Court Opinion

ID: 9530401
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:59:33.636251+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:06.032811
License: Public Domain

ROSSMAN, J.,
specially concurring.
The argument that ORS 336.260 is lacldng in needed particulars and is, therefore, incapable of administration fails to persuade me. Our school districts, boards and officials are good examples of public administrative agencies that have been invested through the years with extensive administrative powers and that have exercised them to the public’s satisfaction. ORS 336.260 became a part of our laws in 1925 (Oregon Laws 1925, Ch 24, p 38). The record contains no intimation that in the 35 years that have passed since the act’s enactment any difficulty in administration has developed except the instance now before us. Regulations substantially similar to ORS 336.260 have been adopted by at least one school board without the aid of any legislation whatever.' Plainly, the adoption of such a measure is within the powers possessed by school boards. The instance just mentioned is People ex rel Latimer v. Board of Education, 394 Ill 228, 68 NE2d 305, 167 ALR 1467. The regulation in that case, which was adopted by the Board of Education of the City of Chicago, was sub*122s.tantially similar to OES 336.260 except that it authorized the release of children for one hour per week only and restricted the operation of the measure to the pupils in the 6th and 7th grade classes. The decision mentioned that 22,500 pupils were released weekly under the regulation for religious instruction. Since the purposes of a statute such as OES 336.260 can he accomplished without any legislation whatever and purely by the exercise of administrative power, the school boards surely can achieve them through the help given by OES 336.260.
It is easy to find statutes worded even more broadly than OES 336.260 that entrust administrative powers to school boards and officials but which have presented no difficulties in their daily operation. For example, statutes with rare exceptions do not prescribe or mention the subjects to be taught in our public schools and institutions of higher learning. In fact, they do not even hint at the manner in which the boards and officials should choose the subjects. Yet no difficulty is encountered there, unless one deems precautions to prevent duplications in courses as indicative of difficulty. See 47 Am Jur, Schools, § 200, p 441. Likewise, no legislative enactment names the text books that our schools should employ. Here again the schools have encountered no problem in the handling of this important administrative power. 79 CJS, Schools and School Districts, § 487, p 431, and 47 Am Jur, Schools, § 202, p 443. No statute mentions the hour when our schools should open, but this is merely another detail that has been left to the administrative agencies successfully and that has caused no difficulty.
It is easy to become more specific than the foregoing and show by citation to express provisions of our statutes that OES 336.260 will present no prob*123lems that our school officials can not readily solve'. For example, ORS 336.380 requires that a school board in the district to which it is applicable shall “cause dental inspection to be made at least once in each school year of each pupil.” Surely that statute confronts school officials with a task more delicate and perplexing than the release of a child upon the request of its parents for religious instruction. Any one who insists upon preciseness in legislation may look askance at the term “dental inspection,” especially since it is to be involuntary; yet the administration of that statute moves along so expeditiously that it provokes no discussion. ORS 336.230 says that:
“In all public and private schools in Oregon there shall be given regular courses of instruction in the Constitution of the United States. * * * ”
No text book is mentioned in that statute and the latter does not specify the length of the course. If the course is compulsory that fact is left unmentioned. ORS 336.240 (1) requires that instruction shall be given in:
“(a) Honesty, morality, courtesy, obedience to law, respect for the national flag, the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Oregon, respect for parents and the home, the dignity and necessity of honest labor and other lessons of a steadying influence which tend to promote and develop an upright and desirable citizenry.
“(b) The effects of alcohol and narcotics upon the human system.
“(c) Blindness and justice to and humane treatment of animals.”
Since no trouble has been experienced in the administration of that measure although it contains such loose terms as “courtesy” and “kindness,” it seems *124that fears are unwarranted that the school officials will be unable to determine the meaning of “instruction in religion.”
Oregon is hot the only state that has enacted a measure such as OKS 336.260. Measures such as the latter have demonstrated their ability to adapt themselves to successful administration: Gordon v. Board of Education of City of Los Angeles, 78 Cal App 2d 464, 178 P2d 488; People ex rel Latimer v. Board of Education of City of Chicago, 394 Ill 228, 68 NE2d 305,167 ALR 1467 (annotated); People v. Graves, 245 NY 195, 156 NE 663; Zorach v. Clauson, 303 NY 161, 100 NE2d 463, affd 72 S Ct 679. See also 79 CJS, Schools and School Districts, § 466 at page 393.
It is unnecessary to go on. The f oregoing examples, which could be greatly increased in number, show that the administration of an act such as OKS 336.260 can be entrusted safely to school officials. Surely, if they can be invested with the power of choosing the subjects of instruction, the books that shall be employed and the hour when school shall open — to say nothing of creating a law school — they must have the ability required to administer OKS 336.260. Those who claim that the statute just mentioned should be clarified by imparting to it some details should ask themselves whether the details would not complicate administration rather than solve matters. The success of the measures above mentioned show that the administration of OKS 336.260 can be safely entrusted to the school officials.
The simple truth of the matter is that in the operation of our schools and institutions of higher learning broad administrative powers' must be entrusted to the school boards and administrative officials. Such has been the course of legislation for a century or *125more. OES 336.260, in its administrative provisions, merely conforms to a pattern that extensive experience has mapped ont for ns.
I concur in the opinion written by Mr. Justice O’Connell.