Court Opinion

ID: 9797707
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:27:33.524183+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:57:48.888130
License: Public Domain

BILLINGS, Judge
(dissenting):
" 20 I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
121 First, I disagree that Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4) requires a defendant to raise an objection at the sentencing hearing. "The purpose of requiring a properly presented objection is to 'put[ ] the judge on notice of the asserted error and allow[ ] the opportunity for correction at that time in the course of the proceeding." State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 359 (Utah Ct.App.1993) (alteration in original) (quoting Broberg v. Hess, 782 P.2d 198, 201 (Utah Ct.App.1989)). This policy is a general corollary of our refusal to entertain an issue for the first time on appeal. The timeliness requirement of this doctrine prevents undue delay in litigation. Accordingly, objection to hearsay evidence, for example, must be made at the time the evidence is proffered; otherwise, the objection is waived.
22 The policy behind the timeliness requirement is less significant when, as here, an objection necessitates a separate eviden-tiary *116hearing.1 Inasmuch as no objection could be raised until after imposition of restitution, I see no practical difference between an objection raised at the sentencing hearing and an objection raised eleven days later-well before the time for direct appeal has run.
1 23 I read the statute not as emphasizing judicial economy but as emphasizing due process concerns. 2 This is of particular concern in this case. Restitution was ordered on the basis of damage amounts found in Defendant's presentence investigation report.3 Restitution was thus based on undocumented double hearsay proffered by the victims, and Defendant was deprived of the opportunity to cross examine the victims as to either the identity or valuation of the items stolen or the reasonableness of the repair costs.
124 Even if section T76-8-201(4)(e) requires that an objection be raised at sentencing, I would hold that the trial court waived any objection to the timeliness of Defendant's motion. The record reveals the following sequence of events, The trial court sentenced and imposed restitution on Defendant on September 10, 1999. On September 21, 1999, eleven days later, Defendant filed in the District Court the following "Motion for Review Hearing":
COMES NOW the Defendant, LANCER MICHEL WEEKS [sic], by and through his counsel of record, MATTHEW G. NIELSEN, hereby requests pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4)(e) (1998), this Court to schedule a Restitution hearing on the grounds that defendant objects to the amount of restitution claimed by the State.
On September 30, 1999, the trial court issued a "Notice of Restitution Hearing," and that hearing was held on October 18, 1999. At the hearing, Defendant argued that amounts ordered for restitution lacked evidentiary support and requested documentation for the damages and a hearing. The State argued that the amounts were reflected in the pre-sentence investigation report and that the amounts, though estimates, were reasonable. The trial court ruled from the bench:
Given the circumstances, the time of the sentencing, the persuasive burden is upon the State to establish, I believe, by preponderance of the evidence to myself, the fact finder, that the sums sought for restitution are fair and reasonable.
Given what I have reviewed, that being the presentence report, as well as the orders in the matter, as well as now having heard arguments of counsel, I was persuaded and [am] now persuaded that preponderance of the evidence burden has been met, that the numbers I have ordered as restitution is fair and reasonable. Consequently the motion to modify the-I will characterize it as a motion to modify the order of restitution is denied.
On October 28, 1999, the court entered an "Order Re: Restitution Hearing," which states:
The Court having heard evidence and arguments of counsel, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises hereby finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the original order in the Judgment and Commitment in this case is the proper amount to be ordered as restitution and hereby affirms that order and denies defendant's motion.
(Emphasis added.)
25 I believe the foregoing establishes the trial court did not rely on waiver but instead
*117addressed the merits of Defendant's motion objecting to the amount of restitution: Defendant requested a "review hearing"; the court scheduled a "restitution hearing"; the parties argued the validity of the evidentiary basis of the restitution award; and the court ruled. Defendant argues on appeal that the court erred by reconsidering the order of restitution without giving Defendant the required evidentiary hearing providing an opportunity to present evidence and cross examine witnesses. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4)(e) (1999).4 Because the trial court did not provide Defendant an evidentiary hearing, I would vacate the restitution order and remand for an evidentiary hearing on the amount of restitution.
¶ 26 I also disagree with the majority's conclusion that we need not remand for findings related to Defendant's ability to pay the restitution assessed. See id. The majority cites this court's opinion in James v. Galetka, 965 P.2d 567, 574 (Utah Ct.App.1998), for the proposition that remand is not required. Galetka is clearly distinguishable in that it involved a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed three years after the defendant's convietion, see id. at 569, and the defendant neither challenged the restitution during sentencing nor appealed it. See id. at 574. Galetka was decided under the well-established rule that courts will not consider an issue on a petition for writ of habeas corpus that could have been addressed at trial or on direct appeal. See id. (citing Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1104 (Utah 1983)). Dicta in Galetka concerning the timing requirement of an objection to restitution is neither binding nor, in my opinion, persuasive.
¶ 27Additionally, the majority quotes selectively from State v. Stayer, 706 P.2d 611 (Utah 1985), for the proposition that we may assume the trial court considered all appropriate factors if evidence in the record supports the trial court's conclusion. However, the full quote from Stayer reads:
In the case before us, there is ample record evidence, from which the trial court could have found that restitution was proper. Notwithstanding the mandate of the statute that the trial court's reasons be included as part of its order, we believe that the failure to do so in this case was harmless error. Nonetheless, we draw attention to this requirement for future guidance of the sentencing courts.
Id. at 614 (emphasis added).
¶ 28 Subsequent cases from our supreme court make clear that record findings under section 76-8-201 are mandatory so that we may no longer assume that the trial court considered the enumerated factors. See State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1234 (Utah 1997) (holding section 76-8-201 is exception to general rule that appellate courts "uphold[ ] the trial court even if it failed to make findings on the record whenever it would be reasonable to assume that the court actually made such findings"); Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1028-29 (Utah 1996) (remanding for explanation of statutory factors in restitution order although defendant did not object to order).
¶ 29 Accordingly, although the trial court discussed some of the statutory factors on the record, the court did not explain on the record its evaluation of Defendant's ability to pay. Under Robertson and Monson, we cannot assume, as the majority does, that the trial court considered factors it did not discuss on the record.
¶ 30 Finally, I wish to clarify potentially confusing dicta in footnote three of the majority opinion. That section of the majority opinion purports to address whether the trial court committed plain error by not granting evidentiary hearing. Defendant's actual argument, and the issue the majority actually addresses, is whether the trial court committed plain error by not considering the statutorily mandated factors when evaluating restitution. Although I agree that remand for an evidentiary hearing for the latter would not be required, see Monson, 928 P.2d at 1028 (Utah 1996),5 remand for an evidentiary *118hearing is clearly the remedy if the error was in failing to hold a requested evidentiary hearing. See State v. Haga, 954 P.2d 1284, 1289 (Utah Ct.App.1998).
131 For the foregoing reasons, I dissent from the majority opinion.

. The State concedes that, had Defendant presented his objection requesting an evidentiary hearing at his original sentencing hearing, the restitution hearing could not have taken place immediately because witnesses would have to have been subpoenaed, evidence gathered, and arguments prepared.

. Indeed, if the court thinks the statute is concerned primarily with the timing of an objection, it should require that the objection be lodged a reasonable time before the sentencing hearing so that the trial court may "at the time of sentencing allow the defendant a full hearing on the [restitution] issue." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4)(e) (1999) (emphasis added). This is clearly not what the statute requires.

. - One victim was awarded restitution of $500 for unspecified personal property stolen from a victim's car. Another victim was awarded restitution of $1500 for a stolen radio, damage to the radio wiring, unspecified stolen personal property, and scratches and dents to the car, although repairs had not been effected and the amounts were estimated by the victim.

. Section 76-3-201(4)(e) provides: "If the Defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow the defendant a full hearing on the issue."

. The Monson court remanded the matter to the Board of Pardons and Parole with instructions *118"to comply with the [restitution] statute by giving [defendant] an explanation of its decision which demonstrates that it has taken into account the appropriate statutory factors." Monson, 928 P.2d at 1028. The court did not remand for an evidentiary hearing because it held that Monson had not requested a hearing from the board, but only made that request in a subsequent habeas corpus petition to the district court. See id. at 1029.