Court Opinion

ID: 9605574
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:38:56.82516+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:28.876484
License: Public Domain

Carley, Justice,
concurring specially.
OCGA § 34-9-8 (a) provides that, for purposes of imposing liability for workers’ compensation benefits, either the principal, intermediate, or subcontractor can be considered the statutory employer of an injured employee. Under OCGA § 34-9-11 (a), the right to recover workers’ compensation benefits is an injured employee’s exclusive remedy, “provided, however, that no employee shall be deprived of any right to bring an action against any third-party tort-feasor. . . The issue in this case is whether a statutory employer who has not been required to pay workers’ compensation benefits under OCGA § 34-9-8 (a) is nevertheless entitled to the immunity from tort liability granted by OCGA § 34-9-11 (a). If this were an issue of first impression, I would hold that a statutory employer with no actual liability for workers’ compensation benefits has no immunity from potential tort liability. In Wright Assoc. v. Rieder, 247 Ga. 496, 499 (1) (277 SE2d 41) (1981), however, this Court held that any and all statutory employers “should receive the correlative benefit of tort immunity. . . .” Although I do not agree with this holding in Rieder, I am bound to follow it in this case and, for that reason, I concur specially.
The underlying policy of the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act) is to insure that an employee who suffers an on-the-job injury can recover benefits, without regard to any issue of negligence, contributory negligence or assumption of the risk. Pardue v. Ruiz, 263 Ga. 146, 148 (429 SE2d 912) (1993). Thus, it is entirely appropriate that the employer who actually bears the financial burden of providing workers’ compensation benefits receive, as the quid pro quo for satisfaction of this statutory liability to the injured employee, an immunity from common law tort liability. See generally Smith v. Gortman, 261 Ga. 206, 207 (403 SE2d 41) (1991). However, it clearly is not the intent of the Act to supplant the law of tort entirely, because an injured employee’s right to sue a third-party tort-feasor specifically is preserved by OCGA § 34-9-11 (a). Because the statutory employer incurring no actual liability for the payment of workers’ compensation benefits is a third-party as to the injured employee’s claim for *719those benefits, it is my opinion that such a statutory employer should be considered a potential third-party tort-feasor as to the injured employee. The effect of allowing tort immunity to a statutory employer having no actual liability for workers’ compensation benefits is to reward a tort-feasor while punishing a tort victim. In return for the statutory right to recover only workers’ compensation benefits for his injury, the injured employee must forgo his right to assert common law tort liability against more than just one potential tort-feasor. See Meiggs v. Associated Builders, 545 A2d 631, 637 (IV) (D.C. App. 1988).
The majority points out the existence of a “marked trend” toward the grant of tort immunity to a statutory employer who incurs no actual liability for workers’ compensation benefits. It should be noted, however, that this trend apparently includes cases from states wherein “the applicable workers’ compensation law specifically requires immunity.” Bence v. Pacific Power & Light Co., 631 P2d 13, 17 (Wyo. 1981). Under our Act, there is no specific grant of tort immunity to statutory employers. In Georgia, the extent of tort immunity is dependent entirely upon whether a “third-party tort-feasor” against whom tort liability can be asserted under OCGA § 34-9-11 (a) includes or excludes any and all statutory employers having potential liability for payment of workers’ compensation benefits pursuant to OCGA § 34-9-8 (a). Notwithstanding the trend noted by the majority, there is extensive authority which supports interpreting the tort immunity granted by OCGA § 34-9-11 (a) to apply only to those statutory employers who actually pay workers’ compensation benefits to the injured employee. See 6 Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law, § 72.31 (b), fn. 48 (1998) (citing cases from 15 states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico). Accordingly, if this were an issue of first impression in Georgia, I would follow that persuasive foreign authority and hold that, without regard to potential liability for workers’ compensation benefits, it is only the employer incurring actual liability for those benefits who is entitled to tort immunity.
However, this issue was resolved in Rieder wherein a majority of this Court adopted a contrary construction of the relevant provisions of the Act. As the majority indicates, subsequent to the decision in Rieder 17 years ago, the General Assembly has amended the Act extensively, but has not redefined “third-party tort-feasor” so as to include a statutory employer who incurs no actual liability for workers’ compensation benefits. Therefore, under that principle of stare decisis to which I subscribe, I am compelled to concur in the majority’s affirmance of the grant of summary judgment in this case. Abernathy v. City of Albany, 269 Ga. 88 (495 SE2d 13) (1998).
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Benham and Justice Hunstein join in this opinion.
*720Decided September 14, 1998.
Davis, Gregory, Christy & Forehand, Hardy Gregory, Jr., Mundy & Gammage, John S. Husser, for appellants.
Webb, Carlock, Copeland, Sender & Stair, David F. Root, Mary K. Greene, for appellee.