Court Opinion

ID: 9579630
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:56:51.144448+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:38.160782
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(dissenting in part). I agree with the majority that, on the facts of this case, the trial court erred in permitting plaintiff Michael Gregory to present a theory of recovery against defen*53dant Cincinnati Incorporated based on a postsale obligation to recall the allegedly defective product. I would, however, affirm the verdict against the defendant seller, Addy-Morand Machinery Company. I also write separately to clarify the analysis for determining when such obligations might arise.
i
The majority correctly notes that imposing post-sale obligations is unnecessary where a product is defective at the time of sale. If a product is defective at the time of sale—whether through faulty manufacture or negligent design—the manufacturer is liable for all harm proximately caused by the defect.1 No additional finding of a breached duty is needed to impose liability.
It does not follow, however, that there can never be a postsale obligation to recall a product. In some cases, a manufacturer may have an obligation to protect against dangers posed by products that were not defective when originally sold. A product may prove to be unreasonably dangerous without having been negligently designed.2 Newly developed drugs are an example. The manufacturer may have used all reasonable care in designing the drug. Yet unreasonably dangerous effects of the drug may become apparent once the drug is on the market. See Beshada v Johns-Manville Products Corp, 90 NJ 191, 196-197; 447 A2d 539 *54(1982), noting that the dangers of asbestos were unknown for decades.3
In such a case, a manufacturer who learns or should learn of an unreasonable product-related danger has an obligation to take reasonable steps to prevent the product from causing harm. Describing this obligation as relating to a "product defect” confuses matters. Michigan defines a product defect in terms of the manufacturer’s knowledge and design choices at the time of manufacture and sale of the product.4 Recognizing a post-sale obligation only has meaning when the product is not initially defective.
Any postsale obligation should be viewed as arising out of the general duty to exercise reasonable care for the safety of others. As one commentator explained:
The manufacturer’s duty of due care extends beyond the sale of a product. . . . The extent of that duty depends on many circumstances . . . dictating the conduct of a reasonable person.[5]
This proposition represents no great change in tort law:
*55[W]hy should a manufacturer’s duty to behave reasonably (and thus not negligently) toward a consumer end at the moment the product is sold? Courts traditionally impose a duty on individuals to remedy hazards they create. The duty to recall seems to be merely a reasonable extension of the doctrine into the field of products liability. Once a manufacturer has created a hazard, it must take all reasonable precautions to remedy it.[6] [See also 2 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 321, p 132.][7]
Where an unreasonable danger of a product was unknown and unknowable at the time of sale, a manufacturer who later learns of the danger is under an obligation to exercise reasonable care to protect against that harm.8 In many cases, that obligation will require warnings. In others, meeting the standard of reasonable care may require recall. This might occur, for example, where there is a risk of great danger, or where the product can readily be made safe.9_
*56II
The majority should not distinguish between a postsale obligation to warn and an obligation to repair or recall. Warnings and repairs are properly viewed not as different obligations but simply different points on "a continuum of post-sale precautions . . . .”10 A recall is simply a warning to buyers accompanied by an offer to bear the cost of making, needed changes in the defective product.
This becomes clearer by recognizing that the term "duty to warn” is something of a misnomer. Strictly speaking, in a negligence action, the manufacturer’s "duty” to a customer is to "produce and market articles with reasonable care under the circumstances.”11 In certain cases, meeting that standard of care requires warnings. But in others, the standard of care may require more than simply notifying buyers of a risk:
While "warning” provides a convenient characterization of the manufacturer’s post-sale obligations, the manufacturer’s responsibility may range from providing the buyer with a corrective device, to the simple sending of a letter. [1 Madden, Products Liability (2d ed), § 10.13, p 456.][12]
*57hi
On the facts of this case, it was error to permit Gregory to pursue a theory based on a postsale obligation to repair or recall. The danger posed by the press brake was well known in 1964, when it was manufactured. It had been widely recognized for decades. This was not a case of an unreasonable danger that was unknown and unknowable in 1964. If Cincinnati is liable to Gregory, such liability should be predicated on a product defect existing in 1964. I agree with the majority that the instructional error and the error in the admission of evidence was not harmless and requires that the verdict against Cincinnati be reversed.
IV
I would, however, affirm the verdict against the seller, Addy-Morand Machinery Company. The errors with regard to the introduction of evidence and jury instructions concerning the manufacturer, Cincinnati Incorporated, did not taint the verdict against the seller, Addy-Morand. In contrast to the instructions regarding the design defect claim against Cincinnati, the instructions on the breach of warranty claim against Addy-Morand unambiguously required the jury to consider the condition of the press brake at the time it left Addy-Morand’s control:
When I use the words "implied warranty” as to Addie Moran [sic] Company, I mean a duty im*58posed by law which requires that the seller’s product be reasonably fit for the purposes and uses intended or reasonably foreseeable by the seller. We will talk about the burden of proof as to this claim of breach of implied warranty.
The plaintiff [has] the burden of proof on each of the following as to Addie Moran Company:
Second, that the press brake was not reasonably fit for the uses or purposes anticipated or reasonably foreseeable by Addie Moran Machinery Company at the time it left Addie Moran’s control.
Moreover, the instructions regarding continuing duty specifically applied to the manufacturer, Cincinnati, only:
A manufacturer has a further duty to [k]eep abreast of and be informed of the developments in the field of safety, design and manufacture and to reasonably incorporate new advances in safety technology into the design and manufacturer [sic] of its product. There is no obligation on the part of the manufacturer to provide every possible new device which might possibly, have been conceived or invented.
Further, a manufacturer who learns of a design defect after the product has been sold has a duty to take reasonable actions to correct the defect. It is for you to determine what constitutes reasonable actions. [Emphasis added.]
The majority nevertheless reverses the verdict against Addy-Morand and remands for a new trial on this count. The majority states that because Gregory did not allege that Addy-Morand breached the implied warranty independently of the actions of Cincinnati, any error in the verdict against the manufacturer infected the verdict against Addy-Morand. I do not agree.
*59The verdict against Addy-Morand did not necessarily derive from the verdict against Cincinnati. As the majority notes, "there was some proof offered of negligent design as of 1964.”13 Defense counsel conceded at oral argument that Gregory presented evidence that the press brake was defective in 1964, the year it was manufactured. Neither defendant has challenged the sufficiency of this evidence.
It was this evidence, and not the verdict against Cincinnati, that supported a verdict against Addy-Morand.14 To be sure, "there was no other evidence of negligence or breach of warranty as far as Addy-Morand is concerned . . . .”15 But that is not relevant because there was evidence that the product was defective or not reasonably fit at the time it was manufactured.
My view of this case does not rest on the assumption that juries comprehend and remember every nuance of the instructions. The instructions are the background against which the parties present their summation of the evidence. A party relying on a particular instruction may emphasize that instruction or ask the jury to pay particular attention to it. In this case, confusion between the breach of warranty claim against Addy-Morand and the instructions that Cincinnati had a continuing obligation could have been avoided by emphasizing the differences between the claims. The defendants neglected to make the distinction as a *60matter of trial strategy, and it therefore cannot form the basis for a claim of error.16
Nor would I infer from the proper verdict against Addy-Morand that any instructional error respecting the claim against Cincinnati was harmless. A different conclusion might be appropriate if the jury’s verdict against Addy-Morand followed a defense argument that the jury could find in favor of Addy-Morand even if it found against Cincinnati on the continuing duty theory, in which event the verdict would necessarily reflect a determination that the press brake was defective at the time it was manufactured. On the present record, however, it cannot be concluded with the requisite degree of certainty that the jury would have rendered the same verdict had it been properly instructed on the claim against Cincinnati.
Accordingly, while I agree with the majority that the verdict against Cincinnati should be reversed, I would reinstate the verdict against Addy-Morand._____

 Smith v E R Squibb & Sons, 405 Mich 79, 89; 273 NW2d 476 (1979); Prentis v Yale Mfg Co, 421 Mich 670, 695; 365 NW2d 176 (1984).

 There is unlikely to be a need for a postsale obligation in connection with manufacturing defects. In such cases, the harm is not caused by an unforeseeable risk. Rather, the danger arises because the product deviates from the manufacturer’s own production standards. Prentis, n 1 supra, p 683.

 Such a situation should be distinguished from a case in which new technological advances render an original design obsolete. This Court should recognize a postsale obligation with regard to dangers not reasonably foreseeable at the time of sale as distinguished from unknown safeguards to avoid known dangers.
The majority properly notes that this case does not require that the Court consider postsale obligations involving "dangers discovered after the product enters the market.” Ante, p 17, n 18.

 Prentis, n .1 supra, p 691. As mentioned in n 2 supra, this would not include manufacturing defects.

 2 Lee & Lindahl, Modem Tort Law Liability & Litigation (rev ed), § 27.17, p 564. See also Johnson v Colt Industries Operating Corp, 609 F Supp 776, 782 (D Kan, 1985), aff’d on other grounds 797 F2d 1530 (CA 10, 1986) ("[wjhether a manufacturer has a duty to recall in any given case is incorporated into the concept of due care as it applies to negligence actions generally”); Jones v Bender Welding & Machine Works, 581 F2d 1331, 1335 (CA 9, 1978) (imposing a postsale obligation "to act in a reasonable fashion”).

 Lamken, Efficient accident prevention as a continuing obligation: The duty to recall defective products, 42 Stan L R 103, 106 (1989). This statement was made as a summary of an argument, not as a statement of the author’s position. The author agreed that there is an obligation to recall in certain contexts. Id., p 153.

 The Restatement, § 321 provides that an actor who “subsequently realizes or should realize that [his act] has created an unreasonable risk of causing physical harm to another ... is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent the risk from taking effect.” This applies even if the prior act was not negligent.

 Id.; Braniff Airways, Inc v Curtiss-Wright Corp, 411 F2d 451, 453 (CA 2, 1969), ruling that when design defects threatening "human safety” come to the attention of the manufacturer after the sale of a product, "the manufacturer has a duty either to remedy these or, if complete remedy is not feasible, at least to give users adequate warnings and instructions concerning methods for minimizing the danger.”

 The majority recognizes that courts have imposed postsale duties to recall under such circumstances. Ante, pp 24-25 (duty to repair or recall where the danger is severe), id., p 25 (obligation to modify a product where the manufacturer knows the identity of the product’s owner because of a postsale relationship).

 Lamken, n 6 supra, p 105.

 Lee & Lindahl, n 5 supra, § 27.12, p 556.

 The majority’s effort to limit this Court’s decision in Comstock v General Motors Corp, 358 Mich 163; 99 NW2d 627 (1959), is unpersuasive.
The majority distinguishes Comstock on the basis that, unlike this case, it involved a latent defect. It defines a latent defect as a flaw the manufacturer "knew or should have known of ” at the time of sale.
This argument misapprehends the meaning of “latency.” Manufacturers warn of defects because the customer would fail to know of the danger. "Latency” describes “a potential for injury that is not readily apparent to the user . . . .” Madden, supra, § 10.1, p 357. (Emphasis added.) Latency, for purposes of an obligation to warn buyers, cannot properly be defined in terms of the seller’s knowledge.
*57The principle described by Comstock should not be limited to latent defects. Comstock ruled that the manufacturer’s duty of reasonable care continued after the sale of a product. On the facts of that case, "reasonable care” required postsale warnings. But in other cases, "reasonable care” may involve different or additional steps.

 Ante, p 29.

 [U]nder the common law of products liability, in an action against the manufacturer of a product based upon an alleged defect in its design, "breach of implied warranty and negligence involve identical evidence and require proof of exactly the same elements.” [Prentis, n 1 supra, p 692, quoting Smith, n 1 supra, p 88.]

 202 Mich App 474, 486; 509 NW2d 809 (1993).

 I also note that Addy-Morand did not ask for a separate trial or jury-