Court Opinion

ID: 9930372
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-06 19:00:36.226377+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:14:32.250279
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-50872       Document: 00517056991           Page: 1   Date Filed: 02/06/2024

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit
                                 ____________                          United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                Fifth Circuit

                                  No. 22-50872
                                                                              FILED
                                                                       February 6, 2024
                                 ____________
                                                                         Lyle W. Cayce
   United States of America,                                                  Clerk

                                                               Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                       versus

   Shawn Malmquist,

                                             Defendant—Appellant.
                    ______________________________

                    Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Western District of Texas
                             USDC No. 1:21-CR-48-12
                    ______________________________

   Before Higginbotham, Higginson, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
   Stephen A. Higginson, Circuit Judge:
          Shawn Malmquist appeals from a guilty-plea conviction and sentence
   of 151 months of imprisonment and four years of supervised release for
   conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of
   methamphetamine. On appeal, Malmquist contends that the Government
   breached the clause of the plea agreement in which the Government
   promised    to    recommend     a   three-level     acceptance-of-responsibility
   reduction. Malmquist argues that the Government’s opposition to the
   reduction at sentencing constituted plain error because there is a reasonable
   probability that, but for the breach, he would have received a lesser sentence,
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   and the Government’s improper extraction of benefits from the agreement
   resulted in a miscarriage of justice.
          We conclude that the Government’s breach of the plea agreement
   constituted plain error because the breach affected Malmquist’s substantial
   rights and called into question the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of
   the judicial proceedings. Therefore, we VACATE Malmquist’s sentence
   and REMAND for resentencing.
                                           I.
          In July 2022, Malmquist pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement,
   to one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or
   more of methamphetamine. 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B).
   According to the presentence investigation report (“PSR”), Malmquist was
   part of an Austin, Texas-based methamphetamine-trafficking organization.
   He was one of 33 participants charged in this conspiracy and was identified
   as being a drug distributor.
          In April 2021, an initial hearing was held to address the Government’s
   application for pretrial detention.          The magistrate judge denied the
   Government’s request in part and pronounced that Malmquist would be
   detained only until there was availability in an inpatient residential drug
   treatment program. In May 2021, Malmquist was released on bond following
   a detention hearing and scheduled to enter an inpatient residential drug
   treatment program within approximately one week, subject to mandated
   conditions of pretrial release.     Malmquist successfully completed that
   residential program in July 2021.
          On March 31, 2022, however, a pretrial-services officer filed a petition
   to modify the conditions of pretrial release following Malmquist’s
   submission of two positive drug tests. When confronted with these results,
   Malmquist eventually admitted to using methamphetamine prior to these

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   drug tests. In the petition, the officer also recounted Malmquist’s successful
   completion of the residential drug treatment program, the reduction in
   mandated counseling sessions per month due to his progress, and
   Malmquist’s active participation in the treatment sessions. Although, as
   noted, such violations could have resulted in the revocation of his pretrial
   release, the officer recommended that Malmquist increase the number of
   individual counseling sessions and random drug tests. The magistrate judge
   and Government concurred with these modifications.
          Approximately six weeks later, on May 10, 2022, Malmquist was
   arrested after being found in possession of methamphetamine following a
   traffic stop during his mandated curfew. He was detained in a local jail in
   Williamson County. The pretrial-services officer filed a petition for an arrest
   warrant and the revocation of Malmquist’s pretrial release the following day,
   and the warrant was issued thereafter. Malmquist remained in Williamson
   County custody until he was transferred to federal custody pursuant to a writ
   on July 5, 2022.
          On July 1, 2022—after Malmquist’s arrest for possession of
   methamphetamine and while he was still in custody in Williamson County—
   Malmquist and the Government entered into a written plea agreement. As
   part of this agreement, the Government guaranteed—as relevant here—that
   it would “recommend that [Malmquist] receive a three level downward
   adjustment for acceptance of responsibility.” In the agreement, Malmquist
   waived his right to appeal and to collaterally challenge his conviction and
   sentence. Also in the agreement, Malmquist further confirmed that he
   understood that his breach of the terms of the plea agreement would release
   the Government from its obligations.

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          On July 6, 2022, the magistrate judge revoked Malmquist’s pretrial
   release and ordered that he be detained pending further proceedings. The
   Government did not appear at this proceeding.
          Later that afternoon, Malmquist pleaded guilty, pursuant to his
   written plea agreement, to the underlying offense before the magistrate
   judge. As recommended by the magistrate judge, the district court accepted
   the guilty plea.
          The PSR assessed a total offense level of 30, and a criminal history
   category of VI. The probation officer determined that an acceptance-of-
   responsibility reduction under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 3E1.1 was not
   applicable due to Malmquist’s “noncompliance issues” and bond
   revocation.   The advisory guidelines range was 168 to 210 months of
   imprisonment, with a statutory minimum of five years of imprisonment.
          In the “Offender Characteristics” section, the probation officer
   stated that Malmquist’s “methamphetamine dependency has proven to be a
   common issue during his adult life, as the frequency of his methamphetamine
   consumption correlates to his involvement with serious criminal conduct.”
   The officer added, as was consistent with the pretrial-services officer’s
   petition to modify pretrial release conditions, that “[p]rior to [the]
   noncompliance issues [while on pretrial release], [Malmquist] was making
   significant progress towards his treatment goals, as he remained sober and
   continued with counseling.”
          Defense counsel filed objections to the PSR and argued, inter alia, that
   a three-level § 3E1.1 acceptance-of-responsibility reduction was applicable
   because Malmquist “plead[ed] guilty promptly and . . . never denied guilt of
   the charged offense.” In response, the probation officer contended that a
   reduction was not applicable due to Malmquist’s behavior “while on pretrial
   release and prior to his guilty plea,” specifically the positive drug tests and

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   possession of methamphetamine. The Government did not object to the PSR
   or submit a response to Malmquist’s objections.
          At sentencing, defense counsel’s argument as to the § 3E1.1 reduction
   was that he “believe[d] that [Malmquist] did accept responsibility.” At this
   point, the Government countered:
                 As to the objection as to whether or not the acceptance
          of responsibility points should be awarded, again, the pretrial
          services officer got this right, Your Honor. . . . Mr. Malmquist
          and his family told [the magistrate judge] he [could] be good.
          He [could] behave himself while he’s out on pretrial release.
          We’ll put him in a program. We’ll make sure that he does what
          he’s supposed to do. Mr. Malmquist told [the magistrate
          judge] that he could abide by the conditions that she set for
          him. Put him into a program. And, as you can see from the
          presentence report, he failed out of that program. Twice he
          tested positive for methamphetamine.
                 More importantly, the court gave him one more chance
          and said, You know what? I’m going to let you stay out as long
          as you agree that you won’t violate the law any longer. What
          did Mr. Malmquist do? Went out and scored more
          methamphetamine. This time it was 50 grams. Again, that’s a
          distribution amount, Your Honor.
                 Mr. Malmquist has not learned a single lesson in the
          time that he was first arrested in April of 2021 until he was re-
          incarcerated. If he had stayed in jail, we wouldn’t be talking
          about the acceptance of responsibility points. Instead, Mr.
          Malmquist made that decision and the pretrial services officer
          got this correct.
   Defense counsel responded that the acceptance-of-responsibility reduction
   was applicable because Malmquist admitted his guilt and “[i]f there[ was]
   any delay, that ha[d] to do with discovery review and the volume of calls in
   this case.”

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          The district court overruled defense counsel’s objections and
   announced its decision:
                 Defendants usually get acceptance of responsibility.
          And I think [the Government] is correct when [it] says that if
          this defendant had remained in jail, we wouldn’t be talking
          about the three points for acceptance of responsibility right
          now. But we are because this defendant appeared in front of a
          magistrate judge and a magistrate judge conducted a hearing.
          It was represented to the magistrate judge that the defendant
          understood the situation, he was released on bond, knowing
          what would happen if he reverted to the use of drugs.
                 I’m highly sympathetic to his situation and I do believe
          that he should get drug treatment, but I find he is not entitled
          to acceptance of responsibility, because after those
          representations, he went back to at least the use of drugs, and
          perhaps due to the quantities, might have distributed some or
          might not. I do not make a finding that he did, but he violated
          the representations to the court with regard to use and
          proximity of drugs and he is not entitled to the acceptance of
          responsibility.
   Defense counsel made no further objection.
          The parties then made their final arguments.         Defense counsel
   requested a sentence of “less than 100 months,” which he calculated to be
   the “average” of the sentences imposed for the codefendants to date. The
   Government stated that a sentence “at the low end of the guideline range
   [was] appropriate.”
          After several of Malmquist’s family members made statements of
   support, the district court adopted the PSR, and pronounced its sentencing
   determination. It acknowledged that it had reviewed the plea agreement,
   considered the underlying facts, listened to Malmquist’s letter of apology and
   family members, and reviewed Malmquist’s personal background. The court

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   confirmed that it was “willing to accept the fact that [Malmquist’s
   involvement in the drug-trafficking organization] was due to [his] drug
   addiction,” because it thought that he had “an extreme drug addiction,” but
   his addiction “in no way lessen[ed]” his role in the offense because many of
   the codefendants had drug addictions as well. Further, the court stated that
   it would impose a sentence that was “more accurate with regard to other
   [defendants] that [it had] sentenced in this case in an attempt to balance
   everybody out.”
          During its explanation, the district court discussed the acceptance-of-
   responsibility reduction on several occasions. It stated that when Malmquist
   was “given a chance where [he] could have gotten some time down under the
   guidelines for acceptance of responsibility, [he] violated that.” The court
   then pronounced:
          [The court] find[s] that the difference between what guidelines
          would have come up with had you satisfied your pretrial release
          and gotten credit for acceptance of responsibility and the
          guidelines that [the court is] applying today is more harsh [sic]
          than it needs to be. It was too great a penalty there.
   The court elaborated that it would impose a sentence “somewhat below the
   guideline range” which was “more of an appropriate penalty because of
   [Malmquist’s] violation of [the] terms of pretrial release.”
          Having considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors, the
   district court imposed a below-guidelines sentence of 151 months of
   imprisonment and four years of supervised release. Again, addressing the
   acceptance-of-responsibility reduction, the court clarified that it would not
   give Malmquist credit for the time he spent in custody in Williamson County
   “because of [the] court’s policy,” and that this was “yet another penalty
   [Malmquist was] suffering because [he] couldn’t make good on” the pretrial
   release conditions. There were no further objections.

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          Malmquist timely filed a pro se notice of appeal on the grounds of (1)
   prosecutorial misconduct resulting from the Government’s breach of the
   plea agreement “openly in court,” and (2) ineffective assistance resulting
   from defense counsel’s failure to object to the breach. See Fed. R. App. P.
   4(b)(1)(A).
                                         II.
          We have jurisdiction over Malmquist’s appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 3742
   and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. As a preliminary matter, an appellate waiver provision
   does not bar a plea-agreement-breach claim because the Government’s
   breach “void[s] the plea agreement (including the defendant’s waiver of
   appeal).” United States v. Keresztury, 293 F.3d 750, 756 (5th Cir. 2002); see
   United States v. Cluff, 857 F.3d 292, 297 (5th Cir. 2017) (considering the
   defendant’s argument, despite the appeal waiver, that the Government
   breached the plea agreement by not recommending an acceptance-of-
   responsibility adjustment); United States v. Gonzalez, 309 F.3d 882, 886 (5th
   Cir. 2002) (“[W]here the government has breached . . . a plea agreement, the
   defendant is necessarily released from an appeal waiver provision contained
   therein.”).
          Generally, a claim that the Government breached a plea agreement is
   reviewed de novo. Cluff, 857 F.3d at 297. However, Malmquist failed to
   preserve his prosecutorial-misconduct-and-Government-breach objection in
   the district court, so we review his breach claim for plain error. See Puckett v.
   United States, 556 U.S. 129, 133-34, 138 (2009); United States v. Williams, 821
   F.3d 656, 657 (5th Cir. 2016). To succeed on plain-error review, a defendant
   must demonstrate that (1) there is an error “that has not been intentionally
   relinquished or abandoned”; (2) “the legal error must be clear or obvious,
   rather than subject to reasonable dispute”; and (3) “the error must have
   affected [his] substantial rights.”     Williams, 821 F.3d at 657 (internal

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   quotation marks and citation omitted). Even if the defendant makes this
   showing, we have discretion to correct the error “only if the error seriously
   affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”
   Id. (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted).
                                        III.
          Malmquist argues that the Government breached the plea agreement
   by advocating for the denial of the three-level acceptance-of-responsibility
   reduction despite having explicitly guaranteed that it would recommend such
   a reduction in the plea agreement. Although it failed to do so in its brief, the
   Government acknowledged at oral argument that it committed clear error by
   breaching the plea agreement. See Oral Argument at 13:47-53; Keresztury,
   293 F.3d at 756; United States v. Munoz, 408 F.3d 222, 226 (5th Cir. 2005);
   United States v. Kirkland, 851 F.3d 499, 503 (5th Cir. 2017).
                                        IV.
          Because the Government breached Malmquist’s plea agreement,
   “[t]he first two plain-error factors are clearly met,” and therefore the crux of
   this appeal concerns the third and fourth factors. Williams, 821 F.3d at 658.
   On appeal, Malmquist argues that the breach “affected [his] substantial
   rights because there is a reasonable probability that, but for the breach, he
   would have received a lesser sentence through a three-level downward
   adjustment.” Malmquist further asserts that the Government’s breach
   affected the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of the judicial
   proceedings because he “surrender[ed] . . . numerous [c]onstitutional
   rights” in exchange for the Government’s promise and the Government
   “extract[ed] benefits” having already known about Malmquist’s post-
   indictment violative acts.
          The Government counters that Malmquist cannot demonstrate that it
   was “reasonably likely [that he would have] receive[d] an acceptance-of-

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   responsibility reduction regardless of any breach.” Further, it asserts that
   “[g]iven the court’s decision to sentence [him] outside the guideline range,
   Malmquist has not shown it was reasonably likely that the district court
   would have imposed a different sentence even if it had reduced his offense
   level for acceptance of responsibility.”         As to the fourth prong, the
   Government argues that because Malmquist “did not cease his life of crime”
   after his indictment, the reputation of the judicial proceedings is not at issue.
   Puckett, 556 U.S. at 143.
                                          A.
          In the sentencing context, “[a]n error affects an appellant’s
   substantial rights when there is a reasonable probability that, but for the error,
   he would have received a lesser sentence.” Williams, 821 F.3d at 657-58
   (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).            Specifically, “[t]he
   Government’s breach of its promise to recommend a lesser sentence affects
   a defendant’s substantial rights unless the record indicates that . . . the
   district court would have imposed the same sentence regardless of the
   Government’s breach.”         Kirkland, 851 F.3d at 503.         A defendant’s
   substantial rights are affected when “[t]here is no indication the district court
   would have been unmoved by the Government’s recommendation.”
   Williams, 821 F.3d at 658. This standard reflects both the “reasonable
   probability” showing required of the defendant and “the common sense
   understanding of the important role the Government’s recommendation
   plays in sentencing.” Kirkland, 851 F.3d at 503.
          There is an additional inquiry where, as here, the Government “did
   not merely remain silent,” but rather “aggressively argued” for the opposite
   of what was promised in the plea agreement. Id. at 504. Under those
   circumstances, we “must consider not only the possibility that the district
   court would have been influenced” had the Government made the promised

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   recommendation, “but also the possibility that the district court was
   influenced by the Government’s recommendation of, and argument for,” the
   opposite of what was promised. Id. (emphasis omitted). If the record
   indicates that “the district court may have been influenced not only by the
   Government’s recommendation, but also by [the] Government’s passionate
   emphasis of aggravating factors in support of that recommendation,” it
   cannot be said that the sentence would have been the same absent the breach.
   Id. at 504-05.
          The Government contends that it did not “aggressively argue[]”
   against the acceptance-of-responsibility reduction, id. at 504, but merely
   “endors[ed] the recommendation of court staff.”                 However, the
   Government actively opposed the reduction and made several misstatements
   at sentencing. Malmquist did not “fail[] out of [the] program” as the
   Government alleged, but rather successfully completed the court-ordered
   residential drug treatment program in July 2021 and then made progress in
   the outpatient services such that he was rewarded in February 2022 with a
   decrease in the frequency of the mandated counseling sessions.             The
   Government’s assertion that Malmquist had “not learned a single lesson”
   since he was first arrested discounted these successes. When Malmquist first
   violated the terms of his pretrial release, it was not only the magistrate judge
   who gave him “one more chance,” as the Government claimed. Rather, the
   pretrial-services officer was the one who made that suggestion and the
   Government concurred. The Government concluded at the sentencing
   hearing by stating that the parties “wouldn’t be talking about the acceptance
   of responsibility points” had Malmquist “stayed in jail” and not made the
   decision to violate his pretrial release terms, when in fact the Government
   had agreed to recommend “a three level downward adjustment for
   acceptance of responsibility” after it was already aware of Malmquist’s arrest
   for possession of methamphetamine in Williamson County.

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          It is reasonably likely that, but for the Government’s breach, the
   district court would have imposed a lesser sentence. See id. at 503-05. First,
   the district court’s expressed hesitancy in denying the reduction
   demonstrates that there is a “possibility that the district court would have
   been influenced” by the Government’s recommendation for an acceptance-
   of-responsibility reduction and, further, that there is a “possibility that the
   district court was influenced” by the Government’s “passionate emphasis of
   aggravating factors” in its advocacy to deny the reduction. Id. at 504-05
   (emphasis omitted). When announcing its decision concerning the § 3E1.1
   reduction, the court began by stating that “[d]efendants usually get
   acceptance of responsibility” but that the Government was “correct” that
   the reduction would not even be a discussion during this proceeding had
   Malmquist “remained in jail.”              That determination rested on a
   misrepresentation by the Government.
          Next, when addressing Malmquist’s criminal history, the court
   acknowledged that “he could have gotten some time down under the
   guidelines” had Malmquist not “violated” the “chance” he was given.
   Again, this statement may have been colored by the Government’s advocacy
   against the acceptance-of-responsibility reduction and its inaccurate
   characterization of Malmquist’s conduct on pretrial release. The court then
   declared that the resulting guidelines range, as it had been calculated without
   the credit for acceptance of responsibility, was “harsh[er] than it need[ed] to
   be” and “too great a penalty.” Accordingly, the court imposed a below-
   guidelines sentence, in part, to give a “more appropriate penalty” despite
   Malmquist’s violation of his pretrial release. The district court’s explanation
   here undermines the Government’s argument that the outcome, regardless
   of the breach, was inevitable.
          Moreover, the court’s emphasis on Malmquist’s drug addiction
   further suggests that the Government’s support for the reduction may have

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   been influential. The Government’s post-violation promise to recommend
   the reduction may have indicated to the district court that weight should be
   given to Malmquist’s history of successes with substance-abuse treatment,
   which showed his initial progress toward “withdraw[ing] from criminal
   conduct.” U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual § 3E1.1 cmt. n.1(B)
   (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2023) [hereinafter “U.S.S.G.”].
          It is true, as the Government urges, that Malmquist engaged in post-
   indictment conduct to warrant the denial of an acceptance-of-responsibility
   reduction based on a finding that he had not “withdr[awn] from criminal
   conduct after being charged in the pending offense.” United States v. Franks,
   46 F.3d 402, 406 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (citing U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt.
   n.1(B)) (affirming the denial of an offense-level reduction where the
   defendant’s possession of ammunition and drugs while on bond pending the
   disposition of his case indicated continued involvement in criminal conduct);
   see United States v. Puckett, 505 F.3d 377, 387 (5th Cir. 2007), aff’d in part,
   556 U.S. 129 (2009). The Government asserts that because of this conduct,
   Malmquist would not have obtained the § 3E1.1 reduction regardless of the
   Government’s breach.
          The Government relies on the Supreme Court’s decision in Puckett
   and this court’s decision in United States v. Hinojosa, 749 F.3d 407 (5th Cir.
   2014), cases in which the denials of the acceptance-of-responsibility
   reduction were affirmed because the courts found that the circumstances
   demonstrated it was “likely [that the defendant] would not have obtained
   [the] benefits [of the plea agreement] in any event,” regardless of any breach.
   Hinojosa, 749 F.3d at 414 (quoting Puckett, 556 U.S. at 142). However, both
   cases are distinguishable. In Puckett, the Government agreed in the plea
   agreement that the defendant qualified for an acceptance-of-responsibility
   reduction and later opposed that reduction because the defendant committed
   another crime after the plea agreement was executed. See 556 U.S. at 131-32.

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   In Hinojosa, as here, the Government was aware of the defendant’s post-
   indictment misconduct when it promised to recommend an acceptance-of-
   responsibility reduction. 749 F.3d at 414. However, the Government’s
   promise in Hinojosa “was conditioned on [the defendant] ‘clearly
   demonstrat[ing] his acceptance of responsibility,’” id., but here, the
   Government’s promise to recommend the reduction was unconditional, see
   And in Hinojosa, this court did not ultimately determine whether the
   Government’s conduct constituted a breach of the plea agreement, id. at 414,
   whereas here, the breach is undisputed.
          Moreover, in neither case did the district court express sympathy for
   the defendant’s underlying issues that led to the criminal conduct, nor state
   that the denial of the reduction was particularly harsh, as occurred here. To
   the contrary, in Puckett and Hinojosa, the district court denied the reduction
   without hesitation and with solely negative comments. See Puckett, 556 U.S.
   at 132 (quoting the district court’s observation that “it’s so rare as to be
   unknown around here where one has committed a crime subsequent to the
   crime for which they appear before the court and for them even then to get
   the three points” (alterations omitted)); Hinojosa, 749 F.3d at 414 (noting
   that the district court found the defendant’s “credibility so lacking that it was
   ‘suspicious of any word out of his mouth’”).
          Finally, the Government asserts that “Malmquist has not shown it
   was reasonably likely that the district court would have imposed a different
   sentence even if it had reduced his offense level for acceptance of
   responsibility.” But the district court’s comments at sentencing cut against
   this argument. The 151-month sentence was 17 months less than the bottom
   of the advisory guidelines range of 168 to 210 months of imprisonment. Had
   the three-level reduction been applied, the resulting advisory guidelines
   range would have been 130 to 162 months of imprisonment. See U.S.S.G.
   ch.5, pt. A (sentencing table). Under that range, 151 months would have been

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   21 months above the bottom of the range and closer to the high end of the
   range. Thus, because “[t]here is no indication the district court would have
   been unmoved by the Government’s recommendation,” Williams, 821 F.3d
   at 658, there is a reasonable probability that the court would not have imposed
   the same sentence had the Government fulfilled its promise by affirmatively
   advocating for the acceptance-of-responsibility reduction.
                                         B.
           The fourth prong of the plain-error analysis is determined “on a case-
   specific and fact-intensive basis.” Kirkland, 851 F.3d at 505 (quoting Puckett,
   556 U.S. at 142). However, there is a “rebuttable presumption that the
   Government’s meaningful breach of a plea agreement satisfies [this] prong.”
   Id.; see Williams, 821 F.3d at 658; Munoz, 408 F.3d at 226. A breach
   “constitutes a particularly egregious error” and there is an “inherent
   unfairness involved in the Government’s inducement of the defendant’s
   waiver of important constitutional rights by making promises that it
   ultimately does not keep.” Kirkland, 851 F.3d at 505-06. As of 2022, the
   Government resolved approximately 98% of federal convictions by securing
   guilty-plea confessions. See Mark Motivans, U.S. Dep’t Just.,
   Off. Just. Programs, Federal Justice Statistics, 2022, at 11
   (2024), https://bjs.ojp.gov/document/fjs22.pdf [https://perma.cc/WDH3-
   ZQAH] (dividing the percentage of guilty-plea convictions by the total
   percentage of convictions). Put otherwise, plea bargaining, necessarily
   outside of judicial purview, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1), is our criminal
   justice system. It is therefore imperative that the Government honor its
   word.
           Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has held that the Government can
   rebut the miscarriage presumption where a defendant “obviously [does] not
   cease his life of crime” and where “receipt of a sentencing reduction for

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Case: 22-50872     Document: 00517056991           Page: 16   Date Filed: 02/06/2024

                                    No. 22-50872

   acceptance of responsibility would [be] so ludicrous as itself to compromise
   the public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Puckett, 556 U.S. at 143
   (emphasis omitted).
          Here, the government has failed to rebut the presumption that its
   breach affected the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of the judicial
   proceedings.    Again, unlike in Puckett, the Government was aware of
   Malmquist’s violation before it signed the plea agreement. See Kirkland, 851
   F.3d at 506 (“The Government cannot extract benefits from a defendant who
   it knows has committed bad acts and later argue that it should not be held to
   its bargain because the defendant has committed those bad acts.”); cf.
   Puckett, 556 U.S. at 132 (recounting that the Government had agreed to
   support an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction “‘a long time ago,’ before
   [the defendant] had engaged in the additional criminal behavior” (citation
   omitted)). Additionally, unlike the defendant in Puckett, who exhibited no
   behavior suggesting any “withdrawal from criminal conduct” prior to
   sentencing, U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.1(B), Malmquist had a history of
   successes with substance-abuse treatment, which the Government
   discounted in its sentencing advocacy against the acceptance-of-
   responsibility reduction.   For these reasons, the Government has not
   rebutted the presumption that its breach constituted a “miscarriage of
   justice,” Kirkland, 851 F.3d at 505, and Malmquist has therefore satisfied the
   fourth prong.
                                        V.
          Because the Government’s breach of the plea agreement constituted
   plain error, we VACATE Malmquist’s sentence and REMAND for
   resentencing.

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