Court Opinion

ID: 9848152
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:13:41.991345+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:04.087753
License: Public Domain

N. J. Kaufman, J.
(dissenting). I cannot agree that the prosecutor’s questioning of defendant concerning his marriage was harmless. Defendant’s claim of error is based on the following portion of his cross-examination by the prosecutor:
"Q. Mr. Flanagan, on May 23rd of 1981, were you married, sir?
”A. Yes, I was.
"Q. Having any problems in your marriage back in May of 1981, Mr. Flanagan?
"A No,
"Q. Shortly after May of 1981 you were divorced, isn’t that true?
"Mr. Arnkoff: Objection; that’s irrelevant.
"Mr. Pilchak: Your Honor, I think that a divorce pending shortly after May of 1981 would be very relevant as to whether or not Mr. Flanagan was having troubles with his marriage and as to whether or not the normal sexual desires in a male would have to be satisfied.
"Mr. Arnkoff: I would object to that unless the prosecutor can show the causes of the breakdown of the marriage relationship, which he can’t do. He hasn’t produced any witnesses that could show any of that. Unless he can produce the divorce decree transcript of *799the proceedings, he cannot get into this line of questioning.
"Mr. Pilchak: I disagree, your Honor.
"The Court: Overruled.
"Q. (Continuing by Mr. Pilchak): Isn’t it true that in August of 1981 your wife filed for divorce?
"A. I’m not sure it was August; that could well be.
"Q. Did your problems with your wife go back to May of 1981?
"A. They went back until then, yes.
"Q. You were having problems with your wife back then?
"A. No.
"Q. You said your problems went back until then?
"A. The [sic] originated that day.
"Q. And eventually you and your wife became divorced?
"A. I believe a week or two ago the decree was finalized.
"Q. And that was in December of 1981, wasn’t it?
"A. I believe that would be right.”
I agree with defendant and the majority that his objections to these questions should have been sustained. Our Supreme Court reversed a statutory rape conviction based on a similar cross-examination in People v Travis, 246 Mich 514; 224 NW 329 (1929). The Court stated:
"In admitting this testimony and limiting it to a time prior to the arrest, the jury was given to understand that a man who had not had sexual intercourse for a considerable period of time would be more inclined to commit rape than one whose sexual desires had been regularly satisfied. It was on this theory that the prosecuting attorney brought out the testimony and apparently on this theory the court admitted it as evidence which the jury might weigh against the defendant in determining his guilt. The prejudicial effect of this testimony would more plainly appear in the case of an *800unmarried defendant called upon to answer a charge of rape. His virtue and continence would be used against him. The jury was required to determine the truth of the story told by the girl or that related by the defendant. Against the probability of the truth of the defendant’s story, which was a complete denial of the charge, they were allowed to consider the fact that he had not had sexual intercourse with his wife for four years.” Travis, supra, p 516.
Defendant’s marital problems had no bearing on any issue properly in the case. The court erred by deciding that the evidence was relevant. Moreover, it should have been recognized that any conceivable probative value the evidence had would clearly be outweighed by its prejudicial effect.
The prosecutor claims, and the majority agrees, that any error in the cross-examination of defendant was harmless. Where it is claimed that the error is harmless, two inquiries are pertinent. First, is the error so offensive to the maintenance of a sound judicial process that it can never be regarded as harmless? Second, was the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt? See People v Mobley, 390 Mich 57, 65-66; 210 NW2d 327 (1973), and People v Robinson, 386 Mich 551, 563; 194 NW2d 709 (1972).
An error may be offensive to the maintenance of a sound judicial system if it is deliberately injected into the proceedings by the prosecutor, if it deprives the defendant of a fundamental element of the adversary process, or if it is particularly inflammatory. See People v Swan, 56 Mich App 22, 31-32; 223 NW2d 346 (1974). The purpose of this exception to the harmless error rule is to deter misconduct by the prosecutor and police and to safeguard those individual rights which are so *801fundamental that the impact of their denial cannot be assessed fairly. Swan, supra, p 32, fn 6.
The prosecutor’s questions concerning defendant’s marital status were clearly not inadvertent. The irrelevance of the questions to the charges against defendant should have been clear. The reasons advanced for admission of the testimony were implausible in 1929 when Travis was decided; they are equally implausible today. The potential for prejudice to defendant’s right to an impartial jury should have been evident. Finally, the prejudice which might arise from an examination of a defendant’s sex life is very difficult to assess. The error injected into this case by the prosecutor and acquiesced in by the trial judge was so offensive to the maintenance of a sound judicial system that its presence in a trial resulting in conviction cannot be condoned.
The prosecutor argues that the failure to discuss defendant’s marital status and divorce in closing argument militates in favor of finding the error harmless. While this argument may be of some force with regard to certain types of evidence, it is of no force here. The prejudicial evidence which the prosecutor disclosed to the jury was not evidence which was rationally probative but inadmissible, but evidence which, while not rationally probative of guilt, might irrationally influence a juror’s vote.
Although the prosecutor did not discuss defendant’s divorce in his closing argument, he did pursue this line of questioning until defendant admitted that his marital problems originated with his arrest for rape. Although the prosecutor told the judge that the examination concerning defendant’s divorce was relevant to the issue of the satisfaction of defendant’s sexual desires, de*802fendant’s testimony refuted this claim. By eliciting this testimony, however, the prosecutor successfully suggested to the jury that defendant’s wife divorced him because of the charges against him. The subtle, but unmistakable, inference which this testimony provided the jury was that even defendant’s own wife did not believe his claim of innocence. In effect, the prosecutor invited the jury to substitute this implicit assessment of defendant’s credibility for its own. The effect of this "hearsay-by-innuendo” may have been to destroy defendant’s credibility in the eyes of at least one juror. It is difficult to conclude that this prejudicial hearsay allegation was not the prosecutor’s goal when he embarked on this line of questioning.
The evidence against the defendant in this case was strong. Both victims testified convincingly. Their testimony was corroborated by some physical evidence. Although it is a close question, I doubt that a single juror would have voted to acquit defendant absent the improper questioning by the prosecutor. It is only the prosecutor’s deliberate attempt to prevent defendant’s trial from being fairly decided by the jury which requires that his conviction be reversed.
I would reverse.