Court Opinion

ID: 9659540
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:49:04.005466+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:09.266489
License: Public Domain

Robert L. Brown, Justice, concurring in part; dissenting in part. Since our decision in Walker v. State, 304 Ark. 393, 803 S.W.2d 502 (1991), reh’g denied, 304 Ark. 402-A, 805 S.W.2d 80 (1991), we have cited the principle that a criminal information may suffice as proof of the seriousness and violence of a charge in some nineteen cases.1 Now, after almost seven years of experience under the Walker holding, this court has determined that the prosecutor must do more than simply rely on the criminal information to establish seriousness and violence. I am amenable to requiring the prosecutor to offer some proof of the crime itself to meet the seriousness-and-violence criterion. Indeed, in Walker v. State, supra, we said that it was desirable, even preferable, for the prosecutor to present evidence at the hearing in addition to the charge itself. What satisfies the requirement of “some proof” is not answered in the majority opinion. Evidence of a shooting or death should be enough to corroborate the criminal information on the seriousness and violent nature of the crime. More often than not, the investigating law-enforcement officer could establish that element. Robberies, assaults, and batteries might require the testimony of the victim, absent an agreement to permit hearsay testimony by the investigating officer. In this regard, I remain convinced that the Rules of Evidence should apply to juvenile-transfer hearings. McClure v. State, 328 Ark. 35, 942 S.W.2d 243 (1997)(Brown and Imber, JJ., concurring). I disagree with the concurring opinion of Justice Newbern, however, that the State should have the full burden of proof in juvenile-transfer cases. Admittedly, these hearings present something of a hybrid situation, with both parties having some obligation to offer proof. It would be unreasonable, though, to hold that a juvenile who has been charged in circuit court could simply move to transfer an adult criminal charge to juvenile court and then sit back and force the State to prove a negative, that is, why the matter should not be transferred. It is the juvenile who seeks to change the status quo, and under such circumstances, he or she should have the burden of going forward with the proof. The better course, in my opinion, was set in Walker v. State, supra, when we said that the juvenile has the burden of going forward with proof to show that the criteria are met. More precisely, the juvenile should have the burden of justifying a transfer based on his or her prospects for rehabilitation within the juvenile system, a showing that the current offense does not evidence a repetitive pattern, and perhaps even proof that the offense was not sufficiently serious and violent to warrant a circuit court trial. The prosecutor, however, must also offer some evidence of the seriousness and violence associated with the crime, if the matter is to remain in circuit court, since the circuit court must make that decision based on clear and convincing evidence. And that evidence, with today’s holding, must be more than the criminal information. Without such evidence by the prosecutor, a transfer to juvenile court becomes automatic. Thus, both parties are required to offer some proof. Finally, I disagree with the majority when it holds that the charges against Djuane Thompson in circuit court should be transferred to juvenile court. The prosecutor undoubtedly relied on our line of cases in offering only the criminal information as proof of seriousness and violence in the instant case. With today’s decision, we are changing our caselaw, after citing the principle that a criminal information is sufficient to meet the seriousness- and-violence factor in nineteen cases. I would remand this matter for a juvenile-transfer hearing to be held forthwith, in light of today’s decision, bearing in mind that Thompson turns eighteen on February 28, 1998. Should a hearing not be conducted before that date in sufficient time for the juvenile court to assume jurisdiction over Thompson in the event of a favorable decision to transfer, then I agree that the matter should be automatically transferred. Corbin, J., joins.   Jones v. State, 326 Ark. 681, 933 S.W.2d 387 (1996); Carrol v. State, 326 Ark. 602, 932 S.W.2d 339 (1996); Sanders v. State, 326 Ark. 415, 932 S.W.2d 315 (1996); Brooks v. State, 326 Ark. 201, 929 S.W.2d 160 (1996); Butler v. State, 324 Ark. 476, 922 S.W.2d 685 (1996); Booker v. State, 324 Ark. 468, 922 S.W.2d 337 (1996); Green v. State, 323 Ark. 635, 916 S.W.2d 756 (1996); Cole v. State, 323 Ark. 136, 913 S.W.2d 779 (1996); McGaughy v. State, 321 Ark. 537, 906 S.W.2d 671 (1995); Hamilton v. State, 320 Ark. 346, 896 S.W.2d 877 (1995); Ring v. State, 320 Ark. 128, 894 S.W.2d 944 (1995); Davis v. State, 319 Ark. 613, 893 S.W.2d 768 (1995); Bell v. State, 317 Ark. 289, 877 S.W.2d 579 (1994); Walter v. State, 317 Ark. 274, 878 S.W.2d 374 (1994); Beck v. State, 317 Ark. 154, 876 S.W.2d 561 (1994); Tucker v. State, 313 Ark. 624, 855 S.W.2d 948 (1993); Johnson v. State, 307 Ark. 525, 823 S.W.2d 440 (1992); Vickers v. State, 307 Ark. 298, 819 S.W.2d 13 (1991); Bradley v. State, 306 Ark. 621, 816 S.W.2d 605 (1991).