Court Opinion

ID: 9549302
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:15:53.620329+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:20:06.084419
License: Public Domain

SUTIN, Judge (dissenting). I dissent. This appeal involves the involuntary commitment of Kathy Dean to the New Mexico State Hospital for evaluation and treatment, not to exceed thirty days. Dean appeals. I would reverse. The State claims this appeal is moot because “the patient has been stabilized on her medication and was released at the end of the commitment period” and “that no matter of public interest exists that would necessitate deciding it on the merits.” I disagree. The record is silent on stabilization and release. Even if the facts stated are true, I have no knowledge of the number of other persons who may be affected by the trial court’s error in arriving at its decision. This fact creates a matter of public importance that should be decided on the merits. Matter of Pernell, 92 N.M. 490, 590 P.2d 638 (Ct.App.1979). To commit a person to a mental institution summarily is a taint that demands care and circumspection on the part of the courts. The State filed an unverified Petition for Involuntary Commitment for Mental Health Care. Pursuant to § 43-1-11, N.M. S.A. 1978, a copy of a Psychiatric Evaluation letter was attached to the petition signed by a physician and psychologist employed at the State Hospital. Neither of them testified, and the doctors’ letter was not offered in evidence. At the close of the case, the trial court announced its decision in favor of commitment and declared: . I am going to make the decision not only upon the testimony of Ms. Razenton, (a registered psychiatrist nurse employed by the Lincoln and Otero County Mental Health Association) . but I am going to consider the letter from . (the two doctors). I am going to find on that bases that there is a likelihood that the respondent will cause serious harm to herself or others. [Emphasis added.] The court’s decision is reversible error as a matter of law. The standard of proof in commitment proceedings is “clear and convincing” evidence. Matter of Valdez, 88 N.M. 338, 540 P.2d 819 (1975). “For evidence to be clear and convincing, it must instantly tilt the scales in the affirmative when weighed against the evidence in opposition and the fact finder’s mind is left with an abiding conviction that the evidence is true.” In re Sedillo, 84 N.M. 10, 12, 498 P.2d 1353, 1355 (1972). The trial court did not have an abiding conviction that the nurse’s testimony, when weighed against that of Dean, tilted the scales in favor of the State. It relied on the letter sent to the district attorney that was not in evidence. “Evidence” constitutes the testimony and matters presented at trial for the purpose of proving a fact in issue. Taylor v. Howard, 111 R.I. 527, 304 A.2d 891 (1973); Commonwealth v. Myers, 393 Pa. 224, 144 A.2d 367 (1958). The letter was not evidence of the fact that Dean would cause serious harm to herself or to others. Schindler v. AG Aero Distributors, Inc., 502 S.W.2d 581 (Tex.Civ.App.1973). The letter attached to the petition could not be considered unless the court could have taken judicial notice thereof. The limits of this rule are enumerated in Rule 44(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule is not broad enough to include a medical report affecting the mental condition of a patient even though it is essential to establish the validity of a commitment petition. The pleadings are not evidence. Pinson v. Dreymala, 320 S.W.2d 152 (Tex.Civ.App.1958); Sears v. Smith, 221 Ga. 47, 142 S.E.2d 792 (1965); Evers v. Hollman, 196 Tenn. 364, 268 S.W.2d 97 (1954); Stoney v. Soar, 322 Mass. 408, 76 N.E.2d 645 (1948). A party’s pleadings merely present the issues. Morris v. City Council of Augusta, 204 Ga. 26, 48 S.E.2d 855 (1948). A verified complaint is but an affidavit and is not admissible over objection. Vaughn v. Coccimiglio, 241 Cal.App.2d 676, 50 Cal.Rptr. 876 (1966). The State seeks to escape in various ways. It claims that Dean did not challenge the court’s findings of fact; that the court’s remarks are not appealable since they were not incorporated into the final order. The Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code, §§ 43-1-2 to 43-1-23, N.M.S.A.1978 does not involve a trial governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 43-l-ll(C) reads: Upon completion of the hearing, the court may order a commitment for evaluation and treatment not to exceed seventeen days if the court finds by dear and convincing evidence that: (1) as a result of a mental disorder, the client presents a likelihood of danger to himself or others; (2) the client’s condition is likely to improve with the proposed treatment; and (3) the proposed commitment is consistent with the least drastic means principle. [Emphasis added.] The proceedings are not intended to be carried on in the formal manner in which ordinary civil actions are prosecuted between litigants. It is in the nature of a summary proceeding. An order issued at the close of a hearing does not contemplate findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court did orally make its findings and order, one of which findings was quoted above. No provision is made in the statute that findings of fact and conclusions of law “must be given in writing and filed with the clerk in the cause” as stated in Rule 52(B)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Rules 9(d) and (m)(2) of Rules of Appellate Procedure in Civil Cases are not applicable. It was unnecessary for Dean to challenge the court’s findings. The State relies on Peterson Prop., etc. v. Valencia Cty. Val. Protests Board, 89 N.M. 239, 549 P.2d 1074 (Ct.App.1976) which holds that statements of a judge as to reasons for a judgment, made before the judgment is entered cannot be considered part of a judgment. This case is far removed from the issue in the instant case. Here the triakcourt admitted that he took into consideration, in arriving at his Order of Commitment, evidence that was not of record. This was an admission that the evidence of record was not clear and convincing on the subject of Dean’s likelihood of danger to herself or others. The State also argues that no testimony is required by the mental health professional whose opinion is reflected in the initial screening report. The syllogistic argument is: (1) the admitting physician evaluates the person to determine if the person shall be detained; (2) the evaluation is made a part of the petition to commit the person; (3) therefore, the legislature intended that the letter of evaluation was prima facie evidence that the physician conducted the evaluation required and actually did determine reasonable grounds to detain the person. If this argument were acceptable, then, at the hearing, the State could rest upon its petition and await the person’s presentation of a defense. The State admits that its argument is good “If speculation is in order as to the probable legislative intent in requiring that the initial screening report be filed with the petition . . . .” In determining legislative intent, “speculation, guess or conjecture” are not acceptable theories. They are blobs that courts must carefully avoid. If the legislature has enacted the State’s position in the Mental Health Code, problems of due process would occur, a point raised by Dean in this appeal. The State’s argument is not meritorious. I have carefully reviewed other matters raised by the State in this appeal. They merit no discussion. The Order of the trial court should be . reversed.