Court Opinion

ID: 9859404
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 21:28:58.187976+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:46:42.908059
License: Public Domain

Weestteaub, C. J.
(concurring). I concur in the essence of the majority opinion but since I differ with it in some respects and with the dissenting opinion in Ricciardi v. Marcalus Manufacturing Company, 26 N. J. 445 (1958), also decided today, I feel I should state my views.
The dissenting opinion differentiates between appellate review of fact findings of an agency and fact findings of a judge sitting without a jury. Even in the absence of a valid legislative restraint upon the judicial role, there is a reluctance to interfere with agency findings. Several considerations so suggest. The subject matter may be within the peculiar expertise of the agency; the legislative or regulatory aspects of the action taken may preponderate over the judicial element or be inseparable from it; and a ready disposition to intervene may encourage appeals in an area in which the public interest demands expeditious solution of the controversy. These considerations are not uniformly present and probably the judge’s estimate of the particular agency will always be a silent variable.
The dissenting opinion concludes the Appellate Division should apply the test whether the factual findings are supported by “substantial evidence on the whole record.” Assuming that standard is significantly different from the one applicable to review of a trial judge, I do not see how the Appellate Division may approach a workmen’s compensation case on the thesis that an agency finding is involved. The Legislature commanded a trial de novo in the County Court on the record made in the Workmen’s Compensation Division, and despite differences in the phrasing of the *442repealed statute and our rule of court, the latter was intended and has been understood to repeat the legislative direction. Surely we cannot say that the Appellate Division shall review the compensation award upon the basis of “substantial evidence on the whole record” and thereby reverse a County Court which correctly reached another result upon the “de novo" approach. Uor can we convert the County Court into an administrative agency and thus apply the more limited type of review to its action. The fact is that the Legislature and this court by its rule provided for a settlement of the dispute in the County Court sitting as such, and the judgment of that court is a judicial one. And, it may be added, the nature of the controversy before the Deputy Director is wholly judicial, indistinguishable in that respect from the conventional suit by one citizen against another. I agree that compensation cases should be concluded promptfy, but I cannot ignore the policy decision in favor of a trial de novo within the judicial branch.
The judgment of the predecessor of the present County Court was reviewable by certiorari under the former constitutional system. The Constitution of 1947, Art. VI, Sec. V, par. 4, provides for a review as of right in matters formerly reviewable by prerogative writs, but I cannot find therein a prescription of the type of review to be accorded with respect to facts. The cited paragraph provides that “review, hearing and relief shall be afforded in the Superior Court, on terms and in the manner provided by rules of the Supreme Court.” The right to be heard is assured; the extent of the review remains unspecified, and if one should believe that there was secured the precise review which was furnished prior to the present Constitution upon a writ of certiorari, still the solution of the present issue would not be advanced since judicial expressions under the former system invite the very question we are now debating.
Nor, for that matter, can I find direction in our rules of court. R. R. 1:5-4(i) relating to appeals says that “new or amended findings of fact may be made, but due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court *443to judge of the credibility of the witnesses,” while B. B. 4:88-13, relating to reviews in lieu of prerogative writ, if it be deemed applicable, states the court “shall have power to review the facts and make independent findings thereon, which power may be exercised by it to such extent as the interests of justice may require.” What remains to be answered is the question, when does “may” become “should” ?
The “substantial evidence” test is not explicit or implicit in either rule, but let us examine that approach. If “substantial evidence” meant evidence sufficient to take a case to the jury, Davis, Administrative Law (1951), § 254, p. 914, I would have no difficulty in differentiating the review of the fact findings of a trial judge. But I understand the dissenting opinion in Bicciardi would require more than “substantial evidence” in the restricted sense just described; it would demand “substantial evidence on the whole record,” a standard which would entail a more extensive, qualitative weighing of the proof. See Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U. S. 474, 71 S. Ct. 456, 95 L. Ed. 456 (1951). At what point, in that process, would supporting evidence become sufficient? I can understand that in a given case the appellate judge could conclude that he would have decided the matter differently if he sat originally and yet is not sufficiently moved to upset the result. But an appellate judge reviewing a trial court commonly finds himself in the same posture and hence affirms. Unless the margin between the two approaches can be clearly defined, it may not be worth the confusion which is likely to follow. In any event, the suggested test cannot be pertinent in a compensation matter so long as the “administrative” aspect is complicated by the circumstance that the County Court sits de novo.
We are in agreement that the judges of the Appellate Division must read the record and that a qualitative weighing process must ensue. At that point we seem to part, although perhaps the difference is more verbal than real. *444I incline to believe that a judge will do what he thinks he should, no matter how we try to corral him. Whether he will disturb the findings depends upon what is really pivotal in the case as he sees it. If the result turns upon credibility, he will allow for the opportunity of the trier of the facts to observe the witness. If the crux is the validity of inferences, he probably will defer to the trier of the facts if the treatment is a reasonable one. He will consider the Deputy Director’s greater experience with medical issues. If, however, he believes the facts were misconceived or there was a failure to note and give effect to a vital fact, I think he would disturb the judgment. The patterns vary. The most that can be said is that an appellate judge should and will sustain the factual findings unless he is persuaded upon the sundry aspects of the case that the trier of the facts was wrong.
Where the Deputy Director and the County Court concur in the fact findings, the appellate judge will place in the scale the circumstance that another mind upon a study of the record agreed with the Deputy Director. The chances of persuading the Appellate Division that the findings should be disturbed are considerably lessened, not because of some imperative, but because another makeweight heightens the reviewer’s reluctance to disagree. If the County Court and Deputy Director reach contrary results, no fixed rule of “determinative” weight can be attached to either tribunal’s action. The appellate judge will simply give such weight to the action of each tribunal as the particular circumstances and his own reaction to them suggest. I doubt that we will profit by attempting to go beyond the simple proposition that the Appellate Division, after weighing all pertinent factors, will affirm unless it is persuaded that the judgment before it is wrong.
Weintraub, C. J., concurring in result.
For reversal—Chief Justice Weintraub, and Justices Heher, Burling and Proctor—4.
For affirmance—Justice Wacheneeld—1.