Court Opinion

ID: 9711690
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:36:43.628797+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:06.707112
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion
Cook, P. J.
— I concur in the majority opinion to the extent that I believe the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. I would not burden the official reports of this court with irrelevant and extraneous matters urged by appellant but not properly before this court.
The parties appeared in person and by counsel before the Newton Circuit Court and after a trial, the court, on January 29, 1962, rendered its judgment granting appellee a divorce from appellant. The judgment decree adopted an agreed property settlement agreement and awarded appellee *109custody of Gail Laze Miller, age six, a child of appellant and appellee, born prior to their marriage, and ordered appellant to support her.
Appellant did not appeal from such final judgment.
On June 17, 1963, appellant filed a complaint to review the divorce judgment alleging that the judgment decree is void in part in adjudging him the father of Gail Laze and requiring him to support her.
Appellee demurred to the complaint for review on the statutory ground, “that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” The Newton Circuit Court sustained the demurrer. Appellant refused to plead further and the trial court entered judgment for appellee and against appellant on his complaint.
Appellant appeals from this judgment and in his assignment of errors asserts the alleged error of the trial court in sustaining appellee’s demurrer to his. complaint. This is the only alleged error properly presented. Other assignments of error relating to the trial court’s action in the original proceedings do not present any questions for our consideration.
Appellant’s rights, if any, to review the original, divorce judgment are circumscribed by Burns’ Ind. Stat. §§ 2-2604 —2-2609. These statutes permit the filing of a complaint for review of a judgment within one year after entry for any error of law (three years for material new matter — not present here). Burns’ § 2-2604 further provides,. “But no complaint shall be filed for a review of a judgment of divorce.”
I believe the statute means just what it says. So did the Supreme Court in Keller v. Keller (1894), 139 Ind. 38, 38 N. E. 337.
It should also be noted that the present action was commenced more than five months beyond the one year period allowed for the filing of a complaint to review a judgment.
*110Aside from the limitations imposed by statute, a court of equity should not grant relief against the consequences of a judgment merely on the ground that the judgment is wrong in fact or in law unless the complaining party, without any fault on his part, was prevented from presenting a meritorious defense because of fraud, duress or circumstances beyond his control. In Re Innis (1944), 140 F. 2d 479, certiorari denied 64 S. Ct. 1048, 322 U.S. 736, 88 Law Ed. 1569. Such is not the case here.
Note. — Reported in 231 N. E. 2d 828.