Court Opinion

ID: 9466512
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:18:16.414514+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:46.827284
License: Public Domain

GOLDBERG, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I agree with the majority’s statement of the controlling legal principles in this case. But because I cannot agree with their application of these principles to the circumstances of this case, I dissent.
Defendant was convicted under a five count indictment for violation of 18 U.S.C. App. § 1202(a).1 Each count charged that defendant, having been previously convicted of a felony, “[o]n or about the 15th day of August, 1977, at the City of Denham Springs, Louisiana, in the Middle District of Louisiana, . . . did knowingly receive and possess in commerce and affecting commerce” the separate firearm named in that count. The district court charged the jury in these same terms; it told the jury that as one of the essential elements of each count “the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant at the time and place charged — that is on or about this date — knowingly received or possessed a firearm.” Trial Transcript at 243.
The Government never attempted to prove that defendant received the weapons at the time and place charged in the indictment. Instead, it proved that defendant possessed the weapons at the specified time and place. In fact, the major conflict in the trial of the case was whether defendant was legally in possession of the weapons, four of which were stored in the house of his estranged wife and one of which was stored in a truck which was registered to *1087another individual but driven by defendant. Further, in its opening and closing arguments, the Government repeatedly told the jury that the question it must decide was whether defendant possessed the weapons; it never argued that defendant received them at the time and place charged.2 Finally, the trial court took notice of the fact that the indictment charged both receipt and possession — two separate acts — in the following terms:
Now, where a statute specifies several alternative ways, such as in this case, it says if he receives and possesses — it has alternative ways that a person can violate the statute — the Government doesn’t have to prove both ways. If they prove either that he received or possessed would be sufficient [sic], knowingly, of course— would be sufficient proof of that particular element.

Of coarse, the crucial part of this case involved the question of possession .

Trial Transcript at 245-46. (Emphasis supplied) After the jury returned its verdict of guilty on each of the five counts, the district court imposed the sentences complained of in defendant’s Rule 35 motion.
The Government in this appeal argues for the first time that the separate convictions may stand because there is evidence in the record showing that defendant received the weapons at distinct times and places, other than those charged in the indictment and instructions, so that each weapon constitutes a separate offense. Had this theory been presented in the court below, it would be sufficient to sustain separate convictions. On this record, however, I do not believe that the Government’s new, post hoc rationalization of the sentences imposed can withstand scrutiny.
The evidence of distinct acts of receipt upon which the Government now relies is not consistent with its sole theory of receipt presented in the indictment and the jury instructions. As noted, the indictment and instructions charged receipt of each of the weapons on August 15, 1977, in Denham Springs, Louisiana. The Government presented absolutely no evidence to support these allegations. It merely attempted to prove that defendant possessed the weapons at the specified time and place. The court instructed the jury that “[o]f course, the crucial part of the case involved the question of possession.” In these circumstances, I think the only issue made fairly submissible to the jury was the question of possession.3 Given this fact, I would not allow the Government to rely on the incidental evidence of distinct receipts of the weapons 4 to establish a totally post hoc rationalization of the sentences imposed below. The defendant was, quite simply, tried for possession. The Government cannot bootstrap a new theory of the case onto incidental evidence of receipt presented below when the jury was never told it could convict defendant on the basis of that evidence.
I would nevertheless hold that the Government proved two distinct offenses of possession. One of the weapons was stored in a place separate from the other four. Under the principles established by other circuits and adopted by the majority, this *1088separate possession is a basis for two separate convictions. Thus, two of the consecutive sentences were permissible.

. 18 U.S.C.App. § 1202(a) provides:
Any person who—
(1) has been convicted by a court of the United States or of a State or any political subdivision thereof of a felony, or
(2) has been discharged from the Armed Forces under dishonorable conditions, or
(3) has been adjudged by a court of the United States or of a State of any political subdivision thereof of being mentally incompetent, or
(4) having been a citizen of the United States has renounced his citizenship,, or
(5) being an alien is illegally or unlawfully in the United States,
and who receives, possesses, or transports in commerce or affecting commerce, after the date of enactment of this Act, any firearm shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both.

. Typical of the Government’s argument is the following:
And finally, the crux of the matter [is] whether or not the Defendant, Gene Grady Bullock, did on or about the fifteenth of April — or August, 1977, possess those firearms. Possessed them, ladies and gentlemen. Nobody has charged him with ownership or anything, merely that he possessed.
Trial Transcript at 218.

. Proof of possession cannot of itself establish receipt under the statute: a receipt charge “is not synonymous with a possession charge since receiving requires more than mere proof of possession. Time of receipt and venue must be proven as well.” United States v. Winer, 519 F.2d 256, 257 (8th Cir. 1975) (per curiam). See United States v. Kelly, 519 F.2d 251 (8th Cir. 1975).

. This evidence is “incidental” because it was presented solely through defendant’s witnesses, as part of his attempt to show that he did not have legal possession of the weapons by showing that others had acquired them, and through the Government’s attempt to rebut this argument. This fact thus reinforces my conclusion that the receipt theory now argued by the Government was never presented to the jury.