Court Opinion

ID: 9668180
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:04:55.356734+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:43.391420
License: Public Domain

McCORMICK, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
“ ‘This Court is forever adding new stories to the temples of constitutional law, and the temples have a way of collapsing when one story too many is added.’ ” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 526, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1654-55, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
This is another one of those Heitman1 eases where the majority discovers yet another important State constitutional right that until now has gone unnoticed. Under the guise of interpreting our State Constitution, the majority’s agenda here is to provide criminal defendants “more protection” 2 than that provided by the United States Constitution by imposing their personal views upon what the majority perceives to be an unenlightened citizenry. See Autran v. State, 887 S.W.2d 31, 43-49 (Tex.Cr.App.1994) (McCormick, P.J., dissenting).
In this case, the majority declines to adopt as a matter of State constitutional law the majority holding in Oregon v. Kennedy. This holding creates an exception to the federal constitutional rule, which also has been understood to be the rule under the Texas Constitution,3 that a defendant’s successful motion for, or consent to, a mistrial removes any double jeopardy bar to reprosecution. See Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 673, 102 S.Ct. at 2088. The majority opinion in Kennedy holds that where a prosecutor intentionally provokes a defendant into successfully moving for a mistrial, double jeopardy principles prohibit a successive prosecution because in such a situation the prosecutor seeks to obtain an advantage by intentionally subverting a defendant’s double jeopardy interests in having his guilt or innocence determined before the first trier of fact. See Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 669-79, 102 S.Ct. at 2086-92. The concurring opinion in Kennedy would extend this exception to situations involving prosecu-torial “overreaching” or “harassment.” See Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 681-93, 102 S.Ct. at 2092-98 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (to invoke the exception for overreaching, it is sufficient that egregious prose-cutorial misconduct has rendered unmean-*704ingful the defendant’s choice to continue or abort the proceeding).
For purposes of Texas constitutional law, the majority opinion in this case further extends the majority and minority holdings in Kennedy to “not only when the objectionable conduct of the prosecutor was intended to induce a motion for mistrial, but also when the prosecutor was aware but consciously disregarded the risk that an objectionable event for which he was responsible would require a mistrial at the defendant’s request” — a sort of recklessness standard. The majority claims its holding is “slightly more expansive” than Kennedy. This is not so for it is interesting to note that none of the members of the Kennedy court would vote for the majority opinion in this ease.4 See Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 669-98, 102 S.Ct. at 2086-98. That, more than anything else, should cause the majority to pause before once again kneeling and worshipping before the golden calf of Heitman.
In addition, the majority’s interpretation of the Texas Constitution actually provides less protection to criminal defendants than that provided by the Federal Constitution or at least that provided in Kennedy. This is so because:
“Knowing that the granting of the defendant’s motion for mistrial would all but inevitably bring with it an attempt to bar a second trial on grounds of double jeopardy, the judge presiding over the first trial might well be more loath to grant a defendant’s motion for mistrial. (Footnote Omitted). If a mistrial were in fact warranted under the applicable law, of course, the defendant could in many instances successfully appeal a judgment of conviction on the same grounds that he urged a mistrial, and the Double Jeopardy Clause would present no bar to retrial. (Footnote Omitted). But some of the advantages secured to him by the Double Jeopardy Clause — the freedom from extended anxiety, and the necessity to confront the government’s case only once — would be to a large extent lost in the process of trial to verdict, reversal on appeal, and subsequent retrial. (Citations Omitted).” Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 676-77, 102 S.Ct. at 2090.
Of course, trial courts, rather than appellate courts, are in the best position to make the call of whether a mistrial is warranted. See Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 676 fn. 7, 102 S.Ct. at 2089-90 fn. 7. That is why appellate courts should and do give great deference to a trial court’s assessment of the need for a mistrial. See id. The rule the majority adopts today has the real potential of harming a criminal defendant in two ways. First, when a trial court fails to grant a mistrial because of the rule the majority adopts, a defendant loses many of the protections afforded by double jeopardy principles even if he successfully appeals the grounds for which he urged the mistrial. See id. Second, because of the deferential standard appellate courts apply to a trial court’s assessment of the need for a mistrial, a defendant probably will not be able to overturn on appeal a trial court’s decision denying a mistrial when otherwise in all fairness the defendant may have been entitled to a mistrial.
The majority also rationalizes its holding by explaining that there should not be a “distinction of constitutional significance between conduct of a prosecuting attorney in which he intends to cause a mistrial and conduct of a prosecuting attorney which he is aware is reasonably certain to result in a mistrial.” The majority then explains their rule has “practical advantages” by “permitting a more certain application of the rule in most cases.”
The majority opinion in Kennedy adequately responds to these points. See Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 674-75, 102 S.Ct. at 2088-89. Remember, the rule the majority adopts prohibits a successive prosecution after a defendant successfully moves for a mistrial “when the prosecutor was aware but consciously disregarded the risk that an objectionable event for which he was responsible *705would require a mistrial at the defendant’s request.” Does everyone understand the exact circumstances under which the majority’s rule will apply? I doubt prosecutors will know with any certainty what conduct is prohibited by this rule. And, trial and appellate courts will be just as much in the dark as to what multiple findings will be necessary to resolve the various claims falling under this rule. See Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 674-75, 102 S.Ct. at 2088-89. The majority’s amorphous rule offers virtually no standards or practical advantages in its application.
The bottom line here is the majority says our Constitution requires the release of a defendant back into society where he successfully obtains a mistrial and meets some amorphous standard that the prosecutor recklessly presented prejudicial evidence before the jury that caused a mistrial. However, it is a prosecutor’s job to present “prejudicial” evidence before a jury.
“Every act on the part of a rational prosecutor during a trial is designed to ‘prejudice’ the defendant by placing before the judge or jury evidence leading to a finding of his guilt. Given the complexity of the rules of evidence, it will be a rare trial of any complexity in which some proffered evidence by the prosecutor or by the defendant’s attorney will not be found objectionable by the trial court.” Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 674-75, 102 S.Ct. at 2089.
Double jeopardy and legitimate prosecuto-rial interests are not served when this Court assumes the role of second-guessing prosecu-torial decisions on which evidence to present and which evidence not to present. The rule set out in the majority opinion in Kennedy does not require trial and appellate courts to do this because that rule turns on the prosecutor’s intent to provoke a defendant into moving for a mistrial and not on whether a prosecutor recklessly presents “prejudicial” evidence that causes a mistrial. See Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 674-75, 102 S.Ct. at 2088-89.
In addition, when a prosecutor injects unfair prejudicial evidence into the proceeding, the defendant’s choice “to continue the proceeding despite the taint” is still a meaningful one because “many juries acquit defendants after trials in which reversible error has been committed, and many experienced trial lawyers will forego a motion for a mistrial in favor of having his case decided by the jury.” Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 685 fn. 15, 102 S.Ct. at 2095 fn. 15 (Stevens, J., concurring). Therefore, there should be a huge “distinction of constitutional significance between conduct of a prosecuting attorney by which he intends to cause a mistrial and conduct of a prosecuting attorney which he is aware is reasonably certain to result in a mistrial.” In the former situation, a prosecutor is intentionally subverting a defendant’s double jeopardy interests; in the latter situation, the prosecutor is not intentionally subverting a defendant’s double jeopardy interests. This should be an important distinction for double jeopardy purposes.
In addition, United States Supreme Court decisions in the mistrial setting have “accommodated the defendant’s double jeopardy interests with legitimate prosecutorial interests.” See Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 682, 102 S.Ct. at 2093 (Stevens, J., concurring). However, the majority does not mention or discuss how their holding strikes any kind of accommodation with legitimate prosecutorial and law enforcement interests. Under the majority’s approach to State constitutional interpretation, it seems as if the law exists for the sole benefit and protection of criminal defendants. So, it is irrelevant to the majority that when they use Heilman to provide “more protection” to criminal defendants, they also are providing “less protection” to law-abiding citizens. However, the Constitution does not exist solely to protect the rights of the accused. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 537-39, 86 S.Ct. at 1661 (White, J., dissenting) (the most basic function of the criminal law is to provide for the security of the individual and his property) and at 384 U.S. at 518-20 fn. 16, 86 S.Ct. at 1651 fn. 16 (Harlan, J., dissenting):
“[Jjustice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser also. The concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the balance true. (Citations Omitted).”
And, it should come as no surprise that the rule the majority adopts today strikes no accommodation with legitimate prosecutorial *706interests. Prosecutors will not know exactly what conduct is prohibited by the majority’s rule. This may cause prosecutors to withhold legally admissible evidence reducing their chances for a conviction. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 540-43, 86 S.Ct. at 1662-63 (White, J., dissenting) (criminal trials, no matter how efficient the police are, are not sure bets for the prosecution). And, in those situations where a trial court declines to grant a mistrial, because of the rule the majority adopts, the prosecution will have to go to the expense of another trial if the defendant successfully appeals the grounds for which he urged the mistrial. See Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 685-86, 102 S.Ct. at 2094-95. The majority’s rule has the real potential of frustrating legitimate prosecutorial efforts to protect the public.
Based on the foregoing, I would adopt for this case the holding of the United States Supreme Court majority opinion in Kennedy. It is better-reasoned than the majority opinion and strikes a proper balance between a defendant’s double jeopardy interests and legitimate prosecutorial interests. A prosecutor’s “recklessness” in “causing” a defense-granted mistrial should not implicate double jeopardy interests.5
I also would use this case as an opportunity to lay Heitman to rest for good. For at least 75 years this Court generally has followed the lead of the United States Supreme Court in interpreting similar provisions of our Constitution. See, e.g., Autran, 887 S.W.2d at 43-49 (McCormick, P.J., dissenting) (and the numerous cases and other authorities cited therein). This court should continue this practice. This approach offers several advantages. It provides for consistency in application and results. In addition, “judicial review can be more precise, but, most important, it gives law enforcement authorities the parameters within which they can legally operate.” See McCambridge v. State, 778 S.W.2d 70, 76 (Tex.Cr.App.1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 910, 110 S.Ct. 1936, 109 L.Ed.2d 299 (1990). Also, it is counterproductive to require trial and appellate courts to first engage in some type of federal constitutional analysis and then, having overcome that hurdle, to engage in some type of independent State constitutional analysis.
Also, United States Supreme Court decisions from the 1950s and 1960s found so many rights in the Federal Constitution that are applicable to the States that I really do not see the point in engaging in any independent State constitutional analysis. See Autran, 887 S.W.2d at 43-49 (McCormick, P.J. dissenting). There can be no question that these federal constitutional decisions strike a *707proper balance between the freedoms all constitutions, state and federal, are intended to secure and legitimate prosecutorial and law enforcement interests. The federalization of this State’s procedural and substantive criminal law in the 1950s and 1960s should, as a practical matter, preclude any independent State constitutional analysis. See id.
This point cannot be overemphasized. This Court and the other state courts in the nation since the 1950s and 1960s have had to follow Supreme Court federal constitutional decisions. Heitman, in effect, allows us to disagree with the Supreme Court in finding “more protection” for criminals under our State Constitution. However, we are not free to disagree with the Supreme Court when it comes to finding “less protection” for criminals in our Constitution than that provided by the Federal Constitution.
Heitman, therefore, is a one-way street. We should not use Heitman to find “more protection” in our Constitution unless the states are free to disagree with the Supreme Court when it comes to finding “less protection” in their state constitutions. For example, in this case, one might disagree with the majority opinion in Kennedy and argue that intentionally provoked mistrials by the prosecution do not implicate double jeopardy interests under our Constitution because a defendant still has a choice of continuing the proceeding despite the taint and preserving his objection for appeal, and our citizens have other mechanisms for dealing with prosecutors who intentionally cause mistrials. See Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 685-86, 102 S.Ct. at 2094—95 (Stevens, J., concurring). Such a rule arguably might strike a proper balance between a defendant’s double jeopardy interests and society’s interest in obtaining a verdict of guilt or innocence. However, with the federalization of this State’s criminal law in the 1950s and 1960s, this Court is not really free to adopt such a rule under our Constitution.
Judge Clinton’s concurring opinion opines that we are at liberty to construe the Texas Constitution “less protectively” than the Federal Constitution. Technically, he is correct. But, as a practical matter, this power is illusory. My point is that the federalization of this State’s criminal law in the 1950s and 1960s has, in effect, preempted any independent State constitutional analysis on matters of common subject. Justice Hecht of the Texas Supreme Court said it best when he noted, “ ‘virtually all New Federalism proponents are motivated by the bare desire to achieve a liberal political agenda.’” See Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4, 43 (Tex.1992) (Hecht, J., concurring in the judgment). He also said that “a non-legal influence has been brought to bear on judicial decision making.” Id. I could not agree with him more.
Practically, Heitman frustrates legitimate prosecutorial interests without promoting any of the interests or values our Constitution is meant to protect. And, Heitman promotes contempt for majoritarian political processes by encouraging appellate judges to read their personal views into our Constitution which is an impermissible basis for constitutional interpretation and a usurpation of legislative power. See Autran, 887 S.W.2d at 43-49 (McCormick, P.J., dissenting). And that is exactly what is going on here. One need only count the number of times the majority uses “we believe,” “it seems to us,” “in our view,” or “we think” to realize the basis of their decision is nothing more than their personal views about how things ought to be. I would leave it up to our citizens through the legislative process to make these types of determinations.6
*708Instead of taking another leap into the Heitman quagmire, this Court ought to be exercising judicial restraint and reaffirming our prior cases that this Court generally will follow the lead of the United States Supreme Court in interpreting our Constitution. See Autran, 887 S.W.2d at 43-19 (McCormick, P.J., dissenting). Principles of stare decisis alone require this. See id. If citizens are unhappy with our holdings, they can change them either through the legislative process or Constitutional amendment. For the most part, they have not exercised this option for at least 75 years when this Court has said it generally will follow the lead of the United States Supreme Court in interpreting our Constitution. On the contrary, I can only recall situations where our citizens have acted when this Court refused to follow the Supreme Court’s lead. See, e.g., Garcia v. State, 829 S.W.2d 796, 800-803 (Tex.Cr.App.1992) (Clinton, J., concurring). It is one thing for our citizens through the legislative process to require us to do a certain thing when we have refused to do so by judicial fiat. It is quite another thing for our citizens through the legislative process to reverse this Court’s judicial fiats which is what they might do to the majority’s opinion in this case.
All the reader really needs to know about Heitman is that it is intended to provide more rights to criminal defendants.
“As a consequence, there will not be a gain, but a loss, in human dignity. The real concern is not the unfortunate consequences of this new decision on the criminal law as an abstract, disembodied series of authoritative proscriptions, but the impact on those who rely on the public authority for protection and who without it can only engage in violent self-help with guns, knives and the help of their neighbors similarly inclined. There is, of course, a saving factor: the next victims are uncertain, unnamed and unrepresented in this case.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 542-43, 86 S.Ct. at 1663 (White, J., dissenting).
Finally, it should not go unnoticed what appears to be a substantial change in the law the majority opinion has made with respect to how this Court interprets the Texas Constitution. In Heitman, this Court announced what actually has been the rule since Texas became a State: this Court is not bound by United States Supreme Court decisions in interpreting the Texas Constitution. See Heitman, 815 S.W.2d at 691. But, Heitman failed to provide any real guidance or framework on how to analyze “independent state grounds” issues. See id.
However, in Lanford v. Fourteenth Court of Appeals, 847 S.W.2d 581, 585 (Tex.Cr.App.1993), a majority of this Court agreed “that the primary goal in the interpretation of a constitutional provision is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the voters who adopted it.” This standard is more or less an “original intent” framework that does not embroil this Court into becoming a “super-legislature” and intruding upon the Legislature’s “lawmaking” power. See Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex.Cr.App.1991). And, there is nothing new or radical about this approach. For example, when courts interpret a statute, their duty is to give effect to the intent of those who enacted the statute. See id. When courts interpret a contract or a will, their duty is to give effect to the intent of the parties to those documents. It should be no different when this Court interprets a constitutional provision; we should give effect to the intent of the voters who adopted it. See Lanford, 847 S.W.2d at 585.
More or less consistent with Lanford and the “original intent” theory of constitutional interpretation, a plurality of this Court in Autran v. State, 887 S.W.2d 31, 37 (Tex.Cr.App.1994), set out various factors for this Court to consider when interpreting the Texas Constitution. These factors include a textual examination, the Framers’ intent, the *709history and application of the constitutional provision at issue, comparable jurisprudence from other states, and practical policy considerations behind the constitutional provision at issue.7 See id. These factors are not even mentioned in the majority opinion in this case.
The standard for constitutional interpretation the majority adopts here has degenerated from the one set out in Lanford to “we do not think,” “it seems to us,” “in our view,” “we think,” “we do not perceive,” “we do not believe,” and “as we see it.” This is a lawless standard.
“Whether the agenda is ‘liberal’ or ‘conservative’ or something else altogether makes no difference. The vice is that a non-legal influence has been brought to bear on judicial decision making. This is not ‘new federalism’; it is ‘new judicial-ism.’ ” Davenport v. Garcia, supra, at 43 (Hecht, J., dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.

. Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681 (Tex.Cr.App.1991).

. "More protection” for criminals also means more restrictions on law enforcement and prose-cutorial efforts to protect us from dangerous criminals.

. DeYoung v. State, 160 Tex.Crim. 628, 274 S.W.2d 406, 407 (Tex.Cr.App.1954) cited with approval by this Court when interpreting both the Federal and State Constitutions in Rios v. State, 557 S.W.2d 87, 90 fn. 2 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); see also Demouchete v. State, 734 S.W.2d 144, 146 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no pet.); Moore v. State, 631 S.W.2d 245, 250 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1982, no pet.).

. Judge Mansfield's dissenting opinion cites two cases which, under their state constitutions, more or less adopted the standard set out in the concurring opinion in Kennedy. See Pool v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 98, 677 P.2d 261 (1984); State v. Kennedy, 295 Or. 260, 666 P.2d 1316 (1983). Both of these cases, however, expressly declined to adopt the sort of recklessness standard the majority adopts today. See Pool, 677 P.2d at 271-72; Kennedy, 666 P.2d at 1324.

. Since the majority is so dead-set on interpreting our Constitution differently than how the United States Supreme Court interprets the Federal Constitution, the first question they should he asking is whether Article I, Section 14, of the Texas Constitution even applies here. Article I, Section 14, provides that "[n]o person, for the same offense, shall be twice put in jeopardy of life or liberty, nor shall a person be again put upon trial for the same offense, after a verdict of not guilty in a court of competent jurisdiction." (Emphasis Supplied). This provision contains a simple command that the government cannot prosecute someone for an offense for which he has been acquitted. But cf. U.S. Const., Amend. V (“nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb”).
Article I, Section 14, by its plain language, does not seem to speak or have any application to the mistrial setting. This raises the question of whether Article I, Section 14, actually provides less protection than the Federal Constitution leaving it up to other mechanisms by which our citizens deal with prosecutors who intentionally, or even recklessly, cause mistrials. It seems our citizens, speaking to this Court through Article I, Section 14, did not intend for prosecution-caused mistrials to implicate double jeopardy interests.
Though this Court has the power to interpret our Constitution, that does not automatically mean our Constitution provides more protection to criminals than the Federal Constitution provides. See, e.g., Welchek v. State, 93 Tex.Crim. 271, 247 S.W. 524 (1923); Autran, 887 S.W.2d at 43-49, 44 (McCormick, P.J., dissenting); Heitman v. State: The Question Left Unanswered, 23 St. Mary’s L.J. at 956-974 (and authorities cited therein). Those whose agenda it is to use Heit-man to provide more protection to criminals erroneously assume our citizens intended for our Constitution to provide greater protection to criminals than the Federal Constitution. However, it is just as likely that our citizens did not intend for criminals to have under our Constitution all the "rights” that the United States Supreme Court in the 1950s and 1960s said they have under the Federal Constitution. See Autran, 887 S.W.2d at 43-49, 44 (McCormick, P.J., dissenting).

. In at least one other case I have seen here, a defendant claimed we shotdd interpret our Constitution to provide more protection to criminals than the Federal Constitution simply because in recent years the Supreme Court has been perceived as becoming more “conservative." This is not a good reason, but one the majority apparently is now willing to accept, to interpret our Constitution differently from how the United States Supreme Court interprets the Federal Constitution. See, e.g., McCambridge, 778 S.W.2d at 77 (Teague, J., dissenting) (because this Court "does nothing less than adopt in principle what the present archconservative Supreme Court's majority has already written and held, in its construction of the federal constitution, I respectfully dissent”) (Emphasis Supplied).
However, constitutional interpretation is not a political question. After stripping away all of its moralistic rhetoric about this Court’s duty to breath life into our Constitution and not to *708"blindly'' follow Supreme Court precedent in interpreting our Constitution, what Heitman really boils down to is an attempt by those who, having lost their ability to persuade American majorities and a majority of the "archconserva-tive" Supreme Court, to expand the sway of state appellate judges by judicially legislating what they consider to be socially desirable results. See Autran, 887 S.W.2d at 43-49 (McCormick, P.J., dissenting). And, the majority seems all too willing to accommodate this contemptuous view of popular sovereignty.

. My dissenting opinion in Autran contended, among other things, that the plurality did not follow the approach for constitutional interpretation they claimed to adopt, and that the plurality merely substituted its judgment for that of accountable law enforcement officials on what the plurality considered to be a "better" or a "more reasonable” policy on how law enforcement officials should conduct inventories. See Autran, 887 S.W.2d at 43-49 (McCormick, P.J., dissenting).