Court Opinion

ID: 9897305
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:09:55.864062+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:05.329947
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                       Aug 23 2023, 9:06 am

                                                                            CLERK
                                                                        Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                           Court of Appeals
                                                                             and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                     ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Brooks B. C. Ledger                                        Theodore E. Rokita
Ledger Law, P.C.                                           Attorney General of Indiana
Logansport, Indiana
                                                           Tyler Banks
                                                           Supervising Deputy Attorney
                                                           General
                                                           Indianapolis, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Kyle Budimir,                                              August 23, 2023
Appellant-Defendant,                                       Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                           23A-CR-17
        v.                                                 Interlocutory Appeal from the
                                                           White Superior Court
State of Indiana,                                          The Honorable Brad A. Woolley,
Appellee-Plaintiff.                                        Judge
                                                           Trial Court Cause No.
                                                           91D01-2107-F6-157

                                Opinion by Judge Bradford
                            Judges Riley and Weissmann concur.

Bradford, Judge.

Case Summary

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-17 | August 23, 2023                               Page 1 of 8
[1]   Kyle Budimir was riding in a vehicle driven by Bianca Roberts when Monon

      Town Marshal Roger Young executed a traffic stop. Marshal Young requested

      an officer with a K9. Shortly before Sergeant Joshua Shoemaker of the White

      County Sheriff’s Department arrived, Marshal Young had given Budimir

      permission to leave, but Budimir had not left by the time Sergeant Shoemaker

      arrived. As Budimir attempted to leave, Sergeant Shoemaker instructed him to

      stay, searched Budimir’s person, and found methamphetamine, drug

      paraphernalia, and marijuana. The State charged Budimir with Level 6 felony

      possession of methamphetamine, Class A misdemeanor possession of

      paraphernalia with a prior conviction, and Class B misdemeanor possession of

      marijuana. Budimir moved to suppress the evidence recovered during the

      search of his person, arguing that the search had violated the Fourth

      Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, section 11, of the Indiana

      Constitution. The trial court denied his motion and Budimir sought an

      interlocutory appeal. Budimir argues that the trial court erred in denying his

      motion to suppress. We agree and reverse.

      Facts and Procedural History
[2]   On July 18, 2021, Marshal Young was on patrol when he spotted a vehicle

      being driven by Bianca Roberts, whose license he knew had been suspended.

      After confirming with dispatch that Roberts’s license was still suspended,

      Marshal Young executed a traffic stop about two blocks from Roberts’s

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-17 | August 23, 2023        Page 2 of 8
      residence. He also requested that an officer with a drug-sniffing K9 come to the

      scene.

[3]   When Marshal Young approached Roberts’s vehicle, he observed Budimir in

      the front seat and two children in the back seat. Budimir told Marshal Young

      that one of the children needed to use the restroom and Marshal Young agreed

      to let Budimir walk the children home. “Within seconds, a minute of the

      stop[,]” Sergeant Shoemaker arrived. Tr. Vol. II p. 13. When Sergeant

      Shoemaker arrived, Budimir was standing outside of Roberts’s vehicle with one

      of the children, beside the driver-side front bumper. Marshal Young informed

      Sergeant Shoemaker that Budimir had been in Roberts’s car but did not inform

      him that he had given Budimir permission to take the children home.

[4]   Sergeant Shoemaker began to approach Roberts’s vehicle, and, at the same

      time, the other child walked over to Budimir. As Sergeant Shoemaker reached

      the driver-side door, Budimir and the two children began walking away from

      the traffic stop. Sergeant Shoemaker called to Budimir, “Hey, hold up man.

      Did he say you were allowed to go?” Ex. 1 at 00:08–00:15. Budimir turned to

      face Sergeant Shoemaker and Roberts told Sergeant Shoemaker that Marshal

      Young had given Budimir permission to take her children home. Sergeant

      Shoemaker then asked Budimir if he had come out of Roberts’s car, and, after

      Budimir affirmed that he had been in the car, Sergeant Shoemaker replied,

      “Well, then you gotta stick around, buddy. Can you stand over there?” and

      motioned to a nearby driveway. Ex. 1 at 00:27–00:31.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-17 | August 23, 2023       Page 3 of 8
[5]   As the traffic stop proceeded, Sergeant Shoemaker walked his K9 around

      Roberts’s vehicle, which resulted in a positive alert. As a result, Sergeant

      Shoemaker performed a warrantless search of Budimir’s person, during which

      Sergeant Shoemaker discovered methamphetamine, marijuana, and drug

      paraphernalia. The State charged Budimir with Level 6 felony possession of

      methamphetamine, Class A misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia with a

      prior conviction, and Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana.

[6]   On September 2, 2022, Budimir moved to suppress the evidence that had been

      discovered on his person, arguing that the search and seizure were unlawful

      under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, section

      11, of the Indiana Constitution. On October 13, 2022, the trial court held a

      hearing on Budimir’s motion. On December 13, 2022, the trial court entered its

      order denying Budimir’s motion to suppress and granted his motion for

      interlocutory appeal. On January 4, 2023, we accepted jurisdiction of

      Budimir’s interlocutory appeal.

      Discussion and Decision
[7]   Our standard of review when considering the denial of a motion to suppress is

      well-settled:

              Our standard of review for the denial of a motion to suppress
              evidence is similar to other sufficiency issues. We determine
              whether substantial evidence of probative value exists to support
              the trial court’s denial of the motion. We do not reweigh the
              evidence and we consider conflicting evidence most favorably to

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-17 | August 23, 2023           Page 4 of 8
               the trial court’s ruling. However, this review is different from
               other sufficiency matters in that we must also consider
               uncontested evidence that is favorable to the defendant.

      Simmons v. State, 781 N.E.2d 1151, 1153–54 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (internal

      citations omitted).

[8]   “Because we only need to reach the federal constitutional analysis if the Indiana

      Constitution does not resolve the claim,” we start with Budimir’s Article 1,

      section 11, argument. State v. Katz, 179 N.E.3d 431, 442 (Ind. 2022). Article 1,

      section 11 of the Indiana Constitution provides for “the right of the people to be

      secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search

      or seizure[.]” Despite Article 1, section 11’s, similarity to the Fourth

      Amendment’s language, Indiana courts interpret it “independently from federal

      Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.” Mitchell v. State, 745 N.E.2d 775, 786 (Ind.

      2001).

[9]   Our analysis under Article 1, section 11, focuses on the “the totality of the

      circumstances” in determining whether “the search or seizure was reasonable.”

      Sandleben v. State, 29 N.E.3d 126, 134 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. Three

      factors guide our review of the reasonableness of a search or seizure: “(1) the

      degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation of law has occurred,

      (2) the degree of intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes on the

      citizen’s ordinary activities, and (3) the extent of law enforcement needs.” Id. at

      135. The State bears the burden of showing that the search or seizure was

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-17 | August 23, 2023           Page 5 of 8
       reasonable under the circumstances. Rutledge v. State, 28 N.E.3d 281, 291 (Ind.

       Ct. App. 2015).

[10]   The degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that Budimir had engaged in

       criminal activity was minimal, at best. Marshal Young had lawfully stopped

       Roberts for her driving with a suspended license; however, shortly thereafter,

       “he released [Budimir] from the scene[.]” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 45. After

       being released, and shortly after Sergeant Shoemaker had arrived on scene,

       Budimir and the children began walking away before Sergeant Shoemaker

       “asked [Budimir] to stay by the scene.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 46. Before

       Sergeant Shoemaker’s K9 alerted on Roberts’s car, there was no reason

       whatsoever to suspect that Budimir had engaged, or was engaging, in criminal

       activity of any kind.

[11]   Moreover, the degree of intrusion was hardly “non-existent” as the State

       argues. Appellee’s Br. p. 14. In Cade v. State, 872 N.E.2d 186, 188–89 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2007), trans. denied, we concluded that the degree of intrusion was

       minimal when an officer executed a routine traffic stop and asked a passenger

       his name. See also Cochran v. State, 843 N.E.2d 980, 985 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)

       (concluding that, where officer approached person standing on sidewalk, the

       officer’s request for the person’s name was minimal intrusion), trans. denied.

       Sergeant Shoemaker’s command to Budimir was far more intrusive than merely

       asking for his name. When Sergeant Shoemaker told Budimir that he needs to

       “stick around” and stay in a nearby driveway, he restricted Budimir’s ordinary

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-17 | August 23, 2023          Page 6 of 8
       activities, namely, his freedom to leave the scene and take the children home.

       Ex. 1 at 00:27–00:31.

[12]   Finally, the needs of law enforcement to detain Budimir were slight. The State

       correctly asserts that “police have a limited right to briefly detain a passenger

       who exits the vehicle after it has been lawfully stopped.” Tawdul v. State, 720

       N.E.2d 1211, 1216–17 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied. However, the

       situation in Tawdul is readily distinguishable from this one. In Tawdul, the

       driver and passenger had already exited the vehicle and had “refused to return

       to the car” despite the police officer’s order to do so. Id. at 1213. We rejected

       Tawdul’s argument that his arrest for resisting law enforcement violated the

       Fourth Amendment and Article 1, section 11, on the principle that “[t]he police

       may detain the passenger in order to ascertain the situation and to alleviate any

       concerns the officer has for his or her safety.” Id. at 1217. Here, however,

       Marshal Young had already assessed the situation and had released Budimir

       from the scene by the time Sergeant Shoemaker arrived and ordered him to

       stay. The State points to nothing in the record to indicate that Sergeant

       Shoemaker observed anything about Budimir that Marshal Young did not that

       would have caused a reasonable concern for officer safety. In light of the

       nonexistent degree of suspicion that Budimir was engaging in criminal activity,

       the relatively intrusive nature of the encounter, and the minimal needs of law

       enforcement, we cannot say that the State met its burden in proving that the

       search and seizure of Budimir was reasonable under the totality of the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-17 | August 23, 2023           Page 7 of 8
       circumstances. As a result, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying

       Budimir’s motion to suppress. See Rutledge, 28 N.E.3d at 291.

[13]   The judgment of the trial court is reversed.

       Riley, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-17 | August 23, 2023       Page 8 of 8