Court Opinion

ID: 9904766
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 20:02:03.849628+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:24.902192
License: Public Domain

11/27/23
                              CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

              IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                              THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                        (Sacramento)
                                             ----

                                                                      C098247
 In re ARLONZO J. BANKS on Habeas Corpus.
                                                            (Super. Ct. No. 22HC00126)

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sacramento County, Allison
Williams, Judge. Affirmed.

      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Sara J. Romano, Assistant Attorney General, Julie
A. Malone, Van Kamberian, Deputy Attorneys General, for Appellant.

           Sharon Wrubel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Respondent.

           Someone mailed inmate/respondent Arlonzo J. Banks two large manila envelopes
with the controlled substance Suboxone hidden inside. A correctional sergeant
intercepted the envelopes in the prison mailroom, and inmate Banks was issued a rules
violation report charging him with conspiracy to introduce a controlled substance into
prison for distribution or sale. During the investigation, inmate Banks tried to ask the
sergeant who issued the rules violation report, “ ‘What, if any, evidence demonstrates I

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agreed with another individual to introduce a controlled substance into the facility?’ ”
The hearing officer deemed the question irrelevant.
       Inmate Banks’s question was spot on. The record contains no evidence of the first
element of conspiracy, namely, the existence of an agreement between at least two
persons. We therefore affirm the trial court’s grant of inmate Banks’s petition for writ of
habeas corpus that vacated a guilty finding of conspiracy.
                   FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       In July 2020, a correctional sergeant was processing mail in the prison mailroom
and searched two large manila envelopes addressed to inmate Banks. That correctional
sergeant found “numerous small orange squares glued underneath the bottom flap of both
the manila envelopes” and gave the envelopes to another correctional sergeant, Sergeant
Laguna, for further investigation. Sergeant Laguna removed the orange squares, took
photographs of the envelopes, and sent the squares to a pharmacist, who determined they
were strips of the controlled substance Suboxone. The envelopes were addressed using
defendant’s CDCR number, two different cell block numbers, and the same return
address, although the return addressee’s name was spelled differently on each envelope.
The sergeant issued a rules violation report to inmate Banks, charging him with
conspiring to introduce a controlled substance into prison for distribution or sale. (Cal.
Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3016, subd. (d).)
       Inmate Banks directed the correctional officer who had been assigned as his
investigative employee to ask Sergeant Laguna, “ ‘What, if any, evidence demonstrates I
agreed with another individual to introduce a controlled substance into the facility?’ ”
The senior hearing officer in charge of hearing the rules violation report deemed the
question irrelevant.
       At the rules violation report hearing, inmate Banks pled not guilty and said, “I
don’t know nothing about this. If I did this I would say so. I always have. I don’t know
that person. And look, the names are spelled different. It wasn’t mine.” As additional

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evidence, the hearing officer considered Sergeant Laguna’s rules violation report, the
pharmacist’s supplemental report that confirmed the hidden strips were Suboxone, and
the initial incident report describing the envelopes.
       The hearing officer found inmate Banks guilty, saying there was “an agreement
between two or more people” to introduce a controlled substance because the envelopes
were addressed to inmate Banks, the Suboxone strips were concealed, and the envelopes
had a fictitious return address. Given the “prison value of said contraband,” 1 the hearing
officer reasoned the sender would not risk sending the envelopes blindly, so inmate
Banks and the sender must have communicated about the smuggling method.
       The hearing officer assessed a 180-day loss of custody credits, 180-day loss of
pay, 60-day loss of canteen privileges, 365-day loss of visiting privileges, 730-day loss of
contact visiting privileges, seven-year loss of family visits, and one month of mandatory
drug testing.
       Inmate Banks exhausted his administrative remedies and then filed a petition for
writ of habeas corpus in the trial court. The court ordered informal responses, received
those responses, and then issued an order to show cause. Both parties filed briefing.
Prison warden/appellant Jeff Lynch argued the sender of the envelopes must have
communicated with inmate Banks because the envelopes were addressed to inmate Banks
and the Suboxone was concealed. Thus, according to the warden, there was
circumstantial evidence of an agreement between the sender and inmate Banks. Inmate
Banks argued the evidence was insufficient to establish a conspiracy because anyone
could easily learn an inmate’s mailing address and the concealment of the drugs showed
only that the sender was trying to sneak them into the prison, not that inmate Banks had

1 There was no evidence about the value of the Suboxone.

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any agreement with the sender. There was also no evidence of phone calls, visitations, or
other communications between inmate Banks and the sender.
       The court granted the petition in a written order, explaining that the senior hearing
officer’s finding was not supported by “ ‘some evidence.’ ” The court also directed the
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to vacate the guilty finding and
restore inmate Banks’s privileges.
                                       DISCUSSION
       The warden argues that at least some evidence supports the senior hearing
officer’s decision to find inmate Banks guilty of conspiring to introduce a controlled
substance into the prison for sale. We disagree.
       “In a habeas corpus proceeding, once the issues have been properly joined, the
court may grant (or deny) the relief sought without ordering an evidentiary hearing as
long as resolution of the petition does not depend on any disputed issue of fact.
[Citation.] When this procedure is employed . . . to review the evidentiary basis for
prison disciplinary action, the trial court’s task is simply to evaluate whether, given the
documentary record summarizing the facts accepted by the parties, there is sufficient
evidence to support the action taken. In such circumstances, the usual deference that
would apply to the review of a trial court’s ruling based on its superior ability to resolve
factual questions (e.g., the credibility of witnesses appearing before it) is unwarranted.
The facts being undisputed, the question presented on appeal is a question of law, and we
review such questions de novo.” (In re Zepeda (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1493, 1497
(Zepeda).)
       “Prisoners are entitled to minimal due process safeguards in disciplinary matters
involving the possible loss of early release credits.” (In re Rigsby (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th
1011, 1016–1017, citing Wolff v. McDonnell (1974) 418 U.S. 539, 558.) “[D]ue process
in this context requires only that there be some evidence to support the findings made in
the disciplinary hearing.” (Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Institution v. Hill (1985)

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472 U.S. 445, 457) The “ ‘some evidence’ ” standard of review is “extraordinarily
deferential.” (Zepeda, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 1498.) “[T]he relevant question is
whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by
the disciplinary board.” (Hill, at pp. 455-456.)
       “Conspiracy ‘ “is an . . . offense, the essence of which is an agreement to commit
an unlawful act.” ’ [Citation.] This crime has four elements: (1) the existence of an
agreement between at least two persons; (2) the specific intent to agree to commit an
offense; (3) the specific intent to commit the offense that is the object of the agreement;
and (4) an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, which may be committed by any
conspirator. [Citations.]” (People v. Ware (2022) 14 Cal.5th 151, 163.) “The
circumstances from which a [conspiratorial] agreement may be inferred include ‘the
conduct of defendants in mutually carrying out a common illegal purpose, the nature of
the act done, the relationship of the parties [and] the interests of the alleged
conspirators.’ ” (People v. Superior Court (Quinteros) (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 12, 20.)
       The evidence reviewed by the senior hearing officer -- the rules violation report,
incident report, supplemental pharmacist report, and inmate Banks’s statements -- do not
demonstrate a conspiratorial agreement existed between inmate Banks and the sender.
The hearing officer concluded the concealment of the strips and the fact the envelopes
were addressed to inmate Banks created an inference that inmate Banks had coordinated
the delivery of the strips ahead of time. But no evidence suggested inmate Banks knew
about the concealed strips, solicited the envelopes, communicated with anyone about the
envelopes, or had any conduct consistent with the illegal purpose of introducing the
Suboxone into the prison. Nor was there any evidence about the sender or the sender’s
relationship with inmate Banks such that it would be reasonable to infer an agreement
between the two. Inmate Banks initially raised this concern before the rules violation
hearing officer when he asked what evidence established an agreement between the
parties; that hearing officer deemed the question irrelevant. While some evidence does

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support the conclusion the sender of the envelopes intended to conceal the drugs and
targeted inmate Banks, no evidence shows inmate Banks made any agreement with the
sender.
       The warden contends there must have been an agreement because it does not make
sense that the sender would send drugs of this value to a random inmate. This contention
fails for two reasons. One, there was no evidence of the value of the Suboxone. And
two, establishing the envelopes were targeted, rather than sent to inmate Banks at
random, is not the same as establishing inmate Banks agreed to distribute the Suboxone
in the prison. The sender may have had any number of positive or negative motives in
targeting inmate Banks without his agreement. There is simply inadequate evidence to
show inmate Banks’s agreement to that motive.
       We conclude the evidence was insufficient to support the disciplinary finding, so
the trial court correctly granted the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

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                                            DISPOSITION
       The trial court’s order granting inmate Banks’s petition for writ of habeas corpus
is affirmed.

                                                      /s/
                                                     MESIWALA, J.

We concur:

 /s/
EARL, P. J.

 /s/
KEITHLEY, J. *

* Judge of the Butte County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI,
section 6 of the California Constitution.

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