Court Opinion

ID: 9624913
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:21:22.711539+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:05:59.745507
License: Public Domain

LENT, J.,
specially concurring.
I concur in the opinion of the court but would add a thought or two concerning the troublesome task of the trial judge in framing proper jury instructions in cases such as this. Here the plaintiff sought recovery on two counts: common law fraud and violation of the Unlawful Trade Practices Act. The same conduct of the defendant was to be the basis of recovery under either theory, and the amount of damages recoverable did not depend upon which count might serve as the vehicle of recovery.
The trial judge instructed, in part, as follows:
"In order to prove that defendant is liable for fraud, plaintiff has the burden of proving each and every element of fraud, as I have defined those elements for you, by clear and convincing evidence. By clear and convincing, I mean that the evidence of fraud must be such as to persuade you that the truth of the facts is highly probable.” (emphasis added)
and, further, that
«* * * The person having the affirmative of the issue in this case would be the plaintiff, he has to prove either fraud or a violation of the Unlawful Trade Practices Act, as alleged in those respects in the complaint on file herein, and as I was getting ready to say, or perhaps I did say, the burden of proof is sustained by what is known as a preponderance of the evidence. It means the greater weight of the evidence. It is such evidence that when weighed with that opposed to it has more convincing force and is more probably true and accurate.” (emphasis added)
*419Defendant contends that these are contradictory instructions, and we have assumed them so to be.
The task of the trial judge to avoid such contradiction is troublesome because of judge-made law that common law fraud can only be established by "clear and convincing” evidence and that juries must be so instructed. See Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Lesher, 152 Or 161, 52 P2d 1133 (1935) and Cook v. Michael, 214 Or 513, 33 P2d 1026 (1958), which partially overruled Lesher insofar as the applicability to civil cases of ORS 41.110 (defining "satisfactory evidence”) is concerned. A juror on a case such as this must find it strange indeed that plaintiff may recover under the statute if he has made it appear from the evidence that it is more probable than not that the facts are as he asserts them to be, but plaintiff can recover on the other count only if the same evidence is "clear and convincing.” Obviously, if the jury believes plaintiffs version of the events, the jury will be convinced, and the evidence perforce must have been "convincing,” whether or not "clear.”
Let us examine a hypothetical situtation. P accuses D of fraudulently depriving P of his property. The only evidence adduced is the testimony of P, which we assume to be sufficient, if believed, to establish fraud by D. P is impeached by showing that he has been convicted in an unrelated matter of the crime of perjury. D’s testimony is a denial that he did the things P testified D did. If the jury believes P, it necessarily therein finds that he has established his case by a preponderance of the evidence, by clear and convincing evidence, and, if the setting be a criminal trial, beyond a reasonable doubt.1
*420I submit that the rule that fraud can only be established by "clear and convincing” evidence has little practical effect, at least in cases where the evidence is mostly direct as distinguished from indirect or circumstantial. The use of the adjectives "clear” and "convincing” in instructions can mean little to a jury without further explanation that proof by clear and convincing evidence means that the truth of the facts asserted is "highly probable.” Cook v. Michael, 214 Or 513, 330 P2d 1026 (1958).2 As soon as those words are used, however, the instruction is arguably afoul of ORS 17.250(5),3 despite what was said in Cook that a fraud case is not a "proper occasion” for an instruction in the terms of ORS 17.250 (5).
In conclusion, I believe that instructing jurors that the evidence must be "clear and convincing” to establish fraud is of little aid to them, may be downright confusing in a case such as this, and is arguably contrary to the statutory law. If it is the latter, the statute must prevail, and this judge-made concept *421fashioned out of mistrust of the jury system would disappear. With it would disappear the task of the trial judge which the Cook court characterized as "troublesome.”

 Compare Mr. Justice Tongue’s language from Krause v. Eugene Dodge, Inc., 265 Or 486, 509 P2d 1199 (1973):
"We are fully aware of the rule that fraud must be proved by evidence which is 'clear and convincing,’ the test of which is that the evidence must be such that the truth of the facts asserted is 'highly probable.’ Cook v. Michael, 214 Or 513, 527, 330 P2d 1026 (1958).
*420"The question of the credibility of witnesses, however, is ordinarily one to be decided by the jury and if, despite inconsistencies in the testimony of a witness, the jury chooses to believe that witness, such testimony has been held to be sufficient to support a jury verdict even in criminal cases, in which the burden of the state is to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Yates, 239 Or 596, 598 399 P2d 161 (1965), and State v. Pace, 187 Or 498, 504, 212 P2d 755 (1949). See also Thom v. Bailey, 257 Or 572, 579, 481 P2d 355 (1971).” 265 Or at 502, 503.
Compare, also, the discussion in Wimer v. Smith, 22 Or 469, 30 P 416 (1892), to the effect that the testimony of an impeached witness may be insufficient, without more, to establish fraud. It must be remembered, however, that this case antedated Amended Art. VII, § 3, of the Oregon Constitution, and further one should note that in a jury case, "they are the exclusive judges” of a witness’ credibility. ORS 44.370

 1 do not agree with the statement in Cook v. Michael, supra, that "clear and convincing” names a degree of proof. Those words do no more than to characterize evidence.

 The statute provides that the jury is to be instructed "on all proper occasions” in civil cases that the jury’s finding "shall be according to the preponderance of the evidence.”