Court Opinion

ID: 9579960
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:00:25.239101+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:55.557816
License: Public Domain

*222On Motion for Rehearing.
The plaintiff-appellant, Ellington, brought suit against the appellee-Tolar, the general contractor; the appellee-Diamond Roofing, the subcontractor, was brought into the suit by Tolar on a contract of indemnity. Diamond Roofing, as third party defendant, had the right to assert against the plaintiff any defenses which Tolar, the third party plaintiff, had to the claim. Code Ann. § 81A-114 (a). Therefore Diamond Roofing moved for summary judgment on the theory that Tolar was a "statutory employer” under South Carolina workmen’s compensation law, that under that statute the plaintiff-appellant’s exclusive remedy against Tolar was workmen’s compensation, and that the plaintiff-appellant being barred from a common law recovery against Tolar, Diamond Roofing, as third party defendant should be granted summary judgment; in support of its motion, Diamond Roofing submitted the affidavit of its president to the effect that it (Diamond Roofing) had "more than fifteen (15) employees” under the applicable South Carolina law and a copy of the contract between Tolar and itself. In light of Diamond Roofing’s status as a third party defendant it is apparent that its claim of "more than fifteen employees” goes to Tolar’s status as a "statutory employer” under South Carolina workmen’s compensation; under the law of that state the employees of the subcontractor (Diamond Roofing) are deemed "statutory employees” of the general contractor (Tolar). Corollo v. S. S. Kresge Co., 456 F2d 306 (4th Cir. 1972). If the plaintiff were a "statutory employee” of Tolar, he would have no common law right of recovery against the general contractor and therefore Diamond Roofing, the third party defendant, sought summary judgment.
The plaintiff filed his own affidavit in opposition to Diamond Roofing’s motion, alleging "Diamond Roofing, Inc. did not employ in service more than fifteen (15) employees”; he further moved the court to compel Diamond Roofing to provide more specifics about the employees it claimed.
A short time later Tolar (the general contractor, *223defendant and third party plaintiff) moved for its own summary judgment on the same grounds as urged by Diamond Roofing (that South Carolina workmen’s compensation was the plaintiffs exclusive remedy against it, the general contractor) and in support attached a copy of the Diamond Roofing affidavit claiming the statutory fifteen employees; again the theory was that the subcontractor’s employees were under South Carolina law the "statutory employees” of the general contractor and that apparently pretermitting its. (Tolar’s) own number of employees, the number of employees of Diamond Roofing made it (Tolar) a "statutory employer.”
The questions presented on these motions for summary judgment were complicated and confusing. Honed to its essence, the issue was what was the applicable South Carolina law and under the evidence was that law, as found, fatally determinative of the plaintiffs action against Tolar. There is no doubt that under our conflicts law, it is the law of South Carolina, the site of the accident, which controls here. Ohio Southern Exp. Co. v. Beeler, 110 Ga. App. 867, 868 (140 SE2d 235). Under Code Ann. § 81A-143 (c) the trial judge was authorized to consider any relevant material or source in determining such law; objections to certain materials in the record as to South Carolina law are without merit. Likewise, it is apparent that the trial judge found the law of South Carolina to have been at the time in question that a "statutory employer” for workmen’s compensation purposes was one who employed "fifteen or more” (not "more than fifteen”). S. C. Code §§ 72-12, 72-13, 72-107 (2). This determination was correct and a proper ruling on a question of law. Code Ann. § 81A-143 (c). If South Carolina workmen’s compensation is applicable its remedy is exclusive and the grant of summary judgment was proper. S. C. Code § 72-121. The problem is that South Carolina workmen’s compensation law applies only if the defendant (Tolar) has fifteen or more employees. Having correctly found what the law of South Carolina is, was the trial judge properly granting summary judgment on the theory that under the evidence before him that law was applicable? Or does there remain a question of material fact — whether Tolar indeed had the requisite fifteen *224employees so as to make it a "statutory employer” so as to make South Carolina law controlling?
The only issue was whether Tolar was a "statutory employer” under South Carolina law. Tolar originally claimed the requisite fifteen employees through reliance on the affidavit of Diamond Roofing (the subcontractor) claiming that number as was proper under South Carolina law; the plaintiff urges he controverted this affidavit by alleging Diamond Roofing did not have "more than” fifteen employees. Ignoring the question whether this was sufficient to create an issue of law (South Carolina law requiring "fifteen or more” and the plaintiffs affidavit alleging not "more than” fifteen), we believe the grant of summary judgment was proper. At the hearing on the motion the trial judge "further inquired into the factual basis” of Diamond Roofing’s affidavit. Code Ann. § 81A-143 (b); he further accepted supplemental affidavits from both Diamond Roofing and Tolar on the question of Tolar’s number of employees. Tolar by affidavit listed twenty-three names and addresses of its employees, all different from those claimed by the subcontractor’s affidavit. Accepting supplemental affidavits was a proper procedure under Code Ann. § 81A-156 (e); the information presented therein was exactly that requested by the plaintiff when he originally filed his affidavit in opposition to the motion. The plaintiff did not respond to these affidavits: nor did he move under Code Ann. § 81A-156 (f) for a continuance or discovery in order to so respond.
Thus the evidence before the trial judge was that the accident happened in South Carolina; that the plaintiffs exclusive remedy under South Carolina law was workmen’s compensation if Tolar were a "statutory employer” under that law; and that by unrebutted affidavit Tolar had in its employ fifteen employees at the time in question different from those claimed by Diamond Roofing, the subcontractor. On this evidence, the trial judge properly found the plaintiff had failed to rebut Tolar’s prima facie showing of its right to summary judgment even though the number of Diamond Roofing’s own employees may have been in controversy. What must be in issue is a material question of fact, i.e., whether or *225not Tolar was a "statutory employer.”
The grant of summary judgment to Tolar was proper. Wardell v. Richmond Screw &c. Co., 133 Ga. App. 378 (210 SE2d 854). The grant of summary judgment to Diamond Roofing, the third party defendant, whose liability would be secondary to Tolar’s, was likewise proper. Code Ann. § 81A-114 (a).

Motion for rehearing denied.