Court Opinion

ID: 9689159
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:22:30.013116+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:45.608149
License: Public Domain

Cavanagh, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in parí). I concur with the majority’s disposition of defendant Mary Lemons’ appeals, and therefore I join in parts I and Hof the majority opinion. However, in part m, which addresses defendant Llewellyn Lemons’ appeal of his sentencing to two terms of sixty to ninety years,1 the majority ignores the fundamental and most important operative distinction — that is, between parolable and nonparolable offenses — and blithely condones the sentencing court’s abuse of discretion in fashioning these challenged sentences.
In my opinion, given that Llewellyn Lemons received a valid life sentence on a separate but related count, the only conceivable rationale for sentencing him to two terms of sixty to ninety years was to effectively prevent the parole board from assuming jurisdiction over him pursuant to MCL 791.234(4); MSA 28.2304(4).2 A sentence fashioned for the sole purpose of depriving the parole board of its legislatively provided jurisdiction constitutes an abuse of a sentencing court’s discretion. It is well established that a sentencing court must exercise its discretion within the parameters established by the Legislature. See In re Campbell, 138 Mich 597; 101 NW 826 (1904); People v Moore, 432 Mich 311; 439 NW2d 684 (1989); People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630; 461 NW2d 1 (1990).
*262Pursuant to MCL 791.233b(w); MSA 28.2303(3)(w), criminal sexual conduct in the first degree is a parolable offense. This explicit legislative pronouncement, under which a prisoner is subject to the jurisdiction of the parole board after serving the minimum term less available disciplinary credits, compels us to invalidate any sentence fashioned solely for the purpose of precluding parole board jurisdiction over a prisoner. And it bears repeating that “being subject to the jurisdiction .of the parole board and actually being paroled are two distinctly different prospects. Few prisoners serving parolable life sentences are ever paroled.” People v Merriweather, 447 Mich 799, 813-814; 527 NW2d 460 (1994) (Cavanagh, C.J., dissenting). “Sentencing a defendant with the sole intent of effectively preventing the jurisdiction of the parole board is contrary to the legislative scheme and, accordingly, is an abuse of a sentencing court’s discretion.” Id. at 816.
I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals with respect to Llewellyn Lemons’ two sentences of sixty to ninety years, and would remand for imposition of a life sentence on these two counts in accordance with Moore, supra. On this basis, I dissent.
Brickley, J., concurred with Cavanagh, J.
Kelly, J., took no part in the decision of this case.

 Defendant Llewellyn Lemons also was sentenced to one life term, but that sentence was not vacated by the Court of Appeals and is not at issue in this appeal. The sentencing guidelines recommended a minimum term of fifteen to thirty years, or life in prison.

 Defendant, forty-five years old at the time of sentencing, would have to live to age 105 before he could receive parole consideration.