Court Opinion

ID: 9470682
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:13:07.641654+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:03.019907
License: Public Domain

GIBBONS, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
The government appeals from an order suppressing a recording of a telephone con*127versation. It is undisputed that section 802 of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub.L. No. 90-351, § 802, 82 Stat. 197, 212-23, 18 U.S.C. § 2515, mandates suppression unless “one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception.” 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(e) (1976). The majority holds that the voluntariness of such consent controls as a matter of law the suppression of the recording, and that vol-untariness is a question of fact which the court must determine from the totality of the circumstances. I completely agree with the majority that “consent will be considered voluntary if, from the totality of the circumstances, the trial court determines that the party agreeing to a wiretap did so consciously and independently and not as a result of a coercive overbearing of his will.” Maj. op. p. 125. Thus I join in the majority’s tacit rejection of the government’s contention that for purposes of the wiretap statute consent should be equated with mere knowledge of what the law enforcement officers want.1 The test is whether voluntariness, in the classic sense of uncoerced free choice, exists. Such vol-untariness is determined from the totality of the circumstances, and, at least with respect to statutory issues such as that before us, this inquiry is factual. Moreover I agree with the majority that since volun-tariness of the consent is a factual matter the scope of review is the clearly erroneous standard of Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a).
At that point we part company. While the evidence certainly did not compel the conclusion that Edward Bencsik’s consent to interception of telephone conversations to which he was a party was coerced, I am unable to hold that the carefully considered conclusion of the trial court to that effect “(1) is completely devoid of minimum evi-dentiary support displaying some hue of credibility, or (2) bears no rational relationship to the supportive evidentiary data.” Krasnov v. Dinan, 465 F.2d 1298, 1302 (3d Cir.1972). Certainly the majority has not established the existence of either of those factors. The Krasnov v. Dinan standard for determining when a trial court’s finding of fact is clearly erroneous should be applied rigorously in all cases, but especially in cases where, as here, the factual determination depends so much upon the factfinder’s face to face evaluation of the witnesses. Rule 52(a) explicitly cautions that “due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses.”
Judge Cahn relied, in making his finding of coercion, on two factors. First, his assessment of Bencsik was that he has a suggestible character. We did not see or hear Bencsik, and we are in no position to second-guess Judge Cahn with respect to that character trait. Second, he concluded that Bencsik was on drugs during the period in which he gave his consent. The government urges that drug-taking does not necessarily affect capacity to consent. While this is true, it does not follow that drug taking never affects capacity to consent. Methamphetamine could have heightened Bencsik’s feelings of peril and caused him to perceive that he had no choice but to cooperate. Marijuana could have increased his suggestibility. There is evidence that both were used. The record also contains several instances of faulty memory. Finally there is evidence from which a factfinder could conclude that Police Chief Viola and Charles Clarkson exerted pressure on Benc-sik to record this telephone conversation with Mr. Kelly.
After considering carefully over a period of more than twenty-four hours the impression that Bencsik made, and his testimony about the totality of circumstances in which he consented to record his telephone conversations, the court found as a fact that his consent was coerced. There is evidentiary support which bears a rational relationship to that finding. This court, which never saw or heard the witnesses, cannot substitute its own finding of fact for that of the trial judge who did. Pullman-Standard v. *128Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982). Thus I would affirm the order appealed from. Suppression is required by 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1976).

. This contention is predicated on a perhaps overbroad reading of United States v. Bonanno, 487 F.2d 654, 658-59 (2d Cir.1973).