Court Opinion

ID: 9844497
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:03:42.296842+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:36.415469
License: Public Domain

PETERS, J.
I dissent:
This defendant has been convicted of an offense of which he was not properly charged. The original complaint charged defendant, in two counts, with rape and incest, it being alleged that both acts were committed against defendant’s daughter on December 5, 1959. At the preliminary hearing the prosecuting witness testified that these acts were committed on that date. She also testified that a fight over the “same sort of thing” occurred on December 16, 1959. The committing magistrate properly held the defendant to answer on the two counts charging rape and incest on December 5, 1959. But when the district attorney subsequently filed the information, he not only charged rape and incest on December 5, 1959, but also added a third count charging attempted incest on December 16, 1959. Counsel for defendant took proper means to have this third count dismissed, but was unsuccessful. As the majority opinion points out, the jury acquitted the defendant of rape on December 5, 1959, disagreed on the charge of incest on December 5, 1959, and found defendant guilty of attempted incest on December 16, 1959.
The Constitution of this state contemplates and expressly provides that a person shall be prosecuted only after he is charged by indictment or information, and in the latter case then only “after examination and commitment by a magistrate.” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 8.) Section 739 of the Penal Code provides that it shall be the duty of the district attorney after commitment, to file an information charging the defendant with the offense or offenses named in the commitment “or any offense or offenses shown by the evidence taken before the magistrate to have been committed.” Interpreted *818in a vacuum, the quoted language could mean that the district attorney could charge in the information any offense shown by the evidence before the magistrate. But the language of the code section is not in a vacuum. It must be interpreted in connection with the Constitution which contemplates and provides that the defendant shall be forced to trial only for such charges as are set forth in or related to those contained in the commitment order. In a long line of cases, section 739 has been interpreted to mean that the district attorney may properly charge the defendant only with the offenses of which he has been held to answer by the magistrate and with any other offense that the evidence shows is “related” or “connected” with the offense or offenses charged. In determining what offenses are “connected” or “related” to the offenses for which defendant has been held to answer, the District Court of Appeal held, in People v. Wyatt, 121 Cal.App. 180 [8 P.2d 901], that the district attorney, under section 739 (then 809) of the Penal Code, could properly charge any offense disclosed by the evidence at the preliminary to have been connected with the offenses charged in the sense it was part of a “common scheme or plan.” This case was specifically and properly overuled by this court in Parks v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.2d 609, 613 [241 P.2d 521], That case held that the offenses to be added by the district attorney must be “connected” or “related” to the offenses set forth in the commitment other than because they were part of a common plan or scheme. The precise words of the court were, speaking of the Wyatt case, “The transaction involved [the one charged by the district attorney not found in the order of commitment] was one of several concerning which there was evidence at the preliminary hearing to show a common scheme or plan for the commission of a series of similar transactions within a period of two years. But there is nothing in the opinion to show that these transactions were in any way related or connected. Therefore language in that opinion [the Wyatt case] which may be deemed inconsistent with the views herein expressed is disapproved.” (38 Cal.2d at p. 613.)
In the Parks case the committing magistrate held the defendant to answer on the charge that he had violated section 476a of the Penal Code (intentionally writing a bad check). The information filed by the district attorney charged defendant with grand theft from one Palmer, with intentionally writing a bad check for $843.76, and with grand theft of lumber having a value of $843.76. It was held that the *819alleged offense against Palmer was not related to or connected with the bad check count. But the court upheld the lumber grand theft charge which was added by the district attorney, stating that, “The charges as to the theft of the lumber and the giving of a worthless check in payment thereof were related, arose out of the transaction which was the basis for the commitment and, depending on the evidence, could result in conviction on one charge or the other. The district attorney was therefore within his right to include the grand theft charge in the information if the necessary elements of that offense reasonably appeared from the evidence before the magistrate. Consequently as to this transaction the petitioner has not shown that he was not legally committed.” (At p. 614.)
Thus, this court then held that, if at the preliminary, evidence is introduced of an offense not charged but that is an integral part of the crime that is charged, the district attorney may include that related offense in the information; otherwise he may not include it. This has been the consistent interpretation of the appellate courts in this state of section 739 and the Parks case. Thus, if on a charge of manslaughter evidence is introduced at the preliminary that the offense may have been murder, then murder may be charged in the information (People v. McGee, 31 Cal.2d 229 [187 P.2d 706] ; cf. People v. Bird, 212 Cal. 632 [300 P. 23]). Or, where a violation of Penal Code section 288 is charged, and evidence is introduced that the defendant also violated section 288a or threatened the victim with a deadly weapon, then an information can be filed adding counts charging a violation of section 288a (People v. Evans, 39 Cal.2d 242, 249 [246 P.2d 636] ; People v. Grimes, 148 Cal.App.2d 747 [307 P.2d 932]) or assault with a deadly weapon (People v. Evans, supra). And where a complaint charges assault with intent to commit rape, an information can be amended to add counts of attempted rape and assault where the added charges “were offenses against the same girls named in the original information and were predicated upon their testimony as to the same two occurrences which underlay the charges set forth in the original information.” (People v. Tallman, 27 Cal.2d 209, 213 [163 P.2d 857].)
The cases cited by the majority do not announce a different rule. In People v. Horton, 191 Cal.App.2d 592 [13 Cal.Rptr. 33], the committing magistrate held the defendant to answer for two counts of statutory rape. The district at*820torney filed an information adding two counts of violations of Penal Code section 288. The District Court of Appeal upheld the information on the ground that each of the offenses which were the basis of the rape charge also constituted the basis of the 288 charge. The court stated, “It is clear from the record herein that as to each count as to which the appellant was convicted, the same transaction which was the basis for the commitment order provided the elements of the crime of which the appellant was found guilty.” (P. 598.)
And in People v. Dean, 158 Cal.App.2d 572 [322 P.2d 929], the complaint charged defendant in two counts with grand theft and with a violation of Vehicle Code section 503. Both of these counts charged the felonious taking of an automobile on a certain date. At the preliminary, it appeared that the defendant took the car by a threat of force. The appellate court properly upheld an information that added a count for robbery of the same auto on that same date. It is clear, however, that when the connection between the offenses charged in the commitment and the evidence of other crimes is such that they are connected only by a common plan or design, the other crimes may not properly be included in the information filed by the district attorney. That is the precise, plain and unambiguous holding of the Parks case. The majority, in an attempt to distinguish that case, actually hold that the added offense may be included when its only connection with offenses charged is that “ [i] n each instance the same pattern was followed by defendant.” (Ante, p. 811.) In so holding the majority, while purporting to follow Parks, actually overrule it. This cavalier treatment of a prior decision should not be countenanced. If Parks is to be overruled it should be done frankly and not by indirection.
The offenses here charged to have been committed on December 5th, are, of course, separate and distinct offenses from the one charged to have been committed on December 16th. Proof of the December 5th offenses, even though committed against the same person, has no relation to the separate and distinct offense alleged to have been committed on December 16th. The only connection between the offenses is that they are related or connected because they are part of a common plan or scheme. Under the Parks case this is not enough.
The fact that the evidence sustains the conviction is not significant. The beneficent provisions of article VI, section *8214% of the Constitution have no application to the violation of such a constitutional right.
I would reverse the judgment on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction of the offense of which defendant has been convicted.
Dooling, J., concurred.
Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied July 3, 1962. Peters, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.