Court Opinion

ID: 9545971
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:22:53.02456+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:15:49.804798
License: Public Domain

O’CONNELL, J.,
dissenting.
As I understand it the majority opinion holds that the filling-in of forms constitutes the practice of law in some circumstances but not in others. But it is not clear what these circumstances are in relation to the principle which is important in drawing the line between what is and what is not the practice of law. The opinion concludes, “* * * we hold that the filling-in of forms as directed by customers under modern business conditions is not the practice of law.” I do not know what thought is meant to be conveyed by the phrase “as directed by customers,” or by “under modern business conditions.” Obviously, if the defendant or any other escrow company is instructed specifically as to what language is to be included in the document the draftsman is a mere amanuensis and is not engaging in the practice of law.
But the question which the parties want us to decide on appeal is whether the escrow company engages in the practice of law when it fills out forms *94without specific directions as to the language to be employed in carrying out the purposes of the party or panties. The drafting of deeds and other instruments of conveyance calls for the making of choices resting upon differences in the legal consequences which attend the use of particular language. Unless the parties to the instrument are made aware of these choices and the consequences of making them, they may end up with a bargain they did not intend to make. One need only examine a treatise such as Patton on Titles to realize the multitude of legal consequences which flow from the use of particular language in an instrument of conveyance. Customers who “direct” escrow companies to draft legal instruments ordinarily do not know what should be included in the instrument. Therefore, they have no way of giving a meaningful “direction” as to how the instrument should be worded. Moreover, the escrow company’s customers may need legal advice upon matters which do not relate to the choice of language in the instrument. Thus the seller may need legal advice as to the tax consequences of the sale.
Escrow companies are not licensed to advise their customers as to the legal effect of instruments drawn for them. It is no answer to say that most customers of escrow companies do not care whether or not they have legal advice or are satisfied if a layman gives it to them. The fact that a person is willing to submit to surgery by one not licensed to practice medicine does not constitute a defense to a charge of the unauthorized practice of medicine. The licensing requirements for doctors, lawyers, accountants and other professional occupations are designed to protect the members of the public from the harm which might flow from the activities of unlicensed practitioners. The *95need for protection exists where the parties are engaged in transactions involving the transfer of interests in land. If escrow companies are to he permitted to draft deeds, the explanation for .the authorization cannot be that they are not practicing law. Bather it must be that in some way they have been given the privilege of doing so.
The majority opinion is confusing in another important particular. The court declines to express an opinion upon the question of whether the court or the legislature has the exclusive power .to define the practice of law. The court reaches this conclusion on the ground that “'the legislature has not attempted to define the practice of law, and, accordingly, there is no need to inquire whether it has the power to do so.” The fact that the legislature has made no effort to define the practice of law has nothing to do .with the need to decide where the power to define the practice of law resides. The count concludes that the drafting of deeds under some circumstances is not the practice of law. It would be unnecessary to decide whether the court or the legislature has the power to define the practice of law only if it could be said that the same conclusion must necessarily be reached in the interpretation of ORS 9.160.① I do not think that it can be said categorically that the legislature intended to exclude from the proscription of the statute the activities of escrow companies in drafting deeds and other instruments relating to real property transactions. In fact the contrary conclusion would seem more reasonable in view of the fact that historically *96the drafting of such instruments has been regarded as the province of the lawyer. The majority has defined the practice of law without any consideration of what the legislature may have intended in enacting OKS 9.160. For that reason I think that there is implicit in the majority opinion an assertion of inherent judicial power to decide what constitutes the practice of law.
I am of the opinion that the court does not have the inherent and exclusive power to make, that decision.② I recognize that the weight of authority supports the contrary view.③ However, I cannot find a satisfactory basis for concluding that the legislature does not have /the right to formulate the state’s policy in this respect. ¥e would not question the power of the legislature to define the permissible area of other professional activities, such as the practice of medicine, dentistry, and accountancy. There is no more reason for questioning the legislature’s power to regulate .the practice of law except where the regulation violates the separation of powers doctrine under our constitution. The principle of separation of powers is not violated by legislative regulation of the practice of law unless the regulation affects the operation of the judicial process.④ 'The judicial process would not *97be affected by legislation which permitted escrow companies to engage in that part .of the practice of law which consists of drafting instruments required in real estate transactions.
In the present case .the question is whether the legislature has made this special dispensation in favor of escrow companies. There is nothing in the statutes or in the legislative history of ORS 9.160 suggesting that the drafting of deeds and other instruments of conveyance are to be considered outside of the practice of law. The court should hold that the defendant is in violation of the statute since there is no basis for removing such activities from the proscription of ORS 9.160. If those activities are to be permitted, it is for the legislature and not for this court to grant the privilege.
Sloan, J., joins in this dissent.

 ORS 9.160 states: “Except for the right reserved .to litigants by ORS 9.320 to prosecute or defend a cause in person, no person shall practice law or represent himself as qualified to practice law unless he is an active member of the Oregon State Bar.”

 This view is taken in Beardsley, The Judicial Claim to Inherent Power Over the Bar, 19 A B A J 509 (1933); Comment, Control of the Unauthorized Practice of Law: Scope of Inherent Judicial Power, 28 U Chi L Rev 162 (1960). A contrary position is set out in Dowling, The Inherent Power of the Judiciary, 21 A B A J 635 (1935).

 Dowling, supra note 2, collects cases at 636, n. 13.

 This does not mean that the courts may not exercise control over matters vital to their operation. For example, they may regulate disciplinary proceedings where the proceedings are necessary to maintain the proper function and dignity of the courts. See Ramstead v. Morgan, 219 Or 383, 347 P2d 594, 77 ALR2d 481 (1959).