Court Opinion

ID: 1087734
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-10-30 02:31:08.035241+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:25.215227
License: Public Domain

102 U.S. 256 (____)
PEOPLE'S BANK
v.
CALHOUN.
Supreme Court of United States.

*259 Mr. Charles W. Thomas for the plaintiff in error.
Mr. Benjamin H. Bristow and Mr. William S. Opdyke for the defendants in error.
*260 MR. JUSTICE MILLER, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.
It has long been the established doctrine of this court that no such exceptions as those taken in this case to the judgment of the court on the facts submitted to it can be inquired of here, under the provisions of the act providing for the mode and the effect of submitting cases triable by jury to the court alone.
There are, however, one or two exceptions to the admission of evidence on the trial which can be and have been assigned for error. A still more important question is raised by the record outside the bill of exceptions, which demands our attention. It relates to the jurisdiction of the case in the United States court as supposed to be acquired by the removal proceedings in the State court, which were founded on the written consent of the bank and of Winslow and Wilson, who were the only parties to the suit.
It needs no citation of authorities to show that the mere consent of parties cannot confer upon a court of the United States *261 the jurisdiction to hear and decide a case. If this were once conceded, the Federal courts would become the common resort of persons who have no right, either under the Constitution or the laws of the United States, to litigate in those courts.
It is not necessary for us to decide whether a paper may not be drawn up and signed by the parties, which shows on its face that the case, either by reason of the citizenship of the parties or the subject-matter of the litigation, is properly cognizable in a Federal court, and that that court can, on their assent, take jurisdiction either by way of original proceeding or by removal from a State court.
No such case is presented by the agreement for removal found in this record. Nor does it anywhere appear in this record that the parties had the citizenship or the alienage which would authorize the Federal court to entertain jurisdiction of the case.
The record, however, shows that in October, 1874, prior to the beginning of the attachment suit, there was instituted in the Circuit Court of the United States a suit to foreclose a mortgage in which Calhoun and Opdyke, as trustees, were plaintiffs, and in which they procured the appointment of a receiver, who held possession of the railroad under the order of that court at the time the writ of attachment was levied. It is further shown that they made application to the court sitting in chancery to enjoin the bank from proceeding in the State court with its attachment. No disposition seems to have been made of this application, and it is a reasonable inference that the removal of the attachment suit from the State court into the court which had possession by its officer of the property attached was made to avoid the conflict which might have arisen if the cases had proceeded to final judgment in courts of different jurisdictions.
We think this was not only permissible, but that it was the proper course to be pursued in such case. The jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of the United States does not here depend on the citizenship of the parties, but on the subject-matter of the litigation. That was in the actual possession of that court when the State court attempted to levy its writ of attachment on the property. It was for the court having such possession *262 to determine how far it would permit any other court to interfere with that possession, and what effect it would give to the attempt of another court to seize the property so under its control. A court of equity may punish for a contempt of its authority persons who bring suits against corporations whose property is in the hands of its receiver, and it is the constant practice to ask its permission to institute suits against him when they concern such property.
The bank was attempting in the State court to enforce by judicial sale a rival and conflicting lien to that of Calhoun and Opdyke, who were proceeding in the Federal court to sell the same property under their lien. The latter court had not only obtained jurisdiction of the question of lien prior to the initiation of the bank's suit, but it had taken possession of the property by its receiver. It had thus drawn to itself the subject-matter of the litigation and the right to decide upon the conflicting claims to the possession and control of the road.
These principles are not new in this court. They will be found to be sustained by Minnesota Company v. St. Paul Company, 2 Wall. 609; Watson v. Jones, 13 id. 679; Buck v. Colbath, 3 id. 334; and Freeman v. Howe, 24 How. 450.
In consenting, therefore, to the voluntary transfer of the litigation from the State court into the Federal court, the parties did no more than what they could have been compelled to do by the injunction of the latter, and what would have been done by such compulsory order if they had not submitted to it by agreement. We do not think that there was error in the court entertaining jurisdiction of the plea of interpleader of Calhoun and Opdyke. Wiswall v. Sampson, 14 How. 52.
In the progress of the trial the intervenors offered in evidence a deed of trust made by Winslow and Wilson on the fourth day of January, 1876, conveying the railroad in question to Calhoun and Opdyke. Exception was taken to the admission of this deed because the certificate of acknowledgment did not state that the grantors were personally known to the officer taking it, and because the deed did not tend to prove the issue made.
As one of the certificates does state that Wilson and his *263 wife were personally known to the officer, the objection to its admissibility as to these grantors was clearly unfounded in fact. The effect of the deed was for the court to consider afterwards.
As the deed professed to convey the property in controversy by the parties against whom the attachment ran, two months before the writ was issued, it is impossible to hold it to be irrelevant to an issue as to the ownership of the property at the date of the levy of the writ.
Similar objections were made to a deed made by the same grantors to the St. Louis and Southeastern Railway Company, of the fifth day of January, 1876, to which the same answers apply.
What effect should be given to the fact that these deeds were not recorded until after the levy of the bank's attachment we need not inquire, for that proposition does not go to their admissibility in evidence, and its decision depends upon other matters, both of law and evidence, as to which no question is raised by this record.
These are all the assignments of error requiring notice at our hands, and in these we find none.
Judgment affirmed.