Court Opinion

ID: 9628958
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:34:57.6991+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:13.665629
License: Public Domain

CARTER, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I concur in the judgment on the ground that J. O. Moncur was a de facto judge and that no error was committed; hence the judgment should be affirmed. But I cannot agree with the holding of the majority that a retired justice or judge may be a de jure justice or judge, or that the Judges’ Retirement Act (Stats. 1937, p. 2204, as amended) is constitutional insofar as it purports to authorize a justice or judge whose term of office has expired to act in a judicial capacity without, at least, the consent of the parties.
The fallacy of the majority holding in this respect is apparent. In effect the majority holds that section 22a of article IV of the Constitution which empowers the Legislature to provide for retirement salaries for state employees modifies or repeals all provisions of the Constitution relating to the selection, terms of office and extrajudicial activities of justices or judges. (See Cal. Const., art IV, §§18 and 20; art. VI, §§ 3, 8, 9, 10, 10a, 18 and 26.) The majority holding also nullifies section 1 of article III of the Constitution providing for the separation of the powers of the state government.
Under the majority holding, the Legislature may, pursuant to section 22a of article IV, extend the term of office of a superior court judge beyond a period of six years fixed by article VI, section 8, of the Constitution and may extend the term of office of a member of the Supreme Court or District Court of Appeal beyond the 12-year period fixed by article VI, sections 3 and 4a, of the Constitution. This is obvious because, under this holding a justice or judge whose term of office has expired, is still a justice or judge although he is entitled to practice law in violation of article VI, section 18, of the Constitution. The chairman of the *416Judicial Council by some magic may assign this practicing lawyer-justice or judge to the position of a de jure justice or judge for such period as such chairman and such lawyer-justice or judge may decide between themselves. If a client should consult such a lawyer-justice or judge while he is under assignment, I presume the latter would say: “While I was a lawyer and entitled to practice law before this assignment, I am now a justice or judge and not entitled to practice law during this assignment, but when I finish this assignment I will again be a lawyer entitled to practice law, and I can then act as your lawyer.” While under such assignment and acting as such justice or judge he is not permitted to give legal advice, accept employment or compensation for any service performed as a lawyer. After the assignment is ended, he resumes the practice of law until the next assignment, or he may seek a public office or fill some public position in violation of article IV, section 20, and article VI, section 18, of the Constitution. He may decide to take a journey out of the state but if he is out of the state for a period of longer than 60 days he violates article VI, section 9, of the Constitution. Suppose a retired justice or judge should be elected a district attorney, a city attorney, a member of the Legislature, or some other public office. Obviously under settled principles of constitutional law he would not be eligible for assignment to a de jure judicial position. Would this mean that he would lose his retirement salary as he would not be available to accept an assignment to a judicial position by the chairman of the Judicial Council? We would then have the unique situation that some retired justices or judges would be eligible for assignment and others .would not. The assignment by the chairman of the Judicial Council of such a lawyer-justice or judge may be for one day or one year or 10 years for service upon any court which such chairman and such retired lawyer-justice or judge may agree upon. All this without popular sanction and in direct violation of constitutional mandates. Just the chairman of the Judicial Council and this lawyer-justice or judge determine when he is a lawyer and when he is a judge and where he will sit when he is a judge. When he is a lawyer he is subject to the provisions of the State Bar Act and must pay his State Bar dues. When he is a justice or judge he is subject to the above cited constitutional provisions with respect to his extrajudicial activities. He may be a lawyer one day and justice or judge *417the next. As a lawyer he is an advocate-—a partisan—a confidential adviser of his clients. As a judge he is required to weigh and consider the evidence and the law and render a fair and impartial decision. As a justice or judge he has no fixed term of office except the period of assignment which may or may not be renewed at the discretion of the chairman of the Judicial Council. In fact, he does not know from one day to another whether he is to be a judge or a lawyer. In short, he must have a dual or split personality to qualify for these dual positions overnight.
In describing the type of judge created by section 6 of the Judges’ Eetirement Act the majority opinion states: “On the other hand section 6 of the Judges’ Eetirement Act operates to establish a court through the medium of a judicial officer of the state and his assignment thereto by the chairman of the Judicial Council. Where duly assigned under that section such officer obviously is not a judge pro tempore selected by stipulation of counsel to try a particular case as contemplated by section 5 of article VI of the Constitution. The latter section operates independently of the retirement act. Neither controls the other. When a retired judge is duly assigned under the retirement act he is a regular judge of the superior court whose status as such is created by the Legislature pursuant to constitutional authority. Section 5 of article VI is therefore not controlling. It necessarily follows that under the retirement statute no stipulation of counsel is required as a prerequisite to the assignment of a retired superior court judge to preside as a judge of the superior court in any county in the state.”
It is obvious from a reading of the foregoing excerpt from the majority opinion that the majority reasons from a false premise; that is, the majority assumes that a retired justice or judge whose term of office has expired is “ a judicial officer of the state.” This assumption is made notwithstanding the previous statement in said opinion as follows: “In no proper sense is the term of a judge extended by his retirement or by his assignment. Upon his retirement he can no longer of his own volition assume to act as a judge whether he retires at the end of his term, as in this case, or in his midterm. . . . While not under assignment there is no good reason to say that he would be subject to the provisions of the Constitution and law of the state made specially applicable to regular incumbent judges.” In other words, when *418not under assignment, the retired justice or judge is returned to the status of a lawyer—a member of the State Bar, if he pays his dues, and is entitled to practice law. How, may I ask, is his status any different from that of any other lawyer or member of the Bar, and what magic has transformed him from a lawyer or member of the Bar into “a judicial officer of the state?” Finally, can it be said that a person may have the status of both a member of the Bar, entitled to practice law, and that of “a judicial officer of the state,” at one and the same time? To so hold is to overrule State Bar of California v. Superior Court, 207 Cal. 323 [278 P. 432], where it was held by a unanimous court as follows (p. 340) : “The duly elected and qualified judges of the courts of record in this state who were such at the time said act became effective and who have since become and are such judicial officers were and are not, under the inhibition of section 22 of article VI of the state constitution, entitled to practice law in this state during their and each of their continuance in office, and hence under the express provisions of said State Bar Act have not become and during said period are not members of The State Bar of California, and hence are not subject to the jurisdiction, control and processes conferred upon said corporation and the governing board or other officers thereof by the scope and provisions of said act.”
The majority opinion also states: “It may not be assumed that the power of assignment conferred by section 6 of the statute will be improvidently exercised. If perchance it should be the Legislature has complete authority to deal with the subject by appropriate legislation even to the extent of withdrawing the power altogether.”
This pronouncement strikes a lethal blow at section 1, article III, of the Constitution known as the separation of powers mandate. Under the majority holding the Legislature, in violation of this mandate, may say to retired justices or judges whose terms of office have expired: “You must continue to serve as justices or judges whenever and wherever we (the Legislature) direct or you may not serve at all— you may or you may not practice law or hold other positions— in other words, you retired justices and judges are under our control and you must obey our mandates.” Obviously, if the Legislature may provide that retired justices or judges may be assigned to a judicial position with their consent, it may also provide that they must serve in such judicial positions without their consent and may provide sanctions *419for their failure to so serve. This may not set well with even some retired Supreme and appellate court justices who may desire to engage in extrajudicial activities. They may then remember the trite saying with mixed metaphors: “When chickens come home to roost it’s a horse of another color.”
Another serious result which may flow from the majority holding in this ease is that a justice or judge eligible for retirement under the Judges’ Eetirement Act may be defeated at an election to succeed himself and then retire under the act before his term expires. Under the majority holding here such justice or judge may be assigned by the chairman of the Judicial Council to sit as a justice or judge in any court in which he may be eligible to sit under the act and thus he may continue to function as a justice or judge indefinitely and thereby thwart the will of the electors. I can envision a situation such as this arising in the smaller counties of the state which have only one or two judges and where the defeated retired judge may be so unpopular that he has lost the confidence and respect of a large segment of the population who constitute his constituents. Yet the chairman of the Judicial Council with the consent of such retired judge could foist him onto the people of that county as a judge of the superior court for an indefinite period by the power of assignment which the majority now hold the chairman of the Judicial Council possesses. I believe there can be no refutation of the statement that when the people of this state adopted section 22a of article IV of the Constitution at the general election in 1930 not a single soul who voted for this amendment ever contemplated the far-reaching consequences of their act as now construed by a majority of this court.
The- majority refers to section 5, article VI, of the Constitution which authorizes the appointment of a judge pro tempore by stipulation of the parties approved by a judge of the superior court. While this provision has been in the Constitution in one form or another since 1879 its use has been very limited. In my 26 years of law practice, I never knew of it being used, and in the more than 14 years that I have been a member of this court, I do not recall a single case coming before this court which had been heard and decided by a judge pro tempore selected under this provision of the Constitution. I mention this only to call *420attention to the fact that it must he the feeling of lawyers and litigants alike that they prefer to have their controversies settled by judges selected in accordance with the constitutional provisions hereinabove cited, and if I am not mistaken the Bar of this state will revolt against the holding of this court which places it within the power of the chairman of the Judicial Counsel and a retired justice or judge to create the judicial tribunal which has the power to determine the rights of the litigants in controversies which may involve their life, liberty, or property in violation of the constitutional mandates which I have heretofore cited.
Much is said in the majority opinion in regard to the desirability of the legislation contained in section 6 of the Judges’ Retirement Act. In this respect the majority opinion states: “The purpose of such a plan would seem to be to make available to the judicial department the experience, aptitude and capabilities of retired judges who, with their consent, may be called upon for assistance in the administration of justice. Such a plan is highly desirable not only in particular cases but also when congestion in judicial business in a particular locality has become critical, and oftentimes intolerable.” Assuming, without conceding, the factual correctness of the foregoing statement, I have grave doubt as to its wisdom even though it were possible by any reasonable or logical analysis to extend the provisions of section 22a of article IV of the Constitution to authorize the adoption of such a plan. While it is no doubt true that some retired justices or judges may be well qualified to continue functioning in a judicial capacity, it is likewise true that some are not. We certainly have the right to assume that when a judge voluntarily retires, he desires to be relieved of the duties of his judicial office, as retirement means just that. The Legislature has the power under the Constitution to create a sufficient number of superior court judgeships to enable our superior courts to expeditiously handle all legal matters coming before our courts, and it seems to me much more appropriate for the Legislature to exercise this power than to resort to the hybrid type of legislation contained in section 6 of the Judges’ Retirement Act.
In this case there is no question that Moneur, the judge who purported to act as such in these consolidated cases, was not a legal judge. The term of office for which he had been elected had expired. He did not run for office again but on the contrary retired as he was authorized to do under *421the retirement act. A successor had been chosen for his office, a superior court judge in Plumas County. It is true he was regularly assigned to act as a judge in these eases by the chairman of the Judicial Council but he was not qualified for that position.
There are several constitutional obstacles to his being a de jure judge or to the power of the Legislature under the retirement act or otherwise to authorize such procedure.
The Constitution requires that judges of superior courts shall he elected by the voters of the county in which is situated the superior court for which the judge is to be chosen (Cal. Const., art. VI, §6), but that in case of a vacancy in the office, the Governor shall appoint a person to hold the office until the commencement of the term of a person elected to fill the vacancy which shall be . done at the general election next after the first day in January after the vacancy occurs, and his term (six years) shall commence on the first Monday of January after the first day of January next succeeding his election. The term of office is six years. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 8.) Under these provisions it has been held that a purported judicial act done by a judge after his term of office has expired has no force or effect. (Martello v. Superior Court, '202 Cal. 400 [261 P. 476] ; Connolly v. Ashworth, 98 Cal. 205 [33 P. 60] ; Mace v. O’Reilley, 70 Cal. 231 [11 P. 721] ; Broder v. Conklin, 98 Cal. 360 [33 P. 211] ; People v. Ruef, 14 Cal.App. 576, 630 [114 P. 48, 54].) The Legislature cannot extend the term of a judge fixed by the Constitution (People v. Campbell, 138 Cal. 11, 16 [70 P. 918]; People v. Markham, 104 Cal. 232, 235 [37 P. 918]) nor confer upon him judicial power after his term has expired, where the Constitution fixes his term of office and mode of selection. (Hallam v. Tillinghast, 19 Wash. 20 [52 P. 329].)
From the above constitutional provision and authorities it is clear that Moncur was not a judge when the cases were tried and any judicial act done by him was ineffective. He had been elected a superior judge but his term had expired on the day he retired and he was not reelected; his successor had previously been elected and was discharging the duties of that office. Moncur did not hold an appointment by the Governor to fill a vacancy. That is, he was in no different position than a judge who did not run for reelection or did run and was defeated; his term had expired and his successor was occupying the position. Hence if there are no other *422provisions justifying a different result, section 6 of the Judges’ Retirement Act, which authorizes retired judges to serve as judges after retirement, at least without the stipulation of the parties, is invalid.
Moreover, the effect of permitting the Legislature to authorize judges who are not judges (retired judges to act as such [the retirement act]) violates the fundamental premise of our Constitution that the legislative, judicial and executive departments of our state government shall he separate. (Cal. Const., art. Ill, § 1.) If the Legislature may at its sole discretion thwart the provisions in the Constitution for the judiciary then there is no longer any true separation of power. Section 6 of the retirement act does just that, because it empowers the chairman of the Judicial Council to create offices of superior court judges where none may exist under the Constitution and in a manner contrary to it.
To overcome the positive constitutional provisions fixing the term of office and mode of selection of superior court judges, the majority opinion proceeds on the theory that the constitutional provisions authorizing the Legislature to establish a retirement system (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 22a) are paramount to the former provisions and that the Legislature may enact measures contrary to them. It stresses the constitutional authority of the chairman of the Judicial Council to assign judges from one area to another, and a retired judge is not a judge until after he has been assigned to serve by the chairman and then only during the assignment.
In reaching that result an analogy is sought to be drawn between the powers granted by the Constitution to the Public Utilities Commission and Industrial Accident Commission.
First, with reference to the assignment authority provision, it is crystal clear that that provision does not purport to repeal the requirement that judges be elected for a fixed term; in case of vacancy and before election the Governor must make an appointment, not the chairman of the Judicial Council. Under the Judicial Council provision it will be noted that “any judge” may be assigned, but in order to derive authority therefrom to assign a retired judge, it would be necessary to conclude that the words mean any person, whether or not he is still a judge in the proper legal sense that he has been elected or appointed under the constitutional provisions above discussed., and his term has not expired. To so construe those words is out of harmony with the rule announced in Fay v. District Court of Appeal, 200 Cal. 522, *423536 [254 P. 896], in holding that amendment to the Constitution with reference to judges pro tempore did not mean that the entire judicial personnel of a District Court of Appeal could consist of pro tempore judges. In Edler v. Hollopeter, 214 Cal. 427 [6 P.2d 245], it was held that under the Judicial Council amendment an inferior court judge could he assigned to a higher court but he must meet the qualifications of the higher judicial position (admission to practice for five years prior to his election). If that is necessary it would follow that he must also satisfy the qualifications for the position of judge, that is, holding office by election or appointment before expiration of his term. And it has been held that the term “judge” does not apply to a person whose term of office has expired. (In re Wheelock’s Will, 205 App.Div. 654 [200 N.Y.S. 157].)
It is unreasonable to believe that the framers of the Judicial Council provision or the people in adopting it, intended that the chairman of the council be given such broad authority by the Constitution that he could select a person for a judicial assignment, who had never been a judge, or who had been one, and was defeated for reeleetion years before or did not run for reeleetion. I would hold, therefore, that the Judicial Council provision in the Constitution did not confer authority on the chairman to assign as judges other than those who were duly elected, qualified and acting and whose term has not expired.
In the same connection the majority opinion makes the point that retired judges are judicial officers only when they are under assignment by the chairman of the Judicial Council; that at all other times they are lawyers with no official position. Even if that is true, it furnishes no ground for creating a “temporary” judge who has not been elected as required by the Constitution, and in any event it is contrary to reason and logic. In speaking of retired federal judges, the United States Supreme Court has this to say: “By retiring pursuant to the statute a judge does not relinquish his office. The language is that he may retire from regular active service. The purpose is, however, that he shall continue, so far as his age and his health permit, to perform judicial service, and it is common knowledge that retired judges have, in fact, discharged a large measure of the duties which would be incumbent on them, if still in regular active service. It is scarcely necessary to say that a retired judge’s judicial acts would he *424illegal unless he who performed them held the office of judge. It is a contradiction in terms to assert that one who has retired in accordance with the statute may continue to function as a federal judge and yet not hold the office of a judge. The Act does not and, indeed, could not, endue him with a new office, different from, but embracing the duties of the office of judge. He does not surrender his commission, but continues to act under it.” (Emphasis added; Booth v. United States, 291 U.S. 339, 350 [54 S.Ct. 379, 78 L.Ed. 836].)
The constitutional retirement provision does not authorize the use of retired judges in a judicial capacity or sanction legislative authority therefor in the face of the constitutional provision requiring election and fixing terms of office for judges. To hold as does the majority would mean that the retirement provision repealed by implication the requirement of election of judges, a drastic conclusion which could not have been contemplated by the voters in authorizing a retirement system.
Serious consequences may flow from the holding of the majority in this case. Similarly the Legislature could authorize the selection and appointment of a retired but defeated legislator to fill a vacancy in the Legislature or to serve while the incumbent legislator was incapacitated. The same would be true of a retired governor. I cannot believe that the constitutional provision for a retirement system was intended to authorize any such a far-reaching and drastic contailment of the other provisions in the Constitution, indeed in our whole system of state government. It is no doubt true that the retirement authorization includes the right to exact further service from the retiree as far as he is concerned, but when we consider the right of the people as guaranteed by the Constitution to have their officers, judicial, legislative and executive, elected by them and serve only for a fixed term, it is another matter. Requiring that retired judges perform services after retirement does not carry the right to impose such judges on the people contrary to the election and term of office provisions of the Constitution. The matter may be simply solved by requiring the consent of the parties to the sitting of a retired judge as was done by the retirement act before its amendment in 1951. The pertinent reasoning in this situation is stated in Fay v. District Court of Appeal, supra, 200 Cal. 522, 536, where the court held that the amendments to the Constitution providing for pro tempore judges *425to sit on the District Court of Appeal did not mean that the entire judicial personnel of a District Court of Appeal could consist of pro tempore judges for: “ To so interpret these provisions in said amendments, evidently intended to afford temporary and emergency relief, would be to encourage the violation of a very vital principle of popular government which is none other than that of the right of the people of a commonwealth to have their* essential rights, liberties, and interests in respect to person and property heard and determined by courts of last resort, the constituent membership of which is composed of public servants of their own selection. That the people might transfer the direct exercise of this selection to those whom they may have chosen to administer the functions of our representative scheme of government is undoubted, but the text of such transfer, whether embodied in a constitution or a statute, should be plain and unambiguous.” The reasoning of the majority opinion is squarely contrary to the Pay case.
The analogy claimed by the majority between the retirement provision and other provisions in the Constitution which are expressly made paramount to other constitutional requirements does not exist. The retirement provision not only does not contain such words of supremacy, but in order to reach the majority’s result we have to read the retirement provision as if it does have such words, and then take the further step of implying that authorization for a retirement system includes the right of the Legislature to wipe out the constitutional provisions as to election and term of office of both superior judges and justices of the Supreme Court and District Courts of Appeal.
In summary, the Constitution fixes the term of office of justices of the Supreme Court and District Courts of Appeal and superior court judges. The Legislature has no power to extend such terms. Under no reasonable construction can it be said that such power is granted by the provisions of section 22a of article IV of the Constitution. In fact, the antithesis of such construction is indicated. The following conclusions are inescapable: (1) That by accepting retirement the justice or judge has decided to withdraw from the position held by him and cease rendering service of a judicial nature; (2) during retirement the justice or judge is restored to his status as a member of the Bar and entitled to practice law which a justice or judge may not do while acting in the capacity of a judicial officer of the state; (3) that his posi*426tion as a justice or judge will be filled by a successor in a manner provided for in the Constitution; (4) that he is entitled to his retirement salary as a part of the compensation earned by him for services already rendered and should not be required to render services in the same capacity after retirement; (5) that to do so would be discriminatory and unfair to those who are capable, because those who are incapable of rendering services will receive their retirement salaries without being required to render services after retirement; (6) that the chairman of the Judicial Council has no constitutional power or authority to create judicial positions and select justices or judges to fill them or change the status of a member of the Bar to that of a justice or judge, and the Legislature cannot constitutionally confer such power in view of the constitutional provisions hereinabove cited which expressly provide for the method of selection and term of office of such justices or judges; (7) that the holding of the majority in this case strikes a lethal blow against our republican form of government and is destructive of the democratic processes set up in our Constitution for the selection of judges; (8) and that even if this drastic change in our form of government were dictated by compelling expediency, I could not accept it, because it is contrary to one of the basic concepts of popular government declared in the Constitution of California—that the people by popular vote shall have the right to determine the manner in which their public officers shall be selected and the term of office of such officials.
I hold, therefore, that the provision in the Judges’ Retirement Act, supra, authorizing the assignment of retired judges to conduct judicial business without the consent of the parties is unconstitutional.
The Johnsons assert, however, that Honour was a de facto judge and hence the judgments are valid. The Pickens reply that there cannot be a de facto judge unless there is a de jure court or office of judge; that there was no de jure office or court here and thus Honour could not be a de facto judge.
It has been stated, and said to be the majority rule, that there cannot be a de facto officer where there is no de jure office or, as to judges, there can be no de facto judge where there is no de jure court. (People v. Hecht, 105 Cal. 621, 629 [38 P. 941, 45 Am.St.Rep. 96, 27 L.R.A. 203], dictum; Oakland Pav. Co. v. Donovan, 19 Cal.App. 488, 494 [126 P. 388], dictum; Malaley v. City of Marysville, 37 Cal.App. 638, 640 [174 P. 367], dictum; Kitts v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. *427App. 462, 468 [90 P. 977], dictum; People v. Toal, 85 Cal. 333, 338 [24 P. 603]; Ex parte Giambonim, 117 Cal. 573 [49 P. 732]; Buck v. City of Eureka, 109 Cal. 504, 512 [30 L.R.A. 409, 42 P. 243]; see cases from other jurisdictions collected, 99 A.L.R. 294.) That rule has received sharp criticism mainly for the reason that the public policy underlying the de facto officer doctrine applies with equal force whether or not there is a de jure office. (See 2 So.Cal.L.Rev. 236, 243; 9 ibid. 189, 206; 1 Vanderbilt L.Rev. 651; 46 Mich.L.Rev. 439; 13 Minn.L.Rev. 439; 29 ibid. 36; 86 U.Pa.L.Rev. 551.) The rule has been said to be unsound; “ [F]irst, because an office created or authorized by the legislature should be treated as de jure until declared otherwise by a competent tribunal, since a statute must be received and obeyed by the individual until questioned in, and set aside by, the courts, because every statute is presumed to be constitutional; second, because the same reasons behind the rule protecting the acts of a de facto officer in a de jure office equally apply to acts of a de facto officer in a de facto office; third, because the attack on the constitutionality of the office should not be made collaterally by private parties but should be brought in an action expressly for the purpose of questioning the validity of acts of an officer under an unconstitutional statute, for to allow individuals who deal with public officers to question their authority in every instance would be productive of uncertainty and of a disordered society; and fourth, because, historically, the English rule requiring a de jure office, from which the majority American rule is derived, is not so productive of harsh results, since the acts of English officials are not declared void because the officer was acting under an unconstitutional statute.” (9 So.Cal.L.Rev. 189, 206.) There are as many authorities to the contrary. (See cases collected, 9 So.Cal.L.Rev. 207; 99 A.L.R. 294.) There are so many so-called exceptions to the rule or qualifications as to what is a de jure office that it cannot be said to have invariable application. Where an office is created by an unconstitutional statute, a person holding office under the statute before it is declared unconstitutional may be a de facto officer. (Statement in State v. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449 [9 Am.Rep. 409], approved in People v. Hecht, supra, 105 Cal. 621; Oakland Pav. Co. v. Donovan, supra, 19 Cal.App. 488; Reclamation Dist. No. 70 v. Sherman, 11 Cal.App. 399 [105 P. 277]; Kitts v. Superior Court, supra, 5 Cal.App. 462.) If the office has potential *428existence-—has not been established but may be—a person holding it is a de facto officer. (Buck v. City of Eureka, supra, 109 Cal. 504.) After a judge’s term expires and his successor is selected, the former may be a de facto judge. (Merced Bank v. Rosenthal, 99 Cal. 39 [31 P. 849, 33 P. 732].)
Even if the de jure office rule is applied, it appears that within the reason of the qualification heretofore noted, there is a de jure office—a court, the superior court, and judges of such court-—and it was to act in the capacity of such a judge that Moncur was assigned. The method of naming him was invalid but he was a de facto judge. He had a clear color of title by reason of the express legislative authority for his assignment (Judges’ Retirement Act, supra) and was regularly assigned by the person authorized to make it.