Court Opinion

ID: 9401898
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-14 16:07:41.128329+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:55.969335
License: Public Domain

J-S07014-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    JARRETT SCHAFFER                           :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1830 EDA 2021

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 24, 2019
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-51-CR-0005726-2018

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.:                                  FILED JUNE 14, 2023

       Appellant, Jarrett Schaffer, appeals from the October 24, 2019

judgment of sentence of two years’ probation following his convictions for

Simple Assault and False Imprisonment. He challenges, inter alia, the weight

and sufficiency of the evidence. Upon review, we affirm.

       Appellant met Lobynn Cha (“Victim”) in October 2014 when he was a

client at a strip club where Victim was working. They began a transactional

sexual relationship a year later which evolved into a more traditional

girlfriend/boyfriend relationship, although the two fought often.1

       In early 2018, Appellant and Victim moved into a studio apartment

together in Philadelphia. At the time, the relationship was “rocky,” and Victim

wanted to break up.          N.T. Trial, 10/24/19, at 19.   Appellant, however,
____________________________________________

1For instance, in September 2017, Appellant strangled Victim during a fight
and Victim kneed Appellant in his face, giving him a black eye.
J-S07014-23

threatened to call Victim’s parents to expose private details about her life if

she left him, including the fact that she previously worked at a strip club and

details about their relationship.

      During this time, Victim began dating another man, Steve Gallo.

Appellant found out about the relationship.     On April 27, 2018, Appellant

tracked Victim’s phone and drove to Mr. Gallo’s home, where Victim was alone

sleeping and took pictures of her car.     At 8:00 AM, Victim woke up and

discovered multiple missed calls from Appellant and from Mr. Gallo, who

warned her not to leave the house because of Appellant.

      Victim later agreed to meet Appellant at a coffee shop near their

apartment because she was worried that Appellant would contact her parents.

When they met around 10:15 AM, Appellant appeared sad and asked to speak

in their apartment; Victim agreed after Appellant promised not to touch her.

      When they arrived at the apartment, there were alcohol bottles

scattered around. Appellant asked Victim to have a shot of alcohol with him

and Victim complied. Appellant continued to drink alcohol and talk about their

relationship.

      Around 11:00 AM, Victim left the apartment. As Victim was about to

drive away, Appellant ran up to the car barefoot claiming that he locked

himself out of the apartment. Victim agreed to unlock the door for Appellant.

When Victim entered the building, she saw that the apartment door was, in

fact, wide open. Appellant then pushed her inside and took her keys from

her. Victim sat on the corner of a futon observing Appellant drink alcohol as

                                     -2-
J-S07014-23

he complained about how his life was ruined, proclaimed he was suicidal, and

ran a dull kitchen knife across his arms without drawing blood.

      About an hour later, Appellant became so intoxicated that he vomited

and passed out on the floor. Victim remained in the apartment because she

became concerned that Appellant would vomit again and choke.

      Around 2:00 PM, Appellant woke up. Victim looked for her keys and

tried to leave but Appellant blocked Victim, threw her onto the futon, and told

Victim she was not going to leave until they finished their conversation. Victim

unsuccessfully tried to leave five times but did not put up much resistance

because she was afraid that Appellant was going to choke her as he had done

before.

      Around 4:00 PM, Victim informed Appellant that she had to leave for a

prior engagement. Appellant took Victim’s watch, threw it across the room,

told her she was not leaving, slammed her head into the wall multiple times,

threw her on the futon, got on top of her, held her down with his legs, and

put a pillow over her face to prevent her from screaming. Every time Victim

attempted to scream, Appellant put the pillow over Victim’s face and slammed

her head against the wooden armrest of the futon. Victim felt that she could

not breathe with the pillow over her face.

      Appellant held Victim down for several hours and repeatedly punched

the sides of Victim’s body. Around 8:00 or 9:00 PM, Appellant got off Victim

and Victim curled into a fetal position. Appellant then began interrogating

Victim about Mr. Gallo. According to Victim, when she admitted that she had

                                     -3-
J-S07014-23

had sexual intercourse with Mr. Gallo, Appellant pulled up her dress and

penetrated her vagina with his fingers while Victim cried.     Appellant then

placed those fingers against Victim’s face and asked her if she wanted to smell

like that. Victim did not attempt to leave again that night because she was

afraid of what Appellant might do.

      Around 5:00 AM, Appellant and Victim woke up. Appellant continued to

talk about their relationship and his suicide.   At 8:00 AM, Victim informed

Appellant that she had to leave. Appellant gave Victim her keys and she ran

out the door. Victim was so relieved that she said, “I’m free.” Id. at 37.

Appellant then sent Victim a text message stating that if she had stayed with

him instead of Mr. Gallo the night before, they would have both been free.

      Victim immediately drove to a police station to report what happened.

On the way, Victim called her friend, Jessi Chavez Collins, and told her what

happened while she was crying. Victim also called her sister and asked her to

block Appellant’s telephone number from their family members’ telephones.

      Once at the police station, Victim filled out a police report and staff

escorted her to the Special Victim’s Unit, where Victim spoke to a detective

and submitted to a rape test. A nurse took photographs of bruising on Victim.

      On May 17, 2018, police arrested Appellant and charged him with

Aggravated Assault, Strangulation, Aggravated Indecent Assault, Unlawful

Restraint, Indecent Assault, Simple Assault, Recklessly Endangering Another

Person, and False Imprisonment.

                                     -4-
J-S07014-23

        On October 24, 2019, the court held a bench trial. The Commonwealth

presented testimony from Victim, Ms. Collins, and Police Officer Sachetti,2

each of whom testified in accordance with the above recitation of facts. In

addition, Police Officer Sachetti testified that while he was filling out Victim’s

police report, he observed bruising on her cheeks and arm.

        Appellant testified in his own defense, admitting that he: (1) had

threatened to expose Victim’s personal life to her parents; (2) drove to Mr.

Gallo’s house to confront her about lying; (3) met Victim at the coffee shop;

and (4) drank five shots of alcohol when he was in the apartment with Victim.

Appellant also testified that it was Victim who had wanted to drink alcohol.

He admitted that he had vomited but claimed that it was the result of Victim

admitting to having another lover.

        Appellant testified that around 4:00 PM, he took Victim’s keys and

prevented her from leaving because she was too drunk to drive. Appellant

further testified that he picked up Victim and took her to the futon, where he

put his arms around her to control her. Appellant denied trying to suffocate

Victim with a pillow and denied hitting Victim.

        Appellant also testified that Victim woke up at 5:30 AM and wanted to

leave.    Appellant explained that he did not want her to leave because he

thought she was still drunk. When Victim finally left, Appellant followed her

to her car and heard her say she was free. Appellant admitted that he sent

____________________________________________

2   Officer Sachetti’s first name does not appear in the notes of testimony.

                                           -5-
J-S07014-23

Victim a text message saying if she left Mr. Gallo, they would both be free.

Appellant testified that he contacted Victim’s parents after she left to inform

them about Victim’s lifestyle but claimed that he did so out of fear for Victim’s

safety.

       The parties stipulated that Appellant had a reputation for being a

peaceful, nonviolent, law-abiding person.

       At the conclusion of the bench trial, the court found Appellant guilty of

Simple Assault and False Imprisonment.           Appellant waived a pre-sentence

investigation report and proceeded immediately to sentencing. The trial court

sentenced Appellant to two years of probation for each conviction to be served

concurrently. The court also issued a stay away order, and mandated alcohol

treatment.

       On November 1, 2019, Appellant, who was represented by counsel, filed

a pro se post-sentence motion and the trial court scheduled a hearing. That

same day, Appellant’s counsel filed a motion to withdraw as counsel.          On

November 22, 2019, the trial court granted counsel’s motion to withdraw and

continued the hearing. After numerous continuances and delays, on June 14,

2021, Appellant’s newly obtained counsel filed a supplemental post-sentence

motion. On August 18, 2021, after a hearing, the trial court denied Appellant’s

post-sentence motion.3

____________________________________________

3 The record reflects that Appellant asserted an oral motion at this hearing
seeking the judge’s recusal which, as discussed infra, the court denied.

                                           -6-
J-S07014-23

       On September 24, 2021, almost two years after the court imposed his

judgment of sentence, Appellant filed a counseled notice of appeal.4       Both

Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

                                               A.

       As an initial matter, we must determine whether we may address this

appeal as it is well-settled that “the timeliness of an appeal implicates our

jurisdiction and may be considered sua sponte.”            Commonwealth v.

Crawford, 17 A.3d 1279, 1281 (Pa. Super. 2011).           “In order to perfect a

timely appeal, a defendant must file a notice of appeal within 30 days of the

imposition of his sentence, unless he files a timely post-sentence motion

within 10 days of sentencing, thereby tolling that 30–day window.”

Commonwealth v. Leatherby, 116 A.3d 73, 78 (Pa. Super. 2015); Pa.R.A.P.

§ 903; Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(a).

       Generally, pro se filings submitted by counseled defendants are treated

as legal nullities that have no tolling effect because the filing constitutes

improper hybrid representation.          Commonwealth v. Williams, 151 A.3d

621, 623 (Pa. Super. 2016). Exceptions to the rule exist in the rare instance

where an appellant is “abandoned by counsel and the trial court fail[s] to

timely appoint new counsel[.]”            Leatherby, 116 A.3d at 79 (emphasis

omitted). This exception exists because an appellant “should not be precluded

from appellate review based on what was, in effect, an administrative
____________________________________________

4 Appellant filed his notice of appeal one year, eleven months, and one day
after the court entered his judgment of sentence.

                                           -7-
J-S07014-23

breakdown on the part of the trial court.”     Id.   Moreover, this Court has

repeatedly declined to quash an appeal “when the defect resulted from an

appellant’s acting in accordance with misinformation relayed to him from the

trial court.” Commonwealth v. Stansbury, 219 A.3d 157, 160 (Pa. Super.

2019) (compiling cases for the same proposition).

      Upon review, we decline to quash this appeal as untimely. Appellant

filed his pro se post-sentence motion the same day that counsel filed his

motion to withdraw.      Technically, Appellant was still represented by trial

counsel, rendering Appellant’s motion a legal nullity. However, the trial court

failed to forward the motion to counsel and/or inform Appellant that his post-

sentence motion was a legal nullity. Instead, by scheduling a post-sentence

motion hearing, the court misled Appellant into thinking that he had filed a

valid post-sentence motion that had tolled the time he had to file a timely

notice of appeal. Moreover, the trial court failed to grant counsel’s motion to

withdraw until there was only one day left in the appeal period even though

counsel clearly indicated in the motion that he was not going to file post-

sentence motions or a notice of appeal on behalf of Appellant.        In these

particular circumstances, we find that Appellant was effectively abandoned by

counsel and that an administrative breakdown occurred.        Accordingly, we

decline to quash the appeal as untimely and will proceed to address the merits

of Appellant’s claims.

                                      B.

      Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

                                     -8-
J-S07014-23

     1. Did the trial court err in finding Appellant guilty of Simple
        Assault when the evidence was insufficient to show that
        Appellant caused or attempted to cause bodily injury to
        [Victim] and where the testimony of [Victim] was explicitly
        found to be not credible by the trial court?

     2. Did the trial court err in finding Appellant guilty of False
        Imprisonment when the evidence was insufficient to show that
        Appellant restrained [Victim] in a way other than to prevent
        her from driving while she was severely intoxicated and where
        the evidence showed that Victim had hours in which she could
        have left their shared apartment while Appellant slept but
        instead chose to say and where the trial court found Victim not
        credible?

     3. Did the trial court err in finding Appellant guilty of Simple
        Assault when the verdict is against the weight of the evidence
        and is so contrary to the evidence that it shocks one’s sense of
        justice as the evidence did not establish that [Victim] suffered
        bodily injury nor does it establish that Appellant intended to
        cause bodily injury, but rather the evidence showed that
        [Victim]’s injuries were caused by her own actions or by
        Appellant acting in self-defense and where the court explicitly
        found [Victim] to be not credible?

     4. Did the trial court err in finding Appellant guilty of False
        Imprisonment when the evidence was insufficient to show that
        Appellant restrained [Victim] in any way other than to prevent
        her from driving while she was severely intoxicated and where
        the evidence showed that [Victim] had hours in which she could
        have left their shared apartment while Appellant slept but
        instead chose to stay and where the trial court found [Victim]
        not credible?

     5. Did the trial court err in denying Appellant’s motion for recusal
        and subsequently denying Appellant’s Post-Sentence Motions
        when the court’s law clerk was actively representing [Victim]
        in her Protection from Abuse proceedings against Appellant and
        had represented her during the pendency of the criminal trial
        in violation of Appellant’s due process rights under Article I § 9
        of the Pennsylvania Constitution as well as the Fifth and
        Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution?

                                     -9-
J-S07014-23

Appellant’s Br. at 2-3 (some capitalization changed, questions reordered and

renumbered for ease of disposition).

                                    C.

      In his first two issues, Appellant raises challenges to the sufficiency of

the evidence for his Simple Assault and False Imprisonment convictions.

Appellant’s Br. at 2-3.

      “A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law.”

Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751 (Pa. 2000). “Our standard

of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth

v. Mikitiuk, 213 A.3d 290, 300 (Pa. Super. 2019).              When reviewing

sufficiency challenges, we evaluate the record in the light most favorable to

the verdict winner, giving the Commonwealth the benefit of all reasonable

inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Commonwealth v. Trinidad, 96

A.3d 1031, 1038 (Pa. Super. 2014). This Court will not disturb a verdict when

“there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of

the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Orr, 38 A.3d 868,

872 (Pa. Super. 2011) (en banc) (citation omitted). “[T]he fact finder is free

to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented.” Commonwealth v.

Mobley, 14 A.3d 887, 889-90 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted).             In

reviewing a sufficiency challenge, we do not re-weigh the evidence and

substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder. Id. at 890.

                                     - 10 -
J-S07014-23

      Challenges to witness credibility pertain to the weight, not sufficiency,

of the evidence.   Commonwealth v. Melvin, 103 A.3d 1, 43 (Pa. Super.

2014). Moreover, inconsistencies are for the fact-finder “to resolve and do

not dictate a finding the evidence was not sufficient for conviction.”

Commonwealth v. Juray, 275 A.3d 1037, 1046 (Pa. Super. 2022).                Our

sufficiency analysis must therefore accept the credibility and reliability of all

evidence that supports the verdict. Commonwealth v. Breakiron, 571 A.2d

1035, 1042 (Pa. 1990).

      Finally, “the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness is sufficient to

sustain a conviction for a criminal offense, so long as that testimony can

address and, in fact, addresses, every element of the charged crime.”

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 180 A.3d 474, 481 (Pa. Super. 2018).

                                          1.

      Appellant avers that the evidence was insufficient to prove that Victim

suffered bodily injury, an element of Simple Assault. Appellant’s Br. at 10.

Specifically, Appellant argues that the photos of Victim’s injuries—which

merely show “discoloration”—contradict Victim’s testimony that Appellant

repeatedly slammed her head into the wall and repeatedly punched her

constituting a “brutal assault.” Id. at 10-11. Moreover, Appellant attacks the

                                     - 11 -
J-S07014-23

credibility of Victim’s testimony, categorizing it as “absurd” and “nonsensical.”

Id. at 10-11.5

       A person is guilty of Simple Assault if he “attempts to cause or

intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another[.]” 18

Pa.C.S. § 2701(a)(1). Bodily injury is defined as an “[i]mpairment of physical

condition or substantial pain.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2301. Evidence of bruising from

a physical attack can be sufficient to prove a defendant caused bodily injury.

In the Interest of M.H., 758 A.2d 1249, 1252-53 (Pa. Super. 2000) (holding

student suffered bodily injury for purposes of simple assault where high school

teacher’s aide grabbed the student’s arm and pushed her against a wall

causing bruises on her arm that lasted several days).

       Here, Victim testified that Appellant pushed her up against a wall,

repeatedly slammed her head into the armrest of the futon, and repeatedly

punched her.        N.T. at 34-36.        Officer Sachetti provided corroborating

testimony that he observed bruising on Victim’s arms and cheek, and

photographs submitted into evidence demonstrated such.           Id. at 118.   As

stated above, the trial court was free to believe all, part, or none of the

evidence. It was reasonable for the fact-finder to infer from Victim’s testimony
____________________________________________

5  Appellant also argues that the trial court should have considered his
testimony that he never assaulted Victim to be credible. Appellant’s Br. at 12.
Appellant’s argument that the trial court should have believed his version of
events and found Victim’s testimony to be incredible is more accurately
categorized as a challenge to the weight of the evidence, which we discuss
infra.

                                          - 12 -
J-S07014-23

and bruising that Appellant caused Victim substantial pain.        Viewing the

evidence   in   the   light   most   favorable   to   the   Commonwealth,   the

Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable

doubt that Appellant caused Victim impairment of physical condition or

substantial pain.

                                           2.

      Appellant next avers that the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient

evidence to demonstrate False Imprisonment. Id. at 7. Appellant argues that

he was trying to prevent Victim from driving while intoxicated and

endangering herself and others, rather than interfering with her liberty. Id.

Moreover, Appellant argues that Victim had several hours in which she could

have left the apartment while Appellant was sleeping and it was her own

choice to stay. Id.

      A person commits false imprisonment when he “knowingly restrains

another unlawfully so as to interfere substantially with [her] liberty.”     18

Pa.C.S. § 2903(a). Instantly, the trial court credited Victim’s testimony that

Appellant pushed Victim into their apartment, took her keys, and forcibly

detained Victim when she wanted to leave.             Moreover, the trial court

emphasized that “although Appellant does not admit he pushed [Victim] into

the apartment, he admits that he would not let her leave.” Trial Ct. Op. at

19. Clearly, Appellant’s actions interfered substantially with Victim’s liberty.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the

                                      - 13 -
J-S07014-23

Commonwealth         presented     sufficient       evidence   to   demonstrate   False

Imprisonment.

                                               D.

       In his next two issues, Appellant raises challenges to the weight of the

evidence. Appellant’s Br. at 2-3. The crux of Appellant’s argument is that the

trial court should have credited his version of events rather than Victim’s

version of events. Id. at 17. Appellant avers that Victim’s testimony was “rife

with contradictions and devoid of any corroboration.” Id. at 19.6

       When considering challenges to the weight of the evidence, we apply

the following precepts.       “The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the

finder of fact, who is free to believe all, none[,] or some of the evidence and

to determine the credibility of the witnesses.” Commonwealth v. Talbert,

129 A.3d 536, 545 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted). Resolving

contradictory testimony and questions of credibility are matters for the finder

of fact. Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 747 A.2d 910, 917 (Pa. Super. 2000).

It is well-settled that we cannot substitute our judgment for that of the trier

of fact. Talbert, 129 A.3d at 546.
____________________________________________

6 In his Statement of Questions, Appellant repeatedly contends that the trial
court “explicitly” found that Victim is not credible. Appellant’s Br. at 2-3.
However, the record belies this representation. Upon review, the trial court
found that none of the witnesses were entirely credible, but believed some
of Victim’s testimony based on the photographs that were submitted into
evidence. The trial court stated on the record: “I don’t think anybody that
testified was one-hundred percent credible today [but] the photos show that
something happened.” N.T. Trial, 10/24/19, at 181-183. As discussed supra,
the trial court “is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented.”
Mobley, 14 A.3d at 889-90 (citation omitted).

                                          - 14 -
J-S07014-23

      Moreover, appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the trial

court’s exercise of discretion in denying the weight challenge raised in the

post-sentence motion; this court does not review the underlying question of

whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.      Id. at 545-46.

“Because the trial judge has had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence

presented, an appellate court will give the gravest consideration to the

findings and reasons advanced by the trial judge when reviewing a trial court’s

determination that the verdict is [or is not] against the weight of the

evidence.” Id. at 546 (citation omitted). “One of the least assailable reasons

for granting or denying a new trial is the lower court’s conviction that the

verdict was or was not against the weight of the evidence and that a new trial

should be granted in the interest of justice.” Id. (citation omitted).

      Furthermore, “[i]n order for a defendant to prevail on a challenge to the

weight of the evidence, the evidence must be so tenuous, vague[,] and

uncertain that the verdict shocks the conscience of the court.” Id. (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). As our Supreme Court has made clear,

reversal is only appropriate “where the facts and inferences disclose a palpable

abuse of discretion[.]”   Commonwealth v. Morales, 91 A.3d 80, 91 (Pa.

2014) (citations and emphasis omitted).

      “[A] true weight of the evidence challenge concedes that sufficient

evidence exists to sustain the verdict but questions which evidence is to be

believed.” Commonwealth v. Thompson, 106 A.3d 742, 758 (Pa. Super.

2014) (citation omitted). For that reason, the trial court need not view the

                                     - 15 -
J-S07014-23

evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner and may instead

use its discretion in concluding whether the verdict was against the weight of

the evidence. Widmer, 744 A.2d at 751 n.3.

      Instantly, the trial court credited Victim’s testimony over Appellant’s

testimony that Appellant assaulted her and restrained her.            Appellant

essentially asks this Court to reassess the credibility of Victim and Appellant,

and reweigh the testimony and evidence presented at trial. We cannot and

will not do so.     Our review of the record shows that the evidence is not

tenuous, vague, or uncertain, and the verdict was not so contrary as to shock

the conscious.     Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial

court’s denial of Appellant’s weight claim.

                                       E.

      In his final issue, Appellant avers that the trial court judge, the

Honorable Sierra Thomas Street, erred in refusing to grant a motion for

recusal made prior to argument on the post-sentence motions because Judge

Street’s law clerk was actively representing Victim in protection from abuse

proceedings.      Appellant’s Br. at 22.    In his Brief, Appellant argues that

evidence of actual bias occurred on October 20, 2021, two months after the

trial court ruled on Appellant’s post-sentence motion, when Judge Street

denied Appellant’s Motion to extend his probation by two years to preserve

his PCRA rights. Id. at 25. Appellant further argues that the only plausible

explanation for this denial is that Judge Street wanted to preclude Appellant

                                     - 16 -
J-S07014-23

from exercising his PCRA rights because it could negatively affect Victim, the

law clerk’s client. Id.

      “[W]e recognize that our judges are honorable, fair and competent.”

Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 720 A.2d 79, 89 (Pa. 1998). Thus, “[o]ur

standard of review of a trial court’s determination not to recuse from hearing

a case is exceptionally deferential.” Commonwealth v. Harris, 979 A.2d

387, 391 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citation omitted). “Where a jurist rules that he

or she can hear and dispose of a case fairly and without prejudice, that

decision will not be overruled on appeal but for an abuse of discretion.”

Commonwealth v. Dip, 221 A.3d 201, 206 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation

omitted).

      When considering a recusal request, jurists “must first make a

conscientious determination of his or her ability to assess the case in an

impartial manner[.] . . . The jurist must then consider whether his or her

continued involvement in the case creates an appearance of impropriety

and/or would tend to undermine public confidence in the judiciary. This is a

personal and unreviewable decision that only the jurist can make.”        Abu-

Jamal, 720 A.2d at 89. The party requesting recusal must “produce evidence

establishing bias, prejudice or unfairness [that] raises a substantial doubt as

to the jurist’s ability to preside impartially.” Commonwealth v. Tedford,

960 A.2d 1, 55-56 (Pa. 2008) (citation omitted).

      Finally, “Pennsylvania law makes clear that it is generally preferable for

the same judge who presided at trial to preside over the post-conviction

                                    - 17 -
J-S07014-23

proceedings.       [F]amiliarity with the case will likely assist the proper

administration of justice. Only where it is adequately demonstrated that the

interests of justice warrant recusal, should a matter be assigned to a different

judge.” Commonwealth v. Lambert, 765 A.2d 306, 362 (Pa. Super. 2000)

(citations omitted).

       Upon review, we are unable to locate a written motion to recuse in the

certified record and Appellant fails to indicate “where in the record the matter

referred to appears.”7 To the extent that this was an oral motion, our review

of the record reveals that at the beginning of the post-sentence motion

hearing, the Assistant District Attorney stated, “I believe the defense has a

motion to recuse.”       N.T. Hearing, 8/18/21, at 6.   Appellant’s counsel then

stated, “So the issue is that I believe [your law clerk] represents [Victim] in

this matter, or represented her at the time that the criminal trial was going

on.” Id. at 6. Appellant did not place any evidence on the record to support

this “motion” to recuse, or enter any exhibits into evidence.

       In denying Appellant’s motion to recuse, Judge Street stated on the

record that she was aware that the “law clerk represents someone involved –

I believe the victim in this case – in another matter. And he does not work

on [Appellant]’s matters because of that, because he has a conflict.” Id. at

____________________________________________

7 Our rules of appellate procedure require that an appellant provide “a
reference to the place in the record where the matter referred to appears” or
a “statement of place of raising or preservation of issues.” Pa.R.A.P. 2117(c)
and 2119(c) and (e). While this defect is substantial, we are nonetheless able
to provide meaningful review of the issue.

                                          - 18 -
J-S07014-23

7. In her Rule 1925(a) opinion, Judge Street further explained her decision

to deny the motion:

      Appellant contends that recusal was warranted because the
      court’s law clerk was actively representing [Victim] in her
      protection from abuse matter against Appellant. To be clear, the
      law clerk worked for the court from January 2021 to November
      2021; therefore, he was not working for the court at the time of
      Appellant’s trial or for the entirety of post-trial motions.
      Moreover, and as the court stated on the record, that law clerk did
      not work on Appellant’s case. Accordingly, the court denied the
      request for recusal. That decision did not involve ill will, manifest
      unreasonableness, misapplication of the law, partiality, and/or
      prejudice. Accordingly, the issue is without merit.

Trial Ct. Op, filed 4/11/22, at 12. We agree. The record reflects that the law

clerk did not work for Judge Street at the time of the trial, Judge Street was

aware of the potential conflict when the law clerk was hired more than a year

after Appellant’s trial, and Judge Street ensured that the law clerk did not

work on Appellant’s post-sentence motions. Appellant failed to provide the

court with any evidence to support his recusal motion other than generalized

allegations without a clear timeline. Moreover, Appellant’s claims that Judge

Street exhibited actual bias when she denied Appellant’s motion to extend his

probation are speculative, at best, and occurred after Judge Street ruled on

Appellant’s post-sentence motion. We decline to find an abuse of discretion.

                                       F.

      In conclusion, the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to

convict Appellant of Simple Assault and False Imprisonment, and the verdict

                                     - 19 -
J-S07014-23

was not against the weight of the evidence. Moreover, the trial court did not

abuse its discretion when it denied Appellant’s motion to recuse.

     Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 6/14/2023

                                    - 20 -