Court Opinion

ID: 9418698
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 22:35:37.722317+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:49:53.349604
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Holmes,
dissenting.
The appellant, a New Jersey corporation, has a part of its lines in and over New Jersey roads and other public places, and transmits over them messages to places both *350within the State and outside. For allowing this privilege the State charges á price in the form of a tax of five per cent, on such proportion of the gross receipts from all the work- done in the State as the lines in the public places bear to the total lines in the State. There are no lines outside. The lines in public places are more than half the total lines. The interstate business is less than a third of the intrastate. I think the tax constitutional. I call it the price for a privilege, because that is what the Courts of the State pronounce it to be, North Jersey Street R. Co. v. Jersey City, 73 N. J. L. 481, 484 ; 74 N. J. L. 761, 763, 765, because on the statutes I think it plainly to be such, and because a statute must be assumed to rest on any and every ground that will support it, except so far as excluded by specific facts.
What then is to hinder New Jersey from charging a reasonable price for something that the appellant cannot have without her consent? It is said that the hindrance lies in the fact that a part of the burden falls on interstate commerce. I am content to assume that if the State were attempting to discriminate against such commerce and using its fight as a disguise, the attempt would fail. A right specifically protected by the Constitution may become a wrong when used to carry out an unlawful scheme. But there is nothing of that sort here. The tax is in lieu of all other taxes on intangible property, which the privilege is held to be in New Jersey. The reference to gross earnings to ascertain the value is legitimate. Cudahy Packing Co. v. Minnesota, 246 U. S. 450. The proportion is prima facie reasonable, especially in view of the proportions between -the lengths of the lines and between state and interstate business. It fairly may be supposed that the lines over the streets do their full share of the work. Furthermore, the only objections to the tax raised in the record by the appellants are objections to the tax as a whole in so far as it may touch receipts from interstate *351business, not to the proportion adopted. And so I think that the incidence of a part of the tax on interstate commerce, if any such there be, “ does not constitute a direct and material burden ” upon it. Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610, 622; United States Express Co. v. Minnesota, 223 U. S. 335.
I do not think names of any importance in this case, and do not discuss whether the tax is to be called a property tax upon an easement, a franchise tax upon an incorporeal hereditament as it is called in New Jersey, a license tax, or by some other title. If the statute fixes a price for what the appellant needs the State’s permission to use, I think it within New Jersey’s constitutional power. “ Even interstate commerce must pay its way.” Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v. Richmond, 249 U. S. 252, 259.
Mr. Justice Brandéis agrees with this opinion.