Court Opinion

ID: 9953684
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 17:00:42.019904+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:00:14.864593
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

     UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
          FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

AJAY PAL SINGH,                                     No. 22-211
                                                   Agency No.
               Petitioner,
                                                  A208-189-362
    v.
                                                     OPINION
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

               Respondent.

           On Petition for Review of an Order of the
               Board of Immigration Appeals

             Argued and Submitted April 17, 2023
                  San Francisco, California

                      Filed March 22, 2024

     Before: Lawrence VanDyke and Gabriel P. Sanchez,
     Circuit Judges, and Kathryn H. Vratil, * District Judge.

                    Opinion by Judge Vratil;
                   Dissent by Judge VanDyke

*
 The Honorable Kathryn H. Vratil, United States District Judge for the
District of Kansas, sitting by designation.
2                        SINGH V. GARLAND

                          SUMMARY **

                           Immigration

    Granting in part and denying in part Ajay Singh’s
petition for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration
Appeals affirming the denial of asylum and related relief,
and remanding, the panel held that the record compelled the
conclusion that Singh experienced past harm rising to the
level of persecution, the BIA erred in its internal relocation
analysis for purposes of asylum and withholding of removal,
and substantial evidence supported the denial of protection
under the Convention Against Torture.
    The panel concluded that the BIA erred when it read the
immigration judge’s decision as having shifted the burden to
the government to rebut the presumption of future
persecution. The panel explained that because the BIA
expressly adopted the IJ’s reasons for finding that internal
relocation was safe and reasonable, it also adopted the IJ’s
flawed relocation analysis, which did not afford Singh the
presumption of past persecution or shift the burden to the
government to prove that Singh can safely and reasonably
relocate within India.
     The panel wrote that the BIA compounded its mistake by
failing to conduct a reasoned analysis of Singh’s
individualized situation to determine if he could safely
relocate to another area of India. The panel explained that
the BIA’s reliance on evidence that Singh never successfully
filed a police report, or that the landlord-tenant identification

**
  This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                      SINGH V. GARLAND                       3

system is not uniformly enforced, did not address whether
Singh would be substantially safer in a new location if he
were to continue expressing his support for the Khalistan
secession movement or maintain his advocacy for the Mann
party. Moreover, the BIA’s analysis was inadequate because
it failed to specifically address Singh’s stated intent to
continue proselytizing for his party.
    The panel held that substantial evidence supported the
BIA’s findings that Singh did not suffer past torture and is
not likely to suffer future torture, and that he failed to show
that any torture would be inflicted or consented to by public
officials or persons acting in official capacities.
    Dissenting, Judge VanDyke disagreed with the majority
that the IJ or BIA failed to place the burden regarding
internal relocation on the government. Judge VanDyke
wrote that the panel manufactured a non-existent conflict
between the IJ’s and BIA’s decisions, and explained that
even if there was a conflict between the BIA’s and IJ’s
analyses and conclusions, this court reviews the BIA’s
decision, which appropriately placed the burden for internal
relocation on the government, adequately considered the
appropriate factors in its individualized analysis, and was
supported by substantial evidence.

                         COUNSEL

Inna Lipkin (argued), Law Offices of Inna Lipkin, Redwood
City, California, for Petitioner.
Jesi J. Carlson (argued) and Nancy K. Canter, Senior
Litigation Counsel; Sarah S. Wilson; Micah Engler, Trial
Attorney; Brian Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant
4                     SINGH V. GARLAND

Attorney General; Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil
Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington,
D.C.; for Respondents.

                         OPINION

VRATIL, District Judge:

    Ajay Pal Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions
for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
(“BIA”) dismissing his applications for asylum, withholding
of removal, and protection under the Convention Against
Torture (“CAT”). Singh asserts that he suffered past
persecution and has a well-founded fear of future
persecution due to his membership in the Shiromani Akali
Dal Amritsar (“Mann party”), which advocates for the
creation of a sovereign state for Sikh people. Two of India’s
major political parties, the Bharatiya Janata Party (“BJP”)
and the Shiromani Akali Dal Badal (“Badal”) party, oppose
the Mann party.
    The BIA affirmed the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”)
determination that Singh did not qualify for asylum or
withholding of removal because the injuries and threats that
he suffered at the hands of BJP and Badal party members
were not sufficiently severe to constitute past persecution.
The IJ and the BIA further found that even if Singh had
established past persecution, he was not entitled to relief
because he could reasonably relocate within India to avoid
persecution in the future. The BIA also affirmed the IJ’s
finding that Singh was not eligible for CAT relief because
he had not established that he would suffer torture by or with
the acquiescence of public officials.
                      SINGH V. GARLAND                      5

    For the reasons set forth below, we grant the petition in
part, deny the petition in part, and remand to the BIA for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. BACKGROUND
     On or about August 24, 2015, Singh entered the United
States without inspection or admission. On September 9,
2015, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) issued
a Notice to Appear which charged Singh with removability.
On March 21, 2019, Singh appeared at a hearing before an
IJ, conceded removability, and filed applications for asylum,
withholding of removal, and protection under CAT.
   A. Singh’s Testimony
    At his removal hearing on February 16, 2018, Singh
testified about the circumstances that he faced prior to
coming to the United States. Singh stated that because of his
affiliation with the Mann party, members of the BJP and the
Badal party verbally and physically attacked him on multiple
occasions in 2014 and 2015. Singh worked for the Mann
party while living in India. He attended rallies, participated
in social work activities, hung political party posters, and
encouraged others to join the party. In November of 2014,
he received two threatening telephone calls from callers who
identified themselves as BJP and Badal party members and
told him to quit the Mann party or be killed.
    On December 30, 2014, BJP and Badal party members
attacked Singh and beat him with hockey sticks and baseball
bats. His attackers stated that they would kill him if he
resumed work for the Mann party. Singh spent one day in
the hospital and remained on bed rest for 15 days. He went
to a police station to report the attack and told them that he
was a Mann party member. The police told him that they
6                     SINGH V. GARLAND

would not file a complaint against the BJP and threatened to
jail him if he returned to the station to complain again.
    On June 10, 2015, BJP and Badal party members again
attacked Singh as he returned home after prayer at a Sikh
temple. The attackers beat him for about six minutes with
wooden sticks and metal knuckle dusters. During the
beating, his attackers said “you have not quit [the] Mann
Party yet, you will be killed.” He spent one day in the
hospital, then lived in hiding with his grandparents for
several weeks before fleeing India. After Singh left India,
his family told him that BJP and Badal party members
harassed Singh’s family members and inquired about his
whereabouts. Members of the BJP and the Badal party had
previously harassed Singh’s father, a Mann party member,
before he died.
    Singh testified that he could not safely relocate within
India because he works for the Mann party and intends to
keep doing so wherever he lives. He fears that BJP and
Badal party members will kill him if he returns to India
because BJP members live all over India and he will have to
provide identification to rent lodgings, which would trigger
a police check and reveal his whereabouts. Singh does not
have any relatives who live outside of Punjab, and he does
not speak Hindi, the predominant language outside of Punjab
in India.
    B. The IJ’s Decision
    The IJ found Singh removable as charged and denied his
applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT
relief. Although the IJ deemed Singh credible, the IJ
concluded that the two beatings and threatening phone calls
that Singh experienced did not rise to the level of
persecution. The IJ noted that the beatings did not result in
                      SINGH V. GARLAND                      7

“any lasting injuries requiring extensive medical treatment,”
the two phone calls were “vague,” and Singh “failed to
demonstrate that the callers have the will or ability to carry
out such threats.”
    Because Singh had not demonstrated past persecution,
the IJ stated that he was not entitled to a presumption of a
well-founded fear of future persecution, citing 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.13(b)(3). Accordingly, the IJ did not shift the burden
to the DHS to show that Singh could safely and reasonably
relocate to another part of the country to avoid persecution
and instead placed the burden on Singh to demonstrate that
he could not reasonably relocate. The IJ observed that Singh
was only a low-level Mann party worker and “there was no
persuasive evidence in the record that a member of the Mann
party similarly situated” to Singh had been harmed or
targeted by BJP or Badal party members or police outside of
Punjab. The IJ noted that when Singh went to the police
after his first attack, he never filed a police report and the
police did not take his picture or fingerprints. The IJ
concluded that Singh had “not offered more than speculative
assertions that members of an opposing party would seek
him out for persecution.”
    Regarding Singh’s claim that persecutors could track
him through the landlord-tenant identification system, the IJ
found that “the evidence [Singh] has submitted shows that
the identification system is not uniformly enforced and does
not always involve the police,” and that the record provided
no evidence that the identification system is used to target
Mann party members. Given Singh’s young age and good
health, the IJ concluded that internal relocation would be
reasonable and “the record does not demonstrate that there
would be unreasonable social or cultural constraints, or other
practical barriers.”
8                     SINGH V. GARLAND

    The IJ also denied Singh’s application for withholding of
removal, stating that because Singh was not eligible for
asylum, it necessarily followed that he was not eligible for
withholding of removal, which requires a heightened
showing that he more likely than not would be persecuted if
removed.
    Finally, the IJ denied Singh’s application for CAT
protection. The IJ found that Singh’s two beatings did not
amount to torture and that he did not establish that any public
official consented or acquiesced to the attacks or would
consent or acquiesce to future torture. The IJ noted evidence
that “only those considered by police to be high-profile
militants are at risk of persecution” and “the Indian
government has made concrete efforts towards holding
government officials responsible for wrongdoings.”
    C. The BIA’s Decision
     Singh appealed the IJ’s decision to the BIA. In
dismissing the appeal, the BIA affirmed the findings of the
IJ, first agreeing that Singh had not shown harm sufficiently
severe to constitute persecution. The BIA cited Gu v.
Gonzales, 454 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir. 2006), for the
proposition that persecution is an “extreme concept” that
“does not include every sort of treatment our society regards
as offensive.” It further cited Prasad v. INS, 47 F.3d 336,
339–40 (9th Cir. 1995), for the conclusion that “the
cumulative physical, psychological and emotional harm the
respondent suffered, while abhorrent, does not rise to the
level of persecution.”
    The BIA also affirmed the IJ’s relocation analysis, stating
that “even assuming [Singh] established past persecution,
which he did not, the Immigration Judge properly
determined that the DHS met its burden of rebutting the
                       SINGH V. GARLAND                        9

presumption of future persecution based on [Singh’s] ability
to relocate within India.” The BIA emphasized the IJ’s
findings that it was unlikely that police or anyone else would
harm Singh or track him down due to his low-profile status
as a low-level worker of the Mann party. As we discuss
below, the BIA misinterpreted the IJ’s opinion, which did
not analyze relocation under a presumption that Singh had
established past persecution and therefore did not shift to the
DHS the burden of showing that Singh could safely and
reasonably relocate outside of Punjab. The BIA nevertheless
affirmed the IJ’s holding that Singh could safely and
reasonably relocate outside Punjab and that he was therefore
ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal.
    The BIA also affirmed the IJ’s denial of protection under
CAT. It determined that Singh had not suffered past torture
and had not established state action as to any future torture,
because “[g]eneral country conditions evidence that some
government officials are corrupt and commit abuses [was]
insufficient to show [that Singh] would face an
individualized risk of torture inflicted by or at the instigation
of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official.”
II. ANALYSIS
    A. Standards Of Review
    “[O]ur review is limited to the BIA’s decision, except to
the extent that the IJ’s opinion is expressly adopted.”
Soriano-Vino v. Holder, 653 F.3d 1096, 1099 (9th Cir. 2011)
(quotation marks and citation omitted). We review questions
of law de novo. Rodriguez v. Holder, 683 F.3d 1164, 1169
(9th Cir. 2012). We review factual findings under the
substantial evidence standard. Singh v. Garland, 57 F.4th
643, 651 (9th Cir. 2022). Under this standard, “[a] factual
finding is ‘not supported by substantial evidence when any
10                   SINGH V. GARLAND

reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the
contrary based on the evidence in the record.’” Aden v.
Wilkinson, 989 F.3d 1073, 1079 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting
Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1059 (9th Cir.
2017) (en banc)).
    When the BIA determines whether particular acts
constitute persecution for purposes of asylum, we have held
alternatively that the BIA’s determination is reviewed de
novo or for substantial evidence. See Kaur v. Wilkinson, 986
F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 2021) (reviewing de novo);
Sharma v. Garland, 9 F.4th 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2021)
(reviewing for substantial evidence). We need not address
which standard should apply because the harm suffered by
Singh rose to the level of persecution even under the
substantial evidence standard, which affords greater
deference to the BIA’s determinations. See Singh v.
Garland, 57 F.4th at 652.
     B. Asylum
    At the discretion of the Attorney General, asylum is
available to an applicant who demonstrates that he is a
refugee. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1). A refugee is a person who
is unable or unwilling to return to the country of origin
“because of persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.”    8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).        “Either past
persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution
provides eligibility for a discretionary grant of asylum.”
Ratnam v. INS, 154 F.3d 990, 994 (9th Cir. 1998). An
individual “who establishes past persecution is presumed to
have a well-founded fear of persecution.” Id. (citing 8
C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i)). “The source of the persecution
                     SINGH V. GARLAND                   11

must be the government or forces that the government is
unwilling or unable to control.” Ahmed v. Keisler, 504 F.3d
1183, 1191 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).
       1. Past Persecution
    To establish past persecution, an asylum applicant must
demonstrate (1) serious harm “ris[ing] to the level of
persecution;” (2) “the persecution was committed by the
government, or by forces that the government was unable or
unwilling to control;” and (3) “the persecution was on
account of one or more protected grounds, such as political
opinion.” Kaur, 986 F.3d at 1221–22 (quoting Bringas-
Rodriguez, 850 F.3d at 1062).
    The BIA affirmed the IJ’s determination that Singh did
not experience serious harm rising to the level of
persecution. After “comparing the facts of [Singh’s] case
with those of similar cases,” we conclude that the record
compels the conclusion that the harm Singh suffered rose to
the level of persecution. Singh v. Garland, 57 F.4th at 654
(9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Singh v. INS, 134 F.3d 962, 967–68
(9th Cir. 1998)).
    In Singh v. Garland, we held that the BIA erred in
dismissing a Mann party member’s application for asylum
in circumstances which are strikingly similar to those
presented here. Id. at 653–54. In doing so, we articulated
five factors which compelled the conclusion that petitioner
had experienced past persecution:

       (1) he was forced to flee his home after being
       repeatedly assaulted; (2) one of those
       incidents involved a death threat; (3) he was
       between the ages of 16 and 18 when the
       attacks occurred; (4) his brother also
12                       SINGH V. GARLAND

        experienced this violence; and (5) we have
        already recognized that Mann Party members
        have faced persistent threats in the region of
        India [Punjab] where [the Mann party
        member] was twice attacked.

Id. at 653.
    Four of those five factors support a finding of past
persecution here. 1 As to the first factor, Singh was forced to
flee his home and live in hiding with his grandparents after
BJP and Badal party members assaulted him and threatened
to kill him on multiple occasions. As we explained in Singh,
“being forced to flee from one’s home in the face of an
immediate threat of severe physical violence or death is
squarely encompassed within the rubric of persecution.” Id.
(quoting Flores Molina v. Garland, 37 F.4th 626, 633–34
(9th Cir. 2022)).
    As to the second factor, BJP and Badal party members
repeatedly threatened to kill Singh. He received two
threatening phone calls in November of 2014 and was
threatened with death during the attacks in December of
2014 and June of 2015. “Repeated death threats, especially
when those threats occurred in conjunction with other forms
of abuse, require a finding of past persecution.”
Smolniakova v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1037, 1049 (9th Cir.
2005); see also Aden, 989 F.3d at 1082 (“[W]hen the
incidents have involved physical harm plus something more,
such as credible death threats, we have not hesitated to

1
  The third factor is not on point because Singh was 22 and not a minor
at the time of his attacks.
                         SINGH V. GARLAND                           13

conclude that the petitioner suffered persecution.” (emphasis
in original)). 2
    The fourth factor applies because, like the petitioner in
Singh, Singh’s family experienced mistreatment from BJP
and Badal party members. Singh testified that they harassed
his father for being a Mann party member and harassed his
family to discover Singh’s whereabouts after he left India.
“[H]arms that have befallen a petitioner’s family members
or close friends strengthen an applicant’s past-persecution
claim.” Singh v. Garland, 57 F.4th at 654 ( quotation marks
and citation omitted).
    Finally, as to the fifth factor, “we have recognized in
multiple cases that Mann Party members have faced
persistent harassment, intimidation, threats, and violence in
Punjab,” and “an asylum applicant’s claim of persecution is
further strengthened when evidence that the applicant was
physically beaten and threatened with his life is presented in
conjunction with evidence of the country’s political and
social turmoil.” Id. (citing Kaur, 986 F.3d at 1219–20; Aden,
989 F.3d at 1083) (cleaned up). That is the precise situation
here. As in Singh, the evidence compels the conclusion that
Singh experienced serious harm rising to the level of
persecution. See Flores Molina, 37 F.4th at 636 (“Any
reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to hold that the
repeated and specific death threats that [petitioner]
experienced, amid the violence and menacing confrontations
to which he was subjected, amount to persecution.”).

2
  Even in the absence of physical violence, we have “consistently held
that death threats alone can constitute persecution.” Canales-Vargas v.
Gonzales, 441 F.3d 739, 743 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Navas, 217 F.3d
at 658).
14                    SINGH V. GARLAND

    We are not persuaded by the agency’s reasons for finding
that Singh did not suffer sufficiently serious harm. The IJ
cited the fact that Singh did not show evidence of “lasting
injuries requiring extensive medical treatment.” However,
“we do not require severe injuries to meet the serious-harm
prong of the past-persecution analysis.” Singh v. Garland,
57 F.4th at 654; see Flores Molina, 37 F.4th at 636 (“[I]t is
the conduct of the persecutor that is relevant to evaluating
whether past treatment rises to the level of persecution—not
the level of harm or subjective suffering the petitioner
experienced.” (quotation marks and citation omitted)). In
particular, “[w]here an applicant suffers [physical] harm on
more than one occasion, and as in this case is victimized at
different times over a period of years, the harm is severe
enough that no reasonable fact-finder could conclude that it
did not rise to the level of persecution” necessary to sustain
an asylum claim. Chand v. INS, 222 F.3d 1066, 1073–74
(9th Cir. 2000). Here, Singh experienced multiple physical
attacks and death threats over an eight-month period, from
November of 2014 to June of 2015. No reasonable
factfinder would conclude that Singh did not experience
serious harm rising to the level of persecution.
    The BIA cited Gu v. Gonzales for the proposition that
persecution is an “extreme concept” that “does not include
every sort of treatment our society regards as offensive.”
454 F.3d at 1019. But Gu did not involve multiple instances
of physical violence coupled with death threats. Instead, the
petitioner in Gu experienced one brief detention,
interrogation, and beating by Chinese police because he
participated in an unsanctioned religious practice. Id. at
1020. Gu concluded that this single incident did not compel
a finding of past persecution, “distinguishing cases in which
the persecutor had some ‘continued interest’ in the petitioner
                       SINGH V. GARLAND                       15

from those cases involving only ‘a single, isolated
encounter.’” Id. Here, unlike Gu, BJP and Badal party
members repeatedly targeted Singh for months. They
continued to visit his family and inquire about him even after
he left India. Singh’s attackers knew his identity and
displayed a continuing interest in him, and his mistreatment
was not a single isolated encounter. See Singh v. Garland,
57 F.4th at 655 (distinguishing Gu on similar basis).
    The BIA’s reliance on Prasad v. INS, 47 F.3d 336 (9th
Cir. 1995), is similarly inapt. In Prasad, a group of ethnic
Fijians detained the petitioner, on account of his race, hit him
in the stomach, kicked him, and questioned him about his
support for a particular political party. Id. at 339. Four to
six hours later, the group set Prasad free. Id. Unlike the
present case, the crowd subjected Prasad to a single attack,
did not harm him severely enough to require medical
attention, and did not expressly threaten to harm him again.
Id.     We concluded that “the cumulative physical,
psychological and emotional harm the respondent suffered,
while abhorrent, does not rise to the level of persecution.” 47
F.3d at 339–40.
     We later distinguished Prasad from another case, Desir
v. Ilchert, 840 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1988), that bears a far closer
resemblance to the circumstances of this petition. In Desir,
petitioner had four separate encounters with his persecutors,
members of a Haitian paramilitary called the Ton Ton
Macoutes, involving his failure to pay bribes to the military
force and his political opposition to the Haitian government.
Id. at 724–25. In those four encounters, which spanned from
1979 to 1981, Macoutes members repeatedly arrested Desir,
beat him, shot at him, and threatened him with death. Id.
Desir fled Haiti, entered the United States, and sought
asylum. Id. at 725. The agency denied asylum in part
16                     SINGH V. GARLAND

because it found that Desir had not experienced persecution
based on his political opinion. Id. After determining that the
Macoutes’ mistreatment of Desir was politically motivated,
we determined that he experienced serious harm that rose to
the level of persecution and that the BIA had erred in
concluding otherwise. Id. at 729. We held that Desir had
established eligibility for asylum because he had “presented
evidence of (1) successive and specific threats on his life; (2)
on the basis of imputed political opinion; (3) in the context
of systemic human rights abuses linked to extortion by the
Ton Ton Macoutes . . . .” Id.
    Like the petitioner in Desir and unlike the petitioner in
Prasad, Singh had four separate encounters with his
persecutors. Over an eight-month period, Singh received
two phone calls where BJP and Badal party members
threatened to kill him, and BJP and Badal party members
beat him on two other occasions while threatening to kill
him. These threats were expressly based on his political
opinion, as his attackers demanded that he stop working for
the Mann party. In addition, Singh submitted extensive
evidence of systematic human rights abuses against Mann
party members in Punjab. See id. at 729 (“Where evidence
of a specific threat on an [applicant’s] life is presented in
conjunction with general corroboration which describes
political and social turmoil, the [applicant] has succeeded in
establishing prima facie eligibility for asylum.”).
                         SINGH V. GARLAND                           17

    For all these reasons we find that the record compels a
finding that Singh suffered harm rising to the level of
persecution. 3
        2. Fear Of Future Persecution
    If a petitioner demonstrates past persecution on account
of statutorily protected grounds at the hands of individuals
whom the government was unable or unwilling to control,
he is entitled to a presumption of a well-founded fear of
future persecution. Mashiri v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 1112, 1119
(9th Cir. 2004). The burden then shifts to the government to
“show by a preponderance of the evidence that the applicant
either no longer has a well-founded fear of future
persecution in the country of his nationality, or that he can
reasonably relocate internally to an area of safety.” Singh v.
Whitaker, 914 F.3d 654, 659 (9th Cir. 2019). To meet this
burden, the government must demonstrate either a
“fundamental change in circumstances” or that Singh could
“avoid future persecution by relocating to another part of
[India], and under all the circumstances, it would be
reasonable to expect [him] to do so.” Boer-Sedano v.
Gonzales, 418 F.3d 1082, 1089 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting 8
C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(A)–(B)).
    Because the IJ determined that Singh had not established
past persecution, he found that Singh was not entitled to a
presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution and
therefore did not shift to the DHS the burden of showing that

3
  On remand, the agency must determine in the first instance whether
Singh established the two remaining elements of past persecution, that
“the persecution was committed by the government, or by forces that the
government was unable or unwilling to control” and “the persecution
was on account of one or more protected grounds.” Kaur, 986 F.3d at
1221; Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 738 (9th Cir. 2009).
18                        SINGH V. GARLAND

Singh could safely and reasonably relocate outside of Punjab.
The BIA, however, concluded that “even assuming [Singh]
established past persecution, which he did not, the
Immigration Judge properly determined that the [DHS] met
its burden of rebutting the presumption of future persecution
based on [Singh’s] ability to relocate within India.” The BIA
erred in finding that the IJ had shifted the burden to the
government to demonstrate the reasonableness of internal
relocation. As the record makes clear, the burden remained
with Singh to prove that he could not safely and reasonably
relocate to another part of the country.
    The IJ began its internal relocation analysis by stating,
“[t]he Court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, the
respondent could avoid any future persecution by relocating
to another part of India, and it would be reasonable to expect
him to do so. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(3)(i).” That the IJ
did not afford Singh the presumption of a well-founded fear
of future persecution is made clear by the regulation it cited,
8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(3)(i), which provides, “[i]n cases in
which the applicant has not established past persecution, the
applicant shall bear the burden of establishing that it would
not be reasonable for him or her to relocate.” (emphasis
added). 4
    The IJ found that Singh could reasonably relocate within
India, not because of evidence the government offered to
rebut the presumption, but because “it is unlikely that an
individual like [Singh] would be harmed by police or by

4
  Conversely, the regulation the BIA cited and wrongly attributed to the
IJ states the correct standard for analyzing internal relocation when an
applicant has established past persecution and is entitled to the
presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.13(b)(1)(i)–(ii).
                      SINGH V. GARLAND                      19

someone the police is unable or unwilling to control.” The
IJ reasoned that Singh was a low-level worker and supporter
of the Mann party, and “there is no persuasive evidence in
the record that a member of the Mann party similarly situated
to the respondent has been harmed or targeted by opposing
party members or police outside of Punjab.” In other words,
the IJ’s determination was based on Singh’s failure to offer
evidence that low-level Mann party members have been
targeted or harmed outside of Punjab.
    The IJ also faulted Singh for failing to establish that the
national identification system used to register tenants would
be used by landlords to pass along information either to
police or opposition party members. The IJ found that “[t]he
evidence [Singh] has submitted shows that the identification
system is not uniformly enforced and does not always
involve the police.” “Nor does the record evidence indicate
that the identification system is used to target Mann party
members.” This discussion reflects that the burden was on
Singh to show that the landlord-tenant identification system
would be utilized by landlords at the behest of police or
opposition party members to persecute him in areas outside
of Punjab. The IJ concluded that Singh “ha[d] not offered
more than speculative assertions that members of an
opposing party would seek him out for persecution,” and
therefore his testimony “was insufficient to demonstrate that
he could not relocate to another part of India.” The BIA thus
erred when it found that the IJ had applied a rebuttable
presumption of future persecution and shifted the burden to
the government to demonstrate that Singh could safely and
reasonably relocate within India.
    The BIA compounded its mistake by failing to conduct a
“reasoned analysis with respect to [Singh’s] individualized
situation” to determine if he could safely relocate within
20                    SINGH V. GARLAND

another area of India. Singh v. Whitaker, 914 F.3d at 661.
In Singh v. Whitaker, the government bore the burden of
showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the
petitioner could safely and reasonably relocate internally.
Id. at 659. We concluded that the BIA erred in its relocation
analysis for two reasons. First, the BIA “erred by failing to
address the potential harm [opposition party] members, or
other local authorities, might inflict upon Singh in a new
state.” Id. at 661. Second, we concluded that the BIA “failed
to specifically address Singh’s stated intent to continue
proselytizing for his party wherever he went.” Id. “Thus,
the BIA’s analysis regarding whether Singh could
reasonably relocate was inadequate.” Id. We remanded for
the BIA to conduct a sufficiently individualized relocation
analysis for petitioner’s asylum and withholding of removal
claims.
    As in Singh v. Whitaker, the BIA here analyzed whether
Punjabi police or other actors would try to pursue Singh to
other parts of India based on his prior Mann party activities,
without considering Singh’s stated intent to continue his
political advocacy and support for the Mann party wherever
he goes. For the government to rebut the presumption of
future persecution, it is not enough to show that Punjabi
police or other actors are unlikely to follow Singh outside of
Punjab because he is a low-level Mann party member and
not a “high-profile militant.” Id. at 660–61. The BIA’s
reliance on evidence that Singh never successfully filed a
police report, or that the landlord-tenant identification
system is not uniformly enforced, fails to address whether
Singh “would be substantially safer in a new location if he
were to continue expressing his support for the Khalistan
secession movement” or maintain his advocacy for the Mann
party. Id. at 660. The BIA’s failure to specifically address
                          SINGH V. GARLAND                             21

in its decision Singh’s “stated intent to continue
proselytizing for his party wherever he went” rendered the
BIA’s relocation analysis inadequate under our precedent.
Id.
    Contrary to our dissenting colleague’s contention, the
BIA did not independently analyze relocation and determine
that the government met its burden. Rather, the BIA
expressly adopted the IJ’s reasons for finding that internal
relocation was safe and reasonable. In doing so, the BIA
adopted the IJ’s flawed relocation analysis, which did not
afford Singh the presumption of past persecution or shift the
burden to the government to prove that Singh can safely and
reasonably relocate within India.          See 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.13(b)(1)(i)–(ii).
    For example, the IJ’s finding that it was unlikely Singh
would be harmed by police or opposition party members was
based entirely on Singh’s failure to offer evidence that other
similarly situated, low-level Mann party members have been
targeted or harmed outside of Punjab. Under a rebuttable
presumption, the DHS was required to demonstrate that
individuals like Singh who participate in Mann party
activities or advocate for a separatist Khalistan state in other
regions of India are unlikely to suffer persecution at the
hands of police or opposition party members. Id. The record
is devoid of any such evidence. 5

5
  Even though Singh was a low-level party member, opposition party
members specifically targeted him and had a particularized interest in
harming him. They made multiple threatening phone calls to his house,
physically confronted and attacked him twice, and repeatedly visited his
family’s home to inquire about him after he left India. His low-level
status in the party did not protect him from past persecution and does not
22                       SINGH V. GARLAND

    Our dissenting colleague asserts that the government did
offer evidence concerning the persecution of Mann party
members outside of Punjab. But the Law Library of
Congress 2012 report submitted by the government in these
proceedings is the same report found wanting in Singh v.
Whitaker. See 914 F.3d at 660–61. That report concludes
that the Punjabi police are likely to pursue only “high profile
militants” outside of Punjab. As we observed in Singh v.
Whitaker, the report does not address the risk of persecution
at the hands of local authorities or opposition party
members, nor does the report shed light on the likelihood of
harm when an individual continues to advocate for Mann
party activities in a new state. Id. at 661. On this record, the
government has not carried its burden to show that Singh is
unlikely to be harmed or targeted by local officials or
opposition party members upon relocation based on his
future political activities and advocacy for Khalistan
succession. Even if the government had presented such
evidence, the BIA failed to specifically address these
questions in an individualized relocation analysis.
    The dissent’s reasoning falters for a second reason as
well. Where, as here, the BIA erred in its relocation analysis,
we do not ignore the error to see if substantial evidence
nevertheless supports the agency’s determination. See, e.g.,
Singh v. Whitaker, 914 F.3d at 661 (remanding because
“BIA’s analysis regarding whether Singh could reasonably
relocate was inadequate”); Knezevic v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d
1206, 1214–15 (9th Cir. 2004) (remanding issue of
reasonableness where agency failed to take into
consideration several regulatory factors); Mashiri v.

support a conclusion that his low status will protect him from future
persecution outside of Punjab.
                      SINGH V. GARLAND                      23

Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 1112, 1123 (9th Cir. 2004) (remanding
where IJ erroneously “placed the burden of proof regarding
internal relocation on the petitioner”); cf. Garcia v.
Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 1136, 1147 (9th Cir. 2021) (remanding
where BIA applied erroneous legal standard to its nexus
analysis).
   In sum, because the BIA erred in its relocation analysis,
we grant Singh’s petition to review his claim for asylum and
remand to the BIA for consideration in light of Singh v.
Whitaker, 914 F.3d 654.
   C. Withholding Of Removal
    A petitioner is entitled to withholding of removal if he
can establish a clear probability that his life or freedom will
be threatened upon return on account of “race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion.” Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1039
(9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ahmed, 504 F.3d at 1199); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(b)(3)(A).      The clear probability standard for
withholding of removal is more stringent than the
well-founded fear standard for asylum because withholding
of removal is a mandatory form of relief. Ahmed, 504 F.3d
at 1199.
    Here, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s denial of Singh’s
application for withholding of removal because it affirmed
the IJ’s denial of his application for asylum. It noted that
“[w]hen the government rebuts an applicant’s well-founded
fear of persecution, it defeats the asylum claim, and his or
her claim for withholding of removal.” We therefore remand
this claim to the BIA so that it can determine whether Singh
has established an asylum claim, and thus benefits from a
“presumption of entitlement to withholding of deportation.”
See Canales-Vargas, 441 F.3d at 746.
24                     SINGH V. GARLAND

     D. Convention Against Torture
     Finally, we analyze Singh’s claim for relief under CAT.
To prevail on this claim, Singh must establish that more
likely than not, he will be tortured if removed to India. See
Kamalthas v. INS, 251 F.3d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 2001)
(citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2)). Singh must also show that
any torture would be inflicted by or at the instigation of or
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other
person acting in an official capacity.             8 C.F.R.
§ 208.18(a)(1).
    The regulations implementing CAT define torture as
follows:

        [A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering,
        whether physical or mental, is intentionally
        inflicted on a person for such purposes as . . .
        punishing him or her for an act he or she or a
        third person has committed or is suspected of
        having committed, . . . or for any reason
        based on discrimination of any kind, when
        such pain or suffering is inflicted by, or at the
        instigation of, or with the consent or
        acquiescence of, a public official acting in an
        official capacity or other person acting in an
        official capacity.

8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1).
    Here, the IJ found that Singh’s two beatings did not
amount to torture and that he did not establish that any public
official consented or acquiesced to the attacks or would
consent or acquiesce to future torture. The BIA affirmed
these findings.
                      SINGH V. GARLAND                      25

    Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s findings that
Singh did not suffer past torture and is not likely to suffer
future torture. See Singh, 914 F.3d at 663 (reversing
agency’s denial of asylum and withholding of removal due
to a flawed relocation analysis but upholding denial of CAT
because record did not compel finding of torture).
Specifically, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s
determination that Singh did not experience pain or suffering
that rose to the level of past torture or that more likely than
not, he will experience future torture if removed to India.
See Fon v. Garland, 34 F.4th 810, 815–16 (9th Cir. 2022)
(record compelled finding of past persecution, but
substantial evidence supported BIA determination that
petitioner failed to show likelihood of future torture).
Further, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s
determination that Singh did not show that any torture would
be inflicted or consented to by public officials or persons
acting in official capacities. We therefore deny the petition
as to CAT relief.
III. CONCLUSION
    For the reasons set forth above, we GRANT Singh’s
petition in part and REMAND to the BIA to consider
(1) whether Singh is eligible for asylum because he suffered
past persecution on account of statutorily protected grounds
by the government or individuals whom the government was
unable or unwilling to control; (2) if so, whether the DHS
rebutted the presumption of a well-founded fear of future
persecution; and (3) whether Singh is entitled to withholding
of removal. Singh’s petition is otherwise DENIED.
26                         SINGH V. GARLAND

VANDYKE, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

    The agency in this case denied asylum and withholding
of removal to Ajay Pal Singh because it concluded that
(1) his past harm didn’t rise to the level of past persecution,
and (2) even if it did, the government “met its burden of
rebutting the presumption of future persecution based on
[his] ability to relocate within India.” The majority disagrees
on both accounts. There’s no reason to debate the first
question because even if Singh did suffer past persecution,
and the government thus bore the burden to rebut a
presumption of future persecution, here the agency
unmistakably determined the government met that burden. 1
And substantial evidence supports that determination. The
majority concludes otherwise by (1) insisting that the BIA
misunderstood the IJ’s analysis, and (2) cursorily second-
guessing the agency’s weighing of ample evidence in this
case supporting Singh’s ability to relocate. I will say it
again: this is not how we should be reviewing the agency’s
decisions. I respectfully dissent.

1
  As a matter of first impression, this case presents a debatable question
of whether Singh suffered past persecution. And as our court often does
when an immigration case presents a debatable question, the majority
here again imposes our court’s own view of what constitutes past
persecution on the agency. See Molina v. Garland, 37 F.4th 626, 646
(9th Cir. 2022) (VanDyke, J., dissenting). But of course, our review in
these cases is not supposed to be de novo, but instead extraordinarily
deferential. Consistent with that standard, if required to reach it I would
conclude that substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that
Singh did not suffer past persecution. But as I explain, it’s not necessary
to address that issue to correctly decide this case.
                      SINGH V. GARLAND                     27

                       DISCUSSION
    The majority’s main attack on the agency’s relocation
analysis is that the agency failed to put the burden on the
government. That is a strange reading of the BIA’s decision.
The BIA clearly stated as an alternative conclusion that,
“even assuming [Singh] established past persecution,” the
government “met its burden of rebutting the presumption of
future persecution based on [his] ability to relocate within
India.” And the BIA cited three pages of the IJ’s decision in
support. The majority argues the BIA was wrong, however,
because the IJ never put the burden on the government.
    It’s the majority that is wrong, and doubly so. First,
while the IJ never directly said it put the burden on the
government, it did say that it “finds, by a preponderance of
the evidence, [Singh] could avoid any future persecution by
relocating ….” That statement makes no sense unless the IJ
was putting the burden on the government to show, “by a
preponderance of the evidence, [Singh] could avoid any
future persecution by relocating.” Singh would never need
to prove—by the preponderance of the evidence or
otherwise—that he “could avoid any future persecution by
relocating.” If the IJ had kept the burden on Singh for the
entirety of its analysis, it would have said that Singh failed
to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he would
suffer (not avoid) future persecution even if he relocated.
The BIA’s reading of the IJ as having flipped the burden to
the government in parts of the IJ’s decision is not only a
reasonable reading of that decision, but arguably the only
reasonable reading. The majority strains mightily to impose
its own eccentric reading of the IJ’s decision in lieu of the
BIA’s.
28                    SINGH V. GARLAND

    Moreover, even if the majority was right that the BIA
must have read the IJ’s decision wrong (it isn’t), that still
wouldn’t matter. If there was necessarily a conflict between
the BIA’s and IJ’s analyses and conclusions (there isn’t),
then obviously it is the BIA’s that we review for substantial
evidence. There is no doubt the BIA put the burden to prove
relocatability on the government and, reviewing the
evidentiary record, concluded the government met its
burden. The majority thus badly errs in first manufacturing
a nonexistent conflict between the BIA and IJ, and then
focusing on its misreading of the IJ’s decision instead of
properly reviewing the BIA’s decision for substantial
evidence. There is more than a bit of irony that we purport
to hold the agency to such a persnickety standard when we
can’t even get our own method of review right.
    Perhaps recognizing that its errant focus on the IJ’s
decision is flawed, the majority also briefly contends the
BIA’s conclusion that the government met its burden is not
supported by substantial evidence. As discussed in more
depth below, the evidence supporting the government is
substantial, and includes a government report that directly
addresses the “Feasibility of Relocation for Sikhs and Mann
Party Members,” the IJ’s individualized finding the Singh
was likely a “low-level worker,” and the absence of any
evidence that other Mann party members similarly situated
to Singh have been “harmed or targeted … outside of
Punjab.” The majority relies on the fact that Singh was
previously targeted in Punjab as inconsistent with the
agency’s conclusion that he is unlikely to be targeted outside
Punjab, failing to engage the agency’s actual rationale.
Beyond that strawman, the majority misreads Singh v.
Whitaker as imposing a magic words requirement mandating
that the agency must talismanically state it has considered
                            SINGH V. GARLAND                              29

that the petitioner will continue to engage in political activity
once he relocates. 914 F.3d 654 (9th Cir. 2019). There is no
reason to think the agency here assumed anything different,
given that (1) it said it considered “all of the relevant
evidence, including country conditions information and
[Singh’s] testimony,” (2) it specifically cited our Whitaker
decision, and (3) the norm is that the agency in the relocation
analysis expects the petitioner will continue to exhibit the
characteristic for which he was previously persecuted. We
don’t assume, for example, that a petitioner who was
persecuted for his religion will stop practicing that religion
after relocating.
    This case is not meaningfully distinguishable from our
very long list of other decisions where we denied petitions
involving Mann Party Sikhs from Punjab claiming
persecution and an inability to relocate. 2 The agency’s

2
  See, e.g., Singh v. Garland, No. 22-1013, 2023 WL 4585960, at *1 (9th
Cir. July 18, 2023) (“Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion
that Petitioner could relocate to Mumbai or Kolkata because Petitioner
lived in Mumbai and Kolkata without persecution for significant periods
of time.”); Singh v. Garland, No. 22-171, 2023 WL 3220907, at *1 (9th
Cir. May 3, 2023) (“First, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s
conclusion that Singh can safely relocate in India. Singh argues that he
cannot safely relocate because he is a member of the Mann Party and
faces threats by both the Bharatiya Janata Party (‘BJP’) and Akali Dal
Badal Party (‘Badal Party’). The record supports the conclusion that
Singh is a low-level member of the Mann Party, and the central
authorities controlled by the BJP target ‘high-profile militants.’ Singh is
also unlikely to suffer persecution by Badal Party outside of Punjab since
different political parties control other states.” (citation omitted)); Singh
v. Garland, No. 21-1005, 2023 WL 2945312, at *2 (9th Cir. Apr. 14,
2023) (“Moreover, the agency reasonably found, based on the evidence,
that the particular kind of work Singh engaged in was unlikely to result
in harm to him. Though hard-core militants, or those who have drawn
30                         SINGH V. GARLAND

the interest of central Indian authorities, may be unable to feasibly
relocate within India, political-party workers like Singh who do not draw
governmental scrutiny appear able to do so. … And though Singh
reiterated his fear of future persecution in India based on two attacks that
he experienced as a Congress Party member in Uttar Pradesh, nothing in
the record compels the conclusion that he has a well-founded fear of
persecution in Punjab.”); Singh v. Garland, No. 22-286, 2023 WL
2401263, at *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 8, 2023) (“The agency further found that
although the police with whom Singh spoke did not help him, they did
not take his picture or fingerprint, and Singh indeed testified that he has
no reason to believe the police would seek him out elsewhere in India.
The agency considered whether Singh’s stated intent to continue his
political activity would cause other individuals to harm him outside of
Punjab, see Singh v. Whitaker, 914 F.3d 654, 661 (9th Cir. 2019), and
concluded that country conditions evidence indicated that he would not
be harmed if he expressed his views peacefully, and that Singh did not
testify that he would engage in violent activity. The agency also pointed
to country conditions evidence indicating that low-profile Mann Party
members who expressed their views peacefully have been able to
relocate successfully within India. The record therefore does not compel
the conclusion that internal relocation would not be safe.”); Singh v.
Garland, No. 17-71809, 2022 WL 3998574, at *1 (9th Cir. Sept. 1, 2022)
(“The IJ cited sufficient evidence that Singh could relocate to ‘other
states’ within India beyond Punjab. See Singh v. Whitaker, 914 F.3d 654,
659 (9th Cir. 2019). For example, the IJ found that ‘holding pro-
Khalistani views would not make someone a high-profile militant,’ and
that Sikhs from Punjab may relocate internally to escape the attention of
local police.”); Singh v. Garland, No. 21-70289, 2022 WL 819524, at *1
(9th Cir. Mar. 17, 2022) (“The agency reasonably determined that the
government sufficiently rebutted the presumption of future persecution
with evidence that Singh could safely and reasonably relocate outside of
Punjab (including a 2018 report from the Library of Congress titled
‘India: Feasibility of Relocation of Sikhs and Members of the Shiromani
Akali Dal (Mann) Party,’ which concludes that relocation is feasible as
long as the individual is not a high-profile militant of interest to the
central authorities, together with Singh’s own testimony that he is not a
high-profile member of the Mann Party and has never been linked to any
terrorism or extremism in India).”); Singh v. Garland, No. 16-73511,
                          SINGH V. GARLAND                             31

relocation finding is easily supported by substantial
evidence, and the majority follows a clearly erroneous if too-
familiar path in concluding otherwise.
  A. The BIA Did Not Err When Interpreting the IJ’s
     Decision.
    Assuming that Singh did experience past persecution,
the government bears the burden of overcoming the
presumption that Singh has a well-founded fear of future
persecution. Popova v. INS, 273 F.3d 1251, 1259 (9th Cir.
2001) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i)). The government
can overcome this presumption by proving, as relevant here,

2022 WL 414247, at *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 10, 2022) (“The evidence,
including a 2012 report from the Library of Congress, supported the
conclusion that relocation is feasible given Singh’s own testimony that
he is not a high-profile member of the Mann Party. Although Singh
testified that he continues to support the Mann party and believes he will
be ‘traceable’ as a Sikh if he relocates, the record does not compel a
conclusion different than the agency’s because substantial evidence—
including reports in the administrative record that refute Singh’s
concern—supports the finding that Singh could safely and reasonably
relocate within India.”); Singh v. Garland, No. 19-71638, 2021 WL
5277081, at *1 (9th Cir. Nov. 21, 2021) (“Substantial evidence supports
the agency’s determination that, even if Singh established past
persecution in Punjab, his presumption of a clear probability of future
persecution was rebutted by evidence that he could safely and reasonably
relocate to another part of India.” (citation omitted)); Singh v. Garland,
843 Fed. App’x 973, 974 (9th Cir. 2021) (“Substantial evidence also
supports the agency’s determination that Singh was able to safely
relocate in India to avoid future persecution.” (citation omitted)); Singh
v. Garland, No. 19-70396, 2022 WL 445515, at *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 14,
2022) (“Singh’s speculation that police will harm him on return, his
mother’s interactions with police, and the documentary evidence do not
compel the conclusion that he is more likely than not to be tortured if
removed.”).
32                    SINGH V. GARLAND

that Singh can avoid future persecution by relocating
somewhere within India. Id.
    Here, the BIA provided the benefit of the presumption to
Singh by requiring the government to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that Singh (1) can relocate
within India to a place where he wouldn’t have a well-
founded fear and (2) that it would be reasonable to require
him to relocate there. As explained below, the BIA offered
a reasonable interpretation of the IJ’s decision as it
conducted this analysis, and even if the BIA had
misinterpreted the IJ’s decision, it would be immaterial to
the BIA’s analysis, which is the decision we review for
substantial evidence.
       1. The BIA Reasonably Interpreted the IJ’s
          Decision as Offering Two Alternative
          Analyses.
    Although admitting that both “[t]he IJ and the
BIA … found that even if Singh had established past
persecution, he … could reasonably relocate within India to
avoid future persecution,” the majority insists the BIA
misunderstood the IJ’s decision as performing two
alternative analyses, one of which put the burden on the
government. The majority insists the entirety of the IJ’s
decision put the burden on Singh to prove that it would be
unreasonable for him to relocate within India, and thus the
IJ never shifted the burden to the government to overcome
the presumption that Singh has a well-founded fear of future
persecution.
    The majority’s privileging of its own reading of the IJ’s
decision over the BIA’s alternative interpretation is
inappropriate. The IJ’s decision, while not an exemplar of
clarity, can certainly be read the way the BIA read it—
                      SINGH V. GARLAND                     33

indeed, that might be the only way it should be read. The
BIA construed the IJ’s decision as reaching two alternative
conclusions: First, that Singh did not experience past
persecution and thus had the burden to prove he couldn’t
relocate, and that he failed to meet that burden. Second, that
even if Singh did experience past persecution, and the
government thus bore the burden to prove Singh could
relocate to avoid persecution, the government met its burden
and proved Singh could relocate. That is a reasonable
reading of what the IJ did.
         a. The IJ’s Decision
    The majority quotes several statements from the IJ’s
decision, claiming they demonstrate that the IJ never placed
the burden on the government. One of those statements does
put the burden on Singh, but another puts the burden on the
government. The rest are statements that say nothing as to
who has the burden.
            i.   One Statement Places the Burden on
                 Singh.
    The IJ’s decision contains one statement that clearly
places the burden on Singh to prove that it would be
unreasonable for him to relocate within India:

       As found above, the respondent has not
       established by a preponderance of the
       evidence that it would be unreasonable for
       the respondent to relocate within India to
       avoid future persecution.

Of course, the fact that the IJ put the burden on Singh for
part of its analysis—the part where it had determined Singh
failed to demonstrate past persecution and thus bore the
34                          SINGH V. GARLAND

burden—is entirely unsurprising and consistent with the
BIA’s reading of the IJ’s decision as containing two
alternative analyses. 3
    It could be argued—and presumably this is the
majority’s position—that the “[a]s found above” part of the
IJ’s statement indicates that earlier parts of the IJ’s decision
also necessarily placed the burden on Singh. But it’s not
necessary to read “found above” to mean that. As a logical
matter, if the IJ earlier in its decision reached a finding that
Singh could safely relocate after having placed the burden
on the government—which, as I’ll explain next, is the best
reading of the IJ’s decision—then a fortiori those earlier
findings would support that Singh could relocate once the
burden was switched to Singh. Thus, the BIA reasonably
interpreted the language from the IJ’s decision quoted above
as merely indicating that the same evidence supporting a
finding that the government satisfied its burden of proving
that Singh could relocate also supports a finding on
relocation if Singh bore the burden.
    That, of course, makes sense. Regardless of who has the
burden, the IJ and BIA were required to take into
consideration all evidence submitted by the parties and
determine whether Singh has a well-founded fear of future

3
  The majority relatedly makes much of the IJ’s citation to the regulation
that places the burden on the petitioner to show unreasonableness of
relocation when he experienced no past persecution. But again, the IJ’s
citation to that regulation is entirely consistent with the BIA’s
interpretation of the IJ’s decision, since nobody disagrees that the IJ put
the burden on the petitioner for at least part of the IJ’s analysis. The
mere fact that the IJ cited a regulation relevant to one part of its analysis
that everyone agrees it conducted doesn’t help the majority in showing
that the IJ did not also do an alternative analysis with the burden on the
government.
                          SINGH V. GARLAND                             35

persecution. If a preponderance of the evidence shows that
the government met its burden of showing that Singh can
relocate, then the same evidence shows that Singh did not
prevail on relocation if he bore the burden. Both the IJ and
the BIA considered the whole record and reached a
conclusion supported by substantial evidence that a
preponderance of the evidence demonstrated Singh could
relocate within India to avoid persecution. The single
sentence in the IJ’s decision that Singh failed to meet his
burden after the IJ found that he had not suffered past
persecution does not change this fact and has no impact on
whether the IJ had an alternative finding where it considered
the same “evidence as a whole” while placing the burden on
the government.
             ii.    One Statement Places the Burden on the
                    Government.
    The IJ also determined that “by a preponderance of the
evidence, [Singh] could avoid any future persecution by
relocating to another part of India, and it would be
reasonable to expect him to do so.” Although the IJ did not
explicitly say that it was placing the burden on the
government in this portion of its analysis, that statement just
quoted is only consistent with the IJ putting the burden on
the government. The only circumstance where someone had
to prove, “by a preponderance of the evidence,” that Singh
“could avoid … future persecution by relocating,” is where
the IJ had put the burden of proof for relocation on the
government. 4

4
  Even assuming arguendo that this statement by the IJ could be read
consistently with putting the burden on Singh (which it can’t), reading it
as putting the burden on the government is certainly a reasonable
36                        SINGH V. GARLAND

    After finding that Singh had not faced past persecution,
the IJ considered whether Singh had proven that he has a
well-founded fear of future persecution. The IJ (and the
BIA) concluded he did not. Past persecution is a close call
in this case. Presumably recognizing that, both the IJ and the
BIA offered an alternative conclusion that the government
proved “by a preponderance of the evidence, [Singh] could
avoid any future persecution by relocating to another part of
India, and it would be reasonable to expect him to do so.”
            iii.    The Other Statements Are Irrelevant as
                    to Who Has the Burden.
    The majority points to other statements in the IJ’s
decision as supporting that the IJ kept the burden on Singh
for the entirety of its analysis, but none of those statements
support that conclusion.
    The majority argues that the IJ found Singh could
reasonably relocate within India “not because of evidence
the government offered” but because of “Singh’s failure to
offer evidence that low-level Mann party members have
been targeted or harmed outside of Punjab.” But the
government did offer evidence, including a government
report specifically about persecution of Mann party
members outside of Punjab. That report is evidence the
government offered to show that someone like Singh—a low
level party member—is unlikely to be harmed outside of
Punjab. It is both (1) evidence and (2) individualized
because the agency needed to determine whether Singh was
a low-level party member or not. The IJ’s consideration of

interpretation of the sentence. The IJ does not explicitly say who it is
placing the burden on in this sentence, and nothing in the record belies
the BIA’s reading that here the IJ was putting the burden on the
government.
                      SINGH V. GARLAND                      37

“Singh’s failure to offer evidence that low-level Mann party
members have been targeted or harmed outside of Punjab”
therefore does not demonstrate that the IJ placed the burden
on Singh. The government had already provided evidence
that low-level members like Singh were rarely targeted. The
IJ’s and BIA’s comments about Singh’s evidentiary
shortcomings cannot be divorced from the backdrop of the
government’s evidentiary showing about Singh’s ability to
relocate. The government had already met its burden, and
the agency was merely observing that Singh had failed to
offer any counter evidence that undermined the
government’s showing.
    The majority’s highlighting of other statements by the IJ
face the same problem: those statements only show that the
IJ considered the evidence offered by Singh (or, more
accurately, the lack thereof) as a part of its consideration of
the totality of the evidence. The IJ could reasonably be
read—as the BIA did—as having done so in deciding
whether the Petitioner had provided any evidence rebutting
the evidence given by the government to meet its burden.
Each of the IJ’s references to Singh’s lack of evidence are
against the backdrop of the evidence already offered by the
government.
    For example, the majority points to the IJ’s finding that
“[t]he evidence [Singh] has submitted shows that the
identification system is not uniformly enforced and does not
always involve the police.” The majority next highlights the
IJ’s statement that “the record evidence [does not] indicate
that the identification system is used to target Mann party
members” and concludes that “[t]his discussion reflects that
the burden was on Singh.” But these statements reflect
nothing of the sort. The IJ considered Singh’s evidence on
this issue in light of the evidence the government had already
38                    SINGH V. GARLAND

offered. This shows nothing other than that the IJ considered
all the evidence—something it was required to do regardless
of who bore the burden.
    Similarly, the IJ’s observation that Singh had “not
offered more than speculative assertions that members of an
opposing party would seek him out for persecution,” merely
shows that the IJ weighed the evidence offered by both the
government and Singh to make its determination, and that it
determined the evidence offered by the government was
more concrete than Singh’s. If additional evidence in the
record had corroborated Singh’s bare assertions (and
overcame the strength of the evidence the government
provided), the IJ might have found the government did not
meet its burden of showing Singh could relocate. The simple
fact that a factfinder points out the paucity of evidence
provided by one of the parties does not evince that the
factfinder is necessarily putting the burden on that party. It
just means that party hasn’t put forward anything that would
rebut the other party’s evidence on that issue. The IJ’s
statements that some of Singh’s assertions were
“speculative” and “unsupported” does not show the IJ put
the burden on Singh; it simply shows the IJ satisfied its
responsibility of considering all the evidence—including the
absence thereof in some instances—before deciding if the
party who bore the burden had met it.
    In short, none of the IJ’s statements that the majority
relies on clearly demonstrate that the IJ put the burden on
Singh for the entirety of its analysis. Indeed, at least one of
the IJ’s statements is inconsistent with the conclusion that
Singh bore the burden. It is the panel majority, not the BIA,
that has manufactured a strained reading of the IJ’s decision.
                      SINGH V. GARLAND                     39

         b. The BIA’s Opinion
    As explained, the BIA interpreted the IJ’s decision as
offering two alternative conclusions. First, that Singh had
not suffered past persecution and failed to prove that he had
a well-founded fear of future persecution. And alternatively,
that even if Singh suffered past persecution, the government
proved by a preponderance of the evidence Singh could
relocate within India.
    The BIA did not clearly err in reaching this conclusion.
Although the IJ never explicitly stated that it was making
alternative findings, as described above, the IJ’s decision is
consistent with the BIA’s conclusion that it did. Indeed, the
BIA’s reading is probably the best interpretation of the IJ’s
decision—better than the majority’s, which as explained
simply ignores a statement from the IJ’s decision that only
makes sense if the burden was put on the government for that
part of the decision. The IJ never stated in the section with
that statement that the burden was on Singh. And the IJ’s
only statement clearly placing the burden on Singh is not
inconsistent with the BIA’s “two-alternatives” interpretation
since that interpretation allows that the IJ did properly put
the burden on Singh for part of his analysis. Nothing within
the IJ’s decision forecloses the BIA’s interpretation of it.
       2. Even if the BIA Had Misread the IJ’s
          Decision, the BIA’s Independent Analysis and
          Conclusion That the Government Met Its
          Burden Controls and Is Supported by
          Substantial Evidence.
   It is undisputed that the BIA placed the burden on the
government to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
Singh could relocate within India. No one can dispute that.
The BIA’s opinion is crystal clear that the BIA reached an
40                     SINGH V. GARLAND

alternative conclusion: that even if Singh suffered past
persecution, the government proved by a preponderance of
the evidence that Singh does not have a well-founded fear of
future persecution because he could relocate within India. If
that conclusion is supported by substantial evidence (as
explained below, it is), we should deny Singh’s petition for
review. Instead, the majority gets caught up in a fallacy: that
the BIA’s supposed misunderstanding of the IJ’s decision
affected the BIA’s analysis and ultimate conclusion. But
even if the IJ did not offer alternative conclusions like the
BIA said it did, that reading of the IJ’s decision had no
impact on the BIA’s own analysis regarding whether the
government proved by a preponderance of the evidence that
Singh could relocate.
    When, as here, the BIA conducts its own analysis and
does not merely adopt the IJ’s analysis, the only relevant
question for our review is whether the BIA’s decision was
supported by substantial evidence. See Yan Liu v. Holder,
640 F.3d 918, 925 (9th Cir. 2011). Of course, if the BIA did
adopt portions of the IJ’s decision, we review those as if they
are part of the BIA’s decision. See Shrestha v. Holder, 590
F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2010); Melkonian v. Ashcroft, 320
F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2003). But to the extent the BIA’s
and IJ’s decisions conflict, we review only the BIA’s
conclusion—even if the BIA itself did not recognize a
conflict existed. See Rodriguez-Zuniga v. Garland, 69 F.4th
1012, 1022–23 (9th Cir. 2023) (“If the IJ erred in applying
some … rule, the BIA did not …. And to the extent the BIA
and IJ part ways, we review the BIA’s findings for
substantial evidence.”).
    Here, even if the IJ failed to give Singh the benefit of the
presumption, the BIA clearly did. The BIA explained, “even
assuming the respondent established past persecution, which
                       SINGH V. GARLAND                       41

he did not, … the DHS met its burden of rebutting the
presumption of future persecution based on [Singh’s] ability
to relocate within India.” Unless the record compels a
conclusion otherwise—which it does not—we must uphold
the BIA’s conclusion.
    The majority argues that my reasoning falters because
where “the BIA erred in its relocation analysis, we do not
ignore the error to see if substantial evidence nevertheless
supports the agency’s determination.” But the majority
rebuts a strawman. My argument is not that we should
ignore the agency’s legal error to see if its conclusion is still
otherwise supported by substantial evidence. My argument
is that the BIA’s reading of the IJ as offering alternative
analyses is reasonable, but even if the BIA were wrong about
the IJ’s reasoning, that error did not affect the BIA’s
independent conclusion, which itself is still supported by
substantial evidence.
    Whether the IJ failed to give Singh the benefit of the
presumption is irrelevant to the BIA’s conclusion in this case
because it had no substantive impact on the evidentiary
record. Imagine, for example, that in some hypothetical case
an IJ found the petitioner had suffered past persecution. By
law, that finding should give rise to a presumption of a well-
founded fear of future persecution. But imagine the IJ
messed up and completely biffed it on the law by putting the
burden on the petitioner to prove that he could not relocate
(even though he faced past persecution). That legal error
could be corrected by the BIA on appeal. The BIA could
apply the correct standard—affording the petitioner the
presumption that he has a well-founded fear of future
persecution and placing the burden on the government to
prove that the petitioner could relocate to avoid
persecution—and properly reach the conclusion that the
42                    SINGH V. GARLAND

preponderance of the evidence demonstrated the petitioner
could relocate. The only way the IJ’s misapplication of the
law would impact the BIA’s analysis is if the IJ’s error
somehow prevented the petitioner from completing the
evidentiary record. If, for example, the IJ in our hypothetical
prohibited the government from putting any evidence into
the record (or if the government chose not to) because the
burden, in the IJ’s mistaken view, was on the petitioner to
prove that he could not relocate, then that would of course
affect the evidentiary record and eliminate the BIA’s ability
to later conduct a proper analysis with the burden properly
on the government.
    No one in this case claims such an evidentiary gap exists.
Both the government and Singh put all the evidence they
wished into the record to support their positions regarding
Singh’s ability to relocate. As both the IJ and the BIA
concluded, the preponderance of all that evidence supported
that Singh could relocate within India. That conclusion is
not affected in this case by who bore the burden. In some
cases, who bears the burden can make the difference. But
this is not one of those cases.
    Here, both parties offered evidence the agency could
consider relevant to relocation. Singh’s evidence was
primarily in the form of a self-serving affidavit. The
government’s evidence was more substantial. The agency’s
job was to sift through all the evidence to determine whether
Singh could relocate or not. Because the record does not
compel a contrary conclusion to the BIA’s answer to that
question, we should have denied Singh’s petition for review
of his asylum and withholding of removal claims. There is
simply no need to remand to the BIA for reconsideration of
“its relocation analysis” when the BIA has already properly
considered the evidence while placing the burden of proof
                       SINGH V. GARLAND                      43

on the government, and it’s obvious nothing will change on
remand.
 B. The Agency Reached a Conclusion Supported by
    Substantial Evidence and Did Not Err in Its
    Individualized Analysis Regarding Whether Singh
    Can Relocate.
    The agency “must conduct a reasoned analysis with
respect to a petitioner’s individualized situation” when
determining whether the petitioner can avoid future
persecution by relocating. Singh v. Whitaker, 914 F.3d at
661. Included in this individualized analysis is the question
of whether the police, or people that the police cannot
control, would persecute the petitioner for his future political
activities in the location where the petitioner would relocate.
Id. When reviewing the agency’s analysis, we are supposed
to presume that the agency considered all evidence in the
record, even if some evidence is not explicitly mentioned.
Hernandez v. Garland, 52 F.4th 757, 770–71 (9th Cir. 2022);
see also Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 991 (9th Cir.
2010) (concluding that the agency “adequately considered”
the record even though it “did not directly reference” certain
evidence). Here, applying this well-established presumption
and the agency’s reasoned analysis of the evidence, I
conclude that the agency’s determination is supported by
substantial evidence.
       1. Substantial Evidence Supports the Agency’s
          Conclusion That Singh Can Relocate Within
          India.
    Here, the agency had to determine whether Singh could
relocate outside of Punjab to avoid future persecution.
Citing Singh v. Whitaker, the BIA acknowledged that the IJ
conducted an individualized analysis regarding whether
44                    SINGH V. GARLAND

Singh could relocate within India, and then the BIA
proceeded to conduct its own individualized analysis. Both
the IJ and BIA considered “all of the relevant evidence,
including country conditions information and [Singh’s]
testimony,” and concluded that Singh could relocate within
India to avoid future persecution. Substantial evidence
supports this conclusion.
    As the agency explained, record evidence in this case
establishes that a low-level Mann party member like Singh
who relocates within India typically does not have a well-
founded fear of persecution from police, people from
Punjab, or those outside of Punjab. Absent something
unusual, low-level Mann party workers like Singh are not of
interest to the police or people outside of Punjab; only hard-
core militants are. Because Singh is admittedly not a hard-
core militant, and is merely a low-level Mann party worker,
it is unlikely that someone would harm him outside of
Punjab. Moreover, the record is void of any evidence that
anything about Singh in particular would be of interest to
central Indian authorities, and it is unlikely that “the police
in one state would share information about his location with
opposition party supporters elsewhere in India.” Instead, the
record contains evidence that “the Punjab police would
require a court order … from the other state’s police in order
to track someone who moves to a different state,” and the
police “would likely only track someone in ‘extreme’ cases.”
In addition, Singh is young, in good health, and was already
able to relocate to the United States even though he does not
speak the predominant language here. Hussain v. Rosen, 985
F.3d 634, 649 (9th Cir. 2021).
     To conclude that a finding that Singh is unable to safely
relocate within India is compelled by the record, the majority
first notes that “the DHS was required to demonstrate that
                       SINGH V. GARLAND                      45

individuals like Singh who participate in Mann party
activities or advocate for a separatist Khalistan state in other
regions of India are unlikely to suffer persecution at the
hands of police or opposition party members.” The majority
then inexplicably claims that the “record is devoid of any
such evidence,” simply ignoring the primary evidence the
government submitted on this issue: a governmental report
directly addressing the feasibility of relocation for Sikhs and
Mann party members. That report specifically states that
“only those considered by police to be high-profile militants
are at risk of persecution even if they were to relocate.” And
“simply holding pro-Khalistani views—favoring an
independent Sikh state in Punjab—would not make an
individual a high-profile suspect.”
    This evidence, offered by the government, directly
addresses the issue the majority identifies. It is also
individualized once it is coupled with Singh’s personal low-
level involvement in pro-Khalistani activities. Indeed, our
court has repeatedly relied on precisely this same evidence
in reviewing and affirming agency decisions concluding that
other low-level Mann party members like Singh here could
safely relocate. See, e.g., Singh v. Garland, No. 22-171,
2023 WL 3220907, at *1 (9th Cir. May 3, 2023); Singh v.
Barr, 808 F. App’x 408 (9th Cir. 2020); Singh v. Barr, 786
F. App’x 682 (9th Cir. 2019) (mem.); Gill v. Whitaker, 750
F. App’x 587, 588 (9th Cir. 2019) (mem.). The majority’s
naked assertion that the record here is “devoid of any …
evidence” that “individuals like Singh who participate in
Mann party activities or advocate for a separatist Khalistan
state in other regions of India are unlikely to suffer
persecution” is not just obviously wrong. It also implies that
many other panels of our court have been improperly
denying petitions in other indistinguishable cases despite the
46                     SINGH V. GARLAND

fact that the agency decisions in those cases were supposedly
similarly “devoid of any evidence” supporting those
decisions. Absurd. And insulting to those panels.
    The majority suggests that the government’s report
cannot serve as evidence that Singh would not be targeted by
local authorities in a new state because this court in Singh v.
Whitaker found this “same report wanting.” Again, the
majority misreads Singh v. Whitaker. Nothing in that case
found the report itself “wanting”—which would be strange
indeed since, as documented above, our court has repeatedly
relied on this same report as constituting substantial
evidence supporting the agency’s decisions in many other
cases involving Mann-party petitioners. What the panel in
Singh v. Whitaker found inadequate was the BIA’s “analysis”
in that particular case—not the report. See 914 F.3d at 661.
The panel in Singh v. Whitaker wrote that “[a]lthough the
BIA discussed the … Report and its conclusion that the
police will likely pursue only ‘high-profile militants’ outside
of Punjab, [the BIA] erred by failing to address the potential
harm Congress Party members, or other local authorities,
might inflict upon Singh in a new state.” Id. In other words,
we faulted the BIA for not considering whether local
authorities in a new state would persecute a petitioner, not
for relying on the report (coupled with individual evidence
about how the petitioner fits within the categories discussed
by the report) to conclude that they wouldn’t. The report
states that relocation is “feasible where the applicant’s fear
is of local [Punjabi] police and the individual is not of
interest to the central authorities.” Therefore, the report does
provide evidence that Singh—who is a low-level party
member, and has provided no reason why he would be of
particular interest to authorities outside of Punjab—could
feasibly relocate.
                      SINGH V. GARLAND                     47

    The majority next points out that, “even though Singh
was a low-level party member, opposition party members
specifically targeted him and had a particularized interest in
harming him.” The majority argues that because “[h]is low-
level status in the party did not protect him from past
persecution” it therefore “does not support a conclusion that
his low status will protect him from future persecution
outside of Punjab.”        But this argument rests on a
mischaracterization of the BIA’s findings. The BIA did not
find that opposing party members lacked a particularized
interest in harming Singh in the abstract; the BIA concluded
they lacked a particularized interest in him outside Punjab if
he relocated. Therefore, the targeted incidents with
opposing party members in Punjab, on which the majority
relies, cannot compel a finding that such incidents would
continue if he left Punjab.
    In sum, substantial evidence supports the agency’s
conclusion that Singh could relocate within India to avoid
future persecution, and the record does not compel a
conclusion otherwise.
       2. Singh v. Whitaker Does Not Require the
          Agency to Explicitly Address Whether a
          Petitioner Plans to Continue Proselytizing.
    The majority relies on Singh v. Whitaker to fault the BIA
for not considering Singh’s “stated intent to continue
proselytizing for his party wherever he went.” Given that
(1) the BIA expressly said that it considered Singh’s
testimony (which is the only evidence indicating he’ll
continue proselytizing), and (2) our assumption that the BIA
considered all relevant evidence unless something suggests
or indicates to the contrary, the majority’s opinion can only
be read as requiring the agency to explicitly mention whether
48                    SINGH V. GARLAND

a person will continue proselytizing. Indeed, the majority
concludes that the “BIA’s failure to specifically address”
Singh’s intent to continue proselytizing “rendered the BIA’s
relocation analysis inadequate under” Singh v. Whitaker.
   That is an extreme and unwarranted reading of Singh v.
Whitaker. Requiring explicit consideration of these matters
would not only be inconsistent with Singh v. Whitaker itself,
but also would be contrary to basic principles in our
immigration precedent.
    In Singh v. Whitaker, the court faulted the BIA for
considering only whether the petitioner would suffer harm
from the Punjabi police outside of Punjab. 914 F.3d at 661.
The BIA had not conducted any reasoned analysis regarding
persecution the petitioner might experience by non-Punjabi
police or other people outside of Punjab as a result of his
future political activities. Id. Instead, the BIA completely
ignored that Singh might face persecution in the future by
people outside of Punjab. Id.
    In contrast, both the IJ and the BIA in this case expressly
considered (1) whether police or other people from Punjab
would persecute Singh in the future and (2) whether police
or other people outside of Punjab would. The agency
ultimately concluded that Singh’s individualized
circumstances made him of no interest to opposition party
members anywhere other than in Punjab. Moreover, the fact
that Singh will continue proselytizing is not highly probative
or potentially dispositive in this case. Najmabadi, 597 F.3d
at 991. And although the agency did not explicitly address
this fact, there is nothing to suggest that the agency did not
consider it—to the contrary, there is indication that it did.
The BIA specifically cited Singh v. Whitaker. Yet the
majority strangely concludes that the BIA cited Whitaker
                      SINGH V. GARLAND                      49

and then blatantly ignored what it says. Instead of applying
the normal presumption that the agency followed the law,
Kohli v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 1061, 1068 (9th Cir. 2007), the
majority applies the opposite presumption that even when
the agency explicitly references the correct law, it’s probably
not following it.
    Ultimately, the majority’s conclusion in this case makes
no sense unless you read Singh v. Whitaker as imposing a
“magic words” requirement that the agency must explicitly
mention that someone intends to continue their political
advocacy. I would not lightly read Whitaker that way, since
that would be obviously contrary to basic principles in
immigration law.       We always presume the agency
considered all relevant evidence even if it’s not explicitly
mentioned. See Hernandez, 52 F.4th at 771; Najmabadi, 597
F.3d at 991. And underlying the presumption of a well-
founded fear of future persecution is the assumption that the
petitioner will continue being politically active in the new
location. If the petitioner did not continue his political
activity, that would arguably give rise to a changed
circumstance finding that would overcome the presumption
that the petitioner has a well-founded fear of future
persecution. And even the majority does not appear fully
committed to its position that the BIA’s failure to expressly
mention that Singh intended to continue proselytizing is fatal
to the BIA’s decision on its own. In the majority’s own
words, any error here simply “compound[s] its mistake.”
    Ultimately, this case is yet another example of our court
inventing trivial and nitpicky supposed shortcomings in the
agency’s analyses in order to buy petitioners another round
of proceedings before the immigration authorities, and all
the resultant delay that entails. The record does not compel
a conclusion contrary to the BIA’s. Rather, substantial
50                       SINGH V. GARLAND

evidence supports the conclusion that Singh can relocate
within India to avoid future persecution, just as it has
supported the same conclusion for literally dozens of other
Mann Party Sikhs from Punjab seeking asylum. 5

5
  I agree with the majority that Singh’s petition for review of his CAT
claim should be denied.