Court Opinion

ID: 9562412
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:28:21.851144+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:20.308715
License: Public Domain

CAREY, Judge, pro tem.,
Concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with the decision to affirm the judgment of conviction and to affirm the denial of the Rule 35 motion. I also concur that Blue Cross is not a “health care provider” for the purposes of awarding restitution.
I dissent from the majority opinion, however, to the extent that it holds that the subro-gee of a named victim in a criminal case, having paid some or all of the victim’s damages resulting from the defendant’s criminal conduct, is not entitled to a judgment of restitution under I.C. § 19-5304.
It is patent that Blue Cross is subrogated to the rights of the victim in this case, because it paid $88,120.50 of the medical bills incurred by the victim as a direct result of the defendant’s criminal conduct. Subrogation is a complete substitution of rights; the subrogee stands in the shoes of the subrogor. It has the same rights as the subrogor, and it is subject to the same burdens and limitations. International Equipment Service, Inc. v. Pocatello Industrial Park Co., 107 Idaho 1116, 695 P.2d 1255 (1985).
Although a person who reimburses a victim of crime for economic loss is not specifically included in the definition of “victim” under I.C. § 19-5304(l)(e), the statute does provide that “The existence of a policy of insurance covering the victim’s loss shall not absolve the defendant of the obligation to pay restitution.” I.C. § 19-5304(2). Thus, in State v. Fortin, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court was correct in refusing to receive evidence that the victim of an aggravated DUI, who was awarded restitution of $12,975.00, had been covered by insurance. As the Court of Appeals noted, “... that the victim had received insurance benefits was irrelevant to the court’s decision on restitution.” State v. Fortin, 124 Idaho 323, 328, 859 P.2d 359, 364 (Ct.App.1993).
If an already-compensated victim may recover a judgment of restitution, it follows that the subrogee, who paid the victim’s medical bills and who has the same rights, burdens and limitations as the subrogor-victim, should have the same right to claim restitution in the criminal proceeding as the victim in whose shoes it stands. This is the rule that has been adopted in the majority of American jurisdictions. Hagler v. State, 625 So.2d 1190 (Ala.App.1993); State v. Steffy, 173 Ariz. 90, 839 P.2d 1135 (App.1992); Warzybok v. State, 505 So.2d 507 (Fla.App.1987); Rogers v. State, 210 Ga.App. 164, 435 S.E.2d 457 (1993); State v. Jola, 409 N.W.2d 17 (Minn.App.1987); State v. Brooks, 116 N.M. 309, 862 P.2d 57 (App.1993); People v. Chery, 126 A.D.2d 659, 511 N.Y.S.2d 88 (1987); LaFleur v. State, 848 S.W.2d 266 (Tex.App.1993); State v. Stayer, 706 P.2d 611 (Utah 1985); Alger v. Commonwealth, 19 Va.App. 252, 450 S.E.2d 765 (1994). There are a few jurisdictions that have reached a contrary conclusion. People v. Williams, 207 Cal. App.3d 1520, 255 Cal.Rptr. 778 (1989); State v. Fryer, 496 N.W.2d 54 (S.D.1993). There also are a few jurisdictions in which criminal restitution statutes expressly exclude insur*169ers from the class entitled to recover restitution.
The Williams case from California, cited by the majority, was not followed in the subsequent case of People v. Foster, 14 Cal.App.4th 939, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 (1993). In an even more recent case, issued after an amendment to California law limiting restitution to “direct” victims of crime, a California court allowed restitution to be ordered in favor of an insured victim and left it to the victim and its insurer to work out repayment under the terms of their insurance contract. People v. Sexton, 33 Cal.App.4th 64, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 242 (1995).
The majority opinion gives the criminal a windfall if the victim has had the foresight to obtain insurance and if the insurer promptly lives up to its responsibilities. This is especially true if the criminal declares bankruptcy, leaving the insurer with no viable civil remedy. The majority opinion also is contrary to the spirit, if not the letter, of I.C. § 19-5304(2), since it effectively “absolve[s] the defendant of the obligation to pay restitution.” For the foregoing reasons, I would rule that Blue Cross is a “victim” for the purpose of restitution, and I would remand the case to the trial court to hold a restitution hearing.
Finally, even if the majority opinion is correct, it should be read only as a limitation on entry of a judgment of restitution under I.C. § 19-5304. It should not be read as a limitation on a trial court’s discretion to impose restitution in favor of a third person as a condition of probation in an appropriate case.