Court Opinion

ID: 9375356
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-27 16:00:58.629252+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:58.186269
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-20037        Document: 00516653918             Page: 1      Date Filed: 02/23/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit                                       United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                       Fifth Circuit

                                                                                     FILED
                                      No. 22-20037                            February 23, 2023
                                    Summary Calendar
                                                                                Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                     Clerk

   John Anthony Buchanan,

                                                                    Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                            versus

   A. Barnes, III, Detention Officer; Detention Officer
   Villanueva; Detention Officer Arsno; Detention
   Officer Zwerspenski; Detention Officer Gurrero, et
   al

                                                                 Defendants—Appellees.

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Southern District of Texas
                               USDC No.4:20-CV-241

   Before Jolly, Oldham, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
   E. Grady Jolly, Circuit Judge:*
         John Anthony Buchanan, a pretrial detainee in the Harris County Jail,
   appeals the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint. He asserted a

         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-20037      Document: 00516653918           Page: 2     Date Filed: 02/23/2023

                                     No. 22-20037

   multitude of constitutional violations as well as several violations of state law.
   For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM.
          Buchanan filed a 52-page complaint naming 28 defendants. The
   district court found that the complaint, although detailed, did not clearly
   identify how each defendant was involved in the claims and ordered
   Buchanan to provide a more definite statement. Buchanan responded by
   listing each defendant and citing page numbers to his earlier complaint. The
   court found his response did not comply with the Federal Rules of Civil
   Procedure or its order. The court then struck both his complaint and
   response. Nevertheless, it granted Buchanan another opportunity to file a
   complaint. It instructed Buchanan to use an approved complaint form for
   § 1983 actions and warned that failure to comply with its order would result
   in dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).
          Eventually, Buchanan filed his amended complaint and a response to
   the court’s order for a more definite statement. He also filed a motion for
   reconsideration of the court’s order striking his earlier response.
   Furthermore, he sent a letter to the district court, calling the judge a racist
   and liar and refusing to use the § 1983 form as instructed.
          In response, the district court issued an order reiterating its earlier
   instructions and warning Buchanan that failure to comply would warrant
   sanctions. Despite Buchanan’s noncompliance with its orders, the court
   provided one last opportunity for him to submit an amended complaint as
   directed. It again warned him that noncompliance would result in dismissal
   pursuant to Rule 41(b). When Buchanan submitted no response, the district
   court dismissed his suit.
                                           I.
          Buchanan appeals. He argues that the district court abused its
   discretion: by dismissing his action pursuant to Rule 41(b); by requiring a

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                                         No. 22-20037

   more definite statement without identifying the problems in his original
   complaint as provided by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e); and finally,
   by dismissing his action in its entirety rather than simply dropping any
   misjoined defendants or claims. 1 We address his arguments as necessary to
   resolve this appeal.
                                               A.
           Rule 41(b) allows a district court to dismiss an action on its own
   motion if the plaintiff fails to comply with a court order. See Coleman v.
   Sweetin, 745 F.3d 756, 766 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam); FED. R. CIV. P.
   41(b). This court generally reviews such decisions for abuse of discretion.
   Coleman, 745 F.3d at 766. Nevertheless, a heightened standard of review
   applies even if the dismissal is without prejudice when future litigation likely
   would be barred by the statute of limitations. Id. In such cases, this court will
   affirm where (1) the record is clear that the plaintiff has either delayed the
   proceedings or engaged in “contumacious conduct” and (2) “the district
   court has expressly determined that lesser sanctions would not prompt
   diligent prosecution, or the record shows that the district court employed
   lesser sanctions that proved to be futile.” Berry v. CIGNA/RSI–CIGNA, 975
   F.2d 1188, 1191 (5th Cir. 1992). Further, this court generally affirms only
   when one of the following aggravating factors is present: where the plaintiff,
   not the plaintiff’s counsel, caused the delay; where intentional conduct
   caused the delay; or where the defendant suffered actual prejudice. Id.

           1
              Rule 41(b) provides: “If the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these
   rules or a court order, a defendant may move to dismiss the action or any claim against it.”
   FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).

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                                         B.
          The district court did not specify whether its dismissal was with or
   without prejudice. Nevertheless, the heightened standard of review applies
   because Buchanan’s claims, which arose in 2019, likely would be barred by
   the applicable two-year limitations period. See Coleman, 745 F.3d at 766; see
   also Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989) (holding that the general
   personal injury statute of limitations for the forum state applies to § 1983
   actions); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.003(a) (setting a
   two-year limitations period in Texas personal injury suits).
          So to determine whether the court’s dismissal was an abuse of
   discretion, we look first to whether Buchanan engaged in contumacious
   conduct. Here, contumacious conduct “is the stubborn resistance to
   authority which justifies a dismissal with prejudice.” McNeal v. Papasan, 842
   F.2d 787, 792 (5th Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
   The district court issued three orders requiring further pleading concerning
   Buchanan’s claims. And yet, Buchanan expressly declined to submit a
   complaint complying with the district court’s orders. Instead, he sent a letter
   disparaging the district court and its orders. His defiant refusal to comply
   with the district court’s orders satisfies the first perquisite for dismissal
   under Rule 41(b)—that is, his conduct was contumacious. Id.
          Next, we review whether the district court considered alternative
   sanctions and determined that they would be futile. Callip v. Harris Cnty.
   Child Welfare Dep’t, 757 F.2d 1513, 1521 (5th Cir. 1985) (per curiam);
   Hornbuckle v. Arco Oil & Gas Co., 732 F.2d 1233, 1237 (5th Cir. 1984). Here,
   the district court on multiple occasions explicitly warned Buchanan that his
   failure to provide an amended complaint would result in dismissal. The
   district court’s warnings can constitute lesser sanctions. See Rogers v. Kroger
   Co., 669 F.2d 317, 320 (5th Cir. 1982) (noting that lesser sanctions include

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   explicit warnings). The record thus shows that the district court applied
   lesser sanctions, which proved futile.
            To conclude our abuse of discretion analysis, we consider the
   presence of factors that “aggravated” the judicial process. See Berry, 975
   F.2d at 1191. Here, the relevant aggravating factor is the senseless delay
   caused by the plaintiff himself. Id. Buchanan caused willful delays in the
   judicial process by contemptuously declining to follow the court’s reasonable
   instructions. In short, Buchanan’s conduct satisfied the “aggravating factor”
   referred to in our cases. See Larson v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1030, 1032 (5th Cir.
   1998).
                                          II.
            Buchanan’s additional arguments also lack merit. First, he argues that
   the district court violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e) by not
   identifying the defects of his complaint with sufficient particularity. Under
   Rule 12(e), a party may file a motion for a more definite statement of a
   pleading if it “is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably
   prepare a response.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e). Thus, Rule 12(e) is not
   specifically applicable, as no party moved for a more definite statement from
   Buchanan. Instead, the district court noted the confusion of the complaint in
   associating the various claims with the respective parties and sua sponte
   ordered a more definite statement.
            Buchanan further argues that the district court should have severed
   any misjoined claims and parties instead of striking his complaint in its
   entirety. It is true that improper joinder of parties is not usually a basis for
   complete dismissal of a case. See Tuft v. Texas, 397 F. App’x 59, 61–62 (5th
   Cir. 2010) (per curiam); Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. But that is not exactly what
   happened here. Here, the district court noted the confusing allegations
   concerning the various claims and parties and remedied the defective

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   complaint by dismissing it and ordering Buchanan to file an amended
   complaint that clearly identified how each party was involved with each
   claim. This remedy was not an abuse of discretion because the district court
   allowed Buchanan to refile a proper complaint. Branum v. Johnson, 265 F.
   App’x 349, 350 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam).
          Finally, Buchanan argues that the Rule 41(b) dismissal for failure to
   prosecute and comply with court orders was improper. He alleges that his
   extensive handwritten complaint was sufficient and that the district court had
   no basis to require him to use the court-provided form. We find no error in
   this requirement by the district court. Based on Buchanan’s status as a
   pretrial detainee, he is a “prisoner” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h). His
   complaint, although extensive, was largely an incomprehensible pleading.
   Thus, it was within the discretion of the district court to order him to simplify
   and clarify his claims by using the proper form for prisoner civil rights
   complaints. See also Watson v. Ault, 525 F.2d 886, 890, 893-94 (5th Cir. 1976)
   (addressing the difficult task that district courts face in reviewing pro se
   litigation and attaching a model form for prisoner civil right complaints).
                                         III.
          We sum up: we hold that dismissal of the complaint was not legal
   error. The district court acted within its discretion in concluding that
   Buchanan’s repeated and contumacious refusals to follow its reasonable
   instructions warranted dismissal. The judgment of the district court is
   therefore
                                                                   AFFIRMED.

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