Court Opinion

ID: 9670713
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:24:32.358367+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:06.084512
License: Public Domain

DYKMAN, J.
¶ 23. (dissenting). In one of Wisconsin's counties, there is a large tract of township land which, if fully developed, would greatly enhance the Town's tax base. But there is an impediment. The land is only accessible from one side, and along that side runs a railroad track next to a river. Developers have passed on the tract because spanning the chasm with a bridge would be too costly, and the Town has refused to bear the cost of building the bridge. The County's attorneys are aware of Wis. Stat. § 81.38(1) (2001-02),1 but have concluded, as do I, that the plain meaning of that statute is that a chasm is not a highway, and certainly not a highway maintainable by the Town.
¶ 24. The following hypothetical illustrates the problem with the majority's interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 81.38(1). After reading the majority's opinion, the developer and the Town enter a contract, in which the developer agrees to build a road on either side of the chasm and reimburse the Town for half of the cost of a magnificent bridge, which the Town will build. As the land is subdivided and sold, the road will be enhanced to suit the capability of the bridge. The beauty of the deal is that half the cost of the bridge will be assumed by county taxpayers, who have little or no use for the bridge. But it saves the developer, and ultimately the lot purchasers, considerable money.
¶ 25. The majority assumes that my view and the County's view of Wis. Stat. § 81.38(1) is reasonable. But *416it also concludes that a railroad track or, in my hypothetical, a stream and a chasm, are really a highway. It concludes that the statute is ambiguous, though it does not go further and examine the rules of statutory construction or extrinsic sources. See DaimlerChrysler v. LIRC, 2007 WI 15, ¶ 37, 299 Wis. 2d 1, 727 N.W.2d 311 (if meaning of a statute is clear, court does not look at rules of statutory construction or extrinsic sources). The reasons the majority uses to reach its conclusion are that the legislature could have used language to exclude county liability for bridges over non-highways but did not, and that the legislature used the word "construct."
¶ 26. The reason the legislature did not use different language to make a clear statute more clear is that, as the majority assumes, the statute is reasonable as is. And focusing on the word "construct" goes nowhere. A Town might construct a new bridge where the previous bridge has deteriorated or it might repair the old bridge. Either way, there was a preexisting highway on the old bridge, or, put the other way, the repair or replacement of the old bridge was "on a highway." The majority's interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 81.38(1) allows a township to build a bridge as a tourist attraction in the middle of a cornfield, construct a connecting road, declare the whole thing a highway, and require the county to pay for half the cost of the bridge. That cannot he a more reasonable interpretation of the statute than one limiting county liability for bridge construction only to bridges that are really "on a highway." There is no reason the state cannot prevent county liability for new bridges that only a township sees a need to build.
¶ 27. The fact is that when the Town of Madison's board voted to build the bridge in question, the location *417of the bridge-to-be was nothing but thin air. It was not on any highway, and the non-highway ■ was not maintainable by the Town. In my view, Wis. Stat. § 81.38(1) is unambiguous. It does not apply to all bridges. There is a requirement of a highway. The legislature might have required counties to pay for half the cost of any bridge a township might like, but it did not. Because I conclude that the statute is unambiguous, precluding the majority's interpretation of it, I respectfully dissent.

 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2001-02 version unless otherwise noted.