Court Opinion

ID: 9896358
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-09 23:00:56.419837+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:46.062890
License: Public Domain

U NITED S TATES A IR F ORCE
            C OURT OF C RIMINAL APPEALS
                       ________________________

                           No. ACM 40119
                       ________________________

                         UNITED STATES
                             Appellee
                                  v.
                        Ervin D. MCCOY
               Airman (E-2), U.S. Air Force, Appellant
                      ________________________

       Appeal from the United States Air Force Trial Judiciary
                        Upon Further Review
                      Decided 9 November 2023
                      ________________________

Military Judge: Colin P. Eichenberger.
Sentence: Sentence adjudged 1 April 2021 by GCM convened at
Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. Sentence entered by military
judge on 26 April 2021: Dishonorable discharge, confinement for 2
years, and reduction to E-1.
For Appellant: Major Matthew L. Blyth, USAF; Major Alexandra K.
Fleszar, USAF.
For Appellee: Lieutenant Colonel Thomas J. Alford, USAF; Lieutenant
Colonel Matthew J. Neil, USAF; Lieutenant Colonel Meredith L. Steer,
USAF; Major John P. Patera, USAF; Major Brittany M. Speirs, USAF;
Mary Ellen Payne, Esquire.
Before ANNEXSTAD, RAMÍREZ, and GRUEN, Appellate Military
Judges.
Judge RAMÍREZ delivered the opinion of the court, in which Senior
Judge ANNEXSTAD and Judge GRUEN joined.
                       ________________________

   This is an unpublished opinion and, as such, does not serve as
   precedent under AFCCA Rule of Practice and Procedure 30.4.
                 United States v. McCoy, No. ACM 40119 (f rev)

                            ________________________

RAMÍREZ, Judge:
    A general court-martial composed of officer and enlisted members convicted
Appellant, contrary to his pleas, of one specification of sexual assault in
violation of Article 120, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C.
§ 920.1 The members found Appellant not guilty of a second specification of
sexual assault against the same victim also in violation of Article 120, UCMJ.
The members sentenced Appellant to a dishonorable discharge, confinement
for two years, and reduction to the grade of E-1. The convening authority took
no action on the findings or sentence.
    On 26 July 2022, Appellant raised eight issues2 on appeal, which we reword
as follows: (1) whether Appellant’s sexual assault conviction is factually
sufficient; (2) whether the military judge abused his discretion concerning Mil.
R. Evid. 404(b) evidence; (3) whether the circuit trial counsel engaged in
improper argument; (4) whether the military judge erred when he denied a
defense request for a unanimous verdict; (5) whether the convening authority
erred when he denied a deferment request Appellant did not request and failed
to address Appellant’s request for a suspension; (6) whether the convening
authority had jurisdiction over Appellant; (7) whether Appellant’s sexual
assault conviction is legally sufficient; and (8) whether the omission of open-
session audio recordings from the record of trial is a substantial omission,
thereby limiting this court’s ability to approve a punitive discharge or
confinement in excess of six months.
    This case is before us a second time as we earlier addressed issue (8). On
31 October 2022, this court returned the record of trial to the military judge
pursuant to Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 1112(d) as the disc containing
the audio recording from Appellant’s trial was missing. United States v. McCoy,
No. ACM 40119, 2022 CCA LEXIS 632, at *3 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 31 Oct. 2022)
(order).3 The issue has since been resolved. The case was re-docketed with this
court with a corrected record.
   We remand this case for a second time as we find that the fifth issue
concerning the convening authority’s failure to properly consider and act on

1 All references in this opinion to the UCMJ, the Military Rules of Evidence, and the

Rules for Courts-Martial are to the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2019
ed.).
2 Issues 6, 7, and 8 are raised pursuant to United States v. Grostefon, 12 M.J. 431

(C.M.A. 1982).
3 We note the remand order had a scrivener’s error incorrectly identifying the date of

docketing as 6 July 2022; the correct date is 6 July 2021.

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                United States v. McCoy, No. ACM 40119 (f rev)

Appellant’s suspension request has merit and must be addressed before we
consider the remaining issues.

                                I. BACKGROUND
    As it pertains to this remand issue, Appellant, through trial defense
counsel, submitted matters to the convening authority on 9 April 2021
requesting that the convening authority “suspend his reduction in rank
pending the execution of his dishonorable discharge.” Appellant did not
mention or ask for deferment. On 23 April 2021, the convening authority issued
his decision on action. In the document, the convening authority specifically
took “no action on the sentence.” Additionally, the convening authority
incorrectly stated that “[o]n 9 April 2021, [Appellant] requested deferment of
the reduction in grade pending the execution of his dishonorable discharge.
That request is hereby denied.” (Emphasis added).
   As part of issue (5), Appellant requests this court remand his case for the
convening authority to properly consider and act on his request.

                                 II. DISCUSSION
A. Law
   We review issues concerning post-trial processing de novo. United States v.
Zegarrundo, 77 M.J. 612, 613 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2018) (citation omitted).
    “Deferment of a sentence . . . is a postponement of the running of the
sentence.” R.C.M. 1103(a)(2). “Suspension of a sentence grants the [appellant]
a probationary period during which the suspended part of a sentence is not
executed, and upon the [appellant’s] successful completion of which the
suspended part of the sentence shall be remitted.” R.C.M. 1107(a). When an
appellant requests deferment, he has “the burden of showing that the interests
of the [appellant] and the community in deferral outweigh the community’s
interests in imposition of the punishment on its effective date.” R.C.M.
1103(d)(2). On the other hand, R.C.M. 1107 puts no such burden on an
appellant concerning the request for a suspension.
    “A motion to correct an error in the action of the convening authority shall
be filed within five days after the party receives the convening authority’s
action.” R.C.M. 1104(b)(2)(B). An appellant’s “failure to file a post-trial motion
within the allotted time forfeits his or her right to object to the accuracy of the
convening authority’s decision on an action, absent plain error.” United States
v. Miller, 82 M.J. 204, 207 (C.A.A.F. 2022) (footnote omitted). “Plain error
occurs when (1) there is error, (2) the error is plain or obvious, and (3) the error
results in material prejudice to a substantial right of the accused.” Id. at 207–
08 (citation omitted).

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                United States v. McCoy, No. ACM 40119 (f rev)

    “[B]ecause of the highly discretionary nature of the convening authority’s
clemency power, the threshold for showing prejudice is low.” United States v.
Lee, 52 M.J. 51, 53 (C.A.A.F. 1999). “This Court will give an appellant the
benefit of the doubt and find that there is material prejudice to the substantial
rights of an appellant if there is an error and the appellant makes some
colorable showing of possible prejudice.” Id. (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).
B. Analysis
    As Appellant failed to file a post-trial motion, we test for plain error. A
review of Appellant’s post-trial request at issue and the convening authority’s
decision on action makes clear that the convening authority committed error
by failing to consider Appellant’s request for suspension of his rank reduction.
    The Government contends that “[i]f the [c]onvening [a]uthority erred, then
the error is a minor technical error of law that did not materially prejudice the
substantial rights of Appellant,” because “[i]t is hard to fathom that the
[c]onvening [a]uthority would have denied the much shorter request for a
deferment under R.C.M. 1103, but would have granted the request for
Appellant to continue to serve in the rank of Airman [ ] pending execution of
the dishonorable discharge.” Noting the Government’s argument, we will not
guess as to what the convening authority would have done in this situation.
    The bar for prejudice is low and we have nothing in the record
demonstrating that the convening authority ever acted on Appellant’s
suspension request, much less considered the request. Furthermore, because
the legal standards that govern suspension and deferment are different, we
cannot be sure that the convening authority was advised of or used the proper
legal standard. Because the convening authority had the ability to grant the
suspension but does not appear to have considered it, we find there is a
colorable showing of prejudice. We will not presume that the convening
authority considered the request or what the convening authority might have
done. See United States v. Valentin-Andino, 83 M.J. 537, 542 (A.F. Ct. Crim.
App. 2023). As such, remand is appropriate.
   In addition to the convening authority’s decision misstating Appellant’s
request and appearing to act upon a request that did not occur, we note that
the entry of judgment also incorrectly states Appellant requested a deferment,
not a suspension.

                               III. CONCLUSION
    Pursuant to R.C.M. 1112(d)(2), this case is REMANDED to the Chief Trial
Judge, Air Force Trial Judiciary, to resolve a substantial issue with the post-
trial processing. Specifically, this case is being returned for the convening

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                United States v. McCoy, No. ACM 40119 (f rev)

authority to address Appellant’s request to suspend his reduction in rank, and
the military judge to correct errors in the entry of judgment.
   Our remand returns jurisdiction over the case to a detailed military judge
and dismisses this appellate proceeding consistent with Rule 29(b)(2) of the
Joint Rules for Appellate Procedure for Courts of Criminal Appeals. JT. CT.
CRIM. APP. R. 29(b)(2). A detailed military judge may:
   (1) Return the record of trial to the convening authority for processing
consistent with this opinion, specifically to have the convening authority or his
successor affirmatively grant or deny Appellant’s request to suspend his
reduction in rank;
   (2) Conduct one or more Article 66(f)(3), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866(f)(3),
proceedings using the procedural rules for post-trial Article 39(a), UCMJ, 10
U.S.C. § 839(a), sessions; and
   (3) Correct or modify the entry of judgment.
    Thereafter the record will be returned to the court for completion of
appellate review under Article 66(d), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866(d). The record of
trial shall be returned to the court not later than 7 December 2023. If the
record cannot be returned to the court by that date, the Government will
inform the court in writing not later than 30 November 2023 of the status of
the Government’s compliance with this opinion.

                     FOR THE COURT

                     CAROL K. JOYCE
                     Clerk of the Court

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