Court Opinion

ID: 9891001
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-17 12:07:25.407495+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:39:40.743807
License: Public Domain

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22-P-870                                               Appeals Court

                      COMMONWEALTH   vs.   THANH DU.

                             No. 22-P-870.

           Suffolk.       June 7, 2023. - October 6, 2023.

             Present:    Wolohojian, Singh, & Hand, JJ.

Controlled Substances. Electronic Surveillance. Cellular
     Telephone. Search and Seizure, Electronic surveillance.
     Evidence, Wiretap. Statute, Construction. Practice,
     Criminal, Motion to suppress. Words, "Oral communication,"
     "Wire communication," "Interception," "Secretly,"
     "Contents."

     Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court
Department on January 8, 2020.

     A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by
Catherine H. Ham, J.

     Applications for leave to prosecute an interlocutory appeal
were allowed by Dalila Argaez Wendlandt, J., in the Supreme
Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk, and the appeals were
reported by her to the Appeals Court.

     Paul B. Linn, Assistant District Attorney, for the
Commonwealth.
     Nancy Dolberg, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for
the defendant.
                                                                    2

     WOLOHOJIAN, J.    An undercover Boston police officer, using

a cell phone, made surreptitious audio-visual recordings of

three purchases of drugs from the defendant.   Each recording was

made without the defendant's knowledge or consent, and without

obtaining a warrant.   The question presented in these

interlocutory cross appeals is whether the Massachusetts

communications interception statute (statute or wiretap

statute),1 G. L. c. 272, § 99, requires that the recordings be

suppressed.   We conclude that it does.

     The facts are undisputed.2   Each of the three drug

transactions at issue followed the same pattern.   Before meeting

with the defendant, an undercover officer used a software

     1 In Commonwealth v. Thorpe, 384 Mass. 271, 272 (1981),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1147 (1982), the Supreme Judicial Court
referred to the statute as the "Massachusetts communications
interception statute," which more accurately describes the
statute than the more commonly used colloquial shorthand
"wiretap statute," because the statute's scope extends to the
secret interception of communications by a variety of electronic
means, not simply wiretaps. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Yusuf,
488 Mass. 379 (2021) (stored body camera video footage);
Commonwealth v. Moody, 466 Mass. 196 (2013) (text messages
transmitted over cellular network); Commonwealth v. Tavares, 459
Mass. 289 (2011) (concealed recording device). Accordingly,
although we sometimes refer in this opinion to the statute as
the "wiretap statute," we do so without intending to suggest any
narrowing of its reach.

     2 We recite the facts as found by the judge, supplemented by
undisputed testimony of the officer who testified at the
suppression hearing and by our own observations of the three
recordings, which were admitted at the evidentiary hearing and
are part of the appellate record.
                                                                    3

application3 on his cell phone to begin an audio-visual

communication (call)4 with officers who were located nearby

conducting surveillance (remote officers).   This software

application was designed to enable (and did, in fact, cause) the

undercover officer's cell phone to transmit to the remote

officers all audio and video captured by the undercover

officer's cell phone during the call.   The remote officers could

(and did) observe and listen "live" to the calls as they were

being transmitted.   At the same time, the undercover officer's

cell phone also transmitted the audio-visual recordings to the

     3 The application is called Callyo, which was described at
oral argument as an electronic tool designed to aid law
enforcement in a variety of investigatory ways. Examples of the
uses to which Callyo has been put in police investigations can
be found in United States vs. Powell, U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 18-CR-
30042 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 17, 2020) (recording, storage, and
download of call involving confidential informant); People v.
Lewis, 2020 IL App (2d) 170900, aff'd, 2022 IL 126705
(interception and recording of text messages); State v. Bilgi,
19 Wash. App. 2d 845 (2021) (interception and recording of text
messages).

     4 On the first and second occasions, the call began over ten
minutes before the undercover officer met the defendant; on the
third, it began two minutes before. During these periods, the
undercover officer would report information such as where the
defendant told him to meet, that the defendant was approaching,
or what the defendant was wearing. The video captured the
officer's location and surroundings as he either stood waiting
or while walking to meet the defendant.
                                                                      4

"cloud,"5 where they were stored.      The participating officers

knowingly consented to this arrangement.

       The drug purchases were made in public places chosen by the

defendant, who arrived on foot.       Two of the transactions took

place on sidewalks, and the other took place in a store parking

lot.       On each occasion, the officer purchased one hundred

dollars' worth of narcotics from the defendant,6 a suspected

street dealer.7      When the defendant arrived within range of the

undercover officer's cell phone, his voice and image were

recorded and transmitted without his knowledge or consent.

Although the defendant knew that he was orally communicating

with a drug purchaser, he did not know that (1) the purchaser

was also an undercover police officer, (2) the undercover

officer was audio-visually recording the interaction, (3) the

       "Cloud computing" is "the practice of storing regularly
       5

used computer data on multiple servers that can be accessed
through the Internet." Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cloud%20computing
[https://perma.cc/D6VT-G8GG]. See Commonwealth v. Gelfgatt, 468
Mass. 512, 536 (2014) (Lenk, J., dissenting) (definition of
cloud computing); G. Jacobs & K. Laurence, Professional
Malpractice § 17.1 n.8 (Supp. 2022).

       On the first occasion, the undercover officer bought three
       6

bags of drugs (one cocaine, one fentanyl, one inconclusive); on
the second and third occasions, the officer purchased two bags
of fentanyl.

       Based on text messages stored on the cell phone of a
       7

person who had died of an overdose, the police "cold called" the
defendant to see if he would sell them drugs.
                                                                   5

audio-visual recording was being transmitted to the remote

officers, who were observing and listening live, or (4) the

recording was also being transmitted to the cloud, where it was

being intercepted, recorded, and stored.   As would naturally be

expected in the context of an undercover investigation, the

police kept all of these matters secret from the defendant.

    Once the drug purchases were finished and the defendant had

walked away, the undercover officer used a verbal code to report

to the remote officers that the transaction had been completed.

Each recording was then terminated.   Later, one of the remote

officers downloaded copies of the recordings from the cloud onto

a disc.   Although it is not stated explicitly in the record, it

is self-evident that the further recording onto a disc also

happened without the defendant's knowledge or consent.

    The defendant was charged with multiple counts of

distributing class A and B substances as a subsequent offender,

in violation of G. L. c. 94C, §§ 32 (a), (b), and 32A (a), (b).

He moved to suppress the recordings on the ground that they

violated the wiretap statute, G. L. c. 272, § 99; he did not

raise any constitutional ground for suppressing the recordings.

The Commonwealth made two arguments in opposition.   First, it

argued that the recordings fell within the exception to the

wiretap statute where police have a reasonable suspicion that

the defendant is engaged in a designated offense in connection
                                                                    6

with organized crime.   See G. L. c. 272, § 99 B 4, 7.   Second,

it argued that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of

privacy in public places.

    After an evidentiary hearing at which the only witness was

the remote officer who downloaded the recordings, whose

testimony the judge credited, the judge suppressed the audio

portion of the recordings but did not suppress the video

portion.   The judge concluded that the video portion need not be

suppressed because the defendant did not move to suppress it;

this was incorrect -- the defendant's motion was not so limited.

As to the audio portion of the recordings, the judge found that

the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy, under

art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, in his "low-

volume" one-on-one conversations with the undercover officer,

even though they occurred in public settings.   The judge then

analyzed the evidence to determine whether the Commonwealth had

proven a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was selling

drugs as part of organized crime, and concluded that it had not:

    "Here, except for [the defendant], the police did not know
    the identity of any other members of [a] narcotics
    distribution organization. There is an assumption by the
    police that [the defendant] is working with others to
    distribute narcotics. There is no evidence that [the
    defendant] is working with anyone. Therefore, there is no
    organized conspiracy to distribute narcotics, as only one
    person cannot conspire with himself. Where the
    Commonwealth has not met its burden that the crime [was]
    engaged in by multiple players, although drug dealing can
                                                                      7

     be [a] nexus to organized crime, the statute['s] exception
     has not been met."

Accordingly, the judge suppressed the audio portion of the

recordings, expressly noting that the undercover officer would

be permitted to testify to his own recollections of the

transactions at trial.    Both the Commonwealth and the defendant

sought leave to pursue interlocutory appeals from the judge's

decision.   These were allowed by a single justice of the Supreme

Judicial Court, who referred the appeal to this court.8    It is in

this posture that the case is now before us.

     Discussion.   It is important to note at the outset that the

defendant did not below -- nor does he here -- argue that the

surreptitious recordings should be suppressed under the Fourth

Amendment to the United States Constitution or art. 14.

Instead, the defendant argues that the recordings must be

suppressed under G. L. c. 272, § 99 P, which has its own

exclusionary provision.    The statute provides for the exclusion

from evidence of "the contents of any intercepted wire or oral

communication or evidence derived therefrom," if the

communication was intercepted in violation of the statute.

G. L. c. 272, § 99 P.     Thus, the core question presented in this

     8 The single justice denied the defendant's petition to the
extent it sought interlocutory review of the judge's decision
not to suppress the fruits of a warrantless search and seizure.
                                                                     8

appeal is whether the audio-visual recordings violate the

statute.   If they do, then their "contents" -- as that term is

defined by the statute -- are to be suppressed under § 99 P.

See Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 426 Mass. 313, 315 (1997)

(recordings made in violation of wiretap statute "are not

admissible in criminal trials for the Commonwealth").     The term

"contents" is broadly defined to mean "any information

concerning the identity of the parties to such communication or

the existence, contents, substance, purport, or meaning of that

communication."   G. L. c. 272, § 99 B (5).

     The history, purpose, and evolution of the wiretap statute

have been extensively explained by the Supreme Judicial Court,

see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rainey, 491 Mass. 632, 645-647

(2023); Commonwealth v. Tavares, 459 Mass. 289, 294-296 (2011),

and we need not repeat them here.   For purposes of this case, we

need only note that in 1968,9 concerned about the "uncontrolled

     9 Vast changes in technology have occurred since 1968, but
they have not prompted the Legislature to amend the statute. By
contrast, other jurisdictions have updated their wiretap
statutes with more regularity to account for technological
advances. See, e.g., Electronic Communications Privacy Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, Title 1, § 101(c), 100 Stat. 1848,
1851 (adding prohibition on interceptions of "electronic
communications" to existing prohibitions on interceptions of
"wire" and "oral" communications); 1999 Ill. Laws 657 (defining
"electronic communication" as "any transfer of signs, signals,
writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature
transmitted in whole or part by a wire, radio, pager, computer,
electromagnetic, photo electronic or photo optical system");
2021 Or. Laws 357 (defining "[v]ideo conferencing program" as
                                                                   9

development and unrestricted use of modern electronic

surveillance devices," the Legislature decided that

Massachusetts should be among the minority of States10 requiring

that all parties consent to the interception of wire and oral

communications.11   G. L. c. 272, § 99 A, third par.   "[T]he

Legislature was concerned principally with the investigative use

of surveillance devices by law enforcement officials to

eavesdrop surreptitiously on conversations."   Rainey, supra at

645.    See Commonwealth v. Morris, 492 Mass. 498, 505 (2023)

(legislative focus of wiretap statute is on deterrence of

invasion of privacy rights by "law enforcement officers'

surreptitious eavesdropping as an investigative tool" [citation

"software or an application for a computer or cellular telephone
that allows two or more persons to communicate via simultaneous
video transmission").

       The other jurisdictions are California, Delaware,
       10

Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Montana, New Hampshire, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, and Washington. See Cal. Penal Code § 632(a);
Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1335(a)(4); Fla. Stat. § 934.03(2)(d);
720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/14-2(a)(1); Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud.
Proc. § 10-402(c)(3); Mont. Code Ann. § 45-8-213(1)(c); N.H.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 570-A:2(I); Or. Rev. Stat. § 165.540(1)(c); 18
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5704(4); Wash. Rev. Code § 9.73.030(1).

       Massachusetts is often colloquially referred to as a
       11

"two-party consent" jurisdiction, but it is more accurate to
describe it as an all-party consent jurisdiction. See Ferch,
Secretly Recording Public Officials: Challenges to the
Massachusetts Wiretap Act, 65 Bos. B.J. 43, 43 (Summer 2021).
                                                                 10

omitted]); Commonwealth v. Gordon, 422 Mass. 816, 833 (1996)

(same).

    With a few exceptions contained in G. L. c. 272, § 99 D,12

none of which are invoked in this case, the statute prohibits

    12    That subsection provides as follows:

          "D. Exemptions.

       "1. Permitted interception of wire or oral
  communications.

          It shall not be a violation of this section –-

       "a. for an operator of a switchboard, or an officer,
  employee, or agent of any communication common carrier, whose
  facilities are used in the transmission of a wire
  communication, to intercept, disclose, or use that
  communication in the normal course of his employment while
  engaged in any activity which is a necessary incident to the
  rendition of service or to the protection of the rights or
  property of the carrier of such communication, or which is
  necessary to prevent the use of such facilities in violation
  of section fourteen A of chapter two hundred and sixty-nine of
  the general laws; provided, that said communication common
  carriers shall not utilize service observing or random
  monitoring except for mechanical or service quality control
  checks.

       "b. for persons to possess an office intercommunication
  system which is used in the ordinary course of their business
  or to use such office intercommunication system in the
  ordinary course of their business.

       "c. for investigative and law enforcement officers of
  the United States of America to violate the provisions of this
  section if acting pursuant to authority of the laws of the
  United States and within the scope of their authority.

       "d. for any person duly authorized to make specified
  interceptions by a warrant issued pursuant to this section.
                                                                   11

the "interception" of "any wire or oral communication."    G. L.

c. 272, § 99 C 1.     Because each of these terms bears on the

analysis of this case, we pause to examine them in detail before

proceeding further.

    An "oral communication" is defined as "speech, except such

speech as is transmitted over the public air waves by radio or

other similar device."    G. L. c. 272, § 99 B 2.   A "'wire

communication' means any communication made in whole or in part

through the use of facilities for the transmission of

communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like

connection between the point of origin and the point of

reception."   G. L. c. 272, § 99 B 1.    The term "wire

communication" includes transmissions made over cellular

networks, and "is broad enough to cover non-oral electronic

       "e. for investigative or law enforcement officers to
  violate the provisions of this section for the purposes of
  ensuring the safety of any law enforcement officer or agent
  thereof who is acting in an undercover capacity, or as a
  witness for the commonwealth; provided, however, that any such
  interception which is not otherwise permitted by this section
  shall be deemed unlawful for purposes of paragraph P.

       "f. for a financial institution to record telephone
  communications with its corporate or institutional trading
  partners in the ordinary course of its business; provided,
  however, that such financial institution shall establish and
  maintain a procedure to provide semi-annual written notice to
  its corporate and institutional trading partners that
  telephone communications over designated lines will be
  recorded."
                                                                  12

transmissions."    Commonwealth v. Moody, 466 Mass. 196, 208

(2013).

     "The term 'interception' means to secretly hear, secretly

record, or aid another to secretly hear or secretly record the

contents of any wire or oral communication through the use of

any intercepting device by any person other than a person given

prior authority by all parties to such communication," G. L.

c. 272, § 99 B 4, except where the interception is made by a law

enforcement officer in the course of investigating a "designated

offense,"13 see G. L. c. 272, § 99 B 7, committed in connection

with organized crime "if the officer is a party to such

communication or has been given prior authorization to record or

transmit the communication by such a party" (one-party consent

exception).   G. L. c. 272, § 99 B 4.   "Organized crime . . .

consists of a continuing conspiracy among highly organized and

disciplined groups to engage in supplying illegal goods and

services."    G. L. c. 272, § 99 A, first par.

     13Designated offenses are "arson, assault and battery with
a dangerous weapon, extortion, bribery, burglary, embezzlement,
forgery, gaming in violation of [G. L. c. 271], intimidation of
a witness or juror, kidnapping, larceny, lending of money or
things of value in violation of the general laws, mayhem,
murder, any offense involving the possession or sale of a
narcotic or harmful drug, perjury, prostitution, robbery,
subornation of perjury, any violation of this section, being an
accessory to any of the foregoing offenses and conspiracy or
attempt or solicitation to commit any of the foregoing
offenses." G. L. c. 272, § 99 B 7.
                                                                  13

    "To show a nexus to organized crime, there must be some
    evidence of an ongoing illegal business operation. The
    Commonwealth also must demonstrate a high degree of
    discipline and organization among the suspected members of
    the criminal enterprise. However, facts suggesting
    coordination of efforts among cohorts standing alone is
    insufficient. . . . For a conspiracy to commit an offense
    enumerated in G. L. c. 272, § 99 B 7, to rise to the level
    of organized crime, there must, at the very least, be an
    organized plan from which one reasonably may infer the
    existence of an ongoing criminal operation. Finally, the
    Commonwealth must show that the designated offense was
    committed to promote the supply of illegal goods and
    services or the furtherance of an ongoing criminal business
    operation." (Quotations and citations omitted.)

Commonwealth v. Burgos, 470 Mass. 133, 140 (2014).   See Tavares,

459 Mass. at 299-300.

    Our cases have found this standard to be met where there

was evidence of an ongoing coordinated effort among multiple

people to engage in one of the statute's designated offenses,

see note 13, supra, for the group's financial gain or goals.

Thus, for example, in Commonwealth v. Lykus, 406 Mass. 135, 142

(1989), a group of people made a coordinated effort to extort

ransom money from the family of a person who had disappeared.

By way of further example, in Commonwealth v. Thorpe, 384 Mass.

271, 278 (1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1147 (1982), there was a

continuing conspiracy among multiple people to supply illegally

the civil service examination.   Similarly, in Commonwealth v.

Fernandes, 492 Mass. 469 (2023), Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 468

Mass. 417 (2014), Commonwealth v. Hearns, 467 Mass. 707 (2014),

and Commonwealth v. Davis, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 484 (2013), there
                                                                    14

was an organized network of individuals engaged in selling

contraband, often involving large quantities (more than a

kilogram) of drugs.   By contrast, where the evidence did not

establish a nexus between a disciplined network's "organized

efforts to supply illicit goods or services" and a designated

offense under the statute, the requirements of the statute have

been held to have not been satisfied.    Tavares, 459 Mass. at

302.   See Burgos, 470 Mass. at 142; Commonwealth v. Long, 454

Mass. 542, 557-558 (2009).

       Finally, we examine the word "secretly" as it is used in

the definition of "interception."   G. L. c. 272, § 99 B 4.

"Secretly" does not "encompass[] only those situations where an

individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy."

Commonwealth v. Jackson, 370 Mass. 502, 506 (1976).    The wiretap

statute's protections are not "coextensive with the Fourth

Amendment and art. 14," nor are they limited "only [to]

communications as to which the speaker maintains a reasonable

expectation of privacy."    Rainey, 491 Mass. at 644 n.21.    See

Morris, 492 Mass. at 506.    For this reason, the Commonwealth's

argument that the statute cannot be violated absent a reasonable

expectation of privacy misses the mark, as did the judge's

approach of engrafting art. 14 concepts onto the statute.

Although a surreptitious recording may in certain circumstances

be suppressed under art. 14, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Yusuf,
                                                                  15

488 Mass. 379, 393-394 (2021); Commonwealth v. Blood, 400 Mass.

61, 77 (1987), as well as under the wiretap statute, the two

avenues of analysis do not rise and fall together.14     The Supreme

Judicial Court has explained that if we "were to interpret

'secretly' as encompassing only those situations where an

individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy," it "would

render meaningless the Legislature's careful choice of words" in

§ 99.     Jackson, supra.   See Morris, 492 Mass. at 506 n.10

("wiretap statute evinces the Legislature's intent to provide

broader protections than those provided by the State and Federal

Constitutions").

     For purposes of the statute, a recording is made "secretly"

when it is made without the actual knowledge of the person being

recorded.    Jackson, 370 Mass. at 507.   See Commonwealth v. Hyde,

434 Mass. 594, 595-601 (2001); Project Veritas Action Fund v.

Rollins, 982 F.3d 813, 819 (1st Cir. 2020) (construing wiretap

     14A good example of this principle in action can be found
by comparing Moody, 466 Mass. 196, and Commonwealth v. Delgado-
Rivera, 487 Mass. 551 (2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 908
(2022). In Moody, the defendant argued that the secret
interception of text messages violated the statute and
accordingly should be suppressed under the statute's
exclusionary provision. The court agreed. By contrast, in
Delgado-Rivera, the defendant argued that the search of another
person's cell phone violated the defendant's expectation of
privacy in his own text messages, such that suppression was
required under the Fourth Amendment and art. 14. The court
disagreed.
                                                                   16

statute); Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 86-87 (1st Cir. 2011).

The Commonwealth may prove actual knowledge "where there are

clear and unequivocal objective manifestations of knowledge [on

the part of the person being recorded], for such indicia are

sufficiently probative of a person's state of mind as to allow

an inference of knowledge and to make unnecessary any further

requirement that the person recording the conversation confirm

the caller's apparent awareness by acknowledging the fact of the

intercepting device."     Jackson, supra.

     With these concepts in hand, we turn now to the audio-

visual recordings at issue in this case.    As an initial matter,

we consider whether there was an "interception" within the

meaning of the statute.    As we have already noted, "[t]he term

'interception' means to secretly hear, secretly record, or aid

another to secretly hear or secretly record the contents of any

wire or oral communication."    G. L. c. 272, § 99 B 4.   "Record,"

for purposes of the wiretap statute, means "to cause (sound,

visual images) to be transferred to and registered on something

[by] electronic means in such a way that the thing so

transferred and registered can . . . be subsequently

reproduced"15 (citation omitted).    Moody, 466 Mass. at 209.

     15It is clear that the reference in Moody to sound and
visual images includes electronic signals created from sound or
visual images.
                                                                    17

Rainey, 491 Mass. at 644 n.22.   A single communication can be

intercepted at more than one point in time or place.    Cf. Yusuf,

488 Mass. at 390-392 (body camera recording assessed, for art.

14, both at moment of recording and as of moment two weeks later

when footage was reviewed for a different investigatory

purpose).   Here, there were four interceptions of each encounter

between the undercover officer and the defendant:    (1) the

undercover officer's audio-visual recording of his encounter

with the defendant; (2) the remote officers' hearing of the

audio-visual transmission of the encounter; (3) the storing of

the audio-visual recording in the cloud; and (4) the downloading

of the audio-visual recording from the cloud to a disc.       The

first of these audio-visually intercepted the contents of an

oral communication between the undercover officer and the

defendant; the remaining three intercepted wire communications.

See Moody, 466 Mass. at 208 (text communication over cellular

network constitutes wire communication).

    All four of the interceptions were made "secretly" within

the meaning of the statute because the Commonwealth produced no

evidence either of the defendant's actual knowledge or of "clear

and unequivocal objective manifestations of knowledge" on his

part.   Jackson, 370 Mass. at 507.   The testifying officer

frankly acknowledged that the recordings were made secretly and

that, as a matter of common sense, one would expect that to be
                                                                 18

the case in the context of an undercover investigation.    We have

reviewed the recordings ourselves and see nothing to indicate

the defendant knew he was being recorded.16   It is undisputed

that the defendant did not consent.   This is not a situation

where an audio-visual recording was made openly, or for a

noninvestigative purpose untargeted to a particular suspect, or

while knowing one is voluntarily speaking with police who are

taking the statement down.   Contrast Morris, 492 Mass. at 506

(station-house recording of police interrogation where defendant

knew his voluntary statement was being preserved by police);

Rainey, 491 Mass. at 643-644 (voluntary victim statement to

police officer wearing body camera); Commonwealth v. Rivera, 445

Mass. 119, 123-125 (2005) (in-store surveillance camera);

Gordon, 422 Mass. at 833 (administrative booking video).

     As to the one-party consent exception, although the

Commonwealth established one of the statute's "designated

offenses" -- namely, an "offense involving the possession or

sale of a narcotic or harmful drug," G. L. c. 272, § 99 B 7 --

     16The Commonwealth argues that the defendant should have
been on notice that a cell phone could be used for such purposes
and that the videos show that the cell phone was in plain view.
Setting aside that the Commonwealth did not preserve the issue
for appeal by raising it below, see Commonwealth v. Bettencourt,
447 Mass. 631, 633 (2006), there was no evidence below as to how
the cell phone was displayed by the undercover officer, and our
independent review of the videos does not lead us to conclude
that it was displayed in plain view in a manner that would lead
the defendant to be on notice that he was being recorded.
                                                                    19

it failed to prove a nexus to organized crime.    As the judge

correctly found, there was no evidence that the defendant, an

apparent street dealer, was acting in concert with others as

part of an organized criminal enterprise.    Nor did the

particulars of the three transactions, which involved small

amounts, give rise to such an inference.    Contrast Mitchell, 468

Mass. at 426; Hearns, 467 Mass. at 715-716; Davis, 83 Mass. App.

Ct. at 490-491.

     For these reasons, we conclude that the interceptions in

this case violated the statute.    We accordingly turn to the

statute's exclusionary provision to consider the appropriate

remedy.   Where, as here, an oral or wire communication has been

unlawfully intercepted, the statute permits a criminal defendant

to "move to suppress the contents of any intercepted wire or

oral communication or evidence derived therefrom."    G. L.

c. 272, § 99 P.   "Contents" is broadly defined as "any

information concerning the identity of the parties to such

communication or the existence, contents, substance, purport, or

meaning of that communication."    G. L. c. 272, § 99 B 5.    The

definition extends beyond the words of the communication itself

or an aural recording of it.17    It may "mean simply that not only

     17This is one of several points of distinction between the
wiretap statute and Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 211
(1968) (Title III). Unlike our Legislature, Congress has
                                                                   20

must the recording of an unlawfully intercepted conversation be

suppressed, but also any evidence that the conversation was

recorded: for example, any transcripts or summaries of, or

references to, the recording; or the testimony of a third person

(not a party to the conversation) who either monitored the

conversation at the time it took place or listened to a

recording of it later."    Commonwealth v. Jarabek, 384 Mass. 293,

298 (1981).    The same definition of "contents" applies to both

oral and wire communications.

     Where, as here, the audio and visual components were

captured during a unitary audio-visual recording, nothing in the

statute suggests that they should be considered separately to

determine whether they constitute "contents" as defined by the

statute.18    But even considering them separately, both fall

within the statutory definition.    The audio portion of the

recordings does so because it is information concerning the

existence, contents, and substance of the defendant's oral

"purposefully narrowed the definition of 'wire communication'
under Title III to include only 'aural transfer'" (citation
omitted). Moody, 466 Mass. at 207. See United States v.
Larios, 593 F.3d 82, 90 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 560 U.S. 935
(2010) (Title III applies only to aural wire communications).

     18This case does not involve a video-only recording of a
communication or a video recording of communication that was
audio recorded separately. Nor do we consider or decide whether
the contents of such video recordings may fall within the
statute.
                                                                   21

communications with the undercover officer.   The video portion

of the recordings does so because it is evidence that the

conversations were recorded, and because it shows the defendant

while he was having those oral communications with the

undercover officer and, accordingly, is "information concerning

the identity of the parties to such communication."19    G. L.

c. 272, § 99 B 5.   Given the Legislature's broad definition of

"contents," both the audio and video aspects of the audio-visual

recordings should have been suppressed.   Because the definition

of "contents" is the same for both wire and oral communications,

the outcome is the same whether we look only to the undercover

officer's initial audio-visual recording of the oral

communications with the defendant, or to the subsequent

interceptions of the wire communications from the undercover

officer.

     The Commonwealth counters that, despite the definition of

"contents," the video portion of the recordings should not be

suppressed because the defendant had no reasonable expectation

of privacy in public places.   But this argument impermissibly

imports art. 14 considerations into the wiretap statute.    As we

have already explained, the Legislature deliberately did not

     19Neither party briefed the question whether the portions
of the recordings when the defendant was not in audio-visual
range of the undercover officer's cell phone violated the
statute, and we therefore do not consider the issue here.
                                                                  22

incorporate art. 14 analysis into the statute, but instead

carefully crafted a scheme that rests instead on whether a

recording is made "secretly."

    At oral argument, both sides expressed concerns regarding

the possible consequence of any decision we might reach.     On the

one hand, counsel for the defendant represented that Callyo (the

software application used by the officers here) is being adopted

by police departments across the country to conduct

surreptitious surveillance on ordinary citizens.   Even accepting

this representation and accounting for the sophisticated

investigatory uses to which Callyo is being put elsewhere as

described in reported cases from other jurisdictions, see note

3, supra, the Legislature has created a strong bulwark against

secret surveillance by law enforcement in this Commonwealth.

General Laws c. 272, § 99, is among the most protective of

electronic surveillance statutes in the country, see note 10,

supra, and more protective than Title III of the Omnibus Crime

Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82

Stat. 211 (1968).   As demonstrated in the outcome we reach here,

the statute is adequately designed to deal even with a

sophisticated and novel surveillance tool such as Callyo.

    On the other hand, the Commonwealth raises the fear that

police officers will be exposed to criminal and civil liability

should they be found to have violated the statute.    The statute
                                                                   23

does indeed provide for criminal penalties and civil remedies.

See G. L. c. 272, § 99 C 1 (criminal penalty), Q (civil remedy).

But the statute allows the Commonwealth to insulate itself

prophylactically from liability by obtaining a warrant.     See

G. L. c. 272, § 99 D 1 d; note 12, supra.   In addition, the

statute protects investigative and law enforcement officers from

criminal and civil liability if they violate the statute "for

the purposes of ensuring [officer] safety" while operating

undercover.   G. L. c. 272, § 99 D 1 e.   In such circumstances,

although the officers will be insulated from liability, the

contents of the unlawful interceptions are nonetheless excluded

from evidence.   See G. L. c. 272, § 99 D 1 e.   In sum, the

statute reflects the Legislature's careful balancing of

competing concerns.20

     The portion of the order allowing the motion to suppress

the audio portion of the recordings is affirmed.     So much of

that order as denied the defendant's motion to suppress the

video portion of the recordings is reversed.     Nothing in this

opinion is to be read to limit the undercover officer's

testimony at trial as to what was said during the three

     20When police wish to use a novel surveillance tool such as
Callyo, we encourage them to seek a search warrant beforehand.
Because our statutes and Declaration of Rights may be more
protective of individual privacy rights than similar laws in
some other States, the police should not simply rely on the fact
that the tool has been used in other jurisdictions.
                                                                24

transactions or what he observed during them.    See Jarabek, 384

Mass. at 293, 299.

                                   So ordered.