Court Opinion

ID: 9583417
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:38:25.094132+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:39:00.521219
License: Public Domain

Evans, Judge,
concurring specially. I concur specially in the judgment affirming the lower court, and do so reluctantly, because I feel there was error in the charge to the jury, but that under the very strict and stringent rules imposed by this court respecting such matters, appellant did not properly complain thereof. In *189enumeration of error number 2 objection was, in my opinion, properly made to the charge of the court that, ". . . it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to show that skidding was the result of negligent operation of the automobile by the defendant, Jane Tootle,” because this plaintiff did not contend that skidding was the result of negligent operation of the automobile by the defendant. I do not feel that plaintiff had any burden whatever in this case of showing that defendant’s skidding was the result of her negligence, especially in that plaintiff specified the grounds of negligence relied upon in Paragraph 26 and subdivisions A, B, C, D and E of her petition and did not therein specify as a ground of negligence that defendant’s car skidded because of defendant’s negligence.
However, examination of the transcript discloses that the plaintiff objected to the entire charge on skidding including the correct charge that "an automobile may skid on a slippery highway without any negligence on the part of the operator.” It was the defendant’s contention that this caused her to skid, and this charge was proper.
Under the authorities cited in the majority opinion, the charge that an automobile may skid on a slippery highway without negligence on the part of the operator was authorized, but the court went further and placed upon the plaintiff the burden of proving such skidding was because of defendant’s negligence, thus giving the jury the impression there could be no recovery by plaintiff unless he proved that defendant skidded because of negligence.
This court has held that in order to properly complain of a charge of the court, appellant’s counsel must be very, very specific in his objections, and strictly comply with § 17 of the Appellate Practice Act of 1965, as amended (Code Ann. § 70-207; Ga. L. 1965, pp. 18, 31; 1966, pp. 493, 498; 1968, pp. 1072, 1078), even to the extent of advising the court what language should have been charged to the jury. Ga. Power Co. v. Maddox, 113 Ga. App. 642 (149 SE2d 393). The writer set forth his objections to these stringent and almost-impossible rules in a dissenting opinion in the case of Black v. Aultman, 120 Ga. App. 826, 834 (172 SE2d 336). Nevertheless, I am bound by the combined wisdom and votes of my brethren on this court in these matters. Here the appellant *190objected to too much of the charge and did not advise the trial court what should have been charged. Under the old rules of procedure he would not have properly specified error. See Gaillard v. State, 41 Ga. App. 478 (3) (153 SE 374); Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Bean, 49 Ga. App. 4, 7 (174 SE 209); Griffin v. State, 183 Ga. 775, 778 (190 SE 2). This court makes this the rule under the new procedure by its court decisions. I reiterate what my dissenting opinion said in Black v. Aultman, as to our rules being too stringent, with which learned and able counsel for the appellant herein finds it virtually impossible to comply.