Court Opinion

ID: 9740119
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:28:31.071668+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:09.913520
License: Public Domain

ROGGENSACK, J.
¶ 46. (dissenting in part). Because I conclude that the majority opinion erroneously interprets the dissenters' rights subchapter of Wis. Stat. ch. 180 (2001-02)1 in regard to postjudgment interest, I respectfully dissent from that part of the decision. However, I do agree with the majority opinion in regard to the cross-appeal.
Standard of Review.
¶ 47. The resolution of the appeal turns on questions of statutory interpretation that we resolve de novo. Thielman v. Leean, 2003 WI App 33, ¶ 6, 260 Wis. 2d 253, 659 N.W2d 73. Additionally, whether a statute is ambiguous is a question of law that we review without deference to the circuit court. Id.
Dissenters' Rights Statutes.
¶ 48. At issue in the appeal are the interpretations of several sections of ch. 180 that relate to a shareholder, SSM, exercising statutory dissenters' rights in its shares of HMO-W because of a merger between HMO-W and UWS Acquisition. The interpre*99tations of all sections at issue are driven by the definition of "interest" found in Wis. Stat. § 180.1301(5). The question presented in the appeal is whether the § 180.1301(5) definition of interest applies only to prejudgment interest or whether it also applies after a judicial determination of fair value.
¶ 49. When we are asked to apply a statute whose meaning is in dispute our goal is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. Truttschel v. Martin, 208 Wis. 2d 361, 365, 560 N.W.2d 315, 317 (Ct. App. 1997). We begin with the plain meaning of the language used in the statute. Id. If that language is capable of being understood by two well informed persons in two or more ways, it is ambiguous. D.S. v. Racine County, 142 Wis. 2d 129, 134, 416 N.W.2d 292, 294 (1987). We also consider the interaction of the statute under consideration with other statutory provisions and case law interpreting those provisions because a statute that appears unambiguous on its face may become ambiguous as it interacts with other statutes. See State v. White, 97 Wis. 2d 193, 198, 295 N.W.2d 346, 348 (1980).
¶ 50. Even though I disagree with the majority opinion, for the reasons set forth below, I conclude that Wis. Stat. § 180.1301(5) is not ambiguous. However, in order to understand why that is so, it is helpful to understand the extensive changes in corporate law that were made to ch. 180 in 1990 and the model upon which those changes were based. In 1990, Wisconsin enacted 1989 Wis. Act 303, Wis. Stat. §§ 180.1301-180.1331, as part of a complete revision of Wisconsin's Business Corporation Law. The statutory reorganization of sub-chapter XIII addressing dissenters' rights that is at issue here was taken in large part from the Revised Model Business Corporation Act (Revised Model Act). See Clay R. Williams & Christopher S. Berry, *100Wisconsin's Business Corporation Law, 63 Wisconsin Lawyer 10, 10 (June 1990).
. ¶ 51. The dissenters' rights subchapter of the Revised Model Act attempted to address the tension between corporate management's efforts to move a corporation into new enterprises that at times could rearrange investors' rights and the desire of investors to continue in the corporate form and enterprise style of the company in which they initially invested. Revised Model Business Corporation Act ch. 13, introductory cmt. (1984). The Revised Model Act resolved this tension by giving management of corporations, who have the support of the majority of the shareholders, an almost unlimited power to change the shape of the corporate enterprise, while also giving those shareholders who dissented from the changes the right to withdraw their investments at a fair value. Id. The Revised Model Act sought to motivate corporate management and dissenting shareholders to settle their disputes in private negotiations by a voluntary payment, encompassing fair value and accrued interest, accompanied by documentation sufficient to evaluate the corporation's determination of fair value, as well as how interest was calculated. Judicial resolution of the payment due for the dissenters' shares was to be used only as a last resort. Henry F. Johnson & Paul Bartlett, Jr., Is a Fistful of Dollars the Answer? A Critical Look at Dissenters' Rights Under the Revised Model Business Corporation Act, 12 J.L. & Com. 211, 220 (Spring 1993).
¶ 52. Like the Revised Model Act, Wisconsin's subchapter on dissenters' rights was devised to operate without a judicial determination of fair value, in most cases. As part of that scheme, it contains definitions that are applicable only to that subchapter of ch. 180. Wis. Stat. § 180.1301. The terms defined, and the *101definitions used, are almost identical to those used in § 13.01 of the Revised Model Act. The definition for "interest," found in § 180.1301(5), is at the heart of this appeal. It states in relevant part:
"Interest" means interest from the effectuation date of the corporate action until the date of payment, at the average rate currently paid by the corporation on its principal bank loans or, if none, at a rate that is fair and equitable under all of the circumstances.
Section 180.1301(5).
¶ 53. The majority focuses on the terms, "date of payment," and concludes that the phrase means payment before and after judgment. In so doing, it engrafts the interest definition of Wis. Stat. § 180.1301(5) onto Wis. Stat. § 814.04(4) and Wis. Stat. § 815.05(8), which establish rates of interest after a judicial determination of the principal amount due. However, § 180.1301 explicitly states that the definitions of § 180.1301 apply only to Wis. Stat. §§ 180.1301 to 180.1331. The majority opinion also overlooks the importance of Wis. Stat. § 180.1325, entitled "Payment" which is a major component of the anticipated extra-judicial operation of revised subchapter XIII of ch. 180, as well as the numerous other sections that address "payment" for a dissenter's interest. See Wis. Stat. §§ 180.1321, 180.1323, 180.1328 and 180.1330.
¶ 54. Wisconsin Stat. § 180.1325 speaks solely to voluntary payment by a corporation to those dissenting shareholders or beneficial shareholders who held shares before the effective date specified in the dissenters' notice. Wis. Stat. § 180.1323(1). Section 180.1325 requires current financial information sufficient to permit the shareholders to evaluate the payment of fair value and the calculation of the interest included in the *102payment the corporation has made. For example, § 180.1325 requires that the balance sheet provided be from the "fiscal year ending not more than 16 months before the date of payment . . . Section 180.1325(2)(a) (emphasis added). In my view, the "date of payment" used in Wis. Stat. § 180.1301(5)'s definition of interest is the same "date of payment" spoken to in § 180.1325(2)(a) and referred to as "amount paid" in § 180.1330(5)(a).
¶ 55. Many subsequent dissenters' rights procedures are triggered by the Wis. Stat. § 180.1325 "payment." For example, a dissenter who does not agree with the "payment made" must notify the corporation in a timely fashion of what she/he believes are the fair value and correct calculation of interest, Wis. Stat. § 180.1328(1), or she/he waives the right to contest the payment made. Section 180.1328(2). Furthermore, throughout subchapter XIII the term, "payment," always includes both fair value and interest, whether it is the payment made to a shareholder under § 180.1325, or notice given under Wis. Stat. § 180.1322, or duty to demand payment under Wis. Stat. § 180.1323, or the withholding of payment under Wis. Stat. § 180.1327, or the procedure to follow if dissatisfied with payment under § 180.1328 or the payment a court is to order under Wis. Stat. § 180.1330. However, a statute directing that a court is to impose judgment for an amount by which the fair value plus interest exceeds what the corporation has paid or offered, as is done in § 180.1330(5), does not explicitly provide that the resultant judgment will run at a rate of interest different from that already set in Wis. Stat. § 814.04(4) and Wis. Stat. § 815.05(8).
¶ 56. Additionally, although we have not directly addressed the question presented by this appeal, we *103have previously held that the "payment date" for a payment of fair value and interest made under Wis. Stat. § 180.1325 is the date the shareholder receives the check, even when the shareholder objects to the amount of the payment and seeks additional remuneration. Kohler Co. v. Sogen Int'l Fund, Inc., 2000 WI App 60, ¶ 20, 233 Wis. 2d 592, 608 N.W2d 746. Our decision in Kohler is consistent with my view that the terms, "date of payment" and "payment," used in the dissenters' rights subchapter refer to the same payment of fair value and interest described in the many other sections of that subchapter that address dissenters' rights. It does not refer to payments made after judicial decision.
¶ 57. Furthermore, I read Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. City of Superior, 159 Wis. 2d 434, 464 N.W2d 643 (1991), as consistent with the premise that the interest provisions in Wis. Stat. § 815.05(8) control every judgment, unless a statute or a contractual provision explicitly states that another rate of interest is to be used after a judicial determination. As the supreme court explained:
[W]e conclude that sec. 815.05(8) establishes the post-judgment interest rate for every judgment for which the legislature has not explicitly provided a different postjudgment interest rate.
Burlington Northern, 159 Wis. 2d at 442, 464 N.W2d at 646 (emphasis added). Wisconsin Stat. § 180.1301(5) does not "explicitly" provide for postjudgment or post verdict interest. Rather, it provides for interest to the "date of payment," a term repeated in subchapter XIII to which we accorded a specific meaning in Koehler. That § 815.05(8) controls interest after judgment is also consistent with the doctrine of merger, which provides that when a litigant obtains a judgment, his original *104claim is extinguished and the rights flowing from the judgment are substituted for the claim. See Production Credit Ass'n v. Laufenberg, 143 Wis. 2d 200, 204-05, 420 N.W.2d 778, 779 (Ct. App. 1988).
¶ 58. There is also a difference in regard to when an explicit legislative directive is set out in ch. 180's terms and Weiland v. DOT, 62 Wis. 2d 456, 215 N.W2d 455 (1974), on which the majority relies for most of its reasoning. Weiland arises out of a Wis. Stat. ch. 32 condemnation proceeding, and it turns on the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 32.05(ll)(b) (1969), that states in relevant part:
If the jury verdict as approved by the court exceeds the basic award, the appellant shall have judgment for the amount of such excess plus legal interest thereon to date of payment in full....
Weiland, 62 Wis. 2d at 461, 215 N.W.2d at 457 (emphasis added). By its very terms, § 32.05(ll)(b) applies to interest after a judicial determination until payment. Therefore, § 32.05(ll)(b) took the interest provisions of Wis. Stat. §§ 814.04(4) and 815.05(8) out of play. Stated another way, § 32.05(ll)(b) "explicitly provided a different postjudgment interest rate," just as Burlington Northern explains. See Burlington Northern, 159 Wis. 2d at 442, 464 N.W.2d at 646. Additionally, Calaway v. Brown County, 202 Wis. 2d 736, 553 N.W.2d 809 (Ct. App. 1996), a later case that also interpreted § 32.05, but under subsec. 10(b), confirms that § 32.05(ll)(b) is a statute that explicitly provides for postjudgment interest.
¶ 59. In Calaway, we were asked to decide whether postjudgment interest of twelve percent was due for a condemnation judgment under Wis. Stat. § 32.05(10)(b) that states in relevant part:
*105The court shall enter judgment for the amount found to be due after giving effect to any amount paid by reason of a prior award. The judgment shall include legal interest on the amount so found due from the date of taking if judgment is for the condemnor, and from 14 days after the date of taking if judgment is for the condemnee.
Calaway, 202 Wis. 2d at 755, 553 N.W.2d at 817. We interpreted this provision as an entitlement to prejudgment interest, but not having any bearing on the rate of postjudgment interest. Id. at 755-56, 553 N.W.2d at 817. We cited Burlington Northern and concluded that Wis. Stat. § 815.05(8) continued to control postjudgment interest. Id. Therefore, the judgment ran at twelve percent interest until paid. We concluded that it was only under § 32.05(ll)(b) that the legislature had explicitly stated that the legal rate of interest found in Wis. Stat. § 138.04 applied after judgment. Id.
¶ 60. Just as in our analysis in Calaway, I conclude that because Wis. Stat. § 180.1301(5) does not explicitly provide that its definition of "interest" applies after judgment, it does not so apply and Wis. Stat. § 814.04(4) and Wis. Stat. § 815.05(8) continue to control where applicable.2 Accordingly, for the reasons set *106out above, I would reverse the decision of the circuit court on the appeal and I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.

 All further references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2001-02 version unless otherwise noted.

 1 also disagree with the majority's conclusion that the interest spoken to in Wis. Stat. § 180.1330(1) can be expressed as a rate of interest rather than as the amount of accrued interest that is due. Majority at ¶ 11. To me, such an interpretation is contrary to what the legislature hoped would be a self-help statute for corporations and shareholders where a dollar amount payment would be made to those dissenters who have complied with their obligations under the statutes and they could take it or respond with a dollar amount for fair value and accrued interest the shareholder believed was appropriate. See Wis. Stat. §§ 180.1325 and 180.1328.