Court Opinion

ID: 9645693
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:32:59.584334+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:30.516628
License: Public Domain

*73Speziale, J.
(dissenting). The majority of the court, by its action today, has usurped the fact-finding function of the trial court.
Whether the defendants’ conduct is “reasonably likely unreasonably to pollute” the environment is a question of fact. General Statutes § 22a-17; Mystic Marinelife Aquarium, Inc. v. Gill, 175 Conn. 483, 503, 400 A.2d 726 (1978). With respect to the plaintiffs’ prima facie showing of unreasonable pollution and the defendants’ rebuttal evidence, the principles regarding burden of proof and weight of the evidence are the same in an action brought under the Environmental Protection Act of 1971 as in other civil actions. General Statutes § 22a-17. During the lengthy trial, the trial court heard extensive testimony from experts for both sides, examined a great number of exhibits, and viewed the premises. In its memorandum of decision the trial court summarized the plaintiffs’ evidence and concluded that, even before applying the five guidelines criticized by the majority opinion, the plaintiffs had failed to prove unreasonable pollution.1 Although the trial court did not use the magic words “prima facie case” or “sufficiently rebutted,” they are implicit in the findings and conclusions stated in the memorandum of decision. State v. Hawthorne, 176 Conn. 367, 371, 407 A.2d 1001 (1978).
*74It is the function of the trial court to weigh the evidence and judge the credibility of the witnesses. Leabo v. Leninski, 182 Conn. 611, 616, 438 A.2d 1153 (1981); Toffolon v. Avon, 173 Conn. 525, 530, 378 A.2d 580 (1977); Johnson v. Flammia, 169 Conn. 491, 497, 363 A.2d 1048 (1975). This court cannot find facts. Our role is to decide whether the decision of the trial court is “clearly erroneous in view of the evidence and pleadings in the whole record”; Practice Book § 3060D; Stelco Industries, Inc. v. Cohen, 182 Conn. 561, 564, 438 A.2d 759 (1980); and “where the factual basis of the court’s decision is challenged we must determine whether the facts set out in the memorandum of decision are supported by the evidence . . . .” Pandolphe’s Auto Parts, Inc. v. Manchester, 181 Conn. 217, 221, 435 A.2d 24 (1980). The majority does not state that the reason for disturbing the factual findings of the trial court is that those facts are “clearly erroneous.” Why not? Perhaps it is because there is nothing in the record of this ease to support such a conclusion.
Without justification the majority has taken over the fact-finding role of the trial court. Unfortunately, the parties and the judicial system will be subjected unnecessarily to the burdens of a new trial.
Wright, J. (dissenting). I also dissent.

 The court stated: “In general the plaintiffs’ experts, honest and qualified as they were, presented a theoretical viewpoint not firmly based on available facts. . . .
“The court finds that the plaintiffs have failed to prove unreasonable pollution, impairment, or destruction of the public trust in the air, water, or other natural resources of the state. Further, even if plaintiffs’ expert evidence were accepted in full at its face value the court finds no unreasonable pollution in the light of the five criteria set forth above.”