Court Opinion

ID: 9571187
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:29:41.940321+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:29:15.924334
License: Public Domain

Benham, Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur in the majority decision that summary judgment was appropriate for all three DOT employees, appellants Ethridge and Tyre and appellee Mims.
I agree with Judge Sognier’s special concurrence that the necessary statutory preconditions for relation back under OCGA § 9-11-15 (c) were not met in the case at bar. However, I believe that summary judgment should have been granted to appellants Ethridge and Tyre and appellee Mims on their statute of limitation defense. While Price’s incompetency tolled the statute of limitation (OCGA § 9-3-90), the period of limitation commenced upon the institution of an action by Price’s next friend, her mother. This court has held that where, as a result of the occurrence giving rise to the cause of action, a person becomes mentally and physically incapable of acting for himself in carrying on his business and in prosecuting his claim, the statute of limitation is tolled until such time as he regains the capacity to act for himself, or until such time as a guardian is appointed and actually does act for him, or until such time as one bona fide acting for him as next friend actually files suit on his behalf. Cline v. Lever Bros. Co., 124 Ga. App. 22 (4a) (183 SE2d 63) (1971); City of Atlanta v. Barrett, 102 Ga. App. 469 (116 SE2d 654) (1960). Thus, the two-year statute of limitation governing personal injury suits commenced in the case at bar on June 26, 1985, the day the mother of the incapacitated adult filed suit as next friend of her incapacitated daughter. Appellant Tyre and appellee Mims were not served with process until February 1, 1988, and appellant Ethridge was not served until February 6, 1988, more than 2-1/2 years after Ms. Price’s next friend filed suit. Since, as Judge Sognier’s special concurrence states, the Prices did not meet the necessary statutory preconditions for relation back of amendments adding parties, summary judgment should have been granted Ethridge, Tyre, and Mims on the ground that the statute of limitation had expired.1
In reaching the conclusion that the statute of limitation does not run against an incapacitated person represented in litigation by next friend, Judge Sognier’s special concurrence relies upon Barnum v. Martin, 135 Ga. App. 712 (2) (219 SE2d 341) (1975), which relies *89upon Jones v. Hartford Accident &c. Co., 132 Ga. App. 130 (207 SE2d 613) (1974). In Barnum, a minor brought suit through her next friend four years before giving the required ante litem notice to a municipality. In deciding Barnum, this court stated that “[a]ny doubt that the statute of limitation will not run against a minor plaintiff who sues through next friend is resolved by our decision in Jones u. Hartford Acc. &c. Co., [supra], where it was held that ‘the disability of infancy ... is only removed when the party affected reaches his lawful majority.’ ” However, the issue in Jones, as recognized by that court, was “whether or not the proviso . . . permitting an eighteen-year-old married person to maintain an action and settle a claim in his own name abolishes the disability of infancy . . . and requires an eighteen-year-old married person to commence his action for injury to the person within the time limitation of [OCGA § 9-3-33].” The court went on to hold that it did not. The Jones case had nothing to do with the commencement of the statute of limitation when a minor brought suit by next friend or guardian, and Barnum’s improper reliance on it should not be perpetuated. In light of the precedents in existence at the time Barnum was decided (Cline v. Lever Bros. Co., supra, and City of Atlanta v. Barrett, supra), which precedents held that the statute of limitation commenced when a guardian or next friend filed suit on behalf of the incapacitated person, I would take this opportunity to overrule Barnum.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Carley and Judge Beasley join in this opinion.

 The trial court awarded summary judgment to Mims on a different ground, and the majority affirms that judgment. I, therefore, concur in the judgment only in A89A1260.