Court Opinion

ID: 9600480
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:27:42.671831+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:28.768416
License: Public Domain

KEARSE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to overturn the district court’s denial of the habeas corpus petition of Muhamed Sacirbey, which sought to forbid his extradition from the United States to the republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereinafter generally “Bosnia”). Extradition was requested by Bosnia in 2002 on the ground that Sacirbey, while serving as its ambassador to the United Nations, abused his official position by misappropriating $610,982.46 in official Bosnian funds to his own private account. There is no dispute that embezzlement by a public official is a criminal offense for which a person who is so “charged” or “convicted” may be extradited pursuant to the treaty between Bosnia, as a successor to the Kingdom of Serbia, and the United States, see Treaty for the Mutual Extradition of Fugitives from Justice, U.S.-Serb., art. I, Oct. 25, 1901, 32 Stat. 1890 (“Treaty”) (the parties “mutually agree to deliver up persons who[ have] been charged with or convicted of any of the crimes and offenses specified in the following article”); id. art. II, para. 6 (“Extradition shall be granted for .... Embezzlement by public officers”). Nor do Sacirbey and the majority appear to suggest that it is not within the competence and authority of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (the “National Court” or “Court”) to adjudicate such a charge of embezzlement; and the majority recognizes that under the Treaty, “formal charges are not required to grant an extradition request,” Majority Opinion ante at 68.
The majority, however, concludes that Sacirbey is not “charged” with embezzlement — or any crime — because the majority finds (a) that “the arrest warrant at issue in this case was issued by a court that neither has jurisdiction over the matter nor authority to enforce the warrant,” Majority Opinion ante at 54, and that a warrant “issued by a court lacking jurisdiction to enforce it” is a nullity, id. at 67; and (b) that the representation by Bosnia’s “Ministry of Justice” that the “Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina will proceed in the Matter of Muhamed Sacirbe[y]” (Letters from Amra Kosovic, Counselor in the Embassy of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Washington, D.C., to the United States Department of State and the United States Department of Justice dated October 11, 2005 (“October 2005 Bosnian Embassy Letter”), and November 10, 2005 (“November 2005 Bosnian Embassy Letter”) (collectively the “2005 Bosnian Embassy Letters”)), leaves the majority “dubious that Bosnia seeks to prosecute Sacirbey for a crime,” id. at 69 *71(emphasis added), because, the majority-says, “[t]his statement does not hint at how the Bosnian court will proceed- — that is whether by immediate prosecution or by permitting the prosecutor to undertake further investigation,” id. at 68 (emphasis in original). I disagree with the majority’s rationales. I discuss them in reverse order.
(1) The Notion that the Bosnian Court Intends Merely To Permit Investigation
The majority’s speculation that the Bosnian National Court may intend merely to permit further investigation of Saeirbey, rather than to entertain his prosecution, is belied by the course of the prior proceedings in Bosnia and by the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“Bosnia CPC” or “CPC”), adopted in 2003 as part of nationwide judicial reforms. In 2001, Bosnia operated under a civil-law system in which investigations of possible criminal acts were conducted by regional courts in Bosnia’s Cantons. In April 2001, the Sarajevo Cantonal prosecutor’s office asked the Sarajevo Cantonal Court to investigate allegations that Saeirbey had abused his official position by misappropriating public funds. In August 2001, the Cantonal Court issued a “DECISION TO INVESTIGATE” Saeirbey, based on “a well-founded suspicion” that during his tenure as Bosnia’s ambassador to the United Nations, Saeirbey abused his official position by, inter alia, transferring various specified sums of Bosnian United Nations mission money, totaling $610,982.46, to his own private accounts. In December 2001, the Cantonal Court issued a “DECISION FOR DETENTION” and a warrant for the arrest of Saeirbey, “the former Ambassador of [Bosnia] at the Permanent Mission of [Bosnia] with the UN,” “because there is a well-founded suspicion that [he] committed the criminal act of abuse of official position or authority.” In January 2002, Bosnia submitted to the United States a request for Sacirbey’s extradition.
In 2003, Bosnia converted from the civil-law system to a common-law system, and investigative functions that had been vested in the courts were transferred to independent prosecutors. In August 2003, the Sarajevo Cantonal Court transferred the Saeirbey matter to the Sarajevo Cantonal Prosecutor’s office for appropriate action. The Bosnian court reforms also included the establishment of the National Court, which serves functions similar to those of the federal courts in the United States. Because Saeirbey was alleged to have abused his position as a representative of the Bosnian nation, the Saeirbey investigation, which had been transferred by the Sarajevo Cantonal Court to the Sarajevo Cantonal Prosecutor, was then transferred from the Cantonal Prosecutor to the office of the National Prosecutor.
The majority’s notion that the Bosnian Ministry of Justice’s representation that the Bosnian National Court “will proceed” in Sacirbey’s case (2005 Bosnian Embassy Letters) means that the Court may merely conduct or “permit[]” “further investigation,” Majority Opinion ante at 68, is belied by the facts that, pursuant to Bosnia’s judicial reforms, the investigation of Sacir-bey had already been transferred from court to independent prosecutor, and under the Bosnia CPC, adopted in 2003 as part of the judicial reforms, the Court plays no role in investigations. The provisions of the CPC “set forth the rules of the criminal procedure that are mandatory for the proceedings of the [National] Court” and the conduct of criminal matters by the National Prosecutor. Bosnia CPC art. 1. Under the CPC, “[t]he term ‘investigation’ refers to all activities,” including collection *72and preservation of information and evidence, “undertaken by the Prosecutor or by authorized officials in accordance with this Code,” id. art. 20(j). “[AJuthorized official[s]” are defined as various law enforcement personnel such as members of the “State Border Service,” “military police,” and “Police bodies of the responsible ministries of’ the Bosnian regions, id. art. 20(g); those officials are supervised by the Prosecutor, see id. art. 218. All of the “INVESTIGATIVE PROCEDURE[S]” set forth in the CPC describe powers and duties of “the Prosecutor” and the officials he or she supervises. See id. art. 213-225. There are no CPC provisions placing investigative functions, or the supervision of such functions, in the courts. The investigative procedures section of the CPC begins by stating that public officials are “bound to,” and private citizens “are entitled to,” report the commission of a criminal offense, id. art. 213(1), 214(1), and that “[t]he report must be filed with the Prosecutor,” id. art. 215(1) (emphasis added). Further clarifying that investigations are within the sole province of the Prosecutor, not the Court, the CPC provides that
[i]f the report [of suspected criminal conduct] is filed with the Court, authorized official or some other court or prosecutor in Bosnia and Herzegovina, they shall accept the report and shall immediately submit the report to the Prosecutor.
Id. art. 215(3) (emphasis added). There is no provision giving the Court authority to say whether or not an investigation may be pursued.
I thus see no principled reason to infer that the Bosnian Ministry of Justice’s statement that the National Court “will proceed” in Sacirbey’s case means that the Court may merely “permit[ ] the prosecutor to undertake further investigation,” Majority Opinion ante at 68. And surely it disserves the interests of international comity for a court of the United States to forbid extradition on the basis of a mere suspicion that the National Court of the requesting nation intends to proceed in a manner not authorized by that nation’s criminal procedure code.
In contrast to the dubiety expressed here by the majority, the district court found that “the evidence,” including the 2005 Bosnian Embassy Letters, “demonstrates that [Bosnia] intends to prosecute Sacirbey for the offense of abuse of authority.” Sacirbey v. Guccione, No. 05 CV 2949, 2006 WL 2585561, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2006); see also id. (“The letters plainly indicate a present intent to prosecute Sacirbey in the National Court. While the effectuation of that intent is conditioned on Saeirbey’s extradition, the intent nevertheless presently exists.” (emphasis in original)). I cannot view the district court’s finding that Bosnia intends to prosecute Sacirbey as clearly erroneous. It is supported not only by the 2005 Bosnian Embassy Letters, but also by (a) the fact that the Sacirbey matter, including the Sarajevo Cantonal Court’s finding of a well-founded suspicion that Sacirbey misappropriated $610,982.46 in Bosnian funds, was transferred to the office of the National Prosecutor, and (b) the CPC provision that “if there is evidence that a criminal offense has been committed,” the National Prosecutor, unless otherwise stated by the CPC, “is obligated to initiate a prosecution,” Bosnia CPC art. 17 (emphasis added).
(2) The Majority’s View that the Arrest Warrant is a Nullity
The majority also reasons that, although the Sarajevo Cantonal Court issued a warrant for Sacirbey’s arrest in 2001, the fact that that court no longer has jurisdiction to enforce the warrant makes the warrant *73a “ ‘dead letter,’ ” Majority Opinion ante at 67, quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 110 S.Ct. 1056, 108 L.Ed.2d 222 (1990)—an opinion that observed that a warrant issued by a magistrate in the United States would have no force “outside the United States,” id. at 274, 110 S.Ct. 1056. I do not see the applicability of that observation — as to a warrant’s potential extraterritorial effect— to the circumstances here, which involve changes in institutional functions resulting from court reforms within a single country.
Further, the majority apparently assumes that the Bosnian court reforms automatically divested the Sarajevo Cantonal Court of jurisdiction to entertain a prosecution of Sacirbey and assumes that a loss of jurisdiction in the Cantonal Court means that no court has jurisdiction. In my view, neither assumption is correct. Although I agree that the Sarajevo Cantonal Court no longer has jurisdiction, it appears to me, given the provisions of the Bosnia CPC, that the divesture of jurisdiction was not automatic but instead results from the decision of the Bosnian National Court to take the case. I see no reason— and the majority does not explain — why a nation’s court reforms cannot entail the transfer of cases from one court to another; and it appears that the Bosnia reforms envision the retention of jurisdiction by the Cantonal Courts in some cases and the transfer to the National Court of other cases of which the National Court wishes to take jurisdiction. The CPC provides that
[cjases falling within the competence of the [National] Court which are pending before other courts or prosecutor’s offices and in which the indictment is not legally effective or confirmed, shall be finalized by these courts unless the [National] Court, ex officio or upon the reasoned proposal of the parties or defense attorney, decide to take such a case.
CPC art. 449(2) (emphases added). I read “shall be finalized by these courts” to mean that even the Sarajevo Cantonal Court could have proceeded to adjudicate Sacirbey’s case if the National Court had not decided to take the case. And I read the “unless the Court ex officio ” clause to mean that the National Court is entitled, simply by virtue of being the National Court, to take jurisdiction of the case. This interpretation is consistent with that of the Bosnian Ministry of Justice, which is Bosnia’s “central co-ordinating body for ensuring inter-Entity legislative and justice system harmony and best practice,” Law on Ministries and Other Bodies of Administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina, art. 13. The Ministry of Justice is identified in the November 2005 Bosnian Embassy Letter as the source of the information (a) that the National Court can hear Sacirbey’s case pursuant to CPC art. 449(2), and (b) that if the United States grants extradition of Sacirbey, the National Court “will proceed.” Thus, while I agree with the majority that the Sarajevo Cantonal Court no longer has the power to proceed in the matter of Sacirbey, I reach that conclusion because the Bosnia National Court has decided to take the case. I do not agree with the majority that extradition should be denied on the theory that, rather than having been transferred to the National Court, the original warrant for Sacirbey’s arrest has become a “dead letter,” Majority Opinion ante at 67 (internal quotation marks omitted).
(3) Replies to the Majority’s Objections to this Dissent
In response to this dissent, the majority makes several assertions that I find untenable and/or unpersuasive. For example, it asserts that “the Cantonal Court was dissolved,” Majority Opinion ante at 69 n.22. That contention was advanced in the dis*74trict court by Sacirbey, but it was explicitly contradicted by the Bosnian government:
The Ministry of Justice of Bosnia and Herzegovina can not accept the statement that the Cantonal Court — -the one that issued the warrant and demand for investigation of Mr. [Sacirbey] — was abolished by the justice system reforms. The mentioned Court exists and hears all cases that are within its jurisdiction.
November 2005 Bosnian Embassy Letter.
In addition, the majority states that “no Bosnian authority has provided a clear statement as to whether there is a prosecution now pending in a Bosnian court,” Majority Opinion ante at 69 n.22 (first emphasis in original; second emphasis mine). I cannot see that this provides a basis for requiring the district court to forbid extradition; the majority itself acknowledges that, under the Treaty, “formal charges are not required to grant an extradition request,” id. at 68.
As to the majority’s further suggestion that there is no evidence “that the original warrant for Sacirbey’s arrest was transferred to the National Court,” Majority Opinion ante at 67 n.19, I see nothing in the record to indicate that the arrest warrant was not transferred as part of the transfer of the case. Further, even if the warrant was not transferred, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the warrant is not still extant, given that — contrary to the majority’s notion that “the Cantonal Court was dissolved,” Majority Opinion ante at 69 n.22 — the Bosnian Ministry of Justice says that the Cantonal Court was not abolished and still “exists” (November 2005 Bosnian Embassy Letter). I thus do not see the validity of the majority’s holding that “there is no valid [arrest] warrant in the present case” “[a]s a matter of law,” id. at 68 n.21.
Finally, the majority finds that Bosnia’s representation that the Bosnia National Court “will proceed” is “ambiguous,” Majority Opinion ante at 68 n.21, as the majority believes this may mean that that court will merely “permit[ ] the prosecutor to undertake further investigation,” id. at 68, and “[i]t is that ambiguity which makes [the majority] unable to derive from the[ 2005 Bosnian Embassy Letters] an active intent to prosecute,” id. at 68 n.21. I have three major difficulties with this aspect of the majority opinion. First, as discussed above, I do not see any provision in the Bosnia CPC giving the National Court authority either to “permit[ ]” or to prohibit “investigation.” Second, even linguistically, I cannot view “permit[] the prosecutor to undertake further investigation” as a plausible interpretation of the Bosnia Ministry of Justice’s statement that the “Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina will proceed.” Third, we are not factfinders; factfinding is the function of the district court. And when the district court has made a finding of fact — -here, that “[t]he letters plainly indicate a present intent to prosecute Sacirbey in the National Court,” 2006 WL 2585561, at *7 — we are not allowed to overturn that finding unless it is “clearly erroneous.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a)(6). A feeling that the evidence is “ambiguous,” Majority Opinion ante at 68 n. 21, does not meet the clearly-erroneous test — especially when the majority acknowledges that the judicial interpretation it questions “is one feasible reading,” id.
In sum, Bosnia has sought the extradition of Sacirbey since January 2002, having issued in December 2001 a warrant for his arrest stating that there was good reason to suspect that, while he was a public official, Sacirbey embezzled Bosnian funds; the matter was thereafter, pursuant to Bosnia’s judicial reforms, transferred to Bosnia’s National Prosecutor, who has a statutory duty to prosecute where there is *75evidence that a criminal offense has been committed; and Bosnia’s Ministry of Justice has stated that Sacirbey’s case will be heard by Bosnia’s National Court — a tribunal to which Bosnia’s reformed criminal procedure code gives no investigative powers but gives authority ex officio to take his case. I thus see no error in the district court’s finding that Bosnia intends to prosecute Sacirbey; and I dissent from the majority’s decision to reverse on the basis of its speculation, contrary to the Bosnia CPC, that the Bosnian National Court may merely intend to permit further investigation, and of its view, contrary to my reading of CPC art. 449(2), that the warrant for Sacirbey’s arrest died with the birth of the Bosnian court reforms.