Court Opinion

ID: 9960582
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-16 16:13:10.974217+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:38.405999
License: Public Domain

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  ALISON KARA-LYNNE MORRIS                     :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1587 MDA 2022

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 7, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-21-CR-0002965-2020

BEFORE:      LAZARUS, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:                     FILED: APRIL 16, 2024

       Alison Kara-Lynne Morris appeals from the judgment of sentence,

entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County, after she

entered a plea of nolo contendere to one count of voluntary manslaughter.1

After careful consideration, we affirm.

       At Morris’ April 7, 2022 plea hearing, the Commonwealth recited the

facts of this case, to which Morris pled no contest, as follows:

       [O]n [October] 26[,] 2020, [Morris] and the victim [], Ryan
       Young, [] were involved in a relationship[.] They had children
       together and were living together. On that date, the[y] were
       involved in a domestic [verbal] argument[.] At some point during
       that argument, [Morris] went into the bathroom of the apartment
       behind a closed door. While she was in that bathroom, [Young]
       was in the hallway outside of the bathroom. The two of them were
       still arguing.   They were also on the phone with different
____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2503(b).
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       individuals each at the same time. At some point during that
       argument, [] Young entered the bathroom.[2] And when [Young]
       entered the bathroom, [Morris], who was seated on a stool on the
       floor of the bathroom, had a knife[3] in her hand at the time,
       reached up and stabbed [] Young in the leg. That stab wound cut
       [Young’s] femoral artery.      [Young called] 9-1-1 [] almost
       immediately[.] Unfortunately[, Y]oung died as a result of that
       wound [shortly thereafter at the hospital].

N.T. Plea Hearing, 4/7/22, at 5-6. In exchange for Morris’ hybrid4 no contest

plea, the Commonwealth agreed to not seek application of the deadly weapon

enhancement at sentencing and agreed to withdraw all other charges—those

at counts 1 through 4 (that include murder,5 aggravated assault,6 involuntary

____________________________________________

2 At the plea hearing, the defense explained that the bathroom “door really

isn’t capable of being locked because of some damage that was done to it on
a prior occasion. But the door was locked [when Morris was in the bathroom.]”
N.T. Plea Hearing, 4/7/22, at 22. Further, the Commonwealth acknowledged
that just before entering the bathroom, the victim stated, “Hold on, this bitch
is in the bathroom talking shit,” see id. at 21, presumably speaking to the
individual with whom he was on the phone.

3 Morris kept the knife in the bathroom because she would use it on occasion

for self-cutting. See id. at 23.

4 A “hybrid” plea is one where the parties did not bargain for a specific
sentence but negotiated as to a certain aspect of the sentence. See
Commonwealth v. Heaster, 171 A.3d 268, 271 (Pa. Super. 2017).

5 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2501(a).

6 Id. at § 2702(a)(1).

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manslaughter,7 and recklessly endangering another person8.)9 The trial court

accepted Morris’ plea, ordered a presentence investigation report (PSI), and

scheduled sentencing for June 7, 2022.

       At the sentencing hearing, the court heard several witnesses’ victim

impact statements, considered 27 letters written to the court by family and

friends of the victim, considered the PSI, heard Morris’ allocution, and heard

argument by the Commonwealth and defense counsel. Ultimately, the trial

court sentenced Morris to 7 to 14 years’ incarceration. At the time it imposed

the sentence, the court stated:

       It is noted that this sentence is above the aggravated range of the
       sentencing guidelines[10] and is given in consideration of the life
       lost here, that there was evidence that the defendant and the
       victim were in a tumultuous relationship, that the defendant made
       statements by text messages that she wishes to kill the victim, in
       consideration of the circumstances surrounding the voluntary
       manslaughter, and that any lesser sentence would depreciate
       from the seriousness of the crime.

____________________________________________

7 Id. at § 2504(a).

8 Id. at § 2705.

9 The Commonwealth originally only charged Morris with the four withdrawn

charges, but, at the plea hearing, the Commonwealth amended the criminal
information to include a fifth count of voluntary manslaughter for purposes of
the plea. See N.T. Plea Hearing, 4/7/22, at 2.

10 Morris has a prior record score of 0, and the voluntary manslaughter charge

carries an offense gravity score of 11, thus calling for a standard-range
sentence of 36 to 54 months’ incarceration, with the top of the aggravated
range at 66 months’ incarceration, and with a statutory maximum sentence
of up to 20 years’ incarceration. See 204 Pa. Code § 303.16(a) (Basic
Sentencing Matrix).

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N.T. Sentencing Hearing, 6/7/22, at 34-35. On June 17, 2022, Morris filed a

timely post-sentence motion, seeking modification of sentence, arguing that

her sentence should be within the standard range because the reasons relied

upon by the trial court did not support the sentence and because the court

failed to consider other factors.11        The court denied Morris’ post-sentence

____________________________________________

11 Morris’ post-sentence motion stated, in relevant part, as follows:

       5. None of the [court’s stated] reasons individually or cumulatively
       support a sentence in [] or above the aggravated range.

       6. The [c]ourt[,] while noting that [Morris] and the victim were in
       a tumultuous relationship[,] did not take into consideration that
       [its] nature [] was due to both [Morris’] and the victim’s behavior.
       Additionally, [although] the court heard evidence of the existence
       of a [protection from abuse order] against the victim by [Morris]
       and the victim had previously pled guilty to committing [s]imple
       [a]ssault against [Morris] while she was pregnant[,] the [c]ourt
       gave no consideration to this evidence.

       7. The [c]ourt[,] while hearing evidence of text messages sent by
       [Morris,] did [not] consider the[ir] context [], [Morris’] mental
       health at the time[,] or the [victim’s] statement [] moments
       before he was stabbed when he said to a person to whom he was
       talking on the phone, “hold on this bitch is talking shit.”

       8. The [c]ourt also stated that it [] account[ed for] the
       circumstances     surrounding    the   voluntary    manslaughter.
       However, those circumstances were fully outlined at the time of
       the plea and showed . . . [Morris] and the victim were arguing,
       that [Morris] had shut herself in the bathroom to get away from
       the victim, [and] that the victim entered the bathroom right after
       making the statement, “hold on this bitch is talking shit.” When
       the victim entered the bathroom and approached [Morris,] she
       was sitting on a booster step [that] was only about six inches off
       of the ground and [] as the victim came at her[,] she stabbed him
       in the leg one time with a kitchen knife that she kept in the
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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motion on October 20, 2022.             Morris filed a timely notice of appeal on

November 17, 2022. Morris and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P.

1925.

        On appeal, Morris raises the following question for our review:

“[whether] the Honorable Court abuse[d] its discretion in imposing a sentence

outside of the standard and aggravated [] range of the Pennsylvania

Sentencing Guidelines.” See Appellant’s Brief, at 4. Morris also includes two

sub-issues in her statement of questions involved, which are stated as follows:

(1) “[whether] the Honorable Court’s reasons for imposing the sentence [was]

supported by the record,” and (2) “[whether] the Honorable Court’s sentence

[was] supported by sufficient reasons to deviate from the Pennsylvania

Sentencing Guidelines.”        Id.    As such, Morris challenges the discretionary

aspects of her sentence.12

        Appellants may not challenge the discretionary aspects of sentencing as

of right.    See Commonwealth v. Sierra, 752 A.2d 910, 912 (Pa. Super.

2000).      A request for appellate review of the discretionary aspects of a

sentence     is   considered    a    petition   for   permission   to   appeal.   See
____________________________________________

        bathroom that she used to cut herself. After the stabbing[, Morris]
        got on the phone with 9[-]1[-]1 and made efforts to stop the
        bleeding[,] which continued until the police arrived. None of these
        circumstances support a sentence outside of the standard range.

Post-Sentence Motion, 6/17/22, at 1-2.

12 A hybrid plea agreement does not preclude appellate review of those
discretionary aspects of the sentence that were not agreed upon during
negotiations. See Heaster, 171 A.3d at 271.

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Commonwealth v. Zirkle, 107 A.3d 127, 132 (Pa. Super. 2014). Prior to

reaching the merits of a discretionary sentencing issue, and to invoke the

appellate court’s jurisdiction, the appellate court conducts a four-part test to

determine:

      (1) whether the appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see
      Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly
      preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify
      sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether the appellant’s brief
      has a fatal defect, [see] Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there
      is a substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not
      appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.[A] § 9781(b).

Commonwealth v. Bradley, 237 A.3d 1131, 1138 (Pa. Super. 2020), citing

Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa. Super. 2006) (brackets

omitted).

      Here, Morris preserved discretionary sentencing claims in a post-

sentence motion seeking to modify her sentence, filed a timely notice of

appeal, and has included a Rule 2119(f) statement in her brief.            See

Appellant’s Brief, at 9. Consequently, we turn to whether Morris’ appeal raises

a substantial question.

      “A defendant presents a substantial question when [s]he sets forth a

plausible argument that the sentence violates a provision of the sentencing

code or is contrary to the fundamental norms of the sentencing process.”

Commonwealth v. Dodge, 77 A.3d 1263, 1268-69 (Pa. Super. 2013)

(citation omitted).   The Court determines what constitutes a substantial

question on a case-by-case basis. See Commonwealth v. Prisk, 13 A.3d

526, 533 (Pa. Super. 2011). In reviewing for a substantial question, “[o]ur

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inquiry must focus on the reasons for which the appeal is sought, in contrast

to the facts underlying the appeal, which are necessary only to decide the

appeal on the merits.” Commonwealth v. Akhmedov, 216 A.3d 307, 328

(Pa. Super. 2019) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The appellate court

cannot look beyond the statement of questions involved and the prefatory

Rule 2119(f) statement to determine whether a substantial question exists.

See Commonwealth v. Christine, 78 A.3d 1, 10 (Pa. Super. 2013).

      In her Rule 2119(f) statement, Morris raises the following three reasons

she relies upon to invoke our discretionary review:

      1. The [s]entencing court abused its discretion in imposing a
         sentence above the aggravated range of the Pennsylvania
         Sentencing Guidelines when the reasons relied upon [] by the
         [s]entencing [c]ourt were not supported by the record.

      2. The [s]entencing [c]ourt [a]bused its discretion in imposing a
         sentence above the aggravated range of the Pennsylvania
         Sentencing Guidelines based upon reasons that are contrary to
         the fundamental norms of the sentencing process.

      3. The [s]entencing [c]ourt sentence[d Morris] above the
         aggravated range of the Pennsylvania Sentencing Guidelines
         and the sentence was unreasonable under the circumstances.

Appellant’s Brief, at 9.

      An allegation that the trial court relied upon factors not supported by

the record raises a substantial question. See Commonwealth v. Downing,

990 A.2d 788, 792 (Pa. Super. 2010).      A claim that advances a colorable

argument that the sentencing court’s actions were either inconsistent with a

specific provision of the Sentencing Code or contrary to the fundamental

norms underlying the sentencing process also raises a substantial question.

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See Commonwealth v. King, 182 A.3d 449, 454 (Pa. Super. 2018). Finally,

a substantial question exists where an “appellant asserts that the trial court

failed to state sufficiently its reasons for imposing sentence outside the

sentencing guidelines.” Commonwealth v. Rodda, 723 A.2d 212, 214 (Pa.

Super. 1999) (en banc). However, bald claims of an excessive sentence do

not raise a substantial question. See Commonwealth v. Zeigler, 112 A.3d

656, 662 (Pa. Super. 2015).

       Here, only the first two reasons in Morris’ Rule 2119(f) statement raise

a substantial question. Morris’ first reason clearly raises a substantial question

where she alleges the court relied upon evidence not of record in imposing

Morris’ sentence. See Downing, 990 A.2d at 792. When considering the

second subpart of Morris’ statement of questions presented, see Appellant’s

Brief, at 4, and her Rule 2119(f) statement together,13 see id. at 9; see also

Christine, 78 A.3d at 10, we conclude that Morris’ second reason in her Rule

2119(f) statement also raises a substantial question insofar as she claims her

sentence is contrary to the fundamental norms underlying the sentencing

process where the court did not rely on sufficient reasons to deviate from the

Pennsylvania Sentencing Guidelines. See King, 182 A.3d at 454; see also

____________________________________________

13 Standing alone, and without reference to Morris’ statement of questions
involved, we would find the second issue raised in Morris’ Rule 2119(f)
statement does not raise a substantial question insofar as it fails to specify
which reasons relied upon by the court were contrary to which fundamental
norms underlying the sentencing process. See Commonwealth v. Rose,
641 A.2d 617, 618 (Pa. Super. 1994).

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Rodda, 723 A.2d at 214. However, Morris’ third reason—that her sentence

is excessive under the circumstances, without her providing any indication of

which circumstances are at issue—amounts to a bald allegation of

excessiveness that does not raise a substantial question. See Zeigler, 112

A.3d at 662. Consequently, we may proceed to review the merits of the two

substantial questions raised above.14

       We consider the merits of Morris’ claims “mindful that sentencing is

vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing court, and we shall not disturb

a sentence absent a manifest abuse of discretion.”           Commonwealth v.

Schroat, 272 A.3d 523, 527 (Pa. Super. 2022).

       In this context, an abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an
       error in judgment. Rather, the appellant must establish, by
       reference to the record, that the sentencing court ignored or
       misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for reasons of
       partiality, prejudice, bias[,] or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly
       unreasonable decision.

Commonwealth v. Summers, 245 A.3d 686, 692-93 (Pa. Super. 2021)

(citation omitted). In addition to the broad sentencing discretion afforded to

the sentencing court, appellate courts also grant the sentencing court great

deference, as it is the sentencing court that is in the best position to “view the

defendant’s character, displays of remorse, defiance[,] or indifference, and

the overall effect and nature of the crime.” Commonwealth v. Walls, 926

A.2d 957, 961 (Pa. 2007) (citation omitted).
____________________________________________

14 Morris combines the three reasons raised in her Rule 2119(f) statement into

only two subparts in the argument section of her brief, in violation of Pa.R.A.P.
2119(a).

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      When imposing a sentence, the sentencing court must consider “the

protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact

on the life of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative needs

of the defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). Further, the sentencing court is

required to consider the circumstances of the offense and the character of the

defendant, paying particular attention to the defendant’s prior criminal record,

her age, personal characteristics, and her potential for rehabilitation.   See

Commonwealth v. Griffin, 804 A.2d 1, 10 (Pa. Super. 2002). Pennsylvania

courts must also consider the Pennsylvania Sentencing Guidelines as one

sentencing factor in the overall analysis.    See Walls, 926 A.2d at 964-65

(“[T]he guidelines have no binding effect, create no presumption in

sentencing, and do not predominate over other sentencing factors—they are

advisory guideposts that are valuable, may provide an essential starting point,

and that must be respected and considered[.]”).        Although they must be

considered, the Pennsylvania Sentencing Guidelines are not mandatory, and

thus do not prohibit any particular sentence otherwise within the statutory

maximum.     See Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 883 A.2d 1096, 1107 (Pa.

Super. 2005).    The balancing of the sentencing factors is within the sole

province of the sentencing court. See Commonwealth v. Velez, 273 A.3d

6, 10 (Pa. Super. 2022).

      When we conduct the merits analysis of a challenge to the discretionary

aspects of a sentence, we are also guided by the statutory requirements of 42

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9781(c) and (d).      See Zeigler, 112 A.3d at 661.        Section

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9781(c)(3)—the only portion of subsection (c) applicable here—provides that

this Court must vacate Morris’ sentence and remand to the sentencing court

for resentencing if “the sentencing court sentenced outside the sentencing

guidelines and the sentence is unreasonable.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(c)(3). In

this context, we consider:

     (1) The nature and circumstances of the offense and the history
     and characteristics of the defendant.

     (2) The opportunity of the sentencing court to observe the
     defendant, including any presentence investigation.

     (3) The findings upon which the sentence was based.

     (4) The guidelines promulgated by the commission.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(d). The appellate court is not permitted to re-weigh the

sentencing factors considered by the sentencing court. See Summers, 245

A.3d at 695. This Court has previously explained that an aggravated-range

sentence is justified to the extent that the circumstances of the case are

atypical of the crime such that a more severe punishment is appropriate. See

Commonwealth v. Fullin, 892 A.2d 843, 848 (Pa. Super. 2006).           Also,

“[w]here [a PSI] exist[s], we shall [] presume that the sentencing judge was

aware of relevant information regarding the defendant’s character and

weighed those considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.”

Commonwealth v. Devers, 546 A.2d 12, 18 (Pa. 1988).

     In her first claim, Morris argues that the record did not support the

sentencing court’s findings that the victim was a good father and a “shining

light,” especially where the record contains:   (1) text messages from the

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victim to Morris the day prior to the stabbing, which Morris characterizes as

cruel, crude, insulting, denigrating, aggressive, and bordering on threatening;

(2) the victim’s simple assault conviction for acts committed against Morris

while she was pregnant; (3) a protection from abuse order against the victim

and in favor of Morris; (4) evidence that the victim assaulted Morris earlier on

the day of the stabbing, including squeezing Morris’ jaw to make her stop

talking and throwing her onto the bed; (5) evidence of the victim’s breach of

the bathroom door where Morris had barricaded herself away from the victim;

and (6) evidence that the victim stated, “Hold on, this bitch is in the bathroom

talking shit,” immediately prior to breaching the locked bathroom.         See

Appellant’s Brief, at 13-17. Morris also argues that the sentencing court’s

statements regarding her failure to exit the relationship with the victim

amounted to victim-blaming and that the court abused its discretion in finding

Morris singularly responsible for that failure. See id. at 16. Further, Morris

claims that the sentencing court’s reliance on Morris’ failure to exit the

relationship does not consider that Morris, in fact, was trying to end that

relationship on the day of the incident. See id. at 17; see also Affidavit of

Probable Cause, 11/30/20, at ¶ 3.

      Here, after the presentation of evidence and argument at the sentencing

hearing, the sentencing court stated on the record that:

      [] I have at length reviewed everything in this case. I appreciate
      all of the letters submitted on behalf of [the victim]. I
      understand much of the facts surrounding the incident that we are
      here for. As I said, I’ve reviewed the [PSI] and all the

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     documentation on behalf of [Morris] for the sentencing
     memorandum.

     One thing that was very clear to me from [] all the letters on
     behalf of the victim is how everyone discussed how much
     he was [“]a light[”] and made people happy. Lots of
     comments about his dimples and that he was a good father,
     and that he was there for everyone.                Several people
     specifically used the word that he was a [“]shining[”] light
     for them. So[,] it’s clear that the loss that has been sustained
     by all of his family is unbearable. It’s clear to me that the family
     is hurting by the circumstances that happened here.

     It’s also clear to me from the facts that there was unfortunately a
     tumultuous relationship between both of them. That they both
     should have separated from each other long ago. Instead,
     despite charges against the victim in the past, and despite
     protection from abuse orders, they both went back to the toxic
     relationship and[,] unfortunately[,] it led us to here. It’s
     correct that no amount of jail time will bring back [the victim] and
     what he had to offer and what he has to offer to all of the family
     members.

     I am sure that [] Morris understands that given she has been
     sitting in prison for how long as she has that her mental health,
     unfortunately, and lack of getting out of a tumultuous
     relationship[,] contributed to her being here today. What is really
     sad, of course, is the children[, a]ll of the grandchildren, but
     specifically [Morris’] five children[.] I know that you are already
     suffering a loss, Ms. Morris, from not having them, and I know
     that the family of [the victim] is also suffering from that loss and
     I hope that those children and, obviously, I will be following that,
     but that those children are doing well in their respective
     placements and will someday see their way forward to having
     good lives.

     I take into account that [Morris] has no prior record, but, again, I
     already mentioned all of the things where she could have made
     other decisions that might have avoided us being here today. I
     take into account that the standard[-]range sentencing guidelines
     start at 36 months, which is three years in prison, up to 54
     months, so that would be the bottom of the standard range.

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      I take into account that all of the family indicated that [Morris]
      showed no remorse to date. That being said, [] defendants
      generally cannot speak[,] or they are given the advice not to
      speak[,] to family members while charges are pending, and I
      heard her express remorse today.

                                  *     *      *

      [T]he court being in receipt of a [PSI,] upon which it relies,
      the sentence of the court at count 5 is that [Morris] . . . undergo
      imprisonment in a [S]tate [C]orrectional [F]acility for not less than
      84 months nor more than 168 months. . . . It is noted that this
      sentence is above the aggravated range of the sentencing
      guidelines and is given in consideration of the life lost here, that
      there was evidence that [Morris] and the victim were in a
      tumultuous relationship, that [Morris] made statements by text
      messages that she wishes to kill the victim, in consideration of the
      circumstances surrounding the voluntary manslaughter, and that
      any lesser sentence would depreciate from the seriousness of the
      crime.

N.T. Sentencing Hearing, 6/7/22, at 31-35 (emphasis added; unnecessary

capitalization omitted).

      Here, we find the record—especially the letters and victim impact

statements—support the trial court’s findings that the victim’s family

considered the victim to be a good father and a shining light. Indeed, it is

appropriate for the sentencing court to consider the gravity of the offense as

it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the

community[.]” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b) (emphasis added). Additionally, our

review reveals that the trial court did not place the blame for failing to end

the tumultuous relationship with the victim solely on Morris, and instead, the

court referred to both Morris and the victim when apportioning responsibility

for failure to end the relationship. See N.T. Sentencing Hearing, 6/7/22, at

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32. Finally, we conclude that Morris’ first issue is actually a request for this

Court to re-weigh the sentencing factors, which we may not do.                 See

Summers, 245 A.3d at 695.              Consequently, we deem Morris’ first issue

meritless.

       In her second claim, Morris asserts that the sentencing court

impermissibly relied upon the seriousness of the offense and failed to

distinguish her case from a typical voluntary manslaughter case when

sentencing above the aggravated range.             See Appellant’s Brief, at 17-19.

Further, Morris argues she was rightfully afraid of the victim, her fears were

well-founded, and she should have been sentenced as such. See id. at 20-

21.

       Here, at the outset, we note that Morris’ arguments on this issue do not

fully pertain to the issue for which we granted her permission to appeal—that

the sentencing court did not rely on sufficient reasons to deviate from the

Pennsylvania Sentencing Guidelines. To the extent Morris raises issues for

the first time on appeal—namely, the court’s consideration of the seriousness

of her crime as well as its failure to find that Morris was “rightfully” afraid of

the victim15—we find these arguments waived as Morris did not raise them at
____________________________________________

15 We recognize that “an averment that the court sentenced based solely on

the seriousness of the offense and failed to consider all relevant factors raises
a substantial question.” Commonwealth v. Macias, 968 A.2d 773, 776 (Pa.
Super. 2009). Further, we observe that a contention that the trial court relied
upon factors which are already considered in the sentencing guidelines when
sentencing in the aggravated range raises a substantial question. See
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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sentencing or in a post-sentence motion.16 See Commonwealth v. Mann,

820 A.2d 788, 794 (Pa. Super. 2003) (objections to discretionary aspects of
____________________________________________

Commonwealth v. Clemat, 218 A.3d 944, 959 (Pa. Super. 2019).
However, we may only look at Morris’ Rule 2119(f) statement and the
statement of questions involved, see Pa.R.A.P. 2116, when determining
whether a substantial question exists. See Christine, 78 A.3d at 10. Because
Morris only raises these claims in the argument section of her brief, we may
not consider whether a substantial question is raised, and therefore, these
claims are additionally waived for that reason.

16 Even if not waived, we conclude this issue is meritless when analyzed under

each potential formulation of the question presented:

First, the sentencing court placed sufficient reasons on the record for deviating
above the aggravated guideline range, including: (1) the court’s consideration
of the victim’s life lost; (2) that Morris and the victim were in a tumultuous
relationship for an extended period of time; (3) that Morris sent text messages
stating she wished to kill the victim; and (4) the circumstances surrounding
the voluntary manslaughter. See N.T. Sentencing Hearing, 6/7/22, at 34-35.

Second, to the extent the sentencing court considered the seriousness of the
crime, which is already accounted for in the sentencing guidelines, the court
was permitted to do so, and did, in connection with its consideration of other
relevant facts, namely, the life lost, the tumultuous relationship, the text
messages, and the circumstances of the crime. See Commonwealth v.
Shugars, 895 A.2d 1270, 1275 (Pa. Super. 2006) (“Trial courts are permitted
to use . . . factors already included in the guidelines if[] they are used to
supplement other extraneous sentencing information.”) (emphasis in
original).

Third, Morris pled no contest to the subsection of voluntary manslaughter
which requires that she possess an unreasonable belief of justification. See
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2503(b) (“A person who intentionally or knowingly kills an
individual commits voluntary manslaughter if at the time of the killing [s]he
believes the circumstances to be such that, if they existed, would justify the
killing under Chapter 5 of this title (relating to general principles of
justification), but h[er] belief is unreasonable.”) (emphasis added). Morris
cannot now claim that she stabbed the victim with a “well-founded” or
“rightful” fear, especially since Morris does not challenge the validity of her
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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sentence are generally waived if not raised at sentencing hearing or in motion

to modify sentence); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302.

       To the extent that Morris’ argument—that the trial court failed to

distinguish her case from a typical voluntary manslaughter case when

sentencing her above the aggravated range—addresses the question of

whether the court relied on sufficient reasons to deviate from the Pennsylvania

Sentencing Guidelines, we find this issue is meritless. Indeed, contrary to

Morris’ claims, the trial court noted factors specific to Morris’ case showing

how it was atypical—thereby justifying an aggravated-range sentence—and

reiterated those factors in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, specifying that:     (1)

Morris’ crime was a long time in the making; (2) Morris had apparent

premeditated ill will towards the victim; (3) Morris took no remedial measures

where she knew she had mental health issues and knew she wanted to kill the

victim; and (4) several children were in the home at the time that Morris kept

a knife in the bathroom. See Trial Court Opinion, 1/20/23, at 6-8.

       Judgment of sentence affirmed.

____________________________________________

plea and she was convicted of a crime specifying that she maintain an
unreasonable belief of her justification. See Commonwealth v. Jabbie,
200 A.3d 500, 505 (Pa. Super. 2018) (“[I]n terms of its effect upon a case, a
plea of nolo contendere is treated the same as a guilty plea. Generally, upon
entry of a guilty plea, a defendant waives all claims and defenses other than
those sounding in the jurisdiction of the court, the validity of the plea, and
what has been termed the ‘legality’ of the sentence imposed.”) (citations,
quotation marks, and brackets omitted).

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J-A23002-23

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 04/16/2024

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