Court Opinion

ID: 9880910
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-28 23:03:29.214949+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:58:01.240568
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/28/23 In re Jocelyn F. CA2/2
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

 In re JOCELYN F., a Person                                   B327777
 Coming Under the Juvenile                                    (Los Angeles County Super.
 Court Law.                                                   Ct. No. 21CCJP00040A)

 LOS ANGELES COUNTY
 DEPARTMENT OF
 CHILDREN AND FAMILY
 SERVICES,

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 CHRISTOPHER F.,

           Defendant and Appellant.
     APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Craig S. Barnes, Judge. Affirmed.

      Lori N. Siegel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.

      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Jessica S. Mitchell, Senior Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                              ******
       Christopher F. (father) challenges the juvenile court orders
(1) terminating family reunification services, and (2) terminating
his parental rights. His challenges ignore the standard of review,
or are otherwise unsupported by the law or the record. Because
they all lack merit, we affirm.
         FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.     Facts
       Jocelyn F. was born in August 2011 to father and Janaye K.
(mother). When Jocelyn was two years old, the family split—with
father settling in Iowa, and Jocelyn and mother eventually
landing in California. Between 2013 and the end of 2020, father
had minimal involvement in Jocelyn’s life: His last in-person
visit was in 2017, and he only rarely contacted her via phone or
email.
       In 2019 and again in late 2020, mother’s then-boyfriend
sexually abused Jocelyn. These repeated incidents of abuse
caused Jocelyn trauma.
       In January 2021, Jocelyn was placed with the maternal
grandparents.

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II.   Procedural Background
       Although mother successfully completed a stint of
voluntary family maintenance programs following the 2019
sexual abuse, the Los Angeles Department of Children and
Family Services (the Department)—following the late 2020
sexual abuse—filed a petition asking the juvenile court to exert
dependency jurisdiction over Jocelyn, as pertinent here, due to
mother’s failure to protect Jocelyn from sexual abuse pursuant to
Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and
(d).1 The petition did not allege any misfeasance or nonfeasance
by father.
      The juvenile court exerted jurisdiction over Jocelyn in
March 2021.
      In late April 2021, the juvenile court held the dispositional
hearing. The court removed Jocelyn from father and mother, and
ordered the Department to provide reunification services. As
part of his case plan, the juvenile court ordered father to (1)
attend sexual abuse awareness classes; (2) attend parenting
classes; (3) have monitored visitation with Jocelyn six hours a
week; and (4) participate in conjoint counseling with Jocelyn, if
Jocelyn’s therapist so recommended.
      The Department provided father 18 months of reunification
services—from April 2021 through August 2022. During that
period, the Department had regular contact with father, usually
on a monthly basis. The Department sent father referrals for the
sexual abuse awareness and parenting classes in Iowa, where
father continued to live; father signed up for and attended
parenting classes, but never signed up for any sexual abuse

1     All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.

                                3
awareness class. The Department arranged regular video and
telephone visits, although father was inconsistent in attending
and the quality of visits was not high: Jocelyn had to carry most
of the conversations as father did not engage with Jocelyn, and
father and Jocelyn only discussed “superficial” matters rather
than matters of import in Jocelyn’s life (such as school, her
health, or her hobbies). Father made two in-person visits during
this period. Jocelyn attended individual counseling and therapy
and also participated in monthly conjoint therapy with mother
until August 2022; however, Jocelyn and father never advanced
to conjoint therapy because Jocelyn never felt “ready” for it and
the record does not indicate that Jocelyn’s therapist
recommended conjoint therapy with father should begin. At the
end of the 18-month period, Jocelyn wrote a letter to the court
explaining that she did not feel safe with father or mother.
        At a contested permanency planning hearing in January
2023, the juvenile court rejected father’s request to apply the
beneficial parent-child exception and terminated father’s
parental rights over Jocelyn.
        Father filed this timely appeal.
                             DISCUSSION
I.      Challenges to the Termination of Reunification
        Although a parent’s challenge to the termination of
reunification services at a status review hearing must
procedurally be raised through a writ petition from the status
review order rather than following any subsequent termination of
parental rights, this procedural rule applies only if the juvenile
court advises that parent of his right to seek writ review orally or
via first-class mail if the parent is not present. (§ 366.26, subd.
(l); In re Cathina W. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 716, 721-724.)

                                 4
Because the juvenile court did not orally advise father of his right
to seek writ review at the 18-month hearing and because the
notice the court mailed had a one-letter typo in father’s street
address (“Start Avenue” versus “Starr Avenue”), the parties
concede that the procedural rule does not govern and that father
may now challenge two aspects of the order terminating
reunification services.
       A.    Challenge to the finding of “detriment”
       When a juvenile court terminates reunification services at
the 18-month status review hearing, the court must return the
child to the parent’s custody unless the court finds, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that doing so “would create a
substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical
or emotional well-being of the child.” (§ 366.22, subd. (a)(1).) We
review a finding of detriment for substantial evidence. (In re
Yvonne W. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1400-1401.)
       Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding
that returning Jocelyn to father’s custody would be detrimental
to her emotional well-being. To begin, this case triggers the
statutory presumption of detriment because father’s failure to
start the sexual abuse awareness classes means he did not
“participate regularly and make substantive progress in court-
ordered treatment programs.” (§ 366.22., subd. (a)(1).)2 Apart

2      Father argues that the Department never addressed how
his participation in sexual abuse awareness classes “would have
changed his relationship with Jocelyn” and that the sexual abuse
awareness classes were “not a necessary component of the case
plan” because they were not “tailored to the particular needs of
the family.” But this is nothing more than an impermissible
collateral attack on an element of his case plan that he never
previously challenged; it is too late to attack it now. (E.g., Steve

                                 5
from the presumption, substantial evidence otherwise supports
the finding that moving Jocelyn to Iowa to live with her father
would cause detriment to her emotional well-being because (1)
Jocelyn suffered trauma when she was sexually abused by
mother’s boyfriend; (2) Jocelyn feels safe with—and has a close
bond with—her maternal grandparents who have been caring for
her since January 2021; and (3) as the juvenile court pointed out,
pulling Jocelyn from “the place where she has the greatest
measure of support” and moving her across the country to live
with an adult man with whom she has almost no relationship
(because father rarely visited her and has had only “superficial”
conversations with her) will exacerbate her trauma and harm her
emotional well-being. (§ 366.22, subd. (a)(1) [relevant question is
whether “the return of the child” to the parent would create the
risk of detriment, not whether the parent’s presence would be
detrimental]; In re Luke M. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1425-
1426 [“detriment need not be related to parental action” but can
relate to removal from “support[] and security”]; In re A.C. (2020)
54 Cal.App.5th 38, 46 [“court properly may decline placement
with a safe and nonoffending parent if that placement would be
detrimental to the child’s emotional well-being”].)
       Father’s arguments to the contrary lack merit. Father cites
other cases with stronger evidence of detriment, but those cases
did not purport to define the minima for “detriment.” Father
argues that Jocelyn never testified and that Jocelyn’s therapist
did not provide input, but our task is to review the sufficiency of

J. v. Superior Court (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 798, 811.) What is
more, the court ordered sexual abuse awareness classes to help
father understand Jocelyn’s trauma in order to enable him to
deal with that trauma should they reunify.

                                6
the evidence that was presented, not examine whether the
Department could have presented more or different evidence.
And even though Jocelyn did not testify, she expressed her
feelings to the court by reading a statement in which she
described only seeing her father twice between ages two and 10
and by submitting a letter in which she described her
“nightmares and anxiety about being taken away from my
grandma and grandpa where I feel safe.” Relatedly, father
argues that conjoint therapy would not have caused Jocelyn
emotional harm or strained her relationship with father, but this
argument seems to examine the detriment from conjoint therapy
where the pertinent question is the detriment from placing her
with father. Father contends that neither a parent’s absence
from a child’s life nor a child’s strongly expressed wishes not to be
placed with a parent are sufficient evidence of detriment by
themselves (see In re Adam H. (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 27, 33 [lack
of relationship not enough to show “detriment” under section
361.2]; In re K.B. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 972, 981 [same]). Even
if we ignore that the cases father cites deal with assessing
“detriment” under section 361.2 (which applies at the time of
initial removal rather than at the termination of reunification),
here the evidence involves both of these factors and more—
namely, the baseline trauma that Jocelyn now suffers, which will
be exacerbated by moving Jocelyn from the “safe” place she
currently lives to a place where she strongly expressed she feels
less safe. Father says his absence of a relationship with Jocelyn
is not his fault: It is mother’s fault for not letting Jocelyn fly to
Iowa by herself to visit him between 2013 and 2019 (when she
was two to eight years old); it is the airlines’ fault for making air
travel so expensive; and it is maternal grandmother’s fault for

                                 7
not re-arranging her and Jocelyn’s schedules to better
accommodate video visits with father since this case started.
Father’s argument ignores the contrary evidence that we must
credit when examining substantial evidence, and it ignores that
the law does not compel caregivers and children to re-arrange
their lives for a parent. Father asserts that the juvenile court did
not explain the “factual basis” for its finding of detriment as
required by section 366.22, subdivision (a)(2); even if we accept
father’s argument and overlook the juvenile court’s frequent
explanations that the risk of detriment here stems from
uprooting Jocelyn from the “stability” and solid “foundation” of
her current placement, we can and do readily infer the factual
basis from the record. (In re Corienna G. (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d
73, 83-84.) And father lastly complains that any detriment to
Jocelyn exists solely because the Department did not offer him
reasonable reunification services that would have eliminated the
detriment attendant to placing Jocelyn with him; we discuss—
and reject—this last argument next.
       B.     Challenge to the finding of “reasonable”
reunification services
       At each status review hearing (including the 18-month
status review hearing), a juvenile court must assess whether, by
clear and convincing evidence, the relevant social services agency
(here, the Department) has made “reasonable” efforts to
implement the case plan defined for the parent at the outset of
reunification services (§§ 366.22, subd. (a)(3), 366, subd.
(a)(1)(B)); unless the Department provides a parent reasonable
reunification services, the court may not initiate a permanency
planning hearing (Katie V. v. Superior Court (2005) 130
Cal.App.4th 586, 594-597). An agency provides “reasonable”

                                 8
services when it (1) “maintain[s] reasonable contact with the
parent[] during the course of the . . . plan”; (2) “offer[s] services
designed to remedy” the problems identified in the parent’s case
plan; and (3) makes “reasonable efforts to assist the parent[] in
areas where compliance proved difficult.” (In re Riva M. (1991)
235 Cal.App.3d 403, 414, italics omitted.) “‘[R]easonable efforts’”
are “good faith” efforts that are “‘reasonable under the
circumstances’” (Robin V. v. Superior Court (1995) 33
Cal.App.4th 1158, 1166, 1164, italics omitted; In re Kristin W.
(1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 234, 254); they “need not be” ideal or
“perfect” (In re Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 972 (Alvin
R.)). We review a juvenile court’s finding that the Department
has provided reasonable reunification services, including the
three subsidiary aspects enumerated above, for substantial
evidence, asking whether the record supports such a finding by
clear and convincing evidence. (T.J. v. Superior Court (2018) 21
Cal.App.5th 1229, 1238-1239, disapproved on other grounds by
Michael G. v. Superior Court (2023) 14 Cal.5th 609, 631 , fn. 8; In
re V.L. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 147, 149.)
      Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding,
by clear and convincing evidence, that the Department provided
reasonable reunification services. The Department kept in
contact with father on a mostly monthly basis. The Department
provided him referrals for local parenting classes and
supplemental lists of referrals for sexual abuse awareness
classes, and even reached out to its Iowa counterpart when father
expressed difficulty lining up a sexual abuse awareness class; it
arranged for Jocelyn to participate in individual therapy; and it
orchestrated video and telephone visits three times a week.
Although father did not ever sign up for the sexual abuse

                                 9
awareness class, an agency’s provision of services is not
unreasonable merely because the agency did not “force [the]
parent to participate in [the offered] services” (In re Nolan W.
(2009) 45 Cal.4th 1217, 1233).
        Father raises what boils down to one procedural and one
substantive challenge to the juvenile court’s finding.
Procedurally, father objects that the court never made an express
finding regarding the reasonableness of the Department’s efforts.
This is true, but irrelevant because we may imply such a finding
(particularly where, as here, the parent did not alert the juvenile
court to its procedural misstep at that time). (See Jose O. v.
Superior Court (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 703, 708 [“reviewing court
may imply a finding if substantial evidence supports it”].)
Substantively, father urges that the Department’s efforts were
unreasonable because (1) the Department did not better assist
him to “achieve regular visitation,” as it did not force the
maternal grandparents and Jocelyn to rearrange their schedules
to better accommodate father’s schedule; and (2) it did not compel
Jocelyn to participate in conjoint counseling with him. By
focusing only on alleged deficiencies, father’s argument ignores
all of the Department’s other efforts; because our task is to assess
whether the Department’s overall efforts are reasonable,
arguments that merely point to deficiencies without discussing
how they affect the overall reasonableness of the Department’s
efforts by definition lead to the conclusion that the agency’s
efforts are unreasonable, and are accordingly myopic and
unhelpful. Further, the Department’s efforts in these two
regards were not unreasonable. Father cites no authority for the
proposition that all other participants in a juvenile dependency
case must re-arrange their schedules for the parent (particularly

                                10
where, as here, there is nothing in the record to indicate that
father ever contemporaneously requested such accommodation).
The juvenile court conditioned conjoint counseling on Jocelyn’s
therapist’s recommendation that such counseling was
appropriate; as father concedes, such a recommendation is
nowhere in the record. (Contra Alvin R., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th
at p. 973 [services not reasonable when order for conjoint therapy
conditioned on child first attending individual therapy and
Department never arranged individual therapy]; In re Mark L.
(2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 573, 578-579, 581, disapproved on other
grounds by Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1010,
fn. 7 [finding error when juvenile court barred therapist from
testifying, and Department from providing any information from
therapist, about the possibility of starting conjoint therapy]; see
In re A.C. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 661, 673 [where record is silent,
it is appellant’s burden to show error].) Father suggests that the
court was inappropriately deferring to Jocelyn’s wishes because
the Department repeatedly noted that Jocelyn did not feel
“ready” for conjoint counseling, but nothing indicates that
Jocelyn’s view was inconsistent with her therapist’s.
II.    Challenge to Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA)
Finding
       Under the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et
seq.; § 224 et seq.), (1) the Department and the juvenile court are
required to make an initial inquiry into whether Jocelyn might be
an “Indian child”; (2) the Department must conduct a further
inquiry if it has “reason to believe” she might be; and (3) the
Department must formally notify any pertinent Indian tribes, the
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and the Secretary of the Interior if
it has “reason to know” she might be. (§§ 224.2, subds. (a)-(e),

                                11
224.3, subd. (a), italics added.) Father does not dispute that the
Department and juvenile court conducted a proper initial inquiry,
that the Department thereafter regularly asked father’s and
mother’s relatives about possible Indian heritage, or that the
court repeatedly asked the parents and any relatives who
attended proceedings about possible Indian heritage. Those
inquiries indicated that father’s mother (the paternal
grandmother) was a member of a Sioux tribe, which prompted
the Department to send informal notices to Sioux tribes listing
information about the paternal grandmother and father; 10 tribes
responded that Jocelyn was neither an “Indian child” nor eligible
for tribal membership. On appeal, father urges that this inquiry
was deficient because the informal notice sent by the Department
(1) listed an incorrect birthdate for father (it was off by two
weeks) and did not list his middle name, and (2) did not list the
paternal grandmother’s tribal membership number in the correct
box on the ICWA-030 form (even though the number was
included in the attached declaration from the social worker).3 We
evaluate a juvenile court’s ICWA finding (and hence its implicit
finding regarding the adequacy of Department’s inquiry
underlying that finding) for substantial evidence. (In re Q.M.
(2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 1068, 1079-1080.)
       Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s implicit
finding that the Department complied with its inquiry and notice
duties under ICWA. Where, as here, an agency has “reason to

3     Father also asserts that the photocopy of paternal
grandmother’s tribal membership card that the Department
attached to the ICWA-030 form does not contain any “legible
enrollment number.” The semi-legible number on that photocopy
appears to be a contact phone number.

                               12
believe” that a child may be an Indian child, it is to contact the
pertinent tribes (as well as the BIA) informally to ascertain
whether formal notice is required. (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(C).) The
Department did that. Father’s complaint that the Department’s
informal notice did not contain complete information about father
does not undermine the adequacy of that notice, as father
repeatedly stated that he was not a member of any Sioux tribe.
Father’s complaint about the omission of a tribal membership
number for the paternal grandmother from the correct box on the
ICWA-030 form also does not undermine the adequacy of that
informal notice, as father does not contend that any of the other
biographical information about her—including her name, date of
birth, place of birth, and the like—was incorrect or otherwise
inadequate for the tribes to ascertain her membership. Father
points to cases faulting social services agencies for not providing
all information in notices to tribes, but those cases deal with
what must be included in formal notice—not in informal notice
conducted as part of the duty to further inquire—and in any
event, father concedes that the notice included paternal
grandmother’s tribal membership number, albeit “in small type”
in the declaration. (Cf. In re Y.W. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 542,
556-557.) Indeed, the Department, as part of its duty of further
inquiry, also contacted a specialist in Sioux tribal membership;
contrary to what father suggests, its failure to document any
follow-up with that specialist does not retroactively invalidate its
otherwise adequate inquiry. What is more, because the
Department’s further inquiry did not unearth a “reason to know”
Jocelyn was an Indian child (because, among other things,
neither she nor father were tribal members) (§ 224.2, subd. (d)

                                13
[defining “reason to know”]), the Department was never required
to give formal notice.
      And although unnecessary, any deficiency in the
Department’s inquiry is also harmless because father has
provided no reason to believe that remedying the omissions he
identifies would lead to a reason to know Jocelyn is an Indian
child. (In re Dezi C. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 769, 774, review
granted Sept. 21, 2022, S275578.)
                          DISPOSITION
      The orders are affirmed.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

                                     ______________________, J.
                                     HOFFSTADT
We concur:

_________________________, Acting P. J.
ASHMANN-GERST

_________________________, J.
CHAVEZ

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