Court Opinion

ID: 9761848
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:56:55.317249+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:27.083455
License: Public Domain

FLAHERTY, Justice, dissenting.
Although the majority’s resolution of the perplexing problems raised by this case is innovative, I must dissent. The issue in this case is not whether the estate of Mrs. Rothman will have any remedies against her alleged slayer, or even whether the provisions of the Slayer’s Act will apply. Rather, the question presented is how shall these claims be presented and to which forum?
The majority’s view is not that the estate of Mrs. Roth-man is entitled to additional remedies because she was allegedly slain by her husband during the pendency of a divorce action, but rather, that in order for her estate to prevent the alleged slayer from profiting from his act, the divorce action must be allowed to continue after the deaths of the parties. I disagree.
The estate of a murdered spouse, under our longstanding rule, would not be permitted to continue the divorce action or to claim an equitable distribution of marital property after the deaths of the parties. But if the wife died of natural causes during the pendency of the divorce action, her estate also would not be permitted to continue the divorce action. The majority’s reason for wanting to extend the right to continue a divorce action after the deaths of the parties, therefore, does not stem from a perception that divorce actions in general should survive the deaths of the parties, but instead relates to the narrow facts of this case. Slayers must be prevented from profiting from the deaths of their victims.
Even under a traditional approach to this case, however, a slayer would not benefit from his act. The purpose of the Slayer’s Act — to prevent a slayer from benefiting from the death of his victim — may be effected by the decedent’s survivors bringing a wrongful death action and by challenges presented during the administration of the victim’s *441estate. Should it be established then that the husband in this case murdered the wife, he would not, by operation of the Slayer’s Act, be permitted to inherit anything from the victim. And should it be established in a wrongful death action that the husband in fact murdered the wife, presumably the wife’s estate would be permitted a recovery against the husband’s estate for that wrongful act. The wife’s estate, therefore, even under a traditional approach has all of the remedies that are usually accorded to the survivors of a murder victim, and where this is true, I can see no need to alter well-established rules concerning the termination of divorce proceedings.
Additionally, although the exception mandated today by the majority would seem to be a narrow one, experience has shown that it is not likely to remain so. One can only imagine the future cases in which it will be argued that although certain legal relationships and rights formerly terminated with death, they should no longer so terminate. The camel’s nose is under the tent, as it were. In sum, since there is no need for this new rule and since its creation can lead only to a clamoring for yet more extensions of a rule which should not have been extended in the first place, I would affirm the order of Superior Court.
ZAPPALA, J., joins this dissenting opinion.