Court Opinion

ID: 9563522
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:41:01.040849+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:53.724915
License: Public Domain

HARTZ, Chief Judge, specially concurring. {27} I concur in the result but not the reasoning of the majority opinion. Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution does not apply to the conduct of the United States Border Patrol agents in this case. Only the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and federal statutes gov-era the search and seizure. Because Defendant concedes that there was no violation of federal law, the marijuana was properly seized and should be admitted into evidence. In State v. Gutierrez, 116 N.M. 431, 446, 863 P.2d 1052, 1067 (1993), the New Mexico Supreme Court stated that suppression of evidence seized in violation of Article II, Section 10 “effectuates” the rights guaranteed by that provision. But when Article II, Section 10 does not apply to a search, suppression can accomplish nothing in that regard. {28} Constitutions provide the framework to “constitute” a government. In this nation’s experience, when a constitution has been formulated to establish a sovereign government, it has been standard practice to include a bill of rights, the purpose of which is to protect against abuse of power by that sovereign. Even though the provisions of such a bill of rights typically include no reference to the sovereign, it is understood that the provisions relate only to the sovereign that is the subject of the constitution. For example, in our federal Constitution the Fourth Amendment states: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. Read in isolation, the language could apply to searches and seizures by anyone. But read in context, it undoubtedly restricts only the federal government. As Chief Justice Marshall wrote in ruling that the Bill of Rights binds only the federal government: “[T]he limitations on power, if expressed in general terms, are naturally, and, we think, necessarily, applicable to the government created by the instrument. They are limitations of power granted in the instrument itself; not of distinct governments, framed by different persons and for different purposes.” Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 247, 7 Pet. 243, 8 L.Ed. 672 (1833) (Just Compensation Clause of Fifth Amendment does not apply to states); see Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 382, 16 S.Ct. 986, 41 L.Ed. 196 (1896) (Bill of Rights does not bind tribal government). Professor Neuman states that “rights within a constitution usually run against the government structured by that constitution.” Gerald L. Neuman, Conflict of Constitutions? No Thanks: A Response to Professors Brilmayer and Kreimer, 91 Mich. L.Rev. 939, 947 (1993) (hereinafter “Neuman”). {29} Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution tracks the language of the Fourth Amendment. It reads: The people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes and effects, from unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to search any place, or seize any person or thing, shall without describing the place to be searched, or the persons or things to be-seized, nor without a written showing of probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation. Like the Fourth Amendment, it applies only to the sovereign governed by the constitution in which it appears — the State of New Mexico. Thus, “[t]his section prohibits the state from making unreasonable searches and seizures.” Chuck Smith, New Mexico State Constitution: A Reference Guide 36 (1996) (emphasis added). Those acting independently of the authority of the State of New Mexico, be they officers of another sovereign or private citizens, are not subject to Article II, Section 10. Cf. State v. Murillo, 113 N.M. 186, 188-91, 824 P.2d 326, 328-31 (Ct. App.1991) (Fourth Amendment inapplicable to conduct of private persons not acting as-instruments or agents of the government). {30} In particular, when federal officers are not acting as instruments or agents of the state, Article II, Section 10 does not govern their conduct. Moreover, application of state law to federal officers may be foreclosed by the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const, art. VI, cl. 2. See Neuman, supra, at 947 n. 33 (“State constitutional rights that ran against the federal government would inherently raise federal preemption problems.”) As the New Jersey Supreme Court wrote. “Stated simply, state constitutions do not control federal action.” State v. Mollica, 114 N.J. 329, 554 A.2d 1315, 1327 (N.J.1989); accord Barry Latzer, The New Judicial Federalism and Criminal Justice: Two Problems and a Response, 22 Rutgers L.J. 863, 883-84 (1991) (hereinafter “Latzer”); see Commonwealth v. Cryer, 426 Mass. 562, 689 N.E.2d 808, 813 (Mass.1998) (provision of Massachusetts Declaration of Rights does not apply to New Hampshire police); 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 1.5(c) at 154-55 (3d ed.1996) (discussing Mollica with approval) (hereinafter “La Fave”). Of course, when state officers are working with federal officers or officers of another state, the state constitution may apply. See Mollica at 1328-30. {31} Despite the above, perhaps a state court would still be tempted to find that evidence is “tainted” — and therefore should be suppressed — when seized by a federal officer acting in compliance with federal law yet contrary to the rules that govern state officers. Such a decision would be misguided. {32} First, the decision would not protect anyone’s privacy interests because it is highly unlikely that federal officers would change their conduct to comply with state laws. The Border Patrol checkpoint in this case will surely be operated the same way regardless of whether we apply New Mexico standards to their searches in judging the admissibility of evidence. Also, I am not aware of any basis on which a court could grant an injunction to require federal officers to comply with the New Mexico Constitution. {33} Second, the “remedial scheme” cre'ated by the decision would be bizarre. If federal officers comply with federal search- and-seizure law, neither they nor the United States could be sued for damages for violating New Mexico standards. After all, as explained above, Article II, Section 10 does not apply to federal officers. Thus, if no evidence of crime is found in a Border Patrol search, the subject of the search would have no remedy for any failure to comply with Article II, Section 10. Only those accused of crime would be afforded relief, through suppression of evidence. This would be a peculiar result, to say the least — a result that would certainly bemuse the Founding Fathers, who knew nothing of the exclusionary rule and viewed the Fourth Amendment as a protection of the common-law right to sue government officials for conducting unreasonable searches and seizures. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Constitution and Criminal Procedure/First Principles 20-22 (1997); Christopher Slobogin, Criminal Procedure: Regulation of Police Investigation/Legal, Historical, Empirical and Comparative Materials 533-34 (2d ed.1998). {34} Third, and most important, exclusion of evidence seized in such circumstances would not vindicate any rights of the person subjected to the search and seizure. The search and seizure was perfectly lawful if it complied with federal law. To be sure, in Gutierrez our Supreme Court said that suppression of evidence is necessary to “effectuate” the rights guaranteed by Article II, Section 10. Gutierrez, 116 N.M. at 446-47, 863 P.2d at 1067-68. But when, as here, Article II, Section 10 does not apply, no right was violated and no right would need “effectuating.” {35} I think that the New Jersey Supreme Court got it right in Mollica. It wrote: We endorse the principle that federal officers acting lawfully and in conformity to federal authority are unconstrained by the State Constitution, and may turn over to state law enforcement officers incriminating evidence, the seizure of which would have violated state constitutional standards. Id. at 1328. In reaching that result, the court explained: [T]he application of the state constitution to the officers of another jurisdiction would disserve the principles of federalism and comity, without properly advancing legitimate state interests.... [I]t does not offend the constitutional principles of a forum jurisdiction to allow the transfer of criminal evidence from the officers of another jurisdiction to those of the forum when the evidence has been obtained lawfully by the former without any assistance by the latter. In determining the validity of a search and seizure conducted by officers of another jurisdiction, the critical assumption that obviates the application of the state constitution is that the state’s constitutional goals will not thereby be compromised.... ... [N]o purpose of deterrence relating to the conduct of state officials is frustrated, because it is only the conduct of another jurisdiction’s officials that is involved. Judicial integrity is not imperiled because there has been no misuse or perversion of judicial process. Further, no citizen’s individual constitutional rights fail of vindication because no state official or person acting under color of state law has violated the State Constitution. Id. at 1327-28 (citations omitted). {36} The majority opinion cites a few opinions to support applying the search-and-seizure law of the forum state to officers of other jurisdictions. I do not find them persuasive. Stidham v. State, 608 N.E.2d 699 (Ind.1993), applied a state statute requiring exclusion of a juvenile’s confession. People v. Griminger, 71 N.Y.2d 635, 529 N.Y.S.2d 55, 524 N.E.2d 409, 412 (N.Y.1988), is devoid of analysis to support its conclusion, and Moran v. State, 644 N.E.2d 536, 538 (Ind. 1994), does little better. State v. Rodriguez, 317 Or. 27, 854 P.2d 399, 403 (Or.1993) (en banc), just follows State v. Davis, 313 Or. 246, 834 P.2d 1008, 1011-13 (Or.1992), which asserts its conclusion without addressing the considerations I find compelling. Moreover, in Moran, Rodriguez, and Davis, the discussion was dictum because the evidence was not suppressed; and in each case the search and seizure involved officers of the forum state, so that applying forum law may well have been appropriate. {37} The better-reasoned opinions and commentary support the admission of evidence obtained by officers of another jurisdiction, particularly federal officers, who act in conformity with the laws of their own jurisdiction. See, e.g., Mollica; Cryer; LaFave, supra, at § 1.5(c); Latzer, supra; John Bernard Corr, Criminal Procedure and the Conflict of Laws, 73 Geo.L.J. 1217, 1233-34 (1985); cf. State v. Bridges, 83 Hawai‘i 187, 925 P.2d 357, 364-72 (Haw.1996) (court will not suppress evidence obtained by Hawaii officers in California in compliance with California law, even if search would have been unlawful in Hawaii). We would be wise to follow that approach.