Court Opinion

ID: 9831043
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 20:45:00.442851+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:29.901947
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
Appellee insists that the effect of our opinion is that Hanks would, after discovery of minerals within the specified time, thereafter continue to have exclusive right, even as against the other tenant in common, to operate and produce same, and that, if ]he chose not to do so, Miller and his assigns would thereby be deprived of such benefits of their ownership of the other one-half interest as would result from production. We do not hold that, after discovery of minerals within the specified one year’s time, Hanks continued to have the exclusive right to explore for and produce the minerals. On the contrary, it is our view that, as to such minerals as were discovered in paying quantities within the year, Hanks and Miller became tenants in common, each owning one-half of such minerals, without any working agreement, thereafter operative. The “exclusive right” granted by the instrument to Hanks was limited to one year’s time, when it wholly ceased. If thereafter Hanks had any interest in the land, it was that of a tenant in common as to one-half of the minerals discovered and as to which he had no other or different rights than the other cotenant. After the one year’s time and the discovery of minerals, only a very few of the contractual provisions of the grant remained operative. The term of the grant, the right and duty of Hanks to remove machinery, buildings, etc., and the reservation of certain surface rights to Miller would constitute almost a complete list of such provisions *354remaining in operation after Hanks became vested with a one-half interest in minerals discovered.
The provision of the lease which, in our opinion, completely distinguishes its nature from those construed by the Supreme Court in Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 113 Tex. 160, 254 S. W. 290, 29 A. D. R. 566, and Texas Co. v. Davis, 113 Tex. 321, 254 S. W. 304, 255 S. W. 601, and like cases, is that reading: “* ⅜ * If any of the products herein named * ⅜ ⅜ is found in paying quantities within the time herein specified, to wit, within one year from the date hereof, then, in that event the said J. T. Miller * ⅜ * and S. M. Hanks * ⅜ * shall become joint and equal owners of the same.”
Without this provision we would hold, under authority of the above decisions of the Supreme Court, that the instrument by its execution and delivery vested immediately title in the minerals. It is undeniable, however, that such effect is one resulting from construction, rather than express-provisions. But the clause last above quoted carries positive negation that the title vested in the beginning. To give effect to this portion of the instrument it must be construed to show that title vested only when minerals were discovered, and expressly upon condition of this discovery within a specified time.
On the question of limitation appellee very forcefully emphasizes the contention that the findings of the court which are unchallenged include every fact which even we hold to -be necessary, in order to show the bar of appellant’s suit by the five-year statute of limitation. The trial court found that defendant had fee-simple title to thei land, including the gas (except as affected by appellant’s rights), and that under a lease from an assignee of Miller the appellant in 1920 “began the drilling of a well for oil and gas and continued the drilling of wells on said realty for the discovery of oil and gas, until 10 wells had been drilled, the first of such wells having been completed on November 5, 1920, which resulted in the production of oil and gas in paying quantities and thereafter continued the drilling of oil and gas wells on said premises until four wells had been completed during the year 1921, which resulted in the production of oil and gas in paying quantities. ⅜- * ⅜ Defendant has continuously been in actual possession of said premises since prior to January 1st, 1921, prospecting, drilling, and producing oil and gas from said premises continuously to the present time and claiming to own the fee simple title to said minerals in and under said lands as against every person whomsoever, paying all taxes on said lands, and the minerals in and under same as the same accrued and is now in possession of * * * all minerals and iiroducing sueh minerals from said land * * * that the original petition of plaintiff was filed on the 18th day of February, 1926.”
Such findings are based upon, and are in the language of, an agreement as to the facts, signed by appellant’s counsel. In our original opinion we construed a further finding that “no gas was utilized from this lease until January 27, 1923, except such gas as was used for the operation of said lease,” as so limiting the finding above stated as to leave the finding uncertain that there had existed for the requisite time that open and continuous adverse possession necessary to constitute a bar. After further consideration we have decided that the proper construction of the finding last quoted does not justify the conclusion that it limits the other findings in any material respect. To so hold would, no doubt, subject the opinion to the criticism that we had decided that there could be no adverse possession of minerals, in the absence of the use of same off the premises where produced. We do not intend so to hold, and, being of the opinion that appellant has agreed to all the facts necessary to show limitation, the judgment of the court in so far as based thereon should be affirmed.
Appellee’s motion for rehearing is therefore granted, our former judgment reversing and remanding the cause will be set aside, and the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.