Court Opinion

ID: 9963004
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-24 14:07:06.079879+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:14.523808
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
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                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-1740-22

Estate of ALFREDO
PABATAO, by its Administratrix
ANGELA PABATAO, and
Estate of SUSANA PABATAO,
by its Administratrix ANGELA
PABATAO,

          Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

PALISADES MEDICAL CENTER,
HACKENSACK MERIDIAN
HEALTH, ANTHONY J.
PASSANNANTE, JR., M.D.,
BERGEN NEW BRIDGE
MEDICAL CENTER, CAREPLUS
BERGEN, INC., and DEBORAH
VISCONI,

     Defendants-Respondents.
________________________________

                   Submitted March 12, 2024 – Decided April 24, 2024

                   Before Judges Enright and Paganelli.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Bergen County, Docket No. L-4644-21.
            Shay Shailesh Deshpande LLC, attorneys for appellants
            (Shay S. Deshpande, of counsel and on the brief).

            Hardin, Kundla, McKeon and Poletto, PA, attorneys for
            respondents Bergen New Bridge Medical Center,
            Careplus Bergen, Inc., and Deborah Visconi (James L.
            Fant, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

      Plaintiffs Estate of Alfredo Pabatao, by its Administratrix Angela Pabatao,

and Estate of Susana Pabatao, by its Administratrix Angela Pabatao, appeal from

trial court orders dated January 6, 2023, denying their motion to amend their

complaint and dismissing their matter with prejudice.1 We reverse and remand.

      We glean the facts and procedural history from the motion record. In July

2021, plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking survival and wrongful death damages

against defendants. The complaint asserted Alfredo2 died on March 26, 2020,

and Susana died on March 30, 2020, "due to the C[ovid]-19 virus."             The

complaint alleged defendants, plaintiffs' employers, caused plaintiffs to become

infected with the Covid-19 virus, and suffer injury, death, and damages.

1
   During the pendency of the appeal, plaintiffs' claims against Alfredo's
employer—Palisades Medical Center, Hackensack Meridian Health, and
Anthony J. Passannante, Jr., M.D. (Palisades defendants)—were settled.
Therefore, we address the Palisades defendants solely to provide context.
2
  Because decedents share the same surname, we refer to them individually by
their first names for clarity of the record. By doing so, we intend no disrespect.
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Moreover, the complaint alleged defendants' actions caused each plaintiff to

infect the other plaintiff, resulting in their injury, death, and damages.

      In October 2021, Bergen New Bridge Medical Center, Care Plus Bergen,

Inc. and Deborah Visconi (Bergen defendants) filed an answer to the complaint.

In October 2022, the Bergen defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint

for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted," pursuant to Rule

4:6-2(e). On November 18, 2022, the judge executed an order granting the

Bergen defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint, without prejudice.

      In November 2022, the Palisades defendants filed a motion to dismiss the

complaint pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e). The following month, plaintiffs filed a

cross-motion to amend their complaint as to all defendants.

      On January 6, 2023, the motion judge executed an order granting the

Palisades defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint, with prejudice. The same

day, the motion judge executed another order denying plaintiffs' motion to file

the proposed amended complaint.

      In an oral opinion, the motion judge determined:

            Alfredo Pabatao worked in the medical field and he
            caught Covid . . . and he was compensated under the
            Worker's Compensation Law, which is an exclusive
            remedy and there is no showing of an intentional act.

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             . . . [A]nd they would have to show that the act was the
             proximate cause of the injury.

             When you remove a guard from a saw, as [in] the
             Laidlow[3] situation . . . , where it can [be] show[n] that
             there was . . . gross, reckless conduct that didn't actually
             result in . . . the harm, that's one thing.

             Here, there's certainly no showing. We don't know how
             − and that was the . . . issue − you can't prove nor is
             there any proof that can be enunciated as to how and
             what the actual cause of origin was and while using or
             reusing masks may or may not have been it, . . . none
             of this is cognizable.

             And it is also not cognizable because of . . . the law that
             was passed in the State concerning the fact that there
             was no recourse for the Covid infections that people
             were getting and this was unfortunately a pandemic. So
             it is barred by the Laidlow standard.

             With regard to the decedent's wife, now we go even
             further outside the realm of possibility and proximate
             cause.

             . . . [T]o say that because of some issue about reusing a
             mask and then him getting infected, that . . . he got it
             from the fact that the mask was reused, that his wife
             then got it from him, . . . no possibility of that can exist
             as being able to show that by a prima facie case and in
             addition, it is also again, prevented under our law from
             doing so.

             . . . [A]s a matter of law, the causes of action are not
             cognizable.

3
    Laidlow v. Hariton Mach. Co., 170 N.J. 602 (2002).
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            There's nothing here to show anything other than this
            being the tragic result of a pandemic, nor that the
            deficiencies . . . claimed were even a proximate cause
            and certainly that there was no intentional and reckless
            conduct.

                  ....

            And the case need[s] to be dismissed . . . with prejudice
            as there's just no way as a matter of law to surmount
            either the issue of proximate cause, duty or to [vault]
            over the exclusive remedy of the Worker's
            Compensation Act or to now impose liability upon the
            employer for the harm that was apparently caused to the
            wife who somehow got Covid.

      On appeal, plaintiffs cite to Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs.

Corp., 116 N.J. 739 (1989) and Rule 4:9-14 to argue the trial court committed

"reversible error" by denying their motion to amend the complaint before

discovery was completed. We agree.

      We begin our discussion with a review of the principles governing our

analysis. "Rule 4:6-2(e) motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted are reviewed de novo." Baskin v. P.C. Richard &

Son, LLC, 246 N.J. 157, 171 (2021) (citation omitted). Thus, "we owe no

4
  The Rule provides, in part: "A party may amend any pleading as a matter of
course at any time before a responsive pleading is served . . . . Thereafter a
party may amend a pleading only by written consent of the adverse party or by
leave of court which shall be freely given in the interest of justice." R. 4:9-1.

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                                       5
deference to the trial judge's conclusions." State ex rel. Comm'r of Transp. v.

Cherry Hill Mitsubishi, Inc., 439 N.J. Super. 462, 467 (App. Div. 2015) (citation

omitted). In undertaking our review,

            it is essential to canvass the complaint to determine
            whether a cause of action can be found within its four
            corners. In so doing, we must accept the facts asserted
            in the complaint as true. A reviewing court must
            search[] the complaint in depth and with liberality to
            ascertain whether the fundament of a cause of action
            may be gleaned from an obscure statement of claim,
            opportunity being given to amend if necessary.
            Accordingly, all reasonable inferences are given to
            plaintiff. Courts should grant these motions with
            caution and in the rarest instances.

            [Ballinger v. Del. River Port Auth., 311 N.J. Super.
            317, 321-22 (App. Div. 1998) (alteration in original)
            (internal citations and quotations omitted).]

      "At this preliminary stage of the litigation the [c]ourt is not concerned

with the ability of plaintiffs to prove the allegation contained in the complaint."

Printing Mart, 116 N.J. at 746 (citation omitted).       "The examination of a

complaint's allegations of fact required by the aforestated principles should be

one that is at once painstaking and undertaken with a generous and hospitable

approach." Ibid.

      In Laidlow, the New Jersey Supreme Court explained that under our

worker's compensation law "not all conduct by an employer is immune from

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common-law suit." 170 N.J. at 606. For instance, "an employer who causes the

death or injury of an employee by committing an 'intentional wrong' will not be

insulated from common-law suit." Ibid. (quoting N.J.S.A. 34:15-8; Millison v.

E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 101 N.J. 161, 169 (1985)).

      The Court further explained:

            we adopted [the] substantial certainty test for
            intentional wrong, a test encompassing acts that the
            employer knows are substantially certain to produce
            injury even though, strictly speaking, the employer
            does not will that result. . . . [I]n order for an
            employer's act to lose the cloak of immunity of N.J.S.A.
            34:15-8, two conditions must be satisfied: (1) the
            employer must know that his actions are substantially
            certain to result in injury or death to the employee, and
            (2) the resulting injury and the circumstances of its
            infliction on the worker must be (a) more than a fact of
            life of industrial employment and (b) plainly beyond
            anything the Legislature intended the Worker['s]
            Compensation Act to immunize.

            [Id. at 617 (citing Millison, 101 N.J. at 161).]

      In addition, to the Worker's Compensation Act, in response to Covid-19,

the Legislature enacted L. 2020, c. 18 § 1(c), which provides:

            (c.) Notwithstanding the provisions of any law, rule, or
            regulation to the contrary:

                  (1) a health care professional shall not be liable
                  for civil damages for injury or death alleged to
                  have been sustained as a result of an act or
                  omission by the health care professional in the

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      course of providing medical services in support
      of the State's response to the outbreak of
      coronavirus disease during the public health
      emergency and state of emergency declared by
      the Governor in Executive Order 103 of 2020;
      and

      (2) a health care facility or a health care system
      that owns or operates more than one health care
      facility shall not be liable for civil damages for
      injury or death alleged to have been sustained as
      a result of an act or omission by one or more of
      its agents, officers, employees, servants,
      representatives or volunteers, if, and to the
      extent, such agent, officer, employee, servant,
      representative or volunteer is immune from
      liability pursuant to paragraph (1) of this
      subsection.

Immunity shall also include any act or omission
undertaken in good faith by a health care professional
or healthcare facility or a health care system to support
efforts to treat C[ovid]-19 patients and to prevent the
spread of C[ovid]-19 during the public health
emergency and state of emergency declared by the
Governor in Executive Order 103 of 2020, including
but not limited to engaging in telemedicine or
telehealth, and diagnosing or treating patients outside
the normal scope of the health care professional’s
license or practice. The immunity granted pursuant to
this subsection shall not apply to acts or omissions
constituting a crime, actual fraud, actual malice, gross
negligence, recklessness, or willful misconduct, and
shall be retroactive to March 9, 2020.

[(Emphasis added.)]

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                           8
      "Among other things, good faith means 'honesty in belief or purpose' and

'faithfulness to one's duty or obligation.'" State v. Crawley, 187 N.J. 460, 461

n.8 (2006) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 701 (7th ed. 1999)). Actual malice

is defined "as the intentional doing of a wrongful act without just cause or

excuse." Jobes v. Evangelista, 369 N.J. Super. 384, 398 (App. Div. 2004). "The

tort of gross negligence falls on a continuum between ordinary negligence and

recklessness, a continuum that extends onward to intentional conduct."

Steinberg v. Sahara Sam's Oasis, LLC, 226 N.J. 344, 363 (2016) (citations

omitted).

      A trial court "shall, by an opinion or memorandum decision, either written

or oral, find the facts and state its conclusions of law thereon in all actions tried

without a jury, on every motion decided by a written order that is appealable as

of right." R. 1:7-4. "Meaningful appellate review is inhibited unless the judge

sets forth the reasons for his or her opinion. In the absence of reasons, we are

left to conjecture as to what the judge may have had in mind." Salch v. Salch,

240 N.J. Super. 441, 443 (App. Div. 1990). "Naked conclusions do not satisfy

the purpose of R[ule] 1:7-4." Curtis v. Finneran, 83 N.J. 563, 570 (1980).

      Applying these well-established principles to this matter, we are

constrained to reverse the January 6, 2023 orders, and remand with the direction

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                                         9
that plaintiffs be allowed to file a motion to amend their complaint. First, despite

the worker's compensation and Covid statute immunities, a viable cause of

action may be pled. Here, plaintiffs claim Susana was impermissibly excluded

from those employees provided with face masks by the Bergen defendants.

Moreover, plaintiffs allege because of her exclusion, she contracted the Covid-

19 virus and passed away. Plaintiffs assert the Bergen defendants conduct was

so egregious as to nullify the worker's compensation and Covid immunity

statutes. Given these facts and considering the Rule 4:6-2(e) standard, we are

satisfied the judge erred in granting the motion to dismiss.

      Second, the motion judge's analysis exceeded the limited scope of Rule

4:6-2(e). The judge did not limit his analysis to whether the amended complaint

offered a "fundament of a cause of action." Instead, the judge concluded there

were no intentional acts or reckless conduct, and that plaintiffs could not

establish causation. The judge's findings addressed plaintiffs' ability to prove

their cause of action, a consideration unnecessary under Rule 4:6-2(e). See

Printing Mart, 116 N.J. at 746

      Lastly, the judge's analysis failed to comply with Rule 1:7-4 regarding

Susana's claim she was impermissibly excluded from those employees provided

with face masks by the Bergen defendants. Indeed, the judge's opinion was

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                                        10
silent as to Susana's direct claim against the Bergen defendants. Instead, the

judge focused on Alfredo's allegation the Palisades defendants compelled him

to "reuse masks and gowns" and whether Susana could prove her injuries were

proximately caused thereby.      In the absence of an analysis of Susana's

allegations, we are unable to engage in meaningful review.

      To the extent we have not addressed any of plaintiffs' remaining

arguments, we conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a

written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

      We do not retain jurisdiction.

      Reversed and remanded.

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