Court Opinion

ID: 9846711
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:46:32.160577+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:45.926261
License: Public Domain

CARLEY, Justice,
concurring specially.
I concur in the majority’s holding that OCGA § 16-8-60 (b) is not unconstitutionally vague or over broad. However, as Presiding Justice Hunstein notes, I believe that the majority fails to acknowledge expressly how it arrives at that result. Like her, I find that, although OCGA § 16-8-60 (b) is facially over broad, that statute can be construed narrowly so as to survive Briggs’ constitutional challenge. To that extent, I concur in Presiding Justice Hunstein’s special concurrence. Nevertheless, I cannot agree with her assertion that this result is somehow inconsistent with my dissent in State v. Fielden, 280 Ga. 444 (629 SE2d 252) (2006). To the contrary, my position in that case is entirely consistent with upholding the constitutionality of OCGA § 16-8-60 (b) in this case. Therefore, I concur specially, but separately.
There is no disagreement over the proper analysis to be applied in cases in which a statute is challenged on grounds that it is unconstitutionally over broad. “[Bjefore considering whether [a] statute that affects protected speech is [unconstitutionally] over broad, it must be determined if it can be narrowly construed by this Court.” Howard v. State, 272 Ga. 242, 244 (1) (527 SE2d 194) (2000) (citing Cunningham v. State, 260 Ga. 827, 831 (400 SE2d 916) (1991)). In Fielden, supra, I did not, as Presiding Justice Hunstein states on p. 333 of her special concurrence, take a “position[ ] which would have required us to rewrite the statute and substitute an intent the Court selected for the intent expressly chosen by the Legislature.” Instead, after considering the wording of the statute there in question, I took the position that it was “possible [ ] to save [it] from *335constitutional challenge by means of a narrow construction ” State v. Fielden, supra at 451 (Carley, J., dissenting). However, a majority of the Court in that case held otherwise, concluding that the provision could not be narrowly construed so as to avoid being stricken as unconstitutional.
When the acknowledged test for determining constitutionality as against a challenge for over broadness is applied in this case, I agree with Presiding Justice Hunstein’s observation on pp. 333-334 of her special concurrence that the purpose of OCGA § 16-8-60 (b)
is so palpable that the majority opinion construes the statutory language accordingly, although without acknowledging that its interpretation constitutes a narrowing of the statute. Achieving this constitutional purpose . . . requires narrowing the scope of the existing statutory language to avoid its unintended impact on constitutionally-protected anonymous speech. By interpreting OCGA § 16-8-60 (b) in this manner, the Court is fulfilling its proper role. . . .
Thus, the majority correctly affirms the judgment of the trial court.