Court Opinion

ID: 9353078
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-10 21:00:25.482949+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:07:28.669386
License: Public Domain

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                                            UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 22-4218

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                            Plaintiff - Appellee,

                     v.

        CHRISTIAN HERNANDEZ MORENO,

                            Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at
        Greensboro. William L. Osteen, Jr., District Judge. (1:17-cr-00202-WO-1)

        Submitted: December 30, 2022                                      Decided: January 9, 2023

        Before AGEE, THACKER, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: Aaron B. Wellman, IVEY, MCCLELLAN, SIEGMUND, BRUMBAUGH &
        MCDONOUGH L.L.P., Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Sandra J. Hairston,
        United States Attorney, Frank J. Chut, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF
        THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               Christian Hernandez Moreno pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon,

        in violation of 18 U.S.C §§ 922(g)(1), 942(a)(2). The district court sentenced Moreno to

        96 months’ imprisonment, and he now appeals. On appeal, Moreno argues that the court

        erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence seized following a pat-down search of

        Moreno, who was a passenger in a vehicle stopped on suspicion of drug activity.

               While patrolling on foot in a high-crime area at night, officers stopped three

        occupants of a parked vehicle, one of whom was Moreno. The officer who approached the

        driver instructed another officer to remove Moreno from the passenger seat; that officer

        removed Moreno and frisked him, finding a handgun in Moreno’s pocket. Moreno argues

        that the district court erred by finding that the initial stop and subsequent frisk of Moreno

        complied with the Fourth Amendment.

               “When reviewing a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we review factual

        findings for clear error and legal determinations de novo,” construing “the evidence in the

        light most favorable to the prevailing party.” United States v. Lull, 824 F.3d 109, 114-15

        (4th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Under well-established doctrine, a

        police officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief investigatory

        stop—known as a ‘Terry 1 stop’—predicated on reasonable, articulable suspicion that

        ‘criminal activity may be afoot.’” United States v. Mitchell, 963 F.3d 385, 390 (4th Cir.

        2020) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30). The officer must have “at least a minimal level of

               1
                   Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. (1968).

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        objective justification,” meaning that he “must be able to articulate more than an inchoate

        and unparticularized suspicion or hunch of criminal activity.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528

        U.S. 119, 123-24 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).            Once the officer has

        conducted a valid Terry stop, if he or she has reasonable suspicion that the person stopped

        is armed and dangerous, the officer may conduct a protective frisk. United States v.

        Robinson, 846 F.3d 694, 698 (4th Cir. 2017); United States v. Black, 525 F.3d 359, 364

        (4th Cir. 2008) (“[I]n connection with such a seizure or stop, if presented with a reasonable

        belief that the person may be armed and presently dangerous, an officer may conduct a

        protective frisk.”).

               Courts assess the legality of a Terry stop and frisk under the totality of the

        circumstances, giving “due weight to common sense judgments reached by officers in light

        of their experience and training.” United States v. Perkins, 363 F.3d 317, 321 (4th Cir.

        2004). “Judicial review of the evidence offered to demonstrate reasonable suspicion must

        be commonsensical, focused on the evidence as a whole, and cognizant of both context and

        the particular experience of officers charged with the ongoing tasks of law enforcement.”

        United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 337 (4th Cir. 2008). “[M]ultiple factors may be

        taken together to create a reasonable suspicion even where each factor, taken alone, would

        be insufficient.” United States v. George, 732 F.3d 296, 300 (4th Cir. 2013).

               We have reviewed the record and conclude that the district court did not err in

        holding that the first officer had reasonable suspicion that Moreno and the other occupants

        of the vehicle were engaged in illegal drug activity. And because there is an “indisputable

        nexus between drugs and guns,” the court also correctly concluded the officer had

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        reasonable suspicion that Moreno and the other occupants were armed and dangerous. See

        United States v. Sakyi, 160 F.3d 164, 169 (4th Cir. 1998). 2 Moreover, the district court did

        not clearly err by finding that the officer instructed the second officer to frisk Moreno, and

        therefore the frisk was valid under the Fourth Amendment.              See United States v.

        Massenburg, 654 F.3d 480, 495 n.6 (4th Cir. 2011).

               Accordingly, we affirm. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

        legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument

        would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                         AFFIRMED

               2
                Noting that most states have legalized some form of marijuana use, Moreno asks
        us to overrule Sakyi. But “one panel [of this court] cannot overrule a decision issued by
        another panel.” United States v. Williams, 808 F.3d 253, 261 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal
        quotation marks omitted).

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