Court Opinion

ID: 9570393
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:22:48.114045+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:07:12.596048
License: Public Domain

URBIGKIT, Justice,
dissenting, with whom MACY, Justice, joins.
This record does not present a basis for me to differentiate intent as an element in a rape case from the statutory criteria that can reasonably be construed as being “for the purposes of sexual arousal, gratification or abuse.” Section 6-2-301(a)(vii)(A), W.S.1977. It would appear that the legislature intended for the statute to speak to intent of the actor. Otherwise, a doctor, in proper practice of his profession, could be accused of rape even if his purpose was to save the life of his patient.
I would find a rape case of whatever character is a rape case invoking a requirement of an intent to do something for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification or abuse. Conversely, accidental rape is an anathema in terminology, since conduct is either accidental or intentional. In result from these facts, if the injury had been an abdominal injury to the liver, it would not have been rape, while an abdominal injury in the genital or anal area, as occurred in this contended accident of wanton misconduct, is now defined as rape, consequently deleting purpose or intent from the statutory definition. The differentiation of being reasonably construed from being determinable as intended from the facts is too illusory for me to concur here.
Nothing in this record indicates an acknowledgment of guilt by defendant that he intended a sexual offense of any kind in doing anything for sexual arousal in the totally inexcusable display of temper and uncontrolled anger which only fortuitously did not achieve a homicide status.
The court recreates the sexual-assault statute to be the same as assault and battery by determining that “first degree sexual assault [can] occur if a sexual purpose is absent.” This simply disregards the specific statutory criteria, “for the purposes of sexual arousal, gratification or abuse,” and the prior case law that can even be capsulized accurately by legal encyclopedia reference.
“It has been held that the use of a weapon to compel a woman to consent to sexual intercourse is not an assault with intent to commit rape if there is no overt attempt to commit the act itself. However, a threat to shoot, in connection with other acts, may be sufficient to warrant a conviction.” 65 Am.Jur.2d, Rape § 21, p. 772.
To obviate incomprehensibility, the issue in this case is whether sexual intent is required for attempted commission of a sexual offense without regard to whether the required intent may be defined as specific or general. I cannot divide intent so as to know when one is doing something one only generally intends to do, or when one perchance is doing something one really specifically intends to do, since whichever, the act is done. In rape, the punishment is for what is done to the other person, and the crime is defined in purpose in statutory language: “for the purposes of sexual arousal, gratification or abuse.”
“The meaning of the word ‘intent’ in the criminal law has always been rather obscure, largely as a result of its use in such phrases as ‘criminal intent,’ ‘general intent,’ ‘specific intent,’ ‘constructive intent,’ and ‘presumed intent.’ Intent has traditionally been defined to include knowledge, and thus it is usually said that one intends certain consequences when he desires that his acts cause those consequences or knows that those consequences are substantially certain to result from his acts. The modern view, however, is that it is better to draw a distinction between intent (or purpose) on the one hand and knowledge on the other.” 1 LaFave and Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 3.5, pp. 302-303 (1986). “ * * * Much of the existing uncertainty as to the precise meaning of the word ‘intent’ is attributable to the fact that courts have often used such phrases as ‘criminal intent,’ ‘general intent,’ ‘specific intent,’ ‘constructive intent,’ and ‘presumed intent.’ ‘Criminal intent,’ for example, is often taken to be synonymous *911with mens rea, the general notion that except for strict liability offenses some form of mental state is a prerequisite to guilt.
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“ ‘General intent’ is often distinguished from ‘specific intent,’ although the distinction being drawn by the use of these two terms often varies. Sometimes ‘general intent’ is used in the same way as ‘criminal intent’ to mean the general notion of mens rea, while ‘specific intent’ is taken to mean the mental state required for a particular crime.” LaFave and Scott, supra, § 3.5(e), pp. 313-314.
Thus, we shall see that rape, which is in itself a sexual act, involves a general-intent characterization. 3 Wharton’s Criminal Law § 283 (14th ed. 1980). While both assault with intent to commit rape and attempt to commit rape invoke the specific intent of sexual arousal, gratification or abuse, this is the essence of the accomplished offense.
“Most often the question of criminal intent in rape does not arise, because it is merely assumed to be present. It is very difficult to imagine a situation in which an actual forcible rape was not accompanied by specific criminal intent. Where statutes defining rape do not specifically require a criminal intent, nevertheless, it may be assumed to be an unarticulated element of the offense.” Morosco, The Prosecution and Defense of Sex Crimes § 3.01 (1987).
LaFave and Scott, in the text on Criminal Law, relate:
“ * * * [S]ome courts have taken the view that intent may be presumed (discussed below) only as to a general intent. It has been suggested, however, that greater clarity could be accomplished by abandoning the ‘specific intent’ — ‘general intent’ terminology, and this has been done in the Model Penal Code. [Fn.47] “[Fn.47] ‘[W]e can see no virtue in preserving the concept of “general intent,” which has been an abiding source of ambiguity and of confusion in the penal law.' Model Penal Code § 2.02, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4,1955).” LaFave and Scott, Criminal Law, § 28, p. 202 (1982).
“The requirement of a particular purpose to arouse or gratify sexual desire distinguishes sexual imposition from ordinary assault and from noncriminal touching. ******
“Together, the limitation on the range of conduct included in the offense and the requirement of purpose differentiate invasion of personal dignity from the casual expression of affection or approval. The basketball coach who pats his players on the bottom is merely fulfilling a ritual of congratulation. Even if such contact proves unwelcome to the recipient, the actor may not be held liable for this offense.” Model Penal Code § 213.4, American Law Institute, Model Penal Code and Commentaries, Part 2, Comment at 40 (1980).
This structure that intent to commit a sexual offense is within the extrinsic nature of the crime of rape, Gallup v. State, Wyo., 559 P.2d 1024 (1977); State v. Smith, 3 Wash.2d 543, 101 P.2d 298 (1940), and that an attempt as assault becomes a category specific-intent offense, is not unrecognized in Wyoming precedent.
“ * * * Defendant, however, raises a further and perhaps a more serious impropriety of the challenged instruction. Following its recitation of the statute defining assault or assault and battery with intent to commit rape, it purports to state the essential elements of the crime and in so doing omits entirely the element of intent without which there could, of course, be no crime. In this respect we deem the instruction incomplete. The jury’s verdict could have been properly returned only in the event they believed that had defendant consummated his intent he would have been guilty of rape. No instruction having covered the material element of intent, Instruction 7 was necessarily misleading and prejudicial to him.” Rhodes v. State, Wyo., 462 P.2d 722, 728 (1969).
See similarly the earlier case, State v. Parmely, 65 Wyo. 215, 199 P.2d 112 (1948), involving proper proof of intent and assault *912with intent to commit murder. In Dean v. State, Wyo., 668 P.2d 639 (1983), we said in differentiation that arson was not a specific-intent statute since the fire was demonstrable and the burning was voluntary, without excuse or justification, and without bona-fide claim of right. In Armijo v. State, Wyo., 678 P.2d 864, 868-869 (1984), an aggravated-homicide-by-vehicle case, this court stated:
“Finally we turn to the contentions of the appellant that § 31-5-1117(a), W.S. 1977 (May 1982 Cum.Supp.), is unconstitutional because it does not encompass a criminal intent in its definition of aggravated homicide by vehicle. One of the enduring principles of the common-law tradition is the concept that, in general, an injury can amount to a crime only when there is a concurrence of an evil-meaning mind with an evil-doing hand, i.e., the act must be accompanied with the unlawful intent. * * * Recognition of a different style of offense has occurred over the past century and a half. This is an offense, sometimes called one of ‘strict liability,’ based upon statutes which are intended to punish the conduct proscribed without requiring an unlawful intent. * * *
“ * * * A general intent crime requires only that the prohibited conduct be undertaken voluntarily.”
Chavez v. State, Wyo., 601 P.2d 166 (1979) brings these issues together in reversing a rape conviction by holding that a sexual-assault offense requires general criminal intent or mens rea, but that
“ * * * the criminal intent is the factor which is critical in differentiating what otherwise are very similar events. That general intent, however, must exist in the mind of the perpetrator (the ‘actor’ under the Wyoming Statutes). It cannot be demonstrated by only the subjective mental set of the alleged victim. It is not possible to structure the criminal intent of the defendant out of the subjective attitudes of the alleged victim.” Id. at 172.
These cases are consistent with the specific-intent factor of the assault-with-intent cases, State v. Wilson, 32 Wyo. 37, 228 P. 803 (1924), and Sanchez v. State, Wyo., 567 P.2d 270 (1977).
Matter of Adoption of RHA, Wyo., 702 P.2d 1259 (1985), involved a recognized incest as an effectuated sexual event, and likewise in Seeley v. State, Wyo., 715 P.2d 232 (1986), intent was not in conflict where defendant denied commission. See also Matlack v. State, Wyo., 695 P.2d 635 (1985), unauthorized use of a vehicle as general intent; Saldana v. State, Wyo., 685 P.2d 20 (1984), cert, denied 471 U.S. 1103, 105 S.Ct. 2331, 85 L.Ed.2d 848 (1985), obstructing police officer; Simmons v. State, Wyo., 674 P.2d 1294 (1984), aggravated assault; and Slaughter v. State, Wyo., 629 P.2d 481 (1981), escape.
I would simplistically apply the rule of Dorador v. State, Wyo., 573 P.2d 839 (1978), as there stated for application in a drug offense, to apply here for an assault with intent to commit a sexual offense:
“Realizing that the distinction between a specific intent crime and a general intent crime is apparently troublesome, we can perhaps clarify it by stating it in a somewhat different way. When the statute sets out the offense with only a description of the particular unlawful act, without reference to intent to do a further act or achieve a future consequence, the trial judge asks the jury whether the defendant intended to do the outlawed act. Such intention is general intent. When the statutory definition of the crime refers to an intent to do some further act or attain some additional consequence, the offense is considered to be a specific intent crime and then that question must be asked of the jury.” Id. at 843.
“ ‘The crime of assault with intent to commit rape is established when the prosecution proves that the defendant intended to have sexual intercourse with his victim and to use force to overcome her resistance.’ ” People v. Peckham, 249 Cal.App.2d 941, 57 Cal.Rptr. 922, 925 (1967), quoting from People v. Peckham, 232 Cal.App.2d 163, 42 Cal-Rptr. 673, 675 (1965).
*913Intent to commit rape as a special-intent offense has a long history. Reagan v. State, 28 Tex.Crim. 227,12 S.W. 601 (1889); People v. Guillett, 342 Mich. 1, 69 N.W.2d 140 (1955); People v. Stagg, 29 lll.2d 415, 194 N.E.2d 342 (1963).
Citation by the court of Lee v. State, 246 Ala. 69, 18 So.2d 706 (1944); Watt v. State, 222 Ark. 483, 261 S.W.2d 544 (1953); and Ard v. State, 57 Ala.App. 250, 327 So.2d 745 (1976) is not of contrary persuasion, since in each case the sexual act was committed and consequent intent to commit a sexual act was never in issue.
I would conclude that intent to commit a sexual offense is an element of rape, and that here, lacking any pre-plea instruction or acknowledged admission of that fact by defendant, no sufficient factual basis was recorded to determine presence or lack of all essential elements of the offense charged, as required by Rules 15(f) and 15(c)(1), W.R.Cr.P. and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.1 I would reverse, in order to permit the defendant to replead, either acknowledging sexual intent in fact, pleading to an offense which he admits, or facing trial on whatever criminal charge the prosecutor feels can be properly proven.

. It is possible to understand why Bryan now recognizes that the arrangement, as a plea bargain, had little to commend negotiative acceptance. His sentence of 20 years was not sufficiently reduced from an expectable range after a jury-trial conviction. Dismissal of a child-745 P.2d — 21 abuse claim which, in itself, carried a five-year maximum and was at least contendably within a double-jeopardy prohibited status, was hardly a bargain within his present argument of an admitted anger-driven, uncontrolled, aggravated-assault offense.