Court Opinion

ID: 9858692
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 16:34:52.241072+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:55:27.910296
License: Public Domain

GUITTARD, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I agree with most of the majority opinion. I agree that on October 4, 1984, this court had plenary power over its judgment of July 11, 1984, dismissing the appeal. I agree that this power should be exercised with “extreme care and caution and very careful discretion.” I agree that appellants’ “motion to withdraw judgment granting appellees’ motion to dismiss appeal,” filed on October 3,1984, had no legal effect and could not properly be treated as a motion for rehearing. I do not agree, however, that our order of October 4 vacating the dismissal was improper. I conclude, rather, that extraordinary circumstances intervening after September 7, 1984, when appellants’ motion for rehearing was overruled, presented one of those rare situations that properly called for the application of this court’s plenary power. Because of these circumstances, I would adhere to our order vacating the dismissal and would reinstate the appeal.
The majority opinion omits facts that I regard as crucial. This appeal was dismissed on July 11,1984, on the ground that appellants were barred from further relief in the state courts because they sought and obtained a nullification of the state trial court’s judgment in a federal court on a ground that they failed to raise in the state court. Humble Exploration Co. v. Browning, 677 S.W.2d 111, 113 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1984, no writ). This collateral review was successful in the federal district court, which held that the judgment of the state court was void on the grounds that the state court trial did not comply with the bankruptcy court’s remand order and that it was conducted in violation of the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362. Browning v. Navarro, 37 B.R. 201, 210 (N.D.Tex.1983), rev’d and remanded, 743 F.2d 1069 (5th Cir.1984). Appellants filed in this court a “motion for rehearing of the order of dismissal,” which was overruled in September 1984. Then on October 1, 1984, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the judgment of the federal district court, holding that under the facts of this case no attack upon the state court’s jurisdiction could properly be made in the federal court action because the proceedings in the state trial court were not contrary to the bankruptcy court’s remand order or the automatic stay of section 362. Browning v. Navarro, 743 F.2d 1069, 1082, 1085 (5th Cir.1984).
The opinion of the federal court of appeals was called to this court’s attention by counsel for both parties. In fact, appellants’ “motion to withdraw judgment granting appellees’ motion to dismiss appeal” had no legal effect other than to call that opinion to our attention. Because that opinion raised serious questions concerning the basis of our judgment of dismissal, a majority of this court vacated our judgment of dismissal and invited the parties to submit written arguments. We acted ex parte in vacating our judgment of dismissal because we realized that appellants’ time for filing an application for writ of error on our judgment of dismissal would have expired before this court could allow *330appellees the usual time to respond to appellants’ motion to withdraw our judgment of dismissal. We recognized that appellees would not be prejudiced by this ex parte order because they would have full opportunity to present to us the contention that we had no further jurisdiction of the appeal and that we should allow the dismissal to stand. In response to our invitation, counsel have presented full briefs on the question of our plenary jurisdiction. I agree with the majority that we did have plenary jurisdiction over our judgment of dismissal. Moreover, I am persuaded, although the majority is not, that our plenary jurisdiction was properly exercised.
My analysis of the federal court of appeals’ opinion has convinced me that it completely undermines our decision dismissing the appeal. We held that appellants should be limited to their remedy in the federal courts because, by analogy to the doctrine of election of remedies as applied in such cases as Saner-Whiteman Lumber Co. v. Texas & New Orleans Railway Co., 288 S.W. 127, 128 (Tex.Comm’n App.1926, holding approved), when a litigant makes a choice between two inconsistent remedies for the' same wrong, he should be bound by that choice. Humble Exploration, 677 S.W.2d at 115. We were persuaded that a litigant ought not to be able to speculate on a judgment in the state court by reserving a complaint not raised there for a subsequent attack on the judgment in the federal court in the event of an adverse judgment in the state court. Consequently, we concluded that a successful attack on the judgment in the federal court on a ground that could have been raised in the state court should preclude appellants from further relief in the state court system by way of appeal. In reaching that decision, we took the federal law as declared by Judge Sanders in the federal district court, which we interpreted to permit such review in federal court of state court proceedings for violation of conditions of remand by the bankruptcy court, Humble Exploration, 677 S.W.2d at 113 (citing Browning, 37 B.R. 201). We were concerned, also, that the availability of such federal-court review would jeopardize the authority of state courts to try and decide cases remanded from the bankruptcy court in accordance with state rules of procedure and recognized principles of state law. Humble Exploration, 677 S.W.2d at 114.
The decision of the federal court of appeals now casts an entirely different light on the matter. That court has decided that the remedy appellants sought in the federal courts is' not available to them. Moreover, that court has strongly indicated in its opinion that the federal courts have no disposition to interpret their exclusive powers under the Bankruptcy Act to authorize the imposition of conditions inconsistent with state law on cases remanded by the bankruptcy court for trial in a state court. In view of that opinion, it appears that these appellants had no opportunity to speculate on the state court judgment and avoid an adverse result by raising in a federal court proceeding a ground not raised in the state court.
Accordingly, we must now decide whether appellants’ unsuccessful attempt to pursue in the federal courts a remedy not available there precludes them from obtaining a review of the judgment by our court. Our analogy to the doctrine of election of remedies suggests that appellants are not precluded by their attempt to pursue an unavailable remedy. The established rule in Texas is that the doctrine of election requires that two inconsistent remedies be available; consequently, an attempt to enforce a supposed but nonexistent remedy does not constitute an election. Poe v. Continental Oil & Cotton Co., 231 S.W. 717, 719 (Tex.Comm’n App.1921, holding approved); Schwarz v. National Loan & Investment Co., 133 S.W.2d 133, 136 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1939, writ ref’d). Texas courts have regarded the doctrine of election with disfavor and have refused to extend it. Custom Leasing, Inc. v. Texas Bank & Trust Co., 491 S.W.2d 869, 871 (Tex.1973). I can find no authority applying the doctrine of election in a situation like the present.
*331Nor can I agree with appellees’ contention that a collateral attack based on the contention that a judgment is void is necessarily inconsistent with an appeal complaining of other errors. In Winters Mutual Aid Association Circle No. 2 v. Reddin, 49 S.W.2d 1095, 1096-97 (Tex.Comm’n App.1932, holding approved), the supreme court refused to dismiss an appeal although the appealing party had filed a bill of review in the trial court attacking the same judgment on equitable grounds. The supreme court approved the holding of the commission of appeals that the two remedies were not inconsistent. Winters, 49 S.W.2d at 1097. In accord with Winters, I conclude that appellants’ unsuccessful claim in the federal court that the judgment is void is not in itself such an inconsistent position as to require dismissal of this appeal.
Appellees insist further, however, that appellants have forfeited their right of appeal here because they did, in fact, trifle with the state trial court by failing to raise there their contention of lack of jurisdiction resulting from the alleged violation of the remand order and then only presenting that claim in the federal court after suffering an adverse judgment in the state court. This argument is untenable in the light of the federal court of appeals’ holding that the state trial court had full jurisdiction under the provisions of the remand order. I cannot agree that appellants should be penalized for failing to raise a contention in the state court that would not have been well taken and could not have been properly sustained there even if it had been raised.
In dismissing the appeal on July 11, we were convinced that appellees should not be burdened with dual review of their judgment in both state and federal court systems, as the federal district court opinion appeared to allow. Humble Exploration, 677 S.W.2d at 114-15. Since the federal court of appeals has now held that no dual review is available in this case, our present question is whether appellants, by their attempt to pursue an unavailable remedy, have forfeited their right of review in this court. In the light of the present record, I do not regard the federal court action as an improper delaying maneuver. The federal court action in which the judgment was attacked was not initiated by appellants, but by appellees, who sought enforcement of their judgment in the federal court because of the pendency of the bankruptcy proceedings. The bankrupt appellants, being unable to post a supersedeas bond, advanced an argument which, although it was ultimately rejected by the federal court of appeals, was plausible enough to convince the United States district judge that the state court judgment was void. I cannot say that this unsuccessful employment of the art of advocacy to resist enforcement of a judgment pending appeal was so reprehensible as to forfeit appellants’ right to have that judgment reviewed for whatever errors may have been committed in the state court.
The majority opinion cites cases holding that this court has no power to extend the time prescribed by rule 4581 for filing a motion for rehearing except on a motion to extend complying with rule 21c. Those authorities, in my view, do not limit our plenary power over our judgments, which, as the majority recognizes, continues until the end of the term in which they were issued or until an application for writ of error is filed. The time for filing a motion for rehearing has nothing to do with the duration of the court’s plenary power after a motion for rehearing has been overruled. Whether an appellate court can extend the time for filing a motion for rehearing without a timely motion to extend and whether such a motion can be considered as a predicate for an application for writ of error are separate questions that are irrelevant to our present problem. If the court retains until the end of the term the plenary power to act sua sponte, then the filing of an untimely motion cannot operate to limit that power. Although our order of October 4 recites the filing of appellants’ “motion to withdraw judgment,” it does not *332provide that the motion is granted; rather it is consistent with the exercise of our plenary jurisdiction sua sponte. Of course, if we had jurisdiction to act sua sponte, as the majority concedes, an order purporting to grant an untimely motion would not be ineffective to vacate our earlier judgment if the order provided, as this order does, that the earlier judgment was vacated. I agree that no order of this court could give an untimely motion validity as a predicate for an application for writ of error to the supreme court.
This interpretation of rule 458 is supported by Wilson Independent School District v. Weaver, 143 Tex. 530, 187 S.W.2d 221, 222 (1945). In that case the supreme court upheld the action of the intermediate court in setting aside its original judgment and rendering a different judgment after a motion for rehearing had already been overruled. The supreme court held that even expiration of the term did not preclude this reconsideration because at the end of the term a motion to certify questions to the supreme court was pending. (This motion was granted in the next term, but certification was not permitted by the supreme court.) Thus, Wilson Independent School District stands for the rule that an appellate court’s plenary power to reconsider and change its judgments ex-* tends to a succeeding term, even though a motion for rehearing has been overruled, if any other matter is properly pending before the appellate court at the expiration of the term. Our reconsideration here need not go that far because on October 4, when we vacated our order of July 11 dismissing the appeal, the term had not expired.
Further support for my interpretation of the court’s plenary power is found in Garrett v. Katz, 27 S.W.2d 373, 374 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1930, no writ), where this court corrected a judgment to delete recovery on a supersedeas bond “as the term of court at which it was entered had not ended.” By its nature, the court’s plenary power is not limited to the correction of clerical errors and the like. The power to correct clerical errors, etc., continues even though the court’s plenary jurisdiction has expired with the end of the term. Knox v. Long, 152 Tex. 291, 257 S.W.2d 289, 293 (1953); TEX.R.CIV.P. 316, 317; see also Finlay v. Jones, 435 S.W.2d 136, 138 (Tex.1969). Moreover, the present problem is not affected by B.D. Click Co. v. Safari Drilling Corp., 638 S.W.2d 860 (Tex.1982), and the other decisions holding that an appellate court has no authority to consider a late-filed record unless it has granted a timely motion to extend in compliance with rule 21c. I agree with the majority that rule 458, like the rules covering the times for filing records, means what it says and must be given effect when applicable. Our authority to consider a late record, however, is not analogous to our plenary power over our judgments. The former is limited by the rules, as held in Click (and by rule 386 as recently amended), while the latter continues, as even the majority recognizes, until the end of the term or until an application for writ of error is filed. Application of the Click rule to the present situation would nullify the doctrine of plenary power and leave the appellate court with no power over its judgment after a motion for rehearing has been overruled or, in absence of a timely motion for rehearing, the time for filing such a motion has expired, notwithstanding the continuation of the court’s term, which begins and ends with the calendar year, as provided by TEX. REY.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 1816 (Vernon Supp.1984).
For the reasons stated, I conclude that the extraordinary circumstances of this case present a situation in which this court should exercise its plenary jurisdiction and give appellants an opportunity to present their appeal. Although they have complied with all applicable rules, have filed an extensive record, and have prepared an elaborate brief, they have been denied their right of review of a multi-million dollar judgment on the ground that they pursued an inconsistent remedy in the federal courts, a remedy now held to be unavailable by the federal court of appeals. Consequently, I would adhere to our order of October 4 vacating our dismissal order *333of July 11 and would set the case for submission and oral argument.
CARVER, VANCE, MALONEY, DEVA-NY, and HOWELL, JJ., join in the dissent.

. All references in the opinion to "rules” are to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.