Court Opinion

ID: 9722852
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:53:13.096329+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:40.959421
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE BURKE delivered the opinion of the court: David Miller, a police Lieutenant, was charged with violating three rules of the Chicago Police Department. Rule 2 prohibits any conduct that impedes the Department’s goals or brings discredit upon the Department; rule 13 prohibits making false reports; and rule 24 requires all police officers to reside within the corporate boundaries of the City of Chicago. After a hearing, the Police Board of the City found that David Miller was guilty of violating these rules and ordered that he be discharged from the Police Department. Miller then filed an action for administrative review under the Administrative Review Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 110, pars. 264-279) in the circuit court of Cook County. The court reversed the findings and decision of Police Board. The Board and the other defendants appeal, contending that: (1) the residential requirement for Chicago police officers is binding on Lieutenant Miller; (2) a trial court may not substitute its judgment for that of an expert administrative body such as the Police Board; and (3) the court erred in reversing the Police Board’s decision because the Board’s findings were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. At the hearing conducted by a hearing officer for the Police Board, five witnesses testified; namely, Lieutenant David Miller, Sergeant Paul Bendis, who investigated the charges for the Police Department, Sergeant Edward Miller, a Chicago Police officer who shared an apartment with Lieutenant David Miller, and two tenants of that apartment building. It was stipulated that the charges relating to the residential requirement for police officers would only deal with the question of whether Lieutenant Miller was residing in Chicago during October and November of 1973. Sergeant Paul Bendis of the Chicago Police Department testified that he was assigned by his commanding officer to investigate a complaint that Lieutenant Miller was residing outside of Chicago. Bendis first obtained a copy of Miller’s 1973 Residence-Auto Information Card filed with the Police Department which showed that David Miller owned a 1969 Chevrolet Camaro and lived at 2025 North Harlem in Chicago, Illinois, while his wife, Margaret Miller, owned a 1970 Oldsmobile convertible and lived at 311 West Washington in Villa Park, Illinois. Bendis then obtained a statement from the Northern Illinois Gas Company that a D. Miller was the subscriber for gas at his wife’s Villa Park address during the months of October and November of 1973. The name of the subscriber was changed on or about December 1, 1973, to an M. Miller. David Miller’s wife’s first name is Margaret. Bendis testified that he established surveillance of Lieutenant Miller’s movements to and from the Chicago and Villa Park addresses. Bendis’ testimony concerned surveillance on October 16, 17, 24 and November 20, 25, 26 and 27. On October 16, 17 and 24, he saw neither Lieutenant Miller nor his red Camaro parked at either the Chicago or Villa Park address. On November 20, 25 and 26, he observed Miller leaving the Villa Park address shortly after 11 p.m. and arriving at the 15th District police station in Chicago a short time thereafter. On the morning of November 26 at 9:15 a.m. he observed Miller returning to the Villa Park address. He also observed Miller at the Chicago address on that morning. On November 27 he did not see Miller at either the Villa Park or Chicago address but did see his red Camaro parked at the Villa Park address. Bendis testified that he visited the 2025 North Harlem address and discovered that Lieutenant Miller and a Sergeant Edward L. Miller, who is not a relative of Lieutenant Miller, shared an apartment there. The apartment contained uniforms, civilian clothes, family photographs and furniture belonging to Lieutenant Miller. The telephone there was registered in both David and Edward Millers’ names. Sergeant Bendis interviewed a Robert Moore, a resident of the apartment building. Moore identified Lieutenant Miller’s picture and stated that he lived at the address. Sergeant Edward L. Miller testified that he and Lieutenant David Miller jointly rented the apartment at 2025 North Harlem in Chicago for three years, each paying one-half the rent. He is not related to Lieutenant Miller. The apartment, Sergeant Miller testified, has one bedroom, a living room and a small kitchenette. Sergeant Miller slept in the bedroom while Lieutenant Miller slept in the living room on a sofa bed. In October of 1973 Sergeant Miller saw Lieutenant Miller on four occasions at their Chicago apartment. Sergeant Miller was out of town 11 days in October. In November, when Sergeant Miller and Lieutenant Miller were both working the day shift, he saw the lieutenant about seven to ten times at the apartment. Lieutenant David Miller testified that he had been a police officer for 20 years and a police lieutenant for 4/2 years. He was married and had three daughters. Two of the daughters were in college and the third lived with her mother at 311 West Washington, Villa Park, Illinois. His wife and daughters lived at the Villa Park address for 16 or 17 years and were residing there in October and November of 1973. Lieutenant Miller testified that he is not divorced or separated from his wife. Lieutenant Miller testified that during October and November of 1973, he lived at 2025 North Harlem Avenue, Chicago, Illinois, where for three years he shared the rent with Sergeant Edward L. Miller and that dining the same period he spent an average of four or five nights a week at his Chicago address and two or three nights a week at his Villa Park address. He testified that he spent his days off at the Villa Park address working to keep the premises in good condition. The property in Villa Park, he testified, is owned by a trust and his wife is the beneficiary. He said he paid 90 percent of the bills on the Villa Park property and was also listed as the payer of the real estate tax on that property and as the subscriber for water bills during October and November of 1973. His wife, he testified, was the “financier of the family.” He would turn over his paychecks to her, and she would handle the finances which included giving him the money to pay his half of the rent for his Chicago apartment and the electric and phone bills there. During October and November of 1973, Lieutenant Miller testified, he and his wife each owned a car which were both registered at his Chicago address/ He had signed the Residence-Auto Information Card which listed one car at the Chicago address and one at the Villa Park address. He testified that the Oldsmobile, listed at the Villa Park address, was at the Villa Park address the vast majority of the time. He stated that he is a registered voter at his Chicago address and submitted his voter registration card, hunting license, driver’s license, Federal income tax return for 1973, and various notices sent to him by the Police Department, listing his address as 2025 North Harlem, Chicago, Illinois. Robert P. Moore, a tenant at 2025 North Harlem, testified that he had been a tenant in the building for 22 years and that he knew Lieutenant Miller as a resident of that building. He stated that he saw Lieutenant Miller twice a week at most and some times only two or three times a month. Josephine Esker, also a tenant of that building, testified that she lived in the building for 12 years and had never seen Lieutenant Miller. The only policeman in uniform she had seen there was Sergeant Edward Miller. She stated she knew about 10 of the 39 tenants in the building and worked from 11 a.m. to 9:30 p.m. After reviewing the evidence the Police Board found Lieutenant Miller guilty of violating the three specified Police Department rules; rule 2 by conduct impeding the Department’s goals and bringing discredit upon the Department; rule 13 by making a false report that he resided at 2025 North Harlem in Chicago when he in fact was residing in Villa Park, Illinois; and rule 24 by failing to reside within the corporate boundaries of the city of Chicago. The Board ordered him discharged. The Police Board contends that its decision is not against the manifest weight of the evidence, and that the trial court erred in substituting its judgment for that of the Board. Lieutenant Miller responds that the Board’s decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence. We are of the opinion that the requirement of rule 24 that a police officer “reside” in Chicago is synonymous with a requirement that he have his “residence” in Chicago, as the terms “reside” and “residence” have generally been held to be synonymous. (See Garrison v. Garrison, 107 Ill. App. 2d 311, 246 N.E.2d 9; In re Estate of Quinn, 283 Ill. App. 597.) The terms “reside” and “residence” denote that a person has a permanent abode or home in a particular place (Routt v. Barrett, 396 Ill. 322, 71 N.E.2d 660; Hughes v. Illinois Public Aid Com., 2 Ill. 2d 374, 118 N.E.2d 14; Garrison v. Garrison, 107 Ill. App. 2d 311, 246 N.E.2d 9), andaperson may not have a permanent residence in two places at the same time. (Anderson v. Pifer, 315 Ill. 164, 146 N.E. 171.) In order to have one’s residence in a certain place one must both establish a physical presence there and have the intent to make that location his permanent residence. (Routt v. Barrett, 396 Ill. 322, 71 N.E.2d 660; Hughes v. Illinois Public Aid Com., 2 Ill. 2d 374, 118 N.E.2d 14.) Intent is the most important element, and in determining intent a person’s acts should be given more weight that his declarations. Stein v. County Board of School Trustees, 40 Ill. 2d 477, 240 N.E.2d 668; People v. Estate of Moir, 207 Ill. 180; 69 N.E. 905. The evidence supports a finding that Lieutenant Miller resided outside the corporate limits of the city of Chicago during October and November of 1973. There was testimony that Lieutenant Miller had a physical presence at his Chicago address. There was substantial testimony that Lieutenant Miller resided at Villa Park and that he intended to retain the Villa Park residence as his permanent residence as manifested by his acts and the nature of his interests there. Lieutenant Miller said on the witness stand and on documents that he resided at 2025 North Harlem Avenue, Chicago, Illinois. Many of his acts point to the conclusion that he resides at 311 West Washington in Villa Park. Perhaps the strongest evidence that his permanent residence is in Villa Park is that his wife and daughter reside there. He testified that he is not separated or divorced from his wife. He turns over his paychecks to his wife and she manages the family finances. It would be unusual for a family man, not separated or divorced, to have a separate permanent residence from his family. Lieutenant Miller was also listed as the subscriber on gas bills and the payer of real estate taxes at the Villa Park address. While Lieutenant Miller testified that he spent more nights at his Chicago address than at his Villa Park address and spent his days off at the Villa Park address, the testimony of the other witnesses place these statements in doubt. Sergeant Bendis who had put Miller under surveillance testified to observing Lieutenant Miller or his car at the Villa Park address four out of seven nights while observing him at his Chicago address on one of the seven occasions. On the occasions Sergeant Bendis observed Lieutenant Miller at the Villa Park address, he traveled to and from work. One tenant at Miller’s Chicago address had never seen him there in the three years they both lived there, while another tenant saw Lieutenant Miller there twice a week or two or three times a month. Sergeant Edward Miller saw Lieutenant Miller there only seven to ten times during the month of November of 1973 when both had the day shift. In McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Service Com. (1975), 19 Pa. Cmwlth 383, 339 A.2d 634, a recent case with similar facts to ours, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania dealt with the question of whether there was substantial evidence to support the Philadelphia Civil Service Commission’s finding that a fire department officer violated a city ordinance requiring city employees to maintain a “bona fide residence” in the city of Philadelphia. The fire department officer sold his home in Philadelphia and moved his family, a wife and nine children, to a New Jersey suburb where the children attended school. The officer evenly split his time off between living at the New Jersey address and in Philadelphia at the fire station or at his mother’s home where he allegedly stayed on duty days, received mail and was registered to vote. The marital relationship with his wife continued after the move to the New Jersey suburb and the officer was the sole support of his family. The court, placing special emphasis on the marital and family relationship, held that the evidence provided substantial support for the Civil Service Commission’s finding that the officer’s bona fide residence was in the New Jersey suburb and not in the city of Philadelphia.  Section 11 of the Administrative Review Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 110, par. 274) states that the findings and conclusions of an administrative agency on questions of fact “shall be held to be prima facie true and correct.” This statutory language has been construed to limit reviewing courts to determine whether the agency findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence. (Davern v. Civil Service Com., 47 Ill. 2d 469, 269 N.E.2d 713; Basketfield v. Police Board, 56 Ill. 2d 351, 307 N.E.2d 371.) This court has held that reviewing courts should accord administrative agencies substantial discretion in construing and applying their rules. (Scheffki v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 23 Ill. App. 3d 971, 320 N.E.2d 371.) We are of the opinion that the Police Board’s finding that Lieutenant Miller violated rule 24 by residing outside the corporate limits of Chicago is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. This view also includes the findings and judgment as to rules 2 and 13. Lieutenant Miller argues that the hearing was restricted by stipulation to consideration as to where he resided in October and November of 1973. He urges that the Board’s decision handed down on January 13, 1975, that he violated rule 24 “in that he is residing at 311W. Washington, Villa Park, Illinois,” (emphasis added) is a nullity because the fact that he “is” residing in Villa Park at the time of the Board’s decision does not establish that he “was” residing there in October and November of 1973. We are of the opinion that the use of the word “is” in the decision was merely an inadvertence. We note that the formal charges filed on July 25, 1974, also used the word “is” residing at 311 W. Washington, Villa Park. During the hearing before the Board’s hearing officer, Lieutenant Miller’s attorney pointed out the word “is” in the charge and stated that he understood that the charges only related to October and November of 1973. Both the Police Department’s counsel and the hearing officer agreed that the charges only applied to October and November of 1973 and the hearing proceeded. There was also a stipulation that the only period to which the charges related was October and November of 1973. It was clear to the parties and the Police Board that they were only considering October and November of 1973. Furthermore, there was no evidence presented which would relate to any events after November of 1973. We are of the opinion, therefore, that the Board’s finding and decision encompassed only October and November of 1973, and the use of the word “is” in the decision was inadvertent. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded to the circuit court with directions to enter a judgment restoring the findings and decision of the Police Board of the City of Chicago. Judgment reversed and cause remanded with directions. O’CONNOR, J., concurs.