Court Opinion

ID: 9555679
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-14 19:04:15.496571+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:41:20.675571
License: Public Domain

Filed 8/14/23 P. v. Noe CA2/6
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,                                                   2d Crim. No. B323016
                                                           (Super. Ct. No. 22F-01156)
     Plaintiff and Respondent,                              (San Luis Obispo County)

v.

JORDAN JOHN NOE,

     Defendant and Appellant.

       Jordan John Noe appeals from the judgment entered after
a court trial. The court found him guilty of attempting by means
of threats to deter an executive officer from performing his duties
in violation of Penal Code section 69.1 Appellant was sentenced
to imprisonment in the county jail for 16 months.
       Appellant contends (1) his conviction is unconstitutional
because his alleged threats were not “true threats” and therefore
were protected speech under the First Amendment of the United

         1 Unless otherwise stated, all statutory references are to

the Penal Code.
States Constitution, (2) the trial court misunderstood the specific
intent required for a violation of section 69, (3) the evidence is
insufficient to support his conviction, and (4) the record fails to
show that he voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial. At
appellant’s request, we have reviewed the sealed record of an in
camera hearing to determine whether the trial court abused its
discretion in ruling on his Pitchess discovery motion. (Pitchess v.
Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess).) We affirm.
                                 Facts
        A 911 call reported that a man who “looks to be drunk or on
drugs” was “running in and out of . . . [traffic] lanes.” Officer
Nolan Parsons drove to the location described by the 911 caller.
Parsons saw appellant standing in one of the lanes of traffic.
“[H]e was out in the middle of the road.” He “was unsteady and
had some slurred speech.”
        Officer Parsons arrested appellant for disorderly conduct in
violation of section 647, subdivision (f). The subdivision provides
that a person is guilty of disorderly conduct if he “is found in any
public place under the influence of intoxicating liquor, [or] any
drug . . . in a condition that [he is] unable to exercise care for [his]
own safety or the safety of others . . . .” Parsons testified that the
arrest was “[b]ased on the totality of [appellant’s] mannerisms,
his balance, his activity in terms of not being able to make
decisions in his best interest, like being in the roadway.”
        Officer Parsons transported appellant to the county jail.
During the ride, appellant threatened Parsons. Appellant said:
“[I]f I wanted to I’ll punch you in your face I’ll put you on the
ground fucking snap your neck pull that gun and shoot your face
after you’re already dead. Just because I wanna see your fucking
brains and face explode.” “[W]hen you step outta your vehicle I’m

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ready to splatter your fucking brains on to the cement.” “You
know what insurgence means? You fucking retard. . . .
Insurgence means that we will fucking murder you.” “I can’t wait
till we catch you on the move. . . . [T]here’s very big huge
humans. . . . They’re looking for you now. . . . You need to stay
inside land, if you leave your land bro we will . . . fucking saw you
legs off . . . .” “Faggot fucking piece of shit, don’t you ever
disrespect me again.” “I will tear your fucking face off I’ll eat
your mother fucking eyeballs outta your face, I’ll fucking pull em’
out . . . .” “I’m gonna fucking put you in your fucking grave.” “Oh
you’re done. You’re smoke dude.” “I can’t wait until someone just
fucks you. I wish someone could put a bullet through your
head . . . .”
        When the threats were made, Officer Parsons and
appellant were the only occupants of the police vehicle. Parsons
was driving, and appellant was in the back seat. “A clear plastic
Plexiglass acetate partition” separated the front seat from the
back seat.
        Appellant’s hands were originally cuffed behind his back.
But during the ride appellant managed to “slip [the] cuffs
underneath [his] feet to where [his] arms [were] now freed in
front of [him].” This “[r]ender[ed] [him] capable of causing a lot
more harm than if [his] hands [were] behind [him].”
        “When [appellant] was being removed from the patrol
vehicle,” Parsons “specifically kept more distance [from
appellant] than normal” because he “was fearful [appellant] was
going to try to execute [the] threats” he had made. Officer
Parsons explained: ”I would typically be the officer who escorted
someone in and was close to them . . . . [¶] But given what
[appellant] articulated in the car, it wasn't worth risking my

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safety because he seemed to be focused on me specifically.”
Parsons believed appellant’s threats were “credible.” He “felt
fear” when appellant “made the comment about splattering [his]
brains.”
                   Appellant’s Conviction Does Not
                     Violate the First Amendment
       Section 69, subdivision (a) provides in relevant part: “Every
person who attempts, by means of any threat or violence, to deter
or prevent an executive officer from performing any duty imposed
upon the officer by law” is guilty of a criminal offense. “[A]
conviction under [section] 69 based on threatening speech is
unconstitutional if the speech was not a ‘true threat.’” (People v.
Smolkin (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 183, 188 (Smolkin).) Appellant
contends that because his “threatening statements were not a
‘true threat,’ his section 69 conviction violates the First
Amendment.” “‘“True threats” encompass those statements
where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of
an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular
individual or group of individuals.’” (Ibid.) “‘[A] present ability
to carry out threats is not required if . . . the target of the threat
could reasonably fear retaliatory action on some future occasion.’”
(People v. Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th 151, 195 (Sivongxxay).)
       “We make ‘an independent examination of the record’ in
determining whether ‘the speech at issue is an unprotected true
threat.’ [Citation.] Nevertheless, ‘[b]ecause the trier of fact is in
a superior position to observe the demeanor of witnesses,
credibility determinations are not subject to independent review,
nor are findings of fact that are not relevant to the First
Amendment issue.’ [Citation.] In the present case, the material
facts are not in dispute. Thus, we must make an independent

                                  4
legal determination whether a ‘reasonable listener would
understand’ [appellant’s threats] to constitute ‘“a serious
expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence”’ ‘in
light of the context and surrounding circumstances.’” (Smolkin,
supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at p. 188.)
       Appellant argues that his threats were not “true threats”
because they were “nonsensical and delusional.” Therefore, his
“statements could not reasonably have caused Parsons to suffer
sustained fear.”
       Appellant relies on Smolkin, supra, 49 Cal.App.5th 183.
There, a section 69 violation was based on the defendant’s letter
to the district attorney. The defendant said that if the charges
against him are not dropped, the “entire [district attorney’s] office
will be arrested by Russian military police, tried in a rubber
stamp trial for kidnapping, and sentenced to death by firing
squad . . . .” (Id. at p. 186.) The Court of Appeal “conclude[d]
that, as a matter of law, a ‘reasonable listener’ would not have
understood [defendant’s] . . . letter to be a true threat. This is
due to the combination of three factors: first, [his] threats were
delusional; second, [his] threatened violence by third parties who
were not (except in his delusion) his associates; and third, [he]
repeatedly assured he was not threatening to personally commit
violence.” (Id. at p. 189.)
       Unlike the Smolkin defendant’s threats, appellant’s threats
were not delusional or nonsensical. He did not threaten Officer
Parsons with execution by a foreign military force. He
threatened to personally kill Parsons: “[W]hen you step outta
your vehicle I’m ready to splatter your fucking brains on to the
cement.” “I will tear your fucking face off I’ll eat your mother

                                 5
fucking eyeballs outta your face, I’ll fucking pull em’ out . . . .”
“I’m gonna fucking put you in your fucking grave.”
         Based on our independent examination of the record, we
conclude a “‘reasonable [police officer] would understand’
[appellant’s threats] to constitute ‘“a serious expression of an
intent to commit an act of unlawful violence”’ ‘in light of the
context and surrounding circumstances.’” (Smolkin, supra, 49
Cal.App.5th at p. 188.) “‘“‘When [as here] a reasonable person
would foresee that the context and import of the words will cause
the listener to believe he or she will be subjected to physical
violence, the threat falls outside First Amendment protection.’”
. . .’” (People v. Nishi (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 954, 965.)
               The Trial Court Did Not Misunderstand the
           Specific Intent Element of a Violation of Section 69
         “[A] violation of section 69 through a threat ‘requires a
specific intent to interfere with the executive officer’s
performance of his duties.’” (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p.
195.) Appellant claims the trial court did not understand this
mental element of the crime. He maintains the court’s comments
show it believed appellant had the requisite specific intent
because he intended to provoke Officer Parsons into killing him,
i.e., he intended to “commit suicide by cop.”
         The “suicide by cop” theory is based on appellant’s cross-
examination testimony that he had threatened Officer Parsons
because “I think partially I was trying to get him to kill me, if I
could. If I could push him to kill me, I figured it would be easier.”
In rendering its decision on appellant’s guilt, the trial court said
the “suicide by cop” theory “does make sense to me.” The court
continued, “[Appellant’s] admission on the stand during cross-
examination was the final piece of the puzzle for me, the why.”

                                  6
Appellant argues, “[T]he trial court’s comments unambiguously
show that it found [he] threatened Parsons to cause the officer to
kill him. Because [his] specific intent to commit suicide does not
equate to a specific intent to deter Parson’s performance of his
duties, the court’s comments as a whole show that it relied on an
erroneous reading of section 69. Reversal is required.”
       “As a broad general proposition, cases have stated that a
trial court's remarks in a bench trial cannot be used to show that
the trial court misapplied the law or erred in its reasoning.
[Citations.] These statements are founded on the principle that,
in a criminal bench trial, the trial court is not required to provide
a statement of decision and that any explanation of his or her
decision a trial judge provides is not part of the record on appeal.
[Citation.] [¶] This broad proposition has been subjected to an
important limitation. . . . [C]ases . . . have held that we may
nonetheless consider a judge’s statement when, taken as a whole,
the judge’s statement discloses an incorrect rather than a correct
concept of the relevant law, ‘embodied not merely in “secondary
remarks” but in [the judge’s] basic ruling.’” (People v. Tessman
(2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1293, 1302 (Tessman).)
       “[W]e apply the general rule ‘that a trial court is presumed
to have been aware of and followed the applicable law.
[Citations.]’ [Citations.] This rule derives in part from the
presumption of Evidence Code section 664 ‘that official duty has
been regularly performed.’” (People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th
1107, 1114.) “Absent evidence to the contrary, that presumption
justifies a finding in this case that the trial court knew the”
specific intent requirement of section 69 and properly applied
that requirement. (People v. Mack (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 1026,
1032.) The court’s “suicide by cop” comments do not preclude a

                                  7
finding that appellant intended to interfere with Parsons’
performance of his duties. By his threats, appellant could have
intended to provoke Parsons into killing him and also to interfere
with Parson’s duty to transport him to the jail.
        The court’s comments show only that it considered the
“suicide by cop” theory in trying to understand appellant’s motive
for making the threats. The comments do not “disclose[] an
incorrect . . . concept of the relevant law, ‘embodied . . . in [the
judge’s] basic ruling.’” (Tessman, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at pp.
1302.) “Motive describes the reason a person chooses to commit a
crime. The reason, however, is different from a required mental
state such as intent or malice.” (People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27
Cal.4th 469, 504.)
       Substantial Evidence Supports the Section 69 Conviction
       Appellant maintains the evidence is insufficient to support
two elements of a violation of section 69: (1) he had the specific
intent to interfere with Officer Parsons’ performance of his duty,
and (2) he had the present ability to carry out his threats or
Parsons could reasonably fear future retaliatory action.
       “‘When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a conviction, we review the entire record in
the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it
contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable
trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.’ [Citation.] We . . . ‘presume[] in support of the judgment
the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from
the evidence.’ (People v. Maciel (2013) 57 Cal.4th 482, 514-515.)
       Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
judgment, we conclude a reasonable trier of fact could find

                                 8
beyond a reasonable doubt that, when appellant made the
threats, he had the specific intent to interfere with Officer
Parsons’ performance of his duty to transport appellant to the
jail. A reasonable trier of fact could also find beyond a reasonable
doubt that Parsons could reasonably fear retaliatory action by
appellant on a future occasion. (See People v. Walker (1988) 47
Cal.3d 605, 639 [defendant’s “courtroom threat, ‘the hell with
getting a cop, I'll get me a D.A.,’ . . . would support a finding of a
violation of section 69”].) “[A] present ability to carry out threats
is not required if, as here, the target of the threat could
reasonably fear retaliatory action on some future occasion.”
(People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1060.)
       Appellant Voluntarily Waived His Right to a Jury Trial
        “‘[A] defendant’s waiver of the right to jury trial may not be
accepted by the court unless it is knowing and intelligent, that is,
“‘“made with a full awareness both of the nature of the right
being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon
it,”’” as well as voluntary “‘“in the sense that it was the product of
a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or
deception.”’”’” (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 166.) Appellant
claims, “[T]he record fails to show that [his] jury waiver was
voluntary.” “The voluntariness of a waiver is a question of law
which we review de novo.” (People v. Vargas (1993) 13
Cal.App.4th 1653, 1660.)
        The jury waiver proceedings were as follows: The trial court
asked appellant’s counsel, “[W]hat do you want to do today . . . ?”
Counsel responded, “[A]fter discussion, we're prepared to waive
jury and have a [c]ourt trial.” The court said to appellant: “So
[your counsel] is telling me that you understand that you have a
right to a jury trial where 12 [p]eople would decide if you are

                                  9
guilty or not guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and they would
have to do that unanimously. [Counsel] tells me that you want to
give up your right to a jury trial, but still have a trial but a judge
will make the decision; is that okay with you?” Appellant replied,
“Yeah.” The court asked counsel if he joined in the waiver.
Counsel answered, “I do.”
       Appellant contends the record fails to show a voluntary
jury waiver because “the trial court did not ask [him] [(1)]
whether the jury waiver was voluntary or a product of his free
will”; (2) “whether ‘anybody promised [him] anything, used any
force, threats, pressure on [him] of any kind to get [him] to make
that decision’”; (3) “whether any threats had been made against
him, whether he had been ‘subject to any force,’ or whether there
was ‘consideration or [a] secret promise or deal or something’ that
was pressuring or forcing [him] to waive his right to jury trial”;
and (4) “whether he was making his decision freely and
voluntarily.” But appellant cites no authority requiring the trial
court to make any of the above inquiries when taking a jury
waiver. Moreover, as the People note in their brief, “[a]ppellant
has offered no citation to the record to support that he was
coerced, threatened, or was pressured by the court, prosecutor, or
anyone else . . . to waive his jury trial right.”
       Appellant faults the trial court for not making an “express
finding of voluntariness.” Such a finding is not necessary.
(People v. Smith (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 492, 502 [“Although the
court did not make an express finding that the waiver was
knowing and voluntary, there is no requirement that it do so”].)
       Finally, appellant argues that the record does not show a
voluntary jury waiver because it “disloses no written jury waiver
that might have contained information about whether [his] jury

                                 10
waiver was voluntary.” No authority requires the jury waiver to
be in writing.
       “We uphold the validity of a jury waiver ‘“if the record
affirmatively shows that it is voluntary and intelligent under the
totality of the circumstances.”’” (People v. Daniels (2017) 3
Cal.5th 961, 991 (lead opn. of Cuéllar, J.) Appellant has not
raised the issue of whether his jury waiver was knowing and
intelligent. He contends only that the record does not show it
was voluntary. Considering the totality of the circumstances, we
conclude appellant voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial.
                           Pitchess Motion
       “[T]he Legislature has enacted procedures to implement
the decision of Pitchess[, supra,] 11 Cal.3d 531 . . . that allow
criminal defendants to seek discovery from the court of
potentially exculpatory information located in otherwise
confidential peace officer personnel records. If a party bringing
what is commonly called a Pitchess motion makes a threshold
showing, the court must review the records in camera and
disclose to that party any information they contain that is
material to the underlying case.” (People v. Superior Court
(Johnson) (2015) 61 Cal.4th 696, 705.)
       Appellant filed a Pitchess motion seeking discovery of
complaints filed and disciplinary action taken against Officer
Parsons. The trial court conducted an in camera hearing during
which it heard testimony from the police department’s custodian
of records. Based on this testimony, the court ruled that there
are no discoverable records. It ordered the in-camera hearing
transcript sealed.
       Appellant has requested that “this [c]ourt . . . review the
sealed Pitchess record to determine whether the lower court

                                11
abused its discretion by concluding there was no relevant
discoverable information to turn over to the defense.” (See People
v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1285 [“This court routinely
independently examines the sealed records of such in[-]camera
hearings to determine whether the trial court abused its
discretion in denying a defendant's motion for disclosure of police
personnel records”].) “We have reviewed the record under seal
and independently conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in its ruling upon the Pitchess motion.” (Id. at
p. 1286.)
                             Disposition
      The judgment is affirmed.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                                YEGAN, J.

We concur:

             GILBERT, P. J.

             CODY, J.

                                12
                 Craig B. Van Rooyen, Judge

           Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo

               ______________________________

      Mi Kim, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, Rama R. Maline, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.