Court Opinion

ID: 9768369
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:59:20.822013+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:39.946782
License: Public Domain

BUTTS, Justice,
dissenting:
My dissent rests upon two principles: the constitutional law of “investigative stop” and appellant’s failure to sustain his burden of proof that his Fourth Amendment privacy interest was violated by police actions involving the premises searched and the property seized.
This is a conviction for burglary of a building.
The testimony adduced at the hearing on the motion to suppress evidence established the following: On October 31,1977, officers Arthur Trevino and Richard Asher of the San Antonio Police Department’s Crime Task Force were conducting undercover surveillance on what they believed to be a major “fencing” operation, that is, a location in west San Antonio where they believed stolen property was being bought. One of Trevino’s informants, known to him as a “street person,” had told him the week before that the proprietor of Pete’s Car and Air Conditioning Service on Culebra Street was willing to buy any kind of stolen property — weapons, TV’s, car stereos, tires, whatever. The informant had given him information on two or three previous occasions, and it had proven correct. The lead given by the informant was corroborated with other sources, and surveillance of Pete’s was begun. From the time police surveillance began, the location was watched about three hours a day. Numerous persons known to be drug addicts who were unemployed “street people” were seen to come and go at Pete’s, and were seen discussing with Pete what officer Trevino believed were negotiations for the “fencing” of stolen property. According to Trevino, based on his experience and his conversations with informants, persons seeking to sell stolen property often would go first to a “fence” to negotiate the price for a sale, and then would bring in the property at a later time.
On the particular day in question, at approximately 11:00 a.m., Trevino and Asher were driving west on Waverly Street, one block north of Culebra, and saw appellant riding as a passenger in an automobile being driven by a woman. It was later established that the woman’s name was Linda Proctor, and that the car belonged to her. Trevino knew appellant on sight because he had seen him on the street before, had police “mug” photos of him in the car, and knew that appellant had had prior arrests for burglary and narcotics offenses. Trevino and Asher followed the other car until they saw it back into a driveway by the side of Pete’s, the establishment which was under surveillance. The officers pulled into a car wash across the street and observed appellant’s activities.
While they watched from the car wash, appellant got out of the car, opened the *437trunk, and removed a large green bag that had a drawstring around the opening. He placed the bag on the ground by the left rear of the car, and Pete walked out onto the back porch of a house next to the driveway. Pete walked up to where appellant and the bag were, appellant opened the bag, and then Pete bent over, looked into the bag, looked at appellant, and nodded affirmatively.
With this, the officers quickly drove their car into the driveway to block the exit of the car appellant had been in, got out of their car, told the woman in the driver’s seat to stay put, showed their badges, and announced that they were police officers. Pete immediately grabbed the bag, dragged it 10 to 15 feet to an old abandoned mail truck, put it in the truck, slammed the truck door, and began to walk away. Trevino stopped him and ordered him to come back and get the bag out of the truck. Pete said, “I don’t know what you are talking about.” Trevino said, “The bag you placed in the truck.” Pete retrieved the bag, and when Trevino opened it, he found in it numerous new-looking pieces of radio and electronic equipment, some with tags stating, “S. & P. Communications” on them. The total value of the equipment was over $5,000.00. It was later established that S. & P. Communications in San Antonio had been burglarized sometime on October 29th or 30th, and that the items in the bag had been stolen in that burglary. Apparently Trevino and Asher were not aware of the burglary at the time of they confronted Pete and appellant.
Throughout the officers’ dealings with Pete, appellant had been standing at the rear of the car, and had said or done nothing. Asher stood by the open car trunk and held the lid open, so that appellant could not close it. After the bag was opened and the contents inspected, the officers saw a brand-new telephone answering machine lying in the trunk of the car. This was seized along with the bag and its contents, and appellant and the woman were placed under arrest.1 After arresting appellant, but before leaving the scene, Trevino talked to appellant, who stated that he had brought the property to leave it with Pete for $40.00.2
After being arrested and booked, appellant executed a written statement in which he confessed to having burglarized S. & P. Communications. He also stated in his confession that he went to Proctor’s house on October 31, the day after the burglary. He stated, “I took the bag from the trunk of my car and put it in her car.... We drove over to some garage where the police stopped us and the radios were in the trunk of the car. . . . All I know is I wanted to sell the radios.” Neither the written statement nor any testimonial evidence from appellant, Proctor, or Pete was offered before the trial court at the suppression hearing. Therefore, we cannot consider this statement in assessing the search and seizure issues in this case.
In his first ground of error, appellant attacks the lawfulness of the seizure of the bag and its contents, as well as the telephone answering machine seized from the proctor car trunk. The question is whether there was no justification for the initial intervention by the officers.
The State characterizes the officers’ entry onto Pete’s premises and their initial show of authority as an investigative detention. The constitutional validity of such an investigative stop is contingent upon the “specific and articulable facts and circumstances” within the officer’s knowledge, as well as reasonable inferences drawn by the officer from those facts and circumstances. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); Scott v. State, 549 S.W.2d 170, 171 (Tex.Crim.App.1977); *438Brown v. State, 481 S.W.2d 106, 109 (Tex.Crim.App.1972). It was stated in Armstrong v. State, 550 S.W.2d 25, 31 (Tex.Crim.App.1977),
There must be a reasonable suspicion by the law enforcement officer that some activity out of the ordinary is or had occurred [sic], some suggestion to connect the detained person with the unusual activity, and some indication that the activity is related to crime.
In United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981), it was stated that a reviewing court must determine the reasonableness of the officer’s action based on “the totality of the circumstances — the whole picture.... ” 449 U.S. at 418,101 S.Ct. at 695. The Court went on to state,
The idea that an assessment of the whole picture must yield a particularized suspicion contains two elements, each of which must be present before a stop is permissible. First, the assessment must be based upon all the circumstances. The analysis proceeds with various objective observations, information from police reports, if such are available, and consideration of the modes or patterns of operation of certain kinds of lawbreakers. From these data, a trained officer draws inferences and makes deductions — inferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained person.
The process does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities. Long before the law of probabilities was articulated as such, practical people formulated certain common sense conclusions about human behavior; jurors as factfinders are permitted to do the same — and so are law enforcement officers. Finally, the evidence thus collected must be seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement.
The second element contained in the idea that an assessment of the whole picture must yield a particularized suspicion is the concept that the process just described must raise a suspicion that the particular individual being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing. Chief Justice Warren, speaking for the Court in Terry v. Ohio, supra, said, “[tjhis demand for specificity in the information upon which police action is predicated is the central teaching of this Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.” Id. 392 U.S., at 21, n. 18, 88 S.Ct., at 1880, n. 18 (emphasis added). See also, Brown v. Texas, [443 U.S. 47, 51, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 2640, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979)]; Delaware v. Prouse, [440 U.S. 648, 661-663, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1400-1401, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979)]; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, 442 U.S., at 884, 95 S.Ct., at 2581.
449 U.S. at 418, 101 S.Ct., at 695. Thus, appellant’s and the majority’s insistence that the officers needed to have probable cause in order to justify their investigative detention of him is mistaken.
Under the circumstances as presented at the suppression hearing, the officers had an “articulable suspicion” which entitled them to enter the premises open to the public in order to investigate the suspected “fencing” operation. They could detain appellant and the other individuals involved and make further investigation. United States v. Cortez, supra; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra; Terry v. Ohio, supra; Manry v. State, 621 S.W.2d 619 (Tex.Crim.App.1981); Greer v. State, 544 S.W.2d 125 (Tex.Crim.App.1976). Compare Peters v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968).3
This court must determine whether appellant established that he has a reasonable *439and legitimate expectation of privacy in the business property of Pete and the bag taken from the trunk of Proctor’s automobile, as well as that trunk itself. A review of the record reveals that he did not. In order to be entitled to seek suppression of evidence of crime, a criminal defendant must establish that some personal Fourth Amendment privacy interest of his was violated by the police actions involving the premises searched and the property seized. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978); Lewis v. State, 598 S.W.2d 280, 283 (1980).
The driveway in question was located on business property open to the public and not owned by appellant. From the instant appellant placed the bag on the ground and opened it, the only person who exercised any physical control over the bag consistent with a privacy interest in it was Pete. Pete looked into the bag, nodded his head affirmatively, and when the officers approached, it was he who tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to dispose of the bag. Even appellant’s statement at the scene that he had brought the property to Pete for “some money” is consistent with his having surrendered it to Pete’s control prior to the officers’ intervention. Quite simply, that appellant failed at trial to establish that he had any “legitimate expectation of privacy,” see Rakas v. Illinois, supra, 439 U.S., at 143, 99 S.Ct., at 430, in the truck at the time officer Trevino ordered Pete to remove the bag from it, or in the bag or its contents at the time Trevino searched and seized it. Appellant had the burden to demonstrate such an interest. It was incumbent upon appellant to show a possessory or propriety interest, Goehring v. State, 627 S.W.2d 159, 165 (Tex.Crim.App.1982). Lewis v. State, supra, 598 S.W.2d at 284; Darland v. State, 582 S.W.2d 452, 455 (Tex.Crim.App.1979); Kleasen v. State, 560 S.W.2d 938, 941 (Tex.Crim.App.1977). Appellant presented no such evidence. His contention as to the admission of the contents of the bag into evidence is without merit.
The seizure of the telephone answering machine from the trunk of Proctor’s car, and the subsequent admission of that item into evidence, presents no error. Items of contraband or fruits or instrumentalities of a crime may be seized by a police officer on sight if he has a prior justification for being in a position to see the item, if the discovery of the incriminating evidence is inadvertent, and if it is immediately apparent to the officer that the evidence before him is incriminating. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467-472, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2039-2041, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971); McGlynn v. State, (No. 67,435—Tex.Crim.App.—decided 12/23/81). We have determined already that the officers were entitled to be on the property in question, and saw the machine in the automobile trunk in plain view. We hold further that given the quantity of equipment found in the bag, its new condition, and the presence of distinctive store tags on much of the equipment, the officers were justified in concluding that the machine in the car trunk was also stolen property. Their seizure of that item and the admission of it into evidence was proper. In addition, appellant failed to show the necessary privacy interest in the trunk and is precluded from contesting the matter.
Appellant’s written confession was admitted into evidence, over his objection. He contends that the illegal search and seizures at the scene tainted his confession and rendered it inadmissible. The officers’ actions at the scene were lawful. Further, the appellant did not met the burden of showing any personal Fourth Amendment interest in the premises and property in question. Appellant’s first ground of error should be overruled.
In his second ground of error appellant contends the court erred in admitting his written statement into evidence because it was involuntarily made. Appellant filed a motion to determine the voluntariness of his confession. In compliance with Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964) and Tex.Code Crim.Pro. Ann. art. 38.22, § 6 (Vernon 1977), the court conducted a hearing based on appellant’s motion. Appellant maintains he would not have made the confession had not *440the officers promised to release Proctor, who was arrested with him. Officers Trevino and Asher, along with the officer who took the confession, testified there was no agreement and that Proctor was released for lack of evidence against her.
The judge at the Jackson v. Denno hearing is the sole judge of the weight of the evidence and credibility of the witnesses. He may believe or disbelieve all or any part of any witness’ testimony. Evans v. State, 622 S.W.2d 866, 870 (Tex.Crim.App.1981), Moon v. State, 607 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex.Crim.App.1980), Barton v. State, 605 S.W.2d 605 (Tex.Crim.App.1980). The court’s conclusion that the confession was voluntarily given after the appellant was fully apprised of his rights and waived those rights is supported by the evidence. This ground of error should be overruled.
I respectfully dissent.

. The record does not disclose Pete’s fate.

. The record is unclear whether this statement was elicited before or after the officers administered warnings to appellant under Tex.Code Crim.Pro.Ann. art. 38.22 (Vernon 1979). There was no objection, however, when this testimony was offered at the hearing on the motion to suppress evidence.

. The circumstances in Peters were much less suspicious than in the present case. In his concurring opinion Justice Harlan noted, 392 U.S., at 78, 88 S.Ct., at 1909, 20 L.Ed.2d, at 943: “Unlike probable cause to arrest, reasonable grounds to stop do not depend on any degree of likelihood that a crime has been committed. An officer may forcibly intrude upon an incipient crime even where he could not make an arrest for the simple reason that there is nothing to arrest anyone for. Hence although officer Lasky has small reason to believe that a crime had been committed, his right to stop Peters can be justified if he had a reasonable suspicion (emphasis supplied by this writer) that he was about to attempt burglary.”