Court Opinion

ID: 9465144
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 00:37:17.617783+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:00.007004
License: Public Domain

KEITH, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Appellant claims that DEA Agent Ginetz intentionally misrepresented certain facts in his affidavit to support the issuance of the search warrant to search appellant’s residence. Appellant argued at the suppression hearing that statements contained in the affidavit concerning the reliability of the unidentified informant were false. Agent Ginetz obtained the search warrant based upon the following affidavit:
This affiant received information from an informant, who has provided me with information which has been reliable and on which arrest have (sic) been based and a considerable quanity (sic) of narcotics have (sic) been conficated (sic) on July 6th and 7th of 1975. The informant further states on this date, July 7th 1975, that on June 30th 1975, he was at the residence at 2575 Indian Creek Rd and personally observed a large quanity (sic) of marijuana, cocaine, amphetamines and barbituates which belong to John Joseph Barone, Jr., who is a resident at this address. The informant further states that on June 30th 1975 that John Joseph Barone, Jr., did give him $10,000.00 to go to Columbia (sic), South America to use to purchase cocaine, which he did. John Joseph Barone, Jr., was arrested by Federal Agents on July 7th 1975 when taking possession of the above purchase of cocaine. The informant further states that there is (sic) still large quanites (sic) of drugs at the residence at 2575 Indian Creek Rd, which he observed on June 30th 1975. (Emphasis Added)
The government admitted that Depp was the informant referred to in the affidavit.
In United States v. Luna, 525 F.2d 4 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied 424 U.S. 965, 96 S.Ct. 1459, 47 L.Ed.2d 732 (1976), this Court set down a test which sought to deter police misconduct and safeguard the integrity of the judicial process. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961); United States v. Luna, supra at 8-9. We pointed out that law enforcement agents, if unchecked, could make a mockery out of a judicial officer’s duty to reach a decision on the issuance of a search warrant in a neutral and detached manner. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948). This would be so if law enforcement agents were permitted to “employ false allegations in order to secure” search warrants and “if the agents could, with impunity, draft affidavits with utter recklessness as to truth or falsity.” United States v. Luna, supra at 8.
Agent Ginetz admitted at trial that he met Depp, his informant, for the first time shortly after appellant Barone had been arrested and that Depp had never furnished the government with information in the past. Nevertheless, Agent Ginetz stated in his affidavit that Depp had provided him with reliable information upon which arrests had been made and narcotics confiscated on July 6 and 7, 1975. The only arrests made on July 6 were those of Depp and Sly, and Depp’s information could not have contributed to his own arrest or that of his companion, Sly. The only arrest made on July 7 was that of appellant Bar-one, which took place prior to the time that Agent Ginetz met Depp. Moreover, the seizure of drugs at the Miami Airport was *127made prior to Depp’s arrest. The arrests and confiscation of drugs therefore were made in spite of, not because of, Depp.
In my view, the inaccuracies and ambiguities contained in Agent Ginetz’s affidavit were more than merely the product of inartful drafting, and I fail to see how the majority can characterize them as minor. The statements appear to have been falsely made and a deliberate obfuscation of the truth in order to show the credibility and the reliability of the informant and thus meet the second prong of the test of an affidavit’s sufficiency as announced by the Supreme Court in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964). See also, Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969).
The Luna test articulated two circumstances which justify impeachment of an affidavit. The first circumstance goes to knowing use of false statements; the second goes to reckless use of false statements. Under the first application of Luna, this Circuit said:
There are two circumstances which we believe authorize the impeachment of an affidavit which on its face is sufficient probable cause for issuance of the warrant. The first of these consists of knowing use of a false statement by the affi-ant with intent to deceive the court. This is true even if the statement can be said to be immaterial to the issue of probable cause. In our judgment such perjury must lead to suppression of the evidence in order to prevent fraud upon the judicial process. (Emphasis added)
525 F.2d at 8. Here Agent Ginetz, the affiant, stated that Depp had provided “me with information” (emphasis added) which had been reliable and upon which arrests had been made and narcotics confiscated. This statement was within the personal knowledge of the affiant and goes to the integrity of the affidavit. Franks v. Delaware, -U.S. -, -, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978); Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528, 84 S.Ct. 825, 11 L.Ed.2d 887 (1964). The Franks decision set a minimum constitutional standard under which the Fourth Amendment mandates suppression of seized evidence in state and federal prosecutions. In my view Franks does not invalidate the concern expressed in this Circuit’s decision in Luna that where a falsely drawn affidavit perpetrates fraud upon and makes a mockery of the judicial process, the affidavit may be impeached.1 In Luna this Circuit enunciated a stricter standard to address this evil. In the exercise of this Court’s supervisory powers, the Luna test should be applied in federal prosecutions. The motion to suppress here should have been granted and the conviction should be reversed.

. United States v. Roberts, 548 F.2d 665 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 920, 97 S.Ct. 2188, 53 L.Ed.2d 232 (1977), and United States v. Rosenbarger, 536 F.2d 715 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 935, 97 S.Ct. 2920, 53 L.Ed.2d 1060 (1977), do not suggest a different result.