Court Opinion

ID: 9895673
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-08 15:03:37.909953+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:33.093597
License: Public Domain

Cite as 2023 Ark. App. 515
                    ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
                                     DIVISIONS II & III
                                       No. CR-22-537

                                                  Opinion Delivered November 8, 2023

 JASON RAY                                APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI
                                APPELLANT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
                                          FIRST DIVISION
                                          [NO. 60CR-20-1681]
 V.
                                                  HONORABLE LEON JOHNSON,
 STATE OF ARKANSAS                                JUDGE
                                   APPELLEE
                                                  AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED

                          WENDY SCHOLTENS WOOD, Judge

                                         I. Introduction

       Jason Ray appeals from the Pulaski County Circuit Court’s sentencing order

convicting him of first-degree domestic battering, first-degree terroristic threatening, and

aggravated assault on a family or household member. Ray was sentenced to concurrent terms

of forty years’ imprisonment for first-degree domestic battering as a habitual offender, fifteen

years’ imprisonment for first-degree terroristic threatening, and fifteen years’ imprisonment

for aggravated assault on a family or household member. Ray asserts five points for reversal:

(1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for first-degree domestic battering;

(2) the circuit court erred in applying the habitual-offender-enhancement statute to his first-

degree domestic-batting conviction; (3) the circuit court erred in denying his request to
trifurcate the proceedings; (4) the circuit court erred in denying his motion to dismiss for

lack of a speedy trial; and (5) the circuit court erred in permitting the State to introduce

photographs of the victim. We affirm as modified.

                                           II. Facts

       On the night of July 30, 2019, Ray attacked his wife, Victoria Hester, in their home.

He was arrested for the incident on March 9, 2020, and charges were filed on May 22. At

trial, Hester testified that on the night of the attack, Ray woke her after he had returned

home and accused her of cheating on him. She said an argument ensued, and Ray grabbed

her by the hair, pushed her to the ground, hit her in the head, strangled her with a phone-

charging cable, threatened to kill her, and plunged her face into the dog’s water and food

bowls. Hester testified that she suffered long-term injuries from the attack, including

permanent scarring to her neck, damage to a vocal cord, and a brain injury. The State

introduced photographs from the scene of the attack showing some of Hester’s injuries.

       North Little Rock police detective Lonell Tims testified that after he interviewed

Hester and reviewed photographs taken of her, he sought an arrest warrant for Ray. Ray

presented the testimony of his fiancée, Rachell Gill, who testified it was her opinion that

Hester was untruthful.

       At the conclusion of the trial, the jury convicted and sentenced Ray. The sentencing

order was entered on July 13, 2022, and this appeal followed.

                                III. Sufficiency of the Evidence

                                               2
       Ray argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motions for directed verdict

challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his first-degree domestic-battering

conviction. Specifically, he argues that the State failed to present substantial evidence that

the prior domestic-battering conduct underlying his previous convictions occurred within

the ten years preceding July 30, 2019.

       On appeal, we treat a motion for directed verdict as a challenge to the sufficiency of

the evidence. Caple v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 41, at 5, 569 S.W.3d 353, 357. When reviewing

the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not weigh the evidence; we determine whether the

evidence in support of the verdict is substantial. Galvin v. State, 323 Ark. 125, 127, 912

S.W.2d 932, 933 (1996). Substantial evidence is that which is forceful enough to compel

reasonable minds to reach a conclusion one way or the other. Id., 912 S.W.2d at 933.

Evidence is not substantial if it leaves the fact-finder only to speculation and conjecture in

choosing between two equally reasonable conclusions and merely gives rise to a suspicion.

Surridge v. State, 279 Ark. 183, 185, 650 S.W.2d 561, 562 (1983). A directed verdict should

be granted where there is no evidence from which the jury could have found, without

resorting to surmise or conjecture, the guilt of the defendant. Winston v. State, 368 Ark. 105,

110, 243 S.W.3d 304, 308 (2006).

       A person commits domestic battering in the first degree if the person (1) commits any

act of second- or third-degree domestic battering as defined in Arkansas Code Annotated

sections 5-26-304 or 5-26-305, and (2) the person has on two previous occasions been

convicted of any act of battery or aggravated assault for conduct that occurred within the ten

                                              3
years preceding the commission of the current offense against a family or household

member. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-26-303(a)(5)(A), (B) (Supp. 2021). Therefore, the jury had to

determine whether Ray had committed either second- or third-degree domestic battering and

whether he had twice previously been convicted of third-degree domestic battering for

conduct occurring within the ten years preceding the July 30, 2019 incident.

       On the morning of Ray’s trial, the circuit court heard several pretrial motions,

including a motion to preclude a habitual-offender-sentencing enhancement for first-degree

domestic battering and a motion to trifurcate the case—to try the case in three stages—so that

the jury would not learn of Ray’s two prior domestic-battering convictions during the guilt

phase. Ray asserted that the prior convictions were unduly prejudicial and that the jury

should first determine guilt of the current offense of domestic battering in the third degree.

He asserted that the prior convictions then should be reviewed by the court and proffered

to the jury “just as we do any findings of priors for the habitual allegation.”

       The court deferred ruling on the issue of the sentencing enhancement, and it denied

Ray’s motion for trifurcation, ruling that the prior domestic-battering convictions

constituted an element of the State’s case for first-degree domestic battering that had to be

proved in the guilt phase of trial. To address Ray’s concerns about undue prejudice from the

introduction of the prior domestic-battering convictions, the State said that it would

introduce the sentencing orders for Ray’s prior domestic-battering convictions into evidence

but would not publish the orders to the jury. The State indicated that it would read to the

jury from the orders only that information necessary to prove the requisite element of first-

                                               4
degree domestic battering. The court approved this process and, along with the State,

confirmed for defense counsel that the sentencing orders containing the prior convictions

for third-degree domestic battering would not be published to the jury.1

       In a bench conference before the first witness was sworn, the State moved to

introduce exhibits 1 and 2: (1) a February 12, 2010 Pulaski County third-degree domestic-

battering conviction for Ray’s conduct on September 2, 2009; and (2) a November 16, 2012

third-degree domestic-battering conviction for Ray’s conduct on February 28, 2012. Defense

counsel renewed his motion to preclude admission of the prior convictions “during the

innocence/guilt portion of the trial” and to try the case in three stages, but the circuit court

denied the motion and received exhibits 1 and 2. The State then told the jury the following:

       Ok - on September 9th — I mean, on September 2nd of 2009, the defendant
       was convicted of domestic battery in the third degree, Class A Misdemeanor in
       Pulaski County. . . .

       On February 28 of 2012 the defendant was convicted of domestic battery in the
       third degree, Class A misdemeanor in Pulaski County.

(Emphasis added.) Thus, instead of presenting the jury with the dates on which Ray’s prior

conduct “occurred,” as required by section 5-26-303(a)(5)(B), the State erroneously informed

the jury of the dates of Ray’s “convictions.”

       1
        On appeal, the State concedes in its brief that the circuit court “noted that those
exhibits could not be published to the jury.”

                                                5
       At the close of the State’s case-in-chief, Ray moved for a directed verdict on each

charge. He asserted, among other things, that the State failed to prove to the jury the dates

on which Ray’s prior domestic-battering offenses had occurred:

       They must show . . . Ray has been convicted on two previous occasions of
       battery against a family or household member in Arkansas and these acts of
       battery occurred within 10 years of July 30th of 2019. They haven’t. All we
       have are convictions from 2009 and 2012. We do not know when the alleged
       acts of battery occurred with one of them being in 2009 and this offense July
       30th of 2019, how could we even say or speculate the actual acts of domestic
       battery occurred within 10 years of July 30, 2019? . . . They have to show the
       acts. What were the acts, not the convictions.

In response, the State asserted that exhibits 1 and 2 had been introduced into evidence and

both reflected the dates on which the prior offenses occurred: September 2, 2009, and

February 28, 2012. Defense counsel disagreed, and the following exchange ensued:

       STATE:               . . . I wrote down exactly what I was going to say to not
                            get sideways on this, and I wrote September 2nd, the date
                            of occurrence, 2009, the defendant was convicted of
                            domestic battery. I mean I read the dates of occurrence
                            into the record.

       THE COURT: And they were admitted.

       DEFENSE:             I personally believe she said the word, conviction, but the
                            record will speak for itself because I was listening as well.

       THE COURT:           All right, it will be denied. The motion for directed
                            verdict will be denied.

At the close of all the evidence, Ray renewed his motion for directed verdict, and the circuit

court denied it.

                                              6
       In the State’s case, there was no evidence presented to the jury of when Ray’s prior

conduct occurred. Rather, the jury heard only the erroneous characterization of when Ray’s

“convictions” occurred. The State concedes on appeal that when reading the sentencing

orders to the jury, the prosecuting attorney “misread” them and “misspoke.” Furthermore,

the jury never received exhibits 1 and 2 pursuant to the circuit court’s pretrial ruling. The

jury was left to speculate as to when the conduct occurred that resulted in Ray’s September

2, 2009, and February 28, 2012, “convictions,” which is an explicit and essential element

required by the plain language of section 5-26-303(a)(5)(B). Accordingly, because the State

failed to prove Ray has on two previous occasions been convicted of any act of battery or

aggravated assault for conduct that occurred within ten years preceding the commission of

the current offense against a family or household member, we hold that the circuit court

erred in denying his motions for directed verdict on the first-degree domestic-battering

charge.

       The State contends that despite the failure to present proof to the jury of the first-

degree domestic battering in its case, the State “clarified” the matter in closing argument.

We note that in its closing argument, the State continued to refer to the incorrect dates of

Ray’s “convictions” and did not mention the dates of his prior domestic-battering conduct.

Defense counsel recognized this, and in his closing remarks argued that the State had failed

to prove the dates on which the previous domestic-battering conduct had occurred. The

State, in rebuttal, made the following argument:

                                             7
       [Defense counsel] made a point that you didn’t know when the offense had
       occurred within 10 years. The State has submitted as State’s Exhibit No. 1 and
       2 but you won’t get to go back with these, but they were submitted to the Court. They
       have a date of offense on here that I read to you guys, which was February 28th
       of 2012, he committed an act of domestic battery in the third degree. . . .

              On the other certified prior, it also gave a date of offense. That is
       September 2nd of 2009. We have proven to you by these priors that he had
       committed two prior offenses of domestic battery within 10 years. Those acts
       did occur.

(Emphasis added.)

       Closing remarks of attorneys are not evidence, and the jurors were instructed that the

State’s remarks were not evidence. AMI Crim. 2d 101(f). Moreover, closing argument was

not the time for the State to correct its failure of proof. Under Arkansas Code Annotated

section 16-89-111(a) (Repl. 2013), the State was required to present the trier of fact with all

evidence necessary to support the elements of the charge of first-degree domestic battering

in its case-in-chief. Failing that, the court could, “for good reason, in furtherance of justice,”

authorize the State to present evidence on its original case after it rested. Ark. Code Ann. §

16-89-111(c). The State never reopened its case.

       These statutory mechanisms are complemented by Arkansas Rule of Criminal

Procedure 33.1, which dictates the timing of and manner for moving for directed verdict.

One of the reasons Rule 33.1(a) requires a motion for directed verdict to be specific is to

allow deficiencies in the proof to be identified so that the State may, as section 16-89-111(c)

provides, supply the missing proof if the court finds it to be warranted. Pinell v. State, 364

Ark. 353, 357, 219 S.W.3d 168, 171 (2005). The rule is clear, moreover, that motions for

                                                8
directed verdict specifying evidentiary deficiencies in the State’s case—and hence any effort

by the State to reopen the record to supply missing proof—must be made promptly at the

close of the State’s case-in-chief and at the close of all the evidence. The State made no effort

to correct the deficiency in its proof, even though the deficiency was brought to its attention

in Ray’s timely directed-verdict motions at the close of the State’s case-in-chief and again at

the close of all the proof.

       Our inquiry does not end there, however. When the proof offered supports a

conviction on a lesser-included offense, this court may reduce the punishment to the

maximum for the lesser offense, reduce it to the minimum for the lesser offense, or choose

something in between, depending on the circumstances. Tigue v. State, 319 Ark. 147, 152–

53, 889 S.W.2d 760, 762 (1994); see also Smith v. State, 352 Ark. 92, 98 S.W.3d 433 (2003);

Inskeep v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 135, 484 S.W.3d 709.

       Ray does not argue that the proof is insufficient to support a conviction for the lesser-

included offense of third-degree domestic battering, which, as the first element of the

charged offense, the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt. A person commits the offense

of third-degree domestic battering if, with the purpose of causing physical injury to a family

or household member, he or she causes physical injury to a family or household member.

Ark. Code Ann. § 5-26-305(a)(1). A person acts purposely with respect to his or her conduct

or a result of his or her conduct when it is the person’s conscious object to engage in conduct

of that nature or to cause the result. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-202 (Repl. 2013). The law

presumes that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of his or her acts.

                                               9
Spight v. State, 101 Ark. App. 400, 402, 278 S.W.3d 599, 600–01 (2008). Physical injury

means impairment of physical condition or the infliction of substantial pain, bruising,

swelling, or visible marks associated with trauma. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-26-302(2) (Supp.

2021). And finally, a spouse is a family or household member. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-26-302(2)

(Supp. 2021).

       Hester’s testimony established that she and Ray were married and lived together at

the time of the attack; thus, she was a member of Ray’s household. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-1-

102(14). She said when he arrived home that night, he woke her and began arguing with

her. He subsequently took her by her hair, threw her to the ground, straddled her, hit or

kicked her in the back of her head, strangled her with a phone cord, plunged her face into

water and the dog-food bowl, and threatened to kill her “once and for all.” She said she

fought him off and called the police, who took multiple photographs that showed some of

her physical injuries, including marks associated with trauma on her neck. She further

testified that she suffered lasting injuries, including permanent scarring on her neck, a

damaged vocal cord, and brain injuries.

       We hold that substantial evidence supports a conviction on the lesser-included

offense of third-degree domestic battering. Accordingly, we modify Ray’s sentence to one

year of imprisonment, the maximum statutory sentence, Ark. Code Ann. § 5-26-305(b)(1)

(Supp. 2021); Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-401(b)(1) (Repl. 2013), to run concurrently with his

fifteen-year sentences for first-degree terroristic threatening and aggravated assault.

                         IV. Habitual-Offender Sentencing Enhancement

                                               10
        For his next point on appeal, Ray argues that the circuit court erred in applying the

habitual-offender sentencing-enhancement statute, pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated

section 5-4-501(d), to his first-degree domestic-battering conviction. In light of our holding

that insufficient evidence supports Ray’s first-degree domestic-battering conviction, we hold

that Ray’s challenge to the habitual-offender sentencing enhancement for that conviction is

moot.

                                         V. Trifurcation2

        On the morning of trial, Ray moved to preclude the admission of his prior

convictions “during the innocence/guilt portion” of his trial for first-degree domestic

battering claiming it would be overly prejudicial. He requested that his case be trifurcated—

tried in three stages. First, he asserted that there should be a finding of guilt by the fact-finder

on the current domestic-battering offense. If there was a finding of guilt, then the circuit

court would decide whether the two prior convictions for domestic battering met the

requirements set forth in section 5-26-303(a)(5)(B). If so, the court would then proffer the

prior convictions to the jury at the close of the evidence. Relying on this court’s holding in

Crayton v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 110, 543 S.W.3d 544, the circuit court denied Ray’s motion.

        On appeal, Ray argues that the circuit court erred by denying his motion to trifurcate

the proceedings. Ray reasserts his argument that it was unfairly prejudicial for the State to

        2
         Although we have determined that the evidence was insufficient to sustain Ray’s
conviction for first-degree domestic battering, we address his trifurcation argument because
it alleges trial error that is relevant to the conviction for the lesser-included offense of third-
degree domestic battering that we have imposed.

                                                11
introduce prior convictions for domestic battering in the same stage of trial in which it must

prove the current offense of domestic battering3 and that trifurcation is similar to what is

required in DWI trials that involve proof of multiple prior convictions.

       We cannot say that the circuit court erred in denying Ray’s motion to trifurcate. First,

Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-97-101 establishes a bifurcated procedure that “shall

govern jury trials which include any felony charges.” Ark. Code Ann. § 16-97-101(1)–(3)

(Repl. 2016). This statute provides for a guilt phase and a penalty phase. Daniels v. State, 322

Ark. 367, 375, 908 S.W.2d 638, 641 (1995). It does not contain a mechanism for further

separating the guilt phase of trial as to each element of an offense.

       Second, Crayton also supports the circuit court’s denial of Ray’s motion to trifurcate.

In Crayton, the appellant argued that the circuit court erred by admitting evidence of the

previous domestic-battering convictions during the guilt phase of his trial and by using the

Arkansas model jury instruction, AMI Crim. 2d 2610, on first-degree domestic battering.

2018 Ark. App. 110, at 1, 543 S.W.3d at 545. This court specifically held that the previous

convictions were elements of first-degree domestic battering, not a sentence enhancement,

and that the circuit court correctly admitted evidence of those elements in the guilt phase of

       3
        Ray’s argument is confined to the conviction for first-degree domestic battering. He
makes no argument on appeal, and made none below, regarding the joinder of the other
offenses for which he was tried with the first-degree domestic-battering charge. If an appellant
does not file a motion to sever under Rule 22.1(a) of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal
Procedure and does not otherwise object to the joining of charges, the issue is waived.
Thompson v. State, 338 Ark. 564, 569–70, 999 S.W.2d 192, 195–96 (1999).

                                              12
the appellant’s trial. Id. at 4–5, 543 S.W.3d at 547. This court further observed that the

model jury instruction supported the circuit court’s decision to require proof of the prior

convictions in the guilt phase. Id. at 5, 543 S.W.3d at 547.

       The model jury instruction provides that the jury will be instructed on both elements

of section 5-26-303(a)(5), together, in the guilt phase of trial. AMI Crim. 2d 2610. Crayton

held that the prior-conviction element in section 5-26-303(a)(5)(B) is not a sentencing

enhancement but is an element that forms the substantive offense of first-degree domestic

battering that is properly proved in the guilt phase. Neither Crayton, nor section 5-26-

303(a)(5), nor the applicable jury instruction supports Ray’s argument for trifurcated

proceedings.

       The procedure in DWI cases does not support Ray’s argument for trifurcation. In

DWI jury trials, the guilt and sentencing stages are bifurcated, not trifurcated. In contrast

with the first-degree domestic-battering statute, the statute defining the substantive offense

for DWI contains no prior-conviction element and is separate from the DWI sentencing

statute, which requires proof of prior DWI convictions. Ark. Code Ann. §§ 5-65-103 and -

111 (Supp. 2021). In these cases, the jury first determines, in the guilt phase of trial, whether

the defendant committed the offense of DWI. If the defendant is found guilty, the jury then

determines the number of prior DWI convictions in the sentencing phase.

       Although our supreme court has held that prior DWI convictions are elements of the

crime of DWI, fourth offense, it has made it clear that proof of earlier DWI offenses is not

appropriate until the sentencing phase of a DWI trial. State v. Sola, 354 Ark. 76, 87, 118

                                               13
S.W.3d 95, 101 (2003). In Sola, the supreme court expressly stated that “the State need not

prove a defendant’s [previous] DWI offenses to determine his guilt.” Id. at 88, 118 S.W.3d

at 101. “It is not until the sentencing phase of the trial that the State need show the earlier

offenses for purposes of sentencing under § 5-65-111(b)(3) for multiple offenses.” Id. Unlike

DWI convictions, whether Ray committed two prior domestic-battering convictions for

conduct that occurred in the past ten years was an element of the offense of first-degree

domestic battering for the guilt phase of trial, not the sentencing phase. Ark. Code Ann. §

5-26-303(a)(5); Clayton, supra. Therefore, the sentencing procedure applicable to DWI cases

does not apply to the instant case and does not support the trifurcation procedure Ray seeks.

       Finally, we note Ray’s reliance on Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997), a

decision in which the defendant’s offer to stipulate to the fact of a prior conviction, which

was conclusive evidence of the prior-conviction element the government had to prove,

rendered the government’s introduction of additional relevant—but unnecessary—evidence

about the conviction unduly prejudicial under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.

The holding in Old Chief is limited to federal cases involving an element requiring proof of

only felon status, such as in felon-in-possession cases. Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 183 n.7, 190–

91. Our supreme court adopted Old Chief’s rationale in Ferguson v. State and similarly limited

its application to proof of felon status. 362 Ark. 547, 555, 210 S.W.3d 53, 57 (2005). It

stated that “[c]ircuit courts still have discretion to admit evidence concerning the nature of

a conviction if it is relevant to an issue in the case other than the defendant’s status as a

convicted felon.” Id. at 553, 210 S.W.3d at 56. The question before this court does not

                                              14
involve a defendant’s offer to stipulate to an essential element involving only his status as a

felon, as in Old Chief and Ferguson. Therefore, the rationale of these cases does not support

Ray’s request for trifurcation.

       Considering the foregoing, we cannot say that the circuit court erred in denying Ray’s

motion to trifurcate and in receiving the State’s prior-conviction evidence in the guilt stage

of the trial. Accordingly, we affirm.

                                        VI. Speedy Trial

       Ray argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to dismiss for violation

of his right to a speedy trial. Rule 28.1 establishes a twelve-month limitation period for trying

a defendant. Ark. R. Crim. P. 28.1 (2023). The time for trial begins to run on the date of

the defendant’s arrest or the filing of the information, whichever occurs first. Ark. R. Crim.

P. 28.2(a); Quackenbush v. State, 2023 Ark. App. 58, at 2, 660 S.W.3d 889, 891. It continues

to run uninterrupted except during any applicable “excluded periods” set forth in Rule 28.3.

Ark. R. Crim. P. 28.1.

       A delay of more than twelve months between the triggering date and the date of trial

constitutes a prima facie violation of the rule. Quackenbush, 2023 Ark. App. 58, at 2, 660

S.W.3d at 892. When a defendant demonstrates a prima facie violation, the burden shifts

to the State to show that the delay was the result of the defendant’s conduct or was otherwise

justified. Id., 660 S.W.3d at 891. A defendant who is not brought to trial in a timely manner

is entitled to dismissal of the charges with an absolute bar to prosecution. Ark. R. Crim. P.

30.1; Quackenbush, 2023 Ark. App. 58, at 2, 660 S.W.3d at 891. On appeal, this court

                                               15
conducts a de novo review to determine whether specific periods of time are excludable.

Quackenbush, 2023 Ark. App. 58, at 2, 660 S.W.3d at 892.

       The record reflects that Ray was arrested on March 9, 2020, and he was not tried

until June 9, 2022. He moved to dismiss on June 8. The filing of a speedy-trial motion to

dismiss tolls the time for trial and establishes the end date for the speedy-trial calculation.

Eagle v. State, 2012 Ark. 371, at 4; Parker v. State, 93 Ark. App. 472, 476, 220 S.W.3d 238,

243 (2005). Therefore, the period of time between March 9, 2020, and June 8, 2022, is 822

days—a prima facie showing of a speedy-trial violation.

       The hearing on Ray’s motion to dismiss for a speedy-trial violation was held on the

morning of trial. Much of the dispute between the parties was due to the closure of the

courthouse due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Ray argued that there were no written orders

or docket entries reflecting that particular window of time would be excluded due to the

courthouse closure. The circuit court stated that it believed the record was clear and that the

parties understood that delays due to COVID-19 would be excluded. Ultimately, the court

found that Ray was brought to trial within 365 days of his arrest and orally denied Ray’s

speedy-trial motion.

       On appeal, Ray concedes that there are several periods of time that are excluded from

the speedy-trial calculation: August 3 to October 4, 2020 (62 days); February 21 to June 7,

2021 (107 days); and November 2, 2021,4 to June 9, 2022 (220 days). However, Ray claims

       4
           Ray’s brief states November 21, but this appears to be a typographical error.

                                                16
that, at most, only 368 of the 822 days were tolled; therefore, the State failed to bring him

to trial within 365 days in violation of his right to a speedy trial. He argues that neither the

court nor the parties understood that some delays were due to the pandemic and that the

court did not sufficiently document delays. Because this court conducts a de novo review on

appeal to determine whether specific periods of time are excludable under the speedy-trial

rules, we discuss each of the relevant periods. Frederick v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 552, at 6, 423

S.W.3d 649, 653.

                                 A. March 9 to August 2, 2020

         After Ray’s arrest on March 9, 2020, his plea-and-arraignment hearing was scheduled

to occur by Zoom videoconference on August 3. Ray, who was out on bond, failed to appear

on August 3, 2020. The 147 days between March 9 and August 2, 2020, are charged to the

State.

                                B. August 3 to October 4, 2020

         Ray failed to appear on August 3, and this started tolling the speedy-trial clock. Ark.

R. Crim. P. 28.3(e) (stating the period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailability

of the defendant is excluded from the speedy-trial calculation). Ray’s plea-and-arraignment

hearing was rescheduled for September 1, and his appointed attorney appeared by Zoom

videoconference. The attorney waived Ray’s in-person appearance, entered a plea of not

guilty on his behalf, and further agreed that speedy trial was tolled from August 3 to October

4 due to the COVID-19 pandemic and closure of the courthouse. The circuit court stated

                                               17
on the record that the time was tolled, and Ray does not contest the exclusion of this period

of sixty-three days.

                         C. October 5, 2020, to February 21, 2021

       At Ray’s plea-and-arraignment hearing on September 1, 2020, the court scheduled

the omnibus hearing for February 22, 2021, and the jury trial for March 9. Although the

courthouse was closed on September 1 due to the COVID-19 pandemic,5 the courthouse

was expected to reopen on October 4. Therefore, when the circuit court initially scheduled

Ray’s trial for March 9, 2021, it was not doing so due to the COVID-19 pandemic or the

closure of the courthouse. Rather, it scheduled the first trial date as “a normal part of the

timeline in criminal trials” to a time when the courthouse was expected to be open.

Quackenbush, 2023 Ark. App. 58, at 7, 660 S.W.3d at 894. Therefore, the delay from October

5, 2020, to March 9, 2021, had nothing to do with the pandemic and was not excludable

under Rule 28.3(h). Id., 660 S.W.3d at 894.6 Speedy-trial time continued to run for the

       5
         Effective July 1, 2020, the Arkansas Supreme Court lifted its previous suspension of
in-person proceedings due to the COVID-19 pandemic, but it did not mandate their
resumption. In re Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic, 2020 Ark. 249, at 2–3 (per curiam).
The resumption of in-person proceedings was left to the discretion of the individual courts,
and the per curiam provided that any delay in proceedings due to precautions against the
COVID-19 pandemic shall presumptively constitute good cause under Arkansas Rule of
Criminal Procedure 28.3(h). Id. at 2–3.
       6
         Although on February 12, 2021, the Arkansas Supreme Court subsequently
reinstated and extended the suspension of jury trials through April 30, 2021, In re Response
to the COVID-19 Pandemic, 2021 Ark. 30 (per curiam), the reinstatement did not apply
retroactively to Ray’s initial March 9, 2021 trial setting when it was made on September 1,
2020. Quackenbush, 2023 Ark. App. 58, at 7, 660 S.W.3d at 894 (per curiam suspending all
in-person proceedings in all courts beginning April 3, 2020, had no effect on the April 3,
2020 setting that was made on February 28, 2020, before the per curiam was issued).

                                             18
period beginning on October 5, 2020, until the next excludable period, which began on

February 22, 2021, which is when Ray failed to appear at the omnibus hearing. Therefore,

the time from October 5, 2020, to February 21, 2021—140 days—is charged to the State.

                               D. February 22 to March 2, 2021

       On February 22, 2021, Ray failed to appear for his omnibus hearing. He next

appeared on March 3. The ten-day period from February 22 to March 2, 2021, is excludable

from the speedy-trial calculation due to Ray’s failure to appear. Ark. R. Crim. P. 28.3(e).

                                E. March 3 to August 30, 2021

       At the March 3 hearing, Ray’s counsel announced that the case was set for trial on

March 9 and that he had advised Ray that speedy trial was going to be tolled because of the

COVID-19 pandemic and the closure of the courthouse pursuant to “the per curiam.” Two

weeks before the March 3 hearing, on February 12, our supreme court issued a per curiam

extending the suspension of jury trials to April 30 due to “a continued high level of COVID-

19 positive tests and hospitalizations.” In re Response to COVID-19 Pandemic, 2021 Ark. 30,

at 1 (per curiam). Pursuant to the per curiam, Ray asked the court to reschedule the omnibus

and jury-trial dates with “[s]peedy trial tolled until the next setting,” and the circuit court did

so, setting Ray’s omnibus hearing date on August 30 and a trial on September 14. Thus, the

record clearly demonstrates that the circuit court rescheduled Ray’s March 9 jury trial to

September 14 due to precautions against the COVID-19 pandemic pursuant to the Arkansas

Supreme Court’s COVID-19 per curiam. However, at the omnibus hearing on August 30,

the State moved for a continuance, which was granted by the circuit court. This ended the

                                                19
time that had been tolling since March 3. Therefore, the time from March 3 to August 30,

2021—180 days—is excluded from the speedy-trial calculation.

                             F. August 31 to November 1, 2021

       After the circuit court granted the State’s motion for a continuance on August 30,

the court rescheduled the September 14 trial to November 2. The time between August 31

and November 1, 2021—sixty-three days—is charged to the State. Romes v. State, 356 Ark. 26,

40, 144 S.W.3d 750, 759 (2004).

                           G. November 2, 2021, to June 8, 2022

       On October 29, 2021, Ray moved for a continuance of his November 2 trial. At a

hearing on November 2, the circuit court granted Ray’s motion and rescheduled the trial for

June 9, 2022, and the record reflects the court confirmed that “[s]peedy trial is tolled” for

this period. The supreme court has held that delays resulting from continuances requested

by the defendant are excluded from the calculation of the speedy-trial period. Dodson v. State,

358 Ark. 372, 382, 191 S.W.3d 511, 517 (2004). Therefore, we hold that the 219-day period

from November 2, 2021, until June 8, 2022, when Ray filed his motion for speedy trial, is

excluded from the speedy-trial computation. Eagle, 2012 Ark. 371, at 4 (holding that the

filing of a speedy-trial motion tolls the time for trial and establishes the end date for the

speedy-trial calculation); Parker, 93 Ark. App. at 476, 220 S.W.3d at 243 (same). Ray does

not contest the exclusion of this period.

                                              20
       In sum, the total time excluded from the speedy-trial equation is 472 days. The total

time charged to the State is 350 days. Because Ray was brought to trial within 365 days, we

affirm the denial of his motion to dismiss on speedy-trial grounds.

                               VII. Admissibility of Photographs

       During Hester’s testimony at trial, the State sought to introduce seven photographs,

five of which depicted her injuries. The photographs showed, among other things, red marks

on her neck that she testified had been caused by the phone cord that Ray had wrapped

around her neck. Hester testified that the photographs fairly and accurately depicted her

injuries on the date of the attack as well as her clothing, the phone cable, and the dog bowls.

The photographs were taken by a police officer, and the State explained that all the

photographs had been printed on cardstock and had not been altered or enhanced. Ray

objected, arguing that Hester could not authenticate the photographs because she was not

the one who had taken the photographs. Ray also asserted that the photographs were

duplicates and inadmissible under Rule 1003 of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence because

they had been printed on glossy card stock and accentuated the purported injuries depicted

in the photographs. The circuit court overruled the objections, and the photographs were

admitted.

       On appeal, Ray concedes that Hester properly authenticated the photographs. But he

reasserts his argument that the photographs were inadmissible as duplicates because they

were on glossy card stock and exaggerated the color of Hester’s skin.

                                              21
       First, we hold that the photographs of which Ray complains are not duplicates.

Arkansas Rule of Evidence 1001(3) (2023) provides that an “original” of a photograph

includes the negative or any print therefrom. If data are stored in a computer or similar

device, any printout or other output readable by sight, shown to reflect the data accurately,

is an “original.” Ark. R. Evid. 1001(3). The State indicated at trial that it merely printed the

photographs on cardstock without altering or enhancing them. Thus, the printouts of the

photographs were “original” under Rule 1001(3).

       However, assuming that the photographs were duplicates, Rule 1003 of the Arkansas

Rule of Evidence provides:

       A duplicate is admissible to the same extent as an original unless (1) a genuine
       question is raised as to the authenticity or continuing effectiveness of the original or
       (2) in the circumstances it would be unfair to admit the duplicate in lieu of the
       original.

Ark. R. Evid. 1003 (2023). The circuit court found that it was not unfair to admit the

photographs. This court will not reverse a circuit court’s decision to admit evidence unless

the court abused its discretion in doing so. Jackson v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 330, at 9, 552

S.W.3d 55, 60. An abuse of discretion requires a showing that the circuit court acted

improvidently, thoughtlessly, or without due consideration. Id., 552 S.W.3d at 60. We

cannot say, in light of Hester’s testimony that the photographs fairly and accurately depicted

their contents, that the circuit court abused its discretion by overruling Ray’s objection.

Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s decision on this point.

                                       VIII. Conclusion

                                              22
       We hold that the evidence was insufficient to support the first-degree domestic-

battering conviction; however, the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction for the lesser-

included offense of third-degree domestic battering. Therefore, we modify Ray’s sentence to

one year in prison to run concurrently with his sentences for first-degree terroristic

threatening and aggravated assault. Our holding related to Ray’s conviction for first-degree

domestic battering renders his challenge to the habitual-offender sentencing-enhancement

statute moot. We affirm all remaining points on appeal.

       Affirmed as modified.

       ABRAMSON, VIRDEN, THYER, and HIXSON, JJ., agree.

       BARRETT, J., dissents.

       STEPHANIE POTTER BARRETT, Judge, dissenting. Appellant Jason Ray appeals his

conviction from the Circuit Court of Pulaski County of one count of first-degree domestic

battering, one count of first-degree terroristic threatening, and one count of aggravated

assault on a family or household member. Ray asserts five points for reversal; however, I must

respectfully dissent from the majority’s modification of his sentence on first-degree domestic

battery based on the sufficiency of the evidence.

       The majority states that to address Ray’s concerns about undue prejudice from the

introduction of the prior domestic-battering convictions, the State said that it would

introduce the sentencing orders for Ray’s prior domestic-battering convictions into evidence

but would not publish the orders to the jury. That is incorrect. On page 78 of the record

transcript, the prosecutor stated, “So, he has one incident from 2009 and one incident from

                                               23
2012. I do have the certified priors for those, so I believe I would just ask to approach and

if they’re going to be admitted as certified priors, then I would just ask that they be admitted

and then publish them to the jury.” She did not ask for a ruling and the court did not make

one. The defense attorney moved the court to trifurcate the proceedings in order to keep

the two prior convictions from the jury until after guilt was established on the current battery

charge. That request was denied. Defense counsel also moved that the court not read from

the criminal information that Ray was charged as having two prior convictions. That request

was also denied as it was an element of the offense. Defense counsel argued that allowing

the jury to know that Ray had twice been convicted of domestic battery would prejudice his

client. The court reiterated that it was an element of the offense that the State had to prove

and that it could not grant his request, stating, “[B]ecause people get up and say, you can’t

talk about it at all because it’s not part of what she has to prove. And then you can move for

a directed verdict and say she didn’t prove this. This is what she’s going to have to prove to

the jury.” The defense attorney responded, “I will not do that.” It turns out, that is exactly

what the defense did. The requests of defense counsel to read and not publish the prior

convictions is tantamount to a stipulation of the prior convictions. With that being said, we

cannot tell from the record whether the documents were published or not. The State clearly

intended to publish them prior to trial. At the time of their introduction, defense counsel

asked, “Just to be clear, I realize that maybe it’s just a term of art, those are not going to be

published to the jury; is that correct?” The court responded, “They are not. They’re just

going to read them.” Defense counsel asked to see the exhibits and then the circuit court

                                               24
entertained a lunch break. After lunch, defense counsel renewed his objection and the

following colloquy occurred:

       PROSECUTOR:           Okay, so at this point, I would ask to admit State’s Exhibit 1 and
                             2. Do I give this to Ms. Poe?

       THE COURT: Yes, give it to Ms. Poe.

       PROSECUTOR:           And then I do intend to -- publish to the jury -- read what we
                             had talked about.

       THE COURT: Yeah, you can read that, then give it to her. Okay.

Clearly, the prosecutor intended at that point to publish to the jury. This exchange took

place AFTER the court initially said that they would not be published. From reading the

transcript, it is unclear whether they were published or not.

       The majority has speculated that the jury did not see the documents and that because

it had not, the motion for directed verdict should have been granted. I disagree. It is not

the function of the appellate court to try to figure out what the jury saw, heard, or paid

attention to, or what their reasoning was in reaching a verdict. It would be impossible to do.

It is well settled that this court can affirm the circuit court when it has reached the right

result, even though it has announced the wrong reason. Sluder v. Steak & Ale of Little Rock,

Inc., 368 Ark. 293, 299, 245 S.W.3d 115, 119 (2006). Similarly, if a jury reached the correct

result, but its reasoning was flawed, we would still affirm. The only difference being that we

do not know a jury’s reasoning as it is not announced. Our responsibility is to review the

record to determine whether there is evidence to support its verdict. There is evidence to

support the jury’s verdict for first-degree domestic battery as State’s exhibits 1 and 2 are the

                                              25
judgment and conviction orders that correctly reflect that the commission date of both

charges is within the ten-year period required.

       The circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying Ray’s directed-verdict

motions as the commission dates of the offenses were introduced and admitted into evidence

as exhibits. Any confusion there might have been regarding the prosecutor’s misstatement

was corrected in closing arguments by the State without objection. Closing arguments must

be confined to questions at issue, the evidence introduced during trial, and all reasonable

inferences and deductions that can be drawn therefrom. Leaks v. State, 339 Ark. 348, 5

S.W.3d 448 (1999). The essence of a closing argument is to afford counsel the opportunity

to focus attention on those factual matters developed during the trial, as well as the

instructions that tend to support counsel’s theory of the case. This is, indeed, the most

propitious moment for counsel to stress those things that he wants the jury to see and hear.

See Powell v. Sears & Roebuck, 268 Ark. 1093, 598 S.W.2d 449 (1980). Furthermore, we have

held that a prosecutor is not barred from reading from evidence during closing argument.

See, e.g., Wright v. State, 2022 Ark. App. 381, 653 S.W.3d 803; Tyler v. State, 2021 Ark. App.

23, at 7, 616 S.W.3d 663, 667.

       It is important to note that the record shows that the prosecutor asked the court for

exhibits 1–3, which were the judgment and conviction orders, and received them before she

began her closing. Prosecutors often hold up exhibits or place them on projectors for the

jury to see even if the words “may I publish to the jury?” are not spoken and transcribed into

the record. We know that the exhibits were not allowed to go back with the jury, a clear

                                             26
error because they contained proof that was an element of the charge, but we do not know

whether the jury saw the exhibits or reasoned that the offense dates must be within ten years

or the court would not have allowed them into evidence because otherwise, they would be

inadmissible irrelevant evidence. Because we do not know what the jury saw, heard, or paid

attention to, we rely on the record to determine whether substantial evidence exists to

support the jury's verdict. The record does so support.

       As the majority points out, closing remarks of attorneys are not evidence. The

prosecutor’s statements regarding the commission dates are not evidence. The evidence is

the judgment and commitment orders, which contain the commission dates. Those were

not introduced in closing arguments, but closing arguments pointed out to the jury relevant

evidence contained in the exhibits that represent sufficient evidence that an element of the

offense has been proved. Whenever trial counsel argues matters that are beyond the record

and states facts or makes assertions not supported by any evidence that are prejudicial to the

opposite party, there is clearly error. Walker v. State, 138 Ark. 517, 212 S.W. 319 (1919);

McElroy v. State, 106 Ark. 131, 152 S.W. 1019 (1913); Willyard v. State, 72 Ark. 138, 78 S.W.

765 (1904); Fakes v. State, 112 Ark. 589, 166 S.W. 96 (1914). That is not the case here.

       In this case, the record supports the conviction because the judgment and conviction

orders of prior convictions listing the occurrence dates within the past ten years are in the

record.

                                             27
       When the facts of this case are viewed in the light most favorable to the State, this

court should affirm the denial of Ray’s motions for directed verdict and find that there was

sufficient evidence to support the conviction.

       I would affirm on all five points.

       James Law Firm, by: William O. “Bill” James, Jr., and Drew Curtis, for appellant.

       Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Brooke Jackson Gasaway, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.

                                              28