Court Opinion

ID: 9957621
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-04 17:15:41.40016+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:26.457336
License: Public Domain

J-S05013-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :
 ANTONIO D. ARCHER                        :
                                          :
                     Appellant            :   No. 1456 WDA 2022

          Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 16, 2022
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County
            Criminal Division at No(s): CP-26-CR-0002396-2018

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., KING, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.E.:                FILED: April 4, 2024

      Antonio D. Archer appeals from the order entered in the Fayette County

Court of Common Pleas on November 16, 2022, denying his first, timely, Post-

Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) petition, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. After careful

review, we affirm.

      A detailed recitation of the underlying facts which support the charges

is unnecessary given our disposition. After a trial held July 8 through July 10,

2019, the jury convicted Archer of rape of a child, involuntary deviate sexual

intercourse with a child, aggravated indecent assault of a child, indecent

assault of a person less than 13 years of age, endangering the welfare of
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children, corruption of minors, and sexual assault.1 Archer was sentenced on

July 18, 2019, to a term of incarceration of a minimum of 17 to a maximum

of 40 years. Archer appealed, and this Court affirmed his judgment of

sentence on March 5, 2021. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied

allowance of appeal on September 21, 2021.

       Archer filed a pro se PCRA petition on May 3, 2021. Appointed counsel

then filed two amended PCRA petitions on June 8, 2022, and October 24,

2022. The PCRA court held a hearing on the amended petitions on October

25, 2022.

       On November 16, 2022, the court denied Archer’s PCRA petition, and

Archer filed the instant appeal.2

       Archer raises four issues:

       [1.] Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file any type
       of pre-trial motions?

       [2.] Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to spend
       sufficient time preparing for trial including, but not limited to,
       spending sufficient time with the defendant to discuss the case
       and preparing for trial, interviewing witnesses and reviewing
       and/or viewing the evidence in which the Commonwealth planned
       to use against the defendant at trial?

       [3.] Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to
       admission of tender years hearsay testimony as no in camera
____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3121(c), 3123(b), 3125(b), 3126(a)(7), 4304(a)(1),
6301(a)(1)(ii), and 3124.1, respectively.

2 Archer timely complied with the trial court’s order of December 16, 2022, to

file a 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal. He filed his
statement on December 28, 2022. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

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      hearing took place to determine if the evidence is relevant and
      that the time, content and circumstances of the statement provide
      sufficient indicia of reliability in accordance with 42 Pa. C. S. A. §
      5985.1 (a)(1)(i)?

      [4.] Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a
      request for bill of particulars to ascertain the specific date or dates
      of the alleged crime prior to trial which would have precluded the
      amendment of the information after the Commonwealth’s case in
      chief and for not raising a proper objection to the amendment at
      the time it was made[?]

Appellant’s Brief at 3.

      We note with extreme displeasure the Commonwealth’s failure to file an

appellee’s brief. “An appellee is required to file a brief that at minimum must

contain ‘a summary of argument and the complete argument for appellee.’”

Commonwealth v. Pappas, 845 A.2d 829, 835 (Pa. Super. 2004) (quoting

Pa.R.A.P. 2112). In Pappas, the panel referred to the Commonwealth’s failure

to file a proper appellee’s brief as “unacceptable.” Id. We echo that opinion

and remind the Commonwealth of its obligation to file an appellee’s brief in

future appeals. In light of the serious nature of the charges in this case,

regarding acts of sexual violence against a child, the Commonwealth should

have prioritized its responsibility to file an appellee’s brief.

      Our standard and scope of review is well-settled:

      This Court analyzes PCRA appeals in the light most favorable to
      the prevailing party at the PCRA level. Our review is limited to the
      findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of record and we do
      not disturb a PCRA court’s ruling if it is supported by evidence of
      record and is free of legal error. Similarly, we grant great
      deference to the factual findings of the PCRA court and will not
      disturb those findings unless they have no support in the record.
      However, we afford no such deference to its legal conclusions.

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      Where the petitioner raises questions of law, our standard of
      review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Finally, we
      may affirm a PCRA court’s decision on any grounds if the record
      supports it.

Commonwealth v. Selenski, 228 A.3d 8, 15 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citations

omitted).

      Counsel is presumed to be effective and a petitioner claiming ineffective

assistance of counsel bears the burden of proving otherwise. See Strickland

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d

294, 311 (Pa. 2014). The petitioner must show, by a preponderance of the

evidence, that: (1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) counsel’s

performance lacked a reasonable basis; and (3) prejudice resulted. See

Commonwealth v. Pierce, 786 A.2d 203, 213 (Pa. 2001). Prejudice requires

the petitioner to demonstrate “that there is a reasonable probability that, but

for counsel’s error, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.”

Id.

      Archer combines his first and third arguments, as such, we address

them together. See Appellant’s Brief, at 6. Archer first claims trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to file any pre-trial motions, specifically, a motion for a

taint hearing. “[P]retrial exploration of taint … is necessary in those cases

where there is some evidence that improper interview techniques, suggestive

questioning, vilification of the accused and interviewer bias may have

influenced a child witness to such a degree that the proffered testimony may

be irreparably compromised.” Commonwealth v. Delbridge, 855 A.2d 27,

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35 (Pa. 2003). “An allegation that the witness’s memory of the event has been

tainted raises a red flag regarding competency, not credibility[,] and therefore

“should occur within a competency hearing.” Id. at 663-64. “When

considering whether some evidence of taint has been presented we look to

the totality of the circumstances surrounding the revelation of the allegations

of child sexual abuse.” Id. at 41. This Court has held that evidence of taint

may come from

      the age of the child[,] the existence of a motive hostile to the
      defendant on the part of the child’s primary custodian[,] the
      possibility that the child’s primary custodian is unusually likely to
      read abuse into normal interaction[,] whether the child was
      subjected to repeated interviews by various adults in positions of
      authority[,] whether an interested adult was present during the
      course of any interviews[,] and [] the existence of independent
      evidence regarding the interview techniques employed.

Commonwealth v. Judd, 897 A.2d 1224, 1229 (Pa. Super. 2006).

      Archer argues that his “trial counsel should have filed a motion for a

taint hearing due to the inconsistencies of the child victim’s testimony.”

Appellant’s Brief, at 6. Archer also notes that the child was interviewed by

multiple people, including two recorded forensic interviews. See id. at 12. The

trial court found that this argument both lacked merit and that Archer did not

prove prejudice resulted. We agree.

      The trial court aptly noted, “the record is devoid of any evidence of

improper interview techniques, suggestive questioning, vilification of the

accused, or interviewer bias” that would justify the pretrial examination of

taint. Trial Court Opinion, 11/16/22, at 13. Archer did not point to, nor could

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we find in our independent review of the record, any evidence of a hostile

motive on the part of the child’s primary custodian at the time of disclosure,

nor any evidence of improper interview techniques.

      Moreover, as observed by the trial court, the question of taint goes to a

child’s competency to testify, not her credibility, and therefore, would be dealt

with in a competency hearing if there were grounds to address the taint issue.

      Where an allegation of taint is made before trial the “appropriate
      venue” for investigation into such a claim is a competency
      hearing. In order to trigger an investigation of competency on the
      issue of taint, the moving party must show some evidence of taint.
      Once some evidence of taint is presented, the competency hearing
      must be expanded to explore this specific question. During the
      hearing the party alleging taint bears the burden of production of
      evidence of taint and the burden of persuasion to show taint by
      clear and convincing evidence.           Pennsylvania has always
      maintained that since competency is the presumption, the moving
      party must carry the burden of overcoming that presumption …
      [A]s with all questions of competency, the resolution of a taint
      challenge to the competency of a child witness is a matter
      addressed to the discretion of the trial court. [Commonwealth v.
      Delbridge (Delbridge I), 578 Pa. at 664, 855 A.2d at 40-41.

PENNSYLVANIA BENCHBOOK ON CRIMES OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE, Ch. 7, pg.

15 (3rd Edition 2015).

      Here, the court conducted an in camera competency hearing at which

the victim was found competent to testify. See id. at 113. Following review,

we agree with the trial court that there was no evidence or insinuation of taint.

Therefore, the issue lacks merit and counsel cannot be found ineffective on

this basis. See Commonwealth v. McAfee, 849 A.2d 270, 277 (Pa. Super.

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2004) (“Counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing to raise a meritless

claim.”) (citation omitted).

      Also, trial counsel testified at the PCRA hearing that when he spoke with

Archer about filing a pre-trial motion for a taint hearing, counsel told Archer

that “whether [the victim] was coached or not[,] she has changed her story[,]

or anything like that” would be for the jury to decide. N.T. PCRA Hearing,

10/25/22 at 53; see Commonwealth v. Page, 59 A.3d 1118, 1130 (Pa.

Super. 2013) (Inconsistencies are for the jury to determine, as credibility

determinations are “solely within the province of the factfinder.”). Counsel

advised Archer that, in his professional opinion, filing a taint motion would not

be appropriate. See N.T. PCRA Hearing, 10/25/22 at 53. Therefore, not only

does the issue lack underlying merit, counsel had a reasonable basis for his

decision not to pursue a taint hearing.

      Next, Archer asserts that trial counsel did not sufficiently prepare for

trial, including failing to “to spend sufficient time with him to discuss and

prepare the case for trial,” interview witnesses and review forensic videos of

the victim that the Commonwealth would be presenting. Appellant’s Brief, at

16.

      First, Archer complains that trial counsel only met with him twice prior

to trial See id. Archer cites to one case and the ABA Standards for the

proposition that trial counsel shall investigate the case and meet with his client

to discuss trial. See id. at 17. Notably, the case relied upon by Archer, United

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States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973), is not binding on this

Court and was decided prior to Strickland.

      Our Court has held that “[t]he length of time dedicated to client

consultation affords no basis for inferring the extent of trial preparation.”

Commonwealth v. Ellis, 700 A.2d 948, 960 (Pa. Super. 1997). It is the

petitioner’s burden on a PCRA petition to show that counsel’s deficient

performance prejudiced him. See Pierce, 786 A.2d at 213. “[Prejudice] can

be demonstrated by alleging beneficial information or issues that counsel

should have presented had he been prepared adequately, which would have

changed the outcome of the trial.” Commonwealth v. Elliott, 80 A.3d 415,

432 (Pa. 2013) (citations omitted).

      The credible evidence of record belies Archer’s claim. Trial counsel

testified at the PCRA hearing that he was appointed to Archer’s case early the

week before the trial week. See PCRA Hearing, 10/25/22, at 50. Counsel

testified that, during the time he was appointed, he met with Archer for forty-

five minutes at least three times. See id. They discussed the trial strategy of

showing the events reported by the victim actually happened elsewhere. See

id. at 56. Furthermore, as more discussed in detail below, counsel took

considerable steps to prepare for trial during the week prior to trial. Archer

has failed to plead and prove that this issue has underlying merit or that he

was prejudiced by counsel’s late appointment.

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      Archer next asserts that counsel was ineffective because he “did not

view the [victim’s] forensic videos until trial.” Appellant’s Brief, at 18

(emphases omitted). We disagree.

      During the workweek prior to trial, counsel worked nights to prepare.

The weekend before the trial, counsel met with the co-defendant’s counsel to

review discovery and prep for trial. See PCRA Hearing, 10/25/22, at 54.

Counsel viewed the forensic videos at length that weekend. See id. Counsel

also watched the videos with Archer prior to their being played at trial and

counsel’s cross-examination of the victim. See id. Counsel testified that he

was prepared to cross-examine the victim about any discrepancies in her

statements during the investigation and that, he did in fact examine her about

“the different disclosures made on the stand versus on the video.” Id. at 55.

Finally, counsel stated that he was able to cross-examine the victim

sufficiently about the video to show the jury that the victim also was abused

at this other location. See id. at 57. Archer has failed to explain how he was

prejudiced where counsel viewed the forensic videos, discussed them with

Archer, and fully cross-examined the victim about them. Archer has failed to

establish all three Pierce prongs in support of this allegation.

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       As to Archer’s claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to interview

and call Commonwealth witnesses,3 we first observe that Archer makes no

argument regarding which Commonwealth witnesses trial counsel should have

spoken to and how the outcome of his trial would have changed if trial counsel

had interviewed any of the Commonwealth witnesses prior to trial. As such,

we find this claim waived. See Commonwealth v. Love, 896 A.2d 1276,

1287 (Pa. Super. 2006) (stating that claims that are not sufficiently developed

in Appellant’s brief are waived). Even if this allegation were not waived, no

relief is due.

       In order to prevail on a claim that counsel was ineffective for
       failing to call a witness, a defendant is required to establish that:
       1) the witness existed; 2) such witness was available to testify for
       the defense; 3) counsel knew of or should have known of the
       existence of the witness; 4) the witness was willing to testify for
       the defense; and 5) the absence of the testimony of such witness
       was so prejudicial as to have denied him a fair trial.

Commonwealth v. Smith, 675 A.2d 1221, 1230 (Pa. 1996). Archer did not

present any witnesses other than himself at the PCRA hearing. Additionally,

counsel testified that Archer spoke to him about calling potential witnesses

from CYS who had been involved with the family prior to the events at issue

in this case, but counsel decided that subpoenaing these individuals would not

____________________________________________

3  Although Archer refers to the proposed witnesses as “Commonwealth
witnesses,” our review of the record reveals that the proposed witnesses were
from Fayette County Children and Youth Services (CYS) related to a prior
family matter. See N.T. PCRA Hearing, 10/25/22, at 51-52; Appellant’s Brief,
at 18 (referring to “Tammy from Family First”).

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have been wise because they had no first-hand knowledge about the facts of

this case. See id. at 51-52. Counsel explained that he discussed this strategy

with co-counsel and they agreed that, because of the nature of this case,

calling these witnesses would only highlight to the jury that CYS was involved

with the family, which does not happen “unless there’s alleged problems in

the home.” Id. at 52. Archer has failed to explain how he was prejudiced by

Counsel’s decision.

      Therefore, we agree with the PCRA court that Archer has failed to plead

and prove that counsel was ineffective in failing to properly prepare for trial,

including spending sufficient time with Archer, interviewing witnesses, and

reviewing the forensic videos.

      Finally, Archer posits “trial counsel was ineffective for not raising a

proper   objection    to   the   amendment    of   the   information   after   the

Commonwealth’s case in chief.” Appellant’s Brief, at 19 (extraneous

capitalization omitted). On day two of trial, the Commonwealth sought to

amend the criminal information as to the date of the offense. Specifically, the

Commonwealth was requesting a date range for the occurrences of the

charged offenses, i.e., the summer of 2017, and asked the amendment to

reflect “on or about June 1, 2017.” See N.T. Trial, 7/9/19, Day 2, at 122. The

original information had the date of “on or about 3/16/2018.” See Criminal

Information, 12/13/18. In its opinion filed on December 4, 2023, pursuant to

Pa.R.A.P. 1925, the PCRA Court stated:

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      This issue was addressed at the October 25th, 2022 PCRA
      Hearing. On Day Two of the Defendant's jury trial, Attorney
      DeMarco-Breeden moved to Amend the Criminal Information to
      reflect an " On Or About Date of June 1st, 2017." (The Criminal
      Information had read, " On or About March 16th, 2018"). Attorney
      Clark objected to the Motion on the record.

Trial Court Opinion, 12/4/23, at 9.

      Therefore, trial counsel did object to the request to amend the

information at the time of trial. See N.T. Trial, 7/9/19, Day 2, at 124 (“We

would object, Your Honor. The Commonwealth had plenty of time to have a

look at that, and we did request a Bill of Particulars, but ultimately we will

leave that up to the Court. I just want to have that objection noted for the

record.”). Archer does not elaborate why this objection was not “proper.” The

trial court permitted the amendment:

      We don't see how there is any prejudice to the Defense. Certainly,
      the Discovery would have revealed that, and this occurred before
      September 27th, 2017, and I don't see how it could have affected
      adversely your preparation and, again, the only purpose for the
      date is to establish the age of the child being below age 13 at the
      time of the crime and that it was within the statute of limitations,
      and neither one of those issues arises from the amendment, so
      we will permit the amendment.

Id.
      Archer did not pursue this issue on direct appeal. Because Archer did

not raise this claim on direct appeal, we find this issue waived. See 42 Pa.C.S.

§ 9544(b) (“[A]n issue is waived if the petitioner could have raised it but failed

to do so before trial, at trial, during unitary review, on appeal or in a prior

state postconviction proceeding.”); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 289 A.3d

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959, 1020 (Pa. 2023) (finding a claim waived when it could have been raised

on direct appeal, but was not).

     Even if not waived, we would find this issue does not merit relief. The

trial court found that Archer did not prove how he was prejudiced by this

amendment. See Trial Court Opinion, 11/16/22, at 9. We agree.

     Amendments to a criminal information are governed by Rule 564, which

provides:

     The court may allow an information to be amended, provided that
     the information as amended does not charge offenses arising from
     a different set of events and that the amended charges are not so
     materially different from the original charge that the defendant
     would be unfairly prejudiced. Upon amendment, the court may
     grant such postponement of trial or other relief as is necessary in
     the interests of justice.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 564. “Rule 564’s purpose is to ensure that a defendant is fully

appraised of the charges, and to avoid prejudice by prohibiting last-minute

addition of alleged criminal acts of which the defendant is uninformed.”

Commonwealth v. Belgrave, 307 A.3d 1240, 1249 (Pa. Super. 2023). There

are six factors that the court must consider in determining whether an

amendment is prejudicial to the defendant:

     (1) Whether the amendment changes the factual scenario
     supporting the charges; (2) whether the amendment adds new
     facts previously unknown to the defendant; (3) whether the entire
     factual scenario was developed during a preliminary hearing; (4)
     whether the description of the charges changed with the
     amendment; (5) whether a change in defense strategy was
     necessitated by the amendment; and (6) whether the timing of
     the Commonwealth’s request for amendment allowed for ample
     notice and preparation.

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Id. The amendment only changed the date range of the alleged offenses, as

such, factors (1), (2), and (4) are not implicated by the amendment. 4 With

respect to factor (3), Archer does not present any argument that the

amendment changed the factual scenario as it was developed at the

preliminary hearing, and we were not provided with any notes from the

preliminary hearing.

       In reference to factor (5), Archer has not alleged how the amendment

changed his defense strategy at the time of trial. Archer only avers that

“[p]rejudice would be obvious. ... The innocence defense was no longer a

viable defense.” Appellant’s Brief, at 21. Archer does not explain why the

innocence defense was no longer a viable defense. In fact, Archer proceeded

with an innocence defense at trial, even after the amendment, by attempting

to show that the abuse occurred after the child had been placed in foster care.

See N.T. PCRA Hearing, 10/25/22, at 56-57; N.T. Trial, 7/9/19, Day 2, at 155-

158.

       In addition, both the discovery and the testimony clearly indicated that

the child victim had been removed from the home in September of 2017, and

never returned to live with Archer following that removal. Therefore, Archer

and trial counsel knew that the date in the original information, March 16,

2018, had to be in error.

____________________________________________

4 In his brief, Archer agrees that the amendment “did not change or alter the

charges.” Appellant’s Brief at 20.

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       Notably, a close review of the trial transcript reveals that the date in the

original information, March 16, 2018, was the date that CYS informed Archer,

in person, that the child made these allegations. See N.T. Trial, 7/9/19, Day

2, 23-25; 154-155. Archer would have known that the abuse did not occur on

March 16, 2018, but must have occurred prior to March 16, 2018. As such,

Archer was not prejudiced by the amendment. As Archer continued to present

a defense to the jury that he was innocent of the charges, he was not

prejudiced by the amendment; counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to

“properly” object.5

       As the trial court did not err in finding Archer did not prove his claims of

ineffective assistance of counsel, we affirm.

       Order Affirmed.

4/4/2024

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5 We do agree that factor six weighs in Archer’s favor. However, this factor

alone does not establish prejudice.

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