Court Opinion

ID: 9386438
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-12 15:05:20.86877+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:06.397360
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                  No. 22-1329
                              Filed April 12, 2023

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF SARAH A. ENKE
AND JASON A. ENKE

Upon the Petition of
SARAH A. ENKE,
      Petitioner-Appellant,

And Concerning
JASON A. ENKE,
     Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cerro Gordo County, Rustin T.

Davenport, Judge.

      Sarah Enke appeals the denial of her request to modify physical care and

the grant of Jason Enke’s request for a postsecondary education subsidy.

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.

      Sophie Wanek of McCormally & Cosgrove, P.L.L.C., Des Moines, for

appellant.

      Jacqueline R. Conway of Laird Law Firm, P.L.C., Mason City, for appellee.

      Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Greer and Chicchelly, JJ.
                                          2

GREER, Judge.

        Sarah Enke appeals the June 2022 modification order concerning her

dissolution decree with Jason Enke, which was the parties’ third trip to court

seeking modification. In this round, she challenges the district court’s limitation to

the testimony of one of her witnesses, Steve Kaduce; its refusal to modify the

physical-care arrangement; and its imputation of a postsecondary education

subsidy obligation on her and not on Jason. Jason asks for appellate attorney

fees.   We find no abuse in the district court’s discretion in limiting Kaduce’s

testimony and affirm the district court’s modification order maintaining physical

care of the two minor children with Jason and requiring a postsecondary education

subsidy obligation for Sarah.      However, we modify the order to require a

postsecondary education subsidy for Jason. Finally, we decline to order appellate

attorney fees.

I. Background Facts and Prior Proceedings.

        Jason and Sarah were married in 1999 and had four children—D.E., J.E.,

B.E., and P.E.    The marriage was dissolved in 2014 by dissolution decree,

adopting the parties’ stipulation they share joint legal custody and joint physical

care. Later that same year, Jason brought a contempt action that Sarah answered

with a counterclaim alleging Jason violated the terms of the dissolution decree. In

the district court’s ruling on the applications for rule to show cause, it noted the

parties struggled to communicate and cooperate with one another, but found only

Jason in contempt for making disparaging comments about Sarah while the

children were present.
                                          3

       In 2015, Jason filed a petition for modification seeking physical care; again,

Sarah counterclaimed seeking the same result for her. In the first modification

action, both parents recognized joint physical care was not in the best interests of

the children. And, as the district court noted in its first modification order, “shared

parenting [had] proven to be ‘unworkable’” and “communication [had] been difficult

and [had] essentially broken down between them, that the accounting for parenting

expenses was impossible, and that the two parents have very different priorities

and parenting styles.” The district court awarded Sarah physical care.

       Less than two years later, in 2017, Jason again filed a petition for

modification. At that time, D.E., then in high school, had moved in with his father

full-time because he found it to be a less stressful environment. During the second

modification hearing, the parents again agreed that joint physical care was not in

the children’s best interest. Overall, the court found that all of the children had

“become more anxious [and] stressed since the last modification” caused by

“continued friction between the parents, especially concerning clothes, activities,

and finances.” Because of these stressors, “[s]everal credible witnesses testified

that the children appear to be more relaxed and at ease and less anxious in their

father’s care.” Moreover, the district court found Sarah was intentionally keeping

information about the children—including doctor appointments and extracurricular

activities—from Jason. Noting the problems arising out of Sarah having physical

care were not previously anticipated, the district court found a substantial change

in circumstances justifying placement of the children in Jason’s physical care while

Sarah was to have liberal visitation. Sarah appealed the ruling, which was affirmed
                                          4

by a panel of this court that November. See In re Marriage of Enke, No. 18-0360,

2018 WL 6130309, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2018).

        In August of 2020, Jason filed a petition for a postsecondary education

subsidy—pursuant to Iowa Code section 598.21F (2020)—for D.E., who was a

sophomore in college, and J.E., who would start her freshman year the following

fall. In his filing, Jason pointed to the language in the original stipulation allowing

for the court to determine their respective contributions for college expenses.

Sarah answered with a counterclaim seeking a third modification; she sought to

change the physical care of B.E. and P.E., the only children who were still minors.

She accused Jason of alienating the children from her and asked the district court

to reinstitute a joint physical care arrangement. She requested a period of no

contact between Jason and the minor children so that she and the children could

participate in a reunification period, after which time she and Jason would co-

parent through a parent coordinator. In response, Jason amended his petition to

ask for sole legal custody of the minor children or sole decision-making for health

care.

        At the time of trial, both D.E. and J.E. attended public in-state universities

and had earned scholarships and grants towards their education. They both also

worked when they were home in the summers and on weekends. And, the district

court was informed that in 2020 Sarah earned $54,725 each year, while Jason

earned $110,626 annually.

        The modification trial was set to begin July 28, 2021. On July 14, Sarah

noticed the telephone deposition of Kaduce, a licensed mental health counselor

who met with the children around the time of the 2017 modification and continued
                                          5

to see Sarah. The deposition was set for July 19, 2021. Jason objected, noting

that Kaduce was not timely disclosed as an expert witness. The district court held1

that Kaduce could testify, but only as to factual matters and not expert opinions.

But, Kaduce was allowed to offer some information with the understanding the

district court would sort out what was fact and what was expert opinion and

disregard the latter.

       The trial occurred over four days in July and October of 2021. Both parents

outlined moments of contention that impacted the children, such as fighting at

D.E.’s graduation party, doctors refusing to treat the children because of discontent

between the parents, verbal sparring at the children’s school events, a lack of

flexibility for special occasions and family events, and various occasions when the

children were left feeling they had to choose between their two parents. A parade

of witnesses came through the courtroom giving their opinion on the parents’

personalities—outlining their best and worst moments. And a wide sampling of

text messages and emails exchanged between the parties was admitted as

evidence to show their communication issues. What everyone involved could

agree on was Jason and Sarah’s demonstrated inability to co-parent.

       Both minor children—in eighth and ninth grade at the time—testified that

they felt more comfortable at their father’s home and preferred the current

1  A hearing occurred on July 19, but the transcript of the hearing regarding the
issue was not provided. “It is the appellant’s duty to provide a record on appeal
affirmatively disclosing the alleged error relied upon. The court may not speculate
as to what took place or predicate error on such speculation.” In re F.W.S., 698
N.W.2d 134, 135 (Iowa 2005) (internal citation omitted). We are limited, then, to
written filings and additional information on the issue the district court provided in
its final argument.
                                          6

arrangement to their experience with joint physical care. They pointed to concerns

with fighting between Sarah and her paramour and Sarah speaking poorly about

Jason or D.E. P.E. wished for the current schedule to stay in place while B.E.

hoped not to have a formal visitation schedule so he could choose when he wanted

to be with Sarah.2     Both children testified Jason urged them to maintain a

relationship with Sarah.

       After the final trial date, Sarah moved for the district court to reconsider its

ruling on Kaduce. Attached to the motion was a letter, marked as an exhibit, that

had not been offered at trial. The district court held that Kaduce was serving as

an expert witness for Sarah and, because he was not properly disclosed as an

expert, Jason was prejudiced. So, the district court denied Sarah’s motion to

reconsider.3

       The district court asked the parties for post-trial filings indicating their

calculations for the postsecondary education subsidy. The remaining balance for

D.E.’s freshman year after his grants, scholarships, loans, and work study was

$1570.27; for his sophomore year, it was $8019.00. For D.E’s last two years of

college, Jason asked that Sarah cover one-half of the estimated cost of tuition,

fees, housing, books, and personal expenses less D.E.’s grants, scholarships,

loans, and work study—totaling $4229.50 each year. For J.E., Jason provided a

similar calculation, subtracting J.E.’s scholarships, grants, and loans from the total

2 At the time of the October hearing dates, B.E. was living full-time with Jason,
though he testified his father encouraged him to go for visitation with Sarah.
3 The district court explicitly noted that even if it had considered all of Kaduce’s

testimony, it would have come to the same conclusion because of his limited
contact with the children since the last modification action as he last counseled the
children in February 2018.
                                         7

cost of tuition, fees, room, meals, books, and personal expenses, taking into

account that she had some scholarships that would only cover her freshman year.

With these calculations, he asked that Sarah cover half of what remained—

$1928.00 for J.E.’s freshman year and $5518.67 for each year after. Jason had

also already paid $330 toward J.E.’s fees and asked to be reimbursed for half of

that cost. In her reply, Sarah argued she had insufficient funds to pay for the

subsidies due to her own student loan4 and her lesser monthly income compared

to Jason.

       Ultimately, the district court maintained physical care with Jason, denied

Jason’s request for sole legal custody or sole decision-making for health care, and

modified Sarah’s child support. The district court also found that, taking into

consideration she is now only paying child support for two children rather than four,

Sarah had the reasonable ability to contribute $2400 a year towards her adult

children’s postsecondary education; it ordered Sarah to pay a postsecondary

education subsidy of $785 for D.E.’s freshman year5 and $2361.79 for his

sophomore year. Considering Sarah’s ability to pay, the court then ordered her to

pay $1600 toward D.E.’s junior year and $1200 toward his senior year. For J.E.,

the court ordered Sarah to pay $800 for her freshman year and $1200 for her

sophomore year. If D.E. had a fifth year of college, this payment arrangement

would continue until D.E. graduated or turned twenty-three years of age, whichever

4 Sarah owes over $125,000 in her own student loans for two separate master’s
degrees in social work and holistic health.
5 This reflected the actual balance for D.E.’s freshman year rather than what Jason

paid out of pocket.
                                          8

came earlier; but, once D.E. graduated or turned twenty-three, Sarah would

contribute $2093 for J.E.’s education until she graduated or turned twenty-three.

       Sarah filed a post-trial motion for an order nunc pro tunc stating the order

had “inadvertently failed to assign responsibility to [Jason] for his specific

contribution amount to [D.E.] and [J.E.]’s post-secondary education.” She also

stated “she [did] not dispute her [postsecondary education subsidy] contribution.”

The district court filed an order noting Sarah had not asked for the court to establish

a postsecondary education obligation for Jason, neither party had argued the issue

at trial, and it was not included in the post-trial filings specifically ordered on the

postsecondary education subsidy issue.         The district court then scheduled a

hearing on the issue and, in a subsequent ruling, reaffirmed that the issue had not

been raised and denied the motion.

       Sarah appeals, (1) arguing the district court abused its discretion by limiting

Kaduce’s testimony, (2) claiming the court erred in denying her petition for

modification, and (3) contesting the postsecondary education subsidy.

II. Analysis.

       A. Steve Kaduce.

       Sarah first argues Kaduce was improperly limited in the testimony he was

allowed to provide at trial when the district court ruled he could testify to factual

matters but not expert opinions. While Kaduce testified fully at trial about his

opinions, the district court noted that topics that were expert in nature, such as

diagnosis or causes of the children’s mental health conditions, would not be

considered in the ruling. “‘We review whether a district court properly admitted [or

excluded] expert testimony for abuse of discretion.’ But when we review the
                                          9

interpretation of a rule of civil procedure, such as rule 1.500(2), our review is for

errors at law.” McGrew v. Otoadese, 969 N.W.2d 311, 319 (Iowa 2022) (citations

omitted).

       Addressing Jason’s position over notice of expert testimony, the district

court determined that Kaduce’s opinions had not been timely disclosed. So we

turn to the disclosure requirements that apply to expert witness testimony,

including Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.500(2)(b) and (c) which states:

              b. Witnesses who must provide a written report. Unless
       otherwise stipulated or ordered by the court, this disclosure must be
       accompanied by a written report—prepared and signed by the
       witness—if the witness is one retained or specially employed to
       provide expert testimony in the case or one whose duties as the
       party’s employee regularly involve giving expert testimony. . . .
              ....
              c. Witnesses who do not provide a written report. Unless
       otherwise stipulated or ordered by the court, if the witness is not
       required to provide a written report, this disclosure must state:
              (1) The subject matter on which the witness is expected to
       present evidence under Iowa Rules of Evidence 5.702, 5.703, or
       5.705.
              (2) A summary of the facts and opinions to which the witness
       is expected to testify.

Sarah argues that, because Kaduce was a “treating physician” rather than one

hired for the purposes of litigation, the requirements in rule 1.500(2)(b) do not

apply. See Mengwasser v. Comito, 970 N.W.2d 875, 881 (Iowa 2022) (noting rule

1.500(2)(b) is “focused on how the expert came to be involved, not when the expert

developed their opinions”). We agree that Kaduce was not “retained or specially

employed” to provide expert testimony under rule 1.500(2)(b). But, rule 1.500(2)(c)

applies to expert witnesses when rule 1.500(2)(b) does not, including in this

situation. See id. (“Rule 1.500(2)(c), in turn, fills the disclosure gap as to experts

who do not have to provide rule 1.500(2)(b) reports.”). Sarah does not provide an
                                         10

argument why rule 1.500(2)(c) would not apply in her initial briefing. And, while

she asserts Kaduce’s designation as a fact witness in her response to

interrogatories should be sufficient to satisfy the notice requirement, she provides

no explanation why—if we accepted this premise—the door would open for

Kaduce to offer opinions on subjects that require expert training without proper

disclosure.6

       As a final note, we consider that the district court evaluated the witnesses

during the trial and specifically found it was “unpersuaded by Kaduce’s opinions”

and that the opinions did not “justify Sarah’s proposed remedy of a no contact order

followed by joint physical care.” See Tappe ex rel. Tappe v. Iowa Methodist Med.

Ctr., 477 N.W.2d 396, 401 (Iowa 1991) (finding reversal was not justified because

the district court’s wrongful exclusion of expert testimony was harmless). We find

no abuse of the court’s discretion in limiting Kaduce’s testimony based on Sarah’s

failure to comply with disclosure requirements in rule 1.500(2)(c).

       B. Physical-Care Modification.

       i. Physical Care.

       Sarah asks us to give her physical care on appeal; Jason asserts that she

failed to preserve error for this request. “It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate

review that issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court

6 In her reply brief, Sarah also argues that, because Kaduce did not testify until the
October trial date, Jason had plenty of notice to conduct discovery and prepare for
cross-examination. “Generally, we will not consider issues raised for the first time
in a reply brief.” Villa Magana v. State, 908 N.W.2d 255, 260 (Iowa 2018). But
even if this was properly raised and we agreed with Sarah’s premise that Jason
was given notice, she still failed to comply with the summary requirement. See
Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.500(2)(c)(2).
                                           11

before we will decide them on appeal.” Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537

(Iowa 2002). In her counterclaim, Sarah asked the court to “grant the modification

to provide that the parties must participate in co-parent counseling and utilize the

services of a parent coordinator and that the children should be in shared physical

care of the parties with a 50/50 schedule.” Sarah argues that although she did not

originally seek physical care, her answer and counterclaim outlined that she was

“more capable of ministering to the long-range best interests of the children than

Jason” and she supplied the district court with child support guidelines showing the

children in her physical care. But the district court’s modification order only refers

to Sarah’s request for joint physical care, not any alternative status. Likewise,

Sarah filed no post-trial motion flagging for the district court that it failed to rule on

any request for physical care. See id. (“When a district court fails to rule on an

issue properly raised by a party, the party who raised the issue must file a motion

requesting a ruling in order to preserve error for appeal.”). Sarah failed to preserve

error on her request for physical care, so we only review her request for joint

physical care.

       ii. Joint Physical Care.

       At trial, Sarah argued the district court should have instituted a joint physical

care arrangement. And on appeal, as noted above, it is not clear if she abandoned

that position or if the request for a joint physical care arrangement remains for our

consideration. In any event, we review the district court’s ruling on a petition to

modify the physical care provision de novo. In re Marriage of Hoffman, 867 N.W.2d

26, 32 (Iowa 2015). “To change a custodial provision of a dissolution decree, the

applying party must establish by a preponderance of evidence that conditions
                                          12

since the decree was entered have so materially and substantially changed that

the children’s best interests make it expedient to make the requested change.” In

re Marriage of Frederici, 338 N.W.2d 156, 158 (Iowa 1983). These proffered

changes “must not have been contemplated by the court when the decree was

entered, and they must be more or less permanent, not temporary” and “must

relate to the welfare of the children.” Id. Then, the parent seeking the modification

“must prove an ability to minister more effectively to the children’s well being.” Id.

This is a heavy burden because “once custody of children has been fixed it should

be disturbed only for the most cogent reasons.” Id. As a guiding principle,

       Physical care issues are not to be resolved based upon perceived
       fairness to the [parents], but primarily upon what is best for the child.
       The objective of a physical care determination is to place the children
       in the environment most likely to bring them to health, both physically
       and mentally, and to social maturity.

In re Marriage of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 695 (Iowa 2007).

       We agree with the district court’s assessment that “[t]his family’s situation is

extremely sad and frustrating.”     Unfortunately, it is not new—their inability to

successfully coparent existed not only at the time of the previous modification, but

has been persistent through multiple court actions involving this family. From our

vantage point, each parent shares the responsibility for the distress and anxiety

these children have suffered. But when considering Sarah’s request to return to

joint physical care, we note the ability of the parents “to communicate and show

mutual respect” and their “degree of conflict” with one another are incredibly

important factors in determining whether joint physical care is appropriate. See id.

at 698 (“In short, a stormy marriage and divorce presents a significant risk factor

that must be considered in determining whether joint physical care is in the best
                                         13

interest of the children. The prospect for successful joint physical care is reduced

when there is a bitter parental relationship and one party objects to the shared

arrangement.”); cf. Melchiori v. Kooi, 644 N.W.2d 365, 368 (Iowa Ct. App. 2002)

(“Discord between parents that has a disruptive effect on children’s lives has been

held to be a substantial change of circumstance that warrants a modification of the

decree to designate a primary physical caregiver if it appears that the children, by

having a primary physical caregiver, will have superior care.”).       There is no

question that these parents have consistently struggled to co-parent7 and that the

past joint physical care arrangement caused a lot of stress for their children.

       With these parents’ demonstrated inability to work together, a joint care plan

would—as it did in the past—work against the children’s best interests. We can

therefore neither find that there was a substantial change in circumstances in this

case nor that a joint-physical-care arrangement is in the children’s best interests.

       C. Postsecondary Education Subsidy.

       In her motion to reconsider the modification ruling, Sarah confirmed “she

does not dispute her contribution” to the older children’s postsecondary education.

But on appeal, Sarah argues that the district court (1) should not have required her

to reimburse D.E. and J.E. for money already put toward their college expenses,

(2) should not have imposed a postsecondary education subsidy for D.E. because

of his contentious relationship with her,8 and (3) should have also imposed a

7 At the modification hearing, Jason testified he and Sarah had not “had a co-
parenting conversation in several years.”
8 See Iowa Code § 598.21F(4) (“A postsecondary education subsidy shall not be

awarded if the child has repudiated the parent by publicly disowning the parent,
refusing to acknowledge the parent, or by acting in a similar manner.”).
                                           14

postsecondary education subsidy on Jason. The first two arguments were not

raised at trial nor in Sarah’s post-trial filing about the subsidy, and they are not

addressed in any of the court’s orders.9 See Meier, 641 N.W.2d at 537. And, the

district court’s post-trial ruling focused solely on Jason’s obligation because of

Sarah’s acquiescence in the contributions set out in the modification order. See

In re K.D., No. 20-1634, 2021 WL 5105900, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 3, 2021)

(“K.D.’s present argument is ‘inconsistent’ with his position in the district

court. . . . K.D. is judicially estopped from asserting a contrary position on appeal.”

(citations omitted)).

       Our review, then, is limited to whether the district court should have imposed

a postsecondary education subsidy obligation on Jason. Our review is de novo.

In re Marriage of Vaughan, 812 N.W.2d 688, 692 (Iowa 2012). We give weight to

the fact findings of the district court but are not bound by these findings. Iowa R.

App. P. 6.904(3)(g); In re Marriage of Olson, 705 N.W.2d 312, 313 (Iowa 2005).

       First, in the original stipulation, the parties agreed that:

       The expenses for the postsecondary education subsidy for the
       children, pursuant to Iowa Code § 598.21F, will be determined at a
       later time when it is known what qualifying institution each will attend
       and the financial conditions of the parties. If the parties cannot agree
       as to their respective contribution to the children’s college support
       will be, the Court will retain jurisdiction to determine the obligation
       upon application of either party without that party having to show a
       substantial change in circumstances.

Second, our legislature determined that “[t]he court may order a postsecondary

education subsidy if good cause is shown.” Iowa Code § 598.21F(1). Historically

9 Though the issues are not addressed in the ruling, it is possible that Sarah raised
them at the hearing; but, as with the hearing about Kaduce, the transcript of the
hearing was not provided for our review. See F.W.S., 698 N.W.2d at 135.
                                          15

Jason was covering some of the shortfall on the college expenses and brought the

modification action to compel Sarah’s participation. Thus, he did not dispute there

was good cause to order a postsecondary education subsidy. To determine good

cause, “the court shall consider the age of the child, the ability of the child relative

to postsecondary education, the child’s financial resources, whether the child is

self-sustaining, and the financial condition of each parent.” Id. § 598.21F(2). To

calculate the obligation, the court is to take “the cost of postsecondary education

based upon the cost of attending an in-state public institution for a course of

instruction leading to an undergraduate degree and shall include the reasonable

costs for only necessary postsecondary education expenses,” Id. § 598.21F(2)(a),

and subtract the child’s expected contribution before “apportion[ing] responsibility

for the remaining cost of postsecondary education to each parent,” Id.

§ 598.21F(2)(c).

       Sarah points to Iowa Code section 598.21F(2)(c), flagging that the subsidy

is supposed to be apportioned to “each parent.” And, in interpreting the statute’s

three-step process for apportioning this responsibility, Iowa courts have repeatedly

described the third step as requiring the court to “allocate the remaining costs

between the parents in an amount not to exceed thirty-three and one-third percent

of the total cost of postsecondary education.” See, e.g., In re Marriage of Larsen,

912 N.W.2d 444, 449 (Iowa 2018). The district court was charged with dividing

responsibility for the subsidy between the child and both parents when Jason

raised the issue, so Sarah was not required to ask again. See Griffin Pipe Prods.

Co. v. Bd of Review, 789 N.W.2d 769, 772 (Iowa 2010) (“Our issue preservation

rules are not designed to be hypertechnical.”).
                                          16

       As for D.E.’s freshman and sophomore years of college and J.E.’s freshman

year, the district court already considered Jason’s voluntarily payments towards

that shortfall. Recognizing Sarah’s financial tensions, the district court limited her

responsibility for postsecondary education subsidy for the two older children to

definitive numbers. See Vaughan, 812 N.W.2d at 693 (recognizing to qualify for a

postsecondary education subsidy, the child “must be between the ages of eighteen

and twenty-two and must have demonstrated capacity to succeed in

postsecondary education”). And, toward the college expense that Jason already

paid, the district court directed Sarah to make specific payments that essentially

reimbursed the child for part of the remaining postsecondary education costs paid

by Jason. We do not disturb those findings.

       Going forward, as the district court did for Sarah, we consider what, if any,

postsecondary education subsidy should be paid by Jason, as the parties

acknowledged should be done under the original stipulation and as the statute

requires. See id. at 694 (“Once the remaining cost has been determined, the

statute directs the court to apportion the responsibility of the remaining cost to each

parent.”). Jason set out what the obligations would be for the future years until the

statutory obligation ends and told the district court he would split the net costs not

paid by the child’s loans and scholarships with Sarah. Considering those costs,

we find Jason shall pay to the school or child the remaining balance of the net

education cost for each child, after reduction of Sarah’s payment and the child’s

contributions, so long as it does not exceed the statutory limitation for his share.

See In re Marriage of Ossowski, ___ N.W.2d ___, No. 21-1154, 2022 WL 3070834

at *3–4 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 3, 2022) (detailing the steps to calculate the subsidy
                                         17

and define the maximum obligation of each parent under the parameters of section

598.21F). For example, here the evidence showed that the gross cost to attend

Iowa State University for J.E. was $22,156 per year. So, Jason should cover the

remaining shortfall after Sarah’s court ordered contribution, not to exceed any

amount over his thirty-three and one-third percent statutory obligation ($22,156÷3

= $7385). Jason has the ability to cover his statutory share of these costs.

       In sum, we affirm the district court’s determination of the postsecondary

obligation of Sarah and modify the order to establish Jason’s responsibility for any

remaining college expense not to exceed thirty-three and one-third percent of the

cost to attend the state university.

       D. Appellate Attorney Fees.

       Jason requests appellate attorney fees and provided an affidavit of fees and

expenses without detailing the number of hours spent or the hourly rate charged.

Though the parties do not have a right to appellate attorney fees, we do have the

discretion to grant them. In re Marriage of Okland, 699 N.W.2d 260, 270 (Iowa

2005). “Factors to be considered in determining whether to award attorney fees

include: ‘the needs of the party seeking the award, the ability of the other party to

pay, and the relative merits of the appeal.’” Id. (citation omitted). While Jason has

prevailed on most issues, he is in a superior financial position to Sarah. We decline

to award appellate attorney fees.

III. Conclusion.

       For the above reasons, we modify the district court’s modification order to
                                      18

institute a postsecondary education subsidy payable by Jason, but otherwise

affirm. We do not award appellate attorney fees.

      AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.