Court Opinion

ID: 9909103
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-12 17:01:03.676079+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:50:03.824104
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-6000     Document: 010110967020       Date Filed: 12/12/2023     Page: 1
                                                                                   FILED
                                                                       United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                         December 12, 2023
                          _________________________________
                                                                          Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                              Clerk of Court
  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

        Plaintiff - Appellee,

  v.                                                           No. 23-6000
                                                    (D.C. No. 5:18-CR-00152-PRW-1)
  LAWRENCE SAMUELS, JR.,                                      (W.D. Okla.)

        Defendant - Appellant.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                          _________________________________

 Before MATHESON, BACHARACH, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
                   _________________________________

       On September 11, 2022, Texas Department of Public Safety Corporal

 Nathaniel Chestnut stopped Lawrence Samuels, Jr., for speeding. Mr. Samuels was

 driving a rental car and was on federal supervised release. He consented to a search

 of the car. When Corporal Chestnut opened the hood, he found a sock tied to the

 engine and discovered a gun inside the sock. He arrested Mr. Samuels. That same

 day, a probation officer petitioned the district court to revoke Mr. Samuels’s

       *
         After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
 argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent,
 except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It
 may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 23-6000     Document: 010110967020       Date Filed: 12/12/2023    Page: 2

 supervised release, alleging three violations: committing a crime, possessing a

 firearm, and leaving the judicial district.

        At the revocation hearing, Mr. Samuels admitted to leaving the district. The

 district court found he had committed the other two violations because he had

 constructive possession of the gun. It revoked Mr. Samuels’s supervised release and

 sentenced him to 24 months in prison followed by 36 months of supervised release.

        Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we reverse and remand

 because the district court applied the wrong constructive possession standard.

                                   I. BACKGROUND

                                    A. Factual History

        Mr. Samuels served 14 years of a 17.5-year sentence for a federal drug offense

 before he was granted executive clemency. His supervised release was set to expire

 in May 2023.

        On September 8, 2022, Mr. Samuels rented a car near Oklahoma City. He

 testified that he had “originally reserved a Kia,” but the “tire was flat.” ROA, Vol. 3

 at 66. The rental manager gave him the only car left—a Toyota Camry that had

 “just” been returned. Id. at 68. Mr. Samuels watched the manager vacuum the

 passenger compartment of the car after Mr. Samuels noticed it “had grass on the

 inside” and “was dirty.” Id. at 68-69. Mr. Samuels did not look under the car’s hood

 and did not observe the manager look under the hood either. Id. at 69.

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       On September 11, Mr. Samuels was driving the Toyota Camry eastbound on

 I-40 in Texas. Corporal Chestnut pulled him over for going 84 mph in a 75-mph

 zone. Mr. Samuels provided his license and the car’s rental agreement to the trooper.

       Asked where his travel began, Mr. Samuels said he had been in Amarillo

 visiting an aunt. Corporal Chestnut pointed out that Mr. Samuels was going the

 wrong direction to be traveling from Amarillo to his home near Oklahoma City.

 Mr. Samuels then said he had been in Bakersfield, California, visiting his fiancée,

 and had lied because he was on supervised release and was not permitted to travel

 outside the Western District of Oklahoma. He later acknowledged he was outside the

 judicial district when he was pulled over in Texas.

       Mr. Samuels denied having any weapons on his person or in the rental car. He

 consented to search of the car. Corporal Chestnut “located a firearm, a Glock

 handgun, in the engine bay. It was tied up in a long, black sock and was located on

 the passenger side front quarter panel.” Id. at 22. He later searched the serial

 number on the gun, could not identify the owner, and concluded the gun was not

 stolen. Another trooper tried and failed to lift fingerprints from the gun.

       Corporal Chestnut arrested Mr. Samuels for being a felon in possession of a

 firearm. His probation officer filed a Petition for Warrant or Summons for Offender

 Under Supervision, alleging Mr. Samuels violated (1) a mandatory condition of his

 release not to commit another federal, state, or local crime; (2) a standard condition

 not to possess a firearm; and (3) another standard condition not to leave the judicial

 district without permission of the district court or his probation officer.

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                                  B. Procedural History

       At the final revocation hearing on these alleged violations, Mr. Samuels

 admitted he left the judicial district without permission, but he disputed the violations

 stemming from his alleged possession of a firearm.

       In determining whether Mr. Samuels had constructively possessed the firearm,

 the district court considered (1) whether it could infer possession from his control of

 the rental car, or (2) whether it should require the Government to show a nexus

 between Mr. Samuels and the gun. Id. at 53, 87. As explained below, the court thus

 decided between a sole-occupancy standard and a joint-occupancy standard for

 constructive possession. The court settled on the former, concluding that

 “knowledge, dominion, and control of the gun can be properly inferred.” Id. at 105.

       The district court determined that Mr. Samuels’s testimony did not overcome

 this inference. Id. at 88-89; see also id. at 104-05. It “ha[d] trouble believing

 [Mr. Samuels’s] testimony” “that he did not know the gun was there” because he lied

 to the trooper about his travel plan. Id. at 105.

       The district court found Mr. Samuels guilty of all three violations. It revoked

 his supervised release and sentenced him to 24 months in prison and 36 months of

 supervised release. Mr. Samuels timely appealed.

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                                      II. DISCUSSION

                                   A. Standard of Review

    Preservation

          The Government argues plain error review applies to Mr. Samuels’s argument

 that the district court erred in failing to apply a joint-occupancy standard. Aplee. Br.

 at 13. It contends that “[a]t no time did Mr. Samuels object or argue that the district

 court used the wrong standard of constructive possession instead of a joint occupancy

 standard.” Id. We conclude the issue was preserved and plain error review does not

 apply.

          An issue is preserved for review if (1) the appellant “pressed” it before the

 district court or (2) the district court “passed upon” it. Tesone v. Empire Mktg.

 Strategies, 942 F.3d 979, 992 (10th Cir. 2019) (quotations omitted). Even if

 Mr. Samuels did not press the joint-occupancy issue, the court passed upon it.

          The district court asked whether this matter presented (1) “[a] straight

 constructive possession inquiry,” that is, inferring possession from “ownership

 dominion, or control of the . . . premises”; or (2) a “joint occupancy issue because it’s

 a rental car,” which would require “some evidence to show some connection or nexus

 between the defendant and firearm.” ROA, Vol. 3 at 53. The court could not “find

 any legal authority for the fact that,” because the gun was found in “a rental car,” it

 should apply “a joint occupancy-type analysis.” Id. at 86-87.

          The district court concluded that because the “undisputed evidence [showed]

 that the defendant had exclusive possession of the car,” “knowledge, dominion, and

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 control of the gun can be properly inferred.” Id. at 105. It thus passed upon whether

 to apply a joint-occupancy constructive possession standard. As a result, we do not

 review for plain error.

    Error Review

        To revoke supervised release, the district court must find by a preponderance of

 the evidence that the defendant violated a condition of his release. 18 U.S.C.

 § 3583(e)(3); United States v. Disney, 253 F.3d 1211, 1213 (10th Cir. 2001). “We

 review the district court’s decision to revoke supervised release for abuse of

 discretion.” United States v. Jones, 818 F.3d 1091, 1097 (10th Cir. 2016) (quotations

 omitted).

        “Legal questions relating to the revocation of supervised release are reviewed

 de novo.” Id. “A district court necessarily abuses its discretion when it makes an

 error of law.” Id. We review factual findings for clear error and we defer to a

 district court’s credibility determinations. United States v. Jordan, 806 F.3d 1244,

 1252 (10th Cir. 2015).

        “As the trier of fact in a revocation proceeding, the district court has the exclusive

 function of appraising the credibility of the witnesses, determining the weight to give

 their testimony, and resolving any conflicts in the evidence.” United States v. Shea,

 512 F. App’x 770, 775 (10th Cir. 2013) (unpublished); see United States v. White,

 39 F.3d 1193, at *1 (10th Cir. 1994) (“giving due deference to the district court’s

 evaluation of the credibility of the evidence received during the revocation and

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 sentencing hearings”) (unpublished).1 We recently “emphasize[d] that the district court is

 in the best position to make credibility determinations, and we are loath to usurp the role

 of factfinder.” United States v. Phillips, 71 F.4th 817, 824 (10th Cir. 2023) (citation and

 quotations omitted).

                                B. Constructive Possession

        The supervised release violations at issue are Mr. Samuels’s alleged

 (1) commission of the crime of being a felon in possession of a firearm, and

 (2) possession of a firearm. Both turn on whether he possessed the gun found in the

 rental car. Because Mr. Samuels did not have actual possession of the gun, the

 Government needed to show he had constructive possession.

    Legal Background

        The parties contest whether the district court should have applied a sole- or a

 joint-occupancy standard. Under both, “constructive possession occurs when a

 person not in actual possession knowingly has the power and intent to exercise

 dominion and control over a firearm.” United States v. Samora, 954 F.3d 1286, 1290

 (10th Cir. 2020) (alterations and quotations omitted).

        First, under the sole occupancy standard, United States v. Benford, 875 F.3d

 1007, 1019 (10th Cir. 2017) (referring to “sole occupancy cases”); see United States

 v. Meza, 701 F.3d 411, 419, 422 (5th Cir. 2012) (referring to a “single occupancy

        1
         We cite the unpublished cases in this opinion for their persuasive value. See
 Fed. R. App. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).

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 standard”), “[k]nowledge, dominion, and control can be inferred when a defendant

 has exclusive control over the premises in which the firearm was found,” Samora,

 954 F.3d at 1290 (quotations omitted). A vehicle is a “premises.” See United States

 v. Jameson, 478 F.3d 1204, 1209-10 (10th Cir. 2007). Intent to control—required

 after Henderson v. United States, 575 U.S. 622 (2015)—may be inferred from

 exclusive control. Benford, 875 F.3d at 1019.

       Second, the joint-occupancy standard applies “when two or more people

 occupy a given space.” Jameson, 478 F.3d at 1209 (quotations omitted). When the

 defendant did not exclusively control the premises, the government may not rely on

 inference only. Id. It must “meet a higher burden in proving constructive

 possession” by showing a “nexus between the defendant and the firearm.” Id.

 (quotations omitted). The “nexus” must “support[] a plausible inference that the

 defendant had knowledge of and access to the weapon or contraband.” Samora,

 954 F.3d at 1291 (quotations omitted).2 Thus, when more than one person occupies a

       2
        Several principles guide the nexus analysis:
                    (1) proximity alone may not establish knowledge
            and access . . . , (2) neither may proximity alone support a
            finding of dominion and control . . . , (3) evidence of
            knowledge and access gives rise to a permissive inference
            of dominion and control, (4) evidence of knowledge and
            access may be proved by direct evidence, or inferred from
            circumstantial evidence, so long as the circumstantial
            evidence includes something other than mere proximity,
            (5) proximity may be considered with other evidence in the
            case to support an inference of knowledge and access, and
            dominion and control over the firearm.
       Jameson, 478 F.3d at 1209-10.

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 vehicle simultaneously, the joint-occupancy standard applies. See, e.g., Jameson,

 478 F.3d at 1207, 1209; United States v. Washington, 783 F.3d 1198, 1200 (10th

 Cir. 2015).

        We also have applied the joint-occupancy standard when a defendant was

 alone in the vehicle, a firearm was found, and (1) the vehicle belonged to the

 defendant’s brother’s friend, United States v. Hishaw, 235 F.3d 565, 572 (10th

 Cir. 2000); (2) the “car [was] registered to [the defendant’s] wife,” United States v.

 Simpson, 845 F.3d 1039, 1061 (10th Cir. 2017); and (3) the “[d]efendant borrowed

 the car from his ex-girlfriend,” Samora, 954 F.3d at 1290. The Eighth Circuit

 applied a joint-occupancy standard when the defendant—the sole occupant of a rental

 car—said that drugs found in the car “between the [trunk] lid liner and the sheet

 metal” were placed there “before he rented it.” United States v. Young, 68 F.4th

 1095, 1097-98 (8th Cir. 2023).

        Courts apply the joint-occupancy standard to avoid finding innocent occupants

 liable for contraband placed by another occupant. United States v. Harris, 515 F.3d

 1307, 1310 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“[A] contrary view could unfairly sweep up unwitting

 roommates or housemates . . . .”); United States v. Ramos, 852 F.3d 747, 754-55

 (8th Cir. 2017) (“[A] father could be imprisoned for marijuana that his son has

 hidden in the house, or a wife could be jailed for her husband’s secret cache of illegal

 guns.”); 3 Wharton’s Criminal Law § 35:3 (16th ed. 2023) (“[E]xclusive control over

 a location . . . is either missing or diminished in joint control situations.”); see United

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  States v. Michel, 446 F.3d 1122, 1128 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting that the heightened

  joint-occupancy standard avoids convictions based on “inferences upon inferences”).

     Application

         Mr. Samuels argues the district court erred in declining to apply the joint-

  occupancy constructive possession standard. We agree.

         Because a renter does not own a rental car, and because rental cars frequently

  change hands, courts should consider whether to apply the joint-occupancy standard

  when contraband is found in a rental car. See Young, 68 F.4th at 1098 (applying

  joint-occupancy standard to a rental car). Although this standard may not apply in

  every rental-car situation, the facts in this case point to applying it here.

         In reaching this conclusion, we do not rely on Mr. Samuels’s testimony that

  the Toyota Camry he rented had “just” been returned and had not been cleaned; that

  he watched the rental manager vacuum the passenger compartment; and that neither

  he nor the manager (while in Mr. Samuels’s presence) looked under the car’s hood.

  ROA, Vol. 3 at 68-69. The district court was troubled by Mr. Samuels’s lie to

  Corporal Chestnut about his travel plan and his explanation for why he lied. See id.

  at 93-94, 105. These doubts about Mr. Samuels’s credibility led the court to

  disbelieve his testimony concerning the circumstances of his renting the car. Id.

  at 89-91. Because we must defer to the district court’s credibility determinations,

  Jordan, 806 F.3d at 1252, we consider only whether the remaining facts suffice to

  show the district court applied the wrong constructive possession standard. They do.

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        The joint-occupancy standard should apply because (1) Mr. Samuels was

  driving a rental car; (2) he had possession of the car for just three days; and (3) the

  gun was located not in the passenger compartment or the trunk but under the hood

  inside a sock tied to the engine block, where a renter and perhaps also the rental

  company are less likely to check than inside the car. See Young, 68 F.4th at 1097-98

  (applying joint-occupancy standard where drugs were found “between the [trunk] lid

  liner and the sheet metal”); United States v. Chatmon, 742 F.3d 350, 353 (8th Cir.

  2014) (noting that a jury could have concluded a “prior lessee . . . placed the firearm

  in the vehicle” because “an employee of the car rental agency testified that although

  the interior of every returned car is inspected, the inspection is ‘more like a glance’

  than a ‘detailed search’”).

        As noted, the district court could not “find any legal authority for the fact

  that,” because the gun was found in “a rental car,” it should apply “a joint

  occupancy-type analysis.” Id. at 86-87. But even if we have not applied this

  standard specifically to rented vehicles, we have applied it where, as here, the

  defendant was the sole occupant but not the owner of the vehicle in which a firearm

  was found. The facts in this case point to application of the joint occupancy standard

  as much as those in Samora, Hishaw, and Simpson.

        In Hishaw, the defendant was alone in a borrowed car when officers pulled him

  over and “smelled burning marijuana, noticed what appeared to be a marijuana cigarette

  on the ground, and . . . observed what appeared to be another marijuana cigarette between

  the driver’s and passenger’s seats.” 235 F.3d at 567; see also id. at 572. They then found

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  a “semiautomatic pistol under the passenger’s seat.” Id. at 567. We applied a joint-

  occupancy standard because the defendant said the car was borrowed and “[t]he

  government presented no evidence to rebut this statement or to show the extent of his

  dominion and control over the car.” Id. at 572.

         In Samora, the “[d]efendant had borrowed his ex-girlfriend’s car and drove it

  alone to a restaurant.” 954 F.3d at 1289. When he left the restaurant, officers tried to

  arrest the defendant on an outstanding warrant, and he fled. Id. “After the officers

  caught and arrested [the d]efendant, they searched the vehicle he had been driving and

  found a loaded firearm inside the center console,” id., as well as the “[d]efendant’s wallet

  in the driver’s side door,” id. at 1290. Relying on Hishaw, we applied the joint-

  occupancy standard “because [the d]efendant borrowed the car from his ex-girlfriend.”

  Id. at 1290-91.

         And in Simpson, the defendant “was sitting [alone] in the driver’s seat of his car

  with the seat in a reclined position” when police executed a search warrant on the car.

  845 F.3d at 1063. They found a “handgun and ammunition . . . under the driver’s seat.”

  Id. at 1061. We held that because the defendant “jointly occupied” the car “with his

  wife,” who was the registered owner of the car, possession could not be inferred from

  occupancy alone. Id. at 1061-62.3

         3
          By contrast, we applied the sole-occupancy standard in United States v. Cota-
  Meza, 367 F.3d 1218 (10th Cir. 2004), because even though the defendant was
  driving a “minivan which belonged to [someone else],” id. at 1220, “[t]he hidden
  compartment” where the contraband was found “contained 18.8 kilograms of cocaine
  with a wholesale street value in excess of $2.6 million,” and “[s]uch a large amount
  of cocaine with a high street value supports a reasonable inference of [the
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         As in these cases, Mr. Samuels did not own the car and other people previously

  had access to it. And as in Young, the contraband was hidden in a place unlikely to be

  noticed by a renter who did not place the contraband there.

         Thus, even disregarding Mr. Samuels’s testimony about the circumstances of

  acquiring the rental car due to the district court’s credibility concerns, we conclude the

  district court should have applied the joint-occupancy standard here.

     Harmless Error

         We are unable to conclude that the district court’s choice of a sole-occupancy

  standard was harmless.

         After the testimony at the revocation hearing, the district court said, “It seems,

  I think undisputed, that Mr. Samuels knowingly held ownership, dominion, or control

  over the rental car. That’s where the gun was found.” ROA, Vol. 3 at 86. Then it

  said, “[I]f it’s in the car and you have possession of the car, that’s enough for

  constructive possession.” Id. Mr. Samuels’s counsel argued that “there [was] a lack

  of knowledge.” Id. at 87. The court responded, “[T]he knowledge though goes as to

  knowledge that he was in possession of the car.” Id.

         After hearing further from both counsel, the district court reiterated “that the

  defendant had exclusive possession of the car. Because of that, knowledge,

  defendant’s] knowledge of the presence of the contraband in the minivan,” id. at
  1224.

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  dominion, and control of the gun can be properly inferred.” Id. at 105. This

  statement mirrors the sole-occupancy standard. See Samora, 954 F.3d at 1290.

         The district court then asked whether “Mr. Samuels’s testimony can overcome

  that inference.” ROA, Vol. 3 at 105. It said:

                And Mr. Samuels did testify that he did not know the gun
                was there. I have trouble believing that testimony for the
                credibility issues that we’ve already described.
                Mr. Samuels has admittedly lied, with respect to the
                conduct in this case, before. Here, it strikes me as his
                testimony, as in many cases, is sort of inconsistent with the
                facts and common sense, you know. The excuse . . . given
                [for] why he lied to the trooper doesn’t make a lot of sense.

  Id. The court added that it “can’t put much weight on Mr. Samuels’[s] denial of

  knowledge of the gun.” Id. at 106.

         The foregoing shows that the district court applied the sole-occupancy

  standard to infer constructive possession and determined that Mr. Samuels did not

  rebut the inference of knowledge because the court did not find his testimony

  credible. But the court did not find that Mr. Samuels knew about the gun, which is

  required under the joint-occupancy test. See Samora, 954 F.3d at 1291.

         “In non-constitutional harmless error cases, the government bears the burden of

  demonstrating, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the substantial rights of the

  defendant were not affected.” United States v. Keck, 643 F.3d 789, 798 (10th Cir. 2011)

  (quotations omitted). “An error is not harmless if it requires us to speculate on whether

  the court would have reached the same determination absent the error.” United States v.

  Harrison, 743 F.3d 760, 764 (10th Cir. 2014) (alterations and quotations omitted).

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        On appeal, the Government contests the proper constructive possession

  standard under the plain-error framework. It thus has not attempted to show by a

  preponderance of the evidence that the error was harmless. And we cannot say, on

  the record before us, that the district court’s application of the wrong standard was

  harmless. When we are “place[d] in the zone of speculation and conjecture,” United

  States v. Labastida-Segura, 396 F.3d 1140, 1143 (10th Cir. 2005), the proper course

  is to remand for the court to apply the correct standard, see United States v. Williams,

  48 F.4th 1125, 1136 (10th Cir. 2022).

                                   III. CONCLUSION

        We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                                              Entered for the Court

                                              Scott M. Matheson, Jr.
                                              Circuit Judge

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