Court Opinion

ID: 9575305
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:12:50.772416+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:07.492596
License: Public Domain

Finney, Justice,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. In my opinion, the state’s articulated racially neutral reason for striking Emmiline Leaphart (Leaphart), the sole black prospective juror, was clearly a pretext, unsupported by the record, and warrants reversal. The pertinent portion of Leaphart’s voir dire follows.
Court: So you see we have got three groups. One is for the death penalty; one is against the death penalty and the other is sort of what we call the don’t know. In other words, they would want to wait and hear the testimony before they decided whether or not to recommend the death penalty. Now, which category do you feel that you would fit?
Leaphart: I had rather wait and hear the facts and all the evidence in the case.
Court: And if after hearing all the evidence in the case, where the State presents its testimony from witnesses on the stand and where the defense presents testimony from witnesses on the stand and that evidence justifies the death penalty, based on that evidence, could you vote to give the defendant the death penalty.
Leaphart: I still would have to wait.
Court: But, if the evidence warranted it, could you vote to give a defendant the death penalty?
Leaphart: Yes.
Leaphart unambiguously stated “yes” when asked whether she could vote to give the death penalty if warranted by the evidence after earlier stating that she would rather wait and *389hear the facts and evidence. Apparently, the majority places great weight on Leaphart’s prior response that she “.. . still would have to wait.” I find this answer neither vacillatory nor an indication of weakness. It merely placed her in the category of white jurors who were seated after stating they would wait to hear the testimony before deciding whether they could recommend the death penalty. Additionally, it is my opinion that Leaphart’s answer was responsive to the court’s question and in accord with South Carolina law that jurors should wait to decide whether or not to recommend the death penalty until after all the evidence is in and the judge has charged the applicable law.
Furthermore, in my view this case is distinguishable from State v. Woodruff, 300 S.C. 265, 387 S.E. (2d) 453 (1989). In Woodruff, as in the present case, the state’s articulated neutral reason for striking prospective black jurors was the jurors’ reluctance to impose the death penalty. But in Woodruff, one stricken juror clearly opposed capital punishment and the other insisted upon imposing the death penalty only if no doubt existed. My reading of Leaphart’s testimony reveals no scintilla of reluctance or vacillation in her voir dire responses.
I would hold that the lack of distinction between Leap-hart’s position and the stance of white jurors seated by the solicitor flawed his stated criterion. In my opinion, the solicitor’s articulated racially neutral reason pales under the weight of his acceptance of white jurors which the record indicates expressed the same view as did Leaphart. See State v. Oglesby, 298 S.C. 279, 379 S.E. (2d) 891 (1989). Thus, his peremptory challenge of Leaphart on the obvious basis of race violated Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. (2d) 69 (1986).
I would reverse and remand for a new sentencing phase proceeding.