Court Opinion

ID: 9465539
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 00:49:13.36378+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:13.877303
License: Public Domain

HEANEY, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the majority’s rejection of the contentions made by Runge in his direct *75appeal. I dissent, however, from the majority’s summary denial of Runge’s motion for a new trial. In my view, resolution of the factual issues which are raised by Runge’s allegations of perjury by government witnesses and of coercion of false testimony by a government agent, and application of the appropriate standard for the granting of a new trial in this context, should be made in the first instance by the District Court.
When considering Runge’s motion below, the District Court applied the test generally applicable to motions for a new trial under Fed.R.Crim.P. 33 on the basis of newly discovered evidence. Under this test, before a new trial may be granted, the movant must show that the evidence is newly discovered, that the movant used diligence in discovering the facts at the time of trial, that the evidence is material to issues at the trial, and that the evidence is likely to produce an acquittal on retrial (must not be merely cumulative or impeaching). United States v. Carter, 549 F.2d 1164, 1165 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 974, 97 S.Ct. 1665, 52 L.Ed.2d 369 (1977); United States v. Kahn, 472 F.2d 272, 287 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 982, 93 S.Ct. 2270, 36 L.Ed.2d 958 (1973). The court held that although the evidence was discovered after trial, was discovered after a diligent defense and may be material, a new trial was not required because the allegations, if true, would be merely cumulative or impeaching and, given the nature of other trial testimony, would not be likely to produce an acquittal on retrial.
By applying the traditional test for new trial motions based on newly discovered evidence, the District Court overlooked the fact that where, as here, the movant’s allegations involve an allegation of corruption of the truth-seeking function of the trial process, a lesser showing of materiality is required. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103-104, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976). The test to be used in such cases is set out by the majority. The movant need not show that the newly discovered evidence would probably produce an acquittal, but only that there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury. Id. at 103, 96 S.Ct. 2392; Ray v. United States, 588 F.2d 601 at 602-603 (8th Cir., 1978). This rule does not lose force because the perjury reflects only upon the credibility of a witness. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 267-270, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959).
Although the majority implicitly recognizes that the District Court evaluated Runge’s allegations against an incorrect legal standard, it does not remand the issue to the District Court because it finds that his allegations either lack sufficient specificity or that the testimony of the witnesses which he claims was perjured was of such low materiality that there is no chance that the District Court could find that it meets even the lesser test. I disagree with this characterization of Runge’s claims.
Runge makes two serious allegations of perjury by David Garritson and Danvers Jansen, the prosecution’s two principal witnesses against him. First, Runge alleges that Garritson and Jansen perjured themselves by denying that they were working in an undercover capacity, when they had in fact been working with both state and federal authorities. I agree with the majority that Runge has failed to allege sufficient facts from which it can be inferred that federal authorities were aware, or should have been aware, of undercover work done by these witnesses for the State of South Dakota. I disagree, however, that Runge has made insufficient allegations to support his contention that Jansen worked for the F.B.I. Runge alleges that Jansen has been working with the F.B.I., specifically with Agent Brannon, “for quite some time.” He further alleges that this may be verified by Agent Brannon and by Agent Canten, both of Sioux Falls, South Dakota. I believe that this allegation is sufficiently specific to warrant consideration of its merits.
Runge also alleges that the prosecution elicited false testimony from Garritson and Jansen that they had not been in communi*76cation with each other prior to trial, when there is evidence not only that they were in communication, but that the FBI facilitated this communication.1 Runge claims that through the post-trial investigative efforts of codefendant Headid and his attorney, testimony is now available from two trustees of the Woodbury County Jail in Sioux City, Iowa, that Garritson and Jansen passed written communications to each other while incarcerated there and that they were in fact put together to discuss the case by F.B.I. agents during the trial. Runge also submits a copy of a letter purportedly written by Jansen to Garritson after the trial, which indicates prior collaboration. It appears from the record that both Garritson and Jansen were asked by the prosecution whether they had been in prior communication, and both denied it.2 Jansen reiterated this position during cross-examination.3 If, as Runge alleges, these witnesses had in fact been brought together to discuss their testimony prior to or during trial by the F.B.I., the prosecution is chargeable with this knowledge and any use by the prosecution of this perjured testimony involves it in a corruption of the truth-seeking function of the trial process. See United States v. Agurs, supra, 427 U.S. at 104, 96 S.Ct. 2392; United States v. Sutton, 542 F.2d 1239, 1241 n.2 (4th Cir. 1976). See also Giglio v. United States, supra, 405 U.S. at 154, 92 S.Ct. 763.
Runge also alleges that Cindy Jorgenson, another government witness, perjured herself when she testified that Runge was present during a conversation between Jansen and Garritson in early April 1976, when the future theft of machines was discussed.4 Runge alleges that this perjury by Jorgenson, as well as her perjury that she had not been in prior contact with any law enforcement authorities and that she drove to Sioux City on her own initiative, was at the *77instigation of Agent Brannon.5 Although the majority agrees that Jorgenson appears to have perjured herself at least to some extent, it concludes that no further investigation into this issue is required since there does not appear to be a reasonable likelihood that knowledge of her perjury would have affected the jury’s judgment. Although Jorgenson’s testimony was less significant than that of Garritson and Jansen, it was still of importance since she was the only other witness whose testimony directly supported the government’s contention that Runge participated in the transportation of the machinery with knowledge that it was stolen. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the District Court could not conclude that knowledge of Jorgenson’s perjury might have affected the judgment of the jury.
While I would not favor the granting of a new trial by this Court on the basis of the record as it now stands, I believe that Runge’s allegations of governmental misconduct are sufficiently serious and sufficiently specific to cross the rather low threshold entitling him to the development of an evidentiary record on his claims before the District Court. See DeMarco v. United States, 415 U.S. 449, 94 S.Ct. 1185, 39 L.Ed.2d 501 (1974); United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138, 142 (2d Cir. 1968). The District Court may make its factual determinations either on the basis of affidavits submitted to that court or after an evidentiary hearing has been held. See United States v. Pitts, 508 F.2d 1237, 1241 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 967, 95 S.Ct. 1958, 44 L.Ed.2d 455 (1975); United States v. Persico, 339 F.Supp. 1077, 1083-1084 (E.D.N.Y.1972), aff’d, 467 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 946, 93 S.Ct. 1360, 35 L.Ed.2d 613 (1973). The District Court should then decide, on the basis of that record and on the basis of its knowledge of prior trial testimony, whether a new trial is required under the test set out above. In my view, such a thorough inquiry into Runge’s allegations is necessary in order to insure that respect for the integrity of the judicial system is maintained.

. Runge also alleges that the government stressed the similarity of the two witnesses’ testimony during closing argument, and the fact that they had not been in communication with each other since May 5, 1976. Since the testimony of Garritson and Jansen constituted the government’s principal case against Runge, particularly with regard to Runge’s knowledge that the machinery, which he allegedly helped transport, was stolen, such an approach by the prosecution during closing argument does not seem improbable. However, since recording of the closing arguments was waived by counsel, it is impossible to verify Runge’s allegation on the basis of the record before us.

. Q [Keith Van Dorn, Assistant United States Attorney]: When was the last time you talked with Danvers Jansen?
A [David Garritson]: May 5, 1976.
* * * * * *
Q [Van Dorn]: Have you discussed that matter that you are testifying about today with David Garritsen [sic] recently?
A [Danvers Jansen]: I haven’t seen him since he was arrested one day not too long after all this happened. I haven’t seen him since then except he walked in the courtroom or jail once; Sioux City jail.
Trial Transcript, February 1, 1977 at 163; Trial Transcript, February 2, 1977, at 424.

. Q [Golby Uhlir, attorney for Daniel Runge]. Did you receive communications from Mr. Garritsen [sic] by way of his brother Doug Garritsen [sic] while you were in the Minnehaha County jail?
A [Danvers Jansen]. Receive communications from him? No.
Q. Did Doug tell you that Dave asked this or that?
A. No. He was angry with me I gathered. I never heard a thing from David Garritsen [sic] since he got locked up.
Trial Transcript, February 2, 1977, at 445.

. The substance of this testimony is as follows:
Q [Keith Van Dorn, Assistant United States Attorney]. Did Mr. Garritsen [sic] ever mention to you his involvement in the theft of some tractors?
A [Cindy Jorgenson], Yes.
Q. And where were you when this conversation took place?
A. At Danny Jansen’s house.
Q. In whose presence did this conversation take place?
A. Who all were there?
Q. Yes.
A. Danny Jansen, Dave Garritsen [sic] and Dan Runge.
* * * * * *
Q. When did these conversations take place?
A. About the first part of April.
Q. Could you tell the members of the jury the nature of those conversations?
A. Talking about getting some machinery—
[Objection of the defense was then sustained.]
Trial Transcript, February 3, 1977, at pages 778-779.

. In support of this allegation, Runge submits a copy of a letter purportedly written by Jorgenson to her boyfriend, John Garritson, which states in part:
That Steve Branan [sic] from the F.B.I. came and talked to me. He said Runge was setting you up and he wouldn’t charge me with accessory if I say what he told me to say and you wouldn’t either be charged. * * * All I said was I heard D.J. and Dave talking about some machines they stole and he said to say Runge was there too. I told him I would have to talk to you first, he said we all could visit together. I just don’t want to see us get into any trouble. I sure hope he knows what he’s doing, after all he’s the F.B.I. Just wish he’d leave us alone.