Court Opinion

ID: 9660197
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:07:28.65728+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:16.326434
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.
(concurring). ¶ 48. I apply the Sullivan test differently than the majority opinion but reach the same result.
¶ 49. Under the first prong of State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 576 N.W.2d 30 (1998), the proponent of the other acts evidence must clearly articulate the legitimate purpose or purposes for which the proffered evidence is offered under Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2) and must demonstrate that the proffered evidence goes to prove the purpose for which it is offered. In other words, the proponent must show (and a court must conclude) that the other acts evidence tends to prove the legitimate purpose for which it is offered and does not merely show the character of the actor and that he or she acted in conformity therewith.1
¶ 50. A "kitchen sink" litany of legitimate purposes under Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2) without adequate analysis of the purpose and the relation of the proffered evidence to the purpose does not satisfy Sullivan. Sullivan mandates a careful statement of a clearly articulated purpose for admission of the proffered other acts evidence and a *576statement setting forth how the evidence proves that articulated purpose.2
¶ 51. I conclude that the evidence of the other acts of the victim in the present case is not admissible because the proponent has not shown that the evidence falls within any legitimate purpose for admission of other acts evidence.
¶ 52. A legitimate purpose in the present case for the admissibility of the other acts evidence would be to show how the fatal accident occurred, that is, to prove the context of the event. Both parties and the majority opinion, as do I, agree that "context" would be a legitimate purpose in the present case.
¶ 53. Case law and treatises explain that "context" evidence shows the res gestae of the crime. The other act is ordinarily close in time to the crime and is integral to the crime such that it is not only helpful in understanding what happened but is necessary to complete the story by filling in otherwise misleading or confusing gaps. In other words, the fact-finder must hear the entire story in order not to be misled.3
¶ 54. On analysis, however, it is clear that the other acts evidence proffered in the instant case does *577not fall within this concept of context evidence. The proffered evidence is not integral to the crime; it does not put the fatal accident in context. The proffered evidence is merely evidence of the character of the victim to show that he acted in conformity therewith.
¶ 55. There probably are Wisconsin cases that do not so limit context evidence. Unfortunately several cases are very lax in enforcing Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2), especially when the State is introducing other acts evidence against a criminal defendant.4 Nevertheless, I conclude that the proffered evidence does not fall within any legitimate purpose under Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2).
¶ 56. Because the defendant has not met the first Sullivan prong I need not go to the second Sullivan prong. The second Sullivan prong is a determination whether the proffered evidence and the purpose for which it is proffered are relevant to a consequential fact in the case.5
¶ 57. For the reasons set forth, I write separately and concur in the mandate.

 State v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 576 N.W.2d 30 (1998); Wis JI Criminal 275.1 Comment: Other Act Evidence (Rel. No. 24-1/90).

 State v. Spraggin, 77 Wis. 2d 89, 100, 252 N.W.2d 94 (1977).

 State v. Hereford, 195 Wis. 2d 1054, 1069, 537 N.W.2d 62 (Ct. App. 1995); 7 Daniel D. Blinka, Wisconsin Practice: Evidence 161-62 (2d ed. 2001); 2 McCormick on Evidence § 190, at 660 (John W Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999); 3 Clifford S. Fishman, Jones on Evidence: Civil and Criminal § 17:9, at 309-10 (7th ed. 1998); 22 Charles Alan Wright & Kenneth W Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence § 5239, at 448-449 (1978) (Supp. 2006); 2 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 404.20[2] (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2006).

 One prominent treatise declares: "There is no question of evidence more frequently litigated in the appellate courts than the admissibility of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Yet despite the recurrence of the issues, the opinions are often poorly reasoned and provide little guidance to trial judges. Even at the theoretical level, the literature is spotty and inconsistent in analysis." 22 Charles Alan Wright & Kenneth W Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence § 5239, at 427 (1978) (footnotes omitted).

 Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 785-86; Wis JI — Criminal 275.1 Comment: Other Act Evidence (Rel. No. 24-1/90).