Court Opinion

ID: 9721977
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:13:42.080676+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:29.767699
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE STEIGMANN, dissenting: I strongly disagree with the majority’s decision to affirm. In my view, the decision of the supreme court in Washington completely disposes of the circuit court’s attempt in this case to tell IDOC how to govern its internal procedures. It is utterly beside the point that the circuit court here did not act on the complaint of an inmate, but instead on the complaint of an IDOC employee. The authority the circuit court purported to exercise in Washington — that the supreme court soundly rejected — was the circuit court’s attempt to "intrude upon traditional matters of internal institutional administration. ” (Washington, 65 Ill. 2d at 398, 359 N.E.2d at 137.) It makes no difference at whose request such an intrusion occurs. In Washington, the juvenile division of the circuit court of Cook County entered an injunction against IDOC (based upon that court’s interpretation of due process) which had the effect of interfering with departmental policies. The supreme court noted that if the circuit court were allowed to inject itself into IDOC operations in such a manner, it "would open the door for the juvenile divisions of the courts in the various counties to determine what each believes are the required procedures for disciplining its wards. Such actions would create intolerable problems in administration for the Department, and this alone provides sufficient reason to [reverse the circuit court’s order].” (Washington, 65 Ill. 2d at 399, 359 N.E.2d at 137.) The supreme court then added the following: "In Meachum v. Fano (1976), 427 U.S. 215, 49 L. Ed. 2d 451, 96 S. Ct. 2532, the United States Supreme Court repeatedly emphasized the point that it is not the duty of courts to supervise the day-today operations of prison administration. That court was obviously aware of the tremendous administrative problems which would result if courts were to intrude into the daily internal operations of prisons. The actions of the circuit court in the instant appeal are illustrative of that improper activity.” Washington, 65 Ill. 2d at 399, 359 N.E.2d at 137. IDOC employs thousands of people and has facilities of one sort or another in dozens of counties throughout this State. Assume that John Doe works at the Pontiac Correctional Center in Livingston County and lives in Grundy County, wherein an IDOC work camp is located. If the majority opinion is correct, nothing would stop John Doe from suing in Grundy County to ask that circuit court to direct IDOC to take certain steps at the Pontiac Correctional Center regarding HIV testing that it did not wish to take; or, for that matter, to take some other action (of whatever nature) that John Doe believes is necessary for his personal protection but that IDOC does not wish to take. Similarly, of course, nothing would stop another IDOC employee from suing IDOC in his or her own county — perhaps McLean or Woodford — concerning the same matter about which the Grundy County circuit court had ordered certain IDOC actions. It does not take great imagination to envision a situation in which IDOC is subjected to multiple, conflicting orders entered by the circuit court in different counties. In Washington, the supreme court concluded by noting that "the juvenile division of the circuit court cannot under the guise of an injunction attempt to establish procedures and guidelines for the Department of Corrections for which it has no authority under the Juvenile Court Act.” (Washington, 65 Ill. 2d at 399, 359 N.E.2d at 137.) The supreme court could not be more clear about the inappropriateness of circuit courts’ entering injunctions which establish procedures and guidelines for IDOC, yet clearly that is what the circuit court did in this case. It is no answer to say, as the majority seems to (265 Ill. App. 3d at 794), that the circuit court has not attempted to establish a lot of procedures and guidelines for IDOC. The point the supreme court in Washington was trying to make is that the 797 circuit judges in this State are not — and cannot be permitted to become — bureaucrats in robes, in the business of telling IDOC what to do with regard to its internal procedures. Last, I notice that in Washington, the supreme court never even mentioned the phrase "sovereign immunity”; it did not need to. The circuit court’s order was so intrusive — as it is in this case — that the supreme court simply rejected the circuit court’s position as beyond that court’s power and authority. Or, to be more blunt, the supreme court in Washington did not need to invoke sovereign immunity in order to relieve IDOC from the blatantly ultra vires order of the circuit court. The majority opinion is wrong, its underlying policy is wrong, and I urge the supreme court to reverse it. If somehow the supreme court fails to do so, then this court would be responsible for opening the floodgates to voluminous litigation — with much of it inevitably frivolous — seeking to have circuit courts Statewide regulate all aspects of IDOC’s internal procedures. I respectfully dissent.