Court Opinion

ID: 9848897
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:29:40.514252+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:52.560676
License: Public Domain

Chief Judge Eagles
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
Summary judgment is only appropriate under exceptional circumstances in negligence cases because a jury ordinarily applies the reasonable person standard to the facts of each case. See Williams v. *418Carolina Power & Light Co., 296 N.C. 400, 250 S.E.2d 255 (1978); Rone v. Byrd Food Stores, Inc., 109 N.C. App. 666, 428 S.E.2d 284 (1993).
The majority finds plaintiff contributorily negligent as a matter of law because she saw the wooden obstacle ten minutes before falling over it, and defendant committed no act to distract her attention. Our Supreme Court has articulated the standard for contributory negligence:
The basic issue with respect to contributory negligence is whether the evidence shows that, as a matter of law, plaintiff failed to keep a proper lookout for her own safety. The question is . . . whether a person using ordinary care for his or her own safety under similar circumstances would have looked down at the floor.
Norwood v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 303 N.C. 462, 468, 279 S.E.2d 559, 563 (1981). Contributory negligence properly bars plaintiff’s recovery when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, “establishes her negligence so clearly that no other reasonable inference or conclusion may be drawn therefrom.” Id. at 469, 279 S.E.2d at 563; see also Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, 128 N.C. App. 282, 288, 495 S.E.2d 149, 153 (1998).
Applying these principles, I respectfully disagree with the majority and believe that plaintiffs forecast of evidence would permit a jury to reasonably conclude that she was not negligent. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the hazard consisted of an unpainted wooden platform, without railings, low to the ground, and partially concealed by the counter where plaintiff stood. Plaintiff, accompanied by four children, initially noticed the bridge but ten minutes later fell over it when her attention had been diverted to pick up a tray loaded with drinks from defendant’s cashier. In her answer to defendant’s interrogatory, plaintiff stated she was “concentrating on not spilling [the] drinks” when she fell over the platform, and plaintiff’s witness described her as “pretty much distracted the entire time” she waited in line. The witness also thought it was “possible” that plaintiff’s tray blocked her view of the wooden bridge, which “was not obviously noticeable to patrons” standing where plaintiff stood. Because the trier of fact properly decides issues of contributory negligence when differing inferences may be drawn from the evidence, plaintiff here was not contributorily negligent as a matter of law.
*419Contrary to the majority’s view, the fact that plaintiff once saw the wooden bridge does not automatically render her contributorily negligent as a matter of law. See Walker v. Randolph County, 251 N.C. 805, 808-09, 112 S.E.2d 551, 553-54 (1960) (citation omitted) (“Circumstances may exist under which forgetfulness or inattention to a known danger may be consistent with the exercise of ordinary care, as . . . where conditions arise suddenly which are calculated to divert one’s attention momentarily from the danger”). In the Norwood case, the plaintiff tripped over an unpainted wooden platform raised four inches from the floor and protruding into an aisle of the defendant’s store. The plaintiff saw the platform out of the comer of her eye, but she did not realize it protruded into the aisle, and her attention had been diverted by displays of merchandise on the platform, along the aisle, and behind the nearby cash register. See Norwood, 303 N.C. at 465-68, 279 S.E.2d at 561-63. Our Supreme Court held that the evidence there permitted a reasonable inference that a person exercising reasonable care could have struck the platform. See id. at 469, 279 S.E.2d at 563. As in Norwood, plaintiff here observed the structure ten minutes before she fell, but she did not realize it protruded significantly into her path.
Furthermore, the majority’s conclusion that plaintiff “was not distracted by any action by defendant” is mistaken for two reasons. First, it improperly decides an issue of fact where plaintiff’s forecast of evidence raised a reasonable inference that she was distracted. “If the plaintiff’s attention was in fact diverted,” (a reasonable inference here) “and if the same would have happened to an ordinarily prudent person, then . . . the plaintiff cannot be considered to have been con-tributorily negligent as a matter of law.” Price v. Jack Eckerd Corp., 100 N.C. App. 732, 737, 398 S.E.2d 49, 52 (1990) (holding that a plaintiff who tripped over a box very close to her when distracted by store displays and cashier’s instructions was not contributorily negligent as a matter of law). Second, defendant may create distracting conditions without taking deliberate “action” to distract the plaintiff. In Norwood', the defendant took no deliberate action beyond the ordinary display of merchandise which commanded the attention of customers away from the floor. See Norwood, 303 N.C. at 468, 279 S.E.2d at 562-63. Here, the restaurant’s procedures requiring patrons to order at a counter and, after waiting for preparation, to carry food on trays from the counter to the dining room also directed patrons’ attention away from the floor and the hazard.
*420In relying on Stansfield v. Mahowsky, 46 N.C. App. 829, 266 S.E.2d 28 (1980), disc. review denied, 301 N.C. 96, -S.E.2d-(1980), the majority ignores two important distinctions. First, the plaintiff in Stansfield offered no evidence pointing to the defendant’s negligence. See id. Here, plaintiff’s forecast of evidence concerning the appearance and placement of the bridge permits a reasonable inference of negligence). Second, the evidence in Stansfield indicated that the plaintiff left the restaurant and made no mention of a distraction. See id. Here, plaintiff’s forecast of evidence shows plaintiff’s focus on the loaded tray and the four young Girl Scouts diverting her attention. Because plaintiff’s forecast of evidence supports a reasonable inference that she exercised ordinary care under the circumstances, she was not contributorily negligent as a matter of law.
In the absence of contributory negligence, for plaintiff to survive defendant’s motion for summary judgment she must forecast evidence of a prima facie case of negligence, showing that defendant owed plaintiff a duty of care, that defendant breached the duty, that the breach actually and proximately caused plaintiff’s injury, and that damages resulted from the injury. See Lamm v. Bissette Realty, 327 N.C. 412, 395 S.E.2d 112 (1990). Whether defendant acted unreasonably in maintaining the low, wooden, railing-less bridge near the counter must be evaluated against the conduct of a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances. See Lorinovich v. K Mart Corp., 134 N.C. App. 158, 516 S.E.2d 643 (1999), cert. denied, 351 N.C. 107, -S.E.2d- (1999) (citing Bolkhir v. N.C. State Univ., 321 N.C. 706, 365 S.E.2d 898 (1988)).
Here, the appearance of the low, wooden, railing-less bridge presents a question of material fact requiring resolution by a jury. Defendant introduced photographs, used by the trial judge in ruling on summary judgment, showing a flat top with railings on both sides of the steps and platform. When shown the pictures during her deposition, however, plaintiff testified: “what I fell over is totally different than this.” Taken in its most favorable light, plaintiff’s forecast of evidence shows the structure as low and unpainted, with no railings, partially concealed beneath the counter. On these facts, a jury could reasonably find that the appearance and placement of the bridge violated defendant’s duty of reasonable care in keeping the premises safe for lawful visitors. See Nelson v. Freeland, 349 N.C. 615, 507 S.E.2d 882 (1998); Lorinovich, 134 N.C. App. at 161, 516 S.E.2d at 646.
*421The majority, in reaching its conclusion, has decided the factual issue regarding the appearance of the bridge. That genuine issue of material fact precludes summary judgment.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.