Court Opinion

ID: 9651015
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 16:02:21.286304+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:08.939908
License: Public Domain

MANTON, Circuit Judge
(dissenting). This proceeding in equity invokes section 4915 of the United States Revised Statutes (Comp. St. § 9460), which provides:
“Whenever a patent on application is refused, either by the Commissioner of Patents or by the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia upon appeal from the Commissioner, the applicant may have remedy by bill in equity; and the court having cognizance thereof, on notice to adverse parties and other due proceedings had, ma.y adjudge that such applicant is entitled, according to law,-to receive a patent for his invention, as specified in his claim, or for any part thereof, as tho facts in tho case may appear. And such adjudication, if it be in favor of the right of the applicant, shall authorize the Commissioner to issue such patent on the applicant filing in the Patent Office a copy of the adjudication, and otherwise complying with the requirements of law. In all casos, where there is no opposing party, a copy of the bill shall be served on the Commissioner; and all tho expenses of the proceeding shall be paid by the applicant, whether the final decision is in his favor or not.”
The statute does not specify where tho venue is to be laid, but provides for “notice to adverse parties.” Personal service is not provided. The residence of the various defendants named in this proceeding indicates well the improbability and almost impossibility of securing personal service upon all adverse parties who might be interested in the outcome of such a proceeding. A multiplicity of suits would be unavailing, for in each instance they may be dismissed for *442want of necessary party within the district. I think the proceeding is in rem. The res consists of what the statute says “a patent on application.” Where section 4915 is invoked, the subject-matter to be litigated for is “the patent on application.” It is not De Forest’s patent, but Armstrong’s application for which he seeks a patent. It is his concept; his right to a patent for it. It is like the will referred to as the res- in Woodruff v. Taylor, 20 Vt. 65. In probating a will, all parties having an interest are given notice. If they reside without the county or district, it is unnecessary to proceed against them within the county or district of their residence. The decision in the proceeding thus instituted determines the validity of the application for the patent — Armstrong’s, not De Forest’s. An adjudication in favor of the applicant merely authorizes the Commissioner to issue the patent, if the applicant otherwise complied with the requirements of the law. Gandy v. Marble, 122 U. S. 432, 7 S. Ct. 1290, 30 L. Ed. 1223.
If the suit is in rem, section 739 of the Revised Statutes does not apply. In Butterworth, Commissioner, v. Hill, 114 U. S. 128, 5 S. Ct. 796, 29 L. Ed. 119, and Barrett Co. v. Ewing, 242 F. 506, 155 C. C. A. 282, the Commissioner of Patents was the sole party defendant, and it was held that, since the residence of the Commissioner was in Washington, D. C., it was necessary to sue him there.
I dissent.