Court Opinion

ID: 9753666
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:22:10.251343+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:40.051036
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
by Mb. Justice Nix :
While recognizing that the 1968 Constitution intended to abolish the former system of separate courts and create a unified court of common pleas, the ma*65jority then proceeds to perpetuate one of the problems that the new system was designed to eliminate. Apparently recognizing that there is no longer a jurisdictional problem raised, the majority nevertheless devotes a substantial portion of the opinion to a consideration as to which division would have been the most appropriate for the filing of this lawsuit. An even more serious mistake in my judgment is that it leaves open the implication that an appellate finding of an inappropriate selection of division for the initiation of an action may of itself, without a consideration of the merits, justify the vacation of the order below although admittedly the court rendering the decision had jurisdiction over the cause.1
As lawsuits became more complex and involved prior to the 1968 Amendment, courts were faced with more and more difficult decisions as to the appropriate jurisdiction between the lower courts. Recognizing this increasing problem, it was the intention of the framers of the new judiciary article to render academic these questions by vesting jurisdiction in a unified court of common pleas. Article Y, §5, Pennsylvania Constitution. As was stated by one of the members of the Constitutional Convention: “There have over the years been many conflicts between the orphans’ court and the common pleas as to who had jurisdiction. Then in many other courts there have been similar conflicts about jurisdiction. It is the present attempt to eliminate all of those conflicts.” Journal of the Constitutional Convention, Vol. II, Feb. 15, 1968, Delegate Braham, p. 852.
*66By a long and labored discussion in this area the majority has attempted to resurrect a problem that it was hoped had been interred forever. They justify this attempt to revive the problem by the presumptuous judgment that the selection of a forum in this lawsuit could properly be characterized as “willy nilly”. In my opinion, this conclusion is not only unjustified but represents an unnecessarily harsh criticism of the plaintiff and the court below. First, I do not agree that even if the selection was patently erroneous that it should be the subject of appellate review. The question no longer being one of jurisdiction, it is difficult to understand the reason for appellate review. Clearly, the 1968 amendment relegated the issue to a matter of administration and any abuse thereof should be handled administratively.
Secondly, I do not share the majority’s opinion that the selection of the Family Division as the forum to commence the lawsuit was so obviously erroneous, if indeed it was erroneous. In setting forth the areas of concern for each division of the new unified court of common pleas the Schedule to the Judiciary Article was not attempting to define theories of actions (e.g., assumpsit, trespass, etc.) nor did it base the classification upon the form of process (e.g., foreign attachment). Bather it was attempting to define the broad areas of the law to which each division was to direct its attention.2 It is equally as clear that an action con*67cerned with enforcement of obligations predicated upon a duty to support bom from a family relationship was entrusted to the Family Division of the new court. I cannot agree that the establishment of the obligation and the reduction of the arrearages to judgment so transforms the character of the lawsuit so that it is no longer an appropriate concern for the Family Division. While admittedly it is an action to enforce an obligation, it is nevertheless an obligation derived from a duty to support as opposed to a contractual duty. The majority, while holding that the reduction to judgment had removed it from the area of support and transformed it to a collection for debt, nevertheless recognizes the origin of the obligation for the purpose of determining the applicability of Section 12 of the Estates Act of 19473 and Section 1 of the Act of May 10, 1921.4 To maintain that for purposes of selecting a forum the fact of the existence of a judgment so transforms the action that we must ignore that it emerges from a support obligation and yet recognize the character of the obligation in determining the right of the judgment holder to proceed against a spendthrift trust is in my judgment utter nonsense.
In any event, whether this was a clear mistake in the exercise of jurisdiction by the court below, or as I believe, in that gray area intended to be eliminated by the 1968 Amendment, the court did have jurisdiction and appellate courts should leave these problems to the internal management of the court below. An inappropriate exercise of jurisdiction by a division of the court of common pleas should not in and of itself pro*68vide the basis for a reversal of a judgment on a vacating of an order.
Upon finally reaching a consideration of the merits, the majority determines that the order of the court below is in violation of the Estates Act of 1947 and the Act of May 10, 1921. To rectify this alleged error, they have vacated the order of the court below, removed the matter from the original judge and remanded the case to the Civil Division of the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas5 for further proceedings. The issues to be resolved by the court below in this action were, whether there was an obligation, and whether there was a fund from which this obligation could be satisfied. The majority of this Court agreed with the lower court’s determination that each was to be answered in the affirmative. The only area in which the determination below is attacked is the amount of the fund that is presently available for the satisfying of the obligation. This error can be remedied by remanding the cause to the same court below with the instruction to modify the order in accordance with their views.
Although the majority recognizes that the question before us is one of internal common pleas court administration and not one of jurisdiction, the majority nevertheless removes the cause from the Family Division and remands it to the Civil Division. Such action can only be justified if the original court acted without jurisdiction, which the majority concedes is not at issue. This contradiction between the majority’s assertions and their action mandates dissent.
Mr. Justice Roberts and Mi*. Justice Manderino join in this dissenting opinion.

 While the majority states that the alleged mistake as to the merits was more important than their finding that it was improperly entertained in the Family Division, it leaves open whether the order to vacate could have been supported on their finding of an improper selection of forum alone. This is further compounded since the error on the merits is of the type (as I will discuss later in this opinion) that does not normally require the drastic remedy of vacating the order.

Section 17(b) of the Schedule to Judiciary Article provides:
“Until otherwise provided by rule of the court of common pleas, the court of common pleas shall exercise jurisdiction in the following matters through the family court division:
“ (i) Domestic Relations: Desertion or nonsupport of wives, children and indigent parents, including children born out of wedlock; proceedings, including habeas corpus, for custody of children; divorce and annulment and property matters relating thereto.
*67“(ii) Juvenile Matters. All matters now within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
“ (iii) Adoptions and Delayed Birth Certificates.”

 20 P.S. §301.12.

 48 P.S. §136.

 Act of December 2, 1968, P. L. 1142, No. 357, 17 P.S. §235.2 (Supp. 1972-73).