Court Opinion

ID: 9811852
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:30:48.919151+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:21:56.842523
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Justice Castillo.
Because of the procedural posture in which this civil forfeiture action reached our Court, I dissent from the majority’s refusal to address application of the exclusionary rule in civil forfeiture proceedings in Texas. Tobin filed a motion to suppress the $36,660 as the fruit of an illegal detention and search. The trial court granted the motion to suppress on that basis. To-bin also asked the trial court to return the property and dismiss the case. The trial court agreed and ordered the money returned to Tobin. Concluding that jurisdiction of an in rem civil forfeiture action *409requires a subject res, it then dismissed the case for want of subject-matter jurisdiction. The State argues on appeal that: (1) Tobin’s detention was legal; (2) the search of Tobin’s vehicle was legal; and (3) even if the detention and search were illegal, the trial court should not have dismissed the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The parties agree that the trial court applied the exclusionary rule in granting Tobin’s motion to suppress and, as a consequence, in returning the money and dismissing the case.

I. APPLICATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT EXCLUSIONARY RULE TO CIVIL FORFEITURES IN TEXAS

The issue squarely before this Court is whether the exclusionary rule applies in civil forfeiture cases brought under chapter 59 of the code of criminal procedure. See Tex.Code CRiM. PROC. Ann. art. 59.01 .12 (Vernon Supp.2004). The approach taken to date in Texas by courts and parties alike is to assume that the exclusionary rule applies without analyzing whether it does or does not. See, e.g., State v. $217,590, 18 S.W.3d 631, 632 n. 1 (Tex.2000) (“Because both parties in this case presume the exclusionary rule’s application, we will assume without deciding that the rule applies.”); 1986 Dodge 150 Pickup v. State, 129 S.W.3d 180, at 181-83 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2004, no pet. h.) (“We assume, as do both parties, the exclusionary rule applies to civil forfeiture proceedings.”). The exclusionary rule’s application in this case has been well briefed and argued by the parties. I would address the issue.

A. The Exclusionary Rule

1. The Purpose of the Exclusionary Rule

The exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard the Fourth Amendment’s right of privacy. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393-94, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914). Its primary purpose is to deter unlawful conduct by law enforcement by prohibiting use of illegally obtained evidence. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 n. 29, 96 S.Ct. 3021, 49 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1976). A secondary purpose is to prevent judicial imprimatur of overzealous police action. Ahart v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 964 P.2d 517, 520 (Colo.1998). The exclusionary rule applies in all state criminal proceedings. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961).

2. The Burdens of Proof Associated with the

Exclusionary Rule in Criminal Cases

An accused seeking to suppress evidence on the basis of illegal police conduct bears the burden of proof to rebut a presumption of proper police conduct. See McGee v. State, 105 S.W.3d 609, 613 (Tex.Crim.App.2003). The accused satisfies the burden by proving the police acted without a warrant. Id. The burden then shifts to the State to either produce a warrant or prove the reasonableness of the challenged conduct. Id. If the State produces a warrant, the burden of proof again shifts to the accused to show the invalidity of the warrant. Russell v. State, 717 S.W.2d 7, 9-10 (Tex.Crim.App.1986) (op. on reh’g). If the State is unable to produce a warrant, it must prove the reasonableness of the search or seizure. Id. The State may demonstrate reasonableness by proving that a statutory exception to the warrant requirement was met. See McGee, 105 S.W.3d at 613. The State must prove probable cause by a preponderance of the evidence. Porter v. State, 938 S.W.2d 725, 727-28 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, *410pet. ref'd).1 With this basic background in mind, I would turn to the forfeiture statute under which the authorities seized Tobin’s $36,660.

B. Forfeiture of Contraband in Texas

Forfeiture under chapter 59 is an in rem civil proceeding. $191,452.00 v. State, 827 S.W.2d 430, 433 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied). The version of article 59.03 in effect at the time of the seizure in this case provided:
(a) Property subject to forfeiture under this chapter may be seized by any peace officer under authority of a search warrant.
(b) Seizure of property subject to forfeiture may be made without warrant if:
(1) the owner, operator, or agent in charge of the property knowingly consents;
(2) the seizure is incident to a search to which the owner, operator, or agent in charge of the property knowingly consents;
(3) the property subject to seizure has been the subject of a prior judgment in favor of the state in a forfeiture proceeding under this chapter; or
(4) the seizure was incident to a lawful arrest, lawful search, or lawful search incident to arrest.
(c) A peace officer who seizes property under this chapter has custody of the property, subject only to replevy under Article 59.02 of this code or an order of a court. A peace officer who has custody of property shall provide the attorney representing the state with a sworn statement that contains a schedule of the property seized, an acknowledgment that the officer has seized the property, and a list of the officer’s reasons for the seizure. Not later than 72 hours after the seizure, the peace officer shall:
(1) place the property under seal;
(2) remove the property to a place ordered by the court; or
(3) require a law enforcement agency of the state or a political subdivision to take custody of the property and move it to a property location.
Act of July 19,1989, 71st Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 12, § 1, 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 14 (eff. Oet.18, 1989) (current version at Tex.Code Ceim. PRoc. Ann. art. 59.03 (Vernon Supp. 2004)).2 A “final conviction for an underlying offense is not a requirement for forfeiture” under chapter 59. Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 59.05(d).

1. Commencement of a Civil Forfeiture Proceeding

Once a peace officer seizes contraband under chapter 59, the “attorney representing the state” must commence a forfeiture proceeding. Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 59.04(a). The “attorney representing the state” is the prosecutor with felony jurisdiction in the county in which the forfeiture proceeding is to be filed. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 59.01(1).

2. The Burdens of Proof in a Civil Forfeiture Proceeding

In all circumstances, to prevail in a civil forfeiture proceeding under chapter 59, *411the State must satisfy a two-part test. See State v. $11, 014, 820 S.W.2d 783, 784 (Tex.1991) (per curiam). First, the State must show probable cause for seizing the property. Id. (citing Tex. Const. art. I, § 9). In the context of civil forfeiture, probable cause is a “reasonable belief that a ‘substantial connection exists between the property to be forfeited and the criminal activity defined by the statute.’ ” $56,700 v. State, 730 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Tex.1987) (quoting United States v. $364,960, 661 F.2d 319, 323 (5th Cir.1981)). Second, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the seized property is contraband and therefore subject to forfeiture. Tex.Code CRIM. PROC. Ann. arts. 59.01(2), 59.05(b).3 Further, if property is seized under chapter 59 without a warrant, article 59.03 imposes a third evidentiary burden. In that circumstance, in addition to proving probable cause and that the property is contraband subject to forfeiture, the State also bears the burden of proving one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement listed in article 59.03. See Tex.Code CRIM. PROC. Ann. art. 59.03(b); see also $217,590, 18 S.W.3d at 634 (finding that State proved consent to search by clear and convincing evidence).4
Moreover, evidence of a dismissal or acquittal in any underlying criminal case “raises á presumption that the property or interest that is the subject of the hearing is nonforfeitable.” Tex.Code CRIM. PROC. Ann. art. 59.05(d). The State may rebut the presumption of nonforfeitability by evidence that the owner knew or should have known that the property was contraband. Id.; Bochas v. State, 951 S.W.2d 64, 71 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1997, pet. denied).
Further, article 59.02(c) provides an affirmative defense for innocent owners. Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 59.02(c). Once the State has met its burdens, the burden shifts to parties claiming the innocent-owner defense to prove they acquired an ownership interest in the property prior to, or during, the act giving rise to forfeiture. Id.; Bochas, 951 S.W.2d at 71.
Finally, Chapter 59 is subject to the Excessive Fines Clause.5 Application of *412constitutional proportionality standards result in a judgment of nonforfeiture if the forfeiture is excessive. See One Car, 1996 Dodge X-Cab Truck White in Color 5YC-T17 VIN 3B7HC13Z5TG163723 v. State, 122 S.W.3d 422, 427 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2003, no pet.) (“We hold that forfeiture in this ease is sufficiently punitive to be subject to the Excessive Fines Clause.”).

C. Application of the Exclusionary Rule in Other Civil Proceedings

1. Federal Interpretation

As a judicially created remedy, the exclusion ary rule does not “proscribe the use of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons.” United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974). Its use is “restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served.” Id. Since the rule is “prudential rather than constitutionally mandated,” it is only applicable “where its deterrence benefits outweigh its ‘substantial social costs.’ ” Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363, 118 S.Ct. 2014, 141 L.Ed.2d 344 (1998) (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984)).
The United States Supreme Court long has applied the exclusionary rule to federal forfeiture proceedings. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 620, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886). “Forced and compulsory extortion of a man’s own testimony or of his private papers to be used as evidence to convict him of a crime or forfeit his goods” violates the Fourth and Fifth Amendments when criminal prosecution and forfeiture “almost run into each other.” Boyd,. 116 U.S. at 630, 6 S.Ct. 524. The Supreme Court held that illegally obtained evidence may not be used to justify a forfeiture. Id. at 638, 6 S.Ct. 524; see One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 700-02, 85 S.Ct. 1246, 14 L.Ed.2d 170 (1965) (holding exclusionary rule applicable to quasi-criminal forfeiture statute).
Nonetheless, more recently the Supreme Court has distinguished civil forfeitures tied to a person’s criminal actions from those that proceed against the property without the need for a criminal conviction. One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 236-37, 93 S.Ct. 489, 34 L.Ed.2d 438 (1972). Significantly, the Court modified its stance regarding the automatic characterization of forfeitures as “quasi-criminal” in favor of utilizing statutory construction to determine whether the forfeiture in question was, in fact, a civil or a criminal penalty, and thus whether constitutional protections applied. Id. Specifically, the Court found that a civil forfeiture was not barred by the double jeopardy clause of the Constitution following the owner’s acquittal of criminal charges. Id. at 237, 93 S.Ct. 489. The Court noted that the forfeiture statute in question did not require the commission of a criminal offense. Id. at 236 n. 6, 93 S.Ct. 489. In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court also noted that the question of whether the forfeiture was a civil remedy or a criminal penalty was one of statutory construction. Id. at 237, 93 S.Ct. 489 (citing Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 400, 58 S.Ct. 630, 82 L.Ed. 917 (1938)).
Accordingly, expressing concern that indiscriminate application of the exclusionary rule might generate “disrespect for the law and administration of justice,” the Supreme Court has adopted a balancing approach to application of the exclusionary rule in civil proceedings. Leon, 468 U.S. at 908, 104 S.Ct. 3405 (citing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976)). In determining *413whether to apply the exclusionary rule in a particular context, the Supreme Court requires that the deterrent benefits outweigh the substantial costs to society of the loss of relevant and reliable evidence. Scott, 524 U.S. at 364, 118 S.Ct. 2014; United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 448-55, 96 S.Ct. 3021, 49 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1976). Thus, a reviewing court must balance: (1) whether exclusion of the evidence in the particular context is substantially likely to deter future violations of the Fourth Amendment; or (2) whether application of the exclusionary rule will not result in appreciable deterrence, in which case its use would be unjustified. Janis, 428 U.S. at 454, 96 S.Ct. 3021. One factor to be weighed in the context of a civil proceeding is whether any additional substantial deterrence will be obtained by excluding the evidence in the civil proceeding beyond that already provided by preclusion of use of the evidence in a criminal proceeding. Scott, 524 U.S. at 364, 118 S.Ct. 2014; Janis, 428 U.S. at 453-54, 96 S.Ct. 3021; Jonas v. City of Atlanta, 647 F.2d 580, 588 (5th Cir.1981).
Balancing these factors, the Supreme Court has rejected application of the exclusionary rule in administrative immigration, tax court, and grand jury proceedings. See, respectively, I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050, 104 S.Ct. 3479, 82 L.Ed.2d 778 (1984); Janis, 428 U.S. at 459-60, 96 S.Ct. 3021; Calandra, 414 U.S. at 354, 94 S.Ct. 613. The exclusionary rule continues to apply in federal civil forfeiture proceedings. See, e.g., Wren v. Towe, 130 F.3d 1154, 1158 (5th Cir.1997) (per curiam) (recognizing that exclusionary rule applies in forfeiture proceedings because forfeiture is criminal or quasi-criminal sanction).

2. Other Civil Forfeiture Proceedings in Texas

The Texas Supreme Court has yet to decide the applicability of the exclusionary rule in civil forfeiture proceedings brought under chapter 59. Hardy v. State, 102 S.W.3d 123, 129 n. 3 (Tex.2003) (citing $217,590, 18 S.W.3d at 632 n. 1); 1986 Dodge 150 Pickup, 129 S.W.3d at 181-83. One Texas court of appeals has applied the exclusionary rule to a tax proceeding. Vara v. Sharp, 880 S.W.2d 844, 850-52 (Tex.App.-Austin 1994, no writ). The Vara court analyzed the Texas Controlled Substances Tax Act and determined it was penal in nature and required operation of the exclusionary rule under the Texas Constitution, if not under the Fourth Amendment, to protect Texas citizens from unlawful seizure. Id. at 853.

D. Analysis of Chapter 59

Unlike the Texas Controlled Substances Tax Act, the forfeiture provisions of chapter 59 are remedial, not punitive. Tex. Code Cmm. PROC. Ann. art. 59.05(e). Also, unlike the suppression mechanism by which illegally seized evidence is excluded in criminal cases, chapter 59 does not impose an initial burden on the owner of seized property to rebut a presumption of forfeitability. To the contrary, a dismissal or acquittal in any underlying criminal case creates a presumption of nonforfeita-bility that the State must overcome. Tex. Code CRIM. PROC. Ann. art. 59.05(d). Dismissal or acquittal can result if the illegally obtained evidence is suppressed in the underlying criminal case. Thus, chapter 59 contains an internal procedural mechanism that gives effect to the exclusionary rule to that extent when it is applied in an underlying criminal case.
Further, even when no criminal prosecution parallels the forfeiture proceeding, as here, the State bears the initial burden of proving both probable cause to seize the property and its contraband nature. Tex. Const, art. I, § 9; Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 59.01(2); $11,OH,00, 820 S.W.2d *414at 784. Moreover, I conclude that the State also bears the burden of producing a warrant or proving one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement in article 59.03. See $217,590, 18 S.W.3d at 634 n. 4. The only circumstance in which the burden shifts from the State is when an innocent owner asserts an affirmative defense. Tex.Code CRiM. PROC. Ann. art. 59.02(c). Even then, I interpret the statute to provide that the burden shifts to the innocent owner only when the State has met its burden to produce evidence: (1) to overcome any presumption of nonforfeitability that arises from disposition of an underlying criminal case; (2) of a reasonable belief that a substantial connection exists between the seized property and proscribed criminal activity; (3) that the seized property is contraband; and (4) that the property was seized either pursuant to a warrant or under an exception to article 59.03’s warrant requirement. Finally, even if the State satisfies each of these burdens, the forfeiture is still subject to constitutional challenge as disproportionate under the Excessive Fines Clause. See 1996 Dodge, 122 S.W.3d at 427.
Because of its remedial nature and internal Fourth Amendment protections, chapter 59 differs markedly from federal forfeiture statutes to which the exclusionary rule applies. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.S. § 981 (2003); 21 U.S.C.S. § 881 (2003). I also note that the evidentiary burdens created by chapter 59 differ from the burden imposed by the forfeiture provisions in article 18.18 of the code of criminal procedure. See TexCode CRiM. PROC. Ann. art. 18.18 (Vernon Supp.2004). Article 18.18 expressly places the evidentiary burden on the person found in possession of allegedly illegal gambling equipment or other defined property to prove the property is not subject to forfeiture under the statute. Id.; Hardy, 102 S.W.3d at 129 n. 3. I would conclude that chapter 59 provides greater protection against illegal police conduct than federal forfeiture statutes or article 18.18.
Accordingly, I agree with the majority that chapter 59 itself provides adequate deterrence to law enforcement and protection to the citizens of Texas. On this record, however, I would go further and hold that it does so without grafting onto the statutory scheme: (1) the exclusionary rule; or (2) a new pre-trial procedure, unique to civil forfeiture proceedings, in the form of a “motion to return” the seized property. The majority misconstrues my position when it labels as “questionable” my “conclusion that the exclusionary rule’s application would have no deterrent effect.” My conclusion is that no “significant protection” would be added by applying the exclusionary rule to these proceedings. See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1045-46, 104 S.Ct. 3479; see also Jams, 428 U.S. at 458, 96 S.Ct. 3021. I would find that any additional deterrence achieved by applying the exclusionary rule would be minimal. See Janis, 428 U.S. at 454, 96 S.Ct. 3021.
Justice Abbot, in concurring in $217,590, questioned the applicability of the exclusionary rule to Texas civil forfeiture proceedings, urging civil litigants to raise the issue. $217,590, 18 S.W.3d at 636 (Abbott, J., concurring). These litigants have presented the issue to this Court for resolution. I would hold that the exclusionary rule does not apply to exclude illegally seized property in forfeiture proceedings brought under chapter 59 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.6
There was a time in this nation when not having money was a criminal offense. Ultimately, vagrancy and other “status” laws *415were declared unconstitutional. See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 171, 92 S.Ct. 839, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972). Now, in our effort to rid society of illicit drugs, the antithesis has occurred. The possession of large sums of cash is now suspect. Nonetheless, I would conclude that when the Texas Legislature structured chapter 59, it was mindful that “[i]t makes sense to scrutinize governmental action more closely when the State stands to benefit.” See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 56, 114 S.Ct. 492, 126 L.Ed.2d 490 (1993). The civil forfeiture procedures contemplated by chapter 59 provide that scrutiny. I would sustain the State’s third issue and hold that the trial court erroneously dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction by applying the exclusionary rule.

II. PRE-TRIAL PROCEDURE IN CIVIL FORFEITURE CASES

The majority assumes, in the absence of any objection from the State, that Tobin’s motion for return of the property is the correct procedural device to effectuate article 59.03. Thus, solely as the result of a procedural default, the majority sanctions an entirely new pre-trial procedure unknown to civil jurisprudence, not contemplated by article 59.03, and without any equivalent in the rales of civil procedure.7
I question whether a “motion to return” pre-trial procedure in civil forfeiture proceedings provides any greater protection from illegal seizure to the citizens of Texas than that provided by well-recognized summary judgment practice. To the contrary, by requiring the owner to file a “motion to return” rather than recognizing that the State bears the burden of proving the legality of the seizure, the procedure sanctioned by the majority provides less protection. Unfortunately, the majority opinion leaves civil forfeiture litigants with more questions than answers.8 I am mystified why the majority refuses to address the only dispositive issue that was presented and argued by both parties to the trial *416court, expressly served as the basis for the trial court’s challenged actions, and was thoroughly briefed and argued to this Court on appeal. Tobin no more asked the trial court to ignore the exclusionary rule in deciding his “motion to return” than the State objected to the procedural mechanism by which Tobin sought return of the money.
To date, no case in Texas has delineated the State’s evidentiary burdens under chapter 59. I would do so in this case. I also would hold that the proper pre-trial procedure to give effect to chapter 59’s built-in Fourth Amendment protections is a summary judgment proceeding, not a suppression motion or a “motion for return” of the seized property. Specifically, since 1997, rule 166a(i) permits a party to a civil action to file a no-evidence summary judgment motion when there is no evidence of one or more essential elements of a claim or defense on which an adverse party has the burden of proof. Tex.R. Civ. P. 166a(i). Rule 166a(i) would operate, in appropriate cases, to put the State to its statutory burden to prove the legality of the police conduct by which the property was seized. If the State does not meet its burden, judgment in the forfeiture proceeding is rendered for the owner, just as in any other civil proceeding in which summary judgment is granted, and the seized property returned to its rightful owner. Creation of an entirely new pre-trial procedure peculiar to civil forfeiture proceedings is unnecessary. In no event1 would the case be dismissed for want of jurisdiction, which is what the challenged order did in this case. While I agree with the majority that the general rule of in rem jurisdiction is that the court’s jurisdiction is dependent on its control over the res, I do not agree that the State’s return of seized property in compliance with a judgment of nonforfeiture divests the trial court of jurisdiction. Unlike the majority, I see no reason why disbursement of seized property should require different procedures than disbursement of other property over which a court exercises control pending its determination of competing claims. See, e.g., Bryant v. United Shortline Inc. Assur. Servs., N.A., 972 S.W.2d 26, 29 (Tex.1998) (“The funds were located in Texas and the Bank tendered them into the Texas trial court’s registry when it filed the interpleader. This gave the trial court jurisdiction over the funds to disburse them upon determining ownership.”).
The parties have asked us to decide if dismissal for want of jurisdiction is proper in this case. I disagree that the State’s failure to object to Tobin’s motion for return of the property justifies the majority’s reasoning in affirming the trial court’s dismissal of the forfeiture proceeding for lack of jurisdiction. In affirming the order below, the majority effectively holds that dismissal for want of jurisdiction is the correct disposition of a forfeiture proceeding that results in a judgment of nonforfeiture. I would hold that it is not. See 1996 Dodge, 122 S.W.3d at 428 (reversing judgment of forfeiture and remanding to trial court with instructions to enter judgment in favor of owners and to order property returned).

III. CONCLUSION

Unlike the majority, I would not reach the State’s .first two issues regarding the legality of Tobin’s detention and the search of his vehicle. See Tex.R.App. P. 47.1. I would reverse the trial court’s dismissal for want of jurisdiction and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

. The seizure at issue here occurred in 1998. Certain provisions of chapter 59 not relevant to my analysis have been amended. Citation hereafter is to the current version unless otherwise specified.

. Chapter 59 defines "contraband” as any real, personal, tangible, or intangible property that is uáed or intended to be used in the commission of a felony under Chapter 481 of the Texas Health and Safety Code (the Texas Controlled Substances Act). TexCode Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 59.01(2)(B)(I).

. The supreme court did not address whether the State’s evidentiary burden under article 59.03(b) is "clear and convincing” or a "preponderance of the evidence.” State v. $217,590, 18 S.W.3d 631, 634 n. 4 (Tex.2000). Likewise, a determination of the quantum of proof required to meet the State’s burden is unnecessary to a decision in this case. Despite the supreme court’s analysis in $217,590, the majority questions my conclusion that article 59.03(b) imposes an additional evidentiary burden on the State where the seizure resulted from a warrantless search. I agree that $217,590 does not expressly hold that the State bears the burden of proof under article 59.03(b). However, the decision that the State proved consent to search by clear and convincing evidence is inconsistent with any conclusion that the State does not bear the burden of proof in a civil forfeiture proceeding. Similarly, the majority’s insistence that $217,590 is inapplicable assumes that the owner bears the burden of proof under article 59.03(b), a conclusion without any support in the law and inconsistent with the purpose and intent of the civil forfeiture statute.

.See U.S. Const. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). The Eighth Amendment is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; see also Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 668, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 8 L.Ed.2d 758 (1962) ("We are not unmindful that the vicious evils of the narcotics traffic have occasioned the grave concern of government.").

. This case does not present, nor would I address, any question regarding application of the exclusionary rule to illegally obtained evidence, other than the seized property, the *415State may seek to introduce in a forfeiture proceeding under chapter 59.

. The cases cited by the majority to justify its embrace of a "motion to return” practice are not persuasive. The first cited case is a criminal case in which the defendant sought suppression and return of evidence of a charged crime, not evidence seized under a civil forfeiture statute. Machado v. State, 112 Tex.Crim. 538, 17 S.W.2d 1060, 1060 (1929) (violation of liquor laws). In the second case, which was a civil forfeiture case, the "motion to return” filed by the owner was for "the return of her mobile telephone system that was in the Cadillac and was not included in the forfeiture.” One 1985 Cadillac Auto. v. State, 805 S.W.2d 944, 946 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth1991, no pet.). In any event, the majority's analysis implies that any common-law "motion to return” practice in a civil forfeiture proceeding is somehow immune from operation of the rules of civil procedure. The result is what happened in this case: essentially a trial on the merits of the forfeiture, leading to what is at its heart a sufficiency review of the evidence by the majority on appeal, without any of the procedural mechanisms attendant to a civil proceeding.

. For example, must this new "motion for return” of the seized property be verified? What time limits apply to the State's response? May the movant reply? Within what time limits? Is the trial court required to hold a hearing? Do pre-trial discovery deadlines and time constraints on pleading amendments apply? Is live testimony required, or does the trial court decide the motion by affidavits? Which party bears the burden of proof? Which standard of proof applies, preponderance of the evidence or clear and convincing? What standard applies to our review on appeal? Finally, and most significantly, what preclusive effect does an order granting the "motion to return” and dismissing the case for want of jurisdiction have on the State’s right to refile a forfeiture proceeding against the same property?