Court Opinion

ID: 9957608
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-04 17:15:33.601071+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:28.084498
License: Public Domain

J-A08030-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  IN THE INTEREST OF: C.C., A                  :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  MINOR                                        :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: J.C., FATHER                      :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 2998 EDA 2023

              Appeal from the Order Entered October 25, 2023
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                      No(s): CP-51-DP-0000377-2020

  IN THE INTEREST OF: C.J.C., A                :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  MINOR                                        :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: J.C., FATHER                      :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 2999 EDA 2023

             Appeal from the Decree Entered October 25, 2023
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                      No(s): CP-51-AP-0000311-2023

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                                 FILED APRIL 04, 2024

       In this consolidated appeal,1 Appellant, J.C., (“Father”) appeals from the

October 25, 2023 decree entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia

County at trial court docket number CP-51-AP-0000311-2023 (“Case
____________________________________________

1 In a January 10, 2024 per curiam order, this Court consolidated sua sponte

the appeals filed with this Court at docket numbers 2998 EDA 2023 and
2999 EDA 2023.
J-A08030-24

311-2023”) that terminated his parental rights to his dependent child, C.J.C.,

a male child born January 2017, (“the Child”) pursuant to section 2511 of the

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101 - 2938.2       Additionally, Father appeals

from the October 25, 2023 order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of

Philadelphia County at trial court docket number CP-51-DP-0000377-2020

(“Case 377-2020”) that granted a motion filed by the Philadelphia Department

of Human Servies (“DHS”) to change the permanency goal of the Child from

reunification to adoption pursuant to the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§§ 6301 – 6375.       We affirm the decree involuntarily terminating Father’s

parental rights and, therefore, dismiss Father’s appeal filed at 2998 EDA 2023

as moot.

       The record demonstrates that, on August 18, 2023, DHS filed a petition

for involuntary termination of Father’s parental rights pursuant to Sections

2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8), and (b) of the Adoption Act. That same

day, DHS also filed a petition to change the Child’s placement goal from one

of reunification with Father to adoption.3 Carla Beggin, Esquire was appointed

as guardian ad litem (“GAL”) to represent the best interests of the Child.

Bernadette Perkins, Esquire was appointed as legal counsel to represent the

____________________________________________

2 We note that in the caption of the appeal filed at 2998 EDA 2023, the minor

child is identified as “C.C.” but in the caption of the appeal filed at
2999 EDA 2023, the same minor child is identified as “C.J.C.” For purpose of
identification, we refer to the minor child as “C.J.C.”

3 The Child’s biological mother, J.G., (“Mother”) died on April 7, 2021.

                                           -2-
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legal interests of the Child.4          Scott Gessner, Esquire was appointed to

represent Father. On October 25, 2023, the trial court conducted a hearing

on the termination petition and the petition for goal change. Father attended

the hearing.

       On October 25, 2023, the trial court found that DHS met its burden of

proof under Sections 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8), and (b) of the

Adoption Act, and subsequently terminated Father’s parental rights to the

Child. On that same day, the trial court also granted DHS’s request to change

the permanent placement goal to one of adoption with regard to the Child.

This appeal followed.5

       Father raises the following issues for our review:

       1.     Did the trial court err in terminating [Father’s] parental
              rights because [DHS] failed to establish by clear and
              convincing evidence that [Father] cannot or will not be able
              to remedy the incapacity and conditions which led to [the
              Child’s] removal and by finding that there would be no
              irreparable harm to [the Child?]
____________________________________________

4 Neither Attorney Beggin or Attorney Perkins filed a brief with this Court.
However, we note that, during the hearing, both the GAL and the Child’s legal
counsel joined with DHS and concluded the Child would be harmed if removed
from his foster parents’ home. N.T., 10/25/23, at 45-48.

5 Father filed separate concise statements of errors complained of on appeal

pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a)(2)(i), along
with separate notices of appeal at each of the aforementioned trial court
dockets on November 23, 2023. The trial court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion
on December 5, 2023, stating that it relied upon its statement, appearing on
pages 50 and 51 of the October 25, 2023 hearing transcript, to support the
termination of Father’s parental rights to the Child and the change in the
permanent placement goal to one of adoption.

                                           -3-
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      [2.]   Did the trial court err in changing the [permanent
             placement] goal to [one of] adoption where the record
             shows that [Father] substantially complied with the family
             service plan and that he made progress towards alleviating
             the circumstances which necessitated the original
             placement[?]

Father’s Brief (Case 311-2023) at 3 (Issue 1); see also Father’s Brief (Case

377-2020) at 3 (Issue 2).

      Father’s first issue challenges the trial court’s termination of his parental

rights pursuant to Section 2511 of the Adoption Act. In matters involving the

termination of parental rights, our standard of review is well-settled.

      The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
      requires appellate courts “to accept the findings of fact and
      credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
      by the record.” In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826 (Pa.
      2012). “If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts
      review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or
      abused its discretion.” Id. “A decision may be reversed for an
      abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
      unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill[-]will.” Id.
      The trial court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely
      because the record would support a different result. Id. at 827.
      We have previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that
      often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning
      multiple hearings. See In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d [1179, 1190 (Pa.
      2010)].

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (original brackets omitted). “[T]he

trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented, and

is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in

the evidence.” In re Q.R.D., 214 A.3d 233, 239 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation

omitted). “If competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will

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affirm even if the record could also support the opposite result.” In re B.J.Z.,

207 A.3d 914, 921 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted).

      The termination of parental rights is guided by Section 2511 of the

Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis of the grounds for

termination followed by an assessment of the needs and welfare of the child.

      Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the [trial]
      court must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating
      parental rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent.
      The party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing
      evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds
      for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the [trial]
      court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination
      of his or her parental rights does the [trial] court engage in the
      second     part   of     the     analysis    pursuant    to    Section
      2511(b)[ - ]determination of the needs and welfare of the child
      under the standard of best interests of the child. One major
      aspect of the needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and
      status of the emotional bond between parent and child, with close
      attention paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing
      any such bond.

B.J.Z., 207 A.3d at 921 (citation omitted).        We have defined clear and

convincing evidence as that which is “so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing

as to enable the trier[-]of[-]fact to come to a clear conviction, without

hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d

1108, 1116 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted).       A child has a right to a

stable, safe, and healthy environment in which to grow, and the “child's life

simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that the parent will summon the

ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.” In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5, 9

(Pa. Super. 2009).

                                      -5-
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      Here, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights to the child

pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), and (a)(8). Section 2511(a)

provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

              § 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

      (a)   General rule. - The rights of a parent in regard to a child
            may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the
            following grounds:

            (1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of
            at least six months immediately preceding the filing of
            the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of
            relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused
            or failed to perform parental duties.

            (2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
            neglect[,] or refusal of the parent has caused the child
            to be without essential parental care, control[,] or
            subsistence necessary for his[, or her,] physical or
            mental well-being and the conditions and causes of
            the incapacity, abuse, neglect[,] or refusal cannot or
            will not be remedied by the parent.

                                      ...

            (5) The child has been removed from the care of the
            parent by the [trial] court or under a voluntary
            agreement with an agency for a period of at least six
            months, the conditions which led to the removal or
            placement of the child continue to exist, the parent
            cannot or will not remedy those conditions within a
            reasonable period of time, the services or assistance
            reasonably available to the parent are not likely to
            remedy the conditions which led to the removal or
            placement of the child within a reasonable period of
            time[,] and termination of the parental rights would
            best serve the needs and welfare of the child.

                                      ...

            (8) The child has been removed from the care of the
            parent by the [trial] court or under a voluntary
            agreement with an agency, 12 months or more have

                                      -6-
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            elapsed from the date of removal or placement, the
            conditions which led to the removal or placement of
            the child continue to exist[,] and termination of
            parental rights would best serve the needs and
            welfare of the child.

23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), and (a)(8).

      Once the trial court determines that involuntary termination of parental

rights is warranted under Section 2511(a), the trial court is required to engage

in an analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b) to determine whether termination

is in the best interests of the child. Section 2511(b) states,

              § 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

                                      ...

      (b) Other considerations. - The court in terminating the
      rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
      developmental, physical[,] and emotional needs and welfare of
      the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on
      the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing,
      furnishings, income, clothing[,] and medical care if found to be
      beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition
      filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6)[,] or (8), the [trial] court
      shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the
      conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent
      to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).

      Thus, in determining whether termination is in the child’s best interest,

Section 2511(b) requires a trial court to “give primary consideration to the

developmental, physical[,] and emotional needs and welfare of the child.”

Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085, 1105 (Pa. 2023). The emotional needs and

welfare of a child include intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and

                                      -7-
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stability. Id. at 1106. Under Section 2511(b), the primary focus is on the

child, and the trial court must consider all three categories of needs and

welfare. Id. at 1105 (stating, the trial court “should consider the matter from

the child’s perspective, placing [the child’s] developmental, physical[,] and

emotional needs and welfare above concerns for the parent”).

      A child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare are

to be determined on a case-by-case basis. Id. While not an exhaustive list,

a trial court, in determining whether to grant or deny termination, is required,

at a minimum, to consider the following factors as part of a Section 2511(b)

analysis: (1) whether the child is in a pre-adoptive home; (2) whether the

child has a bond with the foster parent/family; (3) whether the child has a

bond with the biological parent who is the subject of the termination

proceeding; and (4) whether termination of the biological parent-child bond,

if any, would destroy an existing necessary and beneficial relationship.

      In considering the bonds a child may have, if any, with his or her foster

parent and biological parent, the trial court must examine the intangibles the

child derives from the respective relationships, including love, comfort,

security, permanency, and stability. Id. at 1111. “[S]everance of a necessary

and beneficial relationship is the kind of loss that would predictably cause

extreme emotional consequences or significant, irreparable harm” to the child.

Id. at 1109-1111 (original quotation marks omitted).        As such, a tightly

bonded relationship that would preclude termination requires more than a

showing that severance will have an adverse or detrimental impact on the

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child. Id. In other words, termination should not be denied solely because

of an emotional bond and potential adverse effects from termination. Id. at

1109 n.22. “[C]ourts must determine whether the trauma caused by breaking

the parent-child bond is outweighed by the benefit of moving the child toward

a permanent home.”      Id. at 1107 (citation and original brackets omitted).

“[C]ourts [must] refine their focus on the child’s development and mental and

emotional health rather than considering only the child’s ‘feelings’ or ‘affection’

for the [biological] parent[.]” Id. at 1111 (stating, “courts may weigh the

child’s feelings and affection towards a [biological] parent, relative to all [his

or] her developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare” (emphasis

in original)).

      A trial court may rely on a caseworker or social worker to determine the

status of and nature of a parent-child bond. In re Adoption of J.N.M., 177

A.3d 937, 944 (Pa. Super. 2018) (holding, a trial court “is not required by

statute or precedent to order a formal bonding evaluation be performed by an

expert” (citation omitted)), appeal denied, 183 A.3d 979 (Pa. 2018).

      It is well-established that this Court need only agree with the trial court

as to any one section of Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b), in order

to affirm a decree involuntarily terminating parental rights. Interest of M.E.,

283 A.3d 820, 830 (Pa. Super. 2022), relying on In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380

(Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc), appeal denied, 863 A.2d 1141 (Pa. 2004). Our

review of the certified record confirms that DHS introduced clear and

                                       -9-
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convincing evidence in support of termination pursuant to Section 2511(a)(8)

and Section 2511(b).

     To terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.
     § 2511(a)(8), the following factors must be demonstrated: (1) the
     child has been removed from parental care for 12 months or more
     from the date of removal; (2) the conditions which led to the
     removal or placement of the child continue to exist; and (3)
     termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and
     welfare of the child.       23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8).        Section
     2511(a)(8) sets a 12-month time frame for a parent to remedy
     the conditions that led to the [child’s] removal by the [trial] court.
     Once the 12-month period has been established, the [trial] court
     must next determine whether the conditions that led to the child's
     removal continue to exist, despite the reasonable good faith
     efforts of [DHS] supplied over a realistic time period. Termination
     under Section 2511(a)(8) does not require the [trial] court to
     evaluate a parent's current willingness or ability to remedy the
     conditions that initially caused placement or the availability or
     efficacy of [DHS] services.

In re C.B., 230 A.3d 341, 348 (Pa. Super. 2020) (case citations, quotation

marks, and original brackets omitted), appeal denied, 234 A.3d 410 (Pa.

2020). “Under Section 2511(a)(8), in determining whether the conditions that

led to removal and placement continue to exist, the relevant inquiry in this

regard is whether the conditions that led to removal have been remedied

and[,] thus[,] whether reunification of parent and child is imminent at the

time of the hearing.” C.B., 230 A.3d at 348-349 (citation, original quotation

marks, and original brackets omitted).

     With respect to the “needs and welfare” analysis pertinent to
     Sections 2511(a)(8) and (b), we have observed:

        Initially, the focus in terminating parental rights is on the
        parent, under Section 2511(a), whereas the focus in Section
        2511(b) is on the child. However, Section 2511(a)(8)

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          explicitly requires an evaluation of the “needs and welfare
          of the child” prior to proceeding to Section 2511(b), which
          focuses on the “developmental, physical[,] and emotional
          needs and welfare of the child.” Thus, the analysis under
          Section 2511(a)(8) accounts for the needs of the child in
          addition to the behavior of the parent. Moreover, only if a
          [trial] court determines that the parent's conduct warrants
          termination of his or her parental rights, pursuant to Section
          2511(a), does a [trial] court engage in the second part of
          the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of
          the needs and welfare of the child under the standard of
          best interests of the child. Accordingly, while both Section
          2511(a)(8) and Section 2511(b) direct us to evaluate the
          “needs and welfare of the child,” we are required to resolve
          the analysis relative to Section 2511(a)(8), prior to
          addressing the “needs and welfare” of the child, as
          pr[e]scribed by Section 2511(b); as such, they are distinct
          in that we must address Section 2511(a) before reaching
          Section 2511(b).

Id. at 349 (citation, original brackets, and some quotation marks omitted).

       In the case sub judice, the trial court explained its reasons for

terminating Father’s parental rights to the Child pursuant to Sections

2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8), and (b) as follows:6

       The testimony reflects that [the Child] was placed pursuant to an
       order of protective custody [] in March, 2020. He’s been in the
       same foster home since he was placed there [more than three
       years ago].

       Testimony reflects that single case plan objectives were
       established for a reunification, and that [Father] attended
       approximately four of those single case plan meetings, and
____________________________________________

6 Although our decision to affirm the termination of Father’s parental rights

rests upon Section 2511(a)(8) and Section 2511(b), we incorporate the
entirety of the trial court’s findings pertaining to all the provisions in Section
2511(a) because of the substantial overlap between these statutory provisions
and the elements of Section 2511(a)(8).

                                          - 11 -
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     therefore was aware of his single case plan objectives that
     included attending [the Achieving Reunification Center (“ARC”)]
     for   anger    management,     employment,     [and]     parenting
     [counseling], and that he successfully completed ARC. He was to
     have random drug screens, attend the [Clinical Evaluation Unit
     (“CEU”)] for an evaluation[] and behavioral health services, [and]
     provide proof of employment, housing, and substance use.

     The testimony reflects that while [Father] did complete some of
     his objectives, throughout the case[,] he’s been minimally
     compliant and has made minimal progress.            For months[,]
     unfortunately[, Father’s] whereabouts were unknown.             They
     [became] unknown, and during those times he neither visited nor
     contacted [the Community Umbrella Agency (“CUA”)] regarding
     [the Child. W]hile the CUA case manager testified that at time[s
     Father] was in a shelter or was hospitalized, [Father] clarified that
     he wasn’t hospitalized but had appointments, and during those
     times he did not reach out regarding [the Child].

     The one home assessment that took place showed that the
     housing was not appropriate for reunification. [The trial court
     does not] currently have proof regarding whether the current
     housing is appropriate for reunification. While the testimony
     reflects that the visits [between Father and the Child] go well, they
     remain supervised at [CUA]. And[,] unfortunately[,] attempts to
     have community visits were unsuccessful.

     While there’s a relationship, the testimony does not reflect that
     there’s evidence [the Child has] a strong parental bond with
     [Father. The trial court does not] find that termination would
     destroy an existing, necessary[,] or beneficial relationship, nor
     would termination cause irreparable harm to [the Child]. In fact,
     the testimony was that if [the Child] were removed [from his
     foster home,] it would be detrimental to him.

     [The trial court is] in receipt of [Father’s] exhibits F-1[,] as well
     as F-2. Both exhibits reflect efforts that were made after the goal
     change [and] termination petitions were filed. [The trial court
     finds] that the [Child] has a strong bond with his current foster
     parents. They’re providing him with love, care, and support, and
     are meeting all of his needs. [The trial court finds] that it is in
     [the Child’s] best interest for the goal to be changed to adoption
     and [the] parental rights of [Father] and any unknown putative
     father to be terminated[.]

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N.T., 10/25/23, at 50-51.

      A review of the record demonstrates that on March 10, 2020, the Child

was placed in the care and custody of DHS after the trial court issued an order

of protective custody for the Child, based upon allegations that on March 9,

2020, “Mother and Father [were] found in [the] home, high on K2[, a synthetic

cannabinoid, and the h]ome [was] in deplorable condition with stolen utilities

and little food.” See Application for Order of Protective Custody, 3/10/20;

see also Trial Court Order of Protective Custody, 3/10/20. The Child was

adjudicated dependent on October 9, 2020.

      The Child continued to be in placement when DHS filed a petition for

involuntary termination of Father’s parental rights on August 18, 2023. Thus

at the time the termination petition was filed, the Child had been removed

from Father’s parental care for more than 12 months.             23 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 2511(a)(8); see also C.B., 230 A.3d at 348.

      With a goal of reunification, Father’s case plan objectives included:

completion of a dual diagnosis for any mental health disorder or substance

abuse disorder; submission to three random drug tests; enrollment in a drug

and alcohol program; completion of parenting and housing counseling

provided by ARC; completion of anger management counseling with ARC or a

similar agency; execution of all necessary releases pertaining to the Child;

submission of proof of employment; participation in a home assessment; and

attendance at weekly visitation with the Child. Trial Court Order, 10/9/20;

see also Trial Court Order, 9/20/21; N.T., 10/25/23, at 14-15.

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      A CUA case manager described Father’s progress toward meeting his

case plan objections and alleviating the circumstances that brought the Child

under DHS care and custody as “minimal – definitely minimal.” Id. at 22.

The case manager testified that Father completed parenting, housing,

employment, and anger management counseling. Id. at 18-19. Father has

not, however, provided the case manager proof that he engaged in drug and

alcohol treatment, and Father refused to undergo a behavioral health services

evaluation. Id. at 18. The case manager stated that Father attended less

than half of his random drug tests. Id. at 15. The case manager expressed

that there have always been concerns over Father’s drug use and sobriety

throughout the life of the case because drug use was one of the factors which

precipitated the Child’s placement. Id. at 22, 24. Father admitted to using

and selling phencyclidine, commonly referred to as “PCP,” as recently as

September 2022. Id. at 23.

      The case manager testified that Father has never refused to sign any

consent forms but that, ultimately, Father has only signed one consent form.

Id. at 16. The case manager explained that Father “has just always been

sometimes hard to locate” and that Father’s location is unknown for months

at a time (i.e., June 2022, to August 2022,) and until Father contacts the case

manager.   Id. at 16-17.    Father has made attempts to attend supervised

visitation with the Child except for the periods where Father’s whereabouts

were unknown. Id. at 20.

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      Father has twice provided proof of employment from two separate

employers but is no longer employed by either employer. Although the case

manager was able to complete a home assessment in 2021, Father is no

longer living at that residence, and the case manager has been unable to

verify that Father has “stable housing” for the “last year and a half.” Id. at

26.

      The case manager described the Child’s relationship with the foster

parents as a “very strong parental bond,” in which the Child addresses the

foster parents as “mom” and “dad.” Id. at 10. The foster parents provide for

all of the Child’s basic needs, including providing love, care, support, and

nurture to the Child, while, according to the case manager, Father does not

provide any of the Child’s basic needs. Id. at 10-11. The case manager stated

that he does not have any concerns about the welfare of the Child in the foster

home and recommended that the foster parents be permitted to adopt the

Child. Id. at 12. When asked, the case manager stated that the Child would

not suffer irreparable harm if Father’s parental rights were terminated. Id. at

22. In so concluding, the case manager explained that although the Child

expressed a desire to have contact with Father, the Child has not stated that

he wants to live with Father but, rather, has expressed that he would like to

remain with the foster parents. Id. at 13, 22. The case manager stated that

the Child interacts well with the foster parents, and it would be detrimental to

the Child if the Child were removed from the foster home. Id. at 22, 25.

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       Father testified that he has been employed by a construction company

since June 2023. Id. at 32. Father explained that his current employment

prevents him from attending random drug tests. Id. at 37-38. Father stated

that he is currently living with his sister, but “also [has] a room [that he]

rent[s] for when [he] want[s] to have company, like female company”

because his sister does not allow him to have guests at her home. Id. at

33-34. Father explained that, at his sister’s house, he utilizes the room that

“is basically like the master bedroom” and that if reunification occurred, Father

would be able to erect a partition in the bedroom so that the Child would have

“his own little private room setting[.]”7 Id. at 35. A home assessment of the

sister’s residence, however, has not been performed. Id. at 26, 34.

       Father admitted that he used PCP “last year sometime, around the same

time [he] gave the positive urine” test for drug use. Id. Father testified that

he received services from the NorthEast Treatment Center (“NET”), including

drug and alcohol, mental health, and anger management counseling, and

received drug and alcohol treatment from January 2023, to July 2023. Id. at

35-36, 38.     The case manager described the services provided by NET as

follows:

       [I]t’s like a group that he goes to. It’s not intense treatment
       where [counselors] can get to the root of the problem because
       there’s still the inconsistencies with [Father’s] random [drug tests.
       T]here’s still the inconsistencies with living conditions. So there’s
____________________________________________

7 The parties stipulated that Father’s sister would permit Father and the Child

to live with her, if reunification occurred. N.T., 10/25/23, at 43.

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     just things that behaviorally and emotionally just don’t [] show
     stability. And so, this group, although [Father] has been going off
     and on for some time now, it hasn’t changed his circumstances of
     where he is presently.

Id. at 27-28. NET eventually “dropped” Father from their services rooster as

of July 2023, because Father missed 30 consecutive days of attendance. Id.

at 38.   Father stated that at one point, when he felt his sobriety was

“overbearing” he was placed in a drug and alcohol treatment program for 21

days. Id. at 36.

     Upon review, we concur with the trial court, and the record supports,

that the conditions which led to the removal and placement of the Child

continued to exist despite the reasonable good faith efforts by DHS.       23

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8); see also C.B., 230 A.3d at 348.         While Father

completed parenting, housing, and anger management counseling and signed

at least one release form pertaining to the Child, Father has not completed a

dual diagnosis for mental health disorders and substance abuse disorders or

enrolled in a drug and alcohol treatment program.       Although we respect

Father’s participation in the NET program for the purpose of maintaining his

sobriety, as noted by the case manager, this program lacks the intensity of a

drug and alcohol treatment program or an individualized counseling

arrangement that would aid Father in overcoming the issues that led to the

Child’s placement and establish the stability necessary for reunification.

Moreover, the record is replete with episodes demonstrating that Father has

not summoned the resolve to ameliorate the drug- and housing-related causes

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and conditions that lead to the Child’s removal and placement. For example,

Father cited his current employment as preventing him from submitting to the

required three random drug tests and stated that he “had an appointment”

which prevented a home assessment of his current living conditions. Id. at

34, 37-38. Finally, although Father does participate in visitations with the

Child, those visitations remain supervised at the CUA facility and have been

interrupted periodically by Father’s disappearances and loss of contact with

CUA and, more importantly, with the Child. As such, we concur with the trial

court, and the record supports, that Father has made “minimal progress”

towards overcoming the conditions and obstacles which led to the removal

and placement of the Child.

      We also concur with the trial court, and the record supports, that

termination of Father’s parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare

of the Child, as analyzed under Section 2511(a)(8). The Child is in need of

parental “love, care, and support,” as noted by the trial court, and a safe

environment in which to grow. Father has not completed his dual diagnosis

for any mental health disorders or substance abuse disorders, has failed to

submit to random drug tests, has not undergone a home assessment of his

current living arrangements, admits to relapsing into drug use in 2022, and

has not enrolled in an appropriate drug and alcohol treatment program.

Moreover, Father’s visitation with the Child has been limited to supervised

weekly visitations, when Father decides to be available. A child’s life, and the

need for parental love, comfort, security, and stability, should not be held in

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abeyance while a parent summons the abilities, desire, and prioritization to

overcome the obstacles that prevent reunification. See I.J., 972 A.2d at 9;

see also In re McCray’s Adoption, 331 A.2d 652, 656 (Pa. 1975) (stating

the long-held position that, “[p]arental rights may not be preserved by merely

waiting for some convenient time for the performance of parental duties and

responsibilities while others adequately provide the child with [his or] her

immediate and continuing physical and emotional needs” (ellipses and

parentheses omitted)).

      In examining the effects termination of Father’s parental rights would

have on the Child, as well as the best interests of the Child pursuant to Section

2511(b), the trial court noted that the Child had a “strong bond” with the

foster parents, who provide the Child with love, care, and support and meet

all the Child’s basic needs.    Id. at 51.    Moreover, the trial court heard

testimony that, if given the opportunity, the foster parents wished to adopt

the Child, and the case manager recommended that adoption be permitted

based upon his observation and interaction with the Child, the foster parents,

and Father. Id. at 12. Conversely, the trial court found that the bond between

Father and Child, although existing, was not “a strong parental bond.” Id. at

51. In examining the effects that termination of Father’s parental rights would

have on the Child, the trial court held that termination would not destroy an

existing necessary and beneficial relationship between Father and the Child

and would not cause the Child to suffer irreparable harm. Id.

                                     - 19 -
J-A08030-24

      Upon review, we concur with the trial court, and the record supports,

that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the best interests of the Child

pursuant to Section 2511(b). The record demonstrates that the Child looks

to the foster parents to fulfill his daily, basic needs and for care, love, support,

and stability, and does not look to Father to provide such needs. The Child

refers to his foster parents as “mom” and “dad” and has asked to remain in

the foster home.     While the Child does seek to retain a relationship with

Father, the Child has not expressed a desire to return to Father’s residence.

      For these reasons, we concur with the trial court, and the record

supports, that DHS has proven by clear and convincing evidence that grounds

for termination of Father’s parental rights exist under Section 2511 (a)(8) and

(b). Consequently, we discern no error of law or abuse of discretion in the

decree terminating Father’s parental rights to the Child.

      In his second issue, Father challenges the trial court order changing the

permanent placement goal to one of adoption with regard to the Child.

Father’s Brief (Case 377-2020) at 7. Father asserts that the trial court abused

its discretion in entering the October 25, 2023 order changing the permanent

placement goal to one of adoption because “the record shows that [Father]

substantially complied with the service plan developed for the [Child] and that

[Father] has made progress towards alleviating the circumstances which

necessitated the original placement.” Id. Because we conclude that the trial

court did not abuse its discretion in terminating Father’s parental rights to the

Child, as discussed supra, Father’s issue pertaining to the change of the

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permanent placement goal to one of adoption is moot. See In re Adoption

of A.H., 247 A.3d 439, 446 (Pa. Super. 2021) (stating, “the effect of [this

Court’s] decision to affirm the [trial] court's termination decree necessarily

renders moot the [trial] court's decision to change [the permanent placement]

goal to adoption”), appeal denied, 258 A.3d 1144 (Pa. 2021); see also

Interest of A.R., ___ A.3d ___, 2023 WL 8226326, at *7 (Pa. Super. 2023)

(slip opinion) (stating, because “the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

granting the petition to terminate [] parental rights, [a challenge to the

change of the permanent placement goal] is moot”); Interest of D.R.-W,

227 A.3d 905, 917 (Pa. Super. 2020) (reiterating that, “[a]n issue before a

court is moot if in ruling upon the issue the court cannot enter an order that

has any legal force or effect” (original quotation marks omitted)). As such,

we dismiss Father’s appeal filed with this Court at 2998 EDA 2023 as moot.8
____________________________________________

8 Assuming arguendo, that Father’s appeal filed at 2998 EDA 2023 was not
subject to dismissal as moot, we would conclude that Father is not entitled to
relief. We review a goal-change order for an abuse of discretion. In re R.J.T.,
9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010). As such, we are required to “accept the trial
court's findings of fact and credibility determinations if the record supports
them, but we need not accept the [trial] court's inferences or conclusions of
law.” D.R.-W, 227 A.3d at 917 (citation omitted).

As discussed supra, the Child has been in placement for more than three years
and is currently living with a foster family who provides the Child with his basic
needs, as well as love, care, safety, and stability, and wishes to adopt the
Child. While the record supports that Father achieved some of the objectives
necessary for reunification, the record also supports that Father continues to
struggle at achieving the remaining reunification objectives despite the
assistance provided by DHS and the passage of time. The Child cannot be
expected to place his future on hold while Father summons the ability to get

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       Decree    affirmed     (2999 EDA 2023).     Appeal   dismissed   as   moot

(2998 EDA 2023).

Date: 4/4/2024

____________________________________________

his life in order. As such, we could concur with the trial court, and the record
supports, that a change in the permanent placement goal to one of adoption
is in the best interests of the Child.

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