Court Opinion

ID: 9778193
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:54:55.333669+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:04.392412
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
Appellant is critical of our opinion because we utilized the 1963 addition to Art. 20.01, being Sec. (F)(2), as persuasive authority but did not similarly use the 1963 amendment of Art. 20.01 (I)(l), which now reads, “Retail Sale or Sale at Retail. ‘Retail Sale’ or ‘Sale at Retail’ means: (1) Any sale of tangible personal property.”
Sec. (F) (2) of the 1963 Act if it had been in effect when this case arose would have by explicit language exempted ap-pellee from the tax here sought. It stated that this was the original legislative intention. This is why we relied on such Article as persuasive. Sec. (I) (1) as amended in 1963 does not contain similar language as to Legislative intent. While its language standing alone is explicit, it will undoubtedly be construed with other provisions of the Act when the occasion arises. Its language is broad enough to include all sales, both retail and wholesale as those terms are commonly understood and thus completely change the scheme of the tax as previously considered. These are the reasons we did not use this amendment as persuasive of a contrary decision.
The motion is overruled.
Motion Overruled.