Court Opinion

ID: 9878709
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-27 17:34:56.719935+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:47:39.809600
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE ALBIN,
dissenting.
Today’s decision denying plaintiffs the right to proceed with a class-action lawsuit against TGI Fridays, Inc. and Carlson Restaurants, Inc. (collectively, TGIF) is at odds with decades of this Court’s jurisprudence and steepens the path to justice for consumers with small claims. The decision will make it more difficult for a class of many thousands of defrauded consumers to act collectively in pursuit of a common remedy against a corporate wrongdoer.
In knowing violation of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (CFA), N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 to -206, TGIF does not list beverage prices on its menus. TGIF pursues this policy because it knows—through *76its own study—that a consumer will pay, on average, $1.72 more per meal if beverage prices are not placed on menus. Plaintiffs allege that TGIF, by not listing beverage prices in violation of N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.5, reaped an illicit benefit while TGIF patrons suffered an ascertainable loss. To be sure, TGIF is free to charge whatever it wishes. But if it does so, it must comply—like all restaurants—with the law.
A single consumer does not have the economic wherewithal to litigate against a corporate giant over a $1.72 claim. However, thousands of similarly defrauded consumers banding together in a class action gain “a measure of equality against” a defiant corporate adversary. Lee v. Carter-Reed Co., 203 N.J. 496, 517-18, 4 A.3d 561 (2010).
Unlike the majority, I believe that plaintiffs have presented a viable legal theory under the CFA and our class-action jurisprudence. Looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, as we must at this stage, TGIF engaged in an unconscionable commercial practice that caused an ascertainable loss to its patrons. TGIF has calculated that loss to be $1.72 per meal when beverage prices are not listed on menus. TGIF has concluded that uninformed consumers make purchases exceeding the “fair” price they otherwise would have paid. Thus, each class member’s ascertainable loss is the difference between what the patron in fact paid and what the patron would have paid had TGIF listed beverage prices at the point of sale, as required by N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.5.
In the setting before us lies a stark reality. There is no reasonable substitute for a class action to vindicate the rights of TGIF’s victimized patrons. There will not be individual complaints filed in small claims court to recover a loss of $1.72. The majority’s decision to overthrow the trial court’s certification of the class ensures that there will be no judicial action holding TGIF accountable for its wrongdoing. The majority also has given TGIF a perverse incentive to continue violating the CFA and an unde*77served advantage over competitor restaurants that comply with our consumer-fraud laws.
I therefore respectfully dissent.
I.
A.
Plaintiffs filed a class-action lawsuit against TGIF, alleging that the chain restaurant engaged in a systematic scheme to violate the Consumer Fraud Act in pursuit of higher profits.1 Plaintiffs claim that TGIF deliberately does not list beverage prices on its menus “to induce[ ] consumers to pay higher than reasonable prices for those beverages.” TGIF does not list beverage prices on its menus, notwithstanding N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.5, which requires that the “selling price” of merchandise, including food and beverages, be “plainly marked ... at the point where the merchandise is offered for sale.”2
In a per curiam opinion issued on October 25, 2011, the Appellate Division declared, as a matter of law, that TGIF’s failure to list beverage prices on its menus violates the CFA. In rejecting TGIF’s argument, the Appellate Division stated: “TGIF engages in legal gymnastics in a futile attempt to convince us that beverages are not embraced within the definition of merchandise in N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.5.” At oral argument before this Court, TGIF conceded that it was bound by the Appellate Division’s ruling. Because that ruling is the controlling law and is not contested before this Court, TGIF is in violation of the CFA. The only remaining issue is whether the CFA violation—the failure to list *78beverage prices—caused an ascertainable loss to the class of TGIF patrons.
TGIF does not pretend to be in compliance with the law; rather, its defense is that a class action is not a proper vehicle to be used by the patrons victimized by TGIF’s practices. However, a single consumer, even if defrauded, cannot engage in costly litigation over a sum involving, at most, several dollars. Only through a class action that aggregates thousands of small claims of similarly defrauded patrons can a viable lawsuit proceed.
B.
In support of its application for class certification, plaintiffs rely on marketing studies commissioned by TGIF that analyzed consumer responses to menu pricing.3 In one study, TGIF tested pricing decisions made by patrons in thirty restaurants—fifteen that listed beverage prices on menus and fifteen that did not. TGIF’s statistical study revealed that when alcohol prices are placed on menus, TGIF loses on average $1.72 per customer on a meal. In the study, the informed patrons “traded down” to the optimal price they could afford.
In other studies, TGIF determined the “fair” price and “think-twice” price for the purchase of meals with and without alcoholic beverages. The “think-twice” price, apparently, is the price at which bells go off in patrons’ heads and purchases decline because consumers do not want to exceed their “check thresholds.” From TGIF’s perspective, the beauty of not placing beverage prices on menus in violation of the CFA is that uninformed patrons do not know when their purchases have exceeded the “fair” price and reached the “think-twice” price.
*79TGIF learned through the study what is commonly known—that an informed consumer will make rational pricing decisions. Because restaurants “with alcohol pricing on the menu experienced a [$]1.72 [per-person average] decline as guests traded down,” TGIF made the corporate decision that “alcohol pricing will not be placed on the menu.”4 In other words, TGIF determined that it did not pay to conform to the law and that it was more profitable to capitalize on the ignorance of its patrons. From TGIF’s own statistical analysis comes the calculation of ascertainable loss to its patrons and the gain to itself.
In passing N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.5 and requiring that the price of an item be “plainly marked,” the Legislature intended to empower consumers with knowledge. TGIF has pursued, and continues to pursue, a cynical corporate policy of profiteering from violating that statute.
II.
The Consumer Fraud Act makes it unlawful for a business to engage in an “unconscionable commercial practice,” N.J.S.A. 56:8-2, such as selling merchandise, including food and beverages, without listing the price when it is offered for sale, N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.5.5 The Act “provides a private cause of action to consumers who are victimized by fraudulent practices in the marketplace.” Gonzalez v. Wilshire Credit Corp., 207 N.J. 557, 576, 25 A.3d 1103 (2011). The statutory scheme empowers citizens “to act as ‘private attorneys general’ in bringing civil actions to enforce the Act.” Steinberg v. Sahara Sam’s Oasis, LLC, 226 N.J. 344, 361, 142 A.3d 742 (2016). This private right of action is particularly important when *80the Attorney General—perhaps due to inadequate resources— does not exercise his enforcement powers, see N.J.S.A. 56:8-3 to - 8, -11, -15 to -18, -20, as here, to compel chain restaurants to comply with price-listing requirements mandated by statute.
A plaintiff must satisfy three elements to prove that a business is liable for consumer fraud. The plaintiff must show that the business engaged in “an unlawful practice,” that she suffered an “ascertainable loss,” and that the “ascertainable loss” is causally related to the unlawful practice. Gonzalez, supra, 207 N.J. at 576, 25 A.3d 1103 (quoting Lee, supra, 203 N.J. at 521, 4 A.3d 561); see also N.J.S.A. 56:8-19. If the plaintiff succeeds in her proofs, she is entitled to legal and/or equitable relief, treble damages, and reasonable attorneys’ fees. N.J.S.A. 56:8-19.
TGIF’s own commissioned study establishes that, on average, TGIF patrons who purchased beverages paid $1.72 more per meal than they would have if prices had been listed on TGIF menus. That $1.72 constitutes, on average, an ascertainable loss per person, per meal, causally related to TGIF’s unlawful practice of not disclosing prices. See Lee, supra, 203 N.J. at 522, 4 A.3d 561; see also N.J.S.A. 56:8-19.6
According to the study, TGIF will lose money if it complies with the CFA by listing beverage prices on its menus. If TGIF conforms to the law, then it has two options. It can maintain its current pricing, and informed consumers will trade down rather than purchase drinks that exceed what TGIF has pegged as the “fair” price patrons will pay per meal. Or it can set prices for beverages and meals at rates at which patrons will not trade down. Under either scenario, the consumer benefits if TGIF follows the mandate of the CFA.
*81Thus, TGIF’s patrons who purchase drinks are victimized by the unlawful omission of beverage prices on menus. TGIF sets the overall pricing of its meals and beverages based on its decision not to list beverage prices on menus. Importantly, under the CFA, plaintiffs merely have to show that the unlawful practice caused the ascertainable loss. See Lee, supra, 203 N.J. at 522, 4 A.3d 561; Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs Local No. 68 Welfare Fund v. Merck & Co., 192 N.J. 372, 389, 929 A.2d 1076 (2007).
III.
A class action is the only vehicle that will permit the large number of patrons defrauded by TGIF to band together and prosecute a lawsuit on equal terms with TGIF. See Lee, supra, 203 N.J. at 517-18, 4 A.3d 561. The trial court correctly certified the class of customers who purchased unpriced alcoholic and nonalcoholic beverages at company-owned New Jersey TGIF restaurants between January 12, 2004 and July 14, 2014 because the requirements for class certification under Rule 4:32-1 have been met.
Certain issues are not in dispute: the class of TGIF beverage-purchasing consumers is too numerous for joinder of all members, R. 4:32—1(a)(1); “there are questions of law or fact common to the class,” R. 4:32—1(a)(2); there are claims and defenses “typical” to the class, R. 4:32—1(a)(3); and the representative party “will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class,” R. 4:32-1(a)(4). The parties disagree, however, on whether “the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members” and whether “a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.” See R. 4:32—1(b)(3).
Under our court rule, predominance does not mean that “all issues [must] be identical among class members.” Iliadis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 191 N.J. 88, 108, 922 A.2d 710 (2007). To satisfy the predominance requirement, plaintiffs do not have to show “the absence of individual issues or that the common issues dispose of *82the entire dispute.” Ibid. Nor is it necessary to show that “each class member [is] affected in precisely the same manner.” Id. at 108-09, 922 A.2d 710. Indeed, it is almost certain that individual questions will remain after the resolution of the common questions of law and fact. See id. at 108, 922 A.2d 710. The heart of the matter is whether the common issues are “qualitatively” more significant than the individual ones. See Lee, supra, 203 N.J. at 519-20, 4 A.3d 561.
The common issue of law among all class members is that TGIF does not list its beverage prices in violation of N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.5. The common issue of fact is that all members of the class suffer from TGIF’s unlawful practice of not listing beverage prices. The loss suffered by patrons resulting from TGIF’s violation of the CFA is dispersed over the entire class of beverage purchasers, with individual patrons incurring greater or lesser losses.
That individual loss determinations must be made is not unusual in class actions. For example, in Lee, supra, the class-action lawsuit alleged that a dietary supplement pill called Relacore was sold to thousands of New Jersey consumers through various mass-marketing deceptions in violation of the CFA. 203 N.J. at 504, 4 A.3d 561. We found that common issues of law and fact predominated, notwithstanding that individual questions concerning each class member’s ascertainable loss had to be addressed. Id. at 528, 4 A.3d 561. We recognized that the individual questions would include “[t]he number of bottles of Relacore purchased by a class member, the price of each bottle, and whether a refund was received.” Ibid. That information could come from the corporate defendant’s records or through a customer’s proof of purchase. Ibid. We concluded that “the individual questions posed” did not present an “insuperable obstacle.” Ibid.
Similarly, in Iliadis, supra, we addressed the certification of a class of hourly employees of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. who alleged that they were denied their contractual and statutory right to rest and meal breaks. 191 N.J. at 96, 922 A.2d 710. We held that the predominance prong was met, even though certain individual *83questions persisted, including: how much time each employee worked off-the-clock; “whether employees worked off-the-clock with the expectation of compensation; and how much in damages employees suffered.” Id. at 112, 922 A.2d 710. The presence of those issues did not defeat the certification of the class because the common issues were qualitatively more significant. Id. at 112—13, 922 A.2d 710.
The individual questions that would remain in this case surely are no more difficult or weighty than those faced in Lee and Iliadis. As was true in those cases, the common issues of law and fact predominate over any individual ones.
In addition, a class action unquestionably is “superior” to any other means of fairly adjudicating the claims against TGIF. The many defrauded patrons will not file actions in small claims court to recover their minor monetary losses. See Lee, supra, 203 N.J. at 528, 4 A.3d 561. As we noted in Lee, “[t]he discovery and litigation costs, including expert-witness fees, make a lawsuit against a determined corporate adversary a costly undertaking.” Ibid. A class action “provide[s] a diffuse group of persons, whose claims are too small to litigate individually, the opportunity to engage in collective action and to balance the scales of power.” Id. at 528-29, 4 A.3d 561. Moreover, TGIF will not likely reverse its corporate policy of willful disregard of the CFA if just a few patrons seek relief for the small amounts they overpaid. Here, there will be a class action or no action at all.
IV.
A.
The statistical evidence establishing that patrons suffer a common ascertainable loss by TGIF’s nondisclosure of beverage prices on menus comes from TGIF’s own files. The type of statistical evidence offered here is not foreign to our jurisprudence.
In Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, the United States Supreme Court approved of the use of a statistical or representative *84sample of members of a class of workers, who claimed that they were shorted on their wages, to establish the basis for a class-action lawsuit. 577 U.S. -, -, 136 S.Ct. 1036, 1046, 194 L.Ed.2d 124, 134-35 (2016). In that case, employees of Tyson Foods brought a class action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 201 to 219, claiming that their employer denied them their rightful overtime wages for the time they expended donning and doffing protective equipment. Id. at -, 136 S.Ct. at 1041, 194 L.Ed.2d at 129. Tyson Foods contended that the variance in protective gear worn by employees rendered impossible any uniform calculation of time each employee spent putting on and taking off the gear, and therefore “the employees’ claims were not sufficiently similar to be resolved on a classwide basis.” Id. at -, 136 S.Ct. at 1042-43, 1046, 194 L.Ed.2d at 131, 134-35.
The Supreme Court disagreed. The Court permitted plaintiffs to rely on expert statistical analysis that determined the average time taken for employees to change into the necessary protective gear. Id. at -, 136 S.Ct. at 1044-45, 194 L.Ed.2d at 133. Because “each employee worked in the same facility, did similar work, and was paid under the same policy,” the experiences of a representative subset of employees was “probative as to the experiences of all of them.” Id. at -, 136 S.Ct. at 1048, 194 L.Ed.2d at 137.
Courts have allowed market research analysis to calculate damages for a class of plaintiffs based on the price premium consumers paid resulting from a company’s misrepresentation about its product. One such example in the class action setting is In re Scotts EZ Seed Litigation, 304 F.R.D. 397 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). In that case, consumers in California and New York brought a class action under their respective state consumer laws, alleging that Scotts’ description of their grass as “50% thicker with half the water compared to ordinary seed” was misleading. Id. at 404-05 (internal quotations omitted). At the class certification stage, the plaintiffs’ expert presented a damages model to specifically isolate the *85additional amount of money—or “price premium”—that consumers paid based on the alleged misrepresentation. Id. at 414. The United States District Court held that the proposed model satisfied the standard for showing that damages could be measured on a classwide basis. Id. at 415. Moreover, while the Scotts Court emphasized that under the federal standard an expert was not required to “perform his analyses at the class certification stage,” it did point to compelling evidence that had been provided in support of the actual existence of a price premium, including “internal documents suggesting the existence of a premium based on the [allegedly false claim].” Id. at 414. See also Goldemberg v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Cos., 317 F.R.D. 374, 396-97 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (holding damages measurable on classwide basis where plaintiffs had presented model that isolates portion of price attributable to company’s alleged misrepresentations about its products).
Here, TGIF’s internal documents determined the loss attributable to consumers when it did not list beverage prices. The market analysis conducted by the experts in Scotts and Goldemberg are comparable to the market research used by TGIF to justify its not listing beverage prices.
B.
Based on its marketing studies, TGIF apparently made a business decision not to list beverage prices for the sake of higher profits, notwithstanding that its policy violated the CFA. Certainly, statistical evidence that was sufficiently clear and compelling to guide TGIF in shaping its business policy is equally relevant in this class-action suit to establish that TGIF’s unlawful practice caused an ascertainable loss on average of $1.72 per person, per meal.
Plaintiffs have established that common issues of law and fact predominate over individual ones and that a class action is not only a superior vehicle but is the only vehicle for vindicating the rights of the aggrieved class of patrons.
*86V.
Plaintiffs are not advancing a “fraud-on-the-market” theory—a theory that typically applies in securities cases. Ante at 60, 171 A.3d 620. In an open securities market, the price of stocks depends on all available material information. Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160 (3d Cir. 1986). The fraud-on-the-market theory recognizes that the issuance of a material misleading statement by a company will influence the pricing of its stock. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-42, 108 S.Ct. 978, 989, 99 L.Ed.2d 194, 215 (1988). Based on that premise, in a securities-fraud case, stock purchasers can pursue a fraud claim without showing that they relied on the misrepresentations. Ibid. Under the fraud-on-the-market approach, a rebuttable presumption of reliance applies to satisfy the causal requirement between a defendant’s misrepresentation and plaintiffs purchase of the stock at the fraudulently inflated price. Id. at 243, 244-47, 108 S.Ct. at 989-92, 99 L.Ed.2d at 216-18. In Kaufman v. i-Stat Corp., we did not allow the plaintiffs in a common-law fraud action to “prove the element of reliance through the presumption of a fraud on the market.” 165 N.J. 94, 97, 118, 754 A.2d 1188 (2000) (emphases added).
In this case, plaintiffs do not seek to satisfy an element of their claim through a presumption of fraud on the market. First, “the CFA ‘does not require proof of reliance,’ but only a causal connection between the unlawful practice and ascertainable loss.” See Lee, supra, 203 N.J. at 528, 4 A.3d 561 (quoting Gennari v. Weichert Co. Realtors, 148 N.J. 582, 604, 607, 691 A.2d 350 (1997)). Second, plaintiffs here do not seek the benefit of a presumption to satisfy their burden of proving a causal nexus between TGIF’s statutory violation and the ascertainable loss suffered by TGIF’s patrons.
The present case is unlike International Union, supra, in which the plaintiff sought “to be relieved of the usual requirements that plaintiff prove an ascertainable loss” by showing only that the price charged for Vioxx was higher than it should have been as a result of defendant’s fraudulent marketing campaign.” 192 N.J. at *87392, 929 A.2d 1076. There, the plaintiff intended to use “a single expert who would opine about the effect on pricing of the marketing campaign in which defendant engaged.” Ibid. (emphasis added).
Here, plaintiffs do not rely on a “single expert” to establish the price effect of TGIF’s statutory violation. See ibid. Instead, plaintiffs have presented the study commissioned by TGIF that calculates the ascertainable loss to its patrons when beverage prices are not listed on menus. TGIF’s own study is offered as direct evidence and, at this procedural stage, is entitled to deference as a statistically accurate calculation of the loss incurred by patrons. Although the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, the majority draws negative inferences to cast doubt on the validity of TGIF’s study. Significantly, this case is merely at the class-certification stage, and plaintiffs are entitled to introduce expert-witness testimony to further bolster their claims of ascertainable loss based on TGIF’s study.
Moreover, the majority is mistaken if it is suggesting that the CFA does not protect consumers from price gouging. See, e.g., N.J.S.A. 56:8-33(b) (prohibiting ticket scalping at exorbitant rates).7 The purpose of requiring that the price of merchandise be listed at the point of sale pursuant to N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.5 is to allow consumers to make informed decisions in making purchases. Indeed, the legislative history of N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.5 makes this very point. See Sponsor’s Statement to A. 1172 (1972) (“Consumers have a right to know the price of all items they wish to purchase .... Clear indication of the price of all merchandise will aid in *88preventing discriminatory sales practices and capricious pricing by merchants,”).
Additionally, the greater the number of victims of a CFA violation should not diminish the right to a remedy. The fact that plaintiffs have presented a large discrete class of victimized patrons makes this case a more, not less, compelling case for class certification.
VI.
I also disagree with the majority’s conclusion that plaintiffs have failed to make out a claim under the Truth-in-Consumer Contract, Warranty and Notice Act (TCCWNA), N.J.S.A. 56:12-14 to -18.8 Plaintiffs have presented evidence to satisfy the four elements of a TCCWNA claim.9 Plaintiffs have established that (1) they are consumers; (2) TGIF is a seller; (3) TGIF displays menus, which constitute a written notice or sign for purposes of the TCCWNA; and (4) the omission of beverage pricing on the menus violates state law—N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.5. See N.J.S.A. 56:12-15.
The majority contends that plaintiffs are not “aggrieved customer[s]” pursuant to N.J.S.A. 56:12-17, positing that plaintiffs have not met the evidentiary threshold of showing that TGIF patrons were given menus before purchasing their meals. Ante at 69-70, 171 A.3d 620. To reach that conclusion, the majority denies plaintiffs the benefit of the most favorable inferences to be drawn from TGIF’s corporate policy of requiring its servers to hand each customer a menu. At this stage, the fair inference is that TGIF’s *89servers complied with corporate policy and that patrons received menus. Plaintiffs have satisfied their burden of showing that the class of patrons here meets the definition of aggrieved customers.
Additionally, the majority has erred in finding that TGIF’s obligation to display beverage pricing was not clearly established by the CFA’s point-of-sale statute, N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.5. Ante at 71-72, 171 A.3d 620. The plain and simple statutory language clearly indicates that TGIF is required to list beverage prices on its menus. N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.5 prohibits the sale of “merchandise” without a price at the point of sale. Merchandise “include[s] any objects, wares, goods, commodities, services or anything offered, directly or indirectly to the public for sale.” N.J.S.A. 56:8—1(c). Clearly, beverages are goods, and at the very least, beverages meet the description of “anything offered ... to the public for sale.” Ibid, (emphasis added). TGIF did not have to wait for a published opinion by this Court to reach this common-sense conclusion.
In this case, the Appellate Division expressed its confidence that “if the legislature intended to excise beverage sales at restaurants from the sweep of the CFA ..., it would have done so in plain language without the necessity of an advanced degree in either logic or linguistics.” In other words, divining the meaning of “merchandise” is not rocket science. Significantly, no party has argued before us that N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.5 does not mandate that a restaurant list beverage prices on its menus.
Incredibly, the majority hints that N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.5 may not apply to the sale of beverages by restaurants. If that were true, N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.5 would not require restaurants to post any meal prices. Under the statutory definition of merchandise, there is no logical distinction between food and beverage served in restaurants. It cannot be that a hamburger is merchandise but a milkshake is not.
The majority notes that it is unaware of whether the Attorney General has taken action to compel restaurants to list beverage pricing on menus pursuant to N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.5. Ante at 70, 171 *90A.3d 620. The failure of the Attorney General to enforce a CFA provision, however, is not evidence that a restaurant is complying with the law. Indeed, the CFA vests individuals with the power to act as private attorneys general as a separate enforcement mechanism. Steinberg, supra, 226 N.J. at 361, 142 A.3d 742. This Court, moreover, has the ultimate authority to construe the meaning of N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.5, and if there is any doubt about the Appellate Division’s interpretation, the majority should have certified that issue separately. Why has the majority remanded the Bozzi class-certification case for further proceedings if there is a question about whether restaurants must place beverage prices on their menus? Judicial economy certainly is not advanced by letting a class action proceed if there is no statutory authority to support a claim.
Additionally, the majority does not explain why in the Bozzi case it vacated the trial court’s injunction, which mandated that OSI restaurants list beverage prices on menus. The right to equitable relief compelling those restaurants to comply with the price-listing requirements of N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.5 was not dependent on class certification. See N.J.S.A. 56:8-19. The right to equitable relief depended only on whether N.J.S.A. 56:8-19 requires disclosure of beverage prices on menus, an issue that the majority refuses to address even though it overturns the trial court’s injunction. Last, if the application of TCCWNA to small claims in this case is too blunt an instrument, as argued by amici curiae, the Legislature is the proper forum to address this issue.
VII.
The majority’s decision is a major blow to consumer rights advanced in both the CFA and TCCWNA. The decision ensures that thousands of patrons victimized by TGIF’s violation of our consumer-fraud laws have no meaningful remedy. Additionally, TGIF now has little incentive to alter its corporate policy of ignoring provisions of the CFA. TGIF’s compliance with N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.5’s requirement that beverage prices be listed at the point *91of sale may well depend on whether the Attorney General exercises his powers to enforce our consumer-fraud laws.
For the reasons expressed, I respectfully dissent.

 At this stage, the allegations in the complaint and evidence of record must be viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, who are seeking class certification. Lee, supra, 203 N.J. at 505, 4 A.3d 561.

 The CFA defines “merchandise" as “any objects, wares, goods, commodities, services or anything offered, directly or indirectly to the public for sale.” N.J.S.A. 56:8—1 (c).

 TGIF consulted with Simon-Kucher & Partners, a firm that specializes in pricing strategies and refers to itself as "the world’s leading pricing consultancy." Pricing, Simon-Kucher & Partners, http://www.simon-kucher.com/en/ pricing (last visited Sept. 14, 2017).

 The study also included an analysis of non-alcoholic beverage pricing, indicating that customers will trade down when the cost of a meal exceeds a certain threshold.

 N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.5 makes it unlawful “for any person to sell ... or offer for sale any merchandise at retail unless the total selling price of such merchandise is plainly marked by a stamp, tag, label or sign either affixed to the merchandise or located at the point where the merchandise is offered for sale.”

 In plaintiffs’ second amended complaint, they allege that TGIF's
practice of offering certain beverages without prices ... is designed to ... enable [TGIF] to charge slightly excessive prices on some drinks without losing sales; facilitate [TGIF's] practice of charging grossly excessive prices on other drinks: and facilitate price discrimination and/or charging different prices for the same product based on undisclosed and arbitrary criterifa].

 N.J.S.A. 56:8—33(b) provides:
No person other than a registered ticket broker shall resell or purchase with the intent to resell a ticket for admission to a place of entertainment at a maximum premium in excess of 20% of the ticket price or $3.00, whichever is greater, plus lawful taxes. No registered ticket broker shall resell or purchase with the intent to resell a ticket for admission to a place of entertainment at a premium in excess of 50% of the price paid to acquire the ticket, plus lawful taxes.

 Although the discussion here is directed toward the Dugan case, the reasoning and conclusion apply equally to the Bozzi case.

 N.J.S.A. 56:12-15 provides:
No seller ... shall in the course of his business offer to any consumer or prospective consumer ... or display any written .., notice or sign ... which includes any provision that violates any clearly established legal right of a consumer or responsibility of a seller ... as established by State or Federal law at the time the offer is made or the consumer contract is signed or ... notice or sign is given or displayed.