Court Opinion

ID: 9940294
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-13 21:03:24.537502+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:44:43.009580
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/13/24 P. v. Rojo CA2/4
            NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

         IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                  SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION FOUR

 THE PEOPLE,                                                         B330778

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                 (Los Angeles County
                                                                      Super. Ct. No. GA049199)
           v.

 CESAR JOSE ROJO,

           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Michael Villalobos, Judge. Affirmed.
         Richard Lennon and Ann Krausz, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, and Cesar Jose Rojo, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
         No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                               INTRODUCTION
      Defendant Cesar Jose Rojo (Rojo) was convicted of attempted voluntary
manslaughter after a jury trial. The judgment was affirmed on direct appeal.
Rojo subsequently filed a petition for recall and resentencing under Penal
Code section 1172.6. The trial court denied the petition, concluding Rojo was
ineligible for relief as a matter of law.
      On appeal, appellate counsel filed a brief that summarized the
procedural history with citations to the record, raised no issues, and asked
this court to independently review the record pursuant to People v. Delgadillo
(2022) 14 Cal.5th 216. Rojo submitted his own letter brief and requested that
this court address one issue. We address Rojo’s issue and affirm the order.

                        PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      In 2003, a jury found Rojo guilty of attempted voluntary manslaughter
(Pen. Code, § 664/192, subd. (a)). The jury found true the allegation that Rojo
personally inflicted great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subd. (a)) and
the allegation that Rojo personally used a firearm (Pen. Code, § 12022.5,
subds. (a), (d)).1 The court sentenced Rojo to 45 years to life in state prison.
      In 2004, this court affirmed the judgment on appeal. (People v. Rojo
(July 19, 2004, B168049) [nonpub. opn.].)
      In December 2022, Rojo filed, in pro. per., a petition for resentencing
under section 1172.6. The trial court denied the petition, finding that Rojo
failed to establish a prima facie case that he was entitled to relief because he
was not convicted of any charges that would make him eligible for relief
under section 1172.6.
      Rojo filed a timely notice of appeal.

1     All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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                                DISCUSSION
   A. Governing Principles
      Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) limited accomplice liability
under the felony-murder rule, eliminated the natural and probable
consequences doctrine as it relates to murder, and eliminated convictions for
murder based on a theory under which malice is imputed to a person based
solely on that person’s participation in a crime. (See generally People v. Reyes
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 981; People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957, 959
(Lewis); People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842–843 (Gentile).) Senate
Bill No. 1437 (SB 1437) added section 189, subdivision (e) (limiting
application of the felony-murder rule) and section 188, subdivision (a)(3)
(stating that “to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall act with
malice aforethought” and “[m]alice shall not be imputed to a person based
solely on his or her participation in a crime”). As amended by Senate Bill No.
775, effective January 1, 2022, these ameliorative changes to the law now
expressly apply to attempted murder and voluntary manslaughter.
      SB 1437 also created a procedure, codified at section 1172.6, for a
person convicted of murder, attempted murder, or voluntary manslaughter
under the former law to be resentenced if the person could no longer be
convicted of those crimes under the current law. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 959; Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 847.) A defendant commences that
procedure by filing a petition containing a declaration that, among other
things, the defendant could not presently be convicted of murder, attempted
murder, or voluntary manslaughter under the current law. (People v. Strong
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708.) If a petition establishes a prima facie case for
relief, the trial court must appoint counsel if requested, issue an order to

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show cause, and hold an evidentiary hearing. (Strong, at pp. 708–709;
§ 1172.6, subds. (b)(3), (c), & (d)(1).)
      Where a trial court denies a section 1172.6 petition based on the failure
to make a prima facie case for relief, our review is de novo. (See People v.
Drayton (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 965, 981, overruled in part on another ground
in Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 962–970.)

   B. Analysis
      Rojo asserts that he is eligible for resentencing under section 1172.6
because he “was convicted of attempted manslaughter which is basically the
same crime as attempted murder.” However, the amendments enacted by
Senate Bill No. 775 (2020–2021 Reg. Sess.) limited resentencing to
petitioners convicted after trial of murder, attempted murder, and voluntary
manslaughter, subject to certain express requirements. The Legislature did
not include attempted voluntary manslaughter within those provisions.
“‘[I]nsert[ing]’ additional language into a statute ‘violate[s] the cardinal rule
of statutory construction that courts must not add provisions to statutes.’”
(People v. Guzman (2005) 35 Cal.4th 577, 587.) “Where, as here, the
Legislature makes express statutory distinctions, ‘we must presume it did so
deliberately, giving effect to the distinctions, unless the whole scheme reveals
the distinction is unintended. . . . [W]e presume the Legislature intended
everything in a statutory scheme, and we should not read statutes to omit
expressed language or include omitted language.’” (People v. Connor (2004)
115 Cal.App.4th 669, 691.)
      Because Rojo has not presented any cognizable arguments on appeal,
we must affirm the trial court’s order. (People v. Davis (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th
168, 172 [“a trial court’s order/judgment is presumed to be correct, error is

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never presumed, and the appealing party must affirmatively demonstrate
error on the face of the record”].)

                                 DISPOSITION
      The trial court’s postjudgment order denying Rojo’s section 1172.6
petition is affirmed.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                          ZUKIN, J.

      We concur:

      CURREY, P. J.

      MORI, J.

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