Court Opinion

ID: 9796799
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:05:33.66013+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:50:36.182391
License: Public Domain

BAXTER, J., Dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to vacate the death judgment, rendered after a second penalty trial, in this aggravated case. The majority does not base this decision upon lapses in the evidence (which was overwhelming), or upon identified errors of law that prejudiced defendant’s substantial rights. Instead, the majority, by strained reasoning, discerns a pattern of judicial misconduct it deems sufficient to undermine confidence in the trial’s fairness. In doing so, the majority places exaggerated reliance on petty matters, many of which defendant has not challenged here or below. Indeed, neither defendant nor the majority criticizes the seasoned trial judge for his handling of the guilt phase. Moreover, in assessing the effect of the judge’s conduct on the penalty jury, the majority ignores the cold-blooded nature of this triple slaying. Reversal, and a remand for a third penalty trial, are unnecessary in my view.
Like defendant, the majority first focuses on the trial court’s comment to Prospective Juror C. S., in front of the entire venire, about her questionnaire at the penalty retrial (i.e., “You . . . [believe] in the death penalty when it was premeditated murder, that is a gimme[,] ... all over and done with, ... in the penalty phase”). (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1231, italics omitted.) According to the majority, the court thereby conveyed that the penalty jury was bound by a prior finding of premeditation, and could not consider that issue further. Then, the majority notes, the court denied defendant’s request for a clarifying instruction that (as was true) the guilt jury had not found premeditation. Hence, the majority concludes, the court wrongly eliminated the lack of premeditation as a sentencing factor, severely damaged defense strategy, and unfairly encouraged a death sentence.
The trial court, albeit inartfully, was simply trying to explain that, regardless of issues, like premeditation, that might have been decided at the guilt trial, the penalty jurors must examine more broadly whether the punishment should be death or life without parole. In other words, the court sought to caution that a juror could not automatically impose death for a premeditated murder. I find it difficult to conceive that jurors could have been seriously misled.
*1246Moreover, the majority ignores subsequent steps taken by the trial court to ensure no impropriety or confusion occurred. (People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 735 [244 Cal.Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741] (Melton) [judging propriety and effect of court’s comment by both its content and surrounding circumstances].) When voir dire resumed, the court promptly advised prospective jurors, including C. S., to “disregard[] the court’s comment [about premeditation] before.” Also, to ensure that neither C. S. nor anyone else held erroneous views, the court reiterated that eligibility for a death sentence requires “more” than a conviction of first degree premeditated murder, to wit, a special circumstance finding.1 Thus, though the court did not provide the precise clarification the defense preferred, it substantially addressed the defense concerns about its “premeditation” comment. While the court might have handled the situation more adeptly, the majority’s severe reaction to this incident seems unfair.
As discussed below, the other incidents of alleged misconduct primarily occurred during the testimony of Dr. Stein and Dr. Possum. These defense experts described the general effects of cocaine use and defendant’s social history, respectively. The majority concludes that the court belittled these witnesses in front of the jury, disparaged defense counsel in the process, and created the impression that it was an agent of the prosecution and an enemy of the defense.
As the majority seems to concede, none of the alleged misconduct on which it relies prompted a timely defense objection on that ground. For this reason, perhaps, defendant has avoided basing appellate claims of judicial misconduct on many of the same events. Contrary to what the majority implies, nothing allows this court to ignore the procedural bar that generally applies in such situations. We have said that a timely objection and appropriate admonition will normally cure any harm flowing from judicial misconduct of the kind alleged here. (People v. Monterroso (2004) 34 Cal.4th 743, 759 [22 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 101 P.3d 956] (Monterroso).) We also cannot speculate that the trial court would have refused to correct any error if given the opportunity to do so. (See Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d 713, 735.) Hence, the majority wrongly assumes that the events used to reverse the judgment are properly before this court on appeal.
On the merits, judicial comments made during the examination of defense witnesses were hardly as significant as the majority suggests. (See maj. opn., ante, pp. 1233-1243.) The references to Dr. Stein’s grant money and to cocaine’s antidepressant effect were humorous quips of the kind that *1247have not been deemed serious or harmful before. (E.g., Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d 713, 753-754 [jests aimed at defense expert and counsel]; see Monterroso, supra, 34 Cal.4th 743, 761-762; People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1177 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 998 P.2d 969]; People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 511-512 [34 Cal.Rptr.2d 558, 882 P.2d 249].)
In all the other incidents on which the majority relies, the trial court simply adopted a colloquial style when applying the rules of evidence, and excluding testimony that was irrelevant or nonresponsive. For instance, the court asked why anyone should “care” about Dr. Possum’s answer to one question, and chided counsel for trying to “sneak by” a particular ruling another time. The majority does not find any error in the court’s substantive rulings on these evidentiary points. Moreover, though the majority intimates that the court should have expressed its concerns at sidebar, rather than in front of the jury, it cites no authority requiring a private bench conference each time routine sua sponte rulings are made. (See People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1108 [31 Cal.Rptr.2d 321, 875 P.2d 36] [trial court has broad discretion in handling evidentiary questions and restricting bench conferences].) Even if the court would have been better advised to speak with more decorum, the comments did not come close to denigrating defense counsel, undermining defense witnesses, or damaging defense strategy.
Finally, I disagree with the majority that the trial court’s actions had a cumulative prejudicial effect. In reaching this conclusion, the majority focuses exclusively on the disputed remarks themselves. Such an approach removes, in essence, the aggravating nature of the capital crimes from the prejudice analysis.
Evidence admitted at the penalty retrial identified defendant as the person who robbed and killed three young men at the business where he used to work (e.g., murder weapon, bloodstained clothes, and taped confessions). Each victim was bound and shot in the head execution-style from close range. Defendant evidently planned to use the money he stole from the cash register to buy drugs or a new motorcycle. The jury knew that at least two of the victims cried or begged for mercy before they died. The jury also knew that defendant ignored these pleas even though he had been friendly with the victims in the past. Indeed, the evidence indicated that, before the murders, defendant had met family members and friends of the victims, and thus was aware of the emotional trauma he would cause by killing them. These family members and friends testified to the great pain and grief he had caused by his homicidal acts.
*1248Unlike the majority, I do not attribute the death verdict to the manner in which the trial court conducted the legal proceedings. The blame rests squarely on defendant and the capital crimes he committed. Nothing the majority has cited persuades me that a third trial to determine defendant’s appropriate punishment is justified. I therefore dissent.
Chin, J., concurred.
Respondent’s petition for a rehearing was denied May 17, 2006. Baxter, J., Chin, J., and Corrigan, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

 Of course, the guilt jury’s failure to return a “premeditated murder” verdict did not prevent the penalty jurors from concluding, as a circumstance of the crime (Pen. Code, § 190.3, factor (a)), that the murder was premeditated. Indeed, there was substantial evidence to that effect.