Court Opinion

ID: 9469829
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:50:10.531424+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:35.415746
License: Public Domain

WEICK, Senior Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. The District judge titled his opinion following the bench trial as follows:
MEMORANDUM
“The Shoot Out at the O. K. Motel”
There was indeed a shoot out in the night season around 1:45 A.M. at the motel, but appellant Homicide Detective Jack Rohtert did not participate in the shooting in any manner, and was not even present at the scene. Appellee Fletcher Altman Smith had been pursued by defendant police officer Don Heath for reckless driving and when Smith fled into a room in his motel which contained rifles, shot guns, and ammunition, one of which he had in his hands when Heath chased him into the room and shot him. The room contained on its walls in gun racks, nineteen guns of which twelve were loaded with ammunition.
The rifle in the hands of Smith was not loaded unbeknownst to Heath.
Smith was awarded damages against Heath by the district judge as follows:
(a) Pain and suffering $ 80,000.00
(b) Impairment of enjoyment of life 5,000.00
(c) Violation of his constitutional right not to be shot 5,000.00
(d) Hospital bill 2,212.50
(e) Punitive damages 25,000.00
Attorney fees 28.011.20
Total $140,223.70
Police Officer Heath did not file a cross-appeal.1
In addition, the two Smiths sought to recover damages against Homicide Detective Rohtert, separately, but not as a joint tort-feasor. Rohtert, as before stated, was not even present at the time Smith was shot and Rohtert in no way participated in it. Smith’s theory as to the liability of Detective Rohtert is set forth in an amended pretrial order of the court as follows:
It is also the theory of plaintiff, Fletcher Altman Smith, that:
1. Defendant Rohtert, acting on his own and through officers at his command, did direct and participate in an illegal search of plaintiff’s residence and personal effects, having failed to obtain a search warrant or plaintiff’s permission to search;
2. Defendants in the course of their illegal search damaged plaintiff’s residence and personal belongings;
3. Defendants illegally caused certain of plaintiff’s property including a late model Dodge Maxi-van to be confiscated. Furthermore, it is the theory of plaintiff, Fletcher Altman Smith, that each individual defendant, being first sworn to uphold the laws and ordinances of Tennessee and the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee, was bound to intervene on plaintiff’s behalf to prevent any other officer in the vicinity or under their supervision from conducting an illegal search and seizure or in any manner violating the civil rights of plaintiff. The failure of each defendant to so intervene, creates joint and several liability on the part of each defendant.
The trouble with Smith’s theory is that he was unable to support it with even an iota of evidence or law, as the shooting had already taken place and the search was in progress by other metropolitan police officers before Detective Rohtert arrived on the scene. It was dark and in the early hours of the morning. Rohtert entered through an open door and remained for about 15 to 30 minutes, at most, when he departed for the hospital to investigate the condition of Smith, who had been shot. There were many police officers there conducting the search, which included ser*230geants, lieutenants, majors, and even identification officers, who were actually not only conducting but were in charge of the search. These officers were not employed by Detective Rohtert and he was in no way liable for their torts. In any event, under Section 1983 actions, the doctrine of respondes t superior is in no way applicable as I will demonstrate.
The district court found damages in favor of Smith against Detective Rohtert, in addition to those he assessed against Police Officer Heath as follows:
(a) Unlawful entry and search and seizure $ 5,000
(b) Loss of three rifles when premises were left unattended 450
(c) Punitive damages 5.000
Total $10,450
The district court also determined that Detective Rohtert was liable to Marguerite Betty Smith, also known as, Grandma Smith, who only witnessed the shooting and was detained for a statement and allowed her damages as follows:
As compensatory damages for her unconstitutional arrest and detention for several hours $ 5,000
For her nervous condition 5,000
Punitive damages 2.500
Total $12,500
The district court then assessed against Detective Rohtert costs and attorney fees for Fletcher Smith and Marguerite Smith the sum of $16,574.95.
I
Liability
The appellant Jack Rohtert was a sworn police officer in the Detective Division of the Department of Metropolitan Police of the Metropolitan Government in Nashville, Tennessee. The Charter of the Metropolitan Government provides for the powers, duties and responsibilities of the Department of Metropolitan Police as follows:
1) The Department shall be responsible for the preservation of the public peace, prevention and detection of crime, the apprehension of criminals, protection of personal and property rights and enforcement of laws of the State of Tennessee and ordinances of the metropolitan government, and
2) The Director and other members of the metropolitan police force are vested with all the power and authority belonging to the officer of constable by common law and also with all the power, authority and duties which by statute are provided for police and law enforcement officers of counties and cities.
The Charter of the Metropolitan Government, § 16.05, in part, further provides:
"... The function as principal conservator of the peace is hereby transferred and assigned to the metropolitan chief of police, provided for by article 8, chapter 2 of this Charter ...”
Detective Rohtert had worked in the Homicide Division for about seven years prior to the incident. At the time the shooting took place, Detective Rohtert was driving his police automobile elsewhere when he received a call on his car radio about the shooting which advised the location, and in response thereto, Rohtert drove alone immediately to the motel. He entered an open door. This was even conceded by the majority on page two of their opinion, which states: “When he arrived, he found the door open with the other officers inside.” These officers it is claimed had previously broken into the motel, entered and were conducting the search even before Detective Rohtert arrived. There was no evidence that Homicide Detective Rohtert had anything to do with ordering the presence of the police officers who were actually conducting the search and seizure. In view of this finding by the majority, it is almost unbelievable that they could find Rohtert liable for an unlawful entry and search and seizure. Rohtert did not enter unlawfully. There is no evidence that he conducted any search or seizure. He did not steal any of Smith’s guns. He did not leave the premises unattended. Rohtert was in no way responsible legally for the *231acts or neglects of the other police officers. The majority agrees with the district court that Detective Rohtert is liable for the actions of the police officers who conducted the search and seizure. The statement on page 222 of the majority opinion that Rohtert by his own admission was in charge of the investigation is not entirely correct. He was of course in charge of his own investigation, and he was not accompanied by any other homicide officer. He was not in charge of the investigation by the other officers which was being conducted in full force for some time before Rohtert arrived at the scene.
Rohtert further testified:
Q. Is it correct to state that you were the homicide officer on the scene when you arrived?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. So, therefore, you were the officer in charge of the scene when you arrived?
A. Of the investigation.
Q. Did you remain the officer on the scene in charge of the investigation during the time that you were there?
A. I would say yes, with the exception of there’s an old departmental policy that comes from way back that tells you that at the scene of an investigation your main officer in charge is your identification officer during the time he is processing a scene.
Q. Were you the identification officer?
A. No.
Arriving at the scene at night and in the early hours of the morning after the shooting had already taken place and the motel was filled with other police officers who were conducting the search, it is unbelievable that the district judge could find Detective Rohtert guilty of unlawful entry and search and seizure, when he did not enter unlawfully and did not conduct a search and seizure. Rohtert was not responsible for other police officers being present. They were not his employees, and he had no authority to order them to depart. They were undoubtedly present on orders of the police department. Rohtert, as before stated, entered the motel through an open door. He did not break into the motel in order to enter it.
Detective Rohtert testified as follows:
Q. Where were you and what kind of— how did you get notice of this event?
A. Through the police radio, dispatcher.
Q. When you got this information, however you got it, what did you do?
A. Went to the scene.
Q When you arrived there, sir, what did you observe?
A A large amount of police officers.
Q What did you do?
A I talked with Officer Heath as far as what occurred. He did advise me what occurred. I requested identification team to preserve the crime scene, take whatever evidence is necessary, and evaluate the situation the best I could at the time. If my memory serves me correctly, I personally called General Hospital to request the condition of the man that did leave the scene and found out his condition to be very serious, and it was my choice, I felt as though I should go to the hospital to see if there was a dying declaration.
Q. Approximately how long were you out there at the motel area?
A. I would say the maximum would probably be about thirty minutes, the minimum would be say, fifteen.
Q. Did you see Mrs. Betty Smith on that trip?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you order her to go downtown?
A. No, as far as ordering, per se, no. I asked another police officer which I don’t know his name, to get transportation for the lady to go to the Homicide Office.
We are not called upon to determine whether the other police officers who conducted the search and seizure could be held *232Hable for unlawful search and seizure, as they were not sued and are not parties to this appeal. They could undoubtedly rely on the fact that the search and seizure took place in the early hours of the morning right after the shooting, when it would be difficult if not impossible to obtain a search warrant and that their search took only a very short time. Cf. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978).
The general rule is that the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The mere fact that a supervisor has general authority over a subordinate is not sufficient to impose liability for acts of the subordinate. In order for a supervisor to be held liable under § 1983, he must personally participate in the acts complained of, or at least affirmatively authorize or direct them. In the present case, Rohtert was not even a supervisor.
There are a large number of cases which so hold:
Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 n.58, 98 S.Ct. 2018,2037 n.58, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), citing as authority Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 96 S.Ct. 598, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976).
Ellis v. Blum, 643 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1981).
Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926 (4th Cir. 1977).
Thompson v. Bass, 616 F.2d 1259 (5th Cir. 1980).
Hays v. Jefferson County, Kentucky, 668 F.2d 869, 872-74 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. pending.
Adams v. Pate, 445 F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1971).
DeShields v. United States Parole Commission, 593 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1979).
Lessman v. McCormick, 591 F.2d 605 (10th Cir. 1979).
Freeman v. Trudell, 497 F.Supp. 481 (E.D.Mich.1980).
Knipp v. Weikle, 405 F.Supp. 782 (N.D. Ohio 1975).
Veres v. County of Monroe, 364 F.Supp. 1327 (E.D.Mich.1973), aff’d, 542 F.2d 1177 (6th Cir. 1976).
The best and most thorough discussion which I have found is in the recent case from our court, Hays v. Jefferson County, Kentucky, supra. The court summed up as follows, 668 F.2d at 874:
The result of Rizzo and subsequent cases in the lower federal courts applying the standards it announced is that a failure of a supervisory official to supervise, control, or train the offending individual officers is not actionable absent a showing that the official either encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it. At a minimum a plaintiff must show that the official at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers.
Cases specifically involving liability of police supervisors for acts of subordinates have been held as follows:
Police supervisory officers cannot be held liable for failure to prevent misconduct by subordinate absent a showing of direct responsibility for the improper action. In Wilson v. Beebe, 612 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1980), we held in an opinion by Chief Judge Edwards and Judges Lively and Engel:
The complaint in this case did not allege as to the two State Police officials that they played any personal role in the shooting incident. It does allege that they failed in their supervisory and training functions to prepare Officer Beebe properly for the making of the" arrest involved.
It appears that the United States Supreme Court has held that a § 1983 action will not He against police supervisory officers for failure to prevent police misconduct, absent a showing of direct responsibility for the improper action. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 96 S.Ct. 598, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976); Kostka v. Hogg, 560 F.2d 37 (1st Cir. 1977); Scheurer v. *233Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974).
Police supervisory personnel are not liable for damages to one injured by police misconduct absent direct personal participation. Sanberg v. Daley, 306 F.Supp. 277 (N.D.Ill.1969).
It is not sufficient to hold a chief of police liable for the wrongful acts of his subordinates merely because the wrongdoer was acting under the general supervision of the chief. He must directly and personally participate in the alleged misconduct. Richardson v. Snow, 340 F.Supp. 1261 (D.Md.1972); Fanburg v. City of Chattanooga, 330 F.Supp. 1047 (E.D.Tenn.1968).
Cf. General Building Contractors Association, Inc., Petitioner v. Pennsylvania, et aL, -U.S. —, 102 S.Ct. 3141, 73 L.Ed.2d 835 (1982), 50 L.W. 4975, 4979, 4980, 4981, 4982.
It is clear that the Memorandum of the district judge and the majority opinion, not only conflict with the weight of authority, but also with the two opinions of this court in Wilson v. Beebe, 612 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1980) and Hays v. Jefferson County, Kentucky, 668 F.2d 869 (6th Cir. 1982). The doctrine of stare decisis is supposed to be binding on all of us.
There was no basis for granting punitive damages in favor of either of the plaintiffs against Detective Rohtert or for attorney fees. At all times, Detective Rohtert acted in good faith according to the overwhelming evidence. He did suggest to Marguerite Smith that she go to a back room during the investigation, but this was for her own convenience and protection. He did ask her to go to the homicide headquarters and provided her with transportation, as it was necessary for Rohtert to procure statements of the witnesses immediately and before they could be changed or interfered with. She procured transportation to return to the motel from a friend. If she had preferred to ride to the headquarters for the statement with a friend instead of in the police car, she should have requested that privilege from Detective Rohtert, which she neglected to do. So far as to her treatment by Detective Rohtert she testified:
Q. You were not mistreated by either Detective Rohtert or any one else?
A. No.
Supp. App. P. 56.
Relative to the award of $5,000 for her nervous condition, without trauma, there was no evidence that this was caused by Detective Rohtert. All he did was to take a statement from her after the shooting. She consulted with a doctor who did not testify. It should be remembered that she and a minor child were in very close proximity to the actual shooting, and she was severely frightened because of fear that she or the child might be shot. This could very well have caused her nervousness entirely. If she really had claimed that the taking of her statement and not the shooting which she closely witnessed caused her nervous condition, she should have offered medical testimony to prove it which she neglected to do. At most even if it were found that there was a technical violation of her rights in taking her statement, she would only be entitled to nominal damages.
II
In my opinion, the district judge in making his findings garbled the facts and misapplied the law. Such factual findings do not prevent appellate review to which Detective Rohtert was justly entitled to receive, but has received only an erroneous review. The district judge even questioned Detective Rohtert’s motive in making the investigation, stating that it was to justify the shooting. This was error as Detective Rohtert in making the investigation merely responded to a call to duty received by radio from headquarters.
Detective Rohtert was entitled to the defense of good faith and qualified immunity which was not accorded to him. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967); Ford v. Wells, 347 F.Supp. 1026 (D.C.Tenn.1972), Judge Neese; Annotation 1 ALR Fed. 519; Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974) *234qualified immunity; Wilson v. Beebe, supra; slip opinion Supreme Court of the United States in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 1982, 457 U.S. -, page -, 102 S.Ct. 2690 page 2694, 73 L.Ed.2d 349 (1982); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982), fn. 34, 35.
In Nick Sanborn and John D. Barkeloo, Petitioners v. Dennis M. Wolfel, - U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 3476, 73 L.Ed.2d 1363 (Aug. 2, 1982), the Supreme Court granted certiorari and summarily vacated the judgment of the Sixth Circuit and remanded in the following order in a suit erroneously awarding damages against parole officers of the State of Ohio and failure to award them qualified immunity:
ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is ordered and adjudged by this Court that the judgment of the Court of Appeals in this cause is vacated with costs, and that this cause is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit for further consideration in light of Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 2909, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978) (deeming it “untenable to draw a distinction for purposes of immunity law between suits brought against state officials under § 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitution against federal officials”).
Ill
In sum, it is submitted that the cases against Homicide Detective Rohtert are much ado about nothing. Detective Rohtert was soaked $39,524.95 in damages by the district judge and all he did was to perform alone his sworn duty as a homicide detective, in responding to the call from headquarters to make an investigation. When he arrived at the scene, the shooting had already taken place and the motel was already filled with police officers engaged in making an investigation. If there was an unlawful search and seizure, which I doubt, it had already taken place. Detective Rohtert had nothing to do with ordering the police officers to the scene, as they were sent out by headquarters and were engaged in the search and seizure when Rohtert later arrived. Rohtert did not break and enter into the motel. He entered through an open door. He remained there from 15 to 30 minutes, and then went to the hospital to check on the Plaintiff Smith, who could not be interviewed. Rohtert then went to the homicide headquarters and took statements from the witnesses. Rohtert did not harm or injure anyone. It is clear from the authorities relied on herein that Detective Rohtert cannot be held liable for any unlawful activities of the other police officers who conducted the search and seizure or for any torts which they committed.2 These police officers were not Rohtert’s employees. They were not employed in the homicide division and even if they were, Rohtert would not be responsible for their activities, because he did not ever supervise, let'alone participate in any manner, with their activities. The doctrine of respondeat superior has no place in § 1983 actions even in respect to servants, and the other police officers were not servants of Detective Rohtert.
This appeal is governed by our decision in Wilson v. Beebe, 612 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1980) and Hays v. Jefferson County, Kentucky, 668 F.2d 869 (6th Cir. 1982). The majority opinion conflicts with the decisions in these cases which were not even cited by the majority. The district court erred in holding Detective Rohtert liable for the torts of the other police officers.
In my opinion, Plaintiff-Appellee Fletcher Altman Smith, who caused all this trouble, was fully compensated for any damage he sustained in the award of $140,223.70, which was made to him against the defend*235ant Officer Don Heath. The judgment entered in Smith’s favor against defendant police officer Don Heath operated as a res judicata and collateral estoppel, not only as to the specific claims which he asserted against Heath, but also as to all those which he might have asserted against Heath such as unlawful entry, search and seizure, and loss of three rifles.3 James v. Gerber Products Co., 587 F.2d 324, 328 (6th Cir. 1978); Coogan v. Cincinnati Bar Association, 431 F.2d 1209 (6th Cir. 1970). Smith is not entitled to recover from Rohtert for the claims he asserted or might have asserted against Heath, which were amply provided for in his judgment against Heath. It was Heath and not Rohtert who broke and entered into Smith’s motel without obtaining a search warrant. Rohtert entered later through an open door while the search and seizure of the other officers was in full progress.
In my opinion, the claims asserted by the two Smiths against Rohtert are frivolous. But this is not the end if Plaintiff-Appellee Smith prevails in this court. His attorney will then seek additional attorney fees from Detective Rohtert for having prevailed on appeal.
I would reverse the judgment against Detective Rohtert and remand with instructions to dismiss the complaint.

. Smith was charged with reckless driving; driving under the influence of alcohol, and indicted by the grand jury for assault with intent to commit murder. At a preliminary hearing, the charges were reduced to reckless driving. He was convicted of reckless driving and fined $50.

. The majority erroneously described the other police officers as Rohtert’s subordinates, although they were employed in a different department and had not been ordered to the scene by Rohtert.

. It is noteworthy and unbelievable that Smith did not seek to recover damages from the real wrongdoer, Officer Heath, for breaking and entering into his motel and the bedroom thereof. Instead, he sought to and did recover such damages from Homicide Detective Rohtert. Actually Smith was damaged only by the unlawful entry of Officer Heath and was in no way damaged by the lawful entry later by Rohtert through an open door, when the search and seizure by the other police officers had been in full force and effect for some time.