Court Opinion

ID: 9854169
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:02:15.357496+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:57.783353
License: Public Domain

Chief Justice QUINN
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. Although the dismissal of an appeal is obviously a severe sanction, I cannot say that the court of appeals abused its discretion in this case.
The Colorado Appellate Rules place the responsibility on the appellant to take such actions as are necessary to file the record with the appellate court. C.A.R. 10(b) not only requires the appellant to file with the trial court a designation of the portions of the record that the appellant desires to be included in the appellate record, but also requires the appellant to “order from the reporter a transcript of such parts of the proceedings as he deems necessary for inclusion in the record.” C.A.R. 11(a) requires the appellant, after filing the notice of appeal, to take “any other action necessary to enable the clerk [of the trial court] to assembly [sic] and transmit the record.” If additional time is needed for the transmission of the record to the appellate court, the appellant may request an extension of time, but must support such request by “an affidavit of the reporter specifying why the transcript has not yet been prepared, and the date by which the transcript can be completed.” C.A.R. 11(d). The appellant may also seek an order from the appellate court directing the “trial court to expedite the preparation and transmittal of the record on appeal.” Id.
The Colorado Appellate Rules leave no doubt that dismissal of an appeal may be an appropriate sanction for failure to adhere to the appellate rules or the orders of the appellate court. C.A.R. 3(a) states, in pertinent part, as follows:
Failure of an appellant to take any step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal in the appellate court does not affect the validity of the appeal, but is a ground only for such action as the appellate court deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal.
Supplementing C.A.R. 3(a) is C.A.R. 38(a), which authorizes an appellee to move for dismissal of an appeal “if the appellant fails to cause timely transmission of the record.” Finally, C.A.R. 38(e) states that “[t]he appellate court may apply such sanctions as it deems appropriate, including dismissal, for the failure to comply with any of its orders or with these appellate rules.”
In this case, the sequence of events preceding the order of dismissal clearly demonstrates that the state, after filing the notice of appeal on November 9, 1987, had ample opportunity to petition the court of appeals for an order, pursuant to C.A.R. 11(d), directing the trial court to expedite *148the preparation and transmittal of the record. It made no such request, however, until August 31,1988, when it responded to the order to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed. In addition, the state had a similar opportunity to petition the trial court for an order directing the court reporter to prepare the record in a timely fashion, but failed to seek such relief. Even when the court of appeals denied the state’s second motion for extension on May 3, 1988 — with the result that the record was due to be filed on May 9, 1988 — the state failed to take timely action to seek the1 assistance of the court of appeals in expediting the preparation of the record. The record is clear that the state’s only petition for assistance in expediting the preparation of the record was filed on August 31, 1988, which was far beyond May 9, 1988, the date on which the record was due to be filed in the court of appeals pursuant to the previously granted extension of time.
Although the court of appeals might have imposed a lesser sanction than dismissal, I cannot say that its order of dismissal constituted an abuse of discretion under the circumstances present here. “To say that a court has discretion ... means that it has the power to choose between two or more courses of action and is therefore not bound in all cases to select one over the other.” People v. Milton, 732 P.2d 1199, 1207 (Colo.1987). A court abuses its discretion only if it can be said with fair assurance that, “based on the particular circumstances confronting the court, its decision was manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair.” E.g., King v. People, 785 P.2d 596, 603 (Colo.1990); People v. Hampton, 758 P.2d 1344, 1348 (Colo.1988); Milton, 732 P.2d at 1207. In a case such as this the most that can be expected of an appellate court is to consider all the circumstances of the case in fashioning an appropriate sanction to redress what it obviously perceives as unnecessary and avoidable delay by an appellant. See A.J. Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 203.12, at 3-60 to -61 (1989). While the substantiality of an issue raised 'on appeal is an important factor to consider, it is not the exclusive factor and certainly does not constitute a justifiable excuse for ignoring the time limitations for filing an appellate record. “Transcripts, like briefs, may not be filed whenever ... counsel may find it convenient.” Freeman v. Cross, 134 Colo. 437, 440, 305 P.2d 759, 760 (1957).
There can be no question that the court of appeals, in dismissing the state’s appeal, was aware of the issues raised in the appeal. The state’s notice of appeal, filed pursuant to C.A.R. 3(f), described the nature of the case and the decision which the state was challenging. The court of appeals also was obviously aware that the state had taken no action to expedite the preparation of the record either within the 90-day extension previously granted for filing the record or within the 3V2 months following the expiration of the 90-day extension. To hold that the court of appeals abused its discretion in dismissing the state’s appeal under the circumstances of the case comes dangerously close to depriving that court of any meaningful discretion in managing its heavy docket.
The unambiguous terms of Colorado Appellate Rules 3(a) and 38(e) clearly authorize the court of appeals to exercise its discretion in fashioning a sanction, including dismissal, for failure of a party to cause timely transmission of the record, and I see no basis in this record to second-guess the court of appeals’ exercise of discretion in this case. I would therefore affirm the order of dismissal as a proper sanction within the discretion of the court of appeals.
KIRSHBAUM, J., joins in the dissent.