Court Opinion

ID: 9772169
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:09:12.912541+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:42.398664
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
SEERDEN, Justice.
Appellants have requested rehearing, asserting that “the court erred in holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict as the State failed to prove the necessary intent to cause death and that death was caused by lack of food and medical care as alleged in the indictment.” Under their ground of error, they argue that the evidence on intent will not support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Circumstantial evidence is generally relied on and is sufficient to prove a required culpable mental state. Thompson v. State, 676 S.W.2d 173, 175 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no pet.). If the evidence supports an inference other than the guilt of an accused, a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is not a rational finding. Chambers v. State, (Tex.Crim.App.1986) 711 S.W.2d 240 (on State’s motion for rehearing); McGoldrick v. State, 682 S.W.2d 573, 577-78 (Tex.Crim.App.1985); Freeman v. State, 654 S.W.2d 450, 456 (Tex.Crim.App.1983). The necessary intent or mens rea for murder is intentionally or knowingly. TEX.PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(l)(a) (Vernon 1974). The charge, to which no objections were made, states:
A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the nature of his/her conduct or to a result of his/her conduct when it is their conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.
A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to the nature of *145his/her conduct or the circumstances surrounding his/her conduct when he/she is aware of the nature of his/her conduct or that the circumstances exist. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of his/her conduct when he/she is aware that his/her conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.
The definitions in the charge come from TEX.PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03(a) and (b) (Vernon 1974). The jury was also given the opportunity to find appellants not guilty, or guilty of criminally negligent homicide.
We need not speculate on appellants’ conscious objective or desire. It is sufficient that evidence shows that appellants were aware that the circumstances existed, and that their conduct would be reasonably certain to cause death.
Luke was 3 months old at death. At birth, he weighed 6½ pounds, and the doctor who delivered him testified that he was normal. During the first half of Luke’s life, his maternal grandmother cared for him while his mother worked. Dr. Simpson, the older son’s doctor, testified that he saw Luke at an appointment for his brother when Luke was about a month old. He listened to Luke’s heart, and noticed no signs of malnutrition.
At death, Luke weighed only 4 to 6 ounces more than his birth weight. Both the pathologist who conducted the autopsy and the doctor who signed the death certificate testified that on a standard growth chart, Luke was below the fifth percentile in weight for an infant of three months. This was characterized as “way abnormal.” His head circumference was also “way below normal.” Dr. O’Ryan, a pediatrician who saw the infant shortly after birth and after it was dead, testified to three stages of malnutrition in infants. He said that in the first stage, the baby will use its fat and lose weight, in the second stage, there is a growth arrest, and “in the more severe form of starvation when the baby hasn’t had anything, hardly anything at all, ... the head circumference is below normal because the brain itself stops growing.”
All of the doctors and medical personnel who participated in the attempts to revive Luke testified that he was emaciated. Kevin Oliver, a general duty hospital corpsman who assisted giving CPR, said the child’s facial bones were prominent, he could count the ribs, and “skin and bones” would be a good description. He also said that its skin was not elastic. Dr. Chilton said the baby looked like “one of the Ethiopian children you see on a commercial” and said it had sunken cheeks and “hardly any meat.” Dr. Siegel said the child was “skin and bones” with “sunken cheeks.” Plight surgeon Lillian Wilson said she first thought because of its size that the child was four weeks old or younger, and that the skin was like dehydrated skin, that the child had no muscle tone, “no muscle, no fat.” Dr. Restrepo, who had treated starving children in Colombia, opined that the child starved. He mentioned “an angulat-ed-type of face,” “prominent ribs,” and lack of fat. He also said the baby had “atropic skin” indicative of lack of food or vitamins.
Given the evidence of the child’s weight and extreme appearance, the jury could infer that its condition was noticeable to appellants prior to the child’s death.
There was also direct evidence of appellants’ awareness of the child’s condition. The maternal grandfather testified that three days before Luke died, he and his wife had advised appellants to take Luke to a doctor because of his failure to gain weight. The maternal grandmother acknowledged that she had given such advice. Appellants testified that they were going to take Luke on the day he died, although they had no appointment.
Appellants mention that the death certificate lists “Sudden Infant Death” (SIDS) among causes. The doctor who wrote the certificate testified that he listed several possible causes, including “failure to thrive,” and that starvation was a type of “failure to thrive.” He explained in detail how he came to reject the SIDS theory and *146form the idea that the child starved. The other doctors who were asked about SIDS explained their reasons for rejecting that explanation.
We find the evidence, and particularly that on intent, sufficient to support the jury’s verdict. We OVERRULE appellants’ motion for rehearing.