Court Opinion

ID: 9565902
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:29:55.155186+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:16.957061
License: Public Domain

Deen, Presiding Judge.
The appellant, William Wise, injured his left elbow during his employment as a captain of the appellee’s fire department, and received workers’ compensation benefits. Eventually, he returned to work, but he continued to experience pain and stiffness in the injured elbow; his treating physician recommended a change to light work, and the appellee consequently offered to employ Wise as a radio dispatcher for the appellee’s police department. This shift would have involved a salary reduction, but the appellee also indicated that it would pay Wise temporary partial disability benefits and transfer him back to the fire department when he was physically able to return to normal duty. Wise refused this offer of light duty, because it would have required giving up a part-time job at a bank that he had been able to maintain with the work schedule of the fire department (on 24 hours, off 48 hours). Even including receipt of temporary partial disability benefits, the proposed job transfer to the police department would have resulted in an income reduction of $163 per week.
When Wise refused the police department dispatcher job, the appellee suspended all benefits, and the administrative law judge denied Wise’s claim for recommencement of disability income benefits. The full board, however, reversed, after finding that the police dispatcher job was not suitable employment and that Wise had been justified in refusing it. The superior court in turn found as a matter of law that the light duty job offered to Wise was suitable employment, and reversed the full board. We granted this discretionary appeal, and reverse the superior court.
OCGA § 34-9-240 provides that “[i]f an injured employee refuses employment procured for him and suitable to his capacity, he shall not be entitled to any compensation at any time during the continuance of such refusal unless in the opinion of the board such refusal was justified.” In Clark v. Ga. Kraft Co., 178 Ga. App. 884, 885 (345 SE2d 61) (1986), this court emphasized that “the board is vested with *560a broad discretion in determining whether proffered employment is refused justifiably.” In Clark, this court found no abuse of discretion in the board’s determination that the employee justifiably refused proffered employment that presented no challenge or opportunity for advancement. Similarly, we find no abuse of discretion in the board’s determination of that issue in the instant case. Cf. McDaniel v. Roper Corp., 149 Ga. App. 864 (256 SE2d 146) (1979).
Decided April 19, 1990
Rehearing denied May 9, 1990

Judgment reversed.

Pope, J., concurs. Beasley, J., concurs specially.