Court Opinion

ID: 9961664
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-19 15:00:53.922317+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:21:18.766009
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-5088     Document: 010111034849       Date Filed: 04/19/2024    Page: 1
                                                                                   FILED
                                                                       United States Court of Appeals
                                       PUBLISH                                 Tenth Circuit

                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         April 19, 2024

                                                                          Christopher M. Wolpert
                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                           Clerk of Court
                          _________________________________

  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

        Plaintiff - Appellee,
                                                              No. 22-5088
  v.

  JOHN WILLIAM THOMAS FLECHS,

        Defendant - Appellant.
                       _________________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Northern District of Oklahoma
                          (D.C. No. 4:21-CR-00026-CVE-1)
                        _________________________________

 Amy W. Senia, Assistant Federal Public Defender (Virginia L. Grady, Federal Public
 Defender with her on the briefs), Denver, Colorado for Defendant - Appellant.

 Thomas E. Duncombe (Clinton J. Johnson, United States Attorney, Tulsa, Oklahoma; and
 Katherine A. Gregory, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Buffalo, New York, on the brief), for the
 Plaintiff - Appellee.
                        _________________________________

 Before MATHESON, BACHARACH, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
                   _________________________________

 MATHESON, Circuit Judge.
                    _________________________________

       A jury convicted Defendant-Appellant John William Thomas Flechs of attempted

 enticement of a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). On appeal, he argues (A) the
Appellate Case: 22-5088       Document: 010111034849         Date Filed: 04/19/2024     Page: 2

 evidence at trial was insufficient to support his conviction and (B) the district court erred

 in giving a jury instruction on the term “grooming.” Exercising jurisdiction under

 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

                                     I. BACKGROUND

                                      A. Factual History 1

        In January 2021, Mr. Flechs, using the pseudonym “John Breezy,” began

 conversations on the Kik online messaging platform with someone he believed to be a

 14-year-old boy. Suppl. ROA, Vol. II at 47, 114. In fact, Mr. Flechs was messaging

 Sergeant John Haning, a member of the Rogers County, Oklahoma Internet Crimes

 Against Children Task Force. Id. at 41. 2 The minor told Mr. Flechs he was 14 years old

 and shared two photos of his face. Id. at 54; Suppl. ROA, Vol. III, Ex. 1 at 8, 18.

 Mr. Flechs responded that he was 35 and shared a photo of his face. Suppl. ROA, Vol. II

 at 51; Suppl. ROA, Vol. III, Ex. 1 at 18-19. 3

        Over the next four days, Mr. Flechs and the minor discussed sexual topics in

 graphic detail, including oral sex, masturbation, the size of the minor’s penis, and their

 previous sexual experiences. See Suppl. ROA, Vol. III, Ex. 1 at 10-71. Mr. Flechs asked

        1
            This factual summary derives from the evidence presented at trial.
        2
            We refer to Sergeant Haning as “the minor.”
        3
         We caution the reader that the communications between Mr. Flechs and the
 minor were sexually graphic. Because Mr. Flechs was convicted of a sexual crime and
 challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, we recount the communications to
 evaluate whether the evidence was sufficient and to explain our decision.

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 multiple times about the minor’s sexual desires, id. at 23, 45, and shared his own. At

 other points, the minor asked Mr. Flechs to “teach” him how to have sex. Id. at 29, 42,

 56. Mr. Flechs said, “Lol That’s illegal,” but continued the conversation. Id. at 56.

        After they discussed meeting in person, including Mr. Flechs’s telling the minor

 that he was driving near the minor’s home, id. at 60, Mr. Flechs asked the minor if he

 would be going to the skatepark, id. at 64-66. The minor said yes, and when Mr. Flechs

 asked when the minor would be there, the minor asked Mr. Flechs to bring him a

 Dr. Pepper. Id. at 65. Mr. Flechs agreed but noted that he “c[ould]n’t hang around”

 because he “[had] to take [his] daughter to gymnastics.” Id. He later remarked that he

 was “going [t]o be in a hurry to get to gymnastics so [he] c[ouldn]’t hang out but [he’d]

 get [the minor] a dr pepper.” Id. at 66. He also said there would be “no teaching” during

 the encounter, a euphemism for sex. Id.

        When Mr. Flechs arrived at the skatepark, he handed two Dr. Pepper sodas to an

 officer posing as the minor. Officers then arrested him.

                                   B. Procedural History

        A grand jury indicted Mr. Flechs for attempted enticement of a minor in violation

 of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). Mr. Flechs testified at trial. A petit jury returned a guilty

 verdict. The district court sentenced Mr. Flechs to 120 months in prison and five years of

 supervised release.

        Mr. Flechs timely appealed.

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                                      II. DISCUSSION

        On appeal, Mr. Flechs argues:

          (A) The trial evidence was insufficient to prove that he (1) intended to entice
              the minor or (2) took a substantial step toward enticement.

          (B) The jury instruction on the term “grooming” (1) violated Federal Rule of
              Evidence 605, (2) contained an unconstitutional presumption on the
              element of intent, and (3) misstated the law.

 We reject these arguments and affirm.

                               A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

        Mr. Flechs argues the Government presented insufficient evidence to prove he

 (1) had the requisite specific intent to entice a minor or (2) took a substantial step toward

 enticement. His appeal falters on a misunderstanding of the law of enticement and a

 misapplication of the standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence. We conclude

 the evidence was sufficient to convict him of attempted enticement of a minor under

 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b).

    Standard of Review

        “We review de novo whether the government presented sufficient evidence to

 support a conviction.” United States v. Sells, 477 F.3d 1226, 1235 (10th Cir. 2007)

 (quotations omitted). “In so doing, we view the facts in evidence in the light most

 favorable to the government.” Id. (quotations omitted). “[W]e owe considerable

 deference to the jury’s verdict.” United States v. King, 632 F.3d 646, 650 (10th

 Cir. 2011) (quotations omitted). “Our restrictive standard of review for a sufficiency of

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 the evidence question provides us with very little leeway.” Sells, 477 F.3d at 1235

 (quotations omitted). 4

        “While the evidence supporting the conviction must be substantial and do more

 than raise a mere suspicion of guilt, it need not conclusively exclude every other

 reasonable hypothesis and it need not negate all possibilities except guilt.” United States

 v. Erickson, 561 F.3d 1150, 1158-59 (10th Cir. 2009) (quotations omitted). “We will not

 weigh conflicting evidence or second-guess the fact-finding decisions of the jury,” Sells,

 477 F.3d at 1235 (quotations omitted), and we defer to the jury’s assessment of a

 witness’s credibility, United States v. Rodriguez-Flores, 907 F.3d 1309, 1312 (10th

 Cir. 2018). “[O]ur role is limited to determining whether a reasonable jury could find

 guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, based on the direct and circumstantial evidence, together

 with the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.” Sells, 477 F.3d at 1235

 (quotations omitted).

    Legal Background

        a. Enticement

        The United States Code provides:

               Whoever . . . knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or
               coerces any individual who has not attained the age of 18
               years, to engage in prostitution or any sexual activity for
               which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, or

        4
           Mr. Flechs moved for judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal
 Procedure 29 after the Government’s case-in-chief and renewed the motion after he
 testified and the defense rested. He therefore preserved the issue for appeal. See United
 States v. Kelly, 535 F.3d 1229, 1234-35 (10th Cir. 2008).

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               attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title and
               imprisoned not less than 10 years or for life.

 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). “Congress’s repeated use of the word ‘any’ suggests that Congress

 intended [§ 2422(b)’s] reach to be broad.” United States v. Shill, 740 F.3d 1347, 1352

 (9th Cir. 2014).

        We give the terms “persuade,” “induce,” and “entice” their ordinary meanings.

 “To persuade is to induce by argument, entreaty, or expostulation into some mental

 position; to induce is to move and lead (as by persuasion or influence); and to entice is to

 draw on by arousing hope or desire.” United States v. Isabella, 918 F.3d 816, 831

 (10th Cir. 2019) (quotations omitted). 5

        b. Attempt

        To prove an attempt to commit a crime, the government must show (1) specific

 intent to commit the crime and (2) a substantial step toward completion of the crime. Id.

               i. Specific intent

        Specific intent is more than a general intent to commit the prohibited act. United

 States v. Blair, 54 F.3d 639, 642 (10th Cir. 1995). It requires the defendant to commit the

 act “voluntarily and purposely with the . . . intent to do something the law forbids.”

 Id. (quotations omitted).

        5
          Although Mr. Flechs was actually communicating with Sergeant Haning, “it is
 not a defense to . . . enticement and exploitation of minors that the defendant falsely
 believed a minor to be involved.” United States v. Sims, 428 F.3d 945, 960 (10th
 Cir. 2005).

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        In United States v. Faust, 795 F.3d 1243 (10th Cir. 2015), we said § 2422(b)

 “criminalizes the sexual grooming of minors, regardless of any intent to consummate the

 illegal sexual activity.” Id. at 1249 (quotations omitted). The statute thus “requires only

 that the defendant intend to entice a minor, not that the defendant intend to commit the

 underlying sexual act.” Id. (quotations omitted); see United States v. Dwinells, 508 F.3d

 63, 65 (1st Cir. 2007) (rejecting “that section 2422(b) should be interpreted to include, as

 an additional element of the offense, an intent that the underlying sexual activity actually

 take place”). Stated differently, § 2422(b) “criminalizes an intentional attempt to achieve

 a mental state—a minor’s assent.” Faust, 795 F.3d at 1249 n.6 (quotations omitted).

        Other circuits have similarly found that the statute proscribes an attempt to achieve

 a minor’s assent. Thus, the statute “imposes no requirement that an individual endeavor

 to transform or overcome the will of his intended victim.” United States v. Waqar,

 997 F.3d 481, 488 (2d Cir. 2021) (quotations omitted). And “a defendant can be found to

 ‘persuade’ or ‘entice’ even a seemingly ‘willing’ minor.” United States v. Zupnik,

 989 F.3d 649, 654 (8th Cir. 2021). “The government must prove that the defendant

 intended to cause assent on the part of the minor, not that he acted with the specific intent

 to engage in sexual activity.” United States v. Lee, 603 F.3d 904, 914 (11th Cir. 2011)

 (citations and quotations omitted).

               ii. Substantial step

        The government must also “show that the defendant took a substantial step

 towards the commission of the ultimate crime, and that such step was more than mere

 preparation.” Faust, 795 F.3d at 1248 (alterations and quotations omitted). Whether the

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 defendant took a substantial step is a “highly fact-specific inquiry.” Id. (quotations

 omitted).

        As we explained in United States v. Fleming, 667 F.3d 1098 (10th Cir. 2011):

               A substantial step must be something more than mere
               preparation, yet may be less than the last act necessary before
               the actual commission of the substantive crime. A step need
               not be the final step toward commission of a crime to
               constitute a substantial step. Thus, the fact that further, major
               steps remain before the crime can be completed does not
               preclude a finding that the steps already taken are substantial.

 Id. at 1107 (citations, alterations, and quotations omitted). For attempted enticement,

 “the government must prove that the defendant took a substantial step toward causing

 assent, not toward causing actual sexual contact.” Lee, 603 F.3d at 914.

        “In assessing substantial steps toward . . . enticement to engage in sexual activity,

 we have drawn a rough line between ‘harmless banter’ and illegal inducement.” Isabella,

 918 F.3d at 832 (quoting United States v. Thomas, 410 F.3d 1235, 1246 (10th Cir. 2005)).

 We have recognized that a substantial step “can be accomplished by several means and is

 often carried out through a period of grooming.” Id. at 833 (citation and quotations

 omitted). 6 We have held, for example, that meeting or planning to meet with a purported

 minor following sexual conversations may be a substantial step. See Thomas, 410 F.3d

        6
          Though many enticement cases involve sexual grooming conversations, the Sixth
 Circuit in United States v. Fox, 600 F. App’x 414 (6th Cir. 2015) (unpublished), said
 “[t]hat evidence of sexually explicit online or telephone conversations sufficed to convict
 other defendants under § 2422(b) does not mean that such evidence is necessary to prove
 attempted enticement or coercion.” Id. at 418. Fox is not precedential, but we find its
 reasoning instructive.

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 at 1246; United States v. Munro, 394 F.3d 865, 870 (10th Cir. 2005). But “travel or a

 definite plan to travel is not necessary to constitute a ‘substantial step’ under § 2422(b).”

 United States v. Howard, 766 F.3d 414, 425-26 (5th Cir. 2014); see also United States v.

 Goetzke, 494 F.3d 1231, 1235-37 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[T]ravel by a defendant to meet a

 potential victim is probative, but not required . . . .”).

        The dissent argues that a substantial step requires a proposal for sexual activity as

 a matter of law. Dissent at 20-21. But the statute and case law do not require a proposal,

 and such a categorical rule would run counter to our directive that “[t]he substantial step

 question is a ‘highly fact-specific inquiry.’” Isabella, 918 F.3d at 832 (quoting Faust,

 795 F.3d at 1248).

        In § 2422(b), “Congress has made a clear choice to criminalize persuasion and the

 attempt to persuade.” Faust, 795 F.3d at 1249. Attempted enticement under § 2422(b)

 requires proof of a substantial step toward “persuad[ing], induc[ing], entic[ing], or

 coerc[ing]” a minor “to engage in prostitution or any sexual activity.” 18 U.S.C.

 § 2422(b). A crime this broadly defined “can be committed in many different ways.”

 Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 544, 554 (2019); see United States v. Booker,

 543 U.S. 220, 251 (2005) (“[A]n act that meets the statutory definition [of a crime] can

 be committed in a host of different ways.”).

        Although evidence of attempted enticement may often include a sexual proposal,

 we have not held a proposal is necessary. 7 And other circuits have found a substantial

        7
         The dissent mistakenly relies on United States v. Lopez, 4 F.4th 706 (9th Cir.
 2021), and United States v. Hart, 635 F.3d 850 (6th Cir. 2011), to insist that other circuits

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  step based on evidence other than a proposal or acceptance of a proposal for sexual

  activity. See, e.g., United States v. Clarke, 842 F.3d 288, 298 (4th Cir. 2016) (finding the

  defendant took a substantial step when he “brought candy to what he believed was a

  weekend visit” with two minors because “[a] reasonable jury could have concluded that

  [the] [d]efendant intended to use the candy to entice [the minors] to engage in sex acts”);

  United States v. Hensley, 574 F.3d 384, 391 (7th Cir. 2009) (finding “more than enough

  for a jury to find a substantial step” where the defendant “groom[ed] [the victim] for sex

  by conversing with her using multiple online personas,” “arrange[d] a meeting place and

  have “appeared to assume” a sexual proposal is always necessary for a § 2422(b) attempt
  conviction. Dissent at 5-6. In both cases, the defendant had proposed sexual activity.
  The issue presented on appeal was not whether a proposal was required but whether the
  defendant’s proposal was for a “sexual activity for which any person can be charged with
  a criminal offense”—a different element of the offense. 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). In other
  words, both cases concerned an element of the attempted enticement offense that is not at
  issue here.
         In Lopez, the defendant argued he could not be prosecuted in Guam, where the
  § 2422(b) offense occurred, for the sexual acts he proposed. 4 F.4th at 718-19; see id. at
  719 (“[The defendant] asks us to interpret Section 2422(b) as requiring the Government
  to charge a predicate offense and to prove Guam would have had jurisdiction to prosecute
  him for said predicate offense.”). Lopez held that a defendant who has proposed sexual
  conduct may be convicted under § 2422(b) if the “proposed sexual conduct . . . would be
  criminal in a relevant territorial jurisdiction.” Id. at 726. It did not assume that a
  proposal is always required.
         In Hart, the Sixth Circuit held that “[t]o convict [the defendant] under 18 U.S.C.
  § 2422(b), the jury had to unanimously agree . . . that the sexual activity that [the
  defendant] attempted to persuade [the minor] to engage in would have been chargeable as
  a crime under Kentucky law.” 635 F.3d at 855. The court rejected the defendant’s
  argument that “the jury should have been required to identify in its verdict form which of
  the Kentucky statutes it unanimously concluded [he] violated.” Id. Like Lopez, Hart did
  not assume that a sexual proposal was always required for a § 2422(b) conviction. It
  instead held that the jury need not unanimously agree on which law the proposed act
  would violate. Id. at 856.

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  time,” and “actually traveled to the meeting place” (quotations omitted)); United States v.

  Fox, 600 F. App’x 414, 418 (6th Cir. 2015) (unpublished) (finding sufficient evidence for

  a § 2422(b) attempt where the defendant “flatter[ed]” the minor and “purchased

  expensive gifts for her”). 8

         The dissent’s strict proposal requirement would enable child predators like

  Mr. Flechs to avoid § 2422(b) liability through subtle manipulation by carefully avoiding

  requests for sex. Courts have emphasized how § 2422(b) enticement defendants

  manipulate children. See, e.g., United States v. Zobel, 696 F.3d 558, 565 (6th Cir. 2012)

  (stating the district court “noted [the defendant], while not forcing himself upon the

  minors, had carefully cultivated and manipulated them” (alterations and quotations

  omitted)); United States v. Kempter, 29 F.4th 960, 966 (8th Cir. 2022) (holding “[t]he

  district court did not clearly err in concluding this was a case of grooming” in which the

  defendant “manipulated [the victim’s] weakness”).

         “Congress intended [§ 2422(b)’s] reach to be broad.” Shill, 740 F.3d at 1352. We

  see no reason to limit attempted enticement to cases with proposals. 9

         8
           Although each of these cases included a proposal, we do not read them to say
  that the courts necessarily “upheld the finding of a substantial step based on the
  defendant’s sexual proposals.” Dissent at 18.
         9
           “[O]ur aim is not to decide whether [a defendant’s] conduct is at least as
  ‘criminal’ as the conduct of others convicted under section 2422(b). Each of our
  precedents holds no more than that a reasonable jury could have found that the defendant
  at issue violated section 2422(b). Not surprisingly, none [of our precedents] guesses at or
  purports to have identified the minimum conduct that section 2422(b) proscribes.”
  Lee, 603 F.3d at 916.

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     Analysis

         a. Specific intent

         Mr. Flechs argues the Government adduced insufficient evidence to prove he

  specifically intended to entice the minor because “[e]ach time [the minor] propositioned

  Mr. Flechs for sex, Mr. Flechs declined.” Aplt. Br. at 13. We are not persuaded.

         First, Mr. Flechs misunderstands the law. A defendant need not desire to have sex

  with a minor to satisfy the intent element of § 2422(b). 10 The statute “requires only that

  the defendant intend to entice a minor, not that the defendant intend to commit the

  underlying sexual act.” Faust, 795 F.3d at 1249 (quotations omitted). A defendant may

  be liable for enticement even if the minor propositioned the defendant or the minor was

  otherwise eager, predisposed, or willing to engage in proscribed sexual acts. See Zupnik,

  989 F.3d at 654. The appropriate inquiry, therefore, is whether the Government

  presented sufficient evidence to prove Mr. Flechs intended “to draw [the minor] on” to

  commit a proscribed sexual act “by arous[ing] [the minor’s] hope or desire.” Isabella,

  918 F.3d at 831 (quotations omitted).

         Second, the Government introduced sufficient evidence to prove Mr. Flechs had

  specific intent to entice the minor. At trial, Mr. Flechs admitted that he “introduced

  sexual topics” in the Kik conversation. Suppl. ROA, Vol. II at 113. The minor made

  multiple efforts to convince Mr. Flechs to meet to have sex. Early in their conversations,

         10
           Though “a jury could reasonably infer that Mr. Flechs had wanted to engage in
  sex with [the minor].” Dissent at 3.

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  the minor stated that he “would like to meet [Mr. Flechs] . . . [and] see what [he and

  Mr. Flechs] do.” Suppl. ROA, Vol. III, Ex. 1 at 7. The minor reiterated the overture,

  asking Mr. Flechs, “What would u like to do if we meet?” Id. at 16. When Mr. Flechs

  responded that they could meet at a skatepark, the minor responded, “Fun and then �.”

  Id. The minor also repeatedly asked Mr. Flechs to “teach” him how to have sex. Id. at

  29, 42, 56.

         Amidst the minor’s statements, Mr. Flechs engaged in a highly graphic sexual

  discussion with the minor from which a rational jury could infer Mr. Flechs’s intention to

  “arous[e] [the minor’s stated] hope or desire” for sex. Isabella, 918 F.3d at 831

  (quotations omitted). For example, Mr. Flechs told the minor in detail about his sexual

  experiences with a “cousin [who] was 12 or 13” (when Mr. Flechs “[w]as 16”). Suppl.

  ROA, Vol. III, Ex. 1 at 33-34. They also discussed Mr. Flechs’s desire to “[c]aress

  whoever all over then please them with [his] mouth.” Id. at 53.

         During the conversations, Mr. Flechs also asked about the size of the minor’s

  penis, id. at 26, 40-41, and asked him, “What do you want done to you[?],” id. at 23.

  Mr. Flechs also asked if the minor had “been [masturbating] while [Mr. Flechs had] been

  talking to [him],” id. at 51, and asked multiple times whether the minor had “finish[ed],”

  id. at 51, 55. He also messaged the minor several times when he knew the minor’s

  purported guardian was away—including once at 4:25 a.m. to tell the minor he was

  “driving by [his] area again.” Id. at 60-61. Even though Mr. Flechs stated he wanted to

  meet in a “[v]ery public place,” a reasonable jury could understand these messages as

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  indicating Mr. Flechs’s wish to meet the minor in person without adult supervision.

  Id. at 59.

         A reasonable jury thus could have found that Mr. Flechs intended to entice the

  minor because the conversations “dr[e]w [the minor] on by arousing hope or desire” for

  sex. Isabella, 918 F.3d at 831 (quotations omitted). A jury therefore “could find [the

  intent element satisfied] beyond a reasonable doubt, based on the direct and

  circumstantial evidence, together with the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.”

  Sells, 477 F.3d at 1235 (quotations omitted).

         Mr. Flechs argues his statements to the minor that he did not desire to have sex

  with him proved he lacked the requisite specific intent. 11 This argument reflects a

  cramped view of his statements to the minor, which were replete with graphic sexual

  descriptions and innuendo. See Suppl. ROA, Vol. III, Ex. 1. “[R]ather than examining

  the evidence in bits and pieces, we evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence by

  considering the collective inferences to be drawn from the evidence as a whole.” United

  States v. Brooks, 438 F.3d 1231, 1236 (10th Cir. 2006) (alterations and quotations

  omitted). Mr. Flechs’s argument fails to overcome our standard of review.

         11
             Mr. Flechs did not unambiguously say no to sexual activity with the minor. See
  Suppl. ROA, Vol. III, Ex. 1 at 15 (responding “Yeah” to the minor asking if Mr. Flechs
  “want[ed] to [have sex with a man] again”); id. at 16 (responding to the minor’s
  proposition by saying “Lmao We can be friends”); id. at 39 (responding to the minor’s
  request that Mr. Flechs “be a teacher” with “Lmao I’ve forgotten the male experience”);
  id. at 56 (responding to the minor’s request “[t]o be taught” with “Lol Thats illegal”);
  id. at 59-60 (responding to the minor asking “[w]ho’s [sic] hot dog” they would be eating
  with “Perv Hit me up tomorrow”).

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         “Even when a defendant, as here, denies having the requisite intent, a jury may

  disbelieve the defendant if his words and acts in the light of all the circumstances make

  his explanation seem improbable.” United States v. Porter, 928 F.3d 947, 957 (10th

  Cir. 2019) (alterations and quotations omitted). The jury “was entitled to consider”

  Mr. Flechs’s “demeanor on the witness stand as evidence of the truthfulness of his tale.”

  United States v. Richard, 969 F.2d 849, 857 (10th Cir. 1992). A reasonable jury could

  have found Mr. Flechs’s statements suggesting he did not intend to have sex with the

  minor were not credible when considered alongside his graphic, sexual conversations

  with the minor.

         Our “restrictive standard of review for a sufficiency of the evidence question

  provides us with little leeway” to upset that finding. Sells, 477 F.3d at 1235 (quotations

  omitted). We cannot “second-guess th[at] fact-finding decision[] of the jury,” id.

  (quotations omitted), because “[i]t is the province of the jury, rather than of the appellate

  court, to weigh the credibility of witnesses and to judge conflicting testimony,” United

  States v. Moya, 5 F.4th 1168, 1187 (10th Cir. 2021) (quotations omitted). We must

  “resolve credibility issues in favor of the verdict.” United States v. Meacham, 115 F.3d

  1488, 1495 (10th Cir. 1997).

         b. Substantial step

         Mr. Flechs argues the trial evidence was insufficient to prove he took a substantial

  step toward enticement. We disagree.

         First, he contends the “pre-meeting messages must make it clear that the purpose

  of the meeting is to engage in sexual activity with the minor.” Aplt. Br. at 19. And he

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  asserts the evidence did not prove that “had the police not intervened, [he] would have

  persuaded and encouraged [the minor]—while dropping off the soda—to agree to

  someday have sex with him.” Aplt. Reply Br. at 11.

         But this argument is again premised on a misunderstanding of the law. As

  discussed above, the inquiry is not whether Mr. Flechs took a substantial step toward

  having sex with the minor but whether Mr. Flechs took a substantial step toward enticing

  the minor. A defendant may entice a minor even without an “inten[tion] to commit the

  underlying sexual act.” Faust, 795 F.3d at 1249 (quotations omitted).

         Second, Mr. Flechs maintains that his sexual conversations and meeting with the

  minor were merely preparatory. See Aplt. Br. at 16-20. Even if that were a plausible

  reading of the evidence, under the applicable standard of review, we cannot say the

  evidence was insufficient to support conviction. Mr. Flechs’s sexually graphic and

  suggestive messages and his actions to meet with the minor were sufficient.

         Mr. Flechs’s grooming messages to the minor were relevant not only to his intent

  but also to whether he took a substantial step toward enticement. See Howard, 766 F.3d

  at 425 (“[G]rooming behavior plus other acts strongly corroborative of intent to entice

  illegal sex—such as detailed discussions to arrange a meeting with the minor victim—can

  suffice to establish a substantial step under § 2422(b).”); Goetzke, 494 F.3d at 1235-37

  (holding grooming plus a proposal to meet was a substantial step); Lee, 603 F.3d at 904

  (holding grooming conversations alone may be a substantial step). And here, the jury

  was instructed that “‘grooming’ can constitute a ‘substantial step.’” ROA, Vol. I at 43.

                                              16
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         “In assessing substantial steps toward [enticement], we have drawn a rough line

  between ‘harmless banter’ and illegal inducement.” Isabella, 918 F.3d at 832 (quoting

  Thomas, 410 F.3d at 1246). A reasonable jury could have found:

     • Mr. Flechs’s graphic descriptions of his own sexual experiences as a minor, as

         well as his current sexual desires, and his invasive questions about the minor’s

         penis and masturbation—continuing over four days—were hardly “harmless

         banter,” id., and instead were “enticing communications,” United States v. Davis,

         985 F.3d 298, 305 (3d Cir. 2021).

     • Beyond Mr. Flechs’s highly sexualized conversations with the minor, his agreeing

         to meet escalated matters and “dr[e]w [the minor] on by arousing hope or

         desire”—the definition of enticement. Isabella, 918 F.3d at 831 (quotations

         omitted); Davis, 985 F.3d at 305.

     • Mr. Flechs crossed the substantial-step line when he went to an in-person meeting

         at the skatepark, perhaps even sooner when he was driving in the minor’s

         neighborhood “again” and knew the minor’s guardian was away. Suppl. ROA,

         Vol. III, Ex. 1 at 60-61. 12

         12
            Although Mr. Flechs’s driving through the minor’s neighborhood is not essential
  to affirm, it is not, as the dissent contends, a different “theory” untethered from the jury
  instructions. Dissent at 9 n.2. At trial, the prosecution presented this evidence, which
  was consistent with the jury instructions. The dissent cites McCormick v. United States,
  500 U.S. 257 (1991), which reversed a circuit court for “announcing a [new] rule of law”
  and then applying “legal and factual grounds that were never submitted to the jury” to
  determine that the evidence was sufficient. Id. at 269-70. But that did not happen here.

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         The foregoing is consistent with our cases in which we have held that arranging or

  travelling to meet a minor after exchanging enticing messages may be a substantial step

  toward enticement. In Thomas, we held the defendant took a substantial step toward

  enticement “the moment he began making arrangements to meet [the purported minor],

  notwithstanding the lack of evidence that he traveled to the supposed meeting place.”

  410 F.3d at 1246. And in Munro, we found the defendant “took a substantial step

  towards completion of the crime by actually going to [a] prearranged meeting place.”

  394 F.3d at 869-70; see also United States v. Berg, 640 F.3d 239, 246 (7th Cir. 2011)

  (noting the defendant “d[id] not dispute that a face-to-face meeting in the course of a

  grooming process can be sufficient proof of a ‘substantial step’ toward the completion of

  a § 2422(b) attempt”).

         Under the requisite “‘highly fact-specific inquiry,’” Mr. Flechs’s actions fell on

  the “illegal inducement” side of the line. Isabella, 918 F.3d at 832 (quoting Faust,

  795 F.3d at 1248). A rational jury could find Mr. Flechs took a substantial step toward

  enticement by exchanging sexual messages with the minor, arranging to meet him, and

  travelling to the meeting place.

         Third, Mr. Flechs argues he had reasons unrelated to sex or enticement to go to the

  skatepark, including “an innocent desire to meet [the minor] in person and satisfy a

  curiosity about whether [the minor] was a real teenager or even a real person.” Aplt. Br.

  at 22-23. He again skirts the standard of review. “[T]he evidence supporting the

  conviction . . . need not conclusively exclude every other reasonable hypothesis and it

  need not negate all possibilities except guilt.” Erickson, 561 F.3d at 1158-59 (quotations

                                              18
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  omitted). “It is for the jury, as the fact finder, to resolve conflicting testimony, weigh the

  evidence, and draw inferences from the facts presented.” United States v. Keck, 643 F.3d

  789, 793 (10th Cir. 2011).

         In sum, the jury’s determination that Mr. Flechs took a substantial step toward

  enticement was both reasonable and supported by sufficient evidence. We cannot

  “second-guess th[at] fact-finding decision[] of the jury.” Sells, 477 F.3d at 1235

  (quotations omitted). 13

                                         *    *        *   *

         Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, we determine

  that “a reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, based on the direct

  and circumstantial evidence, together with the reasonable inferences to be drawn

  therefrom.” Id. (quotations omitted). We affirm.

         13
            Even if we accept the dissent’s proposal requirement, a reasonable jury could
  infer that Mr. Flechs’s graphic messages to the minor proposed sexual acts. See, e.g.,
  Suppl. ROA, Vol. III, Ex. 1 at 10 (“Caught my friend’s boys sucking each other off and it
  reminded me of all the fun I had growing up.”); id. at 23 (asking the minor, “What do you
  want done to you[?]”); id. at 48-49 (telling the minor he was going to masturbate and
  asking if the minor was “[t]rying to give [him] a target” by sending a winking face
  emoticon).
          In closing argument, the Government pointed out that Mr. Flechs asked the minor,
  “What do you want done to you[?],” Suppl. ROA, Vol. II at 124, and argued, “There is no
  doubt in this case that . . . [Mr. Flechs] was intimating to the child the things that he
  would like to do,” id. at 132; see Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining
  “proposal” as including “a suggestion”). Evidence of an implicit proposal was consistent
  with the jury instructions and the Government’s grooming argument. And under our
  standard of review, we determine whether a reasonable jury could have convicted based
  on the evidence, see United States v. Thomas, 749 F.3d 1302, 1314 (10th Cir. 2014),
  including any evidence of a substantial step. The dissent’s cases to suggest otherwise,
  United States v. Woodard, 5 F.4th 1148 (10th Cir. 2021), and United States v. Chavez,
  976 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. 2020), did not involve sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges.

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                                      B. Jury Instruction

         The Government proposed and the district court adopted the following jury

  instruction without objection:

                                   Definition of “Grooming”

                “Grooming” refers to deliberate actions taken by a defendant
                to expose a child to sexual material; the ultimate goal of
                grooming is the formation of an emotional connection with
                the child and a reduction of the child’s inhibitions in order to
                prepare the child for sexual activity.

                “Grooming” can constitute a “substantial step.”

  ROA, Vol. I at 43 (capitalization altered without notation).

         Mr. Flechs argues the district court erred in instructing the jury on the meaning of

  “grooming,” asserting the instruction constituted (1) error because it was impermissible

  judicial testimony in violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 605, (2) plain error because it

  established a mandatory presumption on the element of intent, and (3) plain error because

  it misstated the law regarding substantial step. Each of these arguments fails.

         As a general matter, “[w]e review [a] district court’s decision to give a particular

  jury instruction for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Toledo, 739 F.3d 562, 567

  (10th Cir. 2014). We review jury instructions as a whole “de novo in the context of the

  entire trial to determine if they accurately state the governing law and provide the jury

  with an accurate understanding of the relevant legal standards and factual issues in the

  case.” United States v. Jean-Pierre, 1 F.4th 836, 846 (10th Cir. 2021) (alterations and

  quotations omitted).

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     Rule 605

         Rule 605 provides, “The presiding judge may not testify as a witness at the trial.”

  It also states, “A party need not object to preserve the issue.” We therefore review de

  novo whether a district court violated Rule 605. See United States v. Andasola, 13 F.4th

  1011, 1014 (10th Cir. 2021).

         a. Legal background

         “The district court violates Rule 605 when it adds to the record evidence.” Id.

  at 1016 (quotations omitted).

         “The purpose of jury instructions is to give jurors the correct principles of law

  applicable to the facts so that they can reach a correct conclusion as to each element of an

  offense according to the law and the evidence.” United States v. Kahn, 58 F.4th 1308,

  1317 (10th Cir. 2023). An instruction on the applicable law falls outside Rule 605

  because the court is not “testify[ing] as a witness.” Fed. R. Evid. 605.

         As one leading treatise states, “[t]he most important factor” in determining

  whether a court’s statement triggers Rule 605 “should be whether the judge’s statement is

  essential to the exercise of some judicial function or is the functional equivalent of

  witness testimony.” 27 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and

  Procedure § 6063 (2d ed. rev. 2023). “Criminal-statute elements often contain terms

  needing defining.” Moya, 5 F.4th at 1180. And “courts commonly provide jury

  instructions that define an element’s terms separate from the element itself.” Id.

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         b. Analysis

         In Faust, we said that § 2422(b) “criminalizes the sexual grooming of minors,

  regardless of any intent to consummate the illegal sexual activity.” 795 F.3d at 1249

  (quotations omitted). The term “grooming” thus carries legal significance because we

  have interpreted the statute to proscribe such behavior. The district court’s instruction

  relied in substantial part on Isabella, see 918 F.3d at 833, and accurately restated our

  caselaw. It did not improperly “add[] to the record evidence.” Andasola, 13 F.4th

  at 1016 (quotations omitted). Rather, it was comparable to “provid[ing] [a] jury

  instruction[] that define[d] an element’s terms separate from the element itself.” Moya,

  5 F.4th at 1180. We find Fox, 600 F. App’x 414, persuasive. There, the Sixth Circuit

  rejected a challenge to a substantially similar grooming instruction because the

  instruction “adequately informed the jury of the relevant considerations and provided a

  basis in law for aiding the jury in reaching its decision.” Id. at 420 (quotations

  omitted). 14 The instruction thus did not violate Rule 605.

         Mr. Flechs argues that our opinion in Andasola demonstrates the instruction here

  was erroneous. But his reliance on Andasola is misplaced. There, the judge instructed

  the jury: “[T]here is only one video that exists in this case. . . . To the extent there was

         14
           Consistent with the district court here, courts have instructed on the meaning of
  “pyramid scheme,” see, e.g., United States v. Gold, 177 F.3d 472, 478 (6th Cir. 1999),
  “check kiting,” see, e.g., United States v. Montgomery, 980 F.2d 388, 392-93 (6th
  Cir. 1992); United States v. Bonnette, 781 F.2d 357, 360 n.6 (4th Cir. 1986), and
  “churning,” see, e.g., Davis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 906 F.2d
  1206, 1212-13 (8th Cir. 1990), even though none of these terms appeared in the
  underlying statute of conviction.

                                                22
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  any implication that another video exists, that is not an accurate statement. There is only

  one video.” 13 F.4th at 1014 (quotations omitted). We held the instruction was

  erroneous because it “introduced new evidence to the jury by deciding a disputed factual

  issue for the jury,” namely whether there was only one video. Id. at 1016. The grooming

  instruction here added no such factual finding to the trial record and instead provided the

  jury a definition to aid its application of the law to the evidence.

     Presumption

         Mr. Flechs next argues the grooming instruction established a mandatory

  presumption on the intent element. He claims it instructed that if the jury found

  Mr. Flechs had “expose[d] a child to sexual material,” the jury must also find that he

  intended to “prepare the child for sexual activity.” ROA, Vol. I at 43 (capitalization

  altered without notation); see Aplt. Br. at 41-43. Mr. Flechs (1) misreads the instruction

  and (2) has failed to show plain error.

         a. Standard of review

         Because Mr. Flechs did not object to the instruction at trial, we review for plain

  error. 15 Plain error review requires Mr. Flechs “to establish that (1) the district court

         15
             The Government argues Mr. Flechs invited the alleged error because he
  consented to the instruction. Aplee. Br. at 33. “Under the invited error doctrine, this
  [c]ourt will not engage in appellate review when a defendant has waived his right to
  challenge a jury instruction by affirmatively approving it at trial.” United States v.
  Cornelius, 696 F.3d 1307, 1319 (10th Cir. 2012). Invited error must be clear from the
  record. See United States v. Zubia-Torres, 550 F.3d 1202, 1207 (10th Cir. 2008). Here,
  it is unclear whether Mr. Flechs’s attorney consented to the instruction itself or to the
  district court’s statement about when it planned to give the instruction. See Suppl. ROA,

                                                23
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  committed error; (2) the error was plain—that is, it was obvious under current well-

  settled law; (3) the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights; and (4) the error

  seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”

  United States v. Booker, 63 F.4th 1254, 1258 (10th Cir. 2023) (alterations and quotations

  omitted). Mr. Flechs must show plain error “even when the underlying error is

  constitutional.” United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 733 (10th Cir. 2005)

  (en banc); see United States v. Chavez, 229 F.3d 946, 951 (10th Cir. 2000).

         b. Legal background

         A jury instruction may not establish an evidentiary presumption that requires the

  jury to find that the prosecution satisfied an element of the charged offense. See Francis

  v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1985). We distinguish between a mandatory

  presumption and a “permissive inference.” Patton v. Mullin, 425 F.3d 788, 804

  (10th Cir. 2005).

         A mandatory presumption “instructs the jury that it must infer the presumed fact if

  the [Government] proves certain predicate facts.” Francis, 471 U.S. at 314. A

  mandatory presumption “violate[s] the Due Process Clause if [it] relieve[s] the

  [Government] of the burden of persuasion on an element of an offense.” Id. In contrast,

  “[a] permissive inference suggests to the jury a possible conclusion to be drawn if the

  [Government] proves predicate facts, but does not require the jury to draw that

  Vol. II at 30. Because it is not clear that Mr. Flechs “affirmatively approv[ed] [the
  instruction] at trial,” any error was not invited. Cornelius, 696 F.3d at 1319.

                                                24
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  conclusion.” Id. “A permissive inference violates the Due Process Clause only if the

  suggested conclusion is not one that reason and common sense justify in light of the

  proven facts before the jury.” Id. at 314-15.

         c. Analysis

         Mr. Flechs has not shown any error was plain or affected his substantial rights.

                i. Plainness

         Mr. Flechs reads the instruction as directing the jury to impose a mandatory

  presumption of intent if he “expose[d] [the] child to sexual material.” ROA, Vol. I at 43

  (capitalization altered without notation). But the instruction provides no such clear

  directive. It does not mention presumption, intent, or even enticement. And to be plain,

  any error must be “clear or obvious” under current Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit law.

  United States v. Brooks, 736 F.3d 921, 930 (10th Cir. 2013) (quotations omitted). The

  Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit cases Mr. Flechs cites found an instruction improper

  only when it explicitly mandated a presumption.

         For example, he cites Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979), which

  reviewed the trial court’s instruction directing the jury that “the law presumes that a

  person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts.” Id. at 512. The

  Supreme Court held the instruction erroneously called for a mandatory presumption

  because the jury was “not told that they had a choice, or that they might infer that

  conclusion,” but “only that the law presumed it.” Id. at 515. Mr. Flechs also cites

  Patton, in which we found error when an instruction explicitly directed that “a design to

  effect death is inferred from the fact of killing, unless the circumstances raise a

                                               25
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  reasonable doubt whether such design existed.” 425 F.3d at 803 (alterations and

  quotations omitted). 16

         The instruction here did not expressly state the law “presumed” an element was

  satisfied when the Government proved certain predicate facts. Sandstrom, 442 U.S.

  at 515. Nor did it mandate that the jury “infer[]”an element was satisfied. Patton,

  425 F.3d at 803 (quotations omitted).

         Because Mr. Flechs has not shown error that was “clear[ly] or obvious[ly]”

  contrary to settled Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit law, he has not met his burden under

  plain error review. Brooks, 736 F.3d at 930.

                ii. Substantial rights

         Mr. Flechs also has failed to show any error affected his substantial rights. He

  contends “the government could not prove its case solely with the Kik messages” because

  he “never proposed, suggested, intimated, requested or planned for [the minor and him]

  to engage in any sexual activity together.” Aplt. Br. at 45. He asserts the grooming

  instruction was thus essential to the Government’s case as the only way to prove

  Mr. Flechs had the relevant specific intent. Id. We disagree.

         16
            Mr. Flechs cites other cases that similarly fall short. In Francis, the Supreme
  Court found an instruction was flawed because it was “cast in the language of command”
  and “carr[ied] precisely the message of the language condemned in Sandstrom.”
  471 U.S. at 316. And in Wiley v. Rayl, 767 F.2d 679 (10th Cir. 1985), we relied on
  Sandstrom and Franklin to find the trial judge erred by instructing the jury that “[t]here is
  the presumption that a person intends all of the natural and probable consequences of his
  voluntary acts [and] [t]his presumption is overcome if you are persuaded by the evidence
  that the contrary is true.” Id. at 681 (quotations omitted).

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         Mr. Flechs again misunderstands enticement. We repeat: A defendant need not

  desire to have sex with a minor to satisfy the intent element of § 2422(b). The statute

  “requires only that the defendant intend to entice a minor, not that the defendant intend to

  commit the underlying sexual act.” Faust, 795 F.3d at 1249 (quotations omitted). As our

  discussion of the sufficiency issue shows, the Government could prove intent based on

  the Kik messages and Mr. Flechs’s testimony.

         In addition, the district court properly instructed the jury (1) on the meaning of

  enticement and (2) that a defendant can entice a minor without intending to consummate

  a sexual act. See ROA, Vol. I at 36, 46; see Faust, 795 F.3d at 1249. In the face of these

  instructions and the evidence, Mr. Flechs has not shown that telling the jury the “ultimate

  goal of grooming” is “to prepare the child for sexual activity” was prejudicial. ROA,

  Vol. I at 43. As discussed above, the Government introduced sufficient evidence to

  prove Mr. Flechs enticed a minor even if he did not intend to consummate a sexual act

  with the minor. See Faust, 795 F.3d at 1249. Mr. Flechs thus has failed to show “a

  reasonable probability that, but for the error claimed, the result of the proceeding would

  have been different.” United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 82 (2004)

  (alterations and quotations omitted).

     Substantial Step

         Mr. Flechs argues the instruction “misstated the law regarding conduct that can

  constitute a substantial step” because it failed to require the prosecution to prove that he

  did more than engage in explicit sexual conversations. Aplt. Br. at 46 (quotations

  omitted). Again, because he did not object to the instruction, we review for plain error.

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  See Booker, 63 F.4th at 1258. He has not shown any error was plain or affected his

  substantial rights.

         a. Plainness

         As previously noted, an error is plain if it is “clear or obvious under current, well-

  settled law,” meaning “either the Supreme Court or this court [has] addressed the issue.”

  Brooks, 736 F.3d at 930 (quotations omitted). Mr. Flechs cites no Supreme Court case.

  He relies on Isabella, which said the substantial step element was met when “trial

  evidence showed more than explicit sex talk.” 918 F.3d at 835 (alterations and

  quotations omitted). But Isabella did not say additional evidence is always necessary to

  prove a substantial step. See id. at 835-36. And the instruction is consistent with Faust,

  which said that § 2422(b) “criminalizes the sexual grooming of minors.” 795 F.3d

  at 1243 (quotations omitted). 17

         b. Substantial rights

         Mr. Flechs has not shown “a reasonable probability that, but for the error claimed,

  the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d

  at 733 (quotations omitted).

         The district court provided the jury with the meaning of “substantial step” in a

  separate, uncontested instruction: “A substantial step is an act which, in the ordinary

         17
            Mr. Flechs also cites United States v. Gladish, 536 F.3d 646 (7th Cir. 2008).
  See Aplt. Br. at 47. Although “in certain circumstances, the weight of authority from
  other circuits may make an error plain,” this one out-of-circuit case does not show any
  error was plain here. United States v. Hill, 749 F.3d 1250, 1258 (10th Cir. 2014)
  (quotations omitted).

                                               28
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  course of events, would lead to the commission of the particular crime.” ROA, Vol. I

  at 39 (capitalization altered without notation); see United States v. Heckard, 238 F.3d

  1222, 1231 (10th Cir. 2001) (stating we must review jury instructions “in their entirety”

  (quotations omitted)).

         Even without the grooming instruction, a jury could find Mr. Flechs took a

  substantial step toward enticement when, in addition to the sexually graphic and

  suggestive conversations, he arranged to meet the minor and travelled to the meeting

  place. Mr. Flechs has not demonstrated a reasonable probability that a properly

  instructed jury would have found otherwise. He thus has not met his burden to show

  plain error. United States v. Bustamante-Conchas, 850 F.3d 1130, 1138 (10th Cir. 2017)

  (en banc); Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 732-33.

                                     III. CONCLUSION

         We affirm.

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  United States v. John William Thomas Flechs, No. 22-5088
  BACHARACH, J., dissenting.

        This case stemmed from electronic messages sent by Mr. John

  William Thomas Flechs. Mr. Flechs thought that he was messaging a

  14-year-old boy named Mike. In reality, Mike was a fictional individual

  created by the police to catch predators.

        Mr. Flechs’s messages were sexually graphic, but he didn’t propose

  sexual activity with Mike. So the fictional Mike proposed sex. But

  Mr. Flechs didn’t accept. Mike then proposed sex again. And Mr. Flechs

  again declined to accept.

        Though Mr. Flechs declined to accept these sexual proposals, the

  government charged him under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) with attempt to entice

  a minor to engage in sexual activity. To obtain a conviction, the

  government needed to prove that Mr. Flechs had attempted to obtain

  Mike’s assent to sex. The government couldn’t meet that burden because

             it was the fictional Mike who had proposed sex and

             it was Mr. Flechs who had declined to accept these sexual
              proposals.

        The jury found Mr. Flechs guilty anyway, and the majority affirms.

  I would reverse because the defendant never proposed a sexual activity or

  accepted such a proposal.
Appellate Case: 22-5088   Document: 010111034849   Date Filed: 04/19/2024   Page: 31

  1.    The government needed to prove a substantial step.

        To obtain a conviction, the government needed to prove beyond a

  reasonable doubt that Mr. Flechs

             had used a means or facility of interstate commerce

             to knowingly attempt to persuade, induce, entice, or coerce

             an individual that he believed to be younger than 18

             to engage in a prohibited act involving sexual activity for
              which a person could be charged with a criminal offense and

             had taken a substantial step toward commission of the offense.

  18 U.S.C. § 2422(b); United States v. Isabella, 918 F.3d 816, 848 (10th

  Cir. 2019). We must decide whether the jury could reasonably find a

  substantial step toward the commission of a prohibited act.

        In addressing the sufficiency of the evidence, we conduct de novo

  review. United States v. Yurek, 925 F.3d 423, 430 (10th Cir. 2019). This

  review entails consideration of the evidence in the light most favorable to

  the government. Id. We can reverse only if no reasonable factfinder could

  have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. To find guilt beyond a

  reasonable doubt, the factfinder could rely on the evidence and reasonable

  inferences drawn from that evidence, but could not engage in “speculation”

  or “conjecture.” United States v. Arras, 373 F.3d 1071, 1073–74 (10th Cir.

  2004). Given the prohibition against speculation or conjecture, we can’t

                                        2
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  “uphold a conviction . . . by piling inference upon inference.” United

  States v. Valadez-Gallegos, 162 F.3d 1256, 1262 (10th Cir. 1998).

  2.    There was insufficient evidence of a substantial step toward a
        prohibited act.

        From the evidence, a jury could reasonably infer that Mr. Flechs had

  wanted to engage in sex with Mike. But § 2422(b) doesn’t criminalize

  wants; it criminalizes a substantial step to commit a prohibited act. See

  18 U.S.C. § 2422(b); United States v. Isabella, 918 F.3d 816, 831 (10th

  Cir. 2019).

        Here the prohibited act is an adult’s sexual activity with a minor. 18

  U.S.C. § 2422(b). So we must determine whether a jury could have found a

  substantial step to commit a prohibited act involving sexual activity with a

  minor.

        a.      A sexual proposal is necessary in light of the requirements
                for a substantial step and the acts prohibited under
                § 2422(b).

        To make that determination, we must consider

               what constitutes a substantial step and

               what constitutes a prohibited act.

        A substantial step is “an appreciable fragment of a crime and an

  action of such substantiality that, unless frustrated, the crime would have

  occurred.” United States v. Vigil, 523 F.3d 1258, 1267 (10th Cir. 2008)

  (quoting United States v. Smith, 264 F.3d 1012, 1016 (10th Cir. 2001)); see

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  United States v. Gordon, 710 F.3d 1124, 1151 (10th Cir. 2013) (“[A]

  substantial step is appropriately found where the defendant undertook an

  act adapted to, approximating, and which in the ordinary and likely course

  of things will result in, the commission of [a] particular crime.” (internal

  citations & quotation marks omitted)). It wouldn’t have been enough for

  Mr. Flechs to prepare to entice Mike; a substantial step requires conduct

  going beyond preparation. See Gordon, 710 F.3d at 1150 (stating that mere

  preparation does not amount to a substantial step).

        The requirement of a substantial step serves to protect defendants

  from convictions based on “speculative inferences.” United States v.

  Hernandez-Galvan, 632 F.3d 192, 198 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting United

  States v. Oviedo, 525 F.2d 881, 885 (5th Cir. 1976)). “[U]nless and until

  the suspect’s behavior manifests the firm commitment to perform a

  criminal act, the risk is too high that we may have simply misinterpreted

  perfectly legal behavior, particularly when it is borne of customs,

  practices, or eccentricities that are not widely shared.” Hernandez-Cruz v.

  Holder, 651 F.3d 1094, 1103 (9th Cir. 2011); see also United States v.

  Farner, 251 F.3d 510, 513 (5th Cir. 2001) (“The substantial step must be

  conduct which strongly corroborates the firmness of defendant’s criminal

  attempt.”).

        We must consider what steps are “substantial” based on the acts

  prohibited under § 2422(b). This section prohibits persuasion, inducement,

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  enticement, or coercion to engage in a sexual activity. 18 U.S.C.

  § 2422(b). We give these terms “their ordinary meanings.” United States v.

  Isabella, 918 F.3d 816, 831 (10th Cir. 2019). The ordinary meaning of each

  term involves an action to overcome another person’s resistance. See

  United States v. Hite, 769 F.3d 1154, 1161 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“The ordinary

  meanings of the verbs persuade, induce, entice, and coerce demonstrate

  that § 2422(b) is intended to prohibit acts that seek to transform or

  overcome the will of a minor.”). And a person can’t typically overcome

  another person’s resistance to an activity without proposing it. See

  Propose, Webster’s Third New Int’l Dict. 1819 (1993, Philip Babcock

  Gove, Ph.D. ed.-in-chief) (first definition: “to form or declare a plan or

  intention”); Propose, Webster’s II New Riverside Dict. 944 (1994) (first

  definition: “To put forward for consideration, discussion, or adoption”);

  Proposal, Black’s Law Dict. 1474 (11th ed. 2019, Bryan A. Garner ed.-in-

  chief) (first definition: “Something offered for consideration or

  acceptance; a suggestion”).

        Given the ordinary meaning of the four statutory terms (persuades,

  induces, entices, coerces), two circuits have used the term propose as

  shorthand for the conduct prohibited under § 2422(b). United States v.

  Lopez, 4 F.4th 706 (9th Cir. 2021); United States v. Hart, 635 F.3d 850

  (6th Cir. 2011). In these cases, the circuit courts addressed the statutory

  element involving persuasion, inducement, enticement, or coercion to

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  engage in sexual activity. Lopez, 4 F.4th at 719; Hart, 635 F.3d at 856. In

  both cases, the circuit courts appeared to assume that the four statutory

  terms require a proposal:

             “Section 2422(b)’s ‘sexual activity for which any person
              can be charged with a criminal offense’ element requires
              the Government to prove the defendant proposed sexual
              conduct that would have constituted any criminal offense
              in one or more relevant jurisdictions.” Lopez, 4 F.4th at
              719 (emphasis added).

             “Under § 2422(b), the government must prove that the
              sexual authority proposed to a minor could be charged as
              a criminal offense.” Hart, 635 F.3d at 856 (emphasis
              added).

        b.    Whenever we’ve upheld the sufficiency of evidence under
              § 2422(b), a sexual proposal had existed.

        These apparent interpretations of § 2422(b) match our own case law.

  Before today, we have upheld findings of a substantial step under

  § 2422(b) in four published opinions:

        1.    United States v. Faust, 795 F.3d 1243 (10th Cir. 2015)

        2.    United States v. Thomas, 410 F.3d 1235 (10th Cir. 2005)

        3.    United States v. Munro, 394 F.3d 865 (10th Cir. 2005)

        4.    United States v. Isabella, 918 F.3d 816 (10th Cir. 2019)

  In all of these cases, we upheld the convictions based on the defendants’

  proposals for sexual activity.

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        For example, in Faust, we relied on the defendant’s discussions with

  the minor’s mother. 795 F.3d at 1250. These discussions focused on the

  defendant’s proposal for sex with the minor. Id.

        Thomas was similar. There the defendant discussed his desire for sex

  with a fictional 12-year-old girl. 410 F.3d at 1246. That discussion of

  desire constituted a proposal to engage in sexual activity “now.” Id.

        Munro also involved a proposal for sex. There the defendant

  communicated with an undercover agent posing as a 13-year-old girl. 394

  F.3d at 868. The defendant told the fictional girl that he wanted to engage

  in oral sex. Id. That statement constituted a sexual proposal.

        In Isabella, the proposal involved an adult’s request for a 14-year-

  old girl to send a pornographic photo of herself. 918 F.3d at 826. There the

  defendant sent a photo of his penis to a 14-year-old girl and asked what

  she had sent. Id. The girl responded by sending a naked photo from her

  neck down, and the defendant requested a “naughty” photo that included

  her face. Id. That request constituted a proposal for the girl to send child

  pornography, which is considered sexual activity under § 2422(b). 18

  U.S.C. § 2427. 1

  1
         In an unpublished case, we again applied a similar standard for a
  substantial step. See United States v. Wales, 127 F. App’x 424, 431 (10th
  Cir. 2005) (concluding that the defendant had taken a substantial step to
  entice a minor by sending “pornographic images to demonstrate to [a
  person he suspected to be a 12-year-old girl] the poses that he wanted from
  her”).
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        In all of these cases, we relied on the defendants’ proposals for

  sexual activity.

        c.    Sex talk alone doesn’t constitute a substantial step.

        We have observed that a substantial step requires “more than . . .

  explicit sex talk” with a minor. Isabella, 918 F.3d at 835 (quoting United

  States v. Gladish, 536 F.3d 646, 649 (7th Cir. 2008)). The observation

  applies here. Mr. Flechs told graphic stories about sex during his

  childhood, but those stories didn’t suffice for a substantial step. See id.

        d.    The alleged grooming doesn’t support the conviction without
              a sexual proposal.

       Though sex talk alone wasn’t enough for a substantial step, the

  government argued to the jury that Mr. Flechs had groomed Mike for future

  sexual activity. The jury instructions echoed the government’s view,

  stating that grooming

             “refers to deliberate actions taken by a defendant to expose a
              child to sexual material” and

             “can constitute a substantial step.”

  R. vo1. 1, at 43.

        The majority credits the government’s theory of grooming, pointing

  out that

             we said in United States v. Faust that enticement doesn’t
              require an “intention to commit the underlying sexual act” and

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             Isabella defined the term enticement as the arousal of “hope or
              desire.”

  Maj. Op. at 12, 14 (quoting United States v. Faust, 795 F.3d 1243, 1249

  (10th Cir. 2015), and United States v. Isabella, 918 F.3d 816, 831 (10th

  Cir. 2019)). From these excerpts in Faust and Isabella, the majority

  concludes that a reasonable jury could have found an effort to entice Mike

  by arousing his hope or desire. Maj. Op. at 12. The problem with this

  conclusion is that

             the undercover agent, posing as Mike, was the individual who
              was proposing sex with Mr. Flechs and

             Mr. Flechs never agreed to these proposals.

        Though Mr. Flechs never accepted Mike’s sexual proposals, the

  majority relies on the graphic nature of Mr. Flechs’s messages and trip to

  the skatepark. 2 But § 2422(b) isn’t violated by graphic messages or an

  2
        The majority also theorizes that a jury could have found that Mr.
  Flechs “crossed the substantial-step line . . . when he was driving in the
  minor’s neighborhood ‘again’ and knew the minor’s guardian was away.”
  Maj. Op. at 17 (quoting Suppl. R. vol. III, at 60–61). But the government
  didn’t present the jury with this theory, and it didn’t appear in the jury
  instructions. So we can’t affirm the conviction based on the majority’s new
  theory of a substantial step:

        This Court has never held that the right to a jury trial is satisfied
        when an appellate court retries a case on appeal under different
        instructions and on a different theory than was ever presented to
        the jury. Appellate courts are not permitted to affirm convictions
        on any theory they please simply because the facts necessary to
        support the theory were presented to the jury.

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  arrangement to meet; the defendant must take a substantial step to

  persuade, induce, entice, or coerce the minor to assent to a sexual activity.

  See Part 2(a), above. Mr. Flechs might have hoped for the relationship to

  escalate. But a substantial step involves more than hope. Mr. Flechs not

  only didn’t say anything to suggest a sexual encounter, but also declined to

  accept any of Mike’s multiple proposals for sex.

        We’ve never recognized a substantial step in similar circumstances.

  For example, in Faust, the defendant had driven to the parking lot of a

  motel where he thought a 12-year-old girl was waiting. When the defendant

  saw a police car, he left. United States v. Faust, 795 F.3d 1243, 1246–47

  (10th Cir. 2015). On appeal, the defendant challenged the sufficiency of

  the evidence under § 2422(b), arguing that his departure from the parking

  lot showed that he hadn’t intended to follow through with the sexual

  encounter. Id. at 1248. We rejected this challenge because the government

  hadn’t needed to prove an intent to follow through “with the arrangement

  for a sexual encounter.” Id. We reasoned that “§ 2422(b) requires only that

  the defendant intend to entice the minor, not that the defendant intend to

  McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 270 n.8 (1991).

        Even if this theory could be considered, it wouldn’t support a
  substantial step. In the message, Mr. Flechs recounted driving in the
  neighborhood; but he didn’t propose sexual activity or a meeting with
  Mike.

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  commit the underlying sexual act.” Id. (quoting United States v. Thomas,

  410 F.3d 1235, 1244 (10th Cir. 2005)).

        But there’s no suggestion in Faust that we would have upheld the

  conviction under § 2422(b) without the prior arrangements for a sexual

  encounter. See id. After all, the meeting took place only after the defendant

  had arranged to have sex with the daughter. Id. at 1246. In contrast,

  Mr. Flechs had declined to accept Mike’s sexual proposals.

        The majority relies not only on Faust, but also on our statement in

  Isabella that enticement refers broadly to the arousal of hope or desire.

  Maj. Op. at 12–13 (quoting United States v. Isabella, 918 F.3d 816, 831

  (10th Cir. 2019)). From this definition, the majority concludes that

  Mr. Flechs might have been trying to arouse Mike’s hope or desire by

  sending graphic messages and meeting at a skatepark. Id. But “[a] post-

  enticement act like travel can constitute a substantial step in violating

  § 2422(b)” only if the travel “relate[s] to the defendant’s enticing

  communications.” United States v. Davis, 985 F.3d 298, 305 (3d Cir.

  2021). In other words, the travel must demonstrate that “the

  communications were not all ‘hot air.’” Id. (quoting United States v.

  Gladish, 536 F.3d 646, 650 (7th Cir. 2008)); see also id. at 306

  (“Requiring the substantial step to relate to the enticing communications

  prevents criminalizing otherwise lawful behavior and permitting improper

  inferences against a criminal defendant.”).

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          Mr. Flechs’s visit to the skatepark doesn’t show that his graphic

  messages had constituted

               anything beyond “hot air” or

               an effort to obtain Mike’s assent to a sexual act.

          Until now, the circuits have relied on personal meetings to prove a

  substantial step only when the defendant had already proposed sexual

  activity. See id. at 305 n.29 (collecting cases). For example, in United

  States v. Howard, the Fifth Circuit explained that the defendant’s

  conversations about sex and sending of sexual photographs hadn’t

  constituted a substantial step. 766 F.3d 414, 426–27 (5th Cir. 2014). The

  step became substantial only when the defendant discussed arrangements

  for sex with underage girls. Id.

          Our cases have upheld the finding of a substantial step only when the

  defendant had proposed a sexual activity before making arrangements to

  meet. See Faust, 795 F.3d at 1250; Thomas, 410 F.3d at 1246; Munro, 394

  F.3d at 869–70. Given the absence of any prior proposals for sexual

  activity, Mr. Flechs’s trip to the skatepark couldn’t constitute a substantial

  step.

          The majority points to three opinions for the point that grooming

  could bear on the finding of a substantial step:

          1.    United States v. Howard, 766 F.3d 414, 425 (5th Cir. 2014)

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        2.    United States v. Goetzke, 494 F.3d 1231, 1235–37 (9th Cir.
              2007)

        3.    United States v. Lee, 603 F.3d 904, 904 (11th Cir. 2011)

  Maj. Op. at 16.

        But these cases also involved sexual proposals by the defendants, and

  the courts didn’t suggest that a conviction could lie under § 2422(b)

  without a sexual proposal. In Howard, for example, the Fifth Circuit said

  that the defendant had crossed the line to criminality only when he told the

  “undercover police officer to perform sex acts on and procure birth control

  for [underage] girls to get them ready for him.” 766 F.3d at 426. In

  Goetzke, the defendant suggested an exchange of pictures, expressed a

  desire to rub the boy’s “nice butt,” and said that he wanted to perform oral

  sex on the boy. 494 F.3d at 1235. In Lee, the defendant repeatedly

  expressed a desire to “complete the act” of sex with a child, providing

  details on when and how. 603 F.3d at 915. Though grooming might be

  pertinent, the cited cases don’t support the finding of a substantial step

  without a sexual proposal. 3

  3
        The majority also cites United States v. Berg, noting that there the
  defendant didn’t dispute the sufficiency of grooming to prove a substantial
  step. Maj. Op. at 18 (citing United States v. Berg, 640 F.3d 239, 246 (7th
  Cir. 2011)). In Berg, the defendant challenged the element of intent—not
  substantial step. Berg, 640 F.3d at 246, 250; see also Individual Br. and
  Required Short App’x of Defendant-Appellant at Pt. II, United States v.
  Berg, No. 09-2498 (7th Cir. Sept. 1, 2009), available at 2009 WL 2946715
  (arguing only that the government failed to prove specific intent to engage
  in sexual activity with the minor when they were to meet). The defendant
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        e.    No other circuit has upheld a conviction under § 2422(b)
              without a sexual proposal.

        The majority states that three other circuits have upheld convictions

  under § 2422(b) based on evidence other than a sexual proposal, citing a

  Seventh Circuit opinion, a Fourth Circuit opinion, and an unpublished

  Sixth Circuit opinion:

        1.    United States v. Hensley, 574 F.3d 384 (7th Cir. 2009)

        2.    United States v. Clarke, 842 F.3d 288 (4th Cir. 2016)

        3.    United States v. Fox, 600 F. App’x 414 (6th Cir. 2015)
              (unpublished)

  Maj. Op. at 9–11. As the majority acknowledges, however, all of these

  cases included sexual proposals by the defendants. Maj. Op. at 11 n.8.

        For example, the majority states that in Hensley, the court “[found]

  ‘more than enough for a jury to find a substantial step’ where the

  defendant ‘groom[ed] [the victim] for sex by conversing with her using

  multiple online persons,’ ‘arrange[d] a meeting place and time,’ and

  ‘actually traveled to the meeting place.’” Maj. Op. at 10–11 (quoting

  excerpts of Hensley with emphasis added in the majority opinion). This

  description suggests that Hensley upheld the finding of a substantial step

  without a sexual proposal. But that suggestion isn’t correct.

  presumably declined to dispute the existence of a substantial step because
  he had told the fictional girl that he expected “a good blow job” and
  wanted to perform oral sex on her. Berg, 640 F.3d at 241–42.

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        Hensley addressed the sufficiency of evidence under the plain-error

  standard, focusing on whether reversal was necessary to avoid a “manifest

  miscarriage of justice.” Hensley, 474 F.3d at 390. The court concluded that

  the finding of a substantial step didn’t involve a “manifest miscarriage of

  justice” based on “transcripts of the conversations” between the defendant

  and an undercover agent posing as a 13-year-old girl. Id. at 391. In these

  transcripts, the defendant learned that the girl was only 13 years old and

               told her “oh what the hell [I]’d still f*** you,”

               asked her “when she might want to have sex,”

               said “he was ‘horny’ and wanted ‘to get to know [her] with
                [her] clothes off,’” and

               assured the girl that she wouldn’t get pregnant if they had sex
                after her period or if they “engaged in coitus interruptus.”

  Id. at 387.

        Despite these open requests for sex, the majority cites this opinion as

  an example of a court finding “a substantial step based on evidence other

  than a proposal or acceptance of a proposal for sexual activity.” Maj. Op.

  at 9–11. The majority is mistaken: The Seventh Circuit expressly upheld

  the finding of a substantial step—under the plain-error standard—based on

  explicit sexual proposals.

        The majority also relies on a Fourth Circuit case, Clarke, stating that

  there the court had upheld a finding of a substantial step based on the

  defendant’s act of bringing candy to two minors. Maj. Op. at 10 (citing
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  United States v. Clarke, 842 F.3d 288, 298 (4th Cir. 2016)). In upholding

  the finding of a substantial step, the Fourth Circuit explained that the

  defendant had brought candy to the minors for “a weekend visit with [an 8-

  year-old boy and 9-year-old girl] during which Defendant hoped the

  children would engage in sex acts.” Clarke, 842 F.3d at 298. But the court

  didn’t infer the defendant’s “hopes” from his delivery of candy; before

  bringing candy, the defendant had made it clear that he was coming to

  engage in sex acts with both the boy and girl.

          The defendant had conveyed that intent by messaging an undercover

  officer who was posing as the father of the boy and girl. Id. at 292. When

  the defendant learned of the boy, the defendant responded: “OMG you have

  a son! We need to meet.” Id. (quoting Joint App’x at 98, 254). The

  undercover officer then asked the defendant if he would be comfortable

  with the officer watching the children “perform sex acts on [the

  d]efendant.” Id. “The defendant replied that ‘a get together would be

  awesome,’ and agreed to come over that weekend.” Id. (cleaned up;

  quoting Joint App’x at 255). The defendant then asked the undercover

  officer about the children’s sexual experience and whether the boy could

  get an erection and orgasm. Id. After fielding this question, the undercover

  officer asked the defendant if he would “play” with the girl as well as the

  boy. Id. The defendant replied: “[O]f course.” Id. (quoting Joint App’x at

  266).

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        Following these conversations, the defendant and undercover officer

  discussed their plans for a meeting where the defendant would have sex

  with the children. Id. The defendant instructed the undercover officer to

  tell the children that a “‘good friend’ . . . would be coming to their house

  to engage in sex acts.” Id. (quoting Joint App’x at 117, 272). On the day of

  the planned meeting, the defendant asked the undercover officer if it would

  be okay to perform oral sex on the boy and girl. Id. These facts show

  numerous sexual proposals before the planned meeting.

        But the majority cites Clarke as an example of a circuit court finding

  “a substantial step based on evidence other than a proposal or acceptance

  of a proposal for sexual activity.” Maj. Op. at 9–10. I respectfully disagree

  with this characterization: The Fourth Circuit upheld the finding of a

  substantial step based on explicit sexual proposals.

        Finally, the majority relies on an unpublished Sixth Circuit opinion,

  Fox, stating that there the court upheld a finding of substantial step based

  solely on flattery and purchase of expensive gifts. Maj. Op. at 11. There an

  underage girl testified that the defendant had “picked her up” at night and

  “revealed [his] favor: he wanted to have intercourse with her because, in

  [the girl’s] words, ‘he was going to jail for a really long time and he didn’t

  know if he was going to ever get it again.’” Fox, 600 F. App’x at 417

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  (quoting R. at 159). The request for intercourse constituted a sexual

  proposal. 4

        In each of the cited opinions, the circuit court upheld the finding of a

  substantial step based on the defendant’s sexual proposals.

        f.      A substantial step can’t be based on the combination of
                graphic stories and trip to the skatepark.

        Despite the presence of a sexual proposal in all of these cases, the

  majority relies on the combination of Mr. Flechs’s graphic stories and trip

  to the skatepark. For two reasons, the graphic stories and trip to the

  skatepark don’t substitute for a sexual proposal.

        First, the combination of graphic stories and trip to the skatepark

  don’t show a firm commitment to persuade, induce, entice, or coerce Mike.

  See Part 2(a), above.

        Second, without requiring a sexual proposal, we are inviting future

  juries to speculate from “perfectly legal behavior” about the firmness of a

  defendant’s intent to commit a criminal act. See Part 2(a), above; see also

  4
        The majority also cites a statement from the Sixth Circuit’s
  unpublished opinion: “That evidence of sexually explicit online or
  telephone conversations sufficed to convict other defendants under
  § 2422(b) does not mean that such evidence is necessary to prove
  attempted enticement or coercion.” Fox, 600 F. App’x at 418 (quoted in
  Maj. Op. at 8 n.6). The majority states that it finds the Sixth Circuit’s
  reasoning for this statement “instructive.” Maj. Op. at 8 n.6. But the Sixth
  Circuit provided no reasoning for this statement. See Fox, 600 F. App’x at
  418.

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  United States v. Leos–Quijada, 107 F.3d 786, 794 (10th Cir.1997) (stating

  that the evidence supporting a guilty verdict must raise more than the mere

  suspicion of guilt, and the jury’s inferences must be “more than

  speculation and conjecture in order to be reasonable”).

        Mr. Flechs indisputably engaged in egregious sex talk with someone

  that he thought was only 14-years-old. But we’ve held that sex talk isn’t

  enough to convict under § 2422(b). United States v. Isabella, 918 F.3d 816,

  835 (10th Cir. 2019); see Part 2(c), above. Without a sexual proposal, how

  will we safeguard against speculation from sex talk alone?

        The majority theorizes that the trip to a skatepark could constitute an

  effort to entice Mike into a sexual act. That’s possible, but this theory rests

  on speculation because the trip itself didn’t suggest an effort to entice

  Mike to do anything.

        For both reasons, the graphic stories and trip to the skatepark can’t

  create a substantial step without Mr. Flechs’s making or accepting a sexual

  proposal.

        g.    The statutory language controls but doesn’t require magic
              words.

       The majority calls my approach a “strict proposal requirement,”

  suggesting that it would allow child predators to avoid criminal

  responsibility “by carefully avoiding direct requests for sex.” Maj. Op. at

  11. I respectfully disagree.

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       We’re bound by the language that Congress used, and that language

  criminalizes a substantial step to persuade, induce, entice, or coerce a

  minor to engage in a sexual activity. 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b); see Part 2(a),

  above. In applying this statutory language, we must determine whether the

  defendant’s conduct “manifests the firm commitment to perform a criminal

  act.” Hernandez-Cruz v. Holder, 651 F.3d 1094, 1103 (9th Cir. 2011); see

  Parts 2(a), above.

       A firm commitment may exist when the defendant proposes sexual

  activity to a minor. Without a sexual proposal, we would need to enter the

  realm of speculation about a defendant’s further designs and blur the

  boundary between preparation and a firm commitment to criminality.

       Although a sexual proposal is required, this requirement doesn’t

  permit “subtle manipulation.” See Maj. Op. at 11. A sexual proposal or

  assent to a sexual proposal could exist in many forms, and the law doesn’t

  provide a catalog of those forms. But the law does require conduct

  manifesting a firm commitment to persuade, induce, entice, or coerce a

  minor to engage in sexual activity; and that requirement necessarily entails

  a sexual proposal of some sort. 5

  5
        The majority theorizes that Mr. Flechs’s graphic messages might
  have constituted an implicit proposal for a sexual act with Mike. Maj. Op.
  at 19 n.13. But the government doesn’t assert this theory on appeal, and we
  generally consider it “imprudent” to affirm on a theory that the appellee
  hasn’t advanced. United States v. Woodard, 5 F.4th 1148, 1154 (10th Cir.
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                                      * * *

        The majority upholds the conviction under § 2422(b) without the

  defendant’s making or accepting a sexual proposal. In doing so, the

  majority disregards the need for conduct showing a firm commitment to

  persuade, induce, entice, or coerce a minor to assent to a sexual activity.

  By loosening these requirements, the majority muddies the line between

  explicit sex talk and a substantial step. See United States v. Gladish, 536

  F.3d 646, 650 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Treating speech (even obscene speech) as

  the ‘substantial step’ would abolish any requirement of a substantial

  step.”). I would instead retain that line and continue to require a firm

  commitment to persuade, induce, entice, or coerce a minor through a

  proposal for sexual activity.

  2021); United States v. Chavez, 976 F.3d 1178, 1203 n.17 (10th Cir. 2021).
  So we need not decide whether Mr. Flechs made an implicit proposal.

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