Court Opinion

ID: 9898854
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-15 15:08:17.910918+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:34.963823
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-1549-21

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

DAVID COMPANIONI, a/k/a
NEDAL IBARRA, NEDAL
NASRALLAH, and NEDAL
NASRALLAHIBARRA,

          Defendant-Appellant.

                   Submitted October 3, 2023 – Decided November 15, 2023

                   Before Judges Rose and Perez Friscia.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 13-06-0114.

                   Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
                   appellant (Al Glimis, Designated Counsel, on the
                   brief).

                   Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for
                   respondent (Mercedes Robertson, Deputy Attorney
                   General, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM

      Defendant David Companioni appeals from a December 1, 2021 order

denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) following our remand to

the Law Division for more specific findings of fact and conclusions of law

pursuant to Rule 1:7-4 and the Strickland/Fritz standard.1 State v. Companioni,

No. A-1356-19 (App. Div. Feb. 19, 2021) (slip op. at 1, 10-12). We affirm

because the PCR court's amplified decision on remand is "supported by

sufficient credible evidence in the record." State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 543

(2013).

      We incorporate by reference the facts and procedural history summarized

in our prior opinion and reiterate those that lend context to the issue renewed on

this appeal:

                     For his part in cultivating marijuana plants at his
               apartment and a warehouse, defendant was charged in
               a State grand jury indictment with second-degree
               conspiracy to distribute twenty-five pounds or more of
               marijuana (count one), first-degree possession with
               intent to distribute twenty-five pounds or more of
               marijuana (count two), and first-degree maintaining or

1
   Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v. Fritz, 105 N.J.
42, 58 (1987) (requiring a defendant seeking PCR on ineffective assistance of
counsel grounds to demonstrate: (1) the particular manner in which counsel's
performance was deficient; and (2) that the deficiency prejudiced defendant's
right to a fair trial).

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                                          2
            operating a controlled dangerous substance (CDS)
            production facility (count three).     Prior to trial,
            defendant moved to suppress evidence seized after the
            issuance of a communications data warrant (CDW) that
            authorized the placement of a GPS tracking device on
            his co-defendant's car. Defendant contended the GPS
            device was installed before the search warrant was
            issued. The trial judge denied defendant's suppression
            motion.

            [(Companioni, slip op. at 1-2).]

       A jury convicted defendant of first-degree maintaining or operating a

CDS facility as charged in count three, and count two as amended to a second-

degree offense. Id. at 2. The jury failed to reach a verdict on the remaining

charge, which the trial court later dismissed on motion of the prosecutor. Ibid.

After granting the State's extended term motion, the court sentenced defendant

to an aggregate prison term of twenty years with a parole disqualifier of six years

and eight months.      Ibid.   We affirmed defendant's direct appeal of his

convictions, which only challenged the denial of his suppression motion. 2

      Pertinent to this appeal, just before the jury was sworn, the prosecutor

stated in open court that he had just received the judgment of conviction

regarding defendant's 2004 conviction for distribution of CDS within a thousand

2
  State v. Companioni, No. A-1402-15 (App. Div. Feb. 7, 2018), certif. denied,
234 N.J. 197 (2018).
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                                        3
feet of a school. Accordingly, defendant was subject to a mandatory extended

term on the State's application. See N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f); see also N.J.S.A.

2C:43-7. "In fairness . . . and in the interest of justice," the prosecutor was

willing to seek authorization to "reopen the last offer that was placed on the

table," i.e., in exchange for pleading guilty to count two, the State would

recommend a ten-year "flat" prison term. The State would also dismiss count

three, which exposed defendant to a parole ineligibility period between one-third

and one-half of the sentence imposed. See N.J.S.A. 2C:35-4. The prosecutor

further stated if defendant were convicted after trial of a first-degree offense and

the State moved for an extended term, the "minimum of ten years in state prison

[would] become[] a twenty-year minimum," plus "a parole ineligibility number

between one-half and one-third of the top number."

      In response, trial counsel stated:

                   I think a psych evaluation needs to be determined
            at this time. I just talked to my client. He's not
            interested in considering an offer. Basically, the time
            has been doubled from a minimum of ten to twenty, and
            he's not considering that. I think that . . . there's a
            problem with that, as his lawyer, Your Honor. I think
            there's a problem with a person [who]'s not willing to
            consider what the difference in time is here for simply
            growing some marijuana, have that possibility to go to
            jail for twenty years. . . . and the client doesn't even
            want five minutes to discuss it with me.

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      The trial court explained the ramifications of the State's renewed offer in

great detail.   Defendant interjected claiming "a Franks3 hearing might be

necessary" because the search warrant was not signed. The court dismissed

defendant's baseless request; defendant rejected the court's invitation to discuss

the plea offer further with trial counsel. Defendant made no further inquiries of

the court. Notably, the same judge denied defendant's suppression motion and

his ensuing PCR petition.

      Defendant raised multiple claims for PCR. Companioni, slip op. at 2.

Noting the overwhelming evidence adduced at trial, the PCR court denied nearly

all claims without an evidentiary hearing except for defendant's assertion that

he would have accepted the State's plea offer "but for his trial counsel advising

him he could not appeal if he had taken the plea."

      We summarized the ensuing testimony of trial counsel and defendant on

this discrete issue in our prior appeal. Id. at 3-8. Relevant here, on cross-

examination, defendant testified that during the pretrial status conferences, trial

counsel indicated:

3
   Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 170-71 (1978) (holding a challenge to a
search warrant on the grounds of warrant contamination requires defendant
make a "substantial preliminary showing" that the law enforcement officer
seeking the search warrant made misleading or false statements in the supporting
affidavit).
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                                        5
            an appeal was the way to go, and going forward with
            trial . . . is basically the way to go. In order for me to
            get there, it was just to go to trial and take my chances.
            And I also felt the way things were with the laws with
            marijuana that I don't think a jury is going to find me
            guilty of twenty years and better.

      Conversely, trial counsel did not recall speaking with defendant about

appealing the denial of the suppression. In response to the prosecutor's question,

"So you definitely didn't tell [defendant], 'oh no, you cannot appeal,'" trial

counsel responded, "Oh heck no, I didn't tell him that." Trial counsel further

acknowledged he did not advise defendant, "you have to go to trial in order to

appeal this motion to suppress." Rather, he testified he did not "recall having a

conversation like that because it is something [he] would have remembered."

      Earlier on direct examination, trial counsel testified he believed the denial

of any pretrial motion could be appealed following a conviction by guilty plea.

Trial counsel also stated he continuously "harp[ed]" on defendant to plead guilty

in view of the weight of the evidence – including his confession – and his

sentencing exposure.

      Immediately after closing statements, the PCR court issued a decision

from the bench finding the testimony of both witnesses "in equipoise with each

other." Id. at 8-9. Concluding defendant failed to satisfy his burden of proof,

the court denied PCR. Id. at 9.

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                                        6
      Defendant appealed, only challenging trial counsel's effectiveness on the

sole issue explored at the evidentiary hearing. Defendant maintained he rejected

the State's plea offer because trial counsel rendered incorrect advice about his

ability to appeal the denial of his suppression motion following a guilty plea.

Ibid. We remanded for "detailed findings of fact, correlated to comprehensive

conclusions of law that address[ed] all issues raised by the parties as guided by

the Strickland two-part analysis." Id. at 12-13.

      On remand, after considering the parties' supplemental briefs and oral

argument, the PCR court issued a seventeen-page written decision and

accompanying order, amplifying its prior oral decision on the issue raised at the

evidentiary hearing and its prior oral decision denying all other claims for relief.

In its decision, the court set forth the governing law, and expressly applied the

Strickland/Fritz standard and applicable law to the prior grounds of relief raised

by defendant that were not the subject of the evidentiary hearing.

      Turning to the issue reprised on this appeal, the court found:

                   [Defendant] claims he was never made aware that
            if he accepted the plea offer, he could have still
            appealed the denial of his motion. But there is no legal
            basis to back this argument nor is there any proof as to
            whether [defendant] ever inquired about this to trial
            counsel. After hearing the testimony of the witnesses
            at the evidentiary hearing, I found both witnesses to be
            credible and thus their testimony to be in equipoise.

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                                         7
            Trial counsel testified that he told [defendant] that he
            could appeal the court's denial of the defense's request
            to suppress the evidence. [Defendant] testified that he
            was told that he could only appeal the court's decision
            if he went to trial. Even if [d]efendant . . . believed that
            he could only appeal the suppression decision after he
            went to trial, this is of no moment since the evidence in
            the case was overwhelming. Defendant . . . testified at
            trial that he was growing [eighteen] marijuana plants in
            his home, this fact alone established that he was
            operating      a    controlled    dangerous       substance
            [production] facility.

            [(Footnote omitted).]

      Pursuant to our instructions, the court detailed its credibility findings,

noting trial counsel "was calm and never lost eye contact" during direct and

cross-examination. Similarly, the court found defendant "appeared calm and

composed throughout both direct and cross-examination," but noted defendant

"obviously ha[d] a significant interest in the outcome of the [hearing]."

      Addressing all claims raised in defendant's petition, the PCR court

generally concluded defendant "failed to establish a prima facie claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel," finding insufficient his "'bald assertions' and

conclusory allegations." The court elaborated:

            [Defendant] had the burden to provide specific
            instances from the record that showed unprofessional
            behavior which resulted in a changed outcome at trial.
            It is this [c]ourt's determination that trial counsel's
            performance was not deficient and that there is no

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                                         8
            reasonable probability that, but for trial counsel's
            strategic decisions, the result of the proceeding would
            have been different. It is the determination of this
            [c]ourt that trial counsel engaged in reasonable
            representation that in no way rose to a level of
            ineffective assistance of counsel.

      On appeal, defendant raises a single point for our consideration:

            ON REMAND, THE PCR COURT FAILED TO
            FOLLOW THIS COURT'S INSTRUCTION TO
            APPLY THE LAW TO THE FACTS OF THE CASE
            AND APPLIED THE WRONG LEGAL STANDARD.
            THE COURT BELOW THEREBY ERRED IN
            DENYING DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR [PCR]
            SINCE DEFENDANT ESTABLISHED THAT TRIAL
            COUNSEL      PROVIDED       INEFFECTIVE
            ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY FAILING TO
            ADVISE DEFENDANT THAT HE COULD ENTER A
            GUILTY PLEA AND STILL APPEAL THE DENIAL
            OF THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS, CAUSING
            DEFENDANT TO NOT BE FULLY INFORMED
            WHEN HE REJECTED THE STATE'S PLEA OFFER
            AND PROCEEDED TO TRIAL.

      Defendant maintains he was prejudiced by trial counsel's advice because

the State's pretrial sentencing recommendation of ten years' imprisonment

exposed him to substantially less prison time than the aggregate twenty-year

prison sentence imposed after trial. Contending the PCR court failed to follow

our remand instructions but noting "[n]o additional hearings are needed,"

defendant urges us to exercise original jurisdiction under Rule 2:10-5, grant

PCR, and vacate his convictions and sentence.

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                                       9
      The State counters the record refutes defendant's argument because the

pretrial proceedings demonstrate defendant "outright refused to even discuss the

plea offer with his attorney[] and independently chose to proceed to trial."

Asserting the record also reflects defendant proceeded to trial "because he

believed the jury would not find him guilty of a marijuana-related offense," the

State further argues that even if defendant established the first Strickland/Fritz

prong, he failed to demonstrate "a reasonable probability that he would have

accepted the plea offer."

       Well-settled principles guide our review. A defendant's right to effective

assistance of counsel extends to the plea negotiation process. See Missouri v.

Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 140 (2012). "If a plea bargain has been offered, a defendant

has the right to effective assistance of counsel in considering whether to accept

it." Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 168 (2012). To meet the first prong of the

Strickland /Fritz test, a defendant must identify acts or omissions by trial counsel

that were not "the result of reasonable professional judgment." Strickland, 466

U.S. at 690; see Fritz, 105 N.J. at 342.

      "A defendant asserting plea counsel's assistance was ineffective may meet

the first prong of the Strickland standard if the defendant can show counsel's

representation fell short of the prevailing standards expected of criminal defense

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                                        10
attorneys." State v. Vanness, 474 N.J. Super. 609, 624 (App. Div. 2023) (citing

Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366-67 (2010)). Accordingly, a defense

attorney must not "'provide misleading, material information that results in an

uninformed plea.'" State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339, 353 (2012) (quoting State v.

Nuñez-Valdez, 200 N.J. 129, 139-40 (2009)).

      To establish prejudice under the second Strickland/Fritz prong in the

context of plea negotiations, a defendant must demonstrate:          "but for the

ineffective advice of counsel there is a reasonable probability that the plea offer

would have been presented to the court"; "the court would have accepted its

terms"; and "the conviction or sentence, or both, under the offer's terms would

have been less severe" than those imposed after trial. Lafler, 566 U.S at 164.

Relevant here, the Court in Lafler explained defendants must show they "would

have accepted the plea and the prosecution would not have withdrawn it in light

of intervening circumstances." Ibid.

      We acknowledge defendant's argument that the PCR court's decision

regarding his reprised challenge to trial counsel's advice was "not substantially

different from its prior decision."    For example, the court again found the

testimony of defendant and trial counsel "in equipoise," whereas the legal

standard is whether defendant satisfied both Strickland prongs. However, the

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                                       11
PCR court again was convinced defendant did not satisfy his burden. Because

we are satisfied there exists "sufficient credible evidence in the record" to

support the PCR court's finding, see Nash, 212 N.J. at 540, we discern no basis

to disturb the court's decision.

       The record reveals defendant refused to confer with trial counsel about the

State's renewed offer notwithstanding the severity of defendant's sentencing

exposure following a conviction on certain counts after trial. When addressed

by the trial court, defendant confirmed he wished to proceed to trial; he neither

questioned the court nor counsel about the effect of a guilty plea on his ability

to appeal the denial of his suppression motion.         Trial counsel's obvious

frustration – evinced by his request for a psychiatric evaluation of his client in

response to the State's renewed offer – corroborates counsel's testimony that he

repeatedly attempted to convince defendant to plead guilty in view of the

strength of the State's evidence and that he had no recollection of advising

defendant he could only appeal the denial of his suppression motion following

a guilty verdict after trial. 4

4
   Nor are we persuaded by defendant's contention that the PCR court ignored
trial counsel's incorrect belief "that the denial of any motion could be appealed
after a guilty plea." In this instance, that misunderstanding of the applicable
legal principles corroborates, to some extent, trial counsel's testimony that he

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                                       12
      We conclude the PCR court implicitly found defendant failed to satisfy

the first Strickland prong, and because the record evidence supports that finding,

we discern no reason to disturb that decision. Accordingly, we need not reach

the second Strickland prong.

      For the sake of completeness, however, we agree with the State that

defendant rejected the plea offer for reasons that had no bearing upon his ability

to appeal his suppression motion. Indeed, defendant's testimony during the

evidentiary hearing underscores he rejected the State's guilty plea because he

believed the jury would not convict him of marijuana offenses. Moreover, in its

oral decision, the PCR court "firmly remember[ed]" defendant "didn't want to

hear any of us. He really was very, very clear that [he was] taking [the case] to

trial. I think . . . he was firmly convinced that people were not going to find him

guilty of something dealing with marijuana," and "everyone tried to dispel him

of that." Accordingly, defendant failed to demonstrate "but for the ineffective

advice of counsel there is a reasonable probability that . . . defendant would have

accepted the plea." See Lafler, 566 U.S at 164.

      Affirmed.

did not advise defendant his suppression motion could only be appealed
following a conviction after trial.
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