Court Opinion

ID: 9669121
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:39:57.463376+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:52.642803
License: Public Domain

BROOKSHIRE, Justice,
concurring.
While I concur with the majority, I am constrained to address a question of importance: How does an appellant, acting pro se, following the filing of a frivolous brief, raise the issue of ineffectiveness of counsel for failure to pursue racially discriminatory strikes of prospective jurors? Appellant Clarence Hall is of African-American descent.
The appellant advances the contention that the defense counsel was ineffective in that he failed to move to quash the jury selected. This point is based upon the contention that there was a discriminatory use of racially *718motivated peremptory strikes by the State which engaged and brought about the systematic exclusion of minority members from the jury. The appellant places major reliance on Keeton v. State, 724 S.W.2d 58 (Tex. Crim.App.1987).
At the conclusion of the voir dire of the jury panel, the defense counsel exercised all of his allowable peremptory strikes. The State, however, exercised only four of its ten. The trial jury was then seated and sworn. The record seems clear that the trial court diligently and conscientiously excused many of the venire persons who had any question about their ability to be fair and impartial or who had heard anything about the ease or who had formed any opinion, no matter how slight. Apparently from the record, a number of the venire persons could not be fair and they were excused by the court. Those were strikes for cause. From the State’s jury list it appears that the State only exercised four peremptory challenges or strikes. However, the defendant’s jury list reveals that ten peremptory challenges or strikes were made.
The trial jury was seated and sworn on January 13, 1992. Evidently there was no indication at voir dire nor in the statement of facts or by way of the jury lists in the transcript, that trial defense counsel objected to the racial make up of the trial jury or the State’s strikes.
The racial make-up itself is not shown. The record before us does not indicate the race of any person struck by the State or by the defense; Nor does the record reveal the race of any person finally seated on the trial jury. The appellant’s brief makes no reference to the record. No argument, as such, is contained. The appellant has not demonstrated that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to move to quash the venire panel or the trial jury.
The appellant has failed to show discrimination by the prosecution. The appellant, indeed, has failed to show (as far as references to the record are concerned) any type of discrimination, racial or otherwise. The appellant has also failed to show a systematic exclusion of potential minority jurors in a discriminatory manner that violated the appellant’s rights to due process or the appellant’s rights to equal protection, or the appellant’s rights to a jury trial by a cross section of the community.
Appellant’s pro se brief is very concise and short on this point. This alleged point of error, I think, is to be properly construed as a “Batson” issue. However, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) is not cited by appellant on this point, although it is referred to at another place in the pro se brief. The appellant has not shown that the prosecutor engaged in purposeful discrimination based on racial considerations by the use of peremptory challenges against any venire person. The appellant has not demonstrated that the State’s peremptory challenges were based on racial discrimination.
Procedurally, the appellate courts in interpreting the Batson opinion have generally required that a timely and specific objection be made by the accused. For a Batson objection to be made timely it must be raised after the strikes have been made but at a time prior to the jury having been sworn and before the remaining venire persons excused. See Henry v. State, 729 S.W.2d 732 (Tex.Crim.App.1987). Neither the pro se brief nor the “Anders” brief discusses in any detail any discriminatory use of racially motivated peremptory strikes. In fact, from the appellant’s pro se brief, the requirements of Keeton v. State, supra, which appellant did cite, have not been demonstrated.
Appellant cites and relies upon Keeton, supra. In Keeton the record showed that when each black potential juror was struck, Keeton’s counsel objected on the basis that the juror was black as was the appellant. No such showing is made in the appeal at bar. In Keeton the court stated that the issue regarding the State’s use of peremptory strikes was timely presented to the trial court. The record does not demonstrate such an issue being presented to the trial court.
Again, I do not discern from the record a pattern of strikes against any minority jurors. I can perceive no pattern that would *719give rise to an inference of any racial discrimination.
However, the record, as I analyzed it, is silent on the so-called Batson issue. The Keeton opinion reasons that the trial bench or a trial jurist experienced in voir dire, would be able to determine whether the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges created a prima facia case of discrimination based on race. Such a determination needs to be made when the use of these peremptory strikes takes place.
I must compliment the trial court on the efficient and conscientious and searching manner in which the trial court played its proper part in the voir dire in determining whether each venire person could be fair and impartial and had formed no opinion about the case.
My concern is, as stated from the outset, that while the record does not establish a prima facie case of racially discriminatory striking of venire persons by the State; nevertheless, the appellant acting pro se has raised the issue of ineffective counsel for not having pursued this issue. Other than eon-clusory statements by the appellant in his pro se brief, the only relevant facts before us are that certain jurors were excused for cause, the defense used all its peremptory strikes, and the State only used four of its peremptory strikes. I cannot say that appellant has made a prima facie case for ineffectiveness of trial counsel which requires the trial court to conduct an investigative, evi-dentiary Batson hearing to determine in fact if trial counsel should have pursued this issue.
If I assume (which I must not and do not assume) ineffectiveness on the part of trial counsel, I would expect an absence of any record showing that a prima facie case of racially discriminatory strikes was made and then abandoned by the attorney at trial, so I am faced with the quandary of asking what an appellant in Mr. Hall’s position would do to apprise this Court of the need for a hearing on the trial court level to determine racially discriminatory striking of venire persons.
This is a threshold approach. A definitive answer is not forthcoming, however, this is an issue which appellate courts will have to face and guidelines must be established. I am only expressing concern for an area of law which will demand attention in the near future. My opinion is that an evidentiary hearing on the ineffectiveness issue which in turn is based upon Batson should be conducted at the earliest practicable time while the memories of the witnesses, the attorneys, and the trial judge are still fresh.