Court Opinion

ID: 9408532
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-12 23:01:02.447435+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:44.436975
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                          FILED
                  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          JUL 12 2023
                                                                     MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                            FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ZENAIDA MARTINEZ                                No. 22-923
SANDOVAL; MARIA GUADALUPE                       Agency Nos.
FLORENTINO MARTINEZ,                            A208-920-038
                                                A208-920-039
             Petitioners,

 v.                                             MEMORANDUM*

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

             Respondent.

                   On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                       Board of Immigration Appeals

                             Submitted July 10, 2023**
                             San Francisco, California

Before: BEA, BENNETT, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

      Zenaida Martinez Sandoval (“Sandoval”) and her daughter, Maria

Guadalupe Florentino Martinez (“Martinez”), natives and citizens of Mexico,

petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) order

upholding the immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of asylum, withholding of

      *
            This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not
precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).1 The BIA

affirmed the denial of asylum and withholding of removal based on Sandoval’s

lack of credibility. As to the CAT claim, the BIA determined that petitioners

had waived it. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the

petition.

      We review both the IJ’s and BIA’s decisions because the BIA cited

Matter of Burbano, 20 I. & N. Dec. 872 (BIA 1994), and also provided its own

analysis. See Posos-Sanchez v. Garland, 3 F.4th 1176, 1182 (9th Cir. 2021).

Adverse credibility findings are subject to the deferential substantial evidence

standard of review. See Ruiz-Colmenares v. Garland, 25 F.4th 742, 748 (9th

Cir. 2022).

      The IJ and BIA found Sandoval not credible based on three material

omissions, alterations, and inconsistencies. See Iman v. Barr, 972 F.3d 1058,

1068 (9th Cir. 2020) (“[O]missions are probative of credibility to the extent that

later disclosures, if credited, would bolster an earlier, and typically weaker,

asylum application.”); Zamanov v. Holder, 649 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2011)

(“Material alterations in the applicant’s account of persecution are sufficient to

support an adverse credibility finding.”); Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1264, 1270

(9th Cir. 2011) (“If the person cannot tell substantially the same story twice in

1
  Sandoval is the lead petitioner, and Martinez’s claims rest entirely on the facts
of Sandoval’s claims. Only Sandoval testified at the merits hearing before the
IJ.

                                         2                                        22-923
substantially the same way, that suggests a likelihood that the story is false.”).

       First, Sandoval testified before the IJ that she feared returning to Mexico

because the mayor of her town personally threatened to kill her and Martinez.

But Sandoval failed to previously mention this crucial information throughout

the administrative proceedings. She failed to disclose the mayor’s threats

during her initial sworn statement given at the United States border (“sworn

statement”). Although her declaration attached to her asylum application noted

that the mayor was associated with the group that had threatened her, neither the

application nor the declaration alleged that the mayor had personally threatened

her or Martinez. Sandoval again failed to disclose any direct threats by the

mayor in her later-filed amended declaration.

       Second, in both her sworn statement and asylum application, Sandoval

failed to mention that she had been harmed by her husband and feared him.

Indeed, in her sworn statement, she denied ever being physically harmed or

assaulted in Mexico. She then offered a different account in her amended

declaration by alleging for the first time that her husband had physically abused

her.

       Third, Sandoval testified before the IJ that she remained in Tijuana for

two months before attempting to enter the United States. But in her sworn

statement she stated that she arrived in Tijuana on the same day she presented

herself at the border.

       Petitioners challenge only the IJ and BIA’s reliance on the omission and

                                         3                                     22-923
later disclosure of the mayor’s alleged threats, essentially arguing that

Sandoval’s failure to initially disclose such information cannot support an

adverse credibility determination. We disagree. The IJ and BIA could

reasonably conclude that Sandoval initially omitted any direct threats by the

mayor and that her later disclosure of the mayor’s direct threats embellished her

past harms, thereby undermining her credibility. See Ruiz-Colmenares, 25 F.4th

at 750 (acknowledging that later disclosures that embellish past harms “can

certainly form the basis of an adverse credibility determination”).

      “Considering the totality of the circumstances,” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii), the IJ and BIA’s reasons for the adverse credibility

determination—none of which petitioners have shown to be invalid—provide

substantial evidence to support the adverse credibility determination. Absent

credible testimony, petitioners failed to establish eligibility for asylum or

withholding of removal.2 See Rodriguez-Ramirez v. Garland, 11 F.4th 1091,

1094 (9th Cir. 2021).

      Petitioners also challenge the denial of CAT relief. But the BIA

determined that petitioners waived their CAT claim by failing to raise it before

the BIA, and petitioners do not argue that the BIA’s waiver determination was

improper. We therefore agree with the government that petitioners’ CAT claim

should be denied for lack of exhaustion. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); Santos-

2
 Because the adverse credibility determination is dispositive, we need not
address the IJ and BIA’s alternative bases for denying relief.

                                         4                                      22-923
Zacaria v. Garland, 143 S. Ct. 1103, 1114 (2023) (holding that 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(d)(1) is a claim-processing rule); Fort Bend County, Texas v. Davis, 139

S. Ct. 1843, 1849 (2019) (“A claim-processing rule may be ‘mandatory’ in the

sense that a court must enforce the rule if a party ‘properly raises’ it.”

(alterations omitted) (quoting Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 19 (2005)

(per curiam))).

      PETITION DENIED.

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