Court Opinion

ID: 9579781
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:58:33.313547+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:45.819258
License: Public Domain

Barnes, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
While I agree with the result and all that is said in the majority opinion’s Divisions 1, 2, 4, and 5,1 do not agree that the trial court erred in denying summary judgment to MARTA on Mosley’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional harm, and thus I dissent to Division 3.
Considering the record with all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Mosley, the respondent to MARTA’s motion for summary judgment, I cannot say as a matter of law that Richards’ actions do not rise to the level of outrageousness necessary to sustain an action for intentional infliction of emotional harm. Here is Mosley’s description of the incident, from her response to an interrogatory:
Billy Richards opened the office door and called my badge number. As I approached the office, Richards extended his right hand as if to shake my hand. I reached to shake his hand, but when I placed my hand inside his, Richards firmly grasped my hand and pulled me towards him and forcefully twisted my arm, spinning my body around, which forced my [buttocks] to compress against his penis. Then, Richards wrapped his arm around my waist, as he gripped my left side, he squeezed and drew my body into his body more and he moaned. Immediately, I pried my body out of his grip, moved away from him, then turned around to face him; being in shock I tried to speak, saying what are you doing? Richards looked at me and smiled and walked out of the door. I ran to the telephone and called my husband.
This conduct is certainly well beyond the bounds of permissible social interaction between a superior and an employee. Further, we have recognized that “the existence of a special relationship in which one person has control over another, as in the employer-employee relationship, may produce a character of outrageousness that otherwise *494might not exist.” Bridges v. Winn-Dixie Atlanta, 176 Ga. App. 227, 230 (1) (335 SE2d 445) (1985).
Decided July 13, 2006.
Elizabeth McGrath O’Neill, Gay M. Reid, Robert J. Routman, for Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority.
Diana Y. McDonald, for Mosley.
Pursley, Lowery & Meeks, John R. Lowery, Norah M. White, for Richards.
Some claims as a matter of law do not rise to the requisite level of outrageousness and egregiousness. Others raise circumstances which properly put the issue before a jury. Once the evidence shows that reasonable persons might find the presence of extreme or outrageous conduct, the jury must find the facts and make its own characterization. This is a case of the latter class.
(Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.) Gordon v. Frost, 193 Ga. App. 517, 521 (1) (388 SE2d 362) (1989) (trial court properly denied defendant pharmacist’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on plaintiff customer’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional pain as a result of false arrest).
Because I believe that reasonable persons might find Richards’ conduct outrageous when he grabbed Mosley, pulled her buttocks against his penis, rubbed her body, and moaned into her ear, I respectfully dissent from Division 3 of the majority opinion.
I am authorized to state that Judge Miller and Judge Ellington join in this opinion.