Court Opinion

ID: 9861005
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:39:03.144258+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:27:02.548362
License: Public Domain

CHIEF JUSTICE MILLER, dissenting: I do not believe that the defendant is able to raise a reasonable inference that the prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors because of their race, a practice forbidden by Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69, 106 S. Ct. 1712. Accordingly, I would reject the defendant’s challenge to the manner in which his jury was selected and would consider now the remaining issues in this capital case. A defendant raising a Batson claim bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. If the trial judge concludes that a prima facie case has been shown, the burden then shifts to the prosecution to advance race-neutral explanations for its exercise of the peremptory challenges at issue. The trial judge must then determine whether the defendant has shown intentional discrimination in the selection of the jury. Hernandez v. New York (1991), 500 U.S. 352, 358-59, 114 L. Ed. 3d 395, 405, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 1866; Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-98, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 87-89, 106 S. Ct. at 1723-24. Determining whether a defendant has established a prima facie case of discrimination requires the consideration of a variety of circumstances, including, among other things, the proportionate representation of the particular group in the venire, the number of members of that group ultimately selected to serve as jurors, the heterogeneity of the excluded group members, the ethnicity of the victim and the offender, and the prosecutor’s comments during jury selection. See People v. Peeples (1993), 155 Ill. 2d 422, 469; People v. Evans (1988), 125 Ill. 2d 50, 63-64. In the present case, there were 14 blacks among the 42 venire members who were not removed for cause by the trial judge. The prosecution excused five of the 14, and the defense excused six; three blacks ultimately served on the defendant’s jury. The prosecution exercised a total of 11 peremptory challenges during jury selection. Thus, the prosecution exercised 45% of its challenges against black members of the venire (5 of 11). Blacks made up 33% of the venire (14 of 42), and 21% of the jury, including the two alternate positions (3 of 14). In a case presenting similar statistics, this court upheld a trial judge’s determination that the defendant had failed to present a prima facie showing of discrimination. People v. Henderson (1990), 142 Ill. 2d 258, 280. The crimes involved in the present case were not interracial, and that circumstance makes it less likely that the prosecutor would have intended to exclude jurors of the defendant’s race. (See Evans, 125 Ill. 2d at 66.) In addition, the voir dire in this case was conducted entirely by the trial judge, and the record is devoid of any comments by the prosecutor in exercising challenges from which discriminatory intent can be inferred. The trial judge in the present case rejected the defendant’s Batson claim. Although the judge did not expressly state that the defendant had failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, we may infer that this was the court’s finding, for the judge did not proceed to the second stage of the Batson inquiry. Granting to that finding the customary deference we employ in reviewing Batson determinations, I would conclude that the trial judge’s ruling was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. (See People v. Henderson (1990), 142 Ill. 2d 258, 287; People v. Garrett (1990), 139 Ill. 2d 189, 200-01.) The representation of blacks in the venire and on the defendant’s jury, the number of challenges exercised by the prosecution to black members of the venire, the shared ethnicity of the defendant and the crime victims, and the absence of any comments by the prosecution suggestive of discrimination — all these circumstances indicate that the defendant could not succeed in establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. Thus, even if the trial court’s determination in this case is denied the traditional measure of deference accorded to findings of fact, I would conclude, on a de novo consideration of the same evidence, that the defendant failed to carry his burden of presenting a prima facie case under Bat-son. On this record, then, the additional grounds suggested by the majority in support of its decision to remand the matter for further proceedings are singularly unpersuasive. The majority first points to remarks by the trial judge that, the majority believes, suggest that the judge could have been using an incorrect standard in determining the defendant’s Batson claim. On several occasions the trial judge referred to the “systematic exclusion” of minority members from the jury. The majority concludes from these remarks that the judge might actually have been applying the outmoded rules of Swain v. Alabama (1965), 380 U.S. 202, 13 L. Ed. 2d 759, 85 S. Ct. 824, in resolving the defendant’s Bat-son claim. Nothing in the record supports the majority’s suggestion that the trial judge failed to correctly apply the requirements of Batson. In the present case, the trial judge apparently borrowed the term “systematic exclusion” from comments made by the prosecutor, who was the first to use that locution. As the State suggests, it seems clear that the judge was merely using the word “systematic” as a synonym for “methodical.” In similar circumstances, this court has upheld determinations rejecting Batson claims notwithstanding a trial judge’s use of the term “systematic exclusion” (People v. Henderson (1990), 142 Ill. 2d 258, 279), or even defense counsel’s use of the same expression (People v. Edwards (1991), 144 Ill. 2d 108, 151 (trial judge rejected defense argument, under Batson, that State had, as counsel said, “ ‘systematically excluded black people’ ” during jury selection)). In denying the defendant’s motion for a mistrial under Batson, the trial judge here explained, “The Court has in two cases over the past two years declared a mistrial when it has been shown that the State has improperly excused blacks in a systematic manner.” The judge did not purport to require the defendant to show systematic exclusion in case after case, as he would have if he had been applying the Swain test. There is no support in the record for the majority’s belief that the trial judge might have been applying an incorrect standard in determining the defendant’s Batson challenge. The majority also notes that the trial judge asked the prosecution to explain its challenges to the black members of the venire. The majority interprets the trial judge’s request to mean that the judge might have determined that a prima facie case of discrimination had been established and that the judge was then proceeding to the next step in the Batson inquiry. I do not agree that the remarks indicate that the judge believed that the defendant had fulfilled his burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. In response to the trial judge’s comments, the prosecution offered an explanation for its decision to peremptorily challenge one of the excluded veniremen. The prosecutor said that he believed that the individual was under the influence of drugs or alcohol at the time of voir dire. The trial judge agreed that the individual appeared to be impaired, though the judge was not sure whether the impairment was attributable to alcohol or to other causes. Notably, after the State explained the reasons for the challenge to that particular member of the venire, the trial judge did not ask the prosecution to account for any of its remaining challenges to black members of the venire. Had the trial judge intended to move to the next step in the Batson inquiry, as the majority believes, the judge would have asked the prosecution to provide explanations for the four other excluded blacks. Finally, the majority points to the supposed heterogeneity of the excluded venire members as further evidence in support of the defendant’s Batson claim. But that is only one circumstance that should be considered in determining whether the defendant has met his burden of establishing a prima facie case and, even if shown, does not automatically establish such a case. (See People v. Edwards (1991), 144 Ill. 2d 108, 154.) As this court has previously recognized, a party may have different reasons for excluding various members of the venire (People v. Mack (1989), 128 Ill. 2d 231, 239), and there is no reason to assume that all the peremptory challenges exercised by a party must be explicable on a single ground. The present case will serve as an illustration. We know from the explanation offered by the State that the prosecutor believed that one of the five blacks excluded from the jury was under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time of voir dire. That particular juror was also unemployed. According to the voir dire examinations of the four other black members of the venire peremptorily challenged by the State, two rented their residences, one was unemployed, and one had served on the jury in a robbery case only two years before the present trial. As these circumstances indicate, the heterogeneity of the excluded members of the venire might simply mean that the prosecution had different reasons for its exercise of peremptory challenges against different persons. See People v. Henderson (1990), 142 Ill. 2d 258, 289-90. In sum, I would conclude that the trial judge properly denied the defendant’s Batson motion. Unlike the majority, I do not believe that the trial judge’s comments at the hearing indicate either that the judge might have been applying an incorrect standard in determining the defendant’s claim, or that the judge might have found a prima facie case to exist. Nor do I agree with the majority that the various characteristics of the excluded minority members of the venire provide significant support for the defendant’s contention. The trial judge’s Batson ruling was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, and I would consider now the defendant’s remaining allegations of error.