Court Opinion

ID: 9669845
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:09:57.635776+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:42:44.014201
License: Public Domain

DAVID T. PROSSER, J.
¶46. (concurring in part, dissenting in part). The First Amendment is not what it used to be. It is fashionable today to protect deviant speech1 and expressive conduct.2 But pure speech which discusses public issues and public officials is vulnerable to the impulse for government regulation. While I join that part of the court's decision dismissing the suit against the respondents, I dissent from much in the majority opinion.
¶ 47. Little is made of the fact that the respondents in this case went to the State Elections Board for *686guidance before broadcasting their ads. Majority op. at 677, n.24. Only after they received government acquiescence did they go forward. Thereafter, several circuit courts enjoined the broadcast of these pure speech ads while the ads were on the air. Then the Elections Board reversed its position and tried to compel the filing of various reports.
¶ 48. The present case is a new episode in this saga. The majority opinion appears to encourage government rule-making to extend the boundaries of "express advocacy." Rule-makers are encouraged to march through the quicksand of "context" en route to a more correct and perfect political order. The dissent can't wait for others to act; it wants the court to impose its own rules here and now. Both opinions soar into pronouncements about speech regulation after a clear majority of this court decided that we have no viable case before us.
¶ 49. Wisconsin Statutes regulating political expression must be very narrowly construed. 65 O.A.G. 145 (1976). If the term "express advocacy" encompasses more than the magic words enumerated in footnote 52 of Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 (1976) (per curiam), the additional words and phrases should be explicitly disclosed. Those words and phrases must advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate by urging citizens how to vote or directing them to take other specific action unambiguously related to an election.
¶ 50. The First Amendment is inconsistent with rules that leave people in doubt whether their expression is regulated. It does not countenance enforcement against speech on a case by case basis where government regulators are permitted to draw inferences from circumstances or guess about people's motives.
*687¶ 51. It is probably ill-advised to make any comment about "express advocacy" in this case because it really amounts to an advisory opinion.

 See State v. Zarnke, 224 Wis. 2d 116, 589 N.W.2d 370 (1999).

 See Lounge Management v. Town of Trenton, 219 Wis. 2d 13, 580 N.W.2d 156 (1998); State v. Janssen, 219 Wis. 2d 362, 580 N.W.2d 260 (1998).