Court Opinion

ID: 9909766
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-13 23:02:12.843206+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:38.060795
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/13/23 P. v. Smith CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,                                                          D081772

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.                                                          (Super. Ct. No. FSB1301449)

KEISHA RENEE SMITH,

         Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino,
Hon. Alexander R. Martinez, Judge. Affirmed.

         Patricia L. Brisbois, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for the
Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Alan L.
Amann and Christopher P. Beesley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
                         MEMORANDUM OPINION1
      Kiesha Renee Smith (and her codefendant Michael Mitchell) was
convicted in 2014 of first degree special circumstance murder for the 2005
killing of a 90-year old woman during a home invasion robbery. This court
reversed Smith’s conviction for instructional error and remanded for a new
trial. (People v. Smith (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 766.) On remand, Smith pled
no contest pursuant to People v. West (1970) 3 Cal.3d 595 to voluntary
manslaughter (§ 192(a)) during which she personally used a firearm
(§ 12022.5(a)); first degree home invasion robbery (§ 213(a)(1)(A)); first degree
residential burglary (§ 459); and grand theft (§ 487(a)). Pursuant to the
negotiated plea, she was sentenced to 25 years in state prison.
      In January 2022, Smith filed a petition for resentencing under section

1172.6.2 The trial court denied the petition, finding Smith failed to establish
a prima facie case for relief. It reasoned that because Smith entered her plea
in January 2020⎯“an entire year after” Penal Code section 1172.6 was
enacted⎯she could not establish the requirement under subdivision (a)(3) of
the statute that “she could not presently be convicted of murder . . . with the
legal changes that went into effect on January [1], 2029.”
      Smith contends this was error. She argues the fact she entered her
plea after the effective date of the statute does not make her ineligible for

1    We resolve this case by memorandum opinion pursuant to California
Standards of Judicial Administration, section 8.1.

2    All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Smith brought her petition under former section 1170.95, which was
amended effective January 1, 2022, and then renumbered as section 1172.6
without substantive change on June 30, 2022. (See Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10,
(Assem. Bill No. 200).) We will refer to the statute by its current number.

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relief. She asserts she met the requirements under section 1172.6 because
she was charged with felony murder by an amended information filed in 2013
and she “accepted a plea offer instead of going to a trial where she could have
been convicted [f]or murder.” We disagree.
      The question in this appeal⎯“whether a criminal defendant who was
convicted after Senate Bill No. 1437 [(2017-2018 Reg. Sess.)] became effective
can nevertheless obtain resentencing relief under section 1172.6”⎯was
recently answered by the Fifth District Court of Appeal in People v. Reyes

(Nov. 16, 2023, F085582) ___ Cal.App.5th ___ [2023 WL 7895600] (Reyes)).3
Like here, the trial court denied the appellant’s petition for resentencing,
concluding he was ineligible for resentencing because his conviction had
occurred after Senate Bill No. 1437 became effective. (Reyes, at *1.) The
Court of Appeal rejected the appellant’s argument that the date of his
conviction should not bar him from relief and affirmed. (Id. at *2.)
      “In general, the following three conditions are required for a person to
seek resentencing under section 1172.6: [¶] (1) A complaint, information or
indictment was filed against the petitioner that allowed the prosecution to
proceed under a theory of murder liability that is now invalid (§ 1172.6,
subd. (a)(1)); [¶] (2) Following a trial or the acceptance of a plea offer in lieu of
a trial, the petitioner was convicted of manslaughter, murder, or attempted
murder (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(2)); and [¶] (3) The petitioner could not presently
be convicted of murder or attempted murder ‘because of changes’ brought by
Senate Bill No. 1437 and made effective January 1, 2019 (§ 1172.6, subd.
(a)(3)).” (Reyes, supra, [2023 WL 7895600 *2], italics added.)
      The Reyes court found the appellant ineligible for resentencing for two
independent reasons: “First, in order to be resentenced, the charging

3     Reyes was issued after the parties filed their briefs on appeal.
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document filed against appellant must have allowed the prosecution to
proceed under a theory of murder liability that is now invalid. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (a)(1).) This requirement is not met here. The prosecution filed the
information against appellant in 2020. Thus, when this criminal proceeding
was initiated, the prosecution was precluded from proving the murder charge
under a theory of imputed malice. This deficiency amply demonstrates that
the trial court did not err when it denied appellant’s petition for
resentencing.” (Reyes, supra, [2023 WL 7895600 at *3].)
      Second, “[i]n order to be resentenced, a petitioner must allege that he
could not presently be convicted of murder (or its attempt) ‘because of
changes’ brought by Senate Bill No. 1437. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).) This
language demonstrates that appellant’s petition was properly denied.
Appellant was not convicted under the prior law, which permitted a theory of
murder based on imputed malice. Instead, he entered his change of plea in
2021 with the advice and consent of legal counsel. When appellant entered
his change of plea, the now invalid theories of murder liability had already
been eliminated. Consequently, appellant has already received the benefits
of Senate Bill No. 1437.” (Reyes, supra, [2023 WL 7895600 at *3].)
      We agree with the Reyes court and conclude the second reason
articulated by the Reyes court applies to Smith. Smith entered her plea in
2020, with the advice and consent of legal counsel, when the now invalid
theories of murder liability had already been eliminated. She thus cannot
satisfy the third requirement under subdivision (a)(3) of section 1172.6,
namely, she could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder
“because of changes” brought by Senate Bill No. 1437 and made effective
January 1, 2019. As the California Supreme Court stated in People v. Lewis
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957), the resentencing procedure was designed to

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provide retroactive relief to defendants who were, or who could have been,
convicted of murder (or its attempt) under the prior law.
                               DISPOSITION
      The order denying Smith’s petition for resentencing pursuant to section
1172.6 is affirmed.

                                                                       DO, J.

WE CONCUR:

O'ROURKE, Acting P. J.

KELETY, J.

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