Court Opinion

ID: 9767677
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:23:31.390555+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:32.369712
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Griffin,
joined by Justice Hamilton, dissenting.
I agree with the result reached in the majority opinion that the temporary injunction issued by Judge Mays was not void, but voidable and irregular. This was a matter that could have been corrected by a prompt appeal under the provisions of Art. 4662, Vernon’s Ann. Texas Civ. Stats.
I disagree that the injunction was not void by virtue of the fact that the order of the judge did not require a bond to be given and no amount was fixed for the bond.
It is not disputed that the only bond in the record is the bond given to secure the temporary restraining order. It contains no provisions that secure the issuance of a temporary injunction, or protect anyone by virtue of the issuance of a temporary injunction. In fact, it was issued ten days prior to the hearing on the issuance of a temporary injunction.
I do not believe that it can be questioned that the order of May 29, 1959 issued only a temporary restraining order. The life of that restraining order is specifically stated to be “operative until and pending the hearing below ordered.” The hearing was ordered for 10:00 a.m. on June 8, 1959 in the District Courtroom of Sterling County, Texas in Sterling City. The court ordered a bond given before the District Clerk should issue the restraining order. By virtue of its own provisions and also by Rule 680, Texas Rules Civ. Proc., and innumerable cases, this restraining order expired June 8, 1959 and was of no further force and effect. Fort Worth Street Railway Company v. Rose-*237dale Street Railway Company, 1887, 68 Texas 163, 7 S.W. 381; Riggins v. Thompson, 1902, 96 Texas 154, 71 S.W. 14; Cole v. Forto, Texas Civ. App. 1913, 155 S.W. 350, no writ history; City of Jacksonville v. Devereux, Texas Civ. App. 1926, 286 S.W. 572, no writ history; Wood v. Bird, Texas Civ. App. 1929, 20 S.W. 2d 221 (1), no writ history; Dunlap v. Rotge, Texas Civ. App., 1935, 85 S.W. 2d 650 (2, 3), no writ history; 24-A Texas Jur. 24.
It is true, as declared by the majority, that a temporary restraining order is a species of injunction. The above authorities and others hold that it is a separate and distinct order from either a temporary injunction or a permanent and perpetual injunction. The Rules of Civil Procedure recognize that fact for Rule 680 deals only with such restraining order.
Rule 684 also recognizes such fact. That rule provides that “in the order granting any temporary restraining order or temporary injunction, the court shall fix the amount of security to be given by the applicant * * *; before the issuance of the temporary restraining order or temporary injunction * * *; if the restraining order or temporary injunction shall be dissolved * * *; where the temporary restraining order or temporary injunction is against the state * * * the liability of the applicant shall be for its face amount if the restraining order or temporary injunction shall be dissolved * * (Emphasis added) It is apparent from the above wording in Rule 684 that the two species of injunction are separate and distinct.
Rule 685 continues this distinction between the two types of injunctive relief by using the following language: “Upon the granting of a temporary restraining order or an order fixing a time for hearing upon an application for a temporary injunction * * *.” Rule 686 further carries forward this distinction. This Rule makes a difference in the form of citations to be issued in the temporary restraining order and temporary injunction. Rule 688 also recognizes this difference.
The order entered June 18, 1959 reciting a hearing and judgment of June 8, 1959 nowhere continues the restraining order, nor does it mention the restarining order except where the court provides the restraining order bond shall be extended to cover the temporary injunction. I say the court had no right to so order. The temporary restraining order expired and was of no further force and effect. Riggins v. Thompson, supra, and other authorities therein cited. When the restraining order ex*238pired the bond expired with" it. The only case in Texas which I have been able to find in point holds that a temporary restraining order, bond cannot be continued as a bond for a temporary injunction. San Felipe Independent School Dist. v. Nelson, Texas Civ. App. 1934, 74 S.W. 2d 136, no writ history. In that case the San Antonio Court of Civil Appeals had held in their original opinion that such bond could be continued in force and effect. On rehearing they changed their holding and said:
“We wish to expressly state that we were in error in our original disposition of this cause wherein we held that the bond given in connection with the issuing of the temporary restraining order might be substituted for the bond required by law for the issuing of a temporary injunction. This, of course, cannot be done.”
The case of Porter v. Guggenheim, Texas Civ. App. 1937, 107 S.W. 2d 891, wr. dism., is not in point on the question here before us. In that case the trial court had continued the restraining order in part. The Dallas Court of Civil Appeals rested its holding that the bond could be used as a bond for the temporary injunction. That court said, “on the hearing for temporary injunction the court continued the restraining order, in part at least, as a temporary injunction, and the bond likewise continued in force and effect.” (2), 2nd. col., p. 892. In our case, as pointed out above, the judge made no such order. He did not mention the temporary restraining order at all, except as to the bond.
The effect of the majority opinion is to subject the surety on the temporary restraining order bond to new and additional liabilities for which it did not contract when signing the original" bond. It also overloks the plain provision of the first sentence of Rule 684 “in the order granting any temporary restraining order or temporary injunction, the court shall fix the amount of security to be given by the applicant.” (Emphasis added). The trial court did not comply with this provision as no bond was set or given for the temporary injunction. No surety nor sureties have bound themselves for liability under the temporary injunction; nor does the record show any agreement on the part of the sureties on the restraining order bond to be bound for the temporary injunction.
I believe the trial court had no right or authority to make the surety liable for more than it contracted in its original un*239dertaking, and, therefore, I believe the temporary injunction is absolutely void. I would discharge relators.
Opinion delivered October 7,1959.
Rehearing overruled November 11, 1959.