Court Opinion

ID: 9944416
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-26 16:59:55.735356+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:59:10.715041
License: Public Domain

I agree with the lead Justices that a defendant is required to establish materiality and reasonableness before a trial court may exercise its discretionary prerogative to require disclosure of the identity of a confidential informant, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Roebuck,545 Pa. 471, 478, 681 A.2d 1279, 1283 (1996), and that Appellee failed to make the requisite showing here. Although Appellee's explanation regarding his need is somewhat more specific than the lead opinion portrays, 1 the lack of record support is, in my view, dispositive.Cf. Commonwealth v. Herron, 475 Pa. 461, 466, 380 A.2d 1228, 1230 (1977) (reasoning that, "before disclosure of an informer's identity is required in the face of the Commonwealth's assertion of privilege, more is necessary than a mere assertion by the defendant that such disclosure might be helpful in establishing a particular defense.").
Since the threshold requirements were not met, it seems unhelpful, at least to me, to evaluate the appropriate exercise of trial-court discretion under the Carter-Roviaro test.2 Moreover, although the lead Justices desire to bring clarity to this area of the law, see
Opinion Announcing the Judgment of *Page 268 
the Court ("OAJC"), op. at 319, portions of the balancing discussion presented in the lead opinion are in tension with past majority decisions of this Court. For example, the OAJC appears to blend the initial reasonableness requirement with Carter-Roviaro balancing, treating informant safety as a dispositive consideration under either inquiry.See OAJC, op. at 319 ("[T]he fact that a legitimate concern for the informant's safety existed, rendered the request for disclosure of the informant's identity unreasonable."); id. at 325 ("Nor was the request reasonable given the established risk to the CI's safety."). Previously, however, the Court has allocated the informant safety factor to theCarter-Roviaro analysis. See Commonwealth v. Bing, 551 Pa. 659, 664,668, 713 A.2d 56, 58, 60 (1998).
Fostering additional disharmony with existing cases, the OAJC invokes sentiments expressed by a concurring and dissenting author, without discussing the majority view that prevailed in the case under consideration. See OAJC, op. at 325 (citing Roebuck, 545 Pa. at 486,681 A.2d at 1287 (Castille, J., concurring and dissenting)).
Finally, the OAJC seems to downplay the established burden, resting with the Commonwealth in Carter-Roviaro balancing, to establish a "reasonably specific type of danger" to a confidential informant in order to justify controlling reliance by the trial court on such factor. Bing,551 Pa. at 667, 713 A.2d at 60.
In this regard, although this Court's application of the above standard is not extensive, Bing provides an illustrative example of the circumstances that warrant withholding an informant's identity for safety reasons. In Bing, the appellant sought disclosure of the identities of multiple informants who participated in a countywide drug task force operation. At an evidentiary hearing, state troopers testified that one informant had been recently harassed and threatened because of his suspected cooperation with authorities, and that a second informant had been assaulted when it became known in his community that he was working with the police. Because the safety of the informants would have been jeopardized had *Page 269 
their identities been disclosed, this Court concluded that the trial court did not err in denying the appellant's request. See Bing,551 Pa. at 668, 713 A.2d at 60.3
Here, while it is true that Officers Weaver and McClain testified that "the CI's safety might be jeopardized by disclosing his identity," OAJC,op. at 324, their testimony effectively amounted to a series of equivocal, and largely unsupported, conclusions. For instance, Officer Weaver stated that she was told by another officer that the informant feared retaliation if his identity were disclosed, but she did not provide any facts to substantiate this contention. See N.T., Sept. 20, 2005, at 25-27. Similarly, Officer McClain offered his opinion that, "[I]f the identity of the informant . . . is revealed, harm could come to their life." N.T., Nov. 29, 2005, at 13. Pressed by Appellee's counsel for the factual basis for his belief, Officer McClain stated that, given "the amount of narcotics being sold," the informant was at greater risk of "possibly" being harmed than a normal witness. Id. at 22.4
Although I am cognizant of the inherent risks surrounding confidential informants, the prevailing standards are also designed to take into account the interests of a criminal defendant *Page 270 
in securing a fair trial. For this reason, the "reasonably specific type of danger" litmus remains the prevailing standard to justify withholding an informant's identity because of safety concerns. Bing,551 Pa. at 667, 713 A.2d at 60. To the degree that balancing is appropriate here, I believe this salient standard should be applied. See generallyCommonwealth v. Carter, 427 Pa. 53, 63-64, 233 A.2d 284, 289 (1967) (rejecting the Commonwealth's policy argument in favor of the maximum restriction of the disclosure rule).
Chief Justice CASTILLE and Justice TODD join this Concurring Opinion.
1 According to Appellee, he seeks to impeach the testimony of the police witnesses regarding the mechanics of how the drug transaction took place and how the drugs were recovered. See Brief for Appellee at 15.
2 The discussion of balancing in the lead opinion is arguably dictum, albeit perhaps it is offered as an alternative holding. See Commonwealthv. Markman, 591 Pa. 249, 282 n. 15, 916 A.2d 586, 606 n. 15 (2007) (discussing the practice of alternative holdings); Commonwealth ex rel.Fox v. Swing, 409 Pa. 241, 245, 186 A.2d 24, 26 (1962) ("Where a decision rests on two or more grounds equally valid, none may be relegated to the inferior status of obiter dictum[.]") (citation omitted).
3 In reaching this determination, Bing found two cases instructive,Commonwealth v. Miller, 513 Pa. 118, 518 A.2d 1187 (1986), andCommonwealth v. Weidenmoyer, 518 Pa. 2, 539 A.2d 1291 (1988), where this Court refused, amid safety concerns, to reveal certain information that could have led to the disclosure of the confidential informant's identity. Most relevant for the purposes of the present appeal is the evidence that the Commonwealth presented in those matters. In Miller, a detective testified that the informant's life would be severely imperiled if his identity were known, because: the informant provided information that led to the arrest of the appellant for robbery and an unrelated shooting, the arrest of appellant's brother in a separate matter, and the arrest of four other individuals; all of the arrestees lived in close proximity to the informant; and the informant had daily contact with the arrestees' families. See Miller, 513 Pa. at 124-25, 518 A.2d at 1190. Likewise, in Weidenmoyer, a trooper testified that he feared that a motorcycle gang would seek retaliation against the informant if his identity were known, since the appellee was a member, and gang members had already threatened reprisals against one witness. See Weidenmoyer,518 Pa. at 11-12 n. 5, 539 A.2d at 1296 n. 5.
4 Parenthetically, it is unclear from the record the amount of cocaine that Appellee allegedly sold Officer McClain. See N.T., Oct. 19, 2004, at 6.