Court Opinion

ID: 9827825
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 17:52:41.980904+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:37.361740
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
In the opinion we were in error in stating that Williams owned one-third of the stock of the corporation. The record shows that Williams had owned about one-third of the stock of the corporation, and that at the time of the trial he owned one share. The record does not show the interest he owned at the time the contract of January 12, 1937, was executed.
We think that only two controlling questions are presented: First, was the act of Williams in executing the contract of January 12, 1937, on behalf of appellant corporation ultra yires, as pleaded by ap- . pellant ?
Appellant had one filling station that handled only appellant’s gas. Appellant’s station man, a Mr. Simms, had at the filling station oil, gas and automobile accessories. The tires bought from appellee were turned over to Simms, who kept them at that filling station and sold them from there. In answer to the question, “It is very common for gasoline stations to also sell tires, is it not?” witness J. C. Williams, one of the defendants, answered: “Most of them do.” We think we were not in error in overruling appellant’s assignment No. 3, thereby holding that'the execution of the contract by J. C. Williams for appellant was not an act ultra vires. But should it be held that the act was ultra vires, our courts have uniformly held, as a rule of law, that an action for damages for breach of a contract, or suit upon the contract, will not be avoided by the plea of ultra vires where a corporation has accepted the benefits of a contract fully performed by the other party, then refuse payment on the ground that the contract was ultra vires. Long Bell Lbr. Co. v. Hampton et al., Tex.Civ.App., 20 S. W.2d 1081, 1083. In Kincheloe Irr. Co. v. Hahn Brothers & Co., 105 Tex. 231, 146 S. W. 1187, it is h.eld that when the corporation has received benefits under the alleged ultra vires contract the corporation is estopped from denying its power to make the contract, and refers to many cases as so holding. In our opinion, under the facts before us, the issue of ultra vires is not in the case.
The second issue we think to consider more fully is the authority J, C. Williams had to sign appellant’s name to the contract and notes.
The undisputed facts show that appellant was operating an oil refinery and was engaged in drilling oil wells for other parties. The facts unquestionably show that J. C. Williams was appellant’s general manager in the operation of its business. Corporations act exclusively through agents. J. C. Williams testified that he executed the contract of January 12, 1937, and the notes sued upon. After executing the contract he bought from appellee the goods, wares and merchandise for which the notes, subsequently, were given in payment. It is appellant’s contention that in executing the contract and notes Williams exceeded his authority. As held by .Judge Dibrell in Kincheloe Irr. Co. v. Hahn Brothers & Co., supra, in answering the contention there urged that the general manager exceeded his authority in making the contract in that case declared upon, that Bullock, as defendant’s general manager, undertook to comply with the terms of the agreement, and hence the plea of Bullock’s exceeded authority is not available as a defense.
The same question is discussed and decided by the Supreme Court against appellant’s contention in Bond et al. v. Terrell Cotton, & Woolen Mfg. Co., 82 Tex. 309, 18 S.W. 691; Texas & W. Railway Co. v. Gentry, 69 Tex. 625, 632, 8 S.W. 98, and numerous authorities in other jurisdictions referred to in the Bond v. Terrell C. & W. Mfg. Co. case, supra, [82 Tex. 309, 18 S.W. 691, 693] and the cases referred to in appellee’s brief. In the Bond case Judge Tarlton refers to some cases in other jurisdictions holding as contended by appellant. As to said cases Judge Tarlton said, “We cannot appreciate the force of the reasoning as applicable to the jurisprudence of our state.”
Other than the correction made the motion is in all matters overruled.