Court Opinion

ID: 9774991
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:40:27.171352+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:18.811288
License: Public Domain

LEIBSON, Justice,
dissenting.
Respectfully, I dissent.
I am at a loss to follow the logic of the Majority Opinion. KRS 218A.990(6)(b) provides that where more than 25 marijuana plants are “planted, cultivated or harvest ed” “it shall be presumed” that such was “for the purpose of sale.” The Majority concedes the effect of this statutory presumption is to establish “a prima facie case of an intent to sell, ... a question of fact for the jury based upon all the evidence.” Further, the Majority agrees with the Court of Appeals that this statutory presumption “does not shift the burden of proof from the Commonwealth to the defendant”; the Commonwealth must still satisfy the jury beyond a reasonable doubt of “every element necessary to constitute the crime.” Logic demands that, given these operative principles, the statutory presumption does not prove conclusively why the marijuana was being cultivated, and the jury, if persuaded the appellant cultivated the marijuana but not further *493persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt his purpose was to sell it, should have the option to convict him of the lesser included offense.
The Majority Opinion quotes language in Reed v. Commonwealth, Ky., 738 S.W.2d 818 (1987), carefully explaining that a criminal defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense “deducible from or supported to any extent by the testimony”; that “[t]he determination of what issues to submit to the jury should be made based upon the totality of the evidence”; and that “the court should instruct on the lesser degree even though the defendant presents the defense of alibi.” Id. at 822-23.
Here there was no extrinsic evidence proving the intent to sell, only the presumption. From the totality of the circumstances the jury could believe the appellant was guilty of cultivating the plants, but they were for his own use or some other purpose, and thus, if the option were available, could convict him of the lesser included offense of cultivating marijuana, a Class B misdemeanor. Either the statutory presumption is conclusive, or it is not. We have conceded that it is not, but the effect of our holding is to apply it conclusively.
The Commonwealth argues “there is not a shred of evidence to support the misdemeanor instruction.” But the question is whether any state of affairs other than possession for sale could be deduced “based upon the totality of the evidence.” Reed v. Commonwealth, quoted supra. Clearly it could have been. The appellant was not required to testify that he possessed the marijuana for his personal use before being entitled to a misdemeanor instruction. As the Commonwealth concedes, it is the Commonwealth’s responsibility to prove each element of the greater offense beyond a reasonable doubt, and if the jury is not so convinced as to the element of sale, it should find the lesser offense which does not require an intent to sell.
The jury believed the appellant cultivated the plants. The effect of the failure of the trial court to instruct on the misdemeanor offense left the jury with no alternative but to convict of cultivation for sale or to acquit. Leaving out the lesser included offense amounted to a determination as a matter of law on the element of intent to sell. This violates the United States Supreme Court’s mandate against conclusive presumptions in criminal cases. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979).
The Court of Appeals concluded, and quite properly, there was trial error in failing to give the misdemeanor instruction. We should affirm the Court of Appeals.
COMBS, J., joins.