Court Opinion

ID: 9929644
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-02 21:12:59.086+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:33:26.224295
License: Public Domain

02/02/2024
                IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                           AT KNOXVILLE
                         Assigned on Briefs December 4, 2023

                              IN RE AVALEE W., ET AL.

                Appeal from the Chancery Court for Campbell County
                 No. 2022-CV-336 Elizabeth C. Asbury, Chancellor
                      ___________________________________

                            No. E2023-00977-COA-R3-PT
                       ___________________________________

This appeal involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights. The trial court found
by clear and convincing evidence that six grounds for termination were proven and that
termination was in the best interest of the children. The mother appealed. On appeal, the
Department of Children’s Services “does not defend” three of the grounds that the trial
court concluded were established. We reverse these three grounds. Of the three remaining
grounds, which DCS maintains were sufficiently proven, we conclude that the ground of
substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan was proven by clear and convincing
evidence. We further find that termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the
children.    However, due to insufficiencies in the trial court’s findings, we vacate the
grounds of persistent conditions and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume
custody or financial responsibility against the mother. We reverse in part, with respect to
three grounds for termination, and vacate in part, with respect to two grounds for
termination, but otherwise we affirm the trial court’s order terminating parental rights.

 Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed
            in Part, Reversed in Part, Vacated in Part, and Remanded

CARMA DENNIS MCGEE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOHN W.
MCCLARTY and W. NEAL MCBRAYER, JJ., joined.

Jacob H. Shipley, Jacksboro, Tennessee, for the appellant, Mariah W.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter, and Clifton Wade Barnett, Assistant
Attorney General, for the appellee, Tennessee Department of Children’s Services.

                                        OPINION
                             I.      FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       This matter involves a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mariah W.
(“Mother”) to her three children, Avalee, Lillith, and Axel.1 The Department of Children’s
Services (“DCS”) became involved with the family in December 2021 after receiving a
referral with allegations of domestic violence and drug-exposed children. Two days later,
case managers from DCS arrived at the motel where Mother was staying with her three
children and the father of Lillith and Axel. DCS performed a drug screen on Mother, and
she tested positive for amphetamine, methamphetamine, and benzodiazepines. DCS
subsequently filed a petition in the juvenile court alleging that the children were dependent
and neglected and asking the court to award temporary legal custody of the children to
DCS. That same day, the juvenile court entered a protective custody order finding probable
cause to believe that the children were dependent and neglected and awarding temporary
legal custody of the children to DCS. At the time the children were removed from Mother’s
custody, Avalee was three years old, Lillith was one year old, and Axel was eleven months
old. Thereafter, Mother waived the adjudicatory hearing and stipulated that the children
were dependent and neglected due to her substance abuse issues. Thus, the juvenile court
found by clear and convincing evidence that the children were dependent and neglected
and ordered that the children remain in foster care with DCS.

       In January 2022, DCS developed the first permanency plan, which was ratified by
the juvenile court. The plan required Mother to pay $50.00 per month per child in child
support. The plan also included a statement of responsibilities for Mother, which required
her to abstain from alcohol abuse and illegal drugs, not associate with active drug users,
complete an Alcohol and Drug (“A&D”) assessment, and pass random drug tests.
Additionally, drug relapses were to be reported to a treatment provider and DCS. She was
further required to complete a mental health assessment, anger management classes, and
parenting classes and sign a release of information to DCS. Mother was also required to
comply with probation orders, pay all fines and court costs, resolve all current legal issues,
and refrain from obtaining any new legal charges. The statement of responsibilities further
required Mother to obtain and maintain appropriate, safe, and drug free housing adequate
in size for the family; obtain and maintain safe and reliable transportation with age
appropriate car seats; and provide proof of a valid driver’s license, registration and
insurance to DCS. To ensure that she could adequately support the children financially,
Mother was also required to obtain and maintain legal employment or a legal means of
income. Regarding visitation, the statement of responsibilities also required Mother to give
a twenty-four hour notice confirming or cancelling visits, to arrive on time for scheduled

        1
          The petition also concerned the parental rights of the father of Lillith and Axel and of the alleged
biological father of Avalee. The father of Lillith and Axel executed a surrender of his parental rights.
Likewise, the alleged father of Avalee executed a waiver of interest. Thus, this appeal does not concern
their parental rights.
                                                    -2-
visitation, and to meet the children’s age appropriate needs during visitation.2 The
expected completion date for these responsibilities was July 2022. However, before this
completion date arrived, the juvenile court ratified a second permanency plan developed
by DCS. The plan had substantially the same responsibilities for Mother as the first plan,
but the expected completion date was changed to December 2022. The juvenile court
ratified a final permanency plan in November 2022 with the same responsibilities and an
expected completion date of May 2023.

        In December 2022, DCS filed a petition in the chancery court to terminate Mother’s
parental rights to the three children and alleged the following grounds: (1) abandonment
by failure to visit; (2) abandonment by failure to support; (3) abandonment by failure to
provide a suitable home; (4) substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan; (5)
persistent conditions; and (6) failure to manifest an ability or willingness to assume custody
or financial responsibility. DCS further alleged that it was in the best interest of the
children for Mother’s parental rights to be terminated. A trial was held in May 2023. The
court first heard testimony from Autumn Holloway, an employee of DCS. Ms. Holloway
testified concerning the development of the permanency plans and Mother’s efforts at
completing the statement of responsibilities. Ms. Holloway recalled that shortly after the
removal of the children, DCS developed the first permanency plan. According to Ms.
Holloway, by the time of the first plan’s expected completion date in June 2022, Mother
had started an inpatient rehabilitation program, but she did not complete it and left on her
own. Mother then completed an A&D assessment which recommended completing the
MIST3 program or inpatient treatment. Mother started MIST but did not complete it.
Regarding the other tasks on the permanency plan, Ms. Holloway testified that Mother
completed mental health assessments; however, DCS had set up funding for parenting
classes, but Mother had not completed them. Likewise, according to Ms. Holloway,
Mother did not give her information and documentation for proof of transportation or
housing. She also said that Mother was living with family members or friends, and housing
had been a barrier for Mother. Ms. Holloway also recalled that she had received letters
from Mother’s employers in the past, but the jobs ended before she received a pay stub as
proof of a legal source of income. However, Ms. Holloway stated that on the day of trial,
Mother had provided her another letter from her employer. Ms. Holloway said that Mother
was arrested for theft and vandalism in January 2022, and in April 2022, she was arrested
again for theft and “hold for another agency, which was Anderson County.” According to
Ms. Holloway, Mother was arrested in August 2022 for failure to appear, and Mother was

        2
           The first permanency plan included a responsibility for Mother that said “NO CONTACT: Parent
will comply with the no contact order until otherwise noted by court.” This responsibility also appeared in
the third permanency plan. However, the second permanency plan changed the responsibility to read: “If
there is a NO CONTACT: Parent will comply with the no contact order until otherwise noted by the court.”
There is no such no contact order in the record. Also, Ms. Holloway testified at trial that there was never a
no contact order against Mother and she was always free to inquire about visits. Therefore, it is unclear
why this was included in the statement of responsibilities.
         3
           Ms. Holloway testified that MIST stands for Mother Infant Substance Abuse Treatment.
                                                   -3-
incarcerated around November 2022 for a bench warrant. Ms. Holloway stated that when
Mother was incarcerated, she tested positive for fentanyl.

        Ms. Holloway further testified that by the expected completion date for the second
permanency plan in December 2022, Mother had gone to another rehab and halfway house,
but she did not “finish” the halfway house. The recommendations from the rehabilitation
program included maintaining the twelve-step program, maintaining sobriety, and
completing random drug screens. The halfway house was able to help her find employment
and housing, but Mother left in October 2022 without a reason. Concerning Mother’s
issues with housing, Ms. Holloway testified that DCS offered to pay Mother’s first month
of rent and that the initial foster parents of the children made a payment to a local housing
authority for Mother. She said that Mother applied a couple of months later. She recalled
that Mother reported that she was on the waitlist at the housing authority, but Mother never
reported whether she had been accepted or denied. Regarding visitation, Ms. Holloway
stated that Mother did ask for visits, and in the beginning Mother regularly visited the
children, whether through video or in person. She further testified that the visits went well,
but from June or July until December 2022, Mother did not visit regularly and her contact
with Ms. Holloway was limited. Ms. Holloway attributed the lapse in communication and
visitation to Mother being in a relationship with domestic violence. Ms. Holloway further
stated that for a period of time, Mother’s phone would only work with Wi-Fi, so she could
not contact Ms. Holloway when she did not have Wi-Fi. She said that Mother reported to
her that she was not living in stable housing between August and October 2022, but she
did have one video visit with the children in this period. Ms. Holloway also testified that
Mother was ordered to pay child support, initially $50.00 a month per child, but by a court
order in October 2022 this was changed to $43.00 a month per child. Ms. Holloway stated
that since the children were removed, Mother paid zero dollars in child support, which was
confirmed by the Child Support Enforcement Services database.

        Regarding Mother’s situation at the time of trial in May 2023, Ms. Holloway stated
that Mother had recently completed an inpatient substance abuse treatment program, earlier
that month, for which Mother provided a certificate of completion. Ms. Holloway
described that the certificate of completion said that Mother had completed a “CBT of
relapse prevention,” a parenting class, and an anger management class. She also explained
that Mother was staying at a halfway house as recommended by the inpatient treatment
program. She said that she had not received anything saying that the inpatient substance
abuse treatment program conducted drug screens on Mother during her inpatient care.
Regarding housing, Ms. Holloway also testified that Mother has not presented her with any
documentation to show that she has a home suitable for the children. Ms. Holloway
recalled that Mother said that she thought that her friend would allow her in her home with
the children. She further recalled speaking with the friend about the potential arrangement,
but the friend stated to Ms. Holloway that she did not want Mother to have contact with
the children during that time. Ms. Holloway also stated that Mother only provided her with
the friend’s phone number, and the friend would have to agree to give her information to
                                            -4-
do a background check. Likewise, Ms. Holloway testified that Mother failed to obtain
proper transportation. Although, according to Ms. Holloway, Mother wanted to get her
friend to be her transportation, Ms. Holloway stated that DCS would need a letter from the
friend with her insurance, license, and registration before she would be approved.

        Concerning the children, Ms. Holloway testified that the children were initially
placed in a foster home on the day they were removed from Mother’s custody in December
2021. The initial foster parents had the children until August 2022, when they could no
longer care for the children due to health issues with the foster father. Ms. Holloway
stressed that the change in foster home had nothing to do with the children’s behavior. The
children immediately went to a new home, and at the time of trial the children remained in
that foster home. Ms. Holloway stated that the three children are together, and they are
doing well in the foster home, which is a potential adoptive placement. She said that
Avalee, the oldest child, had said during visits not supervised by Ms. Holloway that she
missed her mother and that she hoped that Mother would get to have custody again, but in
the visits that Ms. Holloway supervised, the children did not mention wanting to go back
to Mother. According to Ms. Holloway, Avalee had some trauma for which she is in
therapy. Avalee had nightmares about the past and what she remembered from her time
with Mother. Ms. Holloway stated that the children do seem to enjoy speaking with Mother
at visits, and the visits do build some type of bond. However, Ms. Holloway observed that
the visits have harmed the children with their traumatic experience from the past. Although
Ms. Holloway noted that it is normal for children to regress in behavior after visits, this is
the first case in which she has seen a child have nightmares.

       The court then heard testimony from Mother. Concerning her efforts to address her
substance abuse, Mother testified that after the children were removed, she entered drug
rehabilitation programs a couple of times, but she admittedly left before completing them
due to her self-pity and selfishness. Mother also described her use of illegal substances as
a coping mechanism for a violent relationship that lasted four years. However, Mother
said that she completed the inpatient substance abuse treatment program about nine days
before trial in May 2023. Mother observed that she was finally able to change her life
because prayer gave her “determination, courage, strength, self-love, and with the grace of
God.” She testified that the things she learned at the treatment program were sticking with
her, and she has not used illegal substances since she entered the program.

       Regarding her housing situation, Mother recalled that when DCS first arrived at the
motel, she was getting ready to file her “income tax” to pay for the room, but because the
DCS case manager demanded that she come to the office instead, she was not able to pay
her bills and was evicted as a result. She stated that her application to the local housing
authority was denied because at the time she applied, she was in a halfway house in
Knoxville. Although she admitted that there were other places she could get housing, she
said that it was hard to get housing because the average rent was high. When asked if she
had anywhere that she would be able to stay if she were not in a halfway house, Mother
                                            -5-
answered that she could stay with her friend. She could not recall, however, the address
for her friend’s home, and she was not sure about who else lived with her. She further
testified that her friend would be able to provide transportation for her and the children.

        Mother also testified concerning her compliance with the permanency plans.
Mother admitted that she was not in compliance from the time of the children’s removal
until the filing of the petition to terminate her parental rights one year later. She further
admitted that she paid nothing in child support. However, she recalled bringing the
children Christmas gifts and birthday gifts. She described that at the latest inpatient
substance abuse treatment program, she completed anger management and parenting
classes. When asked whether she was randomly screened for drugs at inpatient program,
Mother testified that she was screened when she went into the program and was screened
when she went to the halfway house. Mother also said that she now has a job making ten
dollars an hour at a landscaping company owned by the person who runs the halfway house
where she stays. Regarding her criminal history, Mother testified that in November 2022,
she pled guilty to using Schedule III and V drugs, for which she was placed on probation.
She also recalled pleading guilty to a criminal charge for failure to appear. She said that
she was in jail for twenty-three days in November 2022 due to the failure to appear charges.

       In June 2023, the trial court entered an order terminating Mother’s parental rights.
The court found that DCS had established the following grounds for termination of the
parental rights of Mother: (1) abandonment by failure to visit; (2) abandonment by failure
to support; (3) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home; (4) persistent conditions;
(5) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial
responsibility; and (6) substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan. The court
further found that termination was in the best interest of the children. Mother subsequently
appealed.

                                II.    ISSUES PRESENTED

       Mother presents the following issues for review on appeal, which we have slightly
restated:

       1. Whether DCS proved Abandonment by Failure to Visit by clear and convincing
          evidence;
       2. Whether DCS proved Abandonment by Failure to Support by clear and
          convincing evidence;
       3. Whether DCS proved Abandonment by Failure to Provide a Suitable Home by
          clear and convincing evidence;
       4. Whether DCS proved Substantial Noncompliance with a Permanency Plan by
          clear and convincing evidence;
       5. Whether DCS proved Persistent Conditions by clear and convincing evidence;
       6. Whether DCS proved Failure to Manifest an Ability and Willingness to Assume
                                         -6-
          Custody or Financial Responsibility by clear and convincing evidence.

At the outset, we note that DCS states in its brief that it “does not defend the grounds of
abandonment by failure to visit, abandonment by failure to support, and abandonment by
failure to provide a suitable home on appeal.” We therefore reverse the trial court’s
findings as to these three grounds. See In re Jaylan J., No. W2019-02025-COA-R3-PT,
2020 WL 7861378, at *12 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2020); In re Colton B., No. M2018-
01053-COA-R3-PT, 2018 WL 5415921, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2018) (“[W]hen
the petitioner who sought termination has conceded on appeal that a ground was not
sufficiently proven, this Court has, in several cases, reversed the trial court’s finding as to
that ground without reaching the merits of whether the ground was actually established.”);
In re Zane W., No. E2016-02224-COA-R3-PT, 2017 WL 2875924, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App.
July 6, 2017) (reversing a ground that DCS “does not defend” and noting that Carrington
“has never been construed to require this Court to also consider the grounds sustained by
the trial court and thereafter conceded or waived by the non-parent on appeal”). DCS
defends only the grounds of substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan, persistent
conditions, and failure to manifest a willingness and ability to assume custody and financial
responsibility. We therefore proceed to consider these issues.

                 III.    STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO TERMINATION CASES

        One of the most serious decisions courts are called upon to make is the termination
of a parent’s rights to his or her child. In re Mariah K.D., No. M2011-02655-COA-R3-
PT, 2012 WL 3090313, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 30, 2012). The decision to terminate a
parent’s rights to his or her child “has the legal effect of reducing the parent to the role of
a complete stranger and of severing forever all legal rights and obligations of the parent or
guardian of the child.” In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d 507, 522 (Tenn. 2016) (citing
Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(l)). Accordingly, “[n]o civil action carries with it graver
consequences than a petition to sever family ties irretrievably and forever.” In re Kaliyah
S., 455 S.W.3d 533, 556 (Tenn. 2015) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(l)). “A parent’s
right to the care and custody of her child is among the oldest of the judicially recognized
fundamental liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clauses of the federal and state
constitutions.” In re Neveah M., 614 S.W.3d 659, 674 (Tenn. 2020) (citing In re
Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 521). Despite being fundamental and constitutionally
protected, however, parental rights are not absolute. In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at
522 (citing In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d 240, 250 (Tenn. 2010)).

       Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113 “sets forth the grounds and procedures
for terminating the parental rights of a biological parent.” In re Kaliyah S., 455 S.W.3d at
546. Pursuant to this statute, the petitioner seeking termination of parental rights must
prove two elements. Id. at 552. First, the petitioner must prove the existence of at least
one of the statutory grounds for termination as provided in section 36-1-113(g). Id.
Second, the petitioner must prove that termination of parental rights is in the best interest
                                             -7-
of the child under the factors set forth in section 36-1-113(i). Id. Due to the constitutional
dimension of the rights at stake, the petitioner seeking termination must prove both
elements by clear and convincing evidence. In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d 586, 596 (Tenn.
2010); see Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c). “Clear and convincing evidence enables the
fact-finder to form a firm belief or conviction regarding the truth of the facts[.]” In re
Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d at 596 (citing In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838, 861 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 2005)). It also “eliminates any serious or substantial doubt about the correctness of
these factual findings.” Id. at 596 (citing In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d 539, 546 (Tenn. 2002);
State, Dep’t of Children’s Servs. v. Mims (In re N.B.), 285 S.W.3d 435, 447 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 2008)).

       Due to the heightened burden of proof applicable in parental termination cases, we
adapt our customary standard of review on appeal. In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 861.
We review the trial court’s factual findings de novo in accordance with Rule 13(d) of the
Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and presume each factual finding to be correct
unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 524. We
then make our own determination “as to whether the facts, either as found by the trial court
or as supported by a preponderance of the evidence, amount to clear and convincing
evidence of the elements necessary to terminate parental rights.” Id. (citing In re Bernard
T., 319 S.W.3d at 596-97). “The trial court’s ruling that the evidence sufficiently supports
termination of parental rights is a conclusion of law, which appellate courts review de novo
with no presumption of correctness.” Id. (citing In re M.L.P., 281 S.W.3d 387, 393 (Tenn.
2009)).

                                            IV.     DISCUSSION

                                   A.       Grounds for Termination

                 1.      Substantial Noncompliance with a Permanency Plan

        The first ground at issue on appeal exists when “[t]here has been substantial
noncompliance by the parent . . . with the statement of responsibilities in a permanency
plan . . .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2).4 The permanency plan responsibilities must
be “reasonable and related to remedying the conditions which necessitate[d] foster care
placement.” In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d at 547 (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-2-
403(a)(2)(C)). Conditions that necessitated foster care may “include conditions related
both to the child’s removal and to family reunification.” Id. at 547. “Not every failure to

        4
          In this opinion, all quotes and references to the termination statute are to the version of the statute
in effect when the petition was filed in December 2022. See In re J.S., No. M2022-00142-COA-R3-PT,
2023 WL 139424, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2023) (“This court applies the versions of the parental
termination statutes in effect on the date the petition was filed.”).

                                                     -8-
comply with a permanency plan will constitute grounds for termination of parental rights.”
In re Jaylan J., 2020 WL 7861378, at *14 (citing In re Abigail F.K., No E2012-00016-
COA-R3-JV, 2012 WL 4038526, at *14 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 14, 2012)). Instead, the
noncompliance with the permanency plan must be substantial. Id. (quoting In re Valentine,
79 S.W.3d at 548). Thus, “[t]rivial, minor, or technical deviations” do not rise to the level
of substantial noncompliance. In re M.J.B., 140 S.W.3d 643, 656 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004).

       As previously discussed, three permanency plans were created for Mother. We find
the responsibilities in these plans to be reasonable and related to remedying the conditions
that necessitated foster care placement. Many of the responsibilities in the plans were
related to remedying Mother’s drug use, which led to the children’s initial removal. The
responsibilities relating to Mother’s parenting, mental health, anger management, housing,
transportation, criminal behavior, employment, and visitation were related to the goal of
family reunification.

        Prior to DCS filing the petition to terminate her parental rights, Mother had
completed an initial A&D assessment and a mental health assessment. Mother likewise
attended visitation but had lapsed in her attendance in the months before the termination
petition was filed. Mother had also incurred new criminal charges. However, after the
petition was filed, Mother also completed parenting and anger management classes and,
according to her testimony, had abstained from illegal drugs since entering and completing
an inpatient substance abuse treatment program, which lasted about a month. Mother also
secured employment after the completion of the treatment program, in the week before
trial. We recognize that an improvement in compliance with the responsibilities of a
permanency plan should be considered in a parent’s favor. In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d at
549 (citing State Dept. of Human Services v. Defriece, 937 S.W.2d 954, 961 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1996)) (noting that Mother’s “poor record of visitation prior to the filing of the
termination petition stands in marked contrast to her commendable efforts in the year prior
to the hearing”). However, Mother’s improvements only began a little more than a month
before trial, and she still had not completed significant responsibilities in her permanency
plan. By the time of trial, Mother had not obtained safe and stable housing or reliable
transportation. We assign great weight to these responsibilities and find Mother’s
noncompliance with them to be substantial. Adequate transportation and housing were
necessary to ensure that it would be safe to reunite the children with Mother. However, at
the time of trial, Mother was residing in a halfway house. Although Mother testified that
she would be able to stay at her friend’s home, she did not provide a location or any
information for DCS to run a background check on her. Likewise, Mother also pointed to
the friend as someone to potentially provide transportation, but the friend has not provided
DCS with any documentation or statements that she is able to do such. Finally, due to the
fact that Mother had only completed the inpatient program and obtained employment one
week before trial, she had not demonstrated that she could maintain her sobriety and
employment for any appreciable time period. While we commend Mother’s recent efforts,
those efforts were simply “too little, too late” to avoid this ground for termination. See In
                                              -9-
re Zakary O., No. E2022-01062-COA-R3-PT, 2023 WL 5215385, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Aug. 15, 2023) (recognizing that an improvement in compliance should be considered in a
parent’s favor but holding that the mother’s efforts at completing permanency plan
requirements after the petition for termination was filed were “too little, too late”); In re
Emily N.I., No. E2011-01439-COA-R3-PT, 2012 WL 1940810, at *16 (Tenn. Ct. App.
May 30, 2012) (“We believe that the [p]arents’ refusal to complete a number of the
requirements until after the termination petition was filed . . . was simply ‘[t]oo little, too
late’ . . . .”). Therefore, we conclude that there is clear and convincing evidence supporting
this ground for termination.

                                2.      Persistent Conditions

       The next ground for termination at issue on appeal is commonly referred to as
“persistent conditions” or “persistence of conditions.” This ground applies when:

       (3)(A) The child has been removed from the home or the physical or legal
       custody of a parent . . . for a period of six (6) months by a court order entered
       at any stage of proceedings in which a petition has been filed in the juvenile
       court alleging that a child is a dependent and neglected child, and:

       (i) The conditions that led to the child’s removal still persist, preventing the
       child’s safe return to the care of the parent . . . , or other conditions exist that,
       in all reasonable probability, would cause the child to be subjected to further
       abuse or neglect, preventing the child’s safe return to the care of the parent .
       ..;

       (ii) There is little likelihood that these conditions will be remedied at an early
       date so that the child can be safely returned to the parent or guardian in the
       near future; and

       (iii) The continuation of the parent . . . and child relationship greatly
       diminishes the child’s chances of early integration into a safe, stable, and
       permanent home;

       (B) The six (6) months must accrue on or before the first date the termination
       of parental rights petition is set to be heard;

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3). Each element must be proven by clear and convincing
evidence. In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d at 550.

      The trial court’s order terminating Mother’s parental rights contains the following
statements regarding this ground:

                                              - 10 -
         It is the opinion of the Court that the State has proven by clear and convincing
         evidence that based on the Mother’s failure to take advantage of many
         opportunities offered to her prior to the filing of the Petition, her current lack
         of appropriate housing for the children, her criminal activity after removal of
         the children and her existing lack of appropriate transportation and housing
         that this ground has been proven by clear and convincing evidence.

As such, the trial court did not make any specific findings with respect to several elements
for this ground, including the likelihood of Mother remedying the conditions or whether
the continuation of the parent and child relationship greatly diminishes the children’s
chances of early integration into a safe, stable, and permanent home. Tennessee Code
Annotated section 36-1-113(k) requires the trial court in termination cases to “enter an
order that makes specific findings of fact and conclusions of law.” “Failure to comply with
this requirement ‘fatally undermines the validity of a termination order.’” In re Ethan W.,
No. M2021-01116-COA-R3-PT, 2023 WL 415999, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2023)
(quoting In re S.M., 149 S.W.3d 632, 639 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004)). Thus, “[t]he absence of
appropriate findings supporting this ground [persistent conditions] for termination is not a
trivial concern.” In re Mickeal Z., No. E2018-01069-COA-R3-PT, 2019 WL 337038, at
*13 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2019). For this reason, we have previously vacated
termination orders with respect to the ground of persistent conditions when the trial court
did not make specific findings as to each of the elements applicable to this ground. See id.;
In re Ethan W., 2023 WL 415999, at *8.

       Although the trial court’s failure to make findings specific to each element would
normally necessitate a remand to the trial court for additional findings, because we
otherwise affirm the termination of Mother’s parental rights on another ground, additional
findings on the ground of persistent conditions are not necessary. See In re Navada N.,
498 S.W.3d 579, 594-95 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2016); In re Ethan W., 2023 WL 415999, at *8;
In re Dominic B., No. E2020-01102-COA-R3-PT, 2021 WL 774185, at *8 n.12 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Mar. 1, 2021). Accordingly, we vacate the order terminating Mother’s parental rights
with respect to this ground.

    3.        Failure to Manifest an Ability and Willingness to Assume Custody or
                                 Financial Responsibility

       The final ground for termination on appeal is failure to manifest an ability and
willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility. This ground exists when:

         A parent . . . has failed to manifest, by act or omission, an ability and
         willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody or financial
         responsibility of the child, and placing the child in the person’s legal and
         physical custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the physical or
         psychological welfare of the child . . .
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Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14). There are two prongs necessary to prove for this
ground: “(1) the parent . . . failed to manifest an ability and willingness to personally
assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility of the child; and (2) placing
the child in the parent’s legal and physical custody would pose a risk of substantial harm
to the physical or psychological welfare of the child.” In re Neveah M., 614 S.W.3d at 674.

        Regarding this ground for termination, the trial court made the following statement
in its order terminating Mother’s parental rights:

       Is [sic] is the opinion of the Court that the State has proven by clear and
       convincing evidence the Mother has failed to manifest a willingness to
       personally assume financial and physical custody of the children. She made
       no real effort to improve her situation until after the filing of the Petition to
       Terminate Parental Rights. Although she has improved her circumstances at
       the present time, she cannot currently assume financial and physical custody
       of the children.

Although the trial court concluded that DCS had sufficiently proven this ground for
termination, the court did not make findings responsive to all of the prongs for this ground.
Specifically, the trial court did not make any finding as to the second prong concerning
whether placing the children in Mother’s legal and physical custody would pose a risk of
substantial harm to the physical or psychological welfare of the children. As previously
discussed, the trial court is directed by statute to “enter an order that makes specific findings
of fact and conclusions of law.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(k). For this reason, this
Court has previously vacated a trial court’s order as to this ground for failure to make
specific findings in support of each prong. See In re Kamyiah H., No. M2021-00834-COA-
R3-PT, 2022 WL 16634404, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 2, 2022) (vacating where order
had no findings as to the second prong); In re Zaylee W., No. M2019-00342-COA-R3-PT,
2020 WL 1808614, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 2020) (vacating where order had no
findings as to the first prong); In re Nevaeh B., No. E2020-00315-COA-R3-PT, 2020 WL
4920020, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 20, 2020) (vacating where trial court did not make
any finding as to second prong). Thus, we vacate the trial court’s order with respect to the
ground of failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial
responsibility as to Mother. However, as with persistent conditions, further findings on
this ground are unnecessary given our ultimate affirmation of the termination of Mother’s
parental rights.

                            B.      Best Interest of the Children

        We now turn to address whether the trial court erred in finding that it was in the

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best interest of the children to terminate Mother’s parental rights.5 The Tennessee Supreme
Court has summarized the law regarding the best interest analysis as follows:

        Facts considered in the best interests analysis must be proven by “a
        preponderance of the evidence, not by clear and convincing evidence.” In re
        Kaliyah S., 455 S.W.3d at 555 (citing In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 861).
        “After making the underlying factual findings, the trial court should then
        consider the combined weight of those facts to determine whether they
        amount to clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child’s
        best interest[s].” Id. When considering these statutory factors, courts must
        remember that “[t]he child’s best interests [are] viewed from the child’s,
        rather than the parent’s, perspective.” In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 878.
        Indeed, “[a] focus on the perspective of the child is the common theme”
        evident in all of the statutory factors. Id. “[W]hen the best interests of the
        child and those of the adults are in conflict, such conflict shall always be
        resolved to favor the rights and the best interests of the child . . . .” Tenn.
        Code Ann. § 36-1-101(d) (2017).

        Ascertaining a child’s best interests involves more than a “rote examination”
        of the statutory factors. In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 878. And the best
        interests analysis consists of more than tallying the number of statutory
        factors weighing in favor of or against termination. White v. Moody, 171
        S.W.3d 187, 193-94 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004). Rather, the facts and
        circumstances of each unique case dictate how weighty and relevant each
        statutory factor is in the context of the case. See In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d
        at 878. Simply put, the best interests analysis is and must remain a factually
        intensive undertaking, so as to ensure that every parent receives
        individualized consideration before fundamental parental rights are
        terminated. In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 523. “[D]epending upon the
        circumstances of a particular child and a particular parent, the consideration
        of one factor may very well dictate the outcome of the analysis.” In re
        Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 878 (citing White v. Moody, 171 S.W.3d at 194).

In re Gabriella D., 531 S.W.3d 662, 681-82 (Tenn. 2017). The twenty statutory best-
interests factors are:

        5
          We note that Mother does not raise an issue or advance any argument on appeal regarding the trial
court’s finding that termination was in the best interest of the children. However, pursuant to our Supreme
Court’s directive in In re Carrington, we nonetheless review this finding. See In Re Carrington H., 483
S.W.3d at 525-26 (“[W]e hold that in an appeal from an order terminating parental rights the Court of
Appeals must review the trial court’s findings as to each ground for termination and as to whether
termination is in the child’s best interests, regardless of whether the parent challenges these findings on
appeal.”) (emphasis added).
                                                  - 13 -
(A) The effect a termination of parental rights will have on the child’s critical
need for stability and continuity of placement throughout the child’s
minority;

(B) The effect a change of caretakers and physical environment is likely to
have on the child’s emotional, psychological, and medical condition;

(C) Whether the parent has demonstrated continuity and stability in meeting
the child’s basic material, educational, housing, and safety needs;

(D) Whether the parent and child have a secure and healthy parental
attachment, and if not, whether there is a reasonable expectation that the
parent can create such attachment;

(E) Whether the parent has maintained regular visitation or other contact with
the child and used the visitation or other contact to cultivate a positive
relationship with the child;

(F) Whether the child is fearful of living in the parent’s home;

(G) Whether the parent, parent’s home, or others in the parent’s household
trigger or exacerbate the child’s experience of trauma or post-traumatic
symptoms;

(H) Whether the child has created a healthy parental attachment with another
person or persons in the absence of the parent;

(I) Whether the child has emotionally significant relationships with persons
other than parents and caregivers, including biological or foster siblings, and
the likely impact of various available outcomes on these relationships and
the child’s access to information about the child’s heritage;

(J) Whether the parent has demonstrated such a lasting adjustment of
circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it safe and beneficial for the
child to be in the home of the parent, including consideration of whether there
is criminal activity in the home or by the parent, or the use of alcohol,
controlled substances, or controlled substance analogues which may render
the parent unable to consistently care for the child in a safe and stable
manner;

(K) Whether the parent has taken advantage of available programs, services,
or community resources to assist in making a lasting adjustment of
circumstances, conduct, or conditions;
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       (L) Whether the department has made reasonable efforts to assist the parent
       in making a lasting adjustment in cases where the child is in the custody of
       the department;

       (M) Whether the parent has demonstrated a sense of urgency in establishing
       paternity of the child, seeking custody of the child, or addressing the
       circumstance, conduct, or conditions that made an award of custody unsafe
       and not in the child’s best interest;

       (N) Whether the parent, or other person residing with or frequenting the
       home of the parent, has shown brutality or physical, sexual, emotional, or
       psychological abuse or neglect toward the child or any other child or adult;

       (O) Whether the parent has ever provided safe and stable care for the child
       or any other child;

       (P) Whether the parent has demonstrated an understanding of the basic and
       specific needs required for the child to thrive;

       (Q) Whether the parent has demonstrated the ability and commitment to
       creating and maintaining a home that meets the child’s basic and specific
       needs and in which the child can thrive;

       (R) Whether the physical environment of the parent’s home is healthy and
       safe for the child;

       (S) Whether the parent has consistently provided more than token financial
       support for the child; and

       (T) Whether the mental or emotional fitness of the parent would be
       detrimental to the child or prevent the parent from consistently and
       effectively providing safe and stable care and supervision of the child.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(1)(A)-(T). “When considering the factors [above], the
prompt and permanent placement of the child in a safe environment is presumed to be in
the child’s best interest.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(2). After considering these
factors, the trial court concluded that it was in the best interest of the children for Mother’s
parental rights to be terminated. For our review of these factors, because evaluation of
these factors often involves discussion of similar issues, we combine our discussion of
these factors “based on the overarching themes within the list of twenty factors.” In re
Chayson D., No. E2022-00718-COA-R3-PT, 2023 WL 3451538, at *14 (Tenn. Ct. App.
May 15, 2023).
                                             - 15 -
       We begin by addressing the children’s needs. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-
113(i)(1)(A) (concerning a child’s need for stability), (B) (concerning how a change in
caretaker would affect a child’s well-being), (D) (concerning the attachment between the
parent and child), (E) (concerning visitation between parent and child), (H) (concerning
the child’s parental attachment with individuals other than the parent), and (T) (concerning
the effect of the parent’s fitness on the child). The children deserve stability at their young
age, and they are finding that in their foster home, where they are happy and healthy. In
the foster home, their needs are taken care of, and they are receiving adequate health care
with necessary therapies. The children’s health and happiness in the foster home stands in
contrast to the effect of Mother’s visitation with the children. After visitation, the oldest
child experiences nightmares from her time with Mother, and Ms. Holloway testified that
although visitation has maintained some kind of bond between Mother and the children,
the visits have also harmed the children with their traumatic experience from the past.
Therefore, we find that these factors weigh in favor of termination.

        Next, we address the factors pertaining to the physical needs and environment of
the children and Mother. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(1)(G) (concerning whether
the parent or the parent’s home triggers the child’s trauma), (N) (concerning abuse or
neglect in the parent’s home), (O) (concerning whether the parent has provided safe and
stable care to any child in the past), (Q) (concerning the parent’s commitment to
maintaining a home that meets the child’s needs), and (R) (concerning the health and safety
of the parent’s home). At the time of trial, Mother resided in a halfway house. As such,
Mother did not obtain and maintain housing that is stable and safe for the children, and for
this reason, it would be detrimental to the children to return them to the care of the Mother.
Likewise, visitation with Mother has caused the children to relive traumatic experiences
from their time in Mother’s home, with the oldest child experiencing nightmares as a result
of trauma. Furthermore, there is nothing in the record to indicate that Mother has provided
safe and stable care to any child in the past. Therefore, we find that these factors weigh in
favor of termination.

        We now consider Mother’s efforts. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(1)(C)
(concerning the parent’s demonstration of continuity and stability in meeting the child’s
needs), (J) (concerning the parent’s lasting adjustment of circumstances), (K) (concerning
the parent’s use of available programs, services, or community resources), (L) (concerning
DCS’s efforts), (M) (concerning parent’s sense of urgency), (P) (concerning the parent’s
understanding of the child’s needs), and (S) (concerning whether the parent has paid more
than token financial support). Although DCS has made extensive efforts to connect Mother
with resources, Mother did not take advantage of many of these resources in order to effect
lasting change until less than a month before trial. Mother likewise did not complete many
of her permanency plan responsibilities until after DCS filed the petition to terminate her
parental rights. This delay in completing these responsibilities and entering into the
inpatient substance abuse treatment program reveals that Mother did not have a sense of
                                            - 16 -
urgency in seeking custody of the children. Mother has also not demonstrated an
understanding of the children’s needs. Ms. Holloway testified that Mother did not inquire
about the children’s medical and education situations and that Mother has not truly
comprehended the depth of trauma that she has caused the children. Mother has also paid
nothing in monetary child support. Although she gave gifts to the children at visitation,
this kind of support is token. We therefore find that these factors weigh in favor of
termination.

       Finally, we address factors (F) (concerning whether the child is fearful of living in
the parent’s home) and (I) (concerning the child’s relationship with others). The trial court
did not hear any testimony regarding whether the children would be fearful of living in
Mother’s home. Likewise, there was no testimony regarding the children’s relationships
with persons other than their parents and caregivers or how termination would affect these
relationships. Therefore, we find these factors inapplicable in the present case.

        We have reviewed the best interest factors and agree with the trial court’s conclusion
that there was clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights
was in the best interest of the children. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not
err in finding that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of the
children.

                                     V.      CONCLUSION

        For the aforementioned reasons, we reverse the termination of parental rights of
Mariah W. as to abandonment by failure to support, failure to visit, and failure to establish
a suitable home and vacate the termination of parental rights as to persistent conditions and
failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility.
Otherwise, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating the parental rights of the mother,
Mariah W. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

        Costs of this appeal are taxed to the appellant, Mariah W., for which execution may
issue if necessary.

                                                     _________________________________
                                                     CARMA DENNIS MCGEE, JUDGE

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