Court Opinion

ID: 9638941
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:59:10.570462+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:10.809090
License: Public Domain

concurring.
The majority follows the statute that insanity as a defense must be a disease of the mind, depriving one from discerning the difference between right and wrong. They leave, however, the possibility for new argument that because “Nowhere in the offer of proof as to the insanity defense was it claimed that Brode was unable to resist the urge to drink, either generally or on the morning of the killing.” Slip opinion p. 6. One might gather that had such argument been made different considerations would follow.
Under Pennsylvania Law, a person who commits an otherwise voluntary act under impulse is still considered to have committed the act voluntarily and is legally responsible for the consequences of that act. See Commonwealth v. Banks, 513 Pa. 318, 347-48, 521 A.2d 1, 15-16 (1987); Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 500 Pa. 16, 27-39, 454 A.2d 937, 942-49 (1982); Commonwealth v. Weinstein, 499 Pa. *30106, 451 A.2d 1344 (1982) (McDermott, J., concurring memorandum); Commonwealth v. Tomlinson, 446 Pa. 241, 252-254, 284 A.2d 687, 696 (1971); Commonwealth v. Weinstein, 442 Pa. 70, 274 A.2d 182 (1971); and Commonwealth v. Neill, 362 Pa. 507, 67 A.2d 276 (1949). Accordingly, those who drink, or use drugs are not excused under section 308 simply because they have done so under impulse or self-induced need. The General Assembly has excluded intoxicated and drug induced conditions from the parameters of section 315 by clearly defining the circumstances under which they can be raised in section 308. The majority establishes a dangerous precedent by failing to clearly identify the appellant’s defense for what it is, futile and frivolous. Otherwise, I join the majority opinion.
LARSEN, FLAHERTY and PAPADAKOS, JJ., join this concurring opinion.