Court Opinion

ID: 9777044
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:52:24.424229+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:46.498475
License: Public Domain

J. CURTISS BROWN, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I have reached the conclusion that I must record my dissent in this case.
Section 3.63 of the Family Code provides: In a decree of divorce or annulment the court shall order a division of the estate of the parties in a manner that the court deems just and right, having due regard for the rights of each party and any children of the marriage.
In my opinion, this provision gives the trial court authority over the entire “bundle of sticks,” and it may divide the estate as it may deem just and right. This authority would extend to the homestead rights of the parties. After all, the parties are not undertaking to maintain a “homestead” but are submitting to the court a dissolution of their marriage and estate. No one would question the right of the parties to agree to sell their homestead and apply the proceeds of the sale to the payment of their debts. In this case, where there was no such agreement, I believe that the parties by their conduct submitted their homestead rights to the court for disposition.
The creditors of these parties are not before the court. Their rights are neither diminished nor enhanced by the exercise of the trial court of its power to divide the estate in accordance with law. Any benefits those creditors may derive from the division ordered by the court is only incidental and not direct. There is no violation of Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 3834. The trial court has made a reasonable requirement with respect to payment of the debts of the parties for which they each may remain liable unless those debts are paid from some of the available funds.
*497It is not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to require the legitimate debts of the parties to be paid out of the proceeds of the sale of their home and the remaining funds divided between them as ordered by the court.
It seems to me of utmost importance that the hands of a court not be tied by the “homestead” concept. In many cases the home is the principal, if not the only, asset of the parties. The court may not do indirectly that which it may not do directly. Therefore, the injection of “homestead” concepts into a division of property in a divorce suit may cause grave difficulties in achieving a division that is just and right.
I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.