Court Opinion

ID: 9388448
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-20 16:11:10.340437+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:20.334280
License: Public Domain

J-S01010-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    JOHN GRAZIOLI                              :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1538 WDA 2021

            Appeal From the PCRA Order Entered December 8, 2021
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Criminal Division at No(s):
                          CP-25-CR-0001341-2018

BEFORE:      BENDER, P.J.E., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                       FILED: April 20, 2023

        Appellant, John Grazioli, appeals from the post-conviction court’s

December 8, 2021 order denying his timely-filed petition under the Post

Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. After careful review,

we vacate the PCRA court’s order and remand for further proceedings

consistent with this memorandum.

        In February of 2019, Appellant was convicted by a jury trial of first-

degree murder, recklessly endangering another person, and carrying a firearm

without a license based on evidence that he shot his wife in the back of the

head while she slept.        On April 5, 2019, Appellant was sentenced to an

aggregate term of life imprisonment, without the possibility of parole. We

affirmed his judgment of sentence on direct appeal. See Commonwealth v.

____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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Grazioli, 229 A.3d 335 (Pa. Super. 2020) (unpublished memorandum).

Appellant did not petition for allowance of appeal with our Supreme Court.

      On January 21, 2021, Appellant filed a timely, pro se PCRA petition

raising eight claims of trial and appellate counsel ineffectiveness, and one

sentencing issue. The court thereafter appointed Tina Fryling, Esq., as counsel

for Appellant.    Attorney Fryling filed a supplemental petition, simply

incorporating by reference all the averments set forth in Appellant’s pro se

petition.   The PCRA court found Attorney Fryling’s supplemental petition

inadequate, and ordered her to file another supplemental petition “identifying,

distilling[,] and presenting in legal terms those pro se claims which counsel

believes have legal merit.” PCRA Court Order, 5/7/21, at 2.

      On June 4, 2021, Attorney Fryling filed an amended, supplemental

petition raising six claims of trial and appellate counsel ineffectiveness. The

Commonwealth thereafter filed a response, as well as a motion to dismiss

Appellant’s petition.   On September 16, 2021, the PCRA court issued a

Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its intent to dismiss Appellant’s petition without a

hearing. Appellant, via Attorney Fryling, filed two responses to the Rule 907

notice, as well as a supplemental PCRA petition adding another claim of trial

counsel ineffectiveness. Counsel asked, inter alia, that the court conduct an

evidentiary hearing.    On November 10, 2021, the court issued another

Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its intent to dismiss, stating that it accepted

Appellant’s   amended    petition,   but   deemed   meritless   the   additional

ineffectiveness claim raised therein.

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       On December 2, 2021, Appellant filed a pro se response to the court’s

Rule 907 notice.        Therein, he claimed that Attorney Fryling had acted

ineffectively     by     raising    certain      of   his   post-conviction   claims

inaccurately/incorrectly. Appellant requested that the PCRA court address his

ineffectiveness claims pertaining to Attorney Fryling under Commonwealth

v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381, 401 (Pa. 2021) (holding “that a PCRA petitioner

may, after a PCRA court denies relief, and after obtaining new counsel or

acting pro se, raise claims of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness at the first

opportunity to do so, even if on appeal”). On December 8, 2021, the PCRA

court issued a memorandum and final order acknowledging Appellant’s

ineffectiveness claims against Attorney Fryling, but stating that it was not

permitted to consider Appellant’s pro se filing under the rule precluding hybrid

representation.        See Memorandum and Order, 12/8/21, at 2 (citing

Commonwealth v. Willis, 29 A.3d 393, 400 (Pa. Super. 2011)). That same

day, the court issued an order dismissing Appellant’s petition.

       Attorney Fryling filed a timely notice of appeal on Appellant’s behalf. On

January 13, 2022, Appellant filed with this Court a pro se petition, again

alleging Attorney Fryling’s ineffectiveness and asking that we remand for the

appointment of new counsel in accordance with Bradley. On January 20,

2022, Attorney Fryling filed an “Application to Remand for a Grazier[1] Hearing

and/or to Appoint Substitute Counsel.” On February 1, 2022, this Court issued

____________________________________________

1   Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998).

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a per curiam order remanding for the PCRA court to hold a Grazier hearing

and “determine whether Appellant wishes to proceed pro se and if Appellant’s

decision to proceed pro se is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.”     Order,

2/1/22, at 1 (single page).

      On February 17, 2022, the PCRA court notified this Court that it had

conducted a Grazier hearing on February 14, 2022.            There, Appellant

indicated that he did not want to proceed pro se, and he agreed to continue

with Attorney Fryling as his counsel. See Response to Order, 2/17/22, at 1

(unnumbered). However, on February 24, 2022, Appellant once again filed a

pro se petition requesting that we remand. Appellant stated that our initial

remand for a Grazier hearing was improper, as he had never expressed his

desire to proceed pro se but had, instead, asked for the appointment of new

counsel so he could assert claims of Attorney Fryling’s ineffectiveness under

Bradley.     Therefore, he requested that we remand for new counsel to be

appointed.

      On March 1, 2022, we issued a per curiam order directing the PCRA

court to appoint Appellant new counsel within 14 days of the date of our order.

We directed Appellant’s new counsel to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise

statement of errors complained of on appeal within 21 days of being

appointed. We also ordered the PCRA court to thereafter file a Rule 1925(a)

opinion. On March 15, 2022, the PCRA court appointed William J. Hathaway,

Esq., to represent Appellant, and ordered Attorney Hathaway to file a Rule

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1925(b) statement within 21 days.      Attorney Hathaway timely filed a Rule

1925(b) statement, and the court thereafter filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion.

      On October 13, 2022, Attorney Hathaway filed an appellate brief on

Appellant’s behalf, stating the following issues for our review:

      A. Whether the [PCRA c]ourt erred in failing to grant PCRA relief
      relating to the ineffective assistance of trial counsel in failing to
      move for a change of venue?

      B. Whether the [PCRA c]ourt erred in failing to grant PCRA relief
      relating to the ineffective assistance of trial counsel in failing to
      raise on direct appeal the claim of the trial court permitting the
      introduction into evidence and examination of messages
      purportedly from [Appellant] to other women on the “Kik” instant
      messaging app?

      C. Whether the [PCRA c]ourt erred in failing to grant PCRA relief
      relating to the ineffective assistance of trial counsel in failing to
      challenge the forensic results of the firearm allegedly used by
      [Appellant] and/or in explicitly challenging the specifications and
      independent testing of the firearm?

      D. Whether the [PCRA c]ourt erred in failing to grant PCRA relief
      relating to the ineffective assistance of trial counsel in failing to
      raise on direct appeal the insufficient and misleading jury
      instructions for possession of [an] instrument[] of crime?

      E. Whether … [A]ppellant was afforded ineffective assistance of
      PCRA counsel in that [Appellant] discerned that he had misstated
      the relevant jury instruction at issue in the preceding claim within
      his pro se PCRA [petition,] and he sought to rectify that omission
      by apprising PCRA counsel of the actual framing of the [possession
      of an instrument of crime] jury instruction, but PCRA counsel[,]
      despite affirming that she would make the correction[,] merely
      restated [Appellant’s] errant claim without modification?

      F. Whether … [A]ppellant was afforded ineffective assistance of
      PCRA counsel given the failure to discern, preserve and argue a
      claim relating to the fact that trial counsel sought to present an
      incongruent and factually[-]flawed[,] mixed defense of voluntary
      intoxication and resultant diminished capacity and accidental
      shooting[,] which were logically inconsistent and disparate

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      thereby serving to undermine the credibility of both respective
      defenses to the detriment of … [A]ppellant?

      G. Whether … [A]ppellant was afforded ineffective assistance of
      PCRA counsel given the failure to discern, preserve and argue the
      failure of trial counsel to object to the Commonwealth’s cross-
      examination of him, which materially exceeded the scope of
      direct[-]examination and delved into issues and facts not
      developed on direct examination?

      H. Whether … [A]ppellant was afforded ineffective assistance of
      PCRA counsel given the failure to discern, preserve and argue that
      trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the
      Commonwealth’s closing argument including details concerning
      Dr. Vey’s testimony[,] which was substantially misrepresented to
      the extent … [it] constitute[d] prosecutorial misconduct through
      the fabrication of trial evidence and the exaggeration of unfounded
      references to the trial record?

      I. Whether … [A]ppellant was afforded ineffective assistance of
      PCRA counsel for want of the submission of objections or response
      to the [“]Notice of Intent to Dismiss PCRA[,”] wherein the [PCRA
      c]ourt concluded that the evidence was overwhelming whereas
      there was no evidence of record except [Appellant’s] own
      testimony explaining what transpired as to the shooting while the
      Commonwealth evidence focused solely on the history of
      [Appellant] and his actions subsequent to the shooting[,] which
      collectively is inconclusive and amounts to supposition as to the
      criminal intent of [Appellant] at the time of the shooting for
      purposes of assignment of the level of criminal culpability
      spanning from first degree murder to involuntary manslaughter
      consistent with the jury instructions set forth?

Appellant’s Brief at 2-3.

      On October 27, 2022, Appellant filed another, pro se petition for

remand. Therein, he averred that Attorney Hathaway acted ineffectively by

filing an appellate brief that waives certain claims for our review. Appellant

contended that Attorney Hathaway’s appellate arguments are undeveloped

and lack citations to any legal authority and/or the record.      Accordingly,

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Appellant requested to proceed pro se, and asked that we remand for a

Grazier hearing. On November 10, 2022, this Court issued a per curiam order

denying Appellant’s petition, citing Grazier’s rule that an appellant cannot

request to proceed pro se after his counsel has filed an appellate brief. See

Order, 11/10/22 at 1 (single page) (citing Grazier, 713 A.2d at 82).

      On November 14, 2022, the Commonwealth filed its appellate brief.

Notably, the Commonwealth argues therein that several of Appellant’s claims

should be rejected because he fails to cite to the record, and/or he presents

claims that are speculative, conclusory, and vague.      See Commonwealth’s

Brief at 5 (stating that, in support of his first issue, “Appellant presents only

vague, speculative and conclusory arguments without any substantiation,

specificity or citations to the record”); id. (stating that Appellant’s second

issue “is speculative and conclusory and unsupported by any specific evidence

or reference to the record”); id. at 8 (arguing that we should reject Appellant’s

fifth issue because he “presents no evidence to substantiate this claim, nor

does he establish that the claim is of arguable merit or that counsel had no

reasonable basis for her alleged conduct or omission, nor does Appellant

establish prejudice”); id. at 9 (asserting that Appellant’s seventh, eighth, and

ninth issues should be found meritless because “Appellant offers only bald and

conclusory arguments, presents no substantiating evidence or citations to the

record, and fails to meet his burden of proof”).

      On November 28, 2022, Appellant filed another pro se petition, which

this Court deferred until disposition by this panel. In his petition, Appellant

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again avers that Attorney Hathaway acted ineffectively by filing an appellate

brief that waives multiple issues due to counsel’s undeveloped arguments, and

failure to cite to legal authority and/or the record where necessary. However,

this time Appellant does not ask that we remand for a Grazier hearing to

determine if he can proceed pro se but, instead, he requests that we remand

for the appointment of new counsel.

      Having carefully reviewed the record and the complex procedural history

of this case, we conclude that Appellant’s petition for remand should be

granted. Our examination of the brief filed by Attorney Hathaway confirms

Appellant’s assertions of ineffectiveness.      As Appellant argues (and the

Commonwealth       essentially   concedes),    Attorney    Hathaway     presented

undeveloped arguments that lack citations to any legal authority, and/or

citations to the record, for several of Appellant’s issues.      For instance, in

support of Appellant’s first issue alleging trial counsel’s ineffectiveness for not

seeking a change of venue, Attorney Hathaway presents a two-paragraph,

page-and-a-half argument that has no citation to any legal authority. See

Appellant’s Brief at 10-11. In support of Appellant’s second issue, alleging

that direct appeal counsel was ineffective for “failing to raise … the claim of

the trial court[’s] permitting the introduction into evidence and examination

of messages purportedly from [Appellant] to other women on the ‘Kik’ instant

messaging app[lication,]” Attorney Hathaway does not cite to where in the

record this evidence was admitted.         Id. at 11.     Additionally, counsel’s

argument in support of this claim is also a meager two paragraphs. Id. at 11-

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12.   Moreover, Attorney Hathaway cites no legal authority to support

Appellant’s third, fifth, sixth, seventh, or ninth issues. See id. at 12-14, 16-

20, 23-25.

      Given these briefing deficiencies, we agree with Appellant that Attorney

Hathaway has waived the majority of his issues for our review.              See

Commonwealth v. Hardy, 918 A.2d 766, 771 (Pa. Super. 2007) (“When

briefing the various issues that have been preserved, it is an appellant’s duty

to present arguments that are sufficiently developed for our review. The brief

must support the claims with pertinent discussion, with references to the

record and with citations to legal authorities.     … [W]hen defects in a brief

impede our ability to conduct meaningful appellate review, we may dismiss

the appeal entirely or find certain issues to be waived.”). We cannot discern

any reasonable basis for Attorney Hathaway’s briefing errors.

      Additionally,   Appellant   is   prejudiced    by   counsel’s   inadequate

representation because we cannot meaningfully assess his claims, including

those of Attorney Fryling’s ineffectiveness, which Appellant is permitted to

raise for the first time on appeal under Bradley. There, our Supreme Court

noted that,

      [i]n some instances, the record before the appellate court will be
      sufficient to allow for disposition of any newly-raised
      ineffectiveness claims. However, in other cases, the appellate
      court may need to remand to the PCRA court for further
      development of the record and for the PCRA court to consider such
      claims as an initial matter. Consistent with our prior case law, to
      advance a request for remand, a petition would be required to

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      provide more than mere “boilerplate assertions of PCRA counsel’s
      ineffectiveness,” [Commonwealth v.] Hall, 872 A.2d [1177,]
      1182 [(Pa. 2005)]; however, where there are “material facts at
      issue concerning [claims challenging counsel’s stewardship] and
      relief is not plainly unavailable as a matter of law, the remand
      should be afforded,” [Commonwealth v.] Grant, 813 A.2d
      [726,] 740 n.2 [(Pa. 2002)] (Saylor, J., concurring)[, abrogated
      by Bradley, supra].

Bradley, 261 A.3d at 402 (one internal citation omitted).

      Here, not only are we precluded from meaningfully assessing Appellant’s

claims of ineffectiveness against Attorney Fryling because of the briefing

errors by Attorney Hathaway, but the record before us is also insufficient to

permit us to dispose of Appellant’s ineffectiveness claims against Attorney

Fryling.   For instance, Appellant alleges that Attorney Fryling erred by not

raising certain claims of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness, yet we have no

explanation from Attorney Fryling for her decisions to forgo those claims. As

such, we cannot evaluate the reasonableness of counsel’s strategy.

      The PCRA court also never addressed the substance of Appellant’s

ineffectiveness allegations against Attorney Fryling.        Although Attorney

Hathaway raised the ineffectiveness claims pertaining to Attorney Fryling in

his Rule 1925(b) statement, in the PCRA court’s responsive, Rule 1925(a)

opinion, it did not address the merits of those issues. Instead, the court stated

that its rationale for dismissing Appellant’s claims was “fully set forth in the

Notice of Intent to Dismiss filed September 16, 2021, the Memorandum and

Notice of Intent to Dismiss of November 10, 2021, and the Memorandum and

Final Order of December 8, 2021.”        PCRA Court Opinion, 7/12/22, at 4.

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However, the only mention of Appellant’s ineffectiveness claims regarding

Attorney Fryling in any of those previous filings was the court’s statement, in

its December 8, 2021 memorandum and order dismissing Appellant’s petition,

that it could not review Appellant’s ineffectiveness claims against Attorney

Fryling under the rule precluding hybrid representation. See Memorandum

and Order, 12/8/21, at 2.    Thus, the PCRA never addressed the merits of

Appellant’s challenges to Attorney Fryling’s representation.

      Accordingly, we conclude that the appropriate relief in this case is to

remand, once again, for the appointment of new counsel, and for further

development of the record regarding Appellant’s ineffectiveness claims

pertaining to Attorney Fryling. We also determine that the court’s underlying

PCRA order must be vacated because the PCRA court might, after assessing

Attorney Fryling’s effectiveness, determine that relief should be afforded (or

further development of the record is required) regarding Appellant’s assertions

of trial/appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness. Consequently, we vacate the PCRA

court’s order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this

memorandum.

      Order vacated. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 4/20/2023

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