Court Opinion

ID: 9714503
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:39:08.13075+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:26.577919
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE BARRY, dissenting: I do not agree that plaintiff received a fair trial in this cause, and I would grant her a new trial; therefore, I must dissent from the opinion of the majority. One blatant error occurred when the jury was given two instructions stating two different standards of care to be applied in this case. IPI Civil No. 105.01 was given, defining the duty owed by a general practitioner, and IPI Civil No. 105.02 was also given, setting forth the higher standard expected of a specialist. Even though it is not error to apply to a specialist the standard of care required of a general practitioner, the problem here is that the jury was given both instructions. Confusion as to the proper standard of care would be inevitable. An error in defining the standard of care should be reversible error. Cf. Seibert v. Grana (1968), 102 Ill. App. 2d 283, 243 N.E.2d 538. In addition I believe that the most critical issue in this appeal is whether plaintiff received a fair trial in view of the understandable efforts of the trial judge to assist defendant in the presentation of his defense. As this court stated, in Bohannon v. Schertz (1974), 21 Ill. App. 3d 149, 150, 315 N.E.2d 316, 317: “The law is well settled in Illinois that a defendant has the right to represent himself and to conduct his care without the aid of an attorney; however, if this is his desire he must comply with the same rules of proceedings as would be required of an attorney.” (Accord, Biggs v. Spader (1951), 411 Ill. 42, 46, 103 N.E.2d 104, 107.) It is clear from the record, in the instant case the trial court several times took over the questioning of witnesses on behalf of defendant in order to facilitate the presentation of a coherent defense in response to the testimony of the plaintiff and the doctors who testified in her behalf. Several examples from the report of proceedings will illustrate my concern. In presenting her case, plaintiff first called defendant as an adverse witness. At the conclusion of her examination of defendant, the trial court explained to defendant the tactical alternatives available to him — ie., that he could wait and testify as a part of his own case or he could give direct testimony at the conclusion of plaintiff’s examination of him. Defendant indicated that he wanted to testify right then, and the trial judge proceeded to question defendant at length about his post-operative treatment of plaintiff and about her progress under that treatment. Thus the court conducted the direct examination of defendant. Later, while defendant was attempting to cross-examine plaintiff’s expert medical witness, defendant started to read from an article that had not been introduced into evidence. After sustaining plaintiff’s objection to defendant’s questions, the court told defendant, “Ask him if he read it and is familiar with the article, Doctor, the operation procedure.” During subsequent cross-examination of the same witness, defendant attempted several times to ask the witness whether his responsibility to his patient did not end when she terminated her relationship with him. After several versions of the question were objected to by plaintiff and the objections sustained by the court, defendant asked, “Is there any way I can accomplish that?” and the court advised defendant, “Ask him what is customary.” Following plaintiff’s redirect examination of the witness, defendant had no recross, but the trial court asked several questions to clarify certain details of surgical procedure which had been mentioned by the witness on redirect. In effect, the court conducted the re-cross-examination for defendant. During another occasion, while defendant was questioning his own expert witness, Dr. McSweeney, the court overruled an objection by plaintiff to the form of a question asked by defendant relating to the surgical procedures the witness would use, and then the court provided defendant with the correct form by adding, “Based on the standards of our local community.” At the close of Dr. McSweeney’s testimony, plaintiff moved that the testimony be stricken as not relevant to the issue of the prevailing standard of care for a reasonably well-qualified surgeon. The court stated: “Well, normally if I had a lawyer sitting there, I would — you might be technically correct. You might be correct. With Dr. Rogers, who at least in his artful questioning, I think the concept is sufficiently established in the record to allow that testimony to stand.” It is apparent to me that the trial court did not hold defendant to the same rules of procedure as he would have an attorney in determining the relevancy and admissibility of this evidence. To condone such actions of the trial court here is to invite pro se representation in difficult trials which would make a mockery of the judicial process, even though to fully inform a jury is a commendable purpose. Defendant was entitled to a fair opportunity to present his evidence, but nothing more. If he was insufficiently versed in legal procedure to place his evidence before the jury pursuant to the ordinary rules of procedure, then he was not entitled to have the court assist him by phrasing questions, by conducting the examination of witnesses, or by special rulings in his favor. Without unnecessarily lengthening this opinion, with additional examples, it is my firm belief the trial court overstepped the bounds of judicial discretion in assisting defendant with the trial of this cause, and, accordingly, that plaintiff is entitled to have the judgment reversed and a new trial granted.