Court Opinion

ID: 9588885
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:39:26.862308+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:00.542756
License: Public Domain

Carrico, J.,
dissenting.
I would reverse the judgment of the trial court, set aside the award of the commissioners, and order a new trial. The award, in my opinion, bears no reasonable relation to the value of the property shown by the *643testimonial evidence in the case. The award is so out of proportion to the highest testimonial estimate of value as to display, to me at least, that the commissioners proceeded upon erroneous principles.
It is true, as the majority states, that the commissioners were told in an instruction that they were not bound by the opinions of the witnesses or by the apparent weight of evidence and that they could exercise their own judgment based upon their view of the property involved. It is also true that the condemnor requested this instruction, that it was granted without objection, and that it became the law of the case.
But also part of the law of the case was an admonition in the same instruction that the commissioners could not return an award that did not “relate to the evidence.” The majority suggests, however, that “the evidence” referred to in this part of the instruction included the information obtained by the commissioners upon their view and that because this information is not in the record the court is powerless to disturb the award.
We have said numerous times that an award of condemnation commissioners is to be measured by the evidence. But the only evidence this court ever has available to measure an award is the testimonial evidence set forth in the record. So when commissioners are told that they may not return an award unrelated to “the evidence,” to me this means the testimonial evidence presented in the courtroom. This must be the rule if this court ever is to discharge its judicial function of correcting unreasonable awards.
It is obvious to me that in this case the commissioners disregarded the admonition against returning an award unrelated to the evidence. It is for this reason that I believe the award was based upon erroneous principles. It is not difficult, however, to understand how the commissioners might have been led to their erroneous conclusion. The admonition is obfuscated by the overpowering language that the commissioners were not bound by the opinions of the witnesses or by the apparent weight of evidence and that they could exercise their own judgment based upon their view of the land. And the admonition became enshrouded in syntactical confusion when, after the instruction told the commissioners “an award cannot be made that does not relate to the evidence,” it immediatély stated: “This, however, does not permit the commissioners to make an arbitrary or capricious award.”
I realize that similar instructions generally are given in eminent domain proceedings in this state. I also realize that the court is powerless to declare the instruction erroneous in this case.
*644While commissioners should be cautioned against returning an award unrelated to the evidence, I believe it is unwise and improper to use the confusing instruction involved in this case. The instruction is inappropriately constructed of excerpts from our opinions. It contains language appropriately employed by this court to explain when and under what circumstances an award must be either set aside or confirmed. The language relating to the commissioners’ view constitutes one of the rules of guidance for courts to test the reasonableness of condemnation awards. But, as we said in Virginia Electric and Power Company v. Pickett, 197 Va. 269, 276, 89 S.E.2d 76, 81 (1955):
“[The] rule is not to be considered as turning commissioners loose to take arbitrary or capricious action and return awards not related to the value of the property. Their awards are to be measured by the evidence and if the evidence clearly shows them to be unreasonable they should be set aside.”
I would hope that, given the proper opportunity, this court will hold erroneous the granting of a “turn loose” instruction such as was granted in this case. In the meantime, even with the instruction the law of the case, I would hold the present award unreasonable as a matter of law.
Harrison, J., joins in this dissent.