Court Opinion

ID: 9465823
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 00:56:47.965595+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:23.553884
License: Public Domain

SEITZ, Chief Judge,
concurring.
Although I agree with the majority that we should affirm Schreiber’s conviction and sentence, I would do so without disturbing Schreiber’s right to seek collateral review of either his claim that the district court violated 28 U.S.C. § 455 or his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. I write separately because it is not at all clear to me whether the majority decides the merits of Schreiber’s claim under section 455.
Sehreiber argues for the first time on appeal that the trial judge erred in not disqualifying himself under section 455. I start, as I must, from the general proposition that “[ajllegations of error not properly raised in the trial court cannot be considered on appeal.” United States v. Carter, 401 F.2d 748, 750 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1103, 89 S.Ct. 905, 21 L.Ed.2d 797 (1969). A narrow exception to the rule that appellate courts may not consider claims de novo is the doctrine of “plain error.” See Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). This exception allows an appellate court, in “exceptional circumstances,” to notice obvious errors or errors that “seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputátion of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160, 56 S.Ct. 391, 392, 80 L.Ed. 555 (1936). The price an appellant pays for his failure to object is a heavier burden of persuasion. He must show that the error was plain.
Like the majority, I believe that it is inappropriate to take cognizance, under the plain-error doctrine, of Schreiber’s claim that the district court violated section 455. But while the majority concludes that the alleged error was not serious enough to merit reversal, I conclude that the plain-error doctrine itself is ill-suited to resolution of the issue in this case. That doctrine’s narrower scope of review is predicated on the appellant’s duty to call error to the attention of the district court: “a party may not sit by silently, take his chances on a verdict, and, if it is adverse, then complain of a matter which, if error, could have been eradicated during the trial if brought to the attention of the court . . . .” United States v. Bamberger, 456 F.2d 1119, 1131 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 969, 92 S.Ct. 2424, 32 L.Ed.2d 668 (1972), 413 U.S. 919, 93 S.Ct. 3067, 37 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1973). Here, however, Sehreiber was under absolutely no duty to object. Section 455 is mandatory in its terms. A judge must determine, sua sponte, whether any of the grounds for disqualification enumerated in that provision are present in a case. If any ground specified in section 455(b) is present, he must disqualify himself immediately. If such specific grounds are not present, but if, for any reason, “his impartiality might reasonably be questioned[,J” he must either disqualify himself or seek a waiver after “full disclosure on the record.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 455(a), 455(e). All this must be done, if necessary, on his own motion. As the Seventh Circuit has noted, section 455 “impose[s] no duty on the parties to seek disqualification nor [does it] contain any time limits within which disqualification must be sought. SCA Services, Inc. v. Morgan, 557 F.2d 110, 117 (7th Cir. 1977).
Apparently, the district judge misunderstood his obligations under section 455. The subject of impartiality was not broached until the hearing on Schreiber’s motion for a new trial. Although Sehreiber had not raised this issue in his motion, the judge spontaneously remarked that he had been “concerned” about presiding at the trial. The district judge’s own doubts suggest, although they do not necessarily establish, that his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. If the district judge had decided, in the sound exercise of his discretion, that such a question existed, *540then he would have been obligated in the absence of a valid waiver to disqualify himself from the case. Instead, he neither acted on nor disclosed his concern because “nobody raised any question about it[.]”
Assuming that the district court should have sought Sehreiber’s waiver, I have several doubts as to whether the colloquy cited by the majority can measure up to the strict standard for waiver set forth in section 455(e). First, the dialogue seemed to occur accidentally, after a full trial and long after the district judge first became concerned about presiding. Moreover, the district judge’s offhand expression of that concern may fall far short of the requisite “full disclosure on the record.” Finally, defense counsel’s unsolicited statement that he had “fully explored” the situation and that he “did not raise the objection” is ambiguous. He seemed to be referring, not to a present waiver, but to a prior decision not to seek disqualification, a decision made without the benefit of any disclosure whatsoever. Counsel may not have understood that, even at that late moment in the proceedings, Schreiber still had a right to seek the judge’s disqualification.
These difficult questions, never aired below, illustrate the awkwardness of a plain-error inquiry in this case. I believe that Schreiber’s claim that the district court violated section 455, like his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, is better suited to collateral attack under section 28 U.S.C. § 2255. I fear, however, that the majority’s decision may prejudice his ability to secure collateral relief. In Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 10 L.Ed.2d 148 (1962), the Supreme Court set forth the criteria for evaluating successive petitions under section 2255. Where a prisoner presents a petition relying on a ground denied “on the merits” in an earlier petition, the prisoner bears the burden of demonstrating that “the ends of justice would be served by a redetermination of the ground.” Id. at 17, 83 S.Ct. at 1078. See also Rule 9, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, and Rule 9, Rules Governing § 2255 Cases, and accompanying Advisory Committee Notes (codifying holding in Sanders). Although Sanders dealt with successive petitions for collateral relief, the Supreme Court has indicated that the same standards should govern an initial petition under section 2255 “where the trial or appellate court has had a ‘say’ on the federal prisoner’s claim.” Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 227 n.8, 89 S.Ct. 1068, 1074, 22 L.Ed.2d 227 (1969). See also Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 342, 94 S.Ct. 2298, 41 L.Ed.2d 109 (1974); Thornton v. United States, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 114, 368 F.2d 822, 833 (1966) (Wright, J., dissenting), cited with approval in Kaufman v. United States, supra, 394 U.S. at 227 n.8, 89 S.Ct. 1068.
I refrain from deciding whether we have had a “say” on Schreiber’s claim under section 455, or whether a determination that a particular action is not plain error constitutes a decision “on the merits” of an issue. Compare United States v. Currie, 589 F.2d 993, 994-95 (9th Cir. 1979) (finding of no plain error on direct appeal precludes similar claim on collateral attack) with United States v. Kazni, 576 F.2d 238, 242 (9th Cir. 1978) (finding of no plain error on direct appeal will not preclude collateral attack if applicant alleges facts outside the appellate record). I only note that if we have triggered Sanders, Schreiber will bear the additional burden on collateral attack of demonstrating that the “ends of justice” would be served by a re-examination of his claim. On the other hand, if we somehow have stopped short of a determination on the merits of Schreiber’s claim, then our decision seems a useless exercise. In either case, I believe it preferable to defer on the merits of Schreiber’s claim under section 455, just as we have deferred on his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. Schreiber is entitled to full consideration of each claim by a district court in the first instance, without the inhibitive effect of the majority’s thoughts on the claims.
I would affirm Schreiber’s conviction without expressing any opinion on the merits of either his claim under section 455 or his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.