Court Opinion

ID: 9905427
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-29 16:00:49.641818+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:33.040893
License: Public Domain

21-6429
     Astudillo-Coronel v. Garland
                                                                                   BIA
                                                                           Thompson, IJ
                                                                           A208 147 057

                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                               FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                    SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.

 1         At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
 2   Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
 3   Square, in the City of New York, on the 29th day of November, two thousand
 4   twenty-three.
 5
 6   PRESENT:
 7                    STEVEN J. MENASHI,
 8                    MYRNA PÉREZ,
 9                    MARIA ARAÚJO KAHN,
10                    Circuit Judges.
11   _____________________________________
12
13   MILTON RODRIGO ASTUDILLO-
14   CORONEL,
15            Petitioner,
16
17                    v.                                         21-6429
18                                                               NAC
19   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
20   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
21              Respondent.
22   _____________________________________
23
24
1    FOR PETITIONER:                     Michael Joseph Segreto, Esq., Peekskill, NY.
2
3    FOR RESPONDENT:                     Brian Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant
4                                        Attorney General; Melissa Neiman-Kelting,
5                                        Assistant Director; Sanya Sarich Kerksiek,
6                                        Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration
7                                        Litigation, United States Department of
8                                        Justice, Washington, DC.

 9         UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

10   Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

11   DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

12         Petitioner Milton Rodrigo Astudillo-Coronel, a native and citizen of

13   Ecuador, seeks review of a July 12, 2021 decision of the BIA affirming a November

14   8, 2018 decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum,

15   withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture

16   (“CAT”). In re Astudillo-Coronel, No. A 208 147 057 (B.I.A. July 12, 2021), aff’g

17   No. A 208 147 057 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Nov. 8, 2018). We assume the parties’

18   familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.

19         We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA and address only

20   the adverse credibility determination. See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 426

21   F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005). We review the agency’s factual findings, including

22   adverse credibility determinations, for substantial evidence, and we review
                                              2
 1   questions of law and the application of fact to law de novo. Hong Fei Gao v.

 2   Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018). “[T]he administrative findings of fact are

 3   conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to

 4   the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).

 5         “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors, a

 6   trier of fact may base a credibility determination on . . . the consistency between

 7   the applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements (whenever made and

 8   whether or not under oath, and considering the circumstances under which the

 9   statements were made) . . . , the consistency of such statements with other

10   evidence of record . . . , and any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements,

11   without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the

12   heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other relevant factor.”               8 U.S.C.

13   § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from

14   the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could

15   make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162,

16   167 (2d Cir. 2008); accord Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76.

17         The agency’s adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial

18   evidence. The agency reasonably relied on Astudillo-Coronel’s admittedly false

                                                3
1    statements during his credible fear interview and in his initial asylum application

2    because “a single false document or a single instance of false testimony may (if

3    attributable to the petitioner) infect the balance of the [petitioner’s] uncorroborated

 4   or unauthenticated evidence.” Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 170 (2d Cir. 2007);

 5   see also 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (providing that a credibility determination may

 6   be based on falsehoods in oral statements). At his hearing, Astudillo-Coronel

 7   alleged that his grandmother’s murderer had threatened to kill him, and he

 8   admitted that he had both fabricated a detailed account of a beating by

 9   government officials during his credible fear interview, and repeated a similar

10   false story in his initial asylum application.     The fact that Astudillo-Coronel

11   recanted his prior false statements does not compel the conclusion that his new

12   claim was credible.

13         The agency was not required to accept Astudillo-Coronel’s explanation that

14   he gave false testimony at the interview because he had a sincere fear of returning

15   to Ecuador, and fellow detainees warned him that his story about his

16   grandmother’s murderer would not satisfy the credible fear standard. See Majidi

17   v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must do more than offer a

18   plausible explanation for his inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must

                                               4
1    demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to credit his

2    testimony.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).

3          The agency also was not required to accept Astudillo-Coronel’s explanation

4    for the fabricated statements in his application—that former counsel prepared the

5    application with false information despite being given accurate facts, and then

6    instructed Astudillo-Coronel to sign it without reviewing its contents with him in

7    Spanish. We agree that Astudillo-Coronel substantially failed to comply with the

8    procedural requirements for an ineffective assistance claim set out in Matter of

 9   Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637, 639 (B.I.A. 1998), because he did not demonstrate that

10   he informed former counsel of the allegations and gave him an opportunity to

11   respond or explain why he had not filed a disciplinary complaint. See Garcia-

12   Martinez v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 511, 513 (2d Cir. 2006) (explaining that

13   “an applicant . . . who has failed to comply substantially with the Lozada

14   requirements forfeits his ineffective assistance of counsel claim in this Court”

15   (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)).

16         Moreover,     the   agency    reasonably    concluded     Astudillo-Coronel’s

17   documentary evidence did not rehabilitate his claim or independently satisfy his

18   burden of proof. “An applicant’s failure to corroborate his or her testimony may

                                              5
 1   bear on credibility, because the absence of corroboration in general makes an

 2   applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into

 3   question.” Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007). As the agency

 4   found, news articles corroborated the murder of Astudillo-Coronel’s grandmother

 5   and the identity of the murderer, but not that Astudillo-Coronel was involved in

 6   bringing the murderer to justice, that the murderer was convicted and sentenced

 7   to only four years’ incarceration, or that the murderer had threatened to kill

 8   Astudillo-Coronel.

 9         The agency was not required to give weight to the documentary evidence

10   offered to corroborate Astudillo-Coronel’s claim that the murderer posed a danger

11   to him. That evidence consisted of letters and affidavits from relatives and a

12   neighbor and a psychological assessment describing symptoms and history

13   reported by Astudillo-Coronel. Although the parties stipulated that Astudillo-

14   Coronel’s mother would testify consistently with her affidavit, she was an

15   interested party, and the remaining affiants were unavailable for cross-

16   examination. Cf. Likai Gao v. Barr, 968 F.3d 137, 149 (2d Cir. 2020) (holding that

17   “the IJ acted within her discretion in according [letters from a wife and friend] little

18   weight because the declarants (particularly [the] wife) were interested parties and

                                                6
1    neither was available for cross-examination”); Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 332–34

2    (2d Cir. 2013) (“We generally defer to the agency’s evaluation of the weight to be

 3   afforded an applicant’s documentary evidence.”).             Further, the country

 4   conditions evidence—which principally shows high crime rates—does not

 5   independently establish Astudillo-Coronel’s entitlement to relief, and the agency

 6   was not required to explicitly discuss that evidence. See Mu Xiang Lin v. U.S.

 7   Dep’t of Just., 432 F.3d 156, 160 (2d Cir. 2005) (requiring “particularized evidence”

 8   beyond general country conditions to support a CAT claim); see also Xiao Ji Chen v.

 9   U.S. Dep’t of Just., 471 F.3d 315, 336 n.17 (2d Cir. 2006) (explaining that “we

10   presume that an IJ has taken into account all of the evidence before him, unless the

11   record compellingly suggests otherwise”).

12         Given the undisputed fabrications and the lack of reliable objective evidence

13   to corroborate Astudillo-Coronel’s fear of his grandmother’s murderer, substantial

14   evidence supports the adverse credibility determination. See Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d

15   at 167; Siewe, 480 F.3d at 170; Biao Yang, 496 F.3d at 273. The adverse credibility

16   determination is dispositive because Astudillo-Coronel’s claims for asylum,

17   withholding of removal, and CAT relief all relied on the same facts. See Paul v.

18   Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2006).

                                              7
1        For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending

2   motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

3                                      FOR THE COURT:
4                                      Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
5                                      Clerk of Court

                                         8