Court Opinion

ID: 9716814
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:51:43.438165+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:49.174482
License: Public Domain

FLANDERS, Justice,
concurring.
Although I concur fully in the court’s opinion, I write separately to emphasize one practical point in dealing with complaints like this one that are potentially subject to the public-duty doctrine and its exceptions.
Because a notice-pleading Zeitgeist dominates any consideration of motions filed under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, the granting of such a motion is now “virtually impossible” to obtain with respect to those claims against governmental defendants where some exception to the public-duty doctrine may be applicable. But see Ryan v. State Department of Transportation, 420 A.2d 841, 842-43 (R.I.1980) (complaint appropriately dismissed when plaintiffs failed to “allege facts that would give rise to a special duty owed to them”).
But this does not mean that such defendants have no expeditious recourse short of trial to test whether a plaintiffs claim is barred by the public-duty doctrine. As our opinion in Haley v. Town of Lincoln, 611 A.2d 845, 850 (R.I.1992), makes clear, the summary-judgment rapier can be used to parry suits that touch “upon the boundaries of the public duly doctrine.” Accord Catri v. Hopkins, 609 A.2d 966, 968 (R.I.1992) (summary judgment appropriately granted when plaintiffs evidence failed to “pierce the protective shell the doctrine affords”). Stated differently, even in those situations in which a plaintiff might possibly adduce facts sufficient to bring a complaint within a recognized exception to the public-duty doctrine, if the defendants have grounds to believe that no such facts exist, a summary-judgment motion can be used to seek an “early disposition” of the litigation and thereby avoid the costs and burdens of preparing for and conducting a trial. See Haley, 611 A.2d at 850.