Court Opinion

ID: 9795652
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:34:49.941685+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:30:43.803847
License: Public Domain

EDMONDS, J.
concurring.
This case involves a determination by the Employment Relations Board (ERB) that Lake County’s newly created position of associate finance director is not a confidential position under ORS 243.650(6) and thus is included within Teamsters Local Union #223’s bargaining unit. 1 The majority holds that Lake County did not preserve the positions at the agency level that it now takes on appeal; thus, under ORAP 5.45(1), the majority exercises its discretion not to consider them. I write separately because part of the majority’s reasoning is inconsistent with the holding of the Oregon Supreme Court in Stull v. Hoke, 326 Or 72, 948 P2d 722 (1997). I concur; however, with the majority’s result for the reasons expressed below.
*280In the “Summary of Argument” portion of its brief on appeal, Lake County takes three separate positions: (1) “The ERB has improperly added a non-statutory criterion to the specific wording of ORS 243.650(5) which define[s] what constitutes a ‘confidential employee’ in collective bargain situations.” (2) “Furthermore, in adding a criterion to the statutory definition, the ERB failed to establish a clear and consistent description of the additional element. As a result, the ERB has repeatedly applied several similar, but legally distinct * * * criteria].” (3) “[T]he purported criterion is impossibly and unconstitutionally vague.”2
I agree with the majority that the issue of whether the agency’s application of the statute to this case is constitutional was not raised to the agency and that therefore, we should not consider it. I also agree that we should not consider the county’s initial position, albeit for a somewhat different legal reason. In closing argument, as the majority correctly observes, the county’s counsel argued to the administrative law judge (ALJ) that, under the applicable case law, “[t]he assistance that [the confidential employee] does provide has to be a necessary duty of hers.” In other words, the county invited the ALJ to apply a “necessary duty” test to the evidence. Assuming, as the county contends, that *281it was error for the ALJ and ERB to insert a “necessary” element into the statutory language under ORS 174.010,3 an appellant cannot be heard to complain on appeal if it was actively instrumental in bringing about the error. State v. Ferguson, 201 Or App 261, 269, 119 P3d 794 (2005), rev den, 340 Or 34 (2006). That is exactly what occurred in this case.
The majority and I, however, part company with regard to whether the county’s second position is properly before us. Later, in its brief, the county explains with regard to that position,
“The issue on review is the ERB’s improper addition to ORS 243.650(6) of an extra non-statutory criterion.
iji ‡ ^
“Perhaps [the] most salient point though is that this non-statutory element has been applied by the ERB in at least three different formulations. The formulation in the instant case is whether the assistance of the employee in question is necessary. However [,] in 2003 [,] in Teamsters Local Union #206, Petitioner v. City of Coquille, Case No. UC-32-02 (2003), the ERB stated the test much differently: ‘[whether] the confidential aid or assistance necessarily involves being privy to and/or involved in the employer’s preparation of proposals, policies or other materials for use in collective bargaining negotiations.’ Quoting from AFSCME Council 75 v. North Bend/Coos Curry Housing Authority, Case No. C-140-84, 8 PECBR 7926, 7929-7930 (1985), and citing to AFSCME v. City of Eugene, Case No. UC-10-85, 9 PECBR 8591, 8600 (1986) as well. In this formulation, the focus of the test was whether it [sic] the assistance provided necessitated exposure to collective bargaining materials.
“A third version of the text was applied last year in Service Employees International Union Local 503, Oregon Public Employees Union v. Oregon Cascade West Council of Governments, Case No. UC-16-04 (2004) in which the ERB applied a very different test and conditioned it on whether the assistance was only ‘reasonably necessary.’ When read *282in full, it is clear that this version of the criterion is legally distinct from the other versions!.]”
(Emphasis in original.) In his opening statement to the ALJ, the county’s counsel said, in part:
“It’s our position that her role in collective bargaining is such that she is evaluating the positions and making recommendations on proposals to the union — to the board in union negotiations, that her confidentiality is not only necessary, but is clearly called for under prior ERB rules.”
In his closing argument to the ALJ, the county’s counsel said, in part:
“The assistance that she does provide has to be a necessary duty of hers. That principle comes from Department of Justice, 10 PECBR 942, and Illinois Valley, 17 PECBR 493.
“The other case that’s relevant is a more recent case, which is City of Coquille. * * *
“When you apply the cases to the facts at hand, it’s obvious, of course, that the [county board of commissioners] is the party responsible for conducting union negotiations. * * * Her role in providing support in those bargaining negotiations is not incidental. It’s not merely input from her. It’s not merely a convenience to the board. The board, as the testimony relates here, relies heavily on her knowledge of the economics, her knowledge of the budget, the comparisons that she makes to relevant other counties, and then making a proposal based on those comparisons to the boardf.]”
The ALJ ruled contrary to the county’s argument that its employee was a “necessary” employee under ORS 243.650(6). In her opinion, she framed the issue as whether the assistance of the employee is
“necessary, thus requiring that the position be excluded from the bargaining unit in order to protect the employer from disclosure of its strategies [.]” Laborers’ International Union of North America, Local No. 121 v. Crook County Park and Recreation Department, Case NO. RC-3-98, 17 PECBR 929 (1999).”
*283She concluded:
“We have previously determined that an employee who occasionally compiles collective bargaining data was not a confidential employee especially when there is another confidential employee who can perform the same work. We have also decided that being a backup to a confidential employee is not a basis for exclusion from the bargaining unit. Nor will we deem as confidential an employee who assists in costing bargaining proposals when the work could be performed by a confidential employee.
“Historically, the finance director has provided financial assistance to the County commissioners and bargaining team. Because of problems experienced with the previous finance director, the commissioners wanted an additional person as back up to the finance director. Although we understand the County’s reason for wanting two financial specialists, either of whom can perform all of the required financial duties, we do not find that it is necessary that Alves provide this assistance. Nor is it necessary to exclude both employees as confidential. Therefore, we conclude, that the associate finance director is not a confidential position and is not excluded from the bargaining unit.”4
(Citations omitted; emphasis in original.)
In sum, the issue litigated at the agency level by the county and determined by the ALJ and ERB was whether the associate finance director position was a confidential position in the collective bargaining process as contemplated by ORS 243.650(6). Part of the determination made by the ALJ concerned whether the assistance rendered by the position was necessary to the formulation, determination, and effectuation of management collective bargaining policies. On judicial review, the county contends that the ALJ and, in turn, ERB applied a different formulation or legal test than had been applied by ERB in other cases. To be sure, the county did not make that precise argument to the ALJ; indeed, it may have not been possible for the county to have anticipated the ALJ’s reasoning. But the point is that the proper interpretation of ORS 243.650(6) was clearly in issue before the ALJ and ERB.
*284It is that point that implicates the holding in Stull for purposes of ORAP 5.45(1). In Stull, the issue was whether a civil action was commenced within the period provided for by a statute of limitations. There were three possible constructions of the statute. However, the plaintiff had argued only the first alternative at trial and to this court, raising the issue of whether only that alternative was preserved under ORAP 5.45(1). The Supreme Court held that “plaintiff raised and preserved the broader legal issue — whether the trial court erred in holding that his claims were barred by the statute of limitations [,]” reasoning that “a specific alternative argument regarding that issue can be raised for the first time in this court.” Stull, 326 Or at 77.
The principle announced in Stull under ORAP 5.45(1) controls the issue of preservation in this case. The county raised the broader legal issue concerning the interpretation of ORS 243.650(6). In response, ERB ruled on that issue based on its interpretation of the meaning of ORS 243.650(6). See State v. Wyatt, 335 Or 331, 343, 15 P3d 22 (2000) (whether an issue is preserved depends on the parties and the tribunal having had the opportunity to consider the issue). The fact that appellant now argues for the first time on judicial review that the ALJ and the board applied a standard inconsistent with its case law in arriving at their interpretation of the statute does not create a new issue for purposes of ORAP 5.45(1). Rather, as in Stull, the county’s position constitutes an alternative argument about why the ALJ and the board’s interpretation and application of the statute was erroneous. Consequently, the majority errs by declining to consider the county’s position that ERB applied a standard in this case that is inconsistent with the standard that it has applied in other cases.
I turn then to the merits of the county’s argument. The standard for judicial review of this bargaining emit clarification decision is embodied in ORS 183.482(8)(b)(B), which requires us to remand if an agency’s exercise of its discretion is “[inconsistent with an agency rule, an officially stated agency position, or a prior agency practice, if the inconsistency is not explained by the agency [.]” It is under that statute that we consider whether ERB’s decision in this case is inconsistent with its pronouncements in other cases. Assoc, of *285Engineering Employes v. Dept. of Trans., 72 Or App 371, 375, 695 P2d 961 (1985). However, “[w]e cannot review the consistency of [a] holding with other ERB decisions in the absence of a clear and specific formulation of a rule or of an independent basis upon which to assess its validity.” Id.
Here, the county has not made the required showing. The county argues that
“ERB has applied at least three different non-statutory tests with three different areas of focus: 1) is classification as ‘confidential’ reasonably necessary to protect against premature disclosure of information? 2) does the assistance necessarily expose the employee to sensitive materials used in collective bargaining? And in the instant case 3) is the assistance itself necessary as the employer engages in collective bargaining work?”
Taking the county’s argument at face value, I discern no substantive difference among the ways in which ERB has formulated the applicable rule. Whether the test is expressed as whether “the assistance of the employee is necessary,” or whether “confidential aid or assistance necessarily involves being privy to * * * employer’s preparations * * * in collective bargaining negotiations,” or whether “the assistance provided necessitated exposure to collective bargaining materials,” ERB’s formulations of its rule focus, as applied to varying sets of facts, on how necessary the employee’s work is to the determination of collective bargaining policy. Because of that ultimate focus, the formulations are insufficiently different to be deemed substantively inconsistent with each other for purposes of judicial review under ORS 183.482(8)(b)(B). Under the circumstances, I conclude that the county has not clearly shown that ERB’s order created an inconsistency with its prior case law that ERB is required to explain, and therefore, remand is not warranted.
For the above reason, I concur.
Linder and Rosenblum, Judges, and Deits, Judge pro tempore, join in this concurrence.

 ORS 243.650(6) defines a “confidential employee” as an employee “who assists and acts in a confidential capacity to a person who formulates, determines and effectuates management policies in the area of collective bargaining.”

 The majority does not address what I have characterized as the county’s second position, preferring instead to treat the county’s brief as conflating its nonconstitutional arguments. See 208 Or App at 275-76 n 4. That treatment permits the majority to conclude that any error was invited by the county and thus, to avoid reaching the merits of the county’s appeal. I disagree with the majority’s methodology for two reasons. First, the argument that ERB improperly added a non-statutory element to ORS 243.650(6) when it applied the statute to the facts of this case is conceptually different from the argument that ERB failed to apply the same standard to this case that it has applied in other cases. The county correctly recognizes in its brief that our standard of review is pursuant to ORS 183.482(8). Under ORS 183.482(8)(b)(B), a court is required to remand the order to the agency if it determines that the agency’s decision is inconsistent with an officially stated agency position, an agency rule or a prior agency practice, unless the inconsistency is explained by the agency. The county’s first and second arguments are conceptually different because under the second argument, an agency could apply the same statutory elements inconsistently without adding a nonstatutory element to the analysis, as the first argument asserts. Second, the majority’s treatment of the county’s brief operates to deprive the county of its “day in court” regarding the interpretation of the statute under which the parties litigated before the ALJ and ERB. Even if the county’s brief is written inartfully, we should give it the benefit of all of its arguments on judicial review; the union was not prejudiced by the manner in which the county’s second argument was raised on judicial review and met that argument in its brief before this court.

 ORS 174.010 provides generally that it is the office of a “judge” to declare the meaning of a statute by the words or substance contained therein and not to insert what has been omitted or omit what has been inserted.

 The board adopted the ALJ’s reasoning.