Court Opinion

ID: 9532919
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:26:14.592191+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:52.244589
License: Public Domain

VEASEY, Chief Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the holding of the majority that there was plain error in the failure of the trial court to provide the jury with a correct statement of the law in accordance with 11 Del. C. § 263. Accordingly, I vote to reverse.39
Nevertheless, I share the dissent’s concern regarding undue expansion of the plain error rule. I write separately to explain why the result in this case does not expand plain error review beyond the circumscribed limits set forth in our plain error jurisprudence.
If objection is not made at trial, we will not grant relief unless an appellant shows plain error.40 That error must be obvious to the appellate court and must result in fundamental prejudice to the defendant. Accordingly, not all errors amount to plain error.41
*1055In Wainwright v. State,42 we explained the plain error standard as follows:
Under the plain error standard of review, the error complained of must be so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process. Furthermore, the doctrine of plain error is limited to material defects which are apparent on the face of the record; which are basic, serious and fundamental in their character, and which clearly deprive an accused of a substantial right, or which clearly show manifest injustice.
The burden of showing plain error lies with the appellant.43 Even when an appellant has carried this burden, under the terms of Supreme Court Rule 8, we may exercise our discretion to decline to grant relief.44 We must eschew the temptation to exercise the clarity of vision that comes with 20/20 hindsight to say — except with extreme reluctance — that the trial judge must jump in, sua sponte, and do this or do that to save a litigant or a lawyer from allowing error to seep into a trial.
This is one of those rare cases where the judge had a heightened duty to “get it right” when settling on what to tell the jury about the law. The plain error jurisprudence has limits. I do not say that in every case a materially incorrect jury charge will constitute plain error per se. But certainly this is a case where we must find plain error.
Our plain error review must be applied in conjunction with the imperative that a jury be given clear and correct guidance. A defendant is “entitled” to a “correct statement of the substance of the law.”45 We have stated that “[t]he primary purpose of jury instructions is to define with particularity the factual issues, and clearly to instruct the jury as to the principles of law which they are to apply in deciding the factual issues involved in the case before them.”46 Moreover, “jury instructions *1056must be adapted to the factual situation of each case. In any criminal case, it is the duty of the jury to examine facts and assign to or eliminate criminal responsibility for specific individuals. The applicable principles of law and the identity of the persons involved must not be confused.” 47
In Culver v. Bennett,48 a tort action, the appellants argued for the first time on appeal that the jury instructions had erroneously and confusingly “presented the jury with two separate and conflicting rules of legal causation”: the “substantial factor rule” and the “but for” rule.49 Analyzing whether it was plain error to use the term “substantial factor” notwithstanding Delaware’s “common law adherence to the ‘but for’ rule of proximate cause,” this Court noted that “this case presents questions of first impression concerning the proper construction of Delaware’s modified comparative negligence statute.”50 The Court determined that under Delaware law “the use of the term ‘substantial factor’ was erroneous and a deficiency which undoubtedly undermined the jury’s ability to intelligently perform its duty....”51 Similarly, in Probst v. State,52 the appellant argued for the first time on appeal that the jury instruction was inadequate because it confusingly used male pronouns to refer to a female defendant in a case in which the actions of the defendant’s brother were also critical.53 Under plain error review, we found that the “jury instructions were erroneous as a matter of law.”54
There is tension between the plain error rule, which limits our review of objections not made at trial, and the principle that a defendant is entitled to a correct statement of the law.55 Application of the plain *1057error rule will continue to rest on the specific facts and circumstances of each case.56 It is pertinent to note, however, as the majority does, that the trial judge has an “obligation to research the law and craft an appropriate charge.”57 This obligation is independent of a party’s obligation to request instructions or make specific objections.58
An additional consideration exists when the legal issue presented for the first time on appeal is one of first impression. Our plain error review has been sensitive to the desirability of addressing such issues in order to provide guidance to future litigants59 and to the related consideration of relieving the appellant from forfeiture arising in part from lack of clarity in the law, assuming that all elements of the plain error standard are satisfied.60
These considerations are present in this case involving jury instructions on a very complex and potentially confusing substantive law issue not previously addressed by this Court. Moreover, this is a very serious homicide case involving this defendant’s conviction of a class C felony and his sentence to five years at Level V, suspended after one year for declining levels of probation. As noted in the majority opinion, this Court has not decided any cases concerning the correct application of 11 Del. C. § 263, and there appears to be only one Delaware case to have instructed the jury on Section 263.61
*1058Section 263 is based on Section 2.03 of the Model Penal Code.62 The Model Penal Code commentary underscores the necessity, explained in the majority opinion, of instructing the jury under Section 263 in cases such as this. Importantly, the commentary also frankly acknowledges the difficult nature of the problems of causation and culpability and the inchoate manner in which the Code addresses them:
These problems are currently dealt with as issues of “proximate causation” and present enormous difficulty (especially in homicide) because of the obscurity of that concept. Rather than seeking to systematize the varying and sometimes inconsistent rules in the numerous areas in which the problem has arisen, the section undertakes a fresh approach to the central issues.
[This section] deals with situations in which the actual result involves the same kind of injury or harm as that designed or contemplated, but in which the precise injury inflicted was different or occurred in a different way. Here the Code makes no attempt to catalogue the possibilities — intervening or concurrent causes, natural or human, unexpected physical conditions; distinctions between mortal and nonmortal wounds; and so on. It deals only with the ultimate criterion by which the significance of such factors ought to be judged— whether the actual result is too remote to have a [just] bearing on the actor’s liability or the gravity of his offense.
In general, the infinite variety of contexts in which the issue can arise precludes an advance catalogue of premises that can be used mechanically to deduce a solution. The issue should be put to the jury in terms of a general principle that articulates the ultimate basis of judgment.
While it is true that the Model Code’s formulation does not give a definitive resolution to most difficult cases, it has the twofold advantage of avoiding the confusing language of “proximate causation” and presenting clearly to the jurors the issues they should properly consider. It also casts aside the sometimes arbitrary distinctions of the common law. Hence, while one should not expect too much of the Code’s general statutory formulation in an area as complex as this, such a formulation has significant advantages over no formulation at all....
Commentary to Section 2.03 of the Model Penal Code at 255-56, 261, 262, 265-66.
In my view, the “enormous difficulty” sometimes engendered by this issue, combined with the fact that it is one of first impression in this Court in a serious criminal case, tips the balance toward a finding *1059of plain error in this case because the instruction lacked essential clarity and was not a correct statement of the law.

. I am inclined to the view, however, that the defendant affirmatively acquiesced in the unavoidable accident jury instruction. That instruction, which is internally unexceptionable, may not have correctly fit the facts of this case. But the defendant requested it and would be barred from appealing it. But, in view of the reversal and the ordering of a new trial this issue is moot.

. See Super. Ct. R. 52(b) ("Plain Error. Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court.”); Barnett v. State, Del.Supr., 691 A.2d 614, 616 (1997) (referring to the "plain error 'interest of justice' exception provided for in Supreme Court Rule 8”).

.See, e.g., Trump v. State, Del.Supr., 753 A.2d 963, 970 (2000) (".. .some members of the defense bar still fail to assert timely objections to prosecutorial misconduct. Such failures hinder the trial judge’s ability to address the alleged misconduct during the trial and ultimately limit a defendant's chance of succeeding on appeal because counsel’s failure to object leaves this Court with the more restricted plain error standard of review.”); id. *1055at 968 ("Yet, had there been an objection, these phrases should have been found to be improper vouching.”). See also Brown v. State, Del.Supr., 729 A.2d 259, 265 (1999) ("We have assumed arguendo that the Superi- or Court should have given a specific unanimity instruction to the jury, if it had been requested by Brown's attorney at trial. We have concluded, nevertheless, that the verdict in Brown’s case demonstrates that the jury was not confused and that Brown’s substantial rights were unaffected by that omission.”); id. at 266 ("Although there was not plain error in Brown’s case, the disjunctive joinder of two distinct offenses in an indictment is not advisable.”).

. Del.Supr., 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (1986) (citations omitted).

. See Brown, 729 A.2d at 265 ("Therefore, in this appeal, Brown has the burden of demonstrating that plain error occurred and affected his substantial rights.” Supr. Ct. R. 8; Super. Ct.Crim. R. 52(b).) (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-35, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508(1993)); Stevenson v. State, Del.Supr., 709 A.2d 619, 633 (1998) ("To establish plain error ... [Stevenson] has the burden of showing that the improper arguments by the prosecutor not only created the possibility of prejudice, but that the errors worked to his actual substantial disadvantage.”) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
Under federal jurisprudence, the difference between harmless error and plain error is that for plain error, "it is the defendant who bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice." Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. at 1778. See Super. Ct.Crim. R. 52(a) ("Harmless Error. Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.”).

. See Supr. Ct. R. 8; Super. Ct.Crim. R. 52(b). Cf. Olano, 507 U.S. at 735-36, 113 S.Ct. at 1778-79 ; Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 1550, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997).

. Grace v. State, Del.Supr., 658 A.2d 1011, 1014 (1995).

. Zimmerman v. State, Del.Supr., 565 A.2d 887, 890 (1989).

. Probst v. State, Del.Supr., 547 A.2d 114, 120 (1988) (citations omitted). Instructions must be substantially correct not flawless:
In undertaking this evaluation, the jury instructions must be viewed as a whole. See Flamer v. State, Del.Supr., 490 A.2d 104, 128 (1984). Although some inaccuracies may appear in the jury instructions, this Court will reverse only if such deficiency undermined the ability of the jury "to intelligently perform its duty in returning a verdict.” Storey v. Castner, Del.Supr., 314 A.2d 187, 194 (1973), quoted in Flamer v. State, 490 A.2d at 128. See also Newnam v. Swetland, Del.Supr., 338 A.2d 560, 562 (1975). A trial court's charge to the jury will not serve as grounds for reversible error if it is “reasonably informative and not misleading, judged by common practices and standards of verbal communication.” Baker v. Reid, Del.Supr., 57 A.2d 103, 109 (1947), quoted in Flamer v. State, 490 A.2d at 128.
Probst, 547 A.2d at 119 (footnote omitted).

. Del.Supr., 588 A.2d 1094, 1095 (1991).

. Id. at 1096.

. Id. at 1098, 1099.

. Id.; see also id. at 1098 ("Since the issue of proximate cause is ordinarily a question of fact to be submitted to the jury, it is not only appropriate but necessary for the trial judge to properly instruct upon that concept.”) (citation omitted).

. Del.Supr., 547 A.2d 114 (1988)

. See id. at 118-20.

. Id. at 120. See also Taylor v. State, Del. Supr., 464 A.2d 897, 899 (1983) ("Having found the instant instruction erroneous we must now determine whether it constitutes plain error since the defendant offered no objection to it at trial. Superior Court Criminal Rules 30(a) and 52(b).... It is our view that it is plain error to fail to instruct the jury on the necessary elements of the crime.”).

. See also Superior Court Criminal Rule 30. Rule 30 provides in relevant part: "No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission therefrom unless that party objects thereto... stating distinctly the matter to which that party objects and the grounds of the objection.” Although this language seemingly prohibits review of objections not made in compliance with the rule, the plain error rule “limits the otherwise absolute bar in Rule 30.” United States v. Ismel, 4th Cir., 153 F.3d 723, 1998 WL 486356 (4th Cir.1998) (unpublished opinion). Thus an objection to a jury instruction raised for the first time on *1057appeal may be reviewed for plain error. See, e.g., Stansbury v. State, Del.Supr., 591 A.2d 188, 191 (1991); United States v. Sotmayor-Vazquez, 1st Cir., 249 F.3d 1, 2001 WL 487962, *13 (2001) (“Because neither defendant objected to the instruction in accordance with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 30, we review for plain error.”)

. See Ayers v. State, Del.Supr., No. 300, 2000, 2001 WL 292610, Veasey, C.J. (March 16, 2001) (ORDER), Order at ¶ 6.

. United States v. Davis, 3d Cir., 183 F.3d 231, 252 (1999).

. See Hall v. State, Del.Supr., No. 380, 1989, 560 A.2d 490, 1989 WL 27783, Horsey, J. (March 3, 1989) (ORDER), Order at ¶ 4 ("Regardless of requests from the parties, the Superior Court has an obligation to charge the jury concerning the law in relation to the facts presented at trial.”) (citation omitted); 9A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2556 (2d ed. 1995) (“It is the inescapable duty of the trial judge to instruct jurors, fully and correctly, on the applicable law of the case, and to guide, direct, and assist them toward an intelligent understanding of the legal and factual issues involved in their search their truth. The court must instruct the jury properly on the controlling issues in the case even though there has been no request for an instruction or the instruction requested is defective.”).

. See McBride v. State, Del.Supr., 477 A.2d 174, 184 (1984) ("However, as the question of the effect of the 1977 amendment is one of first impression, we will waive Rule 8 in the interests of justice to provide guidance to the trial courts and future litigants....”).

. See Monroe v. State, Del.Supr., 652 A.2d 560, 564 (1995) (reversing judgment of conviction based on finding of plain error; noting that "we have not previously addressed the question before the Court in this case”); Culver, 588 A.2d at 1098 (noting that "this case presents questions of first impression,” and that " ‘there is perhaps nothing in the field of law which has called forth more disagreement’ or confusion in judicial opinions than attempts to clarify the concept of proximate cause”) (citation omitted). Cf. Shelton v. State, Del.Supr., 744 A.2d 465, 497 n. 142 (2000) ("Because the right to allocution is arguably a ‘substantial right’ of a capital defendant, and the law of allocution is ambiguous in Delaware, we waive the waiver rule and consider the merits of Shelton’s argument.”) (citation omitted).

. State v. Witherspoon, Del.Super., No. 9610003447, 1999 WL 744429, Silverman, J. (July 30, 1999), aff'd, Witherspoon v. State, Del.Supr., No. 460, 1999, 2001 WL 138499, Steele, J. (Feb. 14, 2001) (ORDER). There is a paucity of authority from other jurisdictions.

. See Comment to § 1.02, Delaware Criminal Code with Commentary (1973). The genesis of the present Delaware Criminal Code is set forth in the introductory section of the Delaware Criminal Code with Commentary. See Introduction, Delaware Criminal Code with Commentary (1973). The Model Penal Code, which was the work of the American Law Institute, was published in final form in 1962. In August 1965, Governor Charles L. Terry, Jr., appointed the Governor’s Committee for Revision of the Criminal Law (on which committee I was honored to serve as co-chair) “to study the need for criminal law reform in Delaware and to produce a draft of a new criminal code.” The Committee issued a Proposed Delaware Criminal Code in 1967. See Governor’s Committee for Revision of the Criminal Law, Proposed Delaware Criminal Code (1967). The Code was first introduced in the House of Representatives in December 1967. After some revisions, it was reintroduced in the Senate in May 1971, and was signed into law by the Governor on July 6, 1972. 58 Del. Laws, c. 497, § 1.