Court Opinion

ID: 9838792
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-07 23:03:43.609005+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:43.624965
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/7/23

                            CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

               IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                             FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION THREE

 THE PEOPLE,

      Plaintiff and Respondent,                      G061394

          v.                                         (Super. Ct. No. 21CF2274)

 SABRINA ARANDA,                                     OPINION

      Defendant and Appellant.

                 Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Michael A. Leversen, Judge. Affirmed.
                 Christopher Love, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
                 Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Collette C. Cavalier and
Ksenia Gracheva, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                    *         *          *
              Sabrina Aranda was charged with possession of a controlled substance in a
correctional facility. During jury selection, the People exercised a challenge for cause
against a prospective juror who admitted she would hold police officers to a higher
standard of credibility than other witnesses. Aranda objected to the challenge, but the
trial court overruled her objection. The jury convicted Aranda, and this appeal followed.
              Aranda argues that the People’s challenge for cause during jury selection
was based on the juror’s general distrust of police officers, that this is a presumptively
invalid reason to challenge a juror under Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7
(section 231.7), and that the trial court prejudicially erred when it overruled her objection
to the challenge. This argument fails because section 231.7 applies only to peremptory
challenges, not challenges for cause. We therefore affirm the judgment.

                                          FACTS
              In December 2018, an Orange County Sheriff’s Department correctional
services assistant was stationed as a guard at the Central Women’s Jail in Santa Ana
when she saw an inmate take something from her pants and pass it to Aranda, who in turn
put it in her own pants. Deputies searched inmate Aranda and found 59 grams of
methamphetamine. Aranda was charged with possession of a controlled substance in a
correctional facility (Pen. Code, § 4573.6), among other charges.
              During voir dire, prospective Juror No. 134 (Juror 134) shared that her
husband had bad experiences with the court system. When asked if she would give a
police officer’s testimony “a leg up,” she responded, “I try to believe they don’t know
everything.” Juror 134 later commented that when assessing witness credibility, she
would be more critical of police officers, hold them to a higher standard in terms of
credibility, and scrutinize them more than she would a layperson.
              The People challenged Juror 134 for cause. Defense counsel objected,
asserting that under recent changes to the law, distrust of law enforcement is a

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presumptively invalid reason to challenge a juror. The trial court overruled the objection
and excused Juror 134.
              The jury convicted Aranda of possession of a controlled substance in a
correctional facility, and the trial court imposed the upper term of four years. Aranda
filed a notice of appeal.

                                      DISCUSSION
              Aranda’s sole contention on appeal is that the trial court prejudicially erred
in overruling her objection to the prosecution’s challenge for cause of Juror 134. In
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support of this argument, Aranda relies on recently enacted section 231.7, which took
effect in January 2021 and provides that a “peremptory challenge” based on a prospective
juror’s “[e]xpressing a distrust of or having a negative experience with law enforcement
or the criminal legal system” (id., subd. (e)(1)) is “presumed to be invalid unless the party
exercising the peremptory challenge” can make a certain evidentiary showing (id.,
subd. (e)). According to Aranda, the prosecution’s challenge for cause of Juror 134 was
presumptively invalid under section 231.7.
              We disagree. On its face, section 231.7 applies only to peremptory
challenges, not challenges for cause. Indeed, the term “peremptory challenge” is used

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               Section 231.7 “creates new procedures for identifying unlawful
discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges. [¶] Under section 231.7, the party
objecting to the peremptory challenge is no longer required to make a prima facie
showing of racial discrimination. Instead, ‘upon objection to the exercise of a
peremptory challenge pursuant to [section 231.7],’ the party exercising the peremptory
challenge must state the reasons for exercising the challenge. (§ 231.7, subd. (c).) Also,
certain reasons for a peremptory challenge are presumptively invalid under section 231.7
unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence that they are unrelated to the
prospective juror’s perceived membership in a protected group and that the reasons bear
on the juror’s ability to be fair and impartial. (§ 231.7, subd. (e).) Those presumptively
invalid reasons include the prospective juror having a negative experience with law
enforcement or having a close relationship with someone who has been convicted of a
crime. (§ 231.7, subd. (e)(1), (3).)” (People v. Jaime (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 941, 943,
fn. omitted.)

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25 times throughout the statute. By comparison, the statute’s only mention of challenges
for cause is found in subdivision (l): “It is the intent of the Legislature that enactment of
this section shall not, in purpose or effect, lower the standard for judging challenges for
cause or expand use of challenges for cause.”
              Aranda asks us to ignore the statute’s plain language, asserting that limiting
the statute to peremptory challenges “would be contrary to the Legislature’s intent.” In
support, she refers us to various excerpts of section 231.7’s legislative history that discuss
its potential application to both peremptory challenges and challenges for cause. (See,
e.g., Sen. Com. on Public Safety Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 3070, (2019-2020 Reg.
Sess.) Aug. 5, 2020, p. 4 [“This bill provides that a party or the trial court on its own
motion may object to the improper use of a peremptory challenge or the use of a
challenge for cause”].) Aranda concedes, however, that the final version of the statute
omits any references to challenges for cause.
              In this case, we need not refer to the legislative history to determine what
the Legislature’s intent was in enacting section 231.7. When interpreting a statute, “[w]e
begin with the statutory language, which is usually the most reliable indicator of
legislative intent,” and “if that language is susceptible of only one meaning, ‘“we
presume the Legislature meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the statute
controls.”’” (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1045.) We consider legislative
history only if the statutory language is reasonably subject to more than one
interpretation. (Id. at p. 1046.)
              The language of section 231.7 is clear: it applies only to peremptory
challenges. We therefore need not consider prior drafts of the statute, nor may we
construct section 231.7 in a way that conflicts with its plain language. To do so would
run afoul of well-established rules of statutory construction. Because the prosecution
challenged Juror 134 for cause and not with a peremptory challenge, section 231.7 does
not apply.

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                               DISPOSITION
          The judgment is affirmed.

                                          GOETHALS, J.

WE CONCUR:

BEDSWORTH, ACTING P. J.

SANCHEZ, J.

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