Court Opinion

ID: 9705641
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:14:33.007053+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:13.185910
License: Public Domain

Kirk, J.
(dissenting, with whom Spiegel, J., joins) My chief concern is the disposition made by the majority of the plaintiffs’ “principal bill for declaratory relief” in so far as it relates to the Authority and to the bank. The majority hold that the Authority is entitled, on demurrer, to a declaration that the taking of the plaintiffs’ property was legal, and that, as against the bank, no case has been stated which entitles the plaintiffs to relief.
On the record before us, I am unable to agree. The allegations which are fairly stated in the majority opinion present, I submit, a case which should be tried on the merits before final disposition is made. In summary, as I read the bill, it is alleged that the Authority, recognizing that its planned Government Center Project was in jeopardy because of the bank’s opposition to the taking of its building, made a deal to appease the bank whereby, if private negotiations failed, the Authority would take the plaintiffs’ building, which was not within the planned Project, so that the bank could continue in business at its existing building *573pending the replacement of the plaintiffs’ building by a tower structure to be erected by a developer selected by the bank. When completed, the first ten floors of the tower building were to be leased to the bank. The plaintiffs’ property has, in fact, been taken by the Authority.
In essence the plaintiffs allege a scheme pursuant to which the Authority exercised its power of eminent domain as a device to take the plaintiffs’ property for the use of the bank and not for any public agency included within the Government Center Project. The charge, it seems to me, requires a hearing on the merits rather than a disposition, based solely on a dilatory plea, which has the twofold effect of a final foreclosure of such a hearing and a binding determination of the rights of the parties. We are limited to the actual allegations of the bill. The Authority and the bank have chosen to stand on their demurrers and thereby admit those allegations. That there may be facts which justify the taking of the plaintiffs’ building for the Project is beside the point. If there be such facts they are not before us in any form. There is no answer; there is no denial. There is no fact of which judicial notice may be taken which compels a determination that the taking was legal. The Authority and the bank should be held to the consequences of their pleadings and be required to go to trial as would any other litigant.
A few additional observations are in order. The opinion states that the plaintiffs’ case does not fall within the illustration given by Chief Justice Qua in Despatchers’ Cafe Inc. v. Somerville Housing Authy. 332 Mass. 259, 263. It could be said that the case in a strictly literal sense does not come within the specific illustration cited. I respectfully suggest, however, that the purpose of the taking, as here alleged, is more flagrant than anything suggested by the illustration in the Despatches’ Cafe case and is indistinguishable in principle. It is the taking by a public authority of land with building of private persons so that other private persons may construct, for their own use and benefit, a different building on the land taken.
I likewise suggest that the issue here presented is not, as *574the opinion intimates, what were “the impelling motives of officers authorized to exercise the power of eminent domain,” but rather is whether the Authority was “actually exercising that power for authorized purposes.” I submit that on the pleadings, a case of the nature envisioned by Chief Justice Qua is now before us in aggravated form and should be dealt with.1
Other grounds relied upon by the majority to support their conclusions seem to me to be insubstantial. It is said, for example, that the acts and statements of the chief administrative officer of the Authority in connection with the taking are not attributable to the Authority. I find it difficult to reconcile this statement with what was said in Costonis v. Medford Housing Authy. 343 Mass. 108, 114-115. In any event, the question of the capacity of the chief administrative officer to act and speak for the Authority, if indeed it is controverted, could be and should be resolved at the trial and is not, in my judgment, either cumulatively or independently, sufficient reason for denying the plaintiffs a trial.
Similarly, the majority’s statement that the position of the bank with respect to the proposed tower building is “no different legal position from that of any other prospective tenant” impresses me as unrealistic in view of the allegations that the bank stood athwart the original plan, participated in the arrangement for the taking of the plaintiffs’ land, selected the developer who was to construct the new building on that land, and made an agreement for a lease of the first ten floors of the new building. If, on these allegations, the bank is not an indispensable party to the litigation, it should, in my opinion, be regarded at least as a proper and perhaps a necessary party as those terms are customarily applied. See Minnesota v. Northern Sec. Co. 184 U. S. 199, 235-236; Franks v. Markson, 337 Mass. 278, 283.
Transcending the effect of the holding of the majority in the present case are its implications for the future. On *575the" one hand, it is difficult to foresee how any landowner will ever have access to a forum to show that the power of eminent domain is being exercised for a private purpose by a public authority vested with that power. On the other hand, it is not difficult to conceive of situations wherein economically powerful private interests, shielded by the opinion of the majority and working behind the facade of a public authority which has the power of eminent domain, will be enabled to become the real beneficiaries of the exercise of that power in contravention of Article X of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the Commonwealth.
For the reasons stated and to the extent indicated, I dissent from the disposition of the bill for declaratory relief. I would order that the demurrers of the Authority and the bank be overruled, that they be required to answer, and that the case proceed to trial with the least practicable delay. .

“It will be time enough to deal with such a case when it arises.” Qua, C.J., in Despatches ’ Cafe Inc. v. Somerville Sousing Authy. 332 Mass. 259, 263.