Court Opinion

ID: 9479978
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:34:18.333477+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:24.260977
License: Public Domain

KOZINSKI, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The majority makes a fundamental analytical error by treating the Commentary to the Sentencing Guidelines as a secondary aid to interpretation, akin to legislative history, rather than as an integral part of the Guidelines themselves. The difference is outcome-determinative in this case, as it probably will be in many other cases. I fear that the majority opinion takes this circuit down the wrong track, a track different from that taken by the other circuits that have considered the issue.
I
The majority reads Sentencing Guidelines § 3Bl.l(c) as calling for a two-step increase in offense level for Anderson’s role as an “organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor” in a “criminal activity,” where the only person over whom he had any control was duped and therefore lacked criminal responsibility. The majority acknowledges that this reading is at odds with the Introductory Commentary to section 3B1.1, which limits the application of that section to offenses committed by more than one “participant.” Majority op at 644. “Participant” is itself defined in the Application Notes to that section as one who is “criminally responsible for the commission of the offense.” The district court assumed that Hambley was not criminally responsible here; under the Commentary *647definition of the term, therefore, there was only one “participant” in the bank robbery — Anderson—and section 3B1.1 does not apply.
The majority’s interpretation is also in conflict with the Background Commentary to section 3B1.1. There the Sentencing Commission explains the purpose of that section:
This section provides a range of adjustments to increase the offense level based upon the size of a criminal organization (i.e., the number of participants in the offense) and the degree to which the defendant was responsible for committing the offense.
(emphasis added). The Background Commentary further explains that section 3B1.-1(c) is intended for cases involving “relatively small criminal enterprises ” (emphasis added). Thus, it is clear that section 3B1.1 increases the punishment of those who hold controlling positions in criminal organizations or enterprises, that is, activities involving more than one criminal. Anderson’s role in the bank robbery simply does not match this description.
A fair reading of the Guidelines together with its attendant Commentary leads to only one conclusion: Anderson should not have been given a two-step increase under section 3Bl.l(c).
II
There are few among the federal judiciary more skeptical than I about the uses and abuses of legislative history. See, for example, Wallace v. Christensen, 802 F.2d 1539, 1559-60 (9th Cir 1986) (Kozinski concurring in the judgment); In re Kelly, 841 F.2d 908, 912 n. 3, 914 n. 6 (9th Cir.1988). Such history is rarely written by the same people who wrote the legislation; it is seldom, if ever, even seen by most of the legislators at the time they cast their votes. See Hirschey v. F.E.R.C., 777 F.2d 1, 7-8 & n. 1 (D.C.Cir.1985) (Scalia concurring). Much legislative history — committee reports and floor debate — is intended to serve political rather than legislative purposes. It frequently reflects the views of only a minority of the legislature; it is often planted, to assuage a certain constituency, or worse, to influence court decisions. See United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 108 S.Ct. 2413, 2423-24, 101 L.Ed.2d 297 (1988) (Scalia concurring in part). In short, courts are wise to be very sparing in their reliance on legislative history, particularly when statutory language is clear. See generally Office of Legal Policy, Using and Misusing Legislative History: A Re-Evaluation of the Status of Legislative History in Statutory Interpretation (U.S. Dept, of Justice, 1989).
But the Sentencing Commission’s Commentary to the Sentencing Guidelines is not cut from the same cloth as ordinary legislative history. In the first place, the Commentary is written by the same Commission by means of the same processes as the Guidelines themselves. The Commentary was part of the original Guidelines package when it was presented to Congress; it forms part of the amendments that the Commission presents to Congress on a continuing basis. See Pub.L. No. 98-473 § 235, 98 Stat. 2031 (Oct. 12, 1984); 28 U.S.C. § 994(p).
Even a cursory review of the Guidelines Manual reveals that the Commentary is an integral part of the Guidelines package. There is Commentary preceding the Guidelines, following them, and before and after almost every section. It is often impossible to understand the Guidelines without reading the explanatory material contained in the Commentary. The dangers inherent in relying on legislative history simply do not apply here.
In fact, courts are required to consider the Commentary. Congress has mandated that “[t]he court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider ... any pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(a)(2)....” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (emphasis added). The Commission, in turn, has explained that the Commentary “is to be treated as the legal equivalent of a policy statement.” Guidelines § 1B1.7. It would be reversible error for a district court to refuse to consider Guidelines Commentary when imposing *648sentence;1 surely, the same is true of the court of appeals.
The majority downgrades the Commentary to the status of a secondary interpretive aid, and thereby weakens an important tool the Commission could otherwise use to clarify and fine tune its views. See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual Appendix C (1989) (amending the Commentary to many sections). This result is particularly troubling because at least two other circuits have come out the other way. The Third Circuit in United States v. Ofchinick, 877 F.2d 251, 257 (3d Cir.1989), concluded:
[T]he Sentencing Commission issued both the guidelines and the commentary in its official Guidelines Manual. This is not the usual case in which we are asked to accept legislative history such as committee reports, or even testimony of a witness before a committee, to determine the intent of Congress as a whole.
See also United States v. Smeathers, 884 F.2d 363, 364 (8th Cir.1989) (“In the context of the sentencing guidelines, the commentary accompanying each section of the guidelines reflects the intent of the United States Sentencing Commission.”).
By taking the contrary approach, the majority creates a conflict with what I believe is the correct view of our sister circuits. This is a serious matter. As this case illustrates, whether the Commentary is treated as an integrated portion of the Guidelines or as a secondary source can affect the outcome of a large number of sentencing issues. It undermines the philosophy of the Guidelines — which call for nationwide uniformity in sentencing — for circuits to take inconsistent positions on this key issue.
Ill
The majority has another reason for refusing to read section 3B1.1 in a way consistent with the Commentary: it “would lead to undesirable results.” Majority op. at 646. The majority argues that Anderson deserves more punishment because he involved a second person in his crime. By misleading Hambley, Anderson did indeed escalate the dangers he created; the majority may be right that Anderson deserves more punishment. But it is not the purpose of section 3B1.1 to punish such behavior. Criminals who commit crimes against multiple victims also increase the risks involved, and deserve more punishment, but that doesn’t justify calling them “leaders” just so we can give them an increased sentence; section 3B1.1 just isn’t relevant. Similarly, section 3B1.1 isn’t relevant in the present case, where Anderson wasn’t leading any criminals.
Unfortunately, the Guidelines do not seem to cover Anderson’s situation; there is no explicit provision for an increased sentence as a result of involving additional individuals through trickery where there are no other participants.2 The district court might therefore have been justified in making an upward departure from the prescribed Guidelines sentence. See Guide*649lines § 5K2.0. But this is no excuse for relying on an inapplicable provision.
It is, in fact, the majority’s reading of section 3B1.1 that may lead to unfortunate results. Anderson is right that under the majority’s interpretation, section 3Bl.l(c) would apply equally to the taking of hostages. After all, hostages are individuals over whom the criminal has control. Criminals who take hostages surely deserve more punishment, but section 3B1.1 simply is not the appropriate mechanism.
The majority seems to acknowledge that the hostage situation would be covered by its rationale, but dismisses the possibility by suggesting that a sentencing judge will be able to tell the difference between a hostage and one who is duped. Majority op. at 645. But how would the judge be justified in making such a distinction in light of the majority’s opinion? Force and fraud are two sides of the same coin; if one who is duped into participation may form part of a criminal enterprise for purposes of section 3B1.1, why shouldn’t one who is forced? There is no meaningful distinction. Under a proper reading, those without criminal responsibility are simply not part of a criminal organization or enterprise. Section 3B1.1 does not apply in either situation.
Conclusion
The Sentencing Guidelines impose an elaborate system of rules on federal judges where previously there was discretion. In working our way through this complex network, the federal courts need all the help they can get. The Sentencing Commission has provided its Commentary as an integral component of the sentencing process. The majority has degraded this crucial source of guidance. I respectfully dissent.

. See United States v. Restrepo, 884 F.2d 1294, 1296 (9th Cir.1989) (“The Commentary interprets the Guidelines and explains their application. Failure by a trial judge to follow the Commentary may constitute an incorrect application of the Guidelines.”) (citations omitted).

. The majority argues that section 3B 1.1(c) does contemplate leadership of those who are duped. The majority points to Application Note 2, which explains that the use of the "unknowing services” of outsiders may be relevant to sentence enhancement. Majority op. at 645 n. 3. But Note 2 refers only to cases where there is an “otherwise extensive" criminal organization, a criterion for enhancement under sections 3B1.-1(a) and (b), but not (c). Nonetheless, the majority concludes that “[i]f involving dupes can be the basis for added offense levels in (a) and (b), there is no reason to exclude consideration of involving such a person under (c).” Id. Of course there is. Note 2 is concerned with the definition of “otherwise extensive.” That phrase does not appear in section 3Bl.l(c). As the majority recognizes, under “the basic principles of statutory construction as set forth in Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23, 104 S.Ct. 296, 300-01, 78 L.Ed.2d 17 (1983),” majority op. at 644, when language is included in one section of a statute and excluded from another the difference is presumed to be intentional. We must therefore conclude that section 3B 1.1(c) has nothing to do with otherwise extensive organizations and that Application Note 2 is irrelevant to its interpretation. You can’t have it both ways.