Court Opinion

ID: 9486299
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 11:43:49.907714+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:38.001954
License: Public Domain

KEITH, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the majority’s decision affirming Appellant Odom’s firearm conviction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2) and Appellant Johnson’s conviction for possession of cocaine in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 2. I similarly concur in the majority’s decision to vacate Bulger’s sentence and remand for resentencing.
I disagree, however, with the majority’s conclusions regarding Hoffman’s grand jury testimony. Because this testimony impacts the conspiracy convictions, and the related firearms convictions of all Appellants, I respectfully dissent from the portion of the opinion affirming the conspiracy convictions.
On January 7, 1992, the court held a hearing at which Todd Hoffman testified that his previous statements before the grand jury implicating Appellants Bulger and Odom were lies. The majority found Hoffman’s testimony at trial sufficiently inconsistent with his grand jury testimony to lay the required foundation for the admission of the grand jury testimony. I disagree because no inconsistencies were elicited until after the introduction of the grand jury testimony. Hoffman’s only inconsistent response consisted of a response to a question about his grand jury testimony. Only after a question which introduced his earlier testimony did Hoffman “contradict” the prior testimony by stating he had lied. The prosecutor, by directly asking Hoffman about his testimony, introduced the grand jury testimony before any inconsistencies and thus before he laid a proper foundation.
Under Rule 801(d)(1)(A), a prior statement by a witness is not hearsay if the declarant after testifying at trial, subject to cross-examination, contradicts or gives testimony inconsistent with such prior statement. Additionally, the prior statement must have been given under oath and subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, deposition or other proceeding. In the instant ease, a review of the prosecutor’s examination of Hoffman reveals that Hoffman made no statements at trial that contradicted his earlier statements before the grand jury. The government did not ask Hoffman any sub*962stantive questions which elicited responses inconsistent with his grand jury testimony. Instead, the prosecutor failed to lay a proper foundation, and began questioning Hoffman on his grand jury testimony before eliciting any trial testimony from Hoffman that was inconsistent with that grand jury testimony.
The majority states:
Contrary to defendants’ assertions, the admissibility of Hoffman's grand jury testimony does not hinge on whether the prosecutor elicited inconsistent trial testimony. Hoffman testified on cross-examination, prior to the admission of his grand jury testimony, to facts inconsistent with his grand jury testimony. It is immaterial whether the prosecutor or defense counsel elicits the foundation for the testimony, so long as the requirements of Rule 801(d)(1)(A) are satisfied. They were satisfied in this case, and the admission of Hoffman’s grand jury testimony as substantive evidence was proper.
I disagree with the majority’s assertion that Hoffman’s statement of “Yes. I falsely testified,” labeling his prior testimony as false, established a sufficient inconsistency to permit admission under Rule 801(d)(1)(A). Hoffman’s statement was not a proper substitute for a true response from the witness contradicting his prior testimony. Thus, under Rule 801, Hoffman’s grand jury testimony constituted inadmissible hearsay.
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right of an accused in a criminal prosecution to be confronted with the witnesses against him. “[T]he main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the opponent the opportunity of cross-examination.” Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1110, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974) (quoting 5 J. Wigmore, Evidence ¶ 1395, p. 123 (3d ed. 1940)).
The Supreme Court “has consistently concluded that the uneross-examined testimony of an alleged co-conspirator is not sufficiently rehable to meet the requirement of the Confrontation Clause.” United States v. Gomez-Lemos, 939 F.2d 326, 332 (6th Cir.1991) (citing Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88. S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968)). The Court has reasoned that a co-conspirator has a “strong motivation to implicate the defendant and to exonerate himself,” and therefore, a co-conspirator’s statements concerning the defendant should be viewed suspiciously. Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 541, 106 S.Ct. 2056, 2062, 90 L.Ed.2d 514 (1986) (quoting Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. at 391, 88 S.Ct. at 1686 (White, J., dissenting) (citations omitted)). Because Hoffman’s testimony was before a grand jury, the Appellants did not have an opportunity to cross-examine him.1 As an alleged co-conspirator in á drug distribution ring, Hoffman had ample reason to blame the Appellants in an effort to vindicate himself. The suspicious nature of his statements is evidenced by the fact that he recanted them at a later proceeding.
Clearly, the admission of Hoffman’s grand jury testimony allowed an error of a constitutional dimension to occur at the Appellants’ trial. Further, in this case the admission of Hoffman’s testimony was not harmless error. The testimony was crucial to the government’s proof of the conspiracy, directly implicating the Appellants as co-conspirators. The conspiracy convictions rest upon improperly admitted hearsay therefore, they should be reversed. Because I believe the conspiracy convictions must be reversed, the firearm convictions in connection with the conspiracy must also be reversed.2

. Although Appellant Leonard Johnson, unlike Appellants Bulger and Odom, was not mentioned by name in Hoffman's grand jury testimony, this evidence was still crucial to the government’s proof of the conspiracy, of which all Appellants were convicted.

. Appellants were convicted for use of a firearm in connection with the conspiracy, under Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646-47, 66 S.Ct. 1180, 1184, 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946). Under the Pinkerton doctrine, a defendant can be found guilty of the substantive offenses of his co-con*963spirators provided the offenses were committed during and in furtherance of the conspiracy.