Court Opinion

ID: 9660172
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:07:00.086922+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:16.231309
License: Public Domain

TEAGUE, Judge,
dissenting.
But for the law as it presently exists in the State of Texas, I would agree with Judge Roberts’ conclusion that the appellant’s arrest was unlawful, thereby rendering inadmissible into evidence the fruits of the impoundment and inventory which followed. However, because of the doctrine of stare decisis, I must respectfully dissent to his opinion.
This Court has in the past applied the doctrines of curative admissibility and waiver of error to the guilt stage of the trial, with evidence and testimony adduced at the punishment stage of the trial. See, for example, Richardson v. State, 458 S.W.2d 665 (Tex.Cr.App.1970); Boothe v. State, 474 S.W.2d 219 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Palmer v. State, 475 S.W.2d 797 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Sims v. State, 502 S.W.2d 730 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Washington v. State, 500 S.W.2d 485 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Moulton v. State, 486 S.W.2d 334 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Sheridan v. State, 485 S.W.2d 920 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Bradley v. State, 478 S.W.2d 527 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Jones v. State, 484 S.W.2d 745 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Hunnicutt v. State, 531 S.W.2d 618 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Warren v. State, 514 S.W.2d 458 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); McKenzie v. State, 487 S.W.2d 65 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Creel v. State, 493 S.W.2d 814 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Lasker v. State, 573 S.W.2d 539 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); and see also Brown v. State, 617 S.W.2d 234 (Tex.Cr.App.1981). Cf. Thomas v. State, 572 S.W.2d 507 (Tex.Cr.App.1978).
By the above authorities, it should not be questioned by anyone that under Texas law as it exists at this time the appellant through her testimony given at the punishment stage of the trial foreclosed herself from raising in her appeal her contention that her arrest was unlawful, and that the resulting inventory and impoundment of her vehicle was also unlawful. The efforts by a majority of this Court, through Judge Roberts, to write around the above cases, though understandable, are for naught because the appellant’s testimony converted the cause from one involving the legality of her arrest to one involving the sufficiency of the evidence. The majority’s efforts to *725make a distinction between the appellant’s response to the prosecutor’s question that she knew the marihuana was in the vehicle and Officer Hutchinson’s testimony that the marihuana he seized was of a usable quantity, by saying that these statements are not the equivalent of one another, are at best an effort without any real meaning.*
I, therefore, respectfully dissent.
DALLY, W. C. DAVIS, and McCOR-MICK, JJ., join in this opinion.

 I personally believe that the above cases, which prevent the appellant from raising in her appeal the issue concerning her arrest and the inventory and impoundment of her vehicle, should be overruled. However, because of stare decisis, and until they are overruled, I am bound to adhere and recognize them. The majority of this Court as it is presently constituted has not seen fit to overrule those cases or the principles of law they state concerning curative admissibility or waiver of error. The present rule of law is a harsh one indeed and effectively prevents a defendant from testifying at the punishment stage of his trial. But that is the law and I am bound to follow that law until it is changed, and regardless of my personal feelings I shall do.