Court Opinion

ID: 9948525
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-07 16:04:38.815702+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:30:04.151868
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
 UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                 AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                    IN THE
             ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                DIVISION ONE

                       STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

                                        v.

                    GLEN RAY ROBERTSON, Appellant.

                             No. 1 CA-CR 23-0082
                               FILED 3-7-2024

           Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
                        No. CR2019-112191-001
                 The Honorable Michael C. Blair, Judge

                                  AFFIRMED

                                   COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Joshua C. Smith
Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix
By Jesse Finn Turner
Counsel for Appellant
                         STATE v. ROBERTSON
                          Decision of the Court

                     MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Maria Elena Cruz delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie and Judge Cynthia J. Bailey joined.

C R U Z, Judge:

¶1             Glen Ray Robertson appeals his convictions and sentences for
first-degree criminal trespassing and disorderly conduct. For the following
reasons, we affirm.

              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2              In the early morning of March 18, 2019, S.B. and P.J. were
asleep in their apartment bedroom. Two of S.B.’s children were asleep
elsewhere in the apartment. S.B. and P.J. woke and saw Robertson standing
at the foot of their bed. S.B. said “Excuse me” to Robertson, and Robertson
apologized and said he lived in the apartment complex and had gone into
the wrong apartment. The door to S.B.’s and P.J.’s apartment had been left
unlocked.

¶3            P.J. got out of bed and grabbed his handgun. He swore at
Robertson and told him to get out, but Robertson did not move. P.J.
chambered a round and pointed the gun at Robertson. Robertson said he
was going to go get his gun and continued to ignore P.J.’s repeated
demands that he leave. Robertson put his shoulder down three or four
times in a posture that made P.J. fear Robertson would tackle him. P.J.
demanded that Robertson leave about a dozen times. Robertson eventually
started backing up with P.J. pointing the gun at him and left the apartment
through the front door.

¶4            P.J. estimated that between two and three minutes elapsed
from when he woke until Robertson left the apartment. During that time,
Robertson told S.B. and P.J. that he was going to get his gun and come back
approximately six times. S.B.’s children woke up during the incident. Her
son had been sleeping on the living room couch and hid behind it; her
daughter stuck her head out of her bedroom and S.B. told her to stay in her
room. S.B. called 9-1-1, and Mesa police officers arrested Robertson in the
apartment complex’s parking lot. He was unarmed. Robertson was on
probation at the time of the offenses.

                                    2
                          STATE v. ROBERTSON
                           Decision of the Court

¶5            A grand jury indicted Robertson on one count of first-degree
criminal trespassing, a class 6 felony (count 1), and one count of disorderly
conduct (count 2), a class 1 misdemeanor. After trial, a jury convicted
Robertson of first-degree criminal trespassing, and the superior court
convicted him of disorderly conduct. The superior court sentenced
Robertson to the presumptive term of 3.75 years in prison with credit for
998 days of presentence incarceration for count 1 and six months in jail for
count 2, to be served concurrently with count 1.

¶6           Robertson timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to
Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) sections 12-120.21(A), 13-4031,
and -4033(A)(1).

                               DISCUSSION

¶7             Robertson first argues the superior court erred by failing to
provide additional instructions to the jury in response to a jury question
asking whether there was a certain amount of time a person had to remain
for the jury to conclude he remained unlawfully. We review the superior
court’s decision to give a jury instruction for abuse of discretion but review
whether the given instruction correctly states the law de novo. State v. Solis,
236 Ariz. 285, 286, ¶ 6 (App. 2014).

¶8              The State conceded in this case that Robertson accidentally
entered the apartment but argued the jury should find him guilty of first-
degree criminal trespass for unlawfully remaining in the apartment after
being told to leave. “A person commits criminal trespass in the first degree
by knowingly . . . [e]ntering or remaining unlawfully in or on a residential
structure.” A.R.S. § 13-1504(A)(1). “’Enter or remain unlawfully’ means an
act of a person who enters or remains on premises when the person’s intent
for so entering or remaining is not licensed, authorized or otherwise
privileged . . . .” A.R.S. § 13-1501(2). The superior court’s jury instructions
mirrored this statutory language.

¶9             During deliberations, the jury sent out a question which read,
“Does the law further or can the judge further clarify ‘remain unlawfully’
for example certain time lapse? —1 min.? or the minute told to leave he
(defendant) had to run away instantly?” Before the superior court
discussed the jurors’ question with the attorneys, Robertson moved for a
mistrial, or in the alternative, a special jury instruction. Robinson asked the
court to provide the following special jury instruction:

       “Unlawfully” is a term of common usage that is not defined
       under the law in this context. But the law does not require

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                            STATE v. ROBERTSON
                             Decision of the Court

       that anyone “run away instantly” the moment they become
       aware they are present somewhere without authorization.

       Rather, as the final jury instructions explain, the State must
       prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
       committed an act with the intent of remaining without
       authorization, and that he did so knowingly.

       To determine whether the defendant’s presence was
       unlawful, the jury must be firmly convinced, beyond a
       reasonable doubt, that the defendant affirmatively refused to
       leave. If the jury believes there is a real possibility that the
       defendant was attempting to leave, then the jury must find
       the defendant not guilty.

The State objected to Robertson’s proposed jury instruction, arguing it
misstated the law, and after discussing the matter with defense counsel and
the State, the superior court denied the motion for mistrial and declined to
give the jurors any additional special instruction. The superior court gave
the jury the following answer to its question: “Please refer to the final jury
instructions that you were given.”

¶10             “The decision to further instruct a jury on a matter . . . is
within the trial court’s discretion.” State v. Ramirez, 178 Ariz. 116, 126
(1994). See also Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 22.3(b) (“If, after the
jury retires, the jury . . . requests additional instructions, the court may recall
the jury to the courtroom and further instruct the jury as appropriate.”)
(emphasis added). “[W]hen a jury asks a judge about a matter on which it
has received adequate instruction, the judge may in his or her discretion
refuse to answer, or may refer the jury to the earlier instruction.” Ramirez,
178 Ariz. at 126 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Because
the superior court’s final jury instructions correctly stated the law
concerning criminal trespass in the first degree, including the statutory
definition of “[e]nter or remain unlawfully,” the court was not required to
provide an additional instruction in response to the jury’s question.
Moreover, Robertson’s proposed special jury instruction did not accurately
reflect the law and added an additional element to the offense—that
Robertson “affirmatively refused to leave.” See State v. Miranda, 200 Ariz.
67, 69, ¶ 5 (2001) (“Courts may not add elements to crimes defined by
statute . . ..”). The superior court correctly concluded that whether
Robertson remained unlawfully in the apartment was a fact question for the
jury. We find no abuse of discretion.

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                         STATE v. ROBERTSON
                          Decision of the Court

¶11           Robertson next argues the superior court erred by precluding
the testimony of two of his witnesses. He argues the witness’ proposed
testimony was relevant to whether he left the apartment within a
reasonable time. We review the superior court’s evidentiary rulings for an
abuse of discretion. State v. Blakley, 204 Ariz. 429, 437, ¶ 34 (2003).

¶12         After the State’s case-in-chief, defense counsel told the court
he planned to call his father, Erik Harris, and defense investigator Jim
Rozalewycz as witnesses. The State asked for offers of proof because
Robertson had not provided the State with statements about their
testimony.

¶13           Defense counsel avowed that Harris would testify he knew
Robertson took prescription painkillers and would testify about how the
medication affected Robertson, “particularly late at night when he’s tired,
and it can cause him to have delayed reactions to things and also cause him
to have the appearance of being intoxicated.”1 When the court asked how
Harris would know if Robertson had taken his medicine, defense counsel
avowed Robertson was at Harris’ house on the evening of March 17 but
acknowledged Harris “may not necessarily see [Robertson] take every pill
that he’s required to take throughout the day.” The State argued Harris’
testimony was irrelevant to whether Robertson remained in the apartment
unlawfully, and Harris could not testify about “any of the facts that
occurred on the date in question.” The superior court found Harris’
proposed testimony irrelevant and precluded it.

¶14          Defense counsel avowed that defense investigator
Rozalewycz would testify that S.B.’s and P.J.’s apartment unit was identical
to Robertson’s girlfriend’s apartment, would lay the foundation for an Uber
receipt showing the route and time Robertson traveled on May 18, and that
Rozalewycz would testify his investigation showed that Robertson’s Uber
driver dropped Robertson off in front of the wrong apartment. The
superior court found Rozalewycz’ proposed testimony irrelevant and
precluded it. The court found the Uber evidence was not exculpatory
because the fact that Robertson entered the apartment by mistake was not
at issue—the issue was whether he unlawfully remained. The court also
found that Rozalewycz was not qualified to provide the foundation for the
Uber receipt because he did not know how the receipt was “kept in the
normal course of business.”

1     Before trial the superior court granted Robertson’s motion to
preclude evidence that he appeared intoxicated.

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                         STATE v. ROBERTSON
                          Decision of the Court

¶15           Relevant evidence is generally admissible. Ariz. R. Evid.
(“Rule”) 402. Evidence is relevant if it “has any tendency to make a fact
more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and . . . the
fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Rule 401. “A witness
may testify to a matter only if evidence is introduced sufficient to support
a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter.” Rule 602.

¶16          The superior court did not err by precluding Harris’ and
Rozalewycz’ testimony. Harris, who last saw Robertson on the evening of
March 17, would not have been able to testify that Robertson was under the
effects of medication on the morning of March 18. And Rozalewycz’
proposed testimony concerning the Uber receipt, when and where
Robertson arrived at the apartment complex, and the similarity of the
apartment units would have had no bearing on whether Robertson
remained unlawfully in the apartment. At most, Rozalewycz’ proposed
testimony would have supported a conclusion that he mistakenly entered
the apartment, a fact the State did not contest.

                              CONCLUSION

¶17          For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Robertson’s convictions
and sentences.

                          AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                          FILED: AA

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