Court Opinion

ID: 9775888
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:12:02.365275+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:59:35.981326
License: Public Domain

McCORMICK, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
Believing that Justice Butts correctly decided this issue in the Court of Appeals, I attach and adopt her unpublished opinion. Accordingly, I dissent to the majority decision to reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
APPENDIX
Opinion by: SHIRLEY W. BUTTS, Justice.
Delivered and filed: October 17, 1990 AFFIRMED.
This appeal arises from the trial court’s denial of a jury to assess punishment after the case was reversed and remanded to the trial court. We affirm.
The appellant pleaded guilty to the offenses of aggravated sexual assault of a child, two counts of indecency with a child, and incest. Before entering his plea of guilty, appellant executed a waiver of jury trial. The trial court assessed punishment. From that judgment of conviction and sentence, appellant perfected his appeal. The Court of Appeals reformed the judgment to delete all other convictions except aggravated sexual assault. The Court of Criminal Appeals granted appellant’s petition for discretionary review and remanded the case to the trial court for assessment of punishment. Appellant filed at the trial court a motion to have a jury assess punishment. The trial court ruled that appellant waived his right to a jury at the time
*952of his original guilty plea.1 The trial court assessed punishment at fifteen years’ imprisonment.
Appellant’s sole point of error is that he was denied his right to have a jury assess punishment. Upon entering a plea of guilty in a felony case, to either the court or a jury, the defendant is not entitled to a bifurcated trial. Thom v. State, 563 S.W.2d 618, 619 (Tex.Crim.App.1978). Once the guilty plea is entered, the procedure becomes a unitary trial to determine the remaining issue of punishment. Ricon-do v. State, 634 S.W.2d 837, 841 (Tex.Crim. App.1982) (opinion on Motion for Rehearing) (en banc).
In Bullard v. State, 548 S.W.2d 13 (Tex. Crim.App.1977) the Court was confronted with an issue similar to the one presented in this case. The defendant in Bullard, on a plea of “not guilty” and pursuant to Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 37.07 (Vernon 1981), was convicted by a jury for the offense of felony theft. He had elected the judge to assess punishment. The trial court sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction but remanded for a new penalty hearing. Prior to the new penalty hearing, the defendant filed a motion to withdraw his earlier election and have a jury assess punishment. The motion was overruled. The court held that a defendant is bound by a waiver of jury on the issue of punishment made at the original trial where the case is remanded for an error committed at the penalty stage. Id. at 21. The court emphasized that the state constitution only guarantees a trial by jury where one was provided by common law or by statute in 1876 when the Texas Constitution was adopted. Id. at 16. Because the statute in effect at that time did not encompass the right to have the jury assess the punishment, the court held that there was no constitutional right to a jury trial on the issue of punishment. Id. at 17. The court added that its decision was in accord with the common law and the federal constitution. Id. at 21.
In addressing the issue of waiver, the court declined to follow the rule in criminal cases that the waiver of a jury at the first trial does not affect the right to demand a jury at the second trial where the entire case is reversed on appeal. The rule is otherwise as to partial remands. The Bul-lard court held that for the purpose of the limited remand in the case for an error committed at the penalty stage before the judge, the defendant is bound by his waiver of a jury on the issue of punishment made at the original trial. Id. at 21.
Appellant contends that two provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure are dis-positive on the issue presented in this case. Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 37.072(b) (Vernon Supp.1990) provides:
[I]f a finding of guilty is returned, it shall then be the responsibility of the judge to assess the punishment applicable to the offense; provided, however, that (1) in any criminal action where the jury may recommend probation and the defendant filed his sworn motion for probation before the trial began, and (2) in other cases where the defendant so elects in writing before the commencement of the voir dire examination of the jury panel, the punishment shall be assessed by the same jury, except as provided in Article jj.29_ (emphasis
added)
Defendant primarily bases his argument upon Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 44.29(b) (Vernon Supp.1990) which provides in pertinent part:
If the court of appeals or the Court of Criminal Appeals awards a new trial to the defendant only on the basis of an error or errors made in the punishment stage of the trial, the cause shall stand as it would have stood in case the new trial had been granted by the court below, except that the court shall commence the new trial as if a finding of guilty had been returned and proceed to the punishment stage of the trial *953under Subsection (b), Section 2, Article 37.07 of this code. If the defendant elects, the court shall empanel a jury for the sentencing stage of the trial in the same manner as a jury is empaneled by the court for other trials before the court, (emphasis added)
In the foregoing provision, the legislature mandated that when the error occurs during the punishment stage, the cause begins on remand at that point — the punishment stage. Articles 44.29(b) and 37.-072(b) refer to each other. We interpret the language in 37.07 “except as provided in Article 44.29” to mean that, if the defendant elects at the original trial to have a jury assess punishment, it will be the same jury as determined guilt, unless the case was reversed and remanded for new punishment assessment only. Obviously, it would be impractical, if not impossible, for the court to reempanel the same jurors who determined guilt to assess punishment upon remand. Furthermore, article 37.-072(b) is limited to pleas of not guilty before a jury. Morales v. State, 416 S.W.2d 403 (Tex.Crim.App.1967). Moreover, it is our opinion that article 44.29 does not alter the law adopted in Bullard that the previously executed waiver remains binding but, by referring to Article 37.07, merely allows for a jury to be empaneled upon remand to the punishment stage in cases where the jury, after a finding of guilt, recommended probation or the defendant elected the jury in writing prior to voir dire of the jury at the original proceedings.
Therefore, we hold the reference in article 44.29 to article 37.07 does not apply where the defendant pleads guilty before the judge. Jackson v. State, 628 S.W.2d 119, 120 (Tex.App. — Beaumont 1981, pet. ref’d). Appellant, by virtue of his plea of guilty before the trial court, waived his right to a jury trial in this case. Appellant is bound by his waiver of a jury on the issue of punishment made at that time.
The judgment is affirmed.

. Although the statement of facts of that hearing is not in the record before this court, the parties are in agreement about the ruling of the trial court.