Court Opinion

ID: 994188
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-07-04 00:19:05.752611+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:30:46.984120
License: Public Domain

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                                    No. 97-4317

ONE MALE JUVENILE,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of North Carolina, at Bryson City.
Lacy H. Thornburg, District Judge.
(CR-94-61)

Submitted: December 30, 1997

Decided: February 12, 1998

Before WILKINS and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges, and
BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

William E. Loose, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellant. Mark T.
Calloway, United States Attorney, Deborah A. Ausburn, Assistant
United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Appellant, one male Juvenile ("1MJ"), appeals the district court's
order sentencing him as a juvenile to twenty-four months imprison-
ment. We review a district court's final sentence imposed under the
Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act* to determine whether the sentence
is plainly unreasonable. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(4) (1994); United
States Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.12 (1996).

1MJ pled guilty to engaging in sexual contact with a person under
the age of twelve in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2244(a)(1) (1994).
Approximately two years after sentencing 1MJ to a three-year term
of probation, the court found that 1MJ violated five conditions of his
probation. The court then recalled 1MJ's probation and sentenced him
to twenty-four months imprisonment.

When a defendant violates the terms of his probation, the sentence
imposed upon revocation is punishment for the original offense and
not punishment for the conduct prompting the revocation. See United
States v. Woodrup, 86 F.3d 359, 360-62 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 65
U.S.L.W. 3294 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1996) (No. 96-6025). Accordingly,
after finding that a probation violation has occurred, a district court
may revoke probation and impose any other sentence that initially
could have been imposed. 18 U.S.C. § 3565(a)(2) (1994).

We find that 1MJ's twenty-four month sentence is not plainly
unreasonable. He makes no argument in his brief that the sentence
violates any statutory provision or any sentencing guidelines provi-
sion. We find that the sentence is one which the district court could
have imposed upon him initially. See 18 U.S.C. § 3565(a)(2) (1994).
Although 1MJ completed sexual abuse counseling, apparently com-
plied with his probation conditions for an extended period, and appar-
ently committed no further sexual abuse violations, other
considerations such as the seriousness of his original offense, the
plethora of probation violations, and his need for drug and alcohol
treatment support the reasonableness of his sentence.
_________________________________________________________________
*18 U.S.C.A. §§ 5031-5042 (West 1985 & Supp. 1997).

                    2
Thus we affirm 1MJ's sentence. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.

AFFIRMED

                    3