Court Opinion

ID: 9716227
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:31:23.923772+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:43.089459
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice House, dissenting: The majority opinion points out nothing in the record to show prejudice or lack of proper representation. On the contrary, it concedes that there is no showing that appointed counsel failed to conduct the defense of the defendant with diligence and resoluteness. Nevertheless, the conviction is reversed, apparently adopting defendant’s thesis that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. The only applicable precedent cited is a Federal district court case, (United States v. Myers, 253 F. Supp. 55,) which in no way binds this court. The Myers case, in turn, relies on Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799, 83 S. Ct. 792, but there the defendant was wholly denied assistance of counsel. There is no Illinois case so holding nor does iny research develop such a precedent from any other State jurisdiction. By education, training and practice members of the legal profession have been inculcated with the principle of objectivity. It seems unfair to the individual lawyer, who here accepted appointment as a public duty, and unfair to the profession generally to hold, in effect, that there is either a presumption of prejudice or that there is prejudice per se when a lawyer defends an indigent in a crime involving theft from a client of the lawyer’s law firm. Assuming arguendo that such representation is per se prejudicial, and I do not so concede, the conviction should stand because there was knowledge of the facts. As the majority opinion notes, the record shows that counsel advised the defendant of his representation of the burglarized corporation and its managing officer, and the trial judge questioned the defendant on the connection. In my opinion there was a knowing waiver of any possible conflict in the representation of the defendant by this counsel. The defendant first pleaded guilty and was sentenced for not less than one nor more than four years. His motion to vacate the judgment on the ground that his counsel had represented that the State would recommend probation was granted and other counsel was appointed. He was then convicted at a jury trial and sentenced to serve one to six years. Thus, by his strategy, defendant will now have had three different opportunities for a lighter sentence if the new trial granted to him again results in his conviction. This use of the courts should not be tolerated. Solfisburg, C.J., and Klingbiel, J., join in this dissent.