Court Opinion

ID: 9364749
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-20 01:00:44.324752+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:39.766418
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-40609     Document: 00516617006         Page: 1     Date Filed: 01/19/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                              United States Court of Appeals
                                                                               Fifth Circuit

                                                                             FILED
                                                                       January 19, 2023
                                  No. 21-40609                          Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                             Clerk

   Rudolph O’Connor,

                                                           Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                       versus

   Wal-Mart Stores Texas, L.L.C.,

                                                           Defendant—Appellee.

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Texas
                            USDC No. 3:20-CV-149

   Before Higginbotham, Dennis, and Graves, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
          In this slip-and-fall case governed by Texas premises-liability law,
   plaintiff Rudolph O’Connor appeals the district court’s grant of summary
   judgment to defendant Wal-Mart Stores Texas, L.L.C. For the following
   reasons, we reverse the district court and remand for further proceedings.

          *
            Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
   opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
   circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
Case: 21-40609      Document: 00516617006          Page: 2    Date Filed: 01/19/2023

                                    No. 21-40609

                                          I.
          On May 10, 2019, O’Connor was exiting a Wal-Mart store in
   LaMarque, Texas, when he slipped and fell on a “green, slimy substance,”
   —later identified by O’Connor’s expert as algae—that covered a portion of
   the cement sidewalk in front of the store’s garden center. He sustained neck
   injuries necessitating a disc replacement surgery.
          The store manager, Jesse Hale, stated in his deposition that the water
   from watering activity in the garden center drains out of the garden center
   and onto the sidewalk in front of it. Despite this, Hale stated that he does not
   check to see if the water is accumulating on the sidewalk outside of the garden
   center; instead, he only drives around the building—usually in the dark.
   Neither Hale nor any other staff member conducts a routine inspection of the
   sidewalk in question. Hale also stated that Wal-Mart is responsible for the
   sidewalk condition, and noted that the area does not drain properly, which
   results in pooling water.
          O’Connor’s expert witness, Dr. Jahan Rasty, a mechanical and
   forensic engineer, noted in his affidavit that green algae was present on the
   sidewalk and extended into the garden area, and he concluded such a
   condition indicated that the water was coming from the garden center.
   Further, he noted that although “natural rainfall water” also accumulated on
   the sidewalk, “the fact that the algae growth extended into that area tells me
   that – on algae growth – was affected by the water coming from that area.”
   Dr. Rasty analyzed photographs taken both at the time of O’Connor’s fall
   and nearly two years later and found them to show green algae staining on the
   concrete as well as water retention in that area. He also noted that “it takes
   many days of continuous moisture . . . for significant levels of algae to
   accumulate.”

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                                        No. 21-40609

          O’Connor filed suit in the district court of Galveston County, Texas,
   asserting both negligent activity 1 and premises liability claims. Wal-Mart
   removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern
   District of Texas on diversity-of-citizenship grounds. Subsequently, Wal-
   Mart moved for summary judgment, arguing that O’Connor (1) failed to
   present evidence “that the green slime/mold is an unreasonably dangerous
   condition[,]” and (2) failed to present evidence of Walmart’s actual or
   constructive notice of any unreasonably dangerous condition. The district
   court granted summary judgment in favor of Wal-Mart, holding that
   O’Connor failed to create a genuine issue of material fact that the “slime” in
   which he slipped was not a “natural” accumulation, for which there can be
   no premises liability under Texas tort law. It did not address Wal-Mart’s
   alternate argument that O’Connor failed to create a genuine issue of material
   fact as to whether Wal-Mart had actual or constructive knowledge of the
   dangerous condition. O’Connor now appeals to this court.
                                             II.
          This court reviews a district court’s decision to grant summary
   judgment de novo, using the same standard as prescribed for the district
   court to apply in deciding the motion. See Smith v. Reg’l Transit Auth., 827
   F.3d 412, 417 (5th Cir. 2016). Summary judgment is proper if the movant
   shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
   is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). “A
   dispute as to a material fact is ‘genuine’ if the evidence is such that a
   reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Boudreaux
   v. Swift Transp. Co., 402 F.3d 536, 540 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing Anderson v.
   Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251–52 (1986)). In resolving the motion,
   the court may not undertake to evaluate or weigh the evidence or resolve

          1
             O’Connor does not challenge the district court’s summary judgment dismissal of
   his negligent activity claim, so we address only the premises liability claim here.

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   factual disputes; so long as the evidence in the record is such that a reasonable
   jury, drawing all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, could arrive at a
   verdict in that party’s favor, the court must deny the motion. Int’l Shortstop
   v. Rally’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1263 (5th Cir. 1991).
                                         III.
          Under Texas law, a premises owner “has a duty to exercise reasonable
   care to make the premises safe for invitees.” Austin v. Kroger Texas, L.P., 465
   S.W.3d 193, 202 (Tex. 2015). To prevail on a premises-liability claim, a
   plaintiff must prove four elements: “(1) Actual or constructive knowledge of
   a condition on the premises by the owner or occupier; (2) That the condition
   posed an unreasonable risk of harm; (3) That the owner or occupier did not
   exercise reasonable care to reduce or eliminate the risk; and (4) That the
   owner or occupier’s failure to use such care proximately caused the
   plaintiff’s injury.” CMH Homes, Inc. v. Daenen, 15 S.W.3d 97, 99 (Tex.
   2000). This appeal involves the first two elements: the actual or constructive
   knowledge of a condition on the premises by the owner or occupier, and the
   risk of harm posed by the condition. We address each below, starting with
   the second.
                                          A.
          In Texas, “naturally occurring” conditions per se do not constitute
   unreasonably dangerous conditions. See, e.g., M.O. Dental Lab v. Rape, 139
   S.W.3d 671, 675–76 (Tex. 2004) (mud); Brownsville Navigation Dist. v.
   Izaguirre, 829 S.W.2d 159, 160–61 (Tex. 1992) (mud); Eubanks v. Pappas
   Rest., Inc., 212 S.W.3d 838, 840–41 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006)
   (“slimy” mud). For instance, the accumulation of mud on a man-made
   sidewalk is not considered an unreasonable risk of harm because it involves
   “nothing more than dirt in its natural state.” M.O. Dental Lab, 139 S.W.3d
   at 676. Texas courts have reasoned that any rule otherwise would make
   landowners strictly liable for injuries resulting from elements beyond their
   control. See id. at 676. By analogy to those cases, the district court reasoned

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   that “[t]he same rule likewise applies to ‘slime’ or a ‘slimy mud,’ which are
   also naturally occurring.”
          The crux of the Texas courts’ holdings in ruling that mud does not
   present an unreasonably dangerous condition is that “rain is beyond the
   control of landowners.” M.O. Dental Lab, 139 S.W.3d at 675–76. Therefore
   “[h]olding a landowner responsible for naturally accumulating mud that
   remains in its natural state would be a heavy burden[.]” Id. at 676 (emphasis
   added). Thus, “[o]rdinary mud that accumulates naturally on an outdoor
   concrete slab without the assistance or involvement of unnatural contact is, in
   normal circumstances, nothing more than dirt in its natural state and,
   therefore, is not a condition posing an unreasonable risk of harm.” Id.
   (emphasis added). But O’Connor testified that he slipped on “water and/or
   mud and/or slimy green algae,” and submitted an expert report analyzing
   photographs of the area which determined that the slippery, slimy substance
   on the sidewalk was indeed green algae. Taking this testimony in the light
   most favorable to O’Connor, he has at least created a material issue of fact as
   to whether the substance on which he slipped was “ordinary mud[.]” M.O.
   Dental Lab, 139 S.W.3d at 676.
          More importantly, O’Connor has raised a genuine question of fact as
   to whether the algae was “naturally accumulating” or “in its natural state.”
   Id. If it wasn’t, then M.O. Dental Lab’s “heavy burden” in favor of the
   landowner doesn’t apply. Id. Wal-Mart argues that O’Connor “did not cite
   a single piece of evidence . . . establishing that the slime was unnatural in
   origin,” but this is plainly untrue. O’Connor presented deposition testimony
   from Jesse Hale, the manager of the LaMarque, Texas Wal-Mart store, who
   affirmed that “as the manager of th[e] store, [he] underst[ood] that the water
   from the garden center drains out of the garden center onto the sidewalk
   [where O’Connor fell], down into the drainage area into the parking lot[.]”
   In addition, photographs show that a raised area between the sidewalk and
   the parking lot prevents water from fully draining into the parking lot, causing

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   it to pool on the sidewalk. This at minimum creates an issue of material fact
   as to whether “the assistance or involvement of unnatural contact”
   attributable to Wal-Mart caused the accumulation of algae on the sidewalk
   where O’Connor slipped. Id. at 675–76. A reasonable jury, reviewing this
   evidence, and drawing all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, could
   find that this algae growth was unnatural—caused by Wal-Mart allowing
   water to drain onto the sidewalk, pool there, and stand long enough for algae
   growth to form. See Int’l Shortstop, 939 F.2d at 1263. The district court thus
   erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Wal-Mart on O’Connor’s
   premises liability claim.
                                        B.
          Wal-Mart urges this court to affirm the grant of summary judgment
   on the alternative ground, unexamined by the district court, that O’Connor
   failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Wal-Mart had
   actual or constructive notice of the algae slime—another requirement for
   pleading a premises liability claim under Texas law. See Gonzalez, 968
   S.W.2d at 936. Wal-Mart argues that O’Connor offered no evidence of such
   actual or constructive notice. But a reasonable fact finder could decide
   otherwise.
          Knowledge of a dangerous condition may be inferred from the
   persistence of that condition. Keetch v. Kroger Co., 845 S.W.2d 262, 266
   (Tex. 1992) (citing Coffee v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 536 S.W.2d 539 (Tex.
   1976)). What constitutes a reasonable time for discovery of a condition is
   highly fact-dependent. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Reece, 81 S.W.3d 812, 816
   (Tex. 2002). To prove constructive notice, “there must be some proof of
   how long the hazard was there before liability can be imposed on the premises
   owner for failing to discover and rectify, or warn of, the dangerous
   condition.” Id. at 816. In determining whether a premises owner had
   constructive knowledge, a court may consider the combination of (1) the
   length of the time the hazard existed, (2) the proximity of employees to the

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   hazard, and (3) the conspicuousness of the hazard. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
   Spates, 186 S.W.3d 566, 567–68 (Tex. 2006) (referring to “analyzing the
   combination of proximity, conspicuity, and longevity” when determining
   constructive notice). “[M]ere proximity of an employee to a spill, without
   evidence of when or how it came to be on the floor, [is] legally insufficient to
   charge a premises owner with constructive notice of the hazard.” Id. at 567
   (citing Reece, 81 S.W.3d at 816–87). Evidence of the changed condition of a
   substance, however, may be sufficient on its own to show that the substance
   existed for long enough to result in constructive knowledge by the premises
   owner. See Kofahl v. Randall’s Food & Drugs, Inc., 151 S.W.3d 679, 681 (Tex.
   App. 2004); Kroger Stores, Inc. v. Hernandez, 549 S.W.2d 16, 16–17 (Tex. Civ.
   App. 1977); Furr’s, Inc. v. Bolton, 333 S.W.2d 688, 689–690 (Tex. Civ. App.
   1960).
            Here, O’Connor’s expert analyzed photographs taken both at the
   time of O’Connor’s fall and nearly two years later, and found them to show
   green algae staining on the concrete as well as water retention in that area.
   O’Connor also introduced deposition testimony that the store manager was
   aware that “water from the garden center drains out of the garden center
   onto the sidewalk.” Wal-Mart argues that this does not establish that the
   algae on which O’Connor slipped had been growing on the sidewalk for long
   enough to justify a finding that Wal-Mart had constructive notice; but, as
   O’Connor’s expert attested, “it takes many days of continuous moisture . . .
   for significant levels of algae to accumulate.” Therefore, taking this evidence
   in the light most favorable to O’Connor, the store manager was aware that
   water from the garden center was draining out onto the sidewalk, and because
   the green algae in question results from accumulation of the water over the
   course of several days, a jury could reasonably conclude that the store
   manager had constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition.
   Accordingly, O’Connor has created a genuine issue of material fact as to
   whether Wal-Mart had constructive notice of the potentially unnatural

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   dangerous condition. We decline to uphold the district court’s grant of
   summary judgment to Wal-Mart on this alternate ground.
                                     IV.
         For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the district court’s
   summary judgment dismissal of O’Connor’s premises liability claim and
   REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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