Court Opinion

ID: 9665809
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:57:37.241107+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:16.020636
License: Public Domain

ROY L. RICHTER, Special Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the majority’s decision not to adopt an “apex” rule, but to apply Rules 56.01(b)(1) and 56.01(c) in deciding when a protective order is justified. The term “apex” used by California and Texas might better be characterized as a “figurehead” rule — which more accurately describes the position held by the person whose deposition is sought.
While not adopting an “apex” or “figurehead” rule, the language contained in Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 10 Cal.App.4th 1282, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 363 (1992),1 and Crown Central Petroleum *610Corp. v. Garcia, 904 S.W.2d 125 (Tex.1995),2 will provide guidance to judges faced with requests for protective orders.
For the foregoing reasons, I concur.

. We conclude it amounts to an abuse of discretion to withhold a protective order when a plaintiff seeks to depose a corporate president, or corporate officer at the apex of the corporate hierarchy, absent a reasonable indication of the officer’s personal knowledge of the case and absent exhaustion of less intrusive discovery methods.
Furthermore, "apex” depositions such as the one in this case, when conducted before less intrusive discovery methods are exhausted, raise a tremendous potential for discovery abuse and harassment. Vast numbers of personal injury claims could result in the deposition of the president of a national or international company whose product was somehow involved. It would be unreasonable to permit a plaintiff to begin discovery by deposing, for instance, the chief executive officer of a major automobile manufacturer when suing over a design flaw in a brake shoe — especially if we were to accept real party’s argument that the mere act of copying the chief executive officer with a few pieces of correspondence creates *610"constructive notice” justifying the deposition.
Consistent with these federal decisions, we hold that when a plaintiff seeks to depose a corporate president or other official at the highest level of corporate management, and that official moves for a protective order to prohibit the deposition, the trial court should first determine whether the plaintiff has shown good cause that the official has unique or superior personal knowledge of discoverable information. If not, as will presumably often be the case in the instance of a large national or international corporation, the trial court should issue the protective order and first require the plaintiff to obtain the necessary discovery through less intrusive methods. These would include interrogatories directed to the high-level official to explore the state of his or her knowledge or involvement in plaintiff's case; the deposition of lower level employees with appropriate knowledge and involvement in the subject matter of the litigation; and the organizational deposition of the corporation itself, which will require the corporation to produce for deposition the most qualified officer or employee to testify on its behalf as to the specified matters to be raised at the deposition. (§ 2025 Civ. Proc., subd. (d)(6).) Should these avenues be exhausted, and the plaintiff make a colorable showing of good cause that the high-level official possesses necessary information to the case, the trial court may then lift the protective order and allow the deposition to proceed. 10 Cal.App.4th 1282, 1287-1288, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 363, 365-367.

. When a party seeks to depose a corporate president or other high level corporate official and that official (or the corporation) files a motion for protective order to prohibit the deposition accompanied by the official’s affidavit denying any knowledge of relevant facts, the trial court should first determine whether the party seeking the deposition has arguably shown that the official has any unique or superior personal knowledge of discoverable information. If the party seeking the deposition cannot show that the official has any unique or superior personal knowledge of discoverable information, the trial court should grant the motion for protective order and first require the party seeking the deposition to attempt to obtain the discovery through less intrusive methods. Depending upon the circumstances of the particular case, these methods could include the depositions of lower level employees, the deposition of the corporation itself, and interrogatories and requests for production of documents directed to the corporation. After making a good faith effort to obtain the discovery through less intrusive methods, the party seeking the deposition may attempt to show (1) that there is a reasonable indication that the official’s deposition is calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and (2) that the less intrusive methods of discovery are unsatisfactory, insufficient or inadequate. If the party seeking the deposition makes this showing, the trial court should modify or vacate the protective order as appropriate. As with any deponent, the trial court retains discretion to restrict the duration, scope and location of the deposition. If the party seeking the deposition fails to make this showing, the trial court should leave the protective order in place. 904 S.W.2d 125, 128.