Court Opinion

ID: 9559830
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:36:14.641662+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:46.669255
License: Public Domain

WERDEGAR, J.,
Concurring.—Although I agree with the result and with much of the reasoning in the majority opinion, I would take a somewhat different approach to the question of discipline for legal error. The question raised by this case, in my view, is not whether a judge’s legal error is itself subject to investigation or discipline by the Commission on Judicial Performance (Commission)—even the Commission concedes it is not, and canon 1 of the California Code of Judicial Ethics so provides. The question, rather, is whether a legal error of the type asserted in the complaint against petitioner has such a tendency to reveal underlying misconduct as to justify investigation and discipline by the Commission. I would answer that question in the negative: Because the judge’s position, as revealed in his initial response to the Commission’s inquiry, had reasonably arguable merit, and because the Commission had no extrinsic evidence of bad faith, bias, abuse of authority, intentional disregard of the law, or any improper purpose, the Commission should have ended its investigation at the time of that response without any discipline.
The majority opinion {ante, at p. 397) rejects petitioner’s “intellectual merit” argument, although we have previously adopted a similar threshold *401standard. (See Wenger v. Commission on Judicial Performance (1981) 29 Cal.3d 615, 647, fn. 13 [175 Cal.Rptr. 420, 630 P.2d 954] [observing that, correct or not, one judge’s ruling “had at least enough merit” not to constitute misconduct]; Gubler v. Commission on Judicial Performance (1984) 37 Cal.3d 27, 47-48 [207 Cal.Rptr. 171, 688 P.2d 551] [stating, with a citation to Wenger v. Commission on Judicial Performance, supra, that “a judge should not be disciplined for mere erroneous determination of legal issues . . . that are subject to reasonable differences of opinion”].) The majority, however, in order to explain why the rulings at issue here did not constitute misconduct, is nevertheless compelled to observe that the prosecutor’s continuance was “properly” denied, that petitioner’s view of the matter was “[n]ot unreasonable],” and that petitioner demonstrated “extraordinary patience” (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 401-402, italics in original), all of which suggest the arguable correctness of petitioner’s rulings is what precludes discipline. Rather than reject petitioner’s position, then, I would accept it, at least in part: When, as here, the Commission has no extrinsic evidence of bad faith or improper motive—no evidence, that is, apart from the nature of the ruling itself—the Commission generally should not pursue an investigation into, or impose discipline for, a legal ruling that has reasonably arguable merit. In such circumstances, the principle of judicial independence requires that the determination whether the ruling was correct or not be left to a reviewing court.
In its letter of inquiry to petitioner, the Commission observed that petitioner had adhered to his dismissal ruling even after the deputy district attorney had drawn his attention to People v. Ferguson , (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1173 [267 Cal.Rptr. 528] (Ferguson), in which the Court of Appeal reversed a dismissal under assertedly similar circumstances. I agree with the implication that, in some circumstances, a judge’s ruling made in the face of directly contrary binding authority cited to him or her might be evidence of intentional disregard for the law. This was not such a case, however, because Ferguson was not so squarely on point as to absolutely preclude a different ruling in the James case. The Commission should have realized this, at the latest, when it received petitioner’s responsive letter, which pointed out three arguably pertinent distinctions between Ferguson and James.1 In the same letter, petitioner informed the Commission that the Court of Appeal had, despite its own Ferguson precedent, summarily denied *402the People’s petition for a writ of mandate in James, an act suggesting the reviewing court did not consider Ferguson completely dispositive.
At this point, if not before, the Commission should have realized that this was a garden-variety legal dispute, in which a litigant complaining of an adverse ruling can (and did) seek review from a higher court. That the ruling complained of appeared contrary to a published decision should not, in itself, have concerned the Commission, especially when petitioner provided arguable grounds for distinguishing the precedent.2 Disputes over whether a prior decision is distinguishable, or whether a particular statute applies, are as common as air in litigation and (to mix metaphors) are typical grist for the appellate mill. In the absence of any evidence of improper motive, such a dispute should not also become the focus of a disciplinary proceeding. Because, in this case, the judicial ruling complained of had at least arguable merit and the Commission cited no extrinsic evidence of improper purpose, the Commission was simply wrong to conclude, as it did in the advisory letter, that petitioner's order of dismissal after Ferguson was brought to his attention, "raises concerns about a reckless disregard of the law, . . . bias or a lack of impartiality. . .
Although the majority reaches the same ultimate conclusion as I, it unfortunately fails to address the hard question of when, if ever, the erroneous nature of a ruling might itself be evidence, sufficient for investigation or discipline, of a judge’s improper disregard for the law. Without attempting to describe all the circumstances under which legal error does and does not demonstrate misconduct, I would hold that, at a minimum, the ruling must lack all reasonably arguable merit.3
For these reasons, I concur in granting the petition.

Petitioner noted that Ferguson did not involve the mandatory denial of an improper oral motion for continuance (Pen. Code, § 1050, subd. (d)); that in Ferguson the assigned deputy district attorney was temporarily unavailable, while in James a deputy had been assigned who was available but unprepared to try the case; and that in Ferguson the People did not refuse to proceed and could have begun trial as soon as the same afternoon, while in James the chief deputy flatly refused to proceed without a continuance of several days. In addition, petitioner *402argued the dismissal in James served certain policy objectives the Ferguson court found lacking in that case.

 Research into the subject, moreover, would have revealed precedent arguably supporting the dismissal order. (See, e.g., People v. Torres (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d Supp. 8, 13 [206 Cal.Rptr. 537] [dismissal proper when prosecutor demands continuance and refuses to proceed without one in order to control timing of trials].)

 To repeat, I speak here only of the case, such as this one, in which the Commission can cite no extrinsic evidence of improper motive or other misconduct.