Court Opinion

ID: 9396764
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-23 18:03:33.08719+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:19.525715
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
 UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                 AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                    IN THE
             ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                DIVISION ONE

                       STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

                                        v.

                   STEPHEN E. PHILBROOK, Appellant.

                             No. 1 CA-CR 22-0235
                               FILED 5-23-2023

           Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
                        No. CR2019-006280-001
               The Honorable Roy C. Whitehead, Judge

                                  AFFIRMED

                                   COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Kevin M. Morrow
Counsel for Appellee

Brown & Little PLC, Chandler
By Matthew O. Brown
Counsel for Appellant
                           STATE v. PHILBROOK
                            Decision of the Court

                       MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Brian Y. Furuya delivered the decision of the Court, in which Vice
Chief Judge David B. Gass and Judge Andrew M. Jacobs joined.

F U R U Y A, Judge:

¶1             Stephen E. Philbrook appeals his convictions and sentences
for molestation of a child and sexual exploitation of a minor, arguing the
trial court should have suppressed incriminating statements he made
during a police interview, and the prosecutor engaged in misconduct at
trial. Finding no error, we affirm.

                 FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2            Philbrook lived in Glendale with his girlfriend, “Julie,” 1 and
Julie’s young daughter, “Natalee,” when he and Julie had a baby boy. Julie
moved out in 2016, but Philbrook continued giving her money “to help her
get back on her feet.” And although she left the children under Philbrook’s
care, Julie would frequently visit them at his home.

¶3            During one of those visits in 2018, Julie found a video on
Philbrook’s phone that showed eight-year-old Natalee sitting on
Philbrook’s lap while “he’s touching her.” Natalee was not wearing
underwear and the video was recorded from under a table where the two
were sitting on a chair. Julie took the phone and called the police.

¶4            Detectives arrested Philbrook and obtained a warrant to
search his home. At Philbrook’s subsequent early-morning interview, the
first detective advised him of his Miranda rights. Philbrook said he
understood, and the interview proceeded. The second detective joined the
interview one hour later. Telling Philbrook, “We know about everything,”
the second detective described incriminating evidence collected during the
search of Philbrook’s home. The second detective questioned Philbrook in
an aggressive and loud manner, repeatedly using explicit language, stated
that Philbrook “look[ed] like a monster . . . preying on this poor little girl,”
and twice told Philbrook to “man up.”

1    “Julie” and “Natalee” are the pseudonyms used in the State’s
Answering Brief.

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                           STATE v. PHILBROOK
                            Decision of the Court

¶5            Philbrook immediately interjected and admitted he “made
bad decisions . . . but I never meant to hurt her.” When asked how many
times he had touched Natalee’s vagina, Philbrook responded, “I can’t
believe I did it even once” before admitting, “Once or twice . . . if that.”
Philbrook then explained that he did not know the video of Natalee sitting
on his lap was saved on his phone. “I thought [it was] deleted,” he said. A
video recording of the interview was admitted at trial without objection and
played for the jury.

¶6              Contrary to what he told Philbrook during the interview, the
second detective admitted at trial he had not at that time personally viewed
the video on Philbrook’s phone. Philbrook testified he either did not recall
making the inculpatory statements or he falsely confessed because he was
“in . . . unbearable pain” from his psoriatic arthritis, which was exacerbated
by his cold jail cell. Philbrook explained he was “just trying to get out of
there” because the second detective was “really aggressive.”

¶7             After the defense concluded its case, the court instructed the
jurors not to consider any statements made by Philbrook during his
interview unless they determined beyond a reasonable doubt that he made
the statements voluntarily. The court then instructed: “The defendant’s
statement was not voluntary if it resulted from the defendant’s will being
overcome by a law enforcement officer’s use of any sort of violence,
coercion, or threats, or by any direct or implied promise, however slight.”
Philbrook’s closing argument followed, and he urged the jury to find his
statements were involuntary because the detective “lied” to him, “got up in
his face[,]” and “bullied him until he started saying what they wanted him
to say.”

¶8           The jury found Philbrook guilty on one count each of
molestation of a child and sexual exploitation of a minor. The trial court
imposed presumptive and consecutive 17-year prison terms.

¶9          Philbrook timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction under
Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and -
4033(A)(1).

                               DISCUSSION

   I.     Philbrook’s Statements to the Detectives were Voluntary.

¶10            Philbrook argues the trial court erred by admitting evidence
of his confessions. See A.R.S. § 13-3988(C) (defining “confession,” in part, as
“any self-incriminating statement made or given orally or in writing.”).

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                           STATE v. PHILBROOK
                            Decision of the Court

According to Philbrook, he confessed involuntarily and his incriminating
statements therefore should have been suppressed.2

¶11            Philbrook admits he did not file a pretrial motion in superior
court seeking to suppress his statements on voluntariness grounds. See
Ariz. R. Crim. P. 16.1(b) (“Parties must make all motions no later than 20
days before trial[.]”). He also concedes he did not raise a similar objection
at trial. See State v. Alvarado, 121 Ariz. 485, 488 (1979) (defendant has the
burden of raising issues regarding voluntariness).

¶12           In the absence of a trial objection, when a question of
voluntariness is raised by the evidence, a trial court is not required to sua
sponte conduct a hearing to determine whether a defendant’s confession
was voluntary; rather, the court has discretion to do so. Bush, 244 Ariz. at
588–90 ¶¶ 53–62. Similarly, if a defendant does not request a pretrial
suppression hearing, a court may exercise its discretion and suppress a
confession after finding the trial evidence establishes the defendant
confessed involuntarily. See State v. Davolt, 207 Ariz. 191, 208 ¶ 60 (2004)
(“The admission of evidence is within the trial court’s discretion and will
not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.”).

¶13            Because Philbrook did not move to suppress his confessions
or object to their admission at trial on voluntariness grounds, he bears the
burden on appeal of establishing fundamental error. State v. Escalante, 245
Ariz. 135, 140, 142 ¶¶ 12, 21 (2018); see State v. Londo, 215 Ariz. 72, 76 ¶ 12
(App. 2006) (reviewing defendant’s claim of an involuntary confession for
fundamental error because he raised the issue “for the first time on
appeal”). To carry his burden, Philbrook must prove either error and
resulting prejudice or that the error “was so egregious that he could not
possibly have received a fair trial.” Escalante, 245 Ariz. at 142 ¶ 21. That is,
to prevail on appeal, Philbrook must first establish the trial court abused its
discretion by failing to sua sponte suppress evidence of his confessions. See
id. (“[T]he first step in fundamental error review is determining whether
trial error exists.”). He did not do so.

2      Philbrook does not argue the court abused its discretion by failing to
hold an evidentiary hearing to determine the voluntariness of his
statements before admitting them. See State v. Bush, 244 Ariz. 575, 590 ¶ 62
(2018) (“[I]f a trial court is aware of facts indicating that a confession was
involuntary, the court, in its discretion and even absent a request, may
order a voluntariness hearing.”).

                                       4
                          STATE v. PHILBROOK
                           Decision of the Court

¶14           A defendant’s statements to police are admissible if they are
voluntary and not obtained by coercion or improper inducement. Haynes v.
Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513 (1963); see A.R.S. § 13-3988(A). “In assessing
voluntariness, we consider the totality of circumstances to determine
whether the statements were or were not the product of a ‘rational intellect
and a free will.’” State v. Hoskins, 199 Ariz. 127, 137 ¶ 28 (2000) (quoting
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398 (1978)). “[C]oercive police activity is a
necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not ‘voluntary[.]’”
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986).

¶15           The evidence supports Philbrook’s contention that the second
detective’s questioning was “aggressive” and “confrontational.” But we
find no support for Philbrook’s assertion that he was treated
“inhumane[ly.]” Indeed, the recorded interview is consistent with the first
detective’s testimony that Philbrook appeared to understand the
conversation and did not assert he was too tired or in too much pain to
continue the interview. In fact, Philbrook did not refuse to answer questions
for any reason. Nor did he otherwise invoke his right to remain silent. And
although Philbrook was visibly shivering and complained of being cold
when he entered the interview room, he immediately agreed with the first
detective’s assessment that the room was “warmer.” As the interview
progressed, Philbrook stopped shivering and he did not repeat his initial
complaint about the temperature.

¶16            The interview video also supports the jury’s apparent
determination the second detective’s questioning did not overcome
Philbrook’s will and thus was not coercive. During the interview, the
second detective—who was not wearing a uniform and did not have a
gun—made no threats or promises. He was seated at a table opposite
Philbrook throughout his questioning. Philbrook’s testimony that he was
“just trying to get out of there” because he was cold and in pain from his
psoriatic arthritis was therefore insufficient to find his confessions were
involuntary. State v. Smith, 193 Ariz. 452, 457 ¶ 14 (1999) (“Coercive police
activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not
voluntary[.] When evaluating coercion, the defendant’s physical and
mental states are relevant to determine susceptibility to coercion, but alone
are not enough to render a statement involuntary.”) (Internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). And the second detective’s misrepresentation
he had personally viewed the video found on Philbrook’s phone was also
insufficient to render the confessions involuntary. See State v. Winters, 27
Ariz. App. 508, 511 (1976) (“Generally, deception alone does not render a
statement inadmissible. . . . A statement induced by fraud or trickery is not
made involuntary unless there is additional evidence indicating that the

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                           STATE v. PHILBROOK
                            Decision of the Court

defendant’s will was overborne or that the confession was false or
unreliable.”). Moreover, that deception was on a collateral point, given the
video on the phone was in the State’s possession, so that its contents were
available to the second detective and known to Philbrook in the first place.
Finally, while Philbrook’s confession occurred in a ninety-minute
interrogation in the middle of the night, he does not argue that fatigue or
the unusual hour of interrogation overbore his will. See United States v.
Castro-Higuero, 473 F.3d 880, 886 (8th Cir. 2007) (explaining “that early
morning/late night interrogations are not in themselves coercive”).

¶17            On this record, the court acted within its discretion by not
suppressing evidence of Philbrook’s confessions. No error, fundamental or
otherwise, occurred. Cf. State v. Strayhand, 184 Ariz. 571, 582 n.3 (App. 1995)
(finding trial court committed fundamental error by failing to sua sponte
suppress confessions because “the admission of the [d]efendant’s
confessions [that] followed repeated refusals to honor his invocation of his
right to remain silent and which were based on threats constitutes a denial
of due process[.]”).

   II.    This Record Does Not Support Allegations of Prosecutorial
          Misconduct.

¶18           Philbrook argues the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by
questioning him in front of the jury about the existence of evidence the court
had previously ruled was inadmissible. Allegations of prosecutorial
misconduct requires showing “intentional conduct which the prosecutor
knows to be improper and prejudicial . . . [and] not merely the result of legal
error, negligence, mistake, or insignificant impropriety.” State v. Lapan, 249
Ariz. 540, 548–9 ¶ 25 (App. 2020) (quoting State v. Martinez, 221 Ariz. 383,
393 ¶ 36 (App. 2009) (cleaned up). In other words, unlike prosecutorial
error, prosecutorial misconduct must “imply a concurrent ethical rules
violation.” State v. Shortman, 254 Ariz. 338, 410 ¶ 20 (App. 2022) (quoting
State v. Murray, 250 Ariz. 543, 548 ¶ 12 (2021)). Because Philbrook failed to
allege any ethical violation by the prosecutor at trial, we consider his
argument as one of prosecutorial error.

¶19           Philbrook also cannot show prosecutorial error. Prosecutorial
error requires showing both that error occurred and “a reasonable
likelihood exists that the [error] could have affected the jury’s verdict,
thereby denying [the] defendant a fair trial.” Murray, 250 Ariz. at 548 ¶ 13
(quoting State v. Anderson, 210 Ariz. 327, 340 ¶ 45 (2005). Here however, the
record belies that argument.

                                      6
                          STATE v. PHILBROOK
                           Decision of the Court

¶20            The day after the State concluded its case-in-chief, Philbrook
disclosed handwritten documents he claimed proved his “loans” to Julie.
The trial court sustained the State’s objection to the documents’ admission,
finding Philbrook’s disclosure was untimely. The court, however, allowed
the parties to present testimony “regarding the issues [they] would like to
elicit testimony on[.]”

¶21          Philbrook then explained on direct examination he loaned
Julie $20,000 over the course of two years “for food and stuff” and,
approximately one week before “this all went down,” Julie learned she
would be getting $30,000 from Natalee’s father for “back child support[.]”
Of that amount, Philbrook noted Julie’s attorney “wanted a cut[,]” but “no
matter what, I wanted my $20,000 back[.]”

¶22           During her cross-examination of Philbrook, the prosecutor
referenced Philbrook’s testimony that “there was some sort of an order
where [Julie] was going to have to pay you money[,]” before beginning to
ask: “You haven’t provided any documents or any other information that
would show—.” Philbrook’s counsel promptly interrupted, and apparently
alluding to the loan paperwork the court precluded, she objected to “Mr.
Philbrook not having any documents to support this allegation.” The
prosecutor clarified for the court that “there hasn’t been anything to
support that there was some sort of judgment, or a court order, or anything
in 2018, [which] he has testified to this morning.” The court overruled the
objection, and the prosecutor continued questioning Philbrook, who stated,
“There was not a judgment from the court, but it was an agreement between
me and her.”

¶23           The record therefore shows the prosecutor’s incomplete
question on cross-examination referred to the lack of documentation
corroborating Philbrook’s direct testimony Julie received $30,000 in a court
proceeding involving back child support owed by Natalee’s father. The
prosecutor did not, as Philbrook argues, refer to the loan documents the
trial court had precluded. Accordingly, we reject Philbrook’s claim of
prosecutorial misconduct. The prosecutor did not err, let alone commit
misconduct. See In re Martinez, 248 Ariz. 458, 470 ¶ 47 (2020) (“When
reviewing the conduct of prosecutors in the context of ‘prosecutorial
misconduct’ claims, courts should differentiate between ‘error,’ which may
not necessarily imply a concurrent ethical rules violation, and ‘misconduct,’
which may suggest an ethical violation.”).

                                     7
                        STATE v. PHILBROOK
                         Decision of the Court

                            CONCLUSION

¶24          For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Philbrook’s convictions
and sentences.

                          AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                          FILED: AA

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