Court Opinion

ID: 9961006
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-17 18:00:45.448972+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:09.379320
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-20118      Document: 68-1     Page: 1    Date Filed: 04/17/2024

        United States Court of Appeals
             for the Fifth Circuit
                            ____________                       United States Court of Appeals
                                                                        Fifth Circuit

                              No. 23-20118
                                                                      FILED
                                                                  April 17, 2024
                            ____________
                                                                 Lyle W. Cayce
Diamond Services Corporation,                                         Clerk

                                                      Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                  versus

Curtin Maritime Corporation; Department of
Homeland Security; National Vessel Documentation
Center; United States Coast Guard; United States of
America; Commandant Linda L. Fagan, United States
Coast Guard; Port of Houston Authority,

                                       Defendants—Appellees.
              ______________________________

              Appeal from the United States District Court
                  for the Southern District of Texas
                       USDC No. 4:22-CV-2117
              ______________________________

Before Richman, Chief Judge, and Haynes and Duncan, Circuit
Judges.
Stuart Kyle Duncan, Circuit Judge:
      Under federal law, vessels may dredge in United States waters only if
they are “built in the United States.” The agency tasked with making this
determination is the United States Coast Guard. Curtin Maritime
Corporation (“Curtin”) sought the Coast Guard’s ruling that its dredging
barge, the DB AVALON (“AVALON”), could operate in United States
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                                     No. 23-20118

waters, despite the fact that the vessel would incorporate foreign-made spuds
and a crane. The Coast Guard ruled the AVALON would be considered
United States-built. One of Curtin’s competitors challenged that ruling as
arbitrary and capricious. The district court deferred to the Coast Guard’s
reasonable interpretation of its own regulations, see Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct.
2400, 2415 (2019); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997), and granted the
Coast Guard summary judgment. We AFFIRM.
                                          I.
                                          A.
        Federal law imposes certain requirements before a vessel may dredge
in the navigable waters of the United States. Among other things, a vessel
must have “a certificate of documentation [“COD”] with a coastwise
endorsement.” 46 U.S.C. § 55109(a)(3). 1 CODs are issued by the National
Vessel Documentation Center (“NVDC”), an arm of the Coast Guard.
Only vessels “built” or “rebuilt” in the United States are eligible for a
coastwise endorsement. Id. §§ 12112(a)(2)(A), 12132(b). A vessel is rebuilt
in the United States “only if the entire rebuilding, including the construction
of any major component of the hull or superstructure, was done in the United
States.” Id. § 12101(a).
       Coast Guard regulations flesh out this statutory framework. The
regulations consider a vessel built in the United States if (1) “[a]ll major
components of its hull and superstructure are fabricated in the United
States,” and (2) “[t]he vessel is assembled entirely in the United States.”
46 C.F.R. § 67.97(a), (b). Conversely, a vessel is “deemed rebuilt foreign”
(hence, not built or rebuilt in the United States) when “any considerable part
        _____________________
        1
           The vessel must also be wholly owned by and, if applicable, chartered by U.S.
citizens. See id. § 55109(a)(1), (2).

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of its hull or superstructure is built upon or substantially altered outside of
the United States.” Id. § 67.177; see also id. § 67.177(a)–(g) (setting out
“parameters” to determine whether a vessel is “rebuilt foreign”). The
regulations define “hull” as “the shell, or outer casing, and internal structure
below the main deck which provide both the flotation envelope and structural
integrity of the vessel in its normal operations.” Id. § 67.3. “Superstructure”
is defined as “the main deck and any other structural part above the main
deck.” Ibid.
        The Coast Guard uses two different tests to determine whether work
done to a vessel’s hull or superstructure qualifies it as rebuilt foreign. With
respect to vessels of any hull construction, the “major component” test
deems a vessel rebuilt foreign “when a major component of the hull or
superstructure not built in the United States is added to the vessel.”
Id. § 67.177(a). The Coast Guard defines “major component” as a “new,
separate and completely-constructed unit” weighing more than 1.5% of the
vessel’s steelweight. With respect to steel- or aluminum-hulled vessels only,
the “considerable part” test considers the relative weight of the work done
on the hull or superstructure. See id. § 67.177(b). 2

        _____________________
        2
            Specifically, the considerable part test provides:
        (1) A vessel is deemed rebuilt when work performed on its hull or superstructure
constitutes more than 10 percent of the vessel’s steelweight, prior to the work, also known
as discounted lightship weight.
        (2) A vessel may be considered rebuilt when work performed on its hull or
superstructure constitutes more than 7.5 percent but not more than 10 percent of the
vessel’s steelweight prior to the work.
        (3) A vessel is not considered rebuilt when work performed on its hull or
superstructure constitutes 7.5 percent or less of the vessel’s steelweight prior to the work.
        Id. § 67.177(b)(1)–(3).

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                                            B.
        On September 10, 2019, Curtin applied to the Coast Guard for a
preliminary determination that its dredging barge, the AVALON, would be
eligible to operate in coastwise trade. See id. § 67.177(g) (establishing
requirements for a “preliminary rebuilt determination”). The AVALON
would be constructed of steel at a shipyard in the United States. Curtin’s
application explained, however, that the vessel’s spuds 3 and crane would be
removed from a foreign vessel and installed after being shipped to the United
States. The crane would be “bolted to the [AVALON’s] hull, not welded,
using a mounting ring,” and the spuds would also be removable.
        On September 24, 2019, the NVDC’s Director issued a
determination that the AVALON “would be considered built in the United
States” under 46 C.F.R. § 67.97 and not “rebuilt foreign” under § 67.177.
Because the crane and spuds would be removable, the AVALON would
“remain a complete and intact vessel and [would] be fully capable of
operating as a vessel without the spuds and crane.” As a result, “the spuds
and crane would be considered outfitting and not part of the hull or
superstructure.” 4 Accordingly, the AVALON would be eligible for a
coastwise endorsement.

        _____________________
        3
          Spuds are long stakes attached to a dredge that bore into the ground underneath
the water to provide the dredge increased stability while dredging. See Dredge, Encyc.
Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/technology/dredge-excavation#ref29604
(Dec. 19, 2023) [https://perma.cc/4A2Q-LP6R].
        4
          The Director found support for her conclusions in a Coast Guard Memorandum
titled Review Criteria for Steel Weight Components wrt U.S. Build and Foreign Rebuild
Determinations. Section (i) of the Memorandum provided that cranes are considered
outfitting and thus not part of the hull or superstructure. Spuds are not directly addressed
in the Memorandum, but the Director analogized spuds to detachable buoyant floats in
Section (e). Because spuds and detachable buoyant floats are both used to augment a
vessel’s stability during certain operations but are otherwise unnecessary for the vessel’s

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                                      No. 23-20118

        In April 2021, Curtin contracted with Conrad Shipyard (“Conrad”)
in Amelia, Louisiana, to construct the AVALON’s hull and superstructure.
The AVALON’s outfitting work was done in Morgan City, Louisiana. The
vessel’s control tower came from the CONTI, a United States supply vessel
with a coastwise endorsement. The crane and spuds were acquired from a
foreign-flagged crane barge, the SHINSO-300, and placed on the
AVALON in Morgan City.
        On July 27, 2022, the NVDC issued the AVALON a COD with a
coastwise endorsement.
        Around this time, the Port of Houston Authority (“the Port”)
solicited bids to expand the Houston Ship Channel. After receiving six bids
from different contractors, the Port awarded the project to Curtin. Curtin’s
competitor, Diamond Services Corporation (“Diamond”), did not bid on the
project, nor did it submit a protest objecting to the Port’s awarding the
project to Curtin.
                                           C.
        On June 28, 2022, Diamond sued Curtin, the Port, and several federal
defendants (collectively, “the Federal Defendants”). 5 Seeking relief under
the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) and the Declaratory Judgment
Act (“DJA”), Diamond asked the district court to declare that AVALON’s
COD was issued in violation of federal law; to enjoin Curtin from performing

        _____________________
normal stability, they “are not included in the flotation envelope.” Accordingly, the spuds
are considered outfitting and thus not part of the hull or superstructure.
        5
         The Federal Defendants are the United States; the Department of Homeland
Security; the Coast Guard; the NVDC; and Linda L. Fagan, the Coast Guard
Commandant.

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                                  No. 23-20118

any jobs involving the AVALON in United States waters; and to enjoin the
Port from awarding Curtin funds or work involving the AVALON.
       Curtin and the Port moved to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), arguing, inter alia, that Diamond lacked
standing and failed to state a claim. Diamond moved for summary judgment
against Curtin, the Port, and the Federal Defendants. The Federal
Defendants moved for summary judgment against Diamond.
       A magistrate judge recommended that the district court deny
Diamond’s motion for summary judgment; grant Curtin and the Port’s
motions to dismiss for lack of standing; and grant the Federal Defendants’
motion for summary judgment. See Diamond Servs. Corp. v. Curtin Mar.
Corp., 2023 WL 2634508 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 6, 2023). Diamond timely
objected, but the district court adopted the recommendations in full. See
Diamond Servs. Corp. v. Curtin Mar. Corp., 2023 WL 2634046 (S.D. Tex.
Mar. 22, 2023).
       Diamond now appeals.
                                      II.
       We review de novo a Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal for lack of standing. Glen
v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 7 F.4th 331, 334 (5th Cir. 2021). We also review the grant
of summary judgment de novo, using the same standards as the district court.
Paymentech, L.L.C. v. Landry’s Inc., 60 F.4th 918, 924 (5th Cir. 2023); Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a).
                                      III.
                                       A.
       We first consider standing. Diamond “has standing to sue if [its]
injury is traceable to the defendant and a ruling would likely redress it.”
Clarke v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 74 F.4th 627, 639 (5th Cir.

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2023) (citation omitted). Diamond does not argue it has standing to sue the
Port and so has forfeited any argument that the district court erred in
dismissing the Port on that ground. Rollins v. Home Depot USA, 8 F.4th 393,
397 (5th Cir. 2021). But Diamond does argue it has standing to sue Curtin as
one of its “competitors.” We disagree.
       Diamond cites cases allowing plaintiffs to sue an agency or its officials
under the APA on the ground that they wrongly “lift[ed] regulatory
restrictions on their competitors or otherwise allow[ed] increased
competition.” Mendoza v. Perez, 754 F.3d 1002, 1011 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(quoting La. Energy & Power Auth. v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n, 141 F.3d
364, 367 (D.C. Cir. 1998)); see also Wash. All. of Tech. Workers v. DHS, 50
F.4th 164, 176 (D.C. Cir. 2022); Adams v. Watson, 10 F.3d 915, 920–25 (1st
Cir. 1993); Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union v. Meese, 891 F.2d
1374, 1379 (9th Cir. 1989). These cases show why Diamond has standing to
sue the Federal Defendants, something no one contests. But they do not
support Diamond’s standing to sue its competitor, Curtin, under the APA.
Diamond cites no authority for that proposition. “Standing to sue one
defendant does not, on its own, confer standing to sue a different defendant.”
Daves v. Dallas County, 22 F.4th 522, 542 (5th Cir. 2022) (en banc).
       Accordingly, the district court did not err by dismissing Curtin for lack
of standing.
                                         B.
       We proceed to the merits of Diamond’s claim against the Federal
Defendants. Specifically, we consider whether the Coast Guard violated the
APA by issuing the AVALON a COD with a coastwise endorsement. The
Federal Defendants say it did not, urging us to defer to the Coast Guard’s
interpretation of its own regulations.

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                                   No. 23-20118

       Such deference is warranted if certain requirements are met. As
clarified by the Supreme Court recently, a court will defer to an agency’s
interpretation of a regulation only after “exhaust[ing] all the traditional tools
of construction” and finding the regulation “genuinely ambiguous.” Kisor,
139 S. Ct. at 2415 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (discussing
Auer, 519 U.S. 452). Even in that event, however, the agency’s interpretation
must be “reasonable.” Ibid. And even then, a court “must make an
independent inquiry into whether the character and context of the agency
interpretation entitles it to controlling weight.” Id. at 2416. For instance, the
agency must have “actually made” the interpretation, which “must in some
way implicate its substantive expertise” and “reflect fair and considered
judgment.” Id. at 2416–17 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
       Accepting the magistrate judge’s recommendation, the district court
concluded deference to the Coast Guard was warranted. The court found the
regulations were genuinely ambiguous because they did not specify whether
cranes and spuds are “part of the hull or superstructure,” nor whether they
are “considered major components, or . . . a structural part.” Furthermore,
the Coast Guard reasonably interpreted its regulations to focus on whether
the crane and spuds “could be removed without affecting the [AVALON’s]
operation as a vessel, the structural integrity of the hull, or the integrity of the
superstructure.” That interpretation, the court reasoned, fell within the
agency’s expertise and was consistent with its longstanding application of its
regulations.
       On appeal, Diamond argues the district court erred in deferring to the
Coast Guard. Specifically, Diamond contends that, contrary to the agency’s
reading of its regulations, the crane is a “structural part” of the AVALON’s

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superstructure and thus subject to the major component test. 6 Applying that
test, Diamond argues, would render the AVALON foreign built and
consequently unable to dredge in United States waters.
                                           1.
        We first consider whether the pertinent regulations are “genuinely
ambiguous,” starting with their text. See id. at 2414. Diamond insists that the
phrase “structural part” in the definition of “superstructure” plainly
includes the AVALON’s crane. Recall that “superstructure” is defined as
“the main deck and any other structural part above the main deck.”
46 C.F.R. § 67.3 (emphasis added). Diamond proposes a definition of
“structural” as “[f]orming a necessary part of the structure of a building or
other construction, as distinct from its decoration or fittings.” See Structural,
Oxford English Dictionary (6th ed. 2007). It argues that, by this
definition, the crane is “structural” because it “is a necessary part of the
dredge” and “not a decoration or fitting.” We disagree.
        The regulation is silent as to what constitutes a “structural part” of
the vessel, and of course it says nothing about whether a dredging barge’s
crane qualifies as such. Diamond would fill that silence with specific
concepts—“necessary” versus “decoration or fittings”—to make a crane
part of the vessel’s structure. Possibly that is one way to define “structural
part,” but the mere fact that Diamond must add content to the phrase
suggests it does not unambiguously include cranes. Besides, the Coast
Guard’s alternative reading—focusing on whether removing the crane would
impair the vessel’s operational integrity—is a plausible interpretation of
        _____________________
        6
          Diamond makes no separate arguments on appeal regarding the agency’s
determination that the spuds were not part of the AVALON’s hull or superstructure.
Diamond has therefore forfeited any argument that the district court erred with respect to
the spuds. See SEC v. Hallam, 42 F.4th 316, 327 (5th Cir. 2022); Rollins, 8 F.4th at 397.

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“structural.” 7 Accordingly, we cannot say that the regulatory text
unambiguously makes the crane a “structural part” of a dredging barge. See
Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2414.
       Nor does history settle the matter. See id. at 2415. The regulation’s
seeds lie in the 1920 Jones Act, which restricted coastwise trade to United
States-built and -owned vessels. See Pub. L. No. 66-261, 41 Stat. 988; see also
46 U.S.C. § 55102(b). When shipbuilders tried to dodge this restriction by
repairing domestic vessels overseas, Congress enacted the 1956 “Second
Proviso,” disqualifying vessels if “rebuilt outside the United States.” The
story did not end there, though. Later regulations permitted some foreign
parts because it was thought undesirable to disqualify a vessel merely for a
foreign-sourced “minor alteration.” That course correction “allow[ed]
American shipyards to continue building vessels without imposing
limitations on the source of parts so excessive as to render the American
construction of ships too expensive to pursue.” Phila. Metal Trades Council,
MTD, AFL-CIO v. Allen, 2008 WL 4003380, at *19 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 25, 2008).
This history is instructive, to be sure, but not determinative. It tells us only
that some foreign-sourced parts are permitted without barring a vessel from
coast-wise trade. It does not tell us, however, whether a dredging barge’s
crane falls into that category.
       Finally, the broader regulatory framework also leaves the question
open. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415. In support of the Coast Guard’s
interpretation, the Federal Defendants point to a different definition of
“superstructure” pertaining to load lines. That definition limits

       _____________________
        7
           See Structural, Cambridge Dictionary (4th ed. 2013) (defining
“structural” as “relating to the structure of a building or similar object”); Structure,
Cambridge Dictionary (4th ed. 2013) (defining “structure” as “the arrangement
or organization of parts in a system”).

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                                     No. 23-20118

superstructure to deck structures that “extend[] from side to side of the
vessel” (or nearly so). 46 C.F.R. § 42.13–15(j)(1). The Federal Defendants
argue this definition excludes a crane because it does not span the vessel’s
breadth. Perhaps one definition of “superstructure” may shed light on the
other, but the fact remains that the two definitions are phrased differently.
We cannot say that the § 42.13–15(j) definition plainly excludes cranes from
the separate definition in § 67.3.
       In sum, the “traditional tools” of statutory construction show the
regulation is ambiguous as to whether the crane is part of the AVALON’s
superstructure. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415. So, the analysis must continue.
                                         2.
       The next step asks whether the Coast Guard’s reading of the
regulation was reasonable. Id. at 2416. A reasonable reading is one that
“come[s] within the zone of ambiguity” in the regulatory text. Ibid. Diamond
contends the reading was unreasonable for several reasons.
       First, Diamond contends the Coast Guard did not engage the text at
all but instead imported the concept of “outfitting.” (Recall that the agency
found the crane and spuds “would be considered outfitting and not part of
the hull or superstructure.”) According to Diamond, the Coast Guard
needed to introduce “outfitting” through formal notice-and-comment
rulemaking, not merely through internal memoranda. We disagree.
       The Coast Guard uses the term “outfitting” as a shorthand to
describe those parts of a vessel that are not “structural.” For example, the
Coast Guard’s review criteria state that, while superstructure includes
“portions of the hull extending above the freeboard deck, such as
forecastles,” it does not include “breakwaters, crane or mast houses, or
ventilation or exhaust trunks (these being outfitting components).” Another
section states that “winches & booms, kingposts, cranes, etc., are outfitting

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                                        No. 23-20118

items and not included as hull structure.” Diamond cites no authority for the
proposition that the agency needed to engage in notice-and-comment
rulemaking before using the term “outfitting” in its analysis. 8 More to the
point, the Coast Guard’s use of the term in its review criteria merely seeks to
differentiate structural from non-structural parts—squarely within the
regulatory zone of ambiguity we have already described. 9 See ibid.
        Diamond next argues that the Coast Guard reads “superstructure to
overlap entirely with hull,” rendering superstructure superfluous. Evidently,
Diamond’s argument is this: in the superstructure analysis, the agency
considers whether a part contributes to a vessel’s structural integrity—which
is a concept also featured in the definition of hull. See 46 C.F.R. § 67.3. We
again disagree. The Coast Guard considers as superstructure parts of a vessel
that could not conceivably be part of its hull. For example, the review criteria
considers deckhouses and pilothouses as superstructure. Those are obviously
not part of the hull—meaning, they are not the vessel’s shell, outer casing,
or internal structure below the main deck. Ibid. But the agency considers
them superstructure because, without them, a vessel cannot remain “a
means of transportation on water.” See ibid. Diamond disagrees with this

        _____________________
        8
            To the extent Diamond suggests the public lacked notice of the Coast Guard’s
criteria, it is mistaken. The review criteria are publicly available on the NVDC’s website.
See Nat’l Vessel Docum. Ctr., U.S. COAST GUARD, https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Our-
Organization/Assistant-Commandant-for-Prevention-Policy-CG-5P/Inspections-
Compliance-CG-5PC-/National-Vessel-Documentation-Center/Determination-Letters/
(last visited Jan. 3, 2024) [https://perma.cc/J7AN-4Y8Y] (selecting “Review Criteria”
from the category “U.S. Build Determinations,” then selecting “Review Criteria for Steel
Weight Components 08-19-2021”).
        9
          Diamond argues that the district court’s rationale impermissibly diverges from
the agency’s. It contends the district court “created a definition [of structural part] for the
Coast Guard” focused on the vessel’s “integrity.” We disagree. The district court merely
explained what was already implicit in the Coast Guard’s distinction between structural
parts and outfitting.

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                                       No. 23-20118

categorization, but that does not render the Coast Guard’s interpretation
unreasonable. After all, Kisor requires only that the agency’s reading must
“fall within the bounds of reasonable interpretation,” 139 S. Ct. at 2416, not
that the agency’s interpretation must align with a party’s preferences. 10
        Diamond next contends that the Coast Guard’s interpretation was
unmoored from its prior rulings. Not so. The agency had determined in the
past that “the cranes, outriggers, spuds and other mechanical systems [are]
deck equipment,” and thus “not integral to the hull or superstructure.” It
also found that Portable Accommodation Modules are not part of the hull or
superstructure. 11 The implicit premise for these determinations is that the
items at issue are not structural parts, and so not necessary to the vessel’s
integrity. Diamond fails to explain how these prior rulings are inconsistent
with its present determination about the AVALON’s crane.
        Finally, Diamond argues that the Coast Guard’s interpretation runs
afoul of various precedents. We again disagree. Diamond first relies on the
Fourth Circuit’s decision in Shipbuilders Council of America v. U.S. Coast
Guard, 578 F.3d 234 (4th Cir. 2009). But that case addressed work that
unquestionably involved the hull, not the antecedent question about whether

        _____________________
        10
          Diamond points out that the Coast Guard ruled in 2013 that an operator’s cab—
which Diamond claims is a type of deckhouse—was not superstructure. This is immaterial.
Regardless of whether an operator’s cab is similar to a traditional deckhouse or pilothouse,
the ruling was made before the Coast Guard revised its criteria in March 2019, which
categorized deckhouses and pilothouses as superstructure. The revised criteria applied to
the AVALON, not criteria from 2013.
        11
          Portable Accommodation Modules (“PAMs”) provide additional living or office
space on vessels that require more crew members than can be accommodated by the
vessel’s permanent quarters. See Guide for Portable Accommodation Modules, Am. Bureau
of           Shipping,             https://ww2.eagle.org/content/dam/eagle/rules-and-
guides/current/offshore/193_portacmod_2022/portable-accommodation-modules-
guide-feb22.pdf [https://perma.cc/4LTV-2FFY].

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                                       No. 23-20118

some component is part of the hull or superstructure. See id. at 237
(addressing a statute that required “all oil tankers in the coastwise trade [to]
be equipped with double hulls by a specified date”). Second, the district
court decision in Philadelphia Metal supports the Coast Guard, not Diamond.
The court upheld the Coast Guard’s determination that foreign-made
equipment modules did not disqualify vessels from U.S.-built status. Phila.
Metal, 2008 WL 4003380, at *19–21. Third, in American Hawaii Cruises v.
Skinner, a district court reversed the Coast Guard because its determination
to allow foreign parts was conclusory, based on an impermissibly vague test,
and inconsistent with prior agency rulings. 713 F. Supp. 452, 465–69 (D.D.C.
1989). 12 Here, by contrast, the Coast Guard explained its ruling that the crane
is not a structural part because its removal would leave the AVALON still
able to function as a vessel. And Diamond has not established that the Coast
Guard’s ruling is inconsistent with prior agency decisions.
        In sum, we conclude that the Coast Guard’s ruling was reasonable.
                                             3.
        Finally, we must “make an independent inquiry into whether the
character and context of the agency interpretation entitles it to controlling
weight.” Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2416. “[E]specially important markers” for this
inquiry are whether the interpretation (1) was actually made by the agency;
(2) implicates the agency’s substantive expertise; and (3) reflects fair and
considered judgment. Id. at 2416–17. We agree with the Federal Defendants
that the Coast Guard’s interpretation checks all three boxes. (Diamond does

        _____________________
        12
           In the same vein is Keystone Shipping Co. v. United States, where a district court
remanded to the Coast Guard because its determination at issue was vague and contrary to
its prior decisions. 801 F. Supp. 771, 781–83 (D.D.C. 1992).

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                                  No. 23-20118

not seriously argue otherwise, but we note these considerations for the sake
of completeness.)
       First, the interpretation “emanate[d]” from the officials in charge of
the agency, employing those vehicles “understood to make authoritative
policy.” Id. at 2416. The Coast Guard acted through the NVDC, its arm
tasked with making vessel documentation rulings, and the ruling came from
its Director, not a lower-level staffer. Moreover, once delivered to Curtin,
the NVDC placed the letter on its publicly available website alongside other
similar letters. 13 So, the Coast Guard’s determination here was not merely an
ad hoc statement but rather the agency’s “official position.” Ibid.
       Second, the ruling was the result of the Coast Guard’s
“[a]dministrative knowledge and experience.” Id. at 2417. As noted, the
NVDC is the arm of the Coast Guard that specializes in making rebuilt
determinations like the one Curtin requested.
       Third, the Coast Guard’s ruling was neither “a merely convenient
litigating position [nor a] post hoc rationalization advanced to defend past
agency action against attack.” Ibid. (cleaned up). Nor was it “a new
interpretation . . . that creates unfair surprise to regulated parties.” Id. at
2418 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Coast Guard’s
interpretation here was neither novel nor surprising, but drew on a line of its
own publicly-available precedents.

       _____________________
       13
           See Nat’l Vessel Documentation Ctr., U.S. COAST GUARD,
https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Our-Organization/Assistant-Commandant-for-Prevention-
Policy-CG-5P/Inspections-Compliance-CG-5PC-/National-Vessel-Documentation-
Center/Determination-Letters/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2023) [https://perma.cc/XSY4-
45VF].

                                        15
Case: 23-20118     Document: 68-1        Page: 16   Date Filed: 04/17/2024

                              No. 23-20118

                                  IV.
      The district court properly deferred to the Coast Guard’s
determination and granted summary judgment for the Federal Defendants.
                                                           AFFIRMED.

                                    16