Court Opinion

ID: 9553574
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:32:04.016982+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:31:42.020948
License: Public Domain

SPENCE, J.
— I dissent.
The solution of this controversy appears to rest upon the determination of two main questions: First, whether substantial compliance with our constitutional provisions will suffice to render valid the adoption of a proposed county charter; and second, if so, whether there was such substantial compliance in the present ease. In my opinion, both questions should be answered in the affirmative.
While the majority opinion concedes that “substantial compliance will suffice (Perry v. Jordan, 34 Cal.2d 87, 94 [207 P.2d 47]; California. Teachers Assn. v. Collins, 1 Cal.2d 202 [34 P.2d 134]), there is contrary language in certain earlier decisions of this court (People v. City of San Buenaventura, 213 Cal. 637 [3 P.2d 3]; People v. Gunn, 85 Cal. 238 [24 P. 718]). In my opinion the language found in those earlier cases should be disapproved, for such language is not in harmony with the position taken by this court in the later cases above cited. Furthermore, to hold that an absolutely literal compliance in every phase of every step is a prerequisite to the adoption of a valid charter is to exalt form above substance, and would compel the invalidation of charter proceedings for the failure to dot an “i” or to cross a “t,” or for any other minor defect in a publication which might be of no substantial significance. Any such rule would tend to bring the law into disrepute and to give color to the claim that justice is administered in a hyper technical manner without regard to the realities.
Assuming, then, that a substantial compliance with our constitutional provisions is sufficient, the facts presented by the record before us clearly show such substantial compliance. It is not claimed that any step required by the Constitution was entirely omitted, but only that one of the steps was imperfectly executed in that 5 of the 10 required publications of the proposed charter were not letter perfect. Between the first publication on September 16, 1948, and the last four publications on September 22, 23, 24, and 25, 1948, all of which publications were “in exact conformance” with the sections of the proposed charter, there were certain errors made in the five intervening publications, which errors are set forth *343in the majority opinion. In these intervening publications the entire text was published but there was a slight transposition in three out of 71 sections of the charter. It seems entirely clear that the errors were of a minor nature, and that the effect, if any, upon the electors who might have read the slightly erroneous publications, instead of the perfect publications, would have been to incline such electors to vote against, rather than in favor of, the adoption of the proposed charter. The charter was nevertheless approved by a large majority of the electors. I therefore believe that it should be held here that there was a substantial compliance, for any other conclusion will result in thwarting the will of the vast majority of the electors without any compelling reason for so doing.
The disapproval of certain language used in People v. City of San Buenaventura, supra, 213 Cal. 637, would not- imply that the decision should be overruled. The situation in that case is clearly distinguishable. There it affirmatively appeared on the face of the concurrent resolution that one entire step required by the Constitution for the adoption of a charter had been omitted. It was there held that it is not for the courts to say that such entire step could be omitted when the Constitution provided otherwise. But if, as here, it affirmatively appears on the face of the concurrent resolution that every step was completed in exact conformance with the constitutional requirements, except for certain typographical errors which crept into some of the publications involved in completing the publication step, then it is for the courts to determine whether such errors were of such minor nature that there was nevertheless substantial compliance with the constitutional requirements.
As stated by Mr. Justice McFarland in his concurring opinion in People v. Gunn, supra, 85 Cal. 238, 250: “Because the constitution declares the provisions to be mandatory, it does not follow that a substantial compliance with them is not sufficient. The proceedings for the adoption of a charter will probably never be so literally perfect that a critical and hostile eye cannot detect in them some slight defect or irregularity, which ought not to be considered fatal. Whether or not there has been a sufficient compliance with the constitution in any particular case must depend on the particular facts of that case.”
That principle has been adopted in the more recent decisions above cited. It is not necessary here to attempt to specify the limits of those minor errors which may be deemed to be *344inconsequential within the substantial compliance rule. It seems clear, however, that if, as in the present case, it may be said with certainty that such minor errors in certain publications could have tended only to result in unfavorable, rather than favorable, votes on the question of the adoption of the proposed charter, then such errors should be held to be so inconsequential as not to invalidate the entire proceedings for the adoption of the proposed charter.
The Legislature here has approved the proposed charter despite the minor errors in some of the publications. It has impliedly found and concluded that there was a substantial compliance with the constitutional provisions. It has frankly shown the extent of such minor errors on the face of the concurrent resolution so as to permit judicial review of its findings and conclusions under the rules set forth in Taylor v. Cole, 201 Cal. 327 [257 P. 40], and People v. City of San Buenaventura, supra, 213 Cal. 637. Upon this judicial review, I am of the opinion that the Legislature was correct in its findings and conclusions, and that this judicial review should result in the validation, rather than the invalidation of the charter.
For the reasons stated, I would reverse the judgment of the trial court, with directions to enter judgment in favor of defendants.
Edmonds, J., and Traynor, J., concurred.
Intervener and appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied June 25, 1951. Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., voted for a rehearing.