Court Opinion

ID: 9855735
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:29:59.361535+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:36:32.120146
License: Public Domain

Carley, Judge,
dissenting in part.
I think that the key to the proper decision in this case is a determination of whether or not as to a particular area or enclosure the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy. As Judge Smith states in his dissent, “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.” Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 351 (88 SC 507, 19 LE2d 576) (1967). Nevertheless, I agree with the majority’s application of controlling precedent to hold that in this case the *265defendant had no such reasonable expectation of privacy as to the “open field.” However, I agree with Judge Banke’s separate dissent to the effect that the storage building was a structure in which the defendant had the necessary expectation of privacy so that the protection of the Fourth Amendment applied. Thus, while I concur in the majority’s affirmance of the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress as to the evidence found in the “open field,” I would reverse as to the denial of the motion with respect to the material found in the storage shed. See Hardwick v. State, 149 Ga. App. 291 (254 SE2d 384) (1979), and Buday v. State, 150 Ga. App. 686 (258 SE2d 318) (1979).
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Quillian joins in this dissent.