Court Opinion

ID: 88909
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2010-04-28 16:01:52+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:03:49.839678
License: Public Domain

86 U.S. 619 (____)
19 Wall. 619
MACKAY
v.
EASTON.
Supreme Court of United States.

*626 Messrs. B.A. Hill and J.F. Darby, for the plaintiff in error.
Mr. C. Gibson (with whom were Messrs. E. Casselberry and W.B. Thompson), contra.
*630 Mr. Justice FIELD, after stating the facts of the case, delivered the opinion of the court, as follows:
We are of opinion that the court ruled correctly in admitting the deed of James Smith to Easton. The deed describes the property as that claimed by J. Smith; it declares that the property was confirmed to the grantor by that name, and it gives the number of the certificate of confirmation. It was acknowledged before a judge of the Circuit Court and immediately placed on record, where it was open to inspection by every one. Easton acted openly upon the supposition that he had acquired the title of the two arpents, and the right of location on other lands, in consequence of their being materially injured by earthquakes. Upon his application such location was made in the immediate vicinity of St. Louis. He had a survey made of the land located by the official surveyor of the government. He had the survey transmitted to the recorder of land titles; and his successor in interest prosecuted the matter until he obtained a patent of the United States. In the meantime a severe and protracted litigation grew up between claimants under the deed and claimants under Spanish concessions, and in none of the controversies was any suggestion made that the grantor to Easton was not the veritable J. Smith who owned the two arpents of land in Little Prairie. It would have been manifest error if, in the face of these facts, after the lapse of half *631 a century, when the property acquired under the deed has become of immense value, and the city of St. Louis has extended over it, the court had held that the deed to Easton is not to be presumed to be the deed of J. Smith, of Little Prairie, because the grantor describes himself as James Smith, of the county of Cape Girardeau. The real Smith had undoubtedly removed from the village of Little Prairie before the date of this deed. That village had been greatly injured, if not destroyed, by the earthquakes, and the inhabitants had been authorized by Congress, in consequence of the injuries thus received, to select lands elsewhere. Cape Girardeau, until 1813, was a part of the county of New Madrid, and the simple fact that the grantor describes himself as of that place after Little Prairie had been abandoned, is of little consequence, as his identity with the original owner of the land is sufficiently stated in the body of the instrument.[*]
In the deed to Gillespie the grantor describes himself as lately of the village of Little Prairie, and this description is open to the same objection as the description of the residence of James Smith in his deed. The reasonable and natural presumption arising from all the circumstances is, that Gillespie, finding, after receiving his deed, that Smith had already conveyed the property to Easton, and the right of location on other lands in consequence of its injury, did not assert any claim to the land, and that thus the deed had been suffered to remain without any attempt to enforce it until the increased value of the land located had tempted speculators to test its efficacy by litigation. The execution of the contract and the second deed of Smith, with his mark, is a circumstance, but in the light of the facts following their execution, a slight one against the theory of identity of the grantors in the two deeds. The use of a mark for his name may have resulted from temporary causes, or difficulty in writing, and not inability to write. But whatever the cause, the use of the mark in the one case, and of *632 the name in the other, before a public officer, was sanctioned by the acknowledgment of the grantor, whether made by his own hand or by another in his presence and by his direction.
The objections taken to the admission of the patent in evidence were: 1st, that the patent was void, because located upon land the sale of which was not authorized by law; 2d, that the patent had been decided by the Supreme Court of the United States to be null and void in Easton v. Salisbury, reported in the 21st of Howard; in Stoddard v. Chambers, reported in the 2d of Howard, and in Mills v. Stoddard, reported in the 8th of Howard; and, 3d, that the patent was located upon land reserved from sale; was not located in accordance with sectional and quarter-sectional lines, but upon land not surveyed; and was not located in season to be validated by the act of Congress of April 26th, 1822.
The first objection may be disregarded, for there was no evidence of the fact, upon the supposed existence of which the objection is founded.
The cases cited under the second objection are not evidence in this case; the records of them are not before us. The reports of their decision in Howard may be referred to as expositions of law upon the facts there disclosed, but they are not evidence of those facts in other cases. In Easton v. Salisbury the controversy was between a Spanish concession to Mordecai Bell, and the title of Easton under the location upon the New Madrid certificate issued to Smith. The claim under the Spanish concession was confirmed by act of Congress to the legal representatives of Bell. The land claimed under this concession was reserved from sale, and could not, therefore, be covered by the New Madrid certificate. So far as the location interfered with the concession it was void, and to that extent the patent was void also, but no further. And that is all there is in the decision in that case. The general language of the opinion must be construed and limited by the facts of the case.
*633 It is true the court said that by the act of April, 1822, it was provided that all warrants under the New Madrid act which were not located within one year were void; and it would seem that the court supposed that the warrant issued to Smith had not been located within that period. The court was speaking at the time of a completed and not an initiatory location, one which would appropriate the land; and evidently considered that there could be no such appropriation until the survey was returned to the recorder of land titles, as had been held in several cases.[*] Of such return after the passage of the act of 1822, there was no evidence in the record in that case. In this case it is admitted that the survey was thus returned within the year; and, consequently, the location of the tract was completed.
In Stoddard v. Chambers, and Mills v. Stoddard, the controversy was also between a Spanish concession and a New Madrid certificate. The patent issued in those cases upon the location of the New Madrid certificate, was held void because it covered land reserved from sale. There is nothing in that ruling which bears upon the question presented in the case at bar.
In several cases which were before this court prior to that of Easton v. Salisbury, it was held, as already stated, that there could be no effectual appropriation of the land located under a New Madrid certificate until the survey made by the officer of the government was returned to the recorder of land titles. The act of Congress, as will be seen by a reference to a prior page,[] declared that when a location was made under its provisions, the title of the person to the land injured should vest in the United States. It contemplated that there should be a concurrent investiture of title; that the title of the owners of the land injured in New Madrid County should pass to the United States, and that at the same time the title to the land located in lieu thereof should pass to the claimant, or rather the right *634 to the title, for the strict legal title did not pass until the patent issued; and that this exchange of titles should take place when the claimant obtained his patent certificate, or the right to such certificate, and that he could not acquire until the plat of the survey was returned to the recorder of land titles. Until the plat was placed in the public depository in the Territory, of evidences of title issuing from the United States, there was no official recognition of the proceedings taken by the claimant which bound the government.
It often happened that the location made at the request of claimants by deputy surveyors were upon lands which had not been surveyed by the government, or if surveyed the locations did not conform to the sectional and quarter-sectional lines of the surveys. To remedy defects of this character Congress passed the act of April 26th, 1822. That act refers in its first section to the actual locations made by the deputy surveyor at the request of the claimant, and not to the completed appropriation of the land by the return of the plat of the survey to the recorder of land titles.
The actual location of the New Madrid certificate issued to Smith, was made and approved in 1818; and any objection to it for want of conformity to the lines of the public surveys, was removed by the first section of the act of 1822. This actual location became a perfected location so as to appropriate the land on the return of the survey to the recorder in 1823, except as against the Spanish concession, which was confirmed to the representatives of Bell. Besides this, a defect in a survey is cured by the issue of a patent thereon.
It follows from the views expressed that the Circuit Court did not err in its rulings, and its judgment must be
AFFIRMED.
NOTES
[*]  See Mott v. Smith, 16 California, 554.
[*]  Barry v. Gamble, 3 Howard, 52; Lessieur v. Price, 12 Id. 74.
[]  Supra, p. 622.