Court Opinion

ID: 9398535
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-31 16:11:04.70449+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:34.241532
License: Public Domain

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :
 MOHAMED DRIDI                            :
                                          :
                    Appellant             :   No. 880 EDA 2022

            Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 25, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-51-CR-0008768-2016

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.:                                FILED MAY 31, 2023

      Appellant, Mohamed Dridi (“Appellant” and/or “Dridi”), appeals from the

March 25, 2022 order that dismissed his petition filed pursuant to the Post

Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. § 9541-46.       He challenges the

effectiveness of trial counsel, appellate counsel, and, for the first time on

appeal, initial PCRA counsel. After careful review, we affirm the PCRA court’s

decision rejecting Appellant’s claim that trial and appellate counsel were

ineffective for failing to challenge the search warrant’s lack of particularity.

However, we vacate and remand for further proceedings regarding Appellant’s

new claims of ineffectiveness of initial PCRA counsel as directed by

Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381 (Pa. 2021).

      On direct appeal, a previous panel of this Court set forth the factual and

procedural history as follows:
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     On April 10, 2016, Special Agent Eric Barlow (Agent Barlow) of
     the Pennsylvania Office of the Attorney General (OAG) utilized the
     office's peer-to-peer file sharing program to download a file
     containing known child pornography. Agent Barlow identified the
     Internet Protocol (IP) address that had shared the file and
     obtained a subpoena for the subscriber information. Verizon's
     records indicated that Dridi was the owner of the IP address and
     provided his address. The OAG confirmed through PennDOT and
     other records that Dridi was the resident of the address in
     question.

     Subsequently, on August 2, 2016, Agent Barlow applied for a
     search warrant for the address. In the Affidavit of Probable Cause
     (Affidavit) attached to the search warrant application, Agent
     Barlow described his investigation in detail. He explained that
     peer-to-peer file sharing programs “allow groups of computers,
     using the same file sharing network and protocols, to transfer
     digital files from one computer system to another while connected
     to a network, usually on the Internet.” Affidavit at 1. The peer-
     to-peer file sharing programs allow users to make their digital
     libraries available to other users and are commonly used to
     disseminate child pornography. Id. Peer-to-peer file sharing
     programs can download a single file from multiple computers;
     however, the program used by the OAG downloads an entire file
     from a single computer and identifies that device's IP address for
     investigation. Id. at 2.

     During his investigation, Agent Barlow made a direct connection
     to a device at an identified IP address and downloaded a file
     containing child pornography. Id. at 3. The device was using
     uTorrent 3.4 software to share the file. Id. Agent Barlow's
     software logged the start and end time for the download, the file
     name and size, and the IP address for the computer sharing the
     file. Agent Barlow then used the American Registry of Internet
     Numbers to determine that the IP address was provided by
     Verizon and issued a subpoena for the subscriber information. As
     noted above, Verizon complied with the subpoena and identified
     Dridi as the subscriber and provided his home address and contact
     information.

     The Affidavit further explained that files may be stored in “free
     space or slack space” on a hard drive long after it has been deleted
     by a user, and a computer may also keep records of deleted data
     and files that were viewed through the internet. Id. at 4. Thus,
     it is possible for investigators to recover files and data that had

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     been deleted or viewed months or years prior. Id. Agent Barlow
     averred that “searching computerized information for evidence or
     instrumentalities of crime commonly requires investigators to
     seize all of a computer system's input/output peripheral devices,
     related software, documentation, and data security devices
     (including passwords) so that a qualified computer expert can
     accurately retrieve the system's data in a laboratory or other
     controlled environment.” Id. at 5. It was necessary to search not
     just computers, but all magnetic storage devices, external storage
     devices, and “computing systems sometimes referred to as central
     processing units (CPU).” Id.

     Based on all of this information, the application for the search
     warrant specified the items to be searched for and seized as
     follows:

        All computer hardware, including, but not limited to, any
        equipment which can collect, analyze, create, display,
        convert, store, conceal, or transmit electronic, magnetic,
        optical or similar computer impulses or data. Any computer
        processing units, internal and peripheral storage devices
        (such as fixed disks, external hard disks, discs, backup
        media, flash media, and optical storage devices), peripheral
        input/output devices (such as keyboards, printers,
        scanners, video displays, switches, and disc/media
        readers), and related communication devices such as
        network/internet devices, cables, and connections,
        recording equipment, as well as any devices, mechanisms,
        or parts that can be used to restrict access to computer
        hardware. These items will be seized and then later
        searched for evidence relating to the possession and/or
        distribution of child pornography.

     Search Warrant, 8/2/16, at 1-2. Agents from the OAG executed
     the search warrant and seized three laptop computers and four
     cell phones from the residence. These items were seized from a
     room in the house that Dridi identified to agents as his bedroom.

     Videos, images, internet search history terms, and other indicia of
     child pornography were recovered from one of the laptops and
     three of the cell phones.         [(These cell phones were all
     smartphones. "A smartphone is a modern day cellular telephone
     with computer-like capabilities." Commonwealth v. Smith, 136
     A.3d 170, 171 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2016))]. Several of the images of
     child pornography were synced across multiple cell phones

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        through a shared Gmail account. The laptop identified Dridi as
        the system owner, with “Ali PC” as the laptop name and “Ali” as
        the username. The laptop also contained a picture of Dridi's green
        card and Social Security card. All images and videos were located
        in “unallocated space” on the devices, indicating that the user had
        deleted the files from the allocated space on the devices but they
        had been retained elsewhere by the system. The uTorrent 3.4
        software that uploaded the video in April 2016 was not found on
        any of the devices.

Commonwealth v. Dridi, No. 723 EDA 2019, 2020 WL 3432711, at *1-2

(Pa. Super. filed June 23, 2020) (non-precedential decision) (emphasis

added). On August 2, 2016, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with one

count of Disseminating Child Pornography, fifteen counts of Possessing Child

Pornography, and one count of Criminal Use of a Communication Facility.1

        On October 11, 2017, Appellant’s initial trial counsel, Michael T. van der

Veen, Esq., litigated a motion to suppress claiming that the search warrant

was stale, overbroad, and lacked probable cause. The trial court denied the

motion to suppress and proceeded to a jury trial, which concluded in a mistrial.

Co-counsel Debra Rainey, Esq. and Matthew Boyd, Esq. from the Defender

Association of Philadelphia represented Appellant during his new trial.        On

September 28, 2018, a jury convicted Appellant of the above-mentioned

charges. On January 23, 2019, the court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate

term of five to ten years’ incarceration, followed by seven years’ probation.

        On June 23, 2020, this Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence

and on February 18, 2021, our Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for

____________________________________________

1   18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6312(c), 6312(d), and 7512(a), respectively.

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allowance of appeal. Dridi, No. 723 EDA 2019, appeal denied, No. 357 EAL

2020 (Pa. filed Feb. 18, 2021).

      Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition and, on September 23,

2021, a counseled amended PCRA petition alleging ineffective assistance of

trial and direct appellate counsel for (1) failing to aver in the motion to

suppress that cell phone evidence should be suppressed because the search

warrant lacked particularity when it did not specify cell phones, and (2) failing

to properly preserve this issue on appeal by including it in a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)

statement. The PCRA court issued a Rule 907 notice of intent to dismiss the

PCRA petition without a hearing and on March 25, 2022, the PCRA court

dismissed the petition.

      Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. Both Appellant and the PCRA

court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Prior to filing his brief to this court, and

after the PCRA court issued its Rule 1925(a) opinion, Appellant obtained new

counsel. In his brief to this court, Appellant challenges the ineffectiveness of

trial and appellate counsel and raises new issues regarding the ineffectiveness

of initial PCRA counsel.

      In particular, Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

      I.    Should the prior attorneys have specifically challenged the
            search of the cell phones given that the search warrant
            either did not cover cell phones, or in the alternative, was
            lacking in particularity and probable cause with respect to
            cell phones?

      II.   Did trial counsel provide the ineffective assistance of
            counsel in failing to retain a competent computer expert for
            trial where the expert who testified at the prior trial provided

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             critical testimony which dramatically undercut the
             prosecution’s ability to prove that Appellant knowingly
             possessed or distributed child pornography and that expert
             would have testified similarly at the retrial?

      III.   Did trial counsel provide the ineffective assistance of
             counsel by repeatedly informing the jury that once the
             police confronted Appellant with a search warrant and read
             him his Miranda warnings, he refused to give a statement,
             refused to sign the Miranda form acknowledging that he
             received his rights, and asked to speak with an attorney?

Appellant’s Br. at 7.

                                        A.

      We review an order denying a petition for collateral relief to determine

whether the PCRA court’s decision is supported by the evidence of record and

free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d 795, 803 (Pa. 2014).

“This Court grants great deference to the findings of the PCRA court if the

record contains any support for those findings.” Commonwealth v.

Anderson, 995 A.2d 1184, 1189 (Pa. Super. 2010).

      To prevail on a petition for PCRA relief, a petitioner must plead and

prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his conviction or sentence

resulted from one or more of the circumstances enumerated in 42 Pa.C.S. §

9543(a)(2). These circumstances include ineffectiveness of counsel, which

“so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of

guilt or innocence could have taken place.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(ii).

      The    law   presumes   counsel    has   rendered   effective   assistance.

Commonwealth v. Rivera, 10 A.3d 1276, 1279 (Pa. Super. 2010). “[T]he

burden of demonstrating ineffectiveness rests on [the] appellant.” Id. To

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satisfy this burden, the appellant must plead and prove by a preponderance

of the evidence that: (1) the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) no

reasonable basis existed for counsel’s actions or failure to act; and (3) there

is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the challenged proceeding

would have been different absent counsel’s error.             Commonwealth v.

Fulton, 830 A.2d 567, 572 (Pa. 2003). Failure to satisfy any prong of the

test will result in rejection of the appellant’s claim. Id.

      To establish the prejudice prong, the petitioner must prove a reasonable

probability that the outcome of the relevant proceedings would have been

different but-for counsel’s action or inaction. Commonwealth v. Busanet,

54 A.3d 35, 46 (Pa. 2012).         Importantly, “counsel cannot be deemed

ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim.” Fears, 86 A.3d at 804.

      Finally, “[t]he PCRA court has discretion to dismiss a petition without a

hearing when the court is satisfied that there are no genuine issues concerning

any material fact, the petitioner is not entitled to post-conviction collateral

relief, and no legitimate purpose would be served by further proceedings.”

Commonwealth v. Holt, 175 A.3d 1014, 1017-18 (Pa. Super. 2017)

(citations omitted). “To obtain a reversal of a PCRA court’s decision to dismiss

a petition without a hearing, an appellant must show that he or she raised a

genuine issue of fact which, if resolved in his favor, would have entitled him

to relief, or that the court otherwise abused its discretion in denying a

hearing.” Id.

                                        B.

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       In his first issue, Appellant avers that both his trial and appellate counsel

were ineffective for failing to raise and/or preserve a suppression of evidence

claim. While trial counsel filed a Motion to Suppress, Appellant argues that

trial counsel was ineffective for only arguing that the search warrant was

overbroad. Appellant now claims that trial counsel should have challenged

the search warrant on the grounds that the search warrant only authorized

the search and seizure of a computer and did not specify the search and

seizure of a cell phone. Appellant’s Br. at 26, 31-45. Similarly, Appellant

argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for not preserving this issue on

appeal.2 Id. We disagree.

       Both Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Fourth

Amendment of the United States Constitution require that search warrants be

supported by probable cause. Commonwealth v. Jones, 988 A.2d 649, 655

(Pa. 2010). “The linch-pin that has been developed to determine whether it

is appropriate to issue a search warrant is the test of probable cause.”

Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 899 (Pa. 1991) (citation

omitted).    Our Supreme Court has explained that “[p]robable cause exists

where the facts and circumstances within the affiant's knowledge and of which

____________________________________________

2 Appellant also argues, for the first time on appeal, that the search warrant
did not provide probable cause to search a cell phone because the agents
knew that the software used to distribute child pornography in this case could
only have been found on a machine running a Windows operating system.
Appellant’s Br. at 26, 47. This argument is waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a)
(“Issues not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal.”).

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he has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to

warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that a search should be

conducted.” Jones, 988 A.2d at 655 (citation omitted). This Court reviews

probable cause determinations pursuant to a “totality of the circumstances”

test and whether, “given all of the circumstances set for the in the affidavit .

. . including the veracity and basis of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay

information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime

will be found in a particular place[.]” Id. (citation omitted).

      It is axiomatic that “a warrant must name or describe with particularity

the property to be seized and the person or place to be searched.”

Commonwealth v. Orie, 88 A.3d 983, 1002 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation

omitted).   “The language of the Pennsylvania Constitution requires that a

warrant describe the items to be seized ‘as nearly as may be[,]” and this

requirement is more stringent than that of the Fourth Amendment, which

merely requires “particularity in the description.”      Id. at 1003 (citation

omitted). “The Pennsylvania Constitution further requires the description to

be as particular as is reasonably possible.” Id. (citation omitted). To that

end, it is undisputed that a “search warrant cannot be used as a general

investigatory tool to uncover evidence of a crime. Nor may a warrant be so

ambiguous as to allow the . . . general rummaging banned by the Fourth

Amendment.”      Commonwealth v. Rega, 933 A.2d 997, 1011 (Pa.

2007) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

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      Our Supreme Court has discussed the specific considerations governing

search warrants respecting electronic devices like cell phones, as follows:

      Because a cell phone often contains even more personal
      information than a home, it logically follows that a warrant should
      be required to search the contents of a cell phone, just as a
      warrant is required to search the contents of a home. This
      rationale, however, does not support the conclusion that, once
      obtained, a warrant to search a digital device should be held to a
      higher overbreadth standard than a warrant to search a home
      simply because of the former’s storage capacity. Of course . . .
      our Constitution requires that all warrants, including warrants to
      search a digital space, (1) describe the place to be searched and
      the items to be seized with specificity and (2) be supported by
      probable cause to believe that the items sought will provide
      evidence of a crime. In applying this standard, courts must be
      cognizant of the privacy interests associated with personal
      electronic devices. However, just as with a search of a home and
      other spaces where an individual maintains a privacy interest, if
      there is probable cause that evidence of a crime will be found
      within an electronic device, that evidence should not be shielded
      simply because a defendant comingles it with personal information
      in a digital space with vast storage capacity. This is particularly so
      when, like here, the nature of the crime is electronic or internet
      based.

Commonwealth v. Green, 265 A.3d 541, 553 (Pa. 2021). Thus, warrants

to search digital spaces must describe “as nearly as may be those items for

which there is probable cause.” Id. at 554 (citation omitted).          However,

“search warrants should be read in a common sense fashion and should not

be invalidated by hypertechnical interpretations.” Rega, 933 A.2d at 1012

(quoting Pa.R.Crim.P. 205 cmt.) (quotation marks omitted). In light of the

“fact-dependent nature” of claims that a warrant is “overbroad, ambiguous,

or perhaps both[,]” our Supreme Court has held that “where the items to be

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seized are as precisely identified as the nature of the activity permits and an

exact description is virtually impossible, the searching officer is only required

to describe the general class of the item he is seeking.” Green, 265 A.3d at

550. Stated another way, “when an exact description of a particular item is

not possible, a generic description will suffice.”   Rega, 933 A.2d at 1012

(quoting Pa.R.Crim.P. 205 cmt.)

      In Green, a recent Supreme Court case that is instructive to our

analysis, police conducted an undercover investigation into the sharing of child

pornography over the internet, which led police to discover an IP address

being used by an unknown device to share child pornography. Id. at 544-

546, 552. In response to a court order, the owner of the IP address provided

a residential address associated with that subscription. Id. at 545. In turn,

police applied for a search warrant to seize the electronic devices in that

residence. Id. at 545-46. The search warrant included in its description,

      Any and all computer hardware, including, but not limited to, any
      equipment which can collect, analyze, create, display, convert,
      store, conceal, or transmit electronic, magnetic, optical or similar
      computer impulses or data. . . . This search is also to include any
      and all cellular phones[.]

Id. at 546 (emphasis omitted).      The appellant in Green argued that the

warrant was overbroad because it failed to specify only his “personal” phone

and computer. Id. at 551. The Supreme Court rejected this argument and

found that there was probable cause to search and seize all digital devices in

the appellant's home. Id. at 552.

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      Our High Court explained, “[t]he warrant did not request to search a

particular device or even name a particular user because there was no way

for investigators to obtain that information prior to a search. . . . Based on the

information available to the corporals at the time they requested the warrant,

the pornography could have been shared by any user on any device using the

internet in the home. There was no way to narrow this inquiry without

conducting a search.” Id.    The Court emphasized the importance of the self-

limiting language in the warrant that only permitted the officers to search for

“evidence relating to the possession and/or distribution of child pornography”

and explained that “[t]his line was critical in focusing the search and seizure

to items connected with the criminal activity for which there was probable

cause.” Id. Moreover, our Supreme Court explained, “[t]his limiting language

prevented an indiscriminate or discretionary search of the home because any

actions taken by the searching officers were restricted to only what could yield

evidence of child pornography.      The record reflects that this was not an

exploratory search, but one directed in good faith towards the objects

specified in the warrant.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).

      Here, relying on Green, the PCRA court opined that Appellant’s claim

that the search warrant lacked particularity was devoid of merit because

smartphones are akin to computers and the warrant contained self-limiting

language which restricted the search to evidence relating to the possession

and/or distribution of child pornography. The court opined:

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      Although the warrant in the instant case did not specify a cell
      phone, it is abundantly clear that cell phones are computers in
      every sense of the word, as are tablets, Ipads, and other similar
      devices. Until the search was conducted of Appellant’s home, the
      agents had no way of knowing exactly what type of device he was
      using, nor is that level of particularity relevant to the subject of
      the investigation, namely, whether Appellant possessed and
      transmitted pornographic images of children that he obtained on
      the internet.

      Here, as in Green, the warrant contained identical self-limiting
      language that allowed the agents to search only for “evidence
      relating to the possession and/or distribution of child
      pornography[,” a line that] was critical in focusing the search and
      seizure to items connected to the criminal activity for which there
      was probable cause. . . . Here, a plain reading of the description
      of items to be seized included any and all computer hardware or
      network/internet devices that could contain images of child
      pornography. Appellant’s cell phone, or “smartphone” functions
      to store images downloaded from the internet in the same fashion
      as any other type of desktop computer, laptop, or tablet. To
      differentiate between the functioning of these devices as it relates
      to the ability to obtain pornographic images from the internet is
      to make a distinction without a difference.

Trial Ct. Op., filed 6/17/22, at 11-12.

      We agree with the PCRA court.       Green refutes Appellant’s argument

that the warrant lacked sufficient particularity. On the contrary, Appellant’s

cell phones had many of the same technological capabilities as computers and

fell within the scope of the search warrant. Analogous to the facts in Green,

Appellant was under investigation for computer based criminal acts, the

search warrant contained a general description of electronic items to be seized

but limited the search to “evidence relating to the possession and/or

distribution of child pornography,” and the “record reflects that this was not

an exploratory search, but one directed in good faith towards the objects

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specified in the warrant.”       265 A.3d at 552 (citation and quotation marks

omitted).      While Appellant argues that the warrant in Green specifically

contained language that included “cell phones,” the PCRA court properly and

thoughtfully found that that distinction unpersuasive, characterizing it as a

distinction without a difference. Trial Ct. Op. at 11-12.

        Since trial counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise an

issue that has no arguable merit and this issue has no arguable merit, the

PCRA court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Appellant’s claim that trial

and appellate counsel were ineffective and dismissing Appellant’s PCRA

petition with regards to these claims.

                                               C.

        In his next two issues, Appellant asserts, for the first time, that initial

PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to raise claims that trial counsel was

ineffective 1) for failing to retain a competent computer expert for trial and 2)

for repeatedly informing the jury that, after police confronted Appellant with

a search warrant and read him his Miranda3 warnings, he refused to give a

statement, he refused to sign the Miranda form acknowledging that he

received his rights, and he asked to speak with an attorney. Appellant’s Br.

at 7.

        Appellant’s assertions—that initial PCRA Counsel was ineffective for

failing to raise issues regarding trial counsel’s ineffectiveness—presents a

____________________________________________

3   Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

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layered ineffectiveness claim. “Where a petitioner alleges multiple layers of

ineffectiveness, he is required to plead and prove, by a preponderance of the

evidence, each of the three prongs of ineffectiveness relevant to each layer of

representation.” Commonwealth v. Parrish, 273 A.3d 989, 1003 n.11 (Pa.

2022). “In determining a layered claim of ineffectiveness, the critical inquiry

is whether the first attorney that the defendant asserts was ineffective did, in

fact, render ineffective assistance of counsel. If that attorney was effective,

then subsequent counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise the

underlying issue.”   Commonwealth v. Burkett, 5 A.3d 1260, 1270 (Pa.

Super. 2010).

      Where an appellant raises a claim of PCRA counsel ineffectiveness for

the first time on appeal, this Court has “the ability to grant or deny relief on

straightforward claims, as well as the power to remand to the PCRA court for

the development of the record.” Bradley, 261 A.3d at 403. We will remand

“where there are material facts at issue concerning claims challenging

counsel’s stewardship and relief is not plainly unavailable as a matter of

law[.]” Id. at 402 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Additionally, we

are mindful of the “general rule” that “a lawyer should not be held ineffective

without first having an opportunity to address the accusation in some fashion.”

Commonwealth v. Colavita, 993 A.2d 874, 895 (Pa. 2010), overruled on

other grounds, Bradley, 261 A.3d 381.

                                      D.

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      As an initial matter, we must address the Commonwealth’s assertion

that these new claims of ineffectiveness are waived because Appellant failed

to raise them at the first possible opportunity to do so, i.e., in a corrected Rule

1925(b) statement. Commonwealth Br. at 37. To support its argument, the

Commonwealth cites Parrish, a case where our Supreme Court found that an

appellant adequately raised and preserved his layered claim of ineffective

assistance of trial and initial PCRA counsel by raising it at the first opportunity

to do so, specifically in his corrected Rule 1925(b) statement and in his

appellate brief.   273 A.3d at 1002.         However, the procedural posture in

Parrish is easily distinguished from the instant case.          In Parrish, our

Supreme Court sua sponte remanded the PCRA appeal of a capital case for

the appointment of new counsel and the filing of a corrected Rule 1925(b)

statement prior to concluding that the appellant preserved his ineffective

assistance of counsel claims in his corrected Rule 1925(b) statement.

      Instantly, Appellant obtained new PCRA counsel after the initial PCRA

counsel filed a Rule 1925(b) statement and after the PCRA court issued a

responsive Rule 1925(a) opinion. In these unique circumstances, we agree

with Appellant’s position that his brief to this Court was the first opportunity

for new PCRA counsel to raise claims of ineffective assistance of initial PCRA

counsel.

                                        E.

      In his layered ineffective assistance of counsel claims, Appellant first

avers that initial PCRA Counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that trial

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counsel was ineffective for failing to retain a competent expert witness.

Appellant’s Br. at 51-54.    Specifically, Appellant argues that trial counsel

should have retained the same expert witness that was called in his first trial

because the expert was highly qualified, had previously examined the data in

question, and provided critical testimony resulting in a hung jury. Appellant

concludes that initial PCRA Counsel was, therefore, ineffective for failing to

raise this claim of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness in the PCRA petition. Id.

      We acknowledge that “[t]o prove arguable merit based on trial counsel's

failure to call a witness, a PCRA petitioner must show that the witness existed

and was available; counsel was aware of, or had a duty to know of the witness;

the witness was willing and able to appear; and the proposed testimony was

necessary in order to avoid prejudice.” Commonwealth v. Robinson, 278

A.3d 336, 343 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted).   “In this context, prejudice means that the uncalled witnesses’

testimony would have been beneficial under the circumstances of the case.”

Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

      After careful review, we determine that remand is necessary for further

development of the record on this issue. Our analysis of Appellant's layered

ineffectiveness claims must begin with a determination of trial counsel's

effectiveness. Based upon the current record, and specifically in the absence

of an evidentiary hearing, we are unable to review Appellant’s claim that initial

PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge trial counsel’s failure to

call as a witness a computer expert. Appellant’s claim is more than a mere

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boilerplate assertion of ineffectiveness, and raises material facts which are

best determined, in the first instance, by the PCRA court. Further, “relief is

not plainly unavailable as a matter of law[.]” Bradley, 261 A.3d at 402.

      Similarly, Appellant avers that initial PCRA counsel was also ineffective

for failing to argue that trial counsel was ineffective for repeatedly referring to

Appellant’s post-arrest silence.     Appellant’s Br. at 55-56.      In particular,

Appellant argues that his initial counsel, Attorney van der Veen, in Appellant’s

first trial had successfully litigated a motion in limine to preclude the

prosecution from raising Appellant’s post-arrest silence to the jury.           In

Appellant’s second trial, however, trial counsel revealed Appellant’s post-

arrest silence to the jury. Id. Appellant relies on Commonwealth v. Molina,

104 A.3d 430 (Pa. 2014), for the proposition that “the right against self-

incrimination prohibits use of a defendant's pre-arrest silence as substantive

evidence of guilt, unless it falls within an exception such as impeachment of a

testifying defendant or fair response to an argument of the defense.”

Appellant’s Br. at 57 (citing Molina, 104 A.3d at 451).

      We find that we must also remand this issue to the PCRA court to

determine whether initial PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that

trial counsel was ineffective for repeatedly raising Appellant’s post-arrest

silence before the jury.      Once again, Appellant has argued more than

boilerplate claims, but raised material facts, and we cannot conclude as a

matter of law that Appellant is not entitled to any relief.

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J-S07012-23

                                        F.

      In conclusion, we affirm the PCRA court’s decision that Appellant failed

to assert a meritorious claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

challenge the search warrant’s lack of particularity.       However, in light of

Bradley, we remand this case to the PCRA court to permit Appellant to amend

the PCRA petition to assert the newly-raised claims that initial PCRA counsel

was ineffective for failing to raise claims that trial counsel was ineffective for:

1) failing to retain a competent expert witness and 2) repeatedly referencing

Appellant’s post-arrest silence in front of the jury.      The PCRA court shall

conduct such further proceedings as necessary to address Appellant's layered

claims of ineffective assistance of trial and initial PCRA counsel.            We

emphasize, however, that the ineffectiveness claims at issue upon remand are

limited to those new claims presented in this appeal before this Court.

      Order vacated.     Case remanded for proceedings consistent with this

memorandum. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 5/31/2023

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