Court Opinion

ID: 9856953
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 07:08:12.236949+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:37:35.561221
License: Public Domain

Evans, Judge,
dissenting. I concur in all that is set forth in Judge Clark’s very cogent and persuasive dissent, and I wish to add these lines. There can be no doubt that every one of the jurors, being intelligent human beings, fully understood the pointed and damaging statement by the trial judge. The juror wished to know if the defendant had a prior record, and Judge Tanksley, in the presence of all twelve jurors, stated: "I cannot address you with regard to this in any way at this time. ’’(Emphasis supplied.) What intelligence did that transmit to the mind of each juror — that at some future time the judge could tell them that the defendant had no prior record? Assuredly not — they knew — as any sensible person would know — that the judge labored under some inhibition which *339prevented his telling the jury about the prior record of the defendant at this time.
But assume that half the jurors were paying little attention, or took this to mean that the defendant had no prior record; and assume the other half took the opposite view, — that the defendant did have a prior record — that is enough to pollute the pure stream which supposedly flows from the fountain of justice. The defendant has no burden of showing that each juror understood the language to mean he had a prior record, or that even one of these so understood it. All he has to show is that the language was such that one juror could have understood it to mean he had a prior record.
Could the trial court, can this court, can anybody say that not a single one of the jurors so understood the judge’s message? Unless we can so state, then we are duty bound to grant the defendant a new trial. The defendant does not have to show that he was injured; he only has to show that he could have been injured by this very pointed and accusatory language.
It has been held that where the trial judge inadvertently uses language which could have injured the defendant, such requires a new trial as "we have no way of telling how much influence it may have had on the jury in arriving at their verdict. ” Nixon v. State, 14 Ga. App. 261, 263 (80 SE 513). The same language citing Nixon is found in Moyers v. State, 58 Ga. App. 237, 240 (198 SE 283). It has also been held that even though the verdict arrived at is the one that ought to have been rendered, and the erroneous statement was wholly unintended by the judge, a reversal must be had "whether in fact it was injurious to the party or not. ” Central of Ga. R. Co. v. Augusta Brokerage Co., 2 Ga. App. 511, 513 (58 SE 904). And where a "slip of the tongue” occurs, unless the true meaning is so palpable as to be clearly understood by the jury, a reversal is required. Plaspohl v. Atlantic C. L. R. Co., 87 Ga. App. 506 (1) (74 SE2d 491).
For all of the foregoing, I am quite convinced that my esteemed colleagues of the majority are in serious error in affirming this unwarranted language by the trial judge in the presence of the jury, and I dissent.