Court Opinion

ID: 9692758
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:04:30.520364+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:36.615095
License: Public Domain

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by
Price, J.:
The substantive issue raised in this appeal is whether *411the determination of the paternity of children born out of wedlock is governed by the Pennsylvania Civil Procedural Support Law of 1953, Act of July 13, 1953, P.L. 431, §1 (62 P.S. §2043.31) et seq., as amended, Act of Aug. 14, 1963, P.L. 872, §1 (62 P.S. §2043.32) et seq., when paternity is disputed. The appellant, E. Edward Schmidt, contends that this determination must be made in a criminal proceeding1 before the applicable limitations period expires.
The appeal from the order of court which certified this action to the Civil Division of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County for a trial by jury on the issue of paternity purportedly raises the question of the court’s jurisdiction to hear the case once the criminal statute of limitations has run. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated that when the bar of the statute of limitations is raised, the issue is not one of the court’s power to hear the case, but is rather an objection to the mode in which the case was brought before the court. Bellotti v. Spaeder, 433 Pa. 219, 249 A.2d 343 (1969). That is, an allegation that an action is barred by the statute of limitations is a procedural bar to recovery, Goldstein v. Stadler, 417 Pa. 589, 208 A.2d 850 (1965), but does not affect jurisdiction. Consequently, the appeal could be quashed as interlocutory. See the Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act, Act of July 31, 1970, P.L. 673, No. 223, art. III, §302 (17 P.S. §211.302).
However, the issue presented by this appeal is of singular importance in that it involves a controlling question of law which could involve a substantial difference of opinion. Therefore, I concur in the entertaining of this appeal pursuant to this court’s discretionary powers of review, as outlined in the majority opinion.
*412I cannot agree, however, with the majority’s determination of the merits of this case.
The record indicates that on June 27, 1967, the ap-pellee-mother filed a complaint for support in the Family Division of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, alleging that appellant is the father of her three children, born out of wedlock. The children were born on October 18, 1957; February 26, 1959; and May 5, 1968, respectively. Appellant, who has never been married to appellee, was first served with notice of the pendency of this action circa January 10, 1974, one month after ap-pellee had filed a rule to show cause why a support order should not be entered. From the initial filing of the complaint on June 27, 1967, until the filing of the rule to show cause on December 10,1973, appellee did not pursue the entry of the requested support order.
A hearing on the rule to show cause was held January 10, 1974. At this hearing, appellant appeared but did not testify. However, through his attorney, he denied paternity, questioned the propriety of a civil determination of the disputed paternity, and demanded a jury trial.2 The court entered an order on February 6, 1974, denying appellant’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.3 In addition, the court certified the case to the Civil Division of the Court of Common Pleas for a jury trial.
Judge Sparvero, in explaining his decision to certify the case to the Civil Division for a jury determination of paternity, stated:
“Here, the Statute of Limitations has run and the defendant has no criminal liability. The youngest of the three children is ten (10) years old. Thus, if this matter is referred to a Criminal Court, the de*413fendant may cite the Statute of Limitations as a defense. . . .
We believe that neither the Supreme nor the Superior Court intended to prohibit civil jurisdiction when the Statute of Limitations [for criminal action] has run.”
I agree with Judge Sparvero’S sentiments, and would hold that when the criminal statute of limitations has expired, a jury convened in the Civil Division4 should be permitted to determine the issue of paternity.
The leading case in this area, Commonwealth v. Dillworth, 431 Pa. 479, 246 A.2d 859 (1968), holds that when a man demands a jury trial on the issue of his paternity, it must be granted, for this right may not be dispensed with unless the consent of both parties is obtained. However, Dillworth does not specify whether the jury trial must be conducted as a civil or criminal trial.
I do not construe Dillworth as mandating a jury trial on the criminal side of the Courts of Common Pleas when the only issue to be determined is the paternity of the putative father and his consequent liability to support the children. I believe that a jury trial on the civil side will sufficiently protect the interest of the putative father, as long as the prosecutrix proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged father sired the children. If this higher burden of proof is met, the putative father may then face a suit for support under the Civil Procedural Support Law, but no criminal conviction will appear on his record. In any event, a verdict against the father *414would have no consequence except that it would serve as a basis for imposing the obligation of support.
In a case which raised the effect of Dillworth, Commonwealth v. Jacobs, 220 Pa. Superior Ct. 31, 34, 279 A.2d 251, 252 (1971), the court stated:
“We conclude that Dilhvorth, supra, does not require that all putative fathers be tried in criminal proceedings. Rather, we read that decision as a mandate to safeguard the right to jury trial (and the other protections afforded in criminal proceedings).”
In Jacobs, the defendant-father had requested a civil determination of his paternity. The court found that he had waived the rights attendant upon criminal proceedings, and a non-jury hearing was held. The court noted futher that:
“By allowing the putative father the alternative of a civil determination, of both paternity and amount of support, the child’s interest will in no way be adversely affected. Where a defendant chooses a civil determination, he will be deemed to have fully waived his jury trial rights and all other protections ancillary to criminal proceedings including the right to have guilt proven ‘beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” 220 Pa. Superior Ct. at 38, 279 A.2d at 254.5
In the present situation, it is particularly necessary that a civilly-convened jury trial be held, because the criminal statute of limitations expired several years ago. Under the majority’s rationale, i.e., that only a criminal adjudication of paternity will serve as the basis for an award of support, a putative father in these circumstances will never be held liable for the support of his *415children. This unfortunate situation will prevail despite the fact that the Civil Procedural Support Law contains no statute of limitations, thus permitting a claim for support to be instituted at any time during the minority of the children. Clearly this result, wherein a father could never be legally required to support his children, is contrary to the intention of the legislature as evidenced by the Civil Procedural Support Law, a vehicle for obtaining such support.
I would affirm the order of the lower court and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
Van der Voort, J., joins in this concurring and dissenting opinion.

. The applicable statutes in this instance are the Penal Code, Act of June 24, 1939, P.L. 872, §506 (18 P.S. §4506), as amended; and the Penal Code, Act of June 24, 1939, P.L. 872, §732 (18 P.S. §4732).

. Appellant did not request a criminal trial by jury in this motion.

. Although the lower court considered appellant’s motion as one to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, as previously noted, it is not a question of jurisdiction.

. I do not intend to suggest that there is a difference in the jurisdiction of the Civil Division as opposed to the Family or Criminal Divisions of the Courts of Common Pleas. Pa. Const. art. V, §5 (b). Transferring the case to the Civil Division is merely an administrative safeguard to insure that the defendant suffers no stigma as he would following a criminal trial, and to indicate that no criminal record will be made. That is, this case deals merely with the exercise of jurisdiction in the Civil Division. See Pa. Const. art. V, §17.

. The same circumstance, i.e., a request by the putative father for a civil determination of paternity, occurred in Commonwealth ex rel. Lonesome v. Johnson, 231 Pa. Superior Ct. 335, 331 A.2d 702 (1974). Therein we held that Johnson had waived his jury trial rights and affirmed the propriety of a civil hearing. I can find no such waiver in the instant case.