Court Opinion

ID: 9676377
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:23:10.035026+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:48.175895
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(concurring).
A reminder to the wary that the habitual offender statutes cannot be used for additional sentence enhancement under the subsequent offender DUI statutes. Carroll v. Solem, 424 N.W.2d 155, 156-57 (S.D.1988).
Here, however, we are confronted with this question: May a prior conviction for DUI be used for enhancement purposes when a suspended imposition of sentence, pursuant to SDCL 23A-27-15, has been granted? Obviously, yes, in view of the explicit legislative direction couched in the statute. Inter alia, the statute recites “other offenses.”
SDCL 23A-27-13 must be honored and not eroded. It instills grace into the criminal process. Essentially, it provides that the trial court may, without entering a judgment of guilt, and with the consent of the defendant, suspend the imposition of sentence and place the defendant on probation (and upon conditions). Needless to say, I agree with the first portion of footnote two of this opinion.
All of which — now brings me to my next point: Reading In re Discipline of Weisensee, 296 N.W.2d 717 (S.D.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1032, 101 S.Ct. 1743, 68 L.Ed.2d 227 (1980), a disciplinary proceeding for disbarment, we see SDCL 23A-27-13 and 23A-27-14 discussed by this Court in a somewhat different context. Notwithstanding, it is a case which has a majority and minority viewpoint on “entering a judgment of guilt.” Weisensee was not involved in a “subsequent offense,” yet, *557the majority opinion held that the dismissal of a proceeding against this attorney, upon completion of his conditions of probation, did not vitiate disciplinary proceedings based upon the attorney’s “conviction.” I maintained then — and I do now — that no “conviction” stood against this attorney. My dissent in Weisensee discourses on the pertinent statutes now at hand. Although I freely agree with this decision due to “subsequent offenses,” i.e., the explicit references and mandate of the State Legislature in SDCL 23A-27-15,1 elaborate on my vote to express that we, in the legal profession in South Dakota, be cognizant of Carroll, cited above, Weisensee, and the grace built into the criminal law by our lawmakers.
Rehabilitation, we have stated in this Court, is one of the goals of the criminal justice system in South Dakota. State v. Weiker, 342 N.W.2d 7, 11-12 (S.D.1983) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976)). It is good that a procedure has been established to foster rehabilitation. When a defendant has committed a crime and been granted some civil salvation via statutes, the trial and appellate bench should breathe spirit into the legislative will. For a decision on the constitutional provision concerning suspended sentences and which addresses statutes on the imposition of sentences without entering a judgment of guilt, see State v. Oban, 372 N.W.2d 125 (S.D.1985).