Court Opinion

ID: 9376752
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-03 19:00:42.45011+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:08.935340
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-60091     Document: 00516664844          Page: 1   Date Filed: 03/03/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                          United States Court of Appeals
                                                                        Fifth Circuit

                                                                      FILED
                                                                  March 3, 2023
                                   No. 22-60091                  Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                      Clerk

   Roberto Rodriguez Gonzalez,

                                                                         Petitioner,

                                       versus

   Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General,

                                                                       Respondent.

                      Petition for Review of an Order of the
                          Board of Immigration Appeals
                                   A079 744 164

   Before Wiener, Elrod, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:
          Petitioner seeks review of a final order of removal by the Board of
   Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). He alleges that the BIA and the Immigration
   Judge (“IJ”) committed legal error in concluding that he was ineligible for
   asylum because of a conviction of Texas aggravated robbery. We disagree and
   deny his petition for review.
                                   I. Background
          Roberto Rodriguez Gonzalez (“Petitioner”) is a native citizen of
   Mexico who received lawful permanent resident status in the United States
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   in 2003. In 2014, he pleaded guilty to Texas aggravated robbery and was
   sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment.
          Subsequently he received a Notice to Appear from the Department of
   Homeland Security in which he was charged as removable because of his
   conviction. An IJ found him removable and, further, ineligible for asylum due
   to his conviction. The BIA affirmed. Following the Supreme Court’s
   decision in Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct 1204 (2018), in which it was held
   that the “crime of violence” designation in the relevant removal statute was
   unconstitutionally vague, id. at 1210, the Petitioner moved to reopen
   proceedings. An IJ again found him ineligible for asylum due to his conviction
   and, independently, ineligible for deferral of removal under the Convention
   Against Torture (“CAT”). The BIA affirmed, and the Petitioner filed a
   petition for review in this court.
                                II. Law and Analysis
          As a general matter, we “only have authority to review the BIA’s
   decision, although we may also review the IJ’s decision when it has some
   impact on the BIA’s decision, as when the BIA has adopted all or part of the
   IJ’s reasoning.” Enriquez-Gutierrez v. Holder, 612 F.3d 400, 407 (5th Cir.
   2010). “[T]he administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any
   reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8
   U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). See also Chen v. Gonzales, 470 F.3d 1131, 1134 (5th
   Cir. 2006) (“Under the substantial evidence standard, reversal is improper
   unless . . . . [t]he applicant . . . show[s] that the evidence is so compelling that
   no reasonable factfinder could reach a contrary conclusion.”) (internal
   citation and quotations omitted). The Court reviews questions of law de novo.
   Miresles-Zuniga v. Holder, 743 F. 3d 110, 112 (5th Cir. 2014).
          A. Eligibility for Asylum

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            Under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), an “alien who is convicted of an
   aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable.” Section
   1101(a)(43) of title 8 provides a list of offenses that qualify as aggravated
   felonies, including, as relevant here, felony theft offenses, 8 U.S.C. §
   1101(a)(43)(G); non-political felony crimes of violence as defined in 18
   U.S.C. § 16(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F); and attempts to commit the
   substantive listed offenses, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(U). Although this court
   lacks jurisdiction to review a final order of removal against an alien with an
   aggravated felony conviction, whether a conviction constitutes an aggravated
   felony is a question of law. Fosu v. Garland, 36 F.4th 634, 636-37 (5th Cir.
   2022).
            In addition to being removable for an aggravated felony conviction, an
   alien is ineligible for asylum or withholding of removal, and subject, except in
   instances inapplicable here, to mandatory denial of withholding of removal
   under the CAT if he has a prior conviction for “a particularly serious crime.”
   8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), (B)(i) (asylum); 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii)
   (withholding of removal); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(d)(2) (CAT withholding). For
   asylum and CAT withholding, a particularly serious crime is defined in part
   as an aggravated felony, regardless of the length of the sentence. §
   1158(b)(2)(B)(i), § 1208.16(d)(3). In the withholding of removal context, a
   particularly serious crime is an “aggravated felony . . . for which the alien has
   been sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment of at least 5 years.” §
   1231(b)(3)(B). Section 1101(a)(43) defines aggravated felonies for these
   statutes and regulation as well.
            To determine whether a prior conviction qualifies as one of the
   offenses defined as aggravated felonies under § 1101(a)(43), we use the
   categorical approach. Garcia v. Barr, 969 F.3d 129, 134 (5th Cir. 2020).
   “Under that approach, [this Court] look[s] not to the facts of the underlying
   case but instead to whether the statutory definition of the state crime

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   categorically fits within the generic federal definition of the removable
   offense.” Id. (quoting Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 190 (2013)) (internal
   quotation marks omitted). We have determined that Texas aggravated
   robbery under Texas Penal Code § 29.03 is divisible into separate crimes. See
   United States v. Lerma, 877 F.3d 628, 633-34 (5th Cir. 2017).
          The BIA concluded that the Petitioner’s conviction “constitutes an
   aggravated felony theft offense under section 101(a)(43)(G).” The Petitioner
   contends that “since the Texas definition of a robbery encompasses an
   attempt to commit theft, it cannot categorically be defined as a theft offense,
   as an actual taking or exercise of control over the property of another is not
   needed for purposes of a conviction.” Thus, he submits, the BIA’s decision
   was incorrect as a matter of law. As the BIA noted, however, “whether the
   respondent’s conduct occurred ‘in an attempt to commit, during the
   commission, or in immediate flight after the attempt or commission of theft,’
   he was convicted of an offense involving either attempted theft, or theft,
   either of which is an aggravated felony” under § 1101(a)(43)(G) (theft) or §
   1101(a)(43)(U) (attempts). Neither the BIA nor this court needs to determine
   whether a petitioner convicted under Texas Penal Code § 29.03 was
   convicted for attempted theft or actual theft because, as a categorical matter,
   it makes no difference.
          Alternatively, the Petitioner is ineligible for asylum because his
   conviction qualifies as a non-political felony crime of violence as defined in
   18 U.S.C. § 16(a). In Lerma, 877 F.3d at 636, we concluded that the
   Petitioner’s offense of conviction, Texas aggravated robbery under §
   29.03(a)(2), satisfies the elements or force clause of § 924(e)(2)(B)(i), which
   all but mirrors the force clause for a crime of violence under § 16(a). Section
   16(a) defines “crime of violence” as “an offense that has as an element the
   use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or
   property of another.” The language in § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) is identical except

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   that it removes “or property.” Thus, § 16(a) is broader than §
   924(e)(2)(B)(i); any offense which categorically falls under the latter also
   categorically falls under the former. Although the BIA did not address this
   argument, “affirmance may be warranted ‘where there is no realistic
   possibility that . . . the BIA would have reached a different conclusion.’”
   Enriquez-Gutierrez v. Holder, 612 F.3d 400, 407 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Cao
   He Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 428 F.3d 391, 401 (2d Cir. 2005)).
          B. Eligibility for Deferral under the CAT
          While the BIA found that Rodriguez Gonzalez remained eligible for
   deferral of removal under the CAT, see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17(a), the BIA
   concluded that he failed to make the required showing for such deferral. To
   obtain CAT relief, a petitioner “must show [inter alia] that it is more likely
   than not that []he will be tortured if []he returns to h[is] country of origin,”
   and that the government of that country will acquiesce in or be willfully blind
   to that torture. Martinez-Lopez v. Barr, 943 F.3d 766, 772 (5th Cir. 2019).
   This court reviews factual findings underlying the denial of CAT protection
   for substantial evidence. Nasrallah v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1683, 1692 (2020).
   Under that standard, the agency’s factual findings “are conclusive unless any
   reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Id.
   (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
          In challenging the BIA’s decision, the Petitioner identifies no
   evidence which casts doubt on the decisions of the IJ and the BIA, let alone
   doubt sufficient to meet his burden. See Nasrallah, 140 S. Ct. at 1692. The
   Petitioner neither conclusively demonstrates a likelihood that he will be
   tortured nor that the Mexican government will acquiesce in or willfully
   ignore his potential torture. As we have held, “potential instances of violence
   committed by non-governmental actors against citizens, together with
   speculation that the police might not prevent that violence, are generally

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   insufficient to prove government acquiescence, especially if there is evidence
   that the government prosecutes rogue or corrupt public officials.” Garcia v.
   Holder, 756 F.3d 885, 892 (5th Cir. 2014). Thus, we agree with the BIA that
   the Petitioner has not made the requisite showing for deferral of removal
   under the CAT.
                                 III. Conclusion
          For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED.

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