Court Opinion

ID: 9776824
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:46:01.471371+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:43.094205
License: Public Domain

Tom Glaze, Justice, dissenting. In a prior decision, this court, in misstating the holding in Johnson v. Florida, 166 So. 2d 798 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964), said that any reference to a polygraph test, in the absence of an agreement or other justifiable circumstances, would constitute error. Van Cleave v. State, 268 Ark. 514, 598 S.W.2d 65 (1980). That misstated rule was again mentioned and applied in Roleson v. State, 272 Ark. 346, 614 S.W.2d 659 (1981). Today, the court corrects that case law by adopting the following rule set out in the Johnson decision: [W]hile neither the results of a lie detector examination nor testimony which indirectly or inferentially apprises a jury of the results of a lie detector examination is admissible into evidence, the mere fact that the jury is apprised that a lie detector test was taken is not necessarily prejudicial if no inference as to the result is raised or if any references that might be raised as to the result are not prejudicial. (Emphasis added.) Although the majority, in correcting this court’s earlier decisions, acknowledges that the mere reference to a polygraph test is not error, it then proceeds to reverse this case for that very reason. Appellant’s trial strategy was to show that his nephew, Frank Boyles, was the trigger man. Boyles was a witness for the state and gave a first-hand account of the shooting. Boyles had made some inconsistent statements about his participation with the appellant in burglarizing a house and stealing some guns. Appellant hoped to focus on the inconsistencies of Boyles’s statements to the police to impeach his credibility. In keeping with this objective, appellant called Detective Sergeant J. C. Rider as a witness. Appellant posed questions regarding whether Boyles participated in burglarizing a house and stealing some guns, including the weapon used later to shoot the murder victim, Stella Martin. Rider mentioned the words “polygraph test” two times during appellant’s examination. The first pertinent part of that colloquy is as follows: Q And I’m talking about April the thirteenth, you’re sitting down — I mean, he’s still in Oklahoma and you went to talk to him. And on this page, he had still told you that Jerry was the [one] who broke in and got everything? A Yes, sir. And I have to admit that’s probably a mistake on my part for letting that pass, asT did, because earlier in the day, myself and Sergeant Boyd had interviewed him in the jail before taking him to OSBI headquarters for a polygraph. He had — MR. MARCHEWSKI: Your Honor, can we approach the bench. (AT BARSIDE, OUT OF JURY’S HEARING.) MR. MARCHEWSKI: I’m going to make a motion for a mistrial at this time. The officer has referred and implied that they took Frankie Boyles to the OSBI headquarters for a polygraph examination. Judge, I think that that is inadmissible. He doesn’t have to say what it’s about. That is an indication that a jury cannot escape that presumption. That’s why the police believe him, is that somehow that’s related to a polygraph examination. I move for a mistrial and ask that the Court grant it. (Emphasis added.) As can be seen, even appellant’s counsel was aware Officer Rider had made no direct or indirect mention of any results of a polygraph test given Boyles. Instead, he was of the expressed impression that he was entitled to a mistrial merely because Rider “referred and implied that the [officers] took Frank Boyles to the OSBI headquarters for a polygraph examination.” In denying appellant’s mistrial motion, the judge clearly stated that all Rider had said was that Boyles had been taken to a polygraph test. The judge also admonished appellant’s counsel that he could not call the polygraph examiner as a witness, saying “I don’t think we’re getting into that... I don’t think it’s got a thing in the world to do with this case . . . it’s not relevant evidence and shouldn’t be entered into.” Besides having failed to show Rider mentioned or implied what the results were of a polygraph given Boyles, appellant also showed no prejudice that could have arisen from Rider’s testimony. Appellant argued that the jury would presume that the police believed Boyles because of the polygraph examination. However, the jury did not hear the results of the polygraph examination but did hear evidence of Boyles’s inconsistent statements. As previously noted, appellant’s questions of Rider directly bore on whether Boyles had participated in a burglary in which the murder weapon was stolen. Boyles testified at trial, as did appellant, on this very subject. They both admitted to having participated in the burglary. Significantly, Boyles also admitted he had given a prior false statement that he never knew where the murder weapon came from. Appellant simply fails to show that the trial judge erred, or if error did occur, that it was prejudicial. This court has said that it will not reverse for errors that do not affect the essential fairness of a trial. Berna v. State, 282 Ark. 563, 670 S.W.2d 434 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1085 (1985). The second passage or colloquy between Rider and appellant’s counsel where Rider mentioned the words “polygraph test” is as follows: Q You know, he’s — you know, talking about being able to get them guns and stuff and saying that he might be able to get some guns and stuff like that. Then he came back and told me how’d he’d gotten those guns and then he got into all that stuff, so, then he was always talkin’ about going to Cushing, over to Pat’s. Now, is that right? A Well, that’s what he told me at the time, sir, but it’s like I told you I made a mistake probably in letting that slide, letting that statement slide and pursuing it any further. Q You mean not confronting him and telling him that he’s lying to you right then? A Yes, sir, I let that slide. But he had told me the truth earlier in the day before he ever took the polygraph test about the burglary. Q You mean he took a polygraph test about the burglary? A No. He took a polygraph test about the homicide. MR. MARSCHEWSKI: Your Honor — THE COURT: Mr. Marschewski, you’re asking him about these things. MR. MARSCHEWSKI: I didn’t ask him about that, Your Honor. THE COURT: You should have guided him more in his testimony, Mr. Marschewski. Ladies and Gentlemen, whether or not this man took a polygraph test, what its results were is not admissible into evidence. It doesn’t have anything to do with this trial. You’re the searchers of the truth, here, and what you find to be the truth is what it’s going to be. As can be readily seen, appellant’s counsel again delved into the conflicting statements Boyles had given concerning the burglary and theft of the guns, including the murder weapon, and Rider again referred to the fact that Boyles had taken a polygraph test. Once more, Rider made no mention of the test results, but even more importantly, this subject was thoroughly covered by counsel for appellant in his trial cross-examination of Boyles, and the jury knew full well that Boyles had previously lied when saying he had not participated in the theft of the guns. It is also noteworthy to mention that Boyles’s credibility was in issue from the outset of his testimony at trial because he admitted early on that he was serving time for the crime of robbery by force. The trial judge did an excellent job in evaluating and ruling on the testimony given by Rider, Boyles and the appellant. He was correct in ruling that the polygraph test results were not mentioned nor were they admissible. And, in these circumstances where the appellant was able to impeach Boyles’s credibility by showing his inconsistent statements about prior criminal activity, the mention of the words “polygraph test” was not prejudicial. The trial judge further admonished the jury to this effect. The majority, in my view, is seriously wrong in finding the trial court erred. Hays and Turner, JJ, join this dissent.