Court Opinion

ID: 9639423
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 16:17:20.923288+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:18.214879
License: Public Domain

STONE, Circuit Judge
(dissenting). With all due respect for the majority opinion, I feel compelled to dissent and to state my reasons therefor. The reversal herein is predicated upon three errors, each of which is deemed sufficiently prejudicial to require a new trial. They are (1) that the court admitted evidence of comparative volume of sales of the Spring Drug Company and of the Lincoln Drug Company and its subsequent withdrawal thereof did not cure the error of such admission; (2) that the convictions were upon four different counts of indictment No. 422 when there was but one offense; and (3) that the court erred in its charge by making certain statements set out in the opinion.
1. As shown in the majority opinion, the evidence of comparative volume of sales of the two companies was stricken out and the jury instructed to disregard it. Where incompetent evidence has been erroneously admitted, the general rule is that a withdrawal thereof from the jury by a clear statement of the trial court that such is withdrawn and is to be disregarded cures the error. The reasons for this rule are clearly stated by Mr. Justice Harlan in Pennsylvania Co. v. Roy, 102 U. S. 451, 459 (26 L. Ed. 141), as follows:
“To this position we cannot assent, although we are referred to some adjudged eases which seem to announce the broad proposition that an error in the admission of evidence cannot afterwards be corrected by instructions to the jury, so as tó cancel the exception taken to its admission. But such a rule would be exceedingly inconvenient in practice, and would often seriously obstruct the course of business in the courts. It cannot be sustained upon principle, or by sound reason, and is against the great weight of authority. The charge from the court that the jury should not consider evidence which had been improperly admitted, was equivalent to striking it out of the ease. The exception to its admission fell when the error was subsequently corrected by instructions too clear and positive to be misunderstood by the jury. The presumption should not be indulged that the jury were too ignorant to comprehend, or were too unmindful of their duty to respect, instructions as to matters peculiarly within the province of the court to determine. It should rather be, so far as this court is concerned, that the jury were influenced in their verdict only by legal evidence. Any other rule would make it necessary in every trial, where an error in the admission of proof is committed, of which error the court becomes aware before the final submission of the case to the jury, to suspend the trial, discharge the jury, and commence anew. A rule of practice leading to such results cannot meet with approval.”
It is only in exceptional instances (Hopt v. Utah, 120 U. S. 430, 438, 7 S. Ct. 614, 30 L. Ed. 708), that such withdrawal does not cure the error. Such exceptional instances ■are present where the language of the withdrawal is not sufficiently clear and definite to indicate the evidence so withdrawn (Throckmorton v. Holt, 180 U. S. 552, 567, 21 S. Ct. 474, 45 L. Ed. 663), or where it is evident to the reviewing court that, such a strong impression must have been made upon the minds of the jurors that it could not be removed by such withdrawal (Hopt v. Utah, 120 U. S. 430, 438, 7 S. Ct. 614, 30 L. Ed. 708; Throckmorton v. Holt, 180 U. S. 552, 567, 21 S. Ct. 474, 45 L. Ed. 663). The rule to be applied is “whether or not, considering the whole case and its particular circumstances, the error committed appears to have been of so serious a nature that it must have affected the minds of the jury despite the correction by the court.” Waldron v. Waldron, 156 U. S. 361, 383,15 S. Ct. 383, 389 (39 L. Ed. 453). Applying this rule of considering the whole case and the particular circumstances surrounding this evidence, I think the result is as follows:
The gist of these indictments is that the C. M. Spring Company had sold narcotics on orders which it knew were not genuine, in the sense that they were presented and filled out by parties not entitled to them. C. M. Spring, president of the drug company, and Russell W. Douglas, an employee thereof, were the individuals acting for the company in these transactions. There was no dispute that the narcotics were sold on the specified orders, and the evidence is very positive that they were sold to persons (government agents) who were not those to whom the order blanks had been issued. Therefore the only really contested issue of fact.before the jury was as to the knowledge of Spring and of Douglas that these orders were being improperly used by persons not entitled to them. Before the trial began, by pleas to abate the indictments and by motion to suppress evidence, the defendants had raised the question of entrapment. At the close of the evidence, defendants asked “the court to suppress all of the evidence in this ease, for the reason that it appears from the testimony that the government agents formed a' conspiracy to *861procure the defendants to violate the Harrison Narcotic Law, and for the reason it was not a sale to the persons alleged in the indictments, and it was made for the purpose of entrapping' and inducing the defendants into the commission of a crime. * * * ” The court charged upon the same matter. The majority opinion correctly states the law to be that, “where the government, through its agents, has reasonable cause to believe that the law is being violated by the defendant, they may legally entrap the defendant by decoy letters or by pretended purchases.” The sole purpose of the question, which elicited the testimony stricken out, was to show what had led the agents to believe the law was being violated and had caused them to make this investigation. That question was, “I want to ask you if there was anything in the volume of narcotics purchased, and the volume sold by the C. M. Spring Drug Company prior to December 6th, that caused you to make this investigation?” The answer was directed to that one point as is emphasized by the witness asking, “Would I be permitted to state why I arrived at my conclusion?” Again, defendants’ counsel, during the cross-examination of this witness and before the above question was asked, first brought the matter of wholesale drug houses handling narcotics into the case. At the end of a rather lengthy and thorough examination as to the variable amounts of narcotics which doctors, hospitals and retail drug stores would use and the factors which might govern such amounts, counsel for defendants inquired as to the number of drug stores in the territory included in the district of the witness as an inspector and then asked, “About how many wholesale houses in all of those states, if you know ?” It was this line of inquiry which, obviously, suggested the above inquiry in rebuttal, as the government counsel immediately preceded the above question (eliciting the testimony stricken out) by asking, “Your attention was directed by an inquiry made by Judge Thurman to wholesale houses in your territory; I • believe you said about forty wholesale houses doing an exclusively wholesale business like the G. M. Spring Company?” I rather incline to the opinion that, with the issue of entrapment clearly in the ease at the time, the evidence was admissible for the only purpose for which it was offered, to wit, to show reasonable cause to believe unlawful acts. But, even if it were inadmissible, it was not directed at the real issue of fact before the jury; was upon a collateral or subsidiary matter; was not stressed, repeated, nor emphasized to the jury (Hill v. Wabash Ry. Co., 1 F. [2d] 626, 628, this court); was but a single question and answer (Throckmorton v. Holt, 180 U. S. 552, 567, 21 S. Ct. 474, 45 L. Ed. 663), and was clearly withdrawn, and the jury instructed to disregard it, immediately following an objection which set forth clearly the reasons why such comparison could not be made. To my mind, it presents an instance of testimony suggested, if not invited, by defendants; not concerning the main issue of fact; presented with no particular impressiveness and promptly and clearly withdrawn. I cannot think evidence of this character and presented under such circumstances could possibly impress the jury to the prejudice of defendants, much less overcome the presumption “that, the jury were influenced in their verdict only by legal evidence.” Pennsylvania Co. v. Roy, 102 U, S. 451, 459 (26 L. Ed. 141).
2. The majority are of the opinion that the four counts (submitted to the jury) of indictment No. 422 were for one offense; that but one count should have been submitted; and, therefore, that the conviction on no one of the counts can be sustained. The separate eases (indictments Nos. 421, 422, and 423) were consolidated in this trial. There was but one count submitted in each of cases Nos. 421 and 423. The punishments assessed were, in case No. 421, a fine of $2,000 against the company, a fine of $500 and 3 years’ imprisonment against C. M. Spring; in case No. 422, a like sentence on each count as to the company and Spring, and a fine of $200 on each count against Douglas; in case No. 423, a like sentence as upon single count in No. 422. All imprisonment sentences were to run concurrently — thus the practical result was a single sentence of 3 years for C. M. Spring. The only real effect of striking down all or all but one of the counts of No. 422 would be a reduction of the fines assessed against each of the three defendants. I do not see how any error of this kind in No. 422 could affect the other two cases in the slightest and I do not understand the majority opinion as having such a meaning. Considering, then, No. 422 as alone being affected. Accepting the view that only one offense was cqvered by No. 422, what is the result? There is no contention that each of the four counts submitted did not, standing alone, constitute an offense. There was a separate verdict and an identical sentence in each. Because three of the counts are good duplications of the other one, should all be stricken down and should convictions on all, with identical sentences be held void? The jury found guilt as to each separately. The sentence was the same, so that it matters *862not which one is preserved. This court finds no objection to any count outside of the duplication. It seems to me the logical procedure would be to sustain one count and annul the sentences on the other three. The practical result would be reduction of the total fines in No. 422 to $2,000 for the company, $500 for Spring, and $200 for Douglas, leaving the prison sentence of Spring unaffected, because to be served concurrently. The majority opinion distinguishes this ease from Claassen v. United States, 142 U. S. 140,12 S. Ct. 169, 35 L. Ed. 966. In my judgment, the Claassen Case is directly in point as to the matters here presented. There, eleven counts had been submitted to -the jury resulting in verdicts of acquittal as to six counts and conviction as to five. The sentence was not upon each count but a general one of imprisonment for 6 years. I can see how that case would be stronger for defendant than the one before us, because it might be argued that the court would not have assessed so large a penalty on one count as upon five, but the Supreme Court there (page 147) said: “The sentence being to imprisonment for not less than 5 years nor more than 10, which was the only sentence authorized for a single offense under the statute on which the defendant was indicted, there is no reason why that sentence should not be applied to any one of the counts which was good.”
“A general verdict of guilty under an indictment containing several counts of necessity imports a conviction as to each count.” Moore v. United States, 1 F.(2d) 839, 841, citing Claassen v. United States, 142 U. S. 140, 146, 12 S. Ct. 169, 35 L. Ed. 966, and Ballew v. United States, 160 U. S. 187, 197, 16 S. Ct. 263, 40 L. Ed. 388. Also see Brooks v. United States, 267 U. S. 432, 441, 45 S. Ct. 345, 69 L. Ed. 699, 37 A. L. R. 1407. Also, where the verdict is general and the sentence general, it was said: “It is well settled that, where a verdict of guilty is rendered upon several counts, and the sentence does not exceed that which might be properly imposed upon conviction on the counts which are good, the sentence must stand,” citing Claassen v. United States, 142 U. S. 140, 12 S. Ct. 169, 35 L. Ed. 966; Evans v. United States, 153 U. S. 608;1 Kalen v. United States (C. C. A.) 196 F. 888 (9th Cir.); Wetzel v. United States (C. C. A.) 233 F. 984 (9th Cir.); Bacigalupi v. United States (C. C. A.) 274 F. 367 (9th Cir.). In Piereg v. United States, 252 U. S. 239, 252, 40 S. Ct. 205, 210 (64 L. Ed. 542), the court said: “The conceded insufficiency of the first count of the indictment does not warrant a reversal, since the sentences imposed upon Pierce, Creo, and Zeilman did not exceed that which lawfully might have been imposed under the second, third, or sixth counts, so that the concurrent sentence under the first count adds nothing to their punishment. Claassen v. United States, 142 U. S. 140,146 [12 S. Ct. 169, 35 L. Ed. 966]; Evans v. United States (2 cases) 153 U. S. 584, 595, 608 [14 S. Ct. 939, 38 L. Ed. 839]; Putnam v. United States, 162 U. S. 687, 714 [16 S. Ct. 923, 40 L. Ed. 1118]; Abrarms v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 619 [40 S. Ct. 17, 63 L. Ed. 1173].”
It is thus clear that, whether the verdict be specifically upon each count or general, and whether the judgment be thus specific or general, sentences on good counts or. applicable to good counts will not be set aside. Also see Savage v. United States, 270 F. 15, 17 (this court); Perlowitz v. United States, 282 F. 229, 230 (this court); Egan v. United States, 55 App. D. C. 306, 5 F.(2d) 267; and Id., 52 App. D. C. 384, 287 F. 958, 963; Mills v. United States (C. C. A.) 294 F. 77, 79 (5th Cir.); Bullock v. United States (C. C. A.) 289 F. 29, 30 (6th Cir.); Bruno v. United States (C. C. A.) 289 F. 649, 657 (1st Cir.); Baird v. United States (C. C. A.) 279 F. 509, 511 (6th Cir.). In Woods v. United States (C. C. A.) 279 F. 706, at page 708 (4th Cir.), the court says: “Nothing is better settled than that a verdict and judgment upon an indictment containing several counts should not be reversed, if any one of the counts is good and warrants the judgment.” Ader v. United States (C. C. A.) 284 F. 13 (7th Cir.), was a case involving the same situation (double punishment) as here. In 'that case as to that contention the court (page 25) said: “This question it is not deemed necessary-to determine. No reversal should result here, even if the contention of the plaintiffs in error should prevail in this particular, for, if conviction of plaintiff in error Ader was proper under the fifteenth count and any one of the first thirteen counts, it must be affirmed; and, if conviction of plaintiff in error Skolnik was proper under any single count of the indictment, it also must be affirmed” (citing the Pierce, Abrams and Claassen Cases, supra).
. Prom the above authorities, as well as upon reason, I think there should be no reversal of No. 422 (much less Nos. 421 and 423) on the ground of duplication (double punishment), but that the judgments thereon should be reduced to a single fine of $2,000 for the *863company, a single fine of $500 and imprisonment for 3 years for Spring, and a single fine of $200 for Douglas.
3. The final ground stated in the majority opinion, for reversal of these cases, is an error in the charge. It is vital to consider the record as to what took place in connection with the charge. At the conclusion of the evidence, defendants urged a motion to suppress all of the evidence because the alleged crime was procured through unlawful entrapment. When this motion was overruled, a request for peremptory charges as to each count under each indictment was made, no ground therefor being stated. These requests were sustained as to the odd-numbered counts in each indictment and denied as to the even-numbered counts in each. No further request of any character was then made, and the court delivered the charge. At the conclusion of the charge occurred the following:
“The Court: Has the government any request to make?
“Mr. Coon: None.
“The Court: Has the defense any request to make? (Attorneys for defense confer with court, out of hearing of the jury.)”
Immediately following this conference, the court charged further. Twice in the course of this further charge the court uses the expression, “my attention has been called to the fact,” clearly showing that the counsel for defendants had called matters to the attention of the court and that such had been acted upon. There was no exception by either side to any part of the charge or the supplemental charge. Therefore, the situation is that the court was not advised by counsel for defendants, in advance of the charge, what they wished to be covered therein; at the end of the charge, the court directly requested suggestions from the defendants concerning the charge; that request was met and counsel made suggestions; the court then charged further, and it is evident that at least a portion of the further charge was in response to such suggestions; there was no exception to the charge in any particular. It would be difficult to imagine a ease where the court could go further toward incorporating in a charge the matters deemed proper by counsel. After such proceeding, the absence of any exception is indisputable proof that, not only as matter, of law but as a fact, the charge was as satisfactory to defendants as they deemed the law to allow. There can be no question of the experience and ability of counsel for defendants. This record shows, beyond a doubt, that they ably and energetically contested these eases from beginning to end. The rights of these defendants were not “butchered” by incompetent or inexperienced counsel, but were ably protected by experienced counsel of acknowledged ability and standing.
Further, the portion of the instruction criticised in the majority opinion was not covered by the assignment of errors or by the additional assignment of errors. It is not mentioned in the printed brief and argument or in the typewritten addenda thereto. This reeord is blank as to any objection to the charge as to any preservation thereof in the assignments of errors, or as to any formal presentation thereof to this court.
It seems to me that reversal of a case under the above circumstances for the above reason tends seriously to weaken certain basic principles of appellate review, which principles are necessary, in my opinion, to the fair and orderly administration of justice 'by courts. Those principles are that errors should be brought to the attention of the trial court in an orderly way, at a time when that court can be given a fair opportunity to correct them; that errors which are expected to be reviewed should, at the time, be properly preserved; that errors which it is intended shall be reviewed be properly stated and preserved in the assignment of errors. The machinery to accomplish these results is exceedingly simple and is known to all attorneys. All that is needed to call an error to the attention of the trial court is a simple statement or objection, setting forth the reasons therefor. All that is required, in the federal courts, to preserve the error for possible review, is to take an exception thereto. All that is necessary to preserve, absolutely, the error for review is to state it in the assignment of errors with enough particularity to identify it in the record. These requirements are not mere formalities, ’ but are based upon sound •reasons drawn from practical experience of many judges and legislators covering the long years during which justice has been orderly administered by the courts of English speaking peoples.
I do not understand the majority opinion as in any way denying the general principles above stated, but, while not stated, it is undoubtedly based upon the idea that this case comes within the only exception recognized to the general rule. In my judgment, this case does not come within ‘that exception. That exception is that, in criminal eases involving the liberty or life of the accused, the appellate court may, not must, examine an alleged error, even though not preserved, and will not reverse a ease therefor “unless it is satisfied that there has been a miscarriage of *864justice.” Feinberg v. United States, 2 F.(2d) 955, 956 (this court). Also see Edwards v. United States, 7 F.(2d) 357, recently decided by this court; Robilio v. United States (C. C. A.) 291 F. 975, 980 (6th Cir.); Bilboa v. United States (C. C. A.) 287 F. 125,126 (9th Cir.); Thompson v. United States (C. C. A.) 283 F. 895, 896 (3d Cir.); De Jianne v. United States (C. C. A.) 282 F. 737, 739 (3d Cir.); Quarles v. United States (C. C. A.) 274 F. 203, 204 (6th Cir.).
The administration of justice is an intensely practical matter. The rules which govern its procedure and practice are intended to deal with things as they are and to accomplish practical ends. Innumerable rules (statutory and court made) have been promulgated in relation to such procedure and practice. Every litigant is entitled to the protection of every one of such rules applicable to any feature or step in his litigation, but he is not compelled to avail himself thereof. He can, by his own action or failure to act, waive any or all of them except only such as relate to the jurisdiction of the court — to its power to act at all — and he can waive even jurisdiction where the legal provision is for his protection; i. e., jurisdiction of the person. Every litigant can protect himself or employ such counsel, learned in the law, as he may choose to do so for him. But the opposing party has, also, his or its rights and the public, which is vitally interested in the speedy administration of justice and the ending of litigation, and which furnishes and pays for the judicial machinery, has its rights. As said in Evans v. United States, 153 U. S. 584 at page 590, 14 S. Ct. 934, 937 (38 L. Ed. 830), in speaking of an indictment: “ * * * It should, after all, be borne in mind that the object of criminal proceedings is to convict the guilty, as well as to shield the innocent, and no impracticable standards of particularity should be set up. * * * ” Therefore a litigant cannot be permitted to waive his rights, and, after the time has gone by when they could be protected without delaying or undoing the retrial of his case, reverse his position, and insist upon them. He cannot insist upon an undeviating enforcement of such rules or a trial of such accurate perfection, unless he does so at the proper time and in the proper manner. Nor is it the purpose of appellate courts to secure such accurate .results. The function of such review is not to secure a trial wherein every applicable rule of procedure or practice was scrupulously observed, but it is to secure application of such rules only where the eomplainer has timely invoked their application and the trial court has refused to recognize his rights so brought to its attention. To enforce any other rule would make the duration of litigation dependent upon the ingenuity or, in some eases, the trickery of counsel; would enable criminals to indefinitely delay or to finally escape merited punishment; would be a rank imposition upon the other party, upon the trial court, upon litigants in other cases waiting to be tried, and upon the public generally. The trial of a lawsuit is not entirely a game or contest of wits. But, even if it were, the rules of the game should be observed, and one of the time honored- and observed rules is that, when a move has been made, it cannot, out of time, be recalled.
I find nothing in this record to justify a departure from this long-established practice, and I find every reason why the above exception should not here apply.
I think the judgment should be affirmed.

 14 S. Ct. 939, 38 L. Ed. 839.