Court Opinion

ID: 9585452
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:00:38.534043+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:47:10.428722
License: Public Domain

*223Miller, J.,
dissenting.
I am in accord with the principles of law announced in the majority opinion but cannot agree that the facts and circumstances in evidence establish causal connection between the negligence of appellant and the collision. On the contrary, I think affirmative, convincing and uncontradicted testimony distinctly discloses that the automobile driver’s independent act (found by the jury to be negligence and a proximate cause of the collision)1 intervened and was the sole proximate cause of the mishap.
■ My disagreement with the maj ority opinion being with regard to the application of settled principles of law to the evidence, that part of the testimony which I think negatives causal connection between appellant’s negligence and the collision and conclusively establishes the negligence of the driver of the automobile as an intervening and the sole proximate cause of the injury of appellee will be hereinafter set out in detail.
It is to be remembered that failure to give the statutory signals required by section 56-414, Code, 1950, and proof of injury, without more, will not sustain a recovery. Proof of causal connection between failure to give the signals and the injury is an additional and essential element that must be established as a fact or be justly inferrible from the facts and circumstances proved before liability is incurred. Virginian Ry. Co. v. Haley, 156 Va. 350, 157 S. E. 776; Simon v. Southern Ry. Co., 96 Va. 152, 31 S. E. 7; Chesapeake, etc., R. Co. v. Barlow, 155 Va. 863,156 S. E. 397.
Nor is the evidence sufficient to establish causal connection between the omission to give the signals and the collision if it merely shows a possibility that the accident would not have occurred had the signals been given. To impose liability upon that character of evidence would be establishing proximate cause by surmise and conjecture and not on facts and circumstances proved and legitimate inferences therefrom.
For a fair appraisal of the testimony bearing upon the vital requirement of causal connection, it is well to know what is revealed by an accurate map of the crossing and surrounding area which was made by an independent surveyor, and filed in *224evidence. From this map it appears that at a point in the highway one hundred feet west of the center of the track at the crossing a train approaching from the east could be seen when it was three hundred feet from the crossing. Standing in the highway fifty feet west of the center of the track at the crossing a train could be seen coming from the east when it was five hundred and thirty feet from the crossing.
James W. Chattin, driver of the automobile, gave this account of what transpired as he approached the track at the very moderate speed of ten to twenty miles per hour:
“Q. When did you first know that a train was approaching?
“A. Well, I heard Mrs. Bryan say, ‘there is the train’, and I was conscious of it then.
“Q. At the time she saw it, you were conscious of it?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. What were you doing?
“A. I was slowing down then and I just applied my brakes and stopped.
“Q. When you stopped, did you think you were in the clear?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Had you reached the tracks then?
“A. No, not then.
“Q. When you stopped you had not reached the tracks?
“A. No, sir.
“Q. At what point on the road do you think you were going about ten miles an hour ?
“A. I was probably 40 or 50 feet from the tracks when I was going between ten and fifteen.
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“Q. When she spoke, how fast were you going?
“A. About fifteen miles an hour.
“Q. Did you intend to stop for that track?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Regardless of whether any train was coming or not?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. You were going to stop anyway?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. And the only reason you stopped too close was because you misjudged your distance?
“A. That’s the only fault I see.
“Q. You were going to stop regardless?
*225“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Begardless of whether a train was coming, you were going to stop ?
“A. Yes, sir.
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“Q. Didn’t you know the railroad crossed there at an angle?
“A. I would never have thought it was so much.
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“Q. You stopped your car as soon as you intended to stop, but because of that curious angle, the train hit you?
“A. Yes, I stopped it.
“Q. You stopped right where you intended to stop, didn’t you?
“A. Yes. She said, ‘There is the train’, and I applied my brakes.
“Q. You had already slowed down, and as soon as she said, ‘There is the train’, you stopped?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. And that was from 40 to 45 feet from the track?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. You had plenty of time to stop, but because of that curious angle, your right wheel got out there too far?
“A. I was judging from the left wheel, and I never thought about the right one.
“Q. You stopped where you intended to stop?
“A. Yes, I thought I was clear of the track.
“Q. You knew of the presence of the train in time to stop all right?
“A. Yes, sir.
Appellee, Norman Chattin, gives this account of the circumstances immediately prior to and attending the collision:
“A. After James came over to get us, we were driving along the highway about 25 or 30, and just as he reached the crossing, he began slowing down before he reached it, and some distance back, Mrs. Bryan gave a warning, she said, ‘There’s a train’, and immediately after that, I looked to my right, and just as I looked back from it to the left, I saw it coming, and James came to a complete stop, and I thought he had stopped just in time *226for it to have missed us, and just as he stopped, it struck, and I was knocked unconscious.
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“Q. After you saw this train and saw your situation, could you tell me about how far the train was up the track, when you saw it?
“A. You mean after Mrs. Bryan said, ‘There’s a train’?
“Q. Yes.
“A. I would say it was 150 to 200 feet down the track.
“Q. "What speed would you say you were traveling at the time Mrs. Bryan observed the train coming?
“A. I would say around 15 to 20, then, when she warned him.
“Q. Now, Mr. Chattin, did you and James, before this accident, go over that crossing practically every day?
“A. Yes, we had to cross it every day.
“Q. What was his habit there? Did he make a habit of stopping at that crossing to look or listen?
“A. Yes, sir.
‘ ‘ Q. How far from the track did he stop ?
“A. I don’t know how far he stopped; he just stopped clear of the track.
“Q. He always stopped, whether a train was coming or not?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Always did, whether there was a train coming or not?
“A. He obeyed the sign.
“Q. All the time.
“A. I don’t know, but every time I was with him he did.
“ Q. It was his habit to stop whether there was a train there or not?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. On this day when there was a train, he didn’t stop?
“A. He just didn’t stop in time. He was too close.”
Two other occupants of the car testified and gave their accounts of how the driver proceeded up to and stopped near the track. Elizabeth Bryan said:
“Q. How fast was he going then?
“A. I think he was making about 20 miles an hour when I first saw the train.
“Q. You think he approached that crossing within 40 to 45 feet, still going 20 miles an hour ?
*227“A. I think he was.
“Q. You don’t think he slowed down until you spoke?
“A. Yes, he was faster than that before I spoke.
“Q. You think James intended to slow down, intending to stop, about 40 feet from the tracks ?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Did his brakes slide?
“A. No, sir.
“Q. Wheels slide?
“A. No.
“Q. Did the car skid?
“A. No.”
The testimony of Bernice Chattin also discloses that the automobile was under complete control and appeared to have been deliberately stopped where the driver intended, uninfluenced by the train’s approach. She said:
“A. As we approached the crossing, he slowed the car to around ten miles cmd hour and mother said: ‘Here comes a train’, and I looked to my right and then back to my left, and he was stopping, and I thought he had stopped so we were clear, but by that time the train had hit us.
“Q. And you looked ahead?
“A. And then turned to my left.
“Q. And where was the train then?
“A. I would say 100 or 150 feet away.
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“Q. When you mother told him the train was there, how fast was he going?
“A. About fifteen.
“Q. And you weren’t uneasy, you thought he could stop?
“A. Sure, I thought he had stopped.”
The recitals of these four witnesses of the circumstances immediately preceding and obtaining at the time of the collision give a factual account and clear picture of how and why the mishap occurred. The testimony of the three witnesses other than appellee is not in conflict with his testimony and the testimony of all four when considered together definitely pin-points the real and sole proximate cause of the mishap. Their account of both how and why it happened is direct, unequivocal, and inclu*228sive. It leaves no room or justification for inference as to what caused the collision. The car’s contact with the train was not because the driver could not stop aftey he saw the train, but simply because he miscalculated the intersection angle and thus placed his vehicle too near the track. The sum total of this evidence negatives any just inference that failure to give the statutory signals was a cause of the car’s dangerous proximity to the track and conclusively shows that the driver’s negligence was an intervening and the sole cause of the accident.
I think it may be fairly said that the testimony of each and all of the occupants of the car discloses that no emergency confronted the driver from the time he was apprised of the presence of the train. This was, no doubt, due to the fact that he intended to stop whether a train was coming or not and was slowdng down preparatory to making the stop in any event. There is nothing that can be relied on in the evidence to indicate that the situation would have been different or that the driver would have acted otherwise had the signals been given. I attach no probative value to the driver’s obvious afterthought and statement given when asked what he would have done if he had heard the train’s whistle or bell as he approached the crossing. It was that he “would have stopped quicker, I guess, because I would have stopped sooner.” I am unwilling to rely upon the random “guess” of this witness as to what he might have done under those circumstances and thus attempt by speculation and surmise to supply the necessary causal connection between the railroad’s negligence and the collision. His guess and our guess, i. e., two guesses, do not add up to “causal connection.”
Here the collision did not occur because of failure to give the signals or because James W. Chattin was not sooner apprised of the train’s approach, but because in stopping he misjudged the acuteness of the angle and thus placed his car too near the track. What he did and what he omitted to do show that the real cause of the accident was his miscalculation of the angle of the intersection and not appellee’s negligent omission to give the statutory signals. Clearly, then, that independent act and negligence of the driver intervened as the sole efficient cause of the accident and thus insulates the prior and more remote negligence of the railroad company as a proximate cause.
: In the case of Spence v. American Oil Go., 171 Ya. 62, 197 S. E. 468, 118 A. L. R. 1120, this court said:
*229“* * * The law of proximate causes requires an unbroken sequence between the prime act of .negligence and the injury; and where it appears that an active cause intervenes, the prime act will not be deemed the proximate cause unless the intervening act was itself a result reasonably to have been expected from the prime act, and hence negligent approach of a railroad train to a crossing was not the proximate cause of a collision with an automobile the driver of which saw the train in time to have stopped, and would have done so except that his brakes failed to work. Keel v. Seaboard Airline Ry., 122 S. C. 17, 114 S. E. 761.” (171 Va. at pp. 74, 75.)
“An intervening cause which breaks the chain of causation becomes the sole proximate cause and supersedes the antecedent negligence of a defendant.” Roanoke Ry., etc., Co. v. Whitner, 173 Va. 253, at p. 258, 3 S. E. (2d) 169.
“Where a second tort-feasor becomes aware, or by the exercise of ordinary care should be aware, of the existence of a potential danger created by the negligence of an original tortfeasor, and thereafter by an independent act of negligence brings about an accident, the condition created by the first tortfeasor becomes merely a circumstance of the accident, but is not a proximate cause thereof. The original negligence of the first tort-feasor is legally insulated by the intervening independent negligence of the second tort-feasor, and the latter becomes the sole proximate cause of the accident.” Hubbard v. Murray, 173 Va. 448, at pp. 455-56, 3 S. E. (2d) 397.
The cases of Virginian Ry. Co. v. Haley, supra, and Southern Ry. Co. v. Whetsel, 159 Va. 796, 167 S. E. 427, are relied upon by appellee and cited and quoted from in the majority opinion. I think it however sufficient to say that in both of those cases the drivers of the automobiles never saw or were apprised of the presence of the train until their vehicles were upon the track. And in neither instance did the driver have time to stop after being aware of the presence of the train or did they intend to stop for the track regardless of whether a train was approaching or not as were the circumstances in the case at bar. In discussing the Haley Case in his brief, appellee says: “Neither the plaintiff nor the driver saw, nor heard the train until they were on the track.” That statement is borne out by the facts of the case.
In the Whetsel Case we find a like statement: “There is no *230evidence tending to show that Grant Whetzel or the operator of the automobile were aware of the approaching train. * * *” Though the principles of law involved in those cases are the same as in the one at bar, yet due to factual differences they are not controlling of the ultimate result that should be reached on this appeal.
I am of opinion that the case should be reversed and.final judgment entered for appellant.

 Verdict and judgment in favor of appellee against the driver of the automobile was rendered in this proceeding and an appeal applied for but denied.