Court Opinion

ID: 9877480
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-27 16:05:28.895535+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:30:12.065629
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                  No. 22-2023
                           Filed September 27, 2023

PRAIRIE VIEW MANAGEMENT, INC., and ACCIDENT FUND GENERAL
INSURANCE COMPANY,
     Petitioners-Appellees,

vs.

ROSE MORAN,
     Respondent-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Celene Gogerty, Judge.

      An injured former employee appeals from judicial review of her workers’

compensation claim. AFFIRMED.

      Gary B. Nelson of Rush & Nicholson, P.L.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellant.

      Laura Ostrander of Accident Fund Holdings, Inc. d/b/a AF Group, Lansing,

Michigan, for appellee.

      Considered by Schumacher, P.J., and Chicchelly and Buller, JJ.
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BULLER, Judge.

       Rose Moran appeals from the district court’s judicial-review ruling reversing

the Workers’ Compensation Commissioner’s award of temporary and penalty

benefits. We affirm the district court, finding that Moran’s employer, Prairie View

Management, Inc. (Prairie View), offered her suitable work through the effective

date of her voluntary quit and she is not entitled to penalty benefits.

       I.     Background Facts and Proceedings

       Moran started working for Prairie View as a community service assistant in

September 2019. A few months later, on December 5, Moran emailed Prairie

View’s human resources specialist with her resignation.           She cited stress,

complaints about coworkers, and paperwork as her reasons for resigning, and she

gave an effective end date of December 20. The human resources specialist

asked Moran to submit a letter of resignation to her direct supervisor.         On

December 9, Moran slipped on a patch of ice while working for Prairie View,

injuring her right wrist and the side of her body. She submitted a formal letter of

resignation as instructed one day later, but she dated her submission December 5

and gave the same December 20 end date.

       After Moran reported the injury to Prairie View, the company modified her

duties to light work according to her restrictions.      These modifications were

effective through her last scheduled day of work on December 20. Moran never

made any written communication to Prairie View seeking to withdraw or rescind

her resignation, but she testified she verbally made a request on an unknown date.

       Moran filed a petition for workers’ compensation benefits against Prairie

View. The deputy commissioner found that Moran was entitled to penalty and
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temporary total benefits after December 20, 2019 (past her end date), based on

her attempt to rescind her resignation. The commissioner affirmed the deputy

commissioner’s decision in its entirety on intra-agency appeal.

       Prairie View sought judicial review. As relevant to this appeal, the company

disputed the commissioner’s ruling on temporary and penalty benefits. The district

court reversed the commissioner’s grant of penalty and temporary total benefits

past Moran’s end date, while affirming on all other grounds. Moran appeals.

       II.    Standard of Review

       This appeal comes before us under Iowa Code chapter 17A, the Iowa

Administrative Procedure Act. See Iowa Code § 86.26 (2019) (“Judicial review of

decisions or orders of the workers’ compensation commissioner may be sought in

accordance with chapter 17A.”). Under this chapter, we may only interfere with an

agency decision if it is erroneous under one of the enumerated grounds and a

party’s substantial rights have been prejudiced. Id. § 17A.19(10). For example,

we must reverse if the agency’s decision was “[b]ased on an erroneous

interpretation of a provision of law whose interpretation has not clearly been vested

by a provision of law in the discretion of the agency.” Id. § 17A.19(10)(c).

       To the extent our review turns on interpretation of the workers’

compensation statute, interpretation has not been vested with the agency and we

do not defer to its legal conclusions. See id. § 17A.19(10)(c), (11)(b); Ramirez-

Trujillo v. Quality Egg, L.L.C., 878 N.W.2d 759, 769 (Iowa 2016) (“The legislature

has not expressly vested the workers’ compensation commissioner with the

authority to interpret the workers’ compensation statutes in chapter 85.”).
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      On questions of fact, we look only for substantial evidence. See Iowa Code

§ 17A.19(10)(f); Meyer v. IBP, Inc., 710 N.W.2d 213, 218 (Iowa 2006).

“Substantial evidence” is “the quantity and quality of evidence that would be

deemed sufficient by a neutral, detached, and reasonable person, to establish the

fact at issue when the consequences resulting from the establishment of that fact

are understood to be serious and of great importance.”                Iowa Code

§ 17A.19(10)(f)(1).

      III.   Discussion

      Moran argues that she was entitled to penalty and temporary total benefits

after her designated end date because she wanted to keep working and attempted

to withdraw or rescind her resignation. Temporary benefits are governed by Iowa

Code section 85.33. Under that section, an injured employee is disqualified “from

receiving temporary partial, temporary total, and healing period benefits if the

employer offers ‘suitable work’ that the employee refuses.”        Neal v. Annett

Holdings, Inc., 814 N.W.2d 512, 519 (Iowa 2012) (citations omitted); Iowa Code

§ 85.33(3)(a).

      We find Schutjer v. Algona Manor Care Center, 780 N.W.2d 549 (Iowa

2010), dictates the outcome here. On the facts, the Schutjer court found an

employee who announced “I’m leaving, I quit,” after her work-related injury was not

eligible for temporary benefits. 780 N.W.2d at 553, 558–59. On the law, the

Schutjer court clarified that the relevant inquiry is (1) whether the employee was

offered suitable work, and (2) whether the employee refused the suitable work. Id.

at 559. The Schutjer court then held the second prong can be met through a
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voluntary quit. Id. (finding a voluntary quit was a refusal to work “on that date and

any future date”).

       We conclude, on the facts here and applying the law set forth in Schutjer,

that Prairie View offered Moran suitable light work for the duration of her

employment up to the effective date of her voluntary quit. See id. The district court

correctly determined Moran was not owed temporary total benefits.

       At first blush, Moran’s attempt to rescind her resignation appears to be a

thorny factual question. But the law is clear. As we have recognized in a published

decision,

       An attempt to withdraw the resignation prior to [the effective] date is
       a request for reemployment. The employer may choose to return to
       status quo by rehiring the employee, or accepting a retraction of the
       notice. However, the employer is not required to accept the
       employee’s request to withdraw her resignation.

Langley v. Emp. Appeal Bd., 490 N.W.2d 300, 303 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992) (citations

and quotation marks omitted). In other words, a resignation is a voluntary quit and

an employee’s unilateral attempt to rescind a resignation does not entitle that

employee to benefits. See id. Applying the law to this case, Prairie View was

entitled to, and did, decline to re-hire Moran or otherwise honor her attempted

withdrawal or rescission of resignation.      By offering suitable work to Moran

between the date of injury and her self-selected last day of employment, Prairie

View fulfilled its statutory obligations and thus did not owe temporary total benefits.

See Iowa Code § 85.33(3)(a); Schutjer, 780 N.W.2d at 559.

       The two legal authorities relied upon by the commissioner do not persuade

us otherwise. The first case is an administrative decision in which a resignation

based on retaliatory conduct did not disqualify the employee from receiving
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benefits. See Lange v. Crestview Acres, File No. 5002953, 2005 WL 3730686,

at *5 (Iowa Workers’ Comp. Comm’n Dec. 27, 2005). Assuming without deciding

there is value in considering this agency order predating Schutjer, it is

distinguishable: there is no claim of retaliation here or in Schutjer. The other case,

from our supreme court, involves an employer who did not offer suitable work to

the employee, which is easily distinguishable from the facts here, as Prairie View

offered Moran appropriate work through her last day of employment. Neal, 814

N.W.2d at 525. Because neither of the authorities relied on by the commissioner

are on-point, we agree with the district court that the commissioner erred in its

application of the law.

       We note our holding—that an employee is not entitled to temporary total

benefits after a voluntary quit—is consistent with the public policy underlying the

statute. “The primary purpose of the workers’ compensation statute is to benefit

the worker and his or her dependents, insofar as statutory requirements permit.”

McSpadden v. Big Ben Coal Co., 288 N.W.2d 181, 188 (Iowa 1980). Within the

umbrella of benefits offered by the statute, “the various categories of workers’

compensation benefits have distinct purposes.” Evenson v. Winnebago Indus.,

Inc., 881 N.W.2d 360, 373 (Iowa 2016).

       “Permanent benefits and temporary benefits are very different.” Mannes v.

Fleetguard, Inc., 770 N.W.2d 826, 830 (Iowa 2009). Permanent benefits are meant

to “compensate either a disability to a scheduled member or a loss in earning

capacity (industrial disability).”   Id.   And temporary benefits are meant to

“compensate the employee for lost wages until he or she is able to return to work.”

Id.   More specifically, the purpose of temporary total benefits is “to partially
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reimburse the employee for the loss of earnings while the employee is recuperating

from the condition the employee has suffered.” Clark v. Vicorp Rests., Inc., 696

N.W.2d 596, 604–05 (Iowa 2005) (citing Arthur C. Hedberg, Jr. & Phillip

Vonderhaar, An Overview of the Iowa Workers’ Compensation Act, 30 Drake L.

Rev. 809, 825 (1981)). “Section 85.33 clearly defines the purpose of temporary

partial benefits and subsection (4) sets forth a formula for calculating temporary

partial benefits, based on actual reduction of income. Thus, as a matter of law,

temporary partial benefits cannot be awarded where there has been no reduction

in income." Mannes, 770 N.W.2d at 831. There is no reduction in income past the

effective date of a voluntary quit because, for an employee to be awarded

temporary benefits, the claimant needs to offer “direct evidence of wage loss.” Id.

at 830. When an employee would no longer receive wages past the effective date

of a voluntary quit, there is no loss of wages causally linked to the injury. Cf. Villela

v. Lund Food Holdings, Inc., No. 06-0367, 2007 WL 1827467, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App.

June 27, 2007) (noting that, for purposes of temporary partial benefits, the

reduction in earning ability must be a result of the injury and not a result of another

reason).

        Finally, because we conclude Moran is not owed temporary total benefits,

we also agree with the district court that the commissioner erred in ordering penalty

benefits. See Gilbert v. USF Holland, Inc., 637 N.W.2d 194, 199 (Iowa 2001)

(“[W]hen an employee’s claim for benefits is fairly debatable based on a good faith

dispute over the employee’s factual or legal entitlement to benefits, an award of

penalty benefits is not appropriate under the statute.”). We affirm on that issue as

well.
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      IV.    Disposition

      Applying precedent and considering the workers’ compensation act’s

purpose, we reject Moran’s arguments on appeal and affirm the district court.

      AFFIRMED.