Court Opinion

ID: 9699629
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:42:28.981022+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:44:14.636380
License: Public Domain

DOYLE, President Judge
Dissenting.
I respectfully dissent because, after a careful review of the record and the parties’ briefs, I am absolutely convinced that Cooney’s appeal is utterly without merit.
The only issue before this Court on appeal from the Board involves the petition to set aside the final receipt that Cooney signed at the request of her previous employer, St. Joseph’s Center. Originally, this petition to set aside had been in the form of a claim petition, in which Coo-ney sought medical benefits and benefits for the specific loss, or loss of use, of a bodily part under Section 306(c) of the Act,1 77 P.S. § 513. Cooney never filed a claim for benefits for partial or total disability at any time. Moreover, she never pursued her claim for specific loss benefits. Therefore, the only claim which Cooney presented to the compensation authorities below was for medical benefits, and the Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) and the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board) both found in Cooney’s favor in that regard and awarded her medical benefits. Since Cooney is not aggrieved by the decisions of either the WCJ or the Board with regard to the only relief she sought, why this appeal?
Despite the fact that both the WCJ and the Board awarded Cooney medical expenses, she nevertheless filed a petition for review with this Court. By her own admission, she is not appealing that portion of the Board’s order that upheld the payment of her medical bills;2 instead, she is ostensibly seeking reversal of the Board’s decision insofar as it deemed her petition to be untimely filed.
Cooney’s actions in bringing this appeal are, to say the least, most unusual because she has already prevailed on the underlying issue at the core of her case. As already stated, during the course of these proceedings Cooney sought payment of medical expenses, which she was awarded. Cooney never requested either partial or total disability benefits, and, while she did check the box for specific loss benefits on both of her claim petitions, she did not present a shred of medical testimony or other evidence that she has lost the use of her right hand, wrist, arm, or whatever. Therefore, any claim for partial, total or specific loss benefits that Cooney might have alleged and pursued in this matter has been waived, and, accordingly, the three-year statute of limitations contained in Section 434 of the Act, 77 P.S. § 1001, is a non-issue.
Cooney asks this Court to reverse the Board and to set aside the final receipt— but why? I suspect that the only reason the petition to set aside is in any way relevant is to secure either partial or total disability benefits sometime in the indefinite future.3 Assuming that Cooney is *1052now seeking future benefits, her claim filed in February of 1997 is time-barred, since the Department of Labor & Industry received the final receipt terminating Coo-ney’s partial disability benefits on November 5, 1993, well past the applicable three-year limitation period.4 In this regard, the Board’s decision was absolutely correct that Cooney’s petition was time-barred, for all benefits except medical expenses, under Section 434 of the Act.
Moreover, on the basis of the record in this case, I respectfully further dissent from the Majority’s holding that the State Workmen’s Insurance Fund (SWIF) committed fraud when it obtained the final receipt, which fraud would toll the relevant limitations period.
First, the Majority acknowledges that the WCJ did not expressly state that SWIF acted fraudulently in obtaining Coo-ney’s signature on the final receipt. In fact, the WCJ found that, in obtaining the final receipt, Mary Kay Curtis, the SWIF adjuster, had a medical release indicating that Cooney could return to work with no restrictions, but that Curtis did not have the medical note indicating that Cooney had reduced strength.5 Although the WCJ concluded that Cooney was not fully recovered when she signed the final receipt, he apparently reached this determination to buttress his decision to set the final receipt aside, not to support a finding of fraud.
The Majority states:
Where an insurance company prepares a final receipt knowing that the claimant has recovered from his or her injuries to regain full earning power but still suffers residual disability and the claimant signs without knowing the significance of the final receipt, the insurance company’s actions constitute fraudulent conduct warranting setting the final receipt aside. Crawford [v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Peugot Contracting), 134 Pa.Cmwlth. 89, 577 A.2d 966 (1990) ].
Cooney v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (St. Joseph’s Center), 776 A.2d 1050 (Pa.Cmwlth.2001). (Emphasis added.) Despite this statement of the law, the WCJ made no finding here that SWIF knew that Cooney suffered a residual disability at the time she signed the final receipt, whereas, in Crawford, the referee6 specifically concluded that the final receipt had been fraudulently prepared and obtained. Moreover, in Auerbach v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Auerbach), 80 Pa.Cmwlth.301, 471 A.2d 596 (1984), cited in Crawford, this Court declined to hold that the referee’s findings that the claimant did not know the signifi-*1053canee of the final receipt and did not actually know what he was signing, in and of themselves, supported a determination that the claimant signed the document by way of deception. Simply stated, there is no legitimate basis to hold that, due to fraud or deception, the final receipt signed by Cooney should be set aside.
For all of the reasons set forth above, I respectfully dissent and would affirm the judgment of the Board.7

.Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. §§ 1 — 1041.4; 2501-2626.

. See Cooney’s petition for review, page 1, n. 1.

. This conclusion is supported by the statement of Cooney's attorney, Thomas Lucas, to the WCJ that, "As of right now, it is a medical only petition for a claim, but she has been *1052scheduled to have surgery on her hand, at which time she will indeed miss some time from work due to the surgery and the recovery period from that.” (Notes of Testimony, June 20, 1997, p. 4.) Attorney Lucas also indicated that it was unclear as to when Coo-ney would undergo the surgery, since it had been scheduled twice and cancelled both times. Id.

.As the Majority has explained, the term "compensation” in Section 434 does not include medical expenses, citing Fuhrman v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Clemens Supermarket), 100 Pa.Cmwlth.577, 515 A.2d 331 (1986), appeal dismissed, 518 Pa. 59, 540 A.2d 267 (1988).

. Admittedly, this note was seemingly written before Cooney signed the final receipt, although the record is not definitive as to when the receipt was signed.

. Prior to the 1993 amendments to the Act, WCJs were known as referees.

. Although my dissent is certainly not based on this procedural defect, I note that the Majority’s order wholly reverses the Board’s decision and reinstates the WCJ's opinion, even though the Board’s order vacated the WCJ's order only insofar as the WCJ granted Cooney's petition to set aside the final receipt, and the Board affirmed the WCJ’s order in all other respects.