Court Opinion

ID: 9629288
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:40:01.252578+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:17.365101
License: Public Domain

BURKE, Justice,
dissenting in part.
I dissent from that portion of the majority opinion holding that Jackson was denied his sixth amendment right of confrontation,1 thereby entitling him to withdraw his plea of nolo contendere and demand a separate trial.
In fact, no such denial has yet occurred. As noted by the majority,2 the issue is presented in abstract form. We do not know how the confessions would have been finally edited for use at trial or, when introduced, what impact they might be said to have had when viewed in the light of the other evidence presented.3 At this time we do not even know whether the confession of Jackson’s codefendant would in fact have been offered at trial. Nor do we know, in that event, whether the codefendant would have taken the stand, thereby curing any Bruton problem under our holding in Sidney v. State, 468 P.2d 960 (Alaska 1970).
Also, since each defendant’s own confession could be used against him, along with any other evidence of guilt, the decision not to allow introduction of his codefendant’s confession would not be dispositive of the entire case. See Oveson v. Municipality of Anchorage, 574 P.2d 801, 803 n. 4 (Alaska 1978). This, together with the other considerations that I have mentioned, convinces me that there is no reason to reverse Jackson’s conviction.4
In all but one of the cases relied upon by the majority, there had been a trial at which the statement or confession complained of was actually introduced. The one exception is United States v. Corbin Farm Service, 444 F.Supp. 510, 538-40 (E.D. Cal.), aff’d on other grounds, 578 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1978). In that case the trial judge, refusing to apply the “interlocking confessions” exception to the Bruton doctrine, granted a pretrial motion for separate trials. Here, there has been no trial. We cannot say with genuine certainty what evidence would have been introduced. Whatever right of confrontation either defendant has or had under the rule of Bruton could be exercised only in the future. Until then, it is impossible for me to say that that right has been denied him by the rulings of the superior court.
Having reached this conclusion, I am not required to accept or reject the “interlocking confessions” exception to the Bruton rule endorsed by a plurality of the Court in Parker v. Randolph, - U.S. -, 99 S.Ct. 2132, 60 L.Ed.2d 713 (1979).
For the reasons stated, I would affirm Jackson’s conviction.5 Quick’s petition, in that event, would become moot. As to those issues addressed in parts I, II and III of the majority opinion, I concur.

. The same guarantee is contained in Alaska Const, art. I, § 11.

. See note 24 of the majority opinion.

. The superior court, although never required to rule on the specific excisions proposed by each party because of Jackson’s change of plea, indicated that, at least, all direct references to codefendants would be excised. Whether additional portions of either confession might eventually have been excised is unknown.

. I am also influenced by the undisputed fact that each confession was voluntary and reliable, at least so far as it implicates its maker in the crime.

.The fact that a defendant’s plea of nolo con-tendere may be rendered “unintelligent and invalid” by our refusal to respect an express reservation of the right to appeal a specific issue, Cooksey v. State, 524 P.2d 1251, 1256 (Alaska 1974), does not mean that the same is true where, as here, we have reviewed the issue, thereby honoring his reservation of the right to appeal, and conclude that a reversal is not required.