Court Opinion

ID: 9637372
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:05:09.671723+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:55.745994
License: Public Domain

FORD ELLIOTT, J.,
dissenting:
¶ 1 I respectfully dissent. I believe based on the unambiguous language contained in the martial property settlement agreement between the parties and the two QDROs executed by the parties that Wife is entitled to 60% of the marital portion of each of Husband’s two pensions. This court has previously held that a basic tenet of contract law is that when the language of a contract is clear and unambiguous its meaning must be determined by an examination of the content of the contract itself. Therefore, it is axiomatic that this Court “must construe the contract only as written and may not modify the plain meaning under the guise of interpretation.” Little v. Little, 441 Pa.Super. 185, 657 A.2d 12, 15 (1995) quoting McMahon v. McMahon, 417 Pa.Super. 592, 612 A.2d 1360, 1364 (1992). Furthermore, it is well-recognized that “[a]bsent fraud, misrepresentation, or duress, spouses should be bound by the terms of their agreements.” McMahon, supra at 1363. (citations omitted). The parties’ property settlement agreement states: “7. The parties acknowledge that the marital estate includes Husband’s pension interest under the Teamsters Local Union No. 211, Pittsburgh Press Company Pension and the Boilermaker’s Retirement Account.” (emphasis added.) Both pension plans describe various types of pensions that are available to participants. The terms “Disability Pension” and “Disability Benefits” are listed under the types of pension plans. There is no language in the parties’ agreement that differentiates between disability retirement benefits or any other retirement benefits.
¶ 2 I would affirm the order of the trial court.