Court Opinion

ID: 9541175
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:23:14.100925+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:00:27.580031
License: Public Domain

*362KAUFFMAN, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent from the majority opinion which imposes a rigid per se rule requiring consultation with an “interested adult” whenever a juvenile is interrogated by the police. The majority would exclude any incriminating statement made by an accused juvenile, regardless of the circumstances, where he has not consulted with an interested adult.
The federal Constitution clearly does not require this extreme result. See Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979). Without any concern for the particular circumstances of this case, however, the majority concludes that its rule is mandated by the law of this Commonwealth, and reinstates the Superior Court order vacating appellant’s convictions of first degree murder, robbery, burglary, theft, criminal conspiracy and unauthorized use of an automobile, (at pgs. 388, 389-390, 392).1 While I agree that state and federal constitutional protections are not necessarily coextensive, and that states may provide safeguards beyond those prescribed in the federal Constitution, nothing in the law of this Commonwealth dictates the inflexible rule fashioned by the majority.
Although we have long recognized that the waiver of constitutional rights by an accused of tender years must be closely scrutinized, I believe that society would be far better served by a rule inquiring into the validity of each particular waiver in view of all of the circumstances. The majority’s mechanical rule will result in blanket exclusion of trustworthy evidence vital to the truth determining process, not because the juvenile’s will has been overborne or his understanding has been inadequate, but because the police did not follow a rigid procedure in obtaining his statement. A totality of the circumstances rule, on the other hand, not only would adequately protect the rights of the accused by disregarding any waiver of constitutional rights not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made, but would also *363protect the interests of society by precluding exclusion of relevant, trustworthy evidence simply because of a failure to comply with a rigid per se rule.
The flexible totality of the circumstances approach would provide sufficient safeguards in full compliance with the requirements of the federal Constitution. The law of this Commonwealth should not be interpreted to go further and mandate a strict per se rule, which in all too many cases would thwart the truth determining process and interfere with legitimate interests of law enforcement.
I would, therefore, affirm the judgment of sentence.
LARSEN and FLAHERTY, JJ., join in this dissenting opinion.

. The trial court held that the written statement of appellant, a 15 year old, was properly admitted after a consideration of the totality of the circumstances.