Court Opinion

ID: 9567592
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:55:59.076468+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:00:42.228916
License: Public Domain

ERICKSON, Justice,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. In my view the trial court and court of appeals correctly concluded that the combination of the two residences operating in conjunction with each other had none of the “characteristics of a normal and permanent family unit.” The protective covenants provided, in part:
1. All sites shall be for residential use only, with only one single-family dwelling permitted on any site.
2. No room or rooms in any residence may be rented or leased to any person. This shall not prevent the renting or leasing of an entire lot together with its improvements as a single unit to any person.
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20. The covenants shall run with the land, and shall bind all parties and all persons claiming under them until January 1, 1989, at which time they shall be automatically extended for successive ten-year periods; unless, by a vote of a majority of the then lot holders, said covenants are changed in whole or in part.
It is not disputed that two separate structures, approximately 150 feet apart, were used to house sixteen developmentally disabled children. The children ranged in age from five to twenty-one years, and Double D Manor, Inc. had a substantial staff to operate and supervise the two residences as a combined unit. The majority recognizes, in construing covenants restricting the use of land, that all doubt must be resolved against the restriction and in favor of the free and unrestricted use of the property. Flaks v. Wichman, 128 Colo. 45, 48, 260 P.2d 737, 739 (1953); Greenbrier-Cloverdale Homeowners v. Baca, 763 P.2d 1 (Colo.App.1988); Shaver v. Hunter, 626 S.W.2d 574 (Tex.App.1981). However, that general principal should not be applied in such a way as to defeat the clear intent and the plain and unambiguous purpose expressed in the restrictive covenants. D.C. Burns Realty & Trust Co. v. Mack, 168 Colo. 1, 450 P.2d 75 (1969); Shaver, 626 S.W.2d at 576.
I agree with the conclusion of both the trial court and the court of appeals that the clear intent and plain and unambiguous purpose of the framers of the protective covenants was to restrict the use of land to the traditional family-style use. I would decline to read the phrase “single-family dwelling” so narrowly as to define only a specific structure or type of building. The phrase also describes a particular use, namely, the traditional family-type residence. The covenant’s intent is also evidenced by the second paragraph of the *1053covenants, prohibiting the rental of rooms. Because the term “single-family dwelling,” in my view, describes a use as well as a structure, I cannot believe that the majority’s interpretation of the restrictive covenants does not violate the spirit and clear intent of the covenants. Omega Corporation of Chesterfield v. Malloy, 228 Va. 12, 319 S.E.2d 728 (1984). I also agree with the trial court that although a state-licensed home for disabled persons is a residential property for zoning purposes, zoning laws do not override covenants running with the land when the covenants require a more restrictive use of the land than is permitted by the zoning provisions. Lidke v. Martin, 31 Colo.App. 40, 500 P.2d 1184 (1972).