Court Opinion

ID: 9737041
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:13:46.904667+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:23:55.960543
License: Public Domain

Kelly, J.
(dissenting). I disagree with the majority on three issues in this case: whether it was error requiring reversal for the prosecutor to present evidence in rebuttal which properly belonged in the prosecutor’s case in chief; whether the trial court erred by instructing the jury on the flight instruction; and whether the court erred by instructing the jury on kidnapping by secret confinement. I will not discuss the first two issues as they are extremely close questions and dissents rarely ride to vindication. However, I am firmly convinced that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on kidnapping by secret confinement and that this error requires reversal.
The majority opinion observes that the prose*808cutor should have charged kidnapping by asportation but then goes on to find that there was sufficient evidence by which the jury could find secret confinement beyond a reasonable doubt. I believe that conclusion is demonstrably wrong. Compare People v Lucille Walker, 135 Mich App 311; 355 NW2d 385 (1984).
The victim testified that she was at a friend’s house on the day of the crimes. The friend was defendant’s sister. Defendant was present at the house as were defendant’s girlfriend, his mother, his little sister, and another friend.
While there, defendant tried to get the victim’s attention and eventually trapped her in the bathroom in order to talk to her. Defendant’s girlfriend discovered them in the bathroom and a fight ensued. Defendant’s mother arrived on the scene, pulled the victim out of the bathroom and told her to leave. The friend got the victim’s coat and promised to meet her outside. Another brother followed the victim outside and offered to call a ride for her. The victim agreed and gave him a number but remained outside.
The victim then saw defendant come out of the house next door, later identified as his girlfriend’s house, and beat on the door of his mother’s home yelling something about his money. When he spotted the victim standing across the street, he told her to wait because she was going to go out with him. When he began banging on the house again, the victim started to leave. Defendant pulled out a gun and told her to wait. He crossed the street, pointed the gun at her and told her to walk with him. The victim described the long path they took through the streets of Saginaw, using a map to aid the jury. They publicly walked more than twenty blocks and passed many people. The victim explained that she did not scream or try to get away *809because she was afraid. Defendant told her that he would kill her or her family if she told anyone and that jail did not bother him because he had been there before. She believed that he would not mind killing her.
The two finally arrived at defendant’s apartment. Defendant placed a bar across the inside of the apartment door. In his apartment, defendant committed the acts of sexual misconduct for which he was convicted. Two to two-and-one-half hours passed. Defendant then permitted the victim to leave but instructed her to return on Monday for more sex and warned her again not to tell anyone. He also instructed her to wait while he dressed. He then accompanied her down the street for about two blocks before he let her go on by herself.
A neighbor who lived in the other apartment at defendant’s address testified that she was home on March 8, 1986, and saw defendant arrive with a woman at about 8:00 p.m. The two were close enough to each other to be holding hands but the neighbor could not see if defendant had anything in his hand. She saw them walk to the back apartment. She also heard a loud male voice twice in the hour she estimated they were in the apartment, but she could not tell what was being said.
Count i of the information charged defendant with kidnapping, MCL 750.349; MSA 28.581. The charge read as follows:
KIDNAPPING
[Defendant] did wilfully, maliciously, and without lawful authority forcibly or secretly confine or imprison another person, to-wit: [the victim] within this state against his/her will with intent either to cause such person to be secretly confined or imprisoned in this state against his/her wall, or in any way held to service against his/her will; *810Contrary to Sec. 750.349 C.L. 1970, as amended; M.S.A. 28.581.
In People v Wesley, 421 Mich 375, 383; 365 NW2d 692 (1984), our Supreme Court interpreted the kidnapping statute to include several forms of kidnapping and stated:
Thus, a person can be convicted of kidnapping if it is proven beyond a reasonable doubt that he or she wilfully, maliciously, and without lawful authority,
(a) forcibly or secretly confined or imprisoned any other person within this state against his will, or
(b) forcibly carried or sent such person out of this state, or
(c) forcibly seized or confined, or inveigled or kidnapped any other person
(1) with intent to extort money or other valuable thing thereby, or
(2) with intent either
(A) to cause such person to be secretly confined or imprisoned in this state against his will, or
(B) [to cause such person to be] in any way held to service against his will.
In appropriate cases, secret confinement or some other nonmovement factor may supply a necessary alternative to asportation to complete the statutory kidnapping. People v Adams, 389 Mich 222, 238; 205 NW2d 415 (1973). In People v McNeal, 152 Mich App 404, 412-413; 393 NW2d 907 (1986), this Court held that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find secret confinement where defendant forced the victim off the street and into a home. For three hours McNeal kept the victim there, most of the time blindfolded. The court believed that the confinement was "secret” in that *811it would be difficult for anyone to know or learn that an abducted victim was confined there.
This case is distinguishable from McNeal because here defendant’s apartment was known to his family and the victim had been seen recently with him. Moreover, the apartment was on the back side of a house which was occupied by a person who actually observed them enter. The apartment was constructed in such a way that sound traveled to the other apartment. The instant case did not involve any blindfolding or otherwise secreting of the location from the victim. Instead of being obviously difficult for anyone to learn or know that a victim had been abducted and secreted there, the victim’s presence in defendant’s apartment was known immediately by one person and immediately thereafter by others. Had a search been called for, defendant’s apartment would have been a first priority.
Defendant objected to the proposed instruction on secret confinement and argued at trial that the more appropriate instruction would be CJI 19:1:01. I agree. There is no evidence showing intent to secretly confine the victim and thus CJI 19:1:04 was inappropriate. The major difference between the two instructions is that, where secret confinement is given, asportation outside of the criminal transportation of the victim for the underlying offense is unnecessary before the jury may find the defendant guilty on the charge of kidnapping. In the instant case, there was ample evidence by which the jury could have concluded that defendant forced the victim to travel more than was necessary to merely commit the rape, particularly since he followed her outside the apartment after the incident.
Because the trial court instructed the jury in such a fashion that they did not have to find *812beyond a reasonable doubt the asportation element normally required in kidnapping cases, the jury was allowed to convict defendant without a necessary element of the charge of kidnapping. This error requires reversal of defendant’s kidnapping conviction. This error did not affect defendant’s trial on the other charges, so I would affirm his convictions for esc, extortion, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.