Court Opinion

ID: 9808734
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 20:48:30.470507+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:17:55.235497
License: Public Domain

Allen J.,
dissenting: I think I may assert with confidence that this-is the first instance on record in which it has been held that property escheated when the owner left a will undertaking to dispose of it, and when if he had died intestate there was one who could take as his heir.
That the owner intended to dispose of his entire estate appears from the will in the record, and that one survived him, his widow, who could take as heir in case of intestacy, is shown by Rule 8 of Descents, which is as follows: “When any person shall die, leaving none who can claim as heir to him, his widow shall be deemed his heir, and as such shall inherit his estate.”
We should not, I submit with deference, reach such a conclusion unless forced to do so by imperative legal rules, as it thwarts the will of the-testator and is at variance' with the spirit of the statute of descent,, which, in this instance, names an heir, and with the law of escheats,, which substitutes “the University in the place of the puhlic in regard to> *238all such real property as fell to the State for want of heirs capable to take.” University v. Gilmour, 3 N. C., 130.
In determining the rights of the parties, I attach no importance to the words in the will “left at my said wife’s death” and “left by her,” which .are emphasized in the opinion of the Court, because in Item 3 the testator gave to his wife for life personal as well as real property; and knowing that she could not dispose of the land, and that much of the personal property'would be consumed, the words naturally refer to the personal property left by her.
The controversy depends on the legal effect to be given to the devise to the “legal heirs” of the testator in the fifth item.
When one “has made a will, the presumption is that he thereby intended to dispose of his entire property,” and “the instrument must be construed in reference to that presumption” (McCallum v. McCallum, 167 N. C., 311), and in this case we not only have the legal presumption, but the will shows unmistakably the purpose to dispose of all his property.
“The intention must be gathered from the will itself, as read, in view ■ of all the facts and surrounding circumstances” (Wooten v. Hobbs, 170 N. C., 214) and “The meaning attributed by him (the testator) to words and phrases, when it appears, must prevail, however different this may be from that ordinarily implied by such words and phrases in ■ other wills or other written instruments. The sole and controlling purpose is to ascertain what the testator whose will may be under consideration intended.” Gray v. West, 93 N. C., 444.
If there is “no defect in the description of either the person or thing • on the face of the instrument it becomes necessary to fit the description to the person or thing; in other words, to identify it. Here, as a, matter • of course, evidence dehors is admissible.” Institute v. Norwood, 45 N. C., 69, approved McLeod v. Jones, 159 N. C., 76.
“Words of every kind, -technical as well as others, aiid particularly when used in last wills, are liable to be varied in their meaning to meet the intention of those who use them; when shown in an authentic manner, the word heir may mean some other person than him on whom the law casts the inheritance in a real estate.” Croom v. Herring, 11 N. C., 395.
It is true in the Croom case the word “heir” was used in connection with personal property, and there was other language in the will indicating that it was not used in its technical sense, but the case is authority for the position that heir “may mean some other person than him on whom the law casts the inheritance in a real estate.”
Applying these principles, it appears that there is no defect on the face of the will, as the term “legal heirs” has a known signification; but *239when construed technically there is no one to answer the description •and it is presumed the testator intended to dispose of his whole estate and had some one in mind who could take, it is necessary to look at the situation of the testator and the surrounding circumstances in order that the persons called “legal heirs” may be identified, and it was for this purpose the parol evidence was admitted, and it shows that the plaintiffs are the children of Frank and Calve McCullen and are the lineal descendants of the sister of the mother of the testator; that the testator spoke of Frank and Calve McCullen as “first cousins,” as “kin to me,” as “the nearest kin he had,” and said “he had no children and no kinsfolk but the McCullens, and that the McCullens was kin to him and would be his heirs he reckon.” Webster defines “reckon” “to conclude, as on an enumeration and balancing of chances; hence to think, suppose”; and as so understood at the time the will was made, the testator concluded, thought, or supposed, the McCullens were his legal heirs, and so devised his property to them. He was thinking of some one, and if not of the McCullens, of whom? since he had declared they were not only his nearest kin, but that he had no other kin, and he thought they were his heirs.
The suggestion that the testator may have had in mind the birth of a child by a second marriage, or by his wife then living, has nothing to support it. Wills speak as of the death of the testator (Revisal, sec. 3140), and the possibility of a second marriage died with him, and it is not within the bounds of probability that he had even a remote idea that the wife with whom he had lived thirty-nine years, and who had given birth to no child, would bear him a child and “legal heir” within nine months after his death.
I therefore think that the verdict of the jury finding that the testator meant by the use of the words “my legal heirs,” Frank and Calve Mc-Cullen, ought to 'stand and the judgment be affirmed, and the same conclusion would be reached if the property devised is treated as personalty.
But if this is not so, it does not follow that the University takes by escheat; and, on the contrary, if the plaintiffs have no title, it seems to me, clearly the defendants are the owners as devisees of the widow of the testator.
The Court says “There is no ambiguity. The devise is to a class— my legal heirs; and who they were is a matter of law.” Granted, for the purpose of the discussion, and the law says “When any person shall die leaving none who can claim as heir to him, his widow shall be deemed as heir to him, and as such shall inherit his estate.” In other words, the opinion of the Court, as I understand it, proceeds upon the idea that the testator had no person in mind when he said “my legal heirs,” and that he intended those to take who could answer the roll call, *240without regard to person; and if so, tbe widow must be held to baye the title as she was the only legal heir under the statute when the will was made, when the testator died, and when she died. Everett v. Griffin, 174 N. C., 107, is an instance of the word “heir” in a will being held to-include a widow, and in Freeman v. Knight, 37 N. C., 75, the same effect was given to “my legal heirs.” The first case is also authority for holding that the proceeds of sale should be dealt with as personalty upon the-ground of equitable conversion, but I do not think this affects the rights-of the parties as the widow would take the same, whether as heir or distributee.
The phrase “after her death-” is no stronger than “at the expiration of my wife’s interest,” and it was held in Taylor v. Taylor, 174 N. C., 538, that in a devise to the wife during widowhood “and at the expiration of -my wife’s interest in land and property, divide it equally among my living children,” that the children who were to take must be ascertained as of the death of the testator, and the same rule would give this property to the widow.
The objection is made that this view cannot prevail because a life estate is given to the widow, and that this demonstrates that the testator did not intend for her to have more, but I respectfully submit that this is answered by the Court when it is held that the testator had no one in mind when he wrote “my legal heirs,” and that his purpose was to give the remainder to those upon whom the law cast the inheritance, without regard to person; and if this is true, and the widow falls within the class, she must take.
Again, it is urged that the widow cannot take under the Rule of Descent except when the husband dies “not having devised the same,” and that the devise to “my legal heirs” prevents the operation of the rule, but the Court has held that the property has not been devised because there was no one to take. If, however, the widow is not within the term “my legal heirs” and cannot take under the will, there is no one who can, no one has ever been in existence who could, and no one can now come into being to answer the description; and if so, the devise-in remainder lapsed and was void, and this upon the death of the testator left the life estate in the widow under the will, and the remainder-in fee undisposed of, which the widow inherited under the Rule of Descent before referred to.
There is one other position in favor of the widow, which is amply supported by authority, and which was approved in a unanimous opinion of this Court in Thompson v. Batts, 168 N. C., 334, and that is that the devise to “my legal heirs” was void as a remainder and left the reversion in fee in the testator at his death, and if so, it passed to the widow under the Rule of ílescent.
*241Feme says, page 51: “A limitation to the right heirs of the grantor will continue in himself as a reversion in fee. As where a fine was levied to the use of the wife of the couser for life, remainder to the use of B. in tail, remainder to the use of the right heirs of the couser, it was adjudged that the limitation of the use to the right heirs of the couser was void, for that the old use of the fee continued in him as a reversion.”
In Read and Morpeth v. Evington, Moor K. B., 284, it was ruled that “If a man seized in fee make a feoffment to the use of A. in tail or for life, remainder to the use of his own right heirs, the land upon the death of A. without issue returns to the feoffer as his ancient reversion, and does not rest in his right heir as a remainder by purchase.”
Sir Edward Coke says: “If a man make a gift in tail, or a lease for life, the remainder to his own right heirs, this remainder is void and he hath the reversion in him, for the ancestor during his life beareth in his body (in the judgment of law) all his heirs.” Go. Litt., 22.
In Hargrave and Butler’s notes (1 Am. Ed., from 19’ London Ed. of 1853) one of the notes to this section states the following case, being note 3: “Feoffment to the use of feofee for forty years, remainder to ■ B. in tail, remainder to the right heirs of the feoffor. It is the old reversion, and the feoffor may devise it, for the use returned to the feoffor for want of consideration to retain it in the feoffee till the death of the feoffor.” See, also, 2 Wash. Real Property, 692, and Robinson v. Blankinship, 92 S. W., 854, 24 A. & E. Enc. L., 398.
Referring to remainders limited to heirs of grantor, Chief Justice Parson, in Law Lectures, p. 142, note, says: “A grant to Z. for life,, remainder to heirs of grantor, the limitation is not a remainder, but the grantor takes his old reversion.” Again, on p. 147, note: “The test by which the applicability of the doctrine may be determined in any particular case is to strike out the devise to the heir, and if he would still take the same interest as the will gives him, the devise is void.”
“An instance of this sort of remainder is exhibited in a grant to Z.. for life, remainder to the heirs of grantor. This limitation, although denominated a remainder in the grant, really is not such. It does not devolve on the heirs.of the grantor as purchasers, as it would do if a remainder, but remains in the grantor himself as his old reversion in fee.” Minors Institute, Vol. 2, pp. 399-400.
“It is a settled maxim of common law that a person cannot make a conveyance of realty to his own right heirs; and a remainder thus limited is void and will remain in the grantor as his old reversion, and his heirs at his death will take by descent and not by purchase.” Harris v. McLaren, 30 Miss., 533.
The same principle is recognized in King v. Scoggin, 92 N. C., 99, *242where the Court says: “It is true, remainders are created by deed or writing, but the estate- is sometimes created, so that what is called a remainder is, in effect, only a reversión; as, for instance, when an estate is given to one for life, remainder to the right heirs of the grantor (2 Washburn on Real Property, 692; Burton on Real Property, 51), and this must be the kind of remainder classed with reversions which go to the donor or to him who can make himself heir to him.”
“An estate in reversion is the residue of an estate left in the grantor, to commence in possession after the determination of some particular estate granted out by him. It is a present vested estate, although to take effect in possession and profit in futuro." 16 Cyc., 661.
“A reversion descends like the old inheritance.” King v. Scoggins, 92 N. C., 102.
Under this principle, twice approved unanimously by our Court, so much of the estate as the testator attempted to devise to his legal heirs did not pass by the will, but remained in him as a present vested interest, and upon his death descended to his heirs, and at the time of his death his widow was his only heir.
If this is sound it can make no difference that the devise to “my legal heirs” is after the death of the wife, because the devise being to the heirs of the testator it can never take effect as a remainder vested or contingent, and operates only as a reversion, which left in the testator at his death the interest attempted to be devised to his heirs, and as “a reversion descends like the old inheritance” it would belong to the widow, who was the only heir at the death of the testator. In other words, it never has been, nor can be, necessary to ascertain the legal heirs of the testator after the death of his wife, because the attempt to devise an interest to his heirs after the life estate of his wife is inoperative and has the legal effect of leaving that interest in the testator at his death, and it would descend to him who was then his heir.
It seems that a sale of the property will not be necessary as all of the parties to the record have elected to treat the property involved in this litigation as land. Why, then, is she not entitled to the property in preference to the University? If it be said the testator did not intend for her to have more than a life estate, it is certain he had no intention of giving his estate to the University, and as the University has abandoned the domain of intent and is relying upon technical legal rules, she may do likewise. I have, therefore, come to the conclusion that the plaintiffs are entitled to recover; and if not that, the defendants are the owners of the land, and that the University has no standing in Court.