Court Opinion

ID: 9448441
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 23:36:16.258945+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:26.265592
License: Public Domain

SWYGERT, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
In Archer v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. Ry. Co., 215 Wis. 509, 255 N.W. 67, 95 A.L.R. 851, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the negligence of an agent which is imputed to a principal will not bar the principal from recovering against the agent. In Klas v. Fenske, 248 Wis. 534, 22 N.W.2d 596, 601, the court said:
*286“In this connection it is pointed out that as between the members of a joint enterprise the doctrine of imputed negligence has no application. Ordinary negligence on the part of a member of a joint enterprise resulting in injury to the other member renders him liable for the injury.”
Moreover, in Johnsen v. Pierce, 262 Wis. 367, 55 N.W.2d 394, 397, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in an action by a mother to recover damages for personal injuries against her son because of his negligence in driving a ear in which both were riding, said:
“We pass now to Mrs. Johnsen’s action against her son. Though Mrs. Johnsen and Robert were engaged in a joint venture, in an action between them the negligence of one venturer is not imputed to the other. Between such parties their liability to each other is the same as though the driver were the host and the plaintiff the guest and the driver owes to the other the care required of a gratuitous agent.”
This case unequivocally demonstrates that under the general law of the State of Wisconsin the doctrine of respondeat superior and the principles of imputed negligence are not applicable to actions between joint adventurers.
The statements in the foregoing cases are consistent with the decisional law prevailing generally throughout the United States. Restatement, Torts, § 491, Comment a; 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 158, at 798; 38 Am.Jur. § 238, at 925.
It is my view that there is nothing in Section 343.15(2) 1 to indicate that the restriction on the principles of imputed negligence which the foregoing Wisconsin cases establish should not be read into the statute. It must be presumed that the Wisconsin Legislature had in mind the Wisconsin decisional law prevailing at the time the statute was passed including the meaning which that law had given to the concept of imputed negligence as applied to actions between joint adventurers.
If someone other than plaintiff had sponsored the driver’s license of William Gilbertson, plaintiff would be entitled to recover under Wisconsin law. The fortuitous circumstance of her sponsorship should not bar her recovery.
Section 343.15(2) makes the minor who operates a motor vehicle as well as the sponsor liable for damages caused by the operator’s negligence. The legislative purpose of the statute is to “protect the public from damage caused by the negligent operation of vehicles by youthful drivers.” Employers’ Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Haucke, 267 Wis. 72, 64 N.W.2d 426. It was not designed to protect the minor which seemingly is the effect of the holding of the Court in the instant case.
For these reasons I respectfully dissent. I would reverse.

. Wisc.Stat. § 343.15(2), 1959.