Court Opinion

ID: 9949026
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-08 16:09:09.687717+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:32.424878
License: Public Domain

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

                                              No. 125,919

               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

                                          STATE OF KANSAS,
                                              Appellee,

                                                     V.

                                          NICHOLAS OWENS,
                                             Appellant.

                                    MEMORANDUM OPINION

        Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; SETH L. RUNDLE, judge. Submitted without oral argument.
Opinion filed March 8, 2024. Vacated in part, dismissed in part, and remanded with directions.

        Kai Tate Mann, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.

        Lance J. Gillett, assistant district attorney, Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Kris W. Kobach,
attorney general, for appellee.

Before ARNOLD-BURGER, C.J., ATCHESON, J., and TIMOTHY G. LAHEY, S.J.

        PER CURIAM: After Nicholas Owens pleaded guilty to one count of attempted
aggravated indecent liberties with a child, the district court ordered that he reimburse the
State Board of Indigents' Defense Services (BIDS) for attorney fees in the sum of $975
and ordered Owens to register under the Kansas Offender Registration Act (KORA).
Owens challenges the attorney fee assessment, claiming the district court failed to
properly consider Owen's financial resources and the burden the BIDS fee would impose
on Owens. Because we agree that the district court erred when imposing the BIDS fees,
we vacate the assessment and remand to the district court for further proceedings. Owen's
also brings two constitutional challenges to the KORA registration. Because neither

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argument was raised before the district court or preserved for appeal, we decline to
consider those challenges.

                              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

        Owens pleaded guilty to attempted aggravated indecent liberties with a child, in
violation of K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 21-5301(a), (c)(1) and K.S.A. 2021 Supp. 21-5506(b)(1),
(c)(2)(A). Because Owen's had applied for and received court appointed counsel at the
outset of the case, the district court noted that the BIDS guidelines suggested attorney
fees of $975 be assessed. Owens requested the district court waive the BIDS fee, arguing
that (1) he would make less than minimum wage in prison; (2) his indigence qualified
him for a public defender; (3) the case was straightforward and did not require "an
outpouring of resources" on counsel's part; and (4) his meager resources would be heavily
consumed during incarceration. Defense counsel concluded by saying, "I ask that you
make State v. Robinson findings and waive any further costs beyond the $100 application
fee."

        The district court responded:

                "THE COURT: Mr. Owens, there are opportunities for employment in the
        Department of Corrections. I believe you've been in the Department of Corrections in the
        past. Are you physically able to work?
                "DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
                "THE COURT: All right. Then I'll impose the $975 in attorney fees along with
        the $100 administrative fee."

        The district court then notified Owens, without objection, of his obligation to
register under KORA, sentenced Owens to the highest presumptive sentence of 55
months in prison, and ordered him to pay a $400 child advocacy center (CAC) fee.

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       As the sentencing hearing concluded, in response to the district court's query
whether there was anything further to put on the record, defense counsel, "in light of the
newly imposed $400 CAC fee," again asked for Robinson findings and for waiver of the
attorney fees. The district court responded:

               ". . . All right. Well, the attorney fees that are applied here I believe are
       appropriate, and the representation that Mr. Owens received and the resolution in this
       case were pretty significant. A non-tried Level 1 case has recommended attorney fees of
       $2300. I'm not even sure that's the amount that applies here, but I believe that Mr. Owens
       is capable of working and paying those attorney fees.
               "In light of the resolution he received, he should pay them, and he does have an
       additional five months in KDOC to work and pay for those attorney fees, so I will leave
       the attorney fees as ordered."

       Owens timely appeals.

                                                ANALYSIS

  I.   Did the district court err when imposing the BIDS fee?

       Owens argues that the district court failed to explicitly consider his financial
resources and the burden such payment would impose, as required by K.S.A. 22-4513(b).
See State v. Robinson, 281 Kan. 538, Syl. ¶ 1, 132 P.3d 934 (2006). Resolving Owens'
appeal requires interpretation of K.S.A. 22-4513, which presents a question of law
subject to unlimited review. State v. Stoll, 312 Kan. 726, 736, 480 P.3d 158 (2021).

       K.S.A. 22-4513(b) states the following: "In determining the amount and method
of payment of [the BIDS fee], the court shall take account of financial resources of the
defendant and the nature of the burden that payment of such sum will impose." In
Robinson, our Supreme Court held that the plain language of the statute requires that

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       "the sentencing court, at the time of initial assessment, must consider the financial
       resources of the defendant and the nature of the burden that payment will impose
       explicitly, stating on the record how those factors have been weighed in the court's
       decision. Without an adequate record on these points, meaningful appellate review of
       whether the court abused its discretion in setting the amount and method of payment of
       the fees would be impossible." 281 Kan. at 546.

       There are numerous opinions from our court applying the BIDS reimbursement
statute and the Robinson case. We consider the limited inquiry by the district court here
to be most similar to cases in which our court has found the analysis lacking and
remanded the cases. For example, in State v. Mans, No. 125,252, 2023 WL 3406550, at*2
(Kan. App. 2023) (unpublished opinion), the district court established that Robert Bruce
Mans Jr. had training as a sheet metal machinist. This court vacated the BIDS attorney
fee and remanded because the district did not ask about the actual income Mans might
earn or explicitly consider the nature of the burden imposed, further noting that Mans
would serve more than 22 years in prison before engaging in his sheet metal trade. 2023
WL 3406550, at *4. In State v. Adams, No. 124,500, 2022 WL 3132160, at *3 (Kan. App.
2022) (unpublished opinion), rev. denied 317 Kan. 846 (2023), this court vacated the
BIDS attorney fee and remanded because the district court established only that Edward
Thomas Adams would "'have some opportunity for income'" while serving his sentence
but failed to consider when he would start working or how much he would make. In State
v. Wright, No. 123,305, 2022 WL 1280717, at *1 (Kan. App.) (unpublished opinion), rev.
denied 316 Kan. 763 (2022), the district court asked John Wright if he could work, and
he replied, "'Yeah I have a list that would hire me right now.'" This court vacated the
BIDS attorney fee and remanded because Wright's employment prospects were largely
speculative in view of his prison sentence of over two years. 2022 WL 1280717, at *2.
"The mere fact Wright might at some point be able to obtain employment was
insufficient for the district court to make a proper determination about his ability to pay
because there was no evidence or information presented about his income and expenses."
2022 WL 1280717, at *2. And in State v. Harrison, No. 122, 750, 2021 WL 4032857, at

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*2 (Kan. App. 2021) (unpublished opinion), rev. denied 316 Kan. 760 (2022), the district
court found only that Harrison could get a job and contended that it had fulfilled its duty
under Robinson. This court vacated the BIDS attorney fee and remanded, holding that
such conclusory analysis does not comport with the K.S.A. 22-4513(b) findings
requirement. 2021 WL 4032857, at *2.

       The State argues that the district court's inquiry into Owens' financial resources
and the nature of the burden of the BIDS attorney fee was "brief but appears to be
sufficient." We do not agree.

       The district court failed to undertake even a cursory, let alone explicit, analysis of
Owens' financial resources or nature of the burden imposed by the BIDS fee. It failed to
directly respond to or analyze any of the arguments made by Owens in support of his
request for waiver. And the district court was specifically asked twice to provide its
analysis under Robinson and did not do so. Instead, the district court repeatedly
referenced the results obtained by appointed counsel as justification for the BIDS fee
assessment. The district court's explicit analysis of the BIDS fees was "[i]n light of the
resolution he received, he should pay them." The "results obtained" by appointed counsel
is not a basis for the assessment of fees under either K.S.A. 22-4513(b) or Robinson.

       Our Supreme Court's holding in Robinson requires district courts to analyze a
defendant's financial resources and the nature of the burden that payment will impose
explicitly. 281 Kan. at 546. That inquiry does not need to be an exhaustive audit of all the
defendant's past and future finances. See State v. Buck-Schrag, 312 Kan. 540, 555, 477
P.3d 1013 (2020). But evidence of a defendant's employability is not enough to satisfy
the district court's obligations under Robinson. State v. Wade, 295 Kan. 916, 927, 287
P.3d 237 (2012). As in Wade, the district court here found only that Owens was
physically employable. It did not ascertain his financial resources or the burden such
reimbursement would cause him. Because the district court's inquiry falls well short of

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the K.S.A. 22-4513(b) requirements as explained in Robinson, we vacate the BIDS
attorney fee and remand for further proceedings.

 II.   We decline to address Owens' claims that KORA violates the United States
       Constitution.

       Owens argues that the obligation to register as a sex offender under KORA
violates his First Amendment right to be free from compulsion to speak at the
government's behest. Because Owens raises this issue for the first time on appeal, we
decline to address his constitutional claim. Generally, constitutional issues not raised
before the district court cannot be raised on appeal. State v. Godfrey, 301 Kan. 1041,
1043, 350 P.3d 1068 (2015).

       Appellate courts may address a constitutional issue for the first time on appeal in
three circumstances:

       "'[T]he newly asserted claim involves only a question of law arising on proved or
       admitted facts and is finally determinative of the case; (2) the claim's consideration is
       necessary to serve the ends of justice or to prevent the denial of fundamental rights; or (3)
       the district court's judgment may be upheld on appeal despite its reliance on the wrong
       ground or reason for its decision.'" State v. Harris, 311 Kan. 371, 375, 461 P.3d 48
       (2020).

But "[t]he decision to review an unpreserved claim under an exception is a prudential
one. Even if an exception would support a decision to review a new claim, we have no
obligation to do so. [Citations omitted.]" State v. Gray, 311 Kan. 164, 170, 459 P.3d 165
(2020). For the reasons set forth below, even if we agreed one of the exceptions might
apply here, we decline to address Owens' new KORA claims on appeal.

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       Laws that compel speech are constitutional only if they can survive strict scrutiny.
See Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 642, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 129
L. Ed. 2d 497 (1994). Strict scrutiny would require the State to show that a compelling
government interest justifies restricting Owens' First Amendment rights, and that the
restriction is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. See Hodes & Nauser, MDs v.
Schmidt, 309 Kan. 610, 680, 440 P.3d 461 (2019). But, as the Pearson court said,
questions of government interest and of narrow tailoring necessarily involve fact-finding.
State v. Pearson, No. 125,033, 2023 WL 2194306, at *1 (Kan. App.) (unpublished
opinion), petition for rev. filed March 20, 2023. Those considerations require the
development of facts outside our appellate record. State v. Spilman, 63 Kan. App. 2d 550,
575, 534 P.3d 583, rev. denied 317 Kan. 849 (2023).

       Several appellants have raised similar First Amendment challenges to KORA, and
our court has repeatedly declined to review the issue for the first time on appeal. See,
e.g., Spilman, 63 Kan. App. 2d at 577; Pearson, 2023 WL 2194306, at *2; State v.
Masterson, No. 124,257, 2022 WL 3692859, at *2 (Kan. App.) (unpublished opinion),
rev. denied 316 Kan. 762 (2022).

       In Pearson, this court explained why it was refraining from addressing the issue
for the first time on appeal, and we agree with the panel's perspective:

               "Identifying the compelling governmental interests KORA . . . involves
       examining a host of issues best explored first at the district court level. Analyzing the
       proportionality of KORA requires an in-depth balancing of its benefits and costs, along
       with exploring potential alternatives to achieving those benefits and the accompanying
       costs and anticipated effectiveness of those alternatives. It may even involve evaluating
       KORA's effectiveness in protecting the compelling governmental interests it is meant to
       serve, which could involve the presentation of evidence and fact-finding. And '[f]act-
       finding is simply not the role of the appellate courts.' [Citations omitted.]" 2023 WL
       2194306, at *1.

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       In addition to declining to review the compelled speech claim, some of the
decisions rendered by this court have also noted that it has weak legal support. For
example, Masterson declined to consider the issue but noted "if we were to address this
issue, it is legally and fatally flawed." (Emphasis added.) 2022 WL 3692859, at *2. The
Masterson court noted that the most persuasive legal authority came from federal courts
which upheld the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), the federal
equivalent to KORA. 2022 WL 3692859, at *2; see United States v. Fox, 286 F. Supp. 3d
1219, 1221-24 (D. Kan. 2018). And KORA itself survived a compelled speech challenge
in federal court. Davis v. Thompson, No. 19-3051-SAC, 2019 WL 6327420, at *3 (D.
Kan. 2019) (unpublished opinion).

       Owens notes that Masterson is not binding and argues that this court should not be
persuaded by its reasoning. Owens argues that the federal cases cited in Masterson are
weak authority because they do not sufficiently analyze offender registries in general and
KORA especially. But Masterson only illustrates the point expressed in Spilman and
Pearson that fact-finding is necessary for proper consideration of the issues. The
Masterson court acknowledged that, thus far, persuasive authority weighs against holding
that KORA is compelled speech and, even further, unconstitutional compelled speech.
See State v. Jones, No. 124,174, 2023 WL 119911, at *5-6 (Kan. App.) (unpublished
opinion) (holding that Jones asserted "no novel arguments" to urge a different outcome
from Masterson), rev. granted 317 Kan. 848 (2023). In other words, the legal arguments
so far, whether considered weak or strong, are against Owens' position that KORA is
unconstitutional compelled speech. Raising the issue in the district court would allow for
the kind of fact-finding described in Spilman, 63 Kan. App. 2d at 575. Because Owens
raises the issue for the first time on appeal, this important step of preserving and fully
litigating the argument has not been done. As a result, we think it prudent to decline to
address Owens' new constitutional claim.

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       Owens also argues—for the first time on appeal—that KORA violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution by
creating an exit mechanism for some offenders which is not available to other offenders.

       As with Owens' compelled speech argument, his equal protection argument
requires additional fact development. Appellate courts apply a lower standard—the
rational basis test—to equal protection challenges to a criminal statute. Spilman, 63 Kan.
App. 2d at 576. To apply the rational basis test, this court would need to determine
whether similarly situated offenders are treated differently and whether the classifications
used to do so bear a rational relationship to a legitimate government objective. Crawford
v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 46 Kan. App. 2d 464, 471, 263 P.3d 828 (2011), rev. denied
294 Kan. 943 (2012). As the party challenging the classifications, Owens would bear the
burden of disputing every reasonable basis to support the classifications. The record does
not provide enough information about these classifications or the governmental
objectives to fully and appropriately analyze the issue.

       Thus, we deem it imprudent to address either of Owens' constitutional challenges
to KORA.

       Vacated in part, dismissed in part, and remanded with directions.

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