Court Opinion

ID: 9557442
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 16:50:13.422396+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:50.368199
License: Public Domain

Ott, J.
(dissenting) — The majority hold that, ás a matter of law, the driver of the forward automobile was not guilty of contributory negligence. I do not agree for three reasons:
(1) RCW 46.60.080 provides that “It shall be unlawful for the operator of a motor vehicle to follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, . . . ”
RCW 46.48.010 provides:
“Every person operating or driving a vehicle of any character upon the public highways of this state shall operate the same in a careful and prudent manner and at a rate of speed no greater than is reasonable and proper under the conditions existing at the point of operation, ..."
These statutes place upon the operator of a motor vehicle, whether following or preceding another, the duty to operate his vehicle in a careful and prudent manner. Whether the operator of a motor vehicle is driving closer to the automobile ahead than is “reasonable and prudent,” or whether the operator of the forward automobile is driving in a “careful and prudent manner,” is a factual determination to be made by the jury.
(2) The ordinance gave the operator of the forward vehicle the absolute right to stop. It also conferred upon him an absolute right to proceed through the intersection under certain circumstances. The manner in which the *908appellant operated his automobile before his abrupt stop indicated that he was going to drive through the intersection. Whether, at the time of the collision, he was driving his automobile in a careful and prudent manner was a question of fact for the jury to decide.
(3) Even though the operator of a motor vehicle complies with the law, there may be circumstances where such compliance does not fulfill the statutory standard of reasonable care. In Curtis v. Perry, 171 Wash. 542, 547, 18. P. (2d) 840 (1933), we said:
“It must be borne in mind that statutory regulations relative to the conduct of drivers of motor vehicles do not attempt to define what reasonable care is. They set up certain rules of conduct, violation of which carries a presumption of negligence, but a compliance with which does not necessarily fulfill the obligation to exercise reasonable care under given circumstances. There are circumstances under which a compliance with the statute alone might be presumed, as a matter of law, to constitute reasonable care; and there are circumstances where such would not be the case.”
The circumstances in the instant case, together with appellant’s statement that “ ‘Under ordinary circumstances I might have went through that light.- ... I just got a new set of snow tires put on my car, ... I just wanted to see if I could stop the whole car,’ ” were facts for the jury to consider in determining the issue of whether appellant exercised reasonable care in driving his automobile. The jury was the sole judge of the facts. Upon conflicting evidence, the jury determined the factual issue of the exercise of reasonable care adversely to appellant.
In my opinion, the court properly instructed the jury. The evidence sustains the verdict, and the judgment should be affirmed.
Donworth, Finley, and Hunter, JJ., concur with Ott, J.