Court Opinion

ID: 9947092
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-02 01:00:44.922285+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:46.695819
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-40591     Document: 70-1    Page: 1   Date Filed: 03/01/2024

       United States Court of Appeals
            for the Fifth Circuit
                                                              United States Court of Appeals
                                                                       Fifth Circuit

                          ____________                               FILED
                                                                 March 1, 2024
                            No. 23-40591                        Lyle W. Cayce
                          ____________                               Clerk

Cheapside Minerals, Limited; Paul R. Lucas, Jr.,
individually and as independent executor of the Estate of Mary K.
Lucas, deceased; James E. Natho; Mary Natho;
McDougal Family 2003, Limited; Et al.,

                                                  Plaintiffs—Appellees,

                                versus

Devon Energy Production Company, L.P., formerly known as
GeoSouthern DeWitt Properties, L.L.C.,

                                                 Defendant—Appellant,

                       consolidated with
                         _____________

                           No. 24-40026
                         _____________

Cheapside Minerals, Limited; McDougal Family 2003,
Limited; Paul R. Lucas, Jr., individually and as independent executor
of the Estate of Mary K. Lucas, deceased; James E. Natho;
Mary Natho; Et al.,

                                                  Plaintiffs—Appellees,

                                versus
Case: 23-40591         Document: 70-1         Page: 2     Date Filed: 03/01/2024

                                    No. 23-40591
                                  c/w No. 24-40026

Devon Energy Production Company, L.P., formerly known as
GeoSouthern DeWitt Properties, L.L.C.,

                                          Defendant—Appellant.
                 ______________________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Texas
                           USDC No. 6:23-CV-34
                 ______________________________

Before Jones, Willett, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
Edith H. Jones, Circuit Judge:
       Defendant Devon Energy Production Company, L.P. appeals from
the district court’s order remanding this oil-and-gas royalties dispute to
Texas state court. Devon contends that the Class Action Fairness Act,
28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711–15 (CAFA), requires that this case be
heard in federal court. The district court disagreed, finding CAFA’s “local
controversy” exception required the court to remand. We interpret the
statute differently and, accordingly, VACATE its judgment remanding this
case to state court.
                             I. BACKGROUND
       A group of 214 plaintiffs sued Devon in Texas state court, alleging that
Devon had underpaid them in excess of $100 million in oil-and-gas royalties.
Devon, a citizen of Oklahoma, is a lessee under certain leases concerning
lands in Dewitt County, Texas.1 Devon markets and sells hydrocarbons
produced from wells on those lands and pays royalties to the Plaintiffs.
Devon makes those payments to locations specified by Plaintiffs from its

       _____________________
       1
         Although Devon is the only defendant bringing this appeal, it is not the only
defendant in this case. The other defendants, BPX Operating Company, BPX Production
Company, and GeoSouthern Energy Corporation, are all citizens of Texas.

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offices in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. There is no dispute that more than two-
thirds of Plaintiffs are citizens of Texas but that some Plaintiffs do not reside
in Texas. In fact, some Plaintiffs reside in places that are thousands of miles
away from Texas, such as Alaska, Massachusetts, and the United Kingdom.
        Pursuant to CAFA, Devon removed this case to federal court.
Plaintiffs sought remand based on CAFA’s “local controversy” exception.2
The district court agreed that the local controversy exception applied and
ordered that the case be remanded.3
        Devon appealed the remand order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and also
filed a request to challenge the remand order under 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c). We
consolidated the separate filings.
                                II. DISCUSSION
        “We review de novo whether the local controversy exception to
CAFA jurisdiction should apply in this case.” Opelousas Gen. Hosp. Auth. v.
FairPay Sols., Inc., 655 F.3d 358, 360 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
                                            A.
        Before turning to the merits, we first address our appellate
jurisdiction. We granted Devon permission to appeal under § 1453(c), but
we asked the parties to brief whether we additionally have jurisdiction based

        _____________________
        2
            Plaintiffs also argued that CAFA’s “local single event exclusion,” see
§ 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I), warranted remand of this case. The district court did not address
that argument in its remand order. Plaintiffs do not argue the local single event exclusion
applies in their appellate brief.
        3
           The district court reasoned that Plaintiffs’ lost royalties were real property
interests. As shown in part II.B.i. of this opinion, the district court erred in making this
determination. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Adams, 513 F.2d 355, 363 (5th Cir. 1975).

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on § 1291.4 As it happens, both the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits hold that
appellants may rely on § 1291 for jurisdiction over an order remanding a case
based on CAFA’s local controversy exception.5 See Simring v. GreenSky,
LLC, 29 F.4th 1262, 1265–66 (11th Cir. 2022) (court could hear appeal under
§ 1291 where appellant “did not rely at all on Section 1453” and “did not
need to file a motion for permissive appeal”); Kitchin v. Bridgeton Landfill,
LLC, 3 F.4th 1089, 1092 (8th Cir. 2021) (“[A]fter recognizing that we had
previously denied the appellants permission to appeal under § 1453(c), we
nevertheless proceeded to address their separately filed § 1291 appeal,
concluding that we had jurisdiction under § 1291 to review the district
court’s application of the local-controversy exception.” (citing Jacks v.
Meridian Res. Co., LLC, 701 F.3d 1224, 1228 n.2, 1229 (8th Cir. 2012)); see
also 10 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3931.2 (3d ed. 2023) (“An order remanding after removal
under the Class Action Fairness Act . . . can be appealed as of right, and
§ 1447(d) does not bar review if the remand is based not on a lack of
jurisdiction but on a decision to decline jurisdiction under the local-
controversy exception or the home-state exception.” (footnotes omitted)).
We follow this persuasive authority.
        Generally, 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) limits this court’s jurisdiction to hear
appeals from orders remanding cases to state court. Under § 1447(d), a
remand order is unreviewable if the district court remands the case for lack

        _____________________
        4
          Devon argues it could have brought this appeal under § 1453(c) or § 1291. But
Devon concedes that, “when permitted” § 1453(c) is the “superior alternative, and so it
should be utilized here.” Plaintiffs agree with Devon that § 1453(c) is the preferable route
to hear appeals concerning CAFA but offer no argument as to whether Devon could have
brought this appeal under § 1291.
        5
         The parties do not point to authorities exhibiting that other circuits have reached
a contrary conclusion, nor are we aware of any.

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of subject matter jurisdiction or a procedural removal “defect.” See Things
Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 127–28, 116 S. Ct. 494, 497 (1995);
Schexnayder v. Entergy La., Inc., 394 F.3d 280, 283 (5th Cir. 2004). Thus,
when a case is remanded for a reason other than subject matter jurisdiction
or a procedural “defect,” § 1447(d) does not bar review and an appellant can
rely on § 1291 to appeal the remand order. See Firefighters’ Ret. Sys. v. Citco
Group Ltd., 796 F.3d 520, 525 (5th Cir. 2015) (“If the statutory bars to review
do not apply, a remand order is a final order for the purposes of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291.” (citing Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 713, 116 S. Ct.
1712, 1719 (1996)).
       CAFA provides a basis for expedited appellate review of appeals from
orders that either remand or deny remand of class action litigation. It
provides: “Section 1447 shall apply to any removal of a case under this
section, except that notwithstanding section 1447(d), a court of appeals may
accept an appeal from an order of a district court granting or denying a motion
to remand a class action to the State court from which it was removed . . . .”
§ 1453(c)(1) (emphases added). But § 1453(c) did not supplant § 1291 and
become the lone vehicle by which an appellant can obtain review of a final
order remanding class action litigation to state court; it simply permits
certain appeals denying remand that §§ 1447(d) and 1291 would have
otherwise prohibited. See BlackRock Fin. Mgmt. Inc. v. Segregated Account of
Ambac Assur. Corp., 673 F.3d 169, 175–76 (2d Cir. 2012); BP Am., Inc. v.
Oklahoma ex rel. Edmondson, 613 F.3d 1029, 1032–33 (10th Cir. 2010)
(Gorsuch, J.) (“Congress has specifically and explicitly suspended the
operation of § 1447(d) with respect to CAFA remand orders arising, like this
one, under § 1453(c)(1).”).
       Moreover, § 1447(d) does not trump § 1291 to deny appeal of a
remand order based on the local controversy exception, because § 1447(d)
does not prohibit review of remands based on “abstention principles.”

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Wallace v. La. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 444 F.3d 697, 701 (5th Cir. 2006).
This court has held that orders remanding cases under CAFA’s local
controversy exception are based on abstention principles. Watson v. City of
Allen, 821 F.3d 634, 639 (5th Cir. 2016); accord Hollinger v. Home State Mut.
Ins. Co., 654 F.3d 564, 570 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (referring to the local
controversy exception as a “mandatory abstention provision of CAFA”). In
sum, appellants may rely on § 1291 or § 1453(c) in appealing orders
remanding a case under the local controversy exception. But only in appeals
predicated on § 1453(c) is this court bound to rule within sixty days of our
granting permission to appeal. Compare § 1453(c)(2), with § 1447; see also
Patterson v. Dean Morris, L.L.P., 444 F.3d 365, 370 (5th Cir. 2006).
                                              B.
        Turning to whether the district court erred in remanding this case,
neither party disputes that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction
pursuant to CAFA, § 1332(d)(2).6 Nevertheless, Plaintiffs urge, and the
district court found, that this case belongs in state court because of CAFA’s
local controversy exception. That exception provides:
        A district court shall decline to exercise jurisdiction under
        paragraph (2)—
        (A)(i) over a class action in which—
        (I) greater than two-thirds of the members of all proposed
        plaintiff classes in the aggregate are citizens of the State in
        which the action was originally filed;
        _____________________
        6
           “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action in which the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and
costs, and is a class action in which—(A) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a
State different from any defendant; (B) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a foreign state
or a citizen or subject of a foreign state and any defendant is a citizen of a State; or (C) any
member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State and any defendant is a foreign state or
a citizen or subject of a foreign state.” § 1332(d)(2).

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         (II) at least 1 defendant is a defendant—
         (aa) from whom significant relief is sought by members of the
         plaintiff class;
         (bb) whose alleged conduct forms a significant basis for the
         claims asserted by the proposed plaintiff class; and
         (cc) who is a citizen of the State in which the action was
         originally filed; and
         (III) principal injuries resulting from the alleged conduct or any
         related conduct of each defendant were incurred in the State in
         which the action was originally filed; and
         (ii) during the 3-year period preceding the filing of that class
         action, no other class action has been filed asserting the same
         or similar factual allegations against any of the defendants on
         behalf of the same or other persons[.]

§ 1332(d)(4). Plaintiffs “bear the burden of establishing that they fall within
[the] exception.” Opelousas Gen. Hosp. Auth., 655 F.3d at 360. The parties
also agree that prongs I and II of the exception’s statutory prerequisites are
satisfied.
         They dispute whether, as prong III requires, the “principal injuries”
resulting from Devon’s underpayment of royalties were sustained in Texas.
For the following reasons, we agree with Devon that Plaintiffs failed to show
the “principal injuries” from royalty underpayments were “incurred” in
Texas.
i.       Where were Plaintiffs’ injuries “incurred”?
         According to prong III, a local controversy must be one in which the
“principal injuries” were “incurred” in the state where the action was first
filed. Devon asserts that Plaintiffs suffered their injuries where they reside.
Devon contends that an underpayment of an oil or gas royalty is an injury to
personal property, and a plaintiff’s residence is determinative of where the
plaintiff suffers that injury. Plaintiffs see it differently. They argue that they

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suffered their injuries “at the location specified for payment.” (emphasis
omitted). That location, according to Plaintiffs, is DeWitt County, Texas,
because the leases make royalty payments “payable” there.
        “Texas law provides that oil and gas are realty when in place and
personalty when severed from the land by production.” Phillips Petroleum
Co., 513 F.2d at 363 (collecting cases); accord Mitchell Energy Corp. v. Samson
Res. Co., 80 F.3d 976, 982 (5th Cir. 1996) (“The right to payment for
minerals already severed from the ground is considered personal property,
not realty.”). The distinction arises because “[t]he right to payment for past
production obviously has no effect upon the value to the leaseholder of the
oil and gas still in the ground,” and, therefore, “accrued royalty interests are
personal property, . . . as is the right to payment for severed minerals.”
Phillips Petroleum Co., 513 F.2d at 363.
        Plaintiffs allege that Devon underpaid their royalties on sales of
hydrocarbons that were already severed from the subject real property. Their
royalties consist of the “gross proceeds received for the sale of production
from the Royalty Owners’ Leases.” (emphasis added). Underpayments of
royalties owed thus comprise injuries to Plaintiffs’ personal property.7
        That still leaves unanswered where Plaintiffs suffered injuries to their
personal property.        To be sure, most Plaintiffs reside in Texas.                  But
approximately ten percent of Plaintiffs either reside outside of Texas,
requested that they be paid at addresses outside of Texas, or both.8

        _____________________
        7
          Tellingly, Plaintiffs do not dispute this conclusion in their appellate brief, even
though Plaintiffs previously defended the district court’s conclusion that “under Texas
law, royalty interests are interests in real property.”
        8
         Plaintiffs concede at least some Plaintiffs reside outside of Texas but note that
approximately 90% reside in Texas. However, the exact number of Plaintiffs that reside in
Texas is unclear. Devon points to twenty Plaintiffs who requested to be paid outside of

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                                     c/w No. 24-40026

        Generally, a plaintiff sustains an economic injury where he resides.
See CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., 653 F.3d 1066, 1079 (9th Cir.
2011) (“We have repeatedly held that a corporation incurs economic loss, for
jurisdictional purposes, in the forum of its principal place of business.”);
CMACO Auto. Sys., Inc. v. Wanxiang Am. Corp., 589 F.3d 235, 247 (6th Cir.
2009) (“Because the economic injury [plaintiff] suffered . . . was clearly felt
at its corporate headquarters [in California], the district court did not err in
holding that CMA’s contract claim accrued . . . in California . . . .”); Cantor
Fitzgerald Inc. v. Lutnick, 313 F.3d 704, 710 (2d Cir. 2002) (“Where . . . the
injury is purely economic, the place of injury usually is where the plaintiff
resides and sustains the economic impact of the loss.” (citation and
quotations omitted)). Notably, this court has observed that a plaintiff feels
the “direct effect” of being underpaid in the place where he resides. See
Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1110–12 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding, in
regard to sovereign immunity, that “the breach of the certificates of deposits
had direct effects in the United States” where plaintiffs resided, even though
Mexico was specified as the place of payment “on the certificates
themselves”). It follows that the Plaintiffs who reside or were paid at
addresses outside of Texas could not have sustained their economic injuries
in Texas because the underpayment of their royalties did not occur in Texas
nor were its effects felt there. See Spence v. Glock, Ges.m.b.H., 227 F.3d 308,
310, 312–14 (5th Cir. 2000) (determining the location of economic injury
based on “where plaintiffs bought the [defective] guns,” not where those
guns were manufactured); see also Racca v. EFG Gen. Partner Corp., No. 1:22-
CV-142, 2022 WL 2764735, at *5–6 (E.D. Tex. July 7, 2022) (Crone, J.)
        _____________________
Texas. Of those twenty, Plaintiffs allege that nineteen reside in Texas. Devon points out
that only one of those nineteen Plaintiffs submitted an affidavit stating he resides in Texas.
In their appellate brief, Plaintiffs do not direct this court to any evidence in the record
rebutting Devon’s evidence and their own allegations.

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(concluding, in a CAFA case, that students who attended a Texas college
remotely and lived outside of Texas sustained their injuries from the
college’s closure in the places where they resided). Thus, the Plaintiffs who
reside outside of Texas sustained their injuries outside of Texas.
        Plaintiffs counter that Devon agreed to pay royalties in Texas with the
consequence that Devon’s failure to satisfy its obligations occurred in Texas.
Plaintiffs find support in the mineral leases, which state: “All royalties,
surface damages, and other payments due under this lease shall be payable in
DeWitt County, Texas, unless otherwise herein provided.”9                     (emphasis
added). This argument misses the mark for two reasons. First, making
royalties “payable” in DeWitt County does not necessarily mean the leases
required Devon to pay Plaintiffs there. See Payable, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2007) (“payable” means “that may,
can, or must be paid”). Moreover, in no way does this lease provision mean
all Plaintiffs were actually paid in DeWitt County. Second, it is undisputed
that Devon paid Plaintiffs from its offices in Oklahoma, and a number of
Plaintiffs requested that Devon pay them at addresses outside of Texas.
Plaintiffs also concede that “[u]nder Texas law, a breach of contract injury
occurs at the location specified for payment.” (emphasis in original). Thus, at
least some of the Plaintiffs sustained their injuries outside of Texas. Plaintiffs
have failed to demonstrate they all sustained or “incurred” injuries in the
state in which they brought this lawsuit.

        _____________________
        9
           This quoted text derives from a lease executed in 2007, and Plaintiffs represent
that all leases contain this quoted text. Devon, however, “does not concede that Plaintiffs
established that the DeWitt County payment provision exists in ‘every single’ Plaintiffs’
lease.”

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ii.     Must all injuries have occurred in Texas for the local controversy
        exception to apply?
        The more challenging, and novel, question is how to interpret the
“principal injuries” that must have been incurred within the forum state
under prong III of the local controversy exception. The parties join issue over
whether “principal injuries” means that all Plaintiffs, or some quantity of
Plaintiffs, must have suffered their injuries in Texas. As a matter of statutory
interpretation, “we follow the plain and unambiguous meaning of
[§ 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(III)], interpreting undefined terms according to their
ordinary and natural meaning and the overall policies and objectives of the
statute.” NPR Invs., L.L.C. ex rel. Roach v. United States, 740 F.3d 998, 1007
(5th Cir. 2014) (citation and quotations omitted).
        Plaintiffs contend they satisfy the principal injuries prong because the
vast majority of Plaintiffs were underpaid their royalties in Texas and,
therefore, their “principal injuries” occurred in the forum state. In other
words, “principal” means “most” of the Plaintiffs who were injured. We
hold, to the contrary, that Plaintiffs’ interpretation of “principal” is contrary
to the prong III provision’s plain meaning. As shown below, the meaning of
“principal injuries” is unambiguous. “Principal injuries” qualitatively and
comparatively evaluates the types of injury, not the quantity of plaintiffs who
were injured. Thus, when some plaintiffs sustain their primary injuries in the
forum state but others do not § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(III) is not satisfied.10

        _____________________
        10
           To be sure, the legislative history of CAFA suggests that not all plaintiffs are
required to suffer their principal injuries in the forum state to satisfy the principal injuries
prong. See Sen. Rep. No. 109-14, 40, 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 38 (2005) (“[T]he principal
injuries resulting from the actions of all the defendants must have occurred in the state
where the suit was filed. By this criterion, the Committee means that all or almost all of the
damage caused by defendants’ alleged conduct occurred in the state where the suit was
brought.” (emphasis added)). But “[o]nly after application of principles of statutory
construction, including the canons of construction, and after a conclusion that the statute

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        CAFA does not define the term “principal.” See § 1332(d). But in
other contexts, the Supreme Court and this court have observed that
“principal” is synonymous with “primary,” “chief,” and “[f]irst or highest
in rank, quality, or importance.” See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 525,
131 S. Ct. 1910, 1936 (2011); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Lange, 480 F.
App’x 309, 313 (5th Cir. 2012). Dictionaries in use at the time Congress
enacted CAFA also attach this definition to “principal.” See Principal,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (“principal” means “[c]hief;
primary; most important”); Principal, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW
INT’L DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2002) (“principal” means “most important,
consequential, or influential . . . relegating comparable matters, items, or
individuals to secondary rank”).11 Read as an adjective that describes
“injuries,” it is common sense that a defendant’s conduct can result in
“principal injuries” that are more important than others. For example, as
Devon explains, a “personal injury plaintiff may suffer bodily harm in Texas
(the principal injury) but incur medical bills payable in Florida (a secondary
injury).”
        The structure of CAFA also supports our interpretation of “principal
injuries.” First, CAFA ties the “principal injuries” sustained to the entire
class, not just a subset of it. CAFA requires plaintiffs to show that the
“principal injuries . . . were incurred in the State in which the action was
originally filed.” § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(III). There is no exception for cases in
which most plaintiffs sustain the principal injury in the forum state but some
do not. Thus, to remand a case to state court when some plaintiffs sustained

        _____________________
is ambiguous may [we] turn to the legislative history.” United States v. Kaluza, 780 F.3d
647, 658 (5th Cir. 2015). Because § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(III) as enacted is unambiguous, we
do not consider legislative history.
        11
             Notably, Plaintiffs concur with this definition of “principal.”

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the principal injuries outside of the forum state would essentially rewrite the
statute, which we may not do. See Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc.,
509 U.S. 155, 168 n.16, 113 S. Ct. 2549, 2557 n.16 (1993) (“[W]e may not add
terms or provisions [to a statute] where congress has omitted them . . . .”
(citation omitted)).
        In other parts of CAFA, Congress enumerated when fewer than all
plaintiffs must meet certain requirements.                   See § 1332(d)(2),12 (3),13
(4)(A)(i)(I), (4)(B).14 Accordingly, the first prong of the local controversy
exception is satisfied when “greater than two-thirds of the members of all
proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate are citizens of the State in which
the action was originally filed.” § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(I). But Congress did not
enumerate the proportion of plaintiffs necessary under the nearby principal
injuries prong. See § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(III). Had Congress intended to
require that only two-thirds of plaintiffs suffer their principal injuries in the
forum state to satisfy the principal injuries prong, it could have said so. See
Conn. Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54, 112 S. Ct. 1146, 1149
(1992) (“[C]ourts must presume that [Congress] says in a statute what it
means and means in a statute what it says there.”). “[W]hen Congress
includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in
another[,]” this court “presumes that Congress intended a difference in
        _____________________
        12
             See supra note 6.
        13
           “A district court may . . . decline to exercise jurisdiction under paragraph (2)
over a class action in which greater than one-third but less than two-thirds of the members of
all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate and the primary defendants are citizens of the
State in which the action was originally filed based on consideration of . . . .” § 1332(d)(3)
(emphasis added).
        14
           “A district court shall decline to exercise jurisdiction under paragraph (2)
[when] two-thirds or more of the members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate,
and the primary defendants, are citizens of the State in which the action was originally
filed.” § 1332(d)(4)(B) (emphasis added).

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meaning.” Digital Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 583 U.S. 149, 161, 138 S. Ct. 767,
777 (2018) (alteration in original) (citation and quotations omitted).
        Moreover, Congress explicitly carved out exceptions to federal
jurisdiction based on injuries that occurred inside and outside the forum
state. CAFA provides that “mass actions”15 can be removed to federal
court.16 But Congress provided that “the term ‘mass action’ shall not
include any civil action in which . . . all of the claims in the action arise from
an event or occurrence in the State in which the action was filed, and that
allegedly resulted in injuries in that State or in States contiguous to that
State . . . .”   § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(I).          Congress did not include similar
language in the principal injuries prong. See § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(III). As
explained above, we presume Congress deliberately omitted such language
from § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(III) because it intended to require that all plaintiffs
sustain their principal injuries in the forum state and nowhere else. See
Digital Realty Tr., Inc., 583 U.S. at 161, 138 S. Ct. at 777; Conn. Nat. Bank,
503 U.S. at 253–54, 112 S. Ct. at 1149.
        Finally, our interpretation of the local controversy exception complies
with the requirement that we construe the exception narrowly and “with all
doubts resolved in favor of exercising jurisdiction over the case.” Opelousas
Gen. Hosp. Auth., 655 F.3d at 360 (citations and quotations omitted); see also

        _____________________
        15
             “[T]he term ‘mass action’ means any civil action (except a civil action within
the scope of section 1711(2)) in which monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons are
proposed to be tried jointly on the ground that the plaintiffs’ claims involve common
questions of law or fact, except that jurisdiction shall exist only over those plaintiffs whose
claims in a mass action satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirements under subsection
(a) . . . .” § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i).
        16
           “For purposes of this subsection and section 1453, a mass action shall be deemed
to be a class action removable under paragraphs (2) through (10) if it otherwise meets the
provisions of those paragraphs.” § 1332(d)(11)(A).

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Case: 23-40591       Document: 70-1         Page: 15   Date Filed: 03/01/2024

                                  No. 23-40591
                                c/w No. 24-40026

Arbuckle Mountain Ranch of Tex., Inc. v. Chesapeake Energy Corp., 810 F.3d
335, 337 (5th Cir. 2016) (“Congress crafted CAFA to exclude only a narrow
category of truly localized controversies, and the exceptions provide a
statutory vehicle for the district courts to ferret out the controversy that
uniquely affects a particular locality to the exclusion of all others.” (citation
and quotations omitted)). Indeed, “[t]he language, structure, and history of
CAFA all demonstrate that Congress contemplated broad federal court
jurisdiction with only narrow exceptions.” Arbuckle Mountain Ranch of Tex.,
Inc., 810 F.3d at 337 (citation and quotations omitted).
       Here, the “principal injury” each Plaintiff sustained is obvious
because there was only one type of injury: a financial harm resulting from
Devon’s alleged underpayment of their royalties. While most Plaintiffs
sustained that injury in Texas, others did not. Therefore, the principal
injuries prong is not satisfied in this case, and Plaintiffs have failed to
demonstrate that the local controversy exception applies.
                              CONCLUSION
       Because CAFA’s local controversy exception does not apply, we
VACATE the judgment of the district court, REMAND to the district
court, and DIRECT that the case be reinstated on that court’s docket.

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