Court Opinion

ID: 9913035
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-26 18:00:56.546481+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:06:52.150507
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-2059     Document: 010110973937      Date Filed: 12/26/2023    Page: 1
                                                                                 FILED
                                                                     United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                       December 26, 2023
                          _________________________________
                                                                        Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                            Clerk of Court
  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

        Plaintiff - Appellee,

  v.                                                        No. 23-2059
                                                  (D.C. No. 2:22-CR-01296-MIS-1)
  RICARDO HERNANDEZ-PORTILLO,                                 (D. N.M.)

        Defendant - Appellant.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
                          _________________________________

 Before HARTZ, MATHESON, and EID, Circuit Judges.
                  _________________________________

       Ricardo Hernandez-Portillo pled guilty to illegal reentry into the United States.

 The district court sentenced him to sixty months’ imprisonment, varying upward

 from the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines range of twenty-four to thirty months’

 imprisonment. Mr. Hernandez-Portillo appeals, arguing his sentence was

 substantively unreasonable. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and

 18 U.S.C. § 3742, we affirm.

       *
         After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
 this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
 precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
 estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 23-2059    Document: 010110973937         Date Filed: 12/26/2023     Page: 2

                                   I. BACKGROUND

       Mr. Hernandez-Portillo is a seventy-year-old native and citizen of Honduras.

 He moved to the United States in 1974. Between 1977 and 2000, Mr. Hernandez-

 Portillo was convicted of several state crimes including: theft, burglary, assault,

 third-degree assault, using force against another, and first-degree negligent driving.

 During that period, he faced additional criminal charges that were either dismissed or

 where the disposition is unknown. 1

       In 2012, a Washington state court convicted him of felony child molestation.

 His victim was a six-year-old girl. For that offense, he was sentenced to sixty-eight

 months to life in prison, a lifetime of community custody, and a lifetime of sex-

 offender registration. He was released after ten years. Upon his release in March

 2022, Mr. Hernandez-Portillo was removed from the United States and returned to

 Honduras.

       Three months later, in June 2022, he was arrested in New Mexico and pled

 guilty to illegal reentry. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(1)–(2), (b)(2). A presentence

 investigation report (“PSR”) summarized Mr. Hernandez-Portillo’s criminal history,

 setting his criminal history category at III and his total-offense level at fifteen. Based

 on his offense level and criminal history category, the PSR found the Guidelines

       1
         Mr. Hernandez-Portillo has no known criminal history from 2001 through
 2011. However, in June 2002, he was removed from the United States and returned
 to Honduras—it is unclear how long he stayed in Honduras or when he returned to
 the United States.

                                             2
Appellate Case: 23-2059     Document: 010110973937         Date Filed: 12/26/2023        Page: 3

 sentencing range was twenty-four to thirty months’ imprisonment. The PSR also

 noted that the applicable statutory maximum sentence was twenty years’

 imprisonment. Neither party objected to the PSR.

        Prior to the sentencing hearing, the district court advised the parties it was

 considering an upward variance and allowed them to file responses. For punishment,

 the government argued an upward variance to at least forty-eight months’

 imprisonment was appropriate, whereas Mr. Hernandez-Portillo opposed an upward

 variance and argued a sentence within the Guidelines range would be sufficient.

        At sentencing, the district court adopted the PSR’s factual findings and stated

 it had considered, inter alia, the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the

 sentencing memoranda, and the parties’ arguments and filings. Ultimately, the

 district court sentenced Mr. Hernandez-Portillo to sixty months’ imprisonment. He

 now appeals, challenging the sentence as substantively unreasonable.

                                    II. DISCUSSION

        “We review a district court’s sentencing decision for substantive

 reasonableness under an abuse-of-discretion standard . . . .” United States v.

 Cookson, 922 F.3d 1079, 1090 (10th Cir. 2019). This standard applies “[r]egardless

 of whether the sentence imposed is inside or outside the Guidelines range.” Gall v.

 United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).

        We will reverse only if the sentence was “arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or

 manifestly unreasonable,” or if the district court “exceeded the bounds of permissible

 choice, given the facts and the applicable law in the case at hand.” United States v.

                                              3
Appellate Case: 23-2059    Document: 010110973937         Date Filed: 12/26/2023     Page: 4

 DeRusse, 859 F.3d 1232, 1236 (10th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). Our

 focus is on “whether the length of the sentence is reasonable given all the

 circumstances of the case in light of the [§ 3553(a)] factors.” Cookson, 922 F.3d at

 1091 (internal quotation marks omitted). Those factors are: (1) the nature and

 circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant;

 (2) the need for a sentence to reflect the seriousness of the crime, deter future

 criminal conduct, protect the public, and provide rehabilitation; (3) the legally

 available sentences; (4) the Sentencing Guidelines; (5) the Sentencing Commission’s

 policy statements; (6) the need to avoid unwarranted disparities among sentences;

 and (7) the need for restitution. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

       In conducting our analysis, “[w]e do not reweigh the sentencing factors but

 instead ask whether the sentence fell within the range of rationally available choices

 that facts and the law at issue can fairly support.” United States v. Blair, 933 F.3d

 1271, 1274 (10th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). And we will “uphold

 even substantial variances when the district court properly weighs the § 3553(a)

 factors and offers valid reasons for the chosen sentence.” United States v. Barnes,

 890 F.3d 910, 916 (10th Cir. 2018); see also Gall, 552 U.S. at 51 (noting that the

 sentencing court “is in a superior position to find facts and judge their import under

 § 3553(a) in the individual case”).

       Mr. Hernandez-Portillo challenges his sentence as substantively unreasonable

 for four reasons, none of which is persuasive. First, he emphasizes facts that he

 argues warrant a shorter sentence, including his advanced age and health issues, the

                                             4
Appellate Case: 23-2059    Document: 010110973937        Date Filed: 12/26/2023    Page: 5

 nature and circumstances underlying his illegal-reentry offense, 2 and that this was his

 first immigration conviction. Second, Mr. Hernandez-Portillo contends that the

 district court’s reasoning does not fairly support the upward variance, suggesting the

 district court placed too much weight on his criminal history because the Guidelines

 already accounted for it. Third, he argues the Guidelines and related Sentencing

 Commission policy statements (regarding a defendant’s age, physical condition, and

 criminal history category not adequately reflecting a defendant’s criminal history)

 conflict with the upward variance. And fourth, Mr. Hernandez-Portillo asserts the

 variance creates an undue sentencing disparity.

       In our view, his first three arguments amount to disagreement with the way the

 district court balanced the § 3553(a) factors and the facts of Mr. Hernandez-Portillo’s

 case. And this court does not reweigh the sentencing factors. Blair, 933 F.3d at

 1274. Moreover, “no algorithm exists that instructs the district judge how to

 combine the factors or what weight to put on each one,” Barnes, 890 F.3d at 916, and

 “we will defer on substantive-reasonableness review not only to a district court’s

 factual findings but also to its determinations of the weight to be afforded to such

 findings,” Cookson, 922 F.3d at 1094 (internal quotation marks omitted).

       2
        He asserts that approximately a month after his March 2022 removal to
 Honduras, his ninety-three-year-old mother’s caretaker called and “told him he
 needed to come back right away if he wanted to see his mother again before she
 died.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 2. He further explains that immigration officials arrested
 him without incident.
                                            5
Appellate Case: 23-2059    Document: 010110973937         Date Filed: 12/26/2023     Page: 6

       In rendering its sentencing decision, the district court referenced myriad

 considerations specific to Mr. Hernandez-Portillo and his crime. For example, the

 district court acknowledged that Mr. Hernandez-Portillo is seventy years old, that he

 suffers from various health issues, that his mother is elderly and in failing health, that

 this was his first immigration conviction, and that he may not have understood the

 consequences of returning to the United States.

       Conversely, the court expressed concern about Mr. Hernandez-Portillo’s

 lengthy criminal history, which involved violent conduct. Relatedly, it noted that he

 had multiple protective orders against him. The court was particularly concerned

 about the egregiousness of his 2012 conviction for felony child molestation,

 emphasizing that he sexually assaulted a six-year-old child. The court was also

 troubled that serving ten years’ imprisonment and being subject to lifetime

 community supervision for the child sex crime was not sufficient deterrence for

 Mr. Hernandez Portillo to illegally reenter the United States only three months after

 his removal. Finally, the district court said that, given these aggravating factors, the

 sentence it imposed was necessary to protect the public, impart the seriousness of the

 offense, deter future criminal conduct, promote respect for the law, and provide just

 punishment for Mr. Hernandez-Portillo’s crime.

       The district court thoroughly supported its variance with detailed analysis and

 valid reasoning. See Barnes, 890 F.3d at 917 (“A sentence is more likely to be

 within the bounds of reasonable choice when the court has provided a cogent and

 reasonable explanation for it.”). Additionally, the court had “broad discretion to

                                             6
Appellate Case: 23-2059    Document: 010110973937        Date Filed: 12/26/2023    Page: 7

 consider” Mr. Hernandez-Portillo’s criminal history even though it was “already

 accounted for in the advisory guidelines range.” Id. at 921 (internal quotation marks

 omitted). In fact, the Guidelines explicitly consider the possibility of upward

 variances when “reliable information indicates that the defendant’s criminal history

 category substantially under-represents the seriousness of the defendant’s criminal

 history or the likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes.” U.S.S.G.

 § 4A1.3(a)(1).

       Mr. Hernandez-Portillo’s argument that policy statements contradict the

 upward variance is also unavailing. The court properly considered the mitigating

 factors discussed in the policy statements and determined that aggravating factors in

 his case outweighed them and necessitated the upward variance. See Barnes,

 890 F.3d at 916; Cookson, 922 F.3d at 1094. Mr. Hernandez-Portillo’s disagreement

 with the way the district court balanced the § 3553(a) factors with the facts of his

 case does not make his sentence substantively unreasonable.

       Turning to the fourth argument, Mr. Hernandez-Portillo contends “[t]he

 upward variance created an unwarranted sentencing disparity between [himself] and

 defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.”

 Aplt. Opening Br. at 18. In support, he cites data to compare his sentence to the

 average and median lengths of sentences imposed on others convicted of illegal

 reentry who shared his criminal history category and offense level—nineteen months

 and eighteen months, respectively—and notes that his sixty-month sentence “is more

 than triple the median.” Id. at 20. Mr. Hernandez-Portillo further emphasizes that

                                            7
Appellate Case: 23-2059    Document: 010110973937         Date Filed: 12/26/2023    Page: 8

 sixty-one percent of the offenders in the comparison group received downward

 variances, while thirty-seven percent received sentences within the Guidelines range.

 Essentially, he argues that his sentence was substantively unreasonable because it

 was longer than those imposed in numerous other cases. We remain unconvinced.

       Significant sentencing disparity alone does not require reversal. See Barnes,

 890 F.3d at 916 (We will “uphold even substantial variances when the district court

 properly weighs the § 3553(a) factors and offers valid reasons for the chosen

 sentence.”). And although “similar offenders engaged in similar conduct should be

 sentenced equivalently, disparate sentences are allowed where the disparity is

 explicable by facts on the record.” United States v. Davis, 437 F.3d 989, 997

 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). After all, “consideration of

 unwarranted sentence disparities is but one factor that a district court must balance

 against the other § 3553(a) factors in arriving at an appropriate sentence.” United

 States v. Martinez, 610 F.3d 1216, 1228 (10th Cir. 2010). Here, the district court did

 not abuse its discretion when it afforded more weight to other factors and determined

 those factors warranted an above-Guidelines sentence.

       In sum, Mr. Hernandez-Portillo has not demonstrated that the district court’s

 sentence was “arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable,” or that it

 “exceeded the bounds of permissible choice, given the facts and the applicable law in the

 case at hand.” DeRusse, 859 F.3d at 1236 (internal quotation marks omitted). We

 therefore hold the district court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed

 Mr. Hernandez-Portillo’s sentence.

                                             8
Appellate Case: 23-2059   Document: 010110973937       Date Filed: 12/26/2023     Page: 9

                                III. CONCLUSION

       Under our deferential standard of review, Mr. Hernandez-Portillo has not

 demonstrated his sentence was substantively unreasonable. We affirm the district

 court’s judgment.

                                           Entered for the Court

                                           Allison H. Eid
                                           Circuit Judge

                                          9