Court Opinion

ID: 9737857
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:36:00.662482+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:02.116967
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HEIPLE, concurring in part and dissenting in part: The Illinois Constitution sets forth the mechanism for enacting a bill. (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, § 8.) The constitution requires, in part, that a bill must be read by title on three different days in both the House and the Senate; that no bill shall become law unless it receives a majority vote in both houses; and that a bill shall be confined to one subject. (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, § 8.) Article IV, section 8, concludes by requiring the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate to sign each bill that passes both houses to certify that the constitutional requirements for passage have been met. From the proceedings of the Illinois Constitutional Convention it is apparent that at least some of the convention delegates believed and intended that if the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate certified the passage of a bill, no court could inquire into the regularity of the bill’s passage or the compliance with constitutional mandates. (See Benjamin v. Devon Bank (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 142, 145, quoting 6 Record of Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention 1386-87.) It was also assumed, however, that the legislature would police itself. (See 4 Record of Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention 2881.) A more extensive discussion of this issue is set forth in Geja’s Cafe v. Metropolitan Pier & Exposition Authority (1992), 153 Ill. 2d 239, 258-60. Previously, in Fuehrmeyer this court adopted the so-called "enrolled bill” doctrine and endorsed the proposition that the signatures of the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate on a bill precluded any judicial inquiry into whether the procedural requirements of the Illinois Constitution had been met. Geja’s raised the question of whether the validity of the General Assembly’s carte blanche certification power should be allowed to continue. Today, the majority has proclaimed that "the enrolled-bill rule precludes this court from considering whether the legislature complied with the three-readings requirement set forth in article IV, section 8.” 165 Ill. 2d at 254. I respectfully dissent. The interpretation of a constitutional provision depends, in the first instance, on the plain meaning of its language. Next, it depends on the common understanding of the citizens who, by ratifying the constitution, have given it life. A court looks to the debates of the convention delegates only when a constitutional provision is ambiguous. (Kalodimos v. Village of Morton Grove (1984), 103 Ill. 2d 483, 492-93.) There is no ambiguity in the provision requiring the legislature to read a bill on three different days in each house, the provision that a bill receive a majority vote in each house, or the provision requiring the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate to sign each bill to certify that the procedural requirements for passage have been met. If it were deemed desirable to foreclose inquiries into the regularity of the passage of bills, language simllar to the enrolled-bill doctrine could have been included within the constitution. There is no such language. Moreover, the Illinois Constitution was adopted at a referendum. It did not become the law of the State by either the discussions of the delegates or by their votes. The constitutional convention merely submitted the. document to the public for a vote. There is no way that a voter could interpret the language of the constitution to mean that procedural requirements for the passage of a bill could be overridden by the signatures of two State officers. In truth, the signatures of the officers are merely prima facie evidence that the General Assembly has abided by the requirements of the constitution. In other words, it raises a rebuttable presumption that the requirements for passage have been met. A literal adherence to this so-called enrolled-bill doctrine means that a bill need never be read or presented in either house, need never receive a majority vote, and need never even be voted on. Two people, the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate, need merely sign and certify a bill and, unless vetoed by the Governor pursuant to article IV, section 9, the bill becomes ipso facto the law of Illinois. Contrary to today’s ruling, I believe that the constitutional requirements for the enactment of a bill should be followed and enforced. While separation of powers is a valid doctrine and a presumption of legislative regularity is its proper corollary, this court should reserve the right of review to ensure the General Assembly’s compliance with constitutional mandates. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which adopts and applies the enrolled-bill doctrine.