Court Opinion

ID: 9859224
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 19:19:54.46013+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:15:41.663825
License: Public Domain

REES, Justice
(dissenting).
I find myself unable to agree with the majority, and dissent.
I. The majority ignores what to me appears to be a very significant body of evidence in the record.
Plaintiff Long testified that he had planted 100 acres of land to beans, and that he harvested a crop averaging 30 bushels per acre, or an aggregate of 3000 bushels. A witness, Clausen, testified he combined the beans and that they averaged about 30 bushels per acre, although he admitted such was an approximation and the yield could have varied two bushels either way. Long testified that during the crop year 1971 he had suffered some hail damage to his bean crop, and that he had about a 35 percent loss for which he recovered on a policy of hail insurance, and he further estimated that without the hail the beans would probably have produced 40 bushels per acre. I believe it is significant that the estimated crop without the hail damage would have, according to the testimony of the plaintiff, yielded 40 bushels per acre, or an aggregate of 4000 bushels, and that by his own testimony his crop was minimized by the hail loss to the extent of 35 percent thereof, and that by his own testimony therefore the bean crop would not have yielded more than 65 percent of the 4000 bushels or a net of 2600 bushels, which is the exact amount of beans which were available for disposition. Long testified he sold 2500 bushels and kept 100 bushels of beans for seed.
Long further testified that he found no evidence of theft or larceny of the beans, only that the beans were gone. The deputy sheriff who investigated also testified that he found no evidence of theft or larceny, that he found no grain spilled in the driveway or in any area proximate to the crib or bin and no other evidence tending to show that the soybeans had been the subject of theft.
I think it is further significant that no-one in investigating the alleged theft contacted the occupant of the dwelling house on the farm which was only 150 feet from the crib where the beans were stored. It appears that a tenant, Janssen, lived in the *275farmhouse and used the driveway of the crib to park his pickup truck to keep it out of the weather. Neither the deputy sheriff who investigated the alleged larceny nor Long made any inquiry of Janssen as to any suspicious circumstances or concerning any knowledge Janssen might have had about any beans being removed from the crib.
I do not agree that there was sufficient substantial evidence adduced to permit the court as a trier of fact to find it was reasonably probable, and more probable than any other theory based on such evidence, that any beans were taken from the granary in late February or early March by some person for his own use without the consent of the plaintiffs.
I recognize our review of the facts is limited to determining whether the trial court’s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence and that if they are so supported they are binding upon us. Rule 344(f) (1), Rules of Civil Procedure.
We may not, however, abdicate our responsibility to review the record to determine the sufficiency of the evidence to provide support for the trial court’s findings of fact.
I am unable to find from the record there was substantial proof of theft.
II. Nor am I able to agree with the majority that “theft” is not defined in the policy. The majority assumes the policy clause which is set out in its opinion is an EXCLUSION clause and that therefore the insurer has the burden of proof. In my judgment the clause referred to is essentially a definition of “theft”. Contrary to the conclusion of the majority that “theft” is not defined in the policy, the clause referred to defines “theft”, and distinguishes it from “mysterious disappearance”, and therefore the broad definition of theft which usually applies and which the majority relies on does not apply here. Otherwise we would read said clause out of the policy.
In Raff v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co. of Neb., 181 Neb. 444, 149 N.W.2d 52, 54, the court said:
“ * * * The provisions material to this risk are as follows: ‘(f) Theft and overturn. This insurance is extended to include direct loss by theft (but excluding escape, mysterious disappearance, inventory shortages, wrongful conversion and embezzlement), and overturn. >{C * * f >>
Continuing at page 55 of 149 N.W.2d:
“In popular usage, the word ‘theft’ is another name for ‘larceny’. As a general rule, however, the term as used in an insurance policy is not necessarily synonymous with larceny, but may have a much broader and more inclusive meaning. It could cover pilferage, swindling, embezzlement, conversion, and other unlawful appropriations as well as larceny. Here, however, it is apparent that the term is used in a much more restricted sense than is usually the case. While it is not necessary to arrive at a precise definition herein, it is evidence ‘theft’ must be construed to mean something other than escape, mysterious disappearance, inventory shortage, wrongful conversion, or embezzlement, because these are specific exclusions in the policy.”
So, as in the matter before us, the term “theft” is not used in the broad sense, but means something other than mysterious disappearance, inventory loss or unaccountable shortage. Therefore this is not a case of placing the burden of proof on the insurer to prove an exclusion; it is a case where the insured is required to prove he comes within the term “theft” which does not embrace or encompass mysterious disappearances. Therefore in any case where an insured’s evidence shows mysterious disappearance, as the evidence does here, plaintiff has not established his own case in the first instance. To hold otherwise completely nullifies the clause and writes the same out of the policy.
*276Under the rationale of the majority it would be difficult to envision a factual situation where a mysterious disappearance could be established.
The plaintiffs have not established in the first instance they lost any beans, in any manner. In the second place, they did not establish the beans, if any were missing, were the subject of theft or that the policies of the defendants indemnified them under the circumstances and the evidence in the record before us.
I would reverse the trial court.
MOORE, C. J., and UHLENHOPP, J., join this dissent.