Court Opinion

ID: 9840541
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-19 13:03:54.056788+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:34:15.742971
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
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official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

                                                             Decided: September 19, 2023

             S22G0874. WISE BUSINESS FORMS, INC. v. FORSYTH
                             COUNTY et al.

         LAGRUA, Justice.

         We granted certiorari in this case to clarify the standards for

determining when a claim for inverse condemnation by permanent

nuisance accrues for purposes of applying the four-year statute of

limitation set forth in OCGA § 9-3-30 (a).1 For the reasons that

follow, we conclude that, although the Court of Appeals articulated

one of the correct standards to apply in determining when the

applicable statute of limitation begins to run on a permanent

nuisance claim, the Court of Appeals failed to construe the

                                   —————————————————————
        OCGA § 9-3-30 (a) provides that “[a]ll actions for trespass upon or
         1

damage to realty shall be brought within four years after the right of action
accrues.”

                                                            1
allegations of the complaint in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff as the non-moving party; erred in concluding there was only

one harm in this case that was “immediately observable” to the

plaintiff when the nuisance at issue was completed; and erred in

concluding that the statute of limitation had run on the plaintiff’s

claim as a matter of law. Therefore, we must reverse.

     1. Pertinent Facts and Procedural History

        (a)   Factual background

     The relevant facts, as summarized by the Court of Appeals

from the allegations in the complaint, are as follows:

          [Wise Business Forms, Inc. (“Wise”)] is the nation’s
     fourth largest printer of business forms, and is
     headquartered in Forsyth County. The property used for
     its headquarters was purchased in three separate
     acquisitions beginning in 1984 and running through
     1996.

          A 36-inch metal pipe (“Subject Pipe”) runs
     underneath Wise’s property and has been in place since
     1985. Approximately twenty-five feet of the drainage pipe
     extends into a two-acre tract of land west of Wise’s
     property (“Corner Tract”). The Corner Tract is
     undeveloped and forms a natural detention basin into
     which a large vertical concrete drainage structure with a

                                    2
large stormwater outlet pipe (“Feeder Structure”) was
constructed. Wise asserted in its complaint that water
from the Feeder Structure on the Corner Tract was
designed to flow through the Subject Pipe underneath
Wise’s property.

     The McFarland Parkway Widening Project
(“McFarland Parkway Project”) extended McFarland
Road from two lanes to four lanes and was completed in
2000. Wise alleged in its complaint that this project
resulted in a substantial increase of the surface and
stormwater runoff flowing underneath its property.
Specifically, Wise asserted that[,] as part of the project[,]
the Appellees designed and installed a sophisticated
stormwater drainage system, while failing to provide
detention facilities to mitigate the increased runoff, and
that the drainage system ultimately channeled water to
the Corner Tract and subsequently through the Subject
Pipe running underneath Wise’s property.

     On June 27, 2016, Wise noticed the first signs of a
sinkhole on its property. Wise subsequently conducted a
test to determine the origin of the majority of water
flowing through the Subject Pipe. Wise asserted that by
tracking marked ping pong balls through the drainage
system, it was able to determine that the “bulk of the
stormwater” that flowed through the Subject Pipe derived
from the catch basins and storm sewers built as part of
the McFarland Parkway Project. Wise also had the
Subject Pipe inspected using a robotic vehicle and
discovered deterioration and erosion within the pipe.

                                3
Wise Business Forms, Inc. v. Forsyth County, 363 Ga. App. 325, 326-

327 (810 SE2d 894) (2022).

         (b)   Trial court proceedings

     On October 25, 2020, Wise filed a complaint against Forsyth

County    (the   “County”)    and   the   Georgia   Department     of

Transportation (the “DOT”) (collectively “Appellees”) in the Superior

Court of Forsyth County, raising claims for per se taking of Wise’s

property, inverse condemnation by permanent nuisance, attorney

fees under OCGA § 13-6-11, and violation of 42 USC § 1983. Wise

amended its complaint to add a claim for inverse condemnation by

abatable nuisance on February 8, 2021.

     In support of Wise’s claims, Wise alleged, among other

allegations, that the increase in the impermeable surface when

McFarland Parkway was widened and the drainage system installed

by Appellees as part of that project “deliberately channeled”

stormwater runoff into the Subject Pipe—constituting a “continuing

trespass”—and over time, the increased flow and velocity of water

                                     4
running through the underground pipe eroded the pipe and

surrounding soil, ultimately causing a sinkhole. As for the resulting

physical harms to Wise’s property, Wise alleged that (1) the “first

visible sign” of the sinkhole occurred on June 27, 2016; (2) Wise

discovered “serious deterioration” of the underground pipe in

September of 2016 after deploying a robotic vehicle; and (3) this

deterioration was “the product of hidden abrasion, corrosion, and

erosion over the years caused by the increased volume and velocity

of stormwater runoff” driven through the pipe by the drainage work

completed for the McFarland Parkway Project. In furtherance of

these allegations, Wise sought compensation “for the diminished

value of its property, for the deprivation of the full use and

enjoyment of its property, for the cost of repairs required to remedy

the situation, and for the continuing damage to and loss of use of

portions of its property caused by [Appellees],” as well as “the

expense of the future repair and maintenance of the Subject Pipe

traversing the Wise Property.”

                                    5
     Contemporaneously with the filing of Appellees’ answers and

before discovery commenced in this case, Appellees separately

moved to dismiss Wise’s complaint on multiple grounds, including

Wise’s failure to file its complaint within the four-year statute of

limitation period under OCGA § 9-3-30 (a). In furtherance thereof,

Appellees     asserted   that    Wise’s    inverse-condemnation-by-

permanent-nuisance claim—the only claim at issue in this appeal—

accrued in 2000 when the alleged increase in the volume and

velocity of the stormwater passing through the Subject Pipe began,

and thus, this claim was barred by the applicable statute of

limitation.

     On March 15, 2021, the trial court granted the motions to

dismiss. In dismissing the complaint, the trial court concluded as

follows: (1) Wise’s per se taking claim “accrued at the time of the

road widening project” in 2000 and was “barred by the four-year-

statute of limitation governing trespass to real property;” (2) Wise’s

claim for inverse condemnation by abatable nuisance “provide[d] no

                                     6
basis for relief” because Wise did not claim that Appellees were

“responsible for maintaining the pipe at issue;” (3) Wise’s claim

premised on 42 USC § 1983 and its derivative claim for attorney’s

fees and expenses pursuant to OCGA § 13-6-11 failed as matter of

law; and (4) Wise’s inverse-condemnation-by-permanent-nuisance

claim, while timely, 2 was nevertheless “subject to dismissal for

[Wise’s] failure to attach to its complaint the expert affidavit

required by OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (g) (21).” Wise appealed the trial

court’s dismissal of its inverse-condemnation-by-abatable nuisance

and inverse-condemnation-by-permanent nuisance claims to the

Court of Appeals.

         (c)   The Court of Appeals’ Decision

                        —————————————————————
      2 The trial court concluded that the four-year statute of limitation under

OCGA § 9-3-30 (a) did not begin to run on this claim until June 27, 2016 when
Wise discovered the sinkhole on its property. While Wise did not file its
complaint until October 25, 2020—more than four years after the trial court
concluded the statute of limitation had started to run—the trial court observed
that this Court’s Declarations of Judicial Emergency order tolled the “statutes
of limitation” and rendered the filing of the complaint timely.
                                          7
     The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of

Wise’s inverse-condemnation-by-abatable-nuisance claim on the

basis that “Wise failed to allege facts demonstrating that Appellees

had a duty to maintain the Subject Pipe, as required for a claim of

abatable nuisance.” Wise, 363 Ga. App. at 329 (2). The Court of

Appeals also affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of Wise’s inverse-

condemnation-by-permanent-nuisance claim, noting that, although

“the trial court erred in finding that Wise’s complaint required an

expert affidavit pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-9.1,”3 Wise’s claim for

inverse condemnation by permanent nuisance was “nonetheless

properly dismissed, as it was barred by the four-year statute of

limitation” under OCGA § 9-3-30 (a). Id. at 327-328 (1).

     In    concluding     that    Wise’s     inverse-condemnation-by-

permanent-nuisance claim was barred by the four-year statute of

                      —————————————————————
     3  In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals explained that,
because Wise’s claim for inverse condemnation by permanent nuisance was
“premised on the Appellees’ intentional acts giving rise to an alleged
nuisance”—not on claims of negligence—“the requirement of OCGA § 9-11-9.1
to file an expert affidavit when a claim alleges damages for professional
negligence [wa]s inapposite here.” Id. at 327-328 (1).
                                      8
limitation under OCGA § 9-3-30 (a), the Court of Appeals held that,

“[i]n claims for permanent nuisances, ‘a plaintiff is allowed only one

cause of action to recover damages for past and future harm. The

statute of limitation begins to run against such a claim upon the

creation of the nuisance once some portion of the harm becomes

observable.’” Wise, 363 Ga. App. at 328 (1) (quoting Oglethorpe

Power Corp. v. Forrister, 289 Ga. 331, 333 (2) (711 SE2d 641) (2011)).

The Court of Appeals then concluded that

      the construction of the stormwater drainage system by
      the Appellees to divert th[e] increased stormwater runoff
      through the Subject Pipe, and the alleged dramatic
      increase in stormwater runoff being driven into the
      Feeder Structure, would have been observable. Thus, as
      a permanent nuisance which had some portion of the
      harm immediately observable, the statute of limitation
      began in 2000 when the McFarland Parkway Project was
      complete.

Id.

      We granted Wise’s petition for certiorari and asked the parties

to address whether the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the

dismissal of Wise’s inverse-condemnation-by-permanent-nuisance

                                     9
claim because it was barred by the statute of limitation set by OCGA

§ 9-3-30 (a). We did not grant certiorari on the Court of Appeals’

ruling that Wise’s claim for inverse condemnation by permanent

nuisance did not require an expert affidavit under OCGA § 9-11-9.1

or on its ruling that Wise’s inverse-condemnation-by-abatable-

nuisance claim was properly dismissed by the trial court.

      2. Analysis

      OCGA § 41-1-1 defines a “nuisance” as

      anything that causes hurt, inconvenience, or damage to
      another and the fact that the act done may otherwise be
      lawful shall not keep it from being a nuisance. The
      inconvenience complained of shall not be fanciful, or such
      as would affect only one of fastidious taste, but it shall be
      such as would affect an ordinary, reasonable man.4

                        —————————————————————
      4 See also, e.g., City Council of Augusta v. Lombard, 101 Ga. 724 (28 SE

994) (1897) (holding that the city’s removal of water gates which controlled
water flowing through a series of canals, causing “large and unusual
quantities of water” to flow “upon the premises of the plaintiff” in “certain
times of high water,” constituted a nuisance); Cox v. Cambridge Square Towne
Houses, Inc., 239 Ga. 127 (236 SE2d 73) (1977) (holding that an apartment
owner’s installation of a storm drain system in an apartment complex, which
“greatly increased the flow of surface waters across [the adjacent landowner’s]
land” constituted a nuisance); City of Atlanta v. Kleber, 285 Ga. 413, 413 (677
SE2d 134) (2009) (holding that an improperly maintained city drainage pipe
and culvert—resulting in the flooding of the plaintiffs’ property during heavy
rains—constituted a nuisance); Forrister, 289 Ga. at 331-332 (holding that
gas-fired combustion turbines in a power plant, which were turned on “when
                                         10
Generally, nuisances are classified as “abatable” or “permanent.”

An “abatable” nuisance is one where the harm to a plaintiff’s

property “results from some minor feature of construction or

management” or “from an improper and unnecessary method of

operation,” which can “be averted at slight expense” or readily

enjoined.    Forrister, 289 Ga. at 333-334 (2) (citations and

punctuation omitted).     A “permanent” nuisance is “one whose

character is such that, from its nature and under the circumstances

of its existence, it presumably will continue indefinitely.” Id. at 333

(2). Determining whether a nuisance is abatable or permanent will

typically dictate “the manner in which the statute of limitations will

be applied.” Id.

     Here, Wise asserted claims against Appellees for both inverse

condemnation by abatable nuisance and inverse condemnation by

permanent nuisance. However, as noted above, this appeal concerns

                     —————————————————————
customers demand[ed] high amounts of electricity” and which caused
“excessive noise” and “vibrations,” constituted a nuisance).
                                     11
only Wise’s claim for inverse condemnation by permanent nuisance,

so we will limit our analysis to when the statute of limitation starts

to run on the permanent nuisance claim. See OCGA § 9-3-30 (a)

(“[a]ll actions for trespass upon or damage to realty shall be brought

within four years after the right of action accrues”).

     In concluding that Wise’s permanent nuisance claim was

barred by OCGA § 9-3-30 (a), the Court of Appeals relied on a 2011

case from this Court, in which we explained that, when a nuisance

is “considered permanent,” a “plaintiff is allowed only one cause of

action to recover damages for past and future harm,” and “the

statute of limitation begins to run against such a claim upon the

creation of the nuisance once some portion of the harm becomes

observable.” Forrister, 289 Ga. at 333 (2). However, this language

from Forrister is imprecise because it does not explain that this

standard will not apply in all permanent nuisance cases.

     Permanent nuisance cases vary in relation to when the alleged

harm to a plaintiff’s property caused by the nuisance becomes

                                     12
“observable” to the plaintiff. Forrister, 289 Ga. at 333 (2). In some

cases, the harm to the plaintiff’s property is immediately observable

“upon the creation of the nuisance.” Id. For example, where a

landowner or governmental agency “erects a harmful structure such

as a bridge or conducts a harmful activity such as opening a sewer

that pollutes a stream,” and it is immediately obvious that the

structure or activity interferes with the plaintiff’s interests, the

plaintiff must file “one cause of action for the recovery of past and

future damages caused by [the] permanent nuisance” within four

years of the date the structure is completed or the harmful activity

is commenced.     Id. at 333-336 (2) and (3) (citing Restatement

(Second) of Torts §§ 899 and 930). Phrased another way, where the

“construction and continuance” of the permanent nuisance at issue

is “necessarily an injury, the damage is original, and may be at once

fully compensated. In such cases[,] the statute of limitations begins

to run upon the construction of the nuisance.”      City Council of

Augusta v. Lombard, 101 Ga. 724, 727 (28 SE 994) (1897).

                                    13
     In other permanent nuisance cases, the harm to the plaintiff’s

property is not “observable” to the plaintiff until later—sometimes

years later. Forrister, 289 Ga. at 333 (2). This circumstance may

arise when a structure is built or an activity is commenced that is

not injurious in and of itself, but it becomes a “permanent and

continuing nuisance” because of “some supervening cause[, like

heavy rains], which produce[s] special injury at different periods.”

Lombard, 101 Ga. at 727. In such cases, “a separate action lies for

each injury thus occasioned, and the statute begins to run” from “the

time when the special injury is occasioned.” Id. (citing Athens Mfg.

Co. v. Rucker, 80 Ga. 291 (4 SE 885) (1887) (“So this court has held

that recovery might be had for injuries [to a plaintiff’s property]

resulting from the erection and maintenance of a dam, in so far as

such injuries occurred within four years preceding the bringing of

the action, although the dam may have remained unchanged for

twenty years.”)).

                                    14
      There are also cases, however, where the permanent nuisance

causes multiple harms to a plaintiff’s property—some of which are

immediately observable upon the completion or construction of the

nuisance and some of which are not observable until later—i.e.,

cases where the nuisance “is by its nature continuing” and “will

continue indefinitely.” Cox v. Cambridge Square Towne Houses,

Inc., 239 Ga. 127, 127-128 (236 SE2d 73) (1977). Pinpointing when

the statute of limitation starts to run in such cases can be

challenging—both for litigants and for factfinders. See id. (noting

that confusion “has long existed as to when a nuisance, which is by

its nature continuing, is considered permanent”).

      The circumstances at issue in Cox were strikingly similar to

those in the present case. 5 The subject nuisance was “by its nature

                        —————————————————————
      5 Cox involved an apartment owner’s installation of a storm drain system

in an apartment complex. Id. More than four years after the drain system was
installed, the adjacent landowner filed a lawsuit against the apartment owner,
alleging that “the storm drain system greatly increased the flow of surface
waters across his land and constituted a trespass” and that, “as a result of the
storm sewer, whenever heavy rains fall, the sewer empties great quantities of
water into a creek which runs through the [adjacent landowner’s] back yard,”
causing “erosion of the banks of the creek” and “slowly washing away the
[adjacent landowner’s] property.” Id. at 127-128. The trial court dismissed the
                                         15
continuing;” the lawsuit arising out of this nuisance was “filed more

than four years after the creation of the nuisance;” and “the dispute

center[ed] around whether the action for damages [was] barred by

the statute of limitations.” Cox, 239 Ga. at 127. In Cox, the Court

held that, where the subject nuisance “will continue indefinitely,

the appellant has the right to elect to treat the nuisance as

temporary and sue for all those damages which have occurred within

the past four years, or he may elect to sue for all future damages as

well and put an end to the matter.”              Id. at 128 (citation and

punctuation omitted).

      In other words, under Cox, when a nuisance “is by its nature

continuing,” the plaintiff can elect to proceed in one of two ways.

The first option would be to treat the nuisance as “temporary” and

file a lawsuit to recover for “all those damages [or harms] which have

                        —————————————————————
landowner’s complaint, concluding that the “claims were barred by the four
year statute of limitation applicable to damage to realty.” Id. at 127. On
appeal, this Court reversed the trial court’s ruling, concluding that “it was
error to dismiss the suit” because the statute of limitations had not run on the
landowner’s claims. Cox, 239 Ga. at 128.

                                         16
occurred [to the plaintiff’s property] within the past four years.”

Cox, 239 Ga. at 127-128. And, by implication, when the plaintiff

elects to proceed in this manner and treats the nuisance as

“temporary,” if the continuing nuisance causes additional harms to

the plaintiff’s property in the future, the plaintiff can file another

lawsuit seeking recovery for these additional harms, as long as the

plaintiff initiates the lawsuit within four years from the occurrence

of that future harm. See Lombard, 101 Ga. at 727 (in these cases,

“every continuance of the nuisance is a fresh nuisance, for which a

fresh action will lie,” and the cause of action “accrues at the time of

such continuance” and “the statute of limitations runs only from the

time of such accrual”). Alternatively, the plaintiff can elect to file a

single lawsuit to recover for harms that occurred to the plaintiff’s

property within the past four years and for all prospective harms

that might occur to the plaintiff’s property in the future. See Cox,

239 Ga. at 127-128. And, if the plaintiff elects to proceed in this

                                     17
manner, the plaintiff is limited to seeking those damages in one

lawsuit. See id.

     In the present case, the nuisance complained of is the

expansion of McFarland Parkway, the drainage system associated

with the McFarland Parkway Project, and other construction

aspects of this roadway expansion project, which was completed in

2000.   In its complaint, Wise alleged that, as a result of this

nuisance, whenever significant rainfall occurs, Wise’s Subject Pipe

is “deliberate[ly,] regular[ly,] and recurrent[ly]” used for “the

disposal of unnatural volumes of stormwater runoff,” which has

caused the gradual deterioration of the Subject Pipe, erosion of the

surrounding soil, and the development of a sinkhole—harms of

which Wise became aware on or after June 27, 2016. In sum, Wise

has alleged a nuisance that “will continue indefinitely,” and because

this alleged nuisance will continue indefinitely, Wise had the option

either “to treat the nuisance as ‘temporary’ and sue for all those

damages which have occurred within the past four years,” or to

                                    18
“elect to sue for all future damages as well and put an end to the

matter.” Cox, 239 Ga. at 128. And, here, Wise has elected to pursue

the latter option and to sue both for those harms that occurred

within the past four years, as well as all future harms, in one

lawsuit. See id.

     The Court of Appeals determined that Wise’s inverse-

condemnation-by-permanent-nuisance claim was barred because

the only harm to Wise’s property was the “alleged dramatic increase

in stormwater runoff,” which would have been “immediately

observable” to Wise in 2000 when the McFarland Parkway Project

was completed. Wise, 363 Ga. App. at 328 (1). See also Forrister,

289 Ga. at 333 (2).   However, this was not the only harm that Wise

alleged, and Wise did not allege that it was observable to Wise in

2000. Wise alleged that there were three related harms resulting

from the permanent nuisance: (1) increased stormwater runoff,

which arguably began when the McFarland Parkway Project was

completed, but was not visible to Wise; (2) a sinkhole, which

                                    19
appeared in Wise’s parking lot in June of 2016; and (3) erosion of the

Subject Pipe and surrounding soil which Wise observed in

September 2016. And, because the Court of Appeals was “reviewing

an order on a motion to dismiss,” it was required to “take the

allegations in the complaint as true and resolve all doubts in favor

of the [plaintiff].” See Norman v. Xytex Corp., 310 Ga. 127, 128 (1)

(848 SE2d 835) (2020).

     [T]he well-established test that must be satisfied before a
     motion to dismiss can be granted is a demanding one: A
     motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
     relief may be granted should not be sustained unless (1)
     the allegations of the complaint disclose with certainty
     that the claimant would not be entitled to relief under any
     state of provable facts asserted in support thereof; and (2)
     the movant establishes that the claimant could not
     possibly introduce evidence within the framework of the
     complaint sufficient to warrant a grant of the relief
     sought. In reviewing such a motion, any doubts regarding
     the complaint must be construed in favor of the plaintiff.

Id. at 130-31 (2) (citations and punctuation omitted).

     The Court of Appeals erred in failing to accept as true—as it

was required to do—Wise’s allegations that the alleged harms were

hidden from Wise’s view (i.e., not observable) until Wise discovered

                                    20
the sinkhole on its property in 2016. See Norman, 310 Ga. at 131

(2). Accordingly, we conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in

affirming the trial court’s dismissal of Wise’s inverse-condemnation-

by-permanent-nuisance claim on the basis that this claim was

barred by the statute of limitation under OCGA § 9-3-30 (a). Thus,

we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the

case to the Court of Appeals with direction to remand the case to the

trial court to conduct further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

     Judgment reversed and case remanded.          All the Justices
concur.

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