Court Opinion

ID: 9391127
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-30 07:11:46.617679+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:39.604970
License: Public Domain

Judgment Vacated, Motion for Supplemental Briefing Denied as Moot, Appeal
Dismissed, and Memorandum Opinion filed April 25, 2023.

                                    In the

                   Fourteenth Court of Appeals

                            NO. 14-22-00520-CV

  ALANA S. PHILLIPS, MAURICE JOHNSON, CHRISTINE DURBIN,
RICHARD POULSON, CHERYL ROTH, CONNIE HUDSON, AND STEVE
                      BROWN, Appellants

                                     V.
  JAYNE HOWELL, IN HER INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY AND IN HER
 OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS DENTON COUNTY REPUBLICAN PARTY
CHAIR; AND BELINDA SMALL, IN HER INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY AND
 IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS DENTON COUNTY REPUBLICAN
           PARTY EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, Appellees

                  On Appeal from the 393rd District Court
                          Denton County, Texas
                    Trial Court Cause No. 22-1296-393

                MEMORANDUM                   OPINION

      Appellants Alana S. Phillips, Maurice Johnson, Christine Durbin, Richard
Poulson, and Cheryl Roth sued Jayne Howell and Belinda Small, individually and
in their respective official capacities as chair and executive director of the Denton
County Republican Party, asking the trial court to enjoin Howell and Small “from
serving for the Denton County Republican Party as an election administrator, an
election official, or being in proximity or in communication with any polling
locations, or with personnel serving in polling locations, during the March 2022
Primary election, including the subsequent runoff elections, such as on May 24th.”
The plaintiff-appellants also asked the trial court to compel the non-party Denton
County District Attorney “to open a speedy investigation of criminal and fraudulent
election violations and allegations henceforth provided in this complaint with the
full authority of [Texas Election Code Chapter] 273 upon receipt of the forthcoming
affidavits.”

       On February 28, 2022, the trial court rendered judgment on the record in open
court that, “without finding that there is jurisdiction, . . . [e]ach of those requests [in
the prayer for relief in the plaintiffs’ petition] are hereby denied.”1 On March 18,
2022, the trial court memorialized the ruling in a signed, take-nothing final
judgment.

       Three days after the trial court signed the judgment, the plaintiff-appellants
filed an amended petition without leave of court in which they attempted to add
Connie B. Hudson and Steve Brown as plaintiffs. The plaintiffs, Hudson, and Brown
filed a motion for new trial which was overruled by operation of law. Hudson and
Brown then joined in the plaintiffs’ notice of appeal and in an appellate brief
challenging the trial court’s judgment.2

       1
         Our judgment in this case makes it unnecessary to discuss at length the issue of the trial
court rendering judgment without first determining whether it had jurisdiction over the cause.
       2
         This case arrives here from the Second Court of Appeals in Fort Worth pursuant to a
docket-equalization order issued by the Supreme Court of Texas. See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 73.001.
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 I. The request for injunctive relief against Jayne Howell and Belinda Small

       Regarding the request for an injunction prohibiting Howell and Small from
certain activity during the 2022 Republican primary election, those dates have
passed, and the Republican primary is over. Because it is not possible to grant the
requested injunctive relief, the claim for injunctive relief is moot.

       A case becomes moot when the court’s action on the merits cannot affect the
parties’ rights or interests, as, for instance, when a justiciable controversy between
the parties ceases to exist. Heckman v. Williamson Cnty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 162 (Tex.
2012). Courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction to decide a moot controversy.
Guardianship of Fairley, 650 S.W.3d 372, 379 (Tex. 2022). Thus, when a case
becomes moot on appeal, the appellate court must vacate the lower court’s order and
dismiss the appeal. See Tex. Foundries v. Int’l Moulders & Foundry Workers’
Union, 151 Tex. 239, 241, 248 S.W.2d 460, 461 (1952).

    II. The request to compel the District Attorney to open an investigation

       Ripeness is a threshold issue that implicates subject-matter-jurisdiction and
emphasizes that a concrete injury must have already occurred or must be likely to
occur. See Patterson v. Planned Parenthood of Houston & Se. Tex., Inc., 971 S.W.2d
439, 442 (Tex. 1998). A case is not ripe when its resolution depends on contingent
or hypothetical facts, or upon events that have not yet come to pass. Id. at 443.

       The plaintiff-appellants asked the trial court to compel the district attorney “to
open a speedy investigation of alleged criminal and fraudulent of criminal and
fraudulent election violations . . . upon receipt of the forthcoming affidavits.” The
plaintiffs did not contend that they had filed with any governmental entity a criminal

Because this is a transfer case, we apply the precedent of the Third Court of Appeals to the extent
it differs from our own. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.

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complaint or an election complaint that the Denton County District Attorney was
required to, and failed to, investigate. To the contrary, their petition alleged only that
the Denton County District Attorney would receive affidavits in the future alleging
such violations. Because the request for relief concerning the Denton County District
Attorney was not ripe, both the trial court and this Court lack subject-matter
jurisdiction to grant the requested relief.

      Moreover, the Denton County District Attorney was not named as a party to
the suit and neither was served with process nor appeared in this case. The trial court
therefore lacked personal jurisdiction over the Denton County District Attorney, and
hence, over this request for relief. See, e.g., Mitchell v. MAP Res., Inc., 649 S.W.3d
180, 194 (Tex. 2022); PNS Stores, Inc. v. Rivera, 379 S.W.3d 267, 275 (Tex. 2012).

                              III. Non-party appellants

      Because standing is a constitutional prerequisite to suit, a court has no
jurisdiction over a claim made by a plaintiff who lacks standing to assert it.
Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 150. Standing must exist as to each claim by each plaintiff.
Id. at 152–53. In general, only parties of record have standing to appeal a trial court’s
judgment. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.1(c); In re Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 184 S.W.3d
718, 723 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding). Also, one generally cannot intervene in a
suit after the trial court has rendered a final judgment. Tex. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ledbetter,
251 S.W.3d 31, 36 (Tex. 2008).

      The record shows that when the trial court rendered final judgment in open
court, and when the trial court signed the judgment, the sole plaintiffs were Alana S.
Phillips, Maurice Johnson, Christine Durbin, Richard Poulson, and Cheryl Roth. The
record shows neither that the trial court granted the Phillips Parties leave to file a
post-judgment amended petition adding additional plaintiffs nor that Connie B.

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Hudson and Steve Brown properly intervened in the suit. We therefore conclude that
Connie B. Hudson and Steve Brown lack standing to appeal the judgment.3

                                      IV. Conclusion

       For the reasons stated above, we notified the litigants on or about March 13,
2023, that unless a response was filed within ten days demonstrating grounds for
continuing the appeal, the case was subject to vacatur of the judgment and dismissal
for want of jurisdiction without further notice. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a).

       The plaintiff-appellants, Hudson, and Brown filed a joint response on March
23, 2023, but their response does not demonstrate grounds for continuing the appeal.
Regarding mootness, they state, “Appellants agree that the original complaint as
written in February 2022 contains remedies that are now moot.” Regarding ripeness,
they “raise no argument as to the court’s jurisdiction.”

       Because all of the claims at issue are either moot or unripe, it is unnecessary
to address the appellants’ remaining arguments. In accordance with our stated intent,
we vacate the trial court’s judgment and dismiss the cause for want of jurisdiction.
We deny as moot the appellants’ motion for supplemental briefing on the merits of
the now-vacated judgment.

                                           /s/       Tracy Christopher
                                                     Chief Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Christopher and Justices Jewell and Spain.

       3
         Hudson and Brown are “appellants” in that each of them is “a party taking an appeal to
the appellate court.” TEX. APP. P. 3.1(a).

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