Court Opinion

ID: 9727283
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:29:08.723983+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:35.865112
License: Public Domain

Opinion Concurring in Part, Dissenting in Part
Prentice, J.
I concur in the majority opinion with respect to the affirmance of the conviction of Donald Harris but dissent from such opinion as to the affirmance of the conviction of Leonard Harris.
It is my opinion that the consolidation of these appeals has confused the majority into a commingling of the evidence from the two separate trials, and that the same understandable error was committed by the trial judge, who presided over both trials in the same day. The evidence being so similar in the two trials, it is difficult to erase from one’s mind the evidence of one while considering the evidence in the other. However, my meticulous examination of Leonard’s Bill of Exceptions has convinced me that the evidence presented in his trial was insufficient, as a matter of law, to sustain his conviction under the tests set forth in Baker v. State (1956), 236 Ind. 55, 138 N. E. 2d 641 and Manlove v. State (1968), 250 Ind. 70, 232 N. E. 2d 874.
The evidence in Leonard’s trial, with regard to the actual *347robbery, did not establish the identity of the robbers but only that the establishment was robbed by two persons, one of whom looked like the twin brothers (Donald and Leonard). The other robber was not identified in any way at this trial. Therefore, Leonard is implicated, not because he was found in the company of anyone who was identified as one of the robbers but only by virtue of having been found in the company of a man who looked like one of the robbers. It is my opinion that we would not affirm a conviction where the only evidence against the accused was that he looked like the culprit but would hold such evidence to be insufficient to establish identity beyond a reasonable doubt. If this be true, affirmance as to Leonard will amount to a conviction by association only with one who himself could not have been convicted. This leaves standing, as the only evidence of probative value against Leonard, the fact that he apparently attempted to establish an alibi by lying to the arresting officers with respect to how long he had been in the vehicle. I agree that this, together with other evidence of probative value, could be considered as evidence of guilt. Standing alone, however I believe it to be insufficient as a matter of law. Leonard’s attempt to establish an alibi is akin to flight and other similar conduct which we have previously held evidences a consciousness of guilt, from which the jury may draw an inference, in connection with other circumstances, that the person is guilty of the specific charge. Pierce v. State (1970), 253 Ind. 650, 256 N. E. 2d 557 at 561. I know of no case in this state, however, where such conduct alone, or with other circumstances which were merely consistent with the hypothesis of guilt but not in and of themselves of probative value, would support a verdict of guilty, and we recently held that it would not. Banks v. State (1971), 257 Ind. 653, 276 N. E. 2d 155.
From a review of the Bill of Exceptions in the trial of Donald Harris, a finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, was warranted that Donald was the one who entered the restaurant and committed the robbery. Were this evidence presented in *348the trial of Leonard, inferences of his guilt could be properly drawn from his being found shortly thereafter in Donald’s company and his attempt to establish the alibi. It appears, therefore, that the State would have little difficulty in convicting him upon a retrial. In this context, it might appear to the casual observer that the error was harmless. The fallacy, however, of permitting voids in the evidence to be supplied from improper sources, is so self-evident as to require no authority or further discussion. The reason for the defense motion for separate trials is obvious and was properly sustained. Having obtained this insulation, however, I am unable to perceive any counsel then subjected Leonard to the same exposure from which he had previously sheltered him. In my opinion, the conviction of Leonard was a natural consequence but, neverthelss, erroneous.
Note. — Reported in 281 N. E. 2d 85.