Court Opinion

ID: 9889600
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-10 19:16:00.420909+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:58.326896
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Taylor, 2023-Ohio-3683.]

STATE OF OHIO                     )                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                                  )ss:                  NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF LORAIN                  )

STATE OF OHIO                                           C.A. No.    22CA011858

        Appellee

        v.                                              APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
                                                        ENTERED IN THE
DAVID TAYLOR                                            COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
                                                        COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO
        Appellant                                       CASE No.   21CR103835

                                  DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: October 10, 2023

        FLAGG LANZINGER, Judge.

        {¶1}     David Taylor appeals from the judgment of the Lorain County Court of Common

Pleas. For the following reasons, this Court affirms.

                                                 I.

        {¶2}     A grand jury indicted Mr. Taylor on one count of improperly discharging a firearm

into a habitation or school safety zone with two accompanying firearm specifications, one count

of carrying a concealed weapon, one of count improperly handling firearms in a motor vehicle,

and one count of obstructing official business. Mr. Taylor pleaded not guilty. The matter

proceeded to a jury trial wherein the following evidence was adduced.

        {¶3}     On the evening of January 16, 2021, the victim, her boyfriend, and her family,

which included children ranging in age from six-months old to sixteen-years old, were enjoying a

family night at their home. Shortly before 10:00 p.m., five gunshots came through the front of the

house. Fortunately, no one was struck.
                                                  2

          {¶4}   About two blocks away, two police officers who were parked in their respective

cruisers heard the gunshots. Each officer immediately drove in the direction of the gunshots,

although each officer took a different route.

          {¶5}   While driving in the direction of where he thought the gunshots came from, one of

the officers observed a vehicle speeding down the road. The officer attempted to stop the vehicle.

The vehicle continued speeding and ran through several stop signs and red lights–reaching speeds

of over 80 m.p.h.–before coming to a stop after it crashed into a parked vehicle. The driver, who

was a juvenile (the “juvenile”), and the passenger, later identified as Mr. Taylor, fled on foot in

different directions. The other officer had arrived at this point, so one officer pursued the juvenile

on foot, and the other officer pursued Mr. Taylor on foot. Mr. Taylor ran over train tracks and

attempted to hide in a wooded area, but the officer located and apprehended him. The other officer

apprehended the juvenile. While Mr. Taylor was seated in the back of a police cruiser, he called

his mother and told her that no one had shot at a house, and that the police chased their car for no

reason.

          {¶6}   The vehicle the juvenile was driving was later identified as Mr. Taylor’s mother’s

vehicle. While searching the vehicle, officers located a 9mm gun on the passenger-side floor.

Officers also located five shell casings in the road outside the victim’s house. The State presented

forensic evidence indicating that the juvenile and Mr. Taylor both tested positive for gunshot

residue, and that the shell casings located in the street were consistent with having been fired from

the gun located in Mr. Taylor’s mother’s vehicle.

          {¶7}   Prior to trial, the parties discussed the fact that the juvenile had entered an

admission to the charges of failure to comply with an order or signal of a police officer, improperly

discharging a firearm into a habitation or school safety zone, and improperly handling firearms in
                                                  3

a motor vehicle in his delinquency proceeding. The juvenile court memorialized the juvenile’s

admission to the charges in a judgment entry (the “Admission”). The parties also discussed the

fact that the juvenile was awaiting his dispositional hearing.1 Defense counsel expressed that he

wanted to review the dispositional hearing transcript from the juvenile’s case to see if there was

any allocution or exculpatory evidence in favor of Mr. Taylor. The prosecutor indicated that the

juvenile’s dispositional hearing would not occur until after Mr. Taylor’s trial because the State

wanted to avoid a situation where the juvenile, facing no further penalty, would take full

responsibility for the events. Defense counsel indicated that he would prefer to proceed to trial

after the juvenile’s dispositional hearing, but stated that he understood the State’s position in that

regard.

          {¶8}   At trial, the State proceeded under the theory that Mr. Taylor was guilty as the

principal offender or was complicit to the acts of the juvenile as an aider and abettor. After the

State’s case-in-chief, defense counsel attempted to introduce a certified copy of the Admission “to

show the innocence of [Mr. Taylor].” After lengthy discussions on the record and briefing on the

issue, the trial court excluded the certified copy of the Admission from evidence. The trial court

reasoned, in part, that the Admission simply indicated that the juvenile admitted to the charges,

which did not necessarily exculpate Mr. Taylor since the juvenile could have admitted to the

charges for a number of reasons. The trial court also reasoned that the Admission was hearsay,

and that it did not fall within the Evid.R.804(B)(3) exception to hearsay for statements against

interest because there was no corroborating evidence to demonstrate its trustworthiness. After the

trial court’s ruling, the defense presented no evidence.

         Throughout the proceedings, the parties referred to the juvenile’s admission as a guilty
          1

plea, and to his dispositional hearing as a sentencing hearing.
                                                  4

          {¶9}   The trial court then instructed the jury, which included instructions on complicity,

aiding and abetting, and constructive possession. The jury found Mr. Taylor guilty of the charges

and accompanying specifications. The trial court sentenced Mr. Taylor accordingly. He now

appeals, raising four assignments of error for this Court’s review.

                                                  II.

                                   ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I

          DEFENDANT DAVID TAYLOR WAS DENIED A MEANINGFUL
          OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT A COMPLETE DEFENSE, WHICH WOULD
          HAVE MATERIALLY ALTERED THE OUTCOME OF THE TR[IAL] WHEN
          HE WAS DENIED THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT EXCULPATORY
          EVIDENCE OF CODEFENDANT’S ADMISSION OF THE CHARGES
          COMMITTED.

          {¶10} In his first assignment of error, Mr. Taylor argues that the trial court erred by

excluding the certified copy of the Admission from evidence, which deprived him of a meaningful

opportunity to present a complete defense. For the following reasons, this Court disagrees.

          {¶11} “[A] trial court has broad discretion in the admission or exclusion of evidence and

this Court will not disturb a trial court’s ruling on the admission of evidence absent an abuse of

discretion and material prejudice to the defendant.” (Alteration sic.) State v. Mitchell, 9th Dist.

Medina No. 21CA0071-M, 2022-Ohio-3176, ¶ 30, quoting Drew v. Marino, 9th Dist. Summit No.

21458, 2004-Ohio-1071, ¶ 8. An abuse of discretion implies that the trial court’s attitude was

unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219

(1983).

          {¶12} Having reviewed the record, this Court cannot say that the trial court committed

reversible error when it excluded the Admission from evidence because Mr. Taylor cannot

establish that he suffered material prejudice. Mitchell at ¶ 30. Mr. Taylor argues that his trial

counsel intended to introduce the Admission as exculpatory evidence to show that the juvenile
                                                 5

admitted under oath that “he had handled the firearm, that he had shot into the building, and that

he had taken responsibility.”     (Emphasis sic.)     Mr. Taylor’s argument, however, fails to

acknowledge the State’s theory at trial that–even if Mr. Taylor was not the principal offender–the

evidence established his guilt as an aider and abettor. Under R.C. 2923.03(F), an aider and abettor

to a crime is subject to the same penalties as the principal offender. As a result, the Admission,

even if admitted into evidence, would not have exculpated Mr. Taylor because the jury could have

found him guilty under the theory of complicity as an aider and abettor.2 See State v. Hurse, 10th

Dist. Franklin No. 14AP-687, 2015-Ohio-2656, ¶ 9-12 (holding that the trial court’s exclusion of

evidence of a codefendant’s conviction did not prejudice the defendant because the jury could have

found the defendant guilty of complicity); see State v. Askew, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 20110,

2005-Ohio-4026, ¶ 15 (noting that a codefendant’s incriminating statements do not exculpate one

who is complicit to the crime). Thus, even assuming without deciding that the trial court erred by

excluding the Admission, Mr. Taylor cannot establish that he suffered material prejudice as a result

of the trial court’s ruling. Hurse at ¶ 12. Accordingly, Mr. Taylor’s first assignment of error is

overruled.

                                  ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II

       THE STATE [O]F OHIO COMMITTED MISCONDUCT AND
       PURPOSEFULLY DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF A MATERIAL WITNESS TO
       HIS DEFENSE WHEN IT KNOWINGLY MOVED CODEFENDANT’S
       SENTENCING DATE TO A DATE AFTER TAYLOR’S TRIAL DATE IN
       ORDER TO DISSUADE CODEFENDANT FROM ENTERING ADMISSIONS
       OF GUILT AT TAYLOR’S TRIAL.

       2
         This Court notes that Mr. Taylor has not challenged the sufficiency or manifest weight of
the evidence as it relates to his role as either a principal offender or as an aider and abettor.
                                                  6

       {¶13} In his second assignment of error, Mr. Taylor argues that the State committed

prosecutorial misconduct when it moved the juvenile’s dispositional hearing to a date after Mr.

Taylor’s trial to dissuade the juvenile from testifying on Mr. Taylor’s behalf. Mr. Taylor argues

that this deprived him of a material witness, which deprived him of a fair trial. For the following

reasons, this Court disagrees.

       {¶14} As Mr. Taylor acknowledges in his merit brief, his trial counsel did not object when

the State indicated that the juvenile’s dispositional hearing was moved to a date after Mr. Taylor’s

trial. As a result, Mr. Taylor is limited to arguing plain error on appeal. State v. Fortune, 9th Dist.

Wayne No. 19AP0024, 2020-Ohio-3606, ¶ 38 (“If a defendant fails to object to alleged

prosecutorial misconduct, he forfeits all but plain error.”). Under Crim.R. 52, “[p]lain errors or

defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention

of the court.” “To establish plain error, one must show (1) an error occurred, i.e., a deviation from

a legal rule, (2) the error is plain, i.e., an obvious defect in the proceedings, and (3) the error

affected a substantial right, i.e., affected the outcome of the proceedings.” State v. Grant, 9th Dist.

Summit No. 29259, 2019-Ohio-3561, ¶ 5, citing State v. Morgan, 153 Ohio St.3d 196, 2017-Ohio-

7565, ¶ 36. Notice of plain error “is to be taken with the utmost caution, under exceptional

circumstances and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.” State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d

91 (1978), paragraph three of the syllabus.

       {¶15} “In deciding whether a prosecutor’s conduct rises to the level of prosecutorial

misconduct, a court determines if the prosecutor’s actions were improper, and, if so, whether the

defendant’s substantial rights were actually prejudiced.” State v. Moreland, 9th Dist. Summit No.

27910, 2016-Ohio-7588, ¶ 22, citing State v. Smith, 14 Ohio St.3d 13, 14 (1984). To demonstrate

prejudice, “[t]he defendant must show that, but for the prosecutor’s misconduct, the trier of fact
                                                  7

would not have convicted him.” Moreland at ¶ 22. “The touchstone of the analysis ‘is the fairness

of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.’” State v. Diar, 120 Ohio St.3d 460, 2008-Ohio-

6266, ¶ 140, quoting Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982).

       {¶16} Here, the prosecutor stated during a pretrial that the delay in the juvenile’s

dispositional hearing was:

       purposeful * * * to avoid the situation where the juvenile’s already sentenced, and
       then we have the potential where he faces no further penalty, and potentially * * *
       takes the blame for all this, so the juvenile court is continuing out his sentencing
       until this case is resolved.

       {¶17} During trial, outside the presence of the jury, the juvenile’s attorney informed the

trial court that the juvenile was still awaiting final disposition. The juvenile’s attorney also

informed the trial court that, if Mr. Taylor’s defense counsel called the juvenile as a witness, the

juvenile intended to exercise his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. The trial court, therefore,

determined that “it would be [an] inefficient use of judicial resources” to require the juvenile to

appear at Mr. Taylor’s trial, and declared him unavailable to testify.

       {¶18} On appeal, Mr. Taylor argues that the juvenile “would have likely testified that he

was the one who fired the weapon and that [Mr.] Taylor was not complicit in that regard.” As a

result, he argues, he was denied the opportunity to present a complete defense.

       {¶19} As an initial matter, there is no indication that the prosecutor in Mr. Taylor’s case

was the same prosecutor in the juvenile’s case. Thus, any delay in the dispositional hearing would

have been requested by a different prosecutor and would have been granted by a different trial

judge. This Court is not aware of–nor has Mr. Taylor pointed to–any case law that indicates that

a prosecutor can engage in prosecutorial misconduct based upon the actions of a different

prosecutor, in a different case, in front of a different trial judge. See App.R. 16(A)(7) (requiring

appellants to support their arguments with citations to legal authorities).
                                                  8

       {¶20} Additionally, Mr. Taylor’s argument is based upon speculation as to how the

juvenile would have testified. While defense counsel proffered the Admission for the record, the

juvenile could have admitted to the charges based upon his role as the principal offender, or as an

aider and abettor. Mr. Taylor speculates on appeal that the juvenile “would have likely testified

that he was the one who fired the weapon and that [Mr.] Taylor was not complicit in that regard.”

This Court, however, will not engage in speculation as to how the juvenile “would have likely

testified” for purposes of determining whether the prosecutor engaged in prosecutorial misconduct.

See Moreland, 2016-Ohio-7588, at ¶ 29, 34 (rejecting an appellant’s claim of prosecutorial

misconduct and noting that “this Court will not engage in speculation.”); State v. Chatman, 10th

Dist. Franklin No. 08AP-803, 2009-Ohio-2504, ¶ 55 (noting that, without evidence as to how a

witness would have testified, “it is pure speculation to conclude there was prosecutorial

misconduct and that prejudice resulted from the same.”).

       {¶21} Even assuming without deciding that the prosecutor in Mr. Taylor’s case engaged

in misconduct, this Court cannot say that, but for the prosecutor’s misconduct, the trier of fact

would not have convicted Mr. Taylor. As set forth in this Court’s recitation of the facts above, the

State presented evidence indicating that: (1) the juvenile was driving Mr. Taylor’s mother’s vehicle

and Mr. Taylor was in the front passenger’s seat; (2) after the vehicle crashed into a parked vehicle,

Mr. Taylor fled from officers on foot and attempted to hide in a wooded area before an officer

apprehended him; (3) officers located a gun on the passenger-side floor of the vehicle; (4) Mr.

Taylor testified positive for gunshot residue; and (5) the shell casings located from the street in

front of the victim’s house were consistent with having been fired from the gun located in the

vehicle. While Mr. Taylor speculates on appeal that the juvenile’s testimony would have been

exculpatory, this Court disagrees in light of this evidence.
                                                 9

       {¶22} Based upon the foregoing, this Court concludes that Mr. Taylor has failed to

establish that, but for the prosecutor’s alleged misconduct, the jury would not have convicted him.

See Moreland, 2016-Ohio-7588, at ¶ 22.         As a result, Mr. Taylor has failed to establish

prosecutorial misconduct. See id. Mr. Taylor’s second assignment of error is overruled.

                                 ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III

       DEFENDANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
       WHICH MATERIALLY DEPRIVED HIM OF A FAIR TRIAL WHEN[]
       COUNSEL FAILED TO OBJECT TO THE STATE’S MANIPULATION OF
       SENTENCING SCHEDULE IN ORDER TO DEPRIVE HIM OF A MATERIAL
       WITNESS AND WHEN DEFENSE COUNSEL PREJUDICED THE JURY TO
       TAYLOR THROUGH HIS DAMAGING CLOSING ARGUMENTS.

       {¶23} In his third assignment of error, Mr. Taylor argues that his trial counsel rendered

ineffective assistance. For the following reasons, this Court disagrees.

       {¶24} “[I]n Ohio, a properly licensed attorney is presumed competent.” State v. Gondor,

112 Ohio St.3d 377, 2006-Ohio-6679, ¶ 62. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel, Mr. Taylor must establish: (1) that his counsel’s performance was deficient to the extent

that “counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth

Amendment[;]” and (2) that “the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). A deficient performance is one that falls below an

objective standard of reasonable representation. State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136 (1989),

paragraph two of the syllabus. To establish prejudice, Mr. Taylor must show that there existed a

reasonable probability that, but for his counsel’s errors, the outcome of the proceeding would have

been different. State v. Sowell, 148 Ohio St.3d 554, 2016-Ohio-8025, ¶ 138. As the Ohio Supreme

Court has acknowledged, “[a] defendant’s failure to satisfy one prong of the Strickland test negates

a court’s need to consider the other.” State v. Madrigal, 87 Ohio St.3d 378, 389 (2000), citing

Strickland at 697.
                                                 10

       {¶25} Mr. Taylor argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance for several

reasons, including by: (1) failing to object to the State delaying the dispositional hearing of the

juvenile, which effectively barred the juvenile from testifying on his behalf; (2) making comments

about partisanship and race relations during closing arguments instead of focusing on the

weaknesses in the State’s case; and (3) suggesting his guilt during closing arguments by stating

that the incident could have occurred by “some reckless teenager who’s got a new fancy toy, I’m

just going to ride around like a cowboy, hee-haw, shooting off into the air.” For the following

reasons, this Court concludes that Mr. Taylor’s arguments lack merit.

       {¶26} Regarding Mr. Taylor’s trial counsel’s failure to object to the State delaying the

dispositional hearing of the juvenile, this Court has already concluded that Mr. Taylor has failed

to demonstrate any resulting prejudice. Accordingly, Mr. Taylor cannot establish ineffective

assistance in that regard. See Madrigal at 389 (“A defendant’s failure to satisfy one prong of the

Strickland test negates a court’s need to consider the other.”).

       {¶27} Regarding Mr. Taylor’s trial counsel’s closing arguments, the Ohio Supreme Court

has acknowledged that “[c]ounsel for both sides are afforded wide latitude during closing

arguments.” State v. Lang, 129 Ohio St.3d 512, 2011-Ohio-4215, ¶ 192. It has also acknowledged

that “[d]ebatable trial tactics generally do not constitute a deprivation of effective counsel.” Id.

       {¶28} Mr. Taylor is correct in that his trial counsel discussed race relations, partisanship,

and national instances of police misconduct that occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic during

closings arguments. He did so in the context of attempting to explain to the jury why Mr. Taylor,

an African American, would have been motivated to run from a crashed vehicle and attempt to

hide from the police in a wooded area despite not committing a crime. This Court fails to see how

Mr. Taylor’s trial counsel’s strategy in this regard was deficient, let alone deficient to the extent
                                                 11

that “counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth

Amendment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.

       {¶29} Regarding Mr. Taylor’s trial counsel’s comment during closing arguments that the

incident could have occurred by “some reckless teenager who’s got a new fancy toy, I’m just going

to ride around like a cowboy, hee-haw, shooting off into the air[,]” this Court’s review of the record

indicates the Mr. Taylor’s trial counsel was not suggesting Mr. Taylor’s guilt. When read as a

whole, Mr. Taylor’s trial counsel stated: “How do we know that this just wasn’t some reckless

teenager who’s got a new fancy toy, I’m just going to ride around like a cowboy, hee-haw, shooting

off into the air.” Mr. Taylor’s trial counsel then explained that the State did not present an expert

witness as to the trajectory of the bullet and criticized the police officers’ investigation. Viewing

Mr. Taylor’s trial counsel’s closing argument as a whole, this Court concludes that Mr. Taylor’s

argument that his trial counsel improperly suggested his guilt lacks merit. Accordingly, Mr. Taylor

has failed to establish that his trial counsel rendered a deficient performance in this regard. Mr.

Taylor, therefore, cannot establish ineffective assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Madrigal,

87 Ohio St.3d at 389.

       {¶30} In light of the foregoing, Mr. Taylor’s third assignment of error is overruled.

                                  ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV

       COUNSEL’S MANY ERRORS, WHILE SOME MAY BE DEEMED
       HARMLESS, CUMULATIVELY DENIED DEFENDANT A FAIR TRIAL.

       {¶31} In his fourth assignment of error, Mr. Taylor argues that cumulative error deprived

him of a fair trial. This Court disagrees.

       {¶32} This Court has explained the doctrine of cumulative error as follows:

       Under the doctrine of cumulative error, “a conviction will be reversed when the
       cumulative effect of errors in a trial deprives a defendant of a fair trial even though
       each of the numerous instances of trial—court error does not individually constitute
                                                  12

         cause for reversal.” State v. Powell, 132 Ohio St.3d 233, 2012-Ohio-2577, ¶ 223.
         To succeed on a claim of cumulative error, a defendant must establish that there
         were multiple instances of trial court error, State v. Stahl-Francisco, 9th Dist.
         Medina No. 19CA0093-M, 2020-Ohio-5456, ¶ 17, and that he sustained prejudice
         as a result of those errors, State v. Froman, 162 Ohio St.3d 435, 2020-Ohio-4523,
         ¶ 156. If a defendant “‘fail[s] to demonstrate any prejudice resulting from the errors
         he has alleged, he cannot demonstrate cumulative error.’” State v. Straughan, 9th
         Dist. Summit No. 29549, 2021-Ohio-1054, ¶ 68, quoting In re F.B., 9th Dist.
         Summit Nos. 28960, 28985, 2019-Ohio-1738, ¶ 47. The Supreme Court has
         recognized that “‘there can be no such thing as an error-free, perfect trial, and * *
         * the Constitution does not guarantee such a trial.’” State v. Hill, 75 Ohio St.3d
         195, 212 (1996), quoting United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 508-509 (1983).

(Alterations sic.) State v. Yatson, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 20CA011658, 2022-Ohio-2621, ¶ 75.

         {¶33} Mr. Taylor argues that, in addition to the errors set forth in his third assignment of

error regarding his trial counsel’s deficient performance, his trial counsel committed a series of

errors, including: (1) suggesting to the trial court that Mr. Taylor would be pleading guilty and,

therefore, suggesting his guilt and removing his ability to have a bench trial; (2) “float[ing] the

theory that [Mr.] Taylor was either the shooter or that he was complicit in the shooting[;]” and (3)

failing to present the certified copy of the Admission during the State’s case-in-chief by using it

to cross-examine the officer who arrested the juvenile. The cumulative effect of these errors, Mr.

Taylor argues, deprived him of a fair trial.

         {¶34} While Mr. Taylor asserts that his trial counsel suggested his guilt to the trial court,

this Court’s review of the record reveals otherwise. During several pretrials, Mr. Taylor’s counsel

did note that he and the prosecutor were in negotiations to potentially “resolve” the case ahead of

the trial date. In discussing the underlying facts at one of the pretrials, Mr. Taylor’s trial counsel

made clear that he was not “in any way representing * * * that [his] client has represented” that

the facts as alleged by the State occurred. Despite Mr. Taylor’s argument to the contrary, the

record–when read as a whole–does not indicate that his trial counsel suggested his guilt to the trial

court.
                                                  13

        {¶35} Regarding Mr. Taylor’s argument that his trial counsel “floated” the idea that he

was the shooter or was complicit to the shooting, Mr. Taylor has not pointed this Court to the

portion of the record that he relies upon to support this argument. See App.R. 16(A)(7) (requiring

an appellant’s brief to cite the “parts of the record on which appellant relies.”). Notwithstanding,

the record indicates that Mr. Taylor’s trial counsel zealously advocated for Mr. Taylor throughout

the pretrial process and trial; it does not indicate that his trial counsel simply conceded his guilt as

Mr. Taylor’s argument suggests. His argument, therefore, lacks merit.

        {¶36} Regarding Mr. Taylor’s trial counsel’s failure to introduce a certified copy of the

Admission, this Court has already determined that Mr. Taylor has failed to establish prejudice in

that regard. His argument, therefore, lacks merit. Straughan, 2021-Ohio-1054, at ¶ 68, quoting

In re F.B., 2019-Ohio-1738, at ¶ 47 (providing that if a defendant “fail[s] to demonstrate any

prejudice resulting from the errors he has alleged, he cannot demonstrate cumulative error.”).

        {¶37} Lastly, to the extent that Mr. Taylor relies upon his trial counsel’s alleged errors as

set forth in his third assignment of error, “a party may not incorporate the arguments contained in

the other assignments of error to support a different assignment of error.” State ex rel. Midview

Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Ohio School Facilities Comm., 9th Dist. Lorain No.

16CA010991, 2017-Ohio-6928, ¶ 29. Even if Mr. Taylor had properly developed an argument in

this regard, this Court has already determined that Mr. Taylor’s trial counsel did not render a

deficient performance, and/or that he did not suffer any prejudice as a result of his trial counsel’s

alleged deficient performance. Mr. Taylor’s argument, therefore, lacks merit. See Straughan at ¶

68.

        {¶38} In light of the foregoing, Mr. Taylor’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.
                                                14

                                                III.

       {¶39} Mr. Taylor’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Lorain

County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

                                                                               Judgment affirmed.

       There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

       We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common

Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of

this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.

       Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period

for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to

mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the

docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.

       Costs taxed to Appellant.

                                                       JILL FLAGG LANZINGER
                                                       FOR THE COURT

CARR, P. J.
STEVENSON, J.
CONCUR.
                                         15

APPEARANCES:

JOHN KOPASAKIS, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.

J.D. TOMLINSON, Prosecuting Attorney, and C. RICHLEY RALEY, JR., Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for Appellee.