Court Opinion

ID: 9864652
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 14:37:45.777725+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:20:37.589701
License: Public Domain

THE COURT.
[2] In denying the petition for transfer to this court after decision by the district court of appeal we deem it proper to say that escrow instructions giveti by the grantor in a deed are not privileged communications even though such instructions be given to a party who has theretofore, or at the time occupies the position of attorney to the grantor. The assumption that the attorney, while acting as the depository of the deed, is occupying the position of attorney to the grantor, and acting as the agent of the grantor, assumes the very matter in issue where the question of delivery in escrow is involved, because if the attorney is acting solely as the attorney for the grantor then the deed in the possession of the attorney, as such, is, in legal effect, in the possession of the grantor and there has been no delivery whatever. The very act of constituting the attorney depository of the deed in escrow makes him the agent *450of both the grantor and grantee (McDonald v. Hu,ff, 77 Cal. 279, 282 [19 Pae. 499]; Wellborn v. Weaver, 17 Ga. 267 [63 Am. Dec. 235]; Davis v. Clark, 58 Kan. 100 [48 Pae. 563]; Gammon v. Bunnell, 22 Utah, 421 [64 Pae. 958]), and renders the instructions given to him unprivileged.
[3] Instructions to the holder of a deed delivered in escrow with reference to its delivery are not “in the course of the professional employment” of the attorney within the meaning of section 1881, subdivision 2, of the Code of Civil Procedure, although the delivery be made to the grantor’s attorney, but are instructions which he is bound to reveal at the request of the grantee for whose benefit the instructions are given. “Where the communication between the client and attorney is one authorizing the attorney to perform some act on behalf of the client, the communication giving such authority is not a confidential communication by the client, and the attorney may testify to the instructions given to him. (Burnside v. Terry, 51 Ga. 186; Williams v. Blumenthal, 27 Wash. 24 [67 Pac. 393]; Bruce v. Osgood, 113 Ind. 300 [14 N. E. 563]).” (Collette v. Sarrasin, 184 Cal. 283, 284 [193 Pac. 571, 572], see, also, Henshall v. Coburn, 177 Cal. 54 [169 Pac. 1014]; Ruiz v. Dow, 113 Cal. 498 [45 Pac. 867].)
The petition is denied.