Court Opinion

ID: 9763557
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:49:11.740259+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:57:28.107503
License: Public Domain

LARSEN, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent, as I believe the trial court abused its discretion in refusing plaintiff the opportunity to reopen his evidence to prove a simple, technical point essential to his case.
The majority correctly recites the first prong of our standard for reviewing the trial court’s decision on reopening evidence under Tex.R.Civ.P. 270:
It is well established that in considering appeals based on rule 270 that the question of re-opening a case for the purpose of admitting additional evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial judge, and his action refusing to permit a party to reopen for such purpose should not be disturbed by an appellate court unless it clearly appears that such discretion has been abused. Word of Faith World Outreach Center Church, Inc. v. Oechsner, 669 S.W.2d 364, 366 (1984), citing Guerrero v. Standard Alloys Manufacturing Co., 598 S.W.2d 656 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
But it then gives short shrift to the second prong of that standard, which is:
However, such discretion should be liberally exercised in the interest of permitting both sides to fully develop the case in the interest of justice. Word of Faith World Outreach, 669 S.W.2d at 366-367, citing Barrier v. Beavers, 531 S.W.2d 191, 193 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Papco, Inc. v. Eaton, 522 S.W.2d 538, 543 (Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana 1975, no writ).
Indeed, it appears that in some Rule 270 situations the trial court’s discretion is very limited:
Ordinarily it lies within the trial court’s discretion to reopen a case for the reception of additional testimony. But there are occasions when it is the duty of the trial court to grant such a request, especially when the proffered testimony is decisive, its reception will not cause any undue delay, or do an injustice. Hill v. Melton, 311 S.W.2d 496, 500 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1958, writ dism’d); accord Word of Faith Outreach, 669 S.W.2d at 367; Alkas v. United Savings Assoc., 672 S.W.2d 852, 860 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Thus, our analysis should include more than just the single factor upon which the majority focuses, whether plaintiff established a diligent attempt to present evidence of filing a claim with the IAB during his case-in-chief.1 Instead, I believe our review *252should contain all the factors listed in Hill v. Melton. A party seeking to reopen evidence should show: (1) the proffered testimony is decisive; (2) the party was diligent in producing the evidence before closing; (3) its reception will not cause any undue delay; and (4) refusing to allow additional evidence will result in an injustice. See O’ConnoR’s Texas Rules * Civil TRIALS (1994) p. 653 § 2.2. Three of these factors are inarguably present here. As to the diligence factor, which is certainly the most problematic in this case, it is my belief that the majority does not properly analyze this diligence requirement in the context of Tex.R.Civ.P. 270. My reasoning follows.

Decisive

But for the jury’s adverse finding on notice to the IAB, plaintiff would have prevailed with a judgment for total and permanent disability. Because of the adverse finding, he lost a judgment for past and future loss of wage earning capacity, and more importantly he lost the right to lifetime medical coverage such a judgment would have provided. The proffered testimony of attorney Elias was clear and concise on the issue of timely filing with the IAB. The evidence was decisive.

No undue delay

The jury had not retired, and although plaintiff had rested, neither side had closed its evidence. The witness who would have provided the requested evidence was present in the courtroom, and indeed gave the relevant testimony outside the jury’s presence. The proposed evidence was confined to one simple, discreet issue. Delay was not a factor here.

Prevent injustice

This is a case where insurance counsel’s knowledge of technical pleading rules converged with plaintiff’s counsel’s apparent lack of experience to create a sad disparity at trial.2 The equities here clearly favored reopening the evidence, allowing both sides to fully develop the case. The insurance carrier did not contend that it was harmed by any notice defect. Indeed, the carrier did not even assert that plaintiff actually failed to file his notice of claim within one year; rather, it relied solely upon plaintiffs failure to timely prove the issue. Late filing, and therefore good cause, were never real issues in the case. Had plaintiff’s copy of his notice of claim, attached to his answers to interrogatories, been file-stamped by the IAB, no evidence on this issue would have been needed. Plaintiff could not fully develop his case because of the trial court’s ruling here; that is precisely the injustice Rule 270 is meant to foreclose.

Diligence

Finally, I believe the majority misapplies the diligence requirement. It focuses solely upon plaintiffs (or more realistically, plaintiffs counsel’s) failure to present crucial notice of claim evidence during his case-in-chief. If Tex.R.Civ.P. 270 required plaintiff to show a diligent attempt to present the omitted evidence during his case-in-ehief, however, the rule would serve little purpose. In the panglossian world envisioned by the majority, all parties would be thoroughly prepared, unrattleable, and impervious to memory lapses. Rule 270 would never be needed. That the rule exists at all belies’ the harsh diligence standard employed by the majority. Rather, the rule’s intent is to prevent manifest injustice where a party, through oversight, inadvertence or misunderstanding of the issues, has failed to put on evidence which is both necessary and available.
I believe the Rule 270 diligence requirement applies chiefly after Rule 270 becomes applicable; that is, after a party rests and closes its case. This is reflected in language discussing the rule: “the moving party must show diligence in producing the evidence at trial before the evidence is closed.” Guerre*253ro, 598 S.W.2d at 658; see also O’ConnoR’s Texas Rules * Civil TRials p. 653, § 2.2 (1994). Before the jury has retired, it would seem a more lenient standard applies. As the evidence had not been closed here,. I question whether the diligence element was relevant at all; rather, Rule 270 requires diligence after a rectifiable mistake has been made.
Finally, we should not lose sight that the workers’ compensation laws are to be liberally construed in order to confer benefits upon the injured working people of this state. Stott v. Texas Employers Ins. Ass’n, 645 S.W.2d 778, 780 (Tex.1983); Hargrove v. Trinity Universal Insurance Co., 152 Tex. 243, 256 S.W.2d 73, 75 (1953). In this case, it must have been clear to the trial court that refusing to allow plaintiff to reopen would insure a take-nothing verdict. Although I sympathize with the trial court’s desire to try a clean case and its duty to remain neutral, nevertheless I am left with the strong belief that justice was not served here. No real purpose was served by depriving this plaintiff of benefits to which he was otherwise entitled. I would hold that the trial court was under a duty to reopen the evidence here. For these reasons, I must dissent.

. I hastily acknowledge he failed to do so, and under these facts could never have done so. The only explanation for this failure is that plaintiff’s *252counsel simply did not understand the import of the verified answer filed by the carrier.

. The majority states that once defendant filed its verified denial, plaintiff "had the burden of pleading and proving that he timely presented his claim to the IAB.... ” If this means that the majority would require plaintiff to file some pleading refuting the verified answer, I disagree. Plaintiff's live petition at trial alleged a timely filed claim or alternatively good cause for late filing. "Plaintiff need not deny any special matter of defense pleaded by the defendant, but the same shall be regarded as denied unless expressly admitted.” Tex.R.Civ.P. 82.