Court Opinion

ID: 9847105
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:54:07.421384+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:01.090740
License: Public Domain

DOOLIN, Justice
(dissenting):
I agree with the majority that under Imbler v. Pachtman if it is shown a district attorney is acting within the scope of his authority and in pursuance of his official prosecutorial duties, he is immune from civil liability for his acts. This is further supported by other cases cited. However, believing the action taken by the majority to be premature, I dissent to the issuance of the writ.
As the majority opinion sets out, the trial court has not passed on the question of whether the petition states a cause of action. It held in abeyance argument on petitioner’s motion to dismiss for failure to state cause of action but sustained plaintiff’s motion to compel answers to interrogatories.
Before the trial court heard argument or ruled on motion to dismiss, petitioner filed application and petition for writ of prohibition. Petitioner requests this court to prohibit trial court from ruling on whether petitioner’s activities are of such nature as to clothe him with absolute immunity from suit. In order to rule in his favor we must hold a district attorney is always absolutely immune regardless of the capacity in which he acts. If this hypothesis is true it would be impossible to state a cause of action for malicious prosecution against petitioner. This is not the law.
*169The recent United States Supreme Court decision, Imbler v. Pachtman clearly holds only that a district attorney is absolutely immune if he is acting in his prosecutorial capacity. The Court states “in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State’s case, the prosecutor is immune from a civil suit for damages under § 1983.” There the district attorney’s activities were “intimately associated with the judicial phase of criminal process and thus were functions to which the reasons for absolute immunity apply with full force.” The United States Supreme Court did not consider whether he would be immune for "those aspects of the prosecutor’s responsibility that cast him in the role of an administrator or investigative officer rather than that of advocate.” The Court left standing the rule “that a prosecutor engaged in certain investigatory activities enjoys not the absolute immunity associated with judicial process, but only a good-faith defense comparable to the policeman’s.” Imbler has not rendered these cases impotent. It is possible to state a cause of action for malicious prosecution against a district attorney acting in some capacity other than prosecutorial.
In Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1965), the court said when a prosecuting attorney acts in some capacity other than quasi-judicial such as a police officer, he is no longer immune. If immunities are too broadly granted to prosecutors without consideration of the nature of their alleged misdeeds and the reason for immunity, then § 1983 becomes subject to circumspection if not emasculation. See also Littleton v. Berbling, 468 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1972).
Even prior to the enactment of § 1983 there is authority that a district attorney sheds his immunity if he is not acting on complaints sworn out by others but rather initiates the complaint himself and causes a party to be arrested on a charge that he knows to be false. See Watts v. Gerking, 111 Or. 641, 222 P. 318 (1924); Schneider v. Shepherd, 192 Mich. 82, 158 N.W. 182 (1916).
Since § 1983 is remedial legislation it must be given liberal construction. An action under § 1983 must not be dismissed at the pleading stage unless it appears to be a certainty that the plaintiff would be entitled to no relief under any stated facts which might be proved in support of his claim. Barnes v. Merritt, 376 F.2d 8 (5th Cir. 1967), Holmes v. New York City Housing Authority, 398 F.2d 262 (2nd Cir. 1968). Otherwise we are giving a district attorney carte blanche to investigate and initiate as well as prosecute an action against anyone for any reason without just cause, with no fear of reprisal and with no redress in the citizen. Imbler does not contemplate this type immunity. I agree with Justice White in his concurring opinion, “that to extend absolute immunity to any group of state officials is to negate pro tanto the very remedy which it (§ 1983) appears Congress sought to create.” The learned Justice further states: “If the complaint is based on allegations of suppression or failure to disclose, the prosecutor should not be absolutely immune.”
In our case, there was no demurrer to petition filed. Petitioner simply refused to answer the interrogatories submitted by the plaintiff. Our Oklahoma Statutes are specific. The trial court may order a party to answer interrogatories and a party may be held in indirect contempt if he refuses. 12 O.S.1971 § 549(c). The district attorney is given no more right to refuse than a private citizen. If we permit a district attorney to act in this cavalier manner, do we also give a private citizen the right to refuse to answer interrogatories if he believes the complaint to be faulty? I think not. By the majority opinion, that right belongs exclusively to judicial and quasi-judicial officers.
The trial court has never ruled on whether petition states a cause of action. This court has wrongly commandeered this authority. Consequently plaintiff has not *170had an opportunity to amend his petition and is denied his right to argue its merits. 12 O.S.1971 § 314 gives a plaintiff an absolute right to amend his petition without leave anytime before an answer is filed without prejudice to the proceedings. 12 O.S.1971 § 315 allows a plaintiff to amend within ten days after the demurrer is filed. 12 O.S.1971 §318 provides:
“Amendment when demurrer sustained. If the demurrer be sustained, the adverse party may amend, if the defect can be' remedied by way of amendment, with or without costs, as the court, in its discretion, shall direct.”
The issuance of a writ of prohibition by this court prior to an answer by petitioner or a ruling on a demurrer divests trial court of his broad authority to permit amendment at anytime during proceedings. See Maben v. Norvell, 328 P.2d 425 (Okla.1958).
The right of a plaintiff to amend his petition before an answer is an absolute one and plaintiff may plead any additional cause of action relating to the same subject matter. Hocker v. Rackley, 90 Okl. 83, 216 P. 151 (1923).
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974) involved a suit under § 1983 against the Governor of Ohio, Adjutant General and others by the personal representatives of the estates of the students who were killed on the campus of Kent State University. The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction before an answer was filed because it felt the defendants were being sued in their official capacities. The sixth circuit affirmed. The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding the issue was not whether a plaintiff would ultimately prevail, even though it might appear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery was very remote and unlikely, but whether the claimant was entitled to offer evidence to support his claims. A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears the plaintiff could prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. The acts of a government officer do not have the quality of a supreme and despotic edict, overriding all conflicting rights. These acts are reviewable through the judicial power granted by virtue of § 1983. The Court further held in Scheuer the district court had acted prematurely and hence erroneously in dismissing the complaints as it did, without affording claimants any opportunity to establish their claims.
This is the identical situation here. Plaintiff has had no opportunity to amend his petition to conform to Imber and present evidence to support his claim. I am not unmindful that the suit here is against a district attorney, not the governor. But to hold this office is clothed with a higher degree of immunity than that of the governor of a sovereign state is to do an injustice to the intent and meaning of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The erosion of § 1983 has begun with the majority decision.
The trial court acted correctly in holding in abeyance his decision on petitioner’s motion to dismiss and authority is still vested in that court unless taken over by the majority here. Plaintiff is entitled to a ruling from the trial court as to whether his petition states a cause of action and an opportunity to amend if it does not.
I express no opinion as to whether petition states a cause of action or as to the validity of plaintiff’s claims or his chances of prevailing. I would simply hold that to dismiss the cause at this point, before plaintiff has had an opportunity to consider the answers to the interrogatories and if necessary amend his petition, is premature and a usurpation of the power of the trial court.
The writ should be denied.
I am authorized to state IRWIN, J., joins in this dissent.