Court Opinion

ID: 9726514
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:54:10.694161+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:27.874091
License: Public Domain

CONCURRING OPINION
Staton, J.
This appeal involves only Roman, the Receiver, and Lake Mortgage Company, servicing the mortgage, and the Ernsts, the conditional sales purchasers. The record clearly demonstrates that the trial court’s ruling which sustained the TR. 50 motion for judgment on the evidence was correct as a matter of law. The trial court’s first reason for granting a new trial: “. . . that because of the complexity of the issues herein, the jury may have been confused in its conclusions and verdict, . . .” could not have applied to either Roman or Lake Mortgage Company since the jury did not deliberate upon any issue concerning either of them. The jury’s deliberations were limited to issues concerning Thomas Schmal, who is an appellee in another or second appeal. The second “clarifying” reason given by the trial court that “. . . the evidence in this case may indicate that Nick Roman, Jr., Receiver herein, may not have discharged his duties fully . . .” avoids any mention of Lake Mortgage Company and avoids Indiana Rules of Procedure, Trial Rule 59(E). The latter avoidance is fatal since the trial court should have indicated whether the verdict was:
(a) against the weight of the evidence; or
(b) clearly erroneous as contrary to the evidence; or
(c) not supported by the evidence.
If the trial court’s reason was either (b) or (c) above, it should have stated why judgment was not entered upon the evidence. If the trial court’s reason was (a) above, it should have set out the supporting and opposing evidence of the *618issue upon Roman’s duty as the receiver. This the trial court failed to do. The trial court’s judgment granting a new trial should be reversed.
Note. — Reported at 308 N.E.2d 739.