Court Opinion

ID: 9635927
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 14:10:25.467559+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:38.975963
License: Public Domain

*240Concurring Opinion by
Mr. Justice Pomeroy :
I concur in the result reached by the Court, but since my views do not coincide completely with those of the majority, I deem it desirable to set them forth briefly.
Were the defendant appellee in this case a licensee under the Liquor Code and had he sold the drinks rather than given them away to a person visibly intoxicated, there is little doubt that we would conclude that a cause of action had been stated; such conduct, in clear violation of the provisions of Section 493 of the Liquor Code,1 would be considered negligence per se in a civil suit, even though the statute is penal in nature. Our cases make this plain. See Majors v. Brodhead Hotel, 416 Pa. 265, 268, 205 A. 2d 873, 875, 876 (1965); Jardine v. Upper Darby Lodge No. 1973, 413 Pa. 626, 632, 198 A. 2d 550, 553 (1964); Smith v. Clark, 411 Pa. 142, 144-45, 190 A. 2d 441, 442 (1963); Schelin v. Goldberg, 188 Pa. Superior Ct. 341, 347, 146 A. 2d 648, 651-52 (1958).
The defendant, however, is not a licensee but a private person who played host at a party. The question, therefore, is whether such a person is subject to the interdiction of Section 493, either for purposes of criminal responsibility under the Liquor Code or in a civil suit for damages. More specifically, do the words “any other person” in that section refer to everyone in the Commonwealth or only to persons who, although not licensees or their employees or agents, are nevertheless persons in the liquor trade? The question has never been previously decided by this Court, although the Superior Court has held that the statute does attach criminal responsibility to the forbidden conduct even though the defendant was not connected with the liquor busi*241ness. Commonwealth v. Randall, 183 Pa. Superior Ct. 603, 133 A. 2d 276 (1957).2 One need not quarrel with, the Randall decision on its facts (the conduct there involved also included corrupting the morals of minors) to conclude that it need not be held applicable in a civil suit.
The Liquor Code is primarily concerned with the regulation of licensees of the Liquor Control Board and others connected in one way or another with the liquor industry.3 In my view it is appropriate to hold persons in that class strictly liable in tort law for a violation of the statute, as this Court has done in the cases cited above. See Restatement (Second) of Torts, §286 (1965). That standard of liability, however, is obviously not appropriate for evexy violation of a criminal statute,4 and in my view it is not appropriate where, *242as here, the defendant is a private individual in no way part of the liquor industry. To my knowledge, no court has created civil liability with respect to such persons. See Annot., 8 A.L.R. 3d 1412.
I hasten to add that in my view there is no reason in the nature of things why a private person should not be held liable if he serves liquor to one whom he knows or should know to be intoxicated, and who he knows or should know is about to drive an automobile or engage in some other activity involving the potentiality of harm to himself or to others, with resulting damage. No legislative enactment is required to accomplish that result; it is ordinary tort law.5 The present complaint, however, is not so framed; it is deliberately couched in the statutory language of the Liquor Code without alleging any such scienter on appellee’s part. That being so, I think the demurrer to the amended complaint was properly sustained.

 The section in relevant part provides: “It shall be unlawful . . . for any licensee or the board, or any employe, servant or agent of such licensee or the board, or any other person, to sell, furnish or give any liquor ... or to permit any liquor ... to be sold, furnished or given, to any person visibly intoxicated . . . .”

 We denied allocatur, 184 Pa. Superior Ct. XXVIII, and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari, 355 U.S. 954 (1958).

 The title of the Liquor Code, Act of April 12, 1951, P. L. 90, 47 P.S. §1-101 is in relevant part as follows: “An Act relating to alcoholic liquors, alcohol and malt and brewed beverages; . . . regulating and restricting the manufacture, purchase, sale, possession, consumption, importation, transportation, furnishing, holding in bond, holding in storage, traffic in and use of alcoholic liquors, alcohol, and malt and brewed beverages and the persons engaged or employed therein; . . . .” (emphasis supplied)
The purpose of the Code “is to prohibit the manufacture of and transactions in liquor, alcohol and malt or brewed beverages which take place in this Commonwealth, except by and under the control of the [Liquor Control Board] as herein specifically provided, and every section and provision of the act shall be construed accordingly .. . .” 47 P.S. §1-104.
The provisions of the Code which specify the proscribed conduct and impose criminal liability, Sections 4-491 to 4-497, inclusive, are concerned with the actions of licensees, manufacturers, importers, etc.

 See generally Restatement (Second) of Torts, §288 (1965); Morris, The Role of Criminal Statutes in Negligence Actions, 49 Colum. L. Rev. 21 (1949); 2 Harper and James, Law of Torts, §17.6 (1956).

 In such case, it is possible that Section 493 of the Code would be admissible in evidence as bearing on the proper standard of care. See D. Johnson, Drunken Driving—The Civil Responsibility of the Purveyor of Intoxicating Liquor, 37 Ind. L.J. 317 (1962).