Court Opinion

ID: 9368144
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-02 21:00:43.625466+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:05.822799
License: Public Domain

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                                            UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 21-4012

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                            Plaintiff - Appellee,

                     v.

        ERNEST L. MOORE,

                            Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at
        Richmond. Henry E. Hudson, Senior District Judge. (3:09-cr-00353-HEH-1)

        Submitted: September 29, 2022                                     Decided: February 1, 2023

        Before KING, DIAZ, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: Geremy C. Kamens, Federal Public Defender, Patrick L. Bryant, Appellate
        Attorney, Robert J. Wagner, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE
        FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Raj Parekh,
        Acting United States Attorney, Daniel T. Young, Assistant United States Attorney,
        Alexandria, Virginia, Heather Hart Mansfield, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE
        OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               Ernest L. Moore was convicted in 2010 of possession with intent to distribute five

        grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B) (2009), and

        possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

        § 922(g)(1). The district court sentenced him to 144 months’ imprisonment, followed by

        a five-year term of supervised release. Moore now appeals the district court’s order

        revoking his supervised release and imposing a sentence of 36 months’ imprisonment, with

        no additional supervision to follow. On appeal, Moore argues that his 36-month revocation

        sentence exceeds the 24-month statutory maximum term of imprisonment now applicable

        to his controlled substance offense in light of changes in the law pursuant to the First Step

        Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, which modified the relevant maximum

        term of imprisonment. We affirm.

               As an initial matter, we exercise our discretion to excuse Moore’s abandonment of

        this issue when he argued before the district court that 24 months was not the statutory

        mandatory maximum sentence in his case, thus disclaiming his appellate argument. See

        Manning v. Caldwell for City of Roanoke, 930 F.3d 264, 271-72 (4th Cir. 2019) (en banc)

        (identifying relevant equitable factors). We therefore review his claim for plain error. See

        United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731 (1993). To prevail under the plain error standard,

        Moore “must show that: (1) an error occurred; (2) the error was plain; and (3) the error

        affected his substantial rights.” United States v. Lockhart, 947 F.3d 187, 191 (4th Cir.

        2020) (en banc).

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                We conclude that Moore does not satisfy the plain error standard. With respect to

        the First Step Act, we have previously held that a “revocation sentence is a component of

        [an] underlying original sentence for [a] drug conviction.” United States v. Venable, 943

        F.3d 187, 194 (4th Cir. 2019). A defendant “serving a term of imprisonment for revocation

        of supervised release whose original, underlying conviction was for a ‘covered offense’”

        may accordingly move for a sentence reduction pursuant to the First Step Act. Id.

        However, nothing in the statute or binding case law indicates that the district court must

        sua sponte consider such relief in a revocation proceeding when the defendant has not filed

        a motion seeking a reduction under the First Step Act. Thus, even assuming the First Step

        Act authorized the court to grant relief, the court’s failure to do so sua sponte was not

        plainly erroneous. See United States v. Ramirez-Castillo, 748 F.3d 205, 215 (4th Cir. 2014)

        (stating that error qualifies as plain if it is “clear or obvious at the time of appellate

        consideration” and that clear or obvious error is present “if the settled law of the Supreme

        Court or this circuit establishes that an error has occurred” (cleaned up)). Moore has not

        shown that the alleged error is plain for purposes of plain error review. Accordingly, he is

        not entitled to relief under the plain error standard.

               Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. We dispense with oral argument

        because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this

        court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                        AFFIRMED

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