Court Opinion

ID: 9909254
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-12 20:02:31.213684+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:28.157255
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/12/23 P. v. Urquilla CA2/5
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,                                                      B321417

          Plaintiff and Respondent,                              (Los Angeles County Super.
                                                                 Ct. No. BA100645)
          v.

DOUGLAS URQUILLA,

          Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County, Curtis B. Rappe, Judge. Affirmed.
      Robert E. Boyce, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Nima Razfar, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                              ___________________________
      In 1994, defendant Douglas Urquilla was convicted of
murdering two people with a fellow gang member to cover up the
murders of two other people. He was sentenced to two
consecutive terms of life without the possibility of parole. In
2019, he petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code former
section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6), based on changes to the law
of murder made by Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.).1
The trial court issued an order to show cause and held an
evidentiary hearing, then denied the petition. We conclude there
is substantial evidence that defendant acted as a direct aider and
abettor. We therefore affirm.
                              FACTS
1.    The Underlying Crime2
      On July 6, 1994, Martin Jasso and Erika Briseno were shot
and killed. Jasso, a member of the Harpys criminal street gang,
was killed by defendant, a member of the same gang. Briseno
was killed by a man accompanying defendant. Some evidence
indicated that defendant’s companion was Rudolfo Corrales, also
a Harpys gang member. The Jasso and Briseno murders appear
to have been related to Jasso’s perceived cooperation with the
police on two other murders Corrales had committed three days
earlier.
      On the evening of July 6, Harpys member Aron Nunez, who
was driving a red car, pulled up next to defendant, who was

1     All statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2    These facts are taken from the opinion and the record in
defendant’s direct appeal. (People v. Urquilla (April 16, 1999,
B119484 [nonpub. opn.].)

                                2
standing on the street.3 Defendant got into the car and said
“there were some enemies.” The two drove through the
neighborhood and ultimately stopped next to a turquoise car
containing other Harpys members, including Corrales. “Enemies
being in the hood” was discussed among the occupants of the
cars. Corrales then exited the turquoise car and got into the
backseat of the red car. Corrales and defendant were both
armed.
      The red car proceeded down an alley; Corrales told driver
Nunez to stop, and Corrales got out of the car. As Nunez drove
down the alley, he and defendant spotted Jasso and Briseno
walking together. The red car pulled up next to the victims, and
defendant “pointed a gun out the window at Jasso and fired two
shots.” Jasso and Briseno fled in different directions; defendant
ran after Jasso. Briseno ran down the alley towards where
Corrales had exited the car, and Corrales shot and killed her.
Briseno died of four gunshot wounds. Corrales then ran to
defendant, and together they approached Jasso, who was lying on
the ground. Two shots rang out, and Jasso was killed. It was not
clear whether defendant or Corrales fired these final shots. An
autopsy revealed that Jasso suffered five gunshot wounds, four of
which were fatal.
2.    Prosecution, Conviction, and Direct Appeal
      In 1995, the People charged defendant with two counts of

3     Nunez agreed to testify against defendant at trial in
exchange for a plea deal, but failed to appear. Over defense
objection, the court concluded that Nunez was unavailable and
allowed the prosecutor to read his preliminary hearing testimony
into the record.

                                3
murder (§ 187, subd. (a)), with two armed principal
enhancements (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)) and a multiple-murder
special circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)).4
      The case proceeded to trial in 1997, and at the close of
evidence, the People argued defendant was “the actual killer or
one of the actual killers” of Jasso; defendant aided and abetted
Jasso’s killing, and Briseno’s death was a natural and probable
consequence of that offense; and defendant “aided and abetted in
the killing of Briseno . . . .” Relevant here, defendant’s jury was
instructed on direct liability as an aider and abettor (CALJIC No.
3.01) and aider and abettor liability for murder as a natural and
probable consequence (CALJIC No. 3.02).
      The jury found defendant guilty of two counts of first
degree murder and found true the armed principal allegations
and the multiple-murder special circumstance. The trial court
sentenced defendant to two consecutive terms of life in prison
without the possibility of parole, plus one year for each armed
principal enhancement.
      Defendant appealed, and we affirmed the conviction in an
unpublished opinion (People v. Urquilla, supra, B119484).
3.    1172.6 Petition, Summary Denial, and Appeal
      In 2019, defendant filed a petition for resentencing under
former section 1170.95 (now § 1172.6).5 The trial court
summarily denied the petition without appointing counsel or

4     The information contained the additional special
circumstance that defendant murdered Jasso to prevent his
testimony as a witness to a crime (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(10)), but this
charge was ultimately stricken.

5     For clarity, we will use section 1172.6.

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holding a hearing. Defendant appealed, and this court affirmed
the summary denial as to the Jasso murder, but reversed and
remanded with respect to the Briseno killing. (People v. Urquilla
(Nov. 16, 2020, B298404) [nonpub. opn.].)
4.     1172.6 Proceedings After Remand
       On May 27, 2022, following remand and briefing, the trial
court conducted an evidentiary hearing. Neither party
introduced new evidence. Relying on the trial record, the court
denied defendant’s petition, finding “the People have sustained
their burden of proving each . . . element of this case on two
theories:” First, “direct aiding and abetting, either with express
or implied malice,” and second, “a conspiracy to commit murder,
and that would contemplate any possible witness to the case.”
       Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
                            DISCUSSION
       Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to
support the trial court’s finding beyond a reasonable doubt that
defendant aided and abetted Briseno’s murder.
1.     Section 1172.6
       Murder is “the unlawful killing of a human being . . . with
malice aforethought.” (§ 187, subd. (a).) Malice may be express
or implied. (§ 188, subd. (a).) Express malice is the intent to kill;
implied malice exists “where the defendant . . . acted with
conscious disregard that the natural and probable consequences
of [his or her] act or actions were dangerous to human life.”
(People v. Gonzalez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 186, 197.) Although malice
is an element of murder, when defendant was convicted, the law
allowed defendants who did not act with malice to be liable for
murder under certain circumstances.

                                  5
       After the ameliorative changes in the law effected by
Senate Bill No. 1437 (Stats. 2018, ch. 15), to convict a defendant
of murder, the prosecution must prove he acted with malice—
except under the narrowed felony-murder rule set forth in section
189, subdivision (e)—and malice may not be imputed based solely
on an individual’s participation in a crime (§ 188, subd. (a)(3)),
thereby eliminating the natural and probable consequences
doctrine. (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842–843, 847
(Gentile).)
       Under section 1172.6, a person convicted under one of the
now-invalid theories of murder may petition the sentencing court
to vacate the conviction and to resentence defendant on any
remaining counts. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 953, 957
(Lewis).) If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing that he or
she falls within the provisions of section 1172.6 and is eligible for
relief, the court must issue an order to show cause and hold an
evidentiary hearing to determine whether to grant the petition
and resentence the petitioner. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c) & (d).)
       At the evidentiary hearing, which the trial court held here,
“the burden of proof shall be on the prosecution to prove, beyond
a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder or
attempted murder under California law as amended by changes
to Section 188 and 189 made effective January 1, 2019.”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) The court’s role at the hearing is to act as
an independent fact finder and determine the issues in the first
instance.” (People v. Guiffreda (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 112, 123.)
The court may consider evidence “previously admitted at any
prior hearing or trial that is admissible under current law.”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)

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2.     Standard of Review
       We review a trial court’s denial of a section 1172.6 petition
after an evidentiary hearing for substantial evidence. (People v.
Vargas (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 943, 951 (Vargas).) In assessing
the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the entire record to
determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Zamudio
(2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.) “The record must disclose
substantial evidence to support the verdict—i.e., evidence that is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable
trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.” (Ibid.)
       In applying this test, we review the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution and presume in support of the
judgment the existence of every fact the trier of fact could
reasonably deduce from the evidence. (People v. Kraft (2000)
23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.) We may not reweigh the evidence or
resolve evidentiary conflicts. (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th
1149, 1181.) The same standard applies where the conviction
rests primarily on circumstantial evidence. (People v. Thompson
(2010) 49 Cal.4th 79, 113.)
3.     Direct Aiding and Abetting is Still a Valid Theory of
       Murder
       Although section 1172.6 eliminated several forms of
accomplice liability for murder, accomplices may still be convicted
of murder as direct aiders and abettors. (People v. Reyes (2023)
14 Cal.5th 981, 990; see also People v. Offley (2020)
48 Cal.App.5th 588, 595–596 (Offley).) That is because to convict
a defendant as a direct aider and abettor, the trier of fact must
find that he or she acted with malice, either express or implied.

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(Vargas, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 953; Gentile, supra,
10 Cal.5th at p. 848.)
       Direct aiding and abetting is based on the combined actus
reus of the participants and the aider and abettor’s mens rea.
(People v. Powell (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 689, 712–713 (Powell).)
“[P]roof of aider and abettor liability requires proof in three
distinct areas: (a) the direct perpetrator’s actus reus—a crime
committed by the direct perpetrator, (b) the aider and abettor’s
mens rea—knowledge of the direct perpetrator’s unlawful intent
and an intent to assist in achieving those unlawful ends, and
(c) the aider and abettor’s actus reus—conduct by the aider and
abettor that in fact assists the achievement of the crime.” (People
v. Perez (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1219, 1225; Vargas, supra,
84 Cal.App.5th at pp. 953–954.)
       Whether a defendant aided and abetted a charged crime is
judged under the totality of the circumstances. (People v. Morga
(1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 200, 207.) “Factors to be considered by the
trier of fact in determining ‘whether one is an aider and abettor
include presence at the scene of the crime, failure to take steps to
attempt to prevent the commission of the crime, companionship,
flight, and conduct before and after the crime.’ ” (People v. Garcia
(2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 261, 273 (Garcia); Vargas, supra,
84 Cal.App.5th at p. 955.) Nevertheless, “[m]ere presence at the
scene of a crime is not sufficient to constitute aiding and abetting,
nor is the failure to take action to prevent a crime . . . .” (People
v. Nguyen (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 518, 529–530.)
       Likewise, a conviction may not be based solely on
defendant’s knowledge of what the perpetrator plans to do.
(People v. Horton (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1068, 1115 [“knowledge that a
crime might be committed by defendant in the future did not

                                 8
amount to aiding and abetting the commission of that prospective
crime”].) The prosecution must also prove that the aider and
abettor “does in fact, aid, facilitate, promote, encourage, or
instigate the perpetrator’s commission of” the target offense.
(CALCRIM No. 401.) “Evidence of a defendant’s state of mind is
almost inevitably circumstantial, but circumstantial evidence is
as sufficient as direct evidence to support a conviction.” (People
v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1208.)
4.     Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court’s
       Finding That Defendant Directly Aided and Abetted
       Briseno’s Murder6
       The evidence presented at trial, viewed in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to establish that
defendant acted with express malice in that it showed (1) a plan
to kill both victims, and (2) a motive to kill Briseno as a potential
witness to Jasso’s murder.
       The evidence showed that defendant and Corrales planned
with other Harpys members to trap and kill Jasso and Briseno.
Defendant mentioned “enemies” (plural) upon entering the red
car, which undermines defendant’s assertion that he was only
interested in killing Jasso. The occupants of the red and

6      The trial court also found that the prosecution had proven
all the elements of conspiracy to commit murder. Defendant
observes, and the People do not dispute, that the court’s finding
in this regard is not one contemplated by section 1172.6. We
assign no meaning to the trial court’s reference to “conspiracy”
beyond its function of reiterating the court’s finding that the
People showed defendant acted “either with express or implied
malice.” (Italics added.) (See People v. Beck and Cruz (2019)
8 Cal.5th 548, 642 [“Conspiracy to commit murder may be based
only on express malice, i.e., intent to kill”].)

                                  9
turquoise cars discussed the “enemies in the hood.” Corrales
then left the turquoise car, bringing his gun with him, and got
into the red car—actions consistent with a plan to kill the
“enemies.”
       The red car drove down an alley, and, at some point,
Corrales alighted from the red car; defendant was driven further
down the alley until he happened upon Jasso and Briseno
walking next to each other. At that point, defendant pulled out a
gun and shot at Jasso, which constituted the requisite actus reus
as it caused Briseno to flee toward Corrales, who was waiting to
shoot her. After Corrales killed Briseno, defendant and Corrales
reunited to ensure that Jasso was also dead. (See Garcia, supra,
168 Cal.App.4th at p. 273 [“conduct before and after the crime”
and “companionship” are factors that may support aider and
abettor liability].)
       Not only was the evidence substantial to show defendant
acted as part of a plan to kill both victims, but it also showed a
motive to kill Briseno as a potential witness to Jasso’s murder.
The evidence showed that defendant knew Briseno was with
Jasso, but nonetheless carried out the plan to shoot Jasso.
Indeed, defendant shot at him while Briseno stood right next to
Jasso. The record showed Corrales and defendant were
motivated to kill Jasso because he witnessed Corrales kill two
people in the days prior and was seen by other Harpys members
speaking with police in the resulting investigation. This purpose
in killing Jasso—which is grounds for the witness-murder special
circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(10))—strongly suggests that
defendant and Corrales had no intention of letting Briseno live
after having witnessed the killing of her uncle.

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                        DISPOSITION
     The order denying defendant’s section 1172.6 petition is
affirmed.

                                         RUBIN, P. J.
WE CONCUR:

            BAKER, J.

            MOOR, J.

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