Court Opinion

ID: 2963560
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Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:12:04.378167+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:26.887821
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USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                                                     
                                 ____________________

        No. 94-1890

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                              ARNALDO L. RULLAN-RIVERA,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                                     
                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

                    [Hon. Hector M. Laffitte, U.S. District Judge]
                                              ___________________

                                                     
                                 ____________________

                                 Cyr, Circuit Judge,
                                      _____________

                            Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                    ____________________

                              and Boudin, Circuit Judge.
                                          _____________

                                                     
                                 ____________________

             Luis R. Rivera-Gonzalez, with whom Joseph C. Laws, Jr. was on
             _______________________            ___________________
        brief for appellant.
             Jos  A. Quiles Espinosa, Senior Litigation Counsel, with whom
             _______________________
        Guillermo Gil, United States Attorney, and Warren V zquez, Assistant
        _____________                              ______________
        United States Attorney, were on brief for appellee.

                                                     
                                 ____________________

                                    July 21, 1995
                                                     
                                 ____________________

                    CYR,   Circuit   Judge.     Arnaldo   L.  Rullan-Rivera
                    CYR,   Circuit   Judge.
                           _______________

          ("Rullan") appeals the judgment of conviction entered against him

          for  possessing cocaine with intent to distribute.  See 21 U.S.C.
                                                              ___

            841(a)(1); 18 U.S.C.   2.  As there was no reversible error, we

          affirm the district court judgment.  

                                          I
                                          I

                                      BACKGROUND
                                      BACKGROUND
                                      __________

                    The  relevant facts  are  recounted in  the light  most

          favorable  to the verdict.  United States v. Tuesta-Toro, 29 F.3d
                                      _____________    ___________

          771, 773  (1st Cir. 1994), cert.  denied, 115 S. Ct.  947 (1995).
                                     _____  ______

          Appellant  Rullan and  Humberto Prada-Cordero  ("Prada") enlisted

          Erasto Miranda-Rodriguez ("Miranda") to transport one kilogram of

          cocaine from Puerto Rico  to the continental United States.1   On

          November  10, 1992, Prada, Miranda,  Rullan and his  wife went to

          the Luis  Munoz Marin  International Airport in  Carolina, Puerto

          Rico,  where  Prada and  Miranda were  to board  a flight  to the

          mainland.  After twice  triggering the security checkpoint magne-

          tometer  alarm,  Miranda  abandoned  his  handbag,  passport  and

          airline  ticket, and  fled the  checkpoint area rather  than risk

          disclosure of the cocaine concealed on his person.

                    Shortly thereafter, Miranda surrendered to  the police,

          became a  cooperating witness  for the government  and implicated

          appellant Rullan, who was arrested and indicted for conspiring to

          possess cocaine with intent  to distribute, see 21 U.S.C.    846,
                                                      ___
                              
          ____________________

               1Rullan had  supplied Miranda with small  amounts of cocaine
          for personal use in years past.

                                          2

          and  possessing  cocaine with  intent  to distribute,  see  id.  
                                                                 ___  ___

          841(a)(1); 18  U.S.C.    2.   Rullan filed  a pretrial motion  to

          compel disclosure of any prior "bad acts" evidence the government

          intended to introduce at trial.  Although the motion was granted,

          the government disclosed no Rule 404(b) evidence. 

                    At trial,  the court ruled that no Rule 404(b) evidence

          was to be  introduced.   The prosecutor  accordingly assured  the

          court  that Miranda had been instructed not to mention his previ-

          ous cocaine purchases from Rullan.  See supra note 1.   Neverthe-
                                              ___ _____

          less,  on the  third  day of  trial,  when the  prosecutor  asked

          Miranda whether he had "known Mr. Rullan in relation to [codefen-

          dant]  Humberto  Prada  prior  to [November  8,  1992],"  Miranda

          blurted out:  "No,  I was totally surprised.  Arnaldo Rullan sur-

          prised me because he was my drug dealer."   

                    On  the  following  day, codefendant  Prada  failed  to

          appear  for trial.  The district court denied Rullan's motion for

          mistrial, and ordered that the joint trial proceed, with Prada in
                                                                         __

          absentia.  After the  district court allowed a defense  motion to
          ________

          dismiss the conspiracy charge,  both defendants were convicted on

          the substantive cocaine charge, and Rullan appealed. 

                                          II
                                          II

                                      DISCUSSION
                                      DISCUSSION
                                      __________

          A.   The Rule 404(b) Evidence
          A.   The Rule 404(b) Evidence
               ________________________

                    The government  does not  dispute that Miranda's  unex-

          pected reference to Rullan as his former drug  dealer constituted

          prohibited  "bad  acts"  evidence,  but simply  contends  that  a

                                          3

          mistrial was not  necessary to  cure any inadvertent  harm.   For

          present  purposes,  therefore,  we  assume  that  the  challenged

          testimony violated the prohibition against  Rule 404(b) evidence.

                    A ruling denying a motion for mistrial  is reviewed for

          manifest  abuse of  discretion, United States  v. Romero-Carrion,
                                          _____________     ______________

          No. 94-1792, slip op. at 4 (1st Cir. May 9,  1995); United States
                                                              _____________

          v. Pierro, 32 F.3d 611, 617 (1st Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.
             ______                                    _____ ______

          Ct.  919 (1995),  and will be  upheld absent  a clear  showing of

          prejudice by the defendant-appellant.  United States v. Hahn,  17
                                                 _____________    ____

          F.3d  502, 508 (1st Cir.  1994) (citing United  States v. Sclamo,
                                                  ______________    ______

          578 F.2d 888,  891 (1st Cir. 1978)).  Mistrial  is a last resort,

          to  be employed only if the demonstrated  harm can be cured by no

          less drastic  means, such as a  contemporaneous jury instruction.

          United States v. Sepulveda,  15 F.3d 1161, 1184 (1st  Cir. 1993),
          _____________    _________

          cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2714 (1994).  
          _____ ______

                    Miranda testified in Spanish.   The problematic portion

          of the testimony, see supra p. 3 ("[Rullan] was my drug dealer"),
                            ___ _____

          was never translated into  English before Miranda was interrupted

          in  mid-sentence by  a  defense objection.    The official  trial

          transcript of the exchange reads, in full:

                    Q:   Had you known Mr.  Rullan in relation to
                         Humberto Prada prior to that day?

                    A:   No,  I  was totally  surprised.   Arnold
                         Rullan surprised me --

                                          4

          The trial  judge immediately ordered Miranda's  response stricken

          from  the  record  and  contemporaneously directed  the  jury  to

          disregard it.  

                    It  would be unrealistic,  nonetheless, to suggest that

          the  Puerto  Rico jury  did not  hear  and understand  the entire

          response given  by Miranda in  Spanish.  Be  that as it  may, the

          normal presumption    that juries follow the court's instructions

             can be rebutted only on  a sufficient showing that the offend-

          ing testimony  reasonably could  not have  been ignored  and that

          serious prejudice likely  resulted.  Id. at 1185.  See also Greer
                                               ___           ___ ____ _____

          v. Miller, 483  U.S. 756,  766 n.8 (1987)  ("We normally  presume
             ______

          that a jury will follow an instruction to  disregard inadmissible

          evidence  inadvertently  presented  to  it, unless  there  is  an

          'overwhelming probability' that the jury will be unable to follow

          the  court's instructions.")  (quoting Richardson  v. Marsh,  481
                                                 __________     _____

          U.S. 200, 208 (1987)).  Although  Rullan points out that a limit-

          ing  instruction is  not  always sufficient  to insulate  against

          improper  evidentiary  prejudice,  see,  e.g.,  Bruton v.  United
                                             ___   ____   ______     ______

          States,  391 U.S. 123, 135  (1968), mistrial was  not required in
          ______

          the instant case.  

                    There  was strong  evidentiary  support  for  the  jury

          verdict.  Miranda  testified that Rullan:  (1) telephoned Miranda

          to  arrange the first  meeting at which  the cocaine distribution

          scheme was  discussed; (2) drove Prada to Miranda's apartment for

          their  meetings;  (3)  relayed  drug  smuggling messages  between

          Miranda  and  Prada; (4)  removed cocaine  from  his own  car and

                                          5

          carried  it into Miranda's residence  prior to their  trip to the

          airport; (5)  accompanied Miranda and  Prada to the  airport; and

          (6) discussed  with Miranda and  Prada their plans  for investing

          the drug profits. 

                    The overwhelming  weight of the  direct and circumstan-

          tial evidence, combined  with the firm,  contemporaneous instruc-

          tion, demonstrates  to a "high probability"  that the inadvertent

          introduction of the "bad acts" evidence did not contribute to the

          verdict.   Therefore, the reference  to prior drug  dealings with

          Rullan  was "harmless."  United  States v. Tejeda,  974 F.2d 210,
                                   ______________    ______

          215  (1st Cir. 1992)  ("nonconstitutional evidentiary error under

          Rule 404(b) will be  treated as harmless  if it is `highly  prob-

          able' that the error  did not contribute to the  verdict") (cita-

          tions omitted).

          B.   Sufficiency of the Evidence
          B.   Sufficiency of the Evidence
               ___________________________

                    Rullan could  be convicted  of aiding and  abetting the

          possession of cocaine, with intent to distribute, see 21 U.S.C.  
                                                            ___

          841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C.   2, only if the government proved beyond

          a reasonable doubt that he "associated himself with the  underly-

          ing venture, participated in  it as something he wished  to bring

          about, and  sought by  his actions to  make it succeed."   United
                                                                     ______

          States v. Clifford, 979 F.2d 896, 899 (1st Cir. 1992) (citing Nye
          ______    ________                                            ___

          & Nissen  v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619 (1949)).  We review
          ________     _____________

          the  evidence in  the  light most  favorable  to the  government,

          indulging  all reasonable inferences in its favor, with a view to

                                          6

          determining whether a rational jury could have found guilt beyond

          a reasonable doubt.  Hahn, 17 F.3d at 506.  
                               ____

                    Rullan contends that Miranda's trial  testimony was not

          credible  because Miranda  had  made contrary  statements to  the

          grand jury, and he was motivated  by the expectation of a reduced

          sentence.  We find  this challenge unavailing, since Miranda  was

          impeached, both with his  prior inconsistent grand jury testimony

          and  his plea  agreement, and  the  credibility assessment  was a

          matter for the trial jury.  See Sepulveda, 15 F.3d at 1175; Hahn,
                                      ___ _________                   ____

          17 F.3d  at 506.   Thus,  there was  ample  credible evidence  to

          establish Rullan's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  See supra p.
                                                               ___ _____

          5.

          C.   Flight by Codefendant
          C.   Flight by Codefendant
               _____________________

                    Following an evidentiary hearing,   the district  court

          found that  Prada voluntarily absented himself from the final two

          days of  trial.  Rullan moved  for a mistrial, claiming  that his

          codefendant's  flight might  prompt  a jury  inference that  both

          defendants were  guilty.   The district  court directed  that the

          trial proceed  against both  defendants.   See  Crosby v.  United
                                                     ___  ______     ______

          States,      U.S.    ,     , 113 S. Ct. 748, 752-753 (1993); Fed.
          ______   ___      ___  ____

          R. Crim. P. 43(b). 

                    Rullan asserts three  claims of error.  First, he says,

          the district court mistakenly believed Rullan might avoid retrial

          on  double jeopardy grounds if a mistrial were declared.  Second,

          a limiting instruction  could not prevent  a jury inference  that

          both defendants were guilty because Prada absconded during trial.

                                          7

          Third,  the instruction given by the court was "over extensive in

          content"  and prejudicial.  We  review the two  latter claims for

          manifest abuse of discretion.  Pierro, 32 F.3d at 617. 
                                         ______

                    First,  Rullan correctly  asserts that  double jeopardy

          does not bar  retrial where a mistrial is ordered  at the request

          of  the defendant.    United States  v.  Scott, 437  U.S. 82,  93
                                _____________      _____

          (1978);  United States  v. Aguilar-Aranceta,  957 F.2d  18, 21-22
                   _____________     ________________

          (1st Cir.),  cert. denied, 113 S.  Ct. 105 (1992).   The district
                       _____ ______

          court  nonetheless correctly  predicated its  denial of  Rullan's

          motion for mistrial on the ground that Prada's voluntary  failure

          to appear, in  and of itself, did  not necessarily mean that  the
                                                 ___________

          joint  trial could  not  proceed with  Prada  in absentia.    See
          _____                            ____  _____  __ ________     ___

          Crosby,  113 S. Ct. at 752 (treating voluntary failure to appear,
          ______

          after  trial begins, as  waiver of right to  be tried in person);

          Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(b).  

                    On the other hand, treating the  motion for mistrial as

          a  de facto motion for severance by a non-absconding codefendant,
             __ _____

          see Fed.  R. Crim. P. 14,  we review its denial  under the "plain
          ___

          error" standard,  since severance  was never broached  before the

          district court.  See United States v. Palow, 777 F.2d 52, 54 (1st
                           ___ ______ ______    _____

          Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S.  1052 (1986).  Viewed in  this
                      _____ ______

          light,  Rullan's  motion  rests  exclusively  on  the  conclusory

          assertion  that the jury could  have inferred that  he was guilty

          because his codefendant absconded.  We see no compelling rational
                      ___________

          force in the suggestion that Rullan, who did  not flee, must have

          been tainted with the same brush as the absconding Prada.  

                                          8

                    Moreover, Rullan's conclusory claim runs counter to the

          longstanding presumption that jurors normally follow the instruc-

          tions given them by the trial court.  See United States v. Olano,
                                                ___ ______ ______    _____

          113  S. Ct.  1770, 1781  (1993).  The  district court  firmly in-

          structed the  jury that  Prada's disappearance was  immaterial to

          the verdict on Rullan.  The record further reflects that the jury

          understood.

                         THE COURT:    The absence  of  defendant
                    Prada from trial is no way attributable [sic]
                    to the other defendant on trial.  And may not
                    be considered by you in determining the guilt
                    or innocence of  defendant Rullan.   You  may
                    use this only as  to defendant Prada  itself.
                    [sic]   Is that clear?   Let the  record show
                    that the jury has assented. 

                    We therefore  reject the conclusory contention  that no

          jury  instruction could  protect Rullan  against an  inference of

          guilt  arising  from his  codefendant's  voluntary  flight.   See
                                                                        ___

          United States v. Phibbs, 999 F.2d 1053, 1067 (6th Cir. 1993) (any
          ______ ______    ______

          adverse  effect  upon  nonfleeing  defendant  neutralized  by  "a

          cautionary  instruction  that each  defendant's  case  was to  be

          considered  separately and, further,  that [codefendant's] flight

          could not be  used as  evidence against anyone  but him"),  cert.
                                                                      _____

          denied,  114 S. Ct. 1071 (1994); cf. United States v. Wright, 932
          ______                           ___ ______ ______    ______

          F.2d 868, 877 (10th Cir.) (upholding denial of severance, in part

          because trial  court twice  instructed jury  that "it  should not

          construe  the absence  of [codefendant] as  evidence of  guilt of

                                          9

          either [the  defendant or  the codefendant]"), cert.  denied, 502
                                                         _____  ______

          U.S. 972 (1991).2

                                         III
                                         III

                                      CONCLUSION
                                      CONCLUSION
                                      __________

                    As there  was no  reversible error, the  district court

          judgment is affirmed.
                      ________

                              
          ____________________

               2Rullan  also challenges, as  too extensive and prejudicial,
          the very language he asked the district court to use  in the jury
          instruction relating to Prada's disappearance.  But even assuming
          the  instruction  had not  been invited,  the  claim of  error is
          groundless.  There  was no  error in the  instruction, let  alone
          "plain error."  See Palow, 777 F.2d at 54.
                          ___ _____
               Lastly,  at oral  argument  Rullan  withdrew  his  so-called
          "ineffective assistance of counsel" claim.  See Sainz Gonzalez v.
                                                      ___ ______________
          Banco  de Santander-Puerto Rico, 932 F.2d 999, 1000 n.1 (1st Cir.
          _______________________________
          1991);  Bunol v.  George Engine  Co., 996 F.2d  67, 70  (5th Cir.
                  _____     __________________
          1993).

                                          10