Court Opinion

ID: 9943038
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-22 17:07:15.864164+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:45:56.925659
License: Public Domain

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140 Nev., Advance Opinion +
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

LINA MARIE WILLSON, No. 84353-COA

Petitioner,

VS.

THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, FILED

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF

CARSON CITY; AND THE FEB 22 202

HONORABLE JAMES E. WILSON, a snag )

DISTRICT JUDGE, olf Sucsouer

Respondents, BY pe DEPUTY CLERK
and

THE STATE OF NEVADA.

Real Party in Interest.

Original petition for a writ of certiorari challenging an order of
the district court denying an appeal from a judgment of conviction, entered
pursuant to a bench trial, of obstructing a public officer.

Petition granted.

Charles H. Odgers, Public Defender, Carson City,
for Petitioner.

Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General, Carson City; Jason Woodbury, District
Attorney, and Peter W. Smith and Sarah E. White, Deputy District
Attorneys, Carson City,

for Real Party in Interest.

BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS, GIBBONS, C.J., and BULLA and
WESTBROOK, Ju.

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CORRECTED OPINION!
PER CURIAM:

In this opinion, we consider constitutional challenges to NRS
197.190, which provides that a person may not “willfully hinder, delay or
obstruct any public officer in the discharge of official powers or duties.”
Petitioner Lina Marie Willson was charged and convicted under NRS
197.190 after yelling from her front yard at several police officers, who were
attending to a separate, potentially life-threatening matter involving a
juvenile on the street near Willson’s house. After the district court affirmed
her misdemeanor conviction, Willson petitioned for a writ of certiorari,
arguing that NRS 197.190 is unconstitutionally overbroad or vague. We
conclude that (1) NRS 197.190 applies only to physical conduct or fighting
words that are specifically intended to hinder, delay, or obstruct a public
officer and, therefore, (2) NRS 197.190, as construed by this court, is not
unconstitutionally overbroad or vague, either on its face or as applied to
Willson.

Although we hold that Willson’s as-applied claims fail, we
recognize that Willson’s claims implicate the sufficiency of the evidence in
light of our interpretation of NRS 197.190. Since the district court did not
have the benefit of our interpretation of NRS 197.190 as applying only to
physical conduct and fighting words, it did not consider whether there was
sufficient evidence to support Willson’s conviction. Accordingly, we grant
the petition and direct the clerk of this court to issue a writ of certiorari

upholding NRS 197.190’s constitutionality and instructing the district court

'This corrected opinion is issued in place of the opinion filed on
February 8, 2024.

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to reconsider Willson’s direct appeal for the sole purpose of addressing
whether, under this court's interpretation of NRS 197.190, sufficient
evidence supported Willson’s conviction.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 25, 2021, the Carson City Sheriffs Office responded

to a call indicating a juvenile was contemplating suicide. Sergeant Mike
Cullen was the first officer to arrive and saw the juvenile walking down a
residential road with a knife in his hands. Sergeant Cullen followed the
juvenile in his car and attempted to communicate with him. At some point,
the juvenile stopped in the street, and Sergeant Cullen got out of his car
and continued to communicate with the juvenile from a distance. The
juvenile pressed the knife into his body a couple of times and stated he
wanted to kill himself. In accord with his training, Sergeant Cullen
attempted to build rapport with the juvenile to prevent the juvenile from
committing suicide.

Shortly thereafter, more officers arrived on the scene. One
officer, Deputy Nicholas Simpson, maintained a position with a beanbag
shotgun while the other officers attempted to deescalate and control the
scene. Deputy Simpson was to use the beanbag shotgun if the public or the
officers became at risk. Approximately 15 minutes after the officers arrived
on scene, the juvenile dropped the knife. Sergeant Cullen believed the
situation was unstable up until that moment.

At some point during these 15 minutes, while the officers were
interacting with the juvenile, Willson, who lived next door to where the
incident was taking place, started yelling at the officers and the juvenile

from the middle of her front lawn, Willson continued to yell at the officers

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even though two deputies had asked her to stop yelling several times.? The
officers generally could not recall what Willson was yelling, although
Sergeant Cullen heard Willson yell at some point that “she was a witness of
some sort.”

The officers testified that Willson did not leave her yard, did not
threaten them with violence, and did not throw anything at them.
Nevertheless, the officers testified that Willson’s yelling was loud and
disruptive and delayed their attempts to get the juvenile to drop the knife
because it interfered with their ability to build rapport and interact with
the juvenile. Deputy Simpson also testified that he had to put down the
beanbag shotgun to address Willson because of her yelling, which put the
officers at risk. Eventually, Willson’s behavior “stopped enough” to where
the officers were able to get the juvenile over to the curb, and the juvenile
dropped the knife.

Thereafter, the State charged Willson with obstructing a public
officer in violation of NRS 197.190, and Willson was convicted after a bench
trial in Carson City Justice Court. Willson appealed her conviction to the
district court, arguing that NRS 197.190 was unconstitutionally overbroad
and vague both on its face and as applied to her. The district court denied
the appeal, holding NRS 197.190 was not unconstitutionally overbroad or
vague because the statute required both due notice and the specific intent
to obstruct a public officer.? Wilson then filed this petition for a writ of

certiorarl.

“Deputy Simpson testified that he asked Willson to stop yelling
between three and five times.

3Respondent, the Honorable James E. Wilson, decided Willson’s
appeal and entered the challenged order. He has since retired, and the

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ANALYSIS
In this petition, Willson challenges the constitutionality of NRS

197.190. This court is authorized to review a petition for a writ of certiorari
in cases where a district court has passed upon the constitutionality of a
statute on appeal from justice court. See Nev. Const. art. 6, § 4(1); NRS
34.020(3). “The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law that we
review de novo.” Silvar v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 122 Nev. 289, 292, 129 P.3d
682, 684 (2006). “Statutes are presumed to be valid, and the challenger
bears the burden of showing that a statute is unconstitutional.” Id.
Willson argues NRS 197.190 is unconstitutionally overbroad
and vague, both on its face and as applied to her. “The overbreadth doctrine
permits the facial invalidation of laws that inhibit the exercise of First
Amendment rights if the impermissible applications of the law are
substantial when ‘judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate
sweep.” Ford v. State, 127 Nev. 608, 612, 262 P.38d 1123, 1125 (2011)
(quoting Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 52 (1999)). The First Amendment
of the United States Constitution prohibits the government from abridging
an individual’s freedom of speech.4 U.S. Const. amend. I; Busefink v. State,
128 Nev. 525, 529, 286 P.3d 599, 602 (2012). “The vagueness doctrine holds
that ‘[a] conviction fails to comport with due process if the statute under
which it is obtained fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair

notice of what is prohibited, or is so standardless that it authorizes or

Honorable Kristin N. Luis has succeeded him in Department Two of the
First Judicial District Court.

4The First Amendment is applicable to the states through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Gitlow v. New York, 268
U.S. 652, 666 (1925).

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encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.” Ford, 127 Nev. at 612,
262 P.3d at 1125 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Williams,
553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008)).

To determine whether NRS 197.190 is overbroad or vague, we
must first interpret NRS 197.190 to determine what the statute prohibits.
See id. at 612, 262 P.3d at 1126 (“The first step in both overbreadth and
vagueness analysis is to construe the challenged statute.”); see also United
States v. Hansen, 599 U.S. 762, 770 (2023) (“To judge whether a statute is
overbroad, we must first determine what it covers.”). After interpreting
NRS 197.190, we determine whether NRS 197.190, as construed by this

court, is overbroad or vague, either on its face or as applied to Willson.

NRS_ 197.190 prohibits physical conduct or fighting words that are
specifically intended to hinder, delay, or obstruct a public officer in the
discharge of official powers or duties

NRS 197.190 was enacted as part of the Crimes and
Punishments Act of 1911, reprinted in Nev. Rev. Laws § 6805, at 1928
(1912), and has not been amended by the Legislature or interpreted in a
published decision by the Nevada appellate courts since its enactment. The
statute reads as follows:

Every person who, after due notice, shall refuse or
neglect to make or furnish any statement, report or
information lawfully required of the person by any
public officer, or who, in such statement, report or
information shall make any willfully untrue,
misleading or exaggerated statement, or who shall
willfully hinder, delay or obstruct any public officer
in the discharge of official powers or duties, shall,
where no other provision of law applies, be guilty of
a misdemeanor.

NRS 197.190.

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When interpreting a statute, this court’s “primary goal... . is to
give effect to the Legislature’s intent in enacting it.” Ramos v. State, 137
Nev. 721, 722, 499 P.3d 1178, 1180 (2021). “[Wle first look to the statute’s
plain language to determine its meaning, and we will enforce it as written
if the language is clear and unambiguous.” Jd. In determining the plain
meaning of a statute, we consider both “the particular statutory language
at issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole.”
Reggio v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 1389 Nev., Adv. Op. 4, 525 P.3d 350, 353
(2023) (quoting K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988)). “We
will look beyond the statute’s language only if that language is ambiguous
or its plain meaning was clearly not intended or would lead to an absurd or
unreasonable result.” Ramos, 137 Nev. at 722, 499 P.3d at 1180. “An
ambiguity arises where the statutory language lends itself to two or more
reasonable interpretations.” State v. Catanio, 120 Nev. 1030, 1033, 102
P.3d 588, 590 (2004).

As an initial matter, we recognize that NRS 197.190 provides
three alternative means by which a person may be guilty of obstructing a
public officer, and each alternative is laid out in a clause that begins with
“who.” Willson only challenges the constitutionality of the final clause,
which she was charged with violating: “[e]very person... who shall
willfully hinder, delay or obstruct any public officer in the discharge of
official powers or duties.”®> NRS 197.190.

5As such, all references to obstruction in this opinion refer to an
obstruction charge under this last clause, unless stated otherwise. We
express no opinion regarding the constitutionality of the other provisions of
NRS 197.190.

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Willson contends that NRS 197.190’s scope is broad, prohibiting
not only physical conduct but also protected speech. The State contends
that NRS 197.190 is limited in its scope by due notice and specific intent
requirements. As such, the parties ratse three issues for this court’s
consideration: (1) whether NRS 197.190 requires that a person receive “due
notice” that their behavior is hindering, delaying, or obstructing a public
officer; (2) whether NRS 197.190 requires that a person have the specific
intent to hinder, delay, or obstruct a public officer; and (3) whether NRS
197.190 prohibits speech that hinders, delays, or obstructs a public officer.
We consider these issues in turn.

NRS 197.190 does not require that a person receive “due notice” that
they are hindering, delaying, or obstructing a public officer

The State argues, and the district court held, that a person
cannot be guilty of obstructing a public officer unless the person received
due notice that their behavior was hindering, delaying, or obstructing a
public officer. However, such an interpretation 1s at odds with the structure
of the statute.

The phrase “after due notice” succeeds only the first “who”
clause, which introduces the first alternative means of committing the
offense. The phrase’s placement within only the first clause indicates its
application is limited to the category of persons described in that clause,
i.e., those who “refuse or neglect to make or furnish any statement, report
or information lawfully required of the person by any public officer.”
Indeed, interpreting NRS 197.190 as requiring due notice for each means of
committing obstruction would lead to an absurd result, as it would require
that a person convicted of obstruction under the second clause have received
due notice that they were making a “willfully untrue, misleading or

exaggerated statement.”

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Were we to follow the logic of the State and district court, to be
consistent, we would also have to hold that the phrase following the second
“who” clause—‘in such statement, report or information”—would also have
to apply to the other two clauses. However, this would lead to a nonsensical
construction, prohibiting every person who, “in such statement, report or
information” from “willfully hinder[ing], delay[ing] or obstruct[ing] any
public officer in the discharge of official powers or duties.” An absurd
construction such as this should always be avoided. Sheriff, Clark Cnty. v.
Burcham, 124 Nev. 1247, 1253, 198 P.3d 326, 329 (2008). Therefore, we
conclude that NRS 197.190 does not require that a person receive due notice
that their behavior is hindering, delaying, or obstructing a public officer.

NRS 197.190 requires that a person have the specific intent to hinder,
delay, or obstruct a public officer

The State also argues, and the district court held, that a person
cannot be guilty of obstructing a public officer unless the person has the
specific intent to hinder, delay, or obstruct a public officer.

“Specific intent” is “[t]he intent to accomplish the precise
criminal act that one is later charged with.” Intent, Black’s Law Dictionary
(11th ed. 2019); accord Bolden v. State, 121 Nev. 908, 923, 124 P.3d 191, 201
(2005), receded from on other grounds by Cortinas v. State, 124 Nev. 10138,
1026-27, 195 P.3d 315, 324 (2008). In contrast, “general intent” is “[t]he
intent to perform an act even though the actor does not desire the
consequences that result.” Intent, Black’s Law Dictionary; see Bolden, 121
Nev. at 923, 124 P.3d at 201. With respect to NRS 197.190, specific intent
would require that a person intend for a public officer to be hindered,
delayed, or obstructed by the person’s act, whereas general intent would

require only that a person intend to perform an act that results in the

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hinderance, delay, or obstruction of a public officer, regardless of whether
the person desired such a result.

NRS 197.190 makes it unlawful to “willfully hinder, delay or
obstruct any public officer in the discharge of official powers or duties.” NRS
197.190 does not define the term “willfully”; therefore, we consider the term
as it is commonly understood. See Cornella v. Just. Ct. of New River Twp.,
132 Nev. 587, 594, 377 P.3d 97, 102 (2016) (“When the Legislature does not
specifically define a term, this court ‘presume[s] that the Legislature
intended to use words in their usual and natural meaning.” (alteration in
original) (quoting Wyman v. State, 125 Nev. 592, 607, 217 P.3d 572, 583
(2009))). Although the term is generally understood to mean “deliberately”
or “intentionall[ly],” see Willful, Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary
(11th ed. 2020), the term may denote either that an act is “[vJoluntary and
intentional, but not necessarily malicious” or that an act “involves [a]
conscious wrong or evil purpose on the part of the actor,” see Willful, Black's
Law Dictionary.

Because the term “willfully” does not necessarily require
malice, the phrase “willfully hinder, delay or obstruct any public officer”
may reasonably be interpreted as requiring only that a person intend to
perform an act that resulted in the hinderance, delay, or obstruction of a
public officer. See Robey v. State, 96 Nev. 459, 461, 611 P.2d 209, 210 (1980)
(stating the term “‘willful’ when used in criminal statutes with respect to
proscribed conduct relates to an act or omission which is done intentionally,
deliberately or designedly, as distinguished from an act or omission done
accidentally, inadvertently, or innocently”); see also Moore v. State, 186 Nev.
620, 624, 475 P.3d 33, 36 (2020) (recognizing “the term ‘wil[l]fully has been

defined to refer to general intent” in the context of statutes aimed at the

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protection of infants (alteration in original) (quoting Jenkins v. State, 110
Nev. 865, 870, 877 P.2d 1063, 1066 (1994))).

However, because the term “willfully” may also suggest an evil
or malicious purpose on the part of the actor, and the terms “hinder,”
“delay,” and “obstruct” are transitive verbs that refer to a specific object,
i.e., ‘any public officer,” the phrase “willfully hinder, delay or obstruct any
public officer” may also reasonably be interpreted as requiring that a person
intend their act to hinder, delay, or obstruct a public officer. See Flores-
Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646, 650 (2009) (“In ordinary English,
where a transitive verb has an object, listeners in most contexts assume
that an adverb... that modifies the transitive verb tells the listener how
the subject performed the entire action, including the object as set forth in
the sentence.”); see also Byford v. State, 116 Nev. 215, 284, 994 P.2d 700,
713 (2000) (holding “willful means intentional” and that “willful first-degree
murder requires that the killer actually intend to kill”). Therefore, we
conclude NRS 197.190 is ambiguous as to whether the offense is a general
or specific intent crime.

“To interpret an ambiguous statute, we look to the legislative
history and construe the statute In a manner that is consistent with reason
and public policy.” State v. Lucero, 127 Nev. 92, 95, 249 P.38d 1226, 1228
(2011). We also consider “prior judicial interpretations of related or
comparable statutes by this or other courts,” Castaneda v. State, 132 Nev.
434, 439, 373 P.3d 108, 111 (2016), as well as definitions of the offense at
common law, see Adler v. Sheriff, Clark Cnty., 92 Nev. 641, 643, 556 P.2d
549, 550 (1976); see also NRS 193.050(8). Finally, “every reasonable
construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from

unconstitutionality.” State v. Castaneda, 126 Nev. 478, 481, 245 P.3d 550,

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552 (2010) (quoting Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895)); see also
United States v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909) (“[W]here a
statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and
doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such
questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter.”).

Unfortunately, there is neither legislative history to assist in
discerning legislative intent, nor any Nevada caselaw discussing the
reasons for NRS 197.190’s passage more than a century ago. See City of
Milwaukee v. Wroten, 466 N.W.2d 861, 869, 871 (Wis. 1991) (declining to
guess the original intent of the drafters in passing a 135-year-old ordinance
that prohibited resisting an officer). Neither is there any Nevada caselaw
discussing or recognizing the common law offense.

Other jurisdictions appear split on whether similar statutory
offenses are general or specific intent crimes. Compare People v. Roberts,
182 Cal. Rptr. 757, 760-61 (App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1982) (holding a statute
that made it a crime to “willfully resist[ ], delay[], or obstruct[ ] any public
officer” required only a general intent to act), and People v. Gleisner, 320
N.W.2d 340, 341-42 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (holding a statute that made it a
crime to “willfully obstruct, resist or oppose” an officer required “only an
intent to do a certain physical act”), with Harris v. State, 726 S.E.2d 455,
457-58 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012) (recognizing a statute that made it a crime to
knowingly and willfully obstruct or hinder an officer did not criminalize
“any actions which incidentally hinder an officer” (quoting Hudson v. State,
218 S.E.2d 905, 907 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975))), and State v. Singletary, 327
S.E.2d 11, 13 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (holding a statute that made it a crime
to “willfully and unlawfully resist, delay, or obstruct a police officer” did not

proscribe innocent conduct but only conduct made with the intent to resist,

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delay, or obstruct).° A few state courts appear to have explicitly considered
whether the common law offense requires a specific intent to obstruct, and
those cases suggest the common law offense is a specific intent crime. See,
e.g., Cover v. State, 466 A.2d 1276, 1284 (Md. 1983) (holding the common
law offense requires the “[iJntent to obstruct or hinder the officer by the
act”); Commonwealth v. Adams, 125 N.E.3d 39, 51 (Mass. 2019) (holding the
common law offense requires “that the defendant intended his or her
conduct, and intended ‘the harmful consequences of the conduct—that is,

”)

the interference with, obstruction, or hindrance” (quoting Commonwealth
vu. Joyce, 998 N.E.2d 1038, 1042 (Mass. App. Ct. 2013))).

Thus, to the extent there is guidance from other jurisdictions, it
tends to lean toward interpreting the statute as requiring specific intent.
Indeed, interpreting NRS 197.190 as requiring only a general intent to act
would raise grave doubts as to the statute’s constitutionality. In particular,
such an interpretation would criminalize a significant amount of
constitutionally protected activity. For example, “merely remonstrating
with an officer in behalf of another, or criticizing or questioning an officer
while he is performing his duty” could constitute an unlawful act. State v.
Leigh, 179 S.E.2d 708, 713 (N.C. 1971); see also City of Houston v. Hill, 482
U.S. 451, 461 (1987) (stating “the First Amendment protects a significant

amount of verbal criticism and challenge directed at police officers”).

6‘We note that NRS 199.280, which prohibits a person from “willfully
resist[ing], delay[ing] or obstruct[ing] a public officer in discharging or
attempting to discharge any legal duty of his or her office” is similar, but
not identical, to NRS 197.190. However, there is also no Nevada caselaw
interpreting NRS 199.280 from which this court may draw guidance in this
matter.

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Such an interpretation would also raise vagueness concerns
because the statute would likely be violated with regular frequency but only
few would be subject to prosecution. See Scott v. First Jud. Dist. Ct., 131
Nev. 1015, 1022-23, 363 P.3d 1159, 1164-65 (2015) (holding an obstruction
ordinance was impermissibly vague because its prohibitions were “violated
scores of times daily, ... yet only some individuals—those chosen by the
police in their unguided discretion—are arrested” (quoting Hill, 482 U.S. at
466-67)). For example, a person could be charged with obstruction for
intentionally walking in front of a police officer, even if the person was
unaware that doing so would hinder, delay, or obstruct the officer.

In contrast, a specific intent requirement would mitigate
overbreadth concerns by narrowing the scope of criminal proscriptions that
could reach constitutionally protected activity. See, e.g., Ford v. State, 127
Nev. 608, 619, 262 P.3d 1123, 1130 (2011) (holding a pandering of
prostitution statute was not overbroad in part because the statute’s intent
requirement narrowed the statute’s application); see also Stubbs v. Las
Vegas Metro. Police Dep't, 792 F. App’x 441, 444-45 (9th Cir. 2019)
(Tashima, J., dissenting) (stating NRS 197.190 must be construed as
requiring specific intent in order to withstand constitutional scrutiny).

A specific intent requirement would also mitigate vagueness
concerns by providing an objective standard for the statute's enforcement.
See Ford, 127 Nev. at 621-22, 262 P.3d at 1132 (stating the determination
of “[w]hether someone held a belief or had an intent is a true-or-false
determination, not a subjective judgment such as whether conduct is
‘annoying’ (quoting United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 306 (2008))).
Therefore, we interpret NRS 197.190 as requiring that a person have the

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specific intent to hinder, delay, or obstruct a public officer in the discharge
of official duties or powers.
NRS 197.190 only applies to physical conduct and fighting words

Willson argues that NRS 197.190 is unconstitutional because
its prohibition against speech that hinders, delays, or obstructs a public
officer includes speech protected by the First Amendment.

Although NRS 197.190 makes it unlawful to “hinder, delay or
obstruct any public officer in the discharge of official powers or duties,” the
statute does not define the operative verbs “hinder,” “delay,” or “obstruct.”
These terms plainly indicate a “legislative intent to prohibit that which
would interfere with law enforcement officers as they go about their duties,”
Newton v. State, 698 P.2d 1149, 1152 (Wyo. 1985), but they do not clearly
indicate whether the statute encompasses mere speech, see Hinder,
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (‘to make slow or difficult the
progress of: hamper” or “to hold back: check”); Delay, Merriam-Webster’s

02 te

Collegiate Dictionary (to “put off, postpone,” “to stop, detain, or hinder for a
time,” or “to cause to be slower or to occur more slowly than normal”);
Obstruct, Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (“to block or close up by
an obstacle” or “to hinder from passage, action, or operation: impede”).
Strictly speaking, the spoken word may slow, hamper, prevent,
or impede a public officer from performing their duties. See DeFusco v.
Brophy, 311 A.2d 286, 288 (R.I. 1973) (stating “the spoken word can be just
as effective in impeding an officer in the discharge of his duty as if the orater
[sic] had grappled with the officer”); see also Scott, 131 Nev. at 1022, 363
P.3d at 1164 (stating a pedestrian may hinder or delay a deputy sheriff by
asking the deputy for directions while the deputy is directing traffic at an
intersection). As such, NRS 197.190 may reasonably be interpreted as

prohibiting speech that hinders, delays, or obstructs a public officer.

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However, the statute does not explicitly reference speech, and
it does not contain all-encompassing language, such as “in any way’ or “in
any manner,” that would suggest its provisions extend to speech. Cf. Hill,
482 U.S. at 455 (striking down an ordinance that made it a crime to “in any
manner oppose, molest, abuse or interrupt any policeman” because it
prohibited speech); Wroten, 466 N.W.2d at 870 (“Thus, if it were not
apparent from the words themselves, the ‘any way’ language, as does the
‘any manner’ language of Hill, leads inexorably to the conclusion that the
prohibited activity includes speech....”), The terms “obstruct” and
“hinder” may also connote some action (or inaction) apart from verbal
expression. See, e.g., State v. Snodgrass, 570 P.2d 1280, 1286 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1977) (stating the term “‘obstructing’...implfies] ... ‘some physical act or
exertion” (third alteration in original) (quoting State v. Tages, 457 P.2d 289,
292 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969))); Wilkerson v. State, 556 So. 2d 453, 455 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1990) (stating the term “obstruct’... contemplates acts or conduct
apart from verbal expressions, which operate to physically hinder or impede
another in doing something”); Bennett v. St. Louis County, 542 S.W.3d 392,
401 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017) (stating “[t]he term ‘obstruct’... does not suggest
speech” but rather “connotes purely physical action”). As such, NRS
197.190 may also reasonably be interpreted as applying only to physical
conduct. Therefore, we conclude NRS 197.190 is ambiguous as to whether
it prohibits speech.

In hght of the constitutional concerns previously identified, the
canon of constitutional avoidance obligates this court to further limit NRS
197.190’s application to physical conduct and unprotected fighting words.
See Hill, 482 U.S. at 463 n.12 (stating “fighting words’ which ‘by their very

utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace’

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are not constitutionally protected” (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942))). Although the specific intent requirement
“narrow[s] and clariflies] the statute, so as to bring it at least closer to being
within constitutional parameters,” Scott, 131 Nev. at 1027 n.6, 363 P.3d at
1168 n.6 (Hardesty, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), it is not
clear that this requirement would wholly resolve the constitutional
concerns presented by the statute.

Notably, the specific intent requirement would not prevent NRS
197.190’s application to constitutionally protected speech. See Hill, 482
U.S. at 469 n.18 (stating “speech does not necessarily lose its constitutional
protection because the speaker intends it to interrupt an officer’); Long v.
Valentino, 265 Cal. Rptr. 96, 101 (Ct. App. 1989) (stating “speech is
generally protected by the First Amendment, even if it is intended to
interfere with the performance of an officer’s duty, provided no physical
interference results”). The specific intent requirement also may not, in
itself, provide sufficient guidance to law enforcement in the statute’s
application. See Hill, 482 U.S. at 469 n.18 (stating an intent requirement
would not “cabin the excessive discretion the ordinance provides to
officers”); Scott, 131 Nev. at 1027 n.6, 363 P.3d at 1168 n.6 (Hardesty, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating “there is little doubt” an
obstruction ordinance would survive constitutional scrutiny if interpreted
to require both specific intent and physical conduct or fighting words).

Indeed, several courts have interpreted similar statutes as
being limited to physical conduct, and sometimes fighting words, so as to
ensure such statutes are constitutionally firm. See, e.g., Snodgrass, 570
P.2d at 1286-87 (holding a statute that made it a crime to “willfully resist,

delay or obstruct a public officer” required “the presence of some physical

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act or exertion against the officer”); State v. Williams, 534 A.2d 230, 236,
239 (Conn. 1987) (holding a statute that made it a crime to “obstruct| ],
resist[ |], hinder[ ] or endanger[ | any peace officer” proscribed “only physical
conduct and fighting words”); Wilkerson, 556 So. 2d at 454-56 (holding a
statute that made it a crime to “obstruct or oppose any such
officer... without offering or doing violence to the person of the officer”
required some act or conduct apart from verbal expressions); People v. Raby,
240 N.E.2d 595, 597, 599 (Ill. 1968) (holding a statute that made it a crime
to “knowingly resist[{] or obstruct[ ] the performance by one known to the
person to be a peace officer” proscribed only physical acts); State v. Krawsky,
426 N.W.2d 875, 876-77 (Minn. 1988) (holding a statute that made it a crime
to “intentionally obstruct[], hinder| ], or prevent[ ] the lawful execution of
any legal process, ... or [to] interfere[ ] with a peace officer” was “directed
solely at physical acts”); State v. Williams, 251 P.3d 877, 879, 883 (Wash.
2011) (recognizing a statute that made it a crime to “willfully hinderT ],
delay[], or obstruct[ ] any law enforcement officer” required “conduct in
addition to pure speech’).

Therefore, we interpret NRS 197.190 as applying only to
physical conduct and fighting words. We note that NRS 197.190 does not
require the use of force or violence, and that a person’s action (e.g., blocking
the path of an officer) or inaction (e.g., refusing to obey a lawful order) may
constitute physical conduct that hinders, delays, or obstructs an officer. See
State v. Hudson, 784 P.2d 533, 537 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (recognizing that
“nonaggressive behavior” may hinder, delay, or obstruct an officer just as
“assaultive conduct”); see also Christopher Hall, Annotation, What
Constitutes Obstructing or Resisting Officer, in Absence of Actual Force, 66
A.L.R.5th 397 (1999) (collecting cases where courts have determined what

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constitutes obstructing an officer in the absence of actual force). Of course,
whether a person’s physical conduct actually hinders, delays, or obstructs a
public officer is a question to be resolved by the trier of fact in a given case.
NRS 197.190 is not facially overbroad

Having determined what NRS 197.190 prohibits, we now
consider whether NRS 197.190 is facially overbroad. A statute is facially
overbroad “if the impermissible apphecations of the law are substantial when
‘judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.” Ford, 127
Nev. at 612, 262 P.3d at 1125 (quoting City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S.
41, 52 (1999)). Because a determination that a statute is facially overbroad
voids the statute in its entirety, “the overbreadth doctrine is strong
medicine” that should not be employed casually. Scott, 131 Nev. at 1018,
363 P.3d at 1162 (quoting Silvar v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 122 Nev. 289, 298,
129 P.3d 682, 688 (2006)); see also United States v. Hansen, 599 U.S. 762,
770 (2028).

Willson argues NRS 197.190 is facially overbroad because it
allows protected speech to be made a crime. In support of this argument,
Willson cites cases where ordinances were struck down as overbroad
because of their application to protected speech. See, e.g., Hill, 482 U.S. at
460-67 (holding an ordinance that made it unlawful for any person to “in
any manner” oppose, molest, abuse, or interrupt a police officer was facially
overbroad because it applied to speech and was not narrowly tailored to
prohibit only disorderly conduct or fighting words); Lewis v. City of New
Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 132-34 (1974) (holding an ordinance that made it
unlawful for any person to curse or revile or to use obscene or opprobrious
language toward a city police officer was facially overbroad because it
applied to speech and was not narrowly tailored to prohibit only fighting

words).

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However, as construed by this court, NRS 197.190 does not
apply to protected speech; it applies only to physical conduct and fighting
words. This limitation positively distinguishes NRS 197.190 from the
ordinances struck down in Hill and Lewis: “the statute does not apply to
ordinary verbal criticism directed at a police officer even while the officer is
performing his official duties and does not apply to the mere act of [verbally]
interrupting an officer, even intentionally.” Krawsky, 426 N.W.2d at 878.

This limitation and NRS 197.190’s specific intent requirement
also distinguishes NRS 197.190 from the ordinance deemed
unconstitutional in Scott. There, the Nevada Supreme Court held an
ordinance that made it unlawful for “any person to hinder, obstruct, resist,
delay, molest or threaten to hinder, obstruct, resist, delay or molest any city
officer ...in the discharge of his official duties” was overbroad. Scott, 131
Nev. at 1018-21, 363 P.3d at 1161-63 (emphasis added). In so holding, the
supreme court recognized that the ordinance did not contain a specific
intent requirement,’ id. at 1019, 363 P.3d at 1163, and that the ordinance
applied to speech in light of its prohibition of “mere threats” to hinder,
obstruct, resist, delay, or molest a police officer, id. at 1020, 363 P.3d at
1168.

Given our holdings that NRS 197.190 does not apply to
protected speech and only prohibits physical conduct or fighting words that
are specifically intended to hinder, delay, or obstruct a public officer, NRS

7Although the supreme court noted that an intent requirement would
not, in itself, save the ordinance, Scott, 181 Nev. at 1019 n.3, 363 P.3d at
1163 n.3, the supreme court also indicated that invalidating the ordinance
would not affect NRS 199.280’s validity, which is similar to NRS 197.190,
because that statute was “explicitly limited by an intent requirement,” id.
at 1020 n.4, 363 P.3d at 1163 n.4; see also supra note 3.

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197.190 is distinguishable from the ordinances in Hill, Lewis, and Scott.
Moreover, the mere fact that “a person’s speech may at times be implicated
incidentally in the enforcement of this statute” does not render the statute
facially overbroad. Wilkerson, 556 So. 2d at 456. Therefore, Willson fails to
demonstrate that NRS 197.190 is substantially overbroad relative to the
scope of its plainly legitimate sweep, and we conclude that NRS 197.190 is
not facially overbroad.

NRS 197.190 is not facially vague

Willson argues NRS 197.190 is unconstitutionally vague on its
face because it fails to provide persons of ordinary intelligence fair notice of
what is prohibited and it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory
or arbitrary enforcement.

“The void-for-vagueness doctrine is predicated upon a statute's
repugnancy to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.” Scott, 131 Nev. at 1021, 363 P.3d at 1163-64
(quoting Silvar, 122 Nev. at 293, 129 P.3d at 684-85). A statute is
unconstitutionally vague “(1) if it ‘fails to provide a person of ordinary
intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited’; or (2) if it ‘is so standardless
that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.” Jd.
at 1021, 363 P.3d at 1164 (quoting State v. Castaneda, 126 Nev. 478, 481-
82, 245 P.3d 550, 553 (2010)). “The first prong is concerned with guiding
those who may be subject to potentially vague statutes, while the second—
and more important—prong is concerned with guiding the enforcers of
statutes.” Silvar, 122 Nev. at 2938, 129 P.3d at 685. A statute involving
criminal penalties or constitutionally protected rights is facially vague if
“vagueness so permeates the text that the statute cannot meet these
requirements in most applications.” Flamingo Paradise Gaming, LLC v.

Chanos, 125 Nev. 502, 512-13, 217 P.3d 546, 553-54 (2009).

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NRS 197.190 provides sufficient notice of what is prohibited
Willson argues NRS 197.190 fails to provide persons of ordinary

intelligence fair notice that they may be arrested for protected speech.
However, as previously discussed, NRS 197.190 does not prohibit protected
speech. Rather, NRS 197.190 prohibits only physical conduct and fighting
words that hinder, delay, or obstruct a public officer, and the terms “hinder,”
“delay,” and “obstruct” are words of recognized meaning that provide
persons of ordinary intelligence fair notice that they may not interfere with
or hamper the activities of a public officer. See Newton v. State, 698 P.2d
1149, 1152 (Wyo. 1985) (stating the terms “hinder,” “delay,” and “obstruct”
are “words of recognized meaning by those of ordinary intelligence”); see also
Snodgrass, 570 P.2d at 1286, 1289 (stating “a person of common intelligence
can easily ascertain what acts are prohibited” under a statute that made it
a crime to “willfully resist, delay or obstruct a public officer”); Krawsky, 426
N.W.2d at 876, 878 (stating “[p]ersons of common intelligence need not
guess at whether their conduct violates” a statute that made it a crime to
“intentionally obstruct[ ], hinder| ], or prevent[ ] the lawful execution of any
legal process, ... or [to] interfere[ ] with a peace officer”),

Moreover, NRS 197.190’s specific intent requirement further
ensures that persons of ordinary intelligence have fair notice of when their
conduct constitutes a criminal offense. See Ford, 127 Nev. at 621, 262 P.3d
at 1132 (stating “a law that requires specific intent to produce a prohibited
result may avoid vagueness, both by giving the defendant notice of what is
prohibited and by affording adequate law enforcement standards’); see also
Vill. of Hoffman Ests. v. Flipside, Hoffman Ests. Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499
(1982) (recognizing “that a scienter requirement may mitigate a law’s
vagueness, especially with respect to the adequacy of notice to the

complainant that his conduct is proscribed”). Accordingly, we conclude NRS

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197.190 does not fail to provide a person of ordinary intelligence sufficient
notice of what is prohibited.

NRS 197.190 is not so standardless so as to authorize or encourage
seriously discriminatory or arbitrary enforcement

Willson argues NRS 197.190 authorizes or encourages seriously
discriminatory or arbitrary enforcement because it grants police officers
unfettered discretion to arrest individuals based on their subjective belief
that a citizen has obstructed an arrest or investigation.

Police officers must always exercise some judgment in
determining whether a person has obstructed the performance of a public
officer's duties. And “given the wide variety of circumstances in which the
type of conduct [the statute] legitimately seeks to proscribe can occur,” some
degree of judgment must be permitted. Krawsky, 426 N.W.2d at 878-79.
Indeed, “it seems unlikely that a substantially more precise standard could
be formulated which would not risk nullification in practice because of easy
evasion.” Jd. As the United States Supreme Court has similarly recognized,

[t]here are areas of human conduct where, by the
nature of the problems presented, legislatures
simply cannot establish standards with great
precision. Control of the broad range of disorderly
conduct that may inhibit a policeman in the
performance of his official duties may be one such
area, requiring as it does an _ on-the-spot
assessment of the need to keep order.

Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 581 (1974).

NRS 197.190 does not provide those charged with enforcement
of its provisions unfettered and unguided discretion. As construed by this
court, NRS 197.190 prohibits only physical conduct and fighting words that
hinder, delay, or obstruct a public officer in the discharge of official duties

or powers. As such, law enforcement has no discretion to arrest persons for

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protected speech or for physical conduct that is merely annoying or
offensive. Cf. Scott, 131 Nev. at 1022, 363 P.3d at 1164 (holding an
obstruction ordinance was unconstitutionally vague because it was “worded
so broadly that sheriffs [sic] deputies [were] given ‘unfettered discretion to
arrest individuals for words or conduct that annoy or offend them” (quoting
Hill, 482 U.S. at 465)).

Moreover, NRS 197.190’s specific intent requirement prevents
law enforcement from citing or arresting persons for innocent conduct that
incidentally interferes with a public officer. See Ford, 127 Nev. at 622-23,
262 P.3d at 1132 (recognizing that a specific intent requirement curbs the
amount of discretion a statute affords to law enforcement); City of Las Vegas
v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 122 Nev. 1041, 1051, 146 P.38d 240, 247 (2006)
(holding an ordinance “provide[d] an adequate standard for law
enforcement because officers will know that, in order to prosecute someone
for violating the ordinance, the prosecutor must prove that the dancer or
the patron fondled or caressed the other with the intent to sexually arouse
or excite”).

Accordingly, we conclude NRS 197.190 is not so standardless
that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory or arbitrary
enforcement, and that NRS 197.190 is not so permeated by vagueness so as
to render the statute facially vague.

NRS 197.190 is not unconstitutional as applied to Willson
Willson argues that NRS 197.190 is overbroad as applied to her

because she was cited and convicted for her protected speech and that it is
vague as applied to her because she “had no reason to believe that she would
be cited or convicted for that speech.”

In contrast to a facial constitutional challenge, which “seeks to

invalidate a statute...itself,’ an as-applied constitutional challenge

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“concedes that a statute may be facially constitutional or constitutional in
many of its applications but contends that it is not so under the particular
circumstances of the case.” See 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 243 (2023).
In light of our holding that NRS 197.190 does not apply to protected speech,
Willson’s claims that NRS 197.190 is unconstitutional as applied to her
protected speech do not actually implicate the constitutionality of the
statute.’ Rather, the issue that remains is whether her actions and words
in fact constitute protected speech: if they do constitute protected speech,
then they are not punishable under the statute as construed by this court;
but if they do not constitute protected speech, then they may be punishable
under the statute. For this reason, Willson’s as-applied claims are more
properly viewed as claims challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to
support her conviction. See Ex parte Carter, 514S.W.3d 776, 780 (Tex. App.
2017) (recognizing the appellant’s as-applied claim was actually a “veiled
sufficiency challenge”); see also In re Mental Commitment of K.E.K., 954
N.W.2d 366, 380 (Wis. 2021) (stating the petitioner’s “dispute is with the
sufficiency of the evidence, not with the constitutionality of’ the statute).
The district court did not have the benefit of our interpretation
of NRS 197.190 as being limited to physical conduct and fighting words, and
it therefore did not consider whether there was sufficient evidence that
Willson engaged in physical conduct or uttered fighting words so as to
support her conviction of violating NRS 197.190. Because Willson’s as-

applied constitutional challenges are more properly viewed as challenges to

8For this reason, Willson’s “as-applied” claims necessarily fail. See,
e.g., In re Mental Commitment of K.E.K., 954 N.W.2d 366, 379 (Wis. 2021)
(rejecting a petitioner's claim that a statute was unconstitutional as apphed
to them because “[t]he statute ha[d] no application, constitutional or
otherwise, against those” in the petitioner's position).

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the sufficiency of the evidence, and because Willson raised these claims in
the district court, we grant the petition and instruct the district court to
reconsider Willson’s direct appeal for the sole purpose of addressing
whether sufficient evidence supported Willson’s conviction under this
court’s interpretation of NRS 197.190.9 See Cornella v. Just. Ct. of New
River Twp., 132 Nev. 587, 600, 377 P.38d 97, 106 (2016) (upholding the
constitutionality of the challenged statute but granting the petition with
instructions for the district court to reconsider the petitioner's direct
appeal).
CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that NRS 197.190
only applies to physical conduct and fighting words that are specifically
intended to hinder, delay, or obstruct a public officer and, thus, the statute
is not unconstitutionally overbroad or vague, either on its face or as applied
to Willson. However, in light of our interpretation of NRS 197.190, Willson’s
as-applied constitutional challenges are more properly viewed as challenges
to the sufficiency of the evidence. Because the district court did not consider
whether there was sufficient evidence to support Willson’s conviction, we
grant the petition and direct the clerk of this court to issue a writ of
certiorari upholding NRS 197.190’s constitutionality and instructing the

district court to reconsider Willson’s direct appeal for the sole purpose of

"Because a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim is outside the scope of a
petition for a writ of certiorari filed pursuant to NRS 34.020(3), see NRS
34.020(3) (stating “the writ shall be granted ... for the purpose of reviewing
the constitutionality or validity of [a] statute or ordinance”), we do not
address whether there is sufficient evidence to support Willson’s conviction,
see Cornella v. Just. Ct. of New River Twp., 132 Nev. 587, 600 n.14, 377 P.3d
97, 106 n.14 (2016).

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addressing whether, under this court’s interpretation of the statute,

sufficient evidence supported Willson’s conviction.

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