Court Opinion

ID: 9957826
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-05 14:13:48.905071+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:54.380653
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

The Honorable Maria Musti Cook,           :
in her official capacity as the           :
President Judge of the Court of           :
Common Pleas of York County,              :
Nineteenth Judicial District; and         :
The Court of Common Pleas of              :
York County,                              :
                            Petitioners   :
                                          :
                    v.                    :   No. 161 M.D. 2021
                                          :   Argued: September 13, 2023
The Pennsylvania Labor Relations          :
Board; and SEIU Local 668 PSSU,           :
                       Respondents        :

BEFORE:      HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
             HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
             HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
             HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
             HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
             HONORABLE ELLEN H. CEISLER, Judge
             HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
PRESIDENT JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER                      FILED: April 5, 2024

      Before the Court is the Application for Summary Relief (Application)
pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1532(b), Pa.R.A.P. 1532(b),
filed by The Honorable Maria Musti Cook, in her official capacity as President Judge
of the Court of Common Pleas of York County, Nineteenth Judicial District, and the
Court of Common Pleas of York County (Common Pleas) (together, Petitioners).
Petitioners seek, through their “Petition for Review in the Nature of an Appeal and,
Alternatively, An Action for Declaratory Judgment” (Petition) filed in this Court’s
original jurisdiction, to have this Court vacate an Order issued by the Pennsylvania
Labor Relations Board (Board) because the Board lacked jurisdiction and remand
the matter for the Board to dismiss the underlying unfair labor practice complaint
(Complaint) for lack of jurisdiction. This Court previously denied an application for
summary relief filed by the Board and Service Employees International Union, Local
668, Pennsylvania Social Services Union (SEIU), the union that filed an unfair labor
charge against Petitioners, (together, Respondents), in Cook v. Pennsylvania Labor
Relations Board, __ A.3d __ (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 161 M.D. 2021, filed November 2,
2022) (Cook I).         Relying on this Court’s reasoning in Cook I for denying
Respondents’ application for summary relief, Petitioners now assert that they are
entitled to summary relief because it is clear as a matter of law that the Board lacked
jurisdiction to issue the Complaint and its doing so violated the separation of powers
doctrine.1 Based on our reasoning in Cook I, Petitioners have established a clear

      1
          As stated in Cook I,

      [a]pplications for summary relief are governed by Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate
      Procedure 1532(b), Pa.R.A.P. 1532(b). It provides that “[a]t any time after the
      filing of a petition for review in an appellate or original jurisdiction matter, the court
      may[,] on application[,] enter judgment if the right of the applicant thereto is clear.”
      Pa.R.A.P. 1532(b). Summary relief is reserved for disputes that are legal rather
      than factual, and we resolve all doubts as to the existence of disputed material fact
      against the moving party. Rivera v. Pa. State Police, 255 A.3d 677, 681 (Pa.
      Cmwlth. 2021). “An application for summary relief may be granted if a party’s
      right to judgment is clear and no material issues of fact are in dispute.” Leach v.
      Turzai, 118 A.3d 1271, 1277 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015), aff’d, 141 A.3d 426 (Pa.
      2016).

      ....

(Footnote continued on next page…)

                                                  2
right to judgment, and we therefore grant the Application and declare that the Board
lacked jurisdiction to issue the Complaint. Because this declaration resolves the
appellate portion of the Petition, which was also based on the Board’s lack of
jurisdiction, we lift the stay of that part of the Petition entered in Cook I and vacate
the Board’s Order on the basis that the Board lacked jurisdiction to issue the
Complaint in the first instance.
       Petitioners allege, in pertinent part, the following.2 In February 2018, an adult
probation officer (Probation Officer) was reprimanded by Common Pleas “for
failing to follow court procedures, failing to debrief his supervisor following an
incident, and failing to submit a written incident report within 72 hours of an
incident.” (Petition ¶ 13.) SEIU filed a grievance on Probation Officer’s behalf.
(Id. ¶ 15, Ex. C.) In reviewing the grievance, the Director of Probation Services
increased the discipline from a written reprimand to a two-day suspension, citing the

       The purpose of the Declaratory Judgments Act “is to settle and to afford relief from
       uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations,
       and [it] is to be liberally construed and administered.” Section 7541 of the
       Declaratory Judgments Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 7541. “Declaratory judgment as to the
       rights, status or legal relationships is appropriate only where an actual controversy
       exists.” Eleven [Eleven] Pa., LLC v. State Bd. of Cosmetology, 169 A.3d 141, 145
       (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (citing McCord v. Pennsylvanians for Union Reform, 136 A.3d
       1055 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016)). “An actual controversy exists when litigation is both
       imminent and inevitable and the declaration sought will practically help to end the
       controversy between the parties.” McCord, 136 A.3d at 1061. It is within this
       Court’s sound discretion to either grant or deny a petition for declaratory relief.
       GTECH Corp v. Dep’t of Revenue, 965 A.2d 1276, 1285 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009).
       Additionally, where the issue raised in a declaratory judgment action involves the
       jurisdiction of an executive agency and whether such exercise is constitutional,
       declaratory judgment is proper notwithstanding the existence of an alternative
       remedy. P.J.S. v. State Ethics Comm’n, 669 A.2d 1105, 1109 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996).

Cook I, __ A.3d at __, slip op. at 15.
        2
          In Cook I, we set forth a detailed account of the allegations. Thus, it is unnecessary to do
so here.

                                                  3
severity of the offense. (Id. ¶¶ 15-16, Ex. C.) Thereafter, SEIU filed an unfair labor
practice charge with the Board, which issued the Complaint. (Id. ¶¶ 18-19.)
Common Pleas sought to dismiss the Complaint, arguing that, under Beckert
v. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, 425 A.2d 859
(Pa. Cmwlth. 1981), the Board was without jurisdiction to review Probation
Officer’s discipline based on the doctrine of separation of powers because the unfair
labor charge “clearly involved discipline of a court employee.” (Id. ¶ 19.) Based on
stipulated facts and following briefing, a hearing examiner issued a proposed
decision and order concluding that the Board had jurisdiction, but SEIU did not
establish an unfair labor practice. (Id. ¶ 21, Ex. A at 1.) Common Pleas filed
exceptions to the proposed decision and order, again arguing the Board did not have
jurisdiction. (Id. ¶ 22.) On April 20, 2021, the Board dismissed Common Pleas’
exceptions and adopted the proposed decision and order, stating “there is binding
precedent expressly holding that the Board has jurisdiction to hear unfair practice
cases concerning the rights of court-appointed employees under” the Public
Employe Relations Act (PERA).3 (Final Order at 1-2 (citing Teamsters Local 115
v. Pa. Lab. Rels. Bd., 619 A.2d 382, 388 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992)).)
      Petitioners then filed the Petition with this Court, seeking a declaration that
“absent an unfair labor practice charge alleging [Common Pleas] is interfering with,
coercing, or restraining organizing and bargaining activity of court employees, the
Board is without jurisdiction to entertain an unfair labor practice charge involving
the hire, fire, or supervision of court employees.” (Id. ¶ 39.) Respondents filed an
Answer denying the allegations in the Petition and subsequently filed their own
summary relief application, which we denied in Cook I. There, Respondents

      3
          Act of July 23, 1970, P.L. 563, as amended, 43 P.S. §§ 1101.101-1101.2301.

                                               4
asserted the Board had jurisdiction because the unfair labor practice charge alleged
that a court of common pleas is “interfering with, coercing, or restraining organizing
and collective bargaining activity.” Cook I, __ A.3d at __, slip op. at 8 (citing Mazzie
v. Commonwealth, 432 A.2d 985 (Pa. 1981); Pa. Lab. Rels. Bd. v. Chester & Del.
Cntys. Bartenders, Hotel & Rest. Emps. Union, Local No. 677, 64 A.2d 834 (Pa.
1949)). Respondents maintained that Teamsters Local 115 supported the Board’s
exercise of jurisdiction in this matter.
      Petitioners argued declaratory relief was proper because their challenge to the
Board’s jurisdiction sought “relief from [the] uncertainty and insecurity with respect
to rights, status, and other legal relations” in matters involving judicial employers’
decisions regarding the hiring, firing, and supervising of judicial employees. Cook
I, __ A.3d at __, slip op. at 9-10 (citation omitted). Petitioners further asserted the
Board had to follow Beckert and Teamsters Local 115, which limited the Board’s
jurisdiction to situations not involved here, and its continued failure to do so violated
the separation of powers doctrine. Id. at __, slip op. at 10-11.
      This Court, in Cook I, agreed with Petitioners’ arguments and denied
Respondents’ application for summary relief concluding that under Beckert,
Teamsters Local 115, and other precedent, the Board’s exercise of jurisdiction over
judicial employers in matters involving the hiring, firing, and supervising of court
employees would constitute a violation of the separation of powers doctrine. Cook
I, __ A.3d at __, slip op. at 17-27.
      Following our decision in Cook I, Petitioners filed the instant Application,
arguing that Cook I is dispositive of their Application, as we have already analyzed
the issue of the Board’s jurisdiction to act on the Complaint and concluded, therein,
that the Board did not have jurisdiction. The parties essentially make the same

                                           5
arguments as they did in Cook I, and we have already resolved those arguments in
Petitioners’ favor in Cook I. We are not persuaded that our decision in Cook I was
in error.
       The Board asserts that the separation of powers doctrine is not absolute and
that a “theoretical encroachment” does not violate the separation of powers doctrine.
Beckert v. Warren, 439 A.2d 638, 643 (Pa. 1981) (Warren). It also argues that it is
the union members’ due process rights that are violated by preventing the Board
from exercising its exclusive jurisdiction over an unfair labor practice charge and
renders their collective bargaining effort illusory, contravening the decision in
Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board v. State College Area School District, 337 A.2d
262, 266 (Pa. 1975). Further, the Board argues that Teamsters Local 115 still
supports its exercise of jurisdiction and that Petitioners’ reliance (and this Court’s
reliance in Cook I) on Renner v. Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County, 234 A.3d
411 (Pa. 2020), and Thomas v. Grimm, 155 A.3d 128 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017), is
misplaced, as those cases involved the applicability of laws to the judiciary, not
whether PERA can be applied constitutionally, which has clearly been authorized in
Washington County v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 72 A.3d 830 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2013), and Teamsters Local 771 v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board,
760 A.2d 496 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000). Finally, the Board asserts that precluding it from
exercising jurisdiction allows for the creation of illusory public bargaining rights,
even if the Board, ultimately, lacks the authority to reinstate or rescind the
discipline.4 After review, we are not persuaded to abandon our rationale and holding
in Cook I.

       4
        The Board also asserts that Petitioners failed to join a necessary party, the York County
Commissioners. We disagree that the York County Commissioners are a necessary party to the
(Footnote continued on next page…)

                                               6
       The Board’s reliance on Washington County and Teamsters Local 771 to
argue the Court’s interpretation of Teamsters Local 115, Renner, and Thomas, in
Cook I was erroneous is misplaced. Neither Teamsters Local 771 nor Washington
County involved unfair labor practices charges naming the judicial employer as the
public employer involved in the unfair labor charge. Washington County, 72 A.3d
at 832 (the unfair labor practice, based on a judicial employer’s refusal to provide a
court employee a union representative during an investigative interview, named
county as the defendant); Teamsters Local 771, 760 A.2d at 500-01 (the unfair labor
charge named the county as the defendant due to the county’s failure to implement
the financial portion of payment of an interest arbitration award even if the judicial
employer would not implement other provisions of the award). Thus, neither
involved situations where the Board was exercising its jurisdiction over a judicial
employer in a matter involving an issue in the exclusive authority of that employer
or where that jurisdiction was challenged based on the separation of powers doctrine.
       The Board’s reliance on Warren, 439 A.2d at 643, to argue that the Board’s
review of Common Pleas’ discipline of Probation Officer does not infringe upon that
court’s essential function to administer justice and was merely a “theoretical
encroachment” of the judiciary’s powers, is likewise misplaced. Warren involved a
situation where county commissioners issued a budget that did not include new
funding requested by a court of common pleas for new positions, but also excluded

Petition where Petitioners seek a legal determination that the Board lacks jurisdiction to consider
unfair labor charges involving Common Pleas’ discipline of court employees. As the Court can
order relief, an order precluding the Board from considering such matters, without infringing on
the County Commissioners’ rights to bargain over issues not related to the hiring, firing, and
supervising of court employees, they are not necessary parties. See Szoko v. Township of Wilkins,
974 A.2d 1216, 1219 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) (“A party is indispensable [if its] rights are so
connected with the claims of the litigants that no relief can be granted without impairing or
infringing upon those rights.”).

                                                7
funding for existing staff, causing some staff to be laid off. Id. at 640. When the
court brought an action challenging the new budget on the basis that it impaired its
authority to exercise its judicial power and properly administer justice, the Supreme
Court agreed, in part. The high court explained that the exercise of the judiciary’s
inherent power to act as a check on “legislative action [that] impairs the
independence of the judiciary in its exercise of judicial power and the administration
of justice” must be “reserved for defensive use in crises” where “[t]here [is] a
genuine threat to the administration of justice, that is, a nexus between the legislative
act and the injury to the judiciary, not merely a theoretical encroachment by the
legislature.” Id. at 643. The Supreme Court concluded that the use of that inherent,
extraordinary authority was required in Warren because the legislative body’s
funding decisions impaired the court’s judicial administration and ability to meet its
constitutional obligations at least to the extent that the court proved that the positions
were reasonably necessary and ordered the county commissioners to add funding to
the budget to meet those needs.
      Here, as in Warren, there is nothing “theoretical” about the encroachment on
Common Pleas’ constitutional authority to supervise and discipline its employees if
the Board is permitted to review those disciplinary decisions. Based on the Board’s
assertion of jurisdiction, Common Pleas, a part of the judiciary, was called before
the Board, a part of the executive branch, for the Board to determine whether
Common Pleas’ actions in disciplining Probation Officer were lawful. Thus, there
is a nexus between the Board’s assertion of jurisdiction and the injury to Common
Pleas’ exclusive authority to supervise and discipline its employees, which is a part
of its constitutional power to administer justice and essential to maintaining an
independent judiciary. Cook I, __ A.3d at __, slip op. at 17-18 (citing Jefferson Cnty.

                                            8
Ct. Appointed Emps. Ass’n v. Pa. Lab. Rels. Bd., 985 A.2d 697, 706-07 (Pa. 2009)).
See also Ellenbogen v. Allegheny County, 388 A.2d 730, 734 (Pa. 1978) (holding
that “judicial authority over court personnel [is] an essential element of the judicial
function”). Accordingly, Warren does not require a different result.
      Nor does State College Area School District, which the Board asserts requires
that Probation Officer and SEIU must be able to vindicate their bargaining rights
otherwise those rights are rendered illusory. The Supreme Court recognized in that
case that the right to collective bargaining set forth in PERA was not unlimited, even
when it involves “wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment.”
State College Area Sch. Dist., 337 A.2d at 265, 269-70 (quoting Section 701 of
PERA, 43 P.S. § 1101.701 & citing Sections 702 and 703 of PERA, 43 P.S.
§§ 1101.702 (removing matters of inherent managerial policy from the scope of
mandatory collective bargaining but making them subject to meet and discuss if they
involve wages, hours, and conditions of employment), 1101.703 (precluding the
implementation of any provision in a collective bargaining agreement that would
violate or be inconsistent with a statute or a municipal home rule charter if the
statutory provision explicitly prohibits a public employer from agreeing to a
different term)). But, in reversing this Court’s decision that a public employer was
not required to bargain over any provision relating to wages, hours, and other terms
of employment that affected the public employer’s policy determinations or
impaired the employer’s performance of their statutory responsibilities or duties, the
Supreme Court explained that such holding would eviscerate Section 701, thwart the
legislative policy of approving collective bargaining in order “to restore harmony in
the public sector,” and would result in “an illusory right of collective bargaining.”
Id. at 265-67. In contrast, there is nothing illusory here because, as this Court has

                                          9
stated, “the union and the other parties cannot validly give a court employee a right
to have his [discipline] reviewed by a non-judicial branch of government.” Beckert,
425 A.2d at 864. Unlike the mandatory topics of bargaining at issue in State College
Area School District, the judiciary’s exclusive authority over hiring, firing, and
supervising its employees, including the disciplining of those employees, may not
be infringed as part of the collective bargaining by the county commissioners
pursuant to Section 1620 of The County Code.5 Beckert, 425 A.2d at 864.
       Because we are not persuaded by the Board’s arguments that we should
deviate from our rationale in Cook I, we adopt and apply Cook I’s rationale here,
grant Respondents’ Application, and declare that the Board lacked jurisdiction to
issue the Complaint. Although we stayed the proceedings on Petitioners’ appeal,
this declaration decides the appellate portion of the Petition, which sought to
overturn the Board’s Order due to its lack of jurisdiction. In the interests of judicial
economy and where the Board has previously acknowledged that resolving the
jurisdictional issue via summary relief would dispose of all of the issues in the
Petition,6 we lift the stay and vacate the Board’s Order on the basis that the Board
lacked jurisdiction to issue the Complaint in the first instance.

                                            __________________________________________
                                            RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge

       5
          Act of August 9, 1955, P.L. 323, as amended, 16 P.S. § 1620.
       6
          See Respondents’ July 23, 2021 “Application for Relief Seeking an Order Suspending the
Briefing Schedule Pending a Ruling on the Application for Summary Relief” ¶ 8 asserting that
resolving Respondents’ Application for Summary Relief on the basis that the Board had
jurisdiction would “dispose of all issues raised in the Petition for Review in both the Court’s
appellate and original jurisdiction.”

                                              10
        IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

The Honorable Maria Musti Cook,             :
in her official capacity as the             :
President Judge of the Court of             :
Common Pleas of York County,                :
Nineteenth Judicial District; and           :
The Court of Common Pleas of                :
York County,                                :
                            Petitioners     :
                                            :
                    v.                      :   No. 161 M.D. 2021
                                            :
The Pennsylvania Labor Relations            :
Board; and SEIU Local 668 PSSU,             :
                       Respondents          :

                                      ORDER

      NOW, April 5, 2024, the Application for Summary Relief filed by The
Honorable Maria Musti Cook, in her official capacity as the President Judge of the
Court of Common Pleas of York County, Nineteenth Judicial District; and The Court
of Common Pleas of York County is GRANTED in accordance with the foregoing
opinion. The stay of the Appellate Petition for Review in this matter entered on
November 2, 2022, is hereby LIFTED, and the Order entered in the above-captioned
appeal by the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board (Board) is VACATED because
the Board lacked jurisdiction to issue the underlying unfair labor practice complaint.

                                          __________________________________________
                                          RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge