Court Opinion

ID: 9477318
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:19:55.046893+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:48.590345
License: Public Domain

GRAY, District Judge,
dissenting:
In Chase Manhattan Bank v. Gems-By-Gordon, Inc., 649 F.2d 710, 712 (9th Cir.1981), this court said:
“We will generally defer to interpretations of Guam law adopted by the United States District Court for the District of Guam, Appellate Division. Determinations of Guam law by that court will be affirmed on appeal if they are based upon a tenable theory and are not manifestly erroneous.”
No adherence to such a statement of policy can be discerned in the majority opinion, and I accordingly register my respectful dissent.
In the first place, the issues presented in this litigation were basically factual. The majority believes that the evidence presented did not justify the recovery awarded to the plaintiff, and the “Discussion” section of the opinion contains a superb analysis of the facts from the standpoint of the defendant. However, the trial court, in its denial of a defense summary judgment motion, the jury, in its verdict, and the United States District Court for the District of Guam, in its opinion of affirmance, all concluded that there was “another side to the coin” and that the evidence justified a judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
Based upon my own examination of the record, I am convinced that a reasonable jury could have concluded that:
(a) Morta’s comparatively limited education was a disadvantage to him in his dealings with the much more sophisticated and experienced Santa Maria, and that the latter took undue advantage of this circumstance.
(b) The recent nature of Morta’s personal injuries and the serious illness that they later and suddenly precipitated may have been indicative of a reduced physical condition and competence at the time the release was signed.
(c) Santa Maria knew that Morta was in immediate need of settlement money and was in no position to challenge whatever proposal that KIC might offer.
(d) Santa Maria did not encourage Morta to read the proposed release or otherwise cause him to understand that it provided for a waiver of liability for any injuries that might later develop from the accident.
(e) When Morta went to an attorney, he had not read the proposed release, nor had he obtained a copy from Santa Maria. The conversation with the attorney did not in any manner alert Morta to the consequences of a release.
(f) When Morta returned to Santa Maria’s office, he signed the four papers that were put before him, including the release, without having read them, in order that he might get his much needed $900, and without any awareness of the extent of the release.
Under such circumstances, I believe that a reasonable jury readily could have concluded that Santa Maria’s conduct was objectionable enough to excuse the plaintiff from his failure to read and understand the release that he signed and the waiver that it contained.
There is a further reason why I believe that the decision below must be affirmed. Section 1542 of the Civil Code of Guam (which is quoted at page 1458 of the majority opinion) was taken word for word from Section 1542 of the California Civil Code. In the California Supreme Court case of Casey v. Proctor, 59 Cal.2d 97, 109, 28 Cal.Rptr. 307, 314, 378 P.2d 579, 586 (1963), Justice Peters, in writing the carefully reasoned opinion of the court, ruled that:
“It therefore appears beyond reasonable doubt that Civil Code, section 1542 was intended by its drafters to preclude the application of a release to unknown claims in the absence of a showing, apart from the words of the release of an intent to include such claims.
* * * # * *
This interpretation of section 1542 does not prevent all settlements for unknown claims_ Rather, its purpose was to prevent the mere recital in the release to that effect from barring a claim for inju*1462ries later discovered in the absence of a showing of a conscious understanding that if injuries were suffered which had not yet manifested themselves, they too would be discharged by the release.” (Emphasis supplied.)
In the present case, there is no evidence whatever, “apart from the words of the release”, that would indicate that Morta knowingly intended to give up his right to recover for unknown claims. Thus, under the rule in Casey, his failure to have insisted upon reading the release and understanding its implications did not ipso facto prevent such recovery. As the majority opinion points out, the Casey decision specifically overruled Berry v. Struble, 20 Cal.App.2d 299, 66 P.2d 746 (1st Dist.1937) and the line of cases that followed it, which had ruled that, in the absence of fraud or duress, a release specifically waiving the right to pursue unknown claims is valid and enforceable.
My colleagues on this panel do not like the rule laid down by Casey, and the majority opinion sets forth at length the reasons for their belief that “by relying on the agreement of the parties rather than extrinsic evidence, Berry provides the far better rule of law.” However, Casey is the law in California, is accordingly persuasive in Guam, Roberto v. Aguon, 519 F.2d 754 (9th Cir.1975), and was cited in this case by the United States District Court for the District of Guam in the opinion affirming the decision of the trial court. It therefore seems to me that our philosophical views concerning the wisdom or lack of wisdom in the doctrine that it announced are of little importance. Certainly, the decision below “[is] based upon a tenable theory and [is] not manifestly erroneous.” See Chase Manhattan Bank v. Gems-By-Gordon, Inc., 649 F.2d 710, 712 (9th Cir.1981).
Accordingly, I would affirm the decision of the United States District Court for the District of Guam.