Court Opinion

ID: 9714936
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:49:43.609994+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:34.564285
License: Public Domain

WILENTZ, C.J.,
dissenting.
There is no clearer general mandate of public policy than the duty of public officials to vote honestly in accordance with their conscience and with due regard for the interests of those they represent. And there is no clearer specific mandate of public policy than the prohibition against bribes and threats that would corrupt their honesty and their vote. In a democracy governed by the vote of elected officials, it is understood and accepted that those officials must vote for what they believe is in the best *408interest of society, and not for their own or another’s economic interest. The Court today perceptively recognizes the connection between the facts of this case and the conflict-of-interest laws. Ultimately, however its reasoning and result disserve both the general mandate and the specific mandate for it accords undue weight to the interest of employers. Its opinion will likely permit an employer to discharge an at-will employee who, in fulfilling his duty as a public servant, fails (or refuses) to vote in the economic interest of his employer or one of his employer’s customers. In the process, the Court has created a complex doctrinal maze and has provided insufficient guidance or standards to help trial courts and litigants navigate through it.
This is not a case about an unfortunate employer being dragged involuntarily into a swirling political controversy by one of its employees, the president of the local town council. It is not about an employer risking a massive loss of customers because of that person’s unpopularity arising from his vote on an ordinance of intense, community-wide interest. It is not about that employer’s right to fire that employee to save its business.
This is a case about an attempted corrupt fix that did not work. It is about a businessman who opposed an ordinance of extremely limited scope that uniquely affected and hurt his business. It is a case about a businessman who discovered what he undoubtedly thought was his good fortune — one of the employees of a company over which he had some influence happened to be the president of the local town council. It appears that the businessman used his leverage over that company first by getting it to “suggest” that the council president kill the ordinance and then, after the ordinance was passed, by getting it to “suggest” again that he reverse his vote. There is no suggestion that the employer resisted that leverage and it is beyond dispute that it participated in the businessman’s attempted fix. Because the council president did not budge, however, the businessman insisted that he be fired, and the employer fired him. In short, the council president was fired from his private job because he refused to participate in the fix.
*409There is nothing complex about this case except the majority’s treatment of it. It is a simple case, as is the principle that should govern it: in New Jersey an employer should not be able to fire an employee because, as a public official, that employee refuses to participate in a corrupt fix.
Although I agree that summary judgment was improperly granted in this case and that the case must therefore be remanded for further proceedings, I simply cannot subscribe to the Court’s articulation of the law in this area and consequently cannot join in the majority’s opinion. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
I
MacDougall was a member and president of the governing body of the Borough of Chester and was a sales associate at Weichert Realty. He voted in favor of a parking ordinance that he believed was in the best interest of his constituents. The vote, however, was against the economic interest of Merriam, one of Weichert’s customers. Merriam then pressured Weichert to fire MacDougall, which it did. MacDougall did not receive a bribe for a good vote; instead, he was fired for a bad vote.
I suspect the majority has been influenced by its sense that Weichert may not have threatened MacDougall until the very end and that its role in this matter was passive, simply responding to the pressure of an important customer. Experience tells us, however, that the facts may not be what the bare record suggests. It is not unlikely that Merriam contacted Weichert, and that the Weichert employee who called MacDougall did so because she had been asked to call, either by Weichert, by Merriam, or by both. Despite the apparent (or alleged) absence of threats prior to MacDougall’s initial vote, after that vote he was pressured by Weichert. Although not disclosing who was interested, Weichert let MacDougall know that it had a “party” that was “very disturbed about the parking ordinance.” It seems likely that Weichert was covertly telling MacDougall that it was important to Weichert that he change his vote. I suspect that MacDougall *410knew from the outset that Merriam was the “disturbed” party, although MacDougall steadfastly contends he did not know or did not remember or was not sure of the “disturbed” party’s identity. See ante at 387, 677 A.2d at 165. Sometimes the wish is the father of the thought, however, and MacDougall may have wished that he had voted without any such knowledge for he may have thought that he should have recused himself. I suspect that the facts, were they fully known, conform to the classic attempted fix.
Those foregoing speculations about the facts may be no more than that and I do not believe they are critical. The possibility that the facts are as I have suggested, however, may make it easier to consider the public policies involved, and the protections that honest public officials need. Either way, I believe that the damage to public policy is the same and the remedy for that damage should be the same. Assuming MacDougall is found to have been an employee of Weiehert, he should have a cause of action against both Weiehert and Merriam — against Weiehert for wrongful discharge, against Merriam for causing it, and a further cause of action against Merriam for the tort of interfering with MacDougall’s prospective economic advantage in remaining Weichert’s employee.
Vindication of that public policy is too important to allow it to be defeated by the competing economic interest of the employer. Employers throughout this state must know in no uncertain terms that no matter how great the pressure of a customer with an economic interest in a vote, they may not fire an employee-public servant because he votes the wrong way, and they may not threaten to do so. The consequences of allowing a retaliatory discharge because of the public servant’s vote are clear. Once the freedom of the employer to do so is understood by employees who happen to be public servants, they will be well-advised and will undoubtedly seek to determine whether matters before them are ones that might affect their employers or their-employers’ customers and vote accordingly.
*411If on remand MacDougaU is deemed to be an employee for the purposes of the doctrine of Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505 (1980), I would rule on this record as a matter of law that his discharge violated a clear mandate of pubhc pohcy and as such was both tortious and a breach of contract. I would also rule as a matter of law that Merriam was a joint tortfeasor if, on remand, the facts support what the record before us strongly suggests — that Merriam threatened to terminate its relations with Weichert either for the purpose of causing or knowing that such threat was likely to cause MacDougall’s discharge. Because I beheve that the record estabUshes that Merriam acted intentionaUy and with mahce, I would rule as a matter of law that Merriam tortiously interfered with MacDougaU’s reasonable expectation of future economic advantage, i.e., his expectation of continuing to work for Weichert. I would instruct the trial court to rule as a matter of law on the employee/independent contractor issue based on the facts developed by the parties. That ruling would depend on whether, given the purposes of the Pierce doctrine, MacDougall’s position did or did not, as a matter of public policy, warrant the same kind of protection given to employees-at-will.
II
The threshold issue in this case is whether, for purposes of Pierce, MacDougaU was an employee or an independent contractor.4 Whether one is an employee or an independent contractor is a part legal and part factual question that may depend on the consequences of the answer. Put differently, the answer may be “employee” for the purposes of applying the Pierce doctrine but “independent contractor” if the question is whether the putative employer is vicariously liable for the putative employee’s tort. Although the majority apparently recognizes that principle, ante *412at 388-389, 677 A.2d at 165-166, it fails to provide adequate guidance to the trial court for making the determination.
The majority's statement that Pierce does not apply to independent contractors is probably correct, but there is no need in this case to go that far. I believe that the trial court should consider those factors that led us in Pierce to modify the traditional doctrine of at-will employment. It may be that for Pierce purposes MacDougall should be regarded as an employee. The intuitive notion that would lead one to reject Pierce protection for independent contractors is that they do not need it — they presumably have various customers, and are therefore not as completely dependent on their employer as are at-will employees. There may be some “independent contractors,” however, that in reality do business with only one company and are totally dependent on that company.
I would direct the trial court to analyze MacDougall’s situation, and further, to analyze the situation of real estate agents working for firms like Weiehert, for it seems to me that the rule should have generality. I believe that that would be a question of law requiring very little factfinding, but the issue has not been addressed by the briefs or in oral argument. Under these circumstances, it would be preferable to have a full-blown trial of the issue and let the trial court decide whether the matter can be disposed of by the court or requires a factual determination by the jury-
There are a number of factors that should be considered in determining whether MacDougall is an employee or an independent contractor. Those include: (1) whether MacDougall’s services were available to anyone else (or could have been made available to others under his agreement with Weiehert); (2) whether a substantial portion of his activities resulted from referrals from Weiehert; (3) whether real estate agents in his position are economically vulnerable and can (but will not necessarily) suffer substantial loss from being discharged; and (4) whether invocation of the Pierce rule would unduly restrain Weichert’s *413legitimate rights. The factors that are traditionally considered in making that determination should also have substantial but not dispositive weight. Those are fairly described by the majority. See ante at 388-389, 677 A.2d at 165-166.
Ill
Putting the employee versus independent contractor issue aside, I now turn to the central issue in this case — whether MacDougall has a cause of action against Weichert and/or Merriam. The majority’s basic premise is that MacDougall may have a cause of action for wrongful discharge if it is found that Weichert and/or Merriam violated a clear mandate of public policy derived from our criminal statutes prohibiting threats and retaliation against public officials. The majority concludes that, although Weichert’s conduct in this case was not a crime, those statutes provide a basis for finding a violation of a clear mandate if MacDougall can show that Weichert’s (and/or Merriam’s) actions were “based on interests or relationships” that “engender” a disqualifying conflict of interest. Ante at 402, 677 A.2d at 173.
That conclusion is at once confusing and overly limited. Although the majority declares that “the conflict-of-interest laws not only impose duties on public employees but they also constitute constraints on persons dealing with public employees,” ante at 402, 677 A.2d at 173, the majority never clearly defines what those duties are. It merely says that at-will employee-public servants are “afford[ed] protection ... from threats or retaliation based on interests or relationships that would engender disqualifying conflicts under the laws governing conflicts of interest.” Ibid. There is nothing in the various conflict-of-interest statutes or relevant case law that suggests that those statutes were intended to regulate the conduct of anyone other than the public officials themselves. Moreover, the very notion of “engendering” a conflict of interest is problematical. Either an employer’s business relationships create a conflict of interest for an employee-public servant or they do not — the employer’s conduct toward the em*414ployee does not generally affect the outcome at all. As we said in Griggs v. Borough of Princeton, 33 N.J. 207, 219, 162 A.2d 862 (1960), “[t]he question is whether there is a potential for conflict, not whether the public servant succumbs to the temptation or is even aware of it.”
The majority apparently suffers from a fundamental misunderstanding of what created the' potential conflict of interest in this case. It was not Weichert’s ordering MacDougall to change his vote (if that is indeed what Weichert did), but rather the fact that MacDougall worked for Weichert and that one of Weichert’s major customers had a direct economic interest in the parking ordinance. Moreover, by relying on the conflict-of-interest laws, the majority unwisely focuses its attention on the vague “wrong” suffered by MacDougall as a result of the possible conflict of interest and Weichert’s (or Merriam’s) actions. The focus should instead be on the very real and definable wrong the public suffers when a private interest uses its economic power and influence to corruptly fix (or attempt to corruptly fix) the vote of a public official. After all, Pierce was designed to serve clear mandates of public policy. The majority loses sight of the forest for the trees, and in so doing, disserves the public’s overriding interest in honest government.
What is most confounding to me, however, is why the majority so adamantly insists on making its decision turn on a direct application of the conflict-of-interest laws. Although the. majority acknowledges that “[sjources of public policy include the United States and New Jersey Constitutions; federal and state laws and administrative rules, regulations, and decisions; the common law and specific judicial decisions; and in certain cases, professional codes of ethics,” ante at 391, 677 A.2d at 167, it never attempts to identify other sources that may be relevant to this case. Moreover, the majority fails to recognize that the possibility that Weichert and MacDougall did not violate the conflict-of-interest laws or the criminal code does not mean that the discharge did not violate a clear mandate of public policy.
*415Had the majority undertaken to look to other sources, it would have found that there áre many, many sources that, taken together, point to an overriding clear mandate of public policy against what happened in this case. What follows is a discussion of those other sources, which I believe demonstrates beyond question that there is a clear mandate of public policy against the attempted corrupt fix of a public official’s vote — a simple principle that the majority apparently does not endorse.
A.
As does the majority, I begin the discussion of the various sources with the sections of our criminal code that prohibit threats and retaliation against public officials, N.J.S.A 2C:27-3a and N.J.S.A 2C:27-5. The former provides that a person commits a criminal offense “if he directly or indirectly ... [threatens unlawful harm to any person with purpose to influence a decision, opinion, recommendation, vote or exercise of discretion of a public servant____” The latter provides that a person commits a criminal offense “if he harms another by any unlawful act with purpose to retaliate for or on account of the service of another as a public servant.”
The majority concludes that those sections do not criminalize what Weichert and Merriam did in this case. See ante at 399-400, 677 A.2d at 171-172. Whether this is correct or not is not particularly relevant here. Certainly, the fact that a clear mandate of public policy is not incorporated in legislation making its violation a crime does not render it any less a clear mandate of public policy. Many cases of this nature, indeed most, involve a clear mandate of public policy the violation of which is not criminalized. See, e.g., Velantzas v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 109 N.J. 189, 192, 536 A.2d 237 (1988) (observing that discharge of employee for requesting information relevant to suspected gender-based employment discrimination would be actionable under Pierce)-, Lally v. Copygraphics, 85 N.J. 668, 670-71, 428 A.2d 1317 (1981) (recognizing cause of action under Pierce for retaliate*416ry firing of employee who filed worker’s compensation action even though specific statutory remedy was available). The Legislature’s decision not to criminalize a violation of public policy, especially when that public policy is otherwise clear beyond debate — as this one is — should not be taken, either as permission to violate it, approval of its violation, or as in any way diminishing its clarity. Indeed, properly understood, I believe that the statutes on which MacDougall primarily relies by themselves constitute a clear mandate of public policy. There may have been many reasons for not criminalizing violations of that mandate that leave its clear declaration of public policy unaffected.
That point is well-illustrated by the history of the drafting of the relevant sections of the Model Penal Code. The principle issue facing the American Law Institute was what types of threats and retaliation should be criminalized. Two positions emerged. One favored making threats of “unlawful harm” criminal. The other advocated making all “corrupt” threats criminal. In the former case, the scope would be defined by reference to background law, with any conduct that constituted a crime or a tort considered “unlawful.” Model Penal Code § 208:11 emt. at 108 (Tentative Draft No. 8, 1958) [hereinafter Tentative Draft ]; see also Model Penal Code § 240.2 part II commentary at 52 (1980) [hereinafter MPC]. The latter formulation would have left the definition of “corrupt” to the courts. MPC § 240.2 part II commentary at 51.
Although the ALI ultimately chose not to adopt the “corruptly” standard, see MPC § 240.2 part II commentary at 51 (1980), that was solely the result of the Institute’s general inability to define precisely what pressures on a politician should not be criminalized. See ibid. (“These distinctions are too subtle for resolution by the blunt instrument of criminal prosecution____ [I]t would be intolerable to subject all such decisions to review under the penal law.”) (emphases added); id. at 52 (“The fact that the content of this body of law is specific and ascertainable is what commends use of ‘unlawful’ rather than ‘corrupt’ to designate the types of threat that are forbidden,” i.e., criminalized.). It did not evince *417any approval of the use of discharge threats to sway the votes of public officials. Indeed, one of the reasons the ALI came close to adopting the “corruptly” rubric was to prevent that type of threat. See Tentative Draft § 208:11 cmt. at 108-09.
The same general considerations led the ALI to adopt the “harm by any unlawful act” standard in the retaliation section. See Tentative Draft § 208:18 cmt. at 110; 35 A.L.I. Proc. 363-64 (1958). The main reporter for that section recognized that in confining retaliation to “unlawful acts,” “[t]here comes a point at which we relax our Penal Code surveillance of this matter----” 35 A.L.I. Proc. 363 (1958) (emphasis added). That recognition lends further credence to my contention that the ALI in no way intended to immunize retaliatory firings from civil liability.
The ALI elected clarity over completeness — a choice it thought necessary in the unique context of the criminal justice system. In the process, the ALI created “an obvious gap,” obvious even to the drafters. See Tentative Draft § 208:11 cmt. at 108 (“restricting [the threat section] to ‘unlawful’ acts would leave obvious gaps in its coverage”). I suggest that that is a huge gap, possibly allowing corrupting influences of the type involved in this case to go unpunished by our criminal justice system.
Although I sympathize with the frustration that the drafters of the Model Penal Code experienced in defining the scope of prohibited conduct, I do not believe that our Legislature intended to permit conduct that, for all intents and purposes, is the same as a bribe. Both in terms of the facts, the law, the questions of proof, and our mores, that type of economic threat, made to influence a public servant’s vote, is totally indistinguishable from a bribe, a form of conduct that has always been criminal.
B.
I now turn to N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2, the section of our criminal code that prohibits bribery. In providing a clear mandate of public policy against bribes (ie., economic reward for a vote), that section has, in my judgment, the same effect for their mirror image— *418threats of economic harm. That they are not identical is clear, but equally clear is the fact that they do not differ in those characteristics that form the basis of the clear mandate of public policy. Their identity is so persuasive in that respect that ordinarily its mere mention would suffice. However, given the majority’s disagreement here, see ante at 899-400, 677 A.2d at 171-172, more is needed.
I believe that the kind of threats against which the bribery section provides a clear mandate of public policy is limited to conduct that is equivalent to bribery in its core form: someone, or some entity, economically interested in a public official’s vote, offers and/or pays money, or gives something of pecuniary value, to a public official to control his vote. The clear mandate of public policy against such bribes is also a clear mandate of public policy condemning conduct that is in all respects its equivalent: someone, or some entity, economically interested in a vote, threatens to inflict economic harm on a public servant to control his vote. The fundamental identity is that both involve the same potential for corruption through economic inducement, whether reward or punishment. There is no difference in substance and should be none in treatment between an economically-interested employer who promises his employee-public servant a promotion or pay raise to influence his vote5 and one who threatens a demotion or pay cut.
Public policy dictates that result as well. If, as I contend, both core bribery and core threats violate a clear mandate of public policy, the effect on all employees would be identical: they would be given some assurance that the law supports their willingness to risk discharge. All employee-public servants in the state would be less corruptible and all employers would be less likely to attempt corruption. If a threat followed by the firing of an employee is not clearly remediable, although a bribe is, employers would be well-advised to use the threat.
*419We have hinted at the equivalence of bribes and threats before. Although we held in State v. Scirrotto, 115 N.J. 38, 48, 556 A.2d 1195 (1989), that the threat and bribery sections were designed to define two different crimes and that the same circumstantial evidence cannot be used to prove the commission of both, we nevertheless noted the essential similarity of those “two generically-distinct categories of conduct” in that both “seek to achieve the conniption of public officials.” Id. at 48, 556 A.2d 1195. We referred, apparently with approval, to the following comment in the New Jersey Criminal Justice Quarterly: “[N.J.S.A] 2C:27-3 [ (the threat section) ] is, in effect, a variation of the bribery prohibition. Its purpose is to prevent persons from subjecting public servants to undue influence by reason of threatened harm, as opposed to promised benefits.” Analysis of the Procedural and Sentencing Provisions of the New Jersey Penal Code and a Remew of the Major Substantive Offenses, 6 Crim. Just. Q. 124, 156 (1978), quoted in Scirrotto, supra, 115 N.J. at 44 n. 4, 556 A.2d 1195.
C.
Sources other than the criminal statutes discussed above strongly support the conclusion that a clear mandate of public policy was violated in this case. The Legislature has enacted an elaborate scheme of ethics requirements pertaining to local government, see N.J.S.A 40A:9-22.1 to -22.25 (Local Government Ethics Law); local school officials, see N.J.S.A 18A:12-21 to -34 (School Ethics Act); and state officials, see N.J.S.A 52:13D-12 to -27 (New Jersey Conflicts of Interest Law). Those statutes have a common theme and objective: to prevent or guard against, or at least reveal, the potential corruption of public officials at all levels, whether legislative or administrative, by virtue of some private economic interest. See, e.g., N.J.S.A 40A:9-22.2e; N.J.S.A. 18A:12-24; N.J.S.A 52:13D-23e. That interest may be the official’s own economic interest, the economic interest of those with whom they have some connection, or the economic interest of a *420potential employer. The objective is clear: public officials are supposed to vote in accordance with their conscience for the good of those they serve, completely uninfluenced by any private economic interest, including their own. As we said in Driscoll v. Burlington-Bristol Bridge Co., 8 N.J. 433, 474, 86 A.2d 201, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 838, 73 S.Ct. 25, 97 L.Ed. 652 (1952), “[a]s fiduciaries and trustees of the public weal [public officials] are under an inescapable obligation to serve the public with the highest fidelity.”
The potential for extraneous influence on public officials, even apart from money, has spawned restrictions prohibiting former officials from having certain dealings with the government. N.J.S.A 40A:9-22.5b. Former state officials are prohibited from representing or appearing on behalf of anyone on any issue with which the state official was directly involved in during the course of his office. N.J.S.A. 52:13D-17; see also N.J.S.A 5:12-60. Local governmental bodies are prohibited from awarding former officials contracts that were not publicly bid, from permitting former officials to represent anyone before them, or from hiring former officials for employment except under certain specific circumstances. N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.5b(l) to (3). Moreover, local government officials are prohibited from undertaking any employment “which might reasonably be expected to prejudice [their] independence of judgment in the exercise of [their] official duties.” N.J.SA 40A:9-22.5(e). One of the concerns that those restrictions seek to address is the possibility of former officials using their presumed influence with their former colleagues to sway their votes. That concern is considerably heightened if the former official has an economic interest in that vote.
The majority relies on the conflict-of-interest laws and cases interpreting them as the sole source for the clear mandate of public policy in this case. Ante at 401-403, 677 A.2d 172-173. Although I stress again my fundamental disagreement with the majority’s holding that, to prevail under Pierce, MacDougall must somehow show that Weichert’s actions violated those laws, those *421laws do lend further support to the contention that MacDougall’s discharge violated a clear mandate of public policy. Indeed, our cases require public officials not to participate in governmental matters where they have a conflict of interest. See, e.g., Van Itallie v. Borough of Franklin Lakes, 28 N.J. 258, 267-68, 146 A.2d 111 (1958); Landau v. Township of Teaneck, 231 N.J.Super. 586, 594, 555 A.2d 1195 (Law Div.1989).* ****6 Courts have uniformly held that disqualification is mandated when the employee-public servant’s employer has a direct, e.g., Griggs v. Borough of Princeton, 33 N.J. 207, 219-22, 162 A.2d 862 (1960); Sokolinski v. Woodbridge Township Mun. Council, 192 N.J.Super. 101, 102-04, 469 A.2d 96 (App.Div.1983); Aldom v. Borough of Roseland, 42 N.J.Super. 495, 507, 127 A.2d 190 (App.Div.1956), or in certain instances, an indirect, e.g., In re Tuxedo Conservation and Taxpayers Assoc., 69 A.D.2d 320, 418 N.Y.S.2d 638, 642 (1979), financial stake in the outcome.7
*422Other statutes protect a similarly fundamental political right— the right to vote or not to vote. Those statutes make it a crime for an employer to threaten harm to induce an employee to vote or not to vote, or to inflict harm because of either. See N.J.S.A 19:34-27; N.J.SA 18A:14r-99. Indeed, any person who intimidates anyone to vote or not to vote or interferes with anyone’s right to vote, in almost any way, or compels anyone to vote or not to vote, is guilty of a crime. See N.J.SA 19:34-28 to -30; N.J.SA 18A:14-100 to -101. Although those statutes cover elections only, the vote of a board member or council member, who may have one of the total of five votes on the entire board, is at least as important as a vote at a general election.
Even more closely analogous are the sections that prohibit employers from enclosing in their employees’ pay envelopes “threats, expressed or implied, intended ... to influence the political opinions or actions of [their] employees.” N.J.SA 19:34-30 (applying to elections in general); see also N.J.SA 18A:14-102 (applying to school board elections). Violation of either of those sections is a crime. N.J.SA 19:34-31; N.J.SA 18A:14-104. Presumably, those statutes were designed to prevent employers from using threats to influence their employees’ votes, but the statutes are broader, prohibiting threats, including implied threats, aimed at influencing any political votes of an employee, the language seeming to encompass voting as a legislator.
The Conscientious Employee Protection Act (“CEPA”), N.J.SA 34:19-1 to -8, provides further support for finding a violation of a clear mandate of public policy in this case in that it undermines the majority’s position that — but for the conflict-of-interest laws— MacDougall would not have a civil remedy because his discharge did not constitute an “unlawful act.” Like Pierce, CEPA forbids retaliatory discharges that are incompatible with a clear mandate *423of public policy.8 N.J.S.A 34:19-3e(3). Under CEPA, discharge is in itself enough: the employer need not threaten at all. Furthermore, the statute protects an employee who “blows the whistle” on another employer with whom his employer has a business relationship. N.J.S.A 34:19-3(a). In enacting that provision, the Legislature recognized that the public policy served by CEPA would be undermined if the employer could retaliate against the employee for exposing the other employer’s objectionable conduct.
Federal law also provides a clear mandate of public policy against what happened in this case. See D’Agostino v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., 133 N.J. 516, 528, 531-35, 628 A.2d 305 (1993) (holding that federal law can provide source of state public policy for determining whether discharge of employee violated clear mandate of public policy). Relevant here is 18 U.S.C.A § 372, which makes it a criminal offense to
conspire to prevent, by force, intimidation, or threat, any person from accepting or holding any office, trust, or place of confidence under the United States, or from discharging any duties thereof, ... or to injure him in his person or property on account of his lawful discharge of the duties of his office____
[18 U.S.C.A § 372.]
Section 372 is a clear expression of the public policy condemning, as contrary to the public interest, threats against public officers in the performance of their duties.9
*424The United States Constitution also provides a basis for supporting the finding of a clear mandate of public policy in this case.10 In Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 72, 110 S.Ct. 2729, 2735, 111 L. Ed.2d 52, 66 (1990), the Supreme Court held that public employees who are not at a policy-making level or entrusted with confidential duties are protected by the First Amendment’s guarantees of freedom of speech and of association from being fired because of their political party affiliation. Surely the patronage prohibited by Rutan poses a much greater threat to political freedom than what I hope are the less frequent occurrences of corruption of public officials in their vote. Although the aggregate harm may be worse in the former case, the appearance of corruption is greater in the latter.
Finally, among the sources supporting the finding of a clear mandate of public policy are the many statutes passed in the past two decades to rid our political system of the influence of money. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C.A §§ 431-455 (requiring disclosure of source of federal campaign funds and setting limits on amount that persons or groups may contribute); N.J.SA 19:44A-1 to -47 (regulating campaign contributions and expenditures in state elections); see generally Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (upholding federal campaign contribution limits but declaring unconstitutional limits on contributions to own campaign). Those statutes were enacted to limit, control, disclose and in some cases, prohibit political contributions. They provide yet another clear expression of the public policy against the use of money to attempt to corrupt the votes of public officials.
*425D.
Although there are no New Jersey decisions on point, the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. Farmers Cooperative Ass’n, 825 P.2d 1323 (Okla.1992), lends still further support to my position. The Smith court concluded, on a motion for summary judgment, that the materials submitted on behalf of the plaintiff could lead a reasonable jury to conclude that a clerk at a farmer’s co-op had been wrongfully discharged by his employer because he did not use his official position as mayor of a town to support a zoning variance sought for personal gain by one of the members of the board of directors of the co-op. Smith, supra, 825 P.2d at 1327. The director’s role in Smith was apparently analogous to that of Merriam in the instant case and, apparently as here, the firing in Smith was pure retaliation. The court, stressing the need to narrow the grounds on which such firings would be prohibited, found that the “clear mandate of public policy” could be drawn solely from the statute defining the municipality’s general zoning power, which specified it was to be used “[f]or the purpose of promoting health, safety, morals or the general welfare of the community.” Id. at 1326. The court noted that
[a]n official who derives his authority from [the statute] is required to act in the public’s best interest. The public policy exception to the employee-at-will doctrine applies when an employee is'fired in retaliation for acting [in the public’s best interest]____ [I]f Smith were fired for performing an act consistent with public policy such as administering the town’s zoning laws while acting in his capacity as mayor and a voting member of the town’s board of trustees, he would have an actionable tort claim.

mm

The distinction that the majority draws between administrative and legislative duties to distinguish Smith from the instant case, ante at 397-399 n. 2, 677 A.2d at 170-171 n. 2, is unpersuasive. That distinction is apparently based on the Model Penal Code, which divides administrative and judicial functions from legislative functions for the purpose of assessing criminal liability. MPC § 240.2(l)(a)-(b). The Smith opinion, however, never even refers to the Model Penal Code and never hints at that distinction.
*426The Smith court’s decision served the clear mandate of public policy that public servants who vote in the interests of the public should not be fired because of the economic interest of their employer, or because of the economic interest of someone with whom the employer has a business relationship. It is directly analogous to the instant case.
E.
There is one other theme in the majority’s opinion with which I must take exception. In noting that “the interests of the employee, the employer, and the public” must be balanced before a court can find that a clear mandate of public policy has been violated by an employee’s discharge, ante at 390, 677 A.2d at 167, the majority, perhaps unwittingly, lends further credence to what is, I believe, a common misstatement of the Pierce doctrine. The principle of balancing in wrongful discharge cases has sometimes been discussed as if it were the typical case-by-case evaluation by which Chancery Division courts assure that justice is done in every case. That is not the essence of Pierce and its progeny, however, and for good reason: clear mandates of public policy are designed to serve the public interest — they are general rules, and sometimes their application in a specific case may seem harsh or unwarranted. But if the clear mandate has been properly identified, the public interest will be best served if it is applied uniformly.
The balancing language in Pierce was meant to describe the general process that produced the Pierce rule itself as well as that which precedes the finding or rejection in the case at hand of a clear mandate of public policy, as distinguished from determining which interest outweighs the other in each ease where the mandate is implicated:
In recognizing a cause of action to provide a remedy for employees who are wrongfully discharged, we must balance the interests of the employee, the employer, and the public. Employees have an interest in knowing they will not be discharged for exercising their legal rights. Employers have an interest in knowing they can run their businesses as they see fit as long as their conduct is *427consistent with public policy. The public has an interest in employment stability and in discouraging frivolous lawsuits by dissatisfied employees.
[Pierce, supra, 84 N.J. at 71, 417 A.2d 505 (emphasis added).]
In Fineman v. New Jersey Department of Human Services, 272 N.J.Super. 606, 640 A.2d 1161 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 138 N.J. 267, 649 A.2d 1287 (1994), the Appellate Division set forth the following formulation of the role of balancing in cases of this nature: “[A] clear mandate of public policy must be one that on balance is beneficial to the public. Determining public policy is a matter of weighing competing interests. This often involves considering the competing interests of society, the employee and the employer.” Id. at 619, 640 A.2d 1161 (citations and quotation marks omitted). I agree with that formulation. The interests involved are weighed not to determine the outcome of the case but to determine the existence of a clear mandate of public policy, one that “on balance” is beneficial to the public. Balancing the interests in a specific case is justified only to the extent it helps us determine what is in the public interest.11
The majority’s treatment of this issue, ante at 390-391, 677 A.2d at 167, is an instructive example of how the concept of balancing of interests is often misapplied. The majority appears to weigh the employer’s interest against the employee’s, disregarding the public interest. It acts as if the public servant’s duty to vote in his perception of the public interest is a private right of the public servant, rather than the public’s right. It asks whether the employee’s interest in remaining employed outweighs the employer’s interest in “run[ning its] business[ ] as [it] see[s] fit,” ante at 390, 677 A.2d at 167, without ever suggesting there may be a public interest involved — the clearly superior public interest in honest government.
*428F.
In mistakenly relying on the conflict-of-interest laws as the sole source of the clear mandate of public policy, in ignoring the numerous other potential sources, and in appearing to elevate the interest of the employer above the public interest, the majority has left public servants with little prospect for a remedy. In so doing, the majority has completely lost sight of what is a simple and unquestionable truth — what happened in this case was an attempted corrupt fix of MacDougall’s vote, driven by the purely economic interests of Merriam and Weichert. As I said at the outset and have reiterated throughout, this firing, whether it resulted from or “engendered” a conflict of interest or not, violated the clearest mandate of public policy there is.
It is impossible to tell from the majority’s opinion precisely what issues will be submitted to the jury, not only on the Pierce wrongful termination count, but also on the tortious interference with prospective economic advantage claim, and even on the issue of distinguishing an employee from an independent contractor. As difficult as our task is in determining what the majority means, that difficulty will pale in comparison with the difficulties facing trial courts and juries, for the majority fails to provide adequate guidance or standards.
The majority not only misses this opportunity to place the Court and the law on the side of those who will not permit the corrupting fix of public officials, but it clearly permits threats to fire, and firing, when an employee-public servant fails to vote the way his employer wants him to in the many money-driven situations that do not violate the conflict-of-interest laws. It gives employers room to believe they may be within their legal right to put in the fix: they just have to learn how to do it right, perhaps with a hint but not a threat.
IY
In this section I discuss what I believe should be the law governing this case. Additional questions that may arise from the *429specific facts of this case, which are in certain respects different from the typical “fix,” are also addressed.
A.
I believe that the law in this area should simply be that an employer may not fire an employee-public servant in retaliation for the employee casting a vote that was against the economic interests of either the employer or one of the employer’s customers. The basis for that conclusion is my conviction that there is a clear mandate of public policy against such retaliatory discharges. That conviction is based primarily on the functional identity between threats and retaliation and a bribe when manifested in what I have termed its core form. Even without a threat, it is the mirror image of a bribe. I have confined the proposed rule to that mirror image. It would apply only when the threat and/or retaliation is based on the employer’s economic interest, direct or (as here) indirect.12 It would go no further than that.
The rule proposed in this dissent would continue to permit an employer to discharge an employee-public servant for reasons other than retaliation for his vote or for no reason at all. The proposed rule would not make the employee-public servant an *430employee-for-life any more than is an employee protected by civil rights statutes, worker’s compensation statutes, or the CEPA statute. Nor would this rule prevent the employer or customer (or anyone else) from attempting to persuade the employee-public servant to Vote a certain way. Anything short of a threat would remain permissible.
Some consideration should be given to the rule’s potential impact. I suspect that in a host of similar situations, the employer who threatens to discharge, and/or discharges an employee-public servant because of his vote, may not be liable under Pierce. That is not because I think the policy considerations would call for such a different outcome, but because there may not be a sufficiently clear mandate of public policy. Beside the specific question of whether a clear mandate of public policy exists, those considerations may implicate countervailing public policies or even constitutional issues. We have not heard argument, or indeed given our full consideration, to the question of whether the aforementioned sources provide a clear mandate of public policy in the various other contexts that I mention below. I note them simply to describe the scope of the proposed rule and the considerations that, were it adopted, might or might not lead to similar conclusions in other related contexts.
The rule would not necessarily apply where the pressure on the employee-public servant to vote a certain way was purely political. Numerous individuals, groups, party leaders, and others, may have a political interest in the vote, whether in the form of strengthening the political party, improving its prospect in a forthcoming election, or similar political interests. The employer itself may have such an interest. The interest may be selfish, altruistic, wholesome, or otherwise, but if it is purely a political interest, and the employer makes the threat for that reason, the proposed rule, narrowly confined as it is in this dissent, would certainly not apply. I express no opinion on whether there is a clear mandate of public policy to cover that situation.
*431The rule also would not necessarily apply if the political pressure were combined with economic pressure, so long as the motivation of those applying it was not to serve their own direct or indirect economic interests. For example, a political party may persuade an employer’s customers to exert economic pressure on the employer to cause it to threaten the employee-public servant. Similar pressure motivated by social issues likewise would not be covered by the proposed rule. As in the case of political pressure, I express no opinion on whether a clear mandate of public policy would cover that situation.
The prospect of picketing in front of the employer’s place of business, threatening to withhold patronage, and other forms of economic pressure to effectuate the social goals of those protesting, should not be lightly dismissed. A rule prohibiting discharge might be totally ineffective: the protests and demonstrations would continue. Further, it might be unthinkable and perhaps unconstitutional to attempt to stop them. Cf. Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. -,-, 114 S.Ct. 2516, 2530, 129 L.Ed.2d 593, 614-15 (1994) (holding unconstitutional order prohibiting anti-abortion protesters from demonstrating in front of family planning climes); Horizon Health Ctr. v. Felicissimo, 135 N.J. 126, 638 A.2d 1260 (1994).
A more difficult situation would arise, however, if a group brought generalized economic pressure against an employer to force it to threaten and/or fire an employee-public servant for his vote. Obviously, that situation would have all of the ugliness of core bribery and its mirror image, but it also would have some of the aspects of social-issue pressure. That may make it impractical to remedy through a civil action. For example, a proposal to rezone a large tract of a community in a way that clearly would depress property values can provoke the same kind of pressures as are found in votes that generate political or social-issue pressures. The motivation of the reaction, if purely economic, is the functional equivalent of one entity applying (the same amount of) pressure in its own economic interest. The same would be true if *432a large number of businesses, rather than individuals, brought the pressure. Obviously, that is not the mirror image of bribery.
The same conclusion pertains to the following hypothetical, which counsel referred to several times during argument. If an employer learns that the position or positions taken by its employee-public servant have or will cause numerous customers to take their business elsewhere, I do not believe there is any clear mandate of public policy preventing the employee’s discharge. Such group action, often spontaneous, has none of the earmarks of the kind of corruption implicated in this case.
The foregoing illustrations demonstrate that the narrowly-targeted rule of this case is not aimed at the spontaneous reaction of numerous individuals, or even at group action. It is aimed at the “fix,” the hidden fix attempted by someone specially economically impacted by a vote and undertaken through a bribe or a threat or a retaliatory discharge.
B.
Unlike the usual factual setting of a corrupt fix, in this case there may not have been any threat made against MacDougail. Indeed, MacDougail contends that he did not know either that Weichert or Merriam had an interest in his vote. If this were true, then there would have been no danger of corruption in this vote. The facts however make it clear that after the vote, there was some pressure on MacDougail to change his vote. Ante at 409, 677 A.2d at 176. If it became known that MacDougail was fired in retaliation for his vote, every employee-public servant in the state would be forced to undertake their duties knowing that they could be next. Whether threatened or not, the discharge here poses the same danger to the clear mandate of public policy because it has the same potential to corrupt all employee-public servants in this state.
The various criminal statutes suggest the same conclusion: a bribe is illegal even if paid after the vote without a pre-vote promise. See N.J.S.A 2C:27-2. Similarly, the general retaliation' *433statute does not require any prior bribe, offer, or threat before the vote in order to render the retaliation criminal. See N.J.S.A, 2C:27-5. From the employee’s point of view the firing is unfair whether threatened or not, but if not threatened, it is not only unfair, it deprives the employee of the opportunity to plead his ease with his employer or recuse himself.
A more troubling issue is Weichert’s apparent lack of culpability. Concerns that the employer may have been “in the middle” through no fault of its own should not be ignored. Our cases have never held that such lack of culpability affects the outcome, however. To do so would be to deny the public the benefit of the clear mandate of public policy. The public invariably benefits from the honest vote of its public servants. It is the fundament of democratic government, and neither the culpable nor innocent employer has an interest sufficient to deprive the public of that benefit. If liability may ultimately fall on the employer, even though innocent, public policy mandates it.
The indirectness of Weichert’s economic interest does not affect its culpability either. For purposes of the proposed rule, one cannot separate the economic interests of Weichert and its customer. They are intertwined. Even if Weichert is construed to be a victim of circumstances, it made a willing choice to participate in the fix in order to preserve its relationship with Merriam. Indeed, it actively participated by pressuring MacDougall to change his vote. Whether it was Weichert’s desire to maintain its relationship with Merriam or its desire to cause MacDougall to vote contrary to his conscience is of no consequence. Hardly a bribe or a threat designed to influence a public servant’s vote, or a retaliation because of that vote, has as its sole purpose influencing or corrupting the official. Its primary purpose, rather, is achieving some other goal through the means of the official’s vote. Moreover, I believe that if my position were adopted it would be somewhat easier for employers to dissuade their customers from exerting such pressure in the first place.
*434Y
Today’s case involves only a small part of the problem of public corruption. I believe the Court has failed to do its part to remedy it. Instead of condemning the clear corruption of the “fix,” it has constructed a convoluted doctrinal maze that will often serve only to deter and defeat legitimate claims. Although paying lip-service to the idea that a “vague, controversial, unsettled, and otherwise problematic public policy does not constitute a clear mandate,” ante at 392, 677 A.2d at 167, the majority proceeds to articulate precisely that. Worse, the majority’s holding fails to serve the public’s need for honesty and integrity in government. I urge the Legislature to remedy it.
The majority presumably understands that few people who are public servants would stand firm if the price were retaliatory discharge from their jobs. My proposed rule would not prevent that type of corruption, nor would it always dissuade those with an economic interest from attempting to corrupt public officials through their employers, nor would it dissuade employers from doing so in their own (or their customer’s) economic interest. What it would do is provide an employee-public servant with a weapon — the ability to tell his employer that it is the law of this state that he can and must vote his conscience, vote in favor of what he believes is in the public interest, and that he may not be discharged for doing so. The majority, by contrast, leaves such a public servant with an ill-defined remedy, available only if the employer’s action violated conflict-of-interest laws in some as-yet unspecified way.
When MacDougall took office he was required to take the following oath: “I, John W. MacDougall, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully, impartially and justly perform all the duties of the office of Chester Borough councilman according to the best of my ability. So help me God.” See N.J.S.A. 41:1-3; State v. Penta, 127 N.J.Super. 201, 204-05, 316 A.2d 733 (Law Div.1974).
*435I would reverse the decision below and remand the matter for further proceedings in accordance with this dissent.
Justice STEIN, joins in this dissent.

 As the following indicates, I disagree with Justice Pollock’s conclusion that on this record, MacDougaU, as a matter of law, is not covered by the Pierce doctrine.

 There is no question that that would constitute a bribe. See Tentative Draft § 208:10 cmt. 3 at 104 (1958) (including among examples of bribes corporate employee who sits in state legislature being offered promotion or raise in return for vote on particular bill).

 I do not believe that recusal is an adequate answer to the problem posed by this case. Its fundamental deficiency is that it typically is the equivalent of a "no” vote (and never the equivalent of a "yes” vote). This case illustrates the point. If MacDougall had recused himself, the vote would have been 2-2 and the parking ordinance would have been defeated. Although recusal may eliminate the appearance of corruption, it does not serve the public interest in the same way that having uncorrupted public officials would.
If recusal were accepted as the sole "remedy” in cases of this nature, the cost of the remedy would be borne solely by the honest public official. The would-be corruptors would be free from liability, as would the public official who yields to the pressure. Whether recusal was mandated in the instant case or not, it provides no substitute for a rule that protects the employee-public servant who refuses to yield to his employer’s corrupting pressure.

 In Tuxedo, a town board member was also a vice-president of an advertising agency that had, as one of its clients, the subsidiary of a company that would be directly affected by a particular ordinance. 418 N.Y.S.2d at 639. Although the member was aware that there was a potential conflict of interest, he refused to disqualify himself and cast the decisive vote on the issue. Ibid. The court annulled the ordinance, finding the council member had violated the spirit of New York's municipal conflict-of-interests law. Id. at 640. Tuxedo suggests that the fact that Weichert was only "indirectly” interested in the outcome of MacDougall's vote may be irrelevant.

 MacDougall chose to bring his action under Pierce, and in so doing, foreclosed any potential cause of action under CEPA. See N.J.S.A. 34:19-8; Young v. Schering Corp., 275 N.J.Super. 221, 238-39, 645 A.2d 1238 (App.Div.1994).

 The Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 1501-1508, 7321-7326, lends further support to my position. Although the Act places some limits on federal employees in their political activities, see 5 U.S.C.A. § 7323-7324, it explicitly recognizes that federal employees "should be encouraged to exercise fully, freely, and without fear of penalty or reprisal, and to the extent not expressly prohibited by law, their right to participate or to refrain from participating in the political processes of the Nation," 5 U.S.C.A. § 7321 (emphasis added). The underlying purpose of the Act is to prevent the government (i.e., the employer) from using its economic leverage over its employees to induce them to support the government’s political agenda. See id. The same concerns apply to private employers (although I note that the Hatch Act expressly prohibits federal employees from running for *424partisan political office, see 5 U.S.C.A. § 7323(a)(3), ruling out the precise scenario encountered in the instant case).

 I also note the potential of First Amendment values reflected in the New Jersey Constitution as a potential source of a clear mandate of public policy in this case. Cf. Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894, 898-901 & n. 6 (3d Cir.1983) (considering Pennsylvania Constitution's guarantee of "free communication of thoughts and opinions" as source of clear mandate of public policy).

 The Legislature followed that approach in CEPA. Nowhere is there any suggestion that the individual interest of employee and employer should be balanced to determine the outcome: the remedies of CEPA are triggered upon the occurrence of certain things that have nothing to do with the damage or benefit incurred by the employee or the employer by granting or withholding relief. See Fineman, supra, 272 N.J.Super. at 620, 640 A.2d 1161.

 The rule would cover other similar types of threats and retaliation, including where there are variations in the nature of the demand made upon the employee and of the economic interest of the employer. The former include where the employer fires the employee-public servant for his mere refusal to vote in the employer’s economic interest and where the employer demands the employee recuse himself and the employee refuses. The latter include where the employer's direct economic interest is unrelated to its business, where the employer's family or friends have a direct economic interest, or where the employer’s business associates (not necessarily customers) have a direct economic interest. There are other possible variations that would fit within the core situation covered by the proposed rule. One such scenario is where the customer has not said anything to the employer, but the employer, aware of the risk that its customer will take his business elsewhere as a result of the vote, threatens to discharge (or actually does discharge) the employee-public servant. The employee should still be protected from discharge in that scenario. The interests are no different and any other rule would make it too easy for the employer to escape liability by asserting that its customer never asked it to discharge the employee.