Court Opinion

ID: 9788730
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:16:51.563905+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:16.376790
License: Public Domain

GOLDEN, J., dissenting,
with whom HILL, C.J., joins.
[T 40] Because I believe there is room for equity under the unique facts of this case, I dissent. With regards to the first issue, the application of the principles of equity to these facts, I disagree with the reasoning of the majority opinion. The Wyoming Probate Code specifically provides that principles of equity should be applied to supplement Code provisions to the extent the equitable principles do not directly contradict express probate provisions. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-1-102(b) (LexisNexis 2003). The majority opinion finds such an express contradiction where I believe none exists. The majority opinion relies heavily on a dissent in a North Carolina intestate succession case to support its reasoning, Lankford v. Wright, 347 N.C. 115, 489 S.E.2d 604, 607 (1997). In Lankford, the North Carolina Supreme Court ree-ognized and applied the doctrine of equitable adoption under a more standard set of facts, ultimately allowing a woman to inherit from the intestate estate of a woman who had held her out as her child. Id. at 606-07.
[141] The dissent in the North Carolina case was based upon a statute that is substantially different from Wyoming's statutes. The North Carolina statute, included in the provisions governing intestate succession, provided that a person adopted in accordance with the adoption statutes is entitled by succession to any property by, through and from his adoptive parents.1 The dissent argued that the statute evinced a legislative policy decision that only those children legally adopted could inherit. Id. at 608. Continuing this line of reasoning, the dissent interpreted the statute as a legislative mandate precluding the application of equitable adoption by courts for purposes of intestate succession.
[T42] The majority in Lankford refused to accept the reasoning of the dissent, stating:
[ Whe again note that an overwhelming majority of states that have addressed the question have recognized and applied the doctrine [of equitable adoption]. More importantly, it is the unique role of the courts to fashion equitable remedies to protect and promote the principles of equity such as those at issue in this case. We are convinced that acting in an equitable manner in this case does not interfere with the legislative scheme for adoption, contrary to the assertions of the dissent. Recognition of the doctrine of equitable adoption does not create a legal adoption, and therefore does not impair the statutory procedures for adoption.
Lankford, 489 S.E.2d at 607. I believe that the majority in Lankford has the better argument, especially concerning the role of equity and the courts. Equity is always available, and indeed is intended, to fill gaps in compliment with the law, whether common law or statutory law.
*1249Equity follows the law except in those matters which entitle the party to equitable relief, although the strict rule of law be to the contrary. It is at this point that their paths diverge. As the archer bends his bow that he may send the arrow straight to the mark, so equity bends the letter of the law to accomplish the object of its enactment.
Holloway v. Jones, 246 S.W. 587, 591 (Mo.1922). A reading of the Wyoming Probate Code as a whole reveals that the legislature intends and expects Wyoming courts to apply equity when necessary to "discover and make effective the intent of a decedent in distribution of his property." § 2-1-102(a)@®).
[143] Thus, equity may be applied when necessary unless prohibited by an express probate provision. The majority opinion finds such an express prohibition in the anti-lapse statute. To save a bequest from lapsing, the anti-lapse statute requires the deceased devisee be a lineal descendant. The majority opinion claims that the term "lineal descendant" is unambiguous and this Court eannot apply equity to "broaden the class of persons identified by the statute." "Lineal descendant" means no more, or less, than in a direct line, eg. a child or grandchild. The definition of "child" remains to be supplied. In In re Cadwell's Estate, this Court quoted with approval a definition of "lineal descendant" that included "an adopted child." 26 Wyo. 412, 419-20, 186 P. 499, 501 (Wyo.1920). "Child" is defined by Wyo. Stat. Aun. § 2-1-301(v) (LexisNexis 2008) as including "an adopted child." No definition expressly states, or even implies, that the definition of "adopted child" is limited to a legally adopted child, to the exclusion of an equitably adopted child. As such, I see no direct conflict in reading "equitably adopted child" into the definition of lineal descendant.
[T 44] Which brings me back to the initial enquiry-should equity be applied to these facts? I would approach the question in a slightly different manner. - Certainly this case does not present the standard set of facts for the application of equitable adoption. Because Neil died testate, equitable adoption in the traditional sense does not apply. The Wyoming Probate Code clearly directs that "[the intention of a testator as expressed in his will controls the legal effect of his dispositions." Wyo. Stat,. Aun. § 2-6-105 (LexisNexis 2008). Thus, the critical inquiry is Neil's intentions as expressed in his will.
[145] In determining the intent of a testator, it is important to note that the Wyoming Probate Code is set up as an "opt out" code. In other words, the provisions of the probate code apply unless the testator evinces a contrary intention in the will. Thus, the anti-lapse statute automatically applies unless the testator indicates otherwise in his will. In this case, Neil's will provides no indication that he did not want the anti-lapse statute to apply. Thus, Neil's intent is for the anti-lapse statute to apply. There is no question that if one or both of the biological sons had predeceased their father, their heirs would have taken "in place" of the deceased devisee.
[146] It is critical to note that the anti-lapse statute is not a statute of devise, but rather only limits the conditions upon which an inheritance will lapse. The inheritance does not lapse if it is made to a lineal descendent. If made to a lineal descendant, the "issue of the deceased devisee take in place of the deceased devisee." Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 26-106 (LexisNexis 2008). Thus, Kim and Kirk are not attempting to inherit in their own name or in their own right; they will only take in the place of Julie. It is still Julie's inheritance that is at stake.
[147] Neil's will clearly indicated that he did want Julie to receive an inheritance from him. The question is: did he want her to receive the inheritance as his daughter or as a non-relative? The majority opinion decides the issue against Julie based upon the lack of any express language in the will referring to Julie as his daughter. I believe this oversimplifies the process. Neil never clarified anyone's status in his will. I believe this lack of clarification renders the terms of the will ambiguous.
[1 48] "[T )the construction of the will is to be resolved by determining the intent of deceased as such appears from a full and complete consideration of the entire will when read in the light of the surrounding cireumstances." Douglas v. Newell, 719 P.2d 971, 973 (Wyo.1986). The cireumstances in *1250this case indicate that Neil consistently treated and referred to Julie as his daughter. Julie was his wife's daughter. When Julie's mother died, she left her entire estate to Neil, leaving nothing to Julie. Then Neil executed his will, treating all three children equally in at least two provisions of the will, including the residuary clause. I believe the family context creates a strong implication that Neil considered Julie his daughter, thus creating an ambiguity in his will requiring extrinsic evidence to resolve his true intent.
[149] The complication in this case is that, even if Neil intended Julie to take as his daughter, Julie was never legally adopted by Neil. Julie is legally not a lineal descendant of Neil. I do not believe, however, that the inquiry is automatically at an end with the determination of Julie's legal status. This case is presented to this Court as a plea to recognize Julie as adopted in equity. If Julie is recognized as adopted in equity, for purposes of inheritance only, Julie would be a lineal descendant, her share would not lapse, and her children would take her share as her representatives. This, I believe, is where there is room for the application of equity to affect Neil's testamentary intent.
[150] This case was decided on summary Judgment. I would reverse and remand this case for further proceedings to determine Neil's testamentary intent. Starting with his will, we know Neil wanted Julie to inherit from him, but we do not know from the will what status Neil accorded Julie. I believe the first issue to determine is if there is clear and convincing evidence to support equitable adoption. If there is not, the inquiry is at an end because Neil could not have considered Julie an adopted daughter. Julie's share would thus lapse.
[T51] If there is clear and convincing evidence supporting equitable adoption, then the question returns to Neil's testamentary intent. Did Neil intend for Julie to take only if she survived him, or did Neil take for granted that Julie was his daughter and her inheritance would not lapse? If it can be proven that Neil did want Julie to take as his daughter, then I believe it would be appropriate to apply the principle of equitable adoption, thus preventing Julie's share from lapsing. This would then allow for Neil's testamentary intent to be fulfilled. Applying principles of law and equity is exactly what this court is expected to do to "discover and make effective the intent of a decedent in distribution of his property." § 2-1-102(a)(ii).
[152] However, I note that many jurisdictions accept that "adoption by estoppel" precludes not just the foster parents but also their heirs from challenging the status of a child as equitably adopted. See e.g. Shaw v. Scott, 217 Towa 1259, 252 N.W. 237 (Iowa 1934) (collecting cases); Fiske v. Lawton, 124 Minn. 85, 144 N.W. 455 (1913). In both Shaw and Fiske, the foster child predeceased the foster parents and the foster parents then died intestate. The respective courts, after finding clear and convincing evidence of an agreement to adopt, estopped the heirs of the foster parents from challenging the status of the foster child as equitably adopted, thus clearing the way for the foster child's children to inherit their parent's share.

. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 29-17 (2001). Succession by, through and from adopted children
(a) A child, adopted in accordance with Chapter 48 of the General Statutes or in accordance with the applicable law of any other jurisdiction, and the heirs of such child, are entitled by succession to any property by, through and from his adoptive parents and their heirs the same as if he were the natural legitimate child of the adoptive parents.