Court Opinion

ID: 9840355
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-16 17:09:04.268293+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:25:20.055550
License: Public Domain

NUMBER 13-22-00242-CR

                             COURT OF APPEALS

                   THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                     CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

EDUARDO SALDIVAR-LOPEZ
A/K/A EDUARDO SALDIVAR,                                                     Appellant,

                                           v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                                           Appellee.

                   On appeal from the 197th District Court
                        of Cameron County, Texas.

                                      OPINION

Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Benavides and Longoria
                Opinion by Chief Justice Contreras

      Appellant Eduardo Saldivar-Lopez a/k/a Eduardo Saldivar challenges his

conviction of continuous sexual abuse of a young child, a first-degree felony for which he

was sentenced to twenty-five years’ imprisonment. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02(b).
On appeal, Saldivar argues the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion for

mistrial after the child’s mother gave allegedly inadmissible testimony. We affirm.

                                           I.       BACKGROUND

        On February 3, 2021, Saldivar was indicted for committing two or more acts of

sexual abuse against his daughter, B.A.S., 1 a child under the age of fourteen, from on or

about June 1, 2019, through April 20, 2020. Saldivar pleaded not guilty. A jury trial

commenced on May 10, 2022.

A.      Trial

        Saldivar married Brenda Ruelas in 2004 and the couple had four children together,

including B.A.S. The couple separated in 2017 and Saldivar moved out of the family home

and moved in with his sister, Nancy Saldivar-Villano. 2 Saldivar and Ruelas continued to

have a cordial relationship after their separation. Their four children would often see

Saldivar at their family’s home or spend time with him at his sister’s house.

        Ruelas testified that she first learned of Saldivar’s abuse of B.A.S. from her eldest

son in August 2020. Immediately after that conversation, Ruelas talked with B.A.S. about

the alleged abuse. B.A.S. started to cry and told Ruelas that Saldivar “had been touching

her” and it had “been going on for about a year.” Ruelas testified that B.A.S. told her that

Saldivar would touch her, smell her, kiss her on the neck and ear, and touch her private

area over her clothes. According to Ruelas, B.A.S. said this happened about six or seven

        1 To protect the identity of the minor child, we refer to her by her initials. See TEX. CONST. art. I,

§ 30(a)(1) (providing that a crime victim has “the right to be treated . . . with respect for the victim’s dignity
and privacy throughout the criminal justice process”).
        2 The couple did not formally divorce until around the time of Saldivar’s arrest.

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times from June 2019 until April 2020 and would always occur at night when Saldivar was

drunk. Ruelas stated that B.A.S. was thirteen at the time of this outcry.

       B.A.S. testified that the abuse began at Villano’s house when she was twelve or

thirteen years old. Villano’s home had four bedrooms, which were all occupied by different

family members. When the children spent the night there, all four children would sleep in

Saldivar’s bedroom, or two of B.A.S.’s brothers would sleep on the couches in the living

room. B.A.S. would always sleep in Saldivar’s bed with him and her youngest brother. 3

       B.A.S. described two incidents of abuse happening at night in Saldivar’s bedroom.

She described one incident where she woke up from feeling Saldivar’s breath on her neck

and his arm around her with his hand on her stomach. His hand went lower, and he began

to touch her “private area,” or vagina, over her clothes. She tried to move his arm but he

“just kept his hand on [her]” and would not move. She turned to her other side so “that he

could move,” but “he kept turning [her] back.” After some time, he stopped. B.A.S. said

her youngest brother was in the bed when this occurred, but no testimony showed that

he was aware of it.

       During the second incident, B.A.S. described waking up to the sound of Saldivar

entering the bedroom. He got into the bed and started “touching [her] shoulder.” He then

“put [her] on top of him” and put his arms around her back. B.A.S. testified that she “could

feel his private area” on her stomach. She tried to get off of him but found she could not

move. Eventually she “ended up getting off of him,” and “he was just there touching on

[her] stomach” until he got up and left.

        3 There was conflicting testimony about whether B.A.S. would occasionally sleep in bed with her

aunt or grandmother and whether there was an air mattress in the bedroom.

                                                  3
       The other incidents of abuse occurred when Saldivar stayed at the family home in

2020. From September 2019 to June 2020, Ruelas began working in another city and

would spend weeks at a time out of town. She invited Saldivar to stay at the family home

to take care of the children. Like the sleeping arrangement at her aunt’s house, B.A.S.

and her youngest brother would sleep with Saldivar in his bed in the master bedroom.

According to B.A.S.’s testimony, though she had her own room at her house, “my dad

would always want me to sleep in the room with him.”

       B.A.S. described the last incident of abuse happening in the family home’s master

bedroom in April of 2020. She was in bed and Saldivar came into the bedroom from the

garage. He laid down next to her and put his arm around her and his hand on her stomach

and again moved his hand down and started touching her “private area.” B.A.S. got up

crying and went into her eldest brother’s room. When her brother asked her what was

wrong, she told him that Saldivar had “touched” her. B.A.S.’s eldest brother confirmed at

trial that B.A.S. came into his room that night crying and told him that Saldivar had touched

her. B.A.S.’s twin brother testified that he saw B.A.S. go into the eldest brother’s bedroom

crying that night but did not learn why she was crying until the following day. Sometime

after B.A.S. left the room, Saldivar called for B.A.S. and they talked in the garage. B.A.S.

testified that Saldivar told her he was sorry and begged her not to tell anyone. He cried

and told her that he would shoot himself if she told anyone.

       The State introduced testimony from Sonja Eddleman, a coordinator with the Child

to Adult Abuse Response Team (CAART). Eddleman attested to B.A.S.’s interview with

a medical examiner that took place the day after her outcry to Ruelas. Eddleman did not

interview B.A.S. but testified that her exam records showed that B.A.S. said Saldivar

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“would come and lay next to [her]” when she was asleep, and he would touch her stomach

and “would go down and touch [her] private area.” Eddleman indicated that B.A.S.

reported that he always touched her over her clothes, and she would turn around to stop

him from touching her. B.A.S. also said that the incidents of abuse happened six times

and had been going on for about a year. According to Detective Jose Martinez, B.A.S.

generally repeated these same details during her interview with a forensic investigator.

       The jury also heard from the defense’s witnesses—Saldivar, Villano, and Maria

Teresa Lopez, Saldivar’s mother. Villano testified that B.A.S. made an initial outcry to her

about a year before her outcry to her mother, but Villano did not tell Ruelas because she

did not believe B.A.S., saying that it was “not the first serious lie” that B.A.S. has told.

Similarly, Lopez testified that she talked with B.A.S. after her outcry to Villano. She

similarly did not believe her because B.A.S. had told “big lies” in the past. She also said

that B.A.S. told her and Villano that Saldivar had only touched her breasts.

       Saldivar and Villano testified that B.A.S. was lying about the abuse because

Saldivar was strict with her. He did not allow her to wear makeup, use social media, talk

with boys, or have a boyfriend. He would regularly check her phone and would take it

away if she violated his rules. Saldivar denied B.A.S.’s accusations of abuse and testified

that B.A.S. was lying to get “[him] out of the picture” so that she could “do what she’s

doing now,” including having sex. Saldivar described how, on the day B.A.S. made her

outcry to her aunt, he had taken away her phone because he found an explicit video of

her masturbating in the shower. On the night she cried to her older brother, Saldivar

disciplined B.A.S. for having a conversation via FaceTime with a boy while she was in

bed, which he strictly prohibited.

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B.    Motion for Mistrial and Request for Instruction

      In a pre-trial hearing, without jurors present, Saldivar requested that the court

admonish Ruelas not to testify about incidents not relevant to the trial, including alleged

abuse by Saldivar towards Ruelas and relationships from Saldivar’s past. Saldivar’s

counsel stated during the hearing:

      Based on discovery I’ve gotten from the State, just that there was—that,
      supposedly, my client was abusive to Ms. Ruelas, that there was an incident
      where my client, allegedly, pointed a firearm at Ms. Ruelas. And, then, there
      are some incidents involving other females, adult females. One of them
      went all the way back 22 years . . . . And none of that—and the State agrees
      that none of that material, at this point, unless somehow the door is
      opened—[is relevant] so we’re asking that the witness be admonished that
      she just can’t throw that out there in front of the jury, unless she’s specifically
      asked.

The court granted the request and restricted Ruelas’s testimony as it related to “any

alleged abuse towards [her], any incidents involving guns, any girlfriends or relationships

that [Saldivar] may have had with adult women or adult men, for that matter, period.”

Ruelas stated under oath that she understood the court’s instructions.

      Later, Ruelas testified that when she found out about the abuse from B.A.S., she

attempted to contact Saldivar to confront him. Saldivar picked up the phone once but

hung up and did not pick up subsequent calls from her or the children at all that night. In

order to get Saldivar to come to the house, Ruelas falsely told him that their youngest son

was sick. Saldivar did not come to the house that night. During trial, the following

testimony took place:

      [The State]:        That evening, when you’re trying to get the defendant to
                          show up to the house so you can confront him about
                          what you’ve learned, was there a plan in place with you
                          and your children?

      [Ruelas]:           Yes, ma’am.

                                              6
        [The State]:            What was that plan?

        [Ruelas]:               We wanted [Saldivar] to come in. One of [my kids] was
                                going to record what he was saying, and then we were
                                going to call the cops.

        [The State]:            And did you take any safety precautions just in case?

        [Ruelas]:               I have—I have my weapon. I wasn’t going to do anything
                                with it, but I was scared that he was going to come,
                                because he has weapons himself.

Saldivar immediately objected to Ruelas’s testimony and moved for a mistrial, arguing

that Ruelas violated the admonishments that the court gave earlier. The trial court

overruled the objection and denied the motion. Saldivar then requested the court to

instruct the jury to disregard the portion of Ruelas’s statement concerning weapons. The

court denied the instruction.

        Saldivar was found guilty as charged, and this appeal ensued.

                                            II.     DISCUSSION

        By his sole issue on appeal, Saldivar argues that the trial court abused its

discretion by denying his motion for mistrial. He contends that Ruelas’s statement that he

“has weapons himself” is “highly inflammatory and prejudicial” and influenced the jury’s

guilty verdict. 4

         4 In arguing that the motion for mistrial was improperly denied, Saldivar treats the court’s denial of

an instruction to disregard as a factor in his analysis. However, he does not present a separate issue
arguing that the court erred in denying the instruction, and he does not provide any legal argument which
would support such an issue. Accordingly, we will not analyze the trial court’s denial of the instruction as a
separate error and will only consider it as a factor in our analysis of whether the court erred in denying a
mistrial. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i), 47.1; Bolling v. Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist., 315 S.W.3d 893,
895 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.) (“[An appellate court is] not responsible for doing the legal research
that might support a party’s contentions.”).

                                                      7
A.     Applicable Law & Standard of Review

       “A mistrial is an appropriate remedy in ‘extreme circumstances’ for a narrow class

of highly prejudicial and incurable errors.” Ocon v. State, 284 S.W.3d 880, 884 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2009) (quoting Hawkins v. State, 135 S.W.3d 72, 77 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)).

“Because it is an extreme remedy, a mistrial should be granted ‘only when residual

prejudice remains’ after less drastic alternatives are explored.” Ocon, 284 S.W.3d at 884–

85 (quoting Barnett v. State, 161 S.W.3d 128, 134 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)). Even if

inadmissible testimony or other evidence comes before the jury, “our law prefers that the

trial continue” unless the evidence “is so emotionally inflammatory that curative

instructions are not likely to prevent the jury being unfairly prejudiced against the

defendant.” Bauder v. State, 921 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).

       We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for mistrial under an abuse of discretion

standard. Archie v. State, 340 S.W.3d 734, 738–39 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). In reviewing

a trial court’s ruling on a motion for mistrial, we must uphold the trial court’s ruling if it was

within the zone of reasonable disagreement. Archie, 221 S.W.3d at 699; Ocon, 284

S.W.3d at 884 (citing Wead v. State, 129 S.W.3d 126, 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)). An

appellate court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling,

considering only those arguments before the court at the time of the ruling. Ocon, 284

S.W.3d at 884.

       While the parties agree that a trial court’s denial of a mistrial is reviewed under the

abuse of discretion standard, the parties’ briefs differ in their application of the standard.

Saldivar argues that the court should balance three factors established in Mosley v. State:

(1) the severity of the misconduct (i.e., the prejudicial effect), (2) curative measures by

                                                8
the court, and (3) the certainty of conviction absent the misconduct. 983 S.W.2d 249, 259

(Tex. Crim. App. 1998). The State argues that the harm analysis set out in Texas Rule of

Appellate Procedure 44.2(b) applies and the three aforementioned factors do not apply.

See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b) (“Any [non-constitutional] error, defect, irregularity, or variance

that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.”). Specifically, the State

argues that “the Mosley factors apply in only two scenarios: (a) when the motion for

mistrial is based on improper jury argument in a case in which constitutional rights are not

implicated, and (b) when the motion for mistrial occurs in the punishment phase of a non-

capital case.”5

        The considerations under both analyses are similar, if not the same. Archie, 221

S.W.3d at 700–01 (“[W]hether a mistrial should have been granted involves most, if not

all, of the same considerations that attend a harm analysis.” (quoting Hawkins, 135

S.W.3d at 77)); see Hallman v. State, 647 S.W.3d 805, 825 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2022,

pet. granted); Young v. State, 591 S.W.3d 579, 595 (Tex. App.—Austin 2019, pet. ref’d);

Benefield v. State, 389 S.W.3d 564, 571 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet.

ref’d). However, we will apply the three Mosley factors because there is well-established

precedent for using the factors outside of the State’s two proffered scenarios. See, e.g.,

Ramon v. State, 159 S.W.3d 927, 928–29 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (“Mosley involved

prosecutorial misconduct in the form of improper jury argument, but the holding is equally

         5 There is some merit to this interpretation. See Hallman v. State, 647 S.W.3d 805, 845 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth 2022, pet. granted) (Womack, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is not clear whether the use of the Mosley
factors is appropriate for the issue raised in this appeal. The Mosley factors seem to be chiefly utilized in
cases involving a motion for mistrial following improper argument by a prosecutor.”); see also Garcia v.
State, No. 10-12-00202-CR, 2013 WL 3482009, at *1 (Tex. App.—Waco July 11, 2013, pet. ref’d) (mem.
op., not designated for publication) (“Because the Court of Criminal Appeals has not adopted the
Mosley/Hawkins factors in evaluating the denial of a motion for mistrial pursuant to any reason other than
improper argument . . . we do not use those factors in our review.”). However, we decline to adopt this
interpretation for the reasons set forth in this opinion.

                                                     9
applicable to the prosecutor’s testimony in this case.”); Flores v. State, 513 S.W.3d 146,

153 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. ref’d) (using Mosley factors to determine

whether the trial court abused its discretion when denying a mistrial for improper witness

testimony); Perez v. State, 187 S.W.3d 110, 112 (Tex. App.—Waco 2006, no pet.) (using

Mosley factors to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion when denying a

mistrial for an improper witness answer that implicated constitutional rights). 6

B.     Analysis

       Under Mosley, the first factor we look to is the severity of the conduct, which by

necessity inquires into the prejudicial effect of the statement. Hawkins, 135 S.W.3d at 77–

78 (“Prejudice is clearly the touchstone of the first factor in the Mosley test.”). Saldivar

argues that the prosecutor’s question, “And did you take any safety precautions just in

case?” and Ruelas’s response, that she was “scared that [Saldivar] was going to come,

because he has weapons himself,” constituted a “deliberate effort to inflame the jury and

deprive [Saldivar] of a fair and impartial trial.”

       Prior to trial, both parties agreed that allegations of Saldivar’s abuse of Ruelas,

including an incident where Saldivar “pointed a firearm” at her or incidents “involving other

[adult] females” were irrelevant “unless somehow the door [was] open[ed].” The court

granted defense counsel’s request and specifically prohibited Ruelas from testifying to

any “incidents involving guns” unless she received permission from the court. According

to Saldivar, the State and Ruelas should therefore have known that any testimony

       6 See also Yancy v. State, No. 13-22-00232-CR, 2023 WL 3526116, at *4 (Tex. App.—Corpus

Christi–Edinburg May 18, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Morin v. State, No.
13-18-00149-CR, 2020 WL 582157, at *13 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Feb. 6, 2020, no pet.)
(mem. op., not designated for publication); Lyne v. State, No. 13-13-00313-CR, 2015 WL 5672692, at *3
(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Sept. 17, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication);
Dominguez v. State, No. 13-10-00218-CR, 2010 WL 5541708, at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg
Dec. 30, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

                                                  10
showing that Saldivar owned a gun was similarly irrelevant and prejudicial. The State

argues that Ruelas did not technically breach the admonishments because “[s]he did not

testify to abuse, or any incident involving guns,” but rather, she was testifying that “both

she and [Saldivar] each possessed weapons.” We agree with the State. The trial court

did not admonish Ruelas not to testify about Saldivar’s mere possession of a gun or

weapon, and defense counsel never asked for such an admonishment. Furthermore,

Ruelas did not testify about an “incident” involving guns because her testimony was about

her preparation to confront Saldivar—a confrontation that never occurred. Finally, even if

Ruelas did breach the admonishments, the State did nothing to emphasize the testimony

concerning weapons, and it did not mention the testimony in its closing argument. See

Martinez v. State, 17 S.W.3d 677, 693 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Perez, 187 S.W.3d at 112–

13 (considering whether the mistake was repeated, whether it seemed inadvertent or

intentional, and the nature of the right affected in the court’s analysis of the first Mosley

factor). This factor weighs against a mistrial.

       The second factor we consider are the measures the trial court adopted to cure

the statement from coming in at trial. See Mosley, 983 S.W.2d at 259. A prompt instruction

to disregard will ordinarily cure error associated with improper testimony. See Ovalle v.

State, 13 S.W.3d 774, 783 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Although we agree with the State that

the testimony did not violate the trial court’s admonishment, we will assume without

deciding that the testimony was otherwise irrelevant and possibly prejudicial. Here, the

trial court provided no curative instruction. Therefore, the trial court’s refusal to take any

corrective measures weighs in favor of a mistrial.

                                             11
       Nevertheless, any prejudicial effect that the testimony may have had was

minuscule when compared to the strength of the evidence supporting the conviction. As

to the certainty of conviction absent the misconduct, the third factor, we note that the

testimony of a victim of a sexual offense alone is sufficient to support a conviction for

sexual assault of a child. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.07(a), (b)(1); Flores,

513 S.W.3d at 167. Here, the jury heard direct testimony from B.A.S. detailing three

different acts of abuse perpetrated by Saldivar and heard testimony from two of her

brothers that confirmed her emotional state after one of those incidents. The jury also

heard testimony about her outcry to her mother, testimony from a coordinator at CAART,

and the police detective for the case. It is unlikely that one witness’s single sentence about

an ancillary issue over a two-day trial affected the jury’s verdict. See Flores, 513 S.W.3d

at 167 (“It is unlikely that the jury’s decision to convict was influenced by the pediatrician’s

testimony that he believed complainant’s story to be credible—the same story the jury

heard from complainant.”); Perez, 187 S.W.3d at 111–13 (holding that the trial court did

not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for mistrial based on the one instance of

improper witness testimony). This factor weighs against a mistrial.

       Overall, we cannot conclude that the prejudicial effect of Ruelas’s statement was

so severe as to prevent Saldivar from receiving a fair and impartial trial. See TEX. R. APP.

P. 21.3(g), (h); Flores, 513 S.W.3d at 175. The heart of the case came down to B.A.S.’s

credibility. See Hammer v. State, 296 S.W.3d 555, 561–62 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)

(“Sexual assault cases are frequently ‘he said, she said’ trials in which the jury must reach

a unanimous verdict based solely upon two diametrically different versions of an event,

unaided by any physical, scientific, or other corroborative evidence.”). In this regard,

                                              12
though Saldivar presented two witnesses that testified that B.A.S. lied in the past and

presented evidence of a potential motive for B.A.S. to lie, the jury is the “exclusive judge

of the credibility of witnesses and of the weight to be given their testimony.” Wyatt v. State,

23 S.W.3d 18, 30 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (quoting Barnes v. State, 876 S.W.2d 316, 321

(Tex. Crim. App. 1994)); see Guevara v. State, 667 S.W.3d 422, 434 (Tex. App.—

Beaumont 2023, pet. ref’d).

       In considering the three Mosley factors, we find that the trial court’s failure to give

a corrective instruction, balanced with Ruelas’s testimony and the evidence at trial, was

not so harmful as to warrant a mistrial. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in denying Saldivar’s motion for mistrial.

                                     III.   CONCLUSION

       The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

                                                                 DORI CONTRERAS
                                                                 Chief Justice

Publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed on the
14th day of September, 2023.

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