Court Opinion

ID: 9649130
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:43:04.890514+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:07.960900
License: Public Domain

Sam Bird, Judge, concurring. I agree with the majority that appellant was not performing employment services at the time of her injury, but I write separately because I believe the Commission, in reaching that result, has misinterpreted Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(A)(i) (Repl. 1996) and prior decisions of this court in stating that appellant’s injury is not compensable because it did not occur while she was in the process of pursuing noncustodial parents or training on the new computer program. The Commission’s narrow interpretation has already been rejected by this court in cases where we have held that the term “employment services,” within the meaning of section 11-9-102, does not mean that for an employee’s injury to be compensable, it must occur while the employee is engaged in the performance of the precise employment task to which he or she has been assigned. For example, in Crossett School District v. Fulton, 65 Ark. App. 63, 984 S.W.2d 833 (1999), we held that an injury was compensable when the employee fell on ice in the employer’s parking lot where she was retrieving from her car reading glasses that she needed to do her assigned work; and in Fisher v. Poole Truck Line, 57 Ark. App. 268, 944 S.W.2d 853 (1997), we held that a truck driver’s injury was compensable even though it occurred when the employee was in an automobile accident while he was transporting in his own car the results of a physical examination that his employer had required before giving him a work assignment. In neither of those cases was the employee performing his or her assigned work tasks at the time of the injuries, yet the injuries were found to be compensable. While it is true that Act 796 of 1993 requires us to strictly construe its provisions, I do not believe that strict construction requires that the Act always be interpreted in a way that will most likely deny benefits. The term “strict construction” is a two-edged sword. The Act does not require that its terms be strictly construed only against the employee. Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-9-101 (Repl. 1996) states that the purpose of the workers’ compensation law is to provide benefits “to all legitimately injured workers who suffer an injury or disease arising out of and in the course of their employment. . . .” In the instant case, I agree that appellant was not engaged in employment services while she was on her lunch break, notwithstanding that her employer was paying for the lunch. However, I do not agree with the Commission’s denial of the claim because she was not, at the moment of her injury, pursuing noncustodial parents or training on the new computer program.