Court Opinion

ID: 9733116
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:53:54.831145+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:38.532280
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(concurring in part; concurring in result in part).
There are three legal points to be advanced by this writer:
1. In Glad v. Gunderson, Farrar, Aldrich and DeMerssman, 378 N.W.2d 680 (S.D.1985), this Court upheld the grant of summary judgment based upon the statute of limitations when fraudulent concealment was alleged. Andersons, by their own testimony, possessed operative facts to cause the statute of limitations to run, i.e., knowledge for more than 20 years that they believed they had been overcharged. Therefore, we have recent precedent in this Court to apply. Furthermore, if the defendant here establishes the defense of the statute of limitations by demonstrating that the case was instituted beyond the statutory period, it behooves the plaintiffs to then go forward with proof to avoid the statute of limitations. Kurylas, Inc. v. Bradsky, 452 N.W.2d 111, 117 (S.D.1990) (quoting Glad, 378 N.W.2d at 682). Obviously, Andersons did not satisfy this requirement.
2. Issue three, fully briefed by both parties, is framed thusly: Did the trial court have jurisdiction to impose sanctions even though the summary judgment was previously granted in the underlying action? In my opinion, yes. Other courts have ruled on this issue concluding that Rule 11 sanctions survive the demise of the underlying lawsuit. Wojan v. General Motors Cory., 851 F.2d 969 (7th Cir.1988); Bryant v. Bloch Companies [166 Ariz. 46], 800 P.2d 33 (Ariz.App.1990); Darrah v. Des Moines General Hospital, 436 N.W.2d 53 (Iowa 1989). A court is not out of business because it decides a case on a summary judgment motion; it has inherent power to finish its business once it makes a decision on the summary judgment. This would include a Rule 11 motion. For an interesting discussion on this point, see, Szabo Food Service, Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1077, 1078 (7th Cir. 1987).
3. Serious attorney mental deductions, slighting of legal responsibilities, and willful stubbornness were attendant here. It was not simply a mental approach of empty headedness. Nor was there, as I review this record, “a pure heart” reflected in the prosecution of this action. Therefore, I join the majority’s opinion on the amount of the sanctions. See, approval of *647$5,500.00 in sanctions ordered by the trial court, Justice Sabers’ writing for this Court in Tri-State Refining v. Apaloosa Co., 431 N.W.2d 311, 316 (S.D.1988). In this regard, however, I absolutely do not approve of the very strong and overreaching language of the Zaldivar opinion, quoted by the majority opinion, handed down by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Rather, if an attorney believed in his or her own mind, that he or she could advance a worthy, supportable theory in law to prosecute or defend an action (and had something to hang his/her hat on a theory which was not specious), I would be hard pressed to impose sanctions in any appreciable amount.* Willfulness is one thing — an empty head (with a little purity of thought) is quite another. Occasionally, a shallow stream will produce a decent dimpling. Decent enough in law to avoid sanctions. Here, warned repeatedly of the probable request for sanctions, this attorney was obstinate. In lieu of objectivity towards the law, disdain of the law existed. Therefore, the sanction, though seemingly heavy, does not constitute an abuse of discretion. Unquestionably, under this state’s statute, judges are vested with a very broad discretion in granting sanctions. An “appropriate sanction” is wide-sweeping language. It is anything but a precise norm. Therefore, each decision in this Court on sanctions should pivot on the circumstances of each particular case. Thereby, justice is permitted to be handmade instead of mass produced.

 Majority opinion, by adoption of federal decisions, totally negates South Dakota statute. SDCL 15-6-11(a) has an absolute implication of the necessity of good faith in prosecuting litigation. Hence, bad faith attends this statute. SDCL 15-6-11(b) refers to "appropriate sanction, which shall include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee." Notice the word "sanction”; whereas, SDCL 15-6-11(d) refers to "reasonable attorney’s fees and costs,” at the appellate court level. The "appropriate sanction” expression refers to "the court,” which does include a trial court. Thus, a trial court or this appellate court had better zero in on the statute which it seeks to invoke. Confusion is eliminated thereby and a better record is established.