Court Opinion

ID: 9555493
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-13 02:01:24.185208+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:35:55.336100
License: Public Domain

USCA4 Appeal: 23-1592     Doc: 64        Filed: 08/11/2023     Pg: 1 of 28

                                            PUBLISHED

                              UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                  FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                             No. 23-1384

        APPALACHIAN VOICES; WILD VIRGINIA; WEST VIRGINIA RIVERS
        COALITION; PRESERVE GILES COUNTY; PRESERVE BENT MOUNTAIN,
        a chapter of Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League; WEST VIRGINIA
        HIGHLANDS       CONSERVANCY;        INDIAN     CREEK    WATERSHED
        ASSOCIATION; SIERRA CLUB; CHESAPEAKE CLIMATE ACTION
        NETWORK; CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY,

                    Petitioners,

        v.

        UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR; DEB HAALAND, in her
        official capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Interior; UNITED
        STATES FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, an agency of the U.S. Department of
        Interior; CINDY SCHULZ, in her official capacity as Field Supervisor, Virginia
        Ecological Services, Responsible Official; MARTHA WILLIAMS, in her official
        capacity as Director of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service,

                    Respondents,

        MOUNTAIN VALLEY PIPELINE, LLC,

                    Intervenor.

        On Petition for Review of an Order of the Department of the Interior (CP16-10-000).

                                             No. 23-1592

        THE WILDERNESS SOCIETY,

                    Petitioner,
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        v.

        UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE; HOMER L. WILKES, in his official
        capacity as Under Secretary for Natural Resources and Environment; U.S.
        DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE; KENDERICK ARNEY, in his official
        capacity as Regional Forester of the Southern Region,

                       Respondents,

        and

        MOUNTAIN VALLEY PIPELINE, LLC,

                        Intervenor.

        -------------------------------------------------------------

        ROBERT C. SCOTT; GERALD E. CONNOLLY; DONALD S. BEYER, JR.;
        JENNIFER WEXTON; JENNIFER L. MCCLELLAN; WILLIAM D. ARAIZA;
        ERWIN CHEMERINSKY; CAPRICE ROBERTS, HOWARD M. WASSERMAN,

                       Amici Supporting Petitioner.

        On Petition for Review of an Order of the Department of Agriculture.

                                                      No. 23-1594

        THE WILDERNESS SOCIETY,

                       Petitioner,

        v.

        BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT; DEB HAALAND, in her official capacity
        as Secretary of the Interior; MITCHELL LEVERETTE, in his official capacity as
        State Director, Bureau of Land Management, Eastern States,

                       Respondents,

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        and

        MOUNTAIN VALLEY PIPELINE, LLC,

                       Intervenor.

        -------------------------------------------------------------

        ROBERT C. SCOTT; GERALD E. CONNOLLY; DONALD S. BEYER, JR.;
        JENNIFER WEXTON; JENNIFER L. MCCLELLAN; WILLIAM D. ARAIZA;
        ERWIN CHEMERINSKY; CAPRICE ROBERTS; HOWARD M WASSERMAN,

                       Amici Supporting Petitioner.

        On Petition for Review of an Order of the Department of the Interior. (VAES-058143-04)

        Argued: July 27, 2023                                                 Decided: August 11, 2023

        Before GREGORY, WYNN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

        Motions to dismiss granted. Judge Wynn wrote the opinion, in which Judge Gregory and
        Judge Thacker joined. Judge Gregory wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment.
        Judge Thacker wrote a separate opinion concurring.

        Kevin William McArdle, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington,
        D.C., for Respondents. Kimberley Hunter, SOUTHERN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
        CENTER, Chapel Hill, North Carolina; Derek Owen Teaney, APPALACHIAN
        MOUNTAIN ADVOCATES, Lewisburg, West Virginia, for Petitioners. Donald B.
        Verrilli, Jr., MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP, Washington, D.C., for Intervenor.

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        WYNN, Circuit Judge:

               These consolidated cases present weighty and important questions involving the

        separation of powers as it relates to a project of national interest. Petitioners are

        environmental groups challenging federal agency actions that will enable the final

        construction and initial operation of the Mountain Valley Pipeline, a 300-plus-mile

        underground pipeline that will transport natural gas from West Virginia to Virginia.

               But during the pendency of this matter before this Court, Congress proactively

        intervened by legislation and enacted the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023. Section 324

        of that Act purports to ratify the agencies’ actions regarding the Mountain Valley Pipeline

        and remove our jurisdiction over the underlying petitions. Armed with this new legislation

        enacted specifically in their favor, Respondents—the federal agencies and the Mountain

        Valley Pipeline—moved in this Court for the dismissal of the petitions.

               Upon consideration of the matters before us, we must grant Respondents’ motions

        to dismiss.

                                                    I.

               The legal history of this matter began in 2017 when the Federal Energy Regulatory

        Commission authorized the construction and operation of the Mountain Valley Pipeline.

        Since its inception, the project has engendered significant public comment and generated

        multiple lawsuits from environmental groups challenging federal agency actions granting

        various approvals and permits necessary for the pipeline’s construction.

               Up and until Congress’s very recently enacted legislation, this Court exercised

        “original and exclusive” jurisdiction over these challenges under the Natural Gas Act. 15

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        U.S.C. § 717r(d)(1). Under this authority, we vacated certain agency actions after finding

        that the agencies failed to comply with the pertinent statutes. See Appalachian Voices v.

        U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 25 F.4th 259, 265–66 (4th Cir. 2022) (discussing relevant prior

        proceedings); Wild Va. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 24 F.4th 915, 923–24 (4th Cir. 2022) (same).

        Though subject to review, none of those decisions were ever disturbed by the Supreme

        Court.

                 The present cases represent the latest such challenges to the Mountain Valley

        Pipeline’s construction, which at this point is “mostly finished.” Appalachian Voices, 25

        F.4th at 282. On April 10, 2023, ten environmental groups petitioned for review of a

        Biological Opinion and Incidental Take Statement issued for the pipeline on February 28,

        2023, by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. On June 1, 2023, The Wilderness Society filed

        two petitions for review of Records of Decision issued by the Bureau of Land Management

        and the U.S. Forest Service on May 17 and May 15, 2023, respectively, that granted the

        Mountain Valley Pipeline certain required permits.

                 On June 3, while the cases were pending before this Court, Congress enacted the

        Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023, Pub. L. No. 118-5, 137 Stat. 10, for the primary purpose

        of temporarily suspending the federal debt limit, preventing default. But embedded in the

        Act was a section containing a set of provisions regarding the Mountain Valley Pipeline,

        Section 324. At the bottom line, Section 324 sought to thwart the petitions by the

        environmental groups for review of the permits granted by the relevant agencies. In

        essence, Congress moved well beyond the type of deference that may be accorded to

        agencies under the Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron to declare virtually unreviewable

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        the actions of the agencies granting permits for the pipeline’s construction. See Chevron,

        U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) (discussing

        Chevron deference).

               Thus, under Section 324(c)(1), Congress “ratifie[d] and approve[d]” all

        authorizations and approvals “issued pursuant to Federal law necessary for the construction

        and initial operation at full capacity of the Mountain Valley Pipeline.” Under Section

        324(c)(2), Congress “direct[ed]” the relevant agencies to “continue to maintain” those

        same authorizations and approvals. Ratification is to occur “[n]otwithstanding any other

        provision of law.” § 324(c).

               In Section 324(e)(1), Congress provided that “[n]otwithstanding any other provision

        of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to review any action taken by” certain listed

        agencies “that grants” any authorization or approval “necessary for the construction and

        initial operation at full capacity of the Mountain Valley Pipeline . . . whether issued prior

        to, on, or subsequent to the date of enactment of this section, and including any lawsuit

        pending in a court as of the date of enactment of this section.” Relevant to this matter,

        under Section 324(e)(2), Congress carved out a specific jurisdictional exception to give the

        U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit “original and exclusive

        jurisdiction over any claim alleging the invalidity of this section or that an action is beyond

        the scope of authority conferred by this section.”

               Finally, under Section 324(f), Congress provided that Section 324 “supersede[d]

        any other provision of law . . . that is inconsistent with the issuance of any authorization”

        necessary for the Mountain Valley Pipeline.

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               Just two days after Congress enacted the Fiscal Responsibility Act, on June 5, 2023,

        Mountain Valley Pipeline—the apparent beneficiary of Section 324—moved to dismiss

        the underlying actions. On June 14, the federal agencies did likewise. Petitioners

        responded, arguing only that Section 324 is unconstitutional.

               Between July 10 and July 12, this Court consolidated the cases, expedited oral

        argument on the motions to dismiss to be heard July 27, and temporarily stayed further

        construction of the pipeline pending our review. 1

                                                     II.

               The threshold question before us is whether Section 324 prohibits this Court from

        determining if we have jurisdiction to review the petitions. In other words, does a federal

        court retain jurisdiction for the limited purpose of determining whether it has jurisdiction?

               The answer is simply yes. Over twenty years ago, the Supreme Court affirmed that

        it is beyond dispute that “a federal court always has jurisdiction to determine its own

        jurisdiction.” United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628 (2002). This includes the jurisdiction

        to review a statute that purports to strip jurisdiction. See Patchak v. Jewell, 828 F.3d 995,

        1001 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (reviewing a jurisdiction-stripping statute and concluding that the

        statute divested the court of jurisdiction), aff’d Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897 (2018).

        Respondents correctly acknowledged as much at oral argument, agreeing that it is

               1
                On July 27—while this Court was hearing oral argument on the motions to
        dismiss—the Supreme Court entered an order vacating the temporary stays.

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        permissible for us to hold a hearing on the pending motions as we carefully consider the

        scope of our jurisdiction under Section 324.

               Having done so, we conclude that Congress has eliminated our jurisdiction over the

        underlying petitions in two ways.

                                                       A.

               First, Section 324(c) “ratifie[d] and approve[d]” all existing authorizations and

        approvals necessary for the Mountain Valley Pipeline and “direct[ed]” the respective

        agencies to “continue to maintain” those authorizations and approvals. Ratification

        occurred “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law.” 2 Section 324(f) further provided

        that Section 324 “supersede[d] any other provision of law. . . that is inconsistent with the

        issuance of any . . . approval for the Mountain Valley Pipeline.” 3

               2
                   In full, Section 324(c) provided:

            (c) APPROVAL AND RATIFICATION AND MAINTENANCE OF EXISTING
        AUTHORIZATIONS.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law—

                (1) Congress hereby ratifies and approves all authorizations, permits, verifications,
        extensions, biological opinions, incidental take statements, and any other approvals or
        orders issued pursuant to Federal law necessary for the construction and initial operation
        at full capacity of the Mountain Valley Pipeline; and

               (2) Congress hereby directs the Secretary of the Army, the Federal Energy
        Regulatory Commission, the Secretary of Agriculture, and the Secretary of the Interior,
        and other agencies as applicable, as the case may be, to continue to maintain such
        authorizations, permits, verifications, extensions, biological opinions, incidental take
        statements, and any other approvals or orders issued pursuant to Federal law necessary for
        the construction and initial operation at full capacity of the Mountain Valley Pipeline.
               3
                   In full, Section 324(f) provided:

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               There is no dispute that the agency actions Petitioners challenge in the underlying

        petitions fall within the ambit of Section 324(c). Prior to the enactment of Section 324(c),

        this Court would have had to determine if those approvals complied with the relevant

        environmental laws. Now, Congress has ratified those approvals “[n]otwithstanding” those

        other laws. § 324(c). In doing so, it has necessarily amended the legal standards that

        previously applied.

               It is well settled that Congress has the power to ratify agency action. See United

        States v. Heinszen & Co., 206 U.S. 370, 382 (1907) (describing Congress’s “power of

        ratification as to matters within [its] authority” as “elementary”); Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at

        911 (Breyer, J., concurring) (observing that there is “no substantial argument” that

        “Congress act[s] unconstitutionally by ratifying [agency] actions”). When it does so,

        Congress may not impermissibly tell this Court how to apply existing law. But it may

        provide a new standard—here, Section 324(c)—and instruct this Court to apply that new

        standard to the case before us. That permissible exercise of Congress’s legislative powers

        does not infringe Article III. See Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 578 U.S. 212, 225 n.17 (2016)

        (noting that Congress infringes Article III when it “direct[s] the court how pre-existing law

        applies to particular circumstances” but not when it creates “new substantive law” that a

        court must apply even to pending cases).

               (f) EFFECT.—This section supersedes any other provision of law (including any
        other section of this Act or other statute, any regulation, any judicial decision, or any
        agency guidance) that is inconsistent with the issuance of any authorization, permit,
        verification, biological opinion, incidental take statement, or other approval for the
        Mountain Valley Pipeline.

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               To be sure, courts considering similar challenges to statutes with similar language

        have generally upheld the statutes, reasoning that Congress approving agency action

        “notwithstanding” other law does not violate the separation of powers because Congress

        has changed the law, not directed courts to apply existing law. See, e.g., Friends of Animals

        v. Jewell, 824 F.3d 1033, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (upholding statute directing agency to

        “reissue” a rule “without regard to any other provision of statute or regulation that applies

        to issuance of such rule”); Consejo de Desarrollo Economico de Mexicali, A.C. v. United

        States, 482 F.3d 1157, 1169 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[W]hen Congress has directed immediate

        implementation ‘notwithstanding any other provision of law,’ we have construed the

        legislation to exempt the affected project from the reach of environmental statutes which

        would delay implementation.”); Nat’l Coal. to Save Our Mall v. Norton, 269 F.3d 1092,

        1094 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (upholding statute directing that the World War II Memorial “shall

        be   constructed    expeditiously”     consistent   with   existing   plans    and   permits

        “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law”).

               Accordingly, because Congress has ratified the challenged agency actions, there is

        no longer a live controversy and the underlying petitions are moot. We therefore lack

        jurisdiction over them. Brooks v. Vassar, 462 F.3d 341, 348 (4th Cir. 2006).

                                                     B.

               Second, Congress also eliminated our jurisdiction over the underlying petitions

        through Section 324(e)(1). That section provided, in relevant part, that “[n]otwithstanding

        any other provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to review any action taken by”

        specified agencies “that grants” any authorization or approval “necessary for the

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        construction and initial operation at full capacity” of the pipeline, including “any lawsuit

        pending in a court as of the date of enactment of this section.” 4

               The Constitution grants Congress the express power to create lower federal courts

        in the first instance, see U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 9, which includes the “lesser power to

        ‘limit the jurisdiction of those Courts,’” Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 906 (plurality op.) (quoting

        United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. 32, 33 (1812)); see Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 441, 449

        (1850) (noting that lower federal courts “can have no jurisdiction but such as the statute

        confers”). Provided it does not violate other constitutional provisions, Congress is widely

        seen to enjoy broad control over the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Patchak, 138 S. Ct.

        at 906 (plurality op.).

               4
                   In full, Section 324(e) provided:

               (e) JUDICIAL REVIEW.—

                (1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to
        review any action taken by the Secretary of the Army, the Federal Energy Regulatory
        Commission, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of the Interior, or a State
        administrative agency acting pursuant to Federal law that grants an authorization, permit,
        verification, biological opinion, incidental take statement, or any other approval necessary
        for the construction and initial operation at full capacity of the Mountain Valley Pipeline,
        including the issuance of any authorization, permit, extension, verification, biological
        opinion, incidental take statement, or other approval described in subsection (c) or (d) of
        this section for the Mountain Valley Pipeline, whether issued prior to, on, or subsequent to
        the date of enactment of this section, and including any lawsuit pending in a court as of the
        date of enactment of this section.

               (2) The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit shall
        have original and exclusive jurisdiction over any claim alleging the invalidity of this
        section or that an action is beyond the scope of authority conferred by this section.

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               The exact confines of Congress’s power over jurisdiction are still being debated,

        especially when it comes to jurisdiction-stripping efforts that appear to dictate the outcome

        of pending litigation. This debate is perhaps most clearly seen in the recent case of Patchak

        v. Zinke. In that case, a landowner sued the Secretary of the Department of the Interior,

        arguing that the agency lacked statutory authority to take certain land into trust for a Native

        American tribe. Id. at 903. While the case was pending, Congress passed the Gun Lake

        Act, which stripped federal courts of jurisdiction to hear any action “relating to” the

        property. Id. at 904.

               A fractured Supreme Court upheld the Gun Lake Act. A four-Justice plurality

        (Justice Thomas, joined by Justices Breyer, Alito, and Kagan) did so based on the

        jurisdiction-stripping provision alone, concluding that “[s]tatutes that strip jurisdiction

        change the law for the purpose of Article III just as much as other exercises of Congress’

        legislative authority.” Id. at 906 (cleaned up). 5 But this view did not command a majority.

        And it was expressly rejected by four other Justices. See id. at 919 (Chief Justice Roberts,

        joined by Justices Kennedy and Gorsuch, dissenting) (“Congress cannot, under the guise

        of altering federal jurisdiction, dictate the result of a pending proceeding.”); id. at 913

        (Justice Sotomayor, concurring in the judgment) (“[A]n Act that merely deprives federal

        courts of jurisdiction over a single proceeding is not enough to be considered a change in

               5
                  Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor voted to uphold the statute based on their view
        that the Gun Lake Act restored the federal government’s immunity from suit. Patchak, 138
        S. Ct. at 912 (Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Sotomayor, concurring in the judgment).

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        the law and . . . any statute that portends to do so should be viewed with great

        skepticism.”). 6

               Petitioners in this case vehemently argue that the jurisdiction-stripping provision in

        Section 324(e) suffers from the same constitutional infirmities that at least four Justices

        saw as existing with the statute in Patchak. Specifically, Petitioners argue that Section

        324(e) “manipulates” jurisdiction to direct entry of judgment for a particular party, the

        Mountain Valley Pipeline, in pending litigation. Response Br. at 17; see Patchak, 138 S.

        Ct. at 919–20 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (expressing the view that Congress impermissibly

        “exercises the judicial power when it manipulates jurisdictional rules to decide the outcome

        of a particular pending case”).

               But regardless of the merits of Petitioners’ arguments, this Court is not the one to

        consider them. That is because Section 324(e)(2) vests the D.C. Circuit with “original and

               6
                  As an aside, we note that the statute at issue in Patchak, in addition to the
        jurisdiction-stripping provision, also contained a ratification provision that “reaffirmed”
        the property as “trust land” and “ratified and confirmed” the agency’s actions in taking that
        land into trust. Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 904 (plurality op.). The plurality opinion, however,
        expressly declined to focus on the ratification provision because Patchak did not argue that
        it was unconstitutional. Id. at 904 n.2. But in a sole concurrence, Justice Breyer stated that
        he would have upheld the statute on ratification alone: “The petitioner does not argue that
        Congress acted unconstitutionally by ratifying the Secretary’s actions . . . , and I am aware
        of no substantial argument to that effect.” Id. at 911 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing
        Heinszen, 206 U.S. at 382–83). The dissenters appear to have agreed, Chief Justice Roberts
        writing that “if [the ratification provision] is constitutional, it is because the provision
        establishes new substantive standards and leaves the court to apply those standards in the
        first instance.” Id. at 922 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). In other words, four Justices in
        Patchak seemingly believed that Congress ratifying agency action in a manner virtually
        identical to Section 324(c) is a lawful exercise of legislative power.

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        exclusive jurisdiction over any claim alleging the invalidity” of Section 324. This

        encompasses Petitioners’ arguments about the constitutionality of that section.

               Petitioners have pointed to no authority that prohibits Congress from vesting a

        particular court (here, the D.C. Circuit) with jurisdiction over a class of claims (here,

        challenges to the constitutionality of Section 324). Rather, Petitioners argue that, despite

        the plain language of Section 324(e)(2), this Court can nevertheless rule on the merits of

        their constitutional arguments. In support, Petitioners interpret the word “claim” to refer to

        a “cause of action” and the command that the D.C. Circuit “shall have” “original”

        jurisdiction as signaling prospective application only. In other words, for Petitioners,

        Section 324(e)(2) is merely a “venue provision that prescribes where post-enactment

        claims directly challenging Section 324 must be filed originally.” Response Br. at 6.

               We disagree. As Respondents point out, “claim” has a natural reading much broader

        than just a cause of action, referring to any argument or allegation. See, e.g., Biden v.

        Nebraska, 143 S. Ct. 2355, 2372 (2023) (discussing “the EPA’s claim that the Clean Air

        Act authorized it to impose a nationwide cap on carbon dioxide emissions”) (emphasis

        added). And the grant of “original” jurisdiction merely signals that the D.C. Circuit can

        hear such arguments about the constitutionality of Section 324 in the first instance, without

        a district court first weighing in.

               Statutory context confirms this understanding. See Lynch v. Jackson, 853 F.3d 116,

        121 (4th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view

        to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” (quoting Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury,

        489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989)). Section 324 clearly evinces a “statutory scheme” to withdraw

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        jurisdiction from all courts to review certain agency actions related to the Mountain Valley

        Pipeline, while giving the D.C. Circuit “exclusive” jurisdiction for any challenges to

        Section 324 itself. 7

               Accordingly, we conclude that Section 324(e)(1) strips this Court of jurisdiction to

        consider the underlying petitions, and that Section 324(e)(2) strips this Court of jurisdiction

        to consider Petitioners’ arguments about the constitutionality of Section 324. Those

        arguments must be heard, if at all, by the D.C. Circuit.

                                               *      *       *

               In sum, with Section 324, Congress removed our jurisdiction in a way that mandates

        dismissal of the underlying petitions, which challenge agency actions that grant necessary

        approvals for the completion of the Mountain Valley Pipeline. Indeed, “no court” has

        jurisdiction to review these approvals, see § 324(e)(1), including the D.C. Circuit, whose

        jurisdiction is limited to “claim[s] alleging the invalidity of [Section 324] or that an action

        is beyond the scope of authority conferred by [Section 324],” § 324(e)(2).

               But Congress left in place the general grant of jurisdiction to this Court under the

        Natural Gas Act over challenges to future pipelines or other natural gas facilities in this

               7
                 This conclusion is further confirmed by reference to the Natural Gas Act, which
        granted this Court its “original and exclusive jurisdiction over any civil action” related to
        the Mountain Valley Pipeline. 15 U.S.C. § 717r(d)(1) (emphasis added). In contrast,
        Section 324 grants the D.C. Circuit “original and exclusive jurisdiction over any claim
        alleging the invalidity” of Section 324. § 324(e)(2) (emphasis added). Courts “usually
        presume differences in language . . . convey differences in meaning,” especially where
        Congress has enacted statutes covering the same subject. See Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. United
        States, 138 S. Ct. 2067, 2071 (2018) (citation omitted).

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        circuit, 15 U.S.C. § 717r(d)(1), as well as future challenges to operations of the Mountain

        Valley Pipeline not covered by the express terms of Section 324.

               For example, at oral argument counsel for the Mountain Valley Pipeline provided

        the hypothetical of a new “spur” on the pipeline that was not covered by the original

        approvals, agreeing that a challenge to that spur would fall outside the scope of Section

        324. Oral Arg. at 25:18–32, available at https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/OAarchive/

        mp3/23-1384-20230727.mp3. And counsel for the federal agencies agreed that this Court

        would be free to hear a future case involving the operation of the pipeline—e.g., if a pipe

        exploded or leaked—because such a challenge would not be to an “approval” “necessary”

        for the “construction and initial operation at full capacity” of the pipeline as required by

        the text of Section 324. Id. at 1:18:10–1:19:01; see § 324(e)(2).

               We save such challenges for another day. Here, Congress has removed our

        jurisdiction to hear the merits of the present petitions. Petitioners’ sole contention in

        response to the motions to dismiss was that Section 324 was unconstitutional, a claim that

        can only be heard by the D.C. Circuit. Therefore, the motions to dismiss must be granted

        for lack of jurisdiction.

                                                    III.

               For the foregoing reasons, we grant Respondents’ motions to dismiss.

                                                                                       DISMISSED

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        GREGORY, Circuit Judge, concurring in judgment:

               I agree with my colleagues’ assessment that we must dismiss these cases for want

        of jurisdiction. As they rightly assert, our authority under Article III extends in the typical

        case to an evaluation of our jurisdiction to hear the underlying dispute. That inquiry

        necessarily includes any question of the validity of a statute that intends to withdraw our

        jurisdiction. But Section 324 of the Fiscal Responsibility Act is not the typical statute.

        Section 324(e)’s jurisdictional bar not only purports to withdraw this Court’s consideration

        of the underlying agency actions. It also forbids us from deciding what the Constitution

        has to say about Section 324 itself. For that task, Congress entrusted the D.C. Circuit (and

        presumably the Supreme Court upon a writ of certiorari) alone. I join the majority in

        abiding Congress’s wishes in that regard.

               But, where Section 324’s text curtails this Court’s judicial authority, the provision’s

        peculiar nature (to say nothing of the burden it has placed upon these proceedings) invites

        exposition. Among its smattering of edicts are Congress’s ratification and approval of any

        agency action “necessary for the construction and initial operation at full capacity of the

        Mountain Valley Pipeline,” § 324(c)(1), its directions to various executive agencies to

        maintain those approvals, § 324(c)(2), its withdrawal of judicial review over those same

        agency actions—including in pending lawsuits—§ 324(e)(1), and its intention that the D.C.

        Circuit “have original and exclusive jurisdiction over any claim alleging the invalidity” of

        Section 324 or any action related to its pronouncements, § 324(e)(2). By all accounts,

        Congress went to such lengths to ensure the Mountain Valley Pipeline’s “timely”

        construction as a matter of “national interest.” § 324(b). “To that judgment we owe all

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        deference, saving only what we owe to the Constitution.” Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S.

        414, 461 (1944) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).

               Courts maintain an enduring “duty to evaluate the constitutionality of legislative acts”

        so as to ensure “that an act of the legislature[] [is not] repugnant to the constitution” and

        therefore “void.” Moore v. Harper, 143 S. Ct. 2065, 2079–80 (2023) (citation omitted). I

        agree with Judge Thacker’s observation on that score: “Congress has tipped the balance of

        power in its favor given that this provision requires us to allow another co-equal court to

        answer questions central to our own jurisdictional inquiry.” Post at 23. Indeed, that

        sweeping result appears to leave us not with “new substantive law” to apply, Bank Markazi

        v. Peterson, 578 U.S. 212, 225 n.17 (2016), nor even our constitutional obligation to decide

        the scope of our own province. Section 324 is instead a mandate to enforce its will “without

        regard for [its] validity.” Yakus, 321 U.S. at 468 (dissenting opinion).

               “Upon this point a page of history is worth a volume of logic.” New York Trust Co.

        v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921). We have much to learn from the history recounted by

        Chief Justice Roberts’s dissenting views from the majority opinion in Bank Markazi and

        the plurality opinion in Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897 (2018). I expound upon it to place

        emphasis on the central role the separation of powers plays in our republic.

               During the founding era, state constitutional structures served as something of a

        proving ground to distill the principles that would form the core of our national

        Constitution. In those early days, state constitutions lacked “structural mechanisms to

        check the dominant legislatures.” Robert F. Williams, The State Constitutions of the

        Founding Decade:      Pennsylvania’s Radical 1776 Constitution and Its Influences on

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        American Constitutionalism, 62 Temp. L. Rev. 541, 547–548 (1989). Unsurprisingly,

        then, many legislatures “functioned as courts of equity of last resort, hearing original

        actions or providing appellate review of judicial judgments.” Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm,

        Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 219 (1995). What’s more, “they routinely intervened in cases still

        pending before courts,” granting all manner of judicial relief. Bank Markazi, 578 U.S. at

        239 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also, e.g., Judicial Action by the Provincial Legislature

        of Massachusetts Acts and Resolves of the Province of Massachusetts Bay, 15 Harv. L.

        Rev. 208, 208 n.1 (1901) (detailing the ways in which the Massachusetts legislature

        “act[ed] in a judicial capacity, sometimes trying causes in equity, sometimes granting

        equity powers to some court of the common law for a particular temporary purpose”).

        Those proceedings often “legislat[ed] for individuals, and for particular cases . . . much too

        frequent[ly].” Vermont State Papers 1779–1786, 542 (W. Slade ed. 1823).

               Consequently, our independent judiciary “in large measure, reflects a reaction

        against . . . the blending of state legislative and judicial authority” seen rampant among the

        pre-framing states. John F. Manning, Response, Deriving Rules of Statutory Interpretation

        from the Constitution, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 1648, 1663 (2001). Observing the status quo

        ante in Virginia, Thomas Jefferson complained that Virginia’s assembly had assumed the

        “legislative, executive, and judiciary” functions, in what he termed “elective despotism.”

        Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia 170–71 (2nd ed.). He advocated instead

        for a society “in which the powers of government should be so divided and balanced among

        several” branches. Id.

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               James Madison, also remarking on the Virginia experience, lamented that the

        assembly, “in many instances, decided rights which should have been left to judiciary

        controversy” despite the state’s constitutional declaration “that the three great departments

        ought not to be intermixed.” The Federalist No. 48, at 258 (G. Carey & J. McClellan eds.

        2001). He reported much the same of Pennsylvania. Id. at 259 (“[C]ases belonging to the

        judiciary department [were] frequently drawn within legislative cognizance and

        determination.”). In view of all this, Madison concluded that “projects of usurpation by

        either of [the executive or legislative departments] would immediately betray and defeat

        themselves.” Id. at 257–58. “Were the power of judging joined with the legislative,” he

        cautioned, “the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control.” The

        Federalist No. 47, at 251–52. Alexander Hamilton agreed: “all possible care is requisite to

        enable [the judicial department] to defend itself against . . . attacks” from the legislative and

        executive departments. The Federalist No. 78, at 402. That is because “there is no liberty,

        if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers.” Id.

               The Constitution focuses on the structure and distribution of responsibility among

        the three branches of federal government. The first three articles of the Constitution

        manifest the division sought by its signatories. Inherent in those provisions of power is the

        basic concept that each branch “exercise[s] . . . the powers appropriate to its own

        department,” and no branch can “encroach upon the powers confided to the others.”

        Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 191 (1881). Thus, the notion that “[t]he judicial

        power [is] the Judiciary’s alone,” Bank Markazi, 578 U.S. at 242 (Roberts, C.J.,

        dissenting), is an “unambiguously enunciate[d] . . . fundamental principle” that must “be

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        jealously guarded,” Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S.

        50, 60 (1982) (plurality opinion).

               The separation of powers is therefore the keystone holding our republic together.

        That formidable credo “safeguards the role of the Judicial Branch in our tripartite system.”

        Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850 (1986). It ensures that

        no president mistakes the people of this country for royal subjects. Comm. on Judiciary,

        United States House of Representatives v. McGahn, 415 F. Supp. 3d 148, 213 (D.D.C.

        2019) (“Stated simply, the primary takeaway from the past 250 years of recorded American

        history is that Presidents are not kings.”). And it is what binds the courts as Congress’s

        “faithful agents.” Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U.

        L. Rev. 109, 111, 163 (2010). To be sure, then, judicial review “can no more be shared

        with another branch than the Chief Executive, for example, can share with the Judiciary

        the veto power, or the Congress share with the Judiciary the power to override a

        Presidential veto.” Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 483 (2011) (cleaned up). We must

        therefore practice vigilance against temptations to “elid[e] these boundaries,” lest we risk

        “undermin[ing] the rule of law and diminish[ing] liberty.” Neil Gorsuch, A Republic, If

        You Can Keep It 43, 61 (2019).

               What does Section 324 say about the rule of law today and the history from which

        it has taken root? The petitioners in these cases, the “inferior Courts,” and Congress alike

        depend on the answer to that question. And the answer depends, in turn, on the fate of

        Section 324. Is it simply a change in the law? Or is it an instruction requiring that “the

        court must deny to itself the jurisdiction” originally granted to it by Congress “because and

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        only because its decision, in accordance with settled law,” is averse to the Mountain Valley

        Pipeline and favorable to its opponents? United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 147 (1871).

        Those who celebrate Congress’s decision to pass Section 324 into law, no less than those

        who condemn it, may be forgiven for their judgments because the separation between the

        legislative and judicial branches presently lacks fortification. See Ante at 12–13 (detailing

        the Supreme Court’s “fractured” decision in Patchak).

               There can be no mistake, however, that Section 324 is a blueprint for the

        construction of a natural gas pipeline by legislative fiat. If that provision is likewise

        constitutionally sanctioned, then Congress will have found the way to adjudicate by

        legislating for particular cases and for particular litigants, no different than the

        governmental excesses our Framers sought to avoid. For that reason, I fear Congress has

        employed this Court’s constitutionally directed deference to legislative prerogatives to

        undermine the Constitution and, in the process, it has made the Court an accessory to its

        deeds. If that is so, I wonder if Section 324 is a harbinger of erosion not just to the

        environment, but to our republic. That, only our Supreme Court can decide.

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        THACKER, Circuit Judge, concurring:

               I join the majority opinion in upholding Section 324 because that is what the law

        requires.

               As the opinion explains, Congress has authority both to change the substantive law

        applicable to pending litigation and to vest “a particular court (here, the D.C. Circuit) with

        jurisdiction over a class of claims (here, challenges to the constitutionality of Section 324).”

        Maj. Op. at 14. While I join the conclusion that Congress has acted within its legislative

        authority in enacting Section 324(e)(2), I write separately because Congress’s use of its

        authority in this manner threatens to disturb the balance of power between co-equal

        branches of government. Such exercises of the legislative authority “should be viewed

        with great skepticism.” Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 913 (2018) (Sotomayor, J.,

        concurring in judgment).

               By restricting claims regarding the constitutionality of Section 324 to only the Court

        of Appeals for the District of Columbia, Congress has tipped the balance of power in its

        favor given that this provision requires us to allow another co-equal court to answer

        questions central to our own jurisdictional inquiry. Here, Petitioners challenged the

        motions to dismiss by arguing that Section 324 is unconstitutional, and therefore its

        jurisdiction stripping provision, Section 324(e)(1), is ineffective.            In any other

        circumstance, we would resolve the motions to dismiss by deciding the underlying

        jurisdictional question. But here, Congress enacted Section 324(e)(2) as an end run around

        our judicial decision-making -- no doubt motivated at least in part because of the view of

        some in Congress that the pipeline would be finished today if it weren’t for the rulings by

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        the Fourth Circuit. 1 Instead of deciding the question for ourselves, we are forced to allow

        the D.C. Circuit, and only the D.C. Circuit, to decide whether Section 324 is constitutional.

        In turn, the only question for this court is whether the D.C. Circuit provision itself is

        constitutional.

               We limit our inquiry to that question because we have determined we are bound to

        do so, but the judicial branch should proceed with caution in scenarios like this one. As

        Judge Wynn asked at oral argument in reference to the idea that Congress can alter pending

        litigation through jurisdiction stripping alone, “Where does it go? Where else is it going to

        show back up[,] maybe in a different environment?” Oral Arg. at 53:30–53:32. Can

        Congress, with particular pending litigation in mind, strip a particular court of jurisdiction

        to hear a certain type of cases when it disagrees politically with the view of the law that

        court has taken in the past? Can Congress punish courts for rulings that it views as

        “political” or “activist” by stripping them of jurisdiction over similar cases? Can it then

        insulate those decisions from further judicial review by enacting a provision like Section

        324(e)(2)? Indeed, can Congress go so far as to usurp the role of the Supreme Court? We

        appear to be inching close to the line. But as it stands, we have no clear guidance from the

        Supreme Court on where the line between legislative and judicial power lies, especially

        when Congress acts for the purpose of influencing pending litigation or even going so far

        as to pick a winner in that pending litigation.

               A contrary view might be that the pipeline could be finished today had MVP and
               1

        Respondents followed all of the necessary laws and regulations to get it done.

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                While Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Kennedy and Gorsuch, has

        explained that he “would hold that Congress exercises the judicial power when it

        manipulates jurisdictional rules to decide the outcome of a particular pending case,”

        Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 919–20 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting), four other justices have held that

        “[s]tatutes that strip jurisdiction ‘change the law’” and are permissible even when they

        decide pending litigation, id. at 907 (Thomas, J.). And, recently, while acknowledging that

        “. . . Congress can regulate various aspects of what the Supreme Court does,” Justice Kagan

        noted, “Can Congress do anything it wants? Well, no. . . . There are limits here, no doubts.”

        Josh Gerstein, Kagan enters fray over Congress’ power to police Supreme Court, Politico

        (Aug.                3,               2023),                https://perma.cc/WF6H-QV8K;

        https://www.politico.com/news/2023/08/03/kagan-enters-fray-over-congress-power-to-

        police-supreme-court-00109770?cid=apn (last visited Aug. 6, 2023).

                This case makes clear that the line is a fine one and perhaps we are getting far too

        close to tipping the balance of power. “What is the limiting principle?. . . When will the

        Supreme Court give us an opinion that lays it out clearly?” Oral Arg. at 52:40–53:45.

        There must be a firm limit on Congress’s intrusion into the judicial branch.

                Additionally, I am compelled to set the record straight with regard to some of the

        outside rhetoric that has been spewed in the midst of our work on these cases. My

        colleagues and I are not politicians or newspaper editorialists. We are judges. As my good

        colleague Judge Wynn noted during oral argument:

                      Judge Wynn: It’s something I think that unfortunately is being
                                  lost in midst of all this hyperbole that is going on.
                                  There needs to be a calmness of understanding

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                                     that we’re just doing our level best to do our job
                                     and no more.

                      Mr. Verrilli (counsel for MVP): Yes, we fully-

                      Judge Wynn: And I think you fully understand that.

                      Mr. Verrilli (counsel for MVP): We appreciate that, Your
                                   Honor.

        Oral Arg. at 15:43–16:00.

               In response to the passage of Section 324 on June 3, 2023, both Mountain Valley

        Pipeline, on June 5, and the federal agency Respondents, on June 14, filed motions to

        dismiss, arguing that in light of Section 324, this court no longer possesses jurisdiction

        over the pending litigation. Briefing on those motions was completed on July 10. Given

        the significance of the case and the importance of the issues involving the separation of

        powers, on July 12 we scheduled the motions for oral argument and expedited the timing

        of such argument. In other words, we set out to not only do our jobs, but to do so

        expeditiously. Yet, we have been variously referred to by certain media and politicians as

        overstepping, activist, alarming, willful, ignoring the law, and a judicial hellhole. Some

        have gone so far as to say that we are without jurisdiction to even hold a hearing and rule

        on the motions to dismiss. Wrong.

               Although Congress certainly has authority to pass laws impacting federal court

        jurisdiction, no branch of government in our democracy possesses all powerful authority.

        That is basic Civics 101. We have three separate but co-equal branches of government:

        the legislative, executive, and judiciary. Congress makes the law, the executive enforces

        the law, and the judiciary interprets the law. Although Congress may act to strip federal

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        court jurisdiction, that is not the last word on the matter. The courts still have a role to

        play. As the majority opinion lays out, “The threshold question before us is whether

        Section 324 prohibits this Court from determining if we have jurisdiction to review the

        petitions. In other words, does a federal court retain jurisdiction for the limited purpose of

        determining whether it has jurisdiction?” Maj. Op. at 7.

                It should go without saying that political pundits certainly do not get to decide

        whether our court has jurisdiction or when we can hold a hearing. We do. The Supreme

        Court has clearly stated that “a federal court always has jurisdiction to determine its own

        jurisdiction.” United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628 (2002); Maj. Op. at 7. Indeed,

        Mountain Valley Pipeline and the federal agency Respondents themselves recognize as

        much:

                      Judge Thacker: Because we have to determine our own
                                     jurisdiction. And you agree it’s always our
                                     role to determine our own jurisdiction, right?

                      Mr. Verrilli (counsel for MVP): I agree with that, your honor.

                      ...

                      Judge Wynn: You are saying this hearing is permissible for a
                                  limited purpose?

                      Mr. Verrilli (counsel for MVP): Yes. Absolutely.

                      Judge Wynn: It is not one that is without authority, it is not one
                                  at which we don’t have jurisdiction to have this
                                  hearing.

                      Mr. Verrilli (counsel for MVP): Absolutely right. Yes, we
                                    certainly agree with that.

                      ...

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                      Judge Thacker: Yes, particularly when Mountain Valley
                                     Pipeline made the motion to dismiss that
                                     brought us here.

                      Mr. Verrilli: Yes, absolutely. We are completely in agreement.

        Oral Arg. at 14:37–45; 15:10–24; 16:01–10.

               With a healthy respect for the bedrock principle of the separation of powers -- but

        with a wary eye toward a potential improper imbalance of power -- today I join my

        colleagues in granting the motions to dismiss because that is what the law requires.

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