Court Opinion

ID: 9553518
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:30:47.645116+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:31:27.717839
License: Public Domain

ROSSMAN, J.,
dissenting.
The majority concludes that barring BPST from considering the historical fact of petitioner’s Idaho convictions
“would involve an improper interference with BPST’s strong interest in examining and ensuring the moral fitness of prospective police officers.” 115 Or App at 603.
Petitioner made some mistakes in his youth. Since then, he has amply demonstrated his moral fitness. The Idaho court that convicted him later made this finding:
“[S]ince the date of his convictions and since the date of the amendment of judgment [setting aside his convictions and dismissing the case against him, petitioner has been] a productive member of society and that a real need exists for the expungement of [the records of his convictions].” .
Because I believe that giving full faith and credit to the orders issued by the Idaho District Court would promote Oregon’s policy of “ensuring the moral fitness of prospective police officers,” I respectfully dissent.
In 1983, less than three months after his 18th birthday, petitioner was convicted of three misdemeanors in Idaho. Idaho law authorized the convicting court to set aside those convictions and dismiss the case against him “if convinced by the showing made that [that would be] compatible with the public interest.” Idaho Code § 19-2604(1). The court was convinced, and its order of dismissal was intended to “have the effect of restoring [petitioner] to his civil rights.” Idaho Code § 19-2604. Petitioner has worked in a variety of law enforcement capacities in Oregon since 1985. His supervisors uniformly praised him and supported his bid for certification as an officer. Nonetheless, BPST denied him certification.
In Morphet v. Morphet, 263 Or 311, 322, 502 P2d 255 (1972), the Supreme Court explained:
*605“[F]ull faith and credit means that a state must accord the judgment of a court of another state the same credit that it is entitled to in the courts of that state.”
In assessing petitioner’s claim that the orders1 issued by the Idaho court bar BPST from considering his Idaho convictions, we should first determine what effect those orders would have in that state.
Recently, the Idaho Court of Appeals observed that the statute permits a court to
“amend a judgment of conviction in order to eliminate the record of a [conviction]. * * * The procedure might best he described as a statutory partial expungement.” Housley v. State, 119 Idaho 885, 890, 811 P2d 495 (Idaho Ct App 1991). (Emphasis supplied.)
In Manners v. State, Bd. of Veterinary Medicine, 107 Idaho 950, 694 P2d 1298 (1985), a veterinarian had been convicted of delivery of a controlled substance, a felony. The trial court suspended his sentence and placed him on probation for a year. After he successfully completed probation, the court allowed him to withdraw his guilty plea, and it issued an order dismissing the charge against him. Subsequently, the Board of Veterinary Medicine revoked his license. Manners v. State, Bd. of Veterinary Medicine, supra, 107 Idaho at 951. The Idaho Supreme Court held that the Board could not use his felony conviction as the basis for revoking his license. It reasoned that, when the Board took its action,
“there was no longer a conviction against him.
<<* * * * *
“Nowhere in [Idaho Code § 19-2604(1)] is there language which limits or conditions the rights which defendant regains.” Manners v. State, Bd. of Veterinary Medicine, supra, 107 Idaho at 952. (Emphasis supplied.)
Recently the Idaho Court of Appeals reiterated:
“To withhold judgment after a plea of guilty protects the defendant at that time against the stigma of a conviction which may he forever avoided should the defendant conform to its terms and conditions. This creates, and rightfully so, a *606hope in the heart of the accused that he may ultimately be released under an order of probation without the stigma of a judgment of conviction. This is an incentive for complete rehabilitation and reform, one of the salutary objectives of the Act.” State v. Deitz, 120 Idaho 755, 757, 819 P2d 1155 (Idaho Ct App 1991) (quoting Ex parte Medley, 73 Idaho 474, 479, 253 P2d 794 (Idaho 1953)). (Emphasis supplied.)
The majority correctly observes that section 19-2604 does not bar every potentially adverse consequence of a dismissed conviction. In State v. Deitz, supra, the defendant had pled guilty to driving while intoxicated. He successfully completed probation, and the court entered an order dismissing the charge against him. He was arrested again for driving under the influence. The court held that, despite the dismissal of his first offense, he was still subject to the enhanced penalties for multiple DUI convictions within a five-year period. The court reasoned:
“The purpose of both the expungement statute and the enhanced DUI penalty statute is the same: to encourage rehabilitation and deter recidivism. Where these two statutes have the same purpose, we will not construe one — the expungement statute — to defeat the effects of the other — the enhanced DUI penalty statute.” State v. Deitz, supra, 120 Idaho at 757.
I conclude that “restoring [a] defendant to his civil rights,” Idaho Code § 19-2604(1), embraces Idaho’s policy of providing a clean slate for those who are demonstrably rehabilitated and that Idaho’s policy would disavow using petitioner’s convictions as the basis for denying him certification as a police officer.
If Oregon must give the same effect to the 1986 amended judgment that an Idaho court would, then BPST is barred from using petitioner’s Idaho convictions as the basis for denying him certification. BPST seeks to recognize his Idaho convictions, while ignoring the orders that amended the judgment to set them aside and dismiss the case against him. I am convinced that BPST “cannot recognize one portion of the judgment and ignore the remainder * * *. Whether the limitation should have been incorporated in the judgment is not for us to say. The fact is that the [other] court put it there and we are required to recognize it.” See Farmland *607Dairies v. Barber, 65 NY2d 51, 59, 489 NYS2d 713, 478 NE2d 1314 (NY 1985).
The United States Supreme Court has declared:
“[F]ull faith and credit does not automatically compel a forum state to subordinate its own statutory policy to a conflicting public act of another state * * *. The clash of interests in cases of this type has usually been described as a conflict between the public policies of two or more states.” Hughes v. Fetter, 341 US 609, 611, 71 S Ct 980, 95 L Ed 1212 (1950).
Oregon law requires BPST to establish “reasonable minimum standards of physical, emotional, intellectual and moral fitness” for police officers. ORS 181.640(1)(a). That law is consistent with the proclamation of the Idaho court, which has ordered that petitioner’s convictions should no longer blemish his record.
Idaho courts could still recognize petitioner’s convictions in the context of recidivist statutes, but that application is consistent with Idaho’s policy of promoting rehabilitation. The Oregon Constitution proclaims a similar polity of promoting rehabilitation:
“Laws for the punishment of crime shall be founded on the principles of reformation, and not of vindictive justice.” Or Const, Art I, § 15.
This is not a case of trying to use Idaho’s expungement law to avoid the enhanced penalties that are applicable to recidivists. See State v. Deitz, supra; see also Groseclose v. Plummer, 106 F2d 311 (9th Cir), cert den 308 US 614 (1939). Rather, this case involves a person who has amply demonstrated his moral fitness by rising above the mistakes that he made in his youth.2
BPST claims that it is concerned about petitioner’s moral fitness to be an officer. If that is truly the case, then I am in a quandary as to why BPST did not rely on OAR 259-08-010(5) when it denied his application for certification. That rule provides, in part:
*608“All law officers must be of good moral fitness as determined by a thorough background investigation:
“(a) For purposes of this standard, lack of good moral fitness means * * * acts and conduct , which would cause a reasonable person to have substantial doubts about the individual’s honesty, fairness, respect for the rights of others, or for the laws of the state and/or the nation[.]”
OAR 259-08-010(5) sets the standard for the moral fitness of a law enforcement officer. BPST did not even mention that rule when it denied petitioner certification — it could not have been very concerned about his moral fitness. If it had been, it should have relied on OAR 259-08-010(5), but that would have required a conclusion that none of the law enforcement officials who testified on petitioner’s behalf were “reasonable persons.”
Instead, BPST relied only on OAR 259-09-070(1) (a)(B) and denied him certification solely on the basis of his Idaho convictions. However, for the purposes of licensing procedures, petitioner does not have any Idaho convictions. Manners v. State, Bd. of Veterinary Medicine, supra, 107 Idaho at 952.
The dismissal of petitioner’s Idaho convictions promoted that state’s interest in encouraging rehabilitation, which is in harmony with Oregon’s policy of promoting reformation. There is no “clash of interests.” Hughes v. Fetter, supra, 341 US at 611. The goals of the two states are identical. The majority concludes that honoring the judgment of the Idaho court would interfere with “BPST’s strong interest in examining and ensuring the moral fitness of prospective police officers.” 115 Or App at 603. I disagree. Recognizing the orders issued by the Idaho District Court would promote the interests of both states. In contrast, allowing BPST to consider petitioner’s Idaho convictions undermines the interests of both states and violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution.
I dissent.

 The court set aside petitioner’s convictions and dismissed the wise against him in a 1986 order. In 1989, the court issued an order expunging the records of his convictions.

 Moreover, the majority’s reliance on United States v. Bergman, 592 F2d 533 (9th Cir 1979), is misplaced. The Full Faith and Credit Clause imposes a duty of recognition on states. It does not impose the same obligation on the federal government. See Yacovone v. Bolger, 645 F2d 1028, 1035 (DC Cir 1981).