Court Opinion

ID: 9538708
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:40:22.334344+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:06.216194
License: Public Domain

HENRIOD, Chief Justice
(dissenting) :
Chronology of this case is thus: a one-day trial was had before the court, sitting without a jury, on February IS, 1965, where the amount of damages was the sole issue. At end, the trial court volunteered from the bench that “I think * * * judgment of $2,000 would be fair.” No signed judgment supports this “think.”
Within 48 hours, and on February 17, the judge transmuted this “think” into a voluntary, signed “Reconsideration” (which should have been entitled “judgment”), prefaced by a change of mind, with the comment that after having his reporter read *78back the evidence “The Court * * * in the interest of justice (has) reconsidered the law and the testimony and concludes that plaintiff is entitled to * * * $4,-800.” This court has said that this he could do.1
After the parties already had stipulated that no finding's and conclusions need be filed, nonetheless the trial- court, after having entered his signed judgment -on February 17, 1965, signed findings and conclusions, which were superfluous and signed an equally superfluous judgment dated March 5, 1965, — no different than the February .17, 1965, pronouncement.
Before the March 5 judgment, and on March 2, defendant had filed a motion for a new trial urging that it was “partially based on the fact that 'the Court immediately following conclusion of the trial duly considered and discussed the matter of damages in chambers * * * and immediately thereafter made and gave its findings *, * * ,from the bench.’” . None of this episode in chambers is in the record, but the pronouncement from the bench is. Defendant says that therefore the judgment of “Reconsideration,” signed within 48 hours “appears to be a manifest injustice on the defendant.” We think such urgence is answered in footnote No. 1.
However, pursuant to the March 2 motion for a new trial, the court, subsequent to its two identical judgments of February 17 and March 5, granted the motion for hew trial dated March 2, on May 4, 1965. On motion to vacate this order, filed by plaintiff a week later, the court vacated its order for a new trial on September 3, 1965, and on September 8, signed a third judgment, identical to those of February 17 and March 5, 1965,' reciting that the judgment of March 5, 1965 was reinstated, which was unnecessary.
We think that the trial court reasonably could have concluded that the motion for new trial did not conform to Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and that the trial court, after having ordered a new trial, vacated it on motion for that reason. One of the grounds urged against such an 'order was Rule 59(a) (l)"re: irregularity in proceedings — which has to be supported by-affidavit under (c) of that Rule, — which was not dorie here.
The judgment should be affirmed.

.. McCollum v. Clothier, 121 Utah 311, 241 P.2d 468 (1952); Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Walker, Case No. 10374, 17 Utah 2d 390, 412 P.2d 920 (April 12, 1966).