Court Opinion

ID: 9900498
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 22:24:13.453116+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:06.470873
License: Public Domain

E-FILED
                                                         CNMI SUPREME COURT
                                                         E-filed: Mar 07 2023 06:09PM
                                                         Clerk Review: Mar 07 2023 06:09PM
                                                         Filing ID: 69282543
                                                         Case No.: 2022-SCC-0019-CIV
                                                         NoraV Borja

                            IN THE
                      Supreme Court
                            OF THE

   Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands

    ANAKS OCEAN VIEW HILL HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, LTD.
                    Petitioner-Appellant,

                               v.

                     PERRY INOS, JR. ET AL.
                      Respondent-Appellee

                              AND

                   ATKINS KROLL SAIPAN, INC.
                      Applicant-Appellee.

             Supreme Court No. 2022-SCC-0019-CIV

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO STAY AGENCY ACTION AND REQUESTS FOR
                      JUDICIAL NOTICE

                      Cite as: 2023 MP 1

                     Decided March 7, 2023

               CHIEF JUSTICE ALEXANDRO C. CASTRO
            JUSTICE PRO TEMPORE ROBERT J. TORRES, JR.
            JUSTICE PRO TEMPORE F. PHILIP CARBULLIDO

                 Superior Court No. 22-0103-CV
         Judge Pro Tempore David A. Wiseman, Presiding
                       ANAKS v. Atkins Kroll Saipan, 2023 MP 1

PER CURIAM:
¶1      This matter comes before the Court upon the appeal filed by Appellant
ANAKS Ocean View Hill Homeowners’ Association, Ltd. (“ANAKS”) after the
Superior Court dismissed their Petition for judicial review for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction. Co-appellee Commonwealth Zoning Board (“Zoning Board”)
voted and issued Conditional Use Permit No. 2020-10382 to Co-appellee Atkins
Kroll Saipan, Inc. (“Atkins Kroll”) for the construction and operation of an Atkins
Kroll car dealership and vehicle repair facility next to ANAKS’ condominiums in
Puerto Rico. ANAKS moves to stay the effective date of Conditional Use Permit
No. 2020-10382 issued to Atkins Kroll. ANAKS and Atkins Kroll also ask this
Court to take judicial notice of various documents that the Zoning Board
considered before issuing the conditional use permit.

¶2      We DENY ANAKS’ Motion to Stay Agency Action. We further DENY
ANAKS’ and Atkins Kroll’s Requests for Judicial Notice. We VACATE the
Superior Court’s Order dismissing ANAKS’ Petition for lack of jurisdiction and
sua sponte REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this Order.

                     I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶3      ANAKS is a lessee of Lot 074 D 133 in Puerto Rico, Saipan, which
comprises of 131 residential units and home to over 170 residents. Next to this
property is Lot EA 896-R1, owned by the Camacho Trust.1 Atkins Kroll leased Lot
EA 896-R1 to develop a Toyota/Lexus car dealership and vehicle repair facility.

¶4      The lots occupied by ANAKS and Atkins Kroll are in the “Mixed
Commercial”2 zoning district under the Saipan Zoning Law of 2013, as amended
(“SZL”). While a car dealership is a permitted use3 in the mixed commercial
zoning district, the vehicle repair shop requires a conditional use permit4 to operate.

1
    Albert LG. Camacho & Paul William Camacho, Trustees of Lot E.A. 896-R1,
    intervened as defendants in the Superior Court.
2
    Saipan is subdivided into eleven zoning districts. SZL § 401. The mixed commercial
    zoning district “provides a broad spectrum of commercial development that requires a
    moderate to high level of vehicular access and for low to moderate density residential
    development.” Id. at § 507. In contrast, the industrial zoning district “protects and
    promotes economic development by reserving and protecting areas that have particular
    suitability for industry while controlling effects on adjoining communities.” Id. at §
    506.
3
    A permitted use is “allowed by right in the zoning district subject to meeting all
    applicable requirements of this Law.” SZL § 404. Section 404 offers a detailed table
    of which uses are permissible, conditional, temporary, or prohibited for each zoning
    district. See Id. at Table 1. Table of Permitted, Conditional and Temporary Use.
4
    A conditional use permit:
         shall be obtained for certain uses that would become harmonious or
         compatible with neighboring uses through the application and
         maintenance of qualifying conditions and siting in specific locations
                        ANAKS v. Atkins Kroll Saipan, 2023 MP 1

SZL § 404. “Vehicle Repair”5 is only a permitted use in the industrial zoning
district. Id.

¶5      The Zoning Board administers a land use and zoning system throughout
the Commonwealth. See 2 CMC § 7211. On or about January 4, 20226, Atkins
Kroll applied for a conditional use permit through the Zoning Board to allow the
vehicle repair part of its project, which included plans to build 27 vehicle service
bays to operate in the mixed commercial zone. By January 12, the Zoning office
received the plans and drawings for the project, and the Zoning Permitting
Supervisor prepared a memorandum assessing the project’s compliance with the
applicable zoning laws.

¶6      The Zoning Board held its first public meeting on January 19, 2022 to
review and discuss Atkins Kroll’s application. ANAKS’ President and several
residents appeared at the meeting to state their concerns to the Zoning Board on
Atkins Kroll’s application. The day before the meeting, ANAKS requested that the
Zoning Board allow ANAKS sixty days to review and respond to Atkins Kroll’s
application, which it granted.

¶7       The Zoning Board held its second public meeting on March 9, 2022 to
discuss Atkins Kroll’s application for a conditional use permit. ANAKS, with its
attorney present, again challenged the development and asked for the denial of the
permit or the grant of sixty more days for ANAKS to review and respond to the
application. The Zoning Board did not grant another sixty days but allowed
ANAKS one week to review the supplemental memorandums submitted by Atkins
Kroll to the Zoning Board.

         within a zoning district, but that would not be allowed under the general
         conditions of the zoning district as stated in this Law.
         SZL § 1308(a).
5
    Section 410(j) of the Saipan Zoning Law defines “Vehicle Repair” as:

         [a]n establishment engaged in the repair and maintenance of motor
         vehicles or other heavy equipment or machinery, including automobiles,
         boats, motorcycles and trucks, paint and body work. Typical uses include
         automobile repair garages, vehicle inspection centers, paint and body
         shops, automobile tune-up stations, automotive glass shops, quick lubes,
         automotive car washing and detailing, and muffler shops. This use does
         not include overnight storage of a vehicle that is not being actively repaired
         or that is not currently registered with the Department of Motor Vehicles.
         General Vehicle Repair businesses shall be screened from adjoining
         properties zoned as Village Residential, Village Commercial, Rural, or
         Mixed Commercial. Screening shall consist of appropriate vegetation or
         fencing.
         SZL § 410(j).
6
    Atkins Kroll states they applied for a conditional use permit on December 17, 2021.
    But the permit issued on April 13 states that Atkins Kroll applied for the permit on
    January 4, 2022.
                      ANAKS v. Atkins Kroll Saipan, 2023 MP 1

¶8      On March 18, 2022 (the “March 18 Vote”), the Zoning Board held a
special meeting to discuss Atkins Kroll’s application for a conditional use permit
and voted unanimously to approve the project with nineteen express conditions.
Before the vote, ANAKS’ President, its attorney, and several of its residents were
present at the special meeting to raise their concerns about the project. They again
asked for more time to review the project, and if the request for more time was
denied, requested the Zoning Board to deny Atkins Kroll’s application. The Zoning
Board denied both requests.

¶9       The Zoning Board issued Conditional Use Permit No. 2020-10382 to
Atkins Kroll on April 13, 2022, followed by a written order on April 21, 2022. On
May 13, 2022, ANAKS filed their Petition seeking judicial review of the Zoning
Board's decision to grant the conditional use permit to Atkins Kroll under 1 CMC
§ 9112. The Petition was filed 22 days after the issuance of the Zoning Board
Order, 30 days after the permit was issued, and 56 days after the March 18 Vote.
In the Petition, ANAKS requested the court issue a preliminary injunction
prohibiting the construction of the dealership and vehicle repair shop until the
disposition of the action, the revocation of the conditional use permit, or in the
alternative, remand to the Zoning Board.

¶ 10    On July 22, 2022, Atkins Kroll and the Zoning Board moved to dismiss
ANAKS’ Petition. They claimed that under 1 CMC § 9112(b), the March 18 Vote
was the final agency action triggering the thirty-day period for ANAKS to file its
appeal. Since ANAKS filed its Petition on May 13, 56 days after the March 18
Vote, the Superior Court had no jurisdiction. ANAKS disagreed, contending that
they timely filed their Petition because the March 18 Vote was merely
interlocutory, and the final agency action was the Zoning Board’s written order
published on April 21.

¶ 11     The Superior Court agreed with Atkins Kroll and the Zoning Board and
found it did not have jurisdiction because the March 18 Vote was the final agency
action. The court dismissed the Petition with prejudice, and judgment was entered.

¶ 12    ANAKS moved for reconsideration under NMI R. Civ. P. 59(e) and a
motion to stay agency action under 1 CMC § 9112(e). The Superior Court denied
both motions, reiterating that it lacks jurisdiction to hear the Petition.

¶ 13    On appeal, ANAKS moves to stay the effective date of the conditional use
permit. In addition, ANAKS and Atkins Kroll request this Court take judicial
notice of various exhibits submitted to the Zoning Board during its public
meetings.

                                II. JURISDICTION
¶ 14    We have appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of the
Commonwealth Superior Court. NMI CONST. art. IV, § 3. Further, 1 CMC § 9113
grants “aggrieved parties” standing to appeal Superior Court decisions reviewing
administrative matters. N. Marianas Coll. v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 2006 MP 4 ¶ 5.
                      ANAKS v. Atkins Kroll Saipan, 2023 MP 1

                              III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 15    While we have not ruled on the standard of review for a motion to stay
pending appeal, “[t]he standard for granting a stay shall be that standard which
governs such motions in civil matters.” NMI R. P. ADMIN. 3(e); see also Pac. Sec.
Alarm, Inc. v. Commonwealth Ports Auth., 2006 MP 17 ¶ 12 (“[W]e do not give
deference to the lower court’s findings because our review of agency actions is
done with the identical guidelines followed by the lower court under the
Administrative Procedure Act.”). “[W]e review the judicial review of an agency
action de novo.” Marianas Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth Ports Auth., 2007 MP 24 ¶
8.

¶ 16     In determining whether a stay will be granted, “[t]he moving party must
show: 1. a combination of probable success on the merits and the possibility of
irreparable injury; or 2. that serious questions are raised and the balance of
hardships tips sharply in its favor.” Vaughn v. Bank of Guam, 1 NMI 318, 321
(1990).7

                                IV. DISCUSSION
                             A. Final Agency Action
¶ 17     The parties dispute when the Zoning Board’s action became final for
calculating when the 30-day period to request judicial review began to run under
1 CMC § 9112(b). Atkins Kroll and the Zoning Board contend that the Zoning
Board’s oral vote approving the conditional use permit on March 18, 2022
consummated the Zoning Board’s decision-making process and where Atkins
Kroll’s rights and obligations were determined. In support, Appellees rely on 2
CMC § 7221(j)(2), which reads that “[n]o decisions of the Zoning Board shall be
made other than in a duly noticed public meeting.” They argue that no authority
requires the Zoning Board to issue its decisions in writing.

¶ 18     By contrast, ANAKS claims that the March 18 Vote did not, and could not
have, constituted a final agency action to trigger the 30-day appeal period. Instead,
they argue that the issuance of the conditional use permit on April 13, 2022 or the
written order on April 21 should be considered the final agency action. Further,
ANAKS points to inconsistencies between the terms of the Zoning Board’s March
18 Vote and what was in the conditional use permit and written order as evidence
that the March 18 Vote could not have been final. We agree.

7
    Section 9112(e) under Commonwealth Administrative Procedure Act (“CAPA”) states
    identical language as written in Vaughn:

        On such conditions as may be required and to the extent necessary to
        prevent irreparable injury, the reviewing court, including the court to
        which a case may be taken on appeal from or on application for certiorari
        or other writ to a reviewing court, may issue all necessary and appropriate
        process to postpone the effective date of an agency action or to preserve
        status or rights pending conclusion of the review proceedings.
        1 CMC § 9112(e).
                       ANAKS v. Atkins Kroll Saipan, 2023 MP 1

¶ 19     The Commonwealth’s Administrative Procedure Act (“CAPA”) allows
for judicial review of final agency actions. 1 CMC § 9112(d). “An aggrieved party
must seek judicial review within thirty days of a final agency action.” Cody v. N.
Mar. I. Ret. Fund, 2011 MP 16 ¶ 18 (citing 1 CMC § 9112(a)-(b)). For an agency
action to be considered final, it must satisfy two requirements. “First, the action
must mark the consummation of the agency’s decision-making process—it must
not be of a merely tentative or interlocutory nature. Second, the action must be one
by which rights or obligations have been determined, or from which legal
consequences will flow.” Cody v. N. Mar. I. Ret. Fund, 2011 MP 16 ¶ 18 (internal
quotations and citations omitted); Marianas Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth Ports
Auth., 2007 MP 24 ¶ 27.

¶ 20     Finality is a jurisdictional requirement for any appeal of an agency action.
Cody v. N. Mar. I. Ret. Fund, 2011 MP 16 ¶ 18 (citing Ukiah Valley Med. Ctr. v.
Fed. Trade Comm’n, 911 F.2d 261, 264 n.1 (9th Cir. 1990)) (“[A] finding of
finality, or of an applicable exception, is essential when the court’s reviewing
authority depends on one of the many statutes permitting appeal only of ‘final’
agency action.”). Thus, when determining whether an agency action is final and
ripe for judicial review, “we look to see whether the agency has rendered its last
word on the matter.” Or. Natural Desert Ass’n v. United States Forest Serv., 465
F.3d 977, 984 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

¶ 21     We have discussed what a final agency action is in other contexts. Cody
addressed a situation in which the plaintiff sought judicial review of a denial of
certain benefits by the Northern Mariana Island Retirement Fund Board of
Trustees. There, the administrator did not issue a final written decision on the
denial of plaintiff’s benefits. On the finality of the agency's action, we held that the
“Fund’s inaction had the same impact upon Cody as a denial of relief.” Cody, 2011
MP 16 ¶ 21 (2011) (emphasis added). This factually differs from this case. Here,
we do not have a situation in which the Zoning Board denied Atkins Kroll’s
application so that further action was not required. Rather, we are presented with
a situation in which the Zoning Board acted. Thus, the fact that in Cody we held
that the lack of a written decision still constituted a final agency action has little
persuasive value here.

¶ 22    Under the facts before us, the March 18 Vote constitutes an action by the
Zoning Board, but we do not view this action as a final agency action satisfying
the two-part test in Cody. While the vote authorized the Zoning Board to issue a
conditional use permit to Atkins Kroll, it was only when the permit was issued on
April 13, 2022 that the decision-making process of the Zoning Board was
consummated and became final. The reduction of the oral vote into writing in the
form of a conditional use permit, delineating and specifying the rights, duties, and
obligations of Atkins Kroll, is not an insignificant step that can be viewed as
merely an extension of a final action.

¶ 23    The issuance of the conditional use permit itself is the very consummation
of the Zoning Board’s decision-making process. The application that Atkins Kroll
                      ANAKS v. Atkins Kroll Saipan, 2023 MP 1

filed was to seek a permit and the decision of the Zoning Board—as evidenced by
Conditional Use Permit No. 2020-10382 and Zoning Board Order No. 2022-1-
03—was to approve the issuance of the permit. (Conditional Use Permit at 4; see
also Zoning Board Order No. 2022-1-03 (“A permit shall be granted for this
Conditional Use Application...[.]”)).

¶ 24     By voting to approve the issuance of the conditional use permit, the Zoning
Board required the added step of the conditional use permit being prepared and
given to Atkins Kroll. If, for example, the Zoning Board failed to issue the
conditional use permit despite its vote, such an act would be considered a violation
of the Zoning Board’s decision, and the process would remain incomplete. Thus,
steps would be taken, by either the Zoning Board or an interested party, to ensure
that the conditional use permit was issued. We do not view the issuance of the
permit as merely an implementation of the Zoning Board’s final action with no
legal or practical significance. Instead, that issuance is the final action from which
the full decision-making process is consummated.

¶ 25    The standard under Cody is not satisfied merely upon the decision of an
agency being made. Instead, the decision-making process is the operative element
to the first clause of the Cody test. Here, the decision-making process was
consummated once the permit was issued to Atkins Kroll on April 13, 2022.

                      B. The Language of Relevant Statutes
¶ 26    Atkins Kroll and the Zoning Board argue that it is not required for a Zoning
Board’s decision to be in writing for it to be considered final. They cite 2 CMC §
7221(j)(2), which mandates that “no decisions of the Zoning Board shall be made
other than in a duly noticed public meeting.” They further claim that an oral vote
made during a Zoning Board meeting is a final agency action under Section
9112(d) of CAPA and aligns with our caselaw in Cody and Marianas Ins. Co.

¶ 27    ANAKS contends that decisions made in Zoning Board meetings are
merely interlocutory because they require additional steps, such as issuing the
written permit or order, for it to become final and from which legal rights or
obligations have been determined. They also claim that Section 7221(j)(2) is
ambiguous in determining if an oral vote is a final agency action within the context
of the Zoning Board and CAPA. We agree.

¶ 28     When a statute is capable of more than one meaning, its language is
considered ambiguous. Bank of Haw. v. Sablan, 1997 MP 9 ¶ 10. “The standard
for testing for an ambiguity is whether the language of the statute is confusing to a
‘well informed person.”’ Id. “Ambiguities should be resolved in favor of a just,
equitable, and beneficial operation of the law.” Id. (internal quotations and
citations omitted).

¶ 29     Section 7221(j)(2) sets forth the procedures of Zoning Board meetings and
how they operate. It provides, inter alia, how often the Zoning Board must meet,
the notice requirements of such meetings, the parameters of what can be discussed
                         ANAKS v. Atkins Kroll Saipan, 2023 MP 1

at meetings, and addresses the opportunity for public participation.8 The key clause
at issue mandates that “no decisions of the Zoning Board shall be made other than
in a duly noticed public meeting.” Id. The confusion arises with the term
“decisions” and whether such decisions made during a Zoning Board meeting are
considered final for judicial review of a final agency action under Section 9112. It
is also unclear whether such a decision must be made either in writing or may be
expressed orally.

¶ 30    A well informed person could conclude that the term “decisions” is
ambiguous because it is capable of more than one meaning. The clause fails to
specify whether decisions made during a Zoning Board meeting are considered
final and whether such decisions alter the legal rights and obligations under the
Commonwealth.

¶ 31    Similarly, 2 CMC § 7221(l) does not help resolve the issues before us. It
states:

         An applicant may appeal a determination of the Zoning Board
         pursuant to the provisions of 1 CMC § 9112, except that the court
         shall act upon such appeals within 60 days of the written record of
         the relevant Zoning Board meeting being made available to the
         court.
         2 CMC § 7221(l).

This provision suggests that an aggrieved party can appeal a decision of the Zoning
without the written record. But the situation this statute envisages is not present in
this case. As we have stated, Section 9112(d) only allows for appeals after a final
agency action, which did not occur until the conditional use permit was issued.
Since Section 7221(l) is subject to the requirements and limitations of Section
9112(d), our analysis of Section 9112(d) controls. Instead, Section 7221(l) simply

8
    Section 7221(j)(2) in its entirety reads:

         The Zoning Board shall meet at least once a month or as necessary to
         discharge its responsibilities without undue delay. Either the chairman or
         any three members may call a meeting. Advance public notice in at least
         one newspaper of local circulation shall be provided for at least two weeks
         prior to a meeting. Meetings of the Zoning Board, except for those
         meetings dealing with termination, hiring, or discipline of the zoning
         administrator, shall be open to the public. The opportunity for public
         participation at meetings shall be provided. No decisions of the Zoning
         Board shall be made other than in a duly noticed public meeting. The
         Zoning Board shall adopt rules of procedure necessary for the conduct of
         its operations and meetings. A majority of the Zoning Board members is
         required to transact official business consistent with other applicable
         Commonwealth law.
         2 CMC § 7221(j)(2).
                      ANAKS v. Atkins Kroll Saipan, 2023 MP 1

prescribes required time limits for court action upon the availability of the written
record of the relevant Zoning Board meeting.

¶ 32     Moreover, the phrase “a determination of the Zoning Board” remains
ambiguous. Because there lacks a definition of what a “determination” is, it is
subject to various reasonable interpretations as to its meaning. For example, a
determination may include an oral vote, a written order, or a permit. But the statute
fails to make that distinction. This broad wording, and the ambiguity it creates,
should not be construed to allow for another avenue of appeal to avoid the
requirements for a final agency action.

¶ 33    Thus, we do not interpret Section 7221(l) as being dispositive for the issues
before us.

  C. Discrepancies Between the Oral Vote, Conditional Use Permit, and Written
                                       Order.
¶ 34    Atkins Kroll argues that the nineteen conditions expressed during the
issued permit and written order are “identical” and merely memorialize the Zoning
Board’s vote. We disagree.

¶ 35     More concretely, the conditional use permit issued to Atkins Kroll here
differs from the terms of the Zoning Board issued in its March 18 Vote. The permit
and the March 18 decision do not have the same terms. Contrary to Appellee’s
assertion, the Zoning Board on March 18 added these conditions:

        1. To reduce the commercial bay height parapet down to 42’2”
        elevation, equal to the back bay and across. Just that parapet itself
        reduce down the height.
        2. To maintain decibel levels as reported in the study provided to us
        in terms of the stand-by generators, air compressors, air
        conditioners, water pumps within the property.
        Atkins Kroll’s Request for Judicial Notice, Exhibit 4,
        Commonwealth Zoning Board Special Meeting Minutes (Mar. 18,
        2022).

Yet, the conditional use permit states:

        16. The applicant shall reduce the Commercial Bay Structure to 42
        feet.
        17. The applicant shall maintain decibel levels as reported and
        submitted to the Zoning Office within its property lines.
        Appellant’s Mot. to Stay Agency Action, Exhibit 1B, Conditional
        Use Permit No. 2020-10382 (Apr. 13, 2022).

¶ 36    In comparing these provisions, while they address the same requirements
in broad strokes, the Zoning Board’s oral vote contained far more specific
requirements than those in the conditional use permit. Because of this discrepancy,
the obligations of Atkins Kroll are unclear, as is which version controls. When
                       ANAKS v. Atkins Kroll Saipan, 2023 MP 1

considering that heavy penalties would be assessed against Atkins Kroll for
violating the terms, at $1,000 a day, it is imperative for clear obligations to be set
forth. It is antithetical to the terms of the Cody test to require Atkins Kroll to abide
and be bound by terms in the permit if the oral vote, with differing terms, is the
controlling determination.

¶ 37     We thus do not view the March 18 Vote as the Zoning Board’s last word
on the matter. It took the Zoning Board twenty-six days after its vote to actually
issue the permit. Between the time of the vote and when the permit was issued, the
Zoning Board could have amended its original decision in another meeting to issue
the conditional permit with different terms. Facts and circumstances could arise in
which a written permit differs from the terms of an oral vote at a public meeting.
An applicant or an aggrieved party would likely suffer prejudice if they relied on
the terms of an oral vote only to learn later that those terms differ from those in the
actual permit issued. A written permit explicitly defines which legal rights and
obligations are in effect.

¶ 38    From a general policy standpoint, relying on the clear and exact written
terms of the permit allows for a uniform, consistent, and explicit establishment of
when a party’s rights or obligations have been determined or from which legal
consequences will flow. This aligns with the requirements of Cody & Marianas
Ins. Co. This also best serves the public interest to require explicit documentation
outlining the terms by which a party is bound.

¶ 39    We note that there is no uniform interpretation across other jurisdictions
as to how similar situations are treated, namely, whether absent authority requiring
a written decision, an agency’s oral vote triggers a statutory appeals period. For
example, in Hoagland v. Town of Clear Lake Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 871 N.E.2d
376, 383 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), the Indiana Court of Appeals held that a zoning
board’s final decision occurred on the date of its oral vote, even though the board
did not issue written findings of fact because the plaintiffs were aware of the
decision. New York, on the other hand, has held that the filing of the meeting
minutes reflecting a board’s vote begins the running of the statute of limitations.
92 MM Motel, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 90 A.D.3d 663, 664 (N.Y. App. Div.
2011). Pennsylvania, in interpreting its statutory scheme, has held that zoning
decisions are not final until the commission issues a written decision. First Ave.
Partners v. City of Pittsburgh Planning Comm’n, 151 A.3d 715, 722 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 2016).

¶ 40    The variances of zoning laws across different jurisdictions in the United
States occur because zoning laws are localized and tailored to the communities
they serve. With little to no uniformity across jurisdictions, they offer little
guidance on resolving this issue before us and offer little persuasive value. Rather,
the portrait that these cases present is one in which each jurisdiction must look to
its own statutory scheme to determine how best to resolve the issue before it.
                       ANAKS v. Atkins Kroll Saipan, 2023 MP 1

                              V. CONCLUSION
¶ 41    We agree with ANAKS that the 30-day period under Section 9112(b)
commenced when the Zoning Board issued the conditional use permit to Atkins
Kroll on April 13, 2022. The issuance of the conditional use permit consummated
the Zoning Board’s decision-making process and determined the rights and
obligations of the parties. Thus, for purposes of the Zoning Board, the issuance of
a permit serves as a final agency action under Section 9112 of CAPA.

¶ 42    Furthermore, ANAKS and Atkins Kroll seek judicial notice of various
documents and pleadings each has submitted. Because of the decision to remand
this matter, both requests are rendered moot. Commonwealth v. Repeki, 2003 MP
1 ¶ 14.

¶ 43    We DENY ANAKS’ Motion to Stay Agency Action. We further DENY
ANAKS’ and Atkins Kroll’s Requests for Judicial Notice. We VACATE the
Superior Court’s Order dismissing ANAKS’ Petition for lack of jurisdiction and
sua sponte REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this Order.

 SO ORDERED this 7th day of March, 2023.

/s/
ALEXANDRO C. CASTRO
Chief Justice

 /s/
ROBERT J. TORRES, JR.
JUSTICE PRO TEMPORE

 /s/
F. PHILIP CARBULLIDO
JUSTICE PRO TEMPORE

                                       COUNSEL

Kathryn B. Fuller & Colin M. Thompson, Saipan, MP, for Appellant.

J. Robert Glass, Jr. & Keisha Blaise, Saipan, MP, for Co-Appellee.

Rodney J. Jacob, Hagåtña, GU & Sean E. Frink, Saipan, MP, for Co-Appellee.

Joey P. San Nicholas, Saipan, MP, for Co-Appellee.
                        ANAKS v. Atkins Kroll Saipan, 2023 MP 1

                                           NOTICE
This slip opinion has not been certified by the Clerk of the Supreme Court for publication
in the permanent law reports. Until certified, this slip opinion may be revised or withdrawn.
If there are any discrepancies between this slip opinion and the opinion certified for
publication, the certified opinion controls. Readers are requested to bring errors to the
attention of the Clerk of the Supreme Court, P.O. Box 502165 Saipan, MP 96950, phone
(670) 236–9715, fax (670) 236–9702, e–mail Supreme.Court@NMIJudiciary.gov.