Court Opinion

ID: 9530798
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:03:41.243972+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:15.197617
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE KASSERMAN, dissenting: I cannot agree with the conclusion of the majority in which it is determined that the evidence in this cause is sufficient to establish that the defendant is guilty of murder. In People v. Johnson (1964), 54 Ill. App. 2d 27, 33, 203 N.E.2d 283, the court stated: “The Criminal Code of 1961 [Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, pars. 9— 1, 9 — 2 and 9 — 3] provides that a person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits murder; that a person who kills an individual without lawful justification, if at the time of the killing he is acting under a sudden and intense passion, resulting from serious provocation by the individual killed, commits voluntary manslaughter; and that a person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits involuntary manslaughter, if his acts, whether lawful or unlawful, which cause the death, are such as are likely to cause death or great bodily harm to some individual, and he performs them recklessly.” The court in Johnson pointed out that in the case of voluntary manslaughter, the act of the defendant is done intentionally or knowingly and concluded: “Intent to kill is not an element of involuntary manslaughter. Involuntary manslaughter is an offense which happens without the intent to inflict injury and death results from acts performed recklessly.” Johnson, 54 Ill. App. 2d 27, 36; cf. People v. Post (1966), 78 Ill. App. 2d 121, 223 N.E.2d 238. It is my conclusion in the instant case that the evidence fails to establish that the defendant performed the acts resulting in the death of Jason Bruce with the knowledge such acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm as required by section 9 — 1(a)(2) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 9 — 1(a)(2)). To the contrary, in my opinion the evidence indicates that the acts of the defendant constitute involuntary manslaughter as defined in section 9— 3(a) of the Criminal Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 9 — 3(a)). For the foregoing reasons, I would reduce the defendant’s conviction to involuntary manslaughter and remand the cause for a new sentencing hearing.