Court Opinion

ID: 9925555
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-22 08:09:06.449037+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:00.810166
License: Public Domain

In the
        Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
         at Fort Worth
     ___________________________
          No. 02-23-00071-CV
     ___________________________

  IN THE INTEREST OF J.R., A CHILD

  On Appeal from the 360th District Court
          Tarrant County, Texas
      Trial Court No. 360-705314-21

  Before Birdwell, Bassel, and Walker, JJ.
  Memorandum Opinion by Justice Bassel
                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

                                    I. Introduction

      Appellant L.T. (Mother), appearing pro se, appeals the trial court’s “Final

Order in Suit to Modify Parent–Child Relationship” in which she was ordered to pay

medical support, dental support, retroactive child support, and a judgment for past-

due medical support (which related to unreimbursed dental expenses) to Appellee

A.R. (Father) for their son J.R (Jonathan), 1 who was eighteen years old at the time of

the hearing. Mother sets forth thirty-five issues in her brief; but even after our giving

her multiple opportunities to file a compliant brief that includes citations to the record

and to legal authorities, she has waived most of her appellate issues.2 After reviewing

the arguments that are adequately briefed and after determining that Father did not

plead for a judgment against Mother for unreimbursed dental expenses, we modify

the final order to delete that section and affirm as modified.

                                   II. Background

      Father and Mother have never been married to each other. In a 2007 “Order

Establishing the Parent–Child Relationship,” a district court in Brewster County

found that Father is the father of Jonathan, who was born in 2005. Pursuant to that

      1
        We use a pseudonym for J.R. even though he turned eighteen prior to the final
order’s rendition. See generally Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 109.002(d).
      2
        Mother filed numerous briefs, but we use her most recently filed brief (which
is file-marked October 25, 2023) because although it is still deficient, it is the most
compliant of the briefs that she filed.

                                            2
order, Father was ordered to pay Mother child support, and Mother was given the

right to determine Jonathan’s primary residence. Jonathan lived with Mother in West

Texas and visited Father in the Benbrook area until July 2019.

      In July 2019, Jonathan went to live with Father.3 Shortly thereafter, the parties

participated in a negotiation conference and agreed to the entry of a “Child Support

Review Order.” In that order, Father was relieved of his child-support obligation:

“PARTIES AGREE TO ZERO CHILD SUPPORT AS CHILD [JONATHAN] IS

CURRENTLY LIVING WITH NON-CUSTODIAL PARENT.” The order further

required Father and Mother to each pay fifty percent of “all additional health care

expenses, including vision and dental[-]care expenses.”

      Approximately two years after Jonathan went to live with Father, Father filed in

the 360th District Court in Tarrant County an amended petition to modify the

parent–child relationship requesting that the trial court order Mother to pay child

support, including retroactive child support; Jonathan’s health and dental insurance

premiums; and half of Jonathan’s uninsured medical expenses.4 Father’s petition also

requested that he be appointed as the sole managing conservator of Jonathan, that

      3
       The parties dispute whether this was meant to be a permanent arrangement (as
Jonathan was starting high school) or a temporary arrangement while Mother
recuperated from health issues and grieved her mother’s death.
      4
        Around the same time that Father filed suit in the 360th District Court (the
trial court), Mother initiated a habeas corpus suit against him in the 233rd District
Court and filed other motions there. Father filed a motion to consolidate the two
cases, and the case from the 233rd District Court was consolidated into the case in the
trial court.

                                          3
Mother be appointed as the possessory conservator, and that Mother be awarded a

standard possession schedule.

      At the February 24, 2023 modification hearing, the trial court heard testimony

from Father, Mother, and an employee from Family Court Services who had

interviewed Jonathan. Because Jonathan was eighteen years old at the time of the

hearing on the modification petition and was on the cusp of graduating from high

school, the trial court stated that it would not make any orders as to conservatorship,

possession, and access. The hearing thus focused on child support, medical support,

and dental support.

      Father testified that his child-support obligation was terminated by agreement

within two months of when Jonathan came to live with him. Father explained that he

did not seek child support at that time because he “didn’t feel it was necessary.

Everything was going well.” But as time went on and Mother would not help with

Jonathan’s medical and dental bills, Father “felt like maybe it was time” to seek child

support from her.

      Father testified that he had incurred expenses for providing food, 5 clothing,

and a vehicle for Jonathan, as well as for Jonathan’s dental procedures, which included

the removal of several baby teeth prior to his getting braces and later having his

wisdom teeth removed. Father asked the trial court to order Mother to pay the

      5
       Father testified, “[F]ood is a big one.”

                                            4
guideline child support based on the federal minimum wage or $175.38 per month6

starting March 1, 2023, and ending when Jonathan graduated high school. Father also

sought retroactive child support in the amount of $3,858.347 from July 1, 2021.

Father further requested that the trial court order Mother to pay $110 per month to

cover the cost of Jonathan’s health insurance and $4.86 per month for his dental

insurance. Father testified that he had paid $7,907 for Jonathan’s dental expenses 8

and that Mother’s half was $3,953.50.

      Mother admitted that she had not provided any type of financial support for

Jonathan while he lived with Father. Mother said that she has a master’s degree in

software engineering but that at the time of the modification hearing, she was not

employed and was “living off the government.” She explained that she had not

worked since 2018 because she had been a full-time student seeking to obtain her

PhD but that she had been forced to quit in the winter of 2021 due to problems with

      6
        Early on during the hearing, the trial court stated that “[$]175.38 [per month]
is the amount [of child support] for someone who makes minimum wage with one
child before the [c]ourt,” and Father’s counsel used this same figure when questioning
Father. As discussed below, this amount is less than the amount calculated by
applying the child-support guidelines to the federal minimum wage.

      It is unclear how Father calculated this amount. From July 1, 2021 to
      7

February 24, 2023 (the date of the hearing), is nineteen months, and nineteen months
of $175.38 monthly child support totals $3,332.22, which is what the trial court
awarded.
      8
       The record includes receipts for the dental expenses, which were incurred
from January 2020 to December 2022.

                                          5
her student loans. Mother agreed that any orders for child support would be based on

the federal minimum wage.

      At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court gave the following oral

rendition of its judgment:

      Current child support is set at $175.38 beginning March 1st, 2023.
      Medical support is set at $110 a month beginning March 1st, 2023. I’m
      setting dental support at $3 a month beginning March 1st, 2023.

            That’s a little less than you asked for, but 9 percent of gross, we
      would exceed that if I did anything more than that.

            Retroactive support is set at $3,332.22 as of February 24th, 2023.
      This shall be paid at the rate of $30 a month beginning March 1st, 2023.

            When current support is no longer due, the mother shall pay child
      support at the rate -- shall pay the retroactive support back at the rate of
      $205.38 per month.

             So when he graduates from high school, then that payment goes
      up to [$]205.38.

            The mother owes the father $3,953.50 in past[-]due medical
      support as of February 24th, 2023. It shall be paid at the rate of $40 a
      month until current medical support is no longer due. Thereafter, the
      mother shall pay medical support at the rate of $153 a month until all
      medical support is paid in full.

      At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court informed Mother about the

preparation of the final order:

      [Father’s counsel] is going to prepare an order that comports with the
      rendition. She’s going to email it to you. If she hears an objection to the
      form of the order -- not that you disagree with the order but does the
      order comport with what I ordered -- she’ll set it for hearing on motion
      to sign.

                                           6
             If she does not hear an objection from you, she can present it to
      me for signature if you don’t respond within ten days of receiving an
      email from her. So make sure you check your email that you gave the
      [c]ourt and make sure that if you object, that you let [Father’s counsel]
      know so she can set it for hearing.

      Seven days later, Mother filed her notice of appeal and attached two requests

for findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Texas Rules of Civil Procedure

296 and 297 and Texas Family Code Section 6.711,9 as well as language that appears

to request child-support findings under Texas Family Code Section 154.130(b). We

notified Mother that her notice of appeal appeared to be premature because the trial

court had not signed an order. Father then filed a motion to sign a final order.

      The trial court held a hearing on Father’s motion to sign a final order and on

Mother’s request for findings of fact.       At the hearing, Mother agreed that the

proposed order prepared by Father’s counsel comported with the trial court’s prior

oral rendition. The trial court signed the final order that same day without making

findings of fact and conclusions of law. Mother’s appeal then proceeded.

    III. The Law on Modifying Support Orders and the Standard of Review

      A court may modify a child-support order if the circumstances of the child or a

person affected by the order have materially and substantially changed since the

previous child-support order was rendered. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 156.401(a)(1),

(a-1). The person seeking modification has the burden of establishing a material and

      9
        This section deals with findings in a suit for dissolution of marriage and thus is
inapplicable here. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 6.711.

                                            7
substantial change. In re A.A.T., 583 S.W.3d 914, 920 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, no

pet.).

         We review the trial court’s modification of orders governing conservatorship,

possession, child support, and medical support for an abuse of discretion. In re

R.R.K., No. 02-20-00302-CV, 2022 WL 1257136, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

Apr. 28, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.). A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts

arbitrarily or unreasonably or does not analyze or apply the law properly. Iliff v. Iliff,

339 S.W.3d 74, 78 (Tex. 2011).

         Whether the evidence supporting the decision is legally and factually sufficient

is relevant in deciding whether the trial court abused its discretion. R.R.K., 2022 WL

1257136, at *4. In determining whether an abuse of discretion has occurred because

the evidence is legally or factually insufficient to support the trial court’s decision, we

engage in a two-pronged inquiry: (1) did the trial court have enough information

upon which to exercise its discretion; and (2) did the trial court err in applying its

discretion? In re C.F., 576 S.W.3d 761, 773 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2019, orig.

proceeding & no pet.).        The applicable sufficiency review comes into play in

answering the first prong.      Id.   Concerning the second prong of our abuse-of-

discretion inquiry, we resolve, based on the elicited evidence, whether the trial court’s

decision was reasonable. Id. A trial court does not abuse its discretion by basing its

decision on conflicting evidence if some evidence supports its decision. Unifund CCR

Partners v. Villa, 299 S.W.3d 92, 97 (Tex. 2009).

                                             8
                                    IV. Discussion

      A.     Briefing Waiver

      As noted in the introduction, even Mother’s most recently filed brief is

deficient. The brief’s statement of facts contains no citations to the actual record.10

See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(g). Moreover, despite listing thirty-five issues (some of which

are duplicates), Mother’s brief’s argument section sets forth only four headings—none

of which mentions the issue(s) to which it corresponds. Accordingly, we initially hold

that Mother has failed to preserve all issues sans those covered in her argument

section, and we overrule those unpreserved issues. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(f), (i); see

also In re S.B., No. 02-23-00017-CV, 2023 WL 6475637, at *4–5 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth Oct. 5, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (observing that pro se appellants are held to

      10
         Instead, Mother cites to “Vol. 8 Page 337” and to “Vol. 8 Page 338,” which
appear to refer to two pages from the 2007 “Order Establishing the Parent–Child
Relationship” from Brewster County; we were forced to decipher that on our own as
the appellate record before us does not contain a volume 8 or any volume with over
300 pages. That order is included multiple times in the clerk’s record, but Mother
failed to include citations to the appellate record.

       Additionally, Mother includes multiple references to “(See Exhibits),” which is
presumably a reference to the documents in the appendix to her brief. The appendix
to Mother’s brief spans from page 46 to page 275 for a total of 230 pages, despite that
the exhibits admitted at trial span fewer than 50 pages. It is clear that many of the
documents attached to Mother’s brief are not part of the appellate record and
therefore cannot be considered on appeal. See Hogg v. Lynch, Chappell & Alsup, P.C.,
480 S.W.3d 767, 773 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.) (“Documents attached to a
brief as an exhibit or appendix, but not appearing in the appellate record, cannot be
considered on appellate review.”); see also Tait v. Pepsico Inc., No. 02-22-00290-CV, 2023
WL 2325194, at *3 n.8 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 2, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.)
(collecting cases).

                                            9
the same standards as a licensed attorney and must comply with applicable laws and

rules of procedure, including those setting forth the requirements for appellate briefs).

We discuss the issues that Mother covers in her argument section below.

      B.     Mother’s Four Argument Headings

             1.     Mother’s Access Argument

      The first heading in Mother’s brief’s argument section is “Noncompliance and

Violations of the Opposing Party.” The crux of Mother’s argument in this section is

that Father violated the 2007 order from Brewster County by denying her access to

Jonathan.   As noted above, Jonathan turned eighteen prior to the modification

hearing. Additionally, the final order includes the following finding regarding how

Jonathan’s age affected the access claims: “The [c]ourt finds that the child made the

subject of this suit reached the age of eighteen since the filing of the Petition to

Modify the Parent–Child Relationship. Accordingly, the [c]ourt makes no provisions

for conservatorship or possession of and access to the child.” The trial court thus

determined that claims for possession, conservatorship, and access were no longer at

issue. And the law supports the trial court’s conclusion. See In re Tex. Dep’t of Fam. &

Protective Servs., No. 04-23-00027-CV, 2023 WL 4610048, at *1 (Tex. App.—San

Antonio July 19, 2023, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (“When a child turns eighteen

years old, issues of conservatorship become moot.” (quoting In re J.D., No. 04-19-

00239-CV, 2020 WL 4607015, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 12, 2020, no pet.)

                                           10
(mem. op.))). Accordingly, we overrule the issues raised under Mother’s brief’s first

argument heading.11

             2.    Mother’s Challenges         to   the   Medical     Support    and
                   Reimbursement

      The second heading in Mother’s brief’s argument section is “Request for

Medical Support and Reimbursement,” and under this heading, she raises various

arguments challenging the portion of the trial court’s order requiring her to pay for

medical and dental insurance and a “Medical Support Judgment” related to Jonathan’s

past dental bills. After addressing Mother’s challenges to the portion of the order

requiring her to pay for Jonathan’s medical and dental insurance, we explain why the

trial court abused its discretion by ordering her to pay for unpleaded unreimbursed

dental expenses.

      Mother argues that Father refused to accept the dental insurance that she

maintained for Jonathan and that Father had failed to maintain health insurance for

Jonathan. No evidence was presented at trial that Mother had dental insurance for

Jonathan or that Father had failed to maintain health insurance for Jonathan. Based

on the evidence presented, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by

      11
        To the extent that Mother’s complaints under her brief’s first argument
heading are not claims challenging possession, conservatorship, and access, we
overrule them as inadequately briefed. See Zhao v. Two Steppin Towing, No. 02-21-
00351-CV, 2022 WL 11456754, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 20, 2022, pet.
denied) (mem. op.) (holding certain challenges were waived due to inadequate
briefing).

                                         11
ordering Mother to pay medical and dental support to cover Jonathan’s health and

dental insurance. 12

       In her brief, Mother also argues that she “does not owe . . . medical/dental

reimbursement.”        The record demonstrates that Father’s modification petition

requested that Mother “be ordered to pay for . . . (50%) of the child’s uninsured

medical expenses.” 13 See generally Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 154.183(c)(1). At trial,

Father did not request that Mother be ordered to pay fifty percent of Jonathan’s

uninsured medical expenses, nor did he put on evidence of any uninsured medical

expenses. Instead, Father testified to and put on evidence of Jonathan’s past dental

expenses totaling $7,907 and said that Mother’s portion was $3,953.50. Based on the

evidence of Jonathan’s past dental expenses, it appears that the trial court attempted

to craft a work-around that fit Father’s pleadings and thus included a “Medical

Support Judgment” in the final order—requiring Mother to pay $3,953.50 for being

“in arrears on medical support”—notwithstanding that the amount was not for

        Mother does not challenge the amount of medical support and dental support
       12

that she was required to pay; instead, she argues simply that she “does not owe
[Father] child support, retroactive child support, and medical/dental reimbursement.”
We therefore need not address the amounts that were calculated by the trial court for
medical and dental support. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.

        Father’s request ignored that pursuant to the 2019 agreed order, the parties
       13

were ordered to pay fifty percent of “all additional health care expenses, including
vision and dental[-]care expenses.” The record is silent regarding why Father did not
file a motion for enforcement or to confirm an arrearage regarding Jonathan’s
unreimbursed dental expenses.

                                          12
medical support but was for Jonathan’s past dental expenses.             See generally id.

§ 154.181.

      This is not a scenario in which only the wrong terminology was used. Instead,

there is no pleading or motion to support a portion of the final order. Father’s

amended petition requested that the trial court order Mother to pay “guideline child[-]

support payments,” retroactive child-support payments, Jonathan’s health and dental

insurance premiums, and fifty percent of Jonathan’s uninsured medical expenses;

Father made no mention of past dental expenses. Father did not file a motion to

enforce the 2019 order requiring Mother to pay fifty percent of Jonathan’s past dental

expenses, nor did he seek a money judgment for an arrearage for past dental expenses

in his motion to modify. See id. § 157.263(a); Holmes v. Williams, 355 S.W.3d 215, 219

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.) (“A cumulative money judgment for

past-due child support results only after the obligee files a motion for the

enforcement of child support requesting a money judgment for arrearage.”).

      Moreover, we cannot conclude that the matter of unreimbursed dental

expenses was tried by consent. As this court has previously stated,

      [T]rial by consent is a doctrine that is only intended to cover the
      exceptional case in which it clearly appears from the record as a whole
      that the parties tried the unplead[ed] issue. It is not intended to establish
      a general rule of practice and should be applied with care, and in no
      event in a doubtful situation.

            To determine whether an issue was tried by consent, the court
      must examine the record not for evidence of the issue[] but rather for
      evidence of trial of the issue. Consent may be found only where

                                           13
      evidence regarding a party’s unpleaded issue is developed under
      circumstances indicating [that] both parties understood the issue was in
      the case[] and [where] the other party failed to make an appropriate
      complaint.

In re A.B.H., 266 S.W.3d 596, 600 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, no pet.) (op. on

reh’g) (footnotes omitted).

      Here, Mother was questioned at trial regarding whether she understood that

she was required to pay half the cost of Jonathan’s dental expenses, and she

responded, “Yeah.” But there is no indication that Mother understood that by

Father’s introducing receipts from Jonathan’s dental procedures, Father was seeking a

judgment against her for Jonathan’s prior unreimbursed dental expenses. Cf. id.

(evaluating whether conservatorship was tried by consent and holding that mother

was not made aware that father was seeking sole managing conservatorship based on

social worker’s recommendation that mother be appointed sole managing

conservator). Evidence in the record of dental expenses, without more, is not enough

to demonstrate that the issue was tried by consent.

      We hold that the trial court abused its discretion by including in the final order

a “Medical Support Judgment” confirming an unpleaded arrearage for dental

expenses. Accordingly, we overrule the arguments that Mother raised under her

second argument heading challenging the portion of the final order requiring her to

pay for Jonathan’s medical and dental insurance, but we sustain Mother’s challenge to

the portion of the final order that is labeled as “Medical Support Judgment,” which is

                                          14
mislabeled and actually confirms an unpleaded arrearage for unreimbursed dental

expenses.14

              3.     Mother’s Child-Support Challenges

       The third heading in the argument section in Mother’s brief is “Indigent

Circumstances/Child is of Legal Age/Emancipation.” Under this heading, Mother

first challenges whether Father is Jonathan’s father. Although Mother made a brief

mention of this in the trial court, Father’s counsel objected to that line of questioning,

and the trial court sustained the objection. Mother did not have any document on file

challenging Father’s paternity, and the 2007 order from Brewster County contains a

parentage section with a finding that Father is Jonathan’s biological father and

ordering “that the parent–child relationship is established between [them].” Mother

cannot now collaterally attack the 2007 order. See Parsons v. Parsons, 648 S.W.3d 354,

357–58 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2021, pet. denied) (“Because the validity of those

[modification and child-support] orders is presumed and [because] the face of those

orders does not show that they are void, [appellant] fail[ed] to demonstrate that they

can be collaterally attacked.”).

       14
          Having determined that there is no pleading to support the “Medical Support
Judgment” that required Mother to pay half of Jonathan’s prior dental expenses, we
need not address Mother’s other arguments related to the dental expenses. See Tex. R.
App. P. 47.1. To the extent that Mother raises conservatorship issues in this section,
we overrule them as moot because Jonathan is over eighteen. See Tex. Dep’t of Fam. &
Protective Servs., 2023 WL 4610048, at *1; J.D., 2020 WL 4607015, at *1.

                                           15
      Mother next reasserts her access arguments that she raised under her first

argument heading, which we have already overruled.

      Mother then describes her “indigent circumstances” and argues that she cannot

afford to pay child support. But she states that she “wants to work. She has an

extensive education and wishes that she could work to provide for herself better. She

applies to jobs constantly, gets interviewed, but simply no company will offer a job.

[She] can prove this with respect to Texas Family Code § 154.066.” The Family Code

section that Mother cites—which is the only legal authority cited under her third

argument heading—deals with intentional unemployment or underemployment. See

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 154.066. The trial court, however, did not find that Mother

was intentionally unemployed or underemployed but instead used the minimum-wage

presumption due to the lack of information about what salary Mother could make if

she were employed because she had been out of the workforce from 2018 to 2021

while pursuing her PhD. See id. § 154.068(a) (stating that “[i]n the absence of evidence

of a party’s resources, . . . the court shall presume that the party has income equal to

the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour week to which the support guidelines may be

applied”); M.G. v. T.G., No. 02-21-00433-CV, 2023 WL 2178762, at *4 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth Feb. 23, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (applying minimum-wage presumption

when mother was unemployed); W.D. v. R.D., No. 02-18-00328-CV, 2019 WL

2635563, at *8 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 27, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (stating in

a case in which the mother was unemployed that “[t]he lack of specific evidence of

                                          16
[mother’s] net resources required the trial court to presume that she had a salary equal

to the federal minimum wage”).

      Furthermore, Mother implicitly argues that she should not be ordered to pay

child support because Jonathan has a full-time job and “can legally provide for himself

financially and is able to manage his own finances.” Again Mother cites no authority

to support her argument. See Huey v. Huey, 200 S.W.3d 851, 854 (Tex. App.—Dallas

2006, no pet.) (stating that the “[f]ailure to cite applicable authority or provide

substantive analysis waives an issue on appeal”). Although the record demonstrated

that Jonathan works part-time at Chick-fil-A, no evidence supports Mother’s

contention that he can provide for himself financially or that he can meet all his needs

with his part-time job. Moreover, the record demonstrates that Jonathan was still in

high school; therefore, Mother was still on the hook for child support because the

Family Code requires a parent to help support his child, even if the child is over

eighteen years of age, so long as that child meets enrollment and attendance

requirements for a program leading to a high school diploma. See Tex. Fam. Code

Ann. § 154.002 (entitled “Child Support Through High School Graduation”); Sweet v.

Sweet, No. 14-22-00133-CV, 2023 WL 6978986, at *1 n.2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] Oct. 24, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.).

      Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by

ordering Mother to pay child support, and we overrule the arguments under her third

heading.

                                             17
             4.    Mother’s Remaining Challenges to the Order

      The fourth and final heading in the argument section of Mother’s brief is

labeled “Abuse of Discretion by Trial Court Judge.” Mother makes multifarious

statements under this heading, and from those statements, we attempt to ascertain her

arguments.

      In the first paragraph of that section, Mother argues that the trial court

      failed to recognize that there are no grounds for a modification of the
      Order Establishing the Parent–Child Relationship and/or child support.
      The non[]custodial parent refused to return the child to [Mother], [the]
      primary custodial parent, after the temporary period she initially
      consented to. (See Texas Family Code, Title 5, Ch[.] 156, §[§]
      156.101,[15] 156.409[16]).

      To the extent that Mother raises a one-sentence argument about the absence of

any grounds for modification, this argument is inadequately briefed. See Huey, 200

      15
        Section 156.101 deals with a modification to conservatorship, possession, or
access. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 156.101. As noted above, Jonathan’s age mooted any
modification on these grounds.
      16
        Section 156.409 addresses modifying child support when there has been a
change in physical possession of the child:

      The court shall, on the motion of a party or a person having physical
      possession of the child, modify an order providing for the support of the
      child to provide that the person having physical possession of the child
      for at least six months shall have the right to receive and give receipt for
      payments of support for the child and to hold or disburse money for the
      benefit of the child if the sole managing conservator of the child or the
      joint managing conservator who has the exclusive right to determine the
      primary residence of the child has . . . voluntarily relinquished the
      primary care and possession of the child[.]

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 156.409(a)(1).

                                          18
S.W.3d at 854. Even if we were to reach the merits of such argument, the record

demonstrates a change in physical possession, increased expenses for food and

clothing, and a change in Jonathan’s dental needs. Cf. Danburg v. Danburg, 444 S.W.2d

845, 848 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1969, no writ) (holding that adjustment in

support order was justified because evidence showed that subsequent to the original

support order, a circumstance had arisen that required costly medical treatment for

the parties’ child). See generally In re H.D.C., 474 S.W.3d 758, 766 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (“In deciding whether a material and substantial

change of circumstances has occurred, a trial court is not confined to rigid or definite

guidelines.”).

       In the remainder of her first paragraph, Mother appears to argue that the trial

court should not have ordered her to pay child support because Father had allegedly

refused to return Jonathan to her. Mother’s argument ignores that courts cannot

condition child support on possession of or access to a child. See Tex. Fam. Code

Ann. § 154.011 (stating that a court may not render an order that conditions the

payment of child support on whether a managing conservator allows a possessory

conservator to have possession of or access to a child); Brazell v. Brazell, No. 13-00-

067-CV, 2001 WL 34616781, at *4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Apr. 26,

2001, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (overruling father’s argument that the

trial court erred by refusing to abate or lower child-support payments because father

did not have access to his child).

                                          19
         In her second paragraph, Mother states that if the trial court had heard the case

from the 233rd District Court, the trial court

         would have known that on the child[-]support portal, [Father] was
         already listed as the primary custodial parent before a hearing ever took
         place. There has been continuous foul play by the other party in this
         case, resulting in hi[s] illegally defying the Order Establishing [the]
         Parent–Child Relationship that was already in place and has been in
         place since October 26, 2007, . . . as well as Texas Family Code, Title 5,
         Ch. 231, § 231.001,[17] § 231.0011,[18] Administration and Designation of
         the Title IV-D Program.

We construe Mother’s argument to be that no modification was necessary due to the

information about conservatorship that was allegedly reflected in the child-support

portal. Mother fails to explain on appeal how such information would prevent the

trial court from modifying the August 2019 child-support review order, which did not

order either party to pay child support. See generally Huey, 200 S.W.3d at 854. The

remainder of Mother’s second paragraph regarding Father’s allegedly illegal conduct

appears to raise conservatorship issues, which were mooted by Jonathan’s age. See

Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 2023 WL 4610048, at *1; J.D., 2020 WL 4607015,

at *1.

         In her one-sentence third paragraph, Mother argues that in ordering her to pay

child support, the trial court did not properly calculate her disposable income and net

         See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 231.001 (stating that “[t]he office of the attorney
         17

general is designated as the state’s Title IV-D agency”).
        See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 231.0011 (entitled “Development of Statewide
         18

Integrated System for Child Support, Medical Support, and Dental Support
Enforcement”).

                                            20
resources in accordance with the law, citing Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 296

through 299 and eleven Family Code sections. Even assuming that Mother had

adequately briefed this issue, her argument fails. See Huey, 200 S.W.3d at 854. As

mentioned above, in the absence of evidence of a party’s resources, the trial court shall

presume that the party has income equal to the federal minimum wage for a forty-

hour week to which the support guidelines may be applied. Tex. Fam. Code Ann.

§ 154.068(a).   Here, the trial court was required to apply the minimum-wage

presumption because the evidence showed that Mother was unemployed, that she had

been unemployed for several years, and that she was actively seeking employment. See

M.G., 2023 WL 2178762, at *4 (applying minimum-wage presumption when mother

was unemployed). As explained in M.G., “a person earning the federal minimum

wage [$7.25 an hour] would gross $290 per week and $15,080 per year ($290

multiplied by 52), or $1,257 monthly.” See id.; see also 29 U.S.C.A. § 206(a)(1)(C)

(setting forth federal minimum wage).        Under the “low-income multiple family

adjusted guidelines” for child support, 19 a person with one child before the court must

pay fifteen percent of her monthly net resources.          See Tex. Fam. Code Ann.

§ 154.129(b). Thus, even without adjusting for the difference between gross and net

wages, in the absence of evidence about the amount of Mother’s income, the trial

court could have ordered her to pay no more than $188.55 per month. The trial court

      19
        Mother had two other children from another relationship, and she received
child-support payments from their father.

                                           21
ordered Mother to pay only $175.38 per month.            Mother does not offer any

alternative calculation or provide argument for why it was not mandatory for the trial

court to apply the minimum-wage presumption. See generally Huey, 200 S.W.3d at 854.

We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by calculating Mother’s net

resources based on the minimum-wage presumption and ordering her to pay child

support of $175.38 per month.

      In her fourth paragraph, Mother argues that the trial court did not prepare

findings of fact and conclusions of law “in accordance with the child[-]support

guidelines.” As noted in the background section above, Mother’s notice of appeal

included two requests for findings of fact and conclusions of law,20 and the trial court

was aware of the request for findings, stating on the record at the outset of the

hearing on the motion to sign that “[t]he matter before the [c]ourt [was] a motion to

sign a final order and findings of fact.” Although the trial court did not file findings

of fact, we conclude that such error was harmless because Mother was not prevented

from presenting her case to this court.

      20
         Mother’s brief contains a page labeled “Request for Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law.” A similar document (but with different formatting) is also
included in the appendix to her brief. These documents differ slightly from those that
Mother filed with her notice of appeal. To the extent that Mother is requesting this
court to make findings of fact and conclusions of law, we cannot do so. See Livingston
v. Erlandson, No. 07-22-00315-CV, 2023 WL 2658748, at *1 n.1 (Tex. App.—Amarillo
Mar. 24, 2023, no pet.) (order) (“[A]ppellate courts in Texas do not have the power to
issue findings of fact and conclusions of law based upon the rulings of the trial
court[;] only the trial court may do so.”).

                                          22
      Mother’s requests for findings of fact and conclusions of law did not

specifically mention Section 154.130, which requires a trial court to make net-resource

findings in rendering a child-support order if a party files a written request with the

court before the order is signed; however, the wording that she used requested

findings regarding her net resources. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 154.130(a)(1), (b).

We presume, without deciding, that the trial court was required to make findings

under Section 154.130 and erred by failing to do so. See Duffey v. Duffey, No. 14-16-

00144-CV, 2017 WL 6045569, at *8 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 7, 2017,

pet. denied) (mem. op.). The evidence at trial did not contain sufficient information

for the trial court to calculate Mother’s net resources, and thus the trial court had to

order child support based on the presumption that she has income equal to the

federal minimum wage for a forty-hour work week. See id. (citing Tex. Fam. Code

Ann. §§ 154.062(b), 154.068). As demonstrated above, Mother was able to challenge

the amount of child support that the trial court ordered. Accordingly, we conclude

that the trial court’s presumed error in failing to file Section 154.130(b) findings was

harmless because it did not prevent Mother from properly presenting a case to this

court. See id. at *9; In re H.D.V., No. 05-15-00421-CV, 2016 WL 4492702, at *11

(Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 26, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.). We reach the same

conclusion as to the findings of fact and conclusions of law that Mother requested

under the Rules of Civil Procedure. See In re I.J.D., No. 13-23-00005-CV, 2023 WL

5487381, at *4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Aug. 24, 2023, no pet.) (mem.

                                          23
op.) (holding that father was not harmed by trial court’s failure to issue findings of

fact and conclusions of law under Rules 296 and 297 in modification case because he

was not prevented from properly presenting a case on appeal).

       In the next-to-the-last argument that Mother raises under her fourth heading,

she contends that the trial court ignored the claims that she raised in the 233rd

District Court case. Assuming without deciding that Mother had served her motions

on Father and had set her motions for a hearing, her claims were mooted because her

claims went to access, possession, and conservatorship. See Tex. Dep’t of Fam. &

Protective Servs., 2023 WL 4610048, at *1; J.D., 2020 WL 4607015, at *1. Moreover, the

final order states,

       IT IS ORDERED AND DECREED that all relief requested in this case
       and not expressly granted is denied. This is a final judgment, for which
       let execution and all writs and processes necessary to enforce this
       judgment issue. This judgment finally disposes of all claims and all
       parties and is appealable.

The trial court thus disposed of the motions that Mother had filed in the 233rd

District Court case, which was consolidated into this case.

       In her final argument under her fourth heading, Mother contends in one

sentence that the trial court clearly displayed a bias in favor of Father. Mother failed

to provide any substantive analysis and has thus waived this argument. See 1701 Com.

Acquisition, LLC v. Macquarie US Trading, LLC, No. 02-21-00333-CV, 2022 WL

3904976, at *14–15 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 31, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.); see

                                          24
also Zhao, 2022 WL 11456754, at *8 (“[A] litigant’s dissatisfaction with a judge’s rulings

does not support a finding of bias.”).

      Accordingly, we overrule the arguments presented under Mother’s fourth

argument heading.21

                                    V. Conclusion

      Having sustained only Mother’s argument challenging the “Medical Support

Judgment,” we modify pages 12 and 13 of the trial court’s “Final Order in Suit to

Modify Parent–Child Relationship” to delete that section and affirm as modified.

                                                       /s/ Dabney Bassel

                                                       Dabney Bassel
                                                       Justice

Delivered: January 18, 2024

      21
        To the extent that Mother raises other issues in this section, we overrule them
as inadequately briefed. See Zhao, 2022 WL 11456754, at *4; Huey, 200 S.W.3d at 854.

                                           25