Court Opinion

ID: 9773707
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:55:43.434005+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:56.573457
License: Public Domain

COVINGTON, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent on the issue of the admissibility of the crimes that Skillicom committed after Drummond’s murder, section III.D of the Court’s opinion. The law on admissibility of uncharged misconduct is well settled. The first exhaustive discussion in recent times is contained in State v. Reese, 364 Mo. 1221, 274 S.W.2d 304 (1954). In Reese, the defendant and his companion committed within a two hour time frame a murder during the course of a holdup of a hotel, then an attempted holdup of a liquor store. The state sought to sustain the propriety of showing defendant’s commission of the separate, independent, and subsequent crime solely on the theory that such evidence was admissible to prove the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of the murder for which he was then on trial. The state argued that inasmuch as bullets found at the hotel were identified as having come from the gun that was in the defendant’s possession at the later liquor store holdup, and that a bullet from this type of gun killed the victim at the hotel, defendant’s possession of the gun at the subsequent holdup linked him with the murder of the victim at the hotel. Id., 274 S.W.2d at 306-07.
This Court recited the well established general rule that proof of the commission of separate and distinct crimes is not admissible unless the proof has some legitimate tendency directly to establish the defendant’s guilt of the charge for which he is on trial. Id., 274 S.W.2d at 307. Evidence of other crimes, when not properly related to the cause on trial, violates the defendant’s right to be tried for the offense for which he has been indicted. Id. The concern is that a jury will convict the defendant for being a bad person instead of finding him guilty because he committed the specific crime for which he is being tried. State v. Sladek, 835 S.W.2d 308, 314 (Mo. banc 1992) (Thomas, J., concurring).
The Reese Court then laid out the well-settled exceptions to the general rule of exclusion. As has been most recently restated in State v. Bernard, generally speaking, evidence of other crimes is competent to prove the specific crime charged when it tends to establish (1) motive; (2) intent; (3) the absence of mistake or accident; (4) a common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish the other; (5) the identity of the person charged with the commission of the crime on trial; or (6) a signature modus operandi. 849 S.W.2d at 13, 17 (Mo. banc 1993).
Reese, Bernard, and Sladek fully explain the test of whether evidence of other distinct crimes falls within any of these exceptions. Whether the requisite degree of legal relevancy exists is a judicial question to be resolved in the light of the consideration that the inevitable tendency of such evidence is to *901raise a “legally spurious presumption of guilt” in the minds of the jurors. Reese, 274 S.W.2d at 307. As a consequence, if the Court does not clearly perceive the connection between the extraneous criminal transaction and the crime charged, that is, its logical relevancy, the accused should be given the benefit of the doubt and the evidence should be rejected. Id.
The Court in the present case disregards the teachings of Reese, Bernard, and Sladek. Evidence of the assault on MeEntee does not tend to establish motive, intent, the absence of mistake or accident, or a common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish the other. Nor does the evidence go to prove the identity of the person charged with the commission of the crime on trial. The majority attempts to argue, in a highly speculative fashion, that the details of the assault on Keri MeEntee are probative on the issue of deliberation of the murder of Drummond. It is difficult to imagine, and the majority does not adequately explain, how deliberation can be demonstrated by the separate assault on MeEntee, a separate and distinct crime occurring several hours after the murder. To say that obtaining firearms from the trunk of Drum-mond’s car and holding them to McEntee’s head are relevant to the element of deliberation of the murder of Drummond strains credulity. If the offense against MeEntee fits within the “sequence of events surrounding the offense charged,” then, what evidence does not? The evidence is not logically relevant. In my view, therefore, the evidence is without probative value.
Even if one assumes, arguendo, that the evidence in dispute has probative value, it is tenuous at best and is far outweighed by the prejudicial effect of the evidence. As the majority opinion reflects, deliberation is the central issue in the case. The state’s theory of SkMeom’s liability for first degree murder rests upon SkUlicom’s guilt as an accomplice to Allen Nicklasson. Skillicorn challenged his liability for first degree murder on the basis of an inadequate showing of deliberation throughout the proceedings. SkQli-com contended that he believed Nicklasson was going to take Mr. Drummond into the woods and somehow restrain him there and that Nicklasson’s murder of Drummond was a complete surprise to him. Admission of the challenged evidence, that Skillicorn and Nicklasson threatened McEntee’s life “only a few hours” after the murder took place, very likely may have caused the jury to find that, if Skillicorn committed the offense against MeEntee, he committed the offense against Mr. Drummond.
In sum, the evidence is neither logically or legally relevant, and its admission constitutes reversible error.