Court Opinion

ID: 9478092
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:39:58.01998+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:35.722873
License: Public Domain

KRAVITCH, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I agree with the majority that the district court did not err in excluding Howard’s proffered expert testimony or in admitting the government’s evidence of Howard’s activities on behalf of McMahan. I do not agree, however, with the majority’s conclusion that the district court did not invade the province of the jury by instructing it that “under the evidence in the case the $118,000 should have been reported.” Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
The majority appears to accept that the falsity of a tax return is a factual element of the offense proscribed by 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1) which the government must prove to the jury’s satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt. See Maj.Op. at 835 (“ultimate issue of falsity of the returns” was properly left for jury determination). To the extent that the majority rejects the government’s argument that the falsity of a tax return is an issue of law which the judge, not the jury, should decide, I concur.
Although there is no Eleventh Circuit case squarely controlling, our predecessor court indicated that falsity is an element of section 7206(1) which must be proven to the jury. In United States v. Fontenot, 628 F.2d 921, 923 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905, 101 S.Ct. 3030, 69 L.Ed.2d 406 (1981), the court stated that “in order to prove its case the government must prove both falsity as to a material matter in the tax return and knowledge of such falsity by the accused at the time the return was signed.” 1 The court plainly treated falsity as a jury issue in Fontenot, for it reviewed the jury’s implicit conclusion that the appellant’s return was false under the deferential standard of Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 469, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942), applicable only to the sufficiency of the evidence presented to the jury.2 In United States v. Jernigan, 411 *839F.2d 471 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 927, 90 S.Ct. 262, 24 L.Ed.2d 225 (1969), the court rejected the argument that the government was required under section 7206(1) to prove that an actual deficiency in tax resulted from a false return and stated that “the crime was complete, when, as the jury found, appellant wilfully made and subscribed a return, under the penalties of perjury, which was false as to a material matter.” 411 F.2d at 473 (emphasis added). In Kolaski v. United States, 362 F.2d 847 (5th Cir.1966), the court remarked that “the gist of the offense is a false statement, willfully made, of a material matter. The statement must be made with respect to a fact or facts [and] [t]he statement must be such that the truth or falsity of it is susceptible of proof” Id. at 848 (emphasis added).3
“The rule is firmly established that the trial judge cannot direct a verdict in favor of the government for all or even one element of a crime.” United States v. Goetz, 746 F.2d 705, 708 (11th Cir.1984). “[N]o fact, not even an undisputed fact, may be determined by the Judge. The plea of not guilty puts all in issue, even the most patent truth. In our federal system, the Trial Judge may never instruct a verdict either in whole or in part.” Roe v. United States, 287 F.2d 435, 440 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 824, 82 S.Ct. 43, 7 L.Ed.2d 29 (1961). After applying Goetz and Roe to this case, I cannot conclude that the district court properly left the issue of falsity to the jury. The district court told the jury, “I now tell you as a matter of law that the court has found under the evidence in the case the $118,000 should have been reported.” Although the court did not state baldly, “I instruct you that the return in this case was false,” it committed essentially the same error by instructing the jury that the court had weighed the evidence and found that the 1982 payments should have been reported. There was nothing left for the jury to do on the issue of falsity; the court’s finding that the payments should have been reported on Howard’s 1982 tax return was equivalent to a finding that the return was false. The trial court simply applied the law to the facts of the case, which it should not have done. See Goetz, 746 F.2d at 708.
The majority seeks to avoid this conclusion by suggesting that the “ultimate issue” of falsity was somehow left to the jury. With due respect, I do not grasp the distinction between the issue of falsity, which the court resolved, and the “ultimate issue” of falsity, which the court supposedly left to the jury. I suspect the majority means that the ultimate issue of whether “the defendant made or caused to be made an income tax return that was false as to a material matter” was left to the jury. See Maj.Op. at 835. As so phrased, however, this “ultimate” issue is actually a compound issue, which includes several subsidiary factual determinations that also *840must be made by the jury. For example, the jury must decide whether the return was made or caused to be made by the defendant, not by another person; whether the return was, in fact, a “return”;4 and whether the information on the return was true or false. Howard was entitled to a jury determination on all of these factual issues, not just on the “ultimate” issue.5
Nor do I agree with the majority that Alterman Foods, Inc. v. United States, 505 F.2d 873 (5th Cir.1974), is applicable to this case. Both Alterman Foods and the case on which it relied, Berkowitz v. United States, 411 F.2d 818 (5th Cir.1969), were civil suits brought by taxpayers to obtain a tax refund. In both cases, the former Fifth Circuit held that the trial court did not err in deciding, as a matter of law, whether certain “undisputed operative facts add[ed] up to debt or equity.” Berkowitz, 411 F.2d at 821; accord Alterman Foods, 505 F.2d at 876. These holdings are unremarkable, for in civil cases it is always within the province of the trial court to determine the legal significance of undisputed facts. This judicial power is the foundation for summary judgments, directed verdicts, and judgments notwithstanding the verdict under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
There is no analogy to these summary procedures in federal criminal procedure. The government may never obtain a directed verdict of guilt in a criminal case. Goetz, 746 F.2d at 708. Indeed, it is fair to say that there is no such thing as an “undisputed operative fact” in federal criminal law. As noted above, a plea of not guilty “puts all in issue, even the most patent truth.” Roe, 287 F.2d at 440. It is not relevant, as the majority implies, that “at trial the battle was fought to the jury largely upon intent and wilfulness,” Maj.Op. at page 835, or that “[mjany of the basic facts were not in dispute.” Id. One may be tempted to overlook the district court’s error on a seemingly trivial issue, but “a trial court’s actions in directing a verdict in a criminal trial, either in whole or in part, cannot be viewed as harmless error.” Goetz, 746 F.2d at 709.
The majority’s error in relying on Alter-man Foods is not cured by its statement that “a defendant is not entitled to an instruction on an issue that is not raised by the evidence,” Maj.Op. at page 835, and its citation to United States v. Costello, 760 F.2d 1123 (11th Cir.1985). Costello involved the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on a defense of voluntary intoxication, not an instruction on an element of the government’s prima facie case. It has long been the case that a defendant may be required to adduce “some evidence,” however slight, before he may obtain a jury instruction on an affirmative defense. Cf. Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 486-87, 16 S.Ct. 353, 357-58, 40 L.Ed. 499 (1895); Blake v. United States, 407 F.2d 908, 910-11 (5th Cir.1969) (en banc). This principle has no application, however, when the pertinent issue is an essential element of the government’s prima facie case. A district court may not refuse to instruct a jury on any element of the government’s prima facie case, even when the defendant fails to bring forward any evidence on that element. Such a practice would violate the defendant’s presumption of innocence and would impair the defendant’s right to stand mute before any criminal accusation and put the government to its proof:
The plea of not guilty is unlike a special plea in a civil action, which, admitting the case averred, seeks to establish substantive grounds of defense by a preponderance of evidence. It is not in confession and avoidance, for it is a plea that controverts the existence of every fact essential to constitute the crime charged. Upon that plea the accused may stand, *841shielded by his presumption of his innocence, until it appears that he is guilty....
Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. at 485-86, 16 S.Ct. at 357-58.
I would reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial.

. The Eleventh Circuit, in the en banc decision Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.1981), adopted as precedent decisions of the former Fifth Circuit rendered prior to October 1, 1981.

. In light of Fontenot, it seems quite remarkable that the government would argue that falsity of a return is an issue of law. Were we to adopt the government’s position, we would be required to review the evidence of falsity de novo on every appeal from a conviction under § 7206(1). Such review could drastically hinder effective prosecution for the filing of false tax returns. Although the government finds it convenient to press this position in the current case, I suggest that it would soon find its victory on this point to be Pyrrhic, once convicted defendants learn that every conviction under § 7206(1) is vulnerable on the issue of falsity. Furthermore, I cannot believe that Congress intended the courts of appeals to undertake such an interventionist role in prosecutions under § 7206(1).
Although, as the majority states, Maj.Op. at page 835, we need not consider at length the persuasive effect of cases holding that materiality is an issue of law for decision by the court in § 7206(1) prosecutions, I would note that these cases have, for me, no persuasive effect at all. Falsity is an issue ideally suited for jury deter*839mination, as the decision turns fundamentally on credibility choices. The materiality determination, by contrast, requires the decision-maker to evaluate the impact of the false information on the governmental body’s effectiveness. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 574 F.2d 232, 235 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 893, 99 S.Ct. 251, 58 L.Ed.2d 239 (1978). This task may be inappropriate for jurors who may not have a complete understanding of the functions of judicial tribunals and government agencies and may not adequately appreciate the scope of information that such bodies require. Thus, even though the courts have long held materiality to be an issue of law under both 21 U.S.C. § 7206(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 1621, the general federal perjury statute, they have not extended this holding to other elements of those offenses.

. In Kolaski, the court remarked that § 7206(1) is similar to other federal perjury statutes, such as 18 U.S.C. § 1621, in that falsity of the statement is an essential element of the offense. It is clear that falsity is a jury issue under both 18 U.S.C. § 1621, the general federal perjury statute, and 18 U.S.C. § 1623, which prohibits false declarations before a court or grand jury. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 816 F.2d 1022, 1029 (5th Cir.1987), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 749, 98 L.Ed.2d 762 (1988); United States v. Flowers, 813 F.2d 1320, 1324 (4th Cir.1987); United States v. Dudley, 581 F.2d 1193, 1196 (5th Cir.1978); United States v. Abrams, 568 F.2d 411, 421-23 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 903, 98 S.Ct. 3089, 57 L.Ed.2d 1133 (1978); LaPlaca v. United States, 354 F.2d 56, 58 (1st Cir.1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 927, 86 S.Ct. 932, 15 L.Ed.2d 846 (1966); Young v. United States, 212 F.2d 236, 241 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1015, 74 S.Ct. 870, 98 L.Ed. 1137 (1954).

. See Goetz, 746 F.2d at 708 (whether tax return is a "return" is factual determination properly made by jury).

. Even more misleading is the majority's statement that the trial court "correctly left to the jury's determination the ultimate question whether the income was in fact reported or not reported in violation of the criminal law.” See Maj.Op. at page 834. The trial court may have left this final question to the jury, but as phrased by the majority, this is simply the ultimate issue of whether Howard was guilty or not guilty.