Court Opinion

ID: 9703399
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:54:32.470457+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:48.514923
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE
¶ 43. (concurring). I write separately to highlight that this is another case in which the court mouths the exclusive plain meaning rule1 and then properly looks beyond the "plain language" of the statute without finding that the statutory language is ambiguous.2 Indeed, the majority construes Wis. Stat. § 631.11(3) by *236looking to the language of the statute itself,3 the statute's place in the broader context of insurance law generally,4 the surrounding language of other statutes,5 jury instructions,6 legislative history,7 and case law.8 As the majority acknowledges, "Our interpretation of the statutory language is supported in a variety of ways."9
¶ 44. I write further, however, to stress that courts, when looking to evidence of legislative intent in the history, context, subject matter, and object of a given statute, must engage in an analysis of both the evidence that supports a given interpretation as well as the evidence that contradicts a given interpretation.10 Courts must look at all relevant available evidence of legislative intent, with no single factor controlling, and interpret a statute consistently with the preponderance of that evidence.11 "[A] court should never exclude relevant and probative evidence from consideration."12
*237¶ 45. In the present case, the majority announces as a rule of statutory construction that courts may examine legislative history when a statute is plain on its face only if that legislative history supports the court's "plain" reading of the statute.13 Specifically, the majority writes, "Although the rules of statutory construction preclude us from using legislative history to uncover ambiguity where otherwise none exists, we are not precluded from looking to legislative history 'to reinforce and demonstrate that a statute plain on its face, when viewed historically, is indeed unambiguous.' "14
*238¶ 46. This "rule" is absurd. How does a court know whether legislative history reinforces unambiguous language until it closely examines that legislative history? What is it about legislative history that makes it relevant evidence when it is in accord with a court's interpretation of a statute but irrelevant and inadmissible evidence when it is contrary to the court's interpretation? If legislative history can "reinforce and demonstrate" that a statute, "when viewed historically," is capable of a particular meaning, then there is no rule of law that prohibits a court from considering it when discerning the meaning of that statute.15 Moreover, a court would be negligent in its duty to discern the intent of the legislature if it refused to consider legislative history that proved to be so probative.16
*239¶ 47. The majority opinion does a good job in the present case considering many different factors that bear on legislative intent. Yet the majority does not include in its analysis those factors that run counter to its construction. For example, despite all of the attention given to the statutory phrase "an insurer's obligations under an insurance policy" in Wis. Stat. § 631.11(3) as requiring the existence of a policy before the statute becomes applicable, the majority opinion relegates to a footnote the fact that the legislature has given "policy" a particular statutory definition for purposes of this provision that is very broad and arguably includes the conditional agreement signed by the parties in the present case.17
¶ 48. Ultimately, I agree with the majority that Wis. Stat. § 631.11(3) is properly construed to apply only to conditions subsequent, not to conditions precedent. The preponderance of the evidence bearing on legislative intent supports the majority's conclusion. Yet this conclusion can, and should, be reached only after considering all relevant evidence of legislative intent, not merely that evidence which supports the interpretation that the court favors after looking to the statutory language in isolation.
¶ 49. For the foregoing reasons, I concur.
¶ 50. I am authorized to state that Justice WILLIAM A. BABLITCH joins this concurrence.
¶ 51. WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J. (concurring). "That depends on what the meaning of the word 'is' is." William Jefferson Clinton.
*240¶ 52. I write only to emphasize that canons of statutory construction, such as the "plain meaning" rule, are tools, not rules. They are all designed to reach one fundamental goal: discerning legislative intent. Ignoring relevant evidence on legislative intent in the name of "plain meaning" will necessarily at times lead to an interpretation that is completely contrary to what the legislature intended.
¶ 53. Language is inherently ambiguous— perhaps not as ambiguous as the quotation above would have us believe, but the quote makes a point: plain meaning is frequently in the eye of the beholder. What is plain to one may be ambiguous to another. If good evidence as to legislative intent is present, why not use it? Accordingly, I join Chief Justice Abrahamson's concurrence.

 Majority op., ¶ 19.

 For discussions and criticisms of the plain meaning rule in Wisconsin, see, e.g., State v. Peters, 2003 WI 88, 263 Wis. 2d 475, 665 N.W.2d 171 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring); State v. Byers, 2003 WI 86, 263 Wis. 2d 113, 665 N.W.2d 729 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring; Crooks, J., dissenting); State v. Davison, 2003 WI 89, 263 Wis. 2d 146, 666 N.W.2d 1; Bruno v. Milwaukee County, 2003 WI 28, 260 Wis. 2d 633, 600 N.W.2d 656; State v. Delaney, 2003 WI 9, ¶¶ 38-40, 259 Wis. 2d 77, 658 N.W.2d 416 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting); State v. Sample, 215 Wis. 2d 487, 508, 573 N.W.2d 187 (1998) (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring).
This court has also espoused an alternative rule to plain meaning. See, e.g., City of Madison v. Town of Fitchburg, 112 Wis. 2d 224, 236, 332 N.W.2d 782 (1983) ("[T]he spirit or intention of a statute should govern over the literal or technical meaning of the language used.").
I declared in 1983 that I am a critic of the plain meaning rule and that the court may examine material outside the statute to determine whether persuasive evidence exists of a "clear legislative intention different from that to which an ordinary reading of the plain words of the statute would lead." Id. at 243-44 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting). I maintain this position today.

 Majority op., ¶¶ 20-24.

 Id.; ¶ 24.

 Id., ¶¶ 25, 28.

 Id., ¶¶ 27-28.

 Id., ¶¶ 30-33.

 Id., ¶ 34.

 Id., ¶ 23.

 See, e.g., State v. Davison, 2003 WI 89, ¶¶ 75-90, 263 Wis. 2d 146, 666 N.W.2d 1 (looking to legislative history and other extraneous evidence that contradicts the plain meaning of a statute to discern legislative intent).

 See, e.g., State v. Stoehr, 134 Wis. 2d 66, 75-82, 396 N.W.2d 177 (1986) (language, legislative history, purpose, and object of statute all bear on the interpretation of a statute, and legislative intent is determined by considering the direction in which all of these different factors point).

 Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction, § 45.02 (6th ed. 2000).
*237For my analytical framework for statutory interpretation, see State v. Byers, 2003 WI 86, 263 Wis. 2d 113, 665 N.W.2d 729 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring); State v. Peters, 2003 WI 88, ¶¶ 27-34, 263 Wis. 2d 475, 665 N.W.2d 171 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring).

 As Justice Stevens of the United States Supreme Court notes, "Justice Aharon Barak of the Supreme Court of Israel... has perceptively noted that the 'minimalist' judge 'who holds that the purpose of the statute may be learned only from its language' has more discretion than the judge 'who will seek guidance from every reliable source.' A method of statutory interpretation that is deliberately uninformed, and hence unconstrained, may produce a result that is consistent with a court's own views of how things should be, but it may also defeat the very purpose for which a provision was enacted." Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 133 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); see also Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation — In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 800, 816-17 (1983) ("By making statutory interpretation seem mechanical rather than creative, the canons conceal... the extent to which the judge is making new law in the guise of interpreting a statute or a constitutional provision.").

 Majority op., ¶ 19 (quoting Resp. Use of Rural & Agric. Land v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 2000 WI 129, ¶ 41, 239 Wis. 2d 660, 619 N.W.2d 888).

 See Train v. Colo. Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc., 426 U.S. 1, 10 (1976) ("When aid to construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly can be no 'rule of law1 which forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on 'superficial examination.'") (quoting United States v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1940)).
Importantly, the Wisconsin "rule" forbidding a court from looking to legislative history except in instances where the legislative history supports an already unambiguous statute, "plain on its face," flatly contradicts the Train decision. It is no wonder that the Wisconsin version of the Train rule was announced in a footnote without any citation. See State v. Martin, 162 Wis. 2d 883, 897 n.5, 470 N.W.2d 900 (1991).

 W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 113-15 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (pointing out many instances in which the Supreme Court has done a "disservice" to the country by putting on "thick grammarian's spectacles" and needlessly ignoring "persuasive evidence of Congress' actual purpose," only to force Congress "to take the time to revisit the matter" and correct the Court's mistake).

 See Wis. Stat. § 600.03(35) (1997-98) (" 'Policy' means any document other than a group certificate used to prescribe in writing the terms of an insurance contract....").