Court Opinion

ID: 9571199
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:29:46.426098+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:29:21.255038
License: Public Domain

Benham, Judge,
dissenting.
Since a fair reading of the majority opinion leaves me with some undispelled qualms, I find it necessary to dissent. The issue here is *566whether the actions of the principal in administering corporal punishment were within the scope of his authority and without wilfulness, malice, or corruption. The majority, in deciding to reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the principal, rules that issues of fact remain for determination as to these matters.
1. The majority opinion decides that issues of fact remain as to whether the actions of the principal were in the scope of his authority. There are two versions of how the injury occurred. The student contends that the injury occurred when he was jerked up from the floor where he had fallen trying to avoid the second lick. The principal contends that the injury occurred while the student was making a twisting motion in avoiding the second lick. In deciding on the summary judgment issue, the trial court was required to view all evidence and ambiguities created thereby favorably towards the respondent and against the movant. North v. Toco Hills, Inc., 160 Ga. App. 116, 119 (286 SE2d 346) (1981); Blount v. Seckinger Realty Co., 167 Ga. App. 778, 779 (307 SE2d 683) (1983).
In support of its determination that material issues of fact remain as to this issue, the majority opinion cites Maddox v. Boutwell, 176 Ga. App. 492 (336 SE2d 599) (1985). In that case, the issue was whether the punishment administered was in bad faith and excessive. “If so, the punishment would be outside the established guidelines and, therefore, outside the scope of [the principal’s] authority, rendering him liable. If not, [the principal] would be protected by both types of immunity.” Id. at 492.
“Corporal punishment in Georgia schools is provided for by OCGA § 20:2-730 et seq. In § 20-2-731, it is provided that school boards may authorize the administration of corporal punishment by the adoption of written policies and that such authority is subject to certain limitations, the first of which is ‘(t)he corporal punishment shall not be excessive or unduly severe.’ ” Id. at 492.
This approach is in conformity with the approach taken in Hennessy v. Webb, 245 Ga. 329, 330 (264 SE2d 878) (1980): “ ‘[SJchool boards, and other agencies or authorities in charge of public schools enjoy immunity from tort liability for personal injuries or death sustained by pupils or other persons in connection therewith, in the absence of a legislative enactment to the contrary, at least where only negligence was involved.’ . . . “ ‘[I]t is . . . well established that “where an officer is invested with discretion and is empowered to exercise his judgment in matters brought before him, he is sometimes called a quasi-judicial officer, and when so acting he is usually given immunity from liability to persons who may be injured as a result of an erroneous decision; provided the acts complained of are done within the scope of the officer’s authority, and without wilfulness, malice, or corruption.” ’ ”
*567There is no question that the school adopted a written policy for administering punishment and that appellee followed that policy in administering punishment. Therefore, the principal will not be considered as having acted outside the scope of his authority unless there is evidence that his actions in administering punishment were wilful or wanton. Hence, no decision can be made on the scope of authority issue until we consider the wilful or wanton issue.
2. As to the wilful or wanton issue, the majority opinion decides that a material issue of fact remains as to whether the punishment was unduly severe or excessive. A review of the legislative enactments concerning corporal punishment makes it abundantly clear that the legislature chose to vest considerable discretion in the school administrators, realizing that people differ considerably as to when corporal punishment is justified and the extent to which punishment should be administered. It necessarily follows that if considerable discretion is given to school officials, then considerable allowances must be made to protect them in the exercise of that discretion. This is especially true where, as in the case sub judice, it does not appear that anger or malice is involved.
Realizing the need to protect school officials from unwarranted accusations and the need to protect students from unduly severe punishment, some states have created a rebuttable presumption in favor of reasonableness. 6 AmJur2d 42, Assault & Battery, § 46. Since our legislature exempted school administrators from liability except where the punishment is excessive or unduly severe (OCGA § 20-2-732; see also Webb v. Hennessy, supra), it appears that for all practical purposes, the legislature intended to provide a presumption in favor of reasonableness.
The majority decision appears to rely mainly on the fact that the student’s arm was broken rather than on the circumstances which led to the injury. It must be kept in mind that the injury occurred not from the punishment itself, but from the student’s attempt to avoid punishment. There is no dispute that the punishment itself was not disproportionate to the gravity of the offense and that the injury occurred while the teacher was engaged in moderate restraint or correction. Therefore, to avoid summary judgment, appellants must show that the method or manner of punishment was in some way excessive. Punishment is not necessarily excessive simply because it results in an injury.
Where there is no showing of excessiveness, we must look to whether the instrument used or the manner in which it is used gives rise to an implication of malice. There is nothing about this case to indicate such. There being no malice, wantonness, or wilfulness, the trial court was eminently correct in granting summary judgment to the school officials.
*568Decided July 14, 1989
Rehearing denied July 31, 1989
Hutto, Palmatary, Magda & Krider, B. Michael Magda, for appellants.
Alva J. Hopkins III, John B. Adams, Bryant H. Bower, Jr., Terry A. Dillard, Robert B. Sumner, for appellees.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Banke, Judge Sognier and Judge Pope join in this dissent.