Court Opinion

ID: 9948726
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-07 20:03:54.728604+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:48.740883
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/7/24 (unmodified opn. attached)
                          CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

       IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                           SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                          DIVISION FIVE

 THE PEOPLE,                                      B320488

        Plaintiff and Respondent,                 (Los Angeles County
                                                  Super. Ct. No. BA485897)
        v.

 JEREMIAH PAUL,                                   ORDER MODIFYING OPINION
                                                  AND DENYING PETITION FOR
        Defendant and Appellant.                  REHEARING

                                                  [NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]

       THE COURT:

      It is ordered that the opinion filed on February 14, 2024, is
modified as follows:
      On the caption page listing Howard R. Price as counsel for
Defendant and Appellant delete, “under appointment by the Court of
Appeal,”.
      On page 9, in the first full paragraph, second sentence, replace “an
objective person to believe that he or she was suspected of wrongdoing,”
with “a reasonable person to believe he is not free to leave or otherwise
disregard the police and go about his business,”.
     The petition for rehearing filed on February 28, 2024, by plaintiff
and respondent is denied.
     There is no change in judgment.

  BAKER, Acting, P. J.               MOOR, J.                 LEE, J.*

* Judge of the Superior Court of San Bernardino County, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

                                          2
Filed 2/14/24 (unmodified opinion)
                  CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                   SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                               DIVISION FIVE

 THE PEOPLE,                             B320488

        Plaintiff and Respondent,        (Los Angeles County
                                         Super. Ct. No. BA485897)
        v.

 JEREMIAH PAUL,

        Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Richard S. Kemalyan, Judge. Reversed and
remanded, with directions.
      Howard R. Price, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Analee J.
Brodie, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                         ___________________
      Following the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress
evidence of a firearm pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5,
Jeremiah Paul pleaded no contest to possession of a firearm with
a prior violent conviction (Pen. Code, § 29900, subd. (a)(1)). Paul
argues that the trial court should have excluded evidence of the
firearm because officers discovered it only after they obtained his
parole status by unlawfully detaining him.
      We reverse the trial court’s judgment, vacate the court’s
order denying Paul’s motion to suppress evidence, and remand.

                             FACTS

Officer Kumlander’s Testimony and Evidence Obtained
through a Body-Worn Camera

       At a hearing on the motion to suppress evidence, Los
Angeles Police Department Officer Charles Kumlander testified
that on March 7, 2020, at around 9:00 p.m., he and his partner
Officer Helmkamp were patrolling a residential neighborhood. A
Toyota Prius drew his attention because it was parked with the
lights on and appeared to be occupied. Officer Kumlander drove
the patrol car alongside the Prius and stopped. Officer
Helmkamp, who was in the passenger seat, then illuminated the
Prius with his flashlight. There was a male in the vehicle (later
identified as Paul) who moved lower in his seat when the officer
shined the flashlight. Officer Kumlander observed that Paul
appeared to be “conceal[ing] himself from [the officers’] view.”
The officer also observed that Paul was male and had dreadlocks.
Officer Kumlander patrolled the area regularly and knew that a
parolee lived across the street from where the Prius was parked.

                                    2
      Officer Kumlander backed up the patrol car and parked it
in the middle of the street with the headlights on. He then
approached the driver’s side door of the Prius to engage Paul in
conversation. Officer Kumlander illuminated the driver’s side
with his flashlight. Officer Helmkamp simultaneously
approached the Prius on the passenger side and illuminated that
side of the vehicle with his flashlight. The Prius’s driver’s side
window was rolled up, but the door was partially open. Officer
Kumlander, who was standing two to three feet from the door,
opened it further and spoke with Paul.
      “KUMLANDER: How ya doin,’ Man?
      “DEFENDANT: What’s up?
      “KUMLANDER: How ya doin’?
      “DEFENDANT: I’m alright, and you?
      “KUMLANDER: Good.
      “DEFENDANT: I’m alright.
      “KUMLANDER: Alright, no, I’m just sayin’ you live right
here?
      “DEFENDANT: Yeah.
      “KUMLANDER: Where at?
      “DEFENDANT: Right here.
      “KUMLANDER: That one?
      “DEFENDANT: Yeah.
      “KUMLANDER: Okay.
      “DEFENDANT: I think so.[1]
      “KUMLANDER: Any probation or parole?
      “DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

      1 Although the transcript indicates that Paul responded, “I
think so,” upon review of the video it appears that Paul
responded, “Okay, sir.”

                                   3
      “KUMLANDER: What? What’s that?
      “DEFENDANT: Parole.”
      Officer Kumlander confirmed Paul’s active parole status
and then conducted a search of the Prius. The officers discovered
and seized a firearm located inside the Prius.
      Officer Kumlander testified that he parked the patrol car in
a way that permitted Paul to drive the Prius away. There was a
driveway behind the Prius and the patrol car was parked a full
length behind it. The headlights of the patrol car illuminated the
road directly in front of the patrol car, and were not aimed at the
Prius. Officer Kumlander testified that he routinely asks people
he contacts whether they are on parole or probation.

Paul’s Testimony

       Paul testified that he parked his Prius about a minute
before the officers approached him. Paul had turned off the
Prius’s engine, but the lights remain illuminated for a few
minutes after the engine is turned off, so the lights were still on.
He was on the phone with a family member who had just called.
The officers pulled up beside the Prius in their patrol car. Paul
did not slump down. He did not recall shielding his eyes, but he
testified that he may have done so in response to the officers
shining a flashlight on him. Paul did not open the door of the
Prius. The officers approached on both sides of the car, so he did
not want to make any sudden moves. If he had opened the door it
would have hit one of the officers, who was standing right next to
the Prius. The Prius’s driver’s side window was rolled up and the
officer was very close—“like inches away”—when he began to
address Paul through the closed window. It seemed to Paul that

                                    4
there was a problem, so he raised his hands to shoulder level.
Paul testified, “I don’t want any problems. I don’t want to, like,
you know . . . get shot or nothing . . . . [I]t’s nighttime. There are
two officers on the side of the car. You know, they just got out
the car for really no reason. So I’m just going to, you know, show
I’m not trying to have problems. I’m going to raise my hands up.”
Paul testified that he was on active parole at the time of the stop.
Paul understood that if he was asked about his parole status he
had to answer truthfully, and he did.

Trial Court’s Ruling

       Following the suppression hearing, the trial court issued a
detailed written ruling denying Paul’s motion to suppress. At the
outset, the court acknowledged that “the legal analysis and
ultimate resolution of the motion . . . present a very close issue.”
The court found that the following facts suggested the encounter
was consensual up until the point where Paul disclosed his parole
status: (1) the patrol car was not blocking the Prius and nothing
prevented Paul from backing up and departing; (2) the officer’s
flashlights provided the only illumination of the Prius; the police
did not use spotlights or headlights; (3) the officers did not
approach the Prius at a brisk pace; (4) the officers did not touch
Paul before he stated that he was on parole; (5) two officers were
present; and (6) Officer Kumlander’s tone when addressing Paul
was casual and conversational before Paul stated he was on
parole. The court found the evidence regarding who initially
opened the door of the Prius inconclusive. The court found that if
the officer opened the door it would be a show of authority, but if
Paul opened the door it would indicate that he consented to the

                                     5
encounter. Either way, the court concluded that the issue of the
door would be only one factor among many to consider. The court
determined that Officer Kumlander’s inquiry regarding Paul’s
parole status did not, in itself, rise to the level of a detention.
Considering the circumstances in their totality, the court found
that the initial encounter was consensual.

                          DISCUSSION

       “ ‘The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable
searches and seizures.’ ” (People v. Greenwood (2010) 189
Cal.App.4th 742, 746.) “A search conducted without a warrant is
unreasonable per se under the Fourth Amendment unless it falls
within one of the ‘specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions.’ ” (People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 674.) “An
illegal detention that uncovers evidence is generally subject to
the exclusionary rule, which dictates the unlawfully obtained
evidence be suppressed as ‘ “fruit of the poisonous tree.” ’ ”
(People v. Kasrawi (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 751, 761.)
       “It is ‘well settled that one of the specifically established
exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable
cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent.’ ” (People
v. Woods, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 674.) “ ‘[C]onsensual
encounters’ [citation], . . . are those police-individual interactions
which result in no restraint of an individual’s liberty
whatsoever—i.e., no ‘seizure,’ however minimal—and which may
properly be initiated by police officers even if they lack any
‘objective justification.’ ” (Wilson v. Superior Court (1983) 34
Cal.3d 777, 784.) The Supreme Court has held “that the Fourth
Amendment permits police officers to approach individuals at

                                     6
random in airport lobbies and other public places to ask them
questions . . . so long as a reasonable person would understand
that he or she could refuse to cooperate.” (Florida v. Bostick
(1991) 501 U.S. 429, 431.) “The citizen participant in a
consensual encounter may leave, refuse to answer questions or
decline to act in the manner requested by the authorities.”
(People v. Franklin (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 935, 941.) “ ‘Only
when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority,
in some manner restrains the individual’s liberty, does a seizure
occur. [Citations.] “[I]n order to determine whether a particular
encounter constitutes a seizure, a court must consider all the
circumstances surrounding the encounter to determine whether
the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable
person that the person was not free to decline the officers’
requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.” [Citation.] This
test assesses the coercive effect of police conduct as a whole,
rather than emphasizing particular details of that conduct in
isolation.’ ” (People v. Garry (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1100, 1106;
see People v. Tacardon (2022) 14 Cal.5th 235, 247 [declining to
state a bright-line rule as to whether police use of a spotlight on a
driver effects a detention, and reiterating that manner of use is
one relevant consideration in evaluating the totality of the
circumstances].)
       “The test for the existence of a show of authority is an
objective one and does not take into account the perceptions of
the particular person involved. [Citation.] The test is ‘not
whether the citizen perceived that he was being ordered to
restrict his movement, but whether the officer’s words and
actions would have conveyed that to a reasonable person.’ ”
(People v. Garry, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 1106.) “This

                                     7
includes an examination of both an officer’s verbal and nonverbal
actions in order to ‘assess[ ] the coercive effect of police conduct as
a whole, rather than emphasizing particular details of that
conduct in isolation.’ ” (Id. at p. 1110.)
      “ ‘In ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court finds the
historical facts, then determines whether the applicable rule of
law has been violated. “We review the court’s resolution of the
factual inquiry under the deferential substantial-evidence
standard. The ruling on whether the applicable law applies to
the facts is a mixed question of law and fact that is subject to
independent review.” ’ ” (People v. Greenwood, supra, 189
Cal.App.4th at pp. 745–746.)
      Paul concedes that, after he informed the officers of his
active parole status, their search of his vehicle and seizure of the
firearm was lawful. He argues only that the initial encounter
with the officers leading up to that lawful search was an unlawful
detention. Paul asserts that, because the officers would not have
obtained his parole status if they had not first detained him
unlawfully, evidence of the firearm was not lawfully obtained and
should be suppressed. The People respond that the encounter
was consensual, and therefore exempt from the warrant and
probable cause requirements.
      Considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude
that the initial encounter with the officers was an unlawful
detention and that the trial court’s order must be reversed.2
Several factors lead us to this conclusion. First, although Officer

      2 Neither party argues that the trial court’s factual findings
were not supported by substantial evidence. Our review focuses
on the mixed question of whether the trial court’s factual findings
support its legal conclusions.

                                      8
Kumlander did not park the patrol car in a manner that
prevented Paul from driving away, the officers’ subsequent
positioning of their bodies blocked Paul from either driving away
or departing on foot. By Officer Kumlander’s own testimony, he
was at most between two to three feet away from the Prius’s
driver’s side door. Paul testified that the officer was inches away
and that he could not open the door without hitting the officer.
The video shows that, even if Officer Kumlander was standing a
few feet away from the Prius initially, he was holding his
flashlight only inches away from the driver’s side window and
had to move back to permit the door to open even slightly. Paul
could not have exited the vehicle with Officer Kumlander
standing there, nor could Paul have pulled the Prius out and
driven away without either engaging or endangering Officer
Kumlander. An objective person would not believe that he or she
was free to simply start driving away with Officer Kumlander
standing in the roadway. Moreover, the presence of Officer
Helmkamp on the passenger side of the vehicle prevented Paul
from sliding across the seat and exiting on foot without engaging
Officer Helmkamp.
       Second, Officer Kumlander and Officer Helmkamp exited
their vehicle, approached the Prius from both sides, and shined
their flashlights into the Prius from close range, right at the car
door windows. This was a display of authority that would lead an
objective person to believe that he or she was suspected of
wrongdoing, both because more than one officer approached and
because the officers shined their flashlights on Paul from opposite
angles, effectively illuminating him on all sides. (See, e.g., People
v. Tacardon, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 247 [“the facts of a particular
case may show a spotlight was used in an authoritative

                                     9
manner”]; In re Edgerrin J. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 752, 760
[holding that multiple officers approaching a vehicle and
standing in front of the doors is a show of authority]; People v.
Kasrawi, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 757 [holding that an
“officer’s use of a sustained spotlight on an individual at night . . .
[is a show of authority that] undoubtedly signals on the otherwise
empty street that the individual is ‘the focus of the officer’s
particularized suspicion’ ”].) If the officers wished to signal that
Paul was free to go, the officers could have approached the Prius
from the same side of the vehicle and engaged Paul in casual
conversation. The officers instead flanked the Prius and
approached from both sides while shining their flashlights into
the vehicle. The officers’ approach is exactly the kind of
coordinated action that an objective person would expect to
witness when being detained. A reasonable person would
conclude that when two officers approach in this manner,
surrounding the individual in the vehicle, he or she is not free to
leave.
       Third, the officers approached Paul while he was talking on
his phone inside a legally parked vehicle with the windows rolled
up. Paul could not reasonably decline to interact with the officers
without suspending or ending his phone conversation and at least
engaging in a brief conversation with them. The circumstances
would lead an objectively reasonable person believe that the
officers required their attention and that they could not simply
depart.
       Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion
that no definitive finding can be made on this record regarding
whether Paul or the officer initially opened the door to Paul’s car.
However, in our view it does not matter who opened the door. In

                                     10
light of the manner in which the officers approached the Prius, an
objectively reasonable person would not feel free to leave. If Paul
opened the door, the reasonable explanation for doing so would be
to display compliance with the officers’ show of authority rather
than to risk being viewed as resisting a detention. If instead
Officer Kumlander opened the door, an objective person would
understand that opening the door was another expression of
authority by the officer and yet further reason to believe that
departing the scene without engaging the officers was not an
option.
       Finally, although the dialogue between Paul and Officer
Kumlander appears to have been non-confrontational in tone and
language up to the point when Paul stated that he was a parolee,
this is not strong evidence to conclude that a reasonable person
would have felt at liberty to terminate the encounter with the
officer. A detention may occur even where “the officers seemed
calm, courteous, and used a conversational tone.” (In re Edgerrin
J., supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 760.) Ostensibly, Officer
Kumlander would interact in a polite, professional manner with a
detainee who was responding in a polite manner, as Paul was in
this case. If the officer’s tone and words had been aggressive, it
would be an additional reason for a reasonable person to believe
that he or she was being detained. The converse is not
necessarily true, however—the officer’s courteous manner of
speaking did not overcome the impression that he intended to
detain Paul, which he and his partner conveyed through their
actions. Moreover, if Officer Kumlander did not intend to detain
Paul, he could have stated that Paul was free to leave at the
outset of the conversation.

                                   11
      In light of all of the circumstances, we cannot conclude that
the interaction between Paul and the officers was consensual.
The trial court erred by denying Paul’s motion to suppress.
“Because it is impossible to assess the impact of an erroneous
denial of a motion to suppress evidence on a defendant’s decision
to plead [no contest], the harmless error rule is inapplicable in
appeals taken pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5, subdivision
(m). (People v. Miller (1983) 33 Cal.3d 545, 556; People v. Hill
(1974) 12 Cal.3d 731, 767–769, overruled on other grounds in
People v. DeVaughn (1977) 18 Cal.3d 889, 896, fn. 5.)
Accordingly, the judgment must be reversed.” (People v. Suggs
(2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1360, 1366.)

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                         DISPOSITION

       The judgment is reversed, the conviction is vacated, and
the matter is remanded. On remand, the trial court shall vacate
its order denying Paul’s motion to suppress the evidence and
shall enter a new order granting that motion.
       CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

                                           MOOR, J.

We concur:

                  BAKER, Acting, P. J.

                  LEE, J.*

* Judge of the Superior Court of San Bernardino County,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.

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