Court Opinion

ID: 9737559
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:28:40.567608+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:23:59.789096
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE McCULLOUGH, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. This case involves simply an interpretation of the Code. The filing of an amendment pursuant to section 2 — 616(a) of the Code cannot be “allowed” unless such action is requested by a party. Such a request is implicit in the terms of section 2 — 616(a). This court has determined that obtaining leave of court to file an amendment to a pleading adding a new party was not necessary to invoke the circuit court’s subject matter jurisdiction over the proceeding or in personam jurisdiction over the added party where the party appeared and failed to make a timely objection to the failure to obtain permission to amend. Ganci v. Blauvelt, 294 Ill. App. 3d 508, 515-19, 690 N.E.2d 649, 653-56 (1998). Similarly, Ragan found that the failure to obtain leave to amend was not a jurisdictional defect. Ragan, 183 Ill. 2d at 355, 701 N.E.2d at 499. The defendant in Ragan had filed an answer to the complaint and affirmative defenses and argued the merits of the pleadings as amended, and on that basis, the supreme court found the defendant had waived its right to raise the issue. Ragan, 183 Ill. 2d at 355, 701 N.E.2d at 499. Ragan rejected Greene because it was unpersuasive and distinguished when applied to the facts in Ragan. In comparing Greene, the supreme court stated: “In contrast, Ragan’s amended complaint added claims and prayers against parties who were already properly before the court.” Ragan, 183 Ill. 2d at 354, 701 N.E.2d at 498. Jurisdiction is not the issue here. A statute of limitation is not a condition precedent constituting a jurisdictional bar to proceedings; it is an affirmative defense. See Marshall v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation District Retirement Fund, 298 Ill. App. 3d 66, 74-75, 697 N.E.2d 1222, 1228 (1998). The majority’s reliance on Ragan is misplaced. The question in this appeal is whether the amended complaint was “filed” within the statute of limitations on December 27, 2000. Plaintiff relies on the fact that an action is commenced by the filing of a complaint (735 ILCS 5/2—201(a) (West 2000)), and a complaint committed to the custody and control of the circuit clerk is deemed filed (Kelly v. Mazzie, 207 Ill. App. 3d 251, 253, 565 N.E.2d 719, 720 (1990)). See Vincent v. McElvain, 304 Ill. 160, 163, 136 N.E. 502, 503 (1922) (a suit is commenced when a party puts in motion the instruments of the court, not when the court gets jurisdiction of the defendant). The mailbox rule is not implicated on the facts of this case. However, the issue in this appeal does not involve the timeliness of the filing of the original complaint. On just and reasonable terms, the trial court “may” allow a party to amend its pleading to join a party as a defendant. 735 ILCS 5/2—616(a) (West 2000). A plaintiff may not file an amended complaint adding new parties without leave of court, and doing so will not toll the statute of limitations against the new parties. Petrella, 92 Ill. App. 3d at 881-83, 417 N.E.2d at 136-37. Also, because an unauthorized amendment to a complaint is a nullity, the later amendment of the complaint does not relate back to the date when the ineffective amendment was attempted. Petrella, 92 Ill. App. 3d at 883, 417 N.E.2d at 137. See Callaghan Paving, Inc. v. Keeneyville Construction Co., 197 Ill. App. 3d 937, 939, 557 N.E.2d 228, 229 (1990) (a plaintiff may only amend a complaint to add a claim against a new party with leave of court, and an amended complaint adding additional parties filed without leave of court is a nullity); First Robinson Savings & Loan v. Ledo Construction Co., 210 Ill. App. 3d 889, 892-93, 569 N.E.2d 304, 306-08 (1991) (there is no absolute right to amend a pleading; filing an amended pleading adding new parties without leave of court is a nullity; a nullity tolls no statute of limitation). This court has recognized that leave to amend a complaint is not granted until a court order is obtained. Allen v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 129 Ill. App. 3d 783, 787, 473 N.E.2d 137, 139 (1985). In addition, the court must expressly give leave to amend; it will not be implied. Greene v. Helis, 252 Ill. App. 3d 957, 960, 625 N.E.2d 162, 165 (1993). I disagree with the suggestion that the granting of a motion to amend a complaint is “ministerial.” Assuming that (1) had the trial court considered and denied the motion to dismiss on December 27, 2000, and (2) this court would have found the denial of the motion to be an abuse of discretion, such standard clearly accepts the discretionary nature of the trial court’s ruling on the motion to amend. The majority also accepts plaintiffs argument that the amended complaint should be deemed to have been filed on December 27, 2000, because an employee in the circuit clerk’s office accepted it, file-stamped it, and told him that the order allowing amendment would be presented to the trial judge and entered that day, as a matter of routine. I disagree with the majority’s concession that it is impossible to conceive of a court denying leave to amend in the situation of this case. To accept that position would eliminate the need for section 2 — 616. In addition, the majority gives the circuit clerk too much prerogative and too much responsibility with respect to an attorney’s duties. As set forth in section 2 — 616, “may be allowed” requires some action. I believe the rule was even acknowledged to mean something by the plaintiff when in fact on February 13 his motion was allowed. I would give no validity to the actions of the circuit clerk’s employee. Neither file-stamping the amended complaint nor prematurely issuing summons without direction to do so from the trial judge should be deemed a substitution for the trial judge’s considering and ruling on the motion to amend. The circuit clerk is not a judge. In addition, the duties of the circuit clerk do not encompass accepting delegation to practice law on behalf of a lawyer’s client. It is the attorney’s obligation to the client to monitor the case and ensure that actions necessary to protect the interests of the client are taken. See 134 Ill. 2d R. 1.1(a). The majority also states that First Robinson was overruled by Savage. I am not persuaded. Savage disagreed with First Robinson “that an order obtained ex parte and without notice, without more, is void.” Savage, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 558, 727 N.E.2d at 1056. The Savage court then distinguished First Robinson. Savage, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 558, 727 N.E.2d at 1056-57. In Savage, the court found the order granting leave to amend ex parte was valid and the amended complaint was properly filed (Savage, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 560, 727 N.E.2d at 1058), but made it clear “[a] court’s decision to grant a motion for leave to amend is a matter within the discretion of the trial court. *** Any doubts as to whether leave *** should be granted should be decided in favor of the allowance of the amendment” (Savage, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 556-57, 727 N.E.2d at 1055). Here, there is no order, let alone an ex parte order. Moreover, there are no local rules governing emergency motions as relied on in Savage. III Illinois Civil Rules & Procedure 212 (West 2001) (local rules). I would deem the statute of limitations tolled if, before the expiration of the limitations period, plaintiff (1) obtained a hearing date for the motion to amend, even if that date was beyond the expiration of the limitations period; (2) filed his motion to amend accompanied by a copy of the proposed amended complaint; (3) provided notice to all parties already in the case of the motion and the hearing date; and (4) obtained an order allowing amendment on that hearing date or at the earliest convenience of the trial court. Merely placing the motion on file is not sufficient to toll the statute of limitations as that would allow a plaintiff to file a motion and do nothing for months to the prejudice of the persons sought to be added as defendants. I decline to condone the practice employed in this case and would affirm the order of the circuit court of Sangamon county granting the motions of Maurer and St. John’s to dismiss the counts of plaintiff’s amended complaint directed to those defendants.