Court Opinion

ID: 9536645
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:04:10.246552+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:50:46.090120
License: Public Domain

SPENCE, J.
— I dissent.
Defendant was convicted of two counts of manslaughter and of one count of violation of section 503 of the Vehicle Code. He appeals only from the judgment relating to the last-mentioned count. The majority opinion holds that the evidence was sufficient to support the judgment as to that count, but reverses solely because of alleged prejudicial error in the failure to give a requested instruction. After a review of the record, including the evidence, I am of the opinion that it cannot be said that the error, if any, in the failure to give the requested instruction “resulted in a miscarriage of justice.” (Canst., art. VI, §4%.)
The information charged that defendant “did wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive and take a certain véhicle . . . without the consent of and with the intent to deprive the . . . owner ... of title to and possession of said vehicle. . . (Emphasis added.) The trial court instructed the jury that “Any person who drives or takes a vehicle not his own, without the consent of the owner thereof, and with *545intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the owner thereof of his title to or possession of such vehicle, ... is guilty of a felony.” (Veh. Code, § 503; emphasis added.) The jury was further given the customary general instructions, including those on the presumption of innocence, reasonable doubt, and burden of proof. Upon the evidence and under these instructions, the jury found defendant “guilty of violation of section 503, Vehicle Code, a felony, as charged in count two of the information.”
It is clear that the given instructions clearly informed the jury that defendant could not be found guilty unless the jury found from the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant drove the automobile with the required criminal intent. Thus, in finding the defendant guilty, the jury necessarily found that defendant had the specific criminal intent mentioned in said section and alleged in the information; and the overwhelming evidence supports that finding.
It is true that defendant told an unusual story concerning the events immediately preceding the fatal accident, but his explanation cannot be reconciled with his great acceleration of the speed of the car and of his traveling at such speed for almost a mile before the accident occurred. Defendant’s criminal intent was further indicated by his attempt unlawfully to take another automobile for the purpose of fleeing from the scene of the accident.
The refused instruction reads: “When a person commits an act or makes an omission through misfortune or by accident under circumstances that show no evil design, intention or culpable negligence, he does not thereby commit a crime, although the same act or omission committed under different circumstances and coupled with criminal intent would constitute a crime.” (Emphasis added.)
A reading of the refused instruction shows that it constitutes, in effect, another way of stating the propositions of law relating to intent which were amply covered by the instructions given. By its terms, it could have no application unless it was found that defendant drove the car under circumstances showing no evil “intention” and in a manner not “coupled with criminal intent.”
In the light of the fact that the given instruction made it entirely clear that defendant could not be convicted unless the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that he drove the car “with intent to either permanently or temporarily de*546prive the owner thereof of his title or to possession of such vehicle,” I find no prejudicial error in the failure to give the requested instruction.
I would therefore follow the constitutional mandate (Const., art. VI, § 4%) and affirm the challenged judgment.
Shenk, J., and Edmonds, J., concurred.
Respondent’s petition for a rehearing was denied December 21, 1955. Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Spence, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.