Court Opinion

ID: 9928826
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-31 22:11:03.785833+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:54:47.399437
License: Public Domain

J-S47020-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  DARREN LYNN SCOTT                            :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 3202 EDA 2022

    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 16, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-23-CR-0003871-2020

BEFORE:      STABILE, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM PER CURIAM:                                FILED JANUARY 24, 2024

       Darren Scott appeals from the judgment of sentence entered following

his conviction for harassment. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2709(a)(1). We affirm.

       This case began on June 7, 2020, in the kitchen of Mr. Scott’s house.

Gennivea Ware was speaking loudly with Mr. Scott’s wife, Precious Scott; Mr.

Scott struck Ms. Ware in the face. Police responded and charged Mr. Scott

with simple assault and harassment. The charges were held for court.

       Mr. Scott’s case remained pending for over two years. Mr. Scott failed

to appear at several status conferences, providing different reasons through

counsel. See, e.g., N.T., 1/6/21, at 3 (self-quarantine); N.T., 1/26/21, at 3

(unknown); N.T., 4/19/21, at 3–4 (no transportation); N.T., 8/20/21, at 3–4

(health issues); N.T., 10/25/21, at 3 (unknown); N.T., 1/7/22, at 3 (surgery);

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S47020-23

N.T., 1/18/22 (Covid test); N.T., 2/8/22, at 6–7 (delayed for a doctor

appointment).

      When Mr. Scott was present, the trial court noted his behavior as

argumentative and disruptive. Trial Court Opinion, 5/23/23, at 2; see, e.g.,

N.T., 5/24/21, at 4; N.T., 2/8/22, at 14–20; N.T., 7/14/22, at 21–36. Mr.

Scott’s first attorney moved to withdraw on July 22, 2021, citing an

irreconcilable breakdown in communication. The trial court heard the motion

on September 13, 2021, granted it, and appointed new counsel. On November

4, 2021, the trial court appointed a third attorney to represent Mr. Scott.

      At a status conference on July 14, 2022, Mr. Scott addressed the trial

court regarding previously litigated motions. N.T., 7/14/22, at 21–36. At the

end of the proceeding, Mr. Scott indicated dissatisfaction with the work of his

appointed counsel.   Id. at 49–51.    He then stated his desire to represent

himself, which the trial court implicitly denied at the end of the proceeding:

      MR. SCOTT: Me and [defense counsel] has -- this is the
      conversations. Last night we talked for an hour. To this date right
      now, just me and you speaking, [defense counsel] has never
      asked me what happened or tried to let me be involved in my
      defense. He has not asked me what happened yet. I told him last
      night three times, I said, you didn’t even ask me what happened
      yet. So how is going to represent me and he don’t even know
      what happened? He don’t even know my side of the story. How’s
      he going to do that, Your Honor, on record -- while we on record?
      He never asked me what happened. Not once.

      [Defense counsel]: Your Honor, Defense will be prepared for July
      19th.

      THE COURT: Thank you.

      MR. SCOTT: So...

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      THE COURT: July...

      [Defense counsel]: 19th, I thought, right?

      THE COURT: Huh?

      MR. GOLD: Yeah, July 19th.

      MR. SCOTT: Your Honor, you didn’t answer me.

      THE COURT: Yes, that is correct. I didn’t hear you correctly at
      first. I thought you said the 9th, that’s why I paused. Yeah.
      Thank you.

      MR. SCOTT: Okay. I do want to represent myself, Your Honor.
      Whatever’s going on. I do.

      THE COURT: [Defense counsel], you’re still the attorney of record.

Id. at 50–52.

      On July 19, 2022, Mr. Scott and counsel appeared. Mr. Scott continued

to complain about the adequacy of his representation but did not indicate on

the record that he wished to represent himself. See N.T., 7/19/22, at 10–11.

      On October 24, 2022, the day before jury selection, Mr. Scott spoke to

the trial court, complaining that his attorney had not interviewed witnesses or

asked him what happened. N.T., 10/24/22, at 5–6. Defense counsel stated

that Mr. Scott had hung up when he tried to call him. Id. at 7. After a long

discussion about Mr. Scott’s complaint, Mr. Scott said he did not want to go

to trial with his attorney. Id. at 18–19. He did not move to represent himself

in court at this time. Id.

      The morning of October 25, 2022, defense counsel stated that Mr. Scott

told him after the previous proceeding that he wanted to represent himself.

N.T., 10/25/22, at 3–4. According to defense counsel, Mr. Scott was already

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on the bus from the courthouse by that time. Id. The trial court inquired of

Mr. Scott:

     THE COURT: Well, the trial is scheduled for today at two o’clock,
     okay, to pick a jury. All right. And we will continue until a verdict
     is reached later this week. So, Mr. Scott, you understand the
     trial’s going forward?

     MR. SCOTT: Yes.

     THE COURT: All right. And you’re telling me you wish to represent
     yourself?

     MR. SCOTT: Yes.

     THE COURT: Have you ever represented yourself before?

     MR. SCOTT: Yes.

     THE COURT: When?

     MR. SCOTT: A couple years ago in front of Judge Bradley I believe.

     THE COURT: And what was the result in that case?

     MR. SCOTT: Not guilty, a jury trial.

     THE COURT: You represented yourself in a jury trial and you were
     acquitted?

     MR. SCOTT: Yes, he . . . appointed Guy Smith as standby counsel.

                                     ...

     THE COURT: Okay. And you’re telling me you were acquitted in
     that case?

     MR. SCOTT: Yes, it was in the newspaper.

     THE COURT: Found not guilty?

     MR. SCOTT: It was in the newspaper.

     THE COURT: Well, I understand but you know I don’t --

     MR. SCOTT: In this day and age you Google things.

     THE COURT: -- have a photographic memory.

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      MR. SCOTT: Right. But in this day and age you Google.

      THE COURT: I don’t know if I read it.

      MR. SCOTT: You can Google my name and it will pop up.

      THE COURT: Okay, all right. We’re on the eve of trial. I’m not
      going to allow Mr. Scott to represent himself. Based on my
      observation of him throughout this case I don’t believe he’s
      capable of representing himself.

N.T., 10/25/22, at 5–7.

      Mr. Scott continued to assert his right to represent himself, complaining

about his attorney’s lack of preparation. The trial court continued to refuse

Mr. Scott’s request. Despite receiving notice in open court, Mr. Scott did not

appear for jury selection that afternoon.

      Trial occurred on October 26, 2022. Mr. Scott again failed to appear,

despite being told when trial would occur. At trial, Ms. Ware testified that

when she was in Mr. Scott’s kitchen on June 7, 2020, “[h]e came up and

snuffed me and hit me.” N.T., 10/26/22, at 41. Ms. Ware explained that Mr.

Scott forcibly hit her in the face with a closed fist. Id. at 43.

      Janet Purnell, who had also been in the kitchen, explained that Mr. Scott

had told Ms. Ware to lower her voice. Id. at 59. Ms. Purnell testified that

when Ms. Ware was talking to Ms. Scott, Mr. Scott “came into the kitchen and

said to [Ms. Ware, ‘]why is you in my wife’s face[?’] And then all of a sudden

he just punched her.” Id. at 60.

      The jury acquitted Mr. Scott of simple assault, but the trial court found

Mr. Scott guilty of harassment.      On November 16, 2022, the trial court

sentenced Mr. Scott to 30 days in jail, 60 days of probation, and an anger

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management program.         Mr. Scott timely appealed.       New counsel was

appointed for appeal. Mr. Scott and the trial court complied with Pennsylvania

Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925.

      Mr. Scott presents three issues in this appeal:

      1. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in denying
         [Mr. Scott’s] request to proceed pro se, where the request was
         timely and unequivocal, without conducting a colloquy as
         required by Pa.R.Crim.P. 121 and applicable appellate caselaw.

      2. Whether [Mr. Scott] was denied his right under the Sixth
         Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1
         Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, as a result of the
         trial court’s denial of [Mr. Scott’s] request to represent himself
         at trial.

      3. Whether the conviction of the summary offense of Harassment
         was based on insufficient evidence, where evidence introduced
         at trial failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
         [Mr. Scott] acted with intent to harass, annoy or alarm.

Scott’s Brief at 4.

      Mr. Scott’s first two issues concern the trial court’s denial of his oral

motion to represent himself the day of jury selection. He argues that the trial

court violated the rules of criminal procedure by denying his timely motion

without conducting a full colloquy. Further, Mr. Scott argues that the trial

court violated his constitutional rights by denying his request to proceed pro

se, which he asserts was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.

      Under the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions, a criminal

defendant has “an affirmative right of self-representation.”         Faretta v.

California, 422 U.S. 806, 813–17 (1975); see U.S. Const. Amend. VI; Pa.

Const. Art. I § 9. To validly waive the right to counsel, a defendant must

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make a timely, unequivocal request. Commonwealth v. El, 977 A.2d 1158,

1163 (Pa. 2009).

      By rule, a trial court must inquire into six areas before finding that a

defendant’s request to proceed pro se is valid:

      (A) Generally.

      (1) The defendant may waive the right to be represented by
      counsel.

      (2) To ensure that the defendant’s waiver of the right to counsel
      is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, the judge or issuing
      authority, at a minimum, shall elicit the following information from
      the defendant:

            (a) that the defendant understands that he or she has the
            right to be represented by counsel, and the right to have
            free counsel appointed if the defendant is indigent;

            (b) that the defendant understands the nature of the
            charges against the defendant and the elements of each of
            those charges;

            (c) that the defendant is aware of the permissible range of
            sentences and/or fines for the offenses charged;

            (d) that the defendant understands that if he or she waives
            the right to counsel, the defendant will still be bound by all
            the normal rules of procedure and that counsel would be
            familiar with these rules;

            (e) that the defendant understands that there are possible
            defenses to these charges that counsel might be aware of,
            and if these defenses are not raised at trial, they may be
            lost permanently; and

            (f) that the defendant understands that, in addition to
            defenses, the defendant has many rights that, if not timely
            asserted, may be lost permanently; and that if errors occur
            and are not timely objected to, or otherwise timely raised
            by the defendant, these errors may be lost permanently.

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     (3) The judge or issuing authority may permit the attorney for the
     Commonwealth or defendant’s attorney to conduct the
     examination of the defendant pursuant to paragraph (A)(2). The
     judge or issuing authority shall be present during this
     examination.

                                    ...

     (C) Proceedings Before a Judge. When the defendant seeks to
     waive the right to counsel after the preliminary hearing, the judge
     shall ascertain from the defendant, on the record, whether this is
     a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of counsel.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 121.   The trial court must conduct a colloquy under this rule

before granting a defendant’s request to waive counsel. Commonwealth v.

Phillips, 93 A.3d 847, 853–54 (Pa. Super. 2014).

     However, as the trial court found in this case, a criminal defendant may

forfeit the right to self-representation despite making an otherwise valid,

timely request to proceed pro se. Commonwealth v. Green, 149 A.3d 43,

58–59 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citing Commonwealth v. Africa, 353 A.2d 855,

864 (Pa. 1976)); see Trial Court Opinion, 5/23/23, at 4. The Supreme Court

of Pennsylvania has explained:

     “The right to self-representation . . . is not absolute.”
     Commonwealth v. Brooks, 104 A.3d 466, 474 (Pa. 2014). In
     Faretta, the High Court recognized that a defendant may forfeit
     his right to self-representation. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46
     (trial court “may terminate self-representation by a defendant
     who deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist
     misconduct[;] ... self-representation is not a license to abuse the
     dignity of the courtroom” or to fail to “comply with relevant rules
     of procedural and substantive law”). The California Supreme
     Court, for example, has held Faretta does not limit the “serious
     and obstructionist misconduct” potentially supporting a finding of
     forfeiture, to behavior occurring in the courtroom. See, e.g.,
     People v. Carson, 104 P.3d 837, 840 (Cal. 2005), citing Faretta,
     422 U.S. at 834 n.46. We find this approach persuasive. Although

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       trial may be the central event in a criminal prosecution, we
       recognize it is the culmination of many weeks or months of
       preparation and related proceedings, not all of which take place in
       the courtroom; accordingly, misbehavior affecting the right to
       self-representation is not restricted to the courtroom and the
       “relevant rules of procedure and substantive law” are not limited
       to those occurring only in the trial itself. Id. at 841, quoting
       Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46. Ultimately, it is the effect and not
       the location of the misconduct and its impact on the core integrity
       of the trial that will determine whether forfeiture is warranted. Id.

Commonwealth v. Tighe, 224 A.3d 1268, 1280 (Pa. 2020) (plurality)

(citation format altered).

       For example, this Court affirmed the denial of a defendant’s motion to

proceed pro se “based upon his utter disregard for the authority of the court

and its processes.”       Green, 149 A.3d at 59.      In Green, the defendant

interrupted and argued with the trial court, disregarded the court’s warnings,

and made derogatory comments to the judge and counsel. Id. Furthermore,

the defendant continued his disruptive behavior after trial began with counsel

present.    Id.   We therefore concluded that the defendant had effectively

waived his right to represent himself. Id. at 60.

       Here, Mr. Scott’s attempts to distinguish Green fail.      The trial court

observed Mr. Scott over two years of pretrial proceedings in this case. When

Mr. Scott appeared for the scheduled events, he repeatedly interrupted the

trial court and argued about previously addressed issues. As trial approached,

Mr. Scott moved to proceed without counsel. When the trial court denied the

motion, Mr. Scott repeatedly complained about his attorney.1 As in Green,
____________________________________________

1 As the trial court attempted to explain to Mr. Scott, the quality of a lawyer

is a different issue from the validity of a decision to proceed without a lawyer.

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Mr. Scott’s actions and arguments over the history of the case reflected a

disregard for the authority of the court and the effect of its rulings. And as in

Green, the court’s concerns were well-founded; Mr. Scott did not appear for

jury selection or trial.2 Based on this record, the trial court could properly

determine that Mr. Scott forfeited his right to self-representation. Therefore,

Mr. Scott’s first two issues fail.

       Mr. Scott’s third issue is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence

to convict him of harassment under Section 2709(a)(1) of the Crimes Code.

He argues that the Commonwealth could not prove his specific intent to

harass, annoy, or alarm, as the statute requires:

       (a) Offense defined.--A person commits the crime of
       harassment when, with intent to harass, annoy or alarm another,
       the person:

       (1) strikes, shoves, kicks or otherwise subjects the other person
       to physical contact, or attempts or threatens to do the same[.]

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2709(a)(1).

       Mr. Scott contends that the testimony from Ms. Ware and Ms. Purnell

did not show that he intended to harass, annoy, or alarm Ms. Ware when he

hit her. Rather, as Ms. Ware was speaking rudely (and loudly) to Ms. Scott,

Mr. Scott submits that his intent was to defuse the situation and aid his wife.

       This Court reviews a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence de

novo. Commonwealth v. Coniker, 290 A.3d 725, 733 (Pa. Super. 2023)

____________________________________________

2 Additionally, after Mr. Scott was arrested on a bench warrant and sentenced,

he sent the trial court a letter attacking its handling of his case.

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(citations omitted). Our inquiry is whether, viewing all evidence from trial in

the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, including

reasonable inferences, the evidence establishes each element of the crime.

Id. at 733–34. Like any element of a crime, the specific intent to harass,

annoy, or alarm “may be inferred from the totality of the circumstances.” Id.

at 734 (quoting Commonwealth v. Cox, 72 A.3d 719, 721 (Pa. Super.

2013)). With regard to specific intent, “the fact-finder is free to conclude that

the accused intended the natural and probable consequences of his actions to

result therefrom.”      Commonwealth v. Faulk, 928 A.2d 1061, 1070 (Pa.

Super. 2007) (quotation omitted).

         Here, although it is plausible that Mr. Scott’s intent was benign, the trial

court was free to conclude that Mr. Scott intended the natural, probable

consequence of striking Ms. Ware. Id. It is reasonable to infer that a person

being suddenly hit in the face would feel harassed, annoyed, or alarmed.

Because we view evidence in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth as

the verdict winner on this count, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient

to sustain Mr. Scott’s conviction for harassment. Coniker, supra. This issue

fails.

         Judgment of sentence affirmed.

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Date: 1/24/2024

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