Court Opinion

ID: 9471383
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:30:59.372331+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:23.048968
License: Public Domain

CLARK, Chief Judge, dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
In our prior opinion we affirmed the district court’s judgment just as written and expressly rejected the changes sought by both the Bank and Trahan. The decisional language of our opinion was as follows:
[Succession of Gragard, 106 La. 298, 30 So. 885 (1901)] certainly demonstrates that Louisiana courts have not felt compelled in every situation to calculate damages for conversion strictly according to the traditional formula.
[T]he unique circumstances of some transactions may call for the value of converted property to be fixed at some time other than the date of conversion. Upon investigation of Louisiana law, we cannot say that Judge Stagg was clearly wrong in his interpretation. We reject the Bank’s argument that the court was obligated to fix damages at the value of the stock at the time of conversion.
Trahan maintains that he should as a matter of law have received the highest value reached by the stock between the date of conversion and the date of judgment. ... We see no reason to compel the imposition of the measure of damages which he seeks.
The trial court levied a damage award which was proper under Louisiana law.
690 F.2d at 468.
When our mandate was returned, the district court applied the judgment exactly as that court had intended that it operate. The judgment, as affirmed by this court, required the tender by the Bank of 15,000 shares of TIPCO stock to Trahan “within 30 days of the date of the judgment.” 690 F.2d at 466 (emphasis supplied). The bank, without performing within or seeking relief from this time limit on performance, appealed. Thus, the Bank assumed the full burden of any price movement in the stock during the appeal. When the appeal process was completed and the mandate got back to the district court, that court was required to enforce thé judgment as originally entered. Since the 30-day period fixed for performance had long ago passed, the court required the Bank to pay the present value of the original limited time delivery. In the unique posture of this unique case,' that was the only way the original judgment could now be enforced. The majority’s contention that the district *835court modified or altered or amended the substantive relief not only, as the majority concedes, deprives Trahan of substantial justice, it is wrong.
During the pendency of the prior appeal and well after the 30-day deadline and after the stock considerably declined in value, the Bank procured 15,000 shares of -TIPCO stock and tendered it into the registry of the district court in full satisfaction of the judgment. The district court allowed the tender motion to be filed but, for lack of jurisdiction, refused to act on it and forwarded it to this court so it would be a part of the record on appeal. This court did not grant the motion. The correctness of the district court’s action is at least corroborated, if not confirmed, by the Bank’s post-judgment activities and this court’s inaction. Surely, if time was not of the essence we would, upon noting the belated tender, have dismissed the appeal as moot.
Our non-action on the Bank’s tender motion, Louisiana law as construed by our prior mandate, the deference we owe to the judge who wrote the judgment in its applications, and substantial justice all require affirmance.