Court Opinion

ID: 9618448
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:12:38.593089+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:37:01.765124
License: Public Domain

HOWE, Justice
(concurring):
I concur.
As to the contention of the defendants that BYU’s action was barred by Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26 (1987), which governs actions for “injury to real property,” the majority has correctly held that statute not applicable here where BYU’s claims arise from a written contract between the parties. The Supreme Court of Colorado in Duncan v. Schuster-Graham Homes, Inc., 194 Colo. 441, 578 P.2d 637 (1978), gave a similar construction to a Colorado statute which fixed a two-year limitation on all actions against any architect, contractor, engineer, or inspector brought to recover damages for “injury to person or property” caused by the design, planning, supervision, inspection, construction, or observation of construction of any improvement to real property. In that case, which was a suit by an owner against the builder, the court held that the words of the statute “injury to person or property” applied to actions seeking damages for personal injury or property damage, and not to actions seeking damages for structural deficiencies. In making the distinction, the court gave the following example:
For example, if a roof were to collapse, injuring a homeowner and smashing his car’s windshield, the owner would have claims for both his personal injury and damage to his car. Both claims would be within the contemplated coverage of [the two-year statute of limitations]. Both would be tort claims. In addition the homeowner would have a separate claim for the cost of repairing the defective roof; but this latter claim, being in the nature of a contract claim arising out of the sale of the house, would not be covered by this special statute of limitations.
As to BYU’s contention that a cause of action for breach of contract should not accrue and the six-year statute of limitations should not begin to run until the breach is discovered, BYU has cited no case and my research has discovered no cases where the discovery rule was so ap*1375plied. See, however, City of Aurora v. Bechtel Corp., 599 F.2d 382 (10th Cir.1979), which was an action for professional malpractice controlled by a contract statute of limitations where the discovery rule was applied. The general rule is, as stated by the majority, that an owner’s action for breach of a construction contract is generally considered to accrue on the date of completion of construction. Logically, I cannot see why if we apply the discovery rule in cases for professional negligence, the same rule should not also be applied in cases for breach of contract where the breach is a latent defect in the construction which becomes apparent only after the statute of limitations has otherwise run. In the reported cases, the refusal of the courts to apply a discovery rule in breach of contract cases has usually been ameliorated by allowing the owner to bring his action against the architect, designer, or builder for negligence, such as negligent design or negligent supervision of construction. See Annots., 1 A.L.R.3d 914, 90 A.L.R.3d 507, & 12 A.L.R.4th 866. The statute of limitations does not begin to run on a negligence claim until the damage is discovered, which may be after the limitation on a contract action has expired. However, in the instant case, even if Paul-sen’s alleged breach of contract is viewed as giving BYU a negligence action against it, BYU would still be barred since its action was filed more than three years after the damage (leaking of the pipes) was discovered.
BYU asserts that section 78-12-25.5, which provides that no action to recover damages for “injury to property” arising out of a defective and unsafe condition of an improvement to real property may be brought against the person performing or furnishing the design, planning, supervision of construction, or construction of such improvement more than seven years after the completion of construction, indicates a legislative intent that actions may be brought by owners against builders on a construction contract after the expiration of six years from the date of completion of construction but before seven years have elapsed. Such an interpretation would permit the maintenance of BYU’s action against Paulsen. A short answer to this contention is that, as pointed out earlier, section 78-12-25.5 does not apply to actions founded on contract by owners against builders for defective construction. Such actions are not for “injury to property.” This is the interpretation given by several courts to similar statutes of repose. Duncan v. Schuster-Graham, Homes, Inc., 578 P.2d 637 (Colo.1978); Securities-Intermountain, Inc. v. Sunset Fuel Co., 289 Or. 243, 611 P.2d 1158 (1980); see Kittson County v. Wells, Denbrook & Associates, Inc., 308 Minn. 237, 241 N.W.2d 799 (1976); cf. Good v. Christensen, 527 P.2d 223 (Utah 1974) (which apparently was a negligence action brought against the builder where we held section 78-12-25.5 applicable).
STEWART, Associate C.J., concurs in the concurring opinion of Justice HOWE.