Court Opinion

ID: 9494443
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:38:03.455521+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:25.049168
License: Public Domain

*167SACK, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I agree entirely with parts I, II A., II C., and III of the majority opinion. With respect to part II B., I agree with the majority’s conclusion that De La Pava’s counsel’s failure to move to dismiss the indictment under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. As the majority points out, ante at 165, we have held that the consular-notification provision of the Convention does not create “fundamental” rights for foreign nationals. Waldron v. INS, 17 F.3d 511, 518 (2d Cir.1993). The government’s failure to comply with Article 36 therefore does not constitute grounds for the dismissal of an indictment against a foreign national, see United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364-65, 101 S.Ct. 665, 66 L.Ed.2d 564 (1981), and De La Pava’s counsel’s failure to raise this issue therefore does not rise to the level of “ineffective assistance” under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). But the majority strongly suggests, further, that “the Convention created no judicially enforceable individual rights.” Ante at 164. Although this statement and the corresponding discussion, based on minimal briefing, seem to me clearly to be dicta, I see no reason even to appear to decide so broad and potentially sensitive an issue of international law. As the majority recognizes, “The Supreme Court has left open the question of whether the consular notification provision creates judicially enforceable rights.” Ante at 164 (citing Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376, 118 S.Ct. 1352, 140 L.Ed.2d 529 (1998)). I would explicitly do the same.
If push came to shove, I might come to agree with the majority that the Convention does not generally give rise to individual rights. But we have not been pushed, let alone shoved.