Court Opinion

ID: 9544031
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:51:30.490357+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:11:49.381776
License: Public Domain

Chief Justice ROVIRA
concurring in the result and dissenting to Part TV:
I concur in the result reached by the majority but dissent to the conclusion that “unlawful entry” means a knowing, criminal entry into a dwelling. A sounder conclusion, based on the criminal code, would be to define “unlawful entry” as an entry into a dwelling in violation of criminal law.
I
At the outset I believe we should first consider the meaning of the phrases “unlawful entry” and “uninvited entry” in the “make-my-day” statute. Ambiguity arises from the General Assembly’s use of both phrases in section 18 — 1—704.5(2).1 It is unclear whether to satisfy the statute an entry must be only unlawful, unlawful and uninvited, or either unlawful or uninvited.
The court of appeals concluded that the two terms were interchangeable. People v. McNeese, 865 P.2d 881, 884 (Colo.App.1993). I disagree with that court’s conclusion that the General Assembly intended an “unlawful entry” to equal an “uninvited entry.” I agree with the majority that the phrase “uninvited entry” refers to the “unlawful entry” and should be read as such.2 See Maj. op. at 312 n. 16.
An “unlawful entry” encompasses a broader range of conduct than an “uninvited entry.”3 Although an “uninvited entry” may be some proof that an entry was unlawful, the two are not interchangeable because alone an “uninvited entry” would not fulfill the statutory requirement of an “unlawful entry.” See People v. Malczewski, 744 P.2d 62 (Colo.1987) (police officer did not unlawfully enter an apartment to take a child into temporary custody even though the officer was uninvited). Therefore, the statute does not require that the entry be both unlawful *315and uninvited or that the entry be either unlawful or uninvited. Rather, the defendant must prove an actual unlawful entry to satisfy the first prong of the statute, People v. Guenther, 740 P.2d 971, 979 (Colo.1987), and in addition, establish that he has a reasonable belief that the person who entered has committed a crime in the dwelling, or is committing or intends to commit a crime against a person or property in addition to the unlawful entry.
II
The question remains as to what constitutes an “unlawful entry.” The “make-my-day” statute does not define the phrase. Accordingly, it should be analyzed in context with, and with regard to, its intended purpose evident from the statutory scheme. Because the “make-my-day” statute appears within the Colorado Criminal Code, I believe we should look to the Code for assistance in arriving at the proper definition of “unlawful entry.” Colorado Dep’t of Social Serv. v. Board of County Comm’rs, 697 P.2d 1, 16 (Colo.1985) (statutes which are part of the same code and pertain to the same subject matter must be read in pari materia).
Section 18-4-201(3), 8B C.R.S. (1986), provides a definition of unlawful entry applicable to offenses found in Article 4, Offenses Against Property. It states “[a] person ‘unlawfully enters or remains’ in or upon premises when he is not licensed, invited, or otherwise privileged to do so.”4 This definition does not contain a culpable mental state of knowingly although offenses containing an “unlawful entry” element may do so. “Unlawful entry” appears in the various degrees of burglary and criminal trespass.5
Another offense which includes an “unlawful entry” is an entry into a dwelling in violation of a restraining order. In a domestic situation, a restraining order can be issued to exclude “a party from the home of another party upon a showing that physical or emotional harm would otherwise result.” § 14-4-102(l)(e), 6B C.R.S. (1994 Supp.). Section 14-4-105, provides “[a] person failing to comply with any order of the court issued pursuant to this article shall be found in contempt of court and, in addition, may be punished as provided in section 18-6-803.5, C.R.S.” Section 18-6-803.5, 8B C.R.S. (1994 Supp.) states “[a] person commits the crime of violation of a restraining order if such person commits an act which is prohibited by any court pursuant to a valid order issued pursuant to ... sections 14-1-101 to 14-4-104, C.R.S. ... which restrains and enjoins any person from ... entering or remaining on [a] premises-” (emphasis added).6 Therefore, entry into a dwelling that violates a restraining order is an unlawful entry.
The majority defines unlawful entry as a knowing, criminal entry into a dwelling. It arrives at this conclusion by first examining the statute’s legislative history. It finds support for its inclusion of a knowing mental state because of the references in the debate and hearings that the statute was to protect homeowners against intruders who illegally entered a dwelling, a burglary-type situation. Maj. op. at 310. The majority then infers a knowing requirement because first and second degree burglary require a person to “knowingly enter or remain unlawfully” in a building or occupied structure. § 18-4-202 to -203, 8B C.R.S. (1986).
I do not believe that the General Assembly intended “unlawful entry” to require a “knowing” entry. It could have explicitly provided for a culpable mental state if it so intended. I fail to see how the legislative history relied upon by the majority opinion supports the conclusion that in order to es*316tablish immunity from prosecution, the homeowner must prove that the intruder had the culpable mental state of “knowing” when he entered the home. One has only to consider the definition of knowingly to recognize that the legislature did not intend to burden the homeowner with this task.7 The hearings give an example of conduct that could satisfy the statute and do not dictate the only situation in which the statute would grant immunity.
The majority further supports its conclusion by stating
[t]he statutory language justifies an occupant’s use of physical force against another person when the other person is knowingly engaging in criminal conduct.... By providing both objective and subjective elements, the structure of section 18-1-704.5 contemplates that an unlawful entry means a knowing, criminal entry.
Maj. op. at 311. The majority also concludes that immunity was not intended to justify use of physical force against persons who enter a dwelling accidently or in good faith. Id. at 311.
This analysis fails both the test of logic and common sense. First, the express language of the statute does not limit the unlawful entry to those entries which are knowing violations of the criminal law. Second, the intruder does not have to knowingly engage in criminal conduct in order for an occupant of a dwelling to be immune from prosecution. See maj. op. at 311. Rather, the person using physical force must reasonably believe a crime has been, is being, or will be committed by the intruder and the intruder will use physical force, no matter how slight, against the occupant. Once an intruder unlawfully enters a dwelling, no additional crime must be committed nor must actual force be used against the occupant of the dwelling. The reasonable belief standard protects the homeowner even if his beliefs are incorrect and a person entered the dwelling by mistake. The majority’s analysis improperly shifts the focus from the reasonable beliefs of the occupant using physical force to the mental state of the intruder.
The original bill, House Bill 1361, required an unlawful and forcible entry. Wilbanks, supra note 2, at 31. However, because an occupant of a dwelling was not likely to know whether the intruder entered forcibly or through an unlocked door or window, the “forcible entry” language was removed from the bill. Id. at 44. The majority’s definition of “unlawful entry” has a similar deficiency. The occupant of a dwelling is not likely to know what an intruder’s state of mind is upon entering the dwelling.
I see no reason to add a culpable mental state of knowingly in arriving at a definition of “unlawful entry.” The relevant mental state is not that of the intruder, but that of the person who used physical force against the intruder.
The majority indicates that first and second degree burglary and first and second degree criminal trespass may satisfy the “unlawful entry” element. Maj. op. at 311-312. However, under the majority’s definition, third degree criminal trespass would not fulfill the “unlawful entry” requirement because it lacks the culpable mental state of knowingly. The third degree criminal trespass statute provides “[a] person commits the crime of third degree criminal trespass if he unlawfully enters or remains in or upon premises.” § 18-4-504, 8B C.R.S. (1986) (emphasis added). By its silence in not referring to third degree criminal trespass, the majority is holding that a statute which defines a crime as “unlawfully enters” does not satisfy the “unlawful entry” element of the “make-my-day” statute. The logic, or lack thereof, which supports the majority’s position further convinces me that the legislature never intended “unlawful entry” to be defined as requiring a culpable mental state.
As to second degree trespass, the majority ignores the fact that it has a knowing requirement for only that portion of the statute *317which refers to a hotel, motel, condominium, or apartment building. § 18-4-503, 8B C.R.S. (1986). It provides “[a] person commits the crime of second degree criminal trespass if he unlawfully enters or remains in or upon the premises which are enclosed in a manner designed to exclude intruders or are fenced or if he knowingly and unlawfully enters or remains in or upon the premises of a hotel, motel condominium, or apartment building.” Id. (emphasis added). Therefore, under the majority’s analysis only certain types of second degree criminal trespass would satisfy the “make-my-day” statute because its definition of “unlawful entry” turns on a distinction between mental states, and not on the difference between “dwelling” and “premises.” Maj. op. at 312 n. 15.
The majority cites Bollier v. People, 635 P.2d 543 (Colo.1981), for the proposition that second degree trespass has an implied mental state of knowingly. Maj. op. at 312. The majority also refers to People v. Moore, 674 P.2d 354 (Colo.1984) and People v. Bridges, 620 P.2d 1 (Colo.1980), to support its conclusion that the court is required to imply a culpable mental state. Maj. op. at 311. Bol-lier, Moore, and Bridges implied a mental state because the defendants were being charged with a criminal offense and a mental state was required for a conviction. Id. at 546.
The rationale for implying a mental state does not exist in this case. The “make-my-day” statute does not define a criminal offense but provides immunity from prosecution or an affirmative defense. The intruder is not charged with any crime and therefore no mental state is necessary. It is well settled that the legislature may define certain acts as criminal without requiring scien-ter when public policy dictates it for protection of the public health, safety, and welfare. People v. Garcia 189 Colo. 347, 541 P.2d 687 (1975) (no scienter necessary for fourth degree arson because control of fire is a matter of great public concern).
I believe the General Assembly intended an “unlawful entry” to mean an entry in violation of criminal law. I do not agree that the Assembly intended to limit “unlawful entry” to a select few offenses which contain a requirement that an entry be a knowing, criminal entry. Because I believe my interpretation more accurately reflects the legislature’s intent, I dissent from so much of Part IV as holds to the contrary.

.Subsection (2) of 18-1-704.5, 8B C.R.S. (1986), provides:
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 18-1-704, any occupant of a dwelling is justified in using any degree of physical force, including deadly physical force, against another person when that other person has made an unlawful entry into the dwelling, and when the occupant has a reasonable belief that such other person has committed a crime in the dwelling in addition to the uninvited entry, or is committing or intends to commit a crime against a person or property in addition to the uninvited entry, and when the occupant reasonably believes that such other person might use any physical force, no matter how slight, against any occupant.
(emphasis added).

. William Wilbanks conducted a study of the Colorado “make-my-day" law and suggested that the references to "uninvited entry" should be changed to "unlawful entry" to avoid confusion. William Wilbanks, The Make My Day Law: Colorado’s Experiment in Home Protection 340 (1989).

. "Unlawful is a broader term and includes entries that are uninvited as well as forcible but removes the focus on the term uninvited." Wilbanks, supra note 2, at 342.

. Under the "make-my-day” statute, a person receives immunity from prosecution for the use of force against a person who unlawfully entered a dwelling and not a person who unlawfully remains in the dwelling. People v. Drennon, 860 P.2d 589, 591 (Colo.App.1993).

. See §§ 18-4-202 to -203, 8B C.R.S. (1986) (burglary); §§ 18-4-502 to -504, 8B C.R.S. (1986) (criminal trespass).

.Justice Scott has expressed concern that the majority opinion’s definition of "unlawful entry” does not permit a spouse to protect herself with physical force from an abusive spouse who enters a dwelling by way of a key. Scott, J., dissenting, slip op. at 15. These statutes demonstrate that the spouse could show an "unlawful entry” in this situation entitling her to seek immunity under the "make-my-day" statute.

. A person acts "knowingly” or "willfully” with respect to conduct or to circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware that his conduct is of such nature or that such circumstance exists. A person acts "knowingly” or “willfully”, with respect to a result of his conduct, when he is aware that his conduct is practically certain to cause the result.
§ 18-1-501(6), 8B C.R.S. (1986).