Court Opinion

ID: 9840385
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-18 09:08:01.772814+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:31:53.787060
License: Public Domain

In the
        Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
         at Fort Worth
     ___________________________
          No. 02-23-00128-CV
     ___________________________

  IN THE INTEREST OF C.C., A CHILD

  On Appeal from the 231st District Court
          Tarrant County, Texas
      Trial Court No. 231-718278-22

   Before Kerr, Womack, and Wallach, JJ.
   Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr
                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

      In this appeal from a judgment terminating the parent–child relationship

between C.C. and her alleged father after C.C.’s mother’s death from a drug overdose,

Father challenges the maternal aunt and uncle’s standing to sue; the evidence’s legal

and factual sufficiency on the trial court’s predicate-conduct and best-interest

findings; and procedural due process. 1 We affirm.

                                    Background

      Mother died on March 19, 2022,2 and C.C. went to live exclusively with her

Aunt and Uncle. At the time, Father was incarcerated for aggravated assault with a

deadly weapon––in 2019, he had run over Mother with a car. On June 6, 2022––not

quite three months after Mother’s death––Aunt and Uncle filed an original petition to

terminate the parent–child relationship between C.C. and Father.

      In their petition, Aunt and Uncle alleged specifically that Father had (1) failed

to support C.C. according to his ability for one year ending within six months of the

petition’s file date; (2) with knowledge of Mother’s pregnancy, voluntarily abandoned

Mother during the pregnancy and through C.C.’s birth––while also failing to provide

      1
        Father characterizes his complaints as due-course-of-law violations. Although
“the Texas Constitution is textually different [from the United States Constitution] in
that it refers to ‘due course’ rather than ‘due process,’ we regard these terms as
without meaningful distinction” and “have traditionally followed contemporary
federal due process interpretations of procedural[-]due process issues.” Univ. of Tex.
Med. Sch. at Hous. v. Than, 901 S.W.2d 926, 929 (Tex. 1995).
      2
       Mother had struggled with addiction and mental-health problems.

                                          2
adequate support or medical care for Mother––and remained apart from C.C. or failed

to support C.C.; and (3) knowingly engaged in criminal conduct resulting in his

conviction, confinement, and inability to care for C.C. for at least two years from the

petition’s file date. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(F), (H), (Q). They also

alleged that termination of the parent–child relationship was in C.C’s best interest. See

id. § 161.001(b)(2). Aunt and Uncle alleged standing to sue under Family Code Section

102.005 generally. Id. § 102.005.

       Father filed several documents opposing the suit. On October 26, 2022, the

trial court notified the parties that it had specially set the final trial for March 3, 2023.

Father filed a formal answer pro se on December 15, 2022. In March 2023, the trial

court rescheduled the trial for April 3, 2023, and issued a bench warrant ordering the

Tarrant County Sheriff to bring Father to Tarrant County for the April 3 trial.

       The parties waived a jury and tried the case to the court. The trial court found

that Father had failed to support C.C.; had voluntarily abandoned Mother and failed

to support her and C.C.; and had knowingly engaged in criminal conduct resulting in

his conviction, confinement, and inability to care for C.C. for at least two years from

the original petition’s file date. The trial court also found that terminating the parent–

child relationship between C.C. and Father––“if any exists or could exist”––was in

C.C.’s best interest. The trial court appointed Aunt and Uncle C.C.’s managing

conservators and approved an adoption evaluation that had been done.

                                             3
      After appealing the judgment, Father––who had obtained counsel––filed a

timely motion to vacate the judgment, in which he asked alternatively for a new trial.

According to Father, Aunt and Uncle lacked standing to sue under Section

102.005 because they had not joined their termination suit with an adoption suit. He

sought a new trial on legal- and factual-sufficiency grounds, among others. After a

hearing, the trial court denied the motion.

                                        Issues

      Father argues on appeal that Aunt and Uncle lacked standing under Family

Code Section 102.005; that the evidence is not legally and factually sufficient to

support the conduct grounds found by the trial court and the trial court’s best-interest

finding; and that the judgment violates his due-course-of-law right because (1) he did

not receive proper notice of the final trial and all pleadings, (2) the trial court

conducted proceedings in his absence after he requested to be present, and (3) Aunt

and Uncle did not provide him any required disclosures.

                                       Standing

Review standard

      We address standing first because “[s]tanding is a constitutional prerequisite to

suit” and because “[a] court has no jurisdiction over a claim made by a plaintiff who

lacks standing to assert it.” Heckman v. Williamson Cnty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 150 (Tex.

2012). Because standing is a component of subject-matter jurisdiction, its existence is

a legal question that we review de novo. See Farmers Tex. Cnty. Mut. Ins. v. Beasley,

                                              4
598 S.W.3d 237, 240 (Tex. 2020). In evaluating standing, we construe the pleadings in

the plaintiff’s favor, and we consider evidence relevant to the jurisdictional inquiry. See

id. When standing is challenged for the first time on appeal, we review the entire

record if necessary to determine if any evidence supports standing. Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v.

Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex. 1993).

      Standing in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship (SAPCR) is governed

by the Family Code. See In re E.G.L., 378 S.W.3d 542, 547 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012,

pet. denied). A party seeking relief in a SAPCR must allege and establish standing

within the parameters of the language used in the relevant statute. In re K.T.R., No. 10-

22-00219-CV, 2022 WL 17834491, at *3 (Tex. App.—Waco Dec. 21, 2022, pet.

denied) (mem. op.) (quoting In re Torres, 614 S.W.3d 798, 801 (Tex. App.—Waco

2020, no pet.)). “Because standing to bring a SAPCR is governed by statute, we apply

statutory-interpretation principles in determining whether a plaintiff falls within the

category of persons upon whom such standing has been conferred.” In re H.S.,

550 S.W.3d 151, 155 (Tex. 2018).

       Family Code Section 102.005 sets forth who has standing to file “[a]n original

suit requesting only an adoption or for termination of the parent-child relationship

joined with a petition for adoption.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 102.005 (listing (1) a

stepparent; (2) an adult with whom the child has been placed for adoption who has

had actual possession and control of the child for 30 days before filing suit; (3) an

adult who has had actual possession and control of the child for at least two months

                                            5
during the three months preceding the petition’s filing; (4) an adult who has adopted,

petitioned to adopt, or is a foster parent of the child’s sibling; and (5) “another adult

whom the court determines to have had substantial past contact with the child

sufficient to warrant standing to do so”).

Application

      Father argues that because the termination pleading did not also expressly seek

adoption, Aunt and Uncle could not rely on Section 102.005 to show standing. He

does not argue that they failed to show they fall within one of the categories of

persons with standing to seek adoption under Section 102.005.

      In their original petition, Aunt and Uncle sought to terminate Father’s parental

rights but also sought an “order in accordance with the allegations of th[e] petition.”

In other parts of the petition, Aunt and Uncle gave fair notice of their intent to adopt

C.C. by referencing adoption-specific Family Code requirements and by specifically

requesting that the court order an adoption evaluation. See id. § 162.002 (requiring

adoption suit to include either a verified allegation that the petitioner has complied

with the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children or a verified statement of

the particular reasons for noncompliance), § 162.003 (requiring adoption evaluation);

T.L. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 03-14-00361-CV, 2014 WL 6845166,

at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Nov. 26, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (applying fair-notice

pleading requirement in Family Code case); see also In re Y.J., No. 02-19-00235-CV,

2019 WL 6904728, at *6–7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 19, 2019, pets. denied)

                                             6
(mem. op.). The judgment contains the following finding: “The court finds that the

required adoption evaluation has been performed and the evaluator’s report is on file

herein. The Court further finds that the adoption evaluation meets the requirements

of the Court.”3

      Moreover, the entire record shows that Aunt and Uncle had also filed a petition

for adoption, albeit in a different cause number. At the hearing on the motion to

vacate, counsel for Aunt and Uncle reminded the trial court that they had filed an

adoption petition in Cause Number 231-718286-22 and that the reporter’s record

from the termination trial “reflect[ed] several comments about adoption.” When

counsel told the trial court, “The adoption could have proceeded that day; however,

you . . . correctly decided it would be better to wait until his time to appeal had

passed,” the trial judge responded, “Correct.” Cf. Rodarte v. Cox, 828 S.W.2d 65,

71 (Tex. App.––Tyler 1991, writ denied) (addressing standing issues in suit to

terminate and adopt in which trial court severed adoption part of suit after a jury had

decided the termination––but not the adoption––issues because statute precluded jury

trial on adoption claim).

      3
       Father contends that the notice of final trial did not include any mention of
adoption, instead listing conservatorship, possession and access, child support, and
termination of parental rights as the issues to be tried. The notice was directed to
Aunt and Uncle’s counsel, Father, and C.C.’s attorney ad litem. Father’s argument
assumes he would have standing to participate in proceedings regarding the merits of
adoption. But upon termination of parental rights, the parent no longer has standing
to contest an adoption. See Ramirez v. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 667 S.W.3d 340,
349 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2022, no pet.).

                                           7
       Based on these specific facts, we conclude that the termination and adoption

suit were sufficiently joined for purposes of establishing Section 102.005 standing.

       Testimony at the trial showed that C.C. had lived exclusively with Aunt and

Uncle for a little over two and one-half months of the three-month period preceding

the suit’s file date. Based on our review of the entire record, we hold that Aunt and

Uncle showed standing to sue under Family Code Section 102.005(3)––they had

actual possession and control of C.C. for at least two months during the three months

preceding the petition’s filing. Thus, we overrule Father’s first issue.

              Sufficiency of evidence supporting conduct-ground Q

       In his second through fourth issues, Father challenges the evidence’s legal and

factual sufficiency to support the conduct grounds supporting termination: F, H, and

Q. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(F), (H), (Q). We need address only one

conduct-ground finding if sufficient evidence supports it. In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355,

362 (Tex. 2003). Here, the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support

termination under Q.

Standard of review and applicable law

       To determine whether the evidence is legally sufficient in parental-termination

cases, we look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the challenged finding

to determine whether a reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction

that the finding is true. In re Z.N., 602 S.W.3d 541, 545 (Tex. 2020). The factfinder

may draw inferences, but they must be reasonable and logical. Id. We assume that the

                                             8
factfinder settled any evidentiary conflicts in favor of its finding if a reasonable

factfinder could have done so. Id. We disregard all evidence that a reasonable

factfinder could have disbelieved, and we consider undisputed evidence even if it is

contrary to the finding. Id.; In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002). That is, we

consider evidence favorable to the finding if a reasonable factfinder could, and we

disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not. In re J.P.B.,

180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005).

      We must perform “an exacting review of the entire record” in determining the

factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the termination of a parent–child

relationship. In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 500 (Tex. 2014). Nevertheless, we give due

deference to the factfinder’s findings and do not supplant the judgment with our own.

In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006). We review the whole record to decide

whether a factfinder could reasonably form a firm conviction or belief that the

movant proved the specific ground for termination. Tex. Fam. Code Ann.

§ 161.001(b); In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 28 (Tex. 2002). If the factfinder reasonably

could form such a firm conviction or belief, then the evidence is factually sufficient.

C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 18–19.

      Under Section 161.001(b)(1)(Q), termination can be based on a parent’s

knowing criminal conduct “that has resulted in the parent’s . . . conviction of an

offense[] and . . . confinement or imprisonment and inability to care for the child for

not less than two years from the date of filing the petition.” Id. § 161.001(b)(1)(Q).

                                          9
Termination according to this predicate ground requires proof that the parent is

unable to care for the child for at least two years from the petition’s file date. In re

E.K., No. 02-22-00355-CV, 2023 WL 2325510, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 2,

2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Although a parent may fulfill his child-care obligation

by arranging for another person to provide that care on his behalf, “[s]imply arranging

for the . . . care is not enough—the person agreeing to care for the children must

agree to do so on behalf of the incarcerated parent.” Id.

       Additionally, although parole-related evidence is relevant, “[m]ere introduction

of parole-related evidence . . . does not prevent a factfinder from forming a firm

conviction or belief that the parent will remain incarcerated for at least two years

[because p]arole decisions are inherently speculative.” In re O.P., No. 02-22-00292-CV,

2022 WL 17494597, at *4 (Tex. App.––Fort Worth Dec. 8, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(quoting H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at 108). And a factfinder “is ‘free to disregard’ the

parent’s parole-related testimony, especially when it constitutes ‘barely more than

conjecture.’” Id. at *4 (quoting In re C.L.E.E.G., 639 S.W.3d 696, 699 (Tex. 2022)).

Application

       The trial court admitted into evidence the judgment from Father’s conviction

for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, which showed that Father’s five-year

confinement was to begin July 6, 2021. Father agreed at trial that his projected release

date was October 2, 2025. Because Aunt and Uncle filed their original petition on

                                            10
June 6, 2022, his projected release date was over two years from the date of the

petition’s filing.

       In a narrative to the court, Father said, “Today I was supposed to see parole. I

was supposed to see parole today. I’m eligible today for parole, you know. I’m sure

they’ll come see me in the County or, you know, maybe I’ll parole out the County or

something. I don’t know.” No other parole-related evidence was presented. 4 The trial

court was not required to believe Father’s bare assertion about the potential for

parole.5 See H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at 109.

       Father testified that he wanted C.C. to continue to live with Aunt and Uncle

until his release but with his fiancée providing financial support on his behalf. His

fiancée testified that she would provide “whatever it takes” financially on Father’s

behalf.6 Aunt, on the other hand, testified that she wanted Father’s rights terminated

       4
        In his brief, Father asserts that he “is currently in the parole review process,
and it is not certain that he will remain confined past two years from the date of filing,
which would be June 6, 2024.”

       Likewise, the trial court did not have to believe Father’s testimony that he had
       5

not intended to commit the underlying offense for which he was convicted and had
instead run over Mother by accident. The evidence showed that Father pleaded guilty
to aggravated assault with a deadly weapon based on an indictment that charged only
an intentional and knowing act.
       6
        Contrary to the argument in Father’s brief, his fiancée did not agree to care for
C.C. in her home while he was incarcerated for aggravated assault; she agreed to
provide only financial support while C.C. continued to live with Aunt and Uncle. And
although his fiancée agreed that after Father’s release, she would be “on the hook” to
raise C.C. if he were to again go to prison, that agreement is not sufficient to prove
that she had agreed to allow C.C. to live with her during Father’s current confinement.

                                           11
for C.C.’s permanency. She did not think Father could safely parent C.C. while

incarcerated. Thus, the evidence did not show that Aunt and Uncle had agreed to care

for C.C. on Father’s behalf.

      Based on the foregoing, we hold that the evidence is both legally and factually

sufficient to support the Q finding. We overrule Father’s fourth issue and therefore

do not address his second and third issues. See A.V., 113 S.W.3d at 362.

                                     Best interest

      In his fifth issue, Father argues that the evidence is legally and factually

insufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest finding. We apply the same

sufficiency standard of review to this finding as we do to the conduct finding. See In re

J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726, 741, 746 (Tex. 2022).

Applicable law

      Although we generally presume that keeping a child with a parent is in the

child’s best interest, In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006), the best-interest

analysis is child-centered, focusing on the child’s well-being, safety, and development,

In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018). In reviewing best-interest evidence, we

consider nonexclusive factors that the factfinder may apply:

      (1) the child’s desires;

      (2) the child’s current and future emotional and physical needs;

      (3) the current and future emotional and physical danger to the child;

                                           12
      (4) the parenting abilities of those seeking custody and programs available to
          assist them;

      (5) the parties’ plans for the child, including the stability of the proposed home
          or placement;

      (6) the parent’s acts or omissions suggesting that the existing parent–child
          relationship is inappropriate; and

      (7) any excuse for the parent’s acts or omissions.

Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976). Additionally, evidence probative

of conduct grounds for termination may also be probative of best interest. In re

E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d 239, 249 (Tex. 2013).

Application

      Based on the evidence summarized below––whether viewed in the light most

favorable to the jury’s best-interest finding or neutrally––we hold that the trial court

could have found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the parent–

child relationship was in C.C.’s best interest. See J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d at 573; C.H.,

89 S.W.3d at 28.

     • Second Holley factor 7: C.C. needed a stable and permanent home. C.C. had
       been present when Mother died and because of that had experienced night
       terrors and insomnia. She also cried a lot, missed Mother, and talked to a
       poster of Mother. Aunt and Uncle had taken her to therapy, given her a photo
       album of her own with pictures of Mother, and allowed her to draw pictures
       for and write letters to Mother. Although C.C. had experienced attachment
       issues, they were getting better. C.C. was still “clingy” with Aunt and Uncle
       from time to time. C.C. had a younger half-sibling––Father’s child with his

      7
       C.C. was not quite four at the time of trial; no evidence pertained directly to
her desires or maturity to express any (first Holley factor).

                                           13
  fiancée; no evidence was presented about whether C.C. had a relationship with
  her half-sibling.

• Fourth Holley factor: Aunt was a licensed professional counselor and able to
  meet C.C.’s needs. Aunt and Uncle had also cared for C.C.’s first cousins in
  their home while their father was deployed. Those cousins treated C.C. “like
  siblings.” Aunt testified that she was able to seek parenting advice from family
  members and colleagues.

• Fifth Holley factor:

     • C.C. was bonded to Aunt and Uncle, was happy and doing well in their
       home, and attended preschool. They planned to adopt her. C.C. started
       “spending a great deal of time with” Aunt and Uncle when she was three
       to four months old, began living with them “on a fairly routine basis”
       when she was two, and by the time of trial, had lived with them
       exclusively for the year after Mother’s death. When Aunt and Uncle had
       cared for C.C. while Mother was alive and not doing well mentally, they
       were C.C.’s “safety net.” They had a place for her in their home, including
       “an appropriate place to sleep and toys to play with.” C.C.’s grandmother
       thought that Aunt and Uncle’s home would be “the best place for her.”

     • Father wanted C.C. to live with Aunt and Uncle until his release from
       prison while his fiancée sent C.C. gifts, clothes, and financial support––“a
       trillion dollars, whatever [C.C.] needs.” He had no concerns about their
       care. His long-term plan was to put her in swimming lessons, live in his
       fiancée’s rented home on a two-acre plot, enroll C.C. in the school where
       his fiancée taught, and “put her in whatever she wants to do.” Eventually,
       he wanted C.C. and her younger brother “to grow up together.”

• Third and sixth Holley factors:

     • Father had “been incarcerated most of his adult life.” Father and Mother
       met after he had been released from prison and was on parole. They
       moved in together, but Mother paid all the bills with help from her
       mother. Mother and Father were eventually evicted. They had several
       fights while together, including during Mother’s pregnancy with C.C.; the
       police were called “[m]ore than once.” Mother and Father had an “off and
       on” relationship.

     • At the time of trial, Father was incarcerated because of a domestic-
       violence incident with Mother; he had run “over [Mother’s] arm with the

                                     14
           car, in a moving vehicle that he was operating.” Father was on the run for
           ten months––without providing for C.C.––before he was jailed for the
           offense. After his arrest, he called Mother’s family members and
           threatened to kill them. Mother had “begged” Aunt to keep C.C. safe after
           Father threatened Mother and C.C. because Mother had testified at his
           aggravated-assault trial.

         • Father did not consistently call C.C. or come see her in person and “did
           not readily accept” her as his child “from the beginning.” Aunt did not
           think that Father had met his financial obligations and had not been “a
           consistent physical presence” for C.C. In the past, Aunt had seen Father
           smoking marijuana with C.C. in the car. Father had returned to C.C.’s
           grandmother pictures of C.C. that Mother had sent him. C.C.’s
           grandmother agreed when asked whether “it would be extraordinarily
           harmful” to C.C. to be taken out of Aunt and Uncle’s home and whether
           “she would be shattered.” According to C.C.’s grandmother, nobody from
           Father’s family had offered to be a placement for C.C., and Father had
           never contacted her to say he had found someone willing to support C.C.
           She agreed when asked if she was afraid C.C. would witness or experience
           family violence if Father had custody.

    • Seventh Holley factor: The trial judge did not have to believe Father’s version of
      events leading up to his aggravated-assault conviction––that he had accidentally
      run over Mother when her bags got stuck in the car, left the scene not knowing
      that he had run her over, and pleaded guilty because his attorney told him that
      Mother was going to testify against him to avoid a then-pending charge against
      her. The judge also did not have to believe Father’s testimony that while he was
      evading police on the aggravated-assault charge, he and Mother would meet
      without her family’s knowledge and that he visited with C.C. and provided her
      financial support. Likewise, the trial judge did not have to believe Father’s
      explanation that he had supported Mother financially but that she lied to her
      family about his not helping so that she could get extra money for drugs.
      Finally, the trial judge did not have to believe Father when he testified that he
      had tried to contact C.C.’s grandmother at her church to tell her that his fiancée
      would provide C.C. with anything she needed.

      Considering the evidence pertinent to all of these factors, they weigh heavily in

favor of the best-interest finding; thus, this evidence is both legally and factually

                                          15
sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that termination of the parent–child

relationship is in C.C.’s best interest. We overrule Father’s fifth issue.

                             Due-course-of-law complaint

       In his sixth issue, Father contends that his parent–child relationship with C.C.

was terminated without due course of law because (1) he was not properly notified

about the “instructions for submitting evidence” for the final trial according to Rule

21(b), (2) “[t]he record is unclear as to whether [he] did in fact receive all notice and

pleadings filed in the trial court as there is no return receipt for many of the mailings

to Appellant where he was incarcerated,” (3) the day after he filed a request to appear

at hearings via video, the trial court held a pretrial conference “without [his]

presence,” and (4) Aunt and Uncle did not serve him with required disclosures under

Rule 194.

       Father’s arguments have no merit. He did not preserve a complaint that he

lacked proper notice of “instructions for submitting evidence” under Rule 21(b), nor

did he preserve a complaint that Aunt and Uncle failed to provide him required

disclosures. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1); cf. Morales v. Carlin, No. 03-18-00376-CV,

2019 WL 1388524, at *6 n.9 (Tex. App.––Austin Mar. 28, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(holding discovery-violation complaint waived under prior version of rule). Father

identifies no particular “notice, pleading, plea, or other form of request” of which he

did not receive adequate notice, nor does he allege any particular harm regarding lack

of notice; he was able to file documents pretrial, attended and participated in the trial

                                             16
by examining witnesses and presenting argument, and timely filed a postjudgment

motion. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i), 44.1(a)(1); Leachman v. Stephens, No. 02-13-00357-

CV, 2016 WL 6648747, at *33 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 10, 2016, pet. denied)

(mem. op.); see also T.L. v. Cook Children’s Med. Ctr., 607 S.W.3d 9, 83–84 (Tex. App.––

Fort Worth 2020, pet. denied) (discussing case-specific due-process requirement of

adequate notice). And finally––although nothing shows that Father’s request to

appear by alternate means had been presented to the trial court before the pretrial

conference––Father has nevertheless failed to show harm regarding the trial court’s

failure to secure his attendance at the pretrial conference. See Tex. R. App. P.

44.1(a)(1).

       We overrule Father’s sixth issue.

                                      Conclusion

       Having overruled Father’s six issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                      /s/ Elizabeth Kerr
                                                      Elizabeth Kerr
                                                      Justice

Delivered: September 14, 2023

                                           17