Court Opinion

ID: 9889994
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-11 20:09:17.271753+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:55.440510
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Cultrona, 2023-Ohio-3707.]

                                        COURT OF APPEALS
                                   TUSCARAWAS COUNTY, OHIO
                                    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

STATE OF OHIO                                     JUDGES:
                                                  Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J.
        Plaintiff-Appellee                        Hon. John W. Wise, J.
                                                  Hon. Andrew J. King, J.
-vs-
                                                  Case No. 2023 AP 01 0006
IAN A. CULTRONA

        Defendant-Appellant                       OPINION

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                       Criminal Appeal from the Municipal Court,
                                               Case No. CRB1700001D

JUDGMENT:                                      Affirmed

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:                        October 11, 2023

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Appellee                         For Defendant-Appellee

LACEE FELIX                                    IAN CULTRONA
CITY PROSECUTOR                                PRO SE
714 North Wooster Avenue                       P. O. Box 300
Dover, Ohio 44622                              Orient, Ohio 43146
Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2023 AP 01 0006                                                2

Wise, J.

         {¶1}   Appellant Ian A. Cultrona appeals the trial court’s January 3, 2023, decision

denying his pro se motion to transfer firearms to a third party and granting the State’s

motion to dispose of the property.

         {¶2}   The Appellee State of Ohio has not filed a brief in this case.

         {¶3}   Preliminarily, we note this case is before this Court on the accelerated

calendar which is governed by App.R. 11.1. Subsection (E), determination and judgment

on appeal, provides in pertinent part: “The appeal will be determined as provided by

App.R. 11.1. It shall be sufficient compliance with App.R. 12(A) for the statement of the

reason for the court's decision as to each error to be in brief and conclusionary form.”

         {¶4}   One of the most important purposes of the accelerated calendar is to enable

an appellate court to render a brief and conclusory decision more quickly than in a case

on the regular calendar where the briefs, facts, and legal issues are more complicated.

Crawford v. Eastland Shopping Mall Assn., 11 Ohio App.3d 158, 463 N.E.2d 655 (10th

Dist.1983).

         {¶5}   This appeal shall be considered in accordance with the aforementioned

rules.

                            STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE

         {¶6}   For purposes of this appeal, the relevant facts and procedural history are

as follows:

         {¶7}   Appellant Ian A. Cultrona was originally charged in this case with domestic

violence, carrying a concealed weapon, possession of a firearm while intoxicated and
Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2023 AP 01 0006                                            3

aggravated menacing. Firearms were seized pursuant to a criminal protection order

entered in this case.

      {¶8}    On May 2, 2017, Appellant was convicted of aggravated menacing, in

violation of R.C. 2903.21, and the remaining three charges were dismissed by the

prosecutor under a Criminal Rule 11(f) negotiated plea. Pursuant to the plea agreement,

two other weapons were forfeited by Appellant, and the weapons which are the subject

hereof were ordered to be held pending further order of the court.

      {¶9}    After a brief period on probation, followed by two warrants for probation

violations, the Appellant's probation was terminated unsuccessfully and he was

sentenced to serve 90 days in the county jail, with credit from March 28, 2018. Although

probation was terminated unsuccessfully, the issue of the two remaining Ruger

handguns was not addressed by the trial court at that time. The Court finds that this was

due to inadvertence by the parties, counsel and the court.

      {¶10} On May 23, 2019 the Defendant began serving an aggregate sentence of 3

years, including a three-year gun specification term, for aggravated robbery and

felonious assault, imposed by the Tuscarawas County Court of Common Pleas.

      {¶11} At a prior hearing the State conceded that the trial court cannot order a

forfeiture of the subject firearms because forfeiture proceedings were never initiated by

the State in accordance with Ohio law.

      {¶12} On April 7, 2022, the State filed a Motion to Dispose of Property in Custody

of the Dover Police Department.

      {¶13} On September 7, 2022, Defendant filed a pro se motion to transfer firearms

to a third party.
Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2023 AP 01 0006                                             4

      {¶14} The current motions involve the disposition of weapons currently in the

possession of the Dover Police Department which, as stated above, were seized

pursuant to a criminal protection order entered in this case. The firearms in question are

a Ruger SR .22 handgun with one magazine, serial no. 361-69158 and a Ruger SR 9mm

handgun with one magazine, serial no. 330-76161.

      {¶15} On December 14, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on the motions. At the

hearing, the State of Ohio was represented by a Dover Assistant Prosecutor and

Appellant appeared by video, without counsel, from the Ohio Correctional Reception

Center in Orient, Ohio.

      {¶16} By Judgment Entry file January 3, 2023, the trial court granted the State’s

motion and denied Appellant’s motion, finding that Appellant failed to demonstrate that

transfer of the firearm to his son would meet the requirements of federal firearms law.

Appellant's son did not appear for the hearing, therefore no acknowledgements of the

legal requirements, or assurance to keep the guns from Appellant were provided. The

son was not subject to questioning by the State. No evidence was presented regarding

the son's legal status regarding firearms possession. The trial court further found that

“the close paternal nexus between father and son make it likely that the Appellant would

attempt to exert control over the possession or use of the weapons.”

      {¶17} Appellant now appeals, assigning the following error for review:

                                 ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

      {¶18} “I.   THE     COURTS     FAILURE     TO    PROPERLY        SEEK    CERTAIN

ASSURANCES FROM THE PROPOSED TRANSFEREE, INCLUDING THAT THE

PROPOSED TRANSFEREE IS NOT PROHIBITED FROM OWNING OR POSSESSING
Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2023 AP 01 0006                                              5

A FIREARM THEMSELVES [SIC], THAT THE PROPOSED TRANSFEREE PROMISE

[SIC] TO KEEP THE FIREARMS AWAY FROM THE FELON, AND THAT WOULD AID

AND ABET A §922(G) VIOLATION PRIOR TO DENYING APPELLANTS MOTION TO

TRANSFER FIREARMS CONSTITUTED AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND/OR

CLEAR DISREGARD OF APPLICABLE LAW.”

                                               I.

      {¶19} In his sole Assignment of Error, Appellant argues that the trial court erred

in denying his motion to transfer. We disagree.

      {¶20} As relevant here, 18 U.S.C. §922(g) makes it unlawful for any person

convicted of a felony to “possess in or affecting commerce [ ] any firearm or ammunition.”

      {¶21} In Henderson v. United States, 575 U.S. 622, 626, 135 S.Ct. 1780, 1784,

191 L.Ed.2d 874, the United States Supreme Court stated that “provision [18 U.S.C.

§922(g)] prevents a court from instructing an agency to return guns in its custody to a

felon-owner like [Appellant], because that would place him in violation of the law. The

question here is how § 922(g) affects a court's authority to instead direct the transfer of

such firearms to a third party.

      {¶22} The Henderson court went on to explain:

             That means, as all parties agree, that § 922(g) prevents a court from

      ordering the sale or other transfer of a felon's guns to someone willing to

      give the felon access to them or to accede to the felon's instructions about

      their future use. See Brief for United States 23; Reply Brief 12. In such a

      case, the felon would have control over the guns, even while another person

      kept physical custody. The idea of constructive possession is designed to
Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2023 AP 01 0006                                               6

      preclude just that result, “allow[ing] the law to reach beyond puppets to

      puppeteers.” United States v. Al–Rekabi, 454 F.3d 1113, 1118 (C.A.10

      2006). A felon cannot evade the strictures of § 922(g) by arranging a sham

      transfer that leaves him in effective control of his guns. And because that is

      so, a court may no more approve such a transfer than order the return of

      the firearms to the felon himself.

      {¶23} The Court then went on to provide the following guidance to trial courts

considering a motion to transfer:

             Accordingly, a court facing a motion like Henderson's may approve

      the transfer of guns consistently with § 922(g) if, but only if, that disposition

      prevents the felon from later exercising control over those weapons, so that

      he could either use them or tell someone else how to do so. One way to

      ensure that result, as the Government notes, is to order that the guns be

      turned over to a firearms dealer, himself independent of the felon's control,

      for subsequent sale on the open market. See, e.g., United States v. Zaleski,

      686 F.3d 90, 92–94 (C.A.2 2012). Indeed, we can see no reason, absent

      exceptional circumstances, to disapprove a felon's motion for such a sale,

      *whether or not he has picked the vendor. That option, however, is not the

      only one available under § 922(g). A court may also grant a felon's request

      to transfer his guns to a person who expects to maintain custody of them,

      so long as the recipient will not allow the felon to exert any influence over

      their use. In considering such a motion, the court may properly seek certain

      assurances: for example, it may ask the proposed transferee to promise to
Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2023 AP 01 0006                                                7

      keep the guns away from the felon, and to acknowledge that allowing him

      to use them would aid and abet a § 922(g) violation. See id., at 94; United

      States v. Miller, 588 F.3d 418, 420 (C.A.7 2009). Even such a pledge, of

      course, might fail to provide an adequate safeguard, and a court should

      then disapprove the transfer. See, e.g., State v. Fadness, 363 Mont. 322,

      341–342, 268 P.3d 17, 30 (2012) (upholding a trial court's finding that the

      assurances given by a felon's parents were not credible). But when a court

      is satisfied that a felon will not retain control over his guns, § 922(g) does

      not apply, and the court has equitable power to accommodate the felon's

      request.

      {¶24} In the case sub judice, Appellant cannot possess firearms because he is

incarcerated and, when released, will be under a firearms disability. However, this

disability does not divest him of the right to seek transfer of the guns to a suitable third

party. As such, Appellant asked the court to transfer the firearm to his son, Ryan

Cultrona, who is 22 years old.

      {¶25} At the hearing on the motion, no evidence, assurance, or promises were

provided to the trial court by the proposed transferee, Appellant’s 22-year-old son, that

he would keep the firearm away from Appellant. Rather, the trial court found that, due to

the father-son relationship, it was “likely that the Defendant would attempt to exert control

over the possession or use of the weapons.”

      {¶26} Based on the foregoing, we find that Appellant’s motion, seeking to transfer

ownership of the firearm property to his son, fails the test set forth in Henderson and the
Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2023 AP 01 0006                                          8

trial court’s decision denying the motion was appropriate. See United States v. Hagar,

N.D.Ohio No. 1:16 CR 00273, 2023 WL 2895155.

       {¶27} Appellant's sole assignment of error is overruled.

       {¶28} The judgment of the Municipal Court, Tuscarawas County, Ohio, is affirmed.

By: Wise, J.

Hoffman, P. J., and

King, J., concur.

JWW/kw 1003