Court Opinion

ID: 9715692
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:12:09.331125+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:37.203059
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(dissenting in part and concurring in part). We granted bypass to consider issues concerning the constitutionality and construction of the Hospital Finance Authority Act, 1969 PA 38.
The constitutional questions cannot be decided as it is apparent that none of the litigants desires that any aspect of the Act be held unconstitutional.
The plaintiffs, W. A. Foote Memorial Hospital, Inc. and City of Jackson, the intervenor, the Attorney General, and the amicus are all in agreement that all the constitutional issues raised by the defendant City of Jackson Hospital Authority are insubstantial.
The Jackson Hospital Authority, while raising these issues, owes its very existence and entirety to the legislation which it purports to challengé. If we were to sustain the constitutional challenges, the purposes of the Act could not be realized and the hospital authority could not function.
The parties desire an adjudication of constitutional issues by this Court. Yet they are not truly adversaries. The interests of the Jackson Hospital Authority, as well as those of the W. A. Foote Memorial Hospital, Inc. and the City of Jackson *229can only be served by upholding the constitutionality of this legislation.
The Jackson Hospital Authority was incorporated pursuant to the challenged act by the City of Jackson. Its five member governing board of commissioners was appointed by the City of Jackson. The commissioners may be removed from office "for cause” by the Jackson City Commission. Vacancies in the office of commissioner of the hospital authority are filled by the Jackson City Commission.
The present case parallels South Spring Hill Gold Mining Co v Amador Medean Gold Mining Co, 145 US 300, 301; 12 S Ct 921; 36 L Ed 712 (1892). Subsequent to the lower court decision, control of both the plaintiff corporation and the defendant corporation had coalesced in the hands of the same persons. In this non-adversary context, the United States Supreme Court declined to adjudicate the appeal on its merits:
"We cannot, however, consent to determine a controversy in which the plaintiff in error has become the dominus litus on both sides. We assume that this is not an agreed case gotten up by collusion; but the litigation has ceased to be between adverse parties, and the case therefore falls within the rule applied where the controversy is not a real one.”
Unless parties have "adverse legal interests” the action is not justiciable for it fails to present a "definite and concrete” controversy. See Aetna Life Insurance Co v Haworth, 300 US 227, 240-241; 57 S Ct 461; 81 L Ed 617; 108 ALR 1000 (1937).
Standing to raise an issue is another integral aspect of justiciability. The predominantly non-adversary nature of this action, in which the defend*230ant Jackson Hospital Authority raises a constitutional defense challenging the Act which gives it life, strongly suggests that it is without standing to complain. "The 'gist of the question of standing’ is whether the party seeking relief has 'alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.’ Baker v Carr, 369 US 186, 204 [82 S Ct 691; 7 L Ed 2d 663] (1962).” Flast v Cohen, 392 US 83, 99; 88 S Ct 1942; 20 L Ed 2d 947 (1968).
While the Jackson Hospital Authority has filed a brief opposing the Act’s constitutionality, it is not the brief of a true adversary whose personal stake in the outcome of the controversy is clearly distinguishable from that of the other litigants. "Competitive briefs frequently sharpen the issues and are of great assistance in deciding the question at hand. Without adversaries we are deprived of the benefit of competitive presentations, and any opinion we might express would be entitled to little weight as precedent because in reality we would not be deciding a question but, rather, merely obliging the litigants before us. See 20 Am Jur 2d, Courts, § 193, p 529.” Rozankovich v Kalamazoo Spring Corp (on reh), 44 Mich App 426, 428; 205 NW2d 311 (1973).
In Poe v Ullman, 367 US 497, 503; 81 S Ct 1752; 6 L Ed 2d 989, 995-996 (1961), the United States Supreme Court, relying on the analysis of Mr. Justice Brandéis in his famous concurring opinion in Ashwander v Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 US 288, 341 346; 56 S Ct 466; 80 L Ed 688 (1936), withheld adjudication of the raised constitutional issue because the requisite adverseness was not present:
*231"In part the rules summarized in the Ash wander opinion have derived from the historically defined, limited nature and function of courts and from the recognition that, within the framework of our adversary system, the adjudicatory process is most securely founded when it is exercised under the impact of a lively conflict between antagonistic demands, actively pressed, which make resolution of the controverted issue a practical necessity.”
As expressed in Johnson v Muskegon Heights, 330 Mich 631, 633; 48 NW2d 194 (1951), "[c]ourts ordinarily will not decide a case or question in or on which there is no real controversy.”
Many of the constitutional issues raised by the Jackson Hospital Authority were dealt with in a similar challenge to the constitutionality of the State Housing Development Authority Act, 1966 PA 346 (MCLA 125.1401 et seq.; MSA 16.114[1] et seq.). See Advisory Opinion re Constitutionality of PA 1966, No 346, 380 Mich 554; 158 NW2d 416 (1968). The posture of this case would be different if the Governor or either house of the Legislature had sought an advisory opinion "after [the Hospital Finance Authority Act had] been enacted into law but before its effective date.” Const 1963, art 3, §8.
Recently, in responding to a request by the Governor and Senate for an advisory opinion concerning the constitutionality of the no-fault motor vehicle liability act (1972 PA 294; MCLA 500.3101 et seq.; MSA 24.13101 et seq.), we said, in refusing to consider questions other than those raised by the Governor and the Senate, that we are not "constitutionally authorized to furnish advisory opinions to the Michigan Trial Lawyers Association or a committee of the State Bar.” Advisory Opinion re Constitutionality of 1972 PA 294, 389 Mich 441, 485; 208 NW2d 469, 484 (1973). Simi*232larly, we may not constitutionally furnish an advisory opinion to the City of Jackson or its hospital authority.
The intervention of the Attorney General provides the necessary adverseness on the other issues. Accordingly, although the litigation began without adversaries, there is no need to dismiss the action.
The Attorney General has vigorously advocated the view that a hospital operated by a city may not be reorganized as a private hospital in order to obtain benefits under the Act. On this issue we agree with Justice M. S. Coleman that there is. nothing in the Act which precludes such a reorganization, that such a reorganization is entirely consistent with the provisions of the Act, and, therefore, Foote Hospital may be so reorganized and avail itself of benefits under the Act.
We would not decide the other issues because they are not questions "of such public moment as to require early determination.” GCR 1963, 797. They are not the kind of issues which warrant bypass of the Court of Appeals. Moreover, in the plethora of issues presented, inadequate attention has been given to the Attorney General’s contention that "the hospital property is affected with a public trust terminable only by the circuit court pursuant to the provisions of the charitable trust act.” MCLA 554.351; MSA 26.1191.
The deed of conveyance from Ida W. Foote to the City of Jackson contains language of covenant as well as language providing for a possibility of reverter upon breach of a condition subsequent. The deed provided:
"The said grantee [City of Jackson] for itself and its successors hereby covenants with the said Ida W. Foote, her heirs, executors, administrators and assigns, that *233no part of said described property shall at any time be used for any purpose other than that of a city hospital, and in case of violation of this covenant, said described premises shall revert to said Ida W. Foote, her heirs, executors, administrators and assigns.”
"A charitable trust may be created although the settlor uses words of condition.” 2 Restatement Trusts, 2d, § 351, comment e; 4 Scott on Trusts (3d ed), § 351, pp 2796-2797.
While land may be conveyed upon a charitable trust subject to reversion to the settlor or his heirs upon breach of a condition subsequent so that "if the condition is broken, the settlor or his heirs are entitled to the property” (4 Scott on Trusts [3d ed], § 401.2, p 3141), no such breach has yet occurred in this case. The Foote Hospital is still being operated by the City of Jackson on the land conveyed by Ida W. Foote.
The issues whether a charitable trust was created and what would happen to the trust res upon a termination of the trust are separate issues.
T. G. Kavanagh, J., concurred with Levin, J.