Court Opinion

ID: 9623337
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:31:27.873913+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:20.843754
License: Public Domain

ANDREWS, Judge (dissenting). The issue in this appeal is whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury as to implied warranty in a contract action where the plaintiff adduced evidence as to the negligence of, and failure to exercise a reasonable degree of skill, by the defendant. Plaintiff (Moss Theatres, Inc.) acting through its agent Moss, contracted with defendant (Turner Fence Company) for the construction of a fence. Defendant contractor discussed the proposed project with the plaintiff and advised Moss that a lightweight fence might not stand up to the winds which were known to be strong in the area. Moss stated that he did not have sufficient funds to go to a heavier grade of fencing and ordered that the lighter fence be built. Plaintiff paid $7,450.00 in advance and the fence was constructed. Some time afterward, but before the balance due on the contract was paid, a strong wind ruined the fence. Plaintiff brought suit on the basis of a breach of contract, alleging that defendant had been negligent in performance. Defendant counter-sued stating that it had performed according to specifications and that it was entitled to the balance of $3,842.96 outstanding on the contract. At trial plaintiff sought to show that the fence was constructed in violation of the relevant building code and that the damage would not have occurred but for the failure of the fence to meet these code provisions. The trial court refused plaintiff’s request for a directed verdict based on negligence per se and instructed the jury on proximate cause-clearly deciding that there was a factual question as to the proximate cause. Plaintiff then requested that the trial court instruct the jury as to implied warranty. The requested instructions were: 17. ****** Where a person is employed in work of skill the employer buys both his labor and his judgment; he ought not to undertake the work if he cannot succeed, and he should know whether it will or not. (Citation omitted.) 18. ****** The court further instructs you that the defendant impliedly warranted that he would exercise such reasonable degree of skill as the nature of the services required. (Citation omitted.) 19. ****** If you find that the fence constructed by the defendant was not fit for the uses and purposes for which it was purchased and that such fence failed to remain erect, it. is defective in its construction and your verdict should be for the Plaintiff. (Citation omitted.) The trial court refused these instructions, and submitted instructions on contract and the negligence of the plaintiff. The plaintiff now appeals a verdict for the defendant and assigns as error the court’s failure to find negligence per se and to properly instruct the jury as to implied warranty. A party is entitled to instructions on a theory which has been pled if there is some evidence on the point. Mac Tyres, Inc. v. Vigil, 92 N.M. 446, 589 P.2d 1037 (1979). Defendant, in arguing that the refusal was correct, emphasizes two positions. The first is that the general instruction as to the plaintiffs case was sufficient-thus, any further instruction would have been unduly repetitious. I disagree. The statement of the case was a general outline and in no way formalized any of the concepts which would have informed the jury of the implied warranty theory. Defendant’s second point is that the judge could very well have believed that plaintiff assumed any risk of possible failure of the fence when it chose the lower priced fence over defendant’s warning. Thus, we are asked to assume that the trial court, as a matter of law, determined that an implied warranty theory was impossible under the evidence adduced. An examination of the law of this state reveals no cases directly addressing this point. We are urged to accept the holding in a Kansas case, Glass v. Wiesner, 172 Kan. 133, 238 P.2d 712 (1951), to support the proposition that if the trial court was of the opinion that there was no evidence supporting the warranty theory, it was not an error to refuse instructions 17, 18 and 19. In Glass v. Wiesner, supra, the court noted: In view of the conflicting testimony the Court had a right to believe the facilities were constructed in accordance with Wiesner’s directions and against Plaintiff’s admonition that they were inadequate and that Defendants agreed to assume the risk. Under such circumstances there [was] no room for the application of the doctrine of implied warranties against the builder. Id., 238 P.2d at 716. While this is a correct statement of the law, the defendant incorrectly relies on this point to support its position. The very crux of the Glass case was that the court had the duty to decide both the law and the facts-it was not a jury trial. The decision states that “the Court had the right to believe: that certain conditions and statements did in fact occur; in short, the issue was one of fact. Only by making a series of factual findings was it possible for the court to then decide that the warranty issue was not applicable. In the instant case, though, the level of skill and the quality of the goods delivered was presented to the jury as a factual issue. Certainly, the trial court might have been of the opinion that the warranty theory was not supported by the evidence. The question should have been, however, whether there was any evidence upon which the jury might have found that such a warranty had in fact existed and had been breached. In my opinion, the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury as to warranty as requested. I would reverse.