Court Opinion

ID: 995156
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-07-04 00:33:22.219874+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:11:42.435642
License: Public Domain

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                                      No. 96-4893

OTIS SALLEY,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of South Carolina, at Orangeburg.
Charles E. Simons, Jr., Senior District Judge.
(CR-96-17)

Submitted: May 12, 1998

Decided: June 3, 1998

Before HAMILTON, LUTTIG, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Richard A. Harpootlian, RICHARD A. HARPOOTLIAN, P.A.,
Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. J. Rene Josey, United States
Attorney, Cameron G. Chandler, Assistant United States Attorney,
Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Appellant Otis Salley appeals his sentence after a conviction of
attempting to influence a juror in the discharge of his duties in a crim-
inal case, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 15031 (1994). We affirm.

Salley was indicted for conspiring to possess with the intent to dis-
tribute and distributing cocaine and cocaine base in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (1994). After the jury was selected, Salley
solicited his aunt, Beulah Johnson, to contact one of the jurors on Sal-
ley's behalf. Johnson called one of the jurors and arranged to meet at
a local restaurant to discuss Salley's case. The juror informed authori-
ties about the meeting, and arrangements were made for the juror to
be fitted with a body wire transmitter and recording device to record
any conversations with Salley and Johnson.

At the arranged meeting, Johnson approached the juror and sat
down. Salley acknowledged the juror and sat at another table. Johnson
told the juror that Salley wanted her to advise the juror that the drugs
had been planted by crooked police officers, and that Salley would
appreciate any help the juror could offer in the case. At the conclusion
of the meeting, Johnson obtained a five dollar bill from Salley, which
she gave to the juror for gas money and for his trouble in meeting her.
Both Johnson and Salley were arrested and charged with attempting
to influence a juror in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1503.

The district court severed Salley's drug charge from the obstruction
charge for purposes of trial. Salley proceeded to trial on the drug
charges in April 1996, and was found not guilty. In June 1996, Salley
proceeded to trial on the obstruction charge, for which he was found
guilty. Salley's PSR recommended that his base offense level for the
obstruction conviction be computed in accordance with USSG
§ 2J1.2(c)(1). Section 2J1.2(c)(1) provides that when the offense
involves an effort to obstruct the investigation or prosecution of a
criminal offense, the cross-reference to USSG § 2X3.1 should apply.
_________________________________________________________________

1 Current version at 18 U.S.C.A.§ 1503 (West Supp. 1998).

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Under § 2X3.1, Salley's base offense level is twenty-eight. Salley's
offense level of twenty-eight and his criminal history category of III
resulted in a guideline range of 97 to 121 months.

Salley objected to the PSR's calculation of his base offense level,
contending that his base offense level should have been computed
identically to Johnson's.2 The district court rejected this argument,
noting that any disparity between Johnson's base offense level and
Salley's was a result of their relative culpability. The district court
sentenced Salley to a term of imprisonment of 100 months.

Our review of the record reveals that Salley's offense level was
correctly computed under U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2(c)(1) and § 2X3.1. See
United States v. Dickerson, 114 F.3d 464, 467-68 (4th Cir. 1997);
U.S.S.G. §§ 2J1.2(c)(1), 2X3.1. Likewise, Salley's sentence was
within the statutory and guideline range. See 18 U.S.C. § 1503;
U.S.S.G. §§ 2D1.1, 2X3.1; U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, pt. A. The calculation of
Johnson's offense level, whether correct or not, has no bearing on
Salley's correctly computed offense level and sentence. See generally
United States v. Withers, 100 F.3d 1142, 1149 n.3 (4th Cir. 1996)
(holding that disparate sentences between codefendants does not pro-
vide a basis for departure), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 65 U.S.L.W.
3631 (U.S. Mar. 17, 1997) (No. 96-7884); United States v. Dillard,
43 F.3d 299, 310-12 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Goff, 907 F.2d
1441, 1447 (4th Cir. 1990).

Accordingly, we affirm Salley's sentence. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the deci-
sional process.

AFFIRMED
_________________________________________________________________

2 Johnson pled guilty. Johnson's presentence investigation report
(PSR), applying U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2J1.2(a) (1995),
calculated Johnson's base offense level at twelve. With a two-level
reduction for acceptance of responsibility, Johnson's adjusted base
offense level of ten and a criminal history category of I resulted in a
guideline range of six to twelve months imprisonment. On motion of the
Government, Johnson received a downward departure for substantial
assistance, and was sentenced to six months federal probation.

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