Court Opinion

ID: 9838493
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-06 16:08:26.576564+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:35.739154
License: Public Domain

J-S24031-23

                                   2023 PA Super 160

  VICTOR TAYLOR                                :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellant               :
                                               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  KAREEM SMITH                                 :   No. 368 MDA 2023

                Appeal from the Order Entered March 1, 2023
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County Civil Division at
                         No(s): FC-2021,20728-CU

BEFORE:      BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                    FILED: SEPTEMBER 6, 2023

       Victor Taylor (“Father”) appeals from the order dated and entered March

1, 2023, awarding shared legal and physical custody of K.J. (“Child”), a male

child born in April of 2020, to him and Kareem Smith, the nonbiological father

who stood in loco parentis to Child. After a careful review, we affirm.

       Child was born to S.J. (“Mother”).          At the time, Mother was in a

relationship with Mr. Smith.        Mr. Smith thought he was Child’s father and

raised Child with Mother until Mother’s death in May of 2021.         See N.T.,

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S24031-23

2/7/23, at 79-82. Thereafter, on July 12, 2021, it was confirmed that Father

is Child’s biological father.1 See id. at 12, 14.

       On August 17, 2021, Father filed a complaint for custody against Mr.

Smith seeking sole legal and physical custody of Child. Then, as set forth by

the trial court,

       [o]n September 30, 2021, March 1, 2022, and April 26, 2022, the
       parties engaged in custody conferences to establish a plan to
       permit Father to be introduced into Child’s life….Those
       conferences finally resulted in the [o]rder dated April 29, 2022,
       [(“interim custody order”)], which provided for shared legal
       custody and shared physical custody on a 50/50 basis.[2]

Trial Court Opinion, 3/7/23, at 1 (footnote added).         Throughout these

proceedings, Mr. Smith was found to be in loco parentis with respect to Child.3

See id.

____________________________________________

1 We glean from the record that Father sought court approval to perform a

paternity test.    Mr. Smith does not dispute Father’s paternity.   See N.T.,
2/7/23, at 12.

2  Specifically, the interim custody order, which was entered by agreement,
provided for shared physical custody following a 2/2/5/5 schedule. Order,
filed 4/29/22.

3 In K.W. v. S.L., 157 A.3d 498 (Pa.Super. 2017), this Court stated:

       “The term in loco parentis literally means ‘in the place of a
       parent.’” Peters v. Costello, 586 Pa. 102, 891 A.2d 705, 710
       (2005) (citing Black’s Law Dictionary, 791 (7th Ed. 1991)). A
       person stands in loco parentis with respect to a child when he
       “assum[es] the obligations incident to the parental relationship
       without going through the formality of a legal adoption. The
       status of in loco parentis embodies two ideas; first, the
       assumption of a parental status, and, second, the discharge of
       parental duties.” Id. (quoting T.B. v. L.R.M., 567 Pa. 222, 786
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       The trial court conducted a hearing on February 7, 2023. Father and

Mr. Smith each testified on their own behalf. In addition, Father presented

the testimony of his live-in girlfriend, V.C., and Mr. Smith recalled Father as

on cross-examination.4, 5 Father reiterated his request for sole legal and

physical custody. See N.T., 2/7/23, at 28, 35-36, 43. Mr. Smith, however,

requested the trial court maintain shared legal and physical custody. See id.

at 83, 99.

____________________________________________

     A.2d 913, 916–17 (2001)). Critical to our discussion here, “in loco
     parentis status cannot be achieved without the consent and
     knowledge of, and in disregard of[,] the wishes of a parent.” E.W.
     v. T.S., 916 A.2d 1197, 1205 (Pa.Super. 2007).
K.W., 157 A.3d at 504-05 (citation omitted). Father does not challenge Mr.
Smith’s in loco parentis status.

4 Father also marked and admitted two exhibits during this hearing, including

a photograph of Child. See N.T., 2/7/23, at 17, 59-60. While not included
with the certified record, we do not find this omission detrimental to our
review. We, however, stress and remind counsel, “[an] [a]ppellant has the
responsibility to make sure that the record forwarded to an appellate court
contains those documents necessary to allow a complete and judicious
assessment of the issues raised on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Wint, 730
A.2d 965 (Pa.Super. 1999). See Pa.R.A.P. 1921 Note (stating, “Ultimate
responsibility for a complete record rests with the party raising an issue that
requires appellate court access to record materials.”) (citation omitted)).
       Further, despite references to the lack of notes of testimony for this
hearing at the time of the submission of the briefs and reproduced record, we
observe that notes of testimony were submitted as a supplement to the
certified record and, therefore, available to this Court for review.

5 Due to Child’s young age, the trial court did not speak with Child.   See N.T.,
2/7/23, at 6.

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       By order dated and entered March 1, 2023, the trial court memorialized

its findings and maintained the interim order awarding the parties shared legal

and physical custody. On March 6, 2023, Father filed a timely notice of appeal,

along with a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). The trial court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion

on March 7, 2023.6

       On appeal, Father raises the following sole issue for our review:

“Whether the court erred in granting an [in loco parentis] party shared

physical and legal custody of the child when the weight of the evidence

presented was against a decision of that nature.” Father’s Brief at 4

(unnecessary capitalization omitted).

       We review custody orders for an abuse of discretion. See R.L. v. M.A.,

209 A.3d 391, 395 (Pa.Super. 2019). We will not find such an abuse merely

because we would have reached a different conclusion. See id. Rather, an

abuse of discretion occurs only if the trial court overrode or misapplied the law

in reaching its conclusion, or the record shows the trial court’s judgment was

manifestly unreasonable or the product of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will.

See id.

____________________________________________

6 The trial court referenced its reasoning placed on the record at the conclusion

of the hearing and discussed infra. See Trial Court Opinion, 3/7/23, at 2.

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      Moreover, our scope of review is broad. See id. Because this Court

does not make independent factual determinations, however, we must accept

findings of the trial court that are supported by competent evidence of record.

See S.C.B. v. J.S.B., 218 A.3d 905, 913 (Pa.Super. 2019). Importantly, we

defer to the trial court on matters of credibility and weight of the evidence, as

the trial court viewed and assessed witnesses firsthand. See id. We are not,

however, bound by the trial court’s deductions or inferences.            See id.

“Ultimately, the test is whether the trial court’s conclusions are unreasonable

as shown by the evidence of record. We may reject the conclusions of the

trial court only if they involve an error of law, or are unreasonable in light of

the sustainable findings of the trial court.”    E.D. v. M.P. 33 A.3d 73, 76

(Pa.Super. 2011) (quoting A.D. v. M.A.B., 989 A.2d 32, 35–36 (Pa.Super.

2010)). As this Court has held, “[i]t is not this Court’s function to determine

whether the trial court reached the ‘right’ decision; rather, we must consider

whether, ‘based on the evidence presented, given [sic] due deference to the

trial court’s weight and credibility determinations,’ the trial court erred or

abused its discretion[.]” King v. King, 889 A.2d 630, 632 (Pa.Super. 2005)

(quoting Hanson v. Hanson, 878 A.2d 127, 129 (Pa.Super. 2005)).

      “When a trial court orders a form of custody, the best interest of the

child is paramount.” S.W.D. v. S.A.R., 96 A.3d 396, 400 (Pa.Super. 2014).

“The best-interests standard, decided on a case-by-case basis, considers all

factors which legitimately have an effect upon the child’s physical, intellectual,

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moral and spiritual well-being.” M.J.N. v. J.K., 169 A.3d 108, 112 (Pa.Super.

2017). To that end, the Child Custody Act sets forth sixteen factors that a

court must consider before making any custody determination. See E.B. v.

D.B., 209 A.3d 451, 460 (Pa.Super. 2019).          “It is within the trial court’s

purview as the finder of fact to determine which factors are most salient and

critical in each particular case.”    Id. (citation omitted).     The statutorily

required factors are as follows:

      § 5328. Factors to consider when awarding custody.
            (a) Factors. – In ordering any form of custody, the court
      shall determine the best interest of the child by considering all
      relevant factors, giving weighted consideration to those factors
      which affect the safety of the child, including the following:
        (1) Which party is more likely to encourage and permit frequent
      and continuing contact between the child and another party.
         (2) The present and past abuse committed by a party or
      member of the party’s household, whether there is a continued
      risk of harm to the child or an abused party and which party can
      better provide adequate physical safeguards and supervision of
      the child.
             (2.1) The information set forth in section 5329.1(a)(1) and
      (2) (relating to consideration of child abuse and involvement with
      protective services).
        (3) The parental duties performed by each party on behalf of
      the child.
        (4) The need for stability and continuity in the child’s education,
      family life and community life.
        (5) The availability of extended family.
        (6) The child’s sibling relationships.
        (7) The well-reasoned preference of the child, based on the
      child's maturity and judgment.
        (8) The attempts of a parent to turn the child against the other
      parent, except in cases of domestic violence where reasonable
      safety measures are necessary to protect the child from harm.

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       (9) Which party is more likely to maintain a loving, stable,
     consistent and nurturing relationship with the child adequate for
     the child's emotional needs.
       (10) Which party is more likely to attend to the daily physical,
     emotional, developmental, educational and special needs of the
     child.
       (11) The proximity of the residences of the parties.
      (12) Each party’s availability to care for the child or ability to
     make appropriate child-care arrangements.
       (13) The level of conflict between the parties and the willingness
     and ability of the parties to cooperate with one another. A party’s
     effort to protect a child from abuse by another party is not
     evidence of unwillingness or inability to cooperate with that party.
       (14) The history of drug or alcohol abuse of a party or member
     of a party’s household.
       (15) The mental and physical condition of a party or member of
     a party’s household.
       (16) Any other relevant factor.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a).

            A trial court must “delineate the reasons for its decision
     when making an award of custody either on the record or in a
     written opinion.” S.W.D. v. S.A.R., 96 A.3d 396, 401 (Pa.Super.
     2014). See 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 5323(a) and (d). However, “there
     is no required amount of detail for the trial court’s explanation; all
     that is required is that the enumerated factors are considered and
     that the custody decision is based on those considerations.”
     M.J.M. v. M.L.G., 63 A.3d 331, 336 (Pa.Super. 2013).

R.L., 209 A.3d at 395.

     As it relates to parents and third parties, we have further explained:

            The parent has a prima facie right to custody, “which will be
     forfeited only if convincing reasons appear that the child’s best
     interest will be served by an award to the third party.” V.B. v.
     J.E.B., 55 A.3d 1193, 1199 (Pa.Super. 2012) (quoting Charles v.
     Stehlik, 560 Pa. 334, 744 A.2d 1255, 1258 (2000)). Section
     5327 of the Custody Act pertains to cases “concerning primary
     physical custody” and provides that, “[i]n any action regarding the

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     custody of the child between a parent of the child and a nonparent,
     there shall be a presumption that custody shall be awarded to the
     parent. The presumption in favor of the parent may be rebutted
     by clear and convincing evidence.” 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 5327(b). This
     Court has defined clear and convincing evidence “as presenting
     evidence that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing so as to
     enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without
     hesitation, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” M.J.S. v.
     B.B. v. B.B., 172 A.3d 651, 660 (Pa.Super. 2017) (citations and
     internal quotation marks omitted).
           Accordingly, “even before the proceedings start, the
     evidentiary scale is tipped, and tipped hard, to the biological
     parents’ side.” V.B., 55 A.3d at 1199 (quoting Charles, 744 A.2d
     at 1258). When making a decision to award primary physical
     custody to a nonparent, the trial court must “hear all evidence
     relevant to the child’s best interest, and then, decide whether the
     evidence on behalf of the third party is weighty enough to bring
     the scale up to even, and down on the third party’s side.” Id.
     (quoting McDonel v. Sohn, 762 A.2d 1101, 1107 (Pa.Super.
     2000)).
            These principles do not preclude an award of custody to the
     nonparent but simply instruct the trial court that the nonparent
     bears the burden of production and the burden of persuasion, and
     the nonparent’s burden is heavy. Jones v. Jones, 884 A.2d 915,
     918 (Pa.Super. 2005). It is well settled, “[w]hile this
     Commonwealth places great importance on biological ties, it does
     not do so to the extent that the biological parent’s right to custody
     will trump the best interests of the child. In all custody matters,
     our primary concern is, and must continue to be, the well-being
     of the most fragile human participant—that of the minor child.”
     Charles, 744 A.2d at 1259. “Once it is established that someone
     who is not the biological parent is in loco parentis, that person
     does not need to establish that the biological parent is
     unfit, but instead must establish by clear and convincing evidence
     that it is in the best interests of the children to maintain that
     relationship or be with that person.” Jones, 884 A.2d at 917
     (emphasis in original).

R.L., 209 A.3d at 396 (emphasis in original).

     Instantly, the trial court analyzed the custody factors set forth in Section

5328(a) on the record at the conclusion of the hearing. See N.T., 2/7/23

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(factors analysis), at 2-10. The trial court suggested the factors in Section

5328(a)(2),7 (7), and (16)8 are inapplicable. See id. at 4-6. The trial court

found the remaining factors weighed evenly. See id. at 4-6, 9-10. The trial

court found salient Section 5328(a)(4), the need for stability and continuity in

the child’s education, family life, and community life. In this regard, the trial

court indicated the following:

       So[,] I find by clear and convincing evidence that the overarching
       factor under Section 5328 is the need for stability and continuity
       in this child’s education, family life, and community life….[B]oth
       of you are doing a terrific job of raising this child….[T]he best thing
       I can do, frankly, is nothing. That is, to leave the existing order
       in place.

Id. at 3, 10.       As such, while the trial court recognized the statutory

presumption in favor of biological parents set forth at 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5327(b),

the trial court found clear and convincing evidence that Child’s best interests

dictated maintaining shared legal and physical custody:

             The [c]ourt is mindful that 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] Section 5327(b)
       provides that Father is entitled to a presumption over Smith. That
       presumption may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.
             [T]he [c]ourt finds by clear and convincing evidence that the
       need for stability and continuity in [] Child’s life is sufficient to
       overcome the presumption contained in 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] Section
       5327(b). Based upon that need for continuity, and based upon
       the fact that the parties are successfully co-parenting [] Child
       under the Order dated April 29, 2022, the [c]ourt finds by clear
____________________________________________

7 While the trial court did not separately address Section 5328(a)(2.1), the

court noted the lack of involvement of a children’s services agency at the
beginning of its discussion. See N.T., 2/7/23 (factors analysis), at 2-3.

8 We find the trial court’s lack of discussion of Section 5328(a)(16) suggestive

of its determination that it was not applicable.

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       and convincing evidence that there is no basis for changing
       custody as established by that Order. For that reason, the Order
       of April 29, 2022, is affirmed, and incorporated herein by
       reference as if more fully set forth, herein.

Trial Court Order, 3/1/23, at 2. See Trial Court Order, 3/7/23, at 2.

       Father, however, asserts there is a lack of clear and convincing evidence

to rebut the statutory presumption in his favor. See Father’s Brief at 8-10.

However, Father does not dispute the equal weight the court placed on the

custody factors between him and Mr. Smith. See id. at 9. As discuss infra,

Father misapprehends the law, and his claim fails.

       Significantly, we find R.L. instructive.    In R.L., where the trial court

concluded the custody factors weighed evenly, and the evidentiary scales were

tipped to even,9 the trial court awarded shared legal and physical custody to

the child’s mother and mother’s former paramour, R.L., whom the trial court

found to be in loco parentis. On appeal, this Court affirmed the trial court’s

award of shared legal and physical custody. R.L., 209 A.3d at 393, 397-98.

Addressing the mother’s challenge to the evidentiary burden and assertion of

a lack of clear and convincing evidence to rebut the statutory presumption,

this Court held:

              Our precedent merely requires the scale to tip to the third
       party’s side prior to awarding primary physical custody to the
       third party and, thus, we find no error in the trial court’s finding
       that, in this case, when the scale was “tipped to even,” an award
       of shared [] custody was in [the] [c]hild’s best interest.
____________________________________________

9 In R.L., the trial court found, in part, that the child was doing well under the

existing 50/50 custody arrangement. R.L., 209 A.3d at 397.

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Id. at 398.

      Similarly, here, the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that the

factors weighed evenly between the parties. For example, at the time of the

subject proceeding, Father and Mr. Smith had been exercising 50/50 shared

custody for almost one year. See Order, 4/29/22. Father and Mr. Smith both

reside in Williamsport in the same school district. See N.T., 2/7/23, at 45-

46, 79.   Father testified things are going well, and he and Mr. Smith are

working together “perfectly” and as “civilized parents.” Id. at 36. See id. at

29. Mr. Smith agreed. See id. at 83, 103-104. Further, Child is happy and

doing well. He has half-siblings and extended family, with whom he is close,

associated with each home. See id. at 17-24, 62, 65-67, 83-84, 86-89.

      Following an analysis of the Section 5328(a) custody factors, the trial

court concluded the factors weighed evenly between the parties. Upon review,

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that an award of

shared legal and physical custody was in Child’s best interest. See R.L., 209

A.3d at 398. In challenging the trial court’s conclusions and assessments,

Father seeks to have this Court re-find facts, re-weigh evidence, and re-assess

credibility. However, we will not disturb the trial court’s findings of fact and

determinations regarding the credibility and weight of the evidence absent the

trial court’s abuse of discretion. See King, supra. Here, there was no such

abuse of discretion.

      For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order.

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     Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 9/6/2023

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