Court Opinion

ID: 9776473
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:36:59.915736+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:39.071121
License: Public Domain

KINKEADE, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
Article 1.14(b) provides:
If the defendant does not object to a defect, error, or irregularity of form or substance in an indictment or information before the date on which the trial on the merits commences, he waives and forfeits the right to object to the defect, error, or irregularity and he may not raise the objection on appeal or in any other postconviction proceeding. Nothing in this article prohibits a trial court from requiring that an objection to an indictment or information be made at an earlier time in compliance with Article 28.01 of this code.
TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 1.14(b) (Vernon Supp.1989). The major objective of article 1.14(b) is to eliminate “sand bagging” by defense counsel. Van Dusen v. State, 744 S.W.2d 279, 280 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1987, no pet.).
The facts of this case show that the State deleted the intent portion of the information and that appellant acquiesced. The trial court specifically asked appellant whether he objected to the deletion, and appellant failed to object. After the trial began and the State rested, appellant moved for an instructed verdict on the basis that the information failed to allege any intent, which was an element of the offense. Appellant’s strategy was to sand bag.
Because the deletion of the intent language occurred on the day of trial, appellant could not object “before the date on which the trial on the merits commences,” as required by article 1.14(b); nevertheless, in this instance, it is clear that, in order to preserve error, appellant had to object before the trial actually commenced. Had appellant objected, the trial court could have corrected the error in a timely fashion, and article 1.14(b)’s objective of eliminating sand bagging would have been met. Had appellant objected and the trial court overruled his objection, the majority’s analysis would apply, the conviction would be reversed, and the information would be dismissed.
Because appellant did not object and sand bagged, this Court must determine the effect, if any, of article 1.14(b) on appel*418lant’s case. The majority holds that article 1.14(b) has no effect. The majority holds that because the information failed to allege any intent, the information failed to charge an offense and, therefore, failed to invest the trial court with jurisdiction. The majority does not define what an information is or what constitutes charging an offense for jurisdictional purposes. The 1985 amendment to article Y, section 12 of the Texas Constitution is the starting point for the answer to both definitions.
Article V, section 12 of the Texas Constitution provides:
An indictment is a written instrument presented to a court by a grand jury charging a person with the commission of an offense. An information is a written instrument presented to a court by an attorney for the State charging a person with the commission of an offense. The practice and procedures relating to the use of indictments and informations, including their contents, amendment, sufficiency, and requisites, are as provided by law. The presentment of an indictment or information to a court invests the court with jurisdiction of the cause.
TEX. CONST, art. V, § 12. The issue is whether the constitutional definition of “charging an offense” is to be read technically or practically. In Studer v. State, 757 S.W.2d 107, 110 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1988, pet. granted), this Court agreed with the following comments regarding the constitutional definition of “charging an offense” for purposes of giving a trial court jurisdiction:
It is possible and preferable, and more likely consistent with electoral understanding, to define “charging ... an offense” as requiring only that the instrument make reasonably clear what criminal offense the grand jury intended. If this can be ascertained from the instrument, it should be regarded as an indictment or information. Presentment of it should give the trial court jurisdiction.
Dix, Texas Charging Instrument Law: The 1985 Revisions and the Continuing Need for Reform, 38 Baylor L.Rev. 1, 43 (1986).
The information, quoted in the majority opinion, makes it reasonably clear that it intended to (and in fact did) charge appellant with public lewdness. Pursuant to Studer, the information, even without the intent allegation, was sufficient to identify the offense. The majority acknowledges that appellant does not argue that the information failed to give him notice.
Article V, section 12 of the Texas Constitution and article 1.14(b) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure reflect amendments made in 1985. The majority relies upon Cardenas v. State, 640 S.W.2d 291, 292 (Tex.Crim.App.1982); Ex parte Kirby, 626 S.W.2d 533, 534 (Tex.Crim.App.1981); Slavin v. State, 548 S.W.2d 30, 31 (Tex.Crim.App.1977); and Victory v. State, 547 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Tex.Crim.App.1976) (op. on reh’g), which were all decided before the 1985 amendments. Therefore, those cases do not address the issue before the Court. The majority relies upon Milam v. State, 742 S.W.2d 810, 814-15 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1987, pet. granted), and Aylor v. State, 727 S.W.2d 727, 730 (Tex.App.—Austin 1987, pet. ref’d). Milam and Aylor are not omitted-element cases; rather, both address whether article 1.14(b) applies where a defendant fails to object to an indictment that attempts to use a criminal statute retroactively. Milam and Aylor address a different issue and are not dispositive of the issue before this Court. The majority also relies upon Ex parte Elliott, 746 S.W.2d 762, 763-64 (Tex.Crim.App.1988). Elliott does not address the 1985 amendments. The apparent reason for this omission is because Elliott’s trial was before the 1985 amendments, because the indictment alleges the offense occurred in November 1981; therefore, the 1985 amendments would not apply. Elliott also fails to address the issue before the Court. The majority also relies upon Whetstone v. State, 739 S.W.2d 650 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1987, pet. granted). Whetstone involved a 1984 guilty plea and a 1986 revocation of probation. Whetstone does not mention the 1985 amendments. With one exception, Whetstone relies upon cases decided before the 1985 amendments. The one exception Whetstone relies upon is Tweedy v. State, 722 S.W.2d 30, 31 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1986, pet. ref'd). In footnote *419one of Tweedy, this Court said that Tweedy was tried before the effective date of the amendment to article 1.14. Therefore, Whetstone relied strictly upon case law decided before the 1985 amendments and did not address whether the 1985 amendments changed the law. Furthermore, because Whetstone involved what appears to be an indictment from 1984, the 1985 amendments did not apply to that case. The issue before the Court is whether the 1985 amendments have changed Cardenas, Kirby, Slavin, Victory, Elliott, and Whetstone. Studer indicates that the law has changed, and, in my opinion, Studer applies to this case.1
The only defect in the information is its failure to give the section 21.01(2) definition of “sexual contact.” In my opinion, the section 21.01(2) definition of “sexual contact” is redundant and, therefore, unnecessary. See Victory, 547 S.W.2d at 5 (Douglas, J. dissenting). In my opinion, the allegation that appellant engaged in sexual contact by touching another person on the genitals was sufficient to charge appellant with touching another person’s genitals with the intent to arouse and gratify the sexual desire of appellant.
I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.

. In Van Dusen, this Court may have already applied article 1.14(b) to the omission of an element of an offense in an information. The opinion indicates that there was a defect in the information, but the opinion never identifies the nature of the defect. Van Dusen, 744 S.W.2d at 279-80. This Court in Van Dusen held that the appellant waived the defect by failing to object before the date of trial.