Court Opinion

ID: 9484037
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:38:47.714378+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:58.861079
License: Public Domain

MAYER, Circuit Judge,
concurring in-part and dissenting in-part.
I would affirm the district court’s judgment that Thom McAn Shoe Company, Melville Corporation and Pagoda Trading Company, Inc. are liable for unfair competition based on trade dress infringement under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988), and the New York state law of unfair competition. I agree with this court that secondary meaning of L.A. Gear’s trade dress has been established, but I see no error in the district court’s conclusion that there is a likelihood of confusion.
The trial court properly applied the factors set out in Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495, 128 USPQ 411, 413 (2nd Cir.1961), to determine whether a likelihood of consumer confusion exists. Its findings of fact en route to its conclusion are entitled to “considerable deference.” Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 873, 230 USPQ 831, 835 (2nd Cir.1986). The district court’s findings on the Polaroid factors are amply supported by the evidence in the record, are not clearly erroneous, and all weigh in favor of its determination that a likelihood of confusion exists. It is apparent that the only way to come to any other conclusion is for this court to reweigh the evidence that was before the trial court, and to substitute its “hunch” for the district court’s judgment. This is an impermissible intrusion on the fact finding role of the district court, and a violation of the proper role of an appellate court.
Of course, the decision on this issue is founded on the law of the second circuit, and the views of this court on second circuit law are not binding on anyone beyond the immediate litigants. So I view it as counterproductive for this court to issue a lengthy published “precedential” opinion purporting to set out the state of the law of that circuit. The practice of expounding on the law of other circuits only obfuscates the doctrine it ostensibly attempts to clarify, and should be avoided in light of the curious rule that we are bound by that law. “I can hardly see the use of writing judicial opinions unless they are to embody methods of analysis and of exposition which will serve the profession as a guide to the decision of future cases. If they are not better than an excursion ticket, good for this day and trip only, they do not serve even as protective coloration for the writer of the opinion and would much better be left unsaid.” Justice Stone to Professor Frankfurter quoted in C. Miller, The Supreme Court and the Uses of History 13 (1969).
I have no quarrel with the disposition of the design patent infringement issue, although I see nothing “adding significantly to the body of law,” Fed.Cir.R. 47.8(b), to warrant publication.