Court Opinion

ID: 9800261
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 08:10:18.748636+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:48:33.458047
License: Public Domain

In The
                                 Court of Appeals
                        Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

                                         No. 07-23-00026-CV

                             JEFFREY LEE GASTON, APPELLANT

                                                    V.

         THE STATE OF TEXAS FOR THE PROTECTION OF A.G., APPELLEE

                            On Appeal from the 274th District Court
                                    Comal County, Texas
           Trial Court No. C2022-0470C, Honorable Deborah L. Wigington, Presiding

                                          August 28, 2023
                                MEMORANDUM OPINION
                    Before QUINN, C.J., and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.

       Through two issues, Appellant, Jeffrey Gaston, complains that the trial court lacked

subject-matter jurisdiction to render a lifetime protective order under Texas Family Code

Chapter 85 in favor of his wife, A.G. Both of Gaston’s arguments depend on the premise

that the State lacks standing to pursue a protective order once the alleged victim

withdraws her consent.1 We disagree and affirm the trial court’s order.

       1 This appeal was originally filed in the Third Court of Appeals and was transferred to this Court by

a docket-equalization order of the Supreme Court of Texas. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001. In the
event of any conflict, we apply the transferor court’s case law. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
                                        Background

       On March 22, 2022, the State filed an Application for Protective Order for A.G.’s

protection. In an affidavit supporting the request for ex parte relief, A.G. described abuse

allegedly inflicted on her by Appellant, including the following:

       [Appellant] said ‘that’s it’ and picked up his gun and started firing it at me. I
       opened the RV door as fast as I could and started running towards the
       neighbor[’]s RV. As he continued to fire at me, I hid behind my neighbor’s
       car and knocked on her door for her to let me in. She opened the door and
       let me inside until the police arrived.

The narrative section of A.G.’s affidavit concluded with statements that Appellant is

“hostile, dangerous, and proven to be capable of trying to kill me. He has multiple firearms

and is not afraid to use them to hurt me. Our children are in danger when he is around

because of his unstable state.”

       When the trial court heard the application in November 2022, A.G. testified she no

longer wished to seek a protective order. After the hearing, the trial court granted a

lifetime protective order in favor of A.G. This appeal followed.

                                          Analysis

       By his first issue, Appellant asserts the protective order is void because the State

lacks standing to proceed contrary to A.G.’s wishes. “Standing is a prerequisite to

subject-matter jurisdiction, and subject-matter jurisdiction is essential to a court’s power

to decide a case.” M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr. v. Novak, 52 S.W.3d 704, 708 (Tex. 2001).

This is a question we review de novo. Mahrou v. White, No. 03-22-00058-CV, 2023 Tex.

App. LEXIS 5830, at *15 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 4, 2023, no pet. h.) (mem. op.).

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       “Standing focuses on the question of who may bring an action.” Novak, 52 S.W.3d

704, 708 (Tex. 2001) (quoting Patterson v. Planned Parenthood, 971 S.W.2d 439, 442

(Tex.1998)). Article I, Section 30 of the Texas Constitution expressly gives the State, via

the prosecuting attorney, “the right to enforce the rights of crime victims.” TEX. CONST.

art. I, § 30. One reason for this power should be straightforward: If the State’s ability to

enforce the rights of victims depended on ongoing consent, individuals could avoid

prosecution for their crimes simply by killing victims or otherwise discouraging

participation.

       Standing, of course, may also be conferred by statute. Farkas v. Nationstar Mortg.,

LLC, No. 05-19-01024-CV, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 4966, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas June

22, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.). Determining standing in these cases turns on the language

of the statute. Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. City of Austin, Tex., 565 S.W.3d 425, 433 (Tex.

App.—Austin 2018, pet. denied). When a statute confers standing, we dispense with the

judge-made rules for determining whether a party possesses standing. Id. Under the

Texas Family Code, a prosecuting attorney has standing to file an application for a

protective order for the protection a person alleged to be a victim of family violence. TEX.

FAM. CODE ANN. § 82.002(d)(1).

       Given these powers, we find no merit to Appellant’s complaint that the State lacked

standing or that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to render an order for

A.G.’s protection. The Third Court of Appeals has reached a similar conclusion under

Family Code section 82.002(c), which permits “any adult” to apply for a protective order

to protect a child from family violence. See B.C. v. Rhodes ex rel. T.L.R., 116 S.W.3d

878, 882–83 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, no pet.).          Because the prosecuting attorney

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possessed standing, the trial court did not lack subject-matter jurisdiction to issue the

protective order notwithstanding A.G.’s change of position.

       In his second issue, Appellant similarly argues the trial court abused its discretion

and reversibly erred by allowing the State to proceed against A.G.’s articulated wishes

because “[t]here is no statute or case law that has created or conferred standing to the

State to serve as the applicant in an application for protective order.” For the reasons set

forth above, we disagree. To the extent Appellant is attempting to argue the State cannot

proceed when A.G. no longer desires a right to do so, we hold that it is Appellant who

lacks standing. See Herrera v. State, 24 S.W.3d 844, 845 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2000, no

pet.) (citing Art. I sec. 30). Finally, Appellant’s issue also suggests the State was not

authorized to “represent” A.G. once she testified she no longer wished to seek a protective

order. The record does not reflect the prosecutor is representing A.G. in an attorney-

client relationship. But even so, Appellant’s complaint would go to the prosecutor’s

authority to proceed, requiring Appellant to preserve the issue by timely notifying the trial

court and obtaining an adverse ruling.       TEX. R. CIV. P. 12, 33.1(a); In re Fifty-One

Gambling Devices, 298 S.W.3d 768, 779 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2009, pet. denied) (holding

appellant waived appellate review). He failed to preserve this argument.

       Appellant’s first and second issues are overruled.

                                        Conclusion

       Having overruled Appellant’s two issues, we affirm the trial court’s protective order.

                                                         Lawrence M. Doss
                                                             Justice
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