Court Opinion

ID: 9915663
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-06 07:09:26.575929+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:17:43.847453
License: Public Domain

Opinion filed January 4, 2024

                                      In The

        Eleventh Court of Appeals
                                   __________

                                No. 11-22-00261-CR
                                    __________

                JAMES EDWARD HARRELL, Appellant
                                        V.
                     THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                     On Appeal from the 104th District Court
                             Taylor County, Texas
                         Trial Court Cause No. 23429-B

                      MEMORANDUM OPINION
      Appellant, James Edward Harrell, was indicted for the second-degree felony
offense of aggravated assault. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02(a)(2) (West
Supp. 2023). A jury found Appellant guilty of the indicted offense and assessed his
punishment at ten years’ imprisonment in the Institutional Division of the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice. In his sole issue on appeal, Appellant argues that
the evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s finding of guilt for the charged
offense because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant
did not act in self-defense. We affirm.
                              I.   Factual Background
      The underlying offense arises from a dispute between two neighbors, which
resulted in Appellant being shot. Appellant and his neighbor, Jerry Wrightsil, had
known each other for approximately three years prior to this incident; Jerry testified
that he and Appellant “never got along.” According to Jerry, Appellant had a “[b]ad
reputation” for violence and he feared Appellant.
      On October 17, 2021, Jerry was at his trailer with several family members. At
some point, Jerry noticed that Appellant’s dogs were in Jerry’s yard causing a
commotion with his dogs; this prompted Jerry to go outside to retrieve his dogs.
Jerry testified that once he was outside, he asked Appellant “not to let his dogs run
in [Jerry’s] yard” because Jerry’s dogs were aggressive. Appellant told Jerry that
“[Jerry’s] dog [was] not s--t.” Appellant’s dogs were restrained by a leash; Appellant
eventually released his dogs, and they attacked Jerry’s dogs.
      During the dogfight, Jerry’s dogs ran across the street, and Jerry followed to
retrieve them. Jerry testified that he grabbed his handgun and held the firearm at his
side as he crossed the street because he “kn[e]w [Appellant’s] M.O.” As this was
occurring, Appellant shouted to Jerry that he “better get these dogs before
[Appellant] start[s] sticking them.” Jerry, having noticed that Appellant had pulled
a knife from his back pants pocket, thought that the phrase “sticking them” meant
Appellant intended to stab Jerry’s dogs. As Jerry reached down to get his dogs,
Appellant lunged and swung at him with the knife. Jerry testified that, at the time,
he believed that Appellant was “[trying] to decapitate [him].” Jerry testified that he
“feared for [his] life,” and he subsequently shot Appellant to “get him away.”
      Shortly after the shooting, Sergeant Kevin Ohnheiser with the Abilene Police
Department received a call from dispatch concerning an injured person. When
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Sergeant Ohnheiser arrived at the scene, he saw Appellant laying in front of a trailer
house with a gunshot wound to his left thigh. Sergeant Ohnheiser then crossed the
street to locate the suspected shooter. Sergeant Ohnheiser testified that Jerry was
sitting on his front porch when he acknowledged the officer, identified himself, and
admitted that he was the shooter. After Appellant was transported to the hospital,
Detective Jeff Cowan arrived at the scene to collect evidence; he recovered a knife
with apparent blood on it, Jerry’s handgun, and a spent bullet casing. Detective
Cowan also received a video recording of the incident, which was recorded by
Jerry’s nephew.
      Detective Cowan later visited the hospital where Appellant was recovering
and interviewed Appellant and his wife.         After completing his investigation,
Detective Cowan concluded that Appellant was both the primary actor and the
aggressor during the incident.
                                 II. Standard of Review
      We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, regardless of
whether it is framed as a legal or factual sufficiency challenge, under the standard of
review set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Brooks v. State, 323
S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Polk v. State, 337 S.W.3d 286, 288–89
(Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. ref’d). Under the Jackson standard, we review all
of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the charged offense
beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d
633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
      Similarly, when a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the rejection of a defense by him, such as self-defense, we examine all of
the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether a rational
jury could have found the defendant guilty of all essential elements of the charged
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offense beyond a reasonable doubt and also could have found against the defendant
on the self-defense issue beyond a reasonable doubt. Saxton v. State, 804 S.W.2d
910, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); see also Braughton v. State, 569 S.W.3d 592, 609
(Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (reaffirming Saxton).
      To support a claim of self-defense, the defendant bears the burden to produce
some evidence to support the claim; the State bears the burden of persuasion to
disprove the raised defense. Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at 608 (citing Zuliani v. State,
97 S.W.3d 589, 594 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 913–14). Once
the defendant produces that evidence, the State’s burden does not require the
production of additional evidence to disprove the defense; instead, it requires only
that the State prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 594–
95.
      When a defendant raises a justification defense, such as self-defense, a
determination of guilt by the jury is an implicit rejection of the defensive theory.
Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 594–95; Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 914. As such, because a claim
of self-defense is a fact issue to be determined by the jury, the jury is free to accept
or reject the defensive theory, either version of the facts, and any part of a witness’s
testimony. Febus v. State, 542 S.W.3d 568, 572 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); see Saxton,
804 S.W.2d at 912 n.3.
      Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict requires that
we consider all of the evidence admitted at trial, including improperly admitted
evidence. Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Clayton v.
State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). As such, we defer to the
factfinder’s credibility and weight determinations because the factfinder is the sole
judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight their testimony is to be afforded.
Winfrey, 393 S.W.3d at 768; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at
778. This deference accounts for the factfinder’s duty to resolve conflicts in the
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testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts
to ultimate facts. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. We may
not reevaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence to substitute our judgment
for that of the factfinder. Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App.
1999). Therefore, if the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume that the
factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that
determination. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525–26
(Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778.
      Because the standard of review is the same, we treat direct and circumstantial
evidence equally. Isassi, 330 S.W.3d at 638; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778; Hooper v.
State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). It is not necessary that the evidence
directly prove the defendant’s guilt. Rather, circumstantial evidence is as probative
as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor and can, without more, be
sufficient to establish his guilt. Carrizales v. State, 414 S.W.3d 737, 742 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2013) (citing Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13). A guilty verdict does not require
that every fact must directly and independently prove a defendant’s guilt. Hooper,
214 S.W.3d at 13.        Instead, the cumulative force of all the incriminating
circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction. Id. Therefore, in evaluating
the sufficiency of the evidence, we must consider the cumulative force of the
evidence. Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); Murray v.
State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).
                                    III. Analysis
      In his sole issue, Appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support
the jury’s rejection of his claim of self-defense. We disagree.
      A person commits the offense of assault if he “intentionally or knowingly
threatens another with imminent bodily injury.” PENAL § 22.01(a)(2). The assault
becomes a second-degree felony if a person “uses or exhibits a deadly weapon during
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the commission of the assault.” Id. § 22.02(a)(2). Here, the jury found Appellant
guilty of the offense of aggravated assault, and there is sufficient evidence in the
record for the jury to have found all the essential elements of this offense beyond a
reasonable doubt. We note, however, that Appellant does not contend that the State
failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt any of the essential elements of aggravated
assault; rather, Appellant limits his argument to the sufficiency of the evidence to
support his claim of self-defense.
      Under appropriate circumstances, a defendant may affirmatively raise the
claim of self-defense if the use of force is “justified.” Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at
606; see also Gamino v. State, 537 S.W.3d 507, 510 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). In
asserting self-defense, the use of force is justified “when and to the degree the actor
reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect the actor against
the other’s use or attempted use of unlawful force.” PENAL § 9.31(a) (West 2019).
Similarly, the use of deadly force against another is justified under the above
circumstances “if the actor would be justified in using force against the other” under
Section 9.31 and “when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the deadly
force is immediately necessary . . . to protect the actor against the other’s use or
attempted use of unlawful deadly force.” Id. § 9.32(a).
      “The reasonably believes language within these statutes contain subjective
and objective components.” Lozano v. State, 636 S.W.3d 25, 32 (Tex. Crim. App.
2021) (emphasis added). First, a “defendant must subjectively believe that another
person used or attempted to use unlawful force (Section 9.31) or deadly force
(Section 9.32) against the defendant and that the defendant’s use of unlawful or
deadly force in response was immediately necessary.” Id. “Deadly force means
force that is intended or known by the actor to cause, or in the manner of its use or
intended use is capable of causing, death or serious bodily injury.” Id. § 9.01(3)
(emphasis added). Second, a defendant’s belief must be objectively reasonable, as
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a reasonable belief is a belief that would be held by an ordinary and prudent person
in the same circumstances as the actor. Id. § 1.07(a)(42). An actor’s belief that
deadly force was immediately necessary is presumed to be reasonable if (1) the actor
knows or has reason to believe that the person against whom the deadly force was
used was committing or attempting to commit an enumerated offense described by
the statute; (2) the actor did not provoke the person against whom the force was used;
and (3) the actor was “not otherwise engaged in criminal activity, other than a Class
C misdemeanor that is a violation of a law or ordinance regulating traffic at the time
the force was used.” See id. § 9.32(b).
      Evidence of self-defense may be raised by “other witnesses’s testimony about
the defendant’s acts and words at the time of the offense.” Lozano, 636 S.W.3d at
33 (citing Smith v. State, 676 S.W.2d 584, 585 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)).
      Appellant points to the following evidence in support of his contention that
the jury acted irrationally when it did not find in favor of Appellant on his claim of
self-defense: (1) Jerry admitted that he crossed the street toward Appellant with a
gun in his hand before he shot Appellant; (2) Jerry stated that he believed Appellant
was acting “defensive;” and (3) Jerry had been convicted of a crime of violence, had
a reputation for violent propensities, and had a reputation for carrying a firearm.
      At the outset, we note that there is scant evidence that Appellant subjectively
believed that Jerry intended to commit an offense under the statute, such as murder,
which would justify Appellant’s use of deadly force against him. See PENAL
§ 9.32(a)(2)(B). Nevertheless, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence in the
record that rebuts the presumption that Appellant’s actions were reasonable under
Section 9.32(b).
      Detective Cowan testified that he interviewed Appellant and his wife after the
shooting occurred while Appellant was hospitalized. Appellant told Detective
Cowan that he did not have any weapons in his possession at the time of the shooting,
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and he reiterated this fact later during the interview. Appellant’s wife, Daniela
Harrell, corroborated Appellant’s version of events, and she told Detective Cowan
that she believed that all of Appellant’s knives were accounted for at their home after
the shooting had occurred. Interestingly, Appellant did not make any statements to
law enforcement indicating that he believed that he was acting in self-defense.
Rather, Appellant only denied possessing a weapon at any time during the altercation
with Jerry. Contrary to the statements made by both Appellant and Daniela during
the interview, the officers at the scene recovered a knife with apparent blood on it.
Further, the video recording of the incident that was provided to law enforcement
shows Appellant holding a knife and swiping it toward Jerry’s head prior to
Appellant being shot.
      Additionally, Daniela testified concerning a confrontation between Appellant
and Jerry that involved Appellant’s dog, which occurred approximately three weeks
before the shooting incident. Daniela further testified that Jerry had a propensity to
carry firearms.
      Appellant’s stepdaughter, Jlynn Llewellyn, testified regarding an incident that
had occurred at Family Dollar approximately two months prior to this offense.
During their interaction, Jerry and Jlynn were backing out of the Family Dollar
parking lot at the same time when Jerry stepped out of his vehicle, and, according to
Jlynn, Jerry threatened her with a gun. Jlynn testified that she then left the parking
lot and drove to a 7-Eleven; Jerry followed her there and proceeded to “cuss at [her.]”
Jlynn later told Appellant about this incident, but stated that she never reported it to
the police. The record also shows that Jerry had been previously convicted of
committing domestic abuse against his wife.
      Jerry’s wife, Aretha Cork, testified that she was at Family Dollar with Jerry
on the same day as the incident that Jlynn testified about; however, according to
Aretha, she did not witness any altercation between Jerry and Jlynn. Aretha testified
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that Jlynn followed Jerry to 7-Eleven and the two individuals cursed at each other.
According to Aretha, Jlynn did not appear to be afraid of Jerry. Additionally, Aretha
testified that Jerry does not normally carry a gun, and that Jerry is not a violent
person despite his previous domestic violence charge whereby she was the victim of
that offense.
      Considering the record as a whole, there is some evidence indicating that
Appellant could have subjectively believed that his actions were reasonable under
the circumstances, because, according to Appellant, Jerry was brandishing a
handgun as he crossed the street, and there is conflicting evidence in the record
concerning prior altercations between Jerry, Appellant, and Jlynn. However, when
the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume that the factfinder resolved
the conflicts in favor of the verdict. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326. Thus, the jury was
free to assess the credibility of the witnesses and rationally determine based on the
evidence presented that Appellant’s subjective belief that deadly force was
immediately necessary was not reasonable. See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899; Clayton,
235 S.W.3d at 778; Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13; Barron v. State, 630 S.W.3d 392,
404 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2021, pet. ref’d).
      A reasonable jury could have also concluded that Appellant provoked the
altercation, thereby rebutting the presumption that Appellant’s belief that the use of
force was reasonable under Section 9.32(b). See PENAL § 9.32(b)(2). Jerry testified
that Appellant escalated the situation because Appellant released his dogs from their
leash, which caused Jerry’s dogs to attack Appellant’s dogs and run across the street.
As Jerry crossed the street to retrieve his dogs, he noticed that Appellant had pulled
a knife out of his back pocket, further escalating the situation. A witness during the
State’s case-in-chief, Lapaul Scaggs, observed the altercation and testified that his
son recorded the event on his cell phone. Lapaul further testified that while Jerry
was on the street walking to the sidewalk, Appellant had already reached for and
                                          9
removed his knife from his pocket as Jerry reached the sidewalk. Jerry also testified
to these facts and stated that “not one time did I point that gun at [Appellant] until
he swung that knife at my neck.”
      The video recording of the incident further supports Jerry’s testimony. In the
video, Appellant can be seen removing a knife from his back pocket while Jerry is
crossing the street. At this time, Jerry is holding his handgun at his side, and the
muzzle of his handgun is pointed at the ground. Appellant then swings his knife
toward Jerry’s head—attacking first—while Jerry’s handgun is still at his side and
pointed at the ground. The video then pans away from Appellant and Jerry prior to
the sound of an audible gunshot.
      Detective Cowan testified that, after completing his investigation, he believed
that Appellant was both the primary actor and the aggressor during the incident.
Additionally, in his interview with Detective Cowan, Appellant told the officers that,
at the time of the incident, “[he] knew [Jerry] had a gun” and that Appellant told
Jerry to “put your gun up and then we’ll fight,” but that Jerry “did not want to do
that.” Here, the jury was presented with some evidence that Appellant was on his
side of the street when the altercation occurred, but there is no evidence or testimony
that Appellant was located on his own property at the time of the shooting. Thus,
the evidence does not support the presumption that Appellant’s actions were
reasonable when he committed this offense, as there is sufficient evidence that
Appellant provoked the altercation. See Smith v. State, 965 S.W.2d 509, 519 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1998).
      The evidence further supports the jury’s rejection of Appellant’s claim that
his actions were objectively reasonable under the circumstances. See Winfrey, 393
S.W.3d at 767; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. Jerry testified that, prior to this event,
Appellant had a “bad reputation” for violence and that he was personally fearful of
Appellant.   Appellant escalated the situation when he (1) made inflammatory
                                          10
statements to Jerry; (2) “unleashed” his dogs, which allowed them to attack Jerry’s
dogs; and (3) reached for and pulled a knife from his pants pocket as Jerry was
crossing the street. Appellant then swung his knife toward Jerry’s neck, as Jerry was
retrieving his dogs, in an attempt “to decapitate [Jerry].” When Appellant swiped
his knife, video evidence shows that Jerry’s handgun was still at his side and pointed
at the ground. Jerry also referred to various surgeries and other health conditions
personal to him, which made him particularly fearful of Appellant’s knife attack
toward his neck area. Because Jerry “feared for [his] life” when Appellant swung a
knife at him, Jerry shot Appellant.
      From the evidence presented, we conclude that a rational jury could have
found that Appellant’s use of force was neither reasonable nor justified. Because
much of the evidence presented on this issue was based on witness testimony,
Appellant’s theory of self-defense was inherently a credibility determination for the
jury to resolve. See Febus, 542 S.W.3d at 572; Barron, 630 S.W.3d at 404. Thus,
because the credibility of Appellant’s claim of self-defense was solely within the
jury’s province to determine, the jurors were free to reject Appellant’s claim of self-
defense and find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt for the offense of aggravated
assault. See Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 914; see also Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at 611–13;
Barron, 630 S.W.3d at 404. In the absence of evidence in the record indicating that
the jury was irrational in their rejection of Appellant’s claim of self-defense, we
decline to substitute our view of the witnesses’ credibility for that of the jury. See
Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 914. Here, the jury’s determination of Appellant's guilt is
tantamount to a rejection of his claim of self-defense, and the jury was free to reject
this defense and Appellant’s version of events. See Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at 609;
Saxton, 804 S.W.2d at 914; see also Febus, 542 S.W.3d at 572.
      Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, we
conclude that the State adduced sufficient evidence from which a rational trier of
                                          11
fact could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, all the essential elements of
aggravated assault and also could have found against Appellant on his claim of self-
defense. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Isassi, 330 S.W.3d at 638. Accordingly, we
overrule Appellant’s sole issue on appeal.
                               IV. This Court’s Ruling
      We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                               W. STACY TROTTER
                                               JUSTICE

January 4, 2024
Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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