Court Opinion

ID: 9468019
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:02:08.966463+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:38.345546
License: Public Domain

TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The facts in this case are not in dispute; in my view, the district judge was required *812to bring the litigation to a close. A brief review of the record demonstrates the appropriateness of summary judgment.
On August 10, 1978, J. A. and Sharon M. Pollock purchased a new automobile from Village Chrysler-Plymouth Inc. (the Dealer), in Birmingham, Alabama. The Pollocks bought the car on credit; they gave the Dealer a note for most of the purchase price, and the Dealer assigned the note to Birmingham Trust National Bank (the Bank). On August 8, 1979, the Pollocks sued the Bank in district court, alleging that the Bank had violated the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601, et seq. (1976), and Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. 226, by failing to make the disclosures required by the Act and regulation to be made to a borrower in a consumer credit transaction. The Pollocks claimed $2,000 in damages and an attorney’s fee.
On February 8, 1980, the Pollocks moved for summary judgment. Thereafter, their attorney advised the court by letter that the plaintiffs sought to hold the Bank liable not as an initial creditor, but, instead, as an assignee under 15 U.S.C. § 1614 (1976), which provides that assignees are liable for any Truth-in-Lending law violations apparent on the face of the credit instrument.1 The Pollocks apparently took that position because they were simultaneously prosecuting a Truth-in-Lending action in the same court against the Dealer, alleging that the Dealer, not the Bank, was liable as the initial creditor for failing to make the required disclosures.
The district court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and entered summary judgment for the Bank, though it had not formally moved for such relief. Treating the Bank as an assignee, the court found no Truth-in-Lending Act violations apparent on the face of the credit instruments assigned to the Bank and therefore held, as it was required to do, that the Bank was not amenable to liability under section 1614. Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration was denied, and plaintiffs took this appeal, contending that the district court lacked authority to grant the Bank summary judgment on their motion.
While this court has not been called upon to decide the precise question — whether a non-moving party can be granted summary judgment on his adversary’s motion — the prevailing, and, to me, most reasonable, view is that a district court has the implied authority under both Fed.R.Civ.P. 54 and 56 to grant that relief. According to Professor Moore:
If either the proponent of the claim or the defending party moves for a summary judgment, and the court finds that the moving party is not entitled thereto, but that the other party is so entitled, it would seem that the court has the power to enter the proper judgment, although a cross-motion therefor was not made. Rule 54(c) gives the court the power to enter the final judgment to which the prevailing party is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings, except in default judgment cases. The theory is that the form of the pleadings should not place a limitation upon the power of the court to do justice. So where one party has invoked the power of the court to render a summary judgment against his adversary, it is reasonable that this invocation gives the court power to render a summary judgment for his adversary if it is clear that the case warrants that result.
6 Moore’s Federal Practice, H 56.12, at 56-331 (2d ed. 1976) (footnote omitted).
This position has been adopted by the Second and Third Circuits, Missouri Pacific Railroad v. National Milling Co., 409 F.2d 882, 885 (3d Cir. 1969); Local 33, International Hod Carriers Building and Common *813Laborer's Union of America v. Masson Tenders District Counsel, 291 F.2d 496, 505 (2d Cir. 1961), and, as the majority acknowledges, it is implicit in our holding in Black Warrior Electric Membership Corp. v. Mississippi Power Co., 413 F.2d 1221, 1226 (5th Cir. 1969). There, we reversed the entry of summary judgment in favor of the moving party and ordered the district court, on remand, to enter summary judgment in favor of the non-moving adversary.2
The Pollocks contend that the district court somehow erred in considering their attorney’s letter to the court, wherein he unequivocally announced that the Pollocks were suing the Bank as an assignee, rather than as an initial creditor. Rule 56(c) provides that summary judgment shall be entered if, among other documents, “[the] admissions on file ... show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” In assessing the record in this case, the district judge was fully authorized, if not duty bound, to consider the attorney’s letter, which, after all, was addressed specifically to the question whether judgment was due. The letter was straightforward; it said:
[The Pollocks] have not taken the position that [the Bank] is liable as an initial creditor, but that it is liable under 15 U.S.C. § 1614 which provides that assignees are liable for violations apparent on the face of the instrument.
Confronted with this representation by an officer of the court, the district judge was entitled to assess the Bank’s liability under section 1614 only, and to fashion the disposition he reached.
The Pollocks now concede, as they must, that the Bank cannot be held liable as an “assignee.” The only way they can have another go at the Bank is to convince us that their attorney’s letter, which to me is unambiguous, did not mean what it said. What their attorney somehow meant to say was that if he lost on his theory that the Bank was an “assignee,” he wanted another day in court to claim that the Bank was an “extender of credit.” I, for one, cannot countenance such disingenuousness.
I therefore dissent.

. Section 1614 of Title 15 provides:
Except as otherwise specifically provided in this subchapter, any civil action for a violation of this subchapter which may be brought against the original creditor in any credit transaction may be maintained against any subsequent assignee of the original creditor where the violation from which the alleged liability arose is apparent on the face of the instrument assigned unless the assignment is involuntary.

. Hanson v. Polk County Land, Inc., 608 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1979), cited by the Pollocks in support of their argument, is inapposite. In Hanson, defendants moved orally for summary judgment and the trial court granted the motion on the same day. A written motion was later filed with the court, and the court issued a written final judgment six days later. The sole question presented was whether the district court had the authority under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 to grant summary judgment to a moving party, on oral motion, when the non-movants had not been given the ten days notice required by the rule. A panel of this court properly held that it was error to grant the movant’s motion under these circumstances.