Court Opinion

ID: 9951162
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-15 18:02:41.841516+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:37:41.508005
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/15/24 P. v. Hicks CA1/5
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                  DIVISION FIVE

 THE PEOPLE,
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                        A166486
 v.
 DANIEL WALTER HICKS,                                                   (Napa County
                                                                        Super. Ct. No. 21CR000516)
           Defendant and Appellant.

         A jury convicted defendant and appellant Daniel Walter Hicks
(appellant) of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury
and found true an allegation that he personally inflicted great bodily injury.
Appellant appeals from the trial court’s judgment sentencing him to six years
in state prison and ordering him to pay court fees and a restitution fine.
Appellant contends that the judgment must be reversed because the term
“great bodily injury” is unconstitutionally vague, and that the imposed fees
and fines are unconstitutional absent a determination of his ability to pay.
We affirm.
                                     PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
         In June 2021, the Napa County District Attorney filed an information
charging appellant with assault by means of force likely to produce great

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bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4))1 with a special allegation of
personal infliction of great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). The
information further alleged a prior strike (§ 667, subd. (b)–(i)) and a prior
serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)).
      In July 2022, a jury found appellant guilty and found true the special
allegation. The trial court found true the prior strike and serious felony
allegations but later granted appellant’s motion to dismiss those
enhancements. The court sentenced appellant to six years in prison and
ordered him to pay a $40 court operations assessment (§ 1465.8), a $30
conviction assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373), a $300 restitution fine (§ 1202.4),
and a $300 suspended restitution fine (§ 1202.45).
                          FACTUAL BACKGROUND
      On January 19, 2021, both appellant and the victim, Paul D., were
patients at Napa State Hospital. At close to 1:00 p.m. that day, Paul D. was
seated at a table playing a board game with Nurse Nelly P. in a day room at
the hospital. Appellant entered the day room; approached Paul D.; and,
without warning, punched Paul D. “at least five times” in the face. Appellant
then left the room.
      A physician testified Paul D. suffered “a significant nasal fracture with
trauma.” Months later, because Paul D. “couldn’t breathe” through his nasal
passages, he had surgery that involved re-breaking his nose. The treating
physician explained that the purpose of the surgery was to change the “nasal
shape [to facilitate] breathing.” The physician “elevate[d] [Paul D.’s] skin
lining . . . to rearrange or remove some of the broken bone pieces that ha[d]
healed incorrectly” and then “sew[ed] it back together.” Afterwards, Paul D.’s

      1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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nose bled every day for three weeks. He testified he could breathe at 80
percent capacity after the surgery.
         Appellant testified that he had experienced a lot of threats and hostility
from Paul D. and that Paul D. had “shoulder check[ed]” appellant and had
left threatening contraband on appellant’s bed on the day of the incident.
Appellant struck Paul D. because, as he passed Paul D. in the day room, Paul
D. “reached for his waistband then started getting up.” Appellant feared he
was “going to get hit with a weapon.” When appellant hit Paul D., he “was
aiming for [Paul D.’s] forehead to put him off balance, put him back in his
seat.”
                                   DISCUSSION
I.       Great Bodily Injury
         Appellant contends the phrase “great bodily injury” as used in
sections 245, subdivision (a)(4) and 12022.7, subdivision (a) is
unconstitutionally vague. We decline his invitation to deviate from the prior
decisions that have rejected the claim.
         The decision in People v. Guest (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 809, 811–812
(Guest), reasoned as follows in rejecting the claim as to section 12022.7: “The
orthodox test under the United States or California constitutions for
unconstitutional vagueness is whether the statute ‘ “either forbids or requires
the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application . . . .” ’
[Citation.] However, ‘a statute is sufficiently certain if it employs words of
long usage or with a common law meaning, “notwithstanding an element of
degree in the definition as to which estimates may differ.” ’ [Citation.] As we
have stated in People v. Kimbrel (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 869, 876, ‘We are
persuaded by the long acceptance of “great bodily injury” as a term commonly

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understandable to jurors that . . . has not acquired a technical legal definition
requiring in the absence of special circumstances a clarifying instruction.’
While the defendant may be correct in that an ‘I know it when I see it’
standard is applied to injuries under section 12022.7 [citation], [people] of
common intelligence can apply these words of long usage to discern what
injuries they are forbidden to inflict under pain of enhancement. . . .
Section 12022.7 is constitutional.”
      As the Guest court pointed out, prior decisions reached the same
conclusion. (Guest, supra, 181 Cal.App.3d at p. 812; People v. Roberts (1981)
114 Cal.App.3d 960, 963 [“great bodily injury” in section 245, subdivision (a)
is not unconstitutionally vague]; People v. Poulin (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 54,
59–61 [“great bodily injury” in former section 12310 is not unconstitutionally
vague]; see also People v. Covino (1980) 100 Cal.App.3d 660, 668.) And more
recent decisions have followed Guest and other similar decisions. (People v.
Bermudez (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 358, 369, fn. 5, disapproved of on another
ground by People v. Valencia (2021) 11 Cal.5th 818, 839, fn. 17; In re Mariah
T. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 428, 436–437; People v. Maciel (2003)
113 Cal.App.4th 679, 686.)
      Finally, the California Supreme Court in People v. Escobar (1992)
3 Cal.4th 740, stated, “ ‘The term “great bodily injury” has been used in the
law of California for over a century without further definition and the courts
have consistently held that it is not a technical term that requires further
elaboration.’ ” (Id. at p. 750, fn. 3.) Although the issue in Escobar was a
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence rather than a constitutional
challenge, the court’s statement agrees with the Guest analysis, as described
previously. (Guest, supra, 181 Cal.App.3d at p. 812.)

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      We follow this substantial body of California authority in concluding
that sections 245, subdivision (a)(4) and 12022.7, subdivision (a) are not
unconstitutionally vague.
II.   Fines and Assessments
      The trial court imposed a $40 court operations assessment (§ 1465.8), a
$30 conviction assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373), and $300 restitution fines
(§§ 1202.4, 1202.45), without considering appellant’s ability to pay.
Appellant argues the court thereby violated his constitutional rights to due
process and to be free from excessive fines, citing People v. Dueñas (2019)
30 Cal.App.5th 1157 (Dueñas).2
      In Dueñas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th 1157, the defendant was indigent and
had suffered misdemeanor convictions for driving with a suspended license;
her license had been suspended because she was unable to pay three juvenile
citations. (Id. at pp. 1160–1161.) The court of appeal held section 1202.4
requires a trial court to impose a minimum restitution fine regardless of
ability to pay, but the constitutional right of due process requires that
execution of the fine be stayed until the defendant’s ability to pay is
determined. (Dueñas, at p. 1172.) The court further found it was a violation
of due process to impose the assessments without finding that the defendant
had the ability to pay them. (Id. at p. 1168.)
      We agree with those courts that have concluded that Dueñas, although
possibly correct on its facts, was incorrect to the extent it stated a broader
rule that, as a matter of constitutional due process, ability to pay must be
established before imposition of fines. (See, e.g., People v. Hicks (2019)
40 Cal.App.5th 320, review granted Nov. 26, 2019, S258946; People v. Aviles

      2 The issue is currently before the Supreme Court. (People v. Kopp
(2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 47, review granted Nov. 13, 2019, S257844.)

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(2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1055; People v. Caceres (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 917.) As
those cases explain, in contrast to the two strands of authority upon which
Dueñas relied, the failure to establish ability to pay a minimum restitution
fine and assessments does not, absent unusual circumstances, impair a
defendant’s access to the courts or subject them to imprisonment as a
consequence. Appellant has not established that imposition of the
assessments and fines was unconstitutional.3
                               DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.

      3 We therefore need not decide whether appellant forfeited the issue, as

respondent contends.

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                      SIMONS, J.

WE CONCUR:

JACKSON, P. J.

CHOU, J.

A166486
People v. Hicks

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