Court Opinion

ID: 9830642
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 20:20:56.684259+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:25.158134
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
The Constitution and statutes divide into two classes those who are liable for the debts of defunct state banks. In the first class are those who are stockholders at the time of the bank’s collapse; in the second class are former stockholders who have disposed of their stock within 12 months of the date of the collapse. Those in the first class are liable for debts owing the bank át the time of the collapse; those in the second class are liable for debts owing at the time of the transfer of their stock. If at the time of such transfer the bank is solvent, those in the second class cannot be held liable in any event. The questions of the solvency of the bank at such dates, of the necessity of an assessment, and of the requisite amount of the assessment, are determinable by the commissioner, and his action thereon is conclusive, and cannot be questioned in a proceeding brought by him to enforce the liability of'the stockholders. But we do not understand that the determination by the commissioner that a person is a stockholder is conclusive against one who is not in fact a stockholder. If he had this power of absolute adjudication, then he could hale any person into court and subject him to liability in a transaction to which he was a total stranger. So, if appellee had never owned stock in the bank, the commissioner could not render her liable by simply including her among those assessed. To render her liable in his proceeding to enforce liability, he must show that she is a stockholder in the bank, or that, not being a present stockholder, she had owned stock within the 12-month period, and had transferred such stock during the period of the bank’s insolvency. If she had transferred her- stock more than' 12 months before the collapse, she would not be liable, and the action of the commissioner in including her among those assessed could not be given the effect of rendering her liable; nor would his act render her liable if the bank was free from debt at the time she transferred her stock, although such transfer was within the 12-month period.
In deference to the decision in the case of Chapman v. Beeman, 265 S. W. 243, we held that appellee transferred her stock in good faith in June, 1921, preceding the bank’s suspension in the following March, 1922. If the bank owed debts at the time she transferred her stock, she was liable under the assessment, but she was not liable, if there were no debts then. The commissioner alleged in' his petition that she owned her stock in January, 1922, and that the bank was in debt at that time. But the proof showed that she did not own any stock in January, 1922, but had transferred her stock in June, 1921, and there were no allegations or proof that the bank was then in debt. We have simply held in the original disposition of the appeal that it was incumbent upon the commissioner to show that appellee transferred her stock within the 12-month period, and at a time when the bank was in debt. There being no such showing, the commissioner could not recover. We adhere to this holding, and overrule appellant’s motion for rehearing.