Court Opinion

ID: 9390212
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-27 07:09:01.396224+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:32.389862
License: Public Domain

In The
                               Court of Appeals
                      Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

                                     No. 07-22-00340-CV

                           IN THE INTEREST OF A.V., A CHILD

                            On Appeal from the 364th District Court
                                   Lubbock County, Texas
            Trial Court No. 2021-543,252, Honorable William Eichman II, Presiding

                                       April 25, 2023
                                DISSENTING OPINION
                   Before QUINN, C.J., and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.

       “Termination of parental rights, the total and irrevocable dissolution of the parent-

child relationship, constitutes the ‘death penalty’ of civil cases.” In re K.M.L., 443 S.W.3d

101, 121 (Tex. 2014) (Lehrmann, J., concurring). I find the system, which is designed to

initially reunite families, failed these parents in the following matters:

           •   removing the child immediately after birth when both the child and
               mother tested negative for drugs;

           •   failing to place the child with a family member following removal;

           •   lack of representation by counsel at the final hearing;

           •   consideration of inadmissible evidence by a caseworker; and
            •    termination of father’s parental rights solely on marihuana use.1

                                             APPLICABLE LAW

        The bond between a parent and child is not given by law. It is endowed by our

Creator. In re J.F., 589 S.W.3d 325, 331 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2019, no pet.) (citing In re

A.M., 630 S.W.3d 25, 25 (Tex. 2019) (Blacklock, J. concurring in denial of petition for

review)). The natural right existing between parents and their child is of constitutional

dimensions. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758–59, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 71 L. Ed.

2d 599 (1982). A decree terminating the natural right between a parent and a child “is

complete, final, irrevocable and divests for all time that natural right . . . .” In re E.R., 385

S.W.3d 552, 555 (Tex. 2012). Thus, in seeking to permanently sever the parent-child

relationship, the trial court must “observe fundamentally fair procedures.”                                 Id.

Consequently, termination proceedings are strictly construed in favor of the parent. Id. at

563. Parental rights, however, are not absolute, and it is essential that the emotional and

physical interests of a child not be sacrificed merely to preserve those rights. In re C.H.,

89 S.W.3d 17, 26 (Tex. 2002).

        The majority is critical of applying the requirement of a “causal connection”

between drug use and endangerment as analyzed in In re L.C.L., 599 S.W.3d 79, 84

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020) (en banc), pet. denied, 629 S.W.3d 909 (Tex.

2021) (Lehrmann, J., concurring). I respectfully dissent and write separately from the

majority opinion not because I disagree that drug use during pregnancy may be

        1 During closing arguments, the trial court asked, “Can marijuana use, if that’s the only drug, be a
ground for termination still in Texas?” Counsel for the Department answered, “[n]o . . . that’s why the orders
for actions necessary is so important in this case.” As noted infra, the trial court did not find subsection (O)
was violated leaving one to wonder whether father’s parental rights should have been terminated. He could
not have violated (E) as he did not place the child with mother because the child was removed from them
immediately after birth.
                                                       2
endangering conduct, but to highlight the Department’s failure to satisfy its heightened

burden of proof to show, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination was proper.

To support my dissent, a more detailed recitation of the underlying facts is necessary.

                                                BACKGROUND

       The parents have been in a relationship for over fourteen years, and they married

in 2012. At the de novo hearing, father indicated they were separated but he had not

advised anyone of it. Mother has lived in the same home for approximately sixteen years.

Father works in the oil industry and travels outside of Lubbock during the week. Mother

works and is a caregiver for her mother. They have stable and appropriate housing,

stable employment, and there is no history of domestic violence. There is no history with

the Department concerning mother’s two older children.2 Mother suffers from mental

health issues. She has used marihuana and began using methamphetamine in 2019

after being sexually assaulted in 2018. She was told by police nothing could be done

regarding her attacker, and she resorted to methamphetamines to cope with night terrors.

Father is an admitted marihuana user. Due to his long workdays, he was unaware of

mother’s drug use, and he was not informed by mother’s doctor of positive drug test

results due to confidentiality issues.

       In July 2020, mother went to the hospital to have a laceration treated and

discovered she was pregnant.                 She ceased using methamphetamine due to her

pregnancy but relapsed in September and December 2020, and February 2021. At the

time of the child’s birth in February 2021, however, she and the child tested negative.

Despite the negative results, the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services,

       2   Father is not the biological parent of the older children.
                                                        3
filed an affidavit for emergency removal of the baby.3 Although mother offered her adult

daughter as a familial placement, the Department did not consider her until one month

before the final hearing when A.V. had already been in two separate foster homes.4

        On February 22, 2021, the Department sought termination of both parents’ rights.

Although numerous violations of the statutory grounds for termination were alleged, the

Department asserted drug use was the primary concern. Both parents signed family

service plans in April 2021, with a completion target date of February 28, 2022, which

was the one-year dismissal date for finalizing the case. However, approximately nine

months after the Department sought termination, on December 2, 2021, the associate

judge held a final hearing which resulted in termination of parental rights for both parents.

        The final hearing before the associate judge was held via Zoom. The evidence

shows the parents were at a rehabilitation facility where mother was attempting to enroll.

Mother was on the phone with her caseworker concerning her enrollment. Father logged

into the link for the Zoom hearing on his phone and was placed in a waiting room. As

time passed, he placed his phone in his back pocket and unbeknownst to him, when the

case was called, he had been disconnected from the Zoom link and did not join the

hearing.5

        3  The affidavit was not introduced into evidence. During closing arguments at the de novo hearing,
the trial court inquired about the need for emergency removal “even though neither of them tested positive
for drugs at the time of the birth,” to which counsel for the parents answered, “I don’t know why they were
taken away, Judge.”

        4There was testimony that Department policy is to place a child with family, but the Department’s
witnesses testified that mother’s adult daughter was not initially considered due to mother’s failure to
provide contact information.

        5We disagree with the Department’s assertion that the parents wholly defaulted. They opposed
the Department’s suit from its inception and were present for at least four hearings prior to the final hearing.
They made a good faith effort to appear at the final hearing but were disconnected from the Zoom link.

                                                       4
        At the de novo hearing, the caseworker testified she informed the parents by letter

their rights had been terminated. Mother also testified she and father were not permitted

any visitation during the period between the final hearing and the de novo hearing

because their rights had been terminated.

        At the final hearing, counsel for the parents announced, “[n]either [mother] nor

[father] appear to be here . . . she has checked herself into inpatient rehabilitation . . . .”

Counsel then moved for a continuance which the trial court denied. He then asked to “be

discharged as counsel because I would be unable to effectively assist my client without

her being here and able to participate in the hearing - - or him or her being here.” The

associate judge denied the motion for continuance but granted the motion to withdraw.6

Thereafter, the hearing proceeded without participation by the parents and without any

legal representation to safeguard their parental rights, which are of constitutional

dimensions.

        The only witness at the final hearing was the caseworker at the time. She was

asked whether mother’s methamphetamine use would endanger [A.V.]. In what had

become a non-adversarial proceeding, she answered, “[i]t alters Mom’s brain activity and

her way of thinking.” She added “even marihuana would affect her ability to take care of

        6  The clerk’s record does not contain a written motion to withdraw specifying good cause or
providing the information required by Rule 10 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. See generally In re
M.H., Jr., No. 07-22-00349-CV, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 2110, at *5–7 (Tex. App.—Amarillo March 30, 2023,
no pet. h.) (mem. op.) (holding the trial court abused its discretion in allowing counsel to withdraw and
leaving mother without representation at the final hearing, a critical stage of the proceeding). The clerk’s
record does contain an “Order Substituting Attorney Ad Litem” signed in May 2022, five months following
the request to withdraw.

                                                     5
a child because it would slow her reactions down.” She testified it would be in the child’s

best interest to terminate both parents’ rights.7

        After presentation of testimony from only a caseworker, who was not subjected to

cross-examination, the associate judge found the Department presented clear and

convincing evidence to support termination of the parents’ rights to A.V. on the following

grounds:

    •   knowingly placed or allowed the child to remain in conditions or
        surroundings which endangered her well-being;

    •   engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who
        engaged in conduct which endangered her well-being; and

    •   failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically
        established the actions necessary for the parent to obtain the return of the
        child.

See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O).8 The trial court also found that

termination of parental rights was in the child’s best interest. § 161.001(b)(2).

        The parents timely requested a de novo hearing which was held on October 6 and

10, 2022, ten months after the final hearing. The only issues specified for de novo review

were the sufficiency of the evidence on the statutory grounds for termination.                            See

§ 201.015(b). See also Legarreta v. Alvidrez, 631 S.W.3d 546, 549 (Tex. App.—El Paso

2021, no pet.) (noting the statute limits the ability to raise new issues not specified in the

request for a de novo hearing). Section 201.015(c) provides that in addition to testimony

        7We note that at the de novo hearing, the same caseworker testified, “[a]s far as when I was in the
home, I did not see any visual or smell any - - any drug use.”

        8   All future references to “section” or “§” are to the Texas Family Code unless otherwise designated.

                                                       6
from new witnesses, the referring court in a de novo hearing may consider the record

from the final hearing before the associate judge. § 201.015(c).

       The court heard testimony from both parents, the caseworker, a Department

permanency specialist, and the child’s foster mother.       The Department’s witnesses

focused on mother’s methamphetamine use and father’s marihuana use.

       During closing statements, the trial court questioned the emergency removal of the

child following negative tests for drugs on both the mother and child. The trial court

expressed apprehension on terminating father’s parental rights based solely on

marihuana use. While seeming to concede marihuana use alone might not be sufficient

to support termination of father’s rights, the Department emphasized to the trial court the

importance of terminating both parents’ rights for failing to comply with the order for

actions to obtain the return of their child. The Department suggested father being married

to mother and knowing of her methamphetamine use justified terminating his rights,

despite the undisputed evidence father was unaware of mother’s methamphetamine use.

       Following the de novo hearing, the trial court signed an order terminating the

parents’ rights for violating section 161.001(1)(b)(D) and (E) only. Although there was

substantial testimony devoted to the parents’ alleged failure to complete their services,

the court did not make a finding they had violated subsection (O). The court found

termination was in the child’s best interest.

                                         ANALYSIS

       The majority relies on In re R.M., No. 07-12-00412-CV, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS

10239 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Dec. 11, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.), as horizontal precedent

                                                7
for affirming the termination order.9 In re R.M. held that drug use and its effect on a

parent’s ability to parent may qualify as an endangering course of conduct. 2012 Tex.

App. LEXIS 10239, at *9–10. The opinion continued that “[a] parent’s illegal drug use can

support termination for endangerment because it exposes the child to the possibility that

the parent may be impaired or imprisoned.” Id. at *10.

        We do not disagree with the holding in In re R.M. However, the termination order

before us, as the majority notes, was initially based on a final hearing in which neither

parent was represented by counsel. Also, the Department presented inadmissible and

conclusory testimony from a caseworker to support termination.10 And although the

majority relies on a thorough de novo review with counsel representing the parents, the

critical stage of the termination proceeding was the “final hearing,” at which the parents

were without representation. See In re A.L.M.-F., 593 S.W.3d 271, 277 (Tex. 2019)

(explaining that de novo stage of a termination proceeding is merely a hearing before a

different tribunal and not a true trial de novo). See also In re J.F., 589 S.W.3d 325, 333

(Tex. App.—Amarillo 2019, no pet.) (noting that a de novo hearing “may actually be less

important than the trial on the merits before the associate judge”).

        The majority also relies on mother’s drug use as endangering conduct while an

older child resided in the home. Again, I do not disagree with the premise. However, the

source of such reliance is the affidavit of removal which was not introduced into evidence

        9 See Mitschke v. Borromeo, 645 S.W.3d 251, 256 (Tex. 2022) (holding that “three-judge panels
must follow materially indistinguishable decisions of earlier panels of the same court . . . .”).

        10 This Court has reversed a termination order supported by conclusory evidence. See In re A.G.D.,
No. 07-15-00201-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 688, at *24 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Jan. 22, 2016, no pet.) (mem.
op.) (noting that conclusory testimony has “no evidentiary value”).

                                                    8
and which is peppered with hearsay statements.11 Also, at the de novo hearing, mother

was questioned about using drugs around her older child. The exchange was as follows:

        Q. In September of 2019 you’re a mother to [Z.C.]. Did you think about how
        using methamphetamines would affect him?

        A. I did not use drugs at home.

After an objection to the questioning was overruled, the Department continued:

        Q. Did you ever think about how using methamphetamines would affect
        [Z.C.]?

        A. It was a possibility I could have, but it wasn’t anything extreme for me.

The majority finds the brief exchange as “ample evidence” to support a finding of

endangerment.” But was mother’s response sufficient to support the heightened standard

of “clear and convincing” evidence?

        In re R.M. acknowledges that drug use “may qualify as an endangering course of

conduct.” 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 10239, at *9. Subsections (D) and (E) require proof of

endangerment as an element of the statutory grounds. Even if this Court declined to

follow In re L.C.L., would the statutory grounds as written not require competent, clear

and convincing evidence of endangerment? Should the Department not be held to its

heightened burden of proof to show that drug use resulted in endangerment, where, as

here, the child was removed from the parents at the hospital and where evidence of drug

use around another child fell short of the clear and convincing standard?

        Another distinguishing factor between the case before us and In re R.M. is the

possibility that drug use may expose a child to the possibility that a parent may be

         11 This Court has previously noted that it is “not inclined to disregard the Texas Rules of Evidence

in termination cases . . . .” In re B.P., No. 07-14-00037-CV, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 8127, at *18 n.8 Tex.
App.—Amarillo July 25, 2014, pet. denied).
                                                     9
impaired or imprisoned. Here, the only evidence at the final hearing, when the parents

had no legal representation, was conclusory testimony by a non-expert caseworker that

she knew the effects of methamphetamine on the brain and that drug use would affect a

parent’s ability to take care of her child. Such conclusory testimony amounts to no

evidence that the parents would be unable to care for their child. There was no evidence

that the parents faced the possibility of imprisonment.

        Because I find In re R.M. materially distinguishable from the case currently before

us, preempting a Mitschke situation, I would find legally insufficient evidence to support

termination and reverse the termination order based on the Department’s failure to

produce competent, clear and convincing evidence that drug use alone endangered the

child even without application of any “causal connection” required by In re L.C.L. The

statutory grounds on which termination is based, subsections (D) and (E), both require

proof of endangerment as an element. I invite the Texas Supreme Court to resolve the

differing opinions among the courts of appeal on drug use alone as a ground for

termination. See In re L.C.L., 629 S.W.3d at 909 (noting that the high Court should

resolve the conflicting opinions “in the proper case”).12

                                             CONCLUSION

        Because I would sustain issue one for legally insufficient evidence, I respectfully

dissent.

                                                                 Alex L. Yarbrough
                                                                      Justice

        12 The concurring opinion recognizes that this Court has, post-In re L.C.L., recited in dicta that

“mere drug use, standing alone,” is not conclusive to support a finding under subsections (D) or (E).
                                                   10