Court Opinion

ID: 9962089
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-22 17:06:00.421956+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:49.842406
License: Public Domain

This decision of the New Mexico Court of Appeals was not selected for publication in
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          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

No. A-1-CA-40700

PERLA A. MONTES,

       Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

LUIS URIEL MANRIQUEZ,

       Respondent-Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF LEA COUNTY
Michael H. Stone, District Court Judge

Law Office of Ross R. Bettis
Ross R. Bettis
Hobbs, NM

for Appellant

The Sawyers Law Group, LLC
Melissa A. Sawyers
Hobbs, NM

for Appellee

                               MEMORANDUM OPINION

YOHALEM, Judge.

{1}     In this divorce case, Petitioner Perla A. Montes (Mother) appeals from the district
court’s initial custody determination and the parenting plan concerning the parties’ two
children (collectively, Children). Mother filed for divorce from Respondent Luis Uriel
Manriquez (Father) in October 2021. Because custody of Children was contested, the
district court appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL) in January 2022, under Rule 1-053.3
NMRA, to conduct an investigation and to provide the court with recommendations on
custody and a parenting plan that would be in Children’s best interest. The GAL
recommended that the parties share joint legal custody of Children, with Father having
primary physical custody and Mother having substantial periods of responsibility for
Children’s care. In August 2022, the district court held an evidentiary hearing to
consider the parties’ objections to the GAL’s recommendations. Both parents and the
GAL testified at that hearing and the GAL’s report and recommendations were
introduced into evidence. At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court made oral
findings, explaining the court’s reasons for adopting the GAL’s recommendations, and
issued a written decree of dissolution that included a parenting plan and child support.
Mother appeals. She challenges the district court’s award of primary physical custody of
Children to Father, arguing that (1) the district court erred in failing to make
particularized findings on each of the factors the Legislature has found to be relevant to
Children’s best interests in NMSA 1978, Sections 40-4-9(A) (1977) and -9.1(B) (1999);
(2) the district court’s finding that it was in Children’s best interest that Father have
primary physical custody of Children was not supported by substantial evidence in the
record at the hearing; and (3) the court abused its discretion in adopting the GAL’s
recommendations, with only a few changes, rather than preparing its own findings of
facts and conclusions. Not persuaded by Mother’s arguments, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

{2}     Mother and Father have two children, a son and a daughter. At the time of the
hearing in August 2022, their son was six years old and had started school, and their
daughter was five years old and about to begin kindergarten. The parties were married
in late June 2017. Mother and Father relocated several times between Hobbs, New
Mexico, and Odessa, Texas both before their marriage and in the year following their
marriage, from April 2016 until they separated in May 2018. When they separated,
Father stayed in Odessa where the couple had been living with Children prior to the
separation. Mother and Children moved to Mother’s parents’ home in Hobbs, which is
an hour and a half drive from Odessa.

{3}    Mother’s minor half-brother lived in the home, along with Mother’s parents,
Mother, and Children. In September 2021, Father reported to the police that his
daughter had disclosed that Mother’s half-brother had sexually abused her. The
Children, Youth, and Families Department (CYFD) investigated and substantiated the
allegation. Finding that Mother had delayed reporting the incident for six months, while
she and Children continued to live in her parents’ home with her half-brother, CYFD
issued a temporary custody order placing Children in Father’s home in Odessa.

{4}     Mother moved out of her parents’ home shortly after Children were placed in
Father’s temporary custody. She filed for divorce on October 15, 2021, and sought
visitation with Children by motion. After a hearing on Mother’s motion, the district court
issued an order outlining an interim visitation schedule in which Children stayed with
Mother in Hobbs every other weekend. Mother was forbidden to allow any contact
between Children and Mother’s half-brother. The district court appointed a GAL,
pursuant to Rule 1-053.3, to assist the court in determining Children’s best interests for
purposes of a permanent custody order and parenting plan. On July 28, 2022, the GAL
submitted his recommendation that the district court award the parties joint legal
custody of Children, with Father having primary physical custody and Mother having
substantial periods of responsibility on weekends, school holidays, and during school
vacations.

{5}     The merits hearing occurred on August 8, 2022. Mother, Father, and the GAL
testified. The district court admitted into evidence the GAL’s report of his investigation,
which included interviews with both parents and observations of Children. According to
Father, son was excelling academically in school and daughter was going to start
school soon. Because Father was working forty to sixty hours a week as a flatbed truck
driver, he shared caregiving responsibilities with his mother (paternal grandmother),
who lives in Odessa, twenty minutes from him. Father’s son would take the bus to
paternal grandmother’s residence after school, where Children remained until Father
picked them up after work, and Father and Children stayed there overnight once or
twice a week.

{6}    Mother had begun working in April 2022 for a sports bar in Carlsbad, New
Mexico, doing advertising and marketing. That job required her to commute from her
home in Hobbs, which was approximately an hour away, two to three times a week. She
worked remotely from home on the other days. Mother testified that she had not
provided child support to Father even though Children were in his primary physical
custody. Mother admitted on cross-examination that she received government benefits
on Children’s behalf, even though they were no longer in her custody.

{7}     The GAL testified positively about both Mother and Father, stating that he likely
would have recommended equally shared physical custody if Mother and Father lived in
the same city. With both Children in school and the drive between Odessa and Hobbs
nearly an hour and a half, the GAL did not find fifty-fifty physical custody to be in
Children’s best interest. The GAL explained that his recommendation to award primary
physical custody to Father rather than Mother, was influenced by Mother’s response to
daughter’s sexual abuse. Mother knew of the abuse in March 2021, but did not report it
to CYFD until September 2021 and did not move out of her parents’ home until after
CYFD removed Children to Father’s home. Mother relocated to Roswell, New Mexico
for four months, and then moved to her own apartment in Hobbs, where she was living
at the time of the hearing.

{8}    The GAL testified that he had drafted his recommendations believing that Father
did not know about daughter’s abuse until late August 2021. Father’s testimony at the
hearing revealed that he had been told about the abuse by Mother in March 2021, and
had delayed reporting the abuse waiting for Mother to act. The GAL was concerned
about Father’s delay, admitting that this new information made his recommendation as
to which parent would have primary physical custody a “closer call.”

{9}   At the conclusion of the three-hour long hearing, the district court gave a lengthy
explanation of its decision to adopt the GAL’s recommendations as to legal and physical
custody, granting parents joint legal custody of Children, and awarding primary physical
custody to Father. The district court found that both Mother and Father “care greatly” for
Children, emphasizing that primary physical custody was a close call. The court
suggested that if both parents lived in the same city, it would likely have awarded joint
legal and equal physical custody and indicated a willingness to reconsider the custody
arrangement if parents’ locations changed.

{10} The district court’s oral ruling described the following facts as dispositive of the
court’s custody determination: (1) “Mother allowed the alleged sexual predator victim to
remain in the home with no report,” and even though Father also waited several months
to report the abuse, the court credited Father’s testimony that he waited, expecting
Mother and her family would act; and (2) “[Mother’s] untruthfulness . . . [about] where
Children resided” for the purpose of continuing to receive government assistance on
behalf of Children even though they were not in her custody.

{11} The district court found that both Mother and Father would require assistance
from grandparents in caring for Children while they work—Mother because she
commuted from her home in Hobbs to her job in Carlsbad several times a week and
Father because he worked long hours. Mother presented testimony at the hearing that
Children slept on the floor in their paternal grandparents’ home during the week, and
claimed that Mother’s situation with help from her parents was superior to Father’s, and
in Children’s best interest because Mother had an apartment where each child has their
own room, and her job was flexible and allowed Children to be at home when they were
not in school. The district court indicated it weighed both parents’ circumstances equally
as to the arrangements they made for substitute care.

{12} The district court added to the parenting plan a requirement that Children receive
all vaccinations because (1) Mother and Father could not reach agreement, (2) Children
would attend public school, and (3) there was no reason to believe vaccinations would
harm Children. The district court’s ruling was memorialized in the decree of dissolution,
which is the final order from which Mother appeals.

DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

{13} “We review a district court’s child custody determination for abuse of discretion.”
Hough v. Brooks, 2017-NMCA-050, ¶ 18, 399 P.3d 387; see Ridgway v. Ridgway,
1980-NMSC-055, ¶ 10, 94 N.M. 345, 610 P.2d 749 (“The determination of the trial
judge, who saw the parties, observed their demeanor and heard the testimony will not
be overturned absent a manifest abuse of discretion.”). “An abuse of discretion occurs
when a ruling is clearly contrary to the logical conclusions demanded by the facts and
circumstances of the case.” Hough, 2017-NMCA-050, ¶ 18 (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).

{14} In child custody cases, the paramount concern is the best interests of the
children. See id. ¶ 28. Under the best interests analysis, the district court possesses
“considerable discretion” as long as it is “consistent with the evidence and statutory
requirements.” Id. ¶ 30 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[District] courts
are vested with broad discretion and great flexibility in fashioning custody arrangements
and parenting plans that will serve the best interests of the children.” Rhinehart v.
Nowlin, 1990-NMCA-136, ¶ 47, 111 N.M. 319, 805 P.2d 88.

I.     The District Court Made Particularized Findings Supporting Its Best
       Interests Analysis and Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Granting Primary
       Physical Custody to Father

{15} Mother first argues that the district court abused its discretion when it failed to
make particularized findings “related to the statutorily mandated factors relevant to a
determination of [C]hildren’s best interest” under Sections 40-4-9(A) and -9.1(B). We
disagree and explain.

{16} Section 40-4-9(A) and -9.1(B) respectively require the district court to consider
“all relevant factors” in its best interests analysis, and to consider nine additional factors
when deciding whether to award joint legal custody. The court is not required to “make
point-by-point findings to correspond to the statutory factors,” but it must “sufficiently
track[] the factors, indicating that the court considered them in making its decision.”
Thomas v. Thomas, 1999-NMCA-135, ¶ 16, 128 N.M. 177, 991 P.2d 7. When the
district court makes verbal findings, “the reviewing court may consider [them] . . . in
order to clarify or discern the basis for the order or action of the court below.” Jeantete
v. Jeantete, 1990-NMCA-138, ¶ 11, 111 N.M. 417, 806 P.2d 66; see Burris-Awalt v.
Knowles, 2010-NMCA-083, ¶ 10, 148 N.M. 616, 241 P.3d 617 (holding that failure to
enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in writing with the final order is “not fatal if
the findings and conclusions are part of the transcript on appeal”).

{17}   The applicable statutory factors under Section 40-4-9(A) are the following

              (1)    the wishes of the child’s parent or parents as to his custody;

              (2)    the wishes of the child as to his custodian;

               (3)    the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his
       parents, his siblings and any other person who may significantly affect the
       child’s best interest;

              (4)    the child’s adjustment to his home, school and community;
       and

              (5)    the mental and physical health of all individuals involved.

The applicable statutory factors under Section 40-4-9.1(B) are the following
            (1)    whether the child has established a close relationship with
      each parent;

              (2)    whether each parent is capable of providing adequate care
      for the child throughout each period of responsibility, including arranging
      for the child’s care by others as needed;

             (3)    whether each parent is willing to accept all responsibilities of
      parenting, including a willingness to accept care of the child at specified
      times and to relinquish care to the other parent at specified times;

             (4)    whether the child can best maintain and strengthen a
      relationship with both parents through predictable, frequent contact and
      whether the child’s development will profit from such involvement and
      influence from both parents;

            (5)      whether each parent is able to allow the other to provide
      care without intrusion, that is, to respect the other’s parental rights and
      responsibilities and right to privacy;

              (6)    the suitability of a parenting plan for the implementation of
      joint custody, preferably, although not necessarily, one arrived at through
      parental agreement;

             (7)    geographic distance between the parents’ residences;

            (8)    willingness or ability of the parents to communicate,
      cooperate or agree on issues regarding the child’s needs; and

             (9)    whether a judicial adjudication has been made in a prior or
      the present proceeding that either parent or other person seeking custody
      has engaged in one or more acts of domestic abuse against the child, a
      parent of the child or other household member. If a determination is made
      that domestic abuse has occurred, the court shall set forth findings that
      the custody or visitation ordered by the court adequately protects the child,
      the abused parent or other household member.

{18} The district court’s written decree of dissolution did not make point-by-point
findings. It is framed as an order, and includes only the court’s decision on custody and
the parenting plan adopted by the court, as well as orders on the dissolution of the
marriage and child support. However, the detailed oral ruling following the evidentiary
hearing on Mother’s objections to the GAL’s recommendations did track the relevant
statutory factors. We note that a number of factors were not in dispute: neither party
claimed that the other interfered with transfers of custody; that they could not
communicate and cooperate in meeting Children’s needs; that they were both able to
adequately care for Children; and that Children had a close relationship with both
parents. Indeed, it does not appear that either party opposed joint legal custody. The
district court’s finding that both parents had shown they could make adequate
arrangements for the care of Children when they were working is challenged by Mother.
That finding and the evidence supporting it are discussed below. The GAL found
Children too young to be able to express a choice between the two parents’ homes but
it did not appear that they had a strong preference towards either parent, so that factor
was not relevant. The district court found as to most of the factors that there was no
clear choice as to which parent’s primary custody was in Children’s best interest.

{19} Faced with choosing one parent who would have primary custody given the
distance between the parents’ homes, the district court highlighted two findings of fact
that significantly influenced its award of primary physical custody to Father (1) Mother’s
failure to report their daughter’s sexual abuse for six months, while continuing to live
with Children in the same home as the half-brother who had sexually abused their
daughter; and (2) Mother’s acceptance of government assistance she was no longer
entitled to receive. The district court concluded from this behavior that Mother had
demonstrated a concerning “propensity to see things her way and not maybe the
reality.”

{20} We find it entirely reasonable for the district court in making this difficult choice to
rely on concerns about conduct by Mother in the past, which appeared to the court to
value Mother’s convenience and her finances (in continuing to live with her parents and
in continuing to improperly, and perhaps illegally, receive government money), without
seeing the potential impact of her choices on Children. We find no abuse of discretion in
the district court’s reliance on Mother’s conduct in these two instances, together with the
evidence that Children were thriving in their current placement with Father, to make the
decision to award Father primary physical custody.

{21} We therefore hold that the district court made adequate findings and did not
abuse its discretion in evaluating and weighing the relevant statutory factors and
determining based on those factors that Father should have primary physical custody of
Children.

II.    Substantial Evidence Supports the District Court’s Finding Regarding
       Father’s Ability To Provide Adequate Care

{22} Mother next argues that the district court’s finding that Father could provide
“adequate care for [Children] throughout each period of responsibility, including
arranging for [Children]’s care by others as needed,” § 40-4-9.1(B)(2), is not supported
by substantial evidence in the record. Mother contends that the evidence conclusively
showed that Children were not being adequately cared for by their paternal
grandparents, who were taking care of Children after school while Father was working.
Mother claims that there is no evidence in the record supporting the district court’s
finding that the substitute care arrangements made by Father with grandparents were
adequate.
{23} We will uphold a district court’s custody findings if they are supported by
substantial evidence. Grant v. Cumiford, 2005-NMCA-058, ¶ 13, 137 N.M. 485,
112 P.3d 1142. “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind
would find adequate to support a conclusion.” Hough, 2017-NMCA-050, ¶ 18 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). “If the evidence shows that the [district] court’s
decision is based on reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence, so that it can be
said that a reasonable person might have reached the same conclusion, the trial court’s
decision should be affirmed.” Brito v. Brito, 1990-NMCA-062, ¶ 16, 110 N.M. 276, 794
P.2d 1205. The district court’s finding that Father arranged for adequate care for
Children while he was working is supported by substantial evidence.

{24} The evidence shows that Father made the decision that it was in Children’s best
interest to be cared for by relatives while he was at work. Father testified that his
mother’s home was near his son’s school. Father’s son would have a much shorter ride
to school in the morning than from his house, and could take the bus directly to Father’s
mother’s house at the end of the school day.

{25} Children had been living primarily with Father, and grandparents had been taking
care of Children for nearly a year at the time of the hearing. Children appeared healthy
and content in their current environment. Father testified that his son was doing well in
school, and the GAL reported that he saw no evidence of Children’s inability to adjust to
their home in Odessa. This constitutes substantial evidence to support a determination
that the care being provided by Father and grandmother was adequate to meet
Children’s needs, and indeed, was the best available alternative.

{26} Mother focuses on evidence that Children and Father slept overnight some
nights at grandmother’s home so that Children could more easily get to school in the
morning. Mother claims that the fact that Children slept on grandmother’s living room
floor with Father on those nights conclusively shows that the care provided to Children
by Father and grandmother was inadequate. We do not agree.

{27} Both the statutory factors to consider in determining a child’s best interests in a
divorce, and our common law concerning a child’s best interests, values a child’s
relationship with their parents and other family members above a comparison of the
material facilities each parent can provide. See Shorty v. Scott, 1975-NMSC-030, ¶ 11
n.9, 87 N.M. 490, 535 P.2d 1341 (stating that the parent-child relationship is a more
important consideration in determining the best interest of a child than “material and
economic factors,” and someone’s ability to provide better facilities to the child is not an
important consideration (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). The positive
evidence concerning Children’s adjustment to their home, school, and community
during their time living primarily with Father, of their comfort with grandmother, and of
the practical advantages of taking the school bus to and from grandmother’s house one
or two nights a week constitutes substantial evidence in the record supporting the
district court’s finding that Father could provide “adequate care for [Children] throughout
each period of responsibility, including arranging for [Children]’s care by others as
needed.” See § 40-4-9.1. We are not persuaded by Mother’s claim of error.
III.   The District Court Properly Adopted the GAL’s Recommendations

{28} Finally, Mother argues that the district court improperly adopted the GAL’s
recommendations instead of preparing its own findings of facts and conclusions of law.
We disagree.

{29} According to Rule 1-053.3(A), the district court may appoint a GAL whenever the
“custody of minor children is contested” by any party in a divorce proceeding. A GAL
“provides independent services without being bound by the child’s or another party’s
directives or objectives.” Kimbrell v. Kimbrell, 2014-NMSC-027, ¶ 10, 331 P.3d 915. The
GAL is charged with making “findings and recommendations to the court regarding the
best interests of the child.” Id. Although the district court is not permitted to “delegate the
ultimate determination of the child’s best interests,” § 1-053.3(D), to the GAL, the district
court does not improperly “abdicate its decision-making responsibility” if it adopts the
GAL’s recommendations. Thomas, 1999-NMCA-135, ¶ 25. Rule 1-053.3(A) states that
“[t]he [GAL] serves as an arm of the court and assists the court in discharging its duty to
adjudicate the child’s best interests.” The GAL is charged with performing an
investigation that the district court is unable to conduct on its own, and preparing
recommendations.

{30} The fact that the district court adopts the GAL’s recommendations with few
changes does not demonstrate that the court has abdicated its decision-making
responsibility. Where the district court has stated its findings and its reasons for
accepting the GAL’s recommendations, as it has in this case, the adoption of the GAL’s
recommendations achieves the purpose of Rule 1-053.3: to provide meaningful
assistance to the district court in carrying out the court’s responsibilities.

CONCLUSION

{31} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the custody order and parenting plan
adopted by the district court.

{32}   IT IS SO ORDERED.

JANE B. YOHALEM, Judge

WE CONCUR:

JACQUELINE R. MEDINA, Judge

ZACHARY A. IVES, Judge