Court Opinion

ID: 9641335
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:29:27.452966+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:36.077094
License: Public Domain

POMEROY, Justice,
dissenting.
I agree with the opinion of Mr. Justice MANDERINO announcing the decision of the court insofar as it concludes that the physician-patient privilege, as embodied in the Act of June 7, 1907, P.L. No. 462, as amended, 28 P.S. § 328, is not applicable to the case at bar and is no defense to the valid court order that the physician-appellant produce a patient’s records.
My quarrel is with the gratuitous creation of a constitutional question where none is presented. No such issue was raised in the lower court nor was it presented to this Court either in the briefs or at the time of oral argument. The sole question brought to this Court by the appellant is the applicability of the statutory physician-patient privilege (28 P.S. § 328, supra) as a defense to the lower court’s order that the appellant produce certain records.
We have long condemned the practice of appellate courts anticipating arguments not presented by parties to a contro*495versy. See, e. g., Girard School District v. Pittinger, 481 Pa. 91,-n. 10, 392 A.2d 261, 265 n. 10 (1978); Reed v. Sloan, 475 Pa. 570, 575 n. 4, 381 A.2d 421 (1977); Wiegand v. Wiegand, 461 Pa. 482, 337 A.2d 256 (1975). Especially is this policy of judicial restraint wise and salutary where constitutional questions are involved. The lead opinion pays lip service to this principle when it observes that we will “avoid the constitutional question if possible.” Ante at 422. But the opinion then ignores the precept by undertaking a detailed analysis of the nature and extent of the constitutional right of privacy which says, the opinion, has not heretofore been considered by a Pennsylvania appellate court. But see Adler v. Montefiore Hospital Ass’n of Western Pennsylvania, 453 Pa. 60, 311 A.2d 634 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1131, 94 S.Ct. 870, 38 L.Ed.2d 755 (1974).
The opinion of Mr. Justice MANDERINO states that the constitutional argument is made by appellant. I respectfully disagree. The only place appellant mentions the point is on page 21 of a twenty-seven page brief. There, in the course of discussing the issue, “Considerations of Public Policy Do Not Justify the Abrogation of the Doctor-Patient Privilege in This Case”, appellant has included a footnote which reads:
“9The Lifschutz [In Re Lifschutz, 2 Cal.3d 415, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829, 467 P.2d 557 (1970)] court went on to state:
‘We believe that a patient’s interest in keeping such confidential revelations [as are disclosed in psychotherapy] from public purview, in retaining this substantial privacy, has deeper roots than the California [privilege] statute and draws sustenance from our constitutional heritage. In Griswold v. Connecticut, supra, 381 U.S. 479, 484 [85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510], the United States Supreme Court declared that “[v]arious guarantees [of the Bill of Rights] create zones of privacy,” and we believe that the confidentiality of the psyehotheraputic session falls within one such zone.’ [85 Cal.Rptr. at 839], 457 [sic] P.2d at 567.
*496“Thus, it would appear that even if the Pennsylvania statute did not protect Mrs. B’s records in this case, those records would be protected from disclosure by the constitutional right to privacy. See generally Note, ‘Psychotherapy and Griswold: Is Confidence a Privilege or Right?’, 3 Conn.L.Rev. 599 (1971); Note, ‘Medical Jurisprudence — Privileged Communications Between Physician and Patient — State Regulation and Right to Privacy,’ 39 Tenn.L.Rev. 515 (1972).”
Such a by-the-way reference to an issue can hardly be considered a tendering of that issue to this Court. See Pa.R.A.P., Rule 2115.* If, however, the Court were of the view that the issue should be reached and decided, it should at the least order reargument so that this difficult and important matter may be adequately presented to us by all parties.
For myself, I decline to address the issue on the basis of footnote 9 of appellant’s brief, supra.
NIX, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.

 In any event, no constitutional question having been presented to the trial court, it should be held waived in this Court. See, e. g., Commonwealth v. Clair, 458 Pa. 418, 326 A.2d 272 (1974).