Court Opinion

ID: 9389617
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-25 21:04:05.949971+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:28.793907
License: Public Domain

NOTICE                      2023 IL App (4th) 221080-U                        FILED
This Order was filed under                                                               April 25, 2023
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is         NOS. 4-22-1080, 4-22-1081 cons.                     Carla Bender
not precedent except in the                                                          4th District Appellate
limited circumstances allowed                                                              Court, IL
under Rule 23(e)(1).
                                      IN THE APPELLATE COURT

                                               OF ILLINOIS

                                            FOURTH DISTRICT

    In re Tal. B. and Tak B., Minors;                             )      Appeal from the
                                                                  )      Circuit Court of
    (The People of the State of Illinois,                         )      Adams County
                  Petitioner-Appellee,                            )      Nos. 19JA81
                                                                  )           19JA82
                      v.                                          )
    ISAAC B.,                                                     )      Honorable
                      Respondent-Appellant).                      )      John C. Wooleyhan,
                                                                  )      Judge Presiding.
                                                                  )

                    JUSTICE ZENOFF delivered the judgment of the court.
                    Justices Turner and Steigmann concurred in the judgment.

                                                  ORDER

   ¶1       Held: The trial court’s finding respondent was unfit under section 1(D)(l) of the
                  Adoption Act was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

   ¶2               In September 2021, the State filed a motion to terminate the parental rights of

   respondent, Isaac B., as to his minor children, Tal. B (born May 13, 2008) and Tak. B. (born

   September 29, 2009). The children’s mother is not a party to this appeal. However, she appealed

   the termination of her parental rights in appellate case Nos. 4-22-1082, 4-22-1083, and 4-23-

   1084. In December 2022, the trial court granted the State’s petition and terminated respondent’s

   parental rights.

   ¶3               Respondent appeals, asserting the trial court erred (1) by taking judicial notice of

   the previous court file in the matter and (2) in determining respondent was unfit because he
failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the children’s

welfare. We affirm.

¶4                                       I. BACKGROUND

¶5              In October 2019, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship, alleging

respondent’s children were neglected by their mother under section 2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile

Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2018)) in that the

children’s environment was injurious to their welfare. The State alleged in part the children’s

mother admitted being addicted to methamphetamine, was currently on felony probation for

possession of methamphetamine, had lost her employment, and was to be evicted from her

apartment. The trial court placed temporary custody and guardianship of the children with the

Department of Children and Family services (DCFS).

¶6              The temporary custody order noted respondent had not received notice and was

not present at the hearing because his whereabouts were unknown. It also ordered there would be

no visitation until further order of the trial court. Respondent did not participate in the initial

service plan in the case. A summons for respondent to appear was returned unserved, and he was

served by publication in December 2019. Respondent did not appear at the adjudicatory hearing

held in July 2020. Respondent also did not appear at the dispositional hearing held on October

26, 2020, during which the court adjudicated the children as neglected and placed guardianship

with DCFS.

¶7              On September 21, 2021, the State filed a petition for termination of parental

rights, alleging in part respondent was unfit under section 1(D)(l) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS

50/1(D)(l) (West 2020)) for failure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or

responsibility as to the children’s welfare. The petition alleged the children’s mother was unfit

                                                  -2-
under section 1(D)(m)(i), (ii) of the Adoption Act (id. § 1(D)(m)(i), (ii)) for failure to make

(1) reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the bases for the removal of the children

and (2) reasonable progress toward the return of the children to respondent’s care within nine

months after the adjudication of neglect. The State filed a document listing the nine-month

period as between July 7, 2020, and April 6, 2021. The State later amended the nine-month

period to include April 6, 2021, to January 7, 2022. On October 6, 2021, respondent made his

first appearance in the case.

¶8             On June 8, 2022, the trial court terminated respondent’s parental rights after a

hearing, and respondent appealed. However, in July 2022, the court vacated the order

terminating respondent’s parental rights because the State had been represented by an unlicensed

attorney at the hearing. On December 13, 2022, the court conducted a new hearing. Respondent

appeared pro se.

¶9             Delaney McDonald, a therapist at Chaddock, the agency designated by DCFS to

manage the case, testified she was the children’s caseworker from October 2020 to December

2021. McDonald identified exhibits showing respondent’s service plans and testified about

respondent’s progress with respect to the goals and tasks stated in the plans.

¶ 10           Regarding the plan covering the period from October 2020 to April 2021,

McDonald reported respondent received an unsatisfactory rating on all goals in the plan, which

consisted of substance abuse, mental health, cooperation, and parenting goals, because he

contacted her only once during this period. McDonald had no knowledge of whether respondent

participated in any services. He had no visitation, as that had been suspended at the temporary

custody hearing. Respondent called McDonald once on October 28, 2020, asked about the

                                                -3-
children, and said he wanted to see them “against court order.” McDonald set up an appointment

to meet with him the next day and he did not show up.

¶ 11           Regarding the plan covering the period from April 2021 to October 2021,

respondent again received unsatisfactory ratings on all his goals because of limited contact.

Respondent called McDonald in July 2021 and left a voicemail. McDonald could not recall the

substance of the voicemail. Respondent did not answer when McDonald returned the call and did

not have his own voicemail activated. Respondent declined to ask any questions of McDonald at

the hearing.

¶ 12           Jessica Fuller, a caseworker at Chaddock, testified about the service plan in effect

between October 2021 and April 2022. Respondent yet again received unsatisfactory ratings on

all his goals because Fuller had no contact with him during that time and he made no attempts to

establish contact. Fuller stated he had an “incarcerated parent service plan as he was lodged in

the Department of Corrections.” After the period ended, Fuller spoke with respondent in

November 2022. At that time, respondent had completed inpatient substance-abuse treatment and

was discharged to a sober living facility. He also completed eight hours of parenting classes and

a mental-health assessment. He had sent two cards to the children, one to Tal. B and one to Tak.

B.

¶ 13           Following Fuller’s testimony, the State entered into evidence exhibits showing

that, on August 7, 2020, respondent pleaded guilty to charges of criminal trespass to a residence

and resisting a peace officer. On March 7, 2022, he was charged with unlawful possession of

methamphetamine. The State also asked the trial court to take judicial notice of “the instant

proceedings, 19-JA-81, including the disposition and adjudication in this matter.” The court took

judicial notice, and respondent did not object. Respondent declined to present any evidence.

                                               -4-
¶ 14            The trial court stated it considered all the evidence. The court noted the two nine-

month periods and stated there were substantial times when respondent was not in contact with

the caseworkers. The court also noted respondent’s visitation was suspended and never resumed,

and he never engaged in services. The court then specifically stated the allegation against

respondent was “that he failed to make any reasonable degree of interest, concern, or

responsibility as to the children’s welfare.”

¶ 15            The trial court found the State proved the allegations in the petition by clear and

convincing evidence and proceeded to hear evidence concerning whether it was in the children’s

best interest to terminate parental rights. During that portion of the proceedings, respondent

elicited testimony from Fuller that he was currently working second shift, making $15 per hour,

was working on substance-abuse services, and had completed a parenting class and mental-

health assessment. He still lacked stable housing, as he was living in the sober living house.

¶ 16            After hearing evidence about the children’s current placements, the trial court

found the State proved by a preponderance of the evidence that it was in the best interest of the

children to terminate parental rights and change the goals of their cases to adoption or

guardianship.

¶ 17            This appeal followed.

¶ 18                                       II. ANALYSIS

¶ 19            Respondent contends the trial court erred (1) by taking judicial notice of the

previous court file and (2) in determining he was unfit based on a failure to maintain a

reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the children’s welfare. Respondent

does not argue the court erred in its best-interest determination.

                                                -5-
¶ 20            We first note respondent forfeited his argument that the trial court erred in taking

judicial notice of the court file because respondent never raised the issue in the trial court. A

respondent’s failure to object forfeits consideration of the claimed error on appeal unless the

respondent can demonstrate plain error See In re M.W., 232 Ill. 2d 408, 430-31, (2009).

Respondent presents no argument that plain error applies. Thus, respondent has forfeited any

plain-error claim on appeal. See People v. Nieves, 192 Ill. 2d 487, 503 (2000); Ill. S. Ct. R.

341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). Even assuming, arguendo, we were to find the court erred by

taking judicial notice of the file, respondent failed to show any prejudice from the error because,

as we discuss below, the evidence that he was unfit was independently strong, and nothing in the

record on appeal suggests the court would have changed its determination that respondent was

unfit if it had declined to take judicial notice of the file.

¶ 21            Involuntary termination of parental rights under the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS

405/1-1 et seq. (West 2020)) is a two-step process. In re J.H., 2020 IL App (4th) 200150, ¶ 67.

The State must first prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is unfit under any

single ground listed in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2020)). Id.

¶ 22            We will not disturb a finding of unfitness unless it is against the manifest weight

of the evidence. Id. ¶ 68. “A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the

evidence clearly calls for the opposite finding [citation], such that no reasonable person could

arrive at the [trial] court’s finding on the basis of the evidence in the record [citation].” (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Id. “This court pays great deference to a trial court’s fitness finding

because of [that court’s] superior opportunity to observe the witnesses and evaluate their

credibility.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re O.B., 2022 IL App (4th) 220419, ¶ 29.

                                                   -6-
¶ 23           Section 1(D)(b) of the Adoption Act provides the grounds for determining

unfitness include “[f]ailure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern[,] or

responsibility as to the child’s welfare.” 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2020). The language of

section 1(D)(b) is in the disjunctive; therefore, any of the three elements may be considered

individually as a ground for unfitness. This court has recognized that, when examining

allegations under this section, the trial court must (1) focus on a parent’s reasonable efforts, not

the success of those efforts and (2) consider any circumstances that may have hindered her

ability to visit, communicate with, or otherwise show interest in the child. In re T.A., 359 Ill.

App. 3d 953, 961 (2005). However, a parent is not fit merely because he or she has demonstrated

some interest or affection towards the child. Id. (quoting In re Jaron Z., 348 Ill. App. 3d 239, 259

(2004)). “Rather, a parent’s interest, concern, or responsibility must be reasonable.” Id.

¶ 24           Here, the record shows the trial court’s determination was not against the manifest

weight of the evidence. During the entire course of the proceedings, respondent was almost

entirely absent and took no action on meeting the goals of the service plan. At best, he asked

about the children twice during a period of over two years and, toward the end of the

proceedings, he sent each child a card. The two instances he did contact caseworkers, he failed to

follow through. Although the record shows he was incarcerated during a portion of the

proceedings, he failed to show any interest or concern whatsoever for his children’s welfare

during his incarceration.

¶ 25           Respondent argues the trial court erred by considering his lack of efforts only

during the nine-month time periods alleged in the petition regarding the children’s mother’s

fitness. However, the court stated it considered all the evidence. Further, even though defendant

was employed at the time of the hearing, seeking treatment, and had taken a parenting class, he

                                                -7-
still failed to demonstrate he showed a reasonable interest in his children when the only evidence

of his interaction with them, inquiry about them, or expression of concern was sending each one

a card. Thus, the facts do not clearly demonstrate the court should have reached the opposite

result in finding that respondent showed a complete lack of interest, concern, or responsibility for

the children’s welfare. Accordingly, the court’s determination that respondent was unfit was not

against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 26                                   III. CONCLUSION

¶ 27           For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 28           Affirmed.

                                               -8-