Court Opinion

ID: 9404882
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-26 17:09:53.266872+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:17.297049
License: Public Domain

J-S14008-23

    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    DIEGO JEREMIAS GUZMAN                      :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 672 WDA 2022

         Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 28, 2022
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
             Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0005112-2021

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.:                             FILED: JUNE 26, 2023

        Diego Jeremias Guzman appeals the judgment of sentence entered

following his guilty plea to two counts of simple assault. Guzman claims he

was illegally detained when the trial court ordered he be held in jail without

bail for 6 months while awaiting trial. However, because Guzman failed to file

a petition for specialized review of the bail order, he has waived this claim.

We therefore affirm.

        Because the procedural history is central to the only issue raised on

appeal, we focus on that history. The Commonwealth charged Guzman with

aggravated assault, strangulation, and simple assault after police responded

to a domestic disturbance call.

____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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       On July 2, 2021, Guzman was arraigned and given an unsecured bond.

After failing to appear for his preliminary hearing on July 31, 2021, a bench

warrant was issued for his arrest. On September 7, 2021, the trial court

revoked Guzman’s bond. The Commonwealth subsequently learned that

Guzman was being held in the Beaver County Jail for reasons related to

immigration and filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum

requesting Guzman be transferred to the Allegheny County Jail for a

September 27, 2021 bail hearing.1 See Petition, 9/21/21. Further, the petition

requested that Guzman be held in Allegheny County Jail without bond until

the conclusion of the case. See id. The trial court granted the habeas petition

and Guzman was transported to Allegheny County. See Trial Court Order,

9/21/21.

       The trial court subsequently denied Guzman bail. See Bail Certification,

9/27/21. The certification does not set forth any reasoning for the denial of

bail. There is no indication in the record that a bail hearing was held prior to

the entry of the bail certification. And notably, defense counsel did not enter

an appearance in this case until October 13, 2021.

       The case proceeded through several continuances, with no action on

bail, until Guzman filed a motion to modify bond and vacate the order in early

____________________________________________

1 A writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum is generally accepted to mean an
order directing removal of a prisoner from his current place of incarceration
“in order to prosecute him in the proper jurisdiction wherein the offense was
committed.” U.S. v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 357 (1978).

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March 2022. In this motion, Guzman argued that the September 21, 2021

order created an illegal detention. See Motion, 3/11/22, at ¶ 11. In support,

Guzman claimed his immigration detainer had automatically expired after 48

hours since federal immigration officials had not assumed custody of him. See

id. at ¶ 20. He therefore contended that the trial court erred in summarily

denying bail without first considering the appropriate factors under our Rules

of Criminal Procedure. See id. at ¶ 28. He requested to be released on non-

monetary bail. See id. at ¶¶ 30, 38.

     After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. See Trial Court Order,

3/24/22. Guzman filed a notice of appeal from this order, but this Court

quashed the appeal sua sponte because Guzman “challenged the order

through a notice of appeal rather than a petition for specialized review”

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1762(b)(2). See Commonwealth v. Guzman, 520

WDA 2022 (Pa. Super. filed Nov. 10, 2022) (unpublished order) (citing

Commonwealth v. Carter, 247 A.3d 27, 30 (Pa. Super. 2021) (quashing

appeal where appellant filed a notice of appeal, as opposed to a petition for

specialized review, from an order denying bail pending sentencing and

appeal)).

     On April 28, 2022, Guzman pled guilty to two counts of simple assault

and was sentenced to three to six months’ incarceration, followed by 15

months of probation. Guzman was ordered to be released within 48 hours of

the imposition of sentence. Guzman then filed the instant appeal.

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       On appeal, Guzman raises the following question for our review:

       Whether the motions court erred in denying [] Guzman’s motion
       to modify bond and vacate its order granting the Commonwealth’s
       petition for writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, where the
       Commonwealth’s habeas petition, and the motions court’s order
       granting the same, resulted in [] Guzman suffering an illegal
       detention pursuant to federal immigration law?

Appellant’s Brief, at 6.2

       Guzman restates his claim that the trial court erred in denying his

motion to modify bond and vacate its order granting the Commonwealth’s

habeas petition. See id. at 17, 30. He asserts the trial court erred in revoking

his bail prior to any hearing, based solely on his confinement as an

immigration prisoner in Beaver County Jail. See id. at 28.

       Appellate review of the trial court’s order denying Guzman’s “Motion to

Modify Bond and Vacate Previous Order of Court” is subject to Chapter 16 of

the Rules of Appellate Procedure See Pa.R.A.P. 1610; see also Pa.R.A.P.

1762(b) (“An order relating to bail shall be subject to review pursuant to

Chapter 16.”); Carter, 247 A.3d at 30. Chapter 16 requires appellants to file

a petition for specialized review when seeking appeal from orders subject to

the chapter. Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1602(a), a petition for specialized review

____________________________________________

2 To the extent Guzman seeks relief for any decision other than the denial of
bail, we note that he did not preserve such an issue by first presenting it to
the trial court. As described previously, his motion in the trial court sought
only immediate release on non-monetary bail. As this was the only issue
presented to the trial court, Guzman has waived any argument that he was
entitled to other relief. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).

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must be filed within 30 days after the entry of the order sought to be reviewed.

See Pa.R.A.P. 1602(a).

      As such, Guzman was required to file a petition for specialized review

within 30 days of the entry of the order denying bail modification. As noted

above, he failed to do so.

      Chapter 16 does not specify whether such a failure to timely file a

petition for specialized review results in waiver of a challenge to a bail order.

And, as detailed in Carter, current Chapter 16 was created by amendments

effective in 2020. See Carter, 247 A.3d at 29. Case law filed prior to 2020 is

therefore of limited value in assessing the Supreme Court’s intent as

expressed in Chapter 16. Nonetheless, we conclude that challenges to bail

orders are generally waived if not challenged under Chapter 16 based upon

the language of Chapter 16.

      We acknowledge that appeals from final orders generally permit review

of prior, interlocutory orders in the case. See Betz v. Pneumo Abex LLC, 44

A.3d 27, 54 (Pa. 2012). However, we note that Rule 311 sets forth several

classes of non-final orders from which a party nonetheless has the right to file

an immediate appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)-(f). In turn, Rule 311 specifically

addresses the consequences of a failure to file such an immediate appeal as

of right. See Pa.R.A.P. 311(g). Subsection (g) explicitly provides that such a

failure will not result in waiver except in certain specified circumstances. See

id.

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      Chapter 16 is similar to Rule 311 in that it provides a right to immediate

review of otherwise interlocutory orders. In contrast with Rule 311, though,

Chapter 16 does not include a provision explicitly addressing waiver. Had the

Supreme Court wished to treat Chapter 16 similarly to Rule 311, it would have

included a provision similar to Rule 311(g). The absence of such a provision

indicates an intent to treat Chapter 16 differently. See Carter, 247 A.3d at

30 (“we must assume the omission of such a provision manifests the High

Court’s intent…”).

      Further, the procedure set forth in Chapter 16 evinces the Supreme

Court’s recognition of the time-sensitive nature of a review of an order

addressing bail. To that end, Chapter 16 sets forth an expedited procedure for

placing an issue before this Court for decision. No briefing is permitted; the

petition must “present all contentions and arguments relied on with accuracy,

brevity, and clarity.” Pa.R.A.P. 1603(d). The petition is also strictly limited in

length. See Pa.R.A.P. 1603(e). Any response to the petition must be filed

within 30 days of service of the petition. See Pa.R.A.P. 1605. And the response

is subject to the same strict limitations on length. See id. In other words,

under Chapter 16 it is possible to generate a decision on the merits within 90

days of the entry of the order addressing bail.

      This expedited procedure is necessary to avoid the issue of bail

becoming moot. Pre-trial bail functions as a protection against extended

imprisonment of defendants prior to trial. As such, an appellate court is

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generally incapable of granting a defendant any meaningful relief once

judgment has been rendered.3 See Commonwealth v. Abed, 989 A.2d 23,

28 (Pa. Super. 2010); see also Commonwealth v. Myers, 86 A.3d 286,

293-94 (Pa. Super. 2014). As such, Chapter 16 is designed to prevent bail

claims from being capable of repetition yet evading appellate review. See,

e.g., Abed, 989 A.2d at 28. Here, Guzman implicitly acknowledges the

absence of any concrete remedy in his brief: “Based on the foregoing, Mr.

Guzman … respectfully requests this Honorable Court … afford whatever relief

the law, justice, and fundamental fairness require.” Appellant’s Brief, at 31.

       For these reasons, we infer that a petition for specialized review under

Chapter 16 is required to preserve a claim of trial court error in addressing a

request for pre-trial or pre-sentence bail. As applied here, we conclude

Guzman failed to preserve the sole issue in his appellate brief by failing to file

a petition for specialized review within 30 days of the order denying his motion

to modify bail.

       Judgment of sentence affirmed.

____________________________________________

3 Obviously, an appellate court could still grant relief in the form of bail pending
further appeal to the extent that it is relevant. Here, however, Guzman has
raised no other challenges to his judgment of sentence. Further, there is no
indication that Guzman has requested bail pending further appeal. Finally, we
note that Guzman has not raised a claim that he failed to receive credit against
his sentence for the time he was imprisoned.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 6/26/2023

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