Court Opinion

ID: 8268232
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-10-16 19:15:04.068345+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:43:26.246487
License: Public Domain

Garrison, J.
(concurring).
I concur in the result announced by Mr. Justice Magie, but not for the reasons contained in the opinion just read, nor for those stated in the conclusions of the learned equity judge who heard the cause in 'the court of chancery.
The object of the complainant’s bill is to execute, through the medium of our court of chancery, an order made by the supreme court of New York upon the defendant to secure his performance of a decree rendered therein against him by mortgaging his lands in New Jersey. The procedure in this state is justified under that provision of the federal law that gives conclusive force in one state to the records and judicial proceedings of another. The vice of this deduction, in the case before us, is that it assumes that the order made by the New York court to secure the performance by the defendant of its decree against him is a “judgment ” of that state within the meaning of the federal constitution and the act of congress,
The transcendent force given by the federal law to the judicial proceedings of sister states is confined to such judicial determinations as possess the quality of judgment; it does not extend to-proceedings in the nature of execution or to orders merely ancillary to some special form of relief.
In cases that proceed to judgment in common-law form, this-distinction is well marked, but it is liable to be lost sight of in decisions rendered in equity causes where judgment, in decretal form, is often accompanied by special orders for particular forms of relief or for the enforcement or securing of the execution of' the decree pronounced. The distinction, however, is always a substantial one that must not be overlooked because of the-form in which the decretal order may be framed.
That only is judgment that is pronounced between the parties to the action upon the matters submitted to the court for decision. To judgments thus rendered, the federal law accords in every state the same conclusive force possessed in the state where they are rendered. After judgment in a state court, all that follows for the purpose oí enabling the successful party to reap the benefits of the determination in his favor is execution or in *571aid of execution. No interpretation has ever been placed upon the federal constitution giving conclusive effect, or, indeed, any effect at all to the executions of the judgments rendered in sister states.or to any order merely in aid thereof. Such orders lack the quality of judgment and must be^differentiated from judgments, ^e53hougU’embodied_ in the._same decretal orders that pronounce the judgment of the court. These decretal orders may be defined to be decisions made touching some matter collateral to the issue presented in the record or required to be passed upon in order to carry into execution the judgment of the court. To these determinations ancillary to execution, no> extra-territorial force is given by the- federal law.
That the order in the present case touching the defendant’s land in New Jersey is of this nature clearly appears in the case before us. Upon this demurrer it is established that the New York suit was instituted for the sole purpose of dissolving the marriage of the complainant with the defendant. Upon the record thus submitted the supreme court of New York pronounced as its judgment that the marriage should be dissolved with the incident of alimony to the complainant. Here the sentence of the law upon the record ceases. The order of the court then proceeds in these words: “And it is further adjudged and decreed that the said defendant, within ten days after the entry of this judgment and service thereof on the attorney for the defendant, execute and deliver unto the plaintiff a mortgage covering the real property owned by the defendant and particularly located in the State of New Jersey, which mortgage shall be of such form and contain such provisions as shall be sufficient and requisite to secure unto the plaintiff the faithful performance of the provisions of this judgment and decree on the part of the defendant as may be directed and approved by this court.”
In my opinion this order was ancillary to execution and did not possess any element of a judgment upon the issue submitted to the court for decision, which was whether the marriage between the parties should be dissolved. Eor this reason I think the complainant’s bill was properly dismissed.