Court Opinion

ID: 9353082
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-10 21:00:44.746137+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:07:28.710289
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 20-12960    Document: 94-1      Date Filed: 01/10/2023    Page: 1 of 48

                                                              [PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 20-12960
                           ____________________

        JAVIER GARCIA-BENGOCHEA,
                                                       Plaintiff-Appellant,
        versus
        CARNIVAL CORPORATION,
        a foreign corporation
        d.b.a. Carnival Cruise Lines,
                                                     Defendant-Appellee.

                           ___________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Florida
                     D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cv-21725-JLK
                           ____________________
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        2                        Opinion of the Court                    20-12960

                               ____________________

                                      No. 20-14251
                               ____________________

        JAVIER GARCIA-BENGOCHEA,
                                                              Plaintiff-Appellant,
        versus
        ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES, LTD.,

                                                            Defendant-Appellee.

                               ____________________

                    Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Southern District of Florida
                       D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cv-23592-JLK
                             ____________________

        Before JORDAN and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges, and BURKE, * District
        Judge.

        *The Honorable Liles Burke, U.S. District Judge for the Northern District of
        Alabama, sitting by designation.
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        20-12960               Opinion of the Court                       3

        PER CURIAM:
              We grant the petition for panel rehearing, vacate our prior
        opinion and Judge Jordan’s concurrence, reported at __ F. 4th __,
        2022 WL 17170885 (11th Cir. Nov. 23, 2022), and substitute the fol-
        lowing in their place. The only changes to the prior opinion and
        the concurrence consist of statutory citations and references to the
        Helms-Burton Act.
               When Fidel Castro overthrew Fulgencio Batista in 1959,
        most Cubans who fled to the United States hoped that they would
        one day return to their homeland. But many would never again
        see the beaches of Varadero or stroll along the Malecón. They built
        homes and lives in the United States, never forgetting what they
        left behind on an island just 90 miles off the coast of Key West.
               In 1996, Congress enacted the Cuban Liberty and Demo-
        cratic Solidarity Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021 et seq. (known as the
        “Helms-Burton Act”), in an attempt to provide a means of com-
        pensation for some of the losses suffered as a result of the Castro
        regime’s actions. As relevant here, Title III of the Act provides a
        private cause of action for U.S. nationals against those who know-
        ingly traffic in property expropriated by the Cuban government af-
        ter the start of the Cuban Revolution. See § 6082(a)(1)(A).
               Title III remained dormant for 23 years, and through three
        different administrations, because the right to bring an action un-
        der Title III was suspended by Presidential decree. See
        § 6085(c)(1)(B) (granting the President the authority to suspend the
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        4                       Opinion of the Court                 20-12960

        right to bring an action under Title III if, among other things, the
        President determines the suspension is “necessary to the national
        interests of the United States and will expedite a transition to de-
        mocracy in Cuba”). But in May of 2019, President Trump lifted the
        suspension, making Title III fully effective. President Biden, since
        taking office, has not suspended Title III and it therefore remains
        in effect today.
               This appeal concerns a number of issues pertaining to claims
        brought under Title III. First, does the plaintiff, Dr. Javier Garcia-
        Bengochea, have Article III standing to assert his claims against
        Carnival and Royal Caribbean? Second, has Dr. Garcia-Bengochea
        stated plausible Title III claims? We heard oral argument on these
        matters, invited the Department of Justice to file an amicus curiae
        brief addressing certain questions about the Act, and permitted the
        parties to respond to that brief.
                We conclude that Dr. Garcia-Bengochea has standing to as-
        sert his Title III claims, but that those claims fail on the merits. We
        therefore affirm the district court’s grant of judgment on the plead-
        ings in favor of Carnival and Royal Caribbean.
                                           I
              We begin with an overview of Title III of the Helms-Burton
        Act and then pivot to the allegations in Dr. Garcia-Bengochea’s
        complaints. Given that this case was resolved at the pleading stage,
        we accept those allegations as true and draw reasonable inferences
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        20-12960               Opinion of the Court                       5

        in Dr. Garcia-Bengochea’s favor. See Glynn Env’t Coal., Inc. v. Sea
        Island Acquisition, LLC, 26 F.4th 1235, 1240 (11th Cir. 2022).
                                         A
               In response to the takings of American property in Cuba by
        the Castro regime, Congress amended the International Claims
        Settlement Act of 1949 with the Cuban Claims Act of 1964, 22
        U.S.C. §§ 1643-1643k. The Cuban Claims Act authorized the For-
        eign Claims Settlement Commission to gather information for an
        eventual negotiation on claims of confiscated properties in Cuba.
        The Commission reviewed the applications of U.S. corporate and
        individual claimants and certified as legitimate nearly 6,000 claims
        valued at about $1.9 billion. See Sylvia M. Becker & Patrick
        Hovakimian, Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the U.S.,
        United States Department of Justice (updated April 21, 2022) (avail-
        able at https://www.justice.gov/fcsc/claims-against-cuba). In
        2005 and 2006 the Commission, pursuant to a subsequent grant of
        statutory authority, conducted a second round of claims review.
        See Pub. L. 105-277, § 2211, 112 Stat. 2681-812. Cuba and the
        United States, however, have never reached a settlement on these
        claims (or, for that matter, on claims by Cuba against the United
        States). See generally Richard E. Feinberg, Reconciling U.S. Prop-
        erty Claims in Cuba: Transforming Trauma into Opportunity,
        Latin America Initiative at Brookings, at 2-15 (December 2015).
              In 1996, Congress passed the Helms-Burton Act in part “to
        protect United States nationals against confiscatory takings and the
        wrongful trafficking in property confiscated by the Castro regime.”
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        6                           Opinion of the Court                       20-12960

        22 U.S.C. § 6022(6). Title III of the Act aims to deter “trafficking in
        confiscated property” with the purpose of “protect[ing] the claims
        of United States nationals who had property wrongfully confis-
        cated by” the Cuban government. See § 6081(6)(B).
                 Specifically, Title III provides “United States nationals who
        were the victims of th[o]se confiscations . . . with a judicial remedy
        in the courts of the United States.” § 6081(11). To that end, it es-
        tablishes a private right of action for “any United States national
        who owns the claim to [confiscated property]” against “any person
        that . . . traffics in [such] property.” § 6082(a)(1)(A). A United States
        national is “any United States citizen” or “any other legal entity. . .
        organized under the laws of the United States, or of any State, the
        District of Columbia, or any commonwealth, territory, or posses-
        sion of the United States, and which has its principal place of busi-
        ness in the United States.” § 6023(15)(A)–(B). 1
             A person “traffics” in confiscated property if that person
        knowingly and intentionally:

        1   See also 22 U.S.C. § 1643(l) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of this
        chapter and only for purposes of section 6082 of this title, a United State[s]
        district court, for fact-finding purposes, may refer to the [Foreign Claims Set-
        tlement] Commission, and the Commission may determine, questions of the
        amount and the ownership of a claim by a United States national (as defined
        in section 6023 of this title), resulting from the confiscation of property by the
        Government of Cuba described in section 1643b(a) of this title, whether or not
        the United States national qualified as a national of the United States (as de-
        fined in section 1643a(1) of this title) at the time of the action by the Govern-
        ment of Cuba.”) (emphasis added).
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        20-12960                 Opinion of the Court                             7

               (i) sells, transfers, distributes, dispenses, brokers,
               manages, or otherwise disposes of confiscated prop-
               erty, or purchases, leases, receives, possesses, obtains
               control of, manages, uses, or otherwise acquires or
               holds an interest in confiscated property,

               (ii) engages in a commercial activity using or other-
               wise benefiting from confiscated property, or

               (iii) causes, directs, participates in, or profits from,
               trafficking (as described in clause (i) or (ii)) by another
               person, or otherwise engages in trafficking (as de-
               scribed in clause (i) or (ii)) through another person,

               without the authorization of any United States na-
               tional who holds a claim to the property.

        § 6023(13).
                                             B
               Dr. Garcia-Bengochea is a U.S. citizen and a U.S. national as
        that term is defined in 22 U.S.C. § 6023(15). He claims to be the
        “rightful owner of an 82.5% interest in certain commercial water-
        front real property in the Port of Santiago de Cuba,” identified by
        the Cuban government as La Marítima and Terminal Naviera. See
        CC D.E. 1 at ¶ 6; RC D.E. 1 at ¶ 7. 2

        2We refer to the docket in the Carnival case, No. 20-12960, as “CC D.E.” and
        to the docket in the Royal Caribbean case, No. 20-14251, as “RC D.E.”
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        8                         Opinion of the Court                      20-12960

               The Cuban government nationalized, expropriated, and
        seized ownership of La Marítima on October 13, 1960, via Cuba’s
        Gazette Law 890, and maintains possession of the property today.
        It has not paid any compensation to Dr. Garcia-Bengochea or any-
        one else for its seizure or use and the claim to the property has not
        been resolved pursuant to an international claims settlement or
        other settlement procedure. Dr. Garcia-Bengochea has never
        abandoned his legitimate interest in the property. See CC D.E. 1
        at ¶¶ 7–9; RC D.E. 1 at ¶ 8–10.
                The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission—pursuant to
        the International Claims Settlement Act—certified a portion of Dr.
        Garcia-Bengochea’s ownership interest in La Marítima when it ad-
        judicated the claim of his cousin, Albert Parreño. This portion rep-
        resents Dr. Garcia-Bengochea’s 32.5% interest in the property, and
        was valued by the Commission in 1970 at $289,549.92. See CC D.E.
        1-1 at 6. The remaining portion of Dr. Garcia-Bengochea’s interest
        in the property is based upon an uncertified claim. See CC D.E. 1
        at ¶¶ 10–11 & Ex. A; RC D.E. 1 at ¶¶ 11–12. 3
               Starting in May of 2016, Carnival knowingly and intention-
        ally conducted its commercial cruise line business to Cuba using La
        Marítima by regularly embarking and disembarking its passengers
        there. In the summer of 2018, Royal Caribbean began doing the

        3On appeal, Dr. Garcia-Bengochea has abandoned the uncertified portion of
        his claim. See Appellant’s Br. in No. 20-12960 at 5; Appellant’s Br. in No. 20-
        14251 at 6.
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        20-12960               Opinion of the Court                         9

        same. Both cruise lines have used the property without the author-
        ization of Dr. Garcia-Bengochea or any other U.S. national who
        holds a claim to it. And both cruise lines have profited from the
        Cuban government’s possession of La Marítima, again without the
        authorization of or payment to Dr. Garcia-Bengochea (or any other
        U.S. national who holds a claim to the property). See CC D.E. 1 at
        ¶¶ 12–13; RC D.E. 1 at ¶¶ 13–14.
                According to the complaints, the knowing and intentional
        conduct of Carnival and Royal Caribbean constitutes trafficking
        under § 6023(13)(A). As a result, Dr. Garcia-Bengochea—who pro-
        vided the cruise lines with written notice by certified mail of his
        intent to commence an action under Title III—claims that he is en-
        titled to damages under § 6082. Those claimed damages are (a) the
        amount greater of (i) the amount certified by the Foreign Claims
        Settlement Commission, plus interest, or (ii) the amount deter-
        mined by a special master pursuant to § 6083(a)(2), or (iii) the fair
        market value of the property, plus interest; and (b) treble damages
        of the amount determined above. See CC D.E. 1 at ¶¶ 15–16, 20;
        RC D.E. 1 at ¶¶ 16–17, 21.
                                          II
               Carnival and Royal Caribbean argue for the first time on ap-
        peal that Dr. Garcia-Bengochea does not have Article III standing
        to assert his Title III claim. Despite the late assertion, we are re-
        quired to address standing because it affects subject-matter jurisdic-
        tion, see Florida Ass'n of Med. Equip. Dealers v. Apfel, 194 F.3d
        1227, 1230 (11th Cir.1999), and we do so below. Our analysis is
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        10                      Opinion of the Court                 20-12960

        plenary. See Muransky v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc., 979 F.3d 917,
        923 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc).
                To have Article III standing, a plaintiff must have suffered an
        injury in fact that can be fairly traced to the defendant’s conduct
        and that can be redressed with a favorable decision. See Lujan v.
        Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). As this case is at the
        pleading stage, Dr. Bengochea has to allege sufficient facts to plau-
        sibly state these three elements. See Thole v. U.S. Bank N.A., 140
        S.Ct. 1615, 1621 (2020); Glynn Env’t Coal., Inc., 26 F.4th at 1240.
               We must not, however, “confus[e] weakness on the merits
        with absence of Article III standing.” Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz.
        Ind. Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787, 800 (2015) (citation omit-
        ted). Indeed, we “must . . . assume that on the merits [Dr. Garcia-
        Bengochea] would be successful in [his Title III] claim[s.]” Culver-
        house v. Paulson & Co. Inc., 813 F.3d 991, 994 (11th Cir. 2016) (ci-
        tation omitted). See also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 502 (1975)
        (assuming the validity of the plaintiff’s claims in determining the
        question of standing).
               As far as we can tell, all the courts that have addressed the
        issue—two circuit courts and a number of district courts—have
        concluded that a plaintiff like Dr. Garcia-Bengochea has, at the mo-
        tion to dismiss stage, standing to bring a claim under Title III. See,
        e.g., Glen v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 7 F.4th 331, 334–36 (5th Cir. 2021);
        Glen v. Trip Advisor LLC, 529 F.Supp.3d 316, 326–28 (D. Del.
        2021), aff’d, 2022 WL 3538221, at *2 (3d Cir. August 18, 2022); de
        Fernandez v. Crowley Holdings, Inc., No. 21-CV-20443, 2022 WL
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        20-12960                Opinion of the Court                          11

        860373, at *3–*4 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 23, 2022); Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
        Corporación CIMEX S.A., 534 F.Supp.3d 1, 30–32 (D.D.C. 2021);
        Sucesores de Don Carlos Nuñez y Doña Pura Galvez, Inc. v. So-
        ciété Générale, S.A., 577 F.Supp.3d 295, 307–10 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22,
        2021); Moreira v. Société Générale, S.A., 573 F.Supp.3d 921, 925–
        29 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2021); N. Am. Sugar Indus. Inc. v. Xinjiang
        Goldwind Sci. & Tech. Co., No. 20-CV-22471 (DPG), 2021 WL
        3741647, at *3–*6 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 24, 2021); Havana Docks Corp. v.
        Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings, Ltd., 484 F.Supp.3d 1215, 1226–
        31 (S.D. Fla. 2020); Havana Docks Corp. v. MSC Cruises SA Co.,
        484 F. Supp. 3d 1177, 1190–95 (S.D. Fla. 2020); Havana Docks Corp.
        v. Carnival Corp., No. 19-CV-21724 (BB), 2020 WL 5517590, at *6–
        *11 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 14, 2020). As explained below, we agree with
        their decisions on this point.
                                           A
               To establish an injury in fact a plaintiff must have suffered
        “an invasion of a legally protected interest” that is both “concrete
        and particularized.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (citations omitted). An
        injury is particularized if it “affect[s] the plaintiff in a personal and
        individual way.’” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 339 (2016)
        (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n.1). See also Valley Forge Chris-
        tian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State,
        Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (“Art. III requires the [plaintiff] … to
        show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened in-
        jury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant.”)
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        12                      Opinion of the Court                  20-12960

        (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). An injury is con-
        crete if it is “real” and “not abstract.” Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 340.
               The alleged injury here is particularized, and the cruise lines
        do not argue to the contrary. Dr. Garcia-Bengochea is suing based
        on his alleged personal interest in (or at least claim to) property that
        the Cuban government confiscated decades ago, and which has
        since been used without permission and without compensation.
        See Trip Advisor, 529 F.Supp.3d at 327; Norwegian Cruise Line,
        484 F.Supp.3d at 1229. He is not asking a court to “decid[e] ques-
        tions of broad social import” that are shared by other citizens in
        equal measure. See Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441
        U.S. 91, 99–100 (1979). He is instead claiming injury to himself “as
        a result of the violation of . . . [statutorily] created legal rights.”
        Palm Beach Golf Center-Boca, Inc. v. John D. Sarris, D.D.S., P.A.,
        781 F.3d 1245, 1251 (11th Cir. 2015). And to the extent that there
        may be a dispute about whether Dr. Garcia-Bengochea has an en-
        forceable interest in La Marítima, that dispute does not affect his
        standing. We must assume the validity of a claim in assessing
        standing, see Culverhouse, 813 F.3d at 994, and “‘when the exist-
        ence of a protected property interest is an element of the claim,
        deciding whether the interest exists virtually always goes to the
        merits rather than the standing.’” Am. Airlines, 7 F.4th at 335
        (quoting Protect Our Parks, Inc. v. Chicago Park Dist., 971 F.3d
        722, 736 (7th Cir. 2020)). Accord PDVSA U.S. Litig. Tr. v. Lukoil
        Pan Americas, LLC, 991 F.3d 1187, 1191–92 (11th Cir. 2021).
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        20-12960               Opinion of the Court                        13

               Carnival and Royal Caribbean argue that Dr. Garcia-Ben-
        gochea’s injury is not concrete because he was not affected in any
        way by their use of La Marítima. As Carnival puts it, Dr. Garcia-
        Bengochea would be “in precisely the same position he stands in
        now” had it never sailed to Cuba or used La Marítima. See Br. for
        Carnival in No. 20-12960 at 16. The cruise lines also contend that
        there is no historical analogue for the Title III cause of action that
        Dr. Garcia-Bengochea is asserting, and that Congress’ judgment
        does not identify any real injury. See id. at 17–29; Br. for Royal
        Caribbean in No. 20-14251 at 18–25. We disagree on both points.
               The Supreme Court has said that “[i]f a defendant has caused
        physical or monetary injury to the plaintiff, the plaintiff has suf-
        fered a concrete injury in fact under Article III.” TransUnion LLC
        v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2204 (2021) (emphasis added). We
        have similarly stated that “financial loss” is an “obvious” tangible
        harm that constitutes injury in fact. See Muransky, 979 F.3d at 926.
        Assuming the validity of his Title III claims, see Culverhouse, 813
        F.3d at 994, Dr. Garcia-Bengochea has alleged a tangible, and there-
        fore concrete, injury. According to the complaints, the Foreign
        Claims Settlement Commission certified a portion of Dr. Garcia-
        Bengochea’s interest in La Marítima and valued that portion at
        $289,549.92 in 1970. That certified claim provides, in part, a means
        of quantifying financial harm. See Exxon Mobil, 534 F.Supp.3d at
        31.
              Though “the injury may have its origin in the confiscation”
        of La Marítima by the Cuban government, the cruise lines’ alleged
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        14                     Opinion of the Court                20-12960

        “continued use” of the property without Dr. Garcia-Bengochea’s
        authorization does not render his “harm less tangible today.” Nor-
        wegian Cruise Line, 484 F.Supp.3d at 1228. See also Moreira, 573
        F.Supp.3d at 926 (“Plaintiffs allege an injury from Defendants’ traf-
        ficking that is distinct from the confiscation of Banco Pujol by the
        Cuban Government.”). In other words, the cruise lines’ failure to
        obtain permission and pay for use of the property constitutes a
        pocketbook injury. See § 6023(13)(A) (defining trafficking, in part,
        as “knowingly and intentionally . . . engag[ing] in a commercial ac-
        tivity using or otherwise benefiting from confiscated property . . .
        without the authorization of any United States national who holds
        claim to the property”) (emphasis added).
               As someone with a claimed interest in La Marítima, Dr. Gar-
        cia-Bengochea “is shut out wrongfully from the gains produced by
        exploiting property that is rightfully h[is].” Sucesores, 577
        F.Supp.3d at 309. When Carnival and Royal Caribbean used the
        property as a part of their commercial businesses—without the per-
        mission of or payment to Dr. Garcia-Bengochea—they engaged in
        exactly the kind of conduct contemplated and prohibited by the
        Act. Congress knew that the Cuban government had wrongfully
        confiscated property from U.S. nationals, and enacted Title III for
        the very purpose of denying traffickers any profits they might ob-
        tain by subsequently exploiting the wrongful seizures. See §
        6022(6). The contention that the initial confiscation somehow im-
        munizes the later trafficking goes against the Act’s text and pur-
        pose.
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        20-12960                Opinion of the Court                        15

                Consider an analogy to takings law. When real property is
        taken by the government through eminent domain, the financial
        harm to the owner does not necessarily end with the physical act
        of confiscation. If the property produced rental income, for exam-
        ple, the just compensation analysis can include the amounts that
        would have been received by the owner during the useful life of
        the property. See, e.g., Monongahela Nav. Co. v. United States,
        148 U.S. 312, 343 (1893) (“[W]hen by the taking of the tangible
        property the owner is actually deprived of the franchise to collect
        tolls, just compensation requires payment, not merely of the value
        of tangible property itself, but also that of the franchise of which he
        is deprived.”); United States v. Tampa Bay Apts., Inc., 294 F.2d 598,
        601, 607 (5th Cir. 1961) (considering, in a case involving compensa-
        tion for the government’s use of eminent domain, the rental in-
        come produced by two housing projects). The analogy is not per-
        fect, for in the takings scenario a court takes into account the
        stream of future income in determining overall just compensation,
        so that there is no unlawful government exploitation of the prop-
        erty after it has been taken through eminent domain. Neverthe-
        less, the analogy suggests that the continued use of confiscated
        property—without permission and without payment—constitutes
        an ongoing and tangible financial harm.
                Even if we assume that Dr. Garcia-Bengochea’s claimed in-
        jury is somehow intangible, it is still concrete. The existence of a
        statutory right does not, by itself, establish concreteness, see Thole,
        140 S.Ct. at 1620, but here the Title III remedy Congress created
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        16                      Opinion of the Court                 20-12960

        bears a close relationship to the remedy of unjust enrichment. See
        generally Restatement (First) of Restitution § 1 (ALI 1937) (“A per-
        son who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is
        required to make restitution to the other.”). In enacting Title III,
        Congress recognized that the international judicial system
        “lack[ed] fully effective remedies for the wrongful confiscation of
        property and for unjust enrichment from the use of wrongfully
        confiscated property,” § 6081(8), and sought to provide a means of
        redress for the continued exploitation and use of such property.
        See Glen v. Club Mediterranee, S.A., 450 F.3d 1251, 1255 (11th Cir.
        2006) (“It is the purpose of the [Act] to deter third party foreign
        investors from trafficking in the confiscated property. . . . This pur-
        pose is achieved through the establishment of a new statutory rem-
        edy[.]”).
               We agree with the Fifth Circuit (and other courts) that “[t]he
        harm allegedly caused by [the cruise lines’] trafficking bears a close
        relationship to unjust enrichment, which has indisputable com-
        mon-law roots.” Am. Airlines, 7 F.4th at 334 (citing Development
        in the Law: Chapter One—The Intellectual History of Unjust En-
        richment, 133 Harv. L. Rev. 2077, 2078–87 (2020)). See also Glen,
        2022 WL 3538221, at *2 (“[W]e agree with the Fifth Circuit that the
        harm Glen alleges—namely, [the defendants’] wrongfully profiting
        from his usurped properties—bears a ‘close relationship to unjust
        enrichment, which has indisputable common-law roots.’”);
        Moreira, 573 F.Supp.3d at 927 (“Congress did indeed ‘elevate to the
        status of legally cognizable’ a harm that has traditionally been
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        20-12960                Opinion of the Court                         17

        regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit in American courts: the
        harm of unjust enrichment.”). As noted earlier, a Title III plaintiff
        like Dr. Garcia-Bengochea is “injured concretely when [he] is shut
        out wrongfully from the gains produced by exploiting property”
        that he claims is “rightfully h[is].” Sucesores, 577 F.Supp.3d at 309.
               Think of a situation where the government nationalizes or
        confiscates a six-bedroom beachfront home without paying its
        owner anything for it and transfers the property to a political sup-
        porter for free. The supporter then turns the property into a suc-
        cessful boutique hotel, which he operates for decades at a signifi-
        cant profit. The political supporter, who has not obtained the orig-
        inal owner’s permission (or paid anything) for the use of the prop-
        erty, can be said to have been unjustly enriched (at least to some
        degree) at the owner’s expense. See Restatement (First) of Restitu-
        tion, at § 1, comment a (“A person is unjustly enriched if the reten-
        tion of the benefit would be unjust.”). This hypothetical is not too
        far removed from what Dr. Garcia-Bengochea is suing over here.
                                           B
               To satisfy the traceability requirement, a plaintiff must es-
        tablish a “causal connection between the injury and the conduct
        complained of.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. Dr. Garcia-Bengochea
        therefore needs to sufficiently allege that his injury is “fairly trace-
        able” to the cruise lines’ conduct rather than “the result of the in-
        dependent action of some third party not before the court.” Id.
        (internal quotation and citation omitted).
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        18                      Opinion of the Court                   20-12960

               Carnival and Royal Caribbean contend, in an argument re-
        lated to their position on injury, that Dr. Garcia-Bengochea has not
        alleged causation because his injury is the result of the Cuban gov-
        ernment’s confiscation of La Marítima, and not their own conduct.
        Like other courts which have addressed the same or similar argu-
        ment in Title III cases, we are not persuaded.
                 It seems to us that the argument proceeds from the wrong
        starting point. The injury that must be traced here is the cruise
        lines’ alleged use of La Marítima without obtaining Dr. Garcia-Ben-
        gochea’s permission and without payment of compensation for
        that use. As we have explained, Dr. Bengochea has been allegedly
        injured by both the Cuban government’s initial confiscation of the
        property and the cruise lines’ subsequent trafficking in the prop-
        erty. Because his action targets the latter and not the former, the
        causation element is satisfied. See Am. Airlines, 7 F.4th at 336
        (“[The plaintiff’s] alleged injury is traceable to American. He al-
        leges an injury that is entirely separate from either the confiscation
        of the properties or the operations of hotels on the properties.”);
        Exxon Mobil, 534 F.Supp.3d at 31 (“Defendants . . . miss the mark
        by characterizing Exxon’s injury as the expropriation of Essosa’s
        property.”); Norwegian Cruise Line, 484 F.Supp.3d at 1230
        (“NCL’s conduct of using and profiting from the Subject Property
        is fairly traceable to Plaintiff’s claimed injuries.”).
               It is true, in a chronological sense, that the cruise lines’ abil-
        ity to cause the trafficking injury identified in Title III is linked to
        the earlier actions of the Cuban government. Had the Cuban
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        20-12960               Opinion of the Court                       19

        government not confiscated La Marítima, Carnival and Royal Car-
        ibbean would not have been able to use that property without com-
        pensating its owners. But that is not a problem at this point in the
        litigation. The Supreme Court has been clear that “[p]roximate
        cause is not a requirement of Article III standing.” Lexmark Int’l,
        Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 134 n.6
        (2014). And so have we. See Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317,
        1324 (11th Cir. 2012) (“A showing that an injury is fairly traceable
        requires less than a showing of proximate cause.”) (internal quota-
        tions omitted).
              Resnick is a good example of how the traceability element
        works. In that case, members of health care plans brought several
        tort and contract claims against a health care plan operator for its
        failure to secure laptops at its office that contained the members’
        sensitive information. The laptops were stolen by third parties and
        then sold to another individual with a history of dealing in stolen
        property. Subsequently, several members became victims of iden-
        tity theft. Those members were injured by the person who alleg-
        edly either sold or used the information stored in the laptops to
        commit identity theft. See Resnick, 693 F.3d at 1321–22. The
        health care operator, the defendant which was being sued, was not
        the sole or even proximate cause of the members’ injuries. Had
        the laptops not been stolen, it is possible that the unsecured infor-
        mation would not have been compromised in the data breach. And
        if the laptops had not been sold by the thieves to the person who
        sold or used the confidential information, there may not have been
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        20                      Opinion of the Court                  20-12960

        any identity theft. Nevertheless, causation for the purposes of Ar-
        ticle III was not a problem with respect to the health care operator.
        We explained that traceability does not equate to proximate cause,
        noting that “[e]ven a showing that a plaintiff’s injury is indirectly
        caused by a defendant’s actions satisfies the traceability require-
        ment.” Id. at 1324.
                As Resnick demonstrates, the presence of multiple actors in
        a chain of events that lead to the plaintiff’s injury does not mean
        that traceability is lacking with respect to the conduct of a particu-
        lar defendant. If the facts alleged are taken as true, and if the valid-
        ity of Dr. Garcia-Bengochea’s claim is assumed, the claimed traf-
        ficking injury is fairly traceable to Carnival and Royal Caribbean,
        even if they had some help from the Cuban government along the
        way.
                                           C
               Finally, we address redressability, the third and final require-
        ment of Article III standing. To satisfy this requirement, a plaintiff
        needs to show that “it must be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘spec-
        ulative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’”
        Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rts.
        Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 43 (1976)). At this stage, Dr. Garcia-Ben-
        gochea must plausibly allege that a decision in his favor would “sig-
        nificant[ly] increase ... the likelihood that [he] would obtain relief
        that directly redresses the injury suffered.” Harrell v. Fla. Bar, 608
        F.3d 1241, 1260 n.7 (11th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). Signifi-
        cantly, for standing purposes the relief sought need not be
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        20-12960                Opinion of the Court                          21

        complete. See Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, 141 S. Ct. 792, 801
        (2021) (addressing whether an award of nominal damages satisfies
        redressability: “True, a single dollar often cannot provide full re-
        dress, but the ability ‘to effectuate a partial remedy’ satisfies the re-
        dressability requirement.”); Made in the U.S.A. Foundation v.
        United States, 242 F.3d 1300, 1310 (11th Cir. 2001) (agreeing that a
        “partial remedy would be sufficient for redressability”) (internal
        quotation marks and citation omitted).
                 Dr. Garcia-Bengochea has sufficiently alleged redressability.
        His claimed financial injury includes the cruise lines’ alleged use of
        (i.e., trafficking in) La Marítima without his permission and with-
        out compensation. An award of damages under Title III will, at
        least in part, redress that injury. See, e.g., Trip Advisor, 529
        F.Supp.3d at 328 (“Glen’s alleged injury can be redressed by a fa-
        vorable judgment. A favorable judgment would entitle Glen to
        money damages as specified in the Helms-Burton Act . . ., compen-
        sation that would redress the harm [he] allegedly suffered from De-
        fendants’ economic exploitation of the Subject Properties.”); Nor-
        wegian Cruise Line, 484 F.Supp.3d at 1231 (explaining that a Title
        III plaintiff need not regain its confiscated property to demonstrate
        redressability).
               We note, as well, that Dr. Garcia-Bengochea alleges that he
        his interest in La Marítima has been partially certified by the For-
        eign Claims Settlement Commission. One measure of damages
        specified in Title III is the amount of such a certified claim, see §
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        22                          Opinion of the Court                        20-12960

        6082(a)(1)(A)(i)(I), and that too provides redressability for purposes
        of standing. See Exxon Mobil, 534 F.Supp.3d at 31. 4
                                                III
                The district court granted judgment on the pleadings in fa-
        vor of Carnival under Rule 12(c). Applying 22 U.S.C. §
        6082(a)(4)(B), it concluded that Dr. Garcia-Bengochea—a U.S. na-
        tional—could not bring a claim under Title III because he “ac-
        quired” his interest in La Marítima through inheritance after the
        enactment of the Helms-Burton Act. See CC D.E. 120 at 6–8. The
        district court also granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of
        Royal Caribbean on the same grounds. See RC D.E. 32 at 5–7. Dr.
        Garcia-Bengochea appeals those rulings.
                                                A
              We review the grant of judgment on the pleadings de novo.
        See Perez v. Wells Fargo N.A., 774 F.3d 1329, 1335 (11th Cir. 2014).

        4 As a general matter, “[r]emedies should not put a plaintiff in a more favorable

        position than he or she would have enjoyed absent [the wrongful conduct.]”
        Babb v. Wilkie, 140 S. Ct. 1168, 1178 (2020). Insofar as Carnival and Royal
        Caribbean contend that the remedies in Title III may financially overcompen-
        sate for the harm suffered by plaintiffs like Dr. Garcia-Bengochea, that conten-
        tion is premature. It goes to the merits and does not affect the existence of
        Article III standing at this stage of the case. In any event, it is not at all clear
        that the damages recoverable by someone like Dr. Garcia-Bengochea would
        historically be limited to the sums due for the use of the property. “Equity
        courts have routinely deprived wrongdoers of their net profits from unlawful
        activity, even though that remedy may have gone by different names.” Liu v.
        S.E.C., 140 S. Ct. 1936, 1942 (2020).
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        20-12960                Opinion of the Court                        23

               Under Rule 12(c), the district had to accept as true the factual
        allegations in the pleadings of the non-moving party—here Dr.
        Garcia-Bengochea—and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor.
        See Mergens v. Dreyfoos, 166 F.3d 1114, 1117 (11th Cir. 1999); 2
        Moore’s Federal Practice § 12.38 (3d ed. 2019). And it also had to
        “treat as false the allegations in [the] answer[s] that contradict[ed]”
        the allegations made by Dr. Garcia-Bengochea. See McDonald v.
        Grace Church Seattle, 457 F.3d 1079, 1081 (9th Cir. 2006). See also
        1 Richard A. Givens, Manual of Federal Practice, § 4.31 (4th ed.
        1991) (“For purposes of a Rule 12(c) motion, all controverted alle-
        gations in the pleadings of the moving party are treated as false[.]”).
                                          B
               In his complaint, Dr. Garcia-Bengochea alleged that he is the
        rightful owner of an interest in La Marítima, and that a portion of
        his interest was certified by the Foreign Claims Settlement Com-
        mission in 1970 in resolving the claim of Albert Parreño (whom
        we’ll refer to as Albert). See e.g., CC D.E. 1-1 at ¶¶ 6, 10 & Ex. A.
        He did not allege anything further as to how, or when, or from
        whom, he obtained his interest in La Marítima.
               The information about Dr. Garcia-Bengochea’s ownership
        of the interest in La Marítima came from Carnival’s answer, the
        exhibits attached to that answer, the Rule 12(c) motion, and asser-
        tions made by Dr. Garcia-Bengochea himself. See e.g., RC D.E. 52
        at 8 & Ex. 1 & 2; CC D.E. 60-24; CC D.E. 61 at 2-3. Those docu-
        ments told the following story: (a) Albert, a U.S. national, owned
        an interest in La Marítima; (b) Albert died in 1972, after the Foreign
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        24                         Opinion of the Court                      20-12960

        Claims Settlement Commission certified a portion of his interest in
        La Marítima; (c) through his will, Albert passed on his interest in
        La Marítima to his brother, Desiderio Parreño (whom we’ll call
        Desiderio); (d) Desiderio, who was a Costa Rican national, died in
        2000, after passage of the Helms-Burton Act; (e) through his will,
        Desiderio passed on his interest in La Marítima to his cousin, Dr.
        Garcia-Bengochea.
               In sum, the district court went beyond the allegations in
        Dr. Garcia-Bengochea’s complaint and attached exhibit in ruling
        on the Rule 12(c) motions. The court did so because the relevant
        facts were “agreed and undisputed.” D.E. 120 at 3. 5
                Dr. Garcia-Bengochea generally objected to Carnival’s Rule
        12(c) motion on procedural grounds. He argued in his response
        that the motion was “procedurally improper” because it relied on
        matters extrinsic to the complaint and its attached exhibit. See CC
        D.E. 61 at 4 (“By improperly submitting evidence beyond the four
        corners of the [c]omplaint, Carnival hopes to force the conversion
        of this [m]otion into a motion for summary judgment under Rule
        12(d), at a stage in the proceedings where [p]laintiff has not yet had
        access to any discovery.”). He also cited to cases and authorities
        standing for the proposition that under Rule 12(c) a district court is

        5 On another issue raised by Carnival in its Rule 12(c) motion—whether Dr.
        Garcia-Bengochea validity inherited an interest in La Marítima from Desiderio
        under Costa Rican law—the district court declined to consider matters not al-
        leged in the complaint or set out in its attached exhibit. See CC D.E. 120 at 5-
        6.
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        20-12960               Opinion of the Court                       25

        not required to accept matters outside the relevant pleadings. See
        id. at 5.
               Rule 12(d) addresses the submission and consideration of
        matters outside the pleadings in Rule 12(c) motions. It provides
        that when “matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not
        excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for sum-
        mary judgment under Rule 56.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). See 5C Ar-
        thur R. Miller & A. Benjamin Spencer, Fed. Practice & Procedure
        § 1369 (3d ed. & April 2022 update) (explaining that a court has dis-
        cretion to consider matters outside the pleadings under Rule 12(c)
        and convert the motion into one for summary judgment under
        Rule 56).
               On appeal, Dr. Garcia-Bengochea does not raise any proce-
        dural challenges to the district court’s Rule 12(c) rulings. Indeed,
        consistent with his position below, he accepts the factual chronol-
        ogy set out above and asks that we rule on the merits that he can
        bring an action under Title III. See Br. for Dr. Garcia-Bengochea
        in No. 20-12960at 3–5. Any procedural objections, then, have been
        abandoned and we will address the merits of the district court’s rul-
        ings by using the undisputed factual timeline. See, e.g., PDVSA US
        Litigation Trust, 991 F.3d at 1192–93 (“We normally decide cases
        and issues as framed by the parties, and here the Litigation Trust
        has abandoned any procedural objections to the champerty ruling
        by not raising them in its brief. Like the district court, then, we
        address champerty on the merits.”) (citations omitted).
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        26                     Opinion of the Court                 20-12960

                                          C
                With certain exceptions not relevant here, Title III of the
        Helms-Burton Act provides that “any person” who “traffics in
        property which was confiscated by the Cuban Government on or
        after January 1, 1959, shall be liable to any United States national
        who owns the claim to such property for money damages[.]” §
        6082(a)(1)(A). To result in liability, the trafficking must have taken
        place after November 1, 1996 (three months after the effective date
        of the Act, which was August 1, 1996). See § 6085(a).
                At this stage of the proceedings, Dr. Garcia-Bengochea sat-
        isfies the requirements of these two provisions. Accepting the alle-
        gations of his complaint as true, (a) the Cuban government confis-
        cated La Marítima after January 1, 1959; (b) the cruise lines traf-
        ficked in La Marítima after the effective date of the Act; (c) he is a
        U.S. national; and (d) he owns an interest (i.e., has a claim) in La
        Marítima. See Havana Docks Corp. v. Carnival Corp., ___
        F.Supp.3d ___, 2022 WL 831160, at * 42 (S.D. Fla. March 31, 2022)
        (setting out the elements of §§ 6082(a)(1)(A) & 6085(a)).
               Two other provisions of Title III, however, contain limita-
        tions on which U.S. nationals can bring a claim:
              (B) In the case of property confiscated before March
              12, 1996, a United States national may not bring an
              action under this section on a claim to the confiscated
              property unless such national acquires ownership of
              the claim before March 12, 1996.
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        20-12960                  Opinion of the Court                      27

               (C) In the case of property confiscated on or after
               March 12, 1996, a United States national who, after
               the property is confiscated, acquires ownership of a
               claim to the property by assignment for value, may
               not bring an action on the claim under this section.

        §§ 6082(a)(4)(B) & (C).
               The district court ruled that Dr. Garcia-Bengochea could not
        bring an action under Title III due to § 6082(a)(4)(B). As explained
        below, we agree. Because La Marítima was confiscated prior to
        1996, and Dr. Garcia-Bengochea inherited his interest (i.e., ac-
        quired ownership of his claim) after Desiderio’s death in 2000, he
        cannot assert a claim under Title III.
              It is undisputed that La Marítima was confiscated prior to
        the Act’s passage. The parties, therefore, understandably focus on
        the meaning of the word “acquires” in § 6082(a)(4)(B) and debate
        whether Dr. Garcia-Bengochea “acquire[d]” ownership of his claim
        before March 12, 1996.
                Dr. Garcia-Bengochea contends that the word “acquires”
        does not encompass the passive act of inheritance and rather re-
        quires affirmative effort to gain ownership or possession. He as-
        serts that this reading is the appropriate one given the text and pur-
        pose of the Act. If the district court’s reading is sustained, he says,
        no heirs could bring Title III claims where the property was confis-
        cated before March 12, 1996, but the original owner died after that
        date and bequeathed his interest.
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        28                      Opinion of the Court                 20-12960

               The cruise lines, in support of the district court’s rulings,
        construe the word “acquires” broadly to include inheritance. They
        argue that because confiscation took place before the passage of the
        Act, and because Dr. Garcia-Bengochea inherited ownership after
        1996, he is barred from asserting a Title III claim by § 6082(a)(4)(B).
               We begin where we must—with the text. When the words
        of a statute are clear, “we must enforce it according to its terms.”
        King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 486 (2015). Though the Helms-Bur-
        ton Act defines a number of terms, see § 6023 (setting out the mean-
        ing of 15 words and phrases), it does not define the word “ac-
        quire[ ].” So we turn to ordinary meaning. See Barton v. U.S. Att'y
        Gen., 904 F.3d 1294, 1298 (11th Cir. 2018) (“[U]nless otherwise de-
        fined, statutory terms are generally interpreted in accordance with
        their ordinary meaning.”) (internal quotation marks and citation
        omitted).
               In our view, the district court came to the correct conclu-
        sion. We agree with the Fifth Circuit’s analysis in American Air-
        lines:
               The plain meaning of “acquires” is “[t]o gain posses-
               sion or control of; to get or obtain.” Acquire, BLACK’S
               LAW DICTIONARY 29 (11th ed. 2019); WEBSTER’S
               THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 18 (1993) (“[T]o come
               into possession, control, or power of disposal of.”).
               That includes inheritance. If Congress meant for “ac-
               quires” to require some form of active conduct, like a
               purchase, it knew how to communicate that mean-
               ing. In fact, it did so in the very same section of the
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        20-12960              Opinion of the Court                      29

              Act: “In the case of property confiscated on or after
              March 12, 1996, a United States national who, after
              the property is confiscated, acquires ownership of a
              claim to the property by assignment for value, may
              not bring an action on the claim under this sec-
              tion.” 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(4)(C) (emphasis added).
              There would have been no reason for Congress to
              add the words “by assignment for value” if “acquires
              ownership” was already limited to assignment for
              value.

              Every court to address the issue has read the statute
              the same way as we do. See Gonzalez v. Ama-
              zon.com, Inc., 835 F. App’x 1011, 1012 (11th Cir.
              2021) (holding that the plaintiff, who inherited prop-
              erty in 2016, “did not possess a claim to confiscated
              property until twenty years after the Helms-Burton
              Act's cutoff date”); Glen, 529 F.Supp.3d [at] 329–
              30, (“[S]ince Glen did not acquire the ownership of
              the claim before March 12, 1996, by inheritance or
              any other manner, he falls within the category of
              ‘United States nationals’ who ‘may not bring an ac-
              tion under this section.’”) (quoting 22 U.S.C. §
              6082(a)(4)(B)); Garcia-Bengochea v. Carnival Corp.,
              2020 WL 4590825, at *4 (S.D. Fla. July 9, 2020) (dis-
              missing Helms-Burton Act claim where plaintiff in-
              herited property after 1996); Garcia-Bengochea v.
              Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 2020 WL 6081658, at
              *3 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 15, 2020) (same).
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        30                     Opinion of the Court                 20-12960

        7 F.4th at 336. See also Gonzalez, 835 F. App’x at 1012 (“The lan-
        guage that Congress used in this provision is clear and unambigu-
        ous. A U.S. national whose property was confiscated before March
        12, 1996, cannot recover damages for another person's unlawful
        trafficking of that property unless ‘such national’—i.e., the specific
        person bringing suit—acquired the claim to the property before
        March 12, 1996. And because the statute's text is plain, we have no
        power to waive or extend this deadline.”). We therefore affirm the
        district court’s entry of judgment on the pleadings in favor of the
        cruise lines.
                                         IV
               Dr. Garcia-Bengochea has Article III standing to assert his
        Title III claims against Carnival and Royal Caribbean under Title
        III of the Helms-Burton Act. But those claims fail under §
        6082(a)(4)(B) of the Act because the Cuban government confis-
        cated La Marítima prior to March 12, 1996, and because Dr. Garcia-
        Bengochea acquired his interest in the property through inher-
        itance after that date.
              AFFIRMED.
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        20-12960                 Opinion of the Court                            1

        JORDAN, Circuit Judge, Concurring.
               José Martí, the 19th-century Cuban patriot, stateman, essay-
        ist, and poet, often used palm trees as metaphorical figures. In a
        speech to Cuban émigrés advocating for independence of his
        homeland from Spanish rule, he famously said that “las palmas son
        novias que esperan” (“the palm trees are brides who wait”). See
        José Martí, Discurso en El Liceo Cubano, Tampa, Nov. 25, 1891, in
        Martí en su Universo: Una Antología (Real Academia Española
        2022). The phrase was a hopeful one for Cubans in the late 1800s
        and early 1900s, and it remains the same today for those who were
        forced to leave the island after Fidel Castro took power in 1959.
        Return, however, has only been a dream for Cuban immigrants.
        Today, more than 60 years have passed, and the palm trees con-
        tinue to wait.
               Much was lost in the Cuban migration to the United States,
        and the Helms-Burton Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021 et seq., enacted by
        Congress in 1996, was an attempt to provide a means of financial
        compensation for some of that loss. For many Cubans who had
        property confiscated by the Cuban government, and who later be-
        came U.S. nationals, Title III of the Act was the only remedy avail-
        able to obtain monetary compensation. 1

        1As of 2018, 59% of the approximately 1.3 million Cuban-born immigrants in
        the United States were naturalized citizens. In numbers, that percentage
        amounts to about 767,000 persons. See Brittany Blizzard & Jeanne Batalova,
        Cuban Immigrants in the United States, Migration Policy Institute (June 11,
        2020). See also Luis Noe-Bustamante, et al., Facts on Hispanics of Cuban
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        2                         JORDAN, J., Concurring                 20-12960

               With respect to our decision today, I join Parts I and II of the
        court’s opinion. As to Part III, I concur in the judgment but do so
        reluctantly because our interpretation of 22 U.S.C. §
        6082(a)(4)(B)—which I think is unavoidable given the language of
        § 6082(a)(4)(C)—undermines the express purposes of Title III of the
        Act and leaves many (and maybe most) U.S. nationals without a
        remedy for the trafficking of their confiscated properties.
                                                I
                As set out in the court’s opinion, Dr. Javier Garcia-Ben-
        gochea alleged that he is a U.S. national and the rightful owner of
        an interest in La Marítima, which was confiscated by the Cuban
        government in 1960. A portion of that interest was certified by the
        Foreign Claims Settlement Commission in 1970 in resolving the
        claim of Albert Parreño, who was also a U.S. national. See CC D.E.
        1-1 at ¶¶ 6, 7, 10 & Exh. A.
                The parties agree that Albert, who died in 1972, passed on
        his interest in La Marítima to his brother, Desiderio Parreño, a
        Costa Rican national. And when Desiderio died in 2000, after the
        Helms-Burton Act went into effect, he passed on his interest in La
        Marítima to his cousin, Dr. Garcia-Bengochea. So Dr. Garcia-

        origin in the United States, 2017, Pew Research Center (September 16, 2019)
        (noting similar percentage for 2017).
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        20-12960               Opinion of the Court                        3

        Bengochea obtained his interest in La Marítima through inher-
        itance from Desiderio.
               Two Title III provisions limit which U.S. nationals can bring
        a claim for the trafficking property confiscated by the Cuban gov-
        ernment. They read as follows:
              (B) In the case of property confiscated before March
              12, 1996, a United States national may not bring an
              action under this section on a claim to the confiscated
              property unless such national acquires ownership of
              the claim before March 12, 1996.
              (C) In the case of property confiscated on or after
              March 12, 1996, a United States national who, after
              the property is confiscated, acquires ownership of a
              claim to the property by assignment for value, may
              not bring an action on the claim under this section.

        22 U.S.C. §§ 6082(a)(4)(B) & (C). The dispute here centers on the
        meaning of the word “acquires” in § 6082(a)(4)(B).
                                         II
                The majority, agreeing with the Fifth Circuit’s resolution of
        the same issue in Glen v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 7 F.4th 331, 336 (5th
        Cir. 2021), and with our unpublished decision in Gonzalez v. Ama-
        zon.com, Inc., 835 F. App’x 1011, 1012 (11th Cir. 2021), affirms the
        district court’s entry of judgment on the pleadings in favor of Car-
        nival and Royal Caribbean. I concur in that resolution, but think
        that the statutory interpretation analysis is more difficult.
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        4                     JORDAN, J., Concurring               20-12960

               The Helms-Burton Act defines a number of terms, see § 6023
        (setting out the meaning of 15 words and phrases), but it does not
        define the word “acquires.” Absent a statutory definition, we look
        to the “ordinary public meaning . . . at the time of enactment.”
        Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S.Ct. 1731, 1738 (2020).
               The Fifth Circuit, and the district court here, reasoned that
        “acquires” in § 6082(a)(4)(B) is broad enough to encompass inher-
        itance. See Am. Airlines, 7 F.4th at 336; CC D.E. 120 at 7. That
        aspect of the analysis, in my view, is too simplistic. “[B]road lan-
        guage is not limitless.” Watson v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc.,
        551 U.S. 142, 147 (2007). As a result, the ordinary meaning of a
        statutory term “is not always co-extensive with its broadest
        reach[.]” Brannon P. Denning, Bittker on Regulation of Interstate
        Commerce § 2.01 (Aspen Pub. 2d ed 2022). See Epic Sys. Corp. v.
        Lewis, 138 S.Ct. 1612, 1631 (2018) (“[A] statute’s meaning does not
        ‘turn solely’ on the broadest imaginable ‘definitions of its compo-
        nent words.’ Linguistic and statutory context also matter.”) (cita-
        tion omitted); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 1003-04 (2000)
        (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“We do not give statutes the broadest def-
        inition imaginable.”). Our task is to ascertain “the more natural
        reading” under the circumstances. See Jam v. Int’l Finance Corp.,
        139 S.Ct. 759, 769 (2019).
                                         A
               Even if Justice Robert Jackson was correct in describing dic-
        tionaries as “the last resort of the baffled judge,” Jordan v. De-
        George, 341 U.S. 223, 234 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting), our
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        20-12960               Opinion of the Court                        5

        current jurisprudence directs us to lay and legal dictionaries around
        the time of enactment to ascertain the meaning of statutory terms.
        See, e.g., EEOC v. Catastrophe Management Solutions, 852 F.3d
        1018, 1026 (11th Cir. 2016). The problem here is that the relevant
        dictionary definitions do not settle the matter. The word “ac-
        quires” has both broad and narrow meanings, and dictionaries do
        not tell us what meaning to use for Title III. So we have to rely on
        matters outside of the text to interpret the text. As one scholar has
        so aptly put it, “[t]extualism demands nontextual sources of argu-
        ment.” H. Jefferson Powell, A Community Built on Words: The
        Constitution in History and Politics 21 (2002).
               Looking first to lay dictionaries published around the time
        the Helms-Burton Act became law, there are two different concep-
        tions of the word “acquire.” One broadly encompasses possession
        by any means, while another more narrowly requires proactive, af-
        firmative effort to gain possession. See 1 New Shorter Oxford Eng-
        lish Dictionary 20 (4th ed. 1993) (defining “acquire” broadly as to
        “[c]ome into possession of” and narrowly as to “[g]ain or get as
        one’s own, by one’s own exertions or qualities”); The American
        Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 12 (3d ed. 1993) (de-
        fining “acquire” broadly as “[t]o get possession of” and narrowly as
        “[t]o get by one’s own efforts”); Random House Webster’s Una-
        bridged Dictionary 18 (2d ed. 1997) (defining “acquire” broadly as
        “to come into possession or ownership of” and narrowly as “to gain
        for oneself through one’s actions or efforts”).
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        6                      JORDAN, J., Concurring                20-12960

                More contemporary lay dictionaries follow a similar pattern
        of distinguishing between gaining possession by any means, includ-
        ing passive inheritance, and gaining possession through affirmative
        efforts. See 1 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 20 (5th ed. 2002)
        (defining “acquire” broadly as to “come into possession of” and
        narrowly as to “gain or get as one’s own; by one’s own exertions
        or qualities”); The American Heritage Dictionary of the English
        Language 15 (4th ed. 2009) (defining “acquire” broadly as “to gain
        possession of” and narrowly as “to get by one’s own efforts”); Web-
        ster’s New World College Dictionary 12 (5th ed. 2018) (defining
        “acquire” broadly as “to come to have as one’s own; get possession
        of” and narrowly as “to get or gain by one’s own efforts or ac-
        tions”). The same is true of current legal dictionaries. See, e.g.,
        Merriam Webster’s Dictionary of Law 10 (2016) (defining “acquire”
        broadly as “to come into possession, ownership, or control of” and
        narrowly as to “obtain as one’s own”); 1 Bouvier Law Dictionary
        Desk Edition 64 (2012) (“Acquisition may be direct or derivative.”).
               The district court opted to use Black’s Law Dictionary, both
        the sixth edition—which was the most current edition prior to the
        enactment of the Helms-Burton Act—and the most recent elev-
        enth edition. It concluded that the “plain meaning” of the term
        “acquire” was “broad enough to cover inheritance,” but did not
        discuss the competing conceptions of the word “acquire” or why it
        chose the broader definition over the narrower one. See D.E. 120
        at 7. Instead, the district court relied on the sixth edition’s defini-
        tion of the word “acquire,” only citing the final entry, which
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        20-12960                Opinion of the Court                         7

        explained that the term “[i]ncludes taking by devise.” See D.E. 120
        at 7. But that very entry was followed by a case citation to United
        States v. Merriam, 263 U.S. 179, 184–85 (1923), which concerned
        the interpretation of a particular provision in a will and property
        “acquired by bequest.” Black’s Law Dictionary 24 (6th ed. 1990).
        In that context, the definition of the word “acquired” invariably in-
        cluded inheritance because it was modified by the phrase “by be-
        quest.” That is not the case here with respect to § 6082(a)(4)(B).
               In fact, the sixth edition of Black’s Law Dictionary also de-
        fines “acquire” as “[t]o gain by any means, usually by one’s own
        exertions.” The entry therefore includes both broad and narrow
        understandings of the word “acquire.” See also Burton’s Legal
        Thesaurus 10 (4th ed. 2007) (categorizing “acquire” as a passive
        verb (i.e., “[r]eceive”) and as an affirmative verb (i.e., “secure”));
        Black’s Law Dictionary 29 (11th ed. 2019) (defining “acquire” gen-
        erally as “[t]o gain possession or control of; to gain or obtain”).
               So a survey of lay and legal dictionaries reveals different pos-
        sible interpretations of the word “acquire,” and no definitive an-
        swer on which one should control here. “The bottom line is that
        the text [of § 6082(a)(4)(B)], taken alone, cannot provide a conclu-
        sive answer to our interpretive question. We must look further.”
        Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 563 U.S. 1, 11
        (2011).
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        8                      JORDAN, J., Concurring                20-12960

                                          B
               Clarity often comes with context. After all, to discern the
        meaning of a statute “words must be read and interpreted in their
        context, not in isolation.” Sw. Airlines Co. v. Saxon, 142 S. Ct.
        1783, 1788 (2022) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
        See also Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
        Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000) (“The meaning—or ambiguity—of
        certain words or phrases may only become evident when placed in
        context.”); Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994) (“Ambiguity
        is a creature not of definitional possibilities but of statutory con-
        text[.]”).
                And context includes textual purpose. See Stansell v. Revo-
        lutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, 45 F.4th 1340, 1354–55 (11th
        Cir. August 23, 2022) (relying, in part, on congressionally-codified
        purpose of a federal law to confirm interpretation of a statutory
        term); Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Inter-
        pretation of Legal Texts 56 (Thomson/West 1st ed. 2012) (“Of
        course, words are given meaning by their context, and context in-
        cludes the purpose of the text[.]”). Here Congress stated that Title
        III of the Helms-Burton Act is meant “to protect United States na-
        tionals against confiscatory takings and the wrongful trafficking in
        property confiscated by the Castro regime.” § 6022(6) (“Pur-
        poses”). And it further explained that Title III’s private right of ac-
        tion is a key tool in deterring trafficking in confiscated properties.
        See § 6081(11) (explaining that Title III’s private right of action is
        designed, in part, to “deter” trafficking). See also § 6081(10) (“The
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        20-12960               Opinion of the Court                       9

        United States Government has an obligation to its citizens to pro-
        vide protection against wrongful confiscations by foreign nations
        and their citizens, including the provision of private remedies.”).
               These codified purposes, it seems to me, call for a narrow
        interpretation of the word “acquires” that does not encompass in-
        terests in property obtained by inheritance. Such a reading benefits
        U.S. nationals whose property was confiscated by the Cuban gov-
        ernment (furthering the compensatory purpose) and deters those
        who might later traffic in that property (furthering the deterrence
        purpose). Cf. Morell E. Mullins, Sr., Coming to Terms with Strict
        and Liberal Construction, 65 Albany L. Rev. 9, 75 (2000) (“An ex-
        press statutory purpose of avoiding inadequate compensation for
        accident victims leads rather naturally to statutory construction in
        favor of such victims.”).
               Here’s why. If the word “acquires” in § 6082(a)(4)(B) is read
        to encompass interests obtained by inheritance, then the provision
        operates contrary to Congress’ express statutory purposes and is
        very hard to explain. The Cuban government carried out most of
        its confiscations of property held by U.S. nationals and U.S. compa-
        nies in the early 1960s, shortly after Fidel Castro came to power.
        See Ada Ferrer, Cuba: An American History 347-48 (2021). The
        individual U.S. owners of confiscated property—assuming they
        were at least 20, the voting age in Cuba at the time, see Constitu-
        tion of the Republic of Cuba, Title VII, Art. 99 (1940)—would be in
        their 80s today, assuming they were still alive. What compensatory
        and/or deterrent effect would Title III have if the only thing
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        10                     JORDAN, J., Concurring                20-12960

        potential traffickers had to do was wait until the original owners
        died to benefit from their confiscated properties?
                Moreover, as noted in the court’s opinion, Congress built in
        a six-month suspension provision for Title III, see § 6085(c)(1)(B),
        and from 1996 to 2019 every U.S. President suspended the right to
        bring an action under Title III. That rendered Title III dormant for
        over 20 years and left the U.S. owners of confiscated properties
        without a remedy for that period with respect to trafficking in their
        properties. If those owners died during the long suspension of Title
        III, and the word “acquires” is read to encompass inheritance, their
        U.S. national heirs could not sue for trafficking. The only heirs
        who could bring actions under Title III would be those U.S. nation-
        als who—by happenstance—inherited their interests in confiscated
        properties before March 12, 1996.
                 That does not make much (if any) sense. I can think of no
        rational basis for allowing heirs to sue if they inherited their inter-
        ests in confiscated properties prior to the passage of the Helms-Bur-
        ton Act, while at the same time precluding heirs who inherited
        their interests after enactment. Imagine twin Cuban brothers who
        co-owned a casino that was confiscated by the Cuban government
        in 1960. Both brothers fled to the United States and became natu-
        ralized U.S. citizens in the 1970s. In December of 1995, before the
        Helms-Burton Act became law, one brother died and, in his will,
        left all of his property and interests to his only daughter, who was
        born in the United States and is a U.S. national. The other brother
        died in April of 1996. In his will he left all of his property and
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        20-12960                Opinion of the Court                        11

        interests to his only son, who was also born in the United States
        and is a U.S. national. If the word “acquires” in § 6082(a)(4)(B) en-
        compasses inheritance, then the daughter of the first brother could
        sue under Title III (because she acquired the claim before March
        12, 1996) but the son of the second brother could not (because he
        acquired the claim after March 12, 1996). Given that death is not
        usually planned around legislation, there does not seem to be a log-
        ical basis for such an outcome given the express purposes of Title
        III. See Br. for Dan Burton, Robert Torricelli, and Directorio Dem-
        ocratico Cubano, Inc. as Amici Curiae in No. 20-12960 at 26 (“If the
        vast majority of eligible claims were excluded because they were
        inherited after March 12, 1996, the compensatory and deterrent
        purpose of the law would be substantially gutted.”). The cruise
        lines, and the United States as amicus curiae, offer no satisfactory
        explanation as to why Congress would decree this state of affairs.
        See, e.g., Br. for Carnival in No. 20-12960 at 29-39; Br. for United
        States as Amicus Curiae in No. 20-12960 at 23-28.
                Indeed, the legislative history indicates that Congress was
        worried not about the inheritance of interests in confiscated prop-
        erties, but about the sale, trading, or bartering of such interests af-
        ter the passage of the Helms-Burton Act. Congress was concerned
        that Title III would, upon enactment, create a marketplace for in-
        terests in confiscated properties and to claims for trafficking in
        those properties. The House Conference Report, for example,
        stated that §§ 6082(a)(4)(B)-(C) were “intended, in part, to eliminate
        any incentive that might otherwise exist to transfer claims to
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        12                        JORDAN, J., Concurring                    20-12960

        confiscated property to U.S. nationals in order to take advantage of
        the remedy created by this section.” H.R. Conf. Rep. 104-468 at 59
        (March 1, 1996). 2
               Title III provided a new way—through a private right of ac-
        tion for claims of trafficking—to monetize interests in confiscated
        properties. It therefore created value for claims that had seemed
        practically worthless given the inability of the United States to
        reach any financial settlements with the Cuban government. A
        U.S. national who had no relationship to confiscated property, hav-
        ing taken note of Title III’s remedies, might find it lucrative to buy
        a claim that could pay dividends every time the confiscated prop-
        erty was “trafficked.” See W. Fletcher Fairey, The Helms-Burton
        Act: The Effect of International Law on Domestic Implementation,
        46 American U. L. Rev. 1289, 1308 n. 108 (1997). Congress wanted
        to prevent that sort of a marketplace for Title III claims—a concern
        not present when one U.S. national, through a will, passes on his
        or her interest in confiscated property to a relative who is also a
        U.S. national.
               If the only statutory language at issue was the text of
        §6082(a)(4)(B), I would read the word “acquires” as not encompass-
        ing inheritance. That interpretation would best reflect Congress’
        expressly-stated purposes for Title III—compensation and

        2“Legislativehistory is not the law, but it can help us understand what the law
        means.” Robert J. Katzmann, Judging Statutes 38 (2014). That, I submit, is
        the case here.
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        20-12960                Opinion of the Court                         13

        deterrence. See Central Hanover Bank B. & T. Co. v. Commis-
        sioner, 159 F.2d 167, 169 (2d Cir. 1947) (L. Hand, J.) (“There is no
        more likely way to misapprehend the meaning of language—be it
        in a constitution, a statute, a will, or a contract—than to read it lit-
        erally, forgetting the object which the document as a whole is
        meant to secure.”); Stanley Fish, The Trouble with Principle 5
        (1999) (explaining that, when a statute is “detached from the his-
        tory that renders it intelligible,” it “becomes unreadable, or . . .
        readable in any direction you like”).
                                           C
                Given what I have said in Part II.B, one might wonder why
        this is a concurrence and not a dissent. That is a fair question, and
        one I will try to answer.
                Legislation is not always pristine. And sometimes Congress,
        despite a very clear intent, drafts poorly. That is what I think hap-
        pened here. At the end of the day, there is one reason why I ulti-
        mately conclude that § 6082(a)(4)(B) must be interpreted as written
        despite its incongruity with express legislative purpose. The reason
        is that § 6082(a)(4)(B) cannot be read in isolation and must be inter-
        preted with reference to its statutory companion, § 6082(a)(4)(C).
              Generally, an identical term used in the same statute is pre-
        sumed to have the same meaning throughout. See, e.g., Mohasco
        Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 826 (1980). Though that presumption
        can be rebutted, see Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy
        Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 574 (2007) (explaining that “[a] given term in
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        14                      JORDAN, J., Concurring                  20-12960

        the same statute may take on distinct characters from association
        with distinct statutory objects calling for different implementation
        strategies”), I do not believe it can be successfully overcome here.
                In defining the scope of liability for trafficking, Title III pro-
        vides that “any person that . . . traffics in property which was con-
        fiscated by the Cuban Government on or after January 1, 1959,
        shall be liable to any United States national who owns the claim to
        such property.” § 6082(a)(1)(A). Nothing in the language of Title
        III indicates that Congress intended to limit the remedy to the orig-
        inal owners of the property or the even the original claimants. It
        only requires that the individual be a U.S. national and “own[ ] the
        claim.” See also 22 U.S.C. § 1643(l). To own a claim, of course, a
        person must have obtained it or received it in some way.
               As a reminder, § 6082(a)(4)(C) provides that “[i]n the case of
        property confiscated on or after March 12, 1996, a United States
        national who, after the property is confiscated, acquires ownership
        of a claim to the property by assignment for value, may not bring
        an action on the claim under this section.” Congress used the word
        “acquires” in this provision in its active sense (to obtain by assign-
        ment for value), and by doing so indicated that the word generally
        encompasses both passive and active means of acquisition.
               There are two textual differences between §§ 6082(a)(4)(B)
        and 6082(a)(4)(C). The first difference is that § 6082(a)(4)(B) gov-
        erns claimants whose property was confiscated prior to March 12,
        1996, whereas § 6082(a)(4)(C) governs claimants whose property
        was confiscated on or after that date. The second difference is that
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        20-12960                Opinion of the Court                          15

        the word “acquires” in § 6082(a)(4)(C) is modified (and limited) by
        the phrase “by assignment for value.”
                This is where Dr. Garcia-Bengochea’s suggested interpreta-
        tion of the word “acquires” in § 6082(a)(4)(B)—i.e., that it requires
        affirmative effort—runs into trouble. A claimant whose property
        was confiscated on or after March 12, 1996, and who obtains own-
        ership of a claim through inheritance, is not barred by §
        6082(a)(4)(C) and can bring an action for trafficking under Title III.
        If “acquires” in § 6082(a)(4)(B) is limited to gaining possession via
        affirmative effort (i.e., not inheritance), why would there be a need
        for Congress to modify “acquires” in § 6082(a)(4)(C) with respect
        to the purchase of claims on or after the passage of the Helms-Bur-
        ton Act? The modification (and limitation) of “acquires” in §
        6082(a)(4)(C) strongly suggests that the word—unless modified—
        generally includes both passive and active acquisitions of interests
        in confiscated properties, and that if Congress wanted to limit the
        word it knew how to do so. This was a point made by the Fifth
        Circuit in American Airlines and by the district court here, and in
        my view it is the critical one. See Am. Airlines, 7 F.4th at 336 (“If
        Congress meant for ‘acquires’ to require some form of active con-
        duct, like a purchase, it knew how to communicate that meaning.
        In fact, it did so in the very same section of the Act. . . . There would
        have been no reason for Congress to add the words ‘by assignment
        for value’ if ‘acquires ownership’ was already limited to assignment
        for value.”).
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        16                     JORDAN, J., Concurring                20-12960

                I concede that this is not a wholly satisfactory resolution in
        light of Congress’ express twin purposes of compensation and de-
        terrence. U.S. nationals who are heirs of individuals whose prop-
        erty was confiscated after passage of the Helms-Burton Act can
        bring Title III claims, but many U.S. nationals who are heirs of in-
        dividuals whose property was confiscated in the 1960s—as the vast
        majority of property was—are denied a Title III remedy. Why
        would Congress deny a Title III claim to heirs of those more likely
        to be more numerous and older but allow a claim to heirs of those
        who suffered later (i.e., post-enactment) confiscations? I do not
        have any ready answers. All I can say is that, in my view, Dr. Gar-
        cia-Bengochea’s interpretation of § 6082(a)(4)(B) is inconsistent
        with the language of § 6082(a)(4)(C). The combined language of
        §§ 6082(a)(4)(B) and 6082(a)(4)(C) cannot bear the weight of Dr.
        Garcia-Bengochea’s reading. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah
        Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 565 (2005) (explaining that an “odd” draft-
        ing error is “not absurd” and when such a drafting oddity occurs,
        “it is up to Congress rather than the courts to fix it”). See also 1
        Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United
        States § 427, at 303 (1833) explaining that to disregard the text of a
        provision “the absurdity and injustice of applying the provision to
        the case [must] be so monstrous, that all mankind would, without
        hesitation, unite in rejecting the application”).
              Interpreting § 6082(a)(4)(B) as the Fifth Circuit did (and as
        we do today) goes against the express purposes of Title III, but it is
        not absurd. While the reach of Title III is narrowed—and maybe
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        20-12960                  Opinion of the Court                             17

        significantly so—there is still a group of people whose heirs will be
        able to file suit under the Act—namely, the U.S. national heirs of
        owners who passed away and bequeathed their property interest
        prior to the passage of the Helms-Burton Act.
                Earlier, I used the example of Cuban twin brothers who co-
        owned a casino that was confiscated by the Cuban government to
        show how our interpretation of § 6082(a)(4)(B) does not make
        much sense. In that hypothetical, one twin’s heir could sue under
        Title III and the other twin’s heir could not, solely because of when
        the heirs acquired the claims. This is illogical but it is not absurd—
        one heir could still sue under Title III. Although I cannot identify
        the exact number of U.S. national heirs in this position, I think I can
        at least say that Title III remains partially effective. 3
                                             III
             I join Parts I and II of the court’s opinion and concur in the
        judgment as to Part III. If, as I suspect, the language of

        3 The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission adjudicated 8,821 claims by U.S.

        nationals against Cuba and found 5,911 to be compensable. See U.S. Dep’t of
        Justice, Completed Programs – Cuba (updated April 21, 2022) (available at
        https://www.justice.gov/fcsc/claims-against-cuba). The overwhelming ma-
        jority of these claims (5,909) were filed and adjudicated by July of 1972—well
        before the passage of the Helms-Burton Act. See id. It stands to reason that
        of those claims, some number—albeit unidentifiable—were made by people
        who acquired their interest—as we interpret § 6082(a)(4)(B)—prior to the pas-
        sage of the Helms-Burton Act. That of course, says nothing about what hap-
        pened to those claims after the original claimants died.
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        18                    JORDAN, J., Concurring               20-12960

        §6082(a)(4)(B) was the result of sloppy drafting, I urge Congress to
        fix it.