Court Opinion

ID: 9585470
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:00:52.385043+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:47:14.218587
License: Public Domain

Finney, Justice:
I respectfully dissent. In my opinion, the trial record unequivocally shows that Darnell’s attorney and the assistant solicitor had an agreement that the charges against Darnell would be dropped if he did not testify for petitioner, and that this agreement was honored by the State. Accordingly, the denials of the attorney and the assistant solicitor at the PCR hearing lack probative value.
As the majority notes, Darnell’s attorney informed the trial court at the outset that the solicitor’s office “agreed that if [Darnell] did not testify then at the end of [petitioner’s] trial they would dismiss the case against him.” As soon as petitioner was convicted and sentenced, the assistant solicitor announced “I will formally on the record note our intention to go immediately next door and not pros [Darnell’s] indictment.” She then did so. While both the assistant solicitor and the attorney denied the existence of the agreement at the PCR hearing, both Darnell and petitioner’s trial attorney confirmed the “deal” at the hearing.
Ordinarily, we defer to the PCR judge’s credibility determinations. Drayton v. Evatt, — S.C. —, 430 S.E. (2d) 517 (1993). If the Court were faced with a disagreement between the recollections of Darnell’s attorney and the assistant solicitor on the one hand, and petitioner’s attorney and Darnell on the other, then I would agree there was probative evidence to support the PCR judge’s ruling and that it should be affirmed. Here, however, we have more than simply conflicting testimony years after the fact; we have the contemporaneous statements of the parties to the alleged agreement. This Court is not bound by the PCR record alone, but must look as well at the trial record. See Harres v. Leeke, 282 S.C. 131, 318 S.E. (2d) 360 (1984). A review of the entire record unequivocally demonstrates the existence of the agreement. Trial counsel’s failure to object to it was unreasonable, and the prejudice to petitioner undeniable. I would reverse and grant petitioner’s application for postconviction relief. United States v. Henricksen, 564 F. (2d) 197 (5th Cir. 1977); see Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 93 S.Ct. 351, 34 L.Ed. (2d) 330 (1972).