Court Opinion

ID: 9588667
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:36:45.901983+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:43:50.443286
License: Public Domain

Sognier, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the amendment to OCGA § 15-10-2 (5) increasing the subject matter jurisdiction of the magistrate courts is remedial, and also disagree that the issues raised by amendment in superior court could be heard on de novo review.
As a general rule, laws prescribe only for the future, and usually will not be given retrospective operation unless required by express statutory or clear legislative purpose, Canton Textile Mills v. Lathem, 253 Ga. 102, 103 (1) (317 SE2d 189) (1984), or when the statute governs only procedure of the courts, including the rules of evidence. Polito v. Holland, 258 Ga. 54, 55 (2) (365 SE2d 273) (1988); see OCGA § 1-3-5. However, even if the statute is procedural it will not be applied retroactively if retroactive application will disturb vested rights. Seaboard Air-Line R. Co. v. Benton, 175 Ga. 491, 499 (165 SE 593) (1932).
I find the 1987 amendment to OCGA § 15-10-2 (5) is procedural because it did not create a new cause of action or legal duty, but rather dealt with enforcement of existing rights by expanding the existing subject matter jurisdiction of the magistrate court. However, I do not agree with the majority that this amendment should be applied retroactively, as I find the amendment did affect the vested rights of litigants who, like the instant parties, were already before magistrate courts because the potential recovery of the plaintiffs and the possible exposure of the defendants were increased by $500. (See Focht v. American Cas. Co., 103 Ga. App. 138, 140-141 (2) (118 SE2d 737) (1961), in which we held that an amendment to the Georgia Long Arm Statute, which authorizes personal jurisdiction in certain suits against nonresidents, should be applied prospectively because, *200although procedural, it created new rights and imposed new obligations.) The majority concludes the amendment to OCGA § 15-10-2 (5) is remedial because no new right or obligation was created, in that a civil action for $3,000 already was permissible in some other courts before July 1, 1987. That holding ignores the obvious fact that this action was filed in magistrate court, which did not have jurisdiction over a $3,000 claim at the time, and not in some other court which did have such jurisdiction. In my view, the majority thus engages in sheer sophistry by concluding that no new right of action was created as to appellees, who were already engaged in litigation in a court with a $2,500 jurisdictional limit at the time that court’s jurisdictional ceiling was raised. Because I believe the amendment to OCGA § 15-10-2 (5) did create new rights and obligations, at least as to litigants who, like the parties sub judice, were already litigating in magistrate courts, I conclude the amended statute should have been applied prospectively, see generally Focht, supra, and thus find $294 of the magistrate court’s judgment should have been struck and judgment entered for the balance. Giles v. Spinks, 64 Ga. 206, 207 (1, 2) (1879); see OCGA § 9-12-8. Similarly, all of the superior court judgment in excess of the magistrate court jurisdictional limit of $2,500 should have been written off.
I also disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the superior court properly considered on de novo review the issues raised in appellees’ amended complaint. “[T]he [de novo] trial in the superior court is not a trial without limitation, but is rather ‘a new trial in which only the matter presented to the court below can be relitigated.’ [Cit.]” Williams v. Calloway, 171 Ga. App. 286, 288 (2) (319 SE2d 500) (1984). Thus, although the parties may introduce evidence not received below, neither party is entitled to raise issues not litigated before the magistrate court. See id.; see also Mathews v. Mathews, 136 Ga. App. 833, 837-838 (2) (222 SE2d 609) (1975). I find the majority’s attempt to distinguish Williams and Mathews unconvincing because in each case the issues raised on de novo appeal were rejected not because they were outside the probate court’s limited jurisdiction but because they had not been raised below. Further, I find the majority’s definition of “issue” flawed. The majority’s definition of “issue” is so broad that it encompasses the entire civil action and thus eviscerates the holdings in Williams and Mathews.
In the instant case, upon appeal to superior court appellees amended their complaint to allege an additional cause of action, and also sought recovery for additional damages under either claim. Although there is no transcript of the superior court proceedings in the record, appellant stated in the statement of facts in his brief before this court that new issues were presented to the superior court, and appellees’ brief did not contest that description of the events below.
*201Decided March 31, 1989.
George P. Graves, for appellant.
Henry R. Stringfellow, for appellees.
Accordingly, pursuant to Court of Appeals Rule 15 (b) (1), we are authorized to consider appellees’ silence as consent to appellant’s statement of the facts, see Bentley-Kessinger, Inc. v. Jones, 186 Ga. App. 466, 467 (367 SE2d 317) (1988), and thus I conclude the superior court considered issues not raised in the magistrate court. As we have no transcript from which to ascertain the permissible scope of the superior court’s judgment, I would reverse the superior court’s denial of appellant’s motion for new trial.