Court Opinion

ID: 9647147
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:24:55.85504+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:45.905940
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING

June 23, 1995
In its motion for rehearing, the City advances eight points of error. After reviewing appellant’s motion, we find that only its seventh point, corresponding to its seventh point on original submission, merits additional discussion. In that point, the City contends that in our original opinion we failed to address its contention that it was entitled to a take-nothing judgment based on its lack of notice of the Ormsbys’ claim. Because of that lack of notice, the City says, it was entitled to a take-nothing judgment which, as a matter of law, barred the Ormsbys’ recovery, thereby making the grant of a new trial and the sanction of attorney’s fees occasioned by the new trial irrelevant.
In considering the City’s claim, it is necessary to briefly review some of the post-trial history of the case. At the first trial of this cause, in addition to questions concerning the City’s negligence, a question was submitted to the jury asking whether the City had actual notice of the “incident involving James Oren Ormsby,” to which the jury answered no. It is this answer upon which the City bases its argument. In its judgment, and reciting only that “the verdict of the jury was for the Defendant and against the Plaintiff,” the trial court found for the City.
After the Ormsbys moved for a new trial on the basis of discovery abuse, the City filed a response in which it argued that it had properly responded to the discovery request, that the Ormsbys’ had not shown entitlement to a new trial and any complaint concerning discovery had been waived. The response did not address the City’s claim that the action was barred for lack of notice. The trial court granted the Ormsbys’ motion for new trial on January 28, 1992. On August 16, 1993, over eighteen months later, and days before the second trial was to start, the City filed a motion to set aside the order granting a new trial. It is in this motion that the City raised the argument that the Orms-bys’ action was barred for lack of notice. As support for this position, the City relied on the jury finding in the first trial.
It should be apparent from this factual recitation why the trial court acted properly in denying the City’s August 16, 1993 motion and why the City’s seventh point must fail. Stated simply, the effect of the trial court’s granting of the Ormsbys’ motion for new trial on January 28, 1992, was to wipe clean the factfinding slate. Schaffer v. Speckels, 62 S.W.2d 85 (Tex.Comm.App.1933) (holding that granting of a new trial requires treating the action as though no trial had been had); State Dept. of Hwys. & Pub. *713Transp. v. Ross, 718 S.W.2d 5, 11 (Tex.App.—Tyler 1986, no writ); see also 6 McDonald Texas Civil Practice § 28:42[b] (1992). The jury finding upon which the City’s argument is predicated had ceased to exist and could no longer form the basis of a judgment in its favor. Moreover, at the time the City made its motion to set aside the grant of a new trial, the trial court’s plenary power over the original judgment had long since expired, and the court was without authority to set aside its order granting a new trial. Porter v. Vick, 888 S.W.2d 789, 789-90 (Tex.1994); Fulton v. Finch, 162 Tex. 351, 346 S.W.2d 823, 826 (Tex.1961). For these reasons, the City’s seventh point is unavailing and is overruled. Finding nothing in the City’s remaining points of error raising new arguments or causing doubt as to the propriety of our original disposition, we overrule appellant’s motion for rehearing.