Court Opinion

ID: 9897329
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:10:13.964427+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:39.845911
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                    Jul 27 2023, 9:29 am

                                                                        CLERK
                                                                    Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                       Court of Appeals
                                                                         and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                      ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Kurtis G. Fouts                                             Theodore E. Rokita
Delphi, Indiana                                             Attorney General of Indiana
                                                            Ian McLean
                                                            Deputy Attorney General
                                                            Indianapolis, Indiana

                                             IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Jason Walden,                                               July 27, 2023
Appellant-Defendant,                                        Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                            22A-CR-2363
        v.                                                  Appeal from the Clinton Circuit
                                                            Court
State of Indiana,                                           The Honorable Laura Zeman,
Appellee-Plaintiff.                                         Senior Judge
                                                            Trial Court Cause No.
                                                            12C01-2008-F1-662

                        Opinion by Judge Riley.
 Judge Weissmann concurs and Judge Bradford concurs in part and dissents in
                       part with separate opinion.

Riley, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2363 | July 27, 2023                           Page 1 of 25
      STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[1]   Appellant-Defendant, Jason Walden (Walden), appeals his convictions and

      sentences for three counts of child molesting, Level 1 felonies, Ind. Code § 35-

      42-4-3(a)(1); and two counts of child molesting, Level 4 felonies, I.C. § 35-42-4-

      3(b).

[2]   We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for resentencing.

      ISSUES
[3]   Walden presents this court with two issues, which we restate as:

              (1) Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it replayed the

                   victim’s entire testimony in response to a jury question; and

              (2) Whether the trial court abused its discretion by considering improper

                   aggravating circumstances at sentencing.

      FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[4]   M.S. was born in September 2010. In the spring and summer of 2020 when

      M.S. was nine years old, her parents were renovating a house in Mulberry,

      Indiana, while the family continued to live at their home in Lafayette, Indiana.

      M.S. always accompanied her parents when they went to Mulberry to work on

      the house. When M.S.’s father needed help with some of the heavy lifting

      involved in the renovation, he called on Walden, who came to Mulberry on

      approximately ten occasions between April and July 2020. Walden was one of

      the family’s closest friends, he had been best man at the wedding of M.S.’s

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2363 | July 27, 2023            Page 2 of 25
      parents, and he accompanied the family on their yearly summer vacation. M.S.

      had known Walden her entire life.

[5]   When M.S., her parents, and Walden were together in Mulberry to work on the

      house, M.S. would largely be allowed to structure her own time while the

      adults worked. “Usually every time he came over[,]” Mulberry would take

      M.S. to either the upstairs of the Mulberry home or to a detached garage and

      molest her. (Transcript Vol. II, p. 133). Walden placed his mouth on M.S.’s

      vagina, he placed his penis on M.S.’s mouth, and he placed his fingers in M.S.’s

      vagina. In addition, Walden placed M.S.’s hand on his penis to masturbate

      him, and he rubbed his penis on the outside of M.S.’s vagina. Walden

      threatened M.S. with harm if she told anyone about his offenses. However, on

      July 29, 2020, M.S. told her mother that Walden had been touching her

      inappropriately, and together they told M.S.’s father. The next day, M.S.’s

      parents alerted law enforcement of M.S.’s report, and on August 3, 2020, M.S.

      was forensically interviewed at the Hartford House where she reported that

      Walden had sexually molested her. M.S. was medically examined, but the

      molestation had left no physical traces of the offenses. In addition, M.S.’s

      clothing had been washed since the last time Walden had been present in

      Mulberry, so, pursuant to testing protocols, investigators did not collect her

      clothing for examination for bodily fluids.

[6]   On August 6, 2020, the State filed an Information, charging Walden with three

      counts of Level 1 felony child molesting for performing or submitting to other

      sexual conduct with M.S. and with two counts of Level 4 felony child molesting

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2363 | July 27, 2023        Page 3 of 25
      for performing or submitting to fondling with M.S. On August 1, 2022, the trial

      court convened Walden’s jury trial. Also on August 1, 2022, the State filed a

      notice of its intention to admit evidence pursuant to Indiana Evidence Rule

      404(b) that Walden had been charged with child molesting in two prior cases,

      and, in its notice, the State provided the cause numbers of the two prior cases.

      However, the State did not attempt to have that evidence admitted at trial.

[7]   At trial, M.S. testified to facts consistent with the above referenced acts of

      molestation. On direct examination, the deputy prosecutor asked M.S. if

      Walden had ever put his fingers into her “crotch”, and M.S. responded, “A

      little bit. Sometimes.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 131). M.S.’s parents, her grandmother,

      two members of law enforcement who worked on the case, and the forensic

      interviewer also testified for the State. Walden testified and denied all the

      allegations against him.

[8]   During deliberations, the jury asked whether M.S. had answered “yes” or “a

      little bit” when she was asked, “[W]ere you penetrated by [Walden’s]

      fingers[?]” (Appellant’s App. Vol. III, p. 2; Tr. Vol. III, p. 74). In response to

      this jury question, the trial court proposed to determine if there was a

      disagreement or an inability to remember the testimony among the jurors, and,

      if so, the trial court further proposed to allow the jurors to decide whether they

      wished to hear M.S.’s entire testimony, including cross-examination, or

      whether they preferred to proceed without rehearing the testimony. Walden’s

      defense counsel objected that the appropriate procedure would be to instruct the

      jury “to consult their collective memory as to the testimony.” (Tr. Vol. III, p.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2363 | July 27, 2023          Page 4 of 25
       74). The trial court overruled that objection, had the jury brought into the

       courtroom, and explained its two proposed options for resolving the jury’s

       question. The jury retired, and the trial court went off the record. When the

       trial court went back on the record, it observed that the jury was not present and

       that they were preparing to replay M.S.’s testimony. Walden’s defense counsel

       raised a second unsuccessful objection, this time arguing that replaying M.S.’s

       testimony served “to unduly accentuate her testimony over the other witnesses

       in this trial.” (Tr. Vol. III, p. 76). The entirety of M.S.’s testimony was then

       replayed for the jury. After continued deliberations, the jury found Walden

       guilty as charged on all counts.

[9]    On August 24, 2022, Walden’s presentence investigation report (PSI) was filed.

       Walden’s PSI indicated that he had a 2001 Class A misdemeanor battery

       conviction. In addition, Walden’s PSI provided that in 2016 Walden had been

       arrested in Marion County on three counts of Level 1 felony child molesting

       and two counts of Level 4 felony fondling and that he had been acquitted of all

       of those charges following a jury trial. As part of the preparation of Walden’s

       PSI, the presentence investigator applied the Indiana Risk Assessment System

       (IRAS) to data about Walden’s criminal history, education, employment and

       finances, family and social support, and other factors. The results of the IRAS

       tool placed Walden in the low-risk category to reoffend.

[10]   On September 6, 2022, the trial court held Walden’s sentencing hearing. When

       asked if there were any additions or corrections to be made to the PSI,

       Walden’s counsel responded that Walden’s acquittal on the 2016 child

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2363 | July 27, 2023         Page 5 of 25
       molesting charges was properly listed in the PSI but that it would be improper

       for the court to consider those charges as an indicator of prior criminal activity.

       When the trial court asked the State whether it had any corrections or additions

       to the PSI, the deputy prosecutor informed the trial court that Walden had been

       previously charged and acquitted after trial on a second set of child molesting

       charges in Marion County in addition to the 2016 case that went to trial and

       resulted in acquittal. Walden’s defense counsel then interjected that “as an

       [o]fficer of the [c]ourt, I must say I was his attorney for both trials. Indeed, he

       was acquitted two times in Marion County” in either 1999 or 2000. (Tr. Vol.

       III, p. 82).

[11]   M.S.’s mother’s victim’s impact statement was read into the record. M.S. had

       told her mother that she had gone through a gender identity crisis, as “she

       wanted to be a male to stop things ‘like this’ from happening again in the

       future.” (Tr. Vol. III, p. 85). M.S.’s mother considered the offenses to be “the

       ultimate betrayal,” especially in light of the fact that Walden knew that she

       herself had been molested as a child. (Tr. Vol. III, p. 86). M.S.’s father testified

       that Walden, whom he considered to be one of his closest friends, had never

       told him that he had been charged, tried, and acquitted of child molesting in

       Marion County. When Walden’s counsel objected, the trial court clarified that

       it would consider Walden’s prior acquittals not as part of his criminal history

       but only as relevant to his risk of re-offense. M.S.’s father further testified that

       during family therapy he had learned that M.S. felt that he had “wanted her

       dead and gone” due to all the consequences of her reporting the offenses and

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2363 | July 27, 2023           Page 6 of 25
       the disruption it caused to their lives. (Tr. Vol. III, p. 89). M.S. made an in-

       person victim impact statement. M.S. told the trial court that Walden had

       started abusing her when she was six-and-a-half or seven years old and that “I

       felt like I needed to be a male because my body and myself felt as if, if I was a

       male, then this wouldn’t happen to me anymore.” (Tr. Vol. III, p. 90). M.S.

       reported having experienced depression, anxiety, and cutting herself to take

       away her sadness.

[12]   In its oral sentencing statement, the trial court expressed amazement that

       Walden had been twice acquitted of child molesting but that, shortly after his

       second acquittal, had begun molesting M.S. The trial court commented that,

       having read Walden’s PSI and learned about his 2016 acquittal, the court had

       “looked it up[.]” (Tr. Vol. III, p. 104). The court stated that in doing so, it had

       learned that the 2016 case had involved

               a little girl who’s about the same age as M.S. She had a troubled
               mother. So much that the children were taken out of the home
               and placed in foster care at one point. And this troubled little
               girl, sadly had to go to a mental health facility because she tried
               to commit suicide.

               And then even during the course of that investigation, you
               admitted to the detective there in Marion County that there was
               another child that had falsely accused you. So I never thought
               that other child had ever gone to trial. But wow. Again, the
               odds are – if I had taken a survey of the entire filled Ross-Ade
               Stadium last week and asked them, how many of you have ever
               been falsely accused, not once, not twice, but three times by three
               independent little girls. [] I would submit to you not one hand
               would raise. Not one.
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2363 | July 27, 2023         Page 7 of 25
       (Tr. Vol. III, pp. 104-05). The trial court also noted that when it compared the

       instant matter and the 2016 child molesting case, “I just see way too many

       similarities.” (Tr. Vol. III, p. 108).

[13]   The trial court found the following aggravating circumstances:

           • The harm, injury, loss, or damage suffered by M.S. was greater than
             necessary to prove the offenses, in that M.S. was still having difficulties
             dealing with her trauma, including resort to self-harm, and was still in
             counseling and because M.S.’s family had also been harmed by Walden’s
             offenses;
           • M.S. was six years old when Walden began molesting her and that the
             molestation was on-going until M.S. was nine years old, which it found
             to be a “tender age”;
           • Walden was in a position of care, custody, or control over M.S. being a
             “very trusted” family friend who had been the best man at M.S.’s father’s
             wedding;
           • Walden had threatened to harm M.S. if she reported the offenses;
           • Walden had a criminal history of one misdemeanor battery in 2001
             which the court would weigh accordingly.

       (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 179; Tr. Vol. III, pp. 106, 108). As a non-statutory

       aggravating factor, the trial court found the following:

               [Walden] is “low” risk to re-offend without appropriate court
               intervention pursuant to the IRAS assessment. However, the
               [c]ourt considers [Walden] to be “high” risk to re-offend based on
               his character and that this is the third time he has been charged
               with similar offenses.

       (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 181). The trial court found Walden’s strong family

       support and his work history to be mitigating factors. The trial court concluded

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2363 | July 27, 2023        Page 8 of 25
       that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances

       and sentenced Walden to thirty years for each of his three Level 1 felony child

       molesting convictions and to six years for both of his Level 4 felony child

       molesting convictions, all to be served consecutively, for an aggregate sentence

       of 102 years.

[14]   Walden now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

       DISCUSSION AND DECISION
       I. Replay of M.S.’s Testimony

[15]   Walden argues that his convictions must be overturned because the trial court

       replayed M.S.’s entire testimony in response to the jury’s question. Walden

       relies on Indiana Code section 34-36-1-6 which provides as follows:

               If, after the jury retires for deliberation:

                        (1) there is a disagreement among the jurors as to any part
                        of the testimony; or

                        (2) the jury desires to be informed as to any point of law
                        arising in the case;

                        the jury may request the officer to conduct them into
                        court, where the information required shall be given in the
                        presence of, or after notice to, the parties or the attorneys
                        representing the parties.

       Requesting that we interpret the statute and focusing on the wording that “the

       information required shall be given,” Walden argues that the trial court acted in

       contravention of the statute because it was mandated to only replay the small

       portion of M.S.’s testimony “required” to answer the jury’s question, not her

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2363 | July 27, 2023             Page 9 of 25
       entire testimony. We cannot credit this argument for two reasons, the first of

       which is that Walden did not raise it in the trial court. Walden only objected

       that the trial court should replay none of M.S.’s testimony and that replaying

       her testimony inappropriately accentuated it over other witness’s testimony.

       Walden did not cite Indiana Code section 34-36-1-6, let alone make any

       argument based on the text of the statute. Arguments presented for the first

       time on appeal are waived. Ramirez v. State, 174 N.E.3d 181, 198 (Ind. 2021)

       (finding defendant’s claim of instructional error based on Indiana Code section

       34-36-1-6 raised for the first time on appeal to be waived). Walden does not

       contend that the trial court’s actions constituted fundamental error. In

       addition, Indiana Code section 34-36-1-6 only applies where the jury explicitly

       indicates to the trial court that there is a disagreement about the evidence.

       Bouye v. State, 699 N.E.2d 620, 627-28 (Ind. 1998) (rejecting a line of precedent

       holding that the statute is triggered whenever the jury asks to rehear testimony

       because the request itself is an inherent expression of disagreement or

       confusion). Here, the jury’s note to the trial court about M.S.’s testimony did

       not explicitly state that the jurors had a disagreement over M.S.’s testimony,

       and there is no indication in the record that the trial court decided to replay

       M.S.’s testimony based on a disagreement. Because the statute did not apply,

       Walden’s argument based on the statute’s text is irrelevant.

[16]   However, when Indiana Code section 34-36-1-6 and its mandatory provisions

       are not triggered, a trial court may exercise its discretion to replay witness

       testimony in response to a jury question. See Pettrie v. State, 713 N.E.2d 910,

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2363 | July 27, 2023         Page 10 of 25
       913 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that where the statute does not apply, “the

       decision to replay testimony is within the sound discretion of the trial court”).

       Walden argues that even if the statute was inapplicable, the trial court did not

       act within its discretion by playing M.S.’s entire testimony because “there could

       be no dispute-resolving purpose to the additional replayed testimony, and it[s]

       only impact was potentially prejudicial.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 10). However, this

       court has held that, even where the mandatory provisions of Indiana Code

       section 34-36-1-6 do apply, the trial court does not err in replaying the victim’s

       entire testimony in response to questions about specific facts in the record. In

       Martinez v. State, 192 N.E.3d 1021, 1022 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied,

       Martinez, who was convicted of two counts of Level 1 and two counts of Level

       4 child molesting, contended on appeal that the trial court had erred in

       replaying his victim’s entire testimony in response to the jury’s questions about

       the date of one of the alleged fondling incidents and about the frequency of the

       alleged offenses during a certain time span. Martinez argued that replaying the

       testimony in its entirety doubled its weight in the minds of the jurors. Id. 1023.

       This court rejected that argument, concluding that Martinez pointed to nothing

       in the record in support of his contention. Id.

[17]   We reach a similar conclusion here and conclude that the trial court acted

       within its discretion when it replayed M.S.’s entire testimony. Contrary to

       Walden’s assertion that the replaying of M.S.’s testimony had no viable role at

       trial, we observe that the jury’s question did not match the precise wording used

       by the deputy prosecutor in questioning M.S. about possible digital penetration

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2363 | July 27, 2023        Page 11 of 25
       of her vagina by Walden, and the trial court could have concluded within its

       discretion that it was best to replay the entire testimony, rather than guess what

       portion of M.S.’s testimony the jury was referencing in its question. In

       addition, the effect of replaying M.S.’s testimony in its entirety was that the

       jury’s area of inquiry was positioned among the larger body of M.S.’s

       testimony, including Walden’s cross-examination, diffusing emphasis on any

       particular aspect of her testimony.

[18]   We do not agree with Walden that, unlike the defendant in Martinez, he has

       pointed to circumstances in the record to support his assertion that the

       replaying of M.S.’s testimony doubled its effect on the jury. Walden argues that

       the replay was certainly unduly prejudicial to him, as M.S.’s testimony was the

       only evidence of his guilt at trial. However, we do not find this argument to be

       persuasive, as the only evidence mentioned in Martinez supporting his guilt was

       the victim’s testimony and the victim’s SANE nurse whose short testimony

       only repeated the victim’s report that Martinez had been molesting her since

       2015. Neither do we find that the replay must have had the effect Walden

       proposes because the deputy prosecutor conditioned the jury during voir dire

       with a “drumbeat” of questions to believe M.S.’s testimony and be willing to

       convict him based on M.S.’s testimony alone. (Appellant’s Br. p. 12). Our

       review of the parties’ voir dire, including the extended passage cited by Walden

       on appeal, revealed that the deputy prosecutor principally asked questions

       meant to expose potential jury bias against or for child witnesses and to

       introduce the concept that the jury could convict a defendant based solely on

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2363 | July 27, 2023          Page 12 of 25
       the testimony of a child witness, if the jury believed the child witness. Walden

       has not presented us with any authority indicating these are improper lines of

       inquiry. At no time did the deputy prosecutor tie these questions to the facts of

       the instant case. In addition, the deputy prosecutor directly posed the majority

       of these questions to the first of four venire panels, with the members of the

       subsequent panels being asked to speak up if they heard something they had a

       comment on. Therefore, the venire members were not exposed to unnecessary

       repetition of these questions. We also observe that the jury that was sworn in

       and heard the evidence against Walden received preliminary and final

       instructions that “[t]he quantity of evidence . . . need not control your

       determination of the truth.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, pp. 100, 127). The jury

       was presumed to have followed the trial court’s instructions. Weisheit v. State,

       109 N.E.3d 978, 989 (Ind. 2018). Therefore, even if the jury somehow

       perceived the replay of M.S.’s testimony as doubling the evidence against him,

       we will not presume that it controlled their determination of his guilt.

       Accordingly, we do not disturb the jury’s verdicts.

       II. Sentencing

       A. Standard of Review

[19]   Walden next argues that the trial court considered improper aggravating

       circumstances upon sentencing him. We acknowledge that where a party

       claims that a trial court considered improper aggravating circumstances, we

       review only for an abuse of discretion. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490

       (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). An abuse of the trial

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2363 | July 27, 2023           Page 13 of 25
       court’s sentencing discretion occurs if its decision is clearly against the logic and

       effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable,

       probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom. Id. A trial court abuses

       its discretion when it fails to enter a sentencing statement at all, its stated

       reasons for imposing sentence are not supported by the record, its sentencing

       statement omits reasons that are clearly supported by the record and advanced

       for consideration, or its reasons for imposing sentence are improper as a matter

       of law. Id. at 490-91.

[20]   Walden challenges four of the six aggravating circumstances found by the trial

       court. We observe that Walden received advisory sentences; therefore, our

       determination that one or more of the challenged aggravating circumstances

       was improper will not result in our conclusion that the trial court erred in

       imposing its individual sentences. 1 Therefore, we will examine the propriety of

       each of the challenged aggravating circumstances in the context of determining

       whether the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences was an abuse of its

       discretion.

       A. Harm Greater Than Necessary to Prove the Offense

[21]   The trial court found in support of this factor that M.S. was still experiencing

       difficulties dealing with the trauma Walden’s offenses caused her, M.S.’s

       involvement in counseling was on-going, she had inflicted harm upon herself as

       1
        Walden does not contend that the trial court was would have imposed any less than advisory sentences for
       his individual convictions.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2363 | July 27, 2023                            Page 14 of 25
       a result of the offenses, and that M.S.’s family had also been harmed. Relying

       on Thompson v. State, 793 N.E.2d 1046, 1053 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), wherein this

       court held in reviewing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim that in order

       for psychological trauma to the victim to be a valid aggravator, there must be

       evidence that “the impact, harm, or trauma is greater than that usually

       associated with the crime,” Walden contends the trial court abused its

       discretion because these are effects usually associated with the offenses and

       which were contemplated by the legislature when it enacted the applicable

       criminal penalties.

[22]   We agree with Walden that in order for this factor to be a valid aggravator, the

       trial court must explain why the impact suffered by the victims exceeded that

       which is normally associated with the crime. Hildebrandt v. State, 770 N.E.2d

       355, 359 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (finding this aggravator to be inappropriate in

       imposing consecutive sentences where the trial court failed to explain why the

       harm suffered by the victim was in excess of that associated with the offense),

       trans. denied. However, we disagree with Walden that the trial court failed to

       make such an explanation here. In its oral sentencing statement, the trial court

       noted that M.S. had cut herself as a result of her trauma and had questioned her

       gender identity as a way of coping with the psychological harm Walden had

       inflicted on her. Walden has not presented us with any authority indicating

       that either of these harms is normally associated with the offense of child

       molesting, and we have been unable to locate any. The trial court also noted in

       its oral sentencing statement that Walden had occupied an incredibly close

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2363 | July 27, 2023        Page 15 of 25
       relationship with this family, in that he was treated like a “revered uncle” or a

       “godfather” and that his actions were especially betraying to M.S.’s mother,

       who he knew had been molested herself. (Tr. Vol. III, p. 104). The trial court

       also noted the sentencing testimony of M.S.’s father, which included his

       account of learning through family therapy that M.S. thought that he was angry

       with her for reporting Walden to the extent that he wanted her dead because of

       the “drama” she had caused to the family. (Tr. Vol. III, p. 89). These are

       particularized aspects of this case that were relied upon by the trial court in

       support of this aggravating factor and which are in excess of the harms usually

       associated with the offense of child molesting.

       B. Age of the Victim

[23]   The trial court found M.S.’s age at the time of the offenses to be aggravating, in

       that she was less than twelve years old, “i.e. age 6 at the time the abuse started

       and continued (on-going abuse) until age of 9”, an age which the trial court

       found to be “tender.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 180; Tr. Vol. III, pp. 106,

       108). Walden claims that this was improper because M.S.’s age was an element

       of the offense. However, while it is improper for a trial court to rely solely on a

       victim’s age where the age of the victim is a material element of the offense, a

       trial court “may properly consider the particularized circumstances of the

       material elements of the crime.” Kien v. State, 782 N.E.2d 398, 414 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2003) (concluding that trial court’s use of the victim’s age was not

       improper in sentencing for three counts of child molesting, where the trial court

       had found that the five-year-old victim was extremely vulnerable to molestation

       because of her “tender years”), trans. denied; see also Stewart v. State, 531 N.E.2d
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2363 | July 27, 2023          Page 16 of 25
       1146, 1150 (Ind. 1988) (concluding that victim’s age was a valid aggravator

       where trial court noted he was of “tender age” because that is a finding of a

       particularized individual circumstance of the offense). Here, the trial court

       made such a finding of a particularized circumstance when it found M.S.’s age

       to be “tender”, and, thus, we find no error. (Tr. Vol. III, pp. 106, 108).

       C. Walden’s Position of Care, Custody, or Control

[24]   Relying solely on Phelps v. State, 914 N.E.2d 283 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), Walden

       asserts that this was also an improper aggravating circumstance. Phelps was

       convicted of two counts of vicarious sexual gratification and one count of

       dissemination of matter harmful to a minor after he assented to the request of

       the son of one of his friends to come to his house with two other boys to shoot

       pool, a get together that turned into the group watching pornography and

       masturbating. Id. at 287. In concluding that the trial court had relied upon an

       aggravating circumstance that was unsupported by the record when it found

       that Phelps had violated a position of trust to commit the offenses, this court

       observed that there was no evidence that Phelps had regularly been in a position

       of control over the children, that he had sought out opportunities to supervise

       them, or that he had sought to establish a prior position of trust and confidence.

       Id. at 291-92. In addition, the State had conceded that the “position of trust”

       aggravator was improper.

[25]   Here, the State makes no similar concession. In addition, the concerns set out

       in Phelps are not implicated here, as there was evidence at trial to support the

       trial court’s finding that Walden was in a position of care, custody, and control

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2363 | July 27, 2023        Page 17 of 25
       over M.S. during the time of the offenses. Walden had a long-standing, close

       relationship with M.S. and her parents which M.S.’s parents testified at trial

       meant that they did not think twice about allowing Walden to be alone with

       M.S. M.S.’s mother testified that while she and M.S.’s father were busy

       working at the house, Walden and M.S. “would hang out all the time . . . It

       would happen every visit. They would go do different things. [We] would be

       working, and we just thought, you know, he was occupying her time, like a

       good friend does.” (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 201-02). There was no evidence suggesting

       that M.S.’s parents asked Walden to do these things. In addition, M.S.’s

       grandmother found Walden and M.S. alone together on at least three

       occasions, and on an occasion recounted by M.S. at trial, during a family

       gathering and without being asked, Walden went inside to be with M.S. alone,

       ostensibly to show her how to search for something on the internet, but instead

       using the opportunity to molest her. This evidence supports the trial court’s

       conclusion that Walden was in an ongoing position of trust and confidence

       with this family and that, during the charged period, he regularly sought out

       opportunities to supervise M.S. while her parents were working. Therefore, we

       do not find Phelps to be persuasive, and, as this is the only argument offered by

       Walden, we find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion on this factor.

       D. IRAS

[26]   Walden makes three claims regarding the trial court’s use of his IRAS score,

       two of which we do not find to be persuasive. Walden first claims that the trial

       court improperly used his IRAS score as an aggravating factor, something that

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2363 | July 27, 2023          Page 18 of 25
       our supreme court has already rejected. See J.S. v. State, 928 N.E.2d 576, 578

       (Ind. 2010) (holding that an offender risk assessment score cannot, in and of

       themselves, be considered as mitigating or aggravating circumstances).

       However, Walden mischaracterizes the trial court’s use of his IRAS score, as

       the trial court clearly rejected Walden’s IRAS score in its oral and written

       findings and did not use it as an aggravating factor. We also decline to credit

       Walden’s contentions that the trial court improperly “looked [] up” the records

       of his 2016 child molesting case and that “[i]t appears from the sentencing

       dialogue” that the trial court discovered his 2000 child molesting case “while

       conducting outside investigation regarding the 2016 case.” (Appellant’s Br. p.

       21, Tr. Vol. III, p. 104). Both these prior child molesting cases were referenced

       by cause number in the State’s August 1, 2022, Notice of Intent regarding the

       use of Rule 404(b) evidence, so they were of record in this case before

       sentencing. In addition, pursuant to Indiana Evidence Rule 201(b)(5), (c), and

       (d), a trial court may, sua sponte, take judicial notice of the records of the courts

       of this state at any stage of the proceedings and without notice to the parties, so

       there was nothing improper about the trial court looking up the records of

       Walden’s two prior child molesting cases.

[27]   However, we agree with Walden that the trial court put information about

       Walden’s two prior child molesting cases to improper use. In McNew v. State,

       391 N.E.2d 607, 609, 612 (Ind. 1979), the trial court took into account

       defendant’s prior acquittal in an unrelated armed robbery charge in enhancing

       McNew’s sentence following his conviction for two counts of robbery. In

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2363 | July 27, 2023         Page 19 of 25
       concluding that the trial court abused its discretion in considering the prior

       acquittal as part of McNew’s history of criminal activity, the McNew court

       observed that

               a judge does not err in considering prior arrests which had not
               been reduced to conviction in determining what sentence to
               impose. But he did not properly consider the armed robbery
               charge which resulted in acquittal. A not guilty judgment is
               more than a presumption of innocence; it is a finding of
               innocence. And the courts of this state, including this Court, must
               give exonerative effect to a not guilty verdict if anyone is to respect and
               honor the judgments coming out of our criminal justice system.

       Id. at 612 (emphasis added).

[28]   Here, our review of the trial court’s oral and written sentencing statements

       make it clear to us that the trial court considered Walden’s two prior acquittals

       as part of a pattern of like behavior that culminated in his instant convictions.

       It is equally clear that the trial court’s consideration of Walden’s charges in two

       prior child molesting cases that resulted in acquittals as bearing on his

       likelihood of re-offense could only be relevant if the trial court failed to give

       exonerative effect to those acquittals. Therefore, we conclude that the trial

       court’s findings regarding Walden’s risk of re-offense are improper as a matter

       of law. See id.

[29]   Walden does not dispute that the trial court properly found that his threat of

       harm to M.S. if she told and his 2001 conviction for misdemeanor battery were

       proper aggravators, and we have concluded that all the other aggravators, apart

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2363 | July 27, 2023                Page 20 of 25
       from the trial court’s assessment of Walden’s risk of re-offense, were proper.

       The Indiana courts have long held that the finding of one valid aggravating

       circumstance may justify the imposition of consecutive sentences. Gregory v.

       State, 604 N.E.2d 1240, 1241 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (citing Concepcion v. State, 567

       N.E.2d 784, 790 (Ind. 1991)), trans. denied. However, we may remand for

       resentencing upon concluding that the trial court considered an improper

       aggravating circumstance if we are not convinced that the trial court would

       have imposed the same sentence had it not considered the improper aggravator.

       See McDonald v. State, 179 N.E.3d 463, 464 (Ind. 2022) (remanding for

       resentencing where the court was “not so sure” that the trial court would have

       imposed the same sentence absent the sentencing error); see also Day v. State, 560

       N.E.2d 641, 643 (Ind. 1990) (holding that if a reviewing court “cannot say with

       confidence that the permissible aggravators would have led to the same result, it

       should remand for resentencing by the trial court”). Given the prominence of

       Walden’s prior acquittals in the trial court’s oral and written sentencing

       statements, we are not convinced that it would have ordered Walden to serve

       all his individual sentences consecutively if it had not considered this factor.

       Therefore, we remand for resentencing.

       CONCLUSION
[30]   Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its

       discretion when it replayed M.S.’s testimony in response to the jury’s question

       but that its consideration of Walden’s prior acquittals was improper.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2363 | July 27, 2023         Page 21 of 25
[31]   Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for resentencing consistent

       with this opinion.

[32]   Weissmann, J. concurs.

[33]   Bradford, J. concurs in part and dissents in part with separate opinion.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2363 | July 27, 2023      Page 22 of 25
                                                   IN THE
          COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

      Jason Walden,                                               Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                                  22A-CR-2363
      Appellant-Defendant,

              v.

      State of Indiana,
      Appellee-Plaintiff.

      Bradford, Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

[1]   I agree with the majority that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it

      replayed the victim’s testimony in response to a jury question. I also agree with

      the majority that that the trial court did abuse its discretion in considering

      Walden’s two prior acquittals for child molesting cases as bearing on the

      likelihood that he would reoffend. However, I part with the majority’s ultimate

      conclusion as I am unconvinced that remand for resentencing is necessary.

[2]   As the majority notes, the finding of one valid aggravating circumstance may

      justify the imposition of consecutive sentences. Gregory v. State, 604 N.E.2d

      1240, 1241 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), trans. denied. Remand is only necessary if the

      court is not convinced that the trial court would have imposed the same

      sentence had it not considered the improper aggravator. See McDonald v. State,

      179 N.E.3d 463, 464 (Ind. 2022) (remanding for resentencing where the court

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2363 | July 27, 2023                       Page 23 of 25
      was “not so sure” that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence

      absent the sentencing error).

[3]   In sentencing Walden, the trial court found the following five proper

      aggravating circumstances:

              • The harm, injury, loss, or damage suffered by M.S. was greater than
                necessary to prove the offenses, in that M.S. was still having
                difficulties dealing with her trauma, including resorting to self-harm,
                and was still in counseling and because M.S.’s family had also been
                harmed by Walden’s offenses;
              • M.S. was six years old when Walden began molesting her and that
                the molestation was on-going until M.S. was nine years old, which it
                found to be a “very tender age;”
              • Walden was in a position of care, custody, or control over M.S. being
                a “very trusted” family friend who had been the best man at M.S.’s
                father’s wedding;
              • Walden had threatened to harm M.S. if she reported the offenses; and
              • Walden had a criminal history of one misdemeanor battery in 2001
                which the court would weigh accordingly.

      Tr. Vol. III p. 106; Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 179. Based on the numerous

      proper aggravating factors that the trial court considered in imposing consecutive

      sentences, I am confident that the trial court would have imposed the same

      sentence, even without consideration of the improper aggravating factor. See

      McCain v. State, 148 N.E.3d 977, 984 (Ind. 2020) (providing that, when an

      improper aggravator is used, appellate courts remand for resentencing only if the

      court cannot say with confidence that the trial court would have imposed the

      same sentence if it had only considered proper aggravating and mitigating

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2363 | July 27, 2023       Page 24 of 25
circumstances). As such, I conclude that the trial court’s sentencing error was

harmless and would therefore vote to affirm.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2363 | July 27, 2023    Page 25 of 25