Court Opinion

ID: 9836897
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 03:15:27.557921+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:19.217962
License: Public Domain

CRAWFORD, Judge
(dissenting):
I dissent, based on the affirmative waiver by defense counsel, RCM 920(f), Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (1995 ed.), and alternatively on the basis that any error in this case was harmless. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999)(Court applied harmless error analysis for failure to instruct on a central element of charged offense.).
FACTS
On the evening of December 3, 1994, appellant drove over to the off-base apartment of his estranged wife in Jacksonville, Florida. He had moved out of the apartment about a week earlier. Shortly after he arrived at the apartment, his wife drove up with Marsa Powell, the eventual murder victim. Seeing appellant and not wanting a confrontation, she drove past him, but at Marsa’s urging, she returned. Appellant and his wife got into a verbal altercation, primarily about her being with another man. His wife stated that she had brought Marsa over to the apartment to visit with her sister. However, the sister came downstairs and said she was going to work.
Appellant’s wife stated she was going to take Marsa home and locked the door of her apartment as she was preparing to leave. Appellant grabbed her car keys from her hands and ran to his car. Marsa chased appellant to the car and tried to retrieve the keys. Noticing that Marsa was carrying a pistol, appellant rolled up the windows to the car and sped away. As the car drove away, Marsa took his pistol out and fired a shot into the air.
After leaving his wife’s apartment complex, appellant returned to his apartment. That drive took approximately 10 to 15 minutes. At his apartment appellant called a friend, Petty Officer [PR3] Anthony Perry, United States Navy. After about 5 minutes, PR3 Perry returned appellant’s call.
Appellant told PR3 Perry that he had gotten into “something” at his wife’s apartment and that someone had shot at him. Appellant wanted PR3 Perry to drive him back to the apartment. PR3 Perry’s assumption was that they were going back over to “beat the dude up or something.”
Since appellant did not know where PR3 Perry was located, they met at a local convenience store. Ten minutes after the first phone call, and about 15 minutes after appellant arrived at his apartment to retrieve his gun, appellant reached the store and again “beeped” PR3 Perry. A few minutes later, PR3 Perry arrived. From the convenience store, the two drove separately to the apartment complex of one of PR3 Perry’s friends, where appellant left his car. As PR3 Perry was speaking with his friend on a telephone, appellant put a clip into his gun and got into PR3 Perry’s car. The two then drove to appellant’s wife’s apartment with Perry behind the wheel. En route, PR3 Perry told appellant his gun has been confiscated. Appellant asked if the police still had his gun, and Perry replied “yes.” Appellant retorted he still had his.
When they pulled into the apartment complex, Marsa was still in the parking lot and on PR3 Perry’s side of the car. Perry did not know who Marsa was. When appellant spotted Marsa, he told PR3 Perry, “That’s the dude who shot at me.” At that point, appellant’s gun was still under his seat.
They drove through the parking lot and turned around. While they were turning around, Marsa was walking in their general direction. Appellant shouted to Marsa to get his attention.
After they turned the car around, Marsa was on appellant’s side of the car. Both appellant and Marsa began to exchange *133words. No mention was made of the keys, but a heated argument started. While arguing, appellant had the gun in his right hand just under the window ledge out of Marsa’s view. During the conversation, Marsa backed away and appellant got out of the car and shot Marsa.
Appellant started running as he fired three shots at Marsa. Marsa was hit three times. One of the shots pierced his heart, and he died at the scene within 2 minutes. A .45 caliber semi-automatic pistol was found lying beside Marsa’s body. Appellant fled the scene but turned himself in to the police a few hours later.
Appellant testified that he shot Marsa because he saw him reach for his gun. Petty Officer Hunt testified that he did not see a gun in Marsa’s hand. A witness on a balcony approximately 100 feet away observed the shooting. Likewise, he did not see a gun in Marsa’s hand. According to the witness’s testimony, Marsa was making hand motions, at about the chest and shoulder level, to help make his point as he backed away. Throughout his court-martial, appellant contended he had been justified in shooting Marsa because he was merely acting in self-defense.
DISCUSSION
ROM 920(e) provides:
Required instructions. Instructions on findings shall include:
# # i’fi
(2) A description of the elements of each lesser included offense in issue, unless trial of a lesser included offense is barred by the statute of limitations (Article 43) and the accused refuses to waive the bar;
(3) A description of any special defense under R.C.M. 916 in issue;
(4) A direction that only matters properly before the court-martial may be considered;
* * *
(6) Directions on the procedures under R.C.M. 921 for deliberations and voting; and
(7) Such other explanations, descriptions, or directions as may be necessary and which are properly requested by a party or which the military judge determines, sua sponte, should be given.
RCM 920(f) provides:
Waiver. Failure to object to an instruction or to omission of an instruction before the members close to deliberate constitutes waiver of the objection in the absence of plain error. The military judge may require the party objecting to specify of what respect the instructions given were improper. The parties shall be given the opportunity to be heard on any objection outside the presence of the members.
Both sides were able to review a copy of the proposed written instructions. There was a lengthy discussion concerning these instructions, as well as comments back and forth between the judge and trial counsel. After trial counsel indicated that he had nothing else to add, the judge questioned defense counsel. Defense counsel responded, “Sir, just to expand on the 802 [conference], the limited purpose testimony. We decided that would not be an instruction that we would desire.” An exchange followed in which the judge was amenable to taking suggestions from either side. When asked if there were any other issues which needed to be raised, both counsel replied in the negative.
Both sides were given the instructions to review overnight. The next morning, defense counsel noted typographical errors. The judge agreed over the prosecution’s objection to give a self-defense instruction, including a statement that returning to the apartment to seek a peaceful interview was not provocation by appellant.
The defense had the opportunity to review the instructions, offered numerous suggestions, and failed to raise any issue regarding a heat of passion instruction. The fact that the defense engaged in the discussions and review of the instructions, which took place during a 2-day time period, and did not request a heat of passion instruction constitutes a waiver of any instruction as to a *134lesser-included offense. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993); cf. United States v. Smith, 50 MJ 451, 457 (1999)(Effron, J., concurring in part and in the result). Furthermore, in the alternative, any error based on the instructions set forth below did not affect a substantial right of appellant. United States v. Powell, 49 MJ 460 (1998).
An unlawftd killing done with an intent to kill but in the heat of passion caused by adequate provocation constitutes voluntary manslaughter. Para. 44c(l)(a), Part IV, Manual, supra. However, the provocation must not be sought or induced by the accused.
Paragraph 44c(l)(b) provides:
The provocation must be adequate to excite uncontrollable passion in a reasonable person, and the act of killing must be committed under and because of the passion. However, the provocation must not be sought or induced as an excuse for killing or doing harm. If, judged by the standard of a reasonable person, sufficient cooling time elapses between the provocation and the killing, the offense is murder, even if the accused’s passion persists. Examples of acts which may, depending on the circumstances, constitute adequate provocation are the unlawful infliction of great bodily harm, unlawful imprisonment, and the sight by one spouse of an act of adultery committed by the other spouse. Insulting or abusive words or gestures, a slight blow with the hand or fist, and trespass or other injury to property are not, standing alone, adequate provocation.
Under the majority opinion, appellant was entitled to the following instruction:
(1) That Marsa C. Powell is dead;
(2) That his death resulted from the act of the accused in shooting him with a handgun on December 3, 1994, in Jacksonville, Florida;
(3) That the killing of Marsa C. Powell by the accused was unlawful; and
(4) That, at the time of the killing, the accused had an intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm upon Marsa C. Powell.
The killing of a human being is unlawful when done without legal justification or excuse.
The offense of voluntary manslaughter is committed when a person, with intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm, unlawfully kills a human being in the heat of sudden passion caused by adequate provocation. “Passion” means anger, rage, pain, [or] fear. Proof that the accused was acting in the heat of passion caused by adequate provocation is not required. It is essential, however, that the four elements I have listed for you to be proved beyond reasonable doubt before the accused can be convicted of voluntary manslaughter.
Para. 3-87b, Notes 1 and 2, Military Judges’ Benchbook at 3-175 (Dept, of the Army Pamphlet 27-9 (Change 2, Oct. 1986))(emphasis added).
The judge did give a self-defense instruction, including the following:
A person is not entitled to self-defense if he intentionally provoked the attack upon him or voluntarily engaged in mutual fighting unless he has previously withdrawn in good faith. A person has provoked an attack and thereby or therefore given up the right to self-defense if he willingly and knowingly does some act toward the other person reasonably calculated and intending to lead to a fight or deadly conflict. Unless such act is clearly calculated and intended by the accused to lead to a fight or a deadly conflict the right of self-defense is not lost.
A person may seek an interview with another in a non-violent way for the way [sic] of demanding an explanation of offensive words or conduct or demanding redress of a grievance without giving up the right to self-defense. He may not seek an interview — I am sorry. That’s wrong too. He need not seek the interview in a friendly mood. The right to self-defense is not lost merely because a person arms himself before seeking the interview. The burden of proof on this issue is upon the prosecution. If you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused intentionally provoked attack upon himself so that he could respond by injuring or killing, then you *135have found that the accused gave up the right to self-defense.
(Emphasis added.)
It was on the basis of these two instructions that the court below correctly found that any error was harmless, because the “self-defense was more favorable to the appellant than would have been an instruction on the lessor-included offense of voluntary manslaughter.” Unpub. op. at 10. The court continued, as shown in the instructions above, that the “Government must prove the absence of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. The same would not be true under the involuntary manslaughter instruction.
Under these circumstances, any error was harmless. Neder v. United States, supra. For these reasons, I dissent.