Court Opinion

ID: 9711941
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:42:39.275187+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:08.562922
License: Public Domain

PALLADINO, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
The majority considers first whether the question of immunity has been preserved for our review. I believe that the Appellants waived this issue by failing to (1) file an answer and brief below, and (2) failing to appear for oral argument before the trial court
*534Unlike cases where the motion for summary judgment is granted solely because the opposing party failed to abide by a local rule requiring a response within a given period of time, Brogan v. Holmes Electric Protection Co., 501 Pa. 234, 460 A.2d 1093 (1983); Zoning Board of Adjustment of the City of Philadelphia v. Willits Woods Associates, 112 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 24, 534 A.2d 862 (1987); Civil Service Commission of the City of Philadelphia v. Farrell, 99 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 631, 513 A.2d 1123 (1986); Richland Mall Corp. v. Kasco Construction Co., 337 Pa.Superior Ct. 204, 486 A.2d 978 (1984), the trial court, in the instant matter, proceeded to address the merits of the motion, properly placed the burden of proof upon the moving party, and found that this burden had been met.
Cases cited by the majority, do not support the conclusion that the issue has been preserved for review. The mere fact that an issue is addressed by the trial court, does not mean that the issue is before the appellate court. Issues can be waived. I believe that the rules of civil procedure require the party taking the appeal to preserve the issue for appeal, by, at a minimum, appearing before the trial court to object to the granting of summary judgment. Under the circumstances, in this case, I believe that rule 302 requires that the appeal be quashed.1
To conclude otherwise, I believe would emasculate the motion for summary judgment and similar procedural devices, by permitting appeals merely to facilitate arguments, which should have been made before the trial court. By addressing the merits of the appeal, as the Appellant requests, we have sanctioned conduct which will further bur*535den the limited appellate resources available to the citizens of this commonwealth.
The en banc decision of this court in Department of Public Assistance v. Ward, 108 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 572, 530 A.2d 145 (1987), prohibits this court from addressing the issue of immunity. In Ward DPA appealed from an order striking judgment and awarding counsel fees against DPA, after it had failed to answer the petition to strike off judgment, failed to respond to the request for counsel fees, failed to file a brief in opposition to the petition to strike off judgment, and failed to appear at the hearing on the matter, all at the trial court level. We held as follows:
To allow [DPA] to benefit from the gross dereliction of their duty to the trial court as well as the disrespect their actions have shown to Appellees by allowing them the opportunity on appeal to address issues not worthy of their response or appearance below, would be inequitable. Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) bars the resurrection of such issues when it states: “Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”
108 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. at 580, 530 A.2d at 149 (emphasis added). The majority opinion in effect overrules Ward, an option not available to a panel of this court. Accordingly, I would quash the appeal.
Turning to the second issue, I am convinced that the fire company and its employees are immune from liability, under 42 Pa.C.S. § 8541,2 and that the facts of this case do not support an action under the exceptions to governmental immunity set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542.
In Zern v. Muldoon, 101 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 258, 516 A.2d 799 (1986), this court, after examining in depth the legal relationship between volunteer fire companies and local municipalities, concluded that:
*536[B]ecause of their distinct creation and present relationship to municipalities, [volunteer fire companies] presently enjoy governmental immunity.
Id., 101 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. at 271, 516 A.2d at 805 (emphasis in original). The Zern court relied heavily upon Radobersky v. Imperial Volunteer Fire Department, 368 Pa. 235, 81 A.2d 865 (1951), overruled on other grounds by Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 282 A.2d 206 (1971). The language of importance from Radobersky is as follows:
[A volunteer fire company] an agency capable of performing a governmental function and as such, was entitled to immunity from liability for torts committed by its servants while acting in furtherance of the defendant’s corporate purpose to ‘engage in the prevention and control and extinguishment of fires____’
Id., 368 Pa. at 239, 81 A.2d at 867 (emphasis added). As this court said in Guinn v. Alburtis Fire Company, 134 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 270, 273-274, 577 A.2d 971, 973-74 (1990):
Analogizing governmental immunity to employer immunity, this Court has determined that activities such as fundraisers and educational fire-fighting demonstrations are traditional functions of a volunteer fire company, providing immunity from suit for purposes of The Pennsylvania Workmen’s Compensation Act. Temple v. Milmont Fire Co., 106 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 120, 525 A.2d 848 (1987). However, although mere serving of alcohol does not render Alburtis’ actions outside the scope of its duties, in the context of this tort claim, the facts Guinn pled, if proved, may establish that Alburtis was not within the scope of its duties. (Emphasis added.)
This court reversed the trial court’s sustaining of preliminary objections in Guinn, not because immunity did not apply, but because it was not clear from the pleadings that the fire company was acting outside the scope of its corporate duties. In the matter now before this court, there is no such factual question: this was a fund raising activity of the fire company, and as such was a function providing *537immunity from suit, unless that immunity was statutorily waived.
The majority mistakenly cites to 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(b)(7)3 to support its conclusion that because the commonwealth has chosen to waive immunity for itself for the sale of liquor, that it is contrary to legislative intent to not waive such immunity for volunteer fire companies. However, it must be remembered that the constitution of this commonwealth has placed into the hands of the legislature the right to make such policy decisions, and it is not the function of the judicial branch to legislate. Construing the waivers of immunity strictly, as we must, Mascaro v. Youth Study Center, 514 Pa. 351, 523 A.2d 1118 (1987), no similar waiver is applicable to local agencies. Accordingly, the fire company is immune from suit, when the serving of alcohol is part of a fundraising activity.
The absurdity of the result reached by the majority is exemplified in the following corollary: immunity is available when the local agency is spending money, but is not available when the local agency is collecting the money which it will spend. No such distinction has been made by the legislature, nor have we made such a distinction in the past; we should not make such a distinction in the matter now before us.
In conclusion, I believe that this appeal should be quashed, or in the alternative, the trial court affirmed.

. This conclusion is not inconsistent with the recent opinions of the superior court in Moore v. Gates, 398 Pa.Superior Ct. 211, 580 A.2d 1138 (1990) and Troy v. Kampgrounds of America, Inc., 399 Pa.Superior Ct. 41, 581 A.2d 665 (1990). In both Moore and Troy the party opposing summary judgment did not file either an answer or counter-affidavits, but did appear to oppose the motion at a hearing. As a result, the issues raised by the motion were preserved for appeal. In the matter now before this court, there was no opposition to the motion from the Appellants, hence no preservation of issues.

. This section provides as follows:
§ 8541. Governmental Immunity generally
Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, no local agency shall be liable for any damages on account of any injury to a person or property caused by any act of the local agency or an employee thereof or any other person.

. This section reads as follows:
§ 8522. Exceptions to sovereign immunity
(b) Acts which may impose liability. — The following acts by a Commonwealth party may result in the imposition of liability on the Commonwealth and the defense of sovereign immunity shall not be raised to claims for damages caused by:
(7) Liquor store sales. — The sale of liquor at Pennsylvania liquor stores by employees of the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board created by and operating under the act of April 12, 1951 (P.L. 90, No. 21) known as the "Liquor Code” if such sale is made to any minor, or to any person visibly intoxicated, or to any insane person, or to any person known as an habitual drunkard, or of known intemperate habit. (Footnote omitted.)