Court Opinion

ID: 9674052
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:22:28.085795+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:25.415161
License: Public Domain

DOUGLAS, Judge
(dissenting).
Appellant killed Dr. George Bob Sollock on July 11, 1973. Before the homicide there had developed a dispute between the deceased and his ex-wife, subsequently the appellant’s wife, concerning the custody of one of the children of their marriage. The deceased gained custody of the child after a trial in Dallas County but the appellant’s wife left town with the child and went to various parts of the country to circumvent the court order.
On the evening of the shooting, Dr. Sol-lock and his wife drove to the appellant’s neighborhood to see if they could find the child. As they passed a house where they had seen the appellant’s truck parked, they saw him get into his truck and follow them with the truck’s headlights turned off. He followed them for a short while before he turned the lights on. After passing them, the appellant stopped his truck in front of them in such a way as to force them to the curb. He left his truck and walked toward the couple’s car with a gun in his hand. As he approached the car, the deceased reached under the car seat for a derringer that he kept there. Appellant reached the car, pointed his gun at the deceased’s head and dared the deceased to get out of the car. The deceased got out of his car holding the derringer behind him and told the appellant that he had a gun also. At that point the appellant shot the deceased in the chest.
Roy Messick, a witness called by appellant, testified he was watching appellant’s house to prevent burglaries. He testified that he heard a knock on the door and when he opened it appellant said: “Roy, I caught a man on my property snooping around and I chased him down here and then shot the son-of-a-bitch.”
The majority reverses this conviction because of the admission of testimony offered by the State in its attempt to rebut the testimony given by the appellant’s wife concerning the deceased’s criminal record. The State called an investigator from the district attorney’s office who testified that he had received a computer print-out from the National Criminal Information Center (N.C. I.C.) showing that the Center had no record of arrests or indictments relating to the deceased. The appellant objected to this testimony on the grounds that it was based on hearsay, that no proper predicate had been laid for the introduction of the witness’ testimony and that the witness was not the custodian of the N.C.I.C. records.
It should not be necessary to decide if the testimony came within the business record exception to the hearsay rule as set out in Article 3737e, V.T.C.A., [more specifically, Section 3 of Article 3737e dealing with testimony as to the absence of any record or memorandum]. This testimony was introduced to rebut the appellant’s wife’s testimony concerning the indictment and arrest of the deceased for criminal desertion. The wife’s testimony itself was not properly admitted. In Morgan v. State, 515 S.W.2d 278 (Tex.Cr.App.1974), this Court held that it was not proper for a witness to testify that another was convicted without the records being introduced. Her testimony about indictments had nothing to do with any defensive issue in this case. The witness Mes-sick testified that appellant said that he had seen a man snooping around his property and he chased him and shot the son-of-a-bitch. Appellant made a similar statement to an officer before he was arrested. After appellant testified he stated that he shot Dr. Sollock in self-defense, the court instructed the jury on self-defense. The trial judge was very patient in permitting evidence of several custody trials involving the children of the deceased. If there were indictments they were immaterial to any issue in the case. There was no objection that the witness was being impeached upon *333an immaterial matter and appellant points this out in his brief.
Prior acts of violence or misconduct which show the violent character of the deceased can be admitted in certain limited circumstances. Nichols v. State, 504 S.W.2d 439 (Tex.Cr.App.1974). In this case, however, the prior record sought to be introduced would not show the violent nature of the deceased. Criminal desertion or nonsupport cannot be characterized as crimes of violence. Such crimes, in and of themselves, could not be said to indicate that the deceased was the aggressor at the time of the killing and should not be admissible. See Jackson v. State, 141 Tex.Cr.R. 251, 147 S.W.2d 1078 (1941). Even if the arrest and indictment did show the violent nature of the deceased more would be required in way of proof than the hearsay testimony of the wife. See Everhart v. State, 154 Tex.Cr.R. 291, 226 S.W.2d 637 (1950). See Morgan v. State, supra.
In view of the lack of probative value of the wife’s testimony, Mendoza v. State, 522 S.W.2d 898 (Tex.Cr.App.1975), and the amount of other testimony dealing with the violent character of the deceased by Joan Gassett’s father, the admission of the testimony concerning the computer print-out, if error, was harmless error. See Warren v. State, 514 S.W.2d 458 (Tex.Cr.App.1974).1 The testimony of appellant’s wife was rebutted by her own daughter. The daughter testified that Dr. Sollock was not a man of violent character but that her mother was.
There being no reversible error, the judgment should be affirmed.

.The jury had appellant’s admission that he killed the deceased. Appellant followed the deceased, curbed his car and shot him. Appellant testified that he ended the custody matter when he killed the deceased. Appellant also admitted that he sent a bill to the wife of the deceased for $160 because he was required to be present at a hearing involving the murder case and he missed a day of driving a truck. This is included to show what the jury had before it to show harmless error.