Court Opinion

ID: 9517287
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:12:46.08961+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:42:39.841010
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
DeBruler, J.
— Indiana Code §22-3-2-2 (1978 Supp.), provides the statutory rule to be applied by the Board in deciding upon an application of a compensation claimant. It states:
“[Ejvery employer and every employee . . . shall be required . . . respectively to pay and accept compensation for personal injury or death by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment. ...”
The Board, having heard the evidence presented in the claim at bar made the following findings:
“That on April 2, 1976, plaintiff was in the employ of the defendant at an average weekly wage of $162.00. That plaintiff’s normal duties during March and April of 1976 were those of placing table runners on edges of tables; that said runners weighed approximately a half-pound; that in performing said occupation it was necessary for plaintiff to lift the runners out of a bin into a box and when said box was full, weighing approximately twenty to twenty-five pounds, it was necessary for plaintiff to lift the box onto a table approximately waist high; that while performing said occupation her back at sometime became painful. *512That from all of the credible evidence there is no specific time or incident that can be pointed to that would cause the pain in plaintiff’s back. Said Full Industrial Board of Indiana finds that_ plaintiff did not sustain an accident or untoward event arising out of and in the course of her employment.”
I read these findings as revealing that the Board isolated one of the causation questions created by the statutory standard, namely, whether the personal injury was caused by accidental means, and denied the petition because the evidence failed to show an injury by accident. The evidence was deemed by the Board to be deficient for this purpose because it did not disclose a “specific time or incident that can be pointed to that would cause the pain in plaintiff’s back.” The Board discloses here that it held an erroneous view of the legal requirements imposed upon a claimant to prove an injury by accident. There is nothing in the language of the statute or in reason upon which such a requirement can stand.
Moreover, such requirement cannot stand upon the case law, as is demonstrated by the principle announced in the case of American Maize Products Co. v. Nichiporchik, (1940) 108 Ind. App. 502, 29 N.E.2d 801, correctly quoted and relied upon by Judge Lowdermilk in reversing the Board’s decision for the Court of Appeals. There the court said:
“While it is true that the appellee can point to no particular date nor to a particular blow which produced the resultant injury, yet it is not necessary that the accident occur at any particular or specific time. The series of blows to appellee’s hands produced the injury and loss which was an unintended and unexpected occurrence.” 108 Ind. App. at 511, 29 N.E.2d at 805.
Calhoun was entitled to have the body of evidence received by the Board considered from the correct legal perspective. This the Board did not do, and for such reason the decision should be reversed and the cause remanded.
Hunter, J., concurs.
Note. — Reported at 381 N.E.2d 1242.