Court Opinion

ID: 9705307
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:01:45.810171+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:09.205729
License: Public Domain

ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.
¶ 31. (concurring). The dissent, having declared "great respect" for stare decisis, then ignores it. It attempts to justify this contradiction by explaining that all it wants overruled is the automatic reversal requirement of Ramos. The automatic reversal rule, however, is the essence of Ramos. I write separately to address this contradiction *752and to acknowledge the limitations of the Ramos decision.
¶ 32. The dissent maintains that it has "great respect for the principle of stare decisis" while in the same sentence arguing that the "automatic reversal requirement" of State v. Ramos, 211 Wis. 2d 12, 564 N.W.2d 328 (1997), should be overruled. Dissent at 754-55.1 interpret the dissent as saying that only the "automatic reversal requirement of Ramos should be overruled" and by implication suggesting that the rest of Ramos remain good law. The difficulty with such a proposal, of course, is that if the automatic reversal rule of Ramos is reversed, there remains no meaningful shred of the decision that has precedential value. Ridding this state of the automatic reversal rule can only be accomplished by ridding this state of Ramos.
¶ 33. A discussion of stare decisis was recently articulated in State v. Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d 481, 486, 504-05, 579 N.W.2d 654 (1998):
Because we discern no sound reason either in law or public policy to do so, we also decline the State's invitation to overrule our decision in Ramos.
Put simply, the ink has yet to dry on our decision in Ramos. Were we to overrule Ramos, we find it no great leap of faith to suggest that public confidence in the judiciary would be diminished.
Stare decisis is the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process. ...
[A]ny departure from the doctrine of stare deci-sis demands special justification.... The path upon *753which the State would have us travel is uncertain and precarious. (Citations omitted.)
¶ 34. I joined the dissent in Ramos. I continued that dissent in Ferron, a case that followed quickly on the heels of Ramos. I acknowledge that Ramos is now binding precedent. However, today's opinions more clearly delineate, and in doing so circumscribe, the significance of Ramos. We apply an appellate standard of review that is deferential to the determinations of the circuit court, majority op. at 745, and have narrowly defined the rule of Ramos. See State v. Erickson, 227 Wis. 2d 758, 596 N.W.2d 149 (1999).
¶ 35. The dissent should refrain from parsing stare decisis in an attempt to avoid the rule of Ramos. The automatic reversal rule is Ramos and cannot be separated from it. The dissent should acknowledge that a court cannot overrule the automatic reversal rule without overruling Ramos and affirm today's limitation of that decision. Accordingly, I concur.