Court Opinion

ID: 9522255
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:20:56.687536+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:02:27.305459
License: Public Domain

SHIELDS, Judge,
concurring in “part, dissenting in part.
I concur in part, and dissent, in part.
I vote to remand,1 not only for "reconsideration and factual determination as to whether the offered wage was substantial ly less favorable than that prevailing in the community for similar work," but also for "reconsideration and factual determination" as to whether Richardson's acceptance of the Pakeo position results in the certainty of economic injury.
The purpose of unemployment compensation is to provide benefits to persons unemployed through no fault of their own and, at the same time, to encourage stabilization of employment once obtained. I.C. 22-4-1-1 (Burns Code Ed., 1974). The intent, then, is to avoid the "great hazard of our economic life" described as economic insecurity. Id. I do not equate this expressed intent with intent of guaranteeing to each *779unemployed worker a minimum weekly income of not less than their benefit amount regardless of any other factors. Nevertheless, I must disagree with Judge Sullivan's restricting the consideration of the factor of certainty of economic injury to a comparison of gross wages with gross benefits. In my opinion, the holding in Ball v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division, (1971) 149 Ind.App. 494, 273 N.E.2d 869, and the language of the act requires a comparison of gross benefits with what I shall refer to as "realized income", along with a consideration of the other statutory factors. I define realized income as gross wages less amounts for such deductions and/or expenses as the Board in the exercise of its administrative expertise and prerogative, deems appropriate, limited only by the requirement the expenses and/or deductions be uniquely and directly related to the offered employment and/or generated by the offered employment.
I reach this conclusion although I recognize Ball was decided upon facts which involved offered employment that had a gross wage less than the gross unemployment benefits. Nevertheless, Ball also states bona fide employment conditions personal to the claimant are appropriate considerations in determining suitability, as opposed to only those terms and conditions under the direct control of the offering employer. Ball, decided in 1971, has not been the subject of legislative repeal.
Further, .C. 22-4-15-2 (Burns Code Ed., Supp.1984) supports a consideration of a comparison of factors other than gross wages to gross benefits. The suitability limitation of offered employment is all but abolished for extended benefits.2 For example, with limited exceptions, suitable work is any work within the individual's capacity under 1.C. 22-4-15-2(c). One such exception, however, is employment which offers a gross average weekly remuneration less than the average weekly benefits plus any supplemental unemployment compensation benefits; such employment is not suitable under I.C. 22-4-15-2(d). Because the suitability limitation for extended benefits is severely reduced, and yet employment whose gross wage is less than gross benefits is nevertheless unsuitable, a reasonable conclusion is a comparison of realized income with gross benefits is appropriate for regular benefits.
Additional support for considering realized income as opposed to gross wages is found in the case law involving "good cause" for refusing employment under 1.C. 12-4-14-2.3 Personal reasons may constitute good cause for refusing employment if they do not effectively remove a claimant from the labor market. Martin v. Review Board, (1981) Ind.App., 421 N.E.2d 653. In Martin this court expressly approved the Review Board's consideration of child care considerations and transportation problems, i.e., personal problems, as pertinent to the issue of good cause. While Martin is not authority for the suitability issue presented by Richardson it does stand for the proposition an employee's personal problems are recognizable within the statutory scheme of unemployment benefits. A realized income less than gross benefits certainly may fall within the concept of a "personal problem". Thus, Martin recognizes requiring an employee to accept employment under that condition is contrary to the intent and purpose of the unemployment compensation act which allows employees to restrict or place necessary conditions upon their acceptance of new employment, which encourages the continuation of that employment once accepted. Martin.
I emphasize a comparison of realized income with gross benefits is but one of several factors to be considered and balanced by the Board in reaching its decision *780as to suitability. Accordingly, when balanced with these other factors, its impact will undoubtedly vary. For example, its impact may well be minimal or non-existent if the period of unemployment is lengthy and/or the prospect for securing local work in the customary occupation non-existent. Nevertheless, it is entitled to consideration.
I vote to reverse and remand to the Review Board for further proceedings on the question of suitability giving consideration to the issue of whether the offered wage was substantially less favorable than that prevailing in the community for similar work and whether Richardson suffered the certainty of economic injury. In all other respects, I concur.

. I direct the Review Board's attention on remand to the provisions of I.C. 22-4-15-2(3) (Burns Code Ed., Supp.1984) outlining the monetary consequences of failing to accept suitable employment:
"With respect to benefit periods established on and after July 6, 1980, the ineligibility shall continue for the week in which the failure occurs and until the individual earns remuneration in employment equal to or exceeding the weekly benefit amount of his claim in each of eight (8) weeks. If the qualification amount has not been earned at the expiration of an individual's benefit period, the unearned amount shall be carried forward to an extended benefit period or to the benefit period of a subsequent claim.

If an individual failed to apply for or accept suitable work as outlined in this section, the maximum benefit amount of his current claim, as initially determined, shall be reduced by twenty-five percent (25%). If twenty-five percent of the maximum benefit period is not an even dollar amount, the amount of such reduction shall be raised to the next higher dollar amount. When twenty-five percent (25%) of the maximum benefit amount, as initially determined, exceeds the unpaid balance remaining in the claim, such reduction shall be limited to the unpaid balance."

. For an explanation of the extended benefits see LC. 22-4-2-34 (Burns Code Ed., Supp.1984) and ILC. 22-4-14-6 (Burns Code Ed., Supp. 1984).

. This liberal standard of good cause is distinct from the strict standard of good cause for voluntarily leaving employment under IC. 22-4-15-1 (Burns Code Ed., Supp.1984). See, Martin v. Review Board, (1981) Ind.App., 421 N.E.2d 653.