Court Opinion

ID: 9603987
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:12:18.020882+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:16.672507
License: Public Domain

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE PRINGLE
dissenting in part and concurring in part:
I respectfully dissent to that portion of the majority opinion which holds that the Habitual Criminal Act in this case was constitutionally applied. In all other respects I concur with the majority opinion.
As pointed out in the opinion, the Appellant was convicted of an offense which was a Class 5 Felony and, if the Habitual Criminal Act were not applied, it would carry only a penalty of an indeterminate to five year sentence. This Court has repeatedly held that the Habitual Criminal Act provides no new crime, but is merely an enhancement of the sentence on the crime for which the person has been convicted. People v. Thomas, 189 Colo. 490, 542 P.2d 387; Vigil v. People, 137 Colo. 161, 322 P.2d *112320.
In Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 30 S.Ct. 544, 54 L.Ed. 793 (1910), the Supreme Court of the United States noted that punishment in the state prison for a long term of years might be so disproportionate to the offense as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eight Amendment. See also Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983, 94 S.Ct. 1577, 39 L.Ed.2d 881 (1974).
So here it seems to me that imposing life imprisonment under the circumstances of this case, where ordinarily the penalty would be at most five years, is so grossly disproportionate as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
I am authorized to say that MR. JUSTICE DAY concurs in this dissent.