Court Opinion

ID: 9574025
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:01:36.676695+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:43:57.509253
License: Public Domain

HEARN, C.J.
In my view, even if the jury believed Reese’s statement that he shot his wife accidentally, he was not entitled to an involuntary manslaughter or accident charge because the shooting occurred while Reese was engaged in the felony of pointing or presenting a firearm. Further, although I agree the trial judge erred by allowing the solicitor to urge jurors to speak for the victim, I believe the error was harmless. Thus, I respectfully dissent.

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I. Involuntary Manslaughter and Accident Charge

If there were any evidence from which it could be inferred that Reese committed involuntary manslaughter, Reese would undoubtedly be entitled to receive a jury charge on that lesser-included offense. See State v. Gourdine, 322 S.C. 396, 398, 472 S.E.2d 241, 241 (1996) (“The trial judge is to charge the jury on a lesser included offense if there is any evidence from which it could be inferred the lesser, rather than the greater, offense was committed.”). Likewise, a charge on accident would be warranted if any evidence suggested that the victim’s death resulted from an accidental shooting. However, I believe no such inferences can be drawn based on the record before me.
It is undisputed that Reese and the victim were separated at the time of the shooting, and the victim was living with her parents. The evening before the shooting, the State introduced phone records showing that Reese had called the victim’s cell phone fifty-one times between 9:45 p.m. and 2:00 a.m. When the victim was returning home during the early morning hours on the day of the shooting, Reese was waiting for her at a stop sign in front of her parents’ street. The two drove separately to the home of the victim’s parents, and they talked outside. As the majority opinion quoted, Reese made a statement to the police claiming that while they were talking, he “pulled the gun out” and did not “know why the gun went off’ when he was “moving it back and forth.” Importantly, Reese never denied pointing the gun at the victim. Rather, he stated that he was surprised by the shooting because “he thought both safeties were on.” Moreover, in addition to Reese’s admission that he was waving the gun back and forth, numerous witnesses testified (and the tragic result makes clear) that the gun was pointed in the victim’s direction. In fact, the crime scene investigator, the deputy coroner, and a forensic pathologist all testified that the gun was not only pointed at the victim, but was very near to or right against the victim’s head.2 There is simply nothing in the record to contradict this evidence.
*279To warrant a charge of involuntary manslaughter or accident, a homicide cannot have occurred during the commission of a felony.3 In South Carolina, it is a felony “for a person to present or point at another person a loaded or unloaded firearm.” S.C.Code Ann. § 16-23-410 (1976). Thus, whether or not Reese intended to shoot his wife, he would not be entitled to an involuntary manslaughter or accident charge because the only evidence in the record is that the shooting occurred while he was committing the felony of “presenting or pointing” a firearm. See State v. Tucker, 324 S.C. 155, 170, 478 S.E.2d 260, 268 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1200, 117 S.Ct. 1561, 137 L.Ed.2d 708 (1997) (defining involuntary manslaughter, in relevant part, as the killing of another without malice and unintentionally, but while one is engaged in the commission of some unlawful act not amounting to a felony and not naturally tending to cause death or great bodily harm); State v. Young, 319 S.C. 33, 39-40, 459 S.E.2d 84, 87-88 (1995) (finding the defendant was not entitled to a charge of involuntary manslaughter despite his statement that the gun “just went off’ because his statement also indicated he was committing the felony of armed robbery at the time of the shooting).
The majority correctly notes that the negligent handling of a firearm supports a charge for involuntary manslaughter; however, where the mishandling of a weapon coincides with *280the commission of a felony or some other unlawful act that naturally tends to cause death or great bodily harm, an involuntary manslaughter charge is not warranted. In State v. Burriss, 334 S.C. 256, 264-65, 513 S.E.2d 104, 109 (1999), our supreme court found that evidence on the record could support a finding that appellant was entitled to arm himself in self-defense and was therefore acting lawfully when his negligent handling of a loaded weapon caused the weapon to fire and kill the victim.4 Likewise, in State v. Crosby, 355 S.C. 47, 50, 584 S.E.2d 110, 111 (2003), the supreme court held that involuntary manslaughter should have been instructed because there was evidence that the victim was charging the appellant with his hand behind his back, and the appellant closed his eyes and fired the gun, without even realizing he had pulled the trigger. In both of these cases, the appellants were entitled to a charge of involuntary manslaughter because there was evidence from which the jury could infer they were lawfully acting in self-defense when they unintentionally fired a gun.5
*281In the case at hand, Reese was not acting in self-defense. Rather, by his own admission, he was brandishing a gun in order to see how his wife would react if he threatened to shoot himself. While he had the gun in the air, he moved it back and forth, and according to all the evidence in the record, when it was very close to his wife’s head, he shot her. Even if Reese did not intend to shoot his wife, he is not entitled to an involuntary manslaughter charge because, at the time of the shooting, he was pointing or presenting a weapon, which is a felony, and he was attempting suicide, an unlawful act naturally tending to cause death or great bodily harm. See State v. Levelle, 34 S.C. 120, 13 S.E. 319 (1891) (stating that suicide is an unlawful act and that if A takes B’s life when attempting suicide, A is guilty of murder) overruled on other grounds by State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 406 S.E.2d 315 (1991). Accordingly, I would affirm the trial judge’s ruling denying Reese’s request to charge the jury on involuntary manslaughter and accident.

II. Closing Argument

In regards to the solicitor’s closing argument, which urged the jury to “speak for the victim,” I agree with the majority’s finding that this type of argument impermissibly asks the jurors to advocate for the victim. However, I find the judge’s error in allowing the argument was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of Reese’s guilt. See State v. Mitchell, 286 S.C. 572, 573, 336 S.E.2d 150, 151 (1985) (stating that an error is harmless when it could not reasonably have affected the result of the trial); see, e.g., State v. Primus, 349 S.C. 576, 577-578, 564 S.E.2d 103, 109 (2002) (applying harmless error analysis to improper comment by prosecutor during closing argument as to defendant’s failure to call a witness).
In Reese’s statement to police, he claimed he pulled out a gun and told the victim he was going to kill himself. He admitted that he was waving the gun back and forth and that the gun went off, though he denied purposefully killing her. Numerous witnesses testified that the victim died as a result of a single gunshot wound. Those witnesses also testified that *282the gun was either very near or right against the victim’s head. Based on this overwhelming evidence of Reese’s guilt, especially the uncontradicted evidence that he shot the victim in the head while feloniously presenting a firearm, I firmly believe the solicitor’s improper comments during closing argument were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

III. Purported Hearsay Regarding Marital Problems

Because I propose to affirm Reese’s convictions, I briefly address his other arguments on appeal. Reese contends the trial judge erred in allowing witnesses to testify that the victim had moved to her mother’s home because of marital problems. Reese asserts such testimony was hearsay.
The victim’s cousin testified without objection that “a week or two” before the victim was killed, she and Reese separated and she had moved back in with her parents. Because no objection was made to this testimony, subsequent testimony wherein witnesses stated that Reese and the victim had marital problems, without giving any details, was cumulative to the cousin’s testimony, which was admitted without objection. Therefore, even assuming arguendo that the other witnesses’ testimony was impermissible hearsay, any error in admitting their testimony was harmless. See State v. South, 285 S.C. 529, 535, 331 S.E.2d 775, 778 (1985) (finding that although the court erred by admitting officer’s notes into evidence, the “error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt since [notes were] cumulative to the abundant amount of similar evidence admitted at trial”).

IV. State of Mind Hearsay Exception

Reese also argues the trial judge erred in allowing witnesses to testify that the victim was “afraid for her life” because such testimony did not meet the state of mind exception to the rule against hearsay. Our supreme court addressed the scope of the state of mind exception in State v. Garcia, 334 S.C. 71, 76, 512 S.E.2d 507, 509 (1999), and found that “while the present state of the declarant’s mind is admissible as an exception to hearsay, the reason for the declarant’s state of mind is not.” Reese contends that the witnesses’s testimony that the victim was afraid for her life impermissibly *283related to the reason for the victim’s state of mind. I disagree.
In Garcia, the witnesses repeated out-of-court statements that the defendant had kicked and threatened to kill the decedent and because of that, the decedent had been afraid. Here, the witnesses merely testified that Reese’s wife feared for her life, which described the type of fear she experienced rather than the cause for such fear. As such, the trial judge correctly admitted the testimony under Rule 803(3), SCRE.
V. Admissibility of Photographs
Finally, Reese argues the trial judge erred by allowing the State to admit photographs of the victim’s body into evidence because the photographs were more prejudicial than probative. Generally, a trial judge’s decision to admit evidence will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Adams, 354 S.C. 361, 377, 580 S.E.2d 785, 793 (Ct.App.2003). Because Reese failed to provide this court with a copy of those photographs, I would not meet the merits of this issue. See Harkins v. Greenville County, 340 S.C. 606, 616, 533 S.E.2d 886, 891 (2000) (explaining that the appellant has the burden of presenting the appellate court with an adequate record).
CONCLUSION
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s holding that Reese was entitled to a charge on involuntary manslaughter. Further, although I agree that the solicitor’s closing argument was improper, I believe the error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of Reese’s guilt. All of Reese’s other arguments on appeal are without merit. Therefore, I would affirm Reese’s conviction for murder.

. The deputy coroner testified that “[t]he gunshot wound appeared to be a contact or very near a contact type wound.” The crime scene investigator also testified that upon observation of the body he believed *279the victim’s death was caused by a either "soft contact or a close contact type wound.” Likewise, the forensic pathologist, who performed an autopsy on the body, testified that there was a "loose contact gunshot wound to the left side of the head.” The pathologist further explained that “[t]he gun was just brushing the skin.”

. South Carolina courts have defined involuntary manslaughter as either (1) the killing of another without malice and unintentionally, but while one is engaged in the commission of some unlawful act not amounting to a felony and not naturally tending to cause death or great bodily harm; or (2) the killing of another without malice and unintentionally but while engaged in the doing of a lawful act with a reckless disregard of the safety of others. State v. Tucker, 324 S.C. 155, 170, 478 S.E.2d 260, 268 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1200, 117 S.Ct. 1561, 137 L.Ed.2d 708 (1997). For a homicide to be deemed an accident, there must be evidence that the killing was unintentional, the defendant was acting lawfully, and due care was exercised in the handling of the weapon. State v. Goodson, 312 S.C. 278, 280, 440 S.E.2d 370, 372 (1994).

. The majority also cites to State v. White, 253 S.C. 475, 478, 171 S.E.2d 712, 714 (1969), for the proposition that the negligent handling of a loaded gun supports a finding for involuntary manslaughter. Although White does cite that proposition of law, the opinion does not discuss whether the defendant was entitled to an involuntary manslaughter charge based on the negligent mishandling of a loaded gun. The issue in White was whether the trial judge erred in allowing an indictment for murder to go to the jury when the only charge submitted to the jury was involuntary manslaughter.

. The only other cases in which our appellate courts have found that a defendant’s negligent handling of a loaded firearm supported a charge for involuntary manslaughter are State v. Causer, 87 S.C. 516, 517, 70 S.E. 161, 161 (1911) (defendant took a hunting rifle away from decedent, who had been pointing the gun at two little boys, and defendant was walking away with the gun when, "in some unexplained way it went off, killing the [decedent], who had walked up behind”); State v. Tucker, 86 S.C. 211, 212, 68 S.E. 523, 524 (1910) (defendant was "rubbing [a] pistol” while sitting next to his half-brother, and "without knowing that [the pistol] was loaded or that his brother was in front of him, [defendant] pulled the trigger without meaning to do so”); State v. Revels, 86 S.C. 213, 214-215, 68 S.E. 523, 523 (1910) (a decedent grabbed and pulled on the defendant's cocked gun when it fired, fatally shooting decedent in the knee); State v. Gilliam, 66 S.C. 419, 421, 45 S.E. 6, 7 (1903) (defendant and his decedent wife were "in a playful tussle” for the possession of a pistol when the gun unintentionally fired). Notably, all of these cases differ from the case at hand because *281the negligent mishandling of the weapon coincided with lawful activities.