Court Opinion

ID: 9491405
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:13:19.384987+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:54:43.356387
License: Public Domain

BATAILLON, District Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the court’s decision concluding that the text of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) does not reflect an unmistakably clear intent by Congress to abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity. I also must dissent from the court’s decision that the ADEA exceeds Congress’ § 5 enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Prior to the appeal in this case,' five sister circuits have concluded that Congress had the intent to abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity from claims filed under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. Hurd v. Pittsburg State University, 109 F.3d 1540, 1544 (10th Cir.1997) (declaring “Congress intended to abrogate state sovereign immunity by enacting the 1974 amendments to the ADEA.”); Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 695 (3d Cir.1996) (declaring “The [ADEA] simply leaves *829no room to dispute whether states and state agencies are included among the class of potential defendants when sued under the ADEA for their actions as ‘employers.’”); Santiago v. New York State Dep’t of Correctional Servs., 945 F.2d 25, 31 (2d Cir.1991) (declaring in dictum that the ADEA is an example of “legislation that has clearly stated Congress’ intention to abrogate states’ immunity from damage actions in a variety of contexts.”); Davidson v. Board of Governors, 920 F.2d 441, 443 (7th Cir.1990) (concluding “Unless Congress had said in so many words that it was abrogating the states’ sovereign immunity in age discrimination cases — and that degree of explicitness is not required ... — it could not have made its desire to override the states’ sovereign immunity clearer.”); and Ramirez v. Puerto Rico Fire Serv., 715 F.2d 694, 701 (1st Cir.1983) (concluding “[T]he ADEA’s express authorization for the maintenance of suits against state employers comprises adequate evidence to demonstrate the congressional will that Eleventh Amendment immunity be abrogated.”).
Since this case was argued, the Seventh Circuit has reaffirmed its earlier decision in Davidson, and the Ninth Circuit has joined the overwhelming majority of circuits in holding that Congress clearly expressed its intention to abrogate states’ immunity in private suits for violations of the ADEA. Goshtasby v. Board of Trustees., 141 F.3d 761, 766 (7th Cir.1998) (holding “[W]e reaffirm our position that Congress made its intention to abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity unmistakably clear in the ADEA’s 1974 amendment.”); and Keeton et al. v. University of Nevada Sys., 150 F.3d 1055, 1058 (9th Cir.1998) (holding that “Congress abrogated the states’ immunity in amending the ADEA pursuant to its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement authority.”). The weight of reason set forth in these seven circuit court opinions compels me to dissent from the majority’s decision.
To determine whether Congress abrogated the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity in enacting the ADEA, a Court must first decide whether Congress has “unequivocally expresse[d] its intent to abrogate the immunity.” Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996). However, Congress’ intent in the statutory text does not require explicit reference to state sovereign immunity or to the Eleventh Amendment. Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 233, 109 S.Ct. 2397, 105 L.Ed.2d 181 (1989). Direct reference to the “state” in the text of a federal statute may suffice to evidence Congress’ intent to abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity from suit. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 57, 116 S.Ct. 1114 (concluding that “the numerous references to the ‘State’ in the text of [the statute] make it indubitable that Congress intended through the Act to abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity from suit.”).
When Congress enacted the ADEA in 1967, the Act applied only to private employers. EEOC v. Elrod., 674 F.2d 601, 605-06 (7th Cir.1982). In 1974, Congress expanded the ADEA’s definition of “emplpyer” to include “a State or political subdivision of a State and any agency or instrumentality of a State.” Pub.L. No. 93-259, § 28(a)(2), 88 Stat. 74, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 630(b)(2). Congress also amended the definition of “employee” to include employees subject to the civil service laws of a State government. Id., § 28(a)(4), 88 Stat. 74, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 630(f). The direct textual references to “state” — state, political subdivision of a state, agency of a state, instrumentality of a state, and state government — in the 1974 amendment to the ADEA clearly expressed Congress’ intent to abrogate states’ sovereign immunity. Cf. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 57, 116 S.Ct. 1114.
Under the Seminole Tribe test the second inquiry is whether Congress has acted “pursuant to a valid exercise of power” under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 55, 116 S.Ct. 1114. The Supreme Court has declared that “ § 5 is a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651, 86 S.Ct. 1717, 16 L.Ed.2d 828 (1966). Although the 1974 amendment does not explicitly refer to the Fourteenth Amendment, there is no require*830ment that it do so. EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 243 n. 18, 103 S.Ct. 1054 (declaring congress .need not “anywhere recite the words 'section 5’ of the 'Fourteenth Amendment’ or ‘equal protection’... ‘for the constitutionality of action taken by Congress does not depend on recitals of the power which- it undertakes to exercise’ ”) (quoting Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144, 68 S.Ct. 421, 92 L.Ed. 596 (1948)).
To determine whether Congress enacted appropriate legislation under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court established a three-part test in Katzenbach v. Morgan. First, a court must determine whether. a statute may be regarded as an enactment to enforce the Equal Protection Clause. Second, a court must determine whether the statute is plainly adapted to enforce the Equal Protection Clause. Third, a court must’determine whether the statute is consistent, and not prohibited by, the letter and spirit of the Constitution. 384 U.S. at 650-51, 86 S.Ct. 1717. Recently, the Supreme Court supplemented the analysis by directing courts to examine whether the statute creates new constitutional rights through legislation or only deters and remedies constitutional violations. City of Boerne v. Flores, — U.S. -,-, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 2163, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997). A statute is deemed appropriate legislation if it deters or remedies constitutional violations. Id.
The ADEA was enacted to enforce the Equal Protection Clause. In enacting the ADEA, Congress announced “[T]he purpose of this [Act is] to promote employment of older persons based on their' ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; to help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on employment.” 29 U.S.C. § 621. In 1973, a Senate committee report found “[t]here is evidence that, like the corporate world, government managers also create an environment where young is sometimes better than old.” EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 233, 103 S.Ct. 1054 (quoting Senate Special Committee on Aging, Improving the Age Discrimination Law, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 14 (Comm.Print.1973), Legislative Histqry 215, 231). In 1974, Congress responded by amending the ADEA to provide federal, state, and local government workers with the same protections against age-based discrimination afforded to employees in the private sector. 29 U.S.C. §§ 630(b) and 631(b); EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 233 n. 5, 103 S.Ct. 1054.
Today, the majority concludes that the ADEA is not plainly adapted because it prohibits more than what an Article III court may find unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment.6 In reaching this conclusion, the majority relies, in part, on City of Boeme. The majority’s reliance on City of Boeme is dubious. The federal statute challenged as unconstitutional was the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), 107 Stat. 1488. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. The Court found that the RFRA was an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’ § 5 power because the statute was “so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior.” City of Boerne, — U.S. at -, 117 S.Ct. at 2170. As such, the Court found that Congress exceeded its § 5 power in enacting the RFRA because the statute attempted a “substantive change in constitutional protections.” Id.
Recently, an Eighth Circuit panel considered whether Congress had properly enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Autio v. AFSCME, Local 3139, 140 F.3d 802, 805-06 (8th Cir.1998). In determining that Congress had, the panel distinguished the RFRA from the ADA by declaring:
Unlike the RFRA, the ADA clearly chronicles and directly addresses the discrimination people with disabilities have experienced and the ‘evils’ those with disabilities continue to experience in modern day America.... Unlike the RFRA struck *831down in Flores, the ADA is ‘plainly adapted’ as a remedial measure even though each individual violation of the ADA may not in and of itself be unconstitutional. The remedies provided in the ADA are not so sweeping that they exceed the harms they are sought to redress. Because of the clear “evil” present in disability discrimination and the well-documented need for equal protection in this respect, the ADA is plainly adapted to the end of providing those with disabilities equal protection under the law.
Id. at 805.
The analysis in Autio is directly applicable to this case. In the text of the ADEA statute, Congress directly addressed the arbitrary discrimination older employees face in the workplace. See 29 U.S.C. § 621(b). The remedies provided in the ADEA are not “so out of proportion” to the problems of arbitrary age discrimination identified by Congress. Bather, the documented existence of age-based discrimination in private and public employment induced Congress to intrude not only upon the interests of private employers but also upon state interests through the enactment of the 1974 amendments. In light of the well-documented need for equal protection of older workers, I believe the ADEA is plainly adapted to the end of providing older workers equal protection under the law.
Finally, the 1974 amendments to the ADEA are fully consistent with both the letter and the spirit of the Constitution. The Constitution guarantees equal protection under the law. Arbitrary and intentional discrimination on the basis of age violates the Equal Protection Clause. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. at 470-71, 111 S.Ct. 2395. Simply because the Supreme Court does not elevate age to a suspect or quasi-suspect classification does not mean that Congress cannot enforce the Equal Protection Clause through the enactment of a statute aimed directly at prohibiting arbitrary age discrimination in employment. Goshtasby v. Board of Trustees of University of Illinois, 141 F.3d 761, 771 (7th Cir.1998). I concur with the Seventh Circuit in concluding that Congress does not exceed its enforcement power under § 5 by enacting legislation designed to guarantee equal protection for all persons regardless of the level of judicial scrutiny afforded to them. Id.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent and would reverse the order of the district court.

. Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the ADEA was not a proper exercise of Congress' section 5 power because the ADEA confers more extensive rights than those provided by the Fourteenth Amendment. Kimel v. State of Fla. Bd. Of Regents., 139 F.3d 1426, 1446-47 (11th Cir.1998).