Court Opinion

ID: 9908102
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-07 18:06:28.634955+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:37:11.635729
License: Public Domain

139 Nev., Advance Opinion 51   ,

                         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

                    HIGHROLLER TRANSPORTATION,                          No. 85007-COA
                    LLC,
                    Appellant,
                    vs.                                                     NUE
                    NEVADA TRANSPORTATION
                    AUTHORITY,
                    Respondent.

                               Appeal from a district court order granting in part and denying
                   in part a petition for judicial review of an administrative decision by the
                   Nevada Transportation Authority. Eighth Judicial DiArict Court, Clark
                   County; Eric Johnson, Judge.
                               Affirmed.

                   James S. Kent, Las Vegas,
                   for Appellant.

                   Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General, and Louis V. Csoka, Deputy Attorney
                   General, Carson City,
                   for Respondent.

                   BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS, GIBBONS, CA., and BULLA and
                   WESTBROOK, JJ.

                                                   OPINION

                   By the Court, WESTBROOK, J.:
                               In this opinion, we consider for the first time the scope and
                   application of the waiver rule to the adjudication of contested cases before
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                        the Nevada Transportation Authority (NTA or Authority).            We also

                        emphasize the importance of a developed record at the agency level to
                        enable district courts and appellate courts to meaningfully address the
                        arguments raised in petitions for judicial review.
                                    The NTA administers and enforces Nevada's laws governing

                        the transportation of persons and property on Nevada's roadways. See NRS
                        706.166. The Authority generally conducts its business at public hearings
                        during open meetings of the NTA general session. See NRS 706.1514(2).
                        However, in cases involving the imposition of civil penalties or fines,
                        administrative proceedings may be conducted by a hearing officer
                        designated by the Authority.      NRS 706.1514(2); NRS 706.771.      At the

                        conclusion of such administrative proceedings, the hearing officer delivers
                        the record of the hearing and a proposed decision to the Authority for its
                        consideration.    Nevada Administrative Code (NAC) 706.4015.            The

                        Authority then reviews the hearing officer's proposed decision and, at a
                        meeting of the NTA general session, enters a final order affirming,
                        modifying, or setting aside the decision. NAC 706.4017.
                                    In contested cases before the NTA, we conclude that arguments
                        not raised during the administrative proceedings are generally waived and
                        that the NTA need not consider arguments raised for the first time at the
                        general session. Moreover, when a party to a contested case before the NTA
                        stipulates to informally dispose of the case and waive the findings of fact
                        and conclusions of law otherwise required by NRS 233B.125, that party is
                        bound by the terms of the stipulation and may not subsequently challenge
                        the legal or factual underpinnings of the NTA's decision on judicial review.
                        Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order granting in part and
                        denying in part the petition for judicial review.

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                                              FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
                                        In    2015, Highroller Transportation, LLC,                 obtained
                           authorization to operate charter buses in Nevada when the NTA granted
                           Highroller a certificate of public convenience and necessity. Under the
                           terms of its certificate, Highroller was prohibited from "stag[ing] or
                           stand[ing] a vehicle at any location except while currently chartered or
                           awaiting a preexisting charter client." Highroller accepted this restriction
                           as a condition of its right -to operate and did nOt challenge it at any point
                           prior to the instant case.
                                       In 'December • 2020, - Highroller received. an • adrriiniStrative
                           citation for iinproperly staging a vehicle at a casino without a ch.arter order
                           in violation of i.ts certificate restriction And NAC '706'360.1 Three thenths
                           after reeeiving this citation, Highroller was issu.ed a second citation., also for.
                           improperly sta.ging its vehicles without a charter order. At a subsequent
                           administratiVe hearing on both citatiOns, Highroller .stipulated to the. facts
                           .underlying each citation and agreed to fines totaling $10,000.2 The parties
                           then signed written stipulations waiving formal findings Of •faCt and
                           ConcluSions of law.       Under the terms of - theSe stipulations, "Rlhe
                           parties . . [agreed] to dispose of the t'.ase[s] by. stipUlation . . . [and waived]
                           the'requirement Under Nevada Revised StatUte -(NRS) 233B.1.25 that the
                           Authority'S final Order include findings of faét and conclusions- ollaw:". The
                           Stipulations further provided that "a final- order will issuc which includes,

                                 INAC 706.360 provides that "vehicles of an authorized carrier may
                           not be used for transportation services beyond the scope of the authority of
                           that carrier."
                                 2' The $10,000 ammint .was calcUlated as $1600 for the initial citation,
                           $4400.for the.second citation, and WOO for a prior fine that had.previously
                           been held in abeyance.
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                       generally: (1) The stipulations and admissions of the parties; (2) The
                       [Wearing [oifficer's recommendations to the Authority ... [;] and (3) An
                       order from the Authority approving, modifying, or setting aside the
                       [Wearing [o]fficer's recommendations." The hearing officer then submitted
                       a proposed decision for review by the NTA, recominending that the NTA
                       accept the stipulations and enter the fines against Highroller.
                                   In June 2021, at the NTA's general session, the Authority
                       addressed the hearing Officer's proposed decision in Hightoller's contested
                       cases. The Meeting agenda for this general •sesSion Contained a total of 124
                       docket items, ranging from applications for driver permits, rate and tariff
                       issues, and dozens of citations. At this meeting,' Highroller, for 'the .first
                       time, objected to the NTA's legal authority • to enter the violations and
                       argued that the NTA's authority was preempted under federal law.
                       Highroller posited that this argument was jurisdictional in nature and
                       therefore could be raised' at any time.     The NTA declined to .consider
                       Highroller's federal preemptidn argument, noting that it should have been
                       raised at the administrative hearing before the hearing officer.. Thereafter,
                       the NTA issued a final order affirming the hearing officer's proposed
                       decision and formally imposing the $10,000 in fines.
                                   Highroller then petitioned for judicial review in the district
                       court. In its petition, Highroller argued that its certificate restriction,
                       Which formed the basis of the violations and fines, was federally preempted
                       by• 49 U.S.C. § 14501(a)(1)(C), and, as a result, the NTA did not have
                       Jurisdiction to find that Highroller :was in violation of the restriction.
                       Highroller specifically clainied that the restriction was preempted becaluše
                       the prohibition against staging was not. a valid exercise of the NTA's safety
                       regulatory authOrity; if the restriction were legitimately related. to safety,

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                        Highroller argued, it would uniformly apply to all commercial vehicle
                        operators in the state or otherwise be codified as a law or regulation. In its
                        answering brief, the NTA argued that Highroller's certificate restriction
                        was a proper exercise of its authority to regulate safety because the purpose
                        of the certificate's prohibition on staging was to ensure that large charter
                        buses would not contribute to traffic congestion by parking or being left
                        unattended in vehicle loading areas at resort properties. The NTA also
                        referenced several other codified regulations containing prohibitions on
                        similar conduct 'and argued that Highroller's certificate restriction was
                        safety-related when viewed in the context of these other regulations.3
                                     The district court agreed with the NTA's position and
                        determined that the restriction in Highroller's certificate was related to
                        safety and thus not federally preempted. The court denied Highroller's
                        petition as to the federal preemption claim, and this appeal followed.4

                              3Specifically, the NTA referenced NAC 706.228 (prohibiting parking
                        vehicles in close proximity to a taxi stand), NAC 706.234 (addressing the
                        risk of unattended vehicles around resort properties), NAC 706.354
                        (requiring that charter orders be "[c]arried on the vehicle and be available
                        for inspection during the period of the service"), and NAC 706.360 (stating
                        that vehicles of an authorized carrier must not be used for services beyond
                        the scope of the carrier's authority).
                              4The district court granted the petition in part because the NTA had
                        levied duplicative fines against both Highroller and its employee personally
                        for the same conduct. The district court reversed the NTA's order to the
                        extent of any fines that had already been collected from Highroller's
                        employee for the same "underlying events" as Highroller's .contested
                        citations. The NTA did not file a cross-appeal to challenge this portion of
                        the district court's order.
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                                                 ANA LYSIS
                                Highrolier does not dispute that its conduct violated th.e
                   restriction in its certificate; rather. Highroller contends on appeal that the
                   restriction is preempted by federal law and thus cannOt form the basis for
                   the violations in the NTA's final order. Similar to the argument presented
                   in its petition for judicial review, Highroller argues that its certificate
                   restriction is not related to safety because the NTA does not impose the
                   restriction on all motor carriers, nor is the restriction codified as a uniformly
                   applicable regUlation.. The NTA's "Assertion" of safety in its answering brief
                   on judidial review, Highroller claims, WAs insufficient to "provide any basis"
                   or subStantiate that the restriction pertains to safety,• particularly given
                   that there was no explanation Of the restriction in 2015 when it 'was initially
                   included in Highroller's certificate.
                          •     In 'response, the NTA argues that the restriction is. related..to
                   safety because it was "designed to ensure public safety at the resort
                   properties, by ensuring that' the significantly larger charter busses Are not
                   Whirling around clogging up porte eocherers next to resort properties,. are
                   not bein.g left unattended around resort properties . . . , and not -otherwise
                   being 'used as taxicabs around resort properties." In addition, the NTA
                   reiterates that Highroller's certificate restriction is safety-related when
                   viewed in the context of similar administrative regulations.
                                The NTA argues in the alternative that Highroller waived its
                   federal preernPtiOn argument by • failing to raise it at the administrative
                   hearing before the hearing officer and. alsò by stipulating to: inforthallY
                   dispose of its contested cases. As a' result, the NTA.contends that thesafety
                   purpose of the restriction:was not fully briefed or argued at .the agency leVel
                   and, 'therefore, Highr011er improperly argued preemntion fOr the first time
                   in itS petition for judicial 'review.
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                               When reviewing a decision of an administrative agency, this
                   court's role "is identical to that of the district court: to review the evidence
                   presented to the agency in order to determine whether the agency s decisión
                   was arbitrary or capricious and was thus an abuse of the agency's
                   discretion." United Exposition Serv. Co. v. State Indus. Ins. Sys., 109 Nev.

                   421, 423, 851 P.2d 423, 424 (1993).       Appellate review of a final agency

                   decision is "confined to the record before the agency." Law Offices of Barry
                   Levinson, P.C. v. Milko, 124 Nev. 355, 362, 184 P.3d 378, 384 (2008).
                   However, we review purely legal questions, including matters of statutory
                   interpretation, de novo. Id. "Whether state law is preempted by a federal
                   statute or regulation is a question of law, subject to our de novo review."
                   Nanopierce Techs., Inc. v. Depository Tr. & Clearing Corp., 123 Nev. 362,
                   370, 168 P.3d 73, 79 (2007) (footnote omitted).
                               The doctrine of preemption stems from the Supreinacy Clause
                   of the United States ConstitutiOn. U.S. Const. art. VI, el. 2. When a conflict
                   arises between a federal law and a state law, the federal law will supersede
                   the conflicting state law. Nanopierce"Techs., 123 Nev. at 370, 168 P.3d at
                   79. Preemption may be express or implied. Congress expressly preempts
                   state law when it explicitly states the intent to do so in the statute. Id. at
                   371, 168 P.3d at 79.      To determine whether Congress has expressly
                   preempted state law, courts "examine the statutory language—any explicit
                   preemption language generally governs the extent of preemption." Id.
                               Because    Highroller contends that 49 U.S.C. § 14501(a)
                   expressly preempts the restriction contained in its certificate, we begin by
                   examining the statutory text, which states, in pertinent part:
                               (a) Motor carriers of passengers.--
                                     (1) Limitation on State law.—No State or
                                     political subdivision thereof and no interstate
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                                      agency or other political agency of 2 or more
                                      States shall enact or enforce any law, rule,
                                      regulation, standard, or other provision
                                      having the force and effect of law relating
                                      to—

                                            (C) the authority to provide intrastate
                                            or      interstate     charter      bus
                                            transportation.

                                      (2) Matters not covered.—Paragraph (1)
                                      shall not restrict the safety regulatory
                                      authority of a State with respect to motor
                                      vehicles, the authority of a State to impose
                                      highway route controls or limitations based
                                      on the size or weight of the motor vehicle, or
                                      the authority of a State to regulate carriers
                                      with regard to minimum amounts of financial
                                      responsibility    relating    to     insurance
                                      requirements         and        self-insurance
                                      authorization.
                   (Emphasis added.)
                               Although the plain language of this statute expressly preempts
                   any state "law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provision" relating to
                   "the   authority   to   provide   intrastate   or   interstate   charter   bus

                   transportation," 49 U.S.C. § 14501(a)(1)(C), Congress provided that the
                   preemption directive "shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a
                   State with respect to motor vehicles," 49 U.S.C. § 14501(a)(2); see also City
                   of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Serv., Inc., 536 U.S. 424, 428 (2002)
                   (addressing 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A), which contains an identical safety
                   preemption exception for motor carriers of property). Thus, the extent of
                   federal preemption under § 14501(a) is limited, and it does not apply to

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                      safety-related restrictions.- See Nanppierce Techs., 123 Nev. at 370, 168 P.3d
                      at 79.
                                   In this case, both Highroller and the NTA agree that § 14501(a)
                      applies in this case, but as noted above, they dispute whether Highroller's
                      certificate restriction falls under the NTA's valid safety regulatory
                      authority, such that the restriction is excepted from preemption under
                      § 14501(a)(2).     Before we can reach t.he merits of Highroller's federal
                      preemption claim, however, we Must examine whether its preemption
                      argument was properly preserved for appellate review.
                      Arguments not raised to a hearing officer in a contested case before the NTA
                      are ,generally waived
                                   Highroller raised its federal preemption argument for the first
                      time at the NTA's general session, after all administrative hearings. had
                      concluded. Highroller contends that this was sufficient to properly preserve
                      its preemption claim for judicial review. The NTA disagrees.      •

                         •        Arguments raised for •the first time on appeal are typically
                      deemed waived. State ex rel. State Bd. of Equalization v. Barta, 124 Nev.
                      612, 621, 188 P.3d 1092, 1098 (2008). In Barta, the Nevada. Supreme Court
                      eXtended the Waiver rule to judicial- review of administrative decisions and
                      held that any arguments not made before an administrative agency -are
                      waived. Id. However, Barta did not clearly address when a party. must
                      raise an argument before an .agency-to properly preserve that argument for
                      consideration on judicial review, and we take the•opportunity to do So here,
                      in cases 'arising before the NTA. Based on our review of the relevant
                      statutes and administrative regulations, we Conclude that arguments not
                      presented to a hearing officer at an NTA 'administrative hearing are
                      generally waived- and may not be raised for, the' first time at the NTA'S
                      general seSsion.
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                              The Nevada Administrative Procedure Act (APA), codified in
                    NRS Chapter 233B, provides that any agency proceeding that may result in
                    the imposition of an administrative penalty is a "contested case." NRS
                    233B.032; see also State, Dep't of Health & Human Serus., Div. of Pub. &
                    Behay. Health Med. Marijuana Establishment Program v. Samantha Inc.,
                    133 Nev. 809, 813, 407 P.3d 327, 330 (2017) ("[F]inal agency decisions from
                    a proceeding requiring an opportunity for a hearing or imposing an
                    administrative penalty are judicially reviewable contested cases."). In
                    contested cases, all parties must be afforded an opportunity for a hearing.
                    NRS 233B.121        Contested cases under the APA are quasi-judicial
                    proceedings. See Smith v. State, Bd. of Wildlife Cornm'rs, No. 77485, 2020
                    WL 1972791. at *3 (Nev. Apr. 23, 2020) (Order of Affirmance) (stating that
                    contested cases under the APA are quasi-judicial in nature) (citing NRS
                    233B.032). As such, administrative hearings in contested cases have a
                    "judicial character" and "maintain[ ] trial-like attributes." State, ex rel. Bd.
                    of Parole Cornm'rs v. Morrow, 127 Nev. 265, 272-73, 255 P.3d 224, 228-29
                    (2011).
                                The APA establishes the administrative hearing as an
                    adversarial proceeding that affords an opportunity to contest the validity or
                    grounds for the issuance of a penalty.         In addition to the statutory
                    requirements found in NRS Chapter 233B, the NAC contains supplemental
                    requirements for administrative hearings before the NTA specifically. At
                    such hearings, the hearing officer may hear testimony, NAC 706.3985,
                    consider documentary evidence, NAC 706.3992, and make a variety of'
                    procedural rulings, •see NAC 706.3996 (consolidating hearings); NAC
                    706.400 (briefs); NAC 706.4001 (oral arguments). Parties have the right to
                    examine witnesses, NAC 706.3939, cross-examine opposing witnesses, NAC

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                   706.3985, object to the admissibility of evidence, NAC 706.399, introduce
                   evidence, offer arguments, and make motions, NAC 706.3939; see also NAC
                   706.3959 (authorizing parties to file motions, including motions to dismiss).
                   All motions must be in writing unless rnade during a hearing. NAC
                   706.3959(2). Parties may stipulate to facts, and such stipulations are
                   binding upon the parties and may be considered as evidence by the NTA.
                   NAC 706.3997.
                                 At the conclusion of an administrative hearing, the hearing
                   officer is required to prepare a proposed decision for the NTA's review. NAC
                   706.4015(1)(f), (g). At that time, the matter stands "submitted for decision
                   by the [NTA]," unless otherwise ordered by the hearing officer, NAC
                   706.4002, and only the hearing officer or the NTA may reopen the
                   proceedings for the taking of additional evidence, NAC 706.4003; NAC
                   706.3994(2). The NTA then reviews the hearing officer's recommended
                   decision and the administrative hearing record and enters a final order at
                   an NTA general session affirming, modifying, or setting • aside the
                   recommendation. NAC 706.4017.
                               In quasi-judicial proceedings before an administrative hearing
                   officer, waiver rules serve the same purpose as in traditional judicial
                   proceedings: allowing a party to make arguments to which the opposing
                   party has a chance to respond and the trier of fact has an opportunity to
                   consider in an informed manner. See Oliver v. Barrick Goldstrike Mines,
                   111 Nev. 1338, 1344-45, 905 P.2d 168, 172 (1995) (stating that the purpose
                   of the waiver rule "is to prevent appellants from raising new issues on
                   appeal concerning which the prevailing party had no opportunity to respond
                   and the district court had no chance to intelligently consider during the
                   proceedings below"); see also Valley Health Sys., LLC v. Eighth Judicial

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                     Dist. Court, 127 Nev. 167,It.73, 252 P.3d 67C, 680 (2011); accord Landmark
                     Hotel & Casino, Inc. v. Moore, 104 Nev. 297, 299, 757 P.2d 361, 362 (1988)
                     CThe purpose of the requirenient that a party object to the action of the trial
                     court at the time it is taken is to allow the trial court to rule intelligently
                     and to give the opposing party the opportunity to respond to the objection.")
                                  To permit judicial review of arguments not raised at an NTA
                     administrative hearing would contravene the purpose of the waiver rule by
                     allowing -a. pafty to make •arguments to whith the agenCy had no cha.nce to
                     respond and which the hearing officer had no opportunity to fully consider.
                     Oliver, 111 Nev. at.1344-45, .905 P.2d- at 172. In this case, Highroller raiSed
                     its federal preemption argument for the first time at an NTA general
                     session, after the conclusion of the administrative hearing and after the
                     hearing officer had already issued ,his proposed decisiOn. Thus,..the NTA
                     had no Opportunity to respond during the hearing or present evidence of the
                     restriction's safety-related purpose, which was necessary to evaluate
                     Highroller s preeniptiori argument, Cf. Auto. Club of N. Y., Inc, v. DAstra,
                     423 F. Supp. 2d 279, 281, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (concluding that a state
                     statute was preempted after evidence presented of the statute's purpose' at
                     a bench trial di.d not sh.ow that it was legitimately related to safety
                     concerns).    In addition, the hearing officer was unable to consider
                     Highroller's claim in an informed mariner, nor could he make any findings
                     of fact as to the restriction's purpose or conclusions of law•as to whether that
                     restriction fell Within the preemption exception for safety under .49. U.S.C.
                     §14501(a)(2). The NTA general session was neither the time nor the plaCe
                     to raise such arguments in the firA 'instance. •
                                  We note that the rule prohibitin.g new arguments from being
                     raised for the first time on apneal serves the additional purpose of ensuring

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                   a proper record for appellate review. Young t). State, 139 Nev., Adv. Op. 20,
                   534 P.3d 158, 164 (Ct. App. 2023) (discussing generally the "importance of
                   making timely objections to preserve the record in order to facilitate
                   appellate review").    In other contexts, the Nevada Supreme Court has
                   consistently required lower courts to make findings, either in writing or on
                   the record, so it can evaluate the lower court's decision and the reasons
                   underlying that decision. See, e.g., Somee v. State, 124 Nev. 434, 441-42,
                   187 P.3d 152, 158 (2008) (requiring the district court to make specific
                   factual findings because "[w]ithout an adequate record, this court cannot
                   review a district court's decision to admit or suppress evidence"); Davis v.
                   Ewalefo, 131 Nev. 445, 452, 352 P.3d 1139, 1143 (2015) ("Specific findings
                   and an adequate explanation of the reasons for the custody determination
                   are crucial to enforce or modify a custody order and for appellate review.
                   Without them, this court cannot say with assurance that the custody
                   determination was made for appropriate legal reasons." (internal quotation
                   marks and citation omitted)). The n.ecessity of a fully developed record
                   applies with no less force in administrative agency appeals, such as
                   Highroller's, where appellate review is strictly confined to the agency
                   record. State Indus. Ins. Sys., 109 Nev. at 424 851 P.2d at 424 (stating that
                   the appellate court's review of an agency decision is limited to the agency
                   record).
                                 We also note that the hearing officer in a contested case before
                   the NTA functions somewhat like a magistrate judge who Con ducts hearings
                   and issues recommendations for review and approval by a district court
                   judge.     See Valley Health, 127 Nev. at 172, 252 P.3d at 679. In Valley
                   Health, the Nevada Supreme Court recognized the similarities between
                   federal magistrate judges and discovery commissioners, who both submit

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                   proposed findings of fact and recommendations to the district court for
                   approval, and held that principals of waiver apply to issues resolved in the
                   first instance by a discovery commissioner. Id. The supreme court observed
                   that it would lead to an "inefficient use of judicial resources" to allow parties
                   to make "one set of arguments before the commissioner, waiting until the
                   outcome is determined, then adding or switching to alternative arguments
                   before the district court." Id. at 172-73, 252 P.3d at 679-80. The court
                   concluded that neither the district court nor the appellate Courts would
                   "consider new arguments raised in objection tô a discovery commissioner's
                   report and recommendation that could have been raised before the
                   discovery commissioner but were not." Id. at 173, 252 P.3d at 680.
                               We find the analysis of Valley Health instructive. Permitting
                   parties to raise new arguments at an NTA general session, when those
                   arguments could have been raised at an administrative hearing, would
                   create inefficiency because the new arguments were never presented to .or
                   considered by a hearing officer in the first instance. While the NTA tan
                   certainly choose to reopen administrative proceedings after the conclusion
                   of a contested hearing if it wishes to do so for the taking of additional
                   evidence, see NAC 706.4003, it is not obligated to do so, NAC 706.4002
                   ("Unless otherwise specifically ordered, a matter stands submitted for
                   decision by the Authority at the close of the hearing."). Thus, while the NTA
                   has the discretion to consider an untimely argument raised for the first time
                   at a general session, it may choose not to entertain it, and doing so is not an
                   abuse of that discretion.
                               Nevertheless, while we hold that arguments must generally be
                   raised at the administrative hearing before the NTA, we recognize that a
                   party may raise subject matter jurisdiction at any time. See Swan v. Swan,

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                     106 Nev. 464, 469, 796 P.2d. 221, 224 (1990) (stating generally that subject
                     matter jurisdiction "can be raised by the parties at any time"). Although
                     Highroller has never expressly invoked subject matter jurisdiction,
                     Highroller did argue at the NTA general session and in its petition for
                     judicial review that, as a result of federal preemption, the NTA was without
                     jurisdiction to adjudicate the citations or find that Highroller was in
                     violation of its certificate restriction.    Therefore., we must determine
                     whether Highrollers brief statement at the -NTA general Session • was
                     sufficient to demonstrate that the NTA lacked 'subject *matter jurisdiction
                     over the citations at issue in this case as a result of federal preemption.
                     Ilighr'oller did not establish that 4.9           § -14501(a)(1)(C) divested the
                     NTA of subject !natter jurisdiction in• th.is case
                              •   At the outset, we notethat neither party on appeal briefed the
                     issue of whether preemption under 49 U.S.C. § 14501(a) implicates the
                     NTA's subject matter jurisdiction. In Highraller's petition for judicial
                     review, while Highroller summarily asserted that the NTA was without
                     authority to find it was in violation of its certificate restriction, Highroller
                     did riot clearly argue that federal preemption divested the NTA of subject
                     matter jurisdiction such that• its preemption claim could be raised at any
                     time.5 Nonetheless; because . subject matter jurisdiction can be raised•"Sua
                     sponte by a court of review," Swan,. 106 Nev. at 469, '796 P.2d a.t .224, we
                     address Highroller's preemption claim to the extent Highr011er contend.s it

                           5Rather, Highroller argued •before the district court that it had
                     properly preserved its preemption argument by referencing preemption at
                     the general session. In the alternative, Highroller asserted that if
                     preemption was being raised for the first time on judicial review; the district
                     court should nonetheless consider it because proper resolution was "beyond
                     any doubt" and allowing the NTA's order to stand Would• be unjust, 'citing
                     Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 1.06, 121 (1976).              •

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                   removes the NTA's subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Highroller's
                   contested cases.
                                When federal preemption implicates the choice of law governing
                   an action, it operates as an affirmative defense that may be waived. See
                   Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, AFL-CIO b. Davis, 476 U.S. 380, 381-82 (1986);
                   see also Wiener v. AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co., 58 F.4th 774, 779-80 (4th Cir.
                   2023) (stating that in the context of federal preemption, "[a]ll U.S. Courts
                   of Appeals to have addressed the issue have held that choice of law issues
                   may be waived"); Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337, 349 (2d Cir.
                   2003) ("Where federal preemption affects only the choice of law, the defense
                   may be waived if nOt timely raised."). However, a more limited subset of
                   nonwaivable, jurisdictional federal preemption exists when the preemptive
                   federal legislation vests subject matter jurisdiction "exclusively in one
                   forum" and, in doing so, withdraws jurisdiction from all other forums.
                   Davis, 476 U.S. at 393 nn.9 & 11. Federal preemption derived from choice-
                   of-forurn legislation "mark[s] the bounds of a [state] court's adjudicatory
                   authority, and as such cannot be waived or forfeited." Wiener, 58 F.4th at
                   780 (internal quotation marks omitted).
                               In Davis, the United States Supreme Court considered whether
                   Garmon preemption6 under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29

                         6 In San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garrnon, 359 U.S. 236, 245-
                   46 (1959), the Supreme Court held, as a general matter, that when uni.on
                   activities are "arguably within the compass of § 7 or § 8 of the [NLRA], the
                   State's jurisdiction is displaced" or preempted, and "the States as well. as
                   the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National
                   Labor Relations Board if the danger of state interference with national
                   policy is to be averted." The Nevada Supreme Court addressed Garmon
                   preernption in Rosner u. Whittlesea Blue Cab Co., 104 Nev. 725, 766 P.2d
                   888 (1988), holding that a state law breach of contract action that did not
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                       U.S.C. §§ 151-168, was an affirmative defense and thus subject to waiver,
                       or choice-of-forum legislation and therefore nonwaivable. Following the
                       conclusion of a trial in state court on Davis' wrongful termination claims,
                       the union argued for the first time in a post-trial motion that the state court
                       lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Davis' claims due to federal
                       preemption under the NLRA. 476 U.S. at 385. The state court held that
                       the union had waived its preemption argument by failing to timely raise it
                       until the conclusion of trial and declined to address it on the merits. Id. at
                       385-86. However, the Supreme Court disagreed, determining that, with
                       certain exceptions, state courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to
                       adjudicate claims raised under the NLRA because "in enacting the NLRA
                       Congress intended for the [National Labor Relations] Board generally to
                       exercise exclusive jurisdiction in this area." Id. at 391. In holding that the
                       NLRA is a choice-of-forum statute because it vested exclusive jurisdiction
                       in the National Labor Relations Board, the Supreme Court concluded that
                       Garmon preemption was jurisdictional, and therefore the union did not
                       waive its federal preemption argument by waiting to raise it until after the
                       conclusion of the trial. Id.
                                   Nonetheless, even while recognizing that Garmon preeMption
                       could not be waived, the Supreme Court ultimately concluded that the
                       union did not meet its burden to establish jurisdictional preemption because
                       its allegations of preemption were entirely conclusory in nature and not
                       based on any evidence in the record. Id. at 394-95, 398. Crucially. whether
                       the NLRA preempted the state. cOurt proceedings hinged on whether Davis

                       involve a collective bargaining agreement was not preempted by the NLRA
                       and, therefore, the district court had subject matter jurisdiction •to
                                                      •

                       adjudicate that claim.
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                   was an employee, in which case the NLR.A would apply, or a supervisor, in.
                   which case the NLRA would not apply. ld. at 395. In its briefing to the
                   Supreme Court, the union's."sole submission [was] that Davis was arguably
                   an employee because the Board has not decided that he was a supervisor."
                   id. at 396 (emphasis added). Similarly, "Nile [u]nion. s claim of pre-emption
                   in the state courts was also devoid of any factual or legal showing that Davis
                   was arguably not a supervisor but an employee." Id. at 398. When the
                   union argued preemption in the state court, its mOtion contained no more
                   than a conclu.sory assertion that state jurisdictian was preenipted," and
                   "[u]ntil that motion, no claim of preemption had been made out." Id:
                               •The Supreme Court .deterrnined• this was insufficient. "To
                   accept the [u]nion's submission. woUld be essentia]ly equivalent to allowing
                   a conclusory claim of preemption and would effectively eliminate the
                   necessity •to make out an arguable case." . Id: at 396. Rather, "a• party
                   asserting pre-emption must put forth enough evidence to enable a -court tò
                   Conclude that the activity is arguably subject to the [NLRA]." Id. at 398
                   (emphasis added). "[T]hose claiming preemption must carry the burden of
                   showing at least an arguable ease before the jurisdiction of a state court will
                   be busted," Id. at 396.
                               Here, Highroller doeS riot argue that 49 U.S.C. § 14501(a) vests
                   subject matter jurisdiction "Occlusively in one forum." Davis, 476 U.S.- at
                   393 nn.9 & 11.. Moreover, unlike the NLRA, which -requires claims to be
                   brought before the National Labor Relation's Board, 49 U.S.C. § 14501(a)
                   does riot,, on its face, requite transportation Carrier citations to be
                   adjudicated in another forum. Therefore, it is doubtful that Illighroller's
                   claim, even if it. had it been properly supported, would have divested the

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                   NTA of subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the citations and fines at
                   issue this case.
                                 Nonetheless, even assuming arguendo that Highroller's
                   preemption claim implicates the NTA's subject matter jurisdiction.
                   Highroller presented no evidence at the administrative level concerning
                   whether the restriction at issue is safety-related or not, such that the NTA's
                   authority was even arguably preempted. See Davis, 476 U.S. at 395-96
                   (requiring a party asserting preemption to "put forth enough evidence to
                   enable the court to find" preemption); see also Davidson v. Velsicol Chern.
                   Corp., 108 Nev. 591, 594, 834 P.2d 931, 933 (1992) ("The burden of
                   establishing pre-emption is on the party seeking to give the statute such
                   effect.").
                                 Like in Davis, •where the question of preemption turned on
                   Davis' status as either an employee or a supervisor, the question of
                   preemption in this case turns on whether Highroller's certificate restriction
                   was safety-related or not. Highroller concedes that the NTA has jurisdiction
                   to impose safety-related restrictions on charter bus operators. Therefore, to
                   the extent the restriction in Highroller's certificate can be deemed safety-
                   related, the NTA would necessarily have had subject matter jurisdiction to
                   adjudicate citations related to a violation of that restriction. Had Highroller
                   timely raised its preemption argument during the administrative hearing,
                   the hearing officer could have considered evidence and argument regarding
                   the purpose of the certificate restriction in order to determine in the first
                   instance whether the restriction was, or was not, preempted by 49 U.S.C.
                   § 14501(a).
                                 But Highroller did not avail itself of the opportunity to litigate
                   the preernption issue before the hearing officer and instead made only a

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                   ,
                   sconclusory claim of pre-emption" at the NTA general session. See Davis,
                   476 U.S. at 396. Highroller failed to present any evid6nce at the agency
                   level to permit a finding that the restriction in its certificate was not safety-
                   related. Highroller's claim was thus "devoid of any factual or legal showing"
                   that its certificate restriction was not sufficiently safety-related, which was
                   "a relevant inquiry in making out [its] case."         Id. at 398.    Therefore,

                   Highroller's conclusory and bare assertion of preemp'tion at the NTA
                   general sèssion was insufficient to establish that the NTA lacked subject
                   matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the citations in this case.
                                 We recognize that in the judicial review proceedings before the
                   district court, both Highroller and the NTA briefed the issue of whether
                   Highroller's certificate restriction was excluded from preemption under 49
                   U.S.C. § 14501(a)(2) for being related to safety. However, this post hoc
                   briefing    was insufficient   for   Highroller   to   establish   jurisdictional

                   preemption, both under the framework utilized in Davis and under existing
                   Nevada law.      In Davis, the union's post-trial brief contained only a
                   conclusory assertion of preernption. 476 U.S. at 398. Moreover, when it
                   argued for preemption, the union "did not assert that Davis was an
                   employee, not a supervisor, let alone point to any evidence to support such
                   a claim." Id. Here, similarly, Highroller's briefing in support of its petition
                   for judicial review contained a conclusory assertion of preemption that did
                   not point to any evidence to support such a claim in the administrative
                   record. 7

                          7 In Highroller's pëtition for judicial review and on appeal, Highroller
                   summarily asserts that because its certificate restriction is not universally
                   applicable to all motor carriers, it cannot be related to safety for purposes
                   of preemption under 49 U.S.C. § 14501(a). However, Highroller does not

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                               We again emphasize the need for a fully developed record at the
                   agency level in order to properly evaluate arguments made in a petition for
                   judicial review. Though we review questi.ons of law, including preemption,
                   de novo, see Nanopierce Techs., 123 Nev. at 370, 168 P.3d at 79, a sufficient
                   record is still necessary for appellate review of administrative decisions.
                   While de novo review entails that "we decide pure legal questions without
                   deference to an agency determination," our review, like the district court's,.
                   is still limited to the agency record: City of Reno v. Bldg. .& Constr. Trades
                   Council of N. Nev., 127 Nev. 114, 119, 251 P.3d 718, 721 (2011) (internal
                   quotation marks omitted).
                                Insofar as the district court addressed Highroller's preemPtion
                   claim on the merits by relying exclusively on the briefs or arguments of
                   counsel rather than the administrative agency record, this was-error. NRS
                   233B.135(1)(b) (Providing th.at the .district court's review is confined to the
                   administrative agency record). As discussed aboVe, Highroller'S preemption
                   argument required the NTA. to make factual findings as to the restrictiOn's
                   purpose, and absent those findings in the administrative record, the district
                   court could not conclude, as a matter of law, whether the restriction was
                   federally preempted. Nonetheless, because Highroller did not establish at
                   the . agency level that its certificate restriction was• preempted,
                   jurisdictionally or otherwise; we affirm the district court's decision denying
                   judicial review, albeit on other grounds. See Wyatt v. State; 86 NeV. 294,
                   298, 468 P.2d 338, 341 (1970) ("If a jud.gment or order of a trial court reaches
                   the right result; alth.ough it is based on an incorrect ground, the judgrnent
                   or order will be affirmed on. appeal:7):

                   provide any legal authority or citations to the administrative record in
                   support of its position.
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                        Highroller also waived its federal preemption argument by stipulating to
                        informal disposition of its contested cases
                                    Lastly, the NTA argues that Highroller waived its preemption

                        argument by stipulating to the violations and waiving additional findings
                        of fact and conclusions of law.      In response, Highroller reiterates its

                        argument that due to federal preemption, the NTA lacked jurisdiction to
                        adjudicate its contested cases.    Insofar as Highroller relies on federal

                        preemption as a basis to disregard its stipulations, for the reasons discussed
                        above, Highroller is not entitled to relief.     Nonetheless, we take this

                        opportunity to clarify the effect , of Highroller's stipulations on its
                        subsequent preemption challenge on judicial review.
                                    A stipulation is an agreement made before a judicial tribunal
                        that requires the assent of the parties to its terms. Taylor v. State Indus.
                        Ins. System, 107 Nev. 595, 598, 816 P.2d 1086, 1088 (1991) (recognizing the
                        validity of a stipulation between an administrative agency and a party).
                        Written stipulations are enforceable contracts. Redrock Valley Ranch, LLC
                        v. Washoe County, 127 Nev. 451, 460, 254 P.3d 641, 647 (2011). Indeed, a
                        stipulation to settle a lawsuit is binding if signed by the party against whom
                        enforcement is sought. See Casentini v. Hines, 97 Nev. 186, 187, 652 P.2d
                        1174, 1175 (1981).    If a stipulation contains an unequivocal statement
                        indicating an intent to dispose of an entire case, a court may treat the
                        stipulation accordingly. See Taylor, 107 Nev. at 599, 816 P.2d at 1088.
                                    In administrative proceedings, a decision or order that is
                        adverse to a party in a contested case must be in writing or stated on the
                        record and ordinarily must include findings of fact and conclusions of law.
                        NRS 233B.125. However, a party in a contested case'may agree to "informal
                        disposition" by stipulation and. in doing so, waive the requirement. that the
                        agency make findings of fact and concluSions of law.      NRS 233B.121(5).
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                   When a party to a contested case validly stipulates to informally dispose of
                   the case and waive the findings of fact and conclusions of law otherwise
                   required by NRS 233B.125, that party is bound by the terms of that
                   stipulation.    See Second Baptist Church of Reno v. Mount Zion Baptist
                   Church, 86 Nev. 164, 172, 466 P.2d 212, 217 (1970) (stating that "valid
                   stipulations are controlling and conclusive and both trial and appellate
                   courts are bound to enforce them"). As a result, a party who waives an
                   agency's obligations under NRS 233B.125 may not subsequently raise
                   claims on judicial review that, had those claims been raised before the
                   agency, would have required the agency to make additional findings of fact
                   and conclusions of law.
                                  In this case, the parties' written stipulations were valid and
                   their terms enforceable. Both parties signed the stipulations and assented
                   to their terms, which included an unequivocal statement of intent to
                   informally dispose of Highroller's contested cases. Taylor, 107 Nev. at 598,
                   816 P.2d at 1088; Casentini, 97 Nev. at 187, 652 P.2d at 1175.
                                  As noted above, in order to evaluate Highroller's preemption
                   argument—raised for the first time after the stipulations were signed--the
                   hearing officer would have had to make further findings of fact regarding
                   the   underlying     purpose   of   Highroller's   certificate   restriction   and

                   conclusions of law to determine if the restriction fell within the safety
                   exception of 49 U.S.C. § 14501(a)(2). Because the terms of the stipulations
                   relieved the NTA of its obligation under NRS 233B.125 to make these
                   findings of fact and conclusions of law, Highroller's stipulation waived its
                   federal preemption argument for purposes of judicial review.
                                  To the extent that Highroller argues on appeal that the NTA
                   failed to meet its burden to establish a safety purpose for the restriction, we

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                         conclude that Highroller invited the claimed error. See .Pearson v.. Pearson,
                         110 Nev. 293, 297, 871 P.2d 343, 345 (1994) ("The doctrine of invited error
                         embodies the principle that a party will not be heard to complain of any
                         errors which he himself induced or provoked the court or the opposite party
                         to commit." (quoting 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and Error § 713 (1962)) (internal
                         quotation marks omitted)). Because Highroller waived the NTA's obligation
                         to make findings of fact and conclusions of law, it cannot challenge the
                         oMissi.on • of such findingS and conclusions • on appeal. Therefore, • as
                         Highroller invited the alleged error, •it is not entitled to' relief.8
                                                       CONCLUSION
                                   • Generally, consistent with traditional waiver principles, a party
                         in a contested case before the NTA must raise arguments at the
                         administrative hearing in order to properly preserve those arguments for
                         appellate.review. The agency must have an opportunity to respond, and the
                         hearing offic.er must also ha.ve an opportunity to fully consider the party's
                         claim. If an argument is presented for the first time at an NTA general

                               8 The NTA argues on appeal that Highroller's petitiOn for judicial
                         review should have been dismissed for failure to timely serve the Nevada
                         Attorney General in accordance with NRS 233B.130(2)(c)(1). However, .as
                         the NTA recognizes, the time for service can be extended upon a showing Of
                         good cause. Heat & Frost Insulators & Allied Workers Local 16 v. Labor
                         Comm'r of Nev., 134 Nev. 1, 4-5, 408 P.3d 156, 159-60 (2018). In this case,
                         the district court found •that good 'cause existed to extend the time for
                         Highroller to properly serve the Attorney General. We review the district
                         court's decision to enlarge time for an abuse of discretion. Scrimer v. Eighth
                         Judicial Dist. Court, 116 Nev. 507, 513, 998 P.2d 1190, 1193-94 (2000).
                         After reviewing.the record in this caSe' .; we conclude thatthe .district court
                         did . not abuse its discretion when it enlarged the time for. Highroller to
                         effectuate service. Id. Insofar as the parties have raised other arguments
                         that are not specifically addressed i.n this opinion, we have considered the
                         same and conclude that they do not. present a basis .for relief.
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                   session, the Authority is not obligated to consider it. Though a challenge to
                   subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, in this case
                   Highroller's conclusory assertion of preemption at the NTA general session,
                   without reference to any evidence in the agency record, was insufficient to
                   establish that the NTA lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enforce
                   Highroller's certificate restriction. Further, because Highroller failed to
                   adequately develop the record at the agency level, neither the district court
                   nor this court can fully assess the merits of Highroller's preemption claim,
                   as our review is limited to the agency record. Lastly, Highroller waived its
                   preemption argument by stipulating to an informal disposition of its
                   contested cases and waiving further findings of fact and conclusions of law.
                   Accordingly, we affirm the district court order granting in part and denying
                   in part Highroller's petition for judicial review in this case.

                                                                                     , J.
                                                         Westbrook

                   We concur:

                                                , C.J.

                       l oroop*ia:micasatiaie
                   Bulla

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