Court Opinion

ID: 9815276
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 00:33:59.906882+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:26.643673
License: Public Domain

By HURD, J.
(Concurring.)
In my opinion the judgment should be reversed also on the ground that it is against the manifest weight of the evidence for the reasons herein stated.
The Supreme Court has held in the majority opinion by Taft, J. (McNees v. Cincinnati Street Railway Co., 152 Oh St 269) that in passing upon a motion for judgment non obstante veredicto “neither the trial court, the court of appeals, nor this court, may weight the evidence.” (Sec. 11601 GC) (See syllabus 2 at page 269). However, this court is not now precluded in this appeal from an order overruling a motion for a new trial, from passing upon the question of whether the verdict of the jury was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. It is clear from an analysis of the opinion of the Supreme Court that the'evidence was not weighed by that court, for at page 281 we find the following- statement:
“We have, therefore, a situation where the evidence received upon the trial is not such as to require a determination, as a. matter of law that decedent’s employment was the proximate cause of the coronary thrombosis, which admittedly caused decedent’s death. Assuming, without deciding, that there was sufficient evidence tending to prove that such employment was the proximate cause of the coronary thrombosis or death, so that there was a question for the jury on such proximate causation, the answer to the interrogatory does not determine that anything was a proximate cause.”
Coming now to a consideration of the evidence, the record shows that there were two medical witnesses, one called on behalf of the plaintiff and the other on behalf of the defendant. Plaintiff’s witness (Dr. Heinold), testified positively that there was a causal relationship between the events immediately preceding the death and the death. He testified in substance that the incidents of decedent’s employment contributed to his death because these incidents would cause a raising of blood pressure in an artery somewhat occluded and would cause a sudden clotting and closing up of the full artery preceding sudden death. While he also testified that a person might die of coronary thrombosis without strain, *220it should be observed most emphatically that all of the evidence in this case pointed unmistakably to an unusual strain in the operation of the bus in a dense fog. While the general public was exposed to the same fog, the decedent with a preexisting heart condition was in an entirely different position from the general public, being obliged to work under the most unusual conditions then existing which in any common sense view of the facts was the proximate cause of the coronary thrombosis and the resulting death.
The statement of Dr. Heinold, amply supports this conclusion when he testified that:
“the events previous to the man’s collapse contributed to the collapse and his eventual death because of the tremendous strain that was placed upon this individual’s physical being and his mental being both, but particularly on the strain of his physical effort.”
These events could not possibly be other than the activities, exegencies and conditions arising out of his employment.
Defendant’s medical witness (Dr. Ventress) when asked concerning the factors which caused' the death of McNees, outlined these factors as being — very bad driving conditions due to the fog; the aggravation by a passenger contradicting those attempting to help the decedent, and the responsibility for the safety of his passengers under the unusual conditions to which the bus driver was subjected at the time of his death. He also testified:
“I think that this anxiety and nervousness, more so than any physical exertion, would be the factor that caused the coronary to become aggravated enough to cause death.”
It should thus be noted that while Dr. Ventress emphasized anxiety and nervousness, he did not exclude the physical exertion caused by the necessity of decedent to stop his bus, get off and replace the trolley poles on the wires two or three times before he collapsed. While he minimized the effect of the physical exertion, he did not exclude it entirely nor did he testify at any time that there was not a proximate causal relationship between the employment and the death.
It is also well to note in t this connection that no charge was asked or given on the question of proximate causal relationship between the conditions, activities and exegencies of the employment and the death. Therefore, whether we consider this testimony and the record as a whole, it seems to me that the conclusion is inevitable that the verdict of the jury was so clearly contrary to the manifest weight' of the evidence as to require a reversal on that ground and a remanding of the case for a new trial according to law.