Court Opinion

ID: 9352410
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-06 06:04:08.962165+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:02:34.779103
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                  revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                            STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                      UNPUBLISHED
                                                                      January 5, 2023
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                     No. 338360
                                                                      Wayne Circuit Court
TYLER MAURICE TATE,                                                   LC No. 16-010656-01-FJ

               Defendant-Appellant.

                                           ON REMAND

Before: M. J. KELLY, P.J., and MARKEY and SHAPIRO, JJ.

SHAPIRO, J. (dissenting).

       I respectfully dissent. In People v Boykin, ___ Mich ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2022) (Docket
Nos. 157738 and 158695), the Michigan Supreme Court held that “in all sentencing hearings
conducted under MCL 769.25 or MCL 769.25a, trial courts are to consider the defendant’s youth
and must treat it as a mitigating factor.” Id. at ___; slip op at 13 (emphasis added). For the reasons
discussed below, I conclude that the trial court failed to comply with this requirement.

        In issuing its sentence, the trial court referenced defendant’s youth only once and that
comment made clear that the court did not “treat it as a mitigating factor.” Specifically, the court
stated that “perhaps your age, and your maturity, were working against you,” but it quickly
dismissed that notion because “in our civilized society, [your] actions, despite your age, do not
make your actions forgivable” and “you knew exactly what you were doing.” In my view, it is
clear from these statements that the trial court concluded that defendant’s youth and immaturity
should not be considered as a mitigating factor because defendant “knew exactly what [he was]
doing.” The comment suggests that immaturity should not be considered a mitigating factor (or at
least was not in this case) unless it rendered the defendant incapable of understanding his actions.
But the question is not whether the minor defendant knew that he was committing a violent
assaultive act. Rather, it is whether his actions were affected by his “lack of maturity and an
underdeveloped sense of responsibility, leading to recklessness, impulsivity and heedless risk-
taking.” Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460, 471; 132 S Ct 2455; 183 L Ed 2d 407 (2012) (quotation
marks and citation omitted). Once a trial court considers the attributes of youth as a mitigating

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factor it may conclude that a 40-year minimum sentence is proportional to circumstances of the
offense and the offender. However, a trial court may not dismiss the defendant’s youth as a
mitigating factor on the basis that he “knew exactly what [he was] doing,” which holds true for
every crime in which intent is an element.1 Nor is the defendant’s youth merely a minor concern.
“[T]he chronological age of a minor is itself a relevant mitigating factor of great weight [as is] the
background and mental and emotional development of a youthful defendant . . . .” Miller, 567 US
at 476 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

       The majority concludes that the trial court’s statements show the court considered youth to
be a mitigating factor but the court “properly focused on contrasting the purposefulness of
[defendant’s] actions from the expectation that a young offender will act impulsively or under
influence.” As I read its opinion, the majority reasons that because defendant’s actions were
purposeful, the trial court correctly determined that they could not be attributed to youth. I disagree
with both the premise and conclusion of this argument.

        While a juvenile defendant’s level of planning and forethought is a relevant factor to
consider, it nonetheless remains the case that youth must be treated as a mitigating factor in all
cases. That is, even when the defendant’s actions cannot be characterized as impulsive, courts
must still consider the other reasons why juveniles are deemed to have diminished culpability, e.g.,
they are “ ‘more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including
peer pressure,’ ” and are less able than adults “ ‘to escape negative influences in their whole
environment[.]’ ” Boykin, ___ Mich at __; slip op at , quoting Roper v Simmons, 543 US 551, 569-
570; 125 S Ct 1183; 161 : Ed 2d 1 (2005). These considerations are especially relevant in this case
when defendant joined a gang when he was 14 or 15 years old.

        Further, the events leading to the shooting unfolded quickly, and defendant’s participation
in the murder can fairly be described as impulsive. Tyshon Taylor heard the victim disparage
Brendon Stanton-Lipscomb’s gang sometime after 5:00 p.m. Taylor, not defendant, then informed
Stanton-Lipscomb and told him to come to the mall. During a phone conversation, Taylor declined
Stanton-Lipscomb’s request to lead the victim out of the mall. At about 5:34 p.m., the phone is
passed to defendant, who agrees to do what Stanton-Lipscomb wanted. Defendant led the victim
out of the mall at about 5:52 p.m., and then the shooting occurred. Accordingly, there was little
time for defendant to reflect on his decision to aid Stanton-Lipscomb, who he looked to as a leader
of their gang.

        I recognize that trial courts are not required to articulate on the record how a defendant’s
youth affected its decision. Boykin, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 2. In this case, however, the trial
court expressly declined to treat defendant’s youth as a mitigating factor because it concluded that
defendant acted purposefully. This was erroneous for the reasons discussed, and the court’s

1
  Indeed, if defendant did not understand what he was doing, it is difficult to see how the element
of intent could be shown, in which case there would be no conviction and so no need for
sentencing.

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statements precludes an inference from the totality of the record that it treated defendant’s youth
as a mitigating factor.2 Accordingly, I would remand for resentencing and so respectfully dissent.

                                                             /s/ Douglas B. Shapiro

2
  I also recognize that the Supreme Court remanded for us to consider the totality of the sentencing
record and I, like the majority, have done so. However, I am not aware of—and the majority fails
to identify—anything in the record that would support a conclusion that the trial court complied
with Boykin’s requirement to treat youth as a mitigating factor.

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