Court Opinion

ID: 9831245
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 20:57:44.032709+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:33.126398
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
[3] Appellant’s motion for a rehearing in in this case has been held under advisement for some time, awaiting the conclusion of the Supreme Coux-t of the United States in a case pending in that court in which the questions submitted were the same as involved in the case before us. The case referred to is that of Postal Telegraph-Cable Company, plaintiff in error, against WarrenGodwin Lumber Company defendant in error. In the opinion delivered by the Supreme Court of the United States in that case, not yet published, but a copy of which has been furnished iis, it is distinctly held that a contract for the transmission of a telegraph message between states, based upon differing rates, may be lawfully made to limit the recovery on the part of the sender of an unrepeated message even though a mistake in the transmission may be caused by the negligence of the telegraph company. The court refers with approval to the case of Primrose v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 154 U. S. 1, 14 Sup. Ct. 1098, 38 L. Ed. 883, expressly upholding such contracts. In the latter case, the doctrine that a common carrier may not wholly exempt itself from liability for the consequences of its own negligence is recognized. But contracts of the kind under consideration were construed, not as wholly exempting the carrier from liability, but as contracts which merely restrict the sum recoverable. The court there said:
“By the settled law of this court, common carriers of goods or passengers cannot, by any contract with their customers, wholly exempt themselves from liability for damage caused by the negligence of themselves or their servants. New York Cent. R. Co. v. Lockwood, [84 U. S.] 17 Wall. 357 [21 L. Ed. 627]; Liverpool & G. W. Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co. [‘The Montana’] 129 U. S. 397, 442 [9 Sup. Ct. 469, 32 L. Ed. 788, 792], and cases cited.
“But even a common carrier of goods may, by special contract with the owner, restrict the sum for which he may be liable, even in case of a loss by the carrier’s negligence; and this upon the distinct ground, as stated by Mr. Justice Blatchford, speaking for the whole *855court, that ‘where 'a contract of the kind, signed by the shipper, is fairly made, agreeing on the valuation of the property carried, with the rate of freight based on the condition that the carrier assumes liability only to the extent of the agreed valuation, even in case of loss or damage by the negligence of the carrier, the contract will be upheld as a proper and lawful mode of securing a due proportion between the amount for which the carrier may be responsible and the freight he receives, and of protecting himself against extravagant and fanciful valuation.’ Hart v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 112 U. S. 331, 343, 5 Sup. Ct. 151 (28 L. Ed. 717, 721).”
While the Primrose Case was decided prior to the Act of June 18, 1910, classing telegraph companies common carriers, the theory upon which the case was determined was applied in the Postal Telegraph-Cable Company Case on the ground that the act of Congress removed that question involved from the operation of state regulations, and hence that the decisions of the federal courts must be followed. The recent case refers to state decisions similar to those followed by us on original hearing holding that contracts concerning the transmission of interstate messages are not affected by the act of Congress, and consequently subject to state regulations, but say that the effect given to the decisions (citing some of them) upon which this view is supported was a mistaken one.
We therefore conclude that we must reverse our former ruling and' upon the facts stated in our original opinion grant the motion for rehearing, reverse the judgment, and here render it as hereinafter indicated. For it must be accepted, we think, without citation of authority, that the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States is controlling, and that it is our duty to follow it notwithstanding the contrary holding of our own state courts.
[4] In rendering judgment, we will observe that, as will be seen by reference to our original opinion, the contract for the transmission of the message under consideration contained two provisions relating to the plaintiff’s right of recovery. The first is that the company shall not be liable beyond the cost of the transmission of the telegram unless the message was repeated. The second is that the company shall not be liable beyond the sum of $50 for mistakes in transmission, “whether caused by the negligence of its servants or otherwise.” We are of the opinion that in rendering judgment we should apply the second limiting ground) inasmuch as it evidently contemplates a case such as we have before us. In the absence of a showing that the mistake in transmission was caused by the negligence of the company, we should perhaps limit the plaintiff’s recovery, where his message, as here, was unrepeated, to the cost of transmission. But here we have an
express finding that the mistake shown was caused by the negligence of the company, and we therefore think that by the terms of the contract appellant is liable in the sum of $50.
It is accordingly ordered that the judgment, below be here reversed, reformed, and here rendered in appellee’s favor for the sum of $50, together with all costs of the trial court; the cost of appeal to be taxed against ap-pellee.