Court Opinion

ID: 9466762
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:26:51.848822+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:56.614387
License: Public Domain

HOLLOWAY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. My conclusion from the record, based on the undisputed facts and those recited in the majority opinion, is that when the theft occurred it was not from an interstate shipment within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 659. The Government should have left this prosecution to the State as the Congress intended.
To me, the salient facts are undisputed.1 The shipment of tires was taken to the warehouse of Delta, the consignee, on July 12, 1978 (R. 13); the trailer was “spotted” at Delta’s facility and the tractor was removed (R. 13, 29); Delta’s warehouse manager broke the seal and removed the packing slip (R. 31, 39); and padlocks of Delta were placed on the door, the keys to which remained in the custody of Delta’s warehouse manager. (R. 39). Moreover as the majority opinion notes, Delta’s employees intended to unload the trailer and only delayed until the next morning because of the late hour of the trailer’s arrival.2
Thus the effective possession and control of the tires were in Delta’s hands.3 In *495these circumstances I am compelled to conclude that the interstate shipment had arrived at its destination and that “the carrier no longer had possession but had surrendered dominion over the property to the consignee, and the consignee in turn had accepted and assumed full dominion and control over the property.”4 See O’Kelley v. United States, 116 F.2d 966, 967-68 (8th Cir.).5 Whether the shipment would be retained and any shortage merely noted on the delivery receipt — as actually happened here6 — or might be rejected was up to the consignee, but it had possession and control before the theft occurred nonetheless. Therefore, as in O’Kelley the conviction here cannot stand since the theft was not from an interstate shipment.
Nor can I agree with the Government’s alternative ground suggested for affirmance. The Government argues that the shipment was still moving as a part of interstate commerce since most of the tires were already on back-order and were destined for sale to retailers in other states, relying upon United States v. Maddox, 394 F.2d 297 (4th Cir.). Maddox does not compel a different result here. There sugar purchased in Puerto Rico was shipped to Baltimore and temporarily stored in a warehouse not owned by the consignee, pending final delivery to be arranged by customers in fulfillment of preexisting contracts. The court rejected a defense contention based on the temporary storing of the cargo, but it recognized that
The deposit of cargo in a warehouse may under certain circumstances constitute a coming to rest, marking the termination of an interstate or foreign shipment. At other times, however, the stopoff at the warehouse may only be a pause in the course of an uncompleted journey. Standing alone, the removal of goods to a warehouse is not conclusive; nor is the consignee’s power to divert the goods from the intended interstate commerce.
Id. at 299 (Emphasis added). Of course, here the delivery of the goods did not stand alone but must be considered along with the breaking of the seal, the placing of Delta's padlock on the trailer, the removal of the tractor, and the fact that later shipment arrangements to the retailers had to be made.
The most that can be said for the Government’s position is that Delta’s representative testified that some 700 plus tires of the 1,145 tires in the shipment were already back-ordered for retailers in Oklahoma, Kansas and Arkansas and that the 700 plus tires would probably not have been in the warehouse over two days at the most. (R. 34, 40). Nevertheless it is clear that the entire load of tires was to be unloaded and put in Delta’s warehouse. (R. 35-36). Delta’s representative admitted on cross-examination that its main business was that of purchasing and storing tires for resale. (R. 37). Hence I feel it is clear that the whole shipment had been delivered, marking the end of the interstate shipment from Wisconsin and that no later, separate shipments of the 700 plus tires to retailers had yet commenced when the theft occurred.
Accordingly I would reverse.

. The majority relies on the jury’s resolution of the interstate commerce question as a factual issue. To me this is not persuasive because, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, there is not sufficient substantial proof from which the jury might find beyond a reasonable doubt that the theft occurred from an interstate shipment. United States v. Twilligear, 460 F.2d 79, 81-82 (10th Cir.). Moreover the evidence on this issue reviewed in this dissent was all adduced during testimony by Government witnesses.

. Delta’s representative testified that the trailer was not unloaded upon arrival at 2:30 p. m. (R. 28) because Delta’s shipping people leave at five o’clock and there would not have been sufficient time to unload that day. (R. 29). He stated that “[they] were going to unload them the next morning." (R. 36). It is apparent that the entire shipment of tires was to be unloaded into Delta’s warehouse.

. As noted by the majority, Delta’s representative did reply negatively when questioned by Luman’s counsel on cross-examination as to whether Delta had assumed care, custody and control of the trailer after it was spotted. The response was a conclusion which not only finds no substantial support in the record, but is in fact contradicted by the witness’s own testimony that Delta broke the seal and placed its own padlocks on the trailer. (R. 39). The apparent basis for the witness’s conclusion is that a delivery receipt had not yet been signed. Indeed, as the majority notes, the absence of a signed delivery receipt was the basis for the response of the carrier’s representative that the carrier had not considered the transaction consummated upon tendering the trailer.
*495Delta’s representative testified that the delivery receipt “would be signed after [Delta] had completely unloaded the trailer and checked off the total quantities.” (R. 31). (Emphasis added).

. Indeed, on cross-examination, Luman’s counsel asked Delta’s representative, “on the 12th day of July, 1978 [the tires] were delivered, is that correct?” Delta’s representative replied, “This particular load was, yes, sir.” (R. 39).

. The cases relied on by the majority are not to the contrary. Rather, the facts of instant case are distinguishable from the facts in all those cases on two grounds: (1) the shipment had arrived at its destination when the theft occurred; and (2) the consignee’s employees had broken the seal and placed Delta’s padlock on the trailer.
I realize that in O’Kelley part of the contents of the sugar shipment had been removed by the consignee before the theft occurred. The fact that here the actual unloading was delayed until the next morning does not control, in my judgment, in view of all the other acts by the consignee and the transportation company.

. See Plaintiff’s Ex. 1, II R. 18.