Court Opinion

ID: 9625420
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:40:29.697241+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:28:13.519608
License: Public Domain

Judge Greene
concurring in the result.
Although I concur in the result reached by the majority, I must write separately because I do not agree that our inquiry into whether Defendant received effective assistance of counsel ends with the determination that defense counsel “opened the door” to the admissibility of expert testimony as to the credibility of the child victim in this case. To the contrary, I believe opening the door to otherwise inadmissible testimony could be as indicative of ineffective assistance of counsel as the failure to object to its admission.
The majority holds, and I agree, that Defendant’s trial counsel “opened the door” to admission of this statement by asking the State’s expert witness whether she would “expect a five year old to say someone put their dink-a-link in her mouth unless ... they had experience [d] [it] before.” I do not believe, however, that our inquiry ends there. We must further determine whether defense counsel’s elicitation of this statement constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.
A defendant’s constitutional right to counsel includes the right to effective assistance of counsel. State v. Braswell, 312 N.C. 553, 561, 324 S.E.2d 241, 247 (1985). To show that counsel was ineffective, a defendant must satisfy a two-part test. Id. at 562, 324 S.E.2d at 248.
First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. *390This requires showing that counsel’s error[s] were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial....
Id. (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693 (1984)). “[E]very effort [should] be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight” in reviewing defense counsel’s effectiveness “and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” State v. Mason, 337 N.C. 165, 177-78, 446 S.E.2d 58, 65 (1994) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 694). There is a “strong presumption” that, under the circumstances, the challenged action of defense counsel was sound trial strategy rather than ineffective assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 694.
In this case, my review of the record reveals defense counsel herein was attempting to elicit favorable information from the expert when asking whether she would expect a five-year-old to make allegations of sexual abuse “[u]nless they had experience^] [it] before.” There was evidence before the jury that Defendant and the child’s mother maintained separate residences, and that the child had previously been sexually abused while in her mother’s care. Testimony of several witnesses, including experts, revealed that the child had told the same story of abuse by Defendant to each of them, and the physical evidence revealed that the child had been sexually abused. Defense counsel was therefore proceeding on the theory that the child was, at best, describing sexual acts committed by adults other than Defendant. Because the evidence supported this reasonable trial strategy, Defendant has not overcome the strong presumption that defense counsel acted reasonably in attempting to elicit this information. Accordingly, I agree with the majority that Defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel.
I also write separately to address the majority’s statement that the Confrontation Clause prohibits “the State from introducing hearsay evidence in a criminal trial unless the State: (1) demonstrates the necessity for using such testimony, and (2) establishes the inherent trustworthiness of the original declaration.” 134 N.C. App. 379, 385, 517 S.E.2d 677, — (1999). Our Supreme Court has explicitly held: “[T]he Confrontation Clause of the North Carolina Constitution does not require a showing or finding of necessity before hearsay testimony may properly be admitted under a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule.” State v. Jackson, 348 N.C. 644, 647, 503 S.E.2d 101, 103 (1998) (emphasis added). Necessity is a prerequisite to *391admission of hearsay testimony only when the testimony is offered under one of the “residual” hearsay exceptions (i.e., Rule 803(24) and Rule 804(b)(5) of our Rules of Evidence). See id. at 652, 503 S.E.2d at 106. I agree with the majority that necessity was a prerequisite to admission of the hearsay testimony in this case because the hearsay testimony at issue was offered under the “residual” hearsay exceptions rather than a “firmly rooted” exception.