Court Opinion

ID: 9759201
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:08:34.562289+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:00.223873
License: Public Domain

FLAHERTY, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent. Trial counsel is alleged to have been ineffective for failing to present certain testimony favorable to the defense. Specifically, the available, albeit omitted, testimony consisted of, inter alia, the opinion of a forensic pathologist, Dr. Sopher, indicating that no scientific evidence, collected from the victim’s body or from the crime scene, identified appellant as having committed the rape and murder in question. The opinion authored by Mr. Justice McDermott omits mention of this, the primary reason to have called Dr. Sopher to testify, and creates the impression that Dr. Sopher would have testified only as to the time of the victim’s death. In the PCHA hearing, appellant’s trial counsel testified as follows regarding his reasons for not presenting certain witnesses on behalf of the defense.
Q. [W]as one of the other factors you considered the nature of Dr. Sopher’s testimony?
A. No.
Q. Was it not a fact that Dr. Sopher could not establish a specific time of death but only give you a range as Dr. Catherman had already indicated?
A. I think on the issue on the time of death Dr. Sopher’s testimony would have been helpful to the defendant. I think it would have contradicted the testimony of the *427Commonwealth. I did not believe ... that Dr. Sopher’s testimony would be strong enough to overcome the effect on the jury of the court’s ruling not only on the prior crimes but other rulings throughout the case.... I felt that the defendant was protected enough on the record that it would be useless to present a ease on his behalf because I don’t think it would have done any good.... I thought the record was replete with errors by the court that were prejudicial to the defendant that would deny him the right to a fair trial and it was senseless and useless to go on. That is exactly the basis of why we didn’t call Dr. Sopher or any of the other witnesses.
Q. [A]s of the time the Commonwealth completed its case was it your judgment that there was so much error on the record that a conviction could not stand up on appeal?
A. It was my judgment, yes.
Q. You’re saying then you quit?
A. It’s not a question of quitting. It’s making a conscious decision not—
Q. Not to fight?
A. Not to put on an affirmative defense because the law does not require it. The Court has made so many errors, let the record stand the way it is. Maybe somebody will read the record. Maybe somebody will see the errors that were committed.
Q. Did you see any advantage to Mr. McKenna in not presenting a full defense?
A. I thought that the less the record was cluttered up by the defense by Mr. McKenna the more chance the Supreme Court would have to read the actual errors committed and discuss them and come to a ruling on them.
Q. In other words you felt that a more extensive or complicated defense might cloud the issues that were already established. Is that what you’re saying?
*428A. That’s correct.
Q. Would it be accurate to say you felt that his best chance of an ultimate acquittal was a reversal in that case and a new trial under other circumstances?
A. My aim was not so much acquittal, my aim was to protect Mr. McKenna’s rights and see that he got a fair trial and when I reached the point where I felt he was not being given a fair trial and there was nothing more I could do to see that he got a fair trial, I felt the Court and everybody else was entitled to us taking the position we’re going to stop right here.
******
Q. And you felt that way because you felt in that way you could best preserve the uncluttered record for appeal. Is that right? If in fact he was convicted.
A. Well, I felt there was no question we’d get a new trial. I don’t know about cluttering up the record. I just didn’t want to waste any more time. I felt that the trial was a complete waste of time and I so conveyed my feelings to Mr. McKenna, and he had conveyed them to me on numerous occasions throughout all the proceedings.
******
Q. Did you just say to him, Mr. McKenna, there’s nothing we can do. Let’s stop putting on a defense?
A. I said, Mr. McKenna, as far as I’m concerned right now they’re going to find you guilty.... I don’t want to be sacrilegious but I don’t think if the Good Lord himself took the stand right now that jury would find you not guilty. They’ve got this thing so screwed up, there’s been so many errors and so many mistakes made in this case that there’s nothing the jury can do.
(Emphasis added.)
In short, trial counsel decided that the trial was so unfair that any conviction resulting therefrom would be reversed on appeal and that it was, therefore, futile to proceed with a defense directed at achieving an acquittal, which, in view of *429the errors alleged, counsel perceived to be unattainable. In so doing, however, counsel presumed to know what the effect upon the jury would be of the evidence which he refrained from presenting, thereby denying appellant the benefit of having testimony considered by the jury. This evidence, although perhaps not determinative of guilt, would nevertheless have contributed to the defense’s position. Trial counsel articulated no legitimate tactical reason for the failure to present the testimony in question, and counsel provided ineffective representation by, in effect, taking it upon himself to terminate the trial while elevating his judgment to that of an appellate court in evaluating the ramifications of the errors alleged.1

. The situation presented in this case is not one where counsel, after consideration of recognized tactical alternatives, determined that certain witnesses should not be called to testify. Counsel’s realm of discretion over the choice of tactics employed is broad, and that discretion necessarily includes the exercise of judgment about whether the presentation of particular witnesses’ testimony would, considering all relevant factors, be beneficial to the client’s case. See Commonwealth v. Spells, 490 Pa. 282, 288, 416 A.2d 470, 473-474 (1980).