Court Opinion

ID: 9740645
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:39:23.564715+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:19.428892
License: Public Domain

CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, specially concurring: I agree with the majority that Dameron’s murder conviction should not be disturbed, but that we should vacate his sentence of death and remand the cause to the circuit court for a new sentencing hearing. I write separately because I would further hold that the State should not be permitted to seek the death penalty on remand. Contrary to my colleagues, I believe that Dameron’s challenge to this state’s death penalty law is meritorious. For the reasons set forth in my partial concurrence and partial dissent in People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998), the Illinois death penalty law violates the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amends. VIII, XIV) and article I, section 2, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2). It is therefore void and unenforceable. Because the death penalty law is unconstitutional, Dameron must now be sentenced to a term of imprisonment. 720 ILCS 5/9 — 1(j) (West 1996). At the time Dameron murdered Rachel, Public Act 89 — 203 had just taken effect. Under that statute, a defendant who had attained the age of 17 and been found guilty of murdering an individual under 12 years of age had to be given a term of imprisonment of natural life when the death penalty was not imposed. 730 ILCS 5/5 — 8—l(a)(l)(c)(ii) (West 1996). As the majority points out, however, Public Act 89 — 203 was invalidated by our court in People v. Wooters, 188 Ill. 2d 500 (1999), on the grounds that it violated the single subject clause of the Illinois Constitution. Accordingly, on remand, Dameron must be resentenced under the unamended provisions of the Unified Code of Corrections as they existed prior to the effective date of Public Act 89 — 203. See People v. Coleman, 311 Ill. App. 3d 467, 477 (2000).