Court Opinion

ID: 9465682
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 00:52:56.682293+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:18.808514
License: Public Domain

SWYGERT, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion on a single but important point. It was reversible error, in my judgment, for the trial judge to allow the prosecutor to introduce into evidence the fact that the defendant paid something in excess of $1000 to the UW-M after an audit showed that amount was unaccounted for in the UBP funds entrusted to the defendant for dispersal. There was testimony that prior to payment one of his supervisors demanded that Hooper pay the money even though no one in charge of the UBP accused him of stealing.
The problem here is covered by Rule 403, Federal Rules of Evidence. The rule reads in part: “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . . .” We are not concerned with a compromise of a claim that was “disputed as to either validity or amount,” covered by Rule 404, Federal Rules of Evidence.
The probative value of the offered evidence, if indeed the evidence was logically relevant, was minimal while its prejudicial potential was enormous. The balancing required by the rule weighed substantially in favor of exclusion. First, the payment was coercive in nature. Second, no one “accused Hooper of theft or intentional misconduct; the request for payment was based on mismanagement.” Majority opinion, supra, p. 221. Third, according to the majority the “advisability of the Government utilizing . . . [this item] of relevant evidence [is questionable]' in view of the apparent ample quantity of evidence of guilt . . . .” Majority opinion, supra, p. 226. Lastly, Hooper was not charged with stealing government funds; he was indicted and found guilty of wilfully and knowingly misrepresenting certain signatures on the stipend payment roster.
Against this minima of probative value must be measured the likelihood of prejudice to the defendant. That likelihood is obvious. It is not difficult to imagine a juror arguing to his colleagues, “This man paid back the money that was missing. What more proof do we need to show he is guilty?”
*227“Unfair prejudice” in terms of Rule 403 means that the offered evidence may tend to influence a jury in an unfair manner. One writer has said it this way: “Is the evidence really necessary or substantially helpful to the proponent to establish the probandum for which it is offered, or is it likely that his real purpose is to excite the emotions of the jury against the opponent?” Trautman, Logical or Legal Relevancy — A Conflict in Theory, 5 Vand.L.Rev. 385, 397 (1952). The offered evidence here was not necessary; it could only generate unfair prejudice. In these circumstances the error may not be washed away by the “harmless error” rubric. Even the majority appears to abjure that suggestion.
Nor can the error be excused by saying, as the majority does, that the district judge did not abuse his discretion. Discretion, at least, must function as a sieve to strain out potentially egregious error of the kind we see here. Fundamental trial fairness is at stake. A reversal is called for, and the case should be remanded for a new trial.