Court Opinion

ID: 9829694
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:32:22.981335+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:04.332669
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Counsel for defendant in error, Camden Company, has filed in this court in behalf of his client a motion for rehearing, and with vigor and apparent earnestness attacks several of our findings and conclusions. -He charges that this court has exceeded its authority in setting aside the holding of the trial judge; that we have substituted our findings for those of the trial judge, which were supported by ample evidence; that'we have made findings as to matters of which there is no evidence, and in many instances directly contrary to the positive record evidence.
Having made these sweeping charges,’ he has entered into detailed charges, and says that we erred in holding that the suit brought in the name of Eckel by Attorneys Hannay and Thompson was brought by authority of Eckel, and in reversing the holding of the trial judge to the contrary, which was supported by ample evidence. Being confronted by these charges, whereby we are charged with having departed from the established law of this state, and with having carelessly found to exist, facts which have no record evidence for their support, we feel called upon to make the following statement:
Eckel testified, substantially, that he placed the matters of settlement between himself and the insurance companies in the hands of *855his attorney, Allen Hannay, and told him to handle the matter of settlement in his own way, or as he áaw best. The undisputed evidence shows that Attorney Hannay, as Eck-el’s attorney, prepared or had prepared the instrument by which, the claims sued upon were transferred to the Northern Company, and that Eckel signed the same and caused it to be delivered to said company. By such instrument, Eckel agreed that the suit for the collection of such claims might he brought in his name, and obligated himself to assist to the best of his ability to collect the claims. It is apparent from the facts above stated that Mr. Hannay was, by authority vested in him by Eckel, authorized to join William Thompson, attorney for the Northern Company, in bringing the suit in Eckel’s name, and thereby giving assistance in an effort to collect the claims which Eckel had transferred to the,Northern Company.
Counsel charges that we stated that Eckel was asserting a claim of $1,800 against the Northern Company, when, as a fact, the claim was for $2,400. The only evidence with reference to the amount of the claim is the testimony of Mr. Hannay, attorney for Eckel, and he states that the claim was for $2,400, so we must concede that this charge of counsel is technically correct. In the transfer signed by Eckel, which is set out in our opinion, it is recited that the Northern Company paid Eckel $1,800. He gave that figure as the amount of the claim.
We stated in our opinion that Eckel approached Joseph P. Clark for the purpose of procuring insurance, and made application therefor, and that such application was forwarded to Craven, Dargan & Roberts, agents of the Camden Company, and that said agents accepted such application. Counsel, in the motion, attacks such statements as being unsupported by any evidence in the record. In the third paragraph of defendant’s original answer it is substantially, admitted that Frank Eckel did make the application as alleged in the plaintiff’s petition, and in the seventh paragraph of the answer it was alleged as follows:
“That the negotiations between the said Frank Eckel and one Joseph P. Clark, or the firm of Messrs. Cravens, Dargan & Roberts, were not completed and were not sufficient to form, and were not intended by any of said parties to form, a completed insurance contract; that the negotiations between plaintiff and' one Joseph P. Clark, or the firm of Messrs. Cravens, Dargan & Roberts, were incomplete and not sufficient to form, and were not intended by either party to form, the basis of a valid contract of insurance upon which action for loss by fire to plaintiff’s property can be predicated.”
Conceding, however, that the statements made, of which counsel complains, were not, technically speaking, shown by any evidence, the same would have no bearing on the issues presented by the appeal and which are before us for determination. They were made only for the purpose of stating the nature of the suit as made by the petition of the plaintiff, and to furnish a preface for an intelligent presentation of the issues before us, and not as having any bearing on the merits of the case, which were not before us. They were made, to disclose the asserted relation or authority of the attorneys, whose authority to bring the suit was challenged by appellant in its motion to dismiss the suit for want of authority in said attorneys. It is clearly apparent that we made the statement with reference to the procurement or attempted procurement of insurance by Eckel merely to show the nature of the suit as made by the plaintiff’s petition, and we are surprised that counsel has so vigorously attacked the same.
Counsel challenges our finding that W. C, Thompson and Allen Hannay were counsel for their respective clients, the Northern Company and the Camden Company, and says that he had found no evidence in the record that either of those attorneys was the attorney of the Northern Company or of Eckel at the time the suit was filed. Mr. Hannay, whose testimony is undisputed, testified that he represented Eckel in the settlement of his insurance claim against the Northern Company, and that the Northern Company was represented by Mr. Thompson’s firm.
Counsel challenges our finding that Eckel testified that he was willing for the suit to continue in bis name before the same was dismissed. He quotes parts of Eckel’s evidence to support his challenge, but he fails to quote those parts of Eckel’s testimony which are as follows:
“Mr. Hannay bandied those negotiations with the Northern Assurance Company. I left the matter of arranging the settlement with Mr. Hannay.
“As to whether I executed this agreement, marked as Plaintiff’s Exhibit A, at Mr. Han-nay’s instance, I went down to Houston, and Mr. Hannay was absent from the state; but his partner had all the papers there for me to sign, the settlement papers. This paper you notice has an ‘X’ there that designates where I was to sign. I did not read the instrument; I left it to him. I signed where he had it marked for me to sign. I signed several instruments at that\ime; I only remember that one where that ‘X’ is; I signed that.
“As to whether I, at the present time, have any objection to this suit which is now pending against the Camden Fire Insurance Association, being prosecuted in my name — under that agreement right there, that covers it. I thought he was handling it. When I signed this affidavit that has been read in evidence, I did not understand the circumstances as I understand them now. I left it all entirely to Mr. Hannay. When I signed that affidavit that has been read in evidence; I did no.t understand just how Mr. Han-nay had handled the matter for me. Having now learned how he handled it for me, I do not know as I have any objection to this proceeding that has been provided for in this agreement, as long as it don’t reflect on me; I am out of it.”
*856Again:
“As to whether I have no interest in this suit now pending, why Mr. Hannay tells me that this case has never been thoroughly completed; I left it to him.”
Again:
“When I signed this agreement that my name appears to here,. marked Exhibit A, I at that time was leaving the whole settlement to my attorneys, to Mr. Hannay. This agreement that I executed, and which my lawyer had prepared, Exhibit A, among other things states that the recovery may be attempted in my name against any of these companies represented by Cravens, Dargan & Roberts.”
It is unnecessary to discuss the other complaints in the motion, as they present no grounds for a rehearing. The motion is overruled.
Overruled.