Court Opinion

ID: 9736023
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:40:36.09773+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:03.428812
License: Public Domain

Becker, J.
I concur in the result reached by the majority; i.e., remand for new trial. I must respectfully dissent from the conclusions reached in Divisions I to V.
*339This severe injury to Glenn Yisser, defendant’s employee, occurred while Yisser was attempting to affix metal outlookers and angle irons to the framework of a building then being constructed. Long before the day of the accident responsible employees of both Ipalco and Abild knew that the contemplated work could not be safely accomplished in such close proximity to the 13,000 volt uninsulated electric transmission line that ran near the proposed building. At the instant of injury Yisser was attempting to manipulate an angle iron more than 16 feet in length while sitting in a position that was only four feet two and one-half inches from the transmission line. Why Abild allowed, much less required, their employee to work in that area without having the electric line de-energized or moved, does not appear.
Yisser could not sue his employer for negligence, section 85.20. He could and did sue the electric company, Ipalco. The jury verdict of $215,000 for injuries which included the loss of both arms was settled for $165,000. Costs of defense were $12,-909.79. It is for these combined sums that Ipalco seeks contribution or indemnity from defendant Abild, Yisser’s employer.
I. The majority recognize that the real issue here is the effect of the special defense afforded an employer by section 85.20 of our Workmen’s Compensation Act on a third-party concurrent tort-feasor seeking indemnity or contribution. Does the existence of a special defense eliminate the right to seek contribution or indemnity as between common or joint tort-feasors? The terms concurrent, common and joint will be used hereinafter as synonymous for the purpose of this discussion. See Allied Mutual Casualty Co. v. Long, 252 Iowa 829, 834, 107 N.W.2d 682.
Harper and James, The Law of Torts, section 10.2, page 718:
“Where recovery of contribution is permitted, it is usually held that there must be a common legal liability on the part of the tort-feasor toward the injured person. Common liability is said to come into existence ‘immediately after the acts of the tort-feasors which give rise to the cause of action against them.’ Common liability has been conceived as a liability which is en*340forceable against each tort-feasor individually. However, instances are not uncommon when one of the tort-feasors has at the time of the tort a personal defense against the injured person which negates the possibility of personal legal liability and thus makes common liability a logical impossibility. In that situation, the person compelled to discharge the liability cannot recover contribution from the other whose participation in the tort gave the injured party no cause of action against him. If the purpose of contribution is to make the wrongdoers share the financial burden of their wrong, then the primary element of contribution should he the pa/rticipation of the wrongdoers in acts or omissions which are considered tortious and which result in injury to a third person. The fact that one of the tort-feasors has a personal defense if he were to be sued by the injured pa/rty would seem to be irrelevant.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The foregoing quotation brings us immediately to the core of the subject. Best v. Yerkes, 247 Iowa 800, 77 N.W.2d 23, 60 A. L. R.2d 1354, permits action for contribution between joint tort-feasors where there is no intentional wrong, moral turpitude or concert of action. If the rule allowing contribution between wrongdoers is to be limited to situations where there is common liability, then the equitable reasons for the rule are only partially met. If the purpose of the rule is to allow contribution between wrongdoers because there is common culpability, with common proximate damage resulting, then the allowance of special defenses defeats the purpose of the rule in a substantial number of cases. Such special defenses can have validity as between the common alleged wrongdoers only where the rationale for the special defense applies to the additional situation or relationship.
II. It seems to be the position of plaintiff in this case that with the possible exception of Allied Mutual Casualty Co. v. Long, supra, none of the cases heretofore decided by this court has required us to clearly decide there should be a necessity for common liability (as distinguished from common negligence plus proximate cause). I agree.
Best v. Yerkes, supra, involved no situation which would allow a special defense, hence the term common liability was *341sufficiently synonymous with common fault, or common culpability, to be so used without harm to the results of the case. Despite what we have said in Best v. Yerkes, supra, Hawkeye-Seeurity Ins. Co. v. Lowe Constr. Co., 251 Iowa 27, 99 N.W.2d 421, Allied Mutual Casualty Co. v. Long, supra, and Fane v. Hootman, 254 Iowa 241, 117 N.W.2d 435, and- despite the holding of a majority of the jurisdictions, common liability in its narrow and ultimate sense should not be a prerequisite to contribution between common tort-feasors. We should follow the superior reasoning of the Maine and Pennsylvania jurisdictions in this matter.
Where a defendant is culpably wrong and damages arc proximately caused, but defendant is shielded from his normal legal duty to respond in compensatory damages for reasons of public policy, such shield should be limited to the relationships giving rise to the public policy.
As to Allied Mutual Casualty Co. v. Long, supra, as plaintiff points out there was no allegation in that case that plaintiff’s insured ivas in fact negligent. However, if this is insufficient as a distinguishing factor, then that ease, insofar as it requires common liability, should be overruled.
III. The majority notes Bedell v. Reagan, 159 Maine 292, 297, 192 A.2d 24, 27. There a defendant sought to make a plaintiff-husband a third-party defendant as to the wife’s claim on the ground that he was a negligent participating or joint tort-feasor, the husband urged that his interspousal immunity destroyed the common liability requirement. He could not, therefore, be made a third-party defendant. The Maine court said:
“In an annotation at 19 A. L. R.2d 1003, with supporting authority, is to be found the following reportorial commentary:
“ * * the courts in most of the few cases passing upon the question have denied to a tortfeasor the right to contribution from one whose concurrent negligence produced the injury of the plaintiff in the tort action, where, because of a marital, filial, or other family relationship between such injured person and the tortfeasor against whom contribution is sought, the former had no enforceable right of action against the latter, since the element of common liability of both tortfeasors to the injured *342person, essential to the right of contribution, is lacking in such cases.’
“ ‘The element of common liability of both tortfeasors to the injured person’ has been suffered to become a fetish in the ratio decidendi stated just above. The element should not be a controlling condition or factor when one joint tortfeasor unintentionally and negligently has wrought harm which he is dispensed from righting because of his matrimonial union with the victim but which the other joint tortfeasor not in the marital relation must redress in full to the injured spouse without any equitable right of contribution from the joint tortfeasor spouse. Law is only sensibly formalistic. It is a practical science. It is of the very proper object of equity to prevent the application of a universal legal principle in an eventuality where unconscionable and unjustifiable hardship must otherwise ensue.”
IY. But the majority distinguishes that case from our instant problem because here we deal with a statutory workmen’s compensation defense. Let us examine the statute.
“85.20 Eights of employee exclusive. The rights and remedies provided in this chapter for an employee on account of injury shall be exclusive of all other rights and remedies of such employee, his personal or legal representatives, dependents, or next of kin, at common law or otherwise, on account of such injury; * *
It will be noted that our statute limits the defense to definite named classes; i.e., “such employee, his personal or legal representatives * * * or next of kin.” Why should we now judicially add common or joint tort-feasors to that list?
Let us note the New York statute as quoted in 2 Larson, Workmen’s Compensation, section 76.30, at page 234:
“ ‘The liability of an employer prescribed by the last preceding section shall be exclusive and in place of any other liability whatsoever, to such employee, his personal representatives, husband, parents, dependents or next of kin, or anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages, at common law or otherwise on account of such injury or death * * *.’ ” (Emphasis added.)
Our statute does not contain the phrase “or anyone other*343wise entitled to recover damages.” Where such a broad inelusionary phrase is present the courts might well be constrained to add third-party joint tort-feasors to the classes within the protected orbit. If we follow suit, we read new material into our statute.
American District Telegraph Co. v. Kittleson (8 Cir.), 179 F.2d 946, 952, 953, notes: “ * * a statute will not be construed as taking away a common law right existing at the date of its enactment, unless that result is imperatively required;’ * * *
“We can discover nothing in the lamguage of the Iowa Compensation Act indicating a purpose to abolish common law actions in tort except as between employer and employee. On the contrary, the language of the Act relied on by appellees points the other way.” (Emphasis added.)
The majority now impliedly rejects the reasoning in Kittleson even though such reasoning was specifically approved in Blackford v. Sioux City Dressed Pork, Inc., 254 Iowa 845, 118 N.W.2d 559. Basically Kittleson’s result is correct. The difficulty imposed by this court’s dicta requiring joint liability is avoided since the federal court would not attempt to change this court’s pronouncements on this matter. Kittleson should not be rejected in this summary fashion. Indeed, the legal fiction employed in Kittleson would be unnecessary in the indemnity situation (page 324 of majority opinion) if the need for common liability is eliminated.
Again, in Blunt v. Brown, 225 F. Supp. 326 (S. D. Iowa), the federal court recognized our language requiring joint liability as a prerequisite to the right to contribution. That was another two-car collision situation where an effort was made to join the father-driver as third-party defendant for contribution or indemnity. The effort was defeated because of this court’s language requiring common liability (as distinguished from common culpability). The federal district court followed that language, and reached a result contra to Bedell v. Reagan, supra. It would appear that the Maine court reached the proper result because the historic and logical basis for such defense, whether based on the guest statute or interspousal immunity, is not present in the contribution-indemnity situation. It should not, *344therefore, be extended. Like reasoning applies where the Iowa Workmen’s Compensation statute, section 85.20, is involved.
V. The citation from Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law, 243, section 76.53, must be noted. The citation is to the effect that it is inconsiderate to force courts to speculate about legislative intentions and “The legislature should face squarely the question whether the third party who happens to be so unfortunate as to get tangled up with a compensable injury should, so to speak, individually subsidize the compensation system by bearing alone a burden which normally he could shift to the employer.”
Whatever validity these remarks may have as to the statute cited by Mr. Larson, the citation does not apply here. The legislature did not create the situation by inappropriate language. We create the situation by inappropriate addition to the statute. It is this court that “should face squarely the question whether the third party who happens to be so unfortunate as to get tangled up with a compensable injury should, so to speak, individually subsidize the compensation system by bearing alone a burden which normally he could shift to the employer.”
VI. Since the majority’s opinion at page 320 attempts to balance the arguments for and against the “common liability” rule as applied to situations where workmen’s compensation defenses are a factor, I must, at the risk of unduly extending this dissent, note the arguments there made.
The incongruities which arise from the majority’s discussion seem to be based upon a misinterpretation of both the purpose and the impact of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. An employer cannot “complain with considerable cogency (that) the net result of a rule permitting contribution is to' put money in the employee’s pocket which has left the employer’s pocket in spite of a plain statement that the employer’s liability for a compensable injury shall be limited to compensation payments.” The cogency is lost both in the plain statement of the act (as heretofore observed) and in the factual situation as it normally develops and as it developed here. The fact is that the money is already in the employee’s pocket. The liability of the third-party common tort-feasor is liability for the whole loss and the em*345ployee will receive the full amount of the compensation (either judicially awarded or by compromise settlement) regardless of whether the employer is forced to contribute or not. This is not a matter between the employer and the employee. It is a matter between the employer and a third person.
Further, the anomalous situations envisioned by the majority at page 320 can occur only in specialized cases and equally anomalous situations can occur in other specialized situations to the benefit of the employer.
At Division I, at page 320, the majority asserts that the employer would be better off if the accident resulted solely from his negligence than it would be if it merely concurred with the negligence of another. This is an inaccurate generalization that is true only if the tort recovery is in the neighborhood of double the amount to be paid under the workmen’s compensation schedule. Take a concrete example, Cronk v. Iowa Power and Light Co., 258 Iowa 603, 138 N.W.2d 843. The issues in that death case did not involve workmen’s compensation, but it clearly was a third-party liability case. Trial was to the court resulting in a verdict for plaintiff in the amount of $18,000 (the workmen’s compensation schedule payment allows $14,250 plus $500 burial expense). If the employer in that case had been concurrently negligent and recovery was obtained from the third party, there could be one of several results. No liability for concurrent negligence for contribution; thus employer gets all of his money back (minus attorney fees). The accident costs him nothing except legal expense. Or the principle of contribution could apply. In that event the employer must share the tort liability loss with the third party. Thus the injury probably costs little more than one half of what it would normally cost. Or the indemnity might apply. Then the full loss, in that case about $3250 above the compensation schedule, would fall on the indemnitor. (Medical expenses, which are often substantial, are omitted for the purpose of these illustrations.) The Cronk case is a good example only because the judgment was less than twice the compensation Schedule. The comparative recovery figures could go either way. The statement of the majority erroneously assumes that in all eases the tort liability will exceed the compensation schedule by *346an amount sufficiently high to make contribution detrimental vis-a-vis sole compensation liability to the employer. This may usually be true. It is not invariably true.
But even if the majority’s assumption is correct, what difference should that make ? The law is not promulgated for the sole protection of a given class. If an exemption for the sole protection of a given class is constitutionally justifiable, it should be limited to the situations that give it validity. Otherwise the constitutional question is different from, and much more serious than that dealt with in Hilsinger v. Zimmerman Steel Co., 193 Iowa 708, 187 N.Y. 493, where the constitutionality of our Workmen’s Compensation Law was upheld.
The rights of the independent contractor are equal to the rights of the employer. As to the employer and employee there can be said to be a quid pro quo for immunity from tort liability. But this cannot be said of potential liability between employer and independent contractor in a contribution or indemnity situation growing out of alleged concurrent negligence.
VII. Since we recognize the primary and active negligence principle for indemnity, Rozmajzl v. Northland Greyhound Lines, 242 Iowa 1135, 49 N.W.2d 501, there is sufficient evidence to submit plaintiff’s Count I. Abild was handling the construction as it approached the dangerous electric line. The jury might well conclude that the continuance of work as such building approached the line, failure to notify Ipaleo of the situation, and other charged specifications of negligence, constituted active and primary negligence.
Count II should also have been submitted for reasons set forth herein.
Divisions VI to XII allow Ipaleo to seek indemnity on a theory of tort by breach of contract. This seems to be a tenuous theory under the fact situation here. It appears to be used and approved because of the inequity arising from insistence on presence of joint liability. A different view by the majority in its Divisions I through V might eliminate the need for submission on this tort by breach of contract theory. Except for the finding in Division XII that Ipalco’s negligence was active or primary as a matter of law, I concur. Thus I believe that under *347the circumstances Count III should be resubmitted consistent with the majority opinion’s Divisions VIII, IX and X.
Thornton and Rawlings, JJ., join in this dissent.