Court Opinion

ID: 9412626
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-01 01:00:34.47863+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:16.513568
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-40350         Document: 00516840280             Page: 1      Date Filed: 07/31/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                                      United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                               Fifth Circuit

                                      ____________                                           FILED
                                                                                         July 31, 2023
                                       No. 22-40350                                     Lyle W. Cayce
                                      ____________                                           Clerk

   Charles Sheffield; Pedestrian Beach, L.L.C.,

                                                                   Plaintiffs—Appellants,

                                             versus

   Dawn Buckingham, in her official capacity as Commissioner of the Texas
   General Land Office; Ken Paxton, in his official capacity as Attorney
   General for the State of Texas,

                                               Defendants—Appellees.
                      ______________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Southern District of Texas
                                USDC No. 3:21-CV-122
                      ______________________________

   Before Graves, Ho, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
          Appellants Charles Sheffield and Pedestrian Beach, LLC (the
   “Owners”) own beachfront parcels in Surfside Beach, Texas. The Owners
   use their beachfront properties for vacation rentals and for personal and
   family use. The Owners’ lots and homes are located landward of the mean
   higher high tide line. After tropical systems battered the Texas coast during
          _____________________
          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-40350     Document: 00516840280          Page: 2   Date Filed: 07/31/2023

                                   No. 22-40350

   the summer of 2020, the General Land Office (“GLO”) Commissioner
   issued a temporary order enlarging areas of the public beach in the State,
   which the Owners claim is unconstitutional and infringe on their property
   rights. The district court, however, declined to issue a preliminary
   injunction. The Owners now ask this court to reverse the district court’s
   denial of a preliminary injunction and enjoin Texas from enforcing the
   temporary order.
                                  Background
         Texas owns “the water and the beds and shores of the Gulf of
   Mexico” between the mean low tide and the mean high tide line, which mark
   the average of low- and high-tide marks over an 18.6-year period. TEX. NAT.
   RES. CODE § 11.012(c); Luttes v. State, 324 S.W.2d 167, 187 (Tex. 1958).
   Texas may obtain access to the dry beach (beach inward from the hightide
   line) for the benefit of the public through easements established by
   “prescription or dedication,” Severance v. Patterson, 370 S.W.3d 705, 711
   (Tex. 2012), or where a right of public use exists “by virtue of continuous
   right in the public . . .” TEX. NAT. RES. CODE §§ 61.011(a). Although Texas
   need not “re-establish easements each time boundaries move due to gradual
   and imperceptible changes to the coastal landscape,” Texas’ easements do
   not automatically “roll” inland after abrupt changes in topography caused by
   events like hurricanes and tropical storms. Severance, 370 S.W.3d at 708.
         In 2013, the Texas Legislature amended the Open Beaches Act to
   permit the GLO to “suspend action on conducting a line of vegetation
   determination for a period of up to three years from the date the order is
   issued if the Commissioner determines that the line of vegetation was
   obliterated as a result of a meteorological event.” TEX. NAT. RES. CODE §
   61.0171(a). During the summer of 2020, Hurricane Laura and tropical storm
   Beta struck the Texas Gulf Coast. Because of the damage to the beach caused

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   by these storms, the GLO Commissioner issued an order under section
   61.0171 titled “Temporary Order Suspending Determination of the Line of
   Vegetation and Suspending Enforcement of Certain Encroachments on the
   Public Beach.” The order provided that “[a]ction on conducting a line of
   vegetation determination is suspended for a period of two years from the date
   of this Order within the Village of Surfside Beach city limits and from the
   western terminus of the Seawall west to Thirteen Mile Road on Galveston
   Island.” The order provided that for “permitting purposes, local
   governments shall use 200 feet landward of mean low tide as the [line of
   vegetation, or ‘LOV’], as applicable depending on the local government’s
   plan, for two years.”
          This new 200-foot beach area allegedly covers part or all of the
   Owners’ properties. This means, according to the Owners, that “members
   of the public can now stand, sit, and otherwise station themselves on areas
   immediately around [the Owners’] homes, near entry ways and windows.
   This limits the homes’ privacy, safety and raises serious liability concerns.”
   The Owners also allege that this constitutes an illegal taking.
                               Procedural History
          On May 24, 2021, the Owners filed a complaint against the
   Commissioner and one other, now dismissed, Texas official, in their official
   capacities. On June 18, 2021, the Owners filed a First Amended Complaint,
   the operative complaint, alleging Fifth Amendment, Fourth Amendment,
   and procedural and substantive due process claims, and on July 24, 2021, the
   Owners filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. On August 9, 2021, the
   Commissioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. On May 24, 2022, the
   district court denied the Commissioner’s motion to dismiss the Fifth
   Amendment, Fourth Amendment, and procedural due process claims. The

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   district court, however, dismissed the Owners’ substantive due process
   claims and denied the Owners’ motion for a preliminary injunction.
            The Owners appealed, requesting that this court reverse and remand
   for entry of an order granting a preliminary injunction. On August 3, 2022,
   after Appellants filed their brief, the Commissioner rescinded the temporary
   order.
                                     Discussion
            We review the district court’s decision to grant or deny a preliminary
   injunction for abuse of discretion. Anderson v. Jackson, 556 F.3d 351, 355 (5th
   Cir. 2009). A “decision based on erroneous legal principles is reviewed de
   novo.” Id. “Only under ‘extraordinary circumstances’ will we reverse the
   denial of a preliminary injunction.” Id. at 355–56 (quoting White v. Carlucci,
   862 F.2d 1209, 1211 (5th Cir.1989)).
            1. The case is moot because the Commissioner rescinded the
               temporary order
            On August 3, 2022, the Commissioner rescinded the temporary order
   because it fulfilled its purpose: allowing for the “natural recovery and
   stabilization of the beach system . . . .” Therefore, the Owners’ properties
   are no longer subject to the temporary order. “Mootness is one of the
   doctrines that ensures federal courts are only deciding live cases or
   controversies.” Spell v. Edwards, 962 F.3d 175, 178–79 (5th Cir. 2020). “A
   matter is moot ‘when it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief
   whatever to the prevailing party.’” Id. at 179 (quoting Knox v. Serv. Emps.
   Int'l Union, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 307 (2012)). “It makes sense, then, that
   a case challenging a statute, executive order, or local ordinance usually
   becomes moot if the challenged law has expired or been repealed.” Id. This
   is because “[o]nce the law is off the books, there is nothing injuring the
   plaintiff and, consequently, nothing for the court to do.” Id.

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          But “a defendant cannot automatically moot a case simply by ending
   its unlawful conduct once sued.” Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 91
   (2013). This is because “a defendant could engage in unlawful conduct, stop
   when sued to have the case declared moot, then pick up where he left off,
   repeating this cycle until he achieves all his unlawful ends.” Id. “To show
   that such a change of heart is not mere litigation posturing, a defendant
   asserting mootness must demonstrate ‘that it is absolutely clear the allegedly
   wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.’” Spell, 962
   F.3d at 179 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Freedom From Religion Found. v. Abbott,
   955 F.3d 417, 425 (5th Cir. 2020)); see also Yarls v. Bunton, 905 F.3d 905, 910
   (5th Cir. 2018) (“Essentially, the goal is to determine whether the
   defendant’s actions are ‘litigation posturing’ or whether the controversy is
   actually extinguished.”).
          Here, “there is nothing injuring the [Owners] and, consequently,
   nothing for the court to do.” Spell, 962 F.3d at 179. There is no order to
   enjoin. On that basis alone, this case is moot unless the Commissioner’s
   behavior is reasonably likely to recur or was ended because of litigation
   posturing.
                a. The temporary order is unlikely to recur, and the alleged
                   future harms are speculative
          As the Owners contend, “since the statutory authorization for the
   Order, and all other relevant factors that gave rise to its issuance remain
   unchanged, this dispute is almost certain to recur.” Additionally, the Owners
   argue that the “Commissioner has not offered any evidence or authority that
   proves his office will not issue such an order in the future.” This, however,
   is a generalized complaint about the statutory authority underpinning the
   Open Beaches Act more broadly, and their suit is not, and has never been, a
   facial attack on the legality of a state statute. They cannot raise an entirely
   new claim for the first time on appeal and in response to a motion to dismiss.

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   The Owners challenged a specific temporary order that was issued in
   response to a unique situation where two powerful storms hit the Village of
   Surfside Beach and Galveston Island. While tropical storms on the Gulf
   Coast are not necessarily rare, it is mere speculation that tropical systems will
   impact the first line of natural vegetation and the Commissioner issues a
   similar order affecting these specific homeowners. See, e.g., Amawi v. Paxton,
   956 F.3d 816, 821 (5th Cir. 2020) (“[I]t is remote, and indeed unrealistically
   speculative, that these defendants will ever again expose the plaintiffs to the
   claimed injury that prompted this lawsuit.”).
          The Owners also contend that this case is not moot because “the
   Order continues to affect the marketability and value of the Owners’
   properties despite its recission.” The Owners argue that “[t]he existence of
   the Order in those records puts prospective buyers of the Owners’ properties
   on notice that state officials can, and are likely to, declare that a public beach
   easement extends to private land lying within 200 feet inland of MLT in
   Surfside Beach, if a tropical storm hits.” But this is not unique to these
   Owners. All properties near the beachfront in Texas could theoretically be
   subjected to similar actions. Because of this, the harms they complain of are
   not individualized or unique, and this theory cannot save their claims from
   dismissal due to mootness.
              b. The temporary order did not end because of litigation
                 posturing
          “[T]he goal is to determine whether the defendant’s actions are
   ‘litigation posturing’ or whether the controversy is actually extinguished.”
   Yarls, 905 F.3d at 910. “[A] statute that expires by its own terms does not
   implicate [litigation postering] concerns. Why? Because its lapse was
   predetermined and thus not a response to litigation. So unlike a postsuit
   repeal that might not moot a case, a law’s automatic expiration does.” Spell,
   962 F.3d at 179. The temporary order suspending determination of the LOV

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   provided that it would “expire two years from the date the Order is issued.”
   Texas rescinded the order just over 16 months later. This analysis is slightly
   complicated by Texas’ decision to rescind the temporary order early, but,
   according to the temporary order, “a primary purpose of the temporary
   suspension of enforcement is to allow natural recovery and stabilization of
   the beach system . . . .” This goal, according to Texas, was achieved prior to
   the two-year mark. It would make little sense to have Texas leave the
   temporary order in place beyond its usefulness and purpose—laid out
   explicitly in the order—simply so a court could find that the case is moot. In
   effect, this order ended by its own terms when Texas determined that it
   achieved its written purpose.
          The presumption of truth to Texas’ statements that the temporary
   order served its usefulness—and did not end because of litigation
   posturing—is warranted. This is because “[g]overnment officials ‘in their
   sovereign capacity and in the exercise of their official duties are accorded a
   presumption of good faith because they are public servants, not self-
   interested private parties.’” Yarls, 905 F.3d at 910–11 (5th Cir. 2018)
   (quoting Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Tex., 560 F.3d 316, 325 (5th Cir.
   2009)). “Without evidence to the contrary, we assume that formally
   announced changes to official governmental policy are not mere litigation
   posturing.” Sossamon, 560 F.3d at 325. Treating Texas’ position and its
   representations to the court with “some solicitude” is warranted. Id.
              c. The Owners’ claim does not fall under the capable of
                 repetition, yet evading review doctrine
          This claim is also not saved from mootness by the “capable of
   repetition, yet evading review” doctrine. This exception to general mootness
   principles has two prongs: “(1) the challenged action was in its duration too
   short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there was
   a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected

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   to the same action again.” Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149, (1975).
   “Under the second prong, the party invoking jurisdiction must show a
   ‘demonstrated probability’ or ‘reasonable expectation,’ not merely a
   ‘theoretical possibility,’ that it will be subject to the same government
   action.” Lopez v. City of Houston, 617 F.3d 336, 340 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting
   Libertarian Party v. Dardenne, 595 F.3d 215, 217 (5th Cir. 2010)). The Owners
   bear the burden of proving both prongs. Id.
          Here, for the first prong, the duration of the temporary order allowed
   time for the Owners to fully litigate this case at the trial court. As for the
   second prong, “merely showing that the government will ‘have an
   opportunity to act in the same allegedly unlawful manner in the future’ is not
   enough to satisfy the second prong of the exception without a reasonable
   expectation that the government will act in that manner.” Id. at 341 (quoting
   Libertarian Party, 595 F.3d at 217). The Owners fail to meet this burden.
                                   Conclusion

          This case is DISMISSED as moot.

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                                      No. 22-40350

   James C. Ho, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
          I respectfully dissent. First, with respect to the Commissioner’s
   assertion of mootness, the timing is suspicious. The Commissioner did not
   rescind the challenged order until shortly before her brief in this appeal was
   due. Moreover, this timing was not pre-ordained—in fact, it contradicted
   the original terms of the order. So I have real doubts as to whether the
   government’s actions mooting this case were sincere or strategic—a question
   we must ask under a faithful application of the doctrine of voluntary
   cessation. See, e.g., U.S. Navy SEALs 1-26 v. Biden, _ F.4th _, _ (5th Cir.
   2023) (Ho, J., dissenting). The majority would presume the Commissioner’s
   good faith. I understand and wish I could agree with my distinguished
   colleagues. But the circumstances give me pause. What’s more, Plaintiffs
   plausibly contend that, no matter what its expiration date, the order will only
   continue to adversely impact the marketability and value of their properties.
          Turning to the denial of preliminary injunctive relief, I disagree with
   the district court’s conclusion that Plaintiffs lack irreparable injury. Plaintiffs
   demonstrate irreparable injury to the extent that sovereign immunity would
   preclude them from recovering any monetary damages caused by Defendants
   in this matter. See, e.g., Clarke v. CFTC, _ F.4th _, _ (5th Cir. 2023) (citing
   Wages & White Lion Invs., LLC v. FDA, 16 F.4th 1130, 1142 (5th Cir. 2021)).
   So I would reverse the denial of preliminary injunctive relief and remand for
   further proceedings accordingly.
          “The Founders recognized that the protection of private property is
   indispensable to the promotion of individual freedom. As John Adams
   tersely put it, ‘[p]roperty must be secured, or liberty cannot exist.’” Cedar
   Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063, 2071 (2021) (quoting Discourses on
   Davila, in 6 Works of John Adams 280 (C. Adams ed. 1851)). Respect
   for private property leads me to conclude that we should reverse and remand.

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