Court Opinion

ID: 9841136
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-21 15:04:10.239873+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:39:44.071875
License: Public Domain

Cite as 2023 Ark. 121
                   SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
                                        No. CR-22-693

                                                 Opinion Delivered:   September 21, 2023
 MICHAEL J. TODD
                                APPELLANT PRO SE APPEAL FROM THE
                                          HEMPSTEAD COUNTY CIRCUIT
 V.                                       COURT
                                          [NOS. 29CR-09-33, 29CR-09-34, 29CR-09-
                                          35, 29CR-09-36, 29CR-09-37, 29CR-09-38,
 STATE OF ARKANSAS                        29CR-09-74, 29CR-09-75]
                                 APPELLEE
                                          HONORABLE DUNCAN CULPEPPER,
                                          JUDGE

                                                 AFFIRMED.

                            SHAWN A. WOMACK, Associate Justice

       Michael J. Todd appeals from the denial of his petition to correct an illegal sentence

filed pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-90-111 (Repl. 2016). In his petition,

Todd alleged that consecutive sentences imposed upon revocation of suspended sentences

in eight separate cases are illegal. Todd alleged in his petition that (1) the circuit court did

not have the jurisdiction to impose suspended sentences originally because he was sentenced

as an habitual offender, which precluded the imposition of suspended sentences; (2) the

sentences imposed upon revocation violated the original plea agreement; (3) the revocation

proceedings violated the prohibition against double jeopardy; (4) the circuit court did not

have the authority to modify the original sentences from concurrent to consecutive; and (5)

the consecutive suspended sentences are illegal under Arkansas statute. The circuit court
denied and dismissed the petition because Rule 37.1 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal

Procedure had superseded it, and his petition was untimely. We affirm.

                                          I. Background

       In May 2009, Todd entered a plea of no contest in two separate cases1 in Hempstead

County.2 In the first case, Todd was charged as an habitual offender with ten felonies that

included nine counts of fraudulent use of a credit card and one count of theft by receiving.

In the second case, Todd was charged with breaking or entering, felony theft of property,

and fraudulent use of a credit card. He was sentenced on each felony count in both cases to

concurrent terms of eight years’ imprisonment in the Arkansas Department of Correction

(ADC) to be followed by seven years’ suspended sentences. 3

       On June 4, 2014, the State filed a petition to revoke Todd’s suspended sentences in

these cases, alleging that in 2013, Todd had violated conditions of his suspension when he

was convicted of committing the crime of forgery in Howard County and was also convicted

of the crimes of commercial burglary, breaking or entering, and theft of property in

Hempstead County.4 On this basis, the circuit court revoked Todd’s suspended sentences

and imposed ten 60-month sentences for ten counts of fraudulent use of a credit card and

       1
           The docket numbers of these cases are 29CR-09-74 and 29CR-09-75.

       2
           Todd v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 204, at 2, 489 S.W.3d 207, 208 (Todd I).

       3
           Id.

       4
           Id.

                                                2
60-month sentences each for one count of breaking or entering and one count of theft of

property. The sentences were imposed to run consecutively for an aggregate sentence of sixty

years’, or 720 months’, imprisonment.         This aggregate sentence was imposed to run

consecutively to the six cases addressed below, for which suspended sentences, imposed for

multiple felonies, were also revoked.

       In 2009, Todd was also charged in Hempstead County in six different cases5 that

included nine felony counts of breaking or entering.6 Todd was charged as an habitual

offender and faced a maximum of fifteen years’ imprisonment on each felony charge.7 He

entered a negotiated plea to the charges and was sentenced to concurrent terms of eight

years’ imprisonment followed by seven years’ suspended imposition of sentences.8 Todd was

released early in June 2012, and in February 2014, the State filed a petition to revoke Todd’s

suspended sentences.9 The State alleged that Todd had violated his suspended sentences by

committing additional felony offenses.10        On this basis, the court again revoked the

       5
      The six docket numbers are 29CR-09-33, 29CR-09-34, 29CR-09-35, 29CR-09-36,
29CR-09-37, and 29CR-09-38.

       6
           Todd v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 270, at 1, 493 S.W.3d 350, 351 (Todd II).

       7
           Id.

       8
           Id.

       9
           Id. at 1–2, 493 S.W.3d at 351.

       10
            Id.

                                                3
suspended sentences, and Todd was sentenced to nine 64-month sentences imposed

consecutively for a total of forty-eight years’, or 576 months’, imprisonment.11

       Todd appealed both revocations to the Arkansas Court of Appeals. In both appeals,

Todd argued, among other things, that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to change or

modify the sentencing orders12 from concurrent to consecutive sentences and that the

original suspended sentences were illegal because he was convicted as an habitual offender,

and suspended sentences are prohibited for habitual offenders in accordance with Arkansas

Code Annotated section 5-4-301(a)(2)(A) (Repl. 2006).13 The court of appeals rejected

Todd’s arguments and affirmed both revocations and the consecutive sentences imposed by

the circuit court. The court of appeals considered and rejected Todd’s claim that the original

suspended sentences were illegal because he had been convicted as an habitual offender,

which precluded the imposition of suspended sentences for the offenses. The court of

appeals found that the circuit court had the authority to suspend a sentence of an habitual

offender as long as the suspended sentence is imposed for a portion of the sentence that was

       11
          Id. at 2, 493 S.W.3d at 351–52.
       12
          The 2014 sentencing orders in the record, which revoked and resentenced Todd,
reflect that the crimes for which Todd was originally convicted were committed in December
2008. Sentencing shall be in accordance with the statute in effect at the time of the
commission of the crime. Wilson v. State, 2022 Ark. 108, at 3.

       13
       See Todd II, 2016 Ark. App. 270, at 3–5, 493 S.W.3d at 352–53; Todd I, 2016 Ark.
App. 204, at 3, 489 S.W.3d at 208–09.

                                              4
beyond the minimum statutory term for the crimes.14 Todd’s suspended sentences for each

offense were imposed beyond the minimum term for Class C and Class D felonies.15

       The court of appeals also rejected Todd’s argument that the circuit court did not have

authority to modify his sentences from concurrent to consecutive. The court of appeals

explained that Arkansas Code Annotated sections 5-4-301(d)(2) (Repl. 2006) and 5-4-

309(f)(1)(A) (Repl. 2006) authorized the circuit court at revocation to modify the original

sentence and impose any sentence that originally could have been given.16

                                      II. Standard of Review

       Under our standard of review, the circuit court’s decision to deny relief under

Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-90-111 will not be overturned unless that decision is

clearly erroneous.17 A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to

support it, the appellate court, after reviewing the entire evidence, is left with the definite

and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.18

       14
         See Todd II, 2016 Ark. App. 270, at 4, 493 S.W.3d at 352; Todd I, 2016 Ark. App.
204, at 4, 489 S.W.3d at 209.

       15
            See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-501(b)(2)(D)–(E) (Supp. 2007).

       16
         Todd II, 2016 Ark. App. 270, at 4, 493 S.W.3d at 353; Todd I, 2016 Ark. App. 204,
at 6, 489 S.W.3d at 210.

       17
            Green v. State, 2021 Ark. 19, at 2, 615 S.W.3d 389, 391.

       18
            Id. at 2–3, 615 S.W.3d at 391–92.

                                                5
                                           III. Illegal Sentence

       The statute governing motions to correct or reduce a sentence provides authority to

a circuit court to correct an illegal sentence at any time.19 An illegal sentence is one that is

illegal on its face.20 A sentence is illegal on its face when it is void because it is beyond the

circuit court’s authority to impose and gives rise to a question of subject-matter jurisdiction.21

Sentencing is entirely a matter of statute in Arkansas.22 When a petitioner seeks relief under

the statute governing motions to correct or reduce a sentence, he bears the burden of

demonstrating that his sentence was illegal. 23 A circuit court has subject-matter jurisdiction

to hear and determine cases involving violations of criminal statutes, and generally, a

sentence imposed within the maximum term prescribed by law is not illegal on its face.24

       Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.2(c) superseded the time limitations on

petitions alleging an illegal sentence.25 Rule 37.2(c) required Todd to file a Rule 37.1

petition challenging the revocation of his suspended sentences within sixty days of the

       19
            Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-111(a).

       20
            E.g., Rainer v. State, 2022 Ark. 159, at 3, 651 S.W.3d 713, 716.

       21
            Id.

       22
            Id. at 3–4, 651 S.W.3d at 716.

       23
            Id. at 4, 651 S.W.3d at 716.

       24
            Id.

       25
            Green, 2021 Ark. 19, at 3, 615 S.W.3d at 392.

                                                    6
issuances of the Arkansas Court of Appeals’ mandates in May and July 2016. However,

Todd filed his petition to correct an illegal sentence in February 2020, almost four years

later.

                                         IV. Claims for Relief

         Todd reasserts the claims on appeal that were raised in his petition to the circuit

court. However, Todd adds two claims that are raised for the first time on appeal: (1) that

there was no arrest warrant in connection with the revocation of his suspended sentences

and (2) that the sentences were imposed ex post facto. This court, however, will not address

arguments that are raised for the first time on appeal.26

         Todd’s claim that the revocation represents a breach of the original plea agreement

amounts to an allegation of an illegal sentence and, therefore, should have been raised in a

timely petition filed pursuant to Rule 37.1.27 Likewise, Todd’s double-jeopardy claim is a

claim that the sentences were illegal and should also have been raised during the revocation

hearing or in a timely petition filed pursuant to Rule 37.1.28

         Next, as set out above, the court of appeals already addressed Todd’s assertions that

the sentences are illegal because the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to enter the suspended

         26
              E.g., Break v. State, 2022 Ark. 219, at 5, 655 S.W.3d 303, 308.

         27
              See Malone v. State, 2016 Ark. 379, at 3, 501 S.W.3d 807, 809–10 (per curiam).

         28
              Wesley v. State, 2019 Ark. 270, at 4–5, 585 S.W.3d 156, 160.

                                                   7
sentences in the original sentencing order and lacked jurisdiction to modify the suspended

sentences by imposing consecutive sentences upon revocation. Issues that are raised and

settled on direct appeal cannot be reargued in postconviction proceedings. 29

       With respect to Todd’s claim that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to impose

his suspended sentences consecutively, the decision to impose sentences concurrently or

consecutively is wholly within the province of the circuit court.30 Furthermore, Todd’s

contention that the circuit court did not have the authority pursuant to Arkansas Code

Annotated section 5-4-307(b) to run his suspended sentences consecutively is unavailing.

Under this statute, the circuit court “is not authorized to run a suspended sentence

consecutively to a term of imprisonment that was imposed for a different charge.”31 In Todd’s

case, however, the circuit court ran the suspended sentences as a portion of the terms of

imprisonment imposed for the same charges, and both the prison sentences and suspended

sentences were originally imposed to run concurrently.

       When imposing sentences for offenses where suspension or probation is revoked, it

is within the circuit court’s discretion to order the sentences to run consecutively or

concurrently.32      Todd was released early from prison in June 2012 and subsequently

       29
            Roberts v. State, 2020 Ark. 45, at 14, 592 S.W.3d 675, 684.

       30
            Fischer v. Payne, 2022 Ark. 105, at 2.
       31
            Willingham v. State, 2021 Ark. 177, at 6, 631 S.W.3d 558, 562–63 (emphasis added).

       32
            See Ark. Code Ann. 5-4-403(a) (Repl. 2006); Walton v. State, 2013 Ark. 265, at 3 (per
curiam).

                                                 8
committed additional crimes in 2013.33 At the time of his release, he had just over five years

left on the suspended sentences.34 The circuit court had jurisdiction to revoke the suspended

sentences in those cases where the terms had not elapsed.

       Todd was convicted as an habitual offender under section 5-4-501(b) of multiple

counts of breaking or entering, which are Class D felonies, and he was also convicted as an

habitual offender of multiple counts of fraudulent use of a credit card, theft of property, and

theft by receiving, which are Class C felonies. The maximum term for an habitual offender

who commits a Class D felony is fifteen years’ imprisonment. Therefore, Todd’s sentences

of consecutive terms of sixty months’ imprisonment for each Class D offense are legal

sentences. Moreover, the maximum penalty for an habitual offender who commits a Class

C felony is thirty years’ imprisonment. Todd’s sentences of consecutive terms of sixty-four

months’ imprisonment for each Class C felony offense do not exceed the maximum penalty

and, thus, are legal sentences. Accordingly, the circuit court did not clearly err when it

denied and dismissed Todd’s petition to correct illegal sentences.

       Affirmed.

       Michael J. Todd, pro se appellant.

       Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Adam Jackson, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.

       33
            See Todd II, 2016 Ark. App. 270, at 3, 493 S.W.3d 350, 352.

       34
            Todd I, 2016 Ark. App. 204, at 3, 489 S.W.3d at 208.

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