Court Opinion

ID: 9541195
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:23:25.442099+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:39.862942
License: Public Domain

Justice LOHR
dissenting:
The majority holds that police inspection of a residential property by use of a helicopter that made four or five passes over that property, hovered in place, and provided vantage points from which police officers took a number of photographs of the property did not constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution or Article II, Section 7, of the Colorado Constitution. The majority therefore approves the inclusion of information gained by that inspection in an affidavit used to obtain a search warrant for the property. Consequently, it affirms the judgment of the Colorado Court of Appeals upholding the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained by a search of the property by officers who entered onto the property under authority of the warrant. See People v. Henderson, 847 P.2d 239 (Colo.App.1993). Because I conclude that the aerial inspection constituted a warrantless search proscribed by both the federal and state constitutions, and that the information gained by that search was essential to support the issuance of the search warrant, I respectfully dissent to parts II and III of the majority opinion and would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and return the case to that court with directions to remand for a new trial.1
I.
The inspection by helicopter at issue here was precipitated by three anonymous telephone calls to police officers, stating in various degrees of detail that the defendant, Bernard Henderson, was engaged in growing and selling marijuana at his residence at 4466 West Bowles Avenue in Littleton, Colorado.2 The first call came in July 1989 and the latter two were received by the police on September 7 and 8 of that year.
On four consecutive days beginning July 24, 1989, police officers conducted surveillance of 4466 West Bowles Avenue for periods ranging from one-half hour to two hours each day. They learned that 4466 West Bowles Avenue was situated on the southwest corner of an intersection. A six foot wooden fence extended along the east side of the property. From the public sidewalks and the street, the officers could see inside the house and could identify a garage, a shed, and some stables behind the house. During the surveillance the officers saw nothing suggesting that criminal activity was taking place.
As detailed in the majority opinion, the police officers obtained the cooperation of television station KUSA, Channel 9, in transporting two officers to inspect the property by use of a KUSA helicopter. See maj. op. at 385-386. On September 8, 1989, the helicopter made four to five passes over the property, including one directly over the residence, at altitudes ranging between 500 and 700 feet. Once, the helicopter hovered in place directly over the property. These activities occupied approximately five minutes, during which the officers took still photographs of the property and a KUSA news photographer recorded observations with a videocamera. Based in part on the information obtained from the inspection, the officers obtained a search warrant, conducted a search of the premises, and acquired the incriminating evidence of marijuana cultivation that became the subject of the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence.
Officer Greg Bohlen, who received the first and last of the three calls from the anonymous informant, was one of the two officers on the flight. He executed the affidavit for search warrant and was the only participant in the helicopter flight who testified at the suppression hearing. In the affidavit, he stated that during the flight he observed a shed with a “clear plastic type roof’ consis*395tent with the cultivation of marijuana. He stated that he “observed through the clear plastic a green leafy plant which is consistent with Marihuana” and that he believed the plants to be marijuana based on the information from the anonymous calls and on his own observations. At the hearing, Bohlen acknowledged that the plastic was not “clear like a window” but maintained that neither was it like a shower curtain, because “[sjhower curtains are really hard to see through. I could see through this.” He also testified that his eyesight was better than 20-20 and that by naked eye he could obtain a clearer vision of the premises than what was depicted on the photographs. The defendant, on the other hand, testified that the covering on the shed consisted of four layers of plastic reinforced by chicken wire. The trial court noted that the covering was made up of “some layers of plastic” but resolved the credibility issue by finding that Bohlen “did have the ability, based on his expertise, to see plants of such a significant size from the area of 500 feet of air space above it.”
In ruling on the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence, the trial court held that the defendant had an expectation of privacy in his house and curtilage,3 but held that a helicopter operating as did the one in this case does not “violate[ ] a reasonable expectation of privacy that a normal citizen would have.” Relying principally on Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 109 S.Ct. 693, 102 L.Ed.2d 835 (1989), the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed. People v. Henderson, 847 P.2d 239, 241-43 (Colo.App.1993).
II.
A.
The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures is guaranteed by both the United States Constitution and the Colorado Constitution. U.S. Const, amend. IV; Colo. Const, art. II, § 7; Hoffman v. People, 780 P.2d 471, 473 (Colo. 1989). In order to safeguard this right, a warrant is generally required before a government official may conduct a search. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714-15, 104 S.Ct. 3296, 3303, 82 L.Ed.2d 530 (1984). In particular, warrantless searches are presumptively invalid as contravening the federal and state constitutional protections against unreasonable searches, subject only to a few specifically delineated exceptions. Hoffman, 780 P.2d at 474.
The issue presented in the present case is whether the inspection of the defendant’s residence property and curtilage constituted a search. It is undisputed that no warrant was obtained to support the aerial inspection and that none of the small group of exceptions to the warrant requirement is applicable. The determination of whether governmental activities constitute a search requires delineation of the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment. In Hoffman, we summarized the well-settled principles by which those interests are to be identified:
The touchstone of fourth amendment analysis is whether a person has a “constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy” in the area or item searched or seized. Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 360, 88 S.Ct. 507, 516,19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 211, 106 S.Ct. at 1811; Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 1740-41, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984). That determination requires the court to ascertain whether an individual has exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy in the particular place or object in question and whether that subjective expectation is one society recognizes as reasonable. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361, 88 S.Ct. at 516. The existence of a legitimate expectation of privacy must be determined after examining all the facts and circumstances in each particular case. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 177-78, 104 S.Ct. at 1740-41; People v. Shorty, 731 P.2d 679, 681 (Colo.1987); People v. Oates, 698 P.2d 811, 819 (Colo.1985); People v. Savage, 630 P.2d 1070, 1073 (Colo.1981).
*396Hoffman, 780 P.2d at 474. A determination of whether a person has a constitutionally-protected reasonable expectation of privacy in an area or item to be searched, therefore, requires a two-part analysis. First, the court must ascertain whether the defendant manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the area or item to be searched. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211, 106 S.Ct. 1809, 1811, 90 L.Ed.2d 210 (1986); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361, 88 S.Ct. 607, 516-17, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967); Hoffman, 780 P.2d at 474. Once it has been demonstrated that the defendant did manifest such an expectation, the next step is to determine whether that expectation was objectively reasonable — that is, one that society recognizes as reasonable. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 211, 106 S.Ct. at 1811; Katz, 389 U.S. at 361, 88 S.Ct. at 516-17; Hoffman, 780 P.2d at 474.
The defendant manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the interior of the covered shed. The defendant took precautions to protect the contents of the shed from observation. The shed itself was located in the backyard of the defendant’s home, within the curtilage. The sides of the shed shielded the interior from ground-level observation, and layers of plastic covered the top. A six foot wooden fence along the east side of the property adjoining the street offered further protection. Under these circumstances there can be no doubt that the defendant intended and expected that the shed would not be open to public inspection. See Riley, 488 U.S. at 450, 109 S.Ct. at 697. Thus, the first prong of the analysis has been satisfied.
It is the second prong — whether the expectation of privacy is one society recognizes as reasonable — that is at issue here. A deeply divided United States Supreme Court has delivered two decisions involving aerial surveillance that provide guidance for resolution of this issue. The first is California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 106 S.Ct. 1809,.90 L.Ed.2d 210 (1986), the second Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 109 S.Ct. 693, 102 L.Ed.2d 835 (1989).
In Ciraolo the Court, in a five to four decision, held that police officers’ aerial observations of plants growing in the curtilage of a home and “readily discernible to the naked eye as marijuana” from an airplane lawfully operating at an altitude of 1,000 feet did not violate “an expectation of privacy that is reasonable.” Id., 476 U.S. at 213, 106 S.Ct. at 1812. High fences six and ten feet tall surrounded the property and prevented observation of the eight to ten feet high plants from ground level. In reaching its conclusion, the Court found it irrelevant that the purpose of the flight was to identify the plants and that the officers were trained to recognize marijuana. Id. at 213, 106 S.Ct. at 1812. The Court acknowledged that Fourth Amendment protections extend to the curti-lage, see supra note 3, but noted that the observations took place “within public navigable airspace” and “in a physically nonintra-sive manner” and that “[a]ny member of the public flying in this airspace who glanced down could have seen everything that these officers observed.” Id. at 213-14, 106 S.Ct. at 1813. The Court summarized:
“In an age where private and commercial flight in the public airways is routine, it is unreasonable for respondent to expect that his marijuana plants were constitutionally protected from being observed with the naked eye from an altitude of 1,000 feet.” Id. at 215, 106 S.Ct. at 1813.
Three years after issuing Ciraolo, the Court decided Riley. That case involved an aerial observation of a greenhouse by helicopter. The greenhouse was located behind a mobile home on a five acre parcel of rural property. Two sides of the greenhouse were not enclosed, but the contents of the structure were obscured from view by trees, shrubs, and the mobile home. The greenhouse roof was made up of both translucent and opaque panels, but two panels, constituting approximately ten percent of the roof area, were missing. Operating on a tip, and being unable to see the contents of the greenhouse from the road, an investigating officer circled twice over the property in a helicopter at a height of 400 feet and, through the openings in the sides and roof, was able to identify what he thought to be marijuana growing in the structure. A plurality of four justices held that Ciraolo controlled and that the inspection was not a *397search subject to the Fourth Amendment. “Our reasoning [in Ciraolo ] was that the home and its curtilage are not necessarily protected from inspection that involves no physical invasion.” Riley, 488 U.S. at 449, 109 S.Ct. at 696. Noting that what a person knowingly exposes to the public even in his own home or office is not subject to Fourth Amendment protection, that generally police may see what may be seen from a public vantage point where they have a right to be, that private and commercial flight by helicopter in the public airways is routine in this country, and that the helicopter was within navigable airspace specified by law and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations, the plurality rejected the respondent’s claim that he reasonably anticipated that the greenhouse would not be subject to observation from that altitude. Id. at 449-52, 109 S.Ct. at 696-97. The plurality cautioned, however, that an inspection of the curtilage of a house from an aircraft will not necessarily always pass muster under the Fourth Amendment simply because the plane was within the lawful navigable air space, id. at 451, 109 S.Ct. at 697, and concluded:
Neither is there any intimation here that the helicopter interfered with respondent’s normal use of the greenhouse or of other parts of the curtilage. As far as this record reveals, no intimate details connected with the use of the home or curtilage were observed, and there was no undue noise, and no wind, dust, or threat of injury.
Id. at 452, 109 S.Ct. at 697.
Justice O’Connor’s opinion concurring in the judgment in Riley supplied the vote necessary to make up a majority for the holding that the inspection by helicopter did not violate an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable and therefore did not constitute a search. She criticized the plurality approach, however, because it “rests the scope of Fourth Amendment protection too heavily on compliance with FAA regulations whose purpose is to promote air safety, not to protect ‘[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.’ ” Id. (O’Con-nor, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting U.S. Const, amend. IV). Justice O’Connor echoed Ciraolo in emphasizing the importance of the curtilage in Fourth Amendment doctrine: “ ‘The protection afforded the cur-tilage is essentially a protection of families and personal property in an area intimately linked to the home, both physically and psychologically, where privacy expectations are most heightened.’ ” Id (quoting Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 212-13, 106 S.Ct. at 1812). Justice O’Connor noted, however, that police officers are not required to shield their eyes when passing by a home on public thoroughfares and that in Ciraolo the court had likened the observation from the plane to such observations from public ways. This analogy applied “because public air travel at 1,000 feet is a sufficiently routine part of modern life that it is unreasonable for persons on the ground to expect that their curtilage will not be observed from the air at that altitude.” Id. 488 U.S. at 453, 109 S.Ct. at 698. Noting the practical difficulties of concealing outdoor patios and yards from all conceivablé aerial views, Justice O’Connor stated that “[t]he fact that a helicopter could conceivably observe the curtilage at virtually any altitude or angle, without violating FAA regulations, does not in itself mean that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy from such observation.” Id. at 454, 109 S.Ct. at 699. She then articulated a test for determining whether one has a reasonable expectation of privacy in cases such as this:
In determining whether Riley had a reasonable expectation of privacy from aerial observation, the relevant inquiry after Cir-aolo is not whether the helicopter was where it had a right to be under FAA regulations. Rather, consistent with Katz, we must ask whether the helicopter was in the public airways at an altitude at which members of the public travel with sufficient regularity that Riley’s expectation of privacy from aerial observation was not “one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” ... Nor is it conclusive that police helicopters may often fly at 400 feet. If the public rarely, if ever, travels overhead at such altitudes, the observation cannot be said to be from a vantage point generally used by the public and Riley *398cannot be said to have “knowingly expose[d]” his greenhouse to public view.
Id. at 454-55, 109 S.Ct. at 699 (emphasis added). The plurality, as well, considered the frequency of low-level overflights to be of some significance: “[TJhere is nothing in the record or before us to suggest that helicopters flying at 400 feet are sufficiently rare in this country to lend substance to respondent’s claim that he reasonably anticipated that his greenhouse would not be subject to observation from that altitude.” Id. at 451-52, 109 S.Ct. at 697 (plurality opinion).
The defendant in Riley introduced no evidence concerning the frequency of public use of the airspace at the altitude in question. See Riley, 488 U.S. at 455, 109 S.Ct. at 699. Justice O’Connor resolved the search issue by holding that the defendant must bear the burden of proving his expectation of privacy was reasonable.4 She concluded, “[bjecause there is reason to believe that there is considerable public use of airspace at altitudes of 400 feet and above, and because Riley introduced no evidence to the contrary before the Florida courts, I conclude that Riley’s expectation that his curtilage was protected from naked-eye aerial observation from that altitude was not a reasonable one.” Id.
The general principle that emerges from Ciraolo and Riley is that a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to those features of a residence and its curtilage that can be observed from the air with the naked eye at altitudes flown by members of the public with some regularity. As is apparent from the Court’s analyses in those cases, however, the facts and circumstances of each individual case must also be examined as they bear on the reasonableness of the expectation of privacy. See also Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177-78, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 1740-41, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984); Hoffman, 780 P.2d at 474.
B.
The majority purports to apply a totality of the circumstances test to determine whether Henderson had a reasonable expectation of privacy. However, the majority relies on only two factors in arriving at its conclusion that the aerial inspection of the defendant’s property was not a search. First, because the helicopter “was flying at an altitude of between 500 and 700 feet, which is a permissible altitude under current FAA regulations,” the marijuana, in the majority’s opinion, “was in plain view to anyone legally viewing the shed from the helicopter.” Maj. op. at 389, 390. Second, the observation “posed only a very limited degree of intrusiveness” because of the duration and altitude of the flight and the limited evidence of “noise, wind, dust, threat of injury, or interference with the use of the curtilage.” Id. at 390.
It is true that the helicopter was flying at altitudes permitted by FAA regulations and in that sense the observations were made while the helicopter and its occupants were at a lawful location. This, however, is not dispositive, as both the plurality and Justice O’Connor agreed in Riley. See Riley, 488 U.S. at 451, 109 S.Ct. at 697 (“This is not to say that an inspection of the curtilage of a house from an aircraft will always pass muster under the Fourth Amendment simply because the plane is within the navigable *399airspace specified by law.” (plurality opinion)); id. at 453, 109 S.Ct. at 698 (“Although ‘helicopters are not bound by the lower limits of the navigable airspace allowed to other aircraft,’ ante, at 451, [109 S.Ct. at 697] there is no reason to assume that compliance with FAA regulations alone determines ‘ “whether the government’s intrusion infringes upon the personal and societal values protected by the Fourth Amendment.” ’ ” (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 212, 106 S.Ct. at 1812 (in turn quoting Oliver, 466 U.S. at 182-83, 104 S.Ct. at 1743)). After all, the purpose of FAA regulations is to promote safety, not to protect “ ‘[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.’ ” Riley, 488 U.S. at 452, 109 S.Ct. at 697 (O’Connor, J. concurring in the judgment) (quoting U.S. Const, amend. IV).
Furthermore, the contents of the covered shed simply cannot be fairly described as having been in plain view. Unlike Ciraolo, this is not a case where “[a]ny member of the public flying in this airspace who glanced down would have seen everything that these officers observed.” Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213-14, 106 S.Ct. at 1812-13. The helicopter here made four to five passes, hovered over the property, and took five minutes to enable Officer Bohlen to determine that plants were growing underneath the layers of plastic in the covered shed. As well as can be determined from the record, the roof was sufficiently translucent to permit only a determination upon close examination from the air that some type of large, green plants were being grown. It is implicit in Officer Boh-len’s testimony and the findings of the trial court that absent the information provided by the anonymous tips, Officer Bohlen would not have been able to arrive at an opinion that the growing plants were marijuana. The plants were not growing in the open as in Ciraolo, nor was there an unobstructed view of them through the open sides or roof of a structure as in Riley. Rather, they were covered by a roof made up of layers of plastic and were protected from view from public ways on the ground. As Justice O’Connor noted in her opinion concurring in the judgment in Riley, “[t]o require individuals to completely cover and enclose their curtilage is to demand more than the ‘precautions customarily taken by those seeking privacy.’ ” Riley, 488 U.S. at 454,109 S.Ct. at 699 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 152, 99 S.Ct. 421, 435, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring)). I discover no basis for a conclusion that the use of the translucent roofing material exposed the plants to public view.
The second of the two factors considered by the majority is intrusivéness. The majority concludes that “the observation posed only a very limited degree of intrusiveness” because “[t]here is little evidence of the noise, wind, dust, threat of injury, or interference with the use of the curtilage” and the neighbors did not come out of their homes to see the helicopter. Maj. op. at 390. This analysis neglects an aspect of intrusiveness central to Fourth Amendment values. Here, the occupants of the helicopter, by making four or five passes and hovering over the property, were positioned to examine the entire curtilage and to observe any activities taking place there. Such an examination of an area that has been recognized as “intimately linked to the home, both physically and psychologically, where privacy expectations are most heightened,” Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213, 106 S.Ct. at 1812, posed a degree of intrusiveness far greater than the “very limited degree of intrusiveness” acknowledged by the majority. See maj. op. at 390.
When isolating and analyzing the relevant facts and circumstances, it is important not to lose sight of the larger picture. Here, police spent approximately five minutes over a residence and curtilage scrutinizing the area and taking photos in order to attempt to determine the contents of a shed covered with translucent material. This was not the type of information that a member of the public could readily ascertain while passing over the property in an airplane or helicopter. In fact, the location was one that, according to the unrebutted testimony of the defendant, was not within the path of any ongoing commercial or other air traffic and had not been overflown by helicopter or airplane.*4005 All these things are relevant when considering the totality of the circumstances. I do not believe that either Riley or Ciraolo can be read to hold that aerial surveillance, without regard to its duration or nature, will never constitute a search as long as FAA regulations are not transgressed, see supra at 397-398, a principle that the majority opinion comes dangerously close to adopting. See maj. op. at 389-390.
Certainly, the activities of the defendant were reprehensible and can evoke no judicial sympathy. But we cannot permit this to divert our attention from the fact that the principles established in cases such as this delineate the extent to which official intrusion into the privacy of any citizen will be constitutionally permissible. In my opinion, the police conduct in this case violated the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy and constituted a forbidden warrantless search under both the United States Constitution and the Colorado Constitution.6
III.
Having determined that the evidence obtained by aerial surveillance was the result of a warrantless search, it cannot be used to support the issuance of a search warrant. See Bartley v. People, 817 P.2d 1029, 1033 (Colo.1991) (information obtained by unconstitutional means cannot be relied upon to support a search warrant). The issue therefore becomes “whether the legally obtained information in the affidavit is sufficient, independent of that secured by unconstitutional means, to establish probable cause.” Id.; accord People v. McFall, 672 P.2d 534, 539 (Colo.1983) (search warrant not tainted where affidavit provided sufficient reliable information independent of information illegally obtained). Absent the information unconstitutionally obtained from the aerial overview, the affidavit here contained only the allegations of an anonymous informant.
Whether an affidavit based on information provided by an anonymous informant is sufficient to establish probable cause must be evaluated on the basis of the totality of the circumstances test formulated by the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). See People v. Paquin, 811 P.2d 394, 397 (Colo.1991) (confidential informant); People v. Pannebaker, 714 P.2d 904, 907 (Colo.1986) (same). The judge issuing the search warrant must make
a “practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the ‘veracity’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a *401fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.”
Paquin, 811 P.2d at 397-98 (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S.Ct. at 2332).
Because the informant was anonymous, it is difficult if not impossible in this case to assess his veracity. There is no indication that the informant has ever provided reliable information on past occasions, and the information supplied included no admission of criminal conduct or other indication of reliability. See People v. Turcotte-Schaeffer, 843 P.2d 658, 661 (Colo.1993) (admissions against penal interest have traditionally been relied upon as a means of showing that information is reliable); Paquin, 811 P.2d at 398 (empha-sising that the affidavit for search warrant contained a statement that the informant had purchased narcotics from the defendant and, further, that the informant had previously provided information that resulted in a felony arrest).
Although a “deficiency regarding reliability and veracity can be overcome by a strong showing as to the informant’s basis of knowledge or some other indicia of reliability,” People v. Leftwich, 869 P.2d 1260, 1266 (Colo.1994) (emphasis in original), the affidavit did not contain such a showing. The informant offered several detailed allegations regarding the defendant’s distribution operation. He advised Officer Bohlen that he had observed sacks of marijuana, scales, weapons, and $5,000 in cash at the defendant’s property. He also stated that he had seen the defendant enter a shed to the southwest of the house and exit with a five foot marijuana plant. According to the informant, the defendant bagged the plant and sold it to a second person. “[T]he giving of a detailed story by itself does not establish reliability because an informant could simply tell an elaborate he.” Turcotte-Schaeffer, 843 P.2d at 662 (emphasis added). Some other indicia of reliability are necessary.
The Gates totality of the circumstances test “places particular importance on the value of corroboration of the details of an informant’s tip by independent police work.” Pannebaker, 714 P.2d at 907. The only information that the informant provided Officer Bohlen that could be corroborated was a general description of the defendant’s property and car, the defendant’s name, and his address — facts easily obtained by someone unfamiliar with the defendant. Although it is not necessary that the details corroborated be incriminating in order to support a showing of probable cause, “[fjacts that are easily obtained or predictions that are easily made add little to the decision of whether probable cause for a search exists.” Leftwich, 869 P.2d at 1268.
Those Colorado cases decided after the reasoning in Gates was adopted and in which a confidential informant’s statements have been found to establish probable cause are distinguishable. In all those cases, at least some indicia of reliability exist. In some, the informant, though confidential, had proven rehable in the past. See People v. Higbee, 802 P.2d 1085 (Colo.1990); People v. Arellano, 791 P.2d 1135 (Colo.1990); People v. Varrieur, 771 P.2d 895 (Colo.1989). In others, officers were able to corroborate more than simply a location and the name of the defendant. See Pannebaker, 714 P.2d at 907 (police observation of suspicious black plastic over defendant’s windows was strong corroboration); People v. Abeyta, 795 P.2d 1324 (Colo.1990) (heavy traffic flow and seizure of marijuana cigarettes from two people leaving the residence corroborated informants’ allegations); People v. Quintana, 785 P.2d 934 (Colo.1990) (electric usage records corroborated informant’s report of defendant’s use of high-energy fights to grow marijuana); People v. Rowerdink, 756 P.2d 986 (Colo.1988) (corroboration by interview of another implicated in the criminal activity). And finally, in others, the statements made were against the penal interests of identified informants. See Turcotte-Schaeffer, 843 P.2d 658; People v. Grady, 755 P.2d 1211 (Colo.1988); People v. Lubben, 739 P.2d 833 (Colo.1987).
In the present case, absent the unconstitutionally obtained corroborating evidence obtained by the helicopter overview, the affidavit did not provide the issuing judge a substantial basis for concluding that there was probable cause to believe that drugs would be found on the defendant’s property. The warrant was therefore invalid and any evi*402dence obtained pursuant thereto must be suppressed. The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine excludes evidence uncovered as a result of a Fourth Amendment violation. People v. McCall, 672 P.2d 534, 537 (Colo.1983).
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and return the ease to that court with directions to remand to the trial court for a new trial at which the illegally obtained evidence would be excluded. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
KIRSHBAUM, J., joins in this dissent.

. Although I do not find it necessary to reach the newsperson privilege issue discussed in part IV of the majority opinion, I agree with that discussion.

. The trial court’s findings are brief. I derive the facts, as the majority necessarily does, from essentially undisputed evidence in the record.

. "Curtilage is a common-law concept which generally refers to the enclosed space of ground and buildings immediately surrounding a dwell-inghouse.” Hoffman v. People, 780 P.2d 471, 472 n. 3 (Colo.1989). It is undisputed that the shed in which the marijuana was growing was within the curtilage.

. The burden of proof issue has not been definitively resolved. The plurality in Riley does not address it directly, although the absence of evidence concerning the rarily of helicopter flights at 400 feet was a factor employed to the disadvantage of the party asserting that the aerial inspection was a search. See Riley, 488 U.S. at 451-52, 109 S.Ct. at 697. Justice Brennan, in a dissenting opinion joined by two other justices, would have resolved the issue of the frequency of low level helicopter flights by taking judicial notice that flights by privately owned helicopters at an altitude of 400 feet over populated areas “are a rarity and are almost entirely limited to approaching or leaving airports or to reporting traffic congestion near major roadways.” Id. at 465, 109 S.Ct. at 704 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun in dissent would have resolved the burden of proof based on a judicial estimate of probabilities and, believing that private helicopters rarely fly over curtilages at an altitude of 400 feet, would have imposed upon the prosecution the burden of proving the contrary as to any flight lower than the 1,000 foot elevation at issue in Ciraolo. Id. at 467-468, 109 S.Ct. at 705-06 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). I disagree with the majority, therefore, that Riley resolves the burden of proof issue. See maj. op. at 389 n. 7. I do not regard the question as of particular importance in resolving the present case, however, because the defendant here testified to the absence of helicopter flights in the area.

. Although Officer Bohlen testified that it was not unusual to fly over a residential area at 500 to 700 feet, he was not speaking of any particular location and it is not clear whether he was referring to police helicopters or helicopters transporting members of the public. See Riley, 488 U.S. at 454-55, 109 S.Ct. at 698-99 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (emphasizing that it is public traffic, not police flights, that determine the frequency of overflights for the purpose of resolving the issue of reasonableness of the expectation of privacy).

. ⅛ a number of circumstances, we have held that the Colorado Constitution provides more extensive protection than does the United States Constitution. See, e.g., People v. Oates, 698 P.2d 811, 815-16 (Colo.1985) (departing from the reasoning in United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714-15, 104 S.Ct. 3296, 3303, 82 L.Ed.2d 530 (1984), the court held that an expectation that purchased commercial goods will be free of government surveillance devices such as beepers was a legitimate expectation of privacy); People v. Corr, 682 P.2d 20, 27-28 (Colo.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 855, 105 S.Ct. 181, 83 L.Ed.2d 115 (1984) (an expectation of privacy in telephone toll records is reasonable under the Colorado constitution despite the holding in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979), that there is no such legitimate expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment); People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135, 140-42 (Colo.1983) (defendant's expectation of privacy in the numbers dialed on his home telephone is reasonable under Article II, Section 7, of the Colorado Constitution despite the Smith v. Maryland decision); Charnes v. DiGiacomo, 200 Colo. 94, 100, 612 P.2d 1117, 1120-21 (1980) (taxpayer-defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the bank records of his financial transactions although United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 96 S.Ct. 1619, 48 L.Ed.2d 71 (1976), held that no such expectation exists under the Fourth Amendment).
In view of my conclusion that the aerial inspection at issue here constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment, it is unnecessary to consider whether the standards for aerial searches are more protective under the Colorado Constitution.