Court Opinion

ID: 9854924
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:16:59.208414+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:36.418946
License: Public Domain

Hall, Justice,
concurring specially.
A question has been raised as to the constitutionality of the sole aggravating circumstance found by the jury in the instant case: "The offense of murder . . . was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim.” Code Ann. § 27-*3292534.1 (b) (7). Similar provisions are found in the Florida death statute1 and in the Model Penal Code.2
The United States Supreme Court upheld the Florida statute based upon the interpretation given by the Florida Supreme Court: "That Court has recognized that while it is arguable 'that all killings are atrocious,... still we believe that the Legislature intended something especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel when it authorized the death penalty for first degree murder.’ Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (1975). As a consequence, the Court has indicated that the . . . statutory provision is directed only at 'the conscienceless or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily torturous to the victim.’ State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 9 (1973). See also Alford v. State, 307 So.2d 433, 445 (1945); Halliwell v. State, 323 So.2d 557, 561 (1975). We cannot say that the provision, as so construed, provides inadequate guidance to those charged with the duty of recommending or imposing sentences in capital cases.” Proffitt v. Florida, 44 USLW 5256, 5260 (U. S. July 2, 1976).
The same construction can be given the Georgia statute, and applying that test to the facts in this case (see majority opinion), these two murders were especially outrageous, wantonly vile, horrible, inhuman and manifested exceptional depravity in the manner in which they were executed. In my opinion, this Court has not given Code Ann. § 27-2534.1 (b) (7) an open-ended construction. Gregg v. Georgia, 44 USLW 5230, 5244, n. 52 (U. S. July 2, 1976); McCorquodale v. State, 233 Ga. 369 (211 SE2d 577) (1974). In the words of the Florida Supreme Court, "the meaning of such terms is a matter of common knowledge, so that an ordinary man would not have to guess at what was intended.” State v. Dixon, supra, p. 9.

 Where the crime is "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel . . .” Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.141 (5)(b)(c) (Supp. 1976-77).

"The murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity.” Model Penal Code § 201.6(3)(b) (Proposed official draft. 1962).