Court Opinion

ID: 9772118
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:07:53.97892+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:42:25.298966
License: Public Domain

*913BARROW, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I would hold that the discharge of the patients from the mental hospital as no longer requiring observation or treatment terminated the order for temporary hospitalization and caused the appeal to become moot. I therefore agree with the judgment of the Austin Court of Civil Appeals that the order for temporary hospitalization should be set aside and the cause dismissed.
The same question was presented to this Court by the application for writ of error in the case of In re Ivey, 534 S.W.2d 163 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1976, writ ref’d n. r. e.). The court of civil appeals, after full consideration of the question held that neither the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception nor the “collateral consequences doctrine” barred application of the mootness doctrine where the patient had been discharged from the hospital. The court said:
“As stated above, upon determination that an appeal is moot the rule in this State is that the judgment of the lower court is reversed and the cause is dismissed. Such procedure quite as effectively erases the ‘collateral consequences’ of the judgment as would the reversal of the judgment upon the basis of procedural error .... ”
This holding was necessarily approved by this Court by our refusal of the application for writ of error, no reversible error because the court of civil appeals did not consider the merits of the appeal. This holding has been followed in other cases. See Winely v. State, 556 S.W.2d 637 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1977, no writ); Hollifield v. State, 545 S.W.2d 267 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1976, no writ).
The majority opinion here apparently rests upon the “collateral consequences doctrine” since the holding largely relies upon Carrillo v. State, 480 S.W.2d 612 (Tex.1972)1 The reliance upon Carrillo is not justified because of the significant statutory differences between an adjudication of delinquency and an order for temporary hospitalization. As pointed out in Carrillo, an adjudication of delinquency by statute carries with it certain deleterious collateral effects and legal consequences in addition to any stigma attached to being adjudged a juvenile delinquent. For example, the juvenile court is permitted to keep the records of conviction and permit other juvenile officers to inspect them. Also, the records of the Texas Youth Council may be used in setting punishment in a future criminal or juvenile case and, if the juvenile is later charged with a felony, his records may be exhibited to the press.
There would be no such collateral effects after the order for temporary hospitalization is set aside and the cause dismissed. After the order is set aside, it cannot form the basis for a subsequent application under Art. 5547-402 for an indefinite commitment to a mental hospital. The Code clearly requires that the prerequisite period of temporary commitment must be pursuant to a valid order for temporary hospitalization.
It is settled law that when this Court concludes that a case is moot, we set aside all orders entered in the cause by lower courts, including the original judgment, and dismiss the cause. City of Corpus Christi v. Public Utility Commission, 569 S.W.2d 494 (Tex.1978); United Services Automobile Association v. Lederle, 400 S.W.2d 749 (Tex.1966); Texas Foundries v. International Moulders & Foundry Workers’ Union, 151 Tex. 239, 248 S.W.2d 460 (1952). Thus, the order complained of here would be completely erased by a finding of mootness.
*914I am unwilling to say as a matter of law in today’s society that there is a stigma attached to a person who is committed to a hospital for observation or treatment for a period not to exceed ninety days. We should recognize that last year more than 43 percent of the patients who were ordered committed sought such commitment voluntarily.3 Assuming arguendo that a stigma does attach to a person temporarily committed for treatment, I fail to see how reversing the commitment order because of a procedural defect removes the stigma more effectively than setting aside the order and dismissing the cause. See Employees Finance Company v. Lathram, 369 S.W.2d 927 (Tex.1963).
It is suggested by the majority that to moot the cause after a patient has been discharged from the hospital because he/she no longer requires observation or treatment would effectively prevent an appeal from such an order. This is not so. The Legislature has recognized the need for an appeal and has provided for an expedited appeal. See Art. 5547-39a-d. The attorney for Mrs. Lodge fully utilized this expedited procedure and perfected hér appeal to the court of civil appeals within eleven days. She was subsequently discharged from the hospital after being treated less than a month. Unfortunately, the court of civil appeals did not determine her appeal until some ten months later. There are other cases where the expedited appeal has been timely heard by the court of civil appeals. See In re Mastin, 521 S.W.2d 150 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1975, no writ); Moss v. State, 539 S.W.2d 936 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1976, no writ).
It is clear that the doctrine of “capable of repetition, yet evading review”4 has no application here. No challenge to the constitutionality of the Code is presented by either of these appeals. The Lodge case was reversed for factual insufficiency and, at least in part, because the State failed to show the qualifications of the purported expert witness. Despite this reversal, there is nothing in the Code to prevent a new application for temporary hospitalization being filed under Art. 5547-31 should she subsequently require treatment or observation in a mental hospital.
It is suggested that we should permit this appeal as a matter of public policy even if it is moot. We must recognize, however, that to pass upon a patient’s points of error after her discharge from the terms of the order would constitute the rendition of an advisory opinion on abstract questions of law. Texas courts have repeatedly held that the judicial power in the Texas Constitution does not embrace the giving of advisory opinions. Firemen’s Ins. Co. of Newark, New Jersey, v. Burch, 442 S.W.2d 331 (Tex.1968); United Services Life Insurance Company v. Delaney, 396 S.W.2d 855 (Tex.1965).
I would affirm the judgment of the court of civil appeals in Cause No. B—9615, Lisa Jones v. State of Texas, 599 S.W.2d 897.
I would reverse the judgment of the court of civil appeals in No. B-9431, The State of Texas v. Wyline Elizabeth Lodge, 597 S.W.2d 773, set aside the trial court order of temporary hospitalization and dismiss the cause.
GREENHILL, C. J., and McGEE, J., join in this dissent.

. The majority also cites Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968), and Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 77 S.Ct. 481, 1 L.Ed.2d 393 (1957) in support of application of the “collateral consequences doctrine.” These cases are clearly distinguishable in that both were appeals from criminal convictions which by law have many deleterious collateral consequences after the sentence is completed. In addition, a constitutional question was presented in each of these cases.

. All statutory references are to Texas Mental Health Code, Texas Revised Civil Statutes Annotated.

. Texas Department' of Mental Health and Mental Retardation, Data Book 1979, Volume A.

. See Southern Pacific Terminal Company v. Interstate Commerce Commission and E. H. Young, 219 U.S. 498, 31 S.Ct. 279, 55 L.Ed. 310 (1911).