Court Opinion

ID: 9719030
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:41:05.265671+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:04.299584
License: Public Domain

WOOLPERT, J.
—I join in my colleagues’ judgment. I agree the particular circumstances causing defendant to admit the prior conviction were prejudicial and entitle him to a trial on that issue, however unlikely any defense may be. Nevertheless, I would not be so quick to readily accept the Bra-camonte and Tipton theory that denial of bifurcation is reversible error.
As stated in People v. Tipton (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 853, 855 [206 Cal.Rptr. 821], “[i]n Bracamonte the court declared, as a rule of criminal practice, that whenever \ . . a defendant pleads not guilty of priors and a *898jury trial thereof is not waived, he is entitled to a bifurcated proceeding wherein the jury is not informed of his prior convictions, either through allegations in the charge or by the introduction of evidence, until it has found the defendant guilty.’ ”
Bracamonte and Tipton both require bifurcation on the theory that the jurors should not hear disposition-type evidence which is irrelevant to guilt. In each case the court concluded evidence of the prior convictions was inadmissible under Beagle standards. The Bracamonte court did limit its general conclusion that a unitary trial causes prejudice, qualifying the conclusion with the language “in this particular case. ...” (People v. Bracamonte (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 644, 655 [174 Cal.Rptr. 191].) Earlier it announced its rule in broad terms suggesting bifurcation should be afforded in all such cases. (Id., at p. 654.) Not all courts have found the Bracamonte rule to be justified. (People v. Trujillo (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 1077, 1090-1091 [202 Cal.Rptr. 832].) If the conviction resulted in imprisonment, the fact of imprisonment is beyond challenge except for identity, a challenge seldom made, and legal questions concerning the validity of the conviction are reserved for decision by the court, not the jury. (Ibid.)
Although I too have some doubts about the need for bifurcation, I have serious reservations about expanding the “rule” to almost per se consequence when violated. If the purpose of the rule is to sanitize the defendant during the guilt trial, it does so, but should not always do so. If in light of Castro there is a Castro-Beagle qualifying prior conviction to be used for impeachment purposes, it may be used even though its use may coincidentally prove the prior conviction for enhancement purposes. Neither Braca-monte nor Tipton hold that permissible impeachment is made impermissible by the bifurcation rule. To the contrary, in the usual case in which defendant testifies, the prior conviction is admitted.
Courts are scrupulous in their efforts to protect defendants from prejudicial disposition-type evidence, but make exceptions which involve mysterious qualifications. Each exception bears a red flag of uncertainty and promotes appeal. Influenced by these prohibitions and exceptions, curious results follow. A defendant whose crime spree has been halted by arrest, may face multiple count charges, or piecemeal prosecution, depending upon time of discovery of the crimes and joinder rules.
The hesitant prosecutor who fails to charge all known crimes in one complaint, may reach trial with a desire to bring in evidence of the other crimes only to fail because of the limitations required by People v. Thompson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 303 [165 Cal.Rptr. 289, 611 P.2d 883]. However, to the *899extent multiple counts may be charged and are tried, jurors hear evidence of other crimes simply because each crime must be proven.
On the other hand, the fortuitous circumstance of when the crimes are discovered may require separate trials. Thus, a jury may hear weak evidence on each of several counts in one action, yet will not hear conclusive proof of a similar crime which resulted in an earlier conviction by another jury if the prior conviction fails to qualify for impeachment under Castro.
These strange results may be the necessary consequence of rules based upon the belief that jurors are unable to fairly consider information about prior criminal activity and are likely to find guilt if there is evidence of disposition. If so, due process requires care in this respect. The ultimate logical extension of the antidisposition evidence approach would be to require the severance of all counts in order that the jury truly divorce disposition as a consideration in determining guilt.
I agree with the conclusion the unique pr e-Castro circumstances made inapplicable the logic of defense counsel and the trial court. Ms. Vollmer observed: “I see, well, of course, if the jury hears it for one purpose, they’re going to hear it for other purposes, anyway.” The court agreed. However, it was not that simple. Understandably neither counsel nor the court anticipated the appellate rule we follow which assumes the trial court would not have admitted evidence of the prior conviction, even if it were Castro-qualifying when properly weighed against potential prejudice. Therefore, following the logic of the other members of this court I agree the enhancement has not been fairly established.
I caution, however, that Ms. Vollmer’s observation may in some cases be a proper one. If a defendant testifies and denies the prior conviction, the prosecutor must then prove the prior conviction, absent an admission which often follows the question. Impeachment is permitted and cannot be denied merely because an enhancement is alleged.
In a bifurcated trial, if a defendant denies a prior conviction and the jury hears the prosecution’s necessary proof of that fact, the jury need not make a written finding before it may consider the prior conviction for impeachment purposes. By contrast, in a unitary trial the jury would have to make a finding that the enhancement allegation is true. Despite appellant’s argument, the requirement of a written finding would not unduly prejudice defendant in a unitary trial.
Having superficially agreed with the Vollmer observation, I agree with the majority in many situations it would not be all that simple. If a defend*900ant’s denial of a prior conviction causes the jurors to hear nothing more than would be the case if no enhancement were charged, then bifurcation would be an unnecessary procedure. This assumes, of course, the trial court reserved its ruling on bifurcation until the defendant testified and was impeached, and did not initially read to the jury the portion of the information charging the enhancement. If, however, the information charges a prior prison term, or its proof requires anything more than jurors would ordinarily hear in routine impeachment, evidence irrelevant to impeachment would reach the jurors, perhaps exposing the jurors to prejudicial disposition evidence.
Because it will be difficult to sanitize the proceeding to the point the defendant testifies and is impeached, and because a unitary trial may result in conflicting cautionary instructions, it seems unlikely a cautious court will want to work very hard to avoid a bifurcated trial. If the defendant testifies and admits the prior conviction for impeachment purposes, it is likely the deferred issue will then disappear with a belated admission for enhancement purposes.
Therefore, agreeing with the result in this case, I reserve judgment whether the failure to bifurcate is always of serious consequence.
The petitions of both parties for review by the Supreme Court were denied April 17, 1986.