Court Opinion

ID: 9851672
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:17:28.559168+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:11.870650
License: Public Domain

Felton and Quillian, JJ.,
dissenting. We concur in division one of the majority opinion concerning the ruling on the pleading. However, we feel that an entirely different picture is presented by the evidence adduced at the trial from the one presented by the pleading. We think that the evidence shows that the defendant Anderson’s negligence was an intervening effective cause which proximately caused the plaintiff’s injuries. Anderson’s testimony shows that he knew Mrs. Hill had signaled for a left turn; that he maintained “proper space” between his automobile and that of the plaintiff; that he lost his sense of distance; that he would have hit the plaintiff’s automobile regardless of for what reason the plaintiff stopped. The plaintiff testified that he gave a proper hand signal to show that he was stopping, and this is not disputed. If Anderson did maintain “proper” distance between his automobile and that of the plaintiff, then any sudden stopping by Locker, the plaintiff, if in fact he did stop suddenly, did not cause the defendant Anderson to strike the rear of the plaintiff’s automobile due to his not maintaining a proper distance between his and the plaintiff’s automobile. Thus it is proper to conclude that Anderson struck the plaintiff’s automobile for some other reason or act of negligence. Anderson testified that he did not suddenly apply his brakes, but applied them off and -on “to break the speed as quickly as possible.” Conceding that Reid’s employee might have reasonably foreseen *291that a third person might be negligently following the plaintiff’s automobile at such a close distance that such third person could not possibly avoid striking the plaintiff if the plaintiff suddenly stopped to avoid striking a wreckage caused by the negligence of Reid’s employee—we do not think that Reid’s employee could have reasonably anticipated that the third party would strike the plaintiff’s automobile because he did not properly apply his brakes, or did not use proper judgment in determining the quickest way to stop, or because of any other reason than traveling too closely behind the plaintiff’s automobile. See Powell v. Waters, 55 Ga. App. 307 (1a) (190 S. E. 615); Seymour v. City of Elberton, 67 Ga. App. 426, 431-434 (20 S. E. 2d 767); Restatement of the Law, Torts, Vol. II, 1188, § 442 (b), (c).
Under our A'iew of the case, the negligence of Reid’s employee proximately caused only the collision between the automobile he was operating and that of Mrs. Hill, and after that collision occurred and the plaintiff came to a stop without striking the Avreckage and without any damage to himself, the employee’s negligence ceased to be operative and Anderson collided with the rear of the plaintiff’s automobile due to his own negligence totally unconnected with the negligence of Reid’s employee. Under Anderson’s OA\m testimony, he had sufficient time and space in which, under the exercise of ordinary care, to come to a stop and avoid striking the plaintiff’s automobile after the conduct of the other actors had come to a complete standstill.
“If, in a giA’en case, the injury complained of did not Sow naturally and directly from the wrongful act or omission attributed to the defendant, or could not reasonably have been expected to result therefrom, or would not have resulted therefrom but for the interposition of some independent, unforeseen cause, the defendant's such antecedent wrongful act or omission would not be the proximate cause of the injury complained of.” Cain v. State, 55 Ga. App. 376, 381 (190 S. E. 371); Andrews & Co. v. Kinsel, 114 Ga. 390, 391 (2) (40 S. E. 300).
The eAÚdence demanded a finding that the defendant Anderson’s inteiwening negligence was the sole proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.