Court Opinion

ID: 9552063
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:04:13.657349+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:25:30.391434
License: Public Domain

EUBANK, Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent from the majority opinion and would affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the State of Arizona.
“Relation back”, under Rule 15(c), Rules of Civil Procedure, 16 A.R.S., in my opinion is not proper under the facts in this wrongful death action because A.R.S. § 12-612 requires the personal representative to bring the action within the limitation period.
A one-car accident occurred on December 9, 1972, injuring Michelle Keener, a minor, and killing the rest of her family — father, mother and sister. Under A.R.S. § 12-612 the wrongful death statute, the only remaining party authorized to bring the wrongful death action was the personal representative of the parents. The statute reads:
A. An action for wrongful death shall be brought by and in the name of the surviving husband or wife or personal representative of the deceased person for and on behalf of the surviving husband or wife, children or parents, or if none of these survive, on behalf of the decedent’s estate.
B. The father, or in the case of his death or desertion of his family, the mother, may maintain the action for death of a child, and the guardian for death of his ward.
C. The amount recovered in an action for wrongful death shall be distributed to the parties provided for in subsection A and in the proportions provided by law for distribution of personal estate left by persons dying intestate.
D. The term “personal representative” as used in this section shall include any person to whom letters testamentary or of administration are granted by competent authority under the laws of this or any other state. The action for wrongful death may be maintained by any such personal representative without issuance of further letters, or other requirement or authorization of law.
The wrongful death cause of action vested in the personal representative, per A.R.S. § 14-477 (now A.R.S. § 14-3110) the survival statute, at the death of Michelle’s parents. A.R.S. § 14 — 477 reads:
Every cause of action, except a cause of action for damages for breach of promise to marry, seduction, libel, slander, separate maintenance, alimony, loss of consortium or invasion of the right of privacy, shall survive the death of the person entitled thereto or liable therefor, and may be asserted by or against the personal representative of such person, provided that upon the death of the" person injured, damages for pain and suffering of such injured person shall not be allowed.
Appellant’s use of the term “nominal party” to describe the statutory role of the personal representative and the majority’s apparent adoption of that concept, does not jibe with the above cited statutes or the following cited case law.
In Lueck v. Superior Court, 105 Ariz. 583, 469 P.2d 68 (1970), our Supreme Court construed the language of A.R.S. § 124312(A) and (C) and found the legislative intent to exclude parents as parties where a deceased son was survived by a wife and child. The court said:
*551The concept embodied in wrongful death recovery is purely statutory and the answer to that issue [whether parents can recover for the wrongful death of a married son] lies in the language of the statute. (105 Ariz. at 584, 469 P.2d at 69).
After citing A.R.S. § 12-612(A) and (C), the court said:
It is our opinion that there is no ambiguity in this statute which cries out for the wizardry of statutory construction. Whether we like the result or not, we find the words to be plain and their meaning to be evident. When we find that the common law or “judge-made law” is unjust or out of step with the times, we have no reluctance to change it. Stone v. Ariz. Hwy. Comm., 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107 (1963). Here we are dealing with a legislative enactment, and it is proper that only the Legislature correct any deficiencies therein.
We hold that the parents of the deceased have no right to recover for his wrongful death because there are also surviving a wife and children. The trial court is affirmed. (105 Ariz. at 585-586, 469 P.2d at 70-71).
In Solomon v. Harman, 107 Ariz. 426, 489 P.2d 236 (1971) the trial court dismissed surviving brothers, sisters and foster parents as parties plaintiff in a wrongful death action, and our Supreme Court upheld the dismissal on the basis that they were not designated to bring the action by A.R.S. § 12-612(A) and (B). The court said:
The right of action for wrongful death is purely statutory and the action must be brought in the names of the persons to whom the right is given by statute.
In the instant case, there being a surviving mother, the trial court properly dismissed all other parties as plaintiffs other than the mother and the administrator . . . . (107 Ariz. at 428, 489 P.2d at 238).
The source note following A.R.S. § 12-612 states that our statute was derived in part from Wyoming. Comparing W.C.S. 1945, § 3 — 404 with § 12-612 confirms the note. The Wyoming Supreme Court faced a similar problem as the one sub judice in Bircher v. Foster, 378 P.2d 901 (Wyo. 1963). There a father filed a wrongful death action for the death of his son just before the statute of limitations had run. He alleged that he was the personal representative of his son’s estate. He was not, since no estate had been filed, and the trial court granted summary judgment dismissal. On appeal the father argued that the personal representative was merely a nominal party. The Supreme Court stated that under the statute only the personal representative could bring the action and since the personal representative did not bring it within the statutory time period dismissal was proper. Similarly, in Pearson v. Anthony, 218 Iowa 697, 254 N.W. 10 (1934), the Iowa Supreme Court characterized the issue as “capacity to sue” and found that there was no such “capacity” in an administratrix who was not appointed until after the statute of limitations had run.
Returning to the facts of the instant case, it is clear that none of the parties designated in A.R.S. § 12-612 timely brought the wrongful death action. Since the action was not brought by the proper party, the personal representative, within the statute of limitations period, it is barred. I would therefore affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the State.