Court Opinion

ID: 9371212
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-15 19:00:26.65803+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:26.132052
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-40922        Document: 00516646998            Page: 1      Date Filed: 02/15/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                                United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                         Fifth Circuit

                                                                                       FILED
                                                                                February 15, 2023
                                       No. 21-40922                                  Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                          Clerk

   James Morrow; Stephen Stuart Watson; Amanee Busby;
   Yuselff Dismukes; Linda Dorman; Marvin Pearson;
   Jennifer Boatwright; Ronald Henderson; Javier Flores;
   William Flores,

                                                                 Plaintiffs—Appellants,

                                            versus

   Michael Baker, City of Tenaha Mayor, in His Official
   Capacity,

                                                                  Defendant—Appellee.

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Eastern District of Texas
                               USDC No. 2:08-CV-288

   Before Smith, Barksdale, and Haynes, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
         At issue is whether the district court erred in this settled class-action
   by denying the last of four interim motions for attorney’s fees as untimely,
   based on an oral pronouncement by the court during a non-transcribed,

         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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                                     No. 21-40922

   unrecorded status conference which purported to set a deadline to file the
   motion.     Because this oral pronouncement was insufficient to set the
   deadline, we VACATE and REMAND.
                                          I.
            This 2008 class action against various officials of the City of Tenaha
   and Shelby County, Texas, claimed Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment
   violations by law enforcement. The parties’ settlement agreement included
   a consent decree, which required defendants to implement specific policies
   and follow monitoring procedures, with a court-appointed monitor to
   oversee defendants’ compliance with those procedures. The decree’s
   effective term of four years could be modified by the court upon motion by a
   party.
            The decree provided defendants would pay plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees
   “as previously agreed to by the parties”, which referred to a 15 June 2012
   mediation proposal. Pursuant to that proposal, the parties: settled on fees
   already incurred; and stipulated plaintiffs’ counsel anticipated future fees
   which “remain[ed] billable and/or subject to determination by the Court”.
   An August 2013 order approved the consent decree.
            Relying on defendants’ agreement to pay attorney’s fees and 42
   U.S.C. § 1988 (allowing court to award attorney’s fees to prevailing party in
   certain civil-rights proceedings), plaintiffs moved in September 2016 for
   those fees related to monitoring defendants’ compliance with the consent
   decree, for 10 September 2013–31 August 2016 (first fees motion). The court
   granted the motion 15 November 2017, concluding plaintiffs were the
   “prevailing party” under § 1988.
            The decree was extended in January 2019 for an additional term of 18
   months, to expire around 24 July 2020. (During a July 2020 conference,
   discussed infra, the court and parties expressed confusion over the exact date

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   of the additional term’s expiration. The amended settlement agreement
   proposing the additional term provided it would “remain in effect for
   eighteen (18) months from the date of entry of the [o]rder entering” the
   amended decree. The order approving the amended decree was entered 24
   January 2019, and 18 months commencing from that date would result in the
   above stated 24 July 2020 expiration.).
          Plaintiffs in October 2019 filed another interim motion for attorney’s
   fees, for 1 September 2016–30 April 2019 (second fees motion). Another was
   filed in May 2020, for 1 May 2019–31 March 2020 (third fees motion).
          A 24 June 2020 docket entry captioned “Status Conference (Hearing
   re Pending Motions and Consent Decree)” reflected a notice for a hearing
   on 21 July 2020 (the July 2020 conference). Just before that conference,
   plaintiffs on 17 July moved for a second additional term for the decree, with
   its length to be decided by the court at a later date.
          During the July 2020 conference, the court stated:
          Somewhere in around April of this year, I recall indicating to
          you in a conference in chambers that I anticipated having a
          hearing on any and all matters that were still alive in this case
          before the expiration of the current extension of the consent
          decree, and that if the plaintiffs intended to seek an extension
          of the consent decree, they needed to proceed to take all
          reasonable steps to do that.
   (Emphasis added.)
   The court further stated it would “withhold ruling [on the proposed second
   additional term] until all [of] the [consent decree’s] notice requirements . . .
   [had] been met and complied with”.
          Regarding the court’s above reference to a conference in chambers
   “around April of this year”, the docket reflects an “In Chambers Telephonic

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   Status Conference” was held 14 April 2020. The conference, however, was
   not recorded or transcribed, and no orders were entered regarding what was
   discussed or decided.
          Approximately two months after the July 2020 conference, the court
   entered two orders on 15 September 2020 (the September 2020 orders): one
   denied the proposed second additional term; the other granted, as modified,
   the second and third fees motions. The order denying a second additional
   term referred to the July 2020 conference as the “Final Hearing” and stated
   “the parties [were put] on notice that any motions would need to be timely
   filed before the Final Hearing at least as early as the telephonic status
   conference held April 14, 2020”. But, the order granting, as modified, the
   second and third fees motions referred to the July 2020 conference as a
   “Status Conference”.
          Subsequent to the July 2020 conference, plaintiffs and the county—
   but not the city—defendants reached a settlement on outstanding fees; on 14
   October 2020 plaintiffs moved to dismiss those defendants. This motion
   prompted the court to schedule another status conference for 9 December
   2020 (the December 2020 conference).
          During the December 2020 conference, the court stated: “[t]his is a
   case that has run its course and has been concluded and is closed and over”;
   and it had “awarded fees that would be through the close of all activity in the
   account”. The court made several other references regarding the case’s
   being closed, but also acknowledged several times it still needed to “direct[]
   the clerk to close the case” and was refraining from doing so “until [the
   parties] put the last nail in the coffin on [the] fee issue”.
          Ultimately, the court did not consider it necessary to dismiss the
   county defendants. It viewed the class action to be “in the same posture as
   if the litigation [had] been reduced to a judgment and . . . the judgment [was]

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   being satisfied”. Therefore, the court felt it would be “highly awkward, . . .
   if not outright inappropriate for there to be an order of dismissal entered”
   because there was “nothing left to dismiss”. Instead, plaintiffs were directed
   to file a notice advising the court that county defendants were released from
   their fee obligations. The court stated, that, upon such filing, “between the
   County Defendants and the Plaintiffs, the case [would be] over with”.
          Plaintiffs on 17 March 2021 moved for additional attorney’s fees, to
   be paid by the city, for 1 April 2020–31 December 2020 (fourth fees motion).
   Following the court’s granting an extension to do so, defendants filed a
   response in opposition. The fourth fees motion was denied 12 April 2021 by
   a two-sentence order.
          Plaintiffs on 15 April 2021 moved to amend that order, seeking
   findings of fact and conclusions of law on which the fourth fees motion was
   denied and otherwise continuing in general to contest the denial of that
   motion. The court on 24 November 2021 denied the motion to amend as
   moot, but in doing so, stated the fourth fees motion was untimely because
   “the Court put the parties on clear notice that any motion” needed to be
   “timely filed before” the July 2020 conference.
          Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal on 20 December 2021, from the 12
   April 2021 and 24 November 2021 orders denying the fourth fees motion.
                                         II.
          Plaintiffs claim the court violated the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
   and procedural due-process by denying their fourth fees motion as untimely,
   without setting a deadline in a written order.
                                         A.
          “Jurisdiction is always first.” Arulnanthy v. Garland, 17 F.4th 586,
   592 (5th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). Jurisdiction vel non is, of course, a

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   question of law. E.g., Gulfport Energy Corp. v. FERC, 41 F.4th 667, 676 (5th
   Cir. 2022).
          Plaintiffs’ opening brief presents three grounds for our having
   jurisdiction. First, the ruling on their fourth fees motion is a reviewable
   interlocutory order under the collateral-order doctrine.         Second, if the
   court’s denying that motion finally resolved all issues regarding attorney’s
   fees, jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Finally, if the orders
   appealed from are deemed a final judgment, § 1291 likewise grants us
   jurisdiction.
          The city (the sole remaining defendant) presents the following
   response in claiming we lack jurisdiction. The 15 September 2020 orders
   were the court’s final judgment, disposing of all claims against all parties. As
   a result, plaintiffs had 28 days under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) to
   move to amend the fee award. Or, had they wished instead to appeal the
   orders, they had 30 days, under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a).
   Because they did neither, the district court lacked jurisdiction to rule on the
   17 March 2021 fourth fees motion and the subsequent motion to amend;
   therefore, the 20 December 2021 notice of appeal was untimely.
          In reply, plaintiffs contend as follows. First, attorney’s fees are a
   collateral issue, which the district court retains jurisdiction over after a final
   decision on the merits; therefore, it had jurisdiction to rule on their fourth
   fees motion even if the 15 September 2020 orders were the final judgment.
   Second, those orders cannot be considered the final judgment because the
   parties were not put on notice that the July 2020 conference would be treated
   as a final hearing. In either event, this appeal was timely.
          “A final decision generally is one which ends the litigation on the
   merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.”
   Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945) (citation omitted). “The

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   intention of the judge is crucial in determining finality.” Vaughn v. Mobil Oil
   Expl. & Producing Se., Inc., 891 F.2d 1195, 1197 (5th Cir. 1990). Along that
   line, a decision “is only final if the judge intends to have nothing further to
   do . . . [with] the case”. Ueckert v. Guerra, 38 F.4th 446, 450 (5th Cir. 2022);
   see also Vaughn, 891 F.2d at 1197 (“[W]e are inclined to fasten finality upon a
   judgment that reflects the intention of the judge to dispose of all the business
   before him”.).
          The 15 September 2020 order regarding the second and third fees
   motions addressed only those two motions, together covering 1 September
   2016–31 March 2020. As stated supra, the additional term of the decree was
   to expire in late July 2020. Neither of the September 2020 orders stated no
   further relief would be granted, nor did they direct the clerk to close the case.
   (The November 2021 order denying the 15 April 2021 motion to amend—
   the court’s last order—did both.) Therefore, there had not been a ruling
   regarding fees for April 2020 through the late July 2020 expiration of the
   decree. This is inconsistent with the notion that the court intended to
   “dispose of all the business before [it]”. Vaughn, 891 F.2d at 1197.
          Moreover, in McLaughlin v. Mississippi Power Company, our court held:
   although the district court’s “order did purport to dismiss the entire case”,
   the court did not “evince an intent to end the litigation by its order” because
   it “did not close the case or direct the clerk to enter judgment” and
   “continued to exercise jurisdiction over the case” by issuing two additional
   orders. 376 F.3d 344, 351 (5th Cir. 2004). Similarly, the court: in its
   September 2020 orders did not direct the clerk to close the case; and
   continued to exercise jurisdiction over the case by ruling on motions and
   holding the December 2020 conference. At no point did the court consider
   itself without jurisdiction. “Accordingly, we conclude that the district court
   did not intend for its [September 2020 orders] to be a final judgment.” Id.

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          As a result, our court has jurisdiction over this appeal. The 30-day
   period to appeal did not begin to run until 24 November 2021, when the court
   entered its order denying the timely 15 April 2021 motion to amend the 12
   April order denying the fourth fees motion. See Fed. R. App. P. 4 (time
   to appeal). The notice of appeal was timely filed 20 December 2021.
   (Needless to say, plaintiffs’ timely filed motion to amend tolled the time to
   appeal the 12 April 2021 order denying the fourth fees motion. E.g., Moody
   Nat’l Bank v. GE Life & Annuity Assur. Co., 383 F.3d 249, 250 (5th Cir.
   2004).)
                                            B.
          Rulings on attorney’s fees are reviewed for abuse of discretion. E.g.,
   Davis v. Abbott, 781 F.3d 207, 213 (5th Cir. 2015). “To constitute an abuse
   of discretion, the district court’s decision must be either premised on an
   erroneous application of the law, or on an assessment of the evidence that is
   clearly erroneous.” In re High Sulfur Gasoline Prods. Liab. Litig., 517 F.3d
   220, 227 (5th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
                                            1.
          “Unless a statute or a court order provides otherwise”, Rule 54
   generally requires motions for attorney’s fees to be filed within “14 days after
   the entry of judgment”. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(B). Rule 23, however,
   applies in class actions when attorney’s fees “are authorized by law or by the
   parties’ agreement”. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h). (With the court’s concluding
   plaintiffs were the prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the former
   applies.) Under Rule 23(h), “[a] claim for an award must be made by motion
   under Rule 54(d)(2), subject to the provisions of this subdivision (h), at a time the
   court sets”. Id. (emphasis added).
          Rule 23’s cross reference to Rule 54’s being “subject to the
   provisions” of Rule 23(h) results in its trumping Rule 54(d)(2) to the extent

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   there are inconsistencies. Therefore, in those circumstances, attorney’s-fees
   motions must be filed “at a time the court sets”. Id. Logically, this directs
   the court to set such a time.
          The Advisory Committee’s Notes to Rule 23 support this
   interpretation. For instance, the notes provide that Rule 54 “is not addressed
   to the particular concerns of class actions. . . . [Therefore] the provisions of
   [Rule 23(h)] control disposition of fee motions in class actions, while Rule
   54(d)(2) applies to matters not addressed in [Rule 23(h)]”. Fed. R. Civ.
   P. 23 advisory committee’s notes to 2003 amendment. Additionally, “[t]he
   court should direct when the fee motion must be filed”. Id.; see also
   Manual for Complex Litigation § 21.721 (4th ed. 2004) (“Rule
   23(h)(1) calls for the court to fix a time for submission of motions for attorney
   fees in class actions.”).
          In any event, even if the court is not required to set a deadline, fees
   motions are timely under Rule 54 if filed within 14 days following entry of
   judgment, absent a court order or statute dictating otherwise. As discussed
   above, the court had not entered its final judgment before plaintiffs filed their
   fourth fees motion.
          Whether Rules 23, 54, and 79 together, as plaintiffs maintain, require
   a deadline for fees motions in class actions to be entered in a written order
   need not be decided in this appeal. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 79 (requiring clerk
   to enter in docket, and keep copies of, court’s orders). It is enough that,
   whatever Rule 23 requires, it was not satisfied in this instance.
          This unusual procedural dilemma—the court’s denying a motion as
   untimely based on a purported court-set deadline completely absent from the
   record—appears to be unprecedented in any circuit.             Nonetheless, as
   discussed below, and as stressed by courts, commentators, and the Advisory

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   Committee’s Notes, Rule 23 is rooted in the need for active judicial oversight
   of class actions.
          “Rule 23 imposes on the trial judge the duty of assuring that . . . the
   pleading and trial of the case is conducted fairly and efficiently”. Bernard v.
   Gulf Oil Co., 596 F.2d 1249, 1259 (5th Cir. 1979), on reh’g, 619 F.2d 459 (5th
   Cir. 1980), aff’d, 452 U.S. 89 (1981). Additionally, as stated by the Court,
   “[b]ecause of the potential for abuse, a district court has both the duty and
   the broad authority to exercise control over a class action”. Gulf Oil Co. v.
   Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 100 (1981).
          Commentators further elaborate on this principle of judicial oversight.
   “Because the stakes and scope of class action litigation can be great, class
   actions often require closer judicial oversight and more active judicial
   management than other types of litigation.” Manual for Complex
   Litigation § 21. “Indeed, the success or failure of a class action . . . turns
   in large part on the judge’s management of the case”. 3 Newberg and
   Rubenstein on Class Actions § 10:1 (6th ed.); see also 7B Charles
   Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure
   § 1791 (3d ed.) (“Because class actions tend to be extremely complicated and
   protracted, their management and disposition frequently require the exercise
   of considerable judicial control and ingenuity in the framing of orders.”).
          In particular, “[f]ee awards are a powerful influence on the way
   attorneys initiate, develop, and conclude class actions”. Fed. R. Civ. P.
   23 advisory committee’s notes to 2003 amendment. Consequently, “[a]ctive
   judicial involvement in measuring fee awards is singularly important to the
   proper operation of the class-action process”; therefore, “the district court
   must ensure that the amount and mode of payment of attorney fees are fair
   and proper”. Id.

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          These principles aid our interpretation. See, e.g., Gulf Oil Co., 452
   U.S. at 99 (“[T]he question for decision is whether the [district court’s
   order] is consistent with the general policies embodied in Rule 23”.). For
   example, in In re High Sulfur, our court held the district court violated Rule
   23 by using “flawed fee allocation procedures that [were] inconsistent with
   well-established class action principles and basic judicial standards of
   transparency and fairness”. 517 F.3d at 227. Specifically, the district court’s
   “decision to convene an ex parte hearing was plainly unauthorized” because
   Rule 23 requires that “when a judge constructs a process for setting fees, the
   process must contain at least the procedural minima of due process”. Id. at
   231 (citation omitted).
          Likewise, the district court’s procedures in this instance were
   “flawed”. Id. at 227. Even assuming it did inform the parties during the
   April 2020 telephonic conference that, during the July 2020 conference, it
   would hear “any and all matters that were still alive”, this instruction is too
   ambiguous to satisfy the court’s burden to manage class actions closely. It
   would be unfair to expect the parties to understand this instruction served to
   either “set a time” for fees motions or otherwise displace the 14-day
   following-entry-of-judgment deadline. See Fed. R. Civ P. 23(h) (file fees
   motions at a time court sets); Fed. R. Civ P. 54(d) (14 days to file absent
   statute or court order setting other time); cf. Dennis v. Kellogg Co., 628 F.
   App’x 510, 510 (9th Cir. 2016) (affirming denial of fees motion in class action
   as untimely where filed late “[d]espite a clear court order” setting deadline
   (emphasis added)).
          Particularly troubling, as discussed supra, the consent decree was not
   set to expire until after the July 2020 conference, with a motion to extend it
   pending. It would be illogical to construe the court’s April 2020 telephonic
   conference instructions as requiring plaintiffs to somehow estimate fees they
   had yet to incur (for potentially an unknown period because of the possibility

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   of the second additional term’s being granted, which was proposed just
   before the July 2020 conference). The earlier-discussed 24 June 2020 docket
   entry, regarding notice of the 21 July “Status Conference”, does nothing to
   rectify this ambiguity because it referred only to a “Hearing re Pending
   Motions and Consent Decree”. Accordingly, the court erred by denying as
   untimely the last of four interim fees motions.
                                            2.
            Because we vacate on the above basis, we need not address plaintiffs’
   due-process issue. E.g., United States v. Pruett, 551 F.2d 1365, 1368 (5th Cir.
   1977).
                                            3.
            Finally, the city contends, for the first time on appeal, that plaintiffs’
   request for additional fees is barred by issue preclusion because they could
   have made the request with reasonable diligence before the July 2020
   conference. Even if this contention is not waived, it is unfounded, as none of
   the requirements for issue preclusion are satisfied. Plaintiffs’ fourth fees
   motion does not concern an issue from a “prior action”; and fees for the
   period covered by that motion were not “previously adjudicated”, “actually
   litigated”, or “necessary to” decide the September 2020 orders, concerning,
   inter alia, the second and third fees motions. Bradberry v. Jefferson Cnty., 732
   F.3d 540, 548 (5th Cir. 2013).
                                           III.
            For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE the 12 April 2021 and 24
   November 2021 orders and REMAND for further proceedings consistent
   with this opinion.

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