Court Opinion

ID: 9914515
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-02 15:11:42.756896+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:13:19.830775
License: Public Domain

Vermont Superior Court
                                                                                                    Filed 11 o 2
                                                                                                  Washingténgnﬁ

 VERMONT SUPERIOR COURT                            ”a"?
                                                            1
                                                           \4                    CIVIL DIVISION
 Washington Unit                                                            Case No. 21-CV-03976
 65 State Street
 Montpelier VT 05602
 802—828—2091
 WWWNerrnontiudiciarvorg

                       Human Rights Defense Center V. Centurion of Vermont LLC

                O inion and Order On Cross-Motions For Summar           Jud ment

        Defendant Centurion of Vermont LLC held the contract with the Vermont

Department of Corrections (DOC) to provide medical, dental and mental health care to

Vermont prisoners between 2015 and 2020. In 2021, Plaintiff Human Rights Defense

Center (HRDC) requested, pursuant to Vermont’s Public Records Act (PRA), that

Centurion produce copies of certain records related to any legal claims against it that

resulted in expenditures by it of $1,000 or more.

        Speciﬁcally, HRDC sought records relating to “claims or lawsuits [from 2015 to

present] brought against” Centurion or any of its employees or agents leading t0

payments of $1,000 or more by Centurion or its insurer, including “settlements, damages,

attorney fee awards, and sanctions.” The speciﬁc documents sought are those relating to

such claims and that include:

        othe names of the parties;
        othe “case or claim number”;
        othe court in which the case or claim was brought;
        othe date of resolution;
        othe payments made and to whom;
        othe complaint or claim form; and
        othe “verdict form, ﬁnal judgment, settlement agreement, consent decree, or other
        paper that resolved the case.1

1Literally, the request broadly seeks “[r]ecords sufﬁcient to show” the bulleted list of
information. The request also is not expressly limited to claims asserted by patient—
prisoners. At argument, the Court invited HRDC to clarify the scope of its request in a
Order                                                                            Page 1 of 15
21—CV—03976 Human Rights Defense Center v. Centurion of Vermont LLC
        Centurion responded by denying that it is subject to the PRA and has produced no

responsive records. This litigation ensued.

        The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment addressing several

legal issues: (1) whether Centurion is subject to the PRA; (2) whether the requested

records are public records for purposes of the PRA; and (3) if Centurion and the records

are subject to the PRA, whether the records are exempt from production under the

exemption for documents that are confidential “by law,” 1 V.S.A. § 317(c)(1), or the

exemption for “personal documents,” 1 V.S.A. § 317(c)(7).2

        I.      Procedural Standard

     Summary judgment procedure is “an integral part of the . . . Rules as a whole, which

are designed ‘to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every

action.’” Morrisseau v. Fayette, 164 Vt. 358, 363 (1995) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986)). Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence in the

record, referred to in the statements required by Vt. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1), shows that there

is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law. Vt. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Gallipo v. City of Rutland, 163 Vt. 83, 86 (1994)

(summary judgment will be granted if, after adequate time for discovery, a party fails to

make a showing sufficient to establish an essential element of the case on which the

party will bear the burden of proof at trial). The Court derives the undisputed facts from

post-hearing memorandum. That memorandum includes more argument but does not
address the intended scope of the request.

2 The motions focus on these broad legal issues rather than whether any particular

record should be produced in whole or in part, though Centurion suggests that if the
Court might order any records produced then it should first review them all in camera.
Order                                                                      Page 2 of 15
21-CV-03976 Human Rights Defense Center v. Centurion of Vermont LLC
the parties’ statements of fact and the supporting documents. Boulton v. CLD

Consulting Engineers, Inc., 2003 VT 72, ¶ 29, 175 Vt. 413, 427. A party opposing

summary judgment may not simply rely on allegations in the pleadings to establish a

genuine issue of material fact. Instead, it must come forward with deposition excerpts,

affidavits, or other evidence to establish such a dispute. Murray v. White, 155 Vt. 621,

628 (1991). Speculation is insufficient. Palmer v. Furlan, 2019 VT 42, ¶ 10, 210 Vt. 375,

380. Where, as here, there are cross-motions for summary judgment, the parties

opposing summary judgment “are entitled to the benefit of all reasonable doubts and

inferences.” Montgomery v. Devoid, 2006 VT 127, ¶ 9, 181 Vt. 154, 156.

        As to the legal issues in the parties’ motions, there is no dispute of fact.

        II.     Whether Centurion is Subject to the PRA

        The parties disagree as to whether Centurion is subject to the PRA at all. HRDC

argues that the issue is controlled by Hum. Rts. Def. Ctr. v. Correct Care Sols., LLC, 2021

VT 63, 215 Vt. 362 (concluding that the contractor preceding Centurion was an

“instrumentality” of the State and thus subject to the PRA). Centurion does not argue

that it is distinct in some material way from Correct Care that would indicate that it

should not be subject to the PRA as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Correct Care.

Instead, it argues that Correct Care was poorly decided, that it did not consider the

incongruities that would be created by applying the PRA to private entities, and that this

Court should not follow it.

        Correct Care controls this case. There, Wellpath (later known as Correct Care)

had the contract with DOC to provide health services to Vermont prisoners for the 5-year

term immediately preceding Centurion’s contract to provide the same services. HRDC

Order                                                                         Page 3 of 15
21-CV-03976 Human Rights Defense Center v. Centurion of Vermont LLC
submitted a request for public records to Wellpath under the PRA, and Wellpath

maintained that it was a private business not subject to the PRA. That was the issue

addressed by the Supreme Court. The Court’s resolution of that issue is crystal clear:

“we conclude that [Wellpath] was an ‘instrumentality’ of the DOC during the contract

period. Therefore, it was a ‘public agency’ as that term is defined in the PRA.” Id., 2021

VT 63, ¶ 13, 215 Vt. at 369 (citations omitted). There is no apparent distinction between

Centurion and Wellpath for purposes of this case, and Centurion does not claim one.

Under Correct Care, Centurion is an instrumentality of the State in undertaking its

contract with the DOC and is subject to the PRA on that basis.

        Nor can the Court conclude that the High Court was oblivious to the difficulties of

applying the PRA and some of its provisions to private companies. Wellpath made some

of those same points. In rejecting them, the Correct Care Court recognized that

“incongruencies or administrative difficulties may inhere as a result of the Act’s

application to instrumentalities like Wellpath.” 2021 VT 63, ¶ 22, 215 Vt. at 373–74. It

further noted that it is “for the Legislature to resolve such nuances.” Id.

        Centurion’s argument that Correct Care was wrongly decided may be presented to

the Supreme Court someday in hopes that it will reconsider that decision; but, this Court

is typically bound by the force of such a recent decision of our Supreme Court. See Eulitt

ex rel. Eulitt v. Maine, Dept. of Educ., 386 F.3d 344, 349 (1st Cir. 2004) (“Until a [higher]

court . . . revokes a binding precedent, a [lower] court . . . is hard put to ignore that

precedent unless it has unmistakably been cast into disrepute by supervening

authority.”), abrogation on other gds recognized by Carson as next friend of O. C. v.

Makin, 142 S.Ct. 1987 (2022).

Order                                                                         Page 4 of 15
21-CV-03976 Human Rights Defense Center v. Centurion of Vermont LLC
        III.    Whether the Requested Records are “Public Records” Under the PRA

        Even if subject to the PRA, Centurion argues that the requested records—all of

them—are its own private business records rather than public records for purposes of the

PRA. It maintains that the records were not acquired in the course of its contract with

DOC and that they cannot be considered “public records.” HRDC takes the opposite view

and argues that the requested records were created in connection with and arose out of

its provision of medical services for the DOC.

        The Correct Care decision addresses whether a contractor in Centurion’s

circumstances, whose principal role is to exercise a fundamental governmental function,

is a public agency under the PRA. It did not rule on whether the litigation records

sought in that case were public records. Instead, it remanded for the trial court to

determine whether the “requested documents were ‘public records’ within the meaning of

the PRA or whether any statutory exemption applied thereto.” Hum. Rts. Def. Ctr. v.

Correct Care Sols., LLC, 2021 VT 63, ¶ 23, 215 Vt. 362, 374. Court records reflect that,

on remand, Correct Care sought consent from the parties involved in the underlying

litigation to produce any requested records that had been designated confidential by

them, it eventually produced all records to HRDC’s satisfaction, and any other issues

were settled without Court involvement. The trial court never had to grapple with the

extent to which responsive records, in fact, were “public records” subject to production.

That question is presented now.

        In advancing its position, Centurion relies primarily on an administrative decision

of the Pennsylvania Office of Open Records (OOR), In re Palattella v. Erie County, No. AP

2022-0924, 2022 WL 2072872 (Pa. Off. Open Rec. June 6, 2022). In that case, the

Order                                                                     Page 5 of 15
21-CV-03976 Human Rights Defense Center v. Centurion of Vermont LLC
requester sought records in the possession of healthcare providers contracted to deliver

care to prisoners. The requested records were particular settlement agreements

resulting from lawsuits filed by prisoners against the contractors, presumably arising out

of care provided to the prisoners within the scope of the contractual arrangement.

        Under Pennsylvania law, as described by the OOR, the issue boiled down to

whether the records directly related to the contractors’ performance under their contracts

with the county. At that point in the decision, however, the analysis gets very thin. The

OOR appears to have held that the records did not directly relate to performance under

the contracts because the county had not been sued in the underlying cases, was not

directly involved in them, and thus did not participate in the decision to terminate the

litigation by compromise. The OOR does not further explain why a unilateral decision by

a contractor to settle a lawsuit renders records from that litigation not directly related to

performance under the contract when the lawsuit plainly arose out of the service the

contractor was contracted to provide. The Palattella decision is not persuasive, at least

as applied to Vermont’s PRA.

        Under the PRA, “public record” is broadly defined to mean “any written or

recorded information, regardless of physical form or characteristics, which is produced or

acquired in the course of public agency business.” 1 V.S.A. § 317(b); U.S. Right to Know

v. Univ. of Vermont, 2021 VT 33, ¶ 11, 214 Vt. 543, 548 (“The ‘determinative factor’ in the

definition of ‘public record’ is whether the document at issue is produced or acquired in

the course of [public] agency business.” (internal quotation and citation omitted)).

Centurion argues that all records requested in this case relate to litigation against it; its

contract with the State does not control how it handles such litigation; the State actually

Order                                                                       Page 6 of 15
21-CV-03976 Human Rights Defense Center v. Centurion of Vermont LLC
exercised no such control; and, thus, any records related to that litigation involved only

its private business interests and those decisions are unrelated to Vermont agency

business.

        The Court notes that it, and presumably HRDC, does not currently know what

responsive records Centurion possesses. The parties focus nearly all of their arguments

on settlement agreements, particularly settlement agreements designated confidential by

the settling parties. HRDC’s written request, however, is substantially broader than

that. See supra n.1. Moreover, in denying HRDC’s request, it does not appear that

Centurion produced an index of withheld records (none is in the record) as required by 1

V.S.A. § 318(b)(2), and it has not produced a Vaughn index of withheld materials in this

case, Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973); 33 Richard Murphy, Fed. Prac. &

Proc. Judicial Review § 8476 (2d ed.) (“FOIA litigation raises the procedural challenge of

finding a way for agencies to prove that documents should not be disclosed without

disclosing them to the requester as part of the litigation process. In response to this

problem, courts developed the Vaughn index.”).

        The U.S. Right to Know Court explained as follows:

               It is clear that by choosing the words “in the course of public agency
        business,” the Legislature sought to shed light on government business, not
        the personal endeavors of state employees. Thus, an essential factor in
        determining whether a given record is a public record is whether its content
        reflects government—as opposed to personal—business. In that analysis,
        we look to the Legislature’s description of public records for such
        considerations as whether the record contains information bearing on a
        government function, provides government officials with bases for making
        decisions, serves to ensure continuity with past government operations, or
        documents responsibilities of government actors. Other necessary factors to
        examine are the circumstances surrounding the record’s creation, for
        example, by whom, for whom, and for what purpose the record was created;
        the role the record played in the functioning of the agency; and the record’s
        location. Additional factors may become relevant in a given set of facts and
Order                                                                     Page 7 of 15
21-CV-03976 Human Rights Defense Center v. Centurion of Vermont LLC
        underlying the analysis is the Legislature’s instruction to construe the PRA
        liberally in favor of disclosure.

U.S. Right to Know v. Univ. of Vermont, 2021 VT 33, ¶ 17, 214 Vt. 543, 550–51.

        The current HRDC request is very broad. It would appear to cover claims

unrelated to the provision of services to DOC. While counsel for HRDC indicated at oral

argument that the intent of the request is more focused, the written request is expansive

and would cover any litigation materials that were created during the time of Centurion’s

contract with DOC.3 Nonetheless, the Court concludes that the core of HRDC’s request

does seek “public records” under the PRA. The governmental function largely delegated

to Centurion by DOC was the provision of health care to Vermont prisoners. If, for

example, Centurion provided such care to a particular prisoner who later came to believe

that the care was negligent and sued Centurion, the Court is hard-pressed to see how

related records would not reflect on the very governmental business undertaken by

Centurion. The point is not that any such lawsuit necessarily had merit or that any

decision to settle means there was merit, but by directly arising out of the governmental

undertaking delegated to Centurion, such records plainly would reflect government,

rather than purely private, business.

        The Court declines to speculate as to whether any particular record is a public

record subject to the PRA because no such particularized disputes are now before the

3
 At its most expansive reading, the request might encompass plainly non-public records.
For example, a lawsuit relating to a tax dispute with the IRS or a personal injury claim
filed by a third party related to a car accident involving one of Centurion’s employees
would likely be wholly collateral to the substance of “agency business” and would not
generate any public records.
Order                                                                     Page 8 of 15
21-CV-03976 Human Rights Defense Center v. Centurion of Vermont LLC
Court. Centurion’s argument that none of the requested records are “public records” is

rejected.

        IV.     Whether the Requested Records are Exempt Under 1 V.S.A. § 317(c)(1)

        Centurion next maintains that, even if it loses the first two arguments, the

requested records are exempt from production under the PRA. It asserts that the

requested records are exempt in total under 1 V.S.A. § 317(c)(1). That provision shields

from access “[r]ecords that by law are designated confidential or by a similar term.” The

records Centurion focuses on are settlement agreements about which the parties agreed

to maintain confidentiality, although HRDC’s request is not expressly limited to

settlement agreements. In any event, to the extent that Centurion is arguing that the

underlying parties’ confidentiality agreement satisfies the “by law” requirement of this

provision, the Court disagrees.

        Private parties are not a law unto themselves by dint of such agreements. “By

law” plainly contemplates a statute, court order, and the like. See, e.g., Norman v.

Vermont Off. of Ct. Adm’r, 2004 VT 13, ¶ 5, 176 Vt. 593, 594 (statutory basis asserted in

support of exemption). If the “by-law” exemption could be triggered by a governmental

entity’s insertion of a confidentiality provision into the entity’s contracts, it would greatly

expand the scope of the exemption and allow a single governmental body, through its

own actions, to declare certain documents off limits from public scrutiny. The Court does

not believe the Legislature intended the by-law exemption to be used in such a fashion.

        At least absent express legislative endorsement of the notion, the exemption for

documents that are confidential “by law” does not apply in circumstances where a

governmental entity has chosen or negotiated to include a secrecy provision in a contract

Order                                                                        Page 9 of 15
21-CV-03976 Human Rights Defense Center v. Centurion of Vermont LLC
with a third party. The opposite conclusion would be in direct conflict with the goals of

the PRA. See, e.g., See Doyle v. City of Burlington Police Dep’t, 2019 VT 66, ¶ 11, 2011

Vt. 10, 15─16 (PRA reflects “Legislature’s acknowledgment that open access to

governmental records is a fundamental precept of our society and it is in the public

interest to enable any person to review and criticize [the] decisions [of officers of

government], who are trustees and servants of the people” (internal quotations omitted)).

        V.      Whether the Requested Records are Exempt Under 1 V.S.A. § 317(c)(7)

        Centurion lastly contends that the requested records are exempt in total under 1

V.S.A. § 317(c)(7). That provision shields from access information “relating to an

individual, including information in any files maintained to hire, evaluate, promote, or

discipline any employee of a public agency; information in any files relating to personal

finances; medical or psychological facts concerning any individual or corporation.” Again,

Centurion focuses on settlement agreements to the exclusion of the broader set of records

presumably within the scope of the request. It argues that because settlement

agreements could contain personal information, particularly medical history, they should

be exempt under this provision.

        The Vermont Supreme Court has explained:

               Section 317(c)(7) exempts from public disclosure “personal documents
        relating to an individual, including information in any files maintained to
        hire, evaluate, promote or discipline any employee of a public agency,
        information in any files relating to personal finances, medical or
        psychological facts concerning any individual or corporation.” We have
        construed the term “personal documents” to apply “only when the privacy of
        the individual is involved.” More specifically, “the exception applies only to
        those documents that reveal intimate details of a person’s life, including any
        information that might subject the person to embarrassment, harassment,
        disgrace, or loss of employment or friends.”

Order                                                                       Page 10 of 15
21-CV-03976 Human Rights Defense Center v. Centurion of Vermont LLC
               In applying § 317(c)(7), the trial court must “balance the public
        interest in disclosure against the harm to the individual.” In doing so, it

              must consider not only the relevance, if any, of the records to the
              public interest for which they are sought, but any other factors that
              may affect the balance, including: the significance of the public
              interest asserted; the nature, gravity, and potential consequences of
              the invasion of privacy occasioned by the disclosure; and the
              availability of alternative sources for the requested information.

Rutland Herald v. City of Rutland, 2013 VT 98, ¶¶ 5–6, 195 Vt. 85, 88 (citations omitted);

see also Kade v. Smith, 2006 VT 44, ¶ 14, 180 Vt. 554, 560 (requiring redactions where

some material is exempt and some not in context of 1 V.S.A. § 317(c)(7)); 1 V.S.A. § 318(e)

(describing the agency’s general duty to redact and disclose where possible).

        HRDC’s request is broad and, presumably, extends to many publicly accessible

filings in court cases. It is highly unlikely that all such records would contain the sort of

personal information that is exempt under 1 V.S.A. § 317(c)(7). Whether any responsive

records contain such information cannot be determined as a matter of law, particularly

without knowing which such records Centurion possesses. This extends to settlement

agreements. Whether such agreements contain exempt information will have to be

determined on the facts of each record, the balancing noted above, and redactions may

potentially conceal the name of the person or exempt material while allowing access to

the remainder.

        VI.     Propriety of In Camera Review at This Time

        As an alternative to its various arguments that no responsive records need to be

disclosed, Centurion asks the Court to examine all records in camera to determine

whether they, or parts of them, are exempt or accessible. See 1 V.S.A. § 319(a) (providing

for in camera review as necessary). In camera inspection of withheld documents is an

Order                                                                       Page 11 of 15
21-CV-03976 Human Rights Defense Center v. Centurion of Vermont LLC
important way for the Court to determine whether responsive records have been

withheld properly. But, [i]n camera inspection is not a substitute for the government’s

burden of proof, and should not be resorted to lightly, due to the ex parte nature of the

process and the potential burden placed on the court.” 1 James T. O’Reilly, Fed. Info.

Discl. § 8:31. The Vaughn Index process was created to avoid, at least at the outset, the

need for such one-sided Court examinations. Campaign For Responsible Transplantation

v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 219 F. Supp. 2d 106, 111 (D.D.C. 2002).

        The rudiments of a Vaughn Index have been described as follows:

               FOIA4 litigation raises the procedural challenge of finding a way for
        agencies to prove that documents should not be disclosed without disclosing
        them to the requester as part of the litigation process. In response to this
        problem, courts developed the Vaughn index. A Vaughn index should
        satisfy the following “indispensable elements:”

                (1) The index should be contained in one document, complete in itself.

               (2) The index must adequately describe each withheld document or
        deletion from a released document.

               (3) The index must state the exemption claimed for each deletion or
        withheld document, and explain why the exemption is relevant. Of course
        the explanation of the exemption claim and the descriptions of withheld
        material need not be so detailed as to reveal that which the agency wishes
        to conceal, but they must be sufficiently specific to permit a reasoned
        judgment as to whether the material is actually exempt under FOIA.

33 Richard Murphy, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Judicial Review § 8476 (2d ed.) (footnotes

omitted). Further:

4 In construing the PRA, the Vermont Supreme Court has sometimes relied upon

interpretations of the analogous federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Toensing v.
Attorney Gen., 2019 VT 30, ¶ 21, 210 Vt. 74, 87 (“[I]n construing the PRA, we have
routinely considered—even if we ultimately declined in some cases to adopt—federal
courts’ interpretations of FOIA provisions.”).
Order                                                                      Page 12 of 15
21-CV-03976 Human Rights Defense Center v. Centurion of Vermont LLC
        The index must “afford the FOIA requester a meaningful opportunity to
        contest, and the district court an adequate foundation to review, the
        soundness of the withholding.”

              Toward that end, the requester and the trial judge must “be able to
        derive from the [Vaughn] index a clear explanation of why each document or
        portion of a document withheld is putatively exempt from disclosure.”
        While there is no set form for a Vaughn index, the agency should describe
        the documents with “as much information as possible without thwarting the
        exemption’s purpose.”

Campaign For Responsible Transplantation v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 219 F. Supp.

2d 106, 111–12 (D.D.C. 2002) (citations omitted).

        The Court declines to conduct an in camera review at this time. A Vaughn index

in this case is needed so that the parties and the Court can proceed in a regimented and

meaningful manner to determine which records, or parts of records, are subject to

production and whether or to what extent in camera review is necessary.

        VII.    Notification of Third Parties

        The Court also notes that some of the requested records may implicate interests of

third parties not before the Court. Centurion’s argument—to the extent that it extends

to confidential settlement agreements—presumes that the plaintiffs in the underlying

cases relied on that confidentiality and would seek to preserve it. As HRDC points out,

though, it may well have been Centurion who requested the term and the other party

would not care if the information was disclosed. The Court cannot say one way or the

other and, in fact, those third parties may have differing views as to enforcing the

confidentiality provision. The same calculus would apply to the information Centurion

asserts is “personal” under § 317(c)(7).

        The Court has no knowledge of the scope of the documents at issue or the number

of potential third parties involved. The Court’s expectation is that appropriate
Order                                                                     Page 13 of 15
21-CV-03976 Human Rights Defense Center v. Centurion of Vermont LLC
redactions and the Vaughn Index process will preserve the anonymity of third parties, at

least at this juncture. To the extent HRDC believes the names of third parties are not

exempt from disclosure and additional litigation is needed, the Court expects that

Centurion will use its best efforts to alert the third parties of this litigation sufficiently in

advance of any hearings to allow them to intervene on those issues.

                                                 Conclusion

        For the foregoing reasons, HRDC’s motion for summary judgment is granted, in

part, and denied, in part. Centurion’s motion for summary judgment is denied, except as

noted above.

        (1)     Within 15 days, the parties shall confer to clarify the scope of HRDC’s

records request, including whether HRDC seeks records unrelated to actions connected

to Centurion’s contract with DOC.

        (2)     Within 30 days thereafter, Centurion shall produce documents and redacted

documents and prepare and file a Vaughn index detailing any withheld responsive

records or parts of records.

        (3)     To the extent that any withheld records or parts of records are subject to

confidentiality agreements entered into among the parties to an underlying lawsuit

and/or seek allegedly private third-party information, the names of those persons shall

not be disclosed. Centurion shall diligently seek to locate and notify those parties of this

suit, and advise them that they may seek to intervene in this action if they wish to be

Order                                                                         Page 14 of 15
21-CV-03976 Human Rights Defense Center v. Centurion of Vermont LLC
heard on the issue. Any such communications shall be documented in Centurion’s

Vaughn index.

        Electronically signed on November 6, 2023, pursuant to V.R.E.F. 7(d).

                                                         ________________________
                                                         Timothy B. Tomasi
                                                         Superior Court Judge

Order                                                                               Page 15 of 15
21-CV-03976 Human Rights Defense Center v. Centurion of Vermont LLC