Court Opinion

ID: 9461954
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:28:36.765174+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:20.264835
License: Public Domain

ROSENN, Circuit Judge
(concurring and dissenting).
I agree with the majority that the factual background of this case differs from that in Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368, 94 S.Ct. 629, 38 L.Ed.2d 583 (1974), and that the instant dispute is arbitrable. I also agree that the district court properly enjoined any coercive tactics by the union other than the withdrawal of employees from portions of the mine designated imminently dangerous by the mine committee. I believe, however, that the employer was not obligated to withdraw employees from the designated areas if it could demonstrate that the committee’s recommendations were not made in good faith. Since the record does contain evidence indicating bad faith on the part of the committee, I would remand the case before vacating the injunction.
As the majority correctly observes, Article III, Section (g)(1) requires the employer where the mine committee “believes an imminent danger exists and the committee recommends that the Employer remove all employees from the involved area ... to follow the recommendation of the committee.” I do not agree with the union’s suggestion that, under this section, the employer is required to withdraw the employees whenever the mine committee believes an area of the mine to be imminently dangerous. Such an interpretation of the agreement is inconsistent with the national labor policy behind section 301 of promoting a higher degree of responsibility upon the parties to bargaining agreements and thereby promoting industrial peace. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 77 S.Ct. 912, 1 L.Ed.2d 972 (1957). The interpretation ignores the “covenant of good faith and fair dealings which must inhere in every collective bargaining agreement if it is to serve its institutional purpose.” United Steelworkers of America v. New Park Mining Co., 273 F.2d 352, 356 (10th Cir. 1959). Further, the agreement provides for cumulative remedies if the members of the mine committee have acted capriciously. Implicit in the reservation contained in Article III, Section (g)(3) for the removal of the committee when it acts capriciously is the fundamental principle that the committee must act in good faith.
Thus, I believe that the employer is not required to follow the committee’s recommendations if it can demonstrate that the committee acted in bad faith. The majority finds it unnecessary to decide this question “because the record demonstrates that there was at the least some factual basis for the Committee members’ views.” The support the majority finds in the record apparently is that the lack of canopies violated the mandatory safety standards of the regulations promulgated under the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act.
The problem with this position is that the Act makes a sharp distinction between conditions creating an imminent danger and those conditions violating mandatory safety standards. Imminent danger is defined as “the existence of any condition or practice in a coal mine which could reasonably be expected to cause death or serious physical harm before such condition or practice can be abated.” 30 U.S.C. § 802(j) (1970). Section 104(b) of the Act mandates specific procedures to be followed for the abatement of conditions violating a mandatory safety standard but not creating an imminent danger. 30 U.S.C. § 814(b) (1970); see Freeman Coal Mining Co. v. Interior Bd. of Mine Operation Appeals, 504 F.2d 741, 745 n. 7 (7th Cir. 1974). *1160Since the 1971 agreement apparently adopted the Act’s standard of imminent danger,1 I do not believe that a violation of a mandatory safety standard is any evidence of the existence of imminent danger; it is the nature of the violation that is essential.
The district court made no findings concerning the presence of good faith. As an appellate court, we may not make such findings, particularly when the record contains substantial evidence of bad faith.
The committee’s recommendation apparently was based on the conclusion that since federal regulations require canopies, the lack of canopies in Vesta Mine No. 5 constituted an imminent danger. All the federal mine inspectors who examined the mine, however, found that the lack of canopies did not constitute an imminent danger. These inspectors were charged with the mandatory statutory duty to issue a notice to the employer to withdraw the employees from areas of the mine found to be imminently dangerous. 30 U.S.C. § 814(a) (1970). The union failed to appeal this determination by the inspectors despite its right to do so. See 30 U.S.C. § 815(a)(1) (1970).
Moreover, the union’s district mine inspector testified that only the Vesta Mine No. 5 had been designated by a mine safety committee as constituting an imminent danger, although to the best of his knowledge only two of the “few hundred” mines within his district completely were equipped with canopies for all electric face equipment. In addition, the company’s Assistant Manager of Mine Operations testified without contradiction that the International Union’s Mine Inspector had told him “that the safety committee was wrong in shutting down the section.”
Finally, the federal regulations became effective on January 1, 1974. The mine committee did not make its recommendation until July. The majority of the employees in the face area are not required by law to work under canopies. The committee did not find that these employees are subject to imminent danger.
Since I believe that the employer would have been entitled to an injunction ordering the employees back to work in areas of the mine found by the committee to be imminently dangerous if that finding had been made in bad faith, and since I do not believe the record conclusively demonstrates the absence of bad faith, I would remand the case for further factual determination before vacating that part of the injunction.

. Section (e) of the 1968 agreement, predecessor to and substantially identical to Article III, Section (g), contained the phrase “immediate danger.” After the passage of the Act, the phrase was changed to “imminent danger.”