Court Opinion

ID: 9930437
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-06 21:01:17.324028+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:17:32.099456
License: Public Domain

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                                             UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 23-4554

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                             Plaintiff - Appellee,

                      v.

        ANTHONY DWAYNE MACK,

                             Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at
        Elkins. Thomas S. Kleeh, Chief District Judge. (2:22-cr-00001-TSK-MJA-1)

        Submitted: January 30, 2024                                       Decided: February 5, 2024

        Before KING, AGEE, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: Sherman L. Lambert, Sr., LAW OFFICE OF SHERMAN L. LAMBERT,
        SR., Shepherdstown, West Virginia, for Appellant. William Ihlenfeld, United States
        Attorney, Wheeling, West Virginia, Stephen Warner, Assistant United States Attorney,
        OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Elkins, West Virginia, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               Anthony Dwayne Mack pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute

        methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). Mack expressly

        conditioned the plea on his right to appeal the district court’s order accepting the magistrate

        judge’s recommendation and denying his motion to suppress.                The court thereafter

        sentenced Mack to 121 months’ imprisonment. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

               When considering a district court’s denial of a suppression motion, we “review legal

        conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error [and] . . . consider the evidence in

        the light most favorable to the Government.” United States v. Pulley, 987 F.3d 370, 376

        (4th Cir. 2021) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “When reviewing factual

        findings for clear error, we particularly defer to a district court’s credibility determinations,

        for it is the role of the district court to observe witnesses and weigh their credibility during

        a pre-trial motion to suppress.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

               Mack argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence

        obtained during a traffic stop. Specifically, he maintains that the court erred in finding that

        the police officer had probable cause to stop Mack’s vehicle based on a traffic violation or,

        alternatively, because the officer had reasonable suspicion that Mack was engaged in

        criminal activity. The temporary detention of a person during a routine traffic stop, “even

        if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose,” constitutes a seizure of a person within

        the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809 (1996);

        United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 335 (4th Cir. 2008). Thus, an automobile stop must

        not be unreasonable under the circumstances. Whren, 517 U.S. at 810. Observation of any

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        traffic violation, no matter how minor, gives an officer probable cause to stop the driver.

        United States v. Hassan El, 5 F.3d 726, 730 (4th Cir. 1993).

               The district court found credible the police officer’s testimony that he stopped Mack

        for crossing the center line, in violation of W. Va. Code § 17C-7-1(a). The officer had a

        better vantage point to observe Mack’s vehicle, and another officer corroborated this

        testimony. Moreover, although Mack’s passenger testified that Mack did not cross the

        center line, she was at least partially distracted, she was not “100% sure” the car did not

        cross the center line, and she was not a disinterested witness. Lastly, because Mack refused

        to answer whether something was happening with his passenger’s phone on the dashboard

        of the car, the court believed that either Mack, or the passenger, or both, was likely

        distracted. We have reviewed the record and conclude that the district court’s credibility

        findings are not clearly erroneous. *

               Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral

        argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

        before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                        AFFIRMED

               *
                 Because we conclude that the district court did not err in finding that the officer
        had probable cause to stop Mack based on a traffic violation, we need not address Mack’s
        challenge to the district court’s determination that the stop was also justified based on the
        officer’s reasonable suspicion that Mack was engaged in criminal activity.

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