Court Opinion

ID: 9647893
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:54:17.951099+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:23:55.844166
License: Public Domain

LITTLETON, Judge (dissenting).
I cannot concur in the majority opinion dismissing plaintiff’s petition on the ground .that it is estopped to claim. the overpayments for 1919, 1920, and 1921 credited against an additional tax assessed for 1917 and 1918, whieh credit was allowed and made after the expiration of the statute of limitation within whieh the tax for 1917 and 1918 could be collected. The plaintiff is held es-topped to question the legality of the credit of overpayments against the tax assessed for prior years because it filed claims for credit in whieh it alleged certain overpayments for 1919, 1920, and 1921, made certain statements therein, and filed amended returns for those years.
Prom a consideration of the circumstances under which the claims for credit were filed and of the statements contained therein, the stipulation of facts, the testimony introduced, the various statutes and regulations with reference to the filing of claims for credit, the decisions of the Treasury Department, and the long-continued practice of the department and the collectors of internal revenue, I am of the opinion that the doctrine of estoppel is not applicable and should not be invoked in this case.
Throughout this case it should be kept in mind that each taxable year stands alone, Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U. S. 359, 51 S. Ct. 150, 75 L. Ed. 383, and that the rights and liabilities of the taxpayer and the Government with respect thereto are fixed by the statutes, whieh prescribe the procedure to be followed, the time within whieh certain acts of the taxpayer or the Commissioner of Internal» Revenue in respect of a particular taxable year or years shall be taken, and the effect thereof upon the rights of the taxpayer or the government.
.Section 252 of the Revenue Act of 1918, approved February 24,1919 (40 Stat. 1085), was the first statute providing for a system of crediting overpayments for one taxable year against a tax that may be due for a different taxable year, and said section was the first provision of law providing for the filing of a claim for credit. Prior to that time sections 3220 and 3228, Revised Statutes (see 26 USCA §§ 149, 157 and notes), provided only for the filing of claims for refund and authorized the commissioner to remit, refund, and pay back taxes erroneously or illegally assessed or collected. Prior to the enactment of the Revenue Act of- 1918 the Treasury Department had no system for filing of claims for credit by taxpayers or for the making of credits of overpayments of taxes for a particular period against taxes due for another period. Article'267, Regs. 33, Revised, relating to the Revenue Act of 1916 (39 Stat. 756), as amended by the Revenue Act of 1917 (40 Stat. 300), discloses the only practice in force in the Treasury Department with reference to the payment of claims. That article provided that upon allowance of claims for taxes overpaid warrants would be issued in favor of the party entitled to the money and would be sent by the Treasurer to such party, "but if the claimants are indebted to the United States for taxes, they must be paid before the warrants are delivered.” This article was predicated on the Act of March 3,1875,18 Stat. 481 (31 USCA § 227), which authorized the Treasury Department to withhold monies due if the person entitled thereto should be indebted to the United States, until the termination of a suit by the government to recover such claimed indebtedness. Section 1006 of the Revenue Act of 1918 (26 USCA § 704) provided that the commissioner, with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, shall make all needful rules and regulations for carrying the provisions of this act into effect. Subsequent acts contained the same provision. Prior to the enactment of that act the commissioner had prescribed separate forms, 46 and 47, to be used in making a claim for refund or a claim for abatement, respectively, and had made certain regulations with reference to the filing thereof and as to the information to be contained therein. In Regs.'45, issued and promulgated under the Revenue Act of 1918, the Treasury Department prepared and issued another form, known as Form 47-A, to be used by taxpayers in making claims for .credit, which form prescribed the manner in whieh sueh claim should be prepared and made, and the in*141formation to be contained therein. Article 1034, Regs. 45, provided that: “Any amount of income, war-profits, or excess-profits tax paid in excess of that properly due shall bo credited against any such taxes due from the taxpayer under any other return. To obtain such credit taxpayers should proceed as follows: (1) Where the credit demanded is equal to or less than any outstanding assessment of tax, a taxpayer desiring to obtain such credit shall file with the collector for the district in which his original return was filed a claim on Form 47-A, which shall bo sworn to and shall contain the following statements: (os) Business engaged in by claimant; (6) character of assessment; (e) amount of tax paid and for what taxable year; (á) portion of tax under (c) claimed as a credit; (e) unpaid assessment against which credit is asked and for what taxable year; and (/) all facts regarding the overpayment.” (Italics supplied.) Said article also provided that where the amount claimed as a credit is greater than the outstanding assessment of tax, the taxpayer desiring’ to obtain such credit and refund ol the balance should file a claim for refund, Form 46, in addition to the claim for credit, and that all the facts regarding the total overpayment should be stated in the claim for refund and a reference made therein to the claim for credit. Article 1035, Regs'. 45, provided for the procedure to be followed by the commissioner and the collector in making tho credits which was tho same as the procedure followed in this case. The 1921 regulations further provided that: “Under no circumstances will a taxpayer be entitled to credit for an alleged overpayment of tax prior to the allowance of such credit by the commissioner. An attempt to take a credit prior to such allowance shall not be held to be tho filing of a claim under section 252 of the Revenue Act of 1921.” See article 1035, Regs. 62, and T. D. 3154, April 11, 1921.
The revenue act had provided that if any tax remained unpaid after the date when it was due and for ten days after notice and demand by the collector there should be added as a part of the tax the sum of 5 per cent, of the amount due and unpaid, plus interest at 12 per cent, a year, from the time it became due until paid, but that as to any amount which was made the subject of a bona fide claim for abatement the 5 per cent, should not be added and the interest from the time the amount was due until the claim is decided should be at the rate of 6 per cent, a year. Article 1035, above mentioned, relating to credits of overpayments against taxes due, provided that: “The filing of a claim for credit of a tax due under another return shall be subject to the samo rules with respect to the addition of interest arid penalties as if the taxpayer had filed a claim for abatement of the tax against which credit is desired.” Articles 1003 and 1006 of Regs. 45 related to interest and penalties where payment was not made within ten days after notice and demand and where a claim for abatement was filed.
On December 8, 1921, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with the approval of tho Secretary of the Treasury, issued and published Treasury Decision No. 3260, 5 C. B. 243, relating to adjustments by credit, in which it was stated that: “Reduction of internal-revenue assessments and adjustments of overpayments of revenues will hereafter be accomplished * * * on the basis of an application submitted by a taxpayer on form * “ 'f 47-A, together with appropriate supporting evidence to be filed in the office of ’the collector of internal revenue of the district in which the tax is assessed.” This provision is contained in article 1033-A, Regs. 62, under the revenue act of 1921. Such Treasury decision contained other provisions relating to abatements and refunds, and the manner in which they would be accomplished, as had been prescribed by article 1034 of Regs. 45, theretofore issued.
Article 261, Regs. 33, revised, under the Revenue Act of 1916, as amended by the Revenue Aet of October 3, 1917, which regulation was issued before the statute and the regulations had authorized a system of credits, provided that: “The filing of a claim for abatement of a tax alleged to have been erroneously assessed does not necessarily operate as a suspension of the collection of the tax, or make it any less the duty of the collector to exercise due diligence to prevent the collection of the tax being jeopardized. ITo should, if necessary, collect tho tax and leave the taxpayer to his remedy by claim on Form 46 [for refund].”
In or about January, 1922, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue rendered and published a decision under section 252 of the Revenue Act of 1921 (42 Stat. 268) and article 1034 of Regs. 45 and 62, being I. T. 1373, I—1 C. B. 318, in which it was held that: “The filing of a claim for credit does not necessarily operate as a suspension of the collection of tax or make it any less the duty of the collector to exercise due diligence to prevent the collection of the tax from being jeopardized. He may, if he considers it nec*142essary, collect the tax and leave the taxpayer to his remedy by a claim for refund.” This decision, as well as others herein mentioned, was furnished to collectors of internal revenue.
Shortly prior to making the above-men.tioned decision the commissioner had made and published a decision, I. T. 1333, I — 1, C. B. 305, in which he held that the running of the statute of limitation against the government, as a result of which the government would be precluded from bringing suit or proceedings against the taxpayer, placed the tax in jeopardy. Thereafter, in or about July, 1922, the commissioner made and published a decision known as I. T. 1446, 1-2 C. B. 218, under sections 250 of the Revenue Acts of 1918 and 1921 (40 Stat. 1082; 42 Stat. 264), and article 1109 of Regs. 45 and 62, in which he held that when a tax had been assessed within the five years provided by section 250 (d) of the Revenue Act of 1921 the tax so assessed could be collected by means other than a proceeding in court after the expiration of such five-year period. Said decision was as follows:
“The income-tax return of the company was filed February 27, 1917. Notice and demand for additional income taxes due for the year 1916 was mailed by the collector on March 1 and received on March 2, 1922.
“Second notice and demand for the tax was sent on March 10, 1922. The collector has notified the corporation that if the taxes are not paid he will distrain its property.
“Under the provisions of section 250 of the Revenue Act of 1921 taxes for years prior to_ 1921. must be determined and assessed within -five years after the return was filed, and no suit or proceeding for the collection of the tax may be begun after the expiration of such five years. It is contended that in this case neither of these requirements of the statute has been met, and request is made that the collector be instructed to refrain from distraining the property.
“This office is of the opinion that * * * section 250 (d) of the Revenue Act of 1921 * * * refers only to judicial proceedings for the collection of such taxes and not to the summary proceeding by means of distraint authorized by sections 3187 to 3209 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (see 26 USCA §§ 116-138).
“As the additional taxes in question were placed on the assessment list under date of February 24, 1922, it will be seen that such taxes were determined and assessed within the five-year period of limitation provided in section 250 (d) of the Revenue Act of 1921, and that the action of the collector in demanding payment after the expiration of such' five years was entirely proper. If payment of the additional assessment of taxes was not made within the prescribed time, the collector may proceed by means of distraint to collect such taxes.”
It was the practice of the Treasury Department to obtain a waiver of the statute of limitation by the taxpayer or secure a bond in eases where it was believed collection of the tax would be jeopardized by delay. See section 250 (d) of the Revenue Act of 19-21 providing for waivers of the statute of limitation, and the collector’s testimony hereafter referred to.
After January, 1922, claims for abatement, credit, and refund, theretofore required by the regulations and rulings of the Treasury Department to be made on separate forms provided for that purpose, were combined into one form, No. 843, which was the form used'by plaintiff in this .case. After January, 1922, taxpayers making a claim indicated thereon whether it was a claim for abatement, credit, or refund, and filled in onl3T that portion thereof which was required in such cases.
I shall next point out certain matters contained in the claims for credit filed by the plaintiff, with reference to the statements printed thereon by the Treasury Department and inserted therein by the plaintiff, as required by said form and the regulations and rulings of the Treasury Department. The claims were headed:
“Claim For
“Abatement of Tax Assessed
“X Credit against Outstanding Assessments
“Refund of Taxes Illegally Collected
“Refund of Amounts Paid for Stamps”
The letter “X” was inserted by the plaintiff to indicate the nature of the claim. The claim also contained the following printed statement: “Important. Not acceptable unless complete^ filled in.” After showing the name of the taxpayer and its place of business, the claim contained the following-; the italicized statements, the dates, and the amounts shown being inserted in the claim by the plaintiff:
“This deponent, being ■ duly sworn according to law, deposes and says that this statement is made on behalf of the taxpayer named, and that the facts given below with *143reference to said statement are true and complete :
1. Business in wliicli engaged: Manufacture of cotton sheeting.
2. Character oi assessment or tax: Income and access profits iaoc.
Period Year
Prom Not. 3o| 1919
To “ 27! 19.20
8. Amount of assessment or stamps purchased ................................. $248,089.85
4. Reduction of tax liability requested (income and profits tax).............. 195,030.41
5. Amount to be abated..............................
6. Amount to bo refunded (or such greater amount as is legally refundable)............
7. Dates of payment (if statement covers income tax liability, items 8-11, inclusive, must be answered) 2/15/21-5/15/21-8/15/21-11/15/21.
8. District in which return, if any, was filed: Massachusetts, Boston.
9. District in which unpaid assessment appears: Hone unpaid.
30. Amount of overpayment claimed as credit .................................. 195,630.41
11. Unpaid assessment against wiiich credit is ashed: period from — -Fiscal year ended Dec. 1, 1917...................... 21,341.98
“Deponent verily believes that this application should be allowed for the following reasons: As per statement attached hereto/’
The remaining statements which were written into each of the claims for credit by the plaintiff are set forth in finding 11. The practice of the Treasury Department was that "no credit will be .allowed after the expiration of the statutory period of limitation applicable to the filing of a claim therefor except upon one or more of the grounds so set forth in a claim.” See T. D. 4265.
The registered letter of May 15, 3924, from the commissioner to the plaintiff, mentioned in finding’ 14, Exhibit I to the stipulation of facts, setting forth the result of the commissioner’s determination upon the claims for credit allowing the same to the extent of $295,196.75 and rejecting them to the extent of $11,241.09, contained the following1 statement : "Under no circumstances should payment of the amount rejected be made until a bill is received from the collector of internal revenue for your district.” At the time the aforementioned registered letter of May 15, 3924, was mailed to plaintiff the statute of limitation relating to the collection of the tax assessed for the fiscal year ending Novernlier 30, 1918, had not expired and did not expire until June 16, 1921, for the reason that plaintiff’s return for said fiscal year ending November 30,1918, was filed June 16, 3919. Notwithstanding this, the government delayed until February 19, 1925, to mal?e the credit, which date was eight months after the overpayments had been determined. The reason for this, I think, is plain. The government was not relying upon plaintiffs claims for credit as an agreement to a settlement of the rax accounts for the several years, irrespective of any statute of limitation,- for the Treasury Department had long prior thereto rendered and published its opinion that the filing of a claim for credit would not operate as a suspension of collection of the tax if it should appear to bo in jeopardy, and had rendered and published its opinion that the five-year statutory limitation on collection related only to a judicial proceeding to collect, and where the assessment had been made in timo collection could be made after the expiration of the statutory period of limitation of five years. It seems manifest that this was the primary cause of the delay in making collection.
The aforementioned general practice and procedure of the Treasury Department of taking no steps to collect an outstanding assessment of tax where a claim for credit was filed appear to have continued in all cases until February 6, 1925, when Treasury Decision No. 3279, JV-1 C. B. 375, was made and published, which changed this practice only with respect to deficiencies assessed after June 2,1924. In this Treasury Decision it was held that: “In any case where a taxpayer presents a claim for credit to he applied against taxes assessed on or after June 2, 1924, the collector will inform him that such claim will not operate as a stay of the collection of the tax.”
In G. C. M. 5739 VIII-1 C. B. 127, being’ a decision made and published about J anuary, 1929, it was hold by the Treasury Department that where a taxpayer filed "a claim for credit for the years 1916 and 1938’, with a request that part of an alleged overpayment of income taxes for those years be applied as a credit against the unpaid 1917 assessment,” which was allowed after the period of limitation had expired within which collection of the 1917 tax could be made, the credit was illegal and the amount of the overpayment determined on the claim for credit must be refunded.
In G. C. M. 6-296, VIII-2 C. B. 152, an opinion made and published by the general counsel of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, it was held that section 611 of the Revenue Act of 3928 (26 USCA § 2611), was not applicable to the ease where a claim for credit of an overpayment had operated to stay the collection of an outstanding assessment. This opinion was as follows:
“An opinion is requested as to whether a portion of an overpayment of tax made by the taxpayer for the year 3918, which was applied against an outstanding additional tax for 1917, should be refunded to the tax*144payer in accordance with the provision of section 607 of the Revenue Act of 1928 (26 USCA § 2607).
“On August 8, 1923, within the statutory period of limitation as extended by a waiver executed by the taxpayer with respect to the collection of 1917 taxes, the taxpayer filed' a claim for credit, requesting that an overpayment of tax for the year 1918 be applied against the additional tax due by the taxpayer for the year. 1917. * * * Under the procedure in effect at that time the filing of a claim for crediit operated to stay the collection of the outstanding tax against which the alleged credit was requested to be applied im, the same manner that a claim for ' abatement 'operated to stay collection. The opinion of this office is requested as to whether the taxpayer’s claim for refund may be rejected, under the provisions of section 6J1 of the Revenue Act of 1928, by reason of the filing of the claim for credit by the taxpayer under the circumstances set forth above. (Italics supplied.)
“In many eases in which taxes were duly assessed prior to the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1924 (43 Stat. 253) claims in abatement were filed by taxpayers in which it was alleged that the outstanding taxes sought to be abated had been erroneously and illegally assessed, and collection of these taxes was frequently delayed, in order that these abatement claims might be considered, until after the running of the statute of limitations. Section 611 of the Revenue Act of .1928, being an exception to the general rule set out in section 607 with respect to payments made after the expiration of the period of limitation against the United States, was intended to cover those eases in which collection of taxes was stayed by reason of the filing of sueh claims in abatement. It may be conceded that at one time the filing of claims for credit by taxpayers likewise had the effect of staying the collection of outstanding taxes. It is to be noted, however, that it is expressly provided in section 611 that before a tax paid after the running of the statute of limitations may be considered not to constitute an overpayment which must be refunded it must appear that a claim in abatement was filed and that collection of the tkx was stayed. No mention is made in section 611 of the filing of a claim for credit by the taxpayer. A claim for credit is not a claim that the taxpayer owes no tax. In requesting that an overpayment for another .period be applied against a certain outstanding tax the taxpayer in effect admits the correctness of the outstanding assessment. Consequently, section 611 of the Revenue Act of 1928 is not applicable to the ease where a claim for credit of an overpayment has operated to stay the collection of an outstanding assessment. * * * This office is of the opinion that section 611 of the Revenue Act of 1928 may not be relied upon as a basis for rejecting the taxpayer’s claim for refund.”
I think the foregoing opinion is' correct.
From all the foregoing, especially the contents and statements contained' in the claims for credit, it seems to me ¡that, if assumptions are to be indulged in, it is much more reasonable to assume that when the plaintiff prepared the claims for credit and the amended returns, showing the overpayments for 1919, 1920, and 1921, and filed them with the collector, it considered and intended that the commissioner would make the credits within the time required by the statute, especially in view of the fact that the claimed overpayments for these years resulted from carrying forward into subsequent years the adjustments which the commissioner had made in the years 1917 and 1918. The complete amended returns were apparently submitted by the plaintiff with the view and for the purpose of enabling the commissioner to take prompt action. There is nothing to indicate that the plaintiff thought an extended investigation would be necessary, and in my view the plaintiff should not be estopped to question the legality of the credit made after the expiration of the statute of limitation for collection of the outstanding assessment. The only thing that the plaintiff appears to have had in mind in filing the claims for credit and the amended returns, showing the overpayments for the years involved, was to furnish the government with the required information and to protect its rights with reference to the overpayments claimed. It is my opinion that the record does not justify any other conclusion. The plaintiff merely filled in the printed instructions on the claims, inserted the necessary facts required by the claim and the regulations, and set forth at the end of the claim the “appropriate supporting evidence.” See article 1033, Regs. 45, and article 1031, Regs. 62. The only place in the claims for credit where there is a request for credit is in the printed portion of item 11 quoted above. The contents of the claims for credit in this case, considered in the light of the commissioner’s regulations and decisions, and the testimony of the deputy collector, who was chief of the claims division of the collector’s office in Boston, seem to me to refute the conclusion that it was at the request and de*145maud of plaintiff that immediate payment of the additional tax for 1917 and 1918 was not enforced or the government’s interest with reference to the deficiencies otherwise protected, and in my opinion demonstrate that the instant case is not one for the application of the doctrine of estoppel.
A deputy collector in the office of the collector at Boston, Mass., since 1919, and who was chief of the claims division of that office, testified that on February 23, 1923, upon receipt of assessment of the additional tax for 1917 and 1918, demand was made for payment and notice given to plaintiff that if the tax was not paid within ten days warrant of distraint would he issued to enforce collection. He further testified that on March 6 the plaintiff paid the total tax assessed for the fiscal year 1916 and $37,458.81 of the additional tax assessed for the fiscal year 1918, having filed on March 5,1923, claims for credit of alleged overpayments for subsequent years against the additional assessment for 1917 and the balance of the assessment for 1918, whereupon, in accordance with the usual practice where claims were filed, the collector’s office took no further steps to collect the outstanding tax. See finding 13. He further testified with reference to this matter as follows:
“Q. Upon receipt of that claim for credit, what further action did your office take with regard to the matter of the collection of these deficiencies ? A. We took no further action.
“Q. Was that the usual practice in cases of the filing of claims for credit? A. You mean to take no action ?
“Q. Yes. A. Yes: that was the usual practice, to take no action.
“Q. Was that the practice universally followed to your knowledge in your office? A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Under whose direction or authority did you presume to act in connection with no further steps to collect the tax? A. Authority derived from the commissioner.
“Q. How, if you know, was that authority eonveved to your office? A. Certain authority contained in the regulation, and in certain mimeograph and Treasury decisions that were issued. a * 4 In the regulations it is provided that the filing of a claim for abatement may act as a stay in collection of the tax, and the same procedure, as I say, was followed on the claims for credit. * ?
“Q. Now, then, acting as your office did under the authority of the documents that have been introduced, what next step did your office take in connection with the collection or liquidation of those outstanding tax liabilities? A. We took no further action on the 1917 fiscal because that was closed out by two credits that were allowed on Schedule No. 11402.”
This witness further pointed out that the 1918 balance was likewise closed out by the same schedule of overassessments, leaving a balance due on the additional tax assessed for 1918 of $11,241.09, which was paid by the plaintiff February 4, 1925, together with interest of $1,292.73. The last-mentioned amount represented interest due on said balance under the statute from March 7, 1923, to February 3, 1925, because the same was not paid within ten days after the notice and demand of February 23, 1923. This witness further testified as follows:
“Q. If I understand your testimony correctly, it is to the effect that after this claim for credit had been filed, your, office took no further steps to collect that tax, pending action on that claim for credit. Is that correct? A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Did you communicate with the taxpayer during that time or did you just let him stand there with this demand against him for the payment? A. I have nothing to indicate in our records that we communicated with the taxpayer after sending that first notice and demand. * 4' *
'“Q. * ® In this particular case is there anything at all on your records that would indicate, or from your own knowledge that you can state, that the taxpayer in this ease was aware that your office would take no steps to collect that tax pending the action on the claim for credit? A. We have nothing in our records. ® *
“Q. You testified that the practice was that after these claims were filed, not to take any further action to collect the assessment made by the commissioner. A. That was the practice except in cases where we might feel that jeopardy was involved.
“Q. And then you required them to file a bond? A. Yes, sir.
“Q. What is the basis, for that practice? Is there a mimeograph on that, or some instructions or something? A. In the regulations it refers to it specifically in connection with claims for abatement, and the collector is charged with the responsibility of collecting taxes, and it is up to him to protect himself if he feels that it is necessary.
“Q. How has that practice grown up? Why ,should you not go right on, anyhow, *146even if the man files a claim for credit and wants the taxes credited against this assessment? You transmit that down to Washington and then you stop your efforts to collect the assessment. Is there any rule or regulation on that ? A. That is provided in the regulations, that a taxpayer may file a claim for credit.
“Q. I understand that; but I mean, What is the rule that authorizes you to stop collection? Here you have your assessment list assessing this man for additional taxes, and then he files a claim, and upon the filing of that claim your office stops its regular steps to collect the assessment. Is that not true ? A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Why do you do that? A. General practice. * * *
“Q. When a claim for credit is filed is it not your practice to ask for bonds? A. It is not in either abatement or credit, unless We feel that there is jeopardy.”
I do not consider it important in this case that plaintiff paid the full amount of the additional assessment of $5,781.39 for the fiscal year ending November 30, 1916, and $37,-458.81 of the additional assessment for 1918 at the time it filed its claims for credit. The plaintiff did not question the correctness of the additional tax assessed for 1916,1917, and 1918. It had agreed to the amounts in conferences with the Bureau of Internal Revenue before the commissioner mailed to it the thirty-day notice on December 19, 1922, as required by section 250 (d) of the Revenue Act of 1921. This fact is- disclosed by said letter, which is made a part of paragraph 6 of the stipulation of facts, and in the same letter the commissioner asked the plaintiff to waive the provisions of section 250 (d) of said act giving a taxpayer thirty days to appeal from his'proposed deficiency so that the tax might be assessed at once, and on December 29, 1922; plaintiff wrote the commissioner that: “As suggested in your letter, we hereby waive the thirty-day notice of time within which to file an appeal under the provisions of section 250 (d) of the Revenue Act of 1921 from the recommendations contained in that letter.” The tax was thereupon assessed. Plaintiff, therefore, had no reason whatever for not paying the amount of the tax for 1916, 1917, and 1918 in excess of the overpayments believed by it to have been made for subsequent years, 1919, 1920, and 1921. Under the established practice the collector of internal revenue certainly would have proceeded to collect this excess, and even if he had not done so, the plaintiff, after March 6, 1923, would have become liable under the statute for a penalty of 5 per cent, of the excess of the tax assessed over the claimed overpayments and also for interest at the rate of 12 per cent, a year thereon until paid or collected. This was not the case with respect to that amount of the outstanding assessment equal to the claimed overpayment. With respect to the latter amount, no penalty attached and the plaintiff became liable only for interest at 6 per cent, per annum from March 6> 1923, until the amount was finally paid or became barred by the statute.
Section 250 (b) of the Revenue Act of 1921 (42 Stat. 264) was the first provision of law to impose interest on a taxpayer upon a deficiency in tax or a deficiency on each installment, other than the interest imposed for failure to pay within ten days after notice and demand. But this provision only applied to the deficiencies for 1921 and subsequent years and had no application to the years 1916, 1917, and 1918. Had the plaintiff paid the entire additional tax assessed for 1916, 1917, and 1918 on or before March 6, 1923, no interest thereon would have been collectible from it and the government would have been liable to the plaintiff for interest at 6 per cent, per annum on the entire overpayment from the dates paid to the date of the commissioner’s allowance. The delay in making collection of the deficiency was therefore to the financial advantage of the United States. Under the practice of the Treasury^ Department in withholding collection and satisfying such tax by credit, as was attempted in this ease, no interest was payable by the government on the overpayments inasmuch as the due date of the tax collected by credit was prior to the dates of the overpayments. The action of the Treasury Department in this ease in withholding collection until the tax was collected by the credit, had its construction of the statute of limitation not been erroneous, would have saved the government at least $59,765 in interest which would otherwise have been payable on the overpayments to February 19, 1925, the date -of the allowance. This doubtless had something to do with the general practice of the Treasury. Department in not making collection of an outstanding tax where an overpayment was claimed as a credit or refund. In some eases the Treasury Department has refused to permit a taxpayer to pay a tax upon notice and demand from the collector where it appeared that there was an overassessment for other years; and it has also refused to recognize as valid an actual payment of an additional assessment, on which the taxpayer was not *147liable for interest, as preventing the commissioner from satisfying such additional assessment by a timely credit of an overpayment for other years, on which overpayments the government would have been liable for interest if they had not been credited; and this action of the Treasury officials has been approved. York Safe So Lock Co. v. United States, 40 F.(2d) 148, 69 Ct. Cl. 529, certiorari denied 282 U. S. 839, 51 S. Ct. 21, 75 L. Ed. 745; United States v. Pacific Midway on Co.,1 C. C. H., Vol. III, 1932, para. 9072. Plaintiff’s cause of action accrued April 9, 1925, after the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1924, and under section 1019 of that act (2G USCA § 153 note) it would not have been entitled to interest on the over-payments for 3919, 1920, and 1921 had the credit been legal. Inasmuch as the credits were not made until after the tax for 1917 and 1918 was barred, the plaintiff, if judgment were rendered in its favor, could recover interest on the overpayments only from the dates on which the tax for 1917 and 1918 became barred, namely,' on $83,623.14, representing an amount equal to tho 1917 tax which became barred March 3.1, 1923, and on $211,527.54, representing an amount equal to tho 1918 tax which became barred on June 19,1924.'
I do not think the payment by plaintiff on February 4, 1925, of the excess of tho additional assessment, in the amount of $11,241.-99, over the overpayments allowed, should affect its right to recover the overpayments illegally credited. Collection of this amount was barred at the time it was paid, but the plaintiff, in all probability, mistakenly relied upon the commissioner's erroneous interpretation of section 250 (d) of the Revenue Act of 1921, that inasmuch as the tax had been timely assessed it could be collected at any time. It was not until February 21, 1927, that this question was finally settled. Bowers v. New York & Albany Lighterage Co., 273 TJ. S. 346, 47 S. Ct. 389, 71 L. Ed. 676. The government and the courts had different notions about the statute of limitations until the matter was finally settled in the New York & Albany Lighterage Co. Case. The plaintiff may well have had the same erroneous opinion. When plaintiff filed its claim for refund in July, 1930, it was too late to claim a refund of this amount, and, of course, it could not be claimed in this suit.
Tho mere fact that a person does not immediately institute suit when his cause of action first .accrues cannot estop him if the suit is brought within the time allowed by law. In this ease the statute allowed plaintiff six years from April 6,1925, within which to sue for the amounts claimed, and this cause of action was timely instituted. The defendant has lost no rights by the delay.
The majority opinion seems to attach some importance to tho fact that the commissioner approved the schedule of refunds and credits, Exhibit K to the stipulation, on February 19, 1925, by signing the authorization to the disbursing clerk of the Treasury Department, although no amount was refundable to the plaintiff. It is stated that: “This is not all, for technically the schedule of refund and credit claims prepared by the collector and transmitted by him to the commissioner finally became effective on February 19, 1925, and of course this schedule, bearing the authorization of the commissioner to the disbursing clerk of the Treasury Department, disclosed no refund due the plaintiff.” Treasury Decision No. 3260, December 8, 1921, explains why schedules of refunds and credits are signed and approved by the commissioner, even though such schedules may not show an amount to be refundable. In many cases interest is due upon the amount credited, and although there may be no refund of tax to be made in connection with the credit, the schedule must nevertheless be approved and take its course for the purpose of payment of interest.
The schedule of refunds and credits in evidence shows that when the commissioner approved it the accounts of other taxpayers appeared on it in addition to the account of the plaintiff, and the amounts which were refundable to each of them were cut out of the schedule before that portion thereof relating to the taxpayer in this case was photostated. The schedule in evidence shows that there were at least 54 items of overassessments relating to other taxpayers on the schedule, for it shows that the plaintiff was item 55 thereon. Also, there is a notation in ink upon that portion of the schedule which was photo-stated, under columns 6 and 7, headed “Interest accrued” and “Total refundable,” respectively, which columns were filled in by the commissioner’s office instead of by the collector, showing that the total interest aeerued in respect of the overpayments disclosed in the schedule was $51,274.51 and that the total amount refundable thereon was $139,275.50. It is also interesting to note that as to the total credit of $295,150.59 in the case o-f this plaintiff shown on the schedule of refunds and credits, the four credit entries made by the collector making up this total under col*148umn 5 of the schedule in the amounts of $65,-806.81, $17,816.33, $180,207.93 and $31,319.-52 were crossed out by a line drawn through them. The schedule also shows that opposite the crossed-out credits there were entered by the commissioner’s office under columns 6 and 7 of the schedule entitled “Interest accrued” and “Total refundable” three items of interest payable to plaintiff in the amounts of $6,-792.88 $17,926.44, and $436.76, totaling $25,-156.08. According to the schedule in evidence, the last-mentioned amount was payable to plaintiff by the disbursing clerk. This indicates that the commissioner regarded these credits as illegal, but later concluded not to refund the overpayments or the interest calculated because he thought the taxpayer had not instituted suit within the time required by law, as stated in his letter of September 20, 1930.
The decision of this court in Ralston Purina Company v. United States, 58 F.(2d) 1065, 1068, is not in point. There the commissioner had assessed an additional tax and the collector was proceeding to collect. No overassessment had been determined by the commissioner. No claim for credit was filed. The taxpayer sent the commissioner a telegram and requested him to instruct the collector to withhold collection until the commissioner had adjusted subsequent tax years in which the plaintiff believed that there would be overpayments in excess of the tax which the collector was insisting must be paid. The commissioner complied with this request with the result that the collector withheld further steps to make collection of the tax. That decision was given with measured caution upon the peculiar facts, and the court expressly declined to give an opinion upon any but the case in judgment. In that case we distinguished “the ordinary case where the taxpayer files the usual claim for credit” and pointed out that “a claim for credit is directed primarily to the year in which there is an overpayment and operates to protect the rights of the person making it with respect to the statute of limitation for the year of the overpayment,” and also pointed out that “the telegram in this ease was not a claim for credit but was directed primarily to the collection of the additional tax for 1918.” If the telegram in the Ralston Case be regarded merely as a claim for credit, the decision was wrong.
The supplemental opinion on plaintiff’s motion for a new trial in Daube v. United States, decided by this court November 14, 1932, is also cited. The quoted statement was made with reference to > the plaintiff’s contention that at the time the commissioner wrote the collector a letter to apply an overpayment for 1918 and 1919 by Daube, which overpayments had been timely allowed, against a profits tax due by a partnership for 1917, section 1106 of the Revenue Act of 1926 (26 USCA § 1249 note) had extinguished the liability of the partnership. The facts which obtained in that case are distinguishable from the facts in the instant ease. The credit involved in the Daube Case was not the usual credit. _ The usual claim for credit was not filed. The individual gave to the eomndssioner a written agreement authorizing him to retain overpayments by -the individual for 1918 and 1919 in satisfaction of a partnership tax for 1917. My views in that ease were separately stated. The facts in the Daube Case, I think, are not parallel to the facts here, and. I do not think the reasoning of the majority in the original and supplemental opinions in that case is applicable here.
As I understand the majority opinion in this ease it holds that in any case where a taxpayer files a claim for credit specifically claiming overpayments for certain years, fills in the printed portions of the claim which require a statement of any outstanding assessments for other years against which credit is asked, writes into the claim or attaches thereto a statement of facts concerning the years for which assessments are outstanding, and furnishes in or with the claim for credit a detailed statement of facts in support of the claimed overpayments for the years involved, the government may collect such outstanding tax by credit after the expiration of the period of limitation within which such tax could otherwise be collected, and the taxpayer is estopped to question the legality of such collection. Counsel for the government did not go this far in the argument of this case. It "was conceded that if this was an ordinary claim for credit the government would have had no right to collect the additional tax for 1917 and 1918 by credit after the expiration of the statute of limitation upon collection. Counsel for the defendant, however, based his argument for estoppel upon the peculiar facts in this ease and contended that they disclosed a special and unusual request or understanding by plaintiff not present in the ordinary ease of claims for credit that the accounts for all of the years be settled and adjusted by credit, irrespective of the statute of limitation on collection. A careful study of the contents of the claims for credit and the facts and circumstances in the ease lead me to the conclusion that there *149was nothing peculiar or unusual about the plaintiff’s conduct or the statements made in the claims filed. The claims contained nothing more than was necessary fully to comply with the statute and the regulations. The detailed statements made therein appear to me to have been made by plaintiff with no other intent or purpose than of assisting the cpmmissioner and enabling him to take prompt action and in order to protect its rights with reference to the overpayments. Inasmuch as plaintiff and the government were, according to plaintiff’s opinion, indebted to each other, it was perfectly natural for plaintiff to desire and expect that the statute would be applied and the amount which had been overpaid would discharge the amounts which it owed. This was the obvious purpose of the statute in making it mandatory upon the commissioner to credit overpayments against deficiencies, but it fixed the time within which he could do this, unless he adopted one of tho means available to him to protect the interest of the government with reference to the tax due. Plaintiff made no request .for delay upon which the commissioner acted; it manifested no desire, understanding, or agreement that the e-redit be accomplished beyond the time when it could legally be required to pay the outstanding tax, and we should not assume that either party waived or intended to waive any rights. If assumptions may be made, it seems more reasonable to assume that the plaintiff considered that the collector and the commissioner would protect the government’s interests with respect to the outstanding assessment. There was no burden resting upon the plaintiff to sugegst that this should be done or to propose the means of doing it. The means were well known to the collector who employed them •whenever he thought necessary. It seems clear to me in this case that the delay in collecting the tax, or otherwise protecting the government’s interest, or sooner making the credit, is to be attributed to' the opinion of the collector and the commissioner as evidenced by I. T. 1446, supra, that the five-year statute of limitation was not applicable.
Long prior to the filing of claims for credit in this case the commissioner had published a definite ruling that a claim for credit would no.t operate to stay collection of the tax, if it appeared to be jeopardized by delay. The defendant concedes that if this were a ease involving an ordinary claim for credit it could not urge estoppel. What is an ordinary daim for credit? The present ease seems to me to be the answer. Complete justification for the statements contained in the claims for credit filed in this case is found in the requirements of the Treasury regulations, and if plaintiff had merely claimed overpayments for 1919,1920, and 1921, and had made no statement as to the outstanding assessment and had furnished no facts or evidence in tho claims as to the reason or grounds of over-payments, its claims would not have complied with the statute or the regulations and the government would have been in a position to reject the claims as insufficient, and, had this action been taken, it would have been able successfully to defend a suit for the over-payments on the ground that the claims were insufficient under the statute and the regulations and did not protect the taxpayer’s right to sue for the overpayments.
The result, according to the position of the government, is this: If tho taxpayer makes the required statements and furnishes tho required information in a claim for credit, ho is estopped to question the legality of a credit of the claimed overpayments against a barred deficiency; if ho does not fully set forth the required informal;ion, he is prohibited by the statute and the regulations from maintaining a suit to recover the over-payments, should the claim be rejected.
The long-eontinued practice of the department with respect to claims for credit should be taken into consideration. Brewster v. Gage, 280 U. S. 327, 336, 50 S. Ct. 115, 74 L. Ed. 457; Paweus Machine Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 375, 51 S. Ct. 144, 75 L. Ed. 397. In Law Opinion 1095, I~1 C. B. 313, the Treasury Department said: “Bearing in mind that the limitations contained in section 250 (d) go only to the remedy and not to the right, it would seem at first blush that if the Government came into possession of money of the taxpayer it might apply it against indebtedness the taxpayer rightly owed to it. It is believed, however, that the expression ‘then duo’ as contained in section 252 is used in a more restricted sense than simply ‘owing’ and has reference to an enforceable claim on the part of the Government.” In this law opinion it was further pointed out that Congress had imposed on the government a definite limit within which to collect taxes in the ordinary way open to it and that it could not be said to have been in contemplation of Congress that a different limitation should prevail in those eases where a taxpayer should perchance make an overpayment; that “to adopt a contrary holding would result in the government in many instances taking advantage of its own wrongdoing, as the section is mandatory and the commissioner is required to apply an overpayment of taxes for one *150year to an underpayment for a different year “ * * ”; and that “the Government itself insists on the benefit of the statute of limitations and holds that a refund due a taxpayer can not be applied on a later tax when the amount refundable is barred by the statute. It is believed that both in good conscience and by legal right the same rule must apply when it works to the advantage of the taxpayer.” The principle thus announced is applicable here.
In order to render the rule of estoppel operative it is essential that the party against whom the estoppel is claimed should have acted with knowledge of his rights and have been aware of the facts in respect of the estoppel claimed; also-, that the party invoking the estoppel was misled by the acts or conduct of the party against whom the estoppel is claimed; that he changed his position in reliance thereon, and was justified in so doing; and that he was prejudiced thereby, or the party against whom the estoppel is claimed benefited. No estoppel arises where the positions taken are necessarily antagonistic or where the conduct relied on to create the estoppel was superinduced by the acts of the party invoicing the doctrine. And in no event can the estoppel be extended beyond the natural and reasonable import of the acts or conduct relied on to create it. To sustain an estoppel in this ease the defendant must affirmatively prove and point to facts to' establish the above essential elements; if any are lacking, the defense fails. Estoppels are not favored by the law and will he disregarded unless clearly established. I am. of the opinion that the facts in this ease do not justify the application of the rule.
It seems to me that instead of the government officials being “lulled to sleep by the actions of the plaintiff,” they were sleeping on the government’s rights with reference to collection for some time prior to the determination and assessment of the tax for 1917 and 1918 and the filing of the claims for credit by plaintiff for 1919 to 1921, and they remained “asleep” to those rights until they were awakened February 21, 1927, nearly four years after the additional assessment of the tax for 1917 and 1918, by the decision in New York & Albany Lighterage Co. v. United States, supra. What they then did is illustrated by decision I. T. 2382, VI-2, C. B. 102, published about July, 1927, and sections 607 to 611 of the Revenue Act of 1928 (26 USCA §§ 2607-2611) which followed. Why did the 1928 act provide that no refund should be made or recovery be had of a tax collected after the running of the statute of limitation where a claim for abatement was filed and, at the same time, provide that the collection by credit after the statute of limitation, where no claim for abatement had been filed in respect of such tax, should be illegal and void? The answer seems obvious.o The two claims were designed to serve different purposes. A claim for abatement related directly and wholly to the tax assessed and claimed by the government to be due. A claim for credit related directly and primarily to overpayments claimed by the taxpayer to have been made and the primary purpose of such a claim for credit was to protect .the taxpayers’ rights to obtain the return of such overpayments after the expiration of the five-year limitation period. Section 252 of the Revenue Act of 1921 (42 Stat. 2.68) provided that if the commissioner upon examination of any return found that an amount of tax had been paid in excess of that properly due “the excess shall be credited against any * * * taxes, or installment thereof, then due from the taxpayer under any other return, and any balance of such excess shall he immediately refunded to the taxpayer: Provided, That no such credit or refund shall be allowed or made after five years from the date when the return was due, unless before the expiration of such five years a claim therefor is filed by the taxpayer.” The intent and purpose in providing in sections 607 to 611 of the Revenue Act of 1928 that no refund' should be made where a claim for abatement had been filed, but that a credit made after the expiration of the limitation period on collection should be void, were, I think, the result of the difference in the nature and purpose of the two claims. In view of such difference in the claims and in view of the fact that the statute made it mandatory upon the commissioner to credit any overpayments against any tax due, it was not thought proper to deprive the taxpayer, who had only filed a claim for credit of overpayments, of the benefit of the statute of limitation on collection where the commissioner failed, because of the department’s erroneous interpretation of the limitation in the statute, to make such credit within the time required.
The majority opinion does not expressly hold that the claims for credit in this ease constituted a waiver of the statute of limitation for collection of the additional assessments. This point was urged by the defendant. I am clear that such holding is not justified'by the record. National Refining Co. of Ohio et al., 1 B. T. A. 236; Peerless Paper Box Mfg. Co. v. Routzahn (D. C.) 22 F.*151(2d) 459; National Tool Co. v. Routxahn (1). C.) 28 F.(2d) 914. The Revenue Act of .1921 provided for waivers as well as for claims for credit, and it is clear that it was not intended that one should accomplish the purpose of the other. A “waiver” is the voluntary relinquishment of a known right and the facts must leave no doubt that the person who, it is claimed, waived said rights intended to do so.
There is another reason which alone seems to me to he sufficient to justify the position taken by the plaintiff in this ease that the claims for credit did not give the government the right to collect the tax for 1917 and 1918 after the expiration of the period of limitation relating thereto.
In December, 1925, this court decided the case of Toxaway Mills v. United States, 61 Ct. Cl. 363, in which it was held that: “Where an additional tax has been assessed and collected and the plaintiff pleads the statute of limitation, it is not entitled to recover unless it can show by sufficient proof that the Government was never liable for the tax.” Tins decision was reversed March 14, 1927, 273 U. S. 781, 47 S. Ct. 471, 71 L. Ed. 889. Section 1106 of the Revenue Act of 1926-, approved February 26, 1926, contained a provision that: “The bar of the statute of limitations against the United States * * * shall not only operate to bar the remedy hut shall extinguish the liability; but no credit or refund in respect of such tax shall be allowed unless the taxpayer has overpaid the tax. The bar of the statute of limitations against the taxpayer * shall not only operate to bar the remedy but shall extinguish the liability; but no collection in respect of such tax shall be made unless the taxpayer has underpaid the tax.”
On February 21,1927, the Supreme Court decided the case of Bowers v. New York & Albany Lighterage Co., supra, in which it was held that a taxpayer could recover a tax collected after the expiration of the statute of limitation. This decision did not construe section 1106 of the Revenue Act of 1928. Thereafter, in or about July, 1927, the Treasury Department, by reason of the aforementioned decisions and the ambiguity of section 1106 of the Revenue Act of 1926, published the following ruling I. T. 2382, VI-2 C. B. 102: “In view of the groat uncertainty as to the whole matter, it is believed that no action toward making a refund should he taken by the bureau in reliance upon the New York & Albany Lighterage Co. Case unless and until the situation is clarified by further court decisions or by legislative action. The problem is already under consideration by the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, and it will be presented to the Congress as soon as it convenes for such action toward a clarification of the situation as it deems proper.” The result wa,s the enactment in the Revenue Act of 1928, approved Ma,y 29, 1928, of sections 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, and the repeal, as of February 26, 1926, of section 1106 (a) of the Revenue Act of 1926 by section 612 (26 [JSCA §' 2612 note). Cf. Graham & Foster v. Goodeell et al., 282 U. S. 409, 51 S. Ct. 186, 75 L. Ed. 415. Section 607 provided that any tax assessed or paid, whether before or after the enactment of that act, after the expiration of the period of limitation properly applicable thereto, should constitute an overpayment and should be credited or refunded if claim therefor was filed within the period of limitation for filing such claim. Section 609 provided that any credit against a tax in respect of any taxable year shall be void if any payment in respect of such liability would be considered an overpayment under section 607. This section was also made retroactive. Section 611 provided that if any tax was within the period of limitation properly applicable thereto assessed prior to the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1924, and if a claim in abatement was filed, with or without bond, and if the collection of any part of the tax was stayed then the payment of such part made before or within one year after the enactment of section 611 should not be considered an overpayment under the provisions of section 607 relating to payments made after the expiration of the period of limitation on assessment and collection. Section 611 was enacted because of the practice which had been followed by the Treasury Department not to make collection in respect of a tax which had been assessed where a claim in abatement had been filed, or to require a bond or waiver with respect thereto. This practice was founded on Treasury ruling I. T. 1446, in or about July, 1922, that where a tax had been assessed within the statute of limitation applicable thereto, collection thereof after the expiration of the five years was entirely proper and that the collector could proceed by means of distraint to collect such tax, notwithstanding the expiration of Ihe five-year limitation period. This decision of the Treasury Department applied as well to collection of a tax by credit after the expiration of the statute of limitation. This practice was followed whether the tax was collected by credit or by distraint. G. C. M. 6296, supra. The statutes which had pro*152vided for claims for abatement had also provided for claims for credit, and the purpose and effect of these claims were well known. When, therefore, the Revenue Act of 1928 provided that a tax timely assessed and collected after the expiration of the statute of limitation should not be refunded if a elaim in abatement had been filed, and, at the same time, provided that a collection by credit after the expiration of the statute of limitation should be void, it seems clear to me that it was not intended to authorise the commissioner to collect an outlawed tax by credit where the taxpayer had filed a claim for credit in accordance with the statute and the regulations, notwithstandnig the collection of the tax mentioned in the credit elaim was postponed or stayed because of erroneous interpretation of the statute to the effect that if the tax was assessed in time it could be collected after the expiration of the five-year period of limitation. This is the construction which the Treasury Department plaeed upon the Revenue Act of 1928 in its published opinion G. C. M. 6296, supra. See, also, G. C. M. 5739, VIII-1 C. B. 127.
I cannot agree with the conclusion of the majority opinion that “sections 607 and 609 of the Revenue Act of 1928, heretofore quoted, apply in eases where the Commissioner acts independently of the taxpayer in. the absence of a request, or conduct upon the part of a taxpayer, to proceed differently.” I am of opinion that when section 609 of the Revenue Act of 1928 provided that any credit against a liability shall be void if any payment-in respect of such liability would be considered an overpayment under section 607, the words “any credit” were used in the light of thd statutes and the departmental practice requiring claims for credit. By “any credit” I do not think the statute meant “any credit except one for which a elaim has been filed.”
When the Revenue Act of 1932, approved June 6,1932 (47 Stat. 173 [26 USCA § 3001 et seq.]), was under consideration by the Finance Committee of the Senate, section 1107, entitled “Credits of overpayments,” was inserted as amendment 262, as follows:
“(a) If any internal-revenue tax was, within the period of limitation properly applicable thereto, assessed prior to June 2, 1924, and if a elaim was filed, or a request in writing made, for a credit against the tax so assessed of an amount claimed as an overpayment of internal-revenue tax, and if collection of any part of the tax so assessed was postponed, then (1) a credit (made prior to May 29, 1928) against the tax so assessed shall not be considered as void under the provisions of section 609 (a) of the revenue act of 1928, relating to erroneous credits, and (2) the payment (made prior to May 29, 1928) of the part of the tax the payment of which was so postponed shall not be considered as an overpayment under the provisions-of section 607 of the revenue act of 1928, relating to payments made after the expiration of the period of limitation on assessment and collection.
“(b) As used in subsection (a), the term ‘tax’ includes any interest, penalty, additional amount, or addition to any internal-revenue tax.”
The manifest purpose of this proposed section was to apply the same rule to claims for credit that the 1928 act had applied to claims for abatement,, inasmuch as the practice with reference to collection of the outstanding tax had theretofore been the same in both eases. See G. C. M. 6296, supra. The-bill containing the above-quoted section was passed by the Senate, but the section was stricken out in conference and the report of the conference, No. 1492, 72d Congress, First Session, stated, on page 29: “This amendment provides that in certain eases where, by reason of the filing of a elaim or request for credit, the collection of an assessed tax was postponed, any credit against the tax so assessed shall not be considered void and any payment of part of the tax, payment of' which was so postponed, shall not be considered as an overpayment; and the Senate recedes.” I do not think the courts, should hold a taxpayer estopped to recover an admitted and allowed overpayment merely because he had filed the statutory claim for credit therefor when Congress was not willing so to provide by statute when it had the specific question under consideration.
I am of opinion that judgment should be-entered for thé plaintiff.