Court Opinion

ID: 9392332
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-04 17:04:03.140167+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:45.498696
License: Public Domain

Filed 5/4/23 P. v. Sula CA4/1

                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 THE PEOPLE,                                                          D080237

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.                                                         (Super. Ct. No. SCS318710)

 KENG SULA,

           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Enrique E. Camarena, Judge. Affirmed.
         Savannah Montanez, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Steven T.
Oetting and Daniel J. Hilton, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
      Keng Sula appeals a judgment following his conviction of one count of a
criminal threat (Pen. Code, § 422);1 one count of vandalism (§ 594, subds. (a),
(b)(1)); and one count of arson (§ 451, subd. (d)). The jury also found true that
Sula personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon, to wit: ax or hatchet,
in making the criminal threat (§§ 12022, subd. (b)(1), 1192.7, subd. (c)(1)(23)).
On appeal, he raises three claims: 1) the trial court prejudicially erred by
instructing the jury that it could find that the weapon he used in connection
with making a criminal threat, a hatchet, was “inherently” deadly or
dangerous; 2) the court abused its discretion when it declined to dismiss the
one-year weapon enhancement based on an apparent misunderstanding of
section 1385; and 3) even if the court understood its discretion under section
1385, the court abused that discretion because the evidence showed the
offenses were connected to mental health issues. As we explain, we reject
these contentions and affirm the judgment.
               FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      Prosecution Evidence
      In early 2021, 39-year-old Sula was living in a three-bedroom house
with his 57-year-old mother, B.S., and his 24-year old nephew, S.K. The
home had security cameras in the front yard and outside S.K.’s bedroom,
which provided video footage to S.K.’s phone. The front yard camera notified
S.K. when somebody was entering or leaving the home.
      Sula often carried a switchblade, butterfly knife, or another sharp
object on his person. Sometimes he would carry other weapons, such as a
hatchet, machete, hammer, drill or a kitchen butcher knife, and would
“taunt[ ] [B.S. and S.K.] everywhere [they would] go, swinging it around.”
B.S. and S.K. would lock themselves in their rooms and sometimes avoid

1     All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
                                       2
leaving to eat or shower when Sula was home. Sula’s demeanor toward B.S.
and S.K. was angry and violent, with his treatment of B.S. being even “more
evil” than his treatment of S.K. B.S. was afraid of Sula.
      In the months leading up to the incident, Sula had threatened to burn
down the house three or four times. Sula also had pushed S.K. against a
mirror, requiring S.K. to go to the hospital for treatment for a sprained arm
and “blood all over” his hands. Sula at another time also burned a beer glass
on top of the stove. About two weeks before the incident, B.S. asked Sula
what he was doing when she saw him holding a “big knife” and gathering
sticks of wood to take into his bedroom. He replied, “Just go away, go away.
I’m going to kill you. Just go away.” Since that time, B.S. was afraid that
Sula would in fact kill her.
      On July 14, 2021, at 2:00 a.m., the morning of the incident, S.K.
observed Sula entering and exiting the home through video footage on his
phone. Sula had a knife with him, walked around, went outside the camera’s
view, returned to the front of the home, looked at the camera, and then went
back inside. Around 6:00 a.m., both S.K. and B.S. left the home. In the front
yard, there was a large Buddha shrine, to which B.S. would pray and give
offerings. It did not appear damaged or destroyed when S.K. left for work
that morning.
      At 10:30 a.m., the front door camera recorded Sula breaking the
Buddha shrine with a hatchet while yelling, “Stop fucking playing with me.”
B.S. returned home later that day and Sula “came out and was very upset at
me and he was swinging something. And he said he’s going to kill me.” B.S.
tried talking to Sula and asked how he was doing. In response, he said, “I’m
doing it. I’m going to kill you.” While Sula spoke, he stood about six feet
away and swung a hatchet at B.S. Sula “sounded very vicious,” “really stared

                                       3
hard at” B.S., “was swinging the [hatchet] back and forth, and then [B.S.]
was so scared so [she] ran away.” B.S. testified, “I don’t want to stand there
and have him chop me up, so I just left.” She believed Sula “was going to kill
me, so I have to run away and call the police”; adding, “I think if I didn’t run
away on that day I would have been killed.”
      When police officers arrived, they observed Sula in the front yard
breaking the Buddha shrine with the hatchet. He appeared “[v]ery
aggressive” and “violent” and “demolished” the shrine. He immediately
started yelling at the officers once they contacted him. Sula was
“uncooperative and not complying with commands” and it took 30 minutes for
the officers to arrest him.
      The officers found B.S. across the street scared to the point that “she
fell to her knees on the ground and started crying.” After the officers
arrested Sula, they took B.S. back to her home and she pointed out the
damage caused by Sula, including a broken television, picture frames of her
parents that were burned, and the destroyed Buddha shrine. The next day,
B.S. obtained an emergency protective order against Sula, which was
eventually extended to three years.
      Defense Evidence
      Sula denied threatening B.S. or waving any weapons in front of her.
He did not see how the television was broken or how the pictures were
burned, but admitted he had been the only one home that morning.
Regarding the Buddha shrine, he claimed he used the hatchet to take it apart
and carry the pieces to the backyard to repair it because it had fallen over. It
weighed hundreds of pounds.
      Sula believed he had a good relationship with B.S., but that she had
been by herself in her room since her husband died a couple months earlier.

                                        4
He did not know why B.S. and S.K. avoided him in the home. He admitted
they had called the police on him before.
                                  DISCUSSION
                                         I.
                Jury Instruction on the Weapon Allegation
      Sula argues that the trial court prejudicially erred and violated his
right to due process by allowing the jury to find the hatchet was “inherently”
deadly and dangerous. We are not persuaded.
      A. Additional Background
      Sula was charged with making a criminal threat (§ 422) and with using
“a deadly and dangerous weapon, to wit: [an] ax or hatchet” in making the
threat (§§ 12022, subd. (b)(1), 1192.7, subd. (c)(23)).
      The trial court instructed the jury as follows with CALCRIM No. 3145
on the weapon allegation in support of this offense:
         “If you find the defendant guilty of [making a criminal
         threat], you must then decide whether . . . the People have
         proved the additional allegation that the defendant
         personally used a deadly or dangerous weapon during the
         commission of that crime. . . .

         “A deadly or dangerous weapon is any object, instrument,
         or weapon that is inherently deadly or dangerous or one
         that is used in such a way that it is capable of causing and
         likely to cause death or great bodily injury.

         “In deciding whether an object is a deadly weapon, consider
         all the surrounding circumstances, including when and
         where the object was possessed, and any other evidence
         that indicates whether the object would be used for a
         dangerous, rather than a harmless, purpose.

         “...

                                         5
         “Someone personally uses a deadly or dangerous weapon if
         he or she intentionally does any of the following: [¶]
         1. Displays the weapon in a menacing manner; [¶] OR [¶]
         2. Hits someone with the weapon.”

      The trial court did not further define what the law determines to be an
“inherently deadly or dangerous” weapon. There were no objections to the
instruction.
      In her closing argument, the prosecutor defined the term “deadly
weapon” the same way as the trial court. She then argued that a hatchet is a
deadly and dangerous weapon “[a]nd the defendant personally used it when
he was waving it in a menacing manner.” However, she did not argue the
weapon was inherently dangerous. In his closing argument, defense counsel
argued that Sula did not threaten B.S. He did not mention the weapon
allegation.
      The jury found Sula guilty of making a criminal threat and found that
he personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon.
      B. Guiding Principles
      A trial court has a duty to instruct “ ‘on general principles of law
relevant to the issues raised by the evidence and necessary for the jury’s
understanding of the case.’ ” (People v. Townsel (2016) 63 Cal.4th 25, 58.)
We review challenges to jury instructions de novo. (People v. Baratang (2020)
56 Cal.App.5th 252, 259.) We apply the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
standard articulated in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 to claims
of instructional error that are based on a legally inadequate theory of guilt.
(People v. Aledamat (2019) 8 Cal.5th 1, 7-9 (Aledamat).) Under that
standard, we “must reverse the conviction unless, after examining the entire
cause, including the evidence, and considering all relevant circumstances, it
determines the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Id. at p. 13.)

                                        6
“A reviewing court must determine whether any rational jury would have
found the defendant guilty based on a valid theory if the jury had been
properly instructed.” (In re Lopez (2023) 14 Cal.5th 562, 587 (Lopez).)
      C. Analysis
      There is no dispute that the trial court erred when it instructed that a
hatchet was an inherently deadly weapon. Because a hatchet is usually
“used for innocent purposes, it is not among the few objects that are
inherently deadly weapons.” (Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 6 [“ ‘Some few
objects, such as dirks and blackjacks, have been held to be deadly weapons as
a matter of law; the ordinary use for which they are designed establishes
their character as such’ ”].) In presenting the jury with two possible theories
to support the deadly weapon allegation, the court improperly permitted the
jury to conclude that a hatchet is inherently deadly, when it cannot be so as a
matter of law. (Id. at pp. 6-7 [holding that a trial court errs if it instructs
jurors that they may find a weapon to be inherently deadly and dangerous,
when, as a matter of law, the weapon is not inherently deadly or dangerous];
People v. Stutelberg (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 314, 317(Stutelberg) [jury
“instructions are flawed because they suggest the jury might properly
conclude that a box cutter is inherently dangerous”].
      The People contend Sula has forfeited on appeal the issue of whether
the trial court erred in giving CALCRIM No. 3145 that included the
“inherently deadly or dangerous” weapon instruction. We disagree.
Although defense counsel failed to object in the trial court to the weapon
instruction, we may “review any instruction given . . . , if the substantial
rights of the defendant were affected thereby.” (§ 1259; People v. Letner and
Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 180, fn. 23 [“To the extent that defendants
contend these asserted instructional errors violated their substantial rights,

                                         7
we . . . review their claims pursuant to section 1259, even if these claims were
forfeited”].) The legally incorrect instruction “is not of the type that must be
preserved by objection.” (People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 976, fn. 7;
cf. People v. Powell (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 689, 709-710 [claim that the
instructions allowed the jury to convict the defendant on a legally invalid
theory “need not be preserved by objection in order to be considered on
appeal”].)
      After a careful review of the record, we conclude that the instructional
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because any rational juror
hearing the evidence would have concluded that Sula used the hatchet as a
deadly or dangerous weapon. (Lopez, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 589] [“If the
reviewing court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that any rational juror
would have made the additional findings, based on the jury’s actual verdict
and the evidence at trial, the error is harmless because the presentation of
the invalid theory to the jury made no difference”].) The prosecutor initially
repeated the same weapon enhancement instruction that the judge gave the
jury, CALCRIM No. 3145, and stated, “A hatchet is certainly a deadly and
dangerous weapon.” However, key to our decision, the prosecutor did not
address the incorrect “inherently deadly or dangerous” legal theory any
further in her closing argument and instead argued that Sula used the
hatchet in a way that it was “capable of causing” death or injury. The
prosecutor urged the jury to “use your common sense” and explained that
“the defendant personally used [the hatchet] when he was waving it in a
menacing manner.” She continued:
         “Just by the fact that he displayed the weapon in a
         menacing manner is sufficient for personal use. When
         [B.S.] was testifying, demonstrating with her hand, about
         what he was doing with that hatchet, you know what that
         hatchet can do. You had an opportunity to also watch a

                                        8
           video of him using the hatchet on what he described as a
           300-pound Buddha house, the damage and destruction that
           caused and the damage and destruction that can cause to a
           human body.”

        The record thus shows the prosecutor relied on the legally correct part
of CALCRIM No. 3145 in arguing the jury should find the weapon allegation
true.
        Additionally, we find the error harmless based on the instructions as a
whole. (See, e.g., People v. Hallock (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 595, 604 [“error in
giving” jury instruction was “harmless” when considering “the instructions as
a whole”].) For example, the court instructed the jury that “[s]ome of these
instructions may not apply, depending on findings about the facts of the case.
Do not assume because I give a particular instruction that I’m suggesting
anything about the facts. After you have decided what the facts are, follow
the instructions that do apply to the facts as you find them.” We assume the
jury followed that instruction. (Gray v. Wagner (1969) 272 Cal.App.2d 671,
672.) The court also instructed the jury to “consider all the surrounding
circumstances, including when and where the object was possessed, and any
other evidence that indicates whether the object would be used for a
dangerous, rather than a harmless, purpose.” As the California Supreme
Court has explained,
           “This part of the instruction suggested . . . that the jury had
           to consider all of the circumstances in deciding whether the
           object was a deadly weapon, either inherently or as used.
           The jury would likely view the ‘inherently deadly’ language
           in light of this additional instruction that it had to consider
           all of the circumstances. Given this additional instruction,
           it seems unlikely the jury would simply view the box cutter
           as inherently deadly without considering the
           circumstances, including how defendant used it.”
           (Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 14.)

                                         9
      The jury here was presented with evidence about the hatchet’s nature,
the manner it was used, and all surrounding circumstances. (People v.
Aguilar (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023, 1029 [“In determining whether an object not
inherently deadly or dangerous is used as such, the trier of fact may consider
the nature of the object, the manner in which it is used, and all other facts
relevant to the issue”].) For example, a responding officer testified that
Sula’s hatchet had a sharp blade and could “cause a severe injury to a person
if used in a violent manner,” including “death” as a result of “a severe slash”
of “an artery or somewhere within the body.”
      In addition, B.S. testified that she truly believed Sula was going to kill
her with the hatchet if she did not run away. As noted, Sula was six feet
away from B.S. when he swung the hatchet back and forth and threatened,
“I’m doing it. I’m going to kill you.” She did not “want to stand there and
have him chop [her] up.” The record supports the inference that the jury
accepted her testimony that Sula used the hatchet as a deadly weapon and
that it rejected Sula’s testimony that he did not display or wave the weapon
at her. Thus, the evidence supports the inference that Sula used the hatchet
as a deadly or dangerous weapon. (See People v. Graham (1969) 71 Cal.2d
303, 328 [“ ‘When it appears . . . that an instrumentality . . . is capable of
being used in a “dangerous or deadly” manner, and it may be fairly inferred
from the evidence that its possessor intended on a particular occasion to use
it as a weapon should the circumstances require, . . . its character as a
“dangerous or deadly weapon” may be thus established, at least for the
purposes of that occasion’ ”].)
      Sula compares his case to Stutelberg, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th 314,
arguing that “the evidence [he] used the hatchet in a deadly and dangerous
manner was not overwhelming.” We disagree. In Stutelberg, the defendant

                                        10
was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon as to C.L. and mayhem with a
deadly weapon enhancement as to M.S. (Stutelberg, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at
p. 316.) The defendant was intoxicated and was denied entry into a bar when
M.S. urged the defendant’s friend “to take [the defendant] home to prevent
police from being called.” (Ibid.) The defendant then “started ‘flicking’ a box
cutter toward” M.S. and C.L. (Ibid.) “[C.L.] yelled that he saw a knife. [The
defendant] swung a fist at [C.L.] but missed. [M.S.] grabbed [the defendant]
and pushed him into a light pole. [The defendant] punched [M.S.] and cut the
back of her head with the box cutter.” (Ibid.)
      Not unlike the instant case, the trial court in Stutelberg instructed the
jury that a “ ‘deadly or dangerous weapon is any object, instrument, or
weapon, that is inherently deadly or dangerous, or one that is used in such a
way that it is capable of causing and likely to cause death or great bodily
injury.’ ” (Stutelberg, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 317.) On appeal, we found
that the instructional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to
M.S. but not as to C.L. (Id. at p. 322.)
      Sula argues that his “waving the hatchet was less likely to cause great
bodily injury than the Stutelberg defendant’s flicking the box cutter toward
[C.L.]” However, in Stutelberg, we explained that “[t]he exact manner in
which [the defendant] used the box cutter against [C.L.] is . . . unclear”
(Stutelberg, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th at p. 322); and that “[t]he jury could
reasonably conclude that his ‘flicking’ motion was more of a threat, as
opposed to an act likely to cause death or great bodily injury.” (Ibid.) Here,
in contrast, Sula was threatening B.S. by telling her that he was “going to
kill” her while “swinging the [hatchet] back and forth” and “staring” at her in
a menacing way that communicated to B.S. that he was serious about
carrying out his threats. Unlike in Stutelberg as to victim C.L.¸ the way Sula

                                       11
used the hatchet is not “unclear”; rather, the evidence is sufficient to support
the finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Sula used the hatchet in a deadly
or dangerous manner.
      The California Supreme Court’s decision in Aledamat, supra,
8 Cal.5th 1, is instructive. There the “ ‘defendant pulled a box cutter out of
his pocket and extended the blade; from three or four feet away, defendant
thrust the blade at the man at waist level, saying, “I’ll kill you.” ’ ” (Id. at
p. 4.) As here, the jury in Aledamat was instructed with CALCRIM No. 3145
to “ ‘consider all of the surrounding circumstances including when and where
the object was possessed and any other evidence that indicates whether the
object would be used for a dangerous rather than a harmless purpose.’ ”
(Aledamat, at p. 14.) Additionally, as here,
         “[N]o one ever suggested to the jury that there were two
         separate ways it could decide whether the box cutter was a
         deadly weapon. . . . Although defense counsel did not
         expressly concede that the box cutter was a deadly weapon,
         he did not contest the point. [¶] Contesting the point would
         have been futile based on the record here. A box cutter is
         not inherently deadly because it is not designed for that
         purpose. But if used to assault someone, i.e., used as a
         weapon, a box cutter is potentially deadly even if not
         designed for that purpose. . . . Counsel could readily
         believe it would be pointless for him to argue that even if
         (contrary to the argument counsel did make) the jury found
         defendant assaulted the victim with the box cutter, it was
         not a deadly weapon. This is particularly so in light of
         defendant’s statement, ‘I’ll kill you.’ ” (Ibid.)

      As in Aledamat, the jury instruction here “referred to an object that is
‘inherently deadly or one that is used in such a way that it is capable of
causing and likely to cause death or . . . great bodily injury.’ This
juxtaposition at least indicated what the ‘inherently deadly’ language was
driving at.” (Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at pp. 13-14) The Supreme Court

                                        12
reasoned, “the jury must have considered the term ‘inherently deadly’ to
mean something. . . . [T]he theoretical risk is that, because the court did not
define the term, the jury might have applied its common understanding to
find the box cutter deadly because it is sharp and used for cutting.” (Id. at
p. 15.) “But if the jury did so, it would necessarily find the box cutter deadly
in the colloquial sense of the term—i.e., readily capable of inflicting deadly
harm—and that defendant used it as a weapon.” (Ibid.)
      Based on the instructions given here, the jury necessarily found that:
(1) Sula made “a criminal threat” while (2) he “personally used a deadly or
dangerous weapon, to wit: ax or hatchet.” Thus, even if the jury found the
hatchet to be inherently deadly, it “would necessarily find the [hatchet]
deadly in the colloquial sense of the term—i.e., readily capable of inflicting
deadly harm—and that [Sula] used it as a weapon.” (See Aledamat, supra,
8 Cal.5th at p. 15.) “ ‘No reasonable jury that made all of these findings could
have failed to find’ that defendant used the [hatchet] in a way that is capable
of causing or likely to cause death or great bodily injury.” (Ibid.) As in
Aledamat, the instructional error here was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.
      In sum, the instructional error did not affect the verdict because any
rational juror would have concluded that Sula used the hatchet in a deadly or
dangerous manner.
                                       II.
                      One-Year Weapon Enhancement
      Sula next argues that the trial court misunderstood section 1385,
subdivision (c), as recently amended by Statutes 2021, chapter 721, section 1,
when it denied his request to dismiss the weapon enhancement. In the
alternative, if the court understood its discretion, Sula contends that it

                                       13
abused its discretion when it denied his request. We find these arguments
unavailing.
      A. Additional Background
      As part of his statement in mitigation and sentencing memorandum,
Sula asked the court to dismiss the one-year weapon enhancement (§ 12022,
subd. (b)(1)) under section 1385, subdivision (c), as amended by Senate Bill
No. 81. Sula argued that his “use of methamphetamine, as a result of his
depression, directly contributed to his behavior in this case.” In support of
his request, Sula attached a psychological evaluation that had been written
after his trial. The psychologist diagnosed Sula with severe amphetamine-
type substance use disorder, severe alcohol use disorder, adjustment disorder
with depressed mood, and borderline intellectual functioning.
      At the sentencing hearing, the trial court noted that Sula “has three
felonies as a juvenile. He has nine misdemeanor convictions and nine felony
convictions. Been to prison six times.” After acknowledging it had reviewed
Sula’s psychological evaluation, the court concluded, “I can’t find that . . . the
mental health disorders contributed to the criminal conduct.” Before
imposing the additional year for the weapon enhancement, the court
reiterated that the “aggregates do outweigh the mitigants significantly in
terms of the conduct.” The court further acknowledged its understanding of
section 1385 by stating, “Given that I’ve imposed [sections]
12022[, subdivision] (b)(1) and 1385[, subdivision] (c), it applies to all
enhancements. And you can only use one enhancement per case under
[section] 1385[, subdivision] (c). I’m dismissing the [section]
667[, subdivision] (a)(1) five-year or nickel enhancement.” Finally, the court
acknowledged that it had “read and consider[ed] the probation report and the
briefs that were filed.”

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      At his sentencing, Sula did not object to imposition of the one-year
weapon enhancement.
      B. Legal Framework and Guiding Principles
      Senate Bill No. 81 was passed by the Legislature in 2021. It amended
section 1385 to specify “mitigating circumstances” that the trial court shall
“consider and afford great weight” when deciding whether to dismiss a
sentencing enhancement. (Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1.) Senate Bill No. 81 took
effect before Sula was sentenced in March 2022. Section 1385,
subdivision (c), as amended, provides:
         “(c)(1) Notwithstanding any other law, the court shall
         dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice
         to do so, except if dismissal of that enhancement is
         prohibited by any initiative statute.

         “(2) In exercising its discretion under this subdivision, the
         court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence
         offered by the defendant to prove that any of the mitigating
         circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present.
         Proof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances
         weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement,
         unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement
         would endanger public safety. ‘Endanger public safety’
         means there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the
         enhancement would result in physical injury or other
         serious danger to others.”

      Nine mitigating circumstances that weigh in favor of dismissing an
enhancement are listed in subdivision (c)(2), including whether “[t]he current
offense is connected to mental illness.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(D).) The statute
further provides:
         “For the purposes of subparagraph (D) of paragraph (2), a
         mental illness is a mental disorder as identified in the
         most recent edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical
         Manual of Mental Disorders, including, but not limited to,

                                         15
         bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, or
         post-traumatic stress disorder, but excluding antisocial
         personality disorder, borderline personality disorder, and
         pedophilia. A court may conclude that a defendant’s
         mental illness was connected to the offense if, after
         reviewing any relevant and credible evidence, including,
         but not limited to, police reports, preliminary hearing
         transcripts, witness statements, statements by the
         defendant’s mental health treatment provider, medical
         records, records or reports by qualified medical experts, or
         evidence that the defendant displayed symptoms
         consistent with the relevant mental disorder at or near the
         time of the offense, the court concludes that the defendant’s
         mental illness substantially contributed to the defendant’s
         involvement in the commission of the offense.” (Id., subd.
         (c)(5), italics added.)

      We review the court’s ruling under section 1385 for abuse of discretion.
(People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 530.) “[A] trial
court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so irrational or
arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.” (People v. Carmony
(2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377.) “A court acting while unaware of the scope of its
discretion is understood to have abused it.” (People v. Tirado (2022)
12 Cal.5th 688, 694.)
      C. Analysis
      Relying on People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331 (Scott), the Attorney
General argues that Sula forfeited his arguments regarding the one-year
weapon enhancement by failing to object at sentencing. Under Scott,
“complaints about the manner in which the trial court exercises its
sentencing discretion and articulates its supporting reasons cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal.” (Id. at p. 356.)
      While Sula acknowledges that no objection was made at sentencing, he
contends this issue was “preserved . . . for review on appeal” because his

                                        16
statement in mitigation sought dismissal of the weapon enhancement. We
disagree. The dismissal request in Sula’s statement in mitigation is not
timely as it was raised well before imposition of the sentence. (People v. de
Soto (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1, 9 [arguments at presentencing hearing did not
preserve claims of sentencing error because “objections must be raised
contemporaneously with the pronouncement of sentence”]; accord Scott,
supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 351 [“courts have required parties to raise certain
issues at the time of sentencing” (italics omitted)].) Thus, Sula forfeited his
argument that the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed the one-
year weapon enhancement. Sula did not, however, forfeit his argument that
the trial court misunderstood recently amended section 1385. (People v.
Panozo (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 825, 840 [forfeiture of challenge to the trial
court’s “apparent misapprehension of statutory sentencing obligations” is
inappropriate].) Where the challenge is not to the trial court’s exercise of its
sentencing discretion, but the failure to comply with a statutory obligation,
forfeiture is not appropriate. (Ibid.; see also In re Sean W. (2005)
127 Cal.App.4th 1177, 1181-1182 [no forfeiture where the defendant’s claim
was that the court misapprehended its discretion, not a challenge to how it
exercised that discretion].)
      An examination of the record establishes that the trial court
understood its discretion under section 1385, subdivision (c), considered
Sula’s psychological evaluation and concluded that the evidence failed to
show that Sula’s mental disorders “substantially contributed” to his criminal
conduct. In fact, the court explicitly stated that it would need to find that
“the mental health disorders contributed to the criminal conduct,” but that it
could not find that to be true. The court clearly read Sula’s psychological
evaluation, commenting that it found “the manner in which [the psychologist]

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spoke to [Sula] and things that he said weren’t necessarily summarized well
in terms of coming to a conclusion.” The court also noted it considered the
briefs and probation report, weighed the mitigating and aggravating factors
related to Sula’s conduct,2 and then applied the weapon enhancement to add
a year to Sula’s sentence. Thus, consistent with its obligation under the
statute, the court considered the evidence of Sula’s mental illness before it
imposed the enhancement and decided it was not a substantially contributing
factor to the criminal conduct.
      Despite the clear record, Sula seizes on the trial court’s statement that
“[the psychologist] didn’t use those words” to argue that the court mistakenly
believed it could not find Sula’s mental disorders contributed to his criminal
conduct unless the psychologist explicitly stated that to be the case. But Sula
fails to consider the court’s other comments, which support that the court was
simply reiterating its view that even the psychologist failed to conclude that
Sula’s mental illness impacted his conduct. The court’s other statements, “I
can’t find that . . . the mental health disorders contributed to the criminal
conduct . . . [a]nd that’s what I would need to find,” clearly demonstrate its
understanding that the court needed to find that Sula’s mental health
disorders contributed to the criminal conduct.
      Additionally, the court’s understanding of the amended statute is
further demonstrated by its statement that “you can only use one
enhancement per case under [section] 1385(c). I’m dismissing the 667(a)(1)

2      Although Sula argues that the trial court’s finding that the aggravating
factors outweighed the mitigating factors “is not germane to the section 1385
analysis here,” the statute does provide that the court shall weigh evidence
“of the mitigating circumstances” against the “likelihood that the dismissal of
the enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious danger to
others.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2).)
                                       18
five-year or nickel enhancement.” Under amended section 1385, when
“[m]ultiple enhancements are alleged in a single case . . . all enhancements
beyond a single enhancement shall be dismissed.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(B).)
The court therefore dismissed the five-year enhancement so that it could
impose the one-year weapon enhancement. Thus, the record clearly
establishes that the court was aware of its discretion under the newly
amended statute.
      Even if Sula had preserved his argument that the trial court abused its
discretion, we would still affirm its decision to impose the one-year weapon
enhancement. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(B) [the trial court retains its “discretion”
to decide whether to impose a sentence enhancement].) As noted above, the
trial court considered Sula’s psychological evaluation, the probation report,
the parties’ briefs, and the mitigating and aggravating factors related to
Sula’s conduct, before deciding to apply the one-year weapon enhancement.
We conclude that the record supports the trial court’s decision. (People v.
Avalos (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1569, 1582 [“ ‘We must affirm unless there is a
clear showing the sentence choice was arbitrary or irrational’ ”].)
                                DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.

                                                              HUFFMAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

MCCONNELL, P. J.

O’ROURKE, J.

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