Court Opinion

ID: 1002056
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-07-04 18:05:08.914115+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:26:36.913079
License: Public Domain

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.
                                                                        No. 99-4691
ARTHUR PAUL MOORE, JR., a/k/a
Clay Workman,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Durham.
Frank W. Bullock, Jr., District Judge.
(CR-98-93-1)

Submitted: May 19, 2000

Decided: July 18, 2000

Before MOTZ and KING, Circuit Judges,
and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Alvin G. Matthews, Fayetteville, North Carolina, for Appellant. Wal-
ter C. Holton, Jr., United States Attorney, Douglas Cannon, Assistant
United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Arthur Paul Moore, Jr. appeals his conviction and sentence for con-
spiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine base.
We affirm.

Moore was stopped by a police officer who observed him driving
without a seatbelt. Moore claims this stop was unlawful because it
was impossible under the circumstances of the encounter for the offi-
cer to determine whether Moore was wearing a seatbelt; conse-
quently, he asserts, the evidence discovered as a result of the stop
should have been suppressed. The officer's testimony was not inher-
ently incredible, however. Accordingly, the court's decision to credit
this testimony was not clearly erroneous. See Ornelas v. United
States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996) (stating that factual findings at sup-
pression hearings are reviewed for clear error).

Moore next asserts the evidence was insufficient to prove his
involvement in a conspiracy, because the key prosecution witness,
Della Clark, was not believable. Questions of credibility are for the
jury, however. See United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862-63 (4th
Cir. 1996). Furthermore, Clark's testimony established that Moore,
working with two associates, regularly supplied drugs to Clark for
resale to her customers. Thus, viewed in the light most favorable to
the Government, the record contains "substantial evidence" to support
Moore's conviction. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942).

Finally, Moore contends the district court improperly calculated the
quantity of drugs distributed by his organization and therefore applied
an incorrect base offense level. We review the district court's calcula-
tion of drug quantities for clear error. See United States v. Lipford,
203 F.3d 259, 271 (4th Cir. 2000). We have reviewed the testimony
and we find no clear error in the district court's determination that

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Moore distributed more than 1.5 kilograms of cocaine base, thus qual-
ifying for a base offense level of thirty-eight. See U.S.S.G.
§ 2D1.1(c)(1).

For these reasons, we affirm Moore's sentence and conviction. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argu-
ment would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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