Court Opinion

ID: 9953471
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 06:07:45.811201+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:54:44.648223
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

KANDICE HOLDER,                                                      FOR PUBLICATION
                                                                     March 21, 2024
               Plaintiff-Appellant,

v                                                                    No. 364401
                                                                     St. Clair Circuit Court
ANCHOR BAY INVESTMENTS, INC.,                                        LC No. 2021-000013-NI

               Defendant-Appellee.

Before: MURRAY, P.J., and CAMERON and PATEL, JJ.

PATEL, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part).

         I concur with the majority in vacating the trial court’s grant of summary disposition to
defendant on plaintiff’s common-law premises liability claim and remanding for reconsideration
in light of our Supreme Court’s decision in Kandil-Elsayed v F & E Oil, Inc, 512 Mich 95; 1 NW3d
44 (2023). I also concur with the majority in affirming the grant of summary disposition to
defendant on plaintiff’s statutory claims under MCL 554.139(1)(b) and MCL 125.536 with regard
to the lack of handrails or guardrails on the subject stairway.

        But I respectfully dissent and would reverse the grant of summary disposition to defendant
under MCR 2.116(C)(10) on plaintiff’s statutory claim under MCL 554.139(1)(a) and would
remand for further proceedings because I believe there is a genuine issue of material fact whether
the subject stairway was “fit for the use intended by the parties” given the algae growth.

       Defendant had a statutory duty to ensure that the subject stairway was fit for the use
intended. MCL 554.139(1)(a). As this Court explained in Hadden v McDermitt Apartments, LLC,
287 Mich App 124, 130; 782 NW2d 800 (2010), “[t]he primary purpose or intended use of a
stairway is to provide pedestrian access to different levels of a building or structure.” Although
“MCL 554.139(1)(a) does not require perfect maintenance of a stairway[,] and “[t]he stairway
need not be in an ideal condition, nor in the most accessible condition possible,” the stairway “must
provide tenants ‘reasonable access’ to different building levels.” Id.

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      The facts in Hadden were as follows:

               Plaintiff testified that she lived on the second floor of defendant’s apartment
      building. In order to access her mailbox on the first floor, plaintiff used the stairway
      in question, which consisted of approximately 12 open steps located outside the
      building but covered by a roof. Plaintiff testified that the day before the fall, she
      left her apartment to check her mail and noted the presence of snow on all the stairs
      of the stairway. Although she was able to use the stairway without incident,
      plaintiff called defendant and complained to “Lori” about the presence of snow and
      ice on the stairway. She was told that “Scott” would take care of it when he had
      the time.

               Plaintiff testified that on the day of the fall, before she had left her
      apartment, she again called and notified defendant about the presence of snow and
      ice on the stairway. Plaintiff produced weather data indicating that preceding her
      fall, temperatures were at or below freezing, and the area experienced episodes of
      light freezing rain and at one point “ice pellets.” At approximately 1:00 p.m. on
      December 1, 2006, plaintiff left her apartment to check her mail. She noticed “lots
      of snow” that was “fresh,” and that there was “more than a couple of inches” on the
      second floor as she walked toward the stairway. Plaintiff descended the stairway
      and checked her mailbox. Plaintiff’s testimony was conflicting on the issue
      whether she noticed snow or ice on the stairway before her fall. On her way back
      up the stairway, plaintiff used the right side of the stairway so that she could use
      the handrail. As she reached the second step, plaintiff slipped and fell on ice,
      fracturing her left hip. She testified that she did not see the ice before her fall
      because it was black ice and the stairway was too dark. As she fell, however,
      plaintiff noticed that the gutters overhead were overflowing with water and icicles
      had formed. Plaintiff testified that there was no salt on the stairway at the time of
      her fall. [Id. at 130-131.]

       Comparing the facts in Hadden to those in Allison v AEW Capital Mgt, LLP, 481 Mich
419; 751 NW2d 8 (2008) the Hadden panel concluded:

      We agree with the trial court that plaintiff has produced enough evidence to create
      a material question of fact whether the stairway was fit for its intended use at the
      time of plaintiff's fall. As stated earlier, the primary purpose of a stairway is to
      provide pedestrians reasonable access to different levels of a building or structure.
      Reasonable minds could conclude that the presence of black ice on a darkly lit,
      unsalted stairway—possibly caused or aggravated by overflowing ice water from
      overhead gutters in the presence of freezing rain—posed a hidden danger that
      denied tenants reasonable access to different levels of the apartment building and
      rendered the stairway unfit for its intended use.

             This case is factually distinguishable from Allison because black ice on a
      stairway presents more than the “[m]ere inconvenience” posed by “one to two
      inches of snow” in a parking lot. Furthermore, as the Court stated in Allison, the
      primary use of a parking lot is to park cars. Although the Court recognized that

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       tenants must have reasonable access to their vehicles in a parking lot, i.e., they must
       be able to walk to the vehicles, tenants do not use a parking lot for its intended use
       by merely walking in the lot. Walking in a parking lot is secondary to the parking
       lot’s primary use. In contrast, a tenant uses a stairway for its intended use solely
       by walking up and down it. Thus, the primary purpose of a stairway is for walking.
       Indeed, the primary purposes and, therefore, intended uses of a parking lot and a
       stairway are two different things.

               Therefore, under all the circumstances presented here, the snow- and ice-
       covered stairway may not have been fit for its intended use at the time of plaintiff’s
       fall. We agree with the trial court that this issue presents a material question of fact
       for the jury. [Hadden, 287 Mich App at 131-132 (cleaned up).]

        Similarly, in this case, plaintiff argues that the three-step wooden stairway outside her first-
floor apartment unit was not fit for its intended use of providing reasonable access to her apartment
and the ground level because the steps were covered in algae, which caused them to be “very
slippery.” Consequently, plaintiff contends the trial court erred by summarily dismissing her
statutory claim under MCL 554.139(1)(a). I agree.

        Plaintiff testified that her apartment had two different access doors and each door had a set
of exterior wooden stairs for ingress and egress. Plaintiff presented photographs reflecting three
wooden steps connected to a wooden porch under a covered roof in front of the main entrance to
her unit. Plaintiff maintained that, beginning in May 2019, both exterior stairways had become
“algaefied” and, as a result, “very slippery.” Plaintiff testified that the “algaefied” condition was
present daily, and the slippery condition worsened when the steps were wet. Plaintiff testified that
she slipped on the steps outside her main entrance in May 2019, which was a few months before
the August 2019 incident. Plaintiff stated that she notified defendant in May 2019 that she slipped
on the steps. She further testified that she made “multiple phone calls [to the landlord] to have the
steps either cleaned or the safety strips put on the steps.” According to plaintiff, the second and
third (middle and bottom) steps of the stairway outside her main entrance “were completely
covered in the green substance” on the date of her fall. And plaintiff testified that the steps on the
other stairway leading from her apartment “were just as algaefied and slippery as the front . . . .”

        According to plaintiff’s expert’s report, which was uncontroverted, the grooves or wood
grains in the surface of the wooden stair treads “become filled with grime and flora like algae and
moss” and “[t]hese wood surface contaminants grow and continue to build up and spread during
wet periods or in shady and humid areas as they need moisture for both growth and reproduction.”
Plaintiff’s expert stated that the subject stairway is “located on the north side of the building[,]
which is mostly shady and receives less sun to dry the surface.” Plaintiff’s expert averred that
these contaminants made the steps slippery.

       Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff as the non-moving party, I
believe that there is a genuine issue of material fact whether the subject stairway was unfit for its
intended use. See El-Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich 152, 160; 934 NW2d 665
(2019). I believe reasonable minds could conclude that the slippery algae-like substance covering
both exterior stairways outside of plaintiff’s apartment posed a danger that denied plaintiff
reasonable access to her apartment and the ground level and rendered the subject stairway unfit

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for its intended use. Accordingly, I would reverse the trial court’s grant of summary disposition
with regard to plaintiff’s statutory claim under MCL 554.139(1)(a) and remand for further
proceedings.

                                                           /s/ Sima G. Patel

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