Court Opinion

ID: 9868428
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 18:34:55.277439+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:50.299672
License: Public Domain

O'n Petition to Rehear.
The contention made by the State in its petition to rehear may be classified as follows: (1) That the de*63termination of the genuineness of the handwriting- offered as a standard of comparison was for the jury; and (2) that even if the trial judge was in error in permitting the jury to determine the genuineness of the standards of comparison, no prejudice thereby resulted to defendants.
The first of these contentions is untenable in view of the plain language of the statute providing that comparison-of disputed writing with “any tvriting or. signature proved to the satisfaction of the judge to be genuine, shall be permitted to be made by expert ivitness-es.” Code 1932, Section 9731. (Italics ours.) It is perfectly evident from the language used that the judge alone determines the question of the genuineness of the writing offered. It would be an unwarranted invasion of the jurisdiction of the Legislature for this court to undertake to strike out the word “ judge” from the statute and substitute the word “jury.”
In the case of Powers v. McKenzie, 90 Tenn., 167, 16 S. W., 559, 561, chapter 22, Acts 1889, was assailed on the ground that it left to the judge, and not to the jury, the decision as to the genuineness of writings offered as a standard of comparison. It was insisted that this was an invasion of the province of the jury under the Constitution. The court sustained the constitutionality of the statute, and held it was competent for the Legislature to leave to the judge the decision of the question. This decision of the eminent judges constituting the court at that time, among whom were Horace H. LtjetoN, BeNjamiN J. Lea, and David L. Shodgbass, has stood unchallenged until now.
In speaking of the statute making it the duty of the judge to pass upon, the genuineness of the writing, the *64court said in Powers v. McKenzie, as quoted above in the original opinion in this cause: “It is a legislative adaptation to the subject-matter of the settled rule of the common law, that, as a general proposition, it is the province of the court to say what is evidence in cases, and the province of the jury to decide upon its efficacy. ’ ’
Apt illustrations of the principle referred to by the court in Powers v. McKenzie are to be found in our criminal cases. In this state the admissibility of dying declarations is a question for the court alone, without the aid of the jury. Dickason v. State, 139 Tenn., 601, 202 S. W., 922. In cases of search and seizure it is always the duty of the judge, when objection is made because of an unlawful search, to determine, in the absence of the jury, as a matter of law whether such evidence is competent. Goodwin v. State, 148 Tenn., 682, 687, 257 S. W., 79. With reference to confessions, this court said in Self v. State, 65 Tenn. (6 Baxt.), 244, 253:
“When confessions are offered as evidence, their competency becomes a preliminary question, to be determined by the court. This imposes upon the presiding judge the duty of deciding the fact whether the party making the confession was influenced by hope or fear. This rule is so well established, that if the jtodge allow the jury to determine the preliminary fact, it is error, for which the judgment will be reversed. Boyd v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Humph.), 39. These are elementary principles too long established and followed to be now questioned.” (Italics ours.)
That the learned trial judge allowed the jury to determine the question of the genuineness of the writing on the exhibits is an undisputed fact. He charged the jury:
*65“. . •. Before you may consider the writing other than the signatures in these exhibits for any purpose, you must he satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that such handwriting other than the signatures is the genuine handwriting of the defendant Omohundro.”
The same charge was repeated with reference to the exhibits purporting to show the handwriting of Gibson. In support of its contention that the writings, offered as a standard of comparison, were in the handwriting of these defendants, the State introduced numerous witnesses, and their testimony was allowed to go to the jury over the objections of defendants.
The genuineness of the writing on the exhibits was disputed by Omohundro and Gibson. The collateral issue thus raised was left to the jury for determination. The court in the leading case of University of Illinois v. Spalding, 71 N. H., 163, 51 A., 731, 734, 62 L. R. A., 817, 826, 827, speaking on this point, said.:
“If disputed signatures were admissible for the purpose of comparison, a collateral inquiry would be raised as to each standard; and the proof upon this inquiry •would be comparison again, which would only lead to an endless series of issues, each more unsatisfactory ' than the first, and the case would thus be filled with issues aside from the real question before the jury. Juries are indeed more intelligent than when the common law denied them even the right to make comparison with admitted signatures not otherwise in the case, but the time has not yet come when they should be left without chart and-compass. It is due to them and to the administration of justice that when called upon to pass upon the identity of a signature the standards furnished for this purpose should be genuine standards. *66The jury should not be required, nor should they be permitted, to make comparison with disputed standards, and to settle for themselves the collateral question of the genuineness' of the standards, which might often be .more difficult than the main question of the genuineness of the writing in issue. Such a practice is not only indefensible in reason, but it is against the judicial and legislative opinion of the world, almost without exception. 15 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2 Ed.), pp. 272, 273; Lawson, Exp. Ev., 408 ; Rogers, Exp. Test., section 138.”
The English common-law procedure act of 1854, with respect to proving standards of comparison, is identically the same as our statute; both provide that such writing shall be “proved to the.satisfaction of the judge to be' genuine:!’ The New York act substituted the word “court” for the word “judge.” The'case of People v. Molineux, 168 N. Y., 264, 61 N. E., 286, 308, 62 L. R. A., 193, made a basic distinction between “court” and “judge” in holding that the proof of the genuineness of the standard should be submitted to the jury. The court said: “The 'Word ‘court’ in the statutes is used in its generic sense, and includes both judge and jury 'in a "case where a jury is present. It is significant that the statute of 1880, which' was obviously copied from the statute of .Great Britain enacted in 1854, substitutes the Word ‘court’ for the word ‘judge.’ ” This case, relied on by the’State,is not in point.
An analysis of other cases relied on by the State shows that they either 'support thé holding of this court, in principle, or else' áre readily: distinguishable! For example, the case of State v. Ryno, 68 Kan., 348, 74 P., 1114, 64 L. R. A., 303, is relied ón. The handwriting statute of Kansas (chapter 62, section 1427, Revised *67Statutes) is utterly different from our statute. It does not provide that tlie standard offered be found genuine by tlie judge. The inapplicability of State v. Ryno is demonstrated when the language of the Kansas statute is considered. That statute reads as follows: .
“Persons of skill, or experts, may be called to testify as to tlie genuineness of a note, bill, draft, certificate of deposit or other writing; but three witnesses at least shall be required to prove the fact, except -in case of a larceny thereof, the single evidence of the president, cashier or teller of the bank purporting to have issued the same, or the maker thereof, may be received as sufficient. ’ ’
It would extend this memorandum beyond all reasonable bounds were we to attempt to consider separately the other cases cited in the brief for the State. Counsel for defendants have fully discussed these cases in their brief, to which we make reference.
Under our statute there can be no doubt that it is the duty of the judge alone to determine the genuineness of a writing offered as a standard of comparison. Iiis decision on this question is final, when supported by' material evidence, and is not subject to' review or reversal by the jury.
The second contention is, in effect, that even if the trial judge was in error in permitting the jury to determine the genuineness of the standards of comparison, no prejudice thereby resulted to defendants. Section 10654 of the Code is invoked, which section, in' substance, is that no reversal for errors not affecting the result of the trial will be granted.' This contention ignores the fact that the testimony given by the large number of witnesses as to the genuineness of the stand*68ards was incomplete to go to the jury under chapter 22, Acts 1889, and could have, as said in University of Illinois v. Spalding; supra, but served to “confuse and distract the jury.” The position of the State would do away with our handwriting statute, for it could always be argued that no prejudice resulted in addressing the evidence to the jury when it reached the same conclusion as to genuineness as had the judge. But substantially the only evidence offered connecting defendants with the offense charged was that of the expert, "Walter.. His testimony could only be received in strict compliance with the requirements of chapter 22, Acts 1889. To throw in along with his testimony the testimony of the witnesses as to the genuineness of the standards, not direct evidence upon the merits of the case, and entered collateral thereto, was essentially prejudicial to defendants.
The point is, however, that the condition under which writings offered as a standard may be proved was not observed. The question of genuineness was left to the jury. • Without a strict observance of the requirements of the statute, the expert, Walter, was without right to make comparisons. This court said in Franklin v. Franklin, 90 Tenn., 44, 16 S. W., 557, 558, that this statute “should be strictly construed.” It can scarcely be rated a technicality for this court to give force and effect to a- solemn act of the Legislature. Except for the act, the State would have been unable to proceed with its case. Having invoked the act, it must be held to the necessity of taking it as written.
Petition overruled.