Court Opinion

ID: 9646269
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 12:54:49.111926+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:36.213113
License: Public Domain

ON MOTIONS FOR REHEARING OR TRANSFER
PER CURIAM.
Both defendants have filed a motion for rehearing or in the alternative a motion to transfer to the Missouri Supreme Court. We believe one contention should be addressed for clarification. Defendant-Appellant Bonnie Browning asserts:
By holding that separate entries from the trial court (some made before and some made after the Notice of Appeal was filed in this case) can result in a “judgment” from which an appeal can be taken, this Court has permitted the trial court and the appellate court to exercise jurisdiction over this judgment simultaneously which is a misapplication of the law.
Defendant Browning contends that after May 23, 1989, when she filed her notice of appeal, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to thereafter rule on the motion for prejudgment interest. She states that this court allowed jurisdiction of this matter to “remain in both the trial court and the appellate court simultaneously.” This contention has no merit. Defendant Browning’s notice of appeal was filed prematurely and did not divest the trial court of jurisdiction nor confer jurisdiction here.
There was no “final judgment” in this matter until well after the trial court awarded prejudgment interest. That did not occur until the trial court apportioned the recovery between plaintiffs pursuant to § 537.095.3, RSMo 1986. Until that time, jurisdiction was not lodged here, but remained in the trial court. Schaefer v. Yellow Freight Systems, Inc., 788 S.W.2d 345, 346 (Mo.App.1990); Bragg v. Missouri Pacific Railroad, 756 S.W.2d 666, 667-668 *86(Mo.App.1988). See also Jurgens v. McKasy, 905 F.2d 382, 384-385 (Fed.Cir.1990) (holding that a motion for prejudgment interest filed after a judgment entry renders of “no effect” a notice of appeal filed before that ruling).
In Jurgens, the court dismissed the appeal noting it could not consider an appeal under a premature notice of appeal. In this respect, Missouri law is different. Rule 81.05(b) provides that if a notice of appeal has been filed prematurely “such notice shall be considered as filed immediately after the time the judgment becomes final for the purpose of appeal.” This rule applies in any case where the notice of appeal precedes the time an appealable judgment appears. Meyer Supply Co. v. Lane, 741 S.W.2d 304, 306 (Mo.App.1987). After a judgment is entered, jurisdiction vests in the appellate court to decide the substantive issues of the appeal based upon the premature notice of appeal. Id.
Until damages were apportioned, no final judgment had been entered and the trial court retained jurisdiction. It was only after the apportionment occurred that this court obtained jurisdiction, upon the premature notice of appeal. It then proceeded to dispose of the issues.
The motions of defendants for rehearing or in the alternative for transfer to the Missouri Supreme Court are denied.