Court Opinion

ID: 9885086
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 03:29:39.00088+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:43.791524
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE KLUCZYNSKI delivered the opinion of the court: Defendant pleaded guilty in the circuit court of Rock Island County to attempted escape and aggravated battery. He was sentenced to the penitentiary for concurrent terms of 3 to 5 years on the former charge and 5 to 10 years on the latter. The appellate court affirmed (People v. Lerch (Ill.App. 1971), 268 N.E.2d 901) and we granted leave to appeal. The only issue presented on review is whether the concurrent sentences were validly imposed. The facts are not in dispute. While incarcerated in the county jail for failure to post bond on a pending felony charge, defendant and several other prisoners, during their escape attempt, attacked and severely beat the jailer who had come to take another prisoner from the cell block. Defendant, citing People v. Whittington, 46 Ill.2d 405, and People v. Stewart, 45 Ill.2d 310, contends that he was convicted of more than one offense which arose from the same act or transaction. He requests that this court reverse his conviction for attempted escape which is the less serious charge. The problem of multiple sentences has arisen before this court on numerous occasions in recent years. In People v. Schlenger, 13 Ill.2d 63, defendant was convicted of armed robbery and grand larceny when he took $200 from one victim. Defendant argued that only one crime was committed, i.e., the armed robbery, and that the concurrent sentence on the latter charge should be reversed for it might prejudice his application before the pardon and parole board. We reversed his conviction for grand larceny, adopting the view that the lesser conviction was improper for both charges arose from the identical act. This rationale was subsequently applied to reverse a conviction for incest which occurred when defendant raped his daughter. People v. Duszkewycz, 27 Ill.2d 257. The pertinent section of the Criminal Code (Ill.Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 38, par. 1 — 7(m)) provides: “Consecutive and Concurrent Sentences. When a person shall have been convicted of 2 or more offenses which did not result from the same conduct, either before or after sentence has been pronounced upon him for either, the court in its discretion may order that the term of imprisonment upon any one of the convictions, may commence at the expiration of the term of imprisonment upon any other of the offenses.” The committee comments concerning this section state: “Subsection (m) is intended to codify the holding in People v. Schlenger, 13 Ill.2d 63, 147 N.E.2d 316 (1958), by the implicit converse of the provision stated, i.e., if the offenses resulted from the same conduct the defendant may not be sentenced on both, either concurrently or consecutively. ‘Conduct’ is defined in section 2 — 4 and is used in the sense of ‘the same transaction’ discussed in Schlenger, supra.” S.H.A., ch. 38, sec. 1 — 7(m), p. 37. In light of this provision, decisions of this court may be classified in two categories. Our decision in Schlenger has been followed where multiple convictions arose from a single act. (City of Chicago v. Hill, 40 Ill.2d 130.) However, we have sustained multiple sentences where each offense was complete and there was no necessary relationship between them (People v. Raby, 40 Ill.2d 392), and where the offenses, although arising from a closely related series of acts, were clearly distinct and required different elements of proof. People v. Harper, 50 lll.2d 296; People v. Johnson, 44 Ill. 2d 463. Both parties to this appeal erroneously characterize defendant’s criminal conduct as involving multiple acts. The State asserts that the aggravated battery upon the jailer was complete before the attempt to escape was made. However, the count in the indictment charging attempted escape to which the defendant pleaded guilty states that he “committed the offense of ATTEMPT, in that [he] with intent to commit the offense of ESCAPE, took a substantial step towards the commission of the offense of ESCAPE, when [he] intentionally” struck and kicked the jailer, and as a result of this attack he was able to leave the cellblock. Attempt occurs when a person “with intent to commit a specific offense *** does any act which constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of that offense.” (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1971, ch. 38, par. 8-4.) The facts clearly demonstrate defendant’s guilt as to both charges. However, the criminal conduct describing his attempted escape is identical with the conduct specified in the count for aggravated battery, i.e., the attack upon the jailer. Under circumstances where defendant is charged with multiple offenses which arose from a single act, as charged in the present indictment, we are compelled to vacate his sentence for attempted escape which is the less serious offense. Ill.Rev.Stat. 1971, ch. 38, par. 1 — 7(m); City of Chicago v. Hill, 40 Ill.2d 130; People v. Duszkewycz, 27 Ill.2d 257; People v. Schlenger, 13 Ill.2d 63. For the aforementioned reasons the judgment of the appellate court affirming the conviction and sentence for attempted escape is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court with directions to vacate that sentence. Reversed and remanded, with directions.