Court Opinion

ID: 9529222
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:48:59.406382+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:42.520070
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
Staton, P.J.
I dissent from the majority opinion, since it creates a new “standard” of probable cause for electronic communications. This new “standard” is no standard at all. Its credentials are limited to its form and mode of transmission. If accepted, it makes searches easy. If accepted, it makes a meaningful probable cause standard unnecessary. I can not accept it; therefore, I would reverse the trial court’s judgment with instructions to grant a new trial and to sustain the motion to suppress.
I.

Probable Came

A security guard from the Saint Joseph Hospital reported that he had observed two suspicious men with a handgun concealed in a brown handbag. This report was electronically transmitted by the dispatcher. After receiving the transmitted report over their police car radio, two police officers observed the car described in the transmission and stopped it. In their search, they found no brown handbag and no handgun. After their search, they asked the occupants of the car for identification and checked for outstanding warrants. One of the occupants, Clark, was arrested on an outstanding bench warrant for a vehicle inspection sticker violation. A search of his person by the police officers revealed the possession of a controlled substance.
The test for determining whether probable cause exists is set forth in Walker v. State (1973), 155 Ind. App. 404, 293 N.E.2d 35,41:
“The test for probable cause to make an arrest is whether at the time of the arrest the facts and circumstances within *665the knowledge of the officers and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man of reasonable caution in believing that the arrestee had committed or was committing an offense.” (My emphasis.) Smith v. State (1971), 256 Ind. 603, 271 N.E.2d 133.
The arresting officers had absolutely no information from the transmission or from any other source that the men in the car had committed or were about to commit an offense. The only information they had was that the two men in the car were suspicious looking in the judgment of a hosiptal security guard and that they might be in possession of a brown handbag which concealed a handgun. The officers did not know whether the men in the car had a license to carry a handgun. Therefore, the two men were stopped by the police because, in the judgment of a security guard at the hospital, they looked suspicious.
In Paxton v. State, (1970), 255 Ind. 264, 275, 263 N.E.2d 636, 642 Justice Hunter observed:
“Appellee, in attempting to establish that the police officers had probable cause to conduct the search point out that appellant Atherton and Silcox were ‘suspicious persons’ known to both Bishop and Hutchison. We find this argument to be blatantly offensive. It will be a sad day indeed when this court sanctions the detention and search of persons and their property on the mere allegation that they are of suspicious character.”
Clark was not known by either police officer. Their actions were based solely upon the electronic transmission from the dispatcher.
In Jackson v. State (1973), 157 Ind. App. 662, 301 N.E.2d 370, 371, a similar factual posture to Clark’s search is found. In Jackson, Judge Hoffman wrote:
“. . . [Police] received from an unknown source information to the effect that Fred D. Jackson ‘was carrying a gun.’ A police officer, without obtaining a warrant . . . found Jackson sitting behind the steering wheel of an automobile ... in [a] parking lot . . . and requested Jackson to *666step out of the automobile. When Jackson complied, the officers ‘observed the butt of a pistol sticking out of his pocket.’ Thereupon, the defendant was asked if he had a permit to carry the weapon. Upon stating that he did not, the gun was confiscated and Jackson was placed under arrest. . . .
# % ij:
“It has . . . been held that a police officer who has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and presently dangerous individual may make a reasonable search for weapons although he may lack probable cause for arrest. . . . However, such a search must be based upon more than a mere ‘hunch’ or suspicion. ... A police officer must be able to point to definite facts from which he could reasonably infer that the individual he is confronting is armed and, dangerous. . . .
“A ‘tip’ from an unknown informer of unknown reliability may create, at most, mere suspicion. We therefore find that the officers were not justified in their ‘seizure’ of Jackson absent anything whatsoever to corroborate the information which they received.
“Evidence obtained through unreasonable searches and seizures is not admissible.” (Citations omitted.) (My emphasis).
The police found a handgun in Jackson’s belt. Jackson did not have a permit.
When Clark was stopped by the police, their search did not bear the fruit of a handgun or a brown handbag as described in the electronic transmission. Yet, the search was extended and Clark was detained until a further investigation could be conducted without probable cause.
II.

“Unusual Conduct”

The majority’s reliance upon the statute, IC 1971, 35-3-1-1 (Burns Code Ed.), to justify the search is misplaced. The statute mandates that the observation of the “unusual conduct” be made by the police officer who conducts the search *667and not by a private security guard whose experience and training may be considerably more limited. The statute does not cover unobservable electronic transmissions. If the transmitter does not have probable cause to arrest, probable cause can not be created by merely sending an electronic transmission of someone’s suspicions, which is all that has been done in Clark’s case.1
The statute provides: “. . . observation [by the officer] of unusual conduct under the circumstances and in light of his experience, that criminal activity has been, is being, or is about to be committed. . . .” (My emphasis). The security guard had only suspicions. He knew of no criminal activity being planned or about to be committed.
The obvious inherent danger with the majority’s interpretation of the statute is that any reported observation, (trained or untrained; experienced or inexperienced; civilian, private security guard, or other similarly situated persons with some color of authority) could initiate an arrest or search of another person by merely telephoning their suspicions to the local police station or the police dispatcher. The judgment of the experienced and trained police officer required by the statute would no longer be needed.
When Clark was stopped by the officers, one officer testified:
“Q. Did you note anything unusual about the conduct of the defendant prior to your searching him ?
“A. No, he seemed to be fairly well composed. We got along rather well I thought.
“Q. Had the defendant committed any traffic violation?
“A. No, sir. Other than going a block and a half in front of a squad car with red lights and siren and not pulling over at the earliest opportunity.”
*668III.

Conclusion

The pretext for the search of Clark’s person and car was a mere suspicion, not probable cause. The electronic transmission received by the officers over their car radio did not cause a factual mutation from suspicion to probable cause. The facts transmitted were merely someone’s suspicions about the conduct of another and nothing more. The law requires that the facts constitute probable cause to search. Less than probable cause would create easy searches.2 Less than probable cause would create illegal searches. Mere suspicion is not a substitute for probable cause. I would reverse the trial court’s judgment with instructions to grant a new trial and to sustain the motion to suppress.3
Note. — Reported at 358 N.E.2d 761.

. By transmitter, the writer includes all authorized law enforcement officers who send information to a dispatcher for transmission.

. The United States Supreme Court also had addressed the issue: “Under our system suspicion is not enough for an officer to lay hands on a citizen. ... It is better, so the Fourth Amendment teaches, that the guilty sometimes go free than that citizens be subject to easy arrest.” (My emphasis). Henry v. United States (1959), 361 U.S. 98, 104; 80 S.Ct. 168, 172; 4 L.Ed.2d 134, 139.

. Thomas Leroy Madison v. State of Indiana (1976), 171 Ind. App. 492, 357 N.E.2d 911. Judge Lybrook recognized two standards for an investigatory stop:
“. ... IC 1971, 35-3-1-1 (Burns Code Ed. authorizes a stop for ‘unusual conduct’ whenever a police officer reasonably infers, from on-the-scene observations and in light of his experience, that criminal activity has been, is being, or is about to be committed. A separate standard applies when the investigatory stop is founded on information supplied by another person, rather than the officer’s personal observation. . . .”
In Madison v. State, supra, the trial court’s judgment was reversed for the reason that the court erred in overruling the motion to suppress.