Court Opinion

ID: 9705090
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:56:09.543266+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:07.836304
License: Public Domain

JACKSON B. SMITH, Jr., Justice,
dissenting (Assigned).
I respectfully dissent. I do not believe appellant, Dwight Wolfe, has alleged facts which satisfy the requirements necessary to proceed by bill of review. Thus, I would affirm and not reach the other issues.
FACTS
Wolfe retained attorney, Steve Gordon, to file suit against Grant Prideco., Inc. F/K/A Grant TFW, Inc. After Gordon filed suit, his health required him to leave the practice of law. In 1997, Gordon closed his office, listed on Wolfe’s pleadings as 5821 S.W. Freeway, Suite 501, Houston, Texas, 77057, and referred the case to attorney Ralph D. Huston, who agreed to continue prosecuting Wolfe’s case. Gordon did not file a motion to withdraw as attorney of record. Huston did not file a motion to substitute himself as attorney of record for Gordon, even though the record shows Huston signed and filed a pleading in the case.
Some two years later, on October 7, 1998, in a Notice of Intent to Dismiss Status Report Required, the trial court ordered the parties to file a joint status report and informed the parties of its intent to dismiss the case for want of prosecution if a joint status report was not filed. The clerk of the trial court mailed the notice to Gordon at 5821 S West Frwy 412, Houston, Texas 77057, the address listed in the Harris County District Clerk’s Justice Information Management System for Gordon, but different from, the address on the pleadings Gordon had filed for Wolfe.
The judge’s order required that the joint status report be filed by November 16, 1998. When the parties did not file the joint status report, the trial court dismissed the suit for want of prosecution on November 16. On May 14, 1999, Wolfe filed this bill of review seeking to overturn the dismissal of his suit.
To succeed in a bill of review, a petitioner must prove (1) he had a meritorious claim or defense, (2) he was prevented from asserting the claim or defense by the fraud, accident, or wrongful act of his opponent or by official mistake, and (3) there was no fault or negligence on his part that prevented the assertion of this claim or defense. Caldwell v. Barnes, 975 S.W.2d 535, 537 (Tex.1998); Hernandez v. Koch Mach. Co., 16 S.W.3d 48, 57 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied).
Wolfe asserts he has met all three criteria necessary to succeed in a bill of review. He states he did not receive notice of the order to file a status report, did not receive notice of the dismissal of his case, and he was not at fault or negligent in any respect.
It is true that Wolfe, personally, was not at fault or negligent, however, there was fault and negligence on the part of Wolfe’s attorney of record, Gordon. Gordon did not file a change of address or a motion to withdraw from the suit, nor did he take any steps to insure that either he, or Huston, the attorney to whom he had referred the case, filed the proper substitution instruments to remove Gordon as attorney of record. Huston also was negligent in not filing appropriate papers to become substituted as attorney of record. As a result, all notices were sent to Gordon, because he was still shown as the attorney of record.
The majority relies on Osterloh v. Ohio Decorative Products, Inc., (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ). I believe Osterloh is distinguishable on the key point that, when Osterloh changed attorneys, a new attorney actually substituted *778into the case and then he changed firms, but did not provide the trial court with his new address. However, the new attorney filed numerous pleadings and discovery with his new address on the documents. Still, when the trial court sent a notice of its intent to dismiss the case for want of prosecution, the notice went to the substituted attorney’s old address listed in the Harris County District Clerk’s Register of Attorneys, instead of to the attorney’s new address on the documents he had filed for Osterloh. On those facts, this Court found that there was no statutory or case authority to authorize a district clerk to use any address other than the address shown in the papers on file. Id. at 582.
Here, Gordon never withdrew from the case. Thus, Gordon was the attorney of record and remained responsible for the suit until he changed such designation by written notice to the trial court. Tex.R. Civ. P. 8 (Vernon 2000); Palkovic v. Cox, 792 S.W.2d 743, 745 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied) (signing amended petition is insufficient to notify court that party has new attorney).
A case may be dismissed for want of prosecution on failure of any party seeking affirmative relief to appear for any hearing or trial of which the party had notice. Notice of the court’s intention to dismiss and the date and place of the dismissal hearing shall be sent by the clerk to each attorney of record. Tex.R. Civ. P. 165a (Vernon 2000). Moreover, under the local rules for the Harris County District Courts, a case is eligible for dismissal for want of prosecution when a party or his attorney has failed to take any action specified by the court, such as here, the failure to file a court-ordered joint status report. Harris (Tex.) Civ. Dist. Ct. Loc. 3.6.
In the instant case, the trial court sent notice of its intent to dismiss for want of prosecution to the address of the attorney of record that was recorded in the Harris County District Clerk’s Register of Attorneys, not to the address on the document of the attorney, Huston, who had filed the last pleading in the court. Gordon was the attorney of record and the rules do not require a clerk of a trial court to send notice to every attorney who may have filed a pleading in the court, unless that attorney is an attorney of record. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 165a (Vernon 2000).
Huston’s statement that Gordon was not negligent in any respect is an apparent attempt by Huston to absolve Gordon of any responsibility because of Huston’s failure to substitute in as attorney of record. Unfortunate as the facts in this case are, Huston’s statement cannot enable the courts to circumvent the rules of procedure which we must follow.