Court Opinion

ID: 9549933
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:26:41.236814+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:21:04.378908
License: Public Domain

ORDER ON REHEARING AND SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS
SUMMERS, Justice.
Appellee Clancy’s petition for rehearing is denied. Appellant Wilson seeks appeal-related attorney’s fees and costs, and we address that request.1
I.
Appellant seeks an attorney’s fee under several statutes. First he cites 20 O.S.1991 § 15.1. This statute authorizes an attorney’s fee when the appeal is “without merit.” It has no applicability to this case. Harsha v. Maremont Corp., 784 P.2d 1070, 1074 (Okla. 1989). Wilson himself was the appellant.
Next, Appellant relies upon 12 O.S.1991 § 936. Section 936 provides for attorney’s fees in actions on an open account, note, bill, negotiable instrument, or contract for the purchase or sale of goods, services, etc., but not for this declaratory judgment action. This declaratory judgment action does not include a request for relief within the category of actions listed in § 936.
Appellant argues that this is but a continuation of a foreclosure action, in apparent reference to 42 O.S.1991 § 176. That section allows attorney’s fees in an action to enforce a lien. First Community Bank of Blanchard v. Hodges, 907 P.2d 1047, 1054 (Okla.1995). In Blanchard, as in the case before us, the plaintiff sought declaratory relief. However, in Blanchard the plaintiff Bank also sought to enforce its hen. Bank sought an order directing the payment of proceeds from a sheriff’s sale to the Bank to satisfy its hen.
In the present ease the right to the fire insurance proceeds was derived from a standard mortgage clause, an independent contract between the insurer and mortgage lender. Willis v. Nowata Land and Cattle Co., Inc., 789 P.2d 1282, 1285-1286 (Okla. 1989). This declaratory judgment action was to enforce that contract right and not to enforce a hen.
In the alternative Appellant rehes upon 12 O.S.1991 § 928 for attorney’s fees. This statute allows recovery of costs of course to the plaintiff in successful actions for the recovery of money or recovery of specific real or personal property. Statutory allowance of costs does not include attorney’s fees, unless stated otherwise. Butcher v. McGinn, 706 P.2d 878, 882 (Okla.1985). See General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Carpenter, 576 P.2d 1166 (Okla.1978) and the discussion of 12 O.S.Supp.1977 § 1580, a statute that specifically allowed attorney’s fees to be taxed as costs. Section 928 does not specifically authorize attorney’s fees, and thus is not authority for granting such fees. Butcher v. McGinn, supra.
Finally, Appellant cites 12 O.S.1991 § 1655. Section 1655 says: “Further rehef based upon a determination of rights, status, or other legal relations may be granted whenever such rehef becomes necessary and proper after the determination has been *292made.” Although this section authorizes other forms of relief it does not specifically authorize awarding attorney’s fees. In the declaratory judgment action of Case-Aimola Properties, Inc. v. Thurman, 752 P.2d 1120 (Okla.1988) we stated that mandamus could issue as consequential relief from a declaratory judgment. Id. 152 P.2d at 1123. We then denied attorney’s fees because such fees are ordinarily not recoverable in the absence of a statute or contract. Id. We conclude that attorney’s fees are not recoverable in this declaratory judgment action as further relief pursuant to § 1655.
Appellant Wilson’s motion for an appeal-related attorney’s fee is denied.
II.
Appellant also seeks costs. He requests reimbursement for such items as photocopies, delivery sérviee, telephone calls, Westlaw research, and postage. We have explained that the cost of making copies is not a recoverable cost. Oklahoma Turnpike Authority v. New, 853 P.2d 765, 765 (Okla. 1993); Sunrizon Homes v. American Guaranty Investment Corporation, 782 P.2d 103, 109 (Okla.1988). In Oklahoma Turnpike Authority v. New, supra, we said that the expenses of mailing, mileage, long distance telephone calls, telefax expenses and postage are part of the overhead, and are not recoverable as costs. Id. 853 P.2d at 767.
He also seeks recovery of a $100.00 filing fee. The filing fees required by 20 O.S.1991 § 15 (as amended in 1993), and 20 O.S.1991 § 30.4 are recoverable pursuant to 12 O.S.1991 § 978 by the successful appellant. Sunrizon Homes, 782 P.2d at 109. A sua sponte examination of this Court’s docket shows a filing fee of $100.00 paid by Appellant on March 31, 1992. It also shows a filing fee of $100.00 with Appellant’s petition for certiorari, filed January 6,1994. Wilson’s motion for costs is granted only to the extent of $200.00 to be recovered against Glancy, and otherwise denied.
All Justices concur.

. Gwen’Elin A. Pruden, Personal Representative of the Estate of Harold Wilson, deceased, is now the moving party herein. We refer to Wilson in this writing for the sake of consistency with the opinion.