Court Opinion

ID: 9352541
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-06 20:08:25.44161+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:57:41.115316
License: Public Domain

J-S41041-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    DEVON K. MOORE                             :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 433 MDA 2022

         Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 5, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s):
                            CP-67-CR-0000058-2020

BEFORE:      LAZARUS, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                       FILED: JANUARY 6, 2023

        Appellant Devon K. Moore appeals nunc pro tunc from the judgment of

sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of York County following his

conviction by a jury on the charges of third-degree murder, criminal attempt-

first-degree murder, and involuntary manslaughter.1 After a careful review,

we affirm.

        The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows: The

Commonwealth charged Appellant with multiple crimes in connection with the

shooting death of Solomon Moore (“Solomon”).             On October 25, 2021,

____________________________________________

*   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1   18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(c), 901(a), and 2504(a), respectively.
J-S41041-22

Appellant, who was represented by counsel, proceeded to a jury trial at which

numerous witnesses testified.

      Specifically, David Lambert (“David”) testified that, during the evening

of October 25, 2019, he drove his daughter, Starasia David (“Starasia”), and

her paramour, Marvin Butler (“Marvin”), to the Fine Wine and Liquor Store.

N.T., 10/25-27, 2021, at 124-25. At approximately 10:50 p.m., he drove the

pair back to Starasia’s house, and as they all began walking into the house,

two men, later identified as Solomon and Appellant, crossed the street so that

they were on the same side as Starasia’s house. Id. at 124. However, the

men recrossed back to the opposite side of the street momentarily, “put their

hoodies on,” and then again crossed back to the same side of the street as

Starasia’s house. Id. at 125. David told Starasia and Marvin that “them guys

[are] coming back across the street, and they don’t look good.” Id. at 132.

      David indicated that, at this point, he was standing on the porch with

Starasia while Marvin was standing on the sidewalk. Id. at 126. As the men

walked closer, David noticed Appellant, who had dark skin and was wearing a

dark-colored hoodie, was “adjusting the gun” in his left hoodie pocket area,

and David could see “[a]lmost all [of the gun].” Id. at 125-26, 132. One of

the men said “something” to Starasia as they walked by her; however, they

“never looked at her.” Id. at 126. Rather, the men approached Marvin and

stood “face to face” with him. Id. at 126, 135.

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       David testified that gunfire suddenly erupted from the group of men

although he was unable to determine who fired the first shot.2 Id. at 127. He

saw Appellant “get shot and fall to the ground[,]” and he saw Marvin shooting

towards Solomon. Id. at 127, 134, 136. In response to the gunshots, David

pulled Starasia into the building and, after the gunshots ceased, he went

outside.    Id.    He saw Marvin running, Appellant lying on the sidewalk

attempting to reload his gun, and Solomon lying dead behind a car. Id.

       David watched as Appellant spoke on a cell phone and crawled to the

front of a car. Id. at 128. He observed an extra clip lying on the ground and,

fearing that Appellant might begin shooting at him and Starasia, he pulled her

towards the back of the building. Id. They then left the scene. Id.

       David testified that, after the shooting, Starasia fled, and he does not

know where she is currently living. Id. at 131. He noted that, at some point

after the shooting, people broke into Starasia’s house, and it appeared they

had been waiting for her to return. Id.

       Horace Walton (“Horace”) testified he was sitting in a car near Starasia’s

home during the evening of October 25, 2019. Id. at 138. He was playing

“loud” music and did not hear any gunshots.          Id. at 140.   However, at

approximately 10:50 p.m., a guy “bolted” in front of his car, opened the car

____________________________________________

2David testified that “30, 40 seconds, 50 at the most[,]” passed from when
he declared the men were coming back across the street until the shooting
occurred. Id. at 136.

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door, entered the car, and asked Horace to drive him “somewhere.”          Id.

Horace drove the man to a nearby restaurant. Id.

     Tanahsia (“Tanahsia”) Wright testified that Appellant is her boyfriend,

and she knows Solomon, who was Appellant’s cousin. Id. at 153, 158. She

and Appellant lived together near Starasia’s house, and during the evening of

October 25, 2019, Appellant left their house. Id. at 160-61. Soon thereafter,

at approximately 10:52 p.m., she heard sirens. Id. at 154. Prior to this, she

did not hear any gunshots or “a commotion” in the street. Id. Upon hearing

the sirens, Tanahsia left her home, and she discovered Appellant had been

taken to the hospital while Solomon was dead. Id. at 155.

     Tanahsia confirmed she has made “approximately 900 plus phone calls”

to Appellant in the time since the shooting, and she is still romantically

involved with Appellant; however, she denied that they have ever talked about

the shooting. Id. at 156. She confirmed Appellant never told her he was

defending himself when he shot at Marvin. Id. at 157. She testified they do

not talk about the subject because Appellant “gets depressed” when the

shooting is mentioned. Id. She admitted Appellant did not want to talk to the

police because the shooting was “traumatic” for him. Id. at 162.

     York City Police Detective Tiffany Pitts (“Detective Pitts”) confirmed she

reviewed private security footage from a video recorded the night in question.

The video reveals Appellant was wearing a dark sweatshirt while Solomon was

wearing a white sweatshirt. Id. at 169. The video shows that David and

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Starasia were standing on the porch while Marvin was standing on the

sidewalk when Appellant and Solomon approached Marvin. Id. at 170. The

video shows “a series of muzzle flashes[.]” Id. Specifically, the video shows

“the first flash” appears to come from the left arm of Appellant, who is left-

handed. Id. at 177.

      The video then reveals that Solomon and Appellant “go down to the

ground” while Marvin “kind of walk[s] out towards the street…between two

vehicles[.]” Id. at 170. The video depicts Appellant crawling towards the back

of a car, and a “reflection on one of the bumpers…indicates…there was a

muzzle flash back there,” which suggested Appellant was continuing to fire his

gun. Id. at 177. Soon thereafter, an unidentified person runs into the area,

appears to pick up something, runs over to Appellant, and then runs away.

Id. at 171. Detective Pitts additionally testified that video footage was

retrieved from a nearby restaurant for the time in question. The video shows

Horace driving up and dropping off Marvin. Id. at 179.

      Moreover, Detective Pitts testified she attempted to interview Appellant

while he was in the hospital; however, Appellant indicated he could not talk

because “he was mourning.”         Id. at 351. Appellant never made any

statements to the police about the events surrounding the shooting. Id.

Detective Pitts noted Appellant had a valid license to carry a firearm on the

date at issue. Id. at 354. She also testified that, as part of the investigation,

she examined Appellant’s social media and discovered that, in the days prior

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to the shooting, Appellant searched for “Flea,” which is Marvin’s nickname, on

Facebook. Id. at 364-65.

      York City Police Officer Joseph Colahan (“Officer Colahan”) testified he

was on duty during the evening of October 25, 2019, when he heard a call for

shots fired outside of Starasia’s house. He and his partner traveled to the

scene. While his partner checked on Appellant, who was wounded, and

Solomon, who was deceased, Officer Colahan began taping off the scene. Id.

at 195. Officer Colahan found a handgun, which was a Glock .40 caliber pistol

containing a magazine, in the driver’s side rear wheel of a Volvo parked

directly in the crime scene. Id. at 197, 234. Appellant was found shot and

lying next to the Volvo by the police. Id. at 287. A cell phone was recovered

from Appellant. Id. at 203.      Additionally, money was discovered near

Solomon’s body. Id. Also, a vehicle leased to Appellant was found running

and parked in a no parking zone in the middle of the street near the shooting.

Id. at 198.

      Numerous additional York City police officers testified about the

investigation. Their testimony revealed eighteen bullet casings, discharged

from at least two separate firearms, were recovered from the scene. Id. at

199-247, 258, 260. Also, Appellant’s clothing, including a black hoodie, which

he was wearing at the time of the shooting, was recovered by police from the

hospital, where Appellant was treated for two gunshot wounds. Id. at 208,

221, 245, 289-90. Appellant’s hoodie had several bullet fragments lodged

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into the cloth.     Id. at 245.      Allison Laneve, a forensic scientist, testified

Appellant’s hoodie tested positive for gunshot residue. Id. 323-24, 327-41.

        Dr. Samuel Land (“Dr. Land”), who is a forensic pathologist, testified he

performed an autopsy on Solomon, who suffered gunshot wounds.                Id. at

308-09. Dr. Land testified, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that

Solomon died from these gunshot wounds. Id. at 313.

        At the conclusion of trial, the jury convicted Appellant of the offenses

indicated supra, and on January 5, 2022, the trial court sentenced Appellant

to an aggregate of seven years to fourteen years in prison. Appellant filed a

timely counseled post-sentence motion, which the trial court denied on

January 18, 2022. Appellant did not file a timely notice of appeal; however,

on March 7, 2022, after Appellant filed a counseled petition, the trial court

reinstated Appellant’s appeal rights nunc pro tunc in accordance with the

PCRA.3 On March 8, 2022, Appellant filed a counseled notice of appeal nunc

pro tunc. All Pa.R.A.P 1925 requirements have been met.

        On appeal, Appellant sets forth the following issues in his “Statement of

Questions Involved” (verbatim):

        A. Whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction
           for third-degree murder under a theory that Defendant created
           a chain reaction that led to another person shooting and killing
           the victim?
        B. Whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction
           for involuntary manslaughter?

____________________________________________

3   Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46.

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      C. Whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction
         for criminal attempt-murder of the first degree?

Appellant’s Brief at 4 (suggested answers omitted).

      Initially, inasmuch as all of Appellant’s claims present challenges to the

sufficiency of the evidence, we note this Court’s standard of review when

considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence requires us to look

at the evidence in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as verdict

winner, and determine whether the evidence presented, actual and/or

circumstantial, was sufficient to enable a fact-finder to find every element of

the crime charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.         See Commonwealth v.

O'Brien, 939 A.2d 912 (Pa.Super. 2007).

             In applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence
      and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we
      note that the facts and the circumstances established by the
      Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence.
      Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the
      fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that
      as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the
      combined circumstances.

Id. at 913–914 (quotation omitted). The finder of fact is free to believe all,

some, or none of the evidence presented and is free to determine the

credibility of the witnesses. Commonwealth v. Dailey, 828 A.2d 356

(Pa.Super. 2003).

      Appellant first contends the evidence was insufficient to sustain his

conviction for third-degree murder on the following grounds: (1) the

Commonwealth     failed   to   prove   malice   and   causation,   and   (2)   the

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Commonwealth failed to disprove that Appellant acted in self-defense.        In

essence, Appellant contends the evidence reveals he was lawfully walking

down the street while carrying a licensed firearm when Marvin killed Solomon,

who was Appellant’s cousin. According to Appellant, he shot at Marvin in self-

defense, and since his conduct was not the direct cause of Solomon’s death,

he cannot be criminally culpable for third-degree murder.

             Pennsylvania retains the common law definition of murder,
      which is a killing conducted “with malice aforethought.” Section
      2502 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code categorizes murder into
      degrees. Third-degree murder is defined as “all other kinds of
      murder,” i.e., those committed with malice that are not intentional
      (first-degree) or committed during the perpetration of a felony
      (second-degree).

Commonwealth v. Packer, 641 Pa. 391, 168 A.3d 161, 168 (2017)

(citations omitted). See Commonwealth v. Fisher, 622 Pa. 366, 80 A.3d

1186, 1195 (2013) (“[T]hird[-]degree murder is not by definition an

unintentional killing; it is a malicious killing without proof that the specific

result intended from the actions of the killer was the death of the victim.”)

(citation omitted)).

      Malice includes not only particular ill will toward the victim, but also

wickedness of disposition, hardness of heart, wantonness, and cruelty,

recklessness of consequences, and conscious disregard by the defendant of

an unjustified and extremely high risk that his actions may cause serious

bodily harm. Commonwealth v. Young, 494 Pa. 224, 431 A.2d 230, 232

(1981); Commonwealth v. Devine, 26 A.3d 1139, 1146 (Pa.Super. 2011).

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      As it pertains to causation, the following legal framework governs our

review:

      (a) General rule.—Conduct is the cause of a result when:
      (1) it is an antecedent but for which the result in question would
      not have occurred; and
      (2) the relationship between the conduct and result satisfies any
      additional causal requirements imposed by this title or by the law
      defining the offense.
                                   ***
      (c) Divergence between probable and actual result.—When
      recklessly or negligently causing a particular result is an element
      of an offense, the element is not established if the actual result is
      not within the risk of which the actor is aware or, in the case of
      negligence, of which he should be aware unless:
      (1) the actual result differs from the probable result only in the
      respect that a different person or different property is injured or
      affected or that the probable injury or harm would have been more
      serious or more extensive than that caused; or
      (2) the actual result involves the same kind of injury or harm as
      the probable result and is not too remote or accidental in its
      occurrence to have a bearing on the liability of the actor or on the
      gravity of his offense.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 303 (bold in original).

      The Commonwealth must “prove a direct causal relationship between

the defendant’s acts and the victim’s death.” Commonwealth v. Rementer,

598 A.2d 1300, 1304 (Pa.Super. 1991) (citations, quotation marks, and

emphasis omitted). “Put another way, if the fatal result was an unnatural or

obscure consequence of the defendant’s actions, our sense of justice would

prevent us from allowing the result to impact on the defendant’s guilt.” Id.

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at 1306-07. “[I]t is well established that the tort theory of causation will not

suffice to impose criminal responsibility.” Id. at 1304.

            [C]ausation-in-fact, the “but for” element of assessing
      the causal connection, alone will not necessarily determine
      criminal culpability. If it did, little would distinguish tort liability
      from criminal liability. Our cases emphasize that a criminal
      conviction requires “a more direct causal connection” than tort
      concepts. Thus, not only do we demand that the defendant’s
      conduct actually cause the victim’s death in that “it is an
      antecedent but for which the result in question would not have
      occurred”, we also question, in cases such as the instant one,
      whether the fatal result was so extraordinary, remote or
      attenuated that it would be unfair to hold the defendant criminally
      responsible for it.

Id. at 1306 (citations and footnotes omitted).

      To establish criminal causation, “the Commonwealth must prove that

the defendant’s conduct was so directly and substantially linked to the actual

result as to give rise to the imposition of criminal liability.” Commonwealth

v. Long, 624 A.2d 200, 203-04 (Pa.Super. 1993) (citing Rementer, 598 A.2d

at 1304).

            In Rementer, we set forth a two-part test for determining
      criminal causation. First, the defendant’s conduct must be an
      antecedent, but for which the result in question would not have
      occurred. Rementer, 598 A.2d at 1304; 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
      303(a)(1). A victim’s death cannot be entirely attributable to
      other factors; rather, there must exist a “causal connection
      between the conduct and the result of conduct; and causal
      connection requires something more than mere coincidence as to
      time and place.” Rementer, 598 A.2d at 1305, n.3 (quotation
      omitted). Second, the results of the defendant’s actions cannot
      be so extraordinarily remote or attenuated that it would be unfair
      to hold the defendant criminally responsible. Id. at 1305.
            As to the first part of the test, the defendant’s conduct need
      not be the only cause of the victim’s death in order to establish a
      causal connection. Id. “Criminal responsibility may be properly

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      assessed against an individual whose conduct was a direct and
      substantial factor in producing the death even though other
      factors combined with that conduct to achieve the result.” Long,
      624 A.2d [at] 203[.] The second part of the test is satisfied when
      the victim’s death is the natural or foreseeable consequence of the
      defendant’s actions.

Commonwealth v. Nunn, 947 A.2d 756, 760 (Pa.Super. 2008) (citations

and quotations omitted).

      Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,

as verdict winner, we conclude the evidence provides ample support for

Appellant’s conviction of third-degree murder for the shooting death of

Solomon. Appellant, in concert with Solomon, put their hoodies on, crossed

the street, and directly approached Marvin, who was walking behind David

and Starasia after they disembarked from a vehicle. Appellant was visibly

carrying a handgun and “adjusting” it as he approached Marvin. N.T., 10/25-

27, 2021, at 125-26, 132.     David warned Marvin that the two men were

approaching, and “they don’t look good.”      Id. at 132.     Surveillance video

depicted gunfire between Appellant and Marvin with the first “flash of light”

coming from Appellant’s left arm.    Trial Court Opinion, filed 5/16/22, at 3

(citation to transcript omitted). Marvin returned fire and, ultimately, Solomon

was fatally shot.

      We   conclude   Appellant’s   actions   of   engaging   in   the   gunfight

demonstrated a recklessness of consequences, and conscious disregard by

him of an unjustified and extremely high risk that his actions may cause

serious bodily harm. Young, supra. Thus, the Commonwealth demonstrated

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malice.     Further, but for Appellant’s actions of approaching Marvin and

shooting at him, Appellant’s cohort, Solomon, would not have been shot by

Marvin’s return of gunfire. As noted supra, Appellant’s actions need not be

the sole cause of death to establish a causal connection. Rather, Appellant’s

conduct of crossing the street with his gun visible, approaching Marvin, and

shooting at Marvin, thereby prompting the shoot-out, was “a direct and

substantial factor in producing [Solomon’s] death even though other factors

combined with that conduct to achieve the result.” Long, 624 A.2d at 203.

The death of Appellant’s cohort, who was unarmed, was a natural and

foreseeable consequence of the shoot-out; it does not matter for purposes of

causation    in   a   third-degree   murder    case   that   Appellant’s   intended

consequence was for Marvin to be shot, and not his cousin, Solomon. Thus,

we conclude that both parts of the test for causation were satisfied, and the

evidence supports a finding that Appellant caused the death of Solomon for

purpose of third-degree murder. Rementer, supra.

      Additionally, we reject Appellant’s claim the Commonwealth failed to

disprove that Appellant acted in self-defense.

      Self-defense is a complete defense to a homicide charge if (1) the

defendant reasonably believed that he was in imminent danger of death or

serious bodily injury and that it was necessary to use deadly force to prevent

such harm; (2) the defendant did not provoke the threat that resulted in the

slaying; and (3) the defendant did not violate a duty to retreat. 18 Pa.C.S.A.

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§ 505(b)(2); Commonwealth v. Sepulveda, 618 Pa. 262, 55 A.3d 1108,

1124 (2012). Where the defendant has introduced evidence of self-defense,

the burden is on the Commonwealth to disprove the self-defense claim beyond

a reasonable doubt by proving that at least one of those three elements is

absent. Sepulveda, supra, 55 A.3d at 1124.

      The finder of fact is not required to believe the defendant’s testimony

that he thought that he was in imminent danger and acted in self-defense.

Commonwealth v. Houser, 610 Pa. 264, 18 A.3d 1128, 1135 (2011).

Disbelief of the defendant’s testimony, however, is not sufficient to satisfy the

Commonwealth’s burden to disprove self-defense absent some evidence

negating self-defense. Commonwealth v. Torres, 564 Pa. 219, 766 A.2d

342, 345 (2001).

      Here, we conclude the Commonwealth sufficiently disproved Appellant’s

claim of self-defense. Specifically, there is no dispute Appellant provoked the

threat that resulted in Solomon’s slaying when he put on his hoodie, crossed

the street with Solomon, approached Marvin while visibly adjusting his

handgun, and fired the handgun at him. Further, there is no evidence

Appellant attempted to retreat; but rather, he continued the shoot-out with

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Marvin while on the street. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 505(b)(2); Sepulveda, supra.

Thus, there is no merit to Appellant’s claim.4

       Appellant’s next claim is the evidence was insufficient to sustain his

conviction for involuntary manslaughter. Specifically, he contends the

Commonwealth failed to prove he did an unlawful or lawful act in a recklessly

or grossly negligent manner, as well as failed to prove a causal connection

between his conduct and the death of Solomon.

       Section 2504 of the Crimes Code defines involuntary manslaughter as:

“[a] person is guilty of involuntary manslaughter when as a direct result of

the doing of an unlawful act in a reckless or grossly negligent manner, or the

doing of a lawful act in a reckless or grossly negligent manner, he causes the

death of another person.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2504(a). Stated differently,

“involuntary manslaughter requires 1) a mental state of either recklessness

or gross negligence[,] and 2) a causal nexus between the conduct of the

accused and the death of the victim.” Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 835

A.2d 801, 806 (Pa.Super .2003).

____________________________________________

4 To the extent Appellant raises the defense of imperfect self-defense, we note
that, if the Commonwealth proves that the defendant’s belief that deadly force
was necessary was unreasonable but does not disprove that the defendant
genuinely believed that he was in imminent danger that required deadly force
and does not disprove either of the other elements of self-defense, the
defendant may be found guilty only of voluntary manslaughter under the
defense of imperfect self-defense. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2503(b); Sepulveda,
supra. As indicated supra, we conclude the Commonwealth proved Appellant
provoked the attack, which led to Solomon’s slaying, and he violated a duty
to retreat. Thus, we do not address this issue further.

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              A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element
       of an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and
       unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result
       from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree
       that, considering the nature and intent of the actor’s conduct and
       the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross
       deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person
       would observe in the actor’s situation.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 302(b)(3).          The term “recklessly,” as set forth in Section

302(b)(3), encompasses “gross negligence” for purposes of involuntary

manslaughter. Commonwealth v. Huggins, 575 Pa. 395, 836 A.2d 862,

868 (2003).

       In the case sub judice, we conclude the Commonwealth sufficiently

proved Appellant did an unlawful or law act in a reckless manner, i.e.,

consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that a person’s

death would result from his conduct, when he crossed the street with Solomon

(who was unarmed), visibly displayed his handgun, adjusted his handgun as

he approached Marvin, and engaged in a shoot-out.            See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §

302(b)(3). Further, for reasons already discussed supra, we reject Appellant’s

claim that there was no casual nexus between his conduct and the death of

Solomon.5 Accordingly, we conclude the evidence was sufficient to sustain his

conviction for involuntary manslaughter.

____________________________________________

5 Moreover, to the extent Appellant contends the Commonwealth failed to
disprove Appellant’s claim of self-defense as it relates to his conviction for
involuntary manslaughter, for the same reasons discussed supra, we find no
merit to the claim.

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     In his final claim, Appellant contends the evidence was insufficient to

sustain his conviction for criminal attempt to commit first-degree murder.

     To obtain a conviction for first-degree murder, the Commonwealth must

demonstrate that a human being was unlawfully killed, the defendant

perpetrated the killing, and the defendant acted with malice and a specific

intent to kill. Commonwealth v. Ovalles, 144 A.3d 957, 969 (Pa.Super.

2016). A person is guilty of attempted murder if he takes a substantial step

towards an intentional killing. Commonwealth v. Wesley, 860 A.2d 585,

593 (Pa.Super. 2004).

     “A person commits an attempt when, with the intent to commit a specific

crime, he does any act which constitutes a substantial step towards the

commission of that crime.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 901(a).

     “For a defendant to be found guilty of attempted murder, the
     Commonwealth must establish specific intent to kill.”
     Commonwealth        v.   Geathers,      847     A.2d     730,    734
     (Pa.Super.2004). Therefore, “[i]f a person takes a substantial step
     toward the commission of a killing, with the specific intent in mind
     to commit such an act, he may be convicted of attempted
     murder.” In re R.D., 44 A.3d 657, 678 (Pa.Super. 2012). “The
     Commonwealth may establish the mens rea required for first-
     degree murder, specific intent to kill, solely from circumstantial
     evidence.” Id. Further, our Supreme Court has repeatedly
     determined that “[t]he use of a deadly weapon on a vital part of
     the body is sufficient to establish the specific intent to kill.”
     Commonwealth v. Rega, 593 Pa. 659, 933 A.2d 997, 1009
     (2007); see also Commonwealth v. Cousar, 593 Pa. 204, 928
     A.2d 1025, 1034 (2007) (“a specific intent to kill may be inferred
     from the use of a deadly weapon on a vital part of the victim's
     body.”).

Commonwealth v. Tucker, 143 A.3d 955, 964 (Pa.Super. 2016).

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      Viewing   the   evidence    in    the     light   most   favorable   to   the

Commonwealth, as verdict winner, we conclude the evidence was sufficient

to sustain Appellant’s conviction for criminal attempt to commit first-

degree murder. Specifically, the circumstantial evidence reveals Appellant

had the specific intent to kill Marvin, and he took a substantial step in this

endeavor. Specifically, Appellant, who searched for Marvin on social media

in the days before the shoot-out, crossed the street, visibly carried his

handgun, adjusted his handgun, approached Marvin, fired a shot at him,

and engaged in a shoot-out with him. Thus, we find no merit to Appellant’s

claim. See Tucker, supra.

      We note that, in developing his sufficiency of the evidence claims,

Appellant invites us to reassess the credibility of the testimony offered by the

witnesses. Also, in developing his sufficiency claims, he presents the evidence

in the light most favorable to him and advances his version of the events.

However, under the standard governing our review of sufficiency challenges,

an appellate court cannot reweigh the evidence and substitute its judgment

for that of the jury, as fact-finder. See Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 981 A.2d

274, 282 (Pa.Super. 2009) (reiterating, “a review of the sufficiency of the

evidence does not include an assessment of the credibility of testimony”)

(citation omitted)). Also, we must view the evidence in the light most

favorable to the Commonwealth, as the verdict winner. O'Brien, supra.

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     For all of the foregoing reasons, we find no merit to Appellant’s claims,

and we affirm his judgment of sentence.

     Affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 01/06/2023

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