Court Opinion

ID: 9897224
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:08:52.870339+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:46.518450
License: Public Domain

IN THE

  Indiana Supreme Court
           Supreme Court Case No. 22S-PL-307
                                                            FILED
             Conroad Associates, L.P.,                  Mar 24 2023, 9:03 am
                          Appellant
                                                            CLERK
                                                        Indiana Supreme Court
                                                           Court of Appeals
                                                             and Tax Court
                             –v–

Castleton Corner Owners Association, Inc. and
               McKinley, Inc.,
                          Appellees

    Argued: November 15, 2022 | Decided: March 24, 2023

           Appeal from the Marion Superior Court
                  No. 49D05-1612-PL-44978
          The Honorable John M.T. Chavis, II, Judge

   On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals
                       No. 21A-PL-1125

               Opinion by Chief Justice Rush
          Justices Massa, Slaughter, and Goff concur.
               Justice Molter not participating.
Rush, Chief Justice.

   Jurisdictional rules ensure finality and certainty in the administration of
justice. One such rule, Appellate Rule 8, erects a jurisdictional fence
between the trial court and the appellate court—preventing parties from
pursuing similar relief in different courts at the same time. Under Rule 8,
once a final judgment is appealed and the clerk certifies completion of the
record, the trial court has no authority to interfere with the subject matter
of that appeal until it is terminated.

   Here, the trial court issued three orders: one amending a damages
award pursuant to remand instructions from a prior appeal, and two
resolving issues that were pending on appeal. The parties only dispute the
validity of the latter two orders. Applying Appellate Rule 8, we hold that
the trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue those orders because, in each, the
court directly interfered with the subject matter pending on appeal. We
therefore affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

Facts and Procedural History
   The present appeal is the third in this case, which finds its genesis in a
dispute involving a faulty sanitary lift station that serviced “various
shopping centers and stand-alone buildings” in Indianapolis. In 2015,
Castleton Corner Owners Association, Inc. (the “Association”) was the
property management entity responsible for operating and maintaining
the lift station when it malfunctioned, flooding a building owned by
Conroad Associates, L.P., with raw sewage. As a result, Conroad sued the
Association.

  Following a 2019 bench trial, the trial court found in Conroad’s favor
and ordered the Association to pay $213,288.70 in damages. Conroad
swiftly moved for proceedings supplemental to enforce the judgment. But
about two weeks later, the Association moved to stay execution of the
judgment. Shortly after the trial court denied the Association’s motion, it
appealed, and Conroad cross-appealed (“Conroad I”). The Association,
however, did not file an appeal bond that would have stayed enforcement
prior to Conroad I’s resolution. See Ind. Trial Rule 62(D). After Conroad

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-PL-307 | March 24, 2023          Page 2 of 9
filed a second motion for proceedings supplemental, the trial court held a
hearing and then issued an order (“Proceedings Supplemental Order”) to
satisfy the judgment. In that order, the court transferred to Conroad the
lift station, related easement interests, and “all other assets of the
Association.” Then, after the court denied the Association’s motion to
reconsider, Conroad recorded its interest in the assets with the Marion
County Recorder.

   With Conroad I still pending, the Association filed a notice appealing
the Proceedings Supplemental Order (“Conroad II”). On July 14, the Notice
of Completion of the Clerk’s Record was noted in the Chronological Case
Summary, vesting jurisdiction over that appeal in the Court of Appeals.
See Ind. Appellate Rule 8. Shortly thereafter, however, the Association
filed for bankruptcy—staying Conroad II.

    About three months later, the Court of Appeals resolved Conroad I by
affirming the Association’s liability but remanding to the trial court with
instructions to reduce Conroad’s damages to $164,640.70. Castleton Corner
Owners Ass’n, Inc. v. Conroad Assocs., L.P., 159 N.E.3d 604, 615 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2020), trans. not sought. Following certification of that opinion, the
Association deposited a check with the Marion County Clerk in the
amount of $183,082.69—reflecting the revised judgment and post-
judgment interest—to be held in escrow. That same day, the Association
filed a motion requesting the trial court to (1) amend the damages award
pursuant to Conroad I’s remand instructions, (2) order the Marion County
Clerk to disburse the held funds to Conroad in full satisfaction of the total
judgment, and (3) vacate the Proceedings Supplemental Order.

   With Conroad II still pending—and following the lift of the bankruptcy
stay and a hearing on the Association’s motion—the trial court, in May
2021, issued three orders adopting verbatim the Association’s proposed
language (“May 2021 Orders”). The first order amended the underlying
judgment “consistent with the Appellate Decision” to $164,640.70, the
second order directed the Association’s check be disbursed to Conroad,
and the third order vacated the Proceedings Supplemental Order as moot.
Two days later, the Association moved to voluntarily dismiss Conroad II.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-PL-307 | March 24, 2023         Page 3 of 9
The Court of Appeals granted that motion, dismissing the appeal with
prejudice.

   Conroad subsequently filed this third appeal, contending in part that
the trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue the May 2021 orders because
Conroad II remained pending at the time. The Court of Appeals rejected
the argument and affirmed. Conroad Assocs., L.P. v. Castleton Corner Owners
Ass’n, Inc., 187 N.E.3d 885, 897–98 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022).

   Conroad petitioned for transfer, which we granted, vacating the Court
of Appeals’ opinion. App. R. 58(A).

Standard of Review
   The question before us is whether the trial court had jurisdiction to
issue the May 2021 Orders. We review such jurisdictional questions de
novo. In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d 574, 577 (Ind. 2017).

Discussion and Decision
   Though this appeal stems from a convoluted procedural history
leading to the trial court’s May 2021 Orders, a straightforward application
of Appellate Rule 8 dictates the outcome. That rule governs when and
how jurisdiction passes from the trial court to the appellate court,
instructing that the latter “acquires jurisdiction on the date the Notice of
Completion of Clerk’s Record is noted in the Chronological Case
Summary.” App. R. 8; see also App. R. 2(F). Generally, orders issued by a
trial court after this date are void. Crider v. Crider, 15 N.E.3d 1042, 1064
(Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.

   We initially note the trial court here had jurisdictional authority to issue
the Proceedings Supplemental Order while Conroad I was pending for two
reasons. First, trial courts retain authority to enforce a judgment so long as
that enforcement is not the subject matter of a pending appeal. See, e.g., id.
at 1064–65. And second, the Association did not file an appeal bond that
would have otherwise stayed proceedings supplemental. See T.R. 62(D).

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-PL-307 | March 24, 2023          Page 4 of 9
But whether the trial court had jurisdiction to issue the May 2021 Orders is
a different inquiry.

   Conroad II—the Association’s appeal of the Proceedings Supplemental
Order—was pending when the trial court issued the May 2021 Orders: the
first amended the judgment pursuant to Conroad I’s remand instructions,
the second declared satisfaction of judgment (“Satisfaction Order”), and
the third vacated the Proceedings Supplemental Order (“Vacatur Order”).
The parties do not dispute the validity of the first order, but Conroad
argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the latter two orders.
The Association disagrees, contending the court retained jurisdiction.

  We agree with Conroad. Applying Appellate Rule 8, we hold the trial
court lacked jurisdiction to issue the Satisfaction Order and the Vacatur
Order because each interfered with the subject matter of a pending appeal.
We therefore affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

I. Under Appellate Rule 8, the trial court lacked
   jurisdiction to issue the Satisfaction Order and the
   Vacatur Order.
   To explain why the trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue the
Satisfaction Order and the Vacatur Order, we first clarify when, and to
what extent, a trial court may amend a judgment that is pending on
appeal. We then apply those principles to the two orders at issue here.

   A. Trial courts retain authority over matters that do not
      interfere with the subject matter pending on appeal.
    As a general rule, trial courts may revisit a ruling when the matter
remains in fieri—in other words, pending judgment. In re Estate of Lewis,
123 N.E.3d 670, 673 (Ind. 2019). But once judgment is entered, an appeal is
filed, and the clerk’s record is complete, Appellate Rule 8 divests the trial
court of “jurisdiction to act upon the judgment appealed from until the
appeal has been terminated.” Schumacher v. Radiomaha, Inc., 619 N.E.2d
271, 273 (Ind. 1993). This rule serves an important purpose in that it
facilitates “the orderly presentation and disposition of appeals and

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-PL-307 | March 24, 2023          Page 5 of 9
prevents the confusing and awkward situation of having the trial and
appellate courts simultaneously reviewing the correctness of the
judgment.” Coulson v. Ind. & Mich. Elec. Co., 471 N.E.2d 278, 279 (Ind. 1984)
(quoting Donahue v. Watson, 413 N.E.2d 974, 976 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980))
(cleaned up).

   Despite Appellate Rule 8’s jurisdictional fence, trial courts nevertheless
retain authority “over matters which are independent of and do not
interfere with the subject matter of the appeal.” Crider, 15 N.E.3d at 1064–
65 (quoting Jernigan v. State, 894 N.E.2d 1044, 1046 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008));
see also Bradley v. State, 649 N.E.2d 100, 106 (Ind. 1995). Such independent
matters include “reassessing costs, correcting the record, or enforcing the
judgment.” Bradley, 649 N.E.2d at 106. Additionally, a trial court can
continue with trial during an interlocutory appeal of an order transferring
or refusing to transfer venue of a case. T.R. 75(E).

    Aside from these circumstances, Appellate Rule 37 enables litigants to
hurdle Rule 8’s jurisdictional fence by providing a mechanism for the trial
court to regain jurisdiction while an appeal is pending. Either party can
file a motion with the appellate court requesting the appeal be
“temporarily stayed and the case remanded to the trial court . . . for
further proceedings.” App. R. 37(A). And if the appellate court grants that
motion, the trial court “obtain[s] unlimited authority on remand,” unless
the order specifies otherwise. App. R. 37(B). We turn now to apply these
principles to the two orders at issue here.

   B. The Satisfaction Order and the Vacatur Order interfered
      with the subject matter pending on appeal.
   The Court of Appeals acquired jurisdiction over the Proceedings
Supplemental Order on July 14, 2020, when the Notice of Completion of
the Clerk’s Record was noted in the Chronological Case Summary. See
App. R. 8. And neither party filed a motion under Appellate Rule 37
requesting that appeal—Conroad II—be stayed and the case remanded to
the trial court. Yet, while Conroad II was pending, the trial court issued the
Satisfaction Order and the Vacatur Order. The question then is whether
these orders interfered with the subject matter of the pending appeal. We

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-PL-307 | March 24, 2023          Page 6 of 9
hold that they did, and thus, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter
them.

   In the Satisfaction Order, the trial court directed the clerk to release and
pay the funds “currently held in escrow for the benefit of Conroad . . . in
satisfaction of the Judgment.” But the issue of how the Association would
satisfy the judgment was pending on appeal. Indeed, the Proceedings
Supplemental Order—the appealed order in Conroad II—satisfied the
judgment a different way by transferring to Conroad “all” of the
Association’s assets, including the lift station, bank-account funds, and
easement interests. Thus, the Satisfaction Order interfered with the subject
matter of a pending appeal.

   The same is true for the Vacatur Order. In that order, the trial court
recognized that “the Pro Supp Order purportedly divested the
Association of the property interests and vested them in Conroad” but
concluded that “the process by which this action was ostensibly taken was
flawed.” This precise issue—the propriety of the title transfer—was
pending in Conroad II. The Association even conceded this point when it
moved the Court of Appeals to dismiss Conroad II, noting the Proceedings
Supplemental Order “is the subject of this appeal.”

   The Association, however, contends the trial court retained jurisdiction
to issue the Satisfaction and Vacatur Orders, arguing that the decision in
Conroad I—amending the underlying judgment—effectively nullified the
Proceedings Supplemental Order. We disagree.

   It’s true that proceedings supplemental “are a nullity” without a valid
judgment. Lewis v. Rex Metal Craft, Inc., 831 N.E.2d 812, 817 (Ind. Ct. App.
2005). But Conroad I’s reduction of the damages award did not invalidate
the underlying judgment; it simply required the trial court to amend the
judgment in accordance with the remand instructions. Nor did Conroad I
authorize the trial court to modify how the underlying judgment would
be enforced because this issue was pending in the appeal of the
Proceedings Supplemental Order—itself a final judgment the trial court
could not revisit absent authority, see Kirk v. Monroe Cnty. Tire, 585 N.E.2d
1366, 1369 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-PL-307 | March 24, 2023          Page 7 of 9
   To be sure, certain trial rules and statutes provide trial courts with
authority to disturb a final judgment. See T.R. 41(F) (allowing a dismissal
with prejudice to “be set aside” on narrow grounds); T.R. 52(B) (allowing
amendment of a judgment in limited circumstances); T.R. 59 (allowing
motions to correct error within thirty days of entry of final judgment
being noted in the CCS); T.R. 60(B) (allowing a court to “relieve a party . . .
from a judgment” for eight specific reasons); see also Ind. Code § 33-23-2-4.
But none of these bases were invoked here.

  To summarize, when a matter is pending on appeal, Appellate Rule 8
controls. The circumstances of a particular case—however unusual they
may be—do not enable a trial court to hurdle that rule’s jurisdictional
fence. And here, plain application of Rule 8 establishes that the trial court
lacked jurisdiction to issue the Satisfaction Order and the Vacatur Order
because each interfered with the subject matter of a pending appeal. Those
orders are therefore void.

Conclusion
   The trial court retained jurisdiction to issue an order amending a
damages award pursuant to instructions on remand, but under Appellate
Rule 8, the court lacked jurisdiction to issue two other orders because each
interfered with the subject matter of a pending appeal. Thus, those two
orders are void. Since we resolve this case under Rule 8, we need not
address the parties’ alternative arguments. We therefore affirm in part,
reverse in part, and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 1

Massa, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur.
Molter, J., not participating.

1We thank amici—the Indiana Mortgage Bankers Association and the Indianapolis Bar
Association’s Appellate Practice Section—for their helpful briefs.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-PL-307 | March 24, 2023                  Page 8 of 9
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT CONROAD ASSOCIATES, L.P.
Christopher J. Bayh
John R. Maley
Beth A. Behrens
Barnes & Thornburg LLP
Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE CASTLETON CORNER OWNERS
ASSOCIATION, INC.
Jenny R. Buchheit
Angela P. Krahulik
Meredith A. Wood
Ice Miller LLP
Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR AMICUS CURIAE INDIANA MORTGAGE
BANKERS ASSOCIATION
Donald E. Morgan
Taft Stettinius & Hollister
Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR AMICUS CURIAE INDIANAPOLIS BAR
ASSOCIATION, APPELLATE PRACTICE SECTION
Paul L. Jefferson
McNeelyLaw LLP
Indianapolis, Indiana

Carol Nemeth Joven
Williams & Piatt, LLC
Indianapolis, Indiana

Lucy R. Dollens
Quarles & Brady LLP
Indianapolis, Indiana

Joshua S. Tatum
Plews Shadley Racher & Braun LLP
Indianapolis, Indiana

Joel M. Schumm
Indianapolis, Indiana

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-PL-307 | March 24, 2023   Page 9 of 9