Court Opinion

ID: 9673346
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:10:26.083445+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:27:30.730715
License: Public Domain

GRIMM, Judge.
I respectfully dissent.
As indicated in the majority opinion, a critical inquiry is “whether Railway was negligent in not preventing Klein from harassing Stewart.” Majority opinion at 125. Therefore, Stewart “ ‘had to show that the railroad should have known that its supervisor[] [was] misbehaving; more concretely, that the railroad had information about [his] propensities, and failed to act on the information.’ ” Id. at 125 (quoting Lancaster v. Norfolk and Western Ry. Co., 773 F.2d 807, 820 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 945,107 S.Ct. 1602, 94 L.Ed.2d 788 (1987).
The majority finds the railroad had knowledge and failed to act. It does so by imputing knowledge to the railroad. The majority reasons (1) Klein was a supervisor, (2) as a supervisor, Klein was an agent of the railroad-corporation, (3) knowledge of an agent is imputed to the railroad-corporation, and (4) therefore Klein’s knowledge of his own conduct as a supervisor may be imputed to the railroad. Majority Opinion at 125.
Ordinarily, a corporation is bound by the knowledge of its agents. Trice v. Lancaster, 270 S.W.2d 519, 524 (Mo.App.E.D. 1954). However, knowledge is not imputable to the corporation “when it concerns a fact which the agent is interested in con*127cealing from the corporation, and where the circumstances are such that it will be presumed that he will not communicate his knowledge to the corporation.” Id.
Here, Klein would be interested in concealing his actions from the corporation. He would not want corporate management to know how he was treating Stewart. In addition, the circumstances are such that it would be unreasonable for Stewart to presume that Klein would report his actions to his superiors. As a result, Klein’s knowledge of his actions is not imputable to the corporation.
The majority opinion also suggests that the number of incidents “may be deemed sufficient to establish a pattern of supervisory abuse which should have put Railway on notice.” Majority opinion at 125 (citing Lancaster, 773 F.2d at 820). Lancaster is not persuasive because of several factual differences.
In Lancaster, the numerous incidents involved four different supervisors; here, only one supervisor, Klein, is implicated. In Lancaster, the incidents occurred over a long period of time, from 1975 to 1979. Here, the incidents occurred in approximately one year. Further, in Lancaster, some of the incidents occurred in the presence of witnesses other than Lancaster and the supervisor. Here, there were no witnesses other than Stewart and Klein.
I also observe that in Lancaster, all incidents took place in the locomotive shop, a single building managed by a “master mechanic.” The railroad “appears to concede that if the master mechanic knew of these [four] supervisors’ propensities to misbehave, the railroad is liable.” Lancaster, 773 F.2d at 820. The Lancaster court concluded there “was enough evidence of a pattern of supervisory abuse to allow a rational jury to infer that a reasonably careful railroad management, represented in the locomotive shop by the master mechanic, would have gotten wind of it and done something to stop it.”
Here, I am unable to discern from the record where all the incidents occurred. The evidence establishes supervisory abuse only by Klein. Unlike Lancaster, no pattern of supervisory abuse by numerous supervisors was shown. Stewart admits he did not “advise any other supervisor or management official of the harassment.” Majority opinion at 125. It would be unreasonable to allow a jury to infer that a reasonably careful railroad management would learn of Klein’s actions from Klein.
The judgment of the trial court should be reversed.