Court Opinion

ID: 9963156
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-24 17:05:37.328229+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:41.515291
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                  No. 22-0861
                              Filed April 24, 2024

STATE OF IOWA,
     Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

LAMONT LLOYD,
     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, John D. Telleen,

Judge.

      Lamont Lloyd appeals his conviction for domestic abuse assault, third or

subsequent offense. AFFIRMED.

      Sonia M. Elossais of Carr Law Firm, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellant.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Aaron Rogers, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

      Considered by Bower, C.J., and Greer and Chicchelly, JJ.
                                           2

BOWER, Chief Judge.

       Lamont Lloyd appeals his conviction for domestic abuse assault, third or

subsequent offense, challenging the district court’s denial of his motion in limine

seeking to exclude testimony from his pretrial-release officer.         Lloyd also

challenges the court’s denial of his motion for mistrial. Upon review, we affirm.

I.     Background Facts and Proceedings

       The State filed a trial information charging Lloyd with domestic abuse

assault, third or subsequent offense, stemming from an assault on his girlfriend,

T.W., in June 2021. Lloyd entered a plea of not guilty, and the case proceeded to

a jury trial. The State presented testimony from several witnesses, including T.W.,

who testified about her relationship with Lloyd and the assault that took place. The

State also presented photographs of T.W.’s injuries. At the close of the State’s

case, Lloyd moved for judgment of acquittal, which the court denied.

       Lloyd then testified, stating he lived in Moline and Rock Island during the

time he was in a relationship with T.W., who lived in Bettendorf. Lloyd agreed he

stayed with T.W. when he “came to visit” her every month or so, and he would

“usually stay for, like, probably, like, a week. Eight, nine nights.” Lloyd denied

having a key to T.W.’s home, assisting T.W. with bills, or placing utilities in his

name.1 Lloyd conceded he and T.W. were involved in a physical altercation but

stated he “wouldn’t call it no beating.”

1 He acknowledged using T.W.’s address to receive mail but stated he did so

“because [he was] moving around” and “never really stayed in one spot like that.”
                                             3

       The jury found Lloyd guilty as charged.2 Lloyd appeals. Additional facts will

be set forth below as relevant to his claims on appeal.

II.    Motion in Limine

       Prior to trial, Lloyd filed a motion in limine seeking, in part, exclusion of “[a]ny

reference to prior arrests, convictions, completed deferred judgments, or bad acts

on the part of [Lloyd], unless [Lloyd] testifies and unless the conviction meets the

requirements of Iowa R. Evid. 6.609(a) and (b). See also Iowa R. Evid. 5.401,

5.402, 5.403, 5.404(b) . . . .” The court addressed the motion at the outset of trial.

Specifically,   Lloyd   challenged     the       admission   of   testimony    from    his

probation/pretrial release officer, Dean Milius, about where Lloyd reported his

residence to be, pursuant to Milius’s supervision of Lloyd. Lloyd claimed:

              The reference to Mr. Lloyd being on supervision or being on
       probation is harkening back to another charge, and so the jury will
       automatically be thinking of what he is on supervision for, what he is
       on probation for, so I do believe that the prejudicial—the danger of
       unfair prejudice does outweigh any probative value in this specific
       evidence.

The State countered:

              [Milius] was tasked to supervise the Defendant as part of a
       case in which he’s required to know where the Defendant was
       residing or living, and the Defendant told him that he was going back
       home to [T.W.’s home address] in Bettendorf.
              ....
              We could just say supervision and that part of Mr. Milius’s duty
       was to ascertain where Mr. Lloyd was residing so that he can testify
       about the Defendant’s statement with respect to his address.
              That’s all the State intends to elicit, and when one of the
       elements of this case is that I have to provide that they were residing
       or co-habitating and he’s denying that he was, it certainly is more
       probative than prejudicial to that issue.

2 Lloyd stipulated he had prior domestic-abuse-assault convictions.
                                         4

      The court then ruled as follows:

             This is an area I think we need to tread very carefully on. The
      Defendant has chosen not to stipulate that he was co-habitating with
      the victim. Therefore, that puts the burden on the State to prove that
      the parties were co-habitating, or had co-habitated, on the State
      beyond a reasonable doubt.
             Because of that, the Court finds that this evidence is relevant.
      This, again, would be in the nature of an admission that the
      Defendant made to his probation officer as to his address, and the
      Court finds that evidence is highly relevant.
             I don’t view this as prior bad act evidence. We’re not going to
      get into why he was seeing a probation officer, what his charges
      were, what he was under supervision for, how long he was under
      supervision for.
             But I believe the probation officer should be allowed to take
      the stand, identify himself, tell the jury what his job is, that he’s a
      probation officer, and from there I would like the witness to simply
      refer to the fact that the Defendant was under supervision—not
      under—not on parole, not on probation, nothing about the charges.
             And it should be a simple question of, “As part of that
      supervision, were you required to determine where he was living?”
      “Yes.” “Did he provide you an address?” “Yes.” “What was that
      address?”

      During trial, Milius was questioned as follows:

              Q [STATE]. And what is your occupation? A [MILIUS]. I’m a
      probation/parole pretrial officer.
              Q. Back in June of 2021, was the Defendant under your
      supervision? A. Yes.
              Q. As part of that supervision, were you required to ascertain
      or find out where he was residing? A. Yes.
              Q. And back on June 14, did he tell you where he was
      residing? A. Yes. I received a phone call from him reporting his
      address.
              Q. And what did he say? A. He reported that he was returning
      home to Bettendorf at [T.W.’s address] in Bettendorf.
              Q. He actually referred to it as his home? A. Yes.

      On appeal, Llyod challenges the court’s admission of Milius’s testimony,

claiming it “constitutes evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts” and was
                                          5

“unnecessary, and more prejudicial than probative.”3         We review evidentiary

rulings for an abuse of discretion. State v. Tyler, 867 N.W.2d 136, 152 (Iowa 2015).

       Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.404(b) states:

               (1) Prohibited uses. Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act
       is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that
       on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the
       character.
               (2) Permitted uses. This evidence may be admissible for
       another purpose such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
       preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake, or lack
       of accident.

We use a three-step test to decide whether other-acts evidence is admissible. See

State v. Putman, 848 N.W.2d 1, 9 (Iowa 2014). First, the evidence must be

relevant to a legitimate issue in dispute. Id. Second, there “must be clear proof

the individual against whom the evidence is offered committed the bad act or

crime.” Id. (citation omitted). Third, its probative value must not be “substantially

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant.”          Id. (citation

omitted).

       Lloyd claims the reference to Milius’s employment as a probation/parole

pretrial officer and Milius’s statement he was supervising Lloyd led jurors to believe

Lloyd had a previous conviction resulting in him being on probation or parole.

According to Lloyd, even though a bad act or a crime was not specified, Milius’s

testimony insinuated to the jury a crime had occurred.

       We, like the district court, are hard-pressed to interpret Milius’s testimony

as prior-bad-acts evidence. As ordered by the court, the State did not elicit

3 The State claims this issue was not properly preserved for appeal.We disagree.
Because Lloyd made a prior-bad-acts argument in his motion and the court
mentioned the issue in ruling on Lloyd’s motion, the claim was preserved.
                                          6

questions from Milius about “why [Lloyd] was seeing a probation officer, what his

charges were, what he was under supervision for, [or] how long he was under

supervision for.” Lloyd had an opportunity to cross-examine Milius to clarify this

point. We also believe Lloyd’s claim is weakened by his own testimony about his

prior incarceration: “I first started talking to [T.W.] when I was in prison, and then

we met physically, like, around May of 2020.”

       In any event, the challenged evidence was relevant to prove an essential

element of domestic abuse assault.4 Lloyd disputed whether he and T.W. “were

residing together at the time of the incident or within the year.” He expressly denied

ever cohabiting with T.W., and instead framed his time at her home as “visit[s].”

Even when the State introduced evidence of mail addressed to Lloyd at T.W.’s

address, Lloyd explained he used T.W.’s address for his mail because he moved

frequently. We acknowledge T.W. testified she and Lloyd were “in an intimate

relationship” and they had “live[d] together” during “four to six months” of the prior

year. T.W. also stated she and Lloyd shared income and “shared the duty of the

4 The jury was instructed the State had to prove the following elements of domestic

abuse assault:
              1. On or about the 14th day of July, 2021, the defendant did
       an act which was specifically intended to cause pain or injury to
       [T.W.]
              2. The defendant had the apparent ability to do the act.
              3. The act occurred between either:
              a. Household members who resided together at the time of
       the incident; or
              b. Persons who have been household members residing
       together within the past year but not residing together at the time of
       the incident.
The jury was further instructed: “When two or more alternative theories are
presented, or where two or more facts would produce the same result, the law
does not require each juror to agree as to which theory or facts leads to his or her
verdict.”
                                         7

house.” T.W.’s mother testified Lloyd was T.W.’s boyfriend and the two resided

together. Even so, “the jury was free to reject certain evidence, and credit other

evidence.” State v. Hickman, 623 N.W.2d 847, 849 (Iowa 2001); see generally

State v. Taylor, 689 N.W.2d 116, 127 (Iowa 2004) (“Evidence reflecting the nature

of the relationship between the defendant and the victim would be crucial to a fact

finder resolving the inconsistencies . . . .”).   Because Lloyd denied having

cohabited with T.W., Milius’s testimony about Lloyd’s residence was “relevant to a

legitimate factual issue in dispute.”   Taylor, 689 N.W.2d at 124.      We further

conclude the testimony was not unfairly prejudicial to Lloyd. See id. We affirm on

this issue.

III.   Motion for Mistrial

       At the end of trial but before the jury was adjourned for the day, Lloyd

assaulted his attorney and had to be restrained by the court attendants. Defense

counsel moved to withdraw, and the court granted his request. The next day,

replacement counsel took over representing Lloyd and moved for a mistrial. Lloyd

declared, “I want a new jury.” Defense counsel argued:

       This does not look like a case where Mr. Lloyd necessarily was trying
       to create a mistrial. The evidence with respect to family or household
       members went about as well as could be expected. The Court had
       just denied the State’s request to leave the record open.
              I can’t speak to Mr. Lloyd’s internal motivations, but I don’t
       think you can necessarily assume that it was to create a mistrial.
       There may have been something else going on, and based on that,
       we’d request a mistrial. I’m not sure how a jury can possibly overlook
       what happened yesterday in the context of an assault trial.

The State resisted the motion. The court considered the parties’ arguments and

denied Lloyd’s motion, stating:
                                           8

               All right. . . . The general rule is that a Defendant cannot
       engage in disruptive conduct and then benefit from that conduct by
       obtaining a mistrial.
               [The State]’s brief does an excellent job of setting forth a
       number of cases from around the country that basically confirm the
       conclusion I came to after thinking about this overnight that it would
       make no sense whatsoever to allow a Defendant if he was
       dissatisfied with the direction his trial was heading, or just for fun, to
       assault his attorney and then turn around and say, “I get a redo. I
       want a new jury that didn’t see that, even though I did it.”
               I think that is totally inappropriate. That turns our system of
       justice, frankly, on its head. Mr. Lloyd, for whatever reason, chose
       to engage in this conduct, and he’s going to have to bear the
       consequences of that.
               I will do my best as a trial judge to ensure that these jurors
       affirm that they can overlook what they saw and reach a decision
       based on the evidence. If more than—we have thirteen jurors at this
       point. I intend to read them the preliminary instruction tomorrow and
       then poll them individually and ask them if they can overlook the
       misconduct and base their decision on the evidence.
               Assuming twelve of the thirteen assure us they can do that,
       then this trial is going to go forward. If one indicates they cannot, I’ll
       listen to arguments about it, but my intention would be to replace that
       juror with the alternate and proceed. If we have more than two that
       indicate—two or more that indicate they cannot put this aside, then I
       will have to look at a mistrial.
               I think there’s two components to this. There is the
       Defendant’s conduct, and I’m not going to allow him to benefit by that
       and get a new jury, but if our jurors that we’re trusting to make this
       decision simply come to the conclusion they cannot do this based
       upon what they saw, then I think that’s a different situation. That’s
       not the Defendant’s conduct as much as it is the jury that we selected
       and their individual feelings. So at this point, the Defendant’s motion
       for mistrial is denied.

       The parties then discussed the court’s preliminary jury instruction, and the

court made some amendments to the instruction, per defense counsel’s request.

The next day, the court instructed the jury as follows:

       The jury witnessed an incident in the courtroom at the conclusion of
       the court proceeding on March 8 of 2022. The jury is instructed to
       disregard the Defendant’s conduct and base your verdict solely on
       the evidence presented in the courtroom.
               I will now ask each of you to confirm that you are able to follow
       this instruction. Please answer yes if you are able to disregard the
                                           9

      Defendant’s conduct and base your verdict on the evidence
      presented in the courtroom. Answer no if you are unable to disregard
      the Defendant’s conduct and base your verdict solely on the
      evidence presented.

All but one juror answered “Yes,” indicating they were able to disregard Lloyd’s

conduct. The juror who answered “No” was excused, and the alternate juror was

seated. After closing arguments, the jury found Lloyd guilty as charged.

      On appeal, Lloyd claims the court erred in denying his motion for mistrial

“because the record lacks evidence [his] conduct was intended to cause a mistrial

and because of the nature of the charge [he] was on trial for.” He also “wonders”

if the court would have granted a mistrial “if trial counsel was female.” We review

the district court’s ruling on motions for mistrial for an abuse of discretion. See

State v. Plain, 898 N.W.2d 801, 811 (Iowa 2017).

      A defendant in a criminal trial is entitled to an impartial jury. Iowa Const.

art. I, § 10; U.S. Const. amend. VI.        However, a claim the jury “speculated

adversely” to the defendant due to an incident in the courtroom does not establish

a “reasonable probability of prejudice.” State v. Blackwell, 238 N.W.2d 131, 138

(Iowa 1976). Rather, a mistrial is appropriate when “an impartial verdict cannot be

reached.” State v. Newell, 710 N.W.2d 6, 32 (Iowa 2006) (citation omitted). As to

whether an impartial verdict can be reached,

      [a] trial judge is always in the best position to determine whether such
      an incident . . . , which it was impossible to anticipate or guard
      against . . . calls for a mistrial. Only a clear and obvious abuse of a
      trial court’s discretion in refusing a mistrial will justify a reversal of a
      case by an appellate court upon a cold record. It is impossible to
      gather from the cold record . . . the atmosphere of the trial itself, the
      manner in which the words were spoken, or the probable effect, if
      any, which they had upon the merits of the controversy.
                                          10

Blackwell, 238 N.W.2d at 138 (cleaned up). The “pertinent question” in this case

is whether, despite the jury observing Lloyd assault his attorney, the district court

was “clearly unreasonable in concluding an impartial verdict could be reached.”

See Newell, 710 N.W.2d at 32.

       We do not think the court’s exercise of its discretion was clearly

unreasonable. See generally United States v. Smith, No. 22-CR-352, 2023 WL

7632853, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2023) (“Where the defendant has elected a jury

trial and then created the potential prejudice through his own conduct, granting the

defendant’s request for a mistrial at best gives a defendant a free do-over of any

trial the defendant believes is going poorly, and at worse effectively requires

dismissal of the indictment if there is no way to prevent similar conduct at future

trials.”). The court instructed the jurors to “disregard [Lloyd]’s conduct and base

[their] verdict solely on the evidence presented in the courtroom” and polled the

jurors individually to determine if they were able to do so. See Blackwell, 238

N.W.2d at 132–33 (“The jury was then informed that anyone who wished to speak

up should do so. And in this regard, ten jurors stated the noon hour events had

not affected their ability to be fair and impartial to both sides of the case.”). In

addition, the court instructed the jury to consider only the evidence presented at

trial and not any extraneous matters. The court also took “curative steps” to ensure

neutrality by the jury and prevent recurrence of additional disturbances.5 See id.

5 The court informed Lloyd it was “happy to accommodate” him “if [he] want[ed] to

wear [his] street clothes” rather than his “jail uniform.” The court also told Lloyd it
was “important” for him to be “in the courtroom for the closing arguments” if Lloyd
could “promise [he would] behave and have no more outbursts.”
                                        11

      Lastly, we observe “the evidence against [Lloyd] was strong.” See Newell,

710 N.W.2d at 33; see also State v. Greene, 592 N.W.2d 24, 32 (Iowa 1999)

(considering strength of evidence in concluding no prejudice warranting a mistrial).

We affirm on this issue.

      AFFIRMED.