Court Opinion

ID: 9895960
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-08 21:14:48.064376+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:34.477053
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA

                               September 2023 Term                              FILED
                                _______________
                                                                       November 8, 2023
                                   No. 22-0234                              released at 3:00 p.m.
                                                                        EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
                                 _______________                        SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                            OF WEST VIRGINIA

                        THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF
                         THE COUNTY OF WYOMING,
                               Petitioner Below,
                                   Petitioner,

                                         v.

                             MARY DAWSON,
                             Respondent Below,
                                Respondent.
       ____________________________________________________________

                  Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kanawha County
                      The Honorable Carrie L. Webster, Judge
                          Civil Action Number: 18-AA-246

                        REVERSED AND REMANDED
                           WITH INSTRUCTIONS
       ____________________________________________________________

                           Submitted: September 27, 2023
                              Filed: November 8, 2023

Joshua A. Cottle, Esquire                     Rebecca A. Roush, Esquire
Francesca C. Rollo, Esquire                   WV School Service Personnel Association
Leigh Anne Wilson, Esquire                    Charleston, West Virginia
Bowles Rice LLP                               Counsel for Respondent
Charleston, West Virginia
Counsel for Petitioner

JUSTICE ARMSTEAD delivered the Opinion of the Court.

JUSTICE WOOTON concurs and reserves the right to file a separate opinion.
                              SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

              1.     “The Board of Education of a school-district is a corporation created

by statute with functions of a public nature expressly given and no other; and it can exercise

no power not expressly conferred or fairly arising from necessary implication, and in no

other mode than that prescribed or authorized by the statute.” Syllabus Point 2, Napier v.

Lincoln County Board of Education, 209 W. Va. 719, 551 S.E.2d 362 (2001).

              2.     “A state or one of its political subdivisions is not bound by the legally

unauthorized acts of its officers and all persons must take note of the legal limitations upon

their power and authority.” Syllabus Point 3, Freeman v. Poling, 175 W. Va. 814, 338

S.E.2d 415 (1985).

                                              i
Armstead, Justice:

              The Board of Education of the County of Wyoming (“Petitioner”) appeals

the order of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County affirming The West Virginia Public

Employees Grievance Board’s (“grievance board”) decision granting Mary Dawson’s

(“Respondent”) grievance, reinstating her to a modified bus run, an extracurricular bus run,

and awarding her back pay. Though Petitioner raises three assignments of error, those

three issues can be condensed into two: First, that the circuit court erred by holding that

Petitioner failed to prove it committed a legal mistake in the original modification of

Respondent’s regular bus run. Second, Petitioner asserts that the circuit court erred in

holding that Petitioner was bound by an ultra vires act and legal mistake made by one of

its employees and that Petitioner was not permitted to correct it.

              Having considered the record on appeal, the briefs 1 and arguments of the

parties, and the applicable legal authority, we find that the circuit court erred in affirming

the grievance board and we reverse both the circuit court and the grievance board and

remand for entry of an order denying the grievance.

              1
                On April 5, 2023, this Court issued an order stating that “[R]espondent’s
brief does not comply with Rule 10 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Counsel is
directed to file a [R]espondent’s brief that fully complies with Rule 10 of the Rules of
Appellate Procedure on or before May 1, 2023.” The initial Respondent’s brief contained
no statement of facts or any citations to the appendix record in support of its contentions.
Although Respondent’s response to this Court’s April 5, 2023, order, contained a
procedural history and statement of facts, it was still devoid of any citations to the record.
                                              1
                  I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

              Respondent has been employed as a bus driver for Petitioner since 1980. 2 At

that time, when she bid on the bus driver position, Respondent was hired to transport both

elementary and high school students on the same bus run at the same time (“regular run”).

In 1983, Respondent entered into a continuing contract with Petitioner for her regular run. 3

In 1985, Respondent bid on a vocational bus run (“vocational run”) that she began,

effective October 15, 1985. 4 At the time Respondent began the vocational run, it did not

conflict with her regular run.

              2
                Throughout this opinion, unless otherwise indicated, we cite to the statutory
version in effect when the matters relevant to this appeal transpired. Petitioner should have
applied the statutes in effect at that time.
              3
                  Continuing contracts are contemplated by West Virginia Code § 18A-2-6:

                     After three years of acceptable employment, each
              service personnel employee who enters into a new contract of
              employment with the board shall be granted continuing
              contract status. The continuing contract of any such employee
              shall remain in full force and effect except as modified by
              mutual consent of the school board and the employee, unless
              and until terminated with written notice, stating cause or
              causes, to the employee, by a majority vote of the full
              membership of the board before the first day of April of the
              then current year….

W. Va. Code § 18A-2-6 (1981) (emphasis added). As discussed below, the Petitioner
school board never consented to the modification of Respondent’s regular run.
              4
               The vocational run was an “extracurricular assignment.” “All school
service personnel assignments shall be considered extracurricular assignments, except such
                                                                          (continued . . .)

                                             2
              In 1987 or 1988, school start times changed, and high school students were

no longer transported at the same time as elementary school students on Respondent’s

regular run. As a result of the start time change, Respondent’s regular run required her to

pick up high school students and drop them off at their school, then pick up elementary

students and drop them off at their school. This caused an overlap between Respondent’s

regular run and the vocational run, making it impossible for her to do both. Because of this

overlap, an unknown employee of the Petitioner’s administrative office modified

Respondent’s regular run, removed the morning elementary portion, and allowed her to

continue to transport students on the vocational run. Another driver was assigned to

transport the elementary students on their morning run. This modification of Respondent’s

regular run was made without approval of Petitioner, as no Board minutes reflect

ratification of this personnel action and the modified regular run was never placed out to

bid.

              For the next thirty years, Respondent continued to make the modified regular

run and the vocational run. In March 2017, Petitioner informed Respondent that the

vocational run was being eliminated “due to changes in enrollment” and Petitioner

eliminated all existing vocational runs, rebidding them with new terms, for the 2017-2018

assignments as are considered either regular positions . . . or extra-duty positions….” W.
Va. Code § 18A-4-16 (2021) (references to other code sections omitted).

                                             3
school year. As the bidding process unfolded, another unnamed employee asked for an

arrangement like that of Respondent, pointing out that a portion of Respondent’s route had

been driven by another driver for years, allowing Respondent to drive the modified regular

run and the vocational run.

              This prompted an investigation by Jeffrey Hylton, Petitioner’s Director of

Safety and Transportation. He researched Petitioner’s minutes back to 1985 and found

Board approval for Respondent to drive the vocational run, effective October 15, 1985;

however, he found no record of Petitioner approving the modified run or posting a new

position for the modified run. In sum, there was no evidence offered showing Petitioner’s

approval of the modifications made to Respondent’s regular run to allow her to drive the

vocational run. When the 2017-2018 school year started, the investigation had not been

completed and the vocational run had not been filled. Thus, Respondent was assigned the

vocational run to begin the school year. She drove the vocational run until September 8,

2017, when Petitioner concluded that the modification of Respondent’s regular run was a

mistake which was not authorized by the Board and her employment was changed back to

the arrangement originally contracted for, namely, transporting both elementary and high

school students to and from their respective schools. Though Respondent bid on the

vocational run, it was awarded to a less senior bus operator because Respondent’s regular

run conflicted with the vocational run.

                                            4
              Respondent then filed a grievance, pursuant to the provisions of West

Virginia Code § 6C-2-3 (2008). 5 During that proceeding, the burden of proof was on

Respondent. 6 At level one, the grievance was denied and the level two mediation was

unsuccessful. 7 The grievance then proceeded to a full level three hearing on May 14,

2018. 8 At that hearing, Respondent argued that Petitioner violated numerous statutes in

making the bus route change in 2017 and in awarding the vocational run to a less senior

employee. Petitioner countered that the administrative assignment of the elementary

portion of Respondent’s regular run to another driver was an unauthorized mistake that had

to be corrected when the mistake was discovered. In sum, Respondent’s entire case hinges

on whether or not Respondent’s regular run was legally modified in 1987 or 1988. The

grievance board granted the grievance, finding that Petitioner’s action in restoring

              5
                This statute was amended in 2023. We cite to the statute in effect when
this grievance was filed.
              6
               “The grievant bears the burden of proving the grievant’s case by a
preponderance of the evidence, except in disciplinary matters, where the burden is on the
employer to prove that the action taken was justified.” W. Va. C. S. R. § 156-1-3 (2008).
              7
                The grievance procedure is generally described in West Virginia Code §
6C-2-4 (2008). This statute was also amended in 2023 and we cite to the provision in effect
when this grievance was filed.
              8
                The circuit court found that no written contracts were presented as evidence
at the Level Three hearing in this matter. Further, Respondent was the only witness who
testified on her behalf at the Level Three hearing. She did not call anyone who allegedly
approved the modification of her regular run and she failed to identify that person. She
offered no job posting or bids reflecting the validity of the modified run. Finally, no Board
minutes were introduced demonstrating Board approval of the modification.
                                             5
Respondent’s regular bus run to its original parameters was unreasonable, arbitrary, and

capricious. Additionally, the grievance board found:

                        The decision to assign another bus operator to drive
                only the morning elementary portion of [Respondent’s]
                original bus run was made in or about 1987 or 1988. There is,
                apparently, no written record of the board approving this
                decision or the decision not to post that one fraction of
                [Respondent’s] morning bus run as a separate position. This
                does not necessarily mean that there was no approval. Given
                that all of this was done about thirty years ago, and the person
                or persons who made the decision are not around, there is
                simply no way to tell what they did or did not do, or how they
                came to their decision. For all we know, the superintendent got
                approval from the board and it was not put in writing or
                included in any meeting minutes. In the end, [Respondent] did
                as she was told by the administration, as did the other bus
                operator(s) who drove the elementary portion of
                [Respondent’s] morning run, and made her regular run and the
                vocational run as directed for about thirty years, throughout
                numerous administrations and board configurations. She was
                not hiding what she was doing. She turned in her time sheets,
                was assigned the same runs every year, and obviously did a
                good job. The absence of written documentation alone does not
                make what occurred thirty years ago a mistake.

                ....

                Again, the general notion that [Petitioner] should be
                encouraged to correct mistakes does not absolve [Petitioner
                from] liability for the violation of statute, [Respondent] proved
                by a preponderance of the evidence her claims that [Petitioner]
                violated West Virginia Code §§ 18A-4-8a(j), 18A-4-8(m); and
                18A-4-16(6). Accordingly, the grievance is granted.

                The circuit court affirmed the grievance board. In its findings, the circuit

court stated:

                       The Decision of the [grievance board] was properly
                made upon the evidence presented. Petitioner simply failed to
                meet its burden of proof to establish the affirmative defense of

                                               6
              “mistake.” Petitioner’s appeal rests entirely on its contention
              that the change made to [Respondent’s] regular bus run was
              significant enough to require Petitioner’s approval. However,
              Petitioner failed to demonstrate that the change was, in fact,
              significant. The uncontroverted facts of the case indicate the
              contrary (i.e., that the change was insignificant). Indeed, the
              change was so slight that it garnered no attention for three
              decades. Then, it only drew attention when another employee
              sought a “deal” like that given to [Respondent] long ago. No
              evidence of any “deal” was presented to the [grievance board].
              [Petitioner] asserted, but failed to prove, that a change to
              [Respondent’s] regular bus run in 1987 or 1988 was a mistake.

                     The uncontroverted facts are that [Respondent]
              transported students for [Petitioner] as part of both her regular
              and vocational bus runs for more than thirty-one (31) years and
              that she was the most senior bus operator in the county. In
              reaching [its] Decision, the [grievance board] properly found
              that [Respondent] had been performing both the regular and
              vocations bus runs for thirty-one years, and that [Petitioner]
              had no legal right to suddenly change [Respondent’s] schedule
              in 2017 without her consent and to strip her of the vocational
              bus run she had held for thirty-one (31) years. The [grievance
              board] properly found that [Petitioner’s] action in doing so was
              unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious.

              Petitioner now appeals the circuit court’s order affirming the grievance

board.

                             II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

              It is well established that, “[w]hen reviewing the appeal of a public

employees’ grievance, this Court reviews decisions of the circuit court under the same

standard as that by which the circuit court reviews the decision of the administrative law

judge.” Syl. pt. 1, Martin v. Barbour Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 228 W. Va. 238, 719 S.E.2d 406

(2011). The standard to be applied by the circuit court, which, by extension, also is applied

by this Court, is set out in West Virginia Code section 6C-2-5 as follows:

                                             7
                  (b) A party may appeal the decision of the administrative
                  law judge on the grounds that the decision:
                  (1) Is contrary to law or a lawfully adopted rule or written
                  policy of the employer;
                  (2) Exceeds the administrative law judge’s statutory
                  authority;
                  (3) Is the result of fraud or deceit;
                  (4) Is clearly wrong in view of the reliable, probative and
                  substantial evidence on the whole record; or
                  (5) Is arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of
                  discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.

              W. Va. Code § 6C-2-5(b) (eff. 2007).

Webster Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Davis, 244 W. Va. 702, 709, 856 S.E.2d 661, 668 (2021).

                                      III. ANALYSIS

              In its decision, the grievance board found that Petitioner could not correct a

mistake or the ultra vires act of one of its employees if such correction would violate the

terms of West Virginia Code §§ 18A-4-8(m) (2023), 18A-4-8a(j) (2023), and 18A-4-16(6)

(2023). 9 West Virginia Code § 18A-4-8(m) prohibits the reclassification or relegation of

any service personnel, without their consent, providing:

              (m) Without his or her written consent, a service person may
              not be:
              (1) Reclassified by class title; or
              (2) Relegated to any condition of employment which would
              result in a reduction of his or her salary, rate of pay,
              compensation or benefits earned during the current fiscal year;
              or for which he or she would qualify by continuing in the same
              job position and classification held during that fiscal year and
              subsequent years.

              These three sections of the West Virginia Code have been amended since
              9

the grievance was filed but those amendments did not make any changes to these
subsections.
                                               8
W. Va. Code § 18A-4-8(m)(1 & 2). West Virginia Code 18A-4-8a(j) prohibits changing a

service person’s daily work schedule during the school year without the employee’s

consent:

              (j) A service person may not have his or her daily work
              schedule changed during the school year without the
              employee’s written consent and the person’s required daily
              work hours may not be changed to prevent the payment of time
              and one-half wages or the employment of another employee.

Finally, West Virginia Code § 18A-4-16(6) gives an option to school service personnel to

retain an extracurricular assignment if such assignment exists in the following school year:

              (6) An employee who was employed in any service personnel
              extracurricular assignment during the previous school year
              shall have the option of retaining the assignment if it continues
              to exist in any succeeding school year. A county board of
              education may terminate any school service personnel
              extracurricular assignment for lack of need pursuant to section
              seven, article two of this chapter. If an extracurricular contract
              has been terminated and is reestablished in any succeeding
              school year, it shall be offered to the employee who held the
              assignment at the time of its termination. If the employee
              declines the assignment, the extracurricular assignment shall
              be posted and filled pursuant to section eight-b of this article.

              These three code sections place certain rights and obligations upon school

service personnel and school boards when a valid contract exists. In this case, there was

no record of any action taken by Petitioner to lawfully modify Respondent’s regular run,

as required by other statutes. First, for the modified run to have been lawfully established,

Petitioner would have had to post and received bids:

                                              9
                     Boards shall be required to post and date notices of all
              job vacancies of established existing or newly created positions
              in conspicuous working places for all service employees to
              observe for at least five working days. The notice of such job
              vacancies shall include the job description, the period of
              employment, the amount of pay and any benefits and other
              information that is helpful to the employees to understand the
              particulars of the job.

W. Va. Code Ann. § 18A-4-8b (1983). Thus, absent a proper job posting for a new position

and Petitioner’s approval of the employee contract as “a matter of the Board’s minute

records,” W. Va. Code § 18A-2-5 (1983), there was no valid contract for the modified bus

run. Because the modified route was never approved by Petitioner, it was an illegal change

in Respondent’s job duties and amounted to an ultra vires act by one of Petitioner’s

employees. See W. Va. Code § 18A-2-6 (1981). Such acts have long been found to be

nonbinding. “[U]nlawful or ultra vires promises are nonbinding when made by public

officials, their predecessors or subordinates, when functioning in their governmental

capacity.” Parker v. Summers Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 185 W. Va. 313, 317, 406 S.E.2d 744,

748 (1991). We have further held:

                     The Board of Education of a school-district is a
              corporation created by statute with functions of a public nature
              expressly given and no other; and it can exercise no power not
              expressly conferred or fairly arising from necessary
              implication, and in no other mode than that prescribed or
              authorized by the statute.

Syl. Pt. 2, Napier v. Lincoln Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 209 W. Va. 719, 551 S.E.2d 362 (2001).

Thus, the unauthorized act of Petitioner’s employee does not have binding effect. Indeed,

“[a] state or one of its political subdivisions is not bound by the legally unauthorized acts

                                             10
of its officers and all persons must take note of the legal limitations upon their power and

authority.” Syl. Pt. 3, Freeman v. Poling, 175 W. Va. 814, 338 S.E.2d 415 (1985) (citations

omitted).

              In Freeman, following an election for Sheriff of Barbour County, the

outgoing Sheriff made representations that certain employees’ jobs would be protected

“under the new civil service system as long as they passed the civil service examination.”

Id., 175 W. Va. at 816, 338 S.E.2d at 417. This Court found that, regardless of what the

outgoing Sheriff told these certain employees, unless “proper procedures [were] followed”

the statutes that established civil service protection did not apply. Id., 175 W. Va. at 818,

338 S.E.2d at 419.

              Similarly, in Parker v. Summers Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 185 W. Va. 313, 406

S.E.2d 744 (1991), the issue was whether the Summers County Board of Education had

promised to award sick leave to Parker for work completed prior to her employment by the

Board. Id., 185 W. Va. at 316, 406 S.E.2d at 747. This Court concluded, citing favorably

to Freeman, that the promises of Board employees to grant sick leave to Parker were ultra

vires acts that did not bind the Board. Id., W. Va. at 317, 406 S.E.2d at 748.

              Further, West Virginia school service personnel have long been required to

execute written agreements for their employment. At the time Respondent began her

regular run for Petitioner, this requirement provided “[b]efore entering upon their duties

                                             11
such personnel shall execute with the board a written contract which may be in letter form

and shall state the classification and terms of work, the employment period and pay, and

shall certify that said employment has been made a matter of minute record.” W. Va. Code

§ 18A-2-5 (1969). By 1983, when Respondent was granted a continuing contract, this

Code section had been significantly amended to include an entire form contract to be used

by county boards of education for employment of school service personnel. W. Va. Code

§ 18A-2-5 (1983). This form required Petitioner and Respondent to execute a written

contract setting forth numerous terms, including the job classification, place of assignment,

and salary of Respondent.      W. Va. Code § 18A-2-5 (1983).            Additionally, when

Respondent’s continuing contract began, the statutory form contained language stating:

“[t]he Board hereby certifies that the Employee’s employment has been duly approved by

the Board and will be a matter of the Board’s minute records.” Id. (emphasis added). It

is undisputed that in 1983, Respondent received a continuing contract for her regular run.

In 1985, she began picking up and dropping off pupils on the vocational run, which was

memorialized in Petitioner’s minutes. However, after the change in school start times

caused an overlap between her regular run and the vocational run, there was never an entry

in Petitioner’s minutes, as required by law, showing approval of any modification to

Respondent’s regular run. Therefore, Respondent did not prove that Petitioner authorized

the changes to Respondent’s regular run.

              The evidence before the grievance board proved that the modification of

Respondent’s regular run was done without Petitioner’s approval. The evidence adduced

                                             12
at the grievance board proved Respondent was hired to transport elementary and high

school students to and from their respective schools on her regular run. She further

demonstrated that her regular run was properly bid and she was awarded that position.

However, there was never any bid on the modified run and the board never approved the

modified run.

                More importantly, Respondent failed to prove that her regular run was legally

modified. See W. Va. Code §§ 18A-4-8b and 18A-2-6. The burden of proof to demonstrate

this modification was on Respondent. See W. Va. C. S. R. § 156-1-3 (2008). See also

Staats v. Jackson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. 15-0227, 2015 WL 6181438, at *5 (W. Va. Oct.

20, 2015) (memorandum decision) (“As this grievance does not involve a disciplinary

matter, Grievant has the burden of proving [her] grievance by a preponderance of the

evidence.”). Indeed, the evidence showed that proper procedures were not followed in

modifying Respondent’s regular run. Respondent testified that she did not remember the

name of the person who allegedly consented to the modification. No person who allegedly

consented to the modification testified. No notice of a modified run was properly posted

and no bids were received for that modified run. Respondent offered no Board meeting

minutes, which are required by law to approve personnel decisions. She produced no

contract. Thus, the modified run was unauthorized and illegal from its inception. 10

                10
                     We have previously held that:

                                                                             (continued . . .)

                                               13
              The circuit court compounded the grievance board’s error by acknowledging

that while a change in the routes was made, such change was insignificant and Petitioner

could not correct it:

                     Petitioner simply failed to meet its burden of proof to
              establish the affirmative defense of “mistake.” Petitioner’s
              appeal rests entirely on its contention that the change made to
              [Respondent’s] regular bus run was significant enough to
              require Petitioner’s approval. However, Petitioner failed to
              demonstrate that the change was, in fact, significant.

Contrary to the circuit court’s finding, it is clear that Petitioner had to correct its legal

mistake. See Freeman 175 W. Va. at 818, 338 S.E.2d at 419. Plainly, the modified run

was not lawfully created by Petitioner because it was not made a part of its minute record.

See W. Va. Code § 18A-2-5 (1969) and (1983). Because the modified run was not properly

created, Petitioner had to correct the error because to do otherwise would discriminate

against Petitioner’s other employees. See W. Va. Code § 18A-4-5b (1990) (“[U]niformity

shall apply to all salaries, rates of pay, benefits, increments or compensation for all persons

regularly employed and performing like assignments and duties within the county. . . .”).

              [T]his Court [has] examined the extent to which jobs duties
              must resemble one another in order to necessitate identical
              benefits or treatment under the uniformity statute. This Court

                     A purported teaching contract entered into between a
              Board of Education and a teacher, in direct contravention of
              the prohibitive provisions of a valid statute, is void ab inito,
              and cannot be subsequently validated by ratification, nor can
              execution thereof be made the basis of an equitable estoppel.

Syl. Pt. 2, Cochran v. Trussler, 141 W. Va. 130, 89 S.E.2d 306 (1955).
                                              14
             reasoned that “once a county board of education pays
             additional compensation to certain teachers, it must pay the
             same amount of additional compensation to other teachers
             performing ‘like assignments and duties[.]’

Bd. of Educ. of Cnty. of Wood v. Airhart, 212 W. Va. 175, 181, 569 S.E.2d 422, 428 (2002)

quoting Weimer-Godwin v. Board of Educ. of Upshur County, 179 W.Va. 423, 427, 369

S.E.2d 726, 730 (1988). Allowing Respondent to continue to receive full pay for her

regular run, when her duties were reduced by 25%, violated the uniformity provisions of

West Virginia Code § 18A-2-5. Indeed, the circuit court’s finding that the modified bus

run was not a “significant mistake” was plainly wrong. Once Petitioner properly restored

Respondent to her regular run, there was now a time conflict between her regular run and

the vocational run. The Grievance Board has held that:

                   Extracurricular assignments must be made on the basis
             of seniority, qualifications and evaluation of past service;
             however, in order for an employee to be qualified for such an
             assignment it must not interfere with either his regular duties
             or any other extracurricular, extra-duty or supplement
             assignments which he holds.

Bowman v. Marion Cnty. Bd. of Educ., W. Va. St. Emp. Griev. Bd., Docket No. 91-24-

343 (Feb. 27, 1992).

             Both the grievance board and the circuit court were clearly wrong in their

determinations. As such, we find that the circuit court should have reversed the grievance

board, found that Respondent did not meet her burden of proof, and ordered dismissal of

the grievance.

                                           15
                                IV. CONCLUSION

            For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the March 4, 2022, order of the Circuit

Court of Kanawha County and direct the circuit court order the West Virginia Public

Employees Grievance Board to deny the grievance.

                                               Reversed and Remanded with Instructions.

                                          16