Court Opinion

ID: 9573383
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:54:02.289234+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:36:57.115091
License: Public Domain

CARLEY, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the affirmance of Williams’ convictions and sentences for malice murder, possession of a firearm during the commission of the murder, and disorderly conduct. I also concur in vacating the separate convictions and sentences for the two aggravated assault counts. However, I dissent to the setting aside of the conviction and sentence for possession of a firearm during the commission of aggravated assault.
Citing State v. Marlowe, 277 Ga. 383 (589 SE2d 69) (2003), the majority holds that, “because the evidence shows the possession charges are based on the continuous possession of a single gun in an attack against a single victim, we must also vacate the conviction and sentence imposed on one of the possession charges.” Majority opinion, p. 369. As indicated by my dissent in Marlowe, I do not agree that only one conviction for violating OCGA § 16-11-106 is authorized where the evidence shows that, during the continuous possession of a single firearm or knife, the accused commits a series of predicate felonies. According to its clear and unambiguous provisions, the statute “authorizes as many convictions for the continuing act of possession as are accompanied by underlying felonies committed over the course of a crime spree.” State v. Marlowe, supra at 388 (Carley, J., dissenting).
Because OCGA § 16-11-106, when properly construed, imposes no statutory impediment to multiple convictions for multiple violations perpetrated during the accused’s continuous possession of a weapon, I believe that the only relevant inquiry in this case is whether constitutional principles of double jeopardy bar Williams’ *371convictions for possessing a gun during the commission of aggravated assault and for possessing the same gun during the malice murder of the same victim. That depends upon whether they are considered the “same offense.” See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U. S. 161, 164 (II) (97 SC 2221, 53 LE2d 187) (1977). Two crimes are not the “same” as a matter of constitutional law simply because their prosecution is based upon the same conduct of the defendant. See United States v. Dixon, 509 U. S. 688, 703 (IV) (113 SC 2849, 125 LE2d 556) (1993) (overruling the “same conduct” rule). They are considered different crimes so long as each “contains an element not contained in the other . . . .” United States v. Dixon, supra at 696 (II).
Decided November 17, 2003.
Jennifer S. Hanson, Bruce S. Harvey, for appellant.

Robert E. Keller, District Attorney, Jack S. Jennings, Assistant

Malice murder requires proof of the specific intent to kill. Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon does not. Riddle v. State, 145 Ga. App. 328, 331 (1) (243 SE2d 607) (1978), overruled on other grounds, Adsitt v. State, 248 Ga. 237, 240 (6) (282 SE2d 305) (1981). Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon requires proof of a general intent either to injure the victim or to commit the act which caused the victim to be reasonably apprehensive of receiving a violent injury. See Dunagan v. State, 269 Ga. 590, 591-594 (2) (502 SE2d 726) (1998). Murder does not. Therefore, for constitutional double jeopardy purposes, possession of a gun during the commission of aggravated assault is not the “same offense” as possession of the gun during the commission of a murder, even though the accused’s conduct in committing both offenses overlaps to some extent. See United States v. Dixon, supra at 701 (III) (B) (holding that an offense requiring proof of the specific intent to kill is not the same as the crime of assault which requires no such proof).
As the majority concedes in Division 1, the evidence is sufficient to authorize a finding that Williams committed aggravated assault. Notwithstanding the merger of that crime into the homicide, his possession of the gun while intending to injure the victim or to frighten him authorizes his separate conviction and sentence for possession of a weapon during the commission of aggravated assault. His possession of the gun when he subsequently pulled the trigger and acted on the specific intent to kill the victim authorizes his separate conviction and sentence for possession of a weapon during the commission of malice murder. Therefore, the conviction and sentence for both violations of OCGA § 16-11-106 should be affirmed.
I am authorized to state that Justice Thompson joins in this opinion.
*372District Attorney, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Frank M. Gaither, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.