Court Opinion

ID: 9795460
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:29:25.883568+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:30:01.939366
License: Public Domain

FABE, Chief Justice,
with whom CARPENETI, Justice, joins, concurring.
I agree that because Seth D. eventually testified in person at trial, his due process claim must fail. I write separately to express my view that the cost of transportation, standing alone, should not suffice as grounds for denying a prisoner the right to testify in person at trial on termination of parental rights. Our case law makes clear that the trial court erred in ruling that Seth’s telephonic testimony “was adequate for a fair trial.” Only the fortuity of Seth D.’s release from prison before the conclusion of his hearing rendered the superior court’s decision to deny transport harmless error.
The constitutional protections afforded in-person testimony reflect subtle but important shortcomings of telecommunications technology. We have recognized that “the potential for empathy and nuanced understanding is much greater in person-to-person communications than in any of the various forms of telecommunicating.”1 Consequently, “when a *1234party is denied an in-person hearing before a trier of fact, there is a risk that the party will be less able to convey the message that his story is the truth.”2 In other words, appearing in person supplies an essential component of the right to testify.
The cost of transporting a prisoner from Seward to Kenai certainly falls well short of justifying a decision to deny a prisoner the right to testify in person in a termination trial. Indeed, we have never held that the mere cost of transportation should suffice as grounds for denying a prisoner’s right to testify in person where a fundamental right is at stake. In Richard B., the trial court denied the request for transport not only because it would have involved significant expense but also because flying Richard from Anchorage to Bethel “would potentially lead to illegal overcrowding and would create ripple effects throughout the system and require significant planning and coordination.”3 Similarly, in Whitesides our decision turned on our determination that public safety, “[t]he foremost government interest involved in driver’s license revocation proceedings, ... will not be prejudiced by providing a person who is under threat of license revocation with an in-person hearing.”4 We held in favor of in-person hearings despite our recognition that in some circumstances, “travel costs and travel time for hearing officers will be greater for in-person hearings than for telephone hearings.”5
As the court today has noted, Whitesides is distinguishable in that we did not require the state to transport a prisoner, but rather provided that a person must be allowed to appear in person before the hearing officer. On the other hand, Whitesides did not involve the fundamental right to the care and custody of one’s own child. The interest at stake in potential termination of that right may not always lead to a decision that a “prisoner’s personal appearance is essential to the just disposition of the action.”6 But it should in many cases. Where security risks or other extraordinary circumstances are absent, the due .process clause dictates that a just disposition in a parental rights termination trial includes permitting requested in-person testimony.

. Whitesides v. State, Dep’t of Pub. Safety, Div. of Motor Vehicles, 20 P.3d 1130, 1137 (Alaska 2001).

. Id.

. Richard B. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., Div. of Family & Youth Servs., 71 P.3d 811, 827 (Alaska 2003).

. 20 P.3d at 1138.

. Id.

. AS 33.30.081.