Court Opinion

ID: 9377684
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-08 16:05:16.641111+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:15.530187
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                    No. 22-0257
                                Filed March 8, 2023

R.M.,
        Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

D.S.,
     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

        Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Buchanan County, Linnea M.N.

Nicol, District Associate Judge.

        D.S. appeals the juvenile court’s extension of a protective order under Iowa

Code chapter 236A (2021). APPEAL DISMISSED.

        Nina Forcier of Forcier Law Office, PLLC, Waterloo, for appellant.

        Sonci Kingery of Iowa Coalition Against Sexual Assault, Des Moines, for

appellee.

        Heard by Tabor, P.J., and Schumacher and Ahlers, JJ.
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TABOR, Presiding Judge.

       D.S. appeals the juvenile court’s extension of a protective order for relief

from sexual abuse under Iowa Code chapter 236A (2021).1 He contends the court

erred in extending the order after its one-year duration had ended. And he also

denies that he continued to pose a threat to the protected party.

       The court first entered a one-year protective order on October 13, 2020. In

short, the court found D.S. committed third-degree sexual abuse against H.M.,

R.M.’s daughter. See Iowa Code § 709.4(1)(a). Our court affirmed on appeal.

See R.M. v. D.S., No. 20-1375, 2021 WL 4592262, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 6,

2021). The supreme court denied further review. And procedendo issued on

November 30, 2021.

       Meanwhile, the protective order was set to expire on October 13, 2021. So

R.M. moved to extend on September 30, 2021. The court entered a temporary

order extending the no-contact order until the extension hearing could be held.

D.S. resisted the motion to extend, arguing procedendo had not yet issued so the

district court lacked jurisdiction to enter further orders in the case. D.S. also argued

the court lacked authority to issue the temporary extension.

       About two weeks after procedendo issued, on December 13, 2021, the

juvenile court held the extension hearing. On January 10, 2022, the court granted

the extension with an expiration date of January 10, 2023. The court found that

D.S. “continues to pose a threat to the safety” of H.M. Iowa Code § 236A.7(2).

D.S. appealed, and our court set the case for oral argument January 11, 2023—

1Because D.S. was a minor, the district court waived jurisdiction to the juvenile
court. See Iowa Code § 236A.3(4) (2020).
                                          3

one day after the extended order expired. At oral argument, the parties disclosed

that R.M. had not sought a second extension. See Riley Drive Ent. I, Inc. v.

Reynolds, 970 N.W.2d 289, 296 (Iowa 2022) (reiterating that appellate courts may

consider matters “technically outside the district court record” in determining

mootness). So we asked for further briefing on whether the appeal is moot.

       A case is moot if it no longer presents a controversy subject to judicial

determination because “the issues involved are academic or nonexistent.” Vroegh

v. Iowa Dep’t of Corr., 972 N.W.2d 686, 705 (Iowa 2022) (citation omitted). We

ask whether our opinion will “have any practical legal effect upon an existing

controversy.” Grinnell College v. Osborn, 751 N.W.2d 396, 399 (Iowa 2008)

(citation omitted).

       In his supplemental briefing, D.S. contends the appeal is not moot because

an ongoing controversy exists on whether he continues to pose a threat to H.M.

But the protective order is not in effect, so that finding no longer has direct

consequences for the parties.      Cf. Luman v. Luman, No. 17-0223, 2018 WL

1099198, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 21, 2018) (dismissing chapter 236 appeal as

moot). Thus, our opinion would have no practical legal impact.

       Short of direct consequences, D.S. insists the juvenile court’s finding of a

continued threat has collateral consequences.2 True, in some contexts, the threat

of adverse collateral consequences provides an exception to the mootness

doctrine.   See In re B.B., 826 N.W.2d 425, 429 (Iowa 2013) (involuntary

2 D.S. ventures that the finding could prevent him from obtaining employment, a
professional license, or admission to college. He also argues even if the record in
this case is not available to the public, the label of sexual abuser “creates a stigma
and harms his reputation.”
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commitment). But in this case, any collateral consequences exist because of the

original protective order—which we upheld in the first appeal. So the mootness

exception for collateral consequences is not a sound reason to decide this appeal

challenging the extension of that original order.

       We can hear a moot case if it meets the public-importance exception. See

Riley Drive Ent. I, Inc., 970 N.W.2d at 298. We consider “(1) the private or public

nature of the issue; (2) the desirability of an authoritative adjudication to guide

public officials in their future conduct; (3) the likelihood of the recurrence of the

issue; and (4) the likelihood the issue will recur yet evade appellate review.” Id.

(citation omitted). D.S. urges us to find the matter is public in nature because it is

before the courts and an authoritative adjudication would be helpful because there

is little case law interpretating chapter 236A. D.S. also argues this issue is likely

to recur and will evade appellate review because the protective orders are limited

to one year in duration and these appeals are not expedited.

       First, we have treated chapter 236 actions as private in nature and see no

reason to take a different view of protective orders under chapter 236A. See

Burns-Rowe v. Rowe, No. 07-1095, 2008 WL 2902186, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. July

30, 2008); R.M., 2021 WL 4592262, at *3 (collecting cases). We agree that

because chapter 236A is relatively new, we have few cases interpreting it. A.N. v.

J.G., No. 19-0634, 2020 WL 2061881, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2020). But, on

the sufficiency-of-the-evidence question, an adjudication on these specific facts

will do little to guide future conduct. See Burns-Rowe, 2008 WL 2902186, at *2.

       Granted, the temporary extension is a different story. We can see how the

bench and bar would benefit from guidance on that issue. But we believe that an
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appellate court can provide that guidance in a case where the issue is not

academic. In other words, while this scenario may recur,3 we cannot say it will

evade review.4 See id. All in all, having considered the four factors, we find they

do not warrant hearing the appeal as a public-importance exception to mootness.

Thus, we dismiss the appeal.

      APPEAL DISMISSED.

3  As R.M. points out, this case featured an unusual confluence of circumstances
leading to the temporary extension: the initial order had a lengthy appeal because
it was set for oral argument; D.S. requested further review delaying procedendo;
and R.M. needed an extension for briefing.
4 Our court has heard and decided the merits of other chapter 236A appeals. See,

e.g., K.C. v. T.D.L., No. 21-1913, 2022 WL 16985442, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov.
17, 2022); J.F. v. K.M., No. 21-1464, 2022 WL 2154824, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. June
15, 2022); N.H. v. L.W., No. 20-0872, 2021 WL 2137684, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. May
26, 2021); A.N. v. J.G., No. 19-0634, 2020 WL 2061881, at *1; T.D. v. J.P., No. 19-
0607, 2020 WL 1548516, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 1, 2020).