Court Opinion

ID: 9690702
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 19:36:14.2839+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:03:10.212009
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.
¶ 45. {dissenting) . This case turns on eyewitness identification and alibi evidence.
¶ 46. I agree with Justice Butler that a significant failure of communication occurred between the circuit court and defense counsel regarding the nature of the expert witness testimony proffered by the defendant Shomberg on eyewitness identification. The record evidences a disconnect between the expert evidence proffered by Shomberg regarding eyewitness identification *34and the circuit court's appreciation of the significance of the proffered evidence.
¶ 47. The defense expert witness sought to emphasize the weakness of an identification made in a lineup in which all persons are shown to an eyewitness at the same time (a simultaneous lineup),1 as compared to an identification made when the persons are shown to an eyewitness one at a time (sequential lineup) and the eyewitness is asked to state after seeing each person whether that person is or is not the suspect.
¶ 48. The circuit court did not appear to appreciate the import of the proffered expert witness testimony relating to simultaneous lineups compared to sequential lineups. Instead of focusing on the weaknesses inherent in a simultaneous lineup in determining whether to admit expert testimony, the circuit court kept returning to the expert's testifying to other weak*35nesses of eyewitness identification, many familiar to triers of fact, such as the effect of stress, darkness, and limited opportunity to observe on the reliability of eyewitness identification. The circuit court then excluded the expert's testimony as not helpful.
¶ 49. If the majority opinion is saying that the circuit court already knew about "relative judgment" in simultaneous lineups, then it was proper not to admit the testimony. The interaction between the circuit court and defense counsel clearly demonstrates, however, that the circuit court did not fully understand Shomberg's offer of proof. The circuit court repeatedly strayed away from factors that require expert testimony such as relative judgment and back to factors such as lack of light and whether the eyewitness had been drinking, which are decidedly different.
¶ 50. Furthermore, the circuit court conceded that, at least prior to the offer of proof, it lacked knowledge or understanding of relative judgment, stating that it had never heard of the term "relative judgment" prior to reading the expert report. The court and defense counsel's exchange was as follows:
THE COURT: So what we're back to is his opinion that sequential is better than simultaneous.
MR. COHEN [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And why.
THE COURT: Because simultaneous means the person, the witness, in essence, has the burden of making a positive identification as opposed to simply eliminating people that the witness does not feel were the perpetrator with the, I guess implicit within the witness's belief, that one of these people must be the perpetrator.
MR. COHEN: Yes. Relative judgment. *36For instance, I didn't know the term relative judgment, in terms of how it affects someone selecting somebody in a six-person lineup. That's not a term I was familiar with. I don't know if the Court was.
THE COURT: No.
But as it relates to these areas, I'm having a problem seeing why this could not be adequately explored by cross-examination of any witness who testifies, as to identification....
¶ 51. If the majority opinion is saying that the circuit court read the offer of proof (which included the expert's report) and gleaned from that report any relevant testimony that the defense expert would have given, this analysis is problematic. It clearly would have been error for the circuit court to consider expert testimony that it had ruled inadmissible.
¶ 52. The dialogue between defense counsel and the circuit court showing the miscommunication on this issue is set forth in Appendix A at the end of this dissenting opinion.
¶ 53. When Shomberg's trial was held in 2002, many judges and counsel in Wisconsin evidently had not yet explored the problems associated with simultaneous lineups.2 Indeed, simultaneous lineups were the norm and any attack on a well-conducted lineup was counter to then-held views. The majority opinion appears to justify upholding the circuit court's exclusion of the defendant's expert witness on the ground that the expert witness would offer a relatively new explanation of the weakness of simultaneous lineups.3 The majority opinion acknowledges that the problems associated *37with simultaneous lineups are not even so well-known in 2006 as to render expert testimony not helpful to a finder of fact.4
¶ 54. As I see it, that the expert opinion offered was relatively unknown information is the very reason the circuit court should have admitted the testimony in the present case. The subject of the expert testimony was not generally known to triers of fact in Wisconsin in 2002. The proffered testimony was apparently specialized knowledge at the time of Shomberg's trial. These factors are precisely why the expert testimony would have been of assistance to the trier of fact in the present case, was essential to the defense, and should have been admitted.5
¶ 55. The circuit court did not fully appreciate, as the expert witness would have testified, that when a witness is given a simultaneous presentation of subjects, the witness tends to make relative judgments, comparing one person in the lineup with the others and identifying the person who looks most like the actual perpetrator. This tendency to make relative judgments does not usually pose a problem if the actual perpetrator is present; the witness will ordinarily identify the perpetrator. But if the perpetrator is not in the lineup, the witness will tend to identify the person in the lineup who looks most like the witness's recollection of the suspect. A simultaneous lineup thus encourages a witness to select the "best" match, making a comparative *38judgment about the persons in the lineup, rather than making an absolute judgment about each person presented.6
¶ 56. Researchers have learned that presenting persons one at a time, sequentially, helps witnesses to make absolute judgments rather than comparative ones. Research suggests that the value of identifications made under sequential presentations is significantly greater than that of those made under simultaneous presentations.7
¶ 57. Relying on what it describes as "scientific rationale," emphasizing relative judgment and suggestiveness, the Wisconsin Department of Justice recently adopted a model policy calling for sequential lineups.8 A Wisconsin legislative task force charged with address*39ing wrongful convictions has recently made a similar recommendation.9 These recommendations are the result of extensive study that demonstrates that, contrary to the previously held view, there are substantial problems with eyewitness identification in general and simultaneous lineups in particular. In the recent Du-bose case, the court identified the problems and risks associated with eyewitness identification in general.10 This case presents the problems and risks associated with simultaneous lineups in particular.
¶ 58. That the circuit court did not fully appreciate the import of the evidentiary offer is understandable and, in essence, makes Shomberg's point.
¶ 59. The majority opinion concludes that the lineup in which Shomberg was identified was "sequential in fact."11 Defense counsel's cross-examination of the eyewitness made clear, however, that even if she believed she recognized Shomberg as he entered the lineup, her identification was a product of relative judgment. The witness testified as follows:
Q And when they brought the six people in, you knew right away it couldn't be number one, three, and six because they were too big, right?
A Right.
*40Q And that left two, four, and five, right?
A Right.
Q And you knew it couldn't be two and four because they were too old, right?
A Right.
Q What did that leave?
A Five.
Q Number five, and that's why you picked him out, right?
A Right.
Q He was the best, and in fact, he was the only one left after you eliminated the other five people?
A That's right.
Q And you didn't pick him out because for sure that was the guy, just he was the best of the six?
A Right.
¶ 60. The majority opinion asserts that the defense was able to convey through cross-examination of Detective Marion Morgan, a state witness, "the concept that some experts believe sequential lineups are relatively more reliable than simultaneous lineups."12 The detective's testimony on cross-examination was based on attending training on eyewitness identification given by Shomberg's proffered expert. It is extraordinarily weak. The cross-examination fails to explain the research or to make the points that the defense's expert witness could have made about a witness's relative judgment in a simultaneous lineup.
*41¶ 61. The defense counsel obviously tried to drag information favorable to the defendant out of the State's witness but was hampered by the witness and the assistant district attorney's objections.
¶ 62. Furthermore, the detective insisted that her training about simultaneous and sequential identification related to identifications from a photo array, not to the kind of lineup involved in the present case. Her cross-examination is set forth in Appendix B at the end of this dissenting opinion.
¶ 63. For the reasons set forth, I dissent. I conclude that the defense's expert witness testimony relating to relative judgment in simultaneous lineups was necessary to the defendant's case; its exclusion was a due process violation of Shomberg's right to present a defense.13
APPENDIX A.
Defense Dialogue with Circuit Court
¶ 64. At the motion hearing, the circuit court and Shomberg's attorney then had the following exchange regarding the offer of proof:
MR. COHEN [defense counsel]: . . . When you look at six people in a lineup, you think to yourself which is the person that most looks like the person I'm looking for, and you use relative judgment, and that's what makes a simultaneous lineup very unreliable.
Mr. Carroll can tell you ... that by using a sequential lineup, you tend to eliminate all the false positives without eliminating the correct positives ....
Why that's important, when we bring somebody in *42for a lineup, they tend to think, hey, I'm here for a lineup, they must have caught the guy, now I got to figure out which of these six people did it, and that is relative judgment.
I think the most important thing this expert can tell you is why the process we're using leads to mistakes.
THE COURT: . . . Ill make a preliminary ruling.
First of all, as it relates to the opinions that the defense is seeking to elicit from Mr. Carroll, I'm not going to allow that for the following reasons:
The bottom line is, the defense seeks to ask Mr. Carroll, in his capacity as an expert, or perception as an expert, as to the reliability of identification hy the complaining witness and by the security guard.
I think that does invade the province of the jury and, yet, I don't see how it assists the jury.14
This holding would be consistent with the Hampton case, as well as Blair and Wilson.
Specifically, the judge in the Hampton case ruled that "the defendant's expert witness would be limited in his testimony to simply listing the different factors affecting human perception, but would not be allowed to give an opinion as to the reliability of the specific identification of the defendant by Mrs. Schlieve.". . .
*43Now Mr. Cohen's motion. .. indicates that the expert would testify that there are factors that may influence a witness's ability to identify a stranger.
Mr. Cohen, how is this going to, if I allow this, is this going to assist the trier of fact?
... I cannot in any way envision allowing the trier of fact to hear the fact that New Jersey mandates sequential lineups as opposed to simultaneous lineups. I don't see what bearing that has.
MR. COHEN: Mandates is not that important, but what is important, the reasons why it's become the preferred method of doing it.
THE COURT: So what we're back to is, you want to call this individual who will opine that sequential lineups are better than simultaneous lineups?
MR. COHEN: And the reason why, not just that they're better, but here's why. Here's [sic] the problems with simultaneous ones.
THE COURT: Because, in part, it's a process of elimination as opposed to positive identification.
MR. COHEN: The fact that exactly, at least part of what the victim said, when she put down her answer, 'Well, I knew it wasn't one and three because they were too big. I knew it wasn't two-and four because they were too old."
*44THE COURT: But isn't that something that you would also ask the witness on cross-examination?
MR. COHEN: I sure could. I sure could, but it's a process that, I think it's important. What I was impressed with was the experiments that they have done. That really sort of, you know, sewed it up for me. This was really a much better way of doing it.
THE COURT: So what we're back to is his opinion that sequential is better than simultaneous.
MR. COHEN: And why.
THE COURT: Because simultaneous means the person, the witness, in essence, has the burden of making a positive identification as opposed to simply eliminating people that the witness does not feel were the perpetrator with the, I guess implicit within the witness's belief, that one of these people must be the perpetrator.
MR. COHEN: Yes. Relative judgment.
For instance, I didn't know the term relative judgment, in terms of how it affects someone selecting somebody in a six-person lineup. That's not a term I was familiar with. I don't know if the Court was.
THE COURT: No.
But as it relates to these areas, I'm having a problem seeing why this could not be adequately explored by cross-examination of any witness who testifies, as to identification and, again, what we're back to is, how much light was available, how much did someone have to drink, did you take any drugs, were you *45under any type of stress, how close was the person, was their fact in any way obstructing [sic], what was the period of time between which this occurred and you were first shown this lineup.
I don't see so far how any of those factors would require the assistance of an expert witness.
I don't think the areas we're talking about require the assistance of an expert because it gets down to the same factors that the trier of fact would consider ....
I say that having reviewed ... Mr. Carroll's report, as well as his CY and when I look at page three of that report, taking up those opinions one by one ... I realize they're offered as the basis for his opinion, that ultimately the reliability is suspect, of the eyewitness identification, number one, several minor inconsistencies found in police reports, that's something that can be brought out on cross-examination.
Number two, again, that's his opinion when he states, "Neither the victim or the witness identify the suspect."
The trier of fact will hear the exact testimony in that regard. I don't think anybody under the auspices of being an expert witness would be allowed to testify, "If we are to convict suspects on this type identification, then at least 10 percent of those convicted would be innocent."
Number three, again, "Victim B[.] isn't identifying the person that she remembers from the incident, but is instead identifying those persons who couldn't have *46committed the crime," that's a matter that the trier of fact can consider unassisted by Mr. Carroll.
Four, "Eyewitness identification remains as one of the most influential types of evidence. Studies indicate that jurors believe eyewitness evidence more than fingerprint evidence."
I don't see how that's relevant or should be considered by the trier of fact.
And then, five, again, relates to his opinion about when eyewitness testimony is more reliable, but it would consider the same types of factors that the trier of fact would as it relates to those studies.
As it relates to those studies, I don't believe that would assist the trier of fact, it would simply invade their province, so for all of those reasons, I'm going to deny the motion to admit expert eyewitness testimony.
APPENDIX B.
Defense counsel's cross-examination of Detective Morgan
¶ 65. The following is the cross-examination relating to simultaneous and sequential lineups:
Q [defense counsel] Did you go to any kind of training on lineup, sequential versus simultaneous?
A [Detective Morgan] Yes, I did.
Q Same one I was at?
A Yes.
Q And you learned why simultaneous lineups like the one that occurred tend to be unreliable, right?
*47MR. KAISER [Assistant District Attorney]: Objection; relevance.
THE COURT: Overruled.
A There were [sic] some discussion about why that presenter didn't believe they were as reliable.
Q Part of the problem is that it gets to be comparative. The witness who is watching the lineup tries to figure out which one most resembles the person, right?
A That's what the instructor said, yes.
Q And the instructor also gave us examples how, when they remove the actual suspect from a lineup and show another lineup without that person, other people tend to get picked out because they remove the actual suspect, right?
MR. KAISER: Objection; relevance of specific examples of other lineups and how they were conducted.
THE COURT: Well, this relates to her training and so I think it's within her general realm of knowledge, so overruled.
Q You understand my question, right?
A One more time, please?
Q The instructor showed you examples where six people are in a photo array and someone, a group of people have seen what the person looked like and they're supposed to pick out which of the six it was, and then they do the same thing again but take out the one who's picked out by the highest percentage of the witnesses, run the whole thing again, and the other five, their percentages all go up as a result, right?
MR. KAISER: Objection; relevance of photo arrays.
*48THE COURT: Overruled.
Q Do you remember that?
A I don't remember that specific example.
Q Do you remember many discussions about the problems, though, with comparison when you look at six people?
A Yes, and actually, I believe most of that was directed towards photo arrays as opposed to in person.
Q And lineups too?
A Okay.
Q City of Madison is now doing a sequence lineup program now, are they not?
MR. KAISER: Objection; relevance.
THE COURT: Overruled.
A Yes, we will be trained in that.
Q Because it tends — because statistics tends to show that you have less false positives that way, right?
A That's part of the training that they plan to present.
Q But you know that already, right?
A I'm not trying to be difficult, but I really think that the training was specifically directed towards photo lineups.

 The defense motion stated the following factors about which the defense expert, Paul Carroll, would testify:
Mr. Carroll would testify about several factors that psychologists specializing in the field of human perception and memory agree have an important bearing on a witnessTs] ability to identify a stranger. These factors are, among others: That sequential lineups are much more reliable and accurate than simultaneous lineups; relative judgment, which occurs when a witness at a line-up eliminates who the perpetrator could not be rather than identifies the actual perpetrator; transference, a mental process that can occur when some period of time separates the initial perception and the later identification; the absence of a rehable relationship between the confidence a witness has in his identification and the accuracy of that identification; how I.D. evidence is often unreliable and there are scores of examples of people wrongly convicted of crimes based solely on an incorrect I.D. witness; that the factors present in this case would tend to render the eyewitnesses' testimony unreliable.
At oral argument the State asserted that the defense's offer of proof was inadequate.

 See majority op., ¶ 15.

 See majority op., ¶ 17.

 Id.

 Wisconsin Stat. § 907.02 provides that "[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."

 Bureau of Training and Standards for Criminal Justice, Wisconsin Dep't of Justice, Model Policy and Procedure for Eyewitness Identification at 5 (Sept. 12, 2005), available at http://www.doj.state.wi.us/dles/tns/EyewitnessPublic.pdf. See also Legislative Task Force (Avery Task Force), Eyewitness Identification Procedure Recommendations at 2-3, available at http://www.law.wisc.edu/fjr/innocence/eyewitness_guidelines.htm; Gary L. Wells, Eyewitness Identification Evidence: Science and Reform, The Champion, Apr. 2005, at 14.

 Bureau of Training and Standards for Criminal Justice, Wisconsin Dep't of Justice, Model Policy and Procedure for Eyewitness Identification at 5 (Sept. 12, 2005), available at http ://www. doj. state. wi.us/dles/tns/EyewitnessPublic.pdf. See also Legislative Task Force (Avery Task Force), Eyewitness Identification Procedure Recommendations at 2-3, available at http://www.law.wisc.edu/fjr/innocence/eyewitness_guidelines.htm; Gary L. Wells, Eyewitness Identification Evidence: Science and Reform, The Champion, Apr. 2005, at 14.

 Bureau of Training and Standards for Criminal Justice, Wisconsin Dep't of Justice, Model Policy and Procedure for Eyewitness Identification at 5 (Sept. 12, 2005), available at *39http://www.doj.state.wi.us/dles/tns/EyewitnessPublic.pdf. The policy also recommends numerous other changes in eyewitness identification procedure.

 Legislative Task Force (Avery Task Force), Eyewitness Identification Procedure Recommendations, available at http://www.law.wisc.edu/fjr/innocence/eyewitness_guidelines.htm.

 State v. Dubose, 2005 WI 126, ¶ 30, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 699 N.W.2d 582.

 Majority op., ¶ 24.

 Majority op., ¶ 29.

 See State v. St. George, 2002 WI 50, 252 Wis. 2d 499, 643 N.W.2d 777.

 But see Wis. Stat. § 907.04 (providing that "[testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact").