Court Opinion

ID: 9668151
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:03:55.234696+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:15.123660
License: Public Domain

*436SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.
(concurring). I agree with the state's position and the majority opinion that the search was constitutional and that the evidence of drugs should not be suppressed.
As the state and the majority make clear, this case fits within an exception to the knock-and-announce rule.1 It is therefore unnecessary for the majority to reach out to overrule our prior cases dating back to at least 1926 and abandon the rule of announcement in search warrants for "evidence of drug dealing."
As the state asserts and the majority opinion explains, the police had probable cause in this case to believe that two ounces of cocaine were on the premises and that the cocaine would be packaged in small amounts. According to State v. Cleveland, 118 Wis. 2d 615, 629, 348 N.W.2d 512 (1984), and State v. Williams, 168 Wis. 2d 970, 982, 485 N.W.2d 42 (1992), information that the quantity of drugs involved could be readily destroyed is sufficient to authorize law enforcement officers to make a no-knock entry. In other words, the majority could have upheld the constitutionality of the search in this case on the basis of existing case law without abandoning the knock-and-announce rule.2
*437Precedents ought not to be overruled without clear justification. The majority opinion has not justified its blanket authorization of unannounced forcible entry to a home to search for "evidence of drug dealing."3 Without evidence in support of its position — and with some empirical evidence in contradiction of it — the majority today decides to overturn a rule that has served important societal interests for a long time.4 Equally *438injudiciously, the majority sets forth an exception to the rule of announcement so broad that it potentially encompasses numerous crimes. In many searches a claim can be made that the evidence sought can easily be destroyed or expunged (for example, evidence of gambling) or involves crimes associated with weapons.
Privacy interests in a home are fundamental to our society's understanding of human dignity. Still, these interests must be balanced against the risk that evidence will be destroyed or law enforcement officers will be harmed. It is possible that the times require some adjustment of the balance, but I am not convinced that the times demand discarding the scales entirely.
h — I
The rule of announcement is not unique to Wisconsin jurisprudence. Its common law history goes back nearly 400 years.5 The United States Supreme Court *439has described the rule of announcement as "deeply rooted in our heritage" and as a "tradition embedded in Anglo-American law." Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313 (1958).
The rule of announcement became a federal statutory requirement for federal law enforcement officers in 1917 and is embodied in federal statutes today.6 Commentators and the courts generally accept the rule of announcement as a rule of constitutional dimension,7 although some disagree.8
*441The rule of announcement has been part of Wisconsin law at least since 1926,9 and has been expressly and unanimously reaffirmed by this court in two recent drug cases. In 1984 the court discussed and applied the rule in State v. Cleveland, 118 Wis. 2d 615, 348 N.W.2d 512 (1984). In 1992 the court further explained, elaborated on, and applied the rule and its exceptions in State v. Williams, 168 Wis. 2d 970, 485 N.W.2d 42 (1992). In still another 1992 case, State v. Moss, 172 Wis. 2d 110, 492 N.W.2d 627 (1992), the court implicitly reaffirmed the rule of announcement.
In light of this history, the rule of announcement should not be abandoned without strong justification. Fidelity to precedent, the doctrine of stare decisis "stand by things decided", is fundamental to "a society governed by the rule of law." Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 420 (1983). When legal standards "are open to revision in every case, deciding cases becomes a mere exercise of judicial will, with arbitrary and unpredictable results." Appeal *442of Concerned Corporators of Portsmouth Savings Bank, 129 N.H. 183, 227, 525 A.2d 671 (1987) (Souter, J. dissenting, quoting Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 786-87 (1986), White, J. dissenting).
Alongside the doctrine of stare decisis is a second generally accepted principle, namely that the common law must accommodate to changing circumstances. Schwanke v. Garlt, 219 Wis. 367, 371, 263 N.W. 176 (1935); Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 11, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962); Prah v. Maretti, 108 Wis. 2d 223, 237-238, 321 N.W.2d 182 (1982).
The doctrine of stare decisis and the dynamic aspect of the common law are harmonized by a third generally accepted principle: A court's decision to depart from precedent is not to be made casually. It must be explained carefully and fully to insure that the court is not acting in an arbitrary or capricious manner. A court should not depart from precedent without sufficient justification. Justification for departure from precedent could include changes or developments in the law that undermine the rationale behind a decision; the need to make a decision correspond to newly ascertained facts; or a showing that the precedent has become detrimental to coherence and consistency in the law.10 No change in the law is justified by "a change in the membership of the court or a case with more egregious facts." Welch v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins., 122 Wis. 2d 172, 182, 361 N.W.2d 680 (1985) (Steinmetz, J. dissenting).
*443The majority opinion at 428 asserts that "the rule of announcement rationale is no longer valid in today's drug culture," first because of the ease with which drugs can be destroyed, 181 Wis. 2d 425, and second because many drug dealers have guns and "commit violent crimes" against police, 181 Wis. 2d 425. But the majority opinion offers no credible support for its assertion that the rationale for the rule of announcement is no longer valid in searches for "evidence of drug dealing."11 I shall discuss each of its pronouncements in turn.
A.
This court has long acknowledged that small amounts of narcotics can be destroyed quickly. Thus in State v. Cleveland, 118 Wis. 2d 615, 629, 348 N.W.2d 512 (1984), we held that the police executing a search warrant may enter a residence without announcing themselves when they have information that *444announcement might result in the destruction of drugs.12 See also State v. Williams, 168 Wis. 2d 970, 982, 485 N.W.2d 42 (1992). Evidently the majority has determined that drug dealers have become so sophisticated since Cleveland and Williams were decided that all drugs irrespective of quantity can be readily destroyed and that therefore a no-knock entry in drug cases is always justified. I can find no credible support for this thesis in either the majority opinion or the cases and law reviews I have examined.
*443I do not join the majority opinion because it neither explains nor justifies its abandonment of long-standing precedent in this case.
*444The majority cites as persuasive authority that six state courts have adopted a "blanket" exception to the rule of announcement because of the destructibility of drugs. In reality, three of the six cases cited do not adopt a "blanket rule;" they merely conclude that the state statute authorizing no-knock entries for drugs does not violate the constitution.13 Furthermore, all six cases cited predate Cleveland and Williams.
Many courts around the country, when faced with similar assertions about the destructibility of drugs, have refused to create a blanket rule authorizing unannounced entry by police in drug cases.14 As the Eighth *445Circuit court of appeals explained in 1992, "a blanket rule permitting no-knock search warrants in all drug cases, regardless of whether the forms and quantities suspected to be present can be readily destroyed, is patently unjustifiable and would invite unnecessary violent and intrusive execution of many search warrants." United States v. Moore, 956 F.2d 843, 850 (8th Cir. 1992).
Drugs are no less easily destroyed in any of these jurisdictions than they are in Wisconsin. Indeed, the majority has cited no evidence in support of its assertion that drugs are always readily destroyable and always likely to be destroyed in the few moments required for police to comply with the rule of announcement when executing a search warrant.
B.
The majority declaration that "the rule of announcement rationale is no longer valid in today's drug culture" because many drug dealers have guns *446and commit violent crimes against police, 181 Wis. 2d 428, is buttressed with citations to two federal cases, both of which predate our Williams and Moss decisions reaffirming the rule of announcement. The majority even attempts to get support from quoting the Williams case itself, 181 Wis. 2d 428. The majority also quotes, 181 Wis. 2d 428, from a sentence about violence against police which appeared in a 1992 Bureau of Justice Report.15 The part of the sentence quoted is substantially similar to material from an Attorney General's report relied on in Williams where, as we have noted, the rule of announcement was reaffirmed.
Thus the majority opinion on its face demonstrates that it has discovered nothing new. It points to no experiences, changes or developments subsequent to Cleveland or Williams that undermine the rationale of those decisions. It furnishes no newly ascertained facts demonstrating the need to change a rule that has been applied in Wisconsin since at least 1926. Nor does it claim that the precedents have become a detriment to coherence and consistency in the law. In short, the majority presents no justification for overturning settled law in this state.
HH I — I
As this court recognized in Cleveland and Williams, crime and violence can all too frequently be traced to drugs. In Cleveland and Williams the court carefully permitted no-knock entries that would safeguard both the public and law enforcement officers and prevent destruction of evidence of drugs. In fact, in *447Cleveland the state explored in its brief, and this court expressly considered and rejected, the blanket rule the court adopts today. State v. Cleveland, 118 Wis. 2d at 628; Brief of the Attorney General, State v. Cleveland, pp. 37-38. See also, United States v. Singer, 943 F.2d 758 (7th Cir. 1991).
As stated above, the majority offers no justification for its adoption of a blanket rule abandoning the rule of announcement in warrants to search for "evidence of drug dealing," and the only empirical evidence I can find undermines the majority's rationale. Indeed, an examination of the federal experience with no-knock warrants and both national and Wisconsin statistics regarding violence against police suggests that little may be gained and much may be lost by abandoning the rule of announcement in cases involving "evidence of drug dealing."
First, a federal attempt to respond to increasing drug-related crime and violence in the early 1970s by relaxing search regulations miscarried. A 1970 federal statute authorizing no-knock warrants became, according to one senator, "an invitation to official lawlessness."16 After two no-knock drug raids on innocent households in Collinsville, Illinois,17 the Drug Enforcement Administration issued guidelines requiring high *448level approval before federal agents could request a no-knock warrant. The federal statute authorizing no-knock warrants was repealed in 1974.
Second, FBI national crime statistics do not bear out the majority's contention that law enforcement officers executing search warrants for drugs are in more danger today than they were in 1992, when Williams was decided, or even in 1984, when Cleveland was decided. National statistics show that from 1978 to 1991 the total number of officers killed on duty actually declined. When comparing 1978-81 to 1987-91, the number of officers killed in situations involving drug matters also declined. From 1987 through 1991 more law enforcement officers were killed in domestic violence incidents than in drug-related situations.18
*449Third, the statistical picture in Wisconsin is similar. It is evident from state statistics that the number of law enforcement officers killed feloniously in the line of duty has not been rising.19 Half as many officers were killed deliberately during the 1980s as were killed in the 1970s. Nor has the number of officers assaulted with firearms been increasing. According to the Wisconsin statistics, more assaults with firearms occurred in the 1970s than in more recent years.20
While the death or injury of even one law enforcement officer is one too many, the empirical evidence undermines the majority's rationale.
*450IV.
I agree that rules regulating police conduct should be reexamined to ensure that the common law rules adopted by this court continue to make sense. Although the rule of announcement was reaffirmed as recently as 1992, we are nevertheless free to re-examine it in *4511993. However, after considering the majority's arguments, the available empirical evidence, and the traditional justifications for the rule of announcement, I conclude that no clear justification for overturning the settled law of this state presently exists.
In the absence of clear justification to depart from precedent, the doctrine of stare decisis should prevail.
Equally important, however, is the fact that the interests served by the rule of announcement are as vital today as they were in 1926 and when Cleveland and Williams were decided. 2 LaFave, Search and Seizure at 272-73 (2d ed. 1987). Chief among those interests are the prevention of violence and the protection of privacy.
As I have written previously, "[a] suspect's access to a firearm means that the firearm may be used against law enforcement officers. On the other hand, a suspect may be less likely to shoot at police officers who identify themselves as such and more likely to shoot at what the suspect may view as unidentified intruders breaking into a residence." State v. Williams, at 992 (Abrahamson, J., concurring).21
When police storm into a home, they are likely to find its occupants in various states of undress, in bed, or in the bathroom.22 Children are likely to be present. Thus the privacy rights protected by requiring the *452police to announce their identity and their purpose include the occupant's right to put on a robe and to prevent the children from being frightened.
Our concerns for police safety and the struggle to balance police power against individual freedom are as old as the. organization of police forces and fourth amendment jurisprudence itself.23 But as dissenting Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executive Association, 489 U.S. 602, 635 (1989): "History teaches that grave threats to liberty often come in times of urgency, when constitutional rights seem too extravagant to endure .... [W]hen we allow fundamental freedoms to be sacrificed in the name of real or perceived exigency, we invariably come to regret it."
For the reasons set forth, I concur.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice NATHAN S. HEFFERNAN joins this opinion.

 The knock-and-announce rule requires that police officers seeking to enter a dwelling in execution of a warrant must announce their presence (identity) and purpose and allow time for the door to be opened, except when the occupants already are aware that the police are present, when an announcement would cause imminent danger to life, or when the officers have reason to believe that occupants would escape or evidence would be destroyed.

 The no-knock entry in State v. Kerr, 181 Wis. 2d 372, 511 N.W.2d 586 (1994), also can be upheld as fitting within an exception to the knock-and-announce rule. See State's Brief, pp 20-22. At the time the warrant was executed, the officers had *437reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant, who was suspected of drug trafficking, was carrying a concealed weapon. State v. Hanson, 163 Wis. 2d 420, 424-25, 471 N.W.2d 301 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Watkinson, 161 Wis. 2d 750, 468 N.W.2d 763 (Ct. App. 1991).

 One of the primary safeguards against general searches included in the Fourth Amendment is its requirement of particularity in "describing the place to be searched and the... things to be seized." U.S. Const. Amend. IV. Thus the constitution requires that the police articulate reasons justifying an individual search.
The majority opinion introduces the phrase "evidence of drug dealing," apparently to distinguish among searches for three types of evidence under sec. 161.41: (1) those relating to possession of controlled substances, (2) those relating to the possession of controlled substances for manufacture, and (3) those relating to possession of controlled substances for delivery. A significant body of case law has developed attempting to distinguish facts giving rise to a conviction for possession with intent to deliver instead of possession. The vagueness introduced by the phrase "evidence of drug dealing" threatens to erode the role of particularity in the search warrant process.

 The rule of announcement was adopted and has been retained because it serves four purposes: (1) It decreases the potential for violence by alerting a resident that a police officer is legitimately on the premises; (2) it protects a resident's right to be free from unexpected, frightening, and embarrassing intrusions into the privacy of the home; (3) it prevents the physical destruction of the home by giving a resident the opportunity *438to admit the officer voluntarily; and (4) it provides an opportunity for a resident to indicate that the premises are mistakenly described in the warrant. For a detailed discussion of the purposes of the rule of announcement, see Note, Announcement in Police Entries, 80 Yale L.J. 139, 140-142 (1970).

 The requirement of notice has been traced back as far as the decision in Semayne's Case, 5 Coke Rep. 91a, 91b, 11 Eng. Rui. Cas. 629, 631, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (1603), a civil case. In 1756 in the Case of Richard Curtis, Fost. 135, 168 Eng. Rep. 67, 68 (K.B. 1757), the court unanimously held that "peace officers, having a legal warrant to arrest for a breach of the peace, may break open doors, after having demanded admittance and given due notice of their warrant."
American courts began speaking of the necessity of giving notice in the execution of a search warrant as early as 1813 in Bell v. Clapp, 10 Johns.R. 263 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813).
For discussions of the rule of announcement, including the history, see Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 306-310 *439(1958); Accarino v. United States, 179 F.2d 456, 460-465 (D.C. Cir. 1949); 2 LaFave, Search and Seizure, sec. 4.8(a) (2d ed. 1987); Charles Patrick Garcia, The Knock and Announce Rule: A New Approach to the Destruction-Of-Evidence Exception, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 685 (1993); Donald B. Allegro, Police Tactics, Drug Trafficking, and Gang Violence: Why the No-Knock Warrant Is an Idea Whose Time Has Come, 64 Notre Dame L. Rev. 552 (1989); Sonnenreich and Ebner, No-Knock and Nonsense, An Alleged Constitutional Problem, 44 St. John's L. Rev. 626 (1970); Blakey, The Rule of Announcement and Unlawful Entry: Miller v. United States and Ker v. California, 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 499 (1964); Note, Announcement in Police Entries, 80 Yale L.J. 139 (1970).

 18 U.S.C. § 3109, which deals with the execution of search warrants by federal officers, states:
The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house, or any part of a house, or anything therein, to execute a search warrant, if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance or when necessary to liberate himself or a person aiding him in execution of the warrant. 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1993).

Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963), is regarded as authority for the proposition that "the rule of announcement is a constitutional requirement implicit in the fourth amendment proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures." Son-nenreich and Ehner, No-Knock and Nonsense, An Alleged Constitutional Problem, 44 St. John's L. Rev. 626, 643 (1970). *440See also, Note, The Knock and Announce Rule: A new Approach to the Destruction-of-Evidence Exception, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 685, 697-698 (1993) (it is generally recognized that absent exigent circumstances, a police officer's failure to knock-and-announce violates the fourth amendment.); Note, Police Tactics, Drug Trafficking, and Gang Violence: Why the No-Knock Warrant Is an Idea Whose Time Has Come, 64 Notre Dame L.Rev. 552, 564 (1989) (the general consensus is that under the fourth amendment exigent circumstances must exist to escape the rule); Note, No-Knock and the Constitution: The District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, 55 Minn. L. Rev. 871, 884 (1970-71) ("the rule of announcement is a constitutional requirement implicit in the fourth amendment proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures"); Note, Announcement in Police Entries, 80 Yale L.J. 139, 146 (1970) (the fourth amendment incorporates the rule of announcement); Rivera v. United States, 928 F.2d 592, 606 (2d Cir. 1991) (fourth amendment requires reasonable effort to provide actual notice of identity and imminent entry); State v. Carufel, 314 A.2d 144, 147 (R.I.1974) (the knock-and-announce requirement is embodied in the fourth amendment); Commonwealth v. Newman, 240 A.2d 795, 798 (Penn. 1968) (forcible entry without announcement of purpose violates the fourth amendment); People v. Gastelo, 432 P.2d 706, 708 (Cal. 1967) (under the fourth amendment, a specific showing must always be made to justify unannounced forcible entry).

 See, e.g., George E. Dix, Means of Executing Searches and Seizures as Fourth Amendment Issues, 67 Minn. L. Rev. 89,100 (1982-83) (the United States Supreme Court no-knock cases reflect a careful effort to avoid addressing the extent, if any, to which the fourth amendment requirement of reasonableness embodies any such advance notice requirement); United States v. Nolan, 718 F.2d 589, 601 (3rd Cir. 1983) (the fourth amendment is implicated by knock-and-announce only "by the overall reasonableness of the state's statutory scheme as applied by law enforcement officers."); Commonwealth v. Goggin, 412 Mass. *441200, 587 N.E.2d 785 (1992) ("[o]ur knock and announce rule is one of common law which is not constitutionally compelled").

See Hiller v. State, 190 Wis. 369, 209 N.W. 260 (1926), overruled on other grounds, Glodowski v. State, 196 Wis. 265, 280 N.W. 260 (1928) (officer with warrant searching for unlawful intoxicating liquors was justified in pulling hook off screen door in order to secure entrance where circumstances led him to believe that attempt was being made to destroy the liquor); Morales v. State, 44 Wis. 2d 96, 170 N.W.2d 684 (1969) (when seeking entrance to a dwelling to execute a warrant, police officers must identify themselves and, except under special circumstances, allow time for the door to be opened); State v. Suits, 73 Wis. 2d 352, 243 N.W.2d 206 (1976) (strict adherence to the rule of announcement is not required when the circumstances encountered by the officer at the time of execution of the warrant justify'a departure from the rule).

See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989); Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984); Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 412 (1932) (Brandéis, J. dissenting).

 Section 902.01 governs judicial notice of adjudicative facts. "A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (a) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (b) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." Section 902.01(2), Stats. 1991-92.
For a discussion of judicial notice of legislative facts, see Peggy C. Davis, "There is a Book Out . . .An Analysis of Judicial Absorption of Legislative Facts, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1539 (1987).

 We said in Cleveland that the particular information could include "the quantity of drugs expected to be discovered and that this amount is readily destroyed if announcement is made, or the preparations that have been made to facilitate the destruction of the drugs, or the defendant's destruction of drugs during a previous attempt to search the premises." 118 Wis. 2d 629.

People v. De Lago, 213 N.E.2d 659, 661 (N.Y. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 963 (1966) (case involved gambling); State v. Loucks, 209 N.W.2d 772, 777-78 (N.D. 1973); State v. Spisak, 520 P.2d 561, 562-63 (Utah 1974).

 See, e.g., United States v. Wulferdinger, 782 F.2d 1473, 1476 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Stewart, 867 F.2d 581 (10th Cir. 1989); United States v. Likas, 448 F.2d 607, 609 (7th *445Cir. 1971); Reynolds v. Alabama, 238 So.2d 557, 559-560 (Ala. Cr. App. 1970); Arizona v. Bates, 587 P.2d 747, 749 (Ariz. 1978); California v. Gastelo, 432 P.2d 706, 708 (Cal. 1967); Connecticut v. Anonymous, 480 A.2d 600, 605 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1984); Indiana v. Dusch, 289 N.E.2d 515, 518 (Ind. 1972); Crabtree v. State, 479 N.E.2d 70, 74 (Ind. App. 1985); Illinois v. Ouellette, 401 N.E.2d 507, 510 (Ill. 1979); Massachusetts v. Gomes, 556 N.E.2d 100, 101-02 (1990); Massachusetts v. Scalise, 439 N.E.2d 818, 823 (Mass. 1982); State v. Matos, 605 A.2d 223, 224 (N.H. 1992); State v. Sundel, 402 A.2d 585, 588 (R.I. 1979); Rhode Island v. Carufel, 314 A.2d 144, 148 (R.I. 1974); Heaton v. Virginia, 207 S.E.2d 829, 831 (Va. 1974); Washington v. Jeter, 634 P.2d 312, 314 (Wash. 1981).
Professor LaFave does not favor a blanket rule. See 2 LaFave, Search and Seizure at 280-84 (2d ed. 1987).

 Neither the Report nor its separate volume entitled Technical Appendix offers factual support for this sentence or relates expressly to violence to law enforcement officers on an execution of a search warrant.

 See 120 Cong. Rec. 22, 898 (1974). For discussions of the 1970 statute, see e.g., Note, No-Knock and the Constitution: The District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970 [A Critique and Proposed Alterations], 55 Minn. L. Rev. 871 (1971); Note, Announcement in Police Entries, 80 Yale L. J. 139 (1970); Note, Unannounced Entry to Search: The Law and the 'No-Knock'Bill (S.3246), 1970 Wash. U. L. Q. 204.

 See Andrew H. Malcolm, Violent Drug Raids Against the Innocent Found Widespread, N.Y. Times, June 25, 1973, at Al. The article cites several examples of mistaken, surprise, unan*448nounced raids by federal, state and local law enforcement agents, including one in which a police officer was killed.

 According to the 1992 Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics, Hindelang Criminal Justice Research Center, the statistics on federal, state and local law enforcement officers murdered are as follows:
Total #/% by Type of Situation
Time Officers Drug Period Murdered Matters Domestic Handling Violence Prisoners
1987-91 355 31/8.7% 37/9.6% 24/6.8%
1982-86 388 28/7.2% 22/5.7% 18/4.6%
1978-81 394 53/5.8% 20/5.1% 12/3.0%
In 1991, 3 officers were killed in drug-related matters; 9 were killed in domestic violence situations; 6 were killed while handling or transporting prisoners in custody.
The percentage of officers killed in drug-related situations increased somewhat from 1978 to 1991, but not as much as the percentage of officers killed while handling or transporting prisoners in custody. The percentage of officers killed while *449handling or transporting prisoners in custody doubled during that same period.

 According to the Wisconsin Office of Justice Assistance, before 1982 the circumstances of the deaths were not recorded. Since then, in 1985 the deaths of two officers in a single incident appeared to be directly related to drug activity. The officers were killed after they stopped three men on a street in Milwaukee on suspicion of dealing drugs.
The statistics regarding the felonious deaths of police officers in Wisconsin indicate the following:
Year/ Officers Year/ Officers • decade killed decade killed
1993 0 1950s ^
1992 0 1940s ^
1991 2 1930s CO rH
1990 3 1920s CO
1980s 7 1910s O)
1970s 16 1900s CO
1960s 9

 According to the Wisconsin Office of Justice Assistance, the figures on assaults with firearms against law enforcement officers are as follows:
*450Assaults Year with Firearms Resulting in Injury
1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
1987
1986
1985
bO M
t-
CO T — I
^ tH
t>
tH
^ tH
M Olt^tOOlOJOOWW
1984
M CO 00 T M CO CO CO £ % 8. cr
1980
1979
1978
1977
1976
1975
1974
1973
1972
1971
1970
ffiamfflt-NnbNON HHNtONONMIlHIM
M MM COCQ~qQOCOOO<iOOO>a>
The records collected by the Wisconsin Office of Justice Assistance do not provide information indicating in detail the circumstances of these assaults, so we do not know what proportion of them are drug related or whether any occurred during the execution of search warrants.

 The federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms estimates that there are approximately 200 million firearms in the nation, about one per person. State v. Williams, 168 Wis. 2d 970, 992 (1992) (Abrahamson, J., concurring). A 1993 survey estimates that 55 per cent of the people in Wisconsin have guns. Wis. St. J. 12/12/93, p.2C.

<See, e.g., Andrew H. Malcolm, Violent Drug Raids Against the Innocent Found Widespread, N.Y. Times, June 25, 1973, at Al. See also 120 Cong. Rec. 15,171 (1973).

 For a history of the criminal justice system in the United States, see Lawrence M. Friedman, Crime and Punishment in American History (1993).