Court Opinion

ID: 9739164
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:09:52.234747+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:10.382214
License: Public Domain

TOMUANOVICH, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. Unlike the majority, I believe that the trial court’s erroneous application of the marital privilege and inclusion of the testimony by Jean Schleh constitute reversible error. Thus I would affirm the court of appeals.
Lee alleged that the complainants fabricated their claims that he had raped them. To demonstrate this, he wanted to call the complainants’ husbands; he asserted that the husbands would testify that the wives did not initially claim that they had been raped but had originally said they were having affairs with him. Both husbands have reportedly made statements that they believed their wives were indeed having affairs with Lee. The defense should have been able to question the husbands on this point, specifically as to what the husbands saw or were told by their wives. What the husbands knew regarding their wives relationships with Lee was critical to the defense. Yet the defense was not allowed to question these men at all because of the trial court’s erroneous interpretation of the marital privilege.
Lee also asserted that he did not inflict the bruises on the complainants, but rather that they were caused by the complainants’ husbands. At the very least, he should have been allowed to put the husbands on the stand 'and ask them if they beat their wives and had caused the bruises.
The majority avoids these issues and instead rests its decision on the defendant’s alleged failure to make offers of proof as to them. I believe that a review of the trial transcript makes it clear why the defense *483wanted to call the husbands. Although it is preferable to make a formal offer of proof, defense counsel made it clear that he wanted to use the husband’s testimony to impeach the complainants and to build the defenses of consent and fabrication.
I also believe it was inappropriate to admit Schleh’s testimony regarding a similar but unrelated criminal prosecution. In State v. Blasus, 445 N.W.2d 535 (Minn.1989),- this court held that questioning an expert witness about participation in notorious cases required reversal in a close case because of the danger that the jury might have been prejudiced by the facts of the other cases. I do not find this case distinguishable from Blasus. In this case, as in that case, I believe “the prosecution intended the jury to mentally link [the accused] with [the facts] of other cases.” Id. at 540. Schleh’s testimony clearly could have prejudiced the jury. As the court of appeals noted:
The prejudice resulting from this testimony is even greater than the prejudice found in Blasus because the notorious prosecution taints the defendant himself, not just a defense witness.
Lee, 480 N.W.2d at 673. I agree.
The majority says the admission of the testimony is acceptable because the defendant “opened the door” by claiming that the complainants were lying. Although part of the defense was that the women were not telling the truth, I do not believe this should open the door to highly prejudicial expert testimony regarding other rapes in the Hmong community, especially when this testimony was made by an Assistant Ramsey County Attorney who worked on the charging phase of this case. A defendant does not consent to the admission of prejudicial testimony by mounting a defense.
Once a defendant establishes a constitutional violation, the burden of proof shifts to the state to prove that the violation is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Conklin, 444 N.W.2d 268, 275 (Minn.1989) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 1§, 23-24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 827-28, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)). My review of the record indicates that this was a close case; some evidence and some witnesses went each way. The state has not demonstrated on appeal that the jury would have reached the same result if the husbands had been required to testify and Schleh had not been allowed to testify in the fashion she did. Therefore, I must dissent.