Court Opinion

ID: 6419262
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-06-25 11:58:30.245261+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:51:42.740338
License: Public Domain

Endicott, J.
It appears from the report that the defendant orally agreed to convey to the plaintiff a lot of land valued at $400, and to take, in exchange or payment therefor, a monument, estimated to be of the value of $200, when completed, and the balance in money. After the monument was finished, the plaintiff tendered it to the defendant, together with the balance in money, according to the contract. The defendant refused to accept the monument or money, or to give the deed.
Whether this was a sale or an exchange of property is immaterial. Assuming that it was an exchange of the land for the monument, with a balance in money to be paid by the plaintiff, it is to be governed by the same rules as apply to a sale when the whole consideration is to be paid in money. Anon. 3 Salk. 157. Commonwealth v. Clark, 14 Gray, 367, 372. Howard v. Harris, 8 Allen, 297. The contract was therefore within the prohibition of the statute of frauds. Gen. Sts. c. 105, § 1, cl. 4. The oral promise on the part of the defendant was not to pay money for the monument, but to convey a lot of land. If the promise had been to pay in money for the monument, when completed, it might have come within the rule, that an agreement to construct or build an article to be paid for when finished need .■not be proved by a memorandum in writing, as in Mixer v. Howarth, 21 Pick. 205. But that view of the case cannot be sustained on the evidence as reported; it does not appear to have been the intention of the parties to make any contract, except that which included the conveyance of the land, which was the sole consideration moving from the defendant. That contract was not in writing, and cannot be enforced, in whole or in part. The plaintiff cannot separate that portion which relates to the building of the monument from the whole, and recover upon it as a distinct undertaking. This would be to make a new contract between the parties; for it was no part of the agreement, as stated, to. pay $200 in money for the monument, but to allow that sum as a portion of the consideration for the conveyance of the land. The plaintiff therefore cannot recover, either upon his first oi second count, for the value of the monument.
*481But the plaintiff contends that he may, under his third count, recover for his labor in completing the monument. It is true, that when a person pays money, or renders service, or makes a conveyance, under an agreement within the prohibition of the statute of frauds, and the other party refuses to perform it, an action will lie to recover the money so paid, or the value of the services rendered or the property conveyed; but it is on the ground that a party who has received a benefit, under an agreement which he has repudiated, shall be held to pay, upon an implied assumpsit, for that which he has received. Dix v. Marcy, 116 Mass. 416, and cases cited. In the case at bar, the defendant received no benefit from the labor performed in completing the monument, although the plaintiff may have suffered a loss because he is unable to enforce his contract, and no recovery can be had for the labor on the monument, as charged in the account annexed to the third count.
But this rule does not apply to the item for services performed by the plaintiff in preparing the land and foundation. If this refers to the lot of the defendant where the monument was to stand, and the work was done upon it, we cannot say as matter of law that it was not of benefit to the defendant. That is a question of fact to be determined, and, by the terms of the report, the entry must be Case to stand for trial.