Court Opinion

ID: 9712745
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:59:11.662173+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:13.968624
License: Public Domain

FICKLING, Associate Judge
(dissenting in part):
The majority contravene both the express language of Super.Ct. L & T R. 5(b) and established case law in this jurisdiction when they state (at p. 191) that:
Our decision today does not repudiate the tenants’ right to seek redress for the landlord’s failure to provide the promised air conditioning service during those periods in which the system was not functioning. We hold merely that such redress may not be sought by means of an equitable defense to an action for possession for nonpayment of rent, for such a grievance is insufficient to justify the withholding of rent and defeat a landlord’s possessory action.
I dissent from this holding and would affirm the trial court’s judgment allowing the set-off for failure to provide air conditioning as provided in the rental agreement.
Rule 5(b) clearly allows a tenant to assert the equitable defense of set-off in an action for recovery of possession for nonpayment of rent. Rule 5(b) provides in pertinent part:
In actions in this branch for recovery of possession of property in which the basis of recovery is nonpayment of rent the defendant may assert an equitable defense of recoupment or set-off ... or for equitable relief related to the premises. . . . [Emphasis supplied.]
The majority have amended this rule since they require a tenant to seek relief for the contractual breach in another action in another branch of the trial court. The majority concede that if the tenants had not withheld a portion of the rent for lack of air conditioning, the tenants might have a right under Rule 5(b) to counterclaim (or assert a set-off) in the possessory action.
In effect, the majority hold that a tenant, in order to invoke Rule 5(b), must not withhold rent for non-housing code violations. Payment of rent is not a condition precedent to asserting a set-off under Rule 5(b). No authority is cited by the majority for such a novel requirement, and such holding is nothing more than legislating an amendment to Superior Court Rule 5(b), which we have no authority to do.
In seeking to justify their departure from the clear dictate of Rule 5(b), the majority argue that a failure to provide promised air conditioning is not a Javins defense. Although I agree that the breach of the covenant to provide air conditioning does not constitute a housing code violation, this conclusion certainly does not defeat a tenant’s right to set-off the value of the unprovided service. Rule 5(b) does not attempt to limit the right of set-off to the Javins situation involving code violations.
Moreover, the majority’s attempt to en-graft such a limitation on the right to set-off flies in the face of established case law in this jurisdiction. George Y. Worthington & Son Management Corp. v. Levy D. C.App., 204 A.2d 334 (1964); Seidenberg v. Burka, D.C.Mun.App., 106 A.2d 499 (1954); Zindler v. Buchanon, D.C.Mun. App., 61 A.2d 616 (1948); Lalekos v. Manset, D.C.Mun.App., 47 A.2d 617 (1946). In Lalekos, a landlord brought suit for possession for nonpayment of rent *194of an entire building leased to defendant. Although the tenant had leased all three floors of the building, the upper two floors were occupied by another party. The tenant took possession of the one unoccupied floor and offered to pay partial rent. The landlord refused these tenders and brought suit for possession. In reversing the trial court’s directed verdict in favor of the landlord, this court stated at 620:
In this jurisdiction, it is well established that a tenant sued for possession of real property for non-payment of rent may defend by an equitable defense sufficient to defeat the landlord’s claim for rent in whole or in part, or may defend by way of recoupment for a total or partial failure of consideration in order to avoid circuity of action. . . . [Footnote omitted.]
Moreover, in requiring the tenants to pursue the circuitous route of bringing a separate action, the majority overlook another long-standing procedure in this jurisdiction. It is well settled that in a suit for possession for nonpayment of rent, the trial court is required to make a finding as to the amount of rent, if any, owed by the tenant. George Y. Worthington & Son Management Corp. v. Levy, supra at 336. This is required because a tenant has a right to pay any back rent owed anytime before or after judgment in order to stay enforcement of the judgment of restitution. Molyneaux v. Town House, Inc., D.C.App., 195 A.2d 744, 746 (1963). In order to determine the amount of rent owed to avoid forfeiture, Rule 5(b) permits the tenant to recoup, or set-off against the rent owed any equitable defense related to the premises. Since the trial court found that the landlord agreed to provide air conditioning and that .a significant portion of the rent paid was in consideration for that air conditioning service, it is clear that under Rule 5(b) the tenants should be allowed to set-off against the rent owed the cost of air conditioning service which the landlord failed to provide.
We would have a different situation if the landlord had filed suit for possession for a reason other than nonpayment of rent. Moreover, we are not dealing with a case where the tenants filed a counterclaim for money damages in excess of the rent owed. Under such circumstances, it may be that a tenant should be required to pursue his remedy in another action in another branch of the trial court. Under the facts of this case, however, Rule 5(b) clearly allows a tenant to assert the set-off as a defense to the action for possession for nonpayment of rent.
In the present case, the requirement that the tenants file an independent suit in another branch of the court is unjustified. This requires resolution of disputes by a circuitous route rather than encouraging parties to litigate all of their disputes in one action and is, therefore, contrary to the policy reflected in Rule 5(b). Moreover, such a requirement might well have a chilling effect upon one wishing to assert his rights.
Accordingly, for the above reasons, I dissent.