Court Opinion

ID: 9845752
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:27:22.328962+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:21.176262
License: Public Domain

Duckworth, Chief Justice,
dissenting. The petition alleges that for $75 the seller agreed to “transfer” an insurance policy covering the property in the amount of $4500; and it was contended that, since the property sold had been destroyed by fire and the seller had not transferred the insurance policy, the purchaser was entitled to have $4500, which was the amount of the policy credited upon the purchase money, and that, when this had been done, the purchase money would be paid in full; and upon this premise it was prayed that the purchase-money notes be declared paid and the deed to secure debt canceled.
The utter fallacy of the position of the petitioners lies in the fact that the premise upon which their position is based is fallacious, in that the seller did not undertake or obligate herself to secure the approval of the insurance company of a tranfser of the insurance coverage to the purchaser, but the limit of her undertaking and obligation, as stated by the petitioners, was merely to transfer the insurance policy. Immediately upon the alienation of the insured property by the seller, the insurance coverage automatically terminated as a matter of law. Code, § 56-825; Curtis v. Girard Fire &c. Ins. Co., 190 Ga. 854 (11 S. E. 2d, 3). If, upon a transfer of the policy, the purchaser had obtained the consent and approval of the insurers to continue the insurance, then the policy would have protected against the loss by the fire, but that was a matter wholly outside the obligation of the *298seller as recited in the petition. The only value of the transferred insurance policy was the unearned premium that had been paid therefor. However, by the decision of the majority of this court, the law of this case is fixed whereby, upon proof of the allegations of the petition which are fairly and correctly analyzed above, the purchasers will be entitled to a verdict and judgment without ever having paid approximately $4400 of the purchase money which, by the-petition, it is admitted that they were required to pay as a condition precedent to the relief sought. Under the law above cited, it is not permissible to contend that, if the seller had transferred the insurance policy, the purchaser would have had any claim whatever against the insurance company on account of the fire. The sole and maximum value to the purchasers of the policy when transferred as agreed would have been a mere trifle, which was the amount of the unearned premium paid thereon, and this amount and no more is the amount of credit that the petitioners are entitled to because of the breach of the agreement on the part of the seller to transfer that policy.
Candler, J., concurs in this dissent.