Court Opinion

ID: 9407318
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-06 16:00:52.584163+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:36.948397
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                             For the Eighth Circuit
                         ___________________________

                                 No. 23-1189
                         ___________________________

                              United States of America

                         lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee

                                            v.

                                    Jaime Villareal

                        lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant
                                        ____________

                     Appeal from United States District Court
                  for the Western District of Arkansas - Ft. Smith
                                  ____________

                              Submitted: June 12, 2023
                                Filed: July 6, 2023
                                  [Unpublished]
                                  ____________

Before GRUENDER, ARNOLD, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
                         ____________

PER CURIAM.

       After serving a 63-month prison sentence for aiding and abetting the
distribution of more than five grams of actual methamphetamine, see 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(viii); 18 U.S.C. § 2, Jaime Villareal violated the conditions of
his supervised release. The district court1 revoked his release and sentenced him to
nine months in prison. Villareal maintains that the court abused its discretion in
imposing that prison term because it gave significant weight to matters it shouldn't
have in fixing the sentence. We affirm.

       A probation officer informed the court that Villareal had, among other things,
tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine six times during the first year
of his supervision and had been arrested on a warrant for failing to pay fines. The
following month the officer informed the court that Villareal had submitted another
positive drug test. The district court continued an ensuing revocation hearing after it
was already underway to give Villareal "an opportunity to demonstrate compliance
with the terms and conditions of" supervision. But about a month later, the probation
officer informed the court that Villareal had yet again tested positive for
methamphetamine and amphetamine and that he had been found in possession of pills
believed to allow Villareal "to flush his system in an attempt to pass his drug tests."

       So Villareal found himself at another revocation hearing, where he admitted
that he violated the conditions of his release. After the court observed that revocation
was mandatory in the circumstances, see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g)(4), it explained that in
imposing sentence it would consider the Sentencing Guidelines as well as the criteria
set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), a few of which it specifically mentioned. The court
calculated the Guidelines range to be three-to-nine months' imprisonment. Defense
counsel discussed the severity of Villareal's drug addiction and said that he wasn't
"really sure the best way to address that addiction issue" and wasn't sure what
sentence would be appropriate because, he said, "I think we've done about everything
that we can." Defense counsel ultimately requested a three-month sentence.

      1
       The Honorable P.K. Holmes, III, United States District Judge for the Western
District of Arkansas.

                                          -2-
       Villareal maintains on appeal that the district court abused its discretion in
imposing a nine-month sentence because it placed "significant weight" on one of the
sentencing criteria found in § 3553(a), namely, the need for the sentence imposed "to
reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide
just punishment for the offense." See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A). Federal law provides
that, in responding to a revocation petition, the sentencing court may, after
considering certain specifically enumerated § 3553(a) criteria, revoke supervised
release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). Absent from that enumerated list is § 3553(a)(2)(A).

       We've held that where a district court in revoking supervised release does not
give § 3553(a)(2)(A) "significant weight" but instead "focuse[s] primarily on the
defendant's history and characteristics," we would not disturb the sentence. See
United States v. Hall, 931 F.3d 694, 697 (8th Cir. 2019). So the mere mention of "the
seriousness of the offense," the need "to promote respect for the law," or the need "to
provide just punishment for the offense" when fixing a revocation sentence is
insufficient to show an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Porter, 974 F.3d 905,
907–08 (8th Cir. 2020).

       The record reflects that the court "focused primarily on [Villareal's] history and
characteristics," see Hall, 931 F.3d at 697, and did not give significant weight to
§ 3553(a)(2)(A). In fixing the sentence, the district court began by noting its concern
with the number of violations Villareal committed, stating that "[t]his case has more
drug test violations than any case I've ever had before." It also emphasized that
Villareal had failed to take advantage of the extraordinary opportunity it extended
him at the first revocation hearing, adding that it was an opportunity that the court
had never extended before. And it suspected that Villareal "had no intention
whatsoever" of complying with his conditions of release and so had duped the court
about his intentions, breaching the court's trust. See United States v. Wilson, 939 F.3d
929, 932 (8th Cir. 2019). It was only after these observations, when it confronted
defense counsel's argument that "there's nothing left to do," that the court stated,

                                           -3-
essentially as an afterthought, that the sentence imposed would promote respect for
the law and provide just punishment for the offense, which it deemed "very
egregious." We point out, moreover, that earlier in the hearing when the court
mentioned some of the § 3553(a) considerations it had in mind, it did not mention the
ones in § 3553(a)(2)(A).

        It is true that immediately after mentioning respect for the law and just
punishment in its discussion leading up to the sentence it chose, the court said, "So
it's going to be my intent to impose a term of imprisonment of nine months." We don't
read the use of the word "so" to refer, as Villareal argues, only to the immediately
preceding allusion to the relevance of respect for the law and just punishment. The
court was simply signaling an end to its detailed explanation for the sentence as a
whole. We discern no abuse of discretion here.

      Affirmed.
                       ______________________________

                                         -4-