Court Opinion

ID: 9598414
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:08:51.685062+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:47:55.515334
License: Public Domain

RICHARDSON, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I concur in the determination that the defendant’s conviction must be reversed. In addition *392and by way of clarification, however, I wish to reaffirm strongly that the status of legitimate booking interviews remains unaltered following today’s opinion.
I. Advice as to Constitutional Rights Is Not Required for Routine Police Questioning Regarding Personal Identification and Background Information During the Booking Process
It is clear that the traditional booking interview, limited to routine questions asked for the purpose of completing personal data on a police form, is unaffected by our holding here. The regular and routine processing of individuals who have been arrested for suspected criminal conduct necessitates that the police obtain information to confirm the identity of the suspect, to provide for medical care if such is required, to identify next of kin in the event of an emergency, and to accomplish various other valid police functions directly related to booking.
In order to eliminate the compulsion inherent in custodial police interrogation, a criminal suspect must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him; that he has the right to the presence of an attorney and if he cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court. (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 479 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 726, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 10 A.L.R.3d 974].) These warnings are absolute prerequisites to interrogation designed to elicit incriminating statements. (Id., at p. 471 [16 L.Ed.2d at p. 722]; see People v. Stewart (1965) 62 Cal.2d 571, 579 [43 Cal.Rptr. 201, 400 P.2d 97].)
Conversely, it is equally well established that the Miranda rules do not apply to routine booking questions relating to personal identification and background information, which questions have nothing to do with the circumstances surrounding the offense with which the declarant is charged. In such situations, there is “no process of interrogation ‘designed to elicit incriminating statements.’” (People v. Hernandez (1968) 263 Cal.App.2d 242, 253 [69 Cal.Rptr. 448], quoting People v. Walters (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 336, 338 [60 Cal.Rptr. 374]; People v. Palmer (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 239, 256 [145 Cal.Rptr. 466].) Indeed, such routine information can be elicited from a suspect in custody even after he has exercised one or more of his Miranda rights. (People v. Van Alstyne (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 900, 908 [121 Cal.Rptr. 363]; People v. Johnson (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 168, 175 [97 Cal.Rptr. 332].)
*393When the police have concluded asking those questions directly related to the completion of the requisite forms and to other formalities attendant on booking the suspect, the “booking interview” is concluded. If the police wish to continue questioning the suspect once the limited purposes of booking have been fulfilled, they must apprise the individual of those constitutional rights enumerated above and obtain a waiver of those rights. The interrogation, regardless of the nature of the questions, may not otherwise continue once the requirements of booking are satisfied. If the interview does continue without the requisite warnings and waiver, the questions and responses to them may be subject to a subsequent suppression motion.
I do not suggest an approved litany of questions for use during the booking interview. The precise questions will undoubtedly vary in number and form from police department to police department. If a defendant wishes to challenge questions which he believes are extraneous to the booking function and, therefore, improperly asked, and which he was obliged to answer, resolution of the matter will be left to the sound discretion of the trial court.
II. Improper Questioning Necessitates Reversal in Present Case
Applying the foregoing legal principles to the present case, it seems to me self-evident that the police were entitled to ask defendant booking questions. They were not obliged to preface those questions with any Miranda warning nor were they, before the conclusion of the booking interview, obliged to honor defendant’s request for an attorney.
However, it seems equally evident that the numerous questions asked regarding defendant’s military service and his past and present educational experience exceeded the scope of any valid booking interview. These questions were, therefore, improper in the absence of an admonition regarding defendant’s constitutional rights and his waiver of those rights.
Distilled from those questions impermissibly asked and included in the material presented to the jury were defendant’s repeated request for an attorney, arguably an improper comment on his exercise of his constitutional rights (Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609 [14 L.Ed.2d 106, 85 S.Ct. 1229]), admissions that he engaged in various forms of petty illegal conduct, and, perhaps most damaging, a tran*394script containing 10 deletions, which may have suggested to the jury the presence of additional inculpatory evidence not presented to the jury.
Because it is not clear that the admission of this evidence, obtained in violation of defendant’s constitutional rights, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 87 S.Ct. 824, 24 A.L.R.3d 1065]), in my view, the conviction must be reversed.
III. Evidence of Proper Booking Questions Is Admissible to Prove Appellant’s Mental Condition
Turning to the evidence secured during the booking interview proper, I now consider whether it was validly admitted in this case. I must respectfully dissent from those portions of the majority opinion (ante, p. 389) which hold that, although the police may obtain neutral information necessary for proper jail administration, the state may not thereafter use the arrestee’s responses to legitimate booking questions in any manner in a subsequent criminal proceeding. The initial receipt of this information was clearly authorized. It trenched on no constitutional rights and the subsequent use of evidence of the booking interview should be analogized to the disclosure of physical as opposed to testimonial evidence.
Recently we addressed this distinction in Cramer v. Tyars (1979) 23 Cal.3d 131 [151 Cal.Rptr. 653, 588 P.2d 793]. We there said (at p. 139): “We conclude that, while appellant could not be questioned about matters that would tend to incriminate him, he was subject to call as a witness and could be required to respond to nonincriminatory questioning which may have revealed his mental condition to the jury, whose duty it was to determine whether he was mentally retarded. Reason and common sense suggest that it is appropriate under such circumstances that a jury be permitted fully to observe the person sought to be committed, and to hear him speak and respond in order that it may make an informed judgment as to the level of his mental and intellectual functioning. The receipt of such evidence may be analogized to the disclosure of physical as opposed to testimonial evidence and may in fact be the most reliable proof and probative indicator of the person’s present mental condition. (See People v. Ellis (1966) 65 Cal.2d 529, 533-534. .. [voice identification not within the privilege against self-incrimination]; People v. Arnold (1966) 243 Cal.App.2d *395.. . [handwriting identification not within the privilege against self-incrimination].) Similarly, a defendant even in a criminal proceeding may be required to give ‘real or physical’ evidence in contrast to ‘communications or testimony’ in the sense of disclosing knowledge. Thus the criminal defendant may be asked to stand, wear clothing, hold items, or speak words. (People v. Ellis, supra, at pp. 533-534; People v. Sims (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 544, 552....) It was proper for the jury to have the benefit of its own observations of Tyars’ responses, both in manner and content, to the court’s questions.” (See also People v. James (1977) 19 Cal.3d 99, 114-115 [137 Cal.Rptr. 447, 561 P.2d 1135] [consent to search need not be preceded by Miranda warnings].)
Here, the trial court in careful instructions to the jury (see ante, pp. 376-377) specifically limited the admission of the interview evidence, the court stating, inter alia, “It is not being offered for you to consider the truth of those statements.... He is not using it for the truth of the statements in the tape, but for the thought process, the clarity of voice, the intonation, whatever you can get from it.... ” Thus, the majority’s claim that the accuracy of the contents of the disclosures was relevant (ante, p. 382), ignores the explicit instructions of the trial court to the jury and is wholly divorced from the context of this case.
The limited purpose for which evidence of the otherwise proper booking interview was admitted distinguishes this case from those relied upon by the majority to support their conclusion that admission of the evidence violated Miranda. It is the nontestimonial character of this evidence rather than its nonhearsay purpose which removes it from the reach of Miranda. Without exception the cases cited by the majority wherein the Miranda rule was applied to exclude evidence admitted for a nonhearsay purpose all involved testimonial evidence. By making this distinction, I do not mean to suggest that there may not be other valid bases on which evidence secured during a proper booking interview may be admitted. I have attempted here only to determine the validity of the basis on which the evidence was admitted in this case.
IV. Conclusion
I conclude that appellant’s conviction must be reversed under the well established constitutional principles discussed, ante, part II, and that *396the majority’s extension of these principles on the facts in this case is both unnecessary and unsupportable.
I would reverse the judgment.
Clark, J., and Manuel, J., concurred.
Respondent’s petition for a rehearing was denied February 27, 1980. Clark, J., Richardson, J., and Manuel, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.