Court Opinion

ID: 9826442
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 15:56:34.711974+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:03.751064
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Watts
dissents. This was an action for damages alleged to have resulted from personal injuries sustained by plaintiff-respondent by reason of being struck by a train of defendant-appellant company, on July 13, 1911. The case was tried before special Judge G. W. Ragsdale and a jury at October term, 1912, and resulted *263in a verdict for $700 in favor of plaintiff. After entry of judgment appellant appeals and asks reversal by six exceptions.
The first exception complains of error in not directing a verdict for the defendant on the ground that all of the testimony tends to show that the injuries to the plaintiff resulted not from any negligence upon the part of the railroad company, but by reason of plaintiff’s own negligence. That according to all of the testimony, including that of the plaintiff, plaintiff stepped on the railroad track immediately in front of a moving train without looking or listening or talcing any other precaution to ascertain whether or not the train was approaching, being at that time surrounded by noise, which prevented his hearing the approach of the train, and for these reasons his injuries were solely due to his own negligence.
The second exception complains of error in not directing a verdict on the ground that even if it is conceded that the defendant was negligent the proof of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff was so complete that only one conclusion could be arrived at, to. wit: the plaintiff’s contributory negligence was the proximate cause of his injury, without which such injury would not have resulted. It appears from the record that his Honor, in refusing to direct a verdict for defendant, directed the jury that there was no testimony in the case from which wilfulness might be inferred.
We think these exceptions should be sustained, and that his Honor was in error in not directing a verdict for the defendant-appellant. The evidence shows that the appellant operated a railroad, a portion of which extends from Conway across Waccamaw River in the direction of the Atlantic Ocean, to Myrtle Beach. Respondent was. injured by locomotive of appellant about half a mile from Conway, Near the point at which he was injured there was a plant known as the wood products plant. Between one-half to *264three-fourths of a mile beyond the wood products plant, traveling from Conway, was the Kanawha lumber plant. The railroad tracks between Conway and the point at which plaintiff was injured, crosses a drawbridge over Waccamaw River, and another long trestle. At each of these trestles was a sign maintained by the railroad, warning people not to use the trestle. Plaintiff lived about two miles from Conway, on the opposite side of the river from the place where he was injured, and on this occasion was traveling in the direction of Kanawha plant. He knew that the trains run over this track four times a day. On this occasion he used the trestles in defiance of the warning on the sign boards not to- use them. It does not appear in evidence what object he had in view, -or what business he was on in traveling towards the Kanawha plant at the time of his injury. The evidence shows that the railroad track was perfectly straight from Conway to the point at which he was injured, and if he had looked he could have seen the locomotive at any point between Conway and that point. The injury was received between eight and -ten o’clock in the daytime. The injury was received almost opposite the wood products plant, where the machinery made considerable noise in running while grinding up lightwood. The evidence shows at the time of the injury the locomotive, by which plaintiff was injured, was equipped with a pilot at each end, left Conway between eight and nine o’clock in the morning, on schedule time, as a regular scheduled train, in the direction of Myrtle Beach, that the day was clear. That the engineer was at his regular post, and conductor was in the cab of the engine, on the fireman’s seat. That the fireman and flagman were sitting on tender at the front end of the locomotive, as it was running, for the purpose- of looking out, according to the rules. The locomotive was running at a slow rate of speed, owing to the fact that a good many people were working around the wood products plant, where there was considerable noise. When the loco*265motive, by which plaintiff was injured, left Conway, plaintiff was walking in the direction of Myrtle Beach, on the right of way of railroad, on the south side of the track, and had he remained here would not have been injured. If he had looked at all, immediately before he stepped on the track, there was nothing to prevent his seeing the locomotive approaching. But being om> the right of way, and not on the railroad track when the locomotive had about reached' him he stepped! up' on the track immediately in front of it, about twelve or fifteen feet south of the “hog” then being operated at the wood products plant. As he stepped on the railroad track the brakeman and fireman gave the alarm, which was heard by a 'bystander at some distance, but failed to attract plaintiff’s attention. Plaintiff failed to heed the warning when given, and having failed to exercise ordinary care or precaution for his safety, he was struck and knocked in the ditch alongside the track. The evidence shows there was plenty of room between the ties piled on the right of way, and the track for him to walk without getting on the track. The evidence shows conclusively to my mind that the plaintiff’s injury was due solely to- his own carelessness and negligence in not exercising the slightest degree of care or taking any precaution for his safety. He had crossed two trestles in defiance of notice, that no one was permitted to do so. He was not going from one town to another town, he was not attempting to go from one public road to- another public road. The place was not a populous community, but on the contrary, does not seem to have been settled at all, or any one living on the railroad. There was absolutely not a jot, or tittle of evidence. to support the assumption that the right of way and railroad track of the defendant at the location in question, had been dedicated to the public use and that the plaintiff, or any one else, had acquired the license to so use it. The undisputed evidence in this case shows, that the defendant exercised more than ordinary good care at the place of *266injury, the track was clear. There was no obstruction in the view. The train was running at a moderate speed. The evidence shows that the conductor and the engineer were looking out, two employees in addition to this were stationed in front of the locomotive, as it was then running, and these two' gave at the first opportunity ample warning of his danger. The plaintiff, on the contrary, neglected to look or exercise any care and precaution whatsover to avoid the danger. By looking he could have seen the locomotive, by listening he could have heard the moving of the locomotive, or warning given by the two employees of the defendant. The evidence shows that he did not even exercise slight care. He was not traveling at such a place as Mrs. Jones was in the case of Jones v. Ry. Co., 61 S. C. 556, 39 S. E. 758. Nor does the case of Carter v. Railway, • 93 S. C. 329, fit this case. In the Jones case the allegation and proof showed she lived in a populous section of Anderson, and she was injured at a place where the general public had been accustomed to- walk for many years, and where men, women, and children had been accustomed to walk. In the Carter case the evidence showed that the public generally, for over twenty years, had walked the railroad between two small towns, and that the deceased was deaf and dumb. There is no proof in this case of any infirmity on the part of the plaintiff, either as to hearing or seeing. There was no proof in this case sufficient to show that the public had acquired by uninterrupted use for the statutory period and there was no evidence at all that any one had used the track previously for a crossing, at the point where plaintiff got on the railroad track and was injured. As was said by this Court in the case of Cable Piano Company v. Southern Railway Co., 94 S. C. 143: “The law imposes upon every capable person the duty of observing due care for his own safety when about to cross the railroad track, which necessarily involves the exercise of his senses. And while it is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury to say *267whether under the circumstances of the particular case the traveler did exercise such’ care, when the facts are undisputed and susceptible of only inference, it becomes a question of law for the Court.” Zeigler v. R. R., 5 S. C. 221; Edwards v. Ry., 63 S. C. 271, 41 S. E. 458; Bamberg v. Railway, 72 S. C. 389, 51 S. E. 988; Osteen v. Ry., 76 S. C. 378, 57 S. E. 196; Drawdy v. Ry., 78 S. C. 379, 58 S. E. 980; Griskell v. Ry., 81 S. C. 193, 62 S. E. 205. In the case' at bar the plaintiff was injured, not at a public crossing, as was the case in Cable Piano Company, supra, but on a railroad track, not at a public crossing, but by his stepping on the track in front of an approaching locomotive, without exercising the slightest care for his protection by the exercise of his senses. By the exercise of his sense of sight, or hearing, the injury would have been prevented. The plaintiff did not look or listen for the train before stepping on the track. He failed to observe its approach; he disregarded the warnings of the employees in the engine, and the only inference that can be drawn from the evidence is that his own negligence was the sole cause of his injury. There is no proof that the injury was in any manner due to any actionable negligence on the part of the defendant railroad. The railroad company, as the evidence shows, did its full duty; it kept a reasonable lookout. It gave warning of the approaching of the train and observed ordinary care under the circumstances of the case to avoid injury to> the plaintiff.
“One going on or near a railroad track is bound at his peril to make diligent use of his senses of sight and hearing, in order to detect the approach of trains, and a disregard of such duty, and a stepping on the track, without looking or listening, would be negligence, and if plaintiff had reason to believe that trains would be approaching, the fact that he was an employee did not release him from the necessity of exercising reasonable care, under the circumstances for his own safety, and that he had no right to rely wholly on *268the railroad company to- protect him from passing trains.” Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Nelson, Federal Reporter, May 29, 1913, page 957.
In my view of the case the judgment should be reversed, and complaint dismissed, as motion to direct for defendant should have been allowed, and it is unnecessary to' consider the other exceptions, and for this reason I dissent.