Court Opinion

ID: 9961542
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-19 07:14:33.387332+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:54.421986
License: Public Domain

In The

                             Court of Appeals

                  Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

                            __________________

                            NO. 09-23-00151-CV
                            __________________

                          JOSEPH COX, Appellant

                                     V.

       CHEVRON PHILLIPS CHEMICAL COMPANY, LP, Appellee

__________________________________________________________________

               On Appeal from the 163rd District Court
                       Orange County, Texas
                      Trial Cause No. 220065-C
__________________________________________________________________

                        MEMORANDUM OPINION

     In this age discrimination suit under the Texas Commission on Human Rights

Act (TCHRA), Appellant Joseph Cox (Cox or Appellant) appeals the trial court’s

summary judgment in favor of Appellee Chevron Phillips Chemical Company, LP

(CPChem). See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.012. We affirm.

                                      1
      Cox filed Plaintiff’s Amended Petition 1 against CPChem, Singular Resource

Solutions LLC (SRS), and JAB Recruitment LLC (JAB) and asserted a claim against

the defendants for age discrimination under the TCHRA. According to the petition,

Cox “contracted to work for [CPChem] under a two (2) year contract as a Project

Engineer, by and through SRS and JAB.”2 On May 10, 2022, the trial court signed

an order non-suiting SRS and JAB pursuant to Plaintiff’s Notice of Nonsuit and

dismissing Cox’s claims against SRS and JAB without prejudice. CPChem filed a

Traditional and No Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment and argued: (1)

CPChem was not Cox’s employer under the TCHRA; (2) Cox, by his own

admission, has no evidence that CPChem discriminated against him based on his

age; (3) Cox cannot meet the elements of a prima facie case of age discrimination;

and (4) Cox has no evidence that CPChem’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons

for its actions are pretext for discrimination. On April 21, 2023, the trial court

granted the motion for summary judgment without specifying the grounds on which

      1
         Plaintiff’s Amended Petition was the live petition at the time the trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of CPChem.
       2
         Cox also asserted causes of action against all defendants for retaliation and
breach of contract, but after CPChem filed its summary judgment motion and prior
to the trial court’s order granting CPChem’s summary judgment motion, Cox
“concede[d] to the dismissal of his retaliation and breach of contract claims[.]”
Accordingly, we will not discuss Cox’s allegations related to those causes of action
or CPChem’s arguments in its summary judgment motion in response to those causes
of action.
                                          2
the summary judgment was granted, and the trial court dismissed Cox’s claims

against CPChem with prejudice. Cox timely filed this appeal.

      In his appellate brief, Cox raises two issues in which he asserts that the trial

court erred in dismissing his claims because it should have found that Cox had

suffered an adverse employment action as a result of his protected class (age) and

that Cox’s employment was terminated based on pretext for discrimination. In

addition to responding to those issues, CPChem suggests in its Appellee’s Brief that

this Court must affirm the trial court’s summary judgment because Cox failed to

negate CPChem’s ground for summary judgment on the basis that CPChem was not

Cox’s employer.

      “When a summary judgment motion alleges multiple grounds and the order

granting summary judgment does not specify the ground on which the summary

judgment was rendered, the appellant must challenge and negate each and every

basis for summary judgment on appeal.” Nixon Fam. P’ship, LP v. Jet Lending, LLC,

No. 09-20-00201-CV, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 5544, at *23 (Tex. App.—Beaumont

Aug. 4, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Ellis v. Precision Engine Rebuilders,

Inc., 68 S.W.3d 894, 898 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.)). According

to CPChem, “Cox’s Appellant’s Brief is devoid of any reference to th[e]

foundational requirement” that only an employer may be liable for an unlawful

employment practice under the TCHRA “although [that requirement] was fully

                                          3
briefed and argued before the trial court in support of CPChem’s Summary Judgment

motions[.]” We agree. In his appellate brief, Cox did not address CPChem’s

argument that CPChem was not Cox’s employer.

      Because the summary judgment order did not state the grounds upon which

the trial court granted summary judgment and Cox has not challenged all

independent bases of CPChem’s motion for summary judgment on appeal, this Court

must affirm the summary judgment. See id. at *26; see also Denmax Energy Servs.

v. LightPoint Eng’g, LLC, No. 09-22-00120-CV, 2024 Tex. App. LEXIS 1742, at

*40 n.16 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Mar. 7, 2024, no pet. h.) (mem. op.). We overrule

Appellant’s issues one and two, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

      AFFIRMED.

                                                        LEANNE JOHNSON
                                                             Justice

Submitted on October 26, 2023
Opinion Delivered April 18, 2024

Before Golemon, C.J., Johnson and Wright, JJ.

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