Court Opinion

ID: 9902390
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-26 23:02:12.529649+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:49.783678
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/22/23 Conservatorship of M.C. CA2/3
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                      SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                  DIVISION THREE

 Conservatorship of the Person of                          B327027
 M.C.
                                                           Los Angeles County
 LOS ANGELES COUNTY                                        Super. Ct. No. ZE042938
 OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC
 GUARDIAN, as Conservator, etc.,

          Petitioner and Respondent,

          v.

 M.C.,

          Objector and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Ronald Owen Kaye, Judge. Affirmed.

      Gerald J. Miller, under appointment by the Court
of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters,
Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey,
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Michael J.
Wise, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                   _________________________

       M.C. was charged with murder and declared incompetent
to stand trial. The Los Angeles County Office of the Public
Guardian (the Public Guardian) petitioned for appointment
as a Murphy conservator. At trial on the petition, the Public
Guardian presented evidence that M.C. suffers from delusions,
some of which involve violence against others. The jury
found M.C. presents a substantial danger to others by
reason of a mental disorder, and the court imposed a Murphy
conservatorship. On appeal, M.C. argues the jury’s verdict
is not supported by substantial evidence, the court erroneously
admitted his testimony from a prior trial, and the court should
have declared a mistrial. We reject M.C.’s arguments and affirm.
         FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1.     The murder charges
       In December 2016, M.C. allegedly killed a man by
repeatedly stabbing him in the chest with a pair of scissors.
M.C. was 65 years old at the time. The People charged M.C.
with murder, but a court found he was incompetent to stand trial.
M.C. was admitted to Patton State Hospital (Patton), and a court
issued an order for involuntary medication.
2.     The Murphy conservatorship
       In August 2018, the Public Guardian filed a petition
for appointment as a Murphy conservator. A Murphy
conservatorship is a type of civil commitment for gravely
disabled individuals who are incompetent to stand trial on
charges involving death or great bodily harm. (Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 5361, subd. (a); see Conservatorship of A.A. (2022)

                               2
84 Cal.App.5th 66, 68.)1 After a bench trial, the court found M.C.
met the criteria for a Murphy conservatorship and appointed
the Public Guardian as his conservator for a one-year term.
       About a month before the end of the conservatorship,
the Public Guardian filed a petition for re-appointment. At
M.C.’s request, the case was tried to a jury in December 2021.
M.C. testified on his own behalf. The jury found M.C. qualified
for a Murphy conservatorship, and the court reappointed the
Public Guardian as his conservator.
3.     The present trial
       The Public Guardian filed another request for
reappointment, and the case was tried to a jury in 2022. At
the trial, the parties stipulated that M.C. had a pending charge
for violating Penal Code section 187, subdivision (a), a court
found probable cause for the charge, and M.C. was found
mentally incompetent to stand trial in that case. The only issue
for the jury to decide was whether M.C. represents a substantial
danger of physical harm to others by reason of a mental disease,
defect, or disorder.
       a.    M.C.’s prior testimony
       Over M.C.’s objection, the court allowed the Public
Guardian to introduce into evidence portions of M.C.’s testimony
from the December 2021 jury trial. The testimony included
M.C.’s account of the incident that led to the murder charge.
       M.C. testified he was sleeping under a bridge when the
victim struck him in the head five times with “steel nunchuks.”
The victim said he would be back to kill M.C. because he “ ‘hate[s]
Mexicans.’ ” M.C. grabbed a pair of sewing scissors to protect

1     Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare
and Institutions Code.

                                3
himself. The victim tried to punch M.C., but M.C. blocked the
punch and stabbed the victim.
      According to M.C., at that point, an “eight-foot tall tornado
came in like Star Trek in the T.V.” From the “whirlwind,” a man
named Hector stepped out of colored vapors and accused the
victim of stealing his money. Hector took out a knife and stabbed
the victim 12 or 13 times, but it did not kill him. M.C. said
the victim “was in perfect health,” not injured at all, and now
runs a liquor store in Atwater Village.
      M.C. testified that he had been hospitalized four times
in the past. He also claimed he had been wrongly convicted of
assault with a deadly weapon for breaking a man’s hand with
a tree branch. M.C. seemed to believe the People accused him
of harming the victim using a photograph of the tree branch,
rather than the branch itself.
      b.     M.C.’s treating psychiatrist
      The Public Guardian presented testimony from M.C.’s
treating psychiatrist at Patton, Jasdeep Aulakh. According
to Aulakh, M.C. had been diagnosed with schizoaffective
disorder, bipolar type. His symptoms include disorganized
thought processes, manic episodes, “odd, bizarre, kind of
grandiose delusions, and persecutory thoughts.” Among other
delusions, M.C. claimed to be a multi-star general in the military,
a law professor, and the owner of a baseball team.
      Aulakh prescribed M.C. an atypical anti-psychotic
medication at twice the maximum dosage that would be
administered in an outpatient setting. Despite the medication,
M.C. continued to suffer delusions and his mental health had
not improved.
      Aulakh testified that M.C. initially refused to allow staff
to draw his blood to monitor his health and confirm he was
taking his medication. After the hospital obtained a court order

                                 4
allowing staff to do so, M.C. agreed to give one vial of blood
at a time, which was significantly less than Aulakh needed.
Nevertheless, Aulakh did not press the issue because he did not
want a confrontation with M.C., which he feared could place
hospital staff in danger.
       Aulakh reported that M.C. had recently fallen after a chair
he was sitting in collapsed. For a “brief period of time” after the
fall, M.C. used a walker and wheelchair. Since then, he had been
walking “really well with a stable gait.” Aulakh described M.C.
as “quite able-bodied” and considered him a physical threat.
Nevertheless, Patton staff designated M.C. a “fall risk” and
placed him in the hospital’s “frail unit.”
       According to Aulakh, M.C. had not had any physical
altercations with other patients or staff at Patton. Aulakh
explained that, because M.C. is physically imposing, the staff
tried to avoid confrontations with him. Also, the staff who cared
for him were trained to minimize the risks of confrontations
with patients.
       Aulakh opined it is “[h]ighly unlikely” that M.C. would
comply with a medicine regiment outside the structured
environment of Patton. He explained that M.C. claims he
does not suffer from schizoaffective disorder and believes he
does not need medication.
       c.    The Public Guardian’s expert
       In addition to M.C.’s treating physician, the Public
Guardian presented expert testimony from a psychiatrist, Gordon
Plotkin. Plotkin interviewed M.C. five times and performed
a psychiatric evaluation of him. Plotkin agreed with M.C.’s
treating physician that M.C. suffers from schizoaffective disorder,
bipolar type.
       Plotkin testified that M.C.’s symptoms include
hallucinations, delusions, disorganized thinking, and

                                5
disorganized speech. Among other delusions, M.C. claimed
he is the highest-ranking official in the military, a prosecutor
in Monte Carlo, and a supreme court justice. He said he has
authority to have people executed and the governor might ask
him to murder someone. M.C. believed he would be shielded
legally because of his military work.
       Plotkin explained that schizoaffective disorder is a lifelong
condition that cannot be cured, but it can be managed with
anti-psychotic and mood stabilizing medications. The keys to
managing M.C.’s condition are medication compliance and insight
into mental illness. M.C. had no insight whatsoever into his
symptoms and illness, despite having been hospitalized many
times. M.C. told Plotkin he would stop taking his medication
if given the choice because he would be better off without it.
       Plotkin opined that M.C. presents a substantial danger
of physical harm to others due to his mental illness. In support,
he pointed to the fact that M.C. experiences delusions that
drive him to commit violent acts.
       Plotkin acknowledged that M.C. had not had any recent
violent incidents, had been compliant with his medication, and
was considered a “fall risk.” Plotkin explained those facts did
not change his opinion concerning M.C.’s dangerousness because
they were “environment dependent.” Plotkin noted that, since
2019, M.C. had been living in a high-security facility where
he was closely supervised by forensically trained staff. He
also noted that M.C. was considered a fall risk during a time
he was “over-medicated.”
4.     Verdict and appeal
       After deliberating for less than an hour, the jury found
M.C. represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others
by reason of a mental disease, defect, or disorder. It also found

                                 6
M.C. qualifies for a Murphy conservatorship. M.C. timely
appealed.
                            DISCUSSION
1.     Relevant law and standard of review
       “The Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (Welf. & Inst. Code,
§ 5000 et seq. . . .) authorizes the creation of renewable one-year
conservatorships for persons who are gravely disabled as a result
of a mental disorder.” (People v. Quiroz (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th
1371, 1375–1376.) As relevant to this case, a person is “gravely
disabled” if (1) the person has a pending felony case involving
death or great bodily harm to another; (2) there has been
a finding of probable cause at a preliminary examination;
(3) as a result of a mental-health disorder, the person is unable
to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings
against him and to assist counsel in his defense; and (4) the
person represents a substantial danger of physical harm
to others by reason of a mental disease, defect, or disorder.
(§ 5008, subd. (h)(1)(B)(i)–(iv).) A conservatorship imposed
under this definition of “ ‘gravely disabled’ ” is commonly referred
to as a “ ‘ “Murphy conservatorship.” ’ ” (Quiroz, at p. 1376.)
       A Murphy conservatorship automatically terminates
after one year. (§ 5361, subd. (a).) If the conservator determines
the conservatorship is still required beyond that period, the
conservator may petition the superior court for reappointment
for an additional one-year period. (Id., subd. (b).)
       A court may impose a Murphy conservatorship over a
person only if the petitioner proves, beyond a reasonable doubt,
the person is gravely disabled. (Conservatorship of Murphy
(1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 15, 17–18 (Murphy).)
2.     Substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict
       M.C. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
the jury’s verdict.

                                 7
       We review a jury’s verdict in a Murphy conservatorship
case for substantial evidence. (Murphy, supra, 134 Cal.App.3d
at p. 18.) Under this familiar standard, we review the entire
record in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine
whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence
that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a
reasonable trier of fact could find all the elements of a Murphy
conservatorship beyond a reasonable doubt. (See People v.
Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 298.) In so doing, we
presume in support of the verdict the existence of every fact
the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. (People v.
Nieber (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 458, 476; People v. Owens (2022)
78 Cal.App.5th 1015, 1022.) Substantial evidence includes
circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn
from that evidence. (People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 57;
Nieber, at p. 476.)
       We resolve all evidentiary conflicts and questions
of credibility in favor of the verdict. (People v. Brady (2018)
22 Cal.App.5th 1008, 1014, quoting People v. Cardenas (2015)
239 Cal.App.4th 220, 226–227.) We cannot reweigh the evidence
or reassess witness credibility on our own. (People v. Young
(2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181 [resolution of conflicts and
inconsistencies in the testimony is the exclusive province of
the trier of fact].)
       Here, the parties stipulated to three of the four elements
required for a Murphy conservatorship: (1) M.C. had a pending
murder case; (2) there had been a finding of probable cause at
a preliminary hearing in that case; and (3) M.C. was incompetent
to stand trial as a result of a mental-health disorder. Therefore,
the only issue on appeal is whether substantial evidence supports
the jury’s finding on the fourth element: that M.C. represented
a substantial danger of physical harm to others by reason of a

                                8
mental disorder. (§ 5008, subd. (h)(1)(B)(iv).) We conclude
it does.
       The record contains ample evidence that M.C. has a severe
mental disorder. M.C.’s treating psychiatrist testified that he
suffers from schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type, which causes
him to experience frequent delusions, some of which are violent
in nature. For example, M.C. claimed he is the highest-ranking
officer in the military with the authority to have people executed.
He also claimed the governor might ask him to commit homicide,
for which he would have legal immunity because of his position
in the military.
       The record also contains evidence that M.C.’s mental
disorder has led him to commit actual violence. The jury heard
M.C.’s testimony from the 2021 trial, in which he admitted
stabbing a man with a pair of scissors. Although portions of
M.C.’s testimony seemed plausible, he also recounted facts that
were plainly delusions. For example, he claimed the victim was
armed with “steel nunchuks,” an “eight-foot tall tornado came
in like Star Trek,” and a man named Hector appeared in the
“whirlwind.” M.C. also was adamant that, despite being stabbed
more than a dozen times, the victim suffered no visible injuries
and was in “perfect health.” Given these incredible claims,
the jury reasonably could have found M.C.’s decision to stab
the victim was connected to his mental disorder.
       The jury also reasonably could have concluded there is
a substantial danger M.C. will commit similar acts of violence
in the future. The Public Guardian’s expert testified that
schizoaffective disorder is a lifelong condition that cannot be
cured. Consistent with that characterization, M.C.’s psychiatrist
reported his condition had not improved and he continued to
experience delusions, despite being heavily medicated and
receiving intensive treatment. Moreover, according to the expert,

                                 9
the keys to managing M.C.’s disorder are medication compliance
and insight into the disorder. The record indicates M.C. lacked
both, as he repeatedly denied being mentally ill and claimed
he would stop taking his medication if given the option. On
this record, the jury reasonably could have found M.C. poses
a substantial danger of physical harm to others on account of
a mental disorder.
       M.C. contends the jury’s finding was unreasonable in
light of evidence that he is elderly and physically infirm. He
points out he was 71 years old at the time of trial, the hospital
staff considered him to be a “fall risk,” he resided in the hospital’s
“frail unit,” and he had been reliant on a walker and wheelchair.
       Contrary to M.C.’s contentions, none of this evidence
precludes a finding that he was dangerous at the time of trial.
Although M.C. was 71 years old, he also was relatively elderly—
65 years old—when he reportedly stabbed a man with scissors.
The record also indicates M.C.’s physical infirmities were
transitory. The Public Guardian’s expert suggested M.C.
was considered a fall risk due to the side effects from being
over-medicated. Given M.C. claimed he wanted to stop taking
his medication, the jury reasonably could have found those
side effects would not limit him in the future.
       Similarly, M.C.’s reliance on a wheelchair and walker
seems to have been intermittent, and it does not appear he
used either during trial. In fact, M.C.’s treating physician
described him as “quite able-bodied,” such that the physician
felt threatened by him. The jurors were able to observe
M.C. throughout the trial, so they could have evaluated the
reasonableness of the physician’s fear. The jurors were in a
better position than we are to evaluate M.C.’s physical condition
at the time of trial, and we decline to second guess them on
appeal.

                                 10
3.      The court did not err by admitting M.C.’s prior
        testimony
        Before trial, M.C. moved to preclude the prosecutor
from entering into evidence his testimony from the 2021 trial.
M.C. argued admission of the testimony violated his right to
due process because it could be used against him in a future
criminal proceeding. He also argued the testimony was
inadmissible hearsay, he was incompetent at the time he gave
it, the testimony lacked reliability, and he did not understand
the nature of the oath he was under. Alternatively, he sought
to exclude the testimony under Evidence Code section 352,
arguing its prejudicial nature far outweighed its probative value.
        The court overruled M.C.’s objections and admitted the
testimony as party admissions. The court found the testimony
was “profoundly probative” on key issues in the case: whether
M.C. suffers from a mental disorder and whether he is
dangerous. The court noted that whether M.C. understood
the nature of the oath went to the weight of the evidence,
not its admissibility.
        M.C. argues the trial court erred, raising many of the same
issues on appeal. First, he contends his prior testimony was
inadmissible because there is no indication he was competent
to testify or understood the nature of the oath he was given.
We are not persuaded.
        At the outset, M.C.’s arguments concern the admissibility
of the testimony at the 2021 trial, and the proper time to raise
them was at that trial. Instead, M.C. effectively waived the
issues by voluntarily testifying on his own behalf. At the 2022
trial, the Public Guardian sought to admit the prior testimony
as party admissions, which do not require the declarant be
competent nor under oath. (See Evid. Code, § 1220.) Therefore,
whether M.C. was competent to testify or understood the nature

                                11
of the oath in 2021 is irrelevant to the admissibility of the
statements in 2022.
        Even if M.C.’s competency in 2021 were relevant in 2022,
he has not shown his prior testimony was inadmissible on
that basis. M.C. seems to believe the fact he was incompetent
to stand trial means he was incompetent to testify. However,
the competency requirements to stand trial and the requirements
to testify are distinct. A defendant is incompetent to stand trial
if, “as a result of a mental health disorder or developmental
disability, the defendant is unable to understand the nature
of the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of
a defense in a rational manner.” (Pen. Code, § 1367, subd. (a).)
In contrast, a witness is incompetent to testify if he or she is
“(1) Incapable of expressing himself or herself concerning
the matter so as to be understood . . . ; or (2) Incapable of
understanding the duty of a witness to tell the truth.” (Evid.
Code, § 701, subd. (a).)
        Here, despite being incompetent to stand trial, M.C. plainly
was capable of expressing himself at the 2021 trial. Moreover,
although his testimony was bizarre and improbable, it appears
he believed he was testifying truthfully. M.C. points to nothing
in the record indicating his delusional thinking rendered him
incapable of understanding his obligation to tell the truth.
Accordingly, he has not met his burden to show he was
incompetent to testify. (See People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491,
589 [the party challenging a witness has the burden to prove
incompetence].)
        M.C. briefly argues his prior testimony should be treated
like statements made to experts during an examination to
determine competency, which are not admissible in a subsequent
trial on guilt or sanity. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.130(d)(3).)
We disagree. Our Supreme Court has explained the immunity

                                 12
rule for statements made during competency examinations is
necessary because it protects the accused’s privilege against self-
incrimination and promotes accuracy in psychiatric evaluations,
which furthers the public policy of not criminally trying persons
who are mentally incompetent. (People v. Weaver (2001) 26
Cal.4th 876, 960.) Those concerns are not present here: M.C.
voluntarily testified on his own behalf at the 2021 trial, he
did not give the testimony as part of a psychiatric evaluation,
and the 2022 trial was a civil proceeding, not a criminal one.
We decline to extend the immunity rule to these circumstances.
       Next, M.C. argues his prior testimony was “fundamentally
unreliable” because it expressed delusional thinking. Relatedly,
he argues the Public Guardian improperly used the testimony
both to prove the truth of the matters asserted—that he stabbed
a man—and also that he suffers from delusions. We agree with
the trial court that these issues go to the weight of the testimony,
not its admissibility. Moreover, there is nothing improper about
the Public Guardian using the testimony for multiple purposes.
(See, e.g., People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 593 [rejecting
a defendant’s argument that a trial court erred by admitting
evidence for both hearsay and nonhearsay purposes].) The jury
was capable of analyzing M.C.’s statements to determine which
were true and which reflected delusional thinking.
       M.C. alternatively argues the court should have excluded
the testimony under Evidence Code section 352 because its
probative value was substantially outweighed by the probability
of undue prejudice. We review a trial court’s decision to admit
evidence over an Evidence Code section 352 objection for abuse
of discretion. (People v. Rocha (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1385,
1397.)
       Contrary to M.C.’s suggestions, his prior testimony had
substantial probative value. The Public Guardian’s expert

                                 13
testified that M.C. suffers from schizoaffective disorder, which
is a condition that causes delusional thinking. The expert
explained that, although rare, some people experience delusions
that lead them to commit acts of violence. M.C.’s prior testimony
—in which he recounted stabbing a man with scissors under
bizarre and improbable circumstances—indicates he suffers from
such delusions. Accordingly, it is highly relevant to key issues
before the jury: whether M.C. suffers from a mental disorder
that makes him dangerous to others.
       M.C. contends the incident was too remote in time to be
relevant on the issue of his current dangerousness. We disagree.
The Public Guardian’s expert testified that schizoaffective
disorder is a lifelong condition that can be managed, but not
cured. There is ample evidence that, in the years following
the stabbing incident, M.C. had not been able to manage the
disorder effectively. Indeed, despite receiving extensive care and
medication, he continued to experience delusions, some of which
involved violence towards others. Under these circumstances,
evidence that M.C.’s delusional thinking was connected to
extreme violence in the relatively recent past is highly probative
of whether he is likely to commit similar acts of violence in
the present and future.
       We also reject M.C.’s suggestion that the evidence was
unduly prejudicial. Even without M.C.’s testimony, the jury
would have learned he had been charged with murder and
suffers from delusional thinking. Although bizarre, M.C.’s
account of the incident was not particularly graphic. Nor did he
reveal any information that might have turned the jury against
him. Weighed against the evidence’s significant probative value
on key issues, the court did not abuse its discretion by declining
to exclude the testimony under Evidence Code section 352.

                                14
4.     The court did not err by denying M.C.’s requests
       for a mistrial
       M.C. argues the trial court erred by refusing to declare
a mistrial in response to improper testimony and argument. He
identifies three instances in which the trial was “infected” by
references to extraneous and prejudicial matters. We consider
each in turn.
       a.    Standard of review
       “ ‘A mistrial should be granted if the court is apprised of
prejudice that it judges incurable by admonition or instruction.
[Citation.] Whether a particular incident is incurably prejudicial
is by its nature a speculative matter, and the trial court is
vested with considerable discretion in ruling on mistrial motions.
[Citation.]’ [Citation.] A motion for a mistrial should be granted
when ‘ “ ‘a [defendant’s] chances of receiving a fair trial have been
irreparably damaged.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Collins (2010) 49 Cal.4th
175, 198–199.)
       Generally, we review the denial of a mistrial motion for
an abuse of discretion. (People v. Garcia (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th
240, 248.) However, we apply a de novo standard where the
appellant’s constitutional rights are implicated. (Ibid.)
       b.    Aulakh’s testimony
       At trial, M.C. requested the court instruct the jury not
to consider the possibility that he could be released into the
community. In support, M.C. cited People v. Mendez (2018)
21 Cal.App.5th 654 (Mendez). The court declined to give M.C.’s
proposed instruction, but it agreed the jury could not consider
his possible placement.
       During direct examination, the Public Guardian asked
Aulakh—M.C.’s treating psychiatrist—what must happen before
M.C. can transition to a lower level of care. Aulakh responded
that M.C. would need to show insight into his disorder, seek

                                 15
treatment on his own, and work collaboratively with his
treatment team. The doctor continued: “[M.C.’s] on a very
structured specialized unit and he’s on a decent dose of
medication, and I can just imagine if he was in the community
or . . . .” M.C. objected. The court sustained the objection
and struck the testimony.
         During a break in the trial, M.C. moved for a mistrial,
citing Mendez, supra, 21 Cal.App.5th 654. M.C. argued that,
although the court struck Aulakh’s statement, the jury still heard
the improper testimony. The court denied M.C.’s motion. On
appeal, M.C. argues the court erred because it was impossible
to cure the prejudice from Aulakh’s testimony.
         M.C.’s reliance on Mendez, supra, 21 Cal.App.5th 654,
is misplaced. In that case, the People sought to commit the
appellant as a mentally disordered offender (MDO). (Id. at
p. 656.) Like a Murphy conservatorship, an MDO commitment
requires a finding that the person represents a substantial
danger to others. At the People’s request, the trial court in that
case instructed the jury it must determine whether the appellant
represented a substantial danger “ ‘if released into the community
unsupervised.’ ” (Id. at p. 659.) The Court of Appeal held the
trial court erred and reversed the commitment order. The court
explained the qualification in the instruction—if released into
the community unsupervised—was not consistent with the
statute, improperly asked the jury to consider the consequences
of its verdict, and was misleading because there were
alternatives to unsupervised release. (Id. at pp. 660–661, 663.)
         We will assume, for the sake of argument, the Mendez
court’s reasoning also applies to Murphy conservatorships.
Nevertheless, the case is inapposite. Here, unlike in Mendez,
the trial court did not give a flawed instruction. Nor did it
suggest to the jury it should consider M.C.’s future placement

                               16
or the consequences of its verdict. To the contrary, when M.C.’s
psychiatrist started to discuss the possibility that M.C. could be
released into the community, the court immediately sustained
M.C.’s objection and struck the testimony. In fact, the court
sustained the objection before the doctor had finished his
thought, which plainly communicated to the jury it should
not consider the issue. The court’s swift and definitive action
cured any potential prejudice. Accordingly, under any standard
of review, the court did not err in denying M.C.’s motion for
a mistrial.
       c.    Plotkin’s testimony
       On direct examination, the Public Guardian’s expert,
Gordon Plotkin, testified that M.C. poses a substantial physical
danger to others due to his mental disorder. The Public
Guardian asked Plotkin to elaborate on his opinion. Plotkin
noted there were “two officers next to him in [the] court. So
the chance of him—.” M.C. objected, and the trial court struck
the testimony.
       The court and the parties discussed the incident during a
break in the trial. The prosecutor suggested Plotkin was simply
explaining why he believed M.C. is dangerous, despite the lack
of recent violent incidents. M.C. moved for a mistrial, arguing
Plotkin’s comment shifted the burden to show dangerousness.
       The court noted the testimony was improper, but it found
Plotkin’s comment did not warrant a mistrial. The court offered
to give a curative admonition, which M.C. accepted. The court
then admonished the jury as follows: “[B]efore we took our break,
you heard some testimony regarding the fact that there are two
guards that are here with [M.C.], and then I granted a motion
to strike, and that was stricken. [¶] But I just wanted to advise
you that it is standard practice that individuals transported from
Patton State Hospital to this court are escorted by two guards,

                               17
and you should not consider for the purpose of determining
whether [M.C.] is a danger to others that he is escorted by
two guards to this courtroom.”
        Contrary to M.C.’s contentions, the trial court handled
the situation appropriately and cured any potential prejudice.
Regardless of Plotkin’s comment, the jury likely would have
noticed that M.C. had been escorted by guards throughout the
trial. Although Plotkin’s comment drew additional attention
to the situation, the court explained to the jury it was common
practice and had no bearing on M.C.’s potential dangerousness.
The court’s admonition sufficiently cured any prejudice. In fact,
it is likely M.C. benefited from the incident, as the jury was
no longer left to speculate as to the reason for the heightened
security. Accordingly, under any standard of review, the court
did not err in denying M.C.’s motion for a mistrial.
        d.    Closing argument
        During closing argument, the Public Guardian argued
M.C. was compliant with his medication only because there was
a threat of an involuntary medication order. M.C. requested
a sidebar with the court, which was not reported. During
a subsequent break, M.C. moved for a mistrial, arguing the
prosecutor’s argument was improper because there was no
evidence that M.C. was aware of an involuntary medication
order. The Public Guardian asserted Aulakh had testified
that he told M.C. about the order. M.C. responded that Aulakh
was referring to an order for blood draws, not medication.
        The court denied the motion, explaining the prosecutor’s
argument was a reasonable inference from the evidence. The
court noted that, in its experience, involuntary medication orders
do not identify specific procedures; instead, they defer to the
doctor to determine what is necessary.

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       On appeal, M.C. contends the Public Guardian’s argument
was pure speculation as there is no evidence he was aware of
an involuntary medication order. We disagree. Aulakh testified
that he informed M.C. he had obtained a court order to draw his
blood. Even assuming that order was limited to blood draws, it is
reasonable to conclude it motivated M.C. to take his medication.
According to Aulakh, one of the reasons to draw M.C.’s blood was
to ensure he was compliant with his medication. It is reasonable
to infer M.C. was aware of this fact and knew that, if his doctors
discovered he was not taking his medication, they also could
obtain a court order forcing him to do so. Accordingly, the Public
Guardian’s argument was a fair comment on the evidence, and
it did not provide grounds for a mistrial under any standard
of review.
                          DISPOSITION
       We affirm the order.

      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                     EGERTON, J.

We concur:

             LAVIN, Acting P. J.                      ADAMS, J.

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