Court Opinion

ID: 9687757
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:46:46.740781+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:31.388991
License: Public Domain

ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.
¶ 53. (dissenting). There is a name for mandatory pretrial disclosure of information that might be offered as evidence in a criminal proceeding: discovery. Although the majority attempts to label what is at issue in this case as merely the pretrial disclosure of information, I agree with a unanimous court of appeals that the order here "in essence, [is] a discovery device." State v. McClaren, 2008 WI App 118, ¶ 25, 313 Wis. 2d 398, 756 N.W.2d 802.
¶ 54. Our precedent is clear that discovery is governed by the criminal discovery statute, Wis. Stat. § 971.23. Lynch v. County Court, 82 Wis. 2d 454, 466, 262 N.W.2d 773 (1978) (citing State v. Miller, 35 Wis. 2d 454, 478, 151 N.W.2d 157 (1967)). If a certain type of evidence is not enumerated in the statute, then mandatory disclosure is not authorized.
¶ 55. The majority departs from this precedent. Realizing that the discovery statute does not require pretrial disclosure of McMorris1 evidence, the majority ultimately turns to the inherent powers of the court. See majority op., ¶ 3.
¶ 56. By relying on inherent authority, the majority opens wide the gates of pretrial discovery in criminal *765cases. Its rationale and holding stretch far beyond the disclosure of McMorris evidence. Instead, the majority rests on an unlimited pronouncement that covers the pretrial disclosure of any information that might aid in ensuring a smoothly run trial: "Foreseeing potential obstacles to a smoothly run trial and taking the necessary steps to avoid them is manifestly within the inherent power of a circuit court." Majority op., ¶ 3.
¶ 57. I agree instead with the court of appeals that "the court's general authority under Wis. Stat. § 906.11 to exercise control over the mode and order of presenting evidence cannot be read to permit it to require pretrial discovery that it would otherwise not be permitted to require under [the criminal discovery statute]." McClaren, 313 Wis. 2d 398, ¶ 1. Although I share the majority's concern for the efficient and fair administration of a trial, I believe that any revision in the law should be brought about by legislative change and not by a resort to inherent authority of the court.2 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
I
¶ 58. In this case, the circuit court ordered the defendant to provide "a summary of all specific instances of the victim's violent conduct of which the defendant was aware and that the defendant intends to introduce at trial, including witnesses to such conduct and the date and place such conduct occurred."3 The *766court of appeals determined that the order for disclosure was governed by the discovery statute. Finding no authority in the statute for the order, it reversed the circuit court.
¶ 59. The majority, however, asserts that this is not a discovery case. Majority op., ¶ 24. Although it attempts to tie its analysis to evidentiary statutes, its conclusion is based on inherent authority: "Foreseeing potential obstacles to a smoothly run trial, and taking the necessary steps to avoid them, is manifestly within the inherent power of a circuit court." Id., ¶ 3.
¶ 60. Our cases have established that compelled pretrial disclosure of evidence by any other name is still governed by the discovery rules. State v. Schaefer, 2008 WI 25, 308 Wis. 2d 279, 746 N.W.2d 457. In Schaefer, *767the defendant filed a subpoena to obtain police reports before the preliminary examination. Id., ¶ 1.
¶ 61. We stated, "This is a discovery case, notwithstanding the defendant's protestations to the contrary." Id., ¶ 18. We determined that the subpoena should be quashed because "the scope of discoverable materials is set out in statute and compliance with the statute will be enforced by the court." Id., ¶ 77 n.17. The lesson from Schaefer is clear. If something looks like discovery, it is governed by the discovery statute.
¶ 62. The policy reasons advanced by the majority for allowing the court to compel the production of McMorris evidence are based on the rationale underlying discovery. The majority explains, "Besides questions of admissibility4 there was also the question of how the State would be able to investigate and rebut evidence that was revealed for the first time at trial." Majority op., ¶ 16.
¶ 63. This is a general discovery rationale. The purpose of discovery is to promote "the ascertainment of the truth and ultimate disposition of the lawsuit in accordance therewith[.]" Monier v. Chamberlain, 221 N.E.2d 410, 417 (Ill. 1966). Through discovery, mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts will be achieved. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
*768¶ 64. In addition to relying upon a discovery rationale, the majority cites to criminal discovery cases. It relies primarily upon three United States Supreme Court opinions: Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970); Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973); and Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988). In all three cases, the issue before the Court was the constitutionality of a discovery rule.
¶ 65. The majority asserts that Williams is "analogous" to this case. Majority op., ¶ 5. In Williams, the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure required a criminal defendant to provide notice of an alibi defense or risk discovery sanctions.5 The Court said, "Florida's notice-of-alibi rule is in essence a requirement that a defendant submit to a limited form of pretrial discovery by the State whenever he intends to rely at trial on the defense of alibi." 399 U.S. at 80.
¶ 66. The second case relied upon by the majority, Wardius, addressed a similar state rule.6 At the outset of the opinion, the Court framed the issue as follows: *769"This case involves important questions concerning the right of a defendant forced to comply with a 'notice-of-alibi' rule to reciprocal discovery." 412 U.S. at 471. The Court commented: "nothing in the Due Process Clause precludes States from experimenting with systems of broad discovery designed to achieve the[] goals" of reducing surprise and enhancing the fairness of a criminal trial. Id. at 474.
¶ 67. The third case, Taylor, is also a discovery case. There, the trial court excluded a witness's testimony because the defendant "fail[ed] to identify [the] defense witness in response to a pretrial discovery request."7 484 U.S. at 401. The question before the Court was whether "the Sixth Amendment bars a court from ever ordering the preclusion of defense evidence as a sanction for violating a discovery rule." Id. at 406. The Court concluded that the Constitution did not create an absolute bar to discovery sanctions.
¶ 68. The majority relies on the analysis of these cases, yet it denies that the issue presented here is a discovery issue, governed by the discovery statute: "We do not view this case as presenting the kind of discovery question [other cases were] addressing." Majority op., ¶ 24.
*770¶ 69. To the contrary, I conclude that the issue presented to this court is squarely a discovery issue, and it is governed by the discovery statute.
II
¶ 70. We have long held that that there is no general right to discovery in criminal cases and that the court should not order discovery on a case-by-case basis:
Wisconsin does not recognize a right [of a] defendant to a pretrial discovery of the prosecution's evidence. If we are to adopt a pretrial discovery procedure in criminal cases in this state we deem it would be best done by a rule of court or by legislative action rather than on a case to case basis by the court.
Miller, 35 Wis. 2d at 478.
¶ 71. Subsequent to Miller, the legislature adopted a comprehensive system of rules governing criminal discovery. See Wis. Stat. § 971.23. After its enactment, Wisconsin courts affirmed the principle that pretrial discovery is prescribed by the statute. See, e.g., Lynch, 82 Wis. 2d at 466 (vacating a court's order permitting a defendant to examine the State's files because it "would operate, in essence, as a discovery device, and would therefore be inconsistent with [the] principle" that "discovery procedures should be determined by statute or by rule of court").
¶ 72. The criminal discovery statute provides limited and reciprocal discovery requirements. Upon demand, a defendant "must disclose" the following: (1) a list of the names and addresses of witnesses the defendant intends to call at trial; (2) relevant written or recorded statements of the named witnesses including *771expert reports that the defendant intends to produce at trial; (3) the criminal records of the named witnesses; and (4) physical evidence the defendant intends to produce at trial. Wis. Stat. § 971.23(2m). McMorris evidence is not on the list.
¶ 73. Aside from the mandatory disclosures enumerated above, "[o]ur discovery statute does not require a defendant to divulge the details of his or her own case." State v. Konkol, 2002 WI App 174, ¶ 17, 256 Wis. 2d 725, 649 N.W.2d 300. The statute provides just one exception to this rule. If the defendant wishes to present an alibi defense, "the defendant shall give notice to the district attorney ... stating particularly the place where the defendant claims to have been when the crime is alleged to have been committed together with the names and addresses of witnesses to the alibi, if known." Wis. Stat. § 971.23(8)(a).
¶ 74. On the issue of notice of self-defense and disclosure of McMorris evidence, however, the statute is silent. Therefore, under the principle stated in Miller and reaffirmed in Lynch, notice and disclosure of this evidence is simply not required.
¶ 75. Finding no authority in the statute for the compelled pretrial disclosure of McMorris evidence, I determine that the court was without authority to enter the order. The court of appeals got it right when it determined that a circuit court's authority to exercise control over the mode and order of presenting evidence does not provide the authority to require pretrial discovery that it would otherwise not be permitted to require under the Wisconsin criminal discovery statute. See McClaren, 313 Wis. 2d 398, ¶ 1.
*772III
¶ 76. Today, the majority permits a circuit court to compel pretrial disclosure of any manner of evidence, citing the court's inherent authority to take the necessary steps to avoid potential obstacles to a smoothly run triad. See majority op., ¶ 3. The majority's attempt to fit a discovery issue into an inherent authority box has broad implications.
¶ 77. A court may exercise its inherent authority to ensure "that the court functions efficiently and effectively to provide the fair administration of justice." City of Sun Prairie v. Davis, 226 Wis. 2d 738, 749-50, 595 N.W.2d 635 (1999). However, invoking inherent powers in order to trump legislatively enacted public policy should be a last resort. See id. at 755.
¶ 78. Here, the legislature has made policy choices regarding the evidence that is subject to compulsory pretrial disclosure. It permits compulsory pretrial disclosure of certain types of evidence, including alibi evidence, but it is silent about McMorris evidence. Nevertheless, the majority permits a circuit court to circumvent these legislative policy choices by invoking the court's inherent authority to ensure that it functions effectively and efficiently to provide for the fair administration of justice.
¶ 79. I acknowledge that McMorris evidence may pose special difficulties for the court. Perhaps the rationale underlying the statutory notice-of-alibi requirement applies to McMorris evidence as well. There may be good policy reasons for a rule requiring pretrial discovery of this type of evidence. If so, however, it would be preferable for the legislature to promulgate a new rule. The advantage of a rule, rather than an *773opinion justified on the basis of the court's inherent authority, is that it could be strictly limited to this type of evidence.
¶ 80. The majority attempts to limit its holding to cases involving similar facts: "Under the circumstances presented here, where McClaren seeks to introduce McMorris evidence in support of a self-defense claim, the circuit court has the authority" to order pretrial disclosure of the evidence. See majority op., ¶ 28. However, the majority's attempt to narrow the scope of its holding is undermined by its invocation of the court's broad inherent powers. Consequently, neither its rationale nor its holding is limited, to McMorris evidence.
¶ 81. For the above stated reasons, I respectfully dissent.

 McMorris v. State, 58 Wis. 2d 144, 205 N.W.2d 559 (1973).

 Because I conclude that the circuit court did not have the authority to enter the order, I need not address McClaren's constitutional arguments.

 See majority op., ¶ 16. Throughout the opinion, the majority focuses on the court's oral ruling rather than focusing on the unilateral nature of the written order. See majority op., *766¶¶ 10,17, 37, 38. This focus is misguided. Appeal is taken from a written order or judgment. State ex rel. Hildebrand v. Kegu, 59 Wis. 2d 215, 216, 207 N.W.2d 658 (1973); Estate of Jackson v. Gray, 212 Wis. 2d 436, 442, 569 N.W.2d 467 (Ct. App. 1997).
As a result, the majority does not squarely address McClaren's constitutional arguments. The majority correctly sets forth the due process principle that disclosure requirements must be reciprocal: "It is fundamentally unfair to require a defendant to divulge the details of his own case while at the same time subjecting him to the hazard of surprise concerning refutation of the very pieces of evidence which he disclosed to the State." Majority op., ¶ 37 (quoting Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 476 (1973).
Nevertheless, the circuit court's written ruling required only the defendant to disclose information. See majority op., ¶ 16 ("The defendant shall make written disclosure to the Court and the prosecution....") The court's written order imposed no reciprocal disclosure requirement upon the State. See id. In fact, it posed no requirement on the State at all.
Given that the circuit court's order lacked reciprocity, it is unclear to me how the majority can affirm this constitutionally deficient written order.

 The majority acknowledges that a court can satisfy its responsibility to vet McMorris evidence prior to its admission, even if the evidence is not produced prior to trial. See majority op., ¶ 21: "The question before us in this case is primarily a question of timing: whether a circuit court has the authority to order a defendant to disclose any planned McMorris evidence prior to trial, so that the factors involved in determining the evidence's admissibility can be weighed not only prior to admission, but also prior to trial."

 See Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 1.200, reprinted in Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 104 (1970) (appendix to opinion of the Court) ("[A] defendant in a criminal case who intends to offer evidence of an alibi in his defense shall, not less than ten days before trial or such other time as the court may direct, file and serve upon such prosecuting attorney a notice in writing of his intention to claim such alibi, which notice shall contain specific information as to the place at which the defendant claims to have been at the time of the alleged offense and, as particularly as is known to defendant or his attorney, the names and addresses of the witnesses by whom he proposes to establish such alibi.")
Wisconsin has a similar rule, which is enumerated in the criminal discovery statute, Wis. Stat. § 971.23(8).

 See Or. Rev. Stat. § 135.875 (1973) ("If the defendant in a criminal action proposes to rely in any way on alibi evidence, he *769shall,... file and serve upon the district attorney a written notice of his purpose to offer such evidence, which notice shall state specifically the place or places where the defendant claims to have been at the time or times of the alleged offense together with the name and residence or business address of each witness upon whom the defendant intends to rely for alibi evidence.").

 The Illinois Supreme Court Rules require a defendant to disclose a list of witnesses that he intends to call at trial. This rule is one of several enumerated under the heading "Discovery." Illinois Supreme Court Rules, Article IV: Rules on Criminal Proceedings in the Trial Court, Part B. Discovery, Rule 413: Disclosure to Prosecution.