Court Opinion

ID: 9838558
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-06 20:01:17.217652+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:16:52.133916
License: Public Domain

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                                                                [PUBLISH]

                                   In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-11339
                          ____________________

        SECURITY WALLS, LLC,
                                                                Petitioner,
        versus
        NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

                                                               Respondent.

                          ____________________

                   Petitions for Review of a Decision of the
                        National Labor Relations Board
                           Agency No. 15-CA-255865
                           ____________________
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        2                         Opinion of the Court                   22-11339

        Before BRANCH and LUCK, Circuit Judges, and SMITH,* District
        Judge.
        BRANCH, Circuit Judge:
               The National Labor Relations Board (the “NLRB” or “the
        Board”) determined that Security Walls, LLC (“Security Walls”),
        unlawfully fired an employee for activity protected under the
        National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”). Security Walls now
        petitions this Court for review of the Board’s decision, arguing that
        the employee’s activity was not protected because he did not utilize
        the union’s grievance process first and because his activity was
        inconsistent with the collective bargaining agreement then in
        place. The Board filed a cross-petition for enforcement of its order.
        After careful review and with the benefit of oral argument, we
        conclude that the employee’s activity was protected. Accordingly,
        we grant the Board’s application for enforcement and deny
        Security Walls’s petition for review.
                             I.          Factual Background
               Since 2017, Security Walls has provided security services for
        the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (“NASA”) at
        the Michoud Assembly Facility (“Michoud”) in New Orleans,
        Louisiana. The company employs approximately 40 security
        officers, whose responsibilities include controlling entry and access
        to Michoud and other on-site buildings and responding to calls for

        * The Honorable Rodney Smith, United States District Judge for the Southern
        District of Florida, sitting by designation.
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        22-11339              Opinion of the Court                       3

        service and emergencies. The International Union, Security, Police
        and Fire Professionals of America (“the union”) represents the
        officers at Michoud, and a collective bargaining agreement covered
        the employees from October 1, 2017, to September 30, 2020.
               In January 2018, Security Walls hired Randall Kelley to work
        as a security officer. Before Kelley started work at Michoud, he
        attended a mandatory training. During his training, Security Walls
        paid Kelley the hourly rate for trainees, which was lower than the
        rate for on-duty officers. After the training ended, Kelley noticed
        that Security Walls continued to pay him at the trainee rate in his
        first paycheck as an on-duty officer—which resulted in
        underpayment of almost $700—and failed to reimburse him for
        mileage and other out-of-pocket expenses incurred during the
        training. After discussing these issues with other coworkers, he
        discovered that another newly hired officer, Mandie Lockwood,
        had been similarly underpaid and unreimbursed.
              With Lockwood’s support, Kelley reported the
        underpayment and reimbursement issues to Captain Henry
        Conravey and Chief Jules Perrie, Security Walls’s on-site managers.
        After several weeks passed without a resolution, Kelley, with
        Lockwood’s encouragement, contacted Security Walls’s corporate
        human resources department directly. Within hours, Kelley and
        Lockwood each received a wire transfer for their missing wages.
        But despite continuing to ask for Conravey’s assistance, Kelley did
        not receive his missing training reimbursements. Eventually,
        Kelley asked Conravey if he should contact human resources
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        4                     Opinion of the Court                 22-11339

        directly about the issue. Conravey replied that Kelley would be
        “suspended on the spot” if he called “corporate” again without
        Conravey’s permission.
               The bungled payments were just the beginning of the issues
        that Kelley encountered during his employment. Consistent with
        the collective bargaining agreement between Security Walls and
        the union, Security Walls selected officers for mandatory overtime
        in reverse order of seniority, proceeding systematically through the
        entire seniority list and only returning to the bottom after every
        officer worked an overtime assignment. In April 2018, Lieutenant
        Jordan Robinson began supervising the second shift—which is the
        shift Kelley worked. Instead of assigning overtime from the spot
        on the seniority list where the prior supervisor had left off,
        Robinson started at the bottom of the list so that officers with the
        lowest seniority had to work overtime twice.
               Kelley and other adversely affected officers discussed the
        situation, and, with the officers’ support, Kelley spoke to Robinson
        about the inequitable assignment of overtime. In response,
        Robinson chastised Kelley for talking to others “behind his back.”
               The following month, officer Emanual Rahman stopped a
        vehicle from entering Michoud because the adult occupants
        appeared to be intoxicated and two unrestrained children were in
        the backseat. Rahman reported the incident over the radio, and
        Robinson, Kelley, and another officer, Thomas Benasco, reported
        to the scene. Robinson directed Rahman to escort the vehicle off
        the property and not to detain it or contact the occupants. Kelley
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        22-11339               Opinion of the Court                        5

        and Benasco questioned Robinson’s directive. They attempted to
        persuade Robinson that they had a duty to prevent the vehicle from
        returning to the road. Kelley expressed concern about the adults’
        impaired condition and the presence of the unrestrained children.
        When Robinson asked, Benasco said that he agreed with Kelley.
               Becoming agitated, Robinson punched his fist into his hand
        and yelled and cursed at Rahman, Kelley, and Benasco. Then,
        before leaving, Robinson said that “nobody better talk shit about
        me when I leave here” and “[don’t] let me find out that anyone’s
        talking behind my back.” Despite Robinson’s instructions, the
        three officers discussed his behavior and agreed that it should be
        brought to management’s attention. The next morning, Kelley
        reported the incident to Conravey, Robinson’s superior, and
        Conravey said that he would take care of it.
                The next issue Kelley encountered involved his post.
        Officers at Michoud hold either stationary or mobile posts. When
        assigned to a stationary post, officers are required to stay within a
        designated building or area. When assigned to a mobile post,
        officers use company-owned vehicles to patrol larger areas.
        Although supervisors create post assignments for each officer daily,
        it is common for officers to trade assignments.
               It was well known that Kelley disliked stationary posts and
        preferred a mobile post. On June 6, 2018, while Kelley was assigned
        to a mobile post, he initiated a traffic stop and arrested a FedEx
        driver. Shortly afterward, Robinson informed Kelley that NASA
        was investigating the incident and that Kelley was restricted to a
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        6                         Opinion of the Court                      22-11339

        stationary post until the investigation was complete. After about a
        week had passed without NASA reaching out about the incident,
        Kelley asked Robinson for more information. Robinson replied
        that FedEx, not NASA, was conducting the investigation and that
        Kelley could return to mobile patrol on July 1.
                Later that day, when Kelley was discussing his post
        restriction with a union representative, Robinson approached
        Kelley. He accused Kelley of “talk[ing] shit behind his back” and
        suggested that they go to a back office and have a conversation.
        The men squared off and exchanged words until another officer
        intervened and separated them. 1
              Kelley immediately reported the incident to Chief Perrie.
        During their conversation, Chief Perrie explained that Kelley had
        never been under investigation and that Robinson simply wanted
        to “ground” Kelley for 30 days because Robinson “got tired of
        hearing [Kelley’s] name come up.”
              The following day, Security Walls suspended Kelley for two
        days without pay for purportedly violating the collective
        bargaining agreement by initiating a verbal altercation with
        Robinson. Security Walls had never previously disciplined any

        1 Robinson’s and Kelley’s accounts of this incident differ. According to
        Robinson, Kelley performed a “leg sweep” on him, causing him to fall against
        the wall. For his part, Kelley denies that any violence or physical altercation
        occurred during their confrontation but maintains that Robinson threatened
        him with violence.
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        22-11339                 Opinion of the Court                              7

        employee for initiating a verbal altercation, fighting, or any other
        disruptive behavior, despite instances of such conduct occurring.
               Additionally, during the summer of 2018, officers heard
        rumors that Security Walls was considering a schedule change in
        which officers would move from five-day workweeks with eight-
        hour shifts to three-day workweeks with twelve-hour shifts.
        Concerned, Kelley created a written analysis that showed how the
        potential change would dramatically reduce the income of dayshift
        officers compared to nightshift officers. Kelley shared his analysis
        with other officers, who also expressed concern over the disparate
        impact of the schedule change.
               Then on July 9, 2018, Kelley emailed Security Walls’s owner
        Juanita Walls and expressed concerns over a workplace
        atmosphere of threats, intimidation, and retaliation. He also
        complained about the potential shift to twelve-hour workdays.
        Walls responded that she would have her newly hired program
        manager, Brenda Hunter, look into the issue.
              Kelley and Benasco met with Hunter a few weeks later, and
        Kelley shared his analysis about the potential schedule change.
        Kelley also complained about Chief Perrie and purported
        supervisory incompetence at Michoud. Shortly after the meeting,
        Robinson issued Kelley a verbal warning for calling off work
        without proper documentation. 2

        2 The collective bargaining agreement requires an employee to provide a
        medical certificate if the employee is absent for more than three consecutive
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        8                       Opinion of the Court                    22-11339

               On July 20, 2018, Kelley was assigned to “Post 3,” which was
        a mobile patrol. At the time, based on the officers’ on-the-job
        training, it was typical for officers to perform building checks inside
        Building 101. When officers working Post 3 checked Building 101,
        they would note that they did so on their daily patrol activity
        reports, which they provided to their supervisors.
               Around 3:15 p.m., Kelley picked up Benasco and drove to
        Building 101. Once there, Kelley and Benasco joined three other
        on-duty officers in the building’s lobby, and all of the officers used
        their personal cell phones in the lobby. Around 4:00 p.m.,
        Robinson approached the officers and directed them to return to
        their respective posts.
              On July 23, 2018, Security Walls suspended Kelley pending
        an investigation into his conduct on July 20. Robinson prepared
        the suspension paperwork, which said that Kelley committed
        “gross misconduct” in violation of the collective bargaining
        agreement when he was observed on closed circuit television
        lounging and using his cell phone for approximately 41 minutes in
        the lobby of Building 101. On July 30, 2018, Security Walls
        discharged Kelley for post abandonment.
               The other officers who had lounged in the lobby with Kelley
        received lesser discipline. Benasco, who had abandoned his post,

        workdays for medical reasons. In the two months before his verbal warning,
        Kelley had called off work four non-consecutive days either because he was
        sick or had to stay home with a sick child.
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        22-11339                Opinion of the Court                           9

        received only a verbal warning for using his personal cell phone.
        Another officer received a verbal warning for eating and not
        performing his assigned duties. And the two remaining officers,
        who were assigned to Building 101 that day, received no discipline.
               After filing unfair labor practice charges with the Board,
        Kelley asked another officer to obtain copies of Security Walls’s
        post orders—i.e., documents that specify an officer’s duties when
        assigned to a specific post. The officer photographed the post
        orders and gave them to Kelley, who provided them to the Board
        agent investigating the charges.
               On February 5, 2020, Security Walls, through counsel, filed
        a motion seeking to postpone the then-scheduled hearing, asserting
        that Kelley had violated an unspecified federal law by
        photographing post orders and that Security Walls had referred
        Kelley’s “criminal activity” to the Federal Bureau of Investigation
        (“FBI”) and NASA for investigation. But Security Walls eventually
        retracted its threat, saying that it had retrained its officers regarding
        NASA’s strict photography policy, and it had “no plans to do
        more.” Security Walls never initiated a criminal investigation or
        referred the matter to NASA or the FBI.
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        10                           Opinion of the Court                    22-11339

                               II.         Procedural History
                After review, 3 the Board found that Kelley engaged in
        protected concerted activity on several occasions4 and that Security
        Walls violated § 8(a)(1) 5 of the NLRA by (1) threatening Kelley with
        suspension if he engaged in protected concerted activity;
        (2) restricting Kelley to a stationary post because he engaged in
        protected concerted activity; (3) suspending Kelley in June 2018
        because he engaged in protected concerted activity; (4) issuing a
        verbal warning in July 2018 because he engaged in protected
        concerted activity; (5) discharging Kelley because he engaged in
        protected concerted activity; and (6) threatening to initiate a

        3 On July 7, 2021, an administrative law judge issued a decision in Kelley’s
        case. After Kelley and Security Walls filed objections to the decision, a three-
        member panel of the Board reviewed Kelley’s case and issued the decision that
        we now review.
        4 Section 7 of the NLRA gives employees the right to engage in “concerted
        activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
        protection.” 29 U.S.C. § 157. Here, for example, the Board found that Kelley
        engaged in protected concerted activity when he discussed “working
        conditions”—including “the underpayment of wages and the inequitable
        assignment of overtime”—with other employees and then relayed those
        complaints to Security Walls.
        5 Section 8(a)(1) provides that “[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for an
        employer . . . to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise
        of the rights guaranteed in [section 7] of this title.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).
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        22-11339                 Opinion of the Court                           11

        criminal investigation because Kelley provided evidence to the
        Board.
               As to the remedy, the Board ordered Security Walls to cease
        and desist from engaging in its unfair labor practices.
        Affirmatively, the Board required Security Walls to offer Kelley
        reinstatement to his former job or a substantially equivalent
        position; make him whole for any loss of earnings or other benefits
        suffered as a result of the discrimination against him; compensate
        him for any adverse tax consequences with a lump-sum backpay
        award; compensate him for his search-for-work and interim
        employment expenses; remove from its files any reference to the
        discriminatory actions against Kelley; notify Kelley that Security
        Walls had undertaken these actions and that the discriminatory
        actions will not be used against him in any way; and post a remedial
        notice.
              Unhappy with the Board’s order, Security Walls petitions
        this Court for review, and the Board cross-petitions for
        enforcement of its order.
                             III.        Standard of Review
               “We review the Board’s legal conclusions de novo,” keeping
        in mind that agencies, like the NLRB, often receive deference in
        construing the statutes that they are charged with administering.
        Ridgewood Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. NLRB, 8 F.4th 1263, 1275 (11th
        Cir. 2021); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
        837, 844 (1984); Visiting Nurse Health Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 108 F.3d
        1358, 1360 (11th Cir. 1997) (“Traditionally, we accord considerable
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                22-11339

        deference to the Board’s expertise in applying the [NLRA] to the
        labor controversies that come before it.”); see NLRB v.
        Dynatron/Bondo Corp., 176 F.3d 1310, 1313 (11th Cir. 1999) (“As in
        the case of construction of the [NLRA], we defer to the Board’s
        application of its rules if the application is reasonable.”). The
        Board’s reasonable inferences in applying the law to the facts may
        not be displaced even though we might have reached a different
        conclusion in the first instance. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340
        U.S. 474, 488 (1951). Likewise, the Board’s findings of fact are
        “conclusive ‘if supported by substantial evidence on the record
        considered as a whole.’” Dynatron, 176 F.3d at 1313 (quoting 29
        U.S.C. § 160(e), (f)). Substantial evidence “means such relevant
        evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
        a conclusion.” NLRB v. Contemp. Cars, Inc., 667 F.3d 1364, 1370
        (11th Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted). “But this deferential standard
        is not merely a rubber[]stamp on agency decisionmaking.”
        Ridgewood Health Care Ctr., 8 F.4th at 1275 (quotation omitted).
        The Board’s decision must be logical, rational, and based on facts
        that are supported by the record. Id. “[W]e will not enforce a
        Board decision that fails to engage in reasoned decisionmaking.”
        Id.
               “Our standard of review does not change when the Board
        reaches a conclusion different from that of the administrative law
        judge, . . . but the administrative law judge’s conclusions are one
        factor to be considered in determining whether [the substantial
        evidence] standard has been satisfied.” Id. at 1274. (quoting Allied
        Med. Transp., Inc., 805 F.3d 1000, 1005 (11th Cir. 2015)).
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        22-11339                    Opinion of the Court                         13

                                      IV.      Discussion
               Security Walls raises a single argument on appeal: that
        Kelley’s conduct was unprotected because his demands were
        inconsistent with the collective bargaining agreement and because
        he did not channel his grievances through the union processes. For
        support, Security Walls relies almost exclusively on Emporium
        Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization, 420 U.S. 50
        (1975). But because Kelley’s activity was not inconsistent with the
        collective bargaining agreement and because Kelley did not have
        to go through the union in the first place, Emporium Capwell does
        not save Security Walls. Thus, we conclude that Kelley’s activities
        were protected. And, because substantial evidence supports
        Kelley’s activity, we enforce the Board’s order. 6
               We begin, as we must, with the statute. Section 7 of the
        NLRA “affirmatively guarantees employees the most basic rights
        of industrial self-determination”: “‘the right to self-organization, to
        form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
        through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
        other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
        or other mutual aid or protection,’ as well as the right to refrain
        from these activities.” Id. at 61–62 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 157). 7

        6 Notably, Security Walls does not challenge whether substantial evidence
        supports the Board’s findings. Accordingly, without argument to the contrary
        and because substantial evidence otherwise supports the Board’s findings, we
        enforce the Board’s order.
        7 In full, section 7 provides that
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        14                        Opinion of the Court                         22-11339

        “These are, for the most part, collective rights, rights to act in
        concert with one’s fellow employees; they are protected not for
        their own sake but as an instrument of the national labor policy of
        minimizing industrial strife ‘by encouraging the practice and
        procedure of collective bargaining.’” Id. at 62 (quoting 29 U.S.C.
        § 151).
               The next section of the NLRA, section 8, gives the former
        teeth by declaring that “[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for an
        employer . . . to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
        exercise of the rights guaranteed in [section 7].” 29 U.S.C.
        § 158(a)(1).
               Turning to the next statutory section, section 9(a) addresses
        the role that lawfully selected union representatives play,
        explaining that they are the exclusive representatives for the
        purpose of collective bargaining:
               Representatives designated or selected for the
               purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of

               [e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
               join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
               through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage
               in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
               bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also
               have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except
               to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement
               requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of
               employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title.
        29 U.S.C. § 157.
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        22-11339                    Opinion of the Court                                 15

                the employees in a unit appropriate for such
                purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all
                the employees in such unit for the purposes of
                collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages,
                hours of employment, or other conditions of
                employment.

        29 U.S.C. § 159(a). Then, section 9(a) qualifies the rule that union
        representatives “shall be the exclusive representatives of all the
        employees” with two provisos that focus on the employee’s rights:
                Provided, That any individual employee or a group of
                employees shall have the right at any time to present
                grievances to their employer and to have such
                grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the
                bargaining representative, as long as the adjustment is
                not inconsistent with the terms of a collective-
                bargaining contract or agreement then in eﬀect:
                Provided further, That the bargaining representative
                has been given opportunity to be present at such
                adjustment.

        Id. 8 With these statutory provisions in mind, we turn to how they
        work together.

        8 The purpose of these provisos “is to permit employees to present grievances

        and to authorize the employer to entertain them without opening itself to
        liability for dealing directly with employees in derogation of the duty to
        bargain only with the exclusive bargaining representative, a violation of
        [section 8].” Emporium Capwell, 420 U.S. at 61 n.12; see also Black-Clawson Co.,
        Paper Mach. Div. v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists Lodge 355, Dist. 137, 313 F.2d 179, 185
        (2d Cir. 1962) (explaining that “the proviso was designed merely to confer
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        16                         Opinion of the Court                       22-11339

                “Section 7 is broadly worded—deliberately so.” E. Chi.
        Rehab. Ctr., Inc. v. NLRB, 710 F.2d 397, 402 (7th Cir. 1983); see Eastex,
        Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 565–68 (1978) (discussing the broad
        scope of section 7). And “[a]lthough section 9(a) qualifies section
        7, it qualifies the part of section 7 that gives workers the right to
        bargain collectively.” E. Chi. Rehab., 710 F.2d at 402. Indeed,
        section 9(a) makes the union representatives—which are
        “designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining”—the
        “exclusive representatives of all the employees” only “for the
        purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages,
        hours of employment, or other conditions of employment.”
        29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (emphases added). Thus, the text of section 9(a)
        “does not—not explicitly anyway—qualify” or otherwise limit
        employees’ “section 7 right to engage in other concerted activities

        upon the employee the privilege to approach his employer on personal
        grievances when his union reacts with hostility or apathy” because “[p]rior to
        the adoption of this proviso in section 9(a), the employer had cause to fear that
        his processing of an individual’s grievance without consulting the bargaining
        representative would be an unfair labor practice”). Thus, “rather than
        conferring an indefeasible right upon the individual employee to compel
        compliance with the grievance procedure,” “section 9(a) merely set up a buffer
        between the employee and his union, ‘permitting’ the employee to take his
        grievances to the employer, and ‘authorizing’ the employer to hear and adjust
        them without running afoul of the ‘exclusive bargaining representative’
        language of the operative portion of section 9(a).” Black-Clawson Co., 313 F.2d
        at 185 (explaining that this interpretation “also best comports with the
        structure of the” statute because a proviso rarely creates substantive rights and
        obligations and more often “carves exceptions out of what goes before”
        (quotation omitted)).
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        22-11339               Opinion of the Court                         17

        for mutual aid or protection.” E. Chi. Rehab., 710 F.2d at 402; see
        also id. (explaining that this “natural” reading of sections 7 and 9(a)
        also comports with other sections of the statute—like “section 13,
        29 U.S.C. § 163, which provides that ‘[n]othing in this subchapter,
        except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as
        either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right
        to strike . . .’”).
               We acknowledge, however, that “[t]he exclusive bargaining
        authority granted unions by section 9 sometimes creates a tension,
        which the NLRA does not clearly resolve, with labor rights granted
        employees by section 7.” CC1 Ltd. P’ship v. NLRB, 898 F.3d 26, 34
        (D.C. Cir. 2018). The Supreme Court confronted this tension in
        Emporium Capwell. In Emporium Capwell, the Supreme Court
        addressed whether the NLRA protects concerted activity by a
        group of minority employees to bargain with their employer over
        issues of employment discrimination. 420 U.S. at 52. There, a
        group of company employees presented a list of grievances—
        including a claim that the company was discriminating based on
        race—to a union representative. Id. at 53. After meeting with the
        company and looking into the matter, the union concluded that the
        company was discriminating and that the union would process
        every grievance through arbitration if necessary. Id. at 54. Some
        company employees pushed back, suggesting that the union’s
        proposed procedures were inadequate to handle such a systemic
        grievance and that the union should begin picketing the store
        instead. Id. The union explained that the collective bargaining
        agreement bound the union to its processes. Id.
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        18                    Opinion of the Court                22-11339

               When the union met to begin its hearing on the issue, a
        group of employees refused to participate in the grievance
        procedure and walked out of the hearing. Id. at 54–55. Then, the
        dissident employees held a press conference at which they
        denounced the company’s employment policy as racist, expressed
        their desire to deal directly with the company’s “top management,”
        and announced their intention to picket and boycott the store. Id.
        Shortly afterwards, at least four employees picketed the store
        throughout the day and distributed handbills at the entrance that
        urged consumers not to patronize the store. Id. The union
        representative advised the picketing employees to rely on the
        union’s grievance process and warned that they might be fired for
        their activities. Id. at 56. Two of the picketing employees received
        written warnings that additional picketing or public statements
        about the company could lead to their discharge. Id. When they
        repeated their picketing and public statements the following week,
        they were discharged. Id.
               After reviewing the employees’ conduct, “the Board found
        that the employees were discharged for attempting to bargain with
        the [c]ompany over the terms and conditions of employment as
        they affected racial minorities” and that their activity was not
        protected under the NLRA. Id. at 57, 60. The Board concluded
        that
              such an attempt to bargain would undermine the
              statutory system of bargaining through an exclusive,
              elected representative, impede elected unions’ eﬀorts
              at bettering the working conditions of minority
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        22-11339                 Opinion of the Court                           19

               employees, and place on the [company] an
               unreasonable burden of attempting to placate self-
               designated representatives of minority groups while
               abiding by the terms of a valid bargaining agreement
               and attempting in good faith to meet whatever
               demands the bargaining representative put forth
               under that agreement.

        Id. at 58 (quotation omitted).
                The Supreme Court ultimately agreed with the Board and
        held that the employees’ attempts to engage in separate bargaining
        were not protected by the NLRA. Id. at 52, 61. The Court
        explained that while “only the union may contract the employee’s
        terms and conditions of employment, and provisions for
        processing his grievances,” Congress also did not “authorize a
        tyranny of the majority over minority interests.” Id. at 63–64
        (quotation omitted). The “employees’ substantive right to be free
        of racial discrimination,” the Court reasoned, “[could not] be pursued
        at the expense of the orderly collective-bargaining process contemplated by
        the NLRA.” Id. at 69; see also id. at 67–69 (noting the potential
        conflict between employee groups if a handful of employees bypass
        the grievance procedure and an employer is confronted with
        bargaining demands from several minority groups).
              Although the Supreme Court concluded in Emporium
        Capwell that the employees’ concerted activity undercut the union
        and was pursued at the expense of the collective bargaining
        process, Emporium Capwell does not transform all unauthorized
        concerted activity into unprotected activity. See E. Chi. Rehab. Ctr.,
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        20                       Opinion of the Court                     22-11339

        Inc., 710 F.2d at 400. It is only when employees’ activities
        undermine the union’s objectives or the union’s position as the
        exclusive bargaining authority that activities lose NLRA
        protection. See id. at 401. In other words, an employee’s activities
        lose protection only when they were for the purposes of collective
        bargaining and were done to bargain with the employer over
        matters reserved for the union to negotiate, such as rates of pay,
        hours, and conditions of employment.
                Our precedent confirms this distinction. “We have
        recognized, of course, that certain concerted activities may lose
        their protected character when in conflict with a union’s status as
        exclusive bargaining representative.” See Richardson Paint Co. v.
        NLRB, 574 F.2d 1195, 1206 (5th Cir. 1978). 9 But we have also said
        that there can “be circumstances in which an employee or a
        minority group of employees may engage, without reference of the
        matter to the union process, in action which is protected under
        [s]ection 7 [of the NLRA] though there is an agreement in force or
        in the process of negotiation.” NLRB v. Shop Rite Foods, Inc., 430
        F.2d 786, 791 (5th Cir. 1970).
               For example, in Richardson Paint Co. v. NLRB, we concluded
        that the “[p]eaceful circulation of a petition for presentation to an
        employer for redress of employee grievances is a protected
        concerted activity.” 574 F.2d at 1206. We reasoned that “nothing

        9 All published cases of the former Fifth Circuit decided before the close of
        business on September 30, 1981, are precedent in this Circuit. See Bonner v.
        City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
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        22-11339                  Opinion of the Court                               21

        in [the employee’s] circulation of the petition would undermine the
        [u]nion’s status as the bargaining representative, or be so serious a
        threat to stable relations to cause [the employee’s] act to lose its
        protected character,” distinguishing the activities of the discharged
        employees in Emporium Capwell as being “of a far different
        character.” Id. at 1205–06 (quotation omitted). At bottom, because
        the employee’s action “was not in derogation of the [u]nion’s status
        as exclusive bargaining agent, we agree[d] that [the employee’s]
        conduct was protected concerted activity.” Id. at 1207.
               Our sister circuits have made the same distinction between
        protected concerted activity and activity that undermines the
        union’s statutory role as exclusive bargainer. 10 See, e.g., NLRB v.
        Noah’s Ark Processors, LLC, 31 F.4th 1097, 1104 (8th Cir. 2022)
        (explaining that the Board and courts agree that Emporium Capwell
        “did not strip the NLRA’s protection from all wildcat strikes” and
        that a “case-by-case analysis is needed to determine whether a
        particular concerted work stoppage is protected by Section 7”
        (quotation omitted)) 11; CC1 Ltd. P’ship, 898 F.3d at 34 (explaining

        10 Security Walls posits that in NLRB v. Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd., 419 F.2d 216
        (9th Cir. 1969), “the Court found that concerted activity without union
        approval is presumed to be unprotected.” But the Ninth Circuit made no such
        holding. Instead, the Court expressly “noted that section 9(a)’s provision for
        an exclusive bargaining representative [still] reserves the right of individual
        employees or groups of employees to deal with the employer regarding
        ‘grievances.’” Id. at 218.
        11 “Wildcat” activity is activity undertaken by unionized employees without
        union authorization, support, or approval.
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        22                     Opinion of the Court                22-11339

        that concerted activity is unprotected only “when employees’
        activity undermines the [u]nion’s objectives or position as
        bargaining authority”); NLRB v. Bridgeport Ambulance Serv., 966 F.2d
        725, 729 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that a wildcat sit-in and walkout
        organized to protest low morale, poor equipment, unfair
        treatment, low wages, and favoritism constituted protected
        concerted activity when there was substantial evidence that the
        walkout was “not called for the purpose of bargaining directly with
        the [c]ompany and did not impair the [u]nion’s performance as
        exclusive bargaining representative”); E. Chi. Rehab., 710 F.2d at
        402 (“Unless . . . a wildcat strike is called for the purpose of
        asserting a right to bargain collectively in the union’s place or is
        likely, regardless of its purpose, to impair the union’s performance
        as exclusive bargaining representative, section 9(a) does not put the
        strikers beyond the pale of section 7.”); NLRB v. Owners Maint.
        Corp., 581 F.2d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 1978) (distinguishing Emporium
        Capwell and holding that a wildcat leafletting campaign constituted
        protected concerted activity).
               Accordingly, to prove that Kelley’s activity was unprotected,
        Security Walls must show that his activities were for the purposes
        of collective bargaining and were done to bargain with Security
        Walls on union matters, such as rates of pay, wages, and other
        conditions of employment. See Richardson Paint Co., 574 F.2d at
        1205–06. Security Walls simply has not done so.
              Security Walls argues that this case is like Emporium Capwell
        because “Kelley wanted to make the negotiated terms of the in-
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        22-11339                   Opinion of the Court                                 23

        place collective bargaining agreement more to his liking” without
        seeking support of the union or inviting the union into his
        discussions. Specifically, Security Walls contends that Kelley
        attempted to “renegotiate” shift schedules, wages, and assignment
        of work—topics that the collective bargaining agreement
        addresses. But, as we explain below, none of Kelley’s activities
        actually undermined the collective bargaining agreement or the
        union’s position as bargainer, making this case distinguishable
        from Emporium Capwell. 12
               The Board found that the facts of this case “contrast sharply
        with those in Emporium Capwell” because “Kelley did not resort to
        economic coercion to pressure [Security Walls] to bypass the
        [u]nion and deal with him directly, and there is no evidence that
        Kelley’s demands or statements were inconsistent with the terms

        12 Security Walls also points to statements in Kelley’s deposition to show that
        Kelley undermined the union. For example, when asked why he did not
        approach the union first with his workplace concerns, Kelley responded:
                In the experience I had with the [u]nion officers there,
                although I paid [the union’s] dues to be a part of the [u]nion,
                our representation was of very poor quality. And things did
                not—they did not progress in—with any sense of urgency no
                matter (audio interference) what it was . . . .
        But Kelley’s view about the quality or efficacy of his union representation does
        not change the fact that he was not required to go to the union first. Under
        the facts of this case, section 7 protected his activities, and although he was not
        prohibited from pursuing union channels, the NLRA did not require him to
        either.
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        24                        Opinion of the Court                       22-11339

        of the collective[]bargaining agreement then in effect or in
        derogation of the [u]nion’s bargaining position.” We agree.
                Contrary to Security Walls’s argument, Kelley was not
        attempting to negotiate new employment terms when he relayed
        employees’ concerns about Security Walls’s rumored change from
        five eight-hour shifts per week to three twelve-hour shifts per
        week. Kelley merely discussed the potential negative ramifications
        of the change with Security Walls and, at most, suggested that
        Security Walls reconsider its proposed shift modification. 13 Section
        7 of the NLRA permits employees like Kelley to engage in
        concerted activity and present their grievances to their employer,
        so long as their activity does not infringe on the union
        representative’s role as exclusive negotiator of the collective
        bargaining agreement. See 29 U.S.C. § 157; Richardson Paint Co.,
        574 F.2d at 1205–06. Here, the facts fail to show that Kelley’s
        activities undermined the union or conflicted with the collective
        bargaining agreement. Indeed, Security Walls has pointed to no

        13 Likewise, contrary to Security Walls’s argument, Kelley’s complaints about
        supervisory incompetence during the meeting in which he discussed the shift
        changes were not a “request to negotiate working conditions.” Kelley simply
        raised employees’ concerns about supervisory conduct. The record does not
        support Security Walls’s claim that Kelley then requested to “negotiate” a
        resolution without the union.
                In any event, to the extent that Security Walls implies that supervisory
        mistreatment of employees is a matter governed by the collective bargaining
        agreement, Security Walls fails to identify any provisions in the agreement
        inconsistent with Kelley’s request, which was simply that employees be
        treated fairly and respectfully by supervisors.
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        22-11339                 Opinion of the Court                             25

        evidence—and we see none—that the union was prejudiced or
        considered Kelley’s conduct objectionable or in derogation of its
        bargaining position on any matter. 14 Likewise, Kelley did not
        “request to negotiate wages,” as Security Walls argues, when he
        called human resources about the underpayment and
        reimbursement issues that affected himself and another officer. 15
        Instead, he simply wanted Security Walls to correct its mistakes
        and pay him and the other officer the proper amount—consistent
        with the collective bargaining agreement. Finally, Kelley did not
        attempt to renegotiate the collective bargaining agreement by
        raising concerns that Robinson was assigning mandatory overtime
        to junior employees without proceeding through the seniority list
        in order. Instead, as the Board correctly found, Kelley’s
        “complaints . . . were consistent with the requirements of the
        collective-bargaining agreement,” which provides that “[o]vertime
        shall be assigned on a rotating seniority basis.”
              Moreover, Kelley’s activities are distinguishable from those
        in Emporium Capwell. In Emporium Capwell, the dissident employees

        14 To the contrary, the record shows that the union stood with Kelley and
        filed a grievance on his behalf when Security Walls suspended him in
        retaliation for his concerted activity.
        15 To the extent Security Walls’s argument is that Kelley attempted to
        renegotiate wages when he pointed out that the rumored shift changes may
        have compensation ramifications, Security Walls has failed to support its
        point. Far from attempting to renegotiate wages, Kelley merely pointed out
        that such a shift change may have a disparate impact on dayshift employees as
        compared to nightshift employees.
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        26                        Opinion of the Court                       22-11339

        acted against the express directions of the union; the union itself
        urged the dissident employees to halt their activities and warned
        that they might be terminated; and the employees took steps to
        pressure the company to renegotiate, directly with the employee
        group, terms that were already addressed in the parties’ collective
        bargaining agreement. 420 U.S. at 52–56. In contrast, here, the
        record is devoid of evidence that Kelley acted against union
        instructions, took any position contrary to the collective bargaining
        agreement or in derogation of the union’s authority, or pressured
        Security Walls to bypass the union and negotiate with him
        directly. 16
               In short, the record does not support that Kelley attempted
        to renegotiate provisions contained in the collective bargaining
        agreement or undermine the union’s role as its exclusive bargainer.
        Accordingly, Kelley did not need union approval or intervention
        for his activities. Instead, as the Board found, his activities were
        covered by section 7. Applying our deferential review, we agree
        with the Board’s rational and supported conclusions that there is
        “no evidence” that the workplace issues that Kelley raised were
        inconsistent or in conflict with the collective bargaining
        agreement; “no basis to conclude that Kelley’s conduct was

        16 Security Walls repeatedly asserts that Kelley’s actions were inconsistent
        with the collective bargaining agreement. But simply repeating an assertion
        does not make it true. Security Walls fails to explain how Kelley’s actions were
        inconsistent or in conflict with the collective bargaining agreement.
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        22-11339             Opinion of the Court                     27

        unprotected”; and no analogy between this case and Emporium
        Capwell.
                               V.         Conclusion
               Because Kelley’s activity did not undermine the union’s
        objectives or its position as a bargaining authority, we conclude
        that Kelley’s activity was protected.
        Petition DENIED       and    cross-petition    for   enforcement
        GRANTED.