Court Opinion

ID: 9712766
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:59:26.376992+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:14.282215
License: Public Domain

Black, J.
(concurring). There is no dispute of fact in this case. The question is whether — in view of the stipulation for discharge contained in this-contract of employment — section 29 authorizes or directs a separate penalty (over and above discharge in event a second writ of garnishment is served upon the employer); such separate penalty being that of adjudication of statutory “misconduct.” I agree with Justice Smith that our answer should be-in the negative.
Five connected sentences, appearing in the prevailing opinion of Linski v. Employment Security Commission, 358 Mich 239, key and spell out the-answer to this question. Quoting (p 245):
“Claimant’s action is termed wrong because it was not in accordance with the terms of the contract concerned. The record discloses this to be true. And the record also shows that the contract penalty of discharge has been applied. We can find no warrant for adding to the contract penalty for breach still another penalty not squarely spelled out in the statute. See T. R. Miller Mill Co., Inc., v. Johns, 261 Ala 615 (75 So2d 675).”
I concur in reversal, noting with Justice Smith that Judge Arch followed — quite properly — Cassar v. Employment Security Commission, 343 Mich 380.* Judge Arch ruled March 9, 1959. Cassar then laid down the rule to which our circuit judges owed allegiance. It was not overruled until November 25, 1959 (by Linski, supra).

 Presumably, Cassar being alive at the time, the appeal board also was influenced by that decision when it decided against this-plaintiff.