Court Opinion

ID: 9943452
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-23 16:10:21.650238+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:02.463385
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Dehart, 2024-Ohio-599.]

                               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                  SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                        DARKE COUNTY

 STATE OF OHIO                                     :
                                                   :
       Appellee                                    :   C.A. No. 2023-CA-8
                                                   :
 v.                                                :   Trial Court Case No. 22-CR-00285
                                                   :
 MICHAEL S. DEHART                                 :   (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas
                                                   :   Court)
       Appellant                                   :
                                                   :

                                             ...........

                                             OPINION

                                     Rendered on February 16, 2024

                                             ...........

LUCAS W. WILDER, Attorney for Appellant

R. KELLY ORMSBY, III, Attorney for Appellee

                                            .............

WELBAUM, J.

        {¶ 1} Michael S. Dehart appeals from his conviction on one count of aggravated

drug possession, a fifth-degree felony.

        {¶ 2} In his sole assignment of error, Dehart challenges the trial court’s overruling

of his motion to suppress methamphetamine found in his car. He contends two sheriff’s

deputies lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity to detain him in his
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parked car and to inquire about his possession of contraband. He asserts that his consent

to search the car was involuntary, as it was given during an illegal detention, and that

methamphetamine found during the search should have been suppressed.

       {¶ 3} We conclude that the deputies obtained permission to search the car during

a consensual encounter and that the trial court correctly overruled Dehart’s suppression

motion. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment will be affirmed.

                          I. Facts and Course of Proceedings

       {¶ 4} Following his indictment on one count of aggravated drug possession, Dehart

moved to suppress the evidence. The matter proceeded to a December 19, 2022

suppression hearing. Darke County Sheriff’s Deputy Steven Strunk was the only witness.

Strunk testified that he saw Dehart’s vehicle parked at a gas station in the early morning

hours of November 11, 2022. Strunk and another deputy, William Toomey, approached

the parked car to perform a welfare check on Dehart, who appeared to be asleep in the

driver’s seat. Strunk immediately recognized Dehart from prior interactions and knew that

he had a suspended driver’s license.

       {¶ 5} Strunk knocked on the driver’s side window and awakened Dehart. Strunk

testified that Dehart responded by opening the car door. Strunk asked whether Dehart

was okay, and Dehart responded affirmatively. The deputy also asked whether Dehart

had been driving the car. Dehart stated that someone else had driven and had left him

there. Strunk then asked whether Dehart was in possession of any weapons or

contraband, and Dehart responded negatively. At that point, the deputy requested

consent to search the car. Dehart granted Strunk consent to search and stepped out of
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the car. Strunk found a baggie of methamphetamine in the center console. Upon finding

the drugs, Strunk arrested Dehart. In addition to Strunk’s testimony, the State admitted

into evidence cruiser-camera recordings from two police cruisers.

       {¶ 6} Following the hearing, the trial court overruled Dehart’s suppression motion

in a written decision. The trial court first determined that the two police cruisers did not

block Dehart’s vehicle. In fact, the trial court noted that Dehart’s car was removed

following his arrest without the need to reposition either cruiser. Based on its review of

the cruiser-camera recordings, the trial court next found it “indeterminable” whether

Strunk or Dehart had opened Dehart’s car door. But even if Strunk opened the door, the

trial court found that the welfare check allowed him to do so. With regard to Dehart’s

argument that Strunk lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity after

confirming his welfare and his denial of driving, the trial court reasoned:

              Defendant further argues that, after the welfare check was complete,

       the deputies had no reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity.

       Again, the Court views the initial meeting of law enforcement and the

       Defendant as a consensual encounter. In less than one minute, Deputy

       Strunk introduced himself, inquired of the Defendant’s status, obtained

       consent to search the vehicle, and was granted consent to search the

       Defendant’s person. In fact, Defendant gave consent to search the vehicle

       and even offered to voluntarily get out of the car. Deputy Strunk then asked

       Defendant, “You ain’t got nothing on you, right?” Defendant replies, “No,”

       and subsequently consented to the search of his person. Once the consent
                                                                                           -4-

       to search had been granted, Defendant’s arguments become moot. And the

       Court does not find that law enforcement unreasonably detained Defendant

       before requesting and obtaining consent.

January 11, 2023 Judgment Entry at 4-5.

       {¶ 7} Dehart subsequently pled no-contest in exchange for the State’s agreement

to recommend community control at sentencing. The trial court accepted the plea, made

a finding of guilt, and sentenced Dehart to five years of community control.

                                        II. Analysis

       {¶ 8} In his sole assignment of error, Dehart challenges the trial court’s

suppression ruling. Dehart maintains that he was “seized” for Fourth Amendment

purposes when Strunk and Toomey positioned their cruisers in front of his car, leaving no

room for him to pull away, and Strunk knocked on his side window. Dehart contends this

seizure was unlawful as the deputies had no reason to believe he had committed or was

about to commit any crime. Dehart also reasons that Strunk’s questions about weapons

or contraband in the car and his request to search were investigatory insofar as they were

intended to confirm or dispel a mere “hunch” about illegal activity. Based on the premise

that he was detained illegally, Dehart asserts that his consent to search was invalid, as it

was tainted by and the product of illegal law-enforcement activity.

       {¶ 9} When ruling on a motion to suppress, a trial court “assumes the role of the

trier of fact, and, as such, is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and evaluate

the credibility of the witnesses.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Retherford, 93 Ohio App.3d

586, 592, 639 N.E.2d 498 (2d Dist.1994). As a result, when we review suppression
                                                                                            -5-

decisions, “we are bound to accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported

by competent, credible evidence. Accepting those facts as true, we must independently

determine as a matter of law, without deference to the trial court’s conclusion, whether

they meet the applicable legal standard.” Id.

       {¶ 10} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,

Section 14, of the Ohio Constitution protect persons from unreasonable searches and

seizures. State v. Leak, 145 Ohio St.3d 165, 2016-Ohio-154, 47 N.E.3d 821, ¶ 13.

Searches and seizures conducted without a warrant are per se unreasonable absent a

few, well recognized exceptions. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19

L.Ed.2d 576 (1967); State v. Adams, 144 Ohio St.3d 429, 2015-Ohio-3954, 45 N.E.3d

127, ¶ 181. One exception cited by the trial court in Dehart’s case “is the community

caretaking/emergency-aid exception, which is grounded in interests of public safety.”

State v. Glowney, 2d Dist. Montgomery Nos. 27896 and 27897, 2019-Ohio-3390, ¶ 34. A

second exception is a consensual encounter, which occurs “when the police merely

approach a person in a public place and engage the person in conversation, and the

person remains free not to answer and to walk away.” State v. Lewis, 2d Dist. Montgomery

No. 22726, 2009-Ohio-158, ¶ 21, citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553,

100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980).

       {¶ 11} With the foregoing legal principles in mind, we see no error in the trial court’s

overruling of Dehart’s suppression motion. As for the trial court’s factual findings, only two

of them require discussion: the positioning of the deputies’ cruisers and the opening of

Dehart’s car door. In support of his claim that he was unlawfully “seized,” Dehart asserts
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that the two deputies parked their cruisers in a way that “cornered” his vehicle and left

him “without room” to drive away. The trial court rejected this claim, finding that the

cruisers did not block Dehart’s vehicle. The record supports the trial court’s conclusion.

The cruiser-camera recordings reflect that the deputies parked with their vehicles angled

toward Dehart’s car but some distance away from it. The trial court correctly noted that

Dehart’s car easily was removed from the scene without the need to reposition either

cruiser. Therefore, even setting aside Dehart’s lack of a driver’s license, the cruiser-

camera recordings confirm that the deputies did not block his vehicle or otherwise prevent

him from leaving.

      {¶ 12} As for the opening of Dehart’s car door, the trial court found it

“indeterminable from the video whether the driver’s side door was opened by Deputy

Strunk or the Defendant.” Having closely studied the two cruiser-camera videos, we are

convinced that one of them shows Dehart opening his own car door, which is consistent

with Strunk’s suppression-hearing testimony. When reviewed at one-quarter speed, the

video recorded by Deputy Toomey’s cruiser shows Deputy Strunk knocking on Dehart’s

driver’s side car window. The deputy then waits as Dehart slowly leans forward and

toward the door as if to open it. The door then opens, and the deputy’s right hand can be

seen resting on top of it. After reviewing this recording several times in slow motion, we

are convinced that Dehart opened his own car door. Therefore, we reject the trial court’s

finding that the video evidence is “indeterminate” with regard to who opened the door.

Both the video recording and Strunk’s uncontroverted testimony constitute competent,

credible evidence establishing that Dehart opened the door.
                                                                                         -7-

       {¶ 13} It is beyond dispute that a law-enforcement officer may approach a person

sleeping in a car and knock on the window. No justification is required because such

contact is a consensual encounter. State v. McCarthy, 2022-Ohio-4738, 2003 N.E.3d 912,

¶ 13 (2d Dist.); see also State v. Windle, 4th Dist. Athens No. 16CA1, 2017-Ohio-7813,

¶ 27 (reasoning “that the officers could lawfully approach [the defendant’s] parked vehicle

and knock on the window to rouse him without any specific justification because such

contact is a consensual encounter that does not implicate the Fourth Amendment”). In

response to Strunk’s knock, Dehart voluntarily opened his car door and conversed with

the deputy. Strunk briefly asked whether Dehart was okay, whether he had been driving

the car, whether he was in possession of any weapons or contraband, and whether he

would consent to a search of the car. Dehart responded that he was fine, that he had not

been driving, that he was not in possession of any weapons or contraband, and that

Strunk could search the vehicle. Given that Dehart authorized the deputy to search the

car during a consensual encounter, no Fourth Amendment violation occurred.

                                     III. Conclusion

       {¶ 14} Dehart’s assignment of error is overruled, and the judgment of the Darke

County Common Pleas Court is affirmed.

                                     .............

TUCKER, J. and HUFFMAN, J., concur.