Court Opinion

ID: 9760637
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:06:17.940726+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:15.275786
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing
 Appellants have filed a motion to amend the transcript so as to include their exceptions to the court’s charge which were apparently dictated to the court reporter but were not transcribed, and the court’s ruling and official signature endorsed thereon and filed with the clerk in time to be included in the transcript as required by Rule 272, Vernon’s Ann. Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, and have also filed a forceful and earnest motion for rehearing. Appellants are apparently awaiting the court’s action on their motion to amend the transcript before submitting such amended transcript as they did not submit the same with their motion. We have concluded that Rule 272 fixes a definite time limit in which to have objections and exceptions to the court’s charge transcribed, the court’s ruling and signature endorsed thereon and then filed with the clerk, when such exceptions to the court’s charge are dictated to the court reporter under the rule. They must be transcribed, endorsed and filed in time to be included in the transcript. At most, it could not be more than 60 days after the judgment of the court, or order overruling the motion for new trial. No good cause being shown for the failure to have their exceptions to the court’s charge transcribed, endorsed and filed as required by the rule being shown, the motion to file a supplemental transcript is overruled.
We might add, further, that in view of the record in this case the exceptions to the court’s charge on all the issues, unless it would be as to the damages, are immaterial because the issues of exercising th'e option, statute of frauds, and agency were completely overcome by filing the suit and service of citation within the time prescribed by the contract for exercising the option.
In their motion for new trial, appellants complain of the action of the trial court in holding that their Points 1, 6, 8 and 10 were multifarious. Whether the points are multifarious or not, they are immaterial to the disposition of this case as hereinafter pointed out and they are here now overruled for that reason.
By Point 1, the appellants complained that the trial court erred in refusing to grant their motion for instructed verdict because the tenancy between the parties was terminated without the option being exercised by the plaintiff; and because the plaintiff failed to comply with the condition precedent in the lease and upon her failure to do so terminated the lease as a matter of law and thereby terminated her option to purchase. If the point is not multifarious but merely states two reasons why the court erred, they were foreclosed by the filing of the suit and service of cita*636tion within the option period in the contract.
By Points 3 and 4, appellants complain of the action of the trial court in refusing their motion for instructed verdict and in submitting Special Issue No. 1, contending that the option clause in the contract was only a conditional offer and was not a valid and existing option. The points are without merit because the option was valid and recited a good and valuable consideration in that all lease rentals paid up to and including the time of the exercise of the option were to be applied on the purchase of the property and the option could not be withdrawn at any time while the lease was in full force and effect without the consent of the ap-pellee. The points are overruled.
By Point 6, appellants complain of the action of the trial court in admitting in evidence the judgment of the county court on the forcible detainer suit because such admission was immaterial and irrelevant and highly prejudicial to the right of appellants; and there was no pleading of res judicata. If the point merely states one point and two reasons why the court erred, the point is without merit because appellants pleaded and proved the filing of the forcible detainer suit for the purpose of showing that they had withdrawn the option in the contract. Appellee was then entitled to prove the outcome of the lawsuit. We do not mean to hold that the judgment in the forcible detainer suit was res judicata except on the issue of showing that the lease was in full force and effect at the time appellee filed her suit and had process served for the purpose of exercising her option. The point is overruled.
Points 5, 7, 8 and 9 bear upon oral acceptance of the option and agency. As a matter of fact, the issue of agency should not have been submitted for they had to do with the acceptance of the option through the agent. This was not necessary because the record in the case showed that the-option was exercised by the filing of the suit and service of citation within the-option period of the contract.
Point 10, we think, is definitely multifarious. It raises the following points-on the issue of money judgment for damages for wrongful sequestration: (1) No-evidence; (2) insufficiency of the evidence; (3) the evidence was so slight that it would be manifestly unfair and unjust to render such judgment; (4) no evidence of wrongful sequestration; and (5) the necessary legal prerequisites were not complied with by plaintiff (this actually does not point out anything). Be that as it may, the point has not been preserved for this appeal, and is overruled.
Remaining convinced that this case was properly disposed upon original submission, the motion to amend the transcript and the motion for rehearing are overruled.