Court Opinion

ID: 9865845
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 22:01:12.071254+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:56:49.360290
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

                                              )
LAGENEIA P. LaROCHELLE,                       )
                                              )
              Plaintiff,                      )
                                              )
      v.                                      )       Civil Action No. 22-cv-0115 (TSC)
                                              )
JOSEPH LYNOTT, et al.,                        )
                                              )
              Defendants.                     )
                                              )

                                 MEMORANDUM OPINION

       This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Amended

Complaint (ECF No. 24), Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Third

Amended Complaint (ECF No. 27), and Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Opposition to

Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Third Amended Complaint (ECF No. 28). For the reasons

discussed below, the court GRANTS leave to file a third amended complaint. And because the

amended pleading fails to state claims upon which relief can be granted, the court DISMISSES

the third amended complaint and this civil action.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       Lageneia P. LaRochelle (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, filed her original complaint

(ECF No. 1, “Compl.”) on January 18, 2022, bringing employment discrimination claims under

the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), see 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., the Rehabilitation

Act, see 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”), see 42

U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., against her former employer, MedStar Washington Hospital Center

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(“MWHC”), and four individuals: Joseph Lynott, Edward Palmer, Robbin Hargrove, and Paul

Hagens.

       Defendants first moved to dismiss (ECF No. 8) on March 23, 2022, and Plaintiff

responded on May 6, 2022, with an opposition (ECF No. 10) and a motion for leave to amend

the complaint (ECF No. 12). The court denied Plaintiff’s motion by minute order on May 9,

2022, because Plaintiff had not conferred with opposing counsel as required under Local Civil

Rule 7(m). On May 18, 2022, Plaintiff renewed her motion for leave to amend (ECF No. 14),

and Defendants filed their opposition (ECF No. 15) on June 2, 2022.

       The court found both the original complaint and first proposed amended complaint (ECF

No. 14-1) deficient in five respects. First, Plaintiff purported to raise a disability discrimination

claim under Title VII, which only applies to discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or

national origin, not disability. Second, Plaintiff named four individuals as party Defendants, yet

there is no individual liability under the relevant statutes. Third, Plaintiff failed to name her

former employer, the only proper defendant to an action under the relevant statutes. Fourth,

Plaintiff failed to identify the formal EEO charge of discrimination giving rise to this lawsuit.

Fifth, Plaintiff neither identified her alleged disability nor alleged facts supporting her claims

under the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. Notwithstanding these shortcomings, dismissal was

not warranted.

       On September 26, 2022, the court issued an order (ECF No. 19) denying Defendants’

motion to dismiss without prejudice and ordering Plaintiff to file a motion to amend her

complaint and a proposed amended complaint drafted in accordance with the court’s order, Rules

8, 9 and 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and Local Civil Rule 5.1, setting forth all the

claims she intends to bring and the Defendant(s) against whom she brings each claim.

                                                                                                        2
          Plaintiff filed a motion to amend (ECF No. 20) on October 26, 2022, and Defendants

filed their opposition (ECF No. 22) on November 9, 2022. Before the court ruled on Plaintiff’s

motion, Plaintiff filed the instant motion (ECF No. 24) on December 21, 2022. The court

entered a minute order on December 23, 2022, directing Defendants to respond motion by

January 20, 2023. Defendants filed a timely response (ECF No. 27), and Plaintiff filed her reply

(ECF No. 28) on February 13, 2023.

II. PLAINTIFF’S THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT

          Plaintiff’s latest submission is, to say the least, confusing. Contrary to Local Civil Rule

15.1, which requires a motion with the proposed amended pleading as an exhibit, Plaintiff

submits a single document titled “Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint”

(ECF No. 24, “3d Am. Compl.”). Contrary to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10, Plaintiff fails

to “state [her] claims . . . in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single

set of circumstances.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). Plaintiff jumps from topic to topic, referring to

events occurring between 2006 and 2022 in no particular order, not by date of occurrence, not by

theme and not by legal claim. It is not always clear when during this 17-year period certain

events occurred, and it certainly is not clear how the events tie together to form distinct legal

claims.

          Plaintiff attempts to set forth five counts:

                  Count One: Violation of the Americans with Disabilities [A]ct of
                  1990, 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq

                  Count Two: Violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
                  1973, 29 U.S.C. 701 et seq.

                  Count Three: Violation of section 60-20.8 (1), (2), & (3) Harassment
                  and hostile work environments

                                                                                                        3
               Count Four: Violation of Private Sector Whistleblower Protection
               Streamlining Act of 2012

               Count Five: Violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

3d Am. Compl. at 2. The headings are essentially meaningless, and the facts alleged within each

section are not confined to, and often appear wholly unrelated to, the topic the count’s heading

suggests.

       That said, the court understands Plaintiff to allege that she is a former Certified

Respiratory Therapist at MWHC who requested light or modified duty as an accommodation for

her disability, that MWHC refused her accommodation request, that MWHC retaliated against

her for having made the accommodation request, and that MWHC wrongfully refused her

request for a religious exemption to its Covid-19 vaccination policy. The third amended

complaint also clarifies that MWHC is the sole defendant and dismisses claims against Lynott,

Palmer, Hargrove and Hagans.

III. DISCUSSION

       A. Counts Three and Four are Dismissed

       Before launching into a discussion of Plaintiff’s discrimination and retaliation claims, the

court summarily disposes of Counts Three and Four. Count Three appears to refer to federal

regulations, see generally 41 C.F.R. Part 60-20, which apply to certain federal government

contractors for compliance with Executive Order 11,246 “to ensure non-discrimination on the

basis of sex in employment.” 41 C.F.R. § 60-20.1; see 41 C.F.R. § 60-20.2(a) (“It is unlawful

for a contractor to discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment because of

sex.”). The complaint makes no factual allegations demonstrating that MWHC is a government

contractor to which these regulations apply or supporting plausible claims of harassment or

hostile work environment on the basis of sex. Even if there were such allegations, there is no

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private right of action under Executive Order 11,246. See Riggs v. Boeing Co., No. 98-cv-2091

(JWL), 1999 WL 233285, at *1 (D. Kan. Mar. 4, 1999) (collecting cases).

       Count Four appears to refer to legislation introduced in but not passed by the 112th

Congress. See H.R. 6409 - 112th Congress (2011-2012): Private Sector Whistleblower

Protection Streamlining Act of 2012, H.R.6409, 112th Cong. (2012),

https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/house-bill/6409. There is no plausible legal clam

based on a statute which has not been enacted.

       B. Count Five is Dismissed for Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

       Under Title VII and the ADA, before filing suit in federal district court, a plaintiff first

must exhaust administrative remedies by filing an EEOC charge. Marshall v. Fed. Express

Corp., 130 F.3d 1095, 1098 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“Before bringing suit in federal court, ADA

plaintiffs, like those under Title VII, must exhaust their administrative remedies by filing an

EEOC charge and giving that agency a chance to act on it.”). The subsequent lawsuit “is limited

in scope to claims that are like or reasonably related to the allegations of the charge and growing

out of such allegations.” Tennant v. District of Columbia, No. 19-cv-2949 (BAH), 2020 WL

4464505, at *10 (D.D.C. Aug. 3, 2020) (quoting Park v. Howard Univ., 71 F.3d 904, 907 (D.C.

Cir. 1995)) (additional citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

       Exhaustion of administrative remedies is an affirmative defense, not a jurisdictional

requirement, see, e.g., Ferrell v. Fudge, No. 21-cv-1412 (CKK), 2023 WL 2043148, at *4

(D.D.C. Feb. 16, 2023), and “[m]otions to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies

are properly addressed as motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim,” Scott v. Dist. Hosp.

Partners, L.P., 60 F. Supp. 3d 156, 161 (D.D.C. 2014) (citation omitted), aff’d, 715 F. App’x 6

(D.C. Cir. 2018). It is Defendants’ burden to prove by a preponderance of evidence that Plaintiff

                                                                                                      5
failed to exhaust her administrative remedies prior to filing suit in federal court. See Gezahey v.

Greater Washington Oncology Assocs./Am. Oncology Network, No. 22-cv-2838 (JMC), 2023

WL 2043077, at *2 (D.D.C. Feb. 16, 2023) (citation omitted); see also Bowden v. United States,

106 F.3d 433, 437 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“Because untimely exhaustion of administrative remedies is

an affirmative defense, the defendant bears the burden of pleading and proving it.”).

       Although Plaintiff has yet to identify the EEOC charge(s) at issue, MWHC identifies two

candidates: EEOC Nos. 570-2021-00319 and 570-2022-00589.1

               1. 2021 EEOC Charge

       EEOC No. 570-2021-00319 (“2021 EEO Charge”), dated May 18, 2021, alleges

retaliation and disability discrimination occurring between August 1, 2020, and February 18,

2021. See Def. Opp. to Pl. Mot. for Leave to File Third Am. Compl. (ECF No. 27, “Def. Opp”),

Ex. 2 (ECF No 27-1) at 5.2 In the narrative portion, Plaintiff states:

               I am an individual with a disability that Respondent is aware of.
               Throughout my employment I take FMLA for my disability. For
               most of my employment I was led to believe that light duty was not
               available to me even when I provided medical documents. It wasn’t
               until recently that I became aware that light duty is available for
               others. Ive [sic] also been subjected to a hostile work environment
               after management advised staff to talk to those employees who take
               leave about the shortage of staff and increased work. Since then
               employees come up to me about taking leave even though its [sic]

1
  The court considers Plaintiff’s EEOC Charges without converting Defendants’ motion to
dismiss into one for summary judgment. See Slate v. Pub. Def. Serv. for the District of
Columbia, 31 F. Supp. 3d 277, 288 (D.D.C. 2014) (considering “EEO complaint filed by the
plaintiff and referenced at paragraph 118 in the Complaint” on motion to dismiss); Ward v.
District of Columbia Dep’t of Youth Rehab. Servs., 768 F. Supp. 2d 117, 119 (D.D.C. 2011)
(considering “documents upon which the plaintiff’s complaint necessarily relies even if the
document is produced not by the plaintiff in the complaint but by the defendant in a motion to
dismiss”).
2
  Plaintiff completed two charge forms, one signed on March 27, 2021, and the other on May
18, 2021. See Def. Opp., Exs. 1-2 (ECF No. 27-1 at 2, 5, respectively). The court follows
MWHC’s lead, see Def. Opp. at 5, in treating the latter as the operative EEOC charge.

                                                                                                      6
               attributed to my medical condition. Furthermore, when I do take
               leave Im [sic] retaliated against by being assigned to work the floor
               which is a form of punishment. Ive [sic] gone to human resources
               with these concerns and yet its [sic] failed to act.
               I believe I have been discriminated against due to my disability and
               retaliated against for engaging in protected activities in violation of
               the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended.
Def. Opp., Ex. 2 (ECF No. 27-1) at 5 (emphasis added). The EEOC issued its Dismissal and

Notice of Rights on October 20, 2021, id., Ex. 5 (ECF No. 27-1) at 17, and the court concludes

that Plaintiff has exhausted administrative remedies with respect to the 2021 EEOC Charge.

               2. 2022 EEOC Charge

        EEOC No. 570-2022-00589 (“2022 EEOC Charge”), dated March 2, 2022, alleges

retaliation and disability and religious discrimination occurring between August 1, 2021, and

November 14, 2021. See id., Ex. 6 (ECF No. 27-1) at 19. Its narrative portion states in relevant

part:

               I began working a Respondent in October 2005, as a Respiratory
               Care Practitioner One. I was terminated on November 14, 2021. On
               or around August 2021, Respondent finally gave me light-duty as an
               accommodation for my disability. However, because I did not want
               to take part in activities that violated healthcare regulations while on
               light duty, my Director began to harass me and constantly told me
               that I was not doing enough to justify my light-duty status. Further,
               on three separate occasions, I was physically assaulted by a co-
               worker. After the third instance, on or around September 24, 2021,
               I reported the assault to Respondent. Respondent has refused to
               provide me with information concerning the assault. Respondent
               required all of its employees to be fully vaccinated against Covid-
               19 in order to continue employment. On or around September 8,
               2021, I gave my personal physician, a Doctor at Respondent, a
               medical exemption form I requested that he fill out so that I could
               provide medical documentation to Respondent exempting me from
               taking the Covid-19 vaccine. However, after nearly a week of
               waiting for the documentation, he still had not returned it to me and
               just hours before the exemption was due, he called me requesting
               more information about what he should do. I was unable to submit
               a medical vaccine exemption because of one of Respondents doctors
               failure to submit the documentation in a timely manner. Because of

                                                                                                   7
               this, I requested a religious exemption to Respondents Covid-19
               vaccine mandate. I submitted by exemption letter and my exemption
               was denied. I submitted a second religious exemption letter, but that
               too was denied. I was terminated on November 14, 2021. I believe
               I have been discriminated against on the basis of my disability, and
               retaliated against for engaging in protected activity, in violation of
               The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended. I also
               believe I have been discriminated against on the basis of my religion
               (Catholic), and retaliated against for engaging in protected activity,
               in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.
Def. Opp., Ex. 6 (ECF No. 27-1) at 20 (emphasis added).

       MWHC represented that the 2022 EEOC Charge remained “pending before the EEOC,

and the EEOC ha[d] not issued any Right To Sue notice” when Plaintiff filed her original

complaint. Def. Opp. at 13. For these reasons, MWHC argued, “Plaintiff ha[d] not exhausted

the required administrative remedies with respect to any religious discrimination claim,” and that

she could not “pursue any such claim in this case.” Id. Plaintiff did not respond to this

argument in her reply, see generally Pl. Resp. to Def. Opp. to Pl. Mot. for Leave to File Third

Am. Compl. (ECF No. 28, “Pl. Reply”), and the court deems the argument conceded, see Ali v.

District of Columbia Court Servs. and Offender Supervision Agency, 538 F. Supp. 2d 157, 161

(D.D.C. 2008) (“If a plaintiff fails to respond to a motion to dismiss or files an opposition to a

motion to dismiss addressing only certain arguments raised by the defendant, a court may treat

those arguments that the plaintiff failed to address as conceded”); Hopkins v. Women’s Div.,

Gen. Bd. of Global Ministries, 238 F. Supp. 2d 174, 178 (D.D.C. 2002), aff’d, 98 Fed. Appx. 8

(D.C. Cir. 2004).

       The court concludes that Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies with respect

to the 2022 EEOC Charge. Consequently, the court DISMISSES Count Five, the Title VII claim

                                                                                                     8
regarding Plaintiff’s request for a religious exemption from MWHC’s Covid-19 vaccine policy.3

        C. Counts One and Two Fail to State Claims for which Relief can be Granted

        The ADA makes it unlawful to “discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of

disability in regard to . . . the . . . advancement[ ] or discharge of employees, employee

compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42

U.S.C. § 12112(a). Similarly, under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, “[n]o otherwise

qualified individual with a disability in the United States . . . shall, solely by reason of her . . .

disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to

discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any

program or activity conducted by any Executive agency[.]” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Plaintiff alleges

MWHC violated these statutes by failing to accommodate her disability and by retaliating

against her for having engaged in protected activity pertaining to her disability.

                1. Limitations Periods

        Given that events described in the Third Amended Complaint occurred over roughly 14

years, the court first addresses the time limits within which an actionable claim must have arisen.

                        a. 300-day Limitations Period for ADA Claims

        The ADA adopts certain “powers, remedies, and procedures” set forth in Title VII, 42

U.S.C. § 12117(a), including 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, which requires that a claimant file a charge of

discrimination “within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment practice

occurred[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). Thus, the only acts for which Plaintiff might recover

3
  Notwithstanding mention of the ADA in the 2022 EEOC Charge, the court discerns no
actionable disability discrimination claim. Plaintiff states that MWHC granted her request for a
light duty assignment in or about August 2021 as an accommodation of her disability, and the
alleged assault by a co-worker does not appear related to Plaintiff’s disability.

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under the ADA are those occurring on or after July 22, 2020. See Charles v. District of

Columbia, 164 F. Supp. 3d 98, 101 (D.D.C. 2016), aff’d sub nom. Charles v. District of

Columbia Dep’t of Youth Rehab. Servs., 690 F. App’x 14 (D.C. Cir. 2017).

                       b. Three-Year Limitations Period for Rehabilitation Act Claims

        “Because the Rehabilitation Act does not specify its own limitations period, courts

generally ‘borrow’ one from an analogous state cause of action, provided that the state

limitations period is not inconsistent with underlying federal policies.” Alexander v. Wash.

Metro. Area Transit Auth., 826 F.3d 544, 551 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (quoting Spiegler v.

District of Columbia, 866 F.2d 461, 463-64 (D.C. Cir. 1989)). While the limitations period

previously was thought to be one year, see Pappas v. District of Columbia, 513 F. Supp. 3d 64,

82 (D.D.C. 2021) (citing Jaiyeola v. District of Columbia, 40 A.3d 356, 368 (D.C. 2012))

(applying one-year D.C. Human Rights Act limitations period to determine timeliness of

Rehabilitation Act claim), the D.C. Circuit since has held that the three-year residual statute of

limitations under District of Columbia law applies, Stafford v. George Washington Univ., 56

F.4th 50, 55 (D.C. Cir. 2022); see Thomas v. District of Columbia, No. 22-cv-1269 (TJK), 2023

WL 2610512, at *4 (D.D.C. Mar. 23, 2023) (pursuant to Stafford, applying three-year statute of

limitations to Rehabilitation Act claim). Thus, Plaintiff may pursue Rehabilitation Act claims

accruing as far back as January 18, 2019. And because “it is generally understood that Section

504 claims brought by non-federal employees . . . are exempt from the administrative exhaustion

requirements that govern claims brought by federal employees under the Rehabilitation Act,”

Pappas, 513 F. Supp. 3d at 83; see Betts v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., No. 21-cv-

1861 (CKK), 2022 WL 3226281, at *15 (D.D.C. Aug. 10, 2022); Congress v. District of

Columbia, 277 F. Supp. 3d 82, 87 (D.D.C. 2017), Plaintiff need not have exhausted a

                                                                                                     10
Rehabilitation Act claim prior to filing this lawsuit.

                2. Failure to Accommodate Claim

        An employer can discriminate by “not making reasonable accommodations to the known

physical . . . limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an . . .

employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an

undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity[.]” 42 U.S.C. §

12112(b)(5)(A); see Minter v. District of Columbia, 809 F.3d 66, 69 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing 42

U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (ADA provision) and 29 U.S.C. § 794(d) (Rehabilitation Act provision

incorporating ADA standards)). A viable claim requires factual allegations that the employee

was disabled; the employer had notice of her disability; the employee was able to perform

essential functions of her position with or without reasonable accommodation; and the employer

denied her request for reasonable accommodation. See Solomon v. Vilsack, 763 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C.

Cir. 2014); Menoken v. Burrows, No. 16-cv-2480 (DLF), 2023 WL 1470014, at *2 (D.D.C. Feb.

2, 2023) (Rehabilitation Act); Hester v. Paul Pub. Charter Sch., No. 21-cv-3166 (JEB), 2023

WL 355913, at *4 (D.D.C. Jan. 23, 2023) (ADA).

                        a. Plaintiff Adequately Alleges “Disability”

        For purposes of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, the term “disability” means:

                (A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
                more major life activities . . . ;
                (B) a record of such an impairment; or
                (C) being regarded as having such an impairment[.]

42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). “A person is disabled . . . if: (1) [she] suffers from an impairment; (2) the

impairment limits an activity that constitutes a major life activity . . . ; and (3) the limitation is

substantial.” Haynes v. Williams, 392 F.3d 478, 481–82 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).

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“Major life activities” include “performing manual tasks, . . . walking, standing, lifting, bending,

. . . and working.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).

                               i. Plaintiff’s Physical Impairments

        Plaintiff’s purported impairments are many. Her original complaint lists several medical

conditions, see Compl. ¶ 12 (“severe congenital cervical spinal stenosis, lumbar spondylitis,

degenerative disc disease, and osteoarthritis”), and her Third Amended Complaint mentions

fibromyalgia, see 3d Am. Compl. at 8, post-traumatic stress disorder, see id. at 11, and “chronic

back pain,” id. at 13. It is not at all clear which of Plaintiff’s impairments, or combination of

impairments, amounts to a disability. Similarly, Plaintiff mentions having sustained work-

related injuries including a back injury in 2007, see id. at 3, and two injuries in 2021, see id. at 5,

12. Again, the Third Amended Complaint alleges no facts to show any of these injuries

constitutes a disability.

        That said, Plaintiff’s allegation that she is unable to bend, pick up objects from the floor,

reach over her head, stand for long periods, put on and tie her shoes, lift more than 25 pounds or

twist, see id. at 3, implies that an impairment or combination of impairments substantially limits

her major life activities. At the motion to dismiss stage, Plaintiff’s meager allegations suffice.

                               ii. Reaction to N95 Masks

        While Plaintiff’s myriad impairments may constitute a disability, the underlying

condition causing a dermatological reaction to N95 masks is not a proper basis for a disability

claim. Plaintiff alleges that, in September 2020, MWHC issued “reused and sterilized N95

mask[s]” which caused her “lip . . . to burn and swell up.” 3d Am. Compl. at 4. After a trip to

the emergency room, Plaintiff alleges, it was recommended that, “[d]ue to dermatological

response to N95 mask (used mask), Plaintiff “use[] new masks not previously used by others

                                                                                                     12
then sterilized.” Id. Although MWHC initially may have “denied [Plaintiff] accommodation for

[the] lip break out (unused N95’s) due to reused then sterilized N95’s supplied by Medstar,” id.

at 5, Plaintiff alleges that she began to receive unused N95 masks in November 2020, see id.

        “A claimant must . . . demonstrate that the impairment substantially limits a major life

activity . . . , and is permanent or long-term.” Lester v. Natsios, 290 F. Supp. 2d 11, 24 (D.D.C.

2003) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). The Third Amended Complaint alleges no facts

showing that Plaintiff had a disability for which new N95 masks would be a reasonable

accommodation, or that a condition triggering a dermatological reaction to used N95 masks

amounts to an impairment substantially limiting a major life activity, or that any such

impairment was permanent or long-term. See Etheridge v. FedChoice Fed. Credit Union, 789 F.

Supp. 2d 27, 36–37 (D.D.C. 2011). Therefore, any disability claim arising from N95 masks must

fail.

               b. Plaintiff Adequately Alleges She is a “Qualified Individual”

        Plaintiff is not entitled to relief merely because she may have a disability. Rather, she

must allege facts to show she is a “qualified individual,” see 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); 29 U.S.C. §

794(a), defined as “an individual who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform

the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires,” 42

U.S.C. § 12111(8).

        ‘“[T]he essential duties of [an employee’s] position are a question of fact’ which are not

required to be ‘alleged with particularity.’” Floyd v. Lee, 968 F. Supp. 2d 308, 327 (D.D.C.

2013); see Pappas, 513 F. Supp. 3d at 94 (quoting Kirkland v. McAleenan, No. 13-cv-0194 (RC),

2019 WL 7067046, at *8 (D.D.C. Dec. 23, 2019)) (observing that “[a] determination that a

plaintiff is not a ‘qualified individual’ is rare on a motion dismiss” as “determining a job’s

                                                                                                    13
‘essential functions’ is typically a factual issue to be determined by a jury”) (additional citation

omitted). Although Plaintiff offers only a broad position description, see 3d Am. Compl. at 1-2,

it is enough that she alleges she “was able to work with or without accommodations,” id. at 3,

and this supports an inference that Plaintiff could perform the essential functions of the Certified

Respiratory Therapist position at all relevant times.4

                        c. Plaintiff Fails to Allege MWHC Had Notice of her Disability

        Here, the rambling and disorganized nature of the Third Amended Complaint works

against Plaintiff in two key respects. First, Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts tending to

show that MWHC had notice of her disability. At most, Plaintiff alleges she “complained to the

night shift supervisors . . . about [her] physical issues and how the assignments [she] was given

made [her] hurt even worse,” 3d Am. Compl. at 6. Plaintiff does not identify whom she notified,

how she notified them, or what she told them. A complaint about “physical issues” or a general

complaint about pain does not allege plausibly that MWHC would have been on notice of a

disability affecting whether and how Plaintiff could perform her duties.

        Plaintiff cannot rely on her requests for leave under the Family Medical Leave Act

(“FMLA”), see 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., as a substitute for notice to MWHC for purposes of the

ADA. See Murphy v. District of Columbia, No. 18-cv-1478 (JDB), 2022 WL 2643554, at *2

(D.D.C. July 8, 2022) (“Given the statutory differences between the FMLA and the ADA, an

application for medical leave under the FMLA does not automatically constitute a request for a

4
  By now, though, Plaintiff is “no longer physically able to do [her] former job, with or without
accommodations,” 3d Am. Compl. at 3, and, presumably, has ceased to be a “qualified
individual.” See Badwal v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of District of Columbia, 139 F. Supp. 3d
295, 310 (D.D.C. 2015); Baron v. Dulinski, 928 F. Supp. 2d 38, 42 (D.D.C. 2013) (granting
defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s disability discrimination claim where plaintiff was
“totally disabled” and incapable of performing the essential functions of her job).

                                                                                                      14
reasonable accommodation under the ADA.”); see also Waggel v. George Washington Univ.,

957 F.3d 1364, 1373 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (“The scope of entitlements under the ADA includes a

range of reasonable accommodations while the FMLA authorizes only leave.”). By invoking

FMLA, Plaintiff was asking not to work for some period of time. Even if Plaintiff sought FMLA

for a medical reason, for example, “exacerbation of pain,” 3d Am. Compl. at 6, her request “does

not equal a request for a reasonable accommodation,” Badwal v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of

District of Columbia, 139 F. Supp. 3d 295, 314 (D.D.C. 2015) (citing Scarborough v. Natsios,

190 F. Supp. 2d 5, 23 (D.D.C. 2002)) (finding a request for leave without pay does not equal a

request for a reasonable accommodation). While “there may well be cases where the plaintiff’s

need for an accommodation is so apparent that the defendant must offer one regardless of

whether the plaintiff requested it,” Chenari v. George Washington Univ., 847 F.3d 740, 748

(D.C. Cir. 2017), Plaintiff has not alleged facts demonstrating that her need for accommodation

was so obvious.

       Second, the Third Amended Complaint does not describe an actual accommodation

request. “An employee’s request for an accommodation does not need to be in writing or use the

specific phrase ‘reasonable accommodation,’ but the request must make sufficiently clear that

the employee ‘wants assistance with . . . her disability so that . . . she may return, or continue, to

work.’” Pappas, 513 F. Supp. 3d at 87 (quoting Badwal, 139 F. Supp. 3d at 313) (additional

citation omitted). Notwithstanding her mention of light duty, see 3d Am. Compl. at 7, schedule

modifications, see id., and modified duty, see id. at 13, in conclusory fashion, Plaintiff makes no

allegations identifying or describing a particular accommodation request, or explaining how a

requested accommodation would have assisted her in returning to or continuing to work at

MWHC as a Certified Respiratory Therapist.

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       Nor is it clear when Plaintiff made her requests. Her amended complaint indicates that, at

most, during the relevant time period, MWHC on unspecified dates allegedly denied

accommodation requests. See 3d Am. Compl. at 5, 13-14. The alleged denials are not connected

to particular requests, however. The only apparent request identified by date occurred in

September 2021, months after the 2021 EEOC Charge, and because that request was granted, see

3d Am. Compl. at 6, it is not a valid basis for a discrimination claim.

         With a failure to accommodate claim, “there is an underlying assumption . . . that the

plaintiff-employee has requested an accommodation which the defendant-employer has

denied.” Murphy, 2022 WL 2643554, at *2 (quoting Flemmings v. Howard Univ., 198 F.3d 857,

861 (D.C. Cir. 1999)) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Plaintiff does not allege

plausibly that she actually requested an accommodation, when she made her requests, when

MWHC denied her requests, or MWHC’s proffered reasons for denying them.

               4. Retaliation Claim

       The ADA and the Rehabilitation Act make it unlawful to retaliate against an employee

“on account of . . . her having exercised or enjoyed . . . any right granted or protected by” these

statutes. Congress v. District of Columbia, 324 F. Supp. 3d 164, 170 (D.D.C. 2018) (citing 42

U.S.C. § 12203 (ADA) and 29 U.S.C. § 791(f) (incorporating ADA standard in 42 U.S.C. §

12203)). A prima facie retaliation claim must allege that the employee engaged in protected

activity, she suffered an adverse employment action, and there exists a causal link between the

two. See Congress, 324 F. Supp. 3d at 170 (citing Solomon, 763 F.3d at 14); see also Smith v.

District of Columbia, 430 F.3d 450, 455 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (applying framework for Title VII

cases to ADA retaliation cases under § 12203). For these purposes, an adverse employment

action “is one that ‘could well dissuade a reasonable [person] from making or supporting a

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charge of discrimination.’” Brown v. Trinity Washington Univ., No. 22-cv-1612 (JDB), 2023

WL 2571729, at *5 (D.D.C. Mar. 20, 2023) (quoting Porter v. Shah, 606 F.3d 809, 817–18 (D.C.

Cir. 2010)).

        It is nearly impossible to identify Plaintiff’s protected activity. Insofar as “the act of

requesting in good faith a reasonable accommodation is a protected activity under 42 U.S.C. §

12203, which is incorporated into the Rehabilitation Act[,]” Solomon, 763 F.3d at 15, perhaps

Plaintiff’s emails to Hargrove on November 4, 2020, see 3d Am. Compl. at 7, 13-14 (“I was

being denied modified duty (accommodations) for my chronic back pain while other day shift

therapists were given accommodations”), and November 18, 2020, see id. at 8, 14 (referencing

“incomplete NLRB charge for harassment and retaliation for engaging in protected activity”),

can be interpreted as good faith accommodation requests. But even if these communications

were considered protected activity, Plaintiff fails to allege facts linking this activity to an adverse

employment action of any sort. Nor can Plaintiff take the position that denial of a request for

reasonable accommodation is itself a basis for a retaliation claim. See Sandler v. Blinken, No.

21-cv-2226 (DLF), 2022 WL 4547557, at *9 (D.D.C. Sept. 29, 2022) (citing Harris v. Chao, 257

F. Supp. 3d 67, 89 n.28 (D.D.C. 2017)) (concluding that, absent “some ‘distinct retaliatory act’

besides denial of [plaintiff’s] requests for accommodation, she cannot bootstrap herself into a

retaliation claim by claiming that denial of her requests for accommodations as itself an act of

retaliation”).

        Furthermore, the only adverse action Plaintiff allegedly suffered was assignment to

general or intermediate medical care floors after having taken FMLA leave, see 3d Am. Compl.

at 6; 2021 EEOC Charge (having “take[n] FMLA for [her] disability,” Plaintiff allegedly was

“retaliated against by being assigned to work the floor which is a form of punishment”), which

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she allegedly had done between 2008 and 2021, see 3d Am. Compl. at 4. There is no FMLA

claim in this lawsuit, however. Although there is such a thing as a FMLA retaliation claim, see

Gordon v. U.S. Capitol Police, 778 F.3d 158, 161 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing Gleklen v. Democratic

Cong. Campaign Comm., Inc., 199 F.3d 1365, 1367–68 (D.C. Cir. 2000)), Plaintiff has not raised

it, and it is not the court’s job to hunt for claims a litigant fails to present on her own.

        “Courts in this Circuit ‘have consistently recognized the ease with which a plaintiff

claiming employment discrimination can survive . . . a motion to dismiss[.]’” McNair v. District

of Columbia, 213 F. Supp. 3d 81, 86 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting Fennell v. AARP, 770 F. Supp. 2d

118, 127 (D.D.C. 2011)). That said, a plaintiff still must allege sufficient facts to make her claim

plausible. See Harris v. District of Columbia Water & Sewer Auth., 791 F.3d 65, 70 (D.C. Cir.

2015) (“While a plaintiff need not plead a prima facie case at this stage, he must nonetheless

allege facts that if accepted as true would make his discrimination claims plausible.”). Plaintiff

has not and, accordingly, the court DISMISSES the Third Amended Complaint. An Order is

issued separately.

Date: September 25, 2023                        /s/
                                                TANYA S. CHUTKAN
                                                United States District Judge

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