Court Opinion

ID: 9588528
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:35:19.809793+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:41.371017
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
POWELL, J.
In petition for rehearing, counsel urge:
*59“That said decision is in conflict with an express statute, to which the attention of the Court has not been called in this case, either in brief or oral argument, or which has been, overlooked by the Court.”
While, as stated, petitioner did not raise in his petition for writ of habeas corpus, the question now interposed, and the same was not by this court directly treated, and ordinarily would not at this time be considered, yet, by reason of the nature of the proceedings and the question being one of first impression in this jurisdiction, comprehensive treatment of the issue is in order, now that it has been urged.
The statutory provision in question is O. S. Supp. 1947, Tit. 3, Sec. 65.16, referred to in the opinion complained of, but not therein quoted. It reads:
“The acquisition of any land or interest therein pursuant to this Act, the planning, acquisition, establishment, development, construction, improvement, maintenance, equipment, operation, regulation, protection and policing of airports and air navigation facilities, including the acquisition or elimination of airport hazards, and the exercise of any other powers herein granted to municipalities and other public agencies, to be severally or jointly exercised, are hereby declared to be public and governmental functions, exercised for a public purpose, and matters of public necessity; and in the case of any county, are declared to be county functions and purposes as well as public and governmental; and in the case of any municipality other than a county, are declared to be municipal functions and purposes as well as public and governmental. All lands and other property and privileges acquired and used by or on behalf of any municipality or other public agency in the manner and for the purposes enumerated in this Act shall and are hereby declared to be acquired and used for public and governmental purposes and as a matter of public necessity, and, in the case of a county or municipality, for *60county or municipal purposes, respectively.” (Italics ours.)
Counsel argue:
“If the above section was not in the Uniform Airport Act, then petitioner would agree with the judgment and decree of the court. This counsel would admit that the logic and reasoning of the court would be good. Also, in the absence of express statutory provision to the contrary, the operation of an airport would as a general rule, be regarded as a proprietary function of a municipal corporation. As the court said in Syllabus 4, it would be similar to a city-owned electric light and power system, or a water system, which operations are usually regarded as proprietary functions of a city.”
Also, counsel says:
“Again, assuming that Sec. 65.16 was absent from the Uniform Airport Act, the Florida case, Miami Beach Airline Service v. Crandon, 159 Fla. 504, 32 So. 2d 153, 172 A.L.R. 1425-30, would in all truth be most compelling and persuasive in the case at bar.”
An examination of the Florida Statute Annotated, Vol. 13, of Sec. 332.03, F.S.A., Laws 1945, c. 22846, § 3 will disclose that the language of such section is almost identical with the Oklahoma provision, O.S. Supp. 1947, Tit. 3, Sec. 65.16, insofar as declaring the powers to be public, governmental and municipal functions. Therefore, the Florida case, supra, holding that the operation of the Miami Beach Airline Service by the Board of County Commissioners of Dade County, constituted a proprietary function rather than a governmental, is in point and by reason of counsel’s concessions affords answer without further treatment, except that comprehensive consideration is indicated for clarification.
We might point out that West Virginia also has a statutory provision, being Article 2A, Chap. 29, Sec. 10, *61Code W. Ya., Acts 1947, Chap. 12, Sec. 10, which is similar to the Oklahoma and Florida sections. The case of County Court of Harrison County v. West Virginia Air Service, Inc., W. Va., 54 S. E. 2d 1 was cited in support of the authority of a municipality to make exclusive contracts with persons or firms using its airport facilities, and thus supports the action of the respondent herein.
We do not find, however, that the issue now interposed in the within case was raised in either the Miami Beach case or the West Virginia case, above, but respondent calls our attention to two cases, Rhodes v. City of Asheville, 1949, 230 N. C. 134, 52 S. E. 2d 371, and Id., 1949, 230 N.C. 759, 53 S. E. 2d 313, and Granite Oil Securities, Inc., v. Douglas County, Nev. 1950, 219 P. 2d 191, from states having statutory provisions very similar to the Oklahoma provision heretofore quoted, and where the answer depended in each case on whether or not the operation of the airport constituted a governmental function or a proprietary function of the municipality. However, the actions were in tort. And generally it may be said that the distinction between functions of municipalities termed governmental and those termed proprietary, have arisen out of tort actions. This is wholly the case in Oklahoma, so far as we have been able to discover. We reached the conclusion heretofore on consideration of the question, that the operation of an airport by a municipality is a proprietary function. A study of the citations in support of this conclusion is recommended.
There is a further difference in that in the North Carolina case the operation of the airport was joint between two cities or municipalities and a county, while in the Nevada case the. operation of the airport was by *62a county. In the within case the operation of the airport is strictly by the municipality of Oklahoma City.
Of course, the primary duty of this court is to seek the legislative intent, and to' arrive at that intent, the entire statute must be considered, and where such intention can be gathered from an entire statute, words may be modified, altered, or supplied to ‘ give the statute the force and effect which the Legislature intended. Also, where the legislative intent is plainly discernible from the provisions of "the statute when considered as a whole, the real purpose and intent of the legislative body will prevail over the literal import of the words employed. Keck v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 188 Okla. 257, 108 P. 2d 162, and see Eagle-Picker Mining & Smelting Co. v. Linthicum, 175 Okla. 483, 53 P. 2d 687. Legislative intent controls in the exposition of statutes, and is to be derived from a view of the whole and every part of the statute, considered together and in light of the general purposes of the Act. Federal Land Bank of Wichita, Kan. v. Howell, 10 Cir., 123 F. 2d 50.
In considering the question raised there are a number of provisions of the Municipal Airport Act, 3 O. S. Supp. § 65.1 et seq., that should be kept in mind, as well as several principles of law adhered to by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma over a long period of time, and that may appear far afield in the solution of the issue raised, but that are nevertheless involved in a clear answer.
By provision contained in the Airport Act. of 1947, Sec. 65.15 of Tit. 3 O.S.A., it is, among other things, provided :
“* * All powers, privileges and authority granted to any municipality by this Act may be exercised and enjoyed jointly with any public agency of this State, and *63jointly with any public agency of any other state or of the United States to the extent that the laws of such other state or of the United States permit such joint exercise or enjoyment. If not otherwise authorized by law, any agency of the State government when acting jointly with any municipality, may exercise and enjoy all of the powers, privileges and authority conferred by this Act upon a municipality.”
Also by provision of Sec. 65.2(a) we find that the muncipalities of this state are authorized to “plan, establish, develop, construct, enlarge, * * * air navigation facilities, either within or without the territorial limits of such municipality and within or without the territorial boundaries of this State * * *.”
It is indicated that the state may acquire and operate an airport separately or jointly with “any municipality or municipalities.” Tit. 8 O.S.A. § 137, Laws 1947, p. 26, § 7, and Secs. 75 and 79, Laws 1945, p. 17, § 5, and p. 18 § 9. Also by provision of § 78, O.S.A. Tit. 3, Laws 1945, p. 18, § 8, Oklahoma Aviation Commission, Tit. 3 O.S.A. §§ 71-80, no provision of the act with reference to the Oklahoma Aviation Commission is mandatory upon any municipality of Oklahoma in the acquisition, operation or improvement of its airport.
In harmony with the above is the holding in Oklahoma City v. District Court of Thirteenth Judicial District, 168 Okla. 235, 32 P. 2d 318, 93 A.L.R. 489, that action against municipal corporation created under Oklahoma Laws may be brought in county where cause of action or some part thereof arose, though that county is county other than situs of municipality, since word “corporation” as used in 12 Okla. St. Ann. § 134, regarding venue includes municipal corporations in view of this section.
*64In Honnold v. Board of Commissioners of Carter County, 1918, 71 Okla. 71, 177 P. 71, 72, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, after quoting Dillon on Municipal Corporations, 3d Ed., §§ 22, 23, and citing a number of cases, said:
“There is a well-defined and marked distinction between municipal corporations proper and political or quasi corporations. Cities, towns, and villages are municipal corporations proper, while counties, townships, school districts, road districts, and the like are quasi corporations. The difference between these two classes of corporations is well established, and a principle applicable to the one class is not necessarily applicable to the other.”
Prior to the Laws 1929, ch. 11, p. 10, § 1, 11 O.S 1941 § 563, Oklahoma had no specific statutory provisions for the establishment of airports by municipal corporations of the state. However, in 1909, in City of Ardmore v. State ex rel. Best, 24 Okla. 862, 104 P. 913, it was held that a pubic park was a “public utility” within the meaning of that term as used in section 27, art 10 of the Constitution of Oklahoma (approving the holding in Barnes v. Hill, 1909, 23 Okla. 207, 99 P. 927), although it has been held by the same court that in the operation of a park the municipality acts in a governmental capacity. And it has been held that condemnation of realty by city for a public park was not invalid because a portion of the park was: used for an airport. Fischer v. Oklahoma City, 198 Okla. 22, 174 P. 2d 244, appeal denied 331 U. S. 824, 67 S. Ct. 1315, 91 L. Ed. 1840.
It hag been held that under provisions of Art. 18, § 6 of the Constitution of Oklahoma, a city may engage in a strictly business enterprise without being placed in position of exercising governmental function. Inter*65state Power Co. v. City of Cushing, D. C. Okla. 12 F. Supp. 806. And that in view of said provision of the Constitution estimate for airport lease is for “local or municipal purposes.” City of Ardmore v. Excise Board of Carter County, 155 Okla. 126, 8 P. 2d 2, 3.
It has also been held that “a public utility”, within the meaning, of constitutional provision authorizing municipal corporations to incur indebtedness for purpose of constructing public utilities, and the statute authorizing cities of more than two thousand population to own and maintain airports, does not diminish power conferred by the Constitution, 11 O.S. 1941 § 563, O.S. 1941 Const. Art. 10, § 27. Price v. Storms, Board of Trustees, 191 Okla. 410, 130 P. 2d 523.
And in State ex rel. Edwards v. Millar, 1908, 21 Okla. 448, 96 P. 747, 748 it was held:
“Section 27, Art. 10, of the Constitution, is a self-executing grant of power to the qualified property taxpaying voters of a city or town voting at an election held for that purpose, by a majority vote, to become indebted in a larger amount than that specified in Section 26, Art. 10, of the Constitution, for the purpose of purchasing or constructing, public utilities, or for repairing the same, to be owned exclusively by such city.”
But it has been held that:
“The fact that a city leases a part of an airport, acquired by eminent domain, and facilities to aviation companies * * * does not make the city a public service corporation or common carrier within the purview of sec. 24, Art. II, Constitution of Oklahoma.” Fischer v. Oklahoma City, supra [198 Okla. 22, 174 P. 2d 245].
By provision of sec. 14, art. 10 of the Constitution of Oklahoma, funds from taxation may be levied and collected for public purposes only. And in the case of City *66of Blackwell v. Lee, 1936, 178 Okla. 338, 62 P. 2d 1219, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that the city of Blackwell had authority under provisions of Sec. 6, Art. 18, of the Constitution of Oklahoma, and Sec. 6350, O. S. 1931, Tit. 11 O.S.A. § 563, to operate an airport, and that such operation was for a public purpose, but in its private or corporate capacity, and therefore held the city liable for the negligence of its servants, where airport hangar caught fire and plaintiff’s airplane was destroyed. See annotations: 161 A.L.R. pp. 733-764; 120 A.L.R. pp. 1376-1382; 124 A.L.R. pp. 350-359. See text and citations in Fixel on Law of Aviation, 3d Ed., par. 198.
The basis for the holding in the Blackwell case, was the rule announced in the case of City of Sand Springs v. Gray, 182 Okla. 248, 77 P. 2d 56, 57, where the city of Sand Springs maintained a fire department normally recognized as a public and governmental function, but where the city was held liable in damages for negligence of fire truck driver in sideswiping of plaintiff’s vehicle while answering a call outside the city limits and where a fee was charged for the call, the court holding that in so doing it was acting in a matter of proprietary interest of the municipality. The court said:
“When a municipal corporation assumes a proprietary power, not for the purpose of governing the people, but rather for the private advantage of the city and its inhabitants as a legal personality, the municipality is not absolved from liability occasioned by failure to carefully perform merely because the exercise of this power relates, in a general way, to a function of government.
«• * * * *x*
“The basis of the rule contended for by the defendant is the principle that no liability attached to a sov*67ereign state or any of its subdivisions in the exercise of any governmental function.
“The more recent and better considered rule makes plain the line of demarcation, beyond which a municipality is not to be excused from liability. The test is based upon the nature of the duties toith which they are charged. If for the general good of the public they are considered as being strictly ■ governmental, and in case of negligence in their discharge, no liability can attach. But, if they are duties which do not concern the public as a whole, but ivhich are for the benefit of the municipality in its private or corporate capacity, then the municipality must stand ready to accept liability the same as any private individual or corporation.” (Italics ours.)
Prior to the Sand Springs case, in City of Shawnee v. Roush, 101 Okla. 60, 223 P. 354, where the city operated a public hospital, normally not for gain and as a governmental function, 'but where the city did accept paying patients at times, and one such patient was injured through the negligence of attending nurses administering to her during an operation, and where thereafter she filed suit, the Supreme Court held that the function became proprietary in nature by reason of the charges made and that the city was therefore liable in damages for such injuries. See also annotation 101 A. L. R., pp. 1166-1171.
It is believed that it would be at once apparent to anyone after a thoughtful perspective of the relationship of an airport of one state with that of another, of the desirability, even the necessity, if aviation is to properly expand and succeed, for the adoption of uniform airport laws throughout the United States. And where substantially such laws have been so adopted, it is our thought that the courts of the various states should seek a harmonious interpretation of the provisions. See dec*68laration of objectives, § 132, O.S.A. Tit. 3, Laws 1947, p. 24, § 2. In fact, Section 65.20 of tbe Municipal Airport Act, Tit. 3, Laws 1947, p. 23, § 20, provides:
“Interpretation and construction. This Act shall be so interpreted and construed as to make uniform so far as possible the laws and regulations of this State and other states and of the government of the United States.”
Considering first the interpretation of similar language by courts of other jurisdictions, we find that the Supreme Court of North Carolina held in Rhodes v. City of Asheville, supra [230 N. C. 134, 52 S. E. 2d 373]:
“(1) A municipal corporation cannot legally engage in any enterprise in its governmental or proprietary capacity which does not come within the meaning or definition of a public purpose. Nash v. Town of Tarboro, 227 N. C. 283, 42 S. E. 2d 209.
“And even though a municipal activity has been held to be for a public purpose, we may still have difficulty in determining whether such activity is a corporate or proprietary function, and is therefore subject to suits in tort, or a governmental function and immune from such suits. * * *
“(4) The overwhelming weight of authority is to the effect that the construction, operation and maintenance of an airport by a municipality is a proprietary function and such municipality may be held liable in tort for the negligent operation thereof. * * * [Citing long line of cases.]
“(5) The interpretation we place on the language of the statute upon which the defendants, are relying for immunity, leads to the view that it was the intent of the Legislature to declare that the acquisition, construction, operation and maintenance of an airport by a municipality was a governmental function in the sense that it was a■ public purpose. Note the language of the statute: ‘The acquisition, establishment, construction, enlargement, *69improvement, maintenance * * * and tbe exercise of any other powers herein granted to municipalities, are hereby declared to be public, governmental and municipal functions exercised for a public purpose and matters of public necessity’.” (Italics ours.)
Following the above decision a rehearing was asked, the appellant advancing the contention that the court sought to interpret the section in question when it was plain and required no interpretation, and the court in Rhodes v. Asheville, 1949, 230 N. C. 759, 53 S. E. 2d 313, held:
“On their petition for rehearing the defendants contend that the one question presented on the appeal was as to the effect of the language used in the Act under which the Asheville-Hendersonville Airport Authority was • created, to-wit: ‘The acquisition, establishment, construction, enlargement, improvement, maintenance * * * and the exercise of any other powers herein granted to municipalities, are hereby declared to be public, governmental and municipal functions, exercised for a public purpose and matters of public necessity. They contend that this' is plain, unambiguous language which does not call for interpretation, and that none was sought, either by the appellee or the appellants. The petition for rehearing is based on the assumption that the Court misapprehended the question presented and proceeded to construe the language rather than to give it the force and effect plainly intended by the Legislature.”
“Unquestionably the Legislature intended to declare that the operation of the Asheville-Hendersonville Airport should be deemed and held to be in furtherance of a governmental function. But the mere legislative declaration to that effect did not make it so, for that is a judicial and not a legislative question. On consideration of the question as presented on the appeal, we were compelled, for the reasons there stated, to conclude that the operation of the airport is a proprietary undertaking.
*70“We cannot attribute to the language used the force and effect urged by appellants. Instead, we must construe it in such manner as to bring it within the legislative authority of the General Assembly and make it consistent with the validity of the statute in which it is used. This is in accord with the applicable rule of construction.”
The Supreme Court of Nevada, in June, 1950, in Granite Oil Securities, Inc., v. Douglas County, 219 P. 2d 191, 197, above referred to, had occasion to construe its airport statute, N.C.L. 1929, §§ 289-293, Laws 1947, c. 215, § 24, which, as indicated, contains provisions practically identical with the Oklahoma Statute, heretofore quoted. There the plaintiff sued Douglas County alleging that its negligence had caused destruction of plaintiff’s aircraft by fire at the airport owned by Douglas County. A demurrer ivas interposed and presented on the theory that the county was acting, by the very wording of the statute, under a governmental capacity and was therefore not liable in tort. The demurrer was sustained and an appeal followed. The Nevada court said:
“Respondent contends that the very wording of the 1947 act declaring that the operation of the airport should be deemed to be in furtherance of a public and governmental function is a declaration of sovereign immunity. Replying, to a similar contention the Supreme Court of North Carolina on rehearing in Rhodes v. City of Asheville, 230 N. C. 759, 53 S. E. 2d 313, said:
“ ‘We cannot attribute to the language used the force and effect urged by appellants. Instead, we must construe it in such manner as to bring it within the legislative authority of the General Assembly and make it consistent with the validity of the statute in which it is used. This is in accord with the applicable rule of construction.’
“Such rule of construction has been enunciated on many occasions by this court. The reference to the ap-*71pa/rent purpose of the declaration that airport operation is a public and governmental function as being to support the validity of the statute, is undoubtedly directed to the general rule restricting the activities of coun-ies to public and governmental purposes as subdivisions of the state. Like the North Carolina court, we believe the declaration to be simply in justification of the powers granted. As applied to statutes creating municipal corporations, eacli of the three separate opinions of the justices of this court in Pardini v. City of Reno, 50 Nev. 392, 263 P. 768, recognized the rule that exemption from liability cannot be claimed unless it is clearly and expressly given. In this view we find it unnecessary, for the purposes of this case, to adopt the further holding of the North Carolina court that the determination of what is or what is not a governmental function is a judicial qiiestion which can in no event be determined by the legislature.” (Italics ours.)
In the within case from what we have set out above, we find that it has been held that independent of statute, the municipalities of Oklahoma by provision of section 27 of article 10 of the Constitution, which has been held to-be self-executing, have authority to purchase, construct, maintain and repair public utilities, and that an airport is held to be a public utility, is for a public use, and is proprietary in nature as distinguished from governmental, and that a municipal corporation possesses the right to condemnation of lands for airport purposes; that the first specific airport legislative provision was the amendatory act'of 1929, Laws 1929, ch. 11, p. 10, § 1, Tit. 11 O.S.A. § 563, and at this time the current and comprehensive statutory provisions as set out in Tit. 3 O.S.A. §§ 21 to 148, inclusive, include section 65.16 which we are called on herein to interpret in connection with the other provisions of the Act.
*72We find the provisions of the 1947 laws covering municipal airports in harmony with the prior nnrepealed legislative provisions covering the subject, as well as in harmony with the prior judicial construction of prior legislative provisions and the Constitutional provisions, as concerns the nature of the function of the 'municipality in the acquiring, construction and operation of airport facilities in the sense of being proprietary as distinguished from governmental, unless it was the intention of the Legislature by words contained in Section 65.16 supra, quoted, to make such functions “governmental”. Such construction would be out of harmony with other legislative provisions, and principles adhered to by the Supreme Court since statehood. To interpret the Act as contended for would be to hold unconstitutional the city ordinance complained of, and therefore hold void the contract between respondent and Limousine Service. And would also and incidentally relieve the State, all counties and all municipalities of Oklahoma from liability for injuries resulting from malfeasance or non-feasance connected with the operation of an airport owned by one or more divisions, in the face of the general rule that municipalities cannot be so exempted except by specific legislation so saying. The general traveling public as well as laborers who might become injured while employed in the construction, repair or operation of municipal airports thus might have no redress.
And if it was the intent of the Legislature to abrogate what has heretofore been recognized as the settled law of this jurisdiction, and which is adhered to by most states of the Union, then should an Oklahoma municipality co-operate with a municipality of a sister state in acquiring and operating an airport, as authorized by the 1947 Act, with one treating the functions governmental *73and tbe other proprietary and with no deference to the settled general rule of construction in the United States, the complications are at once apparent.
We cannot 'believe such to be the legislative intent. Rather, we would heed the admonitions of the provisions of Section 65.20 of the Act and so interpret and construe the Act as to make it “uniform with the laws and regulations of this State and other states and the government of the United States having to do with the subject of municipal airports.”
We therefore approve the interpretation of similar statutory provisions by the Supreme Court of North Carolina and by the Supreme Court of Nevada. We cannot attribute to the language used the force and effect urged by petitioner. Instead, we must construe it in such manner as to bring it within the legislative authority and make it consistent with the validity of the statute in which it is used. The apparent purpose of the Legislature in declaring that airport operation is a public and governmental function is directed to the powers granted counties and the general rule restricting activities of counties to public and governmental purposes as subdivisions of the State. Like the North Carolina and Nevada courts, we believe the declaration to be simply in justification of the powers granted, and justifying the poAvers of condemnation and the police powers, and so far as the function authorized is concerned, erasing all technical distinctions between counties, cites, towns and authorities designated in the Act, and that it was the intent of the Legislature to declare that the occupation, construction, operation and maintenance of an airport by a municipality was a governmental function in the sense that it was a public purpose, thus bringing the Act *74within the constitutional provisions. Const. Art. 10, 14. COO
We find it unnecessary for the purpose of determination of petitioner’s right to a writ of habeas corpus, to treat incidental questions where such treatment is not absolutely necessary for a solution of the main problem, and we therefore refrain from adopting the further holding of the North Carolina court that the determination of what is or is not a governmental function is a judicial question which can in no event be determined by the legislature.1
The petition is denied.
JONES, P. J., and BRETT, J., concur.