Court Opinion

ID: 9738196
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:44:46.417397+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:04.340208
License: Public Domain

ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.
¶ 239. (dissenting). I dissent from the majority opinion, which awards the defendant 305 days of sentence credit on a Wisconsin sentence for time spent in Illinois custody on an Illinois criminal charge. I fear that the majority opinion confuses sentence credit and misplaces the burden of proof that properly lies with the defendant. In addition, the majority asserts that its sentence credit analysis applies only with respect to concurrent sentences, see majority op., ¶ 6 ("hop[ing] [the majority] ha[s] provided greater clarity in awarding sentence credit in a case involving concurrent sentences"), but then fails to explain how or why its analysis would not apply to consecutive sentences. While the majority *93proclaims that it clarifies the law, it actually muddles the sentence credit issues with which trial courts are routinely confronted. Apparently the majority cabins its analysis to the unique facts of this case. The majority's lack of analysis with respect to sentence credit due for related versus unrelated charges and concurrent versus consecutive sentences is telling. The majority opinion must be intended to apply only to a future case where a defendant is in custody out of state on charges in both that state and Wisconsin, and a Wisconsin court later pronounces a concurrent sentence to one imposed in the other state, and the exact same credit is due in each. These facts are unique indeed.
¶ 240. On July 23, 2003, the defendant was charged with first-degree recklessly endangering safety in violation of Wis. Stat. § 941.30(1). On that same date, a felony warrant and authorization for extradition was executed in Wisconsin for the defendant on the above charge. On December 13, 2003, the defendant was arrested in Chicago, Illinois. The arrest report lists both the Wisconsin warrant and an outstanding Illinois warrant for probation violation. The defendant remained in Illinois custody until June 1, 2005, when he was conveyed to Milwaukee County pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. On August 30, 2005, the defendant pled guilty to first-degree recklessly endangering safety and was sentenced to twelve-and-a-half years of imprisonment, comprised of seven-and-a-half years in initial confinement and five years on extended supervision — imposed concurrently with the defendant's existing sentence in Illinois. The circuit court granted the defendant's request for 91 days credit, which the State and defense attorney stipulated to as it comprised *94the period between his initial appearance in Milwaukee County (June 1, 2005) and his sentencing in Milwaukee County (August 30, 2005).
¶ 241. Ten months later, on June 29, 2006, the defendant filed a post-conviction motion in Milwaukee County seeking 324 days of sentence credit representing the time he spent in Illinois custody between the date of his arrest in Illinois and the date of his sentencing on the Illinois charge. The circuit court denied the defendant's motion for 324 days of sentence credit; however, the circuit court granted the defendant an additional credit of six days for a total of 97 days of sentence credit. This adjusted amount included the period between the defendant's arrest in connection with the Wisconsin charge (May 26, 2005) and his sentencing on that charge (August 30, 2005).
¶ 242. As the utterly deficient record in this case makes clear, the most appropriate time to determine sentence credit is at the sentencing itself. Four-and-a-half years later, the majority finds itself drawing assumptions from next to no records detailing the defendant's custody in Illinois. I decline to join the majority's award of 305 days of sentence credit to a defendant who failed to present any Illinois court records proving that he was "in custody" in Illinois "in connection with the course of conduct for which sentence was imposed" in Wisconsin. See Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a). For that reason, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 243. The defendant now seeks credit for time spent in presentence custody in Illinois from the day of his arrest in Illinois (December 13, 2003) until his sentencing on the Illinois charge (October 19, 2004). The defendant claims that this presentence custody was both "in connection with the course of conduct for which sentence was imposed" in Wisconsin, Wis. Stat. *95§ 973.155(1)(a), as well as in connection with the robbery charge in Illinois. However, merely because the defendant was initially brought to court in connection with a Wisconsin charge, if that indeed happened in this case, does not mean that he deserves credit for time spent in Illinois custody absent proof that he was held in custody on the Wisconsin charge. The record is devoid of any proof that the defendant was held in Illinois on cash bail or otherwise because of the Wisconsin charge. The defendant fails to provide official court records which would prove that Illinois filed a fugitive complaint or held an extradition proceeding based upon the Wisconsin warrant. At best, it seems that the defendant was ultimately returned on a detainer, for which it is clear that no sentence credit is due.
¶ 244. I agree with the majority that Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a) provides for sentence credit "for all days spent in custody in connection with the course of conduct for which sentence was imposed." Despite the majority sidestepping the issue, the statute indeed requires that the defendant be "in custody" "in connection with" the Wisconsin charge. See id.; State v. Johnson, 2009 WI 57, ¶ 27, 318 Wis. 2d 21, 767 N.W.2d 207 (explaining that § 973.155(1)(a) requires two determinations: whether the defendant was in custody and whether the custody was in connection with the course of conduct for which sentence was imposed). The "in, connection with" language has a nexus with the "in custody" language, which tethers the defendant's in-custody status to a specific charge. See Johnson, 318 Wis. 2d 21, ¶¶ 32-33. For example, in State v. Beiersdorf, 208 Wis. 2d 492, 498-99, 561 N.W.2d 749 (Ct. App. 1997), the court of appeals declined to grant the defendant 44 days of sentence credit against his sexual assault sentence for time spent in presentence custody *96resulting from a bail jumping charge, despite the bail jumping charge arising out of a violation of the defendant's personal recognizance bond on the sexual assault charge. The court of appeals explained:
[BJecause Beiersdorf posted a personal recognizance bond on the felony sexual assault charge and remained on that bond until his sentencing, and because he was in custody on cash bail only on the subsequent bail jumping and sexual intercourse charges, the forty-four days in custody, under § 973.155(1)(a), Stats., was 'custody' only 'in connection with the course of conduct for which sentence was imposed' and stayed on the bail jumping.
Id. In other words, there was no factual connection between the presentence custody and the sentence imposed on the sexual assault charge, "despite the obvious procedural connection between the bail jumping charge and the original sexual assault charge: i.e., without the sexual assault charge there would have been no personal recognizance bond, and thus, no bail jumping." Johnson, 318 Wis. 2d 21, ¶ 35 (citing approvingly the court of appeals' analysis in Beiersdorf). I fear that the majority today has blurred the clear distinction that has heretofore existed as to when sentence credit is due and when it is not. The "in custody in connection with" language of § 973.155(1)(a) has never been interpreted to require only that law enforcement have knowledge of an outstanding warrant. In this case, sentence credit for being in custody on an Illinois charge should not be awarded to the defendant who has shown merely that a police report suggests that law enforcement knew about an outstanding Wisconsin warrant at the time he was initially arrested in Illinois. The burden of proving both the "in custody" status and its connection with the course of conduct for which the *97Wisconsin sentence was imposed rests with the defendant. State v. Villalobos, 196 Wis. 2d 141, 148, 537 N.W.2d 139 (Ct. App. 1995). Here, the defendant has failed to meet his burden.
¶ 245. In State v. Villalobos, the court of appeals held that Villalobos was not entitled to sentence credit because he failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that the custody for which he sought credit was in connection with the charge he was sentenced on. Id. At the time of his arrest in Racine County for possession of a controlled substance, Villalobos was the subject of an outstanding Kenosha County warrant and complaint for a charge of injury by conduct regardless of life. Id. at 145. Following his sentence on the Racine County drug matter, Villalobos was transferred to Kenosha County, where he was eventually convicted as a habitual criminal of recklessly endangering safety and sentenced to 40 months in prison. Id. Villalobos claimed that he was entitled to sentence credit for the days he spent in presentence custody in Racine County.1 Id. at 146. The court of appeals disagreed. Id. at 148.
¶ 246. Quoting State v. Demars, 119 Wis. 2d 19, 26, 349 N.W.2d 708 (Ct. App. 1984), the Villalobos court ruled that "the custody for which credit is sought *98'must... result from the occurrence of a legal event, process, or authority which occasions, or is related to, confinement on the charge for which the defendant is ultimately sentenced.'" 196 Wis. 2d at 146. The court of appeals rejected Villalobos's argument that under the Demars test, his Racine County custody was sufficiently related to or "in connection with" the Kenosha County arrest warrant and complaint. Id. at 146-48.
¶ 247. As the Villalobos court explained, in Demars, the defendant sought credit against a Winnebago County sentence for time spent in presentence custody served in Fond du Lac County relating to a Fond du Lac probation revocation proceeding. Id. at 146-47 (citing Demars, 119 Wis. 2d at 21). The Winnebago County Sheriffs Department filed a detainer with Fond du Lac County, requesting that Fond du Lac County detain Demars should he post bond and have his probation hold lifted. Demars, 119 Wis. 2d at 21. The court of appeals held that Demars was not entitled to sentence credit against the Winnebago County sentence because the detainer did not occasion Demars' custody on the Winnebago County charge for which he was sentenced:
The communication by the Winnebago County authorities to the Fond du Lac County authorities did not occasion the custody of Demars on the Winnebago County charges in any sense. Demars was not arrested based upon the communication, nor, based on the record before [the court of appeals], was bail set or any bail information conveyed.
Id. at 26.
¶ 248. According to the Villalobos court, "[t]he teaching of Demars is that the mere existence of legal process does not, in and of itself, trigger custody." 196 Wis. 2d at 147. The process must "be accompanied by *99some legal event or occurrence which 'occasions, or is related to, confinement' on the charge referenced in the process." Id. (quoting Demars, 119 Wis. 2d at 26). Accordingly, the mere existence of an arrest warrant, like in Villalobos's case, is not sufficient to trigger custody. Id.
¶ 249. Villalobos argued that the Racine County jail records demonstrated the necessary link under the Demars test, as a reference to the Kenosha County charge was included in a list of the various reasons for his custody. Id. The court of appeals rejected his argument that the jail log entry demonstrated an " 'occurrence of a legal event, process, or authority' within the meaning of Demars." Id. at 147-48 (quoting Demars, 119 Wis. 2d at 26). "Like the detainer in Demars, all this entry connote [d] [was] Racine County's awareness that Kenosha County had an outstanding warrant for Villalobos's custody." Id. at 148. The court of appeals noted that the record was silent as to the reason for Villalobos's arrest in Racine County. Id. Accordingly, the court of appeals denied Villalobos sentence credit for time spent in presentence custody in Racine County, concluding that "[w]hat is lacking is sufficient evidence demonstrating that Villalobos's initial arrest was based on the Kenosha County warrant or that the warrant was ever executed against Villalobos during his Racine County custody." Id.
¶ 250. In this case, the defendant has introduced no proof that he was arrested and held in custody in Illinois on the Wisconsin charge of first-degree recklessly endangering safety. Simply stated, this far after the fact, the record is woefully inadequate with respect to what credit should be due the defendant. The majority awards the defendant sentence credit based on pure speculation. As was the case in Villalobos, the record *100lacks any sufficient evidence demonstrating that the Wisconsin warrant was ever even executed against the defendant during his Illinois custody. See id. While the arrest report documenting the defendant's arrest in Chicago, Illinois may list both an Illinois probation violation warrant and a Wisconsin warrant, the fact that the Wisconsin warrant was listed in the arrest report does not alone sufficiently demonstrate that the defendant was subsequently held in custody in Illinois on the Wisconsin charge. There are no court records to indicate that bail was set for the defendant's Wisconsin case in Illinois or that he was in custody on the Wisconsin charge. Instead, it is apparent that the defendant was held in Illinois to answer to an Illinois criminal charge.
¶ 251. Even assuming that the defendant was arrested in Illinois on the Wisconsin warrant, the record is void of any court records proving that Illinois filed a fugitive complaint or held an extradition proceeding. The record fails to contain any court documents or entries which would evidence that any case was filed or extradition proceeding held on the Wisconsin charge such that the defendant would be entitled to credit for being "in custody in connection with" the Wisconsin charge. See Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a).
¶ 252. The holding of a defendant for extradition is not without certain requirements and protections. The Extradition Clause of the United States Constitution governs interstate extradition and provides that any person accused of committing an offense in one state, who flees to another state, must be returned to the state where the crime was committed upon request of that state's executive authority. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2; 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (2006); see also Black's Law Dictionary 605 (7th ed. 1999). Section 14 of the Uni*101form Criminal Extradition Act, 11 U.L.A. 599 (2003), codified in Wisconsin at Wis. Stat. § 976.03(14) and in Illinois at 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 225/14 (2009),2 "permit[s] the police in one state, upon reasonable information that a person had committed a felony in another state, to arrest that person without a warrant when found in the asylum state." State v. Hughes, 68 Wis. 2d 662, 668, 229 N.W.2d 655 (1975). That arrest is "known as a prerequisition arrest and is for the purpose of holding the defendant until a governor's requisition warrant can he issued upon the demanding state's initiation of extradition proceedings." Id. Regardless of whether the arrest is made with a fugitive warrant, Wis. Stat. § 976.03(13); 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 225/13, or without a fugitive warrant, § 976.03(14); 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 225/14, a judge in the asylum state must issue a fugitive complaint, stating the grounds for the alleged fugitive's arrest. See Hughes, 68 Wis. 2d at 669. In this case, the record does not contain any such complaint, official documentation, or court case file entries.
¶ 253. Following the arrest and the issuance of the fugitive complaint, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 976.03(15) and 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 225/15, a judge in the asylum state must determine whether the appearing defendant is the person charged with committing the crime in the demanding state and whether the defendant is a fugitive from justice. See Hughes, 68 Wis. 2d at 669. If so, the judge must then issue a prerequisition warrant for the defendant's confinement pending the issuance of the governor's warrant from *102the demanding state. § 976.03(15); 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 225/15; Hughes, 68 Wis. 2d at 669. Pending the governor's warrant, the defendant may be committed to county jail in the asylum state for a period not to exceed 30 days. § 976.03(15); 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 225/15. The defendant may be released on bail by bond, so long as the defendant was not charged with a crime punishable in the demanding state by death or life imprisonment. § 976.03(16); 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 225/16. If the governor's warrant is still not received, commitment or bail may be extended up to 60 days. § 976.03(17); 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 225/17. Again, in this case, no such prerequisition warrant or extradition case file entries exist in the record before us.
¶ 254. In fact, we are not presented with any Illinois court records which would prove that the extradition proceeding, mandated by the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act and codified at Wis. Stat. § 976.03 and 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 225, actually took place in this case. See State ex rel. Ehlers v. Endicott, 188 Wis. 2d 57, 63, 523 N.W.2d 189 (Ct. App. 1994) ("The aim of interstate extradition is to [] provide a summary and mandatory proceeding." (citing Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 288 (1978))). The majority concludes that based upon "the records available, the procedures set forth in the Uniform Act appear to have been followed." Majority op., ¶ 76. However, the mandates of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act demand more than a mere "appearance" of being followed. See Doran, 439 U.S. at 288 ("Interstate extradition was intended to be a summary and mandatory executive proceeding derived from the language of Art. IV, § 2, cl. 2, of the Constitution.").
¶ 255. The evidence that the majority so heavily relies on to conclude that an extradition proceeding took place consists of two non-authenticated teletype *103messages sent from the Chicago Police Department Extradition Unit to the Milwaukee Police Department. The first message, sent on December 15, 2003, purportedly gives notice that the defendant "appeared our ct this date & refused to waive formal extradition" and requested that the Milwaukee Police Department "plz proceed with [its] governors warrant application." The second message, sent March 5, 2004, purportedly advised that the "governors warrant has not yet been received" and that the "fugitive charge must be dismissed" if the warrant is not received within the 90-day period of commitment authorized by sections 16 and 17 of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act. It is apparently these teletype messages alone that the circuit court relied upon and the majority now uses to find that the defendant in fact appeared in Cook County Court on December 15, 2003, for an extradition proceeding and was thereafter held in custody in connection with the Wisconsin charge for almost a year.
¶ 256. We do have in the record a governor's warrant that Governor Jim Doyle apparently signed on February 6, 2004, to extradite the defendant back to Wisconsin. However, we do not know where the document came from or whether it was ever received in Illinois. The majority concedes as much. Despite recognizing that "the present record does not document the date" on which service of the warrant actually occurred, if at all, the majority nevertheless makes the extraordinary assumption that the warrant was received by Illinois within the 90-day period of commitment because (a) evident by the second teletype message, Illinois was aware on March 5, 2004, that the Wisconsin charge "must be dismissed" if the governor's warrant is not received within the 90-day period of commitment, and (b) Illinois held the defendant based on the Wis*104consin charge until October 20, 2004, well after the 90-day period would have expired. Majority op., ¶ 71. The bare record before us simply does not support such an incredible leap of logic. Even the majority cannot explain why Illinois would dismiss the extradition case and release the defendant on October 20, 2004, if in fact the governor's warrant had been received. See id., % 73 ("The record is silent about why, after the governor's warrant issued, the extradition case was dismissed, and the defendant was transferred to the Illinois prison system."). Based upon the majority's assumptive logic, it is just as conceivable that Illinois never actually received the governor's warrant and instead held the defendant on the Illinois charge until he was sentenced on that charge on October 19, 2004. Again, based upon the assumptions that the record forces the court to make, how can the majority conclude that the defendant met his burden of proof?
¶ 257. In any event, at oral argument, the parties agreed that the defendant was transferred to Milwaukee County on June 1, 2005, pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act. See Wis. Stat. §§ 976.05, 976.06. The Act "establishes procedures that require cooperation between the 'receiving state' that is requesting the person in custody, and the 'sending state' that currently has custody of the accused." State v. Townsend, 2006 WI App 177, ¶ 10, 295 Wis. 2d 844, 722 N.W.2d 753. "A 'detainer' is not executed against a person, nor, standing alone, can it legally authorize custody." Demars, 119 Wis. 2d at 24. Because sentence credit requires the defendant be "in custody in connection with the course of conduct for which sentence was imposed," Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a), no sentence credit results from a detainer. When then does the majority conclude that the defendant ceased to be held "in *105custody" on the Wisconsin charge and instead was held on a "detainer" for which no credit is due?
¶ 258. The confusion caused by the majority opinion may not be limited to interstate situations. Sentence credit issues arise on a daily basis in trial courts all across Wisconsin. Some sentence credit issues can be difficult, but prior to today, it seemed clear that in order to be awarded sentence credit, the defendant needed to be "in custody in connection with" the case for which the defendant was being sentenced. The majority opinion confuses the fact that a defendant may receive credit for time spent in custody before bond or bail is set by the court, but once set, additional sentence credit is determined from that point forward based on whether the defendant was required to stay in custody on bail in connection with the case for which the defendant is being sentenced. For example, it is not atypical for a defendant to be brought to court, in custody, on two or more charges for which bond or bail will be set in two or more cases. Bail or bond is set separately for each case. A cash bail may be set on one case, and a personal recognizance bond may be set in the other case(s). Assuming the defendant cannot post cash bail and therefore remains in custody in that case, sentence credit from that point forward is due in that case. However, at sentencing in the case for which the defendant received a personal recognizance bond, and therefore is not in custody, the defendant is not due sentence credit for the time spent in custody on the cash bail case, even though he or she was initially arrested and brought into court on both cases. Likewise, in this case, even if the defendant was initially brought to court in connection with a Wisconsin charge along with the Illinois charge, that does not mean that the defendant deserves sentence credit against the *106Wisconsin sentence for time spent in Illinois custody absent proof that he was held in Illinois custody on that Wisconsin charge.
¶ 259. In conclusion, the defendant has failed to prove that he is entitled to sentence credit on the Wisconsin charge for time spent in Illinois custody. He failed to meet his burden of proving that he was "in custody" "in connection with the course of conduct" for which the Wisconsin sentence was imposed. See Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a); Villalobos, 196 Wis. 2d at 148. Merely because the defendant may have been arrested in Illinois with law enforcement possessing knowledge that he had an outstanding Wisconsin warrant does not automatically translate into dual sentence credit in Illinois and Wisconsin for nearly a year of time spent in Illinois custody, especially given the lack of proof that he was held in Illinois custody on the Wisconsin charge. The utterly deficient record is devoid of any proof that the defendant was held in Illinois on cash bail stemming from the Wisconsin charge. There are also no court records before us which prove that Illinois filed a fugitive complaint or held an extradition proceeding based upon the Wisconsin warrant. At best, it seems that the defendant was ultimately returned to Wisconsin on a detainer, for which no sentence credit is due.
¶ 260. For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.

 Following Villalobos's conviction for possession of a controlled substance, the Racine County Circuit Court placed him on probation for 18 months and ordered him to serve 30 days in jail as a condition of probation. State v. Villalobos, 196 Wis. 2d 141, 144, 537 N.W.2d 139 (Ct. App. 1995). Villalobos was credited with 53 days of presentence custody. Id. Because the credit of 53 days was in excess of the 30 days imposed as a condition of probation, Villalobos did not have to serve any further time on the drug matter. Id. It was those remaining 23 days of "excess" Racine County presentence custody for which Villalobos sought credit against the Kenosha County sentence. Id. at 146.

 The cited statutory provisions in Wisconsin and Illinois, which codify the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, are substantively identical. All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2007-08 version, and all references to the Illinois Statutes are to the 2009 version.