Court Opinion

ID: 9650480
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 15:39:31.29257+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:22.229275
License: Public Domain

STONE, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
The majority opinion finds the indictment fatally defective for three reasons, as follows : (1) Because it does not contain “even a general statement that Sneider [the person bailed] was being held on a charge of having committed any crime or offense against the United States; nothing to show any lawful ground or reason for his giving a recognizance, and hence the right of the officer taking it to administer an oath to Schell as surety”; (2) because it does not sufficiently identify the official status of the “commissioner” before whom some of the oaths were taken; (3) because there was no authority for a deputy clerk of the district court, before whom two of the oaths were taken, to administer such.
The sufficiency of the indictment was not attacked by demurrer or motion to quash. The first suggestion of an attack upon the indictment came early in the examination of the -first witness. This took the form of objection to introduction of testimony. The objection was apparently written, and set forth specifically the reasons why the indictment did not state an offense, as follows:
“(A) No allegation as to who the real owner was (the truth of the fact) of the property listed in any count.
“(B) No allegation that the witness knowingly swore falsely. Only use words wilfullyÍ eorrupily and falsely.
*333“(C) Eighth (8th) count does not set forth false portion.
“(D) Each count fails to set forth the bond or recognizance of which the alleged false affidavit is a part.
“(E) Each count fails to allege the recognizance in question was completed and accepted.”
At the time this motion was made, and to make clear the position of accused, counsel stated his contention as follows: “At this time, your Honor, I wish to file objection against the evidence in this ease. I might say, your Honor, that the counts are all the same except the eighth, they are verbatim except the eighth; that is a different count, and that is clearly defective because it doesn’t set out the affidavit at all. That is the eighth count. The others are all exactly the same. We are objecting that the indictment doesn’t state a public offense and we are objecting to any testimony for the reason that there is no charge in the indictment. Now they don’t allege that Mr. Danaher knew it at all. I think that is the element of that indictment. It doesn’t state the facts sufficient to constitute the crime. They don’t charge him with knowing that this man Swanson or whoever the bond was given by, they don’t testify that the bonds were ever signed, if accepted. They don’t charge who the real owners of this property was. Mr. Schell may have had a deed to this property. Mr. Bissonnette may have had a deed to the property. Now they haven’t alleged that Danaher knew that this man’s testimony was false or that his affidavit was to be false. If counsel’s opening statement shows that they expect to prove a lot of this stuff by hearsay testimony, certainly the Government can’t proceed except on an indictment which charges an offense. Of course if we let down here, and let them put down a lot of this testimony, hearsay and everything else, they might proceed — they might make out a ease. That is our position.”
At the close of the evidence, a directed verdict was asked upon each count, for the sole reason that “the Government has failed to prove the charge.” The second attack upon the indictment appeared in a motion to “set aside and vacate the judgment,” which the court treated as a motion for a new trial. This motion is not in the record, blit the grounds thereof (in so far as the indictment is concerned) may be inferred from the memorandum of the court in connection with denial • thereof. Such memorandum shows no grounds in that motion going beyond the motion filed objecting to introduction of testimony. But one assignment of error touches the indictment, and that one complains solely of overruling of the motion objecting to introduction of testimony — the motion being copied therein. The only defects argued, in the briefs or orally, were failure to allege owner of fee of the listed property; failure to allege knowledge, by accused or witness, of falsity of the oath; failure to set forth “in hme verba the bond or recognizance, of which the alleged affidavit is a part.”
Thus it is clear that not one of the grounds urged against the indictment by counsel at any stage of the proceeding is sustained by the majority opinion. It is quite as clear that the grounds upon which this indictment is found fatally defective appear in this case, for the first time, in the majority opinion. This situation is recognized in that opinion, but it is said, first, that “no formal action on the part of defendant was necessary to save the point” where the indictment fails to charge an offense, citing Markham v. United States, 160 U. S. 319, 16 S. Ct. 288, 40 L. Ed. 441; and, second, that “where prejudicial error is obvious appellate courts should of their own motion recognize it and give protection against unlawful deprivation of personal liberty,” citing Lamento v. United States (C. C. A.) 4 F.(2d) 901.
As to the first ground, I can find no expression in the Markham Case to justify the rule announced, nor were the circumstances there similar to those here present because the defects there relied upon were preserved and presented, not only to the Supreme Court, but to the trial court, in a motion in arrest of judgment. So far as I know, the ease before us is the first instance'where an appellate court has itself sought out and declared fatal defects in an indictment which had never been found by industrious and competent counsel. If, as said in the Markham Case, “It may well be assumed, after verdict, that all such facts appeared in evidence, and that the accused was not ignorant of the nature of the inquiry to which his deposition related, and to which the indictment referred,” there is stronger reason to believe that no prejudice resulted where astute counsel, who combed the indictment for defects, could not find what this court has discovered.
As to the second ground, it is undoubtedly true that this court may notice unpreserved error, but the exercise of this power has been carefully limited by the Supreme Court, which announced it. That power is not to be exercised merely because an error has been committed, nor even where such error is prej*334udieial, in the sense that it would have been ground for reversal had it been properly raised and preserved. That power is to be exercised only where an error is not only clear and prejudicial, but where there are “serious errors in the trial of the accused fatal to the defendant’s rights,” Van Gorder v. United States (C. C. A.) 21 F.(2d) 939, 942, and it is “in the interest of a just and fair enforcement of the laws,” same citation. Also see Lamento v. United States, 4 F.(2d) 901, 904, this court; McNutt v. United States, 267 F. 670, 672, this court. In short, unless the entire record convinces that justice requires, there is no reason to notice errors which counsel have not called to the attention of the trial court (USCA tit. 28, § 391; Ripper v. United States, 179 F. 497, 498, this court; Fielder v. United States, 227 F. 832, 833, this court; Lepper v. United States, 233 F. 227, 229 (C. C. A. 4). To my mind this record reveals no reason why this court should go out of its way to reverse this ease on grounds never thought of by careful and alert counsel. It serves no end of justice, but, on the contrary, sets free one accused and found guilty of a most serious crime against the administration of justice itself.
However, even if we should search the indictment for defects, those found by the majority do not, in my judgment, exist. The first of these is that the indictment contained no charge that the person bailed “was being held on á charge of having committed any crime or offense against the United States.” The indictment clearly and unmistakably charges the perjury to have been committed in the qualification of sureties in connection with “recognizance” of the several persons bailed, and this qualification was alleged as being before a United States commissioner or before a deputy clerk of the United States District Court; also that the commissioner had “competent authority to administer the said oath”; also, except in two counts (the sixth and eighth), the perjured affidavit is set forth and is captioned: “United States of America, District of Minnesota, Fourth Division — ss.” No one could read the counts of this indictment without knowing that the person' bailed was being held upon a criminal charge by the United States.
The second ground is that the indictment does not sufficiently identify the official status of the “commissioner.” The indictment speaks of “a commissioner of the District Court of the United States, for the. District of Minnesota.” True, the statute says that such officials shall be “known as United States commissioners.” USCA tit. 28, § 526. But they are appointed by the several District Courts and serve as officials of the court appointing them. When a man is named and is designated as. “a commissioner of the District Court of the United States, for the District of Minnesota,” that man and that official status are set forth in a way no one can mistake. Had the indictment copied the above statutory section, it would have added not one single thing to the information of the accused,, the trial court, this court, or any one else.
The third defect is that there was no authority for the deputy clerk to administer such oaths. This applies to but two counts (6 and 8). Were the position of the majority sound, it could affect but those two. However, the majority opinion concedes that the court might take such recognizances and might direct the clerk to administer the oath. Be that as it may, deputy clerks are expressly authorized generally (exception Alaska) to administer oaths by section 525, USCA, tit. 28.
It is to prevent just such “defects,” as here found fatal, that Congress, in the interest of justice and to prevent criminals escaping punishment through technicalities, enacted section 556 (USCA tit. 18) and, particularly as to perjury, sections 558 and 559. Also see Nurnberger v. United States, 156 F. 721, 725, this court.
The majority opinion finds the evidence was fatally deficient in that it is said it failed to show that the sureties, who committed the perjury, knew they were to be sworn or that appellant knew they were to be sworn as to their financial worth. It was not at all necessary that the sureties should have such knowledge. They are not on trial here. If they did take the oaths and at that time knew they were false, they committed perjury no matter what they might have known or thought, before they were sworn, about the requirement as to an oath. Conceding, for the purposes of this matter, that it is necessary that appellant should know an oath was to be administered, what was the evidence on that point? The evidence clearly shows that appellant made a practice of furnishing worthless bail bonds for a compensation; that he understood the property qualification of the surety would be inquired into at the time such bail was made; that his method was to pay or promise payment to an impecunious person if he would become surety upon a bail bond; that he would furnish such person with a description of property which the person was to claim to own when being so qualified; that he knew the person did not *335own or have any interest in such property; that he accompanied several of these sureties to the commissioner’s office when they went to make the bonds; that he was in the office when two of the sureties (Schell and Christianson) signed the bonds and Immediately thereafter, in the corridor outside the commissioner’s office, designated a place to meet Schell to pay him; that he was “frequently” in the commissioner’s office where and when bonds were being executed; that the method of the commissioner was to prepare the bond and qualifying affidavit, have the affidavit signed, and then administer the oath as to the truth thereof. The above outline of the evidence on this point seems to me to leave no room for doubt that appellant thoroughly understood the entire procedure.
The majority quotes a statement of the trial court, in denying the motion for directed verdict as revealing that that court was doubtful of the sufficiency of the evidence in the respect pointed out in the majority opinion. I get no such meaning from the statement. The situation in which the statement was made was that a motion to direct a verdict on each count had been made “for the. reason that the Government has failed to prove the charge.” What the argument on this motion was is not set forth in the record. But thereafter the court made the statement. The entire statement is as follows:
“The Court: Motion denied. I think that the relation of the parties was such that it is a matter for the jury instead of the court. If we held to a rule as strict as counsel for defendant suggests, these people could never be apprehended. They would simply slip along and get by with one bond after the other and anybody with any sense would know that they were trying to impose upon the court and upon the Commissioner by furnishing sureties who had no property at all, and who they knew had no property at all, but. where the evidence couldn’t in so many words so indicate, but that isn’t necessary; did this man know, or should he have known, that Bissonnette had no property, and was he trying to use it as surety on bond, knowing it was fictitious representation which the surety was making.
“Motion for directed verdict in that count may be denied.
“Motion as to Phosky’s count denied.”
Obviously, the statement referred to something said in argument, and clearly it referred to remarks concerning but a single count of the seven submitted later to the jury. It is clear that the statement was not made as to the defect found by the majority opinion, because that defect applies to all counts and because such defect was not suggested by counsel. I say it was not suggested, because counsel do not suggest it here. The briefs of appellant show a most diligent combing of the record for error by counsel of evident ability. It never occurred to them to suggest that the evidence did not show that the appellant knew the sureties were to be sworn. It remained for and required a majority of this court to discover that. It is evident that the trial court did not express any doubt as to the knowledge of appellant as to the requirement of the oath for two good reasons: That counsel had never suggested it; and that the evidence convincingly showed such knowledge.
This appellant had a fair trial. He was convicted of having suborned perjury in connection with seven separate bail bonds. He is shown clearly to have engaged in a regular business, for profit, of furnishing worthless bail bonds in a federal court and to have employed perjury by others as a necessary step therein. He has been ably represented by counsel in the trial court and here. No error has been pointed out by them which any member of this court has found well founded. A majority of this court have found other matters deemed fatally erroneous, both in the indictment and in the evidence. I find neither. Also I think it an unwise exercise of discretion even to seek such when 'the character of this offense and of this evidence is considered. The result is that a dangerous criminal, who struck straight and contemptuously at the administration of justice in a federal court goes free after being proven guilty, and his success may well encourage him and- others of his kind.
I dissent from the reasoning as well as the results of the majority opinion.