Court Opinion

ID: 9656009
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 19:30:37.560002+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:26.475782
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(concurring). We agree with the lead opinion that this medical malpractice action was timely filed because the time for commencing this action was tolled by the provisions of § 5852 of the Revised Judicature Act.1
Section 5852 provides that if a person dies before the period of limitations has run or within thirty days thereafter, an action which survives by law2 may be commenced at any time within two years after letters testamentary or of administration are granted, although the period of limitations has run, but no action shall be commenced beyond three years after the period of limitations has run.
It appears that plaintiff’s decedent, Larry M. Hawkins, was last treated in April, 1975. Plaintiff’s brief accepts the Court of Appeals determination that “the statute of limitations began to run *441in May of 1975”, and the lead opinion so concludes. It, therefore, appears that the two-year period of limitations for an action charging malpractice3 then began to run. Plaintiffs decedent died on January 27, 1976, within two years of May, 1975. This action was commenced on January 6, 1978, within two years of the issuance of letters testamentary.4 Accordingly, this action was timely commenced.
We would not by obiter dictum attempt to resolve the question which has divided the Court of Appeals5 of whether the cause of action for wrong*442ful death arising from medical malpractice accrues at the time of the last treatment6 or the date of death. That issue is important where the person whose death is alleged to have been caused by medical malpractice dies more than thirty days after the period of limitations has run. We would not appear to prejudge the issue necessary to decision in such a case by discussing it in this case where it is not necessary to decision.
W'é concur in reversal of the Court of Appeals and remand for trial.
Kavanagh, J., concurred with Levin, J.
Coleman and Riley, JJ., took no part in the decision of this case.

 "If a person dies before the period of limitations has run or within 30 days after the period of limitations has run, an action which survives by law may be commenced by or against the executor or administrator of the deceased person or the claim may be proved as a debt against the estate of the deceased person, as the case may be, at any time within 2 years after letters testamentary or letters of administration are granted, although the period of limitations has run, subject to the limitations provided in section 20 of chapter 8 of Act No. 288 of the Public Acts of 1939, being section 708.20 of the Compiled Laws of 1948. But no executor or administrator shall bring an action under this provision unless he commences it within 3 years after the period of limitations has run.” MCL 600.5852; MSA 27A.5852.

 "All actions and claims survive death.” MCL 600.2921; MSA 27A.2921.
We agree with the lead opinion that if a medical malpractice action for wrongful death were to be held to accrue before death that it is a claim that survives death.

 "(1) A person shall not bring or maintain an action to recover damages for injuries to persons or property unless, after the claim first accrued to the plaintiff or to someone through whom the plaintiff claims, the action is commenced within the periods of time prescribed by this section.
"(4) The period of limitations is 2 years for an action charging malpractice.” MCL 600.5805; MSA 27A.5805.

 The letters could not have been issued before the date of death, January 27, 1976.

 In the instant case, Hawkins v Regional Medical Laboratories, PC, 111 Mich App 651, 656; 314 NW2d 450 (1979), the Court declared:
"P]n wrongful death actions claiming malpractice, the cause of action commences as provided by the statutory provision relating to the commencement of actions for medical malpractice, and not at the time of death as plaintiff urges.” (Emphasis supplied.)
In Penner v Seaway Hospital, 102 Mich App 697, 703-704; 302 NW2d 285 (1981), the Court declared:
"The date of death must be considered as the date of accrual of a cause of action for wrongful death, regardless of whether death is caused by general negligence or medical malpractice.” (Emphasis supplied.)
In Palmertree v Genesee Memorial Hospital, 102 Mich App 683; 302 NW2d 279 (1981), a divided Court declared:
"Likewise, in wrongful death cases which are grounded on medical malpractice, regardless of when the malpractice cause of action accrues, the wrongful death plaintiff’s cause of action could not accrue until death occurred. ” (Emphasis supplied.)
In Girz v Endress, 117 Mich App 783; 324 NW2d 502 (1982), the Court declared:
"We believe that Palmertree and Penner reached the correct result in holding that a wrongful death action grounded in medical malpractice accrues at the time of death.” (Emphasis supplied.)

 "(1) A claim based on the malpractice of a person who is, or holds himself out to be, a member of a state licensed profession, * * * accrues at the time that person discontinues treating or otherwise serving the plaintiff in a professional or pseudoprofessional capacity as to the matters out of which the claim for malpractice arose, regardless of the time the plaintiff discovers or otherwise has knowledge of the claim.
"(2) An action involving a claim based on malpractice may be commenced at any time within the applicable period prescribed in Sections 5805 or 5851 to 5856, or within 6 months after the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the existence of the claim, whichever is later. The burden of proving that the plaintiff, as a result of physical discomfort, appearance, condition Or otherwise, neither dis-' covered nor should have discovered the existence of the claim at least 6 months before the expiration of the period otherwise applicable to the claim shall be on the plaintiff. A malpractice action which is not commenced within the time prescribed by this subsection is barred.” MCL 600.5838; MSA 27A.5838.