Court Opinion

ID: 9730119
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:01:44.034109+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:04.326830
License: Public Domain

Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE RIZZI, specially concurring: I agree with the result reached in the opinion of the court, but I cannot concur with the rationale in the opinion regarding the admissibility of the testimony of Sebastian Cannata as to specific prior acts of the decedent. The opinion of the court adopts the position that specific prior acts of a decedent are admissible as a character trait of the decedent to establish that the decedent was the aggressor.11 disagree. I believe that the following rules should be followed with regard to admitting character or reputation evidence of the decedent in a homicide case where there is some evidence of self-defense: (1) If the evidence is offered by the defendant to show the state of mind of the defendant, i.e., that defendant reasonably believed that his use of force was necessary, then the decedent’s reputation for turbulence and violence and specific prior acts of turbulence and violence committed by the decedent are admissible if known by the defendant at the time. If not known by the defendant at the time, they are not admissible. (2) If the evidence is offered by the defendant as a character trait of the decedent to show that the decedent was the aggressor, then the reputation of the decedent for turbulence and violence is admissible. This evidence would be admissible even if the defendant had not known of the decedent’s reputation at the time. However, specific prior acts of turbulence and violence by the decedent would not be admissible whether or not known by the defendant at the time. In the present case, since defendant offered the specific prior acts of the decedent as a character trait to show that the decedent was the aggressor, they were not admissible. Only the reputation of the decedent for turbulence and violence would have been admissible. The opinion of the court disregards the distinction between the admissibility of the reputation and the admissibility of specific prior acts of the decedent in a case where there is some evidence of self-defense. In doing this, the opinion merely refers to a statement found in People v. Baer (1976), 35 Ill. App. 3d 391, 396, 342 N.E.2d 177, 181-82, which in turn cites only a secondary authority to support the conclusion that specific prior acts of the decedent are admissible to establish that the decedent was the aggressor. However, the great majority of cases and jurisdictions where the issue has been raised hold to the contrary. State v. Jacoby (Iowa 1977), 260 N.W.2d 828, and cases cited therein; see State v. Barbour (1978), 295 N.C. 66, 243 S.E.2d 380; Henderson v. State (1975), 234 Ga. 827, 218 S.E.2d 612; cases cited in 1 Wigmore on Evidence §198, at 677 n.l (3d ed. 1940). In State v. Jacoby (Iowa 1977), 260 N.W.2d 828, 838, the Supreme Court of Iowa reviewed cases from various jurisdictions where the question has been posed. The court succinctly stated: “It is the rule in Iowa and the majority of jurisdictions that the quarrelsome, violent, aggressive or turbulent character of a homicide victim cannot be established by proof of specific acts.” Another example of a case which expressly holds that specific prior acts are not admissible to show another person’s character as evidence of his conduct on a particular occasion is State v. Barbour (1978), 295 N.C. 66, 74, 243 S.E.2d 380, 385. There, the Supreme Court of North Carolina held: “The trial court’s actions in excluding this witness’s testimony regarding specific acts of violence by the deceased which were not shown to be within defendant’s knowledge prior to the homicide and striking her statements as to the deceased’s violent character based solely on her personal experience were correct, since specific acts and a witness’ personal opinion are not admissible to show another persons character as evidence of his conduct on a particular occasion.” (Emphasis added.) Also, the Supreme Court of Illinois has recognized the principle that specific prior acts are not admissible to show another person’s character as evidence of his conduct on a particular occasion. In People v. Willy (1921), 301 Ill. 307, 318, 133 N.E. 859, 864, the court stated: “It appears to have been the early practice to prove the character of a person by the testimony of others who testified directly to his character from personal knowledge and observation. While there is some authority for proving character in this manner at the present time, such practice is unusual and against the great weight of modern authority. It is generally held that the personal opinion of a witness is incompetent evidence of either character or reputation, and that character is provable only by evidence of general reputation. (3 Ency. of Evidence, 27-35.) Evidence of specific acts of bad conduct is not admissible to show bad character.” (Emphasis added.) In addition, I believe that the evidentiary reasons for prohibiting the introduction of specific prior acts of the decedent to prove that the decedent was the aggressor are convincing. First, it would be unfair and prejudicial to permit such evidence because a single prior act of the decedent may have been exceptional, unusual and not characteristic, i.e., a specific prior act would not show a character trait to commit an act or to react in a certain way. Second, permitting proof of specific prior acts of the decedent to show that he acted a certain way during the incident involved in the case on trial would open up numerous collateral issues, virtually making a separate trial out of each separate act. Third, although the State is bound to foresee that the reputation of the decedent may be put in issue, it cannot be expected to anticipate and prepare to rebut each and every specific prior act of the decedent. (See Henderson v. State (1975), 234 Ga. 827, 829, 218 S.E.2d 612, 615 (1975); Hunter, Trial Handbook for Illinois Lawyers §72:1, at 735 (4th ed. 1972).) Also, it has been stated that proving a character trait by evidence of specific instances of conduct “possesses the greatest capacity to arouse prejudice, to confuse, to surprise, and to consume time.” State v. Jacoby (Iowa 1977), 260 N.W.2d 828, 838, quoting Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules, 28 U.S.C.A. R. 405, at 148 (1975). Accordingly, in the present case I believe that the trial court properly refused to admit the testimony of Sebastian Cannata as to specific prior acts of the decedent because such evidence is not admissible to prove that the decedent was the aggressor. I disagree with the proposition expressed in the opinion of the court that specific prior acts of a decedent are admissible to prove that the decedent was the aggressor.   The opinion of the court goes on to conclude that the testimony as to the specific acts of the decedent was not admissible in this case, but for a different reason.