Court Opinion

ID: 9615737
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:40:13.875428+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:51.165181
License: Public Domain

ERICKSON, Justice,
specially concurring:
I concur in the result reached by the majority. However, I write separately to express my concern that the holding in part I of the majority opinion is too broad. I do not believe that the definition of “driver” contained in section 42-1-102(22), 17 C.R.S. (1984), should be used to determine whether a person “drove a vehicle” within the meaning of section 42-2-122.1(l)(a)(I), 17 C.R.S. (1984). The latter provides:
(l)(a) The department shall revoke the license of any person upon its determina*571tion that the person: (I) Drove a vehicle in this state when the amount of alcohol in such person’s blood was 0.15 or more grams of alcohol per hundred milliliters of blood or 0.15 or more grams of alcohol per two hundred ten liters of breath at the time of the commission of the alleged offense or within one hour thereafter, as shown by chemical analysis of such person’s blood or breath....
(Emphasis added.) For purposes of the Uniform Motor Vehicle Law, the term “driver”
means every person, including a minor driver under the age of eighteen years and a provisional driver under the age of twenty-one years, who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon a highway.
§ 42-1-102(22), 17 C.R.S. (1984) (emphasis added). As the definition of “driver” includes one who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle, the definition is clearly more expansive than the phrase “drove a vehicle” contained in section 42-2-122.1(l)(a)(I). Brewer was obviously in “actual physical control” of his car and thus a “driver” within the meaning of section 42-1-102(22). However, one can easily imagine other factual scenarios in which a person might reasonably be considered to be a “driver” when, under the circumstances, he could not be said to have driven the motor vehicle. Had Brewer been parked on the side of the street with the engine off, he would have been in actual physical control of the car. But I would be reluctant to conclude that he “drove a vehicle” under such circumstances.
Although I disagree with the majority’s reasoning, I am satisfied that Brewer “drove a vehicle” and therefore concur in the result. I reach that conclusion because of the particular facts in this case, not by employing the statutory definition of “driver.” Here, Brewer was found parked in the middle of a cul-de-sac on a summer night. The investigating police officer observed Brewer asleep behind the steering wheel. The motor of Brewer’s car was running and the lights were on. The officer did not actually see Brewer driving his car, but the circumstances clearly indicated that Brewer had in fact driven the vehicle in an intoxicated condition.
I agree with the majority that the statutes relating to drunk driving should be liberally construed to effectuate their purposes. However, we should avoid interpretations of the statutes which would impose the harsh penalties contained therein on persons who have not been apprehended under circumstances which support a reasonable belief that such persons have actually driven a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol.