Court Opinion

ID: 9956270
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-01 17:11:02.473526+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:16.358799
License: Public Domain

J-S08009-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  CHRISTOPHER VALE-FELICIANO                   :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1358 MDA 2023

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 19, 2023
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-22-CR-0002537-2020

BEFORE:      OLSON, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                       FILED: APRIL 1, 2024

       Appellant, Christopher Vale-Feliciano, appeals from the judgment of

sentence entered July 19, 2023, as made final by the denial of his

post-sentence motion on August 16, 2023. In this direct appeal, Appellant's

counsel has filed both a petition for leave to withdraw as counsel and an

accompanying brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967)

and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). We conclude

that Appellant's counsel has complied with the procedural requirements

necessary to withdraw. Moreover, after independently reviewing the record,

we conclude that the instant appeal is wholly frivolous. Therefore, we grant

counsel's petition for leave to withdraw and affirm Appellant's judgment of

sentence.

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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      In April 2019, an investigation known as Operation Hill Fire sought to

uncover the source of the influx of various drugs in and around the city of

Harrisburg in Dauphin County, Pennsylvania.        A drug organization was

ultimately identified and, by way of a confidential informant and then, an

undercover officer, Operation Hill Fire began engaging in various controlled

purchases of heroin, cocaine, and fentanyl from an individual named Angel

Cintron-Cardona.    Thereafter, Operation Hill Fire began surveillance of

Cintron-Cardon by, inter alia, placing “two tracking devices on vehicle[s],”

deploying “pole camera[s]” in various areas, engaging in wiretaps, and taking

still photographs or videos of Cintron-Cardona, as well as other individuals he

met with. N.T. Trial, 4/10/23-4/12/23, at 72-73. Through their investigative

efforts, Harrisburg officers learned that Cintron-Cardona obtained his supply

of cocaine from Appellant, who “furnished cocaine from [his] residence on

13th Street[, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania]” near Pigeon Alley.        Id. at 84.

Ultimately, in April 2020, the officers “executed what is known as Raid Day or

the Last Day of the investigation,” and executed an arrest warrant for

Appellant and a search warrant for Appellant’s home, which yielded “a money

counter, bulk currency, multiple cell[ular tele]phones, scales and . . .

marijuana.” Id. at 40.

      Thereafter, Appellant was charged via criminal information with multiple

offenses. The matter proceeded to a jury trial on April 10, 2023. On April 12,

2023, the jury found Appellant guilty of possession with intent to deliver

(“PWID”) – cocaine; PWID – heron; conspiracy to commit PWID – cocaine;

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conspiracy to commit PWID – heroin; conspiracy to commit PWID – fentanyl;

corrupt organizations, dealing in proceeds of unlawful activities, and criminal

use of a communication facility.1 Appellant filed a post-sentence motion on

July 27, 2023, which the trial court denied on August 16, 2023. This timely

appeal followed.

       On appeal, Appellant's counsel filed a petition for leave to withdraw and

counsel accompanied this petition with an Anders brief. Before reviewing the

merits of this appeal, this Court must first determine whether counsel has

fulfilled the necessary procedural requirements for withdrawing as counsel.

Commonwealth v. Miller, 715 A.2d 1203, 1207 (Pa. Super. 1998).

       To withdraw under Anders, counsel must satisfy certain technical

requirements. First, counsel must “petition the court for leave to withdraw

stating that, after making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel

has determined that the appeal would be frivolous.” Id. at 1207. Second,

counsel must file an Anders brief, in which counsel:

        (1) provide[s] a summary of the procedural history and facts,
        with citations to the record; (2) refer[s] to anything in the
        record that counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3)
        set[s] forth counsel's conclusion that the appeal is frivolous;
        and (4) state[s] counsel's reasons for concluding that the
        appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts
        of record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that
        have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.

____________________________________________

1 35 Pa.C.S.A. § 780-113(a)(30); 18              Pa.C.S.A.   §§ 903,   911(b)(1),
5111(a)(1), and 7512(a), respectively.

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Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361.        Finally, counsel must furnish a copy of the

Anders brief to his or her client and advise the client “of [the client's] right to

retain new counsel, proceed pro se or raise any additional points worthy of

this Court's attention.” Commonwealth v. Woods, 939 A.2d 896, 898 (Pa.

Super. 2007).

      If counsel meets all of the above obligations, “it then becomes the

responsibility of the reviewing court to make a full examination of the

proceedings and make an independent judgment to decide whether the appeal

is in fact wholly frivolous.”    Santiago, 978 A.2d at 355 n.5; see also

Commonwealth v. Yorgey, 188 A.3d 1190, 1197 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en

banc) (holding that the Anders procedure requires this Court to review “the

entire record with consideration first of the issues raised by counsel. ... [T]his

review does not require this Court to act as counsel or otherwise advocate on

behalf of a party. Rather, it requires us only to conduct a review of the record

to ascertain if[,] on its face, there are non-frivolous issues that counsel,

intentionally or not, missed or misstated. We need not analyze those issues

of arguable merit; just identify them, deny the motion to withdraw, and order

counsel to analyze them”) (internal citations omitted). It is only when all of

the procedural and substantive requirements are satisfied that counsel will be

permitted to withdraw.

      In the case at bar, counsel complied with all of the above procedural

obligations. We must, therefore, review the entire record and analyze whether

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this appeal is, in fact, wholly frivolous. Our analysis begins with the claims

raised in the Anders brief, which are as follows:

       1. Whether the trial court erred in accepting the jury’s verdict
          where the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient
          evidence that Appellant engaged in drug trafficking when he
          was not found [to be in possession of] any drugs?

       2. Whether the trial court erred in accepting the jury’s verdict
          which went against the weight of the evidence [because] the
          Commonwealth failed to establish that [] Appellant was
          engaged in drug trafficking?

       3. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the
          Commonwealth presented evidence to support a[n] Offense
          Gravity Score reflecting over 1000 grams of cocaine?

Appellant’s Brief at 4 (superfluous capitalization omitted).

      In his first issue, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence

supporting his various convictions.    In particular, Appellant contends that,

because he was only found to be in possession of marijuana, the

Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence that he “engaged in a

drug trafficking organization.” Appellant’s Brief at 10.

      Our standard of review is as follows:

       The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of evidence
       is whether, viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light
       most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence
       to enable the fact[-]finder to find every element of the crime
       beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may
       not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of
       the fact-finder.   In addition, we note that the facts and
       circumstances established by the Commonwealth [need] not
       preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding
       a defendant's guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless
       the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law
       no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined

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       circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of
       proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt
       by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in
       applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated
       and all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally,
       the trier of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses
       and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all,
       part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Lambert, 795 A.2d 1010, 1014–1015 (Pa. Super. 2002)

(citations omitted).

      In Section 780-113 of the Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and

Cosmetic Act, PWID is defined as follows:

       (a) The following acts and the causing thereof within the
       Commonwealth are hereby prohibited:

            (30) Except as authorized by this act, the manufacture,
            delivery, or possession with intent to manufacture or
            deliver, a controlled substance by a person not registered
            under this act, or a practitioner not registered or licensed
            by the appropriate State board, or knowingly creating,
            delivering or possessing with intent to deliver, a counterfeit
            controlled substance.

35 Pa.C.S.A. § 780-113(a)(30).

      Section 903 of the Crimes Code states:

       (a) Definition of conspiracy.--A person is guilty of conspiracy
       with another person or persons to commit a crime if with the
       intent of promoting or facilitating its commission he:

            (1) agrees with such other person or persons that they or
            one or more of them will engage in conduct which
            constitutes such crime or an attempt or solicitation to
            commit such crime; or

            (2) agrees to aid such other person or persons in the
            planning or commission of such crime or of an attempt or
            solicitation to commit such crime.

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18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903. Importantly, in a case dealing with conspiracy and PWID,

“successful proof of a conspiracy makes each co-conspirator fully liable for all

of the drugs recovered, without the necessity of proving constructive

possession.”    Commonwealth v. Perez, 931 A.2d 703, 709 (Pa. Super.

2007).

      The crime of corrupt organizations is defined, in relevant part, as

follows:

         § 911 Corrupt organizations:

         (b) Prohibited activities.—

             (1) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received
             any income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern
             of racketeering activity in which such person participated
             as a principal, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any
             part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in the
             acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or
             operation of, any enterprise: Provided, however, That a
             purchase of securities on the open market for purposes of
             investment, and without the intention of controlling or
             participating in the control of the issuer, or of assisting
             another to do so, shall not be unlawful under this
             subsection if the securities of the issue held by the
             purchaser, the members of his immediate family, and his
             or their accomplices in any pattern of racketeering activity
             after such purchase, do not amount in the aggregate to
             1% of the outstanding securities of any one class, and do
             not confer, either in law or in fact, the power to elect one
             or more directors of the issuer: Provided, further, That if,
             in any proceeding involving an alleged investment in
             violation of this subsection, it is established that over half
             of the defendant's aggregate income for a period of two or
             more years immediately preceding such investment was
             derived from a pattern of racketeering activity, a
             rebuttable presumption shall arise that such investment
             included income derived from such pattern of racketeering
             activity.

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18 Pa.C.S.A. § 911(b)(1).

      The crime of dealing in proceeds of unlawful activities requires proof

that, inter alia, a “person conducts a financial transaction . . . with knowledge

that the property involved, including stolen or illegally obtained property,

represents the proceeds of unlawful activity, the person acts with the intent

to promote the carrying on of the unlawful activity.” Id. at § 5111(a)(1).

      Finally, criminal use of a communication facility, requires proof that a

           person uses a communication facility to commit, cause or
           facilitate the commission or the attempt thereof of any crime
           which constitutes a felony under this title or under the act of
           April 14, 1972 (P.L. 233, No. 64),1 known as The Controlled
           Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act. Every instance
           where the communication facility is utilized constitutes a
           separate offense under this section.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 7512(a).

      Herein, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of multiple officers

who participated in Operation Hill Fire to establish that Appellant was a part

of a network of drug traffickers. First, Trooper Shawn Panchik testified about

the initial investigation, which identified Cintron-Cardona, and the series of

controlled purchases of fentanyl, cocaine, and heroin with an undercover

officer.     Trooper Panchik also testified that, through the identification of

Cintron-Cardona, Operation Hill Fire learned that Appellant, with the

assistance      of   his   next-door   neighbor,   Kevin   Ponce-Garcia,   provided

Cintron-Cardona and others with various narcotics from his residence on 13th

Street. N.T. Trial, 4/10/23-4/12/23, at 84. More specifically, Trooper Panchik

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explained that, once Appellant received “an order for narcotics” he would

reach out to Ponce-Garcia who would subsequently “fulfill that order at

[Appellant’s] direction.” Id. at 86. Importantly, footage of their operation,

captured via a pole camera mounted in Pigeon Alley directly behind Appellant’s

residence, was introduced into evidence. The video showed Appellant and

Ponce-Garcia “meet[ing] at the fence line,” talking, and “passing objects back

and forth.” Id. at 87; see also id. at 217. On one occasion, footage also

showed Appellant, Ponce-Garcia, Cintron-Cardona, and another individual,

Jeffrey Pagan-Archeval, in a vehicle, using a scale to weigh a white substance

and subsequently departing from the vehicle, each carrying something. Id.

at 88.

         Thereafter, Trooper Ryan Ivancik, testified about an interaction he had

with Appellant on February 27, 2020. In particular, Trooper Ivancik stated

that, on that day, he conducted a traffic stop of a vehicle operated by

Appellant, wherein Ponce-Garcia was a passenger. During the course of this

stop, Trooper Ivancik obtained their names, dates of birth, addresses and

phone numbers. He stated that Appellant informed him that his telephone

number was 717-877-9103.          Id. at 143.    Later, Corporal Kent Ramierz

testified about the multiple conversations between Appellant and other

individuals obtained via wiretapping. Initially, Corporal Ramierz stated that,

following Appellant’s arrest in April 2020, he confirmed that Appellant was the

voice on the telephone calls at the number, 717-877-9103. Id. at 177-179.

Then, Corporal Ramierz identified and detailed at least 74 different telephone

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conversations between February 6, 2020 and March 23, 2020 wherein

Appellant, inter alia, acknowledged that he possessed various narcotics and

discussed the purchase of narcotics from Puerto Rico and subsequent

distribution throughout Harrisburg. See id. at 185-211 (identifying Appellant

engaging in approximately 74 telephone conversations between February 6,

2020 and March 23, 2020 with, among others, Cintron-Cardona and unknown

individuals from Puerto Rico).

      Based upon all the foregoing, we agree with counsel’s assessment that

the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to sustain Appellant’s

various convictions that arose from his participation in a drug trafficking

organization.

      In his second issue, Appellant claims that the verdict was against the

weight of the evidence. Appellant challenges the credibility of the testimony

and evidence proffered by the Commonwealth to support his participation in

a drug trafficking organization. When considering a challenge to the weight

of the evidence offered in support of a criminal conviction, our standard of

review is well settled.

       The essence of appellate review for a weight claim appears to
       lie in ensuring that the trial court's decision has record support.
       Where the record adequately supports the trial court, the trial
       court has acted within the limits of its discretion.

       A motion for a new trial based on a claim that the verdict is
       against the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion
       of the trial court. A new trial should not be granted because of
       a mere conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the
       same facts would have arrived at a different conclusion. Rather,
       the role of the trial judge is to determine that notwithstanding

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       all the facts, certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that
       to ignore them or to give them equal weight with all the facts is
       to deny justice.

       An appellate court's standard of review when presented with a
       weight of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard of
       review applied by the trial court. Appellate review of a weight
       claim is a review of the exercise of discretion, not of the
       underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight
       of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Windslowe, 158 A.3d 698, 712 (Pa. Super. 2017)

(quotations omitted), appeal denied, 171 A.3d 1286 (Pa. 2017).               “To

successfully challenge the weight of the evidence, a defendant must prove the

evidence is so tenuous, vague and uncertain that the verdict shocks the

conscience of the court.” Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted).

      The entirety of Appellant's argument challenges the credibility of the

Commonwealth's witnesses’ testimony. We conclude that the trial court did

not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant's challenge to the weight of the

evidence. The jury heard the evidence introduced at trial and was free to

determine the weight of the evidence and testimony. It is the fact-finder's

duty to assess credibility and we may not substitute our judgement for the

jury's findings.   Moreover, the evidence was not so tenuous, vague and

uncertain that the verdict shocked the conscience of the court. Accordingly,

Appellant's weight of the evidence claim fails.

      Lastly, Appellant raises a challenge to the discretionary aspects of his

sentence.   More specifically, Appellant claims that the trial court “erred in

sentencing [him] with an offense gravity score [(“OGS”)] of 13” for his charges

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listed at count one, PWID - cocaine, and count two, conspiracy to commit

PWID - cocaine. Appellant’s Brief at 19.

      This Court previously explained:

       It is well-settled that “the right to appeal a discretionary aspect
       of sentence is not absolute.” Commonwealth v. Dunphy, 20
       A.3d 1215, 1220 (Pa. Super. 2011). Rather, where an appellant
       challenges the discretionary aspects of a sentence, we should
       regard his[, or her,] appeal as a petition for allowance of appeal.
       Commonwealth v. W.H.M., 932 A.2d 155, 162 (Pa. Super.
       2007). As we stated in Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d
       162 (Pa. Super. 2010):

            An appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of
            his[, or her,] sentence must invoke this Court's
            jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:

              We conduct a four-part analysis to determine:
              (1) whether appellant [] filed a timely notice of
              appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether
              the issue was properly preserved at sentencing
              or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence,
              see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether appellant's
              brief has a fatal defect, [see] Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f);
              and (4) whether there is a substantial question
              that the sentence appealed from is not
              appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42
              Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

       [Moury, 992 A.2d] at 170 [(citation omitted)]. We evaluate on
       a case-by-case basis whether a particular issue constitutes a
       substantial question about the appropriateness of sentence.
       Commonwealth v. Kenner, 784 A.2d 808, 811 (Pa. Super.
       2001).

Commonwealth v. Hill, 210 A.3d 1104, 1116 (Pa. Super. 2019) (original

brackets omitted). A substantial question exists when an appellant presents

a colorable argument that the sentence imposed is either (1) “inconsistent

with a specific provision of the [s]entencing [c]ode” or (2) is “contrary to the

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fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process.” Commonwealth

v. Mastromarino, 2 A.3d 581, 585 (Pa. Super. 2010), appeal denied, 14 A.3d

825 (Pa. 2011).

      Instantly, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, properly preserved

his claims in his post-sentence motion, and included a Rule 2119(f) statement

in his brief. Moreover, Appellant’s claim that the trial court inappropriately

calculated the OGS raises a substantial question for our review.           See

Commonwealth v. Sunealitis, 153 A.3d 414, 421 (Pa. Super. 2016), citing

Commonwealth v. Archer, 722 A.2d 203, 210-211 (Pa. Super. 1998).

      Appellate review of a trial court's sentencing determination is governed

by Section 9781(c) of the Sentencing Code.

       Section 9781(c) specifically defines three instances in which the
       appellate courts should vacate a sentence and remand: (1) the
       [trial] court applied the guidelines erroneously; (2) the
       sentence falls within the guidelines, but is “clearly
       unreasonable” based on the circumstances of the case; and (3)
       the sentence falls outside of the guidelines and is
       “unreasonable.”

Commonwealth v. Bowen, 975 A.2d 1120,1123 (Pa. Super. 2009), citing

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(c). In reviewing sentencing matters, we are mindful of

our well-settled standard of review.

       Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
       [trial court], and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal
       absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse
       of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment.
       Rather, the appellant must establish, by reference to the record,
       that the [trial] court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised
       its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias[,] or
       ill[-]will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

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Commonwealth v. Garcia-Rivera, 983 A.2d 777, 780 (Pa. Super. 2009)

(quotation omitted).

      The sentencing guidelines lists the offense gravity scores for various

crimes, including PWID and conspiracy to commit PWID. Importantly, Section

303.15 lists the OGS for possessing over 1,000 grams of cocaine as 13. See

204 Pa. Code § 303.15. In addition, Section 303.3 states, in relevant part, as

follows:

       (3) Convictions for attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy to
       commit any offense under The Controlled Substance, Drug,
       Device and Cosmetic Act (35 P.S. § 780-101--§ 780-144)
       receive the [OGS] of the offense attempted, solicited, or which
       was the object of the conspiracy.

204 Pa. Code § 303.3(C)(3).

      Herein,   the    Commonwealth    presented    evidence,   in   particular,

Appellant’s telephone conversations, wherein he negotiated or otherwise

discussed selling and distributing kilograms, which is 1,000 grams, of cocaine.

See N.T. Trial, 4/10/23-4/12/23, at 185-211 (identifying Appellant engaging

in approximately 74 telephone conversations between February 6, 2020 and

March 23, 2020 with, among others, Cintron-Cardona and unknown

individuals from Puerto Rico); see also N.T. Sentencing, 7/19/23, at 7-8 (the

Commonwealth stating that there “was evidence [at trial] o[f] conversations

where [Appellant] was talking about drugs in the amounts of kilo[grams] and

utilizing amounts akin to $11,000[.00] for half kilo[grams] and $30,000[.00]

or more for full kilo[grams]. He was conversing with other kilo-level dealers

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and making trips to pick up and distribute these amounts.”). In addition, the

Commonwealth presented expert testimony further interpreting Appellant’s

various phone calls and indicting that Appellant was discussing “whole

kilograms, which [is] 1,000 grams” of, inter alia, cocaine. N.T. Trial,

4/10/23-4/12/23, at 269. Based upon the foregoing, we agree with counsel

that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in issuing Appellant’s sentence.

      We have independently considered the issues raised within counsel’s

Anders brief and we have determined that the claims are frivolous.             In

addition, after an independent review of the entire record, we see nothing that

might arguably support this appeal. The appeal is, therefore, wholly frivolous.

Accordingly, we affirm Appellant's judgment of sentence and grant counsel's

petition for leave to withdraw.

      Petition for leave to withdraw appearance granted. Judgment of

sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 4/1/2024

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