Court Opinion

ID: 9812939
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:52:14.168596+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:27:16.968448
License: Public Domain

*69Adams, L,
dissenting: I dissent from the opinion of the Court, not only because I believe it to be unsound in theory and unwise in policy, but because in my judgment it is based upon fundamental error and upon a misconception of the purpose and spirit of the act by which the State Highway Commission was created. Moreover, excepting the Newton case, with which it may not in all respects accord, the opinion, as I read it, combats all previous decisions construing the statute, and cannot be harmonized with them through the medium of doubtful or refined distinctions.
The basic 'error pervading the opinion consists in assuming jurisdiction of a question which the Legislature has referred to an administrative agency of the State. In the determination of the present controversy this exercise of jurisdiction in effect sanctions three propositions: (1) to deflect route 70 from B to C and back to D is necessarily to disconnect Eaeford and Lumberton; (2) when a road is once taken over by the State Highway Commission it becomes permanently fixed, and cannot thereafter be changed, altered, or discontinued;- (3) the discretion of the Highway Commission is reduced to a narrow and rigidly limited compass.
With respect to the first of these, the position of a majority of the Court is stated in this way: “Does a highway ‘run to’ a county seat when it terminates at a point thirteen miles from its corporate limits? Does a highway connect a county seat when it lacks thirteen miles of touching it at all? To ask these questions, nothing else appearing, is to answer them in the negative. Therefore, the inevitable conclusion is, that if the road as proposed by the defendant does not ‘run to’ and ‘connect the county seats involved,’ there has been no compliance with the express terms of the law. And if the road, as proposed by the defendants, disconnects a county seat, then this also would violate the express terms of the statute.”
The force of this argument may be measured by referring to the record in connection with the map filed in the cause. The road “proposed by the defendant” diverges from the line marked route 70 at Philadelphus (B), extends to Pembroke (0), connects with route 20, and proceeding along this route passes D and goes on to Lumberton. The question of principal towns is not involved.
The trial judge held that to make the proposed change would “disconnect the towns of Eaeford and Lumberton by thirteen miles”; but as this conclusion involves a mixed question of law and fact, and as this is a proceeding in equity, the finding is subject to review. However, a majority of the Court approve the finding and decide as a matter of law that the defendant has no legal right to make the proposed change and must maintain route 70. from B to D. It may be argued with force that *70in this way the decision in reality locates the road; in any event it refuses to permit a change. Now, what is the result? It is said in the opinion that prior to the ratification of the Eoad Act there was a road extending from Eaeford to Lumberton via Eed Springs; that the Highway Commission took it over and called it route 70; that by the same process route 20 was established as a separate, distinct, and independent road, constituting the sole and only connection between the county seats of Laurinburg and Lumberton; and that No. 20 has been paved without material “change, alteration, or discontinuance.” I think the fallacy implied in the questions quoted above lies in the assumption that by connecting with route 20 at Pembroke route 70 would terminate at this place. Why should it? If by making the proposed change route 70 would terminate at Pembroke (C), why by the same logical process does it not now terminate at McNeill’s Bridge (D) ? If No. 70 cannot extend along No. 20 from Pembroke to Lumberton, by what sort of logic can it extend along No. 20 from McNeill’s Bridge to Lumberton? If No. 70 terminates at D and does not extend along No. 20, then to change it would not disconnect Eaeford and Lumberton. If No. 70 extended from Eaeford to Lumberton before the Highway Commission was created, then under the reasoning in the opinion No. 20 running from Laurinburg terminates at McNeill’s Bridge, where it connects with No. 70. Yet it is said in the opinion that No. 20 is the sole connection between Laurinburg and Lumberton. If Nos. 70 and 20 can extend along the same roadbed from McNeill’s Bridge (D) to Lumber-ton, why could they not extend along the same roadbed from Pembroke to Lumberton? Does one part of the statute apply to the road between McNeill’s Bridge and Lumberton and another part to the road between Pembroke and Lumberton? If deflecting No. 70 as proposed would “disconnect the towns of Eaeford and Lumberton by thirteen miles,” the distance from Pembroke to Lumberton, why are these towns not already disconnected by three miles, the distance from McNeill’s Bridge to Lumberton? Eor according to the logic of the opinion the deduction is that No. 70 or No. 20 must terminate at McNeill’s Bridge; both cannot extend along one roadbed. But which shall it be? Obviously No. 70 because, says the Court, No. 20 connects Lumberton and Laurinburg. These, it seems to me, are some of the inconsistencies which flow from an argument resting upon premises or propositions which cannot be maintained. Apparently they are the product of the Court’s departure from the interpretation given the statute in former decisions, manifested first in the Newton case and extended here far beyond any previous judicial utterance. The result is that the proposed change, which would increase the distance of the road in question only 2.9 miles

*71

*72at an estimated saving of $225,000, is held for the first time to be beyond the powers conferred by law upon the defendant.
As to the question whether taking over a road locates it, little need be said. If when this is done the “period of proposing ends and the period of permanent links begins,” unless section seven is without meaning the period of changing, altering, adding to, and discontinuing roads does not end. By the very terms of the statute the right “to change or relocate any existing roads that it (the defendant) may now own or may acquire” continues. This provision is as unambiguous as it is significant. Can it be said with any degree of plausibility that after the Highway Commission has taken over and assumed control of an existing county road, as in this case, it is forever barred against changing or discontinuing it by an imaginary “fitting of the map to the ground” ? If so, a large proportion of the highways in this State have been constructed without authority of law. . The building of roads in North Carolina is not a simple task; difficult problems must be solved; complex conditions must be met; unforeseen contingencies arise; prevision is demanded; changes are imperative; and if the decision on this point must be adhered to, the work of the commission will hereafter move on as if fettered with gyves or shackles.
The opinion contains repeated references to the defendant’s exercise of discretion, from which it is possible to infer that its exercise of discretion as previously declared by the Court is still recognized as a legal right; but a careful reading will show that the opinion restricts the defendant’s discretion to such a narrow compass as to make its exercise for practical purposes well-nigh a nullity. The boundary prescribed for this imputed discretion it is not hard to discover. In construing the statute 'the Court declares that after a road is once taken over or accepted discretion ceases. This construction overlooks the fact that while in certain respects the defendant’s discretion may not transgress prescribed bounds, in other respects it is enlarged by the statute beyond the border of discretionary powers generally conferred by law upon administrative boards. Beference is made to the divergence of opinion as reflected on the question in the Cameron case. On this point one of the opinions was in effect a dissent, and of course was not in accord with the opinion of the Court in that case. The other two opinions accord in saying that the State Highway Commission is clothed with limited legal discretion, including the discretion expressly conferred by the statute, subject to the limitation contained in the proviso of section seven; also in saying that after a road is taken over it may be altered, changed, or discontinued. The substantial divergence had reference to another question, namely, whether the definition of a “principal town” involves law as well as fact or whether it is a question of fact determin*73able like many other questions in the sound discretion of the Commission. The excerpt taken from the opinion of Stacy, J., refers solely to this question. The opinion in the case at bar after quoting the clause from the opinion of the Court in the Gamer on case, comes to a full and permanent stop without any reference to the context, which shows full recognition of the discretion conferred upon the commission subject tu the limitation in the proviso which has been set out. I am unable to see why this difference of opinion on the legal question whether the term “principal towns” involves law and fact must occupy the vast expanse between zenith and nadir.
The right to exercise discretion in building highways should not be so limited as to make the Highway Commission an automatic mechanism; but so far as my research discloses, the Court up to this time has never made a decision which limits the discretionary power of any similar administrative and governmental agency as the present decision limits the discretionary power of the defendant. The ultimate effect of these “intolerable restrictions” the future will reveal.