Court Opinion

ID: 9518557
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:55:48.660285+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:29:33.494811
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE CHAPMAN, dissenting: “For He cometh to judge the earth: with righteousness shall he judge the world, and the people with equity.” Psalms 98: 9, King James version. Beginning this dissent with a quote from Psalms is not meant to suggest that any member of this court possesses either omniscience or any other quality associated with the Deity. The quote was chosen because it is an ancient recognition of the difference between law and equity. That difference, at least with regard to permanent obstructions to the natural flow of water, has been completely destroyed by the majority’s opinion in this case. Justice Harrison’s disposition concludes that the 20-year period necessary to establish an easement by prescription is not applicable to an action by a dominant landowner against servient owners to challenge obstructions to the natural flow of surface water. The opinion of this court has in fact created a right of prescriptive easement that is established five years from the beginning of the prescriptive use, and it has done this while refusing to acknowledge the consequences of its action. Further, by its expression of concern about potential res judicata difficulties, the majority both creates a nonexistent problem and overlooks factual scenarios which are more likely to arise in the future. Neither a res judicata nor a claim-splitting problem is presented in this case; the plaintiff sought both money damages and equitable relief. If problems do arise in future cases because of claim splitting, those problems can be dealt with in those cases. While the majority may be justifiably concerned in raising the potential problem of claim splitting, it also appears to have outlined the solution to that problem by recognizing that “res judicata extends not only to all matters which were actually decided, but also to all matters which could have been raised or determined.” 217 Ill. App. 3d at 145. I am concerned that the majority, by some process of intellectual insemination, has brought forth a new rule of law establishing a five-year period of prescriptive easements, while refusing to either acknowledge paternity or to concern itself with the parenting problems that its new child will present. The majority states, “This holding is in no way inconsistent with the 20-year period recognized at common law for the establishment of a prescriptive easement. That period remains. Until the requisite 20 years have elapsed, a servient landowner’s obstruction of the natural water flow will still not ripen into a prescriptive easement. Correspondingly, the dominant landowner will retain his right to have the natural water flow kept free from obstruction. If the obstruction and attendant injury are permanent in nature, however, the dominant landowner will simply be barred from seeking legal or equitable relief for injury to his property caused by the obstruction once more than five years have elapsed since the cause of action accrued.” 217 Ill. App. 3d at 145-46. Before today’s opinion, the law regarding time limitations on prescriptive easements in Illinois could be summarized as follows: (1) After five years, suits for money damages were barred by the statute of limitations. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 13 — 205. (2) Between 5 and 20 years, the doctrine of laches applied to suits seeking equitable relief. Under the doctrine, equity would generally follow the law, i.e., the five-year statute of limitations applicable to suits for money damages would apply unless the plaintiff pled and proved extenuating circumstances to relieve himself from the applicability of the five-year statute. Schlossberg v. Corrington (1980), 80 Ill. App. 3d 860, 400 N.E.2d 73. (3) After 20 years, the dominant owner’s rights were extinguished and the servient owner had a prescriptive easement. Poulos v. F.H. Hill Co. (1948), 401 Ill. 204, 214, 81 N.E.2d 854, 859. Justice Harrison’s opinion eliminates category two from Illinois law while explicitly denying that it does so: “This holding is in no way inconsistent with the 20-year period recognized at common law for the establishment of a prescriptive easement.” (217 Ill. App. 3d at 145-46.) To say in one sentence that the 20-year period remains and that the dominant landowner will retain the right to have the natural flow free from obstruction, and in the next sentence that the dominant landowner’s rights are barred after five years, is to engage in the use of the English language worthy of Lewis Carroll at his best. The majority mentions that “[f]or a landowner to thus be left with a right which can no longer be enforced is not as anomalous as it may seem.” (217 Ill. App. 3d at 146.) I would reply that I am sure it seems quite anomalous to the plaintiff in this case, and the court should also be concerned about other cases which may present some of the parenting problems which I referred to earlier. Consider the following scenario: Jones, owner of Blackacre, causes an unnatural flow of water upon Whiteacre, which is owned by Smith. This unnatural flow of water continues for four years 364 days, when Whiteacre is sold to the Widow Allen. Under the law as prescribed in this court’s opinion, Widow Allen has one day to file her claim contesting Jones’ prescriptive use of her property, or otherwise be barred from remedy. Should Widow Allen fail to file her claim within one day, equity will not come to her rescue. She is not • entitled to either monetary or injunctive relief. Consider also the scenario where Whiteacre, owned by Widow Alzheimer, is plagued for five years by the unnatural flow of surface water from Blackacre. Widow Alzheimer dies and Whiteacre is transferred to Smith. Smith’s remedies against Jones are forever barred. The fact that the same results would occur after 20 years does not answer my objection to the majority’s disposition, which is that it is making a significant change in the law while refusing to acknowledge the effect of its action. Equity follows the law. However, contrary to Justice Harrison’s disposition, the statute of limitations does not strictly apply to equity cases. (Trustees of Schools v. American Surety Co. (1940), 307 Ill. App. 398, 406, 30 N.E.2d 513, 517.) Where a party seeking relief after the statutory period has elapsed affirmatively pleads and proves a reasonable basis for the delay, he may avoid application of the statute of limitations to his cause of action. (Schlossherg v. Corrington (1980), 80 Ill. App. 3d 860, 865, 400 N.E.2d 73, 76, citing Nelson v. Wilson (1928), 331 Ill. 11, 162 N.E. 144.) Our supreme court has stated: “[L]aches is not simply a matter of time; rather, it is a principle of ‘inequity founded upon some change in the condition or relation of the property and the parties’ [citation]. That is, it must appear that a plaintiff’s unreasonable delay in asserting his rights has prejudiced and misled the defendant, or caused him to pursue a course different from what he would have otherwise taken. [Citations.] If the defendant is not injured by the delay, then plaintiff is not guilty of laches.” People ex rel. Casey v. Health & Hospitals Governing Comm’n (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 108, 115, 370 N.E.2d 499, 502. In the instant case, Meyers’ reason for not filing a cause of action until nearly seven years after construction of the levee was completed was that Meyers attempted to have the levee removed through the Illinois Department of Transportation, and when that failed, he sought judicial relief. Defendants maintained that if Meyers were permitted to proceed, they would be prejudiced by the delay in Meyers’ commencing his action. Defendants argued that they expended funds in constructing the levee in question and in subsequently repairing and maintaining the same, and were deprived of the opportunity to gather evidence to refute the claims alleged by plaintiffs. The trial court found that the defendants failed to prove laches by a preponderance of the evidence in that they failed to prove that they were injured by any delay by the plaintiff in filing suit. This finding should not be disturbed unless the trial court abused its discretion in making it. (Finley v. Finley (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 317, 330, 410 N.E.2d 12, 18.) The majority does not even acknowledge the fact that the trial court made this specific finding, let alone make any attempt to establish that its finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Instead, the majority creates the new rule discussed earlier. After reviewing the record, I conclude that the trial court’s finding on laches is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. There is no need to extend this dissent further by discussion of all of the points raised by the parties in their respective briefs. I would affirm the trial court: “ ‘[E]quity is not so weak of arm or lame of foot.’ From its earliest origins equity was designed to avoid the rigidity of common-law writs and procedure and to adjust itself to the requirements of justice.” Strom v. Strom (1957), 13 Ill. App. 2d 354, 367, 142 N.E.2d 172, 179.