Court Opinion

ID: 9685304
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:29:55.945499+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:02.248676
License: Public Domain

CHIN, J.,
Dissenting. — I dissent. The question before us is whether the Sixth Amendment requires the trial court to allow a defendant who has already killed a jail inmate (and clearly intends more jail violence) to represent himself, with the obvious danger to jail inmates and staff and other difficulties inherent in such self-representation. The majority holds that the trial court violated defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to represent himself when it revoked his self-representation status shortly before trial. (See Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [45 L.Ed.2d 562, 95 S.Ct. 2525] (Faretta).) In my view, the trial court properly refused to let defendant represent himself under the extreme circumstances the case presents.1
When the trial court revoked defendant’s self-representation status, in October 1997, he was already under a judgment of death in another case. He was in jail awaiting trial in this case for murdering an inmate in the same jail while awaiting trial in the previous case. The murder charge was not just an unfounded allegation, but had been supported by evidence presented in aggravation at the previous trial (see People v. Butler (2009) 46 Cal.4th 847, 852-853 [95 Cal.Rptr.3d 376, 209 P.3d 596]) and at the preliminary hearing *830in this case. That evidence showed that, on March 26, 1995, defendant and other inmates stabbed the victim to death with a metal shank in full view of a correctional officer.
Additionally, defendant had a long series of jail disciplinary charges, ranging from minor to very serious. On several occasions, some after he had already stabbed the inmate to death, he was found with razor blades modified for use as weapons. One time after the murder, defendant “slipped his cuffs and assaulted an inmate in line.” Another time, again after he had stabbed the inmate to death with a shank, he was caught concealing a four-inch shank in his rectum.
Defendant was an obvious and extreme jail security risk. He had killed one inmate, clearly intended more violence and, because he was already under a judgment of death, may have believed he had nothing to lose in perpetrating further violence. The sheriff, charged with protecting the inmates entrusted to his keeping, was understandably concerned about giving defendant self-representation privileges. Human lives were at stake. The sheriff had a duty to do all he reasonably could to ensure defendant had no opportunity to kill again.
Under the circumstances, the sheriff could reasonably protect inmates and jail staff only by denying defendant access to the law library and imposing other security restrictions that would prevent him from adequately preparing his case and competently acting as his own counsel. There were also obvious problems with discovery, as the proceedings before trial attest. How could defendant, with his history, be personally entrusted with sensitive discovery materials from within the jail system?
The majority insists that, even under these circumstances, the Sixth Amendment forced the trial court to permit defendant to represent himself. I disagree. The right of self-representation is not absolute. When, as here, defendant’s own actions made it difficult, if not virtually impossible, for him to effectively represent himself, the trial court, consistent with protecting human lives, may deny self-representation. Two decisions, one from this court and one from the high court, neither directly on point but both highly instructive, make this clear. Together, the two cases present intersecting theories supporting the denial of self-representation.
The first case is Indiana v. Edwards (2008) 554 U.S. 164 [171 L.Ed.2d 345, 128 S.Ct. 2379] (Edwards). In Edwards, the Indiana Supreme Court had concluded the trial court erred in denying self-representation to a defendant who, although competent to go to trial, was not mentally competent to represent himself. It had believed that Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. 806, and *831Godinez v. Moran (1993) 509 U.S. 389 [125 L.Ed.2d 321, 113 S.Ct. 2680] required the state to allow the defendant to represent himself even under those circumstances. (Edwards, supra, 554 U.S. at p. _ [128 S.Ct. at p. 2383].) The high court reversed the Indiana Supreme Court and held the state properly denied self-representation. The court explained, “Faretta does not answer the question before us both because it did not consider the problem of mental competency [citation], and because Faretta itself and later cases have made clear that the right of self-representation is not absolute.” (Id. at p._[128 S.Ct. at p. 2384].)
Edwards “concerned] a mental-illness-related limitation on the scope of the self-representation right.” (Edwards, supra, 554 U.S. at p._[128 S.Ct. at p. 2384].) The court concluded that a trial court may deny self-representation to a defendant who is “not mentally competent to conduct [the] trial himself.” (Id. at p._[128 S.Ct. at p. 2381].) Edwards is not directly on point. The trial court here did not deny self-representation because of defendant’s mental state, but because of his violent behavior in jail. But the reasons Edwards gave for permitting the court to deny self-representation apply here. “[A] right of self-representation at trial will not ‘affirm the dignity’ of a defendant who lacks the mental capacity to conduct his defense without the assistance of counsel.” (Edwards, supra, at p._[128 S.Ct. at p. 2387].) Here, we should be similarly unconcerned with affirming the dignity of a defendant who is already under a sentence of death, and who is personally responsible for the actions that made him such a security risk that he could not effectively defend himself. The specter of a defendant trying to defend himself while incarcerated under severe restrictions that make it impossible for him to capably do so is hardly consistent with affirming that defendant’s dignity.
“Moreover, insofar as a defendant’s lack of capacity threatens an improper conviction or sentence, self-representation in that exceptional context undercuts the most basic of the Constitution’s criminal law objectives, providing a fair trial.” (Edwards, supra, 554 U.S. at p. _ [128 S.Ct. at p. 2387].) “ ‘[T]he government’s interest in ensuring the integrity and efficiency of the trial at times outweighs the defendant’s interest in acting as his own lawyer.’ ” {Ibid.) Accordingly, “the Constitution permits judges to take realistic account of the particular defendant’s mental capacities by asking whether a defendant who seeks to conduct his own defense at trial is mentally competent to do so.” (Id. at pp. - [128 S.Ct. at pp. 2387-2388], italics added.) Similarly, the Constitution permits judges to take realistic account of the particular defendant’s history of jail misconduct, which makes it effectively impossible for him to capably defend himself, consistent with protecting the lives of inmates and staff.
*832The second case that supports the trial court’s denial of self-representation is our own decision in People v. Carson (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1 [23 Cal.Rptr.3d 482, 104 P.3d 837] (Carson). In Carson, the trial court revoked the defendant’s right of self-representation due to his out-of-court misconduct, possibly including witness intimidation, that threatened to obstruct the trial proceedings. We explained that Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. 806, “understandably contains scant reference to the circumstances that would justify termination of the right of self-representation.” (Carson, supra, at p. 8.) We extended the grounds for denying self-representation to out-of-court misconduct “that seriously threatens the core integrity of the trial.” (Id. at p. 6.) We also said that “we do not suggest witness intimidation is the only type of serious and obstructionist out-of-court misconduct that may warrant termination of self-representation.” (Id. at p. 10.) Thus, Carson establishes that, under certain circumstances, the defendant can, by his own actions, effectively forfeit the right of self-representation.
The majority is correct that Carson is not directly on point. The trial court here did not deny self-representation because of courtroom security concerns. Indeed, it acknowledged that defendant had behaved himself in the courtroom. But it certainly denied self-representation due to jail security concerns. Jail security concerns dominated the entire course of the litigation involving defendant’s representation, beginning with county counsel’s first appearance representing the sheriff and expressing the sheriff’s concerns. Beyond question, a court must ensure courtroom security, and fulfilling this duty may justify the denial of self-representation. But the court must also be sensitive to jail security. The need to protect the lives of jail inmates and staff from a defendant’s murderous conduct may also justify the denial of self-representation.
The necessary limitations on defendant’s self-representation, which he alone caused, would have threatened the core integrity of the trial. The high court in Edwards concluded that the Sixth Amendment permits a court to deny self-representation to a defendant who, through no fault of his own, lacks the ability to capably represent himself. Similarly, the Sixth Amendment also permits a court to deny self-representation to a defendant whose own actions make it realistically impossible for him to capably represent himself.
It might be possible, I suppose, for the sheriff and court to work out arrangements that could permit defendant to defend himself at least to some extent — for example, by supplying defendant with his own law library or perhaps his own computer and Internet connection in his jail cell, combined with other measures. I am sure the same was true in Carson, supra, 35 Cal.4th 1. But such arrangements would, no doubt, be extraordinarily difficult and expensive and still entail considerable risk. Jail resources are limited, and any *833extraordinary expenditure of resources on defendant would mean reduced resources available for other inmates, including those who behave themselves. Defendant’s history of jail violence made his competent self-representation incompatible with jail security or the reasonable expenditure of jail and judicial resources. As was the case in Carson, the Sixth Amendment does not require courts to adopt extraordinary measures to shield defendants from the consequences of their own actions.
The majority argues convincingly that the trial court could have permitted defendant to represent himself. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 827.)2 Assuming adequate admonitions and a knowing waiver, I do not doubt the court would not have erred in any way defendant could have complained of had it permitted him to represent himself, even with all of the restrictions that self-representation would have required under the circumstances. However, the question is not whether the court erred in permitting self-representation, but whether it erred denying it. As the high court stressed, holding that a court may permit a defendant to represent himself “simply does not tell a State whether it may deny a gray-area defendant the right to represent himself — the matter at issue here.” (Edwards, supra, 554 U.S. at p._[128 S.Ct. at p. 2385].) The majority never confronts this question. It simply leaps from the conclusion that defendant could have been permitted to represent himself to the non sequitur that “[therefore, contrary to the trial court’s view in this case, inmates still have the right to represent themselves even when their ability to prepare is restricted in custody.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 827.)
The majority states that the trial “court’s conclusion that ‘it just doesn’t make sense’ to allow pro. per. representation under the circumstances faced by defendant may have been reasonable, but it was inconsistent with the requirements of Faretta and its progeny.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 828.) Reasonable the court’s conclusion certainly was. But under the teachings of Edwards, supra, 554 U.S. 164 [128 S.Ct. 2379], and Carson, 35 Cal.4th 1, it was also fully consistent with Sixth Amendment requirements.
*834I do not suggest a trial court may deny self-representation lightly. In normal circumstances, the trial court must honor a criminal defendant’s right of self-representation. But the circumstances here were far from normal. At least when a defendant awaiting trial has already killed a jail inmate and has shown that he intends further violence, the court may conclude that, by his own actions, he has forfeited his right of self-representation. The Sixth Amendment right of self-representation does not require courts to endanger human life or take heroic measures to satisfy a murderous defendant’s desire to represent himself.
Baxter, J., concurred.

Because the majority holds that the entire judgment must be reversed due to the denial of self-representation, my views on the other issues defendant has raised cannot affect the judgment, and I express no opinion on those issues. (See People v. Mattson (1984) 37 Cal.3d 85, 96 [207 Cal.Rptr. 278, 688 P.2d 887] (dis. opn. of Kaus, J.).)

However, the majority’s description of what it claims is “settled” law (maj. opn., ante, at p. 827) oversimplifies a more complex question, as attested by a review of the two high court decisions the majority cites in this regard. Kane v. Garcia Espitia (2005) 546 U.S. 9 [163 L.Ed.2d 10, 126 S.Ct. 407] reversed a federal appellate court decision that had set aside a state criminal conviction for failure to provide a self-representing defendant with law library access. The high court stated that its jurisprudence had not clearly established a law library access right, and the federal courts were divided on the question. Thus, under federal habeas corpus law, the lower court erred in setting aside a state court conviction on that basis. The high court expressly did not resolve the question of whether a self-representing defendant has a right to law library access. (Id. at p. 10.) Thus, if anything, Kane suggests that the relevant law is unsettled, at least within the federal courts.
Lewis v. Casey (1996) 518 U.S. 343 [135 L.Ed.2d 606, 116 S.Ct. 2174] did not involve self-represented criminal defendants at all, but rather the rights of prison inmates to court access after they have been convicted. It has nothing whatsoever to do with this issue.