Court Opinion

ID: 9959671
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-12 14:08:07.243587+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:44.558651
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  23-P-489

                                       E.W.

                                       vs.

                                       M.W.

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       The defendant, M.W., appeals from a G. L. c. 209A abuse

 prevention order, issued by a Probate and Family Court judge

 after an evidentiary hearing, that prevents him from having

 contact with his former wife, E.W.           Concluding that E.W. did not

 present sufficient evidence to show that she had a reasonable

 fear of imminent serious physical harm, we vacate the order.

       Background.     In October 2022, E.W. applied for a c. 209A

 order.    An ex parte order was issued, and a two-party hearing on

 whether to extend the order was held later that month.               From

 E.W.s' affidavit, 1 and from the evidence introduced at the

       1Although E.W. did not formally adopt her affidavit at the
 hearing, M.W. examined her about it extensively. We therefore
 assume in E.W.'s favor that the judge could have considered it.
 But see Banna v. Banna, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 34, 35-36 (2010).
hearing, the judge reasonably could have found the following

facts.

     The parties divorced in 2017.   In 2019, E.W. sought, and

was granted, a c. 209A order against M.W.   The order was either

terminated or expired after only one year, during which the

parties had no contact.   Once the 2019 order was no longer in

force, M.W. began e-mailing E.W. "excessively," sometimes as

often as three to five times a day, even though E.W. gave him no

response.   The content of the e-mail messages is not clear from

the available record, and the parties' characterizations of the

messages differ.

     From E.W.'s perspective, M.W.'s messages were rife with

attempts to intimidate, shame, and harass her about her

parenting style and her romantic life.   At the extension

hearing, she testified that she felt like M.W. was still

pursuing a romantic relationship with her and that she felt

"like this [was] the type of situation [where] if he can't have

me, no one will."   She also asserted that M.W.'s e-mail

messages, which mentioned an ongoing "war" between himself and

E.W., left her feeling threatened and in fear of imminent

physical harm, especially in light of M.W.'s past history of

mental health issues and his potential access to weapons.

     In M.W.'s view, the majority of the messages he sent to

E.W. were about co-parenting their minor child, and he sent so

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many messages only because he had no other method of contacting

her about their two children.   At the hearing, he emphasized

that none of his e-mail messages contained threats of physical

violence and that the "war" he often alluded to was being waged

by E.W. against him, not vice versa.   Aside from the e-mail

messages, M.W. testified that the parties had not spoken to each

other in three years and that they did not interact during the

few events they had both attended at their children's school.

     E.W. also offered evidence that, despite M.W.'s agreement

not to do so when the 2019 order ended, M.W. e-mailed E.W.'s

employer, prompting her to seek the c. 209A order at issue here.

The message, which M.W. characterized as a "public records

request," asked E.W.'s employer for copies of every e-mail

message sent between her and her former supervisor over a period

of twenty years.   M.W. confirmed during the extension hearing

that the messages were to be used as evidence in a lawsuit

against her employer to show that E.W. engaged in an affair with

the supervisor (which she denied), causing M.W. and their

children "ongoing damage."   E.W. interpreted M.W.'s actions as

an escalation of his attempts to intimidate and control her.

     At the close of the evidence, the judge found that E.W. had

met her burden to show that she was "in imminent fear" of M.W.

and that M.W. had been "abusive and harassing."   The judge

extended the order for two years.

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     Discussion.    M.W.'s chief argument on appeal is that there

was insufficient evidence to support the judge's implicit

finding that E.W. had a reasonable fear of imminent serious

physical harm.     A decision to issue or extend a c. 209A order is

reviewed for an abuse of discretion or other error of law, while

according the credibility determinations of the judge the utmost

deference.    See Noelle N. v. Frasier F., 97 Mass. App. Ct. 660,

664 (2020).   Factual findings are reviewed for clear error.      See

Diaz v. Gomez, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 55, 62 (2012).       Where, as here,

the judge has not made any specific factual findings on the

record, we consider whether the judge could find, by a

preponderance of the evidence, together with all permissible

inferences, that the defendant, among other things, "plac[ed]

another in fear of imminent serious physical harm."       G. L.

c. 209A, § 1 (defining "abuse").       See Frizado v. Frizado, 420

Mass. 592, 597 (1995) (preponderance standard in c. 209A cases).

     When the plaintiff seeks to establish that the defendant's

words and conduct have put the plaintiff in fear of imminent

serious physical harm, that fear must be objectively reasonable

in light of the defendant's actions and the attendant

circumstances.     See Ginsberg v. Blacker, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 139,

143 (2006).   Additionally, "[g]eneralized apprehension,

nervousness, feeling aggravated or hassled, i.e., psychological

distress from vexing but nonphysical intercourse, when there is

                                   4
no threat of imminent serious physical harm, does not rise to

the level of fear of imminent serious physical harm."

Wooldridge v. Hickey, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 637, 639 (1998).    In

this case, we conclude that E.W. has not produced evidence that

she had a reasonable fear of imminent serious physical harm.

     First, M.W.'s harassing behavior alone does not rise to the

level of a physical threat.    In Carroll v. Kartell, 56 Mass.

App. Ct. 83 (2002), the court vacated a c. 209A order issued

after the defendant began contacting the plaintiff "with great

frequency," in hopes of cultivating a friendship.    Id. at 84.

The court acknowledged that the defendant's "persistent phone

calls and other unsolicited efforts to contact [the plaintiff]

. . . combined with the revelation of [a pending murder charge]

against him, caused [her] to fear [the defendant] and his

attentions generally," but concluded that the defendant's

actions did not constitute abuse absent any implicit or explicit

threat of physical harm.   Id. at 86.

     Here, like in Carroll, M.W. was accused of e-mailing E.W.

excessively in an attempt to rekindle their relationship or to

harass her.   E.W. also testified that he had appeared

unannounced at their minor child's football game but had not

attempted to speak with her.    Cf. Carroll, 56 Mass. App. Ct. at

84-85 (defendant approached plaintiff several times during event

to speak with her).   E.W. did not describe any overtly

                                  5
threatening behavior on that occasion, or on any of the other

occasions where the parties were in the same place.    Thus, while

M.W.'s harassment may indeed put E.W. in subjective fear of his

further actions, it does not by itself rise to the level of

abuse under Carroll.    See id. at 86-87.

     Secondly, the only evidence produced by E.W. of an implicit

or explicit threat of physical harm against her was M.W.'s vague

reference to a "war" between the parties.    In Noelle N., the

plaintiff was similarly engaged in a contentious custody battle

with her former husband and was in fear of his escalating and

erratic behavior, which included contacting her and her employer

against her wishes.    Noelle N., 97 Mass. App. Ct. at 663.   In

that case, the defendant, a former Marine, told the plaintiff

that "this is war" and that he would "stop at nothing to get his

children."   Id. at 662.   However, in affirming the issuance of

the c. 209A order, the court emphasized that, in addition to the

defendant's harassing behavior and his threat of war, the

defendant emailed the plaintiff about the possibility of her

sudden and unexpected death and often told her about his

firearm -- even once displaying it to their children during a

videocall.   Id. at 662.

     Here, by contrast, E.W. testified that she was not sure

whether M.W. owned any weapons, and she could not point to any

e-mail messages containing a more explicit threat to her

                                  6
physical safety than her own interpretation of the term "war."

See Ginsberg, 67 Mass. App. Ct. at 143 ("the victim's fear or

apprehension . . . must be more than subjective and unspecified"

[quotations omitted]).   Additionally, evidence showed that

M.W.'s e-mail messages actually reflected his belief that the

"war" between the parties was started by E.W. and was being

waged against him.   Thus we conclude that, when put in context,

M.W.'s references to "war" do not carry the same implicit threat

of physical violence as the threat of "war" made in Noelle N.

     Ultimately, we do not doubt that M.W.'s inappropriate

behavior and language likely caused E.W. to feel harassed,

annoyed, and even subjectively afraid of M.W. in a general

sense.   See Carroll, 56 Mass. App. Ct. at 86-87 (explaining that

subjective fear can be understandable but still not reasonable).

We emphasize that our ruling does not preclude E.W. from seeking

a protective order should additional evidence showing reasonable

fear of imminent serious physical harm arise in the future.

And, to the extent that communication about the parties' minor

child creates difficulties, nothing in our decision precludes

either party from seeking relief in the context of their divorce

proceeding.

     Nevertheless, we are constrained to conclude that neither

M.W.'s behavior nor his language as reflected in the present

record can be reasonably interpreted as a threat of imminent

                                 7
serious physical harm; they do not meet the definition of

"abuse" under G. L. c. 209A, § 1.     The order dated October 26,

2022, is vacated.    The case is remanded to the Probate and

Family Court for entry of an order directing the appropriate law

enforcement agency to destroy all records of the vacated order

in accordance with the third paragraph of G. L. c. 209A, § 7. 2

                                      So ordered.

                                      By the Court (Sacks, Singh &
                                        Walsh, JJ. 3),

                                      Assistant Clerk

Entered: April 12, 2024.

     2 The other two issues raised in M.W.'s brief -- that the
judge improperly prevented him from introducing evidence and
violated several rules of judicial conduct -- are merely
assertions of error without sufficient legal argument, and we
need not consider them. See Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9) (A), as
appearing in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019). A thorough perusal of the
record, however, convinces us that the judge acted appropriately
and without bias when deciding the issues in this case.

     3   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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