Court Opinion

ID: 9712837
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:01:06.375743+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:14.751363
License: Public Domain

Cynar, J.
(concurring in result only). While concurring in the result only, I am compelled to write separately. The fact that this state has a very strong policy favoring settlement is no reason to force an unfair settlement upon a plaintiff or defendant. Reasons inducing settlement are many. Parties settle when they perceive such to be in their best respective interests. The purpose of awarding damages is not to punish the defendant but to award fair compensation to the plaintiff.
P. J. Marutiak, J. (dissenting). I respectfully dissent.
Having determined that plaintiff was damaged in the amount of $400,000 and that plaintiff’s own negligence accounted for 75% of this amount, it was the decision of the jury that plaintiff would be compensated by receiving $100,000. Since he had already received a greater amount from his settlement with Barthel Construction Company, he was entitled to nothing more. By subtracting the settlement amount after plaintiff’s negligence percentage was factored in, the trial judge properly applied comparative negligence principles to the jury’s findings of fact.
However, by holding that the settlement amount should be deducted first, the majority allows plaintiff to recover an additional $62,500, a figure which has no obvious foundation in theory.
The leading opinion advances two reasons for its method of calculating awards: 1) the policy of *725encouraging settlements, and 2) the logic employed by the Court in DeMaris v Brown, 27 Wash App 932; 621 P2d 201 (1980), and Rittenhouse v Erhart, 126 Mich App 674; 337 NW2d 626 (1983).
The assessment of artificially enhanced "compensatory” damages1 as an inducement for defendants to settle is problematic, since parties will settle only when both plaintiff and defendant perceive such to be in their best interests.
Concern that a nonsettling tortfeasor may escape liability does not justify this result. The purpose of damages in Michigan is to compensate a plaintiff for his injuries, not to punish a defendant. In fact, the reason plaintiff should recover nothing from this defendant is that he already received, by settlement with the other tortfeasor, a greater amount than his case was worth.2
I do not agree with the reasoning used by the Court in DeMaris, supra. That Court approved deduction of the settlement first, arguing that "the comparative negligence rule is not affronted since the total percentage of contributory negligence remains the same”. DeMaris, supra, p 945. This is simply bad math. Factoring plaintiff’s negligence into a jury award only after the settlement amount has been deducted is the equivalent of applying a lesser percentage to the gross award. This is precisely the point made by the dissenting *726judge, who complained: "By deducting the settlement amount first, the majority reduces the plaintiff’s fault percentage below that found by the jury.” DeMaris, supra, p 946 (Dore, J., dissenting). See also Lemos v Eichel, 83 Cal App 3d 110, 118-119; 147 Cal Rptr 603, 606-607 (1978).
Alternatively, the DeMaris majority relied on speculation that, had the settling tortfeasor’s negligence been assessed at trial, the plaintiff might have recovered something from the other tortfeasor. The concept that a plaintiff is prejudiced where the jury is not allowed to apportion negligence to a settling tortfeasor has been refuted by the Michigan Supreme Court. Mayhew v Berrien County Road Comm, 414 Mich 399, 412; 326 NW2d 366 (1982).3
I conclude that deduction of a settlement amount prior to reduction of the gross jury verdict by the percentage of a plaintiff’s negligence affronts principles of comparative negligence and distorts a jury’s findings of fact. Of equal importance, it is in conflict with a provision of Michigan’s contribution statute, MCL 600.2925d; MSA 27A.2925(4).
In Mayhew, supra, the Court determined that this provision survived the judicial adoption of *727comparative negligence, per Placek v Sterling Heights, 405 Mich 638; 275 NW2d 511 (1979). The Court also interpreted the meaning of the statutory language at issue, which provides in part:
"When a release or a convenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in good faith to 1 of 2 or more persons liable in tort for the same injury or the same wrongful death:
"(b) It reduces the claim against the other tortfeasors to the extent of any amount stipulated by the release or the covenant or to the extent of the amount of the consideration paid for it, whichever amount is the greater.” MCL 600.2925d; MSA 27A.2925(4). (Emphasis supplied.)
The Mayhew Court ruled that under this provision "the liability of the defendant nonsettling tortfeasors is the total liability of the joint tortfeasors minus the amount of the settlement of the settling tortfeasor.” Mayhew, supra, p 410. (Emphasis in original.) The "total liability of the joint tortfeasors” is, of course, the total amount of damages not caused by plaintiffs own negligence. In my opinion, the statute clearly anticipates that plaintiffs negligence will be factored against the gross assessment of damages before the settlement amount is to be subtracted. It is significant to note that the Mayhew Court provided an example of the operation of § 2925d, in which it used the method of damage computation employed by the trial court in this case. Mayhew, supra, p 408, fn 6 and p 411: "[T]he verdict rendered by the jury should only be reduced by the amount of settlement”.
I would affirm.

 Unless the plaintiff settles for an amount equal to or greater than the total amount of the plaintiff’s damages, or the plaintiff is found not to have been negligent at all, deduction of the settlement amount first will yield a larger net award.

 Additionally, a right of contribution may exist in the settling tortfeasor, per MCL 600.2925a(3); MSA 27A.2925(1)(3), whereas the settling tortfeasor is discharged from any liability for contribution to any other tortfeasor, MCL 600.2925(d); MSA 27A.2925(4). This is a legitimate statutory device for encouraging defendants to settle. Bacon v Dep’t of State Highways, 115 Mich App 382; 320 NW2d 681 (1982); West v Rollhaven Skating Arena, 105 Mich App 100; 306 NW2d 408 (1981).

 The Mayhew Court said this:
"Furthermore, numerous difficulties would be presented if we were to allow the jury to apportion damages among all tortfeasors, including a settling non-party. It would mean that the settling tortfeasor’s liability would be assessed without anyone adequately representing that interest. It would put the plaintiff in a unique trial situation. The plaintiff would not only have to advocate that he was not at fault, he would have to convince the jury that the non-party was only minimally at fault. Otherwise, there might be too great a percentage of fault attributed to the non-party, thus reducing the plaintiffs recovery.” Mayhew, supra, p 412.
This annihilates one of plaintiffs premises. Since he has used a "chain of reasoning” approach, his entire appellate argument falls along with it. I join with the majority opinion in this respect, as it has also rejected plaintiffs approach to this question.