Court Opinion

ID: 9693948
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 17:12:21.317164+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:52.790957
License: Public Domain

GILDEA, Justice
(concurring).
I agree with the majority that the “particular cruelty” aggravating factor in the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines does not make the guidelines unconstitutionally vague. I write separately to explain why I reach this conclusion.
Rourke argues, and the district court held, that the provision in the guidelines allowing for departures based on the “particular cruelty” aggravating factor was unconstitutionally vague. Specifically, Rourke contends that the guidelines are unconstitutionally vague because there is no clear definition explaining when a crime is committed with particular cruelty. Instead of a clear definition of such conduct, Rourke argues Blakely juries are left to apply subjective and ever-changing definitions of this factor, and the resulting uncertainty makes this departure provision of the guidelines unconstitutionally vague.
We have already decided that the guidelines are not unconstitutionally vague. State v. Givens, 332 N.W.2d 187, 190 (Minn.1983). Rourke argues that Givens does not control because sentencing departures are “no longer [the] ‘routine sentencing decision[s]’ made by a judge.” Rather, Rourke contends, these decisions now “require[] fact-finding by citizens at large.” But, in briefs to this court, Rourke and the State agreed that the “particular cruelty” factor should not be submitted to a Blakely jury for a factual finding. The parties agreed, and the majority has now held, that the relative concept of “particular cruelty” is a conclusion to be reached by the sentencing judge and not a fact to be found by a Blakely jury. I agree. See State v. Jackson, 749 N.W.2d 353, 363 n. 3 (Minn.2008) (Gildea, J., dissenting). Because Blakely juries should not be asked to make comparative conclusions, such as whether a crime was committed with particular cruelty, there is no basis for Rourke’s argument that Givens is not dis-positive of the constitutional question. I would find that Givens controls, and on the same basis as we did in that case, uphold the constitutionality of the guidelines as against Rourke’s void for vagueness challenge. See Givens, 332 N.W.2d at 190 (“The application of vagueness argument *925to more routine sentencing decisions— those not including the death sentence — is not contemplated by the Gregg [v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976),] and Godfrey [v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980),] decisions. Defendant’s claim of vagueness of the guidelines, either on their face or as applied, is misplaced in this context.”).