Court Opinion

ID: 9718192
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:18:31.335905+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:57.782863
License: Public Domain

Johnson, J.,
concurring. I do not agree that appellant’s actions involved moral turpitude and therefore do not join section III of the Court’s opinion.
Our case law defines a crime of moral turpitude as “one based on conduct not only socially undesirable, but, by its very nature, base or depraved.” State v. LaPlante, 141 Vt. 405, 408, 449 A.2d 955, 956 (1982); State v. Fournier, 123 Vt. 439, 440, 193 A.2d *536924, 925 (1963). This definition originated in the traditional distinction between crimes mala in se and those mala prohibita. Id. See 1W. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 1.6(b), at 45 (1986) (crimes mala in se are “wrong in themselves; inherently evil”; those mala prohibita are “not inherently evil; wrong only because prohibited by legislation”). Crimes of moral turpitude are mala in se, that is, acts that, even without the added stigma of being criminalized, are, in themselves, morally repugnant. See Black’s Law Dictionary 865 (5th ed. 1979) (crime malum in se is “immoral in its nature and injurious in its consequences, without any regard to the fact of its being noticed or punished by the law of the state”).
Although courts have had difficulty classifying which crimes involve moral turpitude or are “bad in themselves,” crimes so classified are generally characterized by an attempt to achieve personal gain or satisfaction by exploiting or injuring others. See LaFave & Scott, supra, at 45-48. Thus, murder, Black’s at 865, and crimes “dangerous to life or limb,” LaFave & Scott, supra, at 45-46, are included, as are theft crimes, crimes of dishonesty, fraud and deceit, commercialized vice crimes, bigamy, and rape. See generally Note, Crimes Involving-Moral Turpitude, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 117 (1929). I have difficulty putting possession of cocaine in the same category as these other crimes or labeling it “immoral in its nature.”
Society’s attitudes toward drugs and drug use are, at best, equivocal. Our lives are filled with a plethora of wonder drugs. Many, such as tranquilizers and stimulants, are mind-altering, and yet they are used by millions of Americans every day. Alcohol and tobacco, though highly addictive and physically debilitating, are tolerated despite their huge social costs. They support multi-billion-dollar industries, and acceptance of their use is deeply ingrained in our collective life style. Street drugs — marijuana and cocaine — may be black sheep, but they are members of the same family.
Recognizing cocaine’s potential to harm both the user, and indirectly, others, society may take all reasonable steps to eliminate its use, including making it illegal. But, identifying drug abuse as a social problem does not render possession of cocaine immoral, any more than alcoholism renders any and all drinking immoral.
*537I do not agree with the majority that more than possession is at issue here. Appellant attempted to purchase approximately six grams of cocaine. He collected half the money for the buy from his colleague and intended to share the drug with him. This transaction did not involve trafficking: appellant had no profit motive. Moreover, appellant should not indirectly be held responsible for the actions of his associate nor should the associate be seen as a victim. There is no evidence that the associate was anything other than a willing participant in the drug transaction. He is also a lawyer, capable of knowing the consequences of his actions and deciding for himself whether to become involved. The key indicia of moral turpitude — dishonesty, injurious consequences, personal gain — are absent. See In re Chase, 299 Or. 391, 403, 702 P.2d 1082, 1089-90 (1985) (distinguishing between sale and trafficking offenses, which involve moral turpitude, and possessory offenses, which do not).