Court Opinion

ID: 9677164
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:45:04.982862+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:54.299768
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON STATE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
CLINTON, Judge.
The issue in this cause is whether unad-judicated extraneous offenses are admissible for a jury to consider in assessing punishment and recommending probation when a defendant applies for probation, pleads not guilty but is found guilty, and then testifies in support of his application.
Appellant was found guilty of murder; the jury assessed his punishment at confinement for life and, of course, did not recommend probation.
After the jury returned its verdict of guilt the trial judge promptly convened a punishment hearing, and called for announcements. The prosecution announced that “the State will rest on punishment.” Thereafter, in substance the court of appeals found the following occurred: Appellant took the stand, stated his name and testified in response to only three questions that he is the person the jury had just found guilty, that he had not before been convicted of a felony offense anywhere and that he had never been placed on felony probation. The prosecution chose not to question him. Appellant rested. Then, outside the presence of the jury, understanding that the State intended to call five witnesses to testify to unadjudicated extraneous offenses allegedly committed by appellant, over his proper objection the trial judge ruled the evidence would be admissible, explaining his reasoning, viz:
“[T]hat extraneous offenses, if shown to have occurred within a reasonably recent period, would be admissible in the punishment hearing, bearing on the proposition only, as to whether or not the defendant is a proper person to have on the street on probation, or should in fact, be in the penitentiary, and not bearing on any other part of the punishment.”1
Accordingly, the trial court permitted the prosecution to adduce evidence of five prior unadjudicated offenses, the oldest of which had been committed some six months before the instant offense, viz: a purse snatching robbery; driving while intoxicated by sniffing paint; fleeing officers in a three county chase under influence of inhaling paint; a misdemeanor assault by near strangulation, followed within an hour by an arrest for public intoxication from sniffing paint. With that, both parties closed.
The charge of the court instructed the jury on its functions “if you desire in your discretion as jurors to recommend probation in this case.”2
The Dallas Court of Appeals noted the trial court had admitted the evidence “on the basis that it was relevant to the accused’s application for probation,” and that the State defends that ruling on the same basis. It found “currently clear that, as a *57general rule, evidence of unadjudicated extraneous offenses is inadmissible under article 37.07,” and held the general rule controlled in the instant case. Allaben v. State, 418 S.W.2d 517 (Tex.Cr.App.1967), upon which the State relied, was found distinguishable on its facts in that there the defendant was offering to show he had sought psychiatric treatment for his sexual problems, and the opinion “does not deal with the admission of an unadjudicated extraneous offense.” It also alluded to “false impression” cases and “fair determination” notion of Davis v. State, 478 S.W.2d 958 (Tex.Cr.App.1972), distinguished them and concluded, “The unadju-dicated offense testimony admitted by the trial court was admitted in violation of article 37.07(3).” Murphy v. State, 700 S.W.2d 747 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1985).
We granted review of that decision to examine the State’s primary contention that “an application for probation, this alone put into issue [appellant’s] suitability for probation and, as such, made relevant that evidence showing his likely future criminal conduct.” State’s Petition for Discretionary Review, p. 7. Tex.R.App. Pro. Rule 200(c)(1), (2) and (3).
I.
As the court of appeals observed, it is currently considered the “general rule” that neither unadjudicated bad acts, nor the details of adjudicated offenses, may be admitted at the punishment phase in a non-capital prosecution. E.g., Ramey v. State, 575 S.W.2d 535 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Sherman v. State, 537 S.W.2d 262 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Lege v. State, 501 S.W.2d 880 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Mullins v. State, 492 S.W.2d 277 (Tex.Cr.App.1973). This general rule derives from V.A.C.C.P., Article 37.07, § 3(a), which at the time of trial in this cause read as follows:
“(a) Regardless of the plea and whether the punishment be assessed by the judge or the jury, evidence may be offered by the state and the defendant as to the prior criminal record of the defendant, his general reputation and his character. The term prior criminal record means a final conviction in a court of record, or a probated or suspended sentence that has occurred prior to trial, or any final conviction material to the offense charged.’’3
This provision had its genesis in the 1965 Code of Criminal Procedure, wherein also, by other provisions of Article 37.07, supra, bifurcation of jury assessments of guilt and punishment was accomplished for the first time.
In Allaben v. State, supra, the Court remarked that evidence admissible at the newly created punishment phase of trial:
“is by no means limited to the defendant’s prior criminal record, his general reputation and his character. Evidence legally admissible to mitigate punishment or evidence that is relevant to the application for probation, if any, is also admissible.”
Id., at 519. In subsequent cases the Court held unadjudicated extraneous offenses admissible on authority of Allaben, supra, where application for probation was made. For example, in Davis v. State, supra, the defendant testified at the punishment phase of trial that he had not realized his companion had intended to commit robbery until he actually pulled a gun on a loan officer. The State was allowed to rebut this testimony with evidence the defendant had committed a robbery at a loan company only a month before. This Court perceived no error, observing:
“While the general rule is that specific acts of misconduct by the accused which have not resulted in final convictions cannot be admitted, this court has been reluctant to exclude legally admissible evidence which is relevant to a fair determination of an accused’s application for probation. Allaben v. State, supra; Santiago v. State, [444 S.W.2d 758 (Tex.Cr.App.(1969) ]. See also Rendon v. *58State, 170 Tex.Cr.R. 548, 342 S.W.2d 317; Ward v. State, 160 Tex.Cr.R. 232, 268 S.W.2d 465.”
Id. at 959. In Cleveland v. State, 502 S.W.2d 24 (Tex.Cr.App.1973), the defendant filed an application for probation and testified in support thereof, not only that he had never before been convicted of a felony, but also that he had been honorably discharged from the military and enjoyed a good work record and family life. On crossexamination the State was allowed to elicit the defendant’s admission that he had purchased marihuana on a prior occasion. Discerning no error in this, the Court observed:
“The issue of probation for this [defendant], who had plead guilty to the possession of marihuana, was squarely before the jury. We are not dealing here with ... testimony which was not proper under Article 37.07, [supra]. Other issues can become involved rendering relevant testimony admissible.”
Id., at 26. See also, McCrea v. State, 494 S.W.2d 821, 825 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Holmes v. State, 502 S.W.2d 728, 729 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Basaldua v. State, 481 S.W.2d 851, 854 (Tex.Cr.App.1972).
The State maintains that the court of appeals erred in interpreting these cases, along with Davis v. State, supra, to hold that only after appellant first attempts to create a false impression as to his “suitability” for probation may the State, in the interest of obtaining a “fair determination,” respond with proof of unadjudicated specific acts of misconduct, to counter that impression.4 We believe a reasoned approach to resolution of this issue involves more than just a recapitulation of these particular cases. An understanding of the history of admissibility of evidence relative to punishment in Texas is also useful, and to that we now turn.
II.
With enactment of the first constitutionally valid suspended sentence law in 1913, see Acts 1913, 33rd Leg., p. 8, ch. 7,5 this Court was confronted for the first time with questions of admissibility of character evidence bearing specifically and exclusively upon a punishment issue in a unitary trial. Before that time it was “always admissible for [the accused] to prove that his character was such as to make it unlikely that he would have perpetrated the act charged upon him.” Wharton’s Criminal Evidence, § 57 (9th ed. 1884). Proof of character to this end was limited to evidence of the accused’s good reputation for a particular character trait, id., § 60, “character” being deemed essentially “convertible” with “reputation,” id., § 58; Brownlee v. State, 13 Tex.App. 255 (1882). Only after the accused had admitted evidence of his good reputation as to a particular character trait could the State respond with character evidence; and then, only in kind, with evidence the accused suffered a bad reputation for that same trait of character. See generally, Branch’s Annotated Penal Code, § 148, p. 84 (1st ed. 1916). Like the accused, the State was prohibited from adducing evidence of particular misconduct to prove character. Wharton’s, supra, § 61; Holsey v. State, 24 Tex.App. 35, 42, 5 S.W. 523 (1887); Thompson v. State, 38 Tex.*59Cr.R. 335, 42 S.W. 974, 977 (1897).6 As is the case today, the State sometimes could admit specific misconduct if its relevancy lay in its tendency to establish some material issue in the case, independent of whatever tendency it might also have had to establish some detrimental trait of the accused’s character per se. But whatever relevance specific misconduct may have had in aid of assessment of punishment was overshadowed in the unitary procedure by these rules preserving rights of the accused to a determination of his guilt or innocence absent uninvited “character/reputation” evidence.
In 1913 the Legislature enacted the Suspended Sentence Law. Pursuant to that act, the accused could file written sworn application for suspended sentence in all but certain enumerated felony offenses. Should the jury assess a term of punishment not exceeding five years, and find the accused had never before been convicted of a felony, it could recommend his sentence be suspended, and the trial court was obliged to follow that recommendation. Art. 776, V.A.C.C.P. (1925). Furthermore, once an application for suspended sentence was filed, the trial court was required to “permit testimony as to the general reputation of defendant to enable the jury to determine whether to recommend the suspension of sentence[.]” Art. 778, V.A.C. C.P. (1925).7 For purposes of this provision, “general reputation” meant, exclusively, reputation of the accused for being peaceable and lawabiding. Campbell v. State, 73 Tex.Cr.R. 198, 164 S.W. 850 (1914); Long v. State, 120 Tex.Cr.R. 373, 48 S.W.2d 632 (1932). Evidence of a reputation for peaceableness, though a statutory consideration, was not deemed a prerequisite to jury recommendation of a suspended sentence. Martin v. State, 122 Tex.Cr.R. 174, 54 S.W.2d 812 (1932).
Caselaw construing these provisions made clear that, whenever application for suspended sentence was made, the old rule prohibiting the State from initiating inquiry into the character of the accused, no longer applied. The application itself put the accused’s “reputation” in issue. E.g., Overby v. State, 92 Tex.Cr.R. 172, 242 S.W. 213 (1922). The very earliest cases, in fact, seem to indicate a belief that by putting “reputation” in issue, the statute authorized any “evidence of the character of life [the accused] has lived in the past ... to enable the jury to determine whether or not the clemency should be extended.” Williamson v. State, 74 Tex.Cr.R. 289, 167 S.W. 360, 362 (1914). See, e.g., Martoni v. State, 74 Tex.Cr.R. 90, 167 S.W. 349 (1914); Conatser v. State, 75 Tex.Cr.R. 91, 170 S.W. 314 (1914). To the extent these cases supported the proposition that specific acts could be proved in aid of the jury’s determination whether to recommend a suspended sentence, however, they were soon undermined. Beginning with Baker v. State, 87 Tex.Cr.R. 305, 221 S.W. 607 (1920), the Court opined that, though alone placing the accused’s “reputation” in issue, the new legislation did not purport to affect rules governing methods of proof. “The passage of the [Suspended Sentence] law did not change the rule touching the manner of *60proving the reputation.” Moore v. State, 91 Tex.Cr.R. 118, 237 S.W. 931, 933 (1922). The Court held, accordingly, that specific acts of misconduct were “not admissible as directly combating the good reputation of the accused.” Skelton v. State, 106 Tex.Cr.R. 90, 291 S.W. 238, 240 (1927).8 See also, Bowman v. State, 98 Tex.Cr.R. 349, 265 S.W. 1038 (1924); Pettiett v. State, 100 Tex.Cr.R. 255, 272 S.W. 473 (1925). Nor was the accused permitted to use particular acts of conduct to prove his good reputation. Wagley v. State, 87 Tex.Cr.R. 504, 224 S.W. 687 (1920); Brown v. State, 92 Tex.Cr.R. 147, 242 S.W. 218 (1922). So disinclined was the Court to allow evidence of extraneous acts that even when the accused managed to put in evidence of specific good conduct, it was ruled error to permit the State to counter with evidence of bad, over objection. Having failed to object to impermissible evidence from the accused, the Court held, the State could not compensate with otherwise impermissible evidence of its own. Johnson v. State, 91 Tex.Cr.R. 582, 241 S.W. 484 (1922) (Opinion on rehearing); Merritt v. State, 124 Tex.Cr.R. 42, 60 S.W.2d 792 (1933); Williams v. State, 130 Tex.Cr.R. 86, 91 S.W.2d 709 (1936). Cf. Jackson v. State, 155 Tex.Cr.R. 466, 236 S.W.2d 623 (1951); Seay v. State, 395 S.W.2d 40 (Tex.Cr.App.1965).
The first Adult Probation Act appeared, as Art. 781b, Y.A.C.C.P., in 1947. Acts 1947, 50th Leg., p. 1049, ch. 452. Under this act only the trial court could grant probation, and then only “where the maximum punishment assessed ... does not exceed ten (10) years imprisonment.” Reminiscent of the still extant Suspended Sentence Law, the new probation statute required proof of no previous felony conviction; unlike the former, however, the probation statute did not expressly authorize admission of character evidence in any form. One possible explanation for this omission is that it was expected the trial court would routinely exercise the statutory alternative, provided in Art. 781b, § 2, supra, to direct a probation officer to “fully investigate and report to the court in writing the circumstances of the offense, criminal record, social history and present condition of the defendant.” Such a report would altogether obviate any need to inquire into the character of the accused in the unitary trial, and thus there would be no call to legislate evidentiary parameters. At any rate, while remarking that whether to give probation was a matter within the “sound,” and evidently unreviewable discretion of the trial court, e.g., Baker v. State, 151 Tex.Cr.R. 454, 209 S.W.2d 769 (1948); Stratmon v. State, 169 Tex.Cr.R. 188, 333 S.W.2d 135 (1960), the Court apparently never found occasion to write on the question of admissibility of evidence at trial bearing on the court’s decision to grant probation.9 In practice, it appears evidence was admitted as to, if not precisely the character of the accused, per se, at least his characteristics, viz., lack of prior “trouble,” employment history, youth, and “reputation.” See, e.g., Baker v. State, supra; Roy v. State, 167 Tex.Cr.R. 307, 319 S.W.2d 705 (1959).
In 1957 the Adult Probation Act was amended and recodified as Article 78 Id. Acts 1957, 55th Leg., p. 466, ch. 226. The amendments are not material to our present discussion.
*61With the new Code of Criminal Procedure in 1965 came radical changes in punishment procedure. The biggest innovation was the bifurcation of most criminal trials before a jury on a plea of not guilty into two stages, the first to determine guilt or innocence of the accused, and the second, where a guilty verdict is returned, to assess punishment. This was accomplished by substantial amendment to former Art. 693, V.A.C.C.P. (1925), and recodification as Article 37.07 of the new Code, with further amendments in Acts 1967, 60th Leg., p. 1739, ch. 659, § 22. As former Presiding Judge Onion observed in Brumfield v. State, 445 S.W.2d 732 (Tex.Cr.App.1969), the new procedure:
“involved splitting the trial on the issues of guilt and punishment and provided that at the penalty stage of the proceedings whether the asessor of punishment be the same jury or the judge, either side could offer evidence of the defendant’s prior criminal record, his character or reputation. Such procedure was obviously designed to take the blindfolds off the judge or jury when it came to assessing punishment. It authorized the introduction of evidence on punishment not heretofore held to be generally admissible. It did, however, limit such introduction to the penalty stage to prevent the accused from being tried as a criminal generally prior to a determination of the issue of guilt. It thus allowed evidence critical to an enlightened determination of punishment but avoided the possibility of prejudice on the issue of guilt.”
Id., at 738. Under the new bifurcated scheme, at least two sorts of evidence became admissible at the punishment stage that could not have been admitted in a unitary trial. First, evidence of the “prior criminal record” of the accused, meaning, as per the 1967 amendment, “a final conviction in a court of record, or a probated or suspended sentence that has occurred prior to trial, or any final conviction material to the offense charged[,]” was authorized. Second, evidence could come in of the accused’s “character.” By this we interpret the legislature to have meant opinion testimony of the character of the accused, as distinct from character evidence in the form of “reputation.” See Hedicke v. State, 779 S.W.2d 837 (Tex.Cr.App. decided this day) (Plurality Opinion). The Court has never construed Article 37.07, supra, expressly to authorize character evidence in the form of specific misconduct, except, of course, inasmuch as that misconduct has become a part of the “prior criminal record” of the accused. Mullins v. State, Lege v. State, and Sherman v. State, all supra. Thus it appears that specific conduct of the accused, good or bad, may not be admitted to prove “character,” per se, even at the separate punishment proceeding.
Also in 1965 the Legislature repealed the Suspended Sentence Law, which had been “long subject to claims of abuse, either real or supposed[.]” Special Commentary, Article 42.12, V.A.C.C.P. At the same time, the Adult Probation Act was recodified as Article 42.12, and amended to allow juries to grant probation. Under the new Article 42.12, the trial court could grant probation regardless of whether the accused had a prior felony conviction. Before it could recommend probation, by contrast, a jury must find he had none. The requirement of a written sworn application was carried over from former Art. 776, supra; the provision in former Art. 778, supra, expressly putting “general reputation” “in issue,” however, was not. Moreover, the Legislature provided nothing to equip the jury in its decision whether to recommend probation comparable to the report provided by earlier versions of the Adult Probation Act, and retained in 1965, to apprise the court of “circumstances of the offense, criminal record, social history and present condition” of the accused.
From this background one thing is certain: that, whereas under the Suspended Sentence Law the State was allowed to initiate proof of character, but only in the form of “reputation” testimony, under its descendant, Article 37.07, § 3(a), supra, the State may present evidence of character at any punishment hearing, limited in form, however, to prior criminal record, and opinion or reputation testimony. Not immedi*62ately clear is whether, and if so what “other issues,” besides character per se, “can become involved rendering relevant testimony admissible.” Cleveland v. State, supra, at 26. Does Article 37.07, § 3(a), supra, define the permissible limits of admissible proof at the punishment phase of trial, or does it merely limit methods of proving character, leaving open whether evidence may be “relevant” to some other purpose? We next consider how admissibility of evidence at the punishment phase is to be determined in the current bifurcated scheme.
III.
On original submission a plurality of the Court applied a test we have traditionally employed to determine admissibility of extraneous misconduct at the guilt or innocence phase of a criminal trial. According to this well-worn test, an extraneous act may become admissible if, quite apart from whatever probativeness it may have to show “character,” it is relevant to a material issue in the case and its relevancy value outweighs its potential for prejudice. E.g., Williams v. State, 662 S.W.2d 344 (Tex.Cr.App.1984); Morgan v. State, 692 S.W.2d 877 (Tex.Cr.App.1985). This test reflects the broad precept that, subject to permissible methods of proof, which are generally more informed by considerations of reliability than relevance, admissibility of evidence is a function of relevancy. Relevancy depends, in turn, upon materiality. In other words, to borrow from the new Rules of Criminal Evidence, to determine whether evidence is “relevant,” it is necessary to know whether it tends to establish or refute “some fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.” Tex.R. Crim.Evid, Rule 401.
In the old unitary trial, before 1965, the rule was applied in the context of extraneous offenses with a view to preventing juries from inferring guilt from proof that the accused was “a criminal in general.” Only if proof of an extraneous transaction supported some material inference other than one of character conformity was it admissible at trial. However, we know from, inter alia, Brumfield v. State, supra, that at least to some extent it is appropriate to consider the criminal character of the accused in assessing punishment. Otherwise the Legislature would not have permitted the State to invoke his criminal record, his infamy in the community, or individual opinions as to his bad character at the new punishment phase. How do we determine what else may be admissible at the punishment phase of trial?
Application of the traditional rule of admitting evidence, even of an extraneous offense, so long as it is “relevant” to a “material issue,” is in most instances an unsatisfactory measure of whether evidence other than that expressly permitted by Article 37.07, § 3(a), supra, is admissible at the punishment phase. The problem lies in defining what the particular “issues” are that evidence may or may not be “relevant” to prove. We have remarked before that “[t]he material issue during the punishment phase is, obviously, what punishment to assess[.]” Hoffert v. State, 623 S.W.2d 141, 145 (Tex.Cr.App.1981). While that is indeed obvious, it is not especially helpful for purposes of deciding relevance.
The facts “of consequence” at the guilt phase of trial are narrowly drawn by or readily extrapolated from penal provisions and statutory justifications. An extraneous offense may be offered as proof of an ultimate fact, such as identity or culpable intent, or it may be offered to establish an evidentiary fact, such as motive, from which an ultimate fact may be inferred. In either case we know what the material issues are because the Legislature has supplied them. Thus we have a fixed point by which to navigate questions of relevance at the guilt phase of trial. The same is not true of the punishment phase. There, aside from certain exceptions,10 the “fact-*63finder” does not determine the existence of discreet facts. Deciding what punishment to assess is a normative process, not intrinsically factbound. Because the material issue at punishment is so indistinct, relevancy of proffered evidence cannot be determined by deductive processes. To extend the nautical metaphor, we have been given a rudder to steer, but no polestar to steer by.
In reality, what is “relevant” to determining proper punishment is more a question of policy than of logic. In creating the separate punishment proceeding in 1965, the Legislature clearly intended to remove the blinders inherent in a unitary trial. Unfortunately, outside of Article 37.07, § 3(a), supra, it has given no clear guidance as to what considerations should inform the jury’s punishment decision.
We do know, nevertheless, that certain information has been widely regarded as “relevant” to assessment of punishment. It is axiomatic, for example, that punishment should fit the particular crime. Accordingly, the trial court routinely instructs the jury it may consider all evidence admitted at the guilt phase in making its punishment determination. Additional evidence of the circumstances of the offense may be admitted at the punishment phase, e.g., Davis v. State, supra, unless the proffered evidence bears only upon an issue necessarily resolved against the proponent by the guilty verdict, as in Dixon v. State, 506 S.W.2d 585 (Tex.Cr.App.1974). Modern pe-nological thought also bolds that, along with the circumstances of the offense, “[hjighly relevant — if not essential — to ... selection of an appropriate sentence is the possession of the fullest information possible concerning the defendant’s life and characteristics." Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 1083, 93 L.Ed. 1337, 1342 (1949). These factors are not “relevant” in the sense that they tend to make more or less probable some identifiable issue of ultimate fact at the punishment phase. Calling circumstances of the offense and the offender “relevant” is really no more than to say we deem that information appropriate for the factfinder to consider in exercise of its unfettered discretion to assess whatever punishment within the prescribed range it sees fit. In the policy gap left by the Legislature, this Court has held evidence of “the circumstances of the offense itself or ... the defendant himself” to be admissible at the punishment phase. Stiehl v. State, 585 S.W.2d 716, 718 (Tex.Cr.App.1979).
Manifestly, one circumstance of the offender is his character. Although character is thus “relevant” at the punishment phase, as an appropriate consideration to inform the factfinder’s discretion, admissibility of evidence of character qua character is nonetheless wholly circumscribed by Article 37.07, § 3(a), supra. From our synopsis of its history we have already determined that neither the State nor the accused may introduce evidence of specific unadjudicated conduct as proof of his character under this provision. We also find it untenable that specific acts may be admitted at the punishment phase to prove some circumstance of the offender apart from his character per se. Though bifurcation in 1965 removed the blinders and created the possibility for admission of evidence unimaginable in the prior unitary proceeding, in coming expressly to describe the new punishment vista the Legislature continued to speak in the familiar vernacular *64of character. Thus, albeit in terms anachronistic from its inception, Article 37.07, § 3(a), supra, affords the only indicator of what the Legislature deemed in appropriate to the punishment decision, viz: specific conduct. It seems incredible that the Legislature would have bothered to limit proof of character per se, by excluding evidence of specific conduct to that end, while at the same time contemplating identical evidence would always be admissible as “relevant” to the broader category, circumstances of the offender. Loath to nullify the apparent legislative intent, we hold that Article 37.07, § 3(a), supra, precludes admission of specific conduct to show character or anything else under the rubric of circumstances of the offender at the punishment phase of trial, either in mitigation or aggravation of punishment.
This is not to say that evidence of the circumstances of the offender is limited to “character” evidence as permitted by Article 37.07, § 3(a), supra. The Court has recognized since Allaben v. State, supra, that other circumstances, such as his family background, religious affiliation, education, employment history and the like, are appropriate considerations in assessment of punishment. E.g., Coleman v. State, 442 S.W.2d 338 (Tex.Cr.App.1969); Miller v. State, 442 S.W.2d 340 (Tex.Cr.App.1969). But see Thomas v. State, 638 S.W.2d 481, 483, n. 6 (Tex.Cr.App.1982). In short, we reiterate that Article 37.07, § 3(a), supra, is not exhaustive in setting out evidence admissible at the punishment phase to show circumstances of the offender. We simply hold that it precludes evidence of specific acts of conduct for that purpose.
But the State does not argue appellant’s extraneous misconduct in this cause is a circumstance of the offender, and for that reason is an appropriate punishment consideration. Rather, as we understand it, the State asserts that the specific misconduct admitted at appellant’s trial was “relevant” to the specific question of his “suitability” for probation, which became a mate-nal issue the moment he filed his sworn application. We agree that where it is clear the Legislature has put a specific fact in issue at the punishment phase, see e.g., n. 10, ante, evidence tending to prove or refute that fact should be admitted, irrespective of whether it also constitutes a form of character evidence that would otherwise be rejected under Article 37.07, § 3(a), supra. Thus we must decide whether, quite apart from general considerations of the offense and the offender, the Legislature has indicated that “suitability” for probation is necessarily a fact “of consequence” to the jury’s decision whether to recommend probation. If so we would be constrained to hold that proof of specific misconduct is indeed admissible as evidence “relevant” to determining that fact, Article 37.07, § 3(a), supra, notwithstanding.11
IY.
Where the offense is a felony and punishment does not exceed ten years, the Adult Probation Act provides, as it almost always has, that a judge may place a defendant on regular probation “when it shall appear to the satisfaction of the court that the ends of justice and the best interests of the public as well as the defendant will be subserved thereby.” Article 42.12, § 3, V.A.C.C.P. Upon such findings granting probation is a matter of “absolute and un-reviewable discretion” for the court. Kemner v. State, 589 S.W.2d 403, 409 (Tex.Cr.App.1979). However, the statute does not require that a jurjr make any such finding. Compare id., § 3a(a): “the jury may recommend probation for a period of any term of years ... but in no event for more than ten years ... when the sworn motion and proof shall show, and the jury shall find in their verdict that the defendant has never before been convicted of a felony[.]”
Therefore, in considering a proper application for probation a jury must find that defendant has not previously been convicted of a felony, determine that an appropriate punishment is a term of years not more *65than ten and decide whether to recommend in its verdict that the court grant probation. Unlike findings a judge must make, the statute leaves to the jury an unbridled discretion to exercise in making its determination of punishment (within prescribed range) and its decision to recommend probation. Kemner v. State, supra, at 409.
Article 37.07, § 3(b), V.A.C.C.P., instructs that “the judge shall give such additional written instructions as may be necessary.” When in prior versions Article 42.12, § 3a, supra, provided that upon recommendation of probation by a jury “the court may impose only those conditions which are set forth in Section 6 hereof,” the Court found:
“While it is considered good practice to enumerate in the court’s charge the probationary conditions which the court may impose if probation is recommended by the jury, the failure to so enumerate the said conditions is not harmful to the accused nor restrictive of the court’s authority under the statute.”
Flores v. State, 513 S.W.2d 66, 69 (Tex.Cr.App.1974). Even though the accused requested it, an utter failure to inform the jury of conditions of probation was not harmful to him or reversible error. O’Neal v. State, 421 S.W.2d 391, 396 (Tex.Cr.App.1967).12 The Court continued to adhere to Flores, finding that failure of the trial court to inform the jury in its charge of all conditions of probation which could be imposed should it recommend probation is not fundamental error, and that the charge as given, apparently listing some conditions, “adequately protected appellant’s rights and that he was not harmed thereby.” Henderson v. State, 617 S.W.2d 697, 700 (Tex.Cr.App.1981).
At a time when Article 42.12, § 3a, supra, limited the trial court to conditions then set forth in § 6, from O’Neal through Flores to Henderson, the Court neither explained why a failure to describe applicable conditions of probation is not harmful to a defendant, nor explicated the reason that it is “good practice” to enumerate conditions of probation in a punishment charge. The dichotomy is a puzzlement: if abject failure to inform the jury of appropriate conditions of probation is not reversible error, the reason must be that such information is not essential to enable a jury to exercise its discretion in the matter of recommending probation; yet the notion that it is “good practice” to so inform the jury seems to follow along the lines of the reasoning of the Court in Kemner, i.e., that the jury is thus “guided” in exercising its discretion to decide whether to recommend probation be granted.13
*66Today, under Article 42.12, § 3a(a), supra, the law remains that whether to recommend probation is a decision wholly within the discretion of jurors. Also the law still is that a trial court need not inform the jury of any condition of probation. It follows that what those conditions may be is of no consequence when application for probation is made to a jury.14 The jury is not there to predict future conduct. That one condition of probation is the defendant shall commit no offense against the law, therefore, is not germane to deliberations and to decision of a jury as to recommending probation.
Nineteen years ago the Court declared, “Requirements and the purpose of probation are a matter of law and common knowledge.” Logan v. State, 455 S.W.2d 267, 270 (Tex.Cr.App.1970). The Adult Probation Act prescribes precisely when an applicant is qualified and how one becomes eligible to be considered by a jury for probation. The Act does not raise any other factual issue for the jury or suggest that jurors must conclude an applicant is “suitable” for probation; it contemplates the jury will merely exercise its discretion in determining whether to recommend probation.15
*67With a heightened public awareness about such matters, surely jurors today approach their deliberations and determination with a common knowledge and appreciation that an ultimate societal objective of probation a jury is being asked to recommend is rehabilitation of the probationer. Sanders v. State, 580 S.W.2d 349, 352 (Tex. Cr.App.1978). Yet, its sole function is to recommend, leaving first to good judgment of the trial judge what conditions will be imposed, and then to trained and experienced supervising adult probation officers enforcement of those behavioral restraints and requirements against the probationer to the end that rehabilitation is achieved.
From evidence leading to the jury’s own finding of guilt jurors well know that defendant engaged in conduct violative of the law, and they learn much about applicant as a person from that criminal conduct and other evidence adduced by the parties pertaining to the circumstances of the offender, including his character. The jury comes to understand that applicant has never before been convicted of a felony in this or any other state — such inquiry having been expressly put in issue by Article 42.12, § 3a, supra. It may hear general testimony concerning applicant from a variety of persons about background, family, employment and the like. As we have explained, see part III., ante, this latter evidence does not bear on any particular “issue,” for there is none the jury must resolve. Rather, the testimony is available for such consideration as the jury may give in assessing punishment and considering probation. Its unfettered discretion thus informed, the jury makes its determination as to whether to recommend probation.
Accordingly, we hold that whether past criminal conduct by an applicant for probation may reveal a trait or propensity to violate the law is not relevant to a material issue tendered by an application for probation in a punishment proceeding before a jury. For that matter, neither is a selfserv-ing declaration by applicant that he will not violate the law if placed on probation. The theory on which the trial court allowed the prosecution to present “rebuttal” evidence is untenable.
Y.
The court of appeals construed the language in Davis v. State, supra, to allow proof of extraneous misconduct where it is necessary to a “fair determination of an accused’s application for probation.” 478 S.W.2d at 959. We agree that the parties may “open the door” to admission of specific conduct at the punishment phase; this is so, in fact, regardless of whether application for probation is made.
When an accused elicits testimony of specific good conduct in an attempt to support a later jury argument that he deserves a lenient sentence, or is “suitable” for probation, a State’s objection will be well taken. Likewise, the accused can prevent the State from proving in the first instance unadjudi-cated bad acts or the details of crimes resulting in convictions as a basis for urging the jury to deny probation or punish harshly. At its option, however, the opponent of such evidence may forgo objection with a view to eliciting other evidence of specific conduct to rebut it. By tendering the evidence in the first instance the proponent has in effect consented to admission of specific acts of conduct to inform the jury’s discretion in deciding both what punishment to assess, and whether to recommend probation. He will not be heard to complain of rebuttal evidence of like kind. Thus, for example, an accused who initiates evidence of specific conduct at the punishment phase, or shows in the first instance that he has never been “in trouble” before, or that he can comply with the law if placed on probation, has “opened the door” to rebuttal evidence which may include proof of specific bad acts. See, e.g., Hamilton v. State, 480 S.W.2d 685 (Tex.Cr.App. 1972); Valerio v. State, 494 S.W.2d 892 (Tex.Cr.App.1973). Cf. Hammett v. State, 713 S.W.2d 102 (Tex.Cr.App.1986).16
*68We have not forgotten that in cases decided prior to 1965, under the Suspended Sentence Law, the State could not prove “reputation” via specific conduct just because it chose not to object to specific conduct evidence from the accused. See p. 60, ante. Obviously the Court’s paramount concern in those cases was to avoid undue prejudice infecting the determination of guilt or innocence in the unitary proceeding. No such danger of contamination exists at the punishment phase in the current bifurcated scheme, and we see no reason the parties may not “open the door,” effectively agreeing that specific conduct is an appropriate jury consideration in assessment of punishment, in spite of Article 37.07, § 3(a), supra.
To the extent prior cases have indicated, however, that evidence that is admissible to show circumstances of the offender, but does not amount to specific conduct, will automatically “open the door” to evidence of specific conduct in rebuttal, simply because application for probation has been made, they are disapproved. E.g., Cleveland v. State, supra, discussed ante at p. 58; Baxter v. State, 645 S.W.2d 812 (Tex.Cr.App.1983) (Plurality Opinion).
Appellant testified only that he had not been previously convicted or placed on felony probation, in strict satisfaction of the probation eligibility requirement. The court of appeals found that appellant made proper objection to the five extraneous offenses admitted against him. Under these circumstances it cannot be said appellant opened the door to admission of specific acts of misconduct, and the trial court erred in admitting them.
Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed.

. All emphasis is supplied throughout by the writer of this opinion unless otherwise indicated.

. Moreover, consistent with his ruling for the court, the judge placed in the charge a limiting instruction, viz:
"You are further instructed that if there is any testimony before you in this case regarding the defendant’s having committed offenses other than the offense alleged against him in the indictment in this case, you cannot consider said testimony for any purpose unless you find and believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed such other offenses, if any were committed, and even then you may only consider the same in determining whether to recommend to the Court that the defendant be given probation in this case, and you shall not consider any such testimony, if any, for any other purpose.”
The charge then enumerated twelve conditions of probation "the Court may impose,” essentially the first eleven in § 6(a), and that he pay a monthly probation fee.

. In 1967 the statute was amended to move this provision from § 2(b), where it had appeared in the 1965 version, and to add the underscored language, rendering the provision applicable “Megardless of the plea," and defining “prior criminal record." Acts 1967, 60th Leg., p. 1739, ch. 659, § 22, eff. Aug. 28, 1967.

. The court of appeals opined:
“The context of [Davis v. State, supra,] makes it clear that the key phrase in [the passage excerpted above] is 'fair determination,’ and the key word is ‘fair.’ It would not be fair to allow a defendant to mislead the jury about the merits of his application for probation. If the State must bring in extraneous offenses to dispel the false impression, then the necessity of a ‘fair’ determination on the application for probation allows it to do so. But in the present case there is no contention that appellant had misled the jury and that the introduction of the extraneous offenses was necessary to dispel the false impression.” 700 S.W.2d at 749-50. Indeed, two of the cases cited in Davis, supra, are pre-1965 "false impression” cases, dealing with admissibility of extraneous acts to rebut defensive assertions an accused has never been in trouble before. Ward v. State and Rendon v. State, both supra. See Hammett v. State, 713 S.W.2d 102, at 105-6 (Tex.Cr.App.1986), and cases cited therein.

. For a brief history of the origins of suspended sentence law, see Ex parte Renter, 734 S.W.2d 349, at 366, n. 21 (Tex.Cr.App.1987) (Teague, J., dissenting).

. Distinguishable, then as now, were two permissible uses for specific misconduct. First was the use of a conviction, or the pendency of an indictment or complaint, for a felony or other offense involving moral turpitude, to attack the character for truth and veracity of an accused who has testified in his own behalf. Widener v. State, 109 Tex.Cr.R. 423, 5 S.W.2d 138 (1928); Branch’s Annotated Penal Code, § 167, p. 101 (1st ed. 1916). Today, of course, only final convictions for such offenses may be put to this use. E.g., Ochoa v. State, 481 S.W.2d 847 (Tex.Cr.App.1972). Second, specific conduct could form the basis for questions testing the knowledge of a reputation witness on crossexamination. Forrester v. State, 38 Tex.Cr.App. 245, 42 S.W. 400 (1897); Holloway v. State, 45 Tex.Cr.R. 303, 77 S.W. 14 (1903); Branch’s Annotated Penal Code, § 184, p. 117 (1st ed. 1916). Compare Rutledge v. State, 749 S.W.2d 50 (Tex.Cr.App.1988).

. In the same Senate Bill by which the Legislature first authorized entry of guilty pleas before the trial court, without a jury, the Suspended Sentence Law was also amended to empower the court, when application is made, to suspend sentence, given satisfaction of the same predicate upon which a jury could make that recommendation. Acts 1931, 42nd Leg., p. 65, ch. 43, § 4, eff. Aug. 22, 1931; Art. 776a, V.A.C.C.P. (1925). Reputation testimony was permissible under this provision as well.

. As before, however, “have you heard” questions were allowed in crossexamination of reputation witnesses. Skelton v. State, supra; Turner v. State, 109 Tex.Cr.R. 301, 4 S.W.2d 58 (1928); Stewart v. State, 148 Tex.Cr.R. 480, 188 S.W.2d 167 (1945).

. By 1947 the trial court was authorized to hear a guilty plea and assess punishment in a felony trial, see Acts 1931, 42nd Leg., p. 65, ch. 43. The accused could not plead not guilty to the trial court in a felony prosecution, however, until the advent of the 1965 Code of Criminal Procedure, wherein former Art. 11, V.A.C.C.P. (1925), was amended, inter alia, by adding the word “capital,” viz:
"The defendant in a criminal prosecution for any offense may waive any rights secured him by law except the right of trial by jury in a capital felony case...."
Acts 1965, 59th Leg., vol. 2, p. 317, ch. 722. Thus, in a trial upon a not guilty plea, the jury could remove any possibility of probation by assessing punishment in excess of ten years. We have found no case, however, involving admissibility of evidence to persuade the jury to assess a term of punishment that would preclude the trial court from granting probation.

. For example, the State must prove that the accused has been previously convicted in order to enhance range of punishment under V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 12.42. Where the jury’s verdict does not already constitute an affirmative finding of use or exhibition of a deadly weapon, under Polk v. State, 693 S.W.2d 391 (Tex.Cr.App.1985), and the issue has not been otherwise *63submitted at the guilt phase of trial, that fact must also be proven at the punishment phase for the State to reap the benefit of Article 42.12, § 3g(a)(2) or Article 42.18, § 8(b), V.A.C.C.P. To obtain a recommendation of probation from a jury, an accused must plead and prove he has never before been convicted of a felony offense. Article 42.12, § 3a(a), V.A.C.C.P. The issue whether one accused of aggravated kidnapping released his victim alive and in a safe place may be submitted at the punishment phase, the burden apparently falling upon the accused, since "proof of such release only mitigates punishment” under V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 20.04(b). Robinson v. State, 739 S.W.2d 795, 797 (Tex.Cr.App.1987). Whenever a particular issue can be identified that is “of consequence” at the punishment proceeding, questions of burden of proof immediately come to mind. Significantly, no burden of proof has ever been assigned to the broad "issue” of what punishment to assess. See Wright v. State, 468 S.W.2d 422 (Tex.Cr.App.1971).

. Because it assumed, without deciding, that "suitability” for probation was a material issue at the punishment phase, the plurality on original submission was able to conduct its analysis of whether appellant’s misconduct was "relevant" to that issue.

. Later, however, the Court refused to find a punishment charge fundamentally defective for failing to give a jury “ ‘minimum guidelines’ to be followed in deciding whether or not to recommend probation," because what was contained in the charge was enough to inform the jury’s discretion, viz:
“The court’s charge in the present case, in accordance with Article 42.12(B)(3a) [sic], supra, by instructing the jury to consider all the facts of the case together with the law submitted to it in the charge as well as the enumerated conditions to be followed by the defendant in the event probation was granted, enabled the jury to exercise its discretion on the question of whether or not to recommend probation for appellant. See O'Neal v. State, 421 S.W.2d 391 (Tex.Cr.App.1967) (Opinion on Appellant’s Motion for Rehearing). Thus, we hold that the court's charge in the present case adequately protected the appellant’s rights and he was not harmed thereby. Article 36.19, Vernon's Ann. C.C.P.”
Kemner v. State, supra, at 409. The opinion has been read to mean "that possible conditions of probation could be submitted to the jury; the Court did not hold that they had to be.” Villanueva v. State, 703 S.W.2d 244, 246 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1985), no PDR history (emphasis by court of appeals). Finding the “correct rule of law stated in Flores v. State, 513 S.W.2d 66 (Tex.Cr.App.1974),” and since under Article 42.-12, § 6(a), "it is the trial court, not the jury,” which determines conditions of probation, the court of appeals thought "there is no fundamental, overriding reason to submit them to the jury.” Thus, the trial court did not err in refusing to include in its charge certain conditions of probation, as requested by appellant. Ibid. To the same effect is Heathington v. State, 705 S.W.2d 326, 329 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1986), no PDR history.

. Since that provision of § 3a limiting conditions of jury recommended probation to those contained in § 6 was deleted by Acts 1981, 67th Leg., Ch. 639, p. 2466, § 2, effective September 1, 1981, form charges appearing in acknowledged works have been modified.
A recognized writer formerly provided optional charges relative to probation: one stating its *66recommendation is “a matter that rests within the sound discretion of the jury" sans a list of conditions, and the other making no mention of discretion but enumerating all conditions extant as of 1979. He no longer suggests the latter. Compare McClung, Jury Charges for Texas Criminal Practice (Revised Edition, January 1981) 306-307, with McClung, op cit. (Revised Edition 1985) 278.
McCormick & Blackwell, Texas Criminal Forms and Trial Manual § 81.13, 8 Texas Practice 284-285, while noting that a failure to give it is not reversible error, presents a revised charge still with an enumeration, viz:
As pertinent here, the jury is told:
“In this case the defendant has filed [his sworn motion et cetera]. If the punishment assessed by you is not more than ten years ... and you further find that he has not ever been convicted of a felony ..., you may recommend the penitentiary time be probated for any term of years not to exceed 10 years, and if you assess a fine you may recommend [it be paid or probated].
The conditions of probation which this court may include, but shall not be limited to the following:
[first nine are listed with direction to add others "as authorized by statute and requested by the defendant or State”]
Probation must be granted by the court if the jury recommends it in their verdict. If you do not DESIRE to recommend probation you will say nothing about it in your verdict.
(For Concluding Instructions [such as arriving at amount of punishment “by a full, fair and free exercise of the opinion of the individual jurors" et cetera] see 81.05).”

. Even when conditions of probation are enumerated, the stock charge does not give jurors even a slight hint about how the nine standard conditions first provided in § 6(a) may "guide" the jury in its deliberations on probation, particularly when jurors are also told that the trial court alone will determine the terms and conditions actually imposed on defendant. Obviously those "rights” the Court often found were adequately protected by a failure fully to charge on applicable conditions do not include a "right" that the jury1 be told what to make of information that is given. Since an enumeration of conditions is not required in the first place, we believe an instruction on the statutory definition of probation, Article 42.12, § 1, V.A.C.C.P., will better serve to inform the exercise of its discretion.

. Of uncertain significance is the fact that the Legislature has never authorized presentence investigation reports for jury scrutiny in considering whether to recommend probation. See now Article 42.12, § 4, V.A.C.C.P. Part of the United States Supreme Court’s rationale for holding such reports do not violate federal due process guarantees was that:
"the modern probation report draws on information concerning every aspect of a defendant's life. The type and extent of this information make totally impractical if not impossible open court testimony with cross-examination. Such a procedure could endlessly delay criminal administration in a retrial of collateral issues.”
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. at 250, 69 S.Ct. at 1084-85, 93 L.Ed. at 1343-44. Perhaps in failing to expressly provide juries with a presen-tence report in 1965, the Legislature assumed that by ordinary evidentiary principles any evidence "relevant” to the accused’s "suitability” for probation would come in at the punishment phase. In view of the language in Williams above, however, there is another way to construe the Legislative silence vis-a-vis information appropriate to the jury’s probation decision. Conceivably the Legislature simply believed that no more evidence was practical or necessary to inform the jury’s discretion whether to recommend probation than was already contemplated as admissible to show circumstances of the offender — as circumscribed by Article 37.07, § 3(a), supra.

. In Hammett the Court highlighted the impeachment function of such evidence, to attack the truth and veracity of the testifying accused. Whether the accused has been in trouble before is usually a collateral matter at the guilt phase of trial. Nevertheless, where the accused vol*68unteers that he has never been in trouble, the State may "expose that falsehood" to show "he is likely to have lied or been in error in the balance of his testimony — those aspects of his testimony that are relevant to material issues in the case.” 713 S.W.2d at 105-06.
Here, by contrast, in declining to object to specific conduct evidence at the punishment phase, the opponent evinces a willingness that specific conduct become a substantive consideration in exercise of the jury's discretion to assess punishment and recommend whether to grant probation, despite the fact it is objectionable under Article 37.07, § 3(a), supra.

. Some of Allaben’s progeny are Santiago v. State, 444 S.W.2d 758 (Tex.Cr.App.1969); Davis v. State, 478 S.W.2d 958 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); McCrea v. State, 494 S.W.2d 821 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Cleveland v. State, 502 S.W.2d 24 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Wills v. State, 501 S.W.2d 925 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); and Stiehl v. State, 585 S.W.2d 716 (Tex.Cr.App.1979). To the extent that these cases conflict with the provisions of Art. 37.07, Section 3(a), they should, of course, be expressly overruled. One statutory exception to Section 3(a), however, is V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 8.04, which provides: "Evidence of temporary insanity caused by intoxication may be introduced by the actor in mitigation of the penalty attached to the offense for which he is being tried.” This exception would, of course, apply to the defendant and not the prosecution. My research to date has yet to reveal *69any other statutory exception to Section 3(a) that would permit the defendant himself to introduce any other evidence or testimony than that stated in Section 3(a), supra.