Court Opinion

ID: 9669800
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:09:29.02249+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:00.347076
License: Public Domain

Kelly, J.
(dissenting). I disagree with the majority that the implied consent statute requires an arrest to trigger entitlement to its protections. See MCL 257.625a(6); MSA 9.2325(1)(6), MCL 257.625c; MSA 9.2325(3). I note that the majority opinion contradicts over two decades of established precedent and supporting legislative acquiescence.
I would affirm the Court of Appeals decision that defendant’s blood alcohol test results were obtained under color of statutory authority, but in violation of the implied consent statute. Therefore, the test results were inadmissible.
THE IMPLIED CONSENT STATUTE
Under the implied consent statute:
(1) A person who operates a vehicle upon a public highway or other place open to the general public . . . within this state is considered to have given consent to chemical tests of his or her blood, breath, or urine for the purpose of determining the amount of alcohol or presence of a controlled substance or both in his or her blood or urine or the amount of alcohol in his or her breath in all of the following circumstances:
*296(a) If the person is arrested for a violation of section 625(1), (3), (4), (5), or (6), section 625a(5) ....
(b) If the person is arrested for felonious driving, negligent homicide, manslaughter, or murder resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle, and the peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe the person was operating the vehicle while impaired by or under the influence of intoxicating liquor or a controlled substance or a combination of intoxicating liquor and a controlled substance, or while having an alcohol content of 0.10 grams or more per 100 milliliters of blood, per 210 liters of breath, or per 67 milliliters of urine ....
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(3) The tests shall be administered as provided in section 625a(6). [MCL 257.625c; MSA 9.2325(3).]
When chemical tests are administered under § 625a(6), the statute requires that
(b) A person arrested for a crime described in section 625c(l) shall be advised of all of the following:
(i) If he or she takes a chemical test of his or her blood, urine, or breath administered at the request of a peace officer, he or she has the right to demand that a person of his or her own choosing administer 1 of the chemical tests.
(ii) The results of the test are admissible in a judicial proceeding as provided under this act and will be considered with other competent evidence in determining the defendant’s innocence or guilt.
(iii) He or she is responsible for obtaining a chemical analysis of a test sample obtained pursuant to his or her own request.
(iv) If he or she refuses the request of a peace officer to take a test described in subparagraph (i), a test shall not be given without a court order, but the peace officer may seek to obtain such a court order.
(v) Refusing a peace officer’s request to take a test described in subparagraph (i) will result in the suspension of his or her operator’s or chauffeur’s license and vehicle *297group designation or operating privilege and in the addition of 6 points to his or her driver record.
(c) A sample or specimen of urine or breath shall be taken and collected in a reasonable manner. Only a licensed physician, or an individual operating under the delegation of a licensed physician . . . , qualified to withdraw blood and acting in a medical environment, may withdraw blood at a peace officer’s request to determine the amount of alcohol or presence of a controlled substance or both in the person’s blood, as provided in this subsection. Liability for a crime or civil damages predicated on the act of withdrawing or analyzing blood and related procedures does not attach to a licensed physician or individual operating under the delegation of a licensed physician who withdraws- or analyzes blood or assists in the withdrawal or analysis in accordance with this act unless the withdrawal or analysis is performed in a negligent manner. [MCL 257.625a(6); MSA 9.2325(1)(6) (emphasis added).]
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
This case involves statutory interpretation, which is a question of law subject to de novo review. Oakland Co Bd of Rd Co Comm’rs v Michigan Property & Casualty Guaranty Ass’n, 456 Mich 590, 610; 575 NW2d 751 (1998). The primary purpose of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent. Frankenmuth Mut Ins Co v Marlette Homes, Inc, 456 Mich 511, 515; 573 NW2d 611 (1998).
When promulgating new laws, the Legislature is presumed to be familiar with rules of statutory construction and existing laws on the same subject. Malcolm v East Detroit, 437 Mich 132, 139; 468 NW2d 479 (1991); People v Tracy, 186 Mich App 171, 177; 463 NW2d 457 (1990). Consequently, silence by the Legislature following judicial construction of a statute sug*298gests consent to that construction. Craig v Larson, 432 Mich 346, 353; 439 NW2d 899 (1989).
As noted by the majority, we previously recognized that “[t]est results obtained pursuant to the exercise of statutory authority are not admissible unless obtained in conformity with the requirements of the [implied consent] statute.” McNitt v Citco Drilling Co, 397 Mich 384, 393; 245 NW2d 18 (1976). In McNitt, we concluded that police officers obtained test results “under color of statutory authority” when (1) the tests were administered by medical personnel pursuant to the request of a police officer, and (2) the medical personnel were not informed the request was being made other than under the statute. Id., 391-392, 394.
We refused to permit the use of test results obtained under color of statutory authority but in violation of the statute. Our rationale was that it would deprive drivers of their statutory choice of submitting to a blood alcohol test or losing their driver’s license. Our ruling in McNitt preserved this statutory choice. Id., 394.
In People v Weaver,1 our Court of Appeals applied this analysis to a suspected intoxicated driver who had consented to chemical testing. As in the case before us, the police had failed to formally arrest or charge the defendant before obtaining his consent, and to comply with the implied consent statute. Id., 56-58. Citing McNitt, the Court of Appeals held:
[CJonsent to a blood alcohol test obtained from a conscious driver will be considered to have been obtained under color of the statutory authority absent express disclaimer to the driver of reliance on the statute and upon *299statutory penalties, and advice that the statutory limits on the use to which such test results may be put is inapplicable. [Id., 63.]
The Court of Appeals reasoned that the defendant might have refused to consent to the test had he realized that (1) the officer’s request was not pursuant to the statute, and that (2) his refusal would not have resulted in revocation of his license. Id. Because the statute may have exerted a coercive effect over the defendant that aided in the acquisition of his blood sample, the Court of Appeals concluded that a “test made pursuant to authority other than the statute must expressly disclaim reliance on the statute and the statutoiy penalties for refusal.” Id. Given that the officer failed to expressly disclaim such reliance, the Court concluded that the trial judge had erroneously admitted evidence of the defendant’s blood alcohol test results. Id.
At the time McNitt and Weaver were decided, the existing version of the implied consent statute provided:
(1) A person who operates a vehicle upon the public highways of this state is deemed to have given consent to chemical tests of his blood, breath, urine or other bodily substances for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his blood if:
(a) He is arrested for driving a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, or while his ability to operate a vehicle has been impaired due to the consumption of intoxicating liquor.
Like the present version of the implied consent statute, the former version provided for the arrest of the driver. Id. Nevertheless, Michigan courts consistently held that blood alcohol test results obtained under *300color of statutory authority were inadmissible unless obtained in conformity with this statute. McNitt, supra at 393-394;2 People v McKinney, 88 Mich App 715; 278 NW2d 728 (1979); Weaver, supra at 63.
However, with this decision, the majority repudiates this case law, finding that it contradicts a legislative intent that only persons who have been arrested fall within the purview of the statute.3 Ante at 285.
Although citing “well established” rules of statutory construction, the majority ignores the fundamental rule that silence by the Legislature following judicial construction of a statute evidences consent to that *301construction. Craig, supra at 353.4 The Legislature has failed to object to this construction for over two decades. Through several amendments of the implied consent statute, it has left the language in question essentially unchanged.5 Hence, the rationale of McNitt and Weaver are equally applicable today.
*302I would affirm the Court of Appeals decision. Defendant’s blood alcohol test results were obtained under color of statutory authority, but in violation of the implied consent statute and, therefore, should be inadmissible.6
STATUTORY AUTHORITY
Section 625a(6)(c) also limits individuals permitted to draw blood for purposes of determining blood alcohol content to medical personnel, authorized pursuant to a police officer’s request. Id. In McNitt,7 we recognized that hospitals would be unlikely to permit medical personnel to draw blood for purposes of determining alcohol content without a request under then MCL 257.625a(2); MSA 9.2325(1)(2).8 Id., 390-391. To do so, absent such a request pursuant to the statute, would subject medical personnel to liability by *303denying them the resulting statutory protection from civil and criminal liability. Id., 391, n 9. We explained:
Absent disclaimer by the officer that he is acting under the statute, hospital personnel are protected in relying on such a request as authorization to proceed to administer a test under the statute without independent investigation and determination whether statutory requirements have been observed. [Id.]
In this case, the nurse who withdrew defendant’s blood for purposes of determining his blood alcohol content was not informed (1) that the officer requested defendant’s consent without statutory authority, or that (2) she could be acting without protection from civil or criminal liability. MCL 257.625a(6)(c); MSA 9.2325(l)(6)(c). The majority disregards the statutory limitation on medical personnel authorized to withdraw blood for purposes of determining blood alcohol content under § 625a(6)(c). It references no independent authority authorizing medical personnel to withdraw blood pursuant to the request of a police officer acting without statutory authority and in violation of the implied consent statute.
The majority additionally fails to address whether (1) the remaining provisions regarding chemical testing under § 625a are applicable under these circumstances, or (2) medical personnel acting under these circumstances are subject to liability. The opinion appears to create at least as many questions as it answers.
*304CONCLUSION
Because the majority permits officers to obtain consent for blood alcohol testing under color of statutory authority and in violation of the implied consent statute, I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and conclude that defendant’s blood alcohol test results were inadmissible.
Cavanagh, J., concurred with Kelly, J.

 74 Mich App 53; 253 NW2d 359 (1977).

 I agree with McNitt and continue to
appreciate that drunk drivers are a menace and that strict enforcement of drunk driving laws is in the public interest. The Legislature has, however, limited authority of police officers to request hospital personnel to withdraw blood or otherwise test for blood alcohol content without consent and has limited the use that may be made of blood alcohol test results obtained pursuant to exercise of that authority. [Id., 394.]

 The majority also discusses Gallagher v Secretary of State (On Rehearing), 59 Mich App 269; 229 NW2d 410 (1975). In Gallagher, the defendant was arrested for drunk driving that occurred outside the officer’s presence. Id., 272. Concluding that the arrest was invalid, the Court of Appeals held that the defendant’s consent to take a chemical test was also invalid. It explained that “the sine qua non to energize the statutory mandate of the ‘implied consent law’ is a prior valid arrest.” Id., 276. However, unlike the immediate case, Gallagher involved an officer attempting to arrest the defendant before requesting his consent, rather than an officer acting under color of authority to obtain consent. In addition, Gallagher held:
Since the arrest in this case was invalid so was the request to submit to the test or suffer the consequences of refusal. To this extent and to this extent alone do we uphold the injunction against further proceedings emanating from the alleged drunken driving by [the defendant]. [Id.]
Although the majority purports to endorse the “sine qua non” analysis from Gallagher, it finds itself obliged to overrule yet another case to reach its unfortunate holding. Ante at 292-293.

 See Wikman v City of Novi, 413 Mich 617, 638; 322 NW2d 103 (1982), Wehmeier v W E Wood Co, 377 Mich 176, 191; 139 NW2d 733 (1966), In re Clayton Estate, 343 Mich 101, 106-107; 72 NW2d 1 (1955), Baks v Moroun, 227 Mich App 472, 489; 576 NW2d 413 (1998), Glancy v Roseville, 216 Mich App 390, 394; 549 NW2d 78 (1996), aff’d 457 Mich 580; 577 NW2d 897 (1998), and Generou v Kalamazoo Regional Psychiatric Hosp, 192 Mich App 295, 304; 480 NW2d 638 (1991).

 The Legislature explicitly responded to the McNitt holding regarding the admissibility of blood alcohol test results in other prosecutions. By its response, it implicitly endorsed the holding that test results obtained under color of statutory authority are inadmissible, unless obtained in conformity with the implied consent statute. As Justice Boyle explained in her dissent from People v Keskimaki, 446 Mich 240, 260-261; 521 NW2d 241 (1994):
In apparent response to McNitt, the Legislature added subsections 9 and 10. See 1982 PA 310. Subsection 9 specifically responds to the rationale in McNitt [that “a blood test taken in a hospital from an unconscious driver ‘who did not consent’ was not admissible as evidence,” Keskimaki at 259], and squarely rejects it:
“[T]he results of a chemical [test] analysis of that sample shall be admissible in a criminal prosecution for a crime described in subsection (1) . . . regardless of whether the person had been offered or had refused a chemical test.”
In addition, and even more persuasive evidence of the legislative intention to facilitate admissibility, the Legislature also explicitly responded to another rationale advanced in McNitt. In McNitt, the Court rejected the argument that the results were admissible under common law. It instead concluded that statutory authority was necessary to authorize the administration of blood tests because hospital authorities had probably taken the blood at the request of a police officer, rather than for diagnostic purposes. In subsection 9, the Legislature specifically addressed this distinction between law enforcement and diagnostic purposes by providing for admissibility of a sample withdrawn “for the purpose of medical treatment.”
The Legislature instituted the amendments discussed by Justice Boyle. However, significantly, it did not alter the determination that blood alcohol test results obtained under color of statutory authority and in violation of the implied consent statute are inadmissible. See People v Sloan, *302450 Mich 160, 183; 538 NW2d 380 (1995). “To change the law in that regard would have been an easy and convenient task for the Legislature.”

 Given that the blood alcohol test results were properly suppressed pursuant to the statute, it was unnecessary for the trial court to make findings of fact regarding the constitutional validity of defendant’s consent. See ante at 294. Therefore, I disagree with the majority’s decision to remand this matter to the trial court for such a finding.

 Supra at 390-391.

 The statute provided:
“Samples and specimens of urine, breath and saliva shall be taken and collected in a reasonable manner; but only a duly licensed physician, or a licensed nurse or medical technician under the direction of a licensed physician and duly qualified to withdraw blood, acting in a medical environment, at the request of a police officer, can withdraw blood for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content therein under the provisions of this act. No liability for a crime or civil damages predicated on the act of withdrawing blood and related procedures attaches to a qualified person who withdraws blood or assists in the withdrawal in accordance with this act unless the withdrawal is performed in a negligent manner.” [Id., 391, n 9, quoting MCL 257.625a(2); MSA 9.2325(1)(2).]
*303As noted by the majority, this provision is “substantively similar” to the present version of MCL 257.625a(6)(c); MSA 9.2325(l)(6)(c). Ante at 288,