Court Opinion

ID: 9852300
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:28:02.811068+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:25.170990
License: Public Domain

SNELL, Justice
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I concur in the result reached in Division II of the majority opinion that the legal standard was met to forfeit the cashier’s check emanating from Rush’s bank account in the Mississippi bank. I respectfully dissent from Division III regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to forfeit other personal property.
The trade in illegal narcotics has occasioned great grief for families, caused enormous economic and human waste, resulted in increased crime, and is today one of our most vexing problems nationally and in Iowa. The forfeiture provisions found in our state law are a powerful tool in our effort to stop this despicable criminal activity. The temptation to use this tool is strong, especially when the suspicion is great that the items seized from Rush were in fact related to his apparent involvement in the drug trade. It is precisely because the illegal drug trade is so pernicious and the need to eradicate it imperative that we *479should be vigilant in applying the rule of law lest we trample the rights of the innocent while punishing the guilty.
Forfeitures are disfavored in law and in equity. Chicago R.I. & P.R. Co. v. City of Iowa City, 288 N.W.2d 536, 541 (Iowa 1980). This court has repeatedly stated that, “In adherence to that rule, forfeiture statutes are to be construed strictly against a forfeiture, with the burden to show full and strict compliance with the statutory procedures upon the party seeking forfeiture.” Jamison v. Knosby, 423 N.W.2d 2, 5 (Iowa 1988) (citing Lett v. Grummer, 300 N.W.2d 147, 149 (Iowa 1981); Kirkpatrick v. Smith, 236 Iowa 584, 593, 19 N.W.2d 699, 703 (1945)). This principle of absolute compliance must also apply to the evidence produced. It must be adequate to support the State’s burden of proof. I believe the State has failed to meet its burden of proof with regard to several of the items seized.
Our standard of review here should be no different from that applied to any other civil proceeding in which our responsibility is to correct errors of law. See State v. One Certain Conveyance, 334 N.W.2d 724, 725 (Iowa 1983). A study of the record is made to determine if the findings by the trial court are supported by substantial evidence. A finding is supported by substantial evidence only if it may be reasonably inferred from the evidence.
While circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in proving a matter in issue, circumstances must have sufficient probative force to constitute a basis for a legal inference. Circumstantial evidence does not have such probative force when the inference drawn from it is “based on surmise, speculation, or conjecture.” Harsha v. State Sav. Bank, 346 N.W.2d 791, 800 (Iowa 1984).
The ultimate fact which the State had to prove by a preponderance of the evidence in order for forfeiture to be valid is that the cash, food stamps, jewelry, and rifle were forfeitable property because Rush violated Iowa Code section 809.1(2) (1987). The trial court found that subsection (b) was violated in that these items were “property which has been used or is intended to be used to facilitate the commission of a criminal offense or to avoid detection or apprehension of a person committing a criminal offense.” The trial court also found a violation of subsection (c) since these items were “property which is acquired as or from the proceeds of a criminal offense.”
The evidence adduced by the State conclusively proved that Rush was a drug dealer. , However, the only evidence presented to prove the connection of the specific property items with illegal drug dealings was circumstantial and was woefully weak. It consisted of Officer Welke’s testimony that (1) drugs, paraphernalia, and cash are necessary to carry on the drug trade, (2) that jewelry and food stamps are mediums of exchange, and (3) that guns are used for protection by drug dealers. In an attempt to fortify the trial court’s findings so that the substantial evidence standard is reached, the majority sees the location of the property in the house as evidence of an illegal source. The majority asserts that jewelry, food stamps, and a rifle not kept where normal law abiding citizens presumably keep such items shows that they were obtained from the illegal drug trade. Although judicial notice is not mentioned, the court must have adopted a new definition of what “everybody knows” since no evidence was presented to connect the location in a house of these items with illegality. Even with the unwarranted assumption that this is more evidence of an illegal drug connection, the standard of proof by substantial evidence to forfeit this property has gone begging.
' When we speak of a fact as established by circumstantial evidence, we mean that the existence of it is fairly and reasonably to be inferred from the other facts proved in the case. IA Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 25 at 954-55 (Tillers Rev.1983). Admissibility of circumstantial evidence must lead to a reasonable inference, not to a mere suspicion of the existence of facts sought to be proved. State v. Wesson, 260 Iowa 331, 149 N.W.2d *480190, 192-93 (1967); see also Wakeley v. State, 118 Neb. 346, 225 N.W. 42, 45 (1929). To forfeit the cash, jewelry, rifle and food stamps, therefore, the evidence must show they came from an illegal source or were illegally used. None of these items was found near drugs or drug account books. Except for the cash, they were not found on or near Rush's person. Rush testified to having considerable legitimate income over the last few years. The food stamps’ value was not large, the- jewelry’s location does not indicate its use as consideration for drugs and the rifle was not even loaded. The cash on Rush’s person greatly exceeded the $700 amount sought to be tied to an illegal drug sale. This cash was not segregated by Rush in any $700 amount. Nevertheless, the State sought forfeiture not of $700, but of all Rush’s money. The ethereal connection to a drug sale is obvious; the overreach by the State is gross and tantamount to being punitive.
We should not take a myopic view of drug forfeiture cases nor ignore the realities of this scourge on society. But the myopia occurs in ignoring the requirements for proving the statutory elements for forfeiting property because of overwhelming evidence that the owner is an illegal drug dealer. In so doing, the rule of law is forfeited with the property.