Court Opinion

ID: 9958634
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-09 18:08:21.216363+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:31.892969
License: Public Domain

[Cite as In re C.B., 2024-Ohio-1332.]

                             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                     HIGHLAND COUNTY

                                          :

IN THE MATTER OF                          :    CASE NO. 23CA17
                                                        23CA18
        C.B. AND M.B.                     :             23CA19
                                                        23CA20
        DEPENDENT CHILDREN.               :
                                               DECISION & JUDGMENT ENTRY
                                          :

_______________________________________________________________
                           APPEARANCES:

Steven H. Eckstein, Washington Court House, Ohio, for Appellant.

Anneka P. Collins, Highland County Prosecuting Attorney, and
Molly Bolek, Highland County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney,
Hillsboro, Ohio, for Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
CIVIL CASE FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT, JUVENILE DIVISION
DATE JOURNALIZED:4-2-24
ABELE, J.

        {¶1}     This is a consolidated appeal from a Highland County

Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division, judgment that granted

Highland County Department of Job and Family Services, Children

Services Division, appellee herein, permanent custody of five-

year-old C.B. and two-year-old M.B.

        {¶2}     Appellants, the children’s biological parents, raise

the following assignment of error:

                 “THE TRIAL COURT’S GRANT OF PERMANENT
                 CUSTODY TO THE HIGHLAND COUNTY JOBS AND
                 FAMILY SERVICES CHILDREN’S DIVISION WAS
                 AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE
           EVIDENCE.”

    {¶3}   On May 3, 2021, appellee filed a complaint that

alleged the two children are abused, neglected, “and/or”

dependent children.     The complaint alleged that on March 18,

2021, appellee learned that the mother, about to give birth to a

child, had not had any prenatal care and had been in labor for

about one day.   The mother indicated that Fayette County had

removed her other children from her custody due to a lack of

running water in the home.     The caseworker contacted Fayette

County and learned that the children had been removed due to

methamphetamine use.     After the mother gave birth, the newborn’s

cord blood tested positive for methamphetamine.

    {¶4}   On March 24, 2021, a caseworker visited the family’s

home, but was not able to make contact.     This caseworker went to

the home a second time on that date and again could not make

contact.

    {¶5}   On March 25, 2021, the caseworker asked law

enforcement officers to conduct a welfare check.     The officers

reported that they were unable to contact the family.

    {¶6}   On March 29, 2021, the caseworker and a police officer

visited the home, and this time, they contacted the family.       The

mother admitted that she had used methamphetamine with the

father and in the children’s presence.     Appellants submitted to

random drug screens and mother’s test returned positive for
methamphetamine, and father’s test returned positive for

methamphetamine, cocaine, and Tramadol.     The caseworker

“completed a safety plan with paternal grandmother.”

    {¶7}    On April 15, 2021, a caseworker visited the family and

conducted another round of drug screens.     Appellants tested

positive for methamphetamine and the father also tested positive

for THC.

    {¶8}    Two weeks later, a caseworker attempted to visit the

paternal grandmother’s home but could not make contact.       The

caseworker then visited appellants’ home.     At first, no one

answered.    The caseworker, however, observed a car in the

driveway that contained car seats.    The caseworker then drove to

a location where she could see the home and “law enforcement was

contacted due to concerns that the safety plan was not being

followed.”    While waiting, the caseworker observed appellants

“walking out to the car with the children.”     Appellants reported

that “they only had the children for a few hours” because the

paternal grandmother had been at a doctor’s appointment.

    {¶9}    Consequently, the agency requested the court to grant

it emergency temporary custody of the children or enter another

appropriate disposition.    Also on May 3, 2021, the agency filed

a motion for emergency temporary custody of the children, which

the trial court granted.

    {¶10} On June 15, 2021, the trial court adjudicated the
children dependent and dismissed the abuse and neglect

allegations.   The court also placed the children in appellee’s

temporary custody for a one-year period.

    {¶11} Nine months later, on April 18, 2022, appellee filed a

permanent-custody motion.   Appellee later amended this motion to

request a six-month extension of temporary custody.   The trial

court granted appellee’s motion.

    {¶12} On October 12, 2022, appellee filed a second

permanent-custody motion.   As with the first permanent-custody

motion, appellee also later amended this motion to request an

extension of temporary custody so that appellee could conduct a

home study for a potential placement.   The trial court granted

this motion and continued the children in appellee’s temporary

custody.

    {¶13} On April 27, 2023, appellee filed a third and final

permanent-custody motion.   At the hearing, the mother testified,

as if on cross-examination, that she has not completed a drug

treatment program.   She agreed she tested positive on 19 of the

20 drug screens that she submitted throughout the pendency of

the case and she is “worse off now than when” the children

initially were removed from her care.

    {¶14} The father likewise testified as if on cross-

examination and stated that he did not complete a drug treatment

program and he tested positive for drugs on 19 of the 20 drug
screens.

    {¶15} Visitation monitor Taylor Ball testified that

appellants attended 107 of 111 visits and the visits went well.

Ball explained that the children appeared to be bonded to

appellants.

    {¶16} The children’s foster father testified that the

children lived in his home since April 30, 2021.   He stated that

he and his wife are interested in adopting the children.

    {¶17} Rebecca Souther testified that she has been the

family’s caseworker since the children’s May 2021 removal.     She

explained that the case plan required appellants to complete

drug and alcohol assessments, to complete mental health

assessments, and to maintain stable housing and employment.

Souther stated that neither parent completed a drug treatment

program or a mental health assessment.

    {¶18} Caseworker Souther agreed that appellants’ visits with

the children have been appropriate.   She also reported that the

children are doing well in the foster home and seem to be bonded

to the foster family.

    {¶19} Caseworker Souther also stated that mother identified

two potential placements for the children.   The first placement

“back[ed] out,” and the second placement did not have the home

study approved.

    {¶20} The mother testified again on direct examination and
reported that she (1) currently stays “between hotels and

family,” (2) has been employed as a nursing assistant for 13

years, (3) is enrolled in an online drug treatment program, (4)

continues to test positive for drugs, (5) is enrolled in a

mental health program through the same online provider, and (6)

has not entered an inpatient treatment center due to the

financial costs.     The father testified that he did not enter a

treatment program because he cannot “make” himself “do it.”

    {¶21} On September 13, 2023, the trial court granted

appellee permanent custody of the two children.     The court found

that the children have been in appellee’s temporary custody for

12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period and that

placing the children in appellee’s permanent custody is in their

best interests.

    {¶22} With respect to the children’s best interests, the

court found that appellants have maintained appropriate contact

with the children.     However, the children are bonded with the

foster family, and the foster parents are willing to adopt both

children.   The guardian ad litem also recommended that the court

grant appellee permanent custody of the children.     The

caseworker stated that no viable relative placements exist and

that the children are doing well in their current placements.

Also, appellants are unable or unwilling to provide the children

with a legally secure permanent placement.     They currently
reside either in hotels or with family members and remain

addicted to drugs and continue to test positive.

    {¶23} The trial court explained:

         This case presents yet another unfortunate example
    of parents being unwilling to make the right choices and
    sacrifices to reunify with their children. They have
    chosen their respective illegal drug consumption and
    unwillingness to provide a stable home for the children
    over reunifying with them.      Simply visiting is not
    enough.

The court did not believe that granting appellants more time

would be in the children’s best interests: “To grant additional

time to the parents for reunification is only delaying what is

in the best interest of the children.”     The court did not

believe that appellants’ efforts would be any different if it

granted them more time.     Consequently, the court granted

appellee permanent custody of the two children.     These appeals

followed.

    {¶24} In their combined and sole assignment of error,

appellants assert that the trial court’s decision is against the

manifest weight of the evidence.     Specifically, they contend

that the trial court could not have formed a firm belief that

placing the children in appellee’s permanent custody is in their

best interests when the mother was unable to quit her job to

enter inpatient drug treatment and was subject to a $350 monthly

child support obligation.     Appellants assert that the mother’s

“recovery from drugs was too difficult to manage, she could not
enter inpatient drug treatment as it required her to quit her

job and then she could not pay her child support.”

    {¶25} Appellants additionally fault the trial court for

failing to understand “what drug addiction is.”   Appellants

charge that “[t]o call it a habit and the parents willingly

using and choosing drugs over their children is not consistent

with any drug addiction theory.”    Appellants contend that the

trial court should have denied appellee’s request for permanent

custody and, instead, should have required the agency to file a

new complaint to start a new two-year period to allow them to

continue to work on their case plan.

                                A

    {¶26} Generally, a reviewing court will not disturb a trial

court’s permanent custody decision unless the decision is

against the manifest weight of the evidence.    E.g., In re B.E.,

4th Dist. Highland No. 13CA26, 2014-Ohio-3178, ¶ 27; In re R.S.,

4th Dist. Highland No. 13CA22, 2013-Ohio-5569, ¶ 29; accord In

re Z.C., Slip Op., 2023-Ohio-4703, ¶ 1.

         “Weight of the evidence concerns ‘the inclination
    of the greater amount of credible evidence, offered in
    a trial, to support one side of the issue rather than
    the other. It indicates clearly to the jury that the
    party having the burden of proof will be entitled to
    their verdict, if, on weighing the evidence in their
    minds, they shall find the greater amount of credible
    evidence sustains the issue which is to be established
    before them. Weight is not a question of mathematics,
    but depends on its effect in inducing belief.’”
Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, 972

N.E.2d 517, ¶ 12, quoting State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380,

387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997), quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1594

(6th Ed.1990).

    {¶27} When an appellate court reviews whether a trial

court’s permanent custody decision is against the manifest

weight of the evidence, the court “‘“weighs the evidence and all

reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses

and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence,

the [finder of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a

manifest miscarriage of justice that the [judgment] must be

reversed and a new trial ordered.”’”   Eastley at ¶ 20, quoting

Tewarson v. Simon, 141 Ohio App.3d 103, 115, 750 N.E.2d 176 (9th

Dist.2001), quoting Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, 678 N.E.2d

541, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485

N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983); accord In re Pittman, 9th Dist.

Summit No. 20894, 2002-Ohio-2208, ¶¶ 23-24.   We further observe,

however, that issues relating to the credibility of witnesses

and the weight to be given the evidence are primarily for the

trier of fact.   As the court explained in Seasons Coal Co. v.

Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, 461 N.E.2d 1273 (1984):

         The underlying rationale of giving deference to the
    findings of the trial court rests with the knowledge
    that the trial judge is best able to view the witnesses
    and observe their demeanor, gestures and voice
    inflections, and use these observations in weighing the
     credibility of the proffered testimony.

     {¶28} Moreover, deferring to the trial court on matters of

credibility is “crucial in a child custody case, where there may

be much evident in the parties’ demeanor and attitude that does

not translate to the record well (Emphasis sic).”     Davis v.

Flickinger, 77 Ohio St.3d 415, 419, 674 N.E.2d 1159 (1997).

Accord In re Christian, 4th Dist. No. 04CA 10, 2004-Ohio-3146, ¶

7.

     {¶29} The question that an appellate court must resolve when

reviewing a permanent custody decision under the manifest weight

of the evidence standard is “whether the juvenile court’s

findings * * * were supported by clear and convincing evidence.”

In re K.H., 119 Ohio St.3d 538, 2008-Ohio-4825, 895 N.E.2d 809,

¶ 43.     “Clear and convincing evidence” is:

     the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the
     mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as
     to the allegations sought to be established.      It is
     intermediate, being more than a mere preponderance, but
     not to the extent of such certainty as required beyond
     a reasonable doubt as in criminal cases. It does not
     mean clear and unequivocal.

In re Estate of Haynes, 25 Ohio St.3d 101, 103-04, 495 N.E.2d 23

(1986).     In determining whether a trial court based its decision

upon clear and convincing evidence, “a reviewing court will

examine the record to determine whether the trier of facts had

sufficient evidence before it to satisfy the requisite degree of

proof.”    State v. Schiebel, 55 Ohio St.3d 71, 74, 564 N.E.2d 54
(1990); accord In re Holcomb, 18 Ohio St.3d 361, 368, 481 N.E.2d

613 (1985), citing Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120

N.E.2d 118 (1954) (“Once the clear and convincing standard has

been met to the satisfaction of the [trial] court, the reviewing

court must examine the record and determine if the trier of fact

had sufficient evidence before it to satisfy this burden of

proof.”); In re Adoption of Lay, 25 Ohio St.3d 41, 42-43, 495

N.E.2d 9 (1986).     Cf. In re Adoption of Masa, 23 Ohio St.3d 163,

165, 492 N.E.2d 140 (1986) (whether a fact has been “proven by

clear and convincing evidence in a particular case is a

determination for the [trial] court and will not be disturbed on

appeal unless such determination is against the manifest weight

of the evidence”).

    {¶30} Thus, if a children services agency presented

competent and credible evidence upon which the trier of fact

reasonably could have formed a firm belief that permanent

custody is warranted, the court’s decision is not against the

manifest weight of the evidence.    In re R.M., 2013-Ohio-3588,

997 N.E.2d 169, ¶ 62 (4th Dist.); In re R.L., 2nd Dist. Greene

Nos. 2012CA32 and Greene Nos. 2012CA33, 2012-Ohio-6049, ¶ 17,

quoting In re A.U., 2nd Dist. Montgomery No. 22287, 2008-Ohio-

187, ¶ 9 (“A reviewing court will not overturn a court’s grant

of permanent custody to the state as being contrary to the

manifest weight of the evidence ‘if the record contains
competent, credible evidence by which the court could have

formed a firm belief or conviction that the essential statutory

elements * * * have been established.’ ”).

    {¶31} Once a reviewing court finishes its examination, the

judgment may be reversed only if it appears that the fact-

finder, when resolving the conflicts in evidence, “ ‘clearly

lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice

that the [judgment] must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’ ”

Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20

Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983).     A

reviewing court should find a trial court’s permanent custody

decision against the manifest weight of the evidence only in the

“ ‘exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against

the [decision].’ ”   Id., quoting Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d at 175,

485 N.E.2d 717; accord State v. Lindsey, 87 Ohio St.3d 479, 483,

721 N.E.2d 995 (2000).

                                B

    {¶32} We recognize that “parents’ interest in the care,

custody, and control of their children ‘is perhaps the oldest of

the fundamental liberty interests recognized by th[e United

States Supreme] Court.’ ”   In re B.C., 141 Ohio St.3d 55, 2014-

Ohio-4558, 21 N.E.3d 308, ¶ 19, quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530

U.S. 57, 65, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000).     Indeed, the

right to raise one’s “child is an ‘essential’ and ‘basic’ civil
right.”   In re Murray, 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 157, 556 N.E.2d 1169

(1990); accord In re Hayes, 79 Ohio St.3d 46, 48, 679 N.E.2d 680

(1997); see Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct.

1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982) (“natural parents have a fundamental

right to the care and custody of their children”).   Thus,

“parents who are ‘suitable’ have a ‘paramount’ right to the

custody of their children.”   B.C. at ¶ 19, quoting In re

Perales, 52 Ohio St.2d 89, 97, 369 N.E.2d 1047 (1977), citing

Clark v. Bayer, 32 Ohio St. 299, 310 (1877); Murray, 52 Ohio

St.3d at 157, 556 N.E.2d 1169.

    {¶33} A parent’s rights, however, are not absolute.      In re

D.A., 113 Ohio St.3d 88, 2007-Ohio-1105, 862 N.E.2d 829, ¶ 11.

Rather, “ ‘it is plain that the natural rights of a parent * * *

are always subject to the ultimate welfare of the child, which

is the polestar or controlling principle to be observed.’ ”     In

re Cunningham, 59 Ohio St.2d 100, 106, 391 N.E.2d 1034 (1979),

quoting In re R.J.C., 300 So.2d 54, 58 (Fla. App. 1974).     Thus,

the State may terminate parental rights when a child’s best

interest demands such termination.   D.A. at ¶ 11.

    {¶34} Before a court may award a children services agency

permanent custody of a child, R.C. 2151.414(A)(1) requires the

court to hold a hearing.   The primary purpose of the hearing is

to allow the court to determine whether the child’s best

interests would be served by permanently terminating the
parental relationship and by awarding permanent custody to the

agency.   Id.   Additionally, when considering whether to grant a

children services agency permanent custody, a trial court should

consider the underlying purposes of R.C. Chapter 2151: “to care

for and protect children, ‘whenever possible, in a family

environment, separating the child from the child’s parents only

when necessary for the child’s welfare or in the interests of

public safety.’ ” In re C.F., 113 Ohio St.3d 73, 2007-Ohio-1104,

862 N.E.2d 816, ¶ 29, quoting R.C. 2151.01(A).

                                  C

    {¶35} A children services agency may obtain permanent

custody of a child by (1) requesting it in the abuse, neglect or

dependency complaint under R.C. 2151.353, or (2) filing a motion

under R.C. 2151.413 after obtaining temporary custody.    In this

case, appellee sought permanent custody by filing a motion under

R.C. 2151.413.    When an agency files a permanent custody motion

under R.C. 2151.413, R.C. 2151.414 applies.    R.C. 2151.414(A).

    {¶36} R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) permits a trial court to grant

permanent custody of a child to a children services agency if

the court determines, by clear and convincing evidence, that the

child’s best interest would be served by the award of permanent

custody and that one of the following conditions applies:

         (a) The child is not abandoned or orphaned or has
    not been in the temporary custody of one or more public
    children services agencies or private child placing
    agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive
    twenty-two month period ending on or after March 18,
    1999, and the child cannot be placed with either of the
    child’s parents within a reasonable time or should not
    be placed with the child’s parents.
         (b) The child is abandoned.
         (c) The child is orphaned, and there are no
    relatives of the child who are able to take permanent
    custody.
         (d) The child has been in the temporary custody of
    one or more public children services agencies or private
    child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a
    consecutive twenty-two month period ending on or after
    March 18, 1999.
         (e) The child or another child in the custody of
    the parent or parents from whose custody the child has
    been removed has been adjudicated an abused, neglected,
    or dependent child on three separate occasions by any
    court in this state or another state.

    {¶37} Thus, before a trial court may award a children

services agency permanent custody, it must find (1) that one of

the circumstances described in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) applies, and

(2) that awarding the children services agency permanent custody

would further the child’s best interest.

    {¶38} In the case at bar, the trial court found that the

children had been in the agency’s temporary custody for more

than 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period, and thus, that

R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) applies.   Appellants do not challenge

this finding.

    {¶39} R.C. 2151.414(D) directs a trial court to consider

“all relevant factors,” as well as specific factors, to

determine whether a child’s best interest will be served by

granting a children services agency permanent custody.    The
listed factors include: (1) the child’s interaction and

interrelationship with the child’s parents, siblings, relatives,

foster parents and out-of-home providers, and any other person

who may significantly affect the child; (2) the child’s wishes,

as expressed directly by the child or through the child’s

guardian ad litem, with due regard for the child’s maturity; (3)

the child’s custodial history; (4) the child’s need for a

legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of

placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody

to the agency; and (5) whether any factors listed under R.C.

2151.414(E)(7) to (11) apply.

    {¶40} Courts that are determining whether a grant of

permanent custody to a children services agency will promote a

child’s best interest must consider “all relevant [best

interest] factors,” as well as the “five enumerated statutory

factors.”   C.F. at ¶ 57, citing In re Schaefer, 111 Ohio St.3d

498, 2006-Ohio-5513, 857 N.E.2d 532, ¶ 56; accord In re C.G.,

9th Dist. Summit Nos. 24097 and Summit Nos. 24099, 2008-Ohio-

3773, ¶ 28; In re N.W., 10th Dist. Franklin Nos. 07AP-590 and

Franklin Nos. 07AP-591, 2008-Ohio-297, ¶ 19.    However, none of

the best interest factors are entitled to “greater weight or

heightened significance.”   C.F. at ¶ 57.   Instead, the trial

court considers the totality of the circumstances when making

its best interest determination.   In re K.M.S., 3rd Dist. Marion
Nos. 9-15-37, 9-15-38, and Marion Nos. 9-15-39, 2017-Ohio-142, ¶

24; In re A.C., 9th Dist. Summit No. 27328, 2014-Ohio-4918, ¶

46.   In general, “[a] child’s best interest is served by placing

the child in a permanent situation that fosters growth,

stability, and security.”    In re C.B.C., 4th Dist. Lawrence Nos.

15CA18 and Lawrence Nos. 15CA19, 2016-Ohio-916, ¶ 66, citing In

re Adoption of Ridenour, 61 Ohio St.3d 319, 324, 574 N.E.2d 1055

(1991).

      {¶41} In the case sub judice, appellants do not explicitly

challenge the trial court’s findings regarding one of the best

interest factors.   Instead, they generally assert that the trial

court could not have “reasonably form[ed] a firm belief that

permanent custody is in the best interest of the children.”

Appellants assert that the trial court placed improper reliance

on their drug addiction and failed to recognize that the mother

could not enter a drug treatment program due to her full-time

employment and her monthly child support obligation.

      {¶42} Appellee, however, contends that the record contains

clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court’s

decision that placing the children in its permanent custody is

in their best interests.    We agree with appellee.

          Children’s Interactions and Interrelationships

      {¶43} The evidence shows that appellants share a bond with

the children and dearly love them.    Appellants consistently
visited the children and had telephone contact with them outside

of their supervised visitations.

    {¶44} The children are doing well with the foster family and

appear bonded to the family.     The foster parents intend to adopt

the children if granted the opportunity.

                         Children’s Wishes

    {¶45} The trial court noted that the children’s guardian ad

litem recommended that the court place the children in

appellee’s temporary custody.     C.F. at ¶ 55 (R.C. 2151.414

“unambiguously gives the trial court the choice of considering

the child’s wishes directly from the child or through the

guardian ad litem”); In re S.M., 4th Dist. Highland No. 14CA4,

2014-Ohio- 2961, ¶ 32 (recognizing that R.C. 2151.414 permits

juvenile courts to consider a child’s wishes as child directly

expresses or through the GAL).

                         Custodial History

    {¶46} The children have been in appellee’s temporary custody

since May 3, 2021.   As of the date that appellee filed its

permanent custody motion, the children had been in appellee’s

temporary custody for almost two years.     Thus, the children have

been in appellee’s temporary custody for 12 or more months of a

consecutive 22-month period.

               Legally Secure Permanent Placement

    {¶47} “Although the Ohio Revised Code does not define the
term, ‘legally secure permanent placement,’ this court and

others have generally interpreted the phrase to mean a safe,

stable, consistent environment where a child’s needs will be

met.”   In re M.B., 4th Dist. Highland No. 15CA19, 2016-Ohio-793,

¶ 56, citing In re Dyal, 4th Dist. Hocking No. 01CA12, 2001 WL

925423, *9 (Aug. 9, 2001) (“legally secure permanent placement”

means a “stable, safe, and nurturing environment”); see also In

re K.M., 10th Dist. Franklin Nos. 15AP-64 and 15AP-66, 2015-

Ohio-4682, ¶ 28 (legally secure permanent placement requires

more than a stable home and income, but also requires an

environment that will provide for child’s needs); In re J.H.,

11th Dist. Lake No. 2012-L-126, 2013-Ohio-1293, ¶ 95 (mother was

unable to provide legally secure permanent placement when she

lacked physical and emotional stability and father was unable to

do so when he lacked grasp of parenting concepts); In re J.W.,

171 Ohio App.3d 248, 2007-Ohio-2007, 870 N.E.2d 245, ¶ 34 (10th

Dist.) (Sadler, J., dissenting) (legally secure permanent

placement means “a placement that is stable and consistent”);

Black’s Law Dictionary 1354 (6th Ed. 1990) (defining “secure” to

mean, in part, “not exposed to danger; safe; so strong, stable

or firm as to insure safety”); id. at 1139 (defining “permanent”

to mean, in part, “[c]ontinuing or enduring in the same state,

status, place, or the like without fundamental or marked change,

not subject to fluctuation, or alteration, fixed or intended to
be fixed; lasting; abiding; stable; not temporary or

transient”).   Thus, “[a] legally secure permanent placement is

more than a house with four walls.      Rather, it generally

encompasses a stable environment where a child will live in

safety with one or more dependable adults who will provide for

the child’s needs.”     M.B. at ¶ 56.

    {¶48} In the case at bar, the evidence shows that the

children need a legally secure permanent placement and that they

cannot achieve this type of placement without granting appellee

permanent custody.     Appellants have not successfully completed a

drug treatment program despite nearly two years of agency

involvement.   The father does not believe that he can “make”

himself “do it.”     The mother has not taken adequate steps to try

to overcome her drug addiction and admitted that, at the time of

the permanent custody hearing, she was “worse” than she had been

when appellee first removed the children from her care.        While

she recently started to engage in an online treatment program,

she continued to test positive for drugs.      The trial court

believed that the mother’s past conduct and her six-year history

of abusing drugs are predictors of her future conduct and did

not bode well for the children.     See In re West, 4th Dist.

Athens No. 05CA4, 2005-Ohio-2977, ¶ 28, citing In re A.S., 12th

Dist. Butler Nos. CA2004-07-182 and CA2004-08-185, 2004-Ohio-

6323, ¶ 37 (“Past history is often the best predictor of future
conduct.     While surely people can change, the facts do not

indicate that [the biological parents] have the motivation or

ability to follow through and do what is necessary to regain

custody of their child.”); In re Vaughn, 4th Dist. Adams No.

00CA692, 2000 WL 33226177, *7 (Dec. 6, 2000) (“To further the

interests of the children, the court must consider any evidence

available to it, including a parent’s pattern of conduct.       Some

of the most reliable evidence for the court to consider is the

past history of the children and the parents.”); see also In re

Brown, 60 Ohio App.3d 136, 139, 573 N.E.2d 1217 (1st Dist.1989)

(stating that the mother’s “past parenting history and her

ability to comply with prior reunification plans regarding her

other children were relevant considerations in the juvenile

court’s dispositional determination” to award a children

services agency permanent custody).

    {¶49} Thus, during the nearly two years that this case had

been pending, appellants failed to conquer their drug addiction

so as to give appellee assurance that, if the court returned the

children to their custody, they would not continue to abuse

drugs.     Appellants have an unfortunate and lengthy history of

substance abuse and did not demonstrate that they would be

capable or willing to try to remain drug-free for their

children’s health, safety, and welfare.

    {¶50} Appellants nevertheless assert that the trial court
should have afforded them two more years to try to conquer their

addiction.   As we have recognized in the past, however, the

permanent custody statutes do not contemplate leaving children

in custodial limbo for an extended period of time while a parent

attempts to demonstrate that the parent is capable and willing

to provide the children with a legally secure permanent

placement.   See R.C. 2151.415(D)(4) (prohibiting court from

granting “an agency more than two extensions of temporary

custody” and from ordering “an existing temporary custody order

to continue beyond two years after the date on which the

complaint was filed or the child was first placed into shelter

care, whichever date is earlier, regardless of whether any

extensions have been previously ordered pursuant to division (D)

of this section”). Additionally, keeping children in limbo is

not in their best interests.    In re B.C., 141 Ohio St.3d 55,

2014–Ohio–4558, 21 N.E.3d 308, ¶ 20, quoting Lehman v. Lycoming

Cty. Children’s Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 513–514, 102 S.Ct.

3231, 73 L.Ed.2d 928 (1982) (“ ‘There is little that can be as

detrimental to a child’s sound development as uncertainty over

whether he is to remain in his current “home,” under the care of

his parents or foster parents, especially when such uncertainty

is prolonged.’ ”).

    {¶51} We recognize that drug addiction is a “powerful and

difficult” force to overcome.   In re Ca.S., 4th Dist. Pickaway
No. 21CA10, 2021-Ohio-3874, ¶ 65.    “However, we do not believe

that it is in a child’s best interest to continue the child in

custodial limbo — or to return a child to a parent’s care — when

the parent is engaged in a long-term fight against drug

addiction.”    Id.

       {¶52} In sum, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion

that the children cannot be placed in appellants’ custody, and

the children desperately need “stability and security * * * to

become productive and well-adjusted members of the adult

community.”    Ridenour, 61 Ohio St.3d at 324.   Their best

interests will be “served by placing them in a permanent

situation that fosters growth, stability, and security.”      In re

C.B.C., 4th Dist. Lawrence Nos. 15CA18 and 15CA19, 2016-Ohio-

916, ¶ 66, citing Ridenour.

       {¶53} The evidence also shows that the children enjoy a

stable placement with the foster family.    The foster parents are

interested in adopting the children, and the foster parents are

able and willing to provide the children with the “stability and

security” that they need “to become productive and well-adjusted

members of the adult community.”    Ridenour, 61 Ohio St.3d at

324.    The trial court could have quite reasonably determined

that placing the children in appellee’s permanent custody would

give them the best opportunity to become productive members of

society.    The trial court had no obligation to give appellants
more time to become drug-free or to return the children to their

custody.

    As this court often notes:

         “* * * [A] child should not have to endure the
    inevitable to its great detriment and harm in order to
    give the * * * [parent] an opportunity to prove her
    suitability. To anticipate the future, however, is at
    most, a difficult basis for a judicial determination.
    The child’s present condition and environment is the
    subject for decision not the expected or anticipated
    behavior of unsuitability or unfitness of the * * *
    [parent]. * * * The law does not require the court to
    experiment with the child’s welfare to see if he will
    suffer great detriment or harm.”

In re W.C.J., 4th Dist. Jackson No. 14CA3, 2014-Ohio-5841, ¶ 48,

quoting In re Bishop, 36 Ohio App.3d 123, 126, 521 N.E.2d 838

(5th Dist.1987).   For all of these reasons, the trial court’s

decision is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

    {¶54} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we

overrule appellants’ sole assignment of error and affirm the

trial court’s judgment.

                                         JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
                         JUDGMENT ENTRY

    It is ordered that the appeal be affirmed and that appellee

recover of appellants the costs herein taxed.

    The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this

appeal.

    It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this

Court directing the Highland County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile

Division, to carry this judgment into execution.

    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute that

mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

    Smith, P.J. & Hess, J.: Concur in Judgment & Opinion

                                   For the Court

                              BY:__________________________
                                 Peter B. Abele, Judge

                        NOTICE TO COUNSEL

     Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a
final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal
commences from the date of filing with the clerk.