Court Opinion

ID: 9606141
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:47:28.742699+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:33.245886
License: Public Domain

Gunderson, J.,
dissenting:
When plaintiff’s counsel instituted this action, he sought to designate the governmental road owner — which ultimately turned out to be the State of Nevada itself — by a subdivision name through which the State commonly transacts business, including ownership of other roads in southern Nevada. Now, having allocated some but not all of its road ownership to that subdivision (the County of Clark), the State of Nevada here contends that a timely action naming its subdivision as defendant was untimely as against itself. I cannot agree.
Plaintiff’s counsel clearly intended to sue the governmental entity which owned the roadway in question. As in Servatius v. United Resort Hotels, 85 Nev. 371, 455 P.2d 621 (1969) — in which the plaintiffs mistakenly sued the wrong corporation, “Aku Aku, Inc.” — here plaintiff’s counsel incorrectly sued a related entity, i.e. Clark County, through which our government does business for other purposes in the same general area. *719Here, as in the Servatius case, the intent was to sue the owner; the mistake was in suing such owner by naming a related entity.
If anything, it appears to me the facts of this case are stronger than those of the Servatius case. By dividing itself into various subdivisions, of which several sometimes share the State’s responsibilities in a given area, the State inevitably creates doubt about the technical ownership of governmental property. Indeed, at particular times, due to territorial disputes between the governmental entities themselves, it may sometimes be legally debatable which entity in fact has legal authority over, and ownership of, a particular roadway. See County of Clark v. City of North Las Vegas, 89 Nev. 10, 504 P.2d 1326 (1973). I therefore respectfully submit that this court should not establish rules of procedure so inflexible that the State may never be substituted in place of a subdivision created for the State’s legal convenience.
I note that the result of a rigid holding will be that careful lawyers must, hereafter, name not only the State of Nevada, but every subdivision which may possibly have an interest. I respectfully submit this will entail unnecessary expenditure of time by government attorneys, who might have been spared involvement if our district courts were allowed flexibility to permit the amendment of pleadings in appropriate cases.
In addition, I note NRAP 3A(b)(5) does not contemplate that denial of a motion to dismiss may be challenged by mandamus. Thus, by assuming jurisdiction of this case, the court is not only extending the holding of Dzack v. Marshall, 80 Nev. 345, 393 P.2d 610 (1964), but going beyond the scope of the appellate rule predicated on that holding.