Court Opinion

ID: 9846794
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:48:34.753053+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:50.016314
License: Public Domain

McFADDEN, Justice
(dissenting) :
The rationale of the majority opinion is that the statutes involved, I.C. § 72-316 and I.C. § 72-405 must be considered in pari materia, and hence the latter provision, which states:
“Want of notice or delay in giving notice shall not be a bar to proceedings under this act if it be shown that the employer, his agent or representative, had knowledge of the accident, or that the employer has not been prejudiced by such delay or want of notice.”
modifies the provisions of I.C. § 72-316(4) which requires:
“That the hernia was reported to the employer within thirty days after the accident.”
Before the pari materia rule of statutory construction can be applied, it must first be found that the statute is ambiguous. 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 5201, at 529 (3d ed. 1943).
“Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, there is no occasion for construction, * * *. An unambiguous statute must be given effect according to its plain and obvious meaning, * * 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 322b (2), at 577, 583 (1953).
The fundamental rule of construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent as expressed in the statute. Gallafent v. Tucker, 48 Idaho 240, 281 P. 375 (1929); Empire Copper Co. v. Henderson, 15 Idaho 635, 99 P. 127 (1908).
“This court is committed to the rule that legislative intent is the main lodestar of construction. Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Shoshone County, 63 Idaho 36, 40, 116 P.2d 221, and cases there cited.” Willard v. First Security Bank of Idaho, 69 Idaho 265, 269, 206 P.2d 770, 773 (1949).
I.C. § 72-316 is a statute which deals specifically with cases of hernia resulting from injury by accident. It requires that the following items be proved:
“1. That it was an injury by accident resulting in hernia.
2. That the hernia appeared suddenly and immediately following the accident.
3. That the hernia did not exist in any degree prior to the injury by accident for which compensation is claimed.
4. That the hernia was reported to the employer within thirty days after the accident.”
*93This statute is explicit in its terms. It is unambiguous and the legislative intent is clear to require proof of these four items for recovery for hernia resulting from injury by accident.
It is my conclusion that the legislative intent expressed by I.C. § 72-405 also is clear and unambiguous. It establishes the standards for the notice mentioned in I.C. § 72-402, and states that “Want of notice or delay in giving notice shall not be a bar to proceedings under this act if it be shown that the employer, his agent or representative, had knowledge of the accident, or that the employer has not been prejudiced by such delay or want of notice.” The “want of notice or delay in giving notice” mentioned in this last sentence can only have reference to the notice previously discussed, i. e., notice given pursuant to I.C. § 72-402. Nowhere does I.C. § 72-405 discuss elements of proof for recovery as does I.C. § 72-316.
I.C. § 72-316 deals with the special cases involving hernia, which is recognized as being unique in medical annals and is specially treated by the statute. See dissenting opinion of Taylor, J., in In re Hillhouse’s Estate, 46 Idaho 730, 271 P. 459 (1928). I.C. § 72-405 deals with the general subject of the sufficiency of notice required under the provisions of I.C. § 72-402 which in turn deals with the prerequisites for “proceedings under this act for compensation for any injury.”
“The rule is where there is one statute dealing with one subject in general and comprehensive terms, and another dealing with the same subject in a more minute and definite way, the two should be read together and harmonized, if possible, with a view to giving effect to a consistent legislative policy, but to the extent of any necessary repugnancy between them, the special will prevail over the general statute.” Oregon, etc., R.R. Co. v. Minidoka Co. S. Dist., 28 Idaho 214, 218, 153 P. 424, 425 (1915).
“A particular statute, however, will prevail over a general one in case of necessary conflict.” State v. Jones, 34 Idaho-83, 86, 199 P. 645 (1921).
“Where two acts deal with a common subject-matter, the one which deals with it in the more minute and particular way will prevail, (citations omitted.) If two-acts dealing with a common subject-matter are necessarily inconsistent, the latter statute is deemed to impliedly repeal the earlier.” Herrick v. Gallet, 35 Idaho 13, 20, 204 P. 477, 479 (1922).
“ ‘Where two acts deal with a common subject-matter, the one which deals with it in the more minute and particular way will prevail/ ” State v. Taylor, 58 Idaho 656, 667, 78 P.2d 125, 130 (1938).
“Where there is a general statute, and a special or specific statute, dealing with the same subject, the provisions of the special or specific statute will control those of the general statute, (citations omitted.)” State v. Roderick, 85 Idaho 80, 84, 375 P.2d 1005, 1007 (1962).
This same rule is discussed in 50 Am.Jur. Statutes § 367, at 371 (1944), in the following terms:
“It is an old and familiar principle closely related to the rule that where an act contains special provisions they must be read as exceptions to a general provision in a separate earlier or subsequent act, [Sec. 561, infra] that where there is in the same statute a specific provision, and also a general one which in its most comprehensive sense would include matters embraced in the former, the particular provisions must control, and the general provision must be taken to affect only such cases within its general language as are not within the provisions of the particular provision.”
50 Am.Jur. Statutes § 561 (1944), mentioned above, states:
“ * * * As a general rule, however, general or broad statutory provisions do *94not control, modify, limit, affect, or interfere with special or specific provisions. To the contrary, to the extent of any irreconcilable conflict, the special or specific provision modifies, qualifies, limits, restricts, excludes, supersedes, controls, and prevails over the general or broad provision, which accordingly must yield to the special or specific provision, and operate only upon such cases and are not included therein. The special or specific act and the general or broad law stand together, the one as the law of a particular case, and the other as the general rule.”
82 C.J.S. Statutes § 347b (1953), summarizes the various cases as follows:
“Unless a legislative intention to the contrary clearly appears, special or particular provisions control over general provisions, terms, or expressions.”
The legislature has clearly expressed its intention that the special statute (I.C. § 72-316) dealing specifically with hernia, should control in hernia cases, as against the statute dealing generally with industrial accidents. Even though as appellants contend, the Workman’s Compensation Act should be liberally construed with a view to effect its objects and promote justice, it is my conclusion that this does not present justification for this court to override the express legislative enactment. Thus, the order of the board should be affirmed.