Court Opinion

ID: 9584901
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:53:44.73671+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:06:49.275330
License: Public Domain

JON P. WILCOX, J.
¶ 58. (concurring). I agree with the majority's analysis and disposition of the present case. I write separately, however, to address this court's recent reformulation of the harmless error test. See majority op. at ¶ 51.
¶ 59. For the reasons stated in Justice Crooks' concurring opinion in Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 2001 WI 109, 245 Wis. 2d 772, 629 N.W.2d 727, which I joined in full, I am confident that the harmless error test with which this court long has grappled should be understood in terms of "probability" rather than "possibility":
An error will not provide grounds for reversal or a new trial unless the error is significant enough to undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceeding at issue. An error is significant enough to undermine confidence in the outcome if there is a reasonable probability that without the error, the outcome would have been different.
*60¶ 60. Although this formulation of the harmless error test is more stringent than the majority's "reasonable possibility" test, I nonetheless agree with the majority that the error in this case requires us to remand this case for a new trial on the issue of damages. As the majority indicates, although the evidence regarding the amounts paid by the plaintiff s insurers was inadmissible and prejudicial, it became central in the dispute over the appropriate amount of medical expenses that the jury should award. See majority op. at ¶¶ 51-55. As such, I conclude that without the erroneous admission of this evidence, there is a reasonable probability that the damages awarded by the jury would have been different. The error in this case was significant enough to undermine confidence in the outcome below.