Court Opinion

ID: 9480431
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:47:54.630277+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:40.487093
License: Public Domain

METZNER, Senior District Judge
(dissenting):
I must disagree with my colleagues’ views in this case. In my opinion, the sentence imposed by the court below cannot be sustained by the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b). Neither the relevant *606statutes nor the Guidelines permit a downward departure from the required Guidelines sentence for a defendant who appears vulnerable to physical attack in prison because of his mannerisms and homosexuality.
The defendant was found guilty of having supplied seven kilograms of 97 per cent pure cocaine to government agents. At the time of sentence the court observed that the evidence against the defendant was overwhelming, that the defendant had committed perjury when he testified at the trial, and that the defendant was still not admitting that he had done something wrong.
When the defendant first appeared for sentence, his counsel stated that he had “grave fears, based on [defendant’s] appearance, his way of being, his generosity, his openness and some factors that were mentioned in the presentence report that he will be victimized in a federal prison.” The factors referred to apparently relate to the defendant’s homosexuality.
The Guidelines’ range for the crime committed by the defendant was 121-1511 months, or 10 to 12-1/2 years. However, because the court had previously declared the Guidelines unconstitutional, it imposed only the mandatory minimum sentence of five years.
After the constitutionality of the Guidelines was upheld, the defendant was remanded for resentencing. At that time his counsel requested a downward departure from the Guidelines’ range based on Section 3553(b). He urged “that in this particular case, we have someone who is a delicate looking young man, someone who for whatever reason has the mannerisms that he has.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The court stated that while the defendant was 22 years old, he looked 16, and that “[t]his defendant is, and I knew it at the time that I sentenced him, peculiarly vulnerable and were it not for the mandatory minimum sentence which Congress required me to impose, I wouldn’t have imposed that at the time.” The court went on to say that “nor do I have any hesitation in modifying those Guidelines downward” because the sentence required by the Guidelines was “nothing less than draconian.”
When the court used the term “peculiarly vulnerable,” I must assume that it was referring to vulnerability stemming from defendant’s mannerisms which reflected his homosexuality. The order appealed from states that the sentence imposed pursuant to the Guidelines is a downward departure “because of the defendant’s vulnerable nature and his admitted bisexuality.”
I
Section 3553(b) mandates the imposition of a sentence within the Guidelines “unless the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described.”
The district court did not decide the question of whether the Commission adequately took into consideration the factor of “peculiar vulnerability” in formulating the Guidelines, the resolution of which presents an issue of law.
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the factors involved here were not considered by the Commission. The majority agrees that vulnerability was considered, but not in the form described by the majority, for the first time, as “extreme vulnerability.” The majority relies on the fact that Morales, between sentences, was placed in solitary confinement for his protection. This fact is irrelevant to determining the issue of law. What is held today will be applicable to the imposition of an original sentence.
The statute creating the Commission provides that the Commission was to:
“provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar *607criminal conduct while maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors not taken into account in the establishment of general sentencing practices.”
28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (1982 & Supp. V 1987) (emphasis supplied).
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sets forth the factors ■ to be considered in imposing sentence. None of them involves the issue of whether the Commission adequately considered the factor under consideration in this case, except subparagraph (6) which refers to “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct....”
With the statutory directives in mind, it is apparent that the Commission, in formulating the Guidelines, adequately considered the factor of a defendant being vulnerable to physical attack in prison because his mannerisms and appearance convey his sexual orientation.
The statute directs that in determining whether the Commission adequately took a factor into consideration, “the court shall consider only the sentencing guidelines, policy statements, and official commentary of the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b). In making this determination, it was said in United States v. Uca, 867 F.2d 783, 787 (3rd Cir.1989) that:
“In exercising our review function on the question whether the Commission adequately took certain factors into consideration a[n] [appellate] court should respect the overriding congressional purpose of reducing sentence disparity and achieving general uniformity of treatment.”
See also United States v. Williams, 891 F.2d 962, 964 (1st Cir.1989).
The members of the Commission are experienced individuals who know of the existence and the extent of homosexuality. A male homosexual is not an unusual person. A male homosexual who, by outward mannerisms, indicates his homosexuality, is not an unusual person. Different, perhaps, but not unusual. The Commission, charged with removing unwarranted disparity in sentencing, could not have overlooked a not unusual set of factors in setting norms for sentencing.
Furthermore, the Commission was directed by' Congress to consider the “nature” and “capacity” of correctional facilities in formulating the Guidelines. 28 U.S.C. § 994(g). Here again, the members of the Commission, because of their breadth of experience, were familiar with the prison environment and the propensity of prisoners to attack physically other inmates. The majority recognizes this but describes the factor as extreme because of Morales’ personal experience in prison. As pointed out above, this experience does not affect the question of law before this court. The Commissioners could not have ignored this not unusual factor in prescribing a guideline applicable to this case pursuant to statutory directive.
II
Even assuming that the Sentencing Commission has not considered the factor of vulnerability because of physical mannerisms, this court must determine whether this factor is sufficiently unusual to warrant departure. This, too, presents a question of law with plenary review. United States v. Hays, 899 F.2d 515 (6th Cir.1990); United States v. Lang, 898 F.2d 1378 (8th Cir.1990); United States v. White, 893 F.2d 276, 278 (10th Cir.1990); United States v. Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d 43, 49 (1st Cir. 1989).
It is agreed that vulnerability, although not expressly mentioned by the Commission as a factor, was considered by the Commission. The Commission considered physical condition, United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, § 5H1.4 (Nov. 1989) (U.S.S.G.), as it might impact on the length of sentence. The Commission stated that such condition is not ordinarily relevant in determining departure except in the case of “an extraordinary physical impairment [which] may be a reason to impose a sentence other than imprisonment.” U.S.S.G. § 5H1.4, p.s. The *608Senate Report, S.Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 52, reprinted in 1984 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 3182, 3356 (Legislative History), in commenting on physical condition, talks of “a particular serious illness,” such as terminal cancer. Defendant’s immature appearance, mannerisms and homosexuality do not present an extraordinary situation and are a far cry from the serious health problems contemplated by Congress or the Commission.
The Commission, in a policy statement regarding mental and emotional conditions, also found that these conditions are not ordinarily relevant in determining whether departure should be granted. U.S.S.G. § 5H1.3, p.s. Homosexuality is not a mental or emotional condition. Homosexuals, like heterosexuals, may have mental or emotional problems. There is no indication that this defendant has any such problems.
Furthermore, 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) limits consideration of mental or emotional condition “to the extent that such condition mitigates the defendant’s culpability.” It is clear that plaintiff’s condition is not remotely related to his culpability.
The floor debates relating to section 3553(b) make clear that a court’s departure power was to be highly circumscribed:
“Adherence to the guidelines is therefore properly required under the law except in those rare and particularly unusual circumstances in which the court concludes that there is present in the case an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind or to a degree not included in the guidelines, and that the presence of this circumstance should result in a sentence different from that described.”
133 Cong.Rec. 516647 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1987) (statement of Senator Hatch) (emphasis supplied).
The Commission has said in a policy statement that while there may be departures on grounds other than those stated in the Guidelines or outside suggested levels, “[i]n its view, however, such cases will be highly unusual.” U.S.S.G. Ch. 1, Pt. A, intro., p.s. at 1.7. It is apparent, therefore, that departures are recognized as proper only when the factor involved significantly differs from the norm.
We do not have here a highly unusual circumstance. Persons who look young and whose mannerisms may indicate homosexuality are not unusual persons. Physical attack in prison is not an unusual situation. The incarceration of such a person does not create an unusual case. The combination of these factors does not create an atypical case. United States v. Rosen, 896 F.2d 789, 792 (3d Cir.1990).
In short, physical mannerisms causing physical attack in prison do not, as a matter of law, present a highly unusual circumstance permitting departure from the Guidelines.
Ill
If the sole question in this case is the reasonableness of the departure from the Guidelines, the court below abused its discretion even under the standards in this circuit of “wide discretion,” United States v. Palta, 880 F.2d 636, 639 (2d Cir.1989), and “sensible flexibility,” United States v. Correa-Vargas, 860 F.2d 35, 40 (2d Cir.1988).
One of the primary motivating factors in the creation of the Sentencing Commission and the adoption of the Guidelines was to create, to the maximum extent possible, uniformity in sentencing. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B). As the Sentencing Commission stated: “Congress sought uniformity in sentencing by narrowing the wide disparity in sentences imposed by different federal courts for similar criminal conduct by similar offenders.” U.S.S.G. Ch. 1, Pt. A, intro., p.s. at 1.2. Persons guilty of the same offense should receive the same punishment where possible.
The Guidelines are addressed mainly to the crime committed and conduct of the defendant relevant to the commission of the crime. They give small value to the individual characteristics of a defendant, although departure in this area is recognized. The Commission has stated in the introduction to the Guidelines that “[w]hile Chapter 5, Part K lists factors that the *609Commission believes may constitute grounds for departure, those suggested grounds are not exhaustive.... In its view, however, such cases will be highly unusual.” Id. at 1.7.
Many judges are unhappy with the Guidelines, for one reason or another. That unhappiness clearly comes through in the views of the court below. However, until Congress changes the law, which is its province, we must proceed within the reasonable parameters of the statute and the Guidelines. See United States v. Aguilar-Pena, 887 F.2d 347, 353 (1st Cir.1989) (“Judicial dissatisfaction alone, no matter how steeped in real-world wisdom, cannot be enough to trigger departures, lest the entire system crumble.”); United States v. Lopez, 875 F.2d 1124, 1126-27 (5th Cir.1989) (disagreement with the Guidelines does not provide a reasonable basis for departure).
We are told in the floor debate that departure should be made only in the atypical, unusual case. 133 Cong.Rec. 516647 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1987) (statement of Senator Hatch). The Senate Report on the original bill defines departure as the rare form of a circumstance which has not been considered by the Commission, or the usual form which has been considered but is present in a particularly extreme form. Legislative History at 3261-62. Homosexuality and physical mannerisms creating vulnerability are not circumstances of a rare form, nor an extreme form.
The introduction to the Guidelines Manual at 1.6 states: “When a court finds an atypical case, one to which a particular guideline linguistically applies, but where conduct significantly differs from the norm, the court may consider whether a departure is warranted.” The Commission went on to say that it has adopted this departure policy because of “the difficulty of foreseeing and capturing a single set of guidelines that encompasses the vast range of human conduct potentially relevant to a sentencing decision.” Id. In both of these statements, the Commission refers to “conduct,” which obviously means the conduct of the defendant in relation to the commission of the crime. As discussed above, this defendant’s conduct does not significantly differ from the norm, either with respect to the crime committed, or as a characteristic of the individual.
The Commission concluded by saying that it “believes that despite the courts’ legal freedom to depart from the guidelines, they will not do so very often. This is because the guidelines, offense by offense, seek to take account of those factors that the Commission’s sentencing data indicate make a significant difference in sentencing at the present time.” Id. at 1.7, p.s.
The case law has followed these directives in limiting the power of the court to depart. In United States v. Williams, 891 F.2d 962 (1st Cir.1989), a case involving downward departure, the court said at 964: “To implement the guidelines properly ... courts must remember the importance which Congress, and the Commission, attached to ensuring that like situations are treated alike.”
The court went on to say at 967:
“So long as we are unready to consign ‘the oft-stated importance of eliminating disparity in sentencing’ to the scrap heap, then departures must be bottomed on meaningful atypicality; in other words, the circumstances triggering a departure must be truly ‘unusual.’ ”
Similar views are found in United States v. Van Dyke, 895 F.2d 984, 987 (4th Cir.1990); United States v. Bolden, 889 F.2d 1336, 1340-41 (4th Cir.1989); United States v. Uca, 867 F.2d at 787.
Drug trafficking is one of the most serious crimes facing us. The defendant is not a steerer-addict seeking to support his habit by being involved in the sale of several glassine envelopes. Rather, he is an intelligent young man, with no indication of being a drug user, who was involved in the sale of 7 kilos of 97 per cent pure cocaine.
Through experience, we have learned that the usual glassine envelope contains 1.5 to 2.5 grains and costs a minimum of $5. If we take an average of two grains per sale, the 7 kilograms of cocaine would end up in 53,900 glassine envelopes worth a *610minimum of $260,000. There have been estimates that the street level value of a kilogram of cocaine is $85,000, which would make 7 kilos worth $595,000. Cook, The Paradox of Antidrug Enforcement, Forbes, Nov. 13,1989, at 105. The amount and purity suggest that the defendant is in the higher echelons of drug trafficking. The Guidelines would recognize this as warranting an upward departure from the 121-151 months applicable in this case. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, Comment, (n. 9).
As the result of today’s decision, this defendant will sit in cell A serving five years’ incarceration, while next door in cell B will be an inmate, who may even be homosexual without outward manifestation of his sexual orientation, convicted of the same crime, who must look at the four walls around him for five additional years under the minimum Guideline sentence because he lacks greater vulnerability to attack flowing from physical mannerisms. This result cannot be justified by any reasonable interpretation of the Guidelines or the policies behind them.
The ruling in this case creates a class of defendants who, by reason of their mannerisms and appearance, will receive favored treatment regardless of the nature of the crime committed.
If there is a problem in prisons with the protection of criminals from physical attack, it should not be dealt with by imposing a lighter sentence on a “vulnerable” person. It should be corrected by better prison administration. Failure to do so would result in liability for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Roland v. Johnson, 856 F.2d 764, 769-70 (6th Cir.1988).
In this case the sentence cannot be sustained under either a “wide discretion” or “sensible flexibility” power in the sentencing judge.
The judgment should be reversed and the case remanded for resentencing in accordance with the views expressed here and in the Guidelines.

. The court below mistakenly stated that the Guidelines required a sentence of 151 months.