Court Opinion

ID: 9430680
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:30:20.394126+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:25.722062
License: Public Domain

Justice Powell,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
I join Parts I, II, III, and VI of Justice Brennan’s opinion. I further agree that § 706(g) does not limit a court in all cases to granting relief only to actual victims of discrimination. I write separately with respect- to the issues raised in Parts IV and V to explain why I think the remedy ordered under the circumstances of this case violated neither Title VII nor the Constitution.
I
Petitioners contend that the Fund order and the membership goal imposed by the District Court and upheld by the Court of Appeals are forbidden by § 706(g) because that provision authorizes an award of preferential relief only to the actual victims of unlawful discrimination. The plain language of Title VII does not clearly support a view that all remedies must be limited to benefiting victims. And although the matter is not entirely free from doubt, I am unpersuaded by petitioners’ reliance on the legislative history of Title VII. Rather, in eases involving particularly egregious conduct a district court may fairly conclude that an injunction *484alone is insufficient to remedy a proven violation of Title VII. This is such a case.
The history of petitioners’ contemptuous racial discrimination and their successive attempts to evade all efforts to end that discrimination is well stated in Part I of the Court’s opinion. Under these circumstances the District Court acted within the remedial authority granted by § 706(g) in establishing the Fund order and numerical goal at issue in this case. This Court’s decision in Firefighters v. Stotts, 467 U. S. 561 (1984), is not to the contrary. There, the question whether Title VII might ever authorize a remedy that benefits those who were not victims of discrimination was not before us, although there is language in the opinion suggesting an answer to that question.
I — I I — I
There remains for consideration the question whether the Fund order and membership goal contravene the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because they may deny benefits to white individuals based on race. I have recently reiterated what I believe to be the standard for assessing a constitutional challenge to a racial classification:
“ ‘Any preference based on racial or ethnic criteria must necessarily receive a most searching examination to make sure that it does not conflict with constitutional guarantees.’ Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448, 491 (1980) (opinion of Burger, C. J.). There are two prongs to this examination. First, any racial classification ‘must be justified by a compelling governmental interest’ Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U. S. 429, 432 (1984); see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 11 (1967); cf. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365, 375 (1971) (alienage). Second, the means chosen by the State to effectuate its purpose must be ‘narrowly tailored to the achievement of that *485goal.’ Fullilove, supra, at 480.” Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U. S. 267, 273-274 (1986).
The finding by the District Court and the Court of Appeals that petitioners have engaged in egregious violations of Title VII establishes, without doubt, a compelling governmental interest sufficient to justify the imposition of a racially classified remedy. It would be difficult to find defendants more determined to discriminate against minorities. My inquiry, therefore, focuses on whether the District Court’s remedy is “narrowly tailored,” see Wygant, supra, at 280, n. 6, to the goal of eradicating the discrimination engaged in by petitioners. I believe it is.
The Fund order is supported not only by the governmental interest in eradicating petitioners’ discriminatory practices, it also is supported by the societal interest in compliance with the judgments of federal courts. Cf. United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258, 303 (1947). The Fund order was not imposed until after petitioners were held in contempt. In requiring the Union to create the Fund, the District Court expressly considered “ ‘the consequent seriousness of the burden’ to the defendants.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 156, quoting 330 U. S., at 304. Moreover, the focus of the Fund order was to give minorities opportunities that for years had been available informally only to nonminorities. The burden this imposes on nonminorities is slight. Under these circumstances, I have little difficulty concluding that the Fund order was carefully structured to vindicate the compelling governmental interests present in this case.
The percentage goal raises a different question. In Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448 (1980), this Court upheld the constitutionality of the “minority business enterprise” provision of the Public Works Employment Act of 1977, which required, absent administrative waiver, that at least 10% of federal funds granted for local public works projects be used by grantees to procure services or supplies from businesses owned by minority group members. In my *486concurring opinion, I relied on four factors that had been applied by Courts of Appeals when considering the proper scope of race-conscious hiring remedies. Those factors were: (i) the efficacy of alternative remedies; (ii) the planned duration of the remedy; (iii) the relationship between the percentage of minority workers to be employed and the percentage of minority group members in the relevant population or work force; and (iv) the availability of waiver provisions if the hiring plan could not be met. Id., at 510-511. A final factor of primary importance that I considered in Fullilove, as well as in Wygant, was “the effect of the [remedy] upon innocent third parties.” 448 U. S., at 514. Application of those factors demonstrates that the goal in this case comports with constitutional requirements.
First, it is doubtful, given petitioners’ history in this litigation, that the District Court had available to it any other effective remedy. That court, having had the parties before it over a period of time, was in the best position to judge whether an alternative remedy, such as a simple injunction, would have been effective in ending petitioners’ discriminatory practices. Here, the court imposed the 29% goal in 1975 only after declaring that “[i]n light of Local 28’s and JAC’s failure to ‘clean house’ this court concludes that the imposition of a remedial racial goal ... is essential to place the defendants in a position of compliance with the 1964 Civil Rights Act.” EEOC v. Local 638, 401 F. Supp. 467, 488 (SDNY 1975).1 On these facts, it is fair to conclude that ab*487sent authority to set a goal as a benchmark against which it could measure progress in eliminating discriminatory practices, the District Court may have been powerless to provide an effective remedy. Second, the goal was not imposed as a permanent requirement, but is of limited duration. Third, the goal is directly related to the percentage of nonwhites in the relevant work force.
As a fourth factor, my concurring opinion in Fullilove considered whether waiver provisions were available in the event that the hiring goal could not be met. The requirement of a waiver provision or, more generally, of flexibility with respect to the imposition of a numerical goal reflects a recognition that neither the Constitution nor Title VII requires a particular racial balance in the workplace. Indeed, the Constitution forbids such a requirement if imposed for its own sake. Fullilove, supra, at 507. “We have recognized, however, that in order to remedy the effects of prior discrimination, it may be necessary to take race into account.” Wygant, supra, at 280. Thus, a court may not choose a remedy for the purpose of attaining a particular racial balance; rather, remedies properly are confined to the elimination of proven discrimination. A goal is a means, useful in limited circumstances, to assist a court in determining whether discrimination has been eradicated.
The flexible application of the goal requirement in this case demonstrates that it is not a means to achieve racial balance. The contempt order was not imposed for the Union’s failure to achieve the goal, but for its failure to take the prescribed steps that would facilitate achieving the goal. Additional *488flexibility is evidenced by the fact that this goal, originally set to be achieved by 1981, has been twice delayed and is now set for 1987.2
It is also important to emphasize that on the record before us, it does not appear that nonminorities will be burdened directly, if at all. Petitioners’ counsel conceded at oral argument that imposition of the goal would not require the layoff of nonminority union workers, and that therefore the District Court’s order did not disadvantage existing union members. Tr. of Oral Arg. 21. This case is thus distinguishable from Wygant where the plurality opinion noted that “layoffs impose the entire burden of achieving racial equality on particular individuals, often resulting in serious disruption of their lives.” 476 U. S., at 283. In contrast to the layoff provision in Wygant, the goal at issue here is akin to a hiring goal. In Wygant the plurality observed:
“In cases involving valid hiring goals, the burden to be borne by individuals is diffused to a considerable extent among society generally. Though hiring goals may burden some innocent individuals, they simply do not impose the same kind of injury that layoffs impose.” Id., at 282.3
My view that the imposition of flexible goals as a remedy for past discrimination may be permissible under the Con*489stitution is not an endorsement of their indiscriminate use. Nor do I imply that the adoption of such a goal will always pass constitutional muster.4

 In its decision establishing the initial goal, the District Court explained: “The record in both state and federal court against these [union and JAC] defendants is replete with instances of their bad faith attempts to prevent or delay affirmative action. After Justice Markowitz [in his 1964 state-court proceeding] ordered implementation of the Corrected Fifth Draft, with the intent and hope that it would create ‘a truly nondiscriminatory union[,]’ Local 28 flouted the court’s mandate by expending union funds to subsidize special training sessions designed to give union members’ friends and relatives a competitive edge in taking the JAC battery. JAC obtained an exemption from state affirmative action regulations directed towards *487the administration of apprentice programs on the ground that its program was operating pursuant to court order; yet Justice Markowitz had specifically provided that all such subsequent regulations, to the extent not inconsistent with his order, were to be incorporated therein and applied to JAC’s program. More recently, the defendants unilaterally suspended court-ordered time tables for admission of forty non-whites to the apprentice program pending trial of this action, only completing the admission process under threat of contempt citations.” 401 F. Supp., at 488.

 The District Court declared that “[i]f the goal is not attained by [August 81,1987], defendants will face fines that will threaten their very existence.” App. to Pet. for Cert. A-123. I agree with the plurality, however, that this statement cannot be taken as evidence that the goal will be applied as an inflexible quota. Ante, at 478.

 Of course, it is too simplistic to conclude from the combined holdings in Wygant and this case that hiring goals withstand constitutional muster whereas layoff goals and fixed quotas do not. There may be cases, for example, where a hiring goal in a particularly specialized area of employment would have the same pernicious effect as the layoff goal in Wygant. The proper constitutional inquiry focuses on the effect, if any, and the diffuseness of the burden imposed on innocent nonminorities, not on the label applied to the particular employment plan at issue.

 If the record now before us supported the position taken by Justice O’Connor, I might well view this case differently. Justice O’Connor apparently assumes that the goal can be achieved by August 31, 1987, only if the District Court requires ‘“the replacement of journeymen by apprentices on a strictly racial basis.’ ” Post, at 498 (quoting EEOC v. Local 638, 753 F. 2d 1172, 1195 (CA2 1985) (Winter, J., dissenting)). If and when that happens, petitioners will be free to argue that an impermissible quota has been imposed on the union and the JAC. An examination of what has occurred in this litigation over the years makes plain that the District Court has not enforced the goal in the rigid manner that concerns Justice O’Connor. Based on the record actually before us, I am satisfied that the goal imposed by the District Court is a flexible one.