Court Opinion

ID: 9521974
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:16:15.405426+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:02:09.322548
License: Public Domain

Reiber, CJ.,
¶ 15. dissenting. Though plaintiff may have suffered as a result of her attorney’s deficient performance, calling into question the trial court’s necessary and reasonable exercise of discretion is not the appropriate response or remedy. In my view, this Court ought to affirm the trial court’s decision to deny plaintiffs motion for relief from judgment.
¶ 16. Time and again we have sought to highlight'the importance of attorneys’ and parties’ compliance with the trial courts’ procedural requirements. Indeed, the majority stresses the salutary and essential nature of this compliance. Ante, ¶ 8.
¶ 17. This case was scheduled for a status conference in June 2012. At plaintiffs request, the court rescheduled the hearing for the following month. A notice to this effect was sent to the parties’ attorneys. At the appointed time, neither plaintiff nor her attorney showed up. The court dismissed the case with prejudice that same day, noting that plaintiff and attorney had not come to court despite requesting the continuance and that defendant did not wish to pursue his counterclaim.
*554¶ 18. Nearly a month later, plaintiff’s attorney filed a motion under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1), requesting relief from judgment based on excusable neglect. The majority sees fit to reverse the trial court and grant this request. I cannot agree.
¶ 19. Counsel’s failure to properly calendar this conference is not excusable neglect. Rule 60(b)(1) permits the courts to relieve parties of a final judgment order for “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” “A motion for relief from judgment brought under V.R.C.P. 60(b)(2) is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling will not ordinarily be disturbed unless it clearly appears from the record that such discretion was withheld or abused.” Desjarlais v. Gilman, 143 Vt. 154, 157, 463 A.2d 234, 236 (1983); see also Lyddy v. Lyddy, 173 Vt. 493, 497, 787 A.2d 506, 513 (2001) (mem.) (trial court has discretion in deciding a Rule 60(b) motion and we must affirm “unless the record indicates that such discretion was abused”). Of the factors courts must consider in identifying “excusable neglect,” the most important is the reason for' the failure. See In re Town of Killington, 2003 VT 87A, ¶ 16, 176 Vt. 60, 838 A.2d 98 (discussing “excusable neglect” in the analogous context of an extension on the appeal time period under V.R.A.P. 4). In the context of appeal timeliness, we have consistently interpreted the excusable neglect standard very strictly, “lest there be a de facto enlargement of the appeal-filing time to sixty days.” Id. ¶ 17 (internal office procedure breakdown not excusable neglect as matter of law); see In re Lund, 2004 VT 55, ¶ 7, 177 Vt. 465, 857 A.2d 279 (mem.) (mistaken reading of rule not excusable neglect); Bergeron v. Boyle, 2003 VT 89, ¶ 22, 176 Vt. 78, 838 A.2d 918 (lawyer’s vacation and internal office procedure breakdown not excusable neglect). That rationale is no less compelling here.
¶ 20. Counsel claims that he missed the conference — continued at his request — because he did not see the hearing listed on an online judiciary calendar that expressly omits scheduling information regarding hearings in the Superior Court, Civil Division, Chittenden Unit, where this case was proceeding. Even if consulting a calendar that specifically excludes the'information counsel sought was a reasonable explanation for his failure to appear, counsel admits that he received written notice of the conference but did not enter it into his phone-based calendar system. This simply is not excusable neglect.
¶21. Plaintiff’s counsel did not even take the appropriate steps to remedy the consequence that arose as a direct result of his *555failure to comply with the court’s scheduling order. Rather than appealing the dismissal or filing a timely motion to amend the judgment of dismissal under V.R.C.R 59, counsel dragged his feet for weeks, filing the properly denied motion now subject to appeal. Indeed, when asked why he delayed for so long, counsel responded at oral argument: “Truth be told, I fell into a little bit of a panic when I got [notice of the dismissal with prejudice]. So it took me a little while to conjure up some argument which I had a legal basis for.”
¶ 22. Nor can I can conclude that the interests of justice compel a different result. See V.R.C.R 60(b)(6). Plaintiffs claim for eviction is moot because defendant has departed the property. Plaintiff also has abandoned her claim for rent because the parties’ agreement did not obligate defendant to pay rent. All that remains, then, is plaintiffs claim for damages based on defendant’s allegedly faulty repairs to her garage. While plaintiff may have lost the opportunity to litigate this claim, she also is not subject to defendant’s defenses and counterclaims for betterment and promissory estoppel based on these same amendments to plaintiffs property. Moreover, plaintiff cannot claim relief under Rule 60(b)(6), the “catch-all provision,” because her claim falls under Rule 60(b)(1). Perrott v. Johnston, 151 Vt. 464, 466, 562 A.2d 459, 460 (1989) (explaining that Rule 60(b)(6) “is available only when a ground justifying relief is not encompassed within any of the first five classes of the rule” (quotation omitted)).
¶ 28. Although the law plainly prizes the substantive resolution of legal disputes over their procedural dismissal, Nichols v. Hofmann, 2010 VT 36, ¶ 4, 188 Vt. 1, 998 A.2d 1040, it does not authorize imprudent attorneys to flout the court’s schedule. See Pelican Prod. Corp. v. Marino, 893 F.2d 1143, 1146 (10th Cir. 1990) (“[T]his judicial preference is counterbalanced by considerations of social goals, justice and expediency, a weighing process which lies largely within the domain of the trial judge’s discretion.” (quotation omitted)). It is true, for example, as the majority observes, that we have weighed heavily this predisposition toward resolutions on the merits when considering Rule 60(b) motions in the context of default judgments against defendants. See, e.g., Desjarlais, 143 Vt. at 157, 463 A.2d at 236 (“A judgment by default effectively deprives a defendant of an opportunity to have the merits of his position determined through the normal adversary judicial process.” (emphasis added)). Even this preference for *556indulgence in reopening default judgments against defendants is often insufficient to justify overruling the trial court’s exercise of discretion. See id. at 158, 463 A.2d at 237 (affirming trial court’s denial of Rule 60(b) motion by defendant against whom default judgment was entered). In any event, a plaintiffs failure to adequately pursue a claim due to her attorney’s carelessness or incompetence is distinct from the situation of a potentially unwitting defendant. Here, quite simply, this was plaintiffs case to prosecute or not.4
¶ 24. We provide the trial court with discretion in these matters precisely because it must be able to make the best use of its limited resources. When plaintiffs’ attorneys fail to adhere to those guidelines but are nevertheless rescued from the consequences of that disregard, it works a disservice on defendants. Furthermore, when attorneys are permitted to inexcusably waste the courts’ valuable and finite time, they erode access for other court users who do comply with the court’s mandates and requirements.
¶ 25. I respectfully dissent. I am authorized to state that Justice Burgess joins this dissent.

 To the extent that plaintiffs attorney is solely responsible for her lost opportunity to litigate a claim, she may have other, more appropriate remedies.