Court Opinion

ID: 9931648
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-09 16:10:31.167184+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:25:14.874705
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Fowler, 2024-Ohio-361.]

                               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                  SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                        MIAMI COUNTY

 STATE OF OHIO                                     :
                                                   :
       Appellee                                    :   C.A. No. 2022-CA-28
                                                   :
 v.                                                :   Trial Court Case No. 22CR113
                                                   :
 MICHAEL O. FOWLER, JR.                            :   (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas
                                                   :   Court)
       Appellant                                   :
                                                   :

                                              ...........

                                             OPINION

                                      Rendered on February 2, 2024

                                              ...........

CARLO C. MCGINNIS, Attorney for Appellant

PAUL M. WATKINS, Attorney for Appellee

                                            .............

WELBAUM, J.

        {¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Michael O. Fowler, Jr., appeals from his conviction in

the Miami County Court of Common Pleas after a jury found him guilty of unlawful sexual

conduct with a minor. In support of his appeal, Fowler claims that the trial court erred by

failing to suppress incriminating statements that he had made to detectives during an

interview. Fowler claims that his statements should have been suppressed because he
                                                                                         -2-

did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights and because his

statements were rendered involuntary by impermissible, coercive police conduct.

Fowler also claims that the trial court erred by admitting certain records from Google at

trial. According to Fowler, the Google records were not properly authenticated and

violated his constitutional right of confrontation. For the reasons outlined below, we find

no merit to Fowler’s claims and will affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                           Facts and Course of Proceedings

       {¶ 2} On April 1, 2022, a Miami County grand jury returned an indictment charging

Fowler with one third-degree-felony count of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor in

violation of R.C. 2907.04(A)/(B)(3), and a forfeiture specification for Fowler’s vehicle.

The charge and specification arose from allegations that Fowler had the victim, who was

13 years old, perform fellatio on him in his vehicle in exchange for providing the victim

with a vape pen.

       {¶ 3} Fowler pled not guilty to the indicted charge and specification and then filed

a motion to suppress statements that he had made during an interview with investigating

detectives.   In support of his motion to suppress, Fowler claimed that he had not

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. Fowler also claimed

that his statements should have been suppressed because they were the product of

impermissible, coercive police conduct.

       {¶ 4} On July 7, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on Fowler’s motion to suppress.

During the hearing, the State presented testimony from one of the detectives who
                                                                                           -3-

interviewed Fowler, i.e., Detective Steve Hickey of the Miami County Sheriff’s Office.

The State also presented audio and video recordings of Det. Hickey’s interactions with

Fowler. The evidence presented at the suppression hearing established that on March

7, 2022, Det. Hickey and Det. Jason Moore traveled to the Adult Parole Authority (“APA”)

office in Dayton, Ohio, to meet with Fowler after his regular office visit with his parole

officer. The detectives’ discussion with Fowler at the APA office was audio recorded and

admitted into evidence at the suppression hearing as State’s Exhibit 1.

       {¶ 5} State’s Exhibit 1 established that the detectives introduced themselves to

Fowler and advised that they had some questions for him regarding an investigation.

Det. Hickey told Fowler that he and Det. Moore would like to talk to him at the Miami

County Sheriff’s Office in Troy and asked if he was willing to go there with them. When

Fowler asked whether he had a choice in the matter, Det. Hickey answered no and said

that, either way, they would be taking him to the sheriff’s office. Hickey did, however,

offer to have a discussion with Fowler at the APA office, but Fowler decided to wait and

talk to the detectives at the sheriff’s office since they were going to take him there anyway.

       {¶ 6} Shortly thereafter, Det. Hickey read Fowler his Miranda rights. In doing so,

Det. Hickey asked Fowler if he understood each of the rights that were read to him. In

response, Fowler verbally affirmed his understanding of the rights. No waiver card or

other written materials were provided to Fowler during the Miranda advisement.

       {¶ 7} The detectives’ discussion with Fowler at the APA office lasted for

approximately 10 minutes. Thereafter, the detectives placed Fowler in handcuffs and

transported him to the Miami County Sheriff’s Office in Troy. The detectives did not ask
                                                                                         -4-

Fowler any questions about the investigation prior to arriving at the sheriff’s office.

Fowler’s transportation to the sheriff’s office took approximately 45 minutes. While at the

sheriff’s office, the detectives began to video record their interaction with Fowler. The

video recording was continuous with the audio recording that was initiated at the APA

office in Dayton. Accordingly, there was no break in the recording between the time

Fowler was taken from Dayton to Troy. The video recording was admitted into evidence

at the suppression hearing as State’s Exhibit 2.

          {¶ 8} State’s Exhibit 2 established that, before interviewing Fowler, Det. Hickey

told Fowler: “Just a reminder, you are still under Miranda rights. I read you your Miranda

rights. You understand all that?” In response, Fowler shook his head affirmatively and

said: “Right.” Det. Hickey then began the interview. During the interview, Fowler did

not deny that he had met with the victim and that he had provided the victim with a vape

pen. Although Fowler initially denied that the victim had performed fellatio on him in

exchange for the vape pen, after further questioning, and after the detectives stressed

the importance of honesty and cooperation, Fowler eventually admitted that the victim

had put her lips on his penis.

          {¶ 9} After considering the testimony and evidence presented at the suppression

hearing, the trial court overruled Fowler’s motion to suppress. The matter thereafter

proceeded to a jury trial. During trial, the State presented the testimony of multiple

witnesses, including Detective Sergeant Todd Cooper of the Miami County Sheriff’s

Office.

          {¶ 10} Det. Cooper’s testimony established that he had applied for a geofence
                                                                                          -5-

warrant through Google in an effort to identify a suspect. Det. Cooper explained that

Google is able to use the Global Positioning System (“GPS”) to track any working cellular

device that has the Google application downloaded onto it. In applying for the geofence

warrant, Det. Cooper provided Google with the coordinates of a fifteen-meter radius

around the victim’s residential driveway. Det. Cooper requested Google to track any

cellular devices that had entered that radius during a specific timeframe in which the victim

had met with Fowler.

       {¶ 11} In response to the geofence warrant, Google sent Det. Cooper a letter, a

signed Certificate of Authenticity, and the requested information.        See State’s Trial

Exhibit 3. The information provided by Google established that there had been one

cellular device detected in the radius provided by Det. Cooper during the timeframe in

question. After learning about this device, Det. Cooper sent a second request for Google

to provide him with the account information associated with the device.

       {¶ 12} In response to Det. Cooper’s second request, Google once again sent a

letter, a signed Certificate of Authenticity, and the requested information. See State’s

Trial Exhibit 4.   The information provided by Google established that the account

associated with the device in question belonged to Fowler. Specifically, Google provided

Det. Cooper with Fowler’s name, e-mail address, billing address, and telephone numbers.

       {¶ 13} Based on this information, Fowler was identified as a suspect in the

investigation. Using the Ohio Law Enforcement Gateway (“OLEG”) system, Det. Cooper

created a photospread lineup that included Fowler’s photograph.           After viewing the

photospread lineup, the victim identified Fowler as the man who had given her a vape
                                                                                           -6-

pen in exchange for performing fellatio on him.

       {¶ 14} After hearing Det. Cooper’s testimony and the testimony of the other trial

witnesses, including the victim, the jury found Fowler guilty as charged in the indictment.

The trial court then sentenced Fowler to 60 months in prison, designated him a Tier II sex

offender, and ordered his vehicle to be forfeited.

       {¶ 15} Fowler now appeals from his conviction, raising two assignments of error

for review.

                                First Assignment of Error

       {¶ 16} Under his first assignment of error, Fowler contends that the trial court erred

by failing to suppress the statements he had made during his interview with Det. Hickey

and Det. Moore.      Fowler claims that his statements should have been suppressed

because he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights prior

to the interview. Fowler also claims that his statements should have been suppressed

because they were the product of impermissible, coercive police conduct.

                                    Standard of Review

       {¶ 17} “Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law

and fact.” State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8.

When ruling on a motion to suppress, “the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and

is therefore in the best position to resolve factual questions and evaluate the credibility of

witnesses.” Id., citing State v. Mills, 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 366, 582 N.E.2d 972 (1992).
                                                                                          -7-

“Consequently, an appellate court must accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they are

supported by competent, credible evidence.” Id., citing State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d

19, 437 N.E.2d 583 (1982). “Accepting these facts as true, the appellate court must then

independently determine, without deference to the conclusion of the trial court, whether

the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard.” Id., citing State v. McNamara, 124 Ohio

App.3d 706, 707 N.E.2d 539 (4th Dist.1997).

                                        Miranda Waiver

       {¶ 18} We will first address Fowler’s claim that the trial court should have

suppressed his statements to detectives because he did not knowingly, intelligently, and

voluntarily waive his Miranda rights.

       {¶ 19} “In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966),

the United States Supreme Court outlined procedural safeguards needed for securing the

privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the United

States Constitution.” State v. Hudson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 29333, 2022-Ohio-

3253, ¶ 30. “Miranda requires police to give a suspect certain prescribed warnings

before custodial interrogation commences and provides that if the warnings are not given,

any statements elicited from the suspect through police interrogation in that circumstance

must be suppressed.” State v. Petitjean, 140 Ohio App.3d 517, 523, 748 N.E.2d 133 (2d

Dist.2000). “[I]f, after Miranda warnings are given, the suspect indicates that he or she

wishes to remain silent, or if the suspect states that he or she wants an attorney, the

interrogation must cease.” Hudson at ¶ 30, citing Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 104,
                                                                                            -8-

130 S.Ct. 1213, 175 L.Ed.2d 1045 (2010).

       {¶ 20} “[A] suspect may effectively waive the rights conveyed in the Miranda

warnings only if the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.” State v.

Dailey, 53 Ohio St.3d 88, 559 N.E.2d 459 (1990), citing Miranda at 444 and 475. “Thus,

a court may recognize the validity of a waiver of Miranda rights only if it finds that (1) ‘the

relinquishment of the right[s] [was] voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free

and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception[,]’ and (2) the

person had ‘a full awareness of both the nature of the right[s] being abandoned and the

consequences of the decision to abandon [them].’ ”              State v. Marejka, 2d Dist.

Montgomery No. 27662, 2018-Ohio-2570, ¶ 14, quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412,

421, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986).            “Courts examine the totality of the

circumstances to determine whether a suspect has knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily

waived his or her Miranda rights.” State v. White, 2018-Ohio-3076, 118 N.E.3d 410, ¶ 17

(2d Dist.), citing State v. Clark, 38 Ohio St.3d 252, 261, 527 N.E.2d 844 (1988).

       {¶ 21} Fowler claims that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive

his Miranda rights because he was not sufficiently advised of those rights before he was

interviewed at the Miami County Sheriff’s Office. We note that there is no dispute that

Fowler was, at all relevant times, subject to a custodial interrogation, and that Det. Hickey

read Fowler his Miranda rights when Fowler was initially taken into custody at the APA

office in Dayton. Although Fowler argues that Det. Hickey read his rights to him in a

speedy manner that only lasted 23 seconds, Fowler does not claim that he lacked an

understanding of the rights when they were read to him.
                                                                                         -9-

       {¶ 22} Fowler instead claims that he was not properly advised of his Miranda rights

because he was transported to a different location, i.e., the Miami County Sheriff’s Office

in Troy, and because he was interrogated approximately 45 minutes after he had been

advised of his Miranda rights at the APA office in Dayton. Given the passage of time

between Det. Hickey reading him his rights in Dayton and his transportation to the sheriff’s

office, Fowler argues that the initial reading of his rights was stale. Accordingly, Fowler

claims that Det. Hickey should have reread him his Miranda rights before proceeding with

the interview at the sheriff’s office. We disagree.

       {¶ 23} “Courts look to the totality of the circumstances when deciding whether

initial warnings remain effective for subsequent interrogations.” State v. Powell, 132

Ohio St. 3d 233, 2012-Ohio-2577, 971 N.E.2d 865, ¶ 119, citing State v. Roberts, 32 Ohio

St.3d 225, 232, 513 N.E.2d 720 (1987). When doing this, courts consider: (1) the length

of time between the giving of the Miranda warnings and the commencement of the

interrogation; (2) whether the warnings and interrogation were given at different places;

(3) whether the warnings were given by the same officer who conducted the interrogation;

(4) the extent to which a subsequent statement differed from any previous statements;

and (5) the apparent intellectual and emotional state of the suspect. Roberts at 232;

Powell at ¶ 119; State v. Pack, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28459, 2020-Ohio-5210, ¶ 10.

“The purpose of [this] test is to ‘determine whether the initial warnings have become so

stale and remote that there is a substantial possibility that the individual was unaware of

his constitutional rights at the time of the subsequent interrogation.’ ” State v. Kottner,

1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-120350, 2013-Ohio-2159, ¶ 24, quoting State v. Grissom, 1st
                                                                                         -10-

Dist. Hamilton No. C-100542, 2011-Ohio-1796, ¶ 13. Accord White, 2018-Ohio-3076,

118 N.E.3d 410, at ¶ 30.

       {¶ 24} It is well established that “[p]olice are not required to readminister Miranda

warnings to a suspect when a relatively short period of time has elapsed since the initial

warnings.” Powell at ¶ 119, citing State v. Treesh, 90 Ohio St.3d 460, 470, 739 N.E.2d

749 (2001). Accord State v. Evans, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27178, 2017-Ohio-8184,

¶ 18. The Supreme Court of Ohio has recognized that lapses of time greater than 24

hours do not necessarily make prior Miranda warnings stale. See, e.g., Powell at ¶ 121

(Miranda warnings given more than 30 hours prior to second interview were not stale

where the defendant remained in continuous custody and was interviewed by the same

officer at the same location); State v. Brewer, 48 Ohio St.3d 50, 59-60, 549 N.E.2d 491

(1990) (statement made one day after the defendant was advised of his Miranda rights

by a different police department was not stale because it was made as “part of a series

of discussions” during which the defendant had indicated his awareness of his rights);

State v. Barnes, 25 Ohio St.3d 203, 208, 495 N.E.2d 922 (1986) (Miranda warnings given

about 24 hours prior to the defendant’s statement were not stale where the defendant

was told that his rights still applied and where it was clear that the defendant was acting

knowingly and voluntary during the conversation).

       {¶ 25} In this case, the trial court found and the record established that there was

a 45-minute delay between Fowler’s Miranda advisement at the APA office in Dayton and

his interview at the Miami County Sheriff’s Office in Troy. This was a relatively short

period of time that did not support Fowler’s claim that the Miranda advisement was stale.
                                                                                          -11-

Although Fowler’s interview was conducted at a different location from where the Miranda

advisement was given, the trial court found and the record establishes that the interview

was conducted by the same detective who had read Fowler his Miranda rights in Dayton.

It is also clear from the trial court’s findings and the record that Fowler’s interview at the

sheriff’s office was simply a continuation of the discussion that Fowler had with Det.

Hickey and Det. Moore in Dayton. Moreover, it is significant that the trial court found that

Det. Hickey referred to the Miranda advisement given in Dayton before interviewing

Fowler at the sheriff’s office. Specifically, Det. Hickey told Fowler: “Just a reminder, you

are still under Miranda rights. I read you your Miranda rights. You understand all that?”

State’s Suppression Hearing Exhibit 2. In response to those statements, Fowler shook

his head affirmatively and said: “Right.” Id.

       {¶ 26} With respect to Fowler’s intellectual and emotional state, the trial court

found and the video evidence established that Fowler was alert, calm, focused, and

cooperative throughout the interview. In addition, Fowler’s responses to the detectives’

questions were relevant and appropriate, thus indicating his understanding of the

questions being asked of him.

       {¶ 27} Based on the foregoing considerations, we do not find that there was a

substantial possibility that Fowler was unaware of his constitutional rights at the time he

was interviewed at the sheriff’s office. In other words, we find that the initial Miranda

advisement provided by Det. Hickey in Dayton was not stale and remained in effect at the

time Fowler was interviewed. Accordingly, there was no need to readvise Fowler of his

Miranda rights. Because of this, Fowler’s claim that he did not knowingly, intelligently,
                                                                                          -12-

and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights on account of not being readvised of his rights at

the sheriff’s office lacks merit.

       {¶ 28} Fowler also argues that he did not validly waive his Miranda rights because

he did not receive the rights in writing, sign a written waiver, or make an express verbal

statement indicating that he wanted to waive his rights. Fowler also claims that there is

no valid waiver because Det. Hickey never expressly asked him whether he wished to

waive his rights. Each of these arguments, however, has been rejected by the Supreme

Court of Ohio.

       {¶ 29} In State v. Myers, 154 Ohio St.3d 405, 2018-Ohio-1903, 114 N.E.3d 1138,

the defendant similarly argued that “he never validly waived his rights because (1) he was

not given the Miranda warnings in written form * * *, (2) [the officer] did not expressly ask

him whether he wished to waive his rights, and (3) he never signed a written waiver.” Id.

at ¶ 68. In rejecting each of these arguments, the Supreme Court explained that:

               A Miranda waiver need not be in writing to be valid. North Carolina

       v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979). Nor

       must the accused specifically state that he waives his rights. Id. at 375-

       376, 99 S.Ct. 1755; Treesh v. Bagley, 612 F.3d 424, 434 (6th Cir.2010).

       “Where the prosecution shows that a Miranda warning was given and that

       it was understood by the accused, an accused’s uncoerced statement

       establishes an implied waiver of the right to remain silent.” Berghuis v.

       Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 384, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010);

       see also State v. Martin, 151 Ohio St.3d 470, 2017-Ohio-7556, 90 N.E.3d
                                                                                       -13-

       857, ¶ 100-101.

Id. at ¶ 68.

       {¶ 30} In State v. Scott, 61 Ohio St.2d 155, 400 N.E.2d 375 (1980), the Supreme

Court also explained that:

               An express written or oral statement of waiver of the right to remain

       silent or the right to counsel * * * is not inevitably either necessary or

       sufficient to establish waiver. The question is not one of form, but rather

       whether the defendant in fact knowingly and voluntarily waived the rights

       delineated in [Miranda].

(Citations omitted.) Id. at paragraph one of syllabus. Accord State v. Dotson, 2d Dist.

Clark No. 1997-CA-71, 1997 WL 822694, *7 (Nov. 21, 1997).

       {¶ 31} In this case, the trial court found and the record established that Fowler

verbally confirmed his understanding of his Miranda rights immediately after they were

read to him in Dayton and immediately before his interview at the Miami County Sheriff’s

Office. Following those confirmations, Fowler did not exercise his right to remain silent

or request the presence of an attorney.         Instead, Fowler willingly spoke with the

detectives and answered their questions. Fowler’s conduct in that regard constitutes an

implied waiver of his Miranda rights, as no written materials or specific oral statements

were required for a valid waiver.

       {¶ 32} For all the foregoing reasons, Fowler’s claim that he did not knowingly,

intelligently, and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights lacks merit.
                                                                                          -14-

                                      Police Coercion

       {¶ 33} We next address Fowler’s claim that the trial court should have suppressed

his statements due to the detectives using impermissible, coercive police tactics during

his interview.   Specifically, Fowler claims that the detectives coerced him to make

incriminating statements by offering him promises of leniency in exchange for his

cooperation. Fowler also claims that the detectives threatened him with the prospect of

an increased punishment if he did not speak to them and tell them the truth.

       {¶ 34} Even where a valid Miranda waiver exists, as is did here, “a statement may

be involuntary and subject to suppression if the statement is the product of actual police

coercion.” State v. Gray-Mosher, 2018-Ohio-1422, 101 N.E.3d 729, ¶ 8 (2d Dist.), citing

State v. Nevarez-Reyes, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27047, 2017-Ohio-2610, ¶ 31-32.

Indeed, “[c]oercive police activity is a necessary predicate to finding that a confession is

not voluntary.” State v. McKinley, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 21668, 2007-Ohio-3705,

¶ 19, citing Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473

(1986).

       {¶ 35} “The test [for coercion] is whether police conduct overbore the defendant’s

will to resist and brought about a confession not freely self-determined.” State v. Cottrell,

2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28089, 2019-Ohio-889, ¶ 13, citing State v. Young, 2d Dist.

Montgomery No. 20408, 2004-Ohio-3916, ¶ 44. “[A] court may find coercion when law-

enforcement officers ‘persuad[e] or deceiv[e] the accused, with false promises or

information, into relinquishing his rights and responding to questions.’ ” State v. Belton,

149 Ohio St.3d 165, 2016-Ohio-1581, 74 N.E.3d 319, ¶ 111, quoting State v. Edwards,
                                                                                         -15-

49 Ohio St.2d 31, 39, 358 N.E.2d 1051 (1976), vacated on other grounds, 438 U.S. 911,

98 S.Ct. 3147, 57 L.Ed.2d 1155 (1978). Accord State v. Gitzinger, 2d Dist. Montgomery

No. 27893, 2018-Ohio-4445, ¶ 13. Accordingly, “false promises of leniency and

misrepresentations of potential punishments by the police are improper.”           State v.

Williams, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28648, 2021-Ohio-1340, ¶ 63, citing State v. Jones,

2015-Ohio-4116, 43 N.E.3d 833, ¶ 18 (2d Dist.).

       {¶ 36} In contrast to false promises of leniency, “a mere suggestion that

cooperation may result in more lenient treatment is neither misleading nor unduly

coercive, as people ‘convicted of criminal offenses generally are dealt with more leniently

when they have cooperated with the authorities.’ ” State v. Stringham, 2d Dist. Miami

No. 2002-CA-9, 2003-Ohio-1100, ¶ 16, quoting State v. Farley, 2d Dist. Miami No. 2002-

CA-2, 2002-Ohio-6192, ¶ 44. (Other citation omitted.) “Likewise, an investigator’s offer

to ‘help’ if a defendant confesses is not improper.” Id., citing State v. Chase, 55 Ohio

St.2d 237, 247, 378 N.E.2d 1064 (1978).          (Other citation omitted.)    “In addition,

admonitions to tell the truth are considered neither threats nor promises and are

permissible.” Id., citing State v. Loza, 71 Ohio St.3d 61, 67, 641 N.E.2d 1082 (1994).

Therefore, “[o]fficers may discuss the advantages of telling the truth, advise suspects that

cooperation will be considered, or even suggest that a court may be lenient with a truthful

defendant.” Belton at ¶ 111. Accord State v. Ford, 158 Ohio St.3d 139, 2019-Ohio-

4539, 140 N.E.3d 616, ¶ 198.

       {¶ 37} In this case, the trial court found that the detectives spoke calmly and

respectfully to Fowler during the interview, which lasted one and a half hours. The trial
                                                                                       -16-

court also found that the detectives did not make any promises or threats to Fowler that

were misleading or unduly coercive, and that the detectives did not mistreat or intimidate

Fowler. In addition, the trial court found that Fowler was calm and alert during the

interview, and that he answered the detective’s questions appropriately.

      {¶ 38} Upon review, we find that the trial court’s findings were supported by

competent credible evidence in the record. The evidence presented at the suppression

hearing established that the detectives simply stressed to Fowler the importance of being

honest and how Fowler’s honesty and cooperation could benefit him. For example,

shortly after reading Fowler his Miranda rights, Det. Hickey made the following statement.

               People who cooperate, um, who are honest about things they’ve

      done, take responsibility for their own actions, those things bode well for

      them down the road, um, be that at the prosecutor’s office or a judge or

      anything like that. But that is completely up to you. We just want to give

      you as much information as we can so that you can make an educated

      decision on how you want to move forward with the stuff we need to talk

      about.

State’s Suppression Hearing Exhibit 1.

      {¶ 39} The evidence also established that the detectives advised Fowler that they

could not make him any promises with regard to his punishment.             The detectives

specifically advised Fowler that it was the judge who would implement the sentencing

guidelines and decide his punishment. The detectives further advised Fowler that the

sentencing guidelines included considerations such as remorsefulness and honesty.
                                                                                         -17-

Accordingly, there is no merit to Fowler’s claim that the detectives made promises of

leniency or threats with regard to his punishment. The detectives simply told Fowler that

his honesty and cooperation would be taken into consideration at sentencing, and that

the detectives wanted to assist him in getting the help he needed. Such conduct was

not improper.

       {¶ 40} We do note that the detectives continually suggested that Fowler was lying

to them after Fowler initially denied that the victim had performed fellatio on him. The

detectives also implied a sense of urgency for Fowler to tell them the whole truth.

However, “[p]olice assertions that the suspect had * * * been lying or would have no later

chance to tell his side of the story do not automatically render a confession involuntary.”

State v. Knight, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2004-CA-35, 2008-Ohio-4926, ¶ 111. Upon review,

we cannot say that the detectives’ conduct overbore Fowler’s will to resist or critically

impaired his capacity for self-determination. The detectives simply told Fowler that they

believed he was lying, that his dishonesty would be looked upon unfavorably by the

prosecutor and the court, and that he could benefit from telling them the whole truth during

the interview. We do not find that this constituted impermissible, coercive police conduct.

Accordingly, Fowler’s claim that his statements were involuntary lacks merit.

       {¶ 41} Having found that Fowler knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his

Miranda rights and that Fowler’s statements were not rendered involuntary by

impermissible, coercive police conduct, we conclude that the trial court properly denied

Fowler’s motion to suppress. Therefore, Fowler’s first assignment of error is overruled.
                                                                                          -18-

                              Second Assignment of Error

       {¶ 42} Under his second assignment of error, Fowler challenges the admissibility

of the Google records that were used to identify him. Fowler contends that the Google

records were inadmissible because they were not properly authenticated. According to

Fowler, the trial court erroneously determined that the Google records were self-

authenticating documents. Fowler also claims that the admission of the Google records

violated his constitutional rights under the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.

Each of Fowler’s arguments are addressed separately below.

                                      Authentication

       {¶ 43} As noted above, Fowler contends that the trial court erroneously determined

that the Google records were self-authenticating documents and thus were not properly

authenticated at trial. “A trial court’s ruling on the adequacy of authentication is reviewed

for abuse of discretion.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Ramos, 2d Dist. Montgomery No.

28214, 2019-Ohio-3588, ¶ 22.       “A trial court abuses its discretion when it makes a

decision that is unreasonable, unconscionable, or arbitrary.” (Citation omitted.) State

v. Darmond, 135 Ohio St.3d 343, 2013-Ohio-966, 986 N.E.2d 971, ¶ 34.

       {¶ 44} Before a document can be admitted into evidence, it must be properly

authenticated as set forth in Evid.R. 901 or self-authenticating under Evid.R. 902. A

document is properly authenticated under Evid.R. 901 “by evidence sufficient to support

a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” Therefore, under

Evid.R. 901, “extrinsic evidence of authentication or identification is a condition precedent
                                                                                         -19-

to the admissibility of substantive evidence.” Congress Park Business Ctr., L.L.C. v.

Nitelites, Inc., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 21262, 2007-Ohio-4200, ¶ 12. Evid.R. 902, on

the other hand, lists certain kinds of documents that are self-authenticating, i.e.,

documents that can be admitted without extrinsic evidence of their authenticity.

       {¶ 45} In this case, the trial court found that the Google records in question were

self-authenticating under Evid.R. 902(11).      Evid.R. 902(11) provides that “Certified

Domestic Records of a Regularly Conducted Activity” are self-authenticating when they

“meet[ ] the requirements of Evid.R. 803(6), as shown by a certification of the custodian

or another qualified person[.]” The rule also requires that, before trial, the proponent of

the self-authenticating document “must give the adverse party reasonable written notice

of the intent to offer the record--and must make the record and certification available for

inspection--so that the party has a fair opportunity to challenge them.” Evid.R. 902(11).

       {¶ 46} Here, Fowler does not dispute that the State provided him with reasonable

written notice of its intent to offer the Google records before trial or that the State made

the records and the required certification available to him for inspection. Instead, Fowler

argues that Evid.R. 902(11) was not satisfied because the Google records did not meet

the requirements of Evid.R. 803(6).

       {¶ 47} Evid.R. 803(6) provides that “Records of Regularly Conducted Activity” are

not excluded by the rule against hearsay. Under Evid.R. 803(6), a record of regularly

conducted activity is:

              A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of

       acts, events, or conditions, made at or near the time by, or from information
                                                                                        -20-

      transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly

      conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that

      business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data

      compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified

      witness or as provided by Rule 901(B)(10), unless the source of information

      or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of

      trustworthiness. * * *

(Emphasis added.) Evid.R. 803(6).

      {¶ 48} Fowler contends that the Google records in question did not meet the

requirements of Evid.R. 803(6) because the State did not present testimony from a

records custodian or other qualified witness establishing that the Google records qualified

as records of regularly conducted activity. This argument is flawed and illogical given

that it is being lodged within the context of Evid.R. 902(11). “[T]he meaning [of Evid.R.

902] is clear: no evidence other than the document or item itself is needed for

authentication (for purposes of admissibility) provided that the document or item meets

the standards of a particular paragraph of the rule.” 1980 Staff Note, Evid.R. 902. To

require the testimony of a records custodian or other qualified witness to establish a

document is self-authenticating under Evid.R. 902(11) would negate the whole purpose

of that rule and render it meaningless.

      {¶ 49} The language of Evid.R. 803(6) indicates that the required features of a

record of regularly conducted activity can be shown not only “by the testimony of the

custodian or other qualified witness” but also “as provided by Rule 901(B)(10).”
                                                                                         -21-

(Emphasis added.) Evid.R. 901(B)(10) states that evidence may be authenticated by

“[a]ny method of authentication or identification provided by statute enacted by the

General Assembly not in conflict with a rule of the Supreme Court of Ohio or by other

rules prescribed by the Supreme Court.” (Emphasis added.) Pursuant to Article IV,

Section 5(B) of the Ohio Constitution, the Supreme Court of Ohio prescribes the rules

governing the practice and procedure in all courts of the state, which includes the Ohio

Rules of Evidence. Accordingly, the self-authentication provisions in Evid.R. 902 are

prescribed by the Supreme Court. Because those provisions are prescribed by the

Supreme Court, they apply to Evid.R. 803(6)’s catchall provision “as provided by Rule

901(B)(10).” See State v. Sherman, 6th Dist. Sandusky No. S-88-6, 1989 WL 47238, *8

(May 5, 1989) (applying Evid.R. 902 to the catchall provision in Evid.R. 803(6)).

       {¶ 50} In addition, a staff note to Evid.R. 803(6) states that: “The record keeper,

absent self-authenticating provisions must testify that the records are such as are

routinely kept as a part of the business and that the entrant (declarant) is under a duty to

record the items contained in the record, and that the records are maintained accurately

in accordance with a custom or routine.” (Emphasis added.) 1980 Staff Note, Evid. R.

803(6). This staff note suggests that when “self-authenticating provisions” are at play,

no testimony from a records custodian is necessary to meet the requirements of Evid.R.

803(6). See also Chagrin Falls v. Ptak, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109342, 2020-Ohio-

5623, ¶ 21 (holding that it was unnecessary to elicit testimony from a records custodian

to satisfy Evid.R. 803(6) where a signed certificate of authenticity made pursuant to

Evid.R. 902(11) was admitted into evidence).
                                                                                          -22-

       {¶ 51} Based on the foregoing analysis, we reject Fowler’s claim that testimony

from a records custodian or other qualified witness is necessary to meet the requirements

of Evid.R. 803(6) when that rule is being applied in the context of self-authentication under

Evid.R. 902(11). However, the other requirements of Evid.R. 803(6) must be satisfied.

Those requirements are that the document must: (1) “be one regularly recorded in a

regularly conducted activity”; (2) “have been entered by a person with knowledge of the

act, event or condition”; and (3) “have been recorded at or near the time of the

transaction.” State v. Davis, 116 Ohio St.3d 404, 2008-Ohio-2, 880 N.E.2d 31, ¶ 171.

In addition, there must be no indication that “ ‘the source of information or the method or

circumstances of preparation [of the document] * * * lack trustworthiness.’ ” Id., quoting

Evid.R. 803(6). As previously discussed, for a document to be self-authenticating under

Evid.R. 902(11), all of the aforementioned requirements must be “shown by a certification

of the custodian or another qualified person.” Evid.R. 902(11).

       {¶ 52} In this case, the State presented two documents titled “Certificate of

Authenticity” that pertained to the Google records at issue. Both certificates were signed

by Google records custodian Christopher Jackson on February 28, 2022, and March 2,

2022. In those documents, Jackson made the following certifications:

       1. I am authorized to submit this affidavit on behalf of Google LLC

          (“Google”), located in Mountain View, California.         I have personal

          knowledge of the following facts, except as noted, and could testify

          competently thereto if called as a witness.

       2. I am qualified to authenticate the records because I am familiar with how
                                                                                          -23-

          the records were created, managed, stored and retrieved.

       3. Google provides Internet-based services.

       4. Attached is a true and correct copy of records pertaining to the

          geographical coordinates 39.944667, -84.225925, with Google Ref. No.

          11489207 (“Document”). Accompanying this Certificate of Authenticity

          as Attachment A is a list of hash values corresponding to each file

          produced in response to the Search Warrant.

       5. The Document is a record made and retained by Google.                Google

          servers record this data automatically at the time, or reasonably soon

          after, it is entered or transmitted by the user, and this data is kept in the

          course of this regularly conducted activity and was made by regularly

          conducted activity as a regular practice of Google.

       6. The Document is a true duplicate of original records that were generated

          by Google’s electronic process or system that produces an accurate

          result.   The accuracy of Google’s electronic process and system is

          regularly verified by Google.

       7. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, I declare under penalty of perjury that the

          foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

State’s Trial Exhibits 3 and 4.

       {¶ 53} Upon review, we find that the foregoing certifications meet all the relevant

requirements of Evid.R. 803(6). We also find that there is nothing in the record indicating

a lack of trustworthiness with regard to the information provided in the Google records.
                                                                                            -24-

Although Fowler’s appellate brief cites various reasons why he questions the

trustworthiness/scientific reliability of the Google records, we note that there was nothing

preventing Fowler from subpoenaing the records custodian’s appearance at trial himself

and questioning the records custodian regarding his concerns.

       {¶ 54} For the foregoing reasons, we do not find that the trial court abused its

discretion when it admitted the Google records as self-authenticating documents under

Evid.R. 902(11).

                                    Confrontation Clause

       {¶ 55} Fowler also claims that the admission of the Google records in question

violated his constitutional rights under the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause. We

review evidentiary rulings that implicate the Confrontation Clause de novo.           State v.

Curtiss, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 29006, 2022-Ohio-146, ¶ 101, citing State v. McKelton,

148 Ohio St.3d 261, 2016-Ohio-5735, 70 N.E.3d 508, ¶ 97, citing United States v.

Henderson, 626 F.3d 326, 333 (6th Cir.2010). “In de novo review, we independently

review a trial court’s decision and accord no deference to it.” (Citations omitted.) Id.

       {¶ 56} “The Confrontation Clause provides: ‘In all criminal prosecutions, the

accused shall enjoy the right * * * to be confronted with the witnesses against him * * *.’ ”

State v. Tench, 156 Ohio St.3d 85, 2018-Ohio-5205, 123 N.E.3d 955, ¶ 210. “This

means that ‘admission of an out-of-court statement of a witness who does not appear at

trial is prohibited * * * if the statement is testimonial unless the witness is unavailable and

the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness.’ ” Id., quoting
                                                                                          -25-

State v. Maxwell, 139 Ohio St.3d 12, 2014-Ohio-1019, 9 N.E.3d 930, ¶ 34, citing Crawford

v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004).

       {¶ 57} A statement is testimonial if it is “made for ‘a primary purpose of creating an

out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.’ ” Maxwell at ¶ 40, quoting Michigan v. Bryant,

562 U.S. 344, 358, 131 S.Ct. 1143, 179 L.Ed.2d 93 (2011). In other words, “[t]o rank as

‘testimonial,’ a statement must have a ‘primary purpose’ of ‘establish[ing] or prov[ing] past

events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.’ ” Bullcoming v. New Mexico,

564 U.S. 647, 131 S.Ct. 2705, 180 L.Ed.2d 610, (2011), fn. 6, quoting Davis v.

Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006).                  “If a

statement’s primary purpose is anything else, the statement is nontestimonial,” meaning

“[i]ts admissibility is ‘the concern of state and federal rules of evidence, not the

Confrontation Clause.’ ” Maxwell at ¶ 40, quoting Bryant at 359.

       {¶ 58} It is well established that business records “by their nature” are “not

testimonial.” Crawford at 56. Business records “ ‘are not testimonial in nature because

they are prepared in the ordinary course of regularly conducted business and are “by their

nature” not prepared for litigation.’ ” State v. Craig, 110 Ohio St.3d 306, 2006-Ohio-4571,

853 N.E.2d 621, ¶ 82, quoting People v. Durio, 7 Misc.3d 729, 734, 794 N.Y.S.2d 863

(2005), quoting Crawford. Therefore, “[b]usiness * * * records are generally admissible

absent confrontation not because they qualify under an exception to the hearsay rules,

but because—having been created for the administration of an entity’s affairs and not for

the purpose of establishing or proving some fact at trial—they are not testimonial.”

Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 324, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 174 L.Ed.2d 314
                                                                                         -26-

(2009). See United States v. Flores, 6th Cir. No. 13-5763, 2014 WL 12930965, *2 (Sep.

29, 2014) (admission of T-Mobile cell phone GPS location data kept in the ordinary course

of the company’s business did not violate right of confrontation because the data “was

not created for trial purposes” and thus “non-testimonial”).

         {¶ 59} In this case, the data provided in the Google records was not kept by Google

for the purpose of proving some fact at trial. Rather, as certified by Google’s records

custodian in the two Certificates of Authenticity: “Google servers record[ed the] data

automatically at the time, or reasonably soon after, it [was] entered or transmitted by the

user, and this data [was] kept in the course of this regularly conducted activity and was

made by regularly conducted activity as a regular practice of Google.” State’s Trial

Exhibits 3 and 4. Because the data provided in the Google records was created as part

of a regularly conducted business activity, and not for purposes of trial, the records are

non-testimonial.      Because the records are non-testimonial, they do not offend the

Confrontation Clause.       Accordingly, Fowler’s Confrontation Clause argument lacks

merit.

         {¶ 60} Because the trial court properly determined that the Google records were

self-authenticating under Evid.R. 902(11), and because the admission of the Google

records did not violate Fowler’s right of confrontation, Fowler’s second assignment of

error is overruled.

                                        Conclusion

         {¶ 61} Having overruled both assignments of error raised by Fowler, the judgment
                                                  -27-

of the trial court is affirmed.

                                  .............

EPLEY, P.J., and HUFFMAN, J., concur.