Court Opinion

ID: 9925761
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-22 21:14:12.809306+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:31.226653
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

 AMY BIGGS,                                     No. 85010-5-I

                     Appellant,                 DIVISION ONE

              v.                                UNPUBLISHED OPINION

 PUGET SOUND ENERGY, INC., a
 Washington public utility corporation,

                     Respondent.

      FELDMAN, J. — Amy Biggs (Biggs) appeals from a trial court’s summary

judgment order dismissing her premises liability claim against Puget Sound

Energy (PSE). Finding no error, we affirm.

                                          I

      Biggs and her husband were staying at the Salish Lodge (Lodge) on

November 24, 2018. Around 8 p.m., after having dinner at the Lodge, Biggs and

her husband walked to the Snoqualmie Falls Park (Park), which is next to the

Lodge, to view Snoqualmie Falls. When they entered the Park, they passed a

sign, which PSE had posted, stating “PARK CLOSED DUSK TIL DAWN.” They

then continued down a stairway, along the pathway, and past another sign, also

posted by PSE, which likewise stated “PARK CLOSED DUSK TIL DAWN.” After
No. 85010-5-I

passing the second sign, Biggs proceeded down a second stairway where she

fell. Biggs suffered a serious injury (a tibial plateau fracture), requiring surgery.

       Biggs sued PSE as the owner of the premises and claimed PSE

“negligently failed to maintain the pedestrian area in a reasonably safe condition.”

PSE filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that it “did not owe [Biggs] a

duty of ordinary care at the time of her fall because she was a trespasser as a

matter of law.” Biggs opposed the motion and asserted that she was not a

trespasser when she fell because PSE “impliedly gives permission” for the

“public to enter the Park to view the Falls at night.” To support that argument,

Biggs asserted, among other things, that the pathway was open to the public,

PSE maintains lights along the path and illuminates Snoqualmie Falls after dark,

and PSE had not installed any chains, gates, or other devices prohibiting access

to the Park even though it knows that visitors enter the Park after dusk.

       The trial court granted PSE’s motion. The court ruled that Biggs was

“trespassing when she entered the park because there were signs informing her

the park was closed. She walked by those signs. Because she was trespassing,

PSE owed her no duty, except to refrain from [causing] willful and wanton injury

to her. Plaintiff does not allege those occurred.” Biggs appeals.

                                           II

       We review summary judgment rulings de novo. Werlinger v. Clarendon

Nat’l Ins. Co., 129 Wn. App. 804, 808, 120 P.3d 593 (2005). Summary judgment

is properly granted when the pleadings and affidavits show there is no genuine

issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

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No. 85010-5-I

law. CR 56(c). We review all evidence and reasonable inferences in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party. Ghodsee v. City of Kent, 21 Wn. App. 2d

762, 768, 508 P.3d 193 (2022). Where reasonable minds could reach but one

conclusion from the admissible facts in evidence, summary judgment should be

granted. Welch v. Brand Insulations, Inc., 27 Wn. App. 2d 110, 114, 531 P.3d

265 (2023).

       Under Washington law, landowners owe no duty to trespassers “except to

refrain from causing willful or wanton injury.” Sikking v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger

Corp., 52 Wn. App. 246, 247, 758 P.2d 1003 (1988). Because there is no

evidence or argument that PSE caused willful or wanton injury to Biggs, the

dispositive issue here is whether Biggs was a trespasser at the time of her injury.

The record shows without dispute that at the time of her injury Biggs was walking

on a trail that was open to the public and fell down a stairway that was also open

to the public. In that narrow sense (ignoring any posted notice to the contrary),

Biggs was on PSE’s property with its consent. See Singleton v. Jackson, 85 Wn.

App. 835, 839-40, 935 P.2d 644 (1997) (possessor of property may consent to

entry through conduct, by omission, or by means of local custom, as well as

through oral or written consent).

       But such consent can be withdrawn in a variety of ways, including by

posting a sign. We have adopted Comment “e” of the Restatement (Second) of

Torts § 330 (Am. Law Inst. 1965), which squarely addresses that issue. See

Singleton, 85 Wn. App. at 839. It states:

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No. 85010-5-I

       The consent which is necessary to confer a license to enter land,
       may be expressed by acts other than words. Here again the
       decisive factor is the interpretation which a reasonable [person]
       would put upon the possessor’s acts. Thus one who constructs and
       opens a roadway across his land for the benefit of his friends and
       neighbors may thereby express his willingness to permit the entry
       of strangers who wish to cross the land, unless he posts a notice to
       the contrary; and this is true although the possessor in fact intends
       to permit the entry only of particular individuals.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 330 cmt. e (emphasis added). The

Restatement thus confirms that while consent may be communicated in

numerous ways—including by conduct or omission—it may also be withdrawn by

posting notice to the contrary.

       Division Two’s opinion in Singleton is in accord with these legal principles.

The court there addressed whether Singleton, a Jehovah’s Witness, was a

trespasser when she slipped and fell on the front porch of a house owned by

Jackson and part of which the Colsons (Jackson’s son and daughter-in-law) used

as a business office. 85 Wn. App. at 837. In addition to adopting the legal

principles set forth in the Restatement, as recited above, the court reiterated, “A

‘trespasser,’ for purposes of premises liability, is one ‘who enters the premises of

another without invitation or permission, express or implied, but goes, rather, for

his own purposes or convenience, and not in the performance of a duty to the

owner or one in possession of the premises.’” Id. at 839 (quoting Winter v.

Mackner, 68 Wn.2d 943, 945, 416 P.2d 453 (1966)). The court ultimately

concluded that Singleton was not a trespasser at the time of her injury, in part,

because “[t]here was no evidence that Jackson or the Colsons notified her by

posting signs . . . that she was not welcome.” Id. at 842.

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No. 85010-5-I

       Here, the record shows, without dispute, that PSE provided the requisite

notice by posting signs that Biggs was not welcome in the Park at the time of her

injury because the Park was “CLOSED DUSK TIL DAWN.” While PSE posted

such signs throughout the Park (and similar information can be found in publicly

accessible websites and PSE’s filings with the Federal Energy Regulatory

Commission), Singleton focuses the inquiry on notice to the alleged trespasser.

See 85 Wn. App. at 842 (examining whether Jackson or Colsons “notified

[Singleton] by posting signs”). Biggs walked past two such signs before her fall.

The signs are clear, unobstructed, and next to the path, and a reasonable person

would interpret these signs as notice of PSE’s intent to prohibit visitors from

entering or remaining in the Park from dusk to dawn. And it is also undisputed

that Biggs entered the Park after dusk (at approximately 8 p.m. in the month of

November). As such, reasonable minds can reach but one conclusion from the

admissible facts in evidence, which is that Biggs did not have PSE’s consent to

be in the Park—and was therefore a trespasser—at the time of her injury.

       Notwithstanding the foregoing analysis, Biggs argues that the “signs are

small, cluttered among other signs, and are not conspicuous,” she “did not see”

the signs as she and her husband walked along the path, and “whether the signs

provide an adequate warning is a question of fact precluding summary

judgment.” These arguments fail because the applicable test is an objective one:

“the decisive factor is the interpretation which a reasonable [person] would put

upon the possessor’s acts.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 330 cmt. e

(emphasis added). Washington courts have similarly held that when applying the

                                         5
No. 85010-5-I

reasonable person standard to a plaintiff’s conduct, “‘the inquiry is whether or not

[the plaintiff] exercised that reasonable care for [their] own safety which a

reasonable [person] would have used under the existing facts and

circumstances.’” Dunnington v. Virginia Mason Med. Ctr., 187 Wn.2d 629, 637-

38, 389 P.3d 498 (2017) (emphasis added) (quoting Rosendahl v. Lesourd

Methodist Church, 68 Wn.2d 180, 182, 412 P.2d 109 (1966)). Applying an

objective standard of reasonableness based on consideration of all the existing

facts and circumstances—including the content, visibility, and placement of the

signs that Biggs admittedly walked past before her fall—no reasonable juror

could conclude that Biggs had PSE’s permission to enter or remain on its

property at the time of her injury. 1

        Lastly, Biggs argues that the following evidence shows that PSE either

“impliedly consent[ed]” or “negligently induced” her to believe she had permission

to enter the park: (1) there is a contiguous paved pathway from the Lodge to the

Park that does not give any indication of separate ownership of the two

properties; (2) there are no barriers on the pathway between the Lodge property

and the PSE property along the walkway; (3) PSE illuminates the paved pathway

to the observation deck where guests can view Snoqualmie Falls; and (4) PSE is

aware that the guests who stay at the Lodge visit the Park at night to view the

        1 Additionally, even if Biggs’s subjective perspective were relevant here, the record does

not support her assertion that she “did not see” the signs as she and her husband walked along
the path. Biggs did not testify that she never saw a “PARK CLOSED DUSK TIL DAWN” sign
posted by PSE, but rather that “I don’t recall seeing it.” Biggs also testified that she visited the
Park “over 20 times” before her fall, and she admitted that she saw a sign indicating “no drone or
UAV flying allowed,” which is similar in size and placed in close proximity to the “PARK CLOSED
DUSK TIL DAWN” sign that she walked past prior to her fall.

                                                 6
No. 85010-5-I

falls, which PSE illuminates. Even when this evidence is viewed in the light most

favorable to Biggs, it does not show that a reasonable person could properly

conclude that they had PSE’s permission to enter or remain on its property after

dusk and before dawn despite walking past two of PSE’s prominently posted

signs stating “PARK CLOSED DUSK TIL DAWN.”2

                                                 III

        The trial court correctly ruled that Biggs was a trespasser at the time of

her injury and, as a result, correctly granted summary judgment in PSE’s favor.

We affirm. 3

WE CONCUR:

         2 Biggs also argues that even if she were a trespasser, under the “constant trespasser

doctrine” landowners owe a duty to warn trespassers of known, artificial, latent, and dangerous
conditions. Washington has not adopted the “constant trespasser” exception to the general rule
of trespass. Sikking, 52 Wn. App. at 248-49. Nevertheless, Biggs argues that our Supreme
Court’s decision in Clark v. Longview Public Service Co., 143 Wn. 319, 255 P. 380 (1927),
permits us to adopt this exception. Biggs overlooks or ignores the portion of the opinion that
narrows its analysis to possessors of land containing “high-voltage electricity” where the
possessor may have reason to believe trespassers “may come into its proximity.” Id. at 323.
Because no such facts are presented here, we reject this argument.
         3 The trial court also ruled, in the alternative, that the recreational use immunity statute

(RCW 4.24.210) applies to PSE and immunizes it from this lawsuit. Because we agree with the
trial court that Biggs was a trespasser when she suffered her injury, we do not reach the immunity
issue.

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