Court Opinion

ID: 9390258
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-27 14:07:57.391255+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:33.117382
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Ameem, 2023-Ohio-1371.]

                              COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                             EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                    :

                Plaintiff-Appellant,              :
                                                           No. 111898
                v.                                :

ANSURI AMEEM,                                     :

                Defendant-Appellee.               :

                               JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 27, 2023

         Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                             Case No. CR-19-638317-A

                                            Appearances:

                Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                Attorney, and Mason McCarthy, Assistant Prosecuting
                Attorney, for appellee.

                Russell S. Bensing, for appellant.

MARY J. BOYLE, J.:

                  In a prior decision by this court, we determined it was

unconstitutional for defendant-appellant, Ansuri Ameem f.k.a. Leon Miller

(“Ameem”), to be reclassified under the Adam Walsh Act. State v. Ameem, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 98773, 2013-Ohio-1555 (“Ameem I”).             In Ameem I, we made

statements regarding Ameem’s classification and registration requirements under

Megan’s Law. Ameem filed a motion to dismiss a subsequent criminal case arising

from his Megan’s Law obligations and argued that our earlier decision is law of the

case. Ameem now asks us to determine whether the trial court erred in overruling

his motion to dismiss. Because our statements regarding Ameem’s Megan’s Law

classification and registration requirements were dicta and not law of the case, we

affirm the trial court’s denial of Ameem’s motion to dismiss.

 I.   Facts and Procedural History

              The 2019 case from which this appeal arises is not Ameem’s first run-

in with the justice system for failure to perform his duties pursuant to Megan’s Law.

The following journal entry from State v. Ameem, Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-16-

606010, sets forth the relevant facts and procedural history:

      The indictment itself is forthright enough: the defendant is charged
      with a single count of failing to provide notice of a change of address,
      as required by Ohio R.C. §2950.05(E)(1); it is alleged that he was
      required to do so based upon his conviction on May 29, 1985, in
      Sacramento County Court, California, Case No. AXXXXXXXX, for sexual
      assault with a foreign object. The failure to provide notice is alleged to
      have occurred on April 15, 2016.

      The state asserts that, as a result of the California conviction, the
      defendant was required to register in California as a sexual offender
      annually for life. The state further claims that, by operation of former
      Ohio R.C. §2950.09(A), “...that conviction... or adjudication
      automatically classifies the person as a sexual predator for the purposes
      of this chapter...,” and thus subjects him to the reporting requirements
      for a sexual predator under the former Megan’s Law — including
      reporting every 90 days and verification of any change of address.
* * * In a previous case (No. CR-544031) this same defendant had been
administratively reclassified under the then-new Adam Walsh Act as
a Tier III offender, which also mandated, inter alia, residence
verification and change of address notification for life. The defendant
was convicted of failing to provide the required verification, and (by
opinion dated April 18, 2013) the Eighth District Court of Appeals
reversed, finding that the reclassification was “invalid.” As previously
noted, under the Ohio Megan’s Law, the defendant then should have
reverted to his prior classification as a sexual predator; however, the
Court of Appeals stated specifically at ¶ 1 that:

      When defendant-appellant Ansuri Ameem moved to
      Ohio, his prior California conviction for sexual assault
      with a foreign object and pandering classified him as a
      sexually[ ]oriented offender under the former Megan's
      Law. He was required to register his address annually for
      a period of ten years.

And again, at ¶ [5]:

      * * * While both Megan’s Law and the Adam Walsh Act
      contain similar reporting requirements, the time periods
      under each law are quite different: as a sexually oriented
      offender under Megan’s Law, Ameem had the duty to
      register on a yearly basis for ten years; as a Tier III
      offender under the Adam Walsh Act, he had the duty to
      register every 90 days for life.

As defendant argues, and as the state concedes, the Court of Appeals
misstated the duty of the defendant by asserting that he was subject to
reporting and verification for merely ten years. Counsel notes that,
under defendant’s former name of Leon Miller, he was sentenced by
the Sacramento County Court, and was released from prison in 1991.
Accepting the dicta of the Eighth District Court of Appeals, then, the
ten[ ]years’ registration requirement would have expired in 2001.

Assuming, arguendo, that the defendant in fact did fail to register his
change of address with the Cuyahoga County Sheriff, the question
remains whether under the law he was required to do so. Given the
clear mandate of former R.C. §2950.09(A), it is evident that the
defendant in fact was required to report every 90 days for life.
      Defendant asserts that this language is part of the holding of the Court
      of Appeals and thus constitutes the law of the case. Clearly, that is not
      so. The law of the case is the decision of the Court of Appeals that the
      state’s administrative reclassification of the defendant from “Sexual
      Predator” under Megan’s Law to “Tier III Sex Offender” under the
      Adam Walsh Act was invalid. The court’s further comment that he is
      thus a “Sexually Oriented Offender” — although set forth repeated — is
      in fact obiter dicta.

      ***

      It must be noted * * * that upon remand from the Court of Appeals, case
      number [CR-10-]544031 was dismissed upon the state’s motion and
      reindicted on February 25, 2014, as case number [CR-14-]582773; the
      defendant pled guilty and was sentenced to the Cuyahoga County Jail
      for six months. On April 16, 2015, the defendant was again indicted on
      charges of failing to verify his address [in case number CR-15-594868],
      (date of offense: October 12, 2014), and sentenced to the Cuyahoga
      County Jail for time served (63 days).

(Footnote omitted.) Id.

               The trial court stated, “Thus, the question before this court is not

whether the defendant in fact was required to provide notice of his change of address

— under the law, he was; rather, the question is whether the misstatement of the law

is sufficient to excuse his failure to do so.” Id. The trial court found that even though

the registration requirement was a matter of strict liability, Ameem was entitled to

rely on this court’s statements and conclude that his registration requirements had

ended in 2001. Id. As a result, the trial court granted Ameem’s motion to dismiss

the indictment. However, the trial court further held that “despite the * * * dicta by

the Court of Appeals, he remains a sexual predator under Ohio law and going

forward shall continue to be required to comply with all requirements thereof for

life.” Id. No appeal was taken from the trial court’s order of October 24, 2016.
               This brings us to the case at issue. In April 2019, Ameem was again

indicted in State v. Ameem, Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-19-638317, with one count of

failing to verify his current address pursuant to R.C. 2950.06(F). Ameem filed a

motion to dismiss and argued that this court’s statements regarding his

classification and registration requirements under Megan’s Law in Ameem I were

not dicta and were, therefore, binding on the trial court. The state opposed the

motion and a hearing was held.

               The trial court subsequently denied Ameem’s motion to dismiss for

four reasons: 1) Megan’s Law classifies Ameem as a sexual predator in Ohio and that

classification carries the obligation to register every 90 days for life; 2) this court’s

“description of [ ] Ameem as a sexually oriented offender twice in passing does not

constitute a finding or adjudication that he is not a sexual predator”; 3) the law-of-

the-case doctrine has no application because the doctrine has never been applied to

a sexual predator determination; and 4) Ameem was put on notice that future failure

to register would result in criminal liability based on his previous convictions and

the trial court’s 2016 ruling. State v. Ameem, C.P. No. CR-19-638317, 2020 Ohio

Misc. LEXIS 139 (Oct. 5, 2020). Ultimately, Ameem entered a no-contest plea in

August 2020 and was found guilty of violating R.C. 2950.06(F) for failing to verify

his current address as charged in the indictment. Ameem waived a presentence-

investigation report and was sentenced on the same day to “a prison sentence at the

Lorain Correctional Institution of 9 month(s),” “up to 2 years of [postrelease control]

at the discretion of the parole board,” and a fine of $1,000. (Aug. 26, 2022,
Judgment Entry.) The imposition of the sentence was stayed and an appellate bond

was granted by the trial court without objection.

              Ameem now appeals raising the following assignment of error for

review:

      Assignment of Error: The trial court erred in overruling [Ameem]’s
      motion to dismiss.

II.   Law and Analysis

              Ameem argues that Ameem I characterized him as a sexually oriented

offender with a duty to register annually for ten years. Ameem maintains that this

court’s statements about his registration duties as a sex offender are mandates of

law that must be applied regardless of their correctness based on the law-of-the-case

doctrine. The state argues that the misstatements made in Ameem were dicta that

did not bind the trial court and should not be applied as controlling precedent.

              Whether the law-of-the-case doctrine applies is subject to de novo

review. Cleveland v. Jaber, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109648, 2021-Ohio-1486, ¶ 20,

citing Frazier v. Rodgers Builders, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 91987, 2010-Ohio-3058,

¶ 60. Under the law-of-the-case doctrine, “the decision of a reviewing court in a case

remains the law of that case on the legal questions involved for all subsequent

proceedings in the case at both the trial and reviewing levels.” Nolan v. Nolan, 11

Ohio St.3d 1, 3-4, 462 N.E.2d 410 (1984). The law-of-the-case doctrine applies only

to legal issues “that have been decided with finality.” Williams v. Matthews, 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103501, 2016-Ohio-3461, ¶ 7; Giancola v. Azem, 153 Ohio St.3d
594, 2018-Ohio-1694, 109 N.E.3d 1194, ¶ 22 (“Only those legal questions resolved

by a reviewing court are the law of that case.”). The goals of the doctrine are “to

ensure consistency of results in a case, to avoid endless litigation by settling the

issues, and to preserve the structure of the superior and inferior courts as designed

by the Ohio Constitution.” Estate of Mikulski v. Centerior Energy Corp., 2019-

Ohio-983, 133 N.E.3d 899, ¶ 35 (8th Dist.), citing Hawley v. Ritley, 35 Ohio St.3d

157, 160, 519 N.E.2d 390 (1988).

              The law-of-the-case doctrine “‘compel[s] trial courts to follow the

mandates of reviewing courts[,]’ and trial courts are ‘without authority to extend or

vary the mandate given.’” Id., quoting Hawley at 160. Thus, when “a trial court is

confronted with substantially the same facts and issues as were involved in the prior

appeal, the court is bound to adhere to the appellate court’s determination.”

(Emphasis sic.) Id., citing id. The law of the case “is considered to be a rule of

practice rather than a binding rule of substantive law and will not be applied so as

to achieve unjust results.” Nolan at 3; Jaber (declining to apply the law-of-the-case

doctrine where prior judgment entry imposed a fine contrary to law).

              “Webster’s [N]ew International Dictionary (2 Ed.), defines obiter

dictum as ‘an incidental and collateral opinion uttered by a judge, and therefore (as

not material to his decision or judgment) not binding. * * * Hence, any incidental

remark, reflection, comment, or the like.’” State ex rel. Gordon v. Barthalow, 150

Ohio St. 499, 505-506, 83 N.E.2d 393 (1948). This court further defined “obiter

dictum” as a “‘judicial comment made while delivering a judicial opinion, but one
that is unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not precedential.’”

Grisafo v. Hollingshead, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107802, 2019-Ohio-3763, ¶ 38, fn.

2, quoting Nelnet, Inc. v. Rauch, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 18AP-555, 2019-Ohio-561,

¶ 10; see also Snellman v. Levine, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95148, 2010-Ohio-5616

(“[W]here a case is decided on one issue, and dicta pertaining to a separate and

distinct issue might be found in the rationale of the case, the court has not decided

the matter on the bases of the issue mentioned in dicta.”). Dicta is not binding in

subsequent cases as legal precedent. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 242,

2020-Ohio-6729, 169 N.E.3d 649 ¶ 27 (court erred as a matter of law by relying on

dicta); Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth. v. FOP Ohio Labor Council, Inc., 2018-Ohio-

1079, 108 N.E.3d 1220, ¶ 40 (8th Dist.) (“[I]t would be improper for us to convert

mere dicta into binding precedent.”); Morris v. State, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.

80839, 2002-Ohio-5975 (“Because the panel dismissed the appeal for want of a

final, appealable order, any statements it made that went beyond the confines of an

analysis of jurisdiction were dicta and not binding on us or any other court.”).

              As noted by the state and concluded in the trial court’s rulings, the

statements about Ameem’s classification and registration requirements in this

court’s prior decision are not law of the case, rather, they are dicta. While Ameem,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98773, 2013-Ohio-1555, involved the same set of facts

presented herein, it resolved a different issue:          whether Ameem’s 2007

reclassification by the Attorney General under the Adam Walsh Act was

constitutional. This issue is separate and distinct from the issues Ameem now
argues were resolved in his prior appeal: 1) whether he was classified as a “sexually

oriented offender” or a “sexual predator” under Megan’s Law and 2) whether that

classification required registration every 90 days for life. In his brief, Ameem

admittedly agrees, “Ameem [I] simply settles the issue of what law Ameem had to

register under.”

                Moreover, this court’s statements about Ameem’s classification and,

consequently, the time requirements of his duty to register, were not material to our

conclusion: Ameem’s 2007 reclassification from Megan’s Law to the Adam Walsh

Act was unconstitutional. Rather, this court decision hinged on the legal precedent

set forth by the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Bodyke, 126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010

Ohio 2424, 933 N.E.2d 753. The statements regarding Ameem’s classification and

registration requirements were thus incidental and collateral to the opinion.

Therefore, the unnecessary statements are not law of the case; they are dicta that

were not binding on the trial court.

                Based on the record before us, in 2016, the trial court made clear that

“[Ameem] in fact was required to report every 90 days for life.”1 Ameem, Cuyahoga

       1  As noted by the state, former R.C. 2950.09(A) provides: “If a person is convicted
* * * in a court in another state * * * for committing a sexually oriented offense that is not
a registration-exempt sexually oriented offense, and if, as a result of that conviction * * *
the person is required, under the law of the jurisdiction in which the person was convicted
* * * to register as a sex offender until the person’s death, that conviction * * *
automatically classifies the person as a sexual predator for the purposes of this chapter,
but the person may challenge that classification pursuant to division (F) of this section.”
See also State v. McMullen, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 97475 and 97476, 2012-Ohio-2629
(offender with lifetime registration requirement in Maryland required to register as
sexual predator in Ohio).
C.P. No. CR-16-606010 (Oct. 24, 2016). The trial court unequivocally concluded

that Ameem “should revert to the earlier statutory classification as a sexual predator,

with the registration and notifications to remain in effect for life.” Id. Thus, so long

as Ameem resides in Ohio, he must perform all obligations Megan’s Law imposes on

him as a sexual predator, including registration every 90 days for life. See R.C.

Chapter 2950.

                Accordingly, Ameem’s assignment of error is overruled.

III.   Conclusion

                Because this court’s prior decision in Ameem I resolved the

constitutionality of his reclassification under the Adam Walsh Act and did not

resolve his classification and registration requirements under Megan’s Law, the

immaterial statements made therein about his Megan’s Law classification and

registration duties are not law of the case; they are mere dicta by which the trial

court was not bound. Thus, the trial court did not err in denying Ameem’s motion

to dismiss.

                Judgment is affirmed.

       It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

       The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

       It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.             The defendant’s

conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case
remanded to the trial court for stay to be lifted and execution of sentence (i.e., prison

sentence, postrelease control, and fine).

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

_______________________
MARY J. BOYLE, JUDGE

LISA B. FORBES, P.J., and
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR