Court Opinion

ID: 9726762
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:07:20.522003+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:14.312354
License: Public Domain

SHIELDS, Presiding Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the majority decision with the exception of Issue VI. Though I agree with the majority's decision that the trial court ordered Saunders's sentences served consecutively pursuant to IC 35-50-2-1(a) (1988), I believe the trial court's enumerated reasons for the consecutive sentence order is insufficient and the order is manifestly unreasonable.
I appreciate the broad discretion a trial court has in making sentencing determinations and do not seek to interfere in the exercise of that discretion. Nevertheless, on occasion, when the sentence imposed *745appears to be manifestly unreasonable in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender, this court has the constitutional duty to revise the sentence on appeal. Ind.Appellate Rule 17. Such is the case here.
The trial court's stated aggravating factors in support of the consecutive sentence order is Saunders's long criminal history and the fact he committed the offenses while on parole. Saunders' criminal convictions consist of a 1976 conviction for arson and a 1984 conviction for fleeing a police officer. Apparently Saunders was on parole from the fleeing conviction when the instant offenses were committed in 1986. In my opinion, no reasonable person could conclude the aggregate sentence of one hundred and forty (140) years is justified by these two convictions even though Saunders had not been discharged from the second conviction at the time of the instant offenses.
Certainly the nature of the offenses of which Saunders was convicted is egregious. There is no more serious problem facing this nation today than controlled substances. This fact has been recognized by our legislature in classifying the cireum-stances under which Saunders conspired to deal and dealt in cocaine as class A felonies, and the circumstances under which he conspired to deal and dealt in LSD as a class B felony. Furthermore, there is statutory authority for aggravating the presumptive felonies for these serious class felonies if the circumstances surrounding the offenses are aggravated or unique. Nevertheless the trial court failed to find any such aggravated or unique circumstances, concentrating instead on Saunders's character. At the same time, the trial court failed to reveal anything about Saunders's character other than that he had two prior convictions and was on parole at the time of the instant offenses.
In my opinion, Saunders's two prior convictions are not appropriately characterized as a long criminal history but they are two prior convictions which, with the parole violation, merit an aggravated sentence. My dispute is with the extent of the aggravation. Again, I am loathe to second guess the trial court but this court is constitutionally mandated to do so when it appears that the sentence imposed is manifestly unreasonable. Based upon the aggravating factors enumerated by the trial court I agree the three dealing counts should be served consecutively to one another and the three conspiracy counts should be served consecutively to one another, as ordered by the trial court. However, unlike the trial court, I vote to order the dealing counts be served concurrently to the conspiracy counts. Thus, I vote to order a total consecutive sentence of seventy (70) years.