Court Opinion

ID: 9376973
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-06 16:01:10.801721+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:10.804307
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                             For the Eighth Circuit
                         ___________________________

                                 No. 22-2005
                         ___________________________

                              United States of America

                                        Plaintiff - Appellee

                                          v.

                                         D.B.

                                     Defendant - Appellant
                                   ____________

                      Appeal from United States District Court
                     for the District of South Dakota - Western
                                    ____________

                            Submitted: October 20, 2022
                               Filed: March 6, 2023
                                  ____________

Before KELLY, WOLLMAN, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
                          ____________

KELLY, Circuit Judge.

       D.B., a juvenile and an enrolled member of the Oglala Sioux Tribe, pleaded
guilty to one count of first-degree burglary pursuant to a plea agreement. The district
court1 sentenced him to 12 months of official detention followed by a three-year

      1
       The Honorable Jeffrey L. Viken, United States District Judge for the District
of South Dakota.
term of juvenile delinquent supervision. D.B. appeals, arguing that his federal
juvenile delinquency proceedings should have been dismissed because he was not
afforded a speedy trial as required by the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act (FJDA),
18 U.S.C. § 5036, and that his sentence is unreasonable. We affirm.

                                         I.

       The events giving rise to this case occurred near Porcupine, South Dakota, on
the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation. On the night of July 20, 2021, then-16-year-old
D.B. and another juvenile, who was armed with a knife, forced their way into the
residence shared by Chance Rowland and his mother Wanda. A violent scuffle
ensued. Once inside, D.B. “pushed” Wanda “to the floor,” allowing the other
juvenile to attack Chance and stab him multiple times in the back and head. D.B.
later admitted that at the time he entered the Rowlands’ residence, he “knew an
assault was going to take place.”

       A Juvenile Information was filed in the District of South Dakota charging
D.B. with first-degree burglary, assault with a dangerous weapon, and assault
resulting in serious bodily injury.2 See 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (providing that juvenile
delinquency proceedings in federal court “shall proceed by information”). D.B. was
subsequently arrested and arraigned in federal court on July 30. He was ordered
detained until an August 2 detention hearing. Following that hearing, the magistrate
judge ordered that D.B. remain in custody pending trial. The district court scheduled
D.B.’s trial for August 31. However, after D.B.’s counsel filed a motion to suppress
on August 16, the district court entered the following order: “Based on the interests

      2
        D.B. was charged in federal court pursuant to the Major Crimes Act, 18
U.S.C. § 1153, which authorizes “exclusive” federal jurisdiction over certain felony
offenses committed by “[a]ny Indian . . . against the person or property of another
Indian or other person . . . within the Indian country.” He was also charged as a
juvenile under the FJDA, which provides various procedural safeguards to juveniles
who are alleged to have committed a “violation of a law of the United States” prior
to turning 18. 18 U.S.C. § 5031; see id. § 5032.

                                         -2-
of justice and 18 U.S.C. § 5036, the deadlines and court trial are canceled pending
resolution of [the] Motion to Suppress.”

       On September 3, D.B.’s counsel filed a motion asking the district court “to
consider releasing” D.B. “on pretrial release to a third party custodian.” A hearing
was held on September 16, and the magistrate judge ordered that D.B. be released
that day to live with his mother, subject to several release conditions. By that point,
D.B. had been in federal custody for 49 days.

       D.B.’s counsel later moved to dismiss D.B.’s case on the ground that D.B. had
not been tried within 30 days of being detained by federal authorities, as required by
the FJDA. See 18 U.S.C. § 5036. But before the district court addressed the motion
to dismiss, D.B. entered into a written plea agreement, pursuant to which he agreed
to plead guilty to first-degree burglary. In exchange, the United States agreed to
dismiss the two remaining counts and to recommend that the district court sentence
D.B. to probation. D.B.’s plea agreement expressly provided that he “agree[d] to
waive any rights to a speedy trial under either the United States Constitution or the
Speedy Trial Act.” He also “waive[d] all defenses and his right to appeal any non-
jurisdictional issues.”

      A change-of-plea hearing was held on December 7. At the hearing, D.B.
confirmed that he had read his plea agreement and understood its terms. D.B.
acknowledged that the parties’ recommendation that he be sentenced to probation
was not binding on the district court. And he acknowledged that, with limited
exceptions, he was waiving his appeal rights. The district court ultimately accepted
D.B.’s guilty plea, found him to be a juvenile delinquent, and denied his still-pending
motion to dismiss as moot.

       D.B. was back in custody at the time of his change-of-plea hearing for having
violated the conditions of his pretrial release. D.B. was re-released that day subject
to amended release conditions. But he was arrested again less than two weeks later
for violating his court-imposed curfew, and his bond was revoked on December 22.
                                         -3-
On February 10, 2022, D.B. was transferred from detention to an adolescent care
center to receive inpatient substance abuse treatment. He was returned to detention
a few weeks later, however, after he assaulted another juvenile patient.

       D.B. remained in custody until his disposition hearing on April 28, 2022.3 At
the hearing, the district court found that had D.B. been prosecuted as an adult, the
applicable Guidelines range for his burglary offense would have been 30–37 months
of imprisonment.4 After noting D.B.’s multiple violations of his release conditions,
the district court rejected the parties’ joint request for a probationary sentence and
sentenced D.B. to 12 months of official detention followed by 36 months of juvenile
delinquent supervision. 5

      D.B. appeals, raising two issues. He first argues that his federal juvenile
delinquency proceedings should have been dismissed under the FJDA’s speedy trial
provision. See 18 U.S.C. § 5036. In the alternative, he contends that the sentence
imposed by the district court is unreasonable. We address each issue in turn.

      3
       The FJDA provides that after a district court “finds a juvenile to be a juvenile
delinquent,” it must hold a “disposition hearing,” during which the court “may
suspend the findings of juvenile delinquency, place [the juvenile defendant] on
probation, or commit [the defendant] to official detention,” the last of which “may
include a term of juvenile delinquent supervision to follow.” 18 U.S.C. § 5037(a).
The “disposition hearing” is effectively a sentencing hearing.
      4
       The Sentencing Guidelines “do not apply to a defendant sentenced under the
[FJDA].” United States Sentencing Guidelines § 1B1.12 (2021). But “the maximum
of the guideline range . . . applicable to an otherwise similarly situated adult
defendant” can, in some circumstances, set the maximum term of official detention
that can be imposed on a juvenile delinquent under the FJDA. 18 U.S.C.
§ 5037(c)(1)(B).
      5
      The district court ordered that D.B. be credited with 166 days of time served
toward his 12-month sentence of official detention.
                                        -4-
                                         II.

       The FJDA governs the treatment of juveniles who are charged in federal court
with violating federal criminal laws. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (setting forth procedures
for trying “[a] juvenile alleged to have committed an act of juvenile delinquency”);
id. § 5031 (defining “juvenile delinquency” as “the violation of a law of the United
States committed by a person prior to his eighteenth birthday which would have been
a crime if committed by an adult”). The Act “creates a separate system of criminal
justice for juveniles to ‘shield’ them from the ordinary criminal justice system and
to provide them with ‘protective treatment not available to adults accused of the
same crimes.’” Jonah R. v. Carmona, 446 F.3d 1000, 1010 (9th Cir. 2006) (cleaned
up) (quoting United States v. Doe, 53 F.3d 1081, 1083 (9th Cir. 1995)). Among the
safeguards provided by the FJDA is the requirement that juvenile defendants in
federal custody be afforded a speedy trial. See 18 U.S.C. § 5036; see also United
States v. Sealed Juv. 1, 192 F.3d 488, 491–92 (5th Cir. 1999) (“The administration
of juvenile justice in a[n] expeditious manner is a paramount interest under the
[FJDA’s] speedy trial provision.”).

      The FJDA’s speedy trial provision provides as follows:

      If an alleged delinquent who is in detention pending trial is not brought
      to trial within thirty days from the date upon which such detention was
      begun, the information shall be dismissed on motion of the alleged
      delinquent or at the direction of the court, unless the Attorney General
      shows that additional delay was caused by the juvenile or his counsel,
      or consented to by the juvenile and his counsel, or would be in the
      interest of justice in the particular case. Delays attributable solely to
      court calendar congestion may not be considered in the interest of
      justice. Except in extraordinary circumstances, an information
      dismissed under this section may not be reinstituted.

18 U.S.C. § 5036.

                                        -5-
      The speedy trial clock begins to run when a juvenile defendant is first detained
by federal authorities on juvenile delinquency charges. See United States v. Juv.
Male, 595 F.3d 885, 895 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. David A., 436 F.3d 1201,
1206 (10th Cir. 2006). That clock “continues to run, with certain specified
exceptions, until the [juvenile] ‘is brought to trial.’” United States v. Female Juv.,
A.F.S., 377 F.3d 27, 34 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 5036)). And absent
“extraordinary circumstances,” failure to comply with the 30-day trial deadline
requires the dismissal of the juvenile’s charges with prejudice. 18 U.S.C. § 5036.

       Here, the parties do not dispute that D.B.’s juvenile delinquency proceedings
were subject to the FJDA’s speedy trial provision. The record indicates that D.B.
was first detained by federal authorities following his arraignment on July 30, 2021,
and he remained in federal custody until September 16—49 days later. He was not
tried during that time. Accordingly, D.B. argues that his speedy trial rights under
the FJDA were violated and that the district court should have dismissed his case.
See id. (providing that a juvenile information “shall be dismissed on motion of the
alleged delinquent” if a juvenile defendant is not brought to trial within 30 days of
being detained).

       We need not resolve whether D.B.’s speedy trial rights under the FJDA were
violated because D.B. waived his right to appeal that issue as part of his plea
agreement. “As a general rule, a defendant is allowed to waive appellate rights.” 6

      6
       We recognize that our cases addressing the enforceability of appeal waivers
in plea agreements have involved adult offenders rather than juveniles. Yet the
FJDA expressly contemplates that juvenile defendants may enter guilty pleas. See
18 U.S.C. § 5032 (“Once a juvenile has entered a plea of guilty . . . subsequent
criminal prosecution or juvenile proceedings based upon such alleged act of
delinquency shall be barred.” (emphasis added)); see also United States v. Juv. Male
E.S., No. 98-1735, 1998 WL 750582, at *1 (8th Cir. Oct. 28, 1998) (involving a
juvenile defendant charged under the FJDA who ultimately entered a conditional
guilty plea). In addition, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure authorize adult
defendants to enter into plea agreements, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c); those Rules can
also apply to juvenile defendants, so long as they are not “inconsistent with” statutes
                                         -6-
United States v. Griffin, 668 F.3d 987, 990 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v.
Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 889 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc)). When reviewing an appeal
waiver, “we must confirm that the appeal” at issue “falls within the scope of the
waiver and that both the waiver and plea agreement were entered into knowingly
and voluntarily.” Andis, 333 F.3d at 889–90. “Even when these conditions are met,
however, we will not enforce a waiver where to do so would result in a miscarriage
of justice.” Id. at 890.

       D.B.’s plea agreement provides in relevant part that “[t]he Defendant hereby
waives all defenses and his right to appeal any non-jurisdictional issues.” D.B. does
not argue, nor does the record indicate, that his appeal waiver was not knowing and
voluntary. D.B. instead maintains that whether his speedy trial rights were violated
is a “jurisdictional issue” not covered by the terms of his appeal waiver. Yet it has
long been settled that “[t]he issue of the right to a speedy trial is non-jurisdictional
in nature.” Becker v. Nebraska, 435 F.2d 157, 157 (8th Cir. 1970) (per curiam)
(emphasis added); see United States v. Seay, 620 F.3d 919, 921–22 (8th Cir. 2010).
D.B.’s speedy trial challenge thus “falls within the plain language” of his appeal
waiver. United States v. Guice, 925 F.3d 990, 992 (8th Cir. 2019); see Griffin, 668
F.3d at 989–90 (concluding that a defendant’s appeal “based on alleged violations
of the Speedy Trial Act” fell within the scope of a general appeal waiver providing
that the defendant had waived “all rights to appeal all non-jurisdictional issues”).

      D.B. also argues that enforcing his appeal waiver here would result in a
miscarriage of justice. We disagree. The “miscarriage of justice” exception “is a
narrow one,” Andis, 333 F.3d at 891, and ordinarily applies to prevent an appeal

governing juvenile delinquency proceedings, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 1(a)(5)(D); and
the FJDA does not mention plea agreements, let alone bar them. We have
“acknowledged the general permissibility” of including appeal waivers in plea
agreements. Andis, 333 F.3d at 889. Thus, we see no reason why the rules that
govern such appeal waivers, see id. at 889–92, should not also apply to those entered
into by juvenile defendants, so long as those rules are not otherwise “inconsistent
with” the juvenile delinquency statute at issue.
                                         -7-
waiver from barring an appeal of “an illegal sentence, a sentence in violation of the
terms of an agreement, [or] a claim asserting ineffective assistance of counsel,”
Griffin, 668 F.3d at 990. D.B. does not assert that his sentence is unlawful or that
his counsel was ineffective. His sentence likewise did not violate the terms of his
plea agreement. Although the district court declined to adopt the parties’ joint
recommendation for a sentence of probation, the agreement cautioned that this
recommendation was not binding on the district court. And that warning was
expressly reiterated to D.B. during his change-of-plea hearing.

       Because D.B.’s speedy trial challenge falls within the express terms of his
valid appeal waiver, we will enforce the waiver and dismiss his appeal as to that
issue.

                                        III.

       D.B. alternatively argues that the sentence imposed by the district court was
“arbitrary and capricious, unreasonable, and greater than necessary to achieve the
goals of sentencing,” principally because the district court sentenced him to
12 months of official detention despite the parties jointly recommending a
probationary sentence. 7

       “We have jurisdiction to review a sentence pronounced under the FJDA to
determine whether it was ‘imposed in violation of law’ or is ‘plainly unreasonable.’”
United States v. M.R.M., 513 F.3d 866, 868 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 3742(a)(1), (4)). D.B. does not argue that his sentence was imposed in violation
of the FJDA or otherwise contrary to law. Consequently, we can vacate his sentence
here only if it is “plainly unreasonable.”

      7
       The United States does not assert that D.B.’s appeal of his sentence is
foreclosed by his appeal waiver.
                                     -8-
       We have explained that a district court “enjoys ‘broad discretion’ when
sentencing juvenile offenders under the FJDA—indeed, broader discretion than
when sentencing an adult.” Id. (citation omitted). This is so because the Sentencing
Guidelines, “even in their advisory capacity, do not apply to juveniles.” Id.; see
USSG § 1B1.12. Nor does the FJDA provision governing juvenile dispositions, 18
U.S.C. § 5037(c), incorporate the sentencing factors that apply to adult offenders,
see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). M.R.M., 513 F.3d at 868. Accordingly, while we have
“found reference to some of the § 3553(a) factors useful in determining whether a
district court permissibly considered certain evidence as relevant in a juvenile
proceeding,” we have not said that a district court “must balance all of the § 3553(a)
factors in making a juvenile disposition.” Id.; see United States v. D.A.L.D., 469
F.3d 727, 730 (8th Cir. 2006) (affirming a juvenile disposition where the district
court “cited only the [§] 3553(a) factors it deemed relevant”). Our focus is on
whether the district court stated its reasons for imposing a given sentence and
“created an adequate record to allow us to conduct a reasonableness review.”
D.A.L.D., 469 F.3d at 729–30.

       The district court satisfied these requirements here. During D.B.’s disposition
hearing, the court expressed concern about D.B.’s multiple violations of his pretrial
release conditions, including his assaultive behavior. These violations, according to
the district court, signaled that D.B. had yet to demonstrate a “willingness or ability
to follow the law and the rules.” It explained that a term of official detention would
help D.B. “learn the consequences” of his behavior and give him an opportunity to
distance himself “from the problems that [he] found [him]self in by not being able
to say no, by getting in a place where people pressure[d] [him] to do the wrong
things.” The district court then imposed a 12-month term of official detention,
significantly lower than the maximum 37-month term authorized by the FJDA. See
18 U.S.C. § 5037(c)(1)(B). And it observed that a post-detention term of juvenile
delinquent supervision would help provide D.B. with the “resources, the support,
and the programs and lessons that [he] need[ed] to learn to go forward in life without
[him] getting in trouble.” Given this adequate record and “the broad discretion
afforded the district courts in the disposition of juvenile adjudications,” M.R.M., 513
                                         -9-
F.3d at 873, we conclude that the sentence imposed by the district court here was
not plainly unreasonable.

                                       IV.

        For the reasons explained above, we dismiss D.B.’s appeal as to his speedy
trial issue and affirm the judgment of the district court.
                         ______________________________

                                      -10-