Court Opinion

ID: 9582169
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:23:19.808626+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:29.929474
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE
¶ 18. (concurring). Although it is not necessary to the court's holding today, which is grounded narrowly on this court's conclusion that exhaustion of administrative remedies was not required in the present case, I would also conclude that Mentek had the right to assistance of counsel established by Wis. Admin. Code § HA 2.05(3)(f) (Jan., 1992) for the administrative appeal of the decision revoking his probation. When an individual has a right to counsel, counsel must be effective.1
¶ 19. The court of appeals focused on the issue of effective assistance of counsel and determined that the right to counsel authorized in the regulations of the Division of Hearing and Appeals applies only to the probation revocation hearing, not to the administrative appeal. Absent a right to counsel on administrative appeal, the court of appeals concluded that Mentek could not argue that he had been denied effective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to file his appeal. I disagree with this reasoning. I agree with the position set forth by Judge Richard Brown in his dissent in the court of appeals.2
¶ 20. The Division's regulations set forth the rights of an individual who faces probation revocation. Wisconsin Admin. Code § HA 2.05, entitled "Revoca*106tion hearing," enumerates the client’s rights at the hearing as follows:
(3) CLIENT'S RIGHTS. The client's rights at the hearing include:
(a) The right to be present;
(b) The right to deny the allegation;
(c) The right to be heard and to present witnesses;
(d) The right to present documentary evidence;
(e) The right to question witnesses;
(f) The right to the assistance of counsel;
(g) The right to waive the hearing;
(h) The right to receive a written decision stating the reasons for it based upon the evidence presented; and
(i) The right to appeal the decision in accordance with sub. (8).
¶ 21. The State points out that this subsection specifies the client's rights "at the hearing." The State then argues that the words "at the hearing" should be read into each of the enumerated rights, including "the right to the assistance of counsel" set forth in provision (f). The State urges us to conclude that the regulations limit a probationer's right to counsel to the revocation hearing itself.
¶ 22. However, as Judge Brown's dissent explains, several of the rights enumerated in subsection (3) are not limited to the hearing itself. For example, (3)(g), the right to waive the hearing, is a pre-hearing right. Provisions (3)(h) and (3)(i), granting the rights to "receive a written decision stating the reasons for it based upon the evidence presented" and to "appeal the decision in accordance with sub. (8)," are post-hearing rights. The right to assistance of counsel *107expressed in (3)(f) seems applicable to before, during, and after a revocation hearing. Consequently, the dissent concluded that statutory interpretation does not require the words "at the hearing" to be read into each of the enumerated rights. I agree. It does not make sense to add the words "at the hearing" to (3)(f), (g), (h), or (i).
¶ 23. Furthermore, Wis. Admin. Code § HA 2.05 is entitled "Revocation hearing," but it governs both pre- and post-hearing matters. Thus,- the term "revocation hearing" as used in Wis. Admin. Code § HA 2.05 encompasses pre-hearing matters such as notice before the hearing3 and post-hearing matters such as appeal,4 as well as the hearing itself.
¶ 24. Additional assistance for our task of interpreting the scope of the right to counsel in Wis. Admin. Code § HA 2.05(3)(f) comes from subsection (8), governing appeal of the administrative law judge's decision. Subsection (8)(a) provides:
The client, the client's attorney, if any, or the department representative may appeal the administrative law judge's decision by filing a written appeal with arguments and supporting materials, if any, with the administrator within 10 days of the date of the administrative law judge's written decision (emphasis added).
The State suggests that the phrase "the client's attorney, if any" means that the regulations do not require the right to assistance of counsel on appeal. However, this interpretation is unconvincing, since the same phrase, "the client's attorney, if any," appears throughout Wis. Admin. Code § HA 2.05, including the *108subsections governing the revocation hearing itself, at which the client unquestionably has the right to the assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Wis. Admin. Code § HA 2.05(6)(g) and (6)(h).
¶ 25. Another aspect of subsection (8) that is helpful to our interpretive task is the fact that it establishes a time period of ten working days for filing a written administrative appeal "with arguments and supporting materials, if any."5 Judge Brown's dissent considered this short administrative appeal time frame relevant, reasoning that it would not make sense to hold that the regulations give an individual a right to counsel at the hearing, but that the client is on his or her own for an appeal, which must be filed within ten days.6 As a result, the dissent concluded that the right to the assistance of counsel set forth in Wis. Admin. Code § HA 2.05(3)(f) extends to the administrative appeal.
*109¶ 26. The most reasonable interpretation of Wis. Admin. Code § HA 2.05(3)(f) is that the probationer has the right to the assistance of counsel for filing an administrative appeal.7 This is the interpretation I would adopt.
¶ 27. For the reasons set forth, I write separately.
¶ 28. I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY joins this opinion.

 See State ex rel. Schmelzer v. Murphy, 201 Wis. 2d 246, 252-53, 548 N.W.2d 45 (1996).

 State ex rel. Mentek v. Schwartz, 2000 WI App 96, ¶ 25, 235 Wis. 2d 143, 612 N.W.2d 746.

 Wis. Admin. Code § HA 2.05(1) (Jan., 1992).

 Wis. Admin. Code § HA 2.05(8) (Sept., 1995).

 Wis. Admin. Code § HA 2.05(8)(a).

 At oral argument, the attorney for the State suggested that this ten-day deadline is not enforced in a Draconian manner, stating:
If somebody is concerned about a deadline, a pro se or probably even an attorney, they say just file something. Just get it in on time and then we'll give you a certain amount of time to supplement it. So it's not like they always have to have everything in within the ten-day working period.
While I appreciate the Division's efforts to provide flexibility, information regarding the Division's informal practices is not relevant to our interpretation of the regulation. The regulation sets forth an unambiguous ten-day time frame for an appeal alongside a right to the assistance of counsel that is ambiguous. Therefore, we consider this ten-day time frame relevant to interpreting the right to counsel in Wis. Admin. Code 2.05(3)(f).

 This analysis is consistent with the analysis used to support an individual's right to counsel on filing a petition for review in this court. See Schmelzer, 201 Wis. 2d at 252-53, in which this court concluded that an accused's right to counsel extends through the filing of a petition for review, and, if the petition is accepted, includes representation through the subsequent proceedings in this court.