Court Opinion

ID: 9752753
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 18:33:10.883916+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:21.796660
License: Public Domain

KELLY, Judge,
concurring:
In all aspects except one, I join in the majority opinion. I agree that appellant’s exercise of his right to silence was not “scrupulously honored” and that the error in admitting statements made thereafter was harmless in view of the fact that appellant’s confession was both purely cumulative and wholly unnecessary to convict him of crimes for which his guilty had been otherwise properly and overwhelmingly established. However, I am unpersuaded that the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Arizona v. Fulminante, — U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991) supports this result.
Before reaching the applicability of the harmless error doctrine, the Court in Fulminante addressed the question of whether a “credible threat of physical violence” improperly induced Fulminante into confessing. — U.S. at-, 111 S.Ct. at 1252, 113 L.Ed.2d at 316. A five to four majority of the Court agreed with the Arizona Supreme Court that under the totality of the circumstances, Fulminante’s will was overborne and thus concluded that the confession obtained was a product of actual coercion. Id.
Conspicuously absent from the Court’s decision in Fulminante is any discussion as to whether Fulminante’s confession was obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment prophylactic right to remain silent described first in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d *338694 (1966). There is good reason for this fact: the question of the existence of a Miranda violation is materially distinct from the question posed to the Court in Fulminante. As the United States Supreme Court has explained, “[a] Miranda violation does not constitute coercion but rather affords a bright-line, legal presumption of coercion, requiring suppression of all unwarned statements.” Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 n. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 1292 n. 1, 84 L.Ed.2d 222, 230-31 n. 1 (1985) (emphasis in original); compare Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 80 S.Ct. 274, 4 L.Ed.2d 242 (1960). Unlike actual coercion, unwarned questioning does “not abridge [a defendant’s] constitutional privilege [to remain silent] ...,” but rather represents a departure “only from the prophylactic standards ... laid down by [the United States Supreme Court] in Miranda____” Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 446, 94 S.Ct. 2357, 2364, 41 L.Ed.2d 182, 194 (1974).
This distinction is not without a difference. Although it is true that statements procured in violation of Miranda must be suppressed, the Court has held that fruit derived thereof is admissible. Id. For analogous reasons, the Court has held that presumptively involuntary statements taken in violation of Miranda may be used by the prosecution for impeachment purposes on cross-examination. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971).1 These holdings do not extend to cases of actually coerced confessions.
Before Fulminante, the distinction between actually and presumptively coerced confessions was relevant with regard to harmless error as well. In deciding, as the Su*339preme Court did in Fulminante, that the improper introduction at trial of an actually coerced confession is subject to harmless error analysis, the Court overturned a well established line of precedent which held to the contrary. See Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 65 S.Ct. 781, 89 L.Ed. 1029 (1945) (holding that introduction of an actually coerced confession deprives the defendant of his Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process even if ample evidence existed to otherwise support the conviction); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 1780, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964) (same); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 83 S.Ct. 1336, 10 L.Ed.2d 513 (1963) (holding introduction of actually coerced confession constitutes reversible error even where confession was cumulative in nature); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 78 S.Ct. 844, 2 L.Ed.2d 975 (1958) (same). Essentially, the Court determined that the prejudicial quality of testimony regarding an actually coerced confession is, like all other improperly introduced testimony at trial, capable of review. At this point in time, the Fulminante decision stands as the sole, albeit the dispositive, case on this point.
In contrast, cases applying the harmless error analysis to the introduction of presumptively coerced statements are legion. See e.g. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 605 & n. 22, 110 S.Ct. 2638, 2652 & n. 22, 110 L.Ed.2d 528, 555 & n. 22 (1990) (holding that although Miranda required the suppression of “testimonial” statements made before defendant was advised of his constitutional rights, “the state court is free, of course, to consider this [harmless error] question upon remand.”); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 443, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3152, 82 L.Ed.2d 317, 336 (1984) (applying harmless error analysis to improper introduction of statements obtained during custodial interrogation and without prior Miranda warnings); Commonwealth v. Hubble, 509 Pa. 497, 515, 504 A.2d 168, 177 (1986) (applying harmless error analysis to improper introduction of statements obtained in violation of Fifth Amendment right to counsel); Commonwealth v. Rodgers, 472 Pa. 435, 449, 372 *340A.2d 771, 777 (1977) (applying harmless error analysis to improper introduction of statements made following refusal to honor exercise of right to remain silent); Commonwealth v. Cooper, 468 Pa. 481, 486, 364 A.2d 296, 299 (1976) (applying harmless analysis to prosecutor’s improper comment on defendant’s election to remain silent); Commonwealth v. Davis, 452 Pa. 171, 178, 305 A.2d 715, 719 (1973) (same); Commonwealth v. Caswell, 316 Pa.Super. 462, 475, 463 A.2d 456, 462 (1983) (Cavanaugh, J., dissenting) (applying harmless error analysis to improper introduction of statements obtained following refusal to honor election to remain silent); Commonwealth v. May, 314 Pa.Super. 577, 582, 461 A.2d 308, 310 (1983) (Cavanaugh, J., dissenting) (applying harmless error analysis to improper introduction of statements obtained before defendant was advised of Miranda rights); Commonwealth v. Flynn, 248 Pa.Super. 62, 72, 374 A.2d 1317, 1322 (1977) (applying harmless error analysis to improper introduction of testimony regarding defendant’s exercise of right to silence). Indeed, the only cases involving presumptively coerced statements which even arguably suggest that harmless error doctrine should not be applied are those in which the courts may be seen to apply a virtually per se harmful error presumption in the analysis. See e.g. Commonwealth v. Bullard, 465 Pa. 341, 349-350, 350 A.2d 797, 801 (1976) (“Because a confession is the most damning of all evidence, we cannot say that we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the judgment.”); Commonwealth v. Carbaugh, 356 Pa.Super. 42, 47, 514 A.2d 133, 137 (1986) (same conclusion); Commonwealth v. Petrino, 332 Pa.Super. 13, 29, 480 A.2d 1160, 1168 (1984) (same conclusion); but see Commonwealth v. Holland, 518 Pa. 405, 415, 543 A.2d 1068, 1072 (1988) (introduction of statements made by lay witnesses regarding the voluntariness of a confession found to be harmless error); Commonwealth v. Maloney, 469 Pa. 342, 355, 365 A.2d 1237, 1244 (1976) (curative instruction given following improper admission of statement regarding right to silence held sufficient not to require mistrial); Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 246 Pa.Super. 132, 138, 369 A.2d 846, *341849 (1977) (recognizing that harmless error analysis is appropriate even if presumptively coerced confession is improperly introduced). Nonetheless, no such case holds that the harmless error approach is inapplicable in cases of presumptively coerced confessions.
The instant case, unlike Fulminante, involves merely a question of presumptive coercion. No evidence as to actual coercion is a part of the record, nor was any argument raised in this regard. Rather, appellant argues, and we agree, that his prophylactic right to silence as set forth in Miranda was violated when the police failed to “scrupulously honor” his “right to cut off questioning.” See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104, 96 S.Ct. 321, 326, 46 L.Ed.2d 313, 321 (1975). With or without the benefit of the Supreme Court’s holding in Fulminante, this Court would unquestionably be authorized and indeed required to address the question of whether the instant error was harmless. See Commonwealth v. Rodgers, supra. Thus, any reliance placed on Fulminante in support of this conclusion, I find to be misplaced.
As I agree that the error was harmless, I join in the result reached by the majority. Because I believe that Fulminante is unnecessary and largely irrelevant to this conclusion, I must concur.

. I note that in Commonwealth v. Triplett, 462 Pa. 244, 341 A.2d 62 (1975), our Supreme Court held that the Pennsylvania Constitution precluded the use of statements obtained in violation of Miranda even to impeach the defendant’s trial testimony. In 1984, however, the people of Pennsylvania rendered dead letter law the Triplett holding by amending the constitution to allow for the prosecution’s use of such statements to impeach. See Commonwealth v. Baxter, 367 Pa.Super. 342, 532 A.2d 1177 (1987). Accordingly, the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Harris v. New York, supra, remains the law in Pennsylvania today.