Court Opinion

ID: 9734936
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:53:07.751267+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:52.652097
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
Emmert, C. J.
In the first appeal of this case, Yessen V. State (1950), 228 Ind. 316, 92 N. E. 2d 621, Judge Gilkison and I filed separate dissenting opinions. The *320majority opinion was subsequently overruled as to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the conviction by the decision in Burton v. State (1953), 232 Ind. 246, 111 N. E. 2d 892. The second point of the decision that affidavits in support of a motion for a new trial could not be considered on appeal unless they were brought into the record by a bill of exceptions was superseded by Rule 1-15 adopted September 25, 1953, which in part provided, “Such affidavits shall be considered as evidence without the introduction thereof on the hearing on the motion, and shall be a part of the record without a bill of exceptions.” Under the law as it now stands an appeal involving the same facts would result in a reversal of the conviction.
In Burton v. State (1953), 232 Ind. 246, 111 N. E. 2d 892, supra, we held a conviction for sodomy would not be affirmed where it rested upon the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecutrix. We quoted with approval the following authorities:
“Psuedologia phantasticia is a mixture of lies with imagination. Not infrequently, this is the basis of alleged sexual assault. Girls assert they have been raped, sometimes recounting as true a story they have heard, falsely naming individuals or describing them.”
1 Gray’s Attorneys’ Textbook of Medicine (3rd Ed.), §96.16, p. 940.

“No judge should ever let a sex-offense charge go to the jury unless the female complainant’s social history and mental makeup have been examined and testified to by a qualified physician.”

Yol. 3, Wigmore, Evidence (3rd Ed.) §924a.
“ ‘Psychiatric Examination of Witnesses in Sex Cases. The penalties for sex-crimes are very severe—justly so, in most cases. But the very severity of the penalty calls for special procedural precau*321tions to protect an innocent accused from condemnation by unreliable testimony.
“ ‘Modern psychiatry has already made its bow and been introduced properly to the criminal courts, by way of examining the mental condition of the accused. But there is also a necessity for invoking its aid for a certain type of witness in a certain class of criminal charges.
“ ‘Today it is unanimously held (and we say “unanimously” advisedly) by experienced phychia-trists that the complainant woman in a sex offense should always be examined by competent experts to ascertain whether she suffers from some mental or moral delusion or tendency, frequently found especially in young girls, causing distortion of the imagination in sex cases.
“ ‘The imperative nature of this measure is further emphasized by the legal fact that the penalty for intercourse with a girl under sixteen years (so-called “statutory rape”) is extremely heavy—sometimes twenty years; in one State, life imprisonment! Thus the erotic imagination of an abnormal child of attractive appearance may send an innocent man to the penitentiary for life. The warnings of the psychiatric profession, supported as they are by thousands of observed cases, should be heeded by our profession.
“ ‘We recommend that in all charges of sex offenses, the complaining witness be required to be examined before trial by competent psychiatrists for the purpose of ascertaining her probable credibility, the report to be presented in evidence.’ ” Yol. 3, Wigmore, Evidence (3rd Ed.) p. 466.
The majority now reasons that after the prosecutrix has recanted, and has consistently maintained she falsely accused Yessen, the trial court is still at liberty to weigh the evidence and disregard our decision in Burton v. State (1953), 232 Ind. 246, 111 N. E. 2d 892, supra, and hold that she told the truth on the first trial.
If this court is to fly in the face of modern medical science, as well as the experience of prosecuting officials *322with sexual offenses, and affirm convictions on records like this, no man’s liberty is safe when accused of a sexual offense by any juvenile delinquent, who in open court admits she put an innocent man in the penitentiary with her perjured testimony.
Nor has the state’s position in this been anything other than an attempt to affirm a judgment regardless of the truth of the accusation. The state had absolute control of the prosecutrix when she was committed as a delinquent to the Indiana Girls’ School. Shortly before the hearing in the federal court on Yessen’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the representatives of the state interviewed the prosecutrix, who refused to change her narration as to what happened, and suggested she take a lie detector test, which was never done. If her original affidavit recanting her testimony was false, it was perjury,—obviously suborned perjury. Yet after all these years the state has made no effort to have a grand jury investigation to see who suborned perjury. The trial court erred in weighing the evidence on the petition for the writ.
All this, however, is not the most shocking part of the history of this miscarriage of justice. Rhetorical paragraph 6 of Yessen’s petition for a writ of coram nobis is as follows:
“Petitioner further avers that the affidavit filed against this petitioner in said cause was obtained through fraud in the following particulars; that Paul Owens, the affiant to said affidavit, signed said affidavit in blank and that he did not know that the blank affidavit would be filled in later to charge the petitioner with the crime of rape until the day of the trial and at that time the said Paul Owens knew that Lois Ann Warner had insisted that this petitioner was not guilty. The petitioner further avers that the prosecuting attorney of LaPorte County, Robert Wilson, did not ever consult, interview or interrogate the said Paul Owens or Lois *323Ann Warner as to the truth of the averments contained in said affidavit to determine whether or not this petitioner was in truth and fact guilty; that said signature to said affidavit was obtained by certain police officers of Michigan City, Indiana falsely and fraudulently.”
These positive allegations as to executing the affidavit in blank, were never specifically denied under oath by the state. The evidence introduced in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana on Yessen’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus was, by agreement, used as evidence on the hearing on the petition for a writ of error coram nobis. Officer Cowgill testified at the habeas corpus hearing as follows:
“Q Did you have Mr. Owens sign this affidavit down at the police headquarters ?
A I did.
Q Did the Prosecutor fill the affidavit out?
A He surely did, because I didn’t.
Q Was he there that night?
A No, the Prosecutor wasn’t. He was called. Mr. Owens signed the blank affidavit and I think it was made out the next day by Lieutenant Miller and the Prosecutor, and it was brought out in court that it was legal.
Q But he signed a blank affidavit?
A That’s right, and he was told what he was signing, he was signing statutory rape at the time he signed it, by Lieutenant Miller and also by . myself.
Q How could you tell him he was signing an affidavit of statutory rape, because you didn’t know what the Prosecutor was going to put in there, did you?
A Oh, yes, we do.
Q Do you tell the Prosecutor what to put in the affidavit in Michigan City, or does he determine what charge?
A He determines, from the evidence you gather.”
*324Owens, who signed the affidavit, testified he signed it that night before he knew what was going on. They asked him to sign the affidavit to make an arrest and they didn’t tell him that Yessen was to be arrested for rape but only for molesting.
Uncontradicted statements of fact in behalf of the petitioner will be taken as true on appeal. Abraham v. State (1950), 228 Ind. 179, 181, 91 N. E. 2d 358; Sanders v. State (1882), 85 Ind. 318, 44 Am. St. Rep. 29; Myers v. State (1888), 115 Ind. 554, 18 N. E. 42; Dobosky v. State (1915), 183 Ind. 488, 109 N. E. 742; Batchelor v. State (1920), 189 Ind. 69, 125 N. E. 773; Bielich v. State (1920), 189 Ind. 127, 126 N. E. 220; Cassidy v. State (1929), 201 Ind. 311, 168 N. E. 18; Kuhn v. State (1944), 222 Ind. 179, 52 N. E. 2d 491; Beard v. State (1949), 227 Ind. 717, 88 N. E. 2d 769.
Under such undisputed facts it becomes our duty to apply the law to the facts. Atkinson v. State (1920), 190 Ind. 1, 128 N. E. 433; Vonderschmidt v. State (1948), 226 Ind. 439, 81 N. E. 2d 782. This is the federal rule. Powell v. Alabama (1932), 287 U. S. 45, 53 S. Ct. 55, 77 L. Ed. 158, 84 A. L. R. 527; White v. Ragen (1945), 324 U. S. 760, 65 S. Ct. 978, 89 L. Ed. 1348; Tomkins v. Missouri (1945), 323 U. S. 485, 65 S. Ct. 370, 89 L. Ed. 407; Williams v. Kaiser (1945), 323 U. S. 471, 65 S. Ct. 363, 89 L. Ed. 398; Hawk v. Olson (1945), 326 U. S. 271, 66 S. Ct. 116, 90 L. Ed. 61; Watts v. Indiana (1949), 338 U. S. 49, 69 S. Ct. 1347, 93 L. Ed. 1801.
We take judicial notice of the record in the prior appeal. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., Tr. (1931), 202 Ind. 641, 177 N. E. 454. The affidavit upon which Yes-sen was convicted was signed by Paul L. Owens and the jurat recited, “Subscribed and sworn to before me *325this 24th day of September, 1948” and was signed by a deputy prosecuting attorney. Section 10-3602, Burns’ 1942 Replacement, makes it a felony for a notary public or other officer authorized to administer oaths to certify any person sworn before him to any affidavit when in fact such person was not so sworn. Since the affidavit was executed in violation of the criminal laws of this state it was absolutely void. The court acquired no jurisdiction of the particular case because only a void affidavit was filed. From then on the whole proceedings were void. Certainly it was a fraud upon the court in the first instance, and when a fraud has been perpetrated upon a court coram nobis is the proper remedy. Sanders v. State (1882), 85 Ind. 318, 44 Am. St. Rep. 29, supra; Partlow v. State (1924), 195 Ind. 164, 144 N. E. 661; Beard v. State (1949), 227 Ind. 717, 88 N. E. 2d 769, supra.
Under the specific provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, the federal courts can only grant relief if it was state action that deprived the appellant of due process. But no such limitation exists in our own constitution. It is our duty to vacate any judgment based on perjury, whether or not it was known to the officers of the state at the time it was perpetrated. Partlow v. State (1924), 195 Ind. 164, 144 N. E. 661, supra; Davis v. State (1928), 200 Ind. 88, 161 N. E. 375. The administration of justice is more than a mere game whereby the winner prevails because obsolete rules, since reversed, may permit a decision without merit. But as to the fraudulent affidavit, there is no controversy. Its execution was a felony whether appreciated by the officer or not. It was a fraud on the trial court when it was filed. It was void, and all proceedings had thereafter were without jurisdiction. We ought never permit the state to have a judgment affirmed when based upon *326an act that was a felony. The judgment should be reversed.
Note.—Reported in 126 N. E. 2d 760.