Court Opinion

ID: 9560082
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:42:40.110825+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:05.026148
License: Public Domain

Sognier, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Agent Markonni had no authority to arrest appellant Batiste for violation of a Georgia law (giving a false name to a police officer), and no probable cause to arrest Batiste on the ground that a federal felony offense was being committed in his presence.
In regard to Markonni’s authority as a Fulton County deputy sheriff to arrest Batiste, Markonni testified that his boss called the sheriff of Fulton County and requested that Markonni and three other DEA agents be appointed deputy sheriffs. The sheriff complied with the request and Markonni was appointed a deputy sheriff. However, he also testified that he took no actions to meet the requirements for appointment as a peace officer set forth in then Code Ann. § 92A-2109 (now OCGA § 35-8-9), nor did he receive a certificate of compliance (waiver) by the Peace Officer Standards and Training Council for having completed an “equivalent” course of instruction. Thus, under the express provisions of Code Ann. § 92A-2115 (now OCGA § 35-8-17 (a)), Markonni was not authorized to exercise the powers of arrest, and this court has so stated in Mason v. State, 147 Ga. App. 179, 182 (7) (248 SE2d 302) (1978).
In regard to Markonni’s arrest powers as a DEA agent, he is authorized to make arrests without a warrant for any felony if he has probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing a felony. 21 USC § 878 (3).
Markonni testified that Batiste’s actions fit the “drug courier profile” which aroused his suspicions. While such facts would be sufficient to warrant an “articulable suspicion” that Batiste was carrying drugs, we have held consistently that an “articulable suspicion” is less than probable cause to make an arrest or conduct a search. Allen v. State, 140 Ga. App. 828, 830 (232 SE2d 250) (1976); Radowick v. *814State, 145 Ga. App. 231, 233 (244 SE2d 346) (1978); Smith v. State, 159 Ga. App. 20, 22 (2) (282 SE2d 677) (1981). In the instant case, Markonni himself testified that “my suspicions as we all know are not probable cause.” (Emphasis supplied.)
It is well established that evidence that a defendant’s behavior fits the “drug courier profile” does not establish probable cause to make an arrest. Bowers v. State, 151 Ga. App. 46 (258 SE2d 623) (1979), affirmed 245 Ga. 367 (265 SE2d 57) (1980); Reid v. Georgia, 448 U. S. 438 (100 SC 2752, 65 LE2d 890) (1980); Florida v. Royer, _U. S.__(103 SC 1319, 75 LE2d 229) (1983).
Since Markonni’s only basis for arresting Batiste was that she fit the “drug courier profile,” he had no probable cause to arrest her. Bowers, Reid and Royer, supra. As the cocaine was obtained as a result of a search incident to an illegal arrest, it was not admissible in evidence. Powell v. State, 163 Ga. App. 801, 803 (295 SE2d 560) (1982). Accordingly, I would reverse.