Court Opinion

ID: 9850932
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:04:39.293622+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:45.883950
License: Public Domain

BUSSEY, Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent. The majority correctly recognizes that 10 O.S.Supp.1984, § 1147 has no application in criminal proceedings. Admission of A.C.’s videotaped statement at trial under this section was improper. Title 22 O.S.Supp.1986, § 752 could not have *379served as a basis to either admit or exclude the statement at trial, since it had not been enacted yet. Therefore, the questions before this Court are, first, could A.C.’s videotaped statement properly be admitted at trial, and second, if admission was improper, could it have resulted in unfair prejudice to appellant.
With regard to the first question, the record reflects that the trial court conducted a hearing outside the presence of the jury and found that the time, content, and circumstances of A.C.’s statement provided sufficient indicia of reliability. A.C.’s testimony was presented at trial. The foundational requirements of 12 O.S.Supp.1984, § 2803.1 were met, and admission of the statement was proper.
I cannot join in the majority’s position that § 2803.1 never covered videotaped statements. The majority asserts that the videotape was not admissible because it constituted hearsay. “ ‘Hearsay’ is a state-ment_” 12 O.S.1981, § 2801. (Emphasis added.) Section 2803.1 provides in part, “A statement ... is admissible_” (Emphasis added.) The majority’s opinion indicates that “statement” has one meaning for defining inadmissible hearsay, but an altogether different meaning for purposes of § 2803.1. My understanding is that “statement” has but one meaning, that being the definition provided by statute at 12 O.S.1981, § 2801. I can find no ambiguity in the use of the word “statement” in § 2803.1. “[W]here the language of a statute is clear and unmistakable, there is no room for construction, and no justification exists for interpretive devices to fabricate a different meaning.” Anschutz Corp. v. Sanders, 734 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Okla.1987). Nonetheless, the majority in this case has not only resorted to the tool of legislative intent to fabricate a different meaning for the word “statement”, but has fabricated inconsistent definitions within a single opinion. Such an arbitrary application of the law is unsupportable under any authority of which I am aware, and I will not join in creating that type of authority.
With regard to the second question, “[i]t is not error alone that requires reversal of judgments of conviction, but error plus injury, and the burden is upon the appellant to establish to the reviewing court the fact that he was prejudiced in his substantial rights by the commission of error.” Harrall v. State, 674 P.2d 581, 583 (Okl.Cr.1984). Even if admission of the videotape had been improper, the record shows that A.C.’s testimony was presented at trial. Adults to whom A.C. had made statements testified concerning those statements. The majority does not contest the propriety of admitting this evidence, nor could it. In this case, the videotape was merely cumulative evidence. In light of the great weight of evidence, admission of the videotape could not have amounted to more than harmless error. See, Byrd v. State, 657 P.2d 183 (Okl.Cr.1982).
Finally, as a practical matter, I would note that under 22 O.S.Supp.1987, § 752, a more specific statute dealing with videotaped statements, the State will be able to introduce the videotape on remand. All of the evidence presented in the first trial will be admissible. A new jury will decide the same issues on the basis of the same evidence. There can be no doubt that the evidence presented in the first trial was sufficient for a conviction. A retrial of this case amounts to nothing more than a waste of judicial resources.
For each of the foregoing reasons, I must respectfully dissent.