Court Opinion

ID: 9905846
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-30 16:06:44.26286+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:56.771453
License: Public Domain

2023 IL 128428

                                       IN THE
                               SUPREME COURT
                                           OF
                         THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

                                   (Docket No. 128428)

               THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v.
                         MIGUEL WEBSTER, Appellee.

                            Opinion filed November 30, 2023.

        JUSTICE O’BRIEN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

        Chief Justice Theis and Justices Neville, Overstreet, Holder White,
     Cunningham, and Rochford concurred in the judgment and opinion.

                                        OPINION

¶1       After a jury trial, defendant Miguel Webster was convicted of first degree
     murder and sentenced to a term of 40 years’ imprisonment. The appellate court, in
     a split decision, vacated defendant’s sentence and remanded the matter for a new
     sentencing hearing. 2022 IL App (1st) 182305-U. In doing so, the majority relied
     upon Illinois Supreme Court Rule 366(a)(1), (5) (eff. Feb. 1, 1994). We
     subsequently allowed the State’s petition for leave to appeal and now hold that,
     absent a finding of error or abuse of discretion, the appellate court is without
     authority to vacate a defendant’s sentence and remand the matter for resentencing.
     Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court and reinstate
     defendant’s 40-year sentence.

¶2                                    BACKGROUND

¶3       Defendant, who was 17 years old, fatally shot 15-year-old Asonte Gutierrez
     with a double-barrel, sawed-off shotgun while in the garage behind defendant’s
     home. Gutierrez sustained a shotgun wound to his hand that was consistent with his
     arm having been in a defensive position and two shotgun wounds to his face.
     Defendant then hid the shotgun in the box spring under his mattress, dragged
     Gutierrez’s body down the alley to an area next to a neighboring garage, and tried
     to clean the crime scene with towels and bleach. He also discarded numerous
     bloodstained items in neighboring garbage receptacles and then returned to his
     house.

¶4       In a video-recorded interview at the police station, defendant initially said that
     no one had been at his house that day, he had not been in his garage for at least a
     week, and he had last seen Gutierrez about a month earlier. Eventually, however,
     defendant admitted that he shot Gutierrez in the garage. He explained that Gutierrez
     had knocked on his bedroom window and told him to come to the garage. Once in
     the garage, Gutierrez allegedly pulled out a shotgun, pointed it at defendant, and
     pulled one of the hammers. Defendant believed Gutierrez was going to shoot him
     so he grabbed the shotgun from Gutierrez, “blacked out,” and shot Gutierrez twice.
     Defendant agreed with the detectives’ suggestion that he shot Gutierrez the second
     time to “finish him off.”

¶5       At trial in Cook County circuit court, defendant testified that Gutierrez had been
     a childhood friend. However, several months before the shooting, defendant and
     Gutierrez had a falling out when Gutierrez called defendant a “bitch” while the two
     were participating in a basketball game. After the game, defendant and Gutierrez
     exchanged words over Facebook, with Gutierrez threatening to “smoke
     [defendant’s] ass,” which defendant interpreted as a death threat. The two later
     reconciled. About two weeks later, Gutierrez drove to defendant’s house and gave

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     defendant the shotgun along with several shotgun shells and asked him to hold on
     to them.

¶6       Defendant testified that, on the night of the shooting, Gutierrez knocked on
     defendant’s bedroom window and told him to come to the garage with the shotgun.
     Defendant went to the garage and gave Gutierrez the shotgun. Gutierrez asked if it
     was loaded, and defendant said that it was. According to defendant, Gutierrez then
     pointed the shotgun at defendant’s face but did not say anything. Defendant pushed
     the shotgun away, but Gutierrez again pointed it at his face and pulled one of the
     hammers. Defendant pulled the gun out of Gutierrez’s hands and, with “rushed
     judgment,” shot twice.

¶7        Defendant admitted that, when he talked to the police at the station, he was not
     initially honest but eventually told the truth. Defendant disagreed with the notion
     that he wanted to “finish [Gutierrez] off” with the second shot. Instead, when
     Gutierrez pointed the gun at him, defendant thought he was going to die and that
     he had to defend himself. Defendant, however, acknowledged that Gutierrez did
     not orally threaten to kill him.

¶8       At the jury instruction conference, the trial judge agreed to instruct the jury on
     self-defense and second degree murder. The jury ultimately returned a verdict
     finding defendant guilty of first degree murder. The jury also found that defendant
     personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused Gutierrez’s death.

¶9       At defendant’s sentencing hearing, the trial judge stated that she had considered
     the presentence investigation report, the arguments made by the parties, and “all of
     the factors in aggravation and mitigation.” Specifically, the trial judge explained:

            “The court has presided over this case since its inception. I arraigned the
        defendant myself on October 23, 2012 so [defendant] has been pending in front
        of this court for six years. ***

            ***

            There’s a lot of things that this court has considered. I’m considering
        mitigation certainly in that the strongest thing the court is considering is the age
        of the defendant. *** He was very close to turning 18 years of age. So the court
        does have the discretion with regards to the gun enhancement. It’s close, but

                                             -3-
the court does have the discretion with regard to whether or not to impose the
extra 25 years to life that this court must impose on people over 18 years of age
and up for committing an offense such as this.

   ***

    He’s never been in trouble before. He does not come to this court with any
juvenile history. He was 17. So he didn’t come to court with any history,
juvenile history, nothing.

    However, the defendant committed a very, very serious offense. He
committed the most serious offense known to man. He killed a young man. I’m
also looking at the aggravation in this case. He killed a 15-year-old young man.
He being 17 years of age. He has consistently stated that it was an accident in
that it was Mr. Gutierrez who pointed the gun at the defendant first. The jury
obviously found something different. They found the defendant guilty of first
degree murder intentionally killing Asante Gutierrez.

    [Defendant] shot Mr. Gutierrez two times in the face and then proceeded to
clean up the area where this occurred. He then dragged his body outside of this
garage and left his body outside for people or someone to come across. The
court clearly recalls that as well; that a 15-year-old’s body was dumped outside
down an alley from where [defendant] resided after he shot him and killed him.

    The court considers that when looking at the defendant’s maturity or lack
of maturity. I don’t know if the defendant panicked, but certainly I’m looking
at all his actions on this day. So that the court finds to be more toward
aggravation when looking at an appropriate sentence in this matter. The
defendant’s actions, what he did, on the date of September 11, 2018 [sic].
However, on that day the defendant was 17 years of age. I do find he lacked
maturity. I do find that it is not appropriate to impose the gun enhancement for
personally discharging a firearm for the reasons just set forth.

    However, the court does find that the appropriate sentence is a sentence of
40 years of incarceration in the Illinois Department of Corrections. ***

                                   ***

                                    -4-
              *** The defendant will be 57 years of age at the time he is released from
          the penitentiary; that certainly [is] young enough to have been rehabilitated and
          to go on with his life after this tragic incident. That’s the reason the court
          decided not to impose the additional gun enhancement. And again, nothing this
          court does today is going to right this terrible wrong, but the court finds that
          sentence [of 40 years] is an appropriate sentence.”

              The trial judge subsequently denied defendant’s motion to reconsider
          sentencing, stating: “The court declined to impose the additional gun
          enhancement, however, the court finds the sentence [of 40 years] is an
          appropriate sentence based on the actions of the defendant on September 11,
          2012.”

¶ 10       Defendant appealed, challenging his conviction and sentence. Specifically,
       defendant argued that his conviction should be reduced from first to second degree
       murder because he had a subjective, though unreasonable, fear for his life when he
       shot Gutierrez. 2022 IL App (1st) 182305-U, ¶ 25. Defendant also argued that his
       sentence is unconstitutional under People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, or, in the
       alternative, that the matter should be remanded for reconsideration in light of
       Buffer, 2022 IL App (1st) 182305-U, ¶ 25.

¶ 11       As to defendant’s conviction, the appellate court unanimously found “that a
       rational juror could have concluded that [defendant] failed to prove imperfect self
       defense by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. ¶ 32. The court therefore declined
       to reduce defendant’s first degree murder conviction to second degree murder.

¶ 12       The appellate court then proceeded to examine the constitutionality of
       defendant’s sentence. Applying our holding in Buffer, the court unanimously found
       defendant’s sentence to be constitutional. Both the majority and the partial dissent
       acknowledged that defendant was sentenced to exactly 40 years of imprisonment
       and thus he did not receive a de facto life sentence. Id. ¶ 37; id. ¶ 52 (Pierce, P.J.,
       dissenting in part). Regardless of this unanimous constitutional finding, however,
       the majority proceeded to cite Rule 366(a)(1), (5) in holding that “[r]emandment
       for [r]esentencing [i]s [n]evertheless [p]roper.” Id. ¶ 38 (majority opinion). The
       majority’s vacatur of defendant’s sentence and remand for resentencing was based
       upon its belief that “the [trial] judge did not intend to impose on [defendant]—

                                                -5-
       whom she clearly found had rehabilitative potential—a sentence that was one day
       short of life in prison.” Id. ¶ 39. The majority further stated:

                “The judge in this case took great care in imposing [defendant’s] sentence,
           holding a lengthy sentencing hearing and explaining carefully why she did not
           impose the gun enhancement and why she imposed the sentence that she did.
           Where, as here, the case is still pending on direct appeal, the legal landscape
           has shifted, such that this is now the lengthiest sentence that could have been
           imposed on this defendant, and the sentencing judge’s statements call into
           question whether that is what she wanted to do in this case, it seems only fair to
           both the judge and to [defendant] to allow the judge to reconsider the sentence
           in light of Buffer.” Id. ¶ 45.

¶ 13       The partial dissent disagreed with this portion of the majority’s analysis. The
       dissent believed that, because there was no finding of error by the majority, the
       appellate court lacked the authority to vacate defendant’s sentence and remand for
       resentencing. Id. ¶ 55 (Pierce, P.J., dissenting in part).

¶ 14                                        ANALYSIS

¶ 15       The present appeal contemplates the source and scope of the appellate court’s
       authority to vacate a criminal sentence imposed by a trial judge and remand the
       matter for resentencing. Here, the appellate majority vacated defendant’s sentence
       in order to “allow the judge to reconsider the sentence in light of Buffer.” Id. ¶ 45
       (majority opinion). The parties vehemently disagree over whether the majority, in
       doing so, found an underlying sentencing error or an abuse of discretion with
       respect to defendant’s sentence. The State, as appellant, posits that no error or abuse
       of discretion was found and therefore concludes that the appellate court lacked the
       authority to vacate and remand the matter absent such a finding. Defendant, as
       appellee, argues the opposite—that the majority did in fact find error and therefore
       vacatur and remand were justified. The relevance of this disagreement is simple: If
       the majority did in fact find the existence of a sentencing error or that the trial judge
       abused her discretion in fashioning defendant’s sentence, such a finding would act
       to vest the appellate court with the authority under Illinois Supreme Court Rule
       615(b) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967) to vacate the improper sentence and remand the matter
       for resentencing. Neither party disputes this fact. Alternatively, however, if the

                                                 -6-
       majority did not find an error or an abuse of discretion, we must then answer the
       secondary question of whether such a finding is a condition precedent to the
       exercise of said authority.

¶ 16       At the outset, we clarify our standard of review. Neither party has adequately
       set forth the appropriate standard of review with respect to the specific questions
       before this court—(1) did the appellate majority find that defendant’s sentence was
       the result of an error or abuse of discretion by the trial judge, and (2) if it did not,
       is such a finding a condition precedent to the exercise of the appellate court’s
       authority under our applicable rules. While the State notes that the interpretation of
       our rules is subject to de novo review, it does not address the appropriate standard
       with respect to the first question. Alternatively, defendant generically contends that
       because he “received a sentence of 40 years, which is not a de facto life sentence,
       this Court’s review is for an abuse of discretion.” Our review of an appellate
       opinion to determine whether the appellate court found an error or an abuse of
       discretion with respect to a defendant’s sentence, however, is not of a deferential
       nature. In other words, the present appeal does not call on us to review the trial
       judge’s discretion in weighing all relevant evidence in aggravation and mitigation.
       If this were the specific question before us, defendant would be correct that our
       review would be for an abuse of discretion. We, however, are not reviewing the
       propriety of the trial judge’s 40-year sentence. Instead, the parties’ arguments and
       procedural posture of this case require us to examine the actions and authority of
       the appellate court, not the trial court. More specifically, we are called to review
       the majority’s opinion and determine whether it did in fact find an underlying error
       or abuse of discretion prior to vacating defendant’s sentence. If it did not, we must
       then determine whether the majority exceeded its authority under our rules when it
       vacated defendant’s sentence and remanded the matter for resentencing absent such
       a finding. Because the first question does not involve one of deference and the
       second question contemplates the interpretation of our rules, we hold that both
       questions are subject to de novo review. We now turn to the initial question of
       whether the majority’s opinion contains a finding of error or a finding of an abuse
       of discretion by the trial judge.

¶ 17       The trial judge sentenced defendant to a term of 40 years’ imprisonment. On
       direct appeal, the majority held that “[t]he sentencing judge’s analysis and
       comments in this case call into question whether she would have imposed a 40-year

                                                -7-
       sentence if she had known that our supreme court would soon hold that this was the
       longest constitutionally permissible sentence available.” Id. ¶ 40. The majority
       proceeded to reject the dissent’s contention that it was “wrong in declaring that the
       40-year sentence is the maximum sentence that could be constitutionally imposed.”
       Id. ¶ 55 (Pierce, P.J., dissenting in part). The majority stated:

              “The dissent [citation] questions our statement that the 40-year sentence
          imposed on [defendant] was the longest sentence that could have
          constitutionally been imposed. However, it clearly was. Given the sentencing
          judge’s finding that [defendant] had rehabilitative potential, any longer
          sentence would have violated the eighth amendment of the United States
          Constitution.” Id. ¶ 46 (majority opinion).

¶ 18       Defendant now adopts the above reasoning in support of his argument that the
       majority did in fact find that the trial judge committed a sentencing error.
       Specifically, defendant argues that his sentence is “in conflict and inconsistent”
       with the trial judge’s mitigating findings “because a sentence of 40 years is a mere
       hair’s breadth away from a de facto life sentence.”

¶ 19       The State correctly notes, however, that the actual sentencing range defendant
       faced based on the jury’s verdict of first degree murder was 20 to 60 years’
       imprisonment. See 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-20(a) (West 2012). Defendant was also
       eligible for a sentence enhancement of 25 years based on the jury’s finding that he
       personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused another person’s death (see
       id. § 5-8-1(a)(1)(d)), but the trial judge had discretion not to impose the
       enhancement due to defendant’s age at the time of the offense (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-
       105(b) (West 2016)). While a sentence beyond 40 years would have qualified as a
       de facto life sentence under Buffer, the trial judge in the instant case still had the
       discretion under the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Miller v.
       Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 483 (2012), to impose a de facto life sentence in excess of
       40 years, so long as the trial judge considered defendant’s age, as well as the
       circumstances of the murder. Accordingly, the majority was incorrect in believing
       that a 40-year sentence was the “longest sentence that could have constitutionally
       been imposed.” 2022 IL App (1st) 182305-U, ¶ 46.

¶ 20      While the Miller court held that the eighth amendment prohibits mandatory life-
       without-parole sentences for murderers under 18 years of age, it did not foreclose

                                               -8-
       discretionary life-without-parole sentences for those offenders. Miller, 567 U.S. at
       480 (“we do not foreclose a sentencer’s ability to make that judgment in homicide
       cases”); see People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271, ¶ 4 (holding Miller did not
       “categorical[ly] prohibit[ ] *** life-without-parole sentences for juvenile
       murderers”). Instead, “the Miller Court mandated ‘only that a sentencer follow a
       certain process—considering an offender’s youth and attendant characteristics—
       before imposing’ a life-without-parole sentence.” Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U.S.
       ___, ___, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1316 (2021) (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 483); accord
       People v. Lusby, 2020 IL 124046, ¶ 52 (holding that juvenile’s 130-year sentence
       passed “constitutional muster” because the trial judge “considered the defendant’s
       youth and its attendant characteristics before concluding that his future should be
       spent in prison”). Here, defendant faced a discretionary sentence of up to 85 years
       in prison (20 to 60 years for first degree murder plus a 25-year firearm
       enhancement), so long as the trial judge considered defendant’s youth and attendant
       circumstances, which it did. Specifically, the trial judge expressly noted
       defendant’s age, lack of maturity, rehabilitative potential, and the circumstances of
       the murder. Therefore, the “longest constitutionally permissible sentence available”
       (2022 IL App (1st) 182305-U, ¶ 40) to be imposed was 85 years, not 40 years.

¶ 21        Defendant’s 40-year sentence is clearly within the applicable statutory
       sentencing limits and is therefore presumed proper. See People v. Stacey, 193 Ill.
       2d 203, 210 (2000) (holding a sentence within statutory limits is presumed proper
       and will only be “deemed excessive and the result of an abuse of discretion by the
       trial court where the sentence is greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of
       the law, or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense”). A review of
       the majority’s opinion illustrates that it did not vacate defendant’s 40-year sentence
       on the basis that it constituted an abuse of discretion or was constitutionally invalid.
       Instead, the majority relied upon the misguided belief that defendant could not be
       sentenced to more than 40 years’ imprisonment. Relying upon this
       misunderstanding, the majority concluded: “[I]t seems only fair to both the judge
       and to [defendant] to allow the judge to reconsider the sentence in light of Buffer.”
       (Emphasis added.) 2022 IL App (1st) 182305-U, ¶ 45. Thus, the majority’s decision
       rests upon perceived principles of equity, not a substantive finding of error.

                                                -9-
¶ 22       Defendant’s brief before this court presents the same misunderstanding with
       respect to the applicable statutory sentencing limits. Specifically, defendant
       contends:

              “Here, because the judge opted not to impose the firearm enhancement
          given [defendant’s] age and the fact that his actions reflected the transient
          immaturity of youth, the applicable sentencing range for this offense effectively
          changed from 20 to 60 years to 20 to 40 years after this Court issued its decision
          in Buffer. [Citations.] So instead of imposing a mid-range sentence, the judge
          imposed the harshest possible sentence she could impose without imposing a
          de facto life sentence.”

¶ 23        Defendant, like the majority below, is incorrect. Defendant’s first degree
       murder conviction and the potential firearm enhancement penalty subjected
       defendant to a discretionary life-without-parole sentence/de facto life sentence (85
       years). Our decision in Buffer, like the United State Supreme Court’s decision in
       Miller, did not ban the discretionary imposition of such a sentence upon a juvenile
       murderer. Buffer simply addressed when a juvenile defendant’s prison term is long
       enough to be considered a de facto life sentence. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 41.
       Here, even though defendant was potentially eligible for a de facto life sentence,
       there is no dispute that the trial judge did not impose such a sentence. Instead, the
       trial judge considered defendant’s individual characteristics and life circumstances,
       including age, as well as the circumstances of the murder (see Miller, 567 U.S. at
       480 n.8), and ultimately decided to impose a midrange sentence upon defendant (40
       years). In fact, the record clearly reveals that it was defendant’s age, lack of
       maturity, and rehabilitative potential that led the trial judge to not impose a
       discretionary life-without-parole sentence/de facto life sentence. The majority
       expressly acknowledged this reality: “The [trial] judge in this case took great care
       in imposing [defendant’s] sentence, holding a lengthy sentencing hearing and
       explaining carefully why she did not impose the gun enhancement and why she
       imposed the sentence that she did.” 2022 IL App (1st) 182305-U, ¶ 45. Likewise,
       defendant, in his brief before this court, acknowledges that “the trial judge in
       [defendant’s] case conducted a hearing that complied with *** the direction of
       Miller.” Simply put, the majority’s vacatur and remand of defendant’s sentence
       were not based upon any underlying error or abuse of discretion finding. Thus, we

                                              - 10 -
       now turn to the secondary question of whether the appellate court may vacate a
       defendant’s sentence and remand for resentencing absent such a finding.

¶ 24      As authority for its actions, the appellate majority cited Rule 366(a)(1), (5).
       Specifically, it stated:

              “Illinois Supreme Court Rule 366[(a)(1), (5) (eff. Feb. 1, 1994)] provides
          that, ‘in its discretion, and on such terms as it deems just,’ this court may ‘grant
          any relief, including a remandment *** that the case may require.’ [Citation.]
          We have exercised this power to remand when the circumstances underlying a
          sentencing judge’s exercise of discretion are called into question by subsequent
          events. For example, where one of several convictions is reversed on direct
          appeal, we will remand for resentencing where we cannot determine whether
          the conviction vacated could have influenced the circuit court in imposing
          sentences for the other convictions. See, e.g., People v. Alejos, 97 Ill. 2d 502,
          511 (1983); People v. Figures, 216 Ill. App. 3d 398, 404 (1991).” Id. ¶ 40.

¶ 25       We initially note that the two cases cited by the appellate majority (Alejos and
       Figures) are distinguishable. Neither case references, let alone relies upon, Rule
       366. More importantly, the dispositional remand in both cases is based upon an
       underlying finding of error, unlike the instant case, which is based upon perceived
       “fair[ness].” See 2022 IL App (1st) 182305-U, ¶ 45. For example, the defendant in
       Alejos was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and of armed violence based on
       voluntary manslaughter. People v. Alejos, 97 Ill. 2d 502, 505 (1983). On review,
       we reversed the defendant’s armed violence conviction on the grounds that
       voluntary manslaughter was not a basis for the armed violence conviction since the
       carrying of weapons was not a criminal offense in all instances. Id. at 510-11. We
       then remanded for resentencing on the manslaughter conviction in order to guard
       against the possibility that the presence of an improper armed violence conviction
       might have influenced the trial judge’s sentence on the manslaughter charge. Id. at
       511-12. Similarly, the defendant in People v. Figures, 216 Ill. App. 3d 398, 399
       (1991), was convicted of aggravated battery, armed violence, and attempted
       murder. On direct appeal, the appellate court vacated the defendant’s armed
       violence conviction on the basis that there was insufficient evidence that defendant
       inflicted “great bodily harm” upon the victim. Id. at 402. The appellate court then
       remanded for resentencing because the court could not determine whether the

                                               - 11 -
       improper armed violence conviction influenced the trial judge when imposing
       sentences for the remaining proper convictions of attempted murder and aggravated
       battery. Id. at 404. Alejos and Figures are simply not relevant to the question of
       whether Rule 366(a) authorizes the appellate court to vacate a criminal sentence
       and remand for resentencing absent an underlying finding of error or abuse of
       discretion.

¶ 26        Indeed, defendant does not contend that Rule 366(a) justifies the appellate
       court’s action in the instant case. Instead, defendant all but concedes that the
       majority’s reliance on Rule 366(a) was misplaced. Specifically, defendant in his
       brief states: “And although the appellate court’s reliance on Supreme Court Rule
       366[(a)] to order the remand may not have been a proper application of that rule,
       Supreme Court Rule 615(b) authorized the remand for resentencing.” The State also
       asserts that the appellate court’s reliance upon Rule 366(a) was improper and that
       it is instead Rule 615(b) that is implicated in this case.

¶ 27       The parties are correct with respect to the applicable supreme court rule. We
       hold that Rule 615(b) is the operative rule in that it sets out the authority of
       reviewing courts in criminal cases. See People v. Young, 124 Ill. 2d 147, 152
       (1988). Alternatively, Rule 366(a) sets out the authority of reviewing courts in civil
       cases. Id. This court has previously explained:

          “The authority in civil cases, as set out in Rule 366[(a)], is much broader and
          more specifically stated than is the authority of a reviewing court in criminal
          appeals as stated in Rule 615(b). The authority to enter an order of remandment
          in criminal cases is not specifically granted in Rule 615(b), but is in Rule 366.
          It is obvious, however, that a reviewing court has such authority in criminal
          cases when used in connection with other authority specifically stated in Rule
          615(b).” Id.

¶ 28       Having determined that Rule 615(b) is the applicable rule governing the
       appellate court’s authority in the instant case, we turn to the State’s argument that
       a court of review may disturb a sentence only if it was “unlawful or amounted to
       an abuse of discretion.” In essence, the State argues that such a finding is a
       condition precedent to the appellate court’s authority to vacate and remand. The
       State concludes that, “because the appellate court found no error or abuse of
       discretion in defendant’s sentence, Rule 615(b) required it to affirm the sentence.”

                                               - 12 -
       Defendant does not respond to this specific argument. Instead, defendant merely
       contends that the appellate court did in fact find a sentencing error and therefore
       vacatur and remand were appropriate under Rule 615(b). For reasons already
       discussed above, defendant is incorrect. Furthermore, we agree with the State’s
       contention that a court of review is without authority to vacate and remand a
       defendant’s criminal sentence absent a finding of error or a finding of an abuse of
       discretion by the trial judge.

¶ 29      Rule 615(b) provides, in its entirety:

          “Powers of the Reviewing Court. On appeal the reviewing court may:

                 (1) reverse, affirm, or modify the judgment or order from which the
              appeal is taken;

                  (2) set aside, affirm, or modify any or all of the proceedings subsequent
              to or dependent upon the judgment or order from which the appeal is taken;

                 (3) reduce the degree of the offense of which the appellant was
              convicted;

                  (4) reduce the punishment imposed by the trial court; or

                  (5) order a new trial.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 615(b) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967).

       While this court has not previously examined the appellate court’s authority under
       Rule 615(b) to vacate and remand absent a finding of error or abuse of discretion,
       we have addressed the question of whether the appellate court has the authority
       under Rule 615(b) to reduce a sentence absent such a finding. In People v.
       Perruquet, 68 Ill. 2d 149, 153-54 (1977), we expressly held that the appellate court
       cannot reduce a defendant’s sentence absent a finding of an abuse of discretion.
       Specifically, we explained:

              “Our Rule 615(b)(4) grants reviewing courts the power to reduce the
          sentence imposed by the trial court. [Citation.] The rule itself does not address
          the scope of this power or the circumstances under which it should be exercised.
          However, our decisions have firmly established that the imposition of a
          sentence is a matter of judicial discretion and that, absent an abuse of this
          discretion, the sentence of the trial court may not be altered upon review.

                                               - 13 -
          [Citations.] And this test has been applied in numerous appellate court opinions.
          [Citations.]

              The defendant contends, however, that a reviewing court may reduce a
          sentence absent a finding of an abuse of discretion. This contention is clearly
          incorrect under the previously cited decisions of this court which have
          interpreted Rule 615(b). To whatever extent the appellate opinion implicitly
          holds that an abuse of sentencing discretion need not be shown in order for a
          reviewing court to alter a sentence, that opinion is erroneous.

              We have frequently stated that the trial judge is normally in a better position
          to determine the punishment to be imposed than the courts of review.
          [Citations.] A reasoned judgment as to the proper sentence to be imposed must
          be based upon the particular circumstances of each individual case. [Citation.]
          Such a judgment depends upon many factors, including the defendant’s
          credibility, demeanor, general moral character, mentality, social environment,
          habits, and age. [Citation.] The trial judge, in the course of the trial and the
          sentencing hearing, has an opportunity to consider these factors ‘which is
          superior to that afforded by the cold record in this court.’ [Citation.] We
          continue to find that the trial court is normally the proper forum in which a
          suitable sentence is to be determined and the trial judge’s decisions in regard to
          sentencing are entitled to great deference and weight. We therefore reaffirm our
          long-standing rule that absent an abuse of discretion by the trial court a sentence
          may not be altered upon review.” Id.

¶ 30        The above reasoning has been subsequently reaffirmed by this court on multiple
       occasions. For example, in People v. O’Neal, 125 Ill. 2d 291, 299 (1988), we held
       that the appellate court was not required to use the phrase “ ‘abuse of discretion’ ”
       in its order modifying the trial court’s imposition of sentence from consecutive to
       concurrent terms. In doing so, we explained that “reviewing courts exercise the
       authority granted under Rule 615(b)(4) cautiously, and the scope of an appellate
       court’s examination of a sentence imposed by the trial court is limited to whether
       the record discloses that the trial court abused its discretion.” Id. at 298. We
       concluded: “[S]ince the [appellate] court implicitly held that the imposition of
       consecutive sentences in this case was an abuse of discretion, the court did not

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       exceed its authority under Rule 615(b)(4).” Id. at 299-300. Significantly, no such
       implicit finding exists in the appellate court’s order before us today.

¶ 31      In People v. Jones, 168 Ill. 2d 367, 378 (1995) we held:

              “In light of the jurisprudence of this court and the plain language of Rules
          615(b)(1) and (b)(4), we conclude a court of review has the power to reduce a
          defendant’s sentence on appeal once it has been determined that the trial court’s
          sentencing decision was unlawful or an abuse of discretion.”

       In People v. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d 205, 212 (2010) we stated: “A reviewing court
       may not alter a defendant’s sentence absent an abuse of discretion by the trial
       court.” See People v. Hauschild, 226 Ill. 2d 63, 90 (2007) (holding that, “[a]bsent
       an abuse of discretion by the trial court, sentences may not be altered on review”).

¶ 32       Today, we again reaffirm the principles and reasoning set out in Perruquet,
       O’Neal, Jones, and Alexander. More specifically, we hold that, absent a finding of
       error or abuse of discretion, the appellate court is without authority under Rule
       615(b) to vacate a defendant’s sentence and remand the matter for resentencing.
       For these same reasons, we also hold that the appellate court may not “modify” a
       sentence absent such a finding. Ill. S. Ct. R. 615(b) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967). Accordingly,
       a constitutional sentence, devoid of error and resulting from a trial judge’s proper
       exercise of discretion, shall be affirmed on review.

¶ 33       While we have already held that Rule 366(a) does not apply in the instant case,
       we take this opportunity to make clear that Rule 366(a) is not intended to be used
       as a mechanism in criminal cases to provide relief that otherwise would not be
       appropriate under Rule 615(b). Finally, we decline defendant’s alternative request
       to reduce his sentence or order resentencing under our constitutionally provided
       supervisory authority. Defendant identifies no “exceptional circumstance[ ]” that
       would support this court substituting its sentencing judgment for that of the trial
       judge or requiring the trial judge to reconsider her sentence. Statland v. Freeman,
       112 Ill. 2d 494, 497 (1986) (holding “this court will not exercise its supervisory
       authority save under exceptional circumstances”).

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¶ 34                                   CONCLUSION

¶ 35       For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court and
       reinstate defendant’s 40-year sentence.

¶ 36      Appellate court judgment reversed.

¶ 37      Circuit court judgment affirmed.

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