Court Opinion

ID: 9568367
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:02:58.633594+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:24:41.210939
License: Public Domain

Brailsford, Justice
(concurring in part and disenting in part) :
Construing the majority opinion as holding that the right of mangement and control of the common areas vested in the eleemosynary corporation for the benefit of the lot owners by the declaration of July 12, 1954, was not revocable at the will of the realty company, and that the attempted revocation of April 12, 1968, was nugatory, I concur in that holding.
I also agree that questions arising under the attempted reservation by the realty company of a limited right to mod*620ify the plan for Briarcliffe Acres can best be decided on a case by case basis.
I respectfully dissent from refusal of the majority to pass upon the exceptions assigning as error the court’s conclusion that the common beach-front area referred to in the declaration is that shown on defendant’s exhibit 2, (some 900 feet in width, with front-beach building lots on each side) instead of that shown on plaintiffs’ exhibit 24, (some 3600 feet in width with no front-beach building lots). The apparent ground of refusal is that the issue was not raised by the pleadings, hence was not before the court and should not have been decided. But it can be fairly argued that this issue was raised by the fifth defense of the answer, and the parties have stipulated in the statement of the case that “the definition of what constitutes beachfront area has been made by the pleadings.”
The majority opinion states that plaintiff’s exception to the supplemental report of the master, challenging, for lack of any supporting evidence, the finding that the front-beach area was that shown on defendant’s exhibit 2, should have been sustained, and continues, “Plaintiffs should have an opportunity to prove, if they can, that their exhibit 24 shows the beach-front common area. The case is remanded to the lower court so that the parties hereto may, upon proper pleadings, have this issue determined, along with any others not heretofore decided.”
But the parties have had their day in court on this issue, and plaintiffs do not seek another opportunity to present evidence. Instead, they except to this finding on the ground, among others, that the evidence “unequivocally established that the beach-front area” was that shown on plaintiff’s exhibit 24.
The declaration of July, 1954, on which plaintiffs have based their case, identifies the common beach-front area only by reference to “recorded maps and plats of Briarcliffe Acres.” A latent ambiguity arises because as of that date *621three maps, defendant’s exhibits 1, 2 and 3, showed beachfront property, each in a different way. However, plaintiff’s exhibit 24, which was not recorded until October 1, 1954, was not referred to in the declaration.
Nothing before us fairly suggests that any evidence on this issue not already presented is available to either party. In my view, we should decide on this record whether plaintiffs’ exceptions to the concurrent findings below are meritorious.
The opinion states: “The lower court has in effect determined that the realty company owns fee simple title to these 21 lots [front-beach lots shown on defendant’s exhibit 2], and has determined that the plaintiffs have no easement or right of enjoyment of the same.” I disagree. Affirmance of the judgement on this issue would not foreclose any rights in the beach area which plaintiffs and other grantees of lots described by reference to the plat of October 1, 1954, may have acquired under their deeds. Cf. Epps v. Freeman, 261 S. C. 375, 388, 200 S. E. (2d) 235, 242. Only those rights arising under the declaration of July, 1954, are at issue in this action.
Bussey, J., concurs.