Court Opinion

ID: 9382674
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-28 16:00:36.751905+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:41.024312
License: Public Domain

FILED
                           NOT FOR PUBLICATION
                                                                            MAR 28 2023
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                          U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

                            FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PHILLIP CAMILLO-AMISANO,                         No.   20-55038

              Plaintiff-Appellant,               D.C. No.
                                                 2:17-cv-06634-ODW-JDE
 v.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS; et                    MEMORANDUM*
al.,

              Defendants-Appellees.

                    Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Central District of California
                    Otis D. Wright II, District Judge, Presiding

                       Argued and Submitted March 16, 2023
                               Pasadena, California

Before: PAEZ, CHRISTEN, and MILLER, Circuit Judges.

      Plaintiff-Appellant Phillip Camillo-Amisano appeals the district court’s

order dismissing with prejudice his pro se complaint alleging several constitutional

claims against Bureau of Prison (BOP) employees and seeking damages pursuant

to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
U.S. 388 (1971). Because the parties are familiar with the facts of this case, we do

not recite them here. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we

affirm.

      We review de novo a district court’s order dismissing a prisoner’s complaint

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Mangiaracina v. Penzone, 849 F.3d 1191, 1195 (9th

Cir. 2017). Dismissal pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6).” Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012).

But pro se complaints are construed liberally and may be dismissed only “if it

appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his

claim that would entitle him to relief.” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 908 (9th

Cir. 2014) (quoting Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012)).

      We affirm the district court’s ruling that Camillo-Amisano’s complaint fails

to state a claim because he seeks only damages, and a Bivens claim is unavailable

for the harms alleged in his complaint. Because Camillo-Amisano concedes that

his claims present new Bivens contexts, the issue on appeal is whether there are any

“special factors” indicating that the judiciary “is at least arguably less equipped

than Congress to ‘weigh the costs and benefits of allowing a damages action to

proceed.’” Egbert v. Boule, 142 S. Ct. 1793, 1803 (2022) (quoting Ziglar v.

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Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 136 (2017)). Though the complaint alleges reprehensible

conduct, the Supreme Court’s decision in Egbert v. Boule establishes that at least

one “special factor” forecloses a Bivens claim here: the BOP’s Administrative

Remedy Program provided Camillo-Amisano access to an alternative remedial

structure for each of his claims. See 142 S. Ct. at 1804, 1806–07; 28 C.F.R. §§

542.10, 542.15. Through that program, Camillo-Amisano could seek “formal

review of an issue relating to any aspect of his[] own confinement,” 28 C.F.R. §

542.10(a), and bypass individual officers by filing grievances directly with the

Regional Director if he feared retaliation, id. § 542.14(d). In Egbert, the Supreme

Court stated that “a court may not fashion a Bivens remedy if Congress already has

provided, or has authorized the Executive to provide, ‘an alternative remedial

structure.’” 142 S. Ct. at 1804 (quoting Ziglar, 582 U.S. at 137). If such a

structure is in place, “‘that alone,’ like any special factor, is reason enough to ‘limit

the power of the Judiciary to infer a new Bivens cause of action.’” Id. (quoting

Ziglar, 582 U.S. at 137); see also Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 74

(2001).

      Camillo-Amisano argues the Administrative Remedy Program is inadequate

because it does not provide for damages and BOP employees interfered with his

ability to use it, but an alternative remedial structure forecloses a Bivens claim even

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if it “do[es] not provide complete relief.” Egbert, 142 S. Ct. at 1804 (quoting Bush

v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 388 (1983)). In Egbert, the Supreme Court emphasized

that “[s]o long as Congress or the Executive has created a remedial process that it

finds sufficient to secure an adequate level of deterrence, the courts cannot second-

guess that calibration.” Id. at 1807. “[T]he question whether a given remedy is

adequate is a legislative determination that must be left to Congress, not the federal

courts.” Id. We therefore hold the district court correctly determined that the

Administrative Remedy Program foreclosed recognizing a Bivens claim for any of

Camillo-Amisano’s allegations.

      AFFIRMED.

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