Court Opinion

ID: 9476551
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:58:39.191058+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:22.727157
License: Public Domain

LIVELY, Chief Judge,
concurring and dissenting.
I concur in that portion of the majority opinion holding that the decision of a judge of this court to withdraw from further participation in en banc proceedings following rehearing does not relate back and nullify that judge’s earlier vote to rehear this case en banc. However, I dissent from the decision of the majority on the merits which affirms the district court’s dismissal of this § 1983 case.
I.
The vote in favor of rehearing this case was 8 to 7, with all active judges voting. The judge who recused himself from participating in the en banc decision of this case did so shortly after oral argument on rehearing. He stated that he was recusing himself from “further” participation. The tentative vote of the court at conference was 8 to 7 in favor of affirming the district court, with the judge who subsequently filed the notice of recusal voting with the majority. His recusal left the court with an apparent tie vote. However, the vote at conference is always tentative. Another member of the en banc court notified all members of the court that he intended to change his conference vote from reversal of the district court judgment to affirmance. No other judge changed his or her vote, leaving the court split 8 to 6 for affirmance.
The matter was debated at a court meeting. Two alternatives were proposed. Several judges argued that the original vote to rehear the case was a nullity because the judge’s later recusal should relate back and cancel his vote in favor of rehearing the case. Other judges argued that the case was properly reheard en banc and that the subsequent recusal of a judge had no effect on that judge’s prior vote to rehear the case. The chief judge ruled that the later recusal did not nullify the recus-ing judge’s prior participation in the en banc procedures. This ruling was upheld by an 11 to 3 vote and the case was assigned to a judge to prepare a proposed disposition. It was pointed out that every judge would have an opportunity to vote finally when the proposed opinion was circulated and to express disagreement with the resolution of the en banc procedural issue.
The en banc procedures of this court are controlled by statute (28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1982)), a national rule (Rule 35, Fed.R. App.P.) and a local rule (Rule 14, Rules of the Sixth Circuit). Several steps are involved in designating a particular case for rehearing en banc.
Either a party or any judge who would sit on the en banc court may “suggest” that a case is appropriate for rehearing en banc. Rule 35(b), Fed.R.App.P.; Rule 14(a), Rules of the Sixth Circuit. No action is taken on the suggestion unless a judge who is in regular active service or a judge sitting by designation who was a member of the panel that rendered the original decision requests a vote on the suggestion. Rule 35(b), Fed.R.App.P. When such a request is received, the active judges of the court vote by ballot, and a majority of all judges in regular active service must vote in favor of the request before rehearing en banc may be ordered. Rule 35(a), Fed.R. App.P.; 28 U.S.C. § 46(c). A vote to rehear a case en banc has the effect of vacating the previous opinion and judgment of the court, staying the mandate and restoring the case on the docket as a pending appeal. Rule 14(a), Rules of the Sixth Circuit. The court that rehears the case en banc consists of all circuit judges in regu*958lar active service and any senior circuit judge of the circuit who was a member of the panel whose decision is being reviewed en banc and who elects to participate. 28 U.S.C. § 46(c).
Since eligibility to participate in the various steps leading to rehearing en banc is not the same for each step, eligibility is determined by a judge’s status at the time a particular step is reached. Thus, a judge who is in regular active service when a suggestion for rehearing en banc is made, but who was not on the panel whose decision is suggested for review, may request a vote. However, if that judge assumes senior status before the vote is taken he or she is not eligible to vote. Further, if the same judge retains active status during the vote, and assumes senior status after voting but before the rehearing is held, that judge is not eligible to participate in the rehearing. Recusals should be treated no differently. A judge who determines, for whatever reason, to refrain from participating at any stage of en banc proceedings withdraws as of that time. Recusal does not act retroactively to nullify the judge’s previous participation. Each stage of the en banc proceedings is distinct, and the requirements must be met serially. This case was properly reheard by the en banc court.
II.
I concur in Judge Merritt's dissent on the merits, and write separately to point out an additional basis for reversing the district court’s dismissal of this action.
Ms. Leaman sought to vindicate First Amendment rights by bringing an action in federal district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The four individuals that she charged with infringing her constitutional rights were her supervisors. She could not sue these persons in the Ohio Court of Claims. I do not believe Ohio could legally require Ms. Leaman to give up her right to seek relief from these individuals as a quid pro quo for taking advantage of the State’s limited waiver of sovereign immunity that permits her to seek damages from the State in the Court of Claims.
The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal court actions against states. However, the Supreme Court created a “fiction” in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), which permits an injunction against a state official who has acted unconstitutionally, because an official so acting no longer represents the state. In this case Ms. Leaman sought prospective relief in the form of an injunction against continuation of unlawful conduct described in the complaint, reinstatement to her position, and other equitable relief in addition to damages. This equitable relief could be granted by a federal court without violating the Eleventh Amendment. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974). The State’s sovereign immunity would not be implicated by granting this relief against the individual defendants even though they were sued in their official capacities. Id. at 664, 94 S.Ct. at 1356. The fact that the Ohio Court of Claims provides a “deep pocket" for a plaintiff's demand for money damages is irrelevant. The state cannot prohibit the plaintiff from seeking the equitable relief that is properly available in a federal court for infringement of her constitutional rights.
I would reverse the judgment of the district court.