Court Opinion

ID: 9749091
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:23:55.806424+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:43.910918
License: Public Domain

SPAETH, Judge,
dissenting:
In Commonwealth v. Williams, 454 Pa. 368, 312 A.2d 597 (1973), the Supreme Court held that a new trial must be granted because
[n]owhere on the record is there any indication that [the defendant] knew the essential ingredients of a jury trial which are necessary to understand the significance of the right he was waiving. These essential ingredients, basic to the concept of a jury trial, are the requirement that the jury be chosen from members of the community (a jury of one’s peers), that the verdict be unanimous, and that the accused be allowed to participate in the selection of the jury panel.
Id., 454 Pa. at 373, 312 A.2d at 600.
*291Accord: Commonwealth v. Morin, 477 Pa. 80, 383 A.2d 832 (1978). Here, appellant was not told that “the jury [would] be chosen from members of the community.”
In nevertheless refusing to grant a new trial, the majority relies heavily on Commonwealth v. Bouie, 263 Pa.Super. 556, 398 A.2d 716 (1979), and Commonwealth v. Guenzer, 255 Pa.Super. 587, 389 A.2d 133 (1978). However, in Guenzer the defendant was told that the jury would be “12 of your peers,” 255 Pa.Super. at 592, 389 A.2d at 135, which was certainly close to the language used by the court in Williams, and in Bouie he was told that it would be “twelve people chosen from a larger group,” 263 Pa.Super. 558, 398 A.2d at 717, which while not so close to the language used by the Court in Williams, was held close enough. Here, nothing in the colloquy, no matter how loosely read, may be said to meet the requirement of Williams that the defendant be told that “the jury [would] be chosen from members of the community; ” nor does the majority point to anything.
Today’s decision is the first in which we have refused to follow Williams. In Commonwealth v. Tami, 264 Pa.Super. 535, 400 A.2d 214 (1979), we reversed and remanded for new trial because two of the requirements of Williams were not met: the defendants were not told either that they would be allowed to participate in the selection of the jury, or that the jury would be chosen from members of the community. In Commonwealth v. Friedman, 268 Pa.Super. 278, 407 A.2d 1355 (1979), the defendant was asked, “Do you understand that you have the right to have a panel of jurors brought into this room to participate with me in the selection of the 12 jurors that would sit in deliberation of this case?” Citing Williams and Guenzer, we reversed and remanded for new trial.
I do not understand the majority’s citation of Commonwealth v. Harris, 488 Pa. 141, 411 A.2d 494 (1979). There the defendant was told that he would be allowed to participate in the selection of “a jury of twelve people.” Id., 488 Pa. at 146, 411 A.2d at 496. Three members of the Court, LARSEN, J., joined by EAGEN, C.J., and FLAHERTY, J., *292held that this was enough. Three other members of the Court, ROBERTS, J., joined by O’BRIEN, J., and NIX, J., held that it was not enough because “nothing ... in the record . . . indicate[s] that appellant was told that his right to a jury trial would give him the right to a jury selected from his peers in his community.” Id., 488 Pa. at 146, 411 A.2d at 496. Harris is indistinguishable from the present case. Nevertheless, the majority by its decision today adopts the view of a minority of the Court in Harris. One is obliged to ask why the majority feels free to ignore the view of the other Justices. The majority says that Harris is of no precedential value because the Court was evenly divided. Granted. That means, however, that Williams is undisturbed, and therefore binds us.
The judgment of sentence should be reversed and the case remanded for new trial.