Court Opinion

ID: 9762022
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:07:50.316037+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:29.185587
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion by
Mr. Justice Nix:
I concur with the result reached by the majority but not with the reasons they offer to support their conclu*104sion. As pointed out by the Chief Justice in his dissent, the indictment, the evidence, and the charge of the court unequivocally establish that the appellant was tried for the alleged crime of attempted assault with the intent to maim. The fact that the verdict slip was incorrect and listed the charge as an “assault with the intent to maim” is obviously immaterial and clearly not a justification for reversing an otherwise proper verdict.
The true issue presented in this appeal is whether attempted assault with the intent to maim is a crime cognizable under the laws of this Commonwealth.
The crime of assault with the intent to maim was not a distinct common law crime1 but is of statutory origin. The Act of June 24,1939, P. L. 872, §712, 18 P.S. §4712. Section 712 provides: “Whoever unlawfully and maliciously, shoots at any person, or, by drawing a trigger or by any other manner, attempts to discharge any kind of loaded arms at any person, or stabs, cuts or wounds any person, with intent to maim, disfigure or disable such person, is guilty of felony, and on conviction, shall be sentenced to pay a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars ($2,000), or undergo imprisonment, by separate or solitary confinement at labor, not exceeding five (5) years, or both.”
The legislature having already provided punishment for simple assault,2 assault and battery,3 and aggravated assault and battery4 was concerned in this section with punishing an assault with a firearm or a battery *105by cutting, stabbing or wounding where the assault or battery is accompanied by an intent to maim. The language of this section clearly discloses a legislative intention of defining an attempt to commit mayhem. The discharging of a weapon at another person as defined in this section is only distinguished from an assault as defined in Section 708 or the crime of pointing a deadly weapon5 by the intent to maim which must accompany the act. So too a cutting, stabbing or wounding of a person is only distinguished from an aggravated assault and battery as defined by Section 709 by the intent to maim. The Act of 1860, March 31, P. L. 382, §83, contained a substantially similar provision to the present Section 712; it is therefore appropriate for one to look to the common law for a definition of the word “maim” as used in this section. Black^s Law Dictionaey 1104-05 (Rev’d. 4th ed. 1968) defines “maim” as follows: “At common law, to deprive a person of a member or part of the body, the loss of which renders him less capable of fighting; or of defending himself; to commit mayhem.” Thus, if the intention required by, Section 712 is effectively accomplished the completed offense of mayhem has been made out.6
Further support for the conclusion that the crime described by Section 712 is an attempt to commit mayhem is furnished by the design of the statute itself. Section 712 and the two immediately succeeding sections (713 and 714) punish specific acts where there is an intent to maim followed by Section 715 which pro*106vides for the statutory completed offense of mayhem.7 The basic format employed in Section 712 covering both assaults and batteries is seen when we read Sections 713 and 714 together. Section 714 provides for the punishment of the assault and Section 713 provides for the battery where these acts involve the use of explosives or corrosive substances and are accompanied by an intent to maim or where from the very nature of the act the possibility of maiming is imminent. The clear statutory scheme in dealing with this area compels the conclusion that the legislature was attempting in Sections 712, 713 and 714 to define attempts to commit the completed offense of mayhem.
Having concluded that the crime announced in Section 712 is itself an attempt I am obliged to find that there cannot be a legally cognizable crime of attempting to violate Section 712. It is basic law that there cannot be an attempt to commit an attempt. By definition an attempt “is an overt act done in pursuance of an intent to do a specific thing, tending to the end but falling short of complete accomplishment of it. In law, the definition must have this further qualification, that the overt act must be sufficiently proximate to the intended crime to form one of the natural series of acts which the intent requires for its full execution. So *107long as the acts are confined to preparation only, and can be abandoned before any transgression of the law or of others’ rights, they are within the sphere of intent and do not amount to attempts.” (Citations omitted.) Commonwealth v. Ellis, 349 Pa. 402, 404, 37 A. 2d 504, 505-06 (1944). Thus, an attempt being the first step beyond preparation, an attempt to commit an attempt must necessarily fall within the realm of preparation for which our law does not attach criminal responsibility. I am not impressed with the dissent’s distinction between an assault and a battery. The crime set forth in Section 712 provides for punishment of both an assault (discharging a weapon at) and also a battery (cutting, stabbing or wounding) where either is accompanied by the requisite intent. The basis for the rejection of the concept of an attempt to commit Section 712 does not turn on whether the overt act is the assault or the battery but rather that the offense as defined is in fact an attempt to commit mayhem.
Finally, I must also reject the argument that although the acts charged fell short of the conduct proscribed by Section 712 it nevertheless amounted to an attempt to commit the completed offense of mayhem. Here the appellant was accused of attempting to stab a police officer with a knife through an open car window with the intent to maim. While it is arguable that the act of lunging with the knife may be sufficient to remove these acts from the realm of intent and constitute common law attempt to commit mayhem it is clear that the legislature has preempted the area and ousted the court of common law jurisdiction. In an analogous situation a majority of this court stated in Commonwealth v. Clopton, 447 Pa. 1, 8, 289 A. 2d 455 (1972) : “Turning to our consideration of legislative intent, we must determine why the legislature would define, with such specificity, the most aggravated form of the crime, this extreme being the most obvious to discern and *108easiest to establish. Certainly, if our lawmakers intended that lesser acts be punishable as attempted murder, it would have made much greater sense to define the acts that would most minimally constitute the crime. At the very least, if the legislature wished that acts more remote to the completed crime were to be considered as attempted murder, it would not have defined it at all.”
I, therefore, would reverse the Superior Court and grant the motion in arrest of judgment on the theory that the instant charge is not a crime punishable under the laws of this Commonwealth.

 “The so-called ‘aggravated assaults’ were not recognized as distinct offenses at common law. Any criminal assault was a misdemeanor and circumstances of aggravation, if present, could be taken into consideration in fixing the penalty.” Perkins, Criminal Law 500 (1957).

 Act of June 24, 1939, P. L. 872, §708, 18 P.S. §4708.

 Id.

 Act of June 24, 1939, P. L. 872, §709, 18 P.S. §4709.

 “Whoever playfully or wautonly points or discharges a gun, pistol or other firearm at any other person. . . .” Act of June 24, 1939, P. L. 872, §716, 18 P.S. §4716.

 Bishop quoting Hawkins (Hawk. P.C. Curw. ed. p. 107, §1) defines “mayhem at the common law as ‘a hurt of any part of a man’s body whereby he is rendered less able, in fighting, either to defend himself or to annoy his adversary.’ ” 2 Bishop On Oetm. Haw §1001 (9th ed. 1923).

 Section 713 provides in part: “Whoever unlawfully, wilfully and maliciously, by the explosion of gunpowder, or other explosive substance, burns, maims, disfigures, disables, or does grievous bodily harm to any person, is guilty of felony. . . .” 18 P.S. §4713.
Section 714 provides in part: “Whoever unlawfully and maliciously causes any gunpowder, or other explosive substance, to explode, or sends or delivers to, or causes to be taken and received by any person, any explosive substance, or any other dangerous or noxious thing, or casts or throws at or upon, or otherwise applies to any person, any corrosive fluid, or other destructive or explosive substance, with intent to burn, maim, disfigure or disable any person, or to do some grievous bodily harm to such person, is guilty of felony. . . .” 18 P.S. §4714.