Court Opinion

ID: 9477071
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:12:58.517663+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:40.424228
License: Public Domain

MAGILL, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the court’s reasoning and result, except as it relates to the reversal of Wright’s conviction on Count 10 of the indictment.
The court concludes that Sivers must have believed that he was personally responsible for the $62,500 loan represented by the debit slip, which is the basis of Count 10. The majority reaches this conclusion merely because (1) the $70,000 note signed by Sivers in 1983 was used to repay the $62,500 loan, and (2) Sivers testified on cross-examination that he did not normally sign renewal notes unless he was responsible for the original obligation. While this evidence might plausibly lead a jury to entertain a reasonable doubt as to Wright’s guilt, it is not so overwhelming that “a reasonable-minded jury must have enter*1250tained a reasonable doubt as to the government’s proof” * * *. United States v. Noibi, 780 F.2d at 1421 (emphasis in original).
This is particularly true here, because the testimony relied upon by the majority is undermined by other testimony, which is sufficient to allow the jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
The district court correctly instructed the jury that the government, in order to meet its burden on the misapplication element, had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt one of the following:
1. That [Wright] knew the debtor named in the note was not aware his name was being used for the debt.
or
2. That [Wright] assured the named debtor that he would not be obligated to repay the loan in the event of default and that the Bank would look solely to Oakland Forging [sic] for repayment.
Instructions to the Jury, Number 9.
A careful review of the trial transcript, in light of the heavy burden borne by a defendant seeking to overturn a jury verdict, id. at 1421, compels a conclusion that there is sufficient evidence to sustain Wright’s conviction on Count 10.
Sivers testified that he did not authorize the $62,500 debit slip, and that he did not remember signing any note supporting the debit slip. No such note was introduced into evidence. Sivers also testified that he did not remember signing the $70,000 renewal note. Moreover, in response to the following question, “Well, would you have signed any of these notes making yourself personally responsible and then giving the money to Oakland Forgings?” Sivers answered, “No. They were signed for the specific purpose of Oakland Forgings, for the benefit of Oakland Forgings.” A jury could reasonably infer from this statement that, even if Sivers had authorized the notes, he believed that he would not be personally liable on any of them, but that the bank would instead look to Oakland Forgings. The fact that he would not normally sign renewal notes unless he believed he was responsible for the underlying obligation is not sufficient to ascribe to the jury reasonable doubt as to whether Sivers believed that he was personally liable for this $62,500 loan. The jury could and did conclude from the evidence that Sivers did not believe he was personally liable for the debt.
Because I believe that there is sufficient evidence to sustain the jury’s verdict of guilty on Count 10, I respectfully dissent from the court’s reversal of the conviction.