Court Opinion

ID: 9404504
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-23 06:00:15.845263+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:14.826919
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     STEVEN OLIVA,                                   DOCKET NUMBER
                         Appellant,                  DA-0752-16-0338-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS                          DATE: June 22, 2023
       AFFAIRS,
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Steven Oliva, Fair Oaks Ranch, Texas, pro se.

           Joan M. Green, Esquire, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     sustained his removal. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the
     following circumstances:      the initial decision contains erroneous findings of
     material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                            2

     or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the
     administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial
     decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of
     discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and
     material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due
     diligence, was not available when the record closed.           Title 5 of the Code of
     Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).                After fully
     considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petit ioner has not
     established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
     Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision,
     which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).
¶2         In addition to his petition for review, the appellant submitted a separate
     pleading with documents he characterized as new and material evidence . Petition
     for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 1, 5, 6, 8. 2 The agency has filed a response. PFR
     File, Tab 10. The appellant has replied. 3 PFR File, Tab 11.
¶3         On review, the appellant challenges the administrative judge’s findings on
     the charge and on his affirmative defenses. PFR File, Tab 1. We discern no basis
     for disturbing the administrative judge’s well-reasoned findings regarding the
     charge or the appellant’s affirmative defenses of discrimination and equal

     2
       The appellant requested leave to supplement his petition for review by further
     identifying pertinent evidence already in the record, PFR File, Tab 5 at 3, but the Clerk
     denied that request, PFR File, Tab 6. The appellant requested reconsideration, PFR
     File, Tab 7, but the Clerk once again denied the request, PFR File, Tab 9.
     3
       After his reply, the appellant submitted yet another request to supplement the record,
     this time with the initial decision from a separate appeal. PFR File, Tab 12. That
     decision need not be made part of the record in this appeal for us to consider it . See
     5 C.F.R. § 1201.64 (providing that an administrative judge may take official notice of
     matters that can be verified). Therefore, we deny the appellant’s motion. The appellant
     also filed a motion to join this appeal with two others he filed “because they all deal
     with one [administrative judge] and her abuse of discretion, bias, and misapplication of
     law.” PFR File, Tab 15. That motion is similarly denied. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.36
     (discussing when an administrative judge may join cases).
                                                                                            3

     employment opportunity (EEO) reprisal. 4 As further explained below, we also
     agree that the appellant failed to establish his affirmative defenses of
     whistleblower reprisal and harmful error.

     The appellant failed to prove his whistleblower retaliation claim.
¶4         In an affirmative defense of whistleblower retaliation, an appellant must
     first prove by preponderant evidence that he made a disclosu re protected by
     5 U.S.C.     §   2302(b)(8)   or   engaged   in   activity   protected   by   5   U.S.C.
     § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D). See Shibuya v. Department of Agriculture,
     119 M.S.P.R. 537, ¶ 19 (2013) (describing burden shifting in the context of a
     disclosure protected by section 2302(b)(8)); see also Alarid v. Department of the
     Army, 122 M.S.P.R. 600, ¶ 12 (2015) (recognizing that, after the Whistleblower
     Protection Enforcement Act of 2012’s enactment, the same burden-shifting
     scheme applies in the context of activities protected by section 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
     (B), (C), or (D)). He also must prove that the protected disclosure or activity was
     a contributing factor in the challenged personnel action.        Alarid, 122 M.S.P.R.
     600, ¶ 13.
¶5         If an appellant meets his burden, the burden shifts to the agency to prove by
     clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same action in the
     absence of the appellant’s protected disclosures or activity.            Id., ¶ 14.   In
     determining whether the agency has met this burden, the Board will consider all
     the relevant factors, including the following:       (1) the strength of the agency’s
     evidence in support of its action; (2) the existence and strength of any motive to
     retaliate on the part of the agency officials involved in the decision; and (3) any

     4
       With respect to appellant’s affirmative defenses of discrimination and EEO reprisal,
     we agree with the administrative judge’s findings that the appellant failed to prove that
     either was a motivating factor in the removal action. We need not reach whether the
     appellant proved that either discrimination or EEO reprisal were a but -for cause of the
     removal. See Pridgen v. Office of Management and Budget , 2022 MSPB 31. We also
     agree with the administrative judge that the appellant failed to prove his other
     affirmative defenses.
                                                                                        4

     evidence that the agency takes similar actions against employees who did not
     engage in such protected activity, but who are otherwise similarly situated. Carr
     v. Social Security Administration, 185 F.3d 1318, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The
     Federal Circuit has explained that “[e]vidence only clearly and convincingly
     supports a conclusion when it does so in the aggregate considering all the
     pertinent evidence in the record, and despite the evidence that fairly detracts from
     that conclusion.” Whitmore v. Department of Labor, 680 F.3d 1353, 1368 (Fed.
     Cir. 2012).
¶6        Below, the administrative judge applied the burden-shifting scheme
     described above. She found that the appellant failed to prove that he made any
     protected disclosures, but did establish that he had engaged in activity protected
     by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i) by filing two individual right of action (IRA)
     appeals. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 39, Initial Decision (ID) at 35-39. She
     further found that the appellant established that this protected activity was a
     contributing factor to his removal because those IRA appeals were pending when
     the agency removed him. ID at 39. Nevertheless, upon shifting the burden, the
     administrative judge found that the agency met its burden of proving that it would
     have taken the same action in the absence of the appellant’s protected activity.
     ID at 39-42.
¶7        On review, the appellant appears to argue that his whistleblowing set in
     motion a series of events that led to the discovery of his misconduct and was,
     therefore, a motivating factor in his removal. PFR File, Tab 1 at 8. However, he
     has failed to clearly identify what whistleblowing he is referring to, as he merely
     identified it as his “January 2015 complaint.” Id. Moreover, the administrative
     judge did not deny the appellant’s whistleblower retaliation claims on the basis of
     the motivating factor requirement, so the argument would be unavailing even if it
     had any merit. Supra ¶ 6.
¶8        Separately, the appellant now asserts that the agency perceived him as a
     whistleblower. PFR File, Tab 1 at 6, 8. He is correct to recognize that the Board
                                                                                           5

      has, at times, found that an individual was entitled to whistleblower protections
      when he did not actually make protected disclosures but was perceived as having
      done so. See, e.g., Holloway v. Department of the Interior, 82 M.S.P.R. 435, ¶ 15
      (1999); Mausser v. Department of the Army, 63 M.S.P.R. 41, 44 (1994);
      Thompson v. Farm Credit Administration, 51 M.S.P.R. 569, 581-82 (1991).
      However, we find no instance of the appellant articulating this legal theory
      below, so we will not consider it now. See, e.g., IAF, Tab 18 at 13, Tab 34. It is
      well settled that the Board need not consider arguments submitted for the fir st
      time in a petition for review absent a showing that the arguments were not
      available prior to the close of the record despite due diligence.            Banks v.
      Department of the Air Force, 4 M.S.P.R. 268, 271 (1980).
¶9          In connection with this new legal theory, the appellant has requested
      permission to supplement the record for the instant appeal with a decision he
      received in a separate Board matter. PFR File, Tab 12 at 4. As a matter of fact,
      the appellant has pursued several IRA appeals before the Board that involved the
      same alleged disclosures as that which he assert ed in the instant removal appeal,
      but different alleged personnel actions and legal theories.             See Oliva v.
      Department of Veterans Affairs, MSPB Docket No. DA-1221-15-0520-W-1,
      Initial Appeal File, Tab 52, Initial Decision; Oliva v. Department of Veterans
      Affairs, MSPB Docket No. DA-1221-16-0199-W-1, Initial Appeal File, Tab 31,
      Initial Decision (0199 ID); Oliva v. Department of Veterans Affairs, MSPB
      Docket No. DA-1221-17-0225-W-1, Initial Appeal File, (0225 IAF), Tab 23,
      Initial Decision (0225 ID).
¶10         The administrative judge joined the first two IRA appeals and issued a
      single decision, finding that the appellant failed to meet his burden of proving
      that he made a protected disclosure. 5 0199 ID at 6-16. That same administrative

      5
        Nearly two years after the initial decision for those appeals, t he appellant filed a
      petition for review, which the Board dismissed as untimely. Oliva v. Department of
                                                                                            6

      judge later issued the initial decision in this removal appeal in which, as
      previously discussed, she considered the appellant’s earlier IRA appeals as
      protected activity.   ID at 1, 36-39.     After the close of record in the instant
      removal appeal, the appellant filed a third IRA appeal alleging that, inter alia, he
      was a perceived whistleblower. E.g., 0225 IAF, Tab 7 at 3, Tab 14 at 1. After
      the initial decision was issued in the instant removal appeal and while it was
      pending our review, a different administrative judge granted corr ective action in
      that third IRA appeal on the basis that the appellant was a perceived
      whistleblower. 6 0225 ID at 6-9, 23.
¶11         While we have reviewed the decisions from each of these IRA appeals, we
      find no basis for concluding that they require a different result in this removal
      appeal. As stated above, the Board will not consider the appellant’s new legal
      theory that he was a perceived whistleblower because he failed to present it
      below, even if that new legal theory was successful in a separate appeal. 7
¶12         As a final matter regarding the whistleblower retaliation claims, the
      appellant has submitted certain evidence for the first time on review. PFR File,
      Tab 8.    Under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115, the Board generally will not consider
      evidence submitted for the first time on review absent a showing that it was
      unavailable before the record was closed despite the party’s due diligence.
      Avansino v. U.S. Postal Service, 3 M.S.P.R. 211, 214 (1980). To constitute new
      evidence, the information contained in the documents, not just the documents
      themselves, must have been unavailable despite due diligence when the record

      Veterans Affairs, MSPB Docket No. DA-1221-15-0520-W-1, Final Order (May 5,
      2023).
      6
       The appellant filed a fourth IRA appeal, but the parties settled that matter. Oliva v.
      Department of Veterans Affairs, MSPB Docket No. DA-1221-18-0437-W-1, Initial
      Appeal File (0437 IAF), Tab 52, Initial Decision. The associated settlement agreement
      explicitly provided that the agreement did not preclude the appellant from continuing to
      pursue his petition for review in the instant appeal. 0437 IAF, Tab 51 at 6.
      7
        Because the agency did not file a petition for review in the appellant’s third IRA
      appeal, the initial decision in that appeal is now final.
                                                                                            7

      closed.   5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(d).       Further, to satisfy the “new and material
      evidence” criterion for granting a petition for review, the new evidentiary
      submission must be of sufficient weight to warrant an outcome different from that
      ordered by the administrative judge.            Russo v. Veterans Administration,
      3 M.S.P.R. 345, 349 (1980).
¶13        The appellant has not satisfied the aforementioned requirements for his
      newly submitted evidence. The evidence includes a recent article describing his
      Director and several other agency officials as being under administrative
      investigation, seemingly because of some other individual’s whistleblowing, but
      we find this evidence immaterial to the appellant’s whistleblowing claim or this
      appeal, generally.     PFR File, Tab 8 at 4-7.      The appellant’s newly submitted
      evidence also includes affidavits that are dated after the close of record below,
      which he describes as relevant to his whistleblower claim. Id. at 8-9. But the
      information contained in these documents is not new, and the appellant has not
      established its materiality.      See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(d) (explaining that, to
      constitute new evidence on review, the information contained in the documents
      that a party submits, and not just the documents themselves, must have been
      unavailable when the record closed below). The remaining evidence submitted on
      review,   which      apparently   involves    matters   other   than   the   appellant’s
      whistleblower affirmative defense, is unavailing for the same reasons. PFR File,
      Tab 8 at 10-18.

      The appellant failed to prove his harmful procedural error claim.
¶14        The Board will reverse a removal action if an appellant shows that the
      agency committed a harmful procedural error. 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(2)(A); 5 C.F.R.
      § 1201.56(c)(1). A harmful error is one that is likely to have caused the agency
      to reach a conclusion different from the one it would have reached in the absence
      or cure of the error. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(r).
¶15        On review, the appellant reasserts that the agency failed to follow
      “VHA700,” an apparent reference to the agency’s handbook for administrative
                                                                                        8

      investigations. PFR File, Tab 1 at 8; IAF, Tab 20 at 120-200. According to the
      appellant, the agency’s Administrative Investigation Board (AIB) did not validate
      the veracity of witnesses, did not interview his witnesses, and was tainted by
      individuals with retaliatory animus or conflicts of interest.      PFR File, Tab 1
      at 8-10.   He further argues that the AIB did not adequatel y or appropriately
      question him about the matters that the agency ultimately relied on to remove
      him, and did not provide him with adequate opportunity to participate in the
      investigation. Id. at 9. The administrative judge did not find these arguments
      persuasive, and we do not either. ID at 43-44.
¶16         Although the appellant has referred to the agency’s administrative
      investigation handbook, generally, he has failed to identify any specific provision
      within that handbook that the agency may have violated. PFR File, Tabs 8-10.
      Moreover, while the appellant is essentially arguing that the agency would not
      have concluded that he engaged in misconduct if the AIB had taken additional
      investigatory measures, that contention is not persuasive in light of the age ncy
      proving its case, here, before the Board. Cf. Simmons v. Department of the Air
      Force, 99 M.S.P.R. 28, ¶¶ 34-35 (2005) (finding unpersuasive an appellant’s
      speculation as to what he might have said during an agency’s investigation absent
      the agency’s alleged error, and reasoning that the appellant’s hearing testimony
      was consistent with what he stated during the investigation), aff’d per curiam sub
      nom. Gebhart v. Department of the Air Force, 186 F. App’x 996 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
      Accordingly, we find no basis for disturbing the administrative judge’s
      well-reasoned findings for the appellant’s harmful error claims.

      The administrative judge properly addressed the agency’s chosen penalty.
¶17         Among those factors that an agency should consider in determining the
      appropriate penalty for an employee’s misconduct is his length of service.
      Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 305-06 (1981).         In what
      appears to be one final argument on review, the appellant summarily asserts that
      the administrative judge and deciding official both erred in failing to
                                                                                           9

      acknowledge his “30-year Federal career.” PFR File, Tab 1 at 10. However, this
      argument appears to misstate his prior service.        The record includes a sworn
      statement wherein the appellant explained that he worked for the agency between
      2000 and 2004, then worked in the private sector for approximately 9 years before
      he returned to the agency in 2012, where he remained until his 2016 removal.
      IAF, Tab 11 at 503.      He testified similarly at the Board hearing.        Hearing
      Compact Disc, Day 2 (testimony of the appellant). Notes from the appellant’s
      oral response to the proposed removal also indicate that during his reply, he
      “went over his professional career to include his military experience which
      spanned 30 years between private and public organizations.” IAF, Tab 11 at 26.
¶18        Moreover,    the   record   shows   that   both   the   deciding   official   and
      administrative judge considered the appellant’s prior service, even if neither
      described it in the way he may have preferred. The deciding official completed a
      penalty selection worksheet in which he specifically state d that he considered
      “years of service” as a mitigating factor. Id. at 22. The administrative judge
      similarly acknowledged the appellant’s “length of service” as a mitigating factor
      in analyzing the reasonableness of the chosen penalty. ID at 50. Accordingly, we
      conclude that the appellant has not presented any persuasive basis for disturbing
      the agency’s penalty or the administrative judge’s analysis of the same.           See
      generally Scheffler v. Department of the Army , 117 M.S.P.R. 499, ¶ 14 (2012)
      (recognizing that the Board will mitigate a penalty only if the Board finds that the
      agency did not weigh the relevant factors or that the penalty clearly exceeds the
      bounds of reasonableness), aff’d, 522 F. App’x 913 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
                                                                                       10

                           NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 8
      You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
review and the appropriate forum with which to file.               5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
jurisdiction.   If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choice s of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you    must   submit   your   petition   to   the   court    at   the
following address:

8
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                   11

                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particu lar
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or   EEOC     review   of   cases     involving   a   claim   of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court (not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
                                                                                12

requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security.        See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant   to   the   Whistleblower    Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
                                                                                     13

disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 9 The court of appeals must receive your
petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court a t the
following address:
                               U.S. Court of Appeals
                               for the Federal Circuit
                              717 Madison Place, N.W.
                              Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscour ts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

9
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                       14

      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                  /s/ for
                                        Jennifer Everling
                                        Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.