Court Opinion

ID: 2964181
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:21:47.135808+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:14.594012
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

          No. 95-2375

                                 JAMES L. GRUBB, JR.,

                                Plaintiff - Appellant,

                                          v.

                                KMS PATRIOTS, L.P. AND
                      NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE PROPERTIES, INC.,

                               Defendants - Appellees.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                   [Hon. Edward F. Harrington, U.S. District Judge]
                                               ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                               Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                          ___________

                           Stahl and Lynch, Circuit Judges.
                                            ______________

                                _____________________

               Blair  L.  Perry,  with whom  Heidi  E.  Harvey  and Fish  &
               ________________              _________________      _______
          Richardson P.C. were on brief for appellant.
          _______________
               Daniel L. Goldberg, with whom Paul M. Robertson and Bingham,
               __________________            _________________     ________
          Dana & Gould were on brief for appellees.
          ____________

                                 ____________________

                                 ____________________

                    TORRUELLA, Chief Judge.   Plaintiff-Appellant James  L.
                    TORRUELLA, Chief Judge.
                               ___________

          Grubb,  Jr. ("Grubb"  or  "Plaintiff"),  challenges the  district

          court's grant of  summary judgment  for Defendants-Appellees  KMS

          Patriots, L.P.  (the  "Patriots"), and  National Football  League

          Properties, Inc. ("NFL Properties")  (collectively "Defendants"),

          on  Grubb's claims  of copyright  infringement under 17  U.S.C.  

          501.  We affirm the decision of the district court.

                                    I.  BACKGROUND
                                    I.  BACKGROUND

                    Resolving reasonable inferences in  favor of Grubb, the

          nonmovant, the summary judgment materials show the following.

                    The Patriots, a professional football team and a member

          of  the  National Football  League,  informed  NFL Properties  on

          January 17, 1993, that  they were considering  a logo change  for

          the upcoming season.  NFL Properties, among  other tasks, manages

          design  and publishing  production assignments  for the  National

          Football League.  At a meeting between Patriots officials and NFL

          Properties  representatives  on January  27,  1993,  the Patriots

          asked that the design of the  new logo be created within the next

          few weeks.

                    Accordingly,    NFL   Properties    contacted   several

          independent design  firms.  On  January 27, 1993,  Bradley Jansen

          ("Jansen")  of NFL  Properties  approached  Evenson Design  Group

          ("Evenson") about the project, and Evenson agreed  to begin work.

          Via  overnight   courier,  Jansen  sent  to   Evenson  a  package

          containing,  among other  things,  a purchase  order and  designs

          similar  to the one that the Patriots had considered and rejected

                                         -2-

          in 1979 ("the 1979 proposed Patriots logo").  Jansen continued to

          be in contact with, and meet with, Patriots employees thereafter.

                    The package was received  on January 28, 1993.   In his

          deposition, Ken Loh  ("Loh"), an Evenson employee, stated that he

          began sketching the design that the Patriots  eventually chose to

          replace their old logo ("the Patriots' new logo").   With the aid

          of his timesheets,  which were  generated by  a computer  program

          that both Plaintiff  and Defendants have stipulated could  not be

          backdated,  Loh indicated  that  he had  virtually completed  the

          Patriots'  new  logo  by February  4,  1993.    Referring to  his

          timesheets, Loh stated  that as  of that  date he  began work  on

          creating  other  logos  and  revising  the  logo  he had  already

          created, which he identified as the Patriots new logo.

                    On February 12, 1993, Evenson sent Loh's  design to NFL

          Properties.    Representatives of  NFL  Properties  met with  the

          Patriots  on February  18, 1993.   The  Patriots were  shown many

          proposed  logos, including  Loh's.   The Patriots  selected Loh's

          design as their new logo on March 5, 1993.

                    Meanwhile, on  February 9, 1993,  having heard  through

          the  news media that the  Patriots planned to  change their logo,

          Grubb submitted an unsolicited proposed design ("Grubb's design")

          to the  Patriots' office  in Foxborough,  Massachusetts.  In  his

          deposition, Grubb stated that he was told by a Patriots' employee

          that  the   Patriots  would  contact  him   later  regarding  his

          submission.  Grubb holds  a Certificate of Copyright Registration

                                         -3-

          for his  design, which the United States  Copyright Office issued

          to him effective February 1, 1994.

                    The Patriots' new logo  and Grubb's design contain some

          of the same elements,  including a man's face in  profile, stars,

          and  stripes.1  The  district court  granted summary  judgment to

          Defendants.   The district court  concluded that Grubb  failed to

          show that Loh had access to Grubb's work, relying in  part on the

          fact that the Patriots established and followed a policy that was

          designed  to  prevent designers  -- such  as  Loh --  from seeing

          outside submissions.  Additionally, the district court found that

          Loh  composed the  Patriots'  new logo  independently of  Grubb's

          design.   In the instant  appeal, Grubb  challenges the  district

          court's grant of  summary judgment to Defendants.  In particular,

          Grubb  argues that  his  Supplemental Affidavit,  in which  Grubb

          compares  Loh's work  and his  own, asserts  facts that  create a

          direct conflict with Loh's testimony, on which the district court

          relied.   In the  Supplemental Affidavit, Grubb  states that "the

          relative  proportions of  the  elements of  the  two designs  are

          substantially identical  and the  curve of  the base  line .  . .

          appears to be a precise match," and that Loh's work was "probably

          . . .  traced from some other drawing."   According to Grubb, the

          district court  erred in  crediting Loh's  testimony in light  of

          Grubb's Supplemental Affidavit.

                              
          ____________________

          1  See appendices following this opinion.
             ___

                                         -4-

                               II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW
                               II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW

                    Summary  judgment is  appropriate when  "the pleadings,

          depositions, answers to interrogatories, and  admissions on file,

          together with the affidavits . . . show that there  is no genuine

          issue  as to  any  material fact  and that  the  moving party  is

          entitled to  a judgment  as a  matter of law."   Kelly  v. United
                                                           _____     ______

          States, 924 F.2d 355, 357 (1st Cir. 1991); see also  Fed. R. Civ.
          ______                                     ________

          P. 56(c).   Under  Rule 56(c),  the opponent  of the  motion must

          produce  evidence on which a reasonable finder of fact, under the

          appropriate proof burden, could base a verdict for the  opponent;

          if  the opponent cannot produce such evidence, the motion must be

          granted.  Celotex  Corp. v.  Catrett, 477 U.S.  317, 323  (1986);
                    ______________     _______

          Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).  
          ________    _____________

                                   III.  DISCUSSION
                                   III.  DISCUSSION

                    To  prevail on  a  claim of  copyright infringement,  a

          plaintiff  must  show two  elements:   (1)  ownership of  a valid

          copyright  and (2) copying of  the protected work  by the alleged

          infringer.   See Concrete  Mach. Co.  v. Classic  Lawn Ornaments,
                       ___ ___________________     ________________________

          Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 605 (1st Cir. 1988); 3 Melvin  B. Nimmer, The
          ____                                                          ___

          Law of  Copyright    13.01  at 13-3  (1987).   Defendants do  not
          _________________

          contest Plaintiff's ownership of a valid copyright on his design.

          Therefore, we turn to  the issue of whether summary  judgment was

          proper with respect to the alleged copying.

                    "Proof by  direct evidence of copying  is generally not

          possible since the actual  act of copying is rarely  witnessed or

          recorded."    Concrete Mach.,  843 F.2d  at  606.   Absent direct
                        ______________

                                         -5-

          evidence,  copying  may  be  inferred  from  a  showing  that the

          defendant  had "access"  to  the plaintiff's  work  prior to  the

          creation  of defendant's work, Baxter v. MCA, Inc., 812 F.2d 421,
                                         ______    _________

          423  (9th Cir. 1987), and  that there is "substantial similarity"

          between the works, Walker v. Time  Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44,
                             ______    ______________________

          48 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159 (1986); see Sid & Marty
                        ____________                        ___ ___________

          Krofft  Television Prods.,  Inc.  v. McDonald's  Corp., 562  F.2d
          ________________________________     _________________

          1157, 1162-63 (9th  Cir. 1977).  Even if both  showings are made,

          however, the trier of fact may nonetheless find no copying if the

          defendant shows  independent creation.  Concrete  Mach., 843 F.2d
                                                  _______________

          at  606 n.6; Eden  Toys, Inc. v.  Marshall Field &  Co., 675 F.2d
                       ________________     _____________________

          498, 501 (2d Cir. 1982).  Viewing the summary judgment record  in

          the  best light for Plaintiff, we conclude  that he has failed to

          raise  a  genuine  issue  of   material  fact  with  respect   to

          Defendants' "access";  this deficiency alone suffices  to justify

          summary judgment.

                    To satisfy its burden  of showing access, the plaintiff

          must  produce evidence  from which  a reasonable  finder of  fact

          could infer that  the defendant had  a reasonable opportunity  to

          copy his or her work.  See Selle v. Gibb, 741  F.2d 896, 901 (7th
                                 ___ _____    ____

          Cir. 1984).  Evidence that only creates a "bare possibility" that

          the  defendant had access is  not sufficient to  create a factual

          issue as to copying.  Jason v. Fonda, 526 F. Supp. 774, 777 (C.D.
                                _____    _____

          Cal. 1981) (concluding  that the  fact that between  200 and  700

          copies of plaintiff's book  were available in Southern California

          bookstores  was  insufficient  to  infer  that  defendant   movie

                                         -6-

          producers had a  reasonable opportunity to  copy it), aff'd,  698
                                                                _____

          F.2d  966 (9th Cir. 1982).  "[T]he  jury cannot draw an inference

          of  access based upon speculation and  conjecture alone."  Selle,
                                                                     _____

          741 F.2d at 901.

                    On  the  summary  judgment  materials  before  it,  the

          district   court  concluded  that,  even  drawing  all  favorable

          inferences for Grubb, the  evidence did not demonstrate  that Loh

          had  access  to  Grubb's design;  in  fact,  it  showed that  Loh

          composed his design  independently of and prior  to Grubb's work.

          With respect to  Loh's access, Grubb  contends that the  district

          court  erred, since an alleged  copier's access may  be proven by

          showing that  an intermediary with  whom the copier  was involved

          had  access to the copyrighted  work under circumstances in which

          the  copier also may  have been given an  opportunity to view the

          copyrighted  work.    Grubb  also argues  that  his  Supplemental

          Affidavit  is  evidence that  Loh had  access to  Grubb's design.

          With respect to the district court's finding of independent prior

          creation,  Grubb argues  that Loh's  testimony suggests  that Loh

          traced  the Patriots' New Logo  from another design.   Grubb also

          questions   Loh's   credibility,   and   submits   that   Grubb's

          Supplemental Affidavit is evidence that Loh did not independently

          create the Patriots' new logo prior to Grubb's design.

                    Turning first  to Loh's  access, it is  undisputed that

          the  Patriots received  Grubb's sketch  on February 9,  1993, via

          Grubb's unsolicited  submission.  Grubb points  to several pieces

          of   evidence  that  he  believes  shows  Loh  had  a  reasonable

                                         -7-

          opportunity to copy Grubb's design.  First, according to  Grubb's

          deposition, the individual Patriots' employee to whom he gave the

          design told him that the  Patriots would get in contact with  him

          in  the  future.   Additionally, Grubb  points  to the  fact that

          Jansen,  as an  employee of  NFL Properties,  admits that  he had

          contact with representatives of the Patriots beginning on January

          27,  1993, and  that Jansen had  also hired the  design firm that

          employed Loh.   Grubb  claims that  Jansen is  a point  of access

          between Loh's firm and the Patriots, from which a finder  of fact

          could  permissibly  infer  a  reasonable   opportunity  to  copy.

          Finally, Grubb claims that his Supplemental Affidavit is evidence

          that Loh had access to Grubb's design.

                    We  need  not  resolve  Grubb's  contention  that  this

          evidence  entitles him to  a finding of  access, however, because

          even assuming,  arguendo, that it did, the undisputed evidence is
                          ________

          that  Loh created  the Patriots'  New Logo  prior to  February 9,

          1993.2   As noted, supra, Grubb  does not just have  to show that
                             _____

          Loh had  access to Grubb's work;  Grubb has to show  that Loh had

          access to Grubb's work before Loh created the Patriots' New Logo.

          See Concrete Mach., 843 F.2d at 605 n.6; Baxter, 812 F.2d at 423.
          ___ ______________                       ______

                              
          ____________________

          2   The  district  court described  this  as  "independent  prior
          creation,"  an  independent  showing  that rebuts  a  finding  of
          access.  We do not consider whether  "independent prior creation"
          is a  separate showing,  see  Grubb v.  National Football  League
                                   ___  _____     _________________________
          Properties,  Inc., slip op. at 6 (D. Mass. 1995) (citing Concrete
          _________________                                        ________
          Machinery, 843 F.2d at 605 n.6), or whether any showing of access
          _________
          must, as a  logical matter,  necessarily be access  prior to  the
                                                              _____
          creation  of a  defendant's work,  see Baxter,  812 F.2d  at 423,
                                             ___ ______
          since resolution of this question either way would not affect the
          result of our analysis.

                                         -8-

          In  his deposition,  Loh  stated that  he  began working  on  the

          Patriots' New Logo on  January 28, 1993, and by February 4, 1993,

          had finished, save for later refinements, the Patriots' New Logo.

          Additionally, in  his affidavit,  Loh further testified  that, in

          late January of 1993, he created a pencil sketch of the Patriots'

          New Logo, to which he  added color later that day.  With  the aid

          of his  timesheets, he was able in his deposition to pinpoint the

          day  he created  these  works  as January  28,  1993.   What  Loh

          identified  as  having  been  created during  this  period  bears

          unmistakable resemblance to the Patriots' New Logo, save for  the

          color of the  star3 in  the hat and  a few  shadings on the  face

          depicted.   This  testimony  demonstrates that  Loh did  not have

          access  to Grubb's  design prior  to creating  the  Patriots' new

          logo, see Baxter, 812  F.2d at 423, since Grubb's  evidence shows
                ___ ______

          that Loh could not  have viewed Grubb's design prior  to February

          9, 1993.

                    To be sure, Grubb  argues that he does in  fact dispute

          Loh's testimony, and therefore, there  remains a genuine issue of

          material fact as to the issue  of Loh's prior creation.  However,

          on summary judgment, absent specific facts discrediting testimony

          from  a witness associated with  the movant, and  absent a direct

          conflict  in the  testimony, the  opponent (although  entitled to

          have his or her evidence  taken as true) is not entitled  to have

          the  defendant's  evidence positively  disbelieved.    Takeall v.
                                                                 _______
                              
          ____________________

          3  While the color  of the star changed from white to  silver, it
          should be noted  that the  Patriots' actual helmet  color --  the
          background of the logo -- also changed from white to silver.

                                         -9-

          Pepsico, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 19, 23 (D. Md. 1992),  aff'd, 14 F.3d
          _____________                                      _____

          596 (4th Cir. 1993),  cert. denied, 114 S.  Ct. 2742 (1994);  see
                                ____________                            ___

          also  Moreau v. Local  247, Int'l Bhd. of  Firemen, 851 F.2d 516,
          ____  ______    __________________________________

          519  (1st Cir. 1988); 10A Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller and

          Mary K. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure:  Civil 2d   2726 at
                        _________________________________________

          119, nn.11-12 (1983).   Grubb first questions the credibility  of

          Loh's testimony, and second argues that Loh's testimony conflicts

          with Grubb's  Supplemental Affidavit, since Grubb  therein opines

          that  his and  Loh's designs are  so similar  that Loh  must have

          copied Grubb's work.

                    Grubb attempts to call into question Loh's testimony by

          arguing that Loh's computer software timesheets do not  show what

          Loh had  drawn on  any particular  date, and  that Loh could  not

          identify individual sketches he created during the design process

          by specific date.   Grubb  also points to  Loh's admission  that,

          without his timesheets, he could not remember on what date he did

          what.   Furthermore, Grubb  argues that Loh  was still  sketching

          possible logos  on or after  February 9, 1993.   All of  this is,

          however, irrelevant.  The  parties stipulated that the timesheet-

          generating software  program could  not be  backdated.   With his

          timesheets and the summaries therein of how he used his time, Loh

          testified  in his deposition that  he began sketching the designs

          for the Patriots'  New Logo on January 28,  1993, and by February

          4, 1993, he  had essentially  finished designing it.   While  Loh

          testified  that  he  was  still  working  on  the  project  after

          February 9,  he also  testified  that this  work involved  simple

                                         -10-

          refinements, such as changing  the color of  the star.  The  fact

          that Loh needed  his timesheets  to recollect dates,  or that  he

          continued  to work on the Patriots project after February 9, does

          not discredit his testimony,  particularly where it is undisputed

          that the timesheets could not have been backdated.

                    Besides challenging the credibility of Loh's testimony,

          Grubb  also  argues  that his  Supplemental  Affidavit represents

          facts  in   direct  conflict  with  Loh's   testimony.    Grubb's

          Supplemental Affidavit expresses his opinion of the Patriots' new

          logo's similarity  to Grubb's work.  Grubb  supplies reasoning --

          pointing to the relative  proportions of the elements of  the two

          designs and the curve of the base line -- for why he believes the

          designs are similar.  Grubb also concludes that Loh's design must

          have been traced from another design.

                    Grubb's argument seems to be that 1) Loh traced, and 2)

          Loh's work resembles Grubb's work, therefore Loh's testimony that

          he did not copy Grubb's work, and in fact,  created the Patriots'

          new  logo before Grubb submitted  his own design,  is in dispute.

          However, similarity alone  cannot lead to  a finding of  copying,

          without  evidence  of access  prior  to  the allegedly  offending

          work's creation.   As a result, we  must look to  whether Grubb's

          affidavit actually creates a direct conflict with Loh's testimony

          --   since  the  latter   rebutted  any  finding   of  access  by

          demonstrating prior  creation.   We conclude that,  even assuming

          that Grubb's Supplemental Affidavit is properly considered expert

          testimony, it  is  simply  not  in  direct  conflict  with  Loh's

                                         -11-

          testimony.  Similarity cannot substitute for access, and the fact

          that Loh admitted  to having  done "tracings" in  the process  of

          producing his work does not conflict with Loh's statement that he

          had virtually  completed the  Patriots' New  Logo by February  4,

          1993,  since Loh admitted  that Evenson  had various  pictures of

          colonial  soldiers  that  he   used,  and  the  Summary  Judgment

          materials indicated that Loh was sent designs similar to the 1979

          proposed Patriots' logo, which  also depicted a colonial soldier.

          The fact  that Loh did tracings is  simply not in direct conflict

          with Loh's testimony that  he had created the Patriots'  new logo

          by February 4, 1993.  

                    As  a result,  like  the district  court before  us, we

          conclude  that Loh  composed his  design prior  to  Grubb's work.

          Such prior creation renders any conclusion of access or inference

          of  copying illogical.  See  Concrete Mach., 843  F.2d at 606 n.6
                                  ___  ______________

          (stating that  "[a]lthough access plus substantial  similarity is

          required  to show copying, the trier of fact may nonetheless find

          no copying if the defendant shows independent creation").

                    Because both access and substantial similarity need  be

          shown, see  Concrete Mach. Co., 843 F.2d  at 606; O'Neill v. Dell
                 ___  __________________                    _______    ____

          Publishing  Co., 630 F.2d 685, 686 (1st Cir. 1980), and Plaintiff
          _______________

          has failed  to  demonstrate  a genuine  issue  of  material  fact

          regarding  access, we need go no further.  While Plaintiff argues

          that "[w]here two designs  are so similar that one must have been

          copied  from  the other,  proof of  access  may not  be required,

          because  no   explanation  other  than   copying  is   reasonably

                                         -12-

          possible,"   Brief  for the Plaintiff-Appellant  at 13,  the lone
                       __________________________________

          case that Plaintiff cites for this proposition, Flag Fables, Inc.
                                                          _________________

          v. Jean Ann's Country Flags  and Crafts, Inc., 730 F. Supp.  1165
             __________________________________________

          (D. Mass. 1989), in fact states that

                      this Court's view of the  present dispute
                      [is that] given  the indisputable  access
                                           ____________________
                      and  substantial  similarity between  the
                      ____________________________
                      two  parties'  banners,  the evidence  of
                      independent  creation   advanced  at  the
                      hearing  by  defendants  was  simply  not
                      persuasive.

          Id.  at 1181 (emphasis added).  Thus, Plaintiff misstates the law
          ___

          by failing to  recognize that he bears the burden of showing both
                                                                       ____

          reasonable  access and substantial  similarity.   Concrete Mach.,
                             ___                            ______________

          843  F.2d at  606; Walker,  784 F.2d  at 48;  Sid &  Marty Krofft
                             ______                     ___________________

          Television,  562  F.2d   at  1162-63.     The  reason  for   both
          __________

          requirements  is  simple:   copyright  protection  precludes only

          copying; if two people  arrive at the same result  independently,

          copyright law will not protect the first.  See Selle, 741 F.2d at
                                                     ___ _____

          896 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating that "two works may  be identical in

          every detail, but,  if the alleged infringer  created the accused

          work independently or both works were copied from a common source

          in the public domain, then there is no infringement"); 3 Nimmer  

          13.02;  see also  Arthur  v. American  Broadcasting Cos.,  633 F.
                  ________  ______     ___________________________

          Supp.  146,   148  n.3,   149  (S.D.N.Y.  1985)   (concluding  no

          infringement  even where  expressions are  extremely similar,  if

          "nearly all the  similarity can  be attributed to  the fact  that

          both [works]  are artist's  renderings of the  same unprotectible

          idea"; ideas cannot be protected under copyright law, 17 U.S.C.  

                                         -13-

          102(b)).  Thus, like  the district court  before us, we need  not

          address the issue of substantial similarity.

                                      CONCLUSION
                                      CONCLUSION

                    As  a  result of  the  foregoing, the  judgment  of the

          district court is affirmed.
                            affirmed.
                            ________

                                         -14-