Court Opinion

ID: 9884999
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 03:27:26.038317+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:43.230339
License: Public Domain

PARKER, Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. The trial court has made it abundantly clear that the only question at issue is whether a genuine issue of material fact exists as to pretext. He has candidly recited that the skills ratings scoring was subjective. Yet the majority states that the ratings method “was applied uniformly to Rademacher and all her class.” I do not understand how this can be known. Subjective ratings systems are inherently suspect because they prove nothing. The question invariably becomes one of impact, i.e., the proof is in the pudding.
The employee contends she has shown statistically that the impact of the reduction in force (RIF) applied by the subjective scoring of skills ratings on the program/business development division shows age discrimination. The trial court found that her statistical evidence failed to show pretext because:
(a) the sample size was too small and too selective to render the statistical argument credible;
(b) she failed to provide statistical analysis proving the significance of her figures; and
(c)the statistical results (impact) of the RIF is best demonstrated by scrutinizing its effect on the age composition of the entire Northern Ordnance workforce.
It is apparent that the trial court has decided two genuine issues of material fact against appellant:
(1) Choice of the population upon which the impact of an RIF is to be examined is often a hotly contested issue in a discriminatory impact case. Can an employer applying a subjective scoring skills test cull out a disproportionate number of older, longer tenured, higher salaried employees in one division if it does not do so throughout the entire workforce? Fifty-eight percent of those involuntarily terminated in appellant’s division were over age 40. The court said sample size damaged the “credibility” of appellant’s statistical argument, yet all reasonable inferences are to be made against the movant in deciding a motion for summary judgment.
(2) For the same reason, failure of the plaintiff to provide a statistical analysis proving the significance of her statistics cannot be a ground (although the trial judge is entitled to some sympathy on this) for granting the motion.
The fact is, appellant has made a showing, by raw data derived from impact of the RIF on her division, of disparate impact resulting from a subjective skills examination applied to secretarial work. Whether the right population to scrutinize was chosen and the weight to be given to her statistical evidence are questions for the finder of fact. The trial court treated them as such and decided them, perhaps rightly; the problem is he had only a motion for summary judgment before him. I would reverse the summary judgment and remand for trial.