Court Opinion

ID: 9466539
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:19:01.133598+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:47.617743
License: Public Domain

J. BLAINE ANDERSON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
In my view, no substantial or fundamental right of the defendant has been impaired. I commence by emphasizing that defendant does not contend that he was surprised or misled, either in apprehending the government’s proof or in formulating, preparing or presenting his defense. He does not and, indeed, could not claim the risk of double jeopardy. The indictment is clear and precise and, when taken with the evidence adduced at trial, amply protects the defendant from any risk of double punishment. United States v. Peterson, 592 F.2d 1035, 1037-38 (9th Cir. 1979), Rule 52(a), Fed.R.Cr.P., 28 U.S.C. § 2111.
The majority opinion takes one instruction out of context, and, by ignoring all of the other instructions which were given to the jury, finds reversible error. If this court chooses to view each instruction in isolation as the majority has done, then it is quite possible that reversible error can now be found in every case where an appeal is taken.
The majority finds that “the instruction impermissibly broadened the scope of the indictment to permit conviction of [Carlson] for acts-of misapplication other than that for which he was indicted by the grand jury.” Initially, I have no quarrel with the general interpretation of the Fifth Amendment which provides that a court cannot broaden the scope of an indictment so as to allow conviction for matters not covered in the indictment. See United States v. Dawson, 516 F.2d 796, 800-804 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 855, 96 S.Ct. 104, 46 L.Ed.2d 80 (contains a thorough discussion of permissible and impermissible amendments). However, this did not occur in the present case. The indictment reasonably advised defendant of the conduct underlying the charge contained in the indictment. It omitted no essential element.
*449The majority’s conclusion that the scope of the indictment was broadened is predicated entirely upon its assumption that the jury could have returned a guilty verdict based on Carlson’s concealment of certain matters from the bank instead of his conversion of the funds to his own use as charged in the indictment. A review of the court’s instructions reveals that the majority has miseharacterized what occurred in the present case.
In reviewing the instructions to the jury, several general considerations should be kept in mind. Any error in the charge to the jury must not be viewed in isolation, but in the context of the instructions as a whole. United States v. Lee, 589 F.2d 980, 985 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Boekelman, 594 F.2d 1238, 1240 (9th Cir. 1979). Moreover, the jury is presumed to have followed the court’s instructions. United States v. Strand, 574 F.2d 993, 996 (9th Cir. 1978).
Prior to its instructions on the specific law applicable to Carlson’s case, the district court read the three counts of the indictment to the jury. Each count charged Carlson with the misapplication of “moneys and funds of the said bank ... by fraudulently causing to be disbursed by said bank, and converting to his personal use . . .” Reporter’s Transcript (R.T.) 325-327. The court then stated that Carlson was “not on trial for any act or conduct not alleged in the indictment.” R.T. 327.
This was followed by the court’s instruction that the prosecution had to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, every essential element of the offense under 18 U.S.C. § 656. R.T. 327. The fourth essential element was that Carlson had “willfully misapplied and converted to his own use the sums set forth in each count of the indictment.” (emphasis added) R.T. 327. It is therefore obvious that the jury had to find that Carlson had not only misapplied the bank’s funds, but also converted them to his own use.
After instructing the jury on the elements of the offense, the court proceeded to define certain terms of the § 656 offense.1 It was at this point that the challenged instruction on misapplication was given. R.T. 328-329. This was merely a definitional instruction. This was followed by the court’s instruction explaining conversion and how conversion was also a necessary element of the § 656 charge. R.T. 329.
An “intent to injure and defraud” (one of the essential elements) by some plan or scheme to willfully misapply and convert bank funds necessarily and inherently carries the connotation of some element of concealment. Truthful revelation is not fraudulent. It cannot be an impermissible enlargement of the indictment to call this obvious fact to the attention of the jury in a definitional instruction.
And so the instructions as a whole made it abundantly clear that Carlson could not be found guilty unless conversion, as charged in the indictment, was found. There was no way that the jury could have returned a guilty verdict by only finding concealment under the definitional instruction on misapplication as suggested by the majority.
The one case relied upon by the majority, Howard v. Daggett, 526 F.2d 1388 (9th Cir. 1975), does not support reversal in the present case. In Howard, the indictment had charged the defendant with interstate travel in aid of prostitution with two specifically-named women. The jury was then instructed that it could find the defendant guilty based on evidence regarding women other than the two named in the indictment. This has no application to the present case at all. Every count in the indictment specifically described the single financial transaction upon which it was based. The jury was never told that it could find Carlson guilty based on evidence regarding some other financial transaction than that which was carefully detailed in *450each count of the indictment. Yet, this is how the majority characterizes the instructions.
In sum, there was no impermissible broadening of the scope of the indictment. The majority’s opinion is, I respectfully submit, based on its misconception that the jury could have found only concealment rather than the conversion alleged in the indictment. However, this could not have occurred. A conversion based on concealment was proper. After all, the jury was instructed that the defendant could be convicted based on the acts charged in the indictment which included an allegation of conversion. An essential element of the offense was the “misapplication and conversion ” of the funds. And, conversion was further explained as a necessary element of the charged offense. In spite of these explicit instructions by the district court, the majority has taken a single definitional instruction out of context and created reversible error.
Surely, we are not going to return to those days when the appellate courts were described as “impregnable citadels of technicality.” Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 759, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 1245, 90 L.Ed. 1557, 1563 (1945).
I respectfully dissent.

. Although the instructions which were given were not perfect, they adequately instructed the jury as to the elements necessary to establish a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 656. See United States v. Dreitzler, 577 F.2d 539, 547-549 (9th Cir. 1978); 2 Devitt and Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, 1979 Supp., p. 121, et seq.