Court Opinion

ID: 9772434
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:17:42.27632+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:44.381305
License: Public Domain

BLACKMAR, Judge,
concurring.
I concur because I cannot distinguish this case from State v. Jones, 705 S.W.2d *50219 (Mo. banc 1986). The affirmance appears to be within the standards this Court has set.
We should recognize that, although § 565.035, RSMo Supp. 1983, (reenacted in 1984 substantially without change) enjoins us to “consider the punishment ...” and to determine “whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases ...,” there is in fact very little proportionality review at the appellate stage. The test rather seems to be the same as the usual test in appealed cases — that is, whether any error has been demonstrated. If there is none, affirmance seems to go as of course.
This case seems to have arisen out of a drinking session. The killing was shocking and senseless, but numerous life sentence cases are reported in which the ultimate punishment is much more appropriate than in this case1 (if, indeed, we must depart from the practice of nations who follow the western tradition2 in exacting the death penalty). The defendant had numerous convictions, but none for major offenses. His is an unlikely selection for the death sentence, when some juries assess it and some do not.
I am also concerned about the statutory aggravating circumstances found by the jury. I am aware of nothing in the record to support the finding that the defendant killed “for the purpose of preventing his lawful arrest.” The fact that the defendant and his brother wore gloves in February, and the fact that money and food stamps were missing (but not found on the defendant), provide, at the most, scanty support for the assertion that the killing was committed “for the purpose of receiving money or other thing of value.” Only the “outrageously or wantonly vile” circumstance seems supported by the decisions of this Court. Were the point an open one, I would hold that it is prejudicial error to submit to the jury an aggravating circumstance which is not supported by the record. Such a submission suggests to the jury that it may consider the unsupported circumstance in reaching its conclusion on punishment. But our decisions are otherwise, and the Supreme Court of the United States has not disturbed our holdings.3
Because of the force of our controlling decisions, I concur.

. State v. Canterbury, 708 S.W.2d 662 (Mo. banc 1986); State v. Engleman, 634 S.W.2d 466 (Mo.1982); State v. Turner, 623 S.W.2d 4 (Mo. banc 1981); State v. Baskerville, 616 S.W.2d 839 (Mo.1981); State v. Downs, 593 S.W.2d 535 (Mo.1980); State v. Weatherspoon, 716 S.W.2d 379 (Mo.App.1986); State v. Rodden, 713 S.W.2d 279 (Mo.App.1986); State v. Williams, 678 S.W.2d 845 (Mo.App.1984); State v. Laws, 668 S.W.2d 234 (Mo.App.1984); State v. Bashe, 657 S.W.2d 321 (Mo.App.1983).

. Without having done extensive research, I recall relatively recent reports of executions in Iran, Pakistan, China, Singapore, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, South Africa, and Franco’s Spain.

. State v. Kenley, 693 S.W.2d 79 (Mo. banc 1985), cert. denied — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 1500, 89 L.Ed.2d 900 (1986); State v. Johns, 679 S.W.2d 253 (Mo. banc 1984), cert. denied 470 U.S. 1034, 105 S.Ct. 1413, 84 L.Ed.2d 796 (1985); State v. LaRette, 648 S.W.2d 96 (Mo. banc 1983); cert. denied 464 U.S. 908, 104 S.Ct. 262, 78 L.Ed.2d 246 (1983); State v. Mercer, 618 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. banc 1981), cert. denied 454 U.S. 933, 102 S.Ct. 432, 70 L.Ed.2d 240 (1981). See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983).