Court Opinion

ID: 9558769
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:16:36.099928+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:34.972824
License: Public Domain

BAKES, Chief Justice
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
The majority states that the issue of whether or not a single unconfirmed EMIT test is sufficiently reliable to provide “some *622evidence” upon which a disciplinary action may be based in a prison setting “is an issue which we need not yet resolve” in this case. Ante 119 Idaho at 609, 809 P.2d at 480. However, the majority nevertheless professes, in dicta, to “see considerable merit in the conclusions of those courts which have held that a single unconfirmed EMIT test is not sufficiently reliable to provide ‘some evidence’ upon which disciplinary action may be based.” That dicta needs more analysis and comment. Furthermore, the majority’s analysis in Part II dealing with the chain of custody is erroneous.
I
With regard to Part I, the question of whether a single EMIT test is sufficiently reliable to provide “some evidence” upon which a disciplinary action may be based, the applicable legal standard of review of a prison disciplinary proceeding decision was most recently expressed by the United States Supreme Court in Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Institution v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985), in which the Court reviewed its earlier holding in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), and reaffirmed the “some evidence” rule, stating that “where good time credits constitute a protected liberty interest, a decision to revoke such credits must be supported by some evidence.” 472 U.S. at 447, 105 S.Ct. at 2770 (emphasis added).
Citing Wolff in various places, the Hill Court elaborated on the “some evidence” standard, stating:
We hold that the requirements of due process are satisfied if some evidence supports the decision by the prison disciplinary board to revoke good time credits. This standard is met if “there was some evidence from which the conclusion of the administrative tribunal could be deduced____” Ascertaining whether this standard is satisfied does not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witness, or weighing of the evidence. Instead, the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board____
472 U.S. at 456, 105 S.Ct. at 2774 (Citations omitted, emphasis added).
The “some evidence” standard, which requires only a “modicum of evidence to support a decision to revoke good time credits,” is an even lesser standard than is required in the ordinary civil action, where the burden of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence, which means more probable than not. Ebert v. Newton, 97 Idaho 418, 546 P.2d 64 (1976); Big Butte Ranch Inc. v. Grasmick, 91 Idaho 6, 415 P.2d 48 (1966) (“ ‘Preponderance of evidence’ means such evidence as, when weighed with that opposed to it, has more convincing force and from which it results that the greater probability of truth lies therein.”).
However, in a prison disciplinary proceeding, the evidentiary burden on prison officials is even less than in an ordinary civil proceeding. The U.S. Supreme Court in Hill held that there need only be a “modicum of evidence to support a decision to revoke good time credits.” 472 U.S. at 454, 105 S.Ct. at 2773. The Court stated that “[ascertaining whether this standard is satisfied does not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence. Instead, the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board____” 472 U.S. at 456, 105 S.Ct. at 2774 (emphasis added).
The standard of a factfinder in an ordinary civil case, i.e., the more probable than not standard, is essentially a 51% standard. It is a higher standard than the “some evidence” standard applicable to prison disciplinary proceedings. However, in this case evidence showed that Bourgeois’ positive EMIT test was 95% accurate. That standard of proof, 95%, while it might not be sufficient in a criminal prosecution where the burden of proof is on the state to prove the disputed fact “beyond a reasonable doubt,” is more than adequate in a *623civil action such as Bourgeois’ habeas corpus action, where the burden of proof was on him and the standard was more probable than not. The evidence of a 95% accuracy of the EMIT test is sufficient, particularly in a prison disciplinary proceeding where, according to Hill, only a “modicum of evidence” or “some evidence” is required to support a disciplinary action. Thus, I cannot agree with the dictal statement of the majority that there is “considerable merit” in the conclusions of those courts which have held that a single unconfirmed EMIT test is not sufficiently reliable to provide “some evidence” upon which disciplinary action may be based. Ante 119 Idaho at 609, 809 P.2d at 480. The prior case law of this Court and the United States Supreme Court is to the contrary.
Recently in Cootz v. State, 117 Idaho 38, 785 P.2d 163 (1989), we set out the standard to be applied in prisoner disciplinary proceedings. In Cootz, the plaintiff filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he was denied due process in a disciplinary hearing because, among other reasons, “no evidence had been presented at the disciplinary hearing to sustain a finding of guilt.” 117 Idaho at 39, 785 P.2d at 164. We quoted much of the above language from Hill, holding that:
[W]e are persuaded that the ‘some evidence rule’ formulated by the Supreme Court in Hill is the appropriate one for us to adopt in prison discipline cases. The rationale given by the Supreme Court for this rule seems sound in light of the complexity of the prison setting. In Hill the Court dealt with the revocation of good time credits. Here, we deal with disciplinary detention. We do not find any significant difference in the liberty that is impaired by one compared to the other.
117 Idaho at 41, 785 P.2d at 166 (emphasis added). We further held that:
While we are prepared to accept the ‘some evidence’ standard establish in Hill, we are not prepared to overlook the written finding requirement of Wolff in determining whether there is some evidence to support the hearing officer’s decision. If we were to do so, we would open the door to post-hearing rationalizations whenever a prisoner challenged the sufficiency of the evidence stated in the written findings. It is not a heavy burden to place on our correctional officials to require them to state in their disciplinary decisions the evidence upon which they relied. Wolff requires it. So do we. We will look only to the written findings made at the time the discipline was ordered to determine if there was some evidence to support the decision.
117 Idaho at 42, 785 P.2d at 167 (emphasis added).
In this case, the magistrate made a specific finding that the EMIT test has a 95% reliability without additional testing. Certainly a reliability of 95% is a “modicum of evidence” as is required under Hill and Cootz, supra. 51% is adequate in most civil proceedings. As the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Hill, “the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” 472 U.S. at 455-56, 105 S.Ct. at 2774 (emphasis added). In this case, the single positive EMIT test provided that evidence.
Other states which have clearly focused on the correct scope of their review, i.e., the “some evidence” standard, have affirmed prison disciplinary actions based on a single EMIT test. For example, in Petition of Johnston, 109 Wash.2d 493, 745 P.2d 864, 868 (1987), the Washington Supreme Court applied Hill to hold that “a single positive result to an EMIT urinalysis test clearly provides some evidence of marijuana use.” The Washington court relied upon several other cases which found the EMIT test to be approximately 95 percent accurate, and upon “expert affidavits which described the EMIT test as ‘extremely reliable’, ‘highly reliable’, or ‘very reliable.’ ” 745 P.2d at 868; see Jensen v. Lick, 589 F.Supp. 35 (D.N.D.1984); Harmon v. Auger, 768 F.2d 270 (8th Cir.1985); Lovvorn v. Chattanooga, 647 F.Supp. 875 (E.D.Tenn.1986); and Peranzo v. Coughlin, 675 F.Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y.1987). Although in Johnston two other experts testified that a single EMIT test might be only *62475 percent accurate, the court stated that “[t]his discrepancy in findings would be troubling in the context of a criminal trial, in which the State bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant has used illegal drugs. In light of the lesser evidentiary standards applicable in prison disciplinary hearings, we deem these differences immaterial.” 745 P.2d at 868. The Washington court correctly applied the “some evidence” standard and upheld the discplinary proceeding.6
Another case, Jensen v. Lick, 589 F.Supp. 35 (D.C.N.D.1984), reached the same conclusion as that in Johnston. There, in considering the admissibility of a single EMIT test, the court stated that “[s]ince the material furnished by the plaintiff establishes that the test can be relied upon with 95% confidence in the accuracy of the test result; and since that is tantamount to almost complete certainty, I conclude that such a level of reliability is adequate to support a decision for administrative punishment in the prison circumstance____” 589 F.Supp. at 39 (emphasis in original).
The requirement of specific written findings in both Wolff and Hill, supra, were followed in this case. The written disciplinary offense report specifically stated that the disciplinary officer relied upon the positive results of the EMIT test in deciding to punish Bourgeois. That is all that was required by the magistrate. State v. Cootz, supra. The majority opinion’s suggestion to the contrary is erroneous dicta.
II
I further disagree with the majority’s holding that “the state’s procedure for handling urine samples violates a prison inmate’s right to due process of the law under the fourteenth amendment as the procedure does not include written documentation of the chain of custody of the urine sample.” Ante 119 Idaho at 609, 809 P.2d at 480. As the majority’s opinion itself states, “[fjindings of fact by a magistrate will not be disturbed on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous. Clear error will not be deemed to exist if the findings are supported by substantial, and competent, though conflicting, evidence. I.R.C.P. 52(a); Barber v. Honorof 116 Idaho 767, 770, 780 P.2d 89, 92 (1989).” Ante at 619 -620, 809 P.2d at 480-481. Bourgeois did not allege, nor did he put on evidence, that there was a specific problem with the chain of custody in this case. Rather, he merely alleged that there was no written documentation of the state’s procedure regarding the chain of custody of his urine sample. The magistrate made the findings of fact that “the policy for handling urine samples as to chain of custody of evidence was followed” and that “there was no allegation or showing of any specific problems with chain of custody of the urine sample.” Bourgeois has made no showing that this finding was clearly “erroneous.” I.R.C.P. 52(a). Nor has the majority in its opinion.
The magistrate put the burden of proof on Bourgeois, as he properly should have in a habeas corpus case, and found that the prison policy regarding chain of custody was followed. Jackson v. State, 87 Idaho 267, 392 P.2d 695 (1964) (“The authorities uniformly hold that the burden is on the petitioner in habeas corpus proceedings to *625establish the illegality of his detention.”). The district court erroneously switched the burden of proof. We should uphold the magistrate’s decision. I.R.C.P. 52(a); Barber, supra.
The majority cites Wolff, supra, in support of its claim that the lack of written documentation on the state’s chain of custody procedure violated the plaintiff’s due process rights. However, that is not the holding in Wolff. Wolff merely requires that prison officials state in writing the evidence upon which they relied to initiate a disciplinary action against an inmate. Wolff does not require written documentation of the chain of custody of a urine specimen. The prison officials complied with the Wolff writing requirement in this case. The written report specifically states that the hearing officer relied upon the positive EMIT test result. Further, in Wykoff v. Resig, 613 F.Supp. 1504 (D.C.Ind.1985), on which the majority relies heavily to support their conclusion that the state’s failure to document the chain of custody violated Bourgeois’ constitutional right to due process, there was no written documentation as to the chain of custody of a urine specimen, yet the court did not reverse because of that failure. The Wykoff court first noted that “[pjlaintiff has introduced no evidence showing that someone had tampered with his urine sample.” 613 F.Supp. at 1514. The court then held that “the handling of plaintiff's urine sample was adequate, and that the disciplinary sanctions imposed upon plaintiff should not be disturbed here.” 613 F.Supp. at 1514. While the court went on to suggest steps that could be taken to document a chain of custody, these steps were not required in the case because it was demonstrated that the chain of custody was adequate.
In this case, the magistrate also found that a proper chain of custody was followed because Bourgeois neither alleged nor proved any chain of custody problem. The district court’s decision, however, put the burden upon the Department of Corrections to show that the test was accurate beyond any doubt and that the proper chain of custody was followed, and that there were no errors in the process. That standard would be appropriate if this were a criminal case in which the state has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. However, this is a habeas corpus decision in which the defendant has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. The rule, according to Hill and Cootz, supra, is that if there is even a modicum of evidence to support the disciplinary action taken, the courts must affirm the disciplinary authority, which is the finder of fact. The district court, and now this Court, has failed to apply the correct evidentiary test and standard of review. If the correct standard were applied, the magistrate’s decision would easily be affirmed. Accordingly, the decision of the district court should be reversed and the decision of the magistrate affirmed.
BOYLE, J., concurs.

. The majority alleges that Johnston, supra, on which the state relies to support its argument in favor of upholding the magistrate’s decision, "reached a decision that was contrary to the case law it used to support its decision, i.e., Spence v. Farrier, 807 F.2d 753 (8th Cir.1986) and Peranzo v. Coughlin, 675 F.Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y.1987)...." Ante 119 Idaho at 609, 809 P.2d at 480. Both Peranzo and Spence upheld the use of an EMIT test when used with a "confirmatory second test.” However, the Johnston court did not primarily rely on Peranzo and Spence to hold that a single, positive EMIT test is sufficient. In fact, the court relied on these cases to support its conclusion that the standard regarding the admissibility of scientific evidence in criminal trials, set out in Frye v. U.S., 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923), is not “applicable in the context of prison disciplinary proceedings.” 745 P.2d at 867. The Johnston court also relied on the statistics mentioned in Peranzo regarding the favorable accuracy of the EMIT test. In fact, the Johnston court specifically and primarily relied on Hill, supra, to support its holding. "Applying the evidentiary ["some evidence”] standard enunciated in Hill, we conclude that a single, positive result to an EMIT urinalysis test clearly provides some evidence of marijuana use." 745 P.2d at 868 (emphasis added).