Court Opinion

ID: 9845830
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:29:06.049767+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:23.141657
License: Public Domain

*596O’CONNELL, J.,
dissenting.
There was evidence from which the jury could conclude that defendant had a last clear chance to avoid the injury. The trial judge apparently disposed of the case upon the basis of a statement in the concurring opinion of Lusk, J., in Palmer v. Murdock, 233 Or 334, 344, 378 P2d 271 (1963), where it was said, “I have grave doubt whether the last clear chance doctrine can ever be applied to a case involving a collision between two automobiles in an intersection of streets under circumstances similar to those described in the opening statement of counsel for the plaintiff.” The concurring opinion then quoted from 61 CJS 123, Motor Vehicles § 493 to the effect that generally the last clear chance doctrine is inapplicable if the plaintiff’s negligence “continued” up to the time of the accident and concurred in the negligence of the motorist as a “proximate cause” of the injury.
A majority of the department of the court which sat in Palmer v. Murdock, supra, did not accept the view expressed in the concurring opinion of Lusk, J. The majority opinion was based upon the premise that the last clear chance doctrine can be applicable to an intersection collision case. The majority opinion also criticized the use of notions such as “continuing negligence” and “proximate cause” in the application of the last clear chance doctrine. The opinion in the present case perpetuates the notion that negligence can be described in terms of being “active” and “continuing” and not having “spent itself.” This language is not helpful and is likely to obscure the real question involved in the last clear chance eases. Negligence is not something that is spendible. The plaintiff is negligent or he is not—his negligence does not stop *597once lie has engaged in substandard conduct. The question is whether a negligent plaintiff is in a position of peril from which he cannot extricate himself and if he is, whether a negligent defendant could have avoided the injury to the negligent plaintiff. Fundamentally, the doctrine of last clear chance is merely a judicially created device to ameliorate the hardship which may be visited upon the plaintiff by the doctrine of contributory negligence. The jury has been entrusted with the task of applying the community standard of conduct in negligence cases. The court should let the jury perform this task unless it is absolutely clear that there is no room for the jury’s judgment. In the present case the jury should have been allowed to look at both defendant’s and plaintiff’s negligence and to decide whether defendant could have avoided the injury to an admittedly negligent plaintiff.
Sloan, J., joins in this dissent.