Court Opinion

ID: 9662745
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:16:45.114321+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:41.981191
License: Public Domain

DAVID GAULTNEY, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.002(8) (Vernon Supp. 2009). The statute requires a delivery. A delivery is a transfer of drugs to another. See id. The issue presented is whether the transfer to the informant is properly considered a constructive transfer to the detective.
The Court of Criminal Appeals has explained that “[tjhere is in fact no specialized ‘criminal’ meaning for the term ‘constructive transfer.’” Sims. v. State, 117 S.W.3d 267, 275 (Tex.Crim.App.2003). “Constructive” is a general term. It is intended to encompass all those acts which are considered — by construction of law — to be equivalent to actual transfer, although real possession may not have been conveyed to the identified transferee. See Donley v. State, 140 S.W.3d 428, 429 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2004, no pet.) (“[A] constructive transfer covers a variety of situations where the transferor does not manually transfer the contraband to the transferee, but may include a transfer through an intermediary....”). Id. “Constructive transfer” refers to the fact that the transfer of possession to the identified transferee is considered by law to be complete, even though the transferee may not yet have taken actual possession of the drugs.
In this case, the informant purchased the drugs for the detective. She was his *360agent. He gave her the money for the purchase and she gave him the drugs. As I view the evidence in this case, when she took possession of the drugs, an actual delivery to her was completed and a constructive delivery to the detective occurred.
The indictment says the drugs were delivered to the detective by “constructive transfer.” The defendant was on notice that the transfer to be proven was considered by law the equivalent of an actual delivery. When that happened in this case, defendant understood the indictment and filed a motion asking for the name of the informant. He understood the nature of the charge against him.
In Heberling v. State, 834 S.W.2d 350, 354 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), the Court of Criminal Appeals held that an actual transfer or delivery contemplates the manual transfer of property from the transfer- or to the transferee, or to the transferee’s agents or to someone identified in law with the transferee. Under the circumstances of that case, the Court treated the delivery to the agent as an actual delivery to the alleged transferee, rather than as a constructive delivery. Id at 355. Citing civil law, the Court noted that delivery to a buyer’s agent is “tantamount to” or “equivalent to” delivery to the buyer. Id at 354 n. 5. The tei-ms “tantamount” and “equivalent” to delivery suggest that, by construction of law, the delivery is considered equivalent to an “actual” delivery to the designated transferee. In Heberling, there was also some evidence the transfer- or knew there would in fact be a third party transferee. Id at 351-52. The indictment alleged an actual transfer, however, not a constructive transfer. Id at 352. Essentially, circumstances that would have satisfied the requirements of a constructive transfer were treated as equivalent to an actual transfer in that case.
The Court of Criminal Appeals has stated nevertheless that “[w]hen the transferee alleged is not the immediate transferee, then for the evidence to be sufficient, the defendant must have contemplated that there would in fact be a third party transferee.” Sims, 117 S.W.3d at 277. This is required for a specific type of “constructive transfer.” It should not be required when the actual transferee is the agent of the constructive transferee.
In this case the jury heard the recordings of the transactions, and may have concluded — based on the conversations about medical records, doctors, legal troubles, mutual acquaintances who had been arrested or turned informant, defendant’s warnings to sell the pills “to only people that you know,” the informant’s own protestation that the pills were for her, the fact that she was previously caught selling drugs, and the obvious friendly relationship between the two — that appellant must have believed she was not the only recipient of the drugs he was providing to her. That is, he “must have contemplated that there would in fact be a third party toans-feree.” Sims, 117 S.W.3d at 277. Of course, he did not anticipate the third party transferee would be the police.
This appeal presents a recurring issue. See Stephens v. State, 269 S.W.3d 178 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2008, pet. ref'd.) (“This case presents the exact problem forecast nearly a decade ago by our brother jurist when he opined that the guidelines distinguishing actual delivery of narcotics from constructive delivery of narcotics had become so muddled that prosecuting attorneys who are preparing an indictment would be left with no discernible guidelines to follow.”) (citing Warren v. State, 15 S.W.3d 168, 173 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2000, no pet.)); see also Hubbard v. State, No. 09-05-430 CR, 2006 WL 3026695 (Tex.App.-Beaumont, Oct. 25, *3612006, no pet.) (not designated for publication). The recurring issue arises, I believe, because the term “constructive transfer” has taken a specialized criminal law meaning where none was intended. See Sims, 117 S.W.3d at 275. The specialized meaning has sought to distinguish in specific cases actual transfers from other transfers considered equivalent to actual transfers, that is constructive transfers. The approach seems counter to itself, and also seems contrary to the intent of the statute. The language of the statute seems intended to cover all deliveries, not to distinguish between methods of delivery.
Regardless, the fact of agency, under the circumstances here, served to make the delivery actual in the sense that the informant was the detective’s “agent” (and the actual delivery to the informant was, under Heberlmg, equivalent to delivery to the detective) and constructive in the sense that the contraband was not really transferred directly from appellant to the detective personally. Under this agency construct, the seller’s knowledge of an intended transferee beyond the informant should not be a requirement. The transfer is at its most basic level a constructive one made equivalent by law to a direct “actual” transfer. If the purpose of including the method of delivery in the indictment is to give the defendant adequate notice, and yet an allegation of agency is not a requirement for the indictment, the allegation of constructive transfer accurately notified the defendant of what he was charged with doing.
There is, of course, no evidence appellant knew when he made the delivery he was selling drugs to someone acting as an agent for law enforcement. Nevertheless, the evidence in this case in my view is sufficient to establish a constructive delivery to the detective. The delivery was the legal equivalent of a delivery to the detective under the circumstances, because appellant actually delivered the drugs to the detective’s agent.