Court Opinion

ID: 9560981
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:00:35.658031+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:51.184184
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-30588      Document: 00516865070         Page: 1    Date Filed: 08/21/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                                  United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                Fifth Circuit

                                 ____________                                 FILED
                                                                        August 21, 2023
                                  No. 22-30588                           Lyle W. Cayce
                                 ____________                                 Clerk

   Andrew Babinski,

                                                             Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                       versus

   Kristin Sosnowsky, in her personal and official capacities as Chair of the
   School of Theatre of Louisiana State University; Shannon Walsh; John
   Fletcher; Alan Sikes,

                                          Defendants—Appellants.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Louisiana
                            USDC No. 3:20-CV-426
                  ______________________________

   Before Richman, Chief Judge, and Stewart and Dennis, Circuit
   Judges.
   Carl E. Stewart, Circuit Judge:
          Kristin Sosnowsky, Shannon Walsh, John Fletcher, and Alan Sikes
   (collectively “the Professors”) appeal the district court’s denial of qualified
   immunity after Andrew Babinski alleged that they violated his Fourteenth
   Amendment right to due process by conspiring to prevent his continued
   enrollment in Louisiana State University’s (“LSU”) theatre program.
   Because the Professors’ conduct does not violate clearly established law, we
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   REVERSE the district court’s determination that they were not entitled to
   qualified immunity and DISMISS Babinski’s claims.
                                I.       Background
          A.     Babinski’s Time at LSU
          Babinski enrolled in LSU’s theatre doctoral program in 2017, where
   he excelled in his coursework. His academic accomplishments garnered him
   favor within the program, and he was invited to teach undergraduate students
   and serve as a teaching assistant to Professor Fletcher. But his experience
   took a turn for the worse in the Spring 2019 term when he enrolled in
   Professor Walsh’s THTR 7923 course, “Gender, Sexuality, and
   Performance.” According to Babinski, he thought he signed up for a semester
   of critical discussions on gender and sexuality in performance but was
   disappointed to find out that the class was largely skewed to Walsh’s
   politically-progressive opinions.
          Throughout the semester, Babinski alleges that he suffered hostility
   and mistreatment from his classmates and Walsh in THTR 7923. He states
   that his classmates regularly made fun of his opinions and were dismissive of
   his views because they often differed from his peers’ assessments of the same
   issues. He further claims that his mistreatment in the course only worsened
   when he approached Walsh for help. He remained in the class despite his
   perceived mistreatment because the course was necessary to progress in the
   program.
          Walsh required each student to write a term paper relevant to the
   subject matter of the course to receive a passing grade in her class. Babinski
   wrote his paper in a performative fashion, a writing technique he learned at

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   LSU. 1 His paper criticized the Professors, the LSU theatre program more
   generally, and his classmates in THTR 7923. Walsh was not amused. In fact,
   she assigned him a failing grade for the course and immediately forwarded his
   paper to Professor Sosnowsky, the Chair of LSU’s School of Theatre, for
   additional review.
           Sosnowsky read Babinski’s paper and was so troubled by its contents
   that she submitted it to the LSU Police Department (“LSU Police”) and the
   LSU Office of Student Advocacy and Accountability (“SAA”). The LSU
   Police found no actionable security issues or threats in Babinski’s paper. SAA
   came to the same conclusion and refused the Professors’ request for a “no
   contact directive” issued against him. Having exhausted all administrative
   avenues to no avail, Babinski alleges that the Professors took matters into
   their own hands and conspired to prevent him from continuing in the theatre
   program.
           Babinski avers that the Professors sabotaged his efforts to appeal his
   failing grade in THTR 7923. Specifically, he alleges that they intentionally
   refused to follow LSU’s regulations for student grade appeals. For example,
   the university required the Professors to have an initial discussion with
   Babinski and find an amenable solution—he states that this never occurred
   because they refused to meet or even correspond with him. Additionally, he
   asserts that, under LSU’s grade-appeal regulations, he was entitled to “a
   meeting with the department chair . . . and [relevant] professor within 14
   days” of his appeal. Babinski states that this meeting never occurred either
           _____________________
           1
             Babinski explains that “performative writing” is “a purposefully exaggerated
   style whereby the writer is performing a concept or idea through language, manner and
   form, in addition to its content.” While Babinski has not produced the paper in these
   proceedings, he has conceded that it contained “strong language, expletives, and harsh
   criticisms of various faculty members and peers[.]” He also included a disclaimer that his
   paper was “performative and exaggerated” when turning it in to Walsh.

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   and that Sosnowsky “instead solicited a single e-mailed statement from [him]
   and [Walsh], from which she e-mailed them her ruling.” He maintains that
   his appeal was only denied due to the Professors’ unfiltered bias and efforts
   against him.
          Babinski states that his failed appeal process was only the beginning of
   his problems. Losing his appeal meant keeping his failing grade, which placed
   him on academic probation, and forfeited his graduate-assistantship stipend.
   He claims that the Professors routinely made direct petitions to the graduate
   school to obtain a waiver for continued funding if a student lost funding due
   to an academic misstep. But that they took no such measures for him as part
   of their scheme to force his withdrawal from the program.
          Babinski also claims that the Professors held a secret disciplinary
   meeting after his grade appeal but before he returned for the Fall 2019
   semester. At this meeting, which he was allegedly prohibited from attending,
   he avers that the Professors determined that they would do whatever was
   necessary to prohibit him from continuing in the theatre program. 2 This
   included the Professors’ refusals to: (1) teach him in any additional courses,
   especially required courses like THTR 7923; (2) convene a dissertation panel
   for him; and (3) administer his general examinations. He states that each of
   these actions were independently sufficient to ensure that he was unable to
   continue in or complete the theatre program.
          The Professors’ alleged campaign against Babinski culminated in the
   Dean advising him that there was no way for him to progress in the Ph.D.
   program because none of the Professors wanted to teach him or serve on a
   dissertation committee for him. Babinski states that the Dean explained to

          _____________________
          2
           Babinski explains that he was only permitted to provide a statement to be read
   and summarized by one of the Professors at the meeting.

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   him that the Professors expected his withdrawal from the theatre program as
   soon as possible.
          Babinski alleges, however, that LSU’s regulations provided him with
   an alternative route to convene a dissertation committee that did not include
   any of the Professors. He claims that the Dean and the Professors
   intentionally withheld this information from him to ensure his departure
   from the program. In support, he highlights that the Professors permitted a
   similar arrangement for a different student in the same program as him.
   Additionally, he asserts that LSU’s regulations permitted him to obtain
   credit for his remaining required course, THTR 7923, through independent
   study. He states that this is another option that the Professors knew was
   available yet refused to inform him of in an ongoing effort to mislead him into
   believing that he had no options to continue in the theatre program.
          Babinski took a full courseload in the Fall 2019 term, consisting of one
   unrequired theatre course and three classes that he needed for his minor
   concentration. During this semester, he also claims to have made multiple
   attempts at remedying his issues with the Professors. He states that these
   efforts were all fruitless as they refused to change their stance on his
   progression in the theatre program. He ultimately cut his losses and
   withdrew, instead pursuing and obtaining a second master’s degree in the
   philosophy department. He sued the Professors in federal court.
          B.     District Court Proceedings
          At the district court, Babinski advanced numerous constitutional
   claims against the Professors, each deriving from his assertion that they
   violated his right to procedural due process by conspiring and accomplishing
   a de facto expulsion. The Professors moved to dismiss his claims on qualified
   immunity grounds. The district court partially held in their favor, granting
   them qualified immunity on all of Babinski’s claims except his: (1) property-

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   interest procedural due process claim and (2) liberty-interest procedural due
   process claim against Sosnowsky.
           On Babinski’s property-interest due process claim, the district court
   reasoned that none of the Professors were entitled to qualified immunity
   because he sufficiently alleged that they effected a de facto expulsion without
   affording him a meaningful opportunity to state his case for remaining in the
   program. It relied on his argument that the Professors willfully circumvented
   LSU’s policies to deprive him of any process. Furthermore, citing Goss v.
   Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) and Plummer v. Univ. of Hous., 860 F.3d 767, 773
   (5th Cir. 2017), as revised (June 26, 2017), it held that he cited caselaw clearly
   establishing that the Professors’ conduct violated his due process rights as an
   LSU student.
           Regarding Babinski’s substantive due process claim against
   Sosnowsky, the district court proceeded under the stigma-plus doctrine. 3 It
   held in his favor because he alleged that Sosnowsky made false claims about
   him to harm his reputation and withheld mitigating information from LSU
   Police, SAA, and other university representatives. It stated that Sosnowsky’s
   actions violated Babinski’s liberty interest in his reputation, good name, and
   integrity.
           In sum, the district court concluded that the Professors “knew or
   should have known that it would be unconstitutional for them to force
   Babinski out of the Program without sufficient process, so qualified immunity

           _____________________
           3
            The stigma-plus doctrine recognizes the liberty interest that an individual has in
   his good name and reputation. To make out a stigma-plus claim, a plaintiff must
   demonstrate that: (1) he has suffered a stigma from some government action; plus (2) he
   experienced the extinguishment of a right of status previously recognized by state law. San
   Jacinto Sav. & Loan v. Kacal, 928 F.2d 697, 701 (5th Cir. 1991).

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   is inappropriate as to the procedural due process claims.” The Professors
   timely appealed.
                            II.     Standard of Review
          We review a district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss asserting
   qualified immunity de novo, accepting all well-pleaded facts as true and
   viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Brown v. Miller,
   519 F.3d 231, 236 (5th Cir. 2008). A plaintiff attempting to overcome
   qualified immunity at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage must plead facts that allow this
   court to reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the harm alleged. See
   Arnold v. Williams, 979 F.3d 262, 267 (5th Cir. 2020).
                                  III.    Discussion
          “To be entitled to the procedural protections of the Fourteenth
   Amendment,” Babinski must show that he was “deprived [] of either a
   ‘liberty’ or a ‘property’ interest.” Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz,
   435 U.S. 78, 82 (1978). If there is a liberty or property interest at stake and
   due process applies, “the question remains what process is due.” Morrissey
   v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
          As an initial matter, we note that, although the district court
   determined that there was a liberty and property interest at stake, the
   Professors do not challenge this holding. Accordingly, the issue is forfeited
   on appeal. See Rollins v. Home Depot USA, 8 F.4th 393, 397 (5th Cir. 2021)
   (“A party forfeits an argument . . . by failing to adequately brief the argument
   on appeal.”).
          The Professors do challenge the district court’s determination that
   Babinski received inadequate process. They argue that the district court: (1)
   incorrectly held that they violated Babinski’s due process rights; and (2)
   erroneously relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Goss and this court’s

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   decision in Plummer to hold that they were on notice that their alleged
   campaign against Babinski’s continued enrollment in LSU’s theatre program
   violated his constitutional right to due process. See 419 U.S. at 465; 860 F.3d
   at 767. Specifically, they contend that the district court ignored that Babinski
   received the only process he asked for and that it analyzed the clearly
   established prong of the qualified immunity analysis at too high a level of
   generality. On the latter point, they maintain that Goss and Plummer are too
   dissimilar from the instant case to have provided the Professors sufficient
   notice of their allegedly unconstitutional behavior. We agree with the
   Professors’ latter argument and reverse in their favor.
          “Qualified immunity operates to ensure that before they are subjected
   to suit, [public officials] are on notice their conduct is unlawful.” Hope v.
   Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
   “When a defendant invokes qualified immunity, the burden is on the plaintiff
   to demonstrate the inapplicability of the defense.” Ramirez v. Guadarrama,
   3 F.4th 129, 133 (5th Cir. 2021) (quotation and citation omitted). This
   demonstration requires a plaintiff to allege both “(1) the violation of a federal
   constitutional or statutory right; and (2) that the right was clearly established
   at the time.” Id. (citation omitted). These inquiries may be addressed in
   “whatever order [this court] deems most expeditious.” Id. (citing Pearson v.
   Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009)).
          “A clearly established right is one that is sufficiently clear that every
   reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that
   right.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015) (internal quotations and
   citation omitted). The Supreme Court has cautioned appellate courts on
   “defin[ing] clearly established law at too high a level of generality.” City of
   Tahlequah v. Bond, 142 S. Ct. 9, 11 (2021). “Although we do not require a
   case directly on point . . . there must be adequate authority at a sufficiently
   high level of specificity to put a reasonable official on notice that his conduct

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   is definitively unlawful.” Walsh v. Hodge, 975 F.3d 475, 485–86 (5th Cir.
   2020) (internal quotations and citation omitted) (emphasis in original); see
   also Ashcroft v. al–Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (“We do not require a case
   directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or
   constitutional question beyond debate.”).
           A.      Constitutional Violation
           To defeat the Professors’ qualified immunity defense, Babinski had to
   assert a “violation of a federal constitutional or statutory right[.]” Ramirez,
   3 F.4th at 133. At the district court, he argued that the Professors violated his
   constitutional right to procedural due process by failing to offer him notice
   and an opportunity to be heard before de facto expelling him from the Ph.D.
   program. 4 The district court embraced his de-facto-expulsion theory,
   agreeing that the Professors’ conduct left him no choice but to withdraw from
   his desired program and settle for a completely different degree.
           Babinski’s de-facto-expulsion theory is particularly important here
   because the characterization of his allegations is key to identifying the level
   of process that he was due. The Supreme Court has drawn a fine line
   differentiating the process required for students facing discipline actions, as
   opposed to academic actions which require less procedurally. Ekmark v.
   Matthews, 524 F. App’x 62, 64 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (unpublished)
   (quoting Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 86). If a student faces certain disciplinary
   consequences, due process requires an “oral or written notice of the charges
   against him and, if he denies them, an explanation of the evidence . . . and an
   opportunity to present his side of the story.” Goss, 419 U.S. at 581. Applying

           _____________________
           4 Other courts have recognized a de facto expulsion as a penalty subject to review

   under the due process standard. See e.g., G.C. v. Owensboro Pub. Sch., 711 F.3d 623, 631 (6th
   Cir. 2013) (“[T]he concept of de facto expulsions is not new to this court.”) (citing cases).

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   this standard, the Supreme Court in Goss determined that a school’s
   suspension of multiple disruptive students without notice and a hearing was
   a violation of the students’ due process rights. Id. at 579.
          In Horowitz, the Court distinguished Goss, holding that “there are
   distinct differences between decisions to suspend or dismiss a student for
   disciplinary purposes and similar actions taken for academic reasons which
   may call for hearings in connection with the former but not the latter.” 435
   U.S. at 87, 88–89. The student in Horowitz sought to challenge her dismissal
   from medical school after several academic deficiencies, though she was
   informed of her impending risk of dismissal and the school’s dissatisfaction
   with her performance. Id. at 80–82. The Court rejected her claim reasoning
   that an academic decision is “by its nature more subjective and evaluative
   than the typical factual questions presented in the average disciplinary
   decision.” Id. at 89–90. Leaving the contours undefined, the Horowitz Court
   determined that academic deficiencies require “far less stringent procedural
   requirements.” Id. at 86; see also Davis v. Mann, 882 F.2d 967, 975 (5th Cir.
   1989) (explaining that a student subject to an academic dismissal is entitled
   to “some meaningful notice and an opportunity to respond”).
          Traditionally, a student’s procedural due process claim falls within
   one of two arenas—academic deficiencies or disciplinary misconduct. See
   Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 87. The unique factual scenario here does not fit
   squarely into either category. In his complaint, Babinski alleges that his de
   facto expulsion is more tantamount to a disciplinary decision, and the district
   court construed his claims as such. To be sure, the chain of events certainly
   begins with an academic exercise, including his completion of a paper,
   obtaining a grade, and disputing the grade. His federal lawsuit, however, does
   not challenge or focus on the grade he received, nor does he allege that it was
   the crux of his de facto expulsion. He instead pleads that his de facto
   expulsion derives from the views that he expressed in his paper. Specifically,

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   he takes issue with the Professors’ conduct in response to his paper, such as
   their actions after issuing his failing grade that effectively froze him out of his
   chosen discipline. These actions include the secret meeting at which they
   refused to teach him in the theatre program and their individual and
   collective efforts to intentionally withhold information from him to ensure
   his departure from the program.
          Given these facts and accepting Babinski’s de facto expulsion
   allegations as true, as we must at this stage, we assume, without deciding,
   that Babinski has pleaded a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment due
   process protections. See Brown, 519 F.3d at 236 (explaining that we view well-
   pleaded facts “in the light most favorable to the plaintiff”). But our inquiry
   does not end here. To defeat qualified immunity, Babinski must satisfy the
   clearly established prong of the analysis. See Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 11
   (requiring a plaintiff to also establish that the injury to his constitutional right
   was “sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood
   that what he [was] doing violate[d] that right”). As we will explain, he fails
   to satisfy his burden by misconstruing caselaw at too high a level of generality.
   See Bond, 142 S. Ct. at 11.
          B.      Clearly Established Law
          As we previously observed, the district court reached this part of the
   qualified immunity analysis after holding that the Professors violated
   Babinski’s constitutional rights by de facto expelling him from the LSU
   theatre program. It then held that the Supreme Court’s decision in Goss and
   this court’s in Plummer clearly established the Professors’ conduct as
   violative of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. Assuming
   arguendo that Babinski’s de facto expulsion from a university academic
   program was a constitutional violation, we disagree with the district court’s
   analysis of the governing caselaw under the clearly established prong.

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           In Goss, the Supreme Court considered a district court’s
   determination that an Ohio law allowing the suspension of students without
   a hearing in a reasonable timeframe violated the students’ procedural due
   process rights. See 419 U.S. at 565–67. While the Court acknowledged the
   importance of allowing public schools deference in running the day-to-day
   affairs, it still held that:
                Students facing temporary suspension have interests
                qualifying for protection of the Due Process Clause,
                and due process requires, in connection with a
                suspension of 10 days or less, that the student be given
                oral or written notice of the charges against him and, if
                he denies them, an explanation of the evidence the
                authorities have and an opportunity to present his side
                of the story. The Clause requires at least these
                rudimentary precautions against unfair or mistaken
                findings of misconduct and arbitrary exclusion from
                school.
   Id. at 581. Ultimately, the Court cabined its decision to suspensions not
   exceeding ten days but explained that “[l]onger suspensions or expulsions
   for the remainder of the school term, or permanently, may require more
   formal procedures.” Id. Importantly, it never considered whether the public-
   school official’s actions tainted or undermined any process that the students
   received. Instead, its primary consideration was whether the students were
   entitled to any process at all, and if so, to what degree.
           In Plummer, two expelled students brought procedural due process
   and Title IX claims against the University of Houston (“UH”), alleging that
   the disciplinary proceedings that they were subjected to were constitutionally
   deficient. See 860 F.3d at 767. The district court granted summary judgment
   to UH and a panel of this court affirmed. We first explained that our role in
   university-student disputes is not to “second-guess[]” the university’s

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   disciplinary determinations. Id. at 772–73 (quoting Wood v. Strickland, 420
   U.S. 308, 326 (1975)). Rather, our duty is merely to ensure “the presence of
   fundamentally fair procedures to determine whether the misconduct ha[d]
   occurred.” Id. (quoting Goss, 419 U.S. at 574). Accordingly, we noted that
   “[w]hether a state university has provided an individual student sufficient
   process is a fact-intensive inquiry and the procedures required to satisfy due
   process will necessarily vary depending on the particular circumstances of
   each case.” Id. at 777.
          While we considered the students’ allegations that the process they
   received was riddled with a UH official’s bias, we never explored any
   conspiracy by UH officials against the students. See id. at 776–77 (rejecting
   Plaintiffs’ argument that a biased official’s actions prevented them from
   cross-examining a witness in their expulsion proceedings). Nor did the
   students ever allege that such a conspiracy occurred. We ultimately
   concluded that the students received due process and that their
   constitutional rights remained intact. Id. Notably, that determination
   effectively ended our qualified immunity inquiry. Id. Only a forced
   interpretation of Plummer would allow us to hold that it established anything
   that happened in Babinski’s pleadings.
          Both Goss and Plummer solidify that students, like Babinski, have a
   Fourteenth Amendment right to some degree of procedural due process
   before or shortly after university officials take certain adverse actions against
   them. See 419 U.S. at 581 (“Students facing temporary suspension have
   interests qualifying for protection of the Due Process Clause.”); 860 F.3d at
   773 (explaining that students are entitled to a “fundamentally fair”
   disciplinary process). However, neither case involved, alleged, or even
   mentioned an underlying conspiracy to block a student from enjoying that
   right. Additionally, neither case dealt with the alleged tainting of the process
   that a school or university provided to a student. True, qualified immunity

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   does not require precedential exactitude or a case “directly” on point. Walsh,
   975 F.3d at 485 (emphasis in original). But both of Babinski’s proffered cases
   miss the mark by failing to address conduct like the Professors’ in this case.
   Absent an appropriately analogous case of greater specificity, we cannot
   uphold the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. See Bond, 142 S. Ct.
   at 11.
            Fifth Circuit precedent also forecloses Babinski’s argument that the
   mere existence of his right to due process provides fair warning to the
   Professors for all conduct that he alleges might violate that right. See Walsh,
   975 F.3d at 487. In Walsh, a professor brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit against
   the university in which he taught, alleging that it fired him without adequate
   due process for his alleged sexual harassment of a student. Id. at 478. The
   district court denied the university and its officials qualified immunity. Id. A
   panel of this court reversed, explaining that “the ‘sine qua non of the clearly-
   established inquiry is “fair warning.”’” Id. at 486 (quoting Morgan v.
   Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 372 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc)). The panel continued
   that while it is “clearly established that due process for a terminated
   professor includes ‘a meaningful opportunity to be heard in his own
   defense,’” there was no caselaw speaking “directly to the procedures
   necessary to protect a professor’s interest in avoiding career-destruction
   after being accused of sexual harassment.” Id.
            The same is true here. Babinski is asking us to do precisely what the
   Walsh panel refused to do: hold that his right to a meaningful opportunity to
   be heard put the Professors on notice that their conduct in this case was
   unconstitutional. Id. at 487 (“Nor can we hold, as Walsh contends, that a
   meaningful opportunity to be heard should have put Defendants on notice
   that their actions were unlawful.” (internal quotation omitted)). Babinski’s
   argument gains no more traction here than Walsh’s did there for precisely
   the same reason: he cannot point to any controlling caselaw that would have

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   put the Professors on notice that his due process rights were violated in a
   similar procedural context. In other words, against the Rule 12(b)(6)
   backdrop, Babinski concedes that he was never expressly expelled from the
   university. His pleadings likewise acknowledge that, after he alleges that he
   was de facto expelled, he continued to enroll in courses and ultimately
   obtained his degree from the university. But we have no caselaw “that speaks
   directly to the procedures necessary” to protect a student who claims he was
   de facto expelled from a university, yet continued to enroll in classes and
   receive a degree from the same university after the point in time that he
   alleges he was de facto expelled. Id. at 486. As the Walsh panel explained, the
   clearly established standard requires more than that—there must be a “high
   degree of specificity” between the alleged misconduct and the caselaw
   purporting to clearly establish the violation. Id. at 487. Without it, the
   requisite “fair warning” required under the clearly established inquiry is
   absent. Id. at 486.
           For these reasons, we hold that the Professors lacked adequate notice
   that their conduct was violative of Babinski’s constitutional rights and
   because they did not have this notice, they are entitled to qualified
   immunity. 5 See Hope, 536 U.S. at 739.
                                   IV.      Conclusion
          For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the district court’s denial
   of qualified immunity and DISMISS Babinski’s claims against the
   Professors.

          _____________________
           5
             Both parties make competing arguments on whether the Professors could pursue
   their qualified immunity argument at a subsequent stage of litigation proceedings. We do
   not address those concerns due to our holding herein.

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