Court Opinion

ID: 9855692
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:29:18.58097+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:36:20.126994
License: Public Domain

ALLBEE, Justice
(dissenting).
Because I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that the “written request” requirement of section 321B.3, The Code, is satisfied by merely reading the request to the arrested motorist, I must dissent. If an oral rendition is held to suffice, the statutory requirement that the request be in writing becomes meaningless.
The majority relies upon dictum in Gottschalk v. Sueppel, 258 Iowa 1173, 1183, 140 N.W.2d 866, 872 (1966), which opines that the written request required by section 321B.3 need never be handed to or read by the arrested motorist, so long as it is read to him. An examination of the statutory scheme enacted by the legislature in chapter 321B, however, indicates a legislative intent to the contrary; thus, the Gottschalk dictum should not be followed.
Chapter 321B is entitled the “Uniform Chemical Test for Intoxication Act.” § 321B.14, The Code 1979. Although the chapter constitutes a “substantial adoption” of the uniform act approved by the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, see 9 Uniform Laws Annotated, 1967 Supp. at 64 (1957), the Iowa legislature added numerous safeguards for the rights of arrested persons not found in the uniform act. Compare Iowa Code §§ 321B.1-.13 with Uniform Chemical Test for Intoxication Act, 9 Uniform Laws Annotated, supra, 1967 Supp. at 65-69. Notable among these is the requirement that a “written request” must precede the taking of a body specimen for testing; the uniform act contains no such requirement. See 9 Uniform Laws Annotated, supra, 1967 Supp. at 65. Other examples of safeguards added to the uniform act by the Iowa legislature include the requirement that testing be preceded by an arrest, § 321B.3; the provision that refusing a blood test alone does not constitute a “refusal,” id.; the requirement that a police officer’s request to a medical person for withdrawal of a body specimen be in writing, § 321B.4; various requirements relating to the accuracy of the test and the health of the arrested *742person, id.; the provision that testing may not be performed upon a dead, unconscious or otherwise incapacitated person unless a licensed physician certifies in advance that the person is so incapacitated, § 321B.5; and the requirement that the defendant be notified that refusal of a chemical test will result in revocation of his driver’s license, § 321B.6.
This comparison of chapter 321B with the uniform act upon which it was based clearly indicates that the Iowa legislature was concerned with providing greater fairness and protection for the arrested person during implied consent proceedings, and that each of the foregoing provisions was purposely added with that objective in mind. The “written request” requirement being one of those added provisions, I can only conclude that its purpose was to increase the fairness of the implied consent procedure by giving the arrested motorist an opportunity to see in writing his options under the law and to consider those options at his own mental pace.
This conclusion is supported by State v. Richards, 229 N.W.2d 229 (Iowa 1975), in which this court required strict compliance with the terms of section 321B.3. The Richards court observed that the “written request” mandated by the statute “must . . . be unequivocal and in proper form. Anything less would unduly dilute the procedural safeguards in the statute.” Id. at 234 (citation omitted).
Based on the foregoing, I would hold that defendant’s initial refusals to submit to a chemical test were not made in response to a “written request” and therefore were not binding on him. Cf. Richards, 229 N.W.2d at 233-34 (defendant not bound by her consent to officer’s oral request for chemical testing). Once defendant was given an opportunity to read the written request for himself, his first response was to ask to consult an attorney. Honoring defendant’s request would not have “interfere[d] with the taking of a test within the time specified in § 321B.3,” State v. Vietor, 261 N.W.2d 828, 832 (Iowa 1978), because nearly an hour and a half of the statutory two-hour period remained. Therefore, defendant was denied his right to consult with counsel under section 804.20, The Code, and “evidence of his refusal to take [a] chemical test [was] inadmissible at [his] later criminal trial.” Vietor, 261 N.W.2d at 832. Trial court erred in admitting that evidence. I would reverse.
REYNOLDSON, C. J., and LeGRAND and LARSON, JJ., join in this dissent.