Court Opinion

ID: 9761584
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:46:25.79797+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:24.754133
License: Public Domain

FRIEDMAN, Judge,
Concurring and Dissenting.
Like the majority, I would dismiss the petition for review in this ease; thus, I concur in the result. However, I respectfully dissent because I believe that the majority has misconstrued the rule of law governing the exhaustion of administrative remedies. Based on my understanding of the doctrine, I conclude that it was not necessary for Larry Pitt & Associates, P.C. and Larry Pitt, Esquire (Petitioners) to exhaust their administrative remedies *1103before filing their petition for review in this case. Thus, unlike the majority, I would overrule Respondents’ preliminary objection challenging the subject matter jurisdiction of this court. As to Respondents’ demurrer, for the reasons set forth below, I would sustain the preliminary objection and dismiss the petition for review.
I. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
In cases involving constitutional issues, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recognized three exceptions to the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine. Empire Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Resources, 546 Pa. 315, 684 A.2d 1047 (1996).
The first exception is where the jurisdiction of an agency is challenged. The second exception is where the constitutionality of a statutory scheme or its validity is challenged. The third exception is where the legal or equitable remedies are unavailable or inadequate, or the administrative agency is unable to provide the requested relief.
Id. at 331, 684 A.2d at 1054 (citations omitted). Because I believe that the second and third exceptions are applicable here, I would overrule Respondents’ preliminary objection to this court’s subject matter jurisdiction.
A. Second Exception
With respect to the second exception, our supreme court has stated that the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine will not bar a court’s equitable intervention where there is both a substantial question of constitutionality and the absence of an adequate statutory remedy. Commonwealth ex rel. Nicholas v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 545 Pa. 288, 681 A.2d 157 (1996). A substantial constitutional challenge is a challenge to the validity of the statute’s scheme or remedy and not simply a challenge to the application of the statute to a particular party. See Cherry v. City of Philadelphia, 547 Pa. 679, 692 A.2d 1082 (1997); Rochester & Pittsburgh Coal Company v. Board of Assessment and Revision of Taxes of Indiana County, 438 Pa. 506, 266 A.2d 78 (1970); Pennsylvania Institutional Health Services, Inc. v. Department of Corrections, 158 Pa.Cmwlth. 221, 631 A.2d 767 (1993), aff'd, 536 Pa. 544, 640 A.2d 413 (1994); and Giffin v. Chronister, 151 Pa.Cmwlth. 286, 616 A.2d 1070 (1992). An administrative remedy is inadequate if it either (1) does not allow for adjudication of the issue raised or (2) allows irreparable harm to occur to the plaintiffs during the pursuit of the statutory remedy. Commonwealth ex rel. Nicholas.
Here, Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of the scheme set forth in section 442 of the Workers’ Compensation Act1 (Act), arguing that it violates the separation of powers doctrine by allowing officials of the executive branch of government to review contingency fee agreements between attorneys and their clients. Therefore, Petitioners have set forth a substantial constitutional challenge. Moreover, Petitioners do not have an adequate administrative remedy in this case because the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (WCAB) may not adjudicate the constitutionality of a provision of the Act. See Berninger v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (East Hempfield Township), 761 A.2d 218 (Pa.Cmwlth.2000) (stating that the WCAB has no jurisdiction to determine the constitutional validity of its own enabling legislation), appeal denied, 565 Pa. 650, 771 A.2d 1287 (2001). Inexplicably, the majority does *1104not address the second exception to the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine. Nevertheless, because the second exception applies in this case, Respondents’ preliminary objection to the subject matter jurisdiction of this court should be overruled.
B. Third Exception
With respect to the third exception, our supreme court has stated that a litigant must exhaust administrative remedies if the litigant “can achieve full relief in front of the agency” or if the litigant has “a forum through which it could obtain the very relief it ultimately desires.” County of Berks ex rel. Baldwin v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 544 Pa. 541, 551-52, 678 A.2d 355, 360 (1996). In County of Berks, which the majority relies upon here, the court held that the County could obtain the very relief it ultimately desired with respect to the constitutional issues presented. The court explained its holding as follows.2
The County .... can attain from the PRLB the remedies it requests. In resolving the County’s pending petition for unit clarification, the PLRB could, for example, divide the unit into two units, one consisting of assistant district attorneys and the other consisting of assistant public defenders. Such a remedy could fully address the County’s concerns raised in Count I that the combined bargaining unit could violate the Sixth Amendment rights of criminal defendants.3 Furthermore, the PLRB could accept the County’s contention that all members of the bargaining unit are managerial and/or confidential employees who are precluded from joining any bargaining unit under PERA. This would provide the County with the remedy that PERA would not be applied to the assistant district attorneys or the assistant public defenders; such a remedy would render moot any concerns the County has over whether application of PERA to these parties infringes on this court’s exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation of attorneys.
Id. at 551-52, 678 A.2d at 360. In other words, County of Berks stands for the proposition that, where an administrative agency can fashion a remedy that would cure the alleged constitutional infirmities, the remedy provides “full relief.”
In contrast to the PLRB in County of Berks, the WCAB in this case cannot provide “full relief’ or “the very relief’ Petitioners ultimately desire. Petitioners ask this court (1) to declare the executive branch’s review of contingent fee agreements under section 442 of the Act to be unconstitutional, (2) to enjoin the executive branch from interfering with such agreements in workers’ compensation matters and (3) to direct the payment of attorney fees pursuant to the agreements. Because the WCAB cannot adjudicate the constitutionality of a provision of the Act, Beminger, it is obvious that the WCAB could not declare its authority to review contingent fee agreements provided by section 442 unconstitutional. Therefore, it could not enjoin itself from reviewing such agreements. Just as obvious, it could not enforce those same agreements. Because the WCAB cannot provide “full relief’ here, the third exception to the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine applies. For this reason also, the prelimi*1105nary objection to this court’s subject matter jurisdiction should be overruled.4
Inasmuch as I would overrule Respondents’ first preliminary objection, I will address Respondents’ second preliminary objection, which is in the nature of a demurrer.
II. Separation of Powers
In their petition for review, Petitioners argue that section 442 of the Act violates the separation of powers doctrine because, in authorizing officials in the executive branch of government to interfere with an attorney’s contingency fee agreement, it infringes upon the exclusive power of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to regulate the practice of law in Pennsylvania. I disagree.
Article V, section 10(c) of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides as follows:
The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules .... for admission to the bar and to practice law .... if such rules are consistent with this Constitution and neither abridge, enlarge nor modify the substantive rights of any litigant.All laws shall be suspended to the extent that they are inconsistent with rules prescribed under these provisions.
Pa. Const, art. V, § 10(c) (emphasis added). Pursuant to Article V, section 10(c), our supreme court has promulgated the Pennsylvania Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement. See Pa. R.D.E. 103.
Rule 203(a) states: “Acts or omissions [by an attorney] .... which violate the Disciplinary Rules, shall constitute misconduct and shall be grounds for discipline. ....” Pa. R.D.E. 203(a). Rule 102(a) indicates that the phrase “Disciplinary Rules” refers to the provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Pa. R.D.E. 102(a). Rule 1.5(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct (emphasis added) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(c) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the service is rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by paragraph (d) or other law.....
The comment to Rule 1.5 explains: “Applicable law may impose limitations on contingent fees, such as a ceiling on the percentage.”
Thus, in prescribing general rules for the practice of law under the Pennsylvania Constitution, our supreme court has decided to prohibit contingent fees in particular cases.5 However, the court also has decided that, where the legislature believes it is necessary, for policy reasons, to further restrict contingent fees, the legislature may enact laws providing more specific regulation. As an example, the comment to Rule 1.5 states that the legislature may set a ceiling on the contingency fee percentage.
Here, in section 442 of the Act, the legislature set a twenty percent ceiling on the contingency fee percentage in workers’ compensation cases, with the possibility of a greater percentage for cause shown. Section 442 of the Act, 77 P.S. § 998 (emphasis added), provides:
*1106All counsel fees, agreed upon by claimant and his attorneys, for services performed in matters before any workers’ compensation judge or the board, whether or not allowed as part of a judgment, shall be approved by the workers’ compensation judge or board as the case may be, providing the counsel fees do not exceed twenty per centum of the amount awarded. The official conducting any hearing, upon cause shown, may allow a reasonable attorney fee exceeding twenty per centum of the amount awarded at the discretion of the hearing official.
This is not a violation of the separation of powers doctrine because, under Rule 1.5(c), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court explicitly permits legislation like section 442 of the Act.
Accordingly, although I would overrule Respondents’ preliminary objection to this court’s subject matter jurisdiction, I would sustain Respondents’ preliminary objection in the nature of demurrer and dismiss the petition for review.

. Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. § 998.

. I note that the majority opinion quotes extensively from County of Berks but omits the Supreme Court’s analysis as to whether there was an adequate administrative remedy. (See Majority op. at 1099.)

. The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution pertains to the right to counsel in criminal proceedings.

. In addressing the third exception, the majority states that Petitioners have an adequate remedy before the WCAB because the WCAB could award Petitioners the attorney fees set forth in their contingency fee agreements on some other grounds. (Majority op. at 1101.) However, this would not provide Petitioners “full relief.” Petitioners want an order de-daring a dedsion of the WCAB relating to attorney fees to be unconstitutional and enjoining such decisions in the future.