Court Opinion

ID: 9851372
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:11:33.477466+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:54.631461
License: Public Domain

*179STEPHENSON, J.,
dissenting.
The majority finds Throckmorton guilty of fraud because of her failure to disclose the existence of the attorneys’ fee agreement to the appellants and her failure to disclose the settlement to the Richmond Chancery Court. However, in order to constitute fraud, the facts concealed “must have been material facts which substantially affect the interests of the person alleged to have been defrauded.” Packard Norfolk v. Miller, 198 Va. 557, 563, 95 S.E.2d 207, 211 (1956). I do not find any evidence of materiality and would therefore affirm the decision of the trial court.
An examination of the record reveals that the appellants were asked no questions regarding the fee agreement. Thus, not only is there no evidence that their knowledge of the agreement would have prevented them from executing the settlement, there is no evidence that they were ignorant of the fee agreement. It is not for the Court to speculate what the appellants knew or what they might have done.
Nor does the evidence indicate that the judge who ratified the fee contract would have acted differently had he known of the settlement agreement. The only testimony given by the judge was that he did not see a written copy of the settlement agreement at the time the fee contract was approved. There was no evidence of what took place at this proceeding, of what facts the judge was aware, or of the effect of this awareness on his decision. The majority states that “it is not conceivable” that the court would have approved the fee if it had known of the settlement agreement. Once again, however, this is speculation. Materiality is a fundamental element of fraud, and the burden was on the appellants to produce some evidence of it. They have failed to do so, and the trial court properly struck the appellants’ evidence.
COMPTON, J., joins in dissent.