Court Opinion

ID: 9590869
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:58:50.072352+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:42:48.585246
License: Public Domain

MOSK, J.
I concur fully in the judgment, which reverses the judgment of the Court of Appeal insofar as it modified the judgment of the superior court convicting appellant, on a jury’s verdict, of felony child abuse to one convicting him of misdemeanor child abuse.
I also concur generally in the opinion of the court prepared by Justice Brown.
I write separately to present my own analysis. I do so in order to explicate felony child abuse—a task that is greatly needed in light of the divergent views expressed by the majority and by the dissenting justice in the Court of Appeal, which reflect similarly divergent views in reported decisions generally.
*1225Felony child abuse—which, strictly speaking, is an alternative felony/ misdemeanor offense—is defined by statute as presently set out in Penal Code section 273a, subdivision (a): “Any person who, under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death, willfully causes or permits any child to suffer, or inflicts thereon unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering, or having the care or custody of any child, willfully causes or permits the person or health of that child to be injured, or willfully causes or permits that child to be placed in a situation where his or her person or health is endangered,” is guilty, alternatively, of a felony or a misdemeanor.
Misdemeanor child abuse is defined by statute as presently set out in Penal Code section 273a, subdivision (b): “Any person who, under circumstances or conditions other than those likely to produce great bodily harm or death, willfully causes or permits any child to suffer, or inflicts thereon unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering, or having the care or custody of any child, willfully causes or permits the person or health of that child to be injured, or willfully causes or permits that child to be placed in a situation where his or her person or health may be endangered, is guilty of a misdemeanor.”
It is clear at first glance how felony child abuse differs from its misdemeanor counterpart. The felony requires that the “circumstances or conditions” (Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (a)) establishing the “context” of the perpetrator’s conduct and mental state (People v. Carter (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 752, 755 [70 Cal.Rptr.2d 569]) must be “likely to produce great bodily harm or death” (Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (a)). The misdemeanor, contrariwise, requires that such circumstances or conditions must not be likely to do so. (Id., § 273a, subd. (b).)
It is not as clear, however, what felony child abuse requires concerning the perpetrator’s conduct and mental state in addition to context.
Cleaving to the syntax of the statutory language, we articulate its clauses thus: “Any person who, under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death, [i] willfully [a] causes or permits any child to suffer, or [b] inflicts thereon[,] unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering, or [ii] having the care or custody of any child, [a] willfully causes or permits the person or health of that child to be injured, or [b] willfully causes or permits that child to be placed in a situation where his or her person or health is endangered,” may be guilty of a felony. (Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (a), brackets and bracketed material added.)
So articulating the clauses of the statutory language, we discern what have been referred to as four “branches,” which are separate but not necessarily independent:
*1226Under the first branch, a person may be guilty of felony child abuse if, “under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death,” he “willfully causes or permits any child to suffer . . . unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering . . . (Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (a).)1 Crucial for present purposes is the adverb “willfully.” In the setting of the statutory language, he must, at least, intentionally commit an act or omission that happens to result in a child “suffer[ing] . . . unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering.” He must do more as well. That is to say, he must “cause[] or permit[]” the child “to suffer . . . unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering” for the purpose of bringing about, or allowing, such a result. The reason is this: The adverb “willfully” modifies the verbs “causes” and “permits”; the object of those verbs is not an act or omission that happens to result in the child “suffer[ing] . . . unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering,” but rather that very result itself. (Cf. People v. Gorshen (1959) 51 Cal.2d 716, 730 [336 P.2d 492], disapproved on another point, People v. Wetmore (1978) 22 Cal.3d 318, 327, fn. 7 [149 Cal.Rptr. 265, 583 P.2d 1308] [holding that to kill “willfully” within the meaning of Pen. Code, § 189, means to act for the purpose of bringing about death].)2
Under the second branch—which is of particular concern here—a person may be guilty of felony child abuse if, “under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death,” he “willfully . . . inflicts . . . unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering” on “any child.” (Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (a).)3 As explained above, he must, at least, intentionally commit an act that “inflicts” such “unjustifiable physical pain or mental *1227suffering”; in addition, he must do so for the purpose of bringing about such a result.
Under the third branch, a person may be guilty of felony child abuse if, “under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death,” he “willfully causes or permits the person or health “of any child in his “care or custody” “to be injured . . . .” (Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (a).) Again, he must, at least, intentionally commit an act or omission that “causes or permits the person or health” of such a child “to be injured”; in addition, he must do so for the purpose of bringing about, or allowing, such a result.
Under the fourth and final branch, a person may be guilty of felony child abuse if, “under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death,” he “willfully causes or permits” any child in his “care or custody” “to be placed in a situation where” the child’s “person or health is endangered . . . .” (Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (a).) Yet again, he must, at least, intentionally commit an act or omission that “causes or permits” such a child “to be placed in a situation where” the child’s “person or health is endangered”; in addition, he must do so for the purpose of bringing about, or allowing, such a result.
It follows that felony child abuse may be described as including three elements. The first goes to the perpetrator’s context, specifically, “circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death.” (Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (a).) The second goes to the perpetrator’s conduct, specifically, an act or omission that “causes or permits” a child “to suffer . . . unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering,” or “inflict[s]” on a child “unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering,” or “causes or permits the person or health” of a child in his “care or custody” “to be injured,” or “causes or permits” such a child “to be placed in a situation where” the child’s “person or health is endangered.” (Ibid.) The third goes to the perpetrator’s mental state, specifically, an intent to commit one of the *1228proscribed acts or omissions, and a purpose to bring about, or allow, one of the proscribed results. (Ibid.)4
Neither the majority nor the dissenting justice in the Court of Appeal explicates felony child abuse thus. Each sets forth extensive discussion. Such discussion, however, turns out to be nothing more, and nothing less, than an analytical tar baby, with which courts should decline to struggle.
In part, the dissenting justice in the Court of Appeal indulged himself, impliedly, in considerations of “general intent” and “specific intent.” Inappropriately. For such notions do not assist in performing the task at hand, which is to explicate felony child abuse. “General intent” and “specific intent” “evolved as labels to identify” particular offenses, with “specific intent” “admitting ... the defense of voluntary intoxication” and “general intent” not doing so. (People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 83 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224] (conc. opn. of Mosk, J.); accord, People v. Hood (1969) 1 Cal.3d 444, 455-457 [82 Cal.Rptr. 618, 462 P.2d 370]; see People v. Whitfield (1994) 7 Cal.4th 437, 463 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 858, 868 P.2d 272] (conc. and dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).) “General intent” has usually been affixed if the mental element of an offense entails only an intent to engage in certain proscribed conduct. (People v. Hood, supra, 1 Cal.3d at pp. 456-457.) In contrast, “specific intent” has usually been affixed if the mental element of an offense entails an intent to engage in certain proscribed conduct for the purpose of bringing about, or allowing, a certain proscribed result. (Id. at p. 457.) “General intent” and “specific intent” have shown themselves to be “notoriously difficult ... to define and apply.” (Id. at p. 456; accord, People v. Cain, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 84 (conc. opn. of Mosk, J.).) For this reason, “they have proved to be mischievous.” (People v. Cain, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 84 (conc. opn. of Mosk, J.).) Even if they were not so, they simply do not assist in explicating felony child abuse. Neither do they aid in describing its mental element. Indeed, were we to attempt to affix the label of “general intent” or “specific intent,” we would doubtless have to select both—“general intent,” insofar as its mental element entails an intent to commit one of the proscribed acts or omissions; and “specific intent,” insofar as it entails an intent to do so for the purpose of bringing about, or allowing, one of the proscribed results.
In other part, the dissenting justice in the Court of Appeal indulged himself, expressly, in considerations of “general intent” and “criminal negligence;.” Again, inappropriately. For such notions also do not assist in *1229performing the task at hand, which is to explicate felony child abuse. “Criminal negligence”—to quote People v. Peabody (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 43 [119 Cal.Rptr. 780] (hereafter sometimes Peabody)—“must go beyond [ordinary negligence] required for civil liability and must amount to a ‘gross’ or ‘culpable’ departure from the required standard of care. [Citations.] [It] must be aggravated or reckless; that is, it must be such a departure from what would be the conduct of an ordinarily prudent person under the same circumstances as to be incompatible with a proper regard for human life. [It] must show an indifference to the consequences, and this has been said to require knowledge, actual or imputed, that the act tends to endanger another’s life.” (Id. at p. 47.)5 “General intent” and “specific intent” are, at least, complementary terms. “General intent” and “criminal negligence,” as is apparent, are not.
The dissenting justice in the Court of Appeal claimed to discern a mental element of “criminal negligence” in felony child abuse insofar as the perpetrator’s conduct involves a proscribed omission. He did so apparently on the assumption that such an omission implies such negligence.
The dissenting justice in the Court of Appeal was wrong: felony child abuse does not include a mental element of “criminal negligence” for the proscribed omission. To be sure, such negligence may accompany such an omission. But so may recklessness or knowledge or even purpose—as when one fails to act in order not to hinder a desired result.
For its part, the majority in the Court of Appeal claimed to discern a mental element of “criminal negligence” in felony child abuse generally, without regard to whether the perpetrator’s conduct involves either a proscribed act or a proscribed omission. It did so following Peabody and its progeny, which had done the same, albeit while looking to branches of the offense other than the second, which is of particular concern here, for the sake of assuring “consistency” in all its branches. It also did so in reliance on the offense’s context element, which covers “circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death” (Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (a)), in the belief that, without “criminal negligence,” the offense would not include a mental element other than that indicated by “willfulness,” which it shared with its misdemeanor counterpart, and would thereby show itself to be “tantamount” to a “disfavored” offense of strict liability.
*1230The majority in the Court of Appeal was wrong as well: felony child abuse does not include a mental element of “criminal negligence” generally. It ought not to have followed Peabody and its progeny. These decisions did not read what the statutory language stated as much as state what they had read into such language. Neither ought it to have relied on the offense’s context element covering “circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death.” (Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (a).) “Criminal negligence” is not referred to in the statutory language. Indeed, it is not even suggested. There is absolutely no “require[ment]” that the perpetrator possess either “actual or imputed” “knowledge” (People v. Peabody, supra, 46 Cal.App.3d at p. 47) that his conduct is “likely to produce great bodily harm or death” (Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (a)). Moreover, even without “criminal negligence,” the offense cannot be deemed to be “tantamount” to one of strict liability. An offense is of this kind if it does not include any mental element whatsoever. (See People v. Simon (1995) 9 Cal.4th 493, 519-522 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 278, 886 P.2d 1271].) This offense is not such. Neither can it be considered similar. For it obviously includes a mental element, which is indicated by “willfulness.” It does not stand in need of another. To be sure, the law requires that an offense must include a conduct element and a mental element in union. (Pen. Code, § 20.)6 But it does not prohibit it from including an element of a third kind, like a context element, not possessing aspects of either of the other two.7
The majority in the Court of Appeal evidently believed that felony child abuse could not, or at least should not, be distinguished from its misdemeanor counterpart solely by its context element. There is no basis for a belief of this sort. A felony may be distinguished from a corresponding misdemeanor solely on the basis of a context element. So is it with theft (Pen. Code, § 484), specifically, the felony (more precisely, the alternative felony/misdemeanor) of grand theft (id., §§ 487, subd. (a), 489, subd. (b)) and the misdemeanor of petty theft (id., §§ 488, 490), where the former may be distinguished from the latter solely on the basis of a context element indicating that the value of the item taken exceeds $400 (id., § 487, subd. (a); see id., § 488). Likewise with burglary (id., § 459), specifically, the felony of first degree burglary {id., §§ 460, subd. (a), 461, subd. 1) and the *1231misdemeanor (more precisely, the alternative felony/misdemeanor) of second degree burglary (id., §§ 460, subd. (b), 461, subd. 2), where the former may be distinguished from the latter solely on the basis of a context element indicating that the nature of the structure entered was that of an inhabited dwelling house (id., § 460, subd. (a); see id., § 460, subd. (b)). Unproblematically so. The context element of a felony may properly mark it as more serious than a corresponding misdemeanor because the consequences of the felony, either actual or potential, are deemed to be graver than those of the misdemeanor, as where the item taken in a theft has a value exceeding $400 or the structure entered in a burglary is an inhabited dwelling house. Thus is it here. The context element of felony child abuse covers “circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death.” (Id., § 273a, subd. (a).) That of its misdemeanor counterpart, in contrast, covers “circumstances or conditions other than those likely to produce great bodily harm or death.'” (Id., § 273a, subd. (b), italics added.)8
In conclusion, I join in reversing the judgment of the Court of Appeal insofar as it modified the judgment of the superior court convicting appellant of felony child abuse to one convicting him of its misdemeanor counterpart.
Kennard, J., concurred.
On March 9, 1999, the opinion was modified to read as printed above.

 It might perhaps be argued that a person may be guilty of felony child abuse if, “under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death,” he “willfully causes or permits any child to suffer” simpliciter (Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (a)), whether or not what the child suffers amounts to “unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering” {ibid.). Such an argument would be based on the punctuation of the clause, “willfully causes or permits any child to suffer, or inflicts thereon unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering,” specifically, on the presence of a comma after “suffer,” and the absence of a comma after “thereon.” It would prove unpersuasive. Punctuation is not necessarily controlling. (E.g., French v. Teschemaker et als. (1864) 24 Cal. 518, 553-554.) In any event, the punctuation that does not appear to the eye in the clause in question sounds in the ear. A paired comma is naturally inserted after “thereon," which bears emphasis as an adverb substituting for the phrase, “on any child”—to read thus, “willfully causes or permits any child to suffer, or inflicts on any child, unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering.”

 Penal Code section 7, subdivision 1, expressly defines “willfully,” with regard to an act or omission, as a “purpose or willingness to commit” such act or omission. It thereby impliedly defines “willfully,” with regard to a result, as a “purpose or willingness” to bring about, or allow, such result.

 In view of the fact that the adverb “willfully” does not appear immediately before the verb “inflicts,” it might perhaps be argued that a person may be guilty of felony child abuse if, “under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death,” he simply “inflicts . . . unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering” on “any child” (Pen. Code, *1227§ 273a, subd. (a)), whether or not he does so “willfully.” Such an argument, however, is foreclosed by our decision in People v. Smith (1984) 35 Cal.3d 798 [201 Cal.Rptr. 311, 678 P.2d 886]. There, we expressly and broadly held that, in order to be guilty of the offense, a person must commit one of the proscribed acts or omissions “willfully.” (Id. at p. 806.) We thereby impliedly and narrowly held that, in order to be guilty of the offense, a person must “inflict. . . unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering” (Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (a)) in like fashion. That holding is surely sound. For, in common usage, both within the law and without, the verb “inflict” connotes “willfulness” in and of itself: to “inflict” harm is to cause it intentionally and not, as it were, by accident.

 What is stated in the text concerning felony child abuse applies, mutatis mutandis, to its misdemeanor counterpart—the mutanda comprising “circumstances or conditions other than those likely to produce great bodily harm or death” (Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (b), italics added).

 For offenses against the person, “criminal negligence” may indeed demand the absence of a “proper regard for human life” and the presence of “actual or imputed” “knowledge” of danger thereto. (People v. Peabody, supra, 46 Cal.App.3d at p. 47.) For other kinds of offenses, of course, it does not. (See People v. Brian (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 3-5 [168 Cal.Rptr. 105].)

 Penal Code section 20 provides that, “[i]n every . . . offense there must exist a union, or joint operation of act or intent, or criminal negligence.” It was enacted in 1872, and has never been amended. Its reference to “intent” and “criminal negligence” should not be understood, narrowly, to identify two particular mental states, but rather, broadly, to embrace the full range of such states.

 In section 2.02(1) of the Model Penal Code, the American Law Institute has stated that, generally, each element of an offense that is not itself a mental element should nevertheless possess a mental aspect. On its very face, its statement is qualified. In any event, it is not binding in California.

 It is clear that, as a general matter at least, whether the “circumstances or conditions” that obtained in any given case were indeed “likely to produce great bodily harm or death” (Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (a)) is a question for the trier of fact. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1221.) That question, as the analysis in the text makes plain, is an objective one that goes to the perpetrator’s context, and not a subjective one that goes to his mental state.
It is also clear that, whenever a trier of fact determines that a perpetrator is guilty of felony child abuse, it necessarily finds that he was at least “criminally negligent.” For, in making its determination, it necessarily finds that the “circumstances or conditions” that obtained were “likely to produce great bodily harm or death” (Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (a), italics added), and not merely “capable” of doing so, as it were, by some bare “possibility.” Because such “circumstances or conditions” were “likely” to produce such a result, the perpetrator must in fact have known of the risk, or at the very least should have done so.