Court Opinion

ID: 9773031
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:35:23.225487+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:49.771888
License: Public Domain

Zimmery Crutcher, Jr., Special Justice. Glenn Lloyd Wilson, appellant, was charged with Battery in the First Degree for causing serious physical injury to Lloyd Stewart on or about June 24, 1984, by means of a deadly weapon or under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life, in violation of Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1601. The case came on for trial on February 25, 1985, before a jury duly impaneled, and after opening statements, the State called the prosecuting witness as its first witness. On cross-examination, appellant’s attorney asked about a $1,000,000 civil suit which the prosecuting witness had filed against appellant arising from the alleged battery. The attorney implied by one of his questions that, had appellant paid the prosecuting witness $ 18,000, the criminal charges would have been dismissed. Before this question was answered, the prosecuting attorney objected and asked for a mistrial. A mistrial was declared over appellant’s objection and the jury was discharged. The trial court set the case for retrial on the following morning, February 26, 1985, and ordered a new jury called to which the appellant objected on the basis of double jeopardy. Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal alleging for reversal that the trial court erred in granting a mistrial and in denying appellant’s motion to dismiss on the ground of double jeopardy.  We agree with the appellant that the trial court erred in granting a mistrial. The trial judge has considerable discretion in determining the scope of cross-examination. Rule 403 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence states: Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Also, Rule 408 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence states: Evidence of (1) furnishing, offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting, offering, or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount is not admissible to prove liability for, invalidity of, or amount of the claim or any other claim. Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations is likewise not admissible. This rule does not require exclusion if the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution. However, this court has consistently taken a broad view of the right of an accused in a criminal prosecution to be confronted with the witnesses against him. Simpson v. State, 274 Ark. 188, 623 S.W.2d 200 (1981). Cross-examination can serve asameans to test the truth of the witness’s direct testimony and the witness’s credibility. A broad view of cross-examination is especially important where it might reveal bias on the part of a key witness. Klimas v. State, 259 Ark. 301, 534 S.W.2d 202 (1976); Haight v. State, 259 Ark. 478, 533 S.W.2d 510 (1976). Here, if the cross-examination had been allowed, the jury would have been informed that the prosecuting witness may have been biased due to a financial interest. On the other hand, the jury may have thought that the civil complaint and damages sought were well founded and that the evidence supported the prosecuting witness’s testimony. Boreck v. State, 277 Ark. 72, 639 S.W.2d 352 (1982). The sequence of questions on cross-examination of the prosecutor’s chief witness by appellant was as follows: MR. CUMMINGS: Did you get a lawyer and sue Mr. Wilson? MR. STEWART: Yes. MR. CUMMINGS: Have you gone over the facts and your testimony with your lawyer? OBJECTION (PROSECUTING ATTORNEY): Now, Judge, I am going to object again. I don’t think that has any relevance, not that civil suit, to this criminal action. THE COURT: Not what he has gone over with an attorney not a party to this action. That would not be admissible. MR. CUMMINGS: You have a definite financial interest in the outcome of this case, don’t you, Mr. Stewart? MR. STEWART: Well, not financial, I want justice done. MR. CUMMINGS: Uh huh. As a matter of fact, if Mr. Wilson had had $18,000.00 to pay you, we wouldn’t be here today, would we?  This court has always held that pecuniary interest, personal affection or hostility, a quarrel or prejudice may always be shown to discredit a witness. Wright v. State, 133 Ark. 16, 201 S.W. 1107 (1918).  Therefore, the trial court was in error in granting a mistrial. The appellant’s second point of contention is that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to dismiss the charges on the ground of double jeopardy. Article 2, Section 8 of the Arkansas Constitution says, “. . . and no person, for the same offense, shall be twice put in jeopardy of life or liberty.”  When the jury is finally sworn to try the case, jeopardy has attached to the accused and when, without the consent of the defendant, expressed or implied, the jury is discharged before the case is completed, then the constitutional right against double jeopardy may be invoked, except in cases of “overruling necessity” Jones v. Ark., 230 Ark. 18, 320 S.W.2d 645 (1959). We have found overruling necessity in cases where the defense counsel was intoxicated or a juror was ill. See Franklin and Reid v. State, 251 Ark. 233, 471 S.W.2d 760 (1971) and Atkins v. State, 16 Ark. 568 (1855). We find no such overruling necessity here. Therefore, since a mistrial was improperly granted and jeopardy has attached, the appellant cannot be retried. Reversed and dismissed. Purtle, J., not participating. Newbern, J., concurs. Holt, C.J., dissents. Hays, J., dissents.