Court Opinion

ID: 6633784
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-07-20 20:38:53.822057+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:59:01.315061
License: Public Domain

Campbell J.
Suit was brought in the court below by the defendants in error, to recover damages for deceit alleged to have been practised upon them in the sale of a local interest under a patent right. They claimed that they were led to purchase by the representation that the patent issued by the United States to Warren covered two different kinds of soap, when in fact it only embraced one. It seems that Warren filed a claim and specifications for the two sorts, but, under the law, only one could be included in a single patent, and therefore one was left out. After the sale to Cole and Arnold of a territorial right under the patent, which they aver was said to be for both inventions, a second patent was issued covering the claim omitted in the former one. There was evidence tending to show a repudiation of the contract by defendants in error on the discovery that the patent did not include all it was supposed to, and there was also contradictory evidence concerning the readiness of Warren to make further assurances to remedy the deficiency in the original transfer; but this last matter does not become important, as no legal question is raised upon it for review. The jury having rendered a verdict for damages against Warren, the case comes before us on objections to the various rulings of the Circuit Judge.
*272Several exceptions are based upon the refusal of the Circuit Court to charge that if defendants in error had disaffirmed the contract, this action would not lie, and to his charges concerning what would or would not amount to a disaffirmance, if such disaffirmance would bar the suit.
The only intelligible ground for the main objection is the claim that this suit amounts to an affirmance, and that a previous election to disaffirm can not be receded from. We do not so understand the pleadings. This is not, as claimed by Warren, a suit to enforce a contract. On the contrary it is an action of tort, to recover damages for a deceit and imposition claimed to have been practised on Cole and Arnold, whereby they were fraudulently induced to make an agreement they would not have made had they known the truth. This being the character of the suit, it can not be seriously contended that a person repudiating a contract for fraud can not sue for redress, if he has suffered damage from it. We think the plaintiff in error has mistaken the nature of this action, and that the objection was not well founded. The minor rulings connected with this theory become unimportant, and were in fact more favorable to plaintiff in error than to the defendants, upon the proper theory of the prosecution.
The court below also refused to charge that the second patent operated to confirm to defendants in error the title which they originally supposed they were buying. Had the conveyance covered, or purported to cover, the subject of the second patent (as the court below seems to have assumed it did,) this question would have been quite material, inasmuch as Warren unquestionably owned the exclusive right as inventor, and had not abandoned it to the public. But the deed will not bear such a construction. It does not purport to convey an interest in anything but the invention identified as described in the letters patent of September 3d, 1861, and can not, therefore, have any bearing whatever upon the invention not included in that *273patent. We are not required, therefore, to decide, and we do not express any opinion upon, the sufficiency of the reasons given for refusing to give retroactive effect to the second patent, so long as the decision itself was right. The deed does not purport to give rights in the second invention, and could work no estoppel concerning it or concerning the subsequent patent.
The remaining exceptions relate to the rule of damages. Objection is made that the court below allowed the jury to give vindictive damages, and to include in the damages the expenses of litigation. We think the instructions were erroneous on both points.
Without considering the disputed question whether damages in a civil action can ever be properly based on the theory of punishment instead of redress, we recognize fully the fact that there are many wrongful acts which are committed under circumstances which preclude the possibility of reducing the grievance to any reasonably certain pecuniary standard. In many cases, it can not be said that there has been any mere pecuniary damage whatever. But, inasmuch as the injured party should have some redress, and the law can only give that redress by pecuniary damages, it has been found necessary to leave the amount, in the absence of any other standard, to the common sense of a jury; and anything which, in their opinion, is not out of proportion to the more or less aggravated character of the grievance, is allowed to stand as the rule of damages; not because it is an accurate measure of redress, but because no better one can be attained. And, accordingly, such damages will stand, unless it is plain that the jury have gone very much astray in their action. Such damages have, in many cases, the effect of a heavy punishment; but whether the law properly regards them in that light we do not find it necessary to determine. For-there\ are many wrongful injuries where the grievance created is purely pecuniary in its nature, and is susceptible of full *274and definite money compensation. When this is the case, we do not conceive it admissible to abandon a certain rule, which will do complete justice, for an uncertain one, that can hardly fail to do injustice. It was remarked by my brother Christiancy, in Allison v. Chandler, 11 Mich. R. p. 555, that “ where, from the nature and circumstances of the case, a rule can be discovered by which adequate compensation can be accurately measured, the rule should be applied in actions of tort, as well as in those upon contract.” We think the present case is one of that kind. The parties have been damnified, if at all, by not getting the property they expected to get. Their position is, in point of damage, just Avhat it would have been, had Warren agreed to convey what they bargained for, and wantonly broken his agreement. The same redress which would compensate the breach of such a contract, will compensate the deceit in not giving them what they supposed they were buying in the transaction complained of. We think the court erred in permitting the jury to adopt any other measure of damages.
Nor do we think the jury were properly permitted to consider the expenses of litigation in the present suit. It was held in Hatch v. Hart, 2 Mich. R. 289, that such expenses could not be considered in estimating damages for detention in replevin suits, and there is no distinction in principle between such cases and other actions for torts. Such we consider the better doctrine on i authority, and also the more reasonable. We are not disposed to disturb the rule so laid down.
For these reasons, we think there is error' apparent on the record upon the rulings on the estimate of damages.
The judgment below must be reversed, with costs, and a new trial granted.
Cooley J. and Christiancy J. concurred.
Martin Ch. J. did not sit in this case.