Court Opinion

ID: 9777289
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:06:08.668998+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:51.677736
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION TO OVERRULING STATE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING WITHOUT WRITTEN OPINION
McCORMICK, Judge.
This is an appeal from a conviction for murder. The jury, finding appellant guilty, assessed punishment at eight years.
On original submission, a panel, with one Judge dissenting, found the trial court erred in refusing appellant’s requested instruction on self-defense. The State has filed a motion for rehearing urging that appellant was not entitled to a reversal because, under the circumstances, appellant forfeited his right to rely on self-defense. Without reiterating the basis of the panel’s opinion, the State’s motion should be granted and the judgment affirmed.
I.
V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 9.32, reads:
“A person is justified in using deadly force against another: ll * * *
(2) if a reasonable person in the actor’s situation would not have retreated;
The instruction on the law of retreat is normally given to the jury with the instruction on self-defense. Thomas v. State, 578 S.W.2d 691 (Tex.Cr.App.1979). The jury must find that a reasonable person would not have retreated under the circumstances. This, of course, is a modification of the law as it existed previous to the new penal code. See Valentine v. State, 587 S.W.2d 399 (Tex.Cr.App.1979).
However, the issue of retreat, under these facts, was, as a matter of law, removed. V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 9.32(2). It is inconceivable how a person could forcibly “bust” down a door, wrongfully enter another’s home, use deadly force, fatally shoot someone in the back, and then claim that a reasonable person *533would not have retreated under these circumstances. Indeed, the law has always been that one who wrongfully enters another’s home must retreat before using deadly force. See and compare Edmonson v. State, 384 S.W.2d 702 (Tex.Cr.App.1964).
Appellant failed to meet the mandate of Section 9.32(2) prior to the use of deadly force. All three requirements of Section 9.32 must be met before deadly force is justified. Since the self-defense issue was removed, the requested charge was properly refused.
II.
Moreover, V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 9.31(b)(4), reads:
“(b) the use of force against another is not justified: (( ‡ ‡ ‡

The underlying rationale, of course, is that a person may not take advantage of a necessity he has brought upon himself.1 This basically was the prior law before it was brought forward and codified in Section 9.31(b)(4). See Practice Commentary, Sections 9.31, 9.32, supra. As was the practice under the prior law, the proper approach, when the issue of imperfect self-defense is raised, is to give an instruction on self-defense, but also to give limiting instructions on the issue. Muckleroy v. State, 165 Tex.Cr.R. 629, 310 S.W.2d 315 (Tex.Cr. App.1957). This limiting and independent instruction is commonly referred to as the “provocation” instruction. Essentially, the jury is instructed that if they find the defendant provoked the difficulty in order to have a pretext to kill or injure the victim, then the defendant forfeits his right of self-defense. See, e. g., McClung, Jury Charges for Criminal Cases (1979 ed.).
At this point, I differ with the panel’s decision. Appellant’s reasonable belief that deceased’s use of force was unlawful is not the controlling issue. Appellant’s right to self-defense must necessarily arise upon the imperfect self-defense claim, not upon his reasonable belief that the force was unlawful.
III.
At first glance, the facts of this case seem to indicate that appellant has the right to the self-defense issue with a limiting “provocation” instruction. See V.T. C.A., Penal Code, Section 9.31(b)(4). However, the historical basis for self-defense and the provocation issue reveals that the circumstances do not warrant their inclusion under these facts.
Under the prior penal code, Article 1222, V.A.P.C., if a defendant was engaged in committing one of the felonies listed which justified killing to prevent the enumerated felonies, the defendant had no self-defense justification against the victim of the felony. Since self-defense was never in issue, instructions on self-defense or imperfect self-defense were not submitted to the jury. See, e. g., Williams v. State, 120 Tex.Cr.R. 484, 48 S.W.2d 304 (Tex.Cr.App.1932) (burglary); Cline v. State, 150 Tex.Cr.R. 586, 204 S.W.2d 512 (Tex.Cr.App.1947) (theft by night).
Of course, Article 1222 has been basically preserved in V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 9.42. This section justifies deadly force to protect one’s own or a third person’s property under certain circumstances. In particular, Section 9.42(2)(A) reads:
A person is justified in using deadly force against another to protect land or tangible, movable property: u ⅜ * *
“(2) when and to the degree he reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately necessary:
“(A) to prevent the other’s imminent commission of arson, burglary, robbery, aggravated robbery, theft during the nighttime, or criminal mischief during the nighttime; ...”
We can find no persuasive argument to abandon the wisdom and logic that existed *534prior to the adoption of the present penal code. Indeed, this logic has been recently reaffirmed in Davis v. State, 597 S.W.2d 358, 360 (Tex.Cr.App.1980), quoting Dickson v. State, 436 S.W.2d 20 (Tex.Cr.App.1971), where this Court wrote:
“ ‘... The robber has no right of self-defense against the owner of the property sought to be taken if the owner would be justified in killing to recover the property or to prevent the offense. [Citations omitted]’.”2
See also, 1 Branch’s Tex.Ann.Penal Statutes, Section 9.42 (3rd ed. 1974) (see explanatory comment).
It is, therefore, incumbent upon us to review the facts of the case before us to determine if appellant forfeited his right to self-defense. Appellant, armed with a handgun, went to the home of his estranged wife to exchange his wife’s coat for some jewelry. However, his wife, the deceased, refused to open the door. She suggested appellant leave the coat at the apartment manager’s office, and that, if he did not, she would not return his jewelry. When appellant would not leave, the deceased warned him to leave or she would start shooting through the door. Appellant had a clear option to leave, but chose to “bust” down the door. Appellant testified that as he stumbled into the apartment he glanced toward the deceased and thought that she was about to shoot him. He drew his pistol and shot her twice — the fatal shot entering the deceased’s back.
Contrary to the panel decision, even if appellant reasonably believed that the deceased was using unlawful force, the self-defense issue is not available. Appellant, without the effective consent of the owner, forcibly entered a habitation, with the intent to commit a felony. V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 30.02(a)(1). The facts, demonstrating appellant’s burglary, forfeited his right of self-defense under Section 9.42. See, Williams v. State, supra.
I dissent to the failure to grant the State’s motion for rehearing.
ODOM, DALLY and W. C. DAVIS, JJ., join in this dissent.

. Commonly referred to as “imperfect self-defense.”

. Robbery was specifically enumerated under old Article 1222, supra, as well as present penal code Section 9.42, supra.