Court Opinion

ID: 9479141
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:09:36.012673+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:51.164176
License: Public Domain

BECKER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I join in Parts I and III of the majority opinion. However, I respectfully dissent from Part II because I believe that arbitration agreements covering claims arising under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621-634 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), must be enforced pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1982). In my view, Nicholson has failed to prove that there is anything in the ADEA’s text, legislative history or purposes that justifies ignoring the mandate of the FAA.
*232I. BARRENTINE, ALEXANDER AND MCDONALD1
I agree with the majority that there is no language in the text of the ADEA relevant to the question whether an employee may prospectively waive a judicial forum. Maj.Op. at 224-25. I also agree with the majority’s assumption that the Supreme Court’s directive to look to the “text” of the statute encompasses examination of both the language and the structure of the Act for the purpose of determining whether Congress intended to preclude waivers of the judicial forum. Id. at 224 n. 3. Additionally, I agree with the majority’s conclusion that after examination of the text and structure of the ADEA, “further inquiry into the arbitrability of ADEA claims is warranted.” Id. at 225.
I take issue, however, with the majority’s conclusion that Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 101 S.Ct. 1437, 67 L.Ed.2d 641 (1981), which held that an individual’s Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982), suit is not barred by prior submission of his grievance to collective bargaining dispute procedures, can provide meaningful guidance as to whether the structure of the ADEA precludes enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate. The majority apparently concedes, Maj.Op. at 225, 229-30 that Barrentine is not dispositive, and that neither are two cognate cases on which Nicholson so heavily relies, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974) (individual’s Title VII claim to be considered de novo in court even though claim was grieved through collective bargaining dispute resolution procedures), and McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 292, 104 S.Ct. 1799, 1804, 80 L.Ed.2d 302 (1984) (“in a § 1983 action, a federal court should not afford res judicata or collateral-estoppel to effect an award in an arbitration proceeding brought pursuant to the terms of a collective-bargaining agreement”). However, the majority does not squarely address CPC’s argument that Barrentine is distinguishable from this case. I believe it is important to elaborate on why these cases do not provide meaningful guidance here.
In Barrentine, the Supreme Court was faced with the task of reconciling the duty to arbitrate grievances under a collective bargaining agreement pursuant to section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982), with the statutory rights of the individual under the FLSA. The inquiry therefore was not whether an individually negotiated arbitration agreement is binding, but rather how best an individual’s rights can be accommodated by the machinery of the collective bargaining process.2 The Court, finding that the legislative history suggested that individuals should not be barred from vindication of these rights by a collective bargaining grievance procedure, rejected the employer’s argument that the grievance arbitration should preclude filing suit in court. 450 U.S. at 745-46, 101 S.Ct. at 1447.
Thus, the Court in Barrentine faced a very different task than the one before us today. While section 301 of the LMRA and the realities of the collective bargaining process shaped the result in that case, section 301 only applies to collective bargaining agreements and therefore Alexander, Barrentine, and McDonald are not binding on our result today. See Coulson, Fair Treatment: Voluntary Arbitration of Employee Claims, 33 Arb.J., Sept. 1978, at 23, 25 (“The often-cited holding in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974), would not be applicable [to arbitration outside the collective bargaining context], except as dictum.”). Rather, the Federal Arbitration *233Act controls our result. The Court in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 107 S.Ct. 2332, 96 L.Ed.2d 185 (1987), delineated our task as follows:
The Arbitration Act, standing alone, ... mandates enforcement of agreements to arbitrate statutory claims. Like any statutory directive, the Arbitration Act’s mandate may be overridden by a contrary congressional command. The burden is on the party opposing arbitration, however, to show that Congress intended to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue. If Congress did intend to limit or prohibit waiver of a judicial forum for a particular claim, such an intent “will be deducible from [the statute’s] text or legislative history,” or from an inherent conflict between arbitration and the statute’s underlying purposes.
Shearson, 107 S.Ct. at 2337 (citations omitted). See also de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 1917, 104 L.Ed.2d 526 (1989).3
Neither the majority nor the dissent in Shearson at any time cited to either Alexander, Barrentine, or McDonald. The majority suggests that the Court’s silence indicates that Shearson did not overrule these cases. Maj.Op. at 224. In my view, the Court’s silence bespeaks the fact that these cases are readily distinguishable from the inquiry into the binding effect pursuant to the FAA of an individually negotiated arbitration agreement. Bar-rentine, l respectfully submit, cannot adequately guide us in our inquiry into whether the ADEA contains a “contrary congressional command” to enforcement of the FAA.
The majority looks to Barrentine because it explicated what procedures are required under the FLSA in the context of collective bargaining, and the ADEA was derived in part from the FLSA. Even though portions of the FLSA provide some of the ADEA’s complicated enforcement mechanisms, this Court has rejected the notion that we should in every instance interpret the “ADEA consistently with the FLSA in areas where the ADEA is not explicit.” Coventry v. United States Steel Corp., 856 F.2d 514, 521 n. 8 (3d Cir.1988) (refusing to follow FLSA precedent completely precluding private waivers of ADEA substantive rights). Our ultimate duty therefore under Shearson and Coventry is to analyze the text, history and the purposes of the ADEA. As the following discussion illustrates, the application of the FLSA in Barrentine is not particularly helpful to this inquiry.
The rationales underlying Barrentine ave either distinguishable from this case or are brought into question by the Court in Shearson. In McDonald, the Court laid out four justifications for its decision in Barrentine and Alexander: (1) “[a]n arbitrator may not ... have the expertise required to resolve the complex legal questions that arise in § 1983 actions”; (2) “ar-bitral factfinding is generally not equivalent to judicial factfinding [because] ... ‘the record of the arbitration proceedings is not as complete ... and rights and procedures common to civil trials .. are often severely limited or unavailable’ ” (3) the arbitrator’s job is to enforce the agreement and, even if the public law is in conflict with the bargain, the arbitrator nonetheless must enforce the contract; and (4) in the case of abitration pursuant to a collective *234bargaining agreement, “[t]he union’s interests and those of the individual employee are not always identical or even compatible. As a result, the union may present the employee’s grievance less vigorously, or make different strategic choices, than would the employee.” 466 U.S. at 290-91, 104 S.Ct. at 1803 (citations omitted).
The majority concedes that the first two justifications are no longer viable. See Maj.Op. at 229; they were expressly rejected by the Court in Shearson, as examples of “a general suspicion of the desirability of arbitration and the competence of arbi-tral tribunals” and are “difficult to reconcile ... with [the] Court’s subsequent decisions involving the Arbitration Act.” Shearson, 107 S.Ct. at 2340. The Court found in Shearson and Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 105 S.Ct. 3346, 87 L.Ed.2d 444 (1985), that “arbitral tribunals are readily capable of handling the factual and legal complexities of antitrust [and securities] claims, notwithstanding the absence of judicial instruction and supervision.” Id.; Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 633-34, 105 S.Ct. at 3357. I do not believe that an ADEA dispute presents anymore complexity in terms of facts or law than an antitrust dispute. The adjudications of both may entail a welter of complex statistical and theoretical analyses. Often, however, the ADEA dispute will be simpler.
The Court in Shearson also rejected the notion previously asserted in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 74 S.Ct. 182, 98 L.Ed. 168 (1953), that arbitration should not go forward on a statutory claim because there may not be “ ‘a complete record of [the] proceedings’ ” Shearson, 107 S.Ct. at 2340 (quoting Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436, 74 S.Ct. at 187), or because the usual civil trial procedures are not completely available. “[T]he streamlined procedures of arbitration do not entail any consequential restriction on substantive rights.”4 107 S.Ct. at 2340; see also Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628, 105 S.Ct. at 3354. As the Supreme Court recently stated in de Quijos that “[t]o the extent that [a court’s decision not to enforce an arbitration agreement] rest[s] on suspicion of arbitration as a method of weakening the protections afforded in the substantive law to would-be complainants, it has fallen far out of step with our current strong endorsement of the federal statutes favoring this method of resolving disputes.” — U.S. at -, 109 S.Ct. at 1920.
The third justification, that the arbitrator must enforce the bargain over the public law is also at odds with the Court’s later arbitration of statutory rights cases. As the Court in Shearson stated, “there is no reason to assume at the outset that arbitrators will not follow the law” 107 S.Ct. at 2340; see also Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 636-37 & n. 19, 105 S.Ct. at 3358-59, particularly in light of the availability of judicial review.5 Thus, “‘[b]y agreeing to arbi*235trate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.’ ” de Quijas, — U.S. at -, 109 S.Ct. at 1920 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628, 105 S.Ct. at 3354.
The fourth justification, that arbitration pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement does not sufficiently protect the rights of the individual, in my view, retains its validity post-Shearson, but is distinguishable from this case. In Barrentine, as well as Alexander and McDonald, the Court held that an individual’s right to pursue a statutory right in federal court was not cut off by arbitration of the substance of the claim pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement. As the Court in McDonald pointed out, the union’s interests are not identical to the individual’s, 466 U.S. at 291, 104 S.Ct. at 1803; see also Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 742, 101 S.Ct. at 1445 (the union might not “support the claim vigorously” and might sacrifice individual’s interests for collective interests); Alexander, 415 U.S. at 58 n. 19, 94 S.Ct. at 1024 n. 19 (“interests of individual employee may be subordinated to the collective interests ... of the bargaining unit”), and therefore the employee may be deprived of any forum in which his claim can be vigorously asserted if he is foreclosed from going to court following the union’s arbitration of his claim.
In short, the procedural waiver was, at least in some cases, tantamount to a waiver of substantive rights. As one commentator on the Alexander decision has stated:
The Court’s willingness to depart from its long pattern of promotion of arbitration makes sense only when one considers the unstated reasons for its decision. Rather than the legislative history, the determinant appears to have been the Court’s distrust, based on a lengthy record of failure to prosecute, of the sincerity of unions in dealing with racial grievances_ [T]he union-controlled arbitral process cannot be counted on to vindicate these rights against discrimination. Because arbitrators are generally selected by agreement between employer and union, and receive their compensation from them, institutional pressures are created which render suspect the efficacy of the arbitral process as a remedy for racial discrimination.
Citron, Deferral of Employee Rights to Arbitration: An Evolving Dichotomy by the Burger Court?, 27 Hastings L.J. 369, 384 (1975).
This fourth justification for the Barren-tine line of cases is inapposite to this case. Nicholson was not involved in a collective bargaining agreement or represented by a union. Arbitration in this case is pursuant to an agreement entered into and signed by the party asserting his statutory rights. A union has not interposed a grievance procedure not individually suited to him and he need not rely on a third party such as a union for the vigorous representation of his rights.6
*236To summarize, Barrentine does not support a conclusion in this case that the mandate of the FAA has been overridden. First, the task in Barrentine, accommodation of individual rights in the context of the collective labor machinery, is very different from the task required under Shear-son of determining whether the ADEA overrides the FAA’s mandate to enforce private arbitration agreements. Second, the rationales underlying Barrentine are either undercut by Shearson or clearly distinguishable from this case. Barrentine’s distrust of the arbitral process is rejected in Shearson; and Nicholson entered into his arbitration agreement individually, not through a union or collective bargaining agreement, and will individually pursue his claim.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY; THE 1978 AMENDMENT OF THE ADEA
As the majority notes, there is no reference to arbitration in the legislative history of the ADEA. The majority asserts, however, that the 1978 amendment adding a provision for the tolling of the statute of limitations provides an indication that judicial resolution is preferred. The majority states that “Congress intended that extrajudicial methods of seeking resolution of age discrimination claims should not impede ultimate resolution of those claims in a judicial forum when extrajudicial methods proved inadequate.” Maj.Op. at 226. I do not draw the same conclusion from the legislative history of the amendment.
As the majority correctly points out, the amendment was intended to make certain that age discrimination claims reached an adjudicatory forum “in the event the conciliation process fails” or in the event “those who have violated the Act [delay and postpone] ... conciliation and thereby possibly avoid[] liability.” S.Rep. No. 493, 95th cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1977), reprinted in ADEA History at 446. I do not believe that this language means that the Congress was concerned that extrajudicial methods must not “impede ultimate resolution of those claims in a judicial forum.” Maj.Op. at 226. Rather, the more logical inference in my view is that Congress passed the tolling amendment because it was concerned about the abuse of the extrajudicial methods which impeded any resolution of those claims. Thus, the amendment was passed in response to fears that employers were improperly stalling conciliation attempts beyond the statute of limitations. The tolling provision was added to ensure that claimants achieved resolution of their claims despite delays and not, as the majority suggests, because informal mechanisms were perceived as inherently inferior to judicial resolution. Therefore, the history supports no conclusion with respect to congressional preference for a judicial forum over a nonjudicial forum, and hence I disagree with the majority that the legislative history is “suggestive” of a congressional intent to preclude waiver of a judicial forum and to override the mandate of the FAA. See Maj.Op. at 227.
III. INHERENT INCOMPATIBILITY
The majority holds that the objectives of the ADEA are inherently incompatible with waiver of a judicial forum and enforcement of a private arbitration agreement. First, the majority asserts that the administrative scheme of the ADEA evidences congressional intent that the EEOC should not be precluded from involvement in a case by arbitration and that the EEOC cannot regulate arbitration in the way that the SEC can, making Shearson distinguishable. *237Second, the majority asserts that an arbitrator’s powers and the arbitral forum are inadequate to achieve the goals of the ADEA. Third, the majority would take into account in determining whether the ADEA overrides the FAA the disparity in bargaining power between Nicholson and CPC.
I do not believe that the majority has accurately characterized the role of the EEOC, the power of an arbitrator to craft equitable relief, or our role in evaluating the agreement. I therefore do not believe the majority, or Nicholson, has persuasively shown that the ADEA is inherently incompatible with enforcement of private arbitration agreements pursuant to the FAA.
A. The Administrative Scheme of the ADEA
The majority describes the many activities in which the EEOC is engaged, e.g., investigation, inspection of records, taking measures to secure enforcement and concludes that there is a clear congressional “intent that compliance with the ADEA be overseen by a public agency.” Maj.Op. at 227. I find this logic unpersuasive. The mere fact of the EEOC’s many activities does not compel the conclusion that Congress intended that the EEOC must be involved in every instance of age discrimination in this country. The SEC is heavily involved in the enforcement of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, but the Supreme Court did not find that the SEC’s elaborate administrative scheme in itself precluded enforcement of private arbitration agreements in Shearson.
Significantly, the EEOC itself has made a formal proposal that courts enforce voluntary nonprospective waivers of all substantive ADEA rights without EEOC supervision, which would effectively circumvent EEOC involvement. See 29 C.F.R. 1627.16(c) (1988).7 Thus, the EEOC itself does not support the majority’s conclusion that all compliance with the ADEA, according to congressional intent, must be overseen by the EEOC. More importantly, this Court recently held that an aggrieved party may voluntarily and knowingly settle his ADEA claims without the involvement of the EEOC, indicating that private resolution absent EEOC involvement is not in derogation of the text, history or purpose of the ADEA. See Coventry, 856 F.2d at 522 n. 8.
In Coventry, we stated that;
the legislative history reflects the intent of the act’s sponsors to achieve swift disposition of disputes and to avoid delays which, as one sponsor noted, “plague so many of our agencies, such as the EEOC and the NLRB. The EEOC, for example, is already years behind in disposing of its docket. Such delay is always unfortunate, but is particularly so in the case of older citizens to whom, by definition, relatively few productive years are left.” ... Another sponsor of the legislation ... noted that the Act should allow the employee to “resolve the dispute himself or work out a compromise with an employer.”
Id. (citations omitted). I conclude therefore that the ADEA does not support the assertion that the EEOC must be or was intended to be necessarily involved in all or most age discrimination disputes.
I also question what I understand to be the majority’s presumption that enforcement of Nicholson’s arbitration agreement effectively bypasses the EEOC’s procedures. See Maj.Op at 227 ("Any procedure *238that detracts from the EEOC charge requirement would undermine Congress’ design.”). The facts of this case run counter to this conclusion. Before suit was filed, Nicholson filed a charge with the EEOC following the ordinary ADEA procedural requirements, but ultimately withdrew his charge so that he could proceed individually. The EEOC thus had the opportunity to enter into conciliation, to file suit, and necessarily received the information with respect to this case that the majority asserts is necessary for the EEOC’s effective oversight of age discrimination in this country. See id. In fact, with respect to the EEOC, the course of this suit is no different than any other in which either the party withdraws its charge or the EEOC decides not to sue. In those instances, pursuit of the claim is the prerogative of the individual plaintiff. In this instance, the plaintiff agreed to arbitration in lieu of a court proceeding. Thus, the EEOC’s involvement is not lessened because an arbitration agreement has been signed.
Moreover, even though Nicholson withdrew his charge, the EEOC has the independent authority as the enforcement agency of the ADEA to continue its investigation and to pursue whatever remedies it deems necessary resulting from alleged age discrimination by CPC. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1626.4, 1626.13 (1988). After withdrawal of a charge, the EEOC retains its independent investigative authority. See 29 C.F.R. 1626.13 (Under the ADEA “the Commission has independent investigative authority [and] may continue any investigation and may secure relief for all affected persons notwithstanding a request by a charging party to withdraw a charge.”). Indeed, Nicholson has not signed away the EEOC’s power to bring suit under the ADEA (nor could he) and CPC makes no argument that he has (or can). Rather, he has only signed away his individual right to bring suit, a right which is secondary to the enforcement powers of the EEOC. See Rogers v. Exxon Research and Engineering Co., 550 F.2d 834, 841 (3d Cir.1977) (“The thrust of the ADEA’s enforcement provisions is that private lawsuits are secondary to administrative remedies and suits brought by the [EEOC].”) cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022, 98 S.Ct. 749, 54 L.Ed.2d 770 (1978). The arbitration agreement does not immunize CPC from EEOC’s exercise of its enforcement obligations. Therefore, Nicholson’s arbitration agreement does not undercut the EEOC’s involvement with or oversight of ADEA claims.
The majority also states that “[em]ploy-ees and lawyers for employees will have little incentive to file charges of age discrimination with the EEOC if they cannot thereafter proceed to a judicial forum but instead must arbitrate their claims.... ” Maj.Op. at 227. This is an empirical statement for which the majority does not provide the basis. However, to the extent that an employee believes that an arbitral forum is less favorable to ADEA claims than a judicial forum, it would seem to me that the employee would have an incentive to seek EEOC assistance in a case in which access to a judicial forum is foreclosed to him through enforcement of an arbitration agreement.8
With respect to the right to bring a charge to the EEOC even though a party has signed an arbitration agreement. I think it is notable that CPC has not argued *239that Nicholson acted improperly by going to the EEOC before entering into arbitration. Regardless of the scope of the arbitration agreement, an aggrieved party may not be precluded from filing a charge with the EEOC. See EEOC v. Cosmair, Inc., 821 F.2d 1085, 1089-90 (5th Cir.1987) (waiver of right to file charge with EEOC is void as against public policy). Because Nicholson does not have the power to sign away the EEOC’s enforcement powers and cannot be precluded from bringing a charge, the arbitration agreement only secures a promise that if Nicholson acts on his own behalf, he will do so in an arbitral forum, not a court. Thus, the avenue to the EEOC is left open even after an arbitration agreement is signed.
In sum, I believe that the majority has significantly overstated the consequences to EEOC involvement and enforcement arising from an individual’s decision to agree to arbitration of ADEA claims. I would not conclude on this ground that enforcement of Nicholson’s arbitration agreement runs counter the purposes of the ADEA.
Buttressing its conclusion that arbitration of ADEA claims is not appropriate, the majority asserts that the EEOC has no power to regulate arbitration proceedings like the power conferred on the SEC as discussed in Shearson. Maj.Op. at 228 & n. 6. First, I do not believe that the power of an administrative agency to regulate arbitration can be dispositive of whether the FAA will be enforced. There is no administrative agency issuing regulations with respect to or overseeing either RICO or antitrust arbitrations, but the Court has found that arbitration was acceptable in those cases. See Shearson, 107 S.Ct. at 2346; Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 632-37, 105 S.Ct. at 3356-59.
Second, I believe that the majority has misconstrued the Court’s discussion of the power of the SEC in Shearson. In Shear-son, the Court justified its severe undermining of the Wilko decision in part on the basis that the SEC “had only limited authority over the rules governing self-regulatory organizations (SROs)” at the time of the Wilko decision, but now has “expansive power to ensure the adequacy of the arbitration procedures employed by the SROs.” Shearson, 107 S.Ct. at 2341. The majority seems to assume that the Supreme Court implied that the Congress must explicitly grant the power to oversee arbitration for the administrative agency charged with carrying out the dictates of the Act to engage in rulemaking with respect to arbitration. That, however, is not my understanding of the discussion of the SEC’s powers in Shearson.
I believe that the Court was emphasizing not that the SEC had a new-found power to regulate arbitration of securities claims, but rather that Congress had extended the SEC’s power to govern self-regulatory organizations, which in turn oversaw arbitration. Thus, I do not think that we need conclude from Shearson that the Congress must explicitly delegate rulemaking authority with respect to arbitration. To the contrary, and despite the majority’s protestations, see Maj.Op. at 228 n. 6, there is no language in the Securities Exchange Act sections cited by the Supreme Court, sections 78s(b)(2) and (c), expressly granting the power to regulate arbitration. Rather, the provisions provide broad ranging power for the SEC to oversee and review all of the rules implemented by self-regulatory organizations.
Similarly, the EEOC has been given broad ranging power with respect to implementation of rules and regulations administering the ADEA. See 29 U.S.C. § 628 (the EEOC “may issue rules and regulations as it may consider necessary or appropriate for carrying out this chapter”). Since Congress clearly has the power to preclude arbitration of statutory claims, see Shear-son, 107 S.Ct. at 2337, it is reasonable to believe that where Congress has not precluded waiver of the judicial forum and therefore arbitration is permissible, the administrative agency (given broad regulatory authority) may reasonably infer that the governance of arbitration of the statutory claims was delegated by Congress and therefore it may regulate how arbitration may be conducted with respect to those claims. See generally United States v. *240Frank, 864 F.2d 992, 1010-11 (3d Cir.1988) (discussing delegation doctrine). I believe, therefore, that the EEOC may regulate arbitration of ADEA claims, i.e., that the EEOC is free to promulgate regulations to assist and guide those engaged in arbitration of ADEA claims in order to effect the aims of the ADEA.9
One possible response to this contention is that even if the EEOC issued regulations with respect to arbitration of ADEA claims, it would not have the means to police private arbitration of ADEA claims. Yet this is also true of the SEC. As Justice Blackmun in his partial dissent in Shearson pointed out, the SEC “neither polices nor monitors the results of these arbitrations for possible misapplication of securities laws or for indications of how investors fare in these proceedings.” Shearson, 107 S.Ct. at 2357. Therefore, I do not believe that the power to police is necessary to a finding that the EEOC has sufficient power to issue regulations relating to the conduct of arbitrations in the ADEA context.
The EEOC’s power to regulate arbitration of ADEA claims would be somewhat different from the SEC’s powers to regulate arbitration; “the SEC has specifically approved the arbitration procedures of the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange, and the National Association of Securities Dealers,” Shearson, 107 S.Ct. at 2341, exercising its regulatory power over each of the self-regulatory organizations. The EEOC’s power would be more direct as there is no intermediate organization issuing arbitration rules. I conclude, therefore, that Nicholson’s and the majority’s attempt to distinguish this case from Shearson on the basis of the EEOC’s purported inferior powers to regulate arbitration of ADEA claims is unavailing.
B. The Powers of the Arbitrator and the Possibility of Collective Action
The majority asserts that arbitration of an individual’s ADEA claim is unacceptable, because arbitrators lack the broad equitable powers of courts under 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) relating to other employees and because the ADEA provides for the possibility of collective action under 29 U.S. C. § 216(b). Maj.Op. at 228-29. The majority concludes that arbitrators are therefore incapable of eliminating discrimination as effectively as courts and the EEOC. Id. at 229. I disagree.
First, the rules of the AAA provide explicitly for the provision of broad equitable remedies by an arbitrator. See AAA, Commercial Arbitration Rules, Rule 43, Scope of Award (1988) (“The arbitrator may grant any remedy or relief that the arbitrator deems just and equitable and within the scope of the agreement of the parties....”) (emphasis added).10 Where the scope of the agreement is broad and includes statutory disputes, as this one does, I believe that the arbitrator’s powers are sufficient to provide redress for the injuries caused.11 I conclude therefore that arbitrators are no less capable of effecting the goal of the ADEA of eliminating age discrimination than courts or the EEOC in the case of arbitration pursuant to a broad arbitration clause.
Second, arbitrations may in fact go forward as class actions. See generally M. Hill & A. Sinicropi, Remedies in Arbitration 240-41 (1981).12 If a class action arbitration were to go forward, relief would *241presumably have to be tailored to each individual claimant. See supra note 10 (AAA Employment Dispute Resolution Rules preclude class relief). I also presume that the class action arbitration could not bind those who have not consented to arbitration, but neither can a class action pursuant to § 216(b) undertaken in court bind parties without their consent. See Sperling v. Hoffman-La Roche Inc., 862 F.2d 439, 444, 446 (3d Cir.1988), cert. granted, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 1526, 103 L.Ed.2d 832 (1989).
However, even if the arbitration could not go forward as a class action or class relief could not be granted by the arbitrator, the fact that the Act provides for the possibility of bringing a collective action does not mean that individual attempts at conciliation were intended to be barred. Section 216(b) provides an opportunity to proceed collectively, not “an invitation to plaintiffs that they could not refuse.” Bird v. Shearson Lehman/American Express, Inc., 871 F.2d 292, 299 (2d Cir.1989) (Cardamone, J., dissenting).
In sum, I do not find that the majority’s assertion about the insufficiency of the arbitrator’s remedial powers or its assertion about the possibility of collective action militates against the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate ADEA claims.13
C. The Standard Governing Waivers of the Procedural Forum
I have now explained at some length why I believe that waiver of the judicial forum is not precluded by the ADEA. In view of that position, I must be sensitive to well-supported claims that the agreement to arbitrate resulted from the sort of fraud or overwhelming economic power that would provide grounds “ ‘ “for revocation of any contract.’”” See Shearson, 107 S.Ct. at 2359 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 627, 105 S.Ct. at 3354 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2))). I therefore think it necessary, in the interest of complete expression of my dissenting views, that I address the issue of what standards should govern procedural waivers, which would have to be addressed under my approach to this case.
Under ordinary contract principles, waivers must generally be knowing and voluntary to be enforceable. See Coventry, 856 F.2d at 521 (“ 1 “waiver”... connotes some kind of voluntary knowing relinquishment of a right’ ”) (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 191, 78 S.Ct. 221, 226, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957))). The Court in Mitsubishi and Shearson, applying the language of the FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (arbitration agreements are enforceable “save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract”), set the standard of ordinary contract principles for waivers of procedural rights where the governing statute does not indicate otherwise. “[A] well-founded claim that an arbitration agreement resulted from the sort of *242fraud or excessive economic power that ‘would provide grounds “for the revocation of any contract”' ” could result in revocation of the arbitration agreement. Shearson, 107 S.Ct. at 2337 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 627, 106 S.Ct. at 3364 (quoting Wilko, 346 U.S. at 432, 74 S.Ct. 182)); see also de Quijas, — U.S. at —, 109 S.Ct. at 1921. Therefore, despite my belief that waivers of the judicial forum are not precluded by the ADEA, I believe careful attention would have to be paid in procedural waiver cases to these basic contract principles.14
We delineated what is meant by “voluntarily and knowingly” in Coventry:
whether a waiver has been ‘knowingly and willfully’ made has been predicated upon an evaluation of several indicia arising from the circumstances and conditions under which the release was executed. Among those factors ... are general principles of contract construction such as the clarity and lack of ambiguity of the language ... and the absence of fraud or undue influence.
856 F.2d at 522 (citations omitted); see also Lancaster v. Buerkle Buick Honda Co., 809 F.2d 539, 541 (8th Cir.) (ADEA substantive waiver valid where there was no “exploitation or overreaching”), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 928, 107 S.Ct. 3212, 96 L.Ed.2d 699 (1987); Moore v. McGraw Edison Co., 804 F.2d 1026, 1033 (8th Cir.1986) (ADEA substantive waiver valid “in the absence of fraud, deceit or unconscionable overreaching”); cf. de Quijas, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. at 1921-22 (dictum suggesting that an agreement to arbitrate is established as “adhesive in nature” might not be enforced).15
The majority intimates that the disparity in bargaining power between age discrimination claimants and employers may be insufficient to void the contract to arbitrate, and then states that “we cannot close our eyes to the realities of the workplace.” Maj.Op. at 229. I certainly agree that the relative bargaining powers of the parties is relevant to consideration whether to enforce a contract to arbitrate. That is one of the necessary criteria in determining whether a contract was entered into voluntarily and knowingly. See supra at 241-42. I would urge district courts to enter into that inquiry with care in the context of age discrimination cases. I do not believe, however, that in the context of enforcement of an arbitration agreement the mere fact of a disparity of. bargaining power is dispositive.
Even if there is a disparity in bargaining power between the employer and the employee when the arbitration agreement is entered into, and, as the majority points out, there often may be, enforcement of the arbitration agreement is not at odds with ADEA’s text, legislative history or *243purposes. As explained supra, there is no ADEA text or legislative history directly on the issue of arbitration and therefore none on whether the disparity in bargaining power between the parties counsels against enforcement. However, the purpose of the ADEA bears careful examination.
As the majority points out, the central purpose of the ADEA is the elimination of age discrimination. This purpose is reiterated in the statute. See 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (purpose of ADEA is “to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment”). As I discuss supra, the goal of eliminating discrimination is not undermined by arbitration and judicial review thereof, which sufficiently vindicate an individual’s rights. Moreover, the EEOC’s enforcement powers are not undermined by the enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate. As I have explained, Nicholson has not through his arbitration agreement bartered away or diluted his right to relief in the event of age discrimination committed against him. Therefore, even where there is some disparity in bargaining power, as there is in virtually every contractual relationship, the central purpose of elimination of arbitrary age discrimination has not been defeated or undercut by enforcement of arbitration.
But that does not end our inquiry. We must also ask whether the ADEA has a secondary purpose of monitoring enforcement of arbitration agreements into which parties have freely entered and of invalidating agreements to arbitrate because the employee was at a bargaining disadvantage from the employer. I think not, and believe that the following hypothetical helps explain my conclusion. A civil rights statute could be passed with the intent that federal courts provide exclusive federal jurisdiction, because state courts historically were not providing adequate protection of civil rights. Presumably, an agreement signed by a person protected by the statute, waiving his or her right to go to federal court in favor of state court, would not be enforced, because enforcing the agreement in that instance would completely undermine the purpose of the act. In that instance, Congress would have evinced an intent to intervene in the normal contracting relationship, refusing to permit enforcement of an agreement bargaining away the right to go to federal court and creating in effect an irrebuttable presumption of an improper disparity in bargaining power where parties negotiate over the appropriate forum. Such a statute could be said to have two central purposes, guaranteeing a right to a federal forum for vindication of civil rights and elimination of discrimination. The ADEA does not share the first purpose, but only the second: elimination of discrimination. Because its goals can be effectively achieved through a variety of forums and through individual bargaining as to the proper forum, I cannot conclude that the ADEA prohibits normal market forces to operate where parties bargain over this type of forum-selection clause.
In fact, there is legislative history to support the conclusion that Congress intended the ends of the ADEA to be achieved simply by bargaining between employee and employer without supervision by any sort of neutral arbiter. See Coventry, 856 F.2d at 522 n. 8 (“The Act should allow the employee to ‘resolve the dispute himself or work out a compromise with an employer.’ ” (quoting Sen. Williams, 123 Cong.Rec. S17275 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1977)). The purpose of the ADEA, in my view, is not to prevent employees from bargaining away their procedural forums (as opposed to substantive rights) such that any disparity in bargaining power will automatically void an individually negotiated agreement, but rather to find an end to age discrimination through private enforcement and EEOC enforcement. Similarly, the Court in Shearson found that the potential for broker overreaching could be grounds for revocation, but concluded that it was insufficient to void the arbitration agreement under ordinary contract principles. 107 S.Ct. at 2339; de Quijas, — U.S. at -, 109 S.Ct. at 19205 (right to select forum is waivable despite “rationale that the Securities Act was intended to place buyers of *244securities on an equal footing with sellers”).
The majority's concern that an “employee may not have fully anticipated” the future dispute, see Maj.Op. at 230, is not in my view a factor going to whether arbitration should be enforced in general, but more appropriately a factor to be considered by the court when it addresses the issue of whether the waiver was voluntary and knowing in the particular case. See, e.g., Cohen v. Wedbush, Noble, Cooke, Inc., 841 F.2d 282, 287 (9th Cir.1988) (addressing claim that agreement was not entered into voluntarily).
The majority’s concern that the dispute may not have been anticipated is an oblique criticism of the fact that the waiver in this case is prospective. In general, substantive rights cannot be waived prospectively. See Coventry, 856 F.2d at 522-25 (permitting waiver of substantive rights at the time of settlement, after discrimination has occurred); S. 54, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § (f)(2)(B) (1989) (settlement of substantive rights may only occur if “the agreement does not waive rights or claims that may arise after the date the agreement is entered into”); H.R. 1432, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § (f)(2)(B) (1989); see also Alexander, 415 U.S. at 51, 94 S.Ct. at 1021 (waiver of individual’s procedural rights tantamount to waiver of substantive rights cannot be entered into by union prospectively). However, the FAA permits waiver of procedural rights in favor of arbitration both prospectively and nonprospectively. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (applying to “[a] written provision ... to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract ... or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract”). Moreover, waiver of the judicial forum in favor of arbitration is not in itself a “restriction on substantive rights,” Shearson, 107 S.Ct. at 2340, but rather “ ‘a specialized kind of forum-selection clause.’ ” de Quijas, — U.S. at -, 109 S.Ct. at 1921 (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519, 94 S.Ct. 2449, 2457, 41 L.Ed.2d 270 (1974)). Therefore, unless Nicholson has succeeded in proving that the ADEA evinces an intent contrary to the FAA’s permission of prospective procedural waivers, I do not believe the fact that this waiver is prospective is dispositive. I do not believe that Nicholson has succeeded in this task and the majority makes no argument that would undermine this conclusion.
I therefore would apply general contract principles and conclude that if enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate was entered into voluntarily and knowingly, it does not undermine the goals of the ADEA and we must enforce it despite a disparity in bargaining power.
IV. CONCLUSION
In summary, “ ‘[tjhere is nothing in the record before us, nor in the facts of which we can take judicial notice, to indicate that the arbitral system ... would not afford the plaintiff the rights to which he is entitled.’ ” de Quijas, — U.S. at -, 109 S.Ct. at 1921 (quoting Wilko, 346 U.S. at 439, 74 S.Ct. at 189 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). None of the majority’s arguments in support of a congressional intent to preclude enforcement of the FAA with respect to ADEA claims is convincing and Nicholson has failed to carry his burden in this regard. Where no contrary congressional intent has been shown, we are constrained to “ ‘rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate.’ ” Shearson, 107 S.Ct. at 2337 (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221, 105 S.Ct. 1238, 1242, 84 L.Ed.2d 158 (1985)). I would therefore enforce Nicholson’s agreement to arbitrate his ADEA claim and direct the district court to stay its proceedings accordingly.

. This dissent is organized to track the major headings in the majority opinion.

. In Alexander, on which Barrentine heavily relied, the Court explicitly characterized its task as one of "accommodation." See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 59-60, 94 S.Ct. at 1025 (holding that "the federal policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes and the federal policy against discriminatory employment practices can best be accommodated by permitting an employee to pursue fully both his remedy under the grievance-arbitration clause of a collective-bargaining agreement and his cause of action under Title VU”).

. The Supreme Court in de Quijos reconfirmed its strong commitment to enforcement of the Federal Arbitration Act. The majority states that “[t]he de Quijos opinion is consistent with the line of cases enforcing arbitration agreements in the setting of business transactions,” Maj.Op. at 224, implying that the arbitration agreements in Mitsubishi and Shearson were enforced because they were in a business setting. I disagree with this reading of the FAA enforcement cases. The Court has never evinced an interpretation of the FAA that would limit its application to commercial settings, and the language of the FAA clearly is not so limited. Under the Court’s analysis, the FAA mandates enforcement of private agreements to arbitrate unless contrary congressional intent is shown; whether the agreement is in a business setting is irrelevant. Moreover, it is not clear to me why an arbitration between a securities investor and his brokerage firm is any more in the business setting than an arbitration agreement between a business executive and his employer.

. In 1978, partly in response to the concerns expressed in Alexander with respect to the adequacy of the arbitral forum for determination of discrimination claims, the AAA issued Employment Dispute Arbitration Rules, arbitration rules designed particularly for the purpose of guiding arbitration of individual discrimination claims. See Employment Dispute Arbitration Rules, reprinted in Coulson, Fair Treatment: Voluntary Arbitration of Employee Claims, 33 Arb.J., Sept. 1978, at 23, 25-29; cf. AAA, Resolving Employment Disputes, January, 1989 (model employment arbitration procedures). Use of these Rules, which provide for the same scope of discovery and remedies as would be available in court, would obviate at least some of the Court’s earlier concerns expressed in Alexander, Barrentine, and McDonald about the adequacy of arbitration. They are arguably available to Nicholson, who agreed to arbitration governed by " ‘the rules of the American Arbitration Asso-tration then in effect.'" Maj.Op. at 223 (quoting App. at 107). CPC, in its appendix, submitted a copy of the AAA’s Commercial Arbitration Rules; we have no decision or issue before us, however, as to which set of rules was intended to be used by the parties.

. The FAA provides four opportunities for review of the arbitrator’s decision. A court may vacate an award
(a) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(b) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them.
(c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing of hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.
*235(d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
9 U.S.C. § 10. While arbitrators are limited as to what they may consider by the scope of the arbitration clause, in instances of an unrestricted submission, such as in this case, the arbitrator’s decision is reviewed for "manifest disregard” of the law. See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436-37, 74 S.Ct. at 187-88 (setting out manifest disregard standard where arbitrator decides legal issue). In light of the Court’s statement in Shearson that "such review is sufficient to ensure that arbitrators comply with the requirements of the statute,” 107 S.Ct. at 2340,1 do not believe that we are free now to assert that arbitration is necessarily an inadequate forum for the vindication of statutory rights absent proof of contrary congressional intent.

. The majority cites to three cases in other courts of appeals supporting its conclusion that the ADEA overrides the FAA. Maj.Op. at 229-30. In Swenson v. Management Recruiters Int'l, Inc., 858 F.2d 1304, 1305-07 (8th Cir.1988), the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit refused to enforce an arbitration agreement with respect to Title VII claims, because it perceived that arbitration is "poorly suited as a forum for the final resolution of rights created by Title VII,” relying on Alexander. Because I believe that the mistrust of arbitral proceedings reflected in Alexander has been largely undercut by Mitsubishi, Shearson, and de Quijos, and the court in Swenson offered no other justification for its conclusion, I do not find Swenson per*236suasive. Of course, whether the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or other concerns peculiar to that Act might warrant a conclusion that Congress did not intend that courts enforce agreements to arbitrate Title VII claims is an issue not before us in this case.
Cooper v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 836 F.2d 1544, 1553 (10th Cir.1988), extended Alexander to the ADEA without addressing the distinction between arbitration pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement and arbitration pursuant to a individually negotiated agreement to arbitrate. Criswell v. Western Airlines, Inc., 709 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.1983), aff'd on other grounds, 472 U.S. 400, 105 S.Ct. 2743, 86 L.Ed.2d 321 (1985), extended the Alexander, Barrentine, McDonald line of cases to claims involving the ADEA in the context of a collective bargaining agreement, hence it is inapposite.

. As the majority points out, this proposal has recently been suspended for the purpose of congressional hearings on the topic. See Maj.Op. at 230 n. 10. The suspension expires Sept. 30, 1989. See Pub.L. No. 100-459, Title V, 102 Stat. 2216 (1988). Hearings on the proposed standard at which the EEOC has testified in favor of its proposal are ongoing; legislation intended to replace the EEOC regulations has been proposed by the House and the Senate. See H.R. 1432, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 Cong.Rec. E816 (daily ed. March 15, 1989); S. 54, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 Cong.Rec. S356 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1989). The EEOC proposal and the proposed bills do not address the issue of whether a waiver of the procedural forum would be permissible, but only address waivers of substantive rights under the ADEA after the alleged discrimination has taken place. Thus, aside from the fact that the EEOC’s support of such nonsupervised waivers supports the inference that the EEOC need not be involved in enforcement of the ADEA, the proposal does not provide guidance for our result in this case.

. The majority also asserts that enforcing arbitration agreements will deprive the EEOC of "the charge as a triggering mechanism.” Maj.Op. at 227. The EEOC’s investigative powers, however, can be triggered by any report of discrimination. See 29 C.F.R. § 1626.4 (1988) (“The Commission shall also receive information concerning alleged violations of the Act, including charges and complaints, from any source.’’). Thus, even if the particular individual who has agreed to arbitrate her discrimination claims fails to report the alleged discrimination to the EEOC, others may do so. Moreover, the EEOC “may, on its own initiative, conduct investigations.” Id. Thus, involvement of the EEOC in cases of alleged age discrimination does not turn on whether individual victims of alleged discrimination themselves file claims with the EEOC. Moreover, the EEOC’s proposed regulation and the current bills before both the House and Senate, see supra note 7, would permit employers and employees to effect nonsupervised settlements of ADEA claims, although such settlements would, under the majority’s reasoning, deprive the EEOC of a charge-triggering mechanism.

. There have been proposals that the EEOC set up its own arbitration procedure. See generally Edwards, Arbitration as an Alternative in Equal Employment Disputes, 33 Arb.J., Dec. 1978, at 22, 25-26.

. The AAA Employment Dispute Arbitration Rules provide explicitly for remedies as broad as those available in court: “The Arbitrator may grant any remedy or relief that a court having jurisdiction of the matter could grant, provided it is within the scope of the parties’ submission agreement,” but precludes class relief. See supra note 4, Rule 25, Scope of Award.

. In contrast, the scope of the arbitration clause in Alexander was limited to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 42, 94 S.Ct. at 1016. (“ ‘arbitrator’s decision must be based solely upon an interpretation of the provisions of this Agreement’”).

. While Nicholson has agreed to arbitrate his claims pursuant to the rules of the American Arbitration Association, he has not agreed to go forward alone and has not agreed not to proceed on the basis of a class action arbitration. *241In fact, the agreement does not speak to the form his arbitration may take.

. I also believe there is a fundamental inconsistency afflicting the majority’s opinion. The majority states that “[njothing in this opinion precludes an employee from voluntarily arbitrating his or her age discrimination claim." Maj.Op. at 229 n. 9. At no point, however, does the majority explain why parties should be permitted to bypass the EEOC voluntarily but be precluded from bypassing the EEOC through enforcement of an arbitration agreement. On the majority’s own terms, any bypassing of the EEOC is impliedly disapproved by Congress. The majority asserts that the EEOC must be involved in the elimination of age discrimination, Maj.Op. at 227-28, and concludes that arbitration cannot satisfactorily effect the goals of the ADEA. The reasons set forth by the majority justifying its conclusion that arbitration agreements should not be enforced are as compelling with respect to voluntary arbitration as they are with respect to compulsory arbitration arising out of an agreement to arbitrate. Thus, I believe that the reasoning of the majority logically calls for a ban on arbitration of ADEA claims at any time, even when the employee voluntarily enters into arbitration. Yet that, I am certain, was not the intent of Congress. See Coventry, 856 F.2d at 522 n. 8 (ADEA sponsor "noted that the Act should allow the employee to ‘resolve the dispute himself or work out a compromise with an employer’ ’’ (citation omitted)); Note, Waiver of Rights Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 86 Colum.L.Rev. 1067, 1079 ("incorporation of Title VII’s conciliation provision [into ADEA] should ... be interpreted as reflecting a favorable attitude toward all recognized mechanisms of out-of-court dispute resolution”).

. In Coventry, we held that settlements of ADEA claims could be effected through private waivers of substantive ADEA rights unsupervised by the EEOC. 856 F.2d at 522. Examining the purposes of the ADEA, we concluded that waivers of substantive rights should not only be judged under the standard contract principles of voluntary and knowing waivers, but also according to the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 523. Compare Runyan v. National Cash Register Corp., 787 F.2d 1039, 1045 (6th Cir.) (substantive waivers judged under standard contract principles), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 850, 107 S.Ct. 178, 93 L.Ed.2d 114 (1986). It was on the basis of the "strong policy concerns to eradicate discrimination in employment,” that we determined that waivers of substantive rights must be judged under the "totality of the circumstances, considerate of the particular individual who has executed the release.” Coventry, 856 F.2d at 522-23. Because the purposes of the ADEA are not frustrated by arbitration, as I have concluded, the policy concern expressed in Coventry of achieving eradication of discrimination is satisfied and therefore we need not adopt Coventry’s higher standard for procedural waivers.

. Nicholson does not argue that the agreement to arbitrate was ambiguous or signed by him as a result of fraud and undue influence. Rather, Nicholson argued before the district court that the entire agreement was entered into "under duress and undue influence, and that the agreement was unsupported by consideration." As the district court noted, the Supreme Court "drew a distinction between fraud in the inducement of an agreement to arbitrate and fraud in the inducement of a contract which contains a promise to arbitrate. While the former is for a federal court to determine, the latter is for an arbitrator.” Dist.Ct.Op. at 5, C.A. No. 88-45, 1988 WL 35382 (Apr. 18, 1988) (citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing, 388 U.S. 395, 403-04, 87 S.Ct. 1801, 1085-06, 18 L.Ed.2d 1270 (1967)).