Court Opinion

ID: 9564286
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:57:13.966364+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:19.789077
License: Public Domain

STEWART, Justice
(concurring):
I concur in the reversal of the judgment of conviction and also in the remand for a new trial. However, in view of the dissent with respect to the proper disposition of the ease, I think it appropriate to state why I think that the case should be retried and not simply reversed.
*348Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978), and Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19, 98 S.Ct. 2151, 57 L.Ed.2d 15 (1978), are pertinent to the proper disposition of this matter, but not dispos-itive. Those cases do not deal specifically with the question of what disposition should be made of a case upon a finding on appeal that certain evidence indispensable to proof of one element of an offense was erroneously admitted in the trial of the matter. In the absence of such evidence there is, of course, insufficient evidence to support the conviction. Greene specifically left the issue open of whether, excluding from consideration the erroneously admitted evidence, with the result that there would then be insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction, the matter could be retried. The Supreme Court in Greene remarked that the lower court’s opinion could be construed as holding “that once the inadmissible hearsay evidence was discounted, there was insufficient evidence to permit the jury to convict,” and the Court refused to express an “opinion as to the double jeopardy implications of a retrial following such a holding.” 437 U.S. at 26, n.9, 98 S.Ct. at 2155 n.9.
Like all human endeavors, trials are rarely if ever conducted without at least some arguable error. It is, as has often been stated, a fair trial and not a perfect trial to which a defendant is entitled. A prosecutor is, of course, bound by the Code of Professional Responsibility, and I would not presume that a prosecutor would intentionally create error for the purpose of harassing a defendant with a second trial. He must also, like all trial lawyers, deal with practical considerations in the trial of a case and the administration of justice. It is important to recognize that prosecutors in the vast majority of cases act in good faith even though they may commit error, or more properly stated, induce a trial court to commit error. A workable system of criminal justice requires that we recognize these facts of life. True it is that a prosecutor should be an expert in trial procedure, but as every lawyer knows, in most lawsuits there are often difficult and arguable evi-dentiary questions which must be decided on the spot by the trial judge without the benefit of research.
In the case of “trial error” — by which I mean the erroneous introduction of evidence — justice is not promoted by simply reversing a conviction without remanding for a new trial because some critical evidence may have been erroneously introduced. Indeed in some cases it may be that the prosecutor holds some evidence back to avoid repetition. If the prosecutor does not have admissible evidence available for a retrial, the case will surely be dismissed. But if there is admissible evidence available, a proper balancing of the interest prohibiting double jeopardy and the interest of society in the enforcement of criminal sanctions requires that trial error not preclude a retrial.
The reasoning stated in United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir. 1979), fully supports the conclusion that trial error should not prevent a retrial. The Court in Mandel stated:
Our question is similar to the one left open in Greene. When the inadmissible evidence is removed from consideration, it is arguable there is insufficient evidence to support a conviction on at least some theories of the case. .
The double jeopardy clause serves to protect a defendant against multiple prosecutions, but it must be remembered that society has a “countervailing interest in the vindication of criminal justice,” and that both the state and the defendant have an interest in an error free determination of the merits of the case. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 219, [78 S.Ct. 221, 240, 2 L.Ed.2d 199] (1957) (Justice Frankfurter dissenting). These competing interests appear to be at the core of the distinction between the double jeopardy consequences of a reversal for trial error and insufficient evidence.
* * * * * *
We are of opinion that ordinarily an appellate court should not be required to decide [the question of the sufficiency of *349evidence if it has been presented in a case which would have to be reversed in all events for procedural error].
Among other things, this rather invades the province of the jury and the trial court on retrial. The jury is the proper trier of the facts, including the credibility of witnesses and the inferences to be drawn from the testimony. Perhaps the faulty evidence was the key to the jury’s decision; perhaps it was not. Who can say? Certainly not a court of appeals which has neither seen the witnesses nor heard them testify.
Another reason ... is that it is impossible to say what other evidence the government might have produced had the faulty evidence not been admitted, and what theory of the case the government might have principally pursued had it been presented in the context of different evidence before the jury.
Thus, we believe it does a service neither to the defendants nor to the government to adjudicate the sufficiency of the balance of the evidence when important evidence has been ruled to be inadmissible. [591 F.2d at 1373-74.]
This approach is supported by dictum in Burks:
In short, reversal for trial error, as distinguished from evidentiary insufficiency, does not constitute a decision to the effect that the government has failed to prove its case. As such, it implies nothing with respect to the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Rather, it is a determination that a defendant has been convicted through a judicial process which is defective in some fundamental respect, e. g., incorrect receipt or rejection of evidence, incorrect instructions, or prosecu-torial misconduct. When this occurs, the accused has a strong interest in obtaining a fair readjudication of his guilt free from error, just as society maintains a valid concern for insuring that the guilty are punished. [437 U.S. at 15, 98 S.Ct. at 2149.] [Emphasis added.]
For these reasons, I concur in remanding for a new trial.
WILKINS, J., concurs in the views expressed in the concurring opinion of STEWART, J.