Court Opinion

ID: 9417873
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 20:41:30.690507+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:12:58.265735
License: Public Domain

Me. Justice BeowN,
concurring:
I concur in the conclusion of the court in this case, and in the reasons given therefor in the opinion of the Chief Justice.
The case is distinguishable from De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 1, in but one particular, viz., the Senate resolution of February 6, 1899. With regard to this, I would say that in my view the case would not be essentially different if this resolution had been adopted by a unanimous vote of the Senate. To be efficacious such resolution must be considered .either (l)'as an amendment to the treaty, or (2) as a legislative act qualifying or modifying the treaty.- It is neither.
It cannot be regarded as part of the treaty, since it received neither the approval of the President nor the consent of the other contracting power. A treaty in its legal sense is defined by Bouvier as “'a compact made between two or more independent nations with a view to the public welfare,” (2 Law Dic. 1136,) and by Webster as “an agreement,-league or contract between two or more nations or sovereigns, formall\r signed by commissioners properly authorized, and solemnly ratified by the sovereigns or the supreme power of each state.” In its essence it is a contract. It differs from an ordinary contract only in being an agreement between independent states instead of private parties. Foster v Neilson, 2 Pet. 253, 314; Head Money Cases, 112 U. S. 580. By the Constitution, (art. 2, sec. 2,) the President “ shall have power, by and with -,the' ad-. *183vice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.” Obviously the treaty must contain the whole contract between the parties, and the power of the Senate is limited to a ratification of such terms as have already been agreed upon between the President, acting for the United States, and the commissioners of the other contracting power. The Senate has no right to ratify the treaty and introduce new terms into it, which shall be obligatory upon the other power, although it may refuse its ratification, or make such ratification conditional upon the adoption of amendments to the treaty. If, for instance, the treaty with Spain had contained a provision instating the inhabitants of the Philippines as citizens of the United States, -the Senate might have refused to ratify it until this provision was stricken out. But it could not, in my opinion, ratify the treaty and then adopt a resolution declaring it not to be its intention'to admit the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands to the privileges of citizenship of the United States. Such resolution would be inoperative as an amendment to the treaty, since it. had not received the assent of the.President or the Spanish commissioners.
Allusion was made to this question in the New York Indians v. United States, 170 U. S. 1, 21, wherein it appeared that, when a treaty with certain Indian tribes was laid before the Senate for ratification, several articles were stricken out, several others amended, a new article added, and a proviso adopted that the treaty should have no force or effect whatever, until the amendment had been submitted to the tribes, and they hqd given their free and voluntary assent thereto. This resolution, however, was not found in the original or in' the published copy of the treaty, or in the proclamation of the President, which contained the treaty without the amendments. With reference to this the court observed: “ The power to make treaties is vested by the Constitution in the President and the Senate, and, while this proviso was adopted by the Senate, there was no evidence that it ever received the sanction or approval of the President. It cannot be considered as a legislative act, since the power to legislate is vested in the President, Senate and House of Representatives. There is something, too, which shocks the con*184science in the idea that a treaty can be put forth as embodying the terms of an arrangement with a foreign power or an.Indian tribe, a material provision of which is unknown to one of the contracting parties, and is kept in the background to be used by the other only when the exigencies of a particular case may demand it. The proviso appears never to. have been called to the attention of the tribes, who would naturally assume that the treaty embodied in the Presidential proclamation contained all the terms of the arrangement.”
In short, it seems'--to me entirely clear that this resolution cannot be considered a part of the treaty.
I think it equally clear that it cannot be treated as a legislative act, though it may be conceded that under the decisions of this court Congress has the power to disregard or modify a treaty with a foreign state. This was not done.
The resolution in question was introduced as a joint resolution, but it never received the assent of the House of Representatives or the signature of the President. While a joint resolution, when approved by' the President, or, being disapproved, is passed by two thirds of each house, has the effect of a law, (Const, art. 1, sec. 7,) no such effect can be given to a resolution of either house acting independently of the other. Indeed, the above clause expressly requires concurrent action upon a resolution “ before the same shall take effect.”
This question was considered by Mr. Attorney General Cush-ing in his opinion on certain Resolutions of Congress, 6 Ops. Attys. Gen. 680, in which he held that while joint resolutions of Congress are not distinguishable from bills, and have the effect of law, separate resolutions of either house of Congress, except in matters appertaining to their own parliamentary rights, have no legal effect to constrain the action of the President or Heads of Departments.. The whole subject is there elaborately discussed.
In any view taken of this resolution it appears to me that it cán be considered only as expressing the individual views of the Senators voting upon it.
I have no doubt the treaty might have provided, as did the act of Congress annexing Hawaii, that the existing customs re-*185latións between the Spanish possessions ceded by the treaty and the United States should remain unchanged until legislation had been had upon the subject; but in the absence of such provision the case is clearly controlled by that of De Lima v. Bidwell.
Me. Justice Gray, Mb. Justice Shiras, Mb. Justice White and Mb. Justice McKeNNA dissented, for the reasons stated in their opinions in Be'Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 1, 200-220, in Booley v.- United States, 182 U. S. 222, 236-248, and in ,Bownes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244, 287-34T.