Court Opinion

ID: 9851016
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:05:45.207472+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:46.985119
License: Public Domain

Calhoun, Judge,
dissenting:
Respectfully, I dissent.
I would not assert with assurance that the proposition stated in the first point of the syllabus represents a general rule or even the weight of authority. In an annotation of the subject in 17 A.L.R. 279, the following statement appears at page 285: “ * * * there is an almost equal number of cases to the contrary effect, that such misconduct [in a prior term of office] may constitute a ground for removal or impeachment.” See also Annot., 138 A.L.R. 753 at 758, et seq. In connection with a discussion of the conflict of authorities on the question, the following statement appears in 43 Am. Jur., Public Officers, Section 202, page 45: “However, although acts preceding election are not grounds for removal, they may be considered in so far as they are connected with or bear on the officer’s general course of conduct during the current term, for the limited purpose of inquiring into his motive and intent as to the acts and omissions charged to him during his second term.” Subsequently in the same section, at page 46, the following statement appears: “According to some authorities, the object *204of the statute relating to removal from office is to purge the public service of an unfit officer, and such unfitness may arise from conduct in an office held continuously, although during the term of an earlier election. Accordingly, it is held that the single circumstance of an election does not prevent inquiry into acts during a prior term and removal from office because thereof.” The passing reference to this question in Wysong v. Walden, 120 W.Va. 122, 127, 52 S.E.2d 392, 396, is pure dictum. Admitting that misconduct of the officer during one or more of his prior successive terms of office may not alone warrant removal from the office currently held, I believe it does not follow that such prior misconduct has no proper relevance to prove misconduct during the current term.
Proceedings for removal of public officers under the state involved in this case are not criminal or penal in character. Daugherty v. Ellis, 142 W.Va. 340, 352, 97 S.E.2d 33, 40; Dawson v. Phillips, 78 W.Va. 14, 88 S.E. 456. “Misconduct’'' does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent. “Manifestly the purpose of the statute was to protect the public.” Kesling v. Moore, 102 W.Va. 251, 258, 135 S.E. 246, 249.
After having heard extensive testimony of witnesses, the judge of the circuit court, sitting in lieu of a jury, made the following findings of fact in the judgment order:
“'Number One. The petitioners have fully sustained the burden of proof of the charges contained in Paragraph Number 1 of their said petition, in that the defendant has failed and refused to comply with the terms and provisions of the West Virginia Code contained in Chapter 18, Article 9(a), Section Four, in that the defendant has caused the valuations of property for assessment purposes in Logan County to be deficient and less than the required mínimums in classes 2 and 4 and this has resulted in losses of large sums of tax money to the people of Logan County, West Virginia.
* * *
“Number Four. The petitioners have sustained the burden of proof of the charges contained in Paragraph Number 4 of their said petition, in that the *205assessor, although complaining and attempting to justify his refusal to comply with the Reappraisal Statute on the basis of insufficient budget and lack of employees, spent virtually no time in his office or in the performance of his official duties and functions.
“Number Five. The petitioners have fully sustained the burden of proof of the charges contained in paragraph Number 5 of their said petition, in that the said defendant has knowingly and wilfully appointed and retained at least two persons as deputy assessors who were incompetent and who performed virtually no duties as deputy assessors. One of these persons, one Ray Porter, is and was well known to the defendant to be a person addicted to the excessive use of intoxicating beverages to the extent that he is and was a habitual drunkard. The other, one Roby Williams, who was shown by other evidence and who also demonstrated by his own testimony that he performed virtually no duties in return for the salaries paid to him by virtue of his appointment and retention by said defendant, all of which has resulted in a substantial wasting of public monies.
“In view of the foregoing, it is the judgment of this Court that the petitioners have sustained the burden of proof and have shown by satisfactory evidence that the said defendant, the said J. T. (Tom) Godby is and has been guilty of official misconduct, malfeasance, incompetence, and neglect of duty. * * * .”
In proceedings of this character for removal of public officials, this Court has heretofore adhered to the general rule that the findings and judgment of the trial court in removing one from public office will not be reversed unless in that respect the findings and judgment of the trial court are clearly wrong.
Moore v. Strickling, 46 W.Va. 515, 33 S.E. 274, involved an appeal from the action of a circuit court in removing a prosecuting attorney from office. In affirming the judgment of the circuit court, this Court made the following statement in the fifth point of the syllabus: “The credibility of witnesses and the weight of evidence are for the trial court, and the Appellate Court will not disturb its finding, unless plainly *206contrary to the preponderance of the evidence.” In the opinion of the same case (46 W.Va. at 519, 33 S.E. at 276), the Court made the following statement: “Public offices belong to the people, and are to be both conferred and taken away according to their will and appointment, and a person who accepts a public office does so subject to all the constitutional and legislative provisions in relation thereto.” In the body of the same opinion (46 W.Va. at 526, 33 S.E. at 278), the Court stated: “In this, as in all similar cases, the circuit judge saw the witnesses face to face, beheld their demeanor on the witness stand, and heard them testify. On him devolves the duty of determining the credibility of witnesses and weighing their testimony; and, unless the evidence is credited [certified] to this Court plainly preponderates against his finding, it will not be disturbed.” Still later in the opinion (46 W.Va. at 526, 33 S.E. at 278), the Court stated: “While it is a harsh measure to remove an incumbent from office, yet he accepted the office on condition of upright behavior, as required in the constitution and laws, and he has no one to blame but himself. If he has been unjustly traduced, there remains for him an appeal to the people, who are quick to remedy such injustice, and readily pardon those whose upright deportment evinces a sincere departure from the follies of youth.”
Daugherty v. Ellis, 142 W.Va. 340, 97 S.E.2d 33, involved an appeal from the judgment of a circuit court in removing from office' a commissioner of the county court pursuant to the statute involved in the instant case. In affirming the judgment of the circuit court, this Court made the following statement in the sixth point of the syllabus: “The finding of a trial court upon facts submitted to it in lieu of a jury will be given the same weight as the verdict of a jury and will not be disturbed by an appellate court unless the evidence plainly and decidedly preponderates against such finding.” In the body of the opinion (142 W.Va. at 357-58, 97 S.E.2d at 42-43), the Court stated: “To establish malfeasance in office it is not necessary to show a specific intent to defraud, or that the act is criminal or corrupt in character.”
*207Edwards v. Hylbert, 146 W.Va. 1, 118 S.E.2d 347, involved an appeal from the action of the Circuit Court of Wood County, sitting in lieu of a jury, in removing from office the mayor and certain members of the municipal council of the City of Parkersburg. In affirming the action of the trial court, this Court, as the third point of the syllabus, quoted and applied the sixth point of the syllabus of Daugherty v. Ellis, supra, which was previously quoted in this dissenting opinion and which again applied the well-settled legal principle concerning the finding of a trial court on facts submitted to it in lieu of a jury. In the body of the Edwards opinion (146 W.Va. at 20, 118 S.E.2d at 357), the Court stated: “The trial court, sitting in lieu of a jury, heard the testimony orally at the bar of the court. The findings of fact made by the trial court are, therefore, entitled to the same weight as the verdict of a jury. Daugherty v. Ellis, 142 W.Va. 340, 97 S.E.2d 33. We can not say that such findings are unwarranted, * * * .”
It is true that the procedure for removal of one from public office is a “drastic remedy”. I do not subscribe to the statement in the majority opinion and in the second point of the syllabus that the statutory provision prescribing the grounds should be given a strict construction. For that proposition the Court cites a sentence from 43 Am. Jur., Public Officers, Section 194. Two appellate court decisions are there cited for that proposition. I prefer to emphasize the fact that this is not á criminal or penal statute and to express my view that statutes in this category are enacted for salutory, beneficent purposes, to promote the public interest, and that such statutes should be reasonably and sensibly applied. I prefer to rely on the following statement from the same volume, 43 Am. Jur., Public Officers, Section 226, at page 60: “It has been observed that the statute is remedial rather than penal in nature, and that the purpose is not to punish the officer, but to improve the public service.”
I recognize, of course, that the findings and judgments of trial courts in cases submitted to them in lieu of juries are not sacrosanct and that it is a part of the function of this Court *208to review such findings and judgments. I would, however, apply faithfully in this case our frequently reiterated rule which accords peculiar weight to the judgment of a trial court in a case such as this.
I respect the trial judge for his obvious exercise of courage, conscience and judicial ability by which he was motivated. I agree fully with his findings and judgment. By no means could I agree with the majority opinion in holding that his findings are not supported by the evidence, or against the preponderance of the evidence or plainly wrong. He is on the scene, he heard the testimony, with the consequent advantage of observing the various witnesses, their manner of testifying and their demeanor on the witness stand. I am unwilling, in the circumstances, to substitute my judgment for his.
In this day in which, in all levels of government throughout the land, the public confidence in public officials is sorely tested, I admire the courage of the trial judge in his effort to bolster and to restore the sagging confidence of the people in their representatives in government. A case of this character is, of course, a serious one from the standpoint of the individual public official, but such a case is, I believe, far more serious from the standpoint of the people he serves. See Green v. Jones, 144 W.Va. 276, 286-87, 108 S.E.2d 1, 8. In all cases, courts should constantly bear in mind that the public, as well as the individual, is entitled to a fair trial. Events in recent years throughout the land demonstrate a need for holding public officials to a fairly high degree of accountability to the public in the performance of their official functions and duties.
I would affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court of Logan County.