Court Opinion

ID: 9750193
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 14:33:16.963342+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:04.254185
License: Public Domain

TIMLIN, J., Concurring.
With one exception I agree with the majority’s discussion and I concur completely in the disposition. I do disagree, however, with the majority’s procedural analysis in arriving at its conclusion that the trial court erred in dismissing Outdoor Media Group’s (OMG) cross-complaint. The majority first states that the law provides that a defendant’s summary judgment motion necessarily includes a test of the sufficiency of the complaint and, under certain circumstances, it therefore may be treated as a motion for judgment on the pleadings. I agree with this statement. But the majority then boldly states there is no reason why the same “standard” should not apply to a plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on its complaint when a cross-complaint has been filed, i.e., a plaintiff’s summary judgment motion may be construed as a motion for a judgment on the pleadings as to any cross-complaint naming plaintiff as cross-defendant. It then proceeds to construe respondent’s motion for summary judgment on the complaint for injunctive relief to also be a motion for judgment on the pleadings as to OMG’s cross-complaint for mandamus, and determines that the cross-complaint does state such a cause of action.
I recognize that when a plaintiff moves for summary judgment, it must establish that there are no triable issues of material fact as to each element of each of its causes of action, and must negate at least one element of every affirmative defense asserted by defendant by way of answer or cross-complaint. If there is a cross-complaint, plaintiff must also establish that, as to those allegations in the cross-complaint which raise defenses to the causes of action alleged in the complaint, there are no triable issues of material fact. (Hayward Union etc. School Dist. v. Madrid (1965) 234 Cal.App.2d 100,120 [44 Cal.Rptr. 268].)1
In my opinion, however, the Hayward Union case does not hold or suggest that a court may treat a plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the complaint to be a motion for judgment on the pleadings as to any existing cross-complaint against it. In many cases, cross-complaints will allege facts and law which are not related to any of the allegations of the complaint and further will raise no defenses to the complaint to which plaintiff’s summary *1085motion is directed. In those cases in which a cross-complaint raises defenses to the complaint, Hayward Union’s narrow rule applies. The majority cites no authority or persuasive rationale that such rule may be expanded by analogy to encompass the principle that plaintiff’s summary judgment motion may be construed as a motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the cross-complaint.
Further, the majority’s approach is not necessary to the resolution of the issue whether the trial court erred in dismissing the cross-complaint, because respondent did suggest indirectly that it was seeking “a judgment on the pleadings” when it requested as item No. 5 in its “Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment”: A “Judgment of Dismissal of defendant’s crosscomplaint re petition for writ of mandate.” In spite of such request, the record reveals that respondent and OMG considered the motion to be solely for a summary judgment in their briefing and argument to the trial court, with OMG’s counsel referring to the cross-complaint only as to those allegations therein which raised a defense to the allegations in the complaint. After the court granted respondent’s motion for summary judgment, OMG’s counsel, almost as an afterthought, said, “For clarification, may I ask what the disposition on the cross-complaint is?” The court responded: “The cross-complaint is . . . without merit. ... the cross-complaint was irrelevant to this proceeding[].” Subsequently it dismissed the cross-complaint by judgment.
I believe the court’s comments regarding the cross-complaint can reasonably be understood to be an implied determination that the cross-complaint did not state a cause of action for mandamus relief. However, in my opinion, the court’s apparent reason for that determination, that the cross-complaint was irrelevant to the summary judgment proceeding, was error. The cross-complaint was relevant insofar as its allegations may have raised defenses regarding the allegations in the complaint.
I, therefore, agree with the majority that the trial court, as shown by its comments that the cross-complaint was without merit and its dismissal of the cross-complaint, impliedly determined that the cross-complaint failed to state sufficient facts to allege a cause of action for traditional mandamus. I further concur with the majority’s analysis and conclusion that the cross-complaint does state a valid cause of action for mandamus relief and that the trial court erred in dismissing it.
Petitions for a rehearing were denied March 24, 1993, and appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied June 3, 1993.

The above statements in the text of the opinion summarize the law as it existed when the court made its challenged rulings in this case. Effective January 1, 1993, subdivision (n) was added to the Code of Civil Procedure, section 437c, which lays out the burdens of producing evidence on a plaintiff’s or defendant’s motion for summary judgment. These provisions do not apply here.