Court Opinion

ID: 9850216
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:53:38.317497+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:33.287801
License: Public Domain

CARLEY, Justice,
dissenting.
The majority inexplicably treats this case as if it involves an ordinary rejection of competitive bids or proposals. Instead, this case involves the exact opposite: the selection of the best competitive sealed proposal in accordance with governing law by the only official authorized to make that decision. The City published a Request for Proposals (RFP) in April 2002, and two companies submitted proposals four months later. Oral interviews were conducted after passage of another four months. In October 2003, over a year after the submission of proposals, the Chief Procurement Officer, in accordance with the authority granted to him, made and communicated in writing the City’s official determination that DFASS was the most responsible and responsive offeror, and that it proposed the most advantageous terms. The majority admits that this selection occurred. At any time during the 14 months preceding the Chief Procurement Officer’s determination, the City could have instigated further discussions, negotiations, and revisions, but it did not. After its evaluation process was complete, the City could have rej ected both *176proposals or cancelled the solicitation, but it did not. Instead, the City proceeded to make that written determination which made its award of the contract to the best offeror mandatory under the Construction Law. At that point, the award of the contract was complete pursuant to OCGA § 36-91-21 (c) (1) (C), and the City and its officials no longer had the discretion to refuse to accomplish remaining formalities. Indeed, the City defended its selection of DFASS for well over a year during the pendency of the appeals process, although this fact is ignored by the majority.
The only provision of the Construction Law, OCGA § 36-91-1 et seq., other than OCGA § 36-91-20 (a), that the majority even mentions is OCGA § 36-91-21 (c) (1) (C), which it summarily treats as subordinate to OCGA § 36-91-20 (a). Only by electing to turn a blind eye to all other provisions of that general statute can the majority achieve its holding that local laws and ordinances solely control the award of contracts entered into by the City, and evade discussion of whether its interpretation of the ordinances upon which it relies conflicts with any portion of the Construction Law. Having ignored the Construction Law, the majority then proceeds to misinterpret the City Code so as to give the Mayor absolute authority, long after the time for rejecting all bids or proposals has passed, to renege on the City’s previous acceptance of a bid or proposal, regardless of any contrary statute or ordinance. Thus, from today forward, the Mayor can ignore any procurement laws and invalidate the award to the selected bidder or proponent for any reason, including a mere dislike for those persons involved with the winning company. Such a situation frustrates the purpose of the Construction Law by sanctioning arbitrary rejection and favoritism. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
The majority opinion notwithstanding, the primary law applicable in this case is the Construction Law. Pursuant to that general statute, the City, as a result of its choice to solicit competitive sealed proposals, “shall... [m]ake an award to the responsible and responsive offeror whose proposal is determined in writing to be the most advantageous to the governmental entity, taking into consideration the evaluation factors set forth in the [RFP].” OCGA § 36-91-21 (c) (1) (C). See also City Charter § 6-402 (a); City Code § 2-1189 (g). Because the City has, in writing, selected DFASS as the responsible and responsive offeror whose proposal is most advantageous, the City “shall. . . [m]ake an award” to DFASS.
This mandatory, substantive language is not vitiated by the fact that, in OCGA § 36-91-20 (a), the Construction Law permits local legislation or ordinances to provide for the manner of execution and entry into public works construction contracts. The manner of execution and entry into a contract relates to formalities, not the substantive formation of the agreement itself. At the end of its opinion, the *177majority makes the unsupported assumption that the Construction Law was merely intended to complement local laws. Unlike the majority opinion, however, nothing in OCGA § 36-91-20 (a) authorizes ordinances to conflict with or prevail over the Construction Law, or to control formation of the contract.
Relying on wholly inapplicable ordinances, the majority claims to respect the discretion given to the Mayor and City Council while completely ignoring the discretion which the Chief Procurement Officer has to accept or reject competitive sealed proposals. The majority incomprehensibly refuses to acknowledge that neither the Mayor nor the City Council has been designated as the City’s purchasing and contracting authority with respect to competitive sealed proposals. Under the plain terms of the City Code, the Chief Procurement Officer is the appropriate official to solicit and enter into construction contracts, and to select the most responsible and responsive offeror. City Code §§ 2-1138 (a), 2-1189 (d). Under OCGA § 36-91-21 (c) (1) (C), the actual preparation of a formal document and the signing of it by the Mayor, after completion of competitive selection procedures, are not prerequisites to the formation of a binding contract. Contrary to the majority’s analysis, it is neither unusual nor prohibited for a contract to become binding prior to the Mayor’s signature and for that signature to be considered a mere formality. City of Atlanta v. Foster & Cooper, 236 Ga. 834, 838-839 (225 SE2d 278) (1976). See also United States v. Purcell Envelope Co., 249 U. S. 313, 319-320 (39 SC 300, 63 LE 620) (1919); 10 McQuillin Mun. Corp. § 29.80 (3rd ed.); 1 Bruner & O’Connor Construction Law § 2:140.
Final approval by the City Council is required prior to an award of contract only if it was not competitively procured in accordance with the Charter and ordinances or if someone other than the most qualified bidder or offeror was selected. City Charter §§ 3-104 (14), 6-402 (f). Other charter provisions, such as § 6-402 (e), cited by the majority, which refer more generally to Council approval must be construed in conjunction with this requirement. See Burkhardt v. Burkhardt, 275 Ga. 142 (2) (561 SE2d 822) (2002); Mayor &c. of Savannah v. Savannah Elec. & Power Co., 205 Ga. 429, 436-437 (54 SE2d 260) (1949). The majority erroneously cites City Code § 2-1140, which is subordinate to the Charter, does not govern which contracts must be approved by the Council, and deals only with the Chief Procurement Officer’s authority to sign certain contracts which have received Council approval. Because competitive procedures have been followed and the best offeror selected, final approval by the City Council is not required prior to the award of contract. Moreover, even if such approval were required, the City Council, like the Mayor, is bound by the applicable statutory provisions and, under the proper interpretation of the Construction Law, the Council’s approval after *178selection of the best offeror would have to be considered a mere formality, the absence of which would not vitiate the previously formed contract.
In determining that the supposedly necessary acts of the Mayor and City Council in approving the contract are discretionary, and not formalities, the majority relies on City Code § 2-176 and Common Cause/Ga. v. City of Atlanta, 279 Ga. 480, 482-483 (2) (614 SE2d 761) (2005). In that case, however, acceptance of a bid was accomplished by a resolution which “specifically stated that the agreement would not be binding on the City until executed by the Mayor. . . Common Cause/Ga. v. City of Atlanta, supra at 480-481. Under that authority, the Mayor was the appropriate official to decide whether to make the award. City Code § 2-176 is simply the general ordinance providing how much time the Mayor has to determine whether to execute a contract for which final approval by the Council is necessary. Common Cause/Ga. correctly held that § 2-176 did not require the Mayor to sign the contract, and thereby make her duty ministerial. Conversely, however, there is absolutely nothing in § 2-176 which makes every signing of a contract by the Mayor discretionary.
Common Cause/Ga. is completely different from this case in every respect and is not, therefore, remotely applicable authority for the majority’s holding. The bidding in Common Cause/Ga. took place in 1999, prior to the enactment of OCGA § 36-91-21. Moreover, that statute would not apply to contracts, like the one in Common Cause/Ga., which deal solely with the management of existing facilities. OCGA § 36-91-2 (10). Therefore, completely unlike Common Cause/Ga., this case is governed by OCGA § 36-91-21. That critical distinction is lost on the majority. By its unambiguous terms, OCGA § 36-91-21 (c) (1) (C) mandates award of the contract to the selected offeror. When the applicable law “require [s] an act, the City lacks the discretion to disregard the requirements.” City of Atlanta v. J.A. Jones Constr. Co., 195 Ga. App. 72, 78 (5) (392 SE2d 564) (1990), rev’d on other grounds, 260 Ga. 658 (398 SE2d 369) (1990). See also United States v. Purcell Envelope Co., supra at 318-319.
The majority opinion effectively confuses the distinction between a mere competitive proposal and a legally enforceable contract. “Public contracts traditionally have been held to be formed by public acceptance of bids rather than by subsequent execution of contracts documenting the acceptance. [Cits.]” 1 Bruner & O’Connor, supra at § 2:140. See also City of Merrill v. Wenzel Bros., 277 NW2d 799, 803 (Wis. 1979) (recognizing that this rule has been applied in three opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States). The issue is not whether the City initially could have rejected DFASS’s proposal, but whether DFASS can be deprived of its rights to the completed contract by the City’s purported cancellation. Several provisions of *179law refer to the routine reservation of the right to reject all proposals or cancel an invitation prior to official acceptance of any proposal. OCGA§ 36-91-20 (c); City Charter § 6-402 (c); City Code § 2-1194. See also 1 Bruner & O’Connor, supra at § 2:135; Northeast Miss. Community College Dist. v. Vanderheyden Constr. Co., 800 FSupp. 1400, 1402 (N.D. Miss. 1992). However, “[wjhere the municipal authority is authorized to reject any and all bids in lieu of awarding the contract to the lowest responsible bidder, having made the award, it may not then reject all bids and readvertise the project. [Cits.]” 10 McQuillin, supra. See also Northeast Miss. Community College Dist. v. Vanderheyden Constr. Co., supra; Donahue v. Bd. of Levee Commissioners of the Orleans Levee Dist., 413 S2d 488, 492 (La. 1982). Once the City accepted DFASS’s proposal in accordance with OCGA § 36-91-21 (c) (1) (C), the reserved right to reject all bids or cancel the solicitation “had not been exercised and it was no longer operative____Simply put, the [City] had communicated its acceptance of [DFASS’s] offer and revocation was not possible.” Northeast Miss. Community College Dist. v. Vanderheyden Constr. Co., supra at 1402.
Under the Construction Law, the City has a responsibility to obtain any revisions in competitive sealed proposals prior to selection of the responsible and responsive proponent with the most advantageous proposal. OCGA§ 36-91-21 (c) (2). See also City Code § 2-1189 (f). After those revisions, the City still is not obligated to make any selection, and may reject all proposals or cancel the solicitation when such action is in the City’s best interests. However, once a proponent is selected as contemplated by OCGA§ 36-91-21 (c) (1) (C), the award of a contract is complete, and the highest ranked offeror cannot be put through either another competitive solicitation process or a second round of negotiations, offers and counter-offers. At that point, the City is limited to the usual contractual defenses and remedies.
The consequences of the majority’s rejection of this statutory scheme are readily apparent in this case. DFASS has spent years complying with the competitive solicitation procedures chosen by the City, being awarded the contract under controlling statutory authority, and defending that award. Appellees admit that the reasons for the purported cancellation were the uncertain duration of the litigation with ADF and improvement of market conditions. Where, as here, a public entity accepts a competitive proposal and later rejects it because of the potential for a better offer or due to legal action by another offeror, that public body “has acted arbitrarily and capriciously and rescission is ineffective. [Cit.]” Northeast Miss. Community College Dist. v. Vanderheyden Constr. Co., supra at 1404. Thus, it is clear that the City arbitrarily refuses to prepare, and the Mayor refuses to sign, a formal written contract. Under these circumstances, “[t]he procedure for the advertising for bids for supplies or *180services to the [City has been treated as] a mockery...United States v. Purcell Envelope Co., supra. The majority sanctions that mockery, but I cannot. Because DFASS has a clear legal right to the formal written execution of the already existing contract, it is entitled to a writ of mandamus and, therefore, I strongly dissent to the affirmance of the trial court’s judgment.
Decided May 14, 2007
Reconsideration denied June 25, 2007.
Mary C. Cooney, Bauer & Deitch, Henry R. Bauer, Jr., Bondurant, Mixson & Elmore, Emmet J. Bondurant, Michael B. Terry, for appellant.
Linda K. DiSantis, Robert B. Caput, Michael S. Fineman, for appellees.
I am authorized to state that Justice Thompson joins in this dissent.