Court Opinion

ID: 9564074
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:54:01.326441+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:13.338839
License: Public Domain

Carley, Judge,
dissenting.
I cannot agree that, for the reasons set forth in Division 3 of the majority opinion, appellant’s conviction of the crime of forgery in the first degree must be reversed. The majority finds that reversible error *746occurred when the trial court allowed testimony concerning the ethical standards of the State Bar of Georgia with regard to an attorney’s conduct related to handling of PIP claims. The rationale underlying the majority’s conclusion is that both binding Georgia authority and foreign cases emphasize that which may constitute unethical conduct for a lawyer does not automatically become criminal conduct. Without doubt, this view of the law is a correct one. However, in this case, the challenged evidence was not introduced for the purpose of showing that the conduct of the defendant was unethical and, therefore, criminal. In fact, in this case, the acts of the defendant constituting the essential elements of the crime — with the exception of intent — are admitted. The primary defense of the defendant was that he had a right to the money retained and even if he didn’t he thought he did and, therefore, “intent,” the sine qua non of the commission of a crime, was not present. Accordingly, the challenged evidence was clearly admissible to show that contrary to appellant’s contentions, he as a lawyer knew or should have known that he was not entitled to the funds and that, therefore, the requisite intent was present. The majority quotes, but then ignores, the very clear and unambiguous instructions of the trial court which informed the jury that the evidence was admitted “solely for the purpose of , . . showing, if it does show, and you are to be the judges of whether or not it does show, whether or not this may bear upon the requisite intent on the part of the defendant to commit the offense for which he is on trial, and for that purpose and that purpose alone. You will not take it for any other purpose.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Decided July 11, 1986.
Richard D. Phillips, for appellant.
H. Lamar Cole, District Attorney, for appellee.
Therefore, I believe that there is no reversible error in this case and that appellant’s conviction should be affirmed.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Banke and Judge Beasley join in this dissent.