Court Opinion

ID: 9900315
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 22:10:53.892406+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:04.120962
License: Public Domain

No. 575                November 8, 2023                        13

           IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                   STATE OF OREGON

                      SHONN WATSON,
                           Petitioner,
                                v.
          BOARD OF PAROLE AND POST-PRISON
                        SUPERVISION,
                          Respondent.
          Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision
                            A174076

   Submitted November 21, 2022.
   Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section, and Stephanie J. Hortsch, Deputy Public Defender,
Office of Public Defense Services, filed the brief for petitioner.
   Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Christopher Page, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
  Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, and Lagesen, Chief
Judge, and Jacquot, Judge.
   AOYAGI, P. J.
   Reversed and remanded.
14                                  Watson v. Board of Parole

         AOYAGI, P. J.
          Petitioner seeks judicial review of a 2020 order of the
Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision that, pursuant
to ORS 163A.100 and OAR 255-085-0020(1) (Jan 10, 2020),
set his sex offender notification level (SONL) at Level 3 (High).
In his first three assignments of error, petitioner contends
that the board violated its own rule, OAR 255-085-0020(1)
(Jan 10, 2020), when it conducted a risk assessment that did
not account for sex-offense-free time in the community, thus
failing to use the Static-99R rules and research as required
by the rule. We addressed identical assignments of error in
another case decided today, Sohappy v. Board of Parole, 329
Or App 28, ___ P3d ___ (2023). Applying Sohappy, we agree
with petitioner that the board violated its own rule, and we
reverse on that basis. However, we reject petitioner’s fourth
and fifth assignments of error, in which he challenges how
the board scored him on the “stranger victim” and “intimate
partner” items on the Static-99R. Accordingly, we reverse
and remand.
         Unless otherwise specified, all references to OAR
255-085-0020 in this opinion are to the version that went into
effect on January 10, 2020, which is the version that the board
applied to petitioner. In Sohappy, we addressed the version
of OAR 255-085-0020 that went into effect on April 29, 2020.
329 Or App at 30-31. There are differences between the
January 10, 2020, and April 29, 2020, versions of the rule,
but they are not material to the issue on review. The current
version of the rule is materially different from the versions
at issue in Sohappy and this case, see id. at 31, but those
amendments are not at issue in this proceeding.
                          I.   FACTS
        Petitioner has been registered as a sex offender
since 1999, when he was convicted of attempted first-degree
sexual penetration of an adult victim. He was released from
custody on that offense in 2002. Since 2002, petitioner has
been convicted of multiple nonperson offenses (such as forg-
ery and drug crimes) but no sexual offenses.
       In 2013, the legislature enacted what is now ORS
163A.100, creating three different sex offender notification
Cite as 329 Or App 13 (2023)                                   15

levels—Level 3 for offenders presenting the highest risk of
committing another sex offense, Level 2 for offenders pre-
senting a moderate risk of committing another sex offense,
and Level 1 for offenders presenting the lowest risk of com-
mitting another sex offense. The goal was to stratify the
registry based on sexual recidivism risk, as well as provide
a mechanism to remove people from the registry, so as to
make the registry more useful to law enforcement for pre-
venting future sex offenses by making it possible to identify
past offenders who present a high risk of committing another
sex offense. Sohappy, 329 Or App at 37-39. The legislature
tasked the board with classifying over 19,000 existing reg-
istrants, a process that is still ongoing, as well as all new
registrants. Id. at 39-41.
          In early 2020, the board conducted a risk assessment
of petitioner for the purpose of determining his SONL. Under
OAR 255-085-0020(1), the board was required to use “the
Static-99R actuarial instrument * * * along with attending
rules and research found on http://www.static99.org/” to con-
duct the risk assessment. The board initially calculated peti-
tioner’s score on the Static-99R as “7” points but, after con-
sidering written objections, changed his score to “6” points.
Based solely on that score, the board set petitioner’s SONL
at Level 3. That is, it assessed him as presenting a high risk
of committing another sex offense. The board issued a final
order to that effect, notifying petitioner that the order was
not subject to administrative review under OAR 255-080 but
was subject to judicial review under ORS 144.335.
        Petitioner filed a timely petition for judicial review. As
previously described, petitioner contends that the board vio-
lated OAR 255-085-0020(1) when it conducted a risk assess-
ment that did not account for sex-offense-free time in the com-
munity, and he also challenges how the board scored him on
two particular Static-99R items. We begin with the latter.
         II. PETITIONER’S STATIC-99R SCORE
        The Static-99R actuarial instrument is discussed
in some detail in Sohappy, 329 Or App at 41-45. As rele-
vant here, to determine a person’s Static-99R “score,” the
evaluator must score 10 individual factual items regarding
16                                         Watson v. Board of Parole

the person’s personal and criminal history as of the date
of the index offense or, for some items, the date of release
for the index offense. Id. at 41-42 (listing the 10 items).
Petitioner challenges how he was scored on two of the items:
first, whether he had ever committed a sex offense against
a stranger, and, second, whether he had ever lived with an
intimate partner for two continuous years. Petitioner raised
the same challenges to the scoring of those items in his
written objections to the board’s order, thus exhausting his
administrative remedies.
         The Static-99R Coding Rules govern the scoring
of the Static-99R, including addressing how each of the
10 factual items is to be scored. See Amy Phenix, Yolanda
Fernandez, Andrew J. R. Harris, Maaike Helmus, R. Karl
Hanson, & David Thornton, Static-99R Coding Rules
Revised, 2016, available at https://saarna.org/static-99/
(accessed Oct 9, 2023) (Coding Rules).1 Because scoring an
individual item requires both making a factual finding and
applying the Coding Rules, a challenge to how a person was
scored on an item may implicate more than one standard of
review. We review factual findings for substantial evidence.
ORS 144.335(3). “Substantial evidence exists to support a
finding of fact when the record, viewed as a whole, would
permit a reasonable person to make that finding.” ORS
183.482(8)(c). “[W]e review for legal error the board’s inter-
pretation of the Static-99R Coding Rules.” Stewart v. Board
of Parole, 312 Or App 32, 36, 492 P3d 1283 (2021).
         Here, petitioner was scored one point for the
“stranger victim” item, based on a finding that he was a
“stranger” to the victim of his index sex offense (the 1999
offense). “A victim is considered a stranger if the victim did
not know the offender (or vice versa) 24 hours before the
offense.” Coding Rules at 82. The Coding Rules address
what it means to “know” a person. See id. The standard for
knowing a person is “quite low but does involve some level
of interaction.” Id. Petitioner argues that the “stranger”
finding is not supported by substantial evidence or that the
    1
      The Coding Rules are also available as an exhibit to the board’s current
rules. OAR 255-085-0020 (Aug 16, 2022) (Exhibit STATIC-99R). We agree with the
parties that the Coding Rules are “attending rules” under OAR 255-085-0020(1).
Cite as 329 Or App 13 (2023)                                                17

board misapplied the Coding Rules. Having reviewed the
record, we agree with the board that there is enough evi-
dence to support the finding that petitioner and the victim
met for the first time on the day of the crime and, thus, were
strangers. Further, given that finding, the board correctly
applied the Coding Rules to score one point. We therefore
reject the fourth assignment of error.
         Petitioner was also scored one point for the “intimate
partner” item, based on a finding that he had never as an
adult cohabitated with someone in an intimate relationship
for two years or longer.2 See Coding Rules at 49-51 (detailing
how to determine whether a person has had a qualifying
relationship). Under the Coding Rules, a person should be
scored one point if the evaluator finds that the person has
never had a qualifying relationship, zero points if the evalu-
ator finds that the person has had a qualifying relationship,
or zero points if there is no credible evidence from which
to make a finding. Id. at 49. The evaluator “should make
an attempt to confirm the offender’s relationship history
through collateral sources and official records” but, absent
such information, may rely on self-reported information that
is deemed credible. Id.; see also Baker v. Board of Parole, 305
Or App 814, 822, 473 P3d 83 (2020) (“The rules’ use of the
words ‘should attempt’ and ‘greatly preferred’ indicate that
the board enjoys at least some discretion over the decision to
contact a collateral source.”).
         Petitioner gave conflicting self-reports to the board
as to whether he had had a qualifying relationship. On the
initial questionnaire, he denied it. Later, before the board
issued its SONL order, petitioner sent the board a letter
providing the name of a person with whom he had a four-
year intimate relationship, but the board determined that
the relationship did not meet the cohabitation requirement,
     2
       The Coding Rules require the evaluator to consider only cohabitation that
occurred before release for the index sex offense. Coding Rules at 49. However,
for some registrants, the board considers cohabitation through the SONL assess-
ment date. Oregon Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision, SONL - Age
Chart, available at https://www.oregon.gov/boppps/Documents/R%26R/S99R_
AgeChart2019.pdf (accessed Oct 9, 2023); see also Sohappy, 329 Or App 51-52
(discussing board practice). That variation is not at issue here, and the board
otherwise follows the Coding Rules in scoring the “intimate partner” item, so we
discuss only the Coding Rules.
18                                            Watson v. Board of Parole

which petitioner does not challenge. Yet later, after the
board issued its initial SONL order, in his written objec-
tions, petitioner identified a new person, J, with whom he
claimed to have cohabitated for four years (including two
years as an adult). The board considered that assertion but,
based on collateral sources, concluded that petitioner’s ini-
tial self-report was more credible than his later self-report.
         We agree with petitioner that the collateral sources
on which the board relied were weak, in that they allowed
only a weak inference that petitioner did not live with J for
a full two years as an adult.3 Standing alone, the existing
collateral evidence would not support an affirmative find-
ing that petitioner never had a qualifying relationship, such
that the board would need to either consult additional col-
lateral sources to make an affirmative finding or score a
zero on this item based on the lack of credible information.
See Coding Rules at 49 (“If no information is available this
item should be scored a ‘0’ (zero)—as if the offender has lived
with an intimate partner for two years.”). But the collateral
sources on which the board relied do not stand alone here.
Although certainly not definitive, they provided some basis
for the board to credit petitioner’s initial self-report denying
a qualifying relationship over his last-minute assertion of
a qualifying relationship with a person who he had never
mentioned until after the board issued its initial order. We
therefore reject the fifth assignment of error.
     III.   PETITIONER’S SEX-OFFENSE-FREE TIME
         We next consider petitioner’s first three assign-
ments of error, which, as previously described, are identi-
cal to the assignments of error in Sohappy, 329 Or App at
45-46. We limit our discussion to issues unique to this case.
For a fuller understanding of the issues addressed herein,
    3
      Petitioner had been scored “1” on this item on two prior Static-99 assess-
ments, but only the scores are in the record, not the information on which they
were based. See OAR 255-085-0020(1) (“Classifying agencies may score regis-
trants using information from previous Static-99 or Static-99R assessments.”
(Emphasis added.)) Also, petitioner had made statements at different points
in the past regarding his intimate-relationship status in September 1991 and
regarding his longest intimate relationship being with someone who was not J.
Suffice it to say that those statements are not necessarily inconsistent with peti-
tioner having lived with J for two years as an adult, but they make his claim to
have done so at least somewhat less credible.
Cite as 329 Or App 13 (2023)                                                   19

we direct the reader to Sohappy, also decided today, which
discusses the history of Oregon’s sex-offender registry, the
board’s promulgation and interpretation of a substantively
identical version of OAR 255-085-0020(1), the Static-99R
risk assessment methodology, and arguments nearly identi-
cal to petitioner’s.
A.    Procedural Issues
         This case comes to us in a different posture than
Sohappy. The petitioner in Sohappy had raised the issue of
sex-offense-free time to the board, thereby exhausting any
administrative remedies available. Sohappy, 329 Or App
at 33-35. By contrast, in this case, petitioner acknowledges
that he did not raise the issue to the board. Relying on
Tuckenberry v. Board of Parole, 365 Or 640, 642, 451 P3d
227 (2019), he asks us to relax or set aside the exhaustion
requirement. The board urges us not to reach the merits,
given the failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
         As mentioned in Sohappy, 329 Or App at 33, it is
“not at all clear” that the board actually provides regis-
trants with an opportunity to raise to the board this type
of challenge to an SONL order. OAR 255-085-0040(1) pro-
vides that written objections to an SONL order “are lim-
ited to presenting factual evidence regarding the Static-
99R score and must be plain, concise, and directly related
to specific items on the Static-99R that the registrant claims
were not scored correctly.”4 (Emphasis added.) The “Notice of
Rights” and the “Written Objections” form that petitioner
received, which are identical to those in Sohappy, reiterate
that limitation. See Sohappy, 329 Or App at 34 (describing
documents). If the board did not provide an opportunity for
petitioner to challenge the board’s interpretation of OAR
255-085-0020(1) as relevant to the SONL order, then there
was no administrative remedy to exhaust. See Fifth Avenue
Corp. v. Washington Co., 282 Or 591, 618, 581 P2d 50 (1978)
(“It goes without saying that for an administrative remedy
to be ‘exhaustible’ it must be available.”); Golden Rule Farms
v. Water Resources Dept., 321 Or App 43, 48, 515 P3d 908
    4
      The current version of OAR 255-085-0040(1) is materially the same as the
version in effect when the board issued the order on review, so we cite the current
rule for convenience.
20                                 Watson v. Board of Parole

(2022) (explaining that a person generally must present an
issue to the agency before it will be considered on judicial
review, if the agency “provides a process” to raise it).
         However, we need not decide that issue, which the
parties do not address, because, even assuming that an
opportunity existed to raise the issue to the board and that
it was forgone, we agree with petitioner that it is appropriate
to relax or set aside the administrative-exhaustion require-
ment here. The doctrine of administrative exhaustion “is a
judicial policy that promotes orderly procedures and good
administration, but [it] has exceptions” and the exhaustion
requirement for board orders, codified in ORS 144.335(1)(b),
“remains flexible under general prudential exhaustion prin-
ciples.” Tuckenberry, 365 Or at 647, 652 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Courts “may relax or set aside [the require-
ment] entirely, depending on the circumstances.” Id. at 647.
          For several reasons, this is an appropriate circum-
stance to relax or set aside the requirement. First, given the
text of OAR 255-085-0040(1) and the content of the notice
and the written-objections form sent to petitioner, it was
at least unclear whether petitioner could raise the issue.
Second, the issue is one of public interest, in that inaccu-
rate classification of sex offenders undermines the purpose
of the SONL statute, which is to help law enforcement pre-
vent future sex crimes by enabling them to direct resources
toward past sex offenders who present the highest risk of
committing new sex crimes. See Sohappy, 329 Or App at
36-40 (discussing statutory purpose); see also Tuckenberry,
365 Or at 655 (“[P]etitioner raises important issues of public
interest concerning the board’s statutory authority to impose
a special condition that purports to regulate all of a parol-
ee’s ‘intimate’ relationships and encounters.”). Third, raising
the issue to the board would have been futile, as the board
presumably would have taken the same position that it did
when the petitioner in Sohappy raised it. See Tuckenberry,
365 Or at 655 (concluding that raising the issue would have
been futile, where another petitioner had raised the issue
unsuccessfully in a different case decided the same day).
       Ultimately, we are persuaded that, as in
Tuckenberry, 365 Or at 655, it is appropriate to relax or set
Cite as 329 Or App 13 (2023)                                 21

aside the administrative-exhaustion requirement and pro-
ceed to the merits of petitioner’s arguments.
          The next question is whether, in the administrative
context, relaxing or setting aside the exhaustion requirement
means that we are limited to plain-error review. See ORAP
5.45(1) (“No matter claimed as error will be considered on
appeal unless the claim of error was preserved in the lower
court and is assigned as error in the opening brief in accor-
dance with this rule, provided that the appellate court may,
in its discretion, consider a plain error.”). We have expressed
that understanding at least once since Tuckenberry, in
Stewart, and petitioner provisionally requests plain-error
review in light of Stewart.
        For present purposes, we assume without deciding
that we are limited to plain-error review. See Stewart, 312
Or App at 35 (“Even if we were to conclude that the exhaus-
tion requirement should be relaxed under Tuckenberry,
such that only preservation-of-error principles were in play,
neither of the first two assigned errors is ‘obvious and not
reasonably in dispute’ so as to qualify as plain error.”); but
see also Tuckenberry, 365 Or at 642 (proceeding to regu-
lar review after relaxing the administrative exhaustion
requirement); Forbus v. Board of Parole, 309 Or App 296,
301, 482 P3d 95 (2021) (same). An error is “plain” when it is
an error of law, the legal point is obvious and not reasonably
in dispute, and the error is apparent on the record. State v.
Vanornum, 354 Or 614, 629, 317 P3d 889 (2013).
B.   Merits
         Petitioner contends that the board has implausibly
interpreted OAR 255-085-0020(1) as allowing it to disregard
the Static-99R rules and research regarding sex-offense-free
time in the community when conducting a risk assessment for
purposes of setting a registrant’s SONL. The alleged error is
one of law, as well as being apparent on the record. Vanornum,
354 Or at 629. As for whether the legal point is obvious and not
reasonably in dispute, we look to the case law as it exists at
the time of our appellate decision. State v. McKinney/Shiffer,
369 Or 325, 333, 505 P3d 946 (2022). In other words, we look
to Sohappy, as current case law directly on point.
22                                             Watson v. Board of Parole

          OAR 255-085-0020(1) requires the board to “ ‘use
the Static-99R actuarial instrument on the Board’s web-
site * * * along with attending rules and research found
on http://www.static99.org/, to conduct a sex offender risk
assessment’ ” of an adult male sex offender to set his SONL.
In Sohappy, we held that the board’s interpretation of OAR
255-085-0020(1) (Apr 29, 2020)—which is identical to the
version of OAR 255-085-0020(1) at issue here—was implau-
sible “and that the only plausible interpretation of the rule
required the board to use the attending rules and research
on the Static-99R website regarding sex-offense-free time in
the community in setting petitioner’s risk level.” 329 Or App
at 30. We further held that the board’s use of its “Age Chart”
in lieu of the Static-99R methodology violated the Coding
Rules and was not a “permissible way to account for sex-of-
fense-free time in the community.” Id. at 51.
         It would seem to follow that the legal points at issue
in this case are now “obvious” and not reasonably in dispute.
However, while petitioner’s arguments in this case are essen-
tially identical to the petitioner’s arguments in Sohappy,
and while some of the board’s arguments in this case are
the same as the board’s arguments in Sohappy (and thus
already addressed in Sohappy), the board has made three
substantive arguments in this case that it did not make in
Sohappy. We pause to address those arguments.5
         First, in its answering brief in this case, the board
argues that OAR 255-085-0020(1) “incorporates the Coding
Rules and the Age Chart” and, relatedly, argues that, because
“[t]he board’s website included links to the Static-99R scoring
sheet, the Coding Rules, and the Age Chart,” a classifying
agency “must” utilize the Age Chart when conducting a risk
assessment under OAR 255-085-0020(1). (Emphases added.)
        That is wrong. OAR 255-085-0020(1) requires the
board to use “the Static-99R actuarial instrument on the
    5
      This case was submitted on the same date as Sohappy and decided by the
same panel as Sohappy. Although we limit our discussion in each opinion to the
parties’ arguments in that case, we were aware of the board’s arguments in this
case when deciding Sohappy, and vice versa. Because both cases were under con-
sideration by the same panel at the same time, and given the nature of the legal
issue (interpretation of a board rule), we effectively considered all of the board’s
arguments in both cases.
Cite as 329 Or App 13 (2023)                                  23

Board’s website” and “the attending rules and research” on
the Static-99R website to conduct the risk assessment. It is
true, as the board points out, that the board’s website con-
tained a link to the board’s Age Chart. See Sohappy, 329
Or App at 51 (“The ‘Age Chart’ is not something available on
the Static-99R website. Rather, it is a tool developed by an
unknown person and used by the board in scoring Items 1 and
2 of the Static-99R.”). But the board putting a link to its Age
Chart on its website does not mean that OAR 255-085-0020(1)
“incorporates” the Age Chart or that classifying agencies
“must” use the Age Chart. To the contrary, the only item on
the board’s website that the rule can be said to “incorporate” is
the Static-99R actuarial instrument. OAR 255-085-0020(1)
(requiring use of “the Static-99R actuarial instrument on
the Board’s website”). Furthermore, the rule unequivocally
requires use of the Coding Rules on the Static-99R web-
site—see OAR 255-085-0020(1) (requiring use of “attend-
ing rules and research found on http://www.static99.
org/”)—and using the Age Chart violates the Coding
Rules. Sohappy, 329 Or App at 52 (so holding). We there-
fore reject the board’s argument that OAR 255-085-0020(1)
incorporates the Age Chart and requires use of the Age
Chart.
         Second, the board argues that, because ORS
163A.100 does not distinguish between existing registrants
and new registrants, it makes sense for the board to inter-
pret OAR 255-085-0020(1) as allowing it to disregard sex-of-
fense-free time in the community in conducting risk assess-
ments of existing registrants, given that new registrants do
not have any sex-offense-free time.
         It is true that ORS 163A.100 does not distinguish
between existing registrants, i.e., people who were first
required to register before January 1, 2014, when the three-
tiered system went into effect, and new registrants. It is also
true that OAR 255-085-0020(1) requires classifying agen-
cies to use the same risk assessment methodology for exist-
ing and new registrants. It does not follow, however, that
OAR 255-085-0020(1) allows classifying agencies to disre-
gard the Static-99R rules and research regarding sex-of-
fense-free time in the community when classifying existing
24                                            Watson v. Board of Parole

registrants, because new registrants are just being released
into the community and therefore have no comparable sex-
offense-free time. The legislature directed the board to adopt
a risk-assessment methodology, and the board adopted the
Static-99R actuarial instrument and its attending rules
and research. The Static-99R actuarial instrument and its
attending rules and research require the consideration of
sex-offense-free time to achieve a statistically sound risk
assessment. Sohappy, 329 Or App at 48-50. The fact that
some registrants do not have sex-offense-free time does not
mean that the board can disregard it for those registrants
who have it.6 Indeed, it is precisely the existence of factual
differences between registrants that causes them to present
different levels of risk to the community and that allows for
different risk classifications.
          Third, the board argues that conducting a risk
assessment that complies with the Static-99R Coding Rules
and current research on the Static-99R website would result
in classification decisions contrary to the legislative intent.
That argument turns on the inclusion of several specific provi-
sions in the 2013 legislation that created the three-tiered sex-
offender registry: that registrants must wait until 10 years
after release from supervision to request reclassification, ORS
163A.125(2)(e); that registrants previously classified as “pred-
atory sex offenders” or “sexually violent dangerous offend-
ers” are automatically classified as Level 3, Or Laws 2013,
ch 708, § 7(2)(b)(A), (B), compiled as a note after ORS 163A.110;
that any registrant initially classified as Level 3 can never
be reclassified below Level 2, ORS 163A.125(3)(b); and that
any registrant convicted of a person felony or person Class A
misdemeanor since the index sex offense cannot be reclassi-
fied or relieved from registration, ORS 163A.125(3)(a).
        It is true that the foregoing statutory provisions
will keep certain past sex offenders on the registry for their
    6
      As for the board’s argument that the legislature expected the board to use
existing Static-99R scores for any existing registrants who had them and that
the legislature did not express any concern about the scores not reflecting sex-
offense-free time, we already considered that argument in Sohappy. See Sohappy,
329 Or App at 47 n 10. It is also worth noting that a person’s Static-99R score for
the same index offense never changes (assuming it was accurately calculated), id.
at 42-43, so the fact that an existing Static-99R score might be reused does not
mean much.
Cite as 329 Or App 13 (2023)                                25

entire lives and keep them classified at a higher SONL
than would be supported by current Static-99R rules and
research regarding the recidivism risk of past offenders who
have lived in the community for an extended period of years
without committing any new sex offenses. That may in part
reflect the fact that research regarding the effect of sex-of-
fense-free time in the community on sexual recidivism risk
was much less developed in 2013. Sohappy, 329 Or App at 47
n 10. In any event, that is a legislative policy choice.
         The existence of those statutory provisions does not
mean, however, that the board can disregard its own rule
in classifying existing registrants, based on a belief that,
had the legislature realized that many existing registrants
would have been living in the community for years without
sexually reoffending and might pose little or no statistical
risk of sexually reoffending by the time of classification, the
legislature would have allowed for different risk assessment
methodologies for new and existing registrants—with new
registrants classified based on their current recidivism risk,
but existing registrants classified based on their past recid-
ivism risk (at the time of release).
         Given the purpose of the statute—to assist law
enforcement in preventing future sex offenses—it is unclear
why the legislature would want existing registrants to be
classified above their actual risk level based on outdated
information. See ORS 163A.045(1) (“The purpose of ORS
163A.005 to 163A.235 is to assist law enforcement agencies
in preventing future sex offenses.”). But even accepting the
board’s premise as correct, the fact remains that the legis-
lature enacted a statute that requires a present risk assess-
ment, Sohappy, 329 Or App at 46-47, and the board adopted a
rule requiring use of “the Static-99R actuarial instrument”
and the “attending rules and research” on the Static-99R
website to conduct that risk assessment and thus determine
whether someone poses the “highest” risk of reoffending
(Level 3), a “moderate” risk of reoffending (Level 2), or the
“lowest” risk of reoffending (Level 1). As held in Sohappy,
a present risk assessment conducted using the Static-99R
actuarial instrument and the attending rules and research
on the Static-99R website necessarily includes consideration
of sex-offense-free time in the community.
26                                 Watson v. Board of Parole

          We note that our holding is narrow. This is not
a case where a registrant was classified as Level 3 based
on a correct application of the Static-99R methodology,
OAR 255-085-0020(1), or was classified as Level 3 auto-
matically based on a legislative policy choice, Or Laws
2013, ch 708, § 7(2)(b)(A), (B), and now seeks reclassifica-
tion or relief from registration, such that the statutory
limitations on reclassification and relief from registration
are at issue. See 329 Or App at 41. This is a case about
a risk assessment conducted under OAR 255-085-0020(1),
specifically the version of OAR 255-085-0020(1) in effect on
January 10, 2020. The only question before us is whether
the board plausibly interpreted that rule as allowing it
to disregard sex-offense-free time when conducting a risk
assessment using the Static-99R actuarial instrument and
attending rules and research on the Static-99R website. We
conclude that the board’s interpretation of its rule is implau-
sible, for the reasons stated in Sohappy and herein.
          Having addressed the arguments that the board did
not make in Sohappy but makes in this case, we reaffirm
our holdings in Sohappy and conclude that the error in this
case qualifies as plain. We exercise our discretion to correct
the plain error, for largely the same reasons discussed in
the administrative-exhaustion section. See 329 Or App at
35-36; Ailes v. Portland Meadows, Inc., 312 Or 376, 382 n 6,
823 P2d 956 (1991) (providing a wide-ranging and nonexclu-
sive list of considerations that may be relevant in deciding
whether to exercise discretion to correct a plain error). The
critical role that accurate risk classification plays in meet-
ing the statutory goal of having a sex-offender registry that
assists law enforcement in preventing future sex offenses,
ORS 163A.045(1), is a particularly significant consideration.
                    IV. CONCLUSION
         In sum, we reject petitioner’s arguments regarding
the board’s scoring of the “stranger victim” and “intimate
partner” items on the Static-99R assessment. However, con-
sistent with our holding in Sohappy, 329 Or App at 30, we
agree with petitioner that the board misinterpreted OAR
255-085-0020(1) (Jan 10, 2020) as allowing it to disregard
the Static-99R rules and research regarding sex-offense-free
Cite as 329 Or App 13 (2023)                                              27

time in the community as relevant to sexual recidivism risk.
We therefore reverse and remand.
         In doing so, we note that, unlike the petitioner in
Sohappy, petitioner in this case received a lower score on
Item 1 of the Static-99R due to the board’s use of its “Age
Chart,” so, if the board applies the same rule again,7 it will
need to rescore petitioner on Item 1. Further, unlike the
petitioner in Sohappy, petitioner in this case has committed
nonsexual offenses since release on his index sex offense,
which the board may consider as relevant to his risk of sex-
ual recidivism in a manner consistent with the Static-99R
methodology. See Sohappy, 329 Or App at 44 & n 9 (discuss-
ing the Static- 99R’s approach to nonsexual offenses com-
mitted after the index sex offense).
          Reversed and remanded.

    7
      Neither party has taken a position on which version of OAR 255-085-0020
should apply on remand. We express no opinion on that issue. We simply note
factual differences between this case and Sohappy that would be relevant under
the version of OAR 255-085-0020 addressed in this opinion.