Court Opinion

ID: 9443700
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 19:28:08.463814+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:34.746391
License: Public Domain

RIVES, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Count I of the indictment against Henry Debrow set out in the footnote1 is typical *703of the indictments in these five cases. All five are dismissed on the single and common ground that the name and the authority of the person who administered the oath are essential elements of perjury and should be stated in the indictments.
With deference, I submit that the holding is extremely technical and is contrary to the letter and spirit of the pertinent Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.2
Section 5396, Revised Statutes, Old 18 U.S.C.A. 558, under which Hilliard v. United States, 5 Cir., 24 F.2d 99, was decided, has been repealed. 62 Stat. 862 ; 80th Congress 2nd. Session c. 645, June 25, 1948. It had been replaced by the new rules and particularly by Rule 7(c).
If the indictment (see footnote 1, supra) is compared with the statute (substantially copied in main opinion), it will be seen that the indictment contains not merely the language of the statute but considerably more, and that was proper.3
It may be true that the language, “having duly taken an oath before a competent tribunal * * * ” states a conclusion, while Rule 7(c) requires a “statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged * * * ”, but it seems to me that the real inquiry lies in the meaning of word “essential” in that rule.
The roots of the principle that “essential facts” must be stated in the indictment are imbedded in the Constitution, Amendments V and VI. A bill of particulars cannot be used to cure an indictment fatally defective, Jarl v. United States, 8 Cir., 19 F.2d 891, 894, cf. Williams v. United States, 5 Cir., 164 F.2d 302, but it may be employed to discover all pertinent details, everything but the “essential facts”. Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29, 34, 16 S.Ct. 434, 40 L. Ed. 606.
What facts then are “essential”? Is the present rule, as the majority holds, that “the indictment must descend to particulars *704and charge every constituent ingredient of which the crime is composed”? If so, we are still enmeshed in the technicalities of common law pleading, .and. the.new rules have failed of their purpose, see Holtzoff, Reform of Federal. Criminal Procedure, 3 F.R.D. 445, 448-449. It seems to me that the “essential facts”, required to be stated in the indictment do not include all of the details necessáry to be proVéd by' the Gov-ernmént, but only such fact's as will meet the requirement of the Sixth Amendment that' “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall' enjoy'the right * '* * to be informed of the nature and 'cause of the accusation; ' *' *.”
“A defendant is informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against , him if the indictment contains such description of the offense charged as will enable him to make his defense, and to plead the judgment in bar 'of any further prosecution for the same crime.” Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29, 34, 16 S.Ct. 434, 435, 40 L.Ed. 606.
See also Bartell v. United States, 227 U.S. 427, 431, 33 S.Ct. 383, 57 L.Ed. 583.
In United States v. Starks, D.C.S.D.N.Y., 6 F.R.D. 43, Judge Holtzoff stated the present test as to the sufficiency of an indictment as follows:
“There are two tests that an indictment must meet: First, it must apprise the defendant of the specific offense with which he is charged.. * * * The second test is that the indictment must be sufficiently definite in order that if the defendant is later charged with the same offense he will be in a position to interpose a plea of double jeopardy.”
It seems to me that-a long-line of decisions of this Court4 culminating in United States v. Williams, 5 Cir., 202 F.2d 712, have established the principle that under the new rules an indictment which meets the requirements of the Sixth Amendment is sufficient.
When that test is applied to these indictments, it seems too clear for argument that each defendant :was informed of the cause and nature, of ..thq offense, with which he was charged so that he could properly prepare his .defense, and if trial ensued and an attempt were thereafter made to try him again on the same charge, he could, successfully interpose a,plea of former jeopardy. The indictment charges, in accordance with one of the alternative provisions of the statute, 18 U.S.C.A., § 1621, that the oath was taken “before a competent tribunal”. Further, it charges that the oath was “duly” taken (a fact not noted by my brothers). The Supreme Court has said that, “The" word ‘duly’ means, in a proper way, or regularly, dr according to law.” Robertson v. Perkins, 129 U.S. 233, 236, 9 S.Ct. 279, 280, 32 L.Ed. 686; followed in Zechiel v. Firemen’s Fund Insurance Co., 7 Cir., 61 F.2d 27. “Duly sworn” means a swearing according to law. 13 Words & Phrases, p. 627. The name and authority5 of the officer who administered the oath are details which are matters of proof on the trial. So far as authority is concerned, any United States Senator, - a member of the subcommittee, had authority to administer oaths to witnesses, 2 U.S.C.A. § 191; Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 291, 49 S.Ct. 268, 73 L.Ed. 692. Under the holding in United States v. Bickford, 9 Cir., 168 F.2d 26, the sufficiency of an averment that, “the oath was administered by some Senator, a member of the subcommittee”, without naming'him, could riot be debated. The word “duly” carried, that same meaning. In all probability, the defendants knew *705which Senator acted. If not, they could ascertain prior to trial by filing a motion for a bill of particulars. I cannot agree with the claim that the omission of this detail made their defenses more difficult, or prejudiced the defendants in any way. I, therefore, respectfully dissent.

. “THE GRAND JURY CHARGES:
“1. That on or about tbe 9th day of April, 1951, at Jackson, and within the Southern District of Mississippi,
HENRY DEBROW,
the defendant herein, having duly taken an oath before a competent tribunal, to wit: a subcommittee of tbe 'Senate Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments known as the Subcommittee on Investigations, a duly created and authorized subcommittee of the United States Senate conducting official hearings in the Southern District of Mississippi, and inquiring in a matter then and there pending before the said subcommittee in which a law of the United States authorizes that an oath be administered, that he would testify truly, did unlawfully, knowingly and wilfully, and contrary to said oath, state a material matter which he did not believe to be true, that is to say:
“2. That at the time and place aforesaid, the said Senate Subcommittee inquiring as aforesaid was conducting a study and investigation of whether applicants for appointments to offices and places under the government of the United States had been and were being solicited and required by numerous per*703sons within the State of Mississippi to make political contributions and donations as a condition precedent to receiving such appointments, and as a consideration in return for promises to use their support and influence in obtaining said offices and places for applicants seeking appointment thereto; and to determine whether the laws of the United States had been violated in connection with and as a result of such activities, the identity of any such person engaged therein, and the extent to which such improper and corrupt activities affected the operation of departments and agencies of the United States.
“3. That at the time and place aforesaid the defendant
HENRY DEBROW
duly appearing as a witness before the Senate Subcommittee and then and there being under oath as aforesaid, testified falsely before said Subcommittee with respect to the aforesaid material matter as follows:
“SENATOR HOEY: Go ahead and state just what that situation was.
“MR. DEBROW: * * * On the way up Professor Hill said to me, ‘Mr. De-brow, you knowing these fellows, I would like to make a thousand dollar contribution. Would you make it for me?’ I said, ‘Providing you are present, I will be glad to.’
“4. That the aforesaid testimony of the defendant, as he then and there well knew and believed was untrue in that on the way up to the Century Building, at Jackson, Mississippi, to see the members of the Mississippi Democratic Committee, Professor Hill did not state to the defendant that he would like to make a thousand dollar contribution to the Committee and requested the defendant to make the contribution for him. (Sec. 1621, Title 18, U.S.C.)”

. “Rule 2.
“These rules are intended to provide for the just determination of every criminal proceeding. They shall be construed to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay.”
“Rule 7(c)
“The indictment or the information shall be a plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged. * * * ”
“Rule 52(a)
“Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.”

. “There is only one exception to the rule that an indictment in the language of the statute is sufficient. The exception applies where the words of the statute *704do not contain all the essontial elements of the offense”. Norris v. United States, 5 Cir., 152 F.2d 808, 810. See also Sutton v. United States, 5 Cir., 157 F.2d 661, 663.

. Among others see Norris v. United States, 5 Cir., 152 F.2d 808, 810; Wilson v. United States, 5 Cir., 158 F.2d 659, 662; Lynch v. United States, 5 Cir., 189 F.2d 476, 479; cf. Sutton v. United States, 5 Cir., 157 F.2d 661, 663.

. The -Sixth Circuit has held that, “It is not required that the indictment must contain' an allegation that an act done by a corporation was authorized by its officers and agents.” Universal Milk Bottle Service v. United States, 188 F.2d 959, 963.