Court Opinion

ID: 9950111
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-13 14:10:52.189434+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:35:40.066622
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-1066-19

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

RODNEY A. GABRIEL,

     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________

                   Argued October 18, 2023 – Decided March 13, 2024

                   Before Judges Currier, Susswein and Vanek.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Union County, Indictment Nos. 17-05-0402
                   and 17-06-0485.

                   John P. Flynn, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
                   argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora,
                   Public Defender, attorney; John P. Flynn, of counsel
                   and on the briefs).

                   Milton Samuel Leibowitz, Assistant Prosecutor, argued
                   the cause for respondent (William A. Daniel, Union
                   County Prosecutor, attorney; Milton Samuel Leibowitz,
                   of counsel and on the briefs; James O. Tansey, First
                   Assistant Prosecutor, on the briefs).
PER CURIAM

      Defendant appeals his jury trial convictions for witness tampering,

terroristic threats, and stalking. His convictions stem from conduct and speech

defendant directed at members of a family after he was charged with robbing

them. He contends the trial court committed several errors, but his principal

argument on appeal is the terroristic-threat and witness-tampering prosecutions

violated his First Amendment right to free speech.

      After initial briefs were filed, both the United States Supreme Court and

New Jersey Supreme Court issued groundbreaking decisions explaining when

persons may be criminally prosecuted based on the content of their speech. In

Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66 (2023), and State v. Fair, ___ N.J. ___

(2024), the Courts addressed First Amendment overbreadth challenges in

terroristic-threat prosecutions.   In State v. Hill, ___ N.J. ___ (2024), our

Supreme Court addressed a First Amendment overbreadth challenge in a

prosecution for witness tampering.

      The State concedes the rule announced in Fair requires us to vacate

defendant's terroristic-threat convictions and remand for a new trial on those

counts. Therefore, we vacate the terroristic threats convictions. The parties do

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                                        2
not agree, however, on the impact of Hill on defendant's witness-tampering

convictions.

      In Hill, our Supreme Court rejected the defendant's contention the

witness-tampering statute is unconstitutionally overbroad on its face. Id., slip

op. at 2. The Court nonetheless held N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5(a) may have been

unconstitutionally applied to the defendant because the prosecution relied on the

content of his speech and the jury was not instructed how to determine whether

that speech was unprotected under the First Amendment. Id., slip op. at 27. The

Court held the jury should have been instructed to determine whether the

defendant intended to cause the victims to engage in any prohibited acts under

the witness-tampering statute. 1 Id., slip op. at 30-31.

1
 N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5(a) applies to a defendant's conduct that a reasonable person
would believe would cause a witness or informant to:

               (1) Testify or inform falsely; (2) Withhold any
               testimony, information, document or thing; (3) Elude
               legal process summoning him to testify or supply
               evidence; (4) Absent himself from any proceeding or
               investigation to which he has been legally summoned;
               or (5) Otherwise obstruct, delay, prevent or impede an
               official proceeding or investigation.

               [N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5(a).]

Rather than reproduce this list repeatedly, we generally refer to these
enumerated acts collectively as the "prohibited acts."
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                                         3
      In the matter before us, defendant was prosecuted for witness-tampering

based in part on the content of his speech uttered during altercations. As in Hill,

the jury was not instructed on how to determine whether that speech was

unprotected under the First Amendment.               We therefore vacate the

witness-tampering convictions and remand for further proceedings. We affirm

the stalking conviction.

                                        I.

      This prosecution arises from altercations between defendant and members

of a family comprised of Betsa Garcia (the mother), Javier Vera-Lopez (the

father), and Javier Vera-Garcia (the son). We discern the following facts from

the trial record.

      The family lived approximately one block from defendant.                 The

altercations all occurred near the family's residence.       On the evening of

December 22, 2016, the family was parking their car in the driveway in the front

of their home when defendant approached them. As Garcia was walking up the

stairs, defendant said to her, "[b]**ch, f****r, mother f****r" and "why are you

looking at me?" Garcia testified defendant "was very aggressive from the

beginning" and said other things in English that she did not understand. Garcia

and Vera-Garcia testified defendant pushed Garcia while she was walking up

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                                        4
the stairs. Vera-Garcia and Vera-Lopez then approached defendant. Defendant

swung his fists at Vera-Lopez's face. According to Garcia, defendant then

demanded Vera-Garcia's cellphone and knocked his glasses off his face. The

family claimed defendant picked up a rock and threatened to use it as a weapon

against Vera-Lopez.

      Garcia called 9-1-1 and told the dispatcher "[t]he man is coming for—

for—for—for a problem with me." She described the man as a "black man"

wearing an "orange t-shirt." Police officers arrived and arrested defendant. The

responding officer's body-worn camera captured Vera-Garcia asking an officer,

"[i]s it okay if I just check the street for my glasses, like when I was turning

back away and I dropped them, like he might have snatched them? I don't

know." At trial, Vera-Garcia explained that he did not know "if [he] dropped

[his glasses] or [if defendant] might have snatched them."

      Later that day, a complaint-warrant was issued charging defendant with

robbery. From January to April 2017—while the robbery charge was pending—

defendant spit on the family's cars "basically every day" and pushed their

garbage cans into the street twice per week.       On one occasion, defendant

screamed at Garcia as she was driving and spit on her windshield. She testified,

"[defendant] was rather angry and he charged at the car . . . . And I thought that

                                                                            A-1066-19
                                        5
he was going to break the windshield or something." She did not report the

incident to police. However, on February 3 and March 10, she called 9-1-1 to

report that a "black man" was pushing over her garbage cans.

      On April 12, 2017, around 5:30 a.m., Vera-Lopez went out to his car to

leave for work. Defendant approached his car, "bang[ed]" and "knock[ed]" his

hands on the driver's side window and said something to Vera-Lopez.

Vera-Lopez testified, "I don't understand that much of the English language;

however, he was saying something, . . . [like] go and complain, police." When

Vera-Lopez began to roll down his window, defendant walked away. At that

time, Vera-Lopez did not call the police.

      Around 3:00 p.m. that afternoon, defendant walked past the family's house

while Vera-Lopez was sitting on the front steps. Defendant began "insulting"

him and saying "[f]**k you" in an "aggressive" tone. Vera-Lopez replied,

"[d]on't you remember what you did in the morning?" He also told defendant "I

don't want any problems."      Vera-Lopez testified defendant then got "in a

position that he wanted to fight, that he wanted to fight like this." Vera-Lopez

demonstrated defendant's actions by "putting his two fists up in front of him one

ahead of the other and he was angling his body a little bit to the side."

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                                        6
      Garcia and Vera-Garcia called 9-1-1. Vera-Garcia then came outside.

Vera-Garcia testified, "[defendant] was basically saying things like f**k you,

you—I didn’t steal anything, this is bulls**t, I should have f**ked you and him

up, meaning me and my dad. Then my mom was on the porch and he said I

should f**k that b***h up, too." He described defendant as "getting ready to

fight my dad, has his hands up" and "[c]ocking his fist back."

      Vera-Garcia confronted defendant about spitting on their cars and

knocking over their trash cans. He testified:

            I was confronting [defendant] about the vandalism,
            saying you're the one that's been doing this, and then he
            said so what if I was, what are you going to do about it,
            saying—kind of antagonizing us to fight him, and I was
            saying I don't want to do anything about it but I want it
            to stop.

When police arrived, defendant "started yelling at [them] and insulting [them]

again." Shortly after, defendant's father arrived in a black Jeep and drove off

with defendant.    Garcia testified that defendant called her "b**ch" and

"motherf****r."

                                       II.

      In May 2017, defendant was charged by indictment with three counts of

second-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(1), and third-degree possession of

a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d).

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                                       7
      In June 2017, defendant was charged in a second indictment with three

counts of first-degree witness tampering, N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5(a)(2); two counts of

third-degree witness tampering, N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5(a)(2); two counts of

third-degree terroristic threats, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a); one count of first-degree

terroristic threats, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a); and one count of fourth-degree stalking,

N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10(b).

      The charges in both indictments were tried together. As to the charges

from the first indictment, the jury convicted defendant only of a lesser -included

petty disorderly persons offense of harassment, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(b), and of a

lesser-included disorderly persons offense of simple assault, N.J.S.A.

2C:12-1(a)(1). As to the charges from the second indictment, the jury convicted

defendant on all counts.

      The trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent twelve-year prison terms

on the first-degree witness-tampering convictions.       The court merged the

convictions for terroristic-threats into the witness-tampering sentences. The

court also imposed a one-year term on the fourth-degree stalking conviction to

run concurrent with the other prison terms and entered a permanent restraining

order pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10.1. For the convictions for petty disorderly

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                                        8
persons harassment and disorderly persons simple assault, the court imposed

fines and penalties.

      Defendant raised the following contentions for our consideration in his

initial appellate brief:

             POINT I
             TO AVOID CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITY, THE
             WITNESS-TAMPERING STATUTE MUST BE
             INTERPRETED TO REQUIRE THAT THE
             DEFENDANT INTENDED HIS SPEECH OR
             CONDUCT TO CAUSE A WITNESS TO WITHOLD
             TESTIMONY.

             A. The Witness-Tampering Statute Must be Construed
             to Require That a Defendant Subjectively Intends his
             Speech or Conduct to Cause a Witness to Withhold
             Testimony.

             B. Gabriel's Convictions Must be Reversed Because the
             Jury was Not Required to Find That Gabriel
             Subjectively Intended His Speech and Conduct to
             Cause the Witnesses to Withhold Testimony.

             POINT II
             GABRIEL'S  CONVICTIONS   FOR     MAKING
             TERRORISTIC THREATS MUST BE REVERSED
             BECAUSE      N.J.S.A   2C:12-3(a)     IS
             UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OVERBROAD.

             POINT III
             THE    TRIAL   COURT'S   CHARGE     ON
             FIRST-DEGREE WITNESS TAMPERING FAILED
             TO INFORM THE JURY THAT THE STATE MUST

                                                                       A-1066-19
                                      9
               PROVE THAT GABRIEL KNEW THAT THE
               OFFICAL PROCEEDING INVOLVED A CRIME
               ENUMERATED IN N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(d).
               POINT IV

               THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR
               BY FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY TO
               EXERCISE CAUTION IN EVALUATING ORAL
               STATEMENTS ALLEGEDLY MADE BY GABRIEL.

               POINT V

               THE   CUMULATIVE     EFFECT    OF   THE
               AFOREMENTIONED      ERRORS     DEPRIVED
               GABRIEL OF DUE PROCESS AND A FAIR TRIAL.

               POINT VI

               THE MATTER SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR
               RESENTENCING BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT
               IMPROPERLY USED GABRIEL'S MENTAL
               HEALTH DIAGNOSES TO FIND AGGRAVATING
               FACTORS AND ERRONEOUSLY REJECTED
               MITIGATING EVIDENCE.

      Defendant raised the following contentions for our consideration in his

reply brief:

               POINT I

               UNLESS THE WITNESS-TA[MP]ERING STATUTE
               IS NARROWLY CONSTRUED TO REQUIRE
               SPECIFIC INTENT OR KNOWLEDGE, IT IS
               UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OVERBROAD AND
               VAGUE.

                                                                       A-1066-19
                                    10
            POINT II
            BECAUSE THERE IS NO WAY TO DISCERN
            WHETHER THE JURY CONVICTED GABRIEL
            UNDER THE FACIALLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL
            PORTION OF THE TERRORISTIC THREATS
            STATUTE, HIS CONVICTIONS MUST BE
            REVERSED.

            POINT III
            THE STATE WAS REQUIRED TO PROVE THAT
            GABRIEL   KNEW    THAT    THE   OFFICAL
            PROCEEDING    INVOLVED      A     CRIME
            ENUMERATED IN N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(d) TO
            CONVICT GABRIEL OF FIRST-DEGREE WITNESS
            TAMPERING.
            POINT IV
            THE MATTER SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR
            RESENTENCING BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT
            IMPROPERLY USED GABRIEL'S MENTAL
            HEALTH DIAGNOSES TO FIND THAT GABRIEL
            WAS LIK[ELY] TO REOFFEND.

      As noted, after the initial briefs were filed by the parties, the United States

and New Jersey Supreme Courts issued opinions explaining the overbreadth

doctrine in the context of terroristic-threat and witness-tampering prosecutions.

We asked the parties to provide supplemental briefs. Defendant raises the

following contentions for our consideration in his supplemental brief:

            POINT I

            BECAUSE GABRIEL WAS PROSECUTED FOR
            WITNESS TAMPERING BASED ON THE
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                                        11
            CONTENT OF HIS ALLEGEDLY THREATENING
            SPEECH, THE STATE NEEDED TO SATISFY THE
            STRICTURES    OF    THE   TRUE-THREATS
            EXCEPTION.

            POINT II

            COUNTERMAN AND FAIR REQUIRE, IN A
            WITNESS-TAMPERING [PROSECUTION] BASED
            ON THREATENING SPEECH, THAT THE JURY BE
            INSTRUCTED ON A HIGHER MENS REA THAN
            REQUIRED BY THE MODEL CHARGE.

            POINT III

            THE REASONABLE-VICTIM STANDARD MUST
            ALSO APPLY TO THE OBJECTIVE ELEMENTS OF
            THE WITNESS-TAMPERING STATUTE.

                                       III.

      We need only briefly address defendant's contentions regarding his

terroristic-threat convictions. In Fair, our Supreme Court considered "whether

a prosecution for terroristic threats under N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a) premised on a

mens rea of recklessness is constitutional. . . ." ___ N.J. at ___ (slip op. at 2).

After reviewing the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Counterman, the

Court held that a mental state of recklessness is constitutionally sufficient for a

"true threat" prosecution under N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a).         Id., slip op. at 23.

However, the Court modified the trial judge's definition of recklessness for

purposes of a true threats prosecution from acting "heedlessly, or foolhardily,"

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                                       12
to "morally culpable conduct, involving a 'deliberate decision to endanger

another.'" Id., slip op. at 24-25 (quoting Counterman, 600 U.S. at 79). The

Court also held an objective component is necessary for a true threats

prosecution to survive constitutional scrutiny and, thus, the State must prove

that a "reasonable person similarly situated to the victim" would have viewed

the message as threatening violence. Id., slip op. at 29-32. Because the jury

instructions failed to explain these new requirements, the Court vacated the

defendant's conviction for terroristic threats and remanded for a new trial. Id.,

slip op. at 35.

      In the matter before us, the State concedes the jury instructions have the

same deficiencies that led the Court to reverse and remand for a new trial in

Fair. Accordingly, we vacate defendant's convictions for terroristic threats and

remand for a new trial on those counts.

                                      IV.

      We turn next to defendant's constitutional arguments with respect to his

witness-tampering convictions. We begin by noting the State initially argued

we should not consider this issue because defendant did not challenge the

witness-tampering statute's constitutionality before the trial court. See Nieder

v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973) ("[A]ppellate courts will

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                                      13
decline to consider questions or issues not properly presented to the trial court

when an opportunity for such a presentation is available 'unless the questions so

raised on appeal go to the jurisdiction of the trial court or concern matters of

great public interest.'" (quoting Reynolds Offset Co. v. Summer, 58 N.J. Super.

542, 548 (App. Div. 1959))). At the time of trial, defendant did not have the

benefit of the Supreme Court's decision in Hill, which now provides instruction

on how to resolve First Amendment as-applied challenges to witness-tampering

prosecutions. The State does not argue Hill should not be applied retroactively. 2

Accordingly,    we    address   defendant's   constitutional   challenge   to   his

witness-tampering convictions on its merits notwithstanding it was not

presented to the trial court.

      We begin our substantive analysis by recounting the pertinent facts and

legal principles set forth in Hill. The defendant in Hill was charged with

first-degree carjacking after the victim, A.Z., identified him in a photo array.

___ N.J. at ___ (slip op. at 4). While the defendant was detained awaiti ng trial,

he sent a letter to A.Z. addressed to her home. Ibid. The defendant was not

subject to a no-contact order. Ibid. He wrote in the letter, among other things,

2
  We note the State by its concession for partial remand implicitly acknowledges
the rule announced in Fair applies retroactively to this case. We see no reason
why the rule announced in Hill should be treated differently.
                                                                            A-1066-19
                                       14
"[i]f it's me that you're claiming as the actor of this crime without a doubt, then

disregard this correspondence. Otherwise please tell the truth if you're wrong

or not sure 100%." Id., slip op. at 5.

      At trial, A.Z. testified receiving the letter at her home "was terrifying" and

made her "scared to" testify. Id., slip op. at 6-7. A redacted version of the letter

was admitted into evidence and a detective read it aloud to the jury. Id., slip op.

at 7. During opening and closing statements, the prosecutor focused on the

letter's contents. Ibid.

      The Supreme Court rejected the defendant's contention that N.J.S.A.

2C:28-5(a) is facially overbroad. Id., slip op. at 21. The Court noted "[m]any

applications of N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5(a) are entirely unrelated to speech." Id., slip

op. at 22. Further, "the heartland of witness[-]tampering prosecutions either do

not involve speech at all, or prosecute unprotected speech, and therefore do not

violate the First Amendment." Ibid.

      The Court emphasized that even when a prosecution involves the content

of speech, some types of speech fall outside the First Amendment's protections.

Id., slip op. at 16. "Those historically unprotected categories of speech include

fighting words, obscenity, child pornography, incitement, defamation, true

threats, and speech integral to criminal conduct." Id., slip op. at 16-17 (citing

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                                         15
Counterman, 600 U.S. at 73-74; United States v. Hansen, 599 U.S. 762, 783

(2023)). The Court added that as to witness-tampering prosecutions involving

speech, "garden-variety prosecutions are consistent with the First Amendment

and Article I, Paragraph 6 of the New Jersey Constitution because they involve

speech that is integral to criminal conduct and is thus unprotected." Id., slip op.

at 24.

         Although the Court held N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5(a) is not facially overbroad, it

concluded the statute may have been unconstitutionally applied in Hill. Id., slip

op. at 27. The Court noted,

               had the jury been required to find that the contents of
               defendant's letter were speech integral to criminal
               conduct, the letter would have been unprotected by the
               First Amendment and there would be no issue with
               defendant's conviction. However, because the jury was
               not required to make such a finding, defendant's
               witness[-]tampering conviction must be vacated and
               remanded for a new trial.

               [Id., slip op. at 30.]

         The Court further explained,

               [b]ecause the letter is facially innocuous, in order to
               prove that it was speech integral to witness tampering,
               the State was required to prove that defendant intended
               the letter to cause A.Z. to [engage in conduct prohibited
               by N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5]. In the trial below, the jury was
               not so charged. Therefore, defendant's conviction for
               witness tampering must be vacated.

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                                         16
              [Id., slip op. at 30-31.]

                                          V.

        We next apply the principles announced in Hill to the matter before us.

The State's proofs generally pertained to defendant's conduct such as spitting on

cars, knocking over garbage cans, and taking what could be characterized as a

fighting stance—rather than his speech. To the extent the State presented

evidence of defendant's verbal utterances, for the most part they were expletives.

        But the oral message defendant delivered to the victims during the April

12, 2017 altercations was not limited to expletives. 3 For example, the State

presented evidence that defendant stated to the victims, "I didn't steal anything,

this is bulls**t." That speech is important because it suggests defendant's

aggressive conduct and cursing on April 12, 2017 was in response to the victims'

having accused him of robbery. Furthermore, as in Hill, the record shows

defendant did not "explicitly ask" or "openly encourage" the victims to do any

of the prohibited acts enumerated in N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5(a).4

3
  As the indictment makes clear, the prosecution for witness tampering focuses
on the events that transpired on April 12, 2017.
4
    The Court in Hill noted:

                                                                            A-1066-19
                                          17
      We conclude the witness-tampering prosecution was based, at least in

part, on the content of defendant's oral speech on April 12, 2017. Consequently,

for the witness-tampering prosecution to comport with the free speech

protections outlined in Hill, the jury should have "been required to find that his

speech fell into a recognized category of speech unprotected by the First

Amendment." Id., slip op. at 29. Because that was not done, defendant's

witness-tampering convictions "must be vacated to ensure that the statute is

constitutionally applied to him." Id., slip op. at 33.

                                        VI.

      Because we remand for a new trial on the witness-tampering charges, we

address whether the jury should be instructed in accordance with the modified

reasonable-person standard the Court adopted in Fair. The Court held, "the

            Defendant's letter is not integral to the criminal act of
            tampering with a witness on its face. It does not
            explicitly ask A.Z. to testify falsely, withhold
            testimony, elude legal process, absent herself from any
            proceeding, or otherwise obstruct, delay, prevent or
            impede any official proceeding or investigation. It does
            not openly encourage A.Z. to do any of those things.
            And it does not threaten A.Z. if she continues to
            cooperate with the police or the prosecution.

            [Id., slip op. at 30.]

                                                                            A-1066-19
                                       18
objective inquiry, in which the jury determines whether a reasonable person

would have viewed the defendant’s words as threatening violence, must be

undertaken not from the perspective of an anonymous ordinary person, but from

the perspective of a reasonable person similarly situated to the victim." Fair,

___ N.J. at ___ (slip op. at 31). The Court explained this perspective "protects

against convictions for statements made in jest, political dissent, or angry

hyperbole, while allowing the State to prosecute true threats of violence that

would instill fear of injury in a reasonable person in the victim’s position." Id.,

slip op. at 32. The Court added, "[t]his is another way of saying that context

matters." Ibid.

       The witness-tampering statute also includes a reasonable person element,

requiring the State prove the actor "knowingly engages in conduct which a

reasonable person would believe would cause a witness or informant to [commit

a prohibited act]." N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5(a). Because the Court in Hill was not

dealing with a "true threats" situation, it had no occasion to address whether and

in what circumstances the similarly situated modification should apply to a

witness-tampering prosecution. See supra note 4 (noting the letter the Hill

defendant mailed did "not threaten A.Z. if she continue[d] to cooperate with the

police or prosecution").

                                                                             A-1066-19
                                       19
      We agree with defendant that in these circumstances, the same

constitutional concerns prompting the Fair Court to apply an objective standard

in that terroristic-threat prosecution also apply in the context of the present

witness-tampering prosecution. Here, the evidence admitted at trial and the

argument presented by the prosecutor in summation emphasized the threatening

nature of defendant's conduct and speech. Indeed, the same evidence pertaining

to defendant's speech was presented in support of both the terroristic-threat and

witness-tampering prosecution theories.       Given these circumstances, we

conclude the jury should be instructed to apply the "similarly situated" modified

standard not only to the counts charging defendant with making terroristic

threats but also the counts charging witness tampering.

                                      VII.

      We turn next to defendant's contention that to be convicted of first-degree

witness tampering, the State must prove he knew the underlying official

proceeding or investigation involved a crime enumerated in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2,

the No Early Release Act (NERA). 5         We are unpersuaded by defendant's

interpretation of the witness-tampering statute.

5
  NERA is a sentencing statute that requires a defendant to serve eighty -five
percent of the sentence imposed before becoming eligible for parole.
                                                                           A-1066-19
                                      20
      N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5(a) provides:

            Tampering. A person commits an offense if, believing
            that an official proceeding or investigation is pending
            or about to be instituted or has been instituted, he
            knowingly engages in conduct which a reasonable
            person would believe would cause a witness or
            informant to:

            (1) Testify or inform falsely;

            (2) Withhold any testimony, information, document or
            thing;

            (3) Elude legal process summoning him to testify or
            supply evidence;

            (4) Absent himself from any proceeding or
            investigation to which he has been legally summoned;
            or

            (5) Otherwise obstruct, delay, prevent or impede an
            official proceeding or investigation.

            Witness tampering is a crime of the first degree if the
            conduct occurs in connection with an official
            proceeding or investigation involving any crime
            enumerated in subsection d. of section 2 of [NERA] and
            the actor employs force or threat of force. Witness
            tampering is a crime of the second degree if the actor
            employs force or threat of force. Otherwise it is a crime
            of the third degree.

      It is well-settled that "[t]he overriding goal of all statutory interpretation

'is to determine as best we can the intent of the Legislature, and to give effect to

that intent.'" State v. S.B., 230 N.J. 62, 67 (2017) (quoting State v. Robinson,

                                                                              A-1066-19
                                        21
217 N.J. 594, 604 (2014)). As a result, "[t]o determine the Legislature's intent,

we look to the statute's language and give those terms their plain and ordinary

meaning . . . because 'the best indicator of that intent is the plain language chosen

by the Legislature[.]'" State v. J.V., 242 N.J. 432, 442 (2020) (first citing

DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005); and then quoting Johnson v.

Roselle EZ Quick, LLC, 226 N.J. 370, 386 (2016)). Accordingly, "[i]f, based

on a plain and ordinary reading of the statute, the statutory terms are clear and

unambiguous, then the interpretative process ends, and we 'apply the law as

written.'" Id. at 443 (quoting Murray v. Plainfield Rescue Squad, 210 N.J. 581,

592 (2012)). It is inappropriate for "'[a] court . . . [to] rewrite a plainly[ ]written

enactment of the Legislature [or to] presume that the Legislature intended

something other than that expressed by way of the plain language.'" Ibid. (third

alteration in original) (quoting O'Connell v. State, 171 N.J. 484, 488 (2002)).

Only "[i]f . . . the statutory text is ambiguous, [can courts] resort to 'extrinsic

interpretative aids, including legislative history,' to determine the statute's

meaning." Ibid. (quoting S.B., 230 N.J. at 68). In the context of criminal

statutes, "N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(c)(1), . . . instructs that a statute's culpability

requirement generally applies to all elements of a crime, 'unless a contrary

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purpose plainly appears.'" State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 177 (2010) (emphasis

omitted).

      The last paragraph of the statute establishes how a witness-tampering

offense is graded. There can be no question that under Apprendi v. New Jersey,

the jury must find, beyond a reasonable doubt, any fact (other a than prior

conviction) that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory

maximum. 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). But while the jury must find beyond a

reasonable doubt that the underlying proceeding—in this case a robbery

prosecution—is designated as a NERA crime, we conclude the State need not

prove defendant knew the pending robbery charge was so designated.

      In reaching that conclusion, we find helpful guidance in State v. Dixon,

346 N.J. Super. 126 (App. Div. 2001), which addressed the gradation of the

crime of fleeing from police, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(b). That statute provides the

eluding offense is a third-degree crime "except that, a person is guilty of a crime

of the second degree if the flight or attempt to elude creates a risk of death or

injury to any person." N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(b). The defendant asserted the jury

should have been instructed they must find he "'knowingly created a risk of death

or injury to anyone' in order to be convicted of second[-]degree eluding." Dixon,

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                                       23
346 N.J. Super. at 132 (emphasis omitted). In rejecting that construction of the

statute, Judge Stern, writing for the court, reasoned:

            [A] person may be found guilty of second-degree
            eluding only if the jury finds that his flight or attempt
            to elude created a risk of death or injury to any person.
            State v. Wallace, 158 N.J. 552, 560 (1999) (finding that
            "the statute was designed to punish those who elude the
            police and . . . whose unlawful conduct creates a
            possibility of injury to others[]"). See also Apprendi[,]
            530 U.S. 466 (2000); State v. Johnson, 166 N.J. 523
            (2001). Our Supreme Court has determined that a
            permissive inference may be established through
            evidence that defendant "violated one or more motor
            vehicle statutes" during the chase. Wallace, . . . 158 N.J.
            at 558-559. However, the term "knowingly" does not
            relate to the risk which aggravates the eluding and
            makes it a second[-]degree crime. The relevant clauses
            in N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2[(b)] are separated by a semi-colon,
            and there is no culpability requirement independent of
            the third[-]degree crime.         We, therefore, reject
            defendant's contention that the judge erred by failing to
            instruct the jury that it had to find that the defendant
            "knowingly" created a risk of death or injury to another
            person.

                  We recognize that N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2[(c)](3)
            requires a "knowing" culpability where culpability is
            intended and the Code is otherwise silent. We also
            recognize that the "risk of death or injury" factor,
            whether considered a sentence enhancer or element of
            the second[-]degree crime, requires a jury finding of
            proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See Apprendi[,]530
            U.S. at 495-97 []; [Johnson], . . ., 166 N.J. at 549;
            N.J.S.A. 2C:1-13(a). Nevertheless, the structure of
            N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2[(b)], and a reasonable reading of its
            provisions, results in a construction that a defendant

                                                                          A-1066-19
                                       24
            need not knowingly create the risk so long as the
            defendant, as in this case, is found to have committed
            third degree eluding with the requisite knowing
            culpability. Cf. State v. Mendez, 345 N.J. Super. 498
            (App. Div. 2001) (indicating "knowingly flees or
            attempts to elude" requires knowing culpability). See
            also State v. Burford, 163 N.J. 16, 20 (2000).

            [Id. at 135-36.]

In this instance, the gradation provision of the witness-tampering statute is not

just set off by a semi-colon, but rather is a separate paragraph in the statute.

      We find further support for our conclusion in Judge Stern's decision in

State v. Moore, 304 N.J. Super. 135 (App. Div. 1997). In that drug trafficking

case, we held the prosecution at trial need not prove the defendant knew the

amount of controlled dangerous substance involved, even though the State must

prove the weight involved beyond a reasonable doubt in determining the degree

of the crime. Id. at 145-46.

      We add that in the present matter, defendant had been arrested and

formally charged by complaint-warrant with robbery, constituting the "official

proceeding" for purposes of the witness-tampering prosecution. But N.J.S.A.

2C:28-5 expressly provides a person can be convicted of tampering with an

"investigation." That term includes investigations that are ongoing and have not

yet resulted in formal charges.         Indeed, the statute expressly includes

                                                                             A-1066-19
                                       25
investigations that are "about to be instituted." It makes no sense to interpret

the statute to require proof that defendant knew a crime specifically designated

in NERA would eventually be charged.

       We note, finally, that Title 2C makes clear the State need not prove a

defendant knows that their conduct is illegal.      See N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(d).6 It

follows the State need not prove a defendant knows the mandatory parole

ineligibility period that would be imposed on conviction for a particular crime.

In the context of a witness-tampering prosecution, it is enough that the State

proves the defendant knew "that an official proceeding or investigation is

pending or about to be instituted."

6
    N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(d) provides:

             Culpability as to illegality of conduct.         Neither
             knowledge nor recklessness nor negligence as to
             whether conduct constitutes an offense or as to the
             existence, meaning or application of the law
             determining the elements of an offense is an element of
             such offense, unless the definition of the offense or the
             code so provides.

             [N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(d).]

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                                       26
                                        VIII.

      We next address defendant's contention the trial court committed plain

error by failing to sua sponte instruct the jury to exercise caution in evaluating

oral statements defendant allegedly made. In State v. Kociolek, our Supreme

Court held that when a defendant makes an inculpatory statement to any

witness,7 the jury should be instructed to "receive, weigh and consider such

evidence with caution, in view of the generally recognized risk of inaccuracy

and error in communication and recollection of verbal utterances and

misconstruction by the hearer." 23 N.J. 400, 421 (1957) (internal quotation

marks omitted). The State acknowledges a Kociolek charge would have been

appropriate but contends the trial court's failure to give that charge sua sponte

does not constitute plain error. At a new trial on remand, we presume defendant

will request that jury instruction, the State will not object, and the trial court will

give it. However, defendant's plain error argument is not moot because it is a

7
 In State v. Hampton, the Court adopted a similar rule with respect to statements
made by defendants to police. 61 N.J. 250, 271-72 (1972).

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                                         27
basis to challenge his stalking conviction. 8 We review defendant's plain error

contention in the context of that conviction.

      It is well-settled that "[a]ccurate and understandable jury instructions in

criminal cases are essential to a defendant's right to a fair trial."      State v.

Concepcion, 111 N.J. 373, 379 (1988). However, "[i]f the defendant does not

object to the charge at the time it is given, there is a presumption that the charge

was not error and was unlikely to prejudice the defendant's case." State v.

Singleton, 211 N.J. 157, 182 (2012). With respect to jury instructions, "plain

error requires demonstration of 'legal impropriety in the charge prejudicially

affecting the substantial rights of the defendant and sufficiently grievous to

justify notice by the reviewing court and to convince the court that of itself the

error possessed a clear capacity to bring about an unjust result.'"        State v.

Chapland, 187 N.J. 275, 289 (2006) (quoting State v. Hock, 54 N.J. 526, 538

(1969)).

8
  Defendant's appellate brief does not explicitly address his stalking conviction.
However, in the point asserting that the trial court committed plain error by
failing to instruct the jury to exercise caution in evaluating oral statements
allegedly made by defendant, defendant concludes in the last sentence, "[f]or
these reasons, all of [defendant's] convictions should be reversed." (emphasis
added).
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                                        28
      The mere possibility of an unjust result is not enough to warrant reversal

of a conviction. State v. Jordan, 147 N.J. 409, 422 (1997). Furthermore, "[t]he

error must be considered in light of the entire charge and must be evaluated in

light 'of the overall strength of the State's case.'" State v. Walker, 203 N.J. 73,

90 (2010) (quoting Chapland, 187 N.J. at 289); see also State v. Crumb, 307 N.J.

Super. 204, 251 (App. Div. 1997) (holding "[w]here such a charge has not been

given, its absence must be viewed within the factual context of the case and the

charge as a whole to determine whether its omission was capable of producing

an unjust result").

      Our Supreme Court has specifically held that failure to give a Kociolek

charge does not automatically constitute plain error. In State v. Harris, 156 N.J.

122, 183 (1998), for example, the Court held "[t]he omission of the Kociolek

and Hampton charges, in the context of the State's entire case against [the]

defendant, was not clearly capable of producing an unjust result" because

defense counsel tested the witness' credibility through a "devastating cross-

examination." See also Jordan, 147 N.J. at 428 (noting it would be "a rare case

where failure to give a Kociolek charge alone is sufficient to constitute

reversible error").

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                                       29
      In the matter before us, the trial court provided the jury with a general

credibility instruction, explaining:

            As the judges of the facts, you are to determine the
            credibility of the witnesses and, in determining whether
            a witness is worthy of belief and therefore credible, you
            may take into consideration: the appearance and
            demeanor of the witnesses; the manner in which he or
            she may have testified; the witness's interest in the
            outcome of the [t]rial, if any; his or her means of
            obtaining knowledge of the facts; the witness's power
            of discernment, meaning his or her . . . judgment,
            understanding; his or her ability to reason, observe,
            recollect, and relate; the possible bias, if any, in favor
            of the side for whom the witness testified; the extent to
            which, if at all, each witness is either corroborated or
            contradicted, supported or discredited by other
            evidence; whether the witness testified with an intent to
            deceive you; the reasonableness or unreasonableness of
            the testimony the witness has given; whether the
            witness made any inconsistent or contradictory
            statements; and any and all other matters in the
            evidence which serve to support or discredit his or her
            testimony.

      Additionally, at trial, defense counsel thoroughly cross-examined the

prosecution witnesses about the statements they attributed to defendant. The

jury also heard Garcia and Vera-Lopez testify with the aid of a Spanish

interpreter. The jury thus had the opportunity to consider the witnesses' English

language skills, their credibility, and their recollection of defendant's

statements. Furthermore, the jury acquitted defendant of numerous charges,

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                                       30
including robbery, assault, and possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose.

These acquittals suggest the jury carefully considered the reliability of the

witnesses' testimony. We therefore conclude defendant has not established a

basis to overturn his stalking conviction.

                                       IX.

      Because     we    are    vacating      defendant's   terroristic-threat     and

witness-tampering convictions, and because defendant's Kociolek argument is

the only error asserted with respect to the stalking conviction, we need not

address defendant's cumulative error contention. We likewise decline to address

defendant's sentencing contentions pending the resolution of the terroristic -

threat and witness-tampering charges on remand.

      Vacated and remanded for further proceedings.            We do not retain

jurisdiction.

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                                       31