Court Opinion

ID: 9425884
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:16:06.890299+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:58.125013
License: Public Domain

MR. Justice Stewart,
with whom Mr. Justice White, Mr. Justice Marshall, and Mr. Justice Powell join,
dissenting.
Under a recently adopted Board policy, an employer who does not commit independent unfair labor practices prejudicing the holding of a fair election has an absolute right to refuse to bargain with a union selected by a majority of his employees until that union petitions for and wins a Board-supervised election. I cannot agree with the Court’s conclusion that this Board policy constitutes a permissible interpretation of §§ 8 (a)(5) and 9 (a) of the Act.1 Accordingly, I would affirm the judg*311ment of the Court of Appeals remanding the case to the Board for further proceedings, although my views are somewhat at variance with those expressed in the Court of Appeals’ opinion.
Section 9 (a) expressly provides that the employees’ exclusive bargaining representative shall be the union “designated or selected” by a majority of the employees in an appropriate unit. Neither § 9 (a) nor § 8 (a)(5), which makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain with the representative of his employees, specifies how that representative is to be chosen. The-language of the Act thus seems purposefully designed to impose a duty upon an employer to bargain whenever the union representative presents convincing evidence of majority support, regardless of the method by which that support is demonstrated. And both the Board and this Court have in the past consistently interpreted §§ 8 (a) (5) and 9 (a) to mean exactly that. A “union did not have to be certified as the winner of a Board election to invoke a bargaining obligation; it could.establish majority status by other means under the unfair labor practice provision of § 8 (a) (5) — by showing convincing support, for instance, by a union-called strike or strike vote, or, as here, by possession of cards signed by a majority of the employees authorizing the union to represent them for collective bargaining purposes.” NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U. S. 575, 597 (footnote omitted).2
*312As the Court recognized in Gissel, the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments strengthen this interpretation of the Act. One early version of the House bill would have amended the Act to permit the Board to find an employer unfair labor practice for refusing to bargain with a union only if the union was “currently recognized by the employer or certified as such [through an election] under section 9.” §8 (a)(5) of H. R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. The proposed change, which would have eliminated any method of requiring employer recognition of a union other than a Board-supervised election, was rejected in conference. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 41. After rejection of the proposed House amendment, the House Conference Report explicitly stated that §8 (a) (5) was intended to follow the provisions of “existing law.” Ibid. And “existing law” unequivocally recognized that a union could establish majority status and thereby impose a bargaining obligation on an unwilling employer by means other than petitioning for and winning a Board-supervised election. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., supra, at 596-598.
The 1947 amendments, however, did provide an alternative to immediate union recognition for an employer faced with a union demand to bargain on behalf of his employees. Section 9 (c)(1)(B), added to the Act in 1947, provides that an employer, alleging that one or more individuals or labor organizations have presented a claim to be recognized as the exclusive representative of his employees, may file a petition for a Board-supervised representation election.
This section, together with §§ 8 (a)(5) and 9 (a), provides clear congressional direction as to the proper approach to the situation before us. When an employer is faced with a demand for recognition by a union that has presented convincing evidence of majority support, he may elect to follow one of four alternatives. First, *313he is free to recognize the union and thereby satisfy his § 8 (a)(5) obligation to bargain with the representatives “designated or selected” by his employees.3 Second, he may petition for a Board-supervised election, pursuant to § 9 (c)(1)(B). NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., supra, at 599. Third, rather than file his own election petition, the employer can agree to be bound by the results of an expedited consent election ordered after the filing of a union election petition. See 29 CFR § 102.62. Finally, the employer can refuse to recognize the union, despite its convincing evidence of majority support, and also refuse either to petition for an election or to consent to a union-requested election. In this event, however, the Act clearly provides that the union may charge the employer with an unfair labor practice under § 8 (a) (5) for refusing to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees. If the General Counsel issues a complaint and the Board determines that the union in fact represents a majority of the employees, the Board must issue an order directing the employer to bargain with the union. See, e. g., NLRB v. Dahlstrom Metallic Door Co., 112 F. 2d 756; cf. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., supra, at 595-600.
The Court offers two justifications for its approval of the new Board practice which, disregarding the clear language of §§8(a)(5) and 9(a), requires an employer *314to bargain only with a union certified as bargaining representative after a Board-supervised election conducted upon the petition of the union.4
First, it is suggested that to require the Board under some circumstances to find a §8 (a)(5) violation when an employer refuses to bargain with the noncertified union supported by a majority of his employees would compel the Board to re-enter the domain of subjective “good faith” inquiries. Ante, at 306. This fear is unwarranted. It is true that early in the administration of the Act it was held that an employer could lawfully refuse to bargain if he had a good-faith doubt as to the union’s majority status, even if in fact the union did represent a majority of the employees. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., supra, at 597 n. 11; NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F. 2d 862, 868. But it was recognized at the same time that a union could present “convincing evidence of majority support” that “could not in good faith be ignored.” NLRB v. Dahlstrom Metallic Door Co., supra, at 757; see NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., supra, at 596; NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., supra, at 868.
Within broad limits imposed by the Act itself, the Board may use its understanding of the policies and practical considerations of the Act’s administration to determine the circumstances under which an employer must take evidence of majority support as “convincing.” Cf. NLRB v. Insurance Agents, 361 U. S. 477, 499; NLRB v. Truck Drivers Union, 353 U. S. 87, 96. The Act in no way requires the Board to define “convincing evidence” in a manner that reintroduces a subjective *315test of the employer’s good faith in refusing to bargain with the union. If the Board continues to believe, as it has in the recent past, that it is unworkable to adopt any standard for determining when an employer has breached his duty to bargain that incorporates a subjective element, see NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U. S., at 592-594, it may define “convincing evidence of majority support” solely by reference to objective criteria — for example, by reference to “a union-called strike or strike vote, or, as here, by possession of cards signed by a majority of the employees ...Id., at 597.5
Even with adoption of such an objective standard for measuring “convincing evidence of majority support,” the employer’s “subjective” doubts would be adequately safeguarded by §9 (c)(1)(B)’s assurance of the right to file his own petition for an election. Despite the Board’s broad discretion in this area, however, the Act simply does not permit the Board to adopt a rule that avoids subjective inquiries by eliminating entirely all inquiries into an employer’s obligation to bargain with a noncertified union selected by a majority of his employees.
The second ground upon which the Court justifies its approval of the Board’s new practice is that it serves to remove from the employer the burden of obtaining a Board-supervised election. Ante, at 307. Although I agree with the Court that it would be improper to impose such an obligation on an employer, the Board’s *316new policy is not necessary to eliminate such a burden.
The only employer obligation relevant to this case, apart from the requirement that the employer not commit independent unfair labor practices that would prejudice the holding of a fair election, is the one imposed by §§ 8 (a)(5) and 9 (a) of the Act: an employer has a duty to bargain collectively with the representative designated or selected by his employees. When an employer is confronted with “convincing evidence of majority support,” he has the option of petitioning for an election or consenting to an expedited union-petitioned election. As the Court explains, §9 (c)(1)(B) does not require the employer to exercise this option. If he does not, however, and if he does not voluntarily recognize the union, he must take the risk that his conduct will be found by the Board to constitute a violation of his § 8 (a)(5) duty to bargain. In short, petitioning for an election is not an employer obligation; it is a device created by Congress for the employer’s self-protection, much as Congress gave unions the right to petition for elections to establish their majority status but deliberately chose not to require a union to seek an election before it could impose a bargaining obligation on an unwilling employer. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., supra, at 598-599.6
*317The language and history of the Act clearly indicate that Congress intended to impose upon an employer the duty to bargain with a union that has presented convincing evidence of majority support, even though the union has not petitioned for and won a Board-supervised election. “It is not necessary for us to justify the policy of Congress. It is enough that we find it in the statute. That policy cannot be defeated by the Board’s policy.” Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co. v. NLRB, 338 U. S. 355, 363. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals remanding the case to the Board, but for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed in this opinion.

 Section 9 (a) of the Act, 49 Stat. 453, as amended, 61 Stat. 143, 29 U. S. C. § 159 (a), provides that “[Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees . . . .” Section *3118 (a) (5), 29 U. S. C. § 158 (a) (5), makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer “to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 9 (a)

 For example, in Mine Workers v. Arkansas Flooring Co., 351 U. S. 62, 69, the Court stated that where the union had obtained signed authorization cards from a majority of the employees, denial of recognition of the union by the employer would have violated § 8 (a) (5) in the absence of any bona fide dispute as to the existence of the required majority of eligible employees.

 If despite its convincing evidence of majority support the union in fact has not attained majority status, a grant of exclusive recognition to the minority union by the employer would constitute unlawful support in violation of §§ 8 (a)(1) and 8(a)(2) of the Act. Garment Workers v. NLRB, 366 U. S. 731, 737-738. This result, however, imposes no real hardship on the employer or the union since it merely requires that recognition be withheld until a Board-conducted election results in majority selection of a representative. Id., at 739. In addition, an employer concerned about the possibility of recognizing a minority union may always petition for an election pursuant to § 9 (c)(1)(B) prior to recognition.

 The Board, of course, continues to permit an employer voluntarily to recognize a noncertified union supported by a majority of his employees. But under the Board rule approved by the Court, an employer has no obligation to do so under the Act.

 1 do not attempt to indicate how the Board should specify standards as to what may constitute “convincing evidence.” In view of its experience and expertise, the Board is better qualified than we are to undertake the specifics of this task. I do suggest that the support of a bare majority of employees, whether demonstrated by authorization cards, a strike, or a strike vote, would not necessarily constitute convincing evidence. Given the possibility of undue peer pressure or even coercion in personal card solicitation or nonsecret strike votes, a higher level of objective dependability might be obtained by requiring a greater show of support than a bare majority.

 Although the Court reiterates the generally acknowledged view that elections are the preferred method for determining whether a union has majority support, it suggests that an election held as a result of an employer petition or an expedited election to which the employer has consented is somehow less desirable than a union-requested election. Ante, at 309. No such distinction is possible. The advantages of a secret election to determine the true desires of employees with respect to the selection of a collective-bargaining representative, ensuring a choice that is free from the influences of mass psychology, see Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U. S. 96, 100, are entirely unrelated to whether the union or the employer has initiated the election proceedings.