Court Opinion

ID: 9405391
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-28 14:13:48.334829+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:21.708820
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  22-P-1002

                                       E.T.

                                       vs.

                                       J.U.

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

        On August 12, 2021, E.T. applied for a harassment

 prevention order against J.U.         See G. L. c. 258E.       In an

 affidavit in support of her application, E.T. stated that J.U.

 had cropped photos from her Facebook account to create over

 twenty lewd images and a video of her, some of which "involved

 extremely sexual conduct."        J.U. sent the photos to several of

 E.T.'s coworkers, and made numerous comments about her work and

 potentially reporting her because of her alleged incompetence.

 E.T. also stated that some of her coworkers had informed her of

 their concerns regarding J.U.'s obsession with her and E.T. did

 "not feel safe" because of his obsession.            Lastly, E.T. wrote

 that J.U. had contacted her children's babysitter, inquiring

 about what time the babysitter was watching the children and

 why.
    At the hearing, after notice, on E.T.'s application for the

order, E.T. and J.U. testified.       E.T. and J.U. have known each

other for three years because of their employment as emergency

medical technicians for the same fire department.       They have

never worked directly together, but interacted occasionally on

duty for emergency calls.   E.T. testified that what she wrote in

her affidavit was true and showed the judge screenshots of the

video that J.U. sent around.    J.U. did not send the video to

E.T., but E.T. received it from a co-worker.       E.T. testified

that J.U. never threatened to harm her.

    The judge concluded that the evidence was sufficient to

issue a harassment prevention order and ordered J.U. to stay

away from and have no contact with E.T. and "to take all photos

and videos of the plaintiff [offline] and not to post any photos

and videos of the plaintiff."

    Discussion.   On appeal, J.U. argues that the evidence was

insufficient to establish "harassment," as defined in G. L.

c. 258E, and thus the harassment prevention order was issued in

error.   When reviewing harassment prevention orders, "we

consider whether the judge could find, by a preponderance of the

evidence, together with all permissible inferences, that the

defendant had committed '[three] or more acts of willful and

malicious conduct aimed at a specific person committed with the

intent to cause fear, intimidation, abuse or damage to property

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and that [did] in fact cause fear, intimidation, abuse or damage

to property'" (citation omitted).      Gassman v. Reason, 90 Mass.

App. Ct. 1, 7 (2016).     See G. L. c. 258E, § 1.   Where, as here,

some of the conduct involves speech, that speech must constitute

"true threats" or "fighting words" to qualify as an act of

harassment.   Seney v. Morhy, 467 Mass. 58, 63 (2014).     True

threats include "direct threats of imminent physical harm" and

"words or actions that -- taking into account the context in

which they arise -- cause the victim to fear such [imminent

physical] harm now or in the future."     Van Liew v. Stansfield,

474 Mass. 31, 37 (2016), quoting O'Brien v. Borowksi, 461 Mass.

415, 425 (2012).

    Because the judge here did not articulate which of J.U.'s

actions constituted the three acts, our review is based on the

entirety of the record.     See Yasmin Y. v. Queshon Q., 101 Mass.

App. Ct. 252, 256 (2022).

    We turn to the photos and the video.      Although they may

have been crude and vulgar, they do not qualify as harassment

because there is no evidence that J.U. sent them with the intent

to cause fear, intimidation, abuse or damage to property or that

they in fact caused E.T. to experience fear, intimidation, abuse

or damage to property.    Furthermore, they did not constitute "a

serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful

violence to a particular individual or group of individuals,"

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Kareem K. v. Ida I., 100 Mass. App. Ct. 902, 904 (2022), quoting

Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003), or "face-to-face

personal insults that are so personally abusive that they are

plainly likely to provoke a violent reaction and cause a breach

of the peace."   O'Brien, 461 Mass. 423, citing Cohen v.

California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971).    Thus, creating and

distributing the photos and video, as a matter of law, did not

constitute acts of harassment, particularly where E.T. informed

the judge that J.U. never threatened her with physical harm or

put her in fear of serious bodily injury.    Cf. A.S.R. v. A.K.A.,

92 Mass. App. Ct. 270, 280 (2017) (though defendant did not

threaten immediate harm, communications that were "relentless,

carried on over a period of months, and frequently contained

explicit references to violence" satisfied definition of "true

threat").

    Similarly, J.U.'s various statements that he was going to

report E.T. to supervisors for incompetence or that he was going

to get her in trouble at work, although upsetting to E.T., did

not amount to harassment or abuse within the meaning of G. L.

c. 258E, § 1.    See O'Brien, 461 Mass. at 427 ("fear of economic

loss, [or] of unfavorable publicity" insufficient to establish

harassment for purposes of G. L. c. 258E).

    The remaining allegation in E.T.'s affidavit -- that J.U.

contacted her children's babysitter to find out what time the

                                  4
babysitter was watching the children and why -- arguably could

have qualified as harassment.   But even so, to obtain a

harassment prevention order, E.T. had the burden of proving that

J.U. committed at least three acts of harassment.   For the

reasons we have stated, she did not meet that burden.      While

J.U.'s conduct is troubling, we are constrained to conclude that

it is not enough to prove harassment under the statute.     General

Laws c. 258E was not designed to protect against every type of

speech that can lead a reasonable person to be disgusted.     See

Gassman, 90 Mass. App. Ct. at 8 ("the term 'harass' has a

specific definition in this context, derived from the statute

and case law, a definition much more exacting than common

usage").

    Because the evidence adduced at the hearing failed to

satisfy the threshold requirements of G. L. c. 258E, § 1, the

harassment prevention order should not have issued and must be

vacated.   Moreover, "if a judge vacates a harassment prevention

order, law enforcement officials shall destroy 'all record'

concerning such order."   Seney, 467 Mass. at 60-61, quoting

G. L. c. 258E, § 9.   The case is remanded to the District Court

for entry of an order vacating and setting aside the harassment

prevention order,

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and for further actions as required by G. L. c. 258E, § 9.     See

F.K. v. S.C., 481 Mass. 325, 335 (2019).

                                      So ordered.

                                      By the Court (Sacks, Shin &
                                        D'Angelo, JJ.1),

                                      Clerk

Entered:    June 28, 2023.

1   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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