Court Opinion

ID: 9754343
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:55:56.081157+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:52.438073
License: Public Domain

RODOWSKY, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the holding that “the comprehensive state-licensing scheme for cigarette vending machines provided by Article 56, §§ 607 through 631” occupies the entire field of the sale of cigarettes through cigarette vending machines. 332 Md. at 300, 631 A.2d at 87. The majority, in my view, has treated as relevant that which is irrelevant. The statutes relied upon by the majority are a conglomeration of portions of four separate enactments, the common denominator of which is that they relate in some way to the sale of tobacco, and thus include the sale of cigarettes through vending machines. Some of these statutes are not regulatory at all; others are regulatory in whole or in part, but were never intended to regulate for the public health as do the municipal ordinances at issue here. A review of the purposes of these separate enactments fails to demonstrate an intent to exercise exclusive control over all aspects of cigarette vending machine sales. Nor, in my opinion, is preemption by conflict applicable to the subject municipal ordinances.
*311The majority has selected as the controlling state statutes the form of those statutes on a date immediately preceding the enactment of the subject municipal ordinances. Thus, the majority opinion is written exclusively in terms of Maryland Code (1957, 1988 Repl.Vol., 1991 Cum.Supp.), Art. 56, §§ 607 through 631.1 Unfortunately, utilizing that date has produced an extraneous, complicating factor in the analysis. All of some, and some of all, of the four enactments referred to above had been restyled, as of that date, in the code revision process. Specifically, when the Tax-General Article (TG) of the Code was enacted by the Acts of 1988, Chapter 2, §§ 607 through 631, in restyled form, were temporarily codified in Art. 56. This was in anticipation of the adoption of the Business Regulation Article (BR), which was later enacted by Chapter 4 of the Acts of 1992. Code revision has larded these four enactments with an overlay of verbiage that, while not intended to alter substance, has obfuscated the preemption analysis.
Accordingly, in Part I of this dissent I shall review the history of the four enactments underlying §§ 607 through 631. There I conclude that, in that form, they did not effect preemption. Part II of this dissent will describe the undifferentiated treatment of these enactments in the code revision process and consider whether that treatment has distorted the enactments from their original purposes and produced preemption by occupation of the field. I conclude that total preemption is not produced. Part III then addresses one of these enactments, a criminal statute, from the standpoint of preemption by conflict. There I conclude that the criminal statute has not produced preemption by conflict.
I
The earliest of the four enactments, one dating back to 1886, is the criminal statute establishing a minimum age for the *312purchase of tobacco products. Chronologically next is an 1890 revenue measure requiring that all vendors of cigarettes obtain from the clerk of a circuit court, in addition to a traders’ license, a cigarette license.2 A Cigarette Sales Below Cost Act was enacted in 1956, requiring, as part of the administration of that program, that cigarette vendors obtain an additional license. Then, in 1958, a stamp tax on cigarettes was enacted.
A
Chapter 371 of the Acts of 1886 is entitled, “AN ACT to protect the health and morals of minors in the State of Maryland.” Any person engaged in the manufacturing, buying, or selling of cigars, cigarettes, or tobacco who sold, bartered, or gave any cigar, cigarette, smoking or chewing tobacco to any person under the age of fourteen years committed a criminal offense, unless the minor’s parent authorized the transaction or the minor was acting solely for the minor’s employer. The penalty was a minimum $10, maximum $100 fine, or imprisonment for five to thirty days in default of payment of the fine. The minimum age was raised to sixteen years by Chapter 131 of the Acts of 1985 and to eighteen years by Chapter 301 of the Acts of 1989. The 1989 enactment will be more fully discussed in Part III.
B
Persons who sold goods, wares or merchandise, including cigars, cigarettes, or tobacco, from a fixed location historically have been required to obtain a traders’ license from a circuit court clerk. Code (1888), Art. 56, §§ 35 through 37. The value of the trader’s inventory has determined the amount of the license fee. Id. §§38 through 49. Similarly, itinerants selling goods, not limited to tobacco products, have been required to obtain a peddlers’ license. Id. §§27 through 34. The peddlers’ license fee historically has been determined by *313the mode of travel, i.e., whether on foot or by vehicle. Id. § 28.
Chapter 91 of the Acts of 1890 added new sections to Code (1888), Art. 56, Title, “Licenses,” subtitle, “Traders.” These sections required an additional license, issued by the clerk of a circuit court for a fee of $50, in order to sell cigarettes, or tobacco wrapped with any material other than tobacco. The applicant was required to state on oath “that the cigarettes intended to be sold under said license contain no injurious drug or narcotic.” Id. § 54B. That oath was deleted from the statute, and the license fee reduced to $10, by Chapter 439 of the Acts of 1896.
The traders’ license, the peddlers’ license, and, in my opinion, the comparable cigarette license also obtained from a circuit court clerk are revenue measures. In Banks v. McCosker, 82 Md. 518, 34 A. 539 (1896), an unlicensed peddler had taken the defendant’s promissory note in consideration of goods sold. That note was transferred to the plaintiff. When the plaintiff sued to collect, the buyer raised as a defense illegality of the transaction underlying the note. In rejecting that argument, this Court said of the peddlers’ license:
“The provisions of the Code referred to neither directly nor indirectly refer to any consequences, save the payment of a fine for a violation of the law, and the failure to pay such fine, so that it can only be regarded as a revenue measure, and does not affect the contract between an unlicensed pedlar, and the purchaser of goods from him.... If the statute seeks only the collection of revenue as ours clearly does, there can be no doubt as to its purpose and meaning, but when ... it is the design of the law-making power to protect the public from fraud in the contract for the promotion of some object of public policy, the contract is then prohibited.”
Id. at 522-23, 34 A. at 540.
This Court reviewed the criminal conviction of an unlicensed ice cream peddler in Brown v. State, 177 Md. 321, 9 A.2d 209 (1939). In response to the contention that the peddler’s *314statute survived only as a police regulation, this Court said that the licensing “requirement seems indistinguishable from any other trade or occupational tax; and this is so even if it may be assumed that it is intended to equalize the public burdens as between hawkers and peddlers and traders in fixed situations.” Id. at 328, 9 A.2d at 212.
This 1890 enactment was codified as §§ 63 and 64, under the subtitle, “Traders [Licenses],” in Code (1957, 1988 Repl. Vol.), and then in restyled form as § 631 under the 1988 reorganization. Currently the fee is set at $25. § 631(c)(1). This $25 tax was simply one of the many licenses issued by circuit court clerks. The distribution of the fees from this melange, including fees from the cigarette license, was governed by § 3. The fees were
“[r]eceipts from licenses issued for billiard tables, bowling alleys, chain stores, cigarettes, circuses, cleaning, dyeing and pressing, construction firms, garages, hawkers and peddlers, laundries, motion picture machines, moving picture shows, plumbers and gas fitters, restaurants or eating places, shows, soda water fountains, theatres, traders, and wholesale dealers in farm machinery.”
Id. The issuing clerk retained “as a fee of his office the present percentage of license revenues as authorized by law and the additional issuance fee now allowed.” Id. After paying to the general fund of the State three percent “to defray the expenses of the State License Bureau,” the net proceeds were to be paid by the clerk “to the incorporated town or city in which the licensed business or activity is located.” Id. If the licensed business were located in an unincorporated area, “the net proceeds shall be paid to the county in which the licensed business or activity is located.” Id.
I shall refer to this fee as the “Cigarette Traders’ License.” It is referred to in the majority opinion as the “County License.”
*315C
What the majority refers to as the “Cigarette Vending Machine Operators License” has its origins in Chapter 90 of the Acts of 1956. The explanation by the Legislative Council accompanying the draft of the bill which became Chapter 90 encapsulates the purpose of that legislation.
“This bill was proposed by the Wholesale Tobacco Distributors of Maryland. It would add to the so-called ‘Unfair Sales Act’, which has been on the statute books for a number of years, an additional set of laws applying the principle of the Unfair Sales Act more specifically to the sale of cigarettes. The complaint is that the present Unfair Sales Act does not entirely reach the practices of ‘bait’ or ‘loss-leaders’ with respect to the sale of cigarettes. The law would be administered by the State Comptroller, and the sponsors cite that its licensing revenues would defray the cost of administration.”3
Legislative Council, Report to the 1956 Maryland General Assembly at 189.
*316Chapter 90’s substantive provisions were originally codified at Code (1957), Art. 83, Title, “Sales and Notices,” under a new subtitle, “Unfair Cigarette Sales Act.” Today they are Code (1975, 1990 Repl.Vol.), §§ 11-501 through 11-510 of the Commercial Law Article (CL), Title, “Trade Regulation,” subtitle, “Cigarette Sales Below Cost Act.”
The provisions of Chapter 90 relating to enforcement of the Sales Below Cost Act were codified in Art. 56. Prior to the 1988 restyling, those provisions were Code (1957, 1988 Repl. Vol.), Art. 56, §§ 65 through 73.
A retailer of cigarettes, other than “a vending machine operator,” must obtain a license for each place of business at an annual fee of $3. § 65. This license is issued by the clerk of the circuit court for the county where the business is located. Id. Wholesalers of cigarettes and “cigarette vending machine operators” obtain their licenses from the Comptroller at an annual fee of $250. § 66. “Vending machine operator” is defined by reference to the substantive provisions of the Sales Below Cost Act. It means a person who owns and operates cigarette vending machines on forty or more premises. CL § 11 — 501(k)(2). Whether a seller is a “vending machine operator” has significance for certain computations of mark up and cost under the Sales Below Cost Act. See, e.g., CL § 11-503.
These license fees are “paid over to the General Fund of the State, and it is intended that the said fees are to be used to cover the expenses of administration of the licensing program and the enforcement of the Cigarette Sales Below Cost Act.” § 68. Thus, these licenses are issued to raise the revenue needed to enforce the Sales Below Cost Act, in keeping with the promise of the Wholesale Tobacco Distributors of Maryland to the General Assembly. In this dissent I shall call this revenue license the “Sales Below Cost Act License.”
The revenue raising feature of the Sales Below Cost Act is simply incidental to its regulatory purpose, which has nothing to do with the public health. This Court addressed the subject enactment in George W. Cochran Co. v. Comptroller, *317292 Md. 3, 437 A.2d 194 (1981). Cochran Co.’s Sales Below Cost Act License had been suspended for having made thirty-five sales below cost. Cochran Co. had reduced its prices in order to meet those of a competitor, but that was not defensive because the Comptroller found that the appellant knew that the competitor’s prices were also illegal. Id. at 12 n. 4, 437 A.2d at 198 n. 4. The appellant’s contention in this Court was that the Sales Below Cost Act was a price fixing scheme in conflict with § 1 of the Sherman Act.
In rejecting that contention we assumed, arguendo, that the statute would be invalid under the Sherman Act but for the state action exception recognized in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 63 S.Ct. 307, 87 L.Ed. 315 (1943). 292 Md. at 7, 437 A.2d at 196. We held that the Parker v. Brown exception did apply because the Maryland Sales Below Cost Act
“is not simply an authorization for private parties to engage in price-fixing arrangements and is not merely an enforcement mechanism for the prices agreed upon by private parties. The Maryland statute directly imposes its requirements upon cigarette wholesalers and retailers without regard to any agreements or arrangements which might or might not exist among those private businesses.... The challenged ‘restraints of trade’ are ‘compelled by the direction of the State acting as a sovereign.’ ”
292 Md. at 11, 437 A.2d at 198.
D
The fourth enactment that crosses the trail of §§ 607 through 631 is the stamp tax on cigarettes. The background of this tax is succinctly stated in R. Walsh & W. Fox, Maryland, A History (1983). Describing the 1957 General Assembly session, the authors state:
“Pressed by a strong lobby, the legislature approved an increase of $400 per teacher in state aid for salaries, the costs to be covered by a three-cent cigarette tax. The governor vetoed the bill after adjournment of the session with the observation that teachers’ salaries should be in*318creased by local governments ‘primarily responsible’ for schools. The legislature in 1958 promptly overrode the veto.”
Id. at 822 (footnote omitted).
The enactment is Chapter 1 of the Acts of 1958. It established minimum salaries for public school teachers, and created a new subtitle in Art. 81, “Revenue and Taxes,” entitled, “State Tobacco Tax Act.” As part of the code revision process, many of the administrative provisions of this act were later moved to Article 56. See §§ 617, 618 and 622 through 630.
Chapter 1 required that each package of cigarettes bear a stamp demonstrating that the tax had been paid. Ch. 1, § 421. The obligation to purchase the stamps from the Comptroller and affix them on a particular supply of cigarette packages was that of the first distributor in Maryland who possessed the cigarettes. See Id. § 420. Unstamped cigarettes are contraband. Id. § 425. Persons obliged to purchase and affix the stamps must obtain a license from the Comptroller at a one-time fee of $1. Id. § 429. That “license was intended only to allow a person to buy unstamped cigarettes from a manufacturer and to buy and affix tax stamps to cigarettes.” Revisor’s Note to § 610.
When Chapter 1 was enacted five counties and Baltimore City also taxed cigarettes at rates ranging from one to three cents per pack. Maryland Legislative Council Committee on Taxation and Fiscal Matters, Technical Supplement to 1960 Report on State-Local Fiscal Relations at 105 (1961). Under Chapter 1, the Comptroller collected those local taxes and remitted them to the taxing subdivisions. Ch. 1, § 443(C). Chapter 321 of the Acts of 1961 increased the stamp tax to six cents per pack of twenty cigarettes and repealed the local taxes by providing that, “[a]fter July 1, 1961, no political subdivision of this State shall have any power or authority to impose a tax upon cigarettes, whether under a public general or public local law.” Ch. 321, § 460(b). The enactment provided essentially for a 50-50 split of the stamp tax between *319the State and all of the counties, including Baltimore City. Id. § 460(a)(4). As of the time selected by the majority for its analysis, approximately thirty percent of the net receipts after cost of collection of the cigarette tax was distributed to the counties, including Baltimore City, and seventy percent to the State. TG §§ 2-1601 through 2-1605.
Chapter 669 of the Acts of 1961 amended this cigarette tax to require that the owner of a cigarette vending machine be identified on a label affixed to the machine. Ch. 669, § 444%. That section was further amended by Chapter 344 of the Acts of 1963 to require that packages of cigarettes be loaded into vending machines with the tax stamp visible. Ch. 344, § 444%. The statute further authorized inspectors from the Comptroller’s Office to seal a vending machine upon observing apparent contraband. Id. Tampering with that seal was made a criminal offense. Id.
In this dissent the state tax on tobacco is called the “Stamp Tax.”
E
From the foregoing review, I conclude that, prior to the enactment of the subject municipal ordinances, the required licenses did not form a comprehensive, health based, state regulation of cigarette vending machines. Vending machines are simply one method of selling cigarettes, and selling cigarettes is simply one aspect of selling tobacco products. The Cigarette Traders’ License and the Sales Below Cost Act License are revenue licenses. The license for the first distributor under the Stamp Tax is a tool in administering that statute, which is a revenue measure.
With the exception of the minimum age requirement under the criminal statute, none of the four enactments reviewed above is a regulation for the public health. To the extent that there is regulation of conduct in conjunction with the revenue measures, the purpose of the regulation is to assist and enforce the raising of the revenue involved. None of the *320enactments suggests its purpose or policy is to prevent local health regulation.
The Stamp Tax does prohibit local legislation, but that prohibition is limited to a local tax on cigarettes. That prohibition against local taxation also illustrates that the General Assembly knows how to preempt, expressly, local legislation on a particular subject when the General Assembly intends that result.
II
When the Tax-General Article was adopted in 1988, the substantive provisions of the Stamp Tax were included as Title 12 of that Article.4 Certain administrative provisions of the Stamp Tax were moved to Art. 56. Those provisions, the Cigarette Traders’ License, the administrative provisions of the Sales Below Cost Act, and portions of the criminal statute were restyled to code revision format and lodged in §§ 607 through 631 under the subtitle, “Cigarette Licenses,” in anticipation of the adoption of the Business Regulation Article. That subtitle contained three parts, “Definitions,” “Cigarette Business Licenses,” and “License to Make Retail Sales of Cigarettes in Counties.” The latter is the Cigarette Traders’ License. “Cigarette Business Licenses” combined the license for what was formerly a “distributor” under the Stamp Tax, the Sales Below Cost Act Licenses, and some features of the criminal statute.
The General Revisor’s Note to the Business Regulation Article which follows BR § 18-202 advises that this combining of provisions was intended to be consistent with the Department of Legislative Reference’s charge to revise the law “in a clear, concise,' and organized manner, without changing the effect of the law.” That same note also advises that the statutory provisions antecedent to code revision were embellished in the process.
*321“One precept of revision has been that, once something is said, it should be said in the same way every time. To that end, the language and organization of this article is conformed to the 21 previously enacted articles. Thus, for example, the provisions of this article for regulatory bodies, for licensing, and for prohibited acts have been drafted in accordance with Model Guide for Drafting Governmental Units and Licensing Provisions, developed in conjunction with the revision of the Health Occupations and Business Occupations and Professions Articles.”
Id. See also General Assembly of Maryland, Dep’t of Legislative Reference, Statutory Revision Division, Model Guide for Drafting Governmental Units and Licensing Provisions (rev. 1989), in its entirety and particularly at 1-8.
The decision to style these revenue licenses as if they were regulatory licenses in various fields of health occupations produces a formal structure that can be illustrated by § 631, which deals with the Cigarette Traders’ License. This section addresses definitions, the license requirement, application, issuance, scope, term, display, revocation, administrative hearing on revocation, a prohibition against nonlicensed activity, and a penalty. The qualifications necessary to obtain this license are asking for it and paying a $25 fee. § 631(c).
In its restyled form of tracking professional and occupational regulatory licensing statutes, the Cigarette Traders’ License section has a “Scope” subsection reading, “While it is effective, a license issued under this section authorizes the licensee to make retail sales of cigarettes in the county for which the license is issued.” § 631(e). Surely this is not a roving commission to sell cigarettes at any site in the county for which the license is issued. The license does not override local zoning restrictions. See Board of Child Care of the Baltimore Annual Conference of the Methodist Church, Inc. v. Harker, 316 Md. 683, 561 A.2d 219 (1989) (holding that state-issued licenses for day care centers did not preempt local restrictions on their locations); Ad + Soil, Inc. v. County Comm’rs, 307 Md. 307, 513 A.2d 893 (1986) (holding that state-issued permits and guidelines for sludge disposal did not *322preempt local zoning restrictions). The authorization referred to in § 631(e) necessarily means that the licensee is authorized to the extent of having paid the required revenue fee.
The Cigarette Traders’ License may be denied, revoked, or suspended
“if the applicant or licensee:
(1) Fraudulently or deceptively obtains or attempts to obtain a license for the applicant, licensee, or for another person;
(2) Fraudulently or deceptively uses a license; or
(3) Fails to comply with the provisions and regulations of the Cigarette Sales Below Cost Act.”
§ 631(h).
These provisions do not convert the Cigarette Traders’ License into a regulatory measure of any significance here. Paragraph (3) simply states the result of not complying with the Cigarette Sales Below Cost Act’s substantive provisions. Further, inasmuch, as a Cigarette Traders’ License will not be issued if tangible personal property taxes are owed, § 2A(a), § 631(h) paragraphs (1) and (2) seem designed to prevent property tax evasion.5
The majority draws its greatest comfort for the preemption holding from Part II of the “Cigarette Licenses” subtitle, §§ 610 through 630. Part II does not require any qualifications of any applicant for any license. There is no testing or examination. Section 612 specifies only that applicants must apply and pay the appropriate, required fee. The fees set forth in § 612 for the various types of cigarette sellers are basically the same amounts previously paid to obtain Sales Below Cost Act Licenses. As shown, supra, those fees are the annually required contributions from tobacco vendors at all *323levels of distribution for the Sales Below Cost Act’s price enforcement program. For those engaging in the business of a cigarette retailer, the cost is $3. § 612(a). That is the former Sales Below Cost Act License fee, per location, for retailers and for vending machine operators who have machines at less than forty locations. The license to engage in the business of a “cigarette subwholesaler” or a “cigarette vending machine operator” is $250.6 § 612(b) and (c). The initial license to engage in the business of a cigarette wholesaler is $251. § 612(d). This is simply the annual $250 Sales Below Cost Act License fee and the $1, nonrecurring fee to become authorized to purchase tax stamps. Renewed wholesaler’s licenses are $250 annually. See Revisor’s Note following § 610.
Subsection 617(b), paragraphs (1) and (2) simply continue provisions relating to vending machines that are derived from the Stamp Tax, namely, requiring visible display of the stamp on packages of cigarettes in the machine and identification of the machine operator by a label on the machine.
The Revisor’s guidelines, of course, called for a scope provision for each of the “cigarette business licenses.” While those licensing provisions were temporarily lodged in Art. 56, §§ 610 through 630, the scope section, § 614, alerted the reader to the following:
“While it is effective, a license issued under this Part I[I] of this subtitle authorizes the licensee to:
(1) Engage in the business of a cigarette retailer;
(2) Engage in the business of a cigarette subwholesaler;
(3) Engage in the business of a cigarette vending machine operator;
(4) Engage in the business of a cigarette wholesaler; or
*324(5) Engage in the business of a licensed manufacturer’s warehouse operator.”
These provisions have since been amplified in BR § 16-206 by combining the requirement for one of the Sales Below Cost Act Licenses with a specification of who may possess unstamped cigarettes and who may deal only in stamped cigarettes under the Stamp Tax.7
Denial, revocation, and suspension of these cigarette licenses were covered by § 618 which reads in full:
“(a) In general. — Subject to the hearing provisions of § 619 of this subtitle, the Comptroller may deny a license to any applicant, reprimand any licensee, or suspend or revoke a license if the applicant or licensee:
(1) Fraudulently or deceptively obtains or attempts to obtain a license for the applicant, licensee, or for another person;
*325(2) Fraudulently or deceptively uses a license;
(3) Fails to comply with the provisions and regulations of the Cigarette Sales Below Cost Act; or
(4) Buys cigarettes for resale:
(i) In violation of a license; or
(ii) From a person who is not a cigarette manufacturer, a licensed subwholesaler, a licensed vending machine operator, or a licensed wholesaler.
(b) Additional cause for wholesaler license revocation.— Subject to the hearing provisions of § 619 of this subtitle, the Comptroller may revoke a license to engage in the business of a cigarette wholesaler if the licensee violates any provision of Title 12 of the Tax-General Article.
(c) Additional cause for license denial. — Subject to the hearing provisions of § 619 of this subtitle, the Comptroller shall deny a license to any applicant who has a license revoked under this section:
(1) For 1 year following the date the license is revoked; and
(2) Until it satisfactorily appears to the Comptroller that the applicant will comply with the requirements and regulations of this title.”
Paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) reflect the same Revisor’s drafting policy noted above with respect to the Cigarette Traders’ License. In this context, they only relate to collecting the revenue. Paragraph (a)(3) enforces the Sales Below Cost Act. Paragraphs (a)(4) and (b) enforce the Stamp Tax. The minimum one year duration of a revocation found in subsection (c) is a feature of the Sales Below Cost Act, formerly Art. 56, § 70(a).
The Stamp Tax Act’s prohibition against a local tax on cigarettes is now codified as TG § 12-102(b). This limited, express preemption provision would not be required if the administrative provisions codified under “Cigarette Business Licenses” prevented all local legislation relating to the sale of tobacco products.
*326My conclusion is that code revision did not convert these licensing statutes into regulations for the public health. Further, none of the restyled licensing enactments suggests a purpose or policy of preventing local health regulation. There is, in my opinion, no total preemption by state occupation of the field of vending machine sales of cigarettes.
Ill
The remaining question, as I see it, concerns the minimum age criminal statute, Code (1957, 1992 RepLVol., 1992 Cum. Supp.), Art. 27, §§ 404 and 405. The offense is selling cigarettes to a minor, but, under the statute, the minor does not commit an act expressly proscribed by §§ 404 and 405 by buying cigarettes. As previously noted, these sections were most recently amended by Chapter 301 of the Acts of 1989. The minimum age was raised from sixteen to eighteen years. The minimum fine and the obsolete reference to imprisonment were eliminated from § 405(a) so that the infraction carries only a fine of up to $100 for each offense. A new subsection 405(b) was added to read:
“If the requirements of Article 56, § 617(b)(3) of the Code are satisfied, the provisions of subsection (a) of this section do not apply to the owner of a tobacco product vending machine or any other person exercising control over a tobacco product vending machine if a person under 18 has purchased a tobacco product from a vending machine.”
Chapter 301 also added a new paragraph (3) to Art. 56, § 617(b) to provide:
“A licensee who sells cigarettes through a vending machine shall:
“(3) display, in the manner that the Comptroller requires by regulation, a conspicuous label that states the age requirement and penalty as provided under Article 27, §§ 404 and 405 of the Code.”
Chapter 301 was Senate Bill 65 of the 1989 session. The legislative file on Senate Bill 65 reflects overwhelmingly that *327its purpose was to protect the health of minors. The sponsor of the bill, testifying before the House Judiciary Committee, blamed cigarette smoking for 315,000 deaths nationally each year, $16.1 billion in direct medical costs, and $26.1 billion in indirect costs, including lost time from work. The sponsor also pointed to a study of United States high school students in 1985 that “clearly establishes the link between smoking and illicit drug use among the pack-a-day smokers.”
Describing what became paragraph (3) the sponsor simply noted:
“The measure’s enforcement and penalty provisions do not apply to tobacco product vending machine owners or people exercising control over such machines. However, the bill requires anyone licensed to sell cigarettes through a vending machine to display a conspicuous label stating the age requirement for cigarette purchase and the legal penalty for violation of the law.”
Thus, when the class of ineligible purchasers was enlarged, a defense to possible criminal prosecution was given to vendors of cigarettes who would not personally be making over the counter sales.
I see no conflict amounting to preemption between § 617(b)(3) and the municipal ordinances at issue here. The latter complement or supplement the former. In analogous situations this Court has found that state regulations did not preempt local legislation. For example, Baltimore City could require a higher minimum wage for waitresses in taverns than that required by state statute. See City of Baltimore v. Sitnick & Firey, 254 Md. 303, 255 A.2d 376 (1969). Similarly, the expiration of a statewide rent control enabling statute did not conflict with the pre-existing power of Baltimore City under its charter to legislate a rent control program. See Heubeck v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 205 Md. 203, 107 A.2d 99 (1954). Here, the municipal ordinances prohibit locating cigarette vending machines in places frequented by minors. They further require that cigarette vending machines in establishments not frequented by minors be located where *328some person employed by the establishment ordinarily would have the machine in view while performing duties in regular course for the establishment.
In order to give preemptive effect to § 617(b)(3), one must infer that the intent of the General Assembly was to prevent any local government from requiring, in addition to the statewide warning, any conduct aimed at ensuring that cigarettes not be sold to persons under age eighteen. That reading means that the General Assembly was not only indifferent to, but intended to prevent prohibition of, locating cigarette vending machines where a procession of minors repetitively could purchase cigarettes. This would mean that the General Assembly intended that the only burdens, state and local, on the owner of a properly labeled vending machine would be to keep it stocked and to collect the sales proceeds. I do not attribute so cynical a purpose to the General Assembly.
Chief Judge MURPHY has authorized me to state that he joins in the views expressed in this dissenting opinion.

. In this dissenting opinion statutory references also will be to Md.Code (1957, 1988 Repl.Vol., 1991 Cum.Supp.), Art. 56, unless otherwise expressly noted or apparent from the context.

. To simplify matters this dissenting opinion assumes that at all relevant times there was a Circuit Court for Baltimore City.

. A more ornamented statement of public policy underlying the Sales Below Cost Act is found in the preamble of Chapter 90 of the Acts of 1956. It reads:
“WHEREAS, cigarettes, because of their standardized character, their great popularity, their widespread and varied types of markets and methods of distribution and the sensitivity of their distribution to price fluctuations, are particularly susceptible to use as 'bait' or ‘loss leaders’ to deceive the public; and
"WHEREAS, the advertising, offering to sell, or sale of cigarettes below cost with the intent of injuring a competitor or competitors, or of substantially lessening or destroying competition, is an unfair, deceptive, destructive and unethical business practice, which has been and is demoralizing and disorganizing the distribution of cigarettes, and fostering monopoly and high prices by tending to force independent wholesalers and retailers out of business; and
"WHEREAS, the distinctive character of cigarettes and the economic facts and circumstances peculiar to their distribution require special and individualized treatment of the problems 'created by advertising, offering and selling cigarettes below cost; and
“WHEREAS, the public welfare will be promoted by the prohibition of such practices in the distribution of cigarettes and the effective enforcement of such prohibition...."

. The distribution provisions were included in Title 2, subtitle, "Tobacco Tax Revenue Distribution,” §§ 2-1601 through 2-1605 of the Tax-General Article.

. Paragraphs (1) and (2) also prohibit giving the clerk a false name in order to obtain a second Cigarette Traders’ License for the same location and licensing period, even if the license fee has already been paid, and thereby prohibit paying the tax twice. But one would think that such situations would be relatively rare.

. The terminology, ' ‘subwholesaler, was new. Revisor’s Note following Art. 56, § 610(m). The term has been limited to a person who "buy[s] stamped cigarettes from a wholesaler or another subwholesaler.” BR § 16-206(c)(2).

. BR § 16-206 reads in full as follows:
"(a) Manufacturer’s warehouse operator license. — A manufacturer’s warehouse operator license authorizes the licensee to act as a manufacturer’s warehouse operator.
(b) Retailer license. — A retailer license authorizes the licensee to:
(1) act as a retailer; and
(2) buy stamped cigarettes from a subwholesaler or wholesaler.
(c) Subwholesaler license. — A subwholesaler license authorizes the licensee to:
(1) act as a subwholesaler; and
(2) buy stamped cigarettes from a wholesaler or another subwholesaler.
(d) Vending machine operator license. — A vending machine operator license authorizes the licensee to:
(1) act as a vending machine operator; and
(2) buy stamped cigarettes from a subwholesaler or wholesaler.
(e) Wholesaler license. — A wholesaler license authorizes the licensee to:
(1) act as a wholesaler;
(2) buy unstamped cigarettes directly from a cigarette manufacturer;
(3) hold unstamped cigarettes;
(4) buy tobacco tax stamps as authorized by § 12-303 of the Tax-General Article;
(5) transport unstamped cigarettes in the State; and
(6) sell unstamped cigarettes to another licensed wholesaler if the Comptroller specifically authorizes.”