Court Opinion

ID: 9701339
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 22:16:00.624154+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:22.547893
License: Public Domain

CAPPY, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
On April 28,1985, Joseph Kiley, III, a five year old boy, was struck by an uninsured motor vehicle, leaving him permanently injured with spastic quadriplegia and in a permanent vegetative state. Appellees have alleged that Joseph’s injuries were a direct and proximate result of a dangerous condition created by barricades erected by Appellant. The barricades allegedly blocked a sidewalk and one-half of a street and provided no safe alternate walkway, thus forcing Joseph into the street where he suffered his catastrophic injuries. The majority concludes that the dangerous condition of the sidewalk “itself” did not, as a matter of law, cause Joseph’s injuries. According to the majority, the dangerous condition, at most, merely “facilitated” the driver in injuring Joseph, and, therefore, Appellees’ action does not fall within either the *510“real property” or “sidewalk” exceptions.to governmental immunity. 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8542(b)(3) and (7). This is error.1
In Crowell v. City of Philadelphia, 531 Pa. 400, 613 A.2d 1178 (1992), this Court addressed the misperception that our decision in Mascaro v. Youth Study Center, 514 Pa. 351, 523 A.2d 1118 (1987), abolished all joint-tortfeasor liability against local agencies. We explained that our decision in Mascaro provided only that a local agency was immune from liability for injuries which could be imputed to it under a theory of vicarious liability, but did not abrogate a finding of liability where the local agency was found liable for an injury caused jointly with another tortfeasor. The distinction, “succinctly stated, [is that] vicarious liability imposes liability on a person by virtue of his relation to the tortfeasor, whereas joint liability is imposed on a person by virtue of actions taken in concert with another tortfeasor.” Crowell, 531 Pa. at 409, 613 A.2d at 1182 (footnote omitted). While the majority in the’ case sub judice correctly notes the holding in Crowell initially, it then distorts that very holding to reach a result which I believe is inconsistent with, and, indeed, not supported by our prior decisions.
The majority employs language from Mascaro wherein this Court stated that the artificial condition or defect of the land itself must cause the injury, and not merely facilitate the injury, in order for the exception to immunity to apply, to conclude that the exception does not apply because Joseph was not physically on the sidewalk at the time he was injured. In so doing, the majority has extended the meaning of the phrases “merely facilitated” and “itself caused the injury” beyond that which was clearly intended in Crowell and Masca-ro and has reached a result wholly unsupported by our *511decision in Crowell. Indeed, the majority has craftily disem-bowelled the entire holding in Crowell. Moreover, in so concluding, the majority has also effectively eviscerated traditional concepts of causation in negligence actions as applied to state and local government.
What this Court clearly held in Crowell was that the real estate exception does not apply absent evidence demonstrating a causal connection between the injury and the real estate -within a local agency’s control. This Court unequivocally stated that our holding in Mascaro as set forth above was meant only to preclude the imposition of liability upon a governmental unit based upon a theory of vicarious liability, but not upon a theory of joint liability. Where a causal connection is established between the injury and the real estate, or as in the instant matter, the sidewalk, we did not abrogate the local agency’s liability.
Notably, the “sidewalk” exception at issue here provides that in order for a claimant to recover he or she must establish that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred and that the local agency knew, or should reasonably have known, of the dangerous condition prior to the accident so as to enable it to have taken measures to correct the dangerous condition. 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(b)(7).2 Given the evidence of record in support of Appellees’ allegations that the condition of the sidewalk created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the type of harm here suffered, the majority is patently wrong in finding insufficient support for an exception. To the contrary, if *512Appellees are able to establish the existence of a dangerous condition, and a causal connection between that condition and Joseph’s injuries, the exception will apply.
Appellant’s purported liability arises from its own actions in erecting barricades without further precautions, which is not grounded upon either imputed or constructive fault and thus merely derivative of some other actor’s conduct. It is conduct alleged to be a direct cause of the severe trauma and devastation of life suffered by Joseph. Appellant and the operator of the motor vehicle bore no legal relation to one another. Each of. them owed an independent duty to Joseph, and, upon proper proof, a jury could reasonably determine that the conduct of Appellant gave rise to a dangerous condition that was a substantial factor in bringing about the harm suffered by Joseph. If such a determination were made, there would exist no basis for indemnification of Appellant by the operator of the motor vehicle. Therefore, pursuant to Crowell, the negligence of Appellant could support the conclusion that Appellant was a joint tortfeasor.
To the extent that the majority relies upon Snyder v. Harmon, 522 Pa. 424, 562 A.2d 307 (1989), for its conclusion that the dangerous condition alleged could not itself have caused Joseph’s accident, such reliance is misplaced. In Snyder, this Court found that a dangerous condition arising from a deep strip mine in close proximity to a highway did not fall within an exception to immunity. Snyder requires only that the dangerous condition originate from or have as its source Commonwealth realty. Unquestionably, Appellees have alleged and the evidence of record could support a finding that the dangerous condition in the matter sub judice originated from and had as its source Appellant’s property. Thus, I must conclude that the majority is invading the province of the jury to determine whether Appellant was a joint tortfeasor. The only other conceivable conclusion is that the majority has impliedly determined that the conduct of the other driver was a superseding intervening cause of the accident. However, such a determination is clearly unwarranted under the facts of the matter sub judice.
*513In Crowell, we determined that “since the basis of the jury’s verdict was the active negligence of the City’s employee misplacing a directional sign, and not merely the City’s status along the chain of causation, the verdict against the City was proper, and this Court’s decision in Mascaro [was] not a basis for the City’s assertion of immunity.” 531 Pa. at 413, 613 A.2d at 1184-85. The facts of the matter sub judice are not unlike those in Crowell, where the jury was permitted to determine whether the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury suffered, and whether the acts of the City were a substantial factor in bringing about the harm suffered.
Obviously, in Crowell, the sign itself did not cause the injuries, but rather, it was the dangerous condition created by the sign, which the jury determined created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury that was incurred: namely, an automobile accident after a driver moved across the center line of a highway in response to misdirection provided by the sign. In my opinion, the facts of the matter sub judice are not distinguishable where the catastrophic injuries suffered by Joseph are alleged to have been directly caused by the Appellant’s negligence in erecting sidewalk barricades, which quite arguably could have directed Joseph into the street. Based upon the evidence of record at the time Appellant moved for summary judgment, I believe the jury should be permitted to determine whether a dangerous condition existed and if so, whether it created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the type of harm suffered by Joseph.
Accordingly, I would affirm the decision of the Commonwealth Court, and remand this matter to the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Civil Division.

. Arguably, the "streets” exception to governmental immunity, as further pled by Appellees, is also implicated where the dangerous condition could conceivably be comprised of not only the demolition of Appellee’s real estate, and the sidewalk covered by debris necessitating barricades, but also the condition of Appellee's street. The record before us could easily support the conclusion that in the absence of an alternative walkway, the presence of abandoned vehicles further exacerbated the impact of Appellee’s barricades, thus directing Joseph even further into the street.

. Sidewalks.—A dangerous condition of sidewalks within the rights-of-way of streets owned by the local agency, except that the claimant to recover must establish that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred and that the local agency had actual notice or could reasonably be charged with notice under the circumstances of the dangerous condition at a sufficient time prior to the event to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition. When a local agency is liable for damages under this paragraph by reason of its power and authority to require installation and repair of sidewalks under the care, custody and control of other persons, the local agency shall be secondarily liable only and such other persons shall be primarily liable.
42 Pa.C.S. 8542(b)(7) (emphasis added).