Court Opinion

ID: 9859522
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 21:57:33.894149+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:51:12.149903
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE BARRY, specially concurring: While I agree that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed, I believe that the majority opinion in this case goes too far. By my view, the resolution of the issue should be a simple one. The case of Department of Public Works & Buildings v. Wilson & Co., cited in the majority opinion and in the dissenting opinion, is directly on point and controls the outcome of this case. See Department of Public Works & Buildings v. Wilson & Co., 62 Ill. 2d 131, 340 N.E.2d 12 (1975). In Wilson, our supreme court found that the taking of direct access and substitution with indirect frontage road access constituted a material impairment of access requiring a jury determination of damages. Wilson, 62 Ill. 2d at 145, 340 N.E.2d at 19. The same result should have occurred, and did occur, at the trial level in the present case. There is nothing in the Wilson case to suggest that the defendant here is also entitled to damages for the extinguishment of access rights in addition to damages for the material impairment of access caused by the substitution of frontage road access for direct access. See Wilson, 62 Ill. 2d 131, 340 N.E.2d 12. Thus, the trial court properly denied the defendant’s request to submit that additional claim of damages to the jury. Furthermore, the case of House of Vision, Inc. v. Hiyane, 37 Ill. 2d 32, 225 N.E.2d 21 (1967), cited in the majority opinion, does not authorize the judicial amendment of a contract by a reviewing court. See House of Vision, Inc. v. Hiyane, 37 Ill. 2d 32, 225 N.E.2d 21 (1967). I think it unwise for this appellate court to order that certain language be added to a contract without the full input of the parties on that matter. That task belongs to the parties, and if necessary, the trial court. I concur.