Court Opinion

ID: 9534150
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:37:12.76221+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:29:44.332253
License: Public Domain

BROUSSARD, J.
I dissent. Defendant made a prima facie showing that the system by which jury venires are selected in Ventura County produces venires which substantially underrepresent the Hispanic population of the community. In the absence of any rebuttal from the People demonstrating that the underrepresentation was legitimately caused, or served an important state interest, defendant’s conviction must be reversed.
“In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection process.” (Duren v. Missouri (1979) 439 U.S. 357, 364 [58 L.Ed.2d 579, 586-587, 99 S.Ct. 664].)
Defendant made out a prima facie case under Duren, supra, 439 U.S. 357. He showed that a cognizable class, that is, Hispanics, made up 18.26 percent of the adult population of Ventura County, where he was tried. He showed significant underrepresentation in that in two consecutive venires, Hispanics made up only 10.71 and 8.73 percent of the venire. He showed systematic underrepresentation with statistical evidence that the underrepresentation was not a chance occurrence, but showed that the system of selection was not random. He suggested that the fault in the system was with Ventura County’s practice of inadequately enforcing its summons to jury service.
The majority find that defendant’s sample was too small, and of too short duration, to establish the unrepresentativeness of the venire or the systematic nature of the exclusion. The majority speak as if the sample size is two, *578referring to the two venires. But for statistical purposes, the sample is defined by the number of jurors called. In the first week, 1,650 jurors were summoned, and in the second week, 1,950 jurors were summoned. The expert testimony was uncontroverted that these samples were large enough to provide a meaningful result.
Defendant’s expert testified that persons with Spanish surnames accounted for 18.26 percent of the adult population of the county. Of the 364 who appeared for service on February 28, 1983, 39, or 10.71 percent, had Spanish surnames. Of the 424 persons reporting for service on March 7, only 37, or 8.73 percent, had Spanish surnames.
Another expert, a consulting actuary, explained the statistical significance of the numbers. The probability that out of 364 persons in the venire, only 39 would be Hispanic was 1 in 1,000. The probability that out of 424 persons in a venire, only 37 would be Hispanic, was 1 in 10,000. He explained the actual number of Hispanics appearing for the venire in the second sample was five standard deviations from what would occur in a random sample, and that using the standard reference text of normal distribution, the occurrence of five standard deviations from the normal has a probability of approximately one out of ten thousand. He concluded that with respect to either sample, it would be extremely unlikely that the panels were drawn randomly. He found the two samples conclusive. “Having the two consecutive panels with such minute probabilities of occurring leads me to conclude that the sample is not randomly drawn.” He then checked his conclusion by directing a computer to select 424 names from the total population in the same way that the county selected its weekly venire. He directed the computer to take a random sample of 424 names, 10,000 times. The smallest number of Spanish surnames that was ever drawn was 50.
Though the majority point to other cases in which more than two venires were sampled, they cite no authority, either legal or statistical, to establish that a survey of two large venires is inadequate to assess the operation of a jury selection system. The expert used the statistical decision method approved in other cases alleging unrepresentative jury venires (see Alston v. Manson (2d Cir. 1986) 791 F.2d 255, 257-258, and cases cited; see also Castaneda v. Partida (1977) 430 U.S. 482, 494, fn. 13 [51 L.Ed.2d 498, 510, 97 S.Ct. 1272]), employment discrimination (see Board of Education v. Califano (2d Cir. 1978) 584 F.2d 576, 584, fn. 29) and school segregation (see Hazelwood School District v. United States (1977) 433 U.S. 299, 308-309 & fn. 14 [53 L.Ed.2d 768, 777-778, 97 S.Ct. 2736]). His statistical *579analysis showed results greater than the standard deviation from the norm.1 In the absence of any evidence that the expert was wrong to think that the evidence before him was adequate to support his conclusion, we have no ground to dispute that conclusion. Here, the two samples were large, and the probability was very low that Hispanics would be as underrepresented as they were. There was at most a one-in-a-thousand possibility that the underrepresentation was attributable to chance. This probability was so low, and the statistical method so well established, that more should not be required.
The majority further reject defendant’s claim on the ground that he has not shown systematic exclusion, the third prong of the Duren test. No general rule of law emerges from the majority opinion, but it does suggest that a defendant cannot make out a prima facie case under Duren if the jury selection system he complains of appears neutral on its face and his only evidence of systematic exclusion is that a cognizable group is significantly underrepresented. “[W]e believe that a prima facie case of systematic exclusion or underrepresentation of a distinctive class is not made merely by demonstrating that the county’s race/class neutral jury selection processes may nonetheless operate to permit the de facto exclusion of a higher percentage of a particular class of jurors than would result from a random draw.” (Maj. opn. at p. 546, italics in original.) Unless the defendant can demonstrate that the underrepresentation was “the immediate and direct result of the state’s exemption laws” (ibid.), the majority suggest that defendant has no ground for complaint. The implication is that defendant must show that the jury selection system is not neutral on its face, and that he must identify what aspect of the system caused the underrepresentation he complains of.
The Sixth Amendment establishes a defendant’s right to be tried by a jury selected from a fair cross-section of the community (Taylor v. Louisiana (1975) 419 U.S. 522, 526-531 [42 L.Ed.2d 690, 695-699, 95 S.Ct. 692]). The Fourteenth Amendment protects against intentional discrimination in the selection of venires (Castaneda v. Partida, supra, 430 U.S. 482, 492-494 [51 L.Ed.2d 498, 509-510]), but the Sixth Amendment protects against unintentional deviations from the constitutional standard. (See Davis v. Zant (11th Cir. 1983) 721 F.2d. 1478, 1482 & fn. 6; LaRoche v. Perrin (1st Cir. 1983) 718 F.2d 500, 503 (overruled on other grounds in Barber v. Ponte (1st Cir. 1985) 772 F.2d 982); Barber v. Ponte, supra, 772 F.2d 982, 1004-1005, dis. *580opn. of Bownes, J., on rehg.) A defendant may make out a prima facie case that a facially neutral system of selection violates the Sixth Amendment, either by showing that subjectivity is allowed in executing the commands of the statute, and that venires are unrepresentative (see Davis v. Zant, supra, 721 F.2d 1478, 1482-1485), or simply by showing that the system has the unintended effect of causing a substantial underrepresentation of a particular group. (People v. Harris (1984) 36 Cal.3d 36, 58 [201 Cal.Rptr. 782, 679 P.2d 433], cert. den. sub nom. California v. Harris (1984) 469 U.S. 965 [83 L.Ed.2d 301, 105 S.Ct. 365]; People v. Buford (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 288, 295-296 [182 Cal.Rptr. 904]; see also United States v. Benmuhar (1st Cir. 1981) 658 F.2d 14, 19 [defendant made out prima facie case that English proficiency requirement systematically excluded cognizable groups].)
The Sixth Amendment vindicates a democracy’s interest in the participation of all groups in the administration of justice. (Taylor v. Louisiana, supra, 419 U.S. at p. 530 [42 L.Ed.2d at p. 698]; see Ballard v. United States (1946) 329 U.S. 187, 195 [91 L.Ed. 181, 186-187, 67 S.Ct. 261]; see also Williams v. Florida (1969) 399 U.S. 78, 100 [26 L.Ed.2d 446, 460, 90 S.Ct. 1893].) The protection against arbitrary or oppressive power “is not provided if the jury pool is made up of only special segments of the populace or if large, distinctive groups are excluded from the pool. Community participation in the administration of the criminal law, moreover, is not only consistent with our democratic heritage but is also critical to public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system. Restricting jury service to only special groups or excluding identifiable segments playing major roles in the community cannot be squared with the constitutional concept of jury trial.” (Taylor v. Louisiana, supra, 419 U.S. at p. 530 [42 L.Ed.2d at p. 698].) The fair cross-section requirement of the Sixth Amendment is substantive, not procedural. It is not satisfied by a facially neutral system which perpetuates the exclusion of disadvantaged groups from the mainstream of government.
Our nation’s history is shadowed by too many examples of facially neutral rules which operated to exclude minority groups from their fundamental rights for us to be confident that a neutral law necessarily operates fairly. The poll tax (Harman v. Forsennius (1965) 380 U.S. 528, 543 [14 L.Ed.2d 50, 60, 85 S.Ct. 1177]), the literacy test (Louisiana v. United States (1965) 380 U.S. 145, 150 [13 L.Ed.2d 709, 713, 85 S.Ct. 817]), and gerrymandering (Gomillion v. Lightfoot (1960) 364 U.S. 339 [5 L.Ed.2d 110, 81 S.Ct. 125]) are all apparently neutral methods by which access to the franchise has been unconstitutionally impaired. States have persistently used apparently neutral standards to exclude minorities from juries. (Hernandez v. Texas (1954) 347 U.S. 475, 478-479 [98 L.Ed. 866, 870, 74 S.Ct. 667]; Norris v. Alabama (1935) 294 U.S. 587, 589 [79 L.Ed. 1074, 1076, 55 S.Ct. 579].) As early as 1886 the high court was called upon to invalidate an apparently neutral *581regulation which, as applied, invidiously discriminated against Chinese business people. (Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886) 118 U.S. 356 [30 L.Ed. 220, 6 S.Ct. 1064].) In the area of employment, apparently neutral employment requirements have been used to perpetuate long-standing discrimination. (See Griggs v. Duke Power Co. (1971) 401 U.S. 424, 430-431 [28 L.Ed.2d 158, 163-164, 91 S.Ct. 849].) It is no answer to a claim that juries are not drawn from a fair cross-section of the community to explain that the system under which the venires are selected is facially neutral.
Apparently the majority are not certain of their suggestion that a facially neutral system would never violate the Sixth Amendment, as they levy the additional charge against defendant that he cannot prove that the underrepresentation was caused by the system of selection. Defendant’s expert evidence was that the probability of the underrepresentation occurring by chance in a random system was so small that it was established that something in the system of selection caused the underrepresentation. Implicit in Duren and also in Fourteenth Amendment cases is the understanding that a significant disparity in representation which is not attributable to chance is attributable to the system of selection. (Duren v. Missouri, supra, 439 U.S. at p. 366 [58 L.Ed.2d at p. 588]; see also Castaneda v. Partida, supra, 430 U.S. at p. 494, fn. 13 [51 L.Ed.2d at p. 510]; United States v. Benmuhar, supra, 658 F.2d at p. 19; Smith v. Yeager (3d Cir. 1972) 465 F.2d 272, 280, cert. den. 409 U.S. 1076 [34 L.Ed.2d 665, 93 S.Ct. 685].) The same logic applies in employment discrimination cases. (Teamsters v. United States (1977) 431 U.S. 324, 337-340 [52 L.Ed.2d 396, 416-418, 97 S.Ct. 1843]; see also Hazelwood School District v. United States, supra, 433 U.S. 299, 307-308 [53 L.Ed.2d 768, 777].)
The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that in cases in which defendant seeks to show that the jury selection system violates the Fourteenth Amendment, underrepresentation of a cognizable class is evidence of both discriminatory effect and discriminatory purpose. “In contrast, in Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section cases, systematic disproportion itself demonstrates an infringement of the defendant’s interest in a jury chosen from a fair community cross section. The only remaining question is whether there is adequate justification for this infringement.” (Duren v. Missouri, supra, 439 U.S. at p. 368, fn. 26 [58 L.Ed.2d at p. 589], italics added.)
Nor is it defendant’s obligation in establishing the the prima facie case to show at exactly what point in the system the disparity occurs. It is suggested that because defendant in Duren could point to the stage in the jury selection process when women became underrepresented, Duren requires defendant to show exactly what caused the underrepresentation. Not so—in Duren itself, the court rejected the idea that defendant had to show that the *582underrepresentation was not caused by jurors seeking exemptions under provisions which were not subject to attack. (Duren v. Missouri, supra, 439 U.S. at pp. 368-369 [58 L.Ed.2d at pp. 589-590].)
Next, the majority suggest that Ventura County is doing all it reasonably can to assure a fair cross-section. (Maj. opn. at p. 549.) The People called a supervisor in the jury commissioner’s office who testified that requests for disqualification, exemption or excuse are acted upon by clerks in the jury commissioner’s office who make no systematic effort to investigate or verify claims. If a person fails to return the questionnaire and fails to appear for jury service, the jury commissioner’s office mails a letter and form soliciting a request for excuse or postponement of service. There is no further effort made to secure the prospective juror’s compliance with the summons. The county essentially operates on the honor system. Of those called during the two weeks studied by defendant, less than a third appeared. When so few actually appear for service, and so little effort is made to verify the excuses of the vast majority who do not appear, the county can hardly claim that it is doing all that can be done.
The Sixth Amendment right to a jury venire drawn from a fair cross-section of the community is an important one. It serves the goal of fairness to the individual defendant, as well as the broader, democratic goal of assuring the participation of the whole community in the judicial branch of government. Our history warns us against complacency in assuming that these goals will be reached. When social science demonstrates that in fact, our jury venires are not representative of a fair cross-section of the community, we must reexamine the system of selection for flaws.
I would reverse the judgment.
The petition of appellant Morales for a rehearing was denied June 1, 1989. Mosk, J., and Broussard, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

 The Supreme Court has explained the statistical model used here, and stated that in a sample of 870 prospective jurors, “[a]s a general rule for such large samples, if the difference between the expected value and the observed number is greater than two or three standard deviations, then the hypothesis that the jury drawing was random would be suspect to a social scientist.” (Castaneda v. Partida, supra, 430 U.S. at p. 497, fn. 17 [51 L.Ed.2d at p. 512].)