Court Opinion

ID: 9840974
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-20 20:05:00.427429+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:32:05.706758
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/20/23 Bd. of Trustees of the United Food & Com. Workers etc v. City of San Diego CA4/1
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE                                         D080621
UNITED FOOD & COMMERCIAL
WORKERS LOCAL 135, et al.,

         Plaintiffs and Appellants,                                 (Super. Ct. No. 37-2021-
                                                                   00027189-CU-TT-CTL)
         v.

CITY OF SAN DIEGO,

         Defendant and Respondent;

SCOTTISH RITE CATHEDRAL OF
SAN DIEGO et al.,

          Real Parties in Interest and
          Respondents.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Richard S. Whitney, Judge. Affirmed.
         Procopio, Cory, Hargreaves & Savitch, Kendra J. Hall,
Rebecca L. Reed, and Megan E. Dawson, for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
         Mara W. Elliott, City Attorney, and Tyler L. Krentz, Chief Deputy City
Attorney, for Defendant and Respondent.
      Buchalter, a Professional Corp. and Brian Fish, Robert M. Dato, and
Chandra A. Roam, for Real Party in Interest and Respondent Home Depot
U.S.A., Inc.
      Lounsbery Ferguson Altona & Peak and Punam Prahalad, for Real
Party in Interest and Respondent The Scottish Rite Cathedral of San Diego.
      The Board of Trustees of the United Food & Commercial Workers Local
135 and United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 135 (collectively,
UFCW) appeal from a judgment denying their petition for writ of mandate
challenging the City of San Diego’s (City) approval of an addendum to a
program environmental impact report (PEIR) for construction of a Home
Depot (Project) in the Mission Valley area.
      UFCW’s narrow contention on appeal is that the addendum’s approval
violated the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA; Pub. Resources

Code, § 21000 et seq.)1 because the City failed to follow proper procedures.
Specifically, UFCW contends that the City’s use of section 21166 and

corresponding CEQA Guidelines sections 15162 and 15164,2 which govern
the use of subsequent EIRs and addendums, was inappropriate. According to
UFCW, the City was instead obligated to apply section 21094 and Guidelines
sections 15152 and 15168, which address tiered EIRs and program EIRs.
Under those procedures, UFCW contends, the City should have prepared an

1    Further statutory references are to the Public Resources Code unless
otherwise stated.

2      The CEQA Guidelines (Guidelines; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15000 et
seq.) are promulgated by the state’s Natural Resources Agency (Resources
Agency) for the implementation of CEQA by public agencies. (§ 21083; Center
for Biological Diversity v. Department of Fish & Wildlife (2015) 62 Cal.4th
204, 217, fn. 4 (Center).) Further Guideline references are to the CEQA
Guidelines.
                                       2
initial study, another EIR, or some other environmental document for the
Project.
      We conclude that the City did not violate CEQA in approving the
addendum. The City made determinations—the substance of which UFCW
does not challenge—under Guidelines sections 15162 (subsequent EIRs and
negative declarations) and 15164 (addendums or negative declarations), and
it prepared an addendum to comply with those Guidelines and with
Guidelines section 15168 (program EIRs). The mere fact that the City did
not explicitly cite to Guidelines section 15168 in the addendum does not
mean it failed to comply with it. Furthermore, we conclude that the City did
not abuse its discretion by applying section 21166 (governing subsequent
EIRs), so we reject UFCW’s argument that the City should have proceeded
under section 21094 (governing tiered EIRs) instead. Accordingly, we affirm
the judgment.

               FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3
      A. The PEIR
      In September 2019, the City approved a comprehensive update to the
existing community plan (CPU) in Mission Valley. In relevant part, the CPU
specified that areas in the community south of Interstate 8 would “be
enhanced through . . . new opportunities for regional retail development[.]”
The City prepared a PEIR for the CPU, which stated under the heading
“Intended Uses of the EIR”:
           “In accordance with CEQA Guidelines Section 15168, a
           PEIR may serve as the environmental document for
           subsequent activities or implementing actions, including
           future development of public and private projects, to the

3     Because UFCW does not assert that the City’s factual determinations
are unsupported by substantial evidence, we provide an abbreviated
summary of the relevant facts.
                                        3
         extent that it contemplates and adequately analyzes the
         potential environmental impacts of those subsequent
         projects. If, in examining future actions for development
         within the CPU area, the City finds that no new effects
         could occur, or no new mitigation measures would be
         required other than those analyzed and/or required in this
         PEIR, the City may approve the activity as being within
         the scope covered by this PEIR, and no new environmental
         documentation would be required. If additional analysis is
         required, it can be streamlined by tiering from this PEIR
         pursuant to CEQA Guidelines Sections 15152, 15153, and
         15168 (e.g., through preparation of a Mitigated Negative
         Declaration, Addendum, or EIR).”

      Under the headings of “Type of EIR” and “PEIR Scope and Content,”
the PEIR stated that “[t]his PEIR is a Program EIR as defined in Section
15168 of the CEQA Guidelines” and that “all phases, or in the case of this
proposed CPU, all discretionary actions associated with the proposed CPU,
are considered at the program level in this PEIR when evaluating potential
impacts on the environment, including the construction of future
development and supporting facilities and infrastructure.” The PEIR’s
“Environmental Analysis” section provided that “[i]ndividual projects
implemented under the proposed CPU would be assessed at the time they are
proposed to determine whether additional environmental review is warranted
in accordance with CEQA.”
      The PEIR contained several hundred pages of discussion and several
thousand pages of supporting technical appendices. The City certified the
PEIR in September 2019, and the record contains no indication that anyone
from UFCW submitted comments or challenged the adequacy of the PEIR
before CEQA’s statute of limitations expired. (See § 21167, subd. (c)
[challenge to EIR “shall be commenced within 30 days from the date of the
filing of the [required] notice” by lead agency].)

                                        4
      B. The Home Depot Project
      The proposed Project site is owned by the Scottish Rite Cathedral of
San Diego (Scottish Rite) and is located within the area covered by the
Mission Valley CPU south of Interstate 8. In 2021, the site consisted of a
building where Scottish Rite operated and where trade shows were
sometimes held, a used car dealership, and a parking lot. The CPU
designated the site location for “Regional Office and Visitor Commercial” use,
including “Big Box Stores.”
      The Project contemplates replacing the existing buildings at the site
with a new, smaller headquarters for Scottish Rite’s use alone, and not for
outside events like trade shows. The site would also include a new Home
Depot store with approximately 106,000 square feet of building space, a
garden center, and a parking structure.
      The City prepared an addendum to the PEIR in February 2021 to
evaluate whether the Project would have environmental impacts “consistent
with the previously certified PEIR.” Specifically, the addendum sought to
analyze “the adequacy of the PEIR relative to the project[]” and document
“that the proposed project-related modifications and/or refinements would not
cause new or more severe significant impacts than those identified in the
2019 Mission Valley CPU PEIR nor otherwise trigger the need for a
subsequent or supplemental EIR.” The City determined in the addendum
that none of the conditions requiring a subsequent EIR described in
Guidelines section 15162, subdivision (a), applied to the Project, and that
pursuant to Guidelines section 15164, use of the addendum was proper. In
other words, the City determined that there would be “no substantial changes
proposed[,]” that no substantial changes in circumstances had occurred, and
that “no new information of substantial importance” had manifested, which

                                       5
would require “major revisions” to the PEIR. (See Guidelines, § 15162,
subd. (a).) The City further stated in the addendum that there was no new
information that “would result in new significant or substantially increased
adverse impacts as a result of the project” than were previously addressed in
the PEIR. (Ibid.) The addendum incorporated approximately 1,800 pages of
project-specific technical studies to support its conclusions.
      The City Council voted to approve the Project in May 2021, and in its
resolution authorizing the Project, the City Council included in its findings
that the addendum “identified that the project impacts have already been
analyzed in the PEIR[,]” that the analysis included all impact areas required
under CEQA, and that the addendum reinstated the impacts and mitigation
measures previously identified in the PEIR.
      UFCW filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging the approval,
and the trial court denied the petition. UFCW timely appealed.
                                 DISCUSSION
      A. Governing Law
      An EIR’s purpose under CEQA “is ‘to provide public agencies and the
public in general with detailed information about the effect which a proposed
project is likely to have on the environment; to list ways in which the
significant effects of such a project might be minimized; and to indicate
alternatives to such a project.’ [Citation.] The EIR thus works to ‘inform the
public and its responsible officials of the environmental consequences of their
decisions before they are made,’ thereby protecting ‘ “not only the
environment but also informed self-government.” ’ ” (Friends of College of
San Mateo Gardens v. San Mateo County Community College Dist. (2016)
1 Cal.5th 937, 944 (San Mateo Gardens); see IBC Business Owners for
Sensible Development v. City of Irvine (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 100, 118 (IBC.)

                                        6
      This case involves a program EIR, which “ ‘may be prepared on a series
of actions that can be characterized as one large project’ and are related in
specified ways. [Citation.] An advantage of using a program EIR is that it
can ‘[a]llow the lead agency to consider broad policy alternatives and program
wide mitigation measures at an early time when the agency has greater
flexibility to deal with basic problems or cumulative impacts.’ [Citation.]”
(In re Bay-Delta etc. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1143, 1169.)
      Program EIRs are used “to avoid preparing multiple EIRs for a series of
actions.” (Save Berkeley's Neighborhoods v. Regents of University of
California (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 226, 242.) When used for this purpose, “the
public agency must examine [subsequent] site-specific program activities ‘in
the light of the program EIR to determine whether an additional
environmental document must be prepared.’ [Citation.] If the site-specific
activity will not create effects or require mitigation measures that were not
discussed in the program EIR, the public agency is not required to prepare
any other site-specific environmental document.” (Center for Biological
Diversity v. Department of Fish & Wildlife (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 214, 238.)
“Put differently, preparation of a site-specific environmental document
through a public process is only required if the agency discovers new impacts
that were unaddressed in the program EIR. [Citation.]” (IBC, supra, 88
Cal.App.5th at p. 119.)
      Several sections in the Public Resources Code and CEQA Guidelines
address the determination of whether later activities are within the scope of
a program EIR. (IBC, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 119.) Section 21166
prohibits agencies from requiring a subsequent or supplemental EIR unless:
(1) “[s]ubstantial changes are proposed in the project which will require
major revisions of the environmental impact report,” (2) there are

                                       7
“[s]ubstantial changes” to the project’s circumstances that will require major
revisions to the EIR, or (3) new information becomes available. (§ 21166;
accord Sierra Club v. County of Sonoma (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1307, 1317
(Sierra Club).)
      “Section 21166 effectively creates a presumption against further
environmental review after a project has been previously subjected to
environmental review. [Citations.]” (Save Our Heritage Organisation v. City
of San Diego (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 656, 666 (Heritage).) “[S]ection 21166
comes into play precisely because in-depth review has already occurred, the
time for challenging the sufficiency of the original EIR has long since expired
[citation], and the question is whether circumstances have changed enough to
justify repeating a substantial portion of the process. [Citation.]” (Id. at
pp. 666–667; see also Bowman v. City of Petaluma (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d
1065, 1074 [section 21166 is “intended to provide a balance against the
burdens created by the environmental review process and to accord a
reasonable measure of finality and certainty to the results achieved.”].)
      The Resources Agency promulgated Guidelines sections 15162 and
15164, among others, to implement section 21166. (See Heritage, supra, 28
Cal.App.5th at p. 666.) Guidelines section 15162, subdivision (a), mirrors
section 21166 and provides that once an EIR has been certified for a project,
no subsequent EIR should be prepared for that project unless the lead agency
determines there are substantial changes to the project, substantial changes
to the circumstances surrounding the project, or new material information
becomes available.
      Guidelines section 15164, which governs addendums to an
EIR, provides: “(a) The lead agency or a responsible agency shall prepare an
addendum to a previously certified EIR if some changes or additions are

                                        8
necessary but none of the conditions described in [Guidelines section] 15162
calling for preparation of a subsequent EIR have occurred. [¶] . . . [¶] (c) An
addendum need not be circulated for public review but can be included in or
attached to the final EIR . . . . [¶] (d) The decision-making body shall
consider the addendum with the final EIR . . . prior to making a decision on
the project. [¶] (e) A brief explanation of the decision not to prepare a
subsequent EIR pursuant to [Guidelines section] 15162 should be included in
an addendum to an EIR, the lead agency’s required findings on the project, or
elsewhere in the record. The explanation must be supported by substantial
evidence.”
      When it comes to subsequent environmental review involving program
EIRs, Guidelines section 15168 instructs agencies to follow the criteria in
Guidelines section 15162 to determine whether a later activity in the
program is within the scope of a program EIR, or whether an additional
environmental document must be prepared. Subdivision (c)(2) of Guidelines
section 15168 provides that if an agency “finds that pursuant to [Guidelines
section] 15162, no subsequent EIR would be required, [it] can approve the
activity as being within the scope of the project covered by the program EIR,
and no new environmental document [is] required.” Subdivision (c)(4) of
Guidelines section 15168 states that the agency “should use a written
checklist or similar device to document the evaluation of the site and the
activity to determine whether the environmental effects of [site-specific
activities are] within the scope of the program EIR.”
      In contrast to section 21166, section 21094 addresses circumstances in
which at least one of the conditions listed in section 21166 is present for a
proposed project such that a subsequent or supplemental EIR is required. In
those cases, section 21094, subdivision (c), provides that an agency must

                                        9
prepare an initial study to “analyze whether the later project may cause
significant effects on the environment that were not examined in the prior
environmental impact report.” Section 21094, subdivision (a), instructs
agencies to use a “tiered” EIR, which “refers to using the analysis of general
matters contained in a broader EIR” with later EIRs on narrower projects,
“incorporating by reference the general discussions from the broader EIR[,]”
and concentrating the later EIR “solely on the issues specific to the later
project.” (Pub. Resources Code, § 21094, subd. (a) & Guidelines, § 15152,
subd. (a).) Section 21094 only applies if a project is not subject to section
21166’s presumption against further environmental review. (§ 21094, subd.
(b)(3); see Sierra Club, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 1320.)
      B. Standard of Review
      “Judicial review under CEQA is generally limited to whether the
agency has abused its discretion by not proceeding as required by law or by
making a determination not supported by substantial evidence.” (Sierra
Club, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 1317.) In CEQA suits, an appellate court
reviews the agency’s action, not the trial court’s decision (Vineyard Area
Citizens for Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cordova (2007) 40
Cal.4th 412, 427 (Vineyard), and “[t]he burden is on petitioner to show the
City erred. [Citations.]” (IBC, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 117). While we
determine de novo whether the agency has employed the correct procedures,
we accord greater deference to the agency’s substantive factual conclusions.
(California Coastkeeper Alliance v. State Lands Commission (2021) 64
Cal.App.5th 36, 55 (Coastkeeper).)

                                       10
      C. Analysis

      UFCW’s contention on appeal is narrow and procedural.4 UFCW
admits it is not challenging any of the City’s factual determinations for lack
of substantial evidence; rather, it claims that the City failed to use the correct
review procedures because it followed section 21166 and corresponding
Guidelines sections 15162 and 15164, which govern the use of subsequent
EIRs and addendums. According to UFCW, the City was obligated to prepare
an initial study, another EIR, or some other environmental document for the
Project in order to comply with section 21094 and Guidelines sections 15152
and 15168, which address tiered and program EIRs.
      We disagree. We begin by noting that although UFCW disclaims any
challenge to the City’s factual determinations, the City’s decision to use the
procedures outlined in section 21166 and corresponding Guidelines was
premised on those determinations. Whether, how, and to what extent the
proposed Project falls within the scope of the PEIR—like the question of
whether an initial environmental document requires major revisions due to
changed plans or circumstances—is a predominantly factual inquiry. (See
San Mateo Gardens, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 952–953.) It is a question for the
agency to answer in the first instance, drawing on its particular expertise.

4      In its opening brief, UFCW appeared to challenge the City’s
determination under Guidelines section 15162, subdivision (a), that the
Project proposed no substantial changes that would require major revisions of
the PEIR. In its reply brief, however, UFCW expressly disclaims any
challenge to the City’s determinations, so we do not consider here whether
substantial evidence supports them. (See Overstock.com, Inc. v. Goldman
Sachs & Co. (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 513, 530, fn. 11 [argument in opening
brief, which was later conceded in reply brief, considered abandoned];
Schwartz v. Fay (1941) 48 Cal.App.2d 446, 448 [“point raised in defendant’s
opening brief was abandoned in his reply brief and in his argument, and need
not be considered[]”].)
                                       11
(Center, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 215.) Thus, contrary to what UFCW asserts,
the City’s choice to use an addendum generally “does not present a question
as to whether [it] failed to proceed in the manner CEQA provides.” (See
Coastkeeper, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at p. 61; see Sierra Club, supra,
6 Cal.App.4th at p. 1318 [when reviewing agency decision not to require a
subsequent or supplemental EIR on a project, “the traditional, deferential
substantial evidence test applies[]”].) Rather, deciding whether the City
acted reasonably in concluding that the Project falls within the scope of the
PEIR “is a fact-based inquiry into whether its determination was supported
by substantial evidence”—an inquiry UFCW says it does not seek. (See
Coastkeeper, at p. 61 [regarding agency’s decision to proceed by supplemental
EIR].) Given UFCW’s own framing of its contentions on appeal, we review de
novo whether the City employed the correct procedures, and assume for our
purposes that substantial evidence supports the City’s unchallenged factual
determinations.
      With that in mind, we address UFCW’s arguments in turn. UFCW
first argues that the City failed to employ the correct CEQA procedures
because the Project and the CPU have to be “the same project” in order for
the subsequent review provisions in section 21166 and Guidelines sections
15162 and 15164 to apply. But Guidelines section 15164 does not dictate that
addendums can only be used when the initial and subsequent projects are
“the same.” Rather, Guidelines section 15164, subdivision (a), states that an
agency “shall prepare an addendum to a previously certified EIR if some
changes or additions are necessary but none of the conditions described in
Section 15162 calling for preparation of a subsequent EIR have occurred.”
(Italics added.) Guidelines section 15168, subdivision (c)(2), also provides
that an agency can rely on a prior program EIR when the subsequent action,

                                       12
in light of Guidelines section 15162, is found to be “within the scope of the
project covered by the program EIR[.]” (Italics added.) The projects do not
have to be “the same” for one to fall within the scope of another.
      UFCW cites San Mateo Gardens to support its assertion that the
projects need to be the same for subsequent review to apply, but its reliance
is misplaced. In that case, our Supreme Court actually criticized the
plaintiff’s argument that subsequent review provisions should only apply
when a previously approved project “remains the same project as before,
rather than an entirely new project[.]” (San Mateo Gardens, supra, 1 Cal.5th
at p. 950.) While acknowledging that the provisions should only apply when
a project has been subject to initial review, the Court found that the
plaintiff’s approach would “inevitably invite arbitrary results.” (Id. at p. 951.)
Instead of asking whether a proposed agency action constitutes a “new” or
different project “in an abstract sense,” the Court reasoned that a decision to
proceed under subsequent review provisions should “necessarily rest on a
determination—whether implicit or explicit—that the original environmental
document retains some informational value.” (Ibid.; see also id. at p. 944
[when agency proposes changes to a previously approved project, agency’s
environmental review obligations “depend on the effect of the proposed
changes” rather than “on any abstract characterization of the project as ‘new’
or ‘old[]’ ”].) We therefore reject UFCW’s contention that the City was
precluded from using subsequent review procedures merely because the CPU
and the Project are not “the same.”
      UFCW goes on to argue that because the PEIR is a type of tiered EIR,
the City was required to prepare an initial study pursuant to section 21094,
which applies to certain tiered EIRs. By its own terms, however, section
21094 only applies if a project is not subject to section 21166’s presumption

                                       13
against further environmental review. (§ 21094, subd. (b)(3).) Contrary to
what UFCW contends, program EIRs are not categorically excluded from
section 21166 and its implementing Guidelines, nor are all program EIRs
subject to section 21094. (See, e.g., IBC, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 121
[“[W]hile a program EIR may use tiering for later site-specific review, it is not
required to do so. Tiering is only required if the subsequent project ‘would
have effects that were not examined in the program EIR.’ [Citation.]”];
Latinos Unidos de Napa v. City of Napa (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 192, 202
[applying section 21166 to program EIR and subsequent project]; American
Canyon Community United for Responsible Growth v. City of American
Canyon (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1062, 1073 [section 21094 applies to program
EIRs “unless the agency determines the project is subject to section 21166”];
see Sierra Club, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 1321 [section 21166 governs if a
subsequent project is “either the same as or within the scope of the project . . .
described in the program EIR[]” (italics added.)].) Indeed, Guidelines section
15168, which addresses program EIRs, expressly refers to Guidelines section
15162 in providing that if an agency “finds that pursuant to [Guidelines
section] 15162, no subsequent EIR would be required, [it] can approve the
activity as being within the scope of the project covered by the program EIR,
and no new environmental document [is] required.” (Guidelines, § 15168,
subd. (c)(2).)
      Additionally, unlike in other instances where tiered EIRs were found to
be subject to section 21094’s requirements, the PEIR here did not purport to
“defer analysis of certain details of later phases of long-term linked or
complex projects until those phases are up for approval.” (See Vineyard,
supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 431; see, e.g., San Mateo Gardens, supra, 1 Cal.5th at
p. 960 [declining to treat previous environmental analysis as a tiered EIR

                                       14
subject to section 21094 because the documents expressly concluded that “all
potential impacts” of the entire project had been considered and mitigated”];
cf. Guidelines, § 15152, subd. (c) [where agency decides to use a tiered
program EIR, agency may defer detailed, site-specific information].) Rather,
the PEIR expressly stated that “all phases, or in the case of this proposed
CPU, all discretionary actions associated with the proposed CPU, are
considered at the program level in this PEIR when evaluating potential
impacts on the environment, including the construction of future
development and supporting facilities and infrastructure.” (Italics added.)
Accordingly, we disagree with UFCW’s contention that section 21166 and its
implementing Guidelines have no application to the PEIR and Project in this
case.
        UFCW next contends that the City did not actually follow Guidelines
section 15168 (governing program EIRs) because the addendum and City
Council resolution do not explicitly cite to that Guideline, because those
documents do not use the exact phrase “within the scope,” and because the
City “affirmatively denied” having to analyze the Project under Guidelines
section 15168 during a City Council hearing. In its reply brief, however,
UFCW itself highlights the City’s following findings which effectively
conclude that the Project was “within the scope” of the PEIR by way of the
relevant criteria in Guidelines section 15162: (1) “[t]here are no substantial
changes proposed in the project which will require major revisions of the
[PEIR] . . .”; (2) “[s]ubstantial changes have not occurred with respect to the
circumstances under which the project is undertaken which will require
major revisions of the [PEIR] . . .”; (3) “[b]ased upon a review of the project,
none of the situations described in [Guidelines section] 15162 . . . apply[]”;
and (4) “[r]elative to the [PEIR], the analysis . . . demonstrates that there

                                        15
would be no new significant impacts that would result from the project and
there is no information in the record or otherwise available that indicates
that there are substantial changes in circumstances that would require major
changes to the PEIR or otherwise trigger the need for a subsequent or
supplemental EIR.”
      UFCW does not dispute that the PEIR is a program EIR prepared in
accordance with Guidelines section 15168—as the PEIR itself explicitly
states. Nor can UFCW dispute that the addendum incorporates the PEIR by
reference, or that the Project is located within the area analyzed by the PEIR.
The crux of UFCW’s argument that the City did not use Guidelines section
15168 appears to turn on the technicality of whether the exact phrase “within
the scope” or “15168” appears in the City’s findings, and the fact that a City
staff member said at a hearing that the City did not “have to go to [Guideline
section 15168]” because it analyzed the Project pursuant to Guidelines
section 15162. As noted, however, Guidelines section 15162 is referenced
within Guidelines section 15168, and the City staff member reiterated at the
hearing that the City’s analysis found “no new significant impacts” in
connection with the Project “that were not already identified in the PEIR.”
Moreover, the addendum functioned as the kind of “checklist or similar
device” contemplated in Guidelines section 15168, subdivision (c)(4), to
document the City’s evaluation of whether the Project’s environmental effects
were within the scope of the PEIR.
      Accordingly, from our review of the record, we conclude that the City
functionally relied on and applied Guidelines section 15168, and we decline to
adopt an approach that would unnecessarily elevate form over function. (See
San Mateo Gardens, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 961 [treating mitigated negative
declaration as a tiered EIR “would disregard the substance of the [agency’s]

                                      16
conclusions”]; Citizens for a Sustainable Treasure Island v. City and County
of San Francisco (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1047–1048 [contention that
EIR was improperly prepared as a “project EIR” instead of a “program EIR”
improperly focused on EIR’s title rather than its substance]; Friends of
Mammoth v. Town of Mammoth Lakes Redevelopment Agency (2000) 82
Cal.App.4th 511, 533–534 [“level of specificity of an EIR is determined by the
nature of the project and the ‘rule of reason’ [citation], rather than any
semantic label accorded to the EIR.”]; Dusek v. Redevelopment Agency (1985)
173 Cal.App.3d 1029, 1038 [rejecting plaintiffs’ “demand for strict
compliance” as “relat[ing] more to labeling and form than it does to the
underlying objectives of CEQA.”].)
      UFCW argues for the first time in its reply brief that because master
EIRs require initial studies for subsequent projects, by analogy, program
EIRs should as well. “We do not consider points raised for the first time in
the reply brief absent a showing of good cause for the failure to present them
before.” (Bruno v. Hopkins (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 801, 822.) But even if
UFCW properly presented the argument, it lacks merit because master EIRs
are a different type of EIR than program EIRs, and are governed by different
code sections and Guidelines. (See §§ 21157, et seq.; Guidelines, § 15175, et
seq.) UFCW provides no persuasive reason why we should adopt the
requirements for master EIRs here, when doing so would disregard the plain
language in Guidelines sections 15168 and 15162 providing that “no
subsequent EIR” and “no new environmental document” is required when a
later activity is within the scope of a program EIR. (See Guidelines,
§§ 15168, subd. (c)(2) & 15162, subd. (a).)
      Lastly, we note that, other than a passing reference to traffic volume
not developed into any appellate argument, UFCW does not identify any

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environmental effects or mitigation measures for the Project that it contends
were not adequately analyzed in the PEIR and its thousands of pages of
appendices. As we have explained, the basic purpose of an EIR is to inform
the public and responsible officials of the environmental consequences of their
decisions before they are made. (San Mateo Gardens, supra, 1 Cal.5th at
p. 944.) UFCW does not demonstrate that the public or the City was
inadequately informed regarding any environmental consequence of the
Project, or that the City proceeded in a manner that would somehow defeat
the fundamental purpose of CEQA. Accordingly, we find that the City did not
abuse its discretion by approving the addendum.
                                DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed. Respondents shall recover their costs on
appeal.

                                                               BUCHANAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

HUFFMAN, J.

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