Court Opinion

ID: 9885083
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 03:29:29.060182+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:43.733295
License: Public Domain

PAUL H. ANDERSON, J.
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. This case arises from the Roseau County District Court’s sua sponte reimposition of a conditional release term on appellant Thomas Calmes’ criminal sentence. The imposition of the conditional release term was upheld by the Minnesota Court of Appeals. The majority concludes that Calmes did not develop a crystallized expectation of finality in his earlier sentence and thus due process was not violated by the imposition of the statutorily mandated conditional release term. I agree with the majority that there is a due process limit to a court’s ability to modify a sentence, but conclude that Calmes did develop a reasonable crystallized expectation of finality in his sentence.
In reaching its conclusion that Calmes’ due process rights were not violated, the majority relies on the factors outlined in DeWitt v. Ventetoulo, 6 F.3d 32 (1st Cir.1993), and the fact that Calmes’ claim is not distinguishable from the due process challenges we addressed in State v. Humes, 581 N.W.2d 317 (Minn.1998), and State v. Garcia, 582 N.W.2d 879 (Minn.1998). However, in reaching this conclusion, the majority disregards the fact that the state originally informed the court that Calmes was correct that the conditional release term should not be applied to his sentence.
Calmes was originally sentenced on March 17, 1997, and his sentence did not include the statutorily mandated conditional release period. On April 10, 1997, the sentencing judge corrected this error and added a 5-year conditional release term to Calmes’ sentence. Calmes immediately opposed this addition and filed a motion to have the conditional release provision removed, asserting that “the sentence originally imposed on Mr. Calmes was properly authorized by law and the court did not have the power to increase the sentence by adding a five-year conditional release term.”
Contrary to the majority’s characterization, the state did more than just “not oppose” Calmes’ motion. The Roseau County Attorney responded to Calmes’ motion with a letter to the court stating that Calmes’ “motion is correct.” The court then rescinded the conditional release term on July 30, 1997. We decided Garcia and Humes on July 9, 1998. Calmes was released from prison on November 22, 1999, and on May 5, 2000, the court sua sponte reimposed the conditional release term on Calmes. However, in its memorandum accompanying its order reimposing the 5-year conditional release term, the court acknowledged that when the sentence was vacated on July 30, 1997, “[t]he defendant, his attorney, the State Public Defender’s Office, the Department of Corrections and the County Attorney agreed that the sentence could not be changed ⅜ *
The majority deems the state’s role in Calmes’ sentencing irrelevant by asserting that “citizens are presumed to know the law” and that due to our subsequent decisions in Humes and Garcia, “Calmes could not have developed a reasonable crystallized expectation of finality in a sentence that did not include a mandatory and non-waivable condition.” This conclusion by the majority eviscerates any due process challenge based on a crystallized expectation of finality because under the majority’s reasoning, a defendant’s expectation is *652not “reasonable” even though the state and the court both asserted in writing that the conditional release period would not be applicable. Instead, the majority presumes a defendant will continually monitor recent court opinions just in case an appellate court has modified the rules involving the application of sentence terms, thus negating the “finality” of a sentence. And, although the majority presumes this diligence of a defendant, it does not require it of the state, despite the fact that the state should also be presumed to know the law and, under the analysis adopted by the majority and the court in DeWitt, the state has some duty to diligently correct a sentencing error.
Accordingly, I conclude that Calmes developed a crystallized expectation of finality in his sentence based on (1) the state’s original position that the conditional release term should not be applied to him, (2) the court’s order vacating the conditional release term, and (3) the state’s failure to diligently correct the sentencing order following our opinions in Garcia and Humes. I would therefore hold that the conditional release term should be rescinded from Calmes’ sentence.