Court Opinion

ID: 9393915
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-11 16:08:29.291038+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:56.087518
License: Public Domain

J-S05031-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    HAZEL BURGWIN, JR.                         :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 168 WDA 2022

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 26, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-02-SA-0001235-2019

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.:                             FILED: MAY 11, 2023

        Hazel Burgwin, Jr. appeals the judgment of sentence entered following

his conviction for driving with a suspended license – DUI related.1 Burgwin

argues that the officer illegally stopped him. We affirm.

        The trial court aptly summarized the facts of the case as follows:

           Port Vue Borough Police Officer Adams testified that on April
           13, 2019, he was dispatched to a convenience store to check
           on an alleged harassment of customers. Upon his arrival,
           the clerk pointed out [Burgwin], who was standing outside
           by a vehicle. Adams followed [Burgwin] after he drove to his
           residence, about a block away. When Adams asked for
           identification, [Burgwin] produced a DUI-related suspended
           driver’s license. During direct examination of Adams,
           [Burgwin], through [his trial counsel], stipulated to the
           elements of the offense.

____________________________________________

1   75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1)(i).
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Rule 1925(a) Opinion (“1925(a) Op.”), filed 7/20/22, at 1 (unpaginated)

(citations to record omitted).

       The court found Burgwin guilty and sentenced him to 60 days reporting

probation. Burgwin filed a timely pro se notice of appeal. The court appointed

appellate counsel who filed in the trial court a “Statement of Intent to File

Anders/Santiago Brief in Lieu of Filing Concise Statement of Errors

Complained of on Appeal.” See Statement of Intent to File Anders/Santiago

Brief in Lieu of Filing Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal

(“Statement"), filed 2/22/22. Counsel stated that “[a]fter a conscientious

review of the record and extensive legal research, . . . there are no

meritorious, non-frivolous issues to raise on appeal[.]” Id. at ¶ 32.

       Two days later, counsel filed a motion to withdraw as counsel and a

motion for a Grazier2 hearing.3 The court held such a hearing, where counsel

stated that after filing the Statement, he received a call from Burgwin that he

did not want to be represented by him and wanted to proceed pro se. See

N.T., Grazier Hearing, 5/4/22, at 6. Burgwin agreed on the record with

counsel’s recitation of what occurred and affirmed that he wished to proceed

pro se on appeal. Id. The court then had the Commonwealth conduct a

thorough colloquy with Burgwin. It asked Burgwin if he understood that he

____________________________________________

2   Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998).

3 The docket reflects that counsel filed a Motion to Withdraw as well as a
Motion for a Grazier hearing. However, these motions are not included in the
certified record.

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had a right to counsel, that he could ask the court to appoint another attorney,

and that if he changed his mind about proceeding pro se, he had a right to

ask the court to reappoint counsel. Id. at 6-7, 9. After stating that he

understood, the Commonwealth asked if he still wished to proceed pro se, to

which Burgwin responded “yes.” Id. at 9. The court granted counsel’s motion

to withdraw and Burgwin’s request to proceed pro se. Id. at 10; see Order of

Court, filed 5/4/22. Burgwin then filed a Rule 1925(b) statement.

      On appeal, Burgwin raises the following claims:

         1. Mr. Officer Adams had no reason to make me give him
            my license. So how can he charge me with having a
            suspended license if he didn’t know it was suspended
            until after he made me give it to him? He violated my
            rights. This is in the transcripts, and everybody act like
            this don’t matter.

         2. He knew he was wrong, so he said he’d let me go with
            an A instead of a B. The Judge said it ain’t up to him. But
            it should be because he the one that violated my rights.

Burgwin’s Br. at 3 (verbatim).

      Here, Burgwin’s brief includes an argument section that is a little over

two pages. It is not separated into the issues he presents. See Pa.R.A.P.

2119(a). His argument for each issue is somewhat unclear but we will review

the issues to the extent we can discern his arguments. To the extent Burgwin

intended to make other arguments, they are waived. See Commonwealth

v. Johnson, 985 A.2d 915, 924–25 (Pa. 2009) (appellant waives an issue on

appeal if he fails to meaningfully develop it).

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       It appears that Burgwin is challenging the legality of his encounter with

Officer Adams. Burgwin cites Commonwealth v. Parker, 161 A.3d 357

(Pa.Super. 2017), and argues that it is similar to the instant case. Officers

stopped Parker by placing their bicycles in front of him and suggested that he

was involved in criminal activity. Parker, 161 A.3d at 361. Officers then asked

for Parker’s name, date of birth, address, telephone phone number, and social

security number. Id. Parker provided this information and officers allowed

Parker to leave. Id. Officers used the phone number provided by Parker to

connect him to drug-related offenses stemming from earlier dates. Id. at 360

n.4. Police arrested Parker on those offenses which led to him filing a motion

to suppress the information he initially gave to the officers. The trial court

denied Parker’s motion and the court found him guilty of the drug offenses.

Parker appealed and challenged the denial of the motion to suppress. He

maintained that the officers “subjected him to an investigatory detention

without reasonable suspicion that he was involved in illegal activity[.]” Id. at

361.

       A panel of this Court determined that the officers suggested that Parker

had been “involved in a criminal disturbance at McDonald’s, and therefore a

reasonable person in [Parker’s] position would not have felt free to leave.” Id.

at 365. Because of this, this Court determined that the officers had subjected

Parker to an investigative detention without reasonable suspicion. Id. at 364-

65. This Court vacated the judgment of sentence, reversed the suppression

order, and remanded for a new trial.

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      Here, Burgwin did not file a motion to suppress. As such, unlike Parker,

Burgwin has waived review of any challenge to the legality of his encounter

with Officer Adams. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 581 (A), (B) (stating motion to suppress

evidence must be filed if there is an allegation of a violation of defendant’s

right and failure to do so results in waiver of issue); Commonwealth v.

Grays, 167 A.3d 793, 810 (Pa.Super. 2017) (raising an issue for the first time

in Rule 1925(b) statement does not cure the failure to first present issue to

the trial court).

      Burgwin also argues that Officer Adams “knew he was wrong” and told

him that he would cite him for a violation of driving with a suspended license

under Section 1543(a), instead of driving with a suspended license that is DUI

related under Section 1543(b)(1)(i). See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(a), (b)(1)(i).

Burgwin states the court told him that Officer Adams could not determine what

his criminal charge would be.

      Burgwin waived this issue because it is not in his Rule 1925(b)

statement. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii). However, even if he had properly

preserved it, it is meritless. Burgwin concedes that he was told that “this ain’t

like the Bill Cosby case because the prosecutor, not the police officer, made

that agreement.” Burgwin’s Br. at 6. He also concedes that “a police officer

cannot bind a prosecutor to an agreement,” citing Commonwealth v.

Stipetich, 652 A.2d 1294 (Pa. 1995). Id. However, he maintains that his case

may be different because it involves a suspended license. Burgwin provides

no authority to support this last point.

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      Even assuming Officer Adams told Burgwin that he would charge him

under Section 1543(a), the agreement would not have been binding on the

Commonwealth. See Stipetich, 652 A.2d at 1295 (stating “[w]hile the police

exercise, as a practical matter, a certain discretion in deciding whether to

make an arrest, issue a citation, or seek a warrant, the ultimate discretion to

file criminal charges lies in the district attorney”). Additionally, Burgwin’s

argument that his case is different because it involves the charge of driving

with a suspended license is to no avail as no precedent supports his position.

The charge does not change the officer’s authority to bind the prosecution in

this regard. Any agreement that existed between Officer Adams and Burgwin

as it related to charging was invalid. We thus affirm.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 5/11/2023

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