Court Opinion

ID: 9729605
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:44:03.65272+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:59.932343
License: Public Domain

HARRIS, Senior Judge,
Concurring in Result.
I concur in all but one aspect of the majority opinion, and believe that the majority has reached the correct result by affirming the trial court’s denial of CR 60.02 relief to the appellant. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the appellant’s CR 60.02 mo*695tion was not brought within a reasonable time. This determination alone affords sufficient basis for affirming the order under review.
I also believe the trial court did not err in rejecting the appellant’s claims of overreaching and intimidation by the appellee as not supported by the record.
However, I cannot concur in the majority’s analysis of appellant’s contention that the trial court erred in rejecting her claim that she lacked mental competency when she signed the separation agreement. The trial court focused its attention on the appellant’s conduct before and after the separation agreement was signed, while the focus should have been on her mental capacity at “the immediate time when the contract was made.” Hall v. Crouch, 341 S.W.2d 591, 594 (Ky.1960) quoting Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Cheek’s Adm’r, 258 Ky. 621, 80 S.W.2d 518 (1935). Had this claim been timely presented, I believe it would have been incumbent upon the trial court to grant appellant an evi-dentiary hearing on her mental capacity claim and then to have rendered a specific finding of fact regarding appellant’s mental capacity at the time she signed the agreement. However, because I agree that the CR 60.02 motion raising this claim was not timely filed, I concur in the result reached by the majority.