Court Opinion

ID: 9514661
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:50:57.543294+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:19.763853
License: Public Domain

*366SABERS, Justice
(dissenting).
[¶ 27.] I dissent from Justice Gilbert-son’s writing. I submit the Constitution protects and guarantees life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. These rights and freedoms are not discarded because someone is voted in or out of the Hutterian colony.
[¶ 28.] The religious beliefs of the Colony members are also protected by the Constitution, but the actions of its members are only qualifiedly privileged.
[¶ 29.] Shunning is obviously protected. However, affirmative actions resulting in assaults and other torts under the laws of South Dakota are not protected. This is so even if accomplished under the guise of “religious beliefs.”
[¶ 30.] The Articles of Incorporation of the Colony, no matter how well intended, do not trump the Constitution of the State of South Dakota and the United States.
[¶ 31.] Additionally, Justice Gilbertson’s writing would put this court’s blessing on the totally improper procedural shortcuts 11 taken by the trial court in this case.
[¶ 32.] Even if the writing were correct in protecting the Colony and the Defendants in their official capacities from suit, it is wholly improper to extend that protection to the Defendants in their individual capacities. Such an opinion would be similar to sanctioning of the conduct occurring during the Crusades and the Inquisition, just because it purports to be done for religious beliefs.
FACTS
[¶ 33.] Plaintiffs sued Defendants, including Colony, for various torts. The trial court held a telephonic hearing and prematurely dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the basis that the matter was “a purely religious dispute.” We should reverse and remand.
[¶ 34.] Tschetter Hutterian Brethren, Inc. (Colony) is a nonprofit, religious corporation whose purpose is to “maintain living quarters and engage in a farming and agricultural operation” for the members of the Hutterian Church. The members live a communal life. The Board of Directors consists of three to seven members. Members are “[a]ll persons who reside upon the real property operated by [the] corporation and who are dependent upon the community fund and treasury for their support[.]” All married male members are voting members; all others are nonvoting members.
[¶ 35.] A conflict arose between members of the Colony following the removal in December 1992 of Jacob Kleinsasser as Senior Elder of the Hutterian Church. The Defendants accepted the new Senior Elder. The Plaintiffs rejected the new leadership and continued to follow Klein-sasser.
[¶ 36.] The conflict eventually resulted in the expulsion of the Plaintiffs from membership in the Colony in March 1995. Defendants claim that Plaintiffs stopped performing their jobs and “refused to follow the Hutterian Brethren Church or the rules and regulations of Tschetter Colony[.]” Plaintiffs were asked to either reconcile with the Colony or leave the premises. Plaintiffs continued to reside on the Colony. Plaintiffs were not allowed to eat in the communal dining hall and were not allowed to use the Colony’s vehicles. Plaintiffs purchased their own vehicle which they claim Defendants vandalized by breaking windows and slashing tires. Meters were placed on their homes in an attempt to make them pay for their own *367utilities. When they refused to pay for their electricity, Defendants threatened to disconnect their electricity, water, and sewer. At one point, the electricity was disconnected at two homes.12 Plaintiffs claim Defendants cut their clotheslines and broke windows on their homes. They also claim their children were mocked and ostracized by Defendants and their children.13
[¶ 87.] On April 17, 1998, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against the corporation and its directors, officers, and shareholders in their official capacities and as individuals. The complaint alleged: 1) tortious interference with a possessory interest and/or trespass to chattel; 2) trespass; 3) intentional infliction of emotional distress; 4) negligent infliction of emotional distress; 5) joint venture; 6) oppression of corporate minority members; 7) breach of fiduciary duty; 8) implied trust; and 9) unjust enrichment. In the complaint, Plaintiffs claim Defendants “maliciously damag[ed] Plaintiffs’ vehicles, personal property, and house.” They claim Defendants prevented them from performing their jobs and locked them out of the Colony kitchen, laundry facilities, and shops. They claim' Defendants “maliciously assault[ed] Plaintiffs by recklessly and intentionally driving vehicles at the Plaintiffs and by driving vehicles within dangerous proximity of the Plaintiffs while the Plaintiffs were walking, all of which placed them in fear of imminent bodily harm and caused them great emotional distress.”
[¶ 38.] Plaintiffs obtained an ex parte temporary restraining order on May 5, 1998. A hearing was scheduled for May 12. The attorney for Defendants contacted the trial judge and filed a motion to set aside the temporary restraining order. It did not include a written motion to dismiss. A telephonic hearing was held May 8. Plaintiffs claim they were not given notice regarding the nature of the hearing and were not given a real opportunity to respond.14
[¶ 39.] As indicated, at the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court dismissed the temporary restraining order and the complaint “with prejudice.” It concluded that the cause of action was “a purely religious dispute” and, therefore, it lacked jurisdiction.
[¶ 40.] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION.
[¶ 41.] The trial court found that Plaintiffs’ complaint involved a religious dispute and dismissed the complaint with prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. Plaintiffs claim that the case “involves matters separate and distinct from questions of religion.” They request “the opportunity that *368all other individuals injured within this jurisdiction [South Dakota] have, that being the right to access the courts to resolve civil claims.”
[¶ 42.] The California Court of Appeals in Snyder v. Evangelical Orthodox Church, 216 Cal.App.3d 297, 264 Cal.Rptr. 640, 644 (1989) addressed a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that the causes of action were religious in nature. It stated: “While the ‘free exercise clause’ protects religious beliefs absolutely, however, it protects religious actions only qualifiedly.” Id. (citing Sherbert v. Venter, 374 U.S. 398, 402-03, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 1793, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963); Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass’n, 46 Cal.3d 1092, 252 Cal.Rptr. 122, 762 P.2d 46 (1988)). In evaluating the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, that court assumed the allegation made in the complaint to be true, Snyder, 264 CaLRptr. at 645 (citations omitted), and stated: “[r]eligious disputes can take a number of forms, however, and do not always result in immunity from liability.” Id. at 644.
[¶ 43.] “[individuals have a qualified privilege to engage in conduct for religious purposes. Conduct does not qualify for immunity based upon the privilege if the conduct at issue is not religiously motivated.” Korean Presbyterian Church v. Lee, 75 Wash.App. 833, 880 P.2d 565, 568 (1994) (citations omitted). “Where a plaintiff can establish that the defendant acted with actual malice, such malice negates any claim that the action was undertaken for religious purposes.” Id. at 569. The Plaintiffs in this case make allegations of tortious conduct including damage to personal property and verbal and physical threats.15 The causes of action include intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. “These allegations ...— whatever the actual proof — describe secular conduct, the pretext of religious purpose notwithstanding, and hence state a cause of action outside the scope of the free exercise clause.” Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544, 564 (Mo.Ct.App.1987).
[¶ 44.] The Defendants cannot commit torts under the cloak of religion, thereby receiving immunity from liability, until it is clearly shown that determination of the claims would require impermissible entanglement with religion. See Snyder, 264 CaLRptr. at 648 (stating “[w]e therefore hold that on a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, it is insufficient for respondents to no more than generally allege, as a substantive defense to tort liability, that their conduct was religious in nature.”). The trial court acted prematurely in concluding it lacked jurisdiction. Obviously, genuine material issues of fact arise in many respects, including: whether the alleged torts were committed and whether *369qualified immunity would exist to protect same.
[¶ 45.] We should not address the actual merits or eventual success of Plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs have pled sufficient facts in their complaint to entitle them to proceed to attempt to prove their claims. See Bear v. Reformed Mennonite Church, 462 Pa. 330, 341 A.2d 105, 108 (1975) (stating: “While the First Amendment may present a complete and valid defense to the allegations of the complaint, in the instant case, appellant has pleaded sufficient facts and created sufficient ‘doubt’ that would entitle him to proceed with his action in order that he may attempt to prove the requisite elements that would entitle him to relief.]”). Therefore, we should reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this dissent.
[¶ 46.] AMUNDSON, Justice, joins this dissent.

. Apparently, this decision was made and announced during a telephone conference to determine the status of a temporary restraining order granted to plaintiffs. There had been no discovery, no depositions, no interrogatories, no written motions, and no hearings. And yet, without warning, the trial court granted an oral telephone motion to dismiss with prejudice and the majority affirms it, making this case eligible for the "dead wrong award" for both procedure and substance, also known as the "double-dead wrong award.”

. Electricity was only disconnected at homes without minor children.

. Defendant claims that Plaintiff’s children were allowed to attend school and were furnished food during this period.

. Plaintiffs filed objections following the hearing. They objected to:
1. The Order dismissing the entire action with prejudice as none of the causes of action were based upon a religious issue.
2. The lack of timely notice as to the telephone hearing.
3. The scope of the hearing and the lack of notice as to a potential dismissal for want of jurisdiction as opposed to what the Court advised was to be a hearing to define the parameters of the Restraining Order.
4. The lack of opportunity to present written briefs on the issue of jurisdiction, oral argument on the issue of jurisdiction, and evidence in the form of testimony as to both the Restraining Order and jurisdiction.
5. The Court’s claim that the Plaintiffs lack standing to sue.
6. The Dismissal of the Restraining Order in that the ex parte Restraining Order was appropriate based upon the fact that there existed a threat of irreparable harm to the movants, there was no significant detriment to the defendants pending the Tuesday hearing, there was a probability that the Plaintiffs!’] request for the Restraining Order would be granted, and the public interest is in limiting or avoiding conflict.

. Plaintiffs complaint states, in part:
11. That within the past three years and through the present time the Defendants have jointly and severally, intentionally and negligently, wantonly and willfully engaged in a course of conduct which includes (but is not limited to) maliciously damaging Plaintiffs' vehicles, personal property, and houses. The Defendants have cut down Plaintiffs’ clotheslines. They have locked the Plaintiffs out of their place of worship. They have locked them out of the shops, kitchen, and laundry facilities of the colony; and have excluded the Plaintiffs from working at any of their jobs at the colony. The Defendants have threatened and actually disconnected some of Plaintiffs’ utilities during the winter months.
12. That within the past three years and through the present time the Defendants have jointly and severally, intentionally and negligently, wantonly and willfully engaged in a course of conduct which includes maliciously assaulting Plaintiffs by recklessly and intentionally driving vehicles at the Plaintiffs and by driving vehicles within dangerous proximity of the Plaintiffs while the Plaintiffs were walking, all of which placed them in fear of imminent bodily harm and caused them great emotional distress.
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14. The Defendants have also negligently and intentionally threatened Plaintiffs verbally and physically throughout the past three years. The Defendants have expressed through words and actions their intent to cause Plaintiffs’ emotional distress and personal injury.