Court Opinion

ID: 9560405
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:48:40.226576+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:53.479960
License: Public Domain

Chief Justice ROVIRA
dissenting:
The majority affirms the trial court’s suppression of a confession made by defendant. Because the police did not violate defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights, I see no valid purpose in excluding defendant’s confession.
I
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const, amend. V. The Supreme Court has set forth procedural safeguards to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The Court also has acknowledged that “[t]he sole concern of the Fifth Amendment, on which Miranda was based, is governmental coercion,” Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170, 107 S.Ct. 515, 523, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986) (emphasis added), and that Miranda goes no further than protecting defendants from relinquishing Fifth Amendment rights in the face of governmental coercion. Id.
*987Here, the trial court found that defendant’s confession was voluntary and was not a product of police misconduct, coercion or abuse. Though the trial court stated defendant did not have the “capacity” to make a knowing and intelligent waiver, there was no finding that defendant was legally incompetent or mentally ill.1 Further, the trial court found defendant was properly advised of his Miranda rights, that these rights were explained to him, that he indicated he understood the rights and that he waived his rights. Finally, defendant never gave any indication he did not understand the rights of which he was advised, he never asked the police officer to repeat or explain a word or sentence, and he never indicated a desire to terminate the questioning. To my knowledge, neither the Fifth Amendment nor Miranda requires a police officer in the field to look into the mind of a suspect to ascertain his level of understanding of abstract concepts.
Based upon these facts, I would find that the requirements of Miranda have been discharged, that there was no violation of defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination and that the exclusion of defendant’s confession serves no purpose other than interfering with the truth-finding function of the criminal justice system.
II
“Jurists and scholars uniformly have recognized that the exclusionary rule imposes a substantial cost on the societal interest in law enforcement by its proscription of what concededly is relevant evidence.” United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 448-49, 96 S.Ct. 3021, 3029, 49 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1976). While the exclusion of evidence is sanctioned to deter and remedy against the abuse of constitutional rights, People v. Kleber, 859 P.2d 1361, 883 (Colo.1993) (Rovira, C.J., dissenting), where there is no constitutional violation the deterrent objective of the exclusionary rule is not realized. See Connelly, 479 U.S. at 166, 107 S.Ct. at 521. The Supreme Court further has cautioned against the expansion of the rule when its use would not fulfill its mandate. See Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 488-89, 92 S.Ct. 619, 626-27, 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972). Finally, the exclusionary rule was not developed to exclude evidence obtained as a result of reasonable police action. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 3418, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) (exclusionary rule should not be applied to deter objectively reasonable police activity).
There is no doubt that “the central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question of the defendant’s guilt or innocence,” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1436, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986), and that the exclusion of relevant and probative evidence obstructs a criminal trial from this basic purpose. See Connelly, 479 U.S. at 166, 107 S.Ct. at 521; Twomey, 404 U.S. at 489, 92 S.Ct. at 626.
Here, the trial court found that the police officer who gave defendant his Miranda advisement “went out of her way to try to make sure the defendant understood” his Miranda rights and “[tjhere was probably nothing the deputies could do in this case to make the defendant understand.” If the police in this case had questioned defendant in the absence of a Miranda advisement, and thus, violated defendant’s privilege against self incrimination the resulting confession would be properly excluded, and the exclusion presumably would have some deterrent affect on future police conduct. However, it is undisputed that the police in this case scrupulously honored the requirements of Miranda and communicated the advisement to defendant in the language of defendant’s choice and obtained an oral and written waiver from defendant; nonetheless, the majority would exclude the evidence as if there had been some constitutional violation. The end result is to penalize reasonable police action in the absence of any constitutional violation which is con*988trary to the rationale of the exclusionary rule. Justice White has commented upon this illogical result:
[EJxcluding the evidence will not further the ends of the exclusionary rule in any appreciable way; for it is painfully apparent that ... the officer is acting as a reasonable officer would and should act in similar circumstances. Excluding the evidence can in no way affect his future conduct unless it is to make him less willing to do his duty.
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 539-40, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 3073, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
I believe that the purposes and goals of the exclusionary rule are not fulfilled when a confession is obtained in accordance with the requirements of the Constitution and in the absence of any police misconduct or coercion. In effect, I believe excluding defendant’s confession only impedes the truth-finding function of the criminal trial and that “suppressing [defendant’s] statements would serve absolutely no purpose in enforcing constitutional guarantees.” Connelly, 479 U.S. at 166, 107 S.Ct. at 521.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to say that Justice VOLLACK joins in this dissent.

. The trial court stated “I believe her [the psychologist’s] opinion was that he was legally competent."