Court Opinion

ID: 9913672
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-28 17:02:46.570831+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:58:31.017285
License: Public Domain

Summary
                                                  December 28, 2023

                            2023COA124

No. 21CA1229, Peo v. Gonzalez-Quezada — Constitutional Law
— Sixth Amendment — Right to Public Trial — Partial
Courtroom Closure —Waller Test

     As a matter of first impression, a division of the court of

appeals determines that the exclusion of a disruptive observer from

a Webex electronic broadcast of the trial does not constitute a

partial closure of the courtroom for purposes of a defendant’s right

to a public trial when the physical courtroom remains open to the

public. Moreover, even if the exclusion of the observer could be

considered a partial closure, the division concludes the trial court

made adequate findings to justify a partial closure in accordance

with Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984).

     The concurring opinion emphasizes that the exclusion of a

disruptive observer from an electronic broadcast should not be
considered a partial closure and therefore should not necessitate

findings under Waller.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS                                       2023COA124

Court of Appeals No. 21CA1229
Weld County District Court No. 19CR2595
Honorable Vicente G. Vigil, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Jaime Gonzalez-Quezada,

Defendant-Appellant.

                            JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

                                  Division III
                          Opinion by JUDGE SCHUTZ
                             J. Jones, J., concurs
                         Johnson, J., specially concurs

                        Announced December 28, 2023

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, William G. Kozeliski, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Jessica A. Pitts, Deputy State
Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1    Defendant, Jamie Quezada,1 appeals his second degree

 murder conviction. We affirm. In doing so, we conclude that there

 was sufficient evidence for the jury to reject the statutory heat of

 passion sentence mitigator. We also conclude that the trial court

 did not violate Quezada’s right of confrontation or his ability to

 effectively test the veracity of an eyewitness to the shooting.

 Finally, as a matter of first impression in Colorado, we conclude

 that the trial court did not deny Quezada his right to a public trial

 by excluding a disruptive observer from remotely viewing the trial.

               I.   Procedural History and Background

¶2    The trial court admitted evidence from which the jury could

 reasonably have found the following facts. Jaime and Alejandra

 Nancy Quezada2 were married for five years before the homicide.

 Prior to the marriage, Quezada had three children and Nancy had

 one child. They had problems throughout the marriage, and on or

 1 Quezada was erroneously charged under the name “Jamie

 Gonzalez-Quezada.” His correct name is Jaime Quezada, and we
 refer to him as such.
 2 Alejandra Nancy Quezada, the defendant’s ex-wife, goes by Nancy.

 We will refer to her by her first name to avoid confusion; we intend
 no disrespect in doing so.
                                    1
 around October 6, 2019, Nancy moved out of the marital home and

 stayed with a friend while she considered how to move forward.

¶3    Nancy worked as a personal trainer at a local gym. On

 October 9, 2019, at 4:18 a.m., she and the victim, Gilberto Marron,

 made plans to meet at the gym. They were in an intimate

 relationship. At around 4:47 a.m., Nancy and Marron got in the

 back seat of her car, which was in the gym’s parking lot. Marron

 was on the passenger side, and Nancy was on the driver’s side.

 What occurred in the car’s back seat was disputed at trial. Nancy

 claimed that they went into the back seat so that he could give her

 a hug and then they started talking. She testified that she rested

 her head on Marron’s lap for about five minutes during their

 conversation. Quezada contended at trial that she appeared to be

 performing fellatio on Marron.

¶4    Unbeknownst to Nancy and Marron, Quezada was also in the

 parking lot. The area was well-lit, and it was possible to see into

 other vehicles even though it was early in the morning. Quezada

 claimed that he decided to go to the gym that morning to say “hi” to

 Nancy. When he saw her place her head in Marron’s lap, he

 retrieved his 9 mm pistol from the center console, drove up to the

                                   2
 passenger side of Nancy’s car, got out of his truck, and fired at least

 one shot into the car through the back seat window. At some point,

 Nancy jumped from the back seat to the front of the car.

¶5    Marron got out of the car and tried to flee, but Quezada fired

 about five more shots, one of which struck Marron in the head,

 resulting in a fatal injury. Marron was shot a total of six times and

 died in the parking lot. Shortly after shooting Marron, Quezada

 allegedly said, “[T]his is what happens when you mess with married

 women.” He also spoke to Nancy, saying something along the lines

 of, “[T]his is what you wanted, right?”

¶6    Quezada drove away in his truck. Nancy then immediately

 called the police. During the call, Nancy referred to Marron as a

 “friend.” Police did not discover the intimate nature of their

 relationship until later.

¶7    Quezada turned himself in to the police about five hours after

 the shooting. Before doing so, he confided to friends and family

 that he had “wasted” someone after seeing that person with his

 wife. He also spoke with a bondsman. The People charged

 Quezada with one count of first degree murder, relating to Marron,

 and a count of reckless endangerment, relating to Nancy.

                                    3
¶8     The jury trial, which took place in May 2021, was held under

  COVID-19 protocols. To limit the number of people who were

  physically present in the courtroom, the trial was also live streamed

  on Webex. The remote participants in the trial included the court-

  approved interpreters who provided interpretation for the benefit of

  Quezada’s and Marron’s family members. The court repeatedly

  reminded Webex observers to mute themselves during the trial. On

  the seventh day of the trial, the court disconnected a line

  participating via Webex because the observer at that phone number

  repeatedly failed to mute their microphone and the noise was

  disrupting the testimony.

¶9     The jury convicted Quezada of second degree murder and

  reckless endangerment. The court sentenced him to forty-eight

  years in the custody of the Colorado Department of Corrections.

                    II.   Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶ 10   Quezada contends that the prosecution presented insufficient

  evidence to disprove the heat of passion mitigator. We disagree.

              A.   Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 11   We review a sufficiency of the evidence claim de novo,

  evaluating “whether the relevant evidence, both direct and

                                    4
  circumstantial, when viewed as a whole and in the light most

  favorable to the prosecution, is substantial and sufficient to support

  a conclusion by a reasonable mind that the defendant is guilty of

  the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v. Donald, 2020 CO

  24, ¶ 18 (quoting Clark v. People, 232 P.3d 1287, 1291 (Colo.

  2010)). Our analysis is guided by four well-established principles.

  First, we give the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable

  inferences that might fairly be drawn from the evidence. Id. at ¶ 19.

  Second, we defer to the jury’s resolution of the credibility of

  witnesses. Butler v. People, 2019 CO 87, ¶ 20. Third, we may not

  serve as a thirteenth juror by weighing various pieces of evidence or

  resolving conflicts in the evidence. Id. Fourth, a conviction cannot

  be based on guessing, speculation, conjecture, or a mere modicum

  of relevant evidence. Donald, ¶ 19.

¶ 12   A person commits murder in the second degree if the person

  knowingly causes the death of another person. § 18-3-103(1)(a),

  C.R.S. 2023. Second degree murder may be mitigated from a class

  2 felony to a class 3 felony if it is committed under the heat of

  passion. Heat of passion is defined as a serious and highly

  provoking act by the intended victim that affected the defendant

                                     5
  sufficiently to excite an irresistible passion in a reasonable person.

  § 18-3-103(3)(b). But if, between the provocation and the killing,

  there is an interval sufficient for the voice of reason and humanity

  to be heard, the killing is a class 2 felony. Id. Heat of passion

  provocation is a mitigating factor for attempted second degree

  murder. People v. Tardif, 2017 COA 136, ¶ 6. If there is sufficient

  evidence to support giving an instruction on heat of passion, the

  prosecution is required to disprove the mitigator beyond a

  reasonable doubt. Id.

                             B.   Application

¶ 13   To support his contention that the People failed to meet their

  burden on the sentence mitigator, Quezada points to evidence in

  the record from which the jury could reasonably have concluded

  that he was acting under a sudden heat of passion: (1) he was

  unaware of Nancy’s relationship with Marron until the events at

  issue; (2) he allegedly went to the gym to say hello to his wife; and

  (3) there were just a few seconds between when he saw Nancy lower

  her head into the victim’s lap and when he fired the first shot.

¶ 14   The trial court properly instructed the jury on the People’s

  “burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Quezada was not

                                     6
  acting upon a sudden heat of passion.” The court also properly

  instructed the jury on the definition of “heat of passion.” Thus, the

  question is whether there was sufficient evidence from which the

  jury could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Quezada did

  not act under a sudden heat of passion when he murdered the

  victim. We conclude that there was.

¶ 15   The jury could have found against Quezada on the heat of

  passion mitigator based on the following facts: (1) Quezada was

  arguably lying in wait for Nancy and Marron to arrive; (2) Quezada

  knowingly placed himself in a situation where he could discover

  their relationship, thus undermining the suddenness component of

  the mitigator; (3) there was time for Quezada to reflect before he

  fired the fatal shot; (4) his statement to Marron about “messing”

  with married women may have indicated premeditation; and (5) his

  question to Nancy about whether this is what she wanted also may

  have led the jury to conclude that he was not acting under a heat of

  passion. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the

  prosecution, we conclude that a reasonable jury could find beyond

  a reasonable doubt that the prosecution disproved the heat of

  passion mitigator, and thus reject Quezada’s sufficiency challenge.

                                    7
                   III.   Fifth Amendment Invocation

¶ 16   Quezada also argues that the trial court erred by (1) allowing

  Nancy to testify even though she planned to invoke her Fifth

  Amendment rights as they related to sexual assault charges

  pending against her and (2) excluding extrinsic evidence that would

  have identified the victim of Nancy’s alleged sexual assault. We

  disagree.

                          A.   Fifth Amendment

                          1.   Additional Facts

¶ 17   During the investigation into the shooting, Nancy revealed that

  she had a sexual relationship with Quezada’s biological son, who

  was nineteen at the time of the disclosure. Further investigation

  revealed that the relationship started when Quezada’s son was a

  minor. In April 2021, the month before Quezada’s trial, Nancy was

  charged with one count of aggravated incest and two counts of

  sexual assault. The prosecutor in that case was also the prosecutor

  in Quezada’s case.

¶ 18   Quezada’s defense counsel filed a motion in limine to exclude

  Nancy’s testimony in light of her potentially invoking her Fifth

  Amendment right to remain silent. The People filed a motion in

                                    8
  limine to exclude evidence of Nancy’s charges or limit how much the

  jury could hear about them. The trial court held pretrial hearings

  on the respective motions and denied defense counsel’s motion to

  bar Nancy’s testimony in its entirety on the grounds that she could

  be effectively cross-examined without identifying Quezada’s son as

  the alleged victim of the sexual assault. The trial court then

  entered an order prohibiting Quezada’s counsel from asking Nancy

  who the victim of the alleged offense was but permitting counsel to

  introduce evidence that she had been charged with sexual assault

  involving incest allegations.

              2.    Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 19   Both parties agree that the issue is preserved; however, they

  dispute which standard of review applies. Quezada contends that

  the trial court’s ruling violated his right to confront witnesses and

  should be reviewed de novo. The People agree that the propriety of

  allowing a witness to testify knowing they will invoke a right to a

  degree that could deprive a defendant of the right of confrontation is

  reviewed de novo. But they assert that if the court’s ruling is

  limited in a manner that does not deprive a defendant of the right to

                                     9
  effectively test the witness’s credibility, the ruling is reviewed for an

  abuse of discretion.

¶ 20   We review de novo a possible Confrontation Clause violation.

  People v. Dominguez-Castor, 2020 COA 1, ¶ 67. “The Sixth

  Amendment right to confrontation and the Fifth Amendment right

  to due process of law require only that the accused be permitted to

  introduce all relevant and admissible evidence.” Id. at ¶ 68 (quoting

  People v. Harris, 43 P.3d 221, 227 (Colo. 2002)). A Confrontation

  Clause violation may exist where a defendant “was prohibited from

  engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to

  show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness.” Kinney

  v. People, 187 P.3d 548, 559 (Colo. 2008) (quoting Delaware v. Van

  Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680 (1986)).

¶ 21   “It does not follow, of course, that every restriction on a

  defendant’s attempts to challenge the credibility of evidence against

  him, or even every erroneous evidentiary ruling having that effect,

  amounts to federal constitutional error.” Krutsinger v. People, 219

  P.3d 1054, 1062 (Colo. 2009). Thus, a defendant may successfully

  assert a constitutional violation only where “the trial court’s ruling,

  under the circumstances of each case, effectively barred the

                                     10
  defendant from meaningfully testing evidence central to

  establishing his guilt.” Dominguez-Castor, ¶ 70 (quoting Krutsinger,

  219 P.3d at 1062).

¶ 22     Nonconstitutional evidentiary rulings, including those

  regarding cross-examination, are reviewed for an abuse of

  discretion. People v. Campos, 2015 COA 47, ¶ 26.

                             3.   Application

¶ 23     Quezada contends that Nancy’s pending criminal matter was

  inextricably linked to Quezada’s case. Thus, Quezada contends it

  was necessary to confront Nancy about the fact that Quezada’s son

  was the victim of Nancy’s alleged sexual assault. By precluding

  such testimony, Quezada says, the trial court deprived him of the

  opportunity to establish Nancy’s bias and motive to testify against

  him.

¶ 24     The People reason that though defense counsel was prohibited

  from asking Nancy about the victim’s identity, counsel was

  nonetheless able to cross-examine her about the fact that she was

  charged with sexual assault based on incest. Additionally, the

  People note that Quezada’s counsel was allowed to test Nancy’s

  credibility through questions about her divorce from Quezada, her

                                    11
  affair with Marron, her prior inconsistent statements to law

  enforcement, and her hopes of leniency on her pending charges.

  Therefore, the People contend Quezada was not deprived of his right

  to confrontation.

¶ 25   For the following reasons, we agree with the People that

  allowing Nancy to testify knowing that she would invoke her right to

  remain silent concerning the identity of the alleged victim of the

  assault did not deprive Quezada of his right to confrontation.

¶ 26   First, we disagree with Quezada’s contention that the identity

  of the alleged sexual assault victim in Nancy’s criminal matter was

  inextricably linked to the shooting. Quezada was not aware of the

  alleged abuse of his son until after his arrest. Thus, the fact that

  his son was the alleged victim could not have impacted his mental

  state at the time of the shooting.

¶ 27   Second, Nancy was a critical witness because she was the only

  person who could describe certain events surrounding the shooting.

  Her testimony provided the jury with valuable evidence about what

  occurred that morning.

¶ 28   Moreover, Quezada’s counsel was not so constrained by

  Nancy’s invocation of her right to remain silent that he could not

                                       12
  adequately cross-examine her. For example, defense counsel cross-

  examined her about inconsistencies and gaps in her story, her

  failure to disclose the romantic nature of the relationship with

  Marron to police, and the circumstances of her divorce from

  Quezada. Defense counsel also asked Nancy whether she was

  hoping for leniency from the prosecution in exchange for her

  testimony, and that questioning revealed that the pending charges

  included incest and sexual assault. There is nothing in the record

  to suggest that the limitation placed on Quezada’s counsel

  effectively precluded counsel from being able to meaningfully test

  the evidence against Quezada. Dominguez-Castor, ¶ 70.

¶ 29   Based on this record, we conclude that the trial court did not

  err by denying defense counsel’s motion to bar Nancy’s testimony in

  its entirety.

  B.    The Exclusion of Other Evidence Regarding the Identity of the
                  Victim of Nancy’s Alleged Sexual Assault

¶ 30   Quezada also contends that the trial court erred by precluding

  his counsel from asking a detective to tell the jury the identity of

  Nancy’s alleged sexual assault victim. He reasons that such

  evidence should have been permitted because it directly impacted

                                    13
  Nancy’s credibility. The trial court excluded such evidence under

  CRE 608(b). Its ruling was based on two grounds. First, it

  concluded that Rule 608 supplanted common law methods of

  impeaching a witness’s credibility. Second, the court concluded

  that Rule 608 only permits impeaching a witness’s credibility on

  cross-examination.

                1.     Standard of Review Applicable Law

¶ 31   We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of

  discretion. People v. Stewart, 55 P.3d 107, 122 (Colo. 2002). A trial

  court abuses its discretion if its ruling is arbitrary, unreasonable, or

  unfair. Id. CRE 608(b) states as follows:

             Specific instances of the conduct of a witness,
             for the purpose of attacking or supporting the
             witness’ character for truthfulness other than
             conviction of crime as provided in [section] 13-
             90-101, may not be proved by extrinsic
             evidence. They may, however, in the discretion
             of the court, if probative of truthfulness or
             untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-
             examination of the witness (1) concerning the
             witness’ character for truthfulness or
             untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character
             for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another
             witness as to which character the witness
             being cross-examined has testified.

                                    14
  We agree with Quezada that Rule 608(b) does not control this issue

  and the trial court erred by relying on it to preclude the testimony.

  However, we may affirm a trial court’s ruling denying evidence on

  any basis supported by the record. People v. Quintana, 882 P.2d

  1366, 1371 (Colo. 1994), abrogated on other grounds by Rojas v.

  People, 2022 CO 8; People v. Everett, 250 P.3d 649, 653 (Colo. App.

  2010).

                            2.    Application

¶ 32   We agree with Quezada that the trial court erred by

  concluding that Rule 608 displaced the common law rule permitting

  the introduction of extrinsic evidence through a third-party witness

  that impeaches another witness’s testimony. See, e.g., People v.

  Taylor, 190 Colo. 210, 213, 545 P.2d 703, 705 (1976) (“[A] party

  who on cross-examination inquires into bias is not bound by the

  denial of the witness but may contradict him with the evidence of

  other witnesses.”). We also conclude that CRE 608(b) does not limit

  impeaching testimony to that which is elicited solely through the

  cross-examination of the witness whose testimony is being

  impeached. See, e.g., People v. Thomas, 2014 COA 64, ¶ 43 (“We

  conclude that the doctrine of specific contradiction allowed this

                                    15
  evidence to be introduced here, and that CRE 608(b) is no

  impediment to the introduction of such evidence.”).

¶ 33   Nonetheless, we conclude, for independent reasons, that the

  trial court properly excluded testimony that the identified victim in

  Nancy’s sexual assault charges was Quezada’s son.

¶ 34   CRE 403 applies to evidence offered under CRE 608(b). “[T]he

  trial court should ‘exclude evidence that has little bearing on

  credibility, places undue emphasis on collateral matters, or has the

  potential to confuse the jury.’” People v. Williams, 2014 COA 114,

  ¶ 36 (quoting People v. Knight, 167 P.3d 147, 153 (Colo. App.

  2006)). Rule 403 precludes the admission of evidence if “its

  probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair

  prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by

  considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless

  presentation of cumulative evidence.”

¶ 35   Recall that the trial court permitted introduction of the fact

  that Nancy had been charged with sexual assault and that the

  charges involved incest. All that was excluded was testimony

  specifically identifying Quezada’s son as the victim of the alleged

  assault. Quezada argues that the identity of the victim was relevant

                                    16
  because it impacted Nancy’s motive to lie. More specifically,

  Quezada argues that Nancy had a motive to lie because she

  understood that Quezada was likely to be called as a witness at her

  trial on the sexual assault charges, and she would benefit if

  Quezada was convicted of these homicide charges because he could

  then be impeached with his prior felony conviction. See § 13-90-

  101, C.R.S. 2023.

¶ 36   But any such motivation had nothing to do with the victim’s

  identity. In other words, Nancy would have a motive to lie to obtain

  a conviction against Quezada regardless of whether the alleged

  victim in her case was Quezada’s son or some other relative. And to

  the extent that Quezada argues that the fact his son was the victim

  makes it more likely that Quezada would be a witness at Nancy’s

  trial, we reject the premise. Regardless of whether the victim was

  Quezada’s son or some other family member, it was highly probable

  that Quezada would be called as a witness to testify about an

  alleged sexual assault of a family member that occurred while he

  and Nancy were married.

¶ 37   Thus, disclosing to the jury that Quezada’s son was the

  alleged victim had de minimis, if any, relevance to the legitimate

                                    17
  assessment of Nancy’s credibility. On the other hand, the

  explosively prejudicial nature of such testimony is self-evident.

  Those who perpetrate sexual assaults against any person are

  viewed with significant scorn. That prejudice is amplified when the

  victim is the child of a spouse. Thus, the prejudicial impact of the

  proffered identification of Quezada’s son was great, and it

  substantially exceeded the de minimis probative value of that

  evidence.

¶ 38   For these reasons, we conclude that Rule 403 precluded the

  admission of evidence that Nancy had been accused of sexually

  assaulting Quezada’s son. Therefore, we further conclude — albeit

  on different grounds — that the trial court did not abuse its

  discretion by excluding such evidence.

                            IV.   Public Trial

¶ 39   Quezada contends that the trial court deprived him of his right

  to a public trial by excluding a disruptive observer from the Webex

  live stream of the proceedings. Specifically, he argues that the

  exclusion constituted a partial closure of the courtroom, and that

  the trial court’s failure to make express findings under Waller v.

  Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984), before excluding the observer deprived

                                    18
  him of his right to a public trial as guaranteed by the United States

  and Colorado Constitutions. See U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV;

  Colo. Const. art. II, § 16. We disagree.

                           A.   Additional Facts

¶ 40   The trial in this case occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic.

  As was common during that period, the trial court live streamed the

  proceedings online using Webex. But the court also maintained

  public access to the courtroom itself, as it discussed in the following

  exchange:

              Prosecutor: I think, for the record, since the
              WebEx [sic] was off during the initial portion of
              Detective Finch’s testimony, I — I — it — it
              should be clear that this is still an open
              courtroom, that people could come and go as
              they wanted, even though the WebEx [sic] feed
              wasn’t working at that time.

              Court: I’m happy to make a record of that. I
              know that we do have some attendees present
              in person. I know that at previous portions of
              this proceeding, that we’ve had many people
              attending in person. The doors are unlocked.
              The courtroom is not closed to the public.

              ....

              Court: And the Court does note that the
              courtroom is open. There are several —
              probably a dozen or so people, if not more,
              present in the courtroom today. The Court
              also posted a message on its WebEx chat
                                     19
               function indicating the technical issues and
               informing the observers that they may observe
               in person if they are able to do so as space
               permits.

  During the trial, the court apparently streamed the testimony of

  witnesses, but it disconnected the Webex feed during some portions

  of the trial. There were also occasional lapses in the streamed

  testimony, due to human error or technological limitations.

¶ 41   The court noted various occasions when one or more Webex

  observers failed to mute their microphones, resulting in noises and

  communications from those observers or those near them being

  broadcast into the courtroom. The court reminded participants on

  multiple occasions of the need to keep their microphones on mute

  unless they were specifically communicating something directly to

  the court.

¶ 42   One Webex observer repeatedly failed to mute themselves and

  disrupted the court proceedings. The court eventually interrupted a

  witness’s testimony to confront that observer:

               So I have repeatedly warned the observers that
               they need to mute their microphone. We are
               conducting a trial.

               I have already had to expel the phone number
               starting with 9-1-7 who has been a repeat

                                     20
             offender and has repeatedly had their
             microphone unmuted and has caused
             background noise.

             I am going to specifically tell whoever is
             observing by phone number 9-1-7 and ending
             in 6-5, I am going to expel you again from
             these proceedings. I have warned the
             observers multiple times to not have their
             microphones unmuted, and we have had
             background noise from this particular number
             multiple times.

             It is an order of the Court that you be expelled
             from these proceedings and that you not
             continue to observe these proceedings due to
             the disruption that your failure to mute your
             microphone has provided multiple times.

             So I am expelling you at this time and, again,
             you are not to return to observe these
             proceedings because you apparently cannot
             follow the instructions of the Court not to be
             disruptive.

  The record does not disclose the identity of the excluded observer,

  or their relationship, if any, to Quezada or Marron.

¶ 43   Quezada characterizes the court’s exclusion of the unidentified

  observer as a partial closure of the courtroom in violation of his

  right to a public trial. The People disagree, arguing that no closure

  occurred, and that even if this exclusion could be considered a

  partial closure, it did not violate Quezada’s rights.

                                     21
                        B.    Standard of Review

¶ 44   Whether the trial court violated a defendant’s right to a public

  trial presents a mixed question of fact and law. People v. Hassen,

  2015 CO 49, ¶ 5. We accept the trial court’s factual findings absent

  an abuse of discretion. People v. Jones, 2020 CO 45, ¶ 14. We

  review its legal conclusions, including the application of the

  determined facts to the controlling law, de novo. Id.

¶ 45   The parties disagree about whether Quezada preserved these

  issues, and relatedly what standards of review and reversal govern.

¶ 46   The People note that Quezada’s counsel failed to object to the

  exclusion of the Webex observer at the time it occurred or at any

  other point during the trial. Consequently, the People argue,

  Quezada waived any error attributed to the exclusion order. See

  Stackhouse v. People, 2015 CO 48, ¶ 5 (finding waiver of the

  defendant’s right to claim that he was denied a public trial where

  counsel was aware of the closure but failed to object); Forgette v.

  People, 2023 CO 4, ¶ 34 (finding waiver of the defendant’s right to

  claim that he was denied a jury trial, even though a juror had slept

  through significant portions of trial testimony, because defense

  counsel did not make a contemporaneous objection). If we

                                    22
  conclude the issue was not waived, the People argue that any error

  should be reviewed under the plain error standard. We reverse for

  plain error only if the error was obvious and so undermined the

  fundamental fairness of the trial that it casts serious doubt on the

  reliability of the conviction. Hagos v. People, 2012 CO 63, ¶ 14.

¶ 47   Quezada counters that the court acknowledged that it had

  previously excluded the observer without informing the parties

  before doing so. Thus, Quezada contends, his attorney had no

  opportunity to object to this initial exclusion, and therefore waiver

  cannot bar his claim on appeal. See People v. Rediger, 2018 CO 32,

  ¶ 39 (Waiver is “the intentional relinquishment of a known right or

  privilege.” (quoting Dep’t of Health v. Donahue, 690 P.2d 243, 247

  (Colo. 1984))).

¶ 48   Quezada argues that the initial exclusion of the observer

  should be reviewed for constitutional harmless error. Such an error

  requires reversal unless it was harmless beyond a reasonable

  doubt. Hagos, ¶ 11. With respect to the second exclusion of the

  offending observer, Quezada acknowledges his attorney had an

  opportunity to object and did not. Nevertheless, he claims the

  failure to object was the product of counsel’s negligence rather than

                                    23
  a knowing decision. Therefore, he contends, the error was forfeited

  but not waived, and we should review for plain error. People v.

  Garcia, 2023 COA 58, ¶¶ 15-16 (forfeiture arises when a defendant

  neglects to make a timely objection; we review forfeited error under

  the plain error standard).

¶ 49   Quezada also contends that if we determine that the trial

  court’s error amounted to a deprivation of his right to a public trial,

  any such error is structural and must be reversed irrespective of

  any prejudice analysis. See Jones, ¶ 45 (applying structural error

  to improper partial closure of courtroom in violation of defendant’s

  right to a public trial).

¶ 50   We need not resolve the parties’ competing positions on these

  issues, however, unless we conclude the trial court erred by

  excluding the disruptive observer. We turn now to that question,

  beginning with a summary of the applicable legal principles.

                              C.   Applicable Law

¶ 51   The constitutional guarantee to a public trial serves multiple

  noble purposes. It protects the rights of a defendant because the

  public’s observation reminds the court and counsel of their

  essential roles in ensuring that a defendant is treated fairly and has

                                      24
  their rights respected. Id. at ¶ 16. The presence of a defendant’s

  family members and friends also reminds the participants of a

  defendant’s humanity and the corresponding right to be treated

  with dignity. See id. In addition to promoting the accountability of

  the court and counsel, a public trial may also have the effect of

  encouraging potential witnesses to come forward with relevant

  information and discouraging testifying witnesses from committing

  perjury. Id. at ¶ 17; People v. Lujan, 2020 CO 26, ¶ 14. “A public

  trial also protects the public’s and the press’s qualified First

  Amendment rights to attend a criminal trial,” thereby protecting the

  greater community’s interest in monitoring the fair administration

  of the criminal justice system. Jones, ¶ 18. These essential

  functions are compromised when a court is closed to the public.

¶ 52   But the right to a public trial is not absolute. Lujan, ¶ 15. In

  some instances, competing interests may require closure of the

  courtroom. See Jones, ¶ 20 (sometimes the right to a public trial

  must yield to a higher interest, such as the protection of a

  defendant’s right to a fair trial or the government’s interest in

  protecting inappropriate disclosure of sensitive information). To

  accommodate this tension, the Supreme Court has articulated four

                                     25
  requirements, known as the Waller factors, that must be met to

  justify a courtroom closure:

             (1) “the party seeking to close the [proceeding]
             must advance an overriding interest that is
             likely to be prejudiced”; (2) “the closure must
             be no broader than necessary to protect that
             interest”; (3) “the trial court must consider
             reasonable alternatives to closing the
             proceeding”; and (4) the court “must make
             findings adequate to support the closure.”

  Lujan, ¶ 15 (quoting Waller, 467 U.S. at 48).

¶ 53   It is undisputed that there was not a complete closure of the

  courtroom. But Quezada argues that the exclusion of the

  disruptive observer constituted a partial closure requiring reversal.

¶ 54   A partial closure may also violate a defendant’s right to a

  public trial. Jones, ¶ 27. In some circumstances, the exclusion of a

  single person may constitute a partial closure. Id. at ¶ 34. But the

  Colorado Supreme Court has also recognized that sometimes a

  partial closure of the courtroom is so trivial that it does not violate a

  defendant’s right to a public trial. Lujan, ¶ 24 (under the trivial

  closure exception, no error occurs through a partial closure if the

  closure did not implicate the concerns animating the Sixth

  Amendment).

                                     26
                               D.   Analysis

¶ 55   Quezada contends that the exclusion of the disruptive

  observer resulted in a partial closure of the courtroom. Because the

  trial court did not expressly apply the Waller factors before

  excluding the observer, Quezada argues that reversal is mandated.

¶ 56   The People counter with multiple arguments. First, they

  contend that no closure occurred because the courtroom was never

  closed. Second, to the extent a partial closure occurred, the People

  contend it was trivial. Finally, even if a non-trivial partial closure

  occurred, the People contend that the trial court’s factual findings

  — though they did not expressly reference Waller — were sufficient

  to satisfy the Waller criteria. We agree with the People’s first and

  third arguments and therefore do not reach the second.

                        1.    No Closure Occurred

¶ 57   While it is undisputed that the trial court barred the

  disruptive observer from continuing to watch the proceedings via

  Webex, it is equally true that the courtroom itself remained open

  during the entirety of the trial. Quezada acknowledges this fact but

  argues that, once the court made the decision to permit some

  members of the public to attend the proceedings via Webex, it was

                                     27
  required to maintain the Webex connection for all persons observing

  via Webex unless it applied the Waller factors before excluding any

  attendee. In effect, Quezada contends that Webex observers are in

  the courtroom because its physical confines have been expanded by

  the use of remote viewing technology.

¶ 58   Quezada concedes that there is no constitutional right to

  attend a proceeding via Webex. But he analogizes the situation to

  one in which a state court, without a constitutional mandate,

  chooses to provide direct appeals. In such situations, though the

  direct appeal is not constitutionally mandated, once a state chooses

  to provide such a right, it must comply with constitutional

  guarantees in administering the appeal. See Griffin v. United

  States, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) (if a state elects to provide appellate

  review, courts must assure equal protection and due process in the

  administration of those appeals). Having provided the option of

  attending a proceeding via Webex, Quezada argues, the court was

  required to apply the Waller factors before excluding a remote

  observer.

¶ 59   But Quezada’s argument presupposes that the observer had

  no means of attending these proceedings other than via Webex.

                                    28
  The record does not support that conclusion. The doors to the

  courtroom remained open, and we reject the notion that Webex

  observers are somehow in the courtroom. Read in context, it is

  clear that the trial court excluded the observer from further Webex

  participation because they ignored or neglected to abide by the

  court’s order to stay muted. The court began by noting that the

  observer had repeatedly failed to stay muted, as ordered by the

  court. And in excluding the observer, the court stated, “It is an

  order of the Court that you be expelled from these proceedings and

  that you not continue to observe these proceedings due to the

  disruption that your failure to mute your microphone has provided

  multiple times.”

¶ 60   The court’s order was clearly based on the observer’s failure to

  mute their microphone while observing via Webex. Thus, the

  observer was precluded from further attendance via Webex. But

  the record contains no indication that the excluded observer was

  not permitted or able to travel to the courtroom to attend the trial in

                                    29
  person.3 Thus, the excluded observer was not precluded from

  attending the trial. Stated otherwise, the remote observer could still

  have attended the trial in the same manner people have for

  centuries — by going to the courtroom. Thus, there was no closure

  of the courtroom, partial or otherwise.

¶ 61   We note that, after the completion of briefing in this case, a

  division of this court addressed a somewhat analogous situation.

  See People v. Bialas, 2023 COA 50. The trial in Bialas also

  occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic. Id. at ¶ 3. Initially, the

  physical courtroom was open to members of the public, but due to

  social distancing concerns, in-person seating was limited. Some

  public observers were in the courtroom and seated close to one or

  more jurors. Id. Other members of the public were permitted to

  3 In reaching this conclusion, we acknowledge that the court also

  said, “I am expelling you at this time and, again, you are not to
  return to observe these proceedings because you apparently cannot
  follow the instructions of the Court not to be disruptive.”
  Considered in isolation, this statement could be interpreted as a
  complete exclusion of the observer from the trial proceedings,
  whether via Webex or in person. But we do not read a trial court
  order’s statements in isolation; instead, we view them in their
  totality. Read in context, it is clear the court excluded the observer
  from further Webex participation because of their repeated failure to
  stay muted.
                                    30
  watch a Webex live stream of the proceedings from a different

  courtroom. Id.

¶ 62   During the trial, one of the jurors reported to the judge that a

  member of the public in the courtroom was making remarks about

  the trial that the juror could hear. Id. at ¶ 4. In response, the trial

  court closed the courtroom to all members of the public, including

  the defendant’s family. Id. at ¶ 5.

¶ 63   On appeal, a division of this court concluded that the broad

  exclusion of the entire public from the courtroom constituted a

  closure even though observers could view the proceedings via

  Webex from another courtroom. Id. at ¶ 15. In reaching this result,

  the division placed significant weight on the fact that the judge,

  lawyers, and others in the courtroom could not view the

  participants who were observing via Webex. This arrangement, the

  division concluded, deprived the court and participants of the

  ability to see the defendant’s family, and thus compromised the

  important purpose that family members play in ensuring that the

  purposes of the Sixth Amendment are fulfilled.

             The exclusion of Bialas’s family during her
             testimony likewise cuts against the assurance
             of a public trial. Even if Bialas’s family could

                                    31
             still view a livestream of the trial, the jury, the
             judge, and counsel were unable to see Bialas’s
             family. Again, “the presence of interested
             spectators” is important to remind the triers of
             “the importance of their functions.”

  Id. at ¶ 13 (quoting Jones, ¶ 16).

¶ 64   Bialas is distinguishable from the situation here. No members

  of Quezada’s family or the general public were excluded from the

  courtroom. Thus, there was no evidence that the judge, lawyers,

  and participants were deprived of the important reminder served by

  the presence of Quezada’s family members. Moreover, in contrast

  to the broad exclusion order entered in Bialas, here, only one

  disruptive observer was precluded from viewing the trial via Webex.4

¶ 65   Quezada’s reliance on Vazquez Diaz v. Massachusetts, 167

  N.E.3d 822 (Mass. 2021), is misplaced. There, the court addressed

  whether a defendant who had waived his right to a speedy trial

  could insist upon having a suppression hearing in person rather

  than virtually. Id. at 827-28. In analyzing this issue, the court

  recognized the general propriety of proceeding virtually during the

  4 As previously mentioned, the record does not disclose the identity

  of the excluded observer. See People v. Morgan, 199 Colo. 237, 242-
  43, 606 P.2d 1296, 1300 (1980) (it is the appellant’s duty to provide
  the court with record support for contentions raised on appeal).
                                       32
  pandemic and that such proceedings do not amount to a de facto

  violation of a defendant’s right to a public trial. Id. at 839-40. But

  the court did not address the circumstances in which a disruptive

  participant may be excluded from virtual proceedings. Therefore,

  the case has limited relevance to the present dispute.

¶ 66   We also reject Quezada’s argument that, if a court provides a

  means of virtual attendance at court proceedings while at the same

  time permitting in-person attendance, any exclusion of a disruptive

  virtual participant constitutes a partial or complete closure of the

  courtroom. Absent extraordinary circumstances not present here, if

  a courtroom remains open during the subject legal proceedings, the

  partial cessation of virtual proceedings does not amount to a

  closure of the courtroom for purposes of the constitutional right to

  a public trial.5

  5 We recognize that the General Assembly has recently enacted

  legislation requiring courts to make criminal proceedings available
  for remote public viewing and listening in real time. See § 13-1-
  132(3.5)(a), C.R.S. 2023. This legislation was passed after the trial
  in this case and is therefore not at issue on appeal. But we note
  that the legislation does not purport to preclude trial courts from
  exercising their discretion to exclude disruptive virtual participants.
  See § 13-1-132(3.5)(e)(IV) (trial courts shall take reasonable steps to
  ensure compliance with sequestration orders and ensure a fair trial,
  including terminating remote observation).
                                    33
            2.    Adequacy of Trial Court’s Factual Findings

¶ 67   Although there was no closure of the courtroom, even if we

  were to assume, for sake of argument, that a non-trivial partial

  closure did occur, we conclude that the trial court’s factual findings

  were sufficient to satisfy the Waller factors.6

¶ 68   The parties agree, as do we, that the trial court articulated an

  overriding interest7 that was likely to be prejudiced by the

  disruptive observer’s continued participation via Webex. The

  unmuted microphone allowed those present in the courtroom to

  6 The concurring opinion concludes that no courtroom closure

  occurs when a Webex observer is excluded from the live stream of
  the proceedings for being disruptive. In doing so, our colleague
  addresses a multitude of potential scenarios that may arise in the
  future, and the difficulties they may pose for trial court judges who
  may also be tasked with making Waller findings in each such
  instance. While we appreciate our colleague’s practical concerns,
  we believe they are best assessed on a case-by-case basis, if and
  when they may arise.
  7 We note that, in the context of a partial closure, some courts have

  replaced the “overriding interest” component in factor one of the
  Waller analysis with the lower standard of a “substantial reason.”
  See People v. Jones, 2020 CO 45, ¶ 24 (collecting cases). The
  Colorado Supreme Court has not yet addressed that issue. See id.
  at ¶ 27 (“[W]e save for another day the decision regarding whether
  the first Waller factor requires a ‘substantial reason’ or an
  ‘overriding interest’ in this context.”). We need not resolve the
  debate because we conclude the trial court’s findings satisfy the
  more rigorous standard.
                                     34
  hear the statements being made by the observer and those around

  them. These repeated disruptions compromised the orderly

  presentation of the evidence and posed the risk of contaminating

  the jury with prejudicial information. The avoidance of such

  occurrences was necessary to protect the parties’ overriding

  interests in a fair trial.

¶ 69    The parties also agree, and so do we, that the second Waller

  factor was met because the court’s remedy was narrowly tailored to

  exclude only the repeat violator.

¶ 70    The parties part company with respect to the third and fourth

  factors. Quezada contends the court did not consider a less drastic

  alternative to excluding the offending observer. Quezada argues

  that the court could have muted all remote observers, rather than

  excluding the disruptive observer completely. But, as the People

  note, this was not a viable alternative because the interpreters, who

  were attending the proceedings virtually, needed to be able to

  inform the court in real time when they were not able to hear the

  audio feed well enough to effectively interpret the proceedings.

  Similarly, if the attendees’ microphones were always locked on

  mute, other observers could not inform the court if they were

                                      35
  unable to hear the proceedings. Additionally, the court did not

  exclude the observer on the first offense, but only after repeated

  violations of the court’s order. Under these circumstances, we

  conclude there was not a reasonable alternative to excluding the

  observer from the virtual proceedings.

¶ 71   We also reject Quezada’s contention that the trial court made

  inadequate factual findings to support excluding the observer.

  Although the court did not expressly reference Waller, it made

  substantial factual findings explaining the observer’s repeated

  violations of the court’s order and the rationale behind its decision

  to exclude them from the proceedings. We do not reverse a trial

  court’s closure order simply because it fails to include an

  incantational reference to Waller. People v. Turner, 2022 CO 50,

  ¶ 35. Rather, our focus is on whether the trial court’s factual

  findings support the closure, given the considerations articulated in

  Waller and its progeny. Id. at ¶¶ 35-36. For the reasons previously

  articulated, we conclude that the trial court’s exclusion of the

  disruptive observer served that purpose.

¶ 72   Finally, we reject Quezada’s assertion that the initial exclusion

  order violated his right to a public trial because the trial court failed

                                     36
  to make a contemporaneous record of its decision or the reasons

  therefor.

¶ 73   The advent of virtual proceedings during the pandemic placed

  extraordinary demands on trial courts. Not only were they required

  to continue to manage the complexities of a typical criminal trial —

  which include listening to the evidence, ruling on objections,

  monitoring the courtroom activities, ensuring jurors only receive

  admitted evidence, and a myriad of other tasks. But with the

  advent of remote proceedings, trial court judges were also required

  to enable and monitor the attendance and online behavior of virtual

  attendees. Often these substantial tasks were complicated by the

  limited capacity of new technology and the inherent vagaries of

  internet connectivity. Given these dynamics, we respectfully

  disagree with Quezada’s suggestion that it is a minor inconvenience

  to require the trial court judge to make a contemporaneous record

  of the Waller factors every time a disruptive observer is excluded

  from the proceedings or the virtual proceedings are interrupted.

¶ 74   While contemporaneous findings for such events are ideal,

  that does not foreclose the possibility that a trial court can make an

  appropriate record of its actions later. Here, the trial court

                                    37
  explained that it had previously excluded the offending observer

  because they disregarded the court’s order and had interfered with

  the orderly presentation of the evidence. Moreover, this disclosure

  did not generate any objection from Quezada’s counsel. Thus, the

  delay in making the record was of no consequence in this case.

¶ 75   For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not

  violate Quezada’s right to a public trial.

                             V.    Disposition

¶ 76   The judgment is affirmed.

       JUDGE J. JONES concurs.

       JUDGE JOHNSON specially concurs.

                                     38
       JUDGE JOHNSON, specially concurring.

¶ 77   I agree with the majority opinion in its overall disposition. But

  I write separately to address some of the majority’s analysis

  concerning the courtroom closure in Part IV. I agree that the facts

  — a disruptive observer on Webex was expelled from the electronic

  platform when the person continued to violate the court’s directive

  that all participants must remain muted — do not constitute a

  courtroom closure. Supra ¶ __.

¶ 78   But I do not agree with the path the majority took to arrive at

  its conclusion. It reasoned that there was no courtroom closure

  because the disruptive Webex observer theoretically could have

  attended in-person proceedings, as the courthouse and the physical

  courtroom remained open to the public. Supra ¶ __. The majority

  uses a “belt and suspenders” approach to conclude there was no

  closure of the courtroom, but even if there was, it satisfied the

  factors under Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984). But the

  majority’s analysis tries to put a square peg into a round hole.

  What do I mean by this? Two things.

¶ 79   First, there should be a difference between a courtroom

  closure that possibly violates a defendant’s constitutional right to a

                                    39
  public trial, thus triggering an analysis under Waller, and a trial

  judge’s exercise of discretion to exclude a disruptive individual from

  the courtroom (or Webex), which should not. Instead, when a judge

  removes a disruptive individual from the proceedings, this simply is

  part of the court’s authority to maintain an orderly administration

  of justice, as the judge deems appropriate and necessary.

¶ 80    I know that our supreme court appears to have rejected this

  viewpoint in People v. Turner, 2022 CO 50, ¶¶ 23-24. There, the

  court said that “the exclusion of even a single individual from the

  courtroom, regardless of the reason for the exclusion, constitutes a

  partial closure that implicates the Sixth Amendment and the Waller

  test.” Id. at ¶ 23. Turner reasoned that exempting exclusion of

  individuals “for cause” — ostensibly including a disruptive

  individual — would be problematic because it “would leave trial

  courts guessing where cause ends and the public trial right begins.”

  Id.

¶ 81    But I fall into the non-majority camp — described by Chief

  Justice Boatright in his concurrence in Turner — that not every

  exclusion of an individual from the courtroom requires Waller

  findings. He said that, when removing a disruptive individual from

                                    40
  the courtroom, “judges in th[o]se instances are merely exercising

  their discretion to ensure the safety, fairness, and efficiency of the

  trial.” Id. at ¶ 49 (Boatright, C.J., concurring in the judgment); see

  also People v. Jones, 2020 CO 45, ¶ 104 (Boatright, J., dissenting)

  (because the individual who was removed from the courtroom was

  disruptive, that type of exclusion should be reviewed for an abuse of

  discretion).

¶ 82   This majority recognizes that “[t]he advent of virtual

  proceedings during the pandemic placed extraordinary demands on

  trial courts,” so much so that it also recognizes that it is not “a

  minor inconvenience to require the trial court judge to make a

  contemporaneous record of the Waller factors every time a

  disruptive observer is excluded from the proceedings or the virtual

  proceedings are interrupted.” Supra ¶ __. Therefore, when a Webex

  observer is being disruptive by remaining unmuted, the person’s

  removal should be no different than if the individual were physically

  in the courtroom gallery and refusing to comply with the judge’s

  orders because he continues to listen to music, talk on his phone,

  or speak loudly to other spectators.

                                     41
¶ 83   I sat on the division for People v. Bialas, 2023 COA 50. My

  position in that case is not at all inconsistent with this one. The

  majority says that the “division placed significant weight” on the

  fact that, even though family and friends could view the proceedings

  in a different room with a live stream broadcast, the court’s ouster

  of individuals from the courtroom was a closure. Supra ¶ __.

  Regardless of the live streaming aspect present in Bialas, the

  closure in that case was overly broad, included the defendant’s

  family (who the record showed were not part of the comments or

  actions giving rise to the closure), and lacked court findings to

  determine whether a more narrowly tailored approach could have

  addressed the situation. Bialas, ¶¶ 19, 22, 26.

¶ 84   I acknowledge that the court in this case did not make

  findings when it first excluded the observer from Webex (i.e.,

  findings as to how the person was disruptive and why the court

  took the action, not Waller findings). As a result, the court’s first

  unannounced exclusion of the observer on Webex — who joined a

  second time and then continued to remain unmuted — is

  concerning. But the court’s later remarks revealing that the same

  observer continued to misbehave are, in my view, sufficient to

                                     42
  conclude that in this instance, the court did not abuse its

  discretion.

¶ 85   Second, because of Turner, the majority walks a fine line,

  coming close but not crossing it, by definitively concluding that

  Webex is not an extension of the “courtroom,” thus implicating the

  same concerns and considerations addressed in Waller. If trial

  judges are required to make Waller findings every time the court

  expels a disruptive individual from a remote platform, I predict the

  courts will see a significant uptick in public closure cases. And this

  is not just because of the majority’s analysis. As the majority

  points out, the General Assembly recently passed section 13-1-132,

  C.R.S. 2023, which mandates remote public viewing of criminal

  proceedings in real time. Supra ¶ __ n.4.

¶ 86   That legislation gives discretion to judges to suspend or modify

  the remote viewing based on various authorized reasons, such as

  the court’s lack of technology or funds to obtain the necessary

  equipment, safety concerns and risks to parties or others, or to

  protect confidential information and sequestration orders. See

  § 13-1-132(3.5)(a)(I), (3.5)(a)(IV)(A), (3.5)(d). And the General

  Assembly authorizes judges to exercise discretion by ensuring that

                                     43
  their actions to suspend or modify remote proceedings employ the

  “less restrictive alternative.” § 13-1-132(3.5)(a)(IV)(B). The statute

  defines that phrase as “allowing remote audio-only observation

  while disabling video observation or turning off remote observation

  for particular witnesses or discrete portions of the proceeding.” Id.

  Ostensibly a court will make findings to comply with these statutory

  bases to suspend or modify remote viewing.

¶ 87   Because the General Assembly has indicated its preference for

  live streaming court proceedings, when is the Webex (or other

  technology) a courtroom and when is it not? This seems to create

  just as much murky water that Turner was supposedly trying to

  avoid because it was not clear where the disruptive individual being

  removed for cause ends and the right to a public trial begins.

¶ 88   But consider the questions raised by this scenario: there is a

  high-profile case and many people — interested public, family and

  friends, the press — want to view the proceedings. The judge will

  now need to monitor every person who has joined the Webex and

  stop proceedings to make findings under Waller before the court

  has authority to eject a person from the remote platform? What if

  the person is writing remarks for everyone to read in the chat

                                    44
  feature, possibly unseemly ones or ones that specifically target

  certain people or comment on the evidence being presented? Or the

  person has the video feature on and is making rude and

  inappropriate gestures while onscreen? Or the person is wearing

  clothing that is inappropriate, because the outfit makes a statement

  about the case or overly reveals certain physical attributes?

¶ 89   True, people in the courtroom — significantly the jurors or

  witnesses, given their functions in the case — likely will not see the

  antics of the online observers. But all the other viewers on the

  Webex may see these activities. Because technology now makes it

  possible for all criminal proceedings to be observed by anyone —

  even people from out of state or another country — I pose this

  question: Is remote viewing really going to be considered an

  extension of the courtroom that, under current supreme court

  precedent, is likely to trigger courtroom closure considerations

  under Waller?

¶ 90   For instance, under the majority’s reasoning, the person

  expelled in this case might very well have been out of state, and the

  individual could not just hop in a car to be “present” in the physical

  courtroom; it might have been a theoretical possibility but not a

                                    45
practical reality. We are treading on shaky ground if, first, we

consider remote proceedings to be an extension of the physical

courtroom in all cases and, second, the court cannot simply, in the

exercise of its discretion, expel individuals from the remote platform

who act inconsistently with or disrupt the orderly administration of

justice.


  Even if technology improves over time, thus eliminating or
decreasing some of my concerns, the court must retain its
traditional authority to manage decorum in the courtroom — which
seems to, at times, and increasingly so, include the electronic
platform and the people on that platform — with greater flexibility
than what is required under Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984),
and its progeny.
                                  46