Court Opinion

ID: 9726999
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:16:44.994775+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:32.738837
License: Public Domain

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
Prentice, J.
I concur in the result reached by the majority. I would not, however, retreat from our pronouncement in Martin v. State, (1972) 258 Ind. 83, 279 N.E.2d 189, that a post-arrest lineup is a “critical stage” requiring the presence of counsel under Article 1, Section 13 of the Constitution of Indiana. Recognizing Kirby v. Illinois, (1972) 406 U.S. 682, 92 S. Ct. 1877, 32 L. Ed. 2d 411 as disposing of this issue contrawise under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States, nevertheless, that determination is not dispositive of the same issue as viewed by this Court under our state constitution, inasmuch as our determination in no way violates the federal constitution but merely gives a more expansive right to counsel. The rule *16in Martin is clear and workable and need be no great burden to the state.
In the case at bar, the identification by Miss Rogers occurred so close in point of time to the robbery that it did not constitute a critical stage requiring the presence of an attorney. As set out in Martin, supra, this Court has held
“ ‘ [T] his Court has held that an on-the-scene confrontation between a witness and a suspect conducted within a reasonably short time after the commission of the crime for the purpose of determining whether the witness can identify the suspect is not within the scope of the Wade-Gilbert rule. Parker v. State, (1970) [254] Ind. [593], 261 N.E.2d 562; McPhearson v. State, (1970) 253 Ind. 254, 253 N.E.2d 226; Lewis v. State, (1969) 252 Ind. 454, 250 N.E.2d 358.’ Dillard v. State, (1971) [257] Ind. [282], 274 N.E.2d 387, 389.” 279 N.E.2d at 190.
I, therefore, would affirm the decision of the trial court upon the right to counsel issue upon this basis.
DeBruler, J., concurs.
Note. — Reported at 323 N.E.2d 228.