Court Opinion

ID: 9582705
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:30:33.205993+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:38:15.562559
License: Public Domain

Given, Judge,
concurring:
I am in agreement as to the reversal, but am unable to agree with the conclusions stated by the Court in the first point of the syllabus. My belief of the extreme importance óf a careful observance of material differences between principles of a collateral attack and a direct at*16tack, that litigants may not be misled to their prejudice, constrains me to write this concurring memorandum.
In 30A Am. Jur., Judgments, Section 845, speaking of the basis for the rule relating to collateral attack, it is said: “The observance of the general rule denying the right collaterally to attack a judgment is required by a due regard for the repute of the courts and for the solemnity of judicial proceedings. The rule has been adopted as the result of weighing, on the one hand, the desire of the courts to avoid results which eifect positive injustice to individuals and, on the other hand, considerations affecting public policy and convenience, especially in regard to the maintenance of the integrity of property rights acquired on the faith of judicial proceedings * * In order to effect such purposes it is necessary to note clear, distinguishing characteristics of the two methods of attacking judgments or proceedings, the direct attack and the collateral attack. (Some courts speak of a third method, an “indirect” attack).
In considering whether the method of attack is direct or collateral, two principles, always recognized, should be kept in mind: “* * * a void judgment is no judgment at all, but a mere nullity and may be assailed in any court, anywhere, whenever any claim is made or rights asserted under it * * 11 M.J., Judgments and Decrees, Section 145; “* * * in order to be collaterally attacked, the want of jurisdiction must affirmatively appear on the face of the record * * 49 C.J.S., Judgments, Section 421. Also, principles relating to res judicata, and rules relating to an attack op a judgment or proceeding, whether the attack be by the direct method or by the collateral method, should not be confused. “* * * In the former case, the litigant is not attacking the judgment collaterally or otherwise; rather is he conceding its validity and seeking a judicial expression as to its evidentiary value as against him. In the latter he is questioning, not the scope of the judgment, but the judgment itself and calling upon the court to declare it a nullity * * 1 Freeman on Judgments, Section 304.
*17Yan Fleet, long a recognized standard authority on collateral attack, cited and relied on by this Court, and cited and relied on by such works as Corpus Juris Secun-dum, defines a collateral attack, in Section 3, as follows: “A collateral attack on a judicial proceeding is an attempt to avoid, defeat, or evade it, or to deny its force and effect in some manner not provided by law. As there are only two ways to attack a judicial proceeding, direct and collateral, it is obvious that this definition complements the one in the last section, and they are both self-evident. Any proceeding provided by law for the purpose of avoiding or correcting a judgment, is a direct attack which will be successful upon showing the error; while an attempt to do the same thing in any other proceeding is a collateral attack, which will be successful only upon showing a want of power.” In Section 2, the same author defines direct attack in this manner: “A direct attack on a judicial proceeding is an attempt to avoid or correct it in some manner provided by law. ILLUSTRATIONS. — A motion for a new trial or for a venire de novo; a motion in the cause to vacate, modify or correct the judgment according to the statute or the practice of the court; appeals; writs of error, cer-tiorari, audita querela and prohibition; petitions for rehearing and bills of review; bills in equity or complaints and petitions under the codes to set aside, vacate, modify or correct judgments for fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, are some of the modes provided by law for avoiding or correcting judgments, and are direct attacks * * *”. I find no authority questioning such definitions, except perhaps a few cases may impliedly do so where the clear distinction between the term “collateral attack” and the term “collateral proceeding” is failed to be observed.
A direct attack is defined in 49 C.J.S., Judgments, Section 408: “A direct attack on a judgment is an attempt to avoid, correct, vacate, annul, review, cancel, or set aside the judgment in a proceeding or manner provided by law for such purpose”, and in the same section a col*18lateral attack is defined as follows: “A collateral attack is an attempt to avoid, defeat, or evade a judgment, or to deny its force and effect, in some incidental proceeding not provided by law for the express purpose of attacking it.”
In BOA Am. Jur., Section 852, it is stated: “* *' * an attack is regarded as direct where the proceeding in which it is made is brought for the purpose of impeaching or overturning the judgment, and as collateral if made in any manner other than by a proceeding the very purpose of which is to impeach or overturn the judgment. Stated affirmatively, this rule is that a collateral attack upon a judgment is an attack made by or in an action or proceeding that has an independent purpose other than the impeaching or overturning of the judgment * *
As pointed out in the majority opinion, and all agree, the instant “proceeding was authorized by the provisions of the statute”. That being true, it can hardly be argued that it was not such a proceeding as was not in “some manner provided by law”. Yet the. majority name it a collateral attack, notwithstanding the clear purpose of the proceeding. The issue drawn by the pleadings related directly to the validity of the proceeding attacked, the sole and indubitable purpose of the proceeding, insofar.as the present question is concerned, being “to avoid” the effect of the proceeding of the city council.
In 1 Freeman on Judgments, Section 306, it is stated: “* * * The law of every jurisdiction prescribes the manner in which litigants must proceed’ to correct, vacate, review or annul judicial decisions. It specifies the remedies to be invoked and the extent to which they are available. This being true, it is but reasonable to conclude that an assailant is pursuing a very direct attack when he strikes at the judgment with one of the procedural weapons thus placed at his disposal, and per contra that his. assault is essentially collateral when attempted without such legal means * * * If instituted for the very pur*19pose of setting aside, correcting or modifying the judgment, it is usually regarded as a direct attack; for the attack upon the judgment in such cases is not incidental to the object of the proceeding and the end of the proceeding is not something collateral to the judgment. If, on the other hand, the direct purpose and aim of the proceeding is to obtain some other relief than the vacation or setting aside of the judgment and the attack upon the judgment is merely incidentally involved, it will be considered a collateral attack * * The same author, after pointing out that proceedings for review of a judgment constitute direct attacks, says, Section 308: “* * * Yet situations arise in which the objections to the judgment cannot be reached by such proceedings. Very often the invalidating elements lie outside the record. The judgment may be perfectly sound on its face, an inspection of the files disclosing nothing to militate against its validity. Circumstances of mistake, imposition or fraud may have so entered into the case as to frustrate any legal or binding adjudication notwithstanding a record entirely free from any suggestion of such influences. To relegate the party injured thereby to the relief obtainable in an appellate tribunal which, as a rule, cannot examine into extraneous matters would be tantamount to ah entire denial of justice. In such a contingency the aggrieved party is not without a remedy. As elsewhere noted in this work he may seek equitable relief from the judgment.
.“The powers of a court of chancery in this respect are well recognized. It has inherent jurisdiction to relieve from fraudulent or void judgments particularly where the invalidating facts are not apparent from the record. Such equitable intervention is very often a party’s only means of escape from the invalid decision; without it he would be. left remediless. These considerations tend strongly to .support the position taken by many courts that a litigant is engaging in a direct attack upon the judgment where he s.eeks equitable relief therefrom in the mode approved by law * *
*20A collateral attack may also be comprehensively defined as an attempt to avoid the effects of a judgment in a proceeding wherein the validity of the judgment is not at issue. The basis of such a rule appears to become clear when we look at the reason for the universally recognized applicable principle that a judgment “In order to be collaterally attacked the want of jurisdiction must affirmatively appear on the face of the record”. 49 C.J.S., Judgments, Section 421. To permit the trial of the question of the validity of the judgment, in a proceeding wherein the validity of that judgment is not at issue, would violate well recognized principles of law relating to trials of matters at issue, and trials of issues foreign to the issues pleaded in the pending proceeding. Of course, if the invalidity of the judgment is such that it may be observed from the face of the record, no pleading is necessary, no issue is required.
In 11 M.J., Judgments and Decrees, Section 140, it is stated: “* * * A collateral attack is an attempt to impeach a judgment or decree in a proceeding not instituted for the express purpose of annulling, correcting, or modifying such judgment or decree. It is thus distinguished from a direct attack which is any proceeding provided by law for the purpose of avoiding or correcting a judgment which will be successful upon showing error.”
A simple illustration, using familiar principles, perhaps would demonstrate more clearly the ever distinguishing characteristics of the two methods of attack than would a wordy critique, or many disquisitions: Suppose A obtains a money judgment against B. After the expiration of time for any review of the judgment, by appeal, writ of error, bill of review, certiorari, or otherwise, A institutes a chancery proceeding for the enforcement of the lien of his judgment against land owned by B, and files with his bill of complaint a certified copy of the money judgment. Suppose further that the certified copy shows on its face that the judgment, for one thousand dollars, was rendered by a justice of the peace, *21clearly a void judgment. Since the judgment is void on its face, no issue, or pleading of such fact,, is necessary or required. It may be attacked collaterally, in the chancery suit. It may also, in certain circumstances, be attacked directly, e.g., where A fails to institute a suit and B desires the alleged lien of the judgment to be declared void, as a cloud on his title to the land. Suppose, on the other hand, that the certified copy shows on its face that the judgment was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, and no error appears on the face of the record which would render it void, and B, in the chancery suit prosecuted for the enforcement of the lien, undertakes to avoid the effect of the judgment on the ground that the person who purportedly signed the judgment order was not, at the time of the entry thereof, judge of the court having allegedly entered the order, a fact which if established would render the judgment void. Clearly, however, since the question of invalidity does not appear from the face of the record, it must be proved. The party litigant claiming under the judgment must have the opportunity to deny, both by pleading and proof, the fact contended to render the judgment void. I assume that no one would contend that the issue as to the invalidity of the judgment was not foreign to the issue or purpose of the suit to enforce the lien of the judgment, or that evidence would be received as to the issue of invalidity of the judgment without proper pleadings. Authorities to the contrary are clear. B is not helpless, however, for he may directly attack the judgment, and “avoid, correct, vacate, annul, review, cancel or set aside the judgment in a proceeding or manner provided by law for such purpose.” 49 C.J.S., Judgments, Section 408.
The holdings of. this Court, with one or two possible exceptions, are in accord. In Lough v. Taylor, 97 W. Va. 180, 124 S. E. 585, the Court quoted with approval a statement from 17 Am. & Eng. Ericy. Law (2d ed.), page 48, as follows: “A collateral attack is an attempt to impeach a judgment or decree, in a proceeding not insti*22tuted for the express purpose of annulling, correcting, or modifying such judgment or decree.”
In State v. Skeen, Warden, etc., 136 W. Va. 805, 811, 68 S. E. 2d 683, Judge Fox, speaking for a full Court, stated: “* * * The authorities cited by the State in support of the contention that the order of the circuit court which shows the entry of the plea of guilty imported a verity, and could not be disproved, are not convincing. At most these cases bear on the question of collateral attack on court records. But if the action of a court can be shown to have been without jurisdiction, and to be void, the general rule is that a direct attack may be made at any time and in any proceeding, and this is particularly true in habeas corpus cases, where relief depends on a showing that the proceeding under attack was void from the beginning * * *". See Bennett v. Bennett, 137 W. Va. 179, 70 S. E. 2d 894; Cable v. Cable, 132 W. Va. 620, 53 S. E. 2d 637; Chilhowie Lumber Co. v. Lance & Co., 50 W. Va. 636, 642, 41 S. E. 128; Smith v. Johnson, 44 W. Va. 278, 29 S. E. 509; Wandling v. Straw & Morton, 25 W. Va. 692.
Since a litigant attacking a judgment or proceeding collaterally can not draw to his aid the assistance of evidence dehors the record, for the simple reason that in such an attack the invalidity rendering the judgment or proceeding attacked void “must affirmatively appear on the face of the record”, the extreme importance to litigants of pursuing the correct method of attack becomes apparent. The importance of the method pursued seems emphasized by the action of the United States Supreme Court in State ex rel. Favors v. Coiner, Acting Warden, 353 U. S. 944, 77 S. Ct. 824, 1 L. ed. 2d 855, 352 U. S. 987, 77 S. Ct. 389, 1 L. ed. 2d 367. By the mandate of the United States Supreme Court made in that case, we were compelled to look beyond facts disclosed by the record, and determine the truth of facts alleged to exist outside the record, which, if true, would have revealed the judgment complained of to be void, though such facts were *23pleaded long after the expiration of time for any manner of review. See State ex rel. Favors v. Tucker, Warden, 148 W. Va. 130, 100 S. E. 2d 411.
The only authority relied on by the majority for its holding is LaFollette v. City of Fairmont, 138 W. Va. 517, 76 S. E. 2d 572. In considering whether the Court could reach behind what appeared on the face of the record with reference to “a finding of fact by a legislative body as a basis for legislative action”, the Court did say, I think correctly, that the proceeding “* * * in that aspect, constitutes a collateral attack upon a legislative finding * * It is significant that the application of the rule was specifically limited to one “aspect” of the case. That is a wholly and materially different conclusion from one saying that every “proceeding to obtain a declaratory judgment as to the validity of a municipal ordinance is a collateral attack upon such ordinance”. Suppose such a proceeding, instituted long after the expiration of time for any manner of review, wherein it is alleged that the ordinance is void because of some fact not appearing on the face of the record, say for the reason that the persons voting the enactment of the ordinance were not, at the time, legally constituted members of the city council. This Court would then be forced to follow one of two courses, and there exists only two courses if the holding in the instant case, to the effect that every “proceeding to obtain a declaratory judgment as to the validity of a municipal ordinance is a collateral attack”, is followed: The Court may forget the always recognized principle that a void judgment is a nullity and may be attacked by one or the other of the two methods at any time and hold the attack to be collateral, and deny relief, for the reason that the facts rendering the proceeding or ordinance void do not appear from the face of the record; or the Court may ignore the other always recognized principle that in a collateral attack the fact rendering the proceeding or ordinance void must appear from the face of the record, then look beyond the face of the record, receive new or evidence dehors the *24record, and determine the truth of the contention, as it was compelled to do in the recent Favors case, cited above. Which way will the Court turn?
. ,1 am of the view, however, that another principle of law, peculiarly. applicable to the facts of the instant case, controls, and makes necessary the result announced by the Court. The principle is clearly expressed in Points 2 and 3 of the syllabus. It seems academic that the validity or sufficiency of a legislative finding, where such validity or sufficiency may be questioned, absence fraud or any wrongdoing, must be determined from the facts, and only from the facts, before the legislative body at the time of the enactment. Validity of Legislation can not be made to depend on such subsequent facts as might be or become available for proof. The principle is akin to one usually followed by an appellate court, that controversies may only be determined from the record made in the trial court.