Court Opinion

ID: 9751575
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 16:37:31.063028+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:34:44.679801
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
President Judge PELLEGRINI.
Because the Walter D. Palmer Leadership Learning Partners Charter School (Charter School) agreed to an enrollment cap on the number of students who would attend its charter school, and nothing in Section 1723-A(d)(l) of the Charter School Law,1 24 P.S. § 17-1723-A(d)(l), requires that agreement to take place after its passage, I respectfully dissent. I also dissent from the majority’s unnecessary holding that a charter school cannot appeal the grant of a charter with conditions both because such an appeal is allowable and would impede the granting of charters.
Boiling the facts down to their essence, after the School District of Philadelphia (School District) did not act timely on the charter of the Charter School, the State Charter Appeal Board issued the Charter School its first charter in 2000, which did not contain an enrollment cap. In December 2001, the Secretary of Education of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania declared the School District to be a distressed school district. A School Reform Commission (Reform Commission) was formed to assume all the powers and duties of the school board of the School District. Un*229der Section 696 of the Public School Code,2 24 P.S. § 6-696, the Reform Commission was granted extensive additional powers to operate the School District, including the ability to suspend many provisions of the Public School Code as well as provisions of the Charter School Law.
After the initial charter expired in 2005, the Charter School requested that the Reform Commission renew its charter. In its renewal application, the Charter School stated that it presently had 675 students but wanted to expand its enrollment to 750 students. The Reform Commission approved the renewal charter by resolution at a public meeting in March 2005. The renewal charter was 27 pages in length containing numerous conditions. One of those conditions limited the Charter School’s enrollment to 675 students to serve pupils in grades kindergarten through eight. Notwithstanding that it was made aware of that condition, the Charter School did not challenge the determination. Both the Reform Commission and the Charter School signed the charter.3
In July 2010, the Charter School requested that the Department of Education (Department) withhold from the School District’s subsidy allocation approximately $1.67 million for students it educated during school years 2007-2008, 2008-2009 and 2009-2010 that were above the enrollment cap of 675 students contained in the charter. The Department issued a letter in September 2010 to the School District informing it that pursuant to Section 1725-A(a)(5) of the Charter School Law,4 24 P.S. § 17-1725-A(a)(5), it had withheld $1.67 million from the School District’s basic education subsidy payment in connection with the request made by the Charter School. It also informed the School District that it could challenge the withholding if it disagreed with the deduction and that the matter could be adjudicated in an administrative proceeding. The School District did object to the withholding, and an administrative hearing was held.
After the hearing, the Department found that there was an agreement by the parties concerning the enrollment cap stating that “while the [Pennsylvania Department of Education] agrees that there is not explicit language in the charter indicating that [Charter School] consented to the enrollment cap by signing it, the Department concludes that the testimony and evidence of the record aptly support the District’s contention that ... [Charter School was] aware of the cap prior to and before signing the charter in September 2005.” (Department’s March 4, 2011 Decision at 13.) However, it went on to find that that agreement was no longer valid *230after the passage of Section 1723-A(d)(l) of the Charter School Law because the School District had to obtain the legal assent of the Charter School anew. As a result, the Secretary found.that the School District properly withheld funds for the school year prior to and including the 2007-2008 school year but was without authority for the following school years. Both the Charter School and the School District appealed.
The majority holds that the Secretary properly found that the School District properly withheld funds for increased enrollment for school years prior to and including 2007-2008 because those years occurred before the passage of any conditions imposed prior to the passage of Section 1723-A(d)(l) and “when the Charter School signed the written charter, it chose to become legally bound to the terms of charter, including the enrollment cap.” (Slip Opinion, p. 6.) However, the majority then goes on to hold that the School District improperly withheld funds for the school years thereafter because the same agreement in which the Charter School “chose to become legally bound” is no longer valid. Ostensibly, that position was arrived at because a new agreement had to be entered into after the passage of Section 1723-A(d)(2). I disagree with the majority for the same reason that it affirms the Secretary for the pre-passage years — Section 1723-A(d) does not make agreements on caps on school enrollment entered prior to its passage null and void.
Section 1720-A(a) of the Charter School Law, 24 P.S. § 17-1720-A(a), provides that “This written 3 charter shall be legally binding on both the local board of school directors of a school district and the charter school’s board of trustees” applicable. The majority suggests that after the passage of Section 1723-A(d), a new agreement has to be entered. That provision provides:
Enrollment
(d)(1) Enrollment of students in a charter school or cyber charter school shall not be subject to a cap or otherwise limited by any past or future action of a board of school directors, a board of control established under Article VII-B, a special board of control established under section 62 or any other governing authority, unless agreed to by the charter school or cyber charter school as part of a written charter pursuant to section 1720-A.
(2) The provisions of this subsection shall apply to a charter school or cyber charter school regardless of whether the charter was approved prior to or approved subsequent to the effective date of this subsection. (Emphasis added.)
Section 1723-A(d)(l)(2) of the Charter School Law, 24 P.S. § 17-1723-A(d)(l)(2).
As can be seen, all that Section 1723-A(d) requires is that there be an agreement regardless of whether that agreement was entered into before or after its passage. Nothing requires a new agreement. In this case, because the Department concluded that there was an agreement as to the enrollment cap in the written charter, it is binding on the Charter School.5
*231Inferring that even though the Charter School “chose” to sign the charter, the majority concludes that the charter cannot be an agreement within the meaning of Section 1723-A(d) because the Charter School could not have appealed the enrollment cap. The majority arrives at that conclusion by relying on Mosaica Academy Charter School v. Dept. of Education, 572 Pa. 191, 813 A.2d 813 (2002), to find that a charter grant cannot be appealed even though it contains unacceptable conditions. I disagree with the majority for several reasons.
First, I disagree that Mosaica applies because it addresses whether a third party, in that case, the Philadelphia School District, could appeal the grant of charter school application granted by another school district. All that case addresses is whether a third party can challenge the grant of a charter.
Second, not addressed in Mosaica is how it interacts with the Administrative Agency Law. 2 Pa.C.S. § 701 provides:
(a) General rule. — Except as provided in subsection (b), this subchapter shall apply to all Commonwealth agencies regardless of the fact that a statute expressly provides that there shall be no appeal from an adjudication of an agency, or that the adjudication of an agency shall be final or conclusive, or shall not be subject to review.
(b) Exceptions. — None of the provisions of this subchapter shall apply to:
(1) Any matter which is exempt from Subchapter A of Chapter 5 (relating to practice and procedure of Commonwealth agencies).[6]
(2) Any appeal from a Commonwealth agency which may be taken initially to the courts of common pleas under 42 Pa.C.S. § 933 (relating to appeals from government agencies).
*232Unless specifically excluded7 by the specific legislation, the provisions of the Administrative Agency Law apply.
As to who can appeal under the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa.C.S. § 702 provides that:
Any person aggrieved by an adjudication of a Commonwealth agency who has a direct interest in such adjudication shall have the right to appeal therefrom to the court vested with jurisdiction of such appeals by or pursuant to Title 42 (relating to judiciary and judicial procedure).
Because a charter school could be aggrieved by a condition attached to a charter by a school district, a charter school can appeal such a condition, including an enrollment cap if it did not, as here, agree to it.
This leads to my final reason — if a charter school could not appeal a condition attached to the grant of a charter, that would effectively mean that a charter school would be effectively denied a charter even though the charter was granted. For example, a school district could attach enumerable conditions — say, not have a management company operate the school or have substantial amounts of cash on hand — that would difficult or impossible to meet. Without allowing a charter school to appeal a condition attached to a charter, it would mean that practically that charter school could not be established.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

. Act of March 10, 1949, P.L. 30, as amended, added by Section 1 of the Act of June 19, 1997, P.L. 225, retroactive effective July 1, 2008.

. Act of March 10, 1949, P.L. 30, as amended.

. Section 1720-A of the Charter School Law, added by the act of June 19, 1997, P.L. 225, 24 P.S. § 17-1720-A, provides:
Upon approval of a charter application under section 1717-A, a written charter shall be developed which shall contain the provisions of the charter application and which shall be signed by the local board of school directors of a school district, by the local boards of school directors of a school district in the case of a regional charter school or by the chairman of the appeal board pursuant to section 1717-A(i)(5) and the board of trustees of the charter school. This written charter, when duly signed by the local board of school directors of a school district, or by the local boards of school directors of a school district in the case of a regional charter school, and the charter school's board of trustees, shall act as legal authorization for the establishment of a charter school. This written charter shall be legally binding on both the local board of school directors of a school district and the charter school’s board of trustees. (Emphasis added.)

.Added by the act of June 19, 1997, P.L. 225.

. In Foreman v. Chester-Upland School District, 941 A.2d 108 (Pa.Cmwlth.2008), at issue was whether an “Empowerment Board” operating under the now expired "Educational Empowerment Act,” Act of March 10, 1949, P.L. 30, as amended, 24 P.S. § 6-693(1), under the authority granted to cancel or renegotiate any contract to which it was a party, authorized it to add enrollment caps to the enrollment levels of existing charter schools. We held that the Empowerment Board's authority to renegotiate contracts was inapplicable because a charter was not a contract, but regulatory in nature because, much like a *231permit application, a school district was obligated to issue a charter if the applicant satisfied the criteria set forth in the Charter School Law. If the application was denied, then the State Charter School Appeal Board could reverse that decision, and that decision could be appealed to this court.
There are important distinctions between that case and this one. First, the Reform Commission was operating under Section 696 of the School Code, 24 P.S. § 6-696, which is much different than the Empowerment Act under which the Empowerment Board was operating. The School Code gives the Reform Commission much more powers regarding charter schools. Second, unlike in Foreman, where the charter did not have enrollment caps which were trying to be added, the charter in this case has an enrollment cap which was trying to be removed. In both instances, the charter is legally binding on both the local board of school directors of a school district and the charter school's board of trustees as required by Section 1720-A (a) of the Charter School Law.

. 2 Pa.C.S. § 581 provides
(a) Commonwealth agencies.- — Except as provided in subsection (b), this subchapter applies to all Commonwealth agencies.
(b) Exception. — This subchapter does not apply to:
(1) Proceedings before the Department of Revenue, the Department of the Auditor General or the Board of Finance and Revenue involving the original settlement, assessment or determination or resettlement, reassessment or redetermination, review or refund of taxes, interest or payments made into the State Treasury.
(2) Proceedings before the Secretary of the Commonwealth under the act of June 3, 1937 (P.L. 1333, No. 320),] known as the Pennsylvania Election Code.
(3) Proceedings before the Department of Transportation involving matters reviewable under 42 Pa.C.S. § 933 (relating to appeals from government agencies).
(4) Proceedings before the State System of Higher Education involving student discipline.
(c) Local agencies. — This subchapter applies to all local agencies.

. 2 Pa.C.S. § 106 provides that, “No subsequent statute shall be held to supersede or modify the provisions of this title except to the extent that such statute shall do so expressly.”