Court Opinion

ID: 9462158
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:33:13.216856+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:25.829072
License: Public Domain

SWYGERT, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that it was proper to give the jury free reign to decide what constitutes “extremely fair treatment.” I concur in the portion of the opinion upholding the finding of equitable estoppel based on the letter of April 29, 1975. But I do not understand why the majority concludes that the perimeters of this estoppel are to be based only on a single phrase of that letter, viewed out of context.
Equitable estoppel has been invoked in this case to override the written contract between these parties because it would be unfair to allow the defendant to rely on that contract in light of the April 29 letter. Yet, it seems to me, it is just as unfair to ignore the very instrument that necessitates the use of the equitable estoppel doctrine. I believe this is what the majority has done. We are concerned with a dispute arising in a commercial context. Certainly, Eaton, Yale & Towne never agreed that in case of cancellation plaintiff would receive whatever a jury thought to be “extremely fair treatment.” In the same letter in which this now seized upon phrase was used, the “normal procedure” was specifically spelled out: .full credit for all orders received within thirty days after final cancellation date and shipped, at *286most, within one year after cancellation. I think that the phrase “extremely fair treatment” must be read to refer to this statement of the normal procedure. The phrase must be given contours if we are to reach an equitable result and the contours are those contained in the same letter. It is interesting to note that to a considerable extent plaintiff, at one time, agreed with my view of what is “equitable” since a letter was written on October 22, 1968 requesting this “fair treatment” which “would involve full payments for all orders booked before October 1, 1968, regardless of when shipped.”
The majority approves the “legal” conclusion that equitable estoppel must apply, but then relies on the “jury question” rubric in regard to the issue of what should fill the void created by disregarding the contract. I do not think that we can interfere with a contract in the name of equity and then ignore the question of the “equitableness” of the outcome of that interference. I would hold that Ehret is entitled to no more than that which would be received under the most liberal interpretation of Eaton’s “normal procedure” as defined in the letter of April 29.