Court Opinion

ID: 9369336
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-08 16:05:30.667147+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:14.601133
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                  No. 22-0654
                             Filed February 8, 2023

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF MARK D. LEVINE, Deceased.

MARGARITA CERVERA LEVINE,
    Appellant,

vs.

SARA LUNN KEOWN,
     Appellee.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Craig E. Block,

Associate Probate Judge.

      Margarita Cervera Levine appeals the probate court’s decision finding it has

subject-matter jurisdiction over the Estate of Mark D. Levine. AFFIRMED.

      Nicholas Critelli of Critelli Law, P.C., Des Moines, and Samuel H. Braland

of Peer, Nelson & Braland, Earlham, for appellant.

      J. Michael Boomershine and Louis R. Hockenberg of Sullivan & Ward, P.C.,

West Des Moines, for appellee.

      Heard by Bower, C.J., and Badding and Buller, JJ.
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BOWER, Chief Judge.

         Margarita Cervera Levine appeals the probate court’s decision finding it has

subject-matter jurisdiction over the Estate of Mark D. Levine. Because a probate

court in Polk County has “original and exclusive jurisdiction to administer the

estates of all persons . . . who die leaving property in the county subject to

administration”1 and the decedent died leaving Polk County real property subject

to administration, we affirm.

I. Background Facts & Proceedings.

         Mark Levine (Levine) died intestate in Belize on February 8, 2021. At the

time of his death, he owned a joint interest in a mobile home and adjoining real

property in Polk County, a condominium in Belize, and various bank and

investment accounts.

         Levine’s adult daughter, Sara Keown (Keown), lives in Polk County. In

September 2020, Levine married Margarita Cervera (Cervera) in Belize.              In

January 2021, Levine filed a change-in-beneficiary designation with a life

insurance company, listing Cervera with a fifty-percent share as beneficiary,

Keown with a thirty-five-percent share, and a cousin with the remaining fifteen-

percent share. Levine’s financial accounts listed his Polk County mobile home as

his mailing address.

         On February 22, Keown filed a petition for intestate administration of

Levine’s estate in Polk County, requesting she be appointed administrator.2

Keown’s petition stated Levine did not leave a surviving spouse. The inventory

1   See Iowa Code § 633.12 (2021).
2   An estate was also opened in Belize in late February.
                                          3

Keown filed in late April listed Cervera as a beneficiary with a note “claims to be

spouse.” On July 7, Keown filed an application for declaratory judgment in the

probate court, challenging the validity of the marriage between Levine and

Cervera.

       Cervera filed a pre-answer motion to dismiss under Iowa Rule of Civil

Procedure 1.421(a), stating, “This court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the

Estate of Mark D. Levine. Proper jurisdiction is in Belize where deceased resided

for many years prior to his death, accordingly these proceedings should be

dismissed.”   Cervera also filed an answer to the application for declaratory

judgment denying any question existed about the legality of her marriage to

Levine.3

       On March 3, 2022, the probate court held a hearing on the question of

subject-matter jurisdiction. In its ruling, the court noted legal distinctions between

residency and domicile, and noted evidence of Levine’s residency in both Polk

County and Belize. The court also noted Cervera raised a question concerning

which estate administration should be primary and which ancillary, finding the

question did “not defeat the court’s capacity to exercise jurisdiction.” The probate

court found “jurisdiction is proper in Polk County, Iowa[,] and the motion to dismiss

for subject matter jurisdiction in denied.” The court did not address Keown’s

3 The Iowa Department of Human Services filed an answer to the application for
declaratory judgment and Cervera’s defense, asserting jurisdiction belonged in
Iowa due to the existence of real and personal property and outstanding medical-
assistance debts in Iowa and noting even if the Iowa probate estate was not the
principal estate it should be considered an ancillary estate. The Estate
subsequently paid Levine’s outstanding state medical assistance debts, and the
department withdrew from the Estate proceedings.
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motion for declaratory judgment or make a finding on Levine’s domicile or primary

residency.

       Cervera appeals.

II. Standard of Review.

       “Our review of the proceedings concerning subject matter jurisdiction is at

law. . . .” Tigges v. City of Ames, 356 N.W.2d 503, 512 (Iowa 1984).

       Subject matter jurisdiction is the power of a court to hear and
       determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in
       question belong, not merely the particular case then occupying the
       court’s attention. Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a claim must
       be conferred by a constitutional or statutory grant.

DeStefano v. Apts. Downtown, Inc., 879 N.W.2d 155, 164 (Iowa 2016) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted).

III. Analysis.

       “At the outset, it is important to precisely define the legal issue behind the

subject matter jurisdictional challenge.” Id. The only question under consideration

by the probate court was Cervera’s assertion, “This court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction over the Estate of Mark D. Levine.”

       Iowa Code section 633.10(1) grants the probate court jurisdiction of “the

administration, settlement and distribution of estates of decedents and absentees,

whether such estates consist of real or personal property or both.” Section 633.12

provides additional jurisdictional guidance:

               The court of each county shall have original and exclusive
       jurisdiction to administer the estates of all persons who are residents
       of the county, or who were residents at the time of their death, and
       all nonresidents of the state who have property, or who die leaving
       property in the county subject to administration, or whose property is
       afterwards brought into the county; to appoint conservators for
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       nonresidents having property in the county; and to appoint
       conservators and guardians of residents of the county.

       The statute clearly gives the court subject-matter jurisdiction over the estate

of any persons “who die leaving property in the county subject to administration,”

regardless of their residency status. Neither residency nor domicile is a necessary

predicate for the court to exercise jurisdiction over an estate with property in the

county. There is no dispute Levine owned real property subject to administration

in Polk County. By statute, the Polk County court therefore has subject-matter

jurisdiction as to an estate administering property in the county.

       The parties’ arguments on appeal debate the definitions of residency and

domicile—an important question in determining the primary and ancillary

administration given Levine’s ownership of property in two distinct jurisdictions. 4

While an interesting question, it is not one properly raised in Cervera’s motion to

dismiss or decided by the probate court, and ancillary or primary administration

designation is not properly before us on appeal. See Meier v. Senecaut, 641

N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) (“It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that

issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we

will decide them on appeal.”).

       Cervera’s motion to dismiss challenges the court’s jurisdiction over the

entire estate; it does not question whether the administration is primary or ancillary

4 Cervera argues on appeal the Belize administration should be primary with Iowa
only exercising ancillary administration, challenging the Iowa court’s “full
jurisdiction over the probate of Levine’s estate” and applying Iowa law to his foreign
assets. But Cervera filed no motion with the probate court regarding the foreign
assets, conflict of laws, or the administration in Belize, or seeking designation of
the Iowa administration as ancillary. See Iowa Code §§ 633.500-.504.
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nor does it question the court’s authority to decide Keown’s application for

declaratory judgment. The court considered the question actually presented and

determined it had subject-matter jurisdiction over the estate based on the

existence of property in the county subject to administration. Considering only that

same specific question considered in the probate court, we agree the court has

subject-matter jurisdiction and affirm.

       AFFIRMED.