Court Opinion

ID: 9583600
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:40:25.435967+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:56:13.547208
License: Public Domain

Pekelis, J.*
(concurring) — As the majority goes through each step of its analysis, I am satisfied with each conclusion. However, the ultimate result is not at all satisfactory and could not have been intended by the Legislature. Nevertheless, because we have no way of knowing what was intended by its conflicting and inconsistent parts, I must concur in the majority’s analysis. I write separately to emphasize that there is an inconsistency that the Legislature must address if it wishes to give plaintiffs something more substantial than the hollow victory won by Fontanilla.
As the majority correctly concludes, by using such expansive language as "no person in the state shall be placed in legal jeopardy of any kind whatsoever,” RCW 9A.16.110 extends the reach of the statute to all cases where a person establishes a self-defense claim that is up*508held by the fact finder. In other words, the Legislature intends this to apply not only to statutorily defined offenses but to municipal offenses as well.
Yet, the majority also correctly concludes that the statute provides that the State—not the city or other subdivision of the State—is responsible for reimbursing such persons. However, since RCW 9A.16.110 clearly states that the reimbursement relief may not be obtained in a separate, independent action, persons like Fontanilla, tried in municipal court, have no effective remedy under this statute7 because the municipal judge has no jurisdiction over the State.
We thus have an anomalous result where the statute gives with one hand what it takes away with the other. If the Legislature wishes to offer relief to all persons who successfully establish a self-defense claim, it must provide for a remedy that is meaningful.

Mustice Rosselle Pekelis is serving as a justice pro tempore of the Supreme Court pursuant to Const. art. IV, § 2(a) (amend. XXXVIII).

The fact that Fontanilla can avail herself of the sundry claims statute provides little solace. The fact remains that the purported expansive reach of this statute is belied by the requirements of the statute itself.