Court Opinion

ID: 9445625
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 21:34:45.696594+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:21.262230
License: Public Domain

LEMMON, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
We have frequently adverted to the weight that courts should accord to findings and decisions made by administrative boards in the exercise of what Mr. Justice Frankfurter is fond of calling “expertise.”1
Once again we are faced with an attempt by a trial court to interfere, this time by injunction, with the activities of a public utility operating under a certificate lawfully granted to it by a regulatory commission.
®In its brief, the appellee ascribes to the appellants a “monstrous contention that an existing public transportation system, franchised and licensed in accordance with law and serving a large and vital area under difficult conditions, is defenseless in a court of equity against the depredations of a group of adventurers out to make a quick dollar by pirating a few lucrative routes,” etc.
I deplore the use of such immoderate language, for which there is not a shred of support in the record.
The District Court issued a preliminary injunction restraining the appellants from interfering with the appel-lee’s franchises, certificates of public convenience and necessity, etc., issued by the Territory of Alaska, etc.; and from operating a bus transportation system over Territorial streets in Anchorage, Alaska, and also over highways connecting Elmendorf Air Force Base and Fort Richardson Military Reservation and the City of Anchorage.
*655From that preliminary injunction the present appeal has been taken.
1. The Amended Complaint
On October 25, 1955, the appellee filed a complaint against the appellants and others, containing, in summary, the following allegations:
The appellee is engaged in operating as a common carrier a motor bus or trolley bus service within the city limits of Anchorage, under the name of Anchorage City Transit System, as grantee under an exclusive twenty-year contract of franchise from the City of Anchorage, dated January 24, 1946.
The appellee also operates a motor bus service between its terminal in the City of Anchorage and Elmendorf Air Force Base, hereinafter Elmendorf, pursuant to a “transportation license” issued by the Department of the Air Force on October 21, 1952, effective for five years, or until October 12, 1957, and also pursuant to an “exclusive certificate of convenience and necessity” issued by the Alaska Bus Transportation Commission, hereinafter the Commission, on September 17, 1949, applicable to the connecting routes between the appellee’s terminal in the City of Anchorage and Elmendorf.
The appellee also operates a motor bus service between its terminal in Anchorage and Fort Richardson Military Reservation, hereinafter Richardson, “pursuant to oral authorization by the appropriate authorities and for which an application for a transportation license is now pending,” and pursuant further to an “exclusive certificate of convenience and necessity” issued by the Commission on September 17, 1949, applicable to the connecting routes between the appellee’s terminal in Anchorage and Fort Richardson. That certificate was still in effect when the suit was filed.
The appellants and other defendants below who have not appealed are interfering with the appellee’s rights, franchises, etc., by seeking “to induce the breach, termination and abrogation of the said contracts, and by spreading malicious rumors concerning the validity and existence thereof,” etc., thus causing irreparable damage to the appellee’s business, “all to the end that great and irreparable damage to the public interest in continued adequate transportation may result,” etc.
The Commission is alleged to have issued a certificate of public convenience and necessity to the appellant Anchorage Bus Company, Inc., hereinafter Anchorage Bus, covering the connecting routes between Anchorage and Elmen-dorf and between Anchorage and Richardson, in violation of the appellee’s “aforesaid exclusive franchise and certificate, without notice or opportunity to be heard first given to [appellee] and contrary to the provisions * * * of applicable Territorial law; issuance of the said certificate to the appellant Anchorage Bus and operation thereunder by Anchorage Bus in competition with the appellee threatens to cause irreparable damage to the appellee by depriving it of the only revenue providing portion of its integral public transportation system, contrary to the public interests,” etc.
A second cause of action alleges publication in two Anchorage daily newspapers of certain statements alleged to have been defamatory. The present appeal is not concerned with this second cause of action.
The complaint closes with a prayer that the appellants be enjoined “during the pendency of this action, and permanently, from interfering” with the appellee’s contracts, franchises, etc.; that the appellee have judgment against the appellants for $250,000; and that the defendant Commission members be enjoined from seeking to abrogate the ap-pellee’s exclusive certificate of public convenience and necessity “except after due notice and proper hearing,” etc. ; that the Commission be ordered to suspend, during the pendency of this action and until final determination on the merits can be made, “any certificate of public convenience and necessity” issued by it to Anchorage Bus, in violation of the appellee’s certificate and franchise; and that the Commission be ordered to show cause why they should not grant a public hearing to the appellee and An*656chorage Bus to determine whether public convenience and necessity require the cancellation of the said certificate issued to Anchorage Bus.
2. Statement of Facts
The appellee held a certificate of public convenience and necessity issued on September 17, 1949, by the Commission, in which it was “exclusively authorized” to provide bus transportation service in and over highways within the Territory from the two bases to the City and return.
Appellee also possessed an exclusive twenty-year franchise, granted by the governing body of the City and approved by the electorate of the City, to operate a bus service picking up and discharging passengers on the streets of the City of Anchorage and adjacent areas, under the name of Anchorage City Transit System. This franchise was granted by an ordinance dated January 24, 1946.
Finally, the appellee on October 21, 1952, was granted by the Department of the Air Force a license.to operate a motor transportation service on Elmendorf, from October 13, 1952, to October 12, 1957. This license was revocable at will by the Secretary of the Air Force, and stipulated that the privilege therein granted was not to be “construed to prevent the furnishing of transportation service by such other persons or companies as may be authorized by the Secretary of the Air Force.”
On June 10, 1955, Anchorage Bus was awarded a contract by the combined Army and Air Force Exchange to operate a bus transportation service on El-mendorf and Richardson, replacing the appellee, which for several years had been furnishing this same service under a license. The Court below found that the appellants “were prepared, ready, and about to commence operation in direct competition with [appellee’s] said transportation system over the public highways * * * of the Territory * * * and Anchorage, between points on said Military Bases and * * * Anchorage.”
On October 21, 1955, the Commission issued to Anchorage Bus a certificate of public convenience and necessity to furnish motor bus transportation between Elmendorf and Fort Richardson, on the one hand, and the Bus Terminal in the City of Anchorage, on the other.
On October 25, 1955 — the same day on which the complaint herein was filed, supra — the Commission suspended the certificate issued to Anchorage Bus “on October 17, 1955.” 2 The reason given for the suspension was that the appellee had protested that it had not been granted an opportunity to appear at the hearing. The Commission’s order also recited that “certain bus service” rendered by the appellee would “be interfered with and possibly discontinued because of the alleged financial difficulties caused by the granting of the said Certificate to [Anchorage Bus], which if substantiated will be to the detriment of the public interest.”
In the same order, the Commission decreed that a public hearing be held on December 6, 1955, to inquire (1) Why the certificate of “October 17,” 1955, issued to Anchorage Bus should not be reinstated; (2) why the certificates [sic] issued to the appellee on September 17, 1949, should not be modified (a) to limit the number of bus routes and certificates issued therefor; and (b) to allow “concurrent operations” by other authorized bus companies, etc.
On October 31, 1955, the court below issued a temporary restraining order prohibiting the appellants from interfering, etc., with “the exclusive Territorial and municipal franchises” of the appel-lee, and from operating any public bus service on the public highways and streets of Anchorage or between Anchorage and Elmendorf or Richardson, etc. The appellee was required to give a $10,-000 bond.
On December 14, 1955, the Commission announced that it was convinced *657that it was “physically possible” for the appellant Anchorage Bus “to travel and transport passengers from Elmendorf * * * and Richardson non-stop to a bus terminal on private property in * * * Anchorage * * * without traversing any Territorial roads,” and that therefore the Commission was “of the opinion that it is possible for * * * Anchorage Bus * * * to operate * * * without the necessity of securing * * * a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity.”
At a meeting of the Commission held on December 21, 1955, there was read a telegram from Colonel Louis E. Coir a, commander of the 5039th Air Base Wing, at Elmendorf, stating that the appellee’s liability policy was considered “absolutely insufficient insurance coverage for operation within military reservation.” The telegram also referred to “past deletion of routes on base without notice and past and present lack of adherence of trip schedules,” which it was charged impeded “arrival and departure of Air Force personnel and civilian employees, seriously affecting operation and morale.”
“For these and other pertinent reasons,” the telegram continued, “Air Force Secretary has been requested to give permission to cancel license of that carrier [appellee] covering operations within military reservation. Upon receipt of permission, [appellee] will be notified that its license is cancelled, and authorization for operation by it of any public transport within reservation will be terminated.
“This will create great hardship unless you authorize operation between City of Anchorage and military bases by another carrier. Present insurance, equipment and on-base service by Anchorage Bus * * * considered entirely adequate and satisfactory. Brief operation between Elmendorf * * * and Anchorage by Anchorage Bus * ® * indicated service adequate to meet requirements of the military.”
Accordingly, the Commission announced its formal decision to the effect that at its hearing on December 15th [sic],3 it had refrained from hearing “the testimony of Anchorage Bus * * * it did so with the thought that the action and the decision made at that hearing would release * * * Anchorage Bus * * * from the restraining order [supra] which was then in effect”; that “At least a majority of the Commission would not have terminated the hearing without allowing * * * Anchorage Bus * * * to complete its ease if they did not feel that this would be the result”; and that therefore, the Commission, “after reconsidering the evidence presented at the hearing in Anchorage on the aforesaid date grants * * * Anchorage Bus * * * a temporary certificate * * * to cover the highways traversed between the terminal in Anchorage on 5th Street to * * * Richardson and Elmendorf. * * *»
A temporary certificate of public convenience and necessity, bearing the same date as that of the meeting just referred to, — December 21, 1955 — was issued to Anchorage Bus. The certificate recited that the appellee had “been denied access to the said military installations, all to the detriment and inconvenience of those members of the public who work, reside or are stationed at the said military installations”; and that “the Elmendorf * * * Commanding Officer has specifically requested that the said Anchorage Bus Company be preferred and authorized to operate between * * * Anchorage and the said Air Force Base for reasons of military operations and morale, * * * ”
The routing indicated in the certificate was substantially the same as that outlined in the decision, supra.
On the following day, a letter was sent by Colonel Coira to Russell Swank, the appellee’s vice president and general manager, stating that the appellee’s liability insurance, “covering injury to per*658sons which arise [sic]' in the operation of your bus transportation service is inadequate. This policy was not approved in this headquarters as required by your license to operate on this installation.”
The letter also stated that the authority granted to the appellee on October 15, 1952, to operate on Elmendorf (the record before us shows that it was signed on October 21, 1952, supra) 'was suspended effective on the conclusion of the appellee’s “presently scheduled runs of 27, December 1955”. Colonel Coira also stated that the extending of a new license for motor transportation service on Elmendorf would be considered “Upon future demonstration to us of your financial responsibility and evidence that you carry adequate liability insurance.”
The record shows that December 23, 1955, a general insurance agency informed the appellee that, effective December 27, 1955, the latter’s liability insurance had been written “with limits as required by the Territory of Alaska namely: $50,000/200,000 Bodily injury, $5,000 Property Damage plus $2,500 Property Damage from any cause for passengers’ property”.
In this connection, it should be pointed out that on this appeal.the right of the appellee to operate within the boundaries of either Elmendorf or Richardson is not pertinent to the issue, since the preliminary injunction specifically provides that “nothing herein contained shall be construed to prohibit the normal operations of the [appellant] within [such] boundaries * * *”
On January 16, 1956, the District Court issued the preliminary injunction appealed from, embodying in general the terms of the temporary restraining order, supra, but fixing the appellee’s bond at $40,000.
3. The District Court’s Findings and Injunction
The court found that the appellee was furnishing an integrated motor bus transportation system under the name of Anchorage City Transit System, pursuant to a franchise issued by the City of Anchorage, a certificate of public convenience and necessity issued by the Territory of Alaska, and a license or licenses issued by the military authorities; that this system was integrated with connecting carriers likewise operated by the appellee and its affiliates; that thereby it serves the entire area of South Central Alaska in the transportation of freight, mail, and passengers; that the appellants operate buses for hire, under contract with the Base and Post Exchanges at Elmendorf and Richardson, and between these two Bases, in competition with the appellee; that the appellants are preparing to commence operation in direct competition with appellee’s transportation system over the highways, streets and alleys in the Territory and the City, between said Bases and the City; that the appellants do not hold a franchise from the City and do not have a permanent certificate of public convenience and necessity issued by the Territory, but only a temporary certificate; that the temporary certificate was issued improvidently and without a determination upon the merits; that the appellee has filed an appeal with the District Court from the issuance of the temporary certificate and that the appeal is still pending; that the appellants do not have any other franchise, license or permit for operation of a bus transportation system between the Bases and the City except the said contract with the Base and Post Exchange and the said temporary certificate; that appellee derives in excess of 70% of its gross revenue from the routes between the City and the Bases, and that the loss of these routes to the appellants would result in financial failure for the rest of appellee’s bus transportation system and force cessation of its operations, contrary to the best public interest, convenience and necessity, and to the irreparable damage and injury of the appellee; that as a result of the appellants’ operations, the ap-pellee bus company has lost the services of a number of its employees and that other employees probably will leave as a result of the appellants’ activities, unless restrained, and will seek to protect themselves against possible unemployment by accepting employment with the appellants, thus seriously disrupting the *659operations of the appellee’s transit system; that the temporary injunction would not seriously damage the appellants ; that the Commission, charged by law with the administration of and having power to control common carrier service by bus in Alaska, has held hearings to resolve the entire controversy and to determine what course of action would be most beneficial to the public interest, which hearings have been recessed and not concluded and, according to the Commission’s order, may be resumed only upon the request of Anchorage Bus, in the event that the latter still desires a certificate from the Territory; that a decision by the Commission will be subject to review by the District Court under Territorial law; that the rights and equities of the parties and the public interest must be protected in continued uninterrupted bus transportation; that continued, uninterrupted bus transportation will be best protected by preserving the status quo, thereby protecting the integrity and financial stability and ability to operate of the presently franchised and licensed carrier, the appellee.
The appellants are enjoined, pending the District Court’s determination upon the merits of the action, from interfering with, breaching or violating in any manner, either directly or indirectly, any of the existing franchises, certificates of public convenience and necessity, licenses or transportation agreements of the appellee, issued by the Territory, the City, or the Department of Defense; from operating any bus or other motor vehicle as a public motor vehicle carrier for hire over the highways, streets, and alleys of the City or Territory, within the City, or between the Bases and the City; but, as we have seen, exempting from the injunction the operations of Anchorage Bus within the boundaries of the Bases.
4. The Questions Presented
Nowhere in their brief do the appellants set out, eo nomine, the “specification of errors” required by our Rule 18, subd. 2(d), 28 U.S.C.A. They have, however, included in the record a “Statement of Points on Which Defendants Will Rely on Appeal”, and in their brief they have listed exactly one-half of the “fourteen separate points”. Of those seven selected “points”, we are informed that three have been consolidated into one. While all this does not amount to a technical compliance with our Rule, I believe that it amounts to a substantial compliance, and I would accept it as constituting the required “specification of errors”. I do not, however, approve of such slipshod observance of our Rules.
The appellee, on the other hand, “contends that only the following issues are presented on this appeal:
“1. Did the Judge below abuse his discretion in granting the temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction?
“2. Do the pleadings and affidavits show sufficient equity in plaintiff’s [ap-pellee’s] bill to permit the trial court to grant interlocutory relief for the preservation of the status quo, pending determination of the case on the merits?”
I adopt as my own the appellee’s more concise statement of the equitable issues presented on this appeal.
5. The Failure of the Commission to Give the Appellants Notice of the Suspension Was Not a Material Error.
Before taking up these two main issues, there should be considered a “collateral” problem that comes into the case through the suspension of the appellants’ certificate of public convenience and necessity. The appellants contend that this suspension, regardless of a specific provision of the certificate,4 giving *660the Commission considerable leeway in the matter of certificates, “was void and of no effect because it was issued without notice to appellants, as provided in subsection (c) of section 9 and it was made effective immediately, contrary to
the provisions of subsection (d) of Section 9.” The “Section 9” referred to is part of Chapter 93 of the 1949 Session Laws of Alaska, excerpts from which are copied in the margin.5
*661Although we believe that Subsection (c) of § 9 of the act of 1949, supra, gives the Commission considerable leeway to “suspend” its orders “upon such notice and in such manner as it shall deem proper”, it seems to me that counsel for the appellants himself waived any irregularity, if there was irregularity, in the Commission’s order of suspension. The main opinion correctly adverts to this.
In any event, on December 21, 1955, the Commission, as we have seen, issued to the appellant Anchorage Bus a certificate of public convenience and necessity. As the appellants themselves state in their brief, it was “armed” with that certificate that the appellants moved the court to dissolve the preliminary injunction.
I turn now to that ultimate question.
6. The Appellee’s Dilemma: Either Its Certificate Purported to Give an Exclusive Franchise, and Was Therefore Invalid—
The appellee concedes that “we have a complex fact situation”. Ordinarily, questions of fact, in a matter of this kind, should be left to the “expertise” of the administrative body skilled and experienced in that area.
It is earnestly pressed upon us, however, that “two Territorial statutes, one * * * applicable to the Territorial and the other to the Municipal franchise”, buttress the appellee's “valuable property right”.
The first is § 2(e) of Chapter 93 of the Session Laws of 1949, supra, which reads as follows:
[“The Commission shall:]
* * •» *
“Issue certificates of convenience and necessity, conformable to the provisions of this Act as hereinafter set forth. This authority shall include the discretion to issue exclusive certificates on such routes and upon such conditions as the Commission deems necessary or advisable in the public interest to secure continuous, efficient and dependable bus services in the affected areas, * * [Emphasis supplied.]
The other statute is Chapter 91 of the 1949 Session Laws of Alaska, which amended § 16-1-35 of the Alaska Compiled Statutes Annotated, Volume 1, to read as follows:
“[The council shall have and exercise the following powers:]
“Section 1. * * * Sixteenth: Franchises. To grant franchises, including exclusive franchise privileges, for the construction, operation and maintenance of * * * bus transportation systems * * * and to permit the use of streets and other public places for a period of not to exceed twenty years, under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by ordinance. * * *
“Section 2. Exclusive franchises heretofore approved by not less than fifty-five percentum of the votes cast at any municipal election wherein the people approved an exclusive franchise within said municipality are hereby ratified and given full force and effect under this Act provided the terms of said franchise intend that the same shall not be in force and effect.” [Emphasis supplied.]
Such enactments by the Territorial Legislature contravene a specific Congressional mandate contained in 48 U.S. C.A.§ 77:
“* * * nor shan the legislature [of Alaska] grant to any corporation, association, or individual any special or exclusive privilege, immunity, or franchise without the affirmative approval of Congress; * * * and all laws passed, or at*662tempted to be passed, by such legislature in said Territory inconsistent with the provisions of this section * * * shall be null and void.”
Again, 48 U.S.C.A. § 1471 reads in part as follows:

“Local or special laws

“The legislatures of the Territories of the United States now or hereafter to be organized shall not pass local or special laws in any of . the following enumerated cases, that is to say:
******
“Granting to any corporation, association, or individual any special or exclusive privilege, immunity, or franchise whatever.
“In all other cases where a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted in any of the Territories of the United States by the Territorial legislatures thereof.”
See also In re O'Harra Bus Lines, Inc., 1948, 12 Alaska 129.
These two next preceding statutes make it abundantly clear that a Territorial legislature in general, and the Alaska legislature in particular, may not grant an exclusive franchise to a bus company without the affirmative approval of Congress — which approval -is of course absent in the instant- case.
In striving to explain away the above two Congressional provisions, which on their face destroy the appellee’s case, the appellee takes somewhat inconsistent positions. It first concedes that “the quoted language * * * does limit the power of the- Territorial Legislature to grant exclusive franchises, by making such exclusive grant subject to the affirmative approval of Congress.” [Emphasis the appellee’s] With this statement I unreservedly agree.
On the next page of its brief, however, the appellee qualifies this concession to plain logic, by asserting:
“The only possible conclusion to be drawn from a combined reading of these two provisions is that Congress intended to prohibit the Territorial Legislature from granting exclusive franchises of Territory-wide application, except with the affirmative approval of Congress. Nor can the Territorial Legislature grant locally restricted but exclusive franchises by the enactment of local or special laws, but is confined to the promulgation of general laws for this purpose,” etc., etc.
On the ensuing page, the brief further develops this “Territory-wide” limitation idea:
“The logic of this interpretation is appealing and is historically sound. Clearly the granting of an exclusive Territory-wide franchise by the Legislature is a matter of such wide import that the Congress of the United States, in view of the limitations placed upon Territorial governments, has properly reserved to itself the right to take final action in such matters. At the same time Congress clearly did not desire to retain unto itself, nor did it intend thereby to prohibit to the Territories, the exercise of exclusive franchising powers on the local scene, either directly by the Legislature or through delegation, except insofar as it imposed a general prohibition against the enactment of local or special legislation, which also applies to a number of other eases.”
[Emphasis again the appellee’s]
I find the appellee’s argument confusing and inconsistent. First we are told that “the power of the Territorial Legislature to grant exclusive franchises [is] * * * subject to the affirmative approval of Congress.
Next we are told that the prohibition applies only to the Legislature’s grant of Territory-wide exclusive franchises.
But it may not “grant locally restricted but exclusive franchises by the enactment of local or special laws”, but only by general laws.
Again, the argument is that Congress did not intend “to prohibit to the Territories, the exercise of exclusive franchising powers on the local scene, either directly by the Legislature or through delegation * * * ”
*663Finally comes the crowning inconsistency, in the same sentence:
* * except insofar as it imposed a general prohibition against the enactment of local or special legislation,” etc.
In other words, (1) the Legislature may not grant exclusive franchises, in general, without the approval of Congress. (2) It may not grant exclusive franchises of “Territory-wide application only”. (3) It may not grant exclusive franchises by enacting local or special laws but may do so by “general” laws. (4) The Legislature may “exercise * *' * exclusive franchising powers on the local scene, either directly * * * or through delegation.” (5) But it may not do so by the enactment of local or special legislation”. (Query: How else cm the Legislature “exercise * * * exclusive franchising powers on the local scene” except by “local or special legislation” ?)
I have thus expatiated upon this quintuple inconsistency of the appellee because I believe that such inconsistency of itself betrays the weakness of the appel-lee’s frantic efforts to escape the plain Congressional mandate:
The Legislature shall not, either directly or indirectly, grant special or exclusive franchises, absent the affirmative approval of Congress.
Nor do I agree with the appellee’s argument that, while “the Territorial Legislature [cannot] grant locally restricted but exclusive franchises by the enactment of local or special laws”, it may promulgate “general laws for this purpose * * * which grant the power to authorize locally exclusive franchises to cities as well as to the Territorial Bus Commission”. The appellee’s theory would enable the Legislature to “delegate” — that is the word used by the ap-pellee elsewhere in this connection— power that it did not itself possess. Under such a paradoxical concept, the creature would have greater power than the creator!
The mere statement of such a proposition demonstrates its fallacy. It would enable the Territorial Legislature to do indirectly what it cannot do directly, thus disregarding the salutary maxim, Qui facit per alium facit per se.
7. ■ — or the Appellee Did Not Have an Exclusive Franchise, in Which Case the Appellants Could Not Be Enjoined from Operating.
If the appellee has a certificate of public convenience and necessity that is not exclusive, and the appellants now possess a valid certificate, as I believe they do, then the appellants have the same right to operate as the appellee has.
In that event, the appellee is not entitled to an injunction, preliminary or permanent.
The above propositions are so self-evident that they do not require to be buttressed by citation of authorities.
In its brief, however, the appellee digests a number of cases in an attempt to support its contention that “even in the absence of an exclusive franchise,” a public utility “has a right * * * to be protected against interference with its operations, property or plant by a competitor”. But every one of the ap-pellee’s own summaries show that relief was granted in those cases because there was an “unlawful” operation of competing taxicabs or that there was “the operation of a competing bus line which was not licensed”; or an “operation of jitney buses * * * in violation of an ordinance”; or “the operation * * * of jitney buses, without permit or license from the city or town”; or that taxicabs “were being operated in violation of an ordinance”.
I have no quarrel with these cases. They simply are not in point.
Similarly, the appellee cites 119 A.L.R. 432-456, which likewise is not in point. This may be seen at once from one of the opening sentences:
“The present annotation, * * * is concerned not with the consequential effects of mere competition, but with direct interference with property or the use thereof. Questions in reference to the right of a public utility operating under a franchise or other sufficient authority to pro*664tection against unlawful competition by one having no valid franchise or permit are not dealt with herein.”
It will thus be seen that the above annotation does not deal with relief against even unlawful competition, which I believe does not exist in the instant case. Nor is there charged here that there was “direct interference with property or the use thereof”. Neither is the preliminary injunction concerned with such interference.
The able District Judge evidently considered himself the arbiter of the city’s transportation interests. This is shown by the following language used by the Court:
“Well, the court must consider the entire transportation system of the area, which means within the City of Anchorage proper as well as that contiguous to the City of Anchorage and not exclusively the City-Military segment, and, based upon the facts in evidence and arguments of counsel that the (court has before it at this time the motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction is hereby denied for the reason that the ground given by the defendants is not sufficient in equity.”
I do not so regard the Court’s duty. The Court should have limited itself to a consideration of the legal and equitable rights of the parties, not the public convenience and necessity. The latter problems were entrusted to the discretion and “expertise” of an administrative body especially created for that purpose — the Alaska Bus Transportation Commission.
In Honolulu Rapid Transit & Land Company v. Territory of Hawaii, 1908, 211 U.S. 282, 290-291, 29 S.Ct. 55, 57, 53 L.Ed. 186, the Court said:
“The business conducted by the transit company is not purely private. It is of that class so affected by a public interest that it is subject, within constitutional limits, to the governmental power of regulation.. This power of regulation may be exercised to control, among other things, the time of the running of cars. It is a power legislative in its character, and may be exercised directly by the legislature itself. But the legislature may delegate to an administrative body the execution in detail of the legislative power of regulation.” [Emphasis supplied.]
The correct rule is thus stated in 28 Am.Jur., Injunctions, § 162, page 352:
“Equity will not attempt by injunction to substitute its own discretion for that of [public] officials in matters belonging to the proper jurisdiction of the latter.”
Again, in op. cit., § 168, page 358, we find the following:
“Government Departments and Executive Officers. — The judiciary may not encroach upon other departments of the government nor will it, as a rule, interfere with performance by them of their constitutional functions.”
I do not think that the appellants, as co-holders with the appellee of nonexclusive public transportation privileges, could be restrained by injunction from the enjoyment of those privileges.
8. Conclusion
The horns of the appellee’s dilemma are as follows:
(1) Either its certificates of public convenience and necessity purported to give it the exclusive right to operate buses between the City of Anchorage and the two military reservations, and therefore were unlawful, as contravening a Federal statute; or
(2) The appellee’s certificates were not exclusive and therefore did not entitle it to an injunction restraining the appellants from operating buses along the same routes.
Whether the appellants were entitled to certificates of convenience and necessity was a matter to be determined by the Alaska Bus Transportation Commission, in the lawful exercise of its administrative “expertise”.
Accordingly, I think that the case should be remanded to the District Court, with instructions to dissolve the preliminary injunction.

. See Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 1951, 340 U.S. 474, 488, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456; Far East Conference v. United States, 1952, 342 U.S. 570, 576, 72 S.Ct. 492, 96 L.Ed. 576.

. The copy of the certificate itself contained in the transcript in this appeal gives the date of the certificate as October 21, 1955, as stated herein, supra.

. As already indicated herein, the transcript before this court shows the date of tbe previous hearing to have been December 14, 1955.

. “This Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity with its conditions and limitations shall continue in full force and effect so long as the Bus Transportation Commission determines that the Anchorage Bus Company, Ine., is at all times ■jit, willing and, able properly to perform the services above proposed and referred to, and to conform to the provisions of the Act and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder, and to properly service the public convenience and necessity at all times.’’ [Emphasis supplied.]

. “Section 6, Certificates of Public Con- ‘ venience and Necessity.
' “(a) Except as allowed under Section 7, no common carrier by bus shall engage in transportation subject to this Act unless it holds a certificate of public convenience and necessity issued by the Commission; provided, however, that if any such carrier or a predecessor in interest was a bona fide operation as a common carrier by bus on January 1, 1947, over the route or routes or between the ports with respect to which application is made and has so operated since that time (or, if engaged in furnishing seasonal service only, was in bona fide operation during the seasonal period, prior to or including such date, for operations of the character in question) except, in either event, as to interruptions of service over which the applicant or its predecessor in interest had no control, the Commission shall issue such certificate without requiring further proof that public convenience and necessity will be served by such operation, and without further proceedings, if application for such certificate is made to the Commission as provided in subsection (b) of this Section and prior to the expiration of ninety days after this Section takes effect. Pending the determination of any such application, the continuance of such operation shall be lawful. If the application for such certificate is not made within ninety days after this Section takes effect, it shall be decided in accordance with the standards and procedure provided for in subsection (c), and such certificate shall be issued or denied accordingly. Any person, not included within the provisions of the foregoing proviso, who is engaged in trans-poration as a common carrier by bus when this Section takes effect may continue such operation for a period of ninety days thereafter without a certificate, and, if application for such certificate is made to the Commission within such period, the continuance of such operation shall be lawful pending determination of such application.
“(b) Application for a certificate shall be made in writing to the Commission, be verified under oath, and shall be in such form and contain such information and be accompanied by proof of service upon such interested parties as the Commission shall, by regulations, require.
“(c) The Commission shall issue a certificate to any qualified applicant therefor, authorizing the. whole or any part of the operations covered by the application, if the Commission finds that the applicant is fit, willing, and able properly to perform the service proposed and to conform to the provisions of this Act and the requirements, rules, and regulations of the Commission thereunder, and that the proposed service, to the extent authorized by the certificate, is or will be required by the present or future public convenience and necessity; otherwise such application shall be denied.
“(d) Such certificate shall specify the route or routes over which, or the points to and from which, such carrier is authorized to operate, and, at the time of issuance and from time to time thereafter there shall be attached, to the exercise of the privileges granted by such certificate such reasonable terms, conditions, and limitations as the public convenience and necessity may from time to time require, including terms, conditions, and limitations as to the extension of the routs (route) or routes of the carrier, and such other terms, and conditions, and limitations as are necessary to carry out, with respect to the operations of the earner, the requirements of this Act or those established by the Commission pursuant thereto; provided, however, that no terms, conditions, or limitations shall restrict the right of the carrier to add to its equipment, facilities, or service within the scope of such certificate, as the development of the business and the demands of the public shall require, or the right of the carrier to extend its services over uncompleted portions of highway projects hereafter completed.
“(e) No certificate issued under this Act shall confer any proprietary or exclusive right or rights in the use of public highways.”
Section 9 of that Act is entitled “Notices, Orders, and Service of Process”. Subsection (c) of Section 9 reads as follows:
“(c) The Commission may suspend, modify, or set aside its orders under this Act upon such notice and in such manner as it shall deem proper.”
*661Subsection (d) of Section 9 follows:
“(d) Except as otherwise provided in this Act, all orders of the Commission, other than orders for the payment of money, shall take effect within such reasonable time, not less than thirty days, as the Commission may prescribe and shall continue in force until its further order, or for a specified period of time, according to provisions of the order, unless the same shall he suspended, modified, or set aside by the Commission, or be suspended or set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction.”