Court Opinion

ID: 9669503
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:57:42.293987+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:57.388080
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.
(dissenting). I would affirm the decision of the court of appeals for the reasons stated in that opinion, Manitowoc County v. Local 986B, 163 Wis. 2d 911, 472 N.W.2d 600 (Ct. App. 1991).
*832This case raises the question whether the sheriffs appointment of an undercover drug agent falls within the ambit of the sheriffs constitutional power not subject to legislative limitation or collective bargaining.
Our prior cases hold that the scope of the constitutional power of a sheriff is not measured simply by the historical duties of the sheriff. The constitutional prerogatives of the sheriff are limited, say the cases, to the immemorial principal and important duties of the sheriff which gave character and distinction to the office. State ex rel. Kennedy v. Brunst, 26 Wis. 412, 414 (1870); State ex rel. Milwaukee County v. Buech, 171 Wis. 474, 482, 177 N.W. 781 (1920); Wisconsin Professional Police Ass'n v. Dane County, 106 Wis. 2d 303, 319, 316 N.W.2d 656 (1982).
At common law, the sheriff shared the duty of conserving the peace with other law enforcement agencies. See State ex rel. Kennedy v. Brunst, 26 Wis. 412, 414 (1870); 16A E. McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations sec. 45.06a (rev. 3d ed. 1984).
While internal management of the sheriffs office is important and was generally recognized as under the sheriffs control when the constitution was adopted, it does not give character and distinction to the office of sheriff. Thus even if an undercover drug officer is performing duties that may be part of the constitutional duties of the office of sheriff, the manner of filling a job may be regulated by the legislature. I conclude that this opinion sub silentio overrules the Buech case.
The majority opinion reinterprets the cases to say that the immemorial, principal, and important duties of the sheriff at common law are constitutionally protected, regardless of their lack of uniqueness to the sheriffs office. According to the majority opinion, enforcing the law and preserving the peace are within the scope of the *833sheriffs constitutionally protected powers. Every aspect of the sheriffs work is related in one way or another to peace keeping. Therefore, if the majority's reasoning is taken to its logical conclusion, all the sheriffs duties are constitutionally protected from legislative limitations and cannot be subject to collective bargaining, arbitration or the civil service system. This interpretation of the sheriffs duties defeats the strong legislative policy in this state favoring collective bargaining and arbitration in the municipal context.
The majority opinion's only defense to this charge is to take the offensive and characterize the union's argument as hyperbolic. The majority opinion insists that this case is not about drawing a line between those law enforcement and peace keeping activities of a sheriff that are constitutionally protected and those that are not. I think that both the facts and the majority opinion present this very issue.
For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.
I am authorized to state that CHIEF JUSTICE NATHAN S. Heffernan and Justice William A. Bablitch join this dissent.