Court Opinion

ID: 9405739
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-29 07:09:14.444387+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:24.433776
License: Public Domain

In The
                                 Court of Appeals
                        Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

                                        No. 07-23-00051-CR
                                        No. 07-23-00052-CR

                      DALTON BRYCE MASSIE-WEAVER, APPELLANT

                                                   V.

                              THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

                            On Appeal from the 355th District Court
                                    Hood County, Texas
          Trial Court Nos. CR15062 & CR14611, Honorable Bryan T. Bufkin, Presiding

                                           June 22, 2023
                                MEMORANDUM OPINION
                   Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and YARBROUGH, JJ.

      Following pleas of not guilty, Appellant, Dalton Bryce Massie-Weaver, was

convicted by a jury of retaliation in trial court cause number CR15062 1 and of possessing

a prohibited weapon (a shank) in a correctional facility in trial court cause number

CR14611. 2 The jury assessed punishment at ten years confinement in each cause and

      1   TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 36.06(a)(1)(2).

      2   TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.11(d)(2).
the trial court ordered the sentences to run concurrently. In the summary portion of the

judgment under Findings on Deadly Weapon, the trial court entered the following finding:

“YES, NOT A FIREARM.” 3 By a single issue in his original brief, Appellant maintains the

trial court erred in making an affirmative deadly weapon finding because there was no

evidence to show he used or exhibited a deadly weapon to facilitate the commission of

an associated felony. Also raised in the original brief and expounded on in his reply brief

is Appellant’s complaint the deadly weapon finding is erroneous because the issue was

not submitted to the jury via a special issue. We affirm both judgments.

                                             BACKGROUND

        While incarcerated in the Hood County Jail, a correctional facility, 4 Appellant was

indicted for possessing “a deadly weapon, to wit: a toothbrush sharpened to a point, that

in the manner of its use or intended use [was] capable of causing death or serious bodily

injury . . . .” On May 2, 2019, while Appellant was in segregation away from the general

population of the jail, correctional officers heard loud noises. Officers Head and Miculka

approached Appellant’s cell and directed him to cease his disruptive conduct. When he

did not obey their commands, they entered the cell and placed Appellant in a protective

wrap. Although Appellant complied with protocol, he threatened to stab the officers in the

         3 Originally appealed to the Second Court of Appeals, this appeal was transferred to this Court by

the Texas Supreme Court pursuant to its docket equalization efforts. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001.
Should a conflict exist between precedent of the Second Court of Appeals and this Court on any relevant
issue, this appeal will be decided in accordance with the precedent of the transferor court. TEX. R. APP. P.
41.3.

        4“Correctional facility” is a “place designated by law for the confinement of a person arrested for,
charged with, or convicted of a criminal offense” and includes a county jail. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §
1.07(a)(14)(A).

                                                     2
neck with a shank. 5 Appellant was temporarily moved to another cell so they could

conduct a search. The shank was not found at that time.

       Lieutenant Jacob Shelly, 6 who was in charge of disciplinary actions, was advised

of the incident between Appellant and the correctional officers and conducted another

search of Appellant’s cell. He testified the shank was discovered where Appellant told

him it was located—in an envelope at the foot of the bunk. Appellant had modified a

toothbrush into a puncturing device which according to Shelly, was capable of causing

death or serious bodily injury if used to stab a correctional officer in the neck area.

       Appellant was restricted from possessing items which could be altered into

puncturing devices. After the shank incident, another correctional officer responded to

loud banging coming from Appellant’s cell. He discovered Appellant was in possession

of colored pencils. When the pencils were confiscated, Appellant became agitated and

made verbal threats against Shelly, his ex-wife, his son, and other family members. He

later made those threats in writing through inmate request forms and jail mail. Those

threats against Shelly and his family resulted in the retaliation conviction which Appellant

does not contest on appeal.

                                           APPLICABLE LAW

       In a jury trial, there are several ways a trial court may make an affirmative finding

concerning a defendant’s use or exhibition of a deadly weapon: (1) where the indictment

specifically alleges a “deadly weapon” and the defendant was found “guilty as charged in

       5   His threats against Officers Head and Miculka, who are public servants, did not result in any
charges.

        6 According to Shelly, he and Appellant were familiar with each other prior to Appellant’s

incarceration.
                                                    3
the indictment”; (2) where the indictment did not use the term “deadly weapon” but alleged

the use of a deadly weapon per se; or (3) where the jury made an express finding of fact

of use of a deadly weapon in response to submission of a special issue during the

punishment stage of trial. Duran v. State, 492 S.W.3d 741, 746 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016)

(citing Polk v. State, 693 S.W.2d 391, 396 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)). 7 In Lafleur v. State,

106 S.W.3d 91, 92 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003), the Court of Criminal Appeals added another

circumstance authorizing the trial court to enter a deadly weapon finding—a jury makes

an express finding that a deadly weapon was used or exhibited when “the indictment

specifically alleges the use of [a] ‘deadly weapon.’” (Emphasis added).

        In Crumpton v. State, 301 S.W.3d 663, 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009), the Court

upheld a deadly weapon finding which involved the use of a motor vehicle in a case of

criminally negligent homicide. The jury’s verdict finding Crumpton guilty recited “as

included in the indictment.” Id.           The Court reasoned the verdict’s reference to the

indictment constituted a finding that the deadly weapon allegation was true and the jury

necessarily found that Crumpton used something that in the manner of its use was

capable of causing—and did cause—death. Id.

                                                ANALYSIS

        Appellant questions the propriety of the deadly weapon finding on the basis that

the issue was not submitted to the jury thereby resulting in error by the trial court in

entering such finding in the judgment. We disagree.

         7 See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42A.054(c) (providing that “[o]n an affirmative finding on the

use or exhibition of a deadly weapon as described by subsection (b), the trial court shall enter the finding
in the judgment of the court”).
                                                     4
        In determining whether an affirmative deadly weapon finding is proper, we do not

look at the facts; rather, we look to the charging instrument, the jury charge, and the jury

verdict. Polk, 693 S.W.2d at 396.              In the underlying case, the indictment charged

Appellant with “intentionally or knowingly possess[ing] a deadly weapon, to wit:                          a

toothbrush sharpened to a point, that in the manner of its use or intented [sic] use is

capable of causing death or serious bodily injury, while in a correctional facility.”

(Emphasis added). The jury’s verdict reads as follows: “We, the Jury, find the defendant,

DALTON BRYCE MASSIE-WEAVER, guilty of the offense of Prohibited Weapon in

Correction Facility, as charged in the indictment. (Emphasis added).

        The jury, as the trier of fact, made a de facto affirmative deadly weapon finding by

simply convicting Appellant based on the indictment that expressly contained and

required a deadly weapon finding. See Roots v. State, 419 S.W.3d 719, 724 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth 2013, pet. ref’d) (citing Polk, 693 S.W.3d at 394). See also Hurd v. State, 322

S.W.3d 787, 792 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, no pet.) (upholding affirmative deadly

weapon finding where indictment charged the defendant with using a deadly weapon and

the jury found him guilty as charged in the indictment). 8 In the underlying case, the

indictment specifically placed the issue before the jury and did not require submission of

a special issue as urged by Appellant.

        8 Cf. Contreras v. State, Nos. 07-22-00185-CR, 07-22-00186-CR, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 3815, at
*9 (Tex. App.—Amarillo June 5, 2023, no pet. h.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (deleting deadly
weapon finding where the trial court’s judgment failed to comport with the verdict). Contreras was convicted
under section 46.10 of the Penal Code which prohibits deadly weapons in a “penal institution” as opposed
to this case which was tried under section 38.11 which prohibits certain substances and items in a
“correctional facility.”
                                                     5
       The charging instrument and jury verdict before us justify entry of a deadly weapon

finding in the trial court’s judgment. Appellant’s sole issue is overruled, and we need not

address whether the shank was used to facilitate another felony.

                                        CONCLUSION

       As the trial court’s judgment in cause number CR15062 was not challenged, that

judgment of conviction is affirmed. The trial court’s judgment in cause number CR14611

is affirmed.

                                                       Alex L. Yarbrough
                                                            Justice

Quinn, C.J., concurring.
Parker, J., concurring in the result.

Do not publish.

                                            6