Court Opinion

ID: 9839858
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-14 16:04:26.823236+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:42:00.780876
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
  UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                  AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                     IN THE
              ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                 DIVISION ONE

  THE ROBERTSON FAMILY LIVING TRUST DATED JUNE 12, 2003;
     JAMES M. ROBERTSON AND COLLEEN M. ROBERTSON,
                    Plaintiffs/Appellants,

                                         v.

SIERRA PINES PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., an Arizona
             non-profit association, Defendant/Appellee.

                              No. 1 CA-CV 23-0069
                                FILED 9-14-2023

             Appeal from the Superior Court in Navajo County
                         No. S0900CV201600289
               The Honorable Joseph Samuel Clark, Judge

                                   AFFIRMED

                                    COUNSEL

Paul D. Nordini, Esq., Scottsdale
By Paul D. Nordini
Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants

Jones, Skelton & Hochuli P.L.C., Phoenix
By J. Gary Linder, Kimberly K. Page, Jonathan P. Barnes, Jr.
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee
              ROBERTSON FAMILY, et a. v. SIERRA PINES
                      Decision of the Court

                      MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge James B. Morse Jr. delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Cynthia J. Bailey and Judge Brian Y. Furuya joined.

M O R S E, Judge:

¶1           The Robertson Family Living Trust Dated June 12, 2003,
James M. Robertson, and Colleen M. Robertson (collectively, "Robertsons")
appeal the superior court's order enforcing a settlement agreement. For the
following reasons, we affirm.

             FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2            In 2016, the Robertsons sued Sierra Pines Property Owners
Association, Inc. ("Sierra Pines") for failing to enforce its Declaration of
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions. The court set a settlement
conference for November 2019.

¶3            At the settlement conference, Sierra Pines' counsel "advised
the Court of the agreement as set forth on the record" and the Robertsons
"advised the Court [they were] in agreement with what [Sierra Pines'
counsel] advised." The court then "noted for the record all parties
knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily" reached an agreement and
"directed [Sierra Pines' counsel] to draw up the agreement for signature."

¶4            Sierra Pines sent the Robertsons a written agreement, and the
Robertsons sent the agreement back to Sierra Pines but removed the
"Confidentiality" and "Non-Disparagement" clauses from the agreement
("Exhibit C"). To determine whether the clauses were part of their
agreement, the parties requested a digital recording of the settlement
conference, but the court was "unable to locate the digital recording."
Without a digital recording of the settlement conference, the parties
stipulated to a status conference to resolve the issue.

¶5            At the status conference, the Robertsons advised the court
that "a settlement conference took place on November 25, 2019," and "a
settlement was reached by the parties at that time." The court "proposed
counsel litigate the pending issue and set a hearing to determine if [the]
parties can reach an agreement." The Robertsons noted that they

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               ROBERTSON FAMILY, et a. v. SIERRA PINES
                       Decision of the Court

"intend[ed] to discuss only the [pending] issue as the rest ha[d] been agreed
upon." The court set a status conference for July 2020.

¶6           At the July conference, the court acknowledged "there was a
dispute regarding confidentiality and non-disparagement" but reassigned
the case due to a conflict. After reassignment, the court held additional
conferences and eventually ordered Sierra Pines to prepare a memorandum
addressing the court's authority to enforce the settlement agreement.

¶7           In May 2021, Sierra Pines moved to enforce the settlement
agreement, providing the court a memorandum of authorities and agreeing
to be bound by Exhibit C's terms. The Robertsons moved to deny Sierra
Pines' motion, arguing "there was no settlement agreement as a result of the
[November 2019] Settlement Conference." The court set a hearing for
August 2021.

¶8            At the August hearing, Sierra Pines stated it was "willing to
execute" Exhibit C, but the Robertsons requested that "the settlement
conference be discarded" and to "continue with the litigation on the basis
[that] the case ha[d] not settled." The court concluded that the parties
agreed to a settlement agreement on the record during the November 2019
settlement conference and granted Sierra Pines' motion to enforce the
settlement agreement, finding "Exhibit C as the agreement of the parties."
The court dismissed the Robertsons' complaint with prejudice.

¶9            The Robertsons timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under
A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).

                                DISCUSSION

I.     Settlement Agreement.

¶10            The Robertsons' opening brief does not provide an applicable
standard of review on appeal. See ARCAP 13(a)(7)(B) (requiring appellants
to provide "the applicable standard of appellate review with citation to
supporting legal authority"). Citing the standard for reviewing grants of
summary judgment, Sierra Pines asserts that we should review the court's
decision de novo. See Robertson v. Alling, 237 Ariz. 345, 347, ¶ 8 (2015).
Accordingly, we conduct a de novo review of the court's ruling but "will
affirm if the trial court's disposition is correct for any reason." Logerquist v.
Danforth, 188 Ariz. 16, 18 (App. 1996).

¶11         The Robertsons argue that the parties did not have an
agreement and the court erred in approving Exhibit C as their agreement.

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               ROBERTSON FAMILY, et a. v. SIERRA PINES
                       Decision of the Court

¶12           Under Rule 80(a), settlement agreements between parties or
attorneys are not binding if disputed unless they are evidenced by a writing
or made orally in court and entered in the minutes. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 80(a)(1)
–(2). Rule 80(a) applies "when parties dispute the existence or terms of an
agreement, as distinct from other challenges to its enforceability."
Robertson, 237 Ariz. at 348, ¶ 15.

¶13           Here, the agreement was set forth on the record and noted in
the court's minute entry. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 80(a)(2); see cf. Fotinos v. Baker, 164
Ariz. 447, 448 (App. 1990) (concluding "that the parties intended to be
bound by the oral agreement of their counsel" despite the parties reducing
their agreement to writing after orally settling). Minutes from the
settlement conference indicate that Sierra Pines' counsel "advised the Court
of the agreement as set forth on the record" and the court "noted for the
record all parties knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily [had] reached an
agreement," directing Sierra Pines' counsel "to draw up the agreement for
signature." See AROK Constr. Co. v. Indian Constr. Servs., 174 Ariz. 291, 299
(App. 1993) ("Manifestations of assent that are in themselves sufficient to
conclude a contract will not be prevented from so operating by the fact that
the parties also manifest an intention to prepare and adopt a written
memorial thereof . . . ." (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 27
(1981))).

¶14            The Robertsons do not dispute that Exhibit C included the
provisions to which they agreed, only that Sierra Pines did not agree to
exclude the "Confidentiality" and "Non-Disparagement" clauses when the
Robertsons first sent Exhibit C. The law "favors enforcement when it is clear
that the parties intended themselves to be bound," and "absent or uncertain
terms are not fatal to the enforceability of an otherwise binding contract."
AROK, 174 Ariz. at 297; see Schade v. Diethrich, 158 Ariz. 1, 10–11 (1988)
(finding agreement to enter into a fair settlement, with specific terms to be
resolved later, manifested mutual assent to be bound). Thus, a contract may
be formed if it is clear the parties intended to be bound by its terms. Johnson
Int'l, Inc. v. City of Phoenix, 192 Ariz. 466, 470, ¶ 26 (App. 1998). And
whether the confidentiality and non-disparagement terms were part of
their agreement is "not invariably fatal to the rights of the parties to obtain
enforcement of their bargain," if the parties agreed to the terms providing
for a breach and remedy. AROK, 174 Ariz. at 297–98 ("The terms of a
contract are reasonably certain if they provide a basis for determining the
existence of a breach and for giving an appropriate remedy." (quoting
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 33(2) (1981))).

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               ROBERTSON FAMILY, et a. v. SIERRA PINES
                       Decision of the Court

¶15            At the initial status conference, the Robertsons admitted that
aside from the two clauses, "the rest ha[d] been agreed upon." And at the
August hearing, the Robertsons admitted their counsel sent Sierra Pines
Exhibit C, which the Robertsons approved. Even though Sierra Pines only
later "accept[ed] the [Robertsons'] version of . . . the settlement agreement,"
the parties did not dispute the remaining terms, which were sufficient to
bind the parties. See AROK, 174 Ariz. at 297 ("[T]he actions of the parties
may show conclusively that they have intended to conclude a binding
agreement, even though one or more terms are missing or are left to be
agreed upon. In such cases, courts endeavor, if possible, to attach a sufficiently
definite meaning to the bargain." (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts
§ 33 cmt. a (1981))); cf. Althaus v. Cornelio, 203 Ariz. 597, 601, ¶ 15 (App. 2002)
(concluding the parties reached a settlement despite several contingencies
such as "acceptable release and confidentiality provisions"). Based on the
parties' concessions in prior proceedings, the court did not err in granting
Sierra Pines' motion to enforce Exhibit C, thereby dismissing the
Robertsons' complaint with prejudice. See Hays v. Fischer, 161 Ariz. 159, 165
(App. 1989) ("[W]here the facts are undisputed, a trial court has authority
to summarily enforce a settlement agreement entered into while the suit is
pending before it.").

II.    Attorney Fees.

¶16           Both parties request an award of attorney fees on appeal. We
deny the Robertsons' request for attorney fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01. See
A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A) ("In any contested action arising out of a contract,
express or implied, the court may award the successful party reasonable
attorney fees."). Sierra Pines requests its attorney fees under the settlement
agreement, citing Am. Power Prods., Inc. v. CSK Auto, Inc., 242 Ariz. 364, 367–
68, ¶ 13 (2017) ("[Section] 12-341.01 does not 'alter[], prohibit[] or restrict[]'
contracts that 'provide for attorney fees' . . . ."). As the prevailing party on
appeal, we award Sierra Pines its reasonable attorney fees upon compliance
with Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 21.

                                CONCLUSION

¶17            We affirm.

                            AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                            FILED: AA

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