Court Opinion

ID: 9804785
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 17:11:32.947811+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:41:38.857362
License: Public Domain

Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Natasha Veytsman Rossbach, AG No. 15,
September Term, 2022. Opinion by Biran, J.

ATTORNEY MISCONDUCT – DISCIPLINE – INDEFINITE SUSPENSION –
Respondent Natasha Veytsman Rossbach violated Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of
Professional Conduct 19-301.1 (Competence), 19-301.3 (Diligence), 19-301.4(a)
(Communication), 19-301.5(a) (Fees), 19-301.16(d) (Declining or Terminating
Representation), 19-308.1(a) and (b) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters), and
19-308.4(a), (c), and (d) (Misconduct). These violations arose from Ms. Rossbach’s
conduct in two client matters, whereby Ms. Rossbach failed to take meaningful action to
advance the clients’ cases, failed to communicate with the clients, and failed to appear for
scheduled meetings. In addition, in connection with Bar Counsel’s investigations, Ms.
Rossbach failed to respond to requests for information and made knowingly false
statements to Bar Counsel. Given these violations and the existence of several aggravating
factors, the Supreme Court of Maryland indefinitely suspended Ms. Rossbach from the
practice of law.
Circuit Court for Baltimore County
Case No.: C-03-CV-22-003423
Argued: Oral argument waived/submitted on papers

                                                                         IN THE SUPREME COURT

                                                                              OF MARYLAND*

                                                                                  AG No. 15

                                                                            September Term, 2022

                                                                 ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
                                                                         OF MARYLAND

                                                                                        v.

                                                                   NATASHA VEYTSMAN ROSSBACH

                                                                        Fader, C.J.
                                                                        Watts
                                                                        Hotten
                                                                        Booth
                                                                        Biran
                                                                        Gould
                                                                        Eaves,

                                                                                      JJ.

                                                                             Opinion by Biran, J.

                                                                            Filed: August 31, 2023

                                                                * At the November 8, 2022 general election, the
                                                                voters of Maryland ratified a constitutional
Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials
Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this   amendment changing the name of the Court of
document is authentic.                                          Appeals of Maryland to the Supreme Court of
                  2023-08-31 12:24-04:00                        Maryland. The name change took effect on
                                                                December 14, 2022.

Gregory Hilton, Clerk
      On August 22, 2022, the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland

(“Petitioner”), acting through Bar Counsel, filed a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial

Action (the “PDRA”) alleging that Respondent Natasha Veytsman Rossbach violated the

following Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MARPC”)1:

1.1 (Competence), 1.3 (Diligence), 1.4(a) and (b) (Communication), 1.5(a) (Fees), 1.15(a)

and (c) (Safekeeping Property), 1.16(d) (Declining or Terminating Representation), 8.1(a)

and (b) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters), and 8.4(a), (c), and (d) (Misconduct).

      This Court designated the Honorable Sherrie R. Bailey of the Circuit Court for

Baltimore County to serve as the hearing judge. Petitioner served Ms. Rossbach with the

PDRA on September 22, 2022, and with discovery requests on October 20, 2022. Ms.

Rossbach did not file an answer to the PDRA, prompting Petitioner to file a motion for

order of default on October 25, 2022. On October 26, 2022, the hearing judge issued an

Order of Default against Ms. Rossbach, which stated that it was:

            ORDERED, that an Order of Default be entered against [Ms.
      Rossbach] … for failure to respond to the [PDRA] within the time permitted
      …; and it is further

             ORDERED, that the Clerk shall issue a notice to [Ms. Rossbach] at
      her last known address informing her that the Order of Default has been
      entered and that she may move to vacate the Order within thirty (30) days
      after entry; and it is further

      1
         Effective July 1, 2016, the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct,
which employed the numbering format of the American Bar Association Model Rules,
were renamed the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MARPC”) and
recodified without substantive modification in Title 19, Chapter 300 of the Maryland
Rules. For ease of reference and comparison with our prior opinions and those of other
courts, we will refer to the MARPC using the numbering of the model rules, as permitted
by Maryland Rule 19-300.1(22).
              ORDERED, that a hearing shall be held in this matter on December
       7, 2022 at 9:00 a.m., at which time the Petitioner shall be permitted to present
       such evidence as it deems necessary to allow the [hearing judge] to carry out
       her assigned function as set forth in Maryland Rule 19-727.

       On the same date, the hearing judge also issued a separate notice to Ms. Rossbach,

as required under Maryland Rule 2-613(c), informing her that she could move to vacate

the Order of Default within 30 days of its entry. The notice also referenced the specific

requirement under Maryland Rule 2-613(d) that the motion to vacate “shall state the

reasons for the failure to plead, as well as the legal and factual basis for the defense to the

claim.” On November 28, 2022, Ms. Rossbach filed a belated motion to vacate the Order

of Default, in which she did not provide any support for her motion, as required under Rule

2-613(d).

       The evidentiary hearing went forward on December 7, 2022. Deputy Bar Counsel

was present on behalf of Petitioner, and Ms. Rossbach attended telephonically. The hearing

judge first addressed Ms. Rossbach, who had called the court that morning to request a

postponement because she was not feeling well. Ms. Rossbach stated that she had been

hoping to attend the hearing in person but was experiencing severe symptoms from a

medical condition, and that she had been in and out of the hospital for the past few months.

The hearing judge told Ms. Rossbach that her staff had made attempts to contact her by

email and phone to schedule the evidentiary hearing, but that Ms. Rossbach had not

responded to her staff’s inquiries. Petitioner objected to the postponement because the

matter was in default status due to Ms. Rossbach’s failure to participate up to that point.

                                              2
Petitioner opposed Ms. Rossbach’s motion to vacate the Order of Default for failure to

satisfy the requirements of Rule 2-613(d).

      The hearing judge denied Ms. Rossbach’s postponement request and her motion to

vacate the Order of Default. Petitioner then requested that “the Court deem the averments

in the [PDRA] be admitted pursuant to Rule 2-613(f) and 2-323(e).” The hearing judge

replied, “All right.” Petitioner next explained that Ms. Rossbach had not responded to its

requests for admissions and had not requested additional time to respond; therefore,

Petitioner stated, “those admissions should be deemed admitted.” Petitioner introduced the

requests for admissions as Exhibit 1.

      The hearing judge allowed Ms. Rossbach to present mitigating factors without

objection from Petitioner. Ms. Rossbach told the hearing judge about her medical

problems, her contentious divorce, her precarious financial condition which prevented her

from retaining counsel to represent her in the case, and other challenges with which she

had been struggling.

      The hearing judge issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on January 23,

2023. Neither Petitioner nor Ms. Rossbach filed any exceptions, and Petitioner

recommended that Ms. Rossbach be indefinitely suspended from the practice of law.

      On February 16, 2023, the Clerk of this Court issued a notice directing Ms.

Rossbach to notify the Clerk and Bar Counsel whether she intended to present oral

argument. The notice advised that Ms. Rossbach’s failure to respond “may constitute a

waiver of oral argument.” On March 28, 2023, the Clerk issued an updated notice

informing the parties that the case would proceed without oral argument, because Ms.

                                             3
Rossbach had not replied to the initial notice, thereby waiving oral argument, and because

Petitioner had affirmatively waived oral argument.

       For the reasons stated below, we conclude that Ms. Rossbach violated Rules 1.1,

1.3, 1.4(a), 1.5(a), 1.16(d), 8.1(a) and (b), and 8.4(a), (c), and (d), and determine that an

indefinite suspension is the appropriate sanction.

                                              I

                         The Hearing Judge’s Findings of Fact

       We summarize here the hearing judge’s findings of fact, which were consistent with

the factual averments contained in the PDRA.

                                        Background

       Ms. Rossbach was admitted to the Maryland Bar on June 19, 2002. During the

period relevant to this matter, Ms. Rossbach maintained an office for the practice of law in

Baltimore County, Maryland.

                              Representation of James Kukin

       In 2008, Ms. Rossbach represented James Kukin in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case in

the Baltimore Division of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland.

Ms. Rossbach obtained a discharge on Mr. Kukin’s behalf in that case. In November 2019,

Mr. Kukin retained Ms. Rossbach to represent him in connection with a second Chapter 7

bankruptcy. Mr. Kukin agreed to pay a flat fee of $1,600 for the representation, as well as

a $300 filing fee. He paid Ms. Rossbach the $1,600 flat fee in two installments, both of

which Ms. Rossbach failed to deposit into an attorney trust account until earned.

                                             4
       In January 2020, Ms. Rossbach met with Mr. Kukin and advised him to stop using

his credit cards and recommended that he wait until March 2020 to reevaluate the

possibility of filing for bankruptcy. Between March and October 2020, Ms. Rossbach failed

to respond to Mr. Kukin’s attempts to contact her about the status of his case.

       On November 9, 2020, Ms. Rossbach’s assistant called Mr. Kukin to convey that

Ms. Rossbach would meet him at her office that afternoon at 2:00 p.m. She then told Mr.

Kukin that he would need to meet her (the assistant) at a liquor store in Catonsville to pay

the $300 filing fee prior to the meeting. Mr. Kukin refused and stated that he would pay

the fee at the meeting with Ms. Rossbach. However, when Mr. Kukin went to Ms.

Rossbach’s office for the 2:00 p.m. meeting, Ms. Rossbach failed to appear. When Mr.

Kukin called Ms. Rossbach, she indicated that he should retain new counsel. Although Ms.

Rossbach did not take any action on behalf of Mr. Kukin, she failed to refund any portion

of the $1,600 fee paid by Mr. Kukin.

       On November 10, 2020, Mr. Kukin retained new counsel. He paid a $2,000 flat fee

for that representation. On November 11, 2020, new counsel prepared and filed a Chapter

7 bankruptcy petition on Mr. Kukin’s behalf. Mr. Kukin received a bankruptcy discharge

on February 22, 2021.

       On October 29, 2020, Mr. Kukin filed a complaint with Bar Counsel concerning

Ms. Rossbach’s representation of him in connection with his second bankruptcy. On

November 18, 2020, Bar Counsel emailed Ms. Rossbach a copy of Mr. Kukin’s complaint

and requested a response by December 11. Ms. Rossbach failed to respond. On January 8,

2021, Bar Counsel sent Ms. Rossbach a copy of its November 18 correspondence by first

                                             5
class mail and certified mail, and requested a response by January 25, 2021. On January

11, 2021, Ms. Rossbach requested an extension of time to respond to the complaint. Bar

Counsel granted an extension through February 1. Ms. Rossbach requested a second

extension on February 2, which Bar Counsel granted, giving Ms. Rossbach until March 8

to respond. On March 10, Ms. Rossbach requested an additional extension through March

12, which Bar Counsel granted.

      Ms. Rossbach provided her response to Mr. Kukin’s complaint to Bar Counsel on

March 12, 2021. In it, Ms. Rossbach stated:

      I reviewed hundreds of pages of [Mr. Kukin’s] business documents, credit
      reports, researched Maryland Judiciary Case Search, Land Records and
      potential Liens, and potential equity in his real estate, along with analyzing
      his assets and liabilities. Beyond the research I conducted, I advised him that
      I needed to determine whether his business and personal assets and liabilities
      would have a negative impact or may potentially impair his ability to file
      another Chapter 7 Bankruptcy.

      During our meeting on November 13, 2019, Mr. Kukin advised me that he
      has used his credit cards to buy Luxury Goods, and was still regularly using
      his credit cards, in addition to the massive Cash Advances he had made from
      his Credit Cards. I then advised him that it would be unethical for me to file
      a Bankruptcy Case for him at that time, due to the egregious use of his
      available credit and it would have been deemed Bad Faith and a Presumption
      of Abuse, to file a Bankruptcy Case while he was actively and frequently
      using his credit cards. Furthermore, he was advised that he must contact me
      when he was no longer using his credit cards and lines of credit, to reevaluate
      his situation as to whether Chapter 7 Bankruptcy was a potential option for
      him.

      The hearing judge found that Ms. Rossbach’s “statements were knowingly and

intentionally false. [Ms. Rossbach] did not review hundreds of pages of documents or

conduct any research on Mr. Kukin’s behalf.”

                                              6
       Additionally, Ms. Rossbach stated in her response: “I am refunding the $1,600 fee

[Mr. Kukin] mentions in his Complaint, to the client immediately. I sincerely hope this

matter is closed.” On or about March 24, 2021, Ms. Rossbach’s office contacted Mr. Kukin

regarding a refund. Mr. Kukin advised that any refund should be mailed to his home

address. Ms. Rossbach never provided any refund to Mr. Kukin.

       Bar Counsel sent requests to Ms. Rossbach on June 3, August 5, and August 19,

2021 to obtain Mr. Kukin’s client file and related financial records. The August 19 letter

was hand delivered by Bar Counsel’s Investigator, Marc Fiedler, to Ms. Rossbach’s

residence. Ms. Rossbach emailed Bar Counsel on September 1, 2021, and requested an

extension of time to respond. Thereafter, Ms. Rossbach failed to respond or provide any of

the documents that Bar Counsel had requested.

                         Representation of Josephine Desogugua

       On December 8, 2017, Josephine Desogugua retained Ms. Rossbach to represent

her in connection with a Chapter 7 bankruptcy filing, and signed a retainer agreement that

provided for a flat fee of $1,000 plus a filing fee of $335. On the same day, Ms. Desogugua

paid $350 toward the flat fee. Ms. Rossbach failed to deposit Ms. Desogugua’s funds in an

attorney trust account until earned.

       On December 13, 2017, Ms. Rossbach sent a letter to Ms. Desogugua’s employer

regarding a writ of garnishment previously served by one of Ms. Desogugua’s creditors.

Ms. Rossbach stated, in part:

       Please be advised this office represents Josephine Desogugua or [sic] the
       filing of her bankruptcy case, that will be imminently filed. Once we have

                                            7
       notice of automatic stay we will forward it to your attention, along with the
       case number.

       On or about May 31, 2018, Ms. Desogugua paid an additional $500 toward the fee.

Ms. Rossbach failed to deposit Ms. Desogugua’s funds in an attorney trust account until

earned.

       On December 5, 2018, Ms. Desogugua was scheduled to meet with Ms. Rossbach.

Ms. Rossbach failed to appear for the meeting. Later that evening, Ms. Rossbach called

Ms. Desogugua, apologized for missing the meeting, and explained that she had been in

court all day. Ms. Rossbach told Ms. Desogugua that she would contact her to reschedule

the meeting. In December 2018, Ms. Desogugua paid the remaining $150 toward the fee

by check. Ms. Rossbach failed to deposit Ms. Desogugua’s funds in an attorney trust

account until earned.

       Between December 2018 and July 2019, Ms. Rossbach failed to communicate with

Ms. Desogugua in any manner or take any action on her case. On or about July 31, 2019,

Ms. Desogugua spoke with Ms. Rossbach by telephone. Ms. Rossbach apologized for

failing to reschedule their meeting. On August 1, 2019, Ms. Desogugua wrote to Ms.

Rossbach and terminated the representation. On November 29, 2019, Ms. Rossbach

emailed Ms. Desogugua and stated that she would provide a formal response to Ms.

Desogugua’s August 1 termination letter the following week. On December 2, 2019, Ms.

Desogugua sent a text message to Ms. Rossbach requesting a refund of the fees she had

paid to Ms. Rossbach. Ms. Rossbach failed to respond to Ms. Desogugua’s refund request

at that time.

                                            8
      Ms. Desogugua filed a complaint with Bar Counsel on June 5, 2020. On June 24,

2020, Bar Counsel sent an email to Ms. Rossbach that attached a copy of Ms. Desogugua’s

complaint and requested a response by July 15, 2020. The email was returned as

undeliverable. On July 21, 2020, Bar Counsel resent the letter and complaint to Ms.

Rossbach by certified mail, and requested a response no later than August 4, 2020. Ms.

Rossbach received Bar Counsel’s letter on July 23, 2020, but failed to respond.

      On November 20, 2020, Bar Counsel emailed Ms. Rossbach at the confidential

address on file with the Maryland Judiciary’s Attorney Information System, enclosed a

copy of the prior correspondence, and requested a response to Ms. Desogugua’s complaint

no later than December 4, 2020. On December 2, 2020, Mr. Fiedler hand-delivered a copy

of Bar Counsel’s prior letters to Ms. Rossbach and requested a response no later than

December 16, 2020. Ms. Rossbach acknowledged to Mr. Fiedler that she had previously

received a copy of Ms. Desogugua’s complaint.

      On December 22, 2020, Ms. Rossbach submitted her response to Ms. Desogugua’s

complaint. Ms. Rossbach stated, in part:

      I believe that, it is important to note, that after having met with Ms.
      Desogugua, on several occasions between 2017 and 2019, to discuss the liens
      that were previously placed on her property and prepare the filing of her
      Bankruptcy Petition, I repeatedly asked her to provide me required
      documents to prepare filing of her Petition.

      …

      I have kept my Client informed throughout the process and did not anticipate
      any issues with filing the Petition and Motions to remove liens on her
      property, as her Petition was already signed and ready to be filed, except that
      I needed her to provide me more documents, complete the Credit Counseling

                                            9
      Course and pay the filing fee that is due upon filing, with the Bankruptcy
      Court.

      The hearing judge found that these “statements were knowingly and intentionally

false. [Ms. Rossbach] did not repeatedly ask for documents from Ms. Desogugua or keep

her ‘informed throughout the process.’”

      In her December 22 response, Ms. Rossbach also stated that she was refunding the

$1,000 fee to Ms. Desogugua immediately. Specifically, Ms. Rossbach stated in her

response: “Attached is the letter, sent to [Ms. Desogugua] with the refund check.” The

hearing judge found that these “statements were knowingly and intentionally false. [Ms.

Rossbach] did not attach a copy of the letter or refund check to her response, and as of

December 22, 2020, [Ms. Rossbach] had not sent any refund to Ms. Desogugua.”

      On December 28, 2020, Ms. Rossbach emailed Bar Counsel and attached a cover

letter that she had purportedly sent to Ms. Desogugua on December 23, 2020 that stated:

“Enclosed please find a refund in the amount of $1,000.00.” Ms. Rossbach failed to provide

a copy of the check. As of January 19, 2021, Ms. Desogugua had not received any refund

check from Ms. Rossbach. On January 19, 2021, Mr. Fiedler called Ms. Rossbach and

informed her that Ms. Desogugua had not received the refund check. Ms. Rossbach replied

that she would “re-issue” the check with a letter to Ms. Desogugua and provide a copy to

Bar Counsel. As of February 9, 2021, neither Ms. Desogugua nor Bar Counsel had received

any letter or refund check. That same day, Mr. Fiedler left a voice message for Ms.

Rossbach regarding the status of the refund to Ms. Desogugua.

                                           10
      On February 18, 2021, Bar Counsel emailed Ms. Rossbach and requested that she

provide additional documents and information no later than March 5, 2021. On February

19, 2021, Mr. Fiedler contacted Ms. Rossbach regarding the status of Ms. Desogugua’s

refund. Ms. Rossbach stated that the refund would be delivered to Ms. Desogugua that day.

On February 19, 2021, Ms. Desogugua received a $1,000 certified check from Ms.

Rossbach.

      On March 15, 2021, Mr. Fiedler met with Ms. Rossbach at her home, and she

provided a copy of her file in connection with her representation of Ms. Desogugua. Ms.

Rossbach also provided a copy of the February 19, 2021 letter and refund check sent to

Ms. Desogugua. However, Ms. Rossbach failed to fully respond to Bar Counsel’s February

18, 2021 letter and to provide the financial records Bar Counsel had requested.

                                            II

                       The Hearing Judge’s Conclusions of Law

      We now summarize the hearing judge’s conclusions of law.

                                 Rule 1.1 - Competence

      The hearing judge concluded that Ms. Rossbach violated Rule 1.1 in both the Kukin

and Desogugua matters. The hearing judge found that, with respect to the Kukin matter,

Ms. Rossbach failed to take any action on behalf of the client, failed to communicate and

provide updates, and failed to appear for a scheduled meeting. With respect to the

Desogugua matter, after sending one letter to the client’s employer, Ms. Rossbach failed

to appear for a scheduled meeting, failed to reschedule the meeting, and failed to

communicate with the client or provide any updates about her case. The hearing judge also

                                           11
found a lack of competence in both matters based on Ms. Rossbach’s failure to deposit the

clients’ fee payments into an attorney trust account.

                                   Rule 1.3 - Diligence

       The hearing judge concluded that Ms. Rossbach showed a lack of diligence, in

violation of Rule 1.3, in both the Kukin and Desogugua matters for the same reasons that

the hearing judge found that Ms. Rossbach violated Rules 1.1 and 1.4.

                                Rule 1.4 - Communication

       The hearing judge concluded that Ms. Rossbach violated Rule 1.4(a) when she

failed to keep Mr. Kukin and Ms. Desogugua reasonably informed about the status of their

matters and failed to respond to their requests for information. The hearing judge noted

that, between March 2020 and October 2020, Mr. Kukin tried, unsuccessfully, to contact

Ms. Rossbach regarding the status of his case. The hearing judge further observed that it

was not until November 2020, that Ms. Rossbach’s assistant scheduled a meeting between

Ms. Rossbach and Mr. Kukin for which Ms. Rossbach then failed to appear.

       With respect to Ms. Desogugua, the hearing judge noted that, after failing to appear

for a meeting on December 5, 2018, Ms. Rossbach failed to reschedule the meeting and

failed to communicate with Ms. Desogugua again until July 2019. The hearing judge

further noted that, after Ms. Desogugua terminated Ms. Rossbach’s representation on

August 1, 2019, Ms. Rossbach did not respond until November 29, 2019, stating that she

would submit a formal response the following week. On December 2, 2019, Ms.

Desogugua requested a refund. The hearing judge observed that Ms. Rossbach never

                                            12
submitted any further response or responded to Ms. Desogugua’s request for a refund,

further violating Rule 1.4(a).

       The hearing judge concluded that Ms. Rossbach also violated Rule 1.4(a) and (b)

when she failed to deposit both clients’ funds in an attorney trust account or obtain their

informed consent, confirmed in writing, to a different arrangement.

                                      Rule 1.5 - Fees

       The hearing judge concluded that Ms. Rossbach violated Rule 1.5(a) in both client

matters by charging unreasonable fees. The hearing judge found that, although the fees

may have been reasonable at the outset of the representations, they became unreasonable

when Ms. Rossbach failed to perform services of value to the clients. With respect to the

Kukin matter, the hearing judge observed that, after Ms. Rossbach advised Mr. Kukin to

wait until March 2020 to reevaluate the possibility of filing for bankruptcy, she failed to

respond over the next nine months to his requests for information and then failed to provide

any services on his behalf. With respect to Ms. Desogugua’s case, the hearing judge found

that, after failing to appear for the December 5, 2018 meeting, Ms. Rossbach failed to

reschedule the meeting or communicate further with Ms. Desogugua for approximately

seven months, until July 2019. During that time, Ms. Rossbach did not perform any

services on behalf of Ms. Desogugua and, shortly thereafter, Ms. Desogugua terminated

the representation.

                             Rule 1.15 - Safekeeping Property

       The hearing judge concluded that Ms. Rossbach violated Rule 1.15(a) and (c) in

connection with the Kukin and Desogugua matters based on Ms. Rossbach’s failure to

                                            13
deposit unearned fees in trust or to obtain the clients’ informed consent to a different

arrangement.

                  Rule 1.16 - Declining or Terminating Representation

      The hearing judge concluded that Ms. Rossbach violated Rule 1.16(d) in both the

Kukin and Desogugua matters. With respect to the Kukin matter, the hearing judge noted

that Ms. Rossbach had failed to refund any portion of the $1,600 unearned fee. As for the

Desogugua matter, the hearing judge concluded that, after Ms. Desogugua terminated the

representation in 2019, Ms. Rossbach failed to refund any portion of the $1,000 unearned

fee until February 2021, approximately 18 months later.

                   Rule 8.1 - Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters

      The hearing judge concluded that Ms. Rossbach violated Rules 8.1(a) and (b) with

respect to both the Kukin and Desogugua matters. Regarding Rule 8.1(a), the hearing judge

concluded that Ms. Rossbach made multiple false statements to Bar Counsel. First, in her

March 12, 2021 response to Mr. Kukin’s complaint, Ms. Rossbach falsely stated that she

reviewed hundreds of pages of business documents and conducted research on behalf of

Mr. Kukin. The hearing judge found that Ms. Rossbach did not take any action to advance

Mr. Kukin’s case, and that her statements to the contrary were knowingly false and

intended to mislead Bar Counsel. The hearing judge also concluded that, in her March 12,

2021 response, Ms. Rossbach falsely stated that she was refunding the $1,600 paid by Mr.

Kukin for the representation.

      With respect to the Desogugua matter, the hearing judge concluded that Ms.

Rossbach falsely stated that she repeatedly asked for documents from Ms. Desogugua that

                                           14
were necessary to prepare the bankruptcy petition, and that she “kept [Ms. Desogugua]

informed throughout the process.” The hearing judge concluded that Ms. Rossbach’s

statements were knowingly and intentionally false and intended to mislead Bar Counsel

regarding the work she performed on behalf of Ms. Desogugua. The hearing judge also

found that Ms. Rossbach falsely stated that she was refunding the $1,000 paid by Ms.

Desogugua.

      With respect to Rule 8.1(b), the hearing judge concluded that Ms. Rossbach violated

the rule when, during the investigation of Mr. Kukin’s complaint, she failed to timely

respond to several letters Bar Counsel sent her between November 2020 and August 2021,

or to provide the documentation requested in Bar Counsel’s August 19, 2021 letter.

Similarly, during the investigation of Ms. Desogugua’s complaint, Ms. Rossbach violated

Rule 8.1(b) when she failed to timely respond to Bar Counsel’s letters dated June 24, July

21, and November 20, 2020. The hearing judge also stated that Ms. Rossbach failed to

timely respond to Bar Counsel’s February 18, 2021 email or provide the financial records

requested.

                                 Rule 8.4 - Misconduct

      The hearing judge concluded that Ms. Rossbach violated Rule 8.4(a) because she

violated other Rules of Professional Conduct. The hearing judge also concluded that Ms.

Rossbach violated Rule 8.4(c) in the Kukin and Desogugua matters when she charged and

collected a fee for the representation, failed to provide commensurate services, and then

failed to refund (or timely refund) the amounts paid. Additionally, the hearing judge

                                           15
concluded that each of Ms. Rossbach’s violations of Rule 8.1(a) constituted a violation of

Rule 8.4(c).

       Further, the hearing judge found that Ms. Rossbach violated Rule 8.4(d), concluding

that, “[t]aken as a whole, [Ms. Rossbach’s] conduct in both matters brings the legal

profession into disrepute and is therefore prejudicial to the administration of justice.” In

particular, the hearing judge concluded that Ms. Rossbach’s failure to maintain unearned

client funds in trust “demonstrates a disregard for the rules pertaining to attorney trust

accounts and negatively impacts the perception of the legal profession.” In addition, the

hearing judge concluded that Ms. Rossbach’s repeated failures to respond to Bar Counsel

constitute conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.

                                     Mitigating Factors

       With respect to mitigating factors, the hearing judge found that Ms. Rossbach does

not have any prior discipline on her record. The hearing judge noted Ms. Rossbach’s

statements at the evidentiary hearing concerning her medical issues, a contentious divorce

she was going through, and other problems she had encountered. However, Ms. Rossbach

provided no corroboration for any of these statements. The hearing judge found that Ms.

Rossbach did not meet her burden to prove the existence of any other mitigating factors.

                                    Aggravating Factors

       The hearing judge concluded that Bar Counsel established the existence of several

aggravating factors by clear and convincing evidence. The hearing judge found that Ms.

Rossbach had a dishonest or selfish motive, as evidenced by her refusal to return unearned

client funds and her knowing and intentional misrepresentations to Bar Counsel to conceal

                                             16
her misconduct. The hearing judge concluded that Ms. Rossbach engaged in a pattern of

misconduct by failing to communicate and to perform the services for which she was

retained in two separate client matters. In each case, the hearing judge observed, Ms.

Rossbach failed to act on behalf of her clients, failed to respond to their requests for

information, and failed to return unearned fees. In addition, the hearing judge noted that

Ms. Rossbach committed multiple offenses. Further, the hearing judge concluded that,

throughout Bar Counsel’s investigation, Ms. Rossbach engaged in bad faith obstruction of

the proceedings by intentionally failing to comply with Bar Counsel’s requests for

information and making intentional misrepresentations to Bar Counsel regarding her

representation of Mr. Kukin and Ms. Desogugua. In addition, the hearing judge found that

Ms. Rossbach had failed to acknowledge the wrongful nature of her conduct and showed

an indifference to making restitution. The hearing judge explained that, at the evidentiary

hearing, Ms. Rossbach claimed that she had performed services of value for Mr. Kukin,

when in fact she had not done so. The hearing judge also noted that Ms. Rossbach never

refunded any of Mr. Kukin’s funds. Although Ms. Rossbach did eventually provide a full

refund to Ms. Desogugua, the hearing judge observed that Ms. Rossbach only did so after

Ms. Desogugua filed a complaint with Bar Counsel. Finally, the hearing judge found that

Ms. Rossbach, having been admitted to the Maryland Bar in 2002, has substantial

experience in the practice of law.

                                            17
                                           III

                                  Standard of Review

      “This Court has original and complete jurisdiction in an attorney disciplinary

proceeding and conducts an independent review of the record. The hearing judge’s findings

of fact are left undisturbed unless those findings are clearly erroneous. We review the

hearing judge’s conclusions of law without deference.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.

Hoerauf, 469 Md. 179, 207-08 (2020) (cleaned up). Where, as here, neither party files any

exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings of fact, we “may treat the findings of fact as

established.” Md. Rule 19-740(b)(2)(A). This Court reviews de novo the hearing judge’s

conclusions of law. Md. Rule 19-740(b)(1). “This is true even where default orders have

been entered by the hearing judge.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Zdravkovich, 375 Md.

110, 126 (2003).

                                           IV

                                       Discussion

      We opt to treat the hearing judge’s findings of fact as established under Maryland

Rule 19-740(b)(2)(A). We now consider the hearing judge’s conclusions of law. For the

reasons stated below, we conclude that clear and convincing evidence demonstrates that

Ms. Rossbach violated Rules 1.1 (Competence), 1.3 (Diligence), 1.4(a) (Communication),

1.5(a) (Fees), 1.16(d) (Declining or Terminating Representation), 8.1(a) and (b) (Bar

Admission and Disciplinary Matters), and 8.4(a), (c), and (d) (Misconduct). We do not find

that clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge’s conclusions that Ms.

Rossbach violated Rule 1.4(b) (Communication) and Rule 1.15(a) and (c) (Safekeeping

                                           18
Property). We find it expedient to consider the Rule 1.15 allegations first and then proceed

to analyze the remaining allegations in numerical order.

                       Rule 1.15(a) and (c) (Safekeeping Property)

       Rule 1.15 provides, in pertinent part:

       (a) An attorney shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in an
       attorney’s possession in connection with a representation separate from the
       attorney’s own property. Funds shall be kept in a separate account
       maintained pursuant to Title 19, Chapter 400 of the Maryland Rules, and
       records shall be created and maintained in accordance with the Rules in that
       Chapter. Other property shall be identified specifically as such and
       appropriately safeguarded, and records of its receipt and distribution shall be
       created and maintained. Complete records of the account funds and of other
       property shall be kept by the attorney and shall be preserved for a period of
       at least five years after the date the record was created.

       …

       (c) Unless the client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing, to a
       different arrangement, an attorney shall deposit legal fees and expenses that
       have been paid in advance into a client trust account and may withdraw those
       funds for the attorney’s own benefit only as fees are earned or expenses
       incurred.

       The hearing judge concluded that Ms. Rossbach “violated Rule 1.15(a) and (c) in

connection with her representation of Mr. Kukin and Ms. Desogugua. In both cases, [Ms.

Rossbach] failed to deposit unearned fees in trust or obtain the clients’ informed consent

to a different arrangement.” We conclude to the contrary because Bar Counsel did not

introduce any evidence, nor did the hearing judge make any factual finding, that supports

the conclusion that Ms. Rossbach “failed to … obtain the clients’ informed consent to a

different arrangement.”

                                             19
        In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Jones, we recently confirmed that Rule

1.15(c) permits advances against unearned fees to be treated as the property of either the

attorney or the client. __ Md. ___, 2023 WL 4484971, at *23 (2023). However, we

explained that “[t]he reasonable client’s expectation is that advance payments belong to

the client until they are earned by the lawyer and will be initially deposited in trust and

withdrawn by the lawyer as they are earned. If an agreement diverges from this expectation,

therefore, the lawyer must disclose those fee terms fully and in a manner that can be

reasonably understood by the client.” Id. (quoting Mont. Comm. on Ethics, Advisory

Opinion 080711 (2008)). “Thus, Rule 1.15’s default position is that, unless the client gives

informed consent, the money is to be treated as the property of the client.” Id. (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted). We cautioned that “[an] attorney does not obtain

informed consent to the deposit of an advance fee in the attorney’s operating account

merely by including language in the fee agreement stating that this will occur.” We further

explained that, “[i]n determining whether a client gave informed consent for an attorney to

deposit an advance fee in an operating account, we will closely scrutinize the client’s

understanding of the agreement, the client’s experience, the history and relationship of the

attorney and client, the legal services rendered, and all other pertinent circumstances.” Id.

        The retainer agreement that Ms. Desogugua signed is in the record. In relevant part,

it states:

        The undersigned [client] gives consent to the immediate deposit of funds
        which represent a deposit against unearned fees into the operating account of
        the attorney’s firm, Law Offices of Natasha Veytsman Rossbach, PA. In
        giving this consent, the [client] is expressly advised that the firm will use all
        funds received in its operating account for any firm financial purposes

                                               20
       including the disbursement of funds directly to the owners, partners or other
       staff of the firm as salaries and or distributions of firm assets. The use of the
       funds in no way interferes with the [client]’s right to a refund of any unearned
       fees at the conclusion of their case.

Next to this provision, there was a line that provided for the client to note her acceptance

of this term by writing her initials. The initials “JD” (presumably for “Josephine

Desogugua”) are handwritten on that line in Ms. Desogugua’s retainer agreement.2

       Here, the PDRA charged that Ms. Rossbach, “by her acts and omissions as set forth

herein, violated,” among other provisions of the MARPC, Rule 1.15(a) and (c). The acts

and omissions alleged in the PDRA concerning Rule 1.15 consisted solely of the

allegations that Ms. Rossbach failed to deposit the clients’ payments toward their flat fees

in an attorney trust account until earned. There was no factual allegation in the PDRA that

Ms. Rossbach failed to obtain informed consent, confirmed in writing, from Mr. Kukin or

Ms. Desogugua to deposit their advance fee payments in an account other than an attorney

trust account.

       As noted above, the hearing judge entered an Order of Default after Ms. Rossbach

failed to file a pleading responding to the PDRA. Bar Counsel asked that the averments in

       2
       The record does not contain a copy of a retainer agreement with respect to Ms.
Rossbach’s representation of Mr. Kukin.

                                              21
the PDRA be admitted under Maryland Rules 2-613(f)3 and 2-323(e),4 and the hearing

judge agreed, which was in keeping with Maryland Rule 19-724(c).5 Accordingly, the

hearing judge properly deemed the factual allegations contained in the PDRA – as relevant

here, that Ms. Rossbach failed to deposit the clients’ fee payments in an attorney trust

account until earned – to be admitted.6 However, the hearing judge did not enter a default

“judgment” of liability against Ms. Rossbach, as would happen under Rule 2-613(f) in a

case originally filed in a circuit court. No “judgment” is entered against a respondent in an

attorney grievance case by any court other than this Court. Because this Court has original

jurisdiction over attorney grievance cases, we review a hearing judge’s conclusions of law

de novo, conducting our own independent review of the record, even where the hearing

       3
          Maryland Rule 2-613(f) provides, in relevant part: “Entry of Judgment. If a
motion was not filed under section (d) of this Rule or was filed and denied, the court, upon
request, may enter a judgment by default that includes a determination as to the liability
and all relief sought, if it is satisfied (1) that it has jurisdiction to enter the judgment and
(2) that the notice required by section (c) of this Rule was mailed.”
       4
        Maryland Rule 2-323(e) provides, in relevant part: “Effect of Failure to Deny.
Averments in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is required, other than those as to
the amount of damages, are admitted unless denied in the responsive pleading or covered
by a general denial.”
       5
         Maryland Rule 19-724(c) provides: “Failure to Answer. If the time for filing an
answer has expired and the attorney has failed to file an answer in accordance with section
(a) of this Rule, the court shall treat the failure as a default, and the provisions of Rule
2-613 shall apply.”
       6
         Similarly, in Bar Counsel’s requests for admissions, Bar Counsel asked Ms.
Rossbach to admit that she failed to deposit the clients’ various fee payments in an attorney
trust account until earned. Because Ms. Rossbach failed to timely respond to Bar Counsel’s
requests for admissions, the hearing judge properly deemed the matters set forth in the
requests for admissions to be admitted, including the facts concerning Ms. Rossbach’s
failure to deposit the fee payments in an attorney trust account until earned.

                                              22
judge has entered an Order of Default under Maryland Rule 2-613(f). See, e.g.,

Zdravkovich, 375 Md. at 126. Thus, notwithstanding the Order of Default that the hearing

judge entered in this case, we must “turn our attention to whether the admitted facts were

sufficient by a clear and convincing standard to warrant the hearing judge’s conclusions of

law.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. McLaughlin, 456 Md. 172, 191 (2017).7 See also

       7
         In McLaughlin, after entering an Order of Default, the hearing judge in that case
“found that an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary” and further found “that the admitted
facts were ‘sufficient by a clear and convincing standard’ to justify the court’s conclusions
of law that McLaughlin violated [Rules] 1.3, 1.4(a) and (b), 1.5(a), 1.15(a) and (e), 8.1(a)
and (b), 8.4(a), (c), and (d), and [Business and Professions Article] § 10-306.” 456 Md. at
186. In that case, this Court issued a per curiam Order disbarring McLaughlin and a month
later issued an Opinion explaining the basis for that decision. See id. at 189-90. After
conducting an independent review of the record, this Court declined to decide whether the
hearing judge’s conclusions of law regarding the Rule 1.15 violations were supported by
clear and convincing evidence. The Court explained:

       The hearing judge found that McLaughlin violated Rule 1.15(a) when she
       failed to remove her earned fees from trust monies. Because we do not know
       what legal services she provided, or when, it is impossible to know whether
       or when she should have removed these funds. Therefore, we decline to reach
       this issue, which did not, in any event, affect our decision to disbar
       McLaughlin.

Id. at 195. With respect to the alleged Rule 1.15(e) violation, the Court stated:

       Rule 1.15(e) applies to property that comes into an attorney’s possession “in
       the course of representing a client.” If two or more persons claim an interest
       in the property, the lawyer is required to keep that property separate pending
       the resolution of the dispute. Id. The hearing judge found that all of Bar
       Counsel’s averments were admitted because McLaughlin never answered the
       Petition, nor appeared at the hearing. For that reason, he concluded that
       McLaughlin had violated 1.15(e).

       It is not clear to us whether 1.15(e) would apply to the dispute between [the
       children of McLaughlin’s client]. McLaughlin received the property in the
       course of the representation. But our review of the record does not show that
       anyone disputed that [the client] owned the funds, or that [the children]

                                             23
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Thomas, 440 Md. 523, 550-51 (2014) (explaining that

because “[t]he well-pleaded averments in the PDRA … were not denied” and an “Order of

Default was entered in the case, and not vacated,” this Court would “accept those averments

as admitted,” and determining, “[b]ased on the deemed admissions, … that the admitted

facts are sufficient, to a clear and convincing standard, to warrant concluding that

Respondent [committed the charged Rules violations]”).

       In Jones, the attorney’s retainer agreement stated that the flat fee paid by the client

“will be placed in Attorney’s Operating Account and not his Escrow Account, [t]hus

becoming property of the Attorney.” __ Md. at __, 2023 WL 4484971, at *8. In addition,

the agreement stated:

       By my signature below, knowing that I have the option to request that fees
       paid for legal representation be placed in Attorney’s Escrow Account, rather
       than Attorney’s Operating Account, and drawn from at an hourly rate of
       $250.00 per hour, I agree instead to the Flat Fee arrangement as described
       above for services rendered. Funds in the operating account, however, can be
       attached by creditors, spent by the Attorney or may otherwise be unavailable
       for immediate refund.

Id. at *11. The hearing judge in Jones concluded that, “[a]lthough this section of the

retainer agreement states where the fees will be placed, and was signed by the clients, there

       claimed an interest in the funds. Our cases applying 1.15(e) typically address
       a lawyer’s failure to pay bills out of settlement funds on a client’s behalf, or
       turn settlement funds over to a client. This rule also applies to attorney fee
       disputes…. There is no evidence in the record that anyone disputed
       McLaughlin’s fee because she never notified anyone that she was taking the
       fee. We similarly decline to reach this issue because it does not affect our
       decision to disbar McLaughlin.

Id. at 196 (footnote omitted).

                                             24
is no evidence that [Mr. Jones] explained the distinction between the operating account and

the attorney trust account.” Id. The hearing judge credited the testimony at the evidentiary

hearing of one of the clients at issue in the case and her mother that “[Mr. Jones] never

discussed this with them, and neither of them knew the difference between the two” types

of accounts. Id. In addition, the hearing judge stated that there was “no evidence that [Mr.

Jones] explained the possible risks and alternatives to the arrangement stated in the retainer

agreement.” Id.

       We concluded that “there is clear and convincing evidence in the record that Mr.

Jones failed to obtain informed consent from the clients … to deposit advance fee payments

into his operating account.” Id. at *25. As to the client who testified at the hearing, we

based this conclusion “on the hearing judge’s crediting of the testimony of [the client and

her mother] that Mr. Jones never discussed the distinction between the operating account

and the trust account with them, and that neither of them ‘knew the difference between the

two.’” Id. We also noted the hearing judge’s finding that there was “no evidence that [Mr.

Jones] explained the possible risks and alternatives to the arrangement stated in the retainer

agreement.” Id.

       Here, as stated above, Petitioner did not include any factual allegations in the PDRA

or in its requests for admissions concerning Ms. Rossbach’s failure to obtain informed

consent, confirmed in writing, from Mr. Kukin or Ms. Desogugua to the deposit of their

advance fee payments in an account other than an attorney trust account. Nor did the

hearing judge make any factual finding that Ms. Rossbach failed to obtain such informed

consent. Petitioner did not call either Mr. Kukin or Ms. Desogugua as witnesses at the

                                             25
evidentiary hearing, where they could have been asked whether Ms. Rossbach explained

the difference between an attorney trust account and an operating account to them. It may

well be that Ms. Rossbach failed to obtain informed consent from Mr. Kukin and/or Ms.

Desogugua on this point, despite at least Ms. Desogugua’s apparent initialing of that

provision in her the retainer agreement. However, it was Petitioner’s burden to show by

clear and convincing evidence that there was an absence of informed consent. Petitioner

failed to do so.

       To be sure, this case proceeded to the evidentiary hearing in a default posture. In

such cases, it often is wasteful and unnecessary to call live witnesses. See Thomas, 440

Md. at 550 (opining that, given the Order of Default entered by the hearing judge, “there

was no apparent need for a full-blown evidentiary hearing”). That is so because, in many

such cases, Petitioner can meet its burden to prove the charged violations by clear and

convincing evidence based simply on the factual averments contained in the PDRA and/or

on matters deemed admitted by virtue of a respondent’s failure to timely respond to Bar

Counsel’s requests for admissions. But Bar Counsel must examine the record as it exists

after an Order of Default is entered with a critical eye. If that record reveals that Bar

Counsel is missing an essential element of a charged violation, if it still wishes to proceed

on that charge, it cannot simply rely on the deficient record.

       For the above-stated reasons, we do not conclude that Ms. Rossbach violated Rule

1.15(a) and (c).

                                             26
                                   Rule 1.1 (Competence)

       Rule 1.1 dictates that an attorney “shall provide competent representation to a client.

Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and

preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.” “Incompetent representation

occurs when an attorney fails to take necessary, fundamental steps in a client’s case.”

Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Ambe, 466 Md. 270, 288 (2019) (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted).

       Clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge’s conclusion that Ms.

Rossbach violated Rule 1.1 in both the Kukin and Desogugua matters when she failed to

appear for scheduled meetings, failed to communicate with the clients for months on end,

and failed to take meaningful action to advance their cases.

       We do not base our conclusion that Ms. Rossbach violated Rule 1.1 on her failure

to deposit the flat fee payments provided by Mr. Kukin and Ms. Desogugua into an attorney

trust account. It is well established that the failure to deposit unearned fees in an attorney

trust account can violate Rule 1.1 in addition to Rule 1.15. See, e.g., Attorney Grievance

Comm’n v. Smith-Scott, 469 Md. 281, 338 (2020). However, as discussed above, Petitioner

did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that Ms. Rossbach failed to obtain informed

consent from her clients to deposit the advance fee payments into an account other than an

attorney trust account. For the same reason, we cannot say that Ms. Rossbach violated Rule

1.1 by failing to deposit the clients’ fee payments into an attorney trust account until earned.

                                              27
                                    Rule 1.3 (Diligence)

       Rule 1.3 requires attorneys to “act with reasonable diligence and promptness in

representing a client.” “The Rule can be violated by failing to advance the client’s cause or

endeavor[.]” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Bah, 468 Md. 179, 208 (2020) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). “The same rationale that supports a Rule [1.1]

violation can support a Rule [1.3] violation.” Id. at 209.

       We agree with the hearing judge that Ms. Rossbach violated Rule 1.3 in the Kukin

and Desogugua matters for the reasons stated in reference to Rules 1.1 and 1.4.

                                 Rule 1.4 (Communication)

       Rule 1.4 provides:

       (a) An attorney shall:
       (1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect
       to which the client’s informed consent, as defined in Rule 19-301.0 (g)
       (1.0), is required by these Rules;
       (2) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter;
       (3) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and
       (4) consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the attorney’s
       conduct when the attorney knows that the client expects assistance not
       permitted by the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct or
       other law.
       (b) An attorney shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to
       permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.

       This Rule requires that attorneys “communicate with their clients and keep their

clients reasonably informed of the status of their case.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.

Edwards, 462 Md. 642, 699 (2019). Failing to do so “prevents the client from making

informed decisions.” Id.

       We agree with the hearing judge’s conclusion that Ms. Rossbach violated Rule

1.4(a) in both matters by failing to keep the clients reasonably informed about the status of

                                             28
their matters and failing to respond to their requests for information. For the same reasons

that we decline to find a violation of Rules 1.1 and 1.15 in connection with Ms. Rossbach’s

deposit of the fee payments into her firm’s operating account, we decline to find that Bar

Counsel proved by clear and convincing evidence that Ms. Rossbach failed to sufficiently

communicate with the clients concerning the deposit of the flat fee payments and therefore

do not find a violation of Rule 1.4(a) and (b) on that basis.

                                     Rule 1.5(a) (Fees)

       Rule 1.5 provides:

       (a) An attorney shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an
       unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses. The factors to be
       considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:
       (1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions
       involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
       (2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the
       particular employment will preclude other employment of the attorney;
       (3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
       (4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
       (5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
       (6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
       (7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney or attorneys
       performing the services; and
       (8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.

       We agree with the hearing judge’s conclusion that, although Ms. Rossbach’s fees

may have been reasonable at the outset of both matters, they became unreasonable when

Ms. Rossbach failed to perform the services for which the clients agreed to pay flat fees.

“The reasonableness of a fee is not measured solely by examining its value at the outset of

the representation; indeed, an otherwise-reasonable fee can become unreasonable if the

lawyer fails to earn it.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Garrett, 427 Md. 209, 224 (2012);

                                             29
see also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Patterson, 421 Md. 708, 732 (2011) (holding that

an attorney’s lack of competence and diligence in representing the client resulted in an

otherwise reasonable fee becoming unreasonable).

      In Mr. Kukin’s case, Ms. Rossbach recommended that Mr. Kukin wait until March

2020 to reevaluate filing for bankruptcy, but then failed to respond to his requests for

information or perform any services between March and October 2020. Mr. Kukin retained

new counsel on November 10, 2020.

      In Ms. Desogugua’s case, Ms. Rossbach failed to appear for their December 5, 2018

meeting, failed to reschedule the meeting, and did not communicate with her or perform

any services on her behalf for approximately seven months. Ms. Desogugua then

terminated the representation on August 1, 2019.

                Rule 1.16(d) (Declining or Terminating Representation)

      Rule 1.16(d) provides:

      Upon termination of representation, an attorney shall take steps to the extent
      reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interests, such as giving
      reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of another
      attorney, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and
      refunding any advance payment of fee or expense that has not been earned
      or incurred. The attorney may retain papers relating to the client to the extent
      permitted by other law.

      We agree with the hearing judge that Ms. Rossbach violated Rule 1.16(d) in both

matters. Ms. Rossbach failed to refund any portion of Mr. Kukin’s $1,600 unearned fee. In

Ms. Desogugua’s case, Ms. Rossbach failed to refund any portion of the $1,000 unearned

fee until approximately 18 months after Ms. Desogugua terminated the representation and

only after she filed her complaint with Bar Counsel.

                                            30
                   Rule 8.1 (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters)

       Rule 8.1 provides:

       An applicant for admission or reinstatement to the bar, or an attorney in
       connection with a bar admission application or in connection with a
       disciplinary matter, shall not:
       (a) knowingly make a false statement of material fact; or
       (b) fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known by
       the person to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a
       lawful demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary authority,
       except that this Rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise
       protected by Rule 19-301.6 (1.6).

       A violation of Rule 8.1(a) “will result whenever an attorney makes intentional

misrepresentations to Bar Counsel.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Mitchell, 445 Md. 241,

259 (2015) (citation omitted).

       Ms. Rossbach made multiple false statements to Bar Counsel in violation of Rule

8.1(a). Ms. Rossbach’s March 12, 2021 response to Bar Counsel falsely stated that she

reviewed “hundreds of pages of [Mr. Kukin’s] business documents” and conducted

research on his behalf. The hearing judge concluded that “Ms. Rossbach did not take any

action to advance Mr. Kukin’s case, and that Ms. Rossbach’s statements to the contrary

were knowingly false and intended to mislead Bar Counsel regarding the work she

performed in the case.” In her March 12, 2021 response, Ms. Rossbach also falsely stated

that she was “refunding the $1,600 fee [Mr. Kukin] mentions in his Complaint, to the client

immediately.” On or about March 24, 2021, Ms. Rossbach’s office contacted Mr. Kukin

and asked how he would like to receive the refund. Mr. Kukin requested that the refund be

mailed to his home address. Thereafter, however, Ms. Rossbach failed to provide any

refund to Mr. Kukin.

                                            31
          Ms. Rossbach’s December 22, 2020 response to Bar Counsel regarding the

Desogugua matter falsely stated that Ms. Rossbach repeatedly asked Ms. Desogugua to

provide “required documents to prepare filing of her Petition,” and that she kept Ms.

Desogugua “informed throughout the process.” The hearing judge concluded that “Ms.

Rossbach’s statements were knowingly and intentionally false and intended to mislead Bar

Counsel regarding the work performed on behalf of Ms. Desogugua.” Ms. Rossbach also

stated in that same response that she was “refunding the $1,000 fee to the client

immediately” and that she had “attached the letter, sent to [Ms. Desogugua] with the refund

check.” The hearing judge found Ms. Rossbach’s statements to be knowingly and

intentionally false.

          Ms. Rossbach violated Rule 8.1(b) in the Kukin matter by failing to timely respond

to correspondence that Bar Counsel sent to her in November 2020, January 2021, and

March 2021. Ms. Rossbach also failed to respond and provide the documents requested in

Bar Counsel’s letters dated June 3, August 5, and August 19, 2021.

          Ms. Rossbach violated Rule 8.1(b) in the Desogugua matter by also failing to timely

respond to several letters from Bar Counsel. Additionally, Ms. Rossbach failed to timely

respond and provide the financial records requested in Bar Counsel’s February 18, 2021

letter.

                                              32
                           Rule 8.4(a), (c), and (d) (Misconduct)

       Rule 8.4 provides, in relevant part:

       It is professional misconduct for an attorney to:
       (a) violate or attempt to violate the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of
       Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so
       through the acts of another;
       …
       (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
       misrepresentation; [or]
       (d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice[.]

       An attorney violates Rule 8.4(a) if they violate any other rule of professional

conduct. Hoerauf, 469 Md. at 214.

       An attorney violates Rule 8.4(c) “by retaining unearned fees without intending to

earn them.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Haley, 443 Md. 657, 674 (2015) (citation

omitted). “The retention of unearned fees paid by a client, alone, may constitute a violation

of Rule 8.4(c).” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. McLaughlin, 372 Md. 467, 502-03 (2002)

(citations omitted). Additionally, a violation of Rule 8.1(a) constitutes a violation of Rule

8.4(c). See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Harris, 403 Md. 142, 164 (2008) (“We have

said that Rules 8.1(a) and 8.4(c) are violated when an attorney acts dishonestly and

deceitfully by knowingly making false statements to Bar Counsel.”).

       “Generally, an attorney violates [Rule 8.4(d)] when an attorney’s conduct impacts

negatively the public’s perception or efficacy of the courts or legal profession.” Hoerauf,

469 Md. at 214-15 (cleaned up).

       Having violated several other rules of professional conduct, Ms. Rossbach violated

Rule 8.4(a). Id. at 215.

                                              33
       We agree with the hearing judge’s conclusion that Ms. Rossbach violated Rule

8.4(c) in both matters when she agreed to represent Mr. Kukin and Ms. Desogugua, charged

and collected a fee, and then failed to perform the services for which she was retained

without refunding the fees. Ms. Rossbach also violated Rule 8.4(c) by making knowing

and intentional false statements to Bar Counsel, in violation of Rule 8.1(a).

       Ms. Rossbach’s conduct in both matters, as described above in recounting her other

violations of the MARPC, also violated Rule 8.4(d), as it “brings the legal profession into

disrepute and is therefore prejudicial to the administration of justice.”

                                              V

                           Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

                                    Aggravating Factors

       We have listed pertinent aggravating factors in an attorney grievance case as

including:

       (1) prior attorney discipline; (2) a dishonest or selfish motive; (3) a pattern
       of misconduct; (4) multiple violations of the [MARPC]; (5) bad faith
       obstruction of the attorney discipline proceeding by intentionally failing to
       comply with the Maryland Rules or orders of this Court or the hearing judge;
       (6) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive
       practices during the attorney discipline proceeding; (7) a refusal to
       acknowledge the misconduct’s wrongful nature; (8) the victim’s
       vulnerability; (9) substantial experience in the practice of law;
       (10) indifference to making restitution or rectifying the misconduct’s
       consequences; (11) illegal conduct, including that involving the use of
       controlled substances; and (12) likelihood of repetition of the misconduct.

Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Sperling, 459 Md. 194, 275 (2018) (citation omitted).

       The hearing judge found the existence of seven aggravating factors: (1) a dishonest

or selfish motive, (2) a pattern of misconduct, (3) multiple offenses, (4) bad faith

                                             34
obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with rules or

orders of the disciplinary agency, (5) refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of

conduct, (6) substantial experience in the practice of law, and (7) indifference to making

restitution. We agree with the hearing judge that these aggravating factors are present in

this case.

       Ms. Rossbach demonstrated a dishonest and selfish motive by making knowing and

intentional misrepresentations to Bar Counsel to conceal her misconduct and by refusing

to refund unearned client funds. As noted above, Ms. Rossbach failed to perform the

services for which she was retained. However, when responding to Bar Counsel, she

knowingly and intentionally misrepresented that she had performed a significant amount

of work on behalf of both clients. Ms. Rossbach’s statements to Bar Counsel that she was

refunding the clients’ unearned fees were also false.

       Ms. Rossbach displayed a pattern of misconduct in both matters by failing to

communicate with her clients, failing to appear for scheduled meetings, and failing to

perform the services for which she was retained. As discussed above, Ms. Rossbach has

committed multiple MARPC violations.

       Ms. Rossbach engaged in bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceedings in

both matters by failing to timely respond to Bar Counsel’s letters on multiple occasions

and by failing to provide Bar Counsel’s requested documentation. Ms. Rossbach also made

intentional misrepresentations to Bar Counsel regarding the work she performed on behalf

of both clients.

                                            35
       Ms. Rossbach failed to acknowledge the wrongful nature of her conduct. In her

responses to Bar Counsel to the clients’ complaints, Ms. Rossbach made knowing and false

statements about the work she had performed.

       Ms. Rossbach also demonstrated an indifference to making restitution. Ms.

Rossbach never refunded any portion of Mr. Kukin’s $1,600 fee, despite her claims that

she would do so. She refunded Ms. Desogugua’s $1,000 fee approximately 18 months after

Ms. Desogugua terminated the representation, and only after Ms. Desogugua filed a

complaint with Bar Counsel.

       Ms. Rossbach was admitted to the Maryland Bar in 2002 and has substantial

experience in the practice of law.

                                     Mitigating Factors

       We have previously listed relevant mitigating factors as including

       absence of a prior disciplinary record; absence of a dishonest or selfish
       motive; personal or emotional problems; timely good faith efforts to make
       restitution or to rectify consequences of misconduct; full and free disclosure
       to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings;
       inexperience in the practice of law; character or reputation; physical or
       mental disability or impairment; delay in disciplinary proceedings; interim
       rehabilitation; imposition of other penalties or sanctions; remorse; and
       finally, remoteness of prior offenses.

Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Hodes, 441 Md. 136, 209 (2014) (citation omitted).

       Although this matter was in default at the time of the evidentiary hearing, the

hearing judge allowed Ms. Rossbach to present mitigating factors without objection from

Petitioner. Ms. Rossbach discussed her health problems and her contentious divorce,

among other challenges with which she had been struggling. Although Ms. Rossbach stated

                                            36
at the evidentiary hearing that she had documentation that corroborated all her claims, she

did not enter any such documentation into evidence. The hearing judge concluded that Ms.

Rossbach failed to meet her burden to prove any mitigating factors other than a lack of

prior discipline. We agree.

                                            VI

                                         Sanction

       In deciding the appropriate sanction, “we are guided by our interest in protecting

the public and the public’s confidence in the legal profession.” Attorney Grievance

Comm’n v. Lewis, 437 Md. 308, 329 (2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

“As a result, our purpose in deciding the appropriate sanction is not to punish the lawyer,

but to protect the public, and deter other lawyers from engaging in similar misconduct.”

Edwards, 462 Md. at 711 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “When

determining the appropriate discipline, we consider the facts and circumstances of each

case and order a sanction that is commensurate with the nature and gravity of the violations

and the intent with which they were committed.” Id. at 712 (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted).

       Bar Counsel recommends an indefinite suspension without specifying a minimum

period that Ms. Rossbach must wait before applying for reinstatement. In support of its

recommendation, Bar Counsel relies on Attorney Grievance Commission v. Kirwan. In

Kirwan, this Court indefinitely suspended the attorney for violating Rules 1.1, 1.3,

1.4(a)(2)-(3) and (b), 1.16(d), 8.1(b), and 8.4(a) and (d). 450 Md. 447 (2016). The attorney

in Kirwan was retained to represent a minor child in a personal injury claim against an

                                            37
elementary school. Following execution of the retainer agreement and medical release

forms, the attorney requested and received medical records and maintained contact with

the client for two months. Thereafter, the attorney became unresponsive to the client’s

numerous attempts to contact her via phone and email, resulting in the client filing a

complaint with Bar Counsel. During the investigation, the attorney failed to respond to Bar

Counsel’s multiple requests for information. Id. at 455-57.

       We agree with Bar Counsel that an indefinite suspension is the appropriate sanction

in this case. “Indefinite suspension ensures that [Ms. Rossbach] is not permitted to practice

law until this Court is satisfied that she is able to do so in a manner that is consistent with

the M[A]RPC. We have reiterated that indefinite suspension is not permanent, so [Ms.

Rossbach] may apply for reinstatement under Maryland Rule 19-752.” Id. at 467.

       We decline, however, as we did in Attorney Grievance Commission v. Green, to set

a minimum time period that must run before Ms. Rossbach may apply for reinstatement:

       It is appropriate sometimes to state a minimum period of time that an attorney
       who has been suspended indefinitely must wait before he or she may apply
       for reinstatement to the Bar. Where there is no evidence in the record bearing
       on the likelihood that the offending attorney may not repeat the misconduct,
       however, we have refrained from specifying a minimum duration for an
       indefinite suspension. Because there is nothing in the record plumbing the
       reasons for [Ms. Rossbach’s] misconduct or the likelihood that recidivism is
       not a concern, due to [her] multiple refusals to cooperate with Bar Counsel,
       an open-ended indefinite suspension is appropriate. We note also in this
       regard that no mitigation was found by [the hearing judge]. Thus, there is no
       basis from which we could divine an appropriate minimum “sit-out” period.

441 Md. 80, 102 (2014) (citations omitted). Where, as here, there is nothing in the record

that would allow this Court to “divine an appropriate minimum ‘sit-out’ period,” we

decline to provide one. Id.

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                                          VII

                                      Conclusion

      For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that Ms. Rossbach violated Rules 1.1,

1.3, 1.4(a), 1.5(a), 1.16(d), 8.1(a) and (b), and 8.4(a), (c), and (d). We suspend Ms.

Rossbach indefinitely from the practice of law in Maryland.

                                        IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT
                                        SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY
                                        THE   CLERK   OF    THIS  COURT,
                                        INCLUDING    COSTS     OF    ALL
                                        TRANSCRIPTS,     PURSUANT     TO
                                        MARYLAND RULE 19-709 FOR WHICH
                                        SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR
                                        OF THE ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE
                                        COMMISSION   AGAINST     NATASHA
                                        VEYTSMAN ROSSBACH.

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