Court Opinion

ID: 9882504
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:10:49.446155+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:00:05.995202
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Guerra, 2023-Ohio-2920.]

                      IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                          THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                              PUTNAM COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,
                                                          CASE NO. 12-23-01
       PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

       v.

ERIC JORDAN GUERRA,                                       OPINION

       DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

                    Appeal from Putnam County Municipal Court
                          Trial Court No. 2022 CRB 00155

                                      Judgment Affirmed

                            Date of Decision: August 21, 2023

APPEARANCES:

        Austin C. Buchholz for Appellant

        Nicole M. Smith for Appellee
Case No. 12-23-01

WILLAMOWSKI, J.

       {¶1} Defendant-appellant Eric J. Guerra (“Guerra”) appeals the judgment of

the Putnam County Municipal Court, alleging that his conviction is not supported

by sufficient evidence; that his conviction is against the manifest weight of the

evidence; and that he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel. For

the reasons set forth below, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

                           Facts and Procedural History

       {¶2} After a birthday party on June 18, 2022, A. went to her cousin’s house

for a sleepover. Her cousin’s mother was Erin T. (“Erin”). However, A. ended up

going with her cousin over to Guerra’s house at roughly 6:00 P.M. for the purpose

of babysitting Guerra’s children. Guerra and his wife, Taylor Guerra (“Taylor”),

went to a community function. When Guerra came home late at night, A. was

watching a movie with her cousin. Guerra asked if they wanted to join the adults at

a bonfire in the backyard. A. and her cousin declined this invitation, opting instead

to finish their movie.

       {¶3} After the movie was over, A. fell asleep on the couch in Guerra’s living

room with a blanket on top of her. A. testified that Guerra woke her up at roughly

3:00 A.M. to tell her that he had taken A.’s cousin home. Guerra then went back

outside to tend to the bonfire. Shortly thereafter, Guerra returned to the living room.

A. testified that he asked if he could sit on the couch and watch some television. A.

then made room for Guerra to sit on the couch.

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Case No. 12-23-01

       {¶4} A. testified that, while Guerra was watching the television, he moved

closer to where she was lying down on the couch, reached under the blanket, and

touched her leg. She affirmed that “his hand began to slide up her leg” and testified

that she “felt like something go up [her] * * * leg and grab her right butt cheek.”

(Tr. 23). She testified that no one else was on the couch beside her and that she

pushed Guerra’s hand away from her body. (Tr. 44-45). A. stated that Guerra then

got up and went to the bathroom.

       {¶5} A. indicated that, when he returned from the restroom, he “got behind”

her on the couch “like he was giving [her] * * * a bear hug.” (Tr. 46). She testified

that Guerra then began to slide his hand down her shirt towards her breast. She

affirmed that he “touch[ed] the top part of her breast” and that she pushed his hand

away a second time. (Tr. 47). Guerra then sat back up on the couch next to her.

       {¶6} A. testified that Guerra then tried a third time to touch her, putting his

hand on her side. After she pushed his hand away for the third time, Guerra went

upstairs and did not attempt to touch her again. A. testified that she then deliberated

about what course of action to take. She did not have her cell phone with her to

contact anyone about this situation. A. ultimately chose to remain on the couch

because another one of her cousins was in the house and she wanted to make sure

her cousin was protected.

       {¶7} Later in the morning of June 19, 2019, A. noticed that Guerra had a

security camera in the living room when she saw Taylor repositioning it. A. testified

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Case No. 12-23-01

that the camera had been turned towards the wall, but after Taylor had adjusted it,

the camera was facing the couch where A. had been sleeping in the living room. A.

was then picked up from Guerra’s house by Erin. On the drive to Erin’s house, A.

shared that she had “felt very uncomfortable” at Guerra’s house and that Guerra had

touched her inappropriately. (Tr. 28). However, she did not disclose the remainder

of her allegations.

       {¶8} A’s father, Gabriel T. (“Gabriel”), picked her up at Erin’s house and

then drove with her to a community event in town. Shortly after they had arrived at

the event, Gabriel noticed that A. seemed “really off.” (Tr. 56). A. then began to

cry and disclosed all of her allegations. Gabriel testified that, in this timeframe, A.

was “[h]ysterical, just crying.” (Tr. 64).

       {¶9} Gabriel then took A. to the police department where she spoke with

Officer Scott Harshman (“Officer Harshman”).            On June 22, 2022, Officer

Harshman contacted Guerra, who denied touching A. inappropriately and suggested

that A. had a nightmare while she was sleeping at his house. Guerra initially denied

having cameras in his living room but later reported that the cameras had been

unplugged. On June 23, 2022, A. sat for an interview at Children’s Services

Department at Putnam County Job and Family Services with Michelle Schumacher

(“Schumacher”).

       {¶10} On August 8, 2022, Guerra was charged with one count of sexual

imposition in violation of R.C. 2907.06(A)(4), a third-degree misdemeanor. A.,

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Case No. 12-23-01

Gabriel, Officer Harshman, Schumacher, and Taylor testified at a bench trial on

January 24, 2023. The Defense called Erin to testify as a witness, but she was not

present by that point during the trial. After considering the evidence, the trial court

found Guerra guilty of the charge against him. On February 16, 2023, the trial court

issued its judgment entry of sentencing.

       {¶11} Guerra filed his notice of appeal on February 21, 2023. On appeal, he

raises the following four assignments of error:

                            First Assignment of Error

       Appellant’s conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence
       presented at trial.

                           Second Assignment of Error

       Appellant’s conviction was against the manifest weight of the
       evidence presented at trial.

                            Third Assignment of Error

       Appellant did not receive effective assistance of counsel when
       Counsel failed [to] request a recess in order to locate Appellant’s
       witness when Appellant’s witness was unable to be found.

                           Fourth Assignment of Error

       The trial court erred by failing to grant a judgment of acquittal,
       pursuant to Crim.R. 29(A) on the Sexual Imposition charge and
       thereafter entering a judgment of conviction on this offense [that]
       was not supported by sufficient evidence.

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Case No. 12-23-01

                            First Assignment of Error

       {¶12} Guerra argues that his conviction for sexual imposition is not

supported by sufficient evidence.

                                    Legal Standard

       {¶13} “A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a

conviction requires a court to determine whether the state has met its burden of

production at trial.” State v. Gear, 3d Dist. Van Wert No. 15-22-03, 2023-Ohio-

1246, ¶ 13, quoting In re Swift, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 79610, 2002-Ohio-1276, ¶

19. This analysis “addresses the question of whether adequate evidence was

produced for the case to be considered by the trier of fact and, thus, whether the

evidence was ‘legally sufficient to support the verdict * * *.’” State v. Barga, 3d

Dist. Shelby No. 17-17-14, 2018-Ohio-2804, ¶ 8, quoting State v. Worthington, 3d

Dist. Hardin No. 6-15-04, 2016-Ohio-530, ¶ 12.

       {¶14} “An appellate court is not to examine whether the evidence presented

should be believed but should rather ‘examine the evidence admitted at trial to

determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of

the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” State v. Wilson, 2022-Ohio-504,

185 N.E.3d 176, ¶ 57 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 274, 574

N.E.2d 492 (1991), superseded by state constitutional amendment on other grounds,

State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 1997-Ohio-355, 684 N.E.2d 668 (1997). On

appeal, the applicable standard of review “is whether, after viewing the evidence in

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Case No. 12-23-01

the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have

found that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable

doubt.” State v. Brown, 3d Dist. Hancock No. 5-17-19, 2018-Ohio-899, ¶ 27,

quoting State v. Plott, 2017-Ohio-38, 80 N.E.3d 1108, ¶ 62 (3d Dist.).

       {¶15} To establish a conviction for sexual imposition in violation of R.C.

2907.06(A)(4), the State must establish that the defendant

       ha[d] sexual contact with another, not the spouse of the offender * *
       * when * * * [t]he other person * * * is thirteen years of age or older
       but less than sixteen years of age, whether or not the offender knows
       the age of such person, and the offender is at least eighteen years of
       age and four or more years older than such other person.

R.C. 2907.06(A)(4). The Ohio Revised Code defines “sexual contact” as follows:

       any touching of an erogenous zone of another, including without
       limitation the thigh, genitals, buttock, pubic region, or, if the person
       is a female, a breast, for the purpose of sexually arousing or gratifying
       either person.

R.C. 2907.01(B). The State need not produce direct testimony to establish the

contact was for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification. State v Lewis, 3d Dist.

Van Wert No. 2-98-1, 2020-Ohio-6894, ¶ 25. “The requisite purpose ‘may be

discerned from the type, nature, and circumstances of the contact * * *.’” Id.,

quoting State v. Uhler, 80 Ohio App.3d 113, 123, 608 N.E.2d 1091 (9th Dist. 1992).

       {¶16} Further, R.C. 2907.06(B) states that a person may not be convicted of

sexual imposition “solely upon the victim’s testimony unsupported by other

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Case No. 12-23-01

evidence.” Thus, the State must produce some corroborative evidence. State v.

Lieurance, 3d Dist. Auglaize Nos. 2-12-21 and 2-12-23, 2013-Ohio-3875, ¶ 27.

                                   Legal Analysis

       {¶17} Under this assignment of error, Guerra raises two main arguments.

First, he asserts that the State did not establish that he was eighteen years old and

more than four years older than A. at the time of this offense. At trial, A. gave her

date of birth and testified that she was fourteen. Taylor then testified that she had

been married to Guerra for five years. This would indicate that he is over the age

of eighteen. Further, for Guerra to have been married for five years, he would also

have to be more than five years older than A. The trial testimony also indicates that

Guerra was able to drive; had four children; and had been drinking alcohol. A. also

describes Guerra as being one of the “adults.” (Tr. 16). Gabriel testified that he and

Guerra “grew up together.” (Tr. 65). Based on this evidence, we conclude that the

State produced some evidence to substantiate the age-related elements of the offense

of sexual imposition. Thus, Guerra’s first argument is without merit.

       {¶18} Second, Guerra argues that the State did not produce evidence that the

alleged contact was motivated by the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification.

However, during her trial testimony, A. indicated that Guerra sat down next to her;

put his hand under the blanket covering her; reached up her leg; and grabbed the

right area of her buttocks. A. stated that she pushed his hand away from her body.

She then testified that Guerra left the couch to go to the bathroom but later returned

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Case No. 12-23-01

to where she was on the couch. A. indicated that Guerra laid alongside her, giving

her a “bear hug.” (Tr. 46). She stated that he then reached under the blanket; down

her shirt; and touched the upper region of her breast. A. stated that she again pushed

his hand away from her body and that he moved away from her.

       {¶19} A.’s trial testimony indicates that, to touch her buttocks and the upper

portion of her breast, Guerra had to sit down next to her on the couch; reach under

a blanket; get underneath her clothes; and move his hand across portions of her

body. After he touched her buttocks, he left the living room before returning to the

couch and reaching down her shirt to touch the upper area of her breast. This

testimony suggests that he was intentionally seeking to make contact with these

erogenous zones of A.’s body. A. also affirmed that, in touching these areas, he

“slid” his hand across her leg and down her shirt. (Tr. 45, 47). She also testified

that he positioned himself around her body when he reached down her shirt to make

contact with her breast, affirming that he gave her a “bear hug.” (Tr. 46).

       {¶20} Further, A. testified that, after Guerra first touched an erogenous zone

of her body, she pushed his hand away to signal that this contact was unwanted.

However, he put his hands on her two more times before he went to bed, prompting

A. to push his hands away from her body on both occasions. Based on the

circumstances surrounding the contact that Guerra made with these erogenous zones

of A.’s body, a rational trier of fact could infer that he acted with the purpose of

attaining sexual arousal or gratification. See State v. Jones, 3d Dist. Auglaize No.

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Case No. 12-23-01

2-98-1, 1998 WL 405906, *3 (July 22, 1998); State v. Adams, 5th Dist. Licking No.

02-CA-00043, 2002-Ohio-5953, ¶ 23. Thus, Guerra’s second argument is without

merit.

         {¶21} Having examined the evidence in a light most favorable to the

prosecution, we conclude some evidence was produced at trial from which the trial

court could determine that Guerra was over eighteen years old and more than four

years older than A. Further, we also conclude that some evidence was produced at

trial from which the trial court could determine that Guerra had acted with the

purpose of seeking sexual arousal or gratification. For these reasons, Guerra has

failed to demonstrate that his conviction is not supported by legally sufficient

evidence. Thus, his first assignment of error is overruled.

                             Second Assignment of Error

         {¶22} Guerra argues that his conviction for sexual imposition is against the

manifest weight of the evidence.

                                   Legal Standard

         {¶23} “In a manifest weight analysis, ‘an appellate court determines whether

the state has appropriately carried its burden of persuasion.’” State v. Richey, 2021-

Ohio-1461, 170 N.E.3d 933, ¶ 29 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Blanton, 121 Ohio

App.3d 162, 169, 699 N.E.2d 136 (3d Dist. 1997). “Unlike our review of the

sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court’s function when reviewing the weight

of the evidence is to determine whether the greater amount of credible evidence

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Case No. 12-23-01

supports the verdict.” Plott, supra, at ¶ 73. Thus, “the appellate court sits as a

‘thirteenth juror’ * * *.” State v. Davis, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-16-30, 2017-Ohio-

2916, ¶ 17, quoting State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 1997-Ohio-52, 678

N.E.2d 541 (1997). On appeal, courts

       must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all of the
       reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses, and
       determine whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the
       factfinder ‘clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage
       of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial
       ordered.’

State v. Brentlinger, 2017-Ohio-2588, 90 N.E.3d 200, ¶ 36 (3d Dist.), quoting

Thompkins at 387.

       {¶24} “A reviewing court must, however, allow the trier of fact appropriate

discretion on matters relating to the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the

witnesses.” State v. Sullivan, 2017-Ohio-8937, 102 N.E.3d 86, ¶ 38 (3d Dist.),

quoting State v. Coleman, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-13-53, 2014-Ohio-5320, ¶ 7. “Only

in exceptional cases, where the evidence ‘weighs heavily against the conviction,’

should an appellate court overturn the trial court’s judgment.” State v. Little, 2016-

Ohio-8398, 78 N.E.3d 323, ¶ 27 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Hunter, 131 Ohio St.3d

67, 2011-Ohio-6524, 960 N.E.2d 955, ¶ 119.

                                   Legal Analysis

       {¶25} We herein reincorporate our review of the evidence presented in the

sufficiency analysis and proceed to examine the evidence presented by the Defense.

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Case No. 12-23-01

At trial, Officer Harshman stated that he heard two inconsistencies between A.’s

disclosure to him at the police station and her trial testimony. First, A. had told him

previously that she told Guerra “no” when he was touching her. In her trial

testimony, she indicated that she did not give him verbal commands but just pushed

his hand away. On redirect examination, A. indicated that she pushed Guerra’s hand

away as a way of letting him know she did not want him to touch her. Second,

Officer Harshman said, “My understanding when she told me that he went up under

her shirt * * * versus her stating [at trial that] Eric [Guerra] went down.” (Tr. 91).

He indicated that her statements were otherwise consistent. Schumacher was

questioned about this second inconsistency and affirmed that she did not see any

“substantive difference” between “saying that he went up the shirt, under the shirt,

or in the shirt * * *.” (Tr. 112).

       {¶26} On cross-examination, A. testified that, when she mentioned Guerra

touching her inappropriately, Erin said nothing in response. A. explained that she

did not disclose all of the allegations to Erin because she did not trust her. On cross-

examination, Gabriel testified that Erin did not mention A. had told her that Guerra

had inappropriately touched her. He testified that A. was not acting abnormally

during the drive to the community event but that he noticed her behavior seemed off

while they were at the event.

       {¶27} The Defense called Taylor as a witness. She testified that A. was over

at their house for a birthday party; that A. babysat their children while they were at

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Case No. 12-23-01

a community event; and that A. spent the night at their house. Taylor stated that

they left their house at roughly 10:00 P.M. and returned close to midnight. She

stated that she and Guerra were outside at a bonfire for a couple hours and then went

to a relative’s house before coming home and going to bed at roughly 4:00 A.M.

       {¶28} Taylor further testified that Guerra did not have any contact with A.

while she (Taylor) was awake. Taylor stated that she tried to wake up A. when

Guerra was going to take A.’s cousin home but was not able to get her up. She

testified that she went to bed at roughly the same time as Guerra and that she

believed she would have woken up if he had gotten up from bed to go downstairs.

After she went to bed, she got up one time to feed her baby. At that time, Guerra

was in their bed. However, she admitted that this feeding lasted a brief period of

time. Taylor also testified that she and Guerra had been drinking that night. She

admitted that Guerra was mildly intoxicated and that he drove A.’s cousin to Erin’s

house in this condition.

       {¶29} Having examined the testimony presented at trial on the basis of its

weight and credibility, we cannot conclude that the evidence weighs heavily against

Guerra’s conviction. The record contains no indication that the finder of fact lost

its way and returned a verdict that is against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Accordingly, Guerra’s second assignment of error is overruled.

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Case No. 12-23-01

                            Third Assignment of Error

       {¶30} Guerra argues that he was denied his right to the effective assistance

of counsel when defense counsel did not request a recess to locate a witness.

                                  Legal Standard

       {¶31} “Under Ohio law, ‘a properly licensed attorney is presumed to carry

out his duties in a competent manner.’” State v. Harvey, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-19-

34, 2020-Ohio-329, ¶ 57, quoting State v. Gee, 3d Dist. Putnam No. 12-92-9, 1993

WL 270995 (July 22, 1993). “For this reason, the appellant has the burden of

proving that he or she was denied the right to the effective assistance of counsel.”

State v. Cartlidge, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-19-44, 2020-Ohio-3615, ¶ 39. “In order

to prove an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the appellant must carry the

burden of establishing (1) that his or her counsel’s performance was deficient and

(2) that this deficient performance prejudiced the defendant.” State v. McWay, 3d

Dist. Allen No. 1-17-42, 2018-Ohio-3618, ¶ 24, quoting Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

       {¶32} In order to establish deficient performance, the appellant must

demonstrate that trial “counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not

functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.”

State v. Howton, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-16-35, 2017-Ohio-4349, ¶ 23, quoting

Strickland at 687. “[D]ebatable trial tactics do not establish ineffective assistance

of counsel.” State v. Queen, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-19-41, 2020-Ohio-618, ¶ 14,

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Case No. 12-23-01

quoting State v. Conway, 109 Ohio St.3d 412, 2006-Ohio-2815, 848 N.E.2d 810, ¶

101.

       {¶33} “In order to establish prejudice, ‘the defendant must show a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have

been different.’” State v. Berry, 3d Dist. Union No. 14-20-05, 2021-Ohio-1132, ¶

122, quoting State v. Bibbs, 2016-Ohio-8396, 78 N.E.3d 343, ¶ 13 (3d Dist.). If the

appellant does not establish one of these two prongs, the appellate court does not

need to consider the facts of the case under the other prong of the test. State v.

Baker, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-17-61, 2018-Ohio-3431, ¶ 19.

                                  Legal Analysis

       {¶34} On appeal, Guerra argues that, when the trial court was notified that

Erin was not present to testify as a witness, defense counsel should have requested

a recess and sought to locate Erin. Even if we assume that Erin could have been

located had a recess been requested and granted, Guerra has not demonstrated how

Erin’s testimony would have changed the outcome of this proceeding. At trial,

Gabriel, Officer Harshman, and Schumacher testified about the content of A.’s

disclosures on June 19, 2022 and June 23, 2022. The content of these disclosures

and A.’s trial testimony were repeatedly compared and scrutinized through direct

and cross-examination.    Schumacher testified that the content of the forensic

interview and the content of A.’s disclosure to the police were consistent.

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       {¶35} However, on direct examination, Officer Harshman identified the two

inconsistencies that he observed between A.’s initial disclosure to him and her trial

testimony. The Defense then recalled Officer Harshman as a witness to testify about

these two inconsistencies at the conclusion of the trial. After hearing all of the trial

testimony, the trial court concluded that A.’s testimony “was extremely credible.”

(Tr. 145). There is no indication that Erin’s testimony would have changed this

conclusion or the outcome of this case. Since Guerra has failed to establish that

defense counsel’s failure to request a recess prejudiced his defense, he has failed to

carry the burden of establishing that he was denied his right to the effective

assistance of counsel. Thus, his third assignment of error is overruled.

                              Fourth Assignment of Error

       {¶36} Guerra argues that the trial court erred in denying his Crim.R. 29

motion for acquittal.

                                    Legal Standard

       {¶37} Crim.R. 29 provides for motions for judgments of acquittal and reads,

in its relevant part, as follows:

       The court on motion of a defendant or on its own motion, after the
       evidence on either side is closed, shall order the entry of a judgment
       of acquittal of one or more offenses charged in the indictment,
       information, or complaint, if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a
       conviction of such offense or offenses.

Crim.R. 29(A). “An appellate court reviews a denial of a Crim.R. 29 motion for

judgment of acquittal using the same standard that is used to review a sufficiency of

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the evidence claim. Sullivan, supra, at ¶ 27, quoting State v. Lightner, 3d Dist.

Hardin No. 6-08-11, 2009-Ohio-544, ¶ 11.

       {¶38} R.C. 2907.06(B) states that “[n]o person shall be convicted of a

violation of this section solely upon the victim’s testimony unsupported by other

evidence.” The Ohio Supreme Court has given the following interpretation of

corroboration requirement in R.C. 2907.06(B):

       The corroborating evidence necessary to satisfy R.C. 2907.06(B) need
       not be independently sufficient to convict the accused, and it need not
       go to every essential element of the crime charged. Slight
       circumstances or evidence which tends to support the victim’s
       testimony is satisfactory. The corroboration requirement of R.C.
       2907.06(B) is a threshold inquiry of legal sufficiency * * * not a
       question of proof * * * [for] the factfinder.

State v. Economo, 76 Ohio St.3d 56, 60, 1996-Ohio-426, 666 N.E.2d 225 (1996).

See State v. Haskell, 3d Dist. Wyandot No. 16-15-03, 2015-Ohio-3095, ¶ 40.

                                  Legal Analysis

       {¶39} After the State rested, defense counsel made a Crim.R. 29 motion for

acquittal, arguing that the State provided “nothing to corroborate” A.’s allegations.

(Tr. 113). However, Gabriel testified that he picked up A. from Erin’s house on

June 19, 2022. They then went to a community event where Gabriel noticed that A.

“was really off” and was acting “out of character.” (Tr. 56, 63). Based on her

“demeanor,” he asked if anything was wrong. (Tr. 60). In response, A. “just started

crying.” (Tr. 61). He also testified that this was not normal behavior for A. to cry

in front of others. Gabriel then took her to a more private location where she

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disclosed her allegations. He stated that, in this process, A. was “[h]ysterical, just

crying.” (Tr. 64).

       {¶40} Officer Harshman also testified that he contacted Guerra about A.’s

allegations. He reported that Guerra indicated that A. was at his house; that “he

heard [her] * * * crying”; that “he went to investigate”; and that A. indicated that

she had a nightmare. (Tr. 83). While Guerra denied having any physical contact

with A., he did confirm that A. was sleeping at his house on that evening. Guerra

also eventually admitted that he had security cameras in his living room as A. had

reported.

       {¶41} Further, Schumacher testified that she spoke with Taylor and Guerra.

She indicated that Taylor stated that she had been with Guerra at a community event

until 1:00 A.M. or 2:00 A.M. on the night when A. was at their house. Taylor told

Schumacher that Guerra then left the house to drive two kids home and that she, not

Guerra, attempted to wake up A. that night. This testimony confirms that A. spent

the night at Guerra’s house. Taylor also indicated that they had cameras in their

house but stated that the footage is not retained after each day.

       {¶42} After hearing the State’s arguments, the trial court denied Guerra’s

Crim.R. 29 motion, finding that corroborating evidence had been presented by the

State in this case. Having examined the evidence in the record in a light most

favorable to the prosecution, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred in finding

that the State had presented corroborative evidence that was sufficient to support a

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conviction for the offense of sexual imposition. See Lieurance, supra, at ¶ 28-29;

Economo, supra, at 228-229. Thus, the trial court did not err in denying Guerra’s

Crim.R. 29 motion. Accordingly, the fourth assignment of error is overruled.

                                   Conclusion

       {¶43} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant in the particulars

assigned and argued, the judgment of the Putnam County Municipal Court is

affirmed.

                                                              Judgment Affirmed

WALDICK and ZIMMERMAN, J.J., concur.

/hls

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