Court Opinion

ID: 9711890
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:41:17.781333+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:07.974540
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
Buchanan, P.J.
— I dissent to the action taken by the majority on rehearing on two grounds:
1. The clear implication of the Findings is that Dudley’s injuries were due to his intoxication.
2. It is unnecessary to remand this case to the Board for more specific findings because the Board’s decision should be reversed in any event as the evidence is substantially without conflict and supports only one reasonable conclusion, a conclusion which the Board did not reach.
GROUND I — While the Findings are clouded by some evi-dentiary language, taken as a whole, they clearly imply Dudley was intoxicated.
The Findings emphasize that Dudley had no recollection of the accident.
The Findings recite that “however the testimony also included, the truck had always operated properly to this day,” which implies that the truck did operate properly on the day in question.
*712The Findings recite “that this accident was an almost head-on collision west of New Castle. . . .”
The Findings recite that “the facts concerning it [the accident] have been supplied by the other driver, Mr. Sidney Shrout, and the investigative State Police Officer . . .”, thereby seeming to signal the Board’s acceptance of the testimony of Mr. Shrout and the State Police Officer. Mr. Shrout had testified that Dudley “just cut right out” of his lane into the opposite lane and struck Shrout’s truck on the wrong side of the road.
The Findings recite in some detail the testimony of the police officer that the result of the gaschromatograph test was .41%, again implying that such was the fact.
The Findings appear to recognize Dudley’s intoxication by stating “. . . there is no additional evidence to establish that intoxication was a proximate cause of Plaintiff’s injuries.”
The sum total of what the Board specifically found and impliedly found by singling out certain evidence and emphasizing such evidence, is that Dudley was intoxicated.
While neither as specific or artful as they should be, the cumulative effect of the Findings is that Dudley was intoxicated, but for some reason not appearing in the record the Board shrunk from reaching a conclusion that his intoxication caused his injuries, which would be consistent with its Findings.
GROUND II — In my opinion it would serve no useful purpose to remand this case for more specific findings because the only reasonable inference arising from the uncontradicted evidence is that Dudley’s intoxication1 caused his injuries.
Dudley could remember nothing, his truck had always operated properly, his blood alcohol level was .41%, he had a collision on the.wrong side, of the road while returning to *713New Castle, there was an odor of alcohol in his truck, and on a clear day he “just cut right out” of his lane into the opposite lane and struck almost head-on Shrout’s truck which was forced to brake suddenly and go off its side of the road in attempting to avoid Dudley. The only reasonable inference from this uncontradicted evidence was that Dudley was intoxicated and that his injuries were due to his intoxication which proximately caused the collision. The Board seems to recognize the fact of intoxication but concludes that the intoxication was not a proximate cause of Dudley’s injuries. But there is no other evidence before the Board of any other cause of the collision.
As Judge White reminds us in his original concurring and dissenting opinion, the Board may disbelieve otherwise uncontradicted testimony, but only if unreasonable or inconsistent with facts and circumstances shown by the other evidence in the case. See, Board of Commissioners of Henry County v. Dudley, supra, 340 N.E.2d at 815; Wright v. Peabody Coal Co., (1948), 225 Ind. 679, 687, 77 N.E.2d 116. There is no such other evidence in this case. To return the case for more specific findings is indeed a meaningless endeavor.
The Board has acted arbitrarily. It has rejected the only reasonable inference possible from the evidence and its own Findings and its decision should be reversed as a matter of law ... all as more fully stated in our original opinion at 340 N.E.2d 808, which is now vacated by action of the majority of this Court. Also see, DeMichaeli & Associates v. Sanders (1976), 167 Ind. App. 669, 340 N.E.2d 796.
Note. — Reported at 344 N.E.2d 853.

. See authorities cited in the original opinion of this case at 340 N.E.2d at 813. Board of Commissioners of Henry County v. Dudley (1976), 167 Ind. App. 693, 340 N.E.2d 808.