Court Opinion

ID: 9716340
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:34:46.627419+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:44.123938
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HEIPLE, dissenting: Since the principle of double jeopardy precludes the defendant’s reprosecution, I respectfully dissent. U.S. Const., amends. V, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §10. Defendant, Anthony Ortiz, was charged with two counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse. Defendant waived his right to a jury trial and, on April 24, 1989, the case proceeded to a bench trial. Following opening statements by the State and the defense, the State proceeded to call its witnesses. Anita Johnson testified first and Stacey Lawrence testified second. The victim’s mother, Gail Ortiz, then took the stand to testify. Midway through the mother’s testimony, the State informed the court that the nine-year-old victim was not available to testify because her father had confused the trial date and he could not have her at the courthouse for another 2½ hours. The State then requested a continuance and defense moved for a dismissal on the following grounds: “The State has long had an opportunity to prepare this case which was filed last October and called for this trial date. The defendant is in jeopardy, and if the State cannot produce its witness in a timely fashion on the day of trial, then I would request that the case be dismissed.” The court then denied the motion for a continuance and allowed the motion to dismiss. Thereafter, the State moved the court to reconsider its ruling, and the court found that it had erred in denying the State’s motion for a continuance. The defendant’s charges were then reinstated, a new bench trial was begun and completed, and the defendant was convicted. The appellate court reversed the defendant’s conviction finding that double jeopardy protections precluded defendant’s reprosecution for the same offense. (207 Ill. App. 3d 569.) The majority opinion herein reverses the appellate court and affirms the judgment of the circuit court. The majority concludes that the circuit court’s granting of the defendant’s motion to dismiss during the first bench trial was really the functional equivalent of an order declaring a mistrial, thus avoiding the double jeopardy issue and legitimizing the second trial. Such assertion will not bear analysis. A mistrial is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as “[a]n erroneous, invalid, or nugatory trial; a trial of an action which cannot stand in law because of want of jurisdiction, or a wrong drawing of jurors, or disregard of some other fundamental requisite.” (Black’s Law Dictionary 1195 (3d ed. 1933).) The defendant’s first bench trial cannot be characterized as invalid or missing some fundamental requisite. To the contrary, except for a lack of evidence, there was nothing legally deficient from the defendant’s first bench trial. A mistrial would not be called for in a situation where the prosecution had presented insufficient evidence to convict and was unable to go forward. If defense counsel had moved for such, it would have been a demonstration of incompetence. If the trial court had granted a motion for mistrial, it would have been error to do so. Thus, referring to the dismissal of the case as the functional equivalent of a mistrial is to engage in circumlocution. The issue in this case is not what might have been but, rather, what was. The prosecution moved for a continuance which was denied. The defendant moved for a dismissal which was granted. Certainly, it would have been in the interest of justice if the trial judge had continued or recessed the trial to allow for the production of the critical witness. That did not happen. The State concedes and the majority opinion agrees that, at the time of the dismissal, the defendant had been placed in jeopardy as that term is understood. That is so because the trial had begun and three witnesses had testified. That we are dealing here with a guilty defendant is made manifest from the fact of his conviction at the second trial. Most fair-minded people, myself included, would desire that this guilty defendant be held to account. Opposed to this result, however, is the constitutional principle of double jeopardy. So far as the undeserving defendant in this case is concerned, it would be well if his conviction were sustained. If to reach that desirable result, however, it is necessary to do violence to the time-honored, humane and constitutional principle of double jeopardy, then such result is not warranted. That is to say, the desired result in a particular case does not warrant the abnegation of a valid constitutional principle of broad and general application. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.