Court Opinion

ID: 9841272
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-21 19:03:38.913756+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:42:57.122359
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/21/23 Wickline v. Schweder CA4/1

                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 DAVID WICKLINE,                                                      D080074

           Plaintiff and Appellant,

           v.                                                         (Super. Ct. No. RIC1708891)

 INGO SCHWEDER et al.,

           Defendants and Respondents.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County,
Randall S. Stamen and John W. Vineyard, Judges. Reversed in part and
remanded.
         Complex Appellate Litigation Group, Rex S. Heinke and Jessica M.
Weisel for Plaintiff and Appellant.
         Carlton Fields, Ellyn S. Garofalo and Amir Kaltgrad for Defendants
and Respondents.

         This is an appeal of a declaratory judgment entered by the trial court in
a lawsuit brought by David Wickline against Ingo Schweder and other
parties based on Wickline’s allegation that Schweder failed to honor the
partnership that the two men entered into with one another involving the
acquisition and ownership of the Glen Ivy Hot Springs resort in Corona,
California.
      The trial court proceedings that led to this appeal occurred in two
steps. First, although Schweder denied he formed any partnership with
Wickline, after a lengthy trial on Wickline’s causes of action for breach of
fiduciary duty and fraudulent inducement of partnership agreement, a jury
disagreed. Specifically, the jury returned a special verdict finding that
Wickline and Schweder had formed a partnership. However, the jury was
not asked to make any findings as to the nature of the partnership or
whether it was ongoing. Next, the trial court decided Wickline’s causes of
action for declaratory relief and promissory estoppel. Among other things,
Wickline sought a declaration as to the nature of the partnership found by
the jury. In its statement of decision on the declaratory relief cause of action,
the trial court specified the nature of the partnership entered into by
Wickline and Schweder, but it also concluded that “[t]he partnership between
[Wickline] and [Schweder] terminated on June 16, 2016.”
      Wickline appeals from the portion of the declaratory judgment stating
that the partnership terminated. According to Wickline, the termination of a
partnership under the Corporations Code (Corp. Code, § 16802) occurs only
when specific statutory requirements are met. As Wickline argues, those
requirements were not satisfied here.
      Respondents do not attempt to argue that the statutory requirements
for termination of a partnership were met. Instead, respondents present two
main arguments. First, they contend that the law of the British Virgin
Islands controls the issue of whether the partnership was terminated, not the
California statutory provisions relied upon by Wickline. We reject that
argument because the trial court ruled that Wickline and Schweder entered

                                        2
into a partnership with a legal existence that is distinct from the British
Virgin Islands company that ultimately owns the Glen Ivy Hot Springs
resort. Second, respondents contend that, even if California law applies, it
would be an exercise in futility for us to entertain this appeal because
Wickline will not be able to benefit from a ruling that the partnership is
ongoing rather than terminated. In making that argument, respondents
venture far afield into scenarios of hypothetical steps that Wickline might
take after obtaining the simple relief he seeks in this appeal: an appellate
opinion vacating a legally-erroneous declaratory judgment.
      We are not concerned in this appeal with what steps Wickline might
later be able to take to enforce his rights once he obtains a ruling that the
partnership has not terminated. This appeal comes to us from a declaratory
judgment. Wickline is entitled to a legally-correct declaration of his rights in
the partnership, and we can grant that relief by deciding this appeal.
      Turning to the question of whether the trial court erred in ruling that
the partnership terminated, the trial court’s ruling is fatally unclear as to the
meaning of the word “terminated.” The trial court indicated at a hearing
prior to finalizing its statement of decision that “the Court uses the term
‘terminated’ because it is a term which both the plaintiff and defendant used
repeatedly in the past.” (Italics added.) If that is the case, the trial court
meant either that (1) the partnership was terminated pursuant to the
requirements for partnership termination set forth in the applicable part of
the Corporations Code; or (2) the partnership was terminated by the fact that
Wickline filed this lawsuit in which he sought legal damages based on
Schweder’s alleged repudiation of the partnership. If the trial court intended
either of those meanings, it erred. It is possible, however, that that trial
court intended to refer to termination of the partnership in a different sense.
For example, respondents suggest that the trial court simply meant that as of

                                        3
June 16, 2016, “any ability for Wickline and Schweder to work together
terminated.” If the trial court did intend a different meaning, it must provide
clarification on remand. We accordingly vacate the declaratory judgment,
and we remand for the trial court to hold further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
      Wickline also appeals from the trial court’s award of costs to
respondents after determining they were the prevailing parties. Because we
are vacating the declaratory judgment, it is possible that the trial court will
come to a different conclusion regarding the award of costs on remand. We
accordingly vacate the trial court’s award of costs to respondents, and we
remand for further proceedings on that issue.
                                       I.
                FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      This litigation arises as a result of the business relationship between
Wickline and Schweder. Wickline previously worked as an investment
banker at JP Morgan and Goldman Sachs and has experience developing
resorts. Schweder has spent his career involved in the hospitality and
wellness industry, and he runs a business that consults for, operates and

designs spas around the world under the “GOCO Hospitality” brand.1
      Wickline and Schweder first met in the mid-2000’s. They agreed in
2014 to start working together to try to purchase and own wellness resorts.
Wickline’s background gave him the expertise to locate funding for the
venture. The efforts of Wickline and Schweder culminated in the successful
purchase of the Glen Ivy Hot Springs resort in January 2016.

1    As the trial court explained, “[m]any of the business entities in which
[Schweder] was involved included GOCO in their names.”
                                        4
      As required by the lender, the purchase transaction was structured
through several layers of corporate ownership. The resort being purchased
was owned by a California corporation, Glen Ivy Hot Springs, Inc. As the
trial court described, “[the lender] required that 100% of the shares of the
existing owners of Glen Ivy Hot Springs, Inc., be transferred into a single
purpose entity formed to own the shares, GOCO Hospitality California, [Inc.,]
a California corporation. GOCO Hospitality Global Opportunity Limited, a
British Virgin Islands company [(GOCO BVI)], was to own 100% of the shares
of GOCO Hospitality California, [Inc.]” GOCO BVI was a preexisting inactive
“shelf company” that, at the time, was 100 percent owned by Schweder as the
sole shareholder. As the trial court explained, GOCO BVI was “utilized for
the purchase for tax purposes and other reasons.”
      The evidence at trial included documented discussion about the parties’
agreement that Wickline would become a 42.5 percent shareholder of GOCO
BVI. For example, the trial court found that in a December 2015 string of e-
mails Wickline and Schweder “confirmed that after the sale of the Resort:
42.5 percent of the shares of [GOCO BVI] would be transferred to [Wickline],
42.5 percent of the shares would be transferred to [Schweder,] and, the
remaining shares reserved for later transfer to the company’s key
representatives and managers.” However, it is undisputed that Wickline
never became a shareholder of GOCO BVI.
      At trial, the jury heard only a very brief explanation of why no shares
in GOCO BVI were transferred to Wickline upon the January 2016 sale of the
resort. Specifically, the jury was read a stipulation stating that from May
2011 to April 2017, Wickline was a judgment debtor as a result of an
unrelated lawsuit for “a substantial amount.” Schweder’s former director of
finance, Matthew Brennan, testified that shortly after the purchase of the
resort, the ownership of GOCO BVI was reorganized so that Schweder owned

                                       5
94 percent, Josephine Leung owned three percent,2 and Brennan owned
three percent. Brennan testified that Wickline’s judgment debtor status was
the reason that Wickline did not take a 42.5 ownership interest in GOCO BVI
in 2016. “My understanding at that time, which was consistent with
December [2015] as well, was that [Wickline] did not want to have ownership
of the shares of GOCO BVI because of his lawsuit that he was having in -- in
2015.” Brennan did not know whether Wickline’s forfeiting of his shares was
meant to be permanent or temporary.
      Wickline’s operative complaint directly alleged that his judgment
debtor status was the reason that his ownership interest in GOGO BVI was
not formally recorded upon the purchase of the resort. Specifically, Wickline
pled, and then dismissed without prejudice prior to trial, a cause of action for
breach of contract alleging that “Schweder . . . agreed to operate the resort
post-closing, and to hold for [Wickline], and recognize upon the resolution of
that unrelated adverse judgment, [Wickline’s] 42.5 percent ownership of that
resort property.” Although the jury did not hear evidence about any such
alleged agreement, it was discussed at length during in limine motions, with
an eventual stipulation that the jury not be presented with evidence of the
alleged agreement. During in limine discussions, counsel for Wickline
specified that although he would not ask the jury to award shares in GOCO
BVI, “[w]e have a declaratory relief claim that’s not before the jury.” That
declaratory relief claim is the subject of this appeal.

2      Leung is married to Schweder and works for the GOCO Hospitality
business as the group director of design and development. As of the date of
the trial in 2019, after having purchased Brennan’s three percent interest,
Leung owned six percent of the shares of GOCO BVI, and Schweder owned
94 percent.
                                        6
      The relationship between Schweder and Wickline started to deteriorate
in May 2016, a few months after the January 2016 purchase of the resort.
The friction between the men is documented in several e-mails that the trial

court described in its statement of decision:3
             “In May 2016, [Wickline] requested reimbursement for
      expenses. That resulted in an exchange of e-mail between
      [Wickline] and [Schweder]. In an e-mail of May 20, 2016, by
      [Schweder] to [Wickline], [Schweder] stated: ‘We Will honor
      everything we agreed upon ! but I prefer to not have a partner
      who seeks a different way of doing things and who does not seem
      to be content with gocos more frugal approach to matters. Money
      is by no means all what counts for me and your aggression and
      words( not only in your mail ) unacceptable to me. GOCO will
      refrain from participating in Vegas and Santa Fe. Pls don’t send
      related mails to my GOCO mail as my secy reads them . . . , And
      the staff talks. Also pls refrain from voicing your issues to my
      team as done in the past and today.’ [Citation to trial exhibit.]

            “An e-mail of May 23, 2016, from [Schweder] to [Wickline],
      concerned whether [Wickline] and [Schweder] had agreed to bear
      their own expenses in connection with their partnership and
      concerned [Wickline’s] leadership skills, propensity to act and
      make decisions unilaterally and outside of the business structure,
      rather than as part of a team and within the business structure.
      [Citation to trial exhibit.] The exchange included the statement
      by [Schweder] that, ‘[y]ou constantly complain about not earning
      enough money and feel that your 42.5% is not sufficient.’
      [Citation to trial exhibit.]

            “On June 16, 2016, [Wickline] sent an e-mail to himself
      wherein he memorialized that he: intended to sue [Schweder];
      needed to work with an attorney to insure evidence he gathered
      would be admissible at trial so [Schweder] ‘hangs himself’;
      perform just enough to make the status of his involvement in
      partnership/Resort unclear; and, withhold his most valuable

3    We have corrected the typos in the trial court’s statement of decision to
match the text of the original e-mails from which the trial court quoted
(which themselves contain several typos).
                                       7
      skills and not perform some of his duties. [Citation to trial
      exhibit.] In August 2016, [Schweder’s] counsel sent a partnership
      termination letter to [Wickline’s] counsel (‘supplementing’ the e-
      mail [Schweder] sent to [Wickline] on May 20, 2016).”4

      On May 17, 2017, Wickline filed a lawsuit against the following parties:

Schweder, Leung, GOCO BVI, Spa Venture Group Limited,5 GOCO

Hospitality California, Inc., and Glen Ivy Hot Springs6 (collectively,
Respondents). The operative second amended complaint alleged the
following causes of action: fraud, civil conspiracy, breach of fiduciary duty,
fraudulent inducement of partnership agreement, breach of contract,

4      Specifically, the letter from counsel stated, “As you know, my clients
wish to sever their relationship with Mr. Wickline. You and I previously
discussed the option of an early mediation to resolve issues relating to
Mr. Wickline’s involvement with Glen Ivy. Although you indicated in our
initial call, that Mr. Wickline might be amenable to this approach, I am still
waiting for a response. In the meantime, we have asked that Mr. Wickline
cease all activities in connection with Goco Hospitality and Glen Ivy. As you
can see from the emails below, Mr. Wickline is insisting on attending a . . .
hearing on Glen Ivy entitlements. Mr. Wickline is not a Goco shareholder
and is not authorized to speak or act on Goco’s behalf. Please instruct
Mr. Wickline not to attend the hearing and certainly not to make any
statements or representations on Goco’s behalf.”

5     Spa Venture Group Limited, which is owned by Schweder and Leung, is
the entity that is paid to manage the Glen Ivy Hot Springs resort. The
second amended complaint alleges that Spa Venture Group Limited is a
British Virgin Islands company.

6     The second amended complaint alleges that the entity sued as “Glen
Ivy Hot Springs” (also referred to in that document as “GIHS”) is a
“California company.”
                                       8
declaratory relief, and promissory estoppel.7 Before trial, Wickline
voluntarily dismissed the fraud, civil conspiracy, and breach of contract
causes of action without prejudice.
      The trial court decided that the two “legal causes of action” (breach of
fiduciary duty and fraudulent inducement of partnership agreement, both
asserted solely against Schweder) would be tried to a jury at the same time
that the two “equitable causes of action” (declaratory relief and promissory
estoppel) were tried to the court. The trial was held over the course of several
weeks in February, March and April 2019.
      At trial, Schweder testified that he did not enter into a partnership
with Wickline. He further contended that his deal with Wickline regarding
the Glen Ivy Hot Springs resort was that Wickline would be given 42.5
percent of GOCO BVI only if Wickline managed to locate investor funding for
the resort. However, because Wickline failed to do so, and instead obtained a
loan to effectuate the purchase of the resort, Wickline was not entitled to any
shares in GOCO BVI. Wickline, in contrast, testified that he entered into a
partnership with Schweder, and that their agreement regarding the Glen Ivy
Hot Springs resort was that Wickline would receive a 42.5 percent share in
GOCO BVI. During closing argument, counsel for Wickline argued to the
jury that Schweder breached his fiduciary duty to Wickline as a partner
because he “froze [Wickline] out” of the business. Counsel also argued that
Schweder made fraudulent misrepresentations to Wickline to cause Wickline
to enter into a partnership with him.

7     All of the Respondents were sued in the declaratory relief cause of
action. Accordingly, they are all parties in Wickline’s appeal from the
declaratory judgment.
                                        9
      Rather than being asked to return a general verdict on the two legal
causes of action, the jury was asked to return a special verdict on a series of
factual questions. In answering those questions, the jury found that
Schweder and Wickline did form a partnership (of an unspecified nature), but
the jury’s remaining findings meant that Wickline did not prevail on either of
his legal causes of action. Specifically, the jury’s answers on the special
verdict form were as follows:
      “1. Do you find that Plaintiff David Wickline and Defendant Ingo
      Schweder formed a partnership?” [¶] [Answer: Yes]

      “[¶] . . . [¶]

      “2. Did Defendant Ingo Schweder knowingly act against Plaintiff
      David Wickline’s interests in connection with the business of
      their partnership? [¶] [Answer: No.]

      “[¶] . . . [¶]

      “6. Did Defendant Ingo Schweder make a false representation of
      fact to Plaintiff David Wickline? [¶] [Answer: Yes]

      “[¶] . . . [¶]

      “7. Did Defendant Ingo Schweder know that the representation
      was false when he made it to Plaintiff David Wickline or did he
      make the representation recklessly and without regard for its
      truth? [Answer: No.]”8

8      Respondents attempt to characterize the jury’s verdict as “impliedly”
finding “that in June 2016, Schweder and [Wickline] were not partners in an
ongoing or existing partnership.” We disagree with that characterization.
The jury was not asked to decide whether and when the partnership
terminated. There are many bases on which the jury could have found that
Schweder did not knowingly act against Wickline’s interests in the business
of the partnership, without concluding that the partnership terminated in
June 2016. For example, as Wickline posited in his written rebuttal closing
argument to the trial court, “The logical conclusion, given the evidence at
trial and the jury’s answers to verdict form questions 1 and 2, is the jury
                                       10
      Thereafter, the parties submitted written closing arguments to the trial
court on the declaratory relief and promissory estoppel causes of action. The
trial court issued a tentative ruling on December 16, 2020, followed by a
“Ruling and Statement of Decision on Equitable Causes of Action” (Statement

of Decision) on May 4, 2021.9
      In the Statement of Decision, the trial court determined it was bound
by the jury’s finding that Schweder and Wickline formed a partnership. The
trial court also described the history of the business relationship between
Schweder and Wickline, in which it identified the nature of the partnership
found by the jury:
      “The business of the partnership initially was the establishment
      and operation of an equity fund named GOCO Asset
      Management. . . . [¶] GOCO Asset Management would purchase
      and own vacation resorts which would focus on the personal
      wellness of their guests. [Wickline] and [Schweder] would each
      own 42.5% of GOCO Asset Management and be the only voting
      shareholders. . . . [¶] [Wickline] did not raise any capital at any
      point in time. [¶] [Wickline] did locate a resort which was for
      sale, Glen Ivy Hot Springs, in Corona, California (the ‘Resort’),
      which was owned by Glen Ivy Hot Springs, Inc., a California

concluded that (i) [Wickline] and Schweder were partners in the Resort, but
(ii) rather than Schweder forcing [Wickline] out of the Resort, [Wickline] and
Schweder had a falling out that resulted in [Wickline] filing this lawsuit soon
thereafter.”

9     At the direction of the trial court, Respondents submitted a proposed
statement of decision, to which Wickline filed objections, along with his own
suggested revisions to Respondents’ proposed statement of decision. The trial
court held a hearing on April 23, 2021, after receiving those filings. At that
hearing, the trial court made several statements clarifying its intended
ruling, which we will discuss in more detail during our legal analysis.
Thereafter, the trial court issued its Statement of Decision using
substantially the same language as its tentative ruling, stating that it did
“not care for” the parties’ proposals.
                                      11
      corporation. . . . At that point, the terms of [Wickline’s] and
      [Schweder’s] partnership changed and narrowed. The
      partnership focused on the acquisition of the Resort. [¶] . . . [¶]
      In an e-mail string . . . which occurred as a result of questions by
      an attorney who assisted in structuring the Resort
      transaction . . . [Wickline] and [Schweder] reaffirmed their
      partnership agreement. They confirmed that after the sale of the
      Resort: 42.5 percent of the shares of [GOCO BVI] would be
      transferred to [Wickline], 42.5 percent of the shares would be
      transferred to [Schweder]; and, the remaining shares reserved for
      later transfer to the company’s key representatives and
      managers.”

      The trial court then set forth the following specific declaratory relief to
address the items set forth in paragraph 104 of the declaratory relief cause of

action in the second amended complaint:10

10   The cause of action for declaratory relief in the second amended
complaint stated as follows:
      “103. [Wickline] therefore requests a full and final judicial
      determination of his rights and responsibilities with respect to
      the Glen Ivy Hot Springs resort, including each and all of
      Defendants GOCO Hospitality, GOCO CA, Spa Venture, and
      GIHS.
      “104. [Wickline] hereby requests a judicial determination and
      order establishing his rightful claim to the following:
         “a. [Wickline] is at least a 42.5 percent owner of GOCO
         Hospitality.
         “b. [Wickline] is at least a 42.5 percent owner of GOCO CA.
         “c. [Wickline] is at least a 42.5 percent owner of Spa Venture.
         “d. [Wickline] is at least a 42.5 percent owner of GIHS.
         “e. [Wickline] is entitled to at least 50 percent of the voting
         rights of each of the entities described in paragraphs 104 (a)
         through (d).
         “f. No shareholder(s) other than [Wickline] and [Schweder] is
         or are entitled to voting rights.
         “g. [Wickline] is entitled to co-management of each of the
         entities described . . . .
         “h. [Wickline] is entitled to full reimbursement of any and all
                                       12
“1)      [Wickline] and [Schweder] entered into a partnership
         (pursuant to the agreement of [Wickline] and [Schweder],
         that the Court is bound by the Jury’s finding that Plaintiff
         and [Schweder] formed a partnership).

“2)      [Wickline’s] and [Schweder’s] oral partnership agreement
         provided that [Wickline] and [Schweder] would each bear
         their own expenses in carrying out their partnership
         duties. [Wickline] and [Schweder] did not discuss or agree
         on the payment of salaries to the themselves. Hence,
         [Wickline] is not entitled to reimbursement for any
         expenses he may have incurred relating to his negotiation
         and eventual acquisition of the Glen Ivy property or back
         pay.

“3)      As confirmed by [Wickline] and [Schweder], the
         partnership was only in GOCO Hospitality Global
         Opportunity Limited, a British Virgin Islands company
         [i.e., GOCO BVI], with each owning a 42.5% interest/shares
         in it and that only [Wickline’s] and [Schweder’s]
         interest/shares had voting rights.

“4)      The Partnership between [Wickline] and [Schweder]
         terminated on June 16, 2016. The Court bases this ruling
         on its findings that: 1) between May 16, 2016, and August
         2016, [Wickline’s] and [Schweder’s] conduct made it not
         reasonably practical for [Wickline] and [Schweder] to carry
         on the business of the partnership together; 2) [Wickline]
         hid the fact that he was withholding his skills and not
         performing all of his duties to the partnership, thereby
         breaching his fiduciary duty to [Schweder]; and, [Schweder]
         intended to terminate the partnership on May 20, 2016.
         The court notes that the jury expressly found that

      expenses reasonably incurred on behalf of Defendants relating
      to his negotiation and eventual acquisition of the Glen Ivy
      property.
      “i. [Wickline] is entitled to back pay in an amount to be proven
      at trial.
      “j. [Wickline] is entitled to at least 42.5 percent of any and all
      profits in the Glen Ivy resort project since January 2016.”
                                    13
            [Schweder] did not knowingly act against [Wickline’s]
            interest in connection with the business of the
            partnership. . . .

      “5)   [Wickline] and [Schweder] are not partners in the Glen Ivy
            Hot Springs resort, Glen Ivy Hot Springs resort real
            property, the Glen Ivy Hot Springs resort business, GOCO
            California, a California corporation, or any other defendant
            business entity. . . .

      “6)   As to paragraph 104 (j) of the declaratory relief cause of
            action, the term ‘Glen Ivy resort project’ is vague and
            ambiguous given the number of business entities, their
            alleged dealings with each other and with [Wickline] and
            [Schweder], and the testimony of [Wickline], [Schweder],
            and witnesses. This portion of the cause of action is
            uncertain and inappropriate for declaratory relief.”11

      The minute order describing the Statement of Decision (and referring
to that document for “[a]dditional, detailed rulings”) summarized the trial
court as having ruled that “[Wickline] and [Schweder] each had a 42.5%
ownership interest/shares in [GOCO BVI]. [Wickline’s] and [Schweder’s]
interest/shares were the only voting interest/shares. The partnership
between [Wickline] and [Schweder] terminated on June 16 , 2016.”
      The trial court’s judgment, entered on July 9, 2021, repeated the
Statement of Decision’s six specific declaratory relief rulings that we have set
forth above, along with the rejection of the promissory estoppel claim. The
judgment also set forth the jury’s verdict on the legal causes of action, and it
specified that Respondents were the prevailing parties and were therefore

11    The trial court also rejected Wickline’s promissory estoppel cause of
action, ruling that “[i]n light of the above rulings and findings by the Court, a
bulk of the allegations asserted in the cause of action are unfounded.”
                                       14
entitled to costs pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 685.090 and

1032, subdivision (b).12
      Wickline filed a notice of appeal from the judgment and from the award
of costs.
                                       II.
                                 DISCUSSION
A.    Wickline’s Appeal of the Declaratory Judgment That the Partnership
      Terminated
      Wickline’s appeal targets one discrete aspect of the trial court’s
declaratory judgment. Specifically, Wickline contends that the trial court
committed legal error in ruling that “[t]he Partnership between [Wickline]
and [Schweder] terminated on June 16, 2016.”
      On the surface, Wickline’s argument is relatively simple and
straightforward. As Wickline argues, because it is a partnership, the
business relationship between him and Schweder is governed by the Revised

Uniform Partnership Act (Corp. Code, § 16100 et seq.) (RUPA).13 RUPA sets
forth the exclusive steps that must occur for a partnership to be terminated:

12   On November 17, 2021, the trial court partially granted Wickline’s
motion to tax costs.

13     Although identified in the statute as “the Uniform Partnership Act of
1994” (Corp. Code, § 16100), the statutory enactment at issue here is
commonly referred to in case law as RUPA. (See, e.g., Heller Ehrman LLP v.
Davis Wright Tremaine LLP (2018) 4 Cal.5th 467, 475.) The name is used
because “[t]he basis of California’s statute was a revised uniform partnership
act (RUPA or the model act), first approved and recommended for adoption in
all states by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws (the Conference) in 1992, and again, with revisions, in 1994.” (Han v.
Hallberg (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 621, 633; see also 9 Witkin, Summary of Cal.
Law (11th ed. 2017) Partnership, § 18, p. 606 [“In 1996, the California
Legislature enacted the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA), with
modifications, entitled the Uniform Partnership Act of 1994.”].)
                                       15
namely dissolution followed by a winding up. (Id., § 16801, 16802.) Those
steps were not completed in this case. Therefore, according to Wickline, the
trial court erred in finding a termination. Wickline argues that the appellate
remedy is for us to vacate the trial court’s declaratory judgment and to
remand for further proceedings.
      Respondents do not attempt to argue that a termination of the
partnership occurred according to the steps set forth in RUPA. Instead, they
argue that regardless of whether RUPA was followed, Wickline should not
prevail on this appeal because (1) RUPA does not apply to a British Virgin
Islands “corporation” such as GOCO BVI; and (2) even if Wickline shows the
trial court erred in determining that the partnership was terminated,
Wickline cannot establish any prejudice from that erroneous ruling, giving
him no right to an appellate opinion vacating the declaratory judgment.
      We proceed by first examining Wickline’s contention that the trial court
committed legal error in determining that the partnership terminated
pursuant to RUPA. As part of that analysis, we will be required to consider
Respondents’ contention that RUPA does not apply. We will then address
Respondents’ contention that we should not issue an opinion in Wickline’s
favor vacating the erroneous declaratory judgment because Wickline has not
identified any prejudicial error by the trial court.
      1.    As a Preliminary Step, We Must Ascertain the Meaning of the
            Trial Court’s Ruling
      Turning to the question of whether the trial court erred in stating that
the partnership between Wickline and Schweder terminated on June 16,
2016, we must attempt to clarify the trial court’s meaning as to two
important points that are crucial to our analysis. In particular, before
undertaking our legal analysis, we must attempt to discern what the trial
court meant when it stated (1) the partnership between Wickline and

                                       16
Schweder “was only in [GOCO BVI], with each owning a 42.5%
interest/shares in it”; and (2) the partnership “terminated” on a specific date.
             a.    Clarification of What the Trial Court Meant by Stating
                   That the Partnership Was “In” GOCO BVI
      The trial court’s statement the partnership between Wickline and
Schweder “was only in [GOCO BVI], with each owning a 42.5%
interest/shares in it” (italics added) needs clarification. On its face, it is not
clear what the trial court meant by stating that the partnership was “in” an
entity, GOCO BVI, that is not a partnership itself, but rather is a legal entity

created under the British Virgin Island’s Business Companies Act.14
However, as we will explain, two other statements by the trial court provide
clarification of the trial court’s meaning.
      First, when discussing the relevant factual background, the trial court’s
Statement of Decision set forth a more specific description of the partnership
agreement: “[Wickline] and [Schweder] reaffirmed their partnership
agreement. They confirmed that after the sale of the Resort: 42.5 percent of
the shares of [GOCO BVI] would be transferred to [Wickline], [and] 42.5
percent of the shares would be transferred to [Schweder].”
      Second, at an April 23, 2021 hearing after the filing of Respondents’
proposed statement of decision and Wickline’s objections, the trial court

discussed the meaning of its tentative ruling.15 The trial court twice stated

14    The appellate record contains the Memorandum of Association and the
Articles of Association for GOCO BVI, which show it was formed under the
British Virgin Island’s Business Companies Act of 2004 as a “company
limited by shares.” Respondents have filed a request that we take judicial
notice of the British Virgin Island’s Business Companies Act of 2004 and the
British Virgin Island’s Limited Partnership Act. We grant the request.

15    Because the trial court ended up adopting the tentative ruling, in
substance, as its Statement of Decision, we view the trial court’s explanation
                                        17
that the partnership between Wickline and Schweder “manifested itself in
[GOCO BVI].” (Italics added.)
      These statements clarify the meaning of the trial court’s ruling that the
partnership was “in” GOCO BVI. California defines a partnership as “an
association of two or more persons to carry on as coowners a business for
profit . . . .” (Corp. Code § 16101, subd. (a)(9).) As we understand the trial
court’s ruling, Wickline and Schweder formed a partnership involving the
acquisition and ownership of the Glen Ivy Hot Springs resort, which they
agreed would be expressed by Wickline taking a 42.5 percent ownership
interest in GOCO BVI. This was because GOCO BVI was the parent entity
that owned GOCO Hospitality California, a California corporation, which in
turn owned the resort. Contrary to Respondents’ suggestion, the trial court
did not rule that the partnership formed by Wickline and Schweder was
identical to GOCO BVI. Instead, it ruled that the manifestation of Wickline’s
partnership stake would be through a 42.5 percent interest in the parent
entity, GOCO BVI.
      Having defined what the trial court meant by the partnership “in”
GOCO BVI, we are able to address Respondents’ contention that the law of
the British Virgin Islands, rather than the California Corporations Code,
governs whether the partnership was terminated. Respondents argue, “any
failure to comply with RUPA is immaterial as the court could not have
dissolved GOCO BVI under the authority of RUPA, as that statute does not
apply to a [British Virgin Islands] corporation. [¶] . . . While RUPA may
provide the ‘exclusive means’ for dissolving a California partnership, it
cannot apply to a corporation subject to [British Virgin Islands] law . . . .”

at the April 23, 2021 hearing about the meaning of the tentative ruling to
provide clarification for what the trial court intended in the Statement of
Decision.
                                        18
Specifically, Respondents contend that because GOCO BVI is a corporate
entity created under the British Virgin Island’s Business Companies Act of
2004, that law should also govern issues of dissolution, termination, and the
distribution of profits to shareholders.
      The argument fails because, as we have determined, there is a
distinction between (1) the partnership formed by Wickline and Schweder for
the purpose of acquiring and owning the resort; and (2) the British Virgin
Islands entity, GOCO BVI. Because the partnership itself is a free-standing
legal relationship entered into by Wickline and Schweder, it is distinct from
the British Virgin Islands company GOCO BVI, and the legal requirements
for the termination of the partnership are not governed by the law of the
British Virgin Islands.
      Having rejected Respondents’ contention that the British Virgin
Island’s Business Companies Act of 2004 applies here, the next question is
whether, as Wickline contends, California law governs the issue of
partnership termination. RUPA provides that with certain inapplicable
exceptions, “the law of the jurisdiction in which a partnership has its
principal office governs relations among the partners and between the
partners and the partnership.” (Corp. Code, § 16106, subd. (a).) As the trial
court found, the business of the partnership was the acquisition and
ownership of the Glen Ivy Hot Springs resort, which is located in California.
Although Respondents argue that the law of the British Virgin Islands
applies, that argument is based solely on the premise that the partnership
formed by Wickline and Schweder was identical to the British Virgin Island’s
corporation, GOCO BVI. Respondents have not argued that, if the
partnership is distinct from the corporate entity, it would be governed by the
law of a jurisdiction other than California. As no party has identified any

                                       19
location for the partnership’s “principal office” other than California, we

apply California law in analyzing whether the partnership terminated.16
            b.     Clarification of What the Trial Court Meant by Stating
                   That the Partnership “Terminated”
      The second aspect of the trial court’s ruling that requires clarification is
what the trial court meant when it stated that the partnership “terminated”
on a specific date, i.e., June 16, 2016. Although the text of the trial court’s
Statement of Decision does not reveal what the trial court meant when it said
that the partnership “terminated,” three different statements made by the
trial court at the April 23, 2021 hearing are of some assistance.
      First, apparently in response to Wickline’s written argument that a
dissolution had not occurred and that the trial court was “confus[ing] two
terms of art: dissolution and termination,” the trial court stated at the April
23, 2021 hearing that its ruling was not addressing whether the partnership

16     In a footnote to their appellate brief, Respondents refer to the British
Virgin Islands Limited Partnership Act, and we have granted their request
for judicial notice of that law. However, we do not perceive Respondents to be
arguing that the partnership formed by Wickline and Schweder is governed
by that law. If Respondents intended to make such an argument, they were
required by appellate rules to set forth the argument in a specific argument
heading and to support it with citation to authority and the record, which
they failed to do. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) [A party’s brief
must “[s]tate each point under a separate heading or subheading . . . , and
support each point by argument and, if possible, by citation of authority.”];
Delta Stewardship Council Cases (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 1014, 1075 [“When
an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with
reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as
forfeited.”].) Moreover, having reviewed the British Virgin Islands Limited
Partnership Act that Respondents submitted to us, the partnership at issue
here was plainly not formed according to the requirements of that law.
Among other things, a partnership formed under the British Virgin Islands
Limited Partnership Act requires registration of the partnership (id., § 4), of
which there is no evidence here.
                                        20
was dissolved. The trial court explained, “The Court is not confusing the
terms ‘termination’ and ‘dissolution.’ Once again, the second amended
Complaint does not contain a cause of action for dissolution. Dissolution is
not included among the ten rights and responsibilities which [Wickline]
requested the Court address in the declaratory relief cause of action.” In his
appellate brief, Wickline posits that the trial court may have meant that the
partnership was dissolved (as that term is used in RUPA), but not that it was
terminated. He devotes a considerable portion of his appellate brief to that
issue. However, based on its statement at the April 23, 2021 hearing we
conclude that the trial court did not intend to rule that partnership was
dissolved.
      Next, in the trial court, Wickline argued in his written objections to the
proposed statement of decision that he “lost everything and received nothing
for his 42.5% direct ownership of GOCO BVI and indirect ownership of the
Resort,” but that, by ruling that the partnership terminated, the trial court
“would have [Wickline’s] partnership interest simply vanish, with Schweder
being gifted [Wickline’s] interest for free.” The trial court replied at the April
23, 2021 hearing with the following observation: “[Wickline] contends that
the tentative ruling provides that any interest which it has or had in [GOCO
BVI], simply have vanished. As [Wickline] put it in its objections to [the]
proposed final statement of decision, this Court would have [Wickline’s]
partnership interest simply vanish. The tentative ruling does not include
that at all. The tentative ruling simply indicates that the partnership
between plaintiff and defendant which manifested itself in [GOCO BVI],
terminated on June 16th, 2016.” Based on this statement, it appears that
whatever the trial court meant by “terminated,” it intended a legal status
under which Wickline could still have a partnership interest.

                                        21
      Finally, the trial court stated at the April 23, 2021 hearing that “the
Court uses the term ‘terminated’ because it is a term which both the plaintiff
and defendant used repeatedly in the past.” (Italics added.) Based on this
statement, we have reviewed the record to determine how the parties used
the word “terminated” in the briefing leading up the April 23, 2021

hearing.17 As we will explain, Wickline and Respondents both used the word
“terminated,” but in different ways.
      In Wickline’s written closing argument, he stated that, because the jury
found a partnership, “the only remaining basis for avoiding the declaratory
judgment sought by Wickline is to decide that the partnership between
Wickline and Schweder was effectively terminated.” (Italics added.) After
making this observation, Wickline argued at length that the partnership
could not have terminated because the requirements for partnership
termination under RUPA were not present. Thus, based on Wickline’s use of
the word “terminated” in his written closing argument, the trial court could
have meant that the partnership terminated based on the statutory
requirements set forth in RUPA.
      Respondents, in their written closing argument, did not attempt to
argue that the statutory requirements for termination under RUPA were
present. Instead, Respondents argued that Wickline, himself, “terminated
the partnership as a matter of law when he elected to sue for damages, in lieu

17     To determine how the parties used the word “terminated” prior to the
April 23, 2021 hearing, we look to the parties’ posttrial written briefing
rather than to statements made at trial, as we see no indication that the
parties focused on the word “terminated” during trial. There was some
discussion during trial about the conclusion of the partnership, but different
terminology was used. Most notably, Respondents’ counsel questioned
Wickline as to when the partnership “ended,” and the documentary evidence
at trial contained a letter from counsel for Schweder to counsel for Wickline
in August 2016 stating that Schweder wished to “sever” their relationship.
                                       22
of an accounting and judicial dissolution,” and thus he was “not entitled to a
declaratory judgment based on the purported – but now unquestionably

terminated – partnership.”18 (Bolding and italics omitted; second italics
added.) For this argument, Respondents relied principally on Gherman v.
Colburn (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 544, 564-565 (Gherman), which they
characterized as holding that that “[i]n electing to bring legal claims, the
wronged partner ‘submit[s] to the repudiation’ ” and thereby “destroys the
partnership.”
      2.    If the Trial Court Intended the Word “Terminated” in Either
            Sense Used by the Parties, It Erred
      Having identified the two ways in which the parties used the word
“terminated” in their written briefing to the trial court, either one of which
the trial court may have intended to adopt in its Statement of Decision, we
proceed to consider whether there is legal merit to either possible meaning of
partnership termination in the context of this case.
            a.    The Requirements for Termination of a Partnership Under
                  RUPA Are Not Present
      As we have explained, Wickline used the word “terminated” to refer to
partnership termination under RUPA. As RUPA is structured, it first sets
forth the possible methods by which a partnership can be dissolved. These
include, as most relevant here, (1) for a partnership at will (as opposed to a
partnership for a definite term or particular undertaking), “by the express
will to dissolve and wind up the partnership business of at least half of the

18    Respondents have resurrected this argument on appeal by stating that
“[Wickline] by his own actions, terminated his alleged partnership interests,”
and that “[Wickline] . . . terminated, indeed destroyed, any partnership with
Schweder when [Wickline] elected to pursue tort claims in lieu of a
dissolution to enforce his partnership rights.” (Italics added, original italics
omitted.)
                                       23
partners”; or (2) “[o]n application by a partner, a judicial determination that
any of the following apply: [¶] (A) The economic purpose of the partnership
is likely to be unreasonably frustrated. [¶] (B) Another partner has engaged
in conduct relating to the partnership business that makes it not reasonably
practicable to carry on the business in partnership with that partner. [¶]
(C) It is not otherwise reasonably practicable to carry on the partnership
business in conformity with the partnership agreement.” (Corp. Code,
§ 16801; see also Corrales v. Corrales (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 221, 227
[describing certain aspects of the process of dissolution for a two-person
partnership].)
      Only after dissolution occurs does the possibility of a partnership
termination arise. Specifically, RUPA states that “(a) Subject to subdivision
(b), a partnership continues after dissolution only for the purpose of winding
up its business. The partnership is terminated when the winding up of its

business is completed.” (Corp. Code, § 16802, italics added.)19 RUPA sets
forth specific statutory provisions governing the winding up of a partnership.
Among other things, in describing the process of winding up, the statute
states:

19     Subdivision (b) states, “At any time after the dissolution of a
partnership and before the winding up of its business is completed, all of the
partners, including any dissociating partner other than a wrongfully
dissociating partner, may waive the right to have the partnership’s business
wound up and the partnership terminated. In that event both of the
following apply: [¶] (1) The partnership resumes carrying on its business as
if dissolution had never occurred, and any liability incurred by the
partnership or a partner after the dissolution and before the waiver is
determined as if dissolution had never occurred. [¶] (2) The rights of a third
party accruing under paragraph (1) of Section 16804 or arising out of conduct
in reliance on the dissolution before the third party knew or received a
notification of the waiver may not be adversely affected.” (Corp. Code,
§ 16802, subd. (b).)
                                       24
      “(a) In winding up a partnership’s business, the assets of the
      partnership, including the contributions of the partners required
      by this section, shall be applied to discharge its obligations to
      creditors, including, to the extent permitted by law, partners who
      are creditors. Any surplus shall be applied to pay in cash the net
      amount distributable to partners in accordance with their right to
      distributions under subdivision (b).

      “(b) Each partner is entitled to a settlement of all partnership
      accounts upon winding up the partnership business. In settling
      accounts among the partners, the profits and losses that result
      from the liquidation of the partnership assets shall be credited
      and charged to the partners’ accounts. The partnership shall
      make a distribution to a partner in an amount equal to any
      excess of the credits over the charges in the partner’s
      account. . . .” (Corp. Code, § 16807.)

      It is undisputed that there was never any attempt to undertake a
winding up of the partnership between Wickline and Schweder. Indeed,
Schweder has consistently denied that any partnership existed, or that
Wickline was ever entitled to any interest in GOCO BVI. Schweder,
accordingly, has not attempted to participate in a winding up. Thus, without

even reaching the question of whether a dissolution might have occurred,20
because there was no winding up, we conclude that the partnership cannot
have terminated within the meaning of RUPA. If the trial court intended to
rule that the partnership was terminated pursuant to the requirements set
forth in RUPA, it erred.
            b.    Wickline Did Not Terminate the Partnership By Seeking
                  Damages in This Lawsuit
      As we have explained, Respondents used the word “terminated” to refer
to their contention that Wickline terminated the partnership when he sought

20   As noted above, the trial court stated it was not addressing whether the
partnership was dissolved.
                                     25
legal damages in this lawsuit to compensate him for Schweder’s allegedly
wrongful repudiation of their partnership.
      Respondents’ argument was based on Gherman, supra, 72 Cal.App.3d
544. According to Respondents, Gherman stands for the principle that if an
ousted partner brings a legal claim for damages against another partner,
alleging that the partner wrongfully repudiated the partnership, “[o]nce the
ousted partner ‘submits’ to the repudiation by bringing claims for damages,
the repudiation is irretrievable and the ousted partner destroys the
partnership and trades his partnership rights.” Relying on Gherman,
Respondents argued that Wickline made an “irretrievable choice” of
“ ‘submitting’ to Schweder’s alleged repudiation of the partnership and
reducing his purported partnership interest to a claim for damages. As a
result, whatever partnership existed has been terminated.”
      Gherman does not stand for the proposition for which Respondents
cited it. On the contrary, Gherman explains that “[a] plaintiff may plead
cumulative or inconsistent causes of action,” and when faced with a
repudiation of a partnership, under the then-controlling statute, a wronged
partner may, among other things, “sue to specifically enforce the
partnership,” “submit to the repudiation and sue for damages for conversion
of his interest, . . . sue for damages for breach . . . [,] or he may sue in tort.”
(Gherman, supra, 72 Cal.App.3d at 565.) Under the specific facts of
Gherman, however, the plaintiff limited his available remedies because he
had “dismissed the action for judicial dissolution and an accounting” and thus
“made an election of remedies to sue for damages (either in tort or for breach
of contract)” that “removed accounting as a possible issue in the case.” (Ibid.,
italics added.) Gherman made clear that it was only “once [plaintiffs] elected
not to assert any partnership rights and to stand solely on the cause of action
arising out of the repudiation, then as between the parties the cause of action

                                         26
for judicial dissolution and an accounting in equity became moot.” (Ibid.,
italics added.)
         Gherman does not hold that a partner effectuates a termination of the
partnership by merely including a cause of action for damages in a lawsuit
against a partner who is alleged to have repudiated the partnership. In fact,
it states the opposite: “[a] plaintiff may plead cumulative or inconsistent
causes of action.” (Gherman, supra, 72 Cal.App.3d at 565.) Thus, Wickline
was permitted to pursue claims for legal damages against Schweder based on
Schweder’s alleged repudiation of the partnership at the same time that he
sought the relief at issue here, namely, a declaration regarding his rights in
an ongoing partnership.
         Accordingly, if the trial court meant to rule, as Respondents argued,
that Wickline terminated the partnership by filing this lawsuit, the trial
court erred.
         3.    There Is No Merit to Respondents’ Contention That Wickline Is
               Not Entitled to an Opinion Ruling on Whether the Trial Court
               Erred in Its Declaratory Judgment By Stating That the
               Partnership Terminated
         As we have noted, instead of trying to defend the trial court’s ruling
that the partnership terminated, Respondents contend that Wickline is not
entitled to an opinion from us, in this appeal, determining that the trial court
erred.
         Respondents rely on the principle that an appellant must show that a
trial court’s error was prejudicial to obtain a reversal on appeal. (Cal. Const.,
art. VI, § 13 [miscarriage of justice requirement for appellate relief].)
According to Respondents, even if the trial court might have erred in ruling
that the partnership terminated on June 16, 2016, “[Wickline] is blocked from
any of the relief he seeks on remand and thus cannot show that he would
have had a better outcome but for the trial court’s perceived errors.”

                                         27
      The argument fails for the simple reason that the cause of action at
issue in this appeal is a request for declaratory relief. A declaratory
judgment does not entail any “relief” aside from a legally accurate statement
on the subject on which the declaration is sought. The remedy of declaratory
relief “is to be used in the interests of preventive justice, to declare rights
rather than execute them.” (Jolley v. Chase Home Finance, LLC (2013)
213 Cal.App.4th 872, 909.) “[T]he court may make a binding declaration of
these rights or duties, whether or not further relief is or could be claimed at
the time.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1060, italics added.)
      Here, the trial court issued a declaratory judgment stating that the
partnership between Wickline and Schweder terminated on June 16, 2016.
But as we have discussed, the trial court erred in issuing that declaration. If
the trial court meant to use the word “terminated” in either sense employed
by the parties, it erred. If the trial court did not intend either meaning
employed by the parties, the ruling is fatally unclear as to what the trial
court might have meant by termination of the partnership. Thus, Wickline’s
“assertions of error” are not “mooted” as Respondents suggest. On the
contrary, Wickline has an interest in obtaining a legally-correct declaratory
judgment, and one that is not fatally unclear. That is the relief we can afford
Wickline in this appeal, regardless of what use, if any, Wickline may be able
to make of a legally-correct declaratory judgment in future dealings with
Schweder or in subsequent court proceedings.
      Respondents devote extensive discussion to arguing that Wickline will
not be able to make any practical use of a legally-correct declaration
regarding the status of the partnership he formed with Wickline. As a
premise to this discussion, Respondents assume that, on remand, if Wickline
obtains a declaration that the partnership did not terminate, Wickline will
seek “to enforce his interest in GOCO BVI including a valuation of his

                                        28
interest and an order compelling shareholder distributions,” or will seek a
“dissolution, accounting and winding up to establish his partnership rights.”
In his appellate reply brief, Wickline denies that he has ever sought a
dissolution. He explains that “[h]e is asking for his interest [in GOCO BVI]
to be recognized and enforced,” after which he “can then seek to enforce his
rights either as a direct shareholder or as a partner in a partnership that is a
shareholder.” Wickline also states that he “is requesting the transfer of some
of Schweder’s shares in GOCO BVI pursuant to the oral partnership
agreement.”
      We need not, and do not, decide what relief, if any, might be available
to Wickline, in this or any other lawsuit, if he prevails in obtaining a
declaration that the partnership he formed with Schweder did not terminate.
The trial court made no ruling regarding the relief that might be available to
Wickline, and it is not our role to do so in the first instance. In this appeal
we are not concerned with whether Respondents have identified any
meritorious ground to conclude that Wickline might be prevented from
benefiting, in the future, from a declaratory judgment stating that he is a
partner in an ongoing partnership. The only issue before us is whether the
trial court erred in ruling that the partnership terminated on June 16, 2016.
Wickline, like any litigant seeking a declaratory judgment, is entitled to a
legally-correct declaration.
      We accordingly vacate the trial court’s judgment on the declaratory
relief cause of action, and we remand for further proceedings. If the trial
court chooses to reissue a declaratory judgment stating that the partnership
has terminated, the trial court must, at a minimum explain what it means by
termination. As we have explained, the record does not support a ruling that
the partnership terminated pursuant to the requirements of RUPA (Corp.

                                        29
Code, § 16802) or by virtue of Wickline’s pursuit of legal damages in this
lawsuit.
B.     Reversal of the Award of Costs
       The trial court’s award of costs to Respondents was based on its
conclusion that Respondents were the prevailing parties.
       Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, subdivision (a)(4) states:
“ ‘Prevailing party’ includes the party with a net monetary recovery, a
defendant in whose favor a dismissal is entered, a defendant where neither
plaintiff nor defendant obtains any relief, and a defendant as against those
plaintiffs who do not recover any relief against that defendant. If any party
recovers other than monetary relief and in situations other than as specified,
the ‘prevailing party’ shall be as determined by the court, and under those
circumstances, the court, in its discretion, may allow costs or not and, if
allowed, may apportion costs between the parties on the same or adverse
sides . . . .”
       Because we have vacated the judgment on the declaratory relief cause
of action, which will require the trial court to reissue a ruling on that cause of
action, the trial court may, after doing so, conclude that Wickline has
“recover[ed] other than monetary relief” in a manner that changes the trial
court’s view on the award of costs. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (a)(4); see
also Marina Pacifica Homeowners Assn. v. Southern California Financial
Corp. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 191, 209 [when the judgment provided both
parties with declaratory relief, the parties “ ‘recover[ed] other than monetary
relief,’ ” giving the trial court “the authority to determine the prevailing party
and to ‘allow costs or not’ ”].) Accordingly, we vacate the award of costs to
Respondents, and we remand for further proceedings on that issue.

                                        30
                                DISPOSITION
      We vacate the judgment entered on Wickline’s sixth cause of action for
declaratory relief, as well as the trial court’s award of costs to Respondents,
and we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                                                     IRION, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

CASTILLO, J.

RUBIN, J.

                                       31