Court Opinion

ID: 9903860
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 16:07:33.637705+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:22.615914
License: Public Domain

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                      FIFTH DISTRICT

                                    NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
                                    FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
                                    DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

WALT DISNEY PARKS AND
RESORTS U.S., INC.,

             Petitioner,
                                             Case No. 5D22-1375
v.                                           LT Case No. 2020-CA-002845-O

LISA ALESI,

          Respondent.
________________________________/

Opinion filed November 18, 2022

Petition for Certiorari Review of Order
from the Circuit Court for Orange County,
Jeffrey L. Ashton, Judge.

Stephanie M. Simm, of Bowman and
Brooke, LLP, Miami, and Frank D. Hosley
and Suzanne L. Kersh, of Bowman and
Brooke, LLP, Lake Mary, for Petitioner.

Sagi Shaked and Cory D. Lapin, of
Shaked Law Firm, P.A., Aventura, for
Respondent.

TRAVER, J.

      Walt Disney Parks & Resorts U.S., Inc. seeks certiorari review of a trial

court order compelling it to better respond to an interrogatory propounded by
Lisa Alesi, the plaintiff in a personal injury case. The trial court correctly

determined that the factual information Alesi seeks is not protected by the

work product doctrine, even though the facts are contained exclusively in

reports and a recorded statement prepared in anticipation of litigation. The

trial court’s order, however, improperly compels the production of Disney’s

work product “not limited to” the facts. We therefore grant the petition in part

and deny it in part.

      Alesi claims a Disney employee injured her by striking her with a

garbage cart.     In connection with her lawsuit, Alesi propounded an

interrogatory that asked Disney to describe how the incident happened,

including all actions taken by its employees and agents to prevent it. Along

with its initial response, which suggested that discovery was ongoing, and

that Alesi may not have been properly watching her surroundings, Disney

produced a privilege log. The log contained two reports about the incident,

including one by Christina Headley, the Disney first aid nurse who treated

Alesi after the incident. It also referenced a recorded statement by Kyle

Morello, the man pushing the garbage cart. Neither Headley nor Morello

currently works for Disney.

      Unsatisfied by this answer, Alesi successfully moved to compel a

better response. This time, Disney stated that it had been informed that “a

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cast member pushing a garbage receptacle came into contact with [Alesi].”

Disney stressed that the depositions of the people who witnessed the

incident had not yet been taken, and it referenced the previous production of

a policy regarding trash removal. The remainder of its response included

Alesi’s own recorded statement and interrogatory response summarizing the

incident.

      Still unsatisfied, Alesi again moved for a better response. This time,

the trial court specifically ordered Disney to provide a verified interrogatory

answer “based on its knowledge of the incident, including, but not limited to,

facts learned from its employees and/or agents (whether former or current),

Kyle Morello, and Christina Headley.” Disney seeks certiorari review of this

order.

      We may grant certiorari relief only if Disney establishes: 1) a departure

from the essential requirements of the law; 2) resulting in material injury for

the rest of the trial; 3) that cannot be remedied on post-judgment appeal.

See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Knapp, 234 So. 3d 843, 848 (Fla. 5th DCA

2018). We use the second and third prongs to determine if we have certiorari

jurisdiction. See Holden Cove, Inc. v. 4 Mac Holdings, Inc., 948 So. 2d 1041,

1041 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007). We have jurisdiction in this case because the trial

court’s discovery order requires Disney to disclose allegedly privileged

                                      3
information. See Knapp, 234 So. 3d at 848. We have held that certiorari is

“particularly appropriate” in this context because disclosure of privileged

material may cause irreparable injury. See Fifth Third Bank v. ACA Plus,

Inc., 73 So. 3d 850, 852 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011).

      The United States Supreme Court created the work product doctrine.

See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947). Now codified by Florida

Rule of Civil Procedure 1.280(b)(4), it protects the disclosure of “documents

and tangible things” that a party prepares in anticipation of litigation or trial.1

Two types of work product exist. Fact work product protects information

related to the case that is gathered in anticipation of litigation. S. Bell Tel. &

Tel. Co. v. Deason, 632 So. 2d 1377, 1384 (Fla. 1994). Opinion work product

primarily safeguards “mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, and

theories.” Id. A party seeking production of work product materials must first

show it needs them for the preparation of its case, and that it cannot

otherwise obtain them without undue hardship.              See Fla. R. Civ. P.

1.280(b)(4). Even then, trial courts “shall protect against disclosure of the

      1
        Rule 1.280(b)(4) does not reference intangible things, like an
attorney’s personal views on when to present evidence or proposed
arguments, but the work product doctrine nevertheless protects them. See
Surf Drugs, Inc. v. Vermette, 236 So. 2d 108, 112 (Fla. 1970) (citing
Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511).

                                        4
mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney

or other representative of a party concerning the litigation.” Id.

      Disney argues that the work product doctrine protects every piece of

information contained in the reports and recorded statement, and that Alesi

has not proven the two prerequisites to obtaining these materials. See id.

Alesi responds that she is not seeking production of the actual documents

Disney prepared; she just wants to know factual details of how the incident

happened.

      Alesi is correct that she is not required to prove need and undue

hardship because she does not demand the production of protected work

product materials. Instead, she merely seeks otherwise-discoverable factual

information contained in the materials.      Alesi can discover this factual

information because the work product doctrine does not safeguard the

discovery of underlying facts gathered in work product materials.       See

Grinnell Corp. v. Palms 2100 Ocean Blvd., Ltd., 924 So. 2d 887, 894 (Fla.

4th DCA 2006) (en banc) (quoting Resol. Tr. Corp. v. Dabney, 73 F.3d 262,

266 (10th Cir. 1995) (“Because the work product doctrine is intended only to

guard against divulging the attorney’s strategies and legal impressions, it

does not protect facts concerning the creation of work product or facts

contained within work product.”)); see also Adams v. Mem’l Hermann, 973

                                       5
F.3d 343, 350 (5th Cir. 2020) (reiterating that work product doctrine protects

only attorney's work product and not underlying facts); 8 Charles Alan Wright

& Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2024 (3d ed. 2022) (noting

that work product doctrine “does not bar discovery of facts a party may have

learned from documents that are not themselves discoverable”). Stated

differently, the underlying facts contained in documents protected by the

work product doctrine are neither fact work product nor opinion work product.

      The Hickman Court recognized that interrogatories or depositions

provided suitable means to uncover “material, non-privileged” facts

embedded in work product.2 See 329 U.S. at 511-13; see also Univ. City

Dev. Partners, Ltd. v. Pupillo, 54 So. 3d 612, 614 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011). For

these reasons, part of the trial court’s order is appropriate, and Alesi can

discover the underlying material, non-privileged factual information

contained in the reports and recorded statement via interrogatory because

this information is not work product.3 If, however, the reports and recorded

      2
        Our sister court has explained that in connection with establishing the
necessary predicate to obtain protected work product, a party should at least
attempt to obtain information via interrogatory or deposition.                 See
Intercontinental Props., Inc. v. Samy, 685 So. 2d 1035, 1036 (Fla. 3d DCA
1997). While this case does not involve the necessity of establishing such a
predicate, it shows the appropriate nature of Alesi’s inquiry.
      3
        Citing Quest Diagnostics Inc. v. Hall, 325 So. 3d 927 (Fla. 5th DCA
2020), Disney frets that if it produces these facts, it will waive its work product
protections on these otherwise-protected documents, thus effectively

                                        6
statement contain any of Disney’s opinions regarding the incident, these

opinions would remain protected. For example, an opinion of why the

accident occurred and who was responsible would not constitute

discoverable underlying facts and would remain protected work product.

See, e.g., Northup v. Acken, 865 So. 2d 1267, 1272 (Fla. 2004) (stating that

an “attorney may not be compelled to disclose the mental impressions

resulting from his or her investigations”).

      In this sense, the trial court’s order sweeps more broadly than merely

compelling the disclosure of facts. Instead, it requires Disney to produce

compelling their future disclosure. In Quest, a plaintiff deposed a Quest
corporate representative. 325 So. 3d at 928. At the deposition, and at least
one time without the plaintiff’s objection, Quest’s corporate representative
disclosed part of an incident report prepared in anticipation of litigation. Id.
at 928–29. We determined this voluntary disclosure constituted a waiver of
the work product protections on the report, and that Quest could not later
seek to safeguard this information after its witness had voluntarily produced
it. Id. at 929. Significantly, Quest never argued that it had not waived work
product protections on its reports because the corporate representative only
testified to facts unprotected by the doctrine.
       This situation is different. Our record reflects that Disney has always
objected to producing its work product, and it has never divulged the contents
of these documents. Disney’s concern about waiver will not materialize if it
answers Alesi’s targeted interrogatory with otherwise-discoverable
underlying factual information. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b)(4); see also
Oklahoma v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 262 F.R.D. 617, 630 (N.D. Okla. 2009)
(noting that although factual information contained in work product can be
discovered via deposition, “interrogatories are the generally preferred route
due to the inherent risk of the [corporate representative] deponent
inadvertently disclosing protected work product”).

                                       7
information about its knowledge of the incident “not limited to” facts. This

would, by definition, include Disney’s work product in the form of mental

impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories. To her credit, Alesi

insists she does not want Disney’s mental impressions, conclusions,

opinions, or legal theories, and she would not be entitled to them anyway.

See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.280(b)(4). Regardless, because the trial court’s order

compels this production, we grant Disney’s petition in part and quash that

portion of the order.

      PETITION GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.                 ORDER

QUASHED IN PART.

SASSO and WOZNIAK, JJ., concur.

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