Court Opinion

ID: 9410923
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-25 13:11:06.635372+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:01.399071
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

              Present: Judges Humphreys, Huff and Lorish
UNPUBLISHED

              Argued at Norfolk, Virginia

              NAKIA DURHAM
                                                                            MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
              v.     Record No. 0650-22-1                                  JUDGE ROBERT J. HUMPHREYS
                                                                                  JULY 25, 2023
              COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                                 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK
                                                Tasha D. Scott, Judge

                              J. Barry McCracken, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.

                              Lucille M. Wall, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares,
                              Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

                     After a bench trial, Nakia Durham appeals his convictions of possession of a firearm by a

              convicted felon and possession of a concealed weapon. Durham contends that the circuit court

              erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a search of his vehicle. He

              also argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions related to the firearm.

                                                       BACKGROUND

                     “On appeal, we review the evidence in the ‘light most favorable’ to the Commonwealth,

              the prevailing party in the [circuit] court.” Commonwealth v. Perkins, 295 Va. 323, 323 (2018)

              (quoting Vasquez v. Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232, 236 (2016)). Doing so requires us to “discard

              the evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth, and regard as true all the

              credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences to be drawn therefrom.”

              Id. at 323-24 (quoting Vasquez, 291 Va. at 236).

                     *
                         This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).
       At approximately 9:00 p.m. on March 26, 2021, Norfolk Police Department Officer

Daniel Labat was driving through a “high crime area” when he noticed a sports utility vehicle

(“SUV”) parked at a housing complex that he regularly patrols. Officer Labat was familiar with

the area and recognized that the SUV “wasn’t one of the vehicles usually parked there.” After

“running the [SUV’s] tags” through a Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”) records

database, Officer Labat determined that the SUV was registered under Durham’s name and that

Durham’s driver’s license was suspended. Officer Labat then resumed patrolling the area.

       Thirty minutes later, Officer Labat initiated a stop of the SUV after seeing it leave the

parking lot, knowing the registered owner of the SUV had a suspended license. The SUV came

to a stop, and Officer Labat noticed four occupants inside: two rear passengers, a front passenger,

and the driver, Durham. As Officer Labat exited his patrol car and approached the SUV from the

rear on the driver’s side, he saw Durham looking at him through the exterior driver’s side mirror.

While Officer Labat was making eye contact with Durham via the mirror, Durham was “twisting

his body to the right” and reaching to his right toward the center console. As he did so, Officer

Labat could see Durham’s arms, but not his hands, and noticed that no one else was moving.

       After Durham brought his hands back to his front, Officer Labat approached the SUV’s

driver’s side window and saw an open bottle of alcohol (Hennessy) on the floorboard behind the

driver’s seat. When Durham rolled down the window and provided his identification card,

Officer Labat could “smell the odor of alcoholic beverage coming from inside the vehicle.”

Officer Labat also noticed a Styrofoam cup in the center console, which was between the driver’s

seat and front passenger’s seat. Officer Labat described the center console’s configuration:

“There’s a driver’s side and passenger side cup holder. Directly behind that is the center console

that has an arm rest that raises and lowers for storage.” The Styrofoam cup was in a cup holder

“next to the front seat passenger” and contained an “amber clear” liquid. Durham handed

                                               -2-
Officer Labat the Styrofoam cup when he asked about it. Officer Labat believed the liquid was

liquor due to its appearance and smell. Officer Labat poured out the liquid and returned to his

patrol car where he confirmed Durham’s identity and license suspension.

       Officer Labat walked back to the SUV and asked Durham and his passengers whether the

SUV contained any weapons. When “[t]hey all said no,” the officer had them exit the SUV so he

could search it for “open containers of alcohol.” Officer Labat grabbed the bottle of Hennessy

and put it in the trunk of the SUV. After asking the occupants to exit the vehicle, he also

observed another cup in the cupholder “on the driver’s side” of the center console which he

testified was in “plain view.” The cup “contained a blue liquid” that smelled of liquor, so

Officer Labat “poured that out and then continued [his] search.” Officer Labat found a loaded

black and silver Smith & Wesson .38 Special revolver inside the armrest compartment in the

center console. The lid of the armrest compartment had been closed, but the latch designed to

hold it shut was broken. Officer Labat noticed that the gun was “warm to the touch,” and

nothing else in the center console was warm. There were not many items in the center console,

just some small items along the bottom.

       Officer Labat detained Durham “for the firearm,” read him his Miranda1 rights, and

questioned him about the gun. Durham denied that the gun was his and claimed that “he did not

know whose it was.” He also stated that “he heard the center console lid close” but “he didn’t

know who had opened it or closed it.” After determining that Durham was a convicted felon,

Officer Labat arrested him for possessing a firearm after conviction of a non-violent felony,

possessing a concealed weapon, and driving on a suspended license, and issued a summons for

drinking while driving.

       1
           Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
                                               -3-
       Before trial, Durham moved to suppress evidence of the firearm found during the search

of his SUV. At a hearing on the motion, Officer Labat testified that he did not obtain a warrant

or permission to search the vehicle. Instead, Officer Labat searched Durham’s SUV for

“additional open containers” based on “the open containers of alcohol that [he] had found

previously.” Officer Labat testified that when searching a vehicle, he would typically inspect

“less likely areas that could still hold contraband or other open containers,” such as “miniature

bottles” of alcohol that can fit under the seat of a vehicle. Officer Labat also testified that at the

time of the search, Durham “was not under arrest for anything” and “was just being detained.”

       During argument on the motion, Durham asserted the search violated the Fourth

Amendment because Officer Labat did not obtain a search warrant or consent to search his SUV,

conduct an inventory search, or search the vehicle for “officer safety.” In addition, Durham

argued that Officer Labat did not search the SUV incident to his arrest because he was not under

arrest at the time of the search, but only detained for a “summonsable” offense. Durham also

asserted, “[J]ust because you have an open container, I don’t think that gives probable cause to

search the whole car for anything [police] may find.” Durham argued that Officer Labat did not

have probable cause to continue searching the vehicle for additional open containers of alcohol

after discovering the first two and discarding their contents because there was nothing else “in

open view [] which was illegal.” Continuing, Durham argued that because “alcohol is not an

inherently illegal item,” the “issue is whether any alcohol was in the open container” when the

officer continued the search. He reasoned that once Officer Labat had poured out the alcohol, he

had “alleviated what . . . the open container charge is intended to prevent,” he was not preserving

evidence, and the officer could not search “any further than what he sees.”

       The circuit court stated that the search of a vehicle “is only justified if the officer is

driven by . . . probable cause.” The circuit court found that although Officer Labat had “found

                                                 -4-
an open bottle, which explained the presence of the brown liquid that was arguably in the cup

nearest to the defendant[,]” Officer Labat “also identified some blue liquid.” The circuit court

stated that “[w]ithout understanding where that liquid was coming from, the Court finds it was

reasonable for [Officer Labat] to pursue looking for some type of container that might have had

that blue liquid.” The circuit court further found that it was “reasonable for the officer to search

for potentially a smaller bottle of blue liquid.” The circuit court denied the motion to suppress.

       At the conclusion of the Commonwealth’s evidence at trial, the circuit court denied

Durham’s motion to strike the charges of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and

possession of a concealed weapon based on the sufficiency of the evidence to prove that he

constructively possessed the firearm.

       At the conclusion of all the evidence, the circuit court denied Durham’s renewed motion

to strike on the same grounds as previously argued. The circuit court convicted Durham of

possessing a firearm after conviction of a non-violent felony, possessing a concealed weapon,

and consuming an alcoholic beverage while driving.2

                                            ANALYSIS

                                           I. Suppression

       Durham argues on appeal that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress

evidence obtained in the search of his vehicle because the officer had neither probable cause nor

justification to search incident to an arrest. Durham contends that the officer’s “observations of a

cup containing a suspected alcoholic beverage and a previously opened liquor bottle in the rear

passenger compartment” did not provide him with probable cause to search the vehicle.3

       2
           The circuit court acquitted Durham of driving on a suspended operator’s license.
       3
         In support of this assignment of error, Durham makes two arguments that he did not
make in the circuit court. Durham argues that Officer Labat lacked probable cause to search the

                                                -5-
       This Court reviews the circuit court’s denial of Durham’s motion to suppress applying

familiar principles:

               A defendant’s claim that evidence was seized in violation of the
               Fourth Amendment presents a mixed question of law and fact that
               we review de novo on appeal. In making such a determination, we
               give deference to the factual findings of the circuit court, but we
               independently determine whether the manner in which the
               evidence was obtained meets the requirements of the Fourth
               Amendment.

Brooks v. Commonwealth, 282 Va. 90, 94 (2011) (quoting Jones v. Commonwealth, 277 Va. 171,

177 (2009)). “[O]ur review includes evidence presented at both the suppression hearing and the

trial.” Williams v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 462, 475 (2020). The principle that we are

bound by the circuit court’s findings of historical fact “unless plainly wrong or without evidence

to support them,” id. (quoting Matthews v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. App. 334, 341 (2015)), also

requires us “to give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local

law enforcement officers,” id. (quoting Commonwealth v. White, 293 Va. 411, 414 (2017)).

       The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const.

amend. IV. “The Fourth Amendment does not denounce all searches or seizures, but only such

vehicle because he did not note any characteristics of Durham reasonably associated with the
consumption of alcohol, an element of the rebuttable presumption established in Code
§ 18.2-323.1(B) for use in a trial on the merits on a charge of drinking while driving. He also
argues for the first time on appeal that Officer Labat was unreasonably mistaken as to what
conduct Code § 18.2-323.1 proscribes—namely, that this statute proscribes drinking while
driving as opposed to having an open container of alcohol in the vehicle. We note however that
Durham’s counsel stated at the suppression motion, that “the issue is whether any alcohol was in
open container, and there wasn’t any at that point.” Thus, Durham named the issue as whether
there was further evidence of alcohol in an open container, not whether Officer Labat was
unreasonably mistaken about the law.
        Because the dissent focuses its analysis on these arguments and in doing so, suggests that
we simply ignore the requirements of Rule 5A:18 unless a violation is raised by a party, we will
assume without deciding that Rule 5A:18 was complied with to avoid confusion regarding the
dissent’s peculiar approach to an unbriefed issue.
                                                 -6-
as are unreasonable.” Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147 (1925). The United States

Supreme Court has long recognized a difference between a search of a dwelling or other

structure and a search of an automobile for contraband goods, “where it is not practicable to

secure a warrant, because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in

which the warrant must be sought.” Id. at 153. “[I]f the search and seizure without a warrant are

made upon probable cause, that is, upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known

to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains that which by law is subject to

seizure and destruction, the search and seizure are valid.” Id. at 149.

               [P]robable cause is a flexible, common-sense standard. It merely
               requires that the facts available to the officer would “warrant a
               man of reasonable caution in the belief” that certain items may be
               contraband or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime; it
               does not demand any showing that such a belief be correct or more
               likely true than false.

Purdie v. Commonwealth, 36 Va. App. 178, 185 (2001) (alteration in original) (quoting Texas v.

Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983)). “Probable cause does not require ‘an actual showing,’ but,

rather, ‘only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity.’” Id. (quoting Illinois v.

Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243 n.13 (1983)). “Probable cause takes into account the ‘totality of the

circumstances surrounding the search,’ Cost v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 246, 251 (2008),

because the ‘question whether the Fourth Amendment has been violated is always a question of

fact to be determined from all the circumstances.’ Malbrough v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 163,

168 (2008).” Bunch v. Commonwealth, 51 Va. App. 491, 495 (2008). If given the totality of the

circumstances “there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in

a particular place,” then probable cause is satisfied. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. “[P]robable cause

does not demand the certainty we associate with formal trials.” Id. at 246.

       Here, the totality of the circumstances supports the circuit court’s finding that Officer

Labat’s search of the car was properly supported by probable cause. Code § 18.2-323.1(A)
                                                 -7-
proscribes consuming alcoholic beverage “while driving a motor vehicle upon a public highway

of the Commonwealth.” As Officer Labat approached Durham’s vehicle he saw Durham twist to

his right towards the center console and move his arms, while maintaining eye contact with

Officer Labat through the driver’s side mirror.4 Through the rear window, Officer Labat saw an

open bottle of Hennessy in the floorboard behind the driver’s seat. Officer Labat noticed the

smell of alcoholic beverage coming from the vehicle when Durham opened the driver’s side

window. Officer Labat saw a cup in the center console cupholder containing an amber-colored

liquid, which he smelled and believed to be liquor. Finally, after all occupants stepped out of the

vehicle, Officer Labat saw a cup containing blue liquid that smelled of alcohol which was in the

driver’s side center console cup holder. With two cups each containing an alcoholic beverage in

between the driver and the passenger, it would be a fair inference on the part of the officer that at

least one of the cups belonged to the driver. Given that each alcoholic beverage was in an open

cup, it would also be a reasonable inference that the beverage was there for immediate

consumption—i.e., Durham was drinking it while driving the vehicle and not saving it for later.

The totality of these circumstances supports a reasonable belief that the vehicle contained further

evidence of that offense, such as an open bottle from which the blue liquid came, or miniature

liquor bottles. Thus, the warrantless search of the vehicle was justified by probable cause. See

Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996) (per curiam) (“If a car is readily mobile and

probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment . . . permits

police to search the vehicle without more.”).

       In response to the dissent, we agree that the conduct proscribed by Code § 18.2-323.1 is

drinking while driving, not simply having an open container containing alcohol. Our review of

       4
         “[F]urtive gestures coupled with other indicia of criminal engagement may suffice to
establish probable cause.” Copeland v. Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 424, 434 (2004).
                                              -8-
the existence of probable cause uses an objective standard with this conduct in view. Whether or

not Officer Labat understood that the proscribed conduct was drinking while driving, an

objective officer could reasonably conclude, based on the totality of the circumstances in this

record, that Durham had been drinking while driving and that the vehicle contained further

evidence of such conduct. See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404 (2006) (“An action is

‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the individual officer’s state of mind,

‘as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the] action.’” (alteration in original)

(quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978))).

       In disagreeing with our probable cause review, our dissenting colleague emphasizes the

rebuttable presumption set out in Code § 18.2-323.1(B)5 implying that Officer Labat had to have

evidence to meet each element of the rebuttable presumption to satisfy probable cause to search

Durham’s vehicle. The dissent misconstrues the statutory purpose of the rebuttable presumption,

which is relevant to proving the Commonwealth’s case at trial. Once the Commonwealth

establishes the elements of the presumption at trial, the presumption shifts the burden of

producing evidence to the defendant to rebut the presumption. See, e.g., Yap v. Commonwealth,

49 Va. App. 622, 636 (2007) (finding rebuttable presumption in Code § 18.2-269 “allows a

permissive inference that the fact finder is free to reject,” and “shifts the burden of producing

       5
           Code § 18.2-323.1(B) provides,

                [A] rebuttable presumption that the driver has consumed an
                alcoholic beverage in violation of this section shall be created if
                (i) an open container is located within the passenger area of the
                motor vehicle, (ii) the alcoholic beverage in the open container has
                been at least partially removed, and (iii) the appearance, conduct,
                odor of alcohol, speech, or other physical characteristic of the
                driver of the motor vehicle may be reasonably associated with the
                consumption of an alcoholic beverage.
                                                 -9-
evidence, while the burden of proof remains with the Commonwealth”). The rebuttable

presumption is not a required component to establish probable cause.

       Furthermore, the dissent ignores the principle that in a probable cause review, the

appellate court must give “due weight to inferences” drawn from the facts by “resident judges

and local law enforcement officers.” Williams, 71 Va. App. at 475. While Officer Labat did not

explicitly testify that Durham’s movements were “furtive,” or say exactly what he thought

Durham was doing with his arms and hands, the testimony was clear that he thought Durham’s

movements were significant, and a fair inference includes that Durham was hiding something

from the officer in the center console. Moreover, contrary to the dissent’s assertion, probable

cause was not based on these movements alone. Prior to Officer Labat searching the vehicle, he

noticed the odor of alcoholic beverage coming from the car and he observed, all in plain view,

the opened bottle of Hennessy, a cup containing an amber-colored alcoholic beverage, and a cup

containing a blue alcoholic beverage. Although not noticed until the occupants of the vehicle

had stepped out of it, when Officer Labat saw the blue alcoholic beverage, the cup was still in

plain view as it was sitting in the center console cup holder, next to the first cup of amber

alcoholic beverage. See Cauls v. Commonwealth, 55 Va. App. 90, 99 (2009) (“[I]f an item is

indeed in ‘plain view,’ the Fourth Amendment is not engaged unless and until the item is seized

because no search has occurred.”).6 The proximity of both cups of alcoholic beverage to

Durham’s reach as he sat in the driver’s seat are relevant to the probable cause of whether he was

drinking while driving. While the open bottle of Hennessey in the rear floorboard alone would

       6
          At the suppression hearing, Durham’s argument was that “once [Officer Labat] dumped
out all of the alcohol, his further search of the car including the compartments was an
unreasonable search of the vehicle.” Durham’s counsel agreed with the circuit court’s statement
of the issue, “The question is did he have probable cause . . . [t]o go into every nook and cranny
of the car.” Thus, Durham’s argument in circuit court was confined to the unreasonableness of
the officer’s search beyond the cups in the center console, i.e., beyond whatever was in plain
view.
                                                  - 10 -
likely not supply probable cause of drinking while driving, it is relevant to the totality of the

circumstances and the reasonable inferences that the officers on the scene and circuit court

judges are permitted to draw from the facts established.

       We conclude that the circuit court did not err in concluding that probable cause existed to

search the vehicle and accordingly in denying the motion to suppress the evidence found in that

search.7

                                  II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

       Durham contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions for the

firearm offenses because the evidence did not establish that he “was ever in either actual or

constructive possession of the revolver seized from the center console of his vehicle.” Relying

on Hancock v. Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 466, 468 (1995), Durham argues that the record

contains no evidence beyond his mere “proximity to the revolver and ownership of the vehicle”

to establish that he possessed the firearm.

       “When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘[t]he judgment of the trial court is

presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to

support it.’” McGowan v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 513, 521 (2020) (alteration in original)

(quoting Smith v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 450, 460 (2018)). “In such cases, ‘[t]he Court does

not ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Secret v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 204,

228 (2018)). “Instead, we ask only ‘whether any rational trier of fact could have found the

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. (quoting Secret, 296 Va. at

       7
         Because we find the officer’s search of the vehicle justified by probable cause, we do
not need to address whether the officer also had justification to search incident to an arrest, as
Durham raises in his assignment of error. “The doctrine of judicial restraint dictates that we
decide cases ‘on the best and narrowest grounds available.’” Commonwealth v. Swann, 290 Va.
194, 196 (2015) (quoting McGhee v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 620, 626 n.4 (2010)).
                                               - 11 -
228). “If there is evidentiary support for the conviction, ‘the reviewing court is not permitted to

substitute its own judgment, even if its opinion might differ from the conclusions reached by the

finder of fact at the trial.’” Id. (quoting Chavez v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 149, 161

(2018)).

       “A conviction for the unlawful possession of a firearm can be supported exclusively by

evidence of constructive possession,” whether sole or joint. Smallwood v. Commonwealth, 278

Va. 625, 630 (2009) (quoting Bolden v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 144, 148 (2008)). Constructive

possession must be established by “evidence of acts, statements, or conduct by the defendant or

other facts and circumstances proving that the defendant was aware of the presence and character

of the firearm and that the firearm was subject to his dominion and control.” Id. (quoting

Bolden, 275 Va. at 148). The issue of what constitutes constructive possession “is largely a

factual one.” Id. (quoting Ritter v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 732, 743 (1970)).

       Although “ownership or occupancy alone is insufficient to prove knowing possession of

[contraband] located on the premises or in a vehicle,” other circumstantial evidence coupled with

ownership or occupancy may establish the constructive possession of such contraband.

Burchette v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 432, 435 (1992). “While no single piece of evidence

may be sufficient, the combined force of many concurrent and related circumstances . . . may

lead a reasonable mind irresistibly to a conclusion.” Pijor v. Commonwealth, 294 Va. 502,

512-13 (2017) (alteration in original) (quoting Muhammad v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 451, 479

(2005)). Moreover, a guilty verdict demonstrates that “the factfinder ‘has found by a process of

elimination that the evidence does not contain a reasonable theory of innocence.’” James v.

Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 671, 681 (2009) (quoting Haskins v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App.

1, 9 (2004)). That conclusion “is itself a ‘question of fact,’ subject to deferential appellate

review.” Id.

                                                - 12 -
       Durham’s reliance upon Hancock v. Commonwealth is misplaced because the facts are

distinguishable. In Hancock, a police officer found a gun lying on the rear floorboard

underneath the defendant’s feet when the officer asked him and four other occupants to exit the

vehicle during a traffic stop at night. 21 Va. App. at 468. The officer noticed that the gun had

“fresh mud on it” and Hancock’s feet were wet. Id. No evidence established that Hancock “ever

held the firearm, saw it, knew it was present, or exercised any dominion and control over it.” Id.

at 472. This Court found that “[p]roof that the firearm was located close to Hancock was not

sufficient to prove the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.

       Here, the record demonstrates that Durham’s conviction was based on more than his mere

ownership of the SUV and proximity to the firearm. At trial, Officer Labat testified that as he

approached the SUV to conduct the traffic stop, Durham reached toward the center console

where the gun was found while keeping his eyes focused on Labat. Furthermore, Officer Labat

saw “nobody else” moving in the SUV as he approached. From that evidence, it was reasonable

for the circuit court to conclude that Durham hastily attempted to conceal the firearm in the

center console to avoid detection by police. See Adkins v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 437, 438-39

(1976) (holding evidence sufficient to support a conviction for constructive possession of

marijuana found on driver’s floorboard of the vehicle where police officer saw the defendant

move from the driver’s seat to the passenger seat as the officer approached); Bagley v.

Commonwealth, 73 Va. App. 1, 29 (2021) (holding defendant’s “status as the driver of the car,

his proximity to the drugs, his furtive movements toward the [drugs’] location,” and hurried exit

from the vehicle was sufficient to prove that he constructively possessed the drugs). That Officer

Labat noticed that the gun was the only item in the center console that was still “warm to the

touch” underscores that conclusion. See United States v. Jones, 432 F.3d 34, 38 (1st Cir. 2005)

(holding police reasonably inferred from the fact that a gun was “still warm and dry” that the

                                              - 13 -
defendant had discarded it while fleeing). Thus, we conclude that Hancock is inapposite, and a

reasonable fact finder could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Durham constructively

possessed the gun found in the vehicle’s console.

       For the above reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

                                                                                      Affirmed.

                                             - 14 -
Lorish, J., dissenting.

        It is not a crime in Virginia to drive with an “open container” of alcohol. Because at least

45 other states make that conduct criminal, it is a common (though mistaken) assumption that

Virginia does as well.8

        It is a crime to drink alcohol while driving. Code § 18.2-323.1(A). Thus, if Officer

Labat had probable cause that Durham was drinking alcohol while driving, he could search his

vehicle for evidence of that crime in his vehicle. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149

(1925). But having an open container of alcohol while driving creates merely a rebuttable

presumption that the driver is drinking while driving, and only if the following conditions are

met:

                (i) an open container is located within the passenger area of the
                motor vehicle, (ii) the alcoholic beverage in the open container has
                been at least partially removed, and (iii) the appearance, conduct,
                odor of alcohol, speech, or other physical characteristic of the
                driver of the motor vehicle may be reasonably associated with the
                consumption of an alcoholic beverage.

Code § 18.2-323.1(B).

        8
         See Ala. Code § 32-5A-330; Alaska Stat. Ann. § 28.35.029; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 4-251; Ark. Code Ann. § 5-71-218; Cal. Veh. Code § 23225; Cal. Veh. Code § 23222; Cal.
Veh. Code § 23223; Cal. Veh. Code § 23226; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 42-4-1305; Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 316.1936; Ga. Code Ann. § 40-6-253; Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 291-3.3; Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 291-3.1; Idaho Code Ann. § 23-505; Idaho Code Ann. § 23-1333; 625 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann.
5/11-502; Ind. Code Ann. § 9-30-15-3; Iowa Code Ann. § 321.284; Iowa Code Ann.
§ 321.284A; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-1599; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 189.530; La. Stat. Ann. § 32:300;
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 29-A, § 2112-A; Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 10-125; Mass. Gen. Laws
Ann. ch. 90, § 24I; Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 257.624a; Minn. Stat. Ann. § 169A.35; Mont.
Code Ann. § 61-8-1026; Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 60-6,211.08; Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 484B.150;
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 265-A:44; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 39:4-51b; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-8-138; N.Y.
Veh. & Traf. Law § 1227; N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 20-138.7; N.D. Cent. Code Ann. § 39-08-18;
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4301.62; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 1220; Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 811.170;
75 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. § 3809; 31 R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 31-22-21.1; S.C. Code Ann.
§ 61-6-4020; S.C. Code Ann. § 61-4-110; S.D. Codified Laws § 35-1-9.1; Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 55-10-416; Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.031; Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-526; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit.
23, § 1134a; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 1134; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 46.61.519; W. Va. Code
Ann. § 17C-5D-3; Wis. Stat. Ann. § 346.935; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-235.
                                               - 15 -
       Before proceeding, I must address a disagreement about the record that ultimately

impacts the information this Court looks at in reviewing whether Officer Labat’s probable cause

determination was reasonable. My colleagues in the majority and I agree that the vehicle

Durham was driving was lawfully pulled over. We agree there was a front seat passenger and

two back seat passengers. And we agree that when Officer Labat approached the vehicle, he saw

an “open Hennessy bottle” on the floorboard behind the driver’s seat. From this vantage point,

he also saw a Styrofoam cup in the center console, “next to the front seat passenger” which

contained an “amber clear” liquid which Officer Labat suspected was “liquor due to its

appearance and smell.”

       Where we disagree is when the search began. I rely on Officer Labat’s testimony that

after the events described above, he told the passengers to leave the SUV so he could search it

for “open containers of alcohol.” In Officer Labat’s own words, it was only after he “began [his]

search of the vehicle for additional open containers in the driver’s seat area [that he] noticed

another cup that was actually in the cup holder on the driver’s side” and that “contained a blue

liquid.”9 Because Officer Labat only found the cup with the blue liquid on the driver’s side of

the console after he began searching the vehicle, I disagree with the majority that we can

consider this cup in determining whether a reasonable officer would have probable cause to

believe evidence of a crime—the crime of drinking while driving—would be found in the

vehicle.

       9
           Because Officer Labat only saw the cup with the blue liquid after he began his search,
the majority’s reliance on the “plain view” doctrine is inapposite. Evidence found during an
illegal search cannot be used to bootstrap the probable cause that existed prior to the search. See
Cauls v. Commonwealth, 55 Va. App. 90, 99 (2009) (noting that the plain view doctrine only
justifies the seizure of evidence when the officer “did not violate the Fourth Amendment in
arriving at the place from which the evidence could be plainly viewed”).
                                                - 16 -
       Probable cause exists when “there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a

crime will be found in a particular place.” Curley v. Commonwealth, 295 Va. 616, 622 (2018)

(quoting Jones v. Commonwealth, 277 Va. 171, 178 (2009)). To determine whether a police

officer had probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle, as here, “we examine the

events leading up to the [search], and then decide whether these historical facts, viewed from the

standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to probable cause.” Id. (alteration

in original) (emphasis added) (quoting District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 586

(2018)). As a result, a court must consider what the “totality of the facts and circumstances”

would have “reasonably meant to a trained police officer” before initiating the search. Id.

(quoting Jones v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 52, 59 (2010)); see also Evans v. Commonwealth, 290

Va. 277, 284 (2015) (“[T]he proper inquiry focuses on what an objective officer could

reasonably believe.” (quoting United States v. Grissett, 925 F.2d 776, 778 (4th Cir. 1991)));

McCain v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 546, 552 (2008) (“Review of the existence of probable cause

. . . involves application of an objective rather than a subjective standard.”).

       Before Officer Labat began his search, he had observed the following:

       •   Durham in the front driver seat along with someone in the front passenger seat;
       •   A Styrofoam cup with an amber clear liquid that looked and smelled like alcohol in
           the center console next to the front seat passenger;
       •   The smell of alcohol “coming from the vehicle” but without the ability to “tell if it
           was [Durham] or the vehicle at that point”;
       •   Two passengers in the rear of the vehicle;
       •   An open Hennessey bottle in the rear of the vehicle, behind the driver’s seat; and
       •   Durham “twisting his body to the right” and “reaching to his right-hand side” while
           Officer Labat could “see his arms and . . . also see the rest of the passengers.”

At best, this may constitute probable cause that someone in the back seat of the vehicle was

drinking while Durham was driving (given the location of the Hennessey bottle), or that the front

seat passenger (next to the Styrofoam cup) was drinking while Durham was driving, but it simply

                                                - 17 -
does not provide any evidence to suggest that Durham was drinking while he was driving.

Probable cause to search “must be particularized to that individual; mere proximity to criminal

activity alone is insufficient to establish probable cause.” Whitehead v. Commonwealth, 278 Va.

300, 313 (2009).

       This conclusion is bolstered by the factors the General Assembly set out in Code

§ 18.2-323.1(B) and which create a “rebuttable presumption” that “the driver has consumed an

alcoholic beverage in violation of this section.” The majority dismisses these factors entirely,

suggesting they are only “relevant to proving the Commonwealth’s case at trial.” While I

certainly agree that an officer need not tick off each factor from the list to conclude there is

probable cause a driver violated Code § 18.2-323.1(B), the items listed here are nevertheless

relevant to whether the statute has been violated. Otherwise, the General Assembly would not

have listed them as factors that create a “permissible inference” that a statute was violated.

Ronald J. Bacigal & Corinna Barrett Lain, Virginia Practice Series, Criminal Procedure § 17:8

(2022) (“What is often referred to as a presumption is in reality a permissible inference.”).

Factors that establish a permissible inference that criminal activity occurred are equally relevant

to whether there is a “probability or substantial chance of criminal activity.” Purdie v.

Commonwealth, 36 Va. App. 178, 185 (2001) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243, n.13

(1983)).

       Turning to those factors, there is no evidence in the record that liquid was “at least

partially removed” from the cup with the amber clear liquid on the passenger’s side. See Code

§ 18.2-323.1(B)(ii). There was also no evidence that Durham’s appearance, conduct, speech, or

physical characteristics were “reasonably associated with the consumption of an alcoholic

beverage” such that the presumption set out in the statute may have been satisfied. Code

§ 18.2-323.1(B)(iii). The Commonwealth argues that Durham’s “twisting his body to the right”

                                                - 18 -
and “reaching to his right-hand side” while Officer Labat approached his vehicle should be a

qualifying physical characteristic. In the context of assessing whether a driver is under the

influence of alcohol, we have previously described performance on the “physical components”

of “field sobriety tests” as requiring a defendant “to exhibit certain physical characteristics.”

Gibson v. Commonwealth, 57 Va. App. 772, 780 (2011). I would interpret “physical

characteristics” in the statute to be characteristics produced from the consumption of alcohol,

consistent with the way that “appearance, conduct, odor of alcohol, [and] speech” are

characteristics produced from the consumption of alcohol. See also Cuccinelli v. Rector, Visitors

of Univ. of Virginia, 283 Va. 420, 432 (2012) (applying principle of noscitur a sociis, “a word is

known by the company it keeps,” in interpreting a word consistently with the words around it).

Nothing about the twisting or reaching motion suggests it was produced from the consumption of

alcohol. Nor did Officer Labat testify that the odor of alcohol was coming from Durham, as

opposed to the car more generally.

       Ignoring these statutory factors and the lack of evidence supporting them, the majority

takes a different tack—applying the label of “furtive movement” to Durham’s movement, and

suggesting that while Officer Labat did not testify what he thought Durham was doing, the

testimony is clear he thought the actions were “significant.” Even if his movement was

“furtive,” such a gesture cannot, without more, constitute probable cause. See, e.g., Copeland v.

Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 424, 434 (2004) (“Furtive gestures alone have been held

insufficient to establish probable cause.”); Curley, 295 Va. at 623 n.4 (noting the defendant’s

“furtive movements were only one of multiple significant factors giving rise to probable cause to

search [the] vehicle”). Here, a gesture combined with an open container next to the passenger,

and an open container in the back seat, may have given a reasonable officer a “strong suspicion”

                                                - 19 -
that Durham had been drinking while driving, but strong suspicion is not probable cause.

Whitehead, 278 Va. at 314.10

       In reaching this conclusion, I note that a different panel of this Court recently reversed a

court’s conclusion that an officer had probable cause Code § 18.2-323.1 was violated where the

driver was the only occupant of the vehicle, disobeyed an officer’s directive to roll down a

window (instead opening a passenger side door), where there was a bottle of liquor on the

passenger side floorboard near the center console with less than a quarter of the contents

remaining, and where the defendant’s manner of speaking was “odd.”11 McEachin v.

Commonwealth, No. 0543-22-1 (Va. Ct. App. July 25, 2023).12 Likewise, in Commonwealth v.

Branch, No. 0132-22-1 (Va. Ct. App. June 21, 2022), a panel of this Court affirmed the denial of

a motion to suppress, agreeing that an “open container’s mere proximity to [the driver] alone is

insufficient to establish probable cause that he drank from the container while driving” even

where the driver and passenger “both appeared nervous,” and “the bottle had some liquid

missing.” Both opinions looked to the factors listed in Code § 18.2-323.1(B)(ii) as relevant to

whether a reasonable officer would have found probable cause to search the vehicle.

       10
          Drivers are consistently subject to rules and obligations that do not apply to passengers,
and drivers (not passengers) are responsible for knowing and following the traffic laws. The
location of the open containers in the vehicle must be considered within the context of
meaningful distinctions between drivers and passengers. For example, a driver may not use a
handheld personal communications device while driving, but a passenger can. See Code
§ 46.2-818.2. A phone sitting next to a passenger creates exceedingly little inference that the
driver had just been texting.
       11
         Although the bottle had a cap screwed on, it was an “open container” under Code
§ 18.2-323.1(C), because it was not an “originally sealed manufacturer’s container.” McEachin
v. Commonwealth, No. 0543-22-1, slip op. at 7 n.7 (Va. Ct. App. July 25, 2023).
       12
          “Although not binding precedent, unpublished opinions can be cited and considered for
their persuasive value.” Otey v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 346, 350 n.3 (2012); see Rule
5A:1(f).
                                             - 20 -
       For these reasons, I disagree with the majority that the “totality of these circumstances

supports a reasonable belief that the vehicle contained further evidence of drinking while

driving.”13 On that basis alone, I would reverse and remand for further proceedings.14

       13
           While not specifically argued below, the totality of the circumstances includes the
length of time Durham was behind the wheel of the vehicle. The record is clear on this point:
Officer Labat did not see Durham drink anything while he was driving. Instead, Officer Labat
knew Durham’s vehicle was parked in front of a public housing area off of Bagnall Road for at
least 30 minutes. Then Officer Labat drove past the car while it was leaving the parking lot, and
“did a U-turn” to “catch up as it was driving on Bagnall Road,” following the vehicle and pulling
it over in the nearby Shop N’ Go parking lot. Even if Durham intended to drink while driving, it
is unlikely he had the time to do so.
       14
            The majority assumes without deciding that Durham’s other arguments complied with
Rule 5A:18. I would simply find that Rule 5A:18 does not apply because the “Commonwealth
has not argued before the panel of this Court” that the arguments were waived. Maust v.
Commonwealth, No. 0505-21-4, slip op. at 8 n.5 (Va. Ct. App. May 30, 2023). Because Rule
5A:18 does not implicate this Court’s subject matter (or potential) jurisdiction, it instead sets out
rules of active jurisdiction otherwise referred to as “mandatory procedural requirement[s].”
Davis v. Commonwealth, 282 Va. 339, 339 (2011). These mandatory procedural rules “require[]
a court . . . to adjudicate a case consistent with the law governing that adjudication.” Cilwa v.
Commonwealth, 298 Va. 259, 266-67 (2019). Unlike defects in subject matter or potential
jurisdiction, “[d]efects in active jurisdiction can be waived.” Id. at 270. When a party has
waived reliance on Rule 5A:18, this Court should not raise it sua sponte absent a “threat[ to] the
judiciary’s institutional interests to such an extent that intervening in the adversarial process by
raising a forfeited or waived” rule is necessary. United States v. Oliver, 878 F.3d 120, 128 (4th
Cir. 2017). For example, institutional concerns would prohibit this Court from reaching any
issue where the factual record was not adequately developed below, and constitutional avoidance
principles may counsel against resolving unpreserved arguments raising constitutional concerns.
Absent institutional concerns (which do not apply here), we should not contradict our general
deference to the way parties choose to litigate their cases. Indeed, “[o]ur adversary system is
designed around the premise that the parties know what is best for them, and are responsible for
advancing the facts and arguments entitling them to relief.” Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S.
237, 244 (2008) (alteration in original) (quoting Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 386
(2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).
                                                  - 21 -