Court Opinion

ID: 9819654
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:29:29.53557+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:38:31.588755
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE BOWMAN, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. In my opinion, the majority’s characterization of the issues in this case allows respondent to fortuitously avoid his burden of proof by simply including the word “review” in the title of his petition. By hinging its analysis on whether “review proceedings” are different from “modification proceedings,” the majority proceeds to carve out its own version of a “review hearing,” in which maintenance can be modified or even terminated absent a showing of a substantial change in circumstances. Such a result flies in the face of the legislature’s mandate that “an order for maintenance may be modified or terminated only upon a showing of a substantial change in circumstances” (750 ILCS 5/510 (a — 5) (West Supp. 2003)) and encourages parties to sidestep this burden by seeking a change under the pretense of a “review.” In my opinion, the appropriate course of action in this case would be to treat respondent’s petition as what it really is,, a petition to terminate maintenance, in which a substantial change in circumstances must be proven. As framed by the majority, the first issue to be decided is whether review proceedings are different from modification/termination proceedings as a means to reconsider maintenance awards. Contrary to the majority’s assertion, I do not believe it necessary to even make this distinction, as the title and body of respondent’s petition clearly reflect an intent to terminate his maintenance obligation.1 Nevertheless, the majority relies on In re Marriage of Cannon, 132 Ill. App. 3d 821, 822 (1985), for the proposition that a court may award maintenance for a stated period but reserve jurisdiction, or set the matter for a later hearing, in order to be able to modify the order without a showing of a substantial change in circumstances. In Cannon, the court ordered maintenance of $2,500 per month for two years, with the order stating that the “ ‘Court intends that this be reviewable no later than the expiration of two years and sooner if the circumstances of the parties change significantly.’ ” Cannon, 132 Ill. App. 3d at 822. Cannon, however, was a divided opinion, and I tend to agree with the dissent. While the “thrust of the theory of the [Cannon] majority appears to be that the language of the order implies an intention on the part of the court that it retain power to change the maintenance award without the necessity of a showing of a substantial change in circumstances,” the dissent gave the order a different interpretation. Cannon, 132 Ill. App. 3d at 825 (Green, EJ., dissenting). According to Justice Green, the court’s intent was to “set the matter for ‘review’ so that it might change the maintenance benefits to the wife if a substantial change in circumstances was shown.” Cannon, 132 Ill. App. 3d at 826 (Green, EJ., dissenting). In other words, the court intended to “review” only the question of whether a substantial change in circumstances had taken place. Cannon, 132 Ill. App. 3d at 826 (Green, EJ., dissenting). Justice Green’s logic in Cannon applies equally here. In this case, the parties’ agreement stated that “[mjaintenance shall be non-modifiable for three years and may only be reviewed no sooner than thirty-six (36) months after the first payment.” (Emphasis added.) While I believe that this language is clear, the majority criticizes it as “inartful,” stating that it “makes no mention of whether review will occur automatically after the 36 months pass or whether review will occur only upon petition by one of the parties.” 358 Ill. App. 3d at 470. Although nothing in this language remotely suggests that a review would occur automatically at the end of the three years, the majority interprets the phrase “no sooner than” to indicate that the parties “contemplated that a review would in fact occur at some time after the 36 months passed.” (Emphasis added.) 358 Ill. App. 3d at 470. Based on this faulty premise, the majority then erroneously concludes that respondent’s petition requested only a “general review” of maintenance. The majority takes this position despite the actual wording of respondent’s petition, entitled “Petition to Review/Terminate Maintenance.” Given the title and body of respondent’s petition, which clearly reflect an intent to terminate maintenance, it makes no sense to interpret the petition as merely seeking a review. Even so, the real crux of the problem seems to be the majority’s preoccupation with the distinction between “review proceedings” and “modification proceedings,” and the label appearing on respondent’s petition. Regardless of whether we term respondent’s petition as seeking a “review” or a “modification/termination” proceeding, respondent’s intent is clear: he seeks to terminate his maintenance obligation. Under section 510(a — 5) of the Act, such a modification requires a showing of a substantial change in circumstances. See Eustathiades v. Bowman, 695 N.W.2d 395, 398-99 (Minn. App. 2005) (if there has been an affirmative setting of a support (or maintenance) amount, any subsequent change of the obligation is a modification, requiring the showing of a substantial change in circumstances). However, by viewing respondent’s petition as strictly a petition to review, the majority takes another great leap, holding that respondent does not have the burden of proving a substantial change in circumstances. 358 Ill. App. 3d at 472. Determining that the movant in a review proceeding does not have the burden of proving a substantial change in circumstances allows a party seeking to modify/terminate maintenance to circumvent a burden that would otherwise exist. For this reason, the majority’s decision epitomizes placing form over substance and encourages creative pleading. In effect, the majority seems to be saying that the mere inclusion of the word “review” in respondent’s petition frees him of the burden that he would otherwise be required to meet if he were seeking to terminate maintenance, even though that is exactly what he is attempting to do. Again, this poses no problem for the majority, as it believes that a court can terminate maintenance in a “review proceeding,” absent a showing of a substantial change in circumstances. In short, this case does not warrant the distinction between “review proceedings” and “modification proceedings” drawn by the majority. Respondent’s clear intent in filing his petition was to terminate maintenance, and I would not allow the majority’s creation of a watered-down review proceeding to relieve him of the burden of proving a substantial change of circumstances. Because the trial court determined that respondent did not have the burden of proving a substantial change in circumstances in this case, I believe that it erred by applying the wrong standard. Accordingly, I would reverse the Kane County circuit court’s judgment and remand the cause for a reconsideration of respondent’s petition to modify maintenance, with respondent having the burden of proving a substantial change in circumstances. See In re Marriage of Daniels, 115 Ill. App. 3d 173 (1983) (denial of increase in child support remanded for reconsideration where trial court possibly applied incorrect legal standard).  As the majority notes, respondent’s petition in this case is entitled “Petition to Review/Terminate Maintenance.”