Court Opinion

ID: 9918499
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-13 21:00:26.39024+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:01:00.390297
License: Public Domain

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                                               PUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                                No. 22-4442

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                     Plaintiff – Appellee,

        v.

        ANTHONY JAMES GROSS,

                     Defendant – Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at
        Asheville. Max O. Cogburn, Jr., District Judge. (1:21−cr−00046−MOC−WCM−1)

        Argued: December 6, 2023                                       Decided: January 12, 2024

        Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

        Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote the opinion, in which Judge
        Niemeyer and Judge Agee joined.

        ARGUED: Melissa Susanne Baldwin, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN
        NORTH CAROLINA, INC., Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellant. Anthony Joseph
        Enright, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina,
        for Appellee. ON BRIEF: John G. Baker, Federal Public Defender, FEDERAL
        DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA, INC., Charlotte, North Carolina, for
        Appellant. Dena J. King, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
        ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
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        WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:

               Anthony Gross pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm after he shot at

        and injured a man in his family’s driveway. The district court sentenced Gross to 63

        months’ imprisonment and 3 years of supervised release. Gross challenges two aspects of

        the court’s Sentencing Guidelines calculation: its application of a sentencing enhancement

        for causing “serious bodily injury” and its cross-reference to the aggravated assault

        guideline. At the core of Gross’s appeal is his contention that we should review the district

        court’s finding of serious bodily injury de novo.

               We disagree. To adopt the de novo standard here would turn law in a direction

        inhospitable to factfinders. The district court’s finding that Gross caused serious bodily

        injury was an application of the Guidelines that turned on a question of fact, and thus we

        review it for clear error. In so doing, we find that the district court did not clearly err in its

        Guidelines calculation and affirm its judgment.

                                                        I.

                                                       A.

               On the morning of May 17, 2021, Anthony Gross, his parents, and his girlfriend

        were at his family’s home in Marshall, North Carolina. Gross’s girlfriend told the others

        that a man whom they had known for years, A.C., had sexually assaulted her the night

        before. The family had been letting A.C. stay over while he went through a period of

        addiction and homelessness, and nearly everything he owned was at their house. A.C.

        himself, however, was nowhere to be found.

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               That soon changed. Around 10:00 am, A.C. drove up on a motorcycle, parked on

        the family’s driveway, and pushed his helmet up onto his head. Gross’s mom saw A.C. in

        the driveway and told him he needed to leave. A.C. retorted that he had a right to retrieve

        his belongings. Gross’s father then came out to talk to A.C., who remained perched on his

        bike, refusing to leave.

               Gross walked out onto the porch, shirtless and holding a long gun. A.C. was

        undeterred. He stayed on his bike and demanded that he be allowed to retrieve his property.

        Gross stepped off the porch and, gun in hand, walked down the driveway towards A.C. He

        stopped about three car lengths away, raised his firearm, and fired a shot. According to

        A.C.’s testimony, Gross had said he was going to shoot A.C. and pointed the gun at him

        before firing. The shot hit the ground, causing a puff of dust to rise up. Three metal

        fragments—either from the shot, the motorcycle, or another nearby object—hit A.C. near

        his right eye. He began bleeding and, once he got his wits about him, ran up a hill into the

        woods to take refuge and find help. He eventually found a neighbor who took him in and

        called 911.

               While waiting for emergency services to arrive, A.C. felt that “the pain was getting

        pretty bad” and was “nervous,” “nauseous,” and “shocked.” J.A. 84. Paramedics picked

        him up and drove him in an ambulance to the emergency room at Mission Hospital in

        Asheville. A.C. initially told the paramedics that he was not in pain, potentially due to the

        “adrenaline” that had “kicked in” when he was shot. Id. at 82. Indeed, once he arrived at

        the hospital, A.C. told doctors that he was in pain, and he received fentanyl and Benadryl

        to quell it. The doctors also examined his eye and took a CAT scan. The scan revealed

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        three metal fragments, ranging from 1 to 3 millimeters wide, lodged near his eye. The

        doctors did not remove the fragments to avoid exacerbating the bruising and swelling

        around his eye. One doctor expressed surprise that A.C. had suffered a gunshot wound

        because his eye was fully functional and his injuries were “superficial.” Id. at 116.

               A.C. was not admitted as a patient at the hospital, did not require surgery, and left

        the emergency room after a few hours. But that night, he went to Pardee Hospital in

        Hendersonville for a second opinion, as he was still experiencing “real sharp pain.” Id. at

        90. He testified that it felt “like something was poking [him] in [his] eye” and that light

        was affecting his vision to the point where he “couldn’t really see.” Id. When asked to

        compare the pain to previous experiences, A.C. said it was “[p]robably one of the worst

        pains I [have] had.” Id. at 84.

               In the following days, A.C. continued to have “real sharp pain in the back of [his]

        eye.” Id. at 102. While his visible injuries dissipated within two weeks, A.C. reported that

        he has experienced chronic sinus problems since the incident. He testified that his sinuses

        were “constantly draining . . . like [he has] an infection,” id. at 92, and speculated that this

        could be because of an allergy to the metal fragments that remained near his eye. A forensic

        pathologist who provided expert testimony for the defense countered that the fragments

        were unlikely to cause congestion because they were located “nowhere near” his sinuses.

        Id. at 118. A.C. testified, however, that he remained “[k]ind of shocked about the whole

        situation” and was struggling to process the ordeal emotionally. Id. at 93.

                                                      B.

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               This shooting was not Gross’s first encounter with the law. He had already been

        convicted of numerous criminal offenses, including six felonies. And on June 1, 2021, a

        grand jury in the Western District of North Carolina indicted Gross with knowing and

        unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Gross

        pleaded guilty on November 17, 2021. He admitted to being a felon in unlawful possession

        of a firearm and agreed to the government’s statement of facts.

               Gross was separately charged in North Carolina court with possession of a firearm

        by a felon, N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 14-415.1, and felonious assault with a deadly weapon

        with intent to kill or inflicting serious injury, id. at § 14-32.

               In preparation for the sentencing hearing, the U.S. Probation Office created a

        presentencing investigation report (PSR) which computed the Sentencing Guidelines range

        for Gross’s offense. The PSR calculated the total offense level by applying a cross-

        reference and two sentencing enhancements. First, because Gross used the firearm in

        connection with the commission of another offense (North Carolina felonious assault with

        a deadly weapon with intent to kill or inflicting serious injury), the PSR cross-referenced

        the guideline of the most analogous substantive federal offense (U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2

        aggravated assault) to find a base offense level of 14. See U.S.S.G. §§ 2K2.1(c)(1), 2X1.1,

        2A2.2(a). Second, the PSR added 5 offense levels because Gross discharged the firearm.

        See id. at § 2A2.2(b)(2)(A). Third, the PSR added an additional 5 offense levels because it

        found Gross caused “serious bodily injury.” Id. at § 2A2.2(b)(3)(B). Upon reaching an

        offense level of 24 based on the cross-reference and the two enhancements, the PSR

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        included a 3-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility under § 3E1.1 to reach a total

        offense level of 21.

               Next, the PSR found Gross’s criminal history category to be VI, the highest possible

        option. Based on the total offense level of 21 and the criminal history category of VI, the

        PSR determined that the Guidelines imprisonment range was 77 to 96 months.

               Gross submitted written objections to two elements of the PSR’s Guidelines

        calculation and renewed these objections at the July 19, 2022 sentencing hearing. First,

        Gross argued that the court should not apply a sentencing enhancement for serious bodily

        injury because he only caused ordinary bodily injury. Second, he claimed that the court

        should not cross-reference the aggravated assault guideline because he neither intended to

        cause bodily injury nor caused serious bodily injury. See U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2 cmt. n.1

        (defining aggravated assault as “felonious assault that involved (A) a dangerous weapon

        with intent to cause bodily injury (i.e., not merely to frighten) with that weapon; [or] (B)

        serious bodily injury”). Gross called a forensic pathologist with expertise in gunshot

        wounds as an expert witness to support his claim that only ordinary bodily injury occurred.

        Additionally, Gross argued for a downward variance because he had a traumatic brain

        injury that affected his impulsivity at the time of the shooting and was amenable to

        treatment.

               The government countered that the preponderance of evidence showed that Gross

        caused serious bodily injury and thus both sentencing enhancements should apply. It called

        A.C. as a witness to substantiate its argument that he had sustained serious bodily injury.

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               After hearing from the parties and their witnesses, the district court overruled

        Gross’s objections. It stated, “the injuries as described with regard to the eye and to what

        the victim had, the fact that we have hospital records backing it up and him going to the

        hospital in the ambulance, all those things together with the government putting that

        evidence on is going to be enough.” J.A. 133. The court went on to “find that th[e injury]

        is a serious injury. It’s not on the high side of arm amputation or something like that, but

        it’s serious and it could ultimately cause problems.” Id. at 133–34. It later reiterated that

        A.C. “suffered . . . serious bodily injury,” id. at 140, and observed that the injury “meets

        the test of serious injury,” id. at 141. The court also determined that “the cross-reference

        does apply.” Id. at 134. It thus adopted the PSR’s Guidelines calculation, finding that the

        range was “properly calculated at 77 to 96 months.” Id.

               The court did, however, credit Gross’s request for a downward variance due to his

        brain injury. It applied a 2-level reduction to the total offense level, bringing Gross’s

        Guidelines range to 63 to 78 months. The court then sentenced Gross to 63 months’

        imprisonment and 3 years of supervised release. Gross timely appealed.

                                                      II.

               Gross contends that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the court

        failed to calculate his Guidelines range correctly. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38,

        51 (2007) (stating that improper calculation of the Guidelines range renders a sentence

        procedurally unreasonable). In so arguing, Gross relies upon the same two objections to

        the Guidelines calculation that he raised below. First, he claims that the district court erred

        in applying the 5-level enhancement for serious bodily injury because the record only

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        supported a finding of ordinary bodily injury. Second, he claims that the court’s findings

        did not support its cross-reference to the aggravated assault guideline.

                                                     A.

               We start with the standard of review, which is a primary point of contention between

        the parties in this case. This court reviews a challenge to a sentence’s procedural

        reasonableness under a “‘deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.’” United States v.

        McCain, 974 F.3d 506, 515 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 41). Both parties

        acknowledge that, when assessing a Guidelines calculation under this standard, we review

        “the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.”

        United States v. Pena, 952 F.3d 503, 507 (4th Cir. 2020). But they disagree about whether

        the application of the Guidelines to the facts of the case should be reviewed for clear error

        or de novo. Gross posits that the Guidelines application here “turns on a legal

        interpretation,” and thus “de novo review is appropriate.” United States v. Dodd, 770 F.3d

        306, 309 (4th Cir. 2014). The government, on the other hand, argues that a district court’s

        decision to apply an enhancement for serious bodily injury is reviewed for clear error. See

        United States v. Saint Louis, 889 F.3d 145, 158 (4th Cir. 2018).

               We hold that a district court’s finding that a defendant caused serious bodily injury

        is reviewed for clear error when the district court applied the correct legal standard, as it

        did here. The district court used the Guidelines to identify the proper standard of law: that

        it should increase the total offense level by 5 levels if it found that the victim sustained

        serious bodily injury. U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2(b)(3)(B). It then applied this legal standard to its

        factual findings to determine that Gross’s shooting caused A.C. to sustain “serious bodily

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        injury.” J.A. 140. The court concluded that “the injury that was suffered . . . meets the test

        of serious injury,” id. at 141, after it considered “the injuries as described” by the victim

        and the supporting “hospital records.” Id. at 133. Because this application of the correct

        legal standard turned primarily on questions of fact, we review it for clear error. See United

        States v. Reed, 75 F.4th 396, 404–05 (4th Cir. 2023); United States v. Adepoju, 756 F.3d

        250, 256–57 (4th Cir. 2014); United States v. Steffen, 741 F.3d 411, 414 (4th Cir. 2013);

        United States v. ReBrook, 58 F.3d 961, 969 (4th Cir. 1995).

               Gross cites United States v. Lewis, 18 F.4th 743 (4th Cir. 2021), for the proposition

        that sentencing enhancements based on findings of bodily injury under § 2A2.2(b)(3) are

        reviewed de novo. In Lewis, this court conducted de novo review to find that a 2-level

        sentencing enhancement for ordinary bodily injury was procedurally unreasonable. Id. at

        750. But there, the district court had disregarded the Fourth Circuit’s legal standard for

        bodily injury as set out in United Sates v. Lancaster, 6 F.3d 208, 209–10 (4th Cir. 1993)

        (per curiam). After “guess[ing]” that the victim had suffered a minor concussion, the court

        found that the bodily injury sentencing enhancement applied because the victim “just ha[d]

        to have an injury that caused him to seek medical attention, and he did.” Lewis, 18 F.4th at

        747. This test contradicted the legal standard established in Lancaster, which required a

        district court, in determining that a defendant caused bodily injury, to make specific factual

        findings beyond merely stating that the injury caused the victim to seek medical attention.

        See Lewis, 18 F.4th at 748–51 (citing Lancaster, 6 F.3d at 209–11 & n.2). Because the

        district court in Lewis fashioned its own legal standard that was at odds with circuit

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        precedent for determining what type of injury qualified for a sentencing enhancement, its

        decision was appropriately reviewed de novo.

               Unlike in Lewis, the district court here made no statements that contradicted existing

        circuit precedent on the definition of serious bodily injury. Nor did the court formulate any

        rules of general application for serious bodily injury. Rather, it merely explained why its

        factual findings established that the legal standard for serious bodily injury had been met.

        We therefore review for clear error. See United States v. Saint Louis, 889 F.3d 145, 158

        (4th Cir. 2018) (applying clear error standard in upholding district court’s application of

        sentencing enhancement for serious bodily injury); United States v. Maynard, No. 22-4178

        at *12 (4th Cir. 2024) (slip op.) (same); Buford v. United States, 532 U.S. 59, 64–66 (2001)

        (holding that a Guidelines application decision should be reviewed deferentially on

        appeal).

               Gross further contends that the district court did not apply the correct legal standard

        because it did not explicitly reference the Guidelines commentary that sets out three

        categories of serious bodily injuries. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(M). We agree that the

        Guidelines commentary is generally authoritative. United States v. Moses, 23 F.4th 347,

        357 (4th Cir. 2022) (citing Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993)). But we reject

        the notion that a district court must mechanically tick through the categories of serious

        bodily injury in the Guidelines commentary or else face de novo scrutiny. Absent evidence

        to the contrary, we presume that the district court knew the law and applied it in making

        its decisions. See United States v. Ali, 991 F.3d 561, 570 (4th Cir. 2021). Because the court

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        here did not state it was relying on a rule of general application that differed from the one

        set out in the Guidelines, we refuse to assume it disregarded the correct legal standard.

               It makes good sense for us to exhibit due deference when reviewing a district court’s

        finding of serious bodily injury. Too often appellate panels are dragged down into second-

        guessing district courts’ fact-intensive applications of the Guidelines de novo, emboldened

        by appellants’ assurances that we are merely resolving questions of law. But determining

        whether a victim’s wounds satisfy the definition of serious bodily injury is an application

        of the Guidelines that “depend[s] on an evaluation and weighing of the factual details, even

        though the details themselves may have been undisputed.” United States v. McVey, 752

        F.3d 606, 610 (4th Cir. 2014). As we noted in Lancaster,

               [Whether an injury qualifies for a sentencing enhancement] should be
               determined by a very factually-specific inquiry which takes into account a
               multitude of factors, some articulable and some more intangible, that are
               observable in hearing the evidence presented on the injury. Because the
               district court hears this evidence, it is by far best-situated to assess these
               myriad factors and determine whether a “significant injury” has occurred.
               We, as the court of appeals, are in a far less advantageous position to make
               this determination as we have before us only the written record and this
               record is often inadequate in conveying many of these factors. As a result of
               our position, our ability to review the district court’s determination of
               whether a “significant injury” has occurred is quite limited and we will
               disturb it only when the record reveals that the district court clearly erred.

        6 F.3d at 210 (upholding ordinary bodily injury finding on clear error review).

               The essentially factual determination of whether serious bodily injury occurred thus

        is reviewed for clear error, see Saint Louis, 889 F.3d at 158, except where the district court

        explicitly identified and applied the wrong legal standard, see Lewis, 18 F.4th at 750–51.

        See also United States v. Gasca-Ruiz, 852 F.3d 1167, 1173 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc)

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        (holding that an application of the serious bodily injury enhancement should be reviewed

        with deference because “[d]istrict courts are better situated than appellate courts to make

        the fact-specific determinations inherent in virtually all guideline-application decisions”).

        Clear error review is particularly appropriate where, as here, the district court heard directly

        from the victim who suffered the injury. To hold otherwise would be to erode the authority

        that district courts have to hear evidence, find facts, and draw inferences from them.

               Because we are reviewing for clear error, we uphold the district court’s

        determination so long as it was “plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety.”

        United States v. Ferebee, 957 F.3d 406, 417 (4th Cir. 2020). But if we are “left with the

        definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed,” we reverse and remand

        for resentencing. United States v. Dugger, 485 F.3d 236, 239 (4th Cir. 2007).

                                                      B.

               We hold that the district court did not clearly err in finding that Gross caused A.C.

        to sustain serious bodily injury. The Guidelines commentary defines “serious bodily

        injury” as an injury (1) “involving extreme physical pain”; (2) involving “the protracted

        impairment of a function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty”; or (3) “requiring

        medical interventions such as surgery, hospitalization, or physical rehabilitation.” U.S.S.G.

        § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(M). Because “this definition uses the disjunctive ‘or,’ the Guideline

        applies where the victim suffered any one of these ailments.” United States v. Flores, 974

        F.3d 763, 765 (6th Cir. 2020). Therefore, “[e]xtreme physical pain” is enough to sustain a

        finding of “serious bodily injury,” even if the victim “did not seek out medical intervention

        and did not suffer protracted impairment.” Saint Louis, 889 F.3d at 158.

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               Here, the district court was within its discretion to find that A.C. sustained an injury

        involving extreme physical pain. A.C. emphasized the painfulness of the injury throughout

        his testimony at the sentencing hearing. He recounted that it caused “real sharp pain” that

        felt “like something was poking [him] in [his] eye.” J.A. 90. And he assessed that it was

        “[p]robably one of the worst pains I [have] had.” Id. at 84. Moreover, the medical records

        from Mission Hospital established that A.C. was given fentanyl—a potent pain

        management drug—to mitigate the pain he experienced while in the emergency room.

               Gross contends that the evidence cannot substantiate a finding that A.C. suffered

        extreme physical pain. He posits that A.C. denied he was in pain when he was in the

        ambulance, that the expert forensic pathologist asserted that A.C.’s injury would merely

        cause “some pain or discomfort,” id. at 125, and that the hospital records referred to the

        injury as “superficial,” id. at 204. But the district court was best-positioned to evaluate and

        weigh these factual details. See Lancaster, 6 F.3d at 210. Indeed, Gross raised these

        arguments below, and the district court rejected them. We therefore conclude that the court

        did not clearly err in finding that A.C. suffered extreme physical pain—and, hence, serious

        bodily injury—when a gunshot caused three metal fragments to lodge near his eye,

        resulting in “[p]robably one of the worst pains” he had ever experienced. J.A. 84.

               A.C.’s testimony of a protracted impairment to his nasal function also supported the

        court’s finding of serious bodily injury. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(M). A.C. recounted

        that, since the injury, his sinuses have been “constantly draining . . . like [he had] an

        infection.” J.A. 92. The defense’s expert witness questioned the causal relationship

        between A.C.’s congestion and the injury. But it was within the court’s discretion to assess

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        that A.C.’s sinus issue resulted from the injury. And this ongoing issue could constitute a

        “protracted impairment” sufficient to establish serious bodily injury under U.S.S.G. §

        1B1.1 cmt. n.1(M).

               Gross vigorously disputes all this, arguing that the district court strayed from its

        factfinding role on the way to what was a legal conclusion. But drawing inferences from

        primary facts does not elevate the standard of review to one of de novo. Take the primary

        fact that three metal fragments were lodged near the victim’s eye. Inferring that those

        fragments made A.C.’s testimony of extreme physical pain more credible was well within

        the sentencing court’s observational competency. Credibility findings are but another

        species of factual determination, see Merzbacher v. Shearin, 706 F.3d 356, 367 (4th Cir.

        2013), and inferences drawn from primary facts to the ultimate fact of serious bodily injury

        afford no basis for a diminution of appellate deference. They are all part of the family of

        facts and, as such, must be treated by reviewing courts accordingly.

               The upshot is that the record provided ample evidence for the district court to find

        that the victim sustained serious bodily injury as defined in the Guidelines commentary.

        We therefore cannot state that the court’s judgment was clearly erroneous.

                                                    C.

               Because we affirm the district court’s finding of serious bodily injury, we also

        affirm its decision to cross-reference the aggravated assault guideline. Gross conceded at

        oral argument that his challenge to the cross-reference rests on his claim that he did not

        inflict serious bodily injury—a claim we resolved against him. We therefore reject Gross’s

        challenge to the cross-reference.

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               In doing so, we note that the district court correctly applied the cross-reference

        provision in U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(c)(1). “[W]hen a felon in possession of a firearm uses that

        firearm in connection with another offense, . . . the court must apply the offense level for

        that other offense, thereby cross-referencing it to determine the ultimate sentence,” if the

        other offense’s level “is higher than the offense level under § 2K2.1.” United States v.

        Burns, 781 F.3d 688, 691 (4th Cir. 2015) (citing U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(c)(1)). This requires the

        court to determine (1) what that “other offense” is and (2) its offense level under the

        Guidelines. When the other offense is not in the Guidelines’ Statutory Index, the court must

        cross-reference “the most analogous guideline.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2(a); see also id. at

        §§ 2X1.1 cmt. n.3; 2X5.1.

               Here, the PSR identified the other offense as North Carolina felonious assault with

        a deadly weapon with intent to kill or inflicting serious injury—the crime that Gross was

        charged with in state court. See N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 14-32. Because this state law offense

        is not in the Statutory Index, the PSR concluded that the aggravated assault guideline in

        U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2 was the most analogous guideline. Upon determining that the aggravated

        assault guideline resulted in a higher offense level, the PSR cross-referenced it.

               Gross objected to the cross-reference, and the district court heard arguments from

        the parties about whether it should adopt it. Ultimately, the court chose to adopt the PSR’s

        finding “that the cross-reference does apply.” J.A. 134. It was well within the court’s

        discretion to do so because the aggravated assault guideline—which defines aggravated

        assault as “felonious assault that involved . . . serious bodily injury,” U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2 cmt.

        n.1—was the most analogous guideline to North Carolina felonious assault with a deadly

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        weapon inflicting serious injury, N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 14-32. Moreover, because we

        upheld the district court’s finding of serious bodily injury, Gross’s claim that his conduct

        did not justify the cross-reference to the aggravated assault guideline is meritless.

                                                     III.

               Courts opine often on separation of powers. But separation of functions has its own

        importance. To leave de novo review loose and on the prowl is to devour the tasks that

        district courts do best. The trial court found the pertinent fact here, and we readily affirm

        its judgment.

                                                                                         AFFIRMED

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