Court Opinion

ID: 9778222
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:56:28.086761+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:05.329685
License: Public Domain

CORNELIUS, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I cannot agree with the majority’s decision that the devise of Dr. Brown’s home was adeemed. In all other respects, I agree with the majority opinion.
The primary goal in interpreting a will is to determine the testator’s intent. Gee v. Read, 606 S.W.2d 677, 680 (Tex.1980). A bequest or devise can be either specific or general. Hurt v. Smith, 744 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tex.1987). A devise or bequest is specific if it is described in the will with such particularity that the property is distinguished from all of the testator’s other property, and the testator intended for the beneficiary to receive that particular item, rather than cash or other property from his general estate. In determining the classification of a devise or bequest, the court must discern the testator’s intent by looking at the entire disposi-tive scheme of the will rather than reaching an arbitrary decision based on ritualistic classification.
The trial court here, without explicitly determining whether the devise of the home was specific or general, found that Dr. Brown intended to leave his home, wherever located, to Susan K. Taggart and that the devise would fail only if Dr. Brown owned no home at his death. The trial court called the home a “special asset” to a family and noted that Dr. Brown shared a home with Susan Brown from the day after the will was executed until his death.
“Ademption” occurs when a specific devise or bequest becomes inoperative because the *610subject matter is removed from the testator’s estate in his lifetime. Rogers v. Carter, 385 S.W.2d 563, 565 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1964, writ ref d n.r.e.). Ademption applies only when the devise or bequest is a specific one. Id. at 566.
Courts are generally reluctant to find ademption, and they use several devices to avoid it, such as (1) finding the gift is general or demonstrative rather than specific; (2) finding that an asset in the estate is, in substance, the property described in the specific devise; (3) finding that the will has special language indicating that other property can take the place of the specifically devised asset; or (4) construing the will as though written immediately before the testator’s death. See, e.g., Welch v. Straach, 518 S.W.2d 862, 868 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco), rev’d on other grounds, 531 S.W.2d 319 (Tex.1975); O’Neill v. Alford, 485 S.W.2d 935, 938-39 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1972, no writ); Houston Land & Trust Co. v. Campbell, 105 S.W.2d 430, 434 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1937, writ ref d); see also John C. Paulus, Ademption by Extinction: Smiting Lord Thurlow’s Ghost, 2 TexTech L.Rev. 195,197 (1971).
Even though the devise of the home may have been a specific devise, I agree with the trial court that a reasonable construction of the devise shows that it was not adeemed. The wording of the devise indicates that Dr. Brown intended to give his wife, not a house located on a specific street, but “my home,” which at that time happened to be located at # 19 Holly Ridge. The address was not part of the devise, but was merely descriptive of the home’s location. One’s home is where the person lives, wherever it is located. Sanchez v. Brandt, 567 S.W.2d 254 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1978, writ ref d n.r.e.). When Dr. Brown and Mrs. Brown moved from # 19 Holly Ridge to 6307 Lakeridge, their home was relocated to that address, but the home remained a part of Dr. Brown’s estate, much the same as the contents of the home admittedly were not adeemed because they were merely relocated. If Dr. Brown had intended to devise the specific house at # 19 Holly Ridge rather than his “home,” it seems he would have specified “the house” or “the budding” at that address, rather than “my home.” See Welch v. Straach, supra.
Appellants rely heavily on the case of Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v. Green, 237 Ark. 785, 376 S.W.2d 275 (1964), but that case is distinguishable from this case. There, the testatrix not only devised her “home place” and gave its address, but gave a detailed legal description of the land on which the home was situated. The Arkansas Supreme Court used the legal description largely as a basis for holding that the devise was a specific one that was adeemed when the home was sold. We do not have that situation in this case.
I would hold that the devise of the home was not adeemed and that the home on Lakeridge passed to Dr. Brown’s widow pursuant to the terms of his will.