Court Opinion

ID: 9622353
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:16:02.233156+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:15.880292
License: Public Domain

Justice SCOTT,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. While I agree with the test adopted by the majority for determining whether a plaintiff has standing under the Colorado Consumer Protection Act (CCPA), I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the Walters satisfy the test. Specifically, I would conclude that the Walters do not meet the third and fifth prongs of the test.
I.
The majority, relying upon Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 105 Wash.2d 778, 719 P.2d 531 (Wash.1986), adopts a five-prong test to determine whether the Walters have standing under the CCPA. I conclude that the Walters’ trespass claim against Hall and Hammond does not satisfy the third prong of that test, that is, that the trespass did not “significantly impact the public as actual or potential consumers of the defendant’s goods, services, or property.” Maj. op. at 235-236. In Hangman Ridge, the Washington State Supreme Court defined the third prong as “a public interest showing.” 719 P.2d at 535. The court then went on to explain, with respect to the public interest showing, that “[wjhere the transaction was essentially a private dispute, it may be more difficult to show that the public has an interest in the subject matter.... [I]t is the likelihood that additional plaintiffs have been or will be injured in exactly the same fashion that changes a factual pattern from a private dispute to one that affects the public interest.” Id. at 538 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The court then lists several factors which would indicate a public interest in this context:
Were the alleged acts committed in the course of defendant’s business? (2) Did defendant advertise to the public in general? (3) Did defendant actively solicit this particular plaintiff, indicating potential solicitation of others? (4) Did plaintiff and defendant occupy unequal bargaining positions? As with the factors applied to essentially consumer transactions, not one of these factors is dispositive, nor is it necessary that all be present. The factors in both the “consumer” and “private dispute” contexts represent indicia of an effect on public interest from which a trier of fact could reasonably find public interest impact.
719 P.2d at 538.
Taking guidance from this additional explanation in Hangman Ridge, I would conclude that the public interest is not implicated in this instance. The injury to the Walters, trespass, is qualitatively different than the injury allegedly suffered by the public as a result of Hall and Hammond’s misrepresentations. There is virtually no likelihood that additional plaintiffs would be injured in “exactly the same fashion” the Walters were, as they were the only homeowners who could suffer trespass on that land. Id. Thus, the wrong is private, not public, and the Walters, who were properly awarded $72,000 as a consequence of the *239trespass and an additional $28,000 because the defendants’ actions were willful and wanton, do not have standing to treble the actual damages for the identical injury under the CCPA. See Martinez v. Lewis, 969 P.2d 213, 222-223, 1998 WL 858153 (Colo. Dee. 14, 1998) (holding that a doctor’s misrepresentations to an insurer did not give standing to the insured under the CCPA, because the wrong was private, and did not impact the public).
II.
I would also conclude that the Walters do not satisfy the fifth prong, namely that '“the plaintiff must be able to show that the defendant’s actions in violation of the CCPA caused the plaintiffs injury.” Maj. op. at 235.
Here, the defendants’ actions for which damages were calculated and awarded constituted trespass. Nowhere in the CCPA, however, is trespass listed as a deceptive trade practice. Moreover, the jury verdict form did not contemplate damages attributable to any CCPA violations. Hence, on this record, the only claim on which the jury awarded damages was the trespass claim. In addition, even if we view the misrepresentations to potential purchasers as having been proven as a violation of the CCPA, I fail to see on this record how Hall and Hammond’s misrepresentations to potential purchasers directly caused the Walters’ injury. The basis for the Walters’ damages was the loss of pasture leases, which was caused by Hall and Hammond’s acts of cutting locks and knocking down fences. These damages for trespass, for which the jury awarded $72,000 in actual damages and $28,000 in punitive damages, had no relation to the misrepresentations, and therefore, there can be no causal link between the two.
III.
Accordingly, I would vacate the treble damages awarded for trespass and award the Walters $72,000 in actual damages and $28,-000 in punitive damages resulting from the trespass.