Court Opinion

ID: 9830056
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:50:48.559716+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:11.857378
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
In calling attention to the fact that counsel for appellant briefed his case without calling for the record filed in this court, we did not intend to convey the idea that counsel had no record or data from which to prepare his brief. We are not unaware of the custom and practice, in some counties, of briefing causes from the copies of the transcript and statement of facts, that are made and filed in the offices of the clerks of trial courts. We know that counsel resorted to such copies in preparing his brief.
We do not think this is good practice, for the obvious reason that we are confined to the record filed before us, and if there are any discrepancies, or omissions, we are bound by the record in the Court of Civil Appeals.
This court committed no error in denying a further postponement of submission of this cause, for two reasons: (1) Counsel has had ample time within which to brief the case, and has shown no mental inability to prepare a brief caused by his fractured foot; that being the only incapacity suffered by counsel. (2) Because appellee filed briefs, and there was no occasion to give further time.
We have shown counsel the courtesy that the occasion demanded, when we granted him about sixty days’ extension of time, on his first motion for postpone*193ment. Counsel waited until three days before the day to which his cause was postponed before he furnished opposing counsel a copy of his brief and made a new motion requesting further postponement. In that motion no great physical suffering, such as is calculated to render counsel unfit to properly prepare his brief, is hinted at. Counsel is somewhat caustic in his assertions with reference to our right to indulge in any prognosis with respect to his fracture. It is true that we are not physicians, but we have had human experiences and have learned some things as we have spent óur years, and we know, as well as does any physician, that in the absence of a terrific injury, or complications, no mere fractured foot gives great pain or mentally incapacitates the average man for twelve weeks.
Had we granted the second extension of time, in fairness to the other litigants, who have the right to be heard “in turn,” and to whom “the law’s delay” is irksome, we would have heeled counsel’s cause and the appellee would have been compelled to await eight or ten months before the cause could have been heard.
We considered appellant’s brief. We did not decline to consider it, as we might have done, because of the delay in presenting the briefs, and because of what, to our minds, shows no “good cause” for not preparing and presenting same sooner.
Our original opinion is amply supported by authorities. There being no assignment of error in appellant’s brief, it remained for us to examine his “propositions” and see if any one of them proved to be sufficient as “a distinct specification of error.” All this we did.
We note the several authorities cited in appellant’s motion, but also note that no mention is made of the opinion by the Commission of Appeals in the case of Lamar-Delta County Levee Imp. Dist. No. 2 v. Dunn et al., 61 S.W.(2d) 816. The identical question before us was presented in that case. The sole question at issue there is at issue here; The Commission of Appeals in no uncertain language said: “None of the assignments of error appearing in the transcript is embodied in said brief. Although the brief contains a series of abstract propositions of law, none of them is sufficient to constitute a distinct specification of error, or to direct the attention of the appellate court to the error complained of." (Italics ours.) This language is plain. It cannot be misunderstood. The Court of Civil Appeals for the Sixth Supreme Judicial District found nothing to consider, except fundamental error in that case, and we find nothing to consider here, other than fundamental error. This we do not find in the case. Geer v. Union Central Life Ins. Co. (Tex.Civ.App.) 91 S.W.(2d) 1146 (writ dismissed).
The motion for rehearing is overruled..