Court Opinion

ID: 9575985
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:19:20.4657+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:53:58.430198
License: Public Domain

D. E. Shelton, J.
(dissenting). This is a case of first impression. It presents the question whether an employer may, with impunity, fire an employee because the employer believes the employee reported a violation of a hazardous-materials law, where it later turns out that that particular employee was not the person who reported the violation. The majority concludes that the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (wpa), MCL 15.361 et seq.; MSA 17.428(1) et seq., does not prevent an employer from terminating an employee on the mistaken basis that the employee had reported illegal conduct. I dissent.
The act provides as follows:
An employer shall not discharge, threaten, or otherwise discriminate against an employee regarding the employee’s compensation, terms, con*125ditions, location, or privileges of employment because the employee, or a person acting on behalf of the employee, reports or is about to report, verbally or in writing, a violation or a suspected violation of a law or regulation or rule promulgated pursuant to law of this state, a political subdivision of this state, or the United States to a public body, unless the employee knows that the report is false, or because an employee is requested by a public body to participate in an investigation, hearing, or inquiry held by that public body, or a court action. [MCL 15.362; MSA 17.428(2). Emphasis added.]
The issue here is whether an employer may lawfully discharge an employee on the basis of a suspicion that the employee is a whistleblower. In my view, the act prohibits such conduct.
Clearly, the language of the statute demonstrates that an actual reporting of an illegal act is not necessary for protection from a retaliatory employer. It protects not only employees who do "report” a violation of law, it also protects those who are. "about to report” and even those who are simply "requested ... to participate in an investigation.”
While there is no direct appellate authority, the Supreme Court has addressed this issue in the interpretation of similar remedial legislation. In Sanchez v Lagoudakis, 440 Mich 496; 486 NW2d 657 (1992), the Michigan Handicappers’ Civil Rights Act (mhcra) was found to prohibit employer discrimination based on a "perception” of membership in a protected category. That statute provided a cause of action at that time to employees who were subject to discrimination "because of a handicap.” MCL 37.1102(1); MSA 3.550(102)(1). The statute defined "handicap’-’ as
a determinable physical or mental characteristic *126of an individual or a history of the characteristic which may result from disease, injury, congenital condition of birth, or functional disorder which ... is unrelated to the individual’s ability to perform the duties of a particular job or position, or is unrelated to the individual’s qualifications for employment or promotion.” [MCL 37.1103(b)(i); MSA 3.550(103)(b)(i).]
The plaintiff there claimed that she had been constructively discharged on the basis of a groundless rumor that she had acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (aids). The circuit court found that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim under the act because she did not in fact have aids. This Court affirmed. In reversing, the Supreme Court held:
The focus of the act was the basis of the employer’s conduct — the employer’s belief or intent — and not the employee’s condition. If the employer acts on a belief that the employee has a handicap, and subsequently discharges or otherwise discriminates against the employee on the basis of that belief, it is inconsequential whether the employee actually has the handicap because, in either hypothesis, the employer has undertaken the kind of discriminatory action that the act prohibits. [440 Mich 502.]
The Court supported its conclusion with a footnote reference to the purpose of the act:
The purpose of the act is to prohibit employers from discriminating on the basis of handicap. It would not be consistent with that purpose to relieve employers who so discriminate of liability if, although they acted in a prohibited discriminatory manner, it later turns out that their belief was in fact erroneous. The key as far as the act is concerned is that the employer acted on the belief of a handicap. [Id. at 502-503, n 16.]
*127The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, reached a similar result in Polk v Yellow Freight System Inc, 801 F2d 190 (CA 6, 1986). The statute at issue in that case, the Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2101 et seq.; MSA 3.548(101) et seq., prohibited "discrimination or retaliation against a person 'because the person has opposed a violation of this act, or because the person has made a charge, filed a complaint, testified, assisted, or participated in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this act.’ [MCL 37.2701(a); MSA 3.548(701)(a)].” Polk, supra at 197. The plaintiff alleged that she had been fired because she visited an office of the Michigan Department of Civil Rights. The defendant argued that the visit was protected only if she actually intended to file a charge. After citing precedent for the proposition that threatening to file a charge was equivalent to filing a charge for purposes of the statute, the court stated:
We see no reason to distinguish between a visit to a government agency to inquire about filing a charge and a threat to file a charge. In both instances, the focus is not on whether the employee intends to follow through with filing the charge, but rather on whether the employer’s decision to discharge was motivated by an improper desire to retaliate against an employee for pursuing rights granted by the Act. [Id. at 200.]
A remedial statute such as the wpa must be liberally construed in favor of the persons intended to be benefited. Dudewicz v Norris Schmid, Inc, 443 Mich 68; 503 NW2d 645 (1993). The reasoning of Sanchez and Polk are precisely applicable to the facts of this case. This employer fired an employee because the employer thought the employee had reported illegal conduct to the authorities. The fact that the employer was wrong *128does not lessen the reprehensibility of the unlawful termination or afford any solace to the innocent employee.
The majority concedes that "defendant’s motivation for the discharge here would be the same as an employer who discharges an employee actually engaged in protected activity.” Ante at 118. The majority, however, then goes on to find that prohibiting, and remedying, such an improperly motivated firing is not the intent of the wpa and attempts to distinguish the legislative purpose of the act as being somehow logically different from the purposes of the handicapper and civil rights laws. It is a flawed analysis. The majority’s perception of the intent of the wpa is focused solely on the employee and concludes that the purpose of the law was solely to protect an employee who actually reports a violation of the law. That is certainly one of the purposes, but the law clearly was also intended to prohibit employer conduct which terminates an employee for unlawful reasons. The point of the wpa is to prevent such a termination. The language that prevents such a termination of an employee who is "about to report” a violation or even one who is only "requested” to appear before an investigatory body makes the intent of the státute clear. Employers are forbidden not only from terminating employees who actually "blow the whistle” but also from terminating employees they suspect are about to do so.
The majority even suggests that punishing an employer for firing an employee that the employer mistakenly thought had reported a violation of the law "could discourage actual reporting.” Ante at 121. Such a suggestion ignores human nature and the reality of the workplace. If this employer is allowed to fire an employee just because it thought *129the employee had reported a violation, the message to workers will be clear and wrong. When this Court sanctions Mr. Chandler’s termination, does the majority really believe that other workers will be encouraged thereby to report illegal conduct? Hardly. Such a decision will more likely cause workers to ask themselves what the Court would allow an employer to do to an employee who actually blew the whistle if it allows the firing of a loyal employee that was wrongly suspected of doing so.
The majority chooses to focus solely on the employee’s motivation and ignores that of the employer. The truth is that they are both important to the public interest and to fairness to employees. In this case, Mr. Chandler’s motivation was totally innocent. There is no evidence that he ever saw or knew of any misconduct by his employer that he could or should have reported. On the contrary, the evidence is that the employer’s motivation was anything but innocent when it chose to terminate Mr. Chandler for an indisputably improper purpose.
This Court has correctly held that the goals of the wpa are "to protect the integrity of the law by removing barriers to employee efforts to report violations of the law . . . and to protect the public by protecting employees who report violations of laws and regulations.” Faulkner v Flowers, 206 Mich App 562, 568; 522 NW2d 700 (1994), quoting Hopkins v City of Midland, 158 Mich App 361, 374; 404 NW2d 744 (1987). An employer’s readiness to retaliate against perceived whistleblowers is certainly a "barrier” to employee efforts to report illegality.
The dissenting opinion of Judge Connor in Kaufman & Payton, PC v Nikkila, 200 Mich App *130250, 259; 503 NW2d 728 (1993), eloquently makes the point:
The Whistleblowers Protection Act . . . makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee because the employee is about to report a suspected violation of law. . . . Employers do not always wait to discriminate until they have proof that an employee is going to blow the whistle. ... If an employer actually discriminates against an employee, it should not matter whether that discrimination is motivated by knowledge or fear. Employers should not be allowed to peremptorily retaliate against employees with impunity.
I would reverse and remand this case for trial.