Court Opinion

ID: 9908507
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-08 22:07:44.91541+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:12.961581
License: Public Domain

12/08/2023
                   IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                               AT NASHVILLE
                             Assigned on Briefs November 1, 2023

                                    IN RE AUBRIA H. ET AL.

                  Appeal from the Juvenile Court for Humphreys County
                    No. J-13446-22     Haylee Bradley-Maples, Judge
                        ___________________________________

                                No. M2023-00329-COA-R3-PT
                            ___________________________________

This appeal involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to two minor children.
The trial court concluded that several grounds for termination existed and that the
termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children.
Although we vacate two grounds for termination, we affirm the trial court’s reliance on the
remaining grounds for termination and its best interests determination. The trial court’s
termination of the mother’s parental rights is accordingly affirmed.

 Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Juvenile Court Vacated in
                     Part, Affirmed in Part, and Remanded.

ARNOLD B. GOLDIN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ANDY D. BENNETT
and KRISTI M. DAVIS, JJ., joined.

Blake C. Kruse, Dickson, Tennessee, for the appellant, Courtney H.1

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter, and Mara Cunningham, Assistant
Attorney General, for the appellee, Tennessee Department of Children’s Services.

                                                OPINION

                     BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

General Background

        This case concerns the termination of parental rights of Courtney H.2 (“Mother”) to

        1
         This Court has a policy of protecting children’s identities in parental termination cases. Therefore,
where appropriate, certain surnames appearing herein will be presented by use of initials.
       2
         In the underlying litigation, the parental rights of Geoffrey O. (“Father”) were also terminated.
As should be evident, however, this Opinion is largely devoid of references to Father insofar as his rights
the minor children at issue herein, Aubria H. and Gabrien H. Aubria and Gabrien
(collectively “the Children”) were born in March 2014 and July 2016, respectively. The
Children were brought into the custody of the Tennessee Department of Children’s
Services (“the Department”) pursuant to a June 8, 2021, protective custody order that
followed the filing of a petition to declare the Children dependent and neglected. Pursuant
to the protective custody order, the Humphreys County Juvenile Court (“the trial court”)
found that there was probable cause to believe the Children were dependent and neglected.
In articulating the basis for this finding, the trial court initially noted that the Department
had received a referral on May 16, 2021, alleging sexual abuse and lack of supervision,
and that the Department had “attempted to locate the family for three weeks due to the
family having a history of homelessness.” As further detailed by the protective custody
order:

        On May 19, 2021, the [Department] spoke to Ms. Keirsten Wiggins, who
        previously care[d] for the children while [Mother] went to work. Ms.
        Wiggins reported that one night, [Mother] did not pick her children up and
        would not answer her phone.

        Ms. Wiggins stated that she planned to allow Aubria to sleep in the room
        with her 4 year old daughter while Gabrien was going to sleep on the couch.
        As she was getting the children ready for bed, she found her daughter with
        her pants down. Ms. [Wiggins] stated that she then separated the children
        and her daughter disclosed that Aubria had pulled her pants down and
        touched her private area.

        On May 28, 2021, the [Department] spoke to [Father’s wife] who stated that
        [Father] only sees the children when [Mother] randomly drops them off at
        their home or calls them to get the children. [Father’s wife] stated that they
        never know how long they will have the children and that it might be a few
        hours or a few weeks.

        On June 7, 2021, the [Department] completed a home visit with [Mother] and
        an unknown male. [Mother] stated that she met the man online, but she did
        not know his name. The unknown male was observed playing with the
        children and when asked he stated his name was “Dom” from North Carolina.

are not at issue in this appeal. Regarding this point, we observe that counsel for Father filed the following
with this Court during the pendency of the appeal:

                [Father] did not file an Appeal . . . and does not intend to participate in the Appeal.

                 Attached please find Appellee’s Verification dated March 6, 2023, which declares
        that he did not want to file an Appeal of the decision of the judge and accepts the decision
        of the judge. See attachment A, attached, and incorporated herein.
                                                    -2-
       Aubria later stated that she was told to call the man “King”.

       [Mother] reported that she has been homeless for several years until her
       mother found a trailer to rent. [Mother] further reported that she often travels
       to see friends and family, but often runs out of gas and has to stay in her car
       until someone can bring her gasoline.

       [Mother] stated that Aubria and Gabrien are not enrolled in school and that
       she does not have their birth certificates.

       On June 7, 2021, the [Department] spoke to Aubria who disclosed that when
       she stays with her father all of the children stay in one bedroom, and her
       brother . . . put his hand in her pants and touches her privates. She stated that
       she will go to the couch so he will leave her alone, but hasn’t told anyone
       because she was scared.

       Aubria reported that the weekend prior they ran out of gas [and] . . . had to
       stay in the car until someone could bring them more gas. She said that her
       mother often runs out of gas and they will sleep in their car.

       Aubria stated that she and her brother have had many babysitters, but most
       often they stay with their grandfather[.] . . . [The grandfather] was found to
       be a registered sex offender.

       The [Department] was unable to speak with [Father] due to his work schedule
       or not having cell phone service. However, [Father] left a message for the
       [Department] to speak to his wife.

(paragraph lettering in original omitted). The Children were later adjudicated dependent
and neglected in an order entered by the trial court on September 21, 2021.

        Following the Children’s removal, a number of permanency plans were created and
ratified. The first of these plans, which was created towards the end of June 2021, recited
that “[Mother] is currently incarcerated with pending charges of domestic assault, criminal
impersonation, and out of county warrants, and she has an extensive history of engaging in
criminal activity and multiple arrests.” The plan additionally noted as follows: “[Mother]
has a history of mental health issues and substance use. [Mother] last used drugs about a
month ago. [Mother] has other children with whom she does not have custody and multiple
prior CPS cases.” In order to address these concerns, along with other issues such as
Mother’s residential instability and her history of leaving the Children in unsafe situations,
the permanency plan included the following responsibilities for Mother: (1) to abide by all
laws upon her release to ensure she is not arrested again, (2) to abide by all rules/regulations
of her probation/parole, (3) to sign a release of information “so FSW can communicate
                                             -3-
with her probation officer,” (4) to complete a mental health intake, (4) to complete an
alcohol and drug assessment and follow all recommendations, (5) to sign a release of
information “so FSW can communicate with all providers to help monitor her progress,”
(6) to submit to regular and random drug screens and be negative for all substances, (7) to
complete domestic violence education and follow all recommendations, (8) to complete
parenting education and follow all recommendations, (9) to demonstrate appropriate
parenting skills during the supervised visitations, (10) to maintain housing for a minimum
of four months, (11) to obtain stable housing within sixty days of her release from jail and
provide proof of housing to the Department “which will include a lease/rental agreement
with her name on it” and allow a walk through, (12) to “provide FSW with any change in
her contact information within 24 hours of the change,” (13) to provide proof of stable and
legal income within thirty days of her release from jail, (14) to engage in appropriate
communication with the Children during visitations, (15) to confirm visitation twenty-four
hours in advance, and (16) to provide for the Children’s basic needs during twice-monthly
visits and to arrive on time. Mother’s responsibilities remained substantially similar under
subsequent plans that were created, although as the Department has highlighted on appeal,
once Mother completed an alcohol and drug assessment, the permanency plans were
modified to specifically reflect the recommendations of that assessment. Indeed, in the
second permanency plan, for instance, the plan noted that Mother had been recommended
drug treatment in an intensive outpatient program if she failed a hair follicle drug test.
Mother, the plan noted, “failed the hair follicle drug test on 10/25/21 for cocaine, so she
needs to complete IOP drug treatment.”

        Nearly a year following the Children’s removal, and with significant concerns
surrounding Mother still in existence, the Department filed a petition to terminate her
parental rights. As grounds for the requested termination of her parental rights, the
Department averred the following: abandonment by an incarcerated parent for wanton
disregard, abandonment for failure to provide a suitable home, substantial noncompliance
with permanency plan, persistent conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and
willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility of the Children. At the ensuing
trial, which took place in January 2023, the Department adduced a wealth of proof pointing
to, among other things, continued drug use and legal troubles by Mother post-removal,
Mother’s failure to maintain a stable residence, and Mother’s inconsistency in visiting the
Children.

Overview of Testimony from Key Witnesses at Trial

       At the time of trial, Mother testified she had been residing in Kentucky for a month
and that prior to that, for about three months, she had resided in McEwen, Tennessee.
Before her residence in McEwen, Tennessee, Mother testified that she had lived in New
Johnsonville, Tennessee for “[m]aybe . . . about a year and six months.” When counsel for
the Department followed up by asking if Mother had ever reported addresses in Franklin
or Clarksville, Mother responded that she had, in fact, stayed in Clarksville “for a little bit”
                                             -4-
with a friend. According to Mother, she had stayed there the year prior “after I got
incarcerated, and I got out.”

       When discussing the removal of the Children, which Mother noted had occurred
while she and the Children were living in New Johnsonville, Mother testified as follows:

       They said that they removed them because Aubria had never been in school
       and that was a concern. So they had, I guess, to get her in school and stuff
       like that and give me time to get on my feet, ’cause I had just gotten a
       residence. I had been homeless for, like, two years before that, so[.]

The transcript reflects that Mother nodded her head affirmatively when she was asked if
the Children had been with her during the two years she stated she was homeless. When
Mother was asked why she was homeless, she stated that she “wasn’t working at the time,”
and when she was asked why she was not working, she responded as follows: “I just wasn’t
working. . . . I got depressed. I was just going through a lot at that time.” In further
discussing her difficulties in keeping a job and caring for the Children and other children
of hers, Mother stated as follows: “[I]t was hard for me to keep a job because I have four
kids and I didn’t have a babysitter, really, and nobody to help me watch them. And I didn’t
have -- I wasn’t making enough money for childcare expenses for four children.”

       Much of Mother’s testimony revealed her failure to complete responsibilities
required of her under the permanency plans that were created. For instance, whereas
Mother testified that she recalled participating in parenting classes, she also testified that
she had not completed them. Moreover, whereas Mother acknowledged that an intensive
outpatient program was one of the recommendations from her alcohol and drug assessment
and testified that she “started the IOP,” she subsequently admitted that she did not
successfully complete the intensive outpatient program she had started. When asked if she
had been discharged because of missing sessions, Mother stated, “Yes.” Mother testified,
“[S]ometimes I would have, like, parenting classes that day, or I would oversleep, and it
was just stuff like that.” Mother testified that she understood that completing an intensive
outpatient treatment program had been a permanency plan requirement, and she
acknowledged that she had never done so. Regarding the required intensive outpatient
treatment program, Mother testified that she would “like a chance to restart it now.”
According to some of her initial testimony, the Department had not done anything to help
her regarding outpatient treatment. Later, however, Mother acknowledged that someone
from the Department had emailed her a list of places, stating as follows: “ I forgot about
that. Yes, she did do that.”

        Although Mother testified that she did a mental health assessment when she had
participated in the intensive outpatient program, she testified that she did not have records
reflecting that she did so. Regarding the subject of visitation, Mother testified that she had
visited regularly with the Children, but she also acknowledged she had missed some visits.
                                             -5-
According to Mother, she “might have missed, maybe, five or six in the past year and
change.” When later asked if there was a reason why she had missed visits, Mother
responded that she “got incarcerated and then . . . either . . . didn’t have a ride, or . . .
couldn’t get there.”

        Mother acknowledged she had been incarcerated several times since the Children’s
births, and her testimony revealed that several legal issues had manifested during this
custodial episode. For instance, in addition to testifying about a recent driving offense that
she had missed a court date on, Mother testified about another unresolved charge from the
summer of 2022 that she stated was for “[d]riving on a suspended, driving on revoked,
unlawful drug paraphernalia, and possession with intent.” Mother testified that family or
the Children’s father would take care of the Children whenever she was arrested.

         As of the time of trial, Mother testified that she was not participating in any services,
stating, “I’ve just been working and I got my new place and stuff, so I’m just focusing on
that.” Mother stated that she had a hair follicle drug screen scheduled for the day after
trial, but she also acknowledged that the screen had been requested of her the prior October.
Although Mother acknowledged that drug screens from October 2021 and May 2022 had
tested positive for cocaine, she stated that the last time she had used cocaine was “[m]aybe
. . . a year ago.” She also further testified, however, that her drug possession charge from
the prior summer was in relation to crack cocaine.

        Mother testified that she had started a full-time job a couple of days before the trial,
although when her attorney asked her if she had consistently been employed since the
Children came into custody, she candidly responded, “On and off.” Mother was not sure
how much child support she had paid since the Children came into the Department’s
custody, but she stated that she had tried to buy school clothes, stating as follows on the
subject: “Yeah, I buy them clothes. I bought them shoes last visit. I try to get them the
stuff they need and bring it when I go to visits.”

        Mother testified that she loved her children and that “they mean everything to me.”
When asked if it was her testimony that she had made some progress but just needed “more
time to continue,” Mother responded, “Yes.” According to Mother, her mother had just
retired and would be able to be a support system for her. Mother also acknowledged that
she previously “wasn’t being responsible” and that it was her fault that the termination
proceeding was taking place.

       Another witness at trial was Heather Hotrum, an employee with Camelot who had
been assigned to provide parenting education services to Mother. Parenting education
services were offered once per week, but according to Ms. Hotrum, Mother did not
complete the services provided and was inconsistent in attending. Elaborating on this, Ms.
Hotrum testified as follows:

                                              -6-
           I did one session October [2021], one in November, none December. It [sic]
           was reached out every week of January and February and communicated a
           lot with the DCS FSW. At that point, then we scheduled an in-person visit
           in March and there was just a lot of non-call/no-shows, and she didn’t show
           to that one either, and we pulled the right to the home.

Ms. Hotrum’s testimony reflected that Mother had done initial intake with Camelot in
September 2021.

      Another noteworthy witness from the trial was Krista Vermilye. Ms. Vermilye, who
was a family service worker with the Department, testified that she had been the
caseworker for the Children since May 2022. Another person, Shauna Lowery, had been
the Children’s previous caseworker.

       According to Ms. Vermilye, the Children had been removed amidst allegations of
educational neglect and lack of supervision. When asked what services were offered by
the Department in the beginning following the Children’s removal, Ms. Vermilye testified
that the Department offered “an A&D assessment, as well as domestic-violence
intervention . . . , as well as parenting education.” The alcohol and drug assessment, which
was paid for by the Department, was completed in August 2021, and Ms. Vermilye’s
testimony reflected that the Department had referred Mother for parenting education and
domestic violence intervention within a couple of weeks of getting the case. According to
Ms. Vermilye, the Department had also offered drug screens during that period of time.

        In Ms. Vermilye’s view, Mother had completed an alcohol and drug assessment but
not any of the other tasks. Although she noted that Mother had started several intensive
outpatient programs, she testified that Mother did not complete them. Ms. Vermilye further
testified that she was not aware of Mother having completed a mental health intake and
that, “[i]f she did complete it, she didn’t provide the provider information . . . to obtain
those records.” Whereas Ms. Vermilye also testified that Mother had completed
approximately seven to nine drug screens “throughout the period of the case,”3 she stated
that Mother had several hair follicle drug screens to complete in the beginning of the
custodial episode but that Mother “did not complete those in the allotted time.” She further
testified that Mother did not follow through when drug screens were requested and had
given excuses. Although Mother had, according to Ms. Vermilye’s testimony, passed a
drug screen within the two months prior to trial, drug concerns were still a significant issue
in the case, as were questions of Mother’s work and residential stability. In addition to
discussing Mother’s failure to complete an intensive outpatient program, Ms. Vermilye
testified that there was routinely not proof of employment for Mother. Further, according
to Ms. Vermilye, in addition to the residences Mother had testified about at trial, Mother

           3
               At another place in her testimony, she stated that Mother had passed approximately five drug
screens.
                                                     -7-
had reported “[m]any” other places to her and the Department during this custodial episode.
When discussing how many addresses Mother had provided, she stated, “To myself alone,
it would be approximately 6. From the beginning, at least 13.” Ms. Vermilye testified that
many of the addresses Mother had reported were “with friends who do not allow DCS to
come to that home,” and thus the Department had been unable to complete a home visit at
several of those addresses. Ms. Vermilye testified that Mother’s residence at the time of
trial was in Kentucky but noted that the Department had only been informed of Mother’s
move to Kentucky the month before trial. Ms. Vermilye’s testimony reflected that, in her
view, a suitable home was more than just the four walls of a structure and that the pertinent
inquiry also involves looking to circumstances of the family, including consideration of
the presence of any criminal charges.

        As for the latter concern of criminal charges, Ms. Vermilye’s testimony reflected
that Mother had been subject to a flurry of arrests and charges in the wake of the Children’s
removal, including charges related to drugs. For instance, she testified that Mother was
arrested about nine days after the Children were removed. Although Mother later bonded
out, Ms. Vermilye testified that Mother was subsequently arrested for driving with a
suspended license in May 2022. Although she bonded out once more a few days after this
latest arrest, she was then arrested again the same month for driving without a license. Ms.
Vermilye testified that Mother “also had possession of THC.” She further discussed how
Mother was arrested again in July 2022 “for driving on a suspended [license] and
possession of cocaine.”

      As for Mother’s visitation with the Children, Ms. Vermilye testified that Mother
was not consistent. In specifically testifying about the matter, she explained as follows:

       It would go from being sick, to not having a ride, to not being able to make
       the time because something had come up. Or she would be en route to the
       visit and something would happen to the vehicle; flat tire, ran out of gas. It
       was just different reasonings that she would provide to Camelot.

As is evident from the testimony of another witness, see infra, Mother’s failure to show up
to visits was not without its consequences on the Children. Ms. Vermilye testified that a
former caseworker had transported Mother to visits in the beginning, and although Mother
was provided transportation from her own mother later on, the Department also provided
gas cards.

       Ms. Vermilye testified that the Children had a bond with Mother. When
subsequently asked, however, if she had ever been able to observe the Children with
Mother, she replied, “I have not.” Further, although she relayed that Mother had a bond,
she also remarked, “It’s been observed to be a friendship bond, not a mother bond.” In
addition, although Ms. Vermilye testified that the Children “talk about their visits with
their mom” and “state that they love their mom,” she testified that the Children had not
                                          -8-
stated that they missed their mom.

       Ms. Vermilye testified that the Children are doing “[r]eally good,” that their foster
parent is actually a teacher in the school they attend, and that the Children “really like being
able to see her and be around her.” She further noted that the Children receive counseling
and therapy weekly. Gabrien, she stated, was diagnosed with ADHD, is on psychotropic
medication, and receives medication management. She testified that the medication has
assisted him.

       Although Ms. Vermilye testified that the Department had not been able to identify
an adoptive home for the Children as of the time of trial, she testified that the current foster
parent was “very open to it.” She further testified that, “[b]ecause [the Children] are
comfortable where they are at, there is not a current need for them to be moved.” In further
testimony about the Children’s future prospects, she testified that Camelot had identified
four possible adoption homes for the Children to be placed in.

        Ms. Vermilye testified that Mother had not changed her circumstances so as to make
her home and situation safe for the Children to go to. Indeed, when asked if Mother had
“made a lasting adjustment after the services provided by the Department to where [she]
could make [her] home appropriate,” she responded, “No.” She testified that it “would be
critical” that any caregiver ensure that Aubria and Gabrien receive the counseling and other
services they are provided outside of their foster home. Gabrien, she explained, can be
“very violent, very aggressive.” In elaborating further on the subject, she stated:

       The meds have changed several times to get him stable. He was very violent
       and aggressive towards foster parents and other children when he first
       entered custody.

               And then he also has an IEP, so he’s slower cognitively. A little bit
       of a speech delay, as well, so he struggles to communicate and that’s where
       a lot of his frustration has come from.

             The meds have really balanced him out, and he is stable when he talks.
       He doesn’t get upset when people don’t understand. He will just keep saying
       the word and he wants you to get it.

             He has changed drastically since being on the correct medication and
       having the mental health, as well.

According to Ms. Vermilye, Gabrien was bonded with his sister, and when discussing
Aubria’s needs and progress since removal, she testified as follows:

              When she first came into custody, she had not been in school ever so
                                          -9-
       that was a really big struggle. She was not caught up on education
       whatsoever. You would not know that now.

             She loves math. She wants to be a math teacher or do something with
       math because she loves math so much.

               She’s very smart. She reads. She writes. You would not even know
       that the child had not ever been in school[.]

       Ms. Vermilye testified that Mother did not contact her to ask about the Children on
a regular basis and claimed that Mother had not demonstrated herself to be proactive in
addressing her issues. Among other things, she testified to having had communication
issues with Mother, as evidenced by the following trial excerpt:

       She also has had several different phones changed, so I don’t know if she did
       receive some of those messages because I didn’t have a current number.

       ....

              So if I didn’t get a response, I assumed it was disconnected. I’d call
       and it was, so not having the communication and being able to get ahold of
       her has also been the biggest struggle.

Ms. Vermilye agreed that it was imperative that the Children get permanency and stability,
and she testified that she was recommending that Mother’s parental rights be terminated.
She testified that the Children were in a stable environment at the time of trial and were
thriving. She further testified that she believed it would be detrimental to the Children to
return them to Mother and that it was in the best interests of the Children for Mother’s
rights to be terminated.

        Avery Wesson, a care coordinator with Camelot, testified that he had been
associated with the Children’s case since March 2022. He testified that he had kept tabs
on the Children to see how they were doing in their foster placement and sometimes
facilitated visits between the Children and Mother. He testified that he had worked with
Mother’s schedule to facilitate visits but that Mother had attended only seven out of twenty
visits that she should have had. He even noted that visits had been moved to Saturdays
when Mother started to work. During one of the visits that occurred, Mr. Wesson observed
Mother yelling. In recounting the incident, he testified as follows: “We were at a park, but
it was louder than I would expect someone to be yelling at a park, if that makes sense.”
According to Mr. Wesson, Mother “act[ed] more as a friend with occasional lapses into the
fact that she was a parent.” Whereas Mother’s general schedule was to have two visits a
month, Mr. Wesson agreed that the most she ever had was one.

                                           - 10 -
       When testifying about times when the Children were present and ready for a visit
but Mother did not show up, he remarked that the Children were “very upset with it” at
first. According to him, “[t]hey became a little defiant and obstinate.” When further
elaborating on this issue of Mother’s failure to show up to visits, he recounted as follows:

              And then after a while, Aubria kind of became jaded with it and was,
       like, She’s not gonna show up. I just know it.

             And then Gabrien wouldn’t really say anything, but he would show it
       physically, like, you know, pushing.

              There was one point where [Mother] didn’t show up to a visit and
       Gabrien was so upset about it that he hit Aubria hard enough to kind of knock
       her into the door of the car, and that was a fun thing to deal with.

At one point, Mr. Wesson recounted, he stopped informing the Children of when visits
were scheduled. His testimony indicated that this was done in an attempt to shield the
Children in case Mother did not show up.

        He testified that he thought the Children loved Mother. When asked if he thought
Mother loved the Children, he replied, “To some degree, yeah.” When asked if he thought
Mother and Children have a relationship or a bond, he responded, “Yeah.” He further
testified that the visits that occurred typically went well, with the exception of the visit
where Mother was yelling. It was after that visit that he “kind of started noticing that
[Mother] would kind of be more of a friend with occasional lapses in the fact that she’s a
parent.”

        Towards the conclusion of the trial, the trial court heard testimony from the
Children’s stepmother, the Children’s paternal grandmother, and the Children’s maternal
grandmother. Testimony from the maternal grandmother reflected that she had generally
retired from working, and she stated that she could help out with the Children. In offering
to help out with the Children, she testified that she could possibly move to be with Mother.
Of note, her testimony also alluded to the fact that Mother herself still had more work to
do to better herself as a caregiver. Indeed, when discussing the prospect of possibly moving
in with Mother, the maternal grandmother testified as follows: “I can move anywhere,
yeah, until she can get herself real good and straight. I think I could help with that.”4
(emphasis added).

       4
        That Mother had unresolved issues was also essentially conceded by her counsel during closing
argument at trial, with counsel referring to Mother’s progress as “ongoing.”
                                               - 11 -
Trial Court’s Termination Order

       Upon the conclusion of trial, the trial court orally ruled that Mother’s parental rights
should be terminated, and this ruling was subsequently memorialized in a written order
entered on February 8, 2023. As reflected in the written order terminating Mother’s
parental rights, the trial court determined that all grounds for termination alleged against
Mother had been proven and that the termination of her parental rights was in the
Children’s best interests. As part of its best interests inquiry, the trial court noted, among
other things, that Mother had not demonstrated a sense of urgency to address the issues
necessitating foster care, that she had pending legal charges and was subject to
incarceration, and that she had not demonstrated a lasting adjustment of circumstances,
conduct, or conditions to make it safe for the Children to be in her home. This appeal
followed the trial court’s termination of Mother’s parental rights.

                                STANDARD OF REVIEW

        “A biological parent’s right to the care and custody of his or her child is among the
oldest of the judicially recognized liberty interests protected by the due process clauses of
the federal and state constitutions.” In re M.L.P., 228 S.W.3d 139, 142 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2007). “Although this right is fundamental and superior to claims of other persons and the
government, it is not absolute.” In re J.C.D., 254 S.W.3d 432, 437 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007).
“It continues without interruption only as long as a parent has not relinquished it,
abandoned it, or engaged in conduct requiring its limitation or termination.” In re M.J.B.,
140 S.W.3d 643, 653 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004). In Tennessee, “[w]ell-defined circumstances
exist under which a parent’s rights may be terminated.” In re Roger T., No. W2014-02184-
COA-R3-PT, 2015 WL 1897696, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2015). Pursuant to the
Tennessee Code, parties who have standing to seek the termination of a parent’s parental
rights must prove two things. The petitioning party must first prove at least one of the
statutory grounds for termination. In re J.C.D., 254 S.W.3d at 438 (citing Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 36-1-113(c)(1)). Then, the petitioning party must prove that termination of parental
rights is in the child’s best interests. Id. (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c)(2)).

       Because the decision to terminate a parent’s parental rights has “profound
consequences,” trial courts must apply a higher standard of proof in deciding termination
cases. In re M.L.P., 228 S.W.3d at 143. “To terminate parental rights, a court must
determine that clear and convincing evidence proves not only that statutory grounds exist
but also that termination is in the child’s best interest.” In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d 539,
546 (Tenn. 2002) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c)). “Clear and convincing evidence
is evidence that eliminates any substantial doubt and that produces in the fact-finder’s mind
a firm conviction as to the truth.” In re M.A.B., No. W2007-00453-COA-R3-PT, 2007 WL
2353158, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 20, 2007). This heightened burden of proof
“minimizes the risk of erroneous decisions.” In re M.L.P., 228 S.W.3d at 143.

                                            - 12 -
      Due to the heightened burden of proof required under the statute, we must adapt our
customary standard of review. In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838, 861 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2005). “First, we must review the trial court’s specific findings of fact de novo in
accordance with Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d).” In re M.J.B., 140 S.W.3d at 654. “Second, we
must determine whether the facts, either as found by the trial court or as supported by the
preponderance of the evidence, clearly and convincingly establish the elements required to
terminate a biological parent’s parental rights.” Id.

                                     DISCUSSION

      Although Mother requests that this Court reverse the trial court’s termination of her
parental rights, the Department maintains that the judgment of the trial court should be
affirmed. In assessing the propriety of the trial court’s judgment, we turn first to the
grounds it relied upon in terminating Mother’s rights.

Grounds for Termination

Abandonment by an Incarcerated Parent for Wanton Disregard and Abandonment for
Failure to Provide a Suitable Home

      Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(1) provides for termination when
“[a]bandonment by the parent or guardian, as defined in § 36-1-102, has occurred.” Tenn.
Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1). Two of the grounds relied upon by the trial court here, i.e.,
abandonment by an incarcerated parent for wanton disregard and abandonment for failure
to provide a suitable home, are among the incorporated definitions of abandonment. As
discussed below, we are of the opinion that the trial court’s judgment should be vacated as
to both of these grounds.

      The ground concerning “wanton disregard,” which implicates a test for abandonment
applicable to incarcerated or recently incarcerated parents, is established when:

      (iv) A parent or guardian is incarcerated at the time of the filing of a
      proceeding, pleading, petition, or amended petition to terminate the parental
      rights of the parent or guardian of the child who is the subject of the petition
      for termination of parental rights or adoption, or a parent or guardian has
      been incarcerated during all or part of the four (4) consecutive months
      immediately preceding the filing of the action and has:

      ....

      (c) Has engaged in conduct prior to incarceration that exhibits a wanton
      disregard for the welfare of the child[.]

                                           - 13 -
Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv).5 As this Court has previously explained:

        “Wanton disregard” is not a defined term. Acts amounting to wanton
        disregard typically “reflect a ‘me first’ attitude involving the intentional
        performance of illegal or unreasonable acts and indifference to the
        consequences of the actions for the child.” In re Anthony R., No. M2014-
        01753-COA-R3-PT, 2015 WL 3611244, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 9, 2015).
        So “probation violations, repeated incarceration, criminal behavior,
        substance abuse, and the failure to provide adequate support or supervision
        for a child can, alone or in combination, constitute conduct that exhibits a
        wanton disregard for the welfare of a child.” In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d
        838, 867-68 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). But the actions constituting wanton
        disregard must have occurred at a point in time when the parent had
        knowledge of the child’s existence, which can include “a child in utero.” In
        re Anthony R., 2015 WL 3611244, at *3.

In re Tinsley L., No. E2022-00965-COA-R3-PT, 2023 WL 6057476, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Sept. 18, 2023).

        Although the record supports a finding that Mother was incarcerated during part of
the four months immediately preceding the filing of the action, it appears that the trial court
did not apply the governing statutory standard applicable at the time of the filing of the
termination petition. Indeed, although the inquiry under the operative version of the statute
here is whether the parent “[h]as engaged in conduct prior to incarceration that exhibits a
wanton disregard for the welfare of the child,” the trial court specifically found—without
reference to any temporal marker end date—that Mother “engaged in conduct that exhibits
a wanton disregard for the children’s welfare by engaging in criminal behavior [the
Children’s] entire lives” and then specifically cited to, among other things, behavior of
Mother’s that occurred after the incarceration incident that triggers review here. For
instance, the trial court notably referred to “drug charges that [Mother] obtained
approximately six months ago that have not been resolved.” Such charges, as we
understand the record, refer to charges Mother obtained after the filing of the termination
petition itself. Although the current version of the statute does look to whether the parent
“engaged in conduct prior to, during, or after incarceration that exhibits a wanton disregard
for the welfare of the child,” the operative statute here, again, looks to the period “prior to
incarceration.” Inasmuch as the trial court did not cabin its wanton disregard analysis to
the pre-incarceration period dictated by the controlling statutory language, we determine
that its conclusion under this ground should be vacated. However, given our ultimate
determination herein that the termination of Mother’s parental rights can be upheld on other
grounds, see infra, we need not remand the matter for further findings on this ground under

        5
            This is the version of the statute in effect at the time of the filing of the termination petition in this
case.
                                                        - 14 -
the governing statutory standard. See In re K.W., No. M2021-00408-COA-R3-PT, 2021
WL 5783355, at *10 n.5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2021) (“We do not remand the matter for
further findings pursuant to the proper standard, however, in light of the rest of our
disposition herein, which results in an affirmance of the termination of Father’s parental
rights.”).

       In connection with our discussion on this matter, we note that the need for adequate
and careful findings is particularly significant when the termination of a parent’s rights, as
well as the interests of children, are at stake. Indeed, this Court has previously noted as
follows concerning the necessity for specific findings in termination cases:

       [P]ursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(k), the trial
       court’s order must contain “specific findings of fact and conclusions of law.”
       See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(k). The requirement for specific findings in
       termination orders is a highly significant one and “reflects the Tennessee
       General Assembly’s recognition of the necessity of individualized decisions
       in these cases.” In re C.R.B., No. M2003-00345-COA-R3-JV, 2003 WL
       22680911, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2003). Moreover, it “reflects the
       legislature’s understanding that findings of fact and conclusions of law
       facilitate appellate review and promote the just and speedy resolution of
       appeals.” Id. “Meticulous compliance” with the mandates of Tennessee Code
       Annotated section 36-1-113(k) is required, In re Maria B.S., No. E2011-
       01784-COA-R3-PT, 2012 WL 1431244, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 25,
       2012), and “[w]hen a trial court fails to enter an order containing adequate
       findings of fact and conclusions of law with regard to all alleged grounds for
       termination, the Tennessee Supreme Court has instructed the appellate courts
       to remand the case to the trial court for the preparation of appropriate written
       findings of fact and conclusions of law.” In re C.R.B., 2003 WL 22680911,
       at *4. We have previously urged judges and litigants to be thorough in the
       preparation of orders, particularly when the rights of parents and minor
       children are involved. In re Jaylah W., 486 S.W.3d 537, 554 n.18 (Tenn. Ct.
       App. 2015).

In re Jayden L., No. E2020-01668-COA-R3-PT, 2021 WL 2255496, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App.
June 3, 2021).

       The need for further and clear findings would not only be needed relative to the
“wanton disregard” ground in our view; respectfully, we are of the opinion that the trial
court’s findings pertaining to abandonment for failure to provide a suitable home are also
lacking. As codified at the time of the filing of the termination petition in this matter, this
other ground of abandonment provides for termination when:

       (ii)(a) The child has been removed from the home or the physical or legal
                                         - 15 -
        custody of a parent or parents or guardian or guardians by a court order at
        any stage of proceedings in which a petition has been filed in the juvenile
        court alleging that a child is a dependent and neglected child, and the child
        was placed in the custody of the department or a licensed child-placing
        agency;

        (b) The juvenile court found, or the court where the termination of parental
        rights petition is filed finds, that the department or a licensed child-placing
        agency made reasonable efforts to prevent removal of the child or that the
        circumstances of the child’s situation prevented reasonable efforts from
        being made prior to the child’s removal; and

        (c) For a period of four (4) months following the physical removal, the
        department or agency made reasonable efforts to assist the parent or parents
        or the guardian or guardians to establish a suitable home for the child, but
        that the parent or parents or the guardian or guardians have not made
        reciprocal reasonable efforts to provide a suitable home and have
        demonstrated a lack of concern for the child to such a degree that it appears
        unlikely that they will be able to provide a suitable home for the child at an
        early date. The efforts of the department or agency to assist a parent or
        guardian in establishing a suitable home for the child shall be found to be
        reasonable if such efforts equal or exceed the efforts of the parent or guardian
        toward the same goal, when the parent or guardian is aware that the child is
        in the custody of the department[.]

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(ii). In our view, clear and adequate findings from the
trial court are specifically lacking here concerning subsection (c). First, as a technical
matter, the trial court’s order does not contain a finding that Mother failed to make
reciprocal reasonable efforts to provide a suitable home for a period of four months
following removal. That is, although the order does make a finding concerning Mother’s
efforts, the specific finding included on the matter—which itself appears to somewhat
blurredly attempt to merge the efforts inquiry with the “demonstrated a lack of concern”
inquiry under the statute—does not articulate that Mother’s failure to make reasonable
efforts spanned a period of four months. Indeed, in pertinent part, the order simply recites
that “[Mother] failed to make any reasonable efforts to provide a suitable home for the
children at an early date.”6 This lack of direct specificity concerning a period of four
months notwithstanding, we note that, in the paragraph prior to this finding, the trial court
noted that the relevant time period for this ground for termination was “June 9, 2021 to
October 9, 2021,” a period which corresponds to the four months after the Children’s

        6
          There does not appear to be a specific separate finding that the parent here, Mother, “demonstrated
a lack of concern for the child to such a degree that it appears unlikely that they will be able to provide a
suitable home for the child at an early date.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(ii).
                                                   - 16 -
removal on June 8, 2021. A less narrow reading of the order might therefore construe the
court’s finding about Mother’s failure to make reasonable efforts as a finding that she failed
to do so over the previously referenced June 9, 2021, to October 9, 2021, period. However,
an additional issue still exists with the order even when read through this contextual lens.
Namely, although it does appear from the nominal framing in the trial court’s order that
the court intended to focus on the four months after the Children’s removal, its specific
engagement with Mother’s efforts does not appear to be so limited, thus ultimately making
the specific temporal scope of the court’s finding, or intended finding, somewhat unclear
as it pertains to the “reciprocal reasonable efforts” assessment. For instance, the trial
court’s order prominently refers to Mother’s discharge from intensive outpatient drug
treatment when appearing to discuss her efforts.7 This implicates facts outside of the four-
month period that the trial court purported to focus on regarding efforts made to provide a
suitable home.8

        In short, there is a lack of specificity in the trial court’s findings regarding some of
the elements connected to this ground and a lack of clarity as to which four-month period
the trial court was actually intending to assess.9 As a result, and as a point of instruction
as to the importance of having specific and adequate findings,10 we therefore vacate this
ground for termination. As with the other abandonment ground, however, we do not
actually remand the matter for further findings. See In re K.W., 2021 WL 5783355, at *10
n.5 (“We do not remand the matter for further findings pursuant to the proper standard,
however, in light of the rest of our disposition herein, which results in an affirmance of the
termination of Father’s parental rights.”).

        7
           The Department’s brief also references the subject of “IOPs” as supposedly being associated with
the “relevant time frame” of “June 9, 2021, to October 9, 2021.”
         8
            As mentioned earlier in this Opinion, the second permanency plan noted that Mother had been
recommended drug treatment in an intensive outpatient program if she failed a hair follicle drug test.
Mother, the plan noted, “failed the hair follicle drug test on 10/25/21 for cocaine, so she needs to complete
IOP drug treatment.”
         9
           To be sure, as we have noted before, “[t]he statutory four-month period during which DCS must
make reasonable efforts and the parent reciprocate them is not limited to the four months immediately
following removal.” In re Robert H., No. E2022-00809-COA-R3-PT, 2023 WL 3451534, at *4 (Tenn. Ct.
App. May 15, 2023). As an aside, we also note that we do not intend to suggest that evidence outside of a
four-month period relied upon to establish this ground is itself otherwise irrelevant to this ground for
termination. If, for instance, the four months after removal are used to specifically assess a parent’s
“reciprocal reasonable efforts,” this does not mean later conduct is not pertinent in consideration of this
ground. Indeed, as it concerns the “demonstrated a lack of concern” inquiry, there is case law explaining
that a parent’s more recent behavior may be considered. See In re Billy T.W., No. E2016-02298-COA-R3-
PT, 2017 WL 4317656, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2017).
         10
            We express no opinion as to the ultimate merits of this ground for termination given our decision
to vacate in light of the written findings presented.
                                                   - 17 -
Substantial Noncompliance with Permanency Plan

       We next review the ground for termination codified at Tennessee Code Annotated
section 36-1-113(g)(2), which provides that a court may terminate a parent’s parental rights
when the parent is in “substantial noncompliance . . . with the statement of responsibilities
in a permanency plan[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2). In conjunction with
terminating a parent’s parental rights under this ground, the court “must first find that the
plan requirements are reasonable and related to conditions that necessitate foster care
placement.” In re Hannah H., No. E2013-01211-COA-R3-PT, 2014 WL 2587397, at *10
(Tenn. Ct. App. June 10, 2014). “The trial court must then find that the noncompliance is
substantial.” Id. Although the termination statute does not define what conduct constitutes
substantial noncompliance, terminating parental rights under this ground “requires more
proof than that a parent has not complied with every jot and tittle of the permanency plan.”
In re M.J.B., 140 S.W.3d at 656. The significance of the noncompliance “should be
measured by both the degree of noncompliance and the weight assigned to that
requirement.” In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d at 548. “Terms which are not reasonable and
related are irrelevant, and substantial noncompliance with such terms is irrelevant.” Id. at
548-49. Because determining whether substantial noncompliance exists is a question of
law, we review the issue de novo with no presumption of correctness. Id. at 548.

        Here, the trial court found that the responsibilities set forth in the permanency plans
were reasonably related to remedying conditions necessitating foster care, and in pertinent
part, it found as follows concerning several key responsibilities in this case: (1) that,
although Mother had completed an alcohol and drug assessment, she had failed to follow
the recommendations and had failed to complete an intensive outpatient drug treatment
program; (2) that, although Mother had passed some drug screens, she had also failed some
and made excuses why she could not submit to others; (3) that Mother had never completed
parenting services and had been discharged due to noncompliance; (4) that Mother was not
consistent in visiting with the Children; (5) that Mother had not maintained a stable home
and had provided the Department with approximately thirteen addresses; and (6) that
Mother had continued to incur criminal charges.

       In light of the above findings and our review of the record, we agree with the trial
court’s conclusion that there was clear and convincing that Mother was in substantial
noncompliance with the statement of responsibilities in the permanency plans. Whereas
Mother makes a passing argument on appeal that the Department “did not provide enough
reasonable efforts to assist her towards the Permanency Plan,” this allegation is not relevant
to establishing this ground under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(2). See
In re Ziquavious P., No. W2022-00743-COA-R3-PT, 2023 WL 3369188, at *3 (Tenn. Ct.
App. May 11, 2023) (“[R]easonable efforts are only relevant to two inquires: the ground
of abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home and the best interest analysis.”).

                                            - 18 -
Persistent Conditions

       Another ground for termination that the trial court held was established is codified
at Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(3). Commonly known as “persistent
conditions” or “persistence of conditions,” this ground applies when

        [t]he child has been removed from the home or the physical or legal custody
        of a parent or guardian for a period of six (6) months by a court order entered
        at any stage of proceedings in which a petition has been filed in the juvenile
        court alleging that a child is a dependent and neglected child, and:
        (i) The conditions that led to the child’s removal still persist, preventing the
        child’s safe return to the care of the parent or guardian, or
        other conditions exist that, in all reasonable probability, would cause the
        child to be subjected to further abuse or neglect, preventing the child’s safe
        return to the care of the parent or guardian;
        (ii) There is little likelihood that these conditions will be remedied at an early
        date so that the child can be safely returned to the parent or guardian in the
        near future; and
        (iii) The continuation of the parent or guardian and child relationship greatly
        diminishes the child’s chances of early integration into a safe, stable, and
        permanent home[.]

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3)(A).11 “Each of the statutory elements that make up the
ground known as persistence of conditions must be established by clear and convincing
evidence.” In re Aaron E., No. M2014-00125-COA-R3-PT, 2014 WL 3844784, at *8
(Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2014) (citing In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d at 550).

         We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that this ground was supported by clear
and convincing evidence. The proof shows that the Children were removed from Mother
in the summer of 2021 following the filing of a petition to declare the Children dependent
and neglected. Clearly, at the time of the January 2023 trial, more than six months had
elapsed. There also clearly were conditions that prevented the Children’s safe return.
Among the other concerns detailed herein that pertain to Mother’s failure to complete
various services to improve her situation, Mother prominently had not effectively
addressed concerns about substance abuse, as she failed to ever complete intensive
outpatient treatment. Moreover, the record clearly supports the conclusion that there was
little likelihood that conditions preventing the Children’s return to Mother would be
remedied at an early date. The prolonged track record over the course of the custodial
episode generally pointed to Mother’s lack of being proactive, and Mother herself testified
that she was not participating in any services at the time of trial. There is also sufficient

        11
             This is the version of the statute in effect at the time of the filing of the termination petition in
this case.
                                                      - 19 -
evidence in this record to support the conclusion that a continuation of the parent and child
relationships Mother had with the Children would greatly diminish the Children’s chances
of early integration into a safe, stable, and permanent home. There is no indication that
Mother’s situation will improve by an early date, and in contrast to concerns that exist as
to her general stability and ability to care for the Children, the Children are reportedly
thriving in foster care and, as accurately noted by the Department, in a potentially adoptive
foster home.

Failure to Manifest an Ability and Willingness to Assume Custody or Financial
Responsibility of the Children

       Finally, we turn our review to the ground for termination codified at Tennessee
Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(14). That statute provides that a parent’s rights may
be terminated when he or she

       has failed to manifest, by act or omission, an ability and willingness to
       personally assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility of
       the child, and placing the child in the person’s legal and physical custody
       would pose a risk of substantial harm to the physical or psychological welfare
       of the child[.]

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14). This ground for termination requires the Department
to establish two elements by clear and convincing evidence. In re Maya R., No. E2017-
01634-COA-R3-PT, 2018 WL 1629930, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 4, 2018). The
Department must first prove that the parent “failed to manifest ‘an ability and willingness
to personally assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility of the
child[ren].’” Id. (quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14)). Second, the Department
must prove that placing the Children in the parent’s legal and physical custody “would pose
a risk of substantial harm to the physical or psychological welfare of the child[ren].” Id.
(quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14)).

       As to the first of the aforementioned prongs, the Tennessee Supreme Court has
clarified that the statute “places a conjunctive obligation on a parent . . . to manifest both
an ability and willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody or financial
responsibility for the child.” In re Neveah M., 614 S.W.3d 659, 677 (Tenn. 2020).
Accordingly, “[i]f a person seeking to terminate parental rights proves by clear and
convincing proof that a parent or guardian has failed to manifest either ability or
willingness, then the first prong of the statute is satisfied.” Id.

      In explaining why this ground had been satisfied as to Mother by clear and
convincing evidence, the trial court noted that Mother “had 19 months to address her
substance abuse issues and establish a safe and stable home for the children, but . . has not
done so.” The court also noted that, in addition to not addressing substance abuse issues,
                                           - 20 -
Mother had not completed parenting education and had pending charges she incurred after
the Children were removed. Continuing on, the trial court noted that Mother had made
excuses for missing visits and drug screens and that her actions demonstrated a lack of
willingness and ability to care for the Children. Further, the trial court found that returning
the Children to Mother’s custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to them, that the
Children were thriving in their foster home placement where they were provided with a
stable life, and that, while the Children needed stability in their lives, Mother had failed to
provide such with her unstable housing and employment and arrests.

       We agree with the trial court that this ground for termination was established by clear
and convincing evidence. Mother may have professed her love for the Children at trial,
but the inquiry into a parent’s willingness involves looking into more than a parent’s verbal
expressions. See In re Eli H., No. E2019-01028-COA-R3-PT, 2020 WL 2300066, at *10
(Tenn. Ct. App. May 8, 2020) (noting that a “parent’s actions can demonstrate a lack of
willingness”). Here, Mother’s actions throughout the custodial episode do not evidence
active efforts to establish stability for the Children. Indeed, not only did Mother continue
to incur legal charges and fail to complete intensive outpatient treatment, she also failed to
complete parenting education. Moreover, as for any efforts to maintain contact with the
Children, the proof showed that Mother was not consistent with visitation.

       As we mentioned earlier in this Opinion, Ms. Vermilye testified that Mother had not
demonstrated herself to be proactive in addressing her issues, and this assessment is
certainly an apt one based on the proof. Further, though, Mother’s failure to substantively
address issues of concern in the case itself accompanied a continued lifestyle that reflects
an inability to care for the Children, and we agree with the trial court that the record
supports the conclusion that placing the Children with Mother would pose a risk of
substantial harm to them. In this vein, we of course also agree with Ms. Vermilye’s
testimony that it would be detrimental to the Children to return them to Mother, particularly
so in light of Mother’s failure to concretely address her substance abuse issues and given
her frequent encounters with the law. As the Department has argued on appeal as it
concerns the substantial harm prong of this ground, substantial harm can be supported
through evidence of a parent’s repeated criminal conduct and history of substance abuse.
See In re O.M., No. E2018-01463-COA-R3-PT, 2019 WL 1872511, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Apr. 26, 2019); In re Piper B., No. M2017-00930-COA-R3-PT, 2018 WL 3954328, at *10
(Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2018). Given that we discern no error in the trial court’s
determination that this ground was properly established, and further, given that at least one
ground for termination has been sufficiently established in this case, we can now shift our
attention to the issue of whether the termination of Mother’s rights was in the Children’s
best interests.

Best Interests Inquiry

       When at least one ground for termination has been properly established against a
                                        - 21 -
parent, as it has in this case, we turn our focus to whether termination of the parent’s
parental rights is in the child’s best interests. “Because not all parental conduct is
irredeemable, Tennessee’s termination of parental rights statutes recognize the possibility
that terminating an unfit parent’s parental rights is not always in the child’s best interest.”
In re Jacobe M.J., 434 S.W.3d 565, 573 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013). As such, “[w]hen at least
one ground for termination of parental rights has been established, the petitioner must then
prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of the parent’s rights is in the
child’s best interest.” Id. at 572 (citing White v. Moody, 171 S.W.3d 187, 192 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 2004)).

       When conducting a best interests analysis, conflicts between the interests of the
parent and child are to be resolved in “favor of the rights and best interest of the child.” Id.
at 573 (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-101(d)). Importantly, the best interests analysis
“must be viewed from the child’s, rather than the parent’s, perspective.” White v. Moody,
171 S.W.3d 187, 194 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004). Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-
113(i), which lists factors to be considered as part of the best interests inquiry, states that
the trial court “shall consider all relevant and child-centered factors applicable to the
particular case before the court.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i). “Ascertaining a child’s
best interests does not call for a rote examination” of statutory factors, and “depending
upon the circumstances of a particular child and a particular parent, the consideration of
one factor may very well dictate the outcome of the analysis.” In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d
at 878 (citing Moody, 171 S.W.3d at 194).

        Here, as part of its consideration of the Children’s best interests under section 36-1-
113(i), and in support of its ultimate conclusion that, by clear and convincing evidence, the
termination of Mother’s parental rights was in their best interests, the trial court noted in
relevant part that the Children had “a critical need for stability and continuity of
placement,” that the Children were thriving in their foster home, that Gabrien has ADHD
and speech issues that were being addressed in the foster home, that the Children have a
positive relationship with the foster parent who is considering adoption, and that it would
be detrimental for the Children to have a change in caretakers and physical environment.
Further, the court found that Mother had not demonstrated a lasting adjustment of
circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it safe for the Children to be in her home;
that Mother had pending legal charges and was subject to incarceration; that Mother had
nineteen months to address her substance abuse issues, participate in parenting, resolve her
legal issues, and establish a stable home but failed to do so; that Mother provided multiple
addresses to the Department since the Children were placed in foster care; that Mother had
not demonstrated a sense of urgency to address the issues necessitating foster care; that
Mother had failed to submit to drug screens and that, based on that evidence and pending
unresolved drug charges, “there continues to be the use of substance abuse in the home that
may render [Mother] from consistently caring for the children in a safe and stable manner”;
and that Mother was not consistent in attending visitation and “often cancelled visitation
or sometimes failed to show which upset the children.”
                                              - 22 -
        The record clearly and convincingly supports the trial court’s determination that the
termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interests. As the trial
court referenced, the proof clearly points to stability in the Children’s placement, while
also overwhelmingly demonstrating continued concern for Mother’s ability to render any
parental care. The trial court’s assessment that Mother had not demonstrated a sense of
urgency is clearly supported by the extensive evidence we have detailed herein, and of
particular note in this case, Mother never completed intensive outpatient treatment despite
the persistent concerns regarding substance abuse. Mother also, among the other varied
concerns we have discussed, continued to receive legal charges. We recognize that Mother
professes love for the Children, but in light of her failure to proactively address significant
areas of concern over the course of this custodial episode, there is no indication when, if at
all, Mother would ever be in a position to properly care for the Children. In light of that
backdrop of uncertainty, the need for stability and pursuit of permanency in the Children’s
lives, and our consideration of the totality of the circumstances presented by the record in
this case, we affirm the trial court’s conclusion that termination is in the Children’s best
interests.

                                      CONCLUSION

       In light of the foregoing discussion, although we vacate both grounds of
abandonment relied upon by the trial court for the termination of Mother’s parental rights,
we affirm the trial court’s reliance on the remaining grounds for termination and its best
interests determination. The trial court’s termination of Mother’s parental rights is
accordingly affirmed.

                                                       s/ Arnold B. Goldin
                                                     ARNOLD B. GOLDIN, JUDGE

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