Court Opinion

ID: 9826866
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 16:48:52.997022+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:17.219928
License: Public Domain

*316OPINION ON PETITION TO REHEAR.
Plaintiff in error has filed a petition seeking a rehearing by this court and an additional finding of facts. The first question presented by the petition is, that there was no evidence to support the averment in the declaration to the effect that James had accepted the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act and had never exempted himself from its terms and provisions. It being further contended by plaintiff in error in the petition to rehear that by the plea of general issue tendered by plaintiff in error, the burden of proving this material allegation was upon the defendant in error.
To this contention we cannot agree. The Workmen’s Compensation Act provides as follows:
“That from and after the taking effect of this Act every employer and every employee, except as herein stated, shall be presumed to have accepted the provisions of this Act, respectively, to pay and accept compensation for personal injury or death by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment, and shall be bound thereby, unless he shall have given prior to any accident resulting in injury, or death, notice to the contrary in the manner herein provided.”
When it is made to appear by proof that the Workmen’s Compensation Act applied to the employer, and an employee is injured in the course of employment, the employee is presumed to have accepted the provisions of the Act, and this presumption continues until the contrary appears by proof.
We have been cited to no case which places a different construction on the above quoted language from the statute in question. The record in this case shows that there were more than five employees working at the mill at the time defendant in error received his injuries. It is also shown that the injuries were received in the course of the employment. If the defendant in error was an employee, as found by the jury under a proper instruction by the court, and not an independent contractor, the Workmen’s Compensation Act applied. There is nothing in the record that remotely tends to show that defendant in error had given notice prior to the accident resulting in his injury, that he did not accept the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. It only appears that he was working at this saw mill, and the jury found, and the trial judge concurred in the finding by overruling the motion for a new' trial, that the relation of employer and employee obtained between plaintiff in error and defendant in error, and not an independent contractor. In the opinion affirming the judgment this court held that there was some evidence to support the verdict, which is a holding that there was some evidence to support the theory of defendant in error that *317he was an employee and not an independent contractor. The other facts appearing in the record made the Workmen’s Compensation Act applicable, and the presumption is expressly created by the Act that he accepted the provision of the Act, unless the contrary appears. We may add that this question was not directly relied upon by plaintiff in error at the trial of the case, nor in the motion for a new trial, nor by any special request tendered by defendant below for further instructions. The whole theory of the defendant below, both at the trial and in the motion for a new trial, was that the plaintiff below was an independent contractor operating the saAV ■mill and was not an employee of the defendant below.
The petitioner makes the further question in the petition to rehear that on page 14 of the opinion by this court we assume that this action was brought under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. In the opinion this court stated on this subject as follows: “We think it conclusive that the Workmen’s Compensation Act applies.” In the petition to rehear it is contended that this court erroneously stated in the opinion that the suit was brought under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. We did not state in the opinion that the suit was brought to recover compensation, but we did say that the suit was brought under the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, meaning that plaintiff'below elected to sue at law as provided by the Workmen’s Compensation Act, and the employer not having complied with the Act, he could not rely upon the defenses of assumed risk, contributory negligence, or the fellow servant’s doctrine. And it Was in this sense that the suit was brought under the Workmen’s Compensation Act.
Petitioner directs attention of the court to our holding on the question of the competency of expert evidence offered by defendant and excluded by the trial judge, and wherein we said in the opinion: “We think this evidence was properly excluded since it was not material if the Workmen’s Compensation Act applies.” This statement was made in connection with a discussion of the evidence that if it appeared that plaintiff below was guilty of contributory negligence in operating the saw mill carriage, and there was any evidence that the off bearer, a fellow employee, was guilty of any negligence that contributed proximately to the injury to plaintiff, that under the provisions of the Compensation Act, the contributory negligence of plaintiff below could not be relied upon by the defendant below.
The opinion by this court fully discussed these questions. We held that there was some evidence tending to show negligence upon the part of the off bearer that contributed proximately to plaintiff’s injury, and under the rule it became a question of fact to be submitted to the jury. The slab sawn from the log was detached before the re*318turn of the carriage. It was the duty of the off bearer to place the slab by moving it, after it was detached from the log, on the live rollers which conveyed it away and in an opposite direction from the return operation of the saw carriage. There Was some evidence that he failed to perform this duty, or that he negligently performed the duty.
The expert evidence offered by the defendant below and excluded by the learned trial judge was intended to show that the operator of the saw mill carriage is required to operate same in a certain way and manner, and if it was not so operated by plaintiff below, it would show negligence on his part. If the negligence of the plaintiff be conceded and there was also negligence of the off bearer, it would not affect the right of plaintiff to recover, hence, the expert evidence offered was immaterial, since contributory negligence could not be relied upon under the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act where the plaintiff elected to sue at law and not for compensation.
We think this disposes of all questions made in the petition for a rehearing and an additional finding of facts. It results that the petition to rehear is overruled. Petitioner and sureties on the appeal bond will pay the cost of the filing of this petition.
Heiskell and Owen, JJ., concur.