Court Opinion

ID: 9918336
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-12 17:04:03.550134+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:02:36.366414
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                                    Jan 12 2024, 9:13 am

                                                                                         CLERK
                                                                                    Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                                       Court of Appeals
                                                                                         and Tax Court

      ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                     ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
      Sarah Medlin                                               Theodore E. Rokita
      Marion County Public Defender Agency                       Indiana Attorney General
      Appellate Division                                         Courtney Staton
      Indianapolis, Indiana                                      Deputy Attorney General
                                                                 Indianapolis, Indiana

                                                  IN THE
          COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

      Thomas Stone,                                              January 12, 2024
      Appellant-Defendant,                                       Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                                 23A-CR-625
              v.                                                 Appeal from the Marion Superior
                                                                 Court
      State of Indiana,                                          The Honorable Grant W.
      Appellee-Plaintiff                                         Hawkins, Judge Pro Tempore
                                                                 Trial Court Cause No.
                                                                 49D31-1603-F3-9427

                                        Opinion by Judge Crone
                                     Judges Pyle and Tavitas concur.

      Crone, Judge.

      Case Summary
[1]   After a bench trial, Thomas Stone was convicted of three counts of level 3

      felony rape that he committed against R.M. One of those counts alleged that he
      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-625 | January 12, 2024                        Page 1 of 10
      committed forcible vaginal intercourse, and another alleged that he committed

      forcible anal intercourse. On appeal, Stone argues that those convictions violate

      substantive double jeopardy principles. We disagree and therefore affirm.

      Facts and Procedural History
[2]   Our factual recitation is based on R.M.’s trial testimony. In February 2016,

      R.M. went to a concert with a friend in Indianapolis. Afterward, they went to a

      nearby bar, where the two got separated. R.M. encountered Stone, who told her

      that he knew where her friend was “and that it was just down the street and he

      offered to take [her] there because that’s where he was headed anyway.” Tr.

      Vol. 3 at 117. R.M. accompanied Stone to his vehicle and sat in the front

      passenger seat. Stone began driving, and R.M. saw that they were approaching

      the interstate. “Sirens [went] off in [her] head” because she “thought [they]

      were just going down the street.” Id. at 122. After they got on the interstate,

      Stone forced R.M.’s “head onto his lap to perform oral sex on him.” Id. at 123.

[3]   “[A]t some point, in an effort to escape, [R.M.] tried to convince [Stone] that

      [she] needed to pee. And so he pulled over into a parking lot.” Id. at 123-24.

      R.M. got out of Stone’s vehicle, but she was unfamiliar with the area, and she

      “didn’t feel safe running there.” Id. at 124. Stone told R.M. that she was

      “wasting [his] time” and dragged her back into the vehicle. Id. at 125. They

      drove off, and Stone again forced R.M. to perform oral sex on him.

[4]   Eventually, they arrived at Stone’s house. Stone grabbed R.M.’s neck, guided

      her into the living room, and forced her to engage in “a mixture” of “[n]on-

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-625 | January 12, 2024       Page 2 of 10
      consensual” oral, vaginal, and anal intercourse until he ejaculated. Id. at 127.

      Afterward, Stone “calmed down” and “said that he was going to take [R.M.]

      back to [her] car[.]” Id. at 131. R.M. “realized that [she] didn’t have [her]

      coat[,]” which “contained [her] car keys in the pocket.” Id. She was unable to

      find it in Stone’s house or vehicle, and he drove her “[b]ack to the spot where

      [she] went outside to pee.” Id. at 132. She was unable to find her coat at that

      location, and Stone drove to a gas station. R.M. “waited until [Stone] stepped

      out of the vehicle[,]” id. at 137, and then she went inside the gas station and

      asked an employee to call 911. Stone drove off, and the police arrived to take a

      report from R.M.

[5]   The State charged Stone with eight counts, including five counts of level 3

      felony rape (Counts I through V), level 5 felony kidnapping (Count VI), level 5

      felony criminal confinement (Count VII), and level 6 felony intimidation

      (Count VIII). Indiana Code Section 35-42-4-l(a) defines level 3 felony rape in

      pertinent part as when a person “knowingly or intentionally has sexual

      intercourse with another person or knowingly or intentionally causes another

      person to submit to other sexual conduct … when … the other person is

      compelled by force or imminent threat of force[.]” (Emphasis added.) Indiana

      Code Section 35-31.5-2-302 defines sexual intercourse as “an act that includes

      any penetration of the female sex organ by the male sex organ.” And Indiana

      Code Section 35-31.5-2-221.5(1) defines other sexual conduct in pertinent part

      as “an act involving … a sex organ of one (1) person and the mouth or anus of

      another person[.]”

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-625 | January 12, 2024       Page 3 of 10
[6]   A bench trial was held in July 2022, at the conclusion of which the prosecutor

      summarized the rape allegations as follows:

              So very specifically, Count I, that’s a rape count involving other
              sexual conduct.[…] And this is very specifically for forcing R.M.
              to perform oral sex on him in his car prior to her losing her coat
              when she tried to escape that first time.

              [….]

              Count II is another rape count. Again for other sexual conduct.
              Again, forcing his penis into her mouth. And this is specifically
              for the oral sex in the car after that struggle in the parking lot.
              Both of these before they ever get to his home, before the
              nightmare continued. Both of them in the car. One before and
              one after she lost her coat.

              Count III is a rape involving sexual intercourse. And this
              specifically applies to forcing his penis into her vagina after he
              forced her back into the car, after he continued to sexually assault
              her orally, after he got her to his house.

              [….]

              Count IV is another count involving forced oral sexual
              intercourse. And this is specifically for forcing his penis into
              R.M.’s mouth at his home[ …]. So Counts I and II are for the
              oral sex that occurred in the car, whereas Count IV is for that
              oral sex that occurred at his home.

              Count V, again a rape involving other sexual conduct.
              Specifically this one is for an act involving the sex organ of one
              person and the anus of another. So, Count V, very specifically
              applied to the forced anal sex that R.M. was forced to endure at
              the hands of the Defendant[ …].

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-625 | January 12, 2024           Page 4 of 10
      Tr. Vol. 5 at 87-88. The trial court acquitted Stone on Counts I, IV, and VI and

      found him guilty on the remaining counts.

[7]   At the sentencing hearing, Stone’s counsel argued that only one of the three

      rape convictions could stand on double jeopardy grounds because “[t]hey’re all

      from the same series of acts.” Supp. Tr. Vol. 2 at 5. The prosecutor disagreed,

      arguing that “every time a woman is penetrated in a different orifice, that is a

      separate and distinct harm.” Id. at 9. The trial court agreed with the prosecutor,

      stating,

               The biggest problem I have is it’s not Count II, rape, Count III,
               rape, Count V, rape. It’s fellatio, sexual intercourse, anal
               intercourse. And I don’t have any trouble at all separating those
               out, seeing them as -- seeing them as three separate and distinct
               offenses, and ordering them concurrent or consecutive,
               depending on the bigger picture.

      Id. at 30. The court sentenced Stone to ten years on each of the rape

      convictions, four years on the criminal confinement conviction, and two years

      on the intimidation conviction. 1

      1
        The trial court’s oral sentencing statement suggests, and the State asserts on appeal, that Stone’s aggregate
      sentence is twenty-six years. See Supp. Tr. Vol. 2 at 31 (“I’m not going to make it 52 years[ …]. As I add
      things up, I think I come in at about half that, because Count III, Count V, Count VII, and Count VIII are all
      consecutive to each other.”); Appellee’s Br. at 4 (asserting that Stone received “an aggregate sentence of 26
      years executed in the Department of Correction”). The written sentencing order could be interpreted
      otherwise, see Appealed Order at 1 (suggesting that sentences on Counts III through VIII run concurrent with
      sentence on Count II but also consecutive to sentences on other counts), but Stone does not dispute the
      State’s assertion.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-625 | January 12, 2024                               Page 5 of 10
       Discussion and Decision
[8]    On appeal, Stone no longer asserts that only one of his three rape convictions

       may stand due to substantive double jeopardy concerns. Instead, he focuses

       only on his rape conviction “supported by the act of sexual intercourse” and his

       rape conviction “supported by the act of anal sex”; according to Stone, “[t]he

       separation of the single crime into multiple convictions violates [his] right

       against double jeopardy[.]” Id. at 4, 8. We disagree with Stone’s contention.

[9]    In Wadle v. State, 151 N.E.3d 227 (Ind. 2020), and Powell v. State, 151 N.E.3d

       256 (Ind. 2020), “our Supreme Court adopted two new tests for addressing

       claims of ‘substantive double jeopardy’ (i.e., claims concerning multiple

       convictions in a single prosecution, as opposed to ‘procedural double jeopardy’

       claims, which concern convictions for the same offense in successive

       prosecutions).” Carranza v. State, 184 N.E.3d 712, 715 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022)

       (citing Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 248-49, and Powell, 151 N.E.3d at 263). “The

       Wadle test applies ‘when a single criminal act or transaction violates multiple

       statutes with common elements[.]’” Id. (quoting Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 247).

       “The Powell test applies ‘when a single criminal act or transaction violates a

       single statute and results in multiple injuries.’” Id. (quoting Powell, 151 N.E.3d

       at 263).

[10]   In Carranza, the defendant molested his eight-year-old stepdaughter “[o]ne night

       in 2019 … by inserting his fingers inside her vagina and rubbing his penis on the

       outside of her vagina.” Id. at 714. Carranza was charged with and convicted of

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-625 | January 12, 2024       Page 6 of 10
two counts of child molesting under Indiana Code Section 35-42-4-3, which

reads in pertinent part as follows:

        (a) A person who, with a child under fourteen (14) years of age,
        knowingly or intentionally performs or submits to … other sexual
        conduct (as defined in IC 35-31.5-2-221.5) commits child
        molesting, a Level 3 felony. However, the offense is a Level 1
        felony if:

                 (1) it is committed by a person at least twenty-one (21)
                 years of age[.]

                 ….

        (b) A person who, with a child under fourteen (14) years of age,
        performs or submits to any fondling or touching, of either the
        child or the older person, with intent to arouse or to satisfy the
        sexual desires of either the child or the older person, commits
        child molesting, a Level 4 felony.

Because both of his convictions fell under the child molesting statute, Carranza

urged another panel of this Court “to apply the Powell ‘single statute’ test to his

double jeopardy claim.” Carranza, 184 N.E.3d at 715. The panel declined his

invitation, espousing the view that “[w]e don’t believe the legislature’s decision

to delineate separate crimes in one statute as opposed to two should control

which double-jeopardy test is applicable.” Id. at 716 (quoting Koziski v. State,

172 N.E.3d 338, 342 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied). In concluding that

Wadle applied to Carranza’s claim, the panel found it significant that his

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-625 | January 12, 2024          Page 7 of 10
       convictions “were based on separate subsections of the primary charging

       statute[.]” Id. 2

[11]   Here, although Stone’s convictions are based on the same subsection of the rape

       statute, they are based on separate—indeed, mutually exclusive—criminal acts:

       forcible sexual intercourse and forcible other sexual conduct, i.e., anal sex.

       Before July 2014, Stone’s acts were punishable as separate offenses under

       separate statutes. See Ind. Code § 35-42-4-1(a)(1) (effective through June 30,

       2014) (defining class B felony rape in pertinent part as when a person

       “knowingly or intentionally has sexual intercourse with a member of the

       opposite sex when … the other person is compelled by force or imminent threat

       of force”); Ind. Code § 35-42-4-2(a)(1) (effective through June 30, 2014)

       (defining class B felony criminal deviate conduct in pertinent part as when a

       person “knowingly or intentionally causes another person to perform or submit

       to deviate sexual conduct when … the other person is compelled by force or

       imminent threat of force”); Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-94(1) (effective through June

       30, 2014) (defining deviate sexual conduct in pertinent part as “an act involving

       2
        In Koziski, the defendant “was convicted of two counts of child molesting under subsection (a) of the Child
       Molesting Statute; however, the ‘other sexual conduct’ required for each fell under separate subsections
       of Indiana Code § 35-31.5-2-221.5.” Carranza, 184 N.E.3d at 715 (citing Koziski, 172 N.E.3d at 342).
             Specifically, the defendant was convicted under subsection (1) for licking the victim’s vagina (an
             act involving “a sex organ of one person and the mouth … another person”), and under
             subsection (2) for putting his finger inside the victim’s vagina (an act involving “the penetration
             of the sex organ … of a person by an object”).
       Id. at 715-16 (quoting Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-221.5). The Koziski court concluded that because the convictions
       fell “under separate statutory provisions, each defining a separate crime, the Wadle ‘multiple statutes’ test
       [was] a better fit than the Powell ‘single statute’ test.” 172 N.E.3d at 342.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-625 | January 12, 2024                                Page 8 of 10
       … a sex organ of one (1) person and the mouth or anus of another person”).

       Like the Carranza and Koziski panels, we do not believe that the legislature’s

       decision to delineate separate crimes in one statute should control which

       double-jeopardy test is applicable, and we conclude that Wadle applies to

       Stone’s claim.

[12]   “Wadle requires a multi-step analysis to evaluate substantive double jeopardy

       claims that arise when a single criminal act implicates multiple statutes.”

       Carranza, 184 N.E.3d at 716 (citing Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 235).

               First, we look to the statutes. Id. If they explicitly allow for
               multiple punishments, no double jeopardy occurs, and our
               inquiry ends. Id. at 248. If the statutes are unclear, we apply
               Indiana’s included-offense statute. Id. (citing Ind. Code § 35-31.5-
               2-168). If either offense is included in the other, we proceed to
               the second step and ask whether the defendant’s actions are “so
               compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and
               continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction.” Id. at
               249. If the facts show only a single crime, judgment may not be
               entered on the included offense.

       Id.

[13]   Subsection (a) of the rape statute does not explicitly allow for multiple

       punishments for multiple acts of rape. Accordingly, we turn to Indiana Code

       Section 35-31.5-2-168, which defines included offense as an offense that

               (1) is established by proof of the same material elements or less
               than all the material elements required to establish the
               commission of the offense charged;

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-625 | January 12, 2024         Page 9 of 10
               (2) consists of an attempt to commit the offense charged or an
               offense otherwise included therein; or

               (3) differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less
               serious harm or risk of harm to the same person, property, or
               public interest, or a lesser kind of culpability, is required to
               establish its commission.

       As indicated above, sexual intercourse and other sexual conduct are mutually

       exclusive material elements of rape, and the “attempt” and “less serious harm”

       provisions of the included-offense statute are inapplicable. Because neither of

       Stone’s rape convictions is included in the other, they do not constitute double

       jeopardy under Wadle. Therefore, we affirm both convictions.

[14]   Affirmed.

       Pyle, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-625 | January 12, 2024        Page 10 of 10