Court Opinion

ID: 9744750
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:14:45.02328+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:51.339161
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE DOOLEY, dissenting: I dissent. The majority has confused “visitation rights” with “custody.” Each is wholly different from the other and governed by different rules of law. Visitation rights were granted to grandparents in Boyles v. Boyles (1973), 14 Ill. App. 3d 602, in People ex rel. Lutz v. Lutz (1975), 24 Ill. App. 3d 948, and in other appellate court decisions, and the propriety of extending such rights to grandparents was presupposed in People ex rel. Edwards v. Livingston (1969), 42 Ill. 2d 201. The majority, while conceding that grandparents are not debarred from visitation rights, limits such rights to cases presenting “special circumstances.” In reaching this result the majority appears to rely on cases such as People ex rel. Whalen v. Sheehan (1940), 373 Ill. 79, which involve the question of custody as well as visitation, and section 18 of the Divorce Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 40, par. 19), dealing with custody, not visitation. When only visitation is at issue, that line of cases is not relevant. The matter of visitation rights, as the majority admits, turns on what is in the best interests of the children. Despite repeated invitations by the trial court, the mother flatly declined to participate in a hearing to determine the effect of visitations by the grandfather on the children. Accordingly, the court denied her motion to dismiss. I would affirm the decisions below as to the jurisdiction of the circuit court, and remand the cause for a hearing on the merits so that there can be a judicial determination of what is in the best interests of these minor children. MR. JUSTICE CLARK joins in this dissent.