Court Opinion

ID: 9905730
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-30 00:03:50.042606+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:52.204850
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/29/23 P. v. Wilson CA2/8
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

 THE PEOPLE,                                                  B323331

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                          (Los Angeles County
                                                              Super. Ct. No. MA064056-02)
           v.

 ROSIE LEE WILSON,

           Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Daviann L. Mitchell, Judge. Affirmed.

     Nancy L. Tetreault, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Thomas C. Hsieh, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                 _______________________
      Defendant and appellant Rosie Lee Wilson appeals the
denial of her petition for resentencing on her second degree
murder conviction. We affirm.
      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.    Procedural History
       Wilson was convicted of second degree murder and felony
child abuse (Pen. Code,1 §§ 187, subd. (a), 273a, subd. (a)) of her
22-month-old son Anthony Wilson, with the additional finding
that in committing the child abuse Wilson personally caused or
permitted her son to suffer unjustifiable physical pain or injury
that resulted in death (§ 12022.95). Wilson was sentenced to
15 years to life in state prison. We affirmed Wilson’s conviction
on appeal. (People v. Wilson (Mar. 27, 2019, B284691 [nonpub.
opn.].)
       On October 22, 2020, Wilson filed a petition for
resentencing pursuant to former section 1170.95, now recodified
as section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) The trial court
found Wilson had established a prima facie case, and in June
2022, it conducted a section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) evidentiary
hearing.
       At the evidentiary hearing, the trial court considered the
transcripts of the testimony presented at trial and the trial
exhibits. It also heard live testimony from several witnesses.
The trial court denied Wilson’s petition on the ground that she
was guilty of aiding and abetting second degree murder under a
theory of implied malice. Wilson appeals.

1     Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                 2
II.   Evidence Presented at Trial
       The Attorney General has requested that the court take
judicial notice of the entire record of Wilson’s trial. We grant the
request. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, 459.)
       Wilson, born in 1993, attended special education classes
and did not complete high school. She had her first child, G.R., in
2010, and gave birth to Anthony in 2012, when she was 18 years
old.
       In 2014, Wilson, her children, and her new boyfriend
Brandon Williams lived in the home of Colleen Brydie. Williams
was jealous and got very angry with Wilson, and he yelled and
cursed at Wilson and her children. Williams hit Wilson at least
once. After Williams moved in, Brydie began noticing an
increasing number of bruises on Anthony, but she thought G.R.
had caused them.
       As of July 21, 2014, Anthony was a normal child: he was
vibrant and playful, and he walked, ran, and played. In early
August 2014, Brydie noticed Anthony was limping. Wilson told
Brydie something seemed wrong with Anthony, and Brydie
encouraged her to take Anthony to the hospital, but Wilson did
not want to do that because the children had just been returned
to her custody and she did not want to lose custody again.
       On August 21, 2014, at approximately 8:00 p.m., Wilson
left her children with Williams and went out with Brydie to a
karaoke bar. That evening, Williams phoned Wilson, and she
answered the call. She returned home at 11:00 p.m. or midnight.
       The next day, August 22, 2014, at approximately 12:30
p.m., Wilson and Williams took Anthony to the hospital.
Anthony was immediately identified as in critical condition, and
he was brought directly into the trauma room to see physician

                                 3
Charles Otieno. Anthony was unconscious and seizing,
suggesting he had a severe head injury. He was “posturing,”
meaning that his hands were stiff, his feet were stiff and rotated
outwards, and his eyes were “deviated.”
       X-rays showed Anthony had older fractures to his left
clavicle and one rib; he was also missing a tooth, which was later
found inside his abdomen. He had abdominal bruises indicative
of internal injuries. Anthony had bruises on his forehead, below
his eyes, on the back of his head, on his back, on his torso, on his
penis and testicles, and on his buttocks; some were fresh and
some were older. There was an abrasion on his lip. His buttocks
were caked with baby powder.
       Anthony’s injuries were caused by child abuse and were not
accidental. His prognosis was poor when he was brought to the
hospital. If he had been brought to the hospital sooner, before his
brain bleeding had progressed so far, his chances of recovery
would have been “far much better.” The delay in bringing him to
the emergency room exacerbated his injuries.
       The neurosurgeon who examined Anthony found he had a
large hematoma on his head and dilated pupils, which indicated
his brain stem was no longer controlling his eyes. Part of
Anthony’s skull was removed to alleviate the pressure on his
brain. The neurosurgeon opined that Anthony’s injury resulted
from major trauma, not a slip and fall.
       Anthony was hospitalized for 45 days and died October 5,
2014. Anthony’s death was ruled a homicide, and his cause of
death was “a sequelae of traumatic injuries, primarily a head
injury, but with a contributing role from multiple fractures.” He
had suffered “blunt force head trauma, severe, acute right
subdural hemorrhage, large, brain swelling, hypoxic ischemic

                                 4
brain injury, chronic subdural membrane, bilateral, and a large
external stem herniation of the right cerebrum,” as well as a
chronic subdural hemorrhage to one eye.
      A specialist in child abuse pediatrics opined Anthony’s
injuries were caused by abuse and were not the result of an
accident. He had suffered a traumatic brain injury causing
bleeding and brain tissue damage. If Anthony had been brought
to the hospital around 11:30 p.m. the night before, rather than at
12:22 p.m. the next day, he would have had a better chance to
survive because the bleeding in his head could have been treated
before it caused such extensive brain injuries.
      A.    Wilson’s Statements and Conduct
            1.    Statements to Medical Professionals
      After Anthony arrived at the hospital, Wilson told Dr.
Otieno Anthony had slipped on water and fallen when she was
not home. She reported Anthony was alert and said “hi” to her
when she got home at approximately 11:00 p.m., but she also
expressed concern about a possible seizure. Wilson said she had
looked up seizures on the internet. She reported giving Anthony
a bath and placing him in front of a cooling unit because he had a
fever. Dr. Otieno found Wilson’s account inconsistent because a
child of Anthony’s weight and size could not suffer the kind of
injury he had suffered simply from falling from a height of three
feet.
      At approximately 1:20 p.m., Nurse Vicki Johnson advised
Wilson that Anthony was in critical condition and needed to be
transferred. Wilson said Anthony had been “normal” at 10:30
p.m. on August 21, 2014, when she went to bed. Anthony did not
appear “right” when she checked on him at approximately 6:00

                                5
a.m., so she and Williams took him to the hospital. Johnson
pointed out she did not bring Anthony to the hospital for more
than six hours after 6:00 a.m., and Wilson responded, “Oh.”
Wilson did not appear overly concerned for Anthony.
           2.    Conduct at Hospital
      Registration clerk Virginia Melendez, who registered
Anthony at the emergency room, observed Wilson was busy on
her phone and mostly paid attention to Williams. Wilson slapped
G.R. on the head, hit her on the buttocks, and pulled her.
      Wilson’s mother Christina Harper and Wilson’s three
sisters, Luevnia Wilson, Celina Parra, and Christina Wilson, all
came to the hospital.2 When asked what happened, Wilson was
defensive and feigned crying, but she did not shed tears. Luevnia
thought Wilson’s crying was an act—there was no emotion
behind it. Wilson looked at her phone while her family prayed for
Anthony. Luevnia testified, “[W]e were praying for a child that’s
in the hospital and in a horrible condition and it seemed to be
that she didn’t care.”
      Parra believed Wilson was lying about what happened to
Anthony and covering for Williams or herself. Parra also noticed
Wilson using her phone while the others prayed, which upset her
because Wilson “should have been worried about Anthony. Why
would she be texting somebody?”
      Christina told Wilson she did not believe her account.
Wilson’s affect was “stone cold.” Christina was bothered that
Wilson texted while everyone else was praying.

2    For clarity, we use first names when referring to Luevnia
and Christina.

                                6
            3.    First Interview with Detective Velazquez
       Wilson was interviewed by Detective Susan Velazquez
twice on August 22, 2014. During the first interview, Wilson said
she left her two children with Williams and went grocery
shopping at Walmart at 9:00 p.m., returning at 10:20 p.m.
Williams telephoned her and said he had given the children
water and put them in the living room while he washed dishes.
He heard a “thump,” and when he ran to the living room,
Anthony was wet and crying. First, Wilson reported Williams
picked him up and changed his clothes. Later, she said Williams
gave Anthony two or three cold baths.
       This was the first time Anthony had fallen. When Wilson
got home, Anthony looked fine, was conscious, and said, “[H]i,
mom.”
       Wilson asked Williams if he was sure Anthony was fine.
She asked, “Are you sure we shouldn’t take him tonight?”
       Williams said, “[W]ell, not tonight. Take him tomorrow.”
Williams said they should monitor Anthony overnight, and if he
was not okay the following day, they would take him for medical
care.
       Wilson said, “Okay, babe,” and then stayed up all night
watching Anthony. She knew children who bumped their heads
should not go to sleep right away. She said, “Honestly, I think
that I should have just brought him [to the hospital] last night.”
       Wilson said she kept Anthony awake during the night. She
and Williams each gave Anthony two cold baths, and they put
him near the air conditioner to wake him up. Wilson said that
about 30 minutes later, Anthony said he wanted to go to sleep,
and they allowed him to go to sleep around 10:40 p.m. At that
time, Anthony was “perfectly fine.” Wilson undressed him, and

                                7
there were no marks on him except some little specks on his
back, which she thought were from the tile. Wilson changed
Anthony’s diaper at about 11:40 p.m. and did not see bruises.
       Wilson watched Anthony until 10:00 a.m. the next
morning. She researched epilepsy symptoms and seizures on her
phone because when Anthony was asleep, his eyes “were closed,
but it was like he, like he wasn’t, you know, like—I don’t know.
You know how babies, like some babies, they sleep with their
eyes half open?” Wilson said, “That’s what I thought it was.”
       At 10:00 a.m., she stepped away to feed G.R., and when she
returned, also at 10:00 a.m., Anthony was in a “seizure position”
and was unresponsive. The back of his head was red, and the
front of his head was turning purple. She had thought the fall
was not serious, but when she saw Anthony in the morning, she
said, “I was like, oh, my God. Like, okay, he needs to go to the
doctor’s.” Wilson described herself as “freaking out” when she
saw Anthony in seizure position: “And I’m like, oh, my God, you
know, what’s wrong with him?” She thought he might have a
concussion from hitting the tile floor.
       Wilson said she packed a bag and took Anthony to the
hospital. She changed Anthony’s diaper at approximately 10:00
a.m., right before leaving for the hospital, at which time she did
not see any bruises on his buttocks. Wilson did not call 911
because she wanted to take him to the hospital rather than him
going without her in an ambulance. She said she “rushed”
Anthony to the hospital as soon as she saw him in the morning,
but she also reported that they did not arrive the hospital until
12:00 p.m. or 1:00 p.m., because on the way to the hospital she
stopped to get food for G.R., who was hungry.

                                8
      Wilson said Williams had been up all night with her, and
he had been “freaking out. We’ve been crying. Praying all night.
Anything you can name, we’ve been doing. Trying to see what it
was. We tried to monitor him to see if it would go away by
tomorrow.”
      Wilson and Williams had been living together and dating
for more than two months. Williams was very good with the
children and never got frustrated. She did not believe he would
hurt them. When shown photographs of bruises on Anthony’s
buttocks, Wilson suggested G.R. might have caused them.
           4.    Meeting between Williams and Wilson
       Detective Velazquez interviewed Williams who confessed to
punching Anthony five times in the back of the head because he
would not stop crying. He also admitted to hitting Anthony
before August 21, 2014. After interviewing Williams, Velazquez
brought Wilson and Williams together. Velazquez wanted
Williams to tell Wilson what he had said so Wilson would know
the truth had come out. Wilson yelled and cried, but Velazquez
was unsure whether she was reacting to the information or to the
fact that everything was now known and she was frightened for
herself.
           5.    Second Interview with Detective Velazquez
      Later on August 22, 2014, Detective Velazquez spoke with
Wilson, her mother, and two of her sisters. Wilson told her
family Williams had confessed to punching Anthony five times in
the head.
      Wilson looked at a photograph of bruises on Anthony’s
buttocks and denied having seen them. She said she had been
shopping at Walmart the night before, and said that when she

                               9
got home, Anthony “didn’t have that on him.” When asked how
she could have missed seeing the bruises if she had changed his
diaper that morning, Wilson said she wiped Anthony from a
different angle. She admitted noticing Anthony’s injured lip.
       Wilson’s mother Christina Harper told Wilson to tell the
truth and stop “covering up.” Her sister Luevnia told Wilson they
knew Anthony had been unconscious. Wilson denied he had been
unconscious and maintained he said “[H]i, mom,” to her.
       Wilson said the previous evening she had noticed some
redness and bruising on Anthony while Williams changed his
diaper. Williams said Anthony had fallen near the pool. Wilson
asked Williams if he hit Anthony. Williams said he fell. Wilson
wanted to take Anthony to the doctor right away, but Williams
said Anthony was fine, they should monitor him, and he was
sleeping.
       In the morning, Wilson saw bruises on Anthony’s buttocks
and asked if someone had hit him. Williams said no, and told
Wilson she could not take Anthony to the doctor because a doctor
would think she had caused the bruises. Williams said that if
asked, he would blame Wilson. Wilson said, “I’m taking my son
to the doctor[,] he’s not looking good.”
       Wilson claimed she did not know Williams was abusing
Anthony, but she also admitted she had seen bruises before and
that if a child fell, he or she would be bruised on the elbows and
knees and not just on the buttocks.
       Wilson had not noticed that Anthony had a tooth missing;
his teeth were “grinded together and [she] couldn’t open them.”
Wilson thought he was having a seizure, and she did not call 911
because she thought she could help him. Wilson admitted she

                               10
was wrong for not calling 911, but she did not think it was
serious until the morning.
            6.    Interview with Jacqueline Lewis
      Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) social
worker Jacqueline Lewis interviewed Wilson on August 25, 2014.
Wilson told Lewis she had been at a karaoke bar on August 21,
2014, when she was notified of Anthony’s injuries by text
message from Williams. She went home, where she first looked
for her cosmetics so she could do her makeup because a producer
she met at the bar was coming over. Then she checked on
Anthony, who looked up at her and said, “Hi, Mommy.” She
watched him all night. He whimpered when she bathed him, but
she did not see any bruises while she bathed him. In the
morning Wilson noticed bruising on Anthony at approximately
7:30 a.m., and she took him to the hospital around noon.
            7.    Third Interview with Detective Velazquez
       On August 26, 2014, Wilson told Detective Velazquez that
three weeks earlier, after she left Anthony with Williams and
Brydie and went to a karaoke bar, she noticed bruises on
Anthony’s buttocks. Williams said Anthony fell by the pool.
After the incident, all Anthony wanted to do was lie down; he did
not want to eat or drink, and he was not using one arm. Wilson
said Anthony’s broken arm and leg were possibly the reason he
did not want to walk. Wilson did not take Anthony to the doctor
because she did not want to lose custody of him, and she thought
she could make him better.
       Wilson lied when she said she was shopping at Walmart;
she was at a karaoke bar. She lied because she did not want it to
look like she had neglected Anthony or left him with someone

                                11
who would hurt him. When she got home that night from the
karaoke bar, Anthony did not say, “[H]i, mom.”
      Wilson did not call 911 because Williams told her not to
take Anthony to the doctor and to monitor him overnight instead.
In the morning, Williams still did not want to take Anthony to
the
      B.    Evidence Involving G.R.
       In March 2011, G.R. was treated at the hospital for a fever.
G.R.’s father authorized treatment when Wilson could not be
reached. Wilson agreed to a “voluntary” DCFS case. She was
provided with parenting classes and a teen mother support
group.
       In June 2012, DCFS received an emergency referral
regarding G.R. A social worker went to the motel room where
Wilson, G.R., and a man were staying. There was a strong odor
in the garbage-strewn room and the bed was soiled. There was
no baby food, just a dirty baby bottle with a thick, clumped
substance inside. G.R., one and one-half years old, was
underweight, small for her age, dirty, could not feed herself, and
could neither crawl nor walk. Her speech was delayed. Neither
Wilson nor the man seemed to be concerned that G.R. was in
danger of falling off the bed, and G.R. eventually fell and hit her
head. Her diaper bag was dirty and contained old milk, old
bottles, and dirty clothes. G.R. was taken into protective custody.
       Lewis, the social worker who responded to the hospital on
August 22, 2014, observed that G.R. was basically nonverbal,
dirty, disheveled, and had difficulty walking. G.R. was
withdrawn and jumpy, and she did not respond to questions.
G.R. had abrasions on one foot and behind one ear, multiple scars
and faint redness on her forehead, and multiple linear scars on

                                12
her chest and upper arms. There was a discoloration on her
abdomen. Her right arm had linear discoloration marks, redness
on the forearm, scarring and an abrasion by the elbow, and a
round red mark. She had marks on her thigh and knees. On her
back, she had redness near her neck, multiple faded discoloration
marks, and scars and marks in several areas.
III.   Live Testimony at the Evidentiary Hearing
       Virginia Melendez testified she was working at the hospital
when Anthony and the family arrived. G.R. waved at her and
Melendez waved back. When Wilson noticed the waving, she
forcefully slapped the back of G.R.’s head and pulled her away by
the arm. Melendez observed Wilson and Williams laughing,
kissing, and looking at a cell phone. Wilson was focused on her
phone and on Williams; she did not ask about Anthony, cry, or
display any emotion concerning her son. Melendez was haunted
by the incident “[b]ecause an innocent kid was dying and the
mother wasn’t concerned about what was going on.”
       Wilson’s sister Luevnia testified that about one month
before Anthony died, she invited Wilson and the children over,
but Wilson said G.R. was sick. She invited them again two weeks
later, but Wilson said Anthony was sick. Wilson never said
Anthony was injured or that anyone was abusing him.
       Luevnia testified Wilson appeared nonchalant, unbothered,
and unconcerned at the hospital. During the family’s prayer
circle Wilson was texting on her phone. Wilson pretended to cry:
she moaned, but she had no tears in her eyes. When Williams
arrived at the hospital, Luevnia had to be restrained from
attacking him. Wilson did not confront Williams.
       Luevnia opined Wilson knew the difference between right
and wrong on August 21, 2014. She believed Wilson knew at that

                               13
time that she should take Anthony to the hospital if he was
injured, and she knew she was delaying Anthony from receiving
the medical care he needed.
      Wilson’s mother Christina Harper testified Wilson was
“pretty emotionless” and did not cry at the hospital. On cross-
examination, Harper testified Wilson had always acted
inappropriately for her age and younger than she actually was.
She still used baby talk at the age of 17. She had learning and
emotional difficulties, and she never displayed emotions
appropriate to events. It was difficult to gauge where she was
emotionally.
      DCFS social worker Jacqueline Lewis testified that when
she advised Wilson on August 25, 2014, that Anthony’s death was
imminent, Wilson stared blankly and showed no emotion.
      Detective Velazquez testified as well. She interviewed
Wilson multiple times. Wilson disclosed that approximately
three weeks prior to the fatal abuse of Anthony, she came home
from karaoke and found Anthony had been injured. He had
bruises on his buttocks, lower back, ear, stomach, head, and
arms. He was missing hair, and he limped. Anthony was not
really moving, would not eat, and could not feed himself; Wilson
kept him on the couch watching cartoons. Wilson photographed
Anthony’s injuries, but she did not seek medical care for him
because she had a prior dependency case and did not want DCFS
to take away her children. Wilson regretted not obtaining
medical care for Anthony.
      In a later interview, Wilson told Velazquez that on the
night of August 21, 2014, she had gone out to karaoke. Williams
telephoned her and told her Anthony had fallen and she needed
to come home. She did not go home right away because she felt

                              14
Williams was taking care of the children. When she did go home,
she found Anthony was injured. She looked on the internet for
information about seizures and other conditions to determine
what was wrong with him. She took him to the hospital around
noon on August 22, 2014, after she put makeup and baby powder
on his buttocks.
       Wilson called one witness, her aunt Angela Wilson, who
testified that she lived with the extended family for about one
month. Wilson had a “great relationship” with her children and
did a “great job” caring for them. Wilson was hyperactive at
times and could not focus. By the night of Anthony’s injuries,
Angela Wilson was no longer in touch with Wilson.
                         DISCUSSION
I.    Applicable Law
       Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018
Reg. Sess.) amended the felony murder rule and the natural and
probable consequences doctrine as it relates to murder, to ensure
that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the
actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a
major participant in the underlying felony who acted with
reckless indifference to human life. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1,
subd. (f).) Senate Bill No. 1437 amended section 188 to require
that a principal “shall act with malice aforethought. Malice shall
not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her
participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).)
       Senate Bill No. 1437 also added what is now section 1172.6,
providing a procedure by which those convicted of murder under
the former law can seek retroactive relief if the amendments
affect their previously sustained convictions. (Stats. 2018,

                               15
ch. 1015, § 2; Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) When a petitioner files a
section 1172.6 petition, the court first appoints counsel and then
conducts a prima facie analysis of the petitioner’s eligibility, with
briefing from the parties. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c); People v. Lewis
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 961–970.) If the trial court finds a prima
facie showing because there is no indication that the petitioner is
ineligible for relief as a matter of law, the court must issue an
order to show cause why relief should not be granted. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (c).)
       At the evidentiary hearing on the order to show cause, the
burden of proof is on the prosecution “to prove, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder or
attempted murder under California law as amended by the
changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) The court may consider evidence
admissible under to the Evidence Code and “evidence previously
admitted at any prior hearing or trial that is admissible under
current law, including witness testimony, stipulated evidence,
and matters judicially noticed. The court may also consider the
procedural history of the case recited in any prior appellate
opinion. However, hearsay evidence that was admitted in a
preliminary hearing pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 872
shall be excluded from the hearings as hearsay, unless the
evidence is admissible pursuant to another exception to the
hearsay rule. The prosecutor and the petitioner may also offer
new or additional evidence to meet their respective burdens.”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) The trial court acts as an independent
factfinder. (People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276,
293-294.)

                                 16
       On appeal, unless there is a question as to the trial court’s
understanding of the elements of the crime, “a trial court’s denial
of a section 1172.6 petition is reviewed for substantial evidence.
[Citation.] Under this standard, we review the record ‘ “ ‘in the
light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether
it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable
trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 988 (Reyes).)
II.   Second Degree Murder Liability
        Under current law, subject to exceptions not applicable
here, second degree murder requires a finding of express or
implied malice. (§ 188, subd. (a)(1), (2).) Express malice is
defined as the intent to unlawfully kill, and it requires a showing
that the assailant either desires the death or knows, to a
substantial certainty, that death will occur. (People v. Smith
(2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 739.) Implied malice requires knowledge
that conduct endangers the life of another, a conscious disregard
for life, and the performance of an act, the natural consequences
of which are dangerous to life. (People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th
1172, 1181 (Chun), superseded by statute on other grounds as
stated in People v. Lamoureux (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 241,
247-249.)
        A person may also be criminally liable for murder as a
direct aider and abettor if the person has knowledge of the direct
perpetrator’s intent to commit the crime; the intent to assist in
committing the crime; and conduct that in fact assists in
committing the crime. (§ 31; People v. Perez (2005) 35 Cal.4th
1219, 1225.) An aider and abettor must know of and share the
direct perpetrator’s intent; to aid and abet an express malice

                                 17
murder the aider and abettor must share the actual perpetrator’s
intent to kill. (People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1118 &
fn. 1.) An aider and abettor who does not expressly intend to aid
a killing can still be convicted of second degree murder if the
person knows his or her conduct endangers the life of another
and acts with conscious disregard for life. (Reyes, supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 990.)
III.   Direct Liability
      Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
determination that Wilson is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of
second degree murder under both direct liability and aiding and
abetting theories.
       A.   Actus Reus
       “ ‘In the context of implied malice, the actus reus required
of the perpetrator is the commission of a life endangering act.’ ”
(Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 991.) Wilson’s repeated failure to
obtain medical attention for Anthony, whom she knew was
unconscious and severely injured, over a period exceeding
12 hours, was an act, the natural consequences of which are
dangerous to life.
       On August 21, 2014, Wilson knew that Williams had
recently injured Anthony badly while taking care of him: a few
weeks earlier, after being in Williams’s care, Anthony had
numerous bruises from head to buttocks, was limping and moved
very little, and could not feed himself. Wilson had found
Anthony’s previous injuries serious and problematic enough that
she documented them by taking pictures. Yet not only did she
leave Anthony with Williams again, she did not immediately

                                18
return home from the karaoke bar when Williams called and
urged her to come home because Anthony was hurt.
       When Wilson did go home, at approximately 11:00 p.m.,
Anthony was unconscious. Williams told her he had performed
CPR on him. She noticed redness and bruising on Anthony when
his diaper was changed. Wilson told Williams they should take
Anthony to the doctor, but he did not want to, and they did not
take Anthony for any medical treatment. They spent the night
“crying. Praying all night. Anything you can name, we’ve been
doing. Trying to see what it was. We tried to monitor him to see
if it would go away by tomorrow.”
       When Wilson saw Anthony in the morning, her reaction
was that he needed to be seen by a doctor. At approximately 6:00
a.m., Wilson checked on Anthony and he did not appear “right.”
At about 7:30 a.m., she noticed bruises on his buttocks. At
around 10:00 a.m., Wilson saw Anthony was in what she
described as a “seizure position” and was unresponsive. The back
of his head was red and the front of his head was turning purple.
Wilson “freak[ed] out,” describing herself as asking, “[W]hat’s
wrong with him?” Yet Wilson did not take Anthony to the
hospital until approximately 12:30 p.m. This evidence supports
the conclusion that for more than 12 hours, Wilson delayed
seeking medical care for her unconscious and seriously-injured
22-month-old child.
       Based on People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, Wilson
argues that the prosecutor was required to prove she engaged in
conduct that posed a high probability of death to Anthony. This
is not the law. In Knoller, the California Supreme Court held
that “the trial court set the bar too high” when it ruled “implied
malice requires a defendant’s awareness that his or her conduct

                               19
had a high probability of resulting in death.” (Id. at p. 143, italics
omitted.) Implied malice, the Supreme Court ruled, “requires a
defendant’s awareness of engaging in conduct that endangers the
life of another—no more, and no less.” (Ibid.)
      B.    Mens Rea
       For direct perpetrator liability for implied malice murder,
“ ‘The mental component is the requirement that the defendant
“knows that his conduct endangers the life of another
and . . . acts with a conscious disregard for life.” ’ ” (Chun, supra,
45 Cal.4th at p. 1181.)
       The evidence was sufficient to support the mens rea
element as a direct perpetrator. There was evidence that Wilson
understood that not taking Anthony to the hospital endangered
his life. When she came home from the karaoke bar, Wilson
found Anthony unconscious and learned Williams had given him
CPR. She saw Anthony’s redness and bruises and thought he
had suffered a seizure. “[E]vidence that [the victim] displayed
clearly visible signs of an extremely serious medical condition
supports the inference that appellants were aware of the life-
threatening nature of [the victim’s] condition.” (People v. Latham
(2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 319, 332 (Latham).) Wilson also later
admitted to the police that she knew she was wrong for not
calling 911, which supports the conclusion that she knew not
seeking immediate medical attention for Anthony endangered his
life.
       Wilson also argues, based on People v. Caffero (1989)
207 Cal.App.3d 678 (Caffero), that the failure to fulfill her
parental obligation to protect her child “does not suffice as
evidence a parent engaged in life endangering conduct toward the
child.” Caffero involved a child who died from a bacterial

                                 20
infection that was introduced to her system through extremely
severe perianal sores. (Id. at p. 685.) The murder indictment
against the parents was dismissed, and the People appealed.
(Id. at p. 680.) The Court of Appeal determined that felony child
abuse is not inherently dangerous to human life within the
meaning of the felony-murder rule and then examined the
evidence to ascertain whether it supported the element of malice
necessary for a murder charge. (Id. at pp. 684–686.) The court
concluded that the evidence did not support a finding of implied
malice because there was no evidence the parents knew her
condition was life-threatening. (Id. at p. 685.) When the child
arrived at the hospital, she “exhibited no obvious symptoms of
her life-threatening condition,” to the point that her condition
was initially deemed non-urgent by an experienced triage nurse.
(Ibid.) The Court of Appeal held that “the evidence will not
support the inference defendants acted with conscious or wanton
disregard for human life,” and therefore the elements of implied
malice were not met. (Id. at p. 686.)
       Wilson argues that just as in Caffero there was insufficient
evidence the parents knew their conduct endangered their child’s
life, here there was insufficient evidence Wilson knew that failing
to obtain medical care for Anthony was a life-endangering act.
Caffero did not address whether failing to obtain medical care for
the child constituted a life-endangering act, the actus reus; it
concerned the parents’ mens rea, whether they had the
“subjective awareness that their acts or omissions endangered
the life of their child.” (Caffero, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at p. 685.)
Factually, the cases are entirely different as well. The child in
Caffero did not appear to need urgent medical care. Anthony did.

                                 21
IV.   Aiding and Abetting Liability
      A.    Actus Reus
       For the direct aider and abettor, the actus reus includes
whatever acts constitute aiding the commission of the life-
endangering act. Thus, to be liable for an implied malice murder,
“ ‘the direct aider and abettor must, by words or conduct, aid the
commission of the life-endangering act, not the result of that
act.’ ” (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 991, italics omitted.) As set
out above, appellant aided Williams in the commission of the life-
endangering act of denying Anthony medical care.
      B.     Mens Rea
       For aiding and abetting liability, “ ‘[t]he mens rea, which
must be personally harbored by the direct aider and abettor, is
knowledge that the perpetrator intended to commit the act, intent
to aid the perpetrator in the commission of the act, knowledge
that the act is dangerous to human life, and acting in conscious
disregard for human life.’ ” (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 991.)
       The evidence supports the inference that Wilson
consciously disregarded the danger to Anthony’s life. Despite
knowing Anthony had lost consciousness, had bruises, possibly
had suffered a seizure, and had apparently required CPR, she
considered taking her unconscious child for medical treatment
but chose not to do so because she was covering for Williams and
thought she might again lose custody of her children. By her own
admission, she noticed something was seriously wrong with
Anthony at 6:00 a.m. Although she described herself as rushing
him to the hospital as soon as she saw him in the morning, in
actuality she did not bring him into the hospital until
approximately 12:30 p.m. Her explanation for the delay was that

                                 22
her older child was hungry so they stopped for food on the way to
the emergency room. Wilson’s obvious lack of regard for
Anthony’s fate after she took him to the hospital—she appeared
unconcerned, laughed with Williams and kissed Williams in the
waiting room, used her cell phone, did not ask about her son, and
texted during a family prayer circle—also supports the inference
that she acted with implied malice. (Latham, supra,
203 Cal.App.4th at p. 332 [evidence parents were “unconcerned”
with their child’s fate, even after she had suffered cardiac arrest,
supported verdict]; People v. Burden (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d
603, 620 [“A defendant’s lack of concern as to whether the victim
lived or died, expressed or implied, has been found to be
substantial evidence of an ‘abandoned and malignant heart’ by
the appellate courts of this state”]; People v. Ogg (1958)
159 Cal.App.2d 38, 51 [“Defendant’s failure to seek the assistance
of his friends or to obtain medical aid even though he knew that
his wife was seriously injured indicates a heartless attitude and
callous indifference toward her”].) These elements are sufficient
to demonstrate direct liability for implied malice murder.
       Wilson does not argue the evidence was insufficient that
she knew not seeking medical attention for Anthony endangered
his life and consciously disregarded that danger, the mens rea
required for direct perpetrator liability. Instead, she argues the
evidence was insufficient to support the mens rea necessary to
prove implied malice on an aiding and abetting theory because
the prosecution did not prove 1) she knew Williams intended to
commit life-endangering acts of child abuse, 2) she intended to
aid Williams in committing life-threatening abuse, or 3) she acted
knowingly to aid Williams in life-threatening child abuse,
consciously disregarding the danger to Anthony’s life. However,

                                23
Wilson’s limited focus on a life-endangering act of child abuse
ignores Wilson and Williams’s life-endangering act of delaying
medical care for the seriously-injured Anthony for many hours.
       Wilson knew Williams had hurt Anthony badly in the past;
indeed, she lied to the police that she was grocery shopping
instead of going to a karaoke bar because she was trying to hide
that she had left Anthony with a person who would hurt him.
She had failed to get medical care for Anthony in the past when
Williams hurt Anthony so badly that he could not move or feed
himself. On the night of August 21, 2014, Wilson knew Williams
did not want to obtain medical treatment for Anthony—when she
got home, found Anthony unconscious, and learned Williams had
used CPR on him, she did not call 911 because Williams told her
not to. She told Williams they should take Anthony to a doctor,
but Williams told her he looked fine and they should monitor him
instead. The following morning, Williams told Wilson she could
not take Anthony to the hospital because the doctor might think
she had hurt him—and he said if he was asked, he would blame
Anthony’s bruises on her. This evidence shows Wilson knew
Williams intended to deny Anthony medical attention.
       Wilson’s conduct supports the inference that she intended
to aid Williams in committing the life-endangering act of failing
to obtain care for Anthony, apparently in order to cover up
Williams’s abuse. Wilson did not take Anthony to the hospital,
call 911, or obtain medical care for him for 12 hours after he
became unconscious. She attempted to hide Anthony’s bruises
with baby powder and makeup before taking him to the hospital.
When Wilson finally did seek attention for Anthony, her lies
about how Anthony received his injuries matched Williams’s
initial account.

                               24
       When combined with Wilson’s knowledge that denying
Anthony medical treatment was dangerous to human life and her
conscious disregard for human life, both discussed above, this
evidence is sufficient to demonstrate the mens rea necessary for
aiding and abetting liability for implied malice second degree
murder.
       Wilson argues her failure to obtain medical care for
Anthony was due to poor judgment and the fear that DCFS might
take the children away from her, not any intent to assist
Williams. Poor judgment, fear of DCFS intervention, and the
intent to aid Williams are not mutually exclusive. The fact that
Wilson can identify other explanations for her actions does not
mean the evidence was insufficient to support the inference that
she intended to aid Williams. (People v. Farnam (2002)
28 Cal.4th 107, 144 [if circumstances “reasonably justify” the
fact-finder’s findings, “we may not reverse the judgment simply
because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled
with defendant’s alternative theories”].)
V.    Wilson’s Youth and Intellectual/Emotional
      Impairments
       Wilson argues the trial court erred by failing to “consider
the impact of appellant’s youth in assessing her culpability,” and
by “not considering” her cognitive and emotional disabilities
when determining whether she intended to aid in a life-
threatening act with knowledge the act was dangerous to life and
with conscious disregard of the danger. Wilson is incorrect. The
trial court expressly considered these factors in ruling on the
petition for resentencing. It concluded that despite her youth and
intellectual and emotional issues, Wilson knew how to properly
care for her children, had the ability to care for them, had been

                               25
trained on proper parenting, knew she should take an injured
child for medical attention, recognized the risk of not taking
Anthony for the immediate medical attention he required, and
decided not to obtain care for her child selfishly and with a
conscious disregard for human life. The failure to weigh the
evidence in the manner a party urges is not the same as the
failure to consider that evidence.
                         DISPOSITION
     The order denying the petition for resentencing is affirmed.

     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                    STRATTON, P. J.

We concur:

             WILEY, J.

             VIRAMONTES, J.

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