Court Opinion

ID: 9901943
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-22 18:08:33.231177+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:41.737296
License: Public Domain

[Cite as In re A.E., 2023-Ohio-4217.]

                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                              EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

IN RE A.E.                                    :
                                                            No. 112615
                                              :

                                              :

                                              :

                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 22, 2023

            Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                                   Juvenile Division
                                 Case No. DL22105013

                                        Appearances:

                 Edward F. Borkowski, Jr., for appellant.

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Danielle Muster, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellee.

MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J.:

                 Defendant-appellant, A.E., appeals his adjudication of delinquency on

one count of gross sexual imposition. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
             A.E. was charged with two counts of gross sexual imposition. Count 1

alleged gross sexual imposition, a felony of the third degree, in violation of

R.C. 2907.05(A)(4). Count 2 alleged gross sexual imposition, a felony of the fourth

degree, in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(1).

             The state gave notice that it intended to introduce statements of the

child victim through other witnesses, pursuant to Evid.R. 807. Before trial, the court

held an in camera hearing and found that the victim, age four, was not competent to

testify. The court also heard arguments from the parties regarding the state’s

Evid.R. 807 motion. The court held the motion in abeyance, and the matter

proceeded to trial. During trial, the court granted the state’s motion.

             K.B., the child victim’s mother, testified that she and A.E.’s mother

were very close and A.E. or his sister often babysat her two young girls. One Tuesday

in March, K.B. dropped her children off at A.E.’s house; A.E.’s sister was supposed

to babysit. K.B. picked them up the next morning, Wednesday, and took them to

school. That night she gave both girls a bath.

             The next day, Thursday, K.B. was getting her daughters ready for a

bath, when her four-year-old daughter said “mommy, [A.E.] did like this to my no-

no spot.” K.B. explained that her daughter made a “flicking motion” with her two

fingers and referred to her vagina as her “no-no spot.” According to K.B., the child

told her that A.E. pulled her pants down. K.B. asked her daughter if A.E. had taken

out his no-no spot and she said no. K.B. asked where A.E.’s mother was when this

happened, and the child said A.E.’s mother was in her bedroom. The child told her
mother that this occurred in A.E.’s bedroom while the child’s sister was sleeping.

According to K.B., the child told A.E. to stop, but he did not. A.E. then said, “this

isn’t me,” and left the room. K.B. took her daughter to the hospital immediately after

her disclosure.

             K.B. testified that after the disclosure, the child’s daycare teacher told

K.B. that the child had been “down,” whiny, and refusing to use the bathroom. Soon

after the disclosure, the child was removed from the daycare due to behavioral

issues.

             Nia Long, a sexual assault nurse examiner (“SANE”), performed the

examination on the child. According to Long, the child victim told her that she was

at A.E.’s house when he took her to his room and “started playing on her no-no

place” and that she told him to stop but he did not. The child told Long that A.E.

stated “this isn’t me” and then left. Long performed an age-appropriate examination

and found some redness on the labia majora and vestibule area. Because of her age,

the child was not able to give a numerical value to any pain she was having, but she

told Long she was in pain, and Long noted that the child indicated that the pain was

in the same location where Long observed redness. Long testified that redness is

not a “normal finding”; “it’s not consistent with [the child’s] skin color.”

               Long testified that the child’s demeanor during the exam was normal,

other than the child being sleepy. Long acknowledged that the redness could have

been caused by something other than a sexual assault.
               Re’Gine Wells was the Cuyahoga County Division of Children and

Family Services (“CCDCFS” or “agency”) social worker assigned to the case. During

her brief interview with the child, she asked the child if anyone touched her “no-no”

spot or her “booty.” At first the child said no, but then disclosed that A.E. had

touched her “no-no” spot. The child told Wells that this happened in A.E.’s bedroom

and it was just the two of them. She also told the social worker that she felt sad and

that her “no-no” spot felt “hurtful.” Wells testified that the child told her that A.E.

had stated that “it wasn’t him.” Wells testified that when the child told her what had

happened to her she became very soft spoken, “shut down,” and walked out of the

interview room.    On cross-examination, Wells testified that the child initially

answered “no” when she asked if anyone touched her and then mentioned A.E.

               The child’s preschool teacher testified that the child’s father died in

February; since then, the child had been “very clingy” and that “[s]he wanted her

mom a lot, didn’t want to use the bathroom, and she cried a lot.” The child had “been

doing this for a while after her father passed away.”

               The investigating detective, Detective James Seawright, testified that

he spoke with the child’s mother, A.E., and A.E.’s mother. Seawright also performed

a buccal swab on A.E. and sent it for analysis.

               Ohio Bureau of Criminal Investigations analyst Andrea Dennis

explained the steps for generating traditional and Y-STR DNA analysis. She testified

that she tested skin swabs of the child’s external genitalia and inner thigh. Dennis

testified that there was not enough DNA to be able to create a profile for
identification. She testified that there was a Y-STR profile from a male, but there

was not enough to identify a person.1

               A.E.’s 19-year-old sister, I.E., testified that she would babysit the child

and her sister, often overnight. I.E. would take the children to her room, where they

would watch television and fall asleep. According to I.E., she last babysat for the

victim in February, not March, when this was said to have occurred. I.E. explained

that her room was on the first floor of the house and that the victim would never go

upstairs because there was nothing up there besides A.E.’s room, which no one went

into because it was dirty. The last time I.E. babysat the children, A.E. was at home,

but he spent the night in his room. I.E. testified she was with the children the entire

time except when she was in the shower.

               The trial court adjudicated A.E. delinquent of both counts of gross

sexual imposition and imposed a consecutive suspended Ohio Department of Youth

Services (“ODYS) commitment. The court also placed A.E. on a single term of

community-control sanctions.

               A.E. filed a notice of appeal.

               In June 2023, after the parties filed their appellate briefs, this court

sua sponte ordered the parties to brief the issue of whether the trial court’s

delinquency adjudication and disposition, which imposed a single term of a

community-control sanctions, was a final, appealable order. The parties submitted

      1 Dennis’s testimony was during a time in the trial that the audio recording was not

working. The trial court summarized Dennis’s testimony on the record.
briefs, and this court dismissed the appeal for lack of a final appealable order,

finding it was error for the trial court to impose a single community-control sanction

on two counts of gross sexual imposition. See motion No. 565870. This court also

granted leave for A.E. to move to reinstate the appeal within 45 days “upon obtaining

a final judgment that does not impose a single term of community control with

regard to separate dispositions.” Id.

                The trial court held another dispositional hearing at which the

assistant county prosecutor informed the court that the two counts of gross sexual

imposition were allied offenses of similar import and should therefore merge. The

state elected to proceed to disposition on Count 1, gross sexual imposition,

R.C. 2907.05(A)(4), a third-degree felony. The court imposed a suspended ODYS

commitment and a two-year term of community control on the sole remaining

count. Counsel for A.E. moved to reinstate his appeal, which this court granted.

                A.E. raises the following assignments of error for our review:

      I. The trial court erred by permitting out-of-court statements pursuant
      to Evid.R. 807 and 803.

      II. The trial court [finding] appellant delinquent [was] against the
      manifest weight of the evidence.

      III. The trial court erred by imposing consecutive ODYS commitments
      on allied offenses.

                In the first assignment of error, A.E. contends that the trial court

erred by permitting into evidence out-of-court statements that the victim made to

other people.
Hearsay – Evid.R. 807

               Generally hearsay is not admissible at trial. Evid.R. 802. However,

hearsay evidence may be admissible if it falls under enumerated exceptions.

In pertinent part, Evid.R. 807(A) allows out-of-court statements made by a child

under the age of twelve to be admitted where those statements describe a sexual act

performed by, with, or on the child. A trial court’s decision to admit statements

under Evid.R. 807 is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Singleton, 2016-

Ohio-4696, 69 N.E.3d 118, ¶ 21 (8th Dist.), citing In re A.K., 2d Dist. Montgomery

No. 26199, 2015-Ohio-30, ¶ 16. An abuse of discretion occurs when a court exercises

its judgment in an unwarranted way regarding a matter over which it has

discretionary authority. Johnson v. Abdullah, 166 Ohio St.3d 427, 2021-Ohio-3304,

187 N.E.3d 463, ¶ 35.

               The Evid.R. 807 hearsay exception for statements made by children

under the age of twelve concerning sex abuse contains four requirements for

admissions of such statements: (1) the statement must be trustworthy; (2) the child’s

testimony must be unavailable; (3) independent proof of the act must exist; and (4)

the proponent must notify all other parties ten days before trial that such a

statement will be offered in evidence. Evid.R. 807(A)(1)-(4).

               A.E. argues that the state failed to show “independent proof of sexual

assault” under Evid.R. 807(A)(3).2 The Staff Notes to Evid.R. 807 provide that “the

      2 A.E. does not contest that the statement was trustworthy, that the child’s testimony

was   unavailable,   or   that   he   was   notified   at   least   ten   days   before   trial.
independent-proof requirement of Evid.R. 807 is comparable to the independent-

proof requirement of the co-conspirator exception, Evid.R. 801(D)(2)(e).” “Thus,

while the rule does not specifically indicate the nature of the independent proof

required, we may derive guidance from the co-conspirator exception, where

independent proof has been subject to a ‘prima facie case’ standard.” State v. Black,

87 Ohio App.3d 724, 729, 622 N.E.2d 1166 (4th Dist.1993), citing Weissenberger,

Ohio Evidence, Section 807.5, at 204-8 (1993).

              A prima facie showing of a fact is a lower standard than proof by a

preponderance of the evidence. State v. Meadows, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 99CA2651,

2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 3120, 18 (Feb. 12, 2001). Prima facie evidence is evidence

“sufficient to support but not to compel a certain conclusion and which does no more

than furnish evidence to be considered and weighed but not necessarily accepted by

the trier of fact.” State v. Martin, 9 Ohio App.3d 150, 152, 458 N.E.2d 898

(11th Dist.1983), citing Cleveland v. Keah, 157 Ohio St. 331, 105 N.E.2d 402

(1952). Thus, the relevant inquiry is “whether the proponent of a hearsay statement

has presented sufficient evidence, independent of the statement itself, to support a

finding that an act of abuse occurred.” Meadows at id.

              The state presented evidence through Long, the SANE nurse, who

testified she noted erythema, or redness, on the child’s labia majora and vestibule

during the exam. A.E. contends that this is insufficient because Long did not have

Evid.R. 807(A)(1), (2), (4). Therefore, we will consider only whether the state showed
independent proof of gross sexual imposition.
specialized training in pediatric exams and Long did not conclude that a sexual

assault occurred.

               Long testified that she has a Bachelor of Science in nursing and is a

specialized SANE nurse. To become a SANE nurse, Long completed a 40-hour

training course through the International Association for Forensic Nursing, which

was hands-on training with practice kits, evidence collection, speculum exams, and

practice taking patient narratives. Once a year, Long completes “competencies,”

where she reviews skills that are required for SANE evaluations. Long estimated

that she has performed at least 70 SANE exams. Long explained the importance of

the narrative portion of a SANE examination, which helps with evidence collection

and aiding in the physical examination, including the examination of children. Long

further explained that the protocol does not call for an internal exam of a four-year-

old child victim and she did not perform one in this case.

               Long testified that the child disclosed pain but was unable to place a

numerical value on the pain due to her age. The redness was located on the labia

majora, or outer lips of the vagina, and the child showed that the pain was located

“where the redness was.” Long testified that redness in the area of the victim’s

vagina “would not be considered normal,” but could have had a cause other than

sexual assault. However, Long testified, the redness she observed on the victim’s

vagina was unusual for a person of the victim’s skin color. Long further testified that

not all sexual assault show injuries: “some do, some do not, so we can’t base our

evaluation off injuries, and we don’t determine if there was a sexual assault or not.
We just collect evidence for it.” Thus, per Long’s testimony, she would not conclude

that a sexual assault occurred because it is not part of the evaluation and treatment

of a patient.

                In light of the nurse’s testimony, we do not find that the trial court

abused its discretion in finding that the state showed independent proof, i.e., made

a prima facie showing as is required by Evid.R. 807(A)(3).

Hearsay – Evid.R. 803(4)

                A.E. next claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it

allowed into testimony statements the child victim made to Long and the agency

social worker, Wells.

                Evid.R. 103(A) provides that an objection to the admission of

evidence at trial must state the ground for the objection with specificity.

State v. Daniels, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 03CA008261, 2004-Ohio-828, ¶ 33; see also

State v. Harris, 10th Dist. Franklin Nos. 21AP-678 and 22AP-124, 2023-Ohio-3994;

State v. Willett, 4th Dist. Ross No. 11CA3260, 2012-Ohio-2186.

                Evid.R. 803(4) states that the following are not excluded by the

hearsay rule: “Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and

describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the

inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as

reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.” This court “has previously upheld

testimony by SANE nurses regarding what the minor child victims told them,
provided it was purposed for medical diagnosis and treatment.” In re M.P., 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 111608, 2023-Ohio-925, ¶ 29.

                Our review of the record reveals that counsel for A.E. objected to

Long’s testimony pursuant to Evid.R. 807, not Evid.R 803(4), and objected to the

social worker’s testimony as a “continuing hearsay objection.” Counsel never argued

at trial that statements that the child made to Long or the social worker were

inadmissible pursuant to Evid.R. 803(4). Thus, we could find that A.E. has waived

any such issue on appeal, Daniels at id., and is subject to the plain error rule.3

                Next, A.E. has not indicated which of the child victim’s statements

violated Evid.R. 803(4). A.E. cites Long’s and Wells’s testimony and argues why

their statements were not for the purposes of treatment or diagnosis but does not

identify which of the child’s statements he is challenging. Regarding Long, A.E.

states that “[t]he statement that the victim in this case made to the SANE nurse was

not for the purpose of diagnosing or treating anything.” Likewise, A.E. contends

that the court “erred by permitting [Wells] to testify about what the child told her,”

but does not identify which statements he is challenging. The child did not make a

single statement to Long or Wells; both witnesses testified about multiple

       3 “Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they

were not brought to the attention of the court.” Crim.R. 52(B). “Plain error exists only if
‘but for the error, the outcome of the trial clearly would have been otherwise,’ and is applied
‘under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.”’
State v. Day, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108435, 2020-Ohio-5259, ¶ 57, quoting State v.
Harrison, 122 Ohio St.3d 512, 2009-Ohio-3547, 912 N.E.2d 1106, ¶ 61.
statements and disclosures the victim made to them. It is not this court’s duty to

surmise which statements A.E. now has an objection to.

              Thus, because A.E. did not object with specificity in the trial court and

has not indicated on appeal which statements he is challenging, we decline to

address his argument regarding Evid.R. 803(4).

              The first assignment of error is overruled.

Manifest Weight of the Evidence

              In the second assignment of error, A.E. argues that his adjudication

was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

              When considering a defendant’s claim that a conviction is against the

manifest weight of the evidence, the appellate court examines the entire record,

weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom,

considers the witnesses’ credibility and determines whether, in resolving conflicts in

the evidence, the trier of fact “‘clearly lost its way and created such a manifest

miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’”

State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997), quoting State

v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983). Reversal on

manifest weight grounds is reserved for the ‘“exceptional case in which the evidence

weighs heavily against the conviction.”’ Id., quoting Martin at 175.

              In support of this claim that the adjudication was against the manifest

weight of the evidence, A.E. argues that the victim’s statements were not credible,

evidence of the victim’s changed behavior was not indicative that she had been
sexually assaulted, and the redness Long noted on the victim’s vagina is not credible

evidence of sexual assault.

               The four-year-old victim made consistent statements to her mother,

the SANE nurse, and the agency social worker that A.E. touched her “no-no,” she

told him to stop but he would not stop, and that he said, “this isn’t me” or something

similar, before stopping and leaving the room.

               Both the child’s mother and preschool teacher testified that the

victim’s behavior changed, so much so that the child was no longer allowed to attend

her daycare. Although the teacher testified she noticed changes in the child’s

behavior prior to when the alleged assault took place, we do not find that any

inconsistencies in the teacher and mother’s testimonies render the court’s verdict

unreliable.

                Finally, Long, the SANE nurse, testified that she noted redness on the

victim’s labia majora and vestibule area and that the child told her she was having

pain; the nurse further noted that the pain was consistent with where the redness

was located. Long explained that the redness she observed was unusual for a person

of the child’s skin color.

               A.E. next argues that his sister gave credible testimony and the

competing theories give way to reasonable doubt. We do not find that the sister’s

testimony was in vast contradiction to that of the other witnesses — the main

contradiction was that I.E. testified the child never went in A.E.’s room because it

was too dirty, and the child disclosed to the state’s witnesses that the assault
occurred in A.E.’s bedroom. The sister admitted she was asleep when babysitting

the children (she babysat them overnight) and was not watching them while she

showered. Moreover, the trier of fact is free to believe all, some, or none of the

testimony of each witness testifying at trial. State v. Jones, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.

108371, 2020-Ohio-3367, ¶ 85. “A conviction is not against the manifest weight of

the evidence simply because the jury believed the testimony of the state’s witnesses

and disbelieved the defendant’s [witnesses].” Id.

              This is not the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily

against A.E.’s adjudication of delinquency for gross sexual imposition.

              The second assignment of error is overruled.

Consecutive Sentences

              In the third assignment of error, A.E. argues that the trial court erred

in imposing consecutive dispositions for two counts of gross sexual imposition.

              As mentioned, this court previously dismissed the appeal for lack of a

final, appealable order. The trial court held a dispositional hearing at which it

merged A.E.’s gross sexual imposition counts and imposed a single sentence. This

court reinstated the appeal. Because there is only one finding of delinquency for

gross sexual imposition and no consecutive dispositions were imposed, the

assignment of error is summarily overruled.

Conclusion

              The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing testimony

pursuant to the hearsay exception enumerated in Evid.R. 807. A.E.’s conviction for
gross sexual imposition is not against the manifest weight of the evidence and his

argument that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive dispositions is overruled

because, after this court dismissed the initial appeal, the trial court imposed a single

disposition.

               Judgment affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment

into execution.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, JUDGE

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, P.J., and
MARY J. BOYLE, J., CONCUR