Court Opinion

ID: 9897432
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:11:29.54998+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:36.047880
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                                   Apr 06 2023, 9:04 am

                                                                                        CLERK
                                                                                    Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                                       Court of Appeals
                                                                                         and Tax Court

      ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT                                     APPELLEE PRO SE
      John H. Haskin                                              Brandon Slate
      John Haskin & Associates                                    Greenwood, Indiana
      Indianapolis, Indiana

                                                   IN THE
           COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

      Steve Ford,                                                 April 6, 2023

      Appellant-Defendant,                                        Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                                  22A-SC-1018
              v.
                                                                  Appeal from the Lawrence Township
                                                                  Small Claims Court of Marion
      Brandon Slate,                                              County
      Appellee-Plaintiff.
                                                                  The Honorable
                                                                  Kimberly J. Bacon, Judge

                                                                  49K03-2110-SC-2157

                                   Opinion by Senior Judge Najam
                                  Judges Crone and Bradford concur.

      Najam, Senior Judge.

                                        Statement of the Case
[1]   Steve Ford (“Ford”) appeals from a small claims judgment entered in favor of

      Brandon Slate (“Slate”) on Slate’s complaint for breach of contract. Slate’s

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-SC-1018 | April 6, 2023                                Page 1 of 18
      claim arose from his employment by Ford, who, along with his wife Teresa

      Ford (“Teresa”), does business as Dickey’s Barbecue Pit. Slate sued Ford for

      $4,375.00, and the trial court entered a money judgment for Slate in the amount

      of $3,675.00. Ford contends that the trial court erred because there was no

      contract between him and Slate, and, further, that all sums due to Slate from

      their employment relationship were paid in full and he owes nothing to Slate.

      We affirm.

                                                       Issues
[2]   Ford raises three issues on appeal, which we restate as follows:

              I.       Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law when it
                       entered judgment for Slate on his breach of contract claim;
                       and
              II.      Whether the trial court erred as a matter of fact when it
                       entered judgment for Slate in the amount of $3,675.00.

      The third issue Ford raises is whether the trial court erred when it

      entered judgment for Slate on his “wage claim.” Appellant’s Amended

      Br. p. 4. Because we can discern no statutory wage claim in the record,

      we need not address that issue.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-SC-1018 | April 6, 2023            Page 2 of 18
                                   Facts and Procedural History
[3]   Ford and Teresa are the owners of Dickey’s Barbeque Pit located on Pendleton
                                                                                                               1
      Pike in Indianapolis, although Teresa is not named as a party to this action. In

      April 2021, the Fords hired Slate as General Manager of the business as an at-

      will employee. They negotiated the terms of their employment relationship,

      which they set forth in a document entitled “Agreement of Services” (“the
                           2
      Agreement”). Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, pp. 13-14. Ford drafted the

      Agreement, and Slate signed it on April 13, 2021. The Agreement provides, in

      relevant part:

                 1) Service provider 3 agrees to work as acting General Manager
                    for employer. Service provider agrees to work approximately
                    50 hours per week with approximately 80% of that time spent
                    in the restaurant.
                 2) Service provider will be employed by employer starting on
                    April 13th, 2021. Employer has agreed to pay a $52,000
                    yearly compensation to service provider bi-weekly starting
                    with first payment on April 30th for the previous two-week
                    period ending on April 25th.

      1
        Slate did not name Teresa or Dickey’s Barbeque Pit as defendants in this case. Ford did not claim during
      trial court proceedings that Teresa or Dickey’s were parties to this dispute.
      2
        The Agreement, which Ford describes as “the alleged Contract” and the “purported agreement,”
      Appellant’s Amended Br. pp. 5 n.1, 12, was attached to Slate’s small claim complaint form but was omitted
      from the record at trial. Ford states that the Agreement was not entered in evidence as an exhibit but that
      “neither party disputed at trial that it had been submitted with the initial claim form.” Id. at 5 n.1. Ford
      included the document in his Appellant’s Appendix. Because the existence of the Agreement is undisputed,
      and the parties referred to the Agreement at trial, we conclude there is no sound reason why it should not be
      considered on appeal.
      3
          The Agreement capitalizes the words “service” and “provider” in some instances, but not in others.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-SC-1018 | April 6, 2023                                 Page 3 of 18
        3) In addition, Employer agrees to pay Service Provider $13,000
           yearly compensation as a form of reimbursement for family
           insurance. This payment will be paid monthly to Service
           Provider on the last week of each month.
        4) In addition, Employer also agrees to pay Service provider
           40% of profits from the restaurant.
             a. This payment will be paid monthly to Service Provider for
             the following month of profit after profit statement is
             submitted by Service Provider.
             b. Employer will agree to make sure prior month financial
             reports are completed by the 15th as long as Service Provider
             provides full accounting information by the 10th of the next
             month.
             c. Service Provider will be given full access to the monthly
             profit and loss report upon completion.
             d. The 40% profit sharing is based on annual calendar
             profitability but will be paid monthly starting with a prorate
             share of April 2021 based on days employed in April (17/30).
        5) Any pay period not fully completed because either party
           decided to end employment will result in these forms of
           payments (bi-weekly pay & insurance reimbursement) being
           paid on a pro-rated daily basis.
        6) Service Provider must continue employment to the 15th of
           each month following the month of profit to be eligible to
           receive profit share. If Employer terminates Service Provider
           at any point the profit share will still be paid out on a pro-
           rated basis and the terms above in section 4 (a,b,c,d), unless
           caused by the Service Provider's own negligence.
        7) Service Provider can earn one week of paid vacation starting
           immediately but not to be used in the first 90 days of
           employment. Two additional weeks of vacation will be
           earned after one year of employment not to be used within 60
           days of each other.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-SC-1018 | April 6, 2023            Page 4 of 18
      Id. at 13.

[4]   Slate was employed for just over seven weeks, from April 13, 2021, to June 3,

      2021. On that date, Ford left a subsequently-transcribed voicemail for Slate

      stating, in relevant part: “we think that you need to be looking for another job

      and plan on not having to work for the rest of the week period.” Tr. Ex. Vol.,

      p. 7. That same day, Ford and Teresa emailed the restaurant’s email account,

      which Slate accessed and read. The email stated Slate’s job was terminated as

      of that day. Id. at 8. Ford states on appeal that, “The parties dispute whether

      Plaintiff was terminated or resigned,” but he also acknowledged leaving the

      voicemail for Slate “indicating that he was terminated.” Appellant’s Amended

      Br. p. 6.

[5]   Slate sued Ford in small claims court, alleging that he was owed unpaid wages

      and other damages arising from Ford’s breach of contract. The court held a

      bench trial, after which it entered judgment for Slate, ordering Ford to pay him

      $3765.00. This appeal followed.

                                     Discussion and Decision
                                           Standard of Review
[6]   Ford appeals from a general judgment. “A general judgment will be affirmed if

      it can be sustained upon any legal theory consistent with the evidence.” Conseco

      Fin. Servicing Corp. v. Friendly Village of Indian Oaks, 774 N.E.2d 87, 92 (Ind. Ct.

      App. 2002), trans. denied.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-SC-1018 | April 6, 2023           Page 5 of 18
[7]   Further, the findings or judgments rendered by a small claims court are upheld

      unless they are clearly erroneous. Vic’s Antiques and Uniques, Inc. v. J. Elra

      Holdingz, LLC, 143 N.E.3d 300, 303 (Ind Ct. App. 2020) (quotation omitted),

      trans. denied; see also Ind. Trial Rule 52(A) (“On appeal of claims tried by the

      court without a jury, . . . the court on appeal shall not set aside the findings or

      judgment unless clearly erroneous . . .”). A judgment will be found clearly

      erroneous only when on the entire record the reviewing court is left with the

      definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Arnold v. Dirrim, 398

      N.E.2d 442, 446 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979).

[8]   Because small claims courts are designed to dispense justice efficiently by

      applying substantive law in an informal setting, this deferential standard of

      review is particularly appropriate. Vic’s Antiques, 143 N.E.3d at 303. We

      consider the evidence most favorable to the judgment and all reasonable

      inferences to be drawn from that evidence. Id. However, we still review issues

      of substantive law de novo. Id.

                     I. The Agreement is an Enforceable Contract
[9]   Ford first contends that there was no enforceable contract of employment

      between him and Slate. Specifically, Ford alleges that:

              No award for damages should have been issued under a theory of
              breach of contract because no contract existed as Plaintiff’s
              employment was ‘at-will’ and could be terminated at any time. The
              document purported to be a contract by the Plaintiff is in reality
              an offer letter because it contains no term of employment for a set
              amount of time. Because no binding contract of employment

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-SC-1018 | April 6, 2023           Page 6 of 18
               existed, no award of damages could have been possible under a
               breach of contract theory.

       Appellant’s Amended Br. p. 9 (emphasis added). Thus, Ford contends that the

       trial court erred to the extent that it held that the Agreement was an enforceable

       contract. Id. at 12. On this question, Ford presents an issue of substantive law.

       See Mueller v. Karns, 873 N.E.2d 652, 657 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (“The existence

       of a contract is a question of law”). As such, we review de novo the question

       whether there was an enforceable contract of employment between Ford and

       Slate. Vic’s Antiques, 143 N.E.3d at 303.

[10]   “A valid contract consists of an offer, acceptance, consideration, and mutual

       assent.” Ellison v. Town of Yorktown, 47 N.E.3d 610, 617 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).

       At trial, Ford did not deny preparing the Agreement, and Slate stated he had

       signed it. The Agreement defines Slate’s compensation. When Ford tendered

       the document to Slate, he offered employment. And after Slate accepted the

       offer and signed the document, he was employed by Dickey’s Barbecue Pit

       according to the terms and conditions stated in the document. Indeed, Ford

       concedes that, “[w]hen hired, [Slate] signed a document that laid out his

       benefits, compensation, incentive structure, and scope of employment.”

       Appellant’s Amended Br. p. 5.

[11]   Ford does not address the elements of contract formation, choosing instead to

       discuss the nature of at-will employment. He states correctly that where there is

       no definite or ascertainable term of employment, an employment relationship is

       at-will and may be terminated at any time with or without cause, by either

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-SC-1018 | April 6, 2023        Page 7 of 18
       party. Id. at 10. As noted, he contends that the Agreement he tendered, and

       which Slate signed, was “akin to an offer letter,” which merely outlined Slate’s

       proposed compensation and did not create an enforceable contract. Id. at 11.

[12]   In making this argument Ford relies upon Community Foundation of Northwest

       Indiana, Inc. v. Miranda, 120 N.E.3d 1090 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). In that case, the

       plaintiff, a terminated employee, challenged her at-will employment status, and

       we held that neither the offer letter nor the employee handbook in that case

       constituted an employment contract that would overcome the presumption of

       at-will employment. Id. at 1100-01. Miranda recited three criteria by which an

       employee handbook may be deemed a “unilateral contract” that binds an

       employer in a “handbook exception to the employment at will doctrine.” Id. at

       1099 (citing Orr v. Westminster Vill. North, Inc., 689 N.E.2d 712, 720 (Ind. 1997)).

       And in that case, the handbook expressly stated that all employees were at-will

       and that the contents of the handbook should not be construed as a contract

       guaranteeing employment for any specific period. Id. at 1097-98.

[13]   Ford contends that Slate “proffered no evidence that the alleged agreement met

       any of the three prongs of the test articulated in Miranda.” Appellant’s

       Amended Br. p. 11. But Slate had no need to address the Miranda test. Miranda

       is inapposite, and Ford’s reliance on Miranda is misplaced, because this case

       does not involve an employee handbook or an attempt by Slate to circumvent

       the employment at will doctrine. This case is about a single, written document

       setting out the terms and conditions of Slate’s employment.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-SC-1018 | April 6, 2023          Page 8 of 18
[14]   Relying again on Miranda, Ford equates the offer letter in Miranda with the

       Agreement in this case. Ford contends, in effect, that because Slate was an at-

       will employee, the Agreement was not an enforceable contract. His contention

       is untenable. Slate does not argue that he was hired for a defined term or that

       his contract with Ford was anything other than employment at will. Instead, he

       sued for a breach of the other terms of his contract with Ford governing pay and

       benefits.

[15]   Ford confuses and conflates employment at will, which is about the term of

       employment, and other terms and conditions of employment about which the

       parties may contract. As noted above, at-will employment simply means there

       is no definite or ascertainable term of employment and that the employment

       may be terminated at any time with or without cause, by either party. But as

       our Supreme Court stated in Orr, “[t]he employment-at-will doctrine is a rule of

       contract construction, not a rule imposing substantive limitations on the parties’

       freedom to contract.” 689 N.E.2d at 717. As a result, even in an employment

       at-will relationship the parties may agree to contract and be bound by other

       terms and conditions of employment for as long as the employment-at-will

       relationship lasts.

[16]   Here, unlike in Miranda, the Agreement of Services document is not a mere

       handbook or offer letter but a document that identifies the employer and the

       employee, and includes a section entitled “Scope of Agreement.” The

       execution of the Agreement fulfilled all the requirements of contract formation.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-SC-1018 | April 6, 2023        Page 9 of 18
       Applying our de novo standard of review, we conclude as a matter of law that

       the Agreement is a valid and binding contract.

[17]   Ford does not argue that, even if the contract were valid and binding, he did not

       breach its terms. Consequently, we next turn to his challenge to the amount of

       the trial court’s damages award.

              II. The Damages Award is Supported By the Evidence
[18]   As we have noted above, we may affirm a general judgment on any legal theory

       supported by the evidence. Conseco Fin. Servicing Corp., 774 N.E.2d at 92.

       When the specific issue for review relates to the award of damages, the award

       should not be reversed if it falls within the scope of the evidence presented to

       the trial court. G & N. Aircraft, Inc. v. Boehm, 743 N.E.2d 227, 234 (Ind. 2001).

[19]   Ford argues, “[t]he evidence proffered by [Slate] at trial was insufficient to

       support the award of damages in the trial court’s judgment.” Appellant’s

       Amended Br. p. 15. Because this is an appeal from a general judgment, it is not

       readily apparent exactly how the court arrived at the $3,675.00 damage award.

       The next question presented, then, is whether the record contains substantial

       evidence of probative value that would support a judgment in that amount.

       There are four components to Slate’s claim of damages: salary, insurance

       reimbursement, profit sharing, and paid vacation.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-SC-1018 | April 6, 2023        Page 10 of 18
                                                       A. Salary

[20]   The parties dispute whether Ford owed Slate for unpaid salary. Slate asserted

       that after he was terminated on June 3, Ford “shorted” his salary by $280.00.

       Tr. Vol. I, p. 9. In contrast, Ford testified that he paid Slate for all wages due

       through June 3, and offered a final pay stub dated June 11, 2021, admitted in

       evidence as Exhibit A, to prove it. Id. at 17; Tr. Ex. Vol., p. 12. But neither at

       trial nor on appeal has Ford attempted to explain by reference to the pay stub

       how the contents of that stub show that Ford paid Slate all the salary he was

       owed.

[21]   When Ford and Teresa terminated Slate’s employment by email on June 3,

       2021, the email provided, “Brandon will be paid for the remainder of this pay

       period and will also receive his pay for the current months [sic] insurance.”

       Tr. Ex. Vol., p. 10. Ford also left a voice message for Slate on the evening of

       June 3 in which he stated that Slate should “just plan on not having to work

       for the rest of this week period.” Id. at 7. Ford further told Slate, “We need

       the key back and we need that deposit [for the receipts from Slate’s last day of

       work], and we need that before your next pay period so that we can get you

       your full pay.” Id. (formatting error corrected). Finally, Ford stated, “we will

       pay you in full for [this] two-week period, but we need this [the key and the

       deposit] turned in.” (emphasis added). Id.

[22]   On appeal, Ford contends that the statements made in the email and the

       voicemail did not create “a binding contract” or an obligation for Ford to pay

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-SC-1018 | April 6, 2023         Page 11 of 18
       Slate any additional compensation. Appellant’s Amended Br. p. 12. In effect,

       Ford contends that the statements he and Teresa made that Slate would be

       “paid for the remainder of this pay period” and that he would be “paid in full”

       were gratuitous promises made for no consideration and, therefore, not

       enforceable. Tr. Ex. Vol., pp. 7, 10. But these statements were coupled with

       Ford’s request that Slate return the key and make the deposit “so that we can

       get you your full pay.” Id. at 7. There is no suggestion that Slate failed to

       return the key or make the deposit, which was adequate consideration to

       support the promise.

[23]   There was sufficient evidence for the trial court to conclude Slate was promised

       and was entitled to receive an additional $280.00 in salary for the pay period.

       Slate’s annual salary, as stated in the Agreement, was $52,000 payable bi-

       weekly, from which we infer that his bi-weekly gross pay was $2,000.00

       (twenty-six bi-weekly pay periods, multiplied by $2,000.00, equals $52,000.00).

       His final pay stub shows gross pay of $1,720.00, which supports his claim that

       he was “shorted” $280.00. Tr. Vol. I, p. 9.

                                         B. Insurance Reimbursement

[24]   Under Paragraph 3 of the Agreement, Ford agreed to reimburse Slate “for

       family insurance,” with the reimbursement “paid monthly to [Slate] on the

       last week of each month.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, p. 13. After Ford

       terminated Slate’s employment, Ford stopped payment on a $1,083 check

       Slate had written to himself for May’s insurance reimbursement, which under

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-SC-1018 | April 6, 2023        Page 12 of 18
       the Agreement would have been payable at the end of June and, according to

       Ford, would only have been payable had Slate still been employed. Tr. Vol. I,

       pp. 20-21. Both at trial and on appeal Ford contends that Slate was entitled to

       the reimbursement “at the end of the subsequent month only if he was still

       employed at that time.” Appellant’s Amended Br. p. 8. But, to the contrary,

       Paragraph 5 of the Agreement states that if either party were to terminate

       Slate’s employment during a pay period, the insurance reimbursement will be

       “paid on a pro-rated daily basis.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, p. 13.

[25]   Slate claims he was entitled to an insurance reimbursement for May. He was

       employed for the entire month of May and, as such, his right to the insurance

       reimbursement for May accrued for the entire month. The fact that the

       reimbursement for May was not payable until the last week in June does not

       mean that the reimbursement for May was not owed to Slate when Ford

       terminated his employment on June 3. Ford confuses accrual of the monthly

       insurance reimbursement with another contract provision which defers

       payment of the reimbursement to the last week of the next month.

[26]   The record does not support Ford’s bald assertion that because the May

       insurance reimbursement was not payable until the last week in June, and Slate

       was no longer employed at that time, Slate is not entitled to the insurance

       reimbursement for May. Ford had valid legal cause to stop payment on the

       check Slate wrote himself in early June for May’s insurance reimbursement

       because the payment was not due until the last week of June. But the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-SC-1018 | April 6, 2023      Page 13 of 18
       Agreement does not say that payment of the insurance reimbursement is

       contingent upon Slate’s continued employment. Slate’s right to an insurance

       reimbursement for May accrued as of May 31, and nothing more was required

       of him for that reimbursement to be paid. While payment of the reimbursement

       was owed at the end of June, the reimbursement for May had already been

       earned when Slate’s employment was terminated. Thus, Slate is correct when

       he states in his brief that, “[r]egardless of the argument” about “when [the

       insurance reimbursement] is supposed to be paid, I am still owed for the month

       of May.” Appellee’s Br. p. 5.

[27]   And, again, Paragraph 5 expressly provides for the daily proration of the

       reimbursement if Slate’s employment is terminated during any pay period not

       fully completed. Thus, Slate is also entitled to the insurance reimbursement

       pro-rated for his three days of employment in June.

[28]   In sum, under Paragraph 3, Slate was entitled to reimbursement for family

       insurance earned during the month of May in the amount of $1,083.00 ($13,000

       per year divided by twelve) and, under Paragraph 5, to reimbursement pro-rated

       for his three days of employment in June in the amount of $108.30 ($1,083.00

       divided by thirty days, multiplied by three days).

                                                 C. Profit Sharing

[29]   Slate claims a right to profit sharing equal to 40 percent of profits from the

       restaurant as stated in Paragraph 4 of the Agreement. He testified at trial that

       the month he started working for Ford “was the best month that [the restaurant]

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-SC-1018 | April 6, 2023        Page 14 of 18
       had in six years.” Tr. Vol. I, p. 10. And Ford provided profit and loss reports

       showing the restaurant’s income for the months of April and May. Tr. Ex.

       Vol., pp. 13-18. Ford’s business records show net income in April of $4,740.45

       and a net loss in May of $666.94, for combined net income of $4,073.51 for

       those two months.

[30]   Ford contends that Slate’s “alleged profit sharing was not a wage and was thus

       discretionary” and that “the trial court erred to the extent that it held [Slate]

       was owed any amount under a profit-sharing commission scheme.”

       Appellant’s Amended Br. p. 13. We cannot agree. The Agreement clearly

       states that the payment for profit sharing “will be paid monthly” although

       “profit sharing is based on annual calendar profitability.” Appellant’s App.

       Vol. 3, p. 13. In other words, profit sharing is based on annual net income as

       determined by the aggregation and reconciliation of monthly profits and losses.

[31]   The Agreement states that Slate is entitled to a forty percent prorated share of

       April income based on his seventeen days of employment during that month,

       provided, that he was employed on the fifteenth day of the following month

       (May), which he was. There was no profit to be shared in May, and under the

       Agreement, May’s loss must be set off against April’s profit. See id. (profit

       sharing is based on “annual calendar profitability” but profit sharing will be

       paid “on a pro-rated basis” if Slate is fired). April’s net profit adjusted and

       reconciled with May’s net loss leaves $4,073.51 in net profit available for profit

       sharing in April, which when prorated over thirty days is $135.78 per day.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-SC-1018 | April 6, 2023          Page 15 of 18
       Thus, Slate is entitled to forty percent of seventeen days in April, at $135.78 per

       day, which equals $923.30.

                                                 D. Paid Vacation

[32]   Slate alleges that he is owed damages for unpaid vacation pay. Ford observes

       that Slate did not refer to unpaid vacation days at trial. Appellant’s Amended

       Br. p. 7. But the Agreement includes a paid vacation provision. Further,

       Slate’s small claims complaint requested compensation for vacation days. As

       such, the issue was presented to the trial court to be considered in assessing

       Slate’s damage claims.

[33]   The first sentence of Paragraph 7 of the Agreement shows that when Slate

       became an employee, he was “immediately” entitled to one week of paid

       vacation, provided only, that he could not take the vacation within the first

       ninety days of his employment. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, p. 13. In other words,

       Slate’s right to one week of paid vacation accrued and vested upon his

       employment, subject only to the condition precedent that he could not exercise

       that right during his first ninety days of his employment.

[34]   Since Slate was not employed for ninety days, the condition precedent

       contained in the paid vacation provision could not be satisfied. The question

       becomes whether Slate was divested of his right to a paid vacation when Ford

       and Teresa terminated Slate’s employment after only fifty-one days.

[35]   A vested interest is a protected right. See Bringle v. Bringle, 150 N.E.3d 1060,

       1071 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (“A vested interest is one that is not contingent, that

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-SC-1018 | April 6, 2023        Page 16 of 18
       is unconditional, and absolute”), trans. denied; see also Vested Interest, Black’s

       Law Dictionary p. 969 (11th ed. 2019) (defining “vested interest” as “[a]n

       interest for which the right to its enjoyment, either present or future, is not

       subject to the happening of a condition precedent”). The paid vacation

       provision does not say that Slate will be entitled to one week of paid vacation

       after he has been employed for 90 days. Instead, Slate’s right to one week of

       paid vacation accrued and vested on Slate’s first day of employment, but the

       exercise of that right was deferred for at least ninety days.

[36]   Because Slate’s employment was employment at will, Ford was entitled to

       terminate his employment at any time with or without cause. Thus, Slate had

       no right to future employment for ninety days or for any other period. But

       when Slate’s employment was terminated, he had accrued a vested contract

       right to one week of paid vacation, and Ford could not eliminate that right by

       terminating Slate’s employment.

[37]   A party may not rely on the failure of a condition precedent to excuse

       performance where that party’s own action or inaction caused the failure. See

       Rogier v. Am. Testing and Eng’g Corp., 734 N.E.2d 606, 621 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000),

       trans. denied. Here, Ford caused the failure of the 90-day condition precedent

       when he terminated Slate’s employment, but Slate’s termination did not

       extinguish his vested right to a paid vacation. If Ford could, at his option,

       vitiate the contract provision for a paid vacation, that provision would amount

       to an illusory promise. See Pardieck v. Pardieck, 676 N.E.2d 359, 364 n.3 (Ind.

       Ct. App. 1997) (“An illusory promise is a promise which by its terms makes

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-SC-1018 | April 6, 2023          Page 17 of 18
       performance entirely optional with the promisor”), trans. denied. Slate is entitled

       to a damage award of $1,000.00 for one week of paid vacation, representing the

       value of one week of a two-week pay period.

                                                  Conclusion
[38]   We have calculated total damages for unpaid wages, unpaid insurance

       reimbursement, unpaid profit sharing, and unpaid vacation compensation of

       $3,394.60, which are only $280.06 or 7.6 percent less than the damages

       awarded by the trial court, an insignificant difference. We will not reverse a

       trial court’s award of damages and substitute our judgment for that of the trial

       court where, as here, the damage award falls within the scope of the evidence.

       See G & N Aircraft, 743 N.E.2d at 234. In this case we can say with confidence

       that the trial court’s judgment is not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we affirm

       the trial court’s judgment.

[39]   Affirmed.

       Crone, J., and Bradford, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-SC-1018 | April 6, 2023       Page 18 of 18