Court Opinion

ID: 9402125
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-15 15:00:59.543253+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:57.899166
License: Public Domain

20-4171
     Khan v. Garland
                                                                            BIA
                                                                  Christensen, IJ
                                                                  A209 848 174
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                  SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

 1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
 2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
 3   United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
 4   New York, on the 15th day of June, two thousand twenty-
 5   three.
 6
 7   PRESENT:
 8            JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
 9            SUSAN L. CARNEY,
10            RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,
11                 Circuit Judges.
12   _____________________________________
13
14   MUZAMAL KHAN,
15            Petitioner,
16
17                     v.                                  20-4171
18                                                         NAC
19   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
20   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
21            Respondent.
22   _____________________________________
23
24   FOR PETITIONER:                   Usman B. Ahmad, Esq., Long Island
25                                     City, NY.
26
27   FOR RESPONDENT:                   Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant
28                                     Attorney General; M. Jocelyn Lopez
 1                                    Wright, Senior Litigation Counsel;
 2                                    Jacob A. Bashyrov, Trial Attorney,
 3                                    Office of Immigration Litigation,
 4                                    United States Department of
 5                                    Justice, Washington, DC.

 6       UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

 7   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

8    ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

9    is DENIED.

10       Petitioner      Muzamal      Khan,   a    native   and    citizen   of

11   Pakistan, seeks review of a November 30, 2020 decision of the

12   BIA affirming a June 5, 2018 decision of an Immigration Judge

13   (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum, withholding of

14   removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture

15   (“CAT”).     In re Muzamal Khan, No. A 209 848 174 (B.I.A. Nov.

16   30, 2020), aff’g No. A 209 848 174 (Immig. Ct. N.Y.C. June 5,

17   2018).       We   assume   the    parties’      familiarity    with     the

18   underlying facts and procedural history.

19       We have reviewed the IJ’s                decision as modified and

20   supplemented by the BIA.         See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of

21   Just., 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005); Yan Chen v. Gonzales,

22   417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005).              We review the agency’s

23   factual findings for substantial evidence and questions of

24   law de novo.      See Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513
                                      2
 1   (2d Cir. 2009).         “[T]he administrative findings of fact are

 2   conclusive       unless       any   reasonable         adjudicator        would     be

 3   compelled        to    conclude     to        the    contrary.”           8     U.S.C.

 4   § 1252(b)(4)(B).

 5          I.   Asylum and Withholding of Removal

 6          Khan alleged that a loan shark beat and threatened him

 7   because of his membership in the particular social groups of

 8   “farmers” and “people belonging to a rural class.”                             He had

 9   the burden to establish that his membership in one of these

10   proposed groups was “at least one central reason” for the

11   past    harm      or    his    fear      of     future      harm.         8    U.S.C.

12   § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); see also Quituizaca v. Garland, 52 F.4th

13   103, 109–14 (2d Cir. 2022) (holding that the “one central

14   reason” standard applies to both asylum and withholding of

15   removal).         Substantial         evidence        supports      the       agency’s

16   conclusion that Khan failed to carry that burden.                         See Edimo-

17   Doualla     v.    Gonzales,     464    F.3d         276,   282   (2d   Cir.     2006)

18   (reviewing nexus determination for substantial evidence).

19          Khan testified that he approached the loan shark to

20   finance medical treatment for his parents, and that the loan

21   shark demanded payment of double the amount Khan had borrowed.

                                               3
 1   When he did not repay, the loan shark threatened Khan, slapped

 2   him and held his neck, and took jewelry from his brother’s

 3   house.   Khan went to the police, but they simply told him to

 4   repay the loan.   Khan testified that the loan shark hurt him

 5   because he wanted his money back.    Based on these facts, the

 6   agency reasonably determined Khan was threatened and harmed

 7   because he failed to repay a loan, and not because of his

8    membership   in   his   proposed   particular   social   groups.

9    Quintanilla-Mejia v. Garland, 3 F.4th 569, 588 (2d Cir. 2021)

10   (explaining that to secure relief a noncitizen must show “his

11   persecutor[’s] motive in threatening his life or freedom was,

12   at least in part, [his] membership in that social group”);

13   see also Quituizaca, 52 F.4th at 114–15 (“A protected ground

14   cannot be incidental or tangential to another reason for

15   harm.” (quotation marks omitted)).      Khan argues generally

16   that the loan shark takes advantage of rural farmers, but the

17   record reflects that the loan shark lends to rural farmers

18   because he can impose usurious terms, and not because of their

19   status as members of a particular social group.      See Ucelo-

20   Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 2007) (“When the

21   harm visited upon members of a group is attributable to the

                                    4
 1   incentives presented to ordinary criminals rather than to

 2   persecution, the scales are tipped away from considering

3    those people a ‘particular social group’ within the meaning

4    of the INA.”).

 5       II. CAT Relief

 6       A CAT applicant bears the burden of demonstrating that

 7   he will “more likely than not” be tortured by or with the

 8   acquiescence     of   government   officials.      8   C.F.R.

 9   §§ 1208.16(c)(2), 1208.18(a)(1).   Torture is defined as any

10   act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or

11   mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person by, or at the

12   instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of, a

13   public official acting in an official capacity or other person

14   acting in an official capacity.     See id. § 1208.18(a)(1).

15   “In assessing whether it is more likely than not that an

16   applicant would be tortured,” the agency must consider “all

17   evidence relevant to the possibility of future torture,”

18   including “[e]vidence of past torture inflicted upon the

19   applicant,” “[e]vidence that the applicant could relocate to

20   a part of the country of removal where he or she is not likely

21   to be tortured,” “[e]vidence of gross, flagrant or mass

                                    5
 1   violations of human rights within the country of removal,”

 2   and “[o]ther relevant information regarding conditions in the

3    country of removal.”     Id. § 1208.16(c)(3).        Furthermore, “an

 4   alien will never be able to show that he faces a more likely

 5   than not chance of torture if one link in the chain cannot be

 6   shown to be more likely than not to occur.                     It is the

 7   likelihood of all necessary events coming together that must

 8   more likely than not lead to torture, and a chain of events

 9   cannot be more likely than its least likely link.”               Savchuck

10   v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting In re

11   J–F–F–, 23 I. & N. Dec. 912, 918 n.4 (A.G. 2006)).

12         The record reflects that on one occasion the loan shark

13   slapped Khan and grabbed him by the neck but did not cause

14   serious injury.      This does not amount to torture.              See 8

15   C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(2) (“Torture is an extreme form of cruel

16   and inhuman treatment and does not include lesser forms of

17   cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment that do

18   not   amount   to   torture.”).       And   Khan   did   not    otherwise

19   establish that the loan shark would more likely than not

20   locate and torture him in the future; any such speculation

21   was undermined by evidence        that the loan shark has             not

                                       6
 1   followed through on prior threats to seize Khan’s house in

 2   Pakistan.   See Savchuck, 518 F.3d at 123; Jian Xing Huang v.

 3   INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2005) (“In the absence of

 4   solid support in the record . . . [an applicant’s] fear is

 5   speculative at best.”).

 6       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

 7   DENIED.   All pending motions and applications are DENIED and

8    stays VACATED.

 9                               FOR THE COURT:
10                               Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
11                               Clerk of Court

                                   7