Court Opinion

ID: 9772629
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:24:24.848619+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:46.399128
License: Public Domain

*378MEYERS, Judge,
dissenting.
As Judge Maloney points out in his concurring opinion, we granted review in this case on the legal issue whether a controlled substance can be possessed “knowingly” if it is not visible to the naked eye. Last week, we decided that issue adversely to the position taken by the Court of Appeals in this case, at least according to Judge Clinton. See King v. State, 895 S.W.2d 701 (Tex.Crim.App.1995) (Clinton, J., concurring). It follows that the Court of Appeals should not have made visibility a legal criterion against which to judge the sufficiency of the evidence. To this extent, at least, I agree with the Court’s analysis here and in King.
However, the Court then proceeds to judge the sufficiency of the evidence itself, instead of remanding to the Court of Appeals. This is clearly improper under our precedents. Even if this Court had jurisdiction to examine the sufficiency of evidence on discretionary review, which it does not, see King at 709 (Meyers, J. dissenting), it would still violate the rule of comity announced in Arcila v. State, 834 S.W.2d 357 (Tex.Crim. App.1992), for us to do so here. The Court of Appeals has not yet had a chance to review the evidence under the legal standard announced in this case and in King. Were it given the chance to do so, it might well reach a different factual conclusion than this Court reaches today. After all, visibility, although not controlling as a matter of law, is nevertheless a factor which the appellate court may take into account when reviewing the evidence, weighing it in the balance as it sees fit under the particular facts and circumstances of each case.
Accordingly, while I agree that the Court of _ Appeals erred, I think our precedents plainly require that the cause be remanded for reconsideration by that court under the appropriate legal standard of review announced here and in King. Whatever conclusion the lower appellate court were to reach on the question, its judgment would, in my view, be unreviewable by this Court except for errors of law. Thus, because the Court refuses to remand as the law requires and once again insists upon usurping the role of the intermediate appellate courts, I dissent.