Court Opinion

ID: 9776090
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:18:44.484305+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:34.303680
License: Public Domain

Robert L. Brown, Justice, concurring. I concur in all aspects of the majority opinion except one. The opinion concludes that the police officers’ assertions that they could save Conner’s life were not false in light of the fact that the State ultimately chose to waive the death penalty. Does that contingency action by the State render the promises true? The majority seems to be saying that police officers can promise leniency as an incentive for a confession with impunity, so long as the State, even if it is by chance, ultimately reduces the charge. I disagree that the pure happenstance of a reduction in the offense charged can justify or excuse a promise by police officers that otherwise would be misleading. We have no idea whether the officers in this case had anything to do with the prosecutor’s decision to waive the death penalty. Probably, they did not, but in any event that is a decision that rests solely with the prosecutor or the grand jury, not law enforcement. See Ark. Const. amend. 21, § 1. See also State v. Knight, 318 Ark. 158, 884 S.W.2d 258 (1994). The majority relies on Tippitt v. State, 285 Ark. 294, 686 S.W.2d 420 (1985), for its conclusion, but that case does not decide the issue of whether a promise needs to be bona fide or within the authority of police officers to be permissible. In Tippitt, the trial court refused to exclude a statement which was obtained by a police officer’s promise not to charge the appellant with attempted capital murder. In rather lukewarm language, we said that “[u]nder the facts and circumstances of this case, when considered in their totality, we think the trial court was correct in admitting the statement.” We then added: “The appellant struck a bargain, which was closely related to a plea bargain, and both sides kept their promises. Most likely the deal was a wise one for the appellant. In any event we can find no prejudicial error.” Tippitt, 285 Ark. at 295, 686 S.W.2d at 421 (emphasis added). No such “deal” or “bargain” was struck in the instant case, and Tippitt was clearly limited to its facts. It is not precedent for the issue confronting us today, since there was clearly no deal between Conner and the interrogating officers. The Maryland Supreme Court has recognized the important distinction between a promise of leniency made by a police officer to an accused during a custodial interrogation and a promise of leniency made by a prosecuting attorney in the context of a plea bargain. See Reynolds v. State, 610 A.2d 782 (Md. 1992). The Maryland court stated that although courts abhor promises of leniency made by state agents to an accused in custodial interrogation, they permit and even encourage promises of reduced charges or lower sentences made by the prosecuting attorney to induce defendants to plead guilty. See Id. And it is an accused’s “sensitivity to inducement while in custody and the potential impact of the promise” that renders a confession under such circumstances inadmissible. Id. at 787. Two other state courts have dealt with factual situations similar to the case at bar. In State v. Strain, 779 P.2d 221 (Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court held improper a police officer’s threat to charge the accused with first-degree murder and possible execution and his personal guarantee that he would only charge him with second-degree murder if the accused admitted his involvement. Although the court stated that the police officer’s statements crossed the line, it remanded the case because the record was not sufficiently developed to consider the totality of the circumstances. And in People v. Johnson, 450 P.2d 265 (Cal. 1969), the police officer threatened the defendant with the gas chamber and repeatedly called him a liar. Implicit in the threat was the promise that if the defendant talked, he would not face the death penalty. The California Supreme Court reversed the judgment and stated that this involved more than merely pointing out to the suspect a consequence that flows naturally from telling the truth. One jurisdiction has gone so far as to hold that it makes no difference whether the promise of the police officers actually comes true. In People v. Vasila, 45 Cal. Rptr.2d 355 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995), police officers promised an accused that they would release him on his own recognizance and not institute federal prosecution for his gun offense in exchange for inculpatory evidence. A confession resulted. The State argued that the confession was voluntary because the police officers had kept their promises, and that only “false” promises of leniency are coercive. The California court disagreed and said: This case did not involve an arms-length negotiation of testimony for consideration or a plea bargain. In fact, the prosecutor was contacted and refused to enter into such an agreement. Instead, defendant was given bald promises that, if he provided the necessary information, he would not be prosecuted federally and would be released from custody. The converse was also threatened. Vasila, 45 Cal. Rptr.2d at 360. The California court then went further and determined that the promise of leniency was improper because the issue is not whether “a commitment was honored, but rather whether governmental agents have coerced a citizen to give testimony against himself.” Vasila, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 361. Thus, whether a promise is kept is irrelevant because the promise itself constitutes improper police coercion. The Vasila court considered this factor in the totality of the circumstances of whether the promise was the motivating factor for the confession, and it excluded the statement. I conclude that a misleading promise of leniency is a circumstance that should be factored into the equation of whether the will of an accused was overborne. See Leach v. State, 311 Ark. 485, 845 S.W.2d 11 (1993); Davis v. State, 275 Ark. 264, 630 S.W.2d 1 (1982). Had Conner confessed during the police officers’ questioning, I would be inclined to reverse due to the threats and the misleading promises. See McDougald v. State, 295 Ark. 276, 748 S.W.2d 340 (1988). But because I do not believe that Conners’s will was overborne in light of the passage of time between the threats and promise on the one hand and the confession on the other as well as Conner’s conversation with his co-defendant, I concur in the affirmance.