Court Opinion

ID: 9788985
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:23:54.889659+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:18.220310
License: Public Domain

JACKSON, Judge
(dissenting):
{39 In 1987, the Utah Legislature invited the institution of common-law marriage into the homes of this state as a means of correcting certain "man in the house" welfare problems. See Utah Code Ann. § 80-1-4.5 (1998); In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 2000 UT 28, ¶ 21, 1 P.3d 1074 (stating "apparent aim [of statute] was ... to prevent the exclusion of an alleged 'common law' spouse's income when an applicant for government benefits was made, thus preventing welfare fraud"). In Whyte v. Blair, 885 P.2d 791 (Utah 1994), the first Utah Supreme Court case dealing with the new "common-law marriage" statute, the court dutifully accepted its obligation to develop common-law marriage "on a case-by-case basis." Id. at 794 n. 8. I write separately to critique the wisdom of trekking further down this case-by-case path and conclude that our Legislature should seriously consider pointing the involved administrative agencies and the courts in a different direction.
40 Further, I would dispose of this particular case based on the rationale that the Kelleys obtained their original divorce decree through fraud on the court. Thus, I would vacate the prior decree, leaving their original solemnized marriage intact. Under my analysis, if either of the Kelleys wants to dissolve those bonds of matrimony, he or she would do so in the prescribed manner without trying to delude the courts of this state.
CRITIQUE OF COMMON-LAW MARRIAGE STATUTE
I. History of Common-Law Marriage
T41 "Common-law marriage" is a misnomer.1 Common-law marriage probably did not exist in England, the home of the common law. The concept arose in "English ecclesiastical courts which administered canon law, rather than in the English common-law courts." John B. Crawley, Is the Honeymoon Over for Common Law Marriage: A Consideration of the Continued Viability of the Common Low Marriage Doctrine, 29 Cumb. L.Rev. 399, 401 (1998/1999). The House of Lords concluded in Regina v. Millis, 8 Eng. Rep. 844 (1848-44), that commonlaw marriage had never been recognized in England. Despite criticism of the ruling by some historians and academicians, see Crawley, supra, at 402 n. 12, the principle of stare decisis leads me to conclude that the issue has been settled as a matter of law. Thus, at a minimum, Utah Code Ann. § 80-1-4.5 (1998) should not be labeled as a "common-law marriage" statute. Better labels or terms would be "unsolemnized" or "noncere-monial" marriage statute. '
[ 42 The recognition of unsolemnized marriages in English ecclesiastical courts, the American colonies, and the several states has an equitable basis. In medieval England and the expanding American frontier it was virtually impossible for couples wanting to marry to find authorized persons to issue marriage licenses and perform ceremonies. See Craw-ley, supra, at 408. Common-law marriage was viewed as one means of solving these procedural difficulties See id. New York was the first state to recognize unsolemnized marriages. See Fenton v. Reed, 4 Johns. 52, 53 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1809) (per curiam). By the *183end of the nineteenth century a majority of states recognized unsolemnized, long-term sexual unions. See David F. Crabtree, Development, Recognition of Common-Law Marriages, 1988 Utah L.Rev. 273, 275 n. 12 (listing thirty-four states, as of 1981, recognizing common-law marriages).
$43 But from there, "common-law marriage" fell into disfavor and began to die a natural death. In modern America, the impediments to ceremonial marriage present in life on the frontier have long since disappeared. Transportation, communication, and hosts of legal administrators are readily available to help those wanting to marry. Accordingly, when Utah adopted its statute in 1987, only a dozen states still acknowledged common-law marriage. Now, Utah is one of only ten. See Mont.Code Ann. § 40-1-403 (1999); Utah Code Ann. § 80-1-4.5 (1998); Campbell's Adm'r v. Gullatt, 43 Ala. 57, 68-69 (1869); Klipfel's Estate v. Klipfel, 41 Colo. 40, 92 P. 26, 27-28 (1907), McFarland v. McFarland, 51 Towa 565, 2 N.W. 269, 2738-74 (1879); Shorten v. Judd, 60 Kan. 73, 55 P. 286, 287 (1898); Warren v. Canard, 30 Okla. 514, 120 P. 599, 600 (1911); Knecht v. Knecht, 261 Pa. 410, 104 A. 676, 678 (1918); Holgate v. United Elec. Rys. Co., 47 R.I. 337, 133 A. 243, 244 (1926); Berger v. Kirby, 105 Tex. 611, 153 S.W. 1130, 1131 (1913). Thus, in two centuries, the American "affair" with common-law marriage has shifted the legal and financial responsibility for dependent women and children either away from or towards the state, depending on whether the doctrine of common-law marriage was in favor or not. See Ariela R. Dubler, Note: Governing Through Contract: Common Low Marriage in the Nineteenth Century, 107 Yale L.J. 1885, 1920 (1998).
4 44 One could claim that Utah is now first in the vanguard of a new cycle restoring common-law marriage to American society. However, it seems more likely that Utah's statute is an anachronistic rear guard. But, because we must, both the supreme court and this court have tried to develop the doctrine of common-law marriage "on a case-by-case basis." Whyte v. Blair, 885 P.2d 791, 794 n. 8 (1994).
II. Unintended Breadth of Common Law Marriage Statute
45 The legislative history behind Utah's common-law marriage statute reveals a narrow, singular focus: preventing welfare fraud to save money for the various administrative agencies involved. See In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 2000 UT 28, ¶ 21, 1 P.3d 1074; David F. Crabtree, Development, Recognition of Common-Law Marriages, 1988 Utah L.Rev. 273, 280-81. During debate, legislators expressed concerns about the new common-law marriage statute's effect on polygamous relationships. Concern was also expressed regarding stale claims to marital status.2 But all these were merely peripheral considerations. Moreover, there was no debate about the substantial question of how common-law marriage might affect existing family law and marriage as an institution and might intrude in other substantive areas of the law. The Legislature and administrative agencies were mainly interested in saving an estimated $323,500 in welfare benefits by establishing 800 common-law marriages (estimating that each common-law marriage established would save about $1,080). See Crabtree, supra, at 281 n. 43.3
146 This statute has injected the Utah judiciary into a debate which has raged for two centuries. However, I believe the Legislature is a better forum than the courts for debating the social and legal policy implications. See generally Ellen Kandoian, Cohabitation, Common Law Marriage, and the Possibility of a Shared Moral Life, 75 Geo. L.J. 1829, 1839 (1987) ("The question posed by the cohabitation cases is what to make of couples, in a state requiring a license and ceremony, who have obtained neither but come before a court on claims arising from their relationships.... In granting a remedy, the court thus establishes that formal marriage is not the only socially approved *184sexual relationship with rights and duties attaching; an alternative, informal type of marriage may also exist."); Ariela R. Dubler, Note: Governing Through Contract Common Law Marriage in the Nineteenth Century, 107 Yale L.J. 1885, 1898 (1998) (describing "social tension[ ] between the power of marriage as a containment tool (ie., marriage as a set of obligations) and its power as a social equalizer (Le., marriage as a bestow-er of social and legal rights)").
147 Aside from the social and legal policy issues raised by common-law marriage, very real questions about the fiscal sensibility of the doctrine remain. The Legislature has the oversight capability and means to audit whether the numbers of common-law marriages created by administrative fiat and the expense incurred justify this process. Has the initial monetary savings goal been attained? Is containment of man-in-the-house fraud a reasonable rationale for maintaining the statute? Should Utah courts be expected to continue spending effort and resources to develop common-law marriage case law? Does the end justify the means? 4
148 I now turn to a brief examination of the language of the statute and our appellate opinions to be specific about the disputes which are being generated. Strikingly, none of them involves welfare fraud.
III. Review of Utah's Common-Law Marriage Statute and Case Law
149 First, I am concerned that the complexity of the statute itself creates problems. The provisions of section 30-1-4.5 show the Legislature tried to narrowly tailor the language to limit the types and thus the numbers of relationships which would qualify as the equal of solemnized marriages. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5 (1998). This was done by creating a laundry list of five subsections, with six elements. See id. In litigation each element becomes a source of dispute. Therefore, if the Legislature wants to keep some form of common-law marriage, a simpler scheme with fewer elements might be the better approach.5 After all, the essential elements of common-law marriage are actually relatively simple: "all that is required is that there should be an actual and mutual agreement to enter into a matrimonial relation, between parties capable in law of making such a contract, consummated by their cohabitation as man and wife or their mutual assumption openly of marital duties and obligations." 55 C.J.S. Marriage § 10 (1998) (citations omitted).
«[ 50 Second, the final phrase of the statute is also a cause for concern. It states that the relationship "may be proved under the same general rules of evidence as facts in other cases." Utah Code Ann. § 80-1-4.5(@) (1998). This general language results in a preponderance of the evidence standard. See Hansen v. Hansen, 958 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah Ct.App.1998). This low standard invites more people to sue for marriage recognition because they have an improved chance of winning. However, the historical eviden-tiary standard required clear and convincing evidence. The purpose of the higher standard was to limit pursuit of both stale and fraudulent claims. See 55 C.J.S,. Marriage § 57 (1998) ("A claim of common-law marriage is regarded with suspicion and will be closely scrutinized especially where one of the purported spouses is deceased and the survivor is claiming a financial interest." (footnotes omitted)). This higher evidentiary *185hurdle would also relieve the need for a one-year time limitation.
151 Third, I note another concern about which the statute is silent, i.e., who may file a petition to create a common-law marriage. I assume this was not mentioned so an administrative agency can instigate legal recognition of the marital relationship. At first blush, it seems this ought to be left to either one or both of the cohabiting persons. But, the object of the statute is otherwise. This statutory silence leaves an opening for other third parties to initiate a marriage recognition proceeding for the couple. Potential third parties include insurers, heirs, creditors, prosecutors, tax collectors, and those who have contractual relationships with the cohabitants. See In re Marriage of Gonzales, 2000 UT 28, ¶¶ 1-4, 1 P.3d 1074 (plurality) (involving intervention of issuer of homeowner's insurance policy in putative wife's attempt to establish common-law marriage to insured); Whyte v. Blair, 885 P.2d 791, 792 (Utah 1994) (involving participation of insurance company in case in which putative husband tried to establish common-law marriage to insured).
1 52 A review of Utah cases to date reveals that Utah's statutory common-law marriage scheme has now implicated several other substantive areas of the law. Issues touching on the ownership and transfer of real and personal property have been raised by putative common-law spouses. See Hansen, 958 P.2d at 988 (seeking establishment of common-law marriage and grant of divorcee, and requesting orders on child custody, child support, and property distribution); Walters v. Walters, 812 P.2d 64, 65 (Utah Ct.App.1991); Layton v. Layton, 777 P.2d 504, 505 (Utah Ct.App.1989); Mattes v. Olearain, 759 P.2d 1177, 1178 (Utah Ct.App.1988). Common-law marriage has also intersected with the criminal law. For instance, a convicted child sex abuser argued he had a common-law marriage to his victim's mother. See State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, 1068 (Utah 1998). In that case, the defendant tried to secure probation under a statute allowing probation in limited cireumstances for a child's stepparent. See id. at 1067-68. And, currently, a county prosecutor has filed a motion in a criminal case to establish a common-law marriage between a man and one of his polygamous wives, so that the man might be prosecuted for bigamy. See State v. Green, No. 001600036 (Utah Dist.Ct. Apr. 17, 2000).
158 Our courts have also entertained several challenges to the constitutionality of the statute and, particularly, the one-year time limit for establishing the marital relationship. In Bunch v. Englehorn, 906 P.2d 918 (Utah Ct.App.1995), we held that the putative wife failed to establish a common-law marriage because she filed a complaint within one year after the relationship ended but did not get an adjudication order within one year. See id. at 920-21. Later, the Utah Supreme Court held that the time limitation of section 30-1-4.5 "requires only the filing of a petition for adjudication of marriage within one year after the termination of the relationship." Gonzalez, 2000 UT 28 at 130. This issue is still being contested with some frequency. See Greaves v. Baker, No. 990689 (Utah Ct.App. July 14, 2000) (certified to and pending in Utah Supreme Court) (addressing issues of whether filing within one year, rather than obtaining adjudication, is sufficient and whether time limitation violates Open Courts Clause of Utah Constitution); Smarr v. Smarr, 2000 UT App 150, slip op. at 2 (May 25, 2000) (unpublished memorandum decision) (concluding Gonzalez overruled Bunch); Clark v. Clark, 2000 UT App 54 (Mar. 2, 2000) (unpublished memorandum decision) (holding petition filed within one year of relationship's termination should not have been dismissed), cert. granted, No. 20000276-SC (June 21, 2000).
IV. Conclusion to Critique of Common-law Marriage in Utah
€54 The English House of Lords ruled long ago that common-law marriage was never part of its common law. Most American states have already experimented with this doctrine. Based on their experience, all but ten have repealed common-law marriage. Utah should not recycle this great experiment. Common-law marriage is not well suited as a corrective remedy for ills afflict, ing the administrative law arena, particularly when the disease is allegedly man-in-the-*186house welfare fraud. Our Legislature has the ability to-and should-prescribe a different administrative law remedy for welfare fraud without harmful side effects in other areas of the law.
FRAUD UPON THE COURT6
{55 The Kelleys have now told the court that their 1994 divorce decree was a collusive pretense. The trial court found that their agreed-upon divorce "created a legal fiction only, designed to protect the residence of the parties from the threat of creditors." A fiction is "(ain imaginative creation or a pretense that does not represent actuality but has been invented." American Heritage Dictionary 500 (2d ed.1985). In other words, the Kelleys' divorcee was a lie.
€56 Moreover, they made the court an unwitting participant in their deception. Thus, they " 'defile[d] the court itself " and prevented the judicial system from performing "in the usual manner its impartial task" of adjudicating cases. 12 James W. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice § 60.21[4][a]l (3d ed.1997). The Kelleys ground for divorce was an artifice to defraud creditors, not a genuine case of irreconcilable differences. In fact, they were fully reconciled; they were in complete agreement. Thus, they were not legally entitled to a divorce decree. Accordingly, I would vacate the 1994 decree and restore them to their former legal status-that of husband and wife. I will now explain the legal support for this sua sponte action.
I. Issue May Be Raised Sua Sponte
157 Fraud upon the court may be raised by the court sua sponte and an appeals court may vacate a lower court decree on this ground. See 12 James W. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice § 60.21[A][f] (3d ed.1997). This inherent equitable power existed at common law. In Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 64 S.Ct. 997, 88 L.Ed. 1250 (1944), a fraud-upon-the-court case, the United States Supreme Court noted the tension between the rule that judgments are final and the "rule of equity ... that under certain circumstances, one of which is after-discovered fraud, relief will be granted." Id. at 244, 64 S.Ct. at 1000. This equitable rule was "fashioned to fulfill a universally recognized need for correcting injustices." Id. It should be exercised cautiously, but when the occasion demands, the power has been wielded "without hesitation" and equity can be interposed to "devitalize[ ] ... judgment[s]." Id. at 245, 64 S.Ct. 997 at 1001. In setting aside a collusive divorcee, the court restores the "status quo ante" and prevents enforcement of the illegal transaction. Martina Theatre Corp. v. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc., 278 F.2d 798, 801 (2d Cir.1960) (citing to Recent, Cases, Clean-Hands Doctrine Prevents Husband from Setting Aside Collusive Divorce and Property Settlement Induced by Wife's Fraud, 67 Harv. L.Rev. 1079 (1954)). In Utah divorcee proceedings, fraud, deceit, collusion, and perjury are "wrongs against the state and a fraud upon the court" which the state may raise on its own motion. Parsons v. Parsons, 40 Utah 602, 607, 122 P. 907, 909 (1912). Further, Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, expressly states that it has no effect on a court's inherent power to set aside a judgment procured through "fraud upon the court." Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b).
T58 When there is collusion, as in this case, neither of the parties is likely to come forward and propose to the court that they have jointly perpetrated some wrong on the court. Even so, we gave the Kelleys the chance to address this issue in supplemental briefs. Predictably, each concluded that the other had committed fraud upon the court. Their respective conclusions weigh heavily in support of my position. In Toscano v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 441 F.2d 980 (9th Cir.1971), the court addressed the problem of who is to initiate the process of reviewing fraud upon the court: " Surely it cannot be that preservation of the integrity of the judicial process must always wait upon the diligence of litigants. The public welfare demands that the agencies of public justice be not so impotent that they must always be *187mute and helpless victims of deception and fraud"" Id. at 985 (quoting Hazsel-Atlas, 322 U.S. at 246, 64 S.Ct. at 1001).
159 This statement explains why we should act sua sponte in this case. If we do not, we cannot expect collusive subversion of the legal process to be exposed. And, if not exposed and dealt with, we can expect similar conduct in the future.
IIL. Finality of Initial Divorcee Decree
T 60 Courts and commentators caution that this doctrine is to be construed narrowly to preserve the finality of judgments and to avoid overlap with Rule 60(b)(8) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and its federal counterpart.7 See Broyhill Furniture Indus., Inc. v. Craftmaster Furniture Corp., 12 F.3d 1080, 1085 (Fed.Cir.1993); Great Coastal Express, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 675 F.2d 1349, 1356 (4th Cir.1982); 11 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2870 (2d ed.1995). "This salutary general rule springs from the belief that in most instances society is best served by putting an end to litigation...." Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 244, 64 S.Ct. 997, 1000, 88 L.Ed. 1250 (1944). But, a final judgment has never "been regarded as completely immune from impeachment." Id. Moreover, the Kelleys have chosen to engage in ongoing litigation. They are able to do so because in divorce actions the trial court "has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for the custody of the children and their support [and] maintenance ... and for distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary." Utah Code Ann. § 30-8-5(8) (Supp.1999).
1 61 Further, the record indicates that neither of the Kelleys has remarried, nor has any child been born as issue of any new marriage. So, no third party would be seriously affected by vacating the decree. Thus, I perceive little need to respect the finality of their divorce decree.
TII Analysis
162 Marriage is much more than a mere contract. Marriage is a "public institution of universal concern [whose] dissolution affect[s] the right not only of the husband and wife but of all other persons." 2 Joel P. Bishop, New Commentaries on Marriage, Divorce, and Separation § 480 (1891) (footnote omitted). As such, "the public becomes in effect a party to the proceeding." Id. at § 481. For this reason, parties cannot agree to dissolve their own marriages for convenience. See id.; Whyte v. Blair, 885 P.2d 791, 795 (Utah 1994) ("A couple may not enter and exit a marriage for simple financial convenience."); Hilton v. Roylance, 25 Utah 129, 137, 69 P. 660, 663 (1902) (stating marriages may not be dissolved at "the mere intention and pleasure of the contracting parties"). That is precisely what happened here.
T 63 The Kelleys agreed that through the artifice of a "paper divorcee" they would shield themselves from creditors but continue holding themselves out to their children, families, neighbors, friends, and the public as wife and husband. The trial court entered findings that the Kelleys carried out their deceptive scheme as planned. The court found that Mr. Kelley told Dr. Marty Hood that the divorce "was only a business thing and that the children would never know." The court also found that "neither party expected the property aspects of the divorce to be valid or implemented" and that they "continued to cohabit and hold each other out as spouse[s]" in the community.
1 64 In Karren v. Karren, 25 Utah 87, 69 P. 465 (1902), a couple conspired in a similar way. The husband told his wife that he would obtain a default divorce to induce his father to convey title to a homestead which his father refused to do if he remained married. See id. at 466. He promised that after obtaining the divorce and deed, they would remarry. See id. The wife agreed to this stratagem and did not appear or defend the *188divorce action. See id. The husband did not fulfill his part of the collusive bargain, married another, and was expecting a child with his new wife. See id. at 466, 467. The first Mrs. Karren then sued to vacate the decree. See id. at 466. The supreme court held that a decree of divorce obtained by any of the following conduct is a fraud upon the court: (1) collusion of the parties, (2) suppression of the facts, or (8) false testimony. See id. In the Karren case, the court declined to grant relief because of the husband's remarriage and the fact that he was expecting a child with his new wife. See id. at 466-67. Here we have no such equitable concern for either of the Kelleys. Neither has remarried and no other children are involved.
T65 The trial court's findings regarding the Kelleys' conduct brings them within the Karren definition of fraud upon the court. Indeed, they obtained their decree of divorce under a collusive agreement and by suppressing the truth.
166 In cases when courts have invoked their equitable powers to remedy fraud upon the court,
the relief granted has taken several forms: setting aside the judgment to permit a new trial, altering the terms of the judgment, or restraining the beneficiaries of the judgment from taking any benéfit whatever from it. But whatever form the relief has taken in particular cases, the net result has been the same: where the situation has required the court has, in some manner, devitalized the judgment.
Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 822 U.S. 288, 245, 64 S.Ct. 997, 1001, 88 L.Ed. 1250 (1944) (footnote omitted). In this case, the appropriate remedy is to vacate the decree.8

. I use the term advisedly and with some reluctance, as it is not an apt description of the doctrine. Nonetheless, because the statute and most of our cases use the term "common-law marriage," I shall also. Further, my short digest is meant to quickly summarize the evolution of common-law marriage, not provide a treatise.

. If debated today, legislators would no doubt express concern about its effect on same-sex relationships.

. Anyone interested in improving or repealing the common-law marriage statute should read this excellent discussion predicting many of the problems we are now having with the statute.

. The Administrative Office of the Courts could survey the trial courts to determine the number and expense of adjudications involving common-law marriage. Perhaps there are many which are not appealed.

. Alabama has a three-element scheme:
First, the parties must have the capacity to marry. Next, they must presently agree to enter the marriage relationship. Finally, they must consummate the marriage; that is, they must live in such a way as to gain public recognition that they are living as husband and wife. Like any other marriage, a common-law marriage can be terminated only by death or divorce. A party seeking to prove a common-law marriage must establish his claim by clear and convincing evidence.
John B. Crawley, Is the Honeymoon Over for Common Law Marriage: A Consideration of the Continued Viability of the Common Law Marriage Doctrine, 29 Cumb. L.Rev. 399, 405 (1998/1999) (footnotes omitted). The author, a judge, asserts that this scheme works well in the Alabama courts.

. Fraud upon the court is defined differently in the context of divorce than in traditional fraud cases, which require proof of several elements. See generally Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 144-45, 247 P.2d 273, 274-75 (1952).

. The text of Rule 60(b) makes it clear that fraud upon the court determinations are made outside the bounds of Rule 60. The Rule states that it "does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action ... to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court." Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b).

. Vacating the divorce decree relieves the courts from having to consider further the following issues addressed by the main opinion:
Section I. Non-solemnized Marriage Statute
Section II Establishment of Common-law Marriages
Section III. Modification of the Decree
Section IV. Temporary Support Order
Section V. Alimony
My colleagues' effort to untangle the issues spun by the Kelleys is commendable. However, the Kelleys were not entitled to it. "Oh, what a tangled web we weave, when first we practice to deceive." Sir Walter Scott (1771-1832). John Bartlett, Familiar Quotations 378:13 (16th ed.1992).