Court Opinion

ID: 9539540
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:05:42.455881+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:56.228858
License: Public Domain

Sognier, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. While the charge complained of was conceivably a “slip of the tongue,” it was an incorrect statement of the law likely to confuse the jury and placed a burden on appellant which the law does not impose. Chambers v. State, 127 Ga. App. 196, 200 (5) (192 SE2d 916) (1972); Bush v. State, 129 Ga. App. 160, 161 (2) (199 SE2d 121) (1973). The court did not retract the charge or call the jury’s attention to the error in any other manner. Where a judge gives a correct charge on an issue involved in a criminal case followed by a further instruction on the same issue which is misleading and confusing to the jury, and fails to withdraw the incorrect charge and call the jury’s attention to its withdrawal, error results. Reece v. State, 210 Ga. 578, 579 (2 (a)) (82 SE2d 10) (1954); Wells v. State, 126 Ga. App. 130, 131 (1) (190 SE2d 106) (1972). Such error cannot be held harmless in view of the fact that the evidence adduced at trial, while sufficient to support the verdict, was not overwhelming.
Next we must consider whether appellant waived his right to raise the issue of an erroneous charge on appeal by failing to object to the charge or to reserve exceptions to the charge. “The general rule in this state is that defendants in criminal cases are not required to except to the jury charge to preserve error for appeal. Code Ann. § 70-207 (a). The right to raise an erroneous charge on appeal may be lost only in certain well-defined instances, as where a defendant’s tactical trial plan justifies a finding of procedural default, State v. Stonaker, 236 Ga. 1 (222 SE2d 354) (1976), where error in the charge is induced by the actions of defense counsel, Edwards v. State, 235 Ga. 603 (221 SE2d 28) (1975), or where defense counsel in response to an inquiry by the trial judge plainly states that he has no objections to the charge as given. Jackson v. State, 246 Ga. 459 (271 SE2d 855) (1980).” Lumpkin v. State, 249 Ga. 834, 835 (1) (295 SE2d 86) (1982); OCGA § 5-5-24 (a). The trial counsel did not plainly state that he had no objections to the charge as given. Hence, I do not believe appellant waived his right to raise this issue on appeal. Accordingly, I would reverse.
*173I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Banke and Judge Carley join in this dissent.