Court Opinion

ID: 9893818
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-30 17:09:26.615601+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:53.641648
License: Public Domain

J-S38011-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  EDWIN ISLAS-CRUZ                             :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 3100 EDA 2022

     Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 17, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division
                     at No(s): CP-46-CR-0000399-2022

BEFORE:      LAZARUS, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:                            FILED OCTOBER 30, 2023

       Edwin Islas-Cruz appeals from the judgment of sentence, imposed in

the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, after a jury convicted him

of first-degree murder on a theory of transferred intent. 1 After our review,

we affirm.

       The trial court set forth the factual history of this matter as follows:

       On November 14, 2022, the four-day jury trial commenced and
       established the following facts. Corporal Tyler North of the
       Norristown Police Department was on duty on September 18,
       2021, and[,] just prior to 5:30 p.m., he heard several shots fired.
       He responded to the scene and observed a male, later identified
       a[s] Barry Fields, with an apparent gunshot wound to his head

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 The trial court, sitting without a jury, also convicted Islas-Cruz of persons

not to possess a firearm based upon the trial testimony and certified copies
of Islas-Cruz’s relevant prior convictions.
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       outside of 641 Astor Street. The officer shut down the block for
       the ensuing investigation[] and spoke with several witnesses.

       Jodi Peregrina, a resident of 641 Astor Street[] and the victim’s
       sister, testified that on the day of the murder[,] she was sitting in
       front of her residence around 5:00 p.m. with her family. Prior to
       the shooting, two unknown males walked past her[;] one was later
       identified as [Josh] Agudio.

       About twenty minutes later[,] a dark[-]colored vehicle pulled up
       and double[-]parked[;] two males[2] jumped out [of] the
       vehicle[]and started shooting. Ms. Peregrina and her family took
       cover, but her brother was shot.

       Lieutenant William Mitchell of the Montgomery County Detective
       Bureau gathered surveillance video from 641 Astor Street. The
       video captured a black Toyota Camry pull up around 5:20 p.m.
       and two individuals exit the vehicle. Sixteen seconds later
       shooting starts. Within eight seconds from the initial shooting,
       the victim was shot. Ballistics evidence determined that there
       were three different firearms that fired the casings found at the
       scene.

       The lieutenant learned that the vehicle was registered to
       Christopher Ladson-Singleton[, who was living with Islas-Cruz’s
       sister at the time of the murder.] Mr. Ladson-Singleton testified
       that he had owned a 2019 black Toyota Camry, and that he had
       given [Islas-Cruz] permission to borrow it on September 18, 2021.

       In the course of the investigation, Lieutenant Mitchell reviewed
       several prison calls from Agudio while incarcerated on [an] illegal
       straw[-]purchase gun case. They revealed that Agudio received
       discovery for the case and he found out that the other individuals
       involved gave statements and told on each other.

       Lieutenant Mitchell also obtained the contents of numer[o]us
       Instagram accounts. He testified, inter alia, that[,] beginning on
       August 14, 2021, he began to see postings in which Agudio was
       calling individuals [“]rats.[”] A story was posted to Agudio's
       Instagram account that stated, “Y’all niggas rats. Paperwork be
____________________________________________

2 The Commonwealth contends that the two men who exited the black Camry

were Islas-Cruz and his brother, Giovanni. As of the time of trial, Giovanni’s
whereabouts were unknown and there was a warrant for his arrest for murder.
See N.T. Trial, 11/16/22, at 102.

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     up soon. Zon [Edzon Castrejon], Snacks [Mark Castrejon], and
     Reese.” On August 18, 2021, [Islas-Cruz’s] Instagram account
     posted a video story in which [Islas-Cruz] was rapping about
     “catching a body” and holding a firearm consistent with the Ruger
     used during the homicide. On August 20, 2021, Agudio’s account
     posted a Montgomery County Detective Bureau supplemental
     report regarding his illegal straw purchase gun case, and the post
     read, “Y’all told tonight”’—with emojis, including of a gray rat. An
     additional post contained [] the supplemental report, tagging Mr.
     Castrejon, Tyrese Dilworth-Simon, and Edzon Castrejon. On
     August 21, 2021, [Islas-Cruz’s] account posted an Instagram
     video. Also on August 21, 2021, Agudio’s account sent a direct
     message to Edzon’s account. He posted a photo of more discovery
     related to the straw[-]purchase case. [Islas-Cruz’s] Inst[a]gram
     account story stated, “If it's rumors you a rat I’m not fucking with
     you I don't give a fuck if it’s true or not show your work and push
     something.” On August 28, 2021, a video is post[ed] to [Islas-
     Cruz’s] account of him rapping about “that’s why I keep a 30 with
     a laser so I can spray you.” Next, the lieutenant testified about []
     messages from [the account belonging to] Agudio[], who was out
     of jail now and presumably in control of his Instagram account, to
     an account named Taz_odrama. The Lieutenant testified that
     these messages indicated that Agudio was looking for a gun.

     On September 2, 2021, there was a conversation between [Islas-
     Cruz’s] and Agudio’s account[s] in which Agudio accuses Edzon
     Castrejon and Mark Castrejon of giving [] statement[s] to police
     implicating him in the illegal straw[-]purchase gun case. [Islas-
     Cruz’s] account communicates with another Instagram account
     attempting to find [out] who Agudio is, and relating that Agudio
     was accusing Edzon Castrejon and Mark Castre[j]on of implicating
     [Agudio] in the illegal straw[-]purchase gun case. On September
     14, 2021, there were several video[s] posted on [Islas-Cruz’s]
     account depicting a barrel of a gun [with a] laser [attached to it].
     On September 16, 2021, [Islas-Cruz’s] account posted, “One false
     move nigga you a goner been masking up way before Corona.”

     On the day before the murder, on September 17, 2021, Agudio is
     waving a gun around on Instagram live. He was rapping about
     “getting back in blood.” On the same date, [Islas-Cruz’s] account
     posted, “Bro know I’m going to shoot until my hand so hot so I
     got to stay strapped niggas trynna kill me and the DA trynna find
     a way to wheel me I was getting high hoping if I get booked just
     write me I’m going to be in hell most likely.”

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                                     ...

     Agudio was arrested on September 29, 2021. Detective Anthony
     Caso of the Montgomery County Detective Bureau interviewed
     him. Agudio told the detective two conflicting versions of events.
     First, he stated that he was shot at. He also told the detective
     that, “they upped their guns” and he started shooting.

     [On October 4, 2021,] Officer Jordan Girardi of the Nebraska State
     Patrol was on patrol [when,] in the course of his duties[,] he made
     a traffic stop for a speeding car. During the vehicle stop, he
     smelled marijuana coming from the vehicle.            In the front
     passenger seat was an individual, identified as Pedro Gonzalez[,
     who was] later determined to be [Islas-Cruz]. Pursuant to a
     vehicle search, Officer Girardo located a Ruger 9mm handgun
     under the front passenger seat where [Islas-Cruz] was seated.
     Underneath the seat in front of the rear passenger area was a
     9mm ghost handgun without a serial number. Giovanni Cruz had
     been seated in the rear passenger seat. All occupants of the
     vehicle were arrested. Officer Girardi later learned that there was
     a warrant for [Islas-Cruz’s] arrest for first-degree murder. [Islas-
     Cruz] was taken into custody by Detective Caso on October 10,
     2021.

     Detective David Schanes of the Montgomery County Detective
     Bureau went to the murder scene on September 18, 2021,
     collected the ballistic evidence, and submitted the evidence for
     analysis. There were 39 fired cartridge casings ("FCC") at the
     scene, four projectiles, and two fragments of projectiles. There
     was also a projectile recovered at the autopsy. The FCC were
     attributed to three separate firearms. Referring to a diagram, the
     detective identified three groupings of the ballistics evidence.
     There was a yellow grouping of 14 FCC, a pink grouping of 13 FCC,
     and blue grouping of 12 FCC.

     Detective Eric Nelson, an expert in firearm identification,
     explained that his analysis of the FCC, he determined that three
     different firearms fired the 39 FCC. One of the firearms recovered
     in Nebraska fired 14 FCC. A second Nebraska firearm fired 12
     FCC. The remaining 13 FCC at the murder scene came from an
     unidentified firearm. The two Nebraska firearms included[] a
     Ruger 9mm, model 9E semiautomatic, equipped with a flashlight
     laser combination sighting device and an extended magazine
     assembly. The second Nebraska firearm matched to the murder
     scene was a Polymer80 ghost gun, 9mm caliber pistol. It was

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      submitted with an extended magazine. The expert determined
      that it was the Polymer80 that fired the 14 FCC at the murder
      scene and that the Ruger fired the 12 FCC found at the scene.

      Detective Nelson also analyzed [] eight 9mm FCC found at [a
      separate shooting that occurred in Norristown two days before the
      murder.] He concluded that the Ruger pistol from the September
      18, 2021 shootout[ also] fired the eight FCC [at the earlier
      shooting].

Trial Court Opinion, 2/17/23, at 2-8 (citations to record and footnotes

omitted).

      After the jury returned a guilty verdict, Islas-Cruz was immediately

sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment. Islas-Cruz filed a timely

notice of appeal, followed by a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise

statement of errors complained of on appeal. He raises the following claims

for our review:

      1. Should [] Islas-Cruz have been granted a jury charge on
      imperfect self-defense?

      2. Were issues properly preserved by [Islas-Cruz] at trial?

      3. Should the evidence and testimony [regarding] the earlier
      shooting [on] September 16, 2021 [have] been excluded from
      trial under [Pennsylvania] Rule of Evidence 403?

      4. Should evidence of violent rap lyrics from Instagram posts have
      been excluded from trial under [Rule] 403?

Brief of Appellant, at 2-3 (reordered for ease of disposition; unnecessary

capitalization omitted).

      Islas-Cruz first argues that the trial court abused its discretion in

refusing to instruct the jury on imperfect self-defense. “[O]ur standard of

review when considering the denial of jury instructions is one of deference—

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an appellate court will reverse a court’s decision only when it abused its

discretion or committed an error of law.” Commonwealth v. Janda, 14 A.3d

147, 163 (Pa. Super. 2011).

      Islas-Cruz asserts that Agudio fired first, from a handgun he had

concealed behind his body, and that Islas-Cruz did not fire until he had been

fired upon.   See Brief of Appellant, at 9.    He argues that he had “every

opportunity to [fire first], having approached [] Agudio with displayed

weapons, but did not, even though at the time[,] Agudio was a point-blank

target who was literally sitting on a step.”   Id.   Moreover, Islas-Cruz was

“trying to get back into [his] car, under heavy fire from Agudio (who fired 13

shots in 8 seconds, per the police firearms expert), when Agudio’s fatal bullet

struck the victim.”   Id.    Islas-Cruz argues that he “may have intended to

intimidate, he may have intended to provoke fear in [] Agudio, but there is a

valid and clear argument . . . that he did not intend to cause death or serious

bodily injury.” Id. at 11.

      Islas-Cruz further argues that, contrary to the trial court’s finding that

Islas-Cruz “could not be found to be free of fault or provocation” because he

exited the car brandishing a firearm, see Trial Court Opinion, 2/17/23, at 10,

“mere display of a firearm, as [] Islas-Cruz [] did, has not precluded even

claims of actual self-defense.” Brief of Appellant, at 10.

      Under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2503(b):

      A person who intentionally or knowingly kills an individual
      commits voluntary manslaughter if at the time of the killing he
      believes the circumstances to be such that, if they existed, would

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      justify the killing under Chapter 5 of this title (relating to general
      principles of justification), but his belief is unreasonable.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2503(b). In explaining the elements necessary to establish

unreasonable belief voluntary manslaughter—sometimes referred to as

“imperfect self-defense”—our Supreme Court has stated:

      This self-defense claim is imperfect in only one respect—an
      unreasonable rather than a reasonable belief that deadly force
      was required to save the actor’s life. All other principles of
      justification under 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 505 must [still be met in order
      to establish] unreasonable belief voluntary manslaughter.

Commonwealth v. Tilley, 595 A.2d 575, 582 (Pa. 1991).

      In order to establish the defense of self-defense under section 505, the

defendant must not only show that he was protecting himself against the use

of unlawful force but must also show that he was free from fault in

provoking or continuing the difficulty which resulted in the killing.

See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 505. Additionally, “the defense of self-defense necessarily

requires that the appellant admit that the shooting was intentional in order to

protect [oneself].”   Commonwealth v. Harris, 665 A.2d 1172, 1175 (Pa.

1995), citing Commonwealth v. Hobson, 398 A.2d 1364, 1368 (Pa. 1979).

Islas-Cruz is entitled to no relief.

      First, Islas-Cruz did not concede that he was at the scene of the crime,

much less that he intentionally shot at Agudio in self-defense, as the law

requires. See Harris, supra. Rather, the defense theory of the case involved

denying that Islas-Cruz was one of the two people that jumped out of the

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dark-colored vehicle and began shooting.          During his opening statement,

defense counsel argued as follows:

      Pay close attention to the evidence because, again, I don’t believe
      that the Commonwealth is going to be able to definitively, beyond
      a reasonable doubt, place my client in that vehicle at that
      particular time on September 18th of 2021. So[,] keep that in
      mind because that’s what they have to prove beyond a reasonable
      doubt, number one, that my client was involved, and I suggest to
      you that there’s going to be plenty of reasons to pause or hesitate
      to suggest that my client was not in that vehicle at the time of this
      incident.

N.T. Trial, 11/14/22, at 34. Having failed to admit that he intentionally shot

at Agudio, let alone that he was even at the scene of the crime, the defense

of imperfect self-defense is inapplicable, and the trial court did not err in

declining to instruct the jury on that defense.

      Moreover, the evidence adduced at trial demonstrates that, upon pulling

up to the scene of the crime, Islas-Cruz leapt out of a car brandishing a

weapon. Thus, even if Agudio actually fired the first shots, Islas-Cruz was not

“free from fault in provoking . . . the difficulty which resulted in the killing.”

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 505. A review of Commonwealth v. Samuel, 590 A.2d 1245

(Pa. 1991), on which Islas-Cruz relies to support his provocation argument,

does not alter our conclusion. There, the defendant’s sister, Yaffa, had asked

her husband, Richard, to move out of their apartment due to Richard’s drug

and alcohol problems. Yaffa asked defendant to move into the apartment “for

the dual purpose of assisting her financially and discouraging, by his presence,

Richard’s return.”   Id. at 1246.     That evening, defendant arrived at the

apartment with his clothes and a handgun, which he carried home in a pouch

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each evening from his place of business. See id. Shortly thereafter, Richard

arrived at the apartment, visibly intoxicated.      See id.    With defendant

standing beside Yaffa with his handgun visible, Yaffa asked Richard to leave

or she would call the police. See id. at 1246-47. Richard refused and Yaffa

called the police. See id. at 1247. While she was doing so, Richard left the

room and walked towards the bedrooms, cursing at defendant.            See id.

Defendant then went into the kitchen/dining area and sat down, placing his

gun back in its pouch on the table. See id. Yaffa completed her call to the

police and went to see what Richard was doing. See id. Richard then came

towards her carrying a sawed-off shotgun. See id. As Yaffa screamed, “he’s

got the gun, he’s got the gun,” Richard pumped the cocking device, loading a

shell into the chamber. Id. Defendant quickly entered the living room, with

his gun at his side. See id. Richard pointed his shotgun at defendant and

defendant fired three shots, two of which struck Richard in the chest, killing

him.   See id.    Defendant was charged with murder and possessing an

instrument of crime (“PIC”).    He pled not guilty, alleging self-defense and

defense of others. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 505, 506. The trial court, sitting

without a jury, convicted defendant of voluntary manslaughter and PIC,

finding that defendant’s belief that he fired in self-defense was unreasonable,

as he had provoked the fatal encounter by previously displaying his handgun

to Richard. Thus, the trial court reasoned, defendant failed to establish that

he was free from fault, precluding his reliance on the doctrine of self-defense.

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On appeal, this Court affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted allowance of

appeal.

      The Supreme Court reversed, stating that “[i]n order to establish that

an actor was the aggressor or provoker and, hence, was not entitled to claim

a defense of self-defense or defense of others, there must be some evidence

to support the inference that the defendant’s acts constituted ‘an intent to

cause death or serious bodily injury.’” Id. at 1248. The Court concluded that

the facts of the case did not meet that requirement, as, prior to Richard

leaving the room and returning with a shotgun, there was “no suggestion that

[defendant] pointed the gun at[,] . . . physically assaulted[,] . . . threatened[,]

. . . or [] had any physical contact with [Richard].” Id. Rather, the defendant

only raised his gun and fired at Richard after Richard aimed his own gun at

the defendant. Moreover, “[e]ven if the initial display of [defendant’s] gun

could be seen as provocative, the balance between the parties shifted when

Richard left the room and defendant retreated to the dining area, setting down

his weapon. Richard’s re-entry into the living room with a sawed-off shotgun

placed him in the position of being the aggressor.” Id. at 1249.

      Islas-Cruz attempts to extrapolate from the Supreme Court’s holding in

Samuel that the mere display of a handgun cannot be deemed to be

provocation for purposes of section 505.        As a result, he would have us

conclude that Islas-Cruz’s act of exiting the car brandishing a gun was not

provocation as contemplated by the statute. He is wrong, and his reliance on

Samuel is misplaced. In Samuel, the Court held that the defendant merely

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holding his gun at his side did not constitute provocation because: (1) there

was no other evidence of the defendant’s intent to cause death or serious

bodily injury, where he had held the gun at his side in a nonthreatening

manner; and (2) following an initial encounter, the defendant put down his

gun, Richard left the room but then re-entered with a sawed-off shotgun,

placing Richard in the position of aggressor. See Samuel, 590 A.2d at 1248–

49. In contrast, here, Islas-Cruz and his brother jumped out of their vehicle

with their guns drawn, after previously engaging with Agudio in an online

dispute, and approached Agudio, who was in a seated position on a step with

his weapon concealed. “[A] valid claim of self-defense cannot be made out

by the killer when the killer introduces a weapon into the encounter without

provocation. Such introduction operates to deny the killer’s assertion that he

was free from fault in provoking the difficulty.” Commonwealth v. Johnson,

331 A.2d 473, 476 (Pa. 1975). Here, Islas-Cruz “introduced a weapon into

the encounter without provocation.” Id. Accordingly, because he was not

free from fault in provoking the shooting, the trial court did not err in denying

Islas-Cruz’s request for an imperfect self-defense instruction.3

       Islas-Cruz’s final two claims involve evidentiary rulings made at trial by

the court.    Prior to addressing those claims, however, we must determine

whether he has properly preserved them.              On May 11, 2022, the
____________________________________________

3 Given the provocative acts by the Islas-Cruz brothers, it is of no moment

that Agudio may have been the first to actually fire his gun. Indeed, the trial
court granted Agudio’s request for a self-defense instruction. See N.T. Trial,
11/17/22, at 8-11.

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Commonwealth filed a motion in limine to admit certain bad acts evidence

under Pa.R.E. 404(b).    This evidence included evidence of the Norristown

shooting that occurred two days before the instant shooting and social media

videos of Islas-Cruz rapping.        The trial court never ruled on the

Commonwealth’s motion.         Subsequently, at trial, the Commonwealth

introduced evidence of both the prior shooting and the social media videos.

At no time did defense counsel object to the admission of that evidence.

     In 2001, Pa.R.E. 103(a) was amended to add the following
     paragraph: “Once the court makes a definitive ruling on the
     record admitting or excluding evidence, either at or before trial, a
     party need not renew an objection or offer of proof to preserve a
     claim of error for appeal.” Id. The amendment to Pa.R.E. 103(a)
     is identical to the amendment to F.R.E. 103(a)[, which] became
     effective on December 1, 2000. [See] Pa.R.E. 103(a), Comment.

     Consistent with the above amendment to Pa.R.E. 103(a), a motion
     in limine may preserve an objection for appeal without any need
     to renew the objection at trial, but only if the trial court clearly
     and definitively rules on the motion. [See] Pa.R.E. 103,
     Comment (“A ruling on a motion in limine on record is sufficient
     to preserve the issue for appeal, without renewal of the objection
     or offer at trial.”); Trach v. Fellin, 817 A.2d 1102, 1107 n.3 (Pa.
     Super. 2003) (en banc ). Conversely, if the trial court defers
     ruling on a motion in limine until trial, the party that brought the
     motion must renew the objection at trial or the issue will be
     deemed waived on appeal. [See] F.R.E. 103, Advisory Committee
     Notes—2000 Amendments (“[W]hen the trial court appears to
     have reserved its ruling or to have indicated that the ruling is
     provisional, it makes sense to require the party to bring the issue
     to the court’s attention subsequently.”); [id.] (citing United
     States v. Valenti, 60 F.3d 941, 945 (2d Cir. 1995)) (“Valenti’s
     briefs and appendix contain no indication that he renewed at trial
     his request for a ruling, a step clearly required when the trial judge
     had earlier stated that he would reserve judgment until he heard
     the trial evidence. The failure to renew the objection constituted
     a waiver of the objection.”); see Markham v. Nat'l States Ins.

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       Co., 122 Fed.Appx. 392, 397 (10th Cir. 2004); Douthit v. Jones,
       619 F.2d 527, 538–39 (5th Cir. 1980).

Blumer v. Ford Motor Co., 20 A.3d 1222, 1232 (Pa. Super. 2011) (finding

hearsay objection waived where appellants did not lodge hearsay objection to

evidence during trial, nor ask trial court to issue definitive ruling on motion in

limine).

       Because Islas-Cruz did not object at trial to the admission of the

evidence of which he now complains, he has waived his claims on appeal.4

       Judgment of sentence affirmed.

____________________________________________

4 As the trial court properly notes, Islas-Cruz has waived his objection to the

admission of the rap videos for two additional reasons:

       First, counsel’s opposition to the videos [as stated in his written
       response to the Commonwealth’s motion in limine] were to all of
       the videos, [both] the ones [in which Islas-Cruz is] rapping and
       the ones [in which] he is not. However, [Islas-Cruz’s] issue on
       appeal makes a new argument by singling out the rap videos,
       arguing that they should not have been admitted because they
       “did not contain threats against any particular person” and only
       “portray [Islas-Cruz] as an individual who made regular threats of
       murder through his music[,]” which was highly prejudicial. See
       [Rule 1925(b) Statement, 12/28/22, at ¶ 3]. This argument was
       never asserted until this appeal. [S]econdly, this issue is waived
       because counsel agreed in his brief that “[t]his [c]ourt should
       permit the Commonwealth to introduce only one (1) of the
       aforesaid social media posts.” See Brief in Opposition to Motion
       in Limine, [] 5/27/22[, at 9]). Implicit in this concession is
       counsel’s concurrence that [] this evidence was [admissible for] a
       legitimate reason under the law[.] Therefore, the appellate issue
       raised herein, namely that the social media rap videos should not
       have been admitted in toto, has not been preserved, and is waived
       on appeal. [See] Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).

Trial Court Opinion, 2/17/23, at 20.

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Date: 10/30/2023

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