Court Opinion

ID: 9480369
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:45:46.687672+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:38.394918
License: Public Domain

TJOFLAT, Chief Judge,
concurring:
I concur in the court’s opinion: it is an accurate account of this circuit’s law. I write separately simply to express my continuing dissatisfaction with this court’s distortion of the final judgment rule in cases such as Blake v. Kemp, 758 F.2d 523 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 998, 106 S.Ct. 374, 88 L.Ed.2d 367 (1985), and Smith v. Kemp, 849 F.2d 481 (11th Cir.1988). I have written previously on this subject, see Blake, 758 F.2d at 540-43 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting); Smith v. Zant, 887 F.2d 1407, 1418-23 (11th Cir.1989) (en banc) (Tjoflat, J., specially concurring), and will not belabor the point here.
I merely point out two things. First, the Blake and Smith courts’ characterization of a petition requesting relief from a conviction and sentence as presenting only two “claims,” regardless of the number of separate grounds for relief presented, is inconsistent with the modern conception of the term “claim.” See Blake, 758 F.2d at 541-42 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting); cf. Collins v. Zant, 892 F.2d 1502, 1505-06 (11th Cir.1990) (defining “claim” for purposes of Rule 9(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases). Second, allowing these piecemeal appeals thwarts two important goals: the preservation of judicial resources and the encouragement of one-proceeding treatment of cases whenever possible. See Blake, 758 F.2d at 543; see also Smith v. Zant, 887 F.2d at 1419-23.
If we were writing on a clean slate today, I would hold that each ground for relief presents a separate claim under section 1291 and Rule 54(b). Therefore, if the court addresses only one ground for relief, even if relief from both conviction and sentence is granted, the order should not be appealable unless the requirements of Rule 54(b) are satisfied. Furthermore, if the district court does grant Rule 54(b) certification, in most cases I would likely hold that the court abused its discretion in determining that there was no just reason for delay. See Smith v. Zant, 887 F.2d at 1423. I would do so because, in my view, granting Rule 54(b) certification in these types of cases is extremely disruptive, wastes judicial resources, and creates the possibility of precluding litigation of claims that were not addressed by the district court. See id. at 1421-23.