Court Opinion

ID: 9580265
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:03:40.561372+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:10.502526
License: Public Domain

Pope, Judge,
concurring specially.
I do not agree that we can hold, as a matter of law, that the facts alleged by plaintiff/appellant do not state a claim for false imprisonment. In this period of high unemployment and economic recession, we cannot say that an employee voluntarily chose to accept a job assignment by her employer simply because she did not decline the assignment. Even if the employee in this case voluntarily consented to the restriction on her liberty by being locked in the store on the evening in question, she surely withdrew her consent when it became vital for her to leave and obtain medical care after suffering a stroke. Neither do I agree that all claims for false imprisonment by an employee against an employer are compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act (the “Act”) and therefore barred by the exclusive remedy provision. I agree, however, that the claim in this case is barred because the injury was essentially a physical injury, and not merely an injury to the employee’s peace and happiness, and therefore is a claim which is subject to the exclusive remedy provision of the Act.
The Act includes the following definition: “ ‘Injury’ or ‘personal *774injury’ means only injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment . . . .” OCGA § 34-9-1 (4). To be compensable under the Act, the injury must be a physical injury or harm. W. W. Fowler Oil Co. v. Hamby, 192 Ga. App. 422 (4) (385 SE2d 106) (1989). But the injury in a false imprisonment claim is not physical, but is simply the deprivation of liberty. Stewart v. Williams, 243 Ga. 580 (1) (255 SE2d 699) (1979). Thus, to prevail on a false imprisonment claim, one does not have to show either physical or mental harm but only wrongful detention. For this reason, a number of jurisdictions has held that an employee is not barred from bringing a tort claim for false imprisonment against an employer. For example, in Moore v. Federal Dept. Stores, 190 NW2d 262, 264 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971), the Michigan appellate court said of that state’s workers’ compensation statute: “The Act has been interpreted to encompass physical and mental injuries which arise out of and in the course of one’s employment. However, the gist of an action for false imprisonment is unlawful detention irrespective of any physicál or mental harm.” Consequently, in that case, which was brought by a store employee for false imprisonment when she was detained and interrogated concerning alleged theft, the court ruled that the claim did not involve the type of personal injury covered under the workers’ compensation act and therefore was not barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the statute. In Columbia Sussex Corp. v. Hay, 627 SW2d 270, 279 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981), the Kentucky appellate court ruled: “Inasmuch as . . . false imprisonment can be established without a showing of actual damages, there is nothing for which the Workers’ Compensation Act would compensate.” See also Le v. Federated Dept. Stores, 560 A2d 42 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989); Redican v. K Mart Corp., 734 SW2d 864 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).1 I agree with the rationale of the decisions cited above that a claim for false imprisonment, when the only injury *775is a non-physical one, is not compensable under the Act and therefore not barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Act.
Decided March 16, 1992
Reconsideration denied April 3, 1992
Oldfield & Wilson, James 0. Wilson, Jr., Carmel W. Sanders, for appellant.
McLain & Merritt, Howard M. Lessinger, for appellees.
Each of these cases, however, involved only a claim for wrongful detention, a non-physical injury. Professor Larson notes the problem inherent in the factual situation of the case at hand, where there is a claim for false imprisonment but where the essence of the injury is compensable, physical harm. “If the essence of the tort, in law, is nonphysical, and if the injuries are of the usual non-physical sort, with physical injury being at most added to the list of injuries as a makeweight, the suit should not be barred. But if the essence of the action is recovery for physical injury or death, the action should be barred even if it can be cast in the form of a normally non-physical tort.” 2A Larson, The Law of Workmen’s Compensation, § 68.34 (a), at 13-117 (1990). See also id. at § 68.31.
The claim in the case at hand involves physical injury and death as well as false imprisonment. On appeal, plaintiff makes an admirable argument that at least that part of the claim which relates only to the allegation of false imprisonment should not be barred by the Act. The claim for false imprisonment, however, is inextricably linked to the claim for physical injury and death. In this case, the damages from the alleged false imprisonment are not only the detention, itself, but the exacerbation of the employee’s physical condition as a result of being denied the opportunity to seek medical attention during that period in which she was wrongfully detained. This physical injury is a compensable claim and thus any recovery for her injury cannot be split between a tort action and a workers’ compensation action. That the injury is essentially one which is compensable under the Act would also bar plaintiff’s RICO claim. For this reason, I agree that the judgment of the trial court must be affirmed.

 This court also has held that the Workers’ Compensation Act does not bar a claim for false imprisonment by an employee against her employer. Smith v. Rich’s, Inc., 104 Ga. App. 883 (123 SE2d 316) (1961). In Smith, however, we based our holding on the ground that plaintiff’s injuries did not arise out of an “accident,” but were the result of the wilful and intentional acts of the agent of the employer. See also Skelton v. W. T. Grant Co., 331 F2d 593 (5th Cir. 1964). As the majority points out in Division 1, the courts of this state have subsequently ruled that the Act precludes recovery in tort for the wilful and intentional acts of the employer so long as the injury is otherwise compensable. Even though the rationale employed in the Smith opinion is no longer accepted, the holding is still correct and is supported by the superior rationale that the injury is simply not compensable under the act. See D. Meade Feild, Workmen’s Compensation, 14 Mercer L. Rev. 244, 261 (1962).
I also note that in Greenbaum v. Brooks, 110 Ga. App. 661 (139 SE2d 432) (1964), decided subsequent to the Smith decision, this court affirmed a jury award of damages in tort to an employee who sued his employer for false imprisonment without addressing the issue of the workers’ compensation bar. In a more recent case, Bi-Lo, Inc. v. McConnell, 199 Ga. App. 154 (404 SE2d 327) (1991), this court permitted an employee to recover from his employer for a similar tort involving non-physical injury, malicious prosecution.