Court Opinion

ID: 9606170
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:47:59.843114+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:33.778621
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE SHEA
concurring.
I concur in the decision affirming the conviction. As to the scope of the search warrant, the defendant objected only to the seizure of the license plates. Moreover, under the case relied on by the majority, the license plates and letter were properly seized. I stress, however, that if the issue had been raised concerning the right of privacy, it could well be that seizure of the items beyond those described in the search warrant, would have violated defendant’s right of privacy under the 1972 Mont.Const., Art. II, § 10.
Applying the standards of search and seizure without regard to a consideration of the right of privacy, it does appear that the seizures here fell within the ambit of Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden (1967), 387 U.S. 294, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.E.2d 782; and State v. Quigg (1970). 155 Mont. 119, 467 P.2d 692; and State v. Meidinger (1972), 160 Mont. 310, 318, 502 P.2d 58. I stress, however, that Warden need not apply to searches and seizures under state law if this Court sees fit to adopt a more strict standard in construing our own Constitution. Moreover, both Quigg and Meidinger were decided before our new “righty of privacy” provision went into effect under the 1972 Constitution.
The “right of privacy” is not preserved, if, under the authority of a search warrant, a law officer seizes items beyond.those particularly described in the search warrant. Before explaining my reasons, I must first mention the state of the record in this appeal. The application for search warrant and the search warrant were not forwarded to this Court. I am at a loss to understand why the parties did not see to it that this Court had these documents. For this reason, I must take some liberty with what I think these documents would reveal if they were part of the record.
For purposes of my discussion, I assume that the application for *45search warrant and search warrant were worded in the customary fashion as to the scope of the permitted search. Since Hayden, and then Quigg and Meidinger, the customary practice is for the search warrant to contain, in addition to an order permitting the search for and seizure of the items particularly described in the search warrant, an additional order which permits the search for and seizure of such items which fall into the category of “any other contraband”, “fruits or instrumentalities of the crime”, and “any additional evidence that may tend to connect the defendant to the commission of the crime.” A particular search warrant may not contain all of this language, but typically there is some variation of it which appears in most warrants. Undoubtedly, the inclusion of this language in search warrants has been spawned by Hayden and its progeny.
Such language in a search warrant creates an automatic expansion of the search warrant from a search for particular items described in the search warrant to a more general search. A right is given, indeed, an order is given, for the law officers to seize nondescribed evidence which they deem to be somehow connected to the crime. The result is that judicial approval is obtained to conduct a general exploratory search under the literal language of the search warrant itself. Practically speaking, the effect is that more often than not, evidence is seized which has not been described in the search warrant. The searches are invariably broader than if the search was confined to the items described in the search warrant. Should the scope of the search later be called into question, the officers merely fall back on the language of the warrant itself which created the authority for them to search for more than the items described. In effect, a permissive seizure made in good faith under the authority of Hayden and Quigg, is converted by law enforcement and the issuing courts, into a command to seize more evidence than that particularly described in the search warrant. General exploratory searches, call them by whatever other name you will, are the inevitable result.
Practically speaking, the case is rare when a seizure beyond those *46items described in the search warrant, is dictated by the exigencies of the situation. In the present case, for example, the State could easily have secured the premises and reapplied for a search warrant authorizing them to seize the license plates and the mail addressed to the defendant. Here, both the defendant and the woman were arrested practically on the spot. There was, therefore, no danger that additional evidence would disappear before it could be seized pursuant to another properly issued search warrant. Indeed, in most cases, the additional evidence can be seized by simply securing the premises and applying for another search warrant.
My reason, however, for not permitting additional seizure language in a search warrant is not confined to my belief that such language serves as an incitement to convert a specific search into a general exploratory search. An additional reason is that if the right of privacy under Montana’s constitution is to have any meaning at all within the contest of a search and seizure, the balance is clearly tipped in favor of prohibiting the inclusion of such seizure language in a search warrant. To go beyond seizures of those items particularly described in the search warrant, I believe the State must demonstrate a “compelling state interest” (1972) Mont. Const., Art. II, § 10), and this the State cannot do.
If evidence is seized without probable cause, whether it is described in the search warrant, or seized as “mere evidence”, it is true that the evidence cannot be used. The quote from Hayden in the majority opinion indicates that the United States Supreme Court believes that the probable cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment are sufficient to protect the right to privacy, even when the search is for “mere evidence.” But there is no specific provision of the United States Constitution which explicitly guarantees the right to privacy. In this State, on the other hand, 1972 Mont. Const., Art. II, § 10, expressly guarantees the “right of privacy” which can be overcome only by the showing of a “compelling state interest.” The function of the search warrant has been served when, upon probable cause, the items specifically described in the search warrant are seized, or when the search has been un*47dertaken for the specific items, but has produced no tangible results.
In this State, if evidence is seized in violation of one’s right of privacy, it cannot be used. But the “right of privacy” provision does not exist solely to prevent the use of evidence seized in violation of that right. It exists also as a preventative measure, to assure (or help assure) that the right of privacy will not be violated in the first instance. If it is to serve this function in the context of searches and seizures, there clearly is no “compelling state interest” to seize evidence other than what is particularly described in the search warrant. But if there is such a seizure, the right of privacy protection guaranteed by 1972 Mont.Const. Art. II, § 10, should stand as a bar to use of the evidence.