Court Opinion

ID: 9498036
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:06:28.187894+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:34.599423
License: Public Domain

GILMAN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
The district court analyzed the affidavit submitted in support of the search warrant when ruling from the bench on August 26, 2002. It found that the first paragraph of the affidavit did nothing more than recite the affiant’s background in drug enforcement. The second paragraph was found deficient because it failed to state where the alleged purchases of methamphetamine were made. As to the third paragraph, the court noted that the source of the affiant’s information was not stated. The fourth and final paragraph was found deficient primarily because it did not say when the observations were made. Even the government concedes that these flaws were “sufficient to render the warrant invalid,” and I agree.
Despite the deficiencies in the affidavit, however, the district court concluded that the document provided more than “what has been deemed ‘bare bones,’ ” thus causing “this matter to fall, I believe, squarely within the exception set forth in United States vs. Leon.” In explaining its ruling, the court reasoned as follows:
The officers executing the search warrant in this case were acting in reliance on a search warrant which they believed was validly issued. There is nothing on the face of the search warrant or based upon the proceedings leading to the issuance of the search warrant, there is nothing which would lead a reasonable officer to conclude that there was something suspect or inherently defective in the search warrant itself or in the way it was issued.
I agree with the district court’s analysis, and disagree with the contrary conclusion *753by my colleagues. In particular, I believe that the affidavit easily refutes the majority’s statements that “the warrant failed to establish any nexus whatsoever between the residence to be searched and the criminal activity attributed to the defendant in the affidavit.” (Maj. Op. at 746^17) The warrant, after all, lists the address to be searched as 1040 Spruce Street. To not link the affidavit’s references to “the home” and “the residence” to Laughton and the stated address strikes me as an unwarranted hypertechnicality, especially when evaluating the officer’s good-faith belief for Leon purposes.
The primary purpose of the “exclusionary rule” is to “instill in ... investigating officers, or in their future counterparts, a greater degree of care toward the rights of an accused.” United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) (quoting United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 539, 95 S.Ct. 2313, 45 L.Ed.2d 374 (1975)). Where the officer’s conduct is objectively reasonable, the “good-faith exception” should apply because “excluding the evidence will not further the ends of the exclusionary rule in any appreciable way; for it is painfully apparent that ... the officer is acting as a reasonable officer would and should act in similar circumstances. Excluding the evidence can in no way affect his future conduct unless it is to make him less willing to do his duty.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 920, 104 S.Ct. 3405 (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 539-540, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976) (White, J., dissenting) (alterations in the original)).
The Leon good-faith exception seems to me fully applicable to the case before us. Despite its deficiencies as summarized above, the affidavit’s statement of facts was well beyond “bare bones.” The officer, moreover, brought the affidavit to the county prosecutor for his approval prior to presenting it to the magistrate. This fact has been recognized as an important piece of evidence demonstrating the officer’s good-faith belief in the propriety of the affidavit. See Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 989, 104 S.Ct. 3424, 82 L.Ed.2d 737 (1984) (noting that the fact that the detective “prepared an affidavit which was reviewed and approved by the District Attorney” helped demonstrate that “[t]he officers in this case took every step that could reasonably be expected of them”); United States v. Bynum, 293 F.3d 192, 198 (4th Cir.2002) (concluding that the fact that the investigating agent “consulted with the prosecutor prior to applying for the search warrant provides additional evidence of his objective good faith, like the law enforcement officer in Leon ... ”).
In sum, I believe that the district court was correct in denying Laughton’s motion to suppress. I would therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.