Court Opinion

ID: 9795272
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:24:06.816825+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:28:41.359817
License: Public Domain

*280PER CURIAM
Wife appeals from a judgment denying her request to set aside a stipulated dissolution judgment. Wife argues that she was not mentally competent at the time that she stipulated to the judgment and that the trial court erred in finding otherwise; in particular, she asserts that the trial court applied the wrong legal test in determining her competency. We review the trial court’s choice of legal standard for errors of law and affirm.
In denying wife’s motion, the trial court noted that courts have applied two tests to determine mental competency in similar circumstances: the “cognitive test” and the “affective test.” Under the cognitive test, a person is competent if he or she has the capacity “to understand the nature of the act and to apprehend its consequences.” Gore v. Gadd, 268 Or 527, 528, 522 P2d 212 (1974) (internal quotation marks omitted). The cognitive test is the test that Oregon courts appear to follow. Wife argues, however, that we should adopt the broader affective test. Under the affective test, a person is incompetent if the person is “unable to act in a reasonable manner in relation to the transaction and the other party has reason to know of his condition.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 15(l)(b) (1979).
As noted in the concurrence, in some cases, Oregon courts may have applied certain aspects of the affective test in determining competency. Nevertheless, the cognitive test appears to be the law of this state, and we are bound to follow it. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in applying the cognitive test. The record supports the trial court’s conclusion that, under the cognitive test, wife was competent to enter into the stipulated judgment. We affirm on wife’s other assignments of error without discussion.
Affirmed.