Court Opinion

ID: 9541079
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:22:31.465888+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:59:50.809575
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE QUINN, specially concurring: I concur in the holding of the majority in affirming defendant’s conviction and sentence. I write separately to address two issues which I believe are significant. First, I believe the majority cites an erroneous standard for determining whether a prosecutor’s improper closing argument should result in reversal. Our supreme court recently reiterated that the test for reversing a conviction based on the remarks of a prosecutor “is whether the jury would have reached a contrary verdict had the improper remarks not been made. See People v. Cisewski, 118 Ill. 2d 163, 175 (1987).” People v. Heard, 187 Ill. 2d 36, 73 (1999). Cisewski phrased the standard thusly — “To constitute reversible error, the complained-of remarks must have resulted in substantial prejudice to the accused, such that absent those remarks the verdict would have been different.” People v. Cisewski, 118 Ill. 2d at 175. When the court in People v. Eaton, 307 Ill. App. 3d 397, 402 (1999), held that reversal is required where the jury “may have reached an opposite result had the remarks not been made,” it cited People v. Montefolka, 287 Ill. App. 3d 199, 212 (1997). The court in Montefolka cited the holding in People v. McCall, 190 Ill. App. 3d 483, 493 (1989), for this standard. The court in McCall cited the holding in People v. Panczko, 86 Ill. App. 3d 409, 413 (1980). Panczko was decided seven years before Cisewski. I believe the correct standard is that enunciated in Cisewski. Second, I strongly disagree with the majority’s decision to put the name of the assistant State’s Attorney who made the improper remarks into the opinion. This case is the first time that an Illinois court of review has held that the sixth amendment right to a jury trial may not be negatively commented upon by the prosecution. I agree with this holding. The Colorado Supreme Court in People v. Rodgers, 756 E 2d 980, 983 (Colo. 1988), held: “It is impermissible for a prosecutor to make comments ‘which ha[ye] the effect of creating an inference of guilt by reference’ to the defendant’s exercise of his right to a trial by jury. [Citation.]” While I agree with this holding, it is the only case cited by the defendant where a court of review directly made such a holding. The cases cited by the majority as support for our finding are not nearly as directly on point. In People v. Meredith, 84 Ill. App. 3d 1065 (1980), the prosecutor told a jury that it should infer guilt from the fact a defendant phoned his lawyer before questioning. In Grünewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 1 L. Ed. 2d 931, 77 S. Ct. 963 (1957), the trial court instructed a jury that it could consider a defendant’s refusal to testify before a grand jury in determining the truthfulness of his testimony at trial. While one would hope that common sense would prevent a prosecutor from arguing that a jury should somehow infer that a defendant is more likely guilty because he has chosen to be tried by a jury, making an argument that lacks common sense is usually not grounds to have one’s legal career put into jeopardy. In this case, the defense attorney objected to the prosecutor’s comment that “you have to ask yourselves why do they want a jury trial.” The trial court immediately sustained this objection. No objection was made to the prosecutor’s next statement that the defendants “hope that they can get one of you to be suckered in.” It is well-settled law that to the extent that a defendant failed to object to a prosecutor’s comments at trial or specifically include them in his motion for a new trial, his argument is waived on appeal. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988). One of the reasons for this is that by failing to object, defense counsel has deprived the trial court of an opportunity to rule on the issue and minimize any prejudice. Another reason to find an issue waived when no objection has been made is that it may be the defense counsel’s trial strategy to minimize his objections. This strategy allows defense counsel to reply to the State’s faulty argument. Another reason to find waiver in the absence of an objection is that the trial court is deprived of the reasoning of the parties — why the prosecutor said what he said and why defense counsel objected. The Supreme Court noted this in the context of reviewing closing arguments when they posited: “we do not think that an appellate court may substitute its reading of ambiguous language for that of the trial court and counsel.” United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 31, 99 L. Ed. 2d 23, 30, 108 S. Ct. 864, 868 (1988). Here, while defense counsel evidently believed the prosecutor’s statement did not merit an objection, the majority have thought it significant enough to warrant naming the prosecutor. It is my belief that naming a prosecutor who has committed what we determine to be error is a very significant sanction. One may understand how significant a sanction it is by noting how rarely it is done. I do not mean to suggest that courts of review should never name a prosecutor who has committed error. I do believe courts of review have an obligation to apply a reasoned analysis to this decision. I believe one of the primary reasons prosecutors make improper arguments is the phraseology used by the courts of review. We refer to any error that does not result in reversal as “harmless.” In analyzing even highly improper arguments, courts of review have a strong tendency to address the issue with no more analysis or comment than is necessary to answer the question of whether the case should be reversed because of it. This procedure provides little guidance to the trial courts or to the prosecutors who are given the task of trying literally hundreds of jury trials every year throughout the state. Based on the fact that many improper arguments are repeated after a court of review has addressed a prosecutor’s similar comments by making a cursory finding that they constituted “harmless error,” it is apparent that many prosecutors take this finding to mean that the comments may be repeated in the future. In those instances where a court of review determines that a prosecutor’s comments constitute error, the reviewing court should plainly say the comments were improper even when the comments do not rise to the level of reversible error. Courts of review need to more effectively communicate to the trial courts and the bar that preventing unprofessional conduct during trial is of paramount importance. I agree with the majority that there are times when a legitimate way to accomplish this goal is to name the lawyer who engages in professional misconduct. However, based on the manner in which the courts of review currently employ this device, one might be concerned that it is only applied against prosecutors or other government lawyers. I do not believe this is necessarily because they engage in more unprofessional conduct than other counsel. If one were to look at orders or opinions which find defense counsel to have been incompetent, they are rarely named. Anecdotally, some of the most egregious examples of unprofessional conduct I have seen have arisen in civil cases. By no means do I wish to deprecate the seriousness of the problems caused specifically by prosecutorial misconduct. I merely wish to point out that improper conduct can be found across the spectrum of all litigation and courts of review need to address it in a consistent manner whenever it is found. I know that the decision by courts of review to name attorneys whom we have determined to have committed misconduct is not made lightly. An attorney’s ability to practice law or to be elected or appointed to the bench will often be negatively impacted upon by being named. When we impose this sanction, we should do so only when the misconduct engaged in warrants it. In making this decision, courts should consider many things, as each case depends on its own facts. Perhaps the most important consideration in assessing an improper argument is the nature and extent of the statements made. People v. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d 99, 132 (2000). Professor Paul J. Spiegelman analyzed 45 reversals due to improper closing argument in the federal courts of appeal from the late 1980s to the late 1990s in a law review article: P Spiegelman, Prosecutorial Misconduct in Closing Argument: The Role of Intent in Appellate Review, 1 J. App. Prac. & Process 115 (1999). In analyzing the 45 reversals, Spiegelman put the arguments into eight categories; (1) commenting on the accused’s failure to testify; (2) depriving the defendant of his sixth amendment right to confront witnesses against him; (3) undermining the right to a reliable death verdict; (4) arguments known to be false; (5) undermining the presumption of innocence or burden or proof; (6) arguing post-Miranda silence in violation of Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91, 96 S. Ct. 2240 (1976); (7) appealing to racial or ethnic prejudice; and (8) engaging in what would normally be nonconstitutional error, but in a manner so prejudicial it denies the right to due process. I would add to this list many other categories of arguments, the most common being appealing to the sympathy of the jury for the victim, commenting on evidence that was admitted for a purpose other than that argued, and calling the defendant names. I list these categories only as examples, not as a comprehensive list. The types of arguments that courts of review have determined to be improper are far too numerous to mention here. I give these examples to illustrate the fact that improper arguments vary greatly in their egregiousness. I believe another important factor for courts to consider in determining egregiousness is how purposeful the improper conduct was. Professor Spiegelman argues that this should really not be a factor in determining whether a case should be reversed. As in 41 of the 45 federal cases Professor Spiegelman analyzed, Illinois courts have long taken into consideration the purposefulness of the prosecutor’s actions in determining whether a case should be reversed. In People v. McCann, 247 Ill. 130, 170 (1910), our supreme court held: “Unless the court can see that statements are unprovoked or so foreign to the case as to be calculated to produce a result which otherwise would not have been reached, a judgment of conviction will not be reversed on that ground.” (Emphasis added.) I believe that when a court is making a decision whether to name an attorney who has committed misconduct, it is imperative to consider whether that misconduct was purposeful. Naming an attorney is a severe sanction and it should not be imposed absent purposeful misconduct. This being so, another factor to consider is whether the attorney violated a well-settled principle of law or a principle just announced (as here). Another factor to consider, but one difficult to determine, is how experienced the prosecutor was. This goes to the element of purposefulness, as more experienced prosecutors should be more familiar with the law. As pointed out earlier, courts should consider whether the improper argument was objected to. Even more importantly for the purposes of this discussion is whether the trial court sustained or overruled the objection. When an attorney persists in the comments after the court sustains an objection, the attorney’s actions are clearly purposeful. People v. Fletcher, 156 Ill. App. 3d 405, 411 (1987). Of course, this is also an important factor to consider when determining whether a prosecutor’s actions constituted misconduct or the trial court made an erroneous evidentiary ruling which was then relied upon by the prosecutor. The timing of the improper argument is also significant. It is harder to find “invited comment” in a prosecutor’s opening close (as here). People v. Tate, 156 Ill. App. 3d 950 (1987). As the majority correctly notes, we must consider the argument in question in the context of the case and in the context of the arguments as a whole. To this I would add that we should consider the defense theory of the case. While I disagree with the majority for naming the prosecutor under the circumstances of the present case, perhaps it will have the salutary effect of encouraging the bar and the judiciary to give thought as to how to address the issue of attorney misconduct. As always, there are many more questions than answers, but it is the duty of the courts of review to answer those that we can.