Court Opinion

ID: 9698126
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:42:39.74963+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:38.583631
License: Public Domain

FRIEDMAN, Judge,
dissenting.
I vigorously dissent. I believe that Major Manufacturing Corporation’s (Major) Lucky Tab Pull Tab Dispenser Model *5901010-BV (Model 1010-BV) does not violate section 3 of the Local Option Small Games of Chance Act (Act)1 by “playing” or assisting in the “play” of the pull-tab game. Moreover, the Model 1010-BV is nothing more than a dispensing machine and, as such, is expressly exempted from the prohibition against mechanical and electrical devices in section 3. Thus, I would reverse the order of the Secretary of Revenue, who accepted the recommendation of the Small Games of Chance Board and sustained the Department of Revenue’s (Department) denial of Major’s request for authorization to market the Model 1010-BV.
I. “Played by or with the assistance of”
The Majority concludes that “the nontraditional components of the device, [i.e., video, lights and sound,] at the very least, assist the play of the game, if not actually substitute for the play of the game.” (Majority Op. at 586.) However, the Majority offers little, if any, support for this conclusion. After the Majority rejects without reason Major’s contention that the “play” of the game consists of consideration, chance and reward, the three elements of any small game of chance, the Majority also dismisses the Department’s argument that “play” occurs when the player purchases a ticket.2 (Majority Op. at 207.)
*591Indeed, the Majority never offers a definition of the statutory term at issue here, i.e., “play.” Instead, the Majority shifts the focus of the inquiry by relying upon Major’s testimony that the video screen “enhances the play” of the game. (Majority Op. at 586.) In so doing, a new issue of statutory construction emerges: whether “enhance” means to “assist.” Unfortunately, the Majority also fails to address this question.3
*592I believe that a proper analysis of the statutory language supports Major’s position that the “play” of a pull-tab game consists of the three elements of gambling: consideration, chance and reward. Indeed, following section 1903(a) of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972,4 the common and approved usage of the word “play,” at least in the context of a statute regulating small games of chance, is “gambling.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1736 (1966). Pennsylvania courts have long recognized the technical legal definition for “gambling” that Major presents in support of its position, and this court would be remiss to ignore its applicability here. See Commonwealth v. Two Electronic Poker Game Machines, 502 Pa. 186, 465 A.2d 973 (1983).
Accordingly, because the amount paid to play the pull-tab game (consideration), the chance of winning (element of chance) and the amount won (reward) are not influenced at all by the video monitor, I would conclude with Major that the Model 1010-BV does not “play” or assist in “playing” the pull-tab game.5
*593II. “Dispensing Machine”
The Majority next determines that the Model 1010-BV “clearly is not a mere dispensing device as contemplated under Section 3 of the Act, 10 P.S. § 313,” based on the active nature of the device and the need to strictly construe the statute.6 (Majority Op. at 587.) Therefore, the Majority concludes that the Model 1010-BV does not qualify for the “dispensing machine” exemption in section 3 of the Act. For the reasons that follow, I disagree.
Section 3 of the Act, 10 P.S. § 313 (emphasis added), states that no pull-tab game “shall be played by or with the assistance of any mechanical or electrical devices or media other than a dispensing machine or passive selection device.... ” The Majority once again fails to properly analyze section 3 of the Act. Instead of examining the definition of the phrase at issue here, i.e., “dispensing machine,” the Majority focuses on the word “passive” in the phrase that follows, thereby reading into the statute the requirement that a “dispensing machine” must be “passive.” Such a reading is contrary to the plain language of the Act.7 A proper analysis of the Act demonstrates that the Model 1010-BV is merely a “dispensing machine.”
Section 3 of the Act, 10 P.S. § 313 (emphasis added), defines a “dispensing machine” in the following way:
“Dispensing machine.” A device designed exclusively for the dispensing of the games of chance authorized by this act, including, but not limited to, ticket jars, fish bowls and stamp machines. Nothing in this act shall be construed to authorize devices commonly knawn as “slot machines” or “video poker.”
*594Here, the General Assembly states with clarity its primary concern, i.e., that video poker, slot machines or other gambling devices should not be construed to be “dispensing machines.” In other words, the General Assembly’s definition of a “dispensing machine” excludes gambling devices, which “play” the game by the mechanical and electrical parts therein and thereby determine a winner. Because the Model 1010-BV is not a gambling device that determines a winner by the operation of its mechanical and electrical components, it is merely a “dispensing machine” as contemplated by the General Assembly in section 3 of the Act.
The regulations promulgated under the Act reinforce this interpretation. By statute, a “stamp machine” is a “dispensing machine.” The regulations provide the following definition:
Stamp machine — A device designed exclusively to dispense preprinted pull-tab tickets which does not make a change to, mark on or alter in any way the ticket placed in the device. The device may not print or produce tickets in any manner. The term is also known as a vending machine for pull-tab tickets.
61 Pa.Code § 901.1 (emphasis added). Thus, the requirements for a “stamp machine” are: (1) it should not print or produce a pull-tab ticket, and (2) it should not make a change to, mark on or alter in any way a pull-tab ticket placed therein. Because the Model 1010-BV complies with these requirements, it is a “stamp machine” as defined by the regulations. As such, it is also a “dispensing machine.”8
*595Accordingly, because the Model 1010-BV does not “play” or assist in the “play” of the pull-tab game and is merely a “dispensing machine” under section 3 of the Act, I would reverse.

. Section 3 of the Local Option Small Games of Chance Act (Act), Act of December 19, 1988, P.L. 1262, 10 P.S. § 313 (emphasis added), states in pertinent part:
“Games of chance.” Punchboards, daily drawings, raffles and pull-tabs, as defined in this-act, provided that no such game shall be played by or with the assistance of any mechanical or electrical devices or media other than a dispensing machine or passive selection device....

. In support of its argument, the Department notes that the Act should be strictly construed, see section 2 of the Act, 10 P.S. § 312, and that deference should be given to the Department’s interpretation of the statute when there is no specific legislative direction. However, the rule properly stated is that “an administrative agency's expert interpre- ■ tation of a statute for which it has enforcement responsibility is entitled to great deference and will not be reversed unless clearly erroneous.” Mormak v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 135 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 232, 237, 579 A.2d 1383, 1385-86 (1990) (emphasis added).
*591In this case, the Department’s interpretation of the Act is clearly erroneous. A person who purchases a ticket may never “play” that ticket. Indeed, the purchaser of a ticket might give the ticket to a friend or relative as a gift. Or, the purchaser might lose the ticket and never actually "play” the game. Or, the purchaser may have been given money by a co-worker to purchase a ticket, in which case the purchaser is not even the “player.” Thus, to accept the Department’s argument that the game is “played” when the ticket is purchased would lead to absurd results.
Moreover, although the Department asserts that it has adopted the common and approved usage of the term “play” in reaching its position, instead of offering an approved dictionary definition of the word, the Department relies upon an advertising expression utilized to promote the Pennsylvania Lottery: "you have to play to win.” However, I do not believe that this court should determine the meaning of a statutory term based upon its use in the advertising community, where the meanings of words change by the hour.
Furthermore, the Department states that the device is "played” when the player purchases a ticket. However, the statute specifically refers to the "play” of the game, not the device. See section 3 of the Act, 10 P.S. § 313. The Department thus implies that the Model 1010-BV is a "gambling device;” however, the Model 1010-BV is not a "gambling device" because the operation of its mechanical and electrical components does not determine whether a ticket is a winner. See In re: One 1986 Oldsmobile Sedan, 165 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 61, 644 A.2d 240 (1994).

. In the context of Major’s testimony, the word "enhance” means to "advance.” See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 753 (1966). Indeed, Major testified that the video monitor does nothing more than enhance the old paper game of pull-tab by bringing it into the twentieth century. (R.R. at 70a-71a.) Accordingly, ”[t]he video screen is marketing” for a new generation of pull-tab players. (R.R. at 99a.)
The word "assist,” on the other hand, means to “help.” Webster's Third New International Dictionary 132 (1966). It is true that the video monitor may "help” visually impaired people read the face of the pull-tab ticket. The monitor may also "help” any player discover whether the dispensed ticket is a winner. However, in either event, the statute does not prohibit the device from helping the player; rather, section 3 states that the device may not help the "play” of the game. *592Unfortunately, as stated above, the Majority fails to define the statutory term "play.”

. Section 1903(a) of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1903(a), states in pertinent part:
Words ... shall be construed ... according to their common and approved usage; but technical words ... shall be construed according to ... [their] peculiar and appropriate meaning or definition.

. I also note that the Model 1010-B, which the Department previously approved, contains a light that flashes and sounds that play when the machine dispenses a winning ticket. (R.R. at 97a-98a, 117a-18a.) In each case, the player knows whether the ticket is a winner before the player pulls the tab. The Majority does not explain why the Model 1010-B, which is still a permissible machine, does not "play” or assist in the “play” of the pull-tab game by giving away the outcome with lights and sounds, but Model 1010-BV "plays” or assists in the "play" of the pull-tab game by revealing the result via video monitor. My view is that the device can signal a winning ticket by flashing lights, by playing music, or by bringing out dancing girls but, as long as these features do not affect the consideration, chance and reward of the pull-tab game, they do not assist in its "play.”

. Section 2 of the Act, 10 P.S. § 312, states in pertinent part:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the General Assembly that ... all laws ... with respect [to the licensing, operation and regulation of small games of chance] ... should be strictly construed and rigidly enforced.

. The phrase “passive selection device” does not stand in apposition to the phrase "dispensing machine.” Rather, these phrases refer to two distinct types of devices or machines. Furthermore, the statutory definition of “dispensing machine” nowhere uses the word “passive.”

. I note again that the Department previously approved Major’s Model 1010-B even though it was capable of producing lights and sounds that announced the dispensing of a winning ticket. If this court now applied the strict construction propounded by the Majority to the Model 1010-B, we would have to conclude that the active nature of the device precludes it from being a "dispensing machine.” However, the Majority has once again failed to explain how the Department, whose position the Majority supports, could approve the Model 1010-B but disapprove the Model 1010-BV.
I do not believe that this court should condone administrative actions that appear to be totally arbitrary. The Department cannot interpret the statute one way with respect to the Model 1010-B and then read it *595another way in evaluating the Model 1010-BV. Such reversals in position can only confuse the regulated community, which, in this case, has invested time, effort and money in developing a new product based upon the Department’s prior ruling.
The regulated community deserves consistency on the part of the agencies. The approval or disapproval of applications to the Department should be more predictable than a game of chance. Here, the Department’s position was correct the first time. This court will not improve matters by permitting the Department to flip a coin in a given situation for its interpretation of the Act. This court should be providing solid guidelines for the agency and the regulated community concerning the meaning of the Act. The Majority decision as written does not do that.