Court Opinion

ID: 9598027
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:04:33.957528+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:27:50.816574
License: Public Domain

STEPHENSON, J.,
dissenting.
We have defined hearsay as: “testimony in court, or written evidence, of a statement made out of court, the statement being offered as an assertion to show the truth of matters asserted therein, and thus resting for its value upon the credibility of the out-of-court asserter.” Stevenson v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 462, 465, 237 S.E.2d 779, 781 (1977). The majority concludes the bills sought to be introduced in this case do not fall within the definition. I cannot agree.
Each bill constituted an out-of-court statement by a service provider. Each contained two relevant assertions: first, that a service was provided and, second, that a certain charge was made for it. Walters introduced the bills to show the truth of these assertions.
Walters was competent to testify from his first-hand knowledge as to the services he received.* He could also testify he received the bills. This testimony, however, does not go to the crucial issue of the amount of damages. If, as the majority asserts, the bills are not being introduced to show these amounts, Walters is left with no evidence in this regard.
I share the majority’s concern that the trial court’s ruling places an obstacle in the way of those with small claims. However, the General Assembly has shown it is cognizant of the problem. Code § 16.1-88.2 provides a procedure for the introduction of medical reports and statements of costs in the district courts. If the General Assembly wished to extend this procedure to the circuit courts, it would do so. See, e.g., Code § 8.01-416 (allowing for the introduction of automobile repair estimates in both the district *454and circuit courts). If, as the majority suggests, these bills are not hearsay, there would be no reason for Code § 16.1-88.2.
Our Rules of Court also provide a means to avoid the practical problems of which the majority speaks. Rule 4:13 provides for a pretrial conference to consider, among other things, “[t]he possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of documents which will avoid unnecessary proof.” In a majority of cases involving small claims, counsel should be able to stipulate the amount of the medical bills, avoiding the necessity of proof.
For the reasons stated, I believe the trial court correctly refused to admit the proffered bills. This being so, I find it unnecessary to discuss whether Walters met his burden of proving the expenses were reasonable.
CARRICO, C.J., and THOMPSON, J., join in dissent.

 Thus, Walters was allowed to testify that he had x-rays taken at the Norfolk General Hospital. However, the trial court correctly sustained an objection when Walters was questioned as to what these x-rays showed.