Court Opinion

ID: 9721951
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:13:11.03315+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:29.509725
License: Public Domain

SHARPNACK, Chief Judge,
dissenting opinion.
I disagree with the majority's analysis of the trial court's refusal to permit Currin to *1325exercise his peremptory challenge. Two aspects of this issue are troubling. First, it appears that it was the judge, not the State, who objected to the use of a peremptory challenge by the defense. Second, an explanation for the peremptory challenge was offered without a prima facie showing of discrimination having been made.
Under Indiana law, "although parties have a right to peremptory challenges in selecting a jury, they are subject to reasonable regulation by the trial court." Nagy v. State (1987), Ind., 505 N.E.2d 434, 437. The trial court may properly refuse additional peremptory challenges after parties are given an opportunity to examine prospective jurors, witness the examination by the opposing party, and make their challenge pursuant to local court rule. Id. However, "[nlo party is required to explain its reasons for the exercise of such a [peremptory] challenge." Phillips v. State (1986), Ind., 496 N.E.2d 87, 88.
The judge in the present case was evidently under the impression that because "everybody is covered by Batson," "everybody gets the right not to be struck for an improper reason." On that basis, the judge apparently asks for reasons for all peremptory strikes.
The majority glosses over this crucial issue by casting the facts in the passive voice.1 A review of the record2 shows that the State made no objection to Currin's peremptory challenge; on the contrary, the judge undertook to require of Currin reasons for three peremptory challenges.
"BY MR. VANES (Defense Counsel): Here is my from memory of the sequence [sic]. I struck or attempted to strike on the first pass three jurors.
BY THE COURT: Oh, Kubik, Marco and Moody, right.
BY MR. VANES: Correct. And the way I tendered them to the Court and I still have my sheet was Mr. Moody was the last one. And the court, I do recall and agree with the court that at one point it said something like, you probably know this better than I do, but he's the only male black on the jury-
BY THE COURT: No. black on the panel. He's the only
BY MR. VANES: Right. Only black on the panel.
BY THE COURT: And then I looked out there for the rest of the venire and we weren't going to get another black for another ten, fifteen people.
BY MR. VANES: The court did say that, but it did not say that until it had already, particularly with Kubik or the other two, it started out in terms of the sequence of things, the court started out by asking me for reasons for the per-emptories before we even got to Mr. Moody, let alone the-when we got to Mr. Moody, at some point the court did say that, that is correct.
BY THE COURT: And the reason why I'm now asking for reasons for everybody, it's up in the air as to who's covered by Batson and who isn't. It looks to me like everybody is covered by Bat-son, everybody. So, everybody gets the right not to be struck for an improper reason.
BY MR. VANES: As long as we're here, does the Court agree with me that it did inquire of my reasons for striking?
BY THE COURT: All three.
BY MR. VANES: All three.
BY THE COURT: I agree.
BY MR. VANES: Okay.
BY MS. SEVERTSON (Prosecutor): And the one potential strike the state tried to make.
*1326BY MR. VANES: Right.
BY THE COURT: Yes, you too. Fears proved unfounded again, Miss Severt-son."
Record, p. 485-37.
Under Indiana law, a judge may not sua sponte require a reason for a peremptory challenge. "A peremptory challenge is one exercised without reason stated, without inquiry, and without 'being subject to the court's control." Phillips, 496 N.E.2d at 88. While there is no constitutional or fundamental right to exercise peremptory challenges, the right to peremptory challenges is a matter of statutory grant which may not be expanded or restricted by judicial interpretation. Castro v. State (1991), Ind., 580 N.E.2d 232, 235. Upon review, appellate courts may look only to the statute to determine the appellant's right. Id.
In Schroer v. Funk (1968), Ind., 237 N.E.2d 247, Justice Jackson stated unequivocally:
"The right of the litigant to the use of a peremptory challenge is absolute, there is no area of discretion on the part of the trial court wherein and whereby such right can be denied or abrogated.
s * * a ik *
The language of the Appellate court relative to the statement that the denial of a peremptory challenge of a juror 'primarily involves the exercise of the discretionary powers of the court' is hereby totally disapproved and is deleted."
Id. at 248.
The trial court erred in objecting sua sponte to Currin's peremptory challenge of juror Moody, and it also erred in requiring Currin to provide a neutral explanation for his peremptory challenge without a prima facie case of discrimination having been made by the State.
Normally, when a party raises Batson in objection to a peremptory challenge, the court rules on whether the party has established a prima facie case of racial discrimination. If so, the burden shifts to the other party to come forward with a neutral explanation for the peremptory challenge. In the present case, the judge apparently objected to the defense's peremptory challenge of juror Moody and demanded a race-neutral explanation without establishing a prima facie case of discrimination or requiring the State to establish one. The defense had little choice but to offer the court an explanation, which the court did not accept.
The majority cites Hernandez v. New York (1991), 500 U.S. 352, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 LEd.2d 395, where the prosecutor volunteered his reasons for striking the jurors without waiting for a ruling on whether the defense had established a prima facie case. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the preliminary question of whether the prima facie case had been made had become moot. In our case, however, neither the court nor the prosecutor even attempted to make a prima facie case of discrimination before an explanation was demanded. The fact that juror Moody was the only black juror on the venire was apparently sufficient for the trial court to demand a race-neutral explanation.
The trial court abused its discretion in objecting sua sponte to the defendant's peremptory challenge and compounded this error by demanding a race-neutral explanation without a showing of a prima facie case of discrimination.
I would reverse and remand for a new trial

. "Here, the record reveals that an objection was made to the defendant's peremptory challenge of a black prospective juror." Op. at 1323.

. The voir dire process was not recorded. Our review of this issue has relied upon a colloquy that took place after the jury had returned its verdict.