Court Opinion

ID: 9403491
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-21 14:09:08.162824+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:07.512495
License: Public Domain

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
                           In The Supreme Court

              In the Matter of the Care and Treatment of Francis Arthur
              Oxner, Petitioner.

              Appellate Case No. 2020-001278

         ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS

                          Appeal from Lexington County
                    Diane Schafer Goodstein, Circuit Court Judge

                               Opinion No. 28160
                    Heard March 15, 2022 – Filed June 21, 2023

                                   AFFIRMED

              Blake Terence Williams and Allen Mattison Bogan, of
              Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP; Chief
              Appellate Defender Robert Michael Dudek and Appellate
              Defender David Alexander, all of Columbia, for
              Petitioner.

              Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior
              Assistant Deputy Attorney General Deborah R.J. Shupe,
              both of Columbia, for Respondent.

JUSTICE FEW: For the first time, this Court considers a Sexually Violent
Predator Act1 case arising under subsection 44-48-100(B) of the South Carolina

1
    S.C. Code Ann. §§ 44-48-10 to -170 (2018).
Code (2018). In all our prior sexually violent predator cases, the person the State
sought to have committed had been convicted in criminal court of a sexually violent
crime as a predicate to commencement of civil commitment proceedings under the
Act. Subsection 44-48-100(B) applies when a person cannot be convicted in a
criminal court because he is not competent to stand trial. The subsection requires
that before the State may proceed to a trial to commit such person as a sexually
violent predator, "the [circuit] court first shall hear evidence and determine whether
the person committed the act or acts with which he is charged." § 44-48-100(B). If
the circuit court determines after such a hearing the person did commit the charged
acts, then the State may take the civil commitment proceedings to trial. Id. The
circuit court in this case found Francis Arthur Oxner committed the acts with which
he was charged. On appeal, Oxner claims a lengthy delay before his subsection 44-
48-100(B) hearing violated his right to a speedy trial, the fact he was never convicted
precludes proceedings under the Act, and conducting the subsection 44-48-100(B)
hearing while he was incompetent violated his due process rights. We affirm.

      I.     Facts and Procedural History

In 2005, the State indicted Oxner for first degree criminal sexual conduct with a
minor, assault with intent to commit first degree criminal sexual conduct (two
counts), buggery, and exposure of private parts in a lewd and lascivious manner.
The State's forensic psychiatrist found Oxner incompetent to stand trial, so the State
dismissed the indictments without prejudice.2 From 2005 until 2011, pursuant to
several probate court orders, Oxner was hospitalized at the South Carolina
Department of Mental Health for treatment of his mental illnesses, which included
Schizophrenia (Paranoid Type) and Schizotypal Personality traits.

In May 2011, the Department recommended Oxner be transferred to a residential
care facility. As required by subsection 44-48-40(A)(1) of the South Carolina Code
(2018), the Department notified the multidisciplinary team and the Attorney General
of the recommended transfer. The State filed a petition in circuit court on July 11,
2011, requesting the court make a probable cause determination as to whether Oxner
qualifies as a sexually violent predator under the Act. On August 16, 2011, the
circuit court issued an order finding probable cause to believe Oxner qualifies as a

2
 To accomplish this, the assistant solicitor wrote "DNP with leave to re-indict if Δ
becomes competent" on the original of each indictment—presumably meaning "do
not prosecute . . ." or "dismiss/nolle prosse . . ."—and signed her name.
sexually violent predator. The circuit court ordered a hearing pursuant to subsection
44-48-100(B).3

The circuit court did not conduct the subsection 44-48-100(B) hearing until April
21, 2016. The court found Oxner "committed the act for which he was charged,"
"remains incompetent to stand trial," and "probable cause exists to have [him]
evaluated under the Act to determine whether or not he suffers from a mental
abnormality or personality disorder that makes him likely to engage in acts of sexual
violence if not confined." Oxner immediately appealed the May 18, 2016 final order
pursuant to subsection 44-48-100(B),4 and the court of appeals affirmed. In re Care
& Treatment of Oxner, 430 S.C. 555, 846 S.E.2d 365 (Ct. App. 2020). We granted
Oxner's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals' opinion. We
affirm the court of appeals.

      II.    Delay of the Subsection 44-48-100(B) Hearing

Oxner argues he was denied the right to a speedy trial because there was "an
unexplained, four-year delay" between the initiation of sexually violent predator
proceedings in 2011 and the subsection 44-48-100(B) hearing in 2016. The court of
appeals declined to address this issue, holding the issue was unpreserved. 430 S.C.
at 565-66, 846 S.E.2d at 371. While we are troubled by this unexplained and clearly
unnecessary delay, we agree with the court of appeals. Oxner did not raise the
timeliness issue until the end of the subsection 44-48-100(B) hearing in April 2016.
The circuit court did not address the issue at that point and did not rule on the issue
in its final order. Oxner did not file a Rule 59(e) motion asking the court to address
the issue. Therefore, whether Oxner was denied the right to a speedy trial because
of the delay is not preserved for our review. See In re Michael H., 360 S.C. 540,
546, 602 S.E.2d 729, 732 (2004) ("In order to preserve an issue for appeal, it must
be raised to and ruled upon by the trial court." (emphasis added) (citing Wilder Corp.
v. Wilke, 330 S.C. 71, 497 S.E.2d 731 (1998))).

3
 In 2014, the State re-indicted Oxner for assault with the intent to commit first
degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor, and in 2015, the State re-indicted
Oxner for first degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor under the age of eleven.
4
  "If, after the conclusion of the hearing on this issue, the court finds beyond a
reasonable doubt that the person committed the act or acts with which he is charged,
the court must enter a final order, appealable by the person, on that issue . . . ." § 44-
48-100(B).
      III.   "Convicted of a sexually violent offense"

Oxner contends he could not be subject to proceedings under the Act because he did
not meet the Act's definition of a sexually violent predator. The Act defines a
"sexually violent predator" as a person who "(a) has been convicted of a sexually
violent offense; and (b) suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder
that makes the person likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if not confined in a
secure facility for long-term control, care, and treatment." § 44-48-30(1). Oxner
argues he has never been "convicted of a sexually violent offense."

The phrase "convicted of a sexually violent offense," however, is a defined term
under the Act. The definition includes, of course, persons who have been criminally
convicted of their crimes. § 44-48-30(6)(a)-(b). The definition also includes a
person who "has . . . been charged but determined to be incompetent to stand trial
for a sexually violent offense." § 44-48-30(6)(c). We have acknowledged this
definition before, stating, "The use of the word 'conviction' is somewhat misleading
. . . since under the Act it includes persons charged but found incompetent to stand
trial, those found not guilty by reason of insanity, and those found guilty but mentally
ill." In re Care & Treatment of Matthews, 345 S.C. 638, 649-50, 550 S.E.2d 311,
316 (2001). While Oxner does not meet the colloquial meaning of "convicted of a
sexually violent offense," he meets the statutory definition. Therefore, we agree
with the court of appeals that he was subject to sexually violent predator
proceedings.

The fact Oxner's charges were dismissed in 2005 makes no difference to this
conclusion.5 For purposes of the "convicted of a sexually violent offense"

5
   Oxner argues he did not meet the subsection 44-48-30(6)(c) requirement of "has
. . . been charged" because the 2005 charges were "nolle prossed." He wrote in his
brief, "For legal purposes, at that juncture it was the same as if Oxner had never been
'charged' since the nolle prosequi had extinguished the legal effect of the charges."
Oxner relies on Mackey v. State, 357 S.C. 666, 595 S.E.2d 241 (2004). In that case,
we vacated the petitioner's convictions and sentences because his indictments had
been dismissed and the State did not re-indict him before his criminal trial. 357 S.C.
at 668, 595 S.E.2d at 242-43. In the course of explaining that the State may not
proceed to a criminal trial after the dismissal of an indictment unless the defendant
is re-indicted, we stated, "We adopt a specific, bright-line rule that . . . treats
charges nol prossed as if they never existed . . . ." 357 S.C. at 669, 595 S.E.2d at
243. Oxner argues the words we used in Mackey require us to find he "has [not]
requirement, it is sufficient that Oxner had been charged in 2005, found incompetent
to stand trial, and re-indicted in 2014 and 2015 before the subsection 44-48-100(B)
hearing in 2016.

      IV.    Due Process Challenge

Finally, Oxner argues the subsection 44-48-100(B) hearing violated his due process
rights because he was unable to assist counsel in representing him due to severe
incompetence. He challenges "whether the constitutional guarantees to due process
and the effective assistance of counsel can be sufficiently afforded in a proceeding
under § 44-48-100(B) where the accused is incompetent and unable to assist
counsel." The court of appeals rejected this argument and held the Act "includes
significant procedural safeguards that protect an incompetent person from the risk
of an erroneous deprivation of his personal liberty interests, while addressing the
State's compelling interests in providing treatment for sexually violent predators and
protecting the public." 430 S.C. at 569, 846 S.E.2d at 373. We agree.

"The United States Supreme Court 'repeatedly has recognized that civil commitment
for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due
process protection.'" In re Care & Treatment of Chapman, 419 S.C. 172, 179, 796
S.E.2d 843, 846 (2017) (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425, 99 S. Ct.
1804, 1809, 60 L. Ed. 2d 323, 330-31 (1979)). However, "Due Process is not a
technical concept with fixed parameters unrelated to time, place, and circumstances;
rather, it is a flexible concept that calls for such procedural protections as the
situation demands." State v. Legg, 416 S.C. 9, 13, 785 S.E.2d 369, 371 (2016) (citing
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334, 96 S. Ct. 893, 902, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18, 33
(1976)).

been charged" under subsection 44-48-30(6)(c). We disagree. First, "nolle
prosequi" is not a term of art; it is simply an archaic way to describe a dismissal
without prejudice. See Fortune v. State, 428 S.C. 545, 551 n.1, 837 S.E.2d 37, 40
n.1 (2019) ("'Nolle prosse' is a shortened version of the archaic Latin term
'nolle prosequi.' In plain, modern English, the term means 'to have (a case)
dismissed.'" (quoting Nolle prosequi, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019))).
Under Mackey, the dismissal of the 2005 indictments meant the State could not
proceed to a criminal trial without re-indicting Oxner. There is nothing in Mackey,
however, or in subsection 44-48-30(6)(c), that prevented the State from seeking a
subsection 44-48-100(B) determination that Oxner "committed the act or acts with
which he is charged" because—"at that juncture"—he "ha[d] been charged."
When a person charged with a sexually violent crime is incompetent, the person
cannot be tried in a court of general sessions. Nevertheless, the State has a
significant interest in protecting the public from sexually violent people who
threaten the health and welfare of the public, especially children. See, e.g.,
Addington, 441 U.S. at 426, 99 S. Ct. at 1809, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 331 (noting "the state
also has authority under its police power to protect the community from the
dangerous tendencies of some who are mentally ill"). Because the State's right and
obligation to protect the public is hindered by the inability to criminally try an
incompetent person, the State's only option is to proceed under the Act and seek
involuntary civil commitment of the person. This is precisely the reason the General
Assembly excluded "the right not to be tried while incompetent" from the
constitutional rights available to persons under the Act but granted every other right
available to criminal defendants. S.C. Code Ann. § 44-48-100(B) (providing "all
constitutional rights available to defendants at criminal trials, other than the right not
to be tried while incompetent, apply" in a subsection 44-48-100(B) hearing).
Without the exclusion of this right, the State is unable to protect the public from
some dangerous sexually violent persons.

While Oxner certainly has the right to due process during his subsection 44-48-
100(B) hearing, his due process rights are satisfied by the safeguards articulated in
the Act.6 While these procedural safeguards may not be perfect, any potential
defects are reasonable in light of the circumstance that Oxner is not competent to
stand a criminal trial. Under the very specific procedures outlined in the statute, the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of Oxner's—any incompetent person's—liberty

6
  For instance, subsection 44-48-100(B) requires compliance with the rules of
evidence, provides all constitutional rights available at criminal trials (except the
competency requirement), requires various findings the circuit court must make
before determining whether the person committed the acts, allows the right to appeal
those findings before being tried, and requires the application of the highest burden
of proof. S.C. Code Ann. § 44-48-100(B). In addition, section 44-48-90 of the South
Carolina Code (2018) grants the right to a jury trial on the ultimate question of
whether the person is a sexually violent predator, permits additional expert witnesses
paid for by the State if the circuit court finds it necessary, and guarantees experts
have access to the individual and his records. Finally, if the person is tried and
subsequently committed as a sexually violent predator, the person has the ability to
petition the circuit court for release from commitment at any time. S.C. Code Ann.
§ 44-48-110 (2018).
interest by involuntary civil commitment is significantly reduced if not completely
eliminated. See United States v. White, 927 F.3d 257, 265 (4th Cir. 2019)
(considering a due process challenge to the federal SVP commitment scheme and
concluding "that the risk of an erroneous deprivation of [the person's] liberty interest
is substantially and adequately mitigated by the broad array of procedures required"
by the statute).

      V.     Conclusion

We find the circuit court did not err in finding Oxner "committed the act or acts with
which he is charged" under subsection 44-48-100(B). We remand the case to the
circuit court for "a trial to determine whether [Oxner] is a sexually violent predator"
as required by subsection 44-48-90(A) of the South Carolina Code (2018).

AFFIRMED.

BEATTY, C.J., KITTREDGE, JAMES, JJ., and Acting Justice Kaye G.
Hearn, concur.