Court Opinion

ID: 92006
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2010-04-28 16:05:13+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:51:04.235857
License: Public Domain

122 U.S. 522 (1887)
FISHER
v.
PERKINS.
Supreme Court of United States.
Submitted April 20, 1887.
Decided May 27, 1887.
ERROR TO THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF KENTUCKY.
*524 Mr. George W. Jolly for plaintiff in error.
Mr. C.S. Walker for defendant in error.
*525 MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE, after stating the case as above reported, delivered the opinion of the court.
This court has no power to review any other judgments of the courts of a state than those of the highest court "in which a decision in the suit could be had." § 709, Rev. Stat. The Court of Appeals is the highest court of the state of Kentucky, and, consequently, until it has been made to appear affirmatively on the face of the record that a decision in this suit could not have been had in that court, we are not authorized to review the judgment of the Superior Court. Although the value in controversy is less than $1000, and the judgment of the inferior court was affirmed by the Superior Court without a dissenting vote, an appeal did lie to the Court of Appeals if two of the judges of the Superior Court certified that, in their opinion, the question involved was novel and of sufficient importance.
To get an appeal from the Superior Court in any case an *526 application therefor must be made to and granted by that court. Such is the express provision of § 7 of the act under which the court was organized. Certainly it would not be claimed that a judgment of the Superior Court could be reviewed by this court in a case not within the exceptions mentioned in § 5 before an application had been made in proper time for the allowance of an appeal, and the application refused for some sufficient reason. It is true that in this particular case the prayer for an appeal could not have been granted, unless the necessary certificate was given; but if given, it would have been as much the duty of the court to make the order of allowance as it would if the value in controversy had exceeded one thousand dollars, or the judgment of affirmance had been with a dissenting vote. Such a certificate enters into and forms part of the allowance of an appeal in a case like this, and an application for the allowance necessarily includes an application for the certificate, unless it has been obtained before, because the certificate is one of the ingredients of an allowance. The want of a certificate is good reason for refusing to allow an appeal, but until it has been asked for and refused its absence furnishes no ground for a writ of error from this court.
The principle on which this case rests is illustrated by what was decided in Gregory v. Mc Veigh, 23 Wall. 294. In Virginia, the Supreme Court of Appeals is the highest court of the state. Judgments of the Corporation Court of Alexandria can only be taken there for review on leave of the Court of Appeals itself or some judge thereof. Gregory, against whom a judgment had been rendered in the Corporation Court, applied to each and every one of the judges of the Court of Appeals for a writ of error, but his applications were all rejected because the judgment was "plainly right." This, by a statute of Virginia, was a bar to any application to the court for the same purpose, and Gregory thereupon sued out a writ of error from this court to the Corporation Court, as the highest court of the state in which a decision in the suit could be had. Upon a motion to dismiss we upheld our jurisdiction, because everything had been done that could be to take the case to the *527 Court of Appeals, and its doors had "been forever closed against the suit, not through neglect, but in the regular order of proceeding under the law governing the practice." Had the court itself refused the leave upon an application for that purpose, its refusal would have been equivalent to a judgment of affirmance, which could have been reviewed in this court; but as in the regular course of proceeding that had been done which prevented either a review of a judgment of the Court of Appeals or an application to that court for a writ of error, the judgment of the Corporation Court had become the judgment of the highest court of the state in which a decision in that suit could be had, and consequently was reviewable here as such.
So, here, if an application to the Superior Court for an appeal had been refused, the doors of the Court of Appeals would have been closed against the suit, and we could have proceeded accordingly. As it is, we find nothing in the record to show that the suit could not have been taken to the Court of Appeals if the necessary application had been made, and, consequently, we have no right to proceed. It matters not that the judgment of the Superior Court is in accordance with what was decided by the Court of Appeals on the former appeal. The judgment is still the judgment of the Superior Court, which is not the highest court of the state, and it might have been taken to the Court of Appeals for review if the grant of an appeal had been applied for and secured. McComb v. Commissioners of Knox County, 91 U.S. 1; Kimball v. Evans, 93 U.S. 320; Davis v. Crouch, 94 U.S. 514, 517. We are not to assume that an appeal would not have been granted if applied for. The record must show its refusal.
The motion to dismiss is granted.