Court Opinion

ID: 9534469
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:40:08.570049+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:30:51.310921
License: Public Domain

TAYLOR, Justice
(concurring and dissenting) .
I concur in the opinion written by Justice KNÚDSON on all points except as to the disposition to be made of count IV of the information, following reversal of the conviction of burglary of the first degree on that count.
A charge of first degree burglary necessarily includes a charge of second degree burglary. State v. Goodmiller, 86 Idaho 233, 386 P.2d 365 (1963); State v. Eubanks, 77 Idaho 439, 294 P.2d 273 (1956); State v. Vanek, 59 Idaho 514, 84 P.2d 567 (1938). See also, State v. Anderson, 82 Idaho 293, 352 P.2d 972 (1960). This being the law, a conviction of burglary of the first degree is also a conviction of burglary of the second degree; and a verdict finding the defendant guilty of burglary of the first degree is also a verdict finding the defendant guilty of burglary of the second degree.
Idaho Code § 18-1401 defines the crime of burglary. Under this statute the crime is committed upon the unlawful entry with the required intent regardless of the time of day or night. The time of day becomes important only to a determination of the degree of the offense, as provided by I.C. § 18-1402.
In the Eubanks case it was said:
“In many cases the prosecutor may be unable to establish the precise time of the entry, whether a few minutes before or a few minutes after sunset or sunrise. It would be a travesty to require him in such cases to allege the hour, and permit the defense to be made that the crime was committed at some other hour. Or, suppose the prosecutor mistakenly believed his proof would show a nighttime entry, and charged first degree — as would be his right and duty — if he fails to establish the hour, beyond a reasonable doubt, or the defense shows the entry occurred in the daytime, is a verdict of not guilty mandatory? The time of day does not change the crime from burglary to something else. Nighttime only aggravates the offense, § 18-1403 I.C., and is material only to the higher degree.
“ Tt would be burglary in either case, whether committed at night or in daytime, and it cannot be correctly said that because the proof establishes the offense in its aggravated form it does not establish it in its less aggravated form. Where sufficient is proved to establish the offense, it would be alto*231gether illogical to say there was a failure of proof, or a variance between the allegations and proof, simply because more was proved than alleged.’ Schwabacher v. People, 165 Ill. 618, 46 N.E. 809, at 811.” 77 Idaho at 442, 294 P.2d at 274.
In obedience to the command of I.C. § 19-2311, the jury found the degree of the crime, that is, burglary of the first degree. The fact that this court finds the evidence insufficient to sustain the jury finding that the offense was committed in the nighttime does not affect or cast doubt upon the jury’s verdict that the defendant was guilty of burglary of the second degree. In such case the statute authorizes this court to modify the judgment based upon the verdict by reducing the conviction from first degree to second degree. I.C. § 19-2821. This court has not hesitated to exercise such authority or to assert its inherent power to make the judgment conform to law and justice.
In People v. O’Callaghan, 2 Idaho 156, 9 P. 414 (1886), the defendant was convicted of murder of the first degree. This court considered that the indictment was insufficient to charge murder of the first degree, and modified the judgment by reducing the verdict to a conviction of second degree, saying:
“The indictment sufficiently charges murder in the second degree, and we are of the opinion that under and in virtue of the general power given to modify we should sustain the verdict, and treat it as a verdict of murder of the second degree, which is included in the first, and modify the judgment accordingly. We are not without precedents and authority in reaching this determination. Fouts v. State, 4 G. Greene, 500; State v. McCormick, 27 Iowa, 414; Johnson v. Com., 24 Pa. St. [386] 387.” 2 Idaho at 160, 9 P. at 417.
In State v. Sprouse, 63 Idaho 166, 118 P.2d 378 (1941), the defendant was convicted of murder of the first degree. The court questioned the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction of murder of the first degree and, citing the inherent power of the court under constitution, art. 1, § 18, and the statute, I.C. § 19-2821, modT ified the judgment by reducing the defendant’s conviction from murder of the first degree to voluntary manslaughter, and remanded the case to the trial court with direction to fix the punishment accordingly.
The fact that the statute, I.C. § 19-2311, requires the jury upon a verdict of guilty, and, I.C. § 19-2502, requires the court upon a plea of guilty, to determine *232the degree of the offense, does not render such determination sacrosanct and remove it from the power and authority of this court to intervene where law and justice requires.
In this case we find from the record that there was no ground for reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt of burglary, as the jury by their verdict found. The only doubt which arises from the record concerns the time of day when the offense was committed. This doubt does not affect in the least the finality or conclusiveness of the jury’s verdict of guilty of burglary. Since, because of such doubt, the verdict of first degree burglary cannot be sustained, in compliance with the statute, LC. § 19-2105, the verdict must be given effect as a verdict of guilty of burglary of the second degree.
A majority of the justices concurring herein, the judgment as to count IV is modified by reducing the conviction to burglary of the second degree, and the cause is remanded to the district court with instructions to vacate the judgment pronounced on that count, and enter judgment thereon as on a conviction of burglary of the second degree.
McQUADE, C. J., and McFADDEN and SMITH, JJ., concur.