Court Opinion

ID: 9666189
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:07:26.23143+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:24.667479
License: Public Domain

TAFT, Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the disposition of appellant’s point of error on the merits, but I write separately to address the State’s threshold preservation argument, which I suggest is dispositive. The State contends the trial court did not refuse to allow appellant to recall Douglas, but that any error in not granting a motion for continuance was not preserved for review because the motion was oral, while the statute requires that it be written.
As the majority opinion notes, Douglas had not been subpoenaed. Likewise, he had not been instructed to remain available or on call. It was neither the State’s fault, nor the trial court’s fault, that Douglas was not available for recall by appellant. Under these conditions, the trial court could only be faulted, if at all, for denying appellant’s oral motion for continuance. However, the statutes governing motions for continuance require that these motions be verified and written. See Tex. Code Crim.P.Ann. arts. 29.03, 29.06, 29.08, 29.13 (Vernon 1989). Because appellant’s motion for continuance was not in writing, he presents nothing for review. See Flores v. State, 789 S.W.2d 694, 698 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, no pet.).
Two cases have carved out an exception to the rule that motions for continuance must be written. See Petrick v. State, 832 S.W.2d 767, 770-71 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, pet. ref'd); O’Rarden v. State, 777 S.W.2d 455, 459-60 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1989, pet. ref'd). The exception only applies, however, when the circumstances surrounding the denial of an oral motion for continuance demonstrate a denial of the rudiments of due process. Pe-trick, 832 S.W.2d at 770. Both Petrick and O’Rarden involved egregious prosecutorial misconduct resulting in reversible error. This case does not, as the majority opinion shows by its disposition.
Furthermore, the reason for carving out an exception to the plain statutory requirements no longer exists. The exception arose during the heyday of fundamental error, a doctrine that allowed appellate courts to address unpreserved reversible error. Now that ineffective assistance of counsel provides easy circumvention of the contemporaneous objection rule, there is no longer a need for either fundamental error or the exception carved by Petrick and O’Rarden.
Appellant’s point of error presents nothing for review, and we should overrule it on that basis. Because the majority opinion does not, I can only respectfully concur in its result.