Court Opinion

ID: 9611647
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:58:51.77649+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:15.760082
License: Public Domain

Carley, Justice,
concurring specially.
I concur fully in the affirmance of the trial court’s denial of an interlocutory injunction, but I do not agree with the majority’s conclusion in footnote 2 that original appellate jurisdiction over this case lies in the Court of Appeals. I firmly believe that this appeal is clearly within this Court’s “equity” jurisdiction and that we have the constitutional obligation to consider it.
We transferred Pittman v. Harbin Clinic Professional Assn., 263 Ga. 66 (428 SE2d 328) (1993) to the Court of Appeals because “[t]he primary question to be answered . . . [was] whether the trial court properly construed the contracts.” Pittman involved the trial court’s non-discretionary rulings as to permanent injunctive relief. “[B]oth the orders enjoining the partners from violating their contracts and *619the orders denying the injunctive relief were secondary to the principal issue of the construction of the contracts — an issue of law. [Cit.]” Pittman, supra at 66-67. However, this case involves a trial court’s ruling on a request for interlocutory injunctive relief. Unlike a permanent injunction, the function of an interlocutory injunction is to preserve the status quo, rather than to make a final disposition of the case. Ga. Canoeing Assn. v. Henry, 263 Ga. 77 (428 SE2d 336) (1993). “The purpose of an interlocutory injunction is preliminary and preparatory; it looks to a future final hearing, and while contemplating what the result of that hearing may be, it does not settle what it shall be. [Cit.]” (Emphasis in original.) Milton Frank Allen Publications v. Ga. Assn, of Petroleum Retailers, 223 Ga. 784, 788 (158 SE2d 248) (1967). On application for an interlocutory injunction, “there should be a balancing of conveniences and a consideration of whether greater harm might be done by granting than by refusing it. [Cit.]” Parker v. West View Cemetery Assn., 195 Ga. 237, 244 (24 SE2d 29) (1943). “‘Generally, the trial court has broad discretion to decide whether to grant or deny an interlocutory injunction. (Cit.)’ [Cit.]” Hunter v. George, 265 Ga. 573, 575 (3) (458 SE2d 830) (1995). As the majority concedes, this case comes within the general rule that an application for an interlocutory injunction invokes the trial court’s exercise of its sound discretion in balancing the procedural benefit and detriment to the respective parties.
While it has been held that when the grant or refusal is based upon a question of law, the rule as to discretion does not apply, nevertheless it is apparent in this case that the judge merely decided that under the facts an injunction was not required pending final trial.
Parker v. West View Cemetery Assn., supra at 242. Thus, resolution of this appeal does not turn upon any legal issue, but upon the propriety of a discretionary ruling entered by the trial court solely in its capacity as a chancellor in equity. See Besser v. Rule, 270 Ga. 473 (510 SE2d 530) (1999). Compare Saxton v. Coastal Dialysis & Medical Clinic, 267 Ga. 177 (476 SE2d 587) (1996); Augusta Eye Center v. Duplessie, 234 Ga. App. 226 (506 SE2d 242) (1998). If the trial court erred, it was not because of any ruling on a legal issue. An appellate reversal would have to be based upon a holding that the trial court abused its discretion in ruling that, under the circumstances, the relative balance of equities militates against the grant of an interlocutory injunction. The Court of Appeals has absolutely no constitutional basis for exercising appellate jurisdiction over a case presenting such an equitable issue. “This [CJourt will not disturb [the trial court’s exercise of its] discretion unless it is abused or there is no evi*620dence to support the ruling. [Cit.]” (Emphasis supplied.) Ga. Dept. of Agriculture v. Ga. Crown Distributing Co., 262 Ga. 761 (425 SE2d 876) (1993). Therefore, I concur in the affirmance of the trial court’s equitable ruling, and firmly believe that, in so doing, we exercise the exclusive appellate jurisdiction conferred upon this Court by Article VI, Section VI, Paragraph III (2) of the Georgia Constitution of 1983.
Decided November 1, 1999.
Kicklighter & Persse, Claude M. Kicklighter, Jr., Robert L. Persse, for appellant.
Cheek & Thompson, Ronald K. Thompson, Godlove & Carellas, William H. Godlove, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Justice Hunstein joins in this special concurrence.