Court Opinion

ID: 9791231
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:07:53.326756+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:34.994627
License: Public Domain

BRYNER, Chief Judge,
with whom SINGLETON, J., joins, concurring.
I agree with the majority opinion’s basic rationale in affirming the superior court’s dismissal order. However, I am concerned that the opinion may be misleading in the undue prominence it gives to decisions that dwell on whether and to what extent a court has the power to direct the prosecution to confer immunity on potential defense witnesses.
The state has mistakenly attempted to characterize the central issue in this case as whether Judge Rowland had the inherent power to order the state to immunize R.E. In support of its contention that Judge Rowland did not have such power, the state marshals strong, if not compelling, authority for the proposition that decisions involving witness immunity lie within the exclusive province of the executive branch of government. In comparison, the case law to the contrary — which the majority opinion discusses at length and relies on unnecessarily — appears to be relatively unconvincing and of questionable validity.
For purposes of deciding this case, however, I think we may assume that there is no inherent judicial authority to immunize a potential defense witness, to direct the state to confer immunity, or to order dis*1076missal as a sanction for the state’s failure to do so.
Judge Rowland did not purport to have inherent authority to immunize R.E. To the contrary, he apparently assumed that he had no such authority. Likewise, Judge Rowland never directed the state to grant immunity to R.E. and said nothing to support the conclusion that he believed himself empowered to command the state to do so. Furthermore, at no point did Judge Rowland say anything to indicate that he dismissed Echols' charges in order to sanction the state for wrongfully refusing to grant immunity. In context, then, the question of judicial authority to compel immunity for defense witnesses is a red herring.1
The simple and exclusive basis for Judge Rowland’s dismissal order was his conclusion that, under the unique circumstances of the present case, it would have been fundamentally unfair to subject Echols to the possibility of conviction on the disputed charges given the absence of R.E.’s exculpatory testimony. Thus, the only question that need be decided here is whether Judge Rowland abused his discretion in concluding, under Criminal Rule 43(c), that dismissal was necessary in furtherance of justice.2
The state gives only cursory attention to this issue in its briefs. Relying primarily on State v. Carlson, 555 P.2d 269 (Alaska 1976), and State v. Jones, 751 P.2d 1379 (Alaska App.1988), the state describes the court’s power to dismiss in furtherance of justice as “extremely limited” and puts forth the conclusory assertion that Judge Rowland abused his discretion in exercising his authority under Rule 43(c) in this case.
This court has previously indicated that, while authority to dismiss in furtherance of justice is not unlimited, “Criminal Rule 43 vests the trial court with broad discretion to dismiss_” Jones, 751 P.2d at 1382. The decisions of this court and the supreme court have restricted trial court discretion to dismiss under Rule 43(c) in only two types of situations, neither of which is apposite here.
*1077In Carlson, 555 P.2d at 271-72, the Alaska Supreme Court held that the superior court’s authority to dismiss in furtherance of justice under Rule 43(c) did not empower the court to engage in charge bargaining with the defendant, over the objections of the state. Carlson is in keeping with similar decisions reached in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., People v. Orin, 13 Cal.3d 937, 120 Cal.Rptr. 65, 71-72, 533 P.2d 193, 199-200 (1975); People v. Panibianci, 134 Misc.2d 274, 510 N.Y.S.2d 801, 803 (Sup.1986); State ex rel. Powell v. Shi, 566 P.2d 1170, 1171-72 (Ok.Crim.App.1977). To similar effect are cases which conclude that the power to dismiss in furtherance of justice does not allow a court to invade the prosecution’s traditionally exclusive authority to determine which charges to bring and how to allocate its resources. See, e.g., People v. Andrade, 86 Cal.App.3d 963, 150 Cal.Rptr. 662, 669 (1978); State v. Fleck, 269 N.W.2d 736, 737 (Minn.1978); State v. Wilke, 28 Wash.App. 590, 624 P.2d 1176, 1179 (1981).
In Jones, 751 P.2d at 1382, this court held that dismissal in furtherance of justice under Rule 43(c) was impermissible when ordered in response to state action that did not result in actual prejudice to the defendant. Again, this holding accords with case law from other jurisdictions indicating that the power to dismiss in furtherance of justice is meant to be used on a case-by-case basis as a remedy for actual unfairness suffered by the accused. See, e.g., People v. Peinado, 67 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 136 Cal.Rptr. 845, 850 (1976); State v. Shepherd, 21 Or.App. 52, 533 P.2d 353, 354-55 (1975); City of Seattle v. Orwick, 113 Wash.2d 823, 784 P.2d 161, 165 (1989); State v. Cochran, 51 Wash.App. 116, 751 P.2d 1194, 1198 (1988); State v. Long, 32 Wash.App. 732, 649 P.2d 845, 847 (1982).
Nothing in these cases suggests, however, that discretion to dismiss in furtherance of justice under Rule 43(c) must be restricted as a matter of law when, as in this case, the judge concludes in the course of trial that a conviction would be fundamentally unfair because of the unavailability of crucial exculpatory evidence. The issue presented is thus whether, under the totality of the circumstances, Judge Rowland abused his broad discretion in deciding to dismiss the disputed charges.
Judge Rowland expressly found R.E.’s proposed testimony to be of crucial exculpatory value, a finding that appears to be amply supported by the record.3 A strong argument could be made that a dismissal under Rule 43(c) would not have been justified absent some state participation in R.E.’s unavailability. See, e.g., People v. Mejia, 57 Cal.App.3d 574, 129 Cal.Rptr. 192, 197 (1976); State v. Adams, 86 Or.App. 139, 738 P.2d 988, 991 (1987); State v. Dailey, 93 Wash.2d 454, 610 P.2d 357, 359 (1980). Here, however, the state was inextricably involved in the circumstances that led R.E. to invoke her privilege not to testify. Indeed, the record establishes that the prosecution consistently did everything in its power to avail itself of R.E.’s testimony when it appeared likely to be favorable and to assure that the testimony would not be heard when it appeared likely to be unfavorable. Given the extent of the state’s involvement in this case, it was not necessary for Judge Rowland to find that the state’s actions were “evil, venal or dishonest.” Cochran, 751 P.2d at 1198. See also Mejia, 129 Cal.Rptr. at 196-97.
It is also arguable that dismissal under Rule 43(c) would have amounted to an abuse of discretion if the prejudice to Echols could have been cured by some lesser measure, such as a mistrial. See, e.g., *1078Peinado, 136 Cal.Rptr. at 850-51; State v. Laureano, 101 Wash.2d 745, 682 P.2d 889, 900 (1984); Dailey, 610 P.2d at 360; State v. Burri, 550 P.2d 507, 513 (Wash.1976). Given the apparent finality of the state’s decision not to confer immunity on R.E., however, Judge Rowland had no reason to believe that the unfairness stemming from her unavailability would be cured upon retrial if a mistrial were granted.
In short, considering the totality of the circumstances in the present case, there appears to be no basis for concluding that Judge Rowland abused his discretion in ordering dismissal in furtherance of justice under Alaska Criminal Rule 43(c). To the extent that this conclusion represents the core holding of the majority opinion, I agree with it.

. Judge Rowland was, of course, aware that the prejudice stemming from R.E.’s unavailability would have been cured had the state elected to grant her immunity. Accordingly, the judge appropriately refrained from ordering dismissal until the state had made its final decision not to grant immunity. In the absence of some action to compel the state to confer immunity or some indication that the dismissal amounted to a sanction for the state’s wrongful withholding of immunity, Judge Rowland’s recognition that, as a practical matter, the state had the authority to make R.E. available did not amount to a judicial incursion into executive branch powers.

. Alaska Criminal Rule 43(c) provides:
(c) In Furtherance of Justice. The court may, either on its own motion or upon the application of the prosecuting attorney, and in furtherance of justice, order an action, after indictment or waiver of indictment, to be dismissed. The reasons for the dismissal shall be set forth in the order.
Alaska Criminal Rule 43(c) was apparently adopted by the Alaska Supreme Court from former ACLA, Code of Criminal Procedure § 66-18-16 (1948) which was in turn derived without change from CLA, Code of Criminal Procedure § 5443 (1933); CLA Code of Criminal Procedure § 2370 (1913); and The Laws of Alaska, Code of Criminal Procedure § 261 (T. Carter ed. 1900). The Alaska code is derived, in part, from the pre-1900 laws of Oregon and New York. See Andreanoff v. State, 746 P.2d 473, 475 n. 2 (Alaska App.1987). The Oregon predecessor was Oregon Laws § 323, October 19, 1864, as recorded in Hills Annotated Laws of Oregon, Criminal Procedure § 1527 (2d ed. 1892). The current statute, Oregon Revised Statute § 135.755 (1989), mirrors Alaska Criminal Rule 43(c).
Under federal law, there is no provision comparable to Alaska Criminal Rule 43(c) authorizing dismissal in furtherance of justice. Consequently, federal courts exercise an extremely restricted range of implied supervisory authority and do not recognize any inherent power to dismiss in furtherance of justice. See, e.g., United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1309 (9th Cir.1977). The federal cases dealing with compelled witness immunity must be understood in this context. When potential defense witnesses refuse to provide exculpatory testimony, federal courts, because they lack authority to dismiss in furtherance of justice, are empowered to dismiss, or to threaten to dismiss, only if they are willing to assume the existence of some inherent power to order immunity or some prosecu-torial duty to confer immunity. The question of inherent judicial authority to require immunity is one which, in turn, poses substantial separation of powers problems. Because Alaska Criminal Rule 43(c), affirmatively grants authority to dismiss in furtherance of justice, no separation of powers problems arise. See, e.g., State v. Sonneland, 80 Wash.2d 343, 494 P.2d 469, 473 (1972).

. The state challenges Judge Rowland's assessment of the importance of this evidence, arguing that R.E. would not have been of material exculpatory value because she would have testified only as to W.E.’s credibility. This argument is specious because it ignores the distinction between general credibility and specific evidence of falsehood. At trial, W.E. denied being abused by Echols and testified that she had fabricated her prior claims of abuse. Proof of Echols’ guilt depended primarily on W.E.’s prior statements. R.E., while not a witness to the alleged abuse, was a direct witness (and, indeed, by her own account and that of W.E., an instigator) of the purportedly falsified charges that W.E. originally made. R.E.’s confirmation of W.E.’s trial testimony could thus have been of crucial value to the jury. Judge Rowland did not abuse his discretion in so finding.