Court Opinion

ID: 9649352
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:50:09.983446+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:09.955505
License: Public Domain

Annabelle Clinton Imber, Justice, dissenting. The majority’s description of Officer Clemmons’s affidavit as inaccurate is, at best, a misnomer. Officer Clemmons knowingly averred in his affidavit that the package had already been delivered and had been received by Charles Sims, when such was not the case. No package had been delivered to Sims at the time the warrant was sought, nor was the package finally delivered to Sims. The package was not delivered until after the warrant was obtained and delivery was made to Sims’s brother-in-law, Douglas Boyer. The majority candidly recognizes the error in the affidavit and the subsequent warrant and further recognizes that the warrant was invalid. However, they justify the validity of the search on the basis of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. I cannot subscribe to the course of action taken by the majority. The majority’s reliance on the good-faith rule of United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), is misplaced. We have had an opportunity to apply the Leon good-faith exception in Pyle v. State, 314 Ark. 165 (1993), and we stated that every fact in an affidavit need not necessarily be correct, but “ ‘must be truthful in the sense that the information put forth is believed or appropriately accepted by the affiant as true.’” Id. (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978)). It is not suggested, nor could it be maintained that Clemmons’s affidavit was truthful, or that he believed his affidavit to be accurate. Officer Clemmons admitted during the suppression hearing that he was aware his affidavit misrepresented the true state of affairs. The majority responds by relying on suppression hearing testimony of Officer Clemmons and Judge O’Bryan that they knew the affidavit and warrant were false, but they also knew that no search would take place until after delivery. This, the majority holds, demonstrates that there was good faith. Such an outcome defies logic. The affidavit and the warrant were both false. Officer Clemmons knew they were false and the magistrate knew they were false. The majority, however, posits that we may look to information outside the affidavit to determine good faith, citing for support United States v. Martin, 833 F.2d 752 (8th Cir. 1987). Martin and Leon do little to support the majority’s holding. In Leon, officers had served a search warrant on the good-faith belief that it was validly issued by the magistrate, but the affidavit establishing probable cause was insufficient. In Martin, the court was also faced with an insufficient affidavit. Nowhere in the Martin or Leon opinions is it suggested that the affidavits in question were false. Moreover, the court in Martin noted that the sufficiency of the affidavit in that case was a close question on which courts could disagree. Therefore, the court stressed that “[although we may not look to facts outside of the affidavit to determine probable cause, when assessing good faith we can and must look to the totality of the circumstances including what [an] officer . . . knew but did not include in his affidavit.” Martin, supra (citations omitted). The majority unwisely extends the Martin holding to allow a court to go beyond an affidavit not merely to supplement an insufficient affidavit with “what [an] officer . . . knew but did not include in his affidavit,” but also to replace a false affidavit and an invalid warrant with unsworn testimony. The Martin court correctly notes that an examination of information outside the affidavit is warranted to determine good faith “where there [have] been no material false statements or misrepresentations in the affidavit.” That is exactly what occurred in this case. We have long held that an affidavit must be supported by sworn testimony. Herrington v. State, 287 Ark. 228, 697 S.W.2d 899 (1985); Baxter v. State, 262 Ark. 303, 556 S.W.2d 428 (1977); Lunsford v. State, 262 Ark. 1, 552 S.W.2d 646 (1977). Moreover, our Rules of Criminal Procedure specifically state that the application for a search warrant “shall be supported by one (1) or more affidavits or recorded testimony under oath before a judicial officer . . . .” Ark. R. Crim. P. 13.1(b) (emphasis added). The majority’s holding relegates this sworn-testimony requirement to a position of insignificance. Under the majority’s approach, an officer may knowingly present a false affidavit and obtain an invalid warrant, but so long as he tells the magistrate what will actually take place he has acted in good faith when the warrant is eventually executed. Such an outcome is illogical, unwise, and contrary to the law. Furthermore, Martin states that under certain circumstances suppression remains the appropriate remedy where the warrant and affidavit are so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable. Martin, supra. There can be good faith only where an officer has reasonably relied upon a magistrate’s determination of probable cause. State v. Hart, 329 Ark. 582, 952 S.W.2d 138 (1997); State v. Blevins, 304 Ark. 388, 802 S.W.2d 465 (1991). The only information on which the probable-cause determination could be made in this case is the unsworn testimony of Officer Clemmons. In attempting to find good faith, the majority’s holding in essence allows a court to look outside a false affidavit and establish an entirely independent basis on which to hinge probable cause for a warrant that is “so lacking in any indicia of probable cause that it was rendered invalid.” Martin, supra. For the above reasons, I must respectfully dissent. Newbern, J., joins in this dissent.