Court Opinion

ID: 9657411
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:25:14.167175+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:44.844431
License: Public Domain

LEVINE, Justice,
dissenting.
I agree with all of the majority opinion except the part that seems to apply a hybrid harmless error-plain error rule in order to craft a limited remedy. I think the majority is saying that the respondent had a right to be present, kind of, but the expert evidence makes a different result unlikely had the respondent been present, so respondent’s exclusion was not reversible error (i.e., it was harmless error) and, besides, respondent’s attorney didn’t object to respondent’s exclusion lie., there was a waiver, but there was also a kind of plain error], so it’s not reversible error. But, respondent gets to testify, if he wishes.
I am not sure that the harmless error doctrine is applicable at all to the violation of a respondent’s right to be present at his commitment hearing. Cf. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 106 S.Ct. 617, 88 L.Ed.2d 598 (1986); McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984). Even if harmless error does apply, I believe the respondent’s exclusion was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, see Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). Exclusion from one’s continuing treatment and forced medication hearing is not qualitatively or quantitatively comparable to a de minimis delay in a continuing treatment hearing, and so the majority’s reliance on In Interest of L.L., 482 N.W.2d 854 (N.D.1992), is not convincing. Respondent’s exclusion from his hearing is not the procedural “trifle” we addressed in the L.L. case, and because respondent’s presence at the hearing is a substantial right, counsel’s failure to object to it is not a waiver because the exclusion is plain error. See Rule 61, NDRCivP. To comport with “substantial justice,” a new trial should be held. Id.
I respectfully dissent.