Court Opinion

ID: 9741231
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:51:58.946132+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:22.978059
License: Public Domain

Lanphier, J.,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The two cases cited by the majority, Shibata v. College View Properties, 234 Neb. 134, 449 N.W.2d 544 (1989), and Richardson v. Ames Avenue Corp., 247 Neb. 128, 525 N.W.2d 212 (1995), were not matters decided upon a motion for summary judgment. Both cases were decided upon motions for directed verdict after the close of all the evidence. In both Richardson and Shibata, the plaintiffs had the opportunity to discover and present the totality of evidence at trial. In the instant case, Swoboda’s opportunity to have her case fully discovered and litigated is cut off. As a procedural equivalent to a trial, a summary judgment is an extreme remedy because a summary judgment may dispose of a crucial question in litigation, or the litigation itself, and may thereby deny a trial to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is directed. Bruning v. Law Offices of Ronald J. Palagi, 250 Neb. 677, 551 N.W.2d 266 (1996); Oliver v. Clark, 248 Neb. 631, 537 N.W.2d 635 (1995); Wachtel v. Beer, 229 Neb. 392, 427 N.W.2d 56 (1988).
I also dissent for the reasons that Chief Justice White and I dissented in Richardson v. Ames Avenue Corp., supra. I believe the majority failed to give Swoboda the benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible from the evidence as required by precedent. It is well settled that in reviewing a summary judgment, an appellate court views the evidence in a light most favorable to the party against whom the judgment is granted and gives such party the benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible from the evidence. Moulton v. Board of Zoning Appeals, ante p. 95, 555 N.W.2d 39 (1996); Polinski v. Omaha Pub. Power Dist., ante p. *35414, 554 N.W.2d 636 (1996); State Farm v. D.F. Lanoha Landscape Nursery, 250 Neb. 901, 553 N.W.2d 736 (1996); Young v. Eriksen Constr. Co., 250 Neb. 798, 553 N.W.2d 143 (1996). Swoboda is entitled to have the benefit of every reasonable inference, because the summary judgment was granted against her.
The evidence, with reasonable inferences in Swoboda’s favor, showed that Swoboda walked around the Old Market in Omaha for 20 minutes, without incident, before entering the restaurant; that her ability to walk was impeded by neither clothing, dizzy spells, nor a cane; that she needed no assistance in walking; and that she ascended the stairs at the restaurant in a normal fashion.
Further, Swoboda’s granddaughter, who accompanied Swoboda at the time of the injury, gave a lay opinion that her grandmother broke her leg when she tripped over the ramp alleged to be the defendants’ defective condition. Importantly, it was the defendants’ attorney who asked Swoboda’s granddaughter for her opinion as to what caused Swoboda’s fall. The granddaughter’s testimony was unrefuted. Lay opinion testimony is competent evidence when it is rationally based on the witness’ perceptions and helpful to a clear understanding of his or her testimony or the determination of a fact in issue. Neb. Evid. R. 701. The granddaughter’s lay opinion, as the only evidence of causation in the record, fits these requirements.
Because all reasonable inferences which can be drawn from the evidence must be to the benefit of Swoboda and the majority fails to give Swoboda the benefit of those reasonable inferences, I am compelled to dissent. I would affirm the Court of Appeals’ reversal of the district court’s order sustaining the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
Gerrard, J., joins in this dissent.