Court Opinion

ID: 1002945
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-07-04 18:18:44.451489+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:11:28.696810
License: Public Domain

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                             No. 00-6824

JORGE E. PARRA,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond.
James R. Spencer, District Judge.
(CR-98-1, CA-99-504-3)

Submitted: October 26, 2000

Decided: November 16, 2000

Before MOTZ and KING, Circuit Judges, and
HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part by unpublished
per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Kerry A. Lawrence, BRICCETTI, CALHOUN & LAWRENCE,
L.L.P., White Plains, New York, for Appellant. Helen F. Fahey,
United States Attorney, James B. Comey, Assistant United States
Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Jorge Parra seeks to appeal the district court's dismissal of his
motion for relief under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2000). Parra
pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to conspiracy to distribute
heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C.A. § 846 (West 1999); and obstruc-
tion of justice, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1503 (West 2000). The
plea agreement contained a waiver of the right to appeal the sentence
to be imposed. Parra received concurrent sentences of 120 months
imprisonment, to be followed by five years of supervised release. No
appeal was noted from his conviction or sentence.

Parra filed this § 2255 motion in the district court, asserting that
trial counsel was ineffective on two grounds: (1) counsel failed to
move to suppress, as a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel, Parra's taped attempt to bribe his codefendant into assuming
responsibility for the drug offense; and (2) counsel failed to note an
appeal although Parra told him to do so. The district court dismissed
the first claim on the ground that Parra's right to counsel had not
attached as to crimes that occurred at the time of the taping. We
agree. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense-specific, and
therefore had not attached for the future charges resulting from the
bribe attempt. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175 (1991). The
motion Parra wished counsel to make therefore was wholly without
merit, and counsel's failure to do so does not fall outside the range
of reasonable professional assistance. Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 689 (1984). Therefore, the district court acted properly in
dismissing this claim.

The district court held that because Parra waived his right to appeal
the sentence, counsel's failure to note an appeal even if Parra had
timely asked him to do so did not constitute ineffective assistance of
counsel. The district court correctly noted that we have enforced

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knowing and voluntary waivers of appellate rights. See United States
v. Marin, 961 F.2d 493, 496 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Wiggins,
905 F.2d 51, 52-53 (4th Cir. 1990). However, the waiver of Parra's
right to appeal his sentence does not preclude the right to raise on
appeal claims, for example, of an involuntary guilty plea or prosecu-
torial misconduct, or even of the validity of the waiver.

Therefore, the claim requires further inquiry. The district court
should determine the facts necessary to assess counsel's conduct
under the Supreme Court's recent decision in Roe v. Flores-Ortega,
528 U.S. 470 (2000). We vacate the district court's opinion on this
issue, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opin-
ion. We affirm the district court's ruling on Parra's other claim. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argu-
ment would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED
AND REMANDED IN PART

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