Court Opinion

ID: 9792877
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:38:33.655616+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:01:21.834765
License: Public Domain

ROVIRA, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
*648After a trial to jury, the petitioners were convicted of felony menacing in violation of section 18-3-206, C.R.S.1973 (now in 1978 Repl.Vol. 8). The jury had been instructed on menacing as a lesser included offense of second-degree assault over the objection of the petitioners. The jury was specifically instructed not to find them guilty of “more than one” of the offenses of assault in the second degree, assault in the third degree, or menacing. See Colo J.I. (Crim.) 36:6. After the judgment of conviction was entered, the petitioners moved for a new trial, arguing that the trial court had committed an error in law by instructing the jury that menacing was a lesser included offense of second-degree assault.
The trial court reversed its prior judgment in response to the petitioners’ motion and ordered a new trial. They then filed this original proceeding seeking a writ in the nature of prohibition under C.A.R. 21 in order to bar further trial. No one disputes that the trial court committed error when it first determined the issue of lesser inclusion of charges. See People v. Rivera, 186 Colo. 24, 525 P.2d 431 (1974). Menacing was not a lesser included offense of second-degree assault.
The majority concludes that the petitioners may not be retried because of double jeopardy protections guaranteed to them by the Colorado Constitution art. II, sec. 18, and by the United States Constitution amend. V. In my opinion, the majority is entirely misguided in its reliance on the Colorado Constitution. Its interpretation of Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199, 61 A.L.R.2d 1119 (1957), though perhaps less obviously mistaken, is premised on a misconception and ignores society’s legitimate interest in accurate determinations of criminal guilt by means of fair trials. See United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 84 S.Ct. 1587, 12 L.Ed.2d 448 (1964).
I.
The trial court reversed itself when it discovered that it had committed error in the defendants’ previous trial. Their prior conviction for menacing was necessarily vacated as part of the procedure for granting a new trial.
It is axiomatic that a former prosecution does not bar a retrial if it resulted “in a judgment of conviction that was set aside, reversed, or vacated upon appeal or in any other subsequent judicial proceeding.” Section 18-l-304(l)(c), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8). The Colorado Constitution art. II, sec. 18, plainly provides that if a “judgment be reversed for error at law, the accused shall not be deemed to have been in jeopardy.” (Emphasis added.)
Under our state constitution, retrial after reversal of a conviction, except on grounds of insufficiency of evidence, creates no second jeopardy for a criminal defendant. He stands in the same position as if no prior trial had taken place. The verdict and judgment formerly rendered are a nullity and, thus, of no legal effect. Stafford v. People, 165 Colo. 328, 438 P.2d 696 (1968); Young v. People, 54 Colo. 293, 130 P. 1011 (1913).
The plain language of the state constitution means that even a conviction for a lesser included offense, where reversed on appeal for error in law, does not bar retrial of the greater offense on which the defendant obtained an “implied acquittal.” Young v. People, supra. See Green v. United States, supra (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). It goes without saying that this principle, although clear in the Colorado constitution, has been interpreted as violating the federal constitution amend. V, as applied to. the states through U.S. Const, amend. XIV. Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 90 S.Ct. 1757, 26 L.Ed.2d 300 (1970); Green v. United States, supra. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969).
In the context of the present case, where the defendants’ conviction was not for a lesser included offense, the majority, nonetheless, deems the petitioners to have been in jeopardy despite the state constitution’s unequivocal and contradictory mandate. I believe that a sound constitutional jurisprudence requires that we recognize the bound*649aries of our decision-making power. We are not free simply to ignore the explicit limitations set down in our state constitution. We should at least feel somewhat inhibited to do so by mere fiat.
In the present case, of course, we are free to interpret the independent requirements. of the federal constitution. In my opinion, there is no conflict here between the double jeopardy principles embodied in the state constitution and those implicit in the federal constitution as interpreted in Green v. United States, supra. But if the Colo. Const, art. II, sec. 18, were alone applied in this case, the petitioners’ writ would have to be discharged. On the other hand, if the Colorado constitution is not controlling, this must be because it is in conflict with the United States Constitution as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. The majority's conclusory dismissal of our state’s established limitation of the double jeopardy protection can only be understood in light of its interpretation of what the federal constitution requires. I disagree with this interpretation.
II.
The double jeopardy clause of U.S.Const. amend. V states that no person shall “be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” The decisional law interpreting these simple words is a “veritable Sargosso Sea which could not fail to challenge the most intrepid judicial navigator.” Albernaz v. United States, - U.S. -, -, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 1144, 67 L.Ed.2d 275, (1981). The question of whether double jeopardy is applicable under the circumstances of this particular case is not subject to facile or routine answers.
In Green v. United States, supra, the United States Supreme Court decided that if a defendant is convicted of a lesser degree of a crime and the jury is silent as to a higher degree of the same crime, he cannot be retried for the higher degree offense if he successfully appeals from his conviction of the lesser degree. The jury’s silence on the higher charge is interpreted as an implicit acquittal. However, in the present case, the usual inference is initially questionable because menacing, in actuality, was not a lesser included offense of the crime of second-degree assault with which the petitioners were charged.
As I see it, this court should examine the record of the former proceeding, as presented to it for review, and interpret all of its parts as a whole before determining the meaning to be assigned the jury’s silence on second- and third-degree assault charges.1 People v. Keagle, 37 Ill.2d 96, 224 N.E.2d 834 (1967). A jury verdict of guilt on one charge does not automatically convert a jury’s silence on other charges into implicit *650acquittals. The jury must have been afforded a “full opportunity to return a verdict” on charges for which it, instead, reached a verdict on another. Green v. United States, supra, 355 U.S. at 191, 78 S.Ct. at 225. Where this opportunity is denied to the jury, the double jeopardy clause does not bar subsequent prosecutions. United States ex rel. Jackson v. Follette, 462 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1972); People v. Jackson, 20 N.Y.2d 440, 231 N.E.2d 722, 285 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 928, 88 S.Ct. 1815, 20 L.Ed.2d 668 (1968); People v. Keagle, supra. See Price v. Georgia, supra; Cichos v. Indiana, 385 U.S. 76, 87 S.Ct. 271, 17 L.Ed.2d 175 (1966).
The most significant feature of the record presented to us here is the manner in which the jury was instructed to consider the substantive charges against the defendants. The jury was told to render only one verdict from among the offenses of second-degree assault, third-degree assault, and menacing:
“If you are not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants are guilty of the offense charged, they may, however, be found guilty of any lesser offense, the commission of which is necessarily included in the offense charged if the evidence is sufficient to establish their guilt of such lesser offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
“The offense of Assault in the Second Degree, as charged in the Information in this case necessarily includes the lesser offenses of Assault in the Third Degree, and Felony Menacing...
“If, after considering all of the evidence, you find that the prosecution has established beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants ... committed the crime charged, or a lesser included offense, you should so find the defendants guilty, and should so state in your verdict; if you do not so find, you should find the defendants not guilty and should so state in your verdict; you are not, in any event to find the defendants ... guilty of more than one of the following offenses: Assault in the Second Degree, Assault in the Third Degree, Felony Menacing. Of course, you may find the defendants not guilty of all of these offenses ...” (Emphasis added.)
See Colo. J. I. (Crim.) 36:6. See also section 18-1 — 408(l)(a), C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol. 8); People v. Hancock, supra, n. 1. The obvious effect of this instruction was that, regardless of the jury’s opinion of the defendants’ possible guilt for other offenses, it could return only one verdict of guilt. The jury was not advised about the order in which it should consider the respective offenses. Consequently, its verdict carries no logical implications of acquittal on the offenses for which it was silent. Cf., State v. Troynack, supra, n. 1. The jury had no reason to weigh the petitioners’ guilt or innocence of other charges once it found them guilty of menacing. More importantly, even if it found them factually guilty of other charges, it could not express this determination. It is perhaps arguable that the jury instruction focused attention on second-degree assault in such a way that the jury would consider it prior to their consideration of other offenses. But even in this case, there would be no logical basis to conclude that the jury considered the petitioners’ guilt or innocence of third-degree assault before it found them guilty of menacing. Under these circumstances, I am convinced that the jury’s silence implies no acquittal of the defendants on other charges. See, e. g., People v. Jackson, supra.
The majority claims that retrial in this case is barred by “fundamental principles underlying the constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy.” Nevertheless, the case law upon which it draws to establish this conclusion is derived from situations where a mistrial has been declared without any “manifest necessity” or in opposition to the “ends of public justice.” See Illinois v. Sommerville, 410 U.S. 458, 93 S.Ct. 1066, 35 L.Ed.2d 425 (1973); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 91 S.Ct. 547, 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971); United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 580, 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824). The circumstances of this case make the majority’s analogy inapposite.
The trial court’s correction of its own error of law, in response to the petitioners’ *651motion for a new trial, by the only practical means available to any court reviewing the case — a trial de novo — is essentially equivalent to a reversal on appeal by an appellate court.2 See People v. Jamerson, 196 Colo. 63, 580 P.2d 805 (1978) (a new trial order is functionally equivalent to a reversal on appeal for purposes of determining whether a defendant’s speedy trial rights have been violated). It is fundamental in constitutional jurisprudence that the double jeopardy clause “imposes no limitations whatever upon the power to retry a defendant who has succeeded in getting his first conviction set aside” (emphasis in original). North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 720, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2078, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969).
In situations where criminal proceedings against an accused have not run their full course, the jeopardy which attaches at the time of the original trial continues into a second trial even though the first conviction has been set aside. Price v. Georgia, supra; United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 16 S.Ct. 1192, 41 L.Ed. 300 (1896). This policy of allowing a retrial in order to correct previous trial error has been justified as the product of balancing the right of an accused to a fair trial against society’s interest in punishing one whose guilt is established after he has obtained such a trial. United States v. Tateo, supra. Where a defendant is subjected to a new trial because of trial error — as distinguished from evidentiary insufficiency — such a trial is not the result of the prosecution’s failure to prove its prior charge, and the previous verdict consequently “implies nothing with respect to the guilt or innocence of the defendant.” Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 15, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2149, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978).
Even if one accepts the majority’s analogy to the law of mistrials, this case is still one where the trial court's reversal of its own error was manifestly necessary and in keeping with the ends of justice. If the defendants had been forced to appeal the jury’s verdict, an appellate court would have made exactly the same decision as the trial court. The constitution does not require an explicit reversal on appeal in order to uphold a policy against wasting time, energy, and money for all concerned. Illinois v. Sommerville, supra.
Under the U.S.Const. amend. V, the prosecution is not barred from retrying the petitioners for second-degree assault and for third-degree assault. There was no implicit acquittal of these charges in the former trial, and relevant principles of double jeopardy jurisprudence permit retrial.
Accordingly, I dissent.

. The record provided to us in this original proceeding has been scrutinized to a remarkable degree. I am as much at a loss as my colleagues to understand why the jury was provided verdict forms on menacing only as to the victim Gutierrez. Contrary to the majority, however, I do not believe we should speculate why. Our practice in original proceedings has been to put the burden of establishing error upon the one who claims it took place and based upon the record presented for review. Any deficiencies in this record seem properly accountable to the petitioners, not to the People.
As the majority points out, “the petitioners had completed a full trial and all charges had been submitted to the jury for a decision.” The jury was instructed in apparent accord with the rule established in People v. Hancock, 186 Colo. 30, 525 P.2d 435 (1974), that a jury cannot convict a defendant of more than one offense in a series of greater and lesser included offenses upon which it must reflect. See People v. Bugarin, 181 Colo. 62, 507 P.2d 875 (1973). The jury then “followed the literal mandate of the instruction and returned a verdict against the petitioners on only one offense.” See the opinion of the majority, supra, n. 4. It is hard for me to see, therefore, how the jury’s failure to resolve other charges against the petitioners amounts to an implicit acquittal of these charges.
One manner of instructing the jury which, indeed, would eliminate ambiguities and uncertainties in their verdict would be for a trial court to require the jury to find a defendant not guilty of the greater offense before it proceeds to consider the lesser. See State v. Troynack, 174 Conn. 89, 384 A.2d 326 (1977); Pope v. State, 509 S.W.2d 593 (Tex.Cr.App.1974). Such an instruction ensures that the jury is given a full opportunity to consider the factual guilt or innocence of the defendant. See Green v. United States, supra.

. The majority finds that the trial court unnecessarily dismissed the jury before it returned a complete verdict on the charges facing the defendants and, thus, the court’s “actions were tantamount to an improper termination of the proceedings.” The precise nature of the trial court’s error eludes me. The jury’s verdict was in compliance with its instructions. The defendants objected to any instruction being given on menacing, but they apparently did not object to the actual form of the instruction which was given. Indeed, the court employed the standard instruction.
The verdict forms supplied to the jury did not prejudice the defendants. Rather, if menacing had been properly before the jury, the defendants could only have benefited from an instruction which precluded the jury from returning verdicts on offenses which had victims other than Gutierrez.
In reality, the defendants received a complete verdict which was in complete compliance with the jury instructions; and this verdict of guilt was tainted by error in law. The majority speculates that “the judge could have rein-structed the jury, furnished them with appropriate verdict forms, and required them to continue their deliberations.” However, if one assumes the judge was acting according to his error and in light of his earlier instructions, he could have done little after the guilty verdict was returned without risking jury confusion or a violation of the dictates of People v. Hancock, supra, n. 1. If he had recognized his error earlier, during or after jury deliberations, he certainly would have had manifest necessity to declare a mistrial. At any rate, this sort of second guessing serves little purpose.
The trial court’s reversal of its error and its order for a new trial showed sound judgment and were not due to a failure of proof offered at trial. The double jeopardy clause of U.S.Const. amend. V is simply not applicable in this case.