Court Opinion

ID: 9735123
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:02:31.368723+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:55.410433
License: Public Domain

Morse, J.,
dissenting. The Court’s conclusion that Dr. Tyler, a licensed clinical psychologist, served as a privately retained expert witness rather than as a neutral adjunct of the trial court contradicts the overwhelming weight of the record evidence. The facts demonstrate that all of the principals — the court, the parties, and Dr. Tyler — understood the latter’s role in this case to be that of a judicially appointed neutral evaluator. Courts have uniformly held that such experts perform a function integral to the judicial process, and therefore, like judges, are entitled to immunity from suit. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
While acknowledging that the arguments for granting immunity to court appointed mental health experts “may have persuasive force,” 170 Vt. at 433, 751 A.2d at 792, the Court declines to address the issue because the “facts of this case do not provide a basis upon which to conclude defendant was performing a judicial or quasi-judicial func*437tion pursuant to a court directive.” Id. I submit that the record supports precisely the opposite conclusion.
First, although not mentioned by the Court, Dr. Tyler’s .participation in this custody dispute was initiated by a motion, filed by plaintiff’s husband, requesting that “the court order a forensic evaluation to be paid for by the parties in proportion to income and adjusted in consideration of their assets.” (Emphasis added.) The motion conformed with the rule providing for the appointment of experts in family court proceedings, including the specific provision that the court may “determine who pays the cost of such evaluation and may order a party, the parties, or the court or some combination thereof to pay.” V.R.F.E 5(a).
The trial court responded with a handwritten order stating, in part, that “[defendant’s request for a forensic evaluation shall be scheduled for a hearing.” Following the hearing, the court issued a brief handwritten order stating: “Hearing held. Forensic evaluation will be done. Mary Kehoe to be appointed as a GAL. Earties to file Form 813. Counsel to let us know within a week who to engage for a forensic evaluation.”
The order’s meaning is unmistakable. The first operative phrase, “[florensic evaluation will be done,” although couched in the passive voice, indicates that an evaluation will be done pursuant to the order. Although it is possible to construe the sentence as merely indicating that an evaluation will occur without the added implication that it be done pursuant to court order, any doubt is dispelled by the subsequent sentence: “Counsel to let us know within a week who to engage for a forensic evaluation.” The only possible meaning of this sentence is that the parties submit to the court (who else could the “us” refer to?) the name of an expert agreed upon by the parties for appointment as an expert. The order tracked the family court rule governing appointment of experts, which provides that the court “shall consider the names of persons submitted by the parties.” V.R.F.E 5(a). As noted, the family court hearing that resulted in this order was held specifically in response to a motion for appointment of an expert.
Viewed in retrospect, it is painfully apparent that this lawsuit could have been avoided through the simple expedient of submitting Dr. Tyler’s name, as the court directed, and having her appointment formalized in another order. This neglected final step, however, was undoubtedly an oversight, as the underlying intent, derived from the record summarized above, is clear. The parties and the court plainly understood Dr. Tyler’s role to be that of a court appointed expert. *438Indeed, in her subsequent complaint against Dr. Tyler for malpractice and infliction of emotional distress plaintiff candidly acknowledged Dr. Tyler’s status as a court appointed expert, stating: “In a handwritten order . . . the Family Court. . . ordered a forensic evaluation.”
Dr. Tyler’s conduct after the appointment is entirely consistent with this conclusion. In her contract for services, she informed the parties that her function would be to “perform the evaluation and furnish a report in connection with [the] Court proceeding,” that her “sole responsibility [was] to evaluate and report what, in my professional opinion, is in the best interest of the minor,” and that they must agree to waive confidentiality in order for her to “serve[] optimally as an evaluator.” (Emphasis added.) Dr. Tyler’s subsequent written evaluation, submitted to the court, was a model of disinterested psychological analysis. Her evaluation contained negative and positive assessments of both plaintiff and her husband. The report addressed in detail each of the factors set forth in 15 V.S.A. § 665 for determining the best interests of the child, and concluded with a list of specific custody and visitation recommendations that “[t]he court may wish to consider,” as well as a final note stating that it had “been a most difficult and distressing case” because of the apparent emotional distress suffered by the minor. (Emphasis added.)
It is impossible to view this report as anything other than a neutral psychological assessment intended to advise and assist the court in rendering its decision. The Court’s conclusion to the contrary is based upon several aspects of the previously mentioned contract of services. None is persuasive. First, the Court notes that the contract stated that Dr. Tyler had been “requested to do an evaluation and a written report” without referencing a court appointment. 170 Vt. at 433, 751 A.2d at 792. Common sense suggests, however, that a privately retained expert would have addressed the employing party in words such as “You have requested an evaluation,” whereas the neutral “I have been requested” very likely referenced the trial court.
The Court also finds significance in the contractual provision stating, “I am willing to be retained by both of you to perform the evaluation. . . upon the following conditions, which must be accepted by both of you,” as well as the subsequent condition that the parties split the payment. Again, the Court derives too much from these terms. The rule providing for appointment of experts expressly authorizes payment by the parties, as occurred here, and the contract’s reference to being “retained by both of you” merely reflects *439that contractual relationship. The existence of a contractual relationship, and the parties’ payment obligation, is entirely consistent with Dr. Tyler’s court appointment.1
Considered in light of the overwhelming evidence of the court and the parties’ intentions, and the unmistakable tenor of the analysis and recommendations contained in Dr. Tyler’s report, the conclusion is inescapable that she functioned in this case as a court appointed neutral evaluator. The only remaining question, therefore, is whether her service in that capacity entitled her to immunity from suit under the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity.2
That question is easily answered. With virtual uniformity courts have granted absolute immunity to persons who perform functions similar to those performed by Dr. Tyler in this case. See, e.g., Lythgoe v. Guinn, 884 P.2d 1085, 1088-89 (Alaska 1994) (independent custody investigator appointed to provide advice and expertise granted absolute immunity); Lavit v. Superior Court, 839 P.2d 1141, 1144-45 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (psychologist who performed child-custody evaluation exercised judicial function requiring absolute immunity); Howard v. Drapkin, 271 Cal. Rptr. 893, 902 (Ct. App. 1990) (psychologist who performed neutral evaluation in custody dispute entitled to same immunity given others who function as neutrals in resolving disputes); Seibel v. Kemble, 631 P.2d 173, 177 (Haw. 1981) (psychiatrist *440who rendered opinion regarding defendant’s mental condition functioned as “arm of court” entitling him to absolute judicial immunity); S.T.J. v. P.M., 556 So. 2d 244, 247 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (psychologists appointed to aid in resolving custody dispute performed quasi-judicial function entitling them to absolute immunity); LaLonde v. Eissner, 539 N.E.2d 538, 541-42 (Mass. 1989) (psychiatrist who performed independent evaluation in visitation dispute “entitled to immunity because of the function he performed and its essential connection to the judicial process”); Duff v. Lewis, 958 P.2d 82, 86-87 (Nev. 1998) (psychiatrist appointed to perform child assessments in custody dispute performed “integral function in assisting courts” entitling him to absolute quasi-judicial immunity); Delcourt v. Silverman, 919 S.W.2d 777, 782 (Tex. App. 1996) (psychologist appointed to evaluate children in custody dispute entitled to absolute immunity by fulfilling “quasi-judicial functions intimately related to the judicial process”); Parker v. Dodgion, 971 P.2d 496, 499 (Utah 1998) (psychologist appointed as evaluator in custody dispute entitled to immunity from suit).
Each of the foregoing decisions relied on the common law doctrine of judicial immunity, a venerable principle designed to protect the integrity of the judicial process by ensuring that judicial officers exercise their functions unconstrained by fear of reprisal. Indeed, as this Court early noted, “[i]t is a privilege not primarily designed for the protection of the judge, but for the protection of the public, by making the judges free, independent and fearless in the discharge of their duties.” Vaughn v. Congdon, 56 Vt. 111, 128 (1883) (Lowers; J., dissenting) (quoted with approval in LaPlaca v. Lowery, 134 Vt. 56, 58, 349 A.2d 235, 236 (1975)). This and other courts have extended the doctrine to so-called quasi-judicial officers, participants in the judicial process whose functions are closely associated with or comparable to judges. See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508-13 (1978) (participants in federal administrative adjudication entitled to quasi-judicial immunity); Muzzy v. State, 155 Vt. 279, 280, 583 A.2d 82, 83 (1990) (quasi-judicial immunity extends to state’s attorney to extent that actions complained of are associated with judicial phase of criminal process); Black v. Clegg, 938 P.2d 293, 296-97 (Utah 1997) (quasi-judicial immunity applies to state bar officers and counsel in performance of attorney discipline functions).
As noted earlier, those courts that have considered the issue have also — with virtual unanimity — extended the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity to mental health experts appointed to assist the *441court in child custody proceedings. The reasoning of these decisions is unassailable. As cogently stated by the court in Parker:
[C]ourts that have addressed this issue have uniformly held that psychologists appointed by the court to conduct psychological evaluations of parties involved in custody disputes perform a function integral to the judicial process and are therefore immune from suit. Several reasons support this conclusion. First, if these individuals are subject to suit, they will be much less willing to serve the court in such a capacity. Second, a psychologist who agrees to fill the role of court-appointed evaluator will be less likely to offer the disinterested, objective opinion the court seeks in making such an appointment if he or she is subject to suit.
971 P.2d at 498-99.
These policies apply with equal force in Vermont, and amply support the conclusion that Dr. Tyler was entitled to immunity from suit. Adequate safeguards against negligent or inaccurate evaluations exist in the form of deposing and cross-examining the expert at trial to bring to the court’s attention any alleged deficiencies, or reporting the expert’s behavior to the appropriate professional board for review. See Lythgoe, 884 P.2d at 1091; LaLonde, 539 N.E.2d at 542; Seibel, 631 P.2d at 177 n.8; see also Note, Absolute Immunity for the Negligent Expert Witness, 26 Willamette L. Rev. 1051, 1076 (1990).
Except for the final step of an order memorializing the parties’ choice of Dr. Tyler as the expert to be appointed by the court, every objective fact in this ease — from the initial motion seeking a court-appointed expert, to the court’s order directing the parties to submit an agreed-upon name, to Dr. Tyler’s independent evaluation and recommendations to the court, to plaintiff’s complaint explicitly acknowledging that the family court had ordered a forensic evaluation — points to no other conclusion but that Dr. Tyler functioned as a court-appointed neutral evaluator. Indeed, in fulfilling that role, defendant left herself vulnerable to precisely the kind of lawsuit which the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity is designed to forestall. It is an injustice and a disservice to her, and to the family court and the judicial system as a whole, to deprive Dr. Tyler of the protection to which she was entitled.

 Indeed, several state courts that have considered the issue of immunity for mental health professionals in custody proceedings have explicitly rejected the notion that payment for an expert’s services by the affected parties, or their contractual relationship with the expert, is inconsistent with the expert’s quasi-judicial role as neutral evaluator. In Lythgoe v. Guinn, 884 P.2d 1085 (Alaska 1994), for example, the court held that the fact the parties had each paid half the costs of a custody investigator was “irrelevant to the quasi-judicial immunity issue, as courts have uniformly held that the determinative question is not how the court-appointed expert is selected or paid, but whether his or her ‘activity is an integral part of the judicial process.’” Id. at 1093 n.6 (quoting Lavit v. Superior Court, 839 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992)). Lythgoe relied on Lavit, where — as here — the parties in a custody dispute had stipulated to an expert and contracted for his services. As the court there explained, “[t]he question becomes not how the psychologist was first chosen but whether his activity is an integral part of the judicial process so that to deny immunity would disserve the broader public interest that non-judicial officers act without fear of liability.” 839 P.2d at 1144; see also LaLonde v. Eissner, 539 N.E.2d 538, 542 n.9 (Mass. 1989) (payment of expert’s services by party did “not affect [his] status as a quasi judicial officer entitled to immunity.”); Duff v. Lewis, 958 P.2d 82, 86 (Nev. 1998) (psychiatrist appointed by court in custody dispute was not an advocate for either parent, even if paid by them).

Although Dr. (fyler raised several other defenses, including witness immunity and the statute of limitations, it is unnecessary to reach these claims in view of the absolute immunity from suit afforded her under the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity.