Court Opinion

ID: 9628713
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:30:14.806668+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:40.849895
License: Public Domain

UDALL, Justice
(dissenting) :
The majority opinion interprets the constitutional and statutory provisions in issue to mean that the appellate jurisdiction granted the court of appeal is concurrent with that of the Supreme Court and that therefore, not only under the more than forty specific laws in the Arizona statutes similar to the one in the instant case, but in all cases there is a right of direct appeal to this Court. I respectfully dissent.
' I think that the legislature intended by the enactment of A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21 and 12-2101 to repeal by implication those portions of statutes similar to A.R.S. § 20-166, which by their terms allow for an appeal to this Court, and to provide that all appeals permitted under such statutes must be initially appealed to the intermediate appellate court before they may be heard by the Supreme Court. I further believe that in all cases, except where expressly prohibited by statute, the right of appeal is to be through the intermediate court and not directly to the Supreme Court; and, if the legislative acts are given such an interpretation they would not be unconstitutional by reason of a conflict with Art. 6, § 5, ¶ 3, and Art. 6, § 5, j[ 5, as the majority opinion suggests.
Art. 6, §§ 1 and 9, as amended, of the Arizona Constitution, vested in the legislature the authority necessary to create an intermediate appellate court and to grant whatever jurisdiction and rights of appeal to such court it thought proper. The legislature, acting per this authority, saw fit to use very broad language in the delegation of jurisdiction to'the court of appeals; e. g. A.R.S. § 12-120.21, subsec. A, par. 2 provides for jurisdiction in the intermediate court of “all actions and proceedings” which may be appealed from the superior court, “except criminal actions involving crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment.” (emphasis added) The legislature preferred to use equally broad language in A.R.S. § 12-2101; e. g. subsection B grants to litigants the right to appeal to the court of appeals:
“From a final judgment entered in an action or special proceeding commenced in a superior court, or brought into a su-' perior court from any other court, except *550in actions of forcible entry and detainer * * (emphasis added)
It should be noted that the legislature did not see fit in either statute referred to above to provide for a general exception by using the language, “unless otherwise provided in specific statutes”. The language used was inclusive, with the exceptions noted, and hence, must be accordingly followed. It is apparent that if the legislature intended for these new statutes to supercede those previously enacted, it had two alternatives : one, seek out and amend all forty plus statutes which provide for an appeal to this Court (see attached appendices) or two, use a general provision. I think the legislature sought to accomplish its purpose by the more expedient means, i. e. by using a general or blanket provision.
I am mindful and appreciate the usual rule that a special or particular statute is not repealed by a general statute “unless the intent to repeal is manifest.” Rowland v. McBride, 35 Ariz. 511, 281 P. 207; see also, Shapley v. Frohmiller, 64 Ariz. 35, 165 P.2d 306; Arizona Corp. Comm’n v. Catalina Foothills Estate, 78 Ariz. 245, 278 P.2d 427; Hudson v. Brooks, 62 Ariz. 505, 158 P.2d 661.
In Southern Pac. Co. v. Gila County, 56 Ariz. 499, 109 P.2d 610, we recognized that “a statute may be repealed by implication, as well as by direct language, in a subsequent act of the legislature, and that such repeals do frequently occur * * In the instant case common sense dictates that the legislature could not have intended the two statutes to be contemporaneously operative. See, State v. Morf, 80 Ariz. 220, 295 P.2d 842; Arizona Tax Com’n v. Dairy & Consumers Co-op Ass’n, 70 Ariz. 7, 215 P.2d 235; State v. Misc., 50 Ariz. 244, 72 P.2d 408.
“It is the universal rule of statutory construction that-when a subsequent act of the Legislature is in conflict with a prior act, it by implication repeals so much of the prior act as is in conflict with the latter law.” City of Bisbee v. Cochise County, 44 Ariz. 233, 36 P.2d 559. See also, City of Douglas v. Kitchel, 44 Ariz. 246, 36 P.2d 564; State Board of Health v. Frohmiller, 42 Ariz. 231, 23 P.2d 941.
In implementing the constitutional provisions by establishing an intermediate appellate court, the legislature sought to completely change the judicial structure in this state. I am convinced that if the statutes such A.R.S. § 20-166 are to be construed as the majority opinion states, i. e. as permitting an appeal directly to this Court instead of initially requiring an appeal to the intermediate appellate court, the very purpose and reasons for which the intermediate court of appeal was established are thwarted. The purpose is completely defeated when the majority announces that a direct appeal to this Court is now permitted in all cases.
It is common knowledge that the court of appeal was created in order to relieve the congestion in the Supreme Court; and during its two years of operation the intermediate court has proved to be highly effective in doing so. However, there is still congestion in this Court, as is clearly revealed by the majority opinion’s order transferring the instant case to the court of appeal because of the “pending workload of the court”, notwithstanding the majority’s holding that the case was properly before this Court.
I am of the opinion that if the court of appeal is to continue to serve the purpose for which it was intended, the words “intermediate appellate courts” must be more literally construed. The word “intermediate” connotes that which comes between, and when applied to a court structure, means that court between the lower courts and the highest court of the state. If it does come between, it must of necessity follow that in getting to the highest court from the lowest, one must pass through the court in between, unless expressly provided otherwise by the legislature.
The practical effect of the majority opinion will be to open wide the gates to direct appeals to this Court, thereby effectively nullifying the very relief expect*551ed from the creation of the intermediate appellate court. It is difficult to conceive of all the various reasons, both legal and nonlegal, both justifiable and unjustifiable, why counsel will seek to by-pass the court of appeal in any given case, but the probability is that a significant number will. That such will create heavy new burdens on this Court never contemplated by the constitutional amendment is uncontrovertable and I find it unthinkable that the Supreme Court should undertake the project of setting up and administering the exceptional procedure necessary to effectively deal with such added and unnecessary burdens. I agree with the statement made by the Wisconsin Supreme Court :
“As a matter of sound appellate practice, there is no reason for allowing a choice of appeal either to circuit court or supreme court. Where the procedure for appeal to circuit court is clearly provided, it is exclusive. Where appeal is permitted directly to the supreme court, that procedure is also exclusive.” County of Milwaukee v. Caldwell, 31 Wis.2d 286, 143 N.W.2d 41, 44 (1966).
The majority opinion states that “if the legislature intended to make the jurisdiction of the court of appeals exclusive, and not concurrent with that of the supreme court, and further intended that the act not be subject to amendment or abrogation by rules of the supreme court, the act would be unconstitutional”, as it would be in conflict with both Art. 6, § 5 ¶ 3 and Art. 6, § 5 jf 5 of our constitution. I must express my disagreement.
This Court has held on a number of occasions that the substantive right to appeal is statutory, exists only by force of statute, and may only be given or denied by the constitution or the legislature. State v. Birmingham, 96 Ariz. 109, 392 P.2d 775, reaffirming 95 Ariz. 310, 390 P.2d 103; Kemble v. Porter, 88 Ariz. 417, 357 P.2d 155; Rueda v. Galvez, 94 Ariz. 131, 382 P.2d 239; Stevens v. Mehagian’s Home Furnishings, Inc., 90 Ariz. 42, 365 P.2d 208; Knape v. Brown, 86 Ariz. 158, 342 P.2d 195; Arizona Corporation Com’n v. Pacific Motor Truck Co., 83 Ariz. 135, 317 P.2d 562; Ross v. Industrial Commission, 82 Ariz. 9, 307 P.2d 612; Barth v. Apache County, 18 Ariz. 439, 162 P. 62. The right to appeal is a creature of statute because such was unknown at common law. It is obviously the prerogative of a legislature which creates a right to limit it as it sees fit. The question which thus presents itself is whether the legislature has limited an appellant’s right to a direct appeal to the Supreme Court. I think the answer is clearly yes and that the legislature was entirely within its rights in doing so.
The statutory right to appeal to the court of appeal is given in A.R.S. § 12-2101. § 12-2101, subsec. B provides that an appeal may be taken from a “final judgment entered in an action or special proceeding commenced in a superior court, or brought into a superior court from any other court * * A.R.S. § 12-120.21 defines the jurisdiction of the court of appeal and in pertinent part states that the court of appeal has appellate jurisdiction in “all actions and proceedings originating in or permitted by law to be appealed from the superior court” with the exception of “criminal actions involving crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment.” A.R.S. § 13-1711 provides in effect that those criminal actions excepted under § 12-120.21 are to be appealed directly to the Supreme Court. I am of the opinion that by only expressly excepting certain actions from being appealable to the court of appeal and at the same time by providing specifically for a right of direct appeal to the Supreme Court in those very actions excepted and no others, the legislature manifested its intention that the right of appeal in all other instances is to be through the intermediate appellate court and not directly to the Supreme Court.
Such a limitation on an appellant’s right to appeal is valid for as I noted previously, the legislature does have the authority to limit any right which it creates; furthermore, such a limitation is no different in effect than those in other statutes which require a case be initially presented to a *552board, a commission, or to a superior or other inferior court.
In the case of Young v. Stearns, 91 Ill. 221, at page 222, the Illinois Supreme Court stated succinctly its view of the role of the legislature. I am in accord.
“There are only four classes of cases in which there is a constitutional right of appeal or writ of error to this court * * *. Even in these cases such constitutional right of appeal or writ of error to this court is not the right of a direct appeal from or writ of error to the trial court, but such appeal or writ of error may be through the intermediary of the Appellate Court. It is for the Legislature to determine as to whether in all, or some, or any of these cases, the appeal shall he direct to this court, or otherwise (emphasis added).
In view of the above, I cannot conceive of how the procedural rule-making power of this Court is infringed upon or is limited by legislative enactment, for it does not and was not intended to displace the legislative power to give and also limit the right to appeal. If the majority supposes that the Supreme Court, by the promulgation of procedural rules, may amend or abrogate the statutory right to appeal, then this Court is usurping the power of the legislature in contravention of a basic tenet of our form of government which provides for a separation of powers among three distinct branches.
I also fail to see why the majority feels that Art. 6, § 5 ¶ 3 would be infringed upon if the legislature intended for the jurisdiction of the court of appeal to be other than concurrent with that of the Supreme Court. The constitution provides for the Supreme Court to have “appellate jurisdiction” and that is exactly what it does have by virtue of A.R.S. § 12-120.24, implemented by Rule 47, Rules of the Supreme Court. The fact that appellate review in this Court is put on a selective rather than a mandatory basis does not abate our jurisdiction, but abates only the burden of having to decide every case which is appealed. I firmly believe that the jurisdiction of this Court remains inviolate and that the jurisdiction of the court of appeal likewise is secure, subject as it should be, however, to the review of this Court in any and all cases where we deem it necessary or desirable. The requirement that an appeal be initially taken to the intermediate appellate court does not lessen one iota this Court’s right and duty to be the final declarer of the laws of this state.
Hence, since the instant appeal was perfected after the court of appeal began to function, I believe the appeal lies in that court and we do not at the present time have jurisdiction to decide this matter. I would therefore order the cause transferred to the Court of Appeals, Division 1, pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-120.22, subsec. B, for consideration and decision on the merits.
APPENDIX I
I Miscellaneous Appeals to Supreme Court by Specific Statutes:
1. Adoption § 8-110
2. Certiorari § 12-2007
3. Workmen’s Compensation § 23-948
4. Transaction Privilege Tax § 42-1339
5. Administrative Decisions §§ 12-903, 12-913
6. Agricultural Improvement District § 45-907
§ 45-913
7. Corporation Commission § 40-254
8. Dispensing Opticians Brd § 32-1695
9. Electrical District § 30-511
10. Occupational Disease Act §§ 23-1144, 23-1146, 23-1230
*55311. Workmen’s Compensation §§ 23-948, 23-951
12. Power Districts § 30-313
13. State Land Commission § 37-214
14. Public Lands § 37-134, subsec. C
15. Soil Cons. District — appeal determination of '
Commissioner § 45-2055:*
r
* refers appellate procedure, § 37-214.
16. Irrigation Districts § 45-1858
17. Director of Insurance § 20-166
18. Mental Health § 36-538
19. State Bd. of Equalization § 42-147, subsec. E
20. Divorce § 25-351
21. Arizona Power Authority § 30-174
22. Unconstitutional Statute or Order § 12-932
23. Medicine and Surgery § 32-1453
24. Sale of Securities § 44 — 1984
25. Criminal Appeals Fee § 13-1721
26. Appeals (Remittitur or Additur) § 12-2104
27. Elections — Successor to Office § 38-345
28. Appeals § 13-1720
29. Railroads § 40-843
30. Oil & Gas § 27-526
31. Nursing § 32-1665
32. Naturopathy § 32-1554
33. Minimum Wage Decision § 23-325
34. Livestock and Animals § 24-621.15
35. Decedents’ Estate § 14-643
36. Ground Waters § 45-321 37 Water Districts § 45-2172
38. Barbering § 32-354
39. Employment Security § 23-682
40. Eminent Domain § 12-1127 ■
41. Military Court Martial § 26-210
The foregoing list is not exhaustive, and is merely intended to illustrate the number of statutes where an appeal may be taken to this Court. There is a possibility that some statutes may provide for such a procedure and not be listed in the index.
II
See also statutes which specify Supreme Court and are still applicable but not amended to include the Court of Appeals:
1. § 13-1715
2. § 13-1716
3. § 13-1717
4. § 13-1718
5. § 13-1719
6. § 13-1720
7. § 13-1721
8. § 12-321
9. § 12-322
10. § 12-323