Court Opinion

ID: 9571726
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:34:38.986377+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:30:51.317024
License: Public Domain

Carley, Justice,
concurring specially.
I concur in Divs. 1, 3, 4 and 5 of the majority opinion and in the affirmance of appellant’s conviction for the malice murder of his wife. I cannot, however, concur in Div. 2 of the majority opinion which addresses the admission of evidence of appellant’s “prior difficulties” with the victim. At trial, appellant objected to the admission of this evidence on the procedural ground that the State had not complied with Uniform Superior Court Rules 31.1 and 31.3. The trial court, relying on Rainwater v. State, 256 Ga; 271, 272 (1) (347 SE2d 586) (1986) and Towns v. State, 260 Ga. 423, 424 (2) (396 SE2d 215) (1990), overruled appellant’s objection. Appellant enumerates this evidentiary ruling as error. The majority finds this enumeration to be meritorious, but affirms appellant’s conviction by applying the principle of harmless error. I can agree that, if there were any error, it would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In my opinion, however, there was no error at all in the admission of the evidence. Accordingly, I must concur specially.
In Rainwater, supra at 272 (1), the defendant was charged with murder of his wife and we held that evidence of his previous acts of abuse committed against his wife was admissible, not “under the rule governing proof of independent crimes, but as evidence of the relationship between the defendant and the victim.”
Subsequent to Rainwater, we held that Uniform Superior Court Rules 31.1 and 31.3 do apply “to acts which are categorized as similar transactions, as well as to those acts or occurrences which are categorized as prior difficulties.” Loggins v. State, 260 Ga. 1, 2 (2) (388 SE2d 675) (1990). However, Loggins was not a case wherein the “prior difficulties” were between the defendant and the victim and Rainwater, which had held that prior difficulties between the defendant and the victim were not subject to the rules governing admissibility of independent crimes, was not overruled.
Subsequent to Loggins, we followed Rainwater and held that, notwithstanding the State’s non-compliance with Uniform Superior Court Rules 31.1 and 31.3, evidence of the defendant’s “previous diffi*537culties” with the intended victim was “admissible, not under the rule governing proof of independent crimes, but as evidence of the relationship between the defendant and . . . the intended victim.” (Emphasis omitted.) Towns v. State, supra at 424 (2). See also Lee v. State, 261 Ga. 341, 342 (2) (405 SE2d 33) (1991).
In the instant case, appellant’s wife was the victim and the State sought to introduce evidence of appellant’s “prior difficulties” with her. Loggins would thus appear to be distinguishable and, under Rainwater and Towns the evidence would appear to be admissible notwithstanding the State’s non-compliance with Uniform Superior Court Rules 31.1 and 31.3.
However, in Maxwell v. State, 262 Ga. 73, 74 (2) (a) (414 SE2d 470) (1992), we held that
Uniform Superior Court Rule 31.1 requires the [S]tate to provide defendant with notice of its intent to present evidence of similar transactions or occurrences, including evidence of prior difficulties between defendant and the victim, at least ten days before trial, unless the trial court lengthens or shortens the notice time. [Cit.]
(Emphasis supplied.) Only Loggins was cited as authority for this proposition and neither Rainwater nor Towns was overruled.
Thus, there is a conflict of authority as to whether the State must comply with Uniform Superior Court Rules 31.1 and 31.3 when it seeks to introduce evidence of the defendant’s prior difficulties with the victim. Rainwater and Towns hold that such compliance is not necessary. Maxwell holds that it is. We are, therefore, called upon to resolve this conflict. The majority resolves that conflict by overruling Rainwater and Towns. I would resolve that conflict by overruling Maxwell.
As noted, Maxwell relies solely upon Loggins for its holding that the State must comply with the Uniform Superior Court Rules when it seeks to introduce evidence of the defendant’s prior difficulties with the victim. In my opinion, this is an erroneous interpretation of Log-gins. As I earlier pointed out, Loggins was not a case dealing with prior difficulties between the defendant and the victim, and Loggins did not purport to overrule Rainwater. That Maxwell misconstrued Loggins is demonstrated by the decision in Towns. There, this court reaffirmed the holding in Rainwater and did so subsequent to the holding in Loggins. If the holding in Loggins is as broad as Maxwell suggests, this court would have followed Loggins in Towns rather than reaffirm Rainwater.
When the State proffers evidence of the defendant’s prior difficulties with the victim of the crime on trial, the admission of such *538evidence is not being sought as proof of a similar separate transaction or occurrence to which the Uniform Superior Court Rules would otherwise apply. Compare Loggins v. State, supra. The admission of such evidence is being sought as proof of the defendant’s relationship with the victim in the very case under consideration. Rainwater v. State, supra; Towns v. State, supra; Lee v. State, supra. Evidence of prior difficulties between the defendant and the victim “should be received with care and should not be admitted at all if there is no probative connection with the present case. . . .” Cooper v. State, 256 Ga. 234, 235 (347 SE2d 553) (1986). In my opinion, however, the admissibility or inadmissibility of such evidence can and should be determined at trial when and if an objection is raised. There should be no procedural requirement that the admissibility or inadmissibility of such evidence be determined in accordance with the Uniform Superior Court Rules.
The purpose of the time requirement of [Uniform Superior Court Rule] 31.1 is fundamental fairness. The rule recognizes the difficulty of rebutting evidence of specific acts unless timely notice of the [S]tate’s intention to offer evidence is given.
Loggins v. State, supra at 2 (2). This purpose is certainly not advanced when the evidence concerns prior difficulties between the defendant and the victim. A defendant who is accused of victimizing another can and should anticipate that his prior difficulties with that same victim will certainly be a potential source of inquiry at trial. Accordingly, I would overrule Maxwell insofar as it holds that the State must comply with the procedural mandate of Uniform Superior Court Rules 31.1 and 31.3 when it seeks to introduce evidence of the defendant’s prior difficulties with the victim.
Appellant’s sole contention is that the evidence of his “prior difficulties” with the victim was not admissible because the State had not complied with the procedural aspects of the Uniform Superior Court Rules. He makes no further contention that the evidence was subject to a substantive objection to its admission.
Evidence of previous difficulties between a defendant and victim is relevant to show defendant’s motive and bent of mind. [Cits.] The evidence of the prior incidents] was relevant here, particularly in light of the appellant’s contention at trial that the [death] was an accident. . . . [W]here the evidence sheds light on the defendant’s conduct toward the victim, its relevance outweighs its prejudicial effect.
Cooper v. State, supra at 234-235 (1).
*539Decided November 22, 1993.
Danny W. Crabbe, for appellant.
Stephen F. Lanier, District Attorney, Fred R. Simpson, Stephen J. Cox, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.
In my opinion, the majority is correct in stating that the legal necessity for granting a new trial in this case is totally nonexistent since, based on the clearly compelling evidence of appellant’s guilt which has already been adduced, the instant conviction should be affirmed. Loggins v. State, supra at 2 (2). However, I believe that the evidence of appellant’s “prior difficulties” with the victim was properly admitted and I would base an affirmance of appellant’s conviction on that properly admitted evidence as well as the other relevant and probative evidence that appellant murdered the victim.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Hunt and Justice Hunstein join in this special concurrence.