Court Opinion

ID: 9754672
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:09:17.571138+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:56.304183
License: Public Domain

Judge BOORAS
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority that the Amendments were validly adopted and concur in that portion of the opinion. However, I think the language of paragraph 5(c) is ambiguous, and would apply the rule requiring strict construction of restrictive covenants to conclude that the Covenants did not ban plaintiffs' activities on Clark's property. Therefore I must respectfully dissent.
The term we now interpret-"any commercial pet-related activities, such as dog boarding kennels, catteries or commercial breeding operations"-is, to my mind, quite unclear. I disagree with the majority's interpretation of this phrase in two respects. First, I do not agree that the term "any" is uniformly understood to be widely inclusive or "without limitation," and second, I do not agree that the phrase "such as dog boarding kennels, catteries, or commercial breeding operations" should be dismissed as mere examples.
Although the term "any" has been frequently construed as an all-inclusive term, e.g., Nat'l Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Estate of Mosher, 22 P.3d 531, 534 (Colo.App.2000), it has also been described as a word having "a diversity of meaning and [which] may be employed to indicate 'all or 'every' as well as 'some' or 'one' and its *380meaning in a given statute depends on the context and subject matter of the statute." Black's Law Dictionary 86 (6th ed. 1990), cited in Mgmt. Council of Wyo. Leg. v. Geringer, 953 P.2d 839, 844-45 (Wyo.1998) (concluding that "any" can refer to a restricted class, based on the context of the provision in which the word "any" is used).
The term "such as," followed by examples, produces further ambiguity. I would agree with the trial court and the majority that the phrase "such as" does not limit "commercial pet-related activity" to the three explicit examples given in paragraph 5(c). Nonetheless, the phrase has often been used restrictively to indicate that the term being defined includes items that are similar to those listed as examples. E.g., Bd. of Adjustment v. Levinson, 244 S.W.2d 281, 282-83 (Tex.Civ.App.1951) (defining "such as" to mean "like or similar to the classification or kinds named"); Charles Behlen Sons' Co. v. Ricketts, 30 Ohio App. 167, 164 N.E. 436, 439 (1928) (construing "such as" to mean "similar to"). One court recognized that the meaning of "such as" can range from the broad "general similitude" to the more restricted "not other or different," Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. McGoldrick, 270 A.D. 186, 59 N.Y.S.2d 243, 248 (N.Y.App.Div.1945), aff'd, 298 N.Y. 536, 80 N.E.2d 669 (1948), indicating that even the least restrictive use of the term "such as" indicates some limitation to similar words or items.
The majority notes caselaw holding that "such as" is "a phrase of general similitude." Macon County Samaritan Mem'l Hosp. v. Shalala, 7 F.3d 762, 767 (8th Cir.1993). This means that "such as" indicates similarity-that the preceding term's definition includes "other matters of the same kind" as those listed examples. Donovan v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 666 F.2d 315, 327 (8th Cir.1981) (emphasis added). True, there may be circumstances in which the examples following "such as" are intended as mere examples that in no way restrict the meaning of the preceding term. However, I cannot agree that examples following the phrase "such as" are always rendered meaningless by the presence of the word "any." On the one hand, paragraph 5(c), when read in a widely inclusive manner as the majority does, would prohibit a wide range of activities including such things as filming dog training videos using Clark's own pets for demonstrations, writing books about dog training, and even knitting dog sweaters for sale over the internet. On the other hand, paragraph 5(c) can be read narrowly to restrict only activities similar to those set out after "such as."
Given that there could be more than one possible meaning to both terms "any" and "such as [various examples]" I would label paragraph 5(c) ambiguous. See Allen v. Reed, 155 P.3d 443, 445 (Colo.App.2006). Therefore, I would apply the primary rule in construction of restrictive covenants and resolve doubts about the Covenants' meaning "against the restriction and in favor of free and unrestricted use of property." Gleneagle Civic Ass'n v. Hardin, 205 P.3d 462, 469 (Colo.App.2008). Given this mandate, I would interpret the "any" in paragraph 5(c) to modify all the words that follow it, prohibiting only-and all of-those activities that are similar to "dog boarding kennels, catteries, or commercial breeding operations."
While the majority discerns no difference between the activities listed in paragraph 5(c) and plaintiffs' business, I do. Kennels, catteries, and commercial breeding operations involve the constant presence of multiple animals on the property and the housing of animals not supervised by individual owners. Plaintiffs' business, in contrast, involves the limited presence of animals not belonging to Clark, with each individual animal supervised by its owner. Colorado's Pet Animal Care and Facilities Act makes a similar distinction. § 85-80-102(11), C.R.8.2010 (defining "[p] et animal facility" as a place "used for the keeping of pet animals" for things like breeding and boarding); § 85-80-108(2)(d), C.R.S. 2010 (excluding "[ainy pet animal training facility where the pet animal owner or such owner's designee, other than a training facility operator, is present during the duration of the animal's stay" from the seope of the Act).
Furthermore, it does not appear that the restriction on commercial pet-related activities was simply intended to limit the presence of animals on the lots generally. The remaining Covenants permit residents to *381keep multiple pets on the property, restricting their presence only to the extent that the pets "create a nuisance" or are so numerous that they cannot "be maintained in a healthy condition without presenting a health or safety hazard to the owners, keepers, or others." The Covenants also contain a provision that a home business shall not create a neighborhood nuisance-a provision the trial court found that plaintiffs did not violate. These provisions, when read together with paragraph 5(c), lead me to believe that the paragraph prohibiting commercial pet-related activities was aimed at a more specific type of business than simply those that invite multiple animals onto the property.
Evidence of the parties' intent in this case supports my interpretation. See 20 Am. Jur.2d Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions § 13 (2010) ("Hlf an ambiguity is found in a covenant, a court moves beyond the four corners of the agreement and ascertains the intent of the parties in light of the instrument as a whole and the surrounding cireum-stances." (footnote omitted)). Because the trial court did not determine until the close of trial that the provision was unambiguous, all parties had opportunity and incentive to present evidence of the drafters' intent. Plaintiffs presented evidence that Ridgewood members sought specifically to prohibit "boarding kennels, the catteries, [and] breeding operations such as puppy mills." The same witness testified that county regulations guided the drafting process, and a representative of the county testified that plaintiffs' business was not of the kind that would require special review by the county in order to operate, whereas the business types listed in paragraph 5(c) would. I cannot see where in the record Ridgewood rebutted this evidence or even posited that the Covenants' drafters had a different intention.
Although the majority identifies several statutes that have employed a combination of "any" and " 'such as,' followed by examples," I do not think my interpretation of the Covenants puts the effect of those statutes in jeopardy. Restrictive covenants are treated differently from statutes when their meaning is unclear, and require strict construction. See Gleneagle Civic Ass'n v. Hardin, 205 P.3d 462, 469 (Colo.App.2008). Furthermore, in the absence of a direct challenge to the statutes listed by the majority, now is not the time to determine whether they should be construed narrowly or broadly.
Although plaintiffs urge us to apply the interpretive canon of moscitur a sociis, see Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for Great Ore., 515 U.S. 687, 694, 115 S.Ct. 2407, 132 L.Ed.2d 597 (1995) ("a word is known by the company it keeps"), application of that or of the closely related ejusdem generis is not necessary in this case. These canons are an interpretive tool of last resort and do not control where we have other evidence of the drafters' intent. Fisher v. Cmty. Banks of Colo., Inc., - P.3d -, - (Colo.App.2010) (cert. granted Mar. 14, 2011) (citing 11 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts §§ 32.1 & 32.7, at 890-91 & 484-39 (4th ed. 1999)).
I would reverse the injunction prohibiting plaintiffs from continuing to operate their business out of Clark's home and remand the case to the trial court for reconsideration of plaintiffs' claims and attorney fees.