Court Opinion

ID: 9902061
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-22 20:09:18.972138+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:43.918617
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Alliman v. Sigsworth, 2023-Ohio-4236.]

                            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                    OTTAWA COUNTY

James Alliman                                         Court of Appeals No. OT-23-040

        Petitioner

v.

Sheriff Paul Sigsworth                                DECISION AND JUDGMENT

        Respondent                                    Decided: November 22, 2023

                                                  *****

        Michael H. Stahl, William V. Stephenson, and Michael G.
        Aird, for petitioner.

        Kevin J. Baxter, Erie County Prosecuting Attorney, and
        Charles Bennett, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondent.

                                                  *****

        SULEK, J.

        {¶ 1} On October 17, 2023, James Alliman petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus,

alleging that he is being held unlawfully pursuant to an unreasonable pretrial bond of

$500,000, no ten percent allowed. On October 23, 2023, this court issued the writ and

ordered respondent Erie County Sheriff Paul Sigsworth to file a return. On October 31,

2023, Sigsworth filed his return in conjunction with a motion to dismiss and a motion for
summary judgment. Alliman filed his response on November 3, 2023. Upon review of

the record, arguments, and assertions of the parties, this court holds that Alliman has not

demonstrated that he is being held unlawfully.

       {¶ 2} By way of background, Alliman’s habeas petition comes following this

court’s reversal of his conviction on reconsideration in State v. Alliman, 6th Dist. Ottawa

No. OT-21-024, 2023-Ohio-2617. Upon remand, the trial court reimposed the $500,000

bond with no ten percent allowed that existed prior to his jury trial.

       {¶ 3} “In general, persons accused of crimes are bailable by sufficient sureties, and

‘[e]xcessive bail shall not be required.’” Chari v. Vore, 91 Ohio St.3d 323, 325, 744

N.E.2d 763 (2001), quoting Article I, Section 9, Ohio Constitution. “Habeas corpus is

the proper remedy to raise the claim of excessive bail in pretrial-release cases.” Id. “The

burden of proof in an excessive-bail habeas petition is on the petitioner.” DuBose v.

McGuffey, 168 Ohio St.3d 1, 2022-Ohio-8, 195 N.E.3d 951, ¶ 12, citing Chari at 326.

“Whether a particular bail determination is unconstitutionally excessive is a question of

law appropriate for de novo review.” Id. at ¶ 15.

       {¶ 4} In his petition, Alliman points to the factors under Crim.R. 46 to argue that

the bail amount of $500,000 with no ten percent allowed is excessive. Alliman also cites

DuBose for the proposition that “public safety is not a consideration with respect to the

financial conditions of bail.” (Emphasis sic.) DuBose at ¶ 24. Notably, in November

2022, in response to the holding in DuBose, the citizens in this state amended Article I,

Section 9 of the Ohio Constitution to specify that “[w]hen determining the amount of

2.
bail, the court shall consider public safety, including the seriousness of the offense, and a

person’s criminal record, the likelihood a person will return to court, and any other factor

the general assembly may prescribe.” In light of the constitutional amendment, the Ohio

Supreme Court repealed Crim.R. 46. In its place, the General Assembly enacted R.C.

2937.011, which is substantially similar to former Crim.R. 46, and which sets forth the

factors and considerations for setting the conditions of pretrial release. Alliman’s

arguments under former Crim.R. 46 will thus be considered under R.C. 2937.011.

       {¶ 5} R.C. 2937.011 provides,

              (A) Unless the court orders the defendant detained pursuant to

       section 2937.222 of the Revised Code or other applicable law, the court

       shall release the defendant on the least restrictive conditions that, in the

       discretion of the court, will reasonably assure the defendant’s appearance in

       court, the protection or safety of any person or the community, and that the

       defendant will not obstruct the criminal justice process. If the court orders

       financial conditions of release, those financial conditions shall be related to

       public safety, the defendant’s risk of nonappearance in court, the

       seriousness of the offense, and the previous criminal record of the

       defendant.

              (B) Any financial conditions shall be in an amount and type that are

       least costly to the defendant while also sufficient to reasonably assure the

       defendant’s future appearance in court.

3.
               ***

               (E) * * * [I]n determining the types, amounts, and conditions of bail,

      the court shall consider all relevant information, including the following:

               (1) The nature and circumstances of the crime charged, and

      specifically whether the defendant used or had access to a weapon;

               (2) The weight of the evidence against the defendant;

               (3) The confirmation of the defendant’s identity;

               (4) The defendant’s family ties, employment, financial resources,

      character, mental condition, length of residence in the community,

      jurisdiction of residence, record of convictions, record of appearance at

      court proceedings or of flight to avoid prosecution;

               (5) Whether the defendant is on probation, a community control

      sanction, parole, post-release control, bail, or under a court protection

      order;

               (6) The considerations required under Ohio Constitution, Article I,

      Section 9.

      {¶ 6} Under the first factor listed in R.C. 2937.011(E)(1), the nature and

circumstances of the crimes charged are very serious. Alliman was indicted on nine

counts of rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) and (B), and one count of rape in

violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2) and (B). The charges arose from Alliman’s alleged

conduct in raping his minor daughters on multiple occasions. Alliman notes that there is

4.
no allegation that he used or had access to a weapon during the commission of these

offenses.

       {¶ 7} Under the second factor, Alliman argues that the evidence against him is not

strong. According to Alliman, the only evidence against him is the testimony of the two

victims, both of whom delayed in their disclosure of the alleged abuse. Alliman

emphasizes that there is no confession and no physical evidence in this case. Further, he

points to this court’s decision reversing his conviction on reconsideration, in which the

lead opinion stated, “When excising the erroneously admitted expert testimony and

weighing the remaining evidence, we do not find that appellant’s guilt is established

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Alliman, 6th Dist. Ottawa No. OT-21-024, 2023-Ohio-

2617, ¶ 20. On the other hand, as noted by Sigsworth, a jury of Alliman’s peers heard the

testimony of the two victims and determined they were credible in finding Alliman guilty

of all ten counts of rape.

       {¶ 8} Under the third factor, there is no dispute concerning Alliman’s identity as

the appropriate defendant.

       {¶ 9} Under the fourth factor, there is no dispute that Alliman is a life-long

resident and has significant family ties to the area, that he was gainfully employed with

the railroad for many years until his arrest, that he has no prior felony convictions, and

that he has appeared at all court proceedings. In addition, there is no dispute that Alliman

has limited financial resources and is unable to post a $500,000 bond.

5.
       {¶ 10} Under the fifth factor, there is no dispute that Alliman is not on probation,

community control, parole, post-release control, or bail for any other offense.

       {¶ 11} Finally, under the sixth factor, “the court shall consider public safety,

including the seriousness of the offense, and a person’s criminal record, [and] the

likelihood a person will return to court.” Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 9. Here,

while Alliman does not have a prior felony record, the ten counts of rape of a minor that

he is facing are incredibly serious offenses demonstrating his danger to the public. As to

the likelihood that Alliman will return to court, it is noteworthy that the circumstances

have changed since bail was set prior to his first trial. Alliman has been found guilty by a

jury on all ten counts and has been sentenced to life without the possibility of parole.

Although his conviction was overturned on appeal due to an evidentiary issue, the

possibility of being convicted again could provide motivation to flee. See Garcia v.

Wasylyshyn, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-07-041, 2007-Ohio-3951, ¶ 8 (“The nature and

number of counts, as well as the possible sentences if convicted, support the implication

that petitioner may indeed be a flight risk and that protection of the community is also

necessary.”).

       {¶ 12} Upon review, Alliman has failed to satisfy his burden to demonstrate that

the trial court’s imposition of a cumulative $500,000 pretrial bond with no ten percent

allowed is excessive. This case is similar to Stevens v. Navarre, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-

21-1010, 2021-Ohio-551, 168 N.E.3d 578. In Stevens, the defendant sought habeas relief

from a pretrial bond of $1.4 million with no ten percent allowed. Stevens was charged

6.
with nine counts of rape, twelve counts of gross sexual imposition, six counts of sexual

battery, and five counts of pandering obscenity to a minor. Id. at ¶ 11. The charges arose

from Stevens’ use of his position at a local public high school, his position as a coach,

and his status as a local parent to target, groom, sexually assault, and rape six children in

his community. Id. Like Alliman, Stevens was a longtime resident of the community,

had no prior felony criminal record, and lacked the financial resources to satisfy the bond.

Id. In addition, while Stevens did involve at least some physical evidence in the form of

seminal fluid of one of the minor victims being found in Stevens’ bedroom, the majority

of the evidence consisted of the victims’ testimony. Id. at ¶ 12. In this case, although

there is no physical evidence, the jury’s prior finding of guilt suggests that the weight of

the evidence in the form of the victims’ testimony is significant.

       {¶ 13} In Stevens, this court held that Stevens did not demonstrate that his $1.4

million pretrial bond was excessive. Id. at ¶ 19. Likewise, Alliman has not demonstrated

that his pretrial bond is excessive. “The purpose of bail is to secure the attendance of the

accused at his trial.” Bland v. Holden, 21 Ohio St.2d 238, 239, 257 N.E.2d 397 (1970).

“[I]f an accused is charged with crimes the conviction for which would result in long

incarceration, with little hope of early release or probation, the incentive to abscond is

greater and the amount must be such as to discourage the accused from absconding.” Id.

       {¶ 14} Here, the $500,000 bond with no ten percent allowed is reasonable and not

excessive in light of the serious nature of the ten counts of rape of a minor that Alliman is

charged with, the danger that he poses to the public, and the incentive to abscond given

7.
that he has already been convicted once for the crimes and sentenced to life in prison

without the possibility of parole. Accordingly, upon review of the record, the arguments

of the parties, and the factors contained in R.C. 2937.011, this action is dismissed with

prejudice. Costs are assessed to Alliman.

       {¶ 15} To the Clerk: Manner of Service.

       {¶ 16} The clerk is directed to serve upon all parties in a manner prescribed by

Civ.R. 5(B) notice of the judgment and its date of entry upon the journal.

                                                                             Action dismissed.

Thomas J. Osowik, J.                             ____________________________
                                                            JUDGE
Gene A. Zmuda, J.
                                                 ____________________________
Charles E. Sulek, J.                                        JUDGE
CONCUR.
                                                 ____________________________
                                                           JUDGE

              This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
         Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
              version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
                       http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.

8.