Court Opinion

ID: 9942526
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-21 15:08:13.636896+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:48:11.721012
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-1910-21

WESTFIELD AREA YMCA,
YMCA OF MADISON
NEW JERSEY, INC., d/b/a
MADISON AREA YMCA,
LAKELAND HILLS FAMILY
YMCA, WYCKOFF FAMILY
YMCA, INC., and WEST
MORRIS YMCA,

          Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

THE NORTH RIVER
INSURANCE COMPANY,
UNITED STATES FIRE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
and PHILADELPHIA
INDEMNITY INSURANCE
COMPANY,

     Defendants-Respondents.
____________________________

                   Argued November 28, 2023 – Decided February 21, 2024

                   Before Judges Gooden Brown and Natali.
            On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
            Division, Union County, Docket No. L-2584-20.

            Carl A. Salisbury argued the cause for appellants
            (Bramnick, Rodriguez, Grabas, Arnold & Mangan,
            attorneys; Carl A. Salisbury, on the briefs).

            Kristin V. Gallagher argued the cause for respondents
            The North River Insurance Company and United States
            Fire Insurance Company (Kennedys CMK LLP,
            attorneys; Kristin V. Gallagher, Mark F. Hamilton, and
            Tyler J. Pierson, of counsel and on the brief).

            Stephen E. Goldman (Robinson & Cole LLP) of the
            Connecticut bar, admitted pro hac vice, argued the
            cause for respondent Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance
            Company (Walsh Pizzi O'Reilly Falanga LLP, and
            Stephen E. Goldman, attorneys; Liza M. Walsh and
            William T. Walsh, Jr., on the brief).

PER CURIAM

      In this insurance coverage action, five YMCAs, plaintiffs Westfield Area

YMCA, YMCA of Madison New Jersey, doing business as Madison Area

YMCA, Lakeland Hills Family YMCA, Wyckoff Family YMCA Inc., and West

Morris Area YMCA, appeal from two January 18, 2022, Law Division orders

granting summary judgment dismissal of their complaint against their respective

insurance companies, defendants the North River Insurance Company (North

River), United States Fire Insurance Company (US Fire), and Philadelphia

                                                                         A-1910-21
                                      2
Indemnity Insurance Company (Philadelphia), three commercial property and

casualty insurance carriers.

      The complaint sought business interruption coverage under the respective

commercial property insurance policies for business income losses sustained

during the pandemic caused by the SARS-CoV-2 virus (the COVID-19

pandemic) that prompted the Governor to issue mandatory closure orders. In

dismissing the complaint, Judge Alan G. Lesnewich determined plaintiffs'

business income losses were not related to any "direct physical loss of or damage

to" the insured properties, prerequisites to coverage. The judge also ruled

coverage was barred by the virus exclusions contained in the policies and the

doctrine of regulatory estoppel did not invalidate the exclusions. We agree and

affirm substantially for the reasons articulated in the judge's statement of

reasons.

                                       I.

      We glean these facts from the motion record, viewed in the light most

favorable to plaintiffs. Angland v. Mountain Creek Resort, Inc., 213 N.J. 573,

577 (2013) (citing Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 523

(1995)). Plaintiffs are non-profit community service organizations that operate

numerous facilities throughout the State to promote their mission of advancing

                                                                           A-1910-21
                                       3
youth development, healthy living, and social responsibility.            To that end,

plaintiffs provide a variety of programs and services in their facilities, including

child-care, early childhood education, summer youth camps, youth and teen

sports programs, youth and teen counseling, health and wellness classes for

adults, and physical fitness training centers. Plaintiffs' facilities are insured by

the insurance policies at issue in this case (the insured properties).

      Defendant North River issued a commercial package property insurance

policy to plaintiff Westfield YMCA for the policy period December 31, 2019 ,

to December 31, 2020. Defendant US Fire issued commercial package property

insurance policies to plaintiffs Madison YMCA from December 31, 2019, to

December 31, 2020, to West Morris YMCA from January 1, 2020 to January 1,

2021, and to Lakeland Hills YMCA from March 31, 2019 to March 31, 2020.

Defendant Philadelphia issued a commercial package property insurance policy

to plaintiff Wyckoff YMCA from April 1, 2019 to April 1, 2020.

      All the relevant policy provisions in the various insurance policies are

identical. The Building and Personal Property Coverage Form provides that

defendants "will pay for direct physical loss of or damage to Covered Property

at the [plaintiffs'] premises . . . caused by or resulting from any Covered Cause

                                                                               A-1910-21
                                         4
of Loss," which is defined as "direct physical loss unless the loss is excluded or

limited in [the policies]."

      The policies' Business Income (And Extra Expense) Coverage Form

provides that:

                   [Defendants] will pay for the actual loss of
                   Business Income [plaintiffs] sustain due to
                   the necessary "suspension" of [plaintiffs']
                   "operations" during the "period of
                   restoration". The "suspension" must be
                   caused by direct physical loss of or damage
                   to property at [the insured properties] and
                   for which a Business Income Limit Of
                   Insurance is shown in the Declarations.
                   The loss or damage must be caused by or
                   result from a Covered Cause of Loss. [1]

"Business Income" is defined as "[n]et [i]ncome ([n]et [p]rofit or [l]oss before

income taxes) that would have been earned or incurred;" and "[c]ontinuing

normal operating expenses incurred, including payroll."

      The policies contain two exclusions that are germane to this appeal. First,

the "Exclusion of Loss due to Virus or Bacteria" Endorsement (the Virus

1
  The policies also include "Extra Expense Coverage," which covers "necessary
expenses [plaintiffs] incur during the 'period of restoration' that [plaintiffs]
would not have incurred if there had been no direct physical loss or damage to
property caused by or resulting from a Covered Cause of Loss." However, such
coverage is only provided if "Business Income Coverage applies at [the insured
properties]."
                                                                            A-1910-21
                                        5
Exclusion) provides that defendants "will not pay for loss or damage caused by

or resulting from any virus, bacterium or other micro-organism that induces or

is capable of inducing physical distress, illness or disease." The Virus Exclusion

"applies to all coverage under all forms and endorsements . . . , including but

not limited to forms or endorsements that cover . . . business income[ and] extra

expense."

      Second, in the "Causes of Loss – Special Form," the policies contain an

Ordinance Or Law Exclusion, which explicitly states that defendants "will not

pay for loss or damage caused directly or indirectly" by "[t]he enforcement of

or compliance with any ordinance or law . . . [r]egulating the . . . use . . . of any

property." The Ordinance Or Law Exclusion "applies whether the loss results

from . . . [a]n ordinance or law that is enforced even if the property has not been

damaged" and "[s]uch loss or damage is excluded regardless of any other cause

or event that contributes concurrently or in any sequence to the loss."

      Finally, the policies issued by North River and US Fire contained an

additional "Food Contamination and Communicable Disease Coverage

Endorsement," providing that:

                         This     endorsement        modifies
                   insurance provided under the following:

                                                                               A-1910-21
                                         6
                      BUSINESS    INCOME   (AND
                  EXTRA EXPENSE) COVERAGE FORM

                        ....

                        (1) If one or more of [plaintiffs'
                  premises are] . . . ordered closed by the
                  Board of Health or any other governmental
                  authority as a result of the discovery or
                  suspicion of "food contamination" or
                  "communicable disease", [North River or
                  US Fire] will pay:

                        (a) The loss of Business Income
                  [plaintiffs] sustain due to the necessary
                  "suspension" of [plaintiffs] "operations" as
                  a result of the "food contamination" or
                  "communicable disease". The coverage for
                  Business Income will begin 24 hours after
                  [plaintiffs] receive notice of closing from
                  the Board of Health or any other
                  governmental authority[.]

                        ....

                         2. "Communicable disease" means
                  any disease that is transmissible by
                  infection or contagion through contact with
                  humans or animals, or through bodily
                  fluids, contaminated objects, airborne
                  inhalation or a similar agent.

      Beginning March 2020, Governor Philip D. Murphy issued a series of

executive orders in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, requiring the closure

of all non-essential for-profit and non-profit businesses in New Jersey. First,

                                                                         A-1910-21
                                       7
Executive Order 103, issued on March 9, 2020, identified COVID-19 as a

"contagious, and at times fatal, respiratory disease caused by the SARS-CoV-2

virus," acknowledged the rapid growth of the COVID-19 pandemic and the

occurrence of confirmed cases in New Jersey and nearby states, declared that "a

Public Health Emergency and State of Emergency exist[ed] in the State of New

Jersey," and implemented measures to protect the public in light of the

emergency. Exec. Order No. 103 (Mar. 9, 2020), 52 N.J.R. 549(a) (Apr. 6,

2020).

      Next, Executive Order 104, issued on March 16, 2020, among other

provisions, ordered the closure of "[a]ll public, private, and parochial preschool

program premises" as well as the closure of all "[g]yms[,] fitness centers and

classes" for as long as the order remains in effect. Exec. Order No. 104 (Mar.

16, 2020), 52 N.J.R. 550(a) (Apr. 6, 2020). Five days later, Executive Order

107, issued on March 21, 2020, superseded Executive Order 104's "operative

paragraphs" and closed to the public, among other establishments, "[t]he brick-

and-mortar premises of all non-essential retail businesses," like plaintiffs'.

                                                                            A-1910-21
                                        8
Exec. Order No. 107 (Mar. 21, 2020), 52 N.J.R. 554(a) (Apr. 6, 2020). The

mandatory closures were subsequently lifted once the emergency abated. 2

      Plaintiffs sought coverage for the business income losses incurred during

the mandatory closures, but defendants denied the claims. As a result, on August

13, 2020, plaintiffs filed a two-count complaint against defendants, commencing

this action. In the complaint, plaintiffs did not allege any direct physical loss or

damage to their facilities. Instead, plaintiffs asserted that in exchange for

"substantial annual premiums," defendants entered into "all risks" insurance

contracts with them, in which defendants promised to "protect [plaintiffs] from

losses and catastrophes, including the interruption or closure of their busine ss

operations due to the physical loss of use, loss of functionality, or loss of access

to their respective facilities." However, according to the complaint, defendants

"failed or refused to provide coverage for [plaintiffs'] business income losses

occasioned by the Executive Order [s]hutdown for various reasons, none of

which comport or comply with the law of New Jersey." In count one, plaintiffs

sought a declaratory judgment, requiring defendants to provide full coverage for

2
  On June 26, 2020, Executive Order 157, which went into effect on July 2,
2020, authorized the limited reopening of "[a]ll retail establishments" subject to
mandated precautions to minimize the spread of the SARS-CoV-2 virus. Exec.
Order No. 157 (June 26, 2020), 52 N.J.R. 1455(a) (Aug. 3, 2020).
                                                                              A-1910-21
                                         9
their losses. In count two, plaintiffs sought compensatory and consequential

damages for defendants' breach of contract.

      Ultimately, defendants moved for summary judgment, which was opposed

by plaintiffs. Following oral argument, Judge Lesnewich granted defendants'

motions and issued memorializing orders with identical statements of reasons

on January 18, 2022.3 In his decision, after outlining the governing legal

principles, the judge first determined that summary judgment was appropriate

because plaintiffs made no claim for "direct physical loss."             The judge

explained:

             The [p]olicies' Business Income coverage and Extra
             Expense coverage both require, as a prerequisite to
             coverage, "direct physical loss of or damage to
             [insured] property" that is "caused by or result[ing]
             from a Covered Cause of Loss." The term "Covered
             Cause of Loss" is defined as "direct physical loss unless
             the loss is excluded or limited in th[e] policy."
             Significantly, [p]laintiffs have not made a claim for the
             repair or replacement of any of their respective
             property. That fact is not disputed. That alone is reason
             for the court to grant summary judgment.

             [(first and second alteration in original).]

3
  One order pertained to North River's and US Fire's motions, and the other
pertained to Philadelphia's motion.
                                                                             A-1910-21
                                        10
      Turning to the exclusions, the judge concluded the Virus Exclusion was

enforceable and barred plaintiffs' claim. In reaching that conclusion, the judge

rejected plaintiffs' contention that the exclusion did not apply because "the

Executive Orders, not COVID-19, were the proximate cause of [plaintiffs']

losses." In that regard, the judge looked to other courts that had decided "the

issue of causation in this context" and relied on our opinion in New Jersey

Transit Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 461 N.J. Super. 440

(App. Div. 2019), where we stated:

                  When there is a conflict as to whether, for
            coverage purposes, losses should be considered to be
            "caused by" an excluded risk or by a covered peril, the
            New Jersey courts employ the efficient proximate cause
            test, which is sometimes referred to as Appleman's
            Rule. . . .

                   Under this test, if an exclusion "bars coverage for
            losses caused by a particular peril, the exclusion applies
            only if the excluded peril was the 'efficient proximate
            cause' of the loss." "Where a peril specifically insured
            against sets other causes in motion which, in an
            unbroken sequence and connection between the act and
            final loss, produces the result for which recovery is
            sought, the insured peril is regarded as the proximate
            cause of the entire loss . . . ."

            [Id. at 460-61 (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted)
            (first quoting Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Keating Bldg.
            Corp., 513 F. Supp. 2d 55, 70 (D.N.J. 2007); and then
            quoting Auto Lenders Acceptance Corp. v. Gentilini
            Ford, Inc., 181 N.J. 245, 257 (2004)).]

                                                                          A-1910-21
                                       11
      Consistent with other courts, Judge Lesnewich determined the Virus

Exclusion "unambiguously bar[red] coverage of [p]laintiffs' claims" because the

"alleged losses were caused by the Coronavirus, . . . in response to which

Governor Murphy issued the [Executive] Orders." The judge explained:

            Plaintiffs cannot show that the Executive Orders, and
            not the COVID-19 virus, were the proximate cause of
            its losses. The Executive Orders were issued for the
            sole reason of reducing the spread of the virus that
            causes COVID-19 and would not have been issued but
            for the presence of the virus in the State of New Jersey.
            Because the Stay-at-Home Orders were issued to
            mitigate the spread of the highly contagious novel
            coronavirus, [p]laintiffs' losses are tied inextricably to
            that virus and are not covered by the policies.

      The judge also rejected plaintiffs' contention that "the Virus Exclusion

[was] void under the theory of regulatory estoppel." According to the judge,

plaintiffs "grounded their regulatory estoppel argument on a statement in an

Insurance Services Office ('ISO') 4 circular" indicating that losses due to viruses

4
  ISO "is an influential [nonprofit] organization within the insurance industry
that promulgates standard form insurance policies, including [commercial
general liability] policies, that insurers across the country use to conduct their
business." Mac Prop. Grp. LLC & The Cake Boutique LLC v. Selective Fire &
Cas. Ins. Co., 473 N.J. Super. 1, 32 n.7 (App. Div. 2022) (alterations in original)
(quoting Christopher C. French, Construction Defects: Are They 'Occurrences'?,
47 Gonz. L. Rev. 1, 5 n.7 (2011/2012)), certif. denied, 252 N.J. 258 and 252 N.J.
261 (2022).
                                                                             A-1910-21
                                       12
were already precluded by the pollution exclusion. Plaintiffs argued that the

ISO circular "misrepresented" to regulators that the proposed virus exclusion

language in the insurance policies was merely a "clarification," when in fact the

language allegedly resulted in a "reduction in existing coverage."

      The judge reasoned that "putting aside the fact that . . . regulatory estoppel

does not void a clear and unambiguous provision such as the Virus Exclusion,"

plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that insurers misrepresented to regulatory

authorities the impact and scope of the exclusion to justify a finding of

regulatory estoppel. See Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am.,

134 N.J. 1, 30 (1993) (declining to enforce an exclusion clause because "[t]o do

so would contravene this State's public policy requiring regulatory approval of

standard industry-wide policy forms to assure fairness in rates and in policy

content, and would condone the industry's misrepresentation to regulators in

New Jersey and other states concerning the effect of the clause").

      In this ensuing appeal, plaintiffs raise the following points for our

consideration:

            I.[5] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
            FOLLOW      THIS  COURT’S   CONTROLLING
            AUTHORITY THAT "DIRECT PHYSICAL LOSS OF

5
  We have omitted the standard of review and renumbered the point headings
accordingly.
                                                                              A-1910-21
                                       13
            OR DAMAGE TO" PROPERTY DOES NOT
            REQUIRE PHYSICAL ALTERATION OF COVERED
            PROPERTY BUT, INSTEAD, IS SATISFIED BY
            LOSS OF USE OF THE PROPERTY.

            II. THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED THE VIRUS
            EXCLUSION, AS A MATTER OF LAW, DESPITE
            THE EXISTENCE OF NUMEROUS MATERIAL
            ISSUES OF FACT IN DISPUTE.

                  A. By Misapplying Appleman's Rule, The
                  Trial Court Erroneously Found That The
                  Virus Was The "Predominant Cause" Of
                  [Plaintiffs'] Losses.

                  B. Plaintiffs Submitted On The Motions
                  Below Numerous Misrepresentations
                  About The Virus Exclusion That ISO Made
                  To State Insurance Regulators, Which The
                  Trial Court Erroneously Ruled Were Not
                  Discernible From The Motion Record.

                                        II.

      "[W]e review the trial court's grant of summary judgment de novo under

the same standard as the trial court." Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat'l

Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 224 N.J. 189, 199 (2016). That standard is

well-settled.

            [I]f the evidence of record—the pleadings, depositions,
            answers to interrogatories, and affidavits—"together
            with all legitimate inferences therefrom favoring the
            non-moving party, would require submission of the
            issue to the trier of fact," then the trial court must deny
            the motion. On the other hand, when no genuine issue

                                                                          A-1910-21
                                       14
            of material fact is at issue and the moving party is
            entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, summary
            judgment must be granted.

            [Steinberg v. Sahara Sam's Oasis, LLC, 226 N.J. 344,
            366 (2016) (citations omitted) (quoting R. 4:46-2(c)).]

      Whether a genuine issue of material fact exists depends on "whether the

competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party in consideration of the applicable evidentiary

standard, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged

disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party." Brill, 142 N.J. at 523. "If

there is no genuine issue of material fact, we must then 'decide whether the trial

court correctly interpreted the law.'" DepoLink Ct. Reporting & Litig. Support

Servs. v. Rochman, 430 N.J. Super. 325, 333 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting

Massachi v. AHL Servs., Inc., 396 N.J. Super. 486, 494 (App. Div. 2007)). "We

review issues of law de novo and accord no deference to the trial judge's [legal]

conclusions . . . ." MTK Food Servs., Inc. v. Sirius Am. Ins. Co., 455 N.J. Super.

307, 312 (App. Div. 2018).

      "The interpretation of an insurance contract is a question of law . . . and

can be resolved on summary judgment." Adron, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 292 N.J.

Super. 463, 473 (App. Div. 1996).           Certain general principles guide our

interpretation of an insurance contract.

                                                                            A-1910-21
                                       15
      An insurance policy "will be enforced as written
when its terms are clear in order that the expectations
of the parties will be fulfilled," with undefined terms
construed in accordance with their "plain and ordinary
meaning." Flomerfelt v. Cardiello, 202 N.J. 432, 441
(2010). "If the language is clear, that is the end of the
inquiry," and courts will not "'engage in a strained
construction to support the imposition of liability' or
write a better policy for the insured than the one
purchased." Chubb Custom Ins. Co. v. Prudential Ins.
Co. of Am., 195 N.J. 231, 238 (2008) (quoting
Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hurley, 166 N.J. 260, 273
(2001)). We have long recognized "the basic notion
that the premium paid by the insured does not buy
coverage for all property damage but only for that type
of damage provided for in the policy." Weedo v. Stone-
E-Brick, Inc., 81 N.J. 233, 237 (1979).

       Exclusionary clauses are "presumed valid if they
are 'specific, plain, clear, prominent and not contrary to
public policy.'" Norman Int'l, Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co.,
251 N.J. 538, 552 (2022) (quoting Mem'l Props., LLC
v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 210 N.J. 512, 528 (2012)).
Policy exclusions "are typically construed narrowly
with the onus 'on the insurer to bring the case within the
exclusion.'" Mem'l Props., 210 N.J. at 528 (quoting
Am. Motorists Ins. Co. v. L-C-A Sales Co., 155 N.J. 29,
41 (1998)). Nonetheless, if the terms of an exclusion
are clear and unambiguous, we "should not engage in a
strained construction to support the imposition of
liability." Longobardi v. Chubb Ins. Co. of N.J., 121
N.J. 530, 537 (1990).

[AC Ocean Walk, LLC v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins.
Co., ___ N.J. ___ (2024) (slip op. at 18-19).]

                                                             A-1910-21
                           16
      Because this coverage dispute involves "the devasting impact of COVID-

19 and state governments' efforts to curb the pandemic, there have been scores

of federal and state appellate-level courts that have addressed the same issues

raised in this appeal." Mac Prop. Grp., 473 N.J. Super. at 26.

            The overwhelming majority of them have granted
            defendant insurers' motions to dismiss complaints
            seeking insurance coverage for business losses due to
            government orders barring or curtailing their operations
            in an effort to curb the COVID-19 pandemic because
            the losses were not due to physical loss or damage to
            their insured premises.

            [Id. at 26-27 (collecting cases).]

      Most significantly, our Supreme Court recently interpreted identical

language as the language at issue in defendants' policies and pointed out that

                  [s]everal federal and state courts have . . .
            construed the policy language "direct physical loss" of
            property or "direct physical . . . damage" to property to
            denote either the property's destruction or its alteration
            rendering it unusable or uninhabitable, and have
            declined to extend that language beyond those
            parameters.

            [AC Ocean Walk, LLC, ___ N.J. at ___ (slip op. at 23).]

      The Court concluded,

                  [w]e concur with the determinations of those
            federal and state courts. Based on the plain terms of the
            policies, we conclude that in order to show a "direct
            physical loss" of its property or "direct physical . . .

                                                                           A-1910-21
                                       17
            damage" to its property under the policy language at
            issue, [the insured] was required to demonstrate that its
            property was destroyed or altered in a manner that
            rendered it unusable or uninhabitable.

            [Id. at ___ (slip op. at 25).]

Otherwise, there is no coverage under the insurance policy. Ibid.

      As a result, in AC Ocean Walk, LLC, where the insured sought coverage

under its commercial property insurance policies for "direct physical loss" of or

"direct physical . . . damage" to its property occasioned by the COVID-19

pandemic when it suspended operations of its casino and entertainment facilities

due to the Governor's executive order mandating closure, the Court held that

"Ocean Walk's COVID-19 allegations [did] not satisfy the policy language." Id.

at ___ (slip op. at 26-27).

            At most, it has alleged that it sustained a loss of
            business during the COVID-19 government-mandated
            suspension of business operations because it was not
            permitted to use its property as it would otherwise have
            done. As the Third Circuit observed with respect to the
            complaint dismissed in [Wilson v. USI Ins. Serv. LLC,
            57 F.4th 131 (3d Cir. 2023)] -- in which the plaintiff
            businesses "lost the ability to use their properties for
            their intended business purposes" by virtue of
            government orders -- such an allegation "is completely
            divorced from the physical condition of the premises,"
            given that the properties were "intact and functional"
            and were "not destroyed in whole or in part." 57 F.4th
            at 142-43. The Appellate Division rebuffed a similar
            argument in Mac Property, noting that the insured

                                                                           A-1910-21
                                        18
            businesses "would have been able to continue
            functioning as a dine-in restaurant, bakery, childcare
            and learning center, or gym without interruption had
            Governor Murphy not issued his [executive orders],"
            given that none of the facilities needed repairs due to
            damage or required relocation. 473 N.J. Super. at 23.
            Here, absent the executive orders, Ocean Walk would
            have been able to use its property for casino and other
            entertainment functions with no suspension of its
            operations.

            [AC Ocean Walk, LLC, ___ N.J. at ___ (slip op. at 26-
            27) (second alteration in original) (footnote omitted).]

The Court also determined that "the deficiency in [Ocean Walk's] allegations

[could not] be remedied by discovery," id. at ___ (slip op. at 29),6 and the Court's

holding "comport[ed] with the vast majority of decisions by federal and state

appellate courts that have addressed that issue," id. at ___ (slip op. at 27).

      Likewise, here, because plaintiffs have not alleged any direct physical loss

or damage to their facilities due to COVID-19 related government closures, as

those terms have been defined in AC Ocean Walk, LLC, plaintiffs are not

entitled to coverage for their business losses under any of the policies regardless

of whether the virus exclusion applied. We therefore affirm Judge Lesnewich's

decision granting defendants' summary judgment. Given our conclusion, we

6
  Unlike this case, procedurally, AC Ocean Walk, LLC was adjudicated on a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e), before
discovery was even conducted. Id. at ___ (slip op. at 10).
                                                                                 A-1910-21
                                        19
need not address plaintiffs' remaining arguments, which we previously rejected

in Mac Property Group LLC, 473 N.J. Super. at 33, 40 (rejecting regulatory

estoppel as a bar to the enforcement of the virus exclusion, and holding that the

COVID-19 virus, rather than the executive orders, was "the efficient proximate

cause of plaintiffs' losses," thus precluding coverage under the virus exclusion).

      As we stated in Mac Property Group LLC,

            We recognize that COVID-19 has caused
            overwhelming economic losses to untold businesses
            and individuals dependent on those businesses in our
            state, nation, and the world. Nevertheless, in the
            context of the issues presented in this appeal, plaintiffs'
            insurance claims are restricted by the clear and plain
            meaning of their insurance policies, which we cannot
            rewrite to cover their unfortunate losses.

            [Id. at 41.]

      Affirmed.

                                                                            A-1910-21
                                       20