Court Opinion

ID: 9762381
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:21:42.24198+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:33.942598
License: Public Domain

BROSKY, Judge,
concurring:
I concur in the result reached by the majority, however, I wish to express my view concerning our standard of review. *416We have very recently stated in Robert H. H. v. May L. H., 293 Pa.Super. 431, 439 A.2d 187 (1981):
Our scope of review in custody disputes is very broad. Commonwealth ex rel. Spriggs v. Carson, 470 Pa. 290, 368 A.2d 635 (1977); Commonwealth ex rel. Myers v. Myers, 468 Pa. 134, 360 A.2d 587 (1976). We will review the record very closely not with a mind toward usurping the fact-finding function of the trial court, but with a responsible eye searching to ferret out what is in the “best interest of the children.” In re Custody of White, 270 Pa.Super. 165, 411 A.2d 231 (1979). Accordingly, we are not bound by the deductions and inferences made by the judge who heard the dispute. Trefsgar v. Trefsgar, 261 Pa.Super. 1, 395 A.2d 273 (1978); Commonwealth ex rel. Ulmer v. Ulmer, 231 Pa.Super. 144, 331 A.2d 665 (1974). Thus, we make an independent review of the evidence and render an independent judgment which will assure that the Commonwealth’s justifiable concern for the health and safety of its children is met. Spells v. Spells, 250 Pa. Super. 168, 378 A.2d 879 (1979). Our review, therefore, requires not only a thoroughly developed and complete record, Augustine v. Augustine, 228 Pa.Super. 312, 324 A.2d 477 (1974), but a comprehensive and well-reasoned opinion which analyzes the facts disclosed in the record in a manner which clearly demonstrates the necessity for placing custody with either the petitioner or respondent. Martincheck v. Martincheck, 262 Pa.Super. 346, 396 A.2d 788 (1979). Hence, we shall engage in a broad and comprehensive review of the record and reach an independent decision regarding the placement of the children in the custody of either party. We shall approach this review with an open mind and will not adhere to an abuse of discretion standard. Simply stated, our broad scope of review encompasses but is not limited to the narrow scope of review described by the term abuse of discretion. Commonwealth ex rel. Berman v. Berman, [289] Pa.Super. [91], 432 A.2d 1066 (1981). To reason in any other manner *417contradicts the very essence of our standard of review in custody cases. In re Jennifer Lynn Arnold, Appeal of Merrill S. Arnold, [286] Pa.Super. [171], [176], 428 A.2d 627, 629 (1981) (HOFFMAN, J., Concurring Opinion); Commonwealth ex rel. E. H. T. v. R. E. T., [285] Pa.Super. [444], [457], 427 A.2d 1370, 1376 (1981) (HOFFMAN, J., Concurring Opinion). [Footnote omitted.]
(293 Pa.Superior Ct. at 433, 434, 439 A.2d 188, 189.)
I would hold that our scope of review is very broad in nature. Accordingly, I agree with Judge Hoffman when he said in Commonwealth ex rel. E. H. T. v. R. E. T., 285 Pa.Super. 444, 457, 427 A.2d 1370, 1377 (1981) (HOFFMAN, J., Concurring Opinion):
Thus, if we are indeed to review a custody order pursuant to the “abuse of discretion” standard, then we may not disturb that order unless the appellant meets the “heavy burden” of convincing us that the lower court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised a manifestly unreasonable judgment, or acted out of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. This minimally exacting level of appellate scrutiny, while proper in other contexts, [footnote omitted] is manifestly inappropriate in cases in which our scope of review purports to be of the broadest type. Accordingly, I believe that it is time for us to disavow a standard which is inconsistent with both our responsibility and our actual practice of closely scrutinizing custody decisions [footnote omitted],
(Emphasis added.) See also Commonwealth v. Siriani, 286 Pa.Super. 176, 428 A.2d 629 (1981) (HOFFMAN, J. concurring), Commonwealth ex rel. Berman v. Berman, supra.