Court Opinion

ID: 9406917
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-05 08:07:44.444197+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:34.068652
License: Public Domain

In the
              Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

                   No. 06-22-00144-CR

         JONAS RAY BRADSHAW, Appellant

                            v.

           THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

          On Appeal from the 54th District Court
               McLennan County, Texas
              Trial Court No. 2020-456-C2

      Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
        Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rambin
                                     MEMORANDUM OPINION

        Jonas Ray Bradshaw pled guilty to seven counts of injury to a child1 and one count of

continuous family violence.2 Bradshaw agreed to have punishment on those offenses tried to the

trial court.3 On appeal, Bradshaw complains that one of the State’s witnesses was allowed to

testify to sentencing, specifically to her desire that Bradshaw receive the maximum sentence

available. Although this testimony was not admissible, we find the error in admission harmless.

We affirm the trial court’s judgments.4

1
 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04 (Supp.). Count one alleged a first-degree felony and counts two through seven
alleged third-degree felonies. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04(e), (f). Counts 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 alleged injuries to
C.K. Counts 6 and 7 alleged injuries to J.K. Count 8 alleged injuries against Mother.
2
 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.11 (Supp.). This was the only count with a plea-bargain agreement. The State
agreed to recommend a sentence of five years for this count. As a result of his plea agreement with the State,
Bradshaw had no right to appeal his continuous family violence conviction, which was Count 8 of the indictment.
Bradshaw did not attempt to appeal, and this opinion does not address that conviction.
3
 Originally appealed to the Tenth Court of Appeals, this case was transferred to this Court by the Texas Supreme
Court pursuant to its docket equalization efforts. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001. We are unaware of any
conflict between precedent of the Tenth Court of Appeals and that of this Court on any relevant issue. See TEX. R.
APP. P. 41.3.
4
 The trial court sentenced Bradshaw as follows:
         Count 1 – life sentence
         Count 2 – ten years
         Count 3 – ten years
         Count 4 – ten years
         Count 5 – ten years
         Count 6 – ten years
         Count 7 – ten years
         Count 8 - five years
The court ordered the sentences to be served concurrently.
                                                         2
I.          Background

            Bradshaw lived with Mother and her two young sons, C.K. and J.K.5 Over the course of

their three-month cohabitation, Bradshaw regularly beat the boys and engaged in violent sexual

relations with Mother. Mother acceded to Bradshaw in this regard in hopes of keeping him

“happy,” “less aggressive,” and away from the boys. Bradshaw, himself, would later express his

way of thinking to an investigator with the Department of Family and Protective Services: “Why

would I have to beat her if I can take it out on her during sex.”

            On January 5, 2020, Mother took C.K. to an emergency room in Waco after Bradshaw

brought C.K., unresponsive, to Mother.6 C.K. was flown to McLane’s Children’s Hospital in

Temple.

II.         Trial Court Erred to Allow Testimony About Preferred Sentence

            The State presented several punishment witnesses. One was Grandmother, who was

Mother’s mother and the grandmother of C.K. and J.K.                              Over Bradshaw’s objection,

Grandmother was allowed to testify that Bradshaw should be sentenced to “whatever the

max[imum] punishment that there is.” That testimony was inadmissible.

            “The wishes of the victim’s family members as to the defendant’s fate fall beyond the

parameters of victim-impact evidence and are not admissible.” Simpson v. State, 119 S.W.3d 262

272 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). The trial court erred to allow Grandmother’s testimony regarding what

punishment she felt was appropriate. We now review this error for harm.

5
 We use initials and generic titles for the two child complainants and their immediate family to protect the victims’
privacy. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.10(a)(3); McClendon v. State, 643 S.W.2d 936, 936 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.]
1982).
6
    On that date, C.K. was eleven months old and J.K. was about three-and-one half years old.
                                                           3
III.    Standard of Review

        An erroneous admission of testimony is reviewed for non-constitutional error. See Potier v.

State, 68 S.W.3d 657, 663 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (“Erroneous evidentiary rulings rarely rise to

the level of denying the fundamental constitutional rights.”); Solomon v. State, 49 S.W.3d 356,

365 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (stating that erroneous admission of opinion testimony reviewed for

non-constitutional error). “A criminal conviction should not be overturned for non-constitutional

error if the appellate court, after examining the record as whole, has fair assurance that the error did

not influence the jury, or had but a slight effect.” Johnson v. State, 967 S.W.2d 410, 417 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1998). “Any . . . error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial rights

must be disregarded.” TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b). “In considering non-constitutional error, an

appellate court must disregard the error if the court, ‘after examining the record as a whole, has

fair assurance that the error did not influence the jury, or had but a slight effect.’” Bagheri v.

State, 119 S.W.3d 755, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (quoting Solomon, 49 S.W.3d at 365; TEX.

R. APP. P. 44.2(b)). In a bench trial, the trial court acts as fact-finder. See Watson v. State, 204

S.W.3d 404, 440 n.120 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (Cochran, J., dissenting) (plurality op.).

IV.     Error Was Harmless

        A.      Evidence

        The trial court heard two days of punishment evidence. After reviewing that evidence,

we conclude that the error7 in admitting Grandmother’s opinion about punishment did not affect

Bradshaw’s substantial rights and was harmless. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b).

7
On the record of this bench trial, we conduct a harm analysis. See Gipson v. State, 844 S.W.2d 738, 741 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1992).
                                                     4
            Mother met and started dating Bradshaw in August 2019. By October, he had moved in

with Mother and the boys. Bradshaw regularly beat the boys, though C.K. received the worst of

it.8 Bradshaw beat C.K. if he cried or did not take his bottle.9 Mother described some of the

abuse: “If [C.K.] wouldn’t be a really quiet baby, the way [Bradshaw] wanted him to be quiet,

[Bradshaw] would go in there and he would take [C.K.] by his foot and hang him upside down

and hit [him] on the wall.” If Mother was not sufficiently attentive to Bradshaw, “[h]e would

take it out on the kids” by “hold[ing] them underneath the water” at bath time, and “they would

be choking, wanting air, and he would pull them out right before they passed out.” If the boys

struggled or resisted, “[Bradshaw] would slap them and tell them to stop and to behave.”

            On January 5, 2020, Mother took C.K. to an emergency room in Waco. C.K. was

covered “head to toe almost” with bruises of various ages and colors. The hospital staff did not

have a cervical collar small enough for the eleven-month-old, and the staff was using their hands

to keep the child’s spine stable. C.K. had bleeding in his brain and behind his eyes. The staff

was very concerned about the extent of C.K.’s injuries. Though generally calm and quiet, C.K.

began vomiting, which was consistent with head trauma. C.K. was diagnosed as having suffered

a traumatic brain injury. C.K. was sent by Careflight to McLane’s Children’s Hospital in

Temple.

            Waco Police Officer Jason Stone investigated C.K.’s injuries and the allegations against

Bradshaw. In describing the severity of the beatings C.K. suffered, Stone testified, “[That was]

8
 Mother testified, “[J.K]. was the one child [Bradshaw] didn’t really bother because [J.K.] had learned to . . . like, if
Jonas is really, really mad I’m going to do exactly what Jonas says.”
9
    Bradshaw admitted to the Department investigator, Olga Solyakova, that he beat C.K. for crying.
                                                           5
probably one of the worst beatings that I’ve ever seen a child take in the time that I’ve been a

peace officer or just a human on this planet.”10 At the Waco hospital, Bradshaw called Mother,

instructing her how to answer questions and what to tell staff and investigators

            Crime Scene Technician Marissa Pophann photographed C.K.’s injuries at the Waco

hospital. Of his injuries, Pophann testified,

            In my entire eight years of working at the police department, this is, hands down
            by far, the worst case of child abuse that I’ve ever seen. I have worked multiple
            cases of murdered children, and they displayed less extensive injuries than the
            injuries I saw on this child that day.[11]

She observed several cuts on C.K.’s face and fingers and on the inside of his lips. Pophann also

photographed “several bruises and bite marks scattered around [Mother’s] body,” and she

photographed bruising on J.K.’s right leg and buttocks.12

            Solyakova interviewed Bradshaw. Bradshaw admitted that he beat J.K., and that he hit

and bit C.K.13           During the interview, Bradshaw said he was “where he belong[ed].” The

interview was conducted in the McClennan County Jail. Bradshaw was in jail from January 5,

2020, until trial, September 12 and 13, 2022. The jail supervisor described Bradshaw’s attitude

toward incarceration as “nonchalant.” According to the supervisor, Bradshaw acted as though

10
  Stone participated in the interview of Bradshaw. Bradshaw never used C.K.’s name. Rather, he referred to the
infant as “the little f*cker.” During the almost two-hour interview, Bradshaw never asked about C.K.’s condition or
well-being.
11
 Describing the reactions of other law enforcement officers who saw C.K. at the hospital, Pophann said,
“Everybody who came into contact with the child appeared very shocked and shaken. Multiple grown men and
women with tears in their eyes. Just an overall very shocking, taken aback reaction.”
12
  At the family home, Pophann observed and photographed a chain lock on the outside of the door to the master
bedroom and evidence that a chain lock had been installed then removed on the door outside the children’s
playroom. The electricity to the playroom was also turned off at the breaker box.
13
     Solyakova also testified that Bradshaw never referred to C.K. by his name, instead calling him “the kid.”
                                                             6
the jail’s rules did not apply to him, and he had to constantly be moved to different pod areas

because he would incite insubordination and misbehavior among other inmates.

            Dr. Erica Ward, a pediatrician at McLane’s Children’s Hospital, examined C.K. after he

was flown to the hospital in Temple. She described C.K.’s extensive injuries, which included the

following:

            •        diffused facial bruising and abrasions;

            •        bruising and petechiae on his gums and upper frenulum;

            •        bruising on both shoulders, with pattern bruising on the left shoulder;14

            •        bruising of abdomen, right ear,15 and both eyes;

            •        bilateral subdural hematomas;

            •        “Bilateral multiple intraretinal hemorrhages”; and

            •        exhibited “[a]ltered mental status” – “was not alert and responsive.”

C.K.’s injuries were not consistent with those a child would incur, even if he had a “big fall.”16

He had “a large abrasion where the skin ha[d] been compromised on the side of his face,” which

could possibly have been a burn injury. Regardless, that injury was uncommon; it was “clearly

trauma to the face” and without any “clear history” for explanation. Dr. Ward testified that the

multiple facial injuries C.K. exhibited were not “commonly see[n] . . . all throughout the face

14
     Treatment notes stated that C.K.’s right shoulder popped with movement.
15
     Dr. Ward said bruising of the ears was “very rare,” as ears tend to be “very protected.”
16
  Bradshaw initially told law enforcement that C.K. had fallen down the home’s stairs and hit his head on the tile
floor.
                                                              7
with normal play at [C.K.’] age.”17 She called C.K.’s retinal hemorrhages “very severe” and

“very rare.”

         By the time of trial, C.K. was about three years, eight months old and nonverbal. In

cognitive testing a year before trial, C.K. exhibited the intellectual capability of an eight-month

old.18   Grandmother testified that he could only say “G,” as if trying to say “Gigi,” his

affectionate name for her. After C.K. was released from the children’s hospital, the boys stayed

with their grandparents. It took some time for the boys to resume eating, and it was difficult to

find things they would eat. Grandmother testified that C.K. would only eat cardboard for almost

a year,19 then was able to eat formula with baby cereal. C.K. was very violent, banging his head

and biting people. He cried continuously and had difficulty sleeping. Bathing the boys was

almost impossible; they would not tolerate water on their faces or heads.                          Eventually the

grandparents were able to bathe the children by pretending bathing was swimming.

         As explained above, Grandmother was allowed to testify over Bradshaw’s objection that

she thought Bradshaw deserved “whatever the max[imum] punishment” available. Without

 The treatment notes with annotations around the diagram of an infant’s body indicate “totality of facial injuries
17

over majority of surface area.”
18
  C.K. was diagnosed with autism in July 2022, about two months before trial. The State presented testimony from
an occupational therapist who worked with C.K. for about a year, beginning about two months after his
hospitalization in January 2020. The therapist testified to significant developmental delays C.K. exhibited in several
categories such as gross and fine motor skills and cognition. However, she could not testify that, if C.K. suffered a
traumatic brain injury from Bradshaw’s beatings, that injury caused the developmental delays. She did testify,
though, that she had observed “small improvements, very minor improvements, but not at the rate [she] would have
liked to see” and that she had encountered with other children.

 Grandmother testified, “He would only eat like cardboard.
19
                                                                   I don’t know why, just cardboard.        He loved
cardboard.”
                                                          8
objection, Mother testified that she wanted “justice” and “the harshest punishment” the trial court

could assess.20

        B.        Analysis

        The prejudicial effect, here, of allowing Grandmother’s opinion of the appropriate

sentence for Bradshaw, did not affect Bradshaw’s substantial rights. The record is replete with

descriptions of the injuries to C.K. and to J.K. The injuries to C.K. quite reasonably could have

led to the maximum sentences in counts one, two, three, four, and five. While the evidence was

not as exhaustive on the injuries to J.K., Bradshaw’s cruelty and violence toward C.K. could

reasonably have informed the trial court’s decision to assess the maximum sentences for counts

six and seven for the injuries to J.K.21

20
  The State argues that Mother’s testimony was essentially the same as Grandmother’s, and Bradshaw’s failure to
object to Mother’s testimony cured the erroneous admission of Grandmother’s testimony. However, the cases
establishing that proposition address the admission of factual evidence. E.g., Lane v. State, 151 S.W.3d 188, 192–93
(Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (victim’s out-of-court identification of defendant not objected to when admitted under
medical diagnosis hearsay exception but admitted over excited-utterance objection); Valle v. State, 109 S.W.3d 500,
509 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (failure to object second time witness testified he feared for his life by appearing to
testify against defendant); Rodriguez v. State, 630 S.W.3d 522, 527 (Tex. App.—Waco 2021, no pet.) (failure to
object when detective related a second hearsay statement that another person told the detective a suspect was in the
house).
          Here, it was not a fact that was proved by objected-to and unobjected-to testimony but, rather, opinions as
to punishment by two different witnesses. Cf. Anderson v. State, 717 S.W.2d 622, 628 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986)
(“Inadmissible evidence can be rendered harmless if other evidence at trial is admitted without objection and it
proves the same fact that the inadmissible evidence sought to prove.” (emphasis added)); Crocker v. State, 573
S.W.2d 190, 201 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978) (“[T]he improper admission of evidence does not constitute
reversible error if the same facts are shown by other evidence which is not challenged.” (emphasis added)). Under
the facts of this case, we will consider the unobjected-to testimony of Mother in our harm analysis.
21
 See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07(a)(1) (Supp.) (stating that prior criminal record, evidence of other
extraneous crimes or bad acts, inter alia, may be considered in setting punishment).
                                                         9
V.     Conclusion

       We find that none of Bradshaw’s substantial rights were affected by the erroneous

admission of Grandmother’s opinion on punishment.        Because the error was harmless, we

overrule Bradshaw’s point of error.

       We affirm the trial court’s judgments.

                                                 Jeff Rambin
                                                 Justice

Date Submitted:       May 8, 2023
Date Decided:         June 30, 2023

Do Not Publish

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