Court Opinion

ID: 9581649
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:17:07.668253+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:09.015742
License: Public Domain

LAKE, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur, in the decision that the defendant is entitled to a new trial. I also concur in all of the majority opinion except the portion of it dealing with the applicability to this case of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602, and with the admissibility of the testimony of Sheriff Womble as to the statements made to him by the defendant and by Evans.
It is my view that the Miranda rule does apply to this case and, consequently, the testimony of Sheriff Womble as to the statements made to him by the defendant was incompetent. As the majority-opinion points out, this compels the conclusion that the testimony of the sheriff as to statements made to him by Evans in the presence of the defendant was also incompetent. If the defendant’s express admission was incompetent by reason of the Miranda rule, the contemporaneous statement by Evans could not be competent as an implied admission by the defendant. The defendant having the constitutional right to remain silent throughout the interrogation by the sheriff, his failure to deny the statement by Evans could not be deemed an implied admission that the Evans statement was true. State v. Fuller, 270 N.C. 710, 155 S.E. 2d 286.
The majority opinion is to the effect that, though a trial be commenced after the Miranda decision, the admissibility in evidence at such trial of a statement made by the defendant in the course of *454custodial interrogation is not affected by the Miranda rule, if the statement was made before the date of that decision. With this I am unable to agree. I believe that for trial courts to follow this course will result in reversals of convictions otherwise proper.
Like Justices Harlan, Stewart, White and Clark, who dissented from the Miranda decision, I believe the rule established by that case is unsound and the result of a misinterpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Consequently, I have no desire to see the effect of that decision enlarged, either as to the content of the rule or as to the time of its effectiveness. The merits of the Miranda decision are, however, not before us.
As stated in my dissenting opinion in Rabon v. Hospital, 269 N.C. 1, 152 S.E. 2d 485, it is my view that the judicial power does not extend to the making of a new rule of law applicable only to the future. For that reason I am unable to concur in those portions of the majority opinion which seem to imply that this Court may lawfully exercise this power, which is the very essence of the legislative power. That power is, in my opinion, denied us by Art. I, § 8, and Art. II, § 1, of the Constitution of North Carolina, but that question is not before us in this case and any such implications in the majority opinion are, at the most, dicta.
While, for like reason, it is my view that the Supreme Court of the United States has no lawful authority under the Constitution of the United States to give to an interpretation of that document by it prospective operation only, that question is not before us. The Supreme Court of the United States has ruled that it does have that authority, and its determination of that question is binding upon us, being, itself, an interpretation of the Constitution of the United States.
Assuming the Supreme Court of the United States has that authority, as we must for the purposes of this case, it is not for this Court to determine whether a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States should or should not be retroactive, or, if it be not fully retroactive, to determine when its effectiveness commences. That is a question to be determined by the Supreme Court of the United States and by no other tribunal. Unless the Supreme Court of the United States otherwise declares, its interpretations of the Constitution of the United States are retroactive and are applicable, where otherwise so, to all trials occurring thereafter, without regard to when the facts giving rise to the question arose. When the Supreme Court of the United States has otherwise declared, its declaration is conclusive of the question as to when its interpretation of *455the Constitution of the United States takes effect and conclusive of the question as to which trials are to be conducted under the new rule announced by it and which are to be conducted under the former rule.
The Supreme Court of the United States has so spoken in Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 16 L. Ed. 2d 882, 86 S. Ct. 1772, with reference to the effective date of its Miranda decision. Consequently, the discussion in the majority opinion, in the present case, as to principles governing determination of when a decision, which changes the law, should be declared retroactive and just how retroactive it should be, is not pertinent to the case ’ now before us. Whether we agree with Johnson v. New Jersey or not, it is the authoritative answer to the question of when the Miranda rule took effect and determines which confessions (time-wise) are admissible and which are not. The only question for us is, What did the Johnson case say about this and what did the Court mean by what it said?
This is what the Court said in Johnson v. New Jersey:
“In this case we are called upon to determine whether Escobedo v. Illinois * * * and Miranda v. Arizona * * * should be applied retroactively. We hold * * * that Miranda applies only to cases in which the trial began after the date of our decision one week ago. * * *
“ [R] etroactive application of * * * Miranda would seriously disrupt the administration of our criminal laws. It - would require retrial or release of numerous prisoners found guilty by trustworthy evidence in conformity with previously announced constitutional standards. * * *
“In the light of these various considerations, we conclude that Escobedo and Miranda * * * should not be applied retroactively. The question remains whether Escobedo and Miranda shall affect cases still on direct appeal when they were decided or whether their application shall commence with trials begun after the decisions were announced. * *
“All of the reasons set forth above for making Escobedo and Miranda nonretroactive suggest that these decisions should apply only to trials begun after the decisions were announced. Future defendants will benefit fully from our new standards governing in-custody interrogation, while past defendants may still avail themselves of the voluntariness test. * * *. -Prospective application only to trials begun after the standards were *456announced is particularly applicable here. * * * In these circumstances, to upset all of the convictions still pending on direct appeal which were obtained in trials preceding * * * Miranda would impose an unjustifiable burden on the administration of justice. * * *
“In the light of these additional considerations, we conclude that * * * Miranda should apply only to cases commenced after those decisions were announced. * * *
"The disagreements among the other courts concerning the implications of Escobedo, however, have impelled us to lay down additional guidelines for situations not presented by that case. This we have done in Miranda, and these guidelines are therefore available only to persons whose trials had not begun as of June IS, 1966.” (Emphasis added throughout.)
When a court says in its opinion that it “holds” a certain thing, this statement, and not the reasons given therefor, determines what that case decides. I am unable to escape the conclusion that the Johnson case decides that the Miranda rule applies to the introduction of a confession at any trial, which trial begins after the Miranda case was decided, 13 June 1966, irrespective of when the confession was obtained. Consequently, I cannot concur in this statement in the majority opinion in the present case:
“In our view, Miranda should not and does not apply to confessions obtained prior to that decision, when offered at trials or retrials beginning thereafter, where law enforcement officers relied upon and complied with constitutional standards applicable at the time the confessions were made.”
Let us suppose an arrest and interrogation just prior to the Miranda decision. The interrogating officer did not inform the prisoner of his right to have counsel appointed, he being an indigent. The prisoner confessed in response to interrogation otherwise proper. The prisoner thereafter escaped before trial and has just been recaptured. He is now brought to trial and the confession is offered in evidence and admitted over his objection. Can there be any doubt as to what the Supreme Court of the United States would hold, assuming it adheres to its decisions in the Miranda and Johnson cases? In the language of the Johnson case, I can find no support for the view that the admissibility of the confession depends on when it was obtained, rather than on when the trial at which it was used commenced.
There remains for consideration the question of whether a new trial, ordered because of errors in a former trial, is indeed a new trial *457or a mere continuation of tbe old one. Is the new trial, which gets under way long after the announcement of the Miranda decision, a trial “begun” before that decision was handed down merely because the case was started by an indictment returned prior to that decision and an abortive trial was then had? In my opinion the answer is obviously, “No.” The old, erroneous trial is a nullity, in this respect at least.
Though the decisions of other courts could not alter the rule of the Johnson case as to the effective date of the Miranda decision, I am strengthened in my view by the fact that, according to the majority opinion in this case, a substantial majority of the decisions from other jurisdictions reach the same conclusion.
Higgins, J., joins in this opinion.