Court Opinion

ID: 9494194
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:31:40.392653+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:16.384053
License: Public Domain

CLAY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
DISSENT
Although I agree with the majority that we retain jurisdiction to exercise our discretion over a certificate of appealability, see United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1007-08 (7th Cir.2000), I disagree with the majority’s decision to vacate the certificate of appealability granted to Petitioner by the district court in this case. The district court was obviously aware of the requirements of Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000), but applied them liberally inasmuch as this is a capital case. Because I agree with the district court’s approach, I see no reason to remand the matter for further consideration. I therefore respectfully dissent.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) allows for the issuance of a certificate of appealability when “the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right[,]” see 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), and the AEDPA further requires the applicant to make such a showing with respect to each issue he seeks to raise on appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(3). In Slack v. McDaniel, the Supreme Court noted that “[ejxcept for substituting the word ‘constitutional’ for the word ‘federal,’ § 2253 is a codification of the CPC [certificate of probable cause] standard announced in Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 894, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 77 L.Ed.2d 1090 [ (1983) ].” See 529 U.S. at 483, 120 S.Ct. 1595. The Court went on to state that “we give the language found in § 2253(c) the meaning ascribed it in Barefoot, with due note for the substitution of the word ‘constitutional.’ ” Id. Accordingly, while relying on Barefoot, the Court held that
[t]o obtain a COA [certificate of appeala-bility] under § 2253(c), a habeas prisoner must make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, a demonstration that, under Barefoot, includes showing that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were “ ‘ade*488quate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.’ ” Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 893, and n. 4, 103 S.Ct. 3383 (“sum[ming] up” the “ ‘substantial showing’ ” standard).
Id. at 483-84, 120 S.Ct. 1595 (alteration in Slack). Although not addressed by the Court in Slack, likely because Slack did not involve a capital matter, it is important to note Barefoot’s command that “[i]n a capital case, the nature of the penalty is a proper consideration in determining whether to issue a certificate of [appeala-bility] .... [,]” Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 893, 103 S.Ct. 3383, which I find no less controlling than Barefoot’s other commands upon which the Supreme Court relied in Slack.
In the matter at hand, the district court noted in its order denying Respondent’s motion for reconsideration of the certificate of appealability that it was aware of Slack’s requirements, but that the court was also of the belief that “certificates of appealability should not be unduly restricted in death penalty cases .” See Porterfield v. Bell, No. 97-2362-To, at 2 (W.D.Tenn. Feb. 6, 2001) (Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration of Certificate of Appeala-bility). Indeed, the district court’s decision was in keeping with Slack and Barefoot, and in my opinion, remanding the matter back to the district court for further consideration under Slack serves no useful purpose but to undermine the court’s decision to apply Slack liberally in a capital case. Again, although Slack may not state that it should be applied liberally in capital cases, Barefoot — the case upon which Slack relies and § 2253 is based— clearly states that the nature of the penalty should be considered when issuing a certificate of appealability. See Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 893, 103 S.Ct. 3383. Several of our sister circuits which have reviewed certificates of appealability in capital cases in the aftermath of Slack have likewise considered the nature of the penalty involved, and have thus applied the Slack standard liberally. See Petrocelli v. Angelone, 248 F.3d 877, 884 (9th Cir.2001); see also Peoples v. Haley, 227 F.3d 1342, 1344 (11th Cir.2000); Alexander v. Johnson, 211 F.3d 895, 897 (5th Cir.2000).
Therefore, contrary to the majority, I would deny Respondent’s motion to dismiss and would proceed with the matter.