Court Opinion

ID: 9908051
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-07 17:09:58.705461+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:53:16.027244
License: Public Domain

J-S31037-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  SALVADOR LOPEZ                               :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1030 EDA 2023

            Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 31, 2023
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-15-CR-0002047-2014

BEFORE: OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.:                         FILED DECEMBER 7, 2023

       Salvador Lopez appeals pro se from the denial of his request for relief

under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. He

claims that the court erred in concluding that his petition was untimely. We

affirm.

       In 2016, Lopez pled guilty to possession with intent to deliver cocaine,

criminal conspiracy, and corrupt organizations.1 The court sentenced Lopez to

a term of 19 to 38 years’ incarceration and a Recidivism Risk Relation

Incentive (“RRRI”) sentence of 15.83 years. We affirmed the judgment of

sentence. See Commonwealth v. Lopez, 2017 WL 4001761 (Pa.Super. filed

September 12, 2017) (unpublished memorandum). Lopez did not seek further

review.

____________________________________________

1 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30); 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 903 and 911(b), respectively.
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      Lopez filed the instant pro se PCRA petition, his second, on February 8,

2023. Lopez labeled it as a “Petition for Permission to file a Petition for

Allowance of Appeal Nun[c] Pro Tunc.” The court filed a Rule 907 notice of its

intention to dismiss the petition. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1). Lopez filed a

response to the Rule 907 notice and claimed that Commonwealth v.

Bradley, 261 A.3d 381 (Pa. 2021), “constituted a ‘constitutional exception’ to

the time bar under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(iii).” Answer to the Court[’]s

907 Letter, filed 3/16/23, at 2 (unpaginated). The court dismissed Lopez’s

petition as untimely, and this timely appeal followed. See Order, filed 3/31/23.

      Lopez raises the following issues:

         1. Did [Lopez’s] Attorney violate his Due process Rights
            when she failed to file [Lopez’s] appeal to the Superior
            Court?

         2. Should [Lopez] be time barred for not filing an appeal to
            the Superior Court when he never knew that his PCRA
            was dismissed years ago?

         3. Should [Lopez] receive his appeal rights back Nunc Pro
            Tunc because of his Attorney’s failure to file his appeal or
            notify [Lopez] that his PCRA was dismissed[?]

         4. Does Commonwealth v. Bradley constitute a
            “constitutional exception” in [Lopez’s] case because his
            PCRA attorney which was his “initial collateral Review”
            counsel was ineffective[?]

         5. Does the admittance by the lower Court that they did not
            serve [Lopez] with the Order Dismissing his PCRA as
            directed in the PCRA Court’s December 18, 2018 order
            allow petitioner[] to receive his Appeal rights back Nunc
            Pro Tunc?

Lopez’ Br. at 2 (unpaginated) (emphasis in original).

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      We review the denial of PCRA relief by determining whether the PCRA

court’s conclusions are “supported by the evidence of record and is free of

legal error.” Commonwealth v. Barndt, 74 A.3d 185, 192 (Pa.Super. 2013)

(citations omitted). We defer to the court’s findings that are supported by the

certified record. See id.

      We do not address the merits of Lopez’s claims because his PCRA

petition is untimely. “If a PCRA petition is untimely, neither this Court nor the

trial court has jurisdiction over the petition. Without jurisdiction, we . . . do

not   have   the   legal    authority   to   address   the   substantive   claims.”

Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091, 1093 (Pa. 2010) (citation

omitted). “A PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent one, must be

filed within one year of the date the petitioner’s judgment of sentence became

final, unless he pleads and proves one of the three exceptions outlined in 42

Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9545(b)(1).” Commonwealth v. Jones, 54 A.3d 14, 16-17 (Pa.

2012). A judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review by the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court, or at the

expiration of the time for seeking such review. Id. at 17 (citing 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 9545(b)(3)). “The PCRA squarely places upon the petitioner the burden of

proving an untimely petition fits within one of the three exceptions.” Id. The

three time-bar exceptions include: 1) governmental interference in raising the

claim; 2) newly discovered facts that could not have been discovered with due

diligence; and 3) a newly recognized constitutional right that has been

recognized to apply retroactively. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). A

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petitioner raising one of the time-bar exceptions must file a petition within

one year from the time the petitioner could have first claimed the exception.

See id. at § 9545(b)(2).

      Here, Lopez’s judgment of sentence became final on October 12, 2017,

when the time to appeal to our Supreme Court expired. See Pa.R.A.P. 1113(a)

(“a petition for allowance of appeal shall be filed with the Prothonotary of the

Supreme Court within 30 days of the entry of the order of the Superior Court”).

Therefore, Lopez had until October 12, 2018, to file a timely PCRA petition.

Thus, the instant petition filed almost five years later is untimely and Lopez

bore the burden of pleading and proving at least one of the time-bar

exceptions. See Jones, 54 A.3d at 17. Although Lopez did not raise a time-

bar exception in his PCRA petition, he did raise an exception in his answer to

the PCRA court’s Rule 907 notice. He claimed the newly recognized

constitutional right time-bar exception, citing Bradley. However, Bradley

affords him no relief.

      Bradley involved an appeal from the dismissal of a timely PCRA petition.

Here, Lopez’s petition is untimely. As this Court has concluded, Bradley did

not “create[] a right to file a second PCRA petition outside the PCRA’s one-

year time limit as a method of raising ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel or

permit[] recognition of such a right.” Commonwealth v. Stahl, 292 A.3d

1130, 1136 (Pa.Super. 2023). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not

recognize a new and retroactive constitutional right, and the PCRA time-bar

exception does not apply.

                                     -4-
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     Because Lopez filed his PCRA petition more than four years after his

judgment of sentence became final, and he failed to plead a time-bar

exception, the PCRA court did not err in dismissing Lopez’s petition as

untimely.

     Order affirmed.

Date: 12/07/2023

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