Court Opinion

ID: 9602338
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:53:18.982602+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:02.786159
License: Public Domain

*389Hill, Chief Justice,
concurring.
I write to emphasize that the charge at issue in this case created a mandatory but rebuttable presumption, as did the charge in issue in the recent decision of Francis v. Franklin, 471 U. S__(105 SC 1965, 85 LE2d 344) (1985), see 105 SC at 1977. In contrast, the charge at issue in Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U. S. 73 (103 SC 969, 74 LE2d 823) (1983), created a mandatory conclusive presumption. This is significant because the plurality in Connecticut v. Johnson, supra, views a conclusive presumption on the issue of intent as the functional equivalent of a directed verdict on that issue. Id. 103 SC at 976. In contrast, while a mandatory rebuttable presumption is unconstitutional because it is burden-shifting, it is not the functional equivalent of a directed verdict. Francis v. Franklin, supra, 105 SC at 1973. For that reason, I conclude that even if a mandatory conclusive presumption is reversible error as a matter of law except for certain “rare situations” in which the reviewing court can be confident that the presumption did not play any role in the jury’s verdict, Connecticut v. Johnson, supra, 103 SC at 977, a mandatory rebuttable presumption is a form of instructional error that should be analyzed for harmlessness under Chapman v. California, 368 U. S. 18 (87 SC 824, 17 LE2d 705) (1967).
Here the victim was beaten over the head with a blunt instrument at least 10 times, and his house was set on fire; the victim died from the combination of skull injuries and smoke inhalation. The disputed issue here was not whether the assailant intended to kill the victim, as in Francis v. Franklin and Connecticut v. Johnson, supra, but whether it was the defendant or his companion who inflicted the wounds and started the fire. The jury found the defendant guilty of the victim’s murder, and there was ample evidence to support their verdict.
Under Chapman v. California, supra, constitutional error does not require reversal unless there is a reasonable possibility that it contributed to the conviction; put conversely, constitutional error does require reversal unless the reviewing court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that it did not contribute to the verdict. Having reviewed the evidence and the charge in this case, I ám satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the complained of language as to intent did not contribute to Williams’ conviction for murder.