Court Opinion

ID: 9597342
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:57:55.573948+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:37.812316
License: Public Domain

Toal, Justice
(concurring in result and joining Justice Chandler’s concurrence in result):
I join my brother Chandler’s concurrence in result in toto. I too would overrule State v. Atkins, 293 S.C. 294, 360 S.E. (2d) 302 (1987). However, I write separately for the majority of this Court for the purpose of expressing our abolition of the outdated doctrine of in favorem vitae.9 This doctrine served a useful function for many years, but today, in light of advances in the quality of legal representation; in light of the many protections and avenues of relief available to criminal defendants; and in light of the modern day restricted use of capital punishment post Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S. Ct. 2726, 33 L. Ed. (2d) 346 (1972), the doctrine has become counterproductive to the administration of justice in some instances.10
This Court first recognized the doctrine of in favorem vitae nearly two hundred years ago. State v. Briggs, 3 S.C.L. 8 (1 Brev.) (1794). This doctrine requires this Court to review the entire record for legal error, and assume error when *61unobjected-to but technically improper arguments, evidence, jury charges, etc. are asserted by the defendant on appeal in a demand for reversal or a new trial. This Court has indicated since the doctrine’s inception that the doctrine is to be used sparingly. In State v. Fley, 4 S.C.L. 338, 345 (2 Brev.) (1809) we stated:
In favor of life, great strictness has been required in indictments. Courts have indeed leaned too much in favor of exceptions to them, which has sometimes proved very prejudicial to public justice, and a reproach to the law. This proneness to favor exceptions in favor of life ought not to be indulged in too far.
Since Fley, we have long recognized the doctrine could be abused in a given case and serve to work an injustice, which the doctrine was created specifically to prevent. Nevertheless, we have retained the doctrine until today because of its once important utilitarian value in certain cases in halting an unjust execution or reversing an erroneous conviction. Other mechanisms of protection and of relief have now been created for the criminal defendant which safeguard the defendant and render the protections afforded by in favorem vitae surplusage.
We now remedy this situation by letting the doctrine take its place in history as a once-useful device necessary to an old culture that desperately needed some form of protection against unfair convictions and sentences. As stated by United States Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 469 (1897).
When in favorem vitae was adopted by this Court, there were numerous crimes for which one could be executed. Sometime shortly after 1800, the total number of capital offenses in England exceeded two hundred. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 314, 92 S. Ct. 2726, 2765, 33 L. Ed. (2d) *62346 (1972) (Marshall, J. concurring). While this plethora of capital offenses did not exist in the colonies, capital punishment was imposed for a wide variety of crimes, not just for murder. See Furman, supra, (Marshall, J. concurring). At the time in favorem vitae was adopted, state post-conviction relief did not exist. New would argue with the proposition that post-conviction relief of any meaningful kind was not available in the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century. State courts thus took action to alleviate what could easily in such times be an unjust conviction or sentence. The Supreme Court of Ohio observed, in 1877,
[t]he fact is unquestioned that there was a time when felonies, which at common law were few in number, embraced, by parliamentary enactments, more than 200 offenses; when acts were punishable with death, which, if committed in this State, at this day, would not be punishable at all; when one charged -with felony was not permitted to have a copy of, or even to examine the indictment, to call witnesses in his defense, or to have the assistance of counsel; when no instance could be found in which a jury, in a criminal case, had failed to render a verdict on the same day it was impaneled; when jurors were fined for refusing to return a verdict of guilty; when the ordinary course was to sentence as soon as a verdict of guilty was rendered, and cause the accused to be executed on the following morning. It is not strange that in such a State of the criminal law, humane judges, in favorem vitae, would determine cases upon technicalities which at this day would be regarded as frivolous.
Burke v. Ohio, 34 Ohio St. 79, 80 (1877).
Such a state of affairs obviously does not exist today. Former Chief Justice Littlejohn, in a non-capital case, noted for this Court:
The courts of the states and of the United States give to a person accused of crime more protection against the possibility of erroneous conviction than many other system of courts on the face of the globe. The State must overcome many hurdles before an accused person is punished:
*63(1) the magistrate may refuse to issue a warrant;
(2) the magistrate may dismiss the case after a preliminary hearing;
(3) a grand jury may refuse to indict;
(4) the solicitor may direct a verdict;
(6) a petit jury may refuse to convict if only one juror has a reasonable doubt; .
(7) the judge may set the verdict aside notwithstanding a verdict of the jury;
(8) the appellate court may reverse the conviction.
If the accused person can prevail at any one of these stages of a proceeding, he goes free and is unpunished. On the other hand, the State must prevail at each of the eight stages before punishment is inflicted.
In addition to these many protections, the accused now has the right of application for post-conviction relief upon a proper showing. In almost any case a convicted person, given time for research, can come up with some sort of theory ostensibly warranting a new trial.
Anderson v. Leeke, 271 S.C. 435, 440-41, 248 S.E. (2d) 120, 122-23 (1978). Moreover, the post-conviction relief mechanism is not a minor one. South Carolina Code Ann. § 17-27-20 (1985), which provides the scope of the Uniform Post-conviction Procedure Act, reads:
(a) Any person who has been convicted of, or sentenced for, a crime and who claims:
(1) That the conviction or the sentence was in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution or laws of this State;
(2) That the court was without jurisdiction to impose sentence;
(3) That the sentence exceeds the maximum authorized by law;
(4) That there exists evidence of material facts, not previously presented and heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interest of justice;
(5) That his sentence has expired, his probation, parole or conditional release unlawfully revoked, or he is *64otherwise unlawfully held in custody or other restraint; or
(6) That the conviction or sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack upon any ground of alleged error heretofore available under any common law, statutory or other writ, motion, petition, proceeding or remedy; may institute, without paying a filing fee, a proceeding under this chapter to secure relief. Provided, however, that this section shall not be construed to permit collateral attack on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction.
Federal habeas corpus relief is also available to criminal defendants. The capital defendant, in addition, has other protections given him by statute. See S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20 et seq. (1976). For example, the death penalty may be inflicted only if one or more aggravating circumstances are found to exist beyond a reasonable doubt. Additionally, a capital defendant may request the Court, pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-25 (1976), to conduct a proportionality review of his sentence. In short, the modern criminal defendant in a capital case has available a variety of procedural and substantive protective devices with which to defend himself. The conviction of an innocent person is unlikely under our modern system; most unlikely relative to the time when in favorem vitae was adopted by this Court.
Therefore, the reasons and basis prompting adoption of the in favorem vitae doctrine no longer exist. However, the dangers associated with the doctrine and potential for abuse of the doctrine by the criminal defendant exist as long as the doctrine still has force. The primary danger associated with the doctrine is that a defendant will deliberately refrain from objecting to an error which occurs during trial. This is what is referred to by some as “sandbagging.” Of course, a contemporaneous objection requirement to preserve legal errors operates to procedurally preclude a defendant from allowing error to occur at trial and then complaining of it on appeal. However, with in favorem vitae review, the appellate court searches the record for error without regard to whether *65an objection has preserved it. This encourages defense attorneys to purposefully allow error to occur (such as improper solicitor argument or erroneous charge by the judge) in a case they feel they are losing at trial, thereby tainting the trial, while taking comfort that this Court will reverse a conviction based upon the unobjected-to error.
This strategy may serve in some cases to make more probable the conviction of a defendant at trial, but the defense attorney finds solace in an in favorem vitae appellate reversal and, possibly years later, a new trial with evidence or witnesses missing. Common sense dictates that a defense attorney is more likely to employ this sandbagging tactic when he feels his client will be convicted anyway. Indeed, the argument that it is a defense attorney’s duty as an advocate to employ this tactic does not lack force. Hence, those defendants who are least likely to be innocent of the charges against them are those most likely to receive the benefit of the operation of in favorem vitae review, since it is those defendants who must employ “sandbagging” tactics and the like in an attempt to avoid punishment for their actions. This practice frustrates the goals of our criminal justice system— which is designed not only to protect the innocent but to punish the guilty.
Further, some attorneys may allow errors to occur as a matter of trial strategy. A defense attorney may, for example, desire that certain improper arguments by the State be heard by the jury, or that the jury be charged a certain erroneous charge. The defense attorney will thus allow the “error” to occur, based on the thinking that the introduction of the argument or charge into the case would benefit the client due to the nature of the case or the circumstances involved. Also, defense counsel may decide as a strategic matter not to object because his objection would highlight the erroneous evidence, argument, or charge. With in favorem vitae review, this Court merely assumes ineffectiveness in these instances,11 having no *66ability to question the parties involved to discover whether strategy was involved.
In situations where an objection is not made due to alleged ineffective assistance of defense counsel, we hold the more preferable method of exploring this issue is via the avenue of an application for post-conviction relief, rather than reversal of the underlying error by way of in favorem vitae review. It is in the context of an adversarial proceeding, such as in post-conviction relief, that a tribunal can make a truly well-informed judgment on whether defense counsel in a given instance was prejudically ineffective, or whether the failure to object was a part of trial strategy.
The purposeful failure to object because of the safety net provided by in favorem vitae also forces the trial judge to inject himself into certain situations in a quasi-adversarial role. The trial judge must, in order to avoid appellate reversal, do what is the defense counsel’s job and prevent the State from making improper arguments and/or comments; from introducing improper evidence; or from asking improper questions. The trial judge is also put in a position at times of choosing to: (1) permit a defendant to strategically refrain from objecting and thereby benefit his client; or (2) refuse to allow the evidence in or argument to be made ex mero motu to prevent reversal by this Court on appeal via in favorem vitae review. This is a breakdown of the traditional adversarial process we can no longer sanction.
A contemporaneous objection requirement enables trial judges to make reasoned decisions by appropriately developing issues by way of argument, both for or against any particular legal proposition. This, in turn, allows potential errors to be prevented or cured. The United States Supreme Court set forth in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90, 97 S. Ct. 2497, 2508, 53 L. Ed. (2d) 594 (1977) the virtues of a contemporaneous objection requirement thusly:
A defendant has been accused of a serious crime, and this is the time and place set for him to be tried by a jury of his peers and found either guilty or not guilty by that jury. To the greatest extent possible all issues which bear on this charge should be determined in this proceeding: the accused is in the courtroom, the jury is in the box, the *67judge is on the bench, and the witnesses, having been subpoenaed and duly sworn, await their turn to testify. Society’s resources have been concentrated at that time and place in order to decide, within the limits of human fallibility, the question of guilt or innocence of one of its citizens. Any procedural rule which encourages the result that those proceedings be as free of error as possible is thoroughly desirable, and the contemporaneous objection rule surely falls within that classification.
As stated by the Court in Wainwright, the contemporaneous objection maintains the framework of our time-proven adversarial process and allows the various actors in each trial (solicitor, defense counsel, and trial judge) to adhere to their traditional roles.
Torrence argues that in favorem vitae review is mandated by statute despite the fact it was adopted by this Court on its own nearly two centuries ago. Torrence contends the legislature codified this review for capital defendants in S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-25 (1988 Cum. Supp.). We disagree and do not interpret this statute as mandating in favorem vitae review. If the legislature had expressly mentioned the in favorem vitae doctrine, or if it had expressly required this Court to review and reverse convictions and/or sentences based on unobjected-to errors, we would think differently.
Torrence points specifically to § 16-3-25(B)’s language, which reads: “[t]he Supreme Court of South Carolina shall consider the punishment as well as any errors by way of appeal.” Torrence argues this verbiage indicates this Court must consider his appellate arguments regardless of whether they are procedurally preserved by a contemporaneous objection. Torrence reads too much into too little. Simply because the legislature failed to mention the procedural requirements necessary to assign error does not mean that none exist. This Court’s general appellate jurisdiction statute, S.C. Code Ann. § 14-3-330 (1976), states in terms similar to those used in § 16-3-25(B): “[t]he Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction for correction of errors of law in law cases----” To accept Torrence’s interpretation of § 16-3-25(B) would mean by way of analogy that this Court would have to *68review procedurally barred “errors of law” in all cases under § 14-3-330.
Torrence next focuses on the language of § 16-3-25(0, which concerns certain situations in which a death sentence must be reversed, viz., (1) when it is the result of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor;12 (2) when there is a lack of evidence supporting the trial judge’s finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance; and (3) where the sentence is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases. Torrence argues this Court must address on appeal any argument under § 16-3-25(C) regardless of whether it is procedurally barred through the absence of a contemporaneous objection. He then contends the “arbitrary factor” language in the statute is a rubric under which virtually all legal errors fall, and that therefore in favorem vitae review of all legal errrors is required by § 16-3-25(C).
As an initial matter, the “arbitrary factor” language in the statute is not to be interpreted as broadly as Torrence urges. Were it to be so interpreted, the legislature would not have needed to include references to insufficient evidence of a statutory aggravating circumstance or to an excessive or disproportionate sentence. The legislature also would not have, in § 16-3-25(B), stated that this Court “shall consider... any errors by way of appeal,” since the “arbitrary factor” term would, under Torrence’s view, encompass all legal errors.
This aside, we have already, by implication, rejected Torrence’s argument that somehow § 16-3-25(C) mandates in favorem vitae review. In State v. Butler, 277 S.C. 543, 290 S.E. (2d) 420 (1982), James Butler argued on appeal that his sentence should be vacated pursuant to § 16-3-25(C)(l) because a solicitor’s personal opinion was injected into the jury’s determinations. Under Torrence’s view, § 16-3-25 itself would require us to review Butler’s claim. We did not interpret the statute in such a way in Butler, however. There, Justice Harwell, writing for the court, stated:
*69Although no timely objection to the remarks was made at trial, this Court will review the record in favorem vitae in a capital case. We conclude that the solicitor’s jury arguments during the penalty phase require that appellant’s sentence of death be vacated. When.a solicitor’s personal opinion is explicitly injected into the jury’s determinations as though it were in itself evidence justifying a sentence of death, the resulting death sentence may not be free from the influence of any arbitrary factor as required by S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-25(C)(1)....
(emphasis added) (citations omitted) 277 S.C. at 546, 290 S.E. (2d) at 421. In Butler we clearly reached the § 16-3-25(C) argument through the in favorem vitae mechanism. Absent that mechanism, the failure to object would have procedurally barred Butler’s argument. In sum, we reject Torrence’s argument that in favorem vitae review is statutorily required.
However, we do not relinquish entirely our ability to provide relief to those who have, for whatever reason, been utterly failed by our criminal justice system. While we abolish in favorem vitae review as an outdated doctrine too easily abused, an imprisoned individual may obtain a writ of habeas corpus from this Court after exhausting all other sources of relief, “where there has been a ‘violation, which, in the setting, constitutes a denial of fundamental fairness shocking to the universal sense of justice.’ ” Butler v. State, — S.C. —, 397 S.E. (2d) 87 (1990) (emphasis in the original) (quoting State v. Miller, 16 N.J. Super. 251, 84 A. (2d) 459 (1951)). This said, we hold a contemporaneous objection is necessary in all trials beginning after the date of this opinion to properly preserve errors for our direct appellate review.13
Gregory, C.J., and Harwell and Chandler, JJ., concur.

 Meaning literally “in favor of life.”

 We address the question of whether to abolish the in favorem vitae doctrine since Torrence’s “Argument IV” could only be considered by this Court via the in favorem vitae vehicle.

 It is true we have held that the doctrine of in favorem vitae is designed to allow this Court to review errors of law only, as opposed to strategy decisions of trial counsel. State v. Riddle, 291 S.C. 232, 353 S.E. (2d) 138 (1987). However, the fact remains that there are very few cases in which we can determine, based on the record before us, whether the failure by defense counsel to object was a strategic decision.

 A finding of a sentence of death based on such would constitute an Eighth Amendment violation in any event.

 To the extent they require in favorem vitae review, the following cases, inter alia, are hereby overruled:
State v. Arthur, 296 S.C. 495, 374 S.E. (2d) 291 (1988);
State v. Diddlemeyer, 296 S.C. 235, 371 S.E. (2d) 793 (1988);
State v. Hawkins, 292 S.C. 418, 357 S.E. (2d) 10 (1987);
State v. Bellamy, 293 S.C. 103, 359 S.E. (2d) 63 (1987);
State v. Reed, 293 S.C. 515, 362 S.E. (2d) 13 (1987);
State v. Riddle, 291 S.C. 232, 353 S.E. (2d) 138 (1987);
*70State v. Cooper, 291 S.C. 332, 353 S.E. (2d) 441 (1986);
State v. Pierce, 289 S.C. 430, 346 S.E. (2d) 707 (1986);
State v. Damon, 285 S.C. 125, 328 S.E. (2d) 628 (1985); cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865, 106 S. Ct. 187, 88 L. Ed. (2d) 156, reh. denied, 474 U.S. 1015, 106 S. Ct. 551, 88 L. Ed. (2d) 479 (1985);
State v. Drayton, 287 S.C. 226, 337 S.E. (2d) 216 (1985);
State v. Gaskins, 284 S.C. 105, 326 S.E. (2d) 132 (1985), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1120, 105 S. Ct. 2368, 86 L. Ed. (2d) 266 (1985);
State v. Koon, 285 S.C. 1, 328 S.E. (2d) 625 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1036, 105 S. Ct. 2056, 85 L. Ed. (2d) 329 (1985);
State v. Lucas, 285 S.C. 37, 328 S.E. (2d) 63 (1985), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1012, 105 S. Ct. 2714, 86 L. Ed. (2d) 729, reh. denied, 473 U.S. 925, 106 S. Ct. 15, 87 L. Ed. (2d) 694 (1985);
State v. Norris, 285 S.C. 86, 328 S.E. (2d) 339 (1985);
State v. Peterson, 287 S.C. 244, 335 S.E. (2d) 800 (1985);
State v. Plemmons, 286 S.C. 78, 332 S.E. (2d) 765 (1985), vacated on other grounds, 476 U.S. 1102, 106 S. Ct. 1943, 90 L. Ed. (2d) 353 (1986);
State v. Singleton, 284 S.C. 388, 326 S.E. (2d) 153 (1985), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1111, 105 S. Ct. 2346, 85 L. Ed. (2d) 863 (1985);
State v. Smith, 286 S.C. 406, 334 S.E. (2d) 277 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1031, 106 S. Ct. 1239, 89 L. Ed. (2d) 347;
State v. Chaffee, 285 S.C. 21, 328 S.E. (2d) 464 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1009, 105 S. Ct. 1878, 85 L. Ed. (2d) 170 (1985);
State v. Patterson, 285 S.C. 5, 327 S.E. (2d) 650 (1984) (II), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1036, 105 S. Ct. 2056, 85 L. Ed. (2d) 329 (1985);
State v. Adams, 279 S.C. 228, 306 S.E. (2d) 208 (1983) (II);
State v. Elmore, 279 S.C. 417, 308 S.E. (2d) 781 (1983) (I);
State v. H. Butler, 277 S.C. 452, 290 S.E. (2d) 1 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 932, 103 S. Ct. 242, 74 L. Ed. (2d) 191 (1982);
State v. J.A. Butler, 277 S.C. 543, 290 S.E. (2d) 420 (1982);
State v. Patterson, 278 S.C. 319, 295 S.E. (2d) 264 (1982) (I);
State v. Smart, 278 S.C. 515, 299 S.E. (2d) 686 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1088, 103 S. Ct. 1784, 76 L. Ed. (2d) 353 (1983);
State v. Thompson, 278 S.C. 1, 292 S.E. (2d) 581 (1982), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 938, 102 S. Ct. 1996, 72 L. Ed. (2d) 458 (1982);
State v. Yates, 280 S.C. 29, 310 S.E. (2d) 805 (1982);
State v. Adams, 277 S.C. 115, 283 S.E. (2d) 582 (1981);
State v. Hyman, 276 S.C. 559, 281 S.E. (2d) 209 (1981); cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1122, 102 S. Ct. 3510, 73 L. Ed. (2d) 1384, reh. denied, 458 U.S. 1132, 103 S. Ct. 18, 73 L. Ed. (2d) 1403 (1982);
State v. Woomer, 276 S.C. 258, 277 S.E. (2d) 696 (1981);
State v. Goolsby, 275 S.C. 110, 268 S.E. (2d) 31 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1037, 101 S. Ct. 616, 66 L. Ed. (2d) 500 (1980);
State v. Gilbert, 273 S.C. 690, 258 S.E. (2d) 890 (1979);
State v. Shaw, 273 S.C. 194, 255 S.E. (2d) 799 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 957, 100 S. Ct. 437, 62 L. Ed. (2d) 329 (1980);
State v. A. Allen, 266 S.C. 175, 222 S.E. (2d) 287 (1976);
State v. J.L. Allen, 266 S.C. 468, 224 S.E. (2d) 881 (1976);
State v. Ingram, 266 S.C. 462, 224 S.E. (2d) 711 (1976);
State v. Atkinson, 253 S.C. 531, 172 S.E. (2d) 111 (1970);
State v. Bell, 250 S.C. 37, 156 S.E. (2d) 313 (1967);
State v. Gamble, 249 S.C. 605, 155 S.E. (2d) 916 (1967);
State v. Cannon, 248 S.C. 506, 151 S.E. (2d) 752 (1966);
State v. Gamble, 247 S.C. 214, 146 S.E. (2d) 709 (1966);
*71State v. Thomas, 248 S.C. 573, 151 S.E. (2d) 855 (1966);
State v. Cain, 246 S.C. 536, 144 S.E. (2d) 905 (1965);
State v. Swilling, 246 S.C. 144, 142 S.E. (2d) 864 (1965), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1055, 88 S. Ct. 806, 19 L. Ed. (2d) 853 (1968);
State v. Black, 243 S.C. 42, 132 S.E. (2d) 5 (1963);
State v. Moorer, 241 S.C. 487, 129 S.E. (2d) 330 (1963);
State v. Morris, 243 S.C. 225, 133 S.E. (2d) 744 (1963);
State v. Sharpe, 239 S.C. 258, 122 S.E. (2d) 622 (1962);
State v. Worthy, 239 S.C. 449, 123 S.E. (2d) 835 (1962);
State v. Outen, 237 S.C. 514, 118 S.E. (2d) 175 (1961);
State v. Robinson, 238 S.C. 140, 119 S.E. (2d) 671 (1961);
State v. Thorne, 239 S.C. 164, 121 S.E. (2d) 623 (1961);
State v. Young, 238 S.C. 115, 119 S.E. (2d) 504 (1961);
State v. Britt, 237 S.C. 293, 117 S.E. (2d) 379 (1960);
State v. Johnson, 236 S.C. 207, 113 S.E. (2d) 540 (1960);
State v. Britt, 235 S.C. 395, 111 S.E. (2d) 669 (1959);
State v. Brooks, 235 S.C. 344, 111 S.E. (2d) 686 (1959), appeal dismissed, 365 U.S. 300, 81 S. Ct. 707, 5 L. Ed. (2d) 689 (1961);
State v. Bullock, 235 S.C. 356, 111 S.E. (2d) 657 (1959);
State v. Livingston, 233 S.C. 400, 105 S.E. (2d) 73 (1958);
State v. Daniels, 231 S.C. 176, 97 S.E. (2d) 902 (1957);
State v. Byrd, 229 S.C. 593, 93 S.E. (2d) 900 (1956);
State v. Jones, 228 S.C. 484, 91 S.E. (2d) 1 (1956);
State v. Boone, 228 S.C. 438, 90 S.E. (2d) 640 (1955);
State v. Chasteen, 228 S.C. 88, 88 S.E. (2d) 880 (1955);
State v. Green, 227 S.C. 1, 86 S.E. (2d) 598 (1955);
State v. Waitus, 226 S.C. 44, 83 S.E. (2d) 629 (1954);
State v. Gantt, 223 S.C. 431, 76 S.E. (2d) 674 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 906, 74 S. Ct. 433, 98 L. Ed. 1065 (1954);
State v. Blassingame, 221 S.C. 169, 69 S.E. (2d) 601 (1952);
State v. Harvey, 220 S.C. 506, 68 S.E. (2d) 409 (1951);
State v. Harris, 212 S.C. 124, 46 S.E. (2d) 682 (1948);
State v. Lincoln, 213 S.C. 553, 50 S.E. (2d) 687 (1948);
State v. Taylor, 213 S.C. 330, 49 S.E. (2d) 289 (1948);
State v. Gidron, 211 S.C. 360, 45 S.E. (2d) 587 (1947);
State v. Gatlin, 208 S.C. 414, 38 S.E. (2d) 238 (1946);
State v. Scott, 209 S.C. 61, 38 S.E. (2d) 902 (1946);
State v. Simmons, 208 S.C. 538, 38 S.E. (2d) 705 (1946);
State v. Grant, 199 S.C. 412, 19 S.E. (2d) 638 (1942); cert. denied, 316 U.S. 662, 62 S. Ct. 942, 86 L. Ed. 1739 (1942);
State v. Osborne, 200 S.C. 504, 21 S.E. (2d) 178 (1942);
State v. McDonald, 184 S.C. 290, 192 S.E. 365 (1937);
State v. Williams, 166 S.C. 63, 164 S.E. 415 (1932). See also, e.g., State v. Green, 48 S.C. 136, 26 S.E. 234 (1897);
State v. Faile, 43 S.C. 52, 20 S.E. 798 (1895);
State v. Morgan, 40 S.C. 345, 18 S.E. 937 (1894); In re State v. Turner, 39 S.C. 414, 17 S.E. 888 (1893), affirmed, State v. Turner, 39 S.C. 420, 17 S.E. 885 (1893);
State v. Levelle, 34 S.C. 120, 13 S.E. 319 (1891);
State v. Davis, 27 S.C. 609, 4 S.E. 567 (1888);
State v. McNinch, 12 S.C. 89 (1879);
State v. Fley, 4 S.C.L. 338 (2 Brev.) (1809);
State v. Arden, 1 S.C.L. 487 (1 Bay) (1795);
State v. Briggs, 3 S.C.L. 8 (1 Brev.) (1794).