Court Opinion

ID: 9554251
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-08 15:00:30.424797+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:21:22.720414
License: Public Domain

20-2758
    Montalvo-Montalvo v. Garland
                                                                                         BIA
                                                                                   Ruehle, IJ
                                                                                 A098 322 976
                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                               FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                   SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.

           At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
    held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the
    City of New York, on the 8th day of August, two thousand twenty-three.

    PRESENT:
                JOSEPH F. BIANCO,
                STEVEN J. MENASHI,
                BETH ROBINSON,
                      Circuit Judges.
    _____________________________________

    JOSE GUADALUPE MONTALVO-
    MONTALVO,
             Petitioner,

                    v.                                                 20-2758
                                                                       NAC
    MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED STATES
    ATTORNEY GENERAL,
                Respondent.
    _____________________________________

    FOR PETITIONER:                      Jose Perez, Esq., Syracuse, NY.

    FOR RESPONDENT:                      Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant Attorney
                                         General; Keith I. McManus, Assistant Director;
                                         Spencer S. Shucard, Trial Attorney, Office of
                                         Immigration Litigation, United States
                                         Department of Justice, Washington, DC.

         UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

DECREED that the petition for review is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

         Petitioner Jose Guadalupe Montalvo-Montalvo, a native and citizen of Mexico,

seeks review of a July 20, 2020, decision of the BIA affirming an October 7, 2019, decision

of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Montalvo-Montalvo’s motion to reopen. In re

Jose Guadalupe Montalvo-Montalvo, No. A098 322 976 (B.I.A. July 20, 2020), aff’g No. A098

322 976 (Immig. Ct. Buffalo Oct. 7, 2019). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the

underlying facts and procedural history.

         We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA. See Xue Hong Yang v.

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005). We review the denial of a motion to

reopen for abuse of discretion. Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 168–69 (2d Cir.

2008).

         To reopen removal proceedings, Montalvo-Montalvo was required to file a motion

to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision

was rendered.      8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1).   It is undisputed

that Montalvo-Montalvo’s 2019 motion to reopen was untimely because it was filed 13

years after his 2006 removal order.                See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R.

§ 1003.23(b)(1).

                                               2
       The agency concluded that Montalvo-Montalvo’s motion did not warrant

equitable tolling, which would have excused the untimeliness of his motion insofar as he

sought to apply for cancellation of removal, because he had not accrued the ten years of

physical presence in the United States required for that relief.                 See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1229b(b)(1)(A). The agency appropriately concluded that Montalvo-Montalvo’s notice

to appear (“NTA”) was insufficient to stop his accrual of physical presence because it did

not include the time and date of his initial hearing, but concluded that defect was cured

when he received a hearing notice providing the missing information.                   As the

Government acknowledges, the Supreme Court rejected that position in Niz-Chavez v.

Garland, 141 S. Ct. 1474 (2021).      Accordingly, the agency erred in concluding that

Montalvo-Montalvo’s accrual of presence stopped at the time of his hearing notice.

       The Government, despite its concession of error, argues that remand would be

futile because Montalvo-Montalvo’s 2006 removal order stopped his accrual of physical

presence before he acquired the 10 years required for cancellation. In support of that

proposition, the Government relies on precedent from the BIA that relates to cases “prior

to the enactment of the ‘stop-time’ rule in section 240A(d)(1) of the Immigration and

Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1).” In re Garcia, 24 I. & N. Dec. 179, 181 (B.I.A.

2007); see also In re Ortega-Cabrera, 23 I. & N. Dec. 793, 794 (B.I.A. 2005). After considering

§ 1229b(d)(1), however, the BIA has held that the statute “plainly and unambiguously

provides that a final administrative order of removal does not trigger the stop-time rule,”

which “is only triggered by the service of a compliant notice to appear or the commission
                                              3
of certain, specified criminal offenses.” Matter of Yun-Xia Chen, 28 I. & N. Dec. 676, 679,

681 (B.I.A. 2023).   We cannot say that remand would be futile because of the BIA’s

interpretation of § 1229b(d)(1).

       We also cannot say as a matter of law that remand would be futile due to the

untimeliness of Montalvo-Montalvo’s motion to reopen. The agency should determine

in the first instance whether Montalvo-Montalvo acted diligently in moving to reopen in

2019 following the United States Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in Pereira v. Sessions, 138

S. Ct. 2105 (2018). See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947) (explaining that this

Court “is powerless to affirm the administrative action by substituting what it considers

to be a more adequate or proper basis” than the one on which the agency relied”).

Accordingly, we grant the petition to the extent it challenges the denial of reopening to

apply for cancellation of removal and remand for the agency to correct its error. See INS

v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002) (“Generally speaking, a court of appeals should

remand a case to an agency for decision of a matter that statutes place primarily in agency

hands.”).

       We deny the petition to the extent that Montalvo-Montalvo challenges the

agency’s denial of his motion to reopen to apply for asylum and related relief. Although

the time limit for motions to reopen does not apply if reopening is sought to apply for

asylum and the motion is “based on changed country conditions,” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), Montalvo-Montalvo did not

establish such conditions because he did not submit country conditions evidence or
                                             4
provide dates for the alleged harm his family suffered, see Tanusantoso v. Barr, 962 F.3d

694, 698 & n.10 (2d Cir. 2020) (relying on In re S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 253 (B.I.A. 2007)

(“In determining whether evidence accompanying a motion to reopen demonstrates a

material change in country conditions that would justify reopening, [the BIA] compare[s]

the evidence of country conditions submitted with the motion to those that existed at the

time of the merits hearing below.”)). Nor did Montalvo-Montalvo demonstrate that he

warranted equitable tolling to permit him to reopen to apply for asylum and related relief

because he did not allege facts showing that he was prevented from applying for such

relief in his underlying proceedings. See Iavorski v. U.S. INS, 232 F.3d 124, 129 (2d Cir.

2000) (“Equitable tolling applies as a matter of fairness where a party has been prevented

in some extraordinary way from exercising his rights.” (quotation marks and brackets

omitted)); see also Valverde v. Stinson, 224 F.3d 129, 134 (2d Cir. 2000) (“The word ‘prevent’

requires the petitioner to demonstrate a causal relationship between the extraordinary

circumstances on which the claim for equitable tolling rests and the lateness of a filing.”).

       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is GRANTED in part and

DENIED in part. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and stays

VACATED.

                                           FOR THE COURT:
                                           Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
                                           Clerk of Court

                                              5