Court Opinion

ID: 9742730
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:19:14.170921+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:35.673242
License: Public Domain

Boslaugh, J.,
dissenting.
The primary issues on this appeal are (1) whether the trial *451court abused its discretion in striking the testimony of the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses and (2) whether the trial court erred in directing a verdict for the defendants. The plaintiffs’ case is dependent upon their experts’ testimony. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in striking that testimony, it was proper to direct a verdict for the defendants.
The majority opinion begins by setting forth the rule, “Expert testimony should be stricken if it appears that the witness is not in possession of such facts as will enable him to express a reasonably accurate conclusion as distinguished from a mere guess or conjecture.” This statement of the rule is in accord with the previous decisions of this court, including Priest v. McConnell, ante p. 328, 363 N.W.2d 173 (1985). However, the majority’s application of the rule cannot be reconciled with this court’s application of the rule in previous cases.
At trial the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses were permitted to testify that, in their opinion, Peterson became spatially disoriented upon takeoff and lost control of the aircraft. Specifically, George Poullos testified by deposition: “So, with no visual reference whatsoever, and presuming that he did not believe his instruments, if he was looking at his instruments, I’m of the: opinion he suffered vertigo, spatial disorientation.”
In order to reach their conclusions, the expert witnesses had to assume the existence of a number of elements. Indeed, the only facts proven were that a twin-engine plane, allegedly piloted by Peterson, departed from runway 32 of the Columbus, Nebraska, airport at about 7 p.m. on November 25, 1979; that, 14 hours later, the plane’s wreckage was found 2 miles northeast of the airport; and that the plane crashed at a 60° nosedown position while headed to the southwest. In the majority opinion, the summation is made: “The experts testified that the location of impact and the angle of impact were consistent with the theory of a pilot suffering spatial disorientation and not being able to maintain control of the aircraft.” (Emphasis supplied.) To reach the conclusion propounded by the experts, it must be assumed that the plane crashed just after takeoff, at the position and location found, because Peterson made an improper right turn; that in doing so *452he encountered a “black hole,” that is, nonvisual flying conditions; that he was forced to fly according to his instruments (IFR); and that he was incapable of flying IFR. It is only at this point that spatial disorientation and its counterpart, loss of control of the airplane, become viable theories.
Although the facts known may be “consistent with” a particular theory as to how the accident happened, that will not support a finding that the accident happened in that way. Such evidence generally is not relevant, and testimony to that effect should not be received. Priest v. McConnell, supra. As was stated in Priest, and has been the underlying reason for disallowing expert testimony in prior decisions of this court, “there is a vast difference between permitting an expert to give an opinion when all the factors necessary to draw a conclusion are in evidence and in permitting an explanation based on assumptions that have no adequate foundation in the evidence.” Id. at 355, 363 N.W.2d at 177. This rationale, for instance, was also demonstrated in Flory v. Holtz, 176 Neb. 531, 126 N.W.2d 686 (1964). Concluding that the factors on which the opinion sought to be elicited were based were too conjectural, this court disallowed the testimony, stating:
We are in the realm of pure speculation. The testimony is dependent upon too many assumptions. We should not confuse inferences drawn from facts and inferences which are based upon mere assumptions. There is a vast difference between permitting an expert to give an opinion when all of the factors necessary to base an estimate of minimum speed are present and in permitting an estimate of actual speed based on assumptions that have no adequate foundation in the evidence. The apparent competency of the expert would merely aggravate the error.
Id. at 539, 126 N.W.2d at 692. Accord Nickal v. Phinney, 207 Neb. 281, 298 N.W.2d 360 (1980).
Expert testimony is permitted by Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 27-702 and 27-703 (Reissue 1979). “However, these rules do not permit either an expert or- a lay witness to render an opinion based upon obvious speculation or conjecture.” State v. Johnson, 215 Neb. 391, 394, 338 N.W.2d 769, 771 (1983).
*453Furthermore, although Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-705(1) (Reissue 1979) begins, “The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give his reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data,” it continues, “The expert may in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination.” And this court has held that where, on cross-examination, the witness “not only did not disclose such data but affirmatively established that he had no such data,” then the opinion testimony should be excluded. Fletcher v. State, 216 Neb. 342, 351, 344 N.W.2d 899, 905 (1984). Appropriate to the case at bar is the conclusion reached in Fletcher:
In this case there was no “reconstruction” of an accident that had occurred. Instead, on the flimsy data apparently considered by the witness, an accident was “constructed” or created. The expert gave no reasons for his opinion, and his conclusions are pure speculation and totally insufficient to form a basis for an opinion.
Id. at 352, 344 N.W.2d at 905.
The record is replete with examples in which the experts during both direct examination and cross-examination disclosed that their theory of how the accident happened was based on a series of assumptions. For instance, George Poullos testified that his theory was “based on . . . especially the black hole.” However, it was further elicited on cross-examination that the defendant would have encountered a “black hole” only if he made a right turn upon takeoff. Furthermore, the only explanation Poullos gave for the defendant to have turned right was “expediency,” whereas the correct flight pattern called for a left turn. The expert Gary Blessing was to later testify that the possibilities of the plane’s turning right, turning left, or traveling straight were equally consistent. Furthermore, the expert Gregory Gorak testified:
A. There is some evidence to support a partial turn, but where we got mixed up with each other is you now bring in the low altitude turn and the fact that the aircraft was heading a different heading other than runway takeoff heading, there obviously was some maneuver involved. Whether this maneuver was the result of a turn or a spatial *454disorientation, loss of control of the aircraft, I’m not quite sure which transpired. I’m leaning to the spatial disorientation, loss of control.
In fact, when asked, “Mr. Gorak, do you know whether or not the aircraft turned?” he replied, “No”; and when asked, “You agree that no one knows how this accident happened?” he answered, “No one knows.”
Moreover, there was no affirmative evidence to rule out the failure of certain controls. When asked if the artificial horizon might have failed, Delbert Valle testified: “It was destroyed. . . . It was beyond the point of determining whether it failed or whether it did not fail.” Similarly, no one could rule out other possible causes of the accident, including someone manipulating the dual controls of the airplane.
The cross-examination also revealed that VFR conditions existed in the entire space of the flight and that Peterson was “perfectly legal” to take off. Additionally, the experts admitted that it was impossible to know whether Peterson ever went on his instruments. Rather, Blessing affirmed that an instrument rating or currency was not required for Peterson to take off, and Poullos was unwilling to testify that Peterson’s failure to have taken a biennial flight review had anything to do with the accident.
When asked if Peterson could have been an extremely proficient pilot, Blessing admitted, “He could have been anything.”
Furthermore, Gorak testified that a vital part of his analysis was that the accident occurred during takeoff. He had not observed the takeoff, and there was no proof that the crash happened during takeoff. There was no evidence of the plane’s climb-out speed or the altitude it reached, and Blessing admitted not having an accurate record of the time. Valle testified that the plane’s clock had stopped at 2:32.
In short, the record on cross-examination demonstrates that the “facts” used by the experts to support their theory were mere assumptions. In State v. Miner, 216 Neb. 309, 312, 343 N.W.2d 899, 902 (1984), this court said: “The ruling of a trial court in receiving or excluding an expert opinion will be reversed on appeal only when a clear abuse of discretion is *455shown.” In light of the facts, or more appropriately, the lack of facts, in the case at bar, no abuse of discretion has been demonstrated.
This conclusion necessitates a finding that the lower court’s order directing a verdict for the defendants should also be affirmed.
The majority sets the tone for its opinion with a quote from Lange v. Nelson-Ryan Flight Service, Inc., 259 Minn. 460, 462, 108 N.W.2d 428, 430 (1961):
It is a tragic characteristic of airplane crashes that the accident itself frequently destroys all evidence of the cause and kills the witnesses who might have- knowledge of the event. Consequently, in litigation arising out of a plane crash the rights of the parties often depend upon the attitude of the court with respect to the right of the jury to draw inferences from such evidence as has survived the disaster.
However, as we stated in Scarborough v. Aeroservice, Inc., 155 Neb. 749, 762, 53 N.W.2d 902, 910 (1952), another airplane crash case:
The defendants assert that negligence is never presumed and not to be inferred from the mere fact that an accident happened. If the cause of the accident is not ascertained except as a matter of guess, conjecture, or surmise, the defendant would then be entitled to prevail. An abundance of authorities support the above proposition.
In determining whether a directed verdict was appropriate in this case, it is necessary to consider the rule governing circumstantial evidence, which was stated recently in Anderson v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., ante p. 1, 4-5, 360 N.W.2d 488, 490-91 (1985):
The plaintiffs may establish their case by circumstantial evidence as well as by direct evidence.
However, circumstantial evidence is not sufficient to sustain a verdict depending solely thereon for support, unless the circumstances proved by the evidence are of such nature and so related to each other that the conclusion reached by the jury is the only one that can fairly and reasonably be drawn therefrom. Mullikin v. *456Pedersen, 161 Neb. 22, 71 N.W.2d 485.
The evidence must be such as to make the plaintiffs’ theory of causation reasonably probable, not merely possible.
In every case, before the evidence is submitted to the jury, there is a preliminary question for the court to decide, when properly raised, not whether there is literally no evidence, but whether there is any evidence upon which a jury can properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it, upon whom the burden of proof is imposed. Weston v. Gold & Co., 167 Neb. 692, 94 N.W.2d 380.
Where several inferences are deducible from the facts presented, which inferences are opposed to each other, but equally consistent with the facts proved, the plaintiffs do not sustain their position by a reliance alone on the inferences which would entitle them to recover. Shamblen v. Great Lakes Pipe Line Co., 158 Neb. 752, 64 N.W.2d 728.
Conjecture, speculation, or choice of quantitative possibilities are not proof. There must be something more which would lead a reasoning mind to one conclusion rather than to the other.
Since the experts’ testimony was properly stricken, the only conclusion which could be reached was that the plaintiffs failed to produce any evidence upon which a jury could properly find in their favor.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs demonstrates that they dispelled the possibility of mechanical failures only to the extent that an investigation would disclose them. There was evidence that Peterson had limited nighttime flying experience; that he was not current in his instrument ratings; that he had gone beyond his biennial flight review date; that he was not authorized to fly a plane at night with passengers aboard; that “marginal” visual flight rules conditions existed at the time of takeoff; and that Peterson violated an FAA rule when he did not obtain a preflight weather report. The evidence further established that he took off prior to doing a complete “run-up” and cockpit check, and prior to allowing the engines to reach normal *457operating temperatures. There was no evidence as to when the crash occurred; whether the plane crashed on takeoff or at some later time when Peterson was returning to the airport; or as to how or why the crash occurred.
The absence of proof of the facts essential to recovery in this case is apparent. Under the standard set forth in Anderson, supra, the evidence of negligence was not sufficient to submit the case to a jury. As stated by the trial court: “I’ve listened to this testimony and the record leaves but one impression: The cause of this accident is unknown.”
The judgment of the trial court should have been affirmed.
Hastings and Caporale, JJ., join in this dissent.