Court Opinion

ID: 9890863
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-16 17:04:46.133742+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:30.517360
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/16/23 In re B.B. CA2/6
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION SIX

In re B.B., a Person Coming                                  2d Juv. No. B325584
Under the Juvenile Court Law.                             (Super. Ct. No. 20JD-00133)
                                                           (San Luis Obispo County)

SAN LUIS OBISPO COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL
SERVICES,

     Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JANE B.,

     Defendant and Appellant.

       Jane B. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s orders
(1) refusing to return her then 14-year-old (now 15-year-old)
daughter, B.B., to mother’s physical custody; (2) terminating
reunification services as to B.B.; (3) placing B.B. with her
presumed father, C.M., and (4) requiring that mother’s visitation
with B.B. be supervised. The orders were made after a contested
18-month permanency review hearing (18-month hearing)
conducted in December 2022.
      The juvenile court did not set a Welfare and Institutions
Code section 366.26 hearing.1 Therefore, the orders are directly
appealable. (See § 395, subd. (a)(1); In re T.G. (2010) 188
Cal.App.4th 687, 692 [“‘[T]he court’s dispositional and following
orders are directly appealable, with the exception of an order
scheduling a selection and implementation hearing under section
366.26 . . .’”]; In re X.Z. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1243, 1248-1249.)
      Mother contends the orders are “unsubstantiated by the
evidence, not in the best[] interest[] of B.B., and made in an
abuse of the discretion of the juvenile court.” We affirm.
       Factual and Procedural Background for Period up to
     April 2022 Order Removing B.B. from Mother’s Custody
      In a prior unpublished opinion, In re D.H. et al. (June 20,
2023, B320188), we affirmed the juvenile court’s April 2022 order
removing mother’s three children, including B.B., from her
physical custody. The juvenile court ordered that family
reunification services be provided to mother. We take judicial
notice of the opinion and record in the prior appeal. (Evid. Code,
§§ 452, subd. (d), 459, subd. (a).) The following factual and
procedural summary is taken from pages 2-8 of the opinion:
      “[Mother and Jeremy H. (Jeremy)] are the parents of D.H.,
who was born in 2014. Mother is also the parent of Z.M., born in
2004, and B.B., born in 2008. Jeremy is not the father of Z.M. or
B.B. C.M. [is] the presumed father of Z.M. and B.B. . . . . All of
the children are female.

        1All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions

Code.

                                  2
       “In August 2020 a juvenile dependency petition was filed.
It alleged that the children came within the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court because their parents had failed ‘to supervise or
protect the child[ren] adequately’ and ‘to provide the child[ren]
with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment.’
Furthermore, [mother and Jeremy] were unable ‘to provide
regular care for the child[ren] due to [their]’ . . . mental illness . . .
or substance abuse.’
       “According to the petition, on August 18, 2020, a social
worker and deputy sheriff visited the home where [mother and
Jeremy] resided with the children. ‘The condition of the home
posed concern for the health and safety of the children. The
home had rat feces throughout the entire house, bugs on the
inside of the refrigerator, counters, and on the trash. There was
trash and chest height debris scattered throughout the entire
home and on the property outside. There were narrow paths to
walk throughout the home; however, the home had so much
debris that it was nearly impossible to determine the intended
purpose for each room. Some of the rooms were inaccessible due
to the debris and trash. The children presented with dirty skin
and clothing, including having an odor.’
       “The petition continued, ‘There are . . . concerns about the
mental health of both parents [Jeremy and mother]. During
previous investigations, the parents have discussed being
diagnosed with various mental health concerns. In addition, the
parents refused to submit to a drug test during the current
investigation, causing concerns for possible substance abuse.’
       “In December 2020 the juvenile court found true the
petition’s allegations. The court stated: ‘[T]here is a
preponderance of the evidence that, in fact, . . . the children were

                                    3
living at [mother’s and Jeremy’s] home, that it was in pretty
abysmal condition. There were rat feces at the time of detention.
There was trash piled chest high. The children were in poor
hygiene . . . and this wasn’t the first time that this issue had been
reported. It's not something that came out of the blue. In fact,
those concerns have been there for a long time . . . . So there’s no
question I should take jurisdiction of the case and I will, and that
will be of all three kids.’
       “The children were adjudged dependent children of the
juvenile court within the meaning of section 300, subdivision (b).
The court placed the children ‘in family maintenance with
[mother] and Jeremy.’ But it directed ‘that the place of [family
maintenance] is to be at Jeremy’s mother's [i.e., D.H.’s paternal
grandmother’s] house . . . until such time as the appropriate
health and land use authorities approve [mother’s and Jeremy’s]
residence to be habita[ble] and then the children can move back
in at that residence.’
       “In February 2021 the San Luis Obispo County
Department of Social Services (DSS) filed a supplemental
petition pursuant to section 387. This was the first of two section
387 petitions. . . .
       “The first section 387 petition alleged: ‘[A]t the last Court
hearing on December 16, 2020,’ mother had stated that ‘the
family home [mother’s and Jeremy’s residence] would be ready
for the children to reside in within two weeks.’ ‘On January 22,
2021, the assigned social worker responded to the parent[s]’ home
unannounced as she had been unable to make contact with the
parents via telephone and text message. The home was found to
be cluttered with boxes, miscellaneous items piled high, broken
windows, and the outside of the home continues to be cluttered

                                 4
and overwhelmed with items. The social worker was not allowed
entry into the home. . . .’
       “In March 2021 the juvenile court sustained the first
section 387 petition. It found ‘that the prior disposition was
ineffective in family maintenance and that we need a different
plan.’ It removed the children from [mother’s and Jeremy’s]
physical custody and ‘place[d] them . . . in the care of their
grandmother.’ It ordered that family reunification services be
provided to [mother, Jeremy, and C.M., the presumed father of
B.B. and Z.M].
       “In September 2021 the juvenile court ordered the children
‘placed, effective immediately, in the care and custody of’ [mother
and Jeremy]. It directed DSS to ‘provide family maintenance
services.’
       “On April 1, 2022, DSS filed a second section 387
supplemental petition. The petition alleged that [mother and
Jeremy] had failed to provide the children ‘with adequate care
due to concerns regarding the parents’ mental health and
possible substance abuse issues.’ [Mother and Jeremy] failed to
participate in random drug testing. Jeremy tested positive for
THC (tetrahydrocannabinol), ‘the psychoactive element in
marijuana or cannabis.’ (People v. Kidane (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th
817, 823 . . . ) In addition, [mother and Jeremy] ‘failed to ensure
[the children’s] regular[] and consistent attendance at school.’
The petition was orally amended to allege that [mother and
Jeremy] did not provide ‘adequate dental care’ for D.H.’s ‘broken
tooth.’
       “DSS’s section 387 report, dated April 25, 2022, was
prepared by Valerie Amador, a social worker. . . .
       “...

                                 5
       “The section 387 report emphasized the children’s school
absences and deficient academic performance . . . .
       “A note from B.B.’s school said, ‘As of Wednesday, March
30, 2022, [B.B.] has been absent from school for 57 days and
present for 77 days. This is equivalent to [B.B.] being present
57% of the days this school year.’ ‘Of [B.B.’s] 57 absences, [only]
5 of them (3/22-3/28) were excused by a doctor’s note.’ ‘[B.B.]
currently has 2 Bs, 1 C, 1 D, and 2 Fs with teachers excusing the
majority of assignments from when she was absent.’
       “The section 387 report continued: ‘On March 29, 2022, the
mother became escalated when advised of the intent to file a
petition to remove the children. . . . The mother denied that the
children had any absences [from school]. When reminded that
the school . . . had asked Law Enforcement to do a welfare check
due to the number of absences the mother “exploded” and stated
that was “bullshit” . . . . The mother continued to yell, walking
away . . . and stating that [Amador] just wanted to take the
children away.’
       “...
       “The [children’s] school informed Amador that the children
have ‘dirty nails and unkempt hair.’ Amador personally observed
‘[t]he same kind of thing. Just unwashed hair, unkempt
nails. . . . Just an uncleanliness, in general.’
       “...
       “As to [mother’s] participation in random drug testing,
Amador testified: ‘From April 4th [2022] to now [April 27, 2022],
mother has tested approximately seven times. Three of those
have been negative. Three have been positive for THC. . . .’
       “...

                                 6
        “ . . . Mother testified that she had received a mental health
diagnosis of ‘[b]ipolar disorder and episodes of depression’ along
with ‘other specified trauma.’ In addition, she ‘suffer[ed] from
fibromyalgia, as well as endometriosis and PTSD [Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder].’ According to the prior jurisdiction
report filed on September 14, 2020, mother ‘shared that she [had
been] diagnosed with . . . Generalized Anxiety Disorder, Social
Anxiety, Agoraphobia, and Borderline Personality Disorder.’ ”
         Factual and Procedural Background for Period after
       April 2022 Order Removing B.B. from Mother’s Custody
        An 18-month hearing was originally scheduled for October
27, 2022. In a Status Review Report prepared by Amador and
dated October 9, 2022, DSS recommended that mother’s family
reunification services be terminated and that B.B. be reunified
with C.M., her presumed father. Amador noted that B.B. was
currently in a “short-term foster placement.”
        As to the condition of mother’s home, Amador observed:
“The mother does attempt to clean the home when she knows
[Amador] will be visiting the home but admits that she
sometimes is not well enough to keep up with the home.”
“During [Amador’s] last scheduled home visit, [she] noted a
broken window at the front of the house, which [DSS] previously
paid to repair. The home smelled strongly of sweat but the
mother had the door open and fan on and was attempting to air
the house out. [Z.M.], [B.B.’s] adult sibling, showed [Amador] her
room, which she shares with [B.B.] and [D.H.]. The room was
exceptionally cluttered and there were items stacked up on the
beds. The bedroom had a strong smell of body odor and pets. . . .
[T]he family does not appear to have windows that open and . . .
it is difficult for them to air out the house.”

                                  7
        As to mother’s physical health, Amador noted: “[M]other
has stated she becomes bedridden when her fibromyalgia flares
up. [She] will need to be able to articulate a plan for when she is
too ill to provide care for the children.”
        As to substance abuse, Amador stated: “[M]other did test
for 60-days during April and May 2022. During that time, the
mother attended all requested drug tests. She tested 13 times
with 7 negative tests and 6 positive tests for
tetrahydrocannabinol (THC).”
        Amador further observed: “[B.B.] is l4 years old and wishes
to remain in her community near her mother, siblings, and
friends [in San Luis Obispo County]. However, the father, [C.M.,
who lives in Bakersfield,] has completed his case plan, is visiting
consistently, and is able to provide for all of [B.B.’s] needs. [C.M.]
supports [B.B.’s] continued contact with family members and her
community and is willing to ensure that she is not isolated from
her connections. [DSS] is confident that [C.M.] will make [B.B.]
available for visitation with the mother if she is placed with him.”
        In a report dated October 24, 2022, the Court Appointed
Special Advocate (CASA) expressed concern about placing B.B.
with C.M.: “I worry most about the further deterioration of
[B.B.’s] emotional and developmental state if she were to be
permanently moved to Bakersfield, away from the family, school,
and routines she has been around her entire life. [B.B.] has been
very clear about not wanting permanent placement in
Bakersfield with her father, but I am encouraged by her desire to
want to continue bi-monthly weekend visitations with him.
[C.M.] has demonstrated great consistency in his visitation
schedule and ability to transport her.” The CASA recommended
that family reunification services be terminated for mother and

                                  8
that “[B.B.] be placed with maternal grandmother, [D.B.], if she
is approved for placement.”
       As to the condition of mother’s home, the CASA wrote:
“While nearly all of the debris and trash have been removed from
the front exterior of the mother's home, I do not know what the
state of the home is inside. In the past, the girls have stated that
their bedroom required repairs and that they were moved to
sleeping in the living room.”
       In a First Addendum Report dated December 6, 2022,
Amador stated: “[B.B.] has been placed with her maternal
grandmother, [D.B.], since October 24, 2022. [B.B.] is content
with being placed with her grandmother. . . . [¶] [DSS] has
received concerns that [B.B.’s] hygiene has declined since being
placed with [D.B.]. . . . [D.B.] resides with her boyfriend in his
home. The boyfriend is reported to have significant health
issues. Should anything happen to the boyfriend, [D.B.] would
not be able to remain in this home with [B.B.].”
       Amador noted that B.B.’s eight-year-old sibling, D.H., was
distressed because mother had been talking to her about the
dependency case and had been pressuring her to lie. Amador
said: “[DSS] is worried that the mother may also be coaching and
influencing [B.B.] in a similar manner. [¶] [DSS] is requesting
that all of the mother's visitation return to supervised
immediately until the resolution of the contested [18-month]
hearing.” “[DSS] continues to believe that the mother has not
made substantial or consistent progress over the life of the case
and is not in a position to reunify with her children or have
reunification services extended out to the 24-month date.”

                                 9
            The 18-Month Permanency Review Hearing
       The 18-month hearing occurred on December 20, 2022.
Eight days before the hearing began, B.B. met with the juvenile
court judge and said she preferred to live with mother.
       Mother, C.M., and Amador testified at the hearing.
Amador opined, “‘The mother continues to take no responsibility
for her actions that led to the children’s three removals [from her
custody] and continues to believe that the children were
wrongfully removed.’”
       After listening to the testimony, the trial court said:
“[S]ometimes mature 14-year-olds can write their own ticket and
the Court will follow what they want. And I know . . . what [B.B.]
wants. [She] has expressed . . . that her first preference would be
to be placed with mom. But . . . it’s just not an option” because of
(1) concerns about mother’s mental and physical health; (2)
mental health counseling for mother is “still in its infancy”; (3)
B.B. has “been removed from [mother’s] home several times . . .
[a]nd [she is] entitled to some level of permanency”; (4) “this . . .
case is almost two and a half years old,” and “we should have had
some resolution of this a year ago at least”; and (5) mother put
pressure on D.H. “to lie.” Mother showed “poor judgment in
involving [D.H.] in this conversation [about lying] that no eight-
year-old should have to have.”
       The juvenile court concluded: “I just can’t see my way clear
to give [mother] another chance. There’s just too much of a risk
to these children. And it’s based on . . . [mother’s] conduct or . . .
lack of progress over the last two years. [¶] So the Court is going
to terminate reunification services to [her].”
       As to C.M., the court said: “He has completed his case plan
successfully. . . . He is [B.B.’s] father. He is entitled to be

                                 10
reunified with [her]. [¶] So I am going to order that [B.B.] be
placed with her father . . . . [It’s] in the best interest of the child.”
“[W]hat’s good about [C.M.] is that he has vowed to make sure
that [B.B.] maintain relationships with . . . the other people in
[her] life.”
        The juvenile court’s written findings stated, “By a
preponderance of the evidence, the return of the child to . . . her
parent . . . would create substantial risk of detriment to the
safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the
child.”
         Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s
           Order Refusing to Return B.B. to Mother’s Home
        At the 18-month permanency review hearing, “the court
shall order the return of the child to the physical custody of their
parent . . . unless the court finds, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the return of the child to their parent . . . would
create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or
physical or emotional well-being of the child.” (§ 366.22, subd.
(a)(1).
        “We review the juvenile court’s finding of detriment for
substantial evidence. [Citations.] Under that standard we
inquire whether the evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted,
supports the court's determination. We resolve all conflicts in
support of the determination, indulge in all legitimate inferences
to uphold the findings and may not substitute our deductions for
those of the juvenile court. [Citations.] However, ‘[s]ubstantial
evidence is not synonymous with any evidence. [Citation.] To be
substantial, the evidence must be of ponderable legal significance
and must be reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value.’”
(Georgeanne G. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (2020) 53

                                   11
Cal.App.5th 856, 864-865.) “An appellate court does not reweigh
the evidence.” (In re Marina S. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 158, 165.)
       Mother “has the burden of showing the . . . finding [of
detriment] is unsupported by substantial evidence.” (In re
Giovanni F. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 594, 598.) She has not
carried her burden. The evidence shows mother failed to make
meaningful, significant progress toward alleviating the problems
that had led to the removal of B.B. from her custody. Although
the condition of mother’s home has improved, it remains
unsatisfactory. Her substance abuse continues. At the 18-month
hearing, mother testified that she currently uses marijuana a
“[c]ouple times a week.”
       Mother suffers from various mental health problems. Her
2020 “original case plan . . . said that she would be expected to
participate in a mental health assessment with county mental
health.” Amador testified, “The [purpose of the] assessment is to
determine what therapeutic services are needed, whether that's a
referral for a weekly therapy, whether it’s a referral for a
psychiatrist’s med evaluation, et cetera . . . .” Mother delayed
participating in such an assessment until October 2022. The
court asked Amador, “Do you know why there was not a
behavioral health assessment that took place between 2020 and
September or October 2022?” Amador replied, “I have been the
[social] worker for the past two years, and . . . [mother] did not
wish to engage in [her] case plan, so it took [her] quite a while to
start engaging.”
       Furthermore, mother showed extremely poor judgment
when she discussed the dependency case with eight-year-old D.H.
and pressured her to lie. These incidents led Amador to “have
concerns” about mother’s “mental health.”

                                12
       Amador also had concerns about B.B.’s education if she
were returned to mother’s home: “[A]ll throughout the life of the
case, education has been an ongoing concern, so I would [have
such concerns], yes. I have not observed anything . . . that would
change my mind about whether or not education would be
addressed if [B.B.] was returned home [to mother].”
       We recognize that B.B. wanted to be placed with mother.
But B.B.’s placement preference is not controlling. (See In re
John M. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1564, 1570 [“By the time of the
dispositional hearing, John was nearly 14 years old. While, at
that age, he was entitled to have his wishes considered, he was
not entitled to decide where he would be placed”].)
           Mother Failed to Show that the Juvenile Court
           Erroneously Terminated Reunification Services
       Mother claims the juvenile court erroneously terminated
reunification services at the 18-month hearing. “[T]he
dependency law establishes a detailed timeline for
reunification. . . . Parents of children three or older are
presumptively eligible for at least 12 months of services.
[Citation.] Reunification services are ordinarily provided for a
maximum of 18 months after a child has been removed from
parental custody.” (Michael G. v. Superior Court (2023) 14
Cal.5th 609, 625 (Michael G.); see id. at p. 627 [“the law sets a
presumptive 18-month limit on reunification services”].)
       “[S]ection 366.22, subdivision (b) authorizes a further
extension after 18 months for three narrowly defined categories
of parents who have faced specified obstacles to reunification: (1)
a parent making progress ‘in a court-ordered residential
substance abuse treatment program’; (2) ‘a parent who was either
a minor parent or a nonminor dependent parent at the time of

                                13
the initial hearing’; and (3) ‘a parent recently discharged from
incarceration, institutionalization, or the custody of the United
States Department of Homeland Security.’ [Citations.] But even
for parents falling within this narrow exception, an extension is
not automatic. The parent must be making ‘significant and
consistent progress’ either in the substance abuse treatment
program, if applicable, or in establishing a safe home for the
child. [Citation.] Further, the court must decide (1) that
extending services would be in the ‘best interests of the child,’
and (2) either that there is a ‘substantial probability’ that the
child will be returned to the parent's custody and safely
maintained in the home during the extension period, or that
‘reasonable services have not been provided to the parent.’
[Citation.] If these conditions are not met, then the usual
timeline set forth in section 366.22, subdivision (a)(3) governs.”
(Michael G., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 628.)
       Despite the above statutory restriction on extending
reunification services beyond the 18-month time limit, “the
juvenile court does have the discretion under section 352 to
continue a section 366.26 permanency planning hearing — and in
the meantime, to extend reunification services past the 18-month
mark — in extraordinary cases. Before granting the extension,
however, the court must determine that the extension, and the
resulting delay to the child’s permanent placement, is not
contrary to the child’s interests.” (Michael G., supra, 14 Cal.5th
at p. 634.)
       Mother does not contend she fell within the section 366.22,
subdivision (b) exception to the 18-month time limit for
reunification services. Nor does she contend that the juvenile
court abused its discretion under section 352 in not extending the

                               14
time limit. Mother does not say she asked the court to exercise
its discretion under this section. Accordingly, she has not carried
her burden of demonstrating that the juvenile court erroneously
terminated reunification services at the 18-month hearing.
“‘“[A]n appealed judgment is presumed correct, and appellant
bears the burden of overcoming the presumption of
correctness.”. . . ’” (Hernandez v. First Student, Inc. (2019) 37
Cal.App.5th 270, 277.)
              Mother Failed to Show that the Juvenile
               Court Erred in Placing B.B. with C.M.
       Mother argues that the trial court’s order “forcing . . . B.B.
to reunify with C.M. . . . [was] unsubstantiated by the evidence,
and not in the best[] interests of B.B.” “[O]nce the noncustodial
parent has requested custody, . . . the party opposing placement
must show that placement with that parent would be detrimental
to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of
the child. [¶] We review the juvenile court's finding that the
[child] would not suffer detriment for substantial evidence.” (In
re Liam L. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1087.)
       Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding
that B.B.’s placement with C.M. would not be detrimental to her
safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being, but
instead would be in her best interest. DSS’s Status Review
Report dated October 9, 2022, stated: “[C.M.] has complied with
and completed his case plan requirements. [He] has
demonstrated the ability to meet [B.B.’s] needs as evidenced by
his successful trial visit [with her at his home in Bakersfield]
from June 10, 2022, through July 29, 2022. During the trial visit,
[C.M.] was able to enroll [B.B.] in school, ensure her attendance
and follow up with school officials. He was able to stay on top of

                                 15
[B.B.’s] appointments and was willing to transport her back to
San Luis Obispo County for her medical appointments. [C.M.]
was able to meet her basic needs and provide her with a safe and
stable living arrangement. [He] was able to ensure that [B.B.]
had access to her friends and family members. [¶] . . . [¶] [DSS]
did not refer [C.M.] to parent education program during this
review period as he has demonstrated exceptional parenting
skills.”
         Mother Forfeited Her Claim that the Juvenile Court
       Erroneously Required Supervised Visitation with B.B.
       Because mother had spoken to D.H. about the dependency
case and had pressured her to lie, DSS requested “that all of the
mother’s visitation [with D.H. and B.B.] return to supervised
immediately until the resolution of the contested [18-month]
hearing.” Mother claims that at the 18-month hearing the
juvenile court erroneously required “that visitation [of B.B.] with
the mother be supervised.” She requests that we “vacate [this]
unsubstantiated requirement.”
       The claim is forfeited because mother does not cite any
portion of the record in support of the allegedly “supervised”
visitation order. “When an appellant’s brief makes no reference
to the pages of the record where a point can be found, an
appellate court need not search through the record in an effort to
discover the point purportedly made. [Citations.] We can simply
deem the contention to lack foundation and, thus, to be forfeited.”
(In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 406-407.) The reporter’s
transcript of the 18-month hearing shows that DSS recommended
that mother’s visitation with B.B. “not be supervised.”
                             Disposition
       The orders appealed from are affirmed.

                                16
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                   YEGAN, J.

We concur:

             GILBERT, P. J.

             BALTODANO, J.

                              17
                   Brian R. Aronson, Judge

           Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo

                ______________________________

     Roni Keller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
     Rita L. Neal, County Counsel, Ann Duggan, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.