Court Opinion

ID: 6643036
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-07-20 20:47:11.43466+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:59:18.926864
License: Public Domain

LONGYEAR, District Judge.
I. There is no direct evidence that Whitbeck had notice of the particular liens in question at the time of his purchase. The fact, however, that he took the precautions he did to protect himself against liens affords a strong presumption that he knew there were liens then in existence, and to a considerable amount, in addition to the chattel mortgage; and if he knew that much, it would be but a short and reasonable step further, to hold him responsible for the additional knowledge of what those liens were and by whom they were held, especially in the absence of all proof that he made any effort to gain such knowledge, or that it was withheld or concealed from him. But, as we shall presently see, it is unnecessary in this case to resort to such presumptions.
II. Notice to the purchaser while a sufficient amount of the purchase money remained unpaid to meet the liens, is as effectual to keep the liens alive as it would be if he had such notice at the time of such purchase, especially where, as in this case, the balance of purchase money was not secured by negotiable paper. At the time Whitbeck took up the two $1,000 non-negotiable notes and gave negotiable notes in lieu, for the purpose of raising money to pay on these claims, there was then still remaining unpaid on the purchase money an amount more than sufficient to pay the balance of these claims in addition to the chattel mortgage. Then, if not before, he had notice of the existence of these specific claims. But he insists that, because only $2.000 was then demanded of him, he had the right to suppose that the claims represented by Connors, with whom he did the business, were no more than that in amount, although he makes no pretense that any such representation was made by Connors, or that the payment then made was understood to be in full. On the contrary, Connors testified that he thought, as it is quite reasonable he would have done, that he told Whitbeck at the time what the claims amounted to. This was not positively denied by Whitbeck, although he said he did not recollect the fact, and thought it was not so. At all events, and this is conceded by Whitbeck, he was then informed, and knew, If he did not before, that the claims were on file in the probate court, where they were readily accessible to him at any time he might desire to examine them. He also admitted that he may have gone to the probate office and examined the claims, but as to whether he did or did not, his recollection was again quite indistinct. He knew, however, that the information was within his reach, and that it was readily accessible, and if he failed to avail himself of it, he must suffer the consequences of his neglect, and be held responsible for the knowledge he would have gained if he had made the requisite examination. Finally, taking all the proofs together, and taking into consideration the nature and character of the transactions in question, and in view of what a reasonable business man, engaged in an *75important business transaction, would naturally and almost inevitably do in the same circumstances, the court cannot avoid the conviction that Whitbeck not only must be presumed to have known, but that he actually did know that there were balances of these claims unpaid, before he paid the remaining two $1,000 notes to the administrator. Therefore, upon all considerations, Whitbeck cannot be granted any exemption fi-om the liens claimed by libellants, for want of notice.
III. Laches on the part of libellants in prosecuting their liens could be made available, if at all, in this case, only in case of want of notice of the liens to Whitbeck as a subsequent purchaser. As the court has already decided that Whitbeck is chargeable with such notice, a consideration of this point is unnecessary. It results, that libellants must have decrees in their favor for the balances due them respectively, including interest to this date, and for costs.
Decree for libellants.