Court Opinion

ID: 9498246
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:11:57.004037+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:42.308565
License: Public Domain

BYE, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part, dissenting in part.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that the Missouri offense of tampering by operation is a “violent felony” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).
Based on the “close connection” between the Missouri offenses of tampering in the first degree and vehicle theft, the majority concludes tampering by operation carries the same serious potential risk of injury to others as those identified for the Missouri offense of vehicle theft in United States v. Sprouse, 394 F.3d 578, 580-81 (8th Cir.2005), in which the court adopted the reasoning in United States v. Sun Bear, 307 *1001F.3d 747, 752-53 (8th Cir.2002).8 In describing the serious potential risks of injury associated with attempted vehicle theft, the court in Sun Bear hypothesizes a scenario in which the thief, while appropriating a vehicle, encounters the returning driver or a passerby, which leads to the possibility of a violent confrontation. Id. The thief, feeling the stress and urgency of the situation, recklessly drives away in the vehicle, either because he perceives a threat of pursuit or because there is an actual pursuit, which then leads to the potential for a high-speed chase. Id. at 753.
To establish the offense of tampering by operation under Missouri law, the State needs to establish only that the “ ‘defendant knew he was operating the car without the consent of the owner.’ ” State v. Presberry, 128 S.W.3d 80, 96 (Mo.Ct.App.2003) (quoting State v. McIntyre, 735 S.W.2d 111, 112 (Mo.Ct.App.1987)). The commission of the offense of tampering by operation does not necessarily involve a defendant who appropriates a vehicle directly from the owner. Instead, the defendant in a tampering case is often a subsequent transferee of a vehicle that has been reported stolen. See 32 Mo. Prac. Series, Missouri Criminal Law § 35.1 (describing typical tampering in the first degree offense in Missouri). As such, the commission of the offense of tampering by operation often occurs when law enforcement spots the defendant driving a vehicle that has been reported stolen and apprehends the defendant. See, e.g., State v. Martin, 882 S.W.2d 768, 769-70 (Mo.Ct.App.1994). Thus, a violent confrontation at the point of appropriation of the vehicle and a recklessly absconding defendant are not serious potential risks of the commission of the offense of tampering by operation. Certainly, there is always the possibility that a defendant, who knows he is driving a vehicle without the owner’s consent and is ordered by the police to pull over, may decide to get away from the police rather than pull over. See, e.g., State v. Hinkle, 987 S.W.2d 11, 12 (Mo.Ct.App.1999). But that is a possible risk whenever law enforcement attempts to stop a vehicle driven by a defendant who fears detection of any unlawful activity.
Furthermore, in Leocal v. Ashcroft, — U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. 377, 383, 160 L.Ed.2d 271 (2004), the Supreme Court, in analyzing the term “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16, advised that in analyzing statutory terms we should not forget the term we are ultimately construing, which in Leo-cal was the term “crime of violence,” id. at 383, and in the instant case is the term “violent felony.” The Supreme Court in Leocal considered both the “ordinary meaning” of the term “crime of violence” and the definition provided in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) before concluding 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) does not include DUI offenses. Leocal, 125 S.Ct. at 383 (citing United States v. Doe, 960 F.2d 221, 225 (1st Cir.1992) (Breyer, C.J.) (“observing that the term ‘violent felony’ in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2000 ed. and Supp. II) ‘calls to mind a tradition of crimes that involve the possibility of more closely related, active violence.’ ”)). The statutory definition of “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) is not the same as the statutory definition of “violent felony” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). However, the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Leocal which we should keep in mind as the ultimate term *1002we are construing is not limited to only 18 U.S.C. § 16(b). This is demonstrated by the Leocal Court’s citation to Doe, in which the First Circuit examined whether the offense of being a felon in possession of a firearm is a “violent felony” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). In my view, the offense of knowingly operating a vehicle without the owner’s consent does not fall within the “ordinary meaning” of the term “violent felony,” which “calls to mind a tradition of crimes that involve the possibility of more closely related, active violence.” Doe, 960 F.2d at 225.
I join in affirming the convictions. I also agree Johnson failed to establish Booker plain error. I dissent from the court’s holding of tampering by operation as being a violent felony under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). Accordingly, I would affirm the convictions, however, vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing.

. I note my agreement with the views expressed by the concurrence in Sprouse, 394 F.3d at 581-82 (Lay, J., concurring), and the dissent in Sun Bear, 307 F.3d at 753-56 (Melloy, J., dissenting), that the description in Sun Bear does not describe the likely consequences in a case of simple vehicle theft.