Court Opinion

ID: 9522549
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:28:42.756049+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:03:14.674894
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE LINN, dissenting: I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that the record contains sufficient proof of the requisite mental state necessary to support defendant’s conviction for voluntary manslaughter. Although charged with murder, a defendant may properly be found guilty of the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter but only if the evidence adduced at trial establishes the necessary elements of that offense. (People v. Thompson (1973), 11 Ill. App. 3d 752, 297 N.E.2d 592; People v. Clark (1973), 15 Ill. App. 3d 756, 305 N.E.2d 218.) Where the record does not contain proof of the elements of voluntary manslaughter, the conviction must either be reversed, or reduced to involuntary manslaughter if the record supports such a reduction. People v. Thompson (1973), 11 Ill. App. 3d 752, 297 N.E.2d 592; People v. Dodson (1973), 11 Ill. App. 3d 709, 297 N.E.2d 367. A conviction for voluntary manslaughter requires proof that the defendant acted under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation sufficient to incite a reasonable person (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par 9 — 2(a)), or that the defendant believed the killing was justified but that belief was unreasonable (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 9 — 2(b)). In my opinion, the facts of this case do not support a voluntary manslaughter conviction on any theory. Since there is no claim made that defendant acted in self-defense or believed that the killing was justified, the conviction cannot be based on subsection (b) of the statute. Thus, in order to sustain the conviction, there must be proof that at the time of the killing the defendant was acting under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation caused by the deceased. The only categories of serious provocation which have been recognized under the statute are “substantial physical injury or assault, mutual quarrel or combat, illegal arrest, and adultery with the offender’s spouse; but not mere words or gestures ” * People v. Crews (1967), 38 Ill. 2d 331, 335, 231 N.E.2d 451, 453, citing Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 38, par. 9—2 (Smith-Hurd). The record in this case does not contain evidence of a single specific act or occurrence of serious provocation sufficient to excite sudden and intense passion in a reasonable person. Rather, the record tells the story of a declining relationship and the attendant despondency and hurt feelings of the jilted party. (See People v. Pequino (1978), 62 Ill. App. 3d 75, 379 N.E.2d 30.) In a case factually similar to the one under consideration, a quarrel about a relationship between the parties was held insufficient to result in serious provocation within the meaning of the statute. People v. Jacobs (1976), 44 Ill. App. 3d 290, 357 N.E.2d 821. I cannot agree that the events cited by the majority in support of their holding are sufficient to incite the requisite sudden passion. Defendant and the deceased had quarreled for several weeks over the termination of their relationship and the deceased’s apparent interest in other women. Several days before the killing the defendant had pointed a gun at the deceased; however, sufficient time had passed to cool any passions aroused by that moment and to allow the voice of reason to be heard. (People v. Clark (1973), 15 Ill. App. 3d 756, 305 N.E.2d 318.) The argument which ensued on the night of the shooting was repetitious of many similar arguments between the defendant and the deceased. In fact, the events of that evening, including the brandishing of the weapon, were nothing at all new to the parties involved. The reoccurence of this scene neutralized its potentially provocative effect. Where, then, is the element of provocation sufficient to incite sudden and intense passion in a reasonable man? The only arguable reason for a finding of serious provocation is based on the nature of the relationship between the victim and the defendant. On this point the State relies on the case of People v. Newberry (1970), 127 Ill. App. 2d 322, 262 N.E.2d 282, where the court held that the circumstances of the relationship between the defendant and the deceased justified the giving of a voluntary manslaughter instruction. The distinction between Newberry and the instant case is clear. The defendant in Newberry had been seeing the deceased for several years and had left his wife because of this relationship. The defendant had given the deceased money throughout their relationship. Several weeks before the shooting the deceased severed the relationship and refused to see the defendant. On the evening of the shooting the defendant attempted to reconcile with the deceased, threatening to kill himself when she refused him. In a rude and obscene manner the deceased replied that she did not care what the defendant did. The defendant immediately thereafter drew his gun and shot the deceased. The defendant’s depressed emotional condition in Newberry was considered a relevant factor in determining whether the rude and obscene language and offensive manner displayed by the deceased at the time of the incident was sufficiently serious to provoke the defendant. Here, even if defendant’s despondency is taken into account, there is no evidence of that essential additional act of provocation on the night of the incident to incite the passions of defendant. (See People v. Pequino (1978), 62 Ill. App. 3d 75, 379 N.E.2d 30; People v. Pecora (1969), 107 Ill. App. 2d 283, 246 N.E.2d 865, cert. denied (1970), 397 U.S. 1028, 25 L. Ed. 2d 538, 90 S. Ct. 1274.) I must conclude that mere evidence of defendant’s continuing disagreement with the deceased is insufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement that defendant had acted under sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation. While I cannot agree that the evidence is sufficient to sustain defendant’s conviction for voluntary manslaughter there is sufficient evidence of reckless conduct to bring defendant’s actions within the statutory definition of involuntary manslaughter. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 9—3.) Although defendant stated that she did not intend to kill the deceased, the evidence indicates his death directly resulted from defendant’s reckless use of a loaded gun. As stated in People v. Bauman (1975), 34 Ill. App. 3d 582, 589, 340 N.E.2d 178, 183: “The pointing of a loaded revolver at another is such a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise that it constitutes recklessness.” In my opinion the evidence as a whole proves the defendant guilty of involuntary manslaughter beyond a reasonable doubt. For these reasons, I would, under the power granted by Supreme Court Rule 615(b)(3) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 110A, par. 615(b)(3); see People v. Goolsby (1977), 45 Ill. App. 3d 441, 359 N.E.2d 871), reduce the degree of the offense for which defendant was convicted from voluntary to involuntary manslaughter and return the case to the trial court for resentencing.