Court Opinion

ID: 9778820
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:21:40.301531+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:13.448097
License: Public Domain

Buser, J.,
dissenting: I dissent because I believe the district court did not err in concluding that under the totality of circumstances the officers’ conduct conveyed to a reasonable person that he or she was free to refuse the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the encounter. See State v. Thompson, 284 Kan. 763, 785, 166 P.3d 1015 (2007).
At tire outset, my colleagues emphasize some inconsistencies in the officers’ testimony. In a thoughtful and detailed memorandum order, however, the district court considered the officers’ testimonial inconsistencies, together with their many consistencies, before concluding the “testimony as to the length and scope of the contact with . . . Hogan is relatively consistent.” Based on this conclusion, and specific findings that the officers returned Hogan’s driver’s license, gave him the citation, told him he was free to go, and then started walking back to their patrol vehicle, the trial court held the result was controlled by Thompson. I agree. There was substantial competent evidence to support the district court’s factual findings, and the court faithfully applied Thompsons precedent to those facts in arriving at its legal conclusion.
A comparison of the circumstances surrounding the Thompson case with the facts of the present case reveals the voluntary nature of the encounter between Hogan and the officers.
In both Thompson and this case, the driver was stopped for a municipal traffic violation during the nighttime. In both cases, two uniformed officers in marked police vehicles kept their emergency lights activated during the entire encounter. In the present case, the majority finds these facts “bear against a mere voluntary encounter.” Slip op. at 11. In Thompson, however, our Supreme Court did not characterize the fact that two uniformed officers with side arms and riding in marked police vehicles established a coercive environment. Moreover, our Supreme Court specifically ob*730served that “the dark of night and the end of the traffic stop make the display of lights ambiguous and not a clear show of authority.” (Emphasis added.) 284 Kan. at 811-12.
In both cases, the officer returned the driver’s license with a warning or citation. In Thompson, our Supreme Court observed that the return of the driver’s license and other documents tends to establish that an encounter was consensual. 284 Kan. at 811.
At tire time the license was returned to the driver in both cases, the officer made a parting comment. In Thompson, the officer told the driver to “have a nice day.” 284 Kan. at 769. Our Supreme Court concluded this comment was “not a clear statement that the traffic stop had ended.” 284 Kan. at 811. In contrast, in the present case, the officer “returned Mr. Hogan’s driver’s license, gave him a citation and told him “he was free to go.” (Emphasis added.) Whereas the officer’s comment in Thompson was ambiguous, here the officer’s statement was explicit and unmistakable. The officer’s “free to go” instruction was also word for word what our Supreme Court in Thompson suggested would provide a driver with an “unequivocal signal that he was free to go.” (Emphasis added.) 284 Kan. at 809. In short, the facts of the present case, more so than in Thompson, favor a finding of a voluntary encounter.
My colleagues list some factors they conclude tend to show the encounter was voluntary. These include “no application of force, no intimidating movement, no overwhelming show of force, no brandishing of weapons, no threat, and no command.” But in addition to discounting the officer’s “free to go” statement, they do not mention the significance of the district court’s finding that after this comment was made, both officers “started to walk back to their patrol vehicle.” Slip op. at 5, 10. In fact, according to Hogan’s briefing, sufficient time elapsed in the interim that “Hogan was squatting outside of his car, and looking at his fuse box” when the officer recontacted him. This uncontroverted evidence of disengagement favors the district court’s legal conclusion that this was a voluntary encounter.
In Thompson, the trial court viewed a videotape of the traffic stop and, according to our Supreme Court, found the officer
*731“ ‘did not leave the vicinity of the defendant after telling him to have a good day, but rather, immediately after the defendant had stated thank you to [the officer], he asked the defendant if he could ask him some additional questions. I do not believe there can be any question but that [the officer] did not disengage the defendant before asking his follow up questions.’ ” 284 Kan. at 769.
Under the circumstances, the Supreme Court concluded there was “not a clear physical disengagement.” 284 Kan. at 811.
In the present case, in addition to the district court’s finding of physical disengagement, even Hogan does not contest that disengagement occurred. The Thompson Supreme Court has stated that while disengagement is not a prerequisite to establishing a voluntary encounter, “[t]he physical movement of a law enforcement officer is a factor that can be taken into account when considering whether a reasonable person would feel free to refuse an officer’s request or otherwise terminate his or her encounter with an officer.” 284 Kan. 763, Syl. ¶ 19. Unlike the facts in Thompson, the officers’ disengagement in the present case was uncontroverted and tended to show the voluntary nature of the encounter.
The Thompson court, in concluding under the circumstances of that case that a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officer’s requests or otherwise terminate the encounter, listed the following facts in support of their conclusion: “ ‘There was no application of force, no intimidating movement, no overwhelming show of force, no brandishing of weapons, no blocking of exits, no threat, no command, not even an authoritative tone of voice.’ [Citation omitted.]” 284 Kan. at 789. In the present case, in addition to these factors listed in Thompson, there was evidence of an unequivocal signal that the driver was free to go and clear disengagement by the officers — additional facts tending to establish a voluntary encounter which were not present in Thompson.
The majority attempts to distinguish Thompson based on the fact that two officers engaged Hogan during this vehicle stop. My colleagues hypothesize that because “there were two officers involved in direct contact with Hogan, only one of whom had authorized Hogan to leave,” and because the other officer “could be perceived as having different objectives,” a reasonable person could “doubt the efficacy of an authorization to leave.” Slip op. at 10-11.
*732I question this supposition. Both officers were on routine patrol and riding together in a single police vehicle. The officers made a routine vehicle stop in order to give the driver an ordinary traffic citation. When one officer told Hogan he was free to leave and both officers started back towards their police vehicle, a reasonable person would not question the efficacy of the authorization to leave. Clearly, Hogan did not — he returned to his vehicle and began to inspect the fuse box.
Of course, two officers were also present in Thompson, but one officer provided “back-up” and did not have “any direct contact with Thompson.” 284 Kan. at 768. But one fact further distinguishes the two cases. In Thompson, the back-up officer arrived shortly after the initial car stop in a separate police vehicle. This circumstance would more likely cause a reasonable person to wonder why an additional officer was called to the scene and whether this back-up officer also agreed with the traffic officer’s statement that the traffic encounter had concluded. See State v. Thomas, 291 Kan. 568, 246 P.3d 678, 686 (2011) (a driver seeing and hearing a single officer asldng for another officer to come to the scene “would strongly suggest to a reasonable person that the called officer was being asked to ‘back-up’ the calling officer in ways besides just helping to ask more questions — which the person is free to ignore. [Citation omitted.] This element is not present with the simultaneous appearance of two officers.”) (Emphasis added.)
Additionally, in finding a voluntary encounter involving the backup officer in Thompson, our Supreme Court did not bifurcate the officers’ authority or otherwise suggest that all officers present must verbally join in any “clear statement that the traffic stop had ended.” 284 Kan. at 811. And only recently our Supreme Court explicitly reaffirmed Kansas law “that in some situations, the presence of more than one officer is not indicative of a coercive atmosphere.” (Emphasis added). Thomas, 291 Kan. at 686.
The majority also cites United States v. Mendez, 118 F.3d 1426, 1429-30 (10th Cir. 1997), for the proposition that “Robinson’s failure to request permission to talk further with Hogan may be a factor in determining whether Robinson’s request was coercive.” Hogan, slip op. at 10. Mendez does not support this proposition. *733The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals did not decide the consensual encounter question in Mendez because the trial court failed to make a critical finding. See 118 F.3d at 1430-31. Nothing else in the cited pages suggests a “failure” by Officer Robinson to request permission to talk further.
Moreover, as a general rule, law enforcement officers may simply initiate questioning without formalities. See United States v. Harris, 313 F.3d 1228, 1234 (10th Cir. 2002); State v. Reason, 263 Kan. 405, 412, 951 P.2d 538 (1997). To the extent a request by Officer Robinson for permission to talk further might have alerted Plogan that he was free to leave after the traffic stop, it would have been largely superfluous because earlier Officer Crowe directly told him he was “free to go.”
In summary, under tire totality of the circumstances in the present case — which include factors more favorable to a finding of a voluntary encounter than in Thompson — “[n]othing about the encounter indicated duress or coercion.” 284 Kan. at 812.
I have one last point of disagreement. After my colleagues conclude the encounter was not voluntary, they assume the encounter was voluntary and state: “[W]e must examine that [voluntary] encounter to see if there was yet another transition back to a detention.” Hogan, slip op. at 13. In its last analysis, the majority then proceeds to consider “whether the search of Hogan’s bag was consensual.” Slip op. at 14.
I would not review these additional legal issues for the simple reason that Hogan did not raise them below, they were not decided by the district court, and they were not raised, briefed, or argued on appeal.
In the district court, Hogan testified that the officers failed to return his driver’s license, the traffic citation, or advise him that he was free to go prior to asking to search the vehicle. Based on this testimony, Hogan’s counsel argued “[f]rom that point on it is an illegal stop, period.” Hogan takes the same tack on appeal, identifying as “the issue in this case . . . whether, at the time the officer asked for consent to search the vehicle, the detention had impermissibly extended beyond the original traffic stop.” Hogan contended below and on appeal that the encounter was an illegal de*734tention at the time the officers asked permission to search the car. Hogan has consistently asserted that the incriminating evidence found in the search should be suppressed — not because his consent to search was involuntarily obtained — but because it was the fruit of the poisonous tree, the illegal detention which preceded the officer s request to search.
My colleagues concede that the issue of the voluntariness of Hogan’s consent to search was not raised by Hogan on appeal. They then proceed to analyze the issue and base their judgment, in part, on the conclusion that Hogan’s consent to search was involuntarily obtained. The majority cites Thompson for the proposition that this additional “analysis is mandatory . . . whether articulated in this manner by tire defendant or not.” Hogan, slip op. at 14.
I believe this is a misreading of Thompson. It is true that our Supreme Court in Thompson separately analyzed whether the encounter and the resulting two consents to search were voluntary. This is because Thompson raised both issues below and on appeal. Our Supreme Court specifically identified the two issues raised by the defendant: “Thompson argues evidence obtained during the warrantless searches should be suppressed because he was detained beyond the permissible scope of a traffic stop and did not voluntarily consent to the searches.” (Emphasis added.) 284 Kan. at 767.
There are two long-standing, general rules of law in our state that are dispositive of this matter. First, issues not raised before the trial court may not be raised on appeal. State v. Warledo, 286 Kan. 927, 938, 190 P.3d 937 (2008). Second, an issue not briefed by the appellant is deemed waived or abandoned on appeal. State v. Martin, 285 Kan. 994, 998, 179 P.3d 457, cert. denied 129 S. Ct. 192 (2008). Accordingly, because the additional issues determined by my colleagues were not raised by Hogan or ruled on by the district court, and not raised, briefed, or argued on appeal, I would find they are not proper issues for appellate review.
I would affirm the district court.