Court Opinion

ID: 9763301
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:40:28.695048+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:40.668640
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
Judge FRIEDMAN.
I must respectfully dissent to the majority’s conclusion that O’Brien Ultra Service Station (Employer) is entitled to subrogate against the uninsured motorist benefits received by Garrett Hannigan (Claimant) under the policy purchased by a third party who was not responsible for Claimant’s injuries. While the majority spends a great deal of time discussing the case law in this area, I believe that the analysis should begin and end by applying the clear and unambiguous language of section 319 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act)1 because where the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, any further deliberation as to its meaning is unwarranted. Meier v. Maleski, 670 A.2d 755 (Pa.Cmwlth.1996), aff'd, 549 Pa. 171, 700 A.2d 1262 (1997). Such is the case here.
Section 319 of the Act, which provides for an employer’s right to subrogation, sets forth, in relevant part:
Where the compensable injury is caused in whole or in part by the act or omission of a third party, the employer shall be subrogated to the right of the employe, his personal representative, his estate or his dependents, against such third party to the extent of the compensation payable under this [Act] by the employer; reasonable attorney’s fees and other proper disbursements incurred in obtaining a recovery or in effecting a compromise settlement shall be prorated between the employer and employe, his personal representative, his estate or his dependents.
77 P.S. § 671 (emphases added).
This language clearly limits an employer’s right of subrogation to those instances *643where the claimant recovers from a third-party tortfeasor. The majority concludes that “the language of Section 319 ... must be (and has been) construed by our appellate courts to include both direct recoveries from third-party tortfeasors as well as recoveries paid on behalf of or for the liability of that third party.” (Majority op. at 12.) However, I disagree that we have such authority, and I am particularly troubled when the unambiguous language of the Act is interpreted in a way that adversely affects claimants.2 As we stated in American Red Cross v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Romano), 745 A.2d 78, 81-82 (Pa.Cmwlth.2000), aff'd, 564 Pa. 192, 766 A.2d 828 (2001),
By amending the Act in 1993, the General Assembly explicitly afforded employers limited subrogation rights, i.e., only against sums received from suits against third party tortfeasors. If the General Assembly desired to make the right to subrogation absolute, regardless of the source of the recovery, it certainly could have done so, but the explicit language of Section 319 is limited. Absent ambiguity in this section of the Act, it is not the role of this Court to interpret the Act further than applying the plain meaning of the section.
Because Claimant received uninsured benefits pursuant to an accident insurance policy held by an insured who was not responsible for Claimant’s injuries, Employer simply is not entitled to subrogation under section 319.
Moreover, I point out that the rationale justifying subrogation requires that three enumerated purposes be satisfied. That is, subrogation is appropriate only where it would: (1) prevent double recovery for the same injury by the claimant; (2) ensure that the employer is not compelled to make compensation payments made necessary by the negligence of a third party; and (3) prevent a third party from escaping liability for his negligence. Brubacher Excavating Inc. v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Bridges), 774 A2d 1274 (Pa.Cmwlth.2001), aff'd, 575 Pa. 168, 835 A.2d 1273 (2003). The majority’s result fails to satisfy the threefold test for subro-gation in that it would allow the uninsured tortfeasor to escape liability and would place the burden on the non-negligent insured.3
*644Accordingly, for these reasons, I would reverse.

. Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. § 671.

. It is this court’s "obligation to interpret the Act liberally to effectuate its humanitarian purpose ... and to resolve borderline interpretations in favor of the injured employee....” Hoffman v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Westmoreland Hospital), 559 Pa. 655, 660, 741 A.2d 1286, 1288 (1999).

. Thus, Poole v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Warehouse Club, Inc.), 570 Pa. 495, 810 A.2d 1182 (2002), is clearly distinguishable from the present matter. In that case of first impression, our supreme court held that proceeds from a claimant’s legal malpractice claim are subject to subrogation. Noting that the unique nature of a legal malpractice claim required the claimant to demonstrate that he suffered injury due to the malfeasance of both his counsel and the original tortfeasor, the court determined that, because all three purposes were satisfied, the "result is mandated by the underlying rationale of subrogation in the context of the Workers’ Compensation Act.” Id. at 499, 810 A.2d at 1184. Explaining, the court stated,
The employee is made whole for his injury while not receiving a double benefit. The employer is not compelled to make compensation payments for the negligence of a third party. Finally, while the underlying tortfeasor may have escaped liability due to the statute of limitations and the actions of employee’s previous counsel, the legal malpractice action places this liability on the proper party.
Id. at 500, 810 A.2d at 1185 (emphasis added).
As to the majority’s reliance on City of Meadville v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Kightlinger), 810 A.2d 703 (Pa.Cmwlth.2002), appeal denied, 578 Pa. 702, 852 A.2d 313 (2004), to support its position, I *644concede that the reasoning applied in that case appears to demand a contrary result here. Nevertheless, I am not persuaded by City of Meadville because I believe it suffers from the same flaws that afflict the majority’s opinion here to the extent that the result in City of Meadville conflicts with the plain language of section 319 of the Act and fails to completely satisfy the threefold rationale justifying subrogation. Quoting City of Meadville, the majority reiterates the rationale that "[i]t would be illogical to allow a claimant who is injured by the actions of an uninsured/under-insured third party and recovers uninsured/underinsured benefits ... to be in a better position than the claimant who recovers directly from the third party tortfeasor.” Id. at 707. However, where the General Assembly has expressed its intent in clear and unambiguous language, it is for that body, not this court, to effectuate any change in meaning.