Court Opinion

ID: 9570170
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:20:44.947116+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:05:04.836723
License: Public Domain

Dore, J.
(dissenting) — I dissent.
The majority holds that the jury in this case had not completed its deliberations and that therefore the trial judge acted properly in returning the jury to the jury room after its verdict had been handed to him, after he had accepted it and after the bailiff had read it into the record. That holding is self-contradictory. If the jury had not completed its deliberations, its verdict should not have been accepted by the judge and read into the record. If the verdict had been recorded, the jury had completed its deliberations and the trial judge had no right to prevent the rendering of the jury verdict and poll the jury and instruct the jurors further on the necessity of reaching a verdict. In doing so he improperly invaded the jury's function. The jury by finding defendant guilty of the lesser charge, necessarily had rejected guilt of the greater charge. The trial judge should have polled the jury on the lesser charge, not the major charge and if 12 votes were secured, the case would have been terminated and there would have been no need for further polling. In any event, the instruction he delivered improperly influenced the jury.
The majority reasons that this trial judge acted within his discretion in finding that the jury had not deliberated long enough, that it was not deadlocked, and that therefore he could return it to the jury room. That is not what occurred here. The record reflects that the jury returned its verdict, that the trial judge reviewed it and that he then directed the bailiff to read it into the record. Only then did he poll the jury.
If it appeared to the judge that the jury had not deliber*446ated long enough, the time for him to inquire as to the jury's progress by polling was when the jury first returned to the courtroom. Instead, the trial judge polled the jury in an apparent attempt to find a flaw in the verdict which he apparently disagreed with. In doing so he clearly invaded the jury's province, and subjected the defendant to double jeopardy.
The trial judge compounded the error by the manner in which he instructed the jury to deliberate further. While polling the jury, he asked:
The Court: . . . Let me ask the foreman. Do you feel there is a reasonable chance that the jury can reach a unanimous verdict?
Mr. Miller: No, not on the greater charge.
The Court: You don't feel with additional time the jury would ever be able to reach a unanimous verdict?
Mr. Miller: On the lesser charge, yes, but on the greater charge, no.
Verbatim Report of Proceedings, vol. 3, at 298.
Here, the matter should have ended. Instead, the judge asked the prosecuting attorney his opinion, which was that the jury had not deliberated long enough. The foreman then reiterated that the jury could not reach a unanimous verdict on the greater charge and that the jury's verdict was to convict on the lesser. The trial court refused to accept this.
The Court: Right. Well, what I'm saying is he is charged, the greater charge is the charge the State has brought against him.
Mr. Miller: Right.
The Court: So your verdict has to be, it has to be unanimous on that particular charge before you even reach the other charges. See, before you can get to those, you have to reach a unanimous verdict one way or the other on the first charge.
Verbatim Report of Proceedings, vol. 3, at 299.
This exchange should not have taken place at all, as I have argued above. Even aside from that error, however, the trial court's comments clearly violate CrR 6.15(f)(2) *447which provides:
After jury deliberations have begun, the court shall not instruct the jury in such a way as to suggest the need for agreement, the consequences of no agreement, or the length of time a jury will be required to deliberate.
This court recognized in State v. Boogaard, 90 Wn.2d 733, 585 P.2d 789 (1978) that the manner in which a jury is polled can violate this prohibition. What is more, the court held that the issue is whether there is a possibility the jury was influenced.
Boogaard was decided on a record less complete than this one; the court knew only that the trial court had asked how the voting stood and whether each juror believed a verdict could be reached in half an hour. The court accepted the contention that the trial judge had not intended to influence or pressure the jury. Nevertheless, this court held that the mere possibility that the jury had been influenced was sufficient to violate the rule.
We can accept the lower court's inference that the questioning was not done with an intent to influence the jury. However, we do not agree with its conclusion as to the probable or possible effect which the procedure had upon the jury.
(Italics mine.) Boogaard, at 736.
Perhaps reasonable people can disagree over whether the exchange quoted above influenced the jurors. But it denies all sense to say that there is no possibility that the jurors were influenced.
Conclusion
The rule against pressuring a jury to reach a result was clearly violated in this case.
I would reinstate the original jury verdict that defendant was guilty of the lesser charge.
Brachtenbach, Callow, and Goodloe, JJ., concur with Dore, J.
Reconsideration denied February 2, 1988.