Court Opinion

ID: 9726939
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:13:39.041291+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:32.042917
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE LINN, dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the decision reached by my colleagues. It appears to me that the reversal is based upon the most tenuous of grounds. In my judgment, the reversal comes perilously close to abrogating the fundamental role of the judiciary to mete out justice supportive of our societal values as. expressed in established law. This is not to say, however, that a defendant’s right to a fair trial should be disregarded. The majority correctly states the rule that a manslaughter instruction must be given if any evidence in the record, if believed, would reduce a charge of murder to the crime of manslaughter. (People v. Simpson (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 497, 384 N.E.2d 373.) It also correctly states that “very slight evidence upon a given theory of a case will justify the giving of an instruction.” People v. Khamis (1951), 411 Ill. 46, 53, 103 N.E.2d 133, 136. However, as I see it, the foregoing authority does not establish a rule of law to the effect that an instruction must always be given no matter how fragile the connection betweem claimed activity and reality. Thus, as asserted by our court in People v. Purrazzo (1981), 95 Ill. App. 3d 886, 892, 420 N.E.2d 461, 466, quoting People v. Bratcher (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 534, 540-541, 349 N.E.2d 31, 34: “Nevertheless, the Very slight evidence’ test does establish a minimal level beneath which instructions need not be given. ‘To hold otherwise would permit a defendant to demand unlimited instructions * * * based on the merest factual reference or witness’ comment.’ ” I submit that the evidence presented by Dannie Barnes is just that — “the merest factual reference” based on a “witness’ comment.” As such, it does not approach the minimal level of evidence required, and thus a voluntary manslaughter instruction need not have been given. The sole evidence offered as justification for a voluntary manslaughter instruction was in Barnes’ statement to the arresting police officer. In that statement Barnes said that he threw an iron at the victim, Betty Riley, because she said Barnes was “worth more dead than alive” and appeared to be reaching for a knife. Allegedly, the electrical cord of the iron wrapped around Riley’s neck and strangled her. However, it is clear that “[a defendant’s statement must] tell a reasonable story or be judged by its improbabilities.” (People v. Morehead (1970), 45 Ill. 2d 326, 330,259 N.E.2d 8,10.) I believe that in this case the defendant’s story is so inherently improbable that it borders on the impossible. I necessarily must conclude that the able and experienced trial judge did not err in refusing to give a voluntary manslaughter instruction. In addition to the insufficiency of the evidence itself to warrant giving a manslaughter instruction, defense counsel (who had represented Barnes at trial) acknowledged in oral argument that he had not requested that a self-defense instruction be given. Barnes’ attorney admitted that his client’s claim of a mistaken belief that self defense was reasonable was so unbelievable that he dared not even request an instruction on that theory. Further, when defense counsel was confronted with the fact that at trial he had structured his case on the theory of accident, not self defense, he replied, “Judge, I did. ° ” The reason that I did was that I had nothing else.” “By its very nature self-defense, whether reasonable or not, relates to the intentional or knowing use of force and not to an accidental * * * [killing].” (People v. Purrazzo (1981), 95 Ill. App. 3d 886, 893,420 N.E.2d 461, 467.) Thus, it seems to me that, faced with a case argued on the basis of accident, the trial judge did not err in refusing a voluntary manslaughter instruction bottomed on a mistaken belief that self defense was necessary. Considering the total record and the law as I understand it, I conclude that the grounds for affirming Barnes’ conviction are by far much stronger and compelling than the grounds on which the reversal is based. I would affirm the trial court.