Court Opinion

ID: 9550926
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:45:00.679346+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:22:43.652169
License: Public Domain

WOLFE, Chief Justice.
I dissent.
All of the eyewitnesses to’ the accident testified that it occurred when the deceased’s car attempted to make a U-turn directly in front of the defendants’ truck. The truck driver stated that he was trying to pass two cars which were traveling in the outside south-bound lane of the four-lane highway, when the southernmost car swung directly in front of him. Mr. and Mrs. McPhie and Mr. Roberts were walking south on the west side of the highway toward the McPhie home at the time the accident occurred. Mrs. McPhie noticed the Tuttle car slow down and pull off to the right (west) side of the highway. Her attention became focused on the car because she thought the car might be stopping at her home. She testified that the car slowed up, then, without any signal being given, it turned suddenly in front of the truck when the truck was 20 or 25 feet behind it. Mr. McPhie also noticed the Tuttle car pull over to the west edge of the cement and then make a U-turn into the path of the truck. Mr. Roberts did not actually see the collision. The Tuttle car was struck in the middle of the left-hand side. This is indelible evidence corroborating the testimony of the McPhies. The truck must have struck it broadside on the left-hand side as it was turning.
The plaintiffs’ version of the accident is that Tuttle was traveling north. This is based on the evidence of various friends and relatives who saw Tuttle leave his home in Springville and estimated the time to be shortly before *4338:30 p. m. The tachometer on the truck recorded the time of the accident’s occurrence at 8:35 p. m. The location of the accident was 3.7 miles north of the Tuttle home in Springville and 1.6 miles south of the semaphore light at Seventh East and Third South Streets in Provo, Utah. The plaintiffs contend that Dale Tuttle could not possibly have had time to proceed north of the point of the accident, turn around, and then be struck as he was turning the second time. There is a dispute in the testimony as to whether witness Stevenson’s car was first to reach the scene of the accident, or whether witnesses Beardall and Holt were first to arrive. If the jury believed that Beardall arrived first, then conclusions are argued from this fact that Tuttle was traveling north!; that his (Tuttle’s) could not have been the first car going south. Yet Mr. and Mrs. McPhie stated positively that the Tuttle car pulled over to the side of the road, as if it were going to stop at their home, but when it slowed down to five or ten miles per hour, it swung directly into the path of defendant’s truck. No one saw headlights coming from the south. It was a cold, clear night.
As difficult as it may be to explain why the deceased was traveling south and then decided to make the U-turn, the plaintiffs’ evidence relating to the elapsed time is not sufficient to permit a finding that deceased was going north in view of McPhies’ uneontradicted testimony. There is no evidence that the McPhies’ vision was obstructed in any way. They both saw the impact from a distance of 300 feet. In Seybold v. Union Pacific R. Co., 121 Utah 61, 239 P. 2d 174, 177, we stated:
“If there is any substantial competent evidence upon which a jury acting fairly and reasonably could make the finding it should stand.”
There we held that negative testimony of the plaintiff as to what he did not see measured against affirmative testimony of a disinterested eyewitness in position to clearly observe, made the testimony of the former such that under the circumstances it could not reasonably be believed by a *434jury. I think this case falls under that category. Absent all eyewitnesses’ testimony, it would appear more probable, in view of the elapsed time between Tuttle’s leaving Spring-ville and the accident, that he was traveling north. But a four or five minute variance in the estimation of time, or in the difference in time that the tachometer was set, compared to that of the watches of the witnesses for the plaintiffs, would give the deceased sufficient time to drive into Provo and then retrace his path and travel south. So long as the evidence as to time does not of necessity compel a finding that deceased was going north instead of south, I do not believe that it can be considered substantial or competent so as to permit a jury acting fairly and reasonably to refute the disinterested eyewitnesses’ account of what happened. The collateral issue concerning which car, Bear-dall’s or Stevenson’s, arrived first at the scene of the accident does not add sufficient substantiation to plaintiffs’ version of the accident to make out an issue of fact for the jury to decide. The theory that the Tuttle car was going north and that the truck skidded into it has the appearance of having been invented. It was the only way in which the ■ truck hitting it broadside on the left side could be explained without stepping into the actual facts. But the actual happening is so corroborated by disinterested eyewitnesses of the collision, plus the fact that Stevenson testified that he followed a blue Plymouth car south from Provo (Tuttle’s car was a blue Plymouth and the only blue Plymouth in that procession) that no jury could reasonably find otherwise than that the Tuttle car, proceeding south, turned in front of the P. I. E. truck. The case should be reversed with directions to dismiss the cause of action.
Nor in an attempt to uphold this verdict should we cast aside as nonprejudicial error the established rule that:
“When, however, facts and circumstances are proven to show just what the deceased did, or failed to do, then his care or the want of it, is to be determined, not on the presumption [that he used due care for his own safety], but upon the facts and circumstances proven. *435That is, whenever the facts or circumstances are shown concerning which the presumption is indulged, the presumption ceases, and the controversy is to be decided by the weight of the evidence adduced.” Ryan v. Union Pacific R. Co., 46 Utah 530, 151 P. 71, 74.
No authority has yet asserted that the presumption that deceased used due care for his own safety was “created to further a result judicially deemed socially desirable” such as the presumption of the legitimacy of a child born in wedlock and the presumption of the validity of a ceremonial marriage. See Edmond M. Morgan’s article, “Some Observations Concerning Presumptions”, 44 Harvard Law Review, pages 931-32, quoted in Mr. Justice Wade’s concurring opinion in In re Pilcher’s Estate, 114 Utah 72, 197 P. 2d 143, 153. This presumption of the deceased having used due care for his own safety is a procedural device. Its purpose is to place the burden upon (normally) the defendant to produce evidence of plaintiffs’ contributory negligence. It is a presumption of law and not of fact. A presumption of law is a presumption furnished by the law. This presumption is not one which arises out of or from basic facts put in evidence. The presumption is “furnished” by the law when there is no evidence as to how the accident happened because from the experience of mankind the law concludes that men do not knowingly or intentionally act in derogation of their instinct to preserve themselves or act or fail to act in such a way as to bring harm to themselves. But this presumption that they do use due care for their own safety is a weak and easily rebuttable presumption because it has also' been the experience of mankind that men are very often careless and that they do act without circumspection. Hence, where there is any evidence which shows how or why the accident happened (circumstances of it) the presumption that the party who was clothed with it used due care, is sluffed off and the plaintiff is left with his proof, which, of course, may include facts in his favor elicited from or presented by his opponent. If it is thought to be non-prejudicial because the lan*436guage of the presumption added to the instruction concerning the defendants’ burden of proof is likened to throwing a handkerchief over something already covered by a blanket, the answer is that what is added to the blanket is something different in quality. By the instruction we have not only added to the defendants’ burden to prove deceased’s negligence (the blanket), but we have permitted the blanket to plant in the minds of the jurors the idea (the handkerchief) that they may start with the knowledge that the law furnishes a presumption that the decedent exercised due care where that presumption did not under the evidence any longer attend deceased. The burden of the defendant to prove negligence on the part of the plaintiff is the same as the burden of the plaintiff to prove negligence on the part of the defendant using “burden” in the sense of legal duty or obligation and not as a measure of the task. Both parties’ burden of proof are equal in law. I do not think this court can conclude that the jury’s admitted confusion was not prejudicial to the defendant. With all the evidence before it concerning the manner in which deceased acted, the jury was instructed that the defendant had the burden of proving contributory negligence and that “there is a presumption that the deceased used due care for his own protection”. This may have led them to believe that they should determine whether the evidence not only satisfied them that the deceased was negligent, but to so determine in the face of a rule of law that he was presumed not guilty of such conduct. Knowledge that the presumption serves only a procedural purpose in the administration of a lawsuit and is not intended as a substantive pronouncement cannot be imputed to the lay jurors. Nor is the susceptibility to an erroneous impression made clearer by the saving clause, “In the absence of evidence to the contrary”. This phrase could likewise rectify all error in instructions into which it was inserted; last clear chance, assumption of risk, anything may be determined in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
*437The rule is simple and easy to follow: Whenever any evidence is adduced contrary to the presumption, the presumption disappears and no longer serves any function in the trial of a lawsuit. See In re Newell’s Estate, 78 Utah 463, 486, 5 P. 2d 230. The only exception to this rule is when we determine to make a forthright declaration that the presumption is substantive and “created to further a result judicially deemed socially desirable”, Edmond M. Morgan, supra, therwise, we are increasing one party’s burden of proof.
At this point, it becomes material to point out statements contained in Mr. Justice Wade’s opinion in regard to the presumption of the use of due care, which I think are inaccurate and misleading. Above I stated why the law furnished the presumption of due care and when it disappeared and no longer played any part in the case. Mr. Justice Wade and I seem to be in agreement on this idea that evidence of how the accident happened would strip the presumption from one otherwise clothed with it. I have difficulty with the underlined portion of the statement in his opinion reading that
“If the opponent fails to meet this burden the presumptive fact should be assumed and the jury should be so instructed if the facts on which the presumption is based is established, but if the required burden is satisfied by the opponent the presumption disappears and the facts must be established from the evidence the same as though no presumption were ever involved * * (Emphasis added by me.)
The “required burden” as used in the quoted sentence, I assume, is not that of satisfying a particular quantum of proof or of introducing enough evidence to satisfy the jury that the presumption or presumptive fact is overcome. The burden is only that of going forward. If this is kept in mind, I see nothing wrong with that particular statement. Then it is for the court to determine whether the “opposing party” has gone forward by introducing some evidence of *438how the accident happened but, if so, it does not need to be sufficient evidence to satisfy the jury or fact finder that the presumption has been overcome, but only some evidence as to how the accident happened. Then the fact finder determines without mention of any presumption under proper instructions the question of liability. But when the statement is read in conjunction with the statement reading:
“Of course, we must keep in mind that the facts on which the presumption is based are in evidence even though the presumption has been destroyed by proof tending to show the non-existence of the presumptive fact [presumption], and to the extent that they logically tend to prove the presumptive fact they may be considered by the jury for that purpose.” (Emphasis supplied by me.)
The thought is misleading because the presumption in this case is not based on facts in evidence “in this case” but, as explained above, on the general knowledge of mankind. The presumptions discussed in the concurring opinion In re Pilcher’s Estate may have included presumptions founded on the facts in evidence in that case. That concurring opinion touched on various kinds of presumptions. I did not concur in that concurring opinion because I was not prepared to agree to all the statements made therein. It seemed to me that unless we confine our remarks to the particular presumption which has an office in the particular case at hand, we tend to confuse the subject of presumptions. In this case, it seems we are attempting to achieve credence for some general statements about presumptions which do not apply to the presumption at hand. For that reason, I am pointing out how such statements are misleading. The phrase reading, “* * * but if the required burden is satisfied * * *” may not in itself be misleading, if it is kept in mind that the “required burden” referred to is only the burden of going forward and not the burden of overcoming a presumption or a so-called “presumptive fact”. But it becomes misleading when coupled with the statement that “* * * facts on which the presumption *439is based are in evidence * * *” when the presumption which attends a person that he used due care for his own safety arises out of the fact of the instinct for self preservation. What was in this case but not in the evidence was that presumption which attended the deceased until evidence appeared to the contrary. But evidence that he did or did not exercise due care for his safety was not the basis for that presumption. It was evidence independent of the presumption which either strengthened what the presumption would have furnished or destroyed it. And in either case there was no room for the presumption to stay in the case. It was “destroyed” when any evidence of deceased’s negligence was introduced regardless of whether that evidence was such as to satisfy the fact finder that the required burden of the defendant in order to prevail was met.
Indeed the statements
“* * * -we must keep in mind that the facts on which the presumption is based are in evidence even though the presumption has been destroyed * * * and to the extent that they logically tend to prove the presumptive fact they may be considered by the jury for that purpose”
seem to be contradictory to the statement that the presumption or “presumptive fact” — that the party, in this case the decedent, had exercised due care for his own safety— has been destroyed and should not be mentioned in the instructions. I submit the basic error in this part of the main opinion is to hold that facts on which the presumption is based are in evidence when what is really in evidence are the facts of decedent’s not using due care which effectively destroyed the presumption or “presumptive fact” that he, the decedent, did use due care for his own safety and left the case bare of any presumption and to be decided purely on evidence introduced and submitted to the jury, provided, of course, it could go to the jury, which in my view as stated above, could not be the case.
HENRIOD, J., did not participate.