Court Opinion

ID: 9950606
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-14 16:03:09.065157+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:35:42.804736
License: Public Domain

Supreme Court of Florida
                             ____________

                          No. SC2022-1055
                            ____________

     THE FLORIDA BAR RE: NORWOOD SHERMAN WILNER.

                           March 14, 2024

PER CURIAM.

     We have for review a referee’s report recommending that

Norwood Sherman Wilner be reinstated to the practice of law from

his 91-day suspension. 1 The Bar challenges the referee’s

recommendation, arguing that Wilner failed to establish

rehabilitation under Rule Regulating The Florida Bar 3-7.10(f)(3)

because he did not strictly comply with rule 3-6.1 as directed by

this Court’s disciplinary order. The Bar claims Wilner was not

actively supervised as required by rule 3-6.1(f) in his post-

     1. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 15, Fla. Const.; see also
R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-7.10 (Reinstatement and Readmission
Procedures).
suspension employment at a law firm. We agree and deny Wilner’s

petition for reinstatement.2

                           BACKGROUND

     In March 2022, the Court suspended Wilner for 91 days for

filing more than three thousand Engle-progeny claims 3 without

investigating or informing himself as to the facts of each case and

for knowingly misrepresenting the viability of the claims to the

United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. Fla.

Bar v. Wilner, No. SC2021-0373 (Fla. Mar. 3, 2022) (approving

uncontested referee’s report).4 The disciplinary order directed

Wilner to fully comply with rule 3-6.1. Id.

      2. The Bar also argues that reinstatement of Wilner is
precluded because Wilner sent a misleading closeout letter to his
client that downplayed the nature of the misconduct on which his
suspension was based. Because we conclude that Wilner’s failure
to comply with rule 3-6.1(f) requires denial of his reinstatement, we
need not address the Bar’s request regarding the closeout letter.

      3. See Engle v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246, 1277 (Fla.
2006) (directing that a class action group of smokers and their
survivors be decertified and permitting class members to file
individualized claims with the Court’s findings receiving res judicata
effect within one year of the mandate).

      4. Wilner was found guilty of violating Rules Regulating The
Florida Bar 4-1.1 (Competence), 4-1.3 (Diligence), 4-1.4
(Communication), 4-3.1 (Meritorious Claims and Contentions),

                                 -2-
     After his suspension, Wilner sold his Jacksonville-based law

firm to Howard Acosta, an experienced lawyer in St. Petersburg

whom Wilner has known since the early 1980s. Acosta paid $100

for the firm, and Wilner, if reinstated, can buy back the firm under

the terms of the purchase agreement for $200. Aside from

renaming the firm Jax Litigation Group (JLG), Acosta made no

tangible changes to the firm after purchasing it. He characterized

his role to the referee as being “kind of a silent owner,” and he

explained that the only real purpose behind the firm’s change in

ownership was to put his name on the letterhead, though his name

does not actually appear there, nor does it appear on the firm’s

website or in its telephone directory. Wilner explained to the referee

that Acosta’s name did not appear in any of these places because

his role “was not to engage in case litigation in Jacksonville.”

     Wilner remained employed with the firm after its sale to

Acosta. He had no specific job title at the firm, and he came into

the office only a few times a week for a couple hours to discuss

4-3.3 (Candor Toward the Tribunal), and 4-8.4(c) (“A lawyer shall
not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation . . . .”).

                                 -3-
general strategy—not specific cases—with the firm’s lawyers, all of

whom Wilner supervised before his suspension. Acosta was the

lawyer responsible for supervising Wilner’s work at JLG, and Acosta

was the only lawyer at the firm eligible to supervise Wilner. 5 His

supervisory role at the firm, however, was limited to speaking with

Wilner and the firm’s office manager on the phone every week or

two. Acosta explained to the referee that in his practice it is rare for

clients to come to the office, and “I think it’s the same with his firm,

or my firm now.” Wilner testified that he did not do much work for

the firm, leaving little for Acosta to supervise. In describing his

conversations with Acosta, Wilner stated:

     Well, he knows me for many years, and he knows, you
     know, what I contribute and understands, as we’ve
     talked since the last spring, since the beginning of this,
     my role is to advise and consult. And so he understands
     that. And we talk about that same group of subjects.

     After his suspension ended, Wilner filed a petition for

reinstatement with the Court. The petition was referred to a

referee, who held a hearing and submitted a very brief report

     5. A suspended or disbarred lawyer is prohibited under rule
3-6.1(b) from being employed or supervised by a lawyer whom the
suspended or disbarred lawyer employed or supervised before the
date of the suspension or disbarment order.

                                  -4-
recommending that Wilner be reinstated to the practice of law. 6

She found that: “Although [Wilner’s] compliance with the

disciplinary order was not perfect, I believe it is sufficient to

recommend reinstatement.”

     The Bar seeks review of the referee’s recommendation.

                               ANALYSIS

     “In a reinstatement proceeding, the party seeking review of the

referee’s recommendation has the burden to demonstrate that the

report is erroneous, unlawful, or unjustified.” Fla. Bar re Dunagan,

775 So. 2d 959, 961 (Fla. 2000) (quoting Fla. Bar re Grusmark, 662

So. 2d 1235, 1236 (Fla. 1995)). A referee’s findings of fact will “be

upheld unless clearly erroneous or without support in the record.”

Id. “With regard to the referee’s legal conclusions and

recommendations, the Court’s scope of review is wider because we

      6. The referee’s report contains no factual findings about
Wilner’s post-suspension conduct. See R. Regulating Fla. Bar
3-7.10(h) (“[T]he referee will make and file . . . a report that includes
the findings of fact and a recommendation . . . .”). However, in his
answer brief, Wilner, with some minor exceptions, “accept[ed] the
Bar’s statement of the case and facts,” which details Wilner’s post-
suspension conduct.

                                  -5-
have the ultimate responsibility to enter the appropriate judgment.”

Id. (quoting Grusmark, 662 So. 2d at 1236).

     As part of his petition for reinstatement, Wilner was required

to produce clear and convincing evidence of his rehabilitation. R.

Regulating Fla. Bar 3-7.10(f)(3). In order to make such a showing,

he was, at a minimum, required to satisfy each applicable element

of rehabilitation listed in rule 3-7.10(f)(3). One of the listed

elements is “strict compliance with the specific conditions of any

disciplinary . . . or other order.” R. Regulating Fla. Bar

3-7.10(f)(3)(A).

     The Bar argues that Wilner failed to establish rehabilitation

because he did not strictly comply with the disciplinary order’s

directive to fully comply with rule 3-6.1. Rule 3-6.1 authorizes legal

service providers to employ suspended or disbarred lawyers and

places certain restrictions on their employment, such as having no

client contact and not handling client funds or property. See R.

Regulating Fla. Bar 3-6.1(d). One of the restrictions is that a

disbarred or suspended lawyer

     must be supervised by a member of The Florida Bar in
     good standing and eligible to practice law in Florida who
     is employed full-time by the entity that employs the

                                  -6-
     individual subject to this rule and is actively engaged in
     the supervision of the individual subject to this rule in all
     aspects of the individual’s employment.

R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-6.1(f). A suspended or disbarred lawyer

and an employing legal services provider are both responsible for

ensuring compliance with the rule. See id.

     The Bar claims that Wilner was not supervised in accordance

with rule 3-6.1(f) while employed at JLG. It contends that his

occasional telephone conversations with Acosta are far from the

active supervision that is required by rule 3-6.1(f). Wilner, however,

maintains that his occasional telephone conversations with Acosta

satisfy rule 3-6.1(f), as they were commensurate with how little

work he actually did for JLG.

     It is clear from our review of the record that, regardless of the

amount of work he either did or did not do for JLG, Wilner was not

actively supervised in all aspects of his employment with the firm.

His supervisor, Acosta, lived across the state in St. Petersburg and

was not actively involved in any of JLG’s cases or Wilner’s work at

the firm. He did not oversee any of Wilner’s so-called strategy talks

with the firm’s other lawyers, and the only oversight he exercised

over Wilner was through unstructured telephone conversations

                                 -7-
every week or two. Acosta simply had no meaningful way to

consistently ensure that Wilner fully complied with the restrictions

on his employment in rule 3-6.1 other than Wilner’s own personal

assurances. This is exactly the type of scenario rule 3-6.1(f) is

intended to guard against, as those subject to its restrictions have

in many instances already demonstrated an unwillingness to abide

by the profession’s rules and ethical standards. See R. Regulating

Fla. Bar 3-6.1(a) (identifying persons subject to the rule).

     Accordingly, we find that Wilner failed to demonstrate strict

compliance with our disciplinary order, and that as a result, he has

failed to establish rehabilitation under rule 3-7.10(f)(3). The Bar

has satisfied its burden in this case, and we find that the referee’s

recommendation to reinstate Wilner to the practice of law is

unjustified.

                            CONCLUSION

     The referee’s recommendation is disapproved, and Norwood

Sherman Wilner’s petition for reinstatement is denied.

     Judgment is entered for The Florida Bar, 651 East Jefferson

Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2300, for recovery of costs from

                                 -8-
Norwood Sherman Wilner, in the amount of $2,281.46, for which

sum let execution issue.

     It is so ordered.

MUÑIZ, C.J., and CANADY, LABARGA, COURIEL, GROSSHANS,
FRANCIS, and SASSO, JJ., concur.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.

Original Proceeding – The Florida Bar

Richard A. Greenberg of Rumberger, Kirk & Caldwell, P.A.,
Tallahassee, Florida,

     for Petitioner

Joshua E. Doyle, Executive Director, The Florida Bar, Tallahassee,
Florida, Patricia Ann Toro Savitz, Staff Counsel, The Florida Bar,
Tallahassee, Florida, Shaneé L. Hinson, Bar Counsel, The Florida
Bar, Tallahassee, Florida, and Mark Lugo Mason, Bar Counsel, The
Florida Bar, Tallahassee, Florida,

     for Respondent

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