Court Opinion

ID: 9481446
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:19:07.799526+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:48:19.184518
License: Public Domain

BUCKLEY, Circuit Judge, concurring:
I concur in all but the court’s discussion of the legislative history of section 1105(c). As the court readily acknowledges, we deal here with statutory language that is clear on its face, and with an agency interpretation that is consistent with that language. I see no need to probe further. “[W]here, as here, the statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms[,]” United States v. Ron Pair Enterps., Inc., 109 S.Ct. 1026, 1030 (1989) (internal quotes and citation omitted); when “the terms of a statute [are] unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete,” Burlington No. R.R. Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, 481 U.S. 454, 461 (1987) (internal quotes and citation omitted).
As it is, the court’s reading of the legislative tea leaves matches speculation (appellants’) against speculation (the court’s) in an attempt to divine what Congress might have had in mind when, in 1972, it deleted the minimum price provision from the section. In my view, the only reliable evidence of the section’s meaning is its language. As the court acknowledges, that language is unambiguous. Moreover, Congress used a formulation (“notwithstanding any other provision of law”) that, as the court points out, we have consistently found to mean what it says. That should have been the end of our inquiry.
I disassociate myself from the court’s consultation of legislative history not only because it is unnecessary, but because I am wary of the practice. The legislative process lends itself to manipulation, and the clues to statutory meaning on which courts are prone to rely can mislead as well as illuminate.