Court Opinion

ID: 9351592
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-02 00:07:41.708567+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:01:11.180753
License: Public Domain

Supreme Court of Texas
                          ══════════
                           No. 21‑0614
                          ══════════

               Cameron International Corporation
               a/k/a Cameron Systems Corporation,
                             Petitioner,

                                  v.

  Hugo A. Martinez and Dolores Ramirez, Individually and on
    Behalf of the Estate of Javier Garcia, Jr., Deceased; Javier
Mayagoitia, Sr., Individually and as Independent Administrator
of the Estate of Javier Mayagoitia, Jr., Deceased; Julieta Taylor;
Osman Martinez; and Jeanne Chavez, Individually and as Next
          Friend and Guardian of M.C., a Minor Child,
                            Respondents

   ═══════════════════════════════════════
               On Petition for Review from the
       Court of Appeals for the Eighth District of Texas
   ═══════════════════════════════════════

                           PER CURIAM

      In this vicarious liability case, we decide whether an oilfield
worker acted within the course and scope of his employment when he
was involved in a deadly car accident. The accident occurred as the
worker drove toward an oilfield drilling site upon completing personal
errands.
      The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the
company alleged to be the worker’s employer. The court of appeals
reversed, holding that fact issues existed as to whether the worker had
the necessary relationship with the company to give rise to vicarious
liability and, if so, whether the worker was acting within the course and
scope of that employment at the time of the accident.
      We hold that the court of appeals incorrectly relied upon the
“special mission” exception in declining to apply the general rule that an
employer is not vicariously liable for negligence arising from employee
travel to and from work. Accordingly, we reverse its judgment and
reinstate the trial court’s summary judgment for the company.1
                                     I
      In 2015, Cameron International Corporation agreed to provide
flowback well testing at ConocoPhillips Company’s “Blue Marlin”
drilling worksite. The worksite, near Orla, Texas, is about sixty miles
northwest of Pecos, on United States Highway 285.2 Cameron engaged
David Boone Oilfield Consulting, a placement agency, to find contract
labor to assist Cameron with the project.       The agency placed John
Mueller, an experienced flowback well‑tester, to work at the site from
June 5 to June 8, 2015.

      1  Given our disposition, we need not address the court of appeals’
additional conclusion that the evidence raises a fact issue as to whether an
employment relationship existed between the company and the worker.
      2  United States Highway 285 is a north‑south highway running
approximately 846 miles from Sanderson, Texas, through New Mexico, to
Denver, Colorado. US 285, US ENDS, https://www.usends.com/285.html (last
visited Dec. 22, 2022).

                                     2
       On June 8, Mueller completed his shift, and Cameron released
him from the Blue Marlin job. Mueller’s Cameron supervisor asked him
to remain on voluntary standby for potential work at a different site the
next day. The supervisor also invited Mueller to dinner in Pecos, and
Mueller accepted. Mueller drove to Pecos in his personal truck and had
dinner with his supervisor at a restaurant. After dinner, Mueller drove
to a nearby store to purchase food and drink for his personal needs and
then to a gas station to refuel his truck. Anticipating that Cameron
would direct him to a new worksite the next day, Mueller planned to
spend the night at the Cameron trailer he had occupied while working
at the Blue Marlin site.
       After leaving the gas station, Mueller headed north on
Highway 285. Seven miles from Pecos, he was involved in a car accident
with Javier Mayagoitia, Jr.3 Mayagoitia and one of his passengers died.
Two other passengers were injured.
       Respondents here are the accident survivors and the decedents’
estates.   They sued Mueller, Cameron, and others, alleging that
Mueller’s negligence caused the accident and that Cameron is
vicariously liable for Mueller’s negligence.        Cameron moved for a
traditional and a no‑evidence summary judgment, arguing that it was
not vicariously liable for Mueller’s conduct because he was neither its

       3 The police report reflects that Mueller and another driver in front of
him veered into the southbound lane of travel to avoid a hazard in the
northbound lane. When the vehicle in front of Mueller moved back into the
northbound lane, Mueller faced Mayagoitia’s oncoming southbound vehicle.
Both vehicles swerved toward the west, ultimately colliding and coming to rest
in a ditch on the side of the highway.

                                      3
employee nor acting within the scope of any employment at the time of
the accident. Respondents countered that Mueller was both. The trial
court granted Cameron’s motions, and it severed and abated the claims
against Mueller, individually.
      The court of appeals reversed, holding that the summary
judgment evidence raised fact issues, among them whether Mueller had
acted within the course and scope of his employment at the time of the
accident. 624 S.W.3d 241, 258 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021). The court of
appeals held that some evidence supported the claim that Mueller’s
purchases of food and water during his trip constituted “a necessary
service in furtherance of Cameron’s business,” triggering the special
mission exception. Id.
                                    II
      In Painter v. Amerimex Drilling I, Ltd., we examined the
special‑mission exception to the general rule that an employer is not
vicariously liable for an employee’s negligent acts during travel to and
from work. 561 S.W.3d 125 (Tex. 2018). Similar to this case, Painter
concerned a vicarious liability claim arising from an automobile accident
that occurred when a drilling-company employee drove three coworkers
back to their employer‑provided bunkhouses after a shift. Id. at 129.
The trial court granted summary judgment to the employer, and the
issue on appeal was whether some evidence could support a finding that
the employee had acted in the course and scope of his employment at the
time of the accident. Id. at 130.
      As we observed in Painter, to establish a claim for vicarious
liability, a plaintiff must show that a worker “was acting in the course

                                    4
and scope of his employment” at the time of the negligent conduct. Id.
at 131. Under the “coming‑and‑going rule,” an employee does not act
within the course and scope of his employment when traveling to and
from work. Id. at 139. The rationale that informs the rule is that
travelers on public roads are equally susceptible to the hazards of doing
so, whether employed or not. See Leordeanu v. Am. Prot. Ins. Co., 330
S.W.3d 239, 241‑42 & nn.6‑7 (Tex. 2010). Such travel hazards do not
arise out of the business of an employer; thus, the law does not hold the
employer liable for injuries resulting from engaging in these risks. Id.
(observing that the special‑mission exception does not extend to prosaic
risks).
          We further observed that the special‑mission exception to the
coming‑and‑going rule may apply when “travel involves the performance
of regular or specifically assigned duties for the benefit of the employer.”
Painter, 561 S.W.3d at 139. For example, an employee may be on a
special mission when traveling to an employer‑mandated seminar.
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Lee, 847 S.W.2d 354, 356 (Tex. App.—El Paso
1993, no writ), cited approvingly in Painter, 561 S.W.3d at 136 (“[W]e
find helpful guidance in two cases.”). Accordingly, in Painter, we held
that some evidence demonstrated that the employee had acted within
the course and scope of his employment while driving coworkers to their
bunkhouses from the worksite at his employer’s direction. 561 S.W.3d
at 139.
          In contrast, the summary judgment evidence in this case
establishes that the special‑mission exception does not apply. According
to the evidence, neither Cameron nor its supervisory personnel directed

                                     5
Mueller to travel to Pecos or to purchase food, water, or fuel for other
workers or for the worksite generally. Instead, Mueller testified that he
decided for himself to travel to Pecos on his own time to have dinner and
to restock his personal groceries and fuel. Mueller’s supervisor similarly
testified that Cameron workers were individually responsible for
obtaining their own food and water.
      In rejecting this evidence, the court of appeals observed that,
“[s]urely, having access to drinking water during a 12‑hour shift, in
hundred‑degree weather, at a remote worksite, was necessary and
benefited Cameron by ensuring workers were physically able to
perform—aside from the obvious fact of it being vital to retaining
functioning workers.” 624 S.W.3d at 258. This rationale, however,
proves too much. Nearly every task that supports a worker’s personal
needs, including travel to and from work, indirectly benefits the
employer. By traveling to the workplace, a worker makes his services
available, “and in that sense he furthers the affairs or business of his
employer by making the journey.” Shelton v. Standard Ins. Co., 389
S.W.2d 290, 292 (Tex. 1965). Not every journey, however, falls within
the course and scope of an employment relationship. Id. To except from
the general rule Mueller’s travel to obtain personal groceries and fuel at
his choice—and not at Cameron’s direction—would turn nearly any
personal grocery errand into a special mission on an employer’s behalf,
a concept that we rejected in Painter. See 561 S.W.3d at 138 (explaining
that an employee’s decision to “conduct a personal errand” while
otherwise engaged in his employer’s business does not give rise to
vicarious liability for travel in connection with that errand). Workers

                                    6
often travel for personal necessities during the workday or leave for a
meal before returning to work, but these activities do not arise from the
business of the employer. Rather, they are daily tasks in which workers
and nonworkers alike engage, carrying the same attendant risks. See
Smith v. Tex. Emps.’ Ins. Ass’n, 105 S.W.2d 192, 193 (Tex. [Comm’n Op.]
1937) (discussing the limits of vicarious liability, which does not extend
to prosaic risks). In determining that purchases of personal food and
water raise some evidence that the special‑mission exception applies,
the court of appeals did not recognize the well‑settled limits of the
doctrine and its underlying rationale.
      Respondents emphasize that Mueller occasionally shared the
water that he purchased with coworkers while at the worksite.
Persuaded by this point, the court of appeals observed that it was a
“basic notion that obtaining drinking water and food for the crew could
very likely constitute a necessary service in furtherance of Cameron’s
business.” 624 S.W.3d at 258. A worker’s choice to share personal
supplies, however, does not transform their acquisition into a special
mission for an employer.
      Respondents’ other arguments are similarly unavailing. First,
they contend that some evidence shows that Cameron generally
authorized Mueller’s travel to Pecos, and thus Mueller had implied
authority to engage in travel on Cameron’s behalf. See Collins v. Cooper,
65 Tex. 460, 464 (1886) (“Every agency carries with it, or includes in it,
as an incident, all the powers which are necessary or proper, or usual,
as means to effectuate the purpose for which it was created.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).      In Painter, however, we rejected the

                                    7
contention that general authority suffices to show that an employee is
acting in furtherance of the employer’s business at the time of travel.
561 S.W.3d at 132‑33. Rather, the general right to control the work of
an employee may answer whether the law recognizes an employment
relationship sufficient to impose vicarious liability. Id. When such a
relationship exists, however, imposing liability in a particular instance
“hinges on an objective assessment of whether the employee was doing
his job” at the time. Id. at 132. “The employer’s right to control the
work,    having   already   been    determined    in   establishing   the
employer‑employee relationship, is not part of this analysis.” Id. at
132‑33. Thus, even assuming implied general authority, Mueller was
not acting within the scope of that authority at the time of the accident.
        Respondents further emphasize that Cameron paid Mueller a
$250 transportation allowance. But payment of a travel allowance is
not sufficient to create a fact question as to whether an employee was
acting within the course and scope of employment at a specific point.
See Pilgrim v. Fortune Drilling Co., 653 F.2d 982, 987‑88 (5th Cir. Unit
A Aug. 1981) (applying Texas law), cited approvingly in Painter, 561
S.W.3d at 136. Applying the special‑mission exception “depends heavily
on the facts and circumstances of the case.” Painter, 561 S.W.3d at 136.
In this case, the travel allowance does not overcome the undisputed
evidence that Mueller was returning from running personal errands at
the time of the accident.
        Lastly, Respondents argue that a workers’ compensation line of
authority, recognized in Janak v. Texas Employers’ Insurance Ass’n, 381
S.W.2d 176 (Tex. 1964), provides the better rule. In Janak, an employee

                                    8
was entitled to workers’ compensation when his “deviation to obtain [ice]
was impliedly directed by the employer.” Id. at 182. However, Texas
law has long recognized the distinction between workers’ compensation
claims under their statutory framework and the imposition of vicarious
liability under the common law. See Shelton, 389 S.W.2d at 291-92. In
Shelton, a truck driver was assisting with relocating his employer’s
corporate offices. He was struck by an automobile as he attempted to
walk from his motel across the street to a café. Id. In upholding a claim
for workers’ compensation, we observed that “[i]t could not be seriously
contended that petitioner, while crossing the street, was in the scope of
his employment for establishing liability under the doctrine of
respondeat superior.” Id. at 293. In short, the common law principles
that govern vicarious liability differ from the statutory definitions and
framework that govern workers’ compensation claims. See Waste Mgmt.
of Tex., Inc. v. Stevenson, 622 S.W.3d 273, 281 (Tex. 2021) (quoting
Garza v. Exel Logistics, Inc., 161 S.W.3d 473, 481 (Tex. 2005))
(discussing this distinction).4 Though the Texas Workers’ Compensation
Act may define injuries arising from trips for necessities as
compensable, such trips are not generally special missions within the
course and scope of employment under the doctrine of respondeat
superior. See Painter, 561 S.W.3d at 138 (observing that the law would
not render an employer vicariously liable “to the extent” a worker could

       4“Courts in other jurisdictions have similarly recognized the distinction
between workers’ compensation cases and the respondeat superior doctrine for
purposes of analyzing exceptions to the going‑and‑coming rule.” Stokes v.
Denver Newspaper Agency, LLP, 159 P.3d 691, 695 (Colo. App. 2006) (collecting
cases).

                                       9
“conduct a personal errand while carrying out” a responsibility to the
employer). Accordingly, the statutory definition of course and scope for
workers’ compensation insurance purposes does not inform the concept
under the common law for the purpose of imposing vicarious liability
against an employer.
                                 * * *
      We hold that a personal trip for groceries does not fall within the
special‑mission exception to the general rule that an employer is not
vicariously liable for an employee’s negligent acts while the employee
travels to and from work. Without hearing oral argument, see TEX. R.
APP. P. 59.1, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and render
judgment for Cameron International Corporation.

OPINION DELIVERED: December 30, 2022

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