Court Opinion

ID: 9662459
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:09:37.987269+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:39.666532
License: Public Domain

DON H. REAVIS, Justice.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, appellant Miguel Lucano Lucero aka Michael Lucero plead guilty to aggravated sexual assault of a child and was granted deferred adjudication and placed on community supervision for five years. Upon the State’s motion to proceed with an adjudication of guilt, on November 14, 2001, a hearing was held and evidence was presented that appellant had violated the terms of community supervision. He was adjudicated guilty by the trial court and sentenced to 25 years confinement. Appellant filed a pro se general notice of appeal.1 By a sole point of error, appellant contends he did not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive his federal constitutional right against self-incrimination at the sentencing phase of his adjudication hearing. Based upon the rationale expressed herein, we affirm.
Approximately one year after appellant was granted deferred adjudication and placed on community supervision, the State filed a motion to proceed with an adjudication of guilt based on 16 alleged violations of the conditions of his community supervision. After the State waived two of the allegations, appellant entered an open plea of true to the remaining fourteen. However, the standard inquiries made by the trial court during the initial guilty plea colloquy designed to protect appellant from entering an involuntary plea were not repeated at the hearing on the motion to proceed with an adjudication of guilt. Instead, the trial court confirmed appellant’s open plea of true to the allegations in the State’s motion and immediately adjudicated him guilty of aggravated sexual assault committed against a 12 year old girl, a friend of appellant’s younger sister.
During the punishment phase the State indicated that it had no witnesses to present. Appellant then voluntarily chose to testify to explain why he had violated the conditions of his community supervision. During cross-examination, appellant indicated he was aware of the range of punishment and upon further questioning by the prosecutor, testified that he did not think it was his idea to have the victim perform oral sex on him. The only objection made by defense counsel, which was sustained, was directed at the prosecutor’s sidebar comment. After defense counsel indicated she had no further evidence to present, the State called the victim to the stand. She testified without objection that it was appellant’s idea for her to perform oral sex because she was unaware of such an act at the time. After both sides closed, the trial court sentenced appellant to 25 years confinement.
Relying on Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 119 S.Ct. 1307, 143 L.Ed.2d 424 (1999) and Carroll v. State, 42 S.W.3d 129 (Tex.Cr.App.2001) (en banc),2 appellant contends he did not voluntarily and intelli*816gently waive his federal constitutional right against self-incrimination at the sentencing phase of the hearing on the State’s motion to proceed with an adjudication of guilt. We agree, but based on the reasoning expressed herein, determine that the error was harmless.
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution prevents a person from being compelled to be a witness against himself in any criminal matter. Since Mitchell it is well settled that a defendant retains the right to remain silent during sentencing. 119 S.Ct. at 1311. Where a sentence has not yet been imposed a defendant may have a legitimate fear of adverse consequences from further testimony. 119 S.Ct. at 1314. Further, the Court again rejected the idea that a plea of guilty completes the incrimination of the defendant thereby extinguishing the right. Id; accord Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 462, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981). Only where there can be no further incrimination, ie., where the sentence has been fixed and the judgment of conviction has become final, is the assertion of the right without basis. Id.
In light of Mitchell, the document executed by appellant waiving his rights pursuant to articles 1.14 and 1.15 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure did not waive his right against self-incrimination during sentencing. See Carroll, 42 S.W.3d at 132-33. As appellant points out in his brief, waiver of the right against self-incrimination is “conspicuously absent” from the written waivers. Based on Mitchell and Carroll, we hold that appellant did not voluntarily and intelligently waive his Fifth Amendment .right against self-inerimination because he was not admonished by the trial court at the sentencing phase. We must now determine whether appellant suffered harm due to the trial court’s error in failing to admonish him.
Since the Court’s decision in Cain v. State, 947 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tex.Cr.App.1997), except for certain federal constitutional errors labeled by the United States Supreme Court as “structural,” no error, whether it relates to jurisdiction, voluntariness of a plea, or any other mandatory requirement, is categorically immune to a harmless error analysis. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1265, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991). Structural error, which is subject to automatic reversal, has been found only in six instances. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (total deprivation of the right to counsel); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 47 S.Ct. 437, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927) (an impartial judge); Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 106 S.Ct. 617, 88 L.Ed.2d 598 (1986) (Unlawful exclusion of members of the defendant’s race from a grand jury); McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177-78, n. 8, 104 S.Ct. 944, 950-51, n. 8, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984) (the right to self-representation); Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49, n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 2217, n. 9, 81 L.Ed.2d 31 (1984) (the right to public trial), and Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993) (defective reasonable doubt instruction). After a thorough search, we are unaware of any case holding that a violation of the Fifth Amendment is structural error subject to automatic reversal. Thus, we apply Rule 44.2(a) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure to determine whether the error contributed to appellant’s punishment beyond a reasonable doubt. See Johnson v. State, 43 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex.Cr.App.2001) (holding that it is the responsibility of the appellate court to assess harm and not a burden that rests on appellant or the State).
In Carroll I, the appellate court’s decision was reversed and the cause remanded *817for further proceedings because based on Mitchell the Court of Criminal Appeals could not conclude that Carroll knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived her federal constitutional right against self-incrimination.3 42 S.W.3d at 183. Carroll entered open pleas of guilty to two counts of delivery of marihuana. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court advised defense counsel that if Carroll did not testify pursuant to the State’s request, it would “reflect very seriously on the Court’s decision.” Reluctantly, Carroll testified to rigorous questions by the State and the trial court, believing that she had lied in her testimony, refused to probate her sentences. Carroll I, 946 S.W.2d at 881. She was sentenced to concurrent five-year sentences and a $5,000 fine. Id. at 880. She appealed the punishment portion of the judgments contending the trial court had coerced her to testify at the sentencing phase when it advised defense counsel that if she invoked her privilege against self-incrimination, it would consider the invocation as a circumstance against her when assessing punishment. Carroll IV, 42 S.W.3d at 130. After the cause was remanded by Carroll IV, the Fort Worth Court conducted a harm analysis and determined that because the trial court relied on coerced testimony in assessing punishment it could not conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the error made no contribution to Carroll’s sentences. 68 S.W.3d at 253.
Appellant voluntarily chose to testify at the sentencing phase and was represented by counsel. Upon cross-ex-animation, he answered questions openly and without hesitation. A review of the record shows no coercion by the trial court nor by the State. Furthermore, a trial court is vested with a great degree of discretion in imposing an appropriate sentence. Jackson v. State, 680 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Tex.Cr.App.1984) (en banc). A penalty imposed within the range established by the Legislature should not be disturbed on appeal. Nunez v. State, 565 S.W.2d 536, 538 (Tex.Cr.App.1978). The range of punishment for a first degree felony is life imprisonment or for any term of not more than 99 or less than five years. Tex. Pen.Code Ann. § 12.32(a) (Vernon 1994). Appellant’s sentence of 25 years confinement being on the lower end of the range of punishment, we determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the trial court’s error in failing to admonish him did not contribute to his punishment. His sole point of error is overruled.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
QUINN, J., concurs.
JOHN T. BOYD, S.J., joins in the disposition of the case, but agrees with Justice QUINN’s concurring opinion.
Before QUINN and REAVIS, JJ., and BOYD, S.J.1

. The State recognizes that appellant's general notice of appeal is sufficient to invoke our jurisdiction because by his complaint, he challenges the punishment phase and not his conviction. See Vidaurri v. State, 49 S.W.3d 880, 884 (Tex.Cr.App.2001).

. Carroll was decided on March 7, 2001, months prior to the hearing on the State’s motion to proceed with an adjudication of guilt.

. Carroll was originally appealed in 1997, and after five decisions, has come full circle. See Carroll I, 946 S.W.2d 879 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1997); Carroll II, 975 S.W.2d 630 (Tex.Cr.App.1998); Carroll III, 12 S.W.3d 92 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1999); Carroll IV, 42 S.W.3d 129 (Tex.Cr.App.2001); and Carroll V, 68 S.W.3d 250 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 2002, no pet.).

. John T. Boyd, Chief Justice (Ret.), Seventh Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 75.002(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2002).