Court Opinion

ID: 9942393
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-20 21:12:59.160255+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:48:03.125598
License: Public Domain

02/20/2024
               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                          AT KNOXVILLE
                              September 20, 2023 Session

   FRANK REED ET AL. v. TOWN OF LOUISVILLE, TENNESSEE ET AL.

                  Appeal from the Circuit Court for Blount County
                    No. L-20992        David R. Duggan, Judge
                     ___________________________________

                           No. E2023-00438-COA-R3-CV
                       ___________________________________

This appeal involves a decision by the Town of Louisville Board of Zoning Appeals
(“BZA”) that was upheld on review by the Blount County Circuit Court (“trial court”).
At its May 5, 2020 hearing, the BZA granted appellee William Mattison’s request for a
variance to allow him to construct an accessory, non-attached garage on his improved
real property, which structure would purportedly exceed the height limit set by town
ordinance. The appellants, Frank and Tina Reed, who own property adjacent to Mr.
Mattison’s property and who had opposed Mr. Mattison’s request for a variance, filed a
petition for writ of certiorari with the trial court on July 5, 2022, seeking review of the
BZA’s decision. The trial court conducted hearings on the Reeds’ petition in January and
February 2023. On February 27, 2023, the trial court entered a final order affirming the
BZA’s decision to grant a variance to Mr. Mattison. The trial court found that there was
a rational basis for the BZA’s decision, which was supported by material evidence, and
that the BZA had acted within its scope of authority and discretion. The Reeds timely
appealed. Determining that there existed no material evidence of any particular
characteristic of the real property warranting the grant of a variance, we reverse the trial
court’s judgment affirming the BZA’s decision and vacate the BZA’s grant of a variance
to Mr. Mattison as illegal and outside the BZA’s authority.

        Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court
                             Reversed; Case Remanded

THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which D. MICHAEL
SWINEY, C.J., and KRISTI M. DAVIS, J., joined.

Matthew A. Grossman and Richard E. Graves, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellants,
Frank Reed and Tina Reed.
Wayne A. Kline and Barton C. Williams, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellee, William
Mattison.

Brian R. Bibb, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellees, Town of Louisville, Tennessee,
and Town of Louisville Board of Zoning Appeals.

                                        OPINION

                          I. Factual and Procedural Background

        On April 9, 2022, Mr. Mattison filed a residential building permit application with
the BZA, seeking to construct a non-attached garage or “accessory building” on his
improved real property located in Louisville, Tennessee. Mr. Mattison stated in the
application that the garage would be 2,400 square feet in size and twenty-one feet tall at
its highest point. Along with the building permit application, Mr. Mattison sent a letter to
the BZA requesting the approval of a height variance for the proposed accessory
building. In this letter, Mr. Mattison explained that the building itself would be fourteen
feet tall and that the roof would peak at twenty-one feet. He also stated that the building
would be the “same as the existing building that I own, on the adjacent parcel 3302.”

       The BZA placed Mr. Mattison’s request for a variance on the agenda for its May
5, 2022 meeting. Adjacent property owners were notified of Mr. Mattison’s request for a
variance and the upcoming hearing. The meeting report from the May 5, 2022 BZA
meeting reflects that neighboring property owners, including Frank and Tina Reed,
Christopher and Brandi Shipwash, and Rita Walker, attended the meeting to speak in
opposition to Mr. Mattison’s request. Mr. Mattison indicated during the hearing that he
had sought the height variance in order to install garage doors that were tall enough to
allow for the storage of boats or other items taller than a standard car.

       The hearing transcript from the May 2022 BZA meeting reflects that a contentious
debate ensued concerning more than the height variance request. Neighboring property
owners who opposed the variance also raised concerns about the lack of upkeep of Mr.
Mattison’s property, its potential use as a commercial repair facility, and the potential
environmental ramifications of such use. In response to these concerns, Mr. Mattison
claimed that he was retired and did not operate any type of business on the property in
question. At the conclusion of the hearing, the BZA voted by a 3-2 majority to approve
the height variance as requested by Mr. Mattison.

       On May 11, 2022, the BZA sent a letter to Mr. Mattison approving his request for
a variance subject to the following conditions:

       1.     The proposed twenty-one foot height for the accessory building
              could not be exceeded.
                                       -2-
      2.     The location of the building had to be at the corner of Mr. Mattison’s
             parcel “with 30 foot setback from the Shipwash property line and 20
             foot setback from the Reed property line.”

      3.     “All of Mr. Mattison’s vehicles and boats, current and future,
             dislocated by the construction of the garage, must be properly
             screened with review and approval required by the Town of
             Louisville Codes Official.”

       Following the BZA’s approval of Mr. Mattison’s request, on July 5, 2022, the
Reeds filed a petition for writ of certiorari seeking the trial court’s review of the BZA’s
variance approval pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 27-8-101, et seq. The
Reeds asked the trial court to declare the BZA’s action illegal, arbitrary, and capricious
because the variance was unsupported by material evidence in that “Mattison did not
adequately demonstrate any necessary hardship justifying a variance.” The Reeds also
requested that the court issue a judgment finding the BZA’s approval of the variance
application to be illegal, void, and unenforceable.

       The trial court conducted an initial hearing with respect to the petition on January
13, 2023, wherein the court raised specific questions and asked for additional briefing
from the parties. The court requested that the parties address whether, when rendering its
decision concerning the variance sought by Mr. Mattison, the BZA was limited to
considering issues related to the shape, size, or topographic conditions of the real
property based on the wording of the zoning ordinance. The court also requested that the
parties brief whether the BZA could exercise broader jurisdiction or review than what the
zoning ordinance expressly allowed, such as passing on special questions or appeals from
a building official’s decision.

       On February 17, 2023, the trial court conducted a final hearing respecting the
Reeds’ petition. Following the arguments of counsel for the parties, the court took note
of the authority vested in the BZA by the Town of Louisville’s Zoning Ordinance,
stating:

             Then when we turn to the specific ordinance in the Town of
      Louisville, we see that the Town of Louisville’s Zoning Ordinance has
      vested the Board of Zoning Appeals with the following authority: “To
      conduct administrative review of any order or requirement, permit decision,
      determination or refusal made by an administrative or building official
      under the Zoning Ordinance . . .” which is consistent with [Tennessee Code
      Annotated § 13-7-]206 and 207 in the statutes. “To pass upon special
      exceptions to the Zoning Ordinance, including any special questions the
      Board is authorized to consider under the Zoning Ordinance.” Again, it’s
                                         -3-
      conceded this is not a special exception, but it may be a special question.
      “To decide variances from the terms of the Zoning Ordinance.”

       Accordingly, the trial court upheld the BZA’s decision, concluding that the Town
of Louisville had chosen to “give the Board of Zoning Appeals in Louisville broader
authority than that contained on the face of Tennessee Code Annotated section 13-7-
207.3, but within the scope of the broader authority authorized by Tennessee Code
Annotated section 13-7-206 and 13-7-207.2[.]” Specifically, the court ruled:

      I am going to find that the Board of Zoning Appeals’ authority is broader
      under the statutes, the interpreting caselaw and the ordinance, the
      empowering ordinance, than what is stated in Tennessee Code Annotated
      Section 13-7-207.3, that the Board was acting within its authority, that all
      of the deferential standards therefore apply, and that the Board of Zoning
      Appeals had a reasonable basis for its decision, and accordingly, I’m going
      to uphold the decision of the Louisville Board of Zoning Appeals.

       On February 27, 2023, the trial court entered its final order affirming the BZA’s
decision to grant the variance to Mr. Mattison. The court found “that there was a rational
basis supported by material evidence for the decision[.]” The court additionally stated
that “the Board of Zoning Appeals acted within the scope of its authority and discretion
granted by Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-7-206, Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-7-207, and the Town of
Louisville Zoning Ordinance.” The court therefore dismissed the petition for certiorari
and affirmed the May 5, 2022 decision of the BZA. The Reeds timely appealed.

                                   II. Issues Presented

       The Reeds present the following issues for this Court’s review, which we have
restated slightly:

      1.     Whether this Court must review the administrative record de novo to
             determine whether material evidence exists supporting the BZA’s
             grant of a height variance to Mr. Mattison.

      2.     Whether judicial review of a variance is limited to review of the
             record for material evidence of unique property characteristics of the
             land at issue.

      3.     Whether the record in this matter lacks material evidence of
             exceptional subject property characteristics or undue hardship to Mr.
             Mattison necessary to justify the height variance.

                                          -4-
       4.     Whether the trial court erred in applying “special question” authority
              to uphold the BZA’s grant of a height variance to Mr. Mattison.

Mr. Mattison restates the relevant issues as:

       5.     Whether Mr. Mattison was permitted to build an accessory structure
              twenty-one feet tall pursuant to the Town of Louisville Zoning Ordinance.

       6.     Whether the BZA had the authority to correct the erroneous interpretation
              of the codes enforcement officer.

       7.     Whether the trial court correctly determined that the BZA had a rational
              basis supported by material evidence for its decision.

                                 III. Standard of Review

     As this Court has explained concerning the proper standard for review of a
common law writ of certiorari:

               The vehicle for reviewing decisions of local boards of zoning
       appeals is through the common law writ of certiorari. Hoover, Inc. v.
       Metro. Bd. of Zoning Appeals of Davidson Cnty., 955 S.W.2d 52, 54 (Tenn.
       Ct. App. 1997) (citing McCallen v. City of Memphis, 786 S.W.2d 633, 639
       (Tenn. 1990)). Under the common law writ of certiorari, the reviewing
       court must examine whether the municipal agency acted illegally,
       arbitrarily, fraudulently, or in excess of its jurisdiction. McCallen, 786
       S.W.2d at 638. In doing so, the court determines “whether there is any
       material evidence that supports the action of the administrative agency.”
       Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. of Nashville, Inc. v. Metro. Bd. of Health for
       Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 934 S.W.2d 40, 49 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996)
       (citing Lansden v. Tucker, 204 Tenn. 388, 321 S.W.2d 795 (1959)). Courts
       must not “reweigh the evidence” or “scrutinize the intrinsic correctness of
       the decision,” but independently review the record to “determine whether it
       contains ‘such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
       adequate to support a rational conclusion.’” Lafferty v. City of Winchester,
       46 S.W.3d 752, 759 [(Tenn. Ct. App. 2000)] (quoting Hedgepath v. Norton,
       839 S.W.2d 416, 421 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992)). A challenge to the
       evidentiary foundation for a local zoning decision presents a question of
       law, which we review de novo with no presumption of correctness. Id., 46
       S.W.3d at 759. This Court’s review of the evidence on appeal is no broader
       or more comprehensive than the trial court’s review. Watts v. Civil Serv.
       Bd. for Columbia, 606 S.W.2d 274, 277 (Tenn. 1980).

                                            -5-
Venture Holdings, LLC v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 585 S.W.3d 409,
416-17 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting Gulley v. Robertson Cnty. Planning & Zoning
Comm’n, No. M2015-00734-COA-R3-CV, 2016 WL 2898478, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App.
May 12, 2016)).

                                IV. Necessity of Variance

      As a threshold issue, Mr. Mattison posits that the grant of a variance was
unnecessary in this matter because the subject zoning ordinance did not prohibit the
proposed accessory structure. The Town of Louisville Zoning Ordinance (“the
Ordinance”) provides in pertinent part:

      11-507. Accessory Building and Use Regulations.

              Buildings and/or uses which are customarily incidental and
      subordinate in size and function to the principal use of a site are considered
      to be accessory buildings and/or uses and are permitted on the same lot
      with a principal use. The establishment of accessory buildings and/or uses
      shall be subject to the following provisions and other applicable provisions
      of this ordinance:

             1. General Provisions.

                    a.      No accessory structure shall be occupied or used
                            unless the principal structure to which it is accessory is
                            occupied or being used.

                    b.      lf an accessory building shares a structural wall with a
                            principal building, it shall be deemed to be a part of
                            the principal building and shall comply with the
                            requirements of the ordinance applicable to a principal
                            building, such as setback, height, etc.

             2. Location.

                    a.      Residential districts. Except for general farming
                            structures, accessory buildings not exceeding one (1)
                            story or fourteen (14) feet in height, and occupying
                            less than twenty (20) percent of the required rear yard,
                            may be located as close as five (5) feet from the rear
                            property line, except as may be provided for in
                            Chapter 8. No accessory buildings or uses shall be
                            permitted within any required front or side yard,
                                           -6-
                                except for perimeter fencing and such items as mail
                                boxes, yard ornaments, and light fixtures, located so as
                                not to create a nuisance or safety hazard to neighboring
                                property or the public.

        ***

        11-508. Height and Density.

               No building or structure shall hereafter be erected or altered so as to
        exceed the height limit, to accommodate or house a greater number of
        families, to have narrower or smaller front yards or side yards than are
        required or specified in the regulations herein for the district in which it is
        located.

       Mr. Mattison asserts that the above provision, specifically Section 11-507(2)(a),
“merely states that the height of the accessory building impacts the setback
requirements.” In other words, his postulate is that the fourteen-foot height mentioned is
not a maximum. Accordingly, Mr. Mattison argues that not all accessory structures over
fourteen feet in height require a variance; rather, only those structures located within a
certain proximity to the rear property line would require a variance if greater than
fourteen feet in height. In support of his interpretation, Mr. Mattison relies on the
permissive nature of the word, “may,” and the fact that this provision appears under the
heading, “Location.”1

       “Interpretation of statutes and ordinances is a question of law which we review de
novo.” City of Knoxville v. Entm’t Res., LLC, 166 S.W.3d 650, 655 (Tenn. 2005). With
respect to interpreting ordinances, this Court has explained:

               When the language of an ordinance is clear, the courts will enforce
        the ordinance as written. When, however, the language of an ordinance is
        ambiguous, the courts will resort to the customary principles of statutory
        construction. See Whittemore v. Brentwood Planning Comm’n, 835 S.W.2d
        [11,] 15 [(Tenn. Ct. App. 1992)]. Accordingly, the reviewing courts will
        construe a zoning ordinance as a whole and will give its words their natural
        and ordinary meaning.        See Lions Head Homeowners’ Ass’n v.

1
  Mr. Mattison also argues that the BZA found the subject provision to be ambiguous such that we should
resolve the issue in favor of allowing him the free use of his property. See Whittemore v. Brentwood
Planning Comm’n, 835 S.W.2d 11, 15 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992). However, as this Court stated in
Northshore Corridor Assoc. v. Knox Cnty., 633 S.W.3d 561, 580 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2021): “Although
courts ‘will refrain from substituting their judgments for that of the local government officials,’ because
interpretation of an ordinance is a question of law, courts must review the interpretation of ordinances de
novo” (internal citations omitted).
                                                   -7-
       Metropolitan Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 968 S.W.2d 296, 301 (Tenn. Ct. App.
       1997); Boles v. City of Chattanooga, 892 S.W.2d 416, 420 (Tenn. Ct. App.
       1994). They will also seek the interpretation that is most consistent with
       the ordinance’s general purposes, but they will resolve ambiguities in favor
       of the property owner’s right to the unrestricted use of his or her property.
       See State ex rel. Morris v. City of Nashville, 207 Tenn. 672, 680, 343
       S.W.2d 847, 850 (1961); State ex rel. Wright v City of Oak Hill, 204 Tenn.
       353, 356, 321 S.W.2d 557, 559 (1959).

Venture Holdings, 585 S.W.3d at 418 (quoting 421 Corp. v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville &
Davidson Cnty., 36 S.W.3d 469, 475 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000)). This Court has further
elucidated:

       [W]hen the language of an ordinance is clear, the courts should enforce the
       ordinance as written even if hardship results. If, however, the ordinance
       lacks precision, the courts should call upon their arsenal of interpretational
       rules, presumptions, and aids to arrive at the ordinance’s meaning and
       intent.

             Zoning ordinances should be free from vague terms and imprecise
       language because of the importance of the property interests involved.
       However, they need not be unerringly accurate. If a zoning ordinance does
       not define a term, the term should be given its natural and ordinary
       meaning, and the ordinance should be construed to carry out its general
       purpose.

Whittemore v. Brentwood Planning Comm’n, 835 S.W.2d 11, 15 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992)
(internal citations omitted).

       It is undisputed that Mr. Mattison’s property is zoned “residential.” The
Ordinance provides that within a residential zone, “[c]ustomary accessory buildings” are
permitted “subject to the requirements of Section 11-507.” See Section 11-701(1)(j).
The provision at issue, subsection 2(a) of Section 11-507, specifically states that
“accessory buildings not exceeding one (1) story or fourteen (14) feet in height, and
occupying less than twenty (20) percent of the required rear yard, may be located as close
as five (5) feet from the rear property line.” Section 11-507 also specifically provides
that “[b]uildings and/or uses which are customarily incidental and subordinate in size and
function to the principal use of a site are considered to be accessory buildings and/or uses
and are permitted on the same lot with a principal use” (emphasis added).

      Although subsection 2(a) is not a model of clarity, when we consider it within the
framework of the Ordinance as a whole and give the words their natural and ordinary
meanings, see Venture, 585 S.W.3d at 418, we conclude that the proper interpretation
                                         -8-
would be to require that any accessory building in a residential zone be no more than
fourteen feet in height pursuant to subsection 2(a). To interpret subsection 2(a) as Mr.
Mattison urges, allowing an accessory building of any height so long as it is located
farther than five feet from the rear property line, would run afoul of subsection 2(a)’s
stated objective of “not [] creat[ing] a nuisance or safety hazard to neighboring property
or the public.” Moreover, an accessory building of substantial height would likely not be
“subordinate in size” to the principal structure. See Section 11-507.

        In further considering the language of Section 11-507, we also apply the statutory
interpretation maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which holds that the
“expression of one thing implies the exclusion of others.” See Northshore Corridor
Assoc. v. Knox Cnty., 633 S.W.3d 561, 580 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Rich v. Tenn.
Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 350 S.W.3d 919, 927 (Tenn. 2011)). In doing so, we infer that the
absence of any other specific height requirement concerning accessory buildings in a
residential zone implies that the fourteen-foot height limit is the only height limit
applicable to such buildings. See Rich v. Tenn. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 350 S.W.3d 919,
927 (Tenn. 2011); Northshore, 633 S.W.3d at 580. We therefore conclude that the proper
interpretation of Section 11-507(2)(a) is that any accessory building must be no more
than fourteen feet tall, occupy less than twenty percent of the required rear yard, and be
located five feet or more from the rear property line. Inasmuch as Mr. Mattison’s
proposed accessory building exceeded this height requirement, a variance or some other
relief from the terms of the Ordinance was necessary.

       We further note that Mr. Mattison took the position before the BZA and the trial
court that a variance was required because of the Ordinance’s height requirement. Mr.
Mattison’s initial letter to the BZA stated: “I am requesting a variance on the height of a
proposed accessory building . . . .” Based on the record before us, we see no indication
that Mr. Mattison has previously adopted the position that the Ordinance did not actually
impose a fourteen-foot height limitation.            Accordingly, he cannot maintain an
inconsistent position on appeal. See Estate of Schultz v. Munford, Inc., 650 S.W.2d 37,
40 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that a party “cannot take a position on appeal
inconsistent with that taken in the trial of the case”); Price v. Tenn. Prod. & Chem. Corp.,
385 S.W.2d 301, 307 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964) (“When a cause is brought up for appellate
review, a party cannot assume an attitude inconsistent with, or different from, that taken
by him at the trial.”); Bradley Cnty. v. City of Cleveland, No. E2012-00634-COA-R3-CV,
2012 WL 5333555, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2012) (“A party is not allowed to take
one position in the trial court and then take a contrary position on appeal.”). We
therefore find Mr. Mattison’s argument that he was not required to seek a variance to be
unavailing.

                                           -9-
                           V. Propriety of Grant of Variance

       We now turn to the issues raised by the appellants. The Reeds’ overarching
argument is that judicial review of a variance is limited to review of the record for
material evidence concerning unique property characteristics of the land at issue. Upon
thorough review, we agree.

      As this Court has previously explained:

             The board of zoning appeals’ authority extends only so far as state
      law permits. Father Ryan High School v. City of Oak Hill, 774 S.W.2d
      184, 190 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988). It cannot be extended by the city
      commission or by implication. State law permits, but does not require, city
      commissions to empower boards of zoning appeals to perform six
      functions: (1) making special exceptions [Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 13-7-
      206(a), -207(2)]; (2) interpreting zoning maps [Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 13-7-
      206(a), -207(2)]; (3) passing upon boundary line disputes [Tenn. Code Ann.
      § 13-7-206(a)]; (4) authorizing variances [Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-7-207(3)];
      (5) deciding other special questions as authorized in the zoning ordinance
      [Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-7-207(2)]; and (6) deciding appeals from decisions
      of a municipal building commissioner or “other administrative official”
      [Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 13-7-206(b), -207(1)].

Whittemore, 835 S.W.2d at 14.

       The statutory section that provides authority for a board of appeals to grant
variances, Tennessee Code Annotated § 13-7-207(3) (2019), states that a board can
authorize a variance based on the following circumstances:

      Where, by reason of exceptional narrowness, shallowness or shape of a
      specific piece of property at the time of the enactment of the zoning
      regulation, or by reason of exceptional topographic conditions or other
      extraordinary and exceptional situation or condition of such piece of
      property, the strict application of any regulation enacted under this part and
      part 3 of this chapter would result in peculiar and exceptional practical
      difficulties to or exception or undue hardship upon the owner of such
      property, [a board can] authorize, upon an appeal relating to the property, a
      variance from such strict application so as to relieve such difficulties or
      hardship; provided, that such relief may be granted without substantial
      detriment to the public good and without substantially impairing the intent
      and purpose of the zone plan and zoning ordinance.

                                          - 10 -
(Emphasis added.)

      With regard to the Ordinance, Section 11-207 provides:

             The Board of Zoning Appeals shall have all of the following powers,
      as granted by Section 13-7-207 of the Tennessee Code Annotated:

      ***

      3.     Variance. To hear and decide applications for variances from the
             terms of this ordinance, where, by reason of exceptional narrowness,
             shallowness, or shape of a specific piece of property as a lot of
             record at the time of adoption of this ordinance a specific hardship
             exists in meeting the requirements of this ordinance, or where by
             reason of exceptional topographical conditions or other
             extraordinary or exceptional situations or conditions of a piece of
             property, the strict application of the provisions of this ordinance
             would result in exceptional practical difficulties to or exceptional
             and undue hardship upon the owner of such property, provided that
             such relief may be granted without substantial detriment to the
             public good and without substantially impairing the intent and
             purpose of this ordinance. In granting a variance, the BZA may
             attach thereto such conditions regarding the location, character, and
             other features of the proposed building, structure or use as it may
             deem advisable in furtherance of the purpose of this ordinance.
             Before any variance is granted it shall be shown that special
             circumstances are attached to the property which do not generally
             apply to other property in the neighborhood.

(Emphasis added.)    In addition, the definitions section of the Ordinance defines a
“variance” as:

      A modification of the provisions of this ordinance when such modification
      will not be contrary to the public interest where, owing to conditions
      peculiar to the property and not the result of the actions of the applicant
      occurring after the effective date of the ordinance, a literal enforcement of
      the ordinance would result in unnecessary and undue hardship.

See Section 11-1003 (emphasis added).

       For many years, this Court has interpreted the above-referenced statutory language
and the wording of similar ordinances as requiring a showing of “peculiar circumstances
of the land . . . rather than any hardship personal to or created by an owner” before a
                                          - 11 -
variance may be lawfully granted by a board of appeals. See McClurkan v. Bd. of Zoning
Appeals for Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 565 S.W.2d 495, 497 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1977) (“[B]oth the statute and ordinance controlling here make characteristics of the
land itself the overriding criteria by which the Board is to decide the issue of hardship to
an owner.”). See also Hillsboro-W. End Neighborhood Ass’n, Inc. v. Metro. Bd. of
Zoning Appeals, Nashville Davidson Cnty., No. 01A01-9406-CH-00282, 1995 WL
79224, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 1995) (explaining that a variance must be
predicated upon a finding that the “unique features of the lot itself . . . result in hardship
to the [owner].”); Baker v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals of Metro. Gov’t of Nashville &
Davidson Cnty., No. C.A. 88-147-II, 1989 WL 3167, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 20, 1989)
(“Reading the statute and the local zoning regulations together, it is essential that there be
proof and a finding that a particular hardship or exceptional practical difficulty is
imposed upon the owner by the size, shape or topographical conditions of the property
before a variance can be granted.”); Metro. Historical Comm’n v. Colony Assocs. Joint
Venture, No. 87-319-II, 1988 WL 109234, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 19, 1988) (“[S]tate
statute and local ordinance [concerning the grant of a variance], read together, require
proof and finding that a particular hardship (as distinguished from a mere inconvenience
or diminution of financial return) is imposed upon the owner by (1) size (2) shape or (3)
topographical conditions of the property.”).

       For example, in Hillsboro, a church had purchased a nearby lot for the purpose of
converting “the existing residence to church classrooms and build[ing] 29 accessory
parking spaces.” See 1995 WL 79224, at *1. However, the nearby lot was zoned
residential, and when the church’s application for a building permit was denied, the
church sought a variance from the Metropolitan Board of Zoning Appeals (“the Board”).
Id. The Board granted the variance, and the Davidson County Chancery Court affirmed
upon certiorari review. Id.

       On appeal, the Hillsboro Court examined Tennessee Code Annotated § 13-7-
207(3), as well as the local zoning regulations, both of which required a showing of
unique shape, size, topography, or other physical characteristics of the land in order to
grant a variance. Id. at *2. Upon review of the record, the Hillsboro Court determined
that no such evidence existed, stating: “Nowhere in the Board’s findings of fact is there a
showing that the unique features of the lot itself in any way result in hardship to the
defendant.” Id. at *3. This Court further found:

       The Church’s need for parking for its worship facilities and its substantial
       financial expenditure to purchase the subject lot are personal to the
       defendant and are not relevant to the issue of the granting of a variance.
       Because there are no facts establishing a hardship to the defendant created
       by the peculiar characteristics of the land, we find that there is no material
       evidence to support the Board’s granting of a variance. Accordingly, the

                                            - 12 -
       Board’s action in granting the variance from section 24.52 of the Zoning
       Regulations was illegal and outside the scope of its jurisdiction.

Id. at *3.

        Similarly, here, both Tennessee Code Annotated § 13-7-207(3) and Section 11-
207(3) of the Ordinance require a showing of some peculiar physical characteristic of the
subject land in order to grant a variance. Mr. Mattison has conceded that no such
characteristics are present on the subject real property. As such, the record lacks material
evidence to support the BZA’s grant of the variance here. Rather, the record
demonstrates that Mr. Mattison sought a variance so that he could build a taller accessory
building with higher garage doors that could accommodate a boat or other motor
vehicles. In addition, the BZA made no finding of any particular characteristic of the real
property that created a hardship for Mr. Mattison. Instead, any hardship in this matter is
clearly “personal to or created by an owner” and is insufficient to justify the grant of a
variance. See McClurkan, 565 S.W.2d at 497. Ergo, the BZA acted illegally and outside
of its authority in granting the variance. We therefore reverse the trial court’s judgment
affirming the BZA’s decision and vacate the BZA’s grant of the variance.

             VI. Other Avenues of Relief from Height Limitation in the Ordinance

       The appellees contend that the trial court properly determined that other statutory
provisions granted the BZA authority to grant relief to Mr. Mattison in this instance. In
addition to the power afforded to boards of appeal regarding the grant of a variance,
Tennessee Code Annotated § 13-7-207 also provides that a board of appeals can:

       Hear and decide appeals where it is alleged by the appellant that there is
       error in any order, requirement, permit, decision, or refusal made by the
       municipal building commissioner or any other administrative official in the
       carrying out or enforcement of any provision of any ordinance enacted
       pursuant to this part and part 3 of this chapter;

       Hear and decide, in accordance with any such ordinance, requests for
       special exceptions or for interpretation of the map or for decisions upon
       other special questions upon which such board is authorized by any such
       ordinance to pass[.]

Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-7-207(1)-(2). Similarly, the Ordinance provides that the BZA can
“hear and decide appeals where it is alleged by the appellant that there is error in any
order, or requirement, permit decision, determination or refusal made by the
Administrator, building official or other administrative official in the carrying out or
enforcement of any provision of this ordinance.” See Section 11-207(1). The Ordinance
also provides that the BZA may “make decisions upon any special questions which the
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[BZA] is authorized to consider under this ordinance, and interpret the zoning map.” See
Section 11-207(2).

       Appellees urge that both of these provisions are potentially applicable here
because (1) Mr. Mattison was denied a permit to build an accessory building by an
administrative official, who was relying on the height limitation in Section 11-507(2)(a),
and (2) his request for relief from the height limitation in Section 11-507(2)(a) could
qualify as a special question upon which the BZA was authorized to act. The trial court
agreed, finding that the BZA had the power to act upon Mr. Mattison’s request for relief
because the BZA was authorized to “conduct administrative review of any order or
requirement, permit decision, determination or refusal made by an administrative or
building official under the zoning ordinance” and because Mr. Mattison’s request “may
be a special question.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-7-206(b) (2019) (allowing the BZA to
hear an appeal from the denial of a building permit); § 13-7-207(1), (2) (detailed above).

       Although the BZA certainly maintains power and authority to act in the
circumstances described in Tennessee Code Annotated § 13-7-207(1)-(2) and Section 11-
207(1)-(2) of the Ordinance, those circumstances were not present before the BZA in the
case at bar. Here, in his letter to the BZA, Mr. Mattison specifically requested the grant
of a variance from the height restriction on accessory buildings in a residential zone
imposed by Section 11-507(2)(a). Mr. Mattison did not expressly seek review of an
administrative official’s decision or the resolution of a special question. Moreover, the
meeting report and transcript from the BZA’s May 5, 2022 meeting reflect that all
discussions and consideration of Mr. Mattison’s request concerned the grant of a variance
from the Ordinance’s height requirement. As this Court has explained, local government
“boards and commissions . . . speak or act officially only through their minutes and
records made at duly called meetings.” See B & B Enters. of Wilson Co., LLC v. City of
Lebanon, No. M2003-00267-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 2916141, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Dec. 16, 2004). Finally, the May 11, 2022 letter sent by the BZA to Mr. Mattison
explicitly approved his request for a variance subject to certain conditions.

       Having determined that the grant of a variance in this situation was illegal and
outside the scope of the BZA’s authority, see Hillsboro, 1995 WL 79224, at *3, we
likewise determine that the trial court erred in affirming the BZA’s grant of the variance
when there existed no material evidence of any particular characteristic of the real
property warranting the grant of a variance. See Venture Holdings, 585 S.W.3d at 416-
17. We further conclude that the trial court erred by looking beyond the Ordinance’s
variance procedure in order to affirm the BZA’s action in this matter. We therefore
reverse the trial court’s decision affirming the BZA’s grant of a variance, and we vacate
the BZA’s grant of a variance to Mr. Mattison.

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                                    VII. Conclusion

       For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court’s decision affirming the
BZA’s grant of a variance, and we vacate the BZA’s grant of a variance to Mr. Mattison
as unsupported by material evidence of any particular characteristic of the subject
property warranting the grant of a variance. We remand this matter to the trial court for
such further proceedings, if any, as may be necessary and proper and collection of costs
assessed below. Costs on appeal are assessed to the appellee, William Mattison.

                                                  s/Thomas R. Frierson, II
                                                  _________________________________
                                                  THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, JUDGE

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