Court Opinion

ID: 6412131
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-06-25 11:53:29.149879+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:51:24.505609
License: Public Domain

Merrick, J.
This action is brought to recover compensation for damages alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff in consequence of an injury to a quantity of his wool delivered to the defendants to be transported for him from Suspension Bridge to Albany. It appears from the report that the wool, directed to Boston, was received by them at the former, and carried to the latter place, and was there safely deposited in their freight depot. But it was not transported seasonably nor with reasonable dispatch. By their failure to exercise the degree ol care and diligence required of them by law, it was detained six days at Syracuse, and consequently arrived at Albany so many days later than it should regularly have been there. Whilst it was lying in the defendant’s freight depot in that city, it was submerged by a sudden and violent flood in the Hudson River. This rise of the water caused the alleged injury to the wool.
Upon the evidence adduced by the parties at the trial, three questions of fact were submitted to the determination of the jury. It is necessary now to advert only to the first of those questions ; for the finding of the jury in relation to the second *485was in favor of the defendants, and the verdict in relation to the third has on their motion been already set aside as having been rendered against the weight of evidence in the case.
In looking at the terms and language in which the action of the jury in reference to the first of these questions is expressed, it would perhaps, at first sight, seer r that they had passed upon and determined the precise point in issue between the parties, namely, whether the wool was injured by reason of an omission on the part of the defendants to exercise the care and diligence in the transportation of the wool, which the law required of them as common carriers. If this were so, it would have been a final and conclusive determination. But upon a closer scru tiny of the statements in the report, it appears that the jury, by their answer to the question submitted to them, intended only to affirm, that the defendants failed to exercise due care and diligence in the prompt and seasonable transportation of the wool, and that by reason of this failure and the consequent detention of the wool at Syracuse it was injured by the rise of water in the Hudson, and thereby sustained damage to which it would not have been exposed if it had arrived at Albany as soon as it should have done, because in that event it would have been taken away from the defendants’ freight depot, and carried forward to Boston before the occurrence of the flood. And it was upon this ground that the verdict was rendered for the plaintiff. This was so considered by both parties in their arguments upon the questions of law arising upon the report.
It is therefore now to be determined by the court, whether the defendants are, by reason and in consequence of their negligence in the prompt and seasonable transporation of the wool, responsible for the injury which it sustained after it was safely deposited in their depot at Albany. And we think it is very plain that, upon the well settled principles of law applicable to the subject, they are not.
It is said to be an ancient and universal rule resting upon obvious reason and justice, that a wrongdoer shall be held responsible only for the proximate and not for the remote consequences of his actions. 2 Parsons on Con. 456. The rule is *486not limited to cases in which special damages arise; but is applicable to every case in which damage results from a contract violated or an injurious act committed. 2 Greenl. Ev. § 256. 2 Parsons on Con. 457. And the liabilities of common carriers, like persons in other occupations and pursuits, are regulated and governed by it. Story on Bailments, 586. Angelí on Carriers, 201. Morrison v. Davis, 20 Penn. State R. 171.
In the last named case, it is said that there is nothing in the policy of the law relating to common carriers, that calls for any different rule, as to consequential damages, to be applied to them. In that case may be found not only a clear and satisfactory statement of the law upon the subject, but a significant illustration of the rule which the decision recognizes and affirms. It was an action against the defendants, as common carriers upon the Pennsylvania Canal. It appeared that their canal boat, in which the plaintiff’s goods were carried, was wrecked below Piper’s Dam, by reason of an extraordinary flood; that the boat started on its voyage with a lame horse, and by reason thereof great delay was occasioned in the transportation of the goods ; and that, had it not been for this, the boat would have passed the point where the accident occurred, before the flood came, and would have arrived in time and safety at its destination. The plaintiff insisted that, inasmuch as the negligence of the defendants in using a lame horse for the voyage occasioned the loss, they were therefore liable for it. But the court, assuming that the flood was the proximate cause of the disaster, held, that the lameness of the horse, by reason of which the boat, in consequence of his inability thereby to carry it forward with the usual and ordinary speed, was exposed to the influence and dangers of the flood, was too remote to make the defendants responsible for the goods which were lost in the wreck. It was only, in connection with other incidents, a cause of the final, direct and proximate cause by which the damages sought to be recovered were immediately occasioned.
There is so great a resemblance between the circumstances upon which the determination in that case was made, and those upon which the question under consideration in this arises, thal *487the decision in both'ought to be the same. In this case, the defendants failed to exercise due care and diligence, in not being possessed of a sufficient number of efficient working engines to transport the plaintiff’s wool with the usual, ordinary and reasonable speed. The consequence of this failure on their part was that the wool was detained six days at Syracuse. This was the full and entire effect of their negligence, and for this they are clearly responsible. But in all that occurred afterwards there was no failure in the performance of their duty. There was no delay and no negligence in any part of the transportation between Syracuse and Albany, and upon reaching the latter place the wool was safely and properly stored in their freight depot. It was their duty to make this disposition of it. They had then reached the terminus of their road; the carriage of the goods was then complete; and the duty only remained of making delivery. The deposit of the wool in the depot was the only delivery which they were required to make; and having made that, their liabilities as carriers thenceforward ceased. It was there to be received by the owner, or taken up by the proprietors of the railroad next in course of the route to Boston. Norway Plains Co. v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 1 Gray, 263. Nutting v. Connecticut River Railroad, 1 Gray, 502. The rise of waters in the Hudson, which did the mischief to the wool, occurred at a period subsequent to this, and consequently was the direct and proximate cause to which that mischief is to be attributed. The negligence of the defendants was remote; it had ceased to operate as an active, efficient and prevailing cause as soon as the wool had been carried on beyond Syracuse, and cannot therefore subject them to responsibility for an injury to the plaintiff’s property, resulting from a subsequent inevitable accident which was the proximate cause by which it Was produced. It is to the latter only to which the loss sustained by him is attributable.
It follows from these considerations, that the verdict in the plaintiff’s behalf must be set aside, and a new trial be had; in which he will recover such damages as he proves were the direct consequence of the negligence of which the defendants may be shown to have been guilty. New trial ordered.