Court Opinion

ID: 9947075
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-01 23:03:21.49477+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:46.412056
License: Public Domain

2024 IL App (3d) 210073

                                 Opinion filed March 1, 2024
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                     IN THE

                                     APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                                               THIRD DISTRICT

                                                       2024

      SINNISSIPPI ROD & GUN CLUB, INC. and )        Appeal from the Circuit Court
      SIMON EICHELBERGER,                         ) of the 14th Judicial Circuit,
                                                  ) Whiteside County, Illinois.
              Plaintiffs-Appellants,              )
                                                  )
              v.                                  ) Appeal No. 3-21-0073
                                                  ) Circuit No. 19-MR-151
      KWAME RAOUL, in His Official Capacity as )
      Attorney General; and BRENDAN F.            )
      KELLY, in His Official Capacity as Director )
      of the Illinois State Police,               ) Honorable
                                                  ) Patricia Ann Senneff,
              Defendants-Appellees.               ) Judge, Presiding.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

            JUSTICE HETTEL delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
            Justice Albrecht specially concurred in the judgment, with opinion.
            Justice Holdridge dissented in the judgment, with opinion.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                  OPINION

¶1          Plaintiffs—Sinnissippi Rod & Gun Club, Inc., and one of its members, Simon

     Eichelberger—filed a complaint in the circuit court of Whiteside County against defendants—

     Illinois Attorney General Kwame Raoul and Illinois State Police Director Brendan F. Kelly—

     challenging the constitutionality of the criminal code restrictions that prohibit them from openly

     carrying a firearm in public. Specifically, plaintiffs requested a declaration that the concealed carry

     provisions under section 24-1(a)(10) of the unlawful use of weapons (UUW) statute (720 ILCS
     5/24-1(a)(10) (West 2020)) and section 24-1.6(a) the aggravated unlawful use of weapon (AUUW)

     statute (id. § 24-1.6(a)) were unconstitutional under the second amendment of the United States

     Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. II). The trial court found that there was no genuine issue of

     material fact regarding the constitutionality of the statutory scheme and granted defendants’

     motion for summary judgment. Applying the text-and-history test recently advanced in New York

     State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. ___, ___, 142 S. Ct. 2111, 2120 (2022), we conclude

     that the public carry restrictions imposed under the UUW and the AUUW do not violate the second

     amendment and affirm.

¶2                                           I. BACKGROUND

¶3          In 2013, the Illinois General Assembly enacted the Firearm Concealed Carry Act

     (Concealed Carry Act) (430 ILCS 66/1 et seq. (West 2020)) allowing law-abiding citizens to

     obtain a license to carry a concealed firearm in public, so long as individuals seeking licensure

     satisfy certain objective criteria. See Pub. Act 98-63 (eff. July 9, 2013). To qualify for a license,

     applicants must be at least 21 years of age, possess a valid card under the Firearm Owners

     Identification Card Act (430 ILCS 65/0.01 et seq. (West 2020)), complete firearm training, and

     avoid criminal conviction for offenses involving violence or driving while under the influence

     within five years preceding his or her application. 430 ILCS 66/25 (West 2020). So long as these

     statutory requirements are met, the applicant provides necessary documentation and fees, and a

     review board determines the applicant is not a danger to himself or the public, the Illinois State

     Police “shall issue” a license to carry a concealed firearm. 1 Id. § 10(a).

            1
              The Concealed Carry Act defines “concealed firearm” as “a loaded or unloaded handgun carried
     on or about a person completely or mostly concealed from view of the public or on or about a person
     within a vehicle.” 430 ILCS 66/5 (West 2020).

                                                       2
¶4           A concealed carry license permits a licensee to publicly carry a loaded or unloaded

     firearm, on or about his or her person, fully or partially concealed from the view of the public. Id.

     § 10(c)(1). A licensee may also keep or carry a firearm on or about his or her person within a

     vehicle. Id. § 10(c)(2). The concealed carry licensing regime, however, does not allow an

     individual to openly carry a firearm in public.

¶5           Two provisions in Criminal Code of 2012 (Criminal Code) (720 ILCS 5/1-1 et seq. (West

     2020)) proscribe the open carriage of firearms in public. Section 24-1(a)(10) of the Criminal

     Code provides that a person commits the offense of unlawful use of weapons when he or she

     knowingly “[c]arries or possesses on or about his or her person, upon any public street, alley, or

     other public lands within the corporate limits of a city, village, or incorporated town, *** any

     pistol, revolver, stun gun, or taser or other firearm” without a “currently valid license under the

     Firearm Concealed Carry Act.” Id. § 24-1(a)(10). Similarly, section 24-1.6(a) of the Criminal

     Code 2 states that a person commits the offense of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon when he

     or she knowingly “[c]arries or possesses on or about his or her person, upon any public street,

     alley, or other public lands within the corporate limits of a city, village or incorporated town,”

     any “pistol, revolver, or handgun” and “has not been issued a currently valid license under the

     Firearm Concealed Carry Act.” Id. § 24-1.6(a)(2), (a)(3)(A-5); (a)(2), (a)(3)(B-5) (West 2020).

¶6           Eichelberger and other members of Sinnissippi Rod & Gun Club have complied with

     Illinois’s Concealed Carry Act and possess licenses to carry concealed firearms in public.

             2
              Previous provisions of the AUUW (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a) (West 2020)) statute have been
     successfully challenged and deemed unconstitutional by the Illinois Supreme Court. In 2013, the court
     held, in People v. Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116, ¶¶ 20-21, that the AUUW’s provision criminalizing
     possession of an operable firearm for self-defense outside the home was a categorical ban in violation of
     an individual’s right to keep and bear arms. Provisions criminalizing firearm carriage in a vehicle and in
     certain public contexts were deemed facially unconstitutional two years later in People v. Mosley, 2015 IL
     115872, and People v. Burns, 2015 IL 117387.

                                                         3
     Eichelberger and other members are also National Rifle Association certified firearms instructors

     and Illinois certified concealed carry license instructors.

¶7          In November 2019, Sinnissippi Rod & Gun Club and Eichelberger filed a complaint for

     declaratory relief against defendants, requesting a declaration that sections 24-1(a)(10) and 24-

     1.6(a) of the Criminal Code were unconstitutional to the extent they prevented “otherwise qualified

     Illinois residents” from openly carrying firearms in public. In their complaint, plaintiffs facially

     challenged the concealed carry restrictions under the UUW and AUUW statutes and asserted that

     Eichelberger and other gun club members would “carry a loaded and functional handgun openly

     in public for self-defense and defense of others, but they refrain from doing so because they fear

     arrest and prosecution.”

¶8          The parties agreed that no genuine issue of material fact existed and filed cross-motions

     for summary judgment. Plaintiffs claimed that District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008),

     controlled the issue. They argued that Heller stands for the proposition that open carry is

     constitutionally permitted and maintained that the open carry of firearms remains “the ultimate

     human right” because it is “the mode that best effectuates” the right of self-defense. Defendants

     argued that there is no second amendment right to openly carry firearms in public. In the

     alternative, defendants maintained that, even if concealed carry laws fell within the scope of the

     second amendment, the statutory scheme passed intermediate scrutiny because concealed carry

     restrictions are substantially related to important public safety interests. The trial court found the

     concealed carry restrictions constitutional and granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

                                                       4
¶9                                              II. ANALYSIS

¶ 10                                        A. The Bruen Decision

¶ 11          In June 2022, the United States Supreme Court decided New York State Rifle & Pistol

       Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. ___, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022). In Bruen, the Court reviewed a

       provision of New York’s concealed carry statute requiring an applicant to demonstrate a

       heightened need for self-defense or “proper cause” to obtain a license. N.Y. Penal Law

       § 400.00(2)(f) (McKinney 2020). New York justified the proper-cause requirement as

       “substantially related to the achievement of an important governmental interest,” preventing gun

       violence. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bruen, 597 U.S. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2125. Relying

       on the established jurisprudence of Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742

       (2010), the Court held that the second and fourteenth amendments’ protection of the “right of an

       ordinary, law-abiding citizen to possess a handgun in the home for self-defense” extended to

       “carry[ing] a handgun for self-defense outside the home.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at

       2122; see Heller, 554 U.S. at 636 (holding that the second amendment guarantees law abiding

       citizens the right to possess a handgun in the home for self-defense); McDonald, 561 U.S. at 786

       (incorporating the same understanding of the second amendment to the states through the

       fourteenth amendment). The Court also referenced, with approval, Heller’s historical

       understanding of the amendment to demark the limits on the exercise of that right:

                     “Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not

              unlimited. From Blackstone through the 19th-century cases, commentators and

              courts routinely explained that the right was not a right to keep and carry any

              weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose....

              [N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding

                                                       5
              prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws

              forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and

              government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the

              commercial sale of arms.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bruen, 597 U.S. at

              ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2162 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring, joined by Roberts, C.J.).

¶ 12          Following a review of firearm regulations from 1791 through 1890, the court struck down

       New York’s discretionary licensing scheme, concluding that the second amendment guarantees

       “the right to bear commonly used arms in public subject to certain reasonable, well-defined

       restrictions.” Id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2156 (majority opinion). Notably, however, the Court

       found no fault with the nondiscretionary “shall-issue” licensing schemes adopted by 43 other

       states, including the Concealed Carry Act plaintiffs challenge here. See id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at

       2123 n.1 (enumerating 43 “shall-issue” state statutes, including section 10 of Illinois’s Concealed

       Carry Act); id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2123 (noting “the vast majority of States—43 by our count—

       are ‘shall issue’ jurisdictions, where authorities must issue concealed-carry licenses whenever

       applicants satisfy certain threshold requirements, without granting licensing officials discretion

       to deny licenses based on a perceived lack of need or suitability”); id. at ___ n.9, 142 S. Ct. at

       2138 n.9 (emphasizing that “nothing in or analysis should be interpreted to suggest the

       unconstitutionality of the 43 States’ ‘shall-issue’ licensing regimes”).

¶ 13          In ruling that New York’s proper-cause requirement infringed on an individual’s right to

       public carry under the second amendment, the Court held that the constitutionality of a firearm

       regulation depends solely on whether the restriction is consistent with “the historical tradition

       that delimits the outer bounds of the right to keep and bear arms.” Id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2127.

                                                         6
       Bruen then set forth a new test courts must conduct when evaluating a second amendment

       challenge:

              “When the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the

              Constitution presumptively protects that conduct. The government must then

              justify its regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with the Nation’s

              historical tradition of firearm regulation. Only then may a court conclude that the

              individual’s conduct falls outside the Second Amendment’s ‘unqualified

              command.’ ” Id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2129-30 (quoting Konigsberg v. State Bar of

              California, 366 U.S. 36, 49 n.10 (1961)).

       This text-and-history standard is a two-part inquiry. The first inquiry is: Does the plain text of

       the second amendment cover an individual’s conduct? Id. If not, the regulation is constitutional

       because it falls outside the scope of protection. But if it does, the individual’s conduct is

       presumptively protected by the second amendment, and we move to the second inquiry: Is the

       State’s regulation “consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation[?]” Id.

¶ 14          In their supplemental briefs, plaintiffs argue that the concealed carry provisions of the

       UUW and the AUUW statutes amount to a “categorical denial” of their right to bear arms under

       the second amendment and are therefore inconsistent with America’s history of second

       amendment liberties. Defendants maintain that the statutes at issue do not implicate the second

       amendment and, alternatively, if they do, the regulations are consistent with historical tradition.

¶ 15                              B. Applying the New Text-and-History Test

¶ 16                     1. Is Plaintiffs’ Conduct Covered by the Second Amendment?

¶ 17          The second amendment provides that “[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the

       security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S.

                                                         7
       Const., amend. II. In Heller, the Supreme Court held that the natural connotation of “bear [a]rms”

       means “wear, bear, or carry ... upon the person or in the clothing or in a pocket, for the purpose ...

       of being armed and ready for offensive or defensive action in a case of conflict with another

       person.” The Court declared that the right to possess and carry weapons for defense of the home

       was a protected second amendment right. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Heller, 554 U.S. at

       584, 636.

¶ 18          The Illinois Supreme Court extended that right outside the home in People v. Aguilar, 2013

       IL 112116, ¶ 21. In Aguilar, our supreme court recognized that “the second amendment protects

       the right to possess and use a firearm for self-defense outside the home” and found section 24-

       1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A) of the AUUW statute, which prohibited carrying a loaded firearm in public, to

       be unconstitutional. Id. ¶¶ 21-22.

¶ 19          In Bruen, the United States Supreme Court agreed that second amendment protections

       include the rights of individuals to possess and carry handguns outside the home for self-defense:

                      “In District of Columbia v. Heller [citation], and McDonald v. Chicago

              [citation], we recognized that the Second and Fourteenth Amendments protect the

              right of an ordinary, law-abiding citizen to possess a handgun in the home for self-

              defense. In this case, petitioners and respondents agree that ordinary, law-abiding

              citizens have a similar right to carry handguns publicly for their self-defense. We

              too agree, and now hold, consistent with Heller and McDonald, that the Second and

              Fourteenth Amendments protect an individual’s right to carry a handgun for self-

              defense outside the home.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2122.

¶ 20          Plaintiffs claim that Illinois’s criminalization of the public carriage of firearms infringes

       on their right to carry a handgun in public for self-defense. Following Heller, Aguilar, and

                                                         8
       Bruen, the rights expressed in the second amendment include the right to carry commonly used

       firearms in public, subject to reasonable government restriction. See id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at

       2156. Plaintiffs argue, however, that the protections provided by the second amendment should

       be extended to include a particular manner of public carriage. We find the resolution of this issue

       unnecessary. Even if we assume plaintiffs’ proposed conduct is covered by the second

       amendment, the challenged regulations are historically justified under the second part of the

       Bruen analysis.

¶ 21                        2. Is the State’s Regulation Consistent with the Nation’s

                                        Tradition of Firearm Regulation?

¶ 22          At the second step, the burden shifts to the State to demonstrate that regulating the

       manner of public carriage by requiring a concealed carry license is “consistent with this Nation’s

       historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2126.

¶ 23          To demonstrate that a challenged restriction is consistent with America’s historical

       tradition of firearm regulation, the government may identify historical regulations that are

       “distinctly similar” to the regulation at issue or use “analogical reasoning.” Id. at ___, 142 S. Ct.

       at 2131-32. As explained in Bruen, most cases “will often involve reasoning by analogy.” Id. at

       ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2132. Inquiry by analogy is not intended to impose a “regulatory straightjacket

       nor a regulatory blank check.” Id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2133. Reasoning by analogy “requires

       only that the government identify a well-established and representative historical analogue, not a

       historical twin.” (Emphases in original.) Id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2133. “Like all analogical

       reasoning, determining whether a historical regulation is a proper analogue for a distinctly

       modern firearm regulation requires a determination of whether the two regulations are

                                                         9
       ‘relevantly similar.’ ” Id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2132 (quoting Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical

       Reasoning, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 741, 773 (1993)).

¶ 24          In determining whether the regulation at issue and historical tradition are “relevantly

       similar,” courts should consider “how and why the regulations burden a law-abiding citizen’s

       right to armed self-defense.” Id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2132-33. Considerations of how and why

       translate into two primary factors: (1) how—whether modern and traditional laws impose a

       “comparable burden” on the right to carry firearms for self-defense—and (2) why—whether that

       burden is “comparably justified.” See id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2133 (“[W]hether modern and

       historical regulations impose a comparable burden on the right of armed self-defense and

       whether that burden is comparably justified are ‘ “central” ’ considerations when engaging in an

       analogical inquiry. [Citation.]” (Emphasis in original.)).

¶ 25          According to Bruen, the best way to conduct an historical analogue is by understanding

       the scope of the second amendment when it was adopted in 1791 through the ratification of the

       fourteenth amendment in 1868 and the Reconstruction Period. Id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2136.

       Courts should examine “a variety of legal and other sources” in early American history to

       determine the public understanding of the second amendment. (Internal quotation marks

       omitted.) Id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2127-28; Heller, 554 U.S. at 605. Those sources include

       (1) English practices that prevailed immediately before and after the framing of the Constitution;

       (2) similar rights to bear arms in state constitutions during the adoption of the second

       amendment; (3) public understanding of the right to keep and bear arms at the time the second

       amendment was enacted in 1791, as well as when the fourteenth amendment was ratified in

       1868; and (4) interpretation of the second amendment from 1791 through the end of the

       nineteenth century. Bruen, 597 U.S. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2127-28.

                                                        10
¶ 26          However, as is evident from a study of Bruen and the cases that have followed, historical

       analysis is not always easy; it can be difficult and nuanced. See id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2130; see

       also Firearms Policy Coalition, Inc. v. McCraw, 623 F. Supp. 3d 740 (N.D. Tex. 2022) (finding

       state statute prohibiting 18- to 20-year-olds from carrying a handgun unconstitutional under

       Bruen); United States v. Rahimi, 61 F.4th 443 (5th Cir. 2023) (finding federal statute prohibiting

       possession by individual subject to domestic violence restraining order unconstitutional under

       Bruen); United States v. Hill, No. H-22-249, 2022 WL 17069855 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 17, 2022)

       (finding federal statute criminalizing possession of a firearm by a felon constitutional under

       Bruen); Frey v. Nigrelli, 661 F. Supp. 3d 176 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (denying injunctive relief and

       concluding plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed in their challenge of state statute banning public

       carriage under Bruen); United States v. Jackson, No. ELH-22-141, 2023 WL 2242873 (D. Md.

       Feb. 27, 2023) (holding federal statute criminalizing possession while under indictment

       constitutional under Bruen). In conducting a review, a precise match between a current law and

       historical regulation is not required. “[E]ven if a modern-day regulation is not a dead ringer for

       historical precursors, it still may be analogous enough to pass constitutional muster.” Bruen, 597

       U.S. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2133.

¶ 27          Following the Bruen framework, the historical regulations cited by the State do not

       provide a “distinctly similar” statute that is, to quote Bruen, a “dead ringer” for Illinois’s

       concealed carry statutory scheme. By analogy, however, the State provides a plethora of

       evidence that regulating the manner of public carriage comports with historical tradition.

¶ 28          As the State maintains, the historical record from the founding era to the ratification of

       the fourteenth amendment consistently demonstrates a tradition of restricting the manner of

       public carriage. The United States Supreme Court recognized this long-standing custom in

                                                         11
       Heller, citing a robust historical tradition of regulating the right to “bear arms.” See Heller, 554

       U.S. at 626. In Heller, the Court explained that “[f]rom Blackstone through the 19th-century

       cases, commentators and courts routinely explained that the right [to keep and bear arms] was

       not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever.” (Emphasis

       added.) Id. And in Bruen, the Court reiterated, if not emphasized, that public carriage has

       historically been subject to reasonable restrictions. See Bruen, 597 U.S. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at

       2128 (declining to declare second amendment right to public carriage of weapons in “any

       manner whatsoever” (emphasis added and internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at ___, 142 S.

       Ct. at 2138 (emphasizing that the right to keep and bear arms in public has traditionally been

       subject to well-defined restrictions); id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2150 (noting that historical tradition

       from the Antebellum period demonstrated that “the manner of public carry was subject to

       reasonable regulation” (emphasis in original)); id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2156 (concluding that

       “through the Anglo-American history of public carry,” the second amendment has been subject

       to restrictions that “limited the intent for which one could carry arms, the manner by which one

       carried arms, or the exceptional circumstances under which one could not carry arms” (emphasis

       added)); see also id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2157 (Alito, J., concurring) (emphasizing that the

       Court’s decision did not disturb “anything that we said in Heller or McDonald [citation], about

       restrictions that may be imposed on the possession or carrying of guns”); id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at

       2162 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring, joined by Roberts, C.J.) (reiterating the holdings in Heller and

       McDonald that the right to keep and bear arms does not guarantee the right to carry a weapon in

       “ ‘any manner whatsoever’ ” (emphasis added) (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626)).

¶ 29          More specifically, as cited by the State, various forms of public carry restrictions

       proliferated across our newly formed Nation after ratification of the second amendment in 1791.

                                                         12
       Between 1791 and the middle of the nineteenth century, several states enacted laws that

       restricted, and even banned, the public carriage of pistols and other small weapons. 3 As

       recognized in Heller and repeated in Bruen, “ ‘the majority of the 19th-century courts to consider

       the question held that [these] prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the

       Second Amendment or state analogues.’ ” Bruen, 597 U.S. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2146 (quoting

       Heller, 554 U.S. at 626). 4

¶ 30           Plaintiffs argue that historical laws demonstrate a tradition of requiring open carry

       because they proscribed the concealed carry of handguns. However, a review of the cases

       considering those laws demonstrates that allowing open carry while prohibiting concealed carry

       was not the crucial factor in determining whether the restrictions passed constitutional muster. In

       the vast majority of those cases, courts struck down statutes that categorically prohibited the

       public carriage of firearms, both open and concealed, and ruled that the second amendment

       permitted limited restriction but not a complete ban. Courts concluded that the government could

       lawfully eliminate one kind of public carry to protect and ensure the safety of its citizens, so long

       as the people were permitted to carry weapons in another manner that allowed self-defense. The

       constitutional emphasis in those cases was the nature of the restriction—categorical

       (unconstitutional) versus limited (constitutional)—rather than open versus concealed. See State

       v. Mitchell, 3 Blackf. 229 (Ind. 1833) (Indiana Supreme Court upheld Indiana law restricting

               3
                  In the early to mid-1800’s, states began enacting laws that proscribed the concealed carry of
       small weapons or banned individuals from carrying weapons in public altogether. See 1795 Mass. Acts
       436; 1801 Tenn. Pub. Acts 259, 260-61; 1813 Ky. Acts 100; 1813 La. Acts 172; 1820 Ind. Acts 39; 1821
       Me. Laws 285; 1821 Tenn. Pub. Acts 15; 1838 Ark. Rev. Stat. § 13, p. 280; 1837 Ga. Acts 90; 1838 Va.
       Acts 76; 1839 Ala. Acts 67; 1859 Ohio Laws 56; 1860 N.M. Laws 94. Bruen also cites two additional
       statutes enacted in Tennessee in 1821 and the territory of Florida in 1835. See Bruen, 597 U.S. at ___
       n.16, 142 S. Ct. at 2146 n.16.
                4
                  Both Bruen and Heller cited State v. Mitchell, 3 Blackf. 229 (Ind. 1833); State v. Reid, 1 Ala.
       612, 616 (1840); State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18 (1842); Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243 (1846); State v. Chandler, 5
       La. Ann. 489 (1850); State v. Smith, 11 La. Ann. 633 (1856); State v. Jumel, 13 La. Ann. 399 (1858).

                                                          13
       public carriage of handguns); State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18, 22 (1842) (Arkansas Supreme Court

       held that restricted carry was constitutional, concluding that “the [second amendment] right in

       question possesses no such immunity as exempts it from all legal regulation and control”); State

       v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489, 490 (1850) (Louisiana Supreme Court upheld state statute

       restricting manner of public carry because statute did not categorically ban public carriage in that

       it did not interfere with the right to carry arms in another manner); State v. Jumel, 13 La. Ann.

       399, 399-400 (1858) (“The statute in question does not infringe the right of people to keep or

       bear arms. It is a measure of police, prohibiting only a particular mode of bearing arms which is

       found dangerous to the peace of society.” (Emphasis omitted.)).

¶ 31          Moreover, the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Bruen “does not prohibit States

       from imposing licensing requirements” for concealed carry of a handgun for self-defense. Bruen,

       597 U.S. ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2161 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring, joined by Roberts, C.J.) (“[T]he

       Court’s decision does not prohibit States from imposing licensing requirements for carrying a

       handgun for self-defense.”). Of relevance here, Bruen specifically noted that “these antebellum

       state-court decisions evince a consensus view that [s]tates could not altogether prohibit the

       public carry of ‘arms’ protected by the Second Amendment or state analogues.” Id. at ___, 142

       S. Ct. at 2147 (majority opinion) (explaining that historical cases demonstrated that the second

       amendment right to bear arms publicly was subject to limits on the manner of carriage).

¶ 32          Further, the history of the colonies and the early Republic demonstrate common practices

       of regulating public carry by the general public to prevent “fear” and “terror.” See 1692 Mass.

       Acts and Laws no. 6, pp. 11-12; 1699 N.H. Laws ch. 1 (“all Affrayers, Rioters, Disturbers, or

       Breakers of the Peace, and such as shall ride or go armed Offensively...by Night or by Day, in

       Fear or Affray of Their Majesties Liege People”); see also Collection of All Such Acts of the

                                                       14
       General Assembly of Virginia, ch. 21, p. 33 (1794) (“no man, great nor small, [shall] go nor ride

       armed by night nor by day, in fairs or markets, or in other places, in terror of the County”).

       Moreover, during the 1800s, states commonly regulated the manner in which individuals carried

       a firearm in public to reduce violence and protect the public. See generally Chandler, 5 La. Ann.

       at 489-90 (law restricting manner of carriage was “absolutely necessary to *** prevent

       bloodshed and assassinations”); Carroll v. State, 28 Ark. 99, 101 (1872) (holding that it was “not

       unreasonable” for the legislature to restrict the manner of public carriage based on public safety

       concerns); State v. Speller, 86 N.C. 697, 700 (1882) (finding public carry restriction

       constitutional because it did not impose a complete ban and its goal was to promote the “peace

       and safety of the public”).

¶ 33          In sum, a review of the analogous statutes and cases between the ratification of the

       second amendment and the late nineteenth century reveals that while a categorical prohibition on

       public carriage of firearms unquestionably violated an individual’s right to keep and bear arms

       (Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. 165, 187 (1871)), laws prohibiting one manner of carriage while

       allowing another did not (Mitchell, 3 Blackf. 229; Buzzard, 4 Ark. at 22; Chandler, 5 La. Ann. at

       490; Jumel, 13 La. Ann. at 399-400). Numerous states regulated the manner of public carriage,

       and these laws were widely enforced. See State v. Click, 2 Ala. 26, 29 (1841); Walls v. State, 7

       Blackf. 572, 573 (Ind. 1845); Hicks v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. 597, 598-99 (1850); Jackson v.

       State, 12 Ga. 1, 5 (1852); State v. Smith, 11 La. Ann. 633, 634 (1856); Commonwealth v.

       McClanahan, 59 Ky. 8, 10 (1859); State v. Stanford, 20 Ark. 145, 146 (1859). In fact, through

       the end of the nineteenth century, courts “almost universally held that the legislature may

       regulate and limit the mode of carrying arms.” Commonwealth v. Murphy, 44 N.E. 138, 138

       (Mass. 1896) (citing antebellum state courts that upheld statutes regulating the manner of public

                                                        15
       carriage). 5 Like its historical counterparts, section 24-1(a)(10) of the UUW statute and section

       24-1.6(a) of the AUUW statute lawfully regulate the manner of public carriage. Illinois’s

       concealed carry licensing requirement lawfully regulates the right to bear arms for self-defense

       by proscribing one manner of carriage and permitting another. As long as the regulation does not

       compel “an absolute ban” that imposes a significant burden on the right of self-defense, the

       statute passes constitutional muster. See Bruen, 597 U.S. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2128 (reviewing

       founding era historical precedent from Heller). Here, the criminal statutes regulating open

       carriage and the referenced Concealed Carry Act do not impose such a categorical ban.

¶ 34           “The Second Amendment guarantee[s] to ‘all Americans’ the right to bear commonly

       used arms in public subject to certain reasonable, well-defined restrictions.” (Emphasis added.)

       Id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2156 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 581). While we agree that the plain

       text of the second amendment protects the public carriage of firearms for self-defense, we cannot

       adhere to plaintiffs’ argument that the criminal statutes at issue represent a categorical and

       unconstitutional ban on that right. Under section 24-1(a)(10) of the UUW statute and section 24-

       1.6(a) of the AUUW statute, individuals who are licensed under the Concealed Carry Act are

       allowed to exercise their second amendment right to bear arms in public, subject to reasonable

       regulations. Applying the text-and-history test recently announced in Bruen, we find the

       challenged criminal statutes constitutional, based on this Nation’s historical tradition of

       regulatory measures restricting the manner of public carry.

¶ 35                                          C. Practical Implications

               5
                 The majority of states to address regulations criminalizing the manner of carriage upheld such
       statutes and constitutional provisions, concluding, almost uniformly, that the right to keep and bear arms
       was not unlimited and could be regulated. See generally Andrews, 50 Tenn. 165; Aymette v. State, 21
       Tenn. 154 (1840); Wilson v. State, 33 Ark. 557 (1878); Haile v. State, 38 Ark. 564 (1882); State v. Reid, 1
       Ala. 612 (1840); State v. Wilforth, 74 Mo. 528 (1881); Mitchell, 3 Blackf. 229.

                                                           16
¶ 36          Legitimate restrictions have been imposed on each constitutional amendment in the

       interest of creating reasonable safeguards. No constitutional right is absolute. Even in the context

       of the first amendment, an individual cannot yell “fire” in a crowded theater. See Schenck v.

       United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). The right of free speech is regulated for the safety and

       well-being of the general public, as are other constitutional rights. As the court in People v.

       Rodriguez, 171 N.Y.S.3d 802, 805-06 (Sup. Ct. 2022), noted:

              “Americans are well acquainted with the truism that one cannot falsely shout fire

              in a crowded theatre despite the free speech protections of the First Amendment

              (see Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 [citation] (1919); U.S. Const.,

              amend. I). The Free Exercise Clause does not bar states from requiring that students

              in public schools be immunized against various vaccine-preventable illnesses over

              religious objection (see Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-167, 64 S. Ct.

              438, 88 L. Ed. 645 (1944); Phillips v. City of New York, 775 F.3d 538 (2d Cir.

              2015); U.S. Const., amend. I), or from penalizing the use of hallucinogenic drugs,

              even though ingested pursuant to religious ceremony (see Employment Div., Dept.

              of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 108 L. Ed. 2d

              876 (1990); see also Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 25 L. Ed. 244 (1878)

              (rejecting claim that criminal laws against polygamy could not constitutionally be

              applied to those whose religion commanded the practice)). Freedom of the press

              does not in all cases forbid a prior restraint on publication (see Nebraska Press

              Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570, 96 S. Ct. 2791, 49 L. Ed. 2d 683 (1976) (“This

              Court has frequently denied that First Amendment rights are absolute”); U.S.

              Const., amend. I). The right of an accused to confront witnesses does not

                                                        17
               categorically prohibit a child witness in a child sexual abuse trial from testifying by

               one-way closed circuit television (see Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 110 S. Ct.

               3157, 111 L. Ed. 2d 666 (1990); U.S. Const., amend. VI). The Fourth Amendment

               requirement that a warrant be obtained in order to enter a private residence to effect

               a search or seizure permits exceptions for exigent circumstances (see Payton v. New

               York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1980); U.S .Const., amend.

               IV).”

¶ 37           We appreciate that Bruen fundamentally changed our analysis of laws that implicate the

       second amendment. The Court rejected the “means-end” test or any form of interest balancing

       that lower courts typically applied post-Heller. Compare Bruen, 597 U.S. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at

       2126 (“we decline to adopt [the] two-part approach”), with People v. Chairez, 2018 IL 121417,

       ¶¶ 32, 35 (applying a “heightened level” of intermediate scrutiny), and Horsley v. Trame, 808

       F.3d 1126, 1131 (7th Cir. 2015) (same). But, in doing so, it did not abandon the long-standing

       principle that the right to bear arms is not unfettered. See Bruen, 597 U.S. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at

       2130, 2133 (noting by analogy our nation’s “historical tradition of firearm regulation”); id. at

       ___ n.9, 142 S. Ct. at 2138 n.9 (“To be clear, nothing in our analysis should be interpreted to

       suggest the unconstitutionality of the 43 States’ ‘shall-issue’ licensing regimes, under which ‘a

       general desire for self-defense is sufficient to obtain a [permit].’ [Citation.]”); id. at ___, 142 S.

       Ct. at 2161 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring, joined by Roberts, C.J.) (“[T]he Court’s decision does

       not prohibit States from imposing licensing requirements for carrying a handgun for self-

       defense.”). Contrary to plaintiffs’ contention, Bruen did not hold that states are powerless to

       criminalize the unlicensed possession of firearms within their jurisdictions. In reviewing

       plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge under Bruen’s two-part inquiry, considering historical

                                                         18
       analogies of firearm regulations from 1791 to the Reconstruction Period, we find no support for

       extending Bruen’s holding that far.

¶ 38           To be clear, plaintiffs in this case are requesting to carry firearms in public whenever and

       however they please, a proposition that Heller, which is still good law, specifically rejected. See

       Heller, 554 U.S. at 626 (right of citizens to carry arms is “not a right to keep and carry any

       weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever”). They are not challenging the right to carry in

       specific places, nor are they challenging the licensure process of the Concealed Carry Act.

       Indeed, they cannot. Eichelberger and other members of Sinnissippi Rod and Gun Club are, in

       fact, licensed to carry handguns in public under the Concealed Carry Act. Instead, plaintiffs are

       claiming they have a constitutional right to openly carry a loaded weapon in public whenever

       and wherever they choose and that the UUW and AUUW statutes criminalizing such conduct are

       unconstitutional. Plaintiffs’ claims are unsupported by Bruen.

¶ 39           Analyzing plaintiffs’ challenge under Bruen, we hold that the UUW and the AUUW

       statutes, criminalizing the carriage of firearms in violation of Illinois’s concealed carry licensing

       system, are consistent with American historical tradition and do not violate the second

       amendment. 6

¶ 40                                            IV. CONCLUSION

¶ 41           The judgment of the circuit court of Whiteside County is affirmed.

¶ 42           Affirmed.

¶ 43           JUSTICE ALBRECHT, specially concurring:

               This holding is consistent with the First District’s recent decision in People v. Thompson, 2023
               6

       IL App (1st) 220429-U, ¶¶ 51-60. There, the court held that Illinois’s prohibition of the open carriage of
       firearms as contained in the AUUW statute (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6 (West 2018)) does not violate the second
       amendment. Thompson, 2023 IL App (1st) 220429-U, ¶¶51-60.

                                                          19
¶ 44           I agree that the State’s regulation of open carriage is consistent with the nation’s

       historical tradition of regulating the manner in which an individual may publicly carry a firearm.

       Therefore, I concur that its prohibition within Illinois’s concealed carry licensing regime satisfies

       the second prong of the Bruen inquiry. This holding is also consistent with the recent First

       District decision, People v. Thompson, 2023 IL App (1st) 220429-U, ¶¶ 51, 60. I write separately

       to point out that, as a threshold issue, plaintiffs’ appeal fails because the definition of the right to

       “bear arms,” as adopted in Heller and Bruen, does not presumptively protect a specific manner in

       which an individual is entitled to exercise his or her right of public carriage.

¶ 45           As the majority points out, the United States Supreme Court has adopted a natural

       meaning of the phrase to “bear arms,” which denotes the right to “ ‘ “wear, bear, or carry ... upon

       the person or in the clothing or in a pocket, for the purpose ... of being armed and ready for

       offensive or defensive action in a case of conflict with another person.” ’ ” Heller, 554 U.S. at

       584 (quoting Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 143 (1998) (Ginsberg, J., dissenting,

       joined by Scalia, C.J., and Souter, J.), quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 214 (6th ed. 1990)).

       Utilizing this definition, the Bruen Court held that the term “bear” naturally encompasses public

       carry and the second amendment’s plain text presumptively covers the conduct of “ ‘bear[ing]’

       arms in public for self-defense.” See Bruen, 597 U.S. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2134-35. This does not

       mean, however, as the plaintiffs suggest, that any manner of public carry is protected by the

       plain language of the second amendment.

¶ 46           The Court’s adopted definition of “bear arms” reads disjunctively in defining the right.

       That is, an individual’s right to “bear arms” may be exercised through the wearing, bearing, or

       carrying of a firearm either openly upon his or her person or concealed inside one’s clothes or

       pocket. See id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2134. Nothing in this understanding suggests that an

                                                         20
       individual is entitled, based on the definition of “bear[ing] arms,” to publicly carry openly and

       concealed. Both textually and historically, therefore, regulating one manner of public carriage

       while permitting another does not strip an individual of this constitutional guarantee. The

       Concealed Carry Act is in accordance with this principle. 7

¶ 47          The initial step in the Bruen inquiry requires a determination of whether the plaintiffs’

       proposed course of conduct falls under the plain text of the second amendment. Id. at ___, 142 S.

       Ct. at 2134. The conduct here is not whether open carry as a form of public carriage is conduct

       that falls within this ambit. Distinctly, the true nature of the conduct is whether open carry is a

       protected activity when concealed carry remains available. Based on the disjunctive definition of

       the right to “bear arms,” I would answer this initial step in the negative. Because plaintiffs’

       conduct falls beyond our judicially accepted understanding of the right to “bear arms,” it is not

       presumptively protected, and I would dismiss plaintiffs’ claim at the first step of the Bruen

       inquiry. See supra ¶ 13. I find this view closest to the limitations placed upon the second

       amendment right, which is not a right to “carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner

       whatsoever and for whatever purpose.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. A contrary holding would

       expand an individual’s right to publicly carry a firearm in any manner that he or she chooses,

       which frustrates the natural meaning of the second amendment’s text.

¶ 48          JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE, dissenting:

¶ 49          The United States Supreme Court has made clear that State restrictions on the public

       carry of firearms are constitutional only if they are consistent with our nation’s historical

       tradition of firearms regulation. Illinois’s categorical ban on the open carry of firearms finds no

              7
               A licensee may carry a fully or partially concealed firearm in public. 430 ILCS 66/10(c)(1)
       (West 2020); supra ¶ 4.

                                                        21
       support in historical tradition. Indeed, it runs directly contrary to the relevant historical

       precedents, which unequivocally hold that open carry is an indispensable and uniquely effective

       means of exercising the second amendment right to armed self-defense in public. As such, open

       carry may not be categorically banned, even when concealed carry is permitted.

¶ 50           The second amendment secures an individual’s right to keep and bear arms for self-

       defense. Heller, 554 U.S. at 595. This includes the right to carry commonly used firearms in

       public, subject to “reasonable, well-defined” government restrictions. Bruen, 597 U.S. at ___,

       142 S. Ct. at 2156. These rights apply to the states through the fourteenth amendment. See

       McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010).

¶ 51           When the second amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution

       presumptively protects that conduct. Bruen, 597 U.S. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2126. To justify its

       regulation of such conduct, the government may not simply posit that the regulation promotes an

       important interest. Id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2126. Rather, the government must demonstrate that

       the regulation is consistent with this nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. Id. at ___,

       142 S. Ct. at 2126; Caulkins v. Pritzker, 2023 IL 129453, ¶ 43. Only if a firearm regulation is

       consistent with this nation’s historical tradition may a court conclude that the individual’s

       conduct falls outside the second amendment’s “unqualified command.” (Internal quotation marks

       omitted.) Bruen, 597 U.S. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2126.

¶ 52           The only questions in this case are (1) whether the plain text of the second amendment

       encompasses the open carry of firearms in public and (2) if so, whether Illinois’s categorical ban

       on open carry is consistent with our nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. I find that

       the plain text of the second amendment encompasses the right to the open public carry of

       firearms and that Illinois’s categorical ban is unconstitutional.

                                                         22
¶ 53                                    I. The Second Amendment’s Text

¶ 54          The text of the second amendment protects the conduct at issue in this case, i.e., the open

       carry of firearms in public. The majority does not address this issue because it finds it

       unnecessary to the resolution of the case. However, the special concurrence adopts the State’s

       argument that the second amendment’s plain text does not encompass the plaintiffs’ conduct. I

       disagree.

¶ 55          In Bruen, the United States Supreme Court held that, by its plain terms, the right to

       “bear” arms expressed in the second amendment includes the right to carry commonly used

       firearms in public for self-defense. Bruen, 597 U.S. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2135. Open carry is

       simply one manner of public carry. Accordingly, the second amendment’s plain text

       presumptively protects the conduct at issue in this case, open carry. Id. Therefore, the only

       question is whether a categorical ban on one manner of public carry (open carry) is consistent

       with this nation’s historical tradition of gun regulations.

¶ 56          The State argues that the open carry of firearms is not presumptively protected because

       the text of the second amendment “says nothing about the right to bear arms in a particular

       manner, such as openly.” As noted above, however, the open carry of firearms is a type of public

       carry, which, in turn, is presumptively protected by the second amendment’s text. Because public

       carry is presumptively protected as a general matter, all types of public carry fall within the

       ambit of such protection. The sole question is whether a particular restriction on a particular

       manner of public carry is constitutionally permissible.

¶ 57          Further, if the Supreme Court had understood the second amendment as protecting only

       concealed carry, it would not have held that the amendment guarantees the right to wear, bear, or

       carry “upon the person” or “in the clothing or in a pocket.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

                                                         23
       See id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2134. The Court’s use of the word “or” conveys that there is a

       difference between carrying a firearm “upon the person” and carrying it “in the clothing or in a

       pocket,” and that both methods of carry are constitutionally protected.

¶ 58           The special concurrence reads the Supreme Court’s use of the disjunctive “or” to mean

       that the second amendment protects either open or concealed carry, but not both at the same

       time. This interpretation contravenes the plain meaning of the language at issue. The Supreme

       Court merely references two different types of carry that are constitutionally protected.

¶ 59           The Supreme Court neither states nor implies anything about the availability of one

       method when the other method is prohibited. The most natural reading of the Supreme Court’s

       use of “or” is that it identifies two distinct methods of carrying firearms, both of which are

       presumptively protected. Whether one method may be banned when another method is

       prohibited is a separate question that must be resolved by determining whether such a restriction

       is consistent with our nation’s history of firearm regulation.

¶ 60           To justify the special concurrence’s conclusion that the text of the second amendment

       does not cover the conduct at issue in this case, the special concurrence also adopts an awkward

       and unduly narrow construction of the term “conduct.” Rather than defining the conduct at issue

       as “the open carry of firearms in public” (which would be the simplest and most straightforward

       definition), the special concurrence contends that “the true nature of the conduct is whether open

       carry is a protected activity when concealed carry remains available.” (Emphasis added.) Supra

       ¶ 47.

¶ 61           By defining the “conduct” in reference to the regulatory regime at issue, the special

       concurrence puts the cart before the horse by presuming the constitutionality of Illinois’s

       regulatory scheme during the first phase of the Bruen analysis. However, during the first phase,

                                                        24
       we must determine only whether the text of the amendment covers the general type of conduct at

       issue. If we find that it does, we then proceed to the second phase to determine whether the

       regulation at issue is constitutionally permissible.

¶ 62          The Supreme Court has ruled unequivocally that public carry for self-defense is

       protected. Bruen, 597 U.S. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2135. Open carry is one species of public carry,

       so it is presumptively covered. The question then becomes whether the particular restriction on

       public carry imposed by Illinois (a categorical ban on open carry while allowing for concealed

       carry) is consistent with our nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.

¶ 63          The Supreme Court applied this method of analysis in Bruen, and we are bound to follow

       it. In Bruen, the Court did not ask whether the right to public carry as regulated by New York’s

       licensing scheme was covered by the text of the second amendment. Instead, it asked whether

       public carry in general was protected. After holding that it was covered, the Court proceeded to

       the second phase of the analysis. Only then did it seek to determine whether New York’s

       particular licensing regime was constitutional. The special concurrence jumps the gun (no pun

       intended) by presuming the constitutionality of Illinois’s regulatory regime before applying the

       required historical analysis.

¶ 64          The remainder of the special concurrence’s argument is premised largely on the

       proposition that any particular manner of carry is subject to reasonable regulation. I agree. I am

       not contending that open carry is an absolute and inviolable right that may not be restricted under

       any circumstances. However, I find that the categorical ban imposed by Illinois is not a

       “reasonable regulation” permitted under the second amendment because it is not consistent with

       our nation’s historical regulation of firearms. The special concurrence’s suggestion that any

                                                         25
       challenge to Illinois’s statutory scheme amounts to a denial of the legitimacy of any regulation

       on open carry is a straw man argument.

¶ 65          The State and the majority further contend that, in Bruen, the Supreme Court upheld the

       constitutionality of “shall-issue” licensing regimes like Illinois’s which limit the discretion of

       State and local governments to deny public carry licenses to law-abiding citizens. In support of

       this argument, they point to Bruen’s statement that “nothing in our analysis should be interpreted

       to suggest the unconstitutionality of the 43 States’ ‘shall-issue’ licensing regimes, under which ‘a

       general desire for self-defense is sufficient to obtain a [permit].’ [Citation.]” Id. at ___ n.9, 142

       S. Ct. at 2138 n.9. When read in its proper context, this statement does not support the State’s

       and the majority’s argument. In the statement at issue, the Bruen Court merely noted that,

       although it found New York’s “may-issue” law to be unconstitutional, it was not addressing the

       constitutionality of any particular “shall-issue” regime. Its holding did not determine whether

       any such regimes were unconstitutional. Bruen did not hold that all “shall-issue” licensing

       regimes are constitutional per se. To the contrary, it held that a categorical ban on public carry

       was unconstitutional, and it did not limit that holding to “may-issue” regimes.

¶ 66          The State maintains that the plaintiffs have forfeited their arguments in this case because

       they have “made no effort to satisfy their burden of showing that the second amendment’s text

       covers the open carriage of firearms” and have not “engaged with” Bruen’s historical analysis.

       Although the plaintiffs’ arguments could have been developed more extensively, I do not find

       their arguments so skeletal and perfunctory as to be forfeited. Regardless, forfeiture is a

       limitation on the parties, not on courts. People v. Sophanavong, 2020 IL 124337, ¶ 21. Given the

       importance of the constitutional issue presented in this case, the merits of the case should be

       addressed notwithstanding any claim of forfeiture.

                                                         26
¶ 67                           II. The Historical Tradition of Firearm Regulation

¶ 68          Because the right to carry firearms in public is presumptively protected by the second

       amendment, the only remaining question is whether the State of Illinois’s allowing for the

       concealed carry of firearms in public while categorically banning the open carry of such

       weapons is consistent with our nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The State bears

       the burden to prove that it is. Bruen, 597 U.S. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2135. Only if the State can

       successfully carry that burden may it credibly maintain that the second amendment does not

       protect the open carry of firearms. Id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2135. I find it cannot.

¶ 69          In determining whether the State’s categorical ban of open carry is consistent with the

       nation’s traditional firearm regulations, it is necessary to consider the regulation of firearms

       during various historical periods, including (1) medieval to early modern England, (2) the

       American Colonies and the early Republic, (3) antebellum America, (4) Reconstruction, and

       (5) the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. Id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2135-36.

¶ 70          However, “when it comes to interpreting the Constitution, not all history is created

       equal.” Id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2136. “ ‘Constitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they

       were understood to have when the people adopted them ***.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Id. at ___,

       142 S. Ct. at 2136 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 634-35).

¶ 71          The second amendment was adopted in 1791; the fourteenth in 1868. “Historical

       evidence that long predates either date may not illuminate the scope of the right if linguistic or

       legal conventions changed in the intervening years.” Id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2136. The most

       relevant and probative historical evidence is that which illuminates the public understanding of

       the right to bear arms that “prevailed up to the period immediately before and after the framing

       of the Constitution.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2136. Evidence

                                                        27
       from the antebellum period is particularly “critical” because (1) it is relatively near the time of

       the founding and closely predates the ratification of the fourteenth amendment in 1868, and

       (2) “the public understanding of the right to keep and bear arms in both 1791 and 1868 was, for

       all relevant purposes, the same with respect to public carry.” Id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2138. The

       majority acknowledges this. See supra ¶ 25 (noting that, in determining whether a modern

       regulation on the public carry of firearms is constitutional, the most important inquiry is whether

       the regulation comports with “the scope of the second amendment when it was adopted in 1791

       through the ratification of the fourteenth amendment in 1868 and the Reconstruction Period”).

¶ 72          Prior to the antebellum period, no State statutes, published judicial decisions, or legal

       commentators addressed whether States may ban the open carry of ordinary firearms for self-

       defense while allowing the concealed carry of such firearms. The State points to various general

       bans on the public carry of firearms imposed in England from enactment of the Statute of

       Northampton in 1328 (Statute of Northampton 1328, 2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (Eng.)) through the

       enactment of the English Bill of Rights in 1689. This historical evidence is of little relevance to

       the question presented in this case.

¶ 73          None of the regulations at issue banned the open carry of firearms while allowing

       concealed carry. Moreover, as the Supreme Court held in Bruen, the majority of these

       regulations did not categorically ban the open carry of all firearms in public, as Illinois has done.

       Rather, they banned only certain limited and well-defined methods of open carry, such as the

       open carry of “unusual” weapons, the carry of weapons in certain “sensitive” places, or the

       bearing of weapons with the intent to terrify members of the public. See Bruen, 597 U.S. at ___,

       142 S. Ct. at 2138-42. The historical sources upon which the State relies confirm this. See

       Abraham Fraunce, The Lawiers Logike: Exemplifying the Praecepts of Logike by the Practice of

                                                        28
       the Common Lawe 56 (London, William Howe 1588); 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries on

       the Laws of England 148-49 (1769). In Sir John Knight’s Case (1686) 87 Eng. Rep. 75, 76 (KB),

       Chief Justice Herbert explained that the English common law tradition, which was codified in

       the Statute of Northampton, established that a person going armed in public would violate the

       Statute only when he acted with malice or evil intent.

¶ 74          Nonetheless, to the extent that any centuries-old English statute or common law

       prohibited or broadly restricted the public carry of firearms, including open carry, such

       antiquated legal sources are of minimal relevance unless similar regulations were in place shortly

       before or after the ratification of the Bill of Rights in 1791. See Bruen, 597 U.S. at ___, 142 S.

       Ct. at 2136 (ruling that “English common-law practices and understandings at any given time in

       history cannot be indiscriminately attributed to the Framers of our own Constitution,” and that, in

       interpreting our own Constitution, “it [is] [sometimes] better not to go too far back into antiquity

       for the best securities of our liberties [citation], unless evidence shows that medieval law

       survived to become our Founders’ law”).

¶ 75          As the Supreme Court found in Bruen, few such regulations existed in the Colonies

       before or after the ratification of the second amendment. See id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2142

       (“there is little evidence of an early American practice of regulating public carry by the general

       public”). The Court added that “[t]his should come as no surprise” because “English subjects

       founded the Colonies at about the time England had itself begun to eliminate restrictions on the

       ownership and use of handguns.” Id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2142.

¶ 76          The State identifies several regulations of public carry that existed during the colonial

       period or shortly after the ratification of the Bill of Rights. None of these regulations banned

       open public carry categorically. For example, the State points to an East New Jersey statute that

                                                        29
       was enacted in 1686. That statute prohibited the concealed carry of “pocket pistol[s]” or other

       “unusual or unlawful weapons,” and it further prohibited “planter[s]” from carrying all pistols

       unless in military service or, if “strangers,” when traveling through the “Province.” An Act

       Against Wearing Swords, &c., ch. 9, in Grants, Concessions, and Original Constitutions of the

       Province of New Jersey 290 (2d ed. 1881) (Grants and Concessions). These restrictions do not

       support the State’s argument.

¶ 77          As the Supreme Court noted in Bruen, the foregoing statute “restricted only concealed

       carry, not all public carry, and its restrictions applied only to certain ‘unusual or unlawful

       weapons,’ including ‘pocket pistol[s].’ ” Bruen, 597 U.S. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2143 (quoting

       Grants and Concessions, supra, at 290). Pocket pistols were far smaller than the other belt and

       hip pistols that were commonly used for lawful purposes in the 1600s and were therefore capable

       of being concealed. Id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2143. Moreover, “the law *** presumably did not by

       its terms touch [on] the open carry of larger, presumably more common pistols, except as to

       “ ‘planters.’ ” Id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2144 (quoting Grants and Concessions, supra, at 290). The

       Court noted that, although the “planter” restriction may have prohibited the public carry of

       pistols, “it did not prohibit planters from carrying long guns for self-defense—including the

       popular musket and carbine.” Id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2144. For all of these reasons, the Court

       concluded that the statute was not entitled to any “meaningful weight” in determining the scope

       of the second amendment. Id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2144.

¶ 78          The State points to other statutes enacted in colonial Massachusetts and New Hampshire

       that authorized justices of the peace to arrest “all Affrayers, Rioters, Disturbers, or Breakers of

       the Peace, and such as shall ride or go armed Offensively ... by Night or by Day, in Fear or

       Affray of Their Majesties Liege People.” 1692 Mass. Acts and Laws no. 6, pp. 11-12; see 1699

                                                        30
       N.H. Laws ch. 1. In Bruen, the Supreme Court found that these statutes “merely codified the

       existing common-law offense of bearing arms to terrorize the people, as had the Statute of

       Northampton itself.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2143. For instance, the Massachusetts

       statute proscribed “ ‘go[ing] armed Offensively ... in Fear or Affray’ of the people,” indicating

       that these laws were “modeled after the Statute of Northampton to the extent that the statute

       would have been understood to limit public carry in the late 1600s.” (Emphasis omitted.) Id. at

       ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2143 (quoting 1692 Mass. Acts and Laws no. 6, pp. 11-12). In that time period,

       it was understood that the bearing of firearms openly in public would terrify people only if the

       firearm was unusual or was brandished in an aggressive manner with the intent to terrify. Id. at

       ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2143.

¶ 79          The State points to a number of other pre-ratification statutes that restricted or barred the

       method and manner of public carry. These statutes generally did not bar public carry or open

       public carry categorically. After reviewing these statutes, the Supreme Court noted that “[a] by-

       now-familiar thread runs through [them]: They prohibit bearing arms in a way that spreads ‘fear’

       or ‘terror’ among the people.” Id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2145. The Supreme Court noted that

       “Chief Justice Holt in Sir John Knight’s Case interpreted this in Terrorem Populi element to

       require something more than merely carrying a firearm in public.” Id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2145.

       And there was “no reason to think that the founding generation held a different view.” Id. at ___,

       142 S. Ct. at 2145. Similarly, Serjeant William Hawkins, in his widely read 1716 treatise,

       confirmed that “no wearing of Arms is within the meaning of [the Statute of Northampton],

       unless it be accompanied with such Circumstances as are apt to terrify the People.” (Emphasis

       added.) 1 William Hawkins, A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown 136 (1716); Bruen, 597 U.S. at

       ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2142. To illustrate that proposition, Hawkins noted as an example that

                                                       31
       “ ‘Persons of Quality’ ” were “ ‘in no Danger of Offending against this Statute by wearing

       common Weapons’ ” because, in those circumstances, it would be clear that they had no

       “ ‘Intention to commit any Act of Violence or Disturbance of the Peace.’ ” Id. at ___, 142 S. Ct.

       at 2142 (quoting 1 Pleas of the Crown 136); see also Theodore Barlow, The Justice of Peace: A

       Treatise Containing the Power and Duty of that Magistrate 12 (1745).

¶ 80           It is important to note that, after reviewing the historical evidence, the Supreme Court

       explicitly held “there is no historical basis for concluding that the preexisting right enshrined in

       the Second Amendment permitted broad prohibitions on all forms of public carry” in the century

       leading up to the second amendment and in the first decade after its adoption. Id. at ___, 142 S.

       Ct. at 2145.

¶ 81           Throughout the nineteenth century, numerous States enacted laws banning the concealed

       carry of firearms for self-defense but allowing the open carry of such weapons. Several cases

       decided in the antebellum period explicitly addressed the constitutionality of such laws. These

       cases are the only legal authorities that squarely address the question presented in this case, i.e.

       whether the right to open carry is guaranteed by the second amendment.

¶ 82           The Supreme Court has relied extensively on some of these cases in determining the

       scope of the second amendment. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 605 (ruling that “the examination of a

       variety of legal and other sources to determine the public understanding of a legal text in the

       period after its enactment or ratification” is a “critical tool” in “constitutional interpretation,” and

       relying on several of the antebellum cases at issue to ascertain whether the second amendment

       was understood to confer a private right of self-defense (emphasis omitted)); Bruen, 597 U.S. at

       ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2146-47 (relying upon the same antebellum cases, among other sources, in

       determining the nation’s historical tradition of regulating public carry).

                                                         32
¶ 83          These antebellum decisions almost uniformly hold that States may ban concealed carry

       without running afoul of the second amendment, but they may not ban open carry. The

       overwhelming majority of these cases hold, either expressly or implicitly, that open carry is the

       only manner of public carry that effectuates the right of self-defense guaranteed by the second

       amendment and is, therefore, the manner of public carry protected by the second amendment.

¶ 84          In State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489, 489 (1850), the Louisiana Supreme Court upheld a

       statute that made it a misdemeanor to be “found with a concealed weapon *** concealed in his

       bosom, coat, or any other place about him, that does not appear in full open view.” (Internal

       quotation marks omitted.) The court found the law to be “absolutely necessary to counteract a

       vicious state of society, growing out of the habit of carrying concealed weapons, and to prevent

       bloodshed and assassinations committed upon unsuspecting persons.” Id. at 489-90. However,

       the court held that citizens had the right under the second amendment to carry arms openly. Id. at

       490. The court noted that the statute at issue did not interfere with a man’s right to “carry arms

       *** in full and open view, which places men upon an equality.” (Internal quotation marks

       omitted.) Id. The court held that “[t]his is the right guaranteed by the Constitution of the United

       States, and which is calculated to incite men to a manly and noble defence of themselves, if

       necessary, and of their country, without any tendency to secret advantages and unmanly

       assassinations.” Id.

¶ 85          In Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243 (1846), the Supreme Court of Georgia reached the same

       conclusion. In that case, the defendant was charged by indictment with a misdemeanor for

       “having and keeping about his person, and elsewhere, a pistol” that was not a horseman’s pistol.

       (Emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 247. The statute under which he was

       charged and convicted banned the keeping, carrying, sale, and use of such a weapon and of

                                                       33
       certain other weapons, under any circumstances. Id. The defendant was not charged with

       carrying the pistol in a concealed manner. The Georgia Supreme Court ruled that the statute

       violated the second amendment to the extent that it banned open carry, which the court

       characterized as the “natural right of self-defence.” (Emphasis omitted.) Id. at 251. Specifically,

       the court ruled that,

              “so far as [the statute] seeks to suppress the practice of carrying certain

              weapons secretly, that it is valid, inasmuch as it does not deprive the

              citizen of his natural right of self-defence, or of his constitutional right to

              keep and bear arms. But that so much of it, as contains a prohibition

              against bearing arms openly, is in conflict with the Constitution, and void

              ***.” (Emphases in original.) Id.

       Accordingly, the court held that, because the defendant “ha[d] been indicted and convicted for

       carrying a pistol, without charging that it was done in a concealed manner, under that portion of

       the statute which entirely forbids its use, the judgment of the court below must be reversed, and

       the proceeding quashed.” Id. (Heller noted with approval the Nunn court’s interpretation of the

       scope the second amendment, at least as to Nunn’s holding that the second amendment

       guaranteed an individual the right to bear arms for his own self-defense.)

¶ 86          Similarly, in State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612 (1840), the Supreme Court of Alabama ruled that a

       ban on concealed weapons was permissible under Alabama’s constitutional analogue to the

       second amendment, but that a ban on open carry would not be. The court concluded that the

       legislature “cannot inhibit the citizen from bearing arms openly” because the Alabama

       Constitution “authorizes him to bear them for the purposes of defending himself and the State,

       and it is only when carried openly, that they can be efficiently used for defence.” (Emphasis

                                                        34
       added.) Id. at 619. According to the court, a ban on concealed carry did not violate a citizen’s

       constitutional right to keep and bear arms for self-defense because, for purposes of self-

       protection in moments of immediate danger, “there can be no necessity for concealing the

       weapon.” Id. at 621. The court stated that it could not conceive of “any supposable

       circumstances” under which concealed carry would be “indispensable to the right of defence.”

       Id. at 622.

¶ 87           The Tennessee Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn.

       154 (1840). In that case, the court upheld the state’s concealed weapons ban. Id. at 161-62.

       Finding that “the right to bear arms in defence of themselves is coupled with the right to bear

       them in defence of the State,” and that arms used in defense of the State “must necessarily be

       borne openly,” the court held that only the open carry of weapons could be protected by

       Tennessee’s second amendment analogue. Id. at 161. A categorical ban on open carry would

       infringe upon the right to bear arms. Id. at 159-60. Further, in Kentucky, Bliss v. Commonwealth,

       12 Ky. 90 (1822), held that any ban on the public carry of firearms for self-defense, whether

       open or concealed, violated Kentucky’s state constitutional analogue to the second amendment.

¶ 88           These cases firmly establish that, by the time of the antebellum period, the right to open

       carry was considered an essential corollary of the right to bear arms in self-defense guaranteed

       by the second amendment (or by its state-law analogues). According to that understanding, open

       carry, and only open carry, effectuates the constitutional right to armed self-defense, and it does

       so in a way that avoids the threats to public safety posed by the concealed carry of weapons.

¶ 89           Put simply, according to the antebellum cases, the constitutional right to bear commonly

       used arms in public for self-defense is the right to bear such arms openly. Concealed carry was

       disfavored and deemed to be outside of the scope of constitutional protections. Thus, the

                                                       35
       antebellum courts held that, while a State may lawfully ban concealed carry under the second

       amendment, it may not ban open carry. The antebellum cases are the only legal authorities to

       squarely address these issues either before the enactment of the second amendment or during the

       70 years following its ratification. Accordingly, they are the only sources that establish the public

       understanding of the second amendment during the most relevant historical periods, i.e., the

       period shortly after its ratification and shortly before the ratification of the fourteenth

       amendment. See generally Heller, 554 U.S. at 605.

¶ 90          Adopting the State’s argument, the majority maintains that Illinois’s ban on open carry is

       consistent with these antebellum cases and with the numerous state statutes enacted in the 19th

       century that banned concealed carry while allowing open carry. The majority notes, correctly,

       that States have always had the authority to regulate the manner of public carry and that many

       States exercised that right during the nineteenth century by prohibiting one type of carry while

       permitting another. The majority and the State contend that, because the Illinois laws at issue

       also prohibit one type of carry while allowing another, the Illinois regulations are equivalent to

       the nineteenth century regulations and are therefore constitutionally permissible.

¶ 91          However, all of nineteenth century statutes and cases that distinguish between open carry

       and concealed carry allow open carry but ban concealed carry.

¶ 92          Illinois, however, has taken precisely the opposite approach by permitting concealed

       carry but prohibiting open carry. This radical departure from historical precedent is not

       constitutionally permissible. Even assuming arguendo that a categorical ban on concealed carry

       is constitutional (as historical precedents have found), that does not mean that a categorical ban

       on open carry passes constitutional muster.

                                                         36
¶ 93          In fact, the antebellum cases discussed above rule out that possibility. The vast majority

       of the antebellum cases that have address the issue either held or implied that the right to armed

       self-defense enshrined in the second amendment could be effectively exercised only through

       open carry. Concealed carry was disfavored because it was considered to be more dangerous

       than open carry and a less effective means of self-defense. It was therefore considered to be

       outside the scope of the second amendment’s protections. The traditional approach of banning

       concealed carry, while allowing open carry, was not merely a random or fungible policy choice.

       It was based on a public understanding of the meaning and scope of the second amendment that

       precludes a categorical prohibition of open carry.

¶ 94          The State’s and the majority’s argument presumes that open and concealed carry are an

       interchangeable and equally effective manner of exercising the second amendment’s right to

       armed self-defense, such that either manner may be prohibited without any diminishment of that

       right. In other words, according to the State and the majority, open carry and concealed carry are

       functionally identical. Either manner, standing alone, would adequately protect the second

       amendment right. Accordingly, it does not matter which manner is allowed and which is barred,

       so long as one method remains available.

¶ 95          However, as noted above, the majority of authorities to address this issue reject the

       State’s argument. They hold that open carry and concealed carry are categorically different and

       that only open carry effectuates the right to armed self-defense guaranteed by the second

       amendment. See Chandler, 5 La. Ann. at 490; Nunn, 1 Ga. at 251; Reid, 1 Ala. at 619; Aymette,

       21 Tenn. at 161; see also Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for

       Self-Defense: An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 1443, 1516

       (2009) (“Heller stated that bans on concealed carry of firearms are so traditionally recognized

                                                       37
       that they must be seen as constitutionally permissible. *** The same cannot, however, be said

       about general bans on carrying firearms in public, which prohibit open as well as concealed

       carrying.”); Jonathan Meltzer, Open Carry for All: Heller and Our Nineteenth-Century Second

       Amendment, 123 Yale L.J. 1486, 1527-28 (2014) (“[T]he distinction between open and

       concealed carry was crucial to [the 19th century courts’] understanding of what proper self-

       defense entailed. For them,” “[s]elf-defense inherently required the open carry of weapons,

       because someone who concealed a weapon must surely have some sort of aggressive or sneaky

       intent.”).

¶ 96           All of the statutes and cases cited by the majority and by the State involve either the

       categorical prohibition of public carry in general or the barring of concealed carry while allowing

       open carry. Neither the State nor the majority have identified a single regulation in the nation’s

       historical tradition of firearm regulation prior to or during the antebellum period prohibiting open

       carry but permitting concealed carry. Any such regulations were enacted long after the

       ratification of the Bill of Rights and of the fourteenth amendment and are therefore not probative

       of the public understanding of the second amendment during the relevant time periods.

¶ 97           Moreover, to the extent that any categorical bans on all forms of public carry (including

       open carry) existed during the relevant historical periods, our Supreme Court held in Bruen that

       such restrictions were rare and ran contrary to the nation’s historical tradition of firearms

       regulation. As the majority concedes, Bruen held that such categorical bans on public carry are

       unconstitutional. Therefore, the statutes and cases cited by the majority enacting or upholding

       such bans may not be relied upon to demonstrate our nation’s historical tradition of “reasonable

       regulations” of the manner of carrying firearms.

                                                        38
¶ 98          The majority asserts that the antebellum cases support its argument. This assertion is

       based on a misreading of the facts and holdings of these cases. I will quote the relevant passage

       of the majority opinion in full. The majority states that

              “a review of the cases considering th[e] laws [proscribing concealed carry]

              demonstrates that allowing open carry while prohibiting concealed carry

              was not the crucial factor in determining whether the restrictions passed

              constitutional muster. In the vast majority of those cases, courts struck

              down statutes that categorically prohibited the public carriage of firearms,

              both open and concealed, and ruled that the second amendment permitted

              limited restriction but not a complete ban. Courts concluded that the

              government could lawfully eliminate one kind of public carry to protect

              and ensure the safety of its citizens, so long as the people were permitted

              to carry weapons in another manner that allowed self-defense. The

              constitutional emphasis in those cases was the nature of the restriction—

              categorical (unconstitutional) versus limited (constitutional)—rather than

              open versus concealed.” (Emphases in original.) Supra ¶ 30.

       In support of its argument, the majority cites 15 cases that were decided after the second

       amendment was ratified and before the ratification of the fourteenth amendment. Only one of

       these cases addressed a categorical ban on the public carry of firearms or other weapons. See

       Nunn, 1 Ga. at 251. Thirteen of the remaining cases upheld a total or partial ban on concealed

       carry where open carry was permitted. See Chandler, 5 La. Ann. at 489-90; Reid, 1 Ala. at 621;

       State v. Smith, 11 La. Ann. 633, 634 (1856); State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18, 24-25, 27 (1842); State

       v. Mitchell, 3 Blackf. 229 (Ind. 1833); State v. Jumel, 13 La. Ann. 399 (1858); Aymette, 21 Tenn.

                                                        39
       at 159-61; State v. Click, 2 Ala. 26 (1841); Commonwealth v. McClanahan, 59 Ky. 8 (1859);

       State v. Stanford, 20 Ark. 145 (1859); Jackson v. State, 12 Ga. 1 (1852); Haile v. State, 38 Ark.

       564 (1882); State v. Wilforth, 74 Mo. 528 (1881); Wilson v. State, 33 Ark. 557 (1878). In several

       of these cases, the courts explicitly held that such a ban was constitutional because open carry

       was the manner of carry that exercised the constitutional right to bear arms guaranteed by the

       federal constitution or its State-law analogues. See, e.g., Chandler, 5 La. Ann. at 490 (holding

       that Louisiana’s prohibition of concealed carry did not interfere with a man’s right to “carry arms

       *** in full and open view,” which “is the right guaranteed by the Constitution of the United

       States, and which is calculated to incite men to a manly and noble defence of themselves, if

       necessary, and of their country, without any tendency to secret advantages and unmanly

       assassinations” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Reid, 1 Ala. at 619 (holding that the

       legislature “cannot inhibit the citizen from bearing arms openly” because the Alabama

       constitution “authorizes him to bear them for the purposes of defending himself and the State,

       and it is only when carried openly, that they can be efficiently used for defence”); Aymette, 21

       Tenn. at 159-61 (upholding the State’s concealed weapons ban and ruling that the citizens “right

       to bear arms in defence of themselves is coupled with the right to bear them in defence of the

       State,” and that arms used in defense of the State “must necessarily be borne openly”). In Walls

       v. State, 7 Blackf. 572 (Ind. 1845), the court did not address concealed carry but ruled that a ban

       on open carry was unconstitutional.

¶ 99          Although Nunn addressed a categorical ban on public carry, it definitively rejects the

       majority’s argument that one method of carry (either open or concealed) may be banned so long

       as the other method remains available. The statute at issue in Nunn categorically banned the

       public carry of a pistol in any manner. The Georgia Supreme Court ruled that the statute at issue

                                                       40
        violated the second amendment only to the extent that it banned open carry, which the court

        characterized as the “natural right of self-defence.” (Emphasis omitted.) Nunn, 1 Ga. at 251.

¶ 100          The Nunn court could have found that the statute was unconstitutional because it

        categorically banned both methods of public carry and that the statute would have been

        constitutional if either open carry or concealed carry were permitted. It did not. Instead, the court

        held that

               “so far as [the statute] seeks to suppress the practice of carrying certain weapons secretly,

               that it is valid, inasmuch as it does not deprive the citizen of his natural right of self-

               defence, or of his constitutional right to keep and bear arms. But that so much of it, as

               contains a prohibition against bearing arms openly, is in conflict with the Constitution,

               and void ***.” (Emphases in original.) Id.

        Nunn, therefore, flatly rejects the majority’s theory that open and concealed carry are equivalent

        and that either may be banned so long as the other remains available. Contrary to the majority’s

        argument, Nunn unequivocally concludes that, while concealed carry may be barred, the second

        amendment requires that open carry be available.

¶ 101          Nor is there support for the majority’s and the State’s theory in Bruen. The State cites

        Bruen for the proposition that states were able to “lawfully eliminate one kind of public carry

        *** so long as they left open the [other] option.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2150.

        However, the text that the State omits by ellipsis and through brackets conveys exactly the

        opposite meaning! Read in its entirety, the actual quote states that the historical evidence from

        the antebellum period shows that “States could lawfully eliminate one kind of public carry—

        concealed carry—so long as they left open the option to carry openly.” (Emphases added.) Id. at

        ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2150.

                                                         41
¶ 102          The State’s egregious misrepresentation of the quote is disingenuous and disturbing. I

        remind counsel for the State of their ethical duty of candor to this court under the Illinois Rules

        of Professional Conduct of 2010. See Ill. R. Prof’l Conduct (2010) R. 3.3(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 2010).

¶ 103          The majority’s contention that Bruen supports its position is also unavailing. The

        passages in Bruen cited by the majority merely indicate that the manner of public carry is subject

        to reasonable regulation. They neither state nor imply that open carry is functionally equivalent

        to concealed carry, such that the former may be categorically banned so long as the latter

        remains available. In fact, as noted above, the Court in Bruen read the antebellum cases as

        holding that states may lawfully eliminate concealed carry so long as open carry is permitted.

¶ 104          In addition, contrary to the majority’s claim, Bruen does not hold that a statute passes

        constitutional muster “[a]s long as the regulation does not compel ‘an absolute ban’ that imposes

        a significant burden on the right of self-defense.” Supra ¶ 33. Although Bruen approved of

        Heller’s reversal of a total ban on the possession of commonly used weapons (Bruen, 597 U.S. at

        ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2128), neither Heller nor Bruen suggests that regulations on public carry are

        constitutional unless they proscribe public carry altogether. As Bruen makes abundantly clear,

        regulations are constitutional only if they are “reasonable,” i.e., only when they are consistent

        with our nation’s historical tradition of gun regulation. Regulations that stop short of a total ban

        on public carry may still run afoul of the second amendment under this standard. Even the

        extremely restrictive regulations that the Supreme Court found to be unconstitutional in Bruen

        did not ban public carry categorically.

¶ 105          In the alternative, the State and the majority maintain that Illinois’s licensing system for

        public carry is analogous to the historical regulations approved in Bruen and is therefore

        constitutionally permissible. To determine whether a modern regulation is consistent with our

                                                         42
        nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation, courts must sometimes reason by analogy. See

        id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2132. Such reasoning is often required in “cases implicating

        unprecedented societal concerns or dramatic technological changes.” Id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at

        2132. For example, a court may be required to determine whether a modern communication over

        the Internet is a constitutionally protected communication under the first amendment, whether

        the use of a tracking device or a thermal imaging device is a permissible “search” within the

        meaning of the fourth amendment, or whether the banning of modern weapons that did not exist

        at the time the second amendment was ratified is constitutional. See, e.g., id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at

        2132; Heller, 554 U.S. at 582; United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404-05 (2012); Kyllo v.

        United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).

¶ 106          Such analogical reasoning is neither necessary nor appropriate in this case because the

        issues presented here involve the scope of the right to publicly carry arms in general and the

        extent to which public carry may be restricted under the second amendment. These are

        fundamental questions that were familiar and were repeatedly addressed by courts and

        legislatures before, during, and after the framing. This case does not require the application of a

        historical constitutional rule to a new situation or to modern technologies that did not exist at the

        time the Bill of Rights was ratified in 1791. Accordingly, like the issues presented in Bruen and

        Heller, the issue presented in this case requires only a “straightforward historical inquiry.”

        Bruen, 597 U.S. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2131.

¶ 107          However, even assuming arguendo that analogical reasoning is necessary, such reasoning

        does not support the State’s and the majority’s argument. Ascertaining whether a historical

        regulation is a proper analogue for a modern firearm regulation requires a determination of

        whether the two regulations are “relevantly similar.” Id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2132. This involves

                                                         43
        an inquiry into “whether modern and historical regulations impose a comparable burden on the

        right of armed self-defense and whether that burden is comparably justified.” Id. at ___, 142 S.

        Ct. at 2133; see McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767; Heller, 554 U.S. at 599. Courts should not “uphold

        every modern law that remotely resembles a historical analogue,” because doing so “risk[s]

        endorsing outliers that our ancestors would never have accepted.” (Internal quotation marks

        omitted.) Bruen, 597 U.S. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2133. On the other hand, “analogical reasoning

        requires only that the government identify a well-established and representative historical

        analogue, not a historical twin.” (Emphases omitted.) Id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2133. “So even if a

        modern-day regulation is not a dead ringer for historical precursors, it still may be analogous

        enough to pass constitutional muster.” Id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2133.

¶ 108          The State and the majority contend that, under these standards, the Illinois regulations at

        issue are analogous to historical regulations. They argue that both the Illinois laws and the

        traditional firearm regulations impose a comparable burden on the right of armed self-defense

        because both legal regimes ban one manner of carry while permitting another. As noted above,

        however, the two methods of carry at issue are not equivalent and interchangeable. The

        antebellum cases and statutes established that open carry, and only open carry, fully and properly

        effectuates the right to armed self-defense contemplated by the second amendment. Thus,

        Illinois’s banning of open carry imposes a far greater burden upon the right to armed self-defense

        than would a ban on concealed carry.

¶ 109          The State and the majority further contend that the burden upon the right to armed self-

        defense imposed by Illinois’s laws and by traditional historical regulations are “comparably

        justified” because both sought to reduce violence and promote safety in public places by

        regulating the manner of the public carry of firearms. The State acknowledges that several

                                                        44
        nineteenth century statutes and the cases interpreting them attempted to promote public safety by

        banning concealed carry, which was historically considered to be more dangerous and more

        likely to lead to violence than was open carry. The State notes that the Illinois General Assembly

        “made a slightly different policy choice (prohibiting open carriage rather than concealed

        carriage) than those reflected in historical regulations” “[i]n view of shifting societal preferences

        and evolving social science.” However, the State maintains that this difference is immaterial

        because both legal regimes sought to promote public safety.

¶ 110           I do not find these arguments to be persuasive. As an initial matter, Illinois did not merely

        make a “slightly different policy choice” regarding how to protect public safety. It made the

        exact opposite choice than that prescribed in the historical regulations. As noted, during the

        relevant historical time periods, no jurisdiction addressed the problem of gun violence by

        banning open carry and allowing concealed carry, as Illinois does. To the contrary, it was

        concealed carry, not open carry, that was traditionally banned because it was thought that only

        concealed carry threatened public safety.

¶ 111           The fact that the problem of gun violence has been addressed so differently throughout

        the nation’s history (and consistently so) is not irrelevant. Indeed, it is strong evidence that

        Illinois’s approach is unconstitutional. “[W]hen a challenged regulation addresses a general

        societal problem that has persisted since the 18th century, the lack of a distinctly similar

        historical regulation addressing that problem is relevant evidence that the challenged regulation

        is inconsistent with the Second Amendment.” Id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2131. “Likewise, if earlier

        generations addressed the societal problem, but did so through materially different means, that

        also could be evidence that a modern regulation is unconstitutional.” Id. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at

        2131.

                                                          45
¶ 112          As the State acknowledges, public safety concerns posed by gun violence have existed

        since the framing. However, none of the historical regulations designed to combat that problem

        adopted the method that Illinois has adopted here. Indeed, the traditional regulations employed

        the exact opposite approach based upon the traditional understanding of the relationship between

        open carry, concealed carry, and the second amendment’s right to armed self-defense. That

        traditional understanding determines the meaning and scope of the second amendment. Illinois’s

        law categorically banning open carry is therefore unconstitutional. To the extent that People v.

        Thompson, 2023 IL App (1st) 220429-U, suggests (without analysis) that Illinois’s categorical

        ban on open carry is constitutional, it was wrongly decided.

¶ 113          The State and the majority’s suggestion that modern day sensibilities and policy

        preferences may alter or supplant the original meaning and scope of the second amendment is

        insupportable. As the United States Supreme Court ruled in Heller, “the enshrinement of

        constitutional rights necessarily takes certain policy choices off the table.” 554 U.S. at 636. The

        public understanding of the second amendment during the 70 years following its ratification

        (including the two decades immediately preceding the enactment of the fourteenth amendment)

        was that the open carry of firearms in public for self-defense may not be categorically banned.

        That understanding fixed the meaning and scope of the second amendment, and it may not be

        overridden merely because it appears outmoded or runs contrary to contemporary policy

        preferences. See id.

¶ 114          The Constitution leaves Illinois a variety of tools for combating the problem of gun

        violence, including the banning of concealed carry. However, a categorical ban on open carry

        violates the second amendment and is therefore “off the table.” See id. If three-fourths of the

        States want to ban open carry, they may amend the Constitution to reflect their policy

                                                         46
        preferences. However, they may not simply engraft those preferences into the second amendment

        by judicial or legislative fiat, thereby disregarding and impermissibly altering the amendment’s

        original public meaning. The determination of whether policies are good or bad is not for the

        judicial branch of government to decide. Rather, its only job is to interpret the second

        amendment and to prevent policies which contravene the protections it affords.

¶ 115          In any event, I disagree with the State’s assessment that banning open carry would reduce

        gun violence and promote public safety. The State argues that allowing open carry is bad policy

        because “common sense dictates, and experience confirms, that the open carriage of firearms

        makes it more difficult for law enforcement to protect the public.” I find this proposition to be

        contrary both to common sense and to experience.

¶ 116          The State argues that if law-abiding citizens were allowed to carry firearms openly in

        public, it would be more difficult for the police to know whether an individual is carrying or

        using a firearm legally. To the contrary, allowing concealed carry, while banning open carry, is

        what places both the police and the public at a disadvantage. If an individual is openly carrying a

        gun, a police officer may approach him and ask him to show proof that he is doing so legally.

        That cannot be done if the person is carrying a concealed weapon. Concealed weapons also pose

        a greater threat to the public because they cannot deter would-be criminals, they increase the

        likelihood that arguments will escalate into violence (including gun violence), and, as the

        historical authorities recognized, they make it easier for anyone carrying a concealed weapon to

        ambush another person. As our forebears rightfully concluded, allowing the open carry of

        firearms is the only way to deter violence or the escalation of violence effectively.

¶ 117          The State further maintains that allowing open carry would cause fear among the public,

        which is “particularly likely for minority groups.” This is so, claims the State, because “hate

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        groups, such as white supremacists, have long openly carried firearms to threaten and intimidate

        others.” There is indeed a shameful history in this country of racist acts of violence and

        intimidation committed by whites against blacks, particularly in the nineteenth and early

        twentieth century South. However, this violence was made possible in large part by racist laws

        that barred blacks from carrying firearms and other weapons for self-defense. See McDonald,

        561 U.S. at 771 (noting the “systematic efforts” made to disarm blacks); Bruen, 597 U.S. at ___,

        142 S. Ct. at 2151-53. Disarming blacks was a tool of oppression that enabled whites to commit

        violence against blacks. Although white-on-black gun violence is far less prevalent in America

        today, blacks are still victims of gun violence at highly disproportionate rates. See GianCarlo

        Canaparo & Abby Kassal, Who Suffers the Most from Crime Wave?, Heritage Found. (Apr. 12,

        2022), https://www.heritage.org/crime-and-justice/commentary/who-suffers-the-most-crime-

        wave [https://perma.cc/HM4G-2AQL] (relying upon crime data compiled by the FBI). Open

        carry would empower blacks and members of other minority groups, many of whom live in high

        crime areas, to defend themselves and to deter criminals of any race from committing acts of

        violence against them. This may allay any fears that blacks or other minorities might have of

        others who openly carry firearms. Open carry would be the most effective means to deter any

        aggression against them.

¶ 118          Regardless, this policy debate is moot because, as noted above, the second amendment

        forecloses the categorical ban on open carry adopted in Illinois. In determining the meaning and

        scope of the second amendment, the Supreme Court relies solely upon the text and history of the

        amendment, not upon a State legislature’s or a court’s balancing of policy considerations. See

        Bruen, 597 U.S. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2129 (stating that Heller and McDonald “expressly

        rejected” the application of any “judge-empowering interest-balancing inquiry” that “asks

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        whether the statute burdens a protected interest in a way or to an extent that is out of proportion

        to the statute’s salutary effects upon other important governmental interests” (internal quotation

        marks omitted)); see also Heller, 554 U.S. at 634; McDonald, 561 U.S. at 790-791 (the second

        amendment does not permit—let alone require—judges to “assess the costs and benefits of

        firearms restrictions” under means-end scrutiny).

¶ 119          To be clear, I am not suggesting that open carry may not be restricted. Reasonable

        restrictions may be imposed so long as they are consistent with our nation’s historical tradition of

        firearm regulations. Illinois presently requires all persons within the State to obtain a Firearm

        Owner’s Identification card in order to lawfully possess or use a gun. Bruen does not suggest that

        such licensing requirements are unconstitutional. See Bruen, 597 U.S. at ___ n.9, 142 S. Ct. at

        2138 n.9; Thompson, 2023 IL App (1st) 220429-U (rejecting a facial challenge to the

        constitutionality of the Concealed Carry Act’s permitting requirement). The State may impose

        other reasonable regulations as it sees fit. However, it may not categorically ban the open carry

        of firearms.

¶ 120          This is an extremely important issue that affects all citizens of Illinois as it affects the

        constitutional right of all citizens to armed self-defense, one of the core rights guaranteed by the

        second amendment and a bulwark against threats to their safety and liberty.

¶ 121          In determining whether Illinois’s categorical ban on open carry violates the second

        amendment, jurists are bound by the dictates and guidelines of the Supreme Court and our

        nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation and are prohibited from imposing personal

        policy preferences under the guise of constitutional interpretation. To do so would violate their

        oath of office.

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             Sinnissippi Rod & Gun Club, Inc. v. Raoul, 2024 IL App (3d) 210073

Decision Under Review:        Appeal from the Circuit Court of Whiteside County, No. 19-
                              MR-151; the Hon. Patricia Ann Senneff, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys                     Dmitry N. Feofanov, of ChicagoLemonLaw.com, P.C., of
for                           Lyndon, for appellants.
Appellant:

Attorneys                     Kwame Raoul, Attorney General, of Chicago (Jane Elinor
for                           Notz, Solicitor General, and Priyanka Gupta and Sarah Hunger,
Appellee:                     Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for appellees.

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