Court Opinion

ID: 9772279
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:13:03.82177+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:43.294913
License: Public Domain

COVINGTON, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the majority opinion with respect to the guilt phase issues, but would reverse and remand for a new penalty phase trial on the basis of the death qualification of the venire.
In Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992), the United States Supreme Court held that defendants who are subject to imposition of the death penalty have a constitutional right to a voir dire of the jury that is sufficient to allow the defendant to exercise intelligently his challenge for cause against those venireper-sons biased about the death penalty. Id at 729-34, 112 S.Ct. at 2229-2232. “[P]art of the guarantee of a defendant’s right to an impartial jury is an adequate voir dire to identify unqualified jurors.” Id. at 729, 112 S.Ct. at 2229-30. If a voir dire is conducted in a manner that prevents a defendant from adequately identifying a biased juror, then his sentence of death cannot stand because there is no assurance that his sentence was imposed by a jury impaneled according to the dictates of the Constitution. Id. at 739, 112 S.Ct. at 2235.
The sufficiency of the voir dire in identifying venirepersons who are not impartial must be measured by the definition of impartiality. A juror is not impartial if the juror’s views about capital punishment prevent or substantially impair the performance of his or her duties as a juror in accordance with the instructions and the juror’s oath. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. *623844, 852, 88 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985). It follows that a juror whose views about the death penalty would prevent or substantially impair the juror from considering both death and life without parole according to the instructions is not impartial. Consequently, if a death-qualification voir dire does not allow the defendant an opportunity to identify such jurors adequately, then the defendant’s constitutional right to an impartial jury has been violated.
This Court has emphasized repeatedly the importance of a thorough death-qualification voir dire. “In a capital murder case, inquiry into the venire members’ views about the death penalty is of critical importance to the state, the defendant and the court. It is the duty of all concerned to investigate those views thoroughly in order to assemble the most qualified jury.” State v. Antwine, 743 S.W.2d 51, 60 (Mo. banc 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017, 108 S.Ct. 1755, 100 L.Ed.2d 217 (1988). In State v. McMillin, 783 S.W.2d 82 (Mo. banc), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S.Ct. 225, 112 L.Ed.2d 179 (1990), this Court stated unequivocally, “Death qualification voir dire necessarily requires ‘deep probing as to opinions held,’ including exploration of whether the venirepersons can consider the full range of punishment under the facts alleged in the case before them.” Id. at 91 (quoting State v. Leisure, 749 S.W.2d 366, 373 (Mo. banc 1988)).
The United States Supreme Court has provided further guidance in determining when a death-qualification voir dire is sufficiently thorough so as to allow a defendant to identify potential jurors biased about the death penalty. In Wainwright, the Court noted the elementary proposition that “it is the adversary seeking exclusion who must demonstrate, through questioning, that the potential juror lacks impartiality.” Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 423, 105 S.Ct. at 851-52 (emphasis added). In discussing the manner in which such questioning can reveal juror bias, the Court stated that “determinations of juror bias cannot be reduced to question-and-answer sessions which obtain results in the manner of a catechism.” Id. at 424, 105 S.Ct. at 852.
The Court expounded upon the adequacy of voir dire in Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. at 721-736, 112 S.Ct. at 2225-34. In Morgan, the Court determined that general fairness and “follow the law” questions were insufficient to satisfy the defendant’s right to an adequate voir dire. Id. at 734-36, 112 S.Ct. at 2232-34. The Court explained that its cases establishing a right to an impartial jury “would be in large measure superfluous were this Court convinced that such general inquiries could detect those jurors with views preventing or substantially impairing then-duties in accordance with their instructions and oath.” Id. at 734-35, 112 S.Ct. at 2232-33. Because the Court found that “[i]t may be that a juror could, in good conscience, swear to uphold the law and yet be unaware that maintaining such dogmatic beliefs about the death penalty would prevent him or her from doing so,” it concluded that the defendant should have been allowed to ask an additional question of the venire probing the specific concern of whether a venirepersons’ views about the death penalty would prevent or substantially impair their ability to follow the court’s death penalty instructions. Id. at 735-36, 112 S.Ct. at 2232-34. The trial court’s refusal to allow such a question led the Court to reverse the sentence of death. Id. at 739, 112 S.Ct. at 2235.
The voir dire in the present case consisted entirely of one set of ten questions asked by the judge with no participation by the attorneys. Not one question was asked directly about the venirepersons’ views about capital punishment and how those views might affect their ability to follow the law. Even in the abstract nature of the questions posed, veni-repersons were asked only whether they would vote for the death penally automatically and whether they would consider life without parole. No juror was asked whether the juror’s ability to consider or vote for life without parole would be substantially impaired. Finally, and perhaps most significantly in view of the limited questions asked, no follow-up questions were allowed.
It is evident that because of the limited voir dire conducted, the failure to allow any follow-up questions prevented appellant from adequately identifying jurors whose views about the death penalty would prevent or *624substantially impair their ability to consider life without parole. The questioning was conducted in the manner of a catechism, a type of questioning specifically said to be inadequate by the United States Supreme Court. See Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 424, 105 S.Ct. at 852. The venirepersons were asked whether they could follow the law, but they were never asked whether they could do so considering their views about the death penalty. As in Morgan, therefore, the voir dire left unprobed the specific question of whether a potential juror’s views about the death penalty would interfere with the juror’s ability to follow the law. See Morgan, 504 U.S. at 735, 112 S.Ct. at 2238. Further, although the voir dire did touch upon the Witherspoon inquiry as to whether the potential jurors’ views would cause them to vote for the death penalty automatically, the voir dire was devoid of the requisite Wainwright inquiry as to whether the venirepersons’ views would substantially impair their ability to consider or impose life without parole.
In addition, the record shows that the nature of the voir dire stifled responses and created confusion. When a potential juror complained that the questions were confusing, no clarification or explanation was given. The confusion created by the voir dire is exemplified by the fact that at least fourteen venirepersons responded both that they would automatically vote for life without parole and that they would automatically vote for death. Considering these shortcomings in the questions posed to the venirepersons, allowing appellant to ask follow-up questions would have been necessary to provide him an opportunity to identify adequately those veni-repersons biased about the death penalty.
Because the voir dire as a whole was insufficient to allow appellant the opportunity to identify adequately those venirepersons whose views about the death penalty would prevent or substantially impair their ability to follow the court’s instructions regarding the death penalty, I would reverse the sentence of death and remand for a new penalty phase trial.