Court Opinion

ID: 9684588
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:02:55.63265+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:57.627125
License: Public Domain

SANDERS, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in that I do not think Potain, S.A. had the minimum contact with the State of Tennessee as required under the holding in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945) and is contra to the holding in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980).
Perhaps the principal basis for my disagreement with my colleagues is that I do not think the crane “entered Tennessee through a chain of distribution initiated by Potain, S.A.” as stated in the majority opinion. In my view, the crane entered Tennessee through a chain of circumstances unrelated to any activity by Potain, S.A. or its distributor. The fact that H. B. Owsley & Sons, Inc., formed a subsidiary corporation, Potain America, Inc., which purchased the assets of Potain, Inc., and became the distributor for Potain, S.A. should be ignored in our determination of the case, as it only serves to confuse the real issue. After the crane was sold to Owsley & Sons, Inc., neither Potain, S.A. nor its distributor had any further connection with it.
With this side issue removed, we come to a simple set of facts. Potain, S.A. manufactured a crane in France. It shipped the crane to its distributor in New York. The distributor sold the crane to a North Carolina corporation. The North Carolina corporation leased the crane to a Tennessee corporation for use in Tennessee. While operating the crane in Tennessee Plaintiff McCombs was injured as the result of an alleged defect in the crane. Potain, S.A. has never had any contact of any nature with the State of Tennessee. In the International Shoe Co., case the court said:
“Whether due process is satisfied must depend rather upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure. That clause does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations.”
Under the facts in the case at bar we ask: How has this criterion been met? The majority opinion seems to answer this question by saying that Potain, S.A. placed its product in the stream of commerce and it was *828foreseeable that the crane might reach the State of Tennessee and cause the injury there. As supportive of their position they quote the following from the World-Wide Volkswagen case:
“[T]he foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not the mere likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum State. Rather, it is that the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” (Emphasis ours.)
It will be observed that the critical point of foreseeability is “the defendant’s conduct or connection with the forum state.” What was the conduct or connection that Potain, S.A. had with the State of Tennessee to bring it within the foreseeable rule?
They further quote from World-Wide Volkswagen:
“.. . if the sale of a product of a manufacturer or distributor such as Audi or Volkswagen is not simply an isolated occurrence, but arises from the efforts of the manufacturer or distributor to serve directly or indirectly the market for its product in other States, it is not unreasonable to subject it to suit in one of those States if its allegedly defective merchandise has there been the source of injury to its owner or to others. The forum State does not exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State. Compare Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill.2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961). (Emphasis ours.)
Again, it is observed it “is not simply an isolated occurrence but arises from the efforts of the manufacturer or distributor to serve directly or indirectly the market for its product in other states.” In my view, whatever connection, if any, there is between Potain, S.A. and the State of Tennessee, it is an isolated occurrence. Then we ask: What efforts are shown to have been made by Potain, S.A., or its distributor to market cranes in Tennessee? The majority opinion answers these questions by saying, “Here the crane entered Tennessee through a chain of distribution initiated by Potain, S.A.” I cannot agree that the record supports this conclusion. In my view, the holding in the majority opinion stands for the proposition that when the manufacturer of a product places it in the stream of commerce and it is foreseeable that it may go into other states and, due to a defective condition, a person is injured in Tennessee, Hawaii, Alaska, or any other state, that state can exercise in persona jurisdiction over the manufacturer even though there has been no other contact. In addressing the due process requirement, the WorldWide Volkswagen court quoted with approval as follows, 100 S.Ct. at 565:
“ ‘As technological progress has increased the flow of commerce between the States, the need for jurisdiction over non-residents has undergone a similar increase. At the same time, progress in communications and transportation has made the defense of a suit in a foreign tribunal less burdensome. In response to these changes, the requirements for personal jurisdiction over non-residents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 24 L.Ed. 565, to the flexible standard of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95. But it is a mistake to assume that this trend heralds the eventual demise of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts. [Citation omitted.] Those restrictions are more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation. They are a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States.’ ”
In addressing foreseeability, the court said, 100 S.Ct. at 566:
“If foreseeability were the criterion a local California tire retailer could be forced to defend in Pennsylvania when a blowout occurs there, see Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502, 507 (CA4 1956); a Wisconsin seller of a defective automobile jack could be haled before a distant court for damage *829caused in New Jersey, Reilly v. Phil Tolkan Pontiac, Inc., 372 F.Supp. 1205 (N.J.1974); or a Florida soft drink concessionaire could be summoned to Alaska to account for injuries happening there, see Uppgren v. Executive Aviation Services, Inc., 304 F.Supp. 165, 170-171 (Minn.1969). Every seller of chattels would in effect appoint the chattel his agent for services of process. His amenability to suit would travel with the chattel. We recently abandoned the outworn rule of Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 25 S.Ct. 625, 49 L.Ed. 1023 (1905), that the interest of a creditor in a debt could be extinguished or otherwise affected by any State having transitory jurisdiction over the debtor. Shaffer v. Heitner, supra, 433 U.S. 186, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977). Having inferred the mechanical rule that a creditor’s amenability to a quasi in rem action travels with his debtor, we are unwilling to endorse an analogous principle in the present case.”
I find the majority view persuasive; however, I think its application goes beyond precedent cases and I would feel compelled to reverse.