Court Opinion

ID: 9567799
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:57:52.860454+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:20:43.410557
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Presiding Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur, based on the analysis articulated plus the following. Although the trial court found that the officer did not observe any frantic movement or immediate flight, a cautious easing out of the location to allay suspicion could in fact arouse it. A reasonable inference is that the driver knew the policeman was watching, as the person on the street appeared to make a gesture alerting the driver to the police presence. Whether the driver’s exit was “immediate” and hurried or not, one cannot overlook that the person who alerted him had been standing on the street corner in a known high crime and drug area at 2:00 a.m. when the business establishments were closed. Due to the circumstances, including the officer’s observations in past situations, he suspected a drug transaction.
The totality of the circumstances is to be taken into account. They may not be, and likely will not be, identical to those in any other cases. The question is whether the circumstances in this case constitute a reasonable suspicion of a drug transaction in progress. “ ‘An investigatory stop must be justified by some objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity. (Cits.)’ [Cit.]” Evans v. State, 183 Ga. App. 436, 438 (2) *514(359 SE2d 174) (1987). The factual indicators were sufficient to support the officer’s suspicion as a reasonable one, thus justifying a brief stop to determine whether or not what he suspected as fact, was indeed fact. The Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures was not violated.
Decided December 3, 1993
Reconsideration denied December 20, 1993
Kenneth W. Mauldin, Solicitor, Ralph W. Powell, Jr., Assistant Solicitor, for appellant.
McArthur & McArthur, John J. McArthur, Sara M. McArthur, for appellee.