Court Opinion

ID: 9962359
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-23 16:00:50.696279+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:28.496090
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-9511    Document: 010111036619       Date Filed: 04/23/2024   Page: 1
                                                                                 FILED
                                                                     United States Court of Appeals
                                       PUBLISH                               Tenth Circuit

                      UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        April 23, 2024

                                                                        Christopher M. Wolpert
                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                         Clerk of Court
                          _________________________________

  CRISTINA RANGEL-FUENTES,

        Petitioner,

  v.                                                         No. 23-9511

  MERRICK B. GARLAND, United States
  Attorney General,

        Respondent.
                          _________________________________

                       Petition for Review of an Order from the
                             Board of Immigration Appeals
                        _________________________________

 Brian M. Lipshutz of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, Washington, D.C.
 (Kannon K. Shanmugam and Jennifer K. Corcoran of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton &
 Garrison LLP, Washington, D.C.; Sandra Saltrese-Miller of The Saltrese Law Firm,
 Boulder, Colorado, with him on the briefs), for Petitioner.

 Greg D. Mack, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil
 Division, Department of Justice (Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney
 General, Civil Division; Sabatino F. Leo, Assistant Director, Office of Immigration
 Litigation, with him on the briefs), Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
                          _________________________________

 Before HARTZ, MORITZ, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges.
                   _________________________________

 MORITZ, Circuit Judge.
                     _________________________________

       Cristina Rangel-Fuentes petitions for review of a final order of removal issued

 by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), arguing that under 8 U.S.C.
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 § 1229b(b)(1)(D), the age of a qualifying child for the purposes of the cancellation of

 removal should be fixed no later than the date the immigration judge closes the

 administrative record. In the alternative, Rangel argues that Tenth Circuit precedent

 requires remand so that the BIA may at least consider whether the particular facts of

 her case warrant fixing the age of her qualifying child at a date prior to the issuance

 of the immigration judge’s final decision.

       For the reasons discussed below, we hold that the BIA’s interpretation of

 § 1229b(b)(1)(D) is reasonable and entitled to deference under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc.

 v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), and that our prior

 precedent does not require remand for the exercise of the BIA’s discretion. We thus

 deny the petition for review as to cancellation of removal. However, we agree with

 Rangel’s separate argument that the BIA abused its discretion by treating her asylum

 appeal as waived, so we grant the petition for review in part and remand for the BIA

 to address the merits of Rangel’s asylum appeal.

                                      Background

       Rangel is a 49-year-old citizen of Mexico. She most recently entered the

 United States in 1995 or 1996 without inspection and has remained here ever since.

 While in the United States, Rangel married and had three children, the youngest of

 whom, Fernando, was born on September 7, 1997.

       The Department of Homeland Security charged Rangel with inadmissibility in

 early 2012, after state law enforcement arrested her for contempt of court following

 her failure to appear when a gym sued her over unpaid membership dues. See 8

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 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Rangel conceded her inadmissibility, but she applied in

 2014 for cancellation of her removal. In support, she argued that “removal would

 result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to [her] . . . child,” her youngest

 son Fernando, who was 17 at the time. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D).

       Later, in July 2017, Rangel filed an application for asylum in which she

 described two recent incidences of violence against her family members in Mexico:

 in late 2016, her female cousin had been murdered and her uncle had been kidnapped.

 Even though Rangel did not apply for asylum within one year of her arrival in the

 United States, she invoked the statutory exception for “changed circumstances which

 materially affect the applicant’s eligibility for asylum.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D).

       At her July 2017 evidentiary hearing before the immigration judge, Rangel

 testified that when her removal proceedings commenced, Fernando began suffering

 from depression, which affected his appetite and sleep, led him to stop participating

 in sports, and caused his grades to drop. Rangel worried that if she were deported to

 Mexico, Fernando might try to take his own life. She also introduced a report from a

 clinical psychologist opining that Fernando could very likely experience a recurrence

 of depression upon Rangel’s deportation.

       Additionally, Rangel discussed her fears of experiencing violence in Mexico.

 She said that her brother, a car mechanic, was forced to repair the cars of individuals

 involved in organized crime. She also recounted how her cousin, who lived in Texas,

 had been stabbed to death while visiting Juarez in 2016, and how her uncle had been

 kidnapped in 2016 and was never seen again. Rangel felt that because she had spent

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 so much time in the United States, people in Mexico would assume she had money

 and target her for kidnapping. She also introduced a letter from a municipal official

 in her hometown in Mexico describing the high safety risk Rangel and her family

 would face upon return.

       The immigration judge declared the record closed in September 2017, when

 Fernando was twenty years old and thus a “child” for the purposes of cancellation of

 removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1) (defining “child,” as relevant here, to mean “an

 unmarried person under [21] years of age”). However, due to the yearly statutory cap

 on the number of cancellations of removal the Attorney General may grant and an

 accompanying regulation that directs judges to reserve cancellation rulings after the

 cap has been reached, the immigration judge did not issue a written opinion until

 September 2019. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(e)(1) (providing that “the Attorney General

 may not cancel the removal and adjust the status under this section . . . of a total of

 more than 4,000 aliens in any fiscal year”); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.21(c)(1) (explaining that

 “[w]hen grants are no longer available in a fiscal year, further decisions to grant such

 relief must be reserved until such time as a grant becomes available under the annual

 limitation in a subsequent fiscal year”).

       In issuing that opinion, the immigration judge concluded that Rangel was

 statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal because Fernando no longer

 qualified as a child under the cancellation-of-removal statute. The immigration judge

 also denied Rangel’s asylum application, ruling that Rangel waited too long to apply

 for asylum upon learning of her cousin’s murder and that she could not show a well-

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 founded fear of future persecution on account of her membership in a particular

 social group.

       Rangel then appealed to the BIA, which rejected Rangel’s argument that the

 immigration judge was required to fix Fernando’s age at the time of the evidentiary

 hearing. The BIA also determined that Rangel had waived her argument with respect

 to the immigration judge’s denial of her asylum application.1

       Rangel then filed this petition for review.2

                                        Analysis

 I.    Cancellation of Removal

       Rangel challenges the BIA’s interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). We

 review the BIA’s legal determinations de novo. Villegas-Castro v. Garland, 19 F.4th

 1241, 1244–45 (10th Cir. 2021).

       “Section 1229b(b)(1)(D) provides, in pertinent part, that the Attorney General

 may cancel removal when an applicant establishes ‘that removal would result in

 exceptional and extremely unusual hardship’ to a relative, including a child ‘who is a

 citizen of the United States.’” Martinez-Perez v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1273, 1280 (10th

       1
          Additionally, the BIA concluded that Rangel waived any challenge to the
 immigration judge’s ruling denying relief under the Convention Against Torture.
 Rangel does not challenge that ruling here.
        2
          Our jurisdiction over these issues arises under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) and
 (b)(4)(D). The former permits us to review questions of law concerning the
 cancellation of removal (as opposed to the discretionary denial of cancellation of
 removal, which § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) prohibits us from reviewing). See Patel v.
 Garland, 596 U.S. 328, 331 (2022). And the latter permits us to vacate a removal
 order denying an asylum application if it is “manifestly contrary to the law and an
 abuse of discretion.” § 1252(b)(4)(D).
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 Cir. 2020) (quoting § 1229b(b)(1)(D)). As mentioned above, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)

 defines a “child” as “an unmarried person under [21] years of age.” But given the

 yearly statutory cap on removals and the regulation directing immigration judges to

 reserve ruling on pending applications for cancellation of removal after that cap has

 been reached, a qualifying child may turn 21 while an application is pending. See 8

 U.S.C. § 1229b(e)(1) (setting cap); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.21(c)(1) (directing reservation of

 rulings); Procedures Further Implementing the Annual Limitation on Suspension of

 Deportation and Cancellation of Removal, 82 Fed. Reg. 57336, 57337–38 (Dec. 5,

 2017) (acknowledging that qualifying child may age out while a decision is reserved

 pending available removal spots). And the cancellation-of-removal statute does not

 account for this reality: “[§] 1229b(b)(1)(D) does not directly identify the point in

 time when the [noncitizen]’s removal must result in a hardship to a qualifying

 relative.” Martinez-Perez, 947 F.3d at 1280 (alteration in original) (quoting Mendez-

 Garcia v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 655, 659 (9th Cir. 2016)).

       Because of this omission, we held in Martinez-Perez that the statute was

 ambiguous on this point and that the BIA had the jurisdiction “to fill the statutory gap

 in reasonable fashion.” Id. (quoting Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X

 Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005)); see also INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S.

 415, 425 (1999) (holding that the BIA has authority to interpret ambiguous statutes).

 At the time, however, we did not rule on the reasonableness of BIA’s interpretation

 of § 1229b(b)(1)(D) because in that case, the BIA had simply disclaimed its authority

 to interpret the statute in the first place. Martinez-Perez, 947 F.3d at 1281. When

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 confronted with Rangel’s appeal in this case, however, the BIA did offer its own

 interpretation of the statute, reasoning that “an application for relief from removal is

 a ‘continuing’ application” and that under § 1229b(b)(1)(D), the age of a qualifying

 child is properly evaluated at the time the immigration judge issues an opinion. R.

 vol. 1, 4 (quoting In re Isidro-Zamorano, 25 I. & N. Dec. 829, 831 (B.I.A. 2012)).

       We review this interpretation under the framework of Chevron deference.

 Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 425 (“[T]he BIA should be accorded Chevron deference

 as it gives ambiguous statutory terms ‘concrete meaning through a process of case-

 by-case adjudication.’” (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448

 (1987))). Under that framework, the relevant inquiry is not whether the BIA has

 correctly interpreted the statute as fixing the age of a qualifying child on the date the

 immigration judge issues a final decision; instead, we ask whether the BIA’s

 interpretation “is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Chevron, 467

 U.S. at 843; see also Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 424. When deciding whether a

 construction is permissible, we “need not conclude that the agency construction was

 the only one it permissibly could have adopted” or was the reading we “would have

 reached if the question initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding.” Seminole

 Nursing Home, Inc. v. Comm’r, 12 F.4th 1150, 1156 (10th Cir. 2021) (quoting

 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.11). Instead, “[a] construction is a permissible one if it

 ‘reflects a plausible construction of the plain language of the statute and does not

 otherwise conflict with Congress’[s] expressed intent.’” Id. (quoting Rust v. Sullivan,

 500 U.S. 173, 184 (1991)). And if the BIA’s interpretation is permissible, we “must”

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 defer to it. Id. (quoting K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, 486 U.S. 281, 292 (1988)).

       Rangel argues that the BIA’s interpretation is unreasonable and not entitled to

 Chevron deference because the statute contemplates that the applicant seeking

 cancellation of removal must “establish[] that removal would result in exceptional

 and extremely unusual hardship to the alien’s spouse, parent, or child.”

 § 1229b(b)(1)(D) (emphasis added). According to Rangel, the word “establish” can

 reasonably refer only to a time at or before the closing of the record because it places

 an evidentiary onus on the applicant, not the court. Rangel advances various

 arguments in support of her interpretation, including dictionary definitions of

 “establish” that equate it with the word “prove” and caselaw in which the Supreme

 Court has used the words “establish” and “prove” interchangeably. See, e.g., Boyle v.

 United States, 556 U.S. 938, 949 (2009). She also contrasts § 1229b(b)(1)(D) with

 the other provisions of § 1229b(b)(1), which begin with the word “has,” to argue that

 the drafters deliberately included the word “establish” in § 1229b(b)(1)(D) because

 they meant for it to have a different meaning. And she further argues that legislative

 history supports her interpretation.

       Yet Rangel’s arguments simply demonstrate that another reasonable

 interpretation of the ambiguity in § 1229b(b)(1)(D) exists—they do not compel the

 conclusion that Rangel’s is the only possible interpretation. For example, one of the

 dictionaries Rangel cites defines “establish” as “[t]o prove; to convince someone of.”

 Establish, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). To be sure, the notion of

 “proving” appears in this definition, but so does the notion of “convincing

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 someone”—and an immigration judge is not “convinced” until ultimately ruling on

 an application for cancellation of removal. Nor does the verb “establish” in

 subsection (D), as compared to the verb “has” in subsections (A), (B), and (C),

 mandate an interpretation of “establish” that is definitively linked to the closing of

 the record. See § 1229b(b)(1).

       Rangel separately argues that the BIA’s interpretation of § 1229b(b)(1)(D) is

 not entitled to deference under Chevron because none of the cases the BIA relied on

 when denying her appeal “interprets the text of the qualifying-relative provision, let

 alone does so reasonably.”3 Aplt. Br. 23. We reject this characterization of the

 precedent cited by the BIA. The BIA here relied on Isidro-Zamorano, in which the

 BIA addressed qualifying relatives and held that applications for cancellation are

 continuing applications. See 25 I. & N. Dec. at 831. While the BIA did not expressly

 discuss the meaning of the word “establish” or the text of § 1229b(b)(1)(D), the

 opinion makes clear the BIA interpreted that provision. See id. at 831 (“We find no

 basis in law to conclude that an applicant in the respondent’s circumstances, who

 loses his qualifying relationship before his application is even adjudicated on its

 merits by the [i]mmigration [j]udge, nonetheless retains his eligibility for

 cancellation of removal.”). Indeed, we have previously acknowledged that the BIA

       3
          Rangel correctly notes that the BIA’s single-member ruling in her case does
 not, itself, constitute binding precedent entitled to Chevron deference. See 8 C.F.R.
 § 1003.1(e)(6)(ii); Carpio v. Holder, 592 F.3d 1091, 1097 (10th Cir. 2010) (“If the
 interpretation is not precedential within the agency, then the interpretation does not
 qualify for Chevron deference.”).
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  authoritatively interpreted the qualifying-relative provision in Isidro-Zamorano.

  Martinez-Perez, 947 F.3d at 1280 (“The BIA acknowledged its authority to interpret

  ambiguous statutes in [Isidro-Zamorano] when it discussed several factors relevant to

  its interpretation and application of § 1229b(b)(1)(D).”). We therefore reject Rangel’s

  non-binding-precedent argument.4

        Thus, we agree with the government that the BIA’s interpretation of

  § 1229b(b)(1)(D) is entitled to Chevron deference because it “reflects a plausible

  construction of the plain language of the statute and does not otherwise conflict with

  Congress’[s] expressed intent.” Seminole Nursing Home, 12 F.4th at 1156. That is not

  to say that Rangel’s interpretation is itself impermissible or unreasonable. But the

  ambiguous phrasing of the statute does not compel Rangel’s construction, and the

  BIA’s interpretation is reasonable. We must therefore defer to it, as two other circuits

  have done. See id.; Mendez-Garcia, 840 F.3d at 664 (concluding that “the BIA could

  reasonably determine that § 1229b(b)(1)(D) requires [a noncitizen] seeking

  cancellation to establish hardship to a qualifying relative as of the time the

  [immigration judge] adjudicates the . . . application”); Espinoza-Solorzano v. U.S.

  Att’y Gen., No. 20-14297, 2021 WL 5095955, at *4 (11th Cir. Nov. 2, 2021)

  (unpublished) (same).

        4
          Rangel also argues that BIA’s interpretation of the qualifying-relative
  provision unfairly punishes her for the immigration court’s own delays. But as the
  government points out, Rangel cites no legal authority for this argument; nor did she
  object to the immigration court’s continuances or file a motion to expedite her
  application.
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         In the alternative, Rangel argues that even if the BIA’s interpretation of

  § 1229b(b)(1)(D) is entitled to Chevron deference, our prior precedent in Martinez-

  Perez requires remand to the BIA so that it may consider, as a matter of its

  discretion, whether Fernando’s age should have been fixed prior to the time he turned

  21. We disagree. As we briefly noted above, in Martinez-Perez, the BIA had

  concluded that the immigration judge lacked jurisdiction over an application for the

  cancellation of removal because the applicant’s qualifying child turned 21 before an

  evidentiary hearing was conducted. 947 F.3d at 1273. We reversed, finding that the

  BIA had jurisdiction to interpret § 1229b(b)(1)(D) in a way that would allow an

  immigration judge to fix the age of a qualifying child prior to the date of

  adjudication. See id. at 1281. In so doing, we interpreted the BIA’s prior decision in

  Isidro-Zamorano as leaving open the possibility that an immigration judge could fix

  a qualifying child’s age at an earlier time if the factual circumstances—namely,

  excessive delay on the part of the immigration court—warranted it. See id.

         However, in this case, the BIA properly exercised its jurisdiction and

  acknowledged its authority to interpret § 1229b(b)(1)(D) by “‘fixing’ the age of the

  applicant’s child at a point in the proceedings prior to the adjudication of the

  application.” R. vol. 1, 4. It also correctly observed that under Martinez-Perez, it was

  not “required to do so.” Id. (quoting Martinez-Tapia v. Garland, No. 20-9610, 2021

  WL 4813413, at *4 (10th Cir. Oct. 15, 2021) (unpublished)). And it specifically found

  that the only delay in Rangel’s case was the result of the statutory cap and reservation of

  ruling; the case had “proceeded in normal course without any undue administrative

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  delay.” Id. at 5. Thus, our holding in Martinez-Perez, which merely addressed the BIA’s

  jurisdiction over cancellation applications where the applicant’s qualifying child had aged

  out of eligibility, does not require remand here.

  II.    Asylum

         Rangel also challenges the BIA’s dismissal of her asylum appeal. Under 8

  U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(D), we may vacate an order denying an asylum application only

  if it is “manifestly contrary to the law and an abuse of discretion.” Moreover, while

  we “may not uphold an agency action on grounds not relied on by the agency,” this

  limitation does not apply where, on remand, governing law not relied upon by the

  BIA would mandate the same outcome and render remand futile. Zapata-Chacon v.

  Garland, 51 F.4th 1191, 1196 (10th Cir. 2022) (quoting Mickeviciute v. INS, 327

  F.3d 1159, 1162–63 (10th Cir. 2003)).

         To obtain asylum, a noncitizen must be “unable or unwilling to return to” their

  country of nationality “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution

  on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or

  political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (defining “refugee”). This is known as

  the “nexus” requirement. See Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187, 1200 (10th Cir.

  2005) (“For persecution to be ‘on account of’ membership in a social group, the

  victim’s protected characteristic must be central to the persecutor’s decision to act

  against the victim.” (quoting § 1101(a)(42)(A)).

         The immigration judge denied Rangel’s asylum application, finding the

  application untimely and further concluding “the harm [Rangel] fears would [not] be

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  perpetrated against her on account of a protected ground,” specifically her status as a

  woman repatriated to Mexico from the United States. R. vol. 1, 54. The BIA, in turn,

  determined on appeal that Rangel “ha[d] not challenged the . . . adverse nexus

  finding” and deemed “th[i]s dispositive issue[] waived.”5 Id. at 6.

         Before us, Rangel disputes this waiver ruling and argues that she adequately

  challenged the adverse nexus finding in the BIA proceedings. On this point, the only

  relevant BIA regulation provides that:

         The party taking the appeal must identify the reasons for the appeal in
         the [n]otice of [a]ppeal . . . or in any attachments thereto, in order to
         avoid summary dismissal . . . . The statement must specifically identify
         the findings of fact, the conclusions of law, or both, that are being
         challenged. If a question of law is presented, supporting authority must
         be cited. If the dispute is over the findings of fact, the specific facts
         contested must be identified.

  8 C.F.R. § 1003.3(b).

         Rangel’s notice of appeal satisfied this relatively low bar. In the addendum to

  her notice of appeal to the BIA, Rangel wrote that “[t]he [immigration judge] erred in

  finding that [she] did not establish eligibility for asylum . . . . [She] is a member of a

  particular social group and has a well-founded fear of future persecution on that basis

  if she returns to her home country.” R. vol. 1, 45. The government briefly

  characterizes Rangel’s notice of appeal as too conclusory and vague to preserve a

  nexus challenge, but we disagree with this passing suggestion. Rangel’s statement

  clearly challenges the immigration judge’s assessment that she lacked a well-founded

         5
         The BIA accordingly did not reach or address Rangel’s argument that her
  asylum application was timely.
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  fear of future persecution based on membership in a particular social group and

  therefore complies with § 1003.3(b).

        The government nevertheless argues that the BIA correctly found waiver

  because Rangel abandoned her nexus challenge by failing to advance such an

  argument in her brief to the BIA. Rangel’s brief identified the specific findings of

  fact she was challenging when she faulted the immigration judge’s omission of “any

  mention of her statement . . . that her female cousin, who had repatriated from the

  U.S.[,] was murdered.” R. vol. 1, 22. Rangel also argued that “the immigration judge

  completely ignored the plethora of documentary evidence substantiating the gender

  violence in Mexico in determin[ing] . . . Rangel’s particular social group.” Id. at 23.

  To this end, Rangel also cited authority holding that “the BIA abuses its discretion

  when it fails to assess and consider evidence of increased persecution with regard to

  [a] claim of changed country conditions.” Id. at 23 n.6.

        The government argues that because Rangel did not use the words “motive” or

  “nexus” or the phrase “on account of,” she exclusively challenged the immigration

  judge’s refusal to delineate a particular social group, not its adverse nexus finding.

  According to the government, “cognizability of a particular social group[] and nexus

  are separate and distinct components of the asylum inquiry.” Aplee. Br. 63. But in

  this case Rangel sought to establish both elements through the same body of

  evidence. In denying Rangel’s asylum application, the immigration judge found “that

  the harm she fears would [not] be perpetrated against her on account of a protected

  ground,” specifically her status as a woman repatriated to Mexico from the United

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  States. R. vol. 1, 54. In so doing, the immigration judge failed to mention Rangel’s

  strongest evidence that she would in fact face persecution on that basis—the murder

  of her cousin, a woman repatriated to Mexico from the United States. And critically,

  for our purposes of evaluating the BIA’s waiver conclusion, this is evidence that goes

  both to Rangel’s asserted social group and the nexus between that social group and

  feared persecution.

        In sum, after reviewing Rangel’s notice of appeal and appellate brief to the

  BIA in conjunction with the immigration judge’s opinion below, we conclude that

  Rangel adequately challenged the immigration judge’s adverse nexus finding and that

  the BIA abused its discretion by failing to address the merits of her asylum appeal.6

  While the BIA is not obligated to develop arguments for litigants, it may also not

        6
           The dissent would reach the opposite conclusion. In so doing, it devotes
  significant attention to the merits of Rangel’s asylum claim, which are irrelevant to
  the BIA’s waiver ruling. Additionally, the dissent engages in a searching analysis of
  the proper waiver and preservation standards to be employed by the BIA, relying
  heavily on this court’s own preservation doctrine, which is neither controlling nor
  invoked by the government. The dissent also repeatedly expresses concern about the
  BIA’s workload, but we fail to see how abstract concerns about the BIA’s heavy
  backlog of cases inform our legal conclusions in this case. Finally, we reject the
  dissent’s reliance on In re Valencia, 19 I. & N. Dec. 354, 355 (B.I.A. 1986), to
  support its suggestion that the BIA has adopted an “as detailed as possible”
  preservation standard. Not only did neither party rely on Valencia, the dissent’s
  suggested standard is an unworkable legal standard that would grant the BIA
  unfettered discretion to dismiss essentially any appeal for lack of preservation.
  Moreover, Valencia is readily distinguishable—the petitioner’s single-sentence
  notice of appeal was grammatically incoherent and not supplemented by any
  appellate briefing, and the BIA engaged in a full discussion of why that was
  insufficient to preserve any challenge. Id. at 354–56. Here, by contrast, Rangel filed a
  reasonably detailed notice of appeal, as well as a brief with additional argument, but
  the BIA ignored both in its conclusory waiver finding.
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  turn a blind eye to the arguments plainly before it.7 Moreover, remand will not be

  futile in this case because there is no law requiring the BIA to affirm the immigration

  judge’s determination that Rangel would not face persecution on account of being a

  woman repatriated from the United States or that her application was inexcusably

  untimely. See Zapata-Chacon, 51 F.4th at 1196.

                                        Conclusion

        Because the BIA’s interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) is reasonable

  and entitled to Chevron deference, we deny Rangel’s petition for review as to

        7
            Because we find that Rangel adequately challenged the immigration judge’s
  adverse nexus finding in both her notice of appeal and her brief to the BIA, we need
  not decide whether an appellant who makes an argument in her notice of appeal but
  fails to address it in her appellate brief has waived that argument entirely. Compare
  Hoxha v. Holder, 559 F.3d 157, 161 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[T]here is no regulatory
  directive that clearly instructs an appellant that it must include in any brief filed with
  the BIA any issues initially identified in the notice of appeal.”), with Abebe v.
  Mukasey, 554 F.3d 1203, 1207–08 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[P]etitioner didn’t raise a
  withholding[-]of[-]removal claim in his brief before the BIA, and the BIA was
  therefore not required to consider it.”), and Claudio v. Holder, 601 F.3d 316, 318–19
  (5th Cir. 2010) (following Abebe). We also disagree that our precedent in Garcia-
  Carbajal v. Holder, 625 F.3d 1233 (10th Cir. 2010), controls the outcome of this
  issue. In Garcia-Carbajal, the petitioner introduced an entirely new legal theory on
  appeal that he had not previously presented to the BIA. Id. at 1236. Accordingly, we
  held that we lacked jurisdiction to entertain the argument because the petitioner did
  not exhaust it and thus did not give the BIA the opportunity to address it. Id. at 1236–
  38. To be sure, Garcia-Carbajal emphasizes the importance of presenting to the BIA
  all available arguments and legal theories. Here, however, Rangel’s challenge to the
  BIA’s waiver conclusion was not available to her prior to the BIA’s ruling; she could
  not have possibly disputed the BIA’s conclusion regarding waiver at any prior point
  in this litigation. We therefore do not face the exhaustion problem at issue in Garcia-
  Carbajal. And as for the general notion of presenting all available arguments and
  legal theories to the BIA, we are firmly convinced (as discussed above) that Rangel
  adequately presented her nexus challenge to the BIA. It is the BIA that erred in
  concluding otherwise.
                                             16
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  cancellation of removal. However, because Rangel did not waive her challenge to the

  immigration judge’s denial of her asylum application, contrary to the BIA’s ruling,

  we grant the petition in part and remand for the BIA to address the merits of Rangel’s

  asylum appeal.

                                           17
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  23-9511, Rangel-Fuentes v. Garland

  HARTZ, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

         I am pleased to join the opinion of Judge Moritz except that I respectfully dissent

  from the remand to the BIA to address Rangel’s asylum appeal. In my view, the BIA did

  not abuse its discretion in holding that Rangel had waived any challenge to the IJ’s

  determination that she had not shown a nexus between her alleged membership in a

  particular social group and her alleged persecution.

         Whether a party has waived an issue before an appellate tribunal is not an all-or-

  nothing proposition. Occasionally a party will say absolutely nothing about an issue in its

  brief to the tribunal. Much more often, at least in my experience on this court, the tribunal

  will say that the issue was waived because it was “inadequately” presented. It is not

  enough simply to state what the issue is. For example, briefs to this court must include a

  Statement of Issues. See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(5). But we have repeatedly said that an

  issue is not preserved on appeal simply because it is listed in the Statement of the Issues

  section of the brief. See, e.g., Blue Mountain Energy v. Dir., Off. of Workers’ Comp.

  Programs, 805 F.3d 1254, 1259 n.3 (10th Cir. 2015) (“It is well-settled in this Circuit that

  an issue listed, but not argued in the opening brief is waived.” (internal quotation marks

  omitted)); Cooper v. Cent. & Sw. Servs., 271 F.3d 1247, 1248 n.2 (10th Cir. 2001) (“In

  her statement of issues presented for review, plaintiff lists the issue of whether she timely

  filed her discrimination charge under the ADA. The issue is not further argued, however,

  and we deem it waived.”); Abercrombie v. City of Catoosa, Okla., 896 F.2d 1228, 1231

  (10th Cir. 1990) (“Although plaintiff lists the liability of the City and the mayor as an
Appellate Case: 23-9511      Document: 010111036619          Date Filed: 04/23/2024      Page: 19

  issue on appeal, he failed to argue this issue in his appellate brief or at oral argument.

  Therefore, we conclude that plaintiff has waived this issue.”). What the appellant must do

  is develop an argument explaining why the party should prevail on the issue. And the

  “argument” cannot be perfunctory. See In re Rumsey Land Co., LLC, 944 F.3d 1259,

  1271 (10th Cir. 2019) (“We . . . do not address arguments raised in the District Court in a

  perfunctory and underdeveloped manner.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The

  length of the discussion is not dispositive. A paragraph without a reasoned argument

  addressing the relevant authority is still inadequate. See Tele-Communications Inc. v.

  C.I.R., 104 F.3d 1229, 1233–34 (10th Cir. 1997); see also Sheward v. City of Henryetta,

  810 Fed. Appx. 684, 689 (10th Cir. 2020) (“It is insufficient merely to state in one’s brief

  that one is appealing an adverse ruling below without advancing reasoned argument as to

  the grounds for the appeal. . . . To advance a reasoned argument, an appellant must

  support his position with legal argument and authority.” (internal quotation marks

  omitted)).

         There is no bright-line rule to determine whether an issue has been adequately

  presented. To say that an issue has not been adequately presented is equivalent to saying

  that the party has not made enough of an argument to be entitled to a response.

  Reasonable people, weighing a variety of considerations, may differ on whether enough

  has been said. Accordingly, “whether an issue should be deemed waived is a matter of

  discretion.” United States v. Walker, 918 F.3d 1134, 1153 (10th Cir. 2019).

         One note of caution. It is important to distinguish the question before the BIA

  (whether Rangel was entitled to review of the issue by the BIA) from the question

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  whether she is entitled to review of the issue by this court. To answer the second

  question, we must determine whether the petitioner has exhausted her remedies before the

  BIA, an issue that we deemed jurisdictional until the Supreme Court corrected us in

  Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411 (2023). Thus, a circuit court could decide that a

  petitioner satisfied the exhaustion requirement but the BIA’s summary dismissal for

  failure to adequately present the issue was appropriate. See Athehortua-Vanegas v. I.N.S.,

  876 F.2d 238, 240–41 (1st Cir. 1989).

         There is nothing inappropriate about different tribunals having different standards

  for determining when presentation of an issue has been adequate. One important factor

  may be the court’s workload. A court with a light load may think it useful to provide

  legal guidance by preparing an opinion explaining why a claim has no merit, while a

  court with a horrendous caseload (such as the BIA) may determine that justice is best

  served if it devotes its limited resources to responding to only reasoned arguments.1 Its

         1
          As the Ninth Circuit explained when the BIA’s caseload was significantly lower
  than now:

         The purpose of the BIA’s strict specificity requirement is to ensure that the
         BIA is adequately apprised of the issues on appeal so that the BIA is not left
         to search through the record and speculate on what possible errors the
         petitioner claims. If the BIA was forced to decipher general statements of
         error, unsupported by specific factual or legal references, the BIA would
         have to spend time and resources reconstructing the proceedings before the
         IJ and building the petitioner’s legal case, in some instances only to conclude
         that the appeal was utterly without merit. But when the BIA receives ample
         specific advice about the reasons for an appeal, the BIA can deal promptly
         with appeals and focus resources on nonfrivolous appeals to reach a correct
         resolution.

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  main incentive for including an explanation in its opinion may be just to facilitate judicial

  review.

            On what basis, then, do we determine whether the BIA has abused its discretion in

  deciding that an issue has been waived? Do we think the BIA gave inadequate attention

  to the issue? Or did not adequately explain its reasoning? That cannot be the standard.

  We presume that the BIA performed its duty, see Wilson v. Hodel, 758 F.2d 1369, 1372

  (10th Cir. 1985) (we presume that an agency properly discharged its official duties

  “absent clear evidence to the contrary”); and to impose a duty of explanation would be in

  tension with our endorsement of the BIA’s practice of regularly issuing one-judge

  opinions affirming the immigration judge without opinion, see Yuk v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d

  1222, 1228– 32 (10th Cir. 2004).

            What the majority opinion appears to be saying is that the BIA failed to comply

  with its own regulations for determining waiver. It points to 8 CFR § 1003.3(b), which

  states:

            The party taking the appeal must identify the reasons for the appeal in the
            Notice of Appeal (Form EOIR–26 or Form EOIR–29) or in any attachments
            thereto, in order to avoid summary dismissal pursuant to § 1003.1(d)(2)(i).
            The statement must specifically identify the findings of fact, the conclusions
            of law, or both, that are being challenged. If a question of law is presented,
            supporting authority must be cited. If the dispute is over the findings of fact,
            the specific facts contested must be identified. Where the appeal concerns
            discretionary relief, the appellant must state whether the alleged error relates
            to statutory grounds of eligibility or to the exercise of discretion and must
            identify the specific factual and legal finding or findings that are being
            challenged.

  Rojas-Garcia v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 814, 820 (9th Cir. 2003) (brackets, citations, and
  internal quotation marks omitted).

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  It appears to think that this standard is more congenial for appellants than is this court’s

  standard for judicial appellate review. Perhaps the rule could be so construed, but that has

  not been the BIA’s construction of the rule for more than half a century. In Matter of

  Holguin, 13 I. & N. Dec. 423 (BIA 1969), the Board construed the predecessor to the

  present rule (then codified at 8 CFR § 3.1(d)(1–a)), which contained essentially the same

  operative language as the present rule—namely, that the BIA could summarily dismiss

  the appeal if “the party concerned fails to specify the reasons for his appeal.” It dismissed

  the appeal in that case, saying, “[G]eneralized statements of the reasons for these appeals,

  as set forth in the respective notices of appeal, are totally inadequate. They do not tell us

  what aspect of the special inquiry officer’s order they consider incorrect and for what

  reason.” Id. at 425 (emphasis added)). Accord Reyes-Mendoza v. I.N.S., 774 F.2d 1364,

  1365 (9th Cir. 1985) (in affirming BIA summary dismissal of appeal, the court stated

  Holguin standard that petitioner must “inform the BIA of what aspects of the IJ’s

  decision were allegedly incorrect and why”).

         Two decades later the BIA construed this regulation as “designed to permit us to

  deal promptly with appeals where the reasons given for the appeal are inadequate to

  apprise the Board of the particular basis for the alien’s claim that the immigration judge’s

  decision is wrong.” Matter of Valencia, 19 I. & N. Dec. 354, 355 (BIA 1986). It

  expanded on the meaning of the rule as follows:

         It is essential to the Board’s adjudication of an appeal that the reasons given
         on the Notice of Appeal be as detailed as possible so that the alleged error
         can be identified and addressed. Without a specific statement, the Board can
         only guess at how the alien disagrees with the immigration judge’s decision.

                                          Page 5 of 14
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           It is therefore insufficient to merely assert that the immigration judge
           improperly found that deportability had been established or denied an
           application for relief from deportation. Where eligibility for discretionary
           relief is at issue, it should be stated whether the error relates to grounds of
           statutory eligibility or to the exercise of discretion. Furthermore, it should be
           clear whether the alleged impropriety in the decision lies with the
           immigration judge’s interpretation of the facts or his application of legal
           standards. Where a question of law is presented, supporting authority should
           be included, and where the dispute is on the facts, there should be a
           discussion of the particular details contested.

           Although the regulations only refer to the reasons that must be stated on the
           Notice of Appeal, the contentions made by an alien on appeal are of course
           best presented in a brief setting forth his arguments. Depending on the
           complexity of the issues raised, a brief may be essential to an adequate
           presentation of the appeal. In all cases, however, the reasons for an appeal
           must be meaningfully identified on the Notice of Appeal.

  Id. at 355 (citation omitted, emphasis added). If anything, the Valencia standard seems

  tougher than the waiver standard in our court. For one thing, we do not require an

  appellant’s statement of reasons for the appeal to be “as detailed as possible.” Matter of

  Valencia, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 355.

           In light of this standard, I do not see any abuse of discretion by the BIA in the

  dismissal at issue here. The BIA ruled that Rangel did not challenge the IJ’s

  determination that she had not established the nexus between her alleged protected group

  and the alleged future persecution. To properly assess whether that ruling was an abuse of

  discretion, it is necessary to put Rangel’s appeal to the BIA in context. I therefore begin

  with an examination of the evidence presented on nexus by Rangel and the law governing

  nexus.

           Rangel’s application for asylum as a refugee was predicated on her assertion that

  she had a well-founded fear that if she returned to Mexico she would be persecuted

                                            Page 6 of 14
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  because of her membership in a particular social group—namely, women who had been

  repatriated to Mexico from the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (defining

  “refugee” to include an individual who has “a well-founded fear of persecution on

  account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political

  opinion”). The IJ rejected the claim, finding that she had not presented sufficient

  evidence to sustain her application.

         As purported support for this claim, Rangel had presented general information

  about violence against women in Mexico; a letter from an official in her hometown in

  Mexico stating that she and her family would be at high risk if they returned to the town;

  and a statement in her I-589 that a cousin of hers, a woman who had been repatriated to

  Mexico from the United States, had been murdered in Mexico. That evidence is wholly

  inadequate. I address each item.

         To begin with, Rangel does not suggest that the general information concerning

  the threat to women living in Mexico would suffice to justify asylum for all women in

  Mexico. Presumably, that is why she did not describe her particular social group as

  “women from Mexico.” In Niang v. Gonzalez, 422 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2005), the

  petitioner’s asserted particular social group was females from her native country who

  belonged to a particular tribe; the relevance of the tribe was that it practiced female

  genital mutilation. See id. at 1198, 1201. In discussing the petitioner’s particular social

  group, we said that a country’s women could constitute a proper social group but then the

  question would be “whether the members of that group are sufficiently likely to be

  persecuted that one could say that they are persecuted ‘on account of’ their membership.

                                          Page 7 of 14
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  It may well be that only certain women—say, those who protest inequities—suffer harm

  severe enough to be considered persecution. The issue then becomes whether the

  protesting women constitute a social group.” Id. at 1999–1200 (citation omitted). Given

  that Rangel chose her particular social group to be “women repatriated to Mexico from

  the United States,” she therefore needed to produce evidence that those specific women

  were targeted for persecution.

         The letter from her hometown official does not help Rangel in that regard. I quote

  the translated letter in full in a footnote.2 The letter is inadequate on its face because, at

  most, it suggests danger to her only in her hometown, not throughout Mexico. See 8

  C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(3)(i) (“In cases in which the applicant has not established past

  persecution, the applicant shall bear the burden of establishing that it would not be

  reasonable for him or her to relocate, unless the persecution is by a government or is

  government-sponsored.”); Tulengkey v. Gonzales, 425 F.3d 1277, 1281 (10th Cir. 2005).

  It is also deficient because it does not indicate what specific dangers she would face in

  her hometown, so one could not tell whether they would rise to the level of persecution.

         2
                To Whom It May Concern:

                The Undersigned C. Reyes Felipe Mendoza Perez, Municipal
                President of Ignacio Zragoza [sic], declares the C. Cristina Rangel
                Fuentes, 38 years old, whose date of birth is the 1st day of September
                of 1974, who is originally from the municipality of Ignacio Zaragoza,
                Chih[uahua], fears return to her municipality since there is a high rate
                of insecurity/safety index that is directly affects her and poses a risk
                to her family, whose known address is [redacted].

         R. at 207.
                                           Page 8 of 14
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  In any event, Rangel (quite understandably) never asserted in the administrative

  proceedings that the letter is saying that the risk to her (and her family) in her hometown

  would arise specifically because she would be a repatriated woman. Her only reference to

  the letter in her brief to the BIA cites it only as part of “the plethora of documentary

  evidence substantiating the gender violence in Mexico in determination of Ms. Rangel’s

  particular social group.” R. at 23.

         There remains only Rangel’s statement that her female cousin, who had lived in

  the United States, was murdered in Mexico. This murder could be one example of the

  murder of a woman repatriated to Mexico from the United States. One example, however,

  ordinarily could not suffice to support a reasonable fear of persecution. And, more

  importantly, Rangel provided absolutely no evidence indicating the motive for her

  cousin’s murder. Perhaps the motive was because she was a repatriated woman, but for

  all we know, the perpetrators did not even know that she had lived in the United States.

         One of the reasons the IJ rejected Rangel’s asylum claim was that “the Record

  indicates that the harm [she] fears in Mexico would . . . not [be] on account of [her]

  membership in any of her proposed social groups.” R. at 55. If the BIA had affirmed the

  IJ’s decision that Rangel had failed to provide sufficient evidence to support her asylum

  claim, we would certainly have denied a petition for review of that decision. In legalese,

  she had utterly failed to satisfy her burden to prove a nexus between persecution and

  membership in her particular social group. That is, she failed to prove that there were

  people in Mexico who would persecute her specifically because she would be a woman

  repatriated to Mexico from the United States.

                                          Page 9 of 14
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         So why did the BIA not address the merits? The reason it gave was that Rangel

  “ha[d] not challenged the [IJ’s] adverse nexus finding. . . . Accordingly, we deem [this]

  dispositive issue[] waived.” A.R. 6. Neither Rangel’s notice of appeal nor her brief to the

  BIA explained why the IJ had erred in finding no nexus. There was thus no abuse of

  discretion by the BIA in dismissing the appeal. See Nazakat v. I.N.S., 981 F.2d 1146,

  1148 (10th Cir. 1992) (decision by BIA to dismiss appeal is reviewed for abuse of

  discretion).

         In support of the proposition that Rangel adequately challenged the adverse nexus

  finding in the BIA proceedings, the majority opinion first quotes the following from the

  addendum to her notice of appeal to the BIA: “The [immigration judge] erred in finding

  that [she] did not establish eligibility for asylum. [She] is a member of a particular social

  group and has a well-founded fear of future persecution on that basis if she returned to

  her home country.” Maj. Op. at 13 (ellipses and internal quotation marks omitted). This is

  hardly an argument. It is a bare assertion. It is essentially a statement of the issue, which

  would never preserve an argument in our court. This court has said, “The first task of an

  appellant is to explain to us why the district court’s decision was wrong.” Nixon v. City

  and Cnty. of Denver, 784 F.3d 1364, 1366 (10th Cir. 2015). Failure to perform that task

  waives the issue. See id. at 1368. Rangel’s addendum provides zero explanation of why

  the IJ decision was wrong. It does not come close to satisfying the BIA’s requirement that

  “the reasons given on the Notice of Appeal be as detailed as possible so that the alleged

  error can be identified and addressed.” Matter of Valencia, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 355. It was

  eminently reasonable for the BIA to determine that the addendum did “not tell us what

                                          Page 10 of 14
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  aspect of the [IJ’s] order [she] consider[ed] incorrect and for what reason.” Matter of

  Holguin, 13 I. & N. Dec. at 425 (emphasis added).

         The majority opinion also refers to Rangel’s statements in her brief to the BIA that

  “faulted the immigration judge’s omission of any mention of her statement that her

  female cousin, who had repatriated from the US, was murdered,” that “argued that the

  immigration judge completely ignored the plethora of documentary evidence

  substantiating the gender violence in Mexico in determining Rangel’s particular social

  group,” and that “cited authority holding that the BIA abuses its discretion when it fails to

  assess and consider evidence of increased persecution with regard to a claim of changed

  country conditions.” Maj. Op. at 14 (ellipses, brackets, and internal quotation marks

  omitted). But recitation of evidence (of gender violence in Mexico and of the murder of

  her cousin) does not preserve an issue absent an argument explaining how the evidence

  rebuts the IJ decision. See Rieck v. Jensen, 651 F.3d 1188, 1191 n.1 (10th Cir. 2011)

  (“[A]n argument is not preserved by merely alluding to it in the statement of facts.”);

  Bhandari v. Garland, 2021 WL 4704661 at *2 (10th Cir. Oct. 8, 2021) (“[A] party does

  not preserve an issue in an appellate brief by simply mentioning a factual predicate for

  the issue; the issue itself must be addressed and fully developed.”).

         And there was no such argument in the brief. Nor was this evidence that supported

  a nexus argument. The evidence of persecution of women in Mexico was not specific to

  Rangel’s proffered social group (women who had repatriated to Mexico), and there was

  no evidence that her cousin (the only member of the proffered social group identified by

  Rangel) was murdered because of her membership in that group. It is this causal

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  connection that is referred to as the nexus requirement. The most important thing, though,

  is that Rangel’s pleadings to the BIA include absolutely no argument or even an

  assertion that the referred-to evidence was sufficient to establish that nexus. The BIA was

  perfectly correct to say that Rangel “has not challenged the Immigration Judge’s adverse

  nexus finding.” R. at 6.

         My view of the BIA’s authority to dismiss appeals is not an outlier. This issue has

  not come before the circuit courts very often, but several opinions have held that a

  petitioner is not entitled to a merits review by the BIA (or the circuit court) if the

  petitioner does not present an explanation of why the IJ decision was improper. See

  Rojas-Garcia v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 814, 820–21 (9th Cir. 2003) (affirming BIA’s

  summary dismissal of petitioner’s claim because “Rojas–Garcia did not indicate if his

  challenges were based on the IJ’s interpretation of facts, and did not provide ‘supporting

  authority’ on any question of law presented”); Bayro v. Reno, 142 F.3d 1377, 1379 (11th

  Cir. 1988) (“[W]hen a petitioner fails to apprise the Board of the specific grounds for his

  appeal, whether by specifying the reasons in the notice of appeal or by submitting an

  additional statement or brief, summary dismissal is appropriate.”) (internal quotation

  marks omitted); Toquero v. I.N.S., 956 F.2d 193, 195 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[T]he Notice of

  Appeal must inform the BIA of what aspects of the IJ’s decision were allegedly incorrect

  and why.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. (“Rather than describing how the

  evidence established extreme hardship and why the IJ erred, Petitioner makes a

  generalized and conclusory statement about the proceedings before the IJ.”); id. at 196

  (“While the Notice correctly focused on the issue in contention, it did not indicate which

                                          Page 12 of 14
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  facts were in contention and how the IJ misinterpreted the evidence.”); Athehortua-

  Vanegas, 876 F.2d at 241 (“At the very least, a grievant must tell the Board what aspects

  of the IJ’s decision he contends were wrong, and why. And, this must be done in a

  meaningful, intelligible way. A reviewing tribunal ought not to be forced into a needless

  search for an evanescent needle in a legal haystack merely because an appellant, whether

  for tactical reasons or out of sheer indolence, neglects to shed light upon the grounds.”

  (citations omitted)); Townsend v. I.N.S., 799 F.2d 179, 181 (5th Cir. 1986) (affirming

  summary dismissal by BIA when appellant’s statement of reasons for appeal was that he

  had “sufficiently established his well-founded fear of persecution according to present

  caselaw” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Rizo v. Lynch, 810 F.3d 688, 692

  (9th Cir. 2016) (dismissal of petition for review for failure to exhaust before the BIA

  because the “conclusory statement [in the brief to the BIA] does not apprise the BIA of

  the particular basis for Rizo’s claim that the IJ erred; it merely asserts that the IJ erred.

  Such a submission does not meaningfully challenge the IJ’s decision on appeal.”);

  Grigorian v. Gonzales, 231 F. App’x 828, 830 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[I]n both his notice of

  appeal to the BIA and his supporting brief, which were filed by counsel, Mr. Grigorian

  made only broad, conclusory assertions of error in the IJ’s future-persecution findings

  that were unsupported by any discussion of the pertinent facts. Consequently, he failed to

  exhaust his administrative remedies as to that issue and we lack jurisdiction over it.”); cf.

  Casas-Chavez v. I.N.S., 300 F.3d 1088, 1091 (9th Cir. 2002) (notice of appeal was

  sufficient to avoid dismissal by BIA when it “directed the BIA’s attention to specific

  portions of the immigration judge’s opinion as well as to evidence supporting

                                          Page 13 of 14
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  [petitioners’] interpretation that the immigration judge erred in not suspending

  deportation proceedings . . . [and their] articulated interpretation was also supported by

  authority”).

         This case should be put to bed. Remand is a gross waste of time for an agency that

  can ill afford such impositions. But what is more troublesome is the additional

  unnecessary workload imposed on the BIA in dealing with its entire caseload. Will it

  hesitate to dismiss appeals or possible issues on appeal for fear that a court of appeals

  might delay removal for several years by ordering the BIA to address the merits?

         I therefore must respectfully dissent on this issue.

                                         Page 14 of 14