Court Opinion

ID: 9417200
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 20:05:46.788534+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:37.405799
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Strong
concurred in the judgment, but not in the construction given by the majority of the court to the second section of the act of 1875, respecting removals from State courts.
• Mr. Justice BradLey concurred in the judgment, and delivered the following opinion in which Mr. Justice Swayne concurred.
■ I concur in the judgment in these cases, but dissent from so much of the opinion as seems to assume that, one condition of Federal jurisdiction, in the removal of a cause from a State court, under the-first clause of sect. 2, act of 1875, is, that each, party on one side of the .controversy must be a citizen of a different State from that of which either of the parties on the other side is a citizen. This portion of the act gives the right of removal to either party, in any suit in which there is “ a controversy between citizens of different States.” In my judgment a controversy is such, as that expression is used in the Constitution, and in the law, when any of the parties on one side thereof are citizens of a different State, or States, from that of which any of the parties on the other side are citizens. ■It is true, if there are other parties on opposite sides of the controversy who are citizens of a common State, it may also be a controversy between citizens of the same State. In other .words, a controversy may be, at the same time, both a controversy between citizens of the same State and between citizens of different States. But the fact that it .is both, does not take away the Federal jurisdiction. Neither the Constitution, nor the law, declares that there shall not be such jurisdiction if any of the contestants on opposite sides of the controversy are citizens of the same State; but they do declare that there shall be such jurisdiction if the controversy is between citizens of different States. The gift of judicial power by the Constitution, and the gift of jurisdiction by the law, are in affirmative terms ; and those terms include as well the case when only part of the contestants opposed to each *480other are citizens of different States, as that in which they are all of different States. And I see no good reason why both the Constitution and the law should not receive a construction as broad as that of the terms which they employ. On the contrary, I think there is just reason for giving to those terms their full effect. The object of extending the judicial power to controversies between citizens of different States was, to establish a common and impartial tribunal, equally related to both parties, for the purpose of deciding between them. This object would be defeated in many cases if the fact that a single one of many contestants on one side of a controversy being a citizen of the same State with one or more of the contestants on the other side, should have the effect of depriving the Federal courts of jurisdiction. This absurdity became so glaring under the construction formerly given by this court to the Judiciaiy Act of 1789, in the case of corporations, when every stockholder was held to be a party, that the court was at length impelled to regard a corporation as a citizen of the State which created it, without regard to the citizenship of its members; — thus getting rid of the troublesome stockholder who happened to be a citizen of the same State with the opposite party, and who almost always appeared in the case.
If we give the same construction to the present law which was given to the Judiciary Act, we shall certainly meet with like embarrassment and difficulty in exercising the fair and proper jurisdiction of the Federal courts. No cases are more appropriate to this jurisdiction, or more urgently call for its exercise, than those which relate to the foreclosure and sale of railroads extending into two or more States, and winding up the affairs of the companies that own them; since, in addition to the convenience of a single jurisdiction having cognizance of the whole matter (which could readily be conferred, if it is not so) the local tribunals in such cases, however upright and pure, are naturally more or less favorably affected towards the interests of their own citizens: and yet, it is almost always essential, in order to do complete justice in these cases, to call before the court some parties on opposite sides of the controversy who are citizens of the same State.' If this- fact is to deprive the Federal courts of jurisdiction, without regard to *481the numerous and important contestants on opposite sides who are citizens of different States, the value of the institution of national courts, for taking cognizance of controversies between citizens of different States, will be greatly impaired.
But it seems to me clear that, in construing the present law, we are not bound by the construction given to the old Judiciary Act. The words of that act, conferring jurisdiction upon the circuit courts in respect of citizenship, were not the same as those used by the present law or by the Constitution. It only conferred jurisdiction when “ the suit is between a citizen of the State where the suit is brought and a citizen of another State.” The singular number only was used; and the courts, in applying the law to cases in which there was a plurality of plaintiffs or defendants, construed it (perhaps justly) as requiring that each plaintiff and each defendant should have the citizenship required by the law. But, now, it is not so. The present law follows the words of the Constitution, and gives jurisdiction to the circuit courts in the broadest terms, namely, whenever, in any suit, there is “ a controversy between citizens of different States; ” and this broad and general expression, as I think I have shown, gives jurisdiction where any of the contestants on opposite sides of the controversy are citizens of different States.
The only objection to this construction which has been seriously pressed, is drawn from the argument ab inoonvenienti; namely, that if in a controversy where the contestants are numerous, a single case of diverse citizenship between opposite parties should give Federal' jurisdiction, the courts of the United States would be overwhelmed with business, litigants would be unnecessarily drawn away from the domestic tribunals, and the intent of the Constitution would be subverted. Now whilst I am satisfied that the apprehended inconveniences are greatly exaggerated, the inconveniences which would result from a contrary interpretation to that contended for would be at least equally great in depriving the Federal courts of jurisdiction by a single case of common citizenship between opposite parties, though a large majority of the opposing litigants are citizens of different States ; and, thus, one inconvenience would balance the other, and we should still be left to *482seek the true construction of the Constitution and the law from the words which they use. But the inconveniences would not be equal. To deprive the Federal courts of jurisdiction b)y a partial community of citizenship between the opposite/parties would, in many instances, actually defeat the very object which the Constitution and the law have in view.
Even if it should happen that, upon the construction contended for, many cases might be brought into the Federal coúrts in which a partial community of citizenship did exist between the opposing parties, what harm would ensue ? Ought it not to be presumed that the courts, which are courts of the common country of all the parties, will as well do equal and exact justice between them as the State courts could do ? If the judicial force is not sufficient to meet the exigency, let it be increased. If the courts are not held at sufficiently convenient places, that difficulty can easily be removed. The phrase in question, “ controversies between citizens of different States,” is a constitutional one ; and the construction which we may give to it will affect the judicial powers of the Federal government for all time; and any temporary inconvenience arising from existing arrangements, which can be remedied by legislation, ought not to stand in the way of a fair .construction of the organic law.
But it is not necessary to pass upon this question in this case. The present controversy is wholly between citizens of different States ; and we are all agreed as to the decision that ought to be made. When the question does come squarely before us, and it becomes necessary to decide it, it is to be hoped that it may receive the fullest consideration.