Court Opinion

ID: 9412584
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-31 20:04:48.205232+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:08.798567
License: Public Domain

Filed 7/31/23 In re M.V. CA2/4
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF
                        CALIFORNIA

                          SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                            DIVISION FOUR

In re M.V., a Person Coming                                               B313993 c/w B319770
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
                                                                          (Los Angeles County
LOS ANGELES COUNTY                                                         Super. Ct. No. 21CCJP02096A)
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

B.R.,

           Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from findings and orders of the Superior
Court of Los Angeles County, Kristen Byrdsong, Judge Pro
Tempore. Dismissed in part and affirmed in part.
     Katie Curtis, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
     Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Avedis Koutoujian, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
     Janette Freeman Cochran, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for respondent minor M.V.

        _________________________________________

      Mother, B.R., appeals from a detriment finding made
at an adjudication hearing, where the court ordered that
Mother was to have no visitation with her daughter, M.V.
After the appeal was filed, the juvenile court vacated the no
visitation order and entered an order giving Father, J.V.,
sole physical custody, Mother monitored visits, and
terminating jurisdiction (the exit order). Mother separately
appealed the exit order, and we consolidated the appeals.
Because there is no relief this court can provide, we dismiss
the appeal of the no visitation order as moot, and we decline
to exercise our discretion to consider the appeal as to that
order. In addition, Mother has forfeited any challenges as
to, and provides no basis for reversing, the court’s exit order,
including its custody and visitation terms, and thus, we
affirm the order.

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    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A.    The No Visitation Order Between Mother and
      M.V.
      M.V. came to the attention of the Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services (the
Department) in March 2021 after Mother’s boyfriend (not
Father) called 911 stating that Mother was behaving
“radically” and attempting to drive off with M.V. It was
reported that Mother had been depressed the past few days,
and her boyfriend said that he refused to let Mother leave
with M.V. because when Mother gets upset, she “rams
(things) with her vehicle . . . .” A few days later, law
enforcement was contacted regarding Mother jumping out of
a vehicle and getting into an unknown vehicle. It was stated
that Mother suffers from either bipolar disorder or
schizophrenia and was not taking medication.
      Following the Department’s initial investigation, the
juvenile court issued an authorization in May 2021 for the
Department to remove M.V. from Mother and place M.V.
with Father. The Department filed a petition under Welfare
and Institutions Code section 300,1 subdivision (b)(1), and at
the detention hearing, the court made a prima facie finding
that M.V. was a person described by section 300. M.V.
remained released to Father. Additionally, the court ordered
monitored visitation for Mother with M.V.

1      All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.

                                   3
      At the adjudication hearing on July 7, 2021, the court
sustained an amended petition. M.V. was declared a
dependent of the court, removed from Mother, and released
to the home of Father. The court ordered family
maintenance services for Father and family enhancement
services for Mother. Furthermore, at M.V.’s counsel’s
request, the court made a detriment finding and ordered no
visitation between M.V. and Mother. The court indicated
that Mother was improperly discussing case issues with
M.V. and acting in a bizarre manner displaying that her
mental health needed to be treated, in addition to having
unresolved alcohol issues. A section 364 hearing was then
set for January 5, 2022.
      Mother timely appealed the no visitation order. In lieu
of a respondent’s brief, the Department submitted a letter
providing that while Mother’s appeal was pending, the
juvenile court vacated the detriment finding as to Mother
and entered the exit order giving Mother monitored
visitation and terminating jurisdiction. The Department
filed a Request for Judicial Notice as to these post-appeal
orders, which was granted. The Department concurrently
filed a motion to dismiss Mother’s appeal of the detriment
finding and no visitation order, arguing the exit order
rendered the appeal moot.

B.   The Exit Order
     At the January 5, 2022, section 364 hearing, the
juvenile court vacated the detriment finding as to Mother’s

                              4
visits with M.V. and ordered monitored visitation for
Mother. The hearing was continued to February 4, 2022, at
Mother’s request, so that she could contest the Department’s
then recommendation for an exit order giving Father sole
physical and legal custody with no visitation for Mother.
Following the hearing, the Department indicated in a new
report that it would be beneficial for Mother and M.V. to
have visits, so the Department then recommended that
jurisdiction be terminated with an order giving joint legal
custody to Mother and Father, sole physical custody to
Father, and monitored visitation for Mother.
      At the February 4, 2022, hearing, Mother withdrew her
opposition and submitted on the new recommendation. On
February 9, 2022, the court entered the final juvenile
custody order in accordance with the terms in the
Department’s new recommendation. The exit order states
the reason for monitored visitation for Mother is that she did
not make substantial progress in court-ordered programs for
substance abuse treatment and counseling to address her
mental health, including whether medication was required
for such. Mother appealed the exit order, which was
consolidated with Mother’s appeal from the no visitation
order.

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                          DISCUSSION
A.    Mother’s Appeal from the No Visitation Order is
      Moot
      Mother argues her appeal as to the juvenile court’s no
visitation order is not moot because the finding creates the
possibility of prejudice in subsequent family law
proceedings. We disagree.
      “A court is tasked with the duty ‘“to decide actual
controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect,
and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract
propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which
cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.”’”
(In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276, quoting Consolidated
etc. Corp. v. United A. etc. Workers (1946) 27 Cal.2d 859,
863.) “A case becomes moot when events ‘“render[ ] it
impossible for [a] court, if it should decide the case in favor
of plaintiff, to grant him any effect[ive] relief.”’ [Citation.]
For relief to be ‘effective,’ two requirements must be met.
First, the plaintiff must complain of an ongoing harm.
Second, the harm must be redressable or capable of being
rectified by the outcome the plaintiff seeks. [Citation.]”
(In re D.P., supra, at p. 276.) In a dependency case, “relief is
effective when it ‘can have a practical, tangible impact on the
parties’ conduct or legal status.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 277.)
      Depending on the circumstances, an order terminating
juvenile court jurisdiction can render an appeal from a
previous order in a dependency proceeding moot. (In re
Rashad D. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 156, 163.) “However,

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dismissal of a dependency appeal for mootness following
termination of jurisdiction ‘is not automatic, but “must be
decided on a case-by-case basis.”’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.; see also
In re S.G. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 654, 663–664 [“The
termination of juvenile court jurisdiction does not
categorically prevent a reviewing court from granting
effective relief in all cases”].)
      In this case, we can grant no effective relief. Mother
seeks to reverse the juvenile court’s no visitation order.
However, the court has vacated the detriment finding as to
Mother’s visits with M.V., terminated its jurisdiction, and
given Mother monitored visits. Mother’s concern that future
family law proceedings may be impacted by the finding is
speculative, which is insufficient to avoid mootness. (In re
D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 278.)
      As to Mother’s assertion that she appealed from the
exit order so that her requested relief could be granted,
Mother submitted on the exit order without objection.
Mother, thus, forfeited any challenges to the that order. (See
In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 [a reviewing court
ordinarily will not consider an issue not raised below],
superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in In re
S.J. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 953, 961–962; see also In re
Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 222 [forfeiture
“applies in juvenile dependency litigation and is intended to
prevent a party from standing by silently until the
conclusion of the proceedings”].) Additionally, Mother does
not challenge the merits of the exit order in her appeal, and

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she does not cite any authority holding that a prior appeal
from a vacated detriment finding authorizes reversal of the
exit order. (See, e.g., Dabney v. Dabney (2002) 104
Cal.App.4th 379, 384 [“We need not consider an argument
for which no authority is furnished”]; Badie v. Bank of
America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784–785 [“When an
appellant . . . asserts [a point] but fails to support it with
reasoned argument and citations to authority, [we] treat the
point as waived”].) Accordingly, Mother’s appeal from the no
visitation order is moot.2 (See In re S.G., supra, 71
Cal.App.5th at pp. 666–667 [to effect an actual change in
visitation rights, appellate court would need to reverse the
exit order terminating jurisdiction]; see also In re Rashad D.,
supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 164 [juvenile court had no
jurisdiction to conduct further hearings, including
modification of its custody order, unless reviewing court also
reversed or vacated order terminating dependency].)

B.    Discretionary Review of the Moot Appeal is Not
      Warranted
      Mother further argues we should exercise our
discretion to reach the merits of Mother’s appeal of the no

2      Pursuant to section 302, subdivision (d), Mother may seek
modification of the final custody order in a proceeding under Family
Code section 3021 if she can demonstrate “there has been a significant
change of circumstances since the juvenile court issued the order and
modification of the order is in the best interests of the child.” (§ 302,
subd. (d).)

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visitation order. We conclude exercise of our discretionary
authority to consider the moot appeal is not warranted.
       “Even when a case is moot, courts may exercise their
‘inherent discretion’ to reach the merits of the dispute.
[Citation.]” (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 282.) “As a
rule, courts will generally exercise their discretion to review
a moot case when ‘the case presents an issue of broad public
interest that is likely to recur,’ ‘when there may be a
recurrence of the controversy between the parties,’ or ‘when
a material question remains for the court’s determination.’
[Citations.]” (Ibid.)
       As Mother asserts, the court in In re C.C., (2009) 172
Cal.App.4th 1481, 1488–1489, exercised its discretion to
consider a moot appeal from a no visitation order because it
sought to address the standard for issuing such an order, but
it also noted that the parent’s concern that the order might
possibly prejudice the parent in subsequent family law
proceedings was “highly speculative.” (See also In re D.P.,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 282.) In In re D.P., decided after In re
C.C., the Supreme Court provided a non-exhaustive list of
factors to be considered when deciding “whether a court
should exercise discretionary review of a moot appeal.”
(In re D.P., supra, at p. 286.) First, a court deciding whether
to exercise discretionary review may consider “whether the
challenged jurisdiction finding ‘could be prejudicial to the
appellant or could potentially impact the current or future
dependency proceedings,’ or ‘“could have other consequences
for [the appellant] beyond jurisdiction.”’” (Id. at p. 285.)

                               9
Second, the exercise of discretionary review “may also be
informed by whether the jurisdictional finding is based on
particularly pernicious or stigmatizing conduct.” (Id. at
pp. 285–286.) Third, a court may consider whether the case
became moot due to prompt compliance by parents with
their case plan. (Id. at p. 286.) “[N]o single factor is
necessarily dispositive of whether a court should exercise
discretionary review of a moot appeal.” (Ibid.)
      As to the first factor, Mother does not explain how the
vacated detriment finding would be prejudicial or potentially
impact future dependency proceedings, nor does she identify
any adverse consequences she could suffer. Furthermore,
Mother will be able to explain in any future family law
proceeding that the juvenile court vacated its detriment
finding, reflecting the judgment that Mother did not pose a
continuing risk of detriment to M.V. As to the second factor,
the challenged finding was based on Mother’s mental health
and alcohol issues. While these issues are serious, we do not
consider them so egregious as to merit review in this case.
(See In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 286.) Notably, in her
appeal from the exit order, Mother does not challenge the
finding that monitored visitation was appropriate because
Mother did not make substantial progress in court ordered
programs to address her mental health and alcohol issues.
As to the third factor, Mother does not contend that this is a
case that became moot due to prompt compliance with her
case plan.

                             10
      No other factor supports reaching the merits. Mother’s
appeal is fact-specific as to the findings against her, and she
does not argue that there may be a recurrence of the issues
between the parties or that a material question remains.
While Mother asserts that the case involves issues of broad
public interest because there are inconsistencies in the law
concerning the making and reviewing of detriment findings
sufficient to suspend visits, Mother also submits that it is
not necessary to clarify the law in order to decide her appeal.
Further, Mother did not sufficiently brief these issues or
support them with argument. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.204, subd. (a)(1)(B); see also Badie v. Bank of America,
supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at 784–785.)

C.    Mother Provides No Basis for Reversing the Exit
      Order
      To the extent Mother seeks reversal of the exit order,
as stated above, Mother has forfeited any claims that the
order was erroneous. Mother neither argues that the exit
order was not in M.V.’s best interest, nor that the juvenile
court abused its discretion by awarding sole physical custody
to Father and giving Mother monitored visitation. (See In re
John W. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 961, 965 [when making an
exit order “it is the best interests of the child, in the context
of the peculiar facts of the case before the court, which are
paramount”]; see also In re C.W. (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 835,
863 [juvenile court’s decision to terminate jurisdiction and

                               11
issue accompanying exit order reviewed for abuse of
discretion].)

                       DISPOSITION
      The portion of the appeal challenging the no visitation
order is dismissed as moot. The portion of the appeal
challenging the exit order is affirmed.
 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                    Mori, J.
We concur:

CURREY, P. J.

ZUKIN, J.

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