing the time within which the People must be ready for trial, the court must exclude “the period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the court at the request of, or with the consent of, the defendant or his counsel” (CPL 30.30 [4] [b]). On October 11, 2012, the People specifically requested October 16, 2012. It was defendant’s request that the case be adjourned to November 1, 2012. Thus defense counsel’s consent was “clearly expressed” (People v Smith, 82 NY2d 676, 678 [1993]; CPL 30.30 [4] [b]; see People v Barden, 27 NY3d 550, 554-556 [2016]). Defense counsel actively participated in setting the adjourn date, sought a date longer than the date requested for his convenience, and actually requested the selected date (see e.g. People v Davis, 80 AD3d 494, 495 [1st Dept 2011]; People v Matthews, 227 AD2d 313 [1st Dept 1996], lv denied 88 NY2d 989 [1996]).
The motion court also improperly charged the People 13 days for the time period of July 23, 2013 to August 5, 2013. The record reflects that on July 23, 2013, the People stated that they *425were not ready to proceed to trial and requested a one week adjournment. The case was adjourned to July 30, 2013. On July 30, 2013, the People stated that they were ready to proceed to trial. It was noted by the parties that there was a witness1 who would be potentially unavailable due to a scheduled vacation if the case were immediately sent out to trial. When asked by the court if the case should be adjourned to a date the following week to accommodate this potential witness, defense counsel acquiesced, stating, “[Y]es.” The case was then adjourned to August 5, 2013.
While defendant argues that the defense neither consented to, nor requested the adjournment for purposes of accommodating a potential witness, they do not dispute that on July 30, 2013, the People stated that they were ready to proceed to trial. Given the statement of readiness by the People, they should not have been charged any time and this additional six day period should have been excluded.
Finally, I find that the motion court improperly included the period from August 5, 2013 to August 22, 2013, a total of 17 days. This period should have been excluded pursuant to CPL 30.30 (4) (g), due to the unavailability of a necessary witness. The People demonstrated that they exercised due diligence to make the witness available, in that they made credible and reasonable attempts to secure the witness’s presence (see People v Carpenito, 199 AD2d 522 [2d Dept 1993]).
On July 25, 2013, in anticipation of the July 30, 2013 trial date, the witness was contacted. At that time he was told that although the case was set for July 30, 2013, it would probably not proceed on that date due to the unavailability of a potential defense witness. The witness indicated that he had tentative travel plans to visit family in the Dominican Republic. He did not state the exact dates of travel. As the People were unaware of the new trial date, he requested that he be contacted as to the new date. Following the July 30, 2013 trial date, it was learned that the witness had traveled to the Dominican Republic and would not be returning until August 22, 2013. The People learned this through conversations with the complaining witness and family members.
While certainly the witness should have been asked as to his travel schedule and his available dates, the failure to inquire does not mean that the People did not exercise due diligence. The People had been in contact with the witness days before. *426They were aware that the witness was still willing to testify at trial. They knew he was planning a vacation, but did not know his exact travel plans. This was not the situation where the People had lost contact with the witness or learned that the witness was no longer cooperating (see People v Figaro, 245 AD2d 300 [2d Dept 1997]; cf. People v Khan, 146 AD2d 806 [2d Dept 1989], lv denied 73 NY2d 1021 [1989]).
There is no legal support for the argument, as set forth by the majority, that the failure of the People to subpoena the witness, obtain a material witness order or apparently to direct his immediate return from the Dominican Republic constituted a failure on their part to exercise due diligence. Further, contrary to the majority’s assertion, this finding of due diligence is not permitting the People to turn a blind eye to a witness’s proposed vacation or condoning “gamesmanship.”
However, even assuming the majority is correct and the People did not establish due diligence in securing the presence of the witness, the inclusion of this period is academic as the People would still be charged with less than the applicable 183 days.2

. The People stated that it was not their intent to call this individual as a prosecution witness. The defense stated that if the People did not call the individual as a witness they may “possibly” do so.

. If the 17 day period from August 5, 2013 to August 22, 2013 were excluded, the People would be charged 160 days. If it were included, the People would be charged 177 days.