Court Opinion

ID: 9781809
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 17:32:29.549134+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:39.668886
License: Public Domain

DURRANT, Justice,
dissenting:
€ 23 I respectfully dissent from Chief Justice Howe's opinion. I disagree with the decision to remand for a determination of whether Golsan operated the Waverunner with Croft's implied consent. The evidence in the record relevant to the issue of implied consent has been adequately developed and is undisputed. Summary judgment was properly granted because reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the undisputed facts do not present a genuine issue as to implied consent for trial. To conclude that Golsan operated the Waverunner with Croft's implied consent, a jury would have to infer not only that Croft's silence meant approval, but also that Bearden's use of "my kids" *543encompassed Golsan. Although the first inference is reasonable, the second is not.
1 24 A party facing a motion for summary judgment must bring forward specific eviden-tiary facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 922 P.2d 745, 752 (Utah 1996); Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). Bearden produced no evidence suggesting that "my kids" might refer to anyone other than Bearden's children. Gol-san was not one of Bearden's children, but apparently a friend of Bearden's children. In short, because Golsan did not operate the Waverunner with Croft's express or implied consent, I would affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Croft.
11 25 I also wish to note that I share Justice Wilkins' concern that, given the substantial differences in language between the two statutes, we should be cautious in relying on cases construing section 58-3-212 to interpret section 73-18-18.
11 26 Associate Chief Justice RUSSON concurs in Justice DURRANT's dissenting opinion.