Court Opinion

ID: 9793527
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:49:09.821262+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:05:50.920338
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Clark
dissenting.
I, too, must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion of the court. I have read with interest and concern the dissent by Mr. Justice Moore and approve all that he has written therein relating • to rules of construction here applicable and to the duty of this court to exert every reasonable means to harmonize the various statutes and constitutional provisions involved to the end that effect may be given to all thereof if possible to do so. Every reasonable presumption favors the validity of the statute, and the burden is upon its assailant to prove clearly that it is violative of the constitution. Consumers’ League v. Colorado & Southern Ry. Co., 53 Colo. 54, 58, 125 Pac. 577, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 1158; Chicago B. & Q. Railroad Co. v. School District No. 1, 63 Colo. 159, 166, 165 Pac. 260; Rinn v. Bedford, 102 Colo. 475, 477, 84 P. (2d) 827. Many other Colorado cases so hold. The majority opinion does violence to those rules.
*254I also agree with Mr. Justice Moore that the instant case is distinguishable from that of Baker v. Bosworth, 122 Colo. 356, 222 P. (2d) 416.
On the proposition that the Bosworth case should now be overruled, I am not quite able to bring myself into accord. This possibly may be attributable to the fact that I was the trial judge in the Bosworth case. At the time of trial of that case I was impressed with the conviction, although rather reluctantly attained, that under the language of the constitutional provision permitting legislation by initiation upon presentation of a petition signed by “at least eight per cent of the legal voters,” the people thereby acquired a basic constitutional right to legislate in that manner, and that an attempt by the legislature to increase that percentage would be violative of a basic right, fixed by constitutional amendment declared therein to be self-executing. It seemed to me then, as it does now, that the constitutional right reserved was basic. The Constitution said “at least eight per cent,” and petitioners obtaining eight per cent had the right to have their proposal placed on the ballot. To change that percentage, as the legislature attempted to do, interfered with this basic right, for it is quite conceivable that the signatures of eight per cent of the voters might be obtained while it would be entirely and completely impossible to secure fifteen per cent, or even nine per cent. Thus could be defeated the very purpose of the initiative right, and render it nugatory.
Can this be said of the 1941 act here involved? The legislative change thereby enacted is not basic or fundamental. It does not destroy the effectiveness of the act. It is procedural only. Ever since its enactment until now, every initiated measure presented has been filed eight months before elections. This is a certain demonstration that it is not preventative of legislation by initiation. It is equally demonstrative of the correctness of the contention that the 1941 act is limited in its purpose to procedure only. Furthermore, it is manifest that the *2551941 act was passed to correct abuses that had grown up concerning, not the question of policy or fundamental principle, but the procedure of submitting proposed legislation by petition. Section 11 of Article VII of the Constitution requires the legislature to enact proper measures to secure the purity of elections and to guard against abuses. When the legislature undertakes to do its duty under this provision, how can it be said that its effort in the performance of this imposed obligation can be invalid under another section of the same basic law? These provisions must be construed so as to give effect to each, and at the same time, if reasonably possible, to harmonize the legislative act therewith. In this instance that is not difficult, as all fit together like a glove. The provision sought to be changed is not a basic right fixed by the Constitution, but is only a step in procedure; abuses were evident under the original procedure; by the 1921 Act the legislature sought to and did correct these abuses, as was its obligation under another constitutional provision; by so doing it not only did not destroy, but made possible the right of the people to enact better considered laws by initiation. In my humble judgment, the case should be reversed and remanded with direction to dismiss.