Court Opinion

ID: 9393538
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-10 16:01:13.215098+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:53.823712
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-11708    Document: 31-1     Date Filed: 05/10/2023   Page: 1 of 7

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-11708
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiff-Appellee,
       versus
       DAMIAN SIERRA,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Florida
                  D.C. Docket No. 8:20-cr-00026-WFJ-JSS-1
                          ____________________
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       2                       Opinion of the Court                  22-11708

       Before JILL PRYOR, LAGOA, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               Damian       Sierra     appeals      his   conviction        for
       possessing 500 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to distrib-
       ute. He argues that the government presented insufficient evidence
       to support the jury’s findings that he knew of and intended to dis-
       tribute the cocaine. Sierra also contends that the district court
       abused its discretion by refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser
       included offense of simple possession of cocaine. On both points,
       we disagree. The evidence presented at trial supporting Sierra’s
       guilt is extensive. The district court also acted within its discretion
       by refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of
       simple possession.
                                       I.

              When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evi-
       dence, we conduct a de novo review, weighing the evidence in the
       light most favorable to the government and resolving all reasona-
       ble inferences in favor of the verdict. United States v. Jiminez, 564
       F.3d 1280, 1284 (11th Cir. 2009). The jury’s guilty verdict must be
       affirmed unless there is no reasonable construction of the evidence
       from which the jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond
       a reasonable doubt. United States v. Foster, 878 F.3d 1297, 1304
       (11th Cir. 2018). A defendant must do more than put forth a rea-
       sonable hypothesis of innocence to rebut the government’s
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       22-11708               Opinion of the Court                         3

       evidence “because the issue is whether a reasonable jury could
       have convicted, not whether a conviction was the only reasonable
       result.” United States v. Cruickshank, 837 F.3d 1182, 1188 (11th Cir.
       2016).
              To obtain a conviction for possession of a controlled sub-
       stance with intent to distribute, the government must prove be-
       yond a reasonable doubt that the defendant: (1) knew that he pos-
       sessed a controlled substance; (2) possessed the controlled sub-
       stance; and (3) intended to distribute it. United States v. Woodard,
       531 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2008). Knowledge or intent may be
       proven by circumstantial evidence. Id. at 1309. For example, a jury
       may reasonably infer that a person caught in possession of a pack-
       age containing large quantities of drugs knew of the presence of
       those drugs because it is unlikely that a “prudent smuggler” would
       entrust such valuable cargo to an innocent person without that per-
       son’s knowledge. United States v. Quilca-Carpio, 118 F.3d 719,
       721−22 (11th Cir. 1997). Similarly, “[i]ntent to distribute may be in-
       ferred from the quantity of cocaine seized.” United States v. Mon-
       tes-Cardenas, 746 F.2d 771, 778−79 (11th Cir. 1984).
               In United States v. Louis, which Sierra relies on in support
       of his arguments on appeal, the defendant watched two men load
       boxes into the back seat of a car in a shipyard and then drove the
       car slowly toward the front gate. 861 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir. 2017).
       The defendant’s employer walked alongside the car. Id. When the
       two men exited the shipyard, law enforcement agents stopped the
       car. Id. The defendant abandoned the car and fled on foot while the
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       4                       Opinion of the Court                 22-11708

       agents searched the car, discovering 111 bricks of cocaine in two of
       the boxes. Id. We held that, although the defendant’s presence and
       flight were evidence that he knew that he was participating in
       something criminal, the government failed to prove that the de-
       fendant knew the boxes contained a controlled substance. Id. at
       1334.
              The evidence presented at trial of Sierra’s possession,
       knowledge, and intent to distribute the cocaine is extensive and
       goes well beyond that presented against the defendant in Louis. See
       id. Multiple law enforcement witnesses testified to the following
       facts. On February 1, 2019, a detective observed a black Chevy Sil-
       verado registered to Sierra pull up to a residence. Sierra was driving
       the truck, exited the vehicle carrying a blue gift bag, and met with
       another man. The man looked into the bag, then Sierra returned
       to the truck to grab a large, black garbage bag before joining the
       other man and entering the house. About half an hour later, Sierra
       exited the house and entered his truck, driving away.
              Another officer stopped the truck at the request of a detec-
       tive and checked the windows for excessive tint. Sierra was the
       driver and sole occupant of the vehicle. Other deputies joined the
       officer at the traffic stop. After a canine indicated drugs in Sierra’s
       vehicle, the police searched the truck.
              Within the vehicle, deputies found a Christmas gift bag on
       the floorboard. Inside the bag, deputies found a brick of narcotics
       wrapped in black duct tape, about eight inches long by five or six
       inches wide and two inches thick. They also recovered a notebook
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       22-11708               Opinion of the Court                       5

       and Western Union receipts from the front passenger seat of Si-
       erra’s car. A forensic chemist with the DEA later testified that the
       brick contained approximately 996.7 grams of powder cocaine.
               As for the Western Union receipts, Gary Corbett, a Special
       Agent for the DEA testified that drug traffickers working in multi-
       ple countries will send money across borders in bulk electronic
       transfers, often through Western Union. He specifically stated that
       Western Union transfers allow drug traffickers to transmit these
       cash payments outside the banking system and avoid detection. He
       testified that drug traffickers will send multiple payments to vari-
       ous individuals to avoid exposing a co-conspirator with a single,
       large cash transfer. Receipts from Western Union show that Sierra
       sent three payments of $206, $204, and $206 to two recipients. Cor-
       bett also testified that the notebook discovered in Sierra’s car ap-
       peared to be a ledger for drug transactions.
              Based on this testimony, Sierra’s claim that the evidence
       could not support a finding that he knew of the cocaine and that he
       intended to distribute it fails. The jury could reasonably infer Si-
       erra’s knowledge and intent to distribute from the quantity of the
       cocaine, its packaging, the circumstances of its discovery, and the
       testimony of DEA Special Agent Corbett. See Quilca-Carpio,
       118 F.3d at 721−22; Montes-Cardenas, 746 F.2d at 778−79. Accord-
       ingly, we affirm the denial of Sierra’s motion for judgment of ac-
       quittal.
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                 22-11708

                                      II.

               The district court also did not abuse its discretion when it
       refused to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of simple
       possession of cocaine. We review a claim that the district court
       omitted an instruction for an abuse of discretion. United States v.
       Morris, 20 F.3d 1111, 1114 (11th Cir. 1994). To establish that the
       district court abused its discretion in refusing to give the jury an
       instruction for a lesser included offense, a defendant must satisfy a
       two-part test: (1) he must show that the charged offense encom-
       passes all the elements of the lesser offense, the “elements” test;
       and (2) he must establish that “the evidence would permit the jury
       rationally to acquit the defendant of the greater, charged offense
       and convict him of the lesser.” United States v. Whitman, 887 F.3d
       1240, 1246 (11th Cir. 2018) (quotation marks omitted). A lesser of-
       fense charge is not proper where, based on the evidence offered at
       trial, “the factual issues to be resolved by the jury are the same as
       to both the lesser and greater offenses.” United States v. Gumbs,
       964 F.3d 1340, 1349 (11th Cir. 2020) (quotation marks omitted).
              Sierra is correct that the charged offense encompassed the
       elements of the lesser offense. To obtain a conviction for simple
       possession, the government must prove beyond a reasonable
       doubt that the defendant knowingly or intentionally possessed a
       controlled substance without authorization. 21 U.S.C. § 844; see
       also United States v. Stone, 139 F.3d 822, 834 (11th Cir. 1998) (stat-
       ing that the elements for simple possession are “the knowing or
       intentional possession of any controlled substance not obtained by
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       22-11708               Opinion of the Court                        7

       a valid prescription” (emphasis omitted)). A conviction for posses-
       sion with intent to distribute requires proof of each of the elements
       of possession and additional evidence of intent to traffic the con-
       trolled substance. See Woodard, 531 F.3d at 1360.
              But Sierra cannot establish that the jury could rationally
       have convicted him of simple possession and, at the same time, ac-
       quitted him of intending to distribute the cocaine. See Whitman,
       887 F.3d at 1246. As discussed above, a reasonable jury could infer
       from the government’s evidence Sierra’s knowledge of the cocaine
       and an intent to distribute it from the quantity, its packaging, and
       the circumstances of its discovery. On the other hand, nothing
       about Sierra’s activities, the amount of the cocaine, or any other
       evidence suggested that Sierra possessed the cocaine for personal
       use. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Sierra’s requested jury in-
       struction as to the lesser included offense of simple possession of
       cocaine.
                                      III.

             Accordingly, the district court is AFFIRMED.