Court Opinion

ID: 9838535
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-06 18:01:29.267246+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:38.052788
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-50748        Document: 00516884698             Page: 1      Date Filed: 09/06/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                                     United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                              Fifth Circuit

                                     ____________                                           FILED
                                                                                     September 6, 2023
                                      No. 22-50748                                     Lyle W. Cayce
                                     ____________                                           Clerk

   Joseph Daniel Cascino; Shanda Marie Sansing; Brenda
   Li Garcia,

                                                                  Plaintiffs—Appellants,

                                            versus

   Jane Nelson, Texas Secretary of State,

                                               Defendant—Appellee.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Western District of Texas
                               USDC No. 5:20-CV-438
                     ______________________________

   Before Jones, Stewart, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
         Prior to this appeal, Plaintiffs, Joseph Daniel Cascino, Shanda Marie
   Sansing, and Brenda Li Garcia, sought and obtained a preliminary injunction
   from the district court, on grounds that a Texas election law was
   unconstitutional as applied during the COVID-19 pandemic. The particular
   law at issue only allowed mail-in voting for adults 65 and older without

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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                                       No. 22-50748

   excuse. This court rejected that argument in a decision vacating the
   injunction and remanding the case to the district court. See Tex. Democratic
   Party v. Abbott, 978 F.3d 168 (5th Cir. 2020) (“TDP II”). Now this case is
   back before us on review; but this time, the argument is slightly different.
   Plaintiffs now argue that the same election law is facially unconstitutional
   notwithstanding COVID-19 concerns. Recognizing the language in our prior
   decision, the district court dismissed their claim. Because our caselaw
   forecloses this issue and there has been no intervening change of law, we
   AFFIRM.
                                I.     Background1
          Texas voters are generally required to cast their ballots in person
   unless they face a particular circumstance or hardship that is expressly
   provided for in the state’s election code. See Tex. Elec. Code §§ 82.001–
   .004. If, on election day, the voter (1) anticipates their absence from a county
   of residence, id. at § 82.001; (2) has a sickness or physical condition that
   prevents them from showing up to the polls without a likelihood of injury or
   a need for assistance or is expecting to give birth within three weeks before
   or after election day, id. at § 82.002; (3) is 65 or older, id. at § 82.003; or (4)
   incarcerated, id. at § 82.004, the voter may apply to cast his ballot by mail.
   See In re State of Tex., 602 S.W.3d 549, 559 (Tex. 2020).
          Plaintiffs are Texas voters who are between the ages of 20 and 60 and
   want to cast mail-in ballots. They argue that Texas’s age-based eligibility for
   casting mail-in ballots violates the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, which
   provides that “[t]he right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen

          _____________________
          1
            The extensive background underlying this case is thoroughly described in our
   previous opinion and briefly summarized here for purposes of completeness. See TDP II,
   978 F.3d at 174–76.

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   years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United
   States or by any State on account of age.” U.S. Const. amend. XXVI § 1.
   According to Plaintiffs, their right to vote is “abridged” because § 82.003
   extends the opportunity to vote by mail to a group “solely on the basis of their
   age.”2
            Plaintiffs brought the instant federal suit against several state officials
   including the Secretary of State.3 They alleged that the age-based condition
   was both “unconstitutional as applied to these Plaintiffs during the
   pandemic” and “facially unconstitutional.” Plaintiffs subsequently filed a
   motion for a preliminary injunction regarding their as-applied claim. Their
   claim focused on the added challenges to voting that arose from the spread of
   COVID-19 during an election year. They sought to enjoin the state from
   denying mail-in ballots to otherwise eligible voters under the age of 65. In
   reviewing this claim, the district court, applying strict scrutiny, held that
   Plaintiffs “established that they are likely to succeed on their as applied
   Twenty-Sixth Amendment claim,” and entered the injunction.
            The state officials appealed and sought an emergency motion for a stay
   pending appeal. Tex. Democratic Party v. Abbott, 961 F.3d 389, 394 (5th Cir.
   2020) (“TDP I”). A motions panel of this court granted the motion to stay,
   and ultimately vacated the injunction. Id. at 412. As to the as-applied

            _____________________
            2
               Plaintiffs first presented a similar constitutional argument in state court at the
   onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. They sought a declaration that Texans who needed to
   socially distance could vote by mail under the notion that the risk of contracting COVID-
   19 was sufficient to meet the “physical condition” category under § 82.002. State of Tex.,
   602 S.W.3d at 551. The Supreme Court of Texas held that “a lack of immunity to COVID-
   19 is not itself a ‘physical condition’ for being eligible to vote by mail within the meaning of
   § 82.002(a).” Id. at 560.
            3
             Although there were other defendants in this suit, Plaintiffs bring their appeal
   only against the Secretary of State.

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   challenge, it determined that rational basis review, rather than strict scrutiny,
   was the proper standard because the right to a mail-in ballot was at stake
   rather than the right to vote. TDP I, 961 F.3d at 408–09 (citing McDonald v.
   Bd. of Election Comm’rs of Chicago, 394 U.S. 802, 807–08 (1969)). Because
   there was “no evidence that Texas [] denied or abridged” the right to vote,
   the panel concluded that Plaintiffs failed to show a substantial likelihood of
   success on the merits, and the injunction was stayed pending merits review.4
   TDP I, 961 F.3d at 409 (emphasis omitted).
           Later when their appeal came before the merits panel, Plaintiffs
   defended the preliminary injunction “only on Twenty-Sixth Amendment
   grounds.” TDP II, 978 F.3d at 176. The panel first grappled with the lack of
   clarity in Plaintiffs’ briefing. Based on the nature of their arguments, it was
   unclear whether Plaintiffs were still challenging the law’s constitutionality in
   the pandemic context or whether they were abandoning their as-applied
   challenge for the facial challenge. Id. at 177. Despite this lack of clarity, the
   panel cabined its review to the district court order properly before it. Id. at
   177–78. As stated, that order solely addressed the as-applied challenge—i.e.,
   it considered the constitutionality of § 82.003 in light of COVID-19 concerns.
   After establishing standing, ripeness, and the inapplicability of the political
   question doctrine, the court held that, contrary to the district court’s
   conclusions, § 82.003 does not run afoul of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment
   because “conferring a benefit on another class of voters does not deny or
   abridge” other individuals’ right to vote. Id. at 194. As such, it vacated the
   injunction and remanded the case to the district court.5 Id.

           _____________________
           4
            Plaintiffs’ writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court in response to this decision was
   denied. Tex. Democratic Party v. Abbott, 140 S. Ct. 2015 (2020).
           5
           Plaintiffs also filed a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court on this decision,
   which was denied. Tex. Democratic Party v. Abbott, 141 S. Ct. 1124 (2021).

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           On remand, Plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint.6 It alleged
   that § 82.003, alone and considered alongside upcoming election policies and
   future pandemic conditions, was unconstitutional, both as applied and
   facially. As to the allegations regarding future laws and conditions, the
   district court held that Plaintiffs lacked standing and that their claims were
   unripe and precluded by sovereign immunity. As to Plaintiffs’ allegations
   based on current harm, the district court dismissed them on the merits.
   Pertinent here, it held that this court’s decision in TDP II foreclosed
   Plaintiffs’ Twenty-Sixth Amendment claim, “as a matter of law,” and that
   the “law of the case” doctrine precluded it from relitigating this issue. The
   suit was dismissed in its entirety, and Plaintiffs timely appealed. On appeal,
   Plaintiffs’ arguments rely only on a facial challenge of the Twenty-Sixth
   Amendment claim against the Secretary. Specifically, they argue that the
   election law’s age-based requirement is unconstitutional, and the district
   court erred in dismissing their claims based on the rule of orderliness and the
   law of the case doctrine.

           _____________________
           6
              Intervening as plaintiffs, the League of United Latin American Citizens and the
   Texas League of United Latin American Citizens also filed a complaint. When the
   Secretary moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint, it moved to dismiss the intervenors’
   complaint as well. The district court addressed the claims congruently in both complaints
   when it dismissed the suit based on a failure to state a claim. Nevertheless, only Plaintiffs
   (i.e., Cascino, Sansing, and Garcia) appealed.

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                         II.    Standard of Review
          When a district court dismisses a claim pursuant to 12(b)(6), this court
   conducts a de novo review of that judgment on appeal. Walker v. Beaumont
   Indep. Sch. Dist., 938 F.3d 724, 734 (5th Cir. 2019). A “claim[] may be
   dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) ‘on the basis of a dispositive issue of law.’”
   Id. (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326 (1989)). It may also be
   dismissed “if the complaint does not contain sufficient factual matter,
   accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id.
   (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). In our review, we “must
   accept all well-pleaded facts as true, and . . . view them in the light most
   favorable to the plaintiff.” Id. at 735 (quoting Campbell v. Wells Fargo Bank,
   N.A., 781 F.2d 440, 442 (5th. Cir. 1986)).
          Finally, whether the law of the case doctrine “forecloses any of the
   district court’s actions on remand” warrants de novo review. Deutsche Bank
   Nat’l Tr. Co. v. Burke, 902 F.3d 548, 551 (5th Cir. 2018) (quotation omitted).
                                III.    Discussion
          In this appeal, Plaintiffs seek to prevent preliminary barriers to the
   court’s review of their facial challenge to the age-based election law.
   Specifically, they assert that: (1) they have standing to bring this claim; (2)
   that this claim is ripe for review; and (3) that this claim is not barred by
   sovereign immunity. Plaintiffs highlight that, unlike some of their claims that
   were dismissed for these reasons on remand, their facial challenge does not
   ask the court to “consider potential future legislation or evaluate the
   potential impact of the pandemic in future elections.” They also point to this
   court’s prior decision in TDP II holding that they had standing to challenge
   the election law and that the Secretary had a sufficient connection to the
   enforcement of the election law to preclude sovereign immunity. See TDP II,
   978 F.3d at 178. In response to these arguments, the State concedes that the

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   facial challenge “is ripe and that TDP II establishes [that] [P]laintiffs have
   standing to bring this claim and that it is not barred by the Secretary’s
   sovereign immunity.” The parties, therefore, agree that this appeal is
   properly before this court for review of the merits.
           The single merits question before us is whether the Twenty-Sixth
   Amendment prohibits the State from providing access to mail-in ballots for
   those 65 and older to the exclusion of younger voters.7 As stated, a prior panel
   vacated a preliminary injunction arising from Plaintiffs’ challenge to the
   election law as applied during the perils of the COVID-19 pandemic. See TDP
   II, 978 F.3d at 177–78. In that decision, the court held that “the Texas
   Legislature’s conferring a privilege to those at least age 65 to vote absentee
   did not deny or abridge younger voters’ rights who were not extended the
   same privilege.” Id. at 192. It then stated that “[§] 82.003 itself does not
   violate the Twenty-Sixth Amendment.” Id. The district court held that this
   decision foreclosed its review of the facial challenge to § 82.003 and holding
   otherwise would violate the law of the case doctrine.
                                 A.      Rule of Orderliness
           Plaintiffs first argue that TDP II does not foreclose their current
   appeal because “the preliminary injunction review panel disclaimed ruling
   on the facial challenge presented in this appeal.” As such, they contend that
   the rule of orderliness does not apply to their facial challenge. On the other
   hand, the State argues that the district court did not err in holding that TDP
   II binds the outcome of the central question of this appeal, regardless of
   whether Plaintiffs now bring a facial or as-applied challenge. According to the
           _____________________
           7
              As the State notes, Plaintiffs have abandoned all other claims against all other
   defendants. See also Brinkmann v. Dall. Cnty. Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th
   Cir. 1987) (holding that an appellant abandons claims on appeal by failing to identify any
   error in the district court’s analysis).

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   State, even though the prior panel did not ultimately decide Plaintiffs’ facial
   challenge to § 82.003 because it was not the exact question before it, the
   holding in TDP II “did not turn on the facts of the pandemic.” We agree with
   the State that TDP II already answered the question that Plaintiffs attempt to
   relitigate now, and thus the rule of orderliness must apply.
          Under the rule of orderliness, we may not overrule controlling
   precedent unless there is “an intervening change in the law, such as a
   statutory amendment or a decision from either the Supreme Court or our en
   banc court.” Thompson v. Dall. City Attorney’s Off., 913 F.3d 464, 467 (5th
   Cir. 2019). In other words, the rule of orderliness applies when a prior panel
   decision already answers the issue before us. See Newman v. Plains All Am.
   Pipeline, L.P., 23 F.4th 393, 400 (5th Cir. 2022) (explaining that the rule of
   orderliness “binds us to follow a prior panel’s decision on an issue”);
   McClain v. Lufkin Indus., Inc., 649 F.3d 374, 385 (5th Cir. 2011). TDP II is a
   published opinion that provides a substantive analysis of whether § 82.003’s
   age-based requirement is violative of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment.
   Although the prior panel cabined its analysis to the as-applied question that
   was the only dispute on review, it noted that the analysis necessarily required
   it to answer generally “whether the law denies or abridges [Plaintiffs’] right
   to vote based on age.” TDP II, 978 F.3d at 182. It further stated throughout
   the decision that “[r]egardless of whether [Plaintiffs brought] a facial or as-
   applied challenge, [the] analysis does not turn on the effect of the pandemic.”
   Id.
          In deciding to vacate the preliminary injunction on § 82.003, this
   court went step-by-step through the exact analysis that would apply to a facial
   challenge. It first determined that “the Twenty-Sixth Amendment confers
   an individual right to be free from the denial or abridgment of the right to vote
   on account of age.” Id. at 184. It then established the scope of the
   Amendment’s protection by distinguishing a right to vote from the right to

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   an absentee ballot. Id. at 188. Based on its interpretation of the terms
   “denied” and “abridged,” the panel made clear that “an election law
   abridges a person’s right to vote . . . only if it makes voting more difficult for
   that person than it was before the law was enacted or enforced.” TDP II, 978
   F.3d at 191. A law, such as the one at issue here, which “makes it easier for
   others to vote does not abridge any person’s right to vote for the purposes of
   the Twenty-Sixth Amendment.” Id. In its concluding language, the panel
   explicitly stated that “§ 82.003 itself does not violate the Twenty-Sixth
   Amendment.” Id. at 192. It was not until after the panel drew this conclusion
   that it considered whether the pandemic affected its analysis for purposes of
   resolving the as-applied challenge. Id. Thus, the scope of the mandate in TDP
   II prevents this panel from departing from that holding and ruling in
   Plaintiffs’ favor on their facial challenge.
          What’s more, Plaintiffs do not point to any intervening law that we
   may rely on to sway from our precedent. See McClain, 649 F.3d at 385. As
   such, like the district court, we reject Plaintiffs’ attempt to relitigate these
   issues and hold that the rule of orderliness applies. See Thompson, 913 F.3d at
   467.
                           B.      Law of the Case Doctrine
          Plaintiffs alternatively argue that the district court erred in applying
   the mandate of TDP II because that decision was clearly erroneous and
   following it would constitute a manifest injustice. We disagree. Under the law
   of the case doctrine, “an issue of law or fact decided on appeal may not be
   reexamined either by the district court on remand or by the appellate court
   on a subsequent appeal.” McClain, 649 F.3d at 385 (quoting Fuhrman v.
   Dretke, 442 F.3d 893, 896 (5th Cir. 2006)). “The district court may only
   deviate from the mandate if one of the exceptions to the law of the case
   doctrine applies.” Fuhrman, 442 F.3d at 897. Those exceptions include: “(i)

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   the evidence on a subsequent trial was substantially different, (ii) controlling
   authority has since made a contrary decision of the law applicable to such
   issues, or (iii) the decision was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest
   injustice.” Id. (quoting United States v. Becerra, 155 F.3d 740, 752–53 (5th
   Cir. 1998)).
           According to Plaintiffs, the prior panel in TDP II, “significantly
   departed from well-established law” when it failed to read the Twenty-Sixth
   Amendment “consistent with the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-
   Fourth Amendments,” and this was a manifest injustice because it
   “allow[ed] [the State] to continue to discriminate against Plaintiffs on
   account of age in voting.” However, the prior panel squarely addressed these
   arguments in TDP II and thus it appears Plaintiffs are simply attempting to
   relitigate their previous appeal.8 See 978 F.3d at 189–92. The exceptions to
   the law of the case doctrine may not be used as a means to revisit issues
   properly addressed. Indeed, the manifest injustice exception is to be applied
   narrowly such that “mere doubts or disagreement about the wisdom of a prior
   decision of this or a lower court will not suffice.” Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d
   256, 272 (5th Cir. 2000). “To be clearly erroneous, a decision must strike us
   as more than just maybe or probably wrong; it must be dead wrong.” Id. at
   272–73.
           The prior panel addressed “seemingly novel questions regarding the
   Twenty-Sixth Amendment.” Tex. Democratic Party, 140 S. Ct. at 2015
   (Sotomayor, J., writing separately, but agreeing with the denial of application
           _____________________
           8
              In the prior appeal, the TDP II panel noted that Plaintiffs only mentioned the
   COVID-19 pandemic as a basis for the law’s unconstitutionally a few times throughout
   their briefs. In its analysis determining whether Plaintiffs were bringing an as-applied or a
   facial challenge, it further highlighted that Plaintiffs explicitly stated that, rather than the
   pandemic, it was the “unambiguous text” of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment that rendered
   the law unconstitutional. TDP II, 978 F.3d at 176–77.

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   to vacate stay). Plaintiffs point to no evidence that strikes us as a clearly
   erroneous application of law. The district court therefore did not err in
   holding that the law of the case doctrine applied and in dismissing Plaintiffs’
   Twenty-Sixth Amendment challenge to Texas’ age-based election law.
                              IV.    Conclusion
          For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.

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