Court Opinion

ID: 9958497
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-09 15:09:56.329011+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:26.518058
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Deborah R. Hargy Malloy and                :
Edward C. Malloy                           :
                 Appellants                :
                                           :
      v.                                   : No. 213 C.D. 2023
                                           :
Hon. Barry C. Dozor                        : Submitted: February 6, 2024

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM                                                       FILED: April 9, 2024

      In this appeal, Appellants Deborah R. Hargy Malloy and Edward C. Malloy
(collectively Appellants) challenge the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware
County’s (Common Pleas) December 29, 2021 order, through which Common Pleas
sustained Appellee Hon. Barry C. Dozor’s (Appellee)1 preliminary objections to
Appellants’ “Amended (Third) Complaint” (Third Amended Complaint) and
dismissed that action with prejudice. Upon review, we affirm Common Pleas
December 29, 2021 order.

                                       I. Background
      On March 29, 2021, Appellants filed an abuse of process action against
Appellee in Common Pleas, to which Appellee responded by filing preliminary
objections. Thereafter, the parties engaged in a repetitious dance of sorts, whereby
Appellants would file a new, slightly revised version of their complaint, thereby
rendering moot Appellee’s existing preliminary objections, only to have Appellee
respond by submitting a new round of preliminary objections. Eventually,
Appellants filed their Third Amended Complaint, which is the subject of this appeal,

      1
          Appellee is a Common Pleas judge. See Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 3a.
on July 21, 2021. Therein, Appellants semi-coherently allege that Appellee has
abused the legal process by ruling upon Appellants’ motion to disqualify him from
a case despite his lack of jurisdictional authority to do so, as well as by repeatedly
challenging several other lawsuits filed by Appellants in Common Pleas via
preliminary objections;2 Appellants characterize the arguments put forth by Appellee
in those preliminary objections as being entirely spurious and improper. R.R. at 3a-
19a.
       On November 24, 2021, Appellee responded to the Third Amended
Complaint via preliminary objections. Specifically, Appellee argued that
Appellants’ action should be dismissed for several reasons. First, Appellants’ claims
were barred by judicial immunity. Id. at 56a-61a. Second, Appellants’ claims were
barred by sovereign immunity. Id. at 61a-63a. Third, Appellants had failed to plead
a legally viable abuse of process claim against Appellee. Id. at 63a-67a. Finally,
Appellants’ lawsuit was an impermissible collateral attack upon previous rulings
made by Appellee. Id. at 67a-69a. Appellants then filed preliminary objections of
their own, through which they requested that Common Pleas strike Appellee’s
preliminary objections “for failure to conform to law or rule of court.” Id. at 71a-
85a.
       On December 29, 2021, Common Pleas overruled Appellants’ preliminary
objections, sustained Appellee’s preliminary objections, dismissed Appellants’
Third Amended Complaint with prejudice, and precluded Appellants from filing a

       2
         Those underlying lawsuits revolve around Appellants’ belief that Appellee, a Common
Pleas judge, has repeatedly failed to comply with the administrative case disposition reporting
requirements imposed upon him by Pennsylvania Rule of Judicial Administration 703, Pa. R.J.A.
703. See R.R. at 3a-16a.

                                              2
fourth amended complaint.3 Id. at 105a. Appellants appealed this ruling to our Court
shortly thereafter.
                                        II. Discussion
       Appellants’ arguments are difficult to parse, as they are not coherently
articulated in their brief, but we interpret them as falling into two categories. First,
Common Pleas erred when it determined that Appellants had failed to state a viable
abuse of process claim against Appellee. Appellants’ Br. at 10-15. Second, Common
Pleas also erred by concluding that Appellee was immune from Appellants’ abuse
of process suit. Id. at 12-13, 16-18.
       We need only address Appellants’ first argument to resolve this appeal.4 “To
prove a claim for abuse of process, the plaintiff must show that the defendant used a

       3
         On September 14, 2022, Common Pleas issued an opinion, in which it explained that it
had sustained Appellee’s preliminary objections on the bases of demurrer and immunity. See R.R.
at 120a-22a.

       4
              “Our standard of review in [an] appeal arising from an order
              sustaining preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer is de
              novo, and our scope of review is plenary.” Raynor v. D’Annunzio,
              243 A.3d 41, 52 (Pa. 2020). A “demurrer is a preliminary objection
              to the legal sufficiency of a pleading and raises questions of law[.]”
              Raynor, 243 A.3d at 52. [A court can] sustain a demurrer only when
              the law undoubtedly precludes recovery; if doubt exists, [a court]
              should overrule the demurrer. Bilt-Rite Contractors, Inc. v. The
              Architectural Studio, 866 A.2d 270, 274 (Pa. 2005). “When ruling
              on a demurrer, a court must confine its analysis to the complaint.”
              Torres v. Beard, 997 A.2d 1242, 1245 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). “Thus,
              the court may determine only whether, on the basis of the plaintiff’s
              allegations, he or she possesses a cause of action recognized at law.”
              Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 5 by McNesby v. City of Phila.,
              267 A.3d 531, 541 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021).
RT Partners, LP v. Allegheny Cnty. Off. of Prop. Assessment, 307 A.3d 801, 805 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2023) (cleaned up).

                                                3
legal process against them primarily to accomplish a purpose for which the process
was not designed.” Morley v. Farnese, 178 A.3d 910, 919 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018).
              The common law tort of abuse of process involves the
              perversion of legal process after it has begun in order to
              achieve a result for which the process was not intended.
              Abuse of process has been described by the Supreme
              Court as the “use of legal process as a tactical weapon to
              coerce a desired result that is not the legitimate object of
              the process.” In order to state a cause of action for abuse
              of process it must be alleged that the defendant used a legal
              process to accomplish a purpose for which the process was
              not designed. The classic example is the initiation of a civil
              proceeding to coerce the payment of a claim completely
              unrelated to the cause of action sued upon. It is not enough
              that the defendant had bad or malicious intentions or that
              the defendant acted from spite or with an ulterior motive.
              Rather, there must be an act or threat not authorized by the
              process, or the process must be used for an illegitimate aim
              such as extortion, blackmail, or to coerce or compel the
              plaintiff to take some collateral action.
Orange Stones Co. v. City of Reading, 87 A.3d 1014, 1024-25 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014)
(quoting Al Hamilton Contracting Co. v. Cowder, 644 A.2d 188, 191-92 (Pa. Super.
1994)). “There is no liability [for abuse of process] where the defendant has done
nothing more than carry out the process to its authorized conclusion, even though
with bad intentions.” Di Sante v. Russ Fin. Co., 380 A.2d 439, 441 (Pa. Super. 1977)
(quoting WILLIAM PROSSER, TORTS, § 100, at 669 (2d ed.1955)) (cleaned up).5
       Given this framework, it is plainly evident that Appellants failed to articulate
a viable abuse of process claim in this matter against Appellee. The gravamen of
Appellants’ lawsuit consists of two assertions. First, Appellants claim that Appellee
has filed preliminary objections in other, related proceedings that contain entirely

       5
         “In general, Superior Court decisions are not binding on this Court, but they offer
persuasive precedent where they address analogous issues.” Lerch v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of
Rev., 180 A.3d 545, 550 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018).

                                             4
spurious arguments, including that Appellee was immune from suit and Appellants
failed to state claims for which legal relief could be granted. See R.R. at 3a-19a.
Those arguments, however, are of the type which defendants often raise at the
preliminary objection stage, in order to short-circuit pending litigation early on, and
are regularly adjudicated at that point by trial courts. 6 Where, as here, such

       6
         Strictly speaking, immunity must be raised as an affirmative defense in new matter, rather
than by preliminary objection. Pa. R.Civ.P. 1030(a). This is not an ironclad rule, though.
               “Should a plaintiff wish to contest the defense on this procedural
               ground, the plaintiff must file a preliminary objection to the
               preliminary objection.” Orange Stones, 87 A.3d at 1022.
               When a party responds to the preliminary objections, instead of
               challenging the procedure by filing its own preliminary objections,
               the party has waived any challenge to the form of pleading the
               defense. See Feldman v. Hoffman, 107 A.3d 821 (Pa. Cmwlth.
               2014). Generally, however, when not objected to in preliminary
               objections, courts have been moving away from this strict
               interpretation and it is now currently accepted that immunity is a
               defense that may be raised by preliminary objection “when to delay
               a ruling thereon would serve no purpose.” Faust v. Dep’t of
               Revenue, 592 A.2d 835, 838 n.3 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1991). But see Rufo v.
               Bastian-Blessing Co., 207 A.2d 823 (Pa. 1965) (trial court may only
               consider immunity defense raised by preliminary objection if
               plaintiff does not object).
               Further, “Pennsylvania courts have long recognized a limited
               exception to this rule and have allowed parties to plead the
               affirmative defense of immunity as a preliminary objection where
               the defense is clearly applicable on the face of the complaint.”
               Feldman, 107 A.3d at 829-30 (emphasis added) (citing string of
               cases); see also Logan v. Lillie, 728 A.2d 995 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999)
               (involving suit against judicial defendants and successful assertion
               of judicial immunity). In fact, “[w]here, however, the asserted
               affirmative defense is clearly applicable on the face of the
               complaint, the court will consider it unless the plaintiff advances
               some reason, ‘other than prolonging the matter,’ to defer
               consideration.” Firearm Owners Against Crime v. City of
               Harrisburg, 218 A.3d 497, 515 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019) (quoting
(Footnote continued on next page…)

                                                5
arguments are made in the normal course of litigation and carried to their “authorized
conclusion,” they cannot form the basis for a viable abuse of process claim, even if
those arguments were put forth “with bad intentions.” Di Sante, 380 A.2d at 441.
Second, Appellants claim that Appellee improperly ruled upon their motion to
disqualify him from a case despite his lack of jurisdiction to do so. However, the
record clearly reflects that Appellee dismissed that motion as moot because another
judge had already been assigned to handle the underlying case going forward; in
other words, Appellants had already been provided with the relief they had sought
through their motion. See R.R. at 26a-27a, 35a (Common Pleas’ December 29, 2021
order and subsequent opinion). We fail to see how Appellee’s dismissal of
Appellants’ motion was, under the circumstances, anything more than recognition
of the obvious, rather than an abuse of process. Accordingly, we conclude that
Common Pleas did not commit an error of law by sustaining Appellee’s preliminary
objections on the basis of demurrer.
                                      III. Conclusion
       In light of the foregoing analysis, we affirm Common Pleas’ December 29,
2021 order.

              Feldman, 107 A.3d at 835) (when method of raising immunity
              defense challenged, upheld overruling of preliminary objection
              because immunity was not clear on face of complaint).
Chasan v. Platt, 244 A.3d 73, 80-81 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020) (cleaned up).

                                              6
          IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Deborah R. Hargy Malloy and        :
Edward C. Malloy                   :
                 Appellants        :
                                   :
     v.                            : No. 213 C.D. 2023
                                   :
Hon. Barry C. Dozor                :

PER CURIAM
                                 ORDER

     AND NOW, this 9th day of April, 2024, it is hereby ORDERED that the Court
of Common Pleas of Delaware County’s December 29, 2021 order is AFFIRMED.