Court Opinion

ID: 9623700
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:40:53.292732+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:52:53.144004
License: Public Domain

KIRSHBAUM, Justice,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the rationale and conclusion expressed by the majority in Section 11(c) of its opinion.
Section 1-40-101(2), IB C.R.S. (1980), prescribes the statutory duty of the board as follows:
[To] prepare a clear, concise summary of the proposed law or constitutional amendment. The summary shall be a true and impartial statement as to the intent of the proposed law or constitutional amendment and shall not be an argument, nor likely to create prejudice, either for or against the measure.
The statute and its predecessors have long served as the benchmark for this court’s review of the board’s deliberations. In construing this statutory provision, this court, prior to today, has consistently ruled that in summarizing an initiated statute or constitutional amendment neither the board nor the court has authority to interpret, construe or otherwise evaluate the meaning or effect of such proposal. Cf In re Title, Ballot Title & Submission Clause, & Summary Pertaining to Casino Gaming, 649 P.2d 303, 310 (Colo.1982) (“[I]t is not our function in this review proceeding, nor is it the Board’s function, to determine the meaning of the language of the initiative; a judicial interpretation of the meaning of the initiative must await an adjudication in a specific factual context.”); In re Title, Ballot Title & Submission Clause, & Summary Including the Estimate of Fiscal Impact & Explanation Thereof Pertaining to the Mineral Production Tax Initiative, 644 P.2d 20, 23 (Colo.1982) (“Since the duty of the board is to impartially summarize the stated intent of the amendment, but not to argue for a certain interpretation, it would be inappropriate to interpret the language of the proposed amendment.... Furthermore, it is not our function in this review proceeding to determine the meaning of the language of the amendment; rather, a judicial interpretation must await an adjudication in a contro*1134versy arising in a specific factual context.”); In -re Proposed Initiative on Transfer of Real Estate, 200 Colo. 40, 43, 611 P.2d 981, 983 (1980) (“If a controversy arises in a specific factual context, then judicial determination ... may be appropriate, but it is not relevant to the determination of accuracy of the language of the titles, summary, and submission clause.”); Bauch v. Anderson, 178 Colo. 308, 310, 497 P.2d 698, 699 (1972) (“[W]e must not in any way concern ourselves with the merit or lack of merit of the proposed amendment since, under our system of government, that resolution rests with the elector-ate_”). The majority today replaces this clear limitation upon the authority of the board and this court with a more elastic and, therefore, far less certain standard. I find the prior test to be the better reasoned rule. Applying it here, I conclude that the titles and submission clause drafted by the board impermissibly interpret section two of the proposed initiative.
It is helpful to recall that voters place primary, if not absolute, reliance upon the board’s product when deciding whether to support or oppose proposed initiatives. It is for this reason that our decisions have insisted that those documents be neutral, unambiguous, non-argumentative and non-interpretive in summarizing the contents of various proposals. Certainly the board, by conscious effort or through carelessness, on occasion might adopt words and phrases which persuade rather than describe. Recognizing the profound influence such language could have on voters, this court has steadfastly prohibited the use of “catch phrases” when words chosen by the board in drafting titles have suggested particular meanings of a proposal rather than merely summarizing its contents. See, e.g., Say v. Baker, 137 Colo. 155, 322 P.2d 317 (1958).
The majority’s suggestion that summari-zation necessarily requires interpretation severely overstates the problem. It is just because summarization can, with care, avoid debatable interpretations that this court has insisted that the board exercise its drafting authority with extreme caution. To elevate the acceptable premise that our elusive language sometimes refuses to permit pure summarization to the dubious proposition that the board cannot avoid interpretation is equally unwarranted. The only effective safeguard against either argumentative or misleading interpretive nuances of phraseology that in reality describe a particular result of a proposal rather than the proposal itself is to prohibit absolutely the use of words which demonstrably interpret or construe proposed initiatives. To date, the board has exhibited admirable skill in performing its statutory duties under this restrictive standard, to the benefit of all voters. I would retain this standard.
The majority accords the board expanded authority to construe the effects of proposals so long as the interpretive language is “not unreasonable” and “relates to a feature of the proposed law that is both peripheral to its central purpose and of limited temporal relevance.” Far from furthering the salutary goal of establishing uniform neutral standards of review of board action, such test greatly reduces the possibility of achieving such objective criteria. It must first be noted that the majority provides no guidance for a determination of what is “not unreasonable.” It is highly unlikely that reasonableness doctrines developed in the common law of negligence will provide a basis for the articulation of this standard. There is no comparable body with which to contrast the conduct of the title review board. Moreover, since a “reasonable” interpretation certainly need not be a “correct” one, the new test for evaluating board action relies upon the particular impressions of a particular majority of this court, formulated without benefit of a factual context, concerning what a reasonable, though perhaps wrong, construction might be.
Compounding the problem of developing objective criteria for review of board action is the proposition that certain provisions of an initiative may be interpreted or construed by the board if such provisions are “peripheral” to the proposal’s “central purpose” and are “of limited temporal rele-*1135vanee. These assertions create new difficulties for the board. In the past, the requirement of brevity has been sufficient to justify the board’s decision to exclude discussion of many provisions of particular proposed initiatives. Now, however, the board is permitted, if not encouraged, to interpret provisions which this court deems marginal. The once clear mandate to achieve brevity has now been muddled. Furthermore, it is difficult to understand how considerations of temporal relativity can lead to development of meaningful standards by which the board may gauge its performance. Are all proposed provisions which expire in thirty-six months or less presumptively of sufficient brevity to be subject to interpretation? The period of time a proposed provision might be effective seems a most ephemeral standard by which particular phraseology is to be measured. In this very case, for example, it certainly is not self-evident that the provision permitting those possibly quite numerous Coloradoans who are at least eighteen years old on July 1, 1985, to continue to consume fermented malt beverages is either peripheral or of sufficiently limited temporality to permit interpretive treatment by the board.
The prior standard has proved to be a relatively clear beacon for the board’s guidance. The new standard is dim and diffuse, complicates the board’s already difficult task, and, in my opinion, can only lead the board and this court astray from the path of neutrality which heretofore has led to faithful summarization of proposed initiatives.
Application of the prior rule to this case leads inescapably to the conclusion that the titles and submission clause prepared by the board impermissibly express an interpretation of certain language of the proposal. For that reason, the board’s action should be reversed.
The proposal, as set forth in full in Appendix A, contains amendments to sections 12-46-112(l)(a) to -(l)(e), 5 C.R.S. (1978), and to section 12 — 46—112(2)(b), 5 C.R.S. (1978). The amendments to section 112(1) substitute the number “twenty-one” for the number “eighteen”. and, with respect to section 112(l)(a), substitute the phrase “2:00 A.M. and 7:00 A.M.” for the phrase “12 midnight and 5 a.m.” The substantive provisions of section 112(1) in general declare numerous acts by various described classes of persons to be unlawful. Sections 1(a) and 1(b) discuss selling; serving; giving away; disposing of; exchanging; delivering; and permitting the sale, serving, giving or procurring of fermented malt beverages. Sections 1(c) and 1(d) discuss obtaining or possessing fermented malt beverages. Section 1(e) discusses suffering or permitting certain persons to violate sections 1(a) or 1(b). The proposed initiative does not contain substitute language for these general substantive provisions.
The proposal does contain the following language, however:
Section 2. Effective Date — Applicability. This act shall take effect July 1, 1985, and shall apply to acts committed on or after said date; however, persons who are eighteen years of age and older prior to July 1, 1985, may continue to consume fermented malt beverages.
(emphasis added).
The titles and submission clause prepared by the board state unequivocally that this exception applies to acts of selling, serving or giving of fermented malt beverages. The exception certainly does not expressly relate to such acts. Depending upon a given fact context, such acts may or may not be deemed prohibited when connected with persons who “consume” beverages. The board has assumed a possible effect of this portion of the proposal and has translated that assumption into an absolute statement of fact. In so doing, the board has construed the meaning and effect of this part of the proposal, rather than — as it admirably did in its summary of the initiative — simply describe the proposal’s contents.
The point is not whether this interpretation of the proposal is accurate or reasonable. The principle is that any construction or interpretation of the initiative by the *1136board is impermissible. In re Title, Ballot Title & Submission Clause, & Summary Pertaining to Casino Gaming, 649 P.2d 303 (Colo.1982); In re Title, Ballot Title & Submission Clause, & Summary Including the Estimate of Fiscal Impact & Explanation Thereof Pertaining to the Mineral Production Tax Initiative, 644 P.2d 20 (Colo.1982); Bauch v. Anderson, 178 Colo. 308, 497 P.2d 698 (1972). The policy is that the voters, in considering whether to support or oppose this initiative, should not be informed to any extent by the documents prepared by the title board what one possible effect of the proposal might be. Any interpretation of the effect of the proposal with regard to the present statute must await the presentation of particularized alternatives addressed by adverse parties in a specific factual context—in short, an adjudicative proceeding.
In view of the requirement of brevity emphasized by the General Assembly in describing the functions of the board, see section 1-40-101(2), IB C.R.S. (1980), it would be well within the board’s discretion to omit from the titles and submission clause any reference to the “consumption” exception contained in section 2 of the proposal. In the event the board elected to treat such exception in the titles and submission clause, language similar to the description contained in the summary would avoid the problems of interpretation and construction which beset the phraseology actually used in the former documents. The present titles and submission clause improperly construe the meaning and effect of a portion of the proposal; for that reason, I would reverse the board’s action and remand the matter with instructions.
I am authorized to say that NEIGHBORS, J., joins me in the dissent.