Court Opinion

ID: 9760662
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:07:26.711997+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:15.516878
License: Public Domain

STORCKMAN, Judge
(dissenting).
It appears to me that the majority opinion circumscribes too stringently our appellate jurisdiction in cases involving “the construction” of constitutional provisions as expressed in art. V, § 3. In Dorrance v. Dorrance, 242 Mo. 625, 148 S.W. 94, 98, the key word “construction” was defined and discussed as follows: “Construction is a broad term and perhaps as instructive a definition as could be stated is quoted from Abbott in Webster’s International Dictionary as follows: ‘Strictly, the term [construction] signifies determining the mean*472ing and proper effect of language by a consideration of the subject-matter and attendant circumstances in connection with the words employed.’ In other words, it does not stop with interpretation, but applies the language as interpreted to both the subject-matter and the attendant circumstances. The ' constitutional provision does not, to give this court jurisdiction in this case, require findings that some constitutional provision has been violated or constitutional right denied, for that is the ultimate object for which the jurisdiction exists. It is only necessary that a constitutional question be presented to the court in the manner required by the rules governing its practice, and on its presentation the jurisdiction attaches to determine it.” (Italics ours.)
General acceptance of this view is indicated by the definition of construction stated in Baldwin’s Century Edition of Bou-vier’s Law Dictionary, which is: “Determining the meaning and application as to the case in question of the provisions of a constitution, statute, will, or other instrument, or of an oral agreement.”
If we limit “construction” to the interpretation of constitutional provisions, as the majority opinion seems to do, and abandon the application, then it would seem our appellate jurisdiction would not exist in cases where the meaning of the constitutional provision is clear and would cease to exist when ambiguous or doubtful provisions have been adjudicated. Such a view would confuse adjudication of constitutional questions with the establishment of standards for such determination. I do not believe this would be in accord with the intent of the jurisdictional grant in art. V, § 3.
In the case at bar the ultimate question to be determined is whether the seizure of the brown bag containing the lottery paraphernalia was violative of defendant’s constitutional rights in that it was unreasonable as that term is used in art. I, § 15. State v. Turner, 302 Mo. 660, 259 S.W. 427, 428 [3], Whether the defendant was lawfully arrested is an intermediate question which does not necessarily determine whether the seizure was reasonable.
The recognition of the legal principle that a search of the person may be made as an incident of a lawful arrest is but one of the standards implicit or expressed in the constitutional provision by which the reasonableness of a search and seizure is determined. One search and seizure case does not adjudicate another where the facts are different. I believe the ultimate question to be determined is controlling with respect to our jurisdiction and not the steps by which we reach our conclusion. Even where the arrest is lawful the right to take property from the person and premises of the prisoner is not unlimited but must conform to the standard of reasonableness. State v. Williams, Mo., 14 S.W.2d 434[ 1 ]; 4 Am.Jur. 47-49, Arrest §§ 68 and 69; 6 C.J.S. Arrest § 18, pp. 623-624; 79 C.J.S. Searches and Seizures, § 67, p. 840; 47 Am.Jur. 515, Searches and Seizures, § 19.
My views are more in accord with those expressed in State v. McBride, Mo.App., 32 S.W.2d 134, 136, which are: “The Supreme Court, by previous ruling in a similar case, could not put at rest the constitutional question of unreasonable search and seizure which, in the very nature of things, must depend upon a state of facts arising in a subsequent case. The Supreme Court now holds that, where it has once determined the constitutionality of a statute, the question may not subsequently be urged as jurisdictional. Dickey v. Holmes, 208 Mo. 664, 106 S.W. 511. No such rule can be applied to this case because the facts in cases are not static but change, and the determination of the question of when a search is unreasonable is a judicial function to be exercised in view of the facts in the particular case.”
I believe the view expressed in the McBride case not only is the correct one but should be preferred because it would tend to lessen jurisdictional uncertainties which are always troublesome and wasteful problems.
For these reasons I respectfully dissent.