Court Opinion

ID: 9402598
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-16 07:25:13.542823+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:01.200356
License: Public Domain

In The

                                Court of Appeals

                    Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

                              ________________

                               NO. 09-23-00002-CV
                              ________________

                          IN THE INTEREST OF H.S.
________________________________________________________________________

                On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 3
                       Montgomery County, Texas
                     Trial Cause No. 21-10-13796-CV
________________________________________________________________________

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Following a bench trial, K.M. (“Mother”) and E.S. (“Father”) appeal the trial

court’s order terminating their parental rights to their minor child, “Henry,” based

on Texas Family Code subsections 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N), (O) and a finding that

termination was in Henry’s best interest. 1 See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §

161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N), (O), (2). In separate briefs, Mother and Father challenge

the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the termination grounds

      1In parental rights termination cases, to protect the identity of the minors, we
refer to the children by a pseudonym or initials and family members by their
relationships to the children. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 109.002(d); Tex. R. App.
P. 9.8(b)(2).
                                          1
specified in sections 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N), and (O) and that termination was in

Henry’s best interest. See id. Mother and Father also challenge the trial court’s

appointment of the Department of Family and Protective Services (“the

Department”) as permanent managing conservator. Father further argues he received

ineffective assistance of counsel. As discussed below, we affirm the trial court’s

termination order.

           BACKGROUND AND FACTS LEADING TO REMOVAL

      In October 2021, the Department filed its Original Petition for Protection of a

Child, for Conservatorship, and for Termination in Suit Affecting the Parent-Child

Relationship naming Henry as the subject of the suit and seeking to terminate

Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. The Department included Investigator James

Dorchak’s Affidavit in Support of Removal with the Petition. Dorchak outlined a

report they received in April 2021 regarding Mother’s neglectful supervision of

Henry, alleging that Mother was using “pills, cocaine, or methamphetamine[,]” and

that Mother had been in jail for assault. The Department also outlined reports it

received in May 2021 and September 2021 regarding Father’s neglectful supervision

of Henry, including mental health issues, a suicide threat, and intoxication. The

September 2021 report alleged Father was suicidal and had threatened to kill himself

and Henry, which led to him being taken to the hospital. Mother reportedly picked

Father up from the hospital, and they were “allegedly using drugs” with Mother

                                         2
stating that Father “shot up heroin” and had “bars.” Father “was trying to harm

himself and refused medical care.”

       The Affidavit described the Department’s investigation and difficulties

locating Mother and Henry during the investigation, which led to Henry being placed

on the Child Safety Check Alert List. Dorchak averred that after setting up a safety

plan with Mother in September 2021, the next day, he was notified that Mother left

in the middle of the night. Dorchak further averred that he was informed by a Harris

County Deputy that they discovered Mother to be incapacitated in the backseat of

her car, and Henry was with her. Mother was taken to the hospital, and Henry was

taken to the Conroe Child Protective Services’ (CPS) office where the Department

took emergency custody.

       The Affidavit also described Mother’s history with the Department beginning

in 2008 and involving her other children. Dorchak outlined the parents’ criminal

histories, which included substance abuse arrests, assault arrests, and domestic

violence arrests, among others.

                               TRIAL EVIDENCE

       The record showed that Mother and Father appeared through counsel, but

Father did not personally appear for trial, and Mother personally appeared only on

the first day.

                                         3
Testimony of James Dorchak

      CPS Investigator Dorchak testified that he was assigned the case in April

2021, when the investigation began. Dorchak explained that initially, it was hard to

locate Mother, but he met Father, who was caring for Henry at his home. Dorchak

testified that during this first interaction, Father took care of Henry, had a clean

home, and had toys for Henry. At that time, there were no immediate concerns for

Henry’s safety, but the investigation was ongoing.

      In June 2021, Dorchak met Mother for the first time at a gas station, after an

incident where Father yelled profanities and screamed at law enforcement. Police

arrested Father at the gas station, and Henry was in the backseat of Father’s vehicle.

Dorchak testified the day of that incident, Father yelled all sorts of profanity at him

over the phone, law enforcement was “mainly intervening[,]” and he “couldn’t even

have a clear conversation with the father.” Besides the shouting, yelling, and cursing,

Father’s slurred speech made Dorchak believe he was impaired.

      At that time, Dorchak was not in charge of finding a placement for Henry, so

Mother took Henry from the gas station. Mother told Dorchak that she lived with

her sister in Liberty County, and Dorchak was instructed to follow Mother to her

residence, where he viewed the home and observed nothing concerning at that time.

Dorchak next contacted Mother in August 2021, and he implemented a safety plan

                                          4
in September 2021 with Mother and her roommate, but they did not follow it, and

there was a period when they could not locate Henry or Mother.

      Dorchak testified that in October 2021, a Harris County Sheriff’s Deputy

informed him that Henry needed care. Dorchak explained that he could not find

family placement for Henry, so he put Henry in foster placement. Dorchak testified

that based on the available information, he could not place Henry with Mother or

Father. Dorchak had concerns about Father not being protective and about his mental

state. Dorchak testified that Father could not articulate thoughts about the CPS case

and “didn’t understand what was going on.” Father offered placement options, but

when the Department checked them out, they were inappropriate. Dorchak explained

that the paternal grandmother was not an appropriate placement, because Father and

his brother had criminal histories and lived with her.

      In October 2021, when Dorchak located Henry, Father described Mother’s

condition as “messed up” and that she did not know where she was. Dorchak

characterized the parents’ relationship during the investigation as “off and on.”

Dorchak also confirmed that during the entire investigation, between April and

October 2021, Henry was in the care of one or both parents.

      Dorchak testified that both parents had a criminal history. Dorchak testified

that documents admitted into evidence showed in February 2019, Mother was

convicted of a second driving while intoxicated offense. Additionally, the

                                          5
documentary evidence included information on an aggravated assault charge against

Mother that occurred in April 2021 and a conviction for possession of a controlled

substance in November 2021. In May 2022, a criminal complaint was filed against

Mother for family violence. Dorchak testified that Mother’s criminal history

concerned him, as the ongoing substance charges and domestic violence charges had

not made for a safe environment for a child. Dorchak explained that the charges he

discussed all occurred in the last few years.

      Dorchak also testified that Father was convicted of possession of a controlled

substance in 2016 and had deferred adjudication for a terroristic threat against a

public servant in 2019. Father’s behavior likewise concerned him. Dorchak testified

there were allegations of domestic violence between Mother and Father, and Mother

talked to him about the allegations. Dorchak explained that he was concerned about

leaving Henry with Mother or Father, given the ongoing issues with substance abuse

and domestic violence.

      Dorchak testified that during the investigation, given his concerns about both

parents using drugs, he asked them to drug test, but they never did. When Dorchak

asked them to drug test, Mother told him to get her drug tests through the probation

department, which he eventually did “with some difficulty.” Dorchak said Father

“just refused to go.”

                                          6
Mother’s Testimony

      During the first day of trial, Mother testified that she did not recall when

Henry was removed from her care, because she was unconscious “due to health

reasons” inside of a Walgreens. Mother testified she now knows that she was

unconscious due to a thyroid problem and was prescribed the wrong medication.

Mother testified that Henry went to Walgreens with her but stayed in the vehicle

with her friend, and she denied she neglected him. Mother testified the next thing

she recalled was waking up and leaving the hospital to find Henry. Mother said she

was in the hospital for a couple of hours.

      Mother denied that she was ever asked to drug test, that she was on probation,

and that she was taking drug tests for probation. Mother testified that she recalled

meeting with another caseworker, Serenity Hubert, who discussed services with her.

Mother remembered being asked to complete services, including a parenting class,

but she testified that nobody would answer her calls when she tried to arrange them.

Mother said a new caseworker asked her to undergo a psychiatric evaluation; she

testified she did but did not receive a report or recommendations from the evaluation.

Mother explained that she was asked to complete a drug and alcohol assessment but

did not, because she missed two appointments, so they refused to work with her

anymore, and she did not recall being sent to another place. Mother testified that she

                                          7
has insomnia, PTSD, is bipolar, and takes multiple medications for these conditions.

Mother did not return the second day of trial to complete her testimony.

Testimony of Teresa Horton

      Teresa Horton testified that she has been the assigned caseworker since

January 2022. 2 Horton explained there was a service plan created for Mother at the

beginning of the case, but she created a second one for Mother when she was

assigned to the case. Horton testified that she reviewed the plan with Mother, which

Mother signed. Horton testified that she asked Mother to undergo a drug and alcohol

assessment with drug screening, domestic violence with possible battering

intervention and prevention program, counseling services, a psychological and a

psychiatric evaluation, visitation, and anger management. Horton also asked Mother

to continue drug testing. Horton testified that Mother did not complete any services.

Horton testified that Mother “never followed through. I could not get her to give me

a straight answer half the time.”

      Horton explained that they arranged weekly visitation for Mother with Henry

at the Conroe CPS office, but Mother did not attend all the visits. Horton said they

changed the visitations in March, because during a visit they observed Mother

“sliding down to the floor. She was swaying back and forth when she was standing

      2For the purpose of disclosing potential conflicts, we note that Justice
Horton is not related to Teresa Horton.
                                          8
up. She was slurring her words. At one point she dropped her phone [be]cause she

fell asleep.” Horton testified that she did not think this was safe or appropriate, so

they stopped the visit and asked both parents to go drug test, but they did not. Father

was there during this visit, and “he wasn’t under the influence as much as she was,

but he was slow, I guess. He was reacting slow.” Horton testified that following this

incident, because of the parents’ lack of progress and not staying in touch, they

moved the visits to one hour per month, and the parents only came to two of those

monthly visits. Horton explained that the parents failed to show for more than half

the visits after confirming, so Henry had to return home without seeing them.

      Horton testified that the parents failed to alleviate the safety concerns during

the case. Horton explained that the concerns included Mother’s drug use and not

being safe around Henry, and Mother completed no services designed to prove that

she was no longer doing those things. Horton did not see any action from Mother to

show that she was not using substances; Horton asked Mother to drug test every time

she saw her, but Mother did not take a single drug test. Horton also asked Father to

drug test. Horton expressed concerns about Father’s drug use and not being safe

around Henry. Horton tried repeatedly to visit the parents’ homes but could not get

a response. Horton explained that she has never seen the home of either parent, and

she has been unable to ensure their homes were safe and appropriate. Horton was

also concerned about domestic violence, which the parents failed to alleviate. Horton

                                          9
testified that her concerns for returning Henry to Mother included Mother’s failure

to get help for substance abuse and domestic violence, and Horton did not believe

Mother would be safe for Henry. With respect to returning Henry to Father, Horton

was also concerned about substance abuse and domestic violence and did not think

it would be safe for Henry.

      Horton testified that Father reported he was working but could not provide the

employer’s name, and neither parent provided employment verification. Horton

testified Father and Mother “got back together” in January or February and were

living together. Father did not do his parenting classes. Horton explained that Father

wanted Henry placed with his mother, but she did not pass the home study. Father

went to Tri-County for mental health services and obtained medication, but Horton

did not know if he continued to follow through. Horton was not concerned about

Father being under the influence the last time she saw him, because he was released

from jail that morning.

      Horton said the Department’s goal is termination of the parents’ rights and

unrelated adoption. She testified that Henry is two and currently in a “foster only”

placement. Horton testified it was in Henry’s best interest that the parents’ rights be

terminated and that he remain in the permanent managing conservatorship of the

Department until they identified a home. Horton explained that they were moving

Henry to a foster-to-adopt placement, and he began visits with that family. Horton

                                          10
testified that Henry would remain in a foster home if not adopted, but the family they

are looking into wants to adopt. Horton described the visitation process for Henry

with the potential adoptive family and testified their first visit with him “went really

well.” Horton testified that the Department is asking for termination of both parents’

rights, and she believed termination was in Henry’s best interest.

Testimony of Randolph Hansen

      Randolph Hansen testified that he is the CASA advocate and has been since

October 2021. Hansen said he visits Henry at least once a month, and Henry does

not have any observable special needs at this time. Although Hansen testified he was

not concerned with the parents’ supervised visits with Henry, he would be concerned

if either parent visited the child unsupervised. Hansen testified that the first visit

between Henry and the potential adoptive family went well. He recommended the

transition to the adoptive family continue, but he was not concerned about Henry’s

current placement. Hansen testified he also recommended termination of both

parents’ parental rights and agreed with the Department’s goal for Henry. Hansen

explained that he based this on the fact that the parents are “not good parents” and

are “very erratic[;]” they have no financial stability and have an unwillingness or

inability to complete their services, and they have shown a lack of effort to visit

Henry and attend court proceedings. Hansen agreed with the Department having

                                          11
permanent managing conservatorship of Henry for the purposes of adoption and

believed it was in Henry’s best interest.

Other Evidence

      Documentary evidence admitted at trial included, among other things, the

court’s orders incorporating the service plans, the service plans for both parents,

Mother’s criminal history, and Father’s criminal history. For Mother, the criminal

history evidence included a recent judgment for family violence assault causing

bodily injury, driving while intoxicated, and possession of a controlled substance.

The criminal history evidence for Father included a recent judgment for evading

arrest, assault on a public servant, making a terroristic threat against a public servant,

and possession of a controlled substance.

                             STANDARD OF REVIEW

      The standard of proof required in cases involving termination of parental

rights is clear and convincing evidence, which is “the measure or degree of proof

that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the

truth of the allegations sought to be established.” Id. §§ 101.007, 161.001(b); In re

E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 802 (Tex. 2012) (citing In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 263

(Tex. 2002)) (other citations omitted). Only one predicate finding under section

161.001(b)(1) is necessary to support a judgment of termination when there is also

a finding that termination is in the child’s best interests. See In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d

                                            12
355, 362 (Tex. 2003) (applying previous version of the statute). Yet when, as here,

a parent challenges the endangerment findings under section 161.001(b)(1)(D) or

(E), due process concerns and the requirement for a meaningful appeal dictate that

we review these grounds. See In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 236–37 (Tex. 2019) (per

curiam); In re C.M.C., 554 S.W.3d 164, 171 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2018, no pet.).

      When conducting a legal sufficiency review of the termination of parental

rights, we examine all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding to

determine whether “a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or

conviction that its finding was true.” In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266; see also In re

J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 344–45 (Tex. 2009). We assume the factfinder resolved

disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could, and we

disregard all evidence a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found

incredible. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 344–45; In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266; see

also In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 802. The evidence is legally insufficient if no

reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction that the matter that must

be proven is true. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266.

      In a factual sufficiency review, we “give due consideration to evidence that

the factfinder could reasonably have found to be clear and convincing” and must

determine “‘whether the evidence is such that a factfinder could reasonably form a

firm belief or conviction about the truth of the State’s allegations.’” Id. (quoting In

                                          13
re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002)). Considering the entire record, if the disputed

evidence a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so

significant that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or

conviction, then the evidence is factually insufficient. Id. We defer to the factfinder

and do not substitute our judgment for the factfinder’s. See In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d

105, 108 (Tex. 2006). The factfinder is the sole arbiter of the witnesses’ credibility

and demeanor. See id. at 109 (quoting In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d 79, 86–87 (Tex.

2005)).

                                    ANALYSIS

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

      In his first issue, Father complains that he was deprived of the ability to

participate in the final trial. Father asserts that counsel announced to the court on

both days of trial that Father could not be there due to transportation issues, yet

counsel failed to file a written motion for continuance both times.

      Claims that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in cases involving

termination of parental rights are governed by the two-prong test stated in Strickland

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). In re D.T., 625 S.W.3d 62, 73 (Tex. 2021);

In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d 534, 544–45 (Tex. 2003). Under the Strickland test, the

complaining party must show: (1) counsel’s performance was deficient, which

means counsel made errors so egregious that they were not functioning as

                                          14
“‘counsel’” guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment; and (2) counsel’s deficient

performance prejudiced the complaining party such that there is a reasonable

probability that but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings

would have been different. In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d at 545 (quoting Strickland, 466

U.S. at 687); see also In re D.T., 625 S.W.3d at 73.

      When evaluating trial counsel’s performance, we indulge a strong

presumption that counsel’s conduct is within the wide range of reasonable,

professional assistance, which includes trial strategy. See In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d at

545 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689) (other citations omitted). An appellant has

the burden to overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the

challenged conduct might be considered sound trial strategy. Strickland, 466 U.S. at

689. If the record is silent about the reasons for counsel’s actions, we do not

speculate to find ineffective assistance of counsel. In re A.S., No. 09-21-00142-CV,

2021 WL 5113817, at *11 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Nov. 4, 2021, pet. denied) (mem.

op.); see also Walker v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 312 S.W.3d 608,

623 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (citation omitted). “Any

claim of ineffective assistance must be firmly founded in the record and the record

must affirmatively demonstrate the ineffectiveness.” In re S.M.T., 241 S.W.3d 650,

653 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2007, no pet.) (citation omitted).

                                          15
      In this case, Father has not met either prong of the Strickland test. See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; In re D.T., 625 S.W.3d at 73; In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d at

545. The record reveals that on the first day of trial counsel told the trial court Father

could not attend because he was at work. Counsel announced not ready and orally

moved for a continuance; the trial court asked if counsel filed a motion, to which

counsel responded she had not and had only learned the information ten minutes

earlier. The record also shows that the trial court did not deny the motion for

continuance because it was not in writing. Rather, the trial court explained that the

case was continued from the first trial setting, “and we have a quickly approaching

dismissal deadline and not a lot of time between now and that dismissal deadline.”

On the second day of trial, Father’s counsel also requested a continuance and

revealed the parents were together but having transportation issues. The trial court

denied the requested continuance and again noted the dismissal deadline, “So based

on the timeline and the dismissal deadline in this case, I’m going to deny the request

to recess again; and we are going forward today.”

      The record establishes that counsel only learned of Father’s unavailability the

first day of trial minutes before, and the second day Father could not appear due to

transportation issues. Given such circumstances, we cannot say that counsel’s failure

to file a written motion for continuance constituted deficient performance under the

first prong of Strickland. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; In re D.T., 625 S.W.3d at

                                           16
73; In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d at 544. The trial court did not deny the continuances

because they were not in writing. Instead, the trial court denied the continuances

based on the dismissal date. See In re R.A.D.G., No. 10-14-00085-CV, 2014 WL

4960792, at *2 (Tex. App.—Waco Oct. 2, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (explaining that

father failed to meet his burden of establishing his trial counsel’s failure to file a

written, verified motion for continuance constituted defective performance where

the trial court did not deny the motion because it was not written). Father cannot

show that but for counsel’s failure to file written motions for continuance, the result

of the proceedings would have been different and therefore, failed also to satisfy the

second prong of Strickland. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; In re D.T., 625 S.W.3d

at 73; In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d at 544; see also In re R.A.D.G., 2014 WL 4960792, at

*2. We overrule Father’s first issue.

Predicate Grounds

      Mother and Father challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the

trial court’s endangerment findings, so we first consider whether the evidence is

sufficient to support the findings terminating Mother’s and Father’s rights under

subsections 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). See In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d at 235–36. If the

evidence is sufficient as to one of these grounds plus sufficient evidence exists to

support the best interest finding, we will affirm the termination order. See id. at 232–

33. Since evidence of grounds D and E is often interrelated, we consolidate our

                                          17
review of these grounds. See In re J.L.V., No. 09-19-00316-CV, 2020 WL 1161098,

at *10 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Mar. 11, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

       Subsection D allows for the termination of parental rights if clear and

convincing evidence supports that the parent “knowingly placed or knowingly

allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger the

physical or emotional well-being of the child[.]” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §

161.001(b)(1)(D). Under subsection E, parental rights may be terminated if clear and

convincing evidence establishes the parent “engaged in conduct or knowingly placed

the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or

emotional well-being of the child[.]” Id. § 161.001(b)(1)(E). The Texas Supreme

Court has explained that “‘endanger’ means to expose to loss or injury; to

jeopardize.” Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex.

1987) (citation omitted). To endanger a child, “it is not necessary that the conduct

be directed at the child or that the child actually suffers injury.” Id. (citation omitted).

       “Subsection D requires the endangerment to the child to be the direct result of

the child’s environment.” See Interest of J.H., No. 09-20-00056-CV, 2020 WL

4516860, at *10 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Aug. 6, 2020, no. pet.) (mem. op.) (citation

omitted). “Endangerment under subsection (D) arises from a child’s environment

and a parent’s disregard for the potential for danger created by the environment.” In

re I.V.H., No. 01-19-00281-CV, 2019 WL 4677363, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

                                            18
Dist.] Sept. 26, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citation omitted). We consider the

child’s environment before the Department obtained custody in our subsection D

endangerment analysis. See In re J.L.V., 2020 WL 1161098, at *10. Under

subsection D, termination may be based on a parent’s single act or omission. In re

A.B., 125 S.W.3d 769, 776 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, pet. denied). It is

unnecessary that a parent know with certainty the child is in an endangering

environment; instead, awareness of the potential for danger and disregarding the risk

is enough to show endangering conduct. See In re J.H., 2020 WL 4516860, at *10.

To terminate a parent’s rights under subsection E, the evidence must “show a

conscious course of conduct.” In re C.M.C., 554 S.W.3d at 172 (citing In re J.T.G.,

121 S.W.3d 117, 125 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.)). In our analysis of

subsection E, we may consider actions occurring before and after a child’s birth to

establish a “course of conduct.” See id. (citation omitted).

      Evidence of a parent’s drug use can establish that the child’s surroundings

endanger his physical or emotional well-being under subsection D and qualify as a

“voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct endangering the child’s

well-being under subsection (E).” In re C.V.L., 591 S.W.3d 734, 751 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2019, pet. denied) (citation omitted). A parent’s continued drug use after the

child’s removal is conduct that risks parental rights and may support an endangering

course of conduct under E. See Cervantes-Peterson v. Tex. Dep’t of Family &

                                         19
Protective Servs., 221 S.W.3d 244, 253 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no

pet.) (noting that mother’s continued narcotics use after child’s removal in the face

of drug testing, jeopardized her relationship with her child). The trial court may infer

from these refusals to drug test that the parents were using drugs. See In re M.S., No.

09-22-00313-CV, 2023 WL 1453166, at *6 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Feb. 2, 2023,

no pet.); In re K.C.B., 280 S.W.3d 888, 895 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2009, pet. denied)

(noting trial court may infer from parent’s refusal to submit to drug test that they are

using drugs).

      “‘Domestic violence and a propensity for violence may be considered

evidence of endangerment, even if the endangering acts did not occur in the child’s

presence, were not directed at the child, or did not cause actual injury to the child.’”

In re M.S., 2023 WL 1453166, at *6 (quoting In re K.A.R., No. 04–17–00723–CV,

2018 WL 1733147, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Apr. 11, 2018, pet. denied)

(mem. op.)); see also Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533. A parent’s abusive or violent conduct

or that of other residents of a child’s home can create an environment endangering

to the child’s physical or emotional well-being. In re M.S., 2023 WL 1453466, at

*6; In re K.A.S., 131 S.W.3d 215, 222 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied).

      As to Mother, the trial court heard testimony that she arrived impaired for a

visit with Henry, refused to submit to drug testing during the case’s pendency, and

failed to complete her services. See Cervantes-Peterson, 221 S.W.3d at 253.

                                          20
Testimony and documentary evidence admitted at trial also established that Mother

had two convictions for driving under the influence and another conviction for

possession of a controlled substance. Although Mother denied that she was asked to

undergo drug tests, the trial court was free to disbelieve this testimony and believe

the caseworkers’ testimony. In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at 109. Dorchak testified there

were concerns for domestic violence, and documentary evidence showed that

Mother was convicted of a family violence assault causing bodily injury to Father.

See In re M.S., 2023 WL 1453466, at *6; In re K.A.S., 131 S.W.3d at 222.

      Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s findings,

we conclude that the trial court could reasonably have formed a firm belief or

conviction that Mother knowingly placed or knowingly allowed Henry to remain in

conditions or surroundings which endangered his physical or emotional well-being

and engaged in conduct or knowingly placed Henry with persons who engaged in

conduct that endangered Henry’s physical or emotional well-being. See Tex. Fam.

Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E); In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345; In re J.F.C.,

96 S.W.3d at 266; Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533; In re M.S., 2023 WL 1453466, at *6–

7.

      Regarding Father, evidence established that despite the domestic violence

concerns between the parents, they were still together “off and on.” See In re M.S.,

2023 WL 1453466, at *6; In re K.A.S., 131 S.W.3d at 222. The trial court also heard

                                         21
testimony describing Father’s outburst in a gas station parking lot while Henry was

with him that ultimately led to Father’s arrest. The documentary evidence revealed

convictions for Father for assaulting a public servant and making a terroristic threat

against a public servant. The CPS investigator testified about Father’s refusal to

submit to drug testing while the case was pending. See In re M.S., 2023 WL

1453166, at *6; In re K.C.B., 280 S.W.3d at 895. Dorchak also expressed concern

about Father’s lack of protective abilities and his mental state.

      Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s findings,

we conclude that the trial court could reasonably have formed a firm belief or

conviction that Father knowingly placed or knowingly allowed Henry to remain in

conditions or surroundings which endangered his physical or emotional well-being

and engaged in conduct or knowingly placed Henry with persons who engaged in

conduct that endangered Henry’s physical or emotional well-being. See Tex. Fam.

Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E); In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345; In re J.F.C.,

96 S.W.3d at 266; Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533; In re M.S., 2023 WL 1453466, at *6–

7.

      We determine that the Department established, by clear and convincing

evidence, that Mother and Father committed the predicate acts enumerated in

subsections 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §

161.001(b)(1)(D), (E); In re M.S., 2023 WL 1453466, at *6–7. Having concluded

                                          22
the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s findings

on subsections 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), we need not address Mother’s and Father’s

challenges to the trial court’s findings under (N) and (O). See In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d

at 235, In re M.S., 2023 WL 1453466, at *7; see also Tex. R. App. P. 47.1. We

overrule Mother’s and Father’s issues challenging the legal and factual sufficiency

of the evidence supporting predicate acts under subsections (D) and (E).

Best Interest

      Both parents challenge the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence

supporting the trial court’s best interest finding. Trial courts have wide latitude in

determining the child’s best interest. See Gillespie v. Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d 449, 451

(Tex. 1982). There is a strong presumption the child’s best interest is served by

keeping him with his parent. See In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex.

2006) (citation omitted); In re D.R.A., 374 S.W.3d 528, 533 (Tex. App.—Houston

[14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.); see also Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.131(b). Prompt and

permanent placement of the child in a safe environment is also presumed to be in the

child’s best interest. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.307(a).

      The Family Code outlines factors in determining whether a parent is willing

and able to provide a safe environment for the child. See id. § 263.307(b). Several

other nonexclusive factors may be considered in a best interest analysis, including:

(1) the desires of the child; (2) the emotional and physical needs of the child now

                                          23
and in the future; (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the

future; (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody; (5) the programs

available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the child; (6) the

plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking custody; (7) the

stability of the home or proposed placement; (8) the parent’s acts or omissions that

may indicate that the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and (9)

any excuse for the parent’s acts or omissions. See Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367,

371–72 (Tex. 1976); see also In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018)

(characterizing the Holley factors as “non-exclusive”). No particular Holley factor is

controlling, and evidence of one factor may be enough to support a finding that

termination is in the child’s best interest. See M.C. v. Tex. Dep’t of Family &

Protective Servs., 300 S.W.3d 305, 311 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, pet.

denied) (“Undisputed evidence of just one factor may be sufficient to support a

finding that termination is in the best interest of a child.”) (citations omitted); see

also In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27.

      We may consider circumstantial evidence, subjective factors, and the totality

of the evidence in our best interest analysis. See In re N.R.T., 338 S.W.3d 667, 677

(Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.). A parent’s past conduct is relevant to

determining the parent’s present and future ability to care for a child. See In re C.H.,

                                          24
89 S.W.3d at 28. Evidence supporting the statutory grounds for termination may also

support a best interest finding. See id.

      We have explained the evidence shows Father’s history of drug use, outbursts

leading to arrest, and multiple criminal convictions. The trial evidence established

Father’s lack of protectiveness and continued relationship with Mother despite her

assault against him which led to a domestic violence conviction. The evidence

further showed that Father did not regularly visit Henry during the proceedings and

failed to complete services.

      Likewise, the evidence established Mother’s multiple criminal convictions,

drug use, and history of domestic violence against Father. The record established

that Mother refused to follow a safety plan the Department implemented, and the

Department could not locate Mother or Henry for a period despite the existence of a

safety plan. A caseworker also testified that Mother completed none of the services

to help deal with her substance abuse and other issues. Finally, a caseworker

established that Mother did not regularly visit Henry and even showed up to one visit

impaired, which led them to stop in-person visits.

      Although evidence of placement plans and adoption are relevant to best

interest, a lack of evidence about definitive plans for permanent placement and

adoption are not dispositive. See id. Rather, based on the entire record, we ask if a

factfinder could reasonably form a firm conviction or belief that termination of the

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parent’s rights is in the child’s best interest—even if the agency cannot precisely

identify the child’s future home environment. See id. Henry remained in foster care

at the time of trial, but evidence showed the Department recently located a potential

adoptive family, and the initial meetings between the family and Henry went well.

The caseworker and ad litem testified that it was in Henry’s best interest for both

parents’ rights to be terminated.

      Considering the evidence related to best interest, deferring to the trial court’s

determinations on witness credibility, the resolution of conflicts in the evidence, and

the weight given to the testimony, we conclude that the statutory and Holley factors

weigh in favor of the trial court’s finding that termination is in Henry’s best

interest. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 161.001(b)(2), 263.307(a), (b); Holley, 544

S.W.2d at 371–72. The trial court could have reasonably formed a firm belief or

conviction that termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights was in Henry’s

best interest. See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28. We overrule Mother’s and Father’s

issue challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the best interest finding.

Conservatorship

      Father and Mother also challenge the legal and factual sufficiency of the

evidence to support the Department’s appointment as managing conservator, and

Father cites Texas Family Code section 161.207. Both parents argue that the trial

                                          26
court appointed the Department as the managing conservator only as “a consequence

to the termination.”

      The trial court’s termination order notes that it appointed the Department as

permanent managing conservator and found “that the appointment of the

Respondents as permanent managing conservator of the child is not in the child’s

best interest because the appointment would significantly impair the child’s physical

health or emotional development.” These findings track those required by Family

Code section 153.131, which indicates the trial court appointed the Department as

the managing conservator under Chapter 153. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.131;

In re L.M., No. 09-22-00307-CV, 2023 WL 2418912, at *5 (Tex. App.—Beaumont

Mar. 9, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (determining same). When a trial court appoints

the Department as the child’s managing conservator based on its authority under

Chapter 153, the parent must challenge the trial court’s appointment of the

Department as the child’s managing conservator to preserve a challenge. See In re

J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d 611, 615–17 (Tex. 2007) (explaining that parent must raise an

issue on appeal challenging trial court’s appointment of the Department when the

findings show it was appointed under Family Code section 153.131 as a challenge

based on those findings is not subsumed by a parent’s claim that terminating the

parent-child relationship is not in the child’s best interest); In re L.M., 2023 WL

2418912, at *4 n.22. Mother and Father did not specifically challenge the

                                         27
conservatorship findings under 153.131, instead they seemingly challenged the

findings based on Family Code section 161.207. See In re L.M., 2023 WL 2418912,

at *5 (upholding Department’s appointment as conservator despite reversing

termination order where parents failed to challenge the conservatorship findings).

      Section 161.207 of the Texas Family Code provides that if the trial court

terminates the parent-child relationship with respect to both parents, the Court shall

appoint a suitable, competent adult, the Department, or a licensed child-placing

agency as managing conservator of the child. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.207(a).

Here, the trial court terminated the parental rights of both parents. Having affirmed

the trial court’s judgment terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights, their

challenge to the conservatorship appointment pursuant to 161.207 was subsumed in

the issues related to the termination of his parental rights. See In re D.N.C., 252

S.W.3d 317, 318–19 (Tex. 2008); In re T.J., No. 09-22-00224-CV, 2022 WL

17491817, at *5 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Dec. 8, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

Furthermore, to the extent they challenge the Department’s appointment as

conservator under Chapter 153, the evidence as outlined in our analysis of their other

issues supports the trial court’s finding that appointment of the parents as permanent

managing conservators “is not in the child’s best interest because the appointment

would significantly impair the child’s physical health or emotional development.”

See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.131(a). We overrule this issue.

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                               CONCLUSION

      Having overruled Mother’s and Father’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s

termination order.

      AFFIRMED.

                                           ________________________________
                                                 W. SCOTT GOLEMON
                                                      Chief Justice

Submitted on April 24, 2023
Opinion Delivered June 15, 2023

Before Golemon, C.J., Horton and Johnson, JJ.

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