Court Opinion

ID: 9496612
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:31:02.422521+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:57:41.325180
License: Public Domain

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
Section 1546(a) of Title 18 is a comprehensive statute that indisputably prohibits Ryan-Webster’s falsification of Certification Applications (ETA-750s) and Visa Petitions (I-140s). This conduct is specifically and unambiguously proscribed by the fourth unnumbered paragraph of § 1546(a), which prohibits persons from “knowingly mak[ing] under oath, or ... penalty of perjury ... any false statement with respect to a material fact in any application, affidavit, or other document required by the immigration laws or regulations prescribed thereunder.” 18 U.S.C.A. § 1546(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2003) (emphasis added). The Government, for reasons unknown, chose to charge Ryan-Webster only under the first paragraph of § 1546(a), which makes it a crime knowingly to falsify “any immigrant or non-immigrant visa, permit, border crossing card, alien registration receipt card, or other document prescribed by statute or *365regulation for entry into or as evidence of authorized stay or employment in the United States.” Id. (emphasis added). Because I disagree with my colleagues’ conclusion that the forms that Ryan-Webster falsified here are “other documents” within the meaning of the first paragraph, I respectfully dissent from Parts III.A. and IV. of the panel’s opinion. I concur in the remainder of the opinion.
In interpreting statutes, our goal “is always to ascertain and implement the intent of Congress.” Scott v. United States, 328 F.3d 132, 138 (4th Cir.2003). Accordingly, “[t]he first step of this process is to determine whether the statutory language has a plain and unambiguous meaning.” Id. at 139 (citing Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450, 122 S.Ct. 941, 151 L.Ed.2d 908 (2002)). If the statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent, the inquiry ceases. Id.
When assessing the ambiguity, or lack thereof, of statutory language, courts “generally give words their ordinary, contemporary, and common meaning.” Id. But, the language itself is not the sole determinant of meaning, or even of whether the language is ambiguous. Courts also must refer to “the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.” Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997). At bottom, my colleagues’ error lies in their failure to abide by this principle of statutory construction. The majority’s analysis, ante at 359-363, has some persuasive appeal if one reads the first paragraph’s catch-all phrase in isolation: the phrase “other documents prescribed by statute or regulation for entry into ... the United States,” without any context, could plausibly be interpreted to cover application documents like the ETA-750 and the 1-140. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1546(a). These documents, as the majority correctly notes, are “prescribed by statute or regulation” and, although they do not themselves allow entry into the country, they are submitted as part of one of the avenues through which an immigrant might gain the right to lawfully “enter” the country. When read in context, however, the first paragraph’s reach is unambiguously narrower.
Two canons of construction instruct us how properly to ascertain the meaning of statutory language from the context in which it is used. The first is the principle of ejusdem generis — i.e., “when a general word or phrase follows a list of specific persons or things, the general word or phrase will be interpreted to include only persons or things of the same type as those listed.” Black’s Law Dictionary 535 (7th ed.1999); see also United States v. Parker, 30 F.3d 542, 552-53 n. 10 (4th Cir.1994) (applying ejusdem generis principle, and defining it as providing that “a general statutory term should be understood in light of the specific terms surrounding it” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Here, the first paragraph presents a textbook ejusdem generis scenario: a general phrase (“other document prescribed by statute or regulation for entry into or as evidence of authorized stay or employment in the United States”), the scope of which we are called upon to interpret, follows a list of specific things (“any immigrant or nonimmigrant visa, permit, border crossing card, alien registration receipt card”). See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1546(a). Accordingly, the ejusdem generis canon compels us to constrain the scope of the general phrase to “other documents” of the same type as those specifically identified.
The enumerated documents in the first unnumbered paragraph have common characteristics, none of which are shared *366by the ETA-750 or the 1-140. Each of these items is a final document issued by the government that has some independent evidentiary significance respecting the legality of the bearer’s entry into or stay in the country. For example, the “immigrant visa” is a document “issued by a consular officer” signifying that the lawful bearer is “an eligible immigrant” under the provisions of the federal immigration laws. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(16) (West 1999). Likewise, the “border crossing card” is a document issued “by a consular officer or an immigration officer” signifying that the lawful bearer is “lawfully admitted for permanent residence,” or is a “resident in foreign contiguous territory” to whom the card was issued “for the purpose of crossing over the borders between the United States and foreign contiguous territory” in accordance with the conditions of issuance. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(6). The “alien registration receipt card” similarly is a document issued by the government that signifies that the lawful bearer has complied with the requirements of the Alien Registration Act of 1940. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1304(d) (West 1999). Because each of these documents signifies that the holder has been found by the government to have complied with some aspect of the immigration laws, they are documents of a type that an alien or immigrant might be required to present to immigration authorities in order to gain entry into or prove the lawfulness of one’s stay in the United States. Accordingly, pursuant to the principle of ejusdem gen-eris, the catch-all phrase “other document prescribed by statute for entry into ... the United States” must be limited to documents of the same type — ie., final documents issued by the government that have independent evidentiary significance that one might be expected to present to an immigration official, either to gain entry into the country or to prove the lawfulness of one’s stay in the country.
The ETA 750 and 1-140 forms have none of these characteristics. First, the government plays no role in the completion of these documents. Applicants and applicants’ employers fill them out and submit them. Second, the documents have no evidentiary significance regarding the immigration status of the holder — they are simply applications, representing nothing more than the applicant’s and/or his employer’s desire that the applicant gain the right to enter or remain in the country legally. Consequently, these forms are not the type of documents that a person might present to immigration officials to gain entry into the country. In sum, the ETA-750 and the 1-140 are not documents of the type enumerated in the first paragraph, and therefore they do not fall within that paragraph’s catch-all phrase.
A second interpretive canon, the rule against superfluity, confirms that this is the proper construction of the first paragraph. Under the rule against superfluity, “[w]here possible, we must give effect to every provision and word in a statute and avoid any interpretation that may render statutory terms meaningless or superfluous.” Scott, 328 F.3d at 139 (citing Freytag v. Comm’r Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868, 877, 111 S.Ct. 2631, 115 L.Ed.2d 764 (1991)). The interpretation of the first paragraph that the majority adopts renders superfluous much of the fourth paragraph, if not the paragraph in its entirety.
As noted above, the fourth paragraph of § 1546(a) makes it a crime for persons to “knowingly mak[e] under oath, or ... penalty of perjury ... any false statement with respect to a material fact in any application, affidavit, or other document required by the immigration laws or regulations prescribed thereunder.” 18 U.S.C.A. § 1546(a) (emphasis added). Fairly read, the majority’s interpretation *367of the catch-all phrase encompasses any document required by statute or regulation that an immigrant must submit under any immigration program. At a minimum, the majority’s interpretation renders the word “application” in the fourth paragraph entirely superfluous because, if the majority’s interpretation of the first paragraph includes application forms like the ETA 750 and the 1-140, then it encompasses all other similar “application” documents. Moreover, the majority’s failure to cabin the first paragraph’s catch-all phrase in any way renders superfluous the rest of the paragraph as well. After all, “affidavits [and] other document[s] required by the immigration laws or regulations prescribed thereunder” are documents “prescribed by statute or regulation” as part of some process governing the entry or stay of immigrants in this country, and as such, they would fall within the majority’s capacious construction.*
In summary, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1546(a), properly construed, is unambiguous as it relates to falsified forms ETA 750 and I-140. Falsification of such forms is covered under the fourth paragraph of the statute and not the first. Therefore, the Government charged Ryan-Webster under the wrong provision of § 1546(a), and the district court erred both in denying Ryan-Webster’s motion for judgment of acquittal as to Counts 2, 3 and 5, and in instructing the jury that forms ETA 750 and 1-140 qualified as documents covered by the first paragraph.
Accordingly, I would reverse Ryan-Webster’s conviction as to Counts 2, 3 and 5, and remand the case for re-sentencing. Because my colleagues conclude otherwise, I respectfully dissent from Parts III.A. and IV. of the panel’s opinion.

 In footnote 16 of the majority opinion, my colleagues contend that their construction of the first paragraph does not render the word "application” in the fourth paragraph entirely superfluous because the first paragraph deals with forgeries, a type of conduct different from the making of false statements, which is covered by the fourth paragraph. The first paragraph, however, is concerned with more than just forgery — it makes criminal the use or possession of documents known to be "forged, counterfeited, altered or falsely made." 18 U.S.C.A. § 1546(a) (emphasis added). Therefore, the majority’s suggestion that "[h]ad Ryan-Webster made false statements but not forged signatures on these applications, she may have been properly chargeable under the fourth paragraph of § 1546(a) and not properly chargeable under its first paragraph," see ante at 363 n. 16, is, I respectfully submit, not accurate. An application with false statements is without question one that is "falsely made.”