Court Opinion

ID: 9959552
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-12 05:05:44.161434+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:08.206670
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                           COURT OF APPEALS

                                                                       UNPUBLISHED
In re Guardianship of LMW, Minor.                                      April 11, 2024

                                                                       No. 367928
                                                                       Charlevoix Probate Court
                                                                       LC No. 17-012503-GM

Before: GADOLA, C.J., and BORRELLO and PATEL, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

       Petitioner appeals as of right the probate court’s order denying his petition to modify the
guardianship in this case to require respondents to allow him video conference contact with LMW.
We affirm.

                                            I. FACTS

        Petitioner is LMW’s father; respondents are LMW’s maternal grandparents. In 2011,
shortly after her birth, LMW was placed in a guardianship with her paternal grandmother amidst
allegations that the parents had neglected the child.1 The paternal grandmother and respondents
thereafter were granted shared custody of LMW, and in 2013, respondents were granted sole
custody of LMW. Since that time the child has lived exclusively with respondents. In 2014,
petitioner was convicted in Texas of possession and distribution of child pornography; he was
sentenced to 60 months’ imprisonment and 20 years’ supervised release.

        In 2017, respondents moved from Virginia to Michigan with LMW, where they petitioned
for continued guardianship of LMW. The probate court granted respondents full guardianship of
LMW, ordering parenting time at the discretion of respondents and in accordance with existing
court orders. The probate court renewed the guardianship each year thereafter.

1
 LMW’s mother was involved in substance use and criminal activity. LMW has regular weekly
contact with her mother, who lives in Virginia, via phone or facetime. LMW’s mother is not a
party to this appeal.

                                               -1-
         In October 2019, petitioner was released from prison. In October 2022, petitioner
petitioned the probate court to modify LMW’s guardianship. He requested that the probate court
establish an appropriate plan for parenting time between him and LMW, beginning with video
conferencing. The probate court ordered the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS)
to issue an investigation report on LMW’s guardianship and petitioner’s request. DHHS reported
that petitioner was current on his child support obligations and was participating in individual
counseling. DHHS reported that although petitioner requested video contact with LMW, he was
agreeable to establishing contact at a more gradual pace. DHHS reported that LMW expressed
“both partial interest and reluctancy” regarding contact with petitioner. DHHS recommended that
any contact between petitioner and LMW be limited to written letters monitored by respondents
for at least the first four to six months.

        In December 2022, the probate court held a hearing on petitioner’s petition to modify the
guardianship. Petitioner testified that he believed video chats would be a safe way to establish
contact with LMW and start a relationship with her. Petitioner confirmed he had been convicted
of child pornography charges and that he was currently on probation. Petitioner also confirmed
he had violated his probation in 2019, and that he had been reprimanded by his probation officer
regarding several social media posts he made on his Facebook account that included sexually
suggestive pictures of anime characters. At the conclusion of the hearing, the probate court denied
petitioner’s petition to allow video contact, but permitted petitioner to write letters to LMW and
send her gifts. The probate court expressed concern over petitioner’s recent Facebook posts, his
criminal history involving child pornography, and the potential for a screenshot to be taken during
a video conference.

        In July 2023, petitioner filed a second petition to modify LMW’s guardianship, again
asking the probate court to permit him video conference contact with LMW. Petitioner reported
that in the months following the December 2022 hearing, petitioner sent letters to LMW at least
once a week and LMW replied by letter only once every three months, although respondents
updated petitioner each month about LMW’s status. The probate court again ordered DHHS to
prepare a report regarding petitioner’s request. DHHS reported that LMW was comfortable with
contacting petitioner only through letter writing.

        In September 2023, the probate court held a hearing on petitioner’s second petition. DHHS
confirmed its recommendation that LMW’s contact with petitioner remain at the discretion of
respondents and be based on LMW’s preferences. Respondents asserted that LMW had expressly
indicated she did not want to engage in video chats with petitioner and that she was content with
letter writing. Respondents also asserted that petitioner was still on probation for his child
pornography conviction and expressed concern regarding LMW’s welfare considering petitioner’s
criminal history.

        The probate court again denied petitioner’s request for video contact with LMW. The
probate court stated that considering the nature of the petitioner’s conviction, it was “not persuaded
at this point in time that the guardianship should be modified to require the video visits over
[LMW’s] objection or over [respondents’] objection.” The probate court reasoned that LMW had
been in respondents’ care for most of her life, and that “to disrupt that over her objection seems to
be contrary to her welfare.” The probate court ordered that parenting time was to remain within

                                                 -2-
respondents’ discretion, stating that respondents had discretion to facilitate video contact if LMW
changed her mind and wanted the contact. Petitioner now appeals.

                                        II. DISCUSSION

        Petitioner contends that the probate court abused its discretion by denying his petition to
modify LMW’s guardianship to require respondents to permit him video conferencing contact with
LMW. Petitioner argues that the trial court erred by failing to make findings regarding LMW’s
best interests under the best-interests factors set forth in MCL 700.5101(a). Petitioner further
argues that the trial court erred by considering only LMW’s preference in denying the petition.
We disagree.

        We review the probate court’s dispositional rulings for an abuse of discretion and review
for clear error the factual findings underlying the probate court’s decision. In re Portus, 325 Mich
App 374, 381; 926 NW2d 33 (2018). The probate court abuses its discretion when it chooses an
outcome outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes, and when it makes an error of
law. Id. A factual finding by the probate court is clearly erroneous if this Court is left with a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made, even if some evidence supports the
finding. Id.

         This case involves a minor-guardianship proceeding under MCL 700.5204(2)(b), which is
part of the Estates and Protected Individuals Code (EPIC), MCL 700.1101 et seq. MCL 700.5204
authorizes the probate court to appoint a guardian for a minor under certain circumstances. A
guardianship does not permanently sever the parent-child relationship and is not tantamount to a
termination of parental rights. In re TK, 306 Mich App 698, 704-705; 859 NW2d 208 (2014).

        In 2017, after moving to Michigan, respondents petitioned the probate court for continued
guardianship of LMW under MCL 700.5204(1), which permits a “person interested in the welfare
of a minor” to petition the probate court for guardianship of the minor. In re ADW, ___ Mich App
___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2024) (Docket No. 368361); slip op at 3. At that time, LMW was six
years old and had been living in the care of respondents, her maternal grandparents, in Virginia for
approximately three years pursuant to an agreement with LMW’s parents. At that time, petitioner
was incarcerated. The probate court granted respondents full guardianship of LMW.

        Petitioner has twice moved to modify the guardianship to compel respondents to permit
video contact between petitioner and LMW. The probate court determined that petitioner could
have contact with the child by written letters under respondents’ supervision, but declined to
require LMW to participate in video conferencing; the probate court explained that respondents
have discretion to permit LMW to video conference with petitioner in the future if LMW changes
her mind and wants video contact with petitioner.

        Petitioner contends that in making this decision the probate court was required to review
the best interests of the child factors set forth in MCL 700.5101(a). In support of his argument,

                                                -3-
petitioner points to unpublished authority2 of this Court in which, in the context of terminating a
guardianship, the probate court considered the best interests of the children in that case by applying
the factors set forth in MCL 700.5101(a). See In re Guardianship of ER, unpublished per curiam
opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued December 15, 2022 (Docket Nos. 362398, 362399), p 1-
2. That case, however, involved the termination of a guardianship. Id. at 3. MCL 700.5209(2)(a)
authorizes a probate court to terminate a guardianship “if the court determines that it is in the best
interests of the minor.”

        By contrast, in this case, petitioner sought parenting time with LMW, which the court
granted but limited to written letters. Under MCL 700.5204(5), “[f]or the minor ward’s welfare,
the court may at any time order . . . reasonable parenting time and contact of the minor ward with
his or her parents.” The statute does not direct the probate court to consider the best interests of
the minor child. Because petitioner in this case sought parenting time, the probate court was not
required by MCL 700.5204(5) to specifically consider or make findings regarding the statutory
best-interests factors when ruling on petitioner’s petition.

        Petitioner also contends that the probate court erred by considering only LMW’s
preferences when determining the mode of communication permitted between petitioner and
LMW. We disagree that the probate court limited its inquiry to LMW’s preferences. The probate
court considered that petitioner was convicted of child pornography charges, was still on probation
related to those charges, and had violated his probation after he was released from prison. The
probate court also specifically considered that, due to the digital format of the proposed contact,
petitioner would be able to take screenshots of LMW during the chats. The probate court also
expressed concern over petitioner’s recent Facebook posts that depicted sexually suggestive
content.

        The probate court also considered LMW’s preference. DHHS reported that LMW
expressed she was not ready to speak with petitioner via video conferencing and that she would
think about having more contact with him when she is an adult. Because LMW had been in
respondents’ care for most of her life, the court concluded that “to disrupt that over her objection
seems to be contrary to her welfare.” The court then acknowledged that, while progress in
petitioner’s and LMW’s relationship may be slow in developing, neither respondents nor LMW
“are resistant in a way that progress [cannot] be made.” The court concluded that, in the event
LMW wanted to contact petitioner through video conferencing, respondents had discretion to
permit that contact. The probate court thus did not limit its consideration to LMW’s wishes, but
correctly gave LMW’s wishes the deference to which they are entitled. Petitioner, too, should
consider LMW’s wishes paramount in this matter.

       We agree with the probate court that video contact with LMW may be contrary to her
welfare considering petitioner’s child pornography conviction, his recent Facebook posts, and the
potential to use LMW’s image. Taken together with LMW’s preference that her contact with

2
  Unpublished opinions of this Court are not precedentially binding, but may be considered
instructive or persuasive. MCR 7.215(C)(1); Broz v Plante & Moran, PLLC, 331 Mich App 39,
47 n 1; 951 NW2d 64 (2020).

                                                 -4-
petitioner remain limited to letter writing, we conclude the court did not clearly err when it
determined that video contact would be contrary to LMW’s welfare.

       The probate court properly considered petitioner’s petition and did not abuse its discretion
when it declined to modify LMW’s guardianship to compel LMW to participate in video
conferencing with petitioner.

       Affirmed.

                                                            /s/ Michael F. Gadola
                                                            /s/ Stephen L. Borrello
                                                            /s/ Sima G. Patel

                                               -5-