Court Opinion

ID: 9838045
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-04 09:09:12.470968+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:33:08.886079
License: Public Domain

In the
        Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
         at Fort Worth
     ___________________________
          No. 02-22-00437-CV
     ___________________________

    KELLY M. TENEYCK, Appellant

                    V.

   RONALD W. TENEYCK, Appellee

  On Appeal from the 393rd District Court
          Denton County, Texas
      Trial Court No. 20-10161-393

   Before Kerr, Wallach, and Walker, JJ.
   Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr
                            MEMORANDUM OPINION

       In this appeal from the trial court’s final divorce decree, appellant Kelly M.

Teneyck (Kelly) asserts five issues. In three issues, she contends that the trial court

abused its discretion by ordering the parties to equally share possession of their children,

awarding $1.3 million in separate property to appellee Ron W. Teneyck (Ron), and

finding that Kelly waived her reimbursement claim. In two issues, she contends that the

trial court committed reversible error by failing to file certain findings of fact and

conclusions of law. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its

possession order and characterization of Ron’s separate property, and it did not find

that Kelly waived her reimbursement claim. We further conclude that any error in the

trial court’s failure to file additional findings of fact and conclusions of law was

harmless. Accordingly, we affirm the final divorce decree.

                                       I. Background

       Kelly and Ron met and began living together in 2012. Two years later, their first

child, B.M.T., was born. The family moved to Texas and purchased a house in The

Colony a year later. The couple married on May 23, 2016, and their second child,

B.O.T., was born in 2017.

       Ron filed a petition for divorce in December 2020 in which he also sought joint

managing conservatorship of the children and a property division. Kelly answered and

filed a counterpetition for divorce.

                                             2
       The trial court held a bench trial at which Kelly and Ron testified. Although Kelly

previously had representation, she was pro se at trial. After closing arguments, the trial

court announced its ruling that the parties were divorced and that it was ordering a joint

managing conservatorship with Kelly’s having the right to designate the children’s

residence and a “50/50” possession schedule, instead of a standard possession order.

Compare Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 153.3101–.3171 (standard possession), with id.

§ 153.133 (parenting plan for joint managing conservatorship). The trial court found

that the marital residence, Ron’s stock shares, and life-insurance policies were Ron’s

separate property. The trial court noted that Ron had stipulated to a community-

property reimbursement for funds spent on the residential mortgage, although Kelly

did not plead it, and the trial court awarded a $63,728.81 reimbursement. The trial court

issued a written final divorce decree reflecting these rulings.

       Kelly timely sought findings of fact and conclusions of law under Texas Rule of

Civil Procedure 296. When the trial court did not file findings and conclusions, Kelly

filed a timely notice of past due findings and conclusions. The trial court filed findings

and conclusions four days later, and Kelly filed a timely request for additional and

amended findings and conclusions under Rule 298. The trial court filed supplemental

findings and conclusions, and this appeal followed.

                                II. Standards of Review

       The trial court is vested with broad discretion in making decisions on custody,

control, possession, and visitation, and we review such decisions for an abuse of

                                             3
discretion. Gillespie v. Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex. 1982); C.W. v. B.W., No. 02-

19-00270-CV, 2020 WL 4517325, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 6, 2020, no pet.)

(mem. op.). We also review a trial court’s alleged property characterization error for an

abuse of discretion. Boyd v. Boyd, 131 S.W.3d 605, 617 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004,

no pet.).

       A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts without reference to any guiding rules

or principles—that is, if its act is arbitrary or unreasonable. Low v. Henry, 221 S.W.3d

609, 614 (Tex. 2007); Cire v. Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835, 838–39 (Tex. 2004). An

appellate court cannot conclude that a trial court abused its discretion merely because

the appellate court would have ruled differently in the same circumstances. E.I. du Pont

de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 558 (Tex. 1995); see also Low, 221 S.W.3d

at 620.

       A trial court also abuses its discretion by ruling without supporting evidence.

Ford Motor Co. v. Garcia, 363 S.W.3d 573, 578 (Tex. 2012). But it does not abuse its

discretion if it decides based on conflicting evidence, so long as some substantive and

probative evidence supports its decision. Unifund CCR Partners v. Villa, 299 S.W.3d 92,

97 (Tex. 2009); Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 211 (Tex. 2002) (op. on reh’g).

       In family-law cases, the traditional sufficiency standards of review overlap with

the abuse-of-discretion standard of review; therefore, legal and factual insufficiency are

not independent grounds of error but are relevant factors in our abuse-of-discretion

assessment. Neyland v. Raymond, 324 S.W.3d 646, 649 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, no

                                             4
pet.). To determine whether a trial court has abused its discretion because the evidence

is legally or factually insufficient to support the decision, we must determine (1) whether

the trial court had sufficient evidence upon which to exercise its discretion and

(2) whether the trial court erred when it applied that discretion. Id.

       In determining the first question, we apply the same standards of review to a trial

court’s findings of fact that we apply to a jury’s answers to questions in the court’s

charge. Catalina v. Blasdel, 881 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Tex. 1994). Evidence is legally

insufficient to support a finding only when (1) the record bears no evidence of a vital

fact, (2) the rules of law or of evidence bar the court from giving weight to the only

evidence offered to prove a vital fact, (3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no

more than a mere scintilla, or (4) the evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of

a vital fact. Gunn v. McCoy, 554 S.W.3d 645, 658 (Tex. 2018). In determining legal

sufficiency, we must consider evidence favorable to the finding if a reasonable

factfinder could, and we must disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder

could not. Cent. Ready Mix Concrete Co. v. Islas, 228 S.W.3d 649, 651 (Tex. 2007); City of

Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005). We indulge “every reasonable

inference deducible from the evidence” in support of the challenged finding. Gunn,

554 S.W.3d at 658 (quoting Bustamante v. Ponte, 529 S.W.3d 447, 456 (Tex. 2017)).

       When reviewing an assertion that the evidence is factually insufficient to support

a finding, we set aside the finding only if, after considering and weighing all the evidence

in the record pertinent to that finding, we determine that the credible evidence

                                             5
supporting the finding is so weak, or so contrary to the overwhelming weight of all the

evidence, that the finding should be set aside and a new trial ordered. Pool v. Ford Motor

Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986) (op. on reh’g); Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175,

176 (Tex. 1986); Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex. 1965).

      When the burden of proof at trial is by clear and convincing evidence, as it is for

establishing that property is separate from the community, see Tex. Fam. Code Ann.

§ 3.003(b), we apply a higher standard of legal and factual sufficiency review. Boyd,

131 S.W.3d at 611. “Clear and convincing evidence” is defined as that “measure or

degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or

conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” Tex. Fam. Code

Ann. § 101.007; Boyd, 131 S.W.3d at 611.

                                    III.   Analysis

A. The Possession Order

      In her third issue,1 Kelly contends the evidence is insufficient to support the trial

court’s 50/50 possession order. She also contends that the trial court’s possession order

is “inherently arbitrary” because it was issued “without the guidance of the required

child custody report.”

      1
       We address Kelly’s issues out of order for simplicity.

                                            6
   1. Sufficiency of the Evidence

      “Suits affecting the parent-child relationship are intensely fact driven, which is

why courts have developed best-interest tests that consider and balance numerous

factors.” Lenz v. Lenz, 79 S.W.3d 10, 19 (Tex. 2002). “The best interest of the child shall

always be the primary consideration of the court in determining the issues of

conservatorship and possession of and access to the child.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann.

§ 153.002. “The standard possession order is presumably in the child’s best interest, but

that presumption is rebuttable.” In re E.D., No. 02-20-00208-CV, 2022 WL 60781, at

*12 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 6, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Tex. Fam. Code

Ann. § 153.252).

       The policy is “to encourage frequent contact between a child and each parent for

periods of possession that optimize the development of a close and continuing

relationship between each parent and child.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.251(b). A trial

court has discretion to determine the best interest of the child when establishing terms

and conditions of conservatorship. In re J.J.R.S., 627 S.W.3d 211, 218 (Tex. 2021). “A

trial court is ‘in the best position to observe the witnesses and their demeanor, and

therefore is given great latitude in determining a child’s best interests.’” In re E.S.,

No. 02-20-00407-CV, 2021 WL 2149627, at *7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 27, 2021,

pet. denied) (mem. op.) (quoting In re Guardianship of C.E.M.-K., 341 S.W.3d 68, 80 (Tex.

App.—San Antonio 2011, pet. denied)). A 50/50 possession schedule may be in a

child’s best interest. See, e.g., In re S.H., No. 02-15-00360-CV, 2017 WL 2871682, at

                                            7
*8 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 6, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[W]e cannot say that the

trial court abused its discretion in determining that a week-on, week-off possession

schedule was in [the child’s] best interest.”).

       The Supreme Court of Texas has identified factors that courts may consider

when determining the best interest of a child, including: (1) the desires of the child;

(2) the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future; (3) the

emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future; (4) the parental

abilities of the individuals seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist these

individuals to promote the best interest of the child; (6) the plans for the child by the

individuals or by the agency seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home or proposed

placement; (8) the acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate that the existing

parent–child relationship is not a proper one; and (9) any excuse for the acts or

omissions of the parent. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976). This is

not an exhaustive list, and a court need not have evidence on every factor listed to make

a valid finding as to the child’s best interest. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 27 (Tex. 2002).

The Texas Family Code sets out similar factors for a court to consider when deviating

from the standard possession order: (1) the age, developmental status, circumstances,

needs, and best interest of the child; (2) the circumstances of the managing conservator

and of the parent named as a possessory conservator; and (3) any other relevant factor.

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.256.

                                             8
       Kelly contends that little best-interest evidence was offered at trial and that

evidence of Kelly’s and Ron’s “parental abilities” was “scant.” But she points to three

pieces of evidence to show that the 50/50 schedule was not in the children’s best

interests. First, as evidence of the physical danger posed to the children, Kelly cites drug

tests and testimony purportedly reflecting that Ron had a “documented history of drug

and alcohol abuse” and that he “tested positive for marijuana twice during the

proceedings.” The results of the drug tests, however, were not admitted at trial. Thus,

they are not part of our analysis. Regardless, the cited drug-test reports reflected in the

record show that Kelly took and failed two drug tests, testing positive for cannabinoids

and THC,2 while Ron took and passed three drug tests. Ron admitted at trial that certain

concerns had been raised about whether he abused alcohol or drugs. The record further

reflects that Ron denied drug use and complied with the trial court’s order for alcohol-

use monitoring. Ron’s alcohol-use report admitted at trial showed 633 compliant tests

and 0 non-compliant tests. He further testified that he does not drink and become

intoxicated when with the children.

       Kelly next cites evidence to show that Ron did not know B.M.T.’s age at trial and

had to be corrected by his attorney. The cited testimony, however, reflects that Ron

       “THC is an abbreviation for tetrahydrocannabinol, which is marijuana’s active
       2

ingredient.” In re J.B., No. 02-22-00384-CV, 2023 WL 1859766, at *1 n.7 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth Feb. 9, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

                                             9
corrected his own answer. When asked, “How old is [B.M.T.]?” Ron answered,

“[B.O.T.] is 7 and [B.M.T.] -- [B.M.T.] is 7. [B.O.T] is 4.”

      Finally, Kelly cites evidence that Ron “did not know about B.M.T.’s educational

plan, the 504 plan Kelly handled with the school.” Kelly cites the following exchange

from her cross-examination of Ron:

      Q. What plan is [B.M.T.] on for extra help for the schooling that will
      follow her through until college?

      A. Well, this is the first meeting of this year, which is the 26th. We’re going
      to meet and we’re going to find out what the plan is going to be. We have
      not yet met with any of the teachers or principals yet this year about how
      we’re going to address [B.M.T.].

Kelly responded, “[B.M.T.] was put on [a] 504 plan in kindergarten and it follows her

through college. It doesn’t stop. Just so you know.” Ron was also unable to name

B.M.T.’s special-education class but said that he had met the teacher. On redirect, he

clarified that he had been involved in the children’s “504 and ARD meetings at school”

and B.M.T.’s individualized education plan, which was the topic of “the meeting on the

26th.” He further testified that he had participated in all school meetings about which

he was notified and that he “would change [his] schedule to make sure [he was] there.”

      We disagree that this evidence demonstrates that the 50/50 schedule is not in

the children’s best interests: some of the cited evidence does not reflect what Kelly

contends and other evidence contradicts it. See Coleman v. Coleman, 109 S.W.3d 108,

111 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, no pet.) (“The district court is the sole judge of the

                                            10
weight and credibility of the evidence.”). We also disagree that there is “scant” evidence

of Kelly’s and Ron’s parenting abilities and the best-interest factors.

       Ron cites his testimony as evidence rebutting the best-interest presumption

favoring the standard possession order. Citing Ragsdale v. Progressive Voters League in her

reply brief, Kelly contends this self-serving testimony does not rebut the presumption.

See 801 S.W.2d 880, 882 (Tex. 1990) (“It is the general rule that the testimony of an

interested witness, such as a party to the suit, though not contradicted, does no more

than raise a fact issue to be determined by the jury.”). She notes that she contradicted

at least some of Ron’s testimony. We must accept uncontradicted testimony as true

unless it is “unreasonable, incredible, or its belief is questionable,” in which case it

merely raises a fact issue. Id.

       At the trial’s outset, Ron submitted to the trial court a proposed parenting plan

seeking a 50/50 possession schedule. Kelly did not object, and the plan was admitted.

Ron testified that such a schedule was in the children’s best interests because he and

Kelly were “extremely close” to their children, he had done “everything with [them]

from the very beginning,” he had not been apart from B.M.T. except for the period

beginning with his separation from Kelly until the trial court issued temporary orders,

and B.M.T. calls him her “BFF.” Ron also testified that his proposed parenting plan

would require the parents to live close enough to one another to have a “shared

schedule.” He further testified that he was not proposing a 50/50 possession schedule

to avoid or reduce his child support obligation but that he had sufficient resources to

                                            11
pay the maximum amount of child support and to support the children during his half

of the possession schedule. Ron opined that the proposed schedule would also give

Kelly the flexibility to seek employment and save money.

      Ron further testified that the 50/50 possession schedule would mitigate the risk

that the parent with greater access to the children would take advantage of the other.

Ron alleged that this had happened under the court’s temporary schedule. Ron said that

Kelly had interfered with scheduled video calls with the children. He detailed one

incident in which Kelly allegedly prevented the children from participating in a video

call with Ron’s sister, who was battling pancreatic cancer. According to Ron, Kelly’s

justification was that the children “will never see [Ron’s sisters].” He also described a

conflict in which Kelly insisted that Ron pick up B.M.T. from Kelly’s house rather than

the school. According to Ron, Kelly did so because he would not use the same parking

spot as Kelly when picking up B.M.T. from school. Ron noted that under the temporary

orders, his time with B.M.T. started when school let out, implying that Kelly was

intruding on his time with B.M.T. Ron also testified about derogatory and threatening

text and e-mail messages Kelly allegedly sent to Ron’s employer during the divorce,

noting that he had obtained a temporary injunction to prohibit Kelly from contacting

his employer because of those communications.

      Ron also testified that he participated in the children’s healthcare “100 percent.”

He noted that the children had not seen a dentist, that both parents had been

responsible for the children’s dental care, and that the children would “be seeing the

                                           12
dentist very soon.” When asked about the children’s vision exam, Ron detailed B.M.T.’s

results, noting that she wanted glasses because they are “the fashionable thing” but that

she does not need them. He did not know about B.O.T.’s results because Kelly allegedly

withheld them from him. When questioned on cross-examination about whether he

paid for the children’s hearing, speech, and vision testing, Ron said that he had but that

if Kelly did not receive any payment, he would “be more than happy” to pay. Kelly

asserted in her cross-examination that Ron had canceled the family’s health insurance,

and Ron responded that he had not canceled the policy but that the insurance carrier

had changed, something his employer controlled.

      Kelly did not directly address Ron’s proposed 50/50 schedule, but she testified

that it was in the children’s best interests for her “to have the [children]” because she

had “always taken care of them, registered them, activities, [and] everything.” She

acknowledged that Ron “definitely loves his kids” but that, to her, “there is a difference

between parenting and loving.” She asserted that she had raised the children “from the

beginning,” “had them by [her] side,” and “ha[d] done everything for them.” After

recounting her frustrations with Ron’s allegedly failing to fulfill his promises, she

testified that she wanted to “move on” and take the children “during school hours” to

ensure that they complete their schoolwork. Kelly also testified that she volunteers at

the “school system.” She further asserted that she wanted Ron in the children’s lives

but that she needed him “to coparent and to listen and to be there.” She ended her

                                           13
direct testimony by saying, “I’m asking just for the 50/50, the kids 50/50, to do

coparenting classes and to relocate and restart.”

       When asked where she planned to relocate, Kelly testified that she did not intend

to leave the state but only wanted to move “outside the current neighborhood.” Kelly

testified on cross-examination that she hoped to open a restaurant after the divorce

because she had experience in that business. She hoped to run the restaurant “and make

things and do [her] own schedule with [her] girls.” When asked why she had not worked

in the 20 months since Ron filed his petition, Kelly said that Ron told her not to work

because he had to travel. She also testified that Ron had refused to “help out on these

days” if she did get a job.

       She also addressed Ron’s allegation that she prevented him from picking up

B.M.T. from school. Kelly testified that B.M.T. got confused when Ron parked in a

different location from the one that they had used for the previous three years.

According to Kelly, Ron had started parking on the other side of the school. Kelly

alleged that she had to search for B.M.T. when B.M.T. became confused about which

parent was picking her up. Kelly testified that she was merely attempting to ensure that

B.M.T. knew where to go after school regardless of which parent was picking her up.

       After the close of evidence, the trial court asked Ron to explain why he requested

a 50/50 schedule versus expanded visitation. Ron explained that both parties had

completed coparenting classes but that the acrimony between them concerned him. He

hoped that the 50/50 schedule would put the parties on “an equal playing field” and

                                           14
mitigate the risk that the children would be “used as a weapon” against either party. He

also reiterated that the maximum child support combined with the 50/50 schedule

would relieve some of Kelly’s financial burdens.

      The trial court’s findings and conclusions state that

      • “[Ron] is a fit parent. [Ron] loves his children, spends time with his
        children and provides parental guidance to the children in a safe and
        suitable way.”

      • “[Kelly] is a fit parent. [Kelly] loves her children, spends time with the
        children, and provides guidance to the children in a safe and suitable
        way.”

      • “The divorce was an intense emotional experience for both parties
        where sometimes emotions resulted in inappropriate language and
        actions by both parties. However, [Kelly] engaged in some conduct
        that went beyond the norm for a contested divorce in contacting
        [Ron’s] employer.”

      • “[I]t is in the best interests of the two children that each parent play a
        significant role in the children’s lives and that there be an allocation of
        conservatorship duties where each parent has a significant role in
        making material decisions regarding the children. Accordingly, the
        possession schedule and allocation of conservatorship duties as set
        forth in the docket entries attached hereto as Exhibit A is appropriate.”

The trial court’s docket entry states that “[Kelly] and [Ron] [are] to have week on and

week off possession during [the] school year” with the non-possessory parent to have

“possession on Wednesday from time school is dismissed until 8:00 . . . p.m.” The trial

court stated in its supplemental findings and conclusions that the reasons for its

possession order were adequately stated in its original findings and conclusions and

                                           15
added that “the relationship between [Ron] and the children is illustrated by the

pictures” admitted at trial. The pictures reflect Ron and the children eating and playing.

      The record reflects sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that

the 50/50 schedule is in the children’s best interests. Specifically, the record reflects

conflicts between the parties over scheduled visits under the temporary possession

schedule, which used a phased approach culminating with a standard possession

schedule. Although Kelly explained the conflict over picking up B.M.T. at school, she

did not contradict Ron’s allegation that she had interfered with his scheduled video calls

with the children, and we may take Ron’s allegation as true. See Ragsdale, 801 S.W.2d at

882. Despite their conflicts, both parties testified that they loved and cared for their

children, spent significant time with them, wanted the other parent to maintain a close

relationship with them, and exhibited a willingness to coparent. Additionally, there is

evidence that the 50/50 schedule combined with Ron’s child support would provide

Kelly the flexibility to pursue employment opportunities. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann.

§ 153.256 (court may consider managing and possessory conservators’ circumstances

and “any other relevant factor” when deviating from the standard possession order).

      We hold that the trial court had sufficient evidence upon which to order a

50/50 possession schedule and that it did not abuse its discretion in doing so. See

J.J.R.S., 627 S.W.3d at 218; Neyland, 324 S.W.3d at 649.

                                           16
   2. Child-Custody Report

      Kelly also contends that the trial court’s possession determination is arbitrary

because the trial court did not wait for the psychological and custody evaluations that

it had ordered in March 2021 with the parties’ agreement. The record reflects that the

psychologist assigned to do the evaluations notified the trial court in July 2021 that she

had not conducted the parties’ first interviews because they had failed to timely submit

the necessary paperwork and could not agree on interview dates. The psychologist

notified the court again in June 2022 that no evaluation had occurred because of the

parties’ “nonresponsiveness . . . to move forward” and that she had established

September 1, 2022, as the deadline by which the parties were to update their paperwork

and agree on interview dates. If the parties failed to comply, the psychologist said she

would notify the trial court that the evaluations could not be completed “due to the

parties’ noncompliance.” The record contains no additional correspondence from the

psychologist, and trial was held on September 13, 2022. Citing Section 107.113 of the

Family Code, Kelly contends that the trial court’s failure to await the outcome of the

psychological and custody evaluations renders the trial court’s possession determination

“inherently arbitrary.” We disagree.

      The Family Code does not require a trial court to order a custody evaluation or

to await a custody-evaluation report. Rather, the trial court has discretion to order such

an evaluation. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 107.103(a). Evaluators who conduct an

evaluation must prepare a report. Id. § 107.113(a). But here, the psychologist did not

                                           17
perform an evaluation because the parties failed to prepare the necessary paperwork

and to agree on interview dates. Kelly cites no evidence reflecting any excuse or good-

faith attempt to comply with the psychologist’s requirements. Accordingly, the trial

court did not act arbitrarily by issuing the possession order without waiting for a report

that was plainly not forthcoming.

      We overrule Kelly’s third issue.

B. The Property Characterization

      In her fourth issue, Kelly contends that the trial court abused its discretion by

awarding $1.3 million in separate property to Ron because he failed to prove his

separate interest by clear and convincing evidence. Kelly takes issue with the separate-

property characterization of three specific items: the marital residence, shareholder

interests in RCP Fund I, LLC, and two life-insurance policies. We address each in turn.

   1. Applicable Law

      In Texas, property owned before marriage—or acquired during marriage by gift,

devise, or descent—is separate property and remains the spouse’s separate property

during and after the marriage. Tex. Const. art. XVI, § 15; Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 3.001.

A trial court has no discretion to divest a party of his or her separate property via a

divorce decree. Alcedo v. Alcedo, No. 02-17-00451-CV, 2019 WL 2292979, at *3 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth May 30, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

      But as a starting point for a property division, “[p]roperty possessed by either

spouse during or on dissolution of marriage is presumed to be community property.”

                                           18
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 3.003(a). A party claiming certain property as separate must

rebut the community-property presumption with clear and convincing evidence. Pearson

v. Fillingim, 332 S.W.3d 361, 363 (Tex. 2011); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 3.003(b).

Generally, one spouse’s uncorroborated testimony is not sufficient to meet this burden.

See Boyd, 131 S.W.3d at 614 (rejecting proposition that “uncorroborated, uncontradicted

testimony of a spouse is per se sufficient to clearly and convincingly prove the separate

character of property”); Newland v. Newland, 529 S.W.2d 105, 107–08 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth 1975, writ dism’d) (citing instances in which uncorroborated testimony would

suffice because no other evidence exists).

      We determine whether property is separate or community by its character at the

time of inception. Boyd, 131 S.W.3d at 612. “Inception of title occurs when a party first

has a right of claim to the property by virtue of which title is finally vested.” Id. The

spouse claiming certain property as separate must trace and clearly identify the property.

Id. (citing Est. of Hanau v. Hanau, 730 S.W.2d 663, 667 (Tex. 1987)). Tracing involves

establishing the property’s separate origin through evidence showing the time and

means by which the spouse originally obtained possession of the property. Id. Generally,

“mere testimony that property was purchased with separate funds, without any tracing

of the funds, is insufficient to rebut the community presumption.” Id.

      “Separate property will retain its character through a series of exchanges so long

as the party asserting separate ownership can overcome the presumption of community

property by tracing the assets on hand during the marriage back to property that,

                                             19
because of its time and manner of acquisition, is separate in character.” Id. (citing

Cockerham v. Cockerham, 527 S.W.2d 162, 168 (Tex. 1975)). When evidence establishes

that a spouse’s title to property originated before the marriage, making the property that

spouse’s separate property, the community-property presumption “no longer prevails.”

Galindo v. Galindo, No. 02-22-00472-CV, 2023 WL 4630673, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth July 20, 2023, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) (quoting Welder v. Lambert, 44 S.W. 281,

287 (Tex. 1898)). If one spouse improves his or her separate property with community

funds, then the other spouse would be entitled to reimbursement to the community

estate out of the separate, improved estate. Id. (citing Dakan v. Dakan, 83 S.W.2d 620,

627 (Tex. 1935)). The equitable claim for reimbursement, however, “is not a right, title,

or interest in the land as such.” Id. (quoting Dakan, 83 S.W.2d at 628). And a spouse’s

separate property does not change to community property merely because it was

improved with community funds. Id.

   2. The Marital Residence

       The parties do not dispute that the marital residence was purchased in 2015,

before the parties married in 2016. The record reflects that Ron was the only grantee

on the deed and the only borrower on the loan application. Thus, under the inception-

of-title rule, the marital residence was Ron’s separate property. See Boyd, 131 S.W.3d at

612.

       As evidence that the marital residence became community property, Kelly cites

a 2017 mortgage refinance in which Ron identified the residence as community property

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and listed the parties’ joint checking account as a source of down payment. She further

cites her testimony that the mortgage company for the refinance led her to believe that

she would be on the deed. Using community funds to refinance the mortgage, however,

would not transform the marital residence from separate to community property. See

Galindo, 2023 WL 4630673, at *3. Rather, there must be some evidence that Ron made

a gift by executing a deed. See id. at *4 n.7; Ryan v. Ryan, No. 02-22-00471-CV,

2023 WL 4007393, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 15, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.).

      Copies of the loan application, note, and lien for the 2017 refinance were

admitted at trial. The lien identifies both Kelly and Ron as borrowers but includes a

provision limiting liability for the mortgage to those borrowers who signed both the

lien and note. The loan application and note list only one borrower: Ron.

      Kelly contends that the facts at issue here are like those in In re Marriage of Nash,

in which the court held that a deed to only one spouse is insufficient to overcome the

community-property presumption. 644 S.W.3d 683, 702 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2022,

no pet.). Nash is inapplicable, however, because the property at issue there was

purchased during marriage, and no evidence showed that the bank had agreed to hold

only the one spouse’s separate property liable for the note. Id.

      The evidentiary record here does not reflect that Ron executed a deed during the

2017 refinance to transfer ownership of the marital residence to Kelly or the community

estate. Thus, the evidence sufficed to support the trial court’s determination that the

marital residence was Ron’s separate property.

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   3. Shareholder Interests in RCP Fund I, LLC

      Ron testified at trial that he worked for Suntex Marina Investors and that Suntex

issued him 1,500 “Class B units” of stock on July 31, 2015. Documents that Ron

purportedly received from Suntex were admitted into evidence. Kelly did not object.

Citing the documents, Ron testified that the “Class B units” would be converted to

“Class A units” under certain circumstances. One of the documents is a letter

purportedly from Suntex’s chief financial officer indicating that Ron received the

1,500 Class B units on July 31, 2015, as part of Suntex’s acquisition of another company.

Another document is a letter from the same person indicating that the “Suntex

recapitalization transaction” had completed and that Ron’s stock would roll over to

33,051 Class A units. Ron testified that he cashed out a portion and rolled over

33,000 units.

      Ron also offered Capital Account Statements and a subscription agreement

purportedly from Resilient Capital Partners (RCP). Kelly again did not object, and the

trial court admitted the documents. The subscription agreement states that RCP Fund

I, LLC (RCP Fund) was “seeking capital contributions . . . of membership interests in

Suntex Marina Investors LLC . . . in exchange for the issuance of limited liability

company interests in [RCP Fund I, LLC].” Ron testified that the RCP documents

reflected that the Suntex Class B units eventually became shares of RCP Fund.

Specifically, Ron pointed to the following language in the subscription agreement:

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      Amount of Capital Contribution:
      Suntex Units: $558,262.18
      Rollover Percentage: 100%

Kelly offered no contrary evidence.

      On appeal, Kelly contends that the unauthenticated letter from Suntex’s chief

financial officer “contain[ed] hearsay statement[s] by a non-testifying party” and was

“at best cumulative testimony.” But because Kelly did not object to any of Ron’s

evidence at trial, she failed to preserve these complaints for appeal. See Tex. R. App. P.

33.1(a)(1)(A); Tex. R. Evid. 103(a)(1).

      Citing Parmeter v. Parmeter, 348 S.W.2d 51, 54 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1961, no writ),

Kelly contends that with the letter excluded, Ron’s “testimony alone is insufficient to

rebut the [community-property] presumption.” In Parmeter, one spouse testified that

neither the community nor the other spouse had equity in an airplane purchased during

the marriage because the asset had depreciated. Id. The spouse offered “no figures as

to values or depreciation.” Id. The court concluded that such a general statement by an

interested party could do no more than raise a fact issue and so was not conclusive

proof that there was no community property. Id.

      Although we agree with this proposition, Parmeter doesn’t apply here. Unlike the

general testimony in Parmeter, Ron testified specifically about when and how he acquired

the Class B units and how they were converted to shares of RCP Fund. And unlike the

unsupported testimony in Parmeter, Ron offered corroborating documentary evidence.

Ron’s testimony and evidence trace the RCP Fund shares to Suntex Class B units that

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he received before the marriage. We conclude that sufficient evidence supports the trial

court’s determination that the RCP Fund shares were Ron’s separate property. See Boyd,

131 S.W.3d at 612.

   4. Life-Insurance Policies

      At trial, Ron introduced documents reflecting the details of two universal life-

insurance policies. Kelly did not object, and the trial court admitted them. Ron testified

that the policies were issued on May 22, 1999, and June 14, 2001. The documents

corroborated his testimony.

      Kelly does not contest that the policies were Ron’s separate property under the

inception-of-title rule. Instead, she contends that the policies increased in value with

each premium payment, that any property division should have accounted for payment

from community funds, and that Ron failed to offer evidence on this issue. But using

community funds to pay the premiums and increase the policies’ value would not

change their character from separate to community property; at most, a reimbursement

claim would arise. See Galindo, 2023 WL 4630673, at *3. Thus, the evidence sufficed to

support the trial court’s determination that the life-insurance policies were Ron’s

separate property under the inception-of-title rule. See Boyd, 131 S.W.3d at 612.

      Having concluded that the record reflects sufficient evidence to support the trial

court’s determination that the marital residence, the RCP Fund stock, and the life-

insurance policies were Ron’s separate property, we overrule Kelly’s fourth issue.

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C. Kelly’s Reimbursement Claim

      In her fifth issue, Kelly contends the trial court abused its discretion when it

determined that she had waived her reimbursement claim because the claim was tried

by consent. Ron contends that the trial court did not in fact find any waiver because he

had stipulated to the reimbursement, which the trial court properly calculated.

      As previously noted, a spouse is entitled to reimbursement to the community

estate from the other spouse’s separate estate that has been improved with community

funds. Galindo, 2023 WL 4630673, at *3. The spouse seeking reimbursement has the

burden to plead and prove reimbursable expenditures. McCoy v. McCoy, No. 02-15-

00208-CV, 2016 WL 3659122, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 7, 2016, no pet.)

(mem. op.) (citing Vallone v. Vallone, 644 S.W.2d 455, 459 (Tex. 1982)). A trial court’s

discretion in evaluating a reimbursement claim is as broad as that exercised when

making a just and right division of the community estate. Id.

      The parties do not dispute that Kelly had the burden to plead a reimbursement

claim and failed to do so. Nonetheless, Ron stipulated to a reimbursement and included

it in his proposed property division, which was admitted at trial. Ron testified that he

owed about $656,000 on the mortgage for the marital residence and that almost

$64,000 had been paid down since the 2017 refinance. Ron’s verified amended

inventory and appraisement, admitted at trial, reflects a mortgage balance of

$667,727.19. Ron’s proposed property division reflects a $63,728.81 paydown. Kelly

offered no evidence to contradict the values in Ron’s proposed property division, but

                                          25
she did inform the court that the parties had been paying $3,468 per month on the

mortgage.

      As to Ron’s life-insurance policies, the trial court asked whether Ron had a

breakdown of the increase in the policies’ cash value. Ron responded that it was Kelly’s

burden to prove the increased value and that he did not have a breakdown. Kelly offered

no evidence on this question. And the record does not show that either party considered

the RCP Fund stock as part of any reimbursement claim. The trial court’s final decree

includes an award to Kelly for $43,153 that represents her portion of community funds

used to pay down the mortgage on the marital residence.

      After closing arguments, the trial court rendered an oral ruling that included its

reimbursement-claim calculation. The trial court noted that Ron “could have just sat

back and said ‘it’s your burden to prove [the reimbursement claim], Ma’am,’ but [he]

didn’t[,] to [his] credit. So I’m finding [he is] correct.” The trial court found that no

evidence was offered to prove a reimbursement claim on the life-insurance policies or

the RCP Fund stock. Finding that Ron’s proposed property division was the only

evidence offered to show the value of the assets at issue in the property division, the

trial court listed the items included in the community estate and set the value at

$116,366.99.

      The trial court awarded Kelly 70% and Ron 30% of the community estate. To

arrive at the reimbursement value for the marital residence, the trial court subtracted

from Ron’s 30% share the value of four specific items it was awarding to Ron from the

                                           26
community estate: a golf cart, a bank account, a health savings account, and an IRA.

The remaining $20,575 was Ron’s share of the equity in the marital residence.

Subtracting this from the $63,728.81 paydown reflected on Ron’s proposed property

division, the trial court determined that Kelly would receive “[$]43,153 out of the home

equity.” The trial court’s final decree reflects this same division, and the trial court’s

findings of fact are consistent with its oral pronouncement. Although we may not treat

the trial court’s oral statements as findings of fact, see Seasha Pools, Inc. v. Hardister,

391 S.W.3d 635, 640 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012, no pet.), they do reflect the trial court’s

reasoning. Because the record reflects that the trial court did not find that Kelly had

waived the reimbursement claim, we overrule her fifth issue.

D. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

       In her first issue, Kelly contends that the trial court erred by not making “specific

asset findings” when she requested them. According to Kelly, she requested findings of

fact and conclusions of law on “several issues related to [the] characterization and value

of the marital assets.” She complains that the trial court’s findings “just state generally

the amount the court found as reimbursement . . . but not the methodology or

calculation on how it reached that conclusion.” In her second issue, Kelly contends that

the trial court erred by not making “specific ‘best interest of the child’ findings” when

she requested them. According to Kelly, the trial court’s findings are “wholly

inadequate” to explain why it deviated from the standard possession order.

                                            27
       In both issues, Kelly contends that the trial court’s failure to file adequate

findings of fact and conclusions of law left her “guessing the reasons for the trial court’s

decision[s].” Thus, she contends that we should reverse the trial court’s property

distribution and possession order and remand for a new trial.

       The record reflects that Kelly timely requested findings of fact and conclusions

of law under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 296. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 296 (permitting any

party to request findings and conclusions in a case tried without a jury). When the trial

court did not file its findings and conclusions, Kelly timely filed a notice of late filing

under Rule 297. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 297 (providing requirements for filing a notice of

past due findings and conclusions). The trial court filed its findings and conclusions,

and Kelly timely filed a request for additional and amended findings and conclusions

under Rule 298. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 298 (providing requirements of filing request for

additional or amended findings and conclusions). The trial court filed supplemental

findings and conclusions.

       Under Rule 296, a trial court’s failure to file findings of fact and conclusions of

law is presumed reversible error, unless the record affirmatively shows that the

requesting party was not harmed by their absence. Tenery v. Tenery, 932 S.W.2d 29,

30 (Tex. 1996). Error is harmless unless it prevents an appellant from properly

presenting a case to the appellate court. Graham Cent. Station, Inc. v. Pena, 442 S.W.3d

261, 263 (Tex. 2014); Tenery, 932 S.W.2d at 30. Kelly does not explain how she was

harmed by the trial court’s failure to produce findings and conclusions beyond those

                                            28
that it filed, and the record shows that she was not harmed. See Graham Cent. Station,

442 S.W.3d at 263. Indeed, Kelly was able to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence

to support the trial court’s determinations at issue, and we have addressed those

challenges. Any error in failing to file additional findings and conclusions was harmless.

See id. We overrule Kelly’s first and second issues.

                               IV.    Conclusion

      Having overruled all of Kelly’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s final divorce

decree.

                                                       /s/ Elizabeth Kerr
                                                       Elizabeth Kerr
                                                       Justice

Delivered: August 31, 2023

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