Court Opinion

ID: 9377218
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-07 14:03:17.55278+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:12.719577
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia

                                                   Decided: March 7, 2023

      S23Y0201. IN THE MATTER OF L. NICOLE HAMILTON.

        PER CURIAM.

        This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the report and

recommendation                 of      Special         Master          Quentin           Marlin,         who

recommends that the Court accept the April 14, 2021 petition for

voluntary discipline of L. Nicole Hamilton1 (State Bar No. 320909)

and impose a six-month suspension as discipline for Hamilton’s

failure to return unearned legal fees to a client after her discharge

and her failure to pay that client’s subsequent fee arbitration award

in a timely manner.

        This same matter was previously before the Court in late 2020.

On September 20, 2020, the Special Master issued his initial report

and recommendation, in which he recommended that we accept

        1   Hamilton was formerly known as L. Nicole Brantley and Nicole King.
Hamilton’s first petition for voluntary discipline, filed in August

2016, and impose a Review Board reprimand for Hamilton’s

professional misconduct. See In the Matter of Brantley, 311 Ga. 61

(855 SE2d 625) (2021) (Brantley II). In Brantley II, we rejected the

Special Master’s recommendation and remanded the matter for an

evidentiary hearing. See id. at 65.

      On August 29, 2022, the Special Master held an evidentiary

hearing and issued the report and recommendation presently before

the Court. For the reasons explained below, the Court agrees that—

strictly in this case—a six-month suspension from the practice of law

is an acceptable sanction for Hamilton’s violation of Rule 1.16 (d) of

the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. See Bar Rule 4-102 (d).2

      1.    The underlying facts giving rise to this disciplinary

matter—as recounted in Brantley II3—are as follows:

      2   This Court issued an order on January 12, 2018, comprehensively
amending Part IV of the Rules and Regulations for the Organization and
Government of the State Bar of Georgia. The former rules govern this matter
because it was commenced prior to July 1, 2018.
       3 Nothing offered at the evidentiary hearing following Brantley II

necessitates any change to our previous recounting of the circumstances giving
rise to this matter.
                                      2
     After being retained [by a client] in October 2013 [and
     paid $6,000 in advance], [Hamilton] was discharged by
     the client, who was dissatisfied with [Hamilton’s] lack of
     communication and failure to follow his instructions in
     handling his case. [Hamilton], however, never submitted
     a written request to withdraw, in violation of Uniform
     Superior Court Rule 4.3, and failed to appear at a
     February 2014 hearing in the case. In April 2014, after
     [Hamilton] had failed to return the unearned portion of
     her retainer, the client filed a fee arbitration petition,
     seeking a refund of $4,000. [Hamilton] submitted an
     answer, in which she agreed to be bound by the fee
     arbitration award, but thereafter failed to appear at the
     fee arbitration hearing. In March 2015, written
     notification of the fee award was sent to [Hamilton], with
     direction that the award be paid within 90 days. After the
     90-day period elapsed, the client filed his grievance.

Brantley II, 311 Ga. at 61-62.

     In April 2016, the State Bar filed a Formal Complaint against

Hamilton and charged her with violating Rule 1.16 (d), which

provides that, “[u]pon termination of representation, a lawyer shall

take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client’s

interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing

time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and

property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance

payment of fee that has not been earned.” The State Bar observed

                                 3
that Rule 1.16 sets “a maximum sanction for a violation as public

reprimand,” but noted that Hamilton “had been subject to discipline

on multiple prior occasions[4] and that, accordingly, she could be

subject to suspension or disbarment.” Brantley II, 311 Ga. at 62.

See also Bar Rule 4-103.            The State Bar petitioned for the

appointment of a Special Master in this proceeding, and this Court

appointed Daniel Brent Snipes5 as Special Master on April 19, 2016.

      4 These prior disciplinary matters will be addressed in more detail below.
      5  Notably, in 2011, the Court also appointed Snipes to serve as the
Special Master in several, prior disciplinary matters against Hamilton, see
Case Nos. S11B0774 and S11B0775 (February 8, 2011) (appointing Snipes as
Special Master), which were docketed in this Court in 2014. See In re
Hamilton, 295 Ga. 456 (761 SE2d 79) (2014) (Hamilton I). Hamilton I involved
three disciplinary matters against Hamilton for conduct that occurred during
2009 and 2010. See id. at 456. Following a hearing, Snipes recommended that
the Court accept Hamilton’s petition for voluntary discipline and impose as
discipline a public reprimand with conditions. Id. This Court disagreed with
Snipes that a public reprimand was an “appropriate level of discipline for
Hamilton’s violations,” particularly in light of Hamilton’s past disciplinary
history, which included two Investigative Panel reprimands in 2006 and 2010
and two letters of admonition in 2010—disciplinary matters that were
unrelated to the conduct giving rise to Hamilton I. Id. at 457. Accordingly, the
Court rejected Hamilton’s petition for voluntary discipline and remanded the
matter for an evidentiary hearing. Id. After remand, Snipes held an
evidentiary hearing on August 10, 2015—during which he took additional
evidence on two new disciplinary matters against Hamilton (then Brantley)
arising from conduct that occurred between December 2010 and the end of the
calendar year 2011. See In the Matter of Brantley, 299 Ga. 732 (791 SE2d 783)
(2016) (Brantley I), reinstatement granted 301 Ga. 653 (802 SE2d 252) (June
30, 2017). Snipes then issued a new report and recommendation,

                                       4
See Case No. S16B1278 (April 19, 2016) (appointing Snipes as

Special Master).

     In June 2016, Hamilton filed an unsworn answer to the State

Bar’s Formal Complaint. In her answer,

     [Hamilton] denied that she was terminated by the client;
     denied that she had failed to refund unearned fees; and
     claimed that she had “never received any notice of any
     [fee] award until this proceeding.” However, in August
     2016, [Hamilton] filed her petition for voluntary
     discipline, admitting, unconditionally, that she had been
     discharged by the client, had failed to refund the client’s
     unearned fees, and, though she had agreed to be bound by
     the fee arbitration panel’s decision, had not paid the fee
     arbitration award. [Hamilton] made no representations
     as to whether she had received notice from the fee
     arbitration office regarding the hearing or the subsequent
     fee award. She offered, as mitigation, to pay the $4,000
     fee arbitration award in monthly installments of $500.

Brantley II, 311 Ga. at 62.

     In response to Hamilton’s August 2016 petition for voluntary

discipline, the State Bar conceded that “the interests of the public

and Bar would be best served by acceptance of the petition, but only

after [Hamilton] submitted proof that she had refunded the full

recommending a 180-day suspension with conditions, which this Court
accepted. See id. at 732.
                                 5
$4,000 fee award.”    Brantley II, 311 Ga. at 62-63.             Hamilton

submitted proof to the State Bar that she completed the installment

payments in June 2017. See id. at 63.

     More than three years later, on July 22, 2020, H. Maddox

Kilgore, a Coordinating Special Master with the State Bar, filed a

motion in this Court, seeking to remove and replace Snipes as the

Special Master in this disciplinary matter.        In the motion, the

Coordinating   Special   Master       asserted   that,   after    Snipes’s

appointment by this Court, Snipes was served with Hamilton’s

petition for voluntary discipline and the State Bar’s response;

however, Snipes did not respond to any emails or letters from the

State Bar, which were sent to him on several occasions in 2017,

2018, and 2019. The Coordinating Special Master asserted that he

had also been unsuccessful in reaching Snipes by telephone or email

in 2020 and that the State Bar and Hamilton did not oppose

replacing Snipes as the Special Master in this disciplinary matter.

The Coordinating Special Master requested that the Court remove

Snipes and appoint Marlin—the current Special Master—as

                                  6
Snipes’s replacement.

     The Court entered an Order appointing Marlin as Special

Master on July 22, 2020. See Case No. S16B1278 (July 22, 2020)

(vacating order appointing former Special Master and appointing

Marlin as new Special Master). The Special Master then issued his

initial report and recommendation on September 22, 2020,

recommending that we accept Hamilton’s August 2016 petition for

voluntary discipline and issue a Review Board reprimand.

     As noted above, this Court rejected the Special Master’s initial

recommendation. See Brantley II, 311 Ga. at 65.      In doing so, we

acknowledged that “the maximum sanction for a violation of Rule

1.16 is a public reprimand,” but we explained that we could not “view

[Hamilton’s] conduct here apart from the larger context in which

this violation was committed”—i.e., her prior disciplinary history—

and “the apparent initial lack of candor [Hamilton] displayed in this

proceeding.” Id. at 63. And, the Court was quite concerned that

Hamilton “willfully refused, without apparent explanation, [(1)] to

refund several thousand dollars in client fees[;]” (2) to acknowledge

                                 7
the wrongful nature of her conduct; and (3) to pay the arbitration fee

award in a timely manner. Id. at 64. The Court also observed that

Hamilton “made no representations regarding any personal

hardship that should be considered in mitigation in relation to this

violation.” Id.

     2. Upon remand, Hamilton filed an amended petition for

voluntary discipline, seeking a six-month suspension based on her

violation of Rule 1.16 (d).    In the amended petition, Hamilton

provides greater detail regarding her failure to participate in the fee

arbitration proceedings and to timely pay the award. To that end,

Hamilton states that, in April 2014, she sustained a severe head

injury in an automobile accident, requiring injections to control the

pain and a referral to the Neurological Institute of Savannah for

treatment until March 2015. In addition, Hamilton asserts that, in

August 2014, she received notice of the petition for fee arbitration at

her home address and filed her acknowledgment of service of the

petition in September 2014. However, she claims that, in October

2014, she moved out of her home with her son because she was afraid

                                  8
of her then-husband, and when she filed her answer to the fee

arbitration petition in December 2014, she failed to include her new

address. Hamilton admits that she did not otherwise notify the

committee of her change of address, so she did not receive actual

notice of the fee arbitration hearing. Hamilton admits that she

failed to attend the fee arbitration hearing, and after the arbitration

award was issued—the amount of which she does not dispute—she

did not receive actual notice of the award by mail and thus failed to

pay the award as directed.

     As to her denial of the allegations in the Formal Complaint,

Hamilton explains that she initially denied the allegations because

she intended to claim that she and the client had a disagreement

about their communications and his trial strategy, and she intended

to offer a good faith claim that she had earned all (or at least a

substantial portion) of the fees. Hamilton acknowledges that her

simple denial of many of the Bar’s allegations in the Formal

Complaint was insufficient and that she should have set forth facts

to support her responses. Hamilton also states that she did not

                                  9
intend to mislead the State Bar, the Special Master, or this Court

into believing that she was unaware of the existence of the fee

arbitration proceedings or the possibility of an award since she was

served with the petition for fee arbitration in August 2014, and she

should have more precisely set forth those facts in her answer,

including that, because she moved residences in October 2014, she

did not receive actual notices of the hearing and the award until she

received the Formal Complaint. Further, Hamilton “acknowledges

that she disregarded the fee arbitration matter, but [again] explains

that[,] following [her] accident in 2014 [and continuing treatment in

2015], she was suffering severe financial hardship and physical

incapacity and did not expect to be able to pay any award.”

Hamilton states that, in time, she was able to return to work, regain

some financial stability, and ultimately pay the arbitration award

in full. Hamilton attached exhibits supporting these claims to her

amended petition, including documentation regarding the accident,

her resulting treatment, and her financial hardship.

     As for prior discipline, Hamilton admits that she received

                                 10
Investigative Panel reprimands in 2006 and 2010; that she accepted

two formal letters of admonition in 2010; that she accepted a formal

letter of admonition in 2014; and that she was suspended from the

practice of law for a period of six months related to five disciplinary

matters in 2016. Hamilton also admits—as she did in her earlier

petition—that, in this case, she violated Rule 1.16 (d) when she did

not promptly refund unearned fees or pay the fee arbitration award

and that, while the maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 1.16 (d)

is a public reprimand, she may be suspended or disbarred in this

matter due to her prior misconduct. See Bar Rule 4-103.

     In regard to her mental state, Hamilton asserts that the

violations here were the result of negligence and not committed

knowingly, and she did not intend to demonstrate a “lack of candor”

in her answer to the Formal Complaint. Brantley II, 311 Ga. at 63.

See also ABA Standard 7.3 (reprimand generally appropriate when

lawyer negligently engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty

owed as a professional and causes injury or potential injury to a

client, the public, or the legal system). Hamilton concedes that she

                                  11
should have promptly issued a refund for some portion of the

attorney’s fees when the client terminated her representation, but

states that, because she had not reached an agreement with the

client as to the amount owed, the fee arbitration proceedings were

an appropriate forum for that issue to be decided. And Hamilton

asserts that she disregarded her obligations in that proceeding only

as a result of negligence and the personal hardships she was

experiencing and that, by the time she learned about the award, she

was facing suspension in other disciplinary matters and was in a

dire financial situation with no hope of promptly paying the award

in full. Hamilton claims that she did not willfully refuse to pay the

award, but argues that her mental state at the time was

“exacerbated” by her accident, her lingering injuries, leaving her

home, and going through a divorce. She admits that she caused

actual injury to her client by failing to pay the award, but contends

that she simply did not have the money to pay at the time and that

her client’s injuries were mitigated somewhat when she completed

the payment plan and paid the entire award.

                                 12
     As to the level of discipline, Hamilton submits that the

appropriate level of discipline to impose here is a six-month

suspension. See In the Matter of Polk, 304 Ga. 326, 327 (818 SE2d

495) (2018) (accepting the attorney’s second petition for voluntary

discipline, filed before the filing of a Formal Complaint, and

imposing a six-month suspension with conditions for reinstatement

for violating Rule 1.16 (d), with a suspension to run consecutive to

the suspension that the attorney was already serving in an

unrelated matter, where the attorney’s prior disciplinary history

had all occurred within the past decade and where the attorney

lacked a dishonest or selfish motive, and was remorseful,

acknowledged the wrongful nature of his conduct, and was

cooperative). Hamilton argues that, like Polk, she has also

acknowledged the wrongful nature of her conduct and her prior

disciplinary history is not too “remote” in time, primarily occurring

within the “past decade”. In the Matter of Polk, 303 Ga. 675, 677

(814 SE2d 327) (2018). Moreover, Hamilton asserts that, while Polk

received numerous suspensions for his conduct—including a 30-

                                 13
month suspension—Hamilton’s harshest discipline to date has been

a single, six-month suspension. Accordingly, she submits that a six-

month suspension is appropriate in this case. See In the Matter of

Johnson, 303 Ga. 795, 799 (815 SE2d 55) (2018) (accepting Special

Master’s recommendation that attorney’s second petition should be

accepted and imposing six-month suspension for attorney who

committed multiple prior similar offenses and had substantial

experience in the practice of law, but also had personal and

emotional problems at time of offense); In the Matter of Buckley, 291

Ga. 661 (732 SE2d 87) (2012) (accepting Special Master’s

recommendation to accept attorney’s petition and imposing four-

month suspension for violation of Rules 1.3, 1.4, and 1.16 in one

client matter, where there was prior disciplinary history, but

mitigating factors including that attorney had provided the client a

refund for unearned fee); In the Matter of Hardwick, 288 Ga. 60, 62

(701 SE2d 163) (2010) (accepting Special Master’s recommendation

that attorney’s petition should be accepted and imposing a six-

month suspension for violating Rules 1.3, 1.4, 3.2, and 8.4 (a) (2),

                                 14
where attorney had personal issues at time of infraction and had

paid full restitution to his clients but where he had prior disciplinary

offenses and made a false statement during disciplinary process).

     In the State Bar’s response to Hamilton’s amended petition,

the State Bar agrees that Hamilton’s misconduct in this case reflects

a pattern of negligence and a disregard of her duties to her client

and the profession—as opposed to a knowing and intentional

violation of those duties—and that the appropriate level of discipline

is a six-month suspension.

     In the Special Master’s report and recommendation presently

before the Court, he agrees with Hamilton and the Bar that a six-

month suspension is appropriate and recommends that this Court

impose that discipline. First, the Special Master states that he is

“satisfied” that Hamilton did not intend to mislead him, the Bar, or

this Court.   The Special Master also agrees that the violations

Hamilton committed in this case occurred as a result of negligence

and were not knowingly committed. The Special Master concludes

that, in light of the new evidence provided by Hamilton—including

                                  15
supporting documentation of her move in October 2014 and her car

accident and medical treatment in 2014, among other records—she

did not intend to demonstrate a lack of candor in her answer to the

Formal Complaint or willfully refuse to appear at the fee arbitration

hearing or to pay the award. However, he notes that Hamilton

should have been more thorough and should have communicated

more candidly with her former client and the Bar. Nevertheless, the

Special Master concludes that Hamilton has honestly expressed her

remorse that she did not do what was required by Rule 1.16 (d).

     On this basis, the Special Master concludes that, although

Hamilton admitted that she violated the duties she owed to her

client and the profession, she did so as a result of negligence and

because of a mental state that was exacerbated by personal

hardships occurring during this timeframe. The Special Master

further concludes that Hamilton caused actual injury to her client

by failing to refund an unearned fee and then by failing to pay the

fee arbitration award for a significant period of time.         And,

notwithstanding her claims of penury, the Special Master states

                                 16
that Hamilton’s conduct benefitted her at the expense of her client.

     In aggravation, the Special Master considered Hamilton’s prior

disciplinary history, see ABA Standard 9.22 (a); her substantial

experience in the practice of law, see ABA Standard 9.22 (i); and her

indifference to making restitution. See ABA Standard 9.22 (j). As

for mitigating factors, the Special Master considered Hamilton’s

personal and emotional problems, see ABA Standard 9.32 (c); her

physical disability on account of the automobile accident6, see ABA

Standard 9.32 (h); her cooperation with the Bar in submitting her

petitions, see ABA Standard 9.32 (e); and her remorse, see ABA

Standard 9.32 (l).

     Finally, as for the level of discipline, the Special Master notes

that the crux of this matter is Hamilton’s failure to promptly return

an unearned fee, and after weighing the evidence with due

consideration of the ABA Standards, the Special Master concludes

that the presumptive penalty for her misconduct would be a

     6 The Special Master noted that Hamilton began to pay restitution and
put together a proper response to the Formal Complaint after she completed
treatment for her injuries.
                                   17
reprimand or a short suspension. The Special Master also concludes

that the aggravating and mitigating factors mostly offset each other,

leaning if at all in the direction of aggravation given Hamilton’s

prior disciplinary history. And, in this regard, the Special Master

points out that, while this Court gives significant weight to personal

and emotional problems that actually cause a violation, see, e.g., In

the Matter of Cook, 311 Ga. 206 (857 SE2d 212) (2021), the problems

Hamilton cites occurred after her obligation to refund the unearned

fee accrued; thus, the personal problems are of less importance than

her significant disciplinary record. In consideration of these factors,

including that this case is one of several in a pattern of neglect, see

In the Matter of Kirby, 312 Ga. 341, 342-344 (862 SE2d 550) (2021),

the Special Master agrees that a six-month suspension is

appropriate in this matter. See Polk, 304 Ga. at 327 (concluding

that “although the maximum sanction for a violation of Rule 1.16 (d)

is ordinarily a public reprimand, given Polk’s disciplinary history, a

more severe punishment was appropriate under Bar Rule 4-103,

which says that a finding of a third or subsequent disciplinary

                                  18
infraction shall constitute discretionary grounds for suspension or

disbarment. . . ”).

     “[B]ecause this Court recognizes that the special master is in

the best position to determine the witnesses’ credibility, it generally

defers to the factual findings and credibility determinations made

by the special master unless those findings or determinations are

clearly erroneous.” In the Matter of Eddings, 314 Ga. 409, 416 (877

SE2d 248) (2022). Deferring to the Special Master’s factual findings

and credibility determinations here, which are not “clearly

erroneous,” id., we conclude that, as to mitigation, Hamilton

demonstrated on remand that, during the pertinent time period, she

suffered   personal   hardships    and   emotional    problems    that

contributed to her delay in paying the fee arbitration award and

helped to explain her lack of candor in her initial response in this

disciplinary proceeding. And we agree with the Special Master that

these mitigating circumstances are outweighed by Hamilton’s prior

disciplinary record, which demonstrates a concerning pattern of

misconduct over a lengthy period of Hamilton’s career. See In the

                                  19
Matter of Jennings, 305 Ga. 133, 135 (823 SE2d 811) (2019)

(attorney’s violations of Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.16 (d), and 3.2 relating to

his failure to return a file in a single matter “show[ed] a pattern of

misconduct, [which] support[ed] the sanction of disbarment”). In

fact, Hamilton’s significant disciplinary history—largely involving

her failure to adequately communicate with clients, her failure to

appear at hearings, and her failure to return unearned fees—has

been and remains of utmost concern to this Court.

     Nevertheless, we observe that the resolution of this matter was

significantly delayed by the first Special Master’s unresponsiveness

and the State Bar’s oversight in allowing this case to languish for

several years—through no fault of Hamilton. And it does not appear

from the record that Hamilton has engaged in any professional

misconduct since the circumstances giving rise to this disciplinary

matter or her reinstatement to the Bar in 2017.7

     Accordingly, based on the evidence in the record and the

     7On the other hand, the record does not show that Hamilton has actually
engaged in the practice of law during this time period.
                                    20
particular circumstances of this case—where an unusual delay by

the State Bar prevented the timely resolution of this matter—we

agree with the Special Master that a six-month suspension is

appropriate for Hamilton’s single violation of Rule 1.16 (d). See

Johnson, 303 Ga. at 799; Hardwick, 288 Ga. at 62. See generally In

the Matter of Kirby, 309 Ga. 826, 831 (848 SE2d 429) (2020)

(concluding that this Court’s precedent “includes numerous cases in

which six-month suspensions have been imposed [in cases involving

Rule 1.16 violations] involving only a single client matter, where the

aggravating circumstances so warranted”). To be clear, the sanction

imposed here should not be relied upon as precedent for the level of

discipline we would ordinarily impose in a case with such a litany of

misconduct; it is only the result of the substantial delay in this case.

     The suspension based on this opinion will take effect as of the

date this opinion is issued and will expire by its own terms six

months later.    After this passage of time, there is no need for

Hamilton to take any action either through the State Bar or through

this Court to effectuate her return to the practice of law; however,

                                  21
Hamilton is reminded of her duties pursuant to Bar Rule 4-219 (b).

     Six-month suspension. All the Justices concur.

                                22