Court Opinion

ID: 9657390
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:24:36.945765+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:44.663388
License: Public Domain

SHORT, Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent and would affirm the trial court’s decision. The exclusive remedies of Minn.Stat. § 363.11 (1992) preempt Williams’ statutory claim under Minn.Stat. § 181.932 (1992) because both claims are identical and are based on the same underlying facts. Williams alleged St. Paul Ramsey Medical Center terminated her because she filed a sexual harassment complaint. She sought actual and compensatory damages for her employer’s alleged retaliation under both the Minnesota Human Rights Act and the Minnesota Whistleblower Act. The trial court granted summary judgment against Williams on her whistleblower claim. The sexual harassment and reprisal claims were tried to the court, and the trial court issued findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order for judgment in favor of the employer.
To reverse and remand the whistleblower count permits Williams a second trial on her reprisal discharge claim and circumvents the unambiguous preemption language contained in the Minnesota Human Rights Act. See Minn.Stat. §§ 645.16 (1992) (law should be construed to give effect to all provisions); 645.17(2) (1992) (legislature intends entire statute to be effective and certain); 645.26, siibd. 1 (1992) (special provision prevails over general provision, unless general provision is enacted later and contains manifest intention that general provision shall prevail over special provision); Mein v. Masonite Corp., 109 Ill.2d 1, 92 Ill.Dec. 501, 504, 485 N.E.2d 312, 315 (1985) (Human Rights Act is exclusive source of redress for human rights violations); Vaughn v. Ag Processing Inc., 459 N.W.2d 627, 638 (Iowa 1990) (wrongful discharge preempted by state Civil Rights Act); cf. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, — U.S. —, —, 114 S.Ct. 2239, 2251, 129 L.Ed.2d 203 (1994) (45 U.S.C. § 151 did not preempt state law causes of action because statutory claim involved rights independent of collective bargaining claims); Wirig v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 461 N.W.2d 374, 378 (Minn.1990) (exclusivity provision of Human Rights Act does not abrogate common law battery claim); Shoemaker v. Myers, 52 Cal.3d 1, 276 Cal.Rptr. 303, 314-16, 801 P.2d 1054, 1065-67 (1990) (California Workers’ Compensation Act did not preempt a whistle-blower claim brought under California Government Code § 19683 because “evils” addressed by statute were different than those addressed by the workers’ compensation law).
In addition, there is no evidence of a causal connection between Williams’ complaint that her employer violated the Minnesota Human Rights Act and her discharge. It is undis*858puted that Williams’ complaint came eleven months before her discharge, six months before she was placed on an employment improvement plan, and four months before she was given a critical evaluation. See Figgous v. Allied/Bendix Corp., 906 F.2d 360, 362 (8th Cir.1990) (discharge was not close enough in time to the filing of complaints to suggest retaliatory motive). The trial court found:
the clear weight of the evidence establishes that defendant’s adverse actions against Ms. Williams were motivated by her consistently unprofessional and incorrigible behavior in the workplace and her failure to improve after repeated complaints by people who would have no reason to know of her allegations toward Mr. Heerwald.
Given these facts, Williams failed to prove an essential element of her whistleblower claim. See Thompson v. Campbell, 845 F.Supp. 665, 674 (D.Minn.1994) (essential elements include causal connection between plaintiffs protected conduct and adverse employment conduct).
Finally, there is no evidence that Williams’ discharge was motivated by her good faith action. See Minn.Stat. § 181.932, subd. 1(a) (creating action for employee who, in good faith, reports employer’s violation of law); Phipps v. Clark Oil & Refining Corp., 408 N.W.2d 569, 572 (Minn.1987) (creating action for employee’s good faith refusal to commit an illegal act for employer). The Phipps decision does not create a general cause of action for every wrongful discharge or a common law cause of action for violation of every remedial statute. Steinbach v. Northwestern Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 728 F.Supp. 1389, 1394 (D.Minn.1989). The trial court found:
plaintiffs allegations of sexual harassment were brought not because of a sincere belief that she had been a victim of sexual harassment, but rather as a vindictive response to Mr. Heerwald’s criticism of her job performance.
Williams was given a full and fair opportunity to be heard on the issue of her motivation, and the fact finder resolved that issue against her. Cf. Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S. 545, 110 S.Ct. 1331, 108 L.Ed.2d 504 (1990) (refusing to accord collateral estoppel effect to trial court’s factual determinations under Title VII, and remanding section 1981 claims for a jury trial). Unlike the plaintiff in Lytle, Williams did not argue below that she was entitled to a jury trial. See Republic Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Lorraine Realty Corp., 279 N.W.2d 349, 355 n. 2 (Minn.1979) (issues not presented to the trial court cannot be raised on appeal). Under these circumstances, Williams waived her jury trial claim and the doctrine of collateral estoppel prevents relitigation of an essential element of her prima facie case.
The trial court properly dismissed Williams’ whistleblower cause of action. A remand would dissipate judicial resources in needless litigation over previously-resolved issues.