Court Opinion

ID: 9364193
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-18 18:00:42.894627+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:36.539887
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                        FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        JAN 18 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                              FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ISRAEL FRANCO MORALES,                           No.   20-72319

                Petitioner,                      Agency No. A029-304-411

 v.
                                                 MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

                Respondent.

                     On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals

                              Submitted January 12, 2023**
                                 Pasadena, California

Before: WATFORD, FRIEDLAND, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.

      Israel Franco Morales, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of

an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming, without opinion,

the decision of an immigration judge (“IJ”) denying his application for cancellation

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
                                                                          Page 2 of 4

of removal. Morales also seeks review of the IJ’s denial of his motion to

administratively close proceedings. We deny the petition in part and dismiss it in

part.

        1. Morales asserts that the notice to appear (“NTA”) he was issued did not

confer jurisdiction on the immigration court because it did not contain the date,

time, and place of hearing. As we recently held, however, “the failure of an NTA

to include time and date information does not deprive the immigration court of

subject matter jurisdiction.” United States v. Bastide-Hernandez, 39 F.4th 1187,

1188 (9th Cir. 2022) (en banc); see also Aguilar Fermin v. Barr, 958 F.3d 887, 889

(9th Cir. 2020) (“[A]n initial NTA need not contain time, date, and place

information to vest an immigration court with jurisdiction if such information is

provided before the hearing.”). The immigration court therefore had the authority

to order Morales’s removal.

        2. The IJ applied the correct legal standard when assessing whether Morales

demonstrated the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” required for

cancelation of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). “To establish exceptional and

extremely unusual hardship, an applicant must demonstrate that qualifying

relatives would suffer hardship that is substantially different from, or beyond, that

which would normally be expected from the deportation of an alien with close

family members here.” De La Rosa-Rodriguez v. Garland, 49 F.4th 1282, 1291
                                                                           Page 3 of 4

(9th Cir. 2022) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). The IJ applied this

standard when he determined that the family-separation and financial hardships

that Morales and his children will experience if he is removed, while significant,

are not atypical. Morales’s claim that the IJ erroneously focused on present facts,

rather than future difficulties, lacks merit. Although the IJ commented on the

academic performance of Morales’s children and their health conditions during a

time period when his wife had primary custody and Morales was significantly

behind on his child support payments, these facts reasonably informed the IJ’s

predictions of the family’s future hardships absent cancelation of removal.

      3. We lack jurisdiction to consider Morales’s claim that the denial of his

motion to administratively close proceedings constituted an abuse of discretion and

a violation of his due process rights. “[F]ailure to raise an issue in an appeal to the

BIA constitutes a failure to exhaust remedies with respect to that question and

deprives this court of jurisdiction to hear the matter.” Zara v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d

927, 930 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal citation omitted). This rule applies even when

the BIA affirms the IJ’s decision without an opinion pursuant to 8 C.F.R.

§ 1003.1(e)(4). See id. at 931. Because Morales did not challenge the IJ’s denial

of his motion for administrative closure in his appeal to the BIA, we cannot review

this claim.
                                                                        Page 4 of 4

      PETITION DENIED IN PART and DISMISSED IN PART.1

1
 The temporary stay of removal remains in place until issuance of the
mandate. The motions for a stay of removal are otherwise denied.