Court Opinion

ID: 9959375
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-11 16:11:22.005513+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:25.427057
License: Public Domain

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 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :
 CHARLES EDWARD HILL, JR.                 :
                                          :
                    Appellant             :   No. 996 EDA 2023

     Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 22, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division
                     at No(s): CP-46-CR-0003124-2020

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                             FILED APRIL 11, 2024

      Charles Edward Hill, Jr. appeals from the aggregate judgment of

sentence of five to ten years of imprisonment, followed by three years of

probation, imposed upon his convictions for sexual assault and indecent

assault without consent. We affirm.

      We glean the following background from the certified record.          On

February 2, 2020, A.Y. (“Victim”), then twenty-three years old, attended a

Super Bowl party at the house of her mother, Cachet Johnson. Appellant was

then in a relationship with Cachet Johnson and also in attendance at the party,

along with a few of Victim’s friends and family members. At some point in the

evening, Victim accepted an invitation from Appellant to go to a local bar so

that Appellant could buy her some drinks, since he had missed celebrating her

birthday the week before. Victim drove her friend, Deja Johnson, home before

proceeding to the bar with Appellant.    After consuming a few drinks each,
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Victim and Appellant left and went to Victim’s apartment so that she could

collect clothing for her three-year-old daughter, who, along with Victim, was

going to spend the night at Cachet Johnson’s home.

      In the apartment, Appellant indicated that he was going to use the

restroom while Victim was in her daughter’s room packing a travel bag. Before

Victim finished packing, she noticed Appellant standing in the doorway to the

room. He asked if Victim was ready, but instead of leaving, he began walking

toward her and “play fighting,” striking her on the arm. N.T. Trial, 5/3/22, at

43. Victim told Appellant that he was drunk and requested that he stop, but

he did not. Appellant then pulled her hair extensions such that they were

partially dangling from the side of her head, and eventually wrapped his arm

around her neck, as if in a hug. Victim fell backward onto her daughter’s bed,

with Appellant falling on top of her. Appellant began kissing her and she told

him to stop, nudging his face away at one point. Appellant nonetheless held

Victim down with his hands on her chest, fondling her breasts under her shirt.

With one hand, he was then able to lower Victim’s pants and underwear, and

subsequently his own.     He pushed Victim’s knees toward her chest and

penetrated her vagina with his penis, telling Victim that he loved her.

      After Victim demanded that Appellant stop and get off her, and

indicating that this should not be happening, Appellant stopped. He allowed

Victim to sit up in the bed, though both still had their clothing partially

removed.    Appellant then told Victim that nobody should know what

happened, and eventually pushed her back down, saying that he wanted to

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continue. At this point, he spit on Victim’s vagina. She again demanded that

he stop. Appellant did so and reiterated to her that nobody be told about the

incident. He then allowed Victim to get fully dressed.

      Victim drove herself and Appellant back to her mother’s house, opting

not to bring the clothes bag since she decided that neither she nor her

daughter would spend the night. Upon entering the house, Victim immediately

went upstairs to retrieve her daughter. She encountered her brother, Aaron

Merlin, who asked if everything was okay. Since Appellant was nearby, Victim

pressed a finger to her lips to indicate being quiet.    Without discussing it

further, she got her daughter and returned to her car to leave. Appellant

followed Victim to her car, asking her to stay because it would look unusual if

she abruptly chose not to spend the night. Victim drove away and Appellant

got into another vehicle and followed her. Victim stopped at a gas station

because she did not want Appellant following her to her apartment. Appellant

pulled up to a pump behind her and began to ask her to come back, also

offering to pay for her gas.

      Victim allowed Appellant to pay for her gas and left the station. En route

to her apartment, she called her friend, Deja Johnson, to explain what had

occurred. She also texted another friend several times after she got home,

asking him to get back to her because something important had happened.

The friend did not immediately respond since it was nearly 2:30 a.m. on

February 3. Several hours later, she also reached out to her ex-husband’s

brother.

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      Victim ultimately went to work that same morning but did not stay for

her whole shift.   On her way home from work, she called and spoke with

Aaron Merlin about the incident. She also called her mother and Appellant’s

mother on a three-way call.        When Victim got home, she met with

Deja Johnson, who encouraged her to contact the police.       She did so, and

spoke with the responding officers, who urged her to get a rape kit performed

at the hospital. Victim proceeded to Reading Hospital that same afternoon

and underwent an examination by a sexual assault nurse examiner (“SANE”).

The SANE nurse did not note any observable injuries to Victim, including to

her genitals. Likewise, testing did not reveal the presence of spermatozoa on

the parts of Victim’s body that were swabbed.

      Based on this foregoing, Appellant was charged with multiple counts,

including rape by forcible compulsion, sexual assault, indecent assault without

consent, and indecent assault by forcible compulsion. Appellant waived his

right to a jury and proceeded to a two-day bench trial. The Commonwealth

introduced testimony from several witnesses consistent with the above

account, as well as text messages from Victim’s phone demonstrating her

communications with various individuals in the early morning hours of

February 3, 2020, and throughout that day.          The Commonwealth also

introduced surveillance video from the bar and gas station that Appellant and

Victim patronized, which corroborated Victim’s timeline of events. Appellant

testified on his own behalf, and his narrative was generally consistent with

Victim’s, except with regard to what occurred in the apartment. He stated

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that Victim had approached him and touched his chest, and then began

touching her own genitals as if to pleasure herself. Appellant said that he

rejected this perceived advance and insisted on returning to Cachet Johnson’s

house.

       At the trial’s conclusion, the court found Appellant guilty of sexual

assault and indecent assault without consent. It acquitted him with respect

to the remaining counts that included a forcible compulsion element.        The

court later held a hearing to determine whether Appellant satisfied the criteria

of being a sexually violent predator (“SVP”). At the hearing, Appellant raised

a challenge to the constitutionality of any registration requirement he may be

subject to pursuant to Revised Subchapter H of the Sexual Offender

Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”). Appellant’s position relied upon

an opinion issued by the Honorable Allison Bell Royer of the Chester County

Court of Common Pleas in the case of Commonwealth v. Torsilieri, CP-15-

CR-0001570-2016.1 The trial court deferred a ruling on these issues to allow

the parties to brief the matter.           Appellant filed a memorandum of law

reiterating his argument, and the Commonwealth submitted a written

response.

       The court then held a phone conference with counsel for Appellant and

the Commonwealth approximately twenty days before sentencing, asking if

defense counsel intended to present any evidence in support of the SORNA
____________________________________________

1 The Commonwealth’s appeal of that decision is currently pending review by

our Supreme Court. See Commonwealth v. Torsilieri, 97 MAP 2022.

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challenge. Counsel indicated that he did not and would rely instead on case

law for his argument. On November 22, 2022, the court sentenced Appellant

as indicated hereinabove, classifying him as a Tier III sex offender with

lifetime registration requirements. It concluded that the Commonwealth failed

to prove that Appellant met the criteria of being an SVP. Notably, at no point

during the sentencing hearing did Appellant present any testimony or evidence

concerning his claim that Revised Subchapter H of SORNA is unconstitutional.

         Appellant filed a post-sentence motion asserting, inter alia, that the

verdicts were against the weight of the evidence. The trial court denied the

motion without a hearing. This timely appeal followed. Appellant complied

with the trial court’s order to file a concise statement of errors, and the court

entered an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).

         Appellant presents the following issues for our review:

   I.       Did the trial court err in finding that Appellant was guilty of
            sexual assault and indecent assault - forcible compulsion[2]
            when the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that
            Appellant engaged in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual
            intercourse without [Victim]’s consent[?] The evidence was
            equally insufficient to demonstrate that Appellant caused
            [Victim] to come into contact with seminal fluid, urine[,] or
            feces for the purpose of arousing sexual [desire] without [her]
            consent[.]

   II.      Did the trial court err in finding the witnesses, including the
            alleged victim, credible to such a degree that these crimes were
____________________________________________

2 Appellant was acquitted of this crime; based on the arguments made in the

remainder of his brief, it appears that Appellant actually intended to contest
the conviction for indecent assault without consent. Accordingly, we address
his claim thusly.

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          proved beyond a reasonable doubt when no physical or video
          evidence[,] as presented by the [Commonwealth] during the
          bench trial[,] demonstrate[d] any antagonism between
          Appellant and the alleged victim and where the court relied
          upon the hearsay testimony of a friend of the alleged victim
          and upon the testimony of the alleged victim’s brother,
          including contradictory statements by the brother, [Aaron
          Merlin], during the trial?

   III.   Did the trial court err in requiring Appellant to register as a
          lifetime registrant under [SORNA] when the constitutionality of
          that act has been found lacking in an action that is currently
          pending before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court?

Appellant’s brief at 7 (cleaned up).

      Appellant’s first claim attacks the sufficiency of the evidence.       We

consider Appellant’s position mindful of the following well-settled standard of

review:

      When reviewing a [sufficiency] claim, we face a question of law.
      Accordingly, our standard of review is de novo. We view the
      evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as the
      verdict winner, and we draw all reasonable inferences therefrom
      in the Commonwealth’s favor. Through this lens, we must
      ascertain whether the Commonwealth proved all of the elements
      of the crime at issue beyond a reasonable doubt.

      The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every
      element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of
      wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, we may not weigh the
      evidence and substitute our judgment for the factfinder. Any
      doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the
      factfinder, unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that,
      as a matter of law, no probability of fact may be drawn from the
      combined circumstances.

Commonwealth v. Roberts, 293 A.3d 1221, 1223 (Pa.Super. 2023)

(cleaned up). Further, a victim’s credible testimony is, by itself, sufficient to

uphold a conviction. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 180 A.3d 474, 481

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(Pa.Super. 2018) (holding that “the uncorroborated testimony of a single

witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction for a criminal offense, so long as

that testimony can address and, in fact, addresses, every element of the

charged crime”).

      Appellant challenges his convictions for both sexual assault and indecent

assault without consent. Concerning sexual assault, “[e]xcept as provided in

[§] 3121 (relating to rape) or 3123 (relating to involuntary deviate sexual

intercourse), a person commits a felony of the second degree when that

person engages in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual intercourse with a

complainant without the complainant’s consent.”      18 Pa.C.S. § 3124.1.     A

person commits the crime of indecent assault without consent if he “has

indecent contact with the complainant, causes the complainant to have

indecent contact with the person[,] or intentionally causes the complainant to

come into contact with seminal fluid, urine[,] or feces for the purpose of

arousing sexual desire in the person” and he “does so without the

complainant’s consent.”     18 Pa.C.S. § 3126.      The Crimes Code defines

“indecent contact” as “[a]ny touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of

the person for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire, in any

person.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 3101.

      On appeal, Appellant argues that neither of his convictions can stand

since “[t]here was no independent evidence produced at trial that indicates

Appellant engaged in any sort of sexual activity with [Victim].” Appellant’s

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brief at 20. He also contends that since the trial court acquitted him as to the

charges of rape by forcible compulsion and indecent assault by forcible

compulsion, there was no basis for conviction as to sexual assault and

indecent assault without consent. Id. Appellant notes that by Victim’s own

testimony, she did not call out for help or immediately avoid Appellant after

the incident.   Id. at 26-27.    He also highlights that the SANE nurse who

examined Victim less than twenty-four hours after the incident did not find

any sign of semen, bruising, or injury, and that none of the items recovered

by police from Victim’s apartment was sent for any sort of testing. Id. at 28-

29. Appellant further opines that to sustain the conviction for indecent assault

without consent, the Commonwealth was required to prove that he “caused

[Victim] to come into contact with seminal fluid, urine[,] or feces,” which did

not occur here. Id. at 25.

      In rejecting this claim, the trial court articulated as follows:

      The court found [Victim] credible in her testimony that Appellant
      had, without her consent: penetrated her vagina with his penis;
      fondled her breasts; and spit on her vagina. This testimony,
      standing alone, was sufficient to find Appellant guilty of sexual
      assault and indecent assault without [Victim]’s consent. Although
      Appellant argues that no physical evidence was presented by the
      Commonwealth to corroborate [Victim]’s testimony, physical
      evidence is not required for a conviction. It simply does not
      matter whether Appellant finds a witness’s testimony lacking in
      credibility as such matters are solely within the province of the
      fact finder.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/29/23, at 10 (cleaned up).

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       Upon review, we agree with the trial court that the evidence was

sufficient to sustain both of Appellant’s convictions. Victim’s testimony that

Appellant penetrated her vagina with his penis, without her consent, itself

supported the conviction for sexual assault.     Further, her attestation that

during the encounter, Appellant fondled her breasts under her shirt, without

her consent, satisfied the elements required for indecent assault. Based on

the facts that Appellant was kissing Victim and telling her that he loved her as

he groped her, the Commonwealth proved that his indecent contact was for

the purpose “of arousing sexual desire.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a). As the trial

court correctly noted, no independent evidence beyond Victim’s credible

testimony was required to prove these crimes. See Johnson, 180 A.3d at

481.

       Moreover, to the extent that Appellant’s argument rests on the belief

that his indecent assault conviction must have been proven by showing

Victim’s forced contact with seminal fluid, urine, or feces, he is plainly

mistaken.    While that describes some types of contact that constitute the

crime of indecent assault, § 3126 clearly states that it may also be shown

from Appellant having “indecent contact with the complainant,” which is

exactly what occurred here. 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a). Therefore, Appellant is

not entitled to relief on this claim.

       Next, Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in finding Victim and

other Commonwealth witnesses credible, and thus that his convictions were

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against the weight of the evidence.3           See Appellant’s brief at 33-37.   The

following law applies to our review of Appellant’s claim:

       A motion for a new trial based on a claim that the verdict is against
       the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the
       trial court. A new trial should not be granted because of a mere
       conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same facts
       would have arrived at a different conclusion. Rather, the role of
       the trial judge is to determine that notwithstanding all the facts,
       certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them
       or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice.

       An appellate court’s standard of review when presented with a
       weight of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard of review
       applied by the trial court. Appellate review of a weight claim is a
       review of the exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question
       of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Arias, 286 A.3d 341, 352 (Pa.Super. 2022) (cleaned up).

Therefore, we must determine whether the trial court, in rejecting Appellant’s

challenge, “abused its discretion by reaching a manifestly unreasonable

judgment, misapplying the law, or basing its decision on partiality, prejudice,

bias, or ill-will.” Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1056 (Pa. 2013)

(cleaned up).

       Appellant argues that the surveillance video showing Appellant with

Victim at the bar before the incident and at the gas station afterwards made

____________________________________________

3 In his statement of questions presented as to this issue, Appellant also states

that the court erred in relying on hearsay testimony. See Appellant’s brief at
7. However, nowhere in his brief does he discuss the hearsay rules or
otherwise develop this argument. Accordingly, we treat this claim as one
challenging the weight of the evidence and not the admissibility of any
evidence.

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it clear that there was no animosity between them. See Appellant’s brief at

34-35. He believes that Victim’s testimony should have been disregarded as

incredible by the court, since she initially indicated to police that her hair

extensions were pulled, but no injuries to her scalp were observed during the

SANE examination. Id. at 35. Likewise, Appellant highlights that Victim’s

clothes did not appear to be damaged, despite her testimony that they were

tugged on by Appellant. Id. Appellant further contends that Aaron Merlin

gave conflicting accounts, testifying at trial that he saw a bruise on Victim’s

face after the assault, but failing to mention that to interviewing police. Id.

While Appellant concedes that “[i]t is legally accurate to state that the word

of the victim can be enough to prove charges beyond a reasonable doubt,” he

nonetheless maintains that it “stretches all credulity to believe that [her]

uncorroborated statement here is true.” Id. at 36 (emphasis omitted).

      In addressing this issue, the trial court stated that video evidence

demonstrating antagonism between Appellant and the victim “is not a

necessary corollary in a case involving sexual assault of a family member, and

[is] indeed the antithesis of such an assault as this, which relies on taking

advantage of a close, familial relationship.” Trial Court Opinion, 6/29/23, at

11.   The court reiterated that it found credible Victim’s contention that

Appellant engaged in vaginal intercourse, fondled her breasts, and spit on her

vagina without her consent.    Id. at 12.    It also observed that “there was

additional evidence that supported this court’s finding that [Victim] was

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credible in her testimony that the sexual acts were not consensual,”

highlighting the following:

      (1) [Officer Timothy] Coffland, the first police officer to respond
      to [Victim]’s complaint, found [her] to be “visibly upset” and
      “traumatized,” a reaction consistent with having been sexually
      assaulted[.] (2) Deja Johnson testified that [Victim] called her
      after the assault as [Victim] was returning to her apartment (i.e.,
      a prompt complaint) in the early morning hours after she was free
      of Appellant who had followed her. Ms. Johnson said [Victim]
      sounded “scared” and “very upset.” When Ms. Johnson met
      [Victim] at [Victim]’s apartment in the afternoon following the
      assault, Ms. Johnson described [Victim] as appearing broken and
      very lost and upset[.] (3) After speaking with Deja Johnson in the
      early morning of February 3, 2020, [Victim] sent frantic text
      messages to her friend[,] Keys: “Keys I need to talk please”;
      “This is so important”; and “Help me[.”] (4) Following the assault,
      when [Victim] and Appellant returned to Cachet Johnson’s house,
      [Aaron Merlin] could tell something was wrong. When he asked
      [Victim] what[ was] wrong, she signaled for him to be quiet as
      Appellant was in close proximity[.] (5) Cachet Johnson testified
      credibly that during the three-way phone call with [Victim] and
      Appellant’s mother on February 3, 2020[,] [Victim] sounded upset
      and was crying. All these circumstances and reactions that
      occurred within [twenty-four] hours of the assault are consistent
      with [Victim]’s testimony that she had been sexually assaulted.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/29/23, at 10-11 (cleaned up).

      Under these circumstances, we conclude that the trial court did not

abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s weight claim. Victim’s testimony

was consistent and corroborated in part by the video evidence and the

testimony of her friend and family. The video matched the locations and times

Victim provided to police. Additionally, the observations by numerous people

that saw and spoke with Victim bolstered the notion that she had an altered

demeanor due to being victimized.     Since the trial court’s conclusions are

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neither unreasonable nor the result of “partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will,”

we may not disturb them. Clay, 64 A.3d at 1056.

        Finally, Appellant argues that his lifetime registration requirement

pursuant to Revised Subchapter H of SORNA is illegal, relying on the trial court

opinion issued in Torsilieri. See Appellant’s brief at 38-45. In this vein, we

note:

              When an appellant challenges the constitutionality of a
        statute, the appellant presents this Court with a question of law.
        Our consideration of questions of law is plenary. A statute is
        presumed to be constitutional and will not be declared
        unconstitutional unless it clearly, palpably, and plainly violates the
        constitution. Thus, the party challenging the constitutionality of a
        statute has a heavy burden of persuasion.

Commonwealth v. Bueno, 307 A.3d 1255, 1258 (Pa.Super. 2024) (cleaned

up).

        In his brief, Appellant essentially adopts the reasoning from the

Torsilieri trial court opinion that SORNA is unconstitutional “because it

creates an irrebuttable presumption that people who are forced to register are

somehow considered more dangerous than those convicted of other serious

crimes[,] such as aggravated assault.” Appellant’s brief at 42. He also relies

on that opinion for the proposition that Revised Subchapter H is punitive, and

thus “results in a criminal sentence in excess of the statutory maximums;

offends federal and state proscriptions against cruel and unusual punishment;

and breaches the separation of powers doctrine.” Id. at 43-44 (cleaned up).

While acknowledging that this decision was not binding on the trial court in

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the case sub judice, Appellant nonetheless contends that the holding applies

equally to him because the Torsilieri opinion found the relevant portion of

SORNA unconstitutional in general, not specifically to that defendant. Id. at

38-39, 44.

      In rejecting this contention, the trial court noted that unlike in

Torsilieri, where the defendant presented extensive expert evidence

supporting his claims, “Appellant here did not present any evidence (despite

being afforded an opportunity to do so) regarding his argument that SORNA

is unconstitutional because it presumes recidivism.”      Trial Court Opinion,

6/29/23, at 13 (emphasis in original). Therefore, it determined that Appellant

had not met his burden of proving the act unconstitutional.

      We agree and find that this case is controlled by our recent decision in

Bueno.    There, the defendant was sentenced in 2022 for convictions of

statutory sexual assault and indecent assault of a person less than sixteen

years old. Bueno, 307 A.3d at 1257. The court designated him as a Tier II

offender and ordered him to register as a sex offender pursuant to Revised

Subchapter H of SORNA, though it did not find that he met the criteria for

being an SVP. Id. The defendant filed post-sentence motions challenging the

constitutionality of SORNA, relying purely on case law, including the Torsilieri

trial court opinion. Bueno did not introduce any independent testimony or

evidence supporting his contentions, despite having the opportunity to do so.

The trial court denied the post-sentence motions.       On appeal, this Court

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affirmed, stating that “without any evidence of scientific studies, [Bueno]

cannot make a colorable argument that the General Assembly’s factual

presumptions have been undermined by recent scientific studies.” Id. at 1262

(cleaned up). We further held that Bueno’s non-SVP status did not establish

that Revised Subchapter H is unconstitutional, since his “unsupported

challenge does not demonstrate a consensus of scientific evidence as was

present to find a presumption not universally true . . . , nor the clearest proof

needed to overturn the General Assembly’s statements that the provisions are

not punitive.” Id. at 1263 (citing Commonwealth v. Wolf, 276 A.3d 805

(Pa.Super. 2022)).

      In all material respects, Appellant’s claim here is the same as that raised

in Bueno.     Appellant and Bueno were identically situated, as both were

subject to registration requirements pursuant to SORNA, neither presented

any evidence supporting their constitutional challenges despite having the

chance to do so, and the trial court in the respective cases determined that

neither defendant was an SVP. Accordingly, we conclude that Appellant, like

the defendant in Bueno, has failed to meet his high burden of proving the

unconstitutionality of SORNA.

      In sum, Appellant has given us no cause to disturb his judgment of

sentence or the imposition of his registration requirement. Thus, we affirm.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

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Date: 4/11/2024

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