Court Opinion

ID: 9533472
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:32:01.39221+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:29:03.776792
License: Public Domain

Chief Justice VOLLACK,
dissenting:
The majority holds that section 10 — 4— 609(1), 4A C.R.S. (1994), requires that Aetna Casualty and Surety Company (Aetna) provide Uninsured Motorist/Underinsured Motorist (UM/UIM) coverage to the same class of persons covered under the liability provision of the policy Aetna issued to the Irving F. Jensen Company, Inc. (Jensen). The majority also concludes that section 10-4-608, 4A C.R.S. (1994), which exempts policies insuring more than four vehicles from the requirements of part 6,1 does not apply to section 10-4-609(1). Finally, the majority determines that Phillip McMichael (McMi-chael) was using the insured vehicle at the time of the accident and that the use of the vehicle was causally related to the accident.
I dissent because the plain language of section 10 — M>08 exempts the policy at issue from compliance with section 10-4-609(1) as that policy insured more than four automobiles. I also disagree with the majority’s holding that section 10-4-609(1) mandates that insurers must offer UM/UIM coverage to all those covered by the liability provisions of a policy. Finally, I dissent from the majority’s holding that McMichael was using the insured vehicle at the time of the accident and that the use of the vehicle was causally related to the accident.
I.
On February 1, 1990, McMichael, an employee of Jensen, was assigned to saw concrete joints in the median of a divided high*106way. McMichael, accompanied by another employee, drove one of Jensen’s pickup trucks (the “Jensen truck”) westbound to the location at which the work was to be performed. The truck was parked facing west on the side of the highway, and the warning signals on the truck were turned on. McMi-chael then removed a cement saw from the truck and began sawing concrete about seventy-five feet in front of the truck. As he was working, a car approaching from the west swerved into the median and struck him. There was never any contact between the eastbound car that struck McMichael and Jensen’s truck which was parked seventy-five feet east of the accident.
The Jensen truck was insured pursuant to a Business Auto Coverage Policy through Aetna Casualty and Surety Company (the Aetna policy). The Aetna policy insured more than eighty of Jensen’s vehicles. Additionally, the policy specifically provided UM/ UIM coverage to a limited class of individuals. McMichael filed an underinsured motorist claim under the Aetna policy to recover compensation for his injuries, as the motorist who struck him did not maintain sufficient liability insurance coverage to compensate him fully.
Aetna denied coverage and filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that McMi-chael could not recover because he was not a named insured under the policy. Aetna asserted that McMichael was not entitled to benefits because the policy language specified that an individual who was not a named insured could only recover if they were occupying an insured vehicle, and McMichael was not occupying the Jensen truck when he was injured.
In response to Aetna’s motion for summary judgment, McMichael argued, inter alia, that the UIM coverage of the insurance policy should be extended, as a matter of public policy, to cover the same class of individuals covered by the liability provision of the policy. McMichael asserted that UM/ UIM coverage should thus be extended to permissive users of an insured vehicle rather than just the named insured and those occupying an insured vehicle. McMichael also argued that he was “using” the Jensen truck at the time of the accident, as was required for coverage by the Aetna policy.
The district court granted Aetna’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plain language of the Aetna policy precluded McMichael’s coverage, as he was not a named insured and was not occupying the vehicle at the time of the accident. McMi-chael then appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the Colorado Court of Appeals. The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s ruling, holding that automobile insurers may not, as a matter of policy, issue an automobile insurance policy that includes UM/UIM coverage covering a class of individuals narrower than the class covered by the liability provision of the policy. As the Aetna policy provided liability coverage for those “using” a vehicle, but only provided UM/UIM coverage for “named insureds” and those “occupying” a covered vehicle, the court held that the Aetna policy was violative of the public policy behind section 10-4-609(1). The court thus construed the UM/ UIM provision of the Aetna policy to protect all individuals injured while “using” a covered vehicle. The court of appeals also concluded that McMichael was using the Jensen truck at the time of the accident and was thus covered by the policy.
II.
The plain language of section 10-4-608, 4A C.R.S. (1994), exempts the Aetna policy from the UM/UIM provision of section 10-4-609, 4A C.R.S. (1994). Thus, I would hold that the UM/UIM provision of the Aetna policy should be read as written, and I would therefore deny coverage to McMichael as he was not occupying the Jensen truck at the time of the accident.
Section 10-4-608 states, in pertinent part: “Exemptions. This part 6 shall not apply to any policy ... insuring more than four automobiles .... ” (Emphasis added.) The majority relies on the extensive analysis of the legislative history of part 6 in Passamano v. Travelers Indemnity Company, 882 P.2d 1312 (Colo.1994), to find that the legislature did not intend that section 10-4-608 modify or otherwise affect the substantive interpre*107tation of section 10^-609’s UM/UIM provision. Maj. op. at 97. I dissented in Passa-mano because such statutory analysis is inappropriate when the statute is facially unambiguous, and I reiterate that view here. It is well established law that,
[i]n construing statutes, this court’s primary task is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature; to do so, the court must first look to the language of the statute itself. When the language of the statute is clear so that the legislature’s intent can be discerned with reasonable certainty, there is no need to resort to other rules of statutory interpretation.
People v. District Court, 894 P.2d 739, 742 (Colo.1995) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
In my view, the statutory language is manifest and unequivocal. Based upon my reading of the plain language of sections 10-4-608 and 10-4-609, I conclude that the UM/UIM provision does not apply to an automobile insurance policy insuring more than four vehicles. As the Aetna policy insured in excess of eighty vehicles, I would hold that it is exempt from the UM/UIM provision of section 10-4-609. Because I do not believe that the UM/UIM provision applies to the Aetna policy, I would construe the policy as it was initially agreed upon by the parties: the UM/UIM provision of the policy covers McMichael only if he is a named insured or if he was occupying the insured vehicle at the time of the accident. As McMichael is not a named insured on the Aetna policy, and he was seventy-five feet from the Jensen truck when the accident occurred, I would hold that the court of appeals erred by reversing the trial court’s order of summary judgment in Aetna’s favor.
III.
I write further to clarify that even if I were to accept, arguendo, the majority’s holding that section 10 — 4-609(1) applies, and that the UM/UIM coverage must be coextensive with the coverage afforded by the liability provision of the Aetna policy,21 would still hold that coverage should be denied because *108I do not believe that McMichael was “using” the Jensen truck at the time of the accident as our prior cases have interpreted that word.
In Trinity Universal Insurance Co. v. Hall, 690 P.2d 227 (Colo.1984), we held that “ ‘there must be a causal relation or connection between the injury and the use of the vehicle in order for the injury to come within the meaning of the phrase “arising out of the use of’ a vehicle.’ ” Id. at 230 (quoting Azar v. Employers Casualty Co., 178 Colo. 58, 61, 495 P.2d 554, 555 (1972)). In Titan Construction Co. v. Nolf, 188 Colo. 188, 515 P.2d 1123 (1973), we stated that the test to determine the existence of such causation was a “but for” test which was satisfied when “the accident would not have occurred except for the [use] of the insured vehicle.” Id. at 194, 515 P.2d at 1126. In Kohl v. Union Insurance Co., 731 P.2d 134 (Colo.1986), we set forth the additional requirement that the claimant must “prove that the accident would not have occurred but for a conceivable use of the vehicle that is not foreign to its inherent purpose.” Id. at 135-36 n. 2 (emphasis added).
In the instant case, the “but for” test of causation is not satisfied, and I would therefore hold that McMichael was not “using” the Jensen truck at the time of the accident, as we have interpreted that term. The majority cites an assortment of eases from a variety of jurisdictions for the proposition that the use of a vehicle as a barricade may constitute “use” for insurance purposes. On these facts, however, McMichael’s use of the Jensen truck was not the “but for” cause of the accident. Although McMichael might have been using the truck as a barricade, McMi-chael was seventy-five feet from the truck when the accident occurred. Moreover, the automobile that struck McMichael approached from the opposite direction from where the Jensen truck was parked. As reflected by the record, the accident occurred because a motorist traveling in the opposite direction from where McMichael had parked the truck could not see out of his fogged windshield and entered the median, striking McMichael.
Additionally, even accepting the proposition that McMichael was “using” the truck as a barricade at the time of the accident, I would hold that he was using the truck in a manner foreign to its inherent purpose. The truck insured by Aetna was an ordinary pickup truck. Common sense dictates that the inherent purpose of a commercial pickup truck is the transportation of workers and materials. It is true that our cases have extended this to unloading and loading a truck, see Titan Constr., 183 Colo, at 194, 515 P.2d at 1126, and other peripheral uses, but it strains credulity to hold that the inherent purpose of a pickup truck is to be used as a barricade to protect workers from oncoming traffic. Our cases have placed the burden on the claimant to establish that he was not using the vehicle in a manner foreign to its inherent purpose. See, e.g., Cung La v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 830 P.2d 1007, 1010-11 (Colo.1992). I would hold that McMichael has failed to meet this burden, and thus was not “using” the Jensen truck at the time of the accident as we have defined that term in our cases.
IV.
In conclusion, I would hold that section 10-4-608, by its plain and unambiguous language, precludes the application of the UM7 UIM provision of section 10-4-609(1) to the Aetna policy. Alternatively, I would hold that, were section 10-4-609(1) to apply, McMichael was not “using” the Jensen truck at the time of the accident as required for coverage by the Aetna policy. I also write to express my dissatisfaction with the majority’s sweeping, public policy based decision requiring that the Aetna policy provide UM/ UIM coverage coextensive with the coverage provided by the liability provisions of that policy. Accordingly, I dissent.

. Part 6 (titled “Automobile Insurance Policy— Regulations”) refers to §§ 10-4-601 through 10-4-613, 4A C.R.S. (1994), of Article 4 (titled “Property and Casualty Insurance”) of Title 10 of the Colorado Revised Statutes.

. I elaborate here to clarify my disagreement with the majority's holding that, as a matter of public policy, an insurer may not contractually agree with its insured to offer more restrictive coverage under the UM/UIM portion of the insurance policy than is offered under the liability portion. Section 10-4-609(1) states, in pertinent part:
No automobile liability ... policy ... shall be ... issued ... in this state ... unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto ... for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles ... resulting therefrom; except that the named insured may reject such coverage in writing.
My disagreement with the majority’s view stems from its interpretation of the phrase “for the protection of persons insured thereunder’’ as relating back to all those who could be covered under the liability portion of the policy. I believe the majority paints with too broad a brush by utilizing such a construction, and thereby makes a decision of public policy that is best left within the province of the legislature.
It has long been the law in Colorado that,
[wjhere provisions of an insurance policy are couched in plain and unambiguous language and do not contravene some principle of public policy, a court has no right by a forced construction or interpretation to require a result not intended by the contracting parties.
Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. De Salvo, 174 Colo. 115, 120, 482 P.2d 380, 383 (1971). The majority acknowledges that the language of the Aetna policy is clear and unambiguous, but then deviates from this plain language by attempting to impose its perceived view of the General Assembly’s intended public policy on the provisions of the Aetna policy.
In my view, it is far from clear that § 10-4— 609(1) evinces such a public policy. It is true that, at the inception of the UM/UIM Act, the General Assembly articulated a clear public policy to protect those injured by financially irresponsible drivers. See Act approved Apr. 30, 1965, ch. 91, secs. 1-8, 1965 Colo.Sess.Laws 333-58. This is not such a sweeping mandate, however, that it may be used broadly, in the absence of clear statutory language, to alter the original intent of the parties to an insurance policy. While § 10^1 — 609(1) does mandate that UM/UIM coverage be offered to those persons insured under the policy, it does not expressly define the different classes of persons to whom such coverage is to be extended. In fact, the last phrase of that section, “the named insured may reject such coverage in writing,” implies that the class to be protected includes only the named insured, and does not extend to all those covered by the liability provision of the policy. Because the statute is ambiguous, I would hold that it does not manifest a principle of public policy compelling enough to force a construction of the Aetna policy not intended by the contracting parties.