Court Opinion

ID: 9569138
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:10:50.301067+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:20:56.403014
License: Public Domain

*588Andrews, Judge,
dissenting.
Because I believe there was sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption in favor of the entry of service, I respectfully dissent. In support of her contention that the trial court erred in finding Dyson was not personally served, Early submits the entry of service and the process server’s affidavit stating that he served Thomas Dyson, Sr., who told him that Dyson, Jr., resided at that address. Also, the evidence shows that on April 15, 1994, more than nine months before he was served in the instant case, defendant Dyson gave his address as 2211 Windsor Spring Road in a deposition taken in a separate case.
While there is a rebuttable presumption of continuity of residence, this presumption only exists until evidence is introduced to the contrary. See Esco v. Jackson, 185 Ga. App. 901, 906 (366 SE2d 309) (1988). Further, while the return of service constituted prima facie evidence that personal service was made upon Dyson, the affidavits and deposition testimony submitted by Dyson “created a factual dispute to be resolved by the factfinder, the trial court.” Terrell v. Porter, 189 Ga. App. 778 (1) (377 SE2d 540) (1989). In addition, the affidavits and depositions of Dyson’s father and brother, both of whom reside at the Windsor Spring Road address, do constitute “the very strongest evidence” necessary to overcome the entry of service. Denham v. Jones, 96 Ga. 130, 131 (23 SE 78) (1895).
The evidence adduced from the depositions of Dyson’s father and brother, Stanley Specks, was that, in 1992, Dyson and his father had a disagreement and Dyson, Sr., told his son “to hit the street.” Specks testified that the reason Dyson would have given the Windsor Spring Road house as his address was because, for a period of time after his father threw him out of the house, he continued to have his mail sent there. Specks testified that Dyson, Sr., became angry when he realized Dyson was having bills sent to the house and, after an incident involving a pager bill, Dyson stopped coming by the house and there was no more mail addressed to Dyson sent to the house. Specks further testified that, as far as he knew, Dyson did not work and stayed mostly with friends, thus explaining Dyson’s failure to give another address.
In light of the above, I find the affidavits and depositions submitted by Dyson disputing the allegations in the return of service were based on the direct personal knowledge of the affiants and thus were sufficient to carry the burden of overcoming the prima facie presumption that service was properly made. See Yelle v. U. S. Suburban Press, 216 Ga. App. 46, 47 (453 SE2d 108) (1995). Since Earley came forward with no additional evidence, “the affidavits . . . were uncontradicted and were direct, personal evidence that service was not accomplished in accordance with the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-4 (d) (7).” Id. Accordingly, the trial court correctly found there was no *589personal service. As this Court is without jurisdiction to overturn these types of factual findings when supported by some evidence, I must dissent from the majority’s decision to reverse the judgment of the trial court. Ga. Power Co. v. Harrison, 253 Ga. 212, 216 (318 SE2d 306) (1984); Wahnschaff v. Erdman, 216 Ga. App. 355, 356 (454 SE2d 213) (1995).
Decided March 12, 1996.
Bell & Bell, David B. Bell, for appellant.
Glover & Blount, Percy J. Blount, for appellees.