Court Opinion

ID: 9624668
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:13:02.629008+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:07:01.920085
License: Public Domain

WORTHEN, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent, suggesting that the majority opinion in its eagerness to avoid a forfeiture in this case has imposed an unreasonable burden upon the county treasurers and the taxpayers of this state, one not contemplated by the legislature in its adoption of sections 59-10-9 and 59-10-10, U.C.A. 1953, cited in the main opinion, and has imposed an unwarranted burden on the county recorders.
The majority opinion states:
“Despite the so-called liberalizing amendment of 1931, it can hardly be supposed that the legislature intended to place the entire responsibility on the taxpayer to find out the valuation, the assessment, the amount of his tax and to pay the same on his own initiative.”
Is it being suggested that if the legislature did intend exactly what is supposed could not have been intended, that the act is unconstitutional, or that only the author of the opinion is able to interpret legislative intent ? There is nothing in said amendment that could lead to any conviction that the legislature considered any great hardship had been done to a taxpayer if the entire responsibility were placed on him to find out the valuation, the assessment, the amount ,of his tax and to pay the same on his own initiative. If the tax is not to be paid by the initiative of the taxpayer, whose initiative is brought into play? In order to prevent any liberalizing of the duties of the assessor under the 1931 amendment, the majority opinion weaves out of pure figment, and without either legislative *288edict or judicial precedent a theory that will undo all that the legislature sought to accomplish and declares:
“ * * * it is important to remember that it is the county as an entity which constitutes the taxing power, and that it carries on the taxing procedure through its functioning officials. The recorder, by placing a deed on record, the assessor, by carrying the information from the deed to the assessment rolls, and the treasurer, by sending out the notices and collecting the taxes, are all performing duties upon which part of the taxing process depends. If they collectively fail to perform the duties to the taxpayer and the public required by the statutes, that failure is chargeable to the county as the taxing entity!’ (Emphasis added.)
The statute imposes no duty upon the recorder such as is intimated in the majority opinion to obtain the taxpayer’s address. With such mental gymnastics as are exhibited here any declaration by the legislature as to the duties to be discharged by certain officers becomes quite immaterial. The composite whole makes each responsible for the failure of the other, and the failure of one is charged to all.
Strange as it may seem there has been no contention made by either of the parties in this case that the treasurer has neglected to perform his duty. Nor can there be under the plain meaning of the words of the cited sections. To require the treasurer to go beyond the bounds of his office to search for correct addresses is to place on him an unreasonable burden not contemplated by the legislature. It is very well to state that the treasurer must search the recorder’s office, but this will only involve throwing an extra burden on those taxpayers who fulfill their duty to pay their taxes without requiring the county officials to hunt them out.
All one who wishes to avoid or delay payment of taxes has to do under the theory of the main opinion is to make sure his deed is recorded; that his address is nowhere shown and then sit back until the statute of limitations has all but run to see whether or not the property will be valuable enough to make payment of taxes thereon profitable to himself, and the county is helpless to collect taxes until he makes that determination. The main opinion suggests that the county has an ever-increasing tax lien upon the property of the delinquent taxpayer, but ever-increasing liens will not pay the salaries of government officials, nor support needed governmental expenditures.
The majority opinion states that “in the interpretation and application of statutory requirements antecedent to forfeiture of property, they are construed in favor of the taxpayer, and against the taxing authority, and are strictissimi juris.” This quotation fails to take into account that the legisla*289ture has specifically placed the burden the other way after a tax sale in this state.
Section 59-10-36, U.C.A.1953 provides:
“A copy of the record of any tax sale duly certified * * * is prima facie evidence of the facts therein shown, and the regularity of all proceedings connected with the assessment, valuation, notice, equalization, levies, tax notices, advertisement and sale of property therein described, and the burden of showing any irregularity in any of the proceedings restdting in the sale of property for the nonpayment of delin-qtient taxes shall be on him who asserts it." (Emphasis added.)
The burden was, therefore, upon the defendants to show a right to notice under the Utah statutes, and I think they have failed ■to meet this burden. The majority opinion ■construes sections 59-10-9 and 10 to mean that the treasurer must diligently search for 'the missing address of the taxpayer, while ■the taxpayer need do nothing but sit back .and hope that the treasurer is unsuccessful.
I think it not unreasonable to require a taxpayer to furnish the assessor with his ■correct mailing address so that the treasurer will not have to conduct any extensive search for the same. It must be conceded that the general rule concerning taxpayers is that:
(1) “ * * * every person is charged with knowledge as to whether his taxes are paid, and if they are not paid be is charged with knowledge that the land may be sold in the manner provided by law, * * *. ”1 and
(2) “ * * * it is incumbent upon a property owner to take notice of the known fact that all property is taxed annually, and unless the taxes are paid that the property will be sold at tax sale.”2
The very life of government is dependent upon the collection of taxes, and the schools and other agencies of government depend upon the speedy and most inexpensive method of tax collection in order that they may function. No obstacles grounded on trivial and ill founded excuses should be permitted to interfere with the functioning of our schools, and our state, county and city governments.
The majority opinion presumes that the only result of their opinion is to avoid a forfeiture in this case and consequently they assume that all justice and equity is on their side. But what the majority opinion fails to take into account is that de*290fendants have shown no right to have any equity considerations enter into this case. We are not here passing on a situation where the property owner has made sure that his address is noted on the assessment roll nor a case where the assessor has been furnished with the taxpayer’s address. Nor are we here concerned with a situation where the property owner’s failure to pay his taxes was due to an honest belief that another, who had agreed to meet his taxes, was paying the same, nor are we concerned here with a case where the failure to pay was shown to be anything but deliberate and wilful. In all likelihood defendants would not now be offering to pay their taxes were it not for this quiet title action by plaintiff.
The majority opinion by casting duties on the treasurer additional to those prescribed by the plain language of sections 59-10-9 and 10, supra, in effect makes the taxpayer who is diligent and honest concerning his taxes foot the bill in order to provide an additional safeguard for those who are too negligent or lazy or dishonest to bother making inquiry concerning why they had not been assessed and asked to pay taxes, when the legislature has itself provided excellent safeguards for the protection of the nonpaying taxpayer by the provisions of chapter 10 of title 59 providing for publication of delinquent lists and a four-year redemption period after preliminary sale to the county.
The effect of the main opinion is simply to prefer one forfeiture over another — i. e., rather the honest, diligent taxpayer should forfeit tax dollars in increased clerical costs in the county treasurer’s office than the slothful, careless, sleeping taxpayer should forfeit his property for failing to bear his fair share of governmental expense. The plain language of sections 59-10-9 and 10 should not be stretched so far by judicial interpretation for such a result.
I would hold that the taxpayer has the responsibility for seeing that his correct address has been given to the assessor’s office, and that he has at least the duty of making inquiry of the assessor and treasurer if he fails to receive tax and valuation notices for any one year.

. Ponder v. Ebey, 194 Okl. 407, 152 P.2d 208.

. Sutter v. Scudder, 110 Mont. 390, 103 P.2d 303, 308. See also many cases cited in American Digest System, Taxation, &wkey; 516.