Court Opinion

ID: 9526329
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:15:48.612555+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:19:27.224741
License: Public Domain

Boyle, J.
(dissenting). I believe this matter should be resubmitted for rebriefing and participation of additional amici curiae and the Attorney General. A majority of the Court not presently agreeing with that view, I concur in the result reached by the Chief Justice and Justice Mallett. However, because I am unpersuaded that plaintiff’s first amended complaint meets the fraud pleading requirements of MCR 2.112(B)(1), I respectfully dissent from the remand of the fraud claim. MCR 2.112(B)(1), which parallels FR Civ P 9(B)(1),1 requires:
In allegations of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake must be stated with particularity.
Wright and Miller,2 discussing fraud pleading in the federal system, list two convincing reasons for particularity in fraud pleading. First, "fraud and mistake embrace such a wide variety of potential conduct that a defendant needs a substantial amount of particularized information about plaintiff’s claim in order to enable him to understand it and effectively prepare his response.” Second, and perhaps more applicable to this case, "actions . . . based upon fraud are disfavored and are scrutinized by the courts with great care be*489cause they often form the basis for 'strike suits’ ” brought in the hope of forcing defendants to settle to avoid discovery expenses. Justice Smith echoed this concern in a fraud pleading case similar to the present action: "The amended bill is but another shotgun pleading for which plaintiffs seek a hunting license.”3
The above rationale is particularly compelling here because the plaintiff must plead himself into the "bad faith” exception to fraudulent misrepresentation. The general rule is "that an action for fraudulent misrepresentation must be predicated upon a statement relating to a past or an existing fact. Future promises are contractual and do not constitute fraud.”4 (Emphasis added.) To fall within the bad-faith exception "evidence of fraudulent intent . . . must relate to conduct of the actor 'at the very time of making the representation, or almost immediately thereafter.’ ”5 In the present case, the plaintiff fails to allege any factual evidence to support a bad-faith claim. His complaint merely lists the definition of fraud and misrepresentation. To argue "that Kassab’s complaint stated the circumstances constituting fraud with particularity,” as the majority does,6 writes MCR 2.112(B)(1) out of the Michigan Court Rules and eliminates the general rule prohibiting fraud actions in future-promise cases except in extremely limited circumstances._

 The substitution of "allegations” for “averments” is inconsequential.

 5 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure, § 1296, pp 580-581.

 Dutkiewicz v Bartkowiak, 372 Mich 386, 388; 126 NW2d 705 (1964).

 Hi-Way Motor Co v Int’l Harvester Co, 398 Mich 330, 336; 247 NW2d 813 (1976).

 Id., pp 338-339.

 Ante, p 442.