Court Opinion

ID: 9929417
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-02 16:19:13.801181+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:07:13.574328
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

                                  2024 WY 16

                                               OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2023

                                                   February 2, 2024

RACHEL RODRIGUEZ-WILLIAMS,
House District Representative; CHIP
NEIMAN, House District Representative;
and RIGHT TO LIFE OF WYOMING,
INC.,

Appellants
(Proposed Intervenors),

v.

DANIELLE JOHNSON; KATHLEEN
DOW; GIOVANNINA ANTHONY,
M.D.; RENE R. HINKLE, M.D.;
CHELSEA’S FUND; and CIRCLE OF
HOPE HEALTHCARE d/b/a Wellspring
Health Access,                                    S-23-0196

Appellees
(Plaintiffs),

and

STATE OF WYOMING; MARK
GORDON, Governor of Wyoming;
BRIDGET HILL, Attorney General for
the State of Wyoming; MATTHEW
CARR, Sheriff Teton County;
MICHELLE WEBER, Chief of Police,
Town of Jackson, Wyoming,

Appellees
(Defendants).
                        Appeal from the District Court of Teton County
                          The Honorable Melissa M. Owens, Judge

Representing Appellants (Proposed Intervenors) Rachel Rodriguez-Williams, House
District Representative; Chip Neiman, House District Representative; and Right to Life
of Wyoming, Inc.:
       Frederick J. Harrison, Frederick J. Harrison, PC, Cheyenne, Wyoming; Denise
       Harle and Timothy Garrison, Alliance Defending Freedom, Scottsdale, Arizona.
       Argument by Mr. Garrison.

Representing Appellees (Plaintiffs) Danielle Johnson; Kathleen Dow; Giovannina
Anthony, M.D.; Rene R. Hinkle, M.D.; Chelsea’s Fund; and Circle of Hope
Healthcare d/b/a Wellspring Health Access:
       John H. Robinson and Marci C. Bramlet, Robinson Bramlet, LLC, Casper,
       Wyoming; Peter S. Modlin, Gibson Dunn & Crutcher, LLP, San Francisco,
       California; Megan Cooney, Gibson Dunn & Crutcher, LLP, Irvine, California.
       Argument by Mr. Modlin.

Representing Appellees (Defendants) State of Wyoming; Mark Gordon, Governor of
Wyoming; and Bridget Hill, Attorney General for the State of Wyoming:
      Jay Jerde, Special Assistant Attorney General.

Representing Appellee (Defendant) Matthew Carr, Sheriff Teton County:
      No appearance.

Representing Appellee (Defendant) Michelle Weber, Chief of Police, Town of Jackson,
Wyoming:
      No appearance.

Before FOX, C.J., and KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, GRAY, and FENN, JJ.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are
requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of
any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the
permanent volume.
FOX, Chief Justice.

[¶1] State Representatives Rachel Rodriguez-Williams and Chip Neiman, and Right to
Life of Wyoming, Inc. (RTLW) (collectively the Proposed Intervenors) appeal the district
court’s denial of their motion to intervene in a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of
two Wyoming laws restricting abortion. We affirm.

                                          ISSUES

[¶2]   This appeal presents two issues:

              1. Did the district court err in denying the Proposed
                 Intervenors’ motion to intervene as of right?

              2. Did the district court abuse its discretion in denying the
                 Proposed Intervenors’ motion for permissive intervention?

                                          FACTS

[¶3] In 2023, the Wyoming Legislature passed two laws restricting abortion. See Wyo.
Stat. Ann. §§ 35-6-120-138; Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-6-139 (2023). On March 17, 2023,
four individuals and two organizations (Plaintiffs) filed a complaint against the State of
Wyoming; Governor Mark Gordon; Attorney General Bridget Hill; Teton County Sheriff
Matthew Carr; and Jackson Chief of Police Michelle Weber. Plaintiffs challenged the
constitutionality of the two laws and sought a permanent injunction enjoining their
enforcement. Plaintiffs contemporaneously filed a motion for a temporary restraining
order to enjoin enforcement of the laws pending the litigation’s outcome.

[¶4] On March 21, 2023, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. That day, the Attorney
General’s Office, on behalf of the State, Governor Gordon, and Attorney General Hill
(the State Defendants), submitted a nearly 100-page opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion for a
temporary restraining order. On March 22, 2023, the district court entered the temporary
restraining order. The challenged laws are therefore not being enforced pending final
determination of this case.

[¶5] On April 4, 2023, the State Defendants answered Plaintiffs’ amended complaint.
On April 6, 2023, the Proposed Intervenors filed a motion to intervene as of right;
alternatively, they sought permissive intervention. Along with their motion to intervene,
the Proposed Intervenors filed a proposed answer to the amended complaint, which in
material respects mirrored the answer of the State Defendants. Plaintiffs opposed the
motion to intervene. The State Defendants did not oppose the Proposed Intervenors’
intervention but objected to their expressed desire for an evidentiary hearing or trial. The

                                             1
State Defendants maintained that the constitutional challenge to the abortion laws
presented purely legal questions that did not require taking evidence.

[¶6] The district court denied the motion to intervene. It found the Proposed
Intervenors timely filed their motion but otherwise did not meet the requirements for
intervention as of right. The court denied permissive intervention on grounds that the
State Defendants adequately represented the interests of the Proposed Intervenors and the
intervention would unduly delay and prejudice adjudication of the case. The Proposed
Intervenors timely appealed to this Court. 1

                                    STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶7] This Court reviews a ruling on the timeliness of a motion to intervene for an abuse
of discretion. Int. of EHD, 2017 WY 134, ¶ 14, 405 P.3d 222, 226 (Wyo. 2017) (quoting
Hirshberg v. Coon, 2012 WY 5, ¶ 9, 268 P.3d 258, 260 (Wyo. 2012)). Aside from the
question of its timeliness, intervention as of right presents a question of law that we
review de novo. Id.

[¶8] We give deference to a district court’s denial of permissive intervention and
review that ruling for an abuse of discretion. Hirshberg, 2012 WY 5, ¶ 9, 268 P.3d at 261
(quoting Concerned Citizens of Spring Creek Ranch v. Tips Up, L.L.C., 2008 WY 64,
¶¶ 11-12, 185 P.3d 34, 38 (Wyo. 2008)); see also Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v.
Gunter, 2007 WY 151, ¶ 9, 167 P.3d 645, 649 (Wyo. 2007) (“We review a denial of a
motion for permissive intervention for an abuse of discretion, and our review is
particularly deferential.”) (citing Masinter v. Markstein, 2002 WY 64, ¶ 14, 45 P.3d 237,
242 (Wyo. 2002)); Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass’n, Inc. v. N.M. Pub. Regul.
Comm’n, 787 F.3d 1068, 1075 (10th Cir. 2015) (agreeing that “decisions holding that the
district court abused its discretion in denying permissive intervention are predictably
rare”).

                                           DISCUSSION

[¶9] We have summarized the W.R.C.P. 24(a)(2) requirements for intervention as of
right as follows:

                First, the applicant must claim an interest related to the
                property or transaction which is the subject of the action.
1
  On appeal, the State Defendants have taken the same position they took below. They do not oppose
intervention but object to the district court taking evidence. The State Defendants therefore offer no
argument regarding the district court’s order denying intervention and instead offer argument only on the
question of whether a trial is required to resolve the legal challenges to the abortion laws. We need not
address that question to resolve this appeal.

                                                   2
                Second, the applicant must be so situated that the disposition
                of the action may, as a practical matter, impair or impede the
                applicant’s ability to protect that interest. Third, there must be
                a showing that the applicant’s interest will not be adequately
                represented by the existing parties. Fourth, the application for
                intervention must be timely.

Int. of EHD, 2017 WY 134, ¶ 12, 405 P.3d at 225-26 (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Colley, 871 P.2d 191, 194 (Wyo. 1994)). “An applicant who fails to meet any of
the conditions of W.R.C.P. 24(a)(2) is not permitted to intervene as of right.”
Halliburton, 2007 WY 151, ¶ 6, 167 P.3d at 648 (cleaned up) (quoting State Farm, 871
P.2d at 194). 2

I.      Because the Proposed Intervenors do not have a significant protectable interest
        in the litigation, the district court did not err in denying their motion to
        intervene as of right.

[¶10] To satisfy Rule 24(a)(2)’s interest requirement, a proposed intervenor must show
“a significant protectable interest.” Tips Up, 2008 WY 64, ¶ 17, 185 P.3d at 40 (citing
Platte Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Basin Elec. Power Coop., 638 P.2d 1276, 1279 (Wyo.
1982)). “A significant protectable interest is distinguished from a merely contingent
interest, an interest shared by members of the public at large, or a mere concern in the
outcome.” Id. (citing Halliburton, 2007 WY 151, ¶ 6, 167 P.3d at 648); see also Allard v.
Frizzell, 536 F.2d 1332, 1334 (10th Cir. 1976) (upholding denial on ground that movants
had “no requisite specific interest, and none other than that asserted by the public
generally”).

A.      RTLW does not have a significant protectable interest in the litigation.

[¶11] RTLW claims the following concerning its interest in the challenge to the abortion
laws:

                       Right to Life of Wyoming’s core purpose is to educate
                the public on the value of human life—including the harms of
                abortion—and to advocate for laws that protect pregnant
                women and their unborn children. All of the organization’s
                resources are dedicated to this mission. Indeed, Right to Life
                of Wyoming devoted substantial time, funds, and other
                resources in specifically lobbying and advocating for the

2
 Plaintiffs did not appeal the district court’s finding that the Proposed Intervenors’ motion was timely,
and we therefore do not address that requirement.

                                                   3
               statutes challenged in this case. Thus, its interest is greatly
               distinguishable from members of the public. The fates of
               these statutes are mission-critical to Right to Life of
               Wyoming’s efficacy.

[¶12] We do not question that RTLW has expended great effort and resources in its
campaign against abortion and in favor of the legislation at issue in this case. We
disagree, however, that these advocacy efforts distinguish RTLW’s interests from the
policy concerns held by members of the public at large. The persuasive weight of
authority holds that advocating for a policy and lobbying for legislation to enact that
policy does not give an individual or entity a protectable interest in a legal challenge to
the subsequently enacted law.

[¶13] For example, in Keith v. Daley, the Illinois Pro-Life Coalition (IPC), a lobbying
organization, sought to intervene in a suit challenging the constitutionality of an Illinois
statute regulating abortion. 764 F.2d 1265, 1267 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
980 (1985). Like RTLW, IPC claimed an interest based on its advocacy for unborn
children and its lobbying efforts in support of the challenged laws. Id. It asserted “that its
‘very existence is intertwined with its ability to promote this type of legislation and to
insure that such laws are adequately defended if challenged.’” Id. at 1269. The district
court denied intervention as of right, and the Seventh Circuit upheld that denial. Id. at
1270. It noted that “[o]nly the defendant Attorney General and the defendant Cook
County State’s Attorney are required to defend and enforce the law of the state of
Illinois[.]” Id. at 1269. It then held:

               [IPC’s] purpose is essentially communicative and persuasive.
               IPC seeks to inform people about abortion and about IPC’s
               preference for alternatives to abortion. IPC also seeks to
               lobby legislators so that its views on the protection of “the
               unborn” may become law. In an America whose freedom is
               secured by its ever vigilant guard on the openness of its
               “marketplace of ideas,” IPC is encouraged to thrive, and to
               speak, lobby, promote, and persuade, so that its principles
               may become, if it is the will of the majority, the law of the
               land. Such a priceless right to free expression, however, does
               not also suggest that IPC has a right to intervene in every
               lawsuit involving abortion rights, or to forever defend statutes
               it helped to enact. Rule 24(a) precludes a conception of
               lawsuits, even “public law” suits, as necessary forums for
               such public policy debates.

Id. at 1270.

                                              4
[¶14] Other courts have reached a similar conclusion. In Northland Fam. Plan. Clinic,
Inc. v. Cox, a group called Standing Together to Oppose Partial–Birth–Abortion (STTOP)
sought to intervene in a suit challenging a Michigan law that regulated abortion. 487 F.3d
323, 327-28 (6th Cir. 2007). STTOP was a ballot-question committee of Right to Life of
Michigan, Inc., formed to promote passage of the challenged law. Id. at 328. It argued
that as a public interest group involved in the process leading to adoption of the
challenged law, it had a legal interest in the subject matter of the lawsuit. Id. at 344. The
district court found the interest insufficient, and the Sixth Circuit agreed. Id. at 343-44,
346. The court held that once a statute is enacted, “the public interest in its enforceability
is entrusted for the most part to the government[.]” Id. at 345. It thus concluded:

              After the Act’s passage . . . STTOP’s interest in the
              enforcement of the statute is greatly diminished due to the
              state’s responsibilities in enforcing and defending it as it is
              written. As things now stand, STTOP’s interest in this case
              simply pertains to the enforceability of the statute in general,
              which we do not believe to be cognizable as a substantial
              legal interest sufficient to require intervention as of right.

Id. at 345-46; see also League of Women Voters Minn. v. Ritchie, 819 N.W.2d 636, 640,
642 (Minn. 2012) (per curiam) (nonprofit organization that expended resources to get
proposed constitutional amendment passed in legislature denied intervention in suit
alleging error in preparation of ballot for general election); Coal. to Def. Affirmative
Action v. Granholm, 501 F.3d 775, 780-81 (6th Cir. 2007) (groups that lobbied for ballot
initiative lacked substantial legal interest in challenge to law despite court’s expansive
view of interest sufficient to support intervention).

[¶15] As these cases illustrate, once the abortion laws challenged in this case were
enacted, the responsibility for enforcing and defending the laws shifted to the
government. At that point, RTLW’s advocacy for the laws and its interest in the policy
underlying them became no different from or greater than that of the public at large. It
thus did not have a protectable interest in the litigation challenging the laws. Tips Up,
2008 WY 64, ¶ 17, 185 P.3d at 40; Allard, 536 F.2d at 1334.

[¶16] The cases the Proposed Intervenors cite are distinguishable and thus do not compel
a different conclusion. They principally rely on Coalition of Ariz./N.M. Cntys. for Stable
Econ. Growth v. Dep’t of the Interior, 100 F.3d 837 (10th Cir. 1996), which they argue
stands for the proposition that advocacy for a cause provides the requisite interest for
intervention as of right. We disagree.

[¶17] In Coalition, the proposed intervenor, Dr. Robin Silver, was “a commercial
wildlife photographer, an amateur biologist, and a naturalist, specializing in
photographing creatures in the American Southwest.” 100 F.3d at 839. He petitioned the

                                              5
United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) to list the Mexican Spotted Owl as a
threatened or endangered species under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), and when
FWS failed to timely act on the petition, he threatened suit under the ESA’s citizen
lawsuit provision. Id. FWS eventually listed the owl as a threatened species but failed to
designate critical habitat for it. Id. Dr. Silver and other environmental groups sued FWS
and obtained an order compelling it to designate habitat. Id.

[¶18] While Dr. Silver’s suit was pending, the Coalition of Arizona/New Mexico
Counties for Stable Economic Growth filed a separate lawsuit challenging the owl’s
listing. Id. Dr. Silver moved to intervene as of right, or in the alternative, for permissive
intervention, and the district court denied the motion. Id. The Tenth Circuit reversed. Id.
at 846.

[¶19] In addressing the interest requirement for intervention as of right, the court held
that Dr. Silver was required to show an interest in the proceedings that was “direct,
substantial[,] and legally protectable.” Id. at 840. It concluded first “that Dr. Silver’s
involvement with the Owl in the wild and his persistent record of advocacy for its
protection amounts to a direct and substantial interest in the listing of the Owl for the
purpose of intervention as of right.” Id. at 841. The court then went on to address whether
the interest was legally protectable, as required for intervention as of right, and
determined it was. Id. First, it found the ESA gave him a legal right to protect his interest
in the owl. Id. Next, the court observed that “the desire to use or observe an animal
species, even for purely esthetic purposes, is undeniably a cognizable interest for purpose
of standing.” Id. at 842 (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562-63, 112
S.Ct. 2130, 2137, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)). It concluded that since Dr. Silver had
independent standing to participate in the suit, he had the legally protectable interest
required to intervene as of right. Id.

[¶20] Under the reasoning of Coalition, RTLW may claim a significant interest in the
litigation challenging Wyoming’s abortion laws based on its advocacy. That, however, is
not sufficient to support intervention as of right. Under our precedent, and the holding in
Coalition, the claimed interest must also be legally protectable. Id. at 846; Tips Up, 2008
WY 64, ¶ 17, 185 P.3d at 40. In Coalition, that requirement was satisfied by Dr. Silver’s
legal rights under the ESA and his independent standing based on his recognized
aesthetic interest in observing the species he sought to protect. RTLW has pointed to no
law that provides it a protectable interest in this litigation, and it has made no claim that it
has independent standing to participate in the litigation. Coalition therefore does not
support its intervention as of right.

[¶21] The Proposed Intervenors’ reliance on W. Watersheds Project v. U.S. Forest Serv.
Chief, No. 20-CV-67-F, 2020 WL 13065066 (D. Wyo. July 29, 2020) and Citizens for
Balanced Use v. Mont. Wilderness Ass’n, 647 F.3d 893 (9th Cir. 2011) is equally
unpersuasive. Both again are environmental cases in which the intervenors showed their

                                               6
members used the resources they sought to protect; intervention as of right was not
granted based solely on an intervenor’s advocacy efforts. W. Watersheds, 2020 WL
13065066 at *3; Mont. Wilderness Ass’n, 647 F.3d at 897-98; see also WildEarth
Guardians v. Nat’l Park Serv., 604 F.3d 1192, 1198 (10th Cir. 2010) (“With respect to
Rule 24(a)(2), we have declared it ‘indisputable’ that a prospective intervenor’s
environmental concern is a legally protectable interest.”). RTLW cites no interest that is
comparable to the protectable interests recognized in these types of environmental cases.

[¶22] RTLW’s reliance on Planned Parenthood of Minn., Inc. v. Citizens for Cmty.
Action, 558 F.2d 861 (8th Cir. 1977) is also misplaced. In that case, Planned Parenthood
challenged an ordinance that would have barred its clinic in the proposed location. Id. at
864. An organization whose professed purpose was “to preserve property values and
insure that abortion facilities do not affect the health, welfare and safety of citizens”
sought to intervene in defense of the ordinance. Id. at 869. The application for
intervention was joined by two couples who lived in the vicinity of the proposed clinic.
Id. The district court denied the motion to intervene, and the Eighth Circuit reversed. Id.
In concluding that the intervenors had a protectable interest in the litigation, the court
found that the “litigation, which will establish the validity or invalidity of the ordinance,
necessarily bears directly on the property interests the applicants seek to preserve.” Id.
Again, the protectable interest in that case went well beyond advocacy for a particular
policy or law.

[¶23] The same is true of Mich. State AFL-CIO v. Miller, 103 F.3d 1240 (6th Cir. 1997).
In that case, the Michigan Chamber of Commerce sought to intervene in a challenge to an
election finance law for which it lobbied. Id. at 1243-44. The district court denied
intervention, and the Sixth Circuit reversed. Id. at 1243. In considering whether the
Chamber had a legally protectable interest, the court noted the Chamber’s advocacy
efforts, but it also relied on the fact that the Chamber had thousands of corporate
members who were subject to regulation under the law. Id. at 1243, 1247. In a later case,
the Sixth Circuit clarified that advocacy for a challenged law is not in itself a protectable
interest for purposes of intervention; it observed that the pivotal consideration in Miller
was the fact that the Chamber’s members were subject to regulation under the challenged
law. Granholm, 501 F.3d at 782. RTLW is not subject to regulation under the abortion
laws, and Miller therefore does not support its position.

[¶24] The only cases RTLW cites that hold intervention should have been permitted
based on advocacy interests alone are three decisions by the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals. See Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1983)
(conservation groups should have been allowed to intervene based on advocacy for bird
conservation area and participation in process to have area designated); Wash. State Bldg.
& Constr. Trades Council v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1982) (sponsor of
radioactive waste initiative should have been allowed to intervene based on its interest in
law); State of Idaho v. Freeman, 625 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1980) (National Organization of

                                             7
Women should have been allowed to intervene in suit challenging procedure for
ratification of ERA based on its interest in the continued viability of ERA). We find these
cases unpersuasive because they contain no reasoning to explain how such advocacy
interests differ from those of the public generally. This is important because courts are
not political forums for these types of public policy debates. Keith, 764 F.2d at 1270. As
one court observed:

              In cases like this one, where a group of plaintiffs challenge
              state legislation, the court should evaluate requests to
              intervene with special care, lest the case be swamped by
              extraneous parties who would do little more than reprise the
              political debate that produced the legislation in the first place.

One Wis. Inst., Inc. v. Nichol, 310 F.R.D. 394, 397 (W.D. Wis. 2015).

[¶25] We therefore adhere to the authority that advocating for a policy and lobbying for
legislation to enact that policy does not give an individual or entity a protectable interest
in a legal challenge to the subsequently enacted law. Because RTLW does not have a
protectable interest in this litigation, the district court did not err in denying its motion to
intervene as of right. Halliburton, 2007 WY 151, ¶ 6, 167 P.3d at 648 (“An applicant
who fails to meet any of the conditions of W.R.C.P. 24(a)(2) is not permitted to intervene
as of right.”) (quoting State Farm, 871 P.2d at 194).

B.     Representatives Rodriguez-Williams and Neiman do not have a significant
       protectable interest in the litigation.

[¶26] Representatives Rodriguez-Williams and Neiman claim a significant protectable
interest in this litigation because they “were the lead sponsor and the chief legislative
shepherd of the statutes, respectively.” They further cite their interest in protecting the
legislature’s authority to enact laws governing abortion and to protect the health and
general welfare of the people. They add:

                      These particular Legislators have an especially strong
              interest in defending the statutes, beyond their roles as lead
              sponsor and floor leader. Both Representatives Neiman and
              Rodriguez-Williams have decades-long personal histories of
              public pro-life advocacy in their communities. Both ran on
              pro-life campaign platforms and committed their legislative
              effort to this crucial policy achievement. The Legislators
              should be allowed to preserve these interests by defending the
              law that they worked so hard to enact.

                                               8
[¶27] Again, we do not question the dedication of the Representatives to their campaign
against abortion and their work on behalf of the challenged laws. However, we also again
disagree that their interest, for purposes of Rule 24(a)(2) intervention, is unique from that
of the public generally.

[¶28] First, we reject the argument that this litigation threatens the legislature’s authority
to regulate abortion or the health and welfare of the public. Regardless of the outcome of
this case, the legislature may still legislate in these areas. To the extent it must do so
within constitutional parameters established by a court decision in the case, that is not a
diminution of its power, but is instead a product of the separation of powers that
underpins our government.

              Determining whether a statute violates the constitution has
              been a matter for judicial consideration since the United
              States Supreme Court decided Marbury v. Madison in 1803.
              Declaring the validity of statutes in relation to the constitution
              is a power vested in the courts as one of the checks and
              balances contemplated by the division of government into
              three departments, legislative, executive and judicial. It is
              emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department
              to say what the law is.

Conrad v. Uinta Cnty. Republican Party, 2023 WY 46, ¶ 13, 529 P.3d 482, 489 (Wyo.
2023) (cleaned up).

[¶29] Interpreting the constitution is exclusively the province of the courts and does not
impinge on the legislature’s authority to vote on legislation. As the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court explained in upholding the denial of intervention to legislators seeking to
defend a law their body enacted,

              the legislators’ interest implicates neither a defense of the
              power or authority of their offices nor a defense of the
              potency of their right to vote. Rather, the legislators simply
              seek to offer their perspective on the correctness of
              governmental conduct, i.e., that the General Assembly did not
              violate the substantive and procedural strictures of the
              Pennsylvania Constitution in enacting Act 13.

Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 84 A.3d 1054, 1055 (Pa. 2014); see also Newdow v.
U.S. Cong., 313 F.3d 495, 499 (9th Cir. 2002) (senate’s own powers and responsibilities
not under attack when constitutionality of law challenged); Roe v. Casey, 464 F.Supp.
483, 486 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (legislator who co-sponsored law had no protectable interest in
litigation where issue did not concern whether law was duly and lawfully enacted).

                                              9
[¶30] The same is true here. The legislature’s authority to vote on legislation is not at
issue in this case. Consequently, Representatives Rodriguez-Williams and Neiman can
claim no protectable interest in this litigation based on their voting authority. Their
reliance on Berger v. N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP, 597 U.S. 179, 142 S.Ct. 2191, 213
L.Ed.2d 517 (2022) to suggest otherwise is misplaced.

[¶31] Berger is the sole case Representatives Rodriguez-Williams and Neiman cite in
support of their asserted interest in this litigation. In that case, the United States Supreme
Court held that if a state legislature authorizes a legislator to intervene in a case
challenging the constitutionality of a state statute, even though the executive branch is
already defending the law, the interest and impairment prongs of Rule 24(a)(2) are
satisfied. Berger, 597 U.S. at 190-94, 142 S.Ct. at 2201-02. The Court reasoned that a
state has a protectable interest in defending its laws and the authority to declare who will
most effectively represent the state in any challenge to its laws. Id.

[¶32] In this case, the Wyoming Legislature did not authorize Representatives
Rodriguez-Willliams and Neiman, or any legislator, to represent the State’s interests in
defending the two abortion statutes. Berger is therefore simply inapplicable. 3

[¶33] Finally, we also reject the Representatives’ claim of a protectable interest based on
their personal histories of advocacy against abortion. This claim fails for the same reason
RTLW’s claim failed. Because it is an interest shared with the general public, advocating
for a policy and working to enact legislation to implement that policy does not create a
protectable interest in a legal challenge to the subsequently enacted law. Tips Up, 2008
WY 64, ¶ 17, 185 P.3d at 40 (interest must differ from interest of public at large); see
also Daughtrey v. Carter, 584 F.2d 1050, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (“Once a bill becomes
law, a Congressman’s interest in its enforcement is shared by, and indistinguishable from,
that of any other member of the public.”); Harrington v. Schlesinger, 528 F.2d 455, 459
(4th Cir. 1975) (“Once a bill has become law . . . [the Senator’s] interest is
indistinguishable from that of any other citizen.”); United States v. Arizona, No. CV 10-
1413-PHX-SRB, 2010 WL 11470582, at *3 (D. Ariz. Oct. 28, 2010) (“Senator Pearce’s
expressed interest is general, shared by many other citizens of the state of Arizona as well
as some of his fellow legislators.”).

3
  Because the Wyoming Legislature did not authorize intervention by a legislator, we need not address
whether we would adopt the Supreme Court’s holding that such authorization compels a conclusion that
the interest and impairment requirements of Rule 24(a)(2) are met. While federal precedent is persuasive
in interpreting our own court rules, it is not binding. Adams v. State, 2023 WY 85, ¶ 21, 534 P.3d 469,
476 (Wyo. 2023) (“[W]e can look to federal precedent interpreting similar rules as persuasive authority.”)
(citing Pena v. State, 2013 WY 4, ¶ 48, 294 P.3d 13, 22-23 (Wyo. 2013)).

                                                   10
[¶34] As we noted in our discussion of RTLW’s interest, our concern with allowing
intervention based on a policy interest shared by the general public is the potential for
interjection of political debate into a purely legal proceeding. Courts are not forums for
such debates. See One Wis. Inst., 310 F.R.D. at 397.

[¶35] For these reasons, Representatives Rodriguez-Williams and Neiman do not have a
protectable legal interest in this litigation. The district court therefore did not err in
denying their motion to intervene as of right. Halliburton, 2007 WY 151, ¶ 6, 167 P.3d at
648 (“An applicant who fails to meet any of the conditions of W.R.C.P. 24(a)(2) is not
permitted to intervene as of right.”) (quoting State Farm, 871 P.2d at 194).

II.    The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Proposed
       Intervenors’ motion for permissive intervention.

[¶36] A court may allow permissive intervention “when the intervenor’s claim or
defense has a question of fact or law in common with the main action and the court in its
discretion determines intervention will not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudications of
the rights of the original parties.” Masinter, 2002 WY 64, ¶ 6, 45 P.3d at 240 (citing
W.R.C.P. 24(b)(2)).

              A court abuses its discretion when it acts in a manner which
              exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances. The
              party who is attacking the trial court’s ruling has the burden
              to establish an abuse of discretion, and the ultimate issue is
              whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did.

Kerbs v. Kerbs, 2020 WY 92, ¶ 14, 467 P.3d 1015, 1019 (Wyo. 2020) (quoting Three
Way, Inc. v. Burton Enters., Inc., 2008 WY 18, ¶ 16, 177 P.3d 219, 225 (Wyo. 2008)).

[¶37] The district court denied permissive intervention on grounds the State Defendants
were adequately representing the Proposed Intervenors’ interests and intervention would
unduly delay and prejudice the case’s adjudication. We find no abuse of discretion in its
ruling.

A.     The district court reasonably concluded the State Defendants were
       adequately representing the interests of the Proposed Intervenors.

[¶38] The Proposed Intervenors contend the district court abused its discretion in
weighing the adequacy of the State Defendants’ representation against its bid for
permissive intervention. They argue the adequacy of the representation is irrelevant to the
question of permissive intervention and, even if it were relevant, they showed the
representation was not adequate. We disagree on both counts.

                                            11
[¶39] Adequate representation of a proposed intervenor’s interests is a proper
consideration for permissive intervention. Tri-State Generation, 787 F.3d at 1075; City of
Stilwell v. Ozarks Rural Elec. Co-op Corp., 79 F.3d 1038, 1043 (10th Cir. 1996). And,
“[w]here the intervenor and an existing party have the same objective, a presumption of
adequacy of representation arises.” Tips Up, 2008 WY 64, ¶ 20, 185 P.3d at 41 (quoting
Or. Env’t. Council v. Or. Dep’t of Env’t. Quality, 775 F.Supp. 353, 359 (D. Or. 1991)).
To overcome this presumption, a proposed intervenor “must make ‘a concrete showing of
circumstances’ that the . . . representation is inadequate.” Tri-State Generation, 787 F.3d
at 1073 (quoting Bottoms v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 797 F.2d 869, 872 (10th Cir. 1986)).

[¶40] The State Defendants filed a nearly 100-page opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion for a
temporary restraining order so their interest in enforcing the challenged laws and having
their constitutionality upheld is apparent. Given that the State Defendants and the
Proposed Intervenors share this same goal, we presume the State Defendants’
representation is adequate. Moreover, the legislature created the Office of the Attorney
General to represent the State’s interests and has specifically recognized the Attorney
General’s role in defending the constitutionality of state statutes. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 9-1-
603(a)(i)-(v) (2023); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-37-113 (2023) (requiring Attorney General to
be copied and heard in any declaratory judgment action alleging a statute to be
unconstitutional); see also Tri-State Generation, 787 F.3d at 1074 (finding adequacy of
representation based in part on fact that defendant was represented by state attorney
general “who is obligated by law to defend the constitutionality of the statute”); Stuart v.
Huff, 706 F.3d 345, 351 (4th Cir. 2013) (“[W]hen a statute comes under attack, it is
difficult to conceive of an entity better situated to defend it than the government.”).

[¶41] The Proposed Intervenors do not challenge the district court’s finding that “the
Wyoming Attorney General is currently asserting a vigorous defense[.]” They instead
point to the State Defendants’ position that the issues in the case are questions of law that
do not require the court to take evidence. Because Plaintiffs have offered evidence to
support their challenge, the Proposed Intervenors contend they should be permitted to
intervene to present opposing evidence they claim supports the challenged laws. Notably,
however, the Proposed Intervenors conceded during oral argument that the State
Defendants have made a colorable argument that they do not necessarily disagree with,
and in their briefing, they refer to it as “principled.” 4

4
  In support of their desire to intervene with evidence, the Proposed Intervenors point to our order
declining to answer the constitutional questions the district court certified to the Court. In that order we
stated, “This Court does not believe it can answer all twelve certified questions on the limited factual
record provided.” The Proposed Intervenors read too much into that statement. We did not specify that an
evidentiary hearing was required. Our concern was with ruling on the questions in a vacuum without a
fully developed record, whatever that record may ultimately look like.

                                                    12
[¶42] The Proposed Intervenors have not made a concrete showing that the State
Defendants’ representation of their interests was inadequate. What they have shown is a
difference in litigation strategy, which is insufficient to establish inadequacy of
representation. Kane Cnty., Utah v. United States, 928 F.3d 877, 892 (10th Cir. 2019)
(“Of course, representation is not inadequate simply because the applicant and the
representative disagree regarding the facts or law of the case.”) (quoting Sanguine, Ltd. v.
U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 736 F.2d 1416, 1419 (10th Cir. 1984) (burden of showing
inadequate representation, while minimal, is on the applicant for intervention)); Stuart,
706 F.3d at 353 (“[T]he relevant and settled rule is that disagreement over how to
approach the conduct of the litigation is not enough to rebut the presumption of
adequacy.”) (citing circuit cases); Saldano v. Roach, 363 F.3d 545, 553-54 (5th Cir.
2004) (denying district attorney’s motion to intervene in post-conviction proceedings
where attorney general confessed error and waived a procedural default and noting that
“[t]he Attorney General is not an inadequate representative simply because he has taken
these actions, especially when state law gives him the authority to do so.”); Bumgarner v.
Ute Indian Tribe of Uintah & Ouray Rsvr., 417 F.2d 1305, 1308 (10th Cir. 1969)
(“Appellants apparently would have handled the defense of the case differently than did
the Administratrix. This however is not sufficient to challenge the adequacy of
representation.”); 7C Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil
§ 1909, at 431-35 (3d ed. Apr. 2023 update) (“A mere difference of opinion concerning
the tactics with which the litigation should be handled does not make inadequate the
representation of those whose interests are identical with that of an existing party[.]”).

[¶43] The Fourth Circuit explained the importance of this limitation on intervention,
particularly in cases where the government is defending the constitutionality of a statute.

                     Finally, to permit private persons and entities to
                     intervene in the government’s defense of a statute
                     upon only a nominal showing would greatly
                     complicate the government’s job. Faced with the
                     prospect of a deluge of potential intervenors, the
                     government could be compelled to modify its litigation
                     strategy to suit the self-interested motivations of those
                     who seek party status, or else suffer the consequences
                     of a geometrically protracted, costly, and complicated
                     litigation. In short, “the business of [the] government
                     could hardly be conducted if, in matters of litigation,
                     individual citizens could usually or always intervene
                     and assert individual points of view.”

Stuart, 706 F.3d at 351 (quoting 6 Moore’s Federal Practice § 24.03[4][a][v][A] (3d ed.
2011)).

                                            13
[¶44] Adequacy of representation is a relevant consideration in ruling on permissive
intervention, and the district court reasonably concluded that the State Defendants
adequately represented the Proposed Intervenors’ interests. It therefore did not abuse its
discretion in weighing this consideration against permissive intervention.

B.     The district court reasonably concluded the Proposed Intervenors’
       intervention would unduly delay the case and prejudice its adjudication.

[¶45] The district court found that because the Proposed Intervenors and the State
Defendants seek the same objective in the litigation, intervention would risk duplicative
and cumulative argument, which would delay the matter to the detriment of the parties.
The Proposed Intervenors contend that because their sole wish is to present evidence the
State Defendants are not presenting, the district court’s concern was not valid. We
disagree.

[¶46] Despite the differences in strategy between the State Defendants and the Proposed
Intervenors, it was not beyond the bounds of reason for the district court to conclude that
their shared objective would result in a duplication of arguments and delay.

              Where the interests of the applicant in every manner match
              those of an existing party and the party’s representation is
              deemed adequate, the district court is well within its
              discretion in deciding that the applicant’s contributions to the
              proceedings would be superfluous and that any resulting
              delay would be undue.

Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Corbett, 296 F.R.D. 342, 350 (M.D. Pa. 2013) (cleaned
up) (quoting Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 672 F.2d 1133, 1136 (3d Cir. 1982)); see also
Barnes v. Sec. Life of Denver Ins. Co., 945 F.3d 1112, 1126-27 (10th Cir. 2019) (Hartz,
J., dissenting) (“Adding a party necessarily imposes additional burdens on the court and
other parties. To do so when there is every reason to expect (and no reason not to expect)
that the interests of the party will be well represented in its absence hardly increases the
efficiency of the judicial process.”); Stuart, 706 F.3d at 355 (upholding denial of
permissive intervention where district court found intervention would cause delay
without a corresponding benefit as existing defendants adequately represented interests).

[¶47] The district court reasonably found intervention would cause delay and prejudice,
and it did not abuse its discretion in weighing this consideration against permissive
intervention.

                                            14
                                    CONCLUSION

[¶48] The Proposed Intervenors do not have a protectable interest in this litigation, and
thus the district court did not err in denying them intervention as of right. The district
court reasonably concluded the State Defendants adequately represented the Proposed
Intervenors’ interest and permissive intervention would cause undue delay and prejudice.
It therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying permissive intervention.

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