Court Opinion

ID: 9916890
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-10 20:03:35.520326+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:05.591844
License: Public Domain

2024 IL App (1st) 231891-U
                                              No. 1-23-1891B
                                       Order filed January 10, 2024
                                                                                           Fifth Division

 NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
 limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
 ______________________________________________________________________________
                                     IN THE
                         APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                                 FIRST DISTRICT
 ______________________________________________________________________________

 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                              )   Appeal from the
                                                                   )   Circuit Court of
           Plaintiff-Appellee,                                     )   Cook County.
                                                                   )
     v.                                                            )   Nos. 23CR7179
                                                                   )        23CR8051
 STILES COTTRELL,                                                  )
                                                                   )   Honorable
           Defendant-Appellant.                                    )   Charles P. Burns,
                                                                   )   Judge Presiding.

           JUSTICE LYLE delivered the judgment of the court.
           Justices Mikva and Navarro concurred in the judgment.

                                                ORDER

¶1        Held: We affirm the circuit court’s order granting the State’s petition for pretrial detention.

¶2        Defendant Stiles Cottrell appeals from an order of the circuit court denying him pretrial

release under article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/art. 110

(West 2022) (Code)), as amended by Public Act 101-652 § 10-255 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023), commonly

known as the Safety, Accountability, Fairness and Equity-Today Act (Act). Mr. Cottrell contends

that the trial court erred in considering and granting the State’s detention petitions because the Act
No. 1-23-1891B

does not permit the State to file a detention petition where a defendant was in pretrial custody

before the Act went into effect and was ordered released with pretrial conditions, including

depositing a bail security. He also contends that the circuit court erred in finding that the State met

its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that he posed a real and present threat to

the safety of any person or persons or the community, and that no condition or combination of

conditions of pretrial release could mitigate that real and present threat. For the reasons that follow,

we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

¶3                                       I. BACKGROUND

¶4     On June 7, 2023, Mr. Cottrell was arrested and charged with home invasion and unlawful

restraint (case no. 23CR7179). A bond hearing was held on June 8, where the court held Mr.

Cottrell on a $250,000 D-bond and ordered that he be placed on electronic monitoring if released.

On June 26, 2023, while in custody at the Cook County Jail, Mr. Cottrell was arrested and charged

with residential burglary that allegedly took place on May 29, 2023 (case no. 23CR8051). On

August 15, 2023, the court held a bond hearing on Mr. Cottrell’s residential burglary case, where

it placed him on a $200,000 D-bond, and ordered that he be placed on electronic monitoring if

released. Mr. Cottrell was unable to pay the bonds and was held in custody. On September 18,

2023, while Mr. Cottrell was in pretrial detention, the Act went into effect. Rowe v. Raoul, 2023

IL 129248, ¶ 52.

¶5     On October 4, 2023, Mr. Cottrell filed a petition to remove a financial condition of pretrial

release. In the petition, Mr. Cottrell contended that under the Act he was entitled to a hearing under

section 110-5(e) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-5(e) (West 2022)). Mr. Cottrell asserted that under

section 110-5(f-5), the court was not required to be presented with new information or a change in

circumstance to remove pretrial conditions. He maintained that he was 18 years old, had no prior

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No. 1-23-1891B

felony convictions, was attending high school, and had a job before his arrest. Mr. Cottrell asked

the court for a hearing on his petition.

¶6     That same day, the State filed petitions in both of Mr. Cottrell’s cases for a pretrial

detention hearing pursuant to section 110-6.1 of the Act. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1 (West 2022). In the

petition for case 23CR7179, the State alleged that Mr. Cottrell committed the forcible felony of

home invasion when he entered the home of two victims and attacked them when they attempted

to call police. In the petition for case 23CR8051, the State alleged that Mr. Cottrell committed the

forcible felony of residential burglary when he entered the apartment of the victim and stole money

from her when she confronted him. In both cases, the State contended that Mr. Cottrell posed a

real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community based on the specific

and articulable facts of the case. The State also asserted that no condition or combination of

conditions of pretrial release could mitigate that threat.

¶7     The matter proceeded to a hearing on Mr. Cottrell’s petition and the State’s two petitions.

At the hearing, the State proffered that the first offense occurred at midnight on May 29, 2023, at

the 200 block of North Dearborn Street. The female victim was doing laundry in her apartment

building. When she returned to her apartment unit, she observed Mr. Cottrell inside looking

through her purse. She confronted Mr. Cottrell who took money from her purse and then fled.

¶8     The second offense took place at 10 a.m. on June 7, 2023, at the 500 block of East 33rd

Place. The two victims, one male and one female, were inside their apartment when Mr. Cottrell

opened the front door using a set of keys. Mr. Cottrell told the female victim that he worked for

building maintenance. She did not believe him and took out her phone to call 911. When Mr.

Cottrell noticed that she was dialing 911, he grabbed the female victim, pushed her up against a

wall, started punching her, and ultimately shoved her to the ground. The male victim attempted to

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No. 1-23-1891B

get Mr. Cottrell off of the female victim, and Mr. Cottrell started punching him. Mr. Cottrell struck

the victims multiple times before fleeing. The victims and building security contacted police who

arrested Mr. Cottrell as he was attempting to flee the area on a bus. Both victims and building

security identified Mr. Cottrell at a show-up. After Mr. Cottrell’s arrest, officers who were

investigating the May 29 residential burglary, connected Mr. Cottrell to that incident and the

female victim in that incident identified Mr. Cottrell as the perpetrator.

¶9      The State proffered that at the time of Mr. Cottrell’s arrest on June 7, he was on probation

for a juvenile 2022 criminal trespass to land and also had a pending misdemeanor case for assault

and unlawful use of a weapon. The State argued that based on these facts, Mr. Cottrell posed a real

and present threat to the public and there was no condition or combination of conditions that could

mitigate that risk.

¶ 10    In response, defense counsel contended that under the Act, the State had 21 days after Mr.

Cottrell’s arrest on June 7, 2023, to file its petition. Counsel maintained that the State should

therefore be precluded from filing the petitions on October 4, 2023.

¶ 11    The State responded that precluding it from filing the petitions in this case would be a

“ludicrous result[].” The State asserted that under defense counsel’s interpretation of the Act, the

State would not be able to file detention petitions for anyone who was arrested before September

18, 2023. The State argued this would include all first degree murders, all sex cases, and all violent

felonies.

¶ 12    Defense counsel proceeded to mitigation where he noted that Mr. Cottrell was 18 years old

and was attending high school. Mr. Cottrell had no prior felony convictions and lived in Chicago

with his grandmother. Before being arrested, Mr. Cottrell worked at Lou Malnati’s for about four

months and represented that this job would still be available to him if he were released from

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No. 1-23-1891B

custody. Counsel asked the court to remove the financial condition of his bond and place Mr.

Cottrell on electronic monitoring with his grandmother.

¶ 13    The court first found that Mr. Cottrell had been charged with forcible felonies. The court

also found that the proof was evident and the presumption great that Mr. Cottrell committed the

offenses. The court noted that the victims were “random” and that therefore Mr. Cottrell posed a

real and present threat to the safety of persons and the community based on the facts of the case,

particularly the fact that he allegedly attempted to stop one of the victims of the home invasion

from calling the police.

¶ 14    The court then addressed defense counsel’s argument regarding the timing of the petition.

The court agreed with the State that it was “kind of a ludicrous argument” because defense

attorneys could wait until the 22nd day after the defendant’s arrest to file the request for a bond

hearing and the State would be precluded from asking that the offender should be detained. The

court therefore found that the requirements had been met for Mr. Cottrell to be detained.

¶ 15    In the written orders after the detention hearing, the court found that Mr. Cottrell posed a

real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community where he committed

multiple felonies involving strangers in their homes. The court also found that no condition or

combination of conditions could mitigate the real and present threat because Mr. Cottrell

committed multiple felonies and entered the homes of multiple victims to commit the felonies.

¶ 16    Mr. Cottrell filed a timely notice of appeal from the circuit court’s order. We find that we

have jurisdiction to consider the merits of this appeal. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(j) (West 2022); Ill.

S. Ct. R. 604(h)(1)(iii) (eff. Sept. 18, 2023).

¶ 17                                        II. ANALYSIS

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No. 1-23-1891B

¶ 18   On appeal, Mr. Cottrell contends that the court improperly considered and granted the

State’s detention petitions where the petitions were untimely. He maintains that the plain language

of the Act does not authorize the State to petition to detain defendants who were previously ordered

released on monetary bail before the effective date of the Act but remain detained because they

failed to post bond. He further asserts that the State’s petition was untimely because the State must

file its petition “at the first appearance before a judge” or, with notice to the defendant, “within the

21 calendar days *** after arrest and release of the defendant ***.” 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(c). The

State responds that the Act authorizes it to file a petition to detain when the trial court holds a

hearing to review the conditions of bond under section 110-7.5(a) (725 ILCS 5/110-7.5(a) (West

2022)). These are issues of statutory interpretation that we review de novo. People v. Whitmore,

2023 IL App (1st) 231807, ¶ 5.

¶ 19   The first issue is whether the court erred in considering the State’s detention petitions

where the petitions were filed after Mr. Cottrell filed a motion for a hearing under section 110-

5(e). Mr. Cottrell was entitled to such a hearing under section 110-7.5 of the Act which provides

that any person who remains in pretrial detention after having been ordered released with pretrial

conditions, including the condition of depositing security, shall be entitled to a hearing under

section 110-5(e). Section 110-5(e) in turn provides:

       “If a person remains in pretrial detention 48 hours after having been ordered released with

       pretrial conditions, the court shall hold a hearing to determine the reason for continued

       detention. If the reason for continued detention is due to the unavailability or the

       defendant's ineligibility for one or more pretrial conditions previously ordered by the court

       or directed by a pretrial services agency, the court shall reopen the conditions of release

       hearing to determine what available pretrial conditions exist that will reasonably ensure the

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No. 1-23-1891B

       appearance of a defendant as required, the safety of any other person, and the likelihood of

       compliance by the defendant with all the conditions of pretrial release. The inability of the

       defendant to pay for a condition of release or any other ineligibility for a condition of

       pretrial release shall not be used as a justification for the pretrial detention of that

       defendant.” 725 ILCS 5/110-5(e) (West 2022).

¶ 20   Section 110-7.5 divides detainees who were arrested prior to the effective date of the Act

into three separate categories:

       “The first category consists of any person who was released subject to pretrial conditions

       prior to the effective date of the Act. [725 ILCS 5/110-7.5(a)]. The second category consists

       of any person who remains in pretrial detention after being ordered released with pretrial

       conditions, including the depositing of monetary security. Id. § 110-7.5(b). The third

       category consists of any person who remains in pretrial detention and whose bond was

       previously set as ‘no bail.’ Id.” (Emphasis in original.) People v. Lippert, 2023 IL App

       (5th) 230723, ¶ 9.

Like the defendant in Lippert, Mr. Cottrell falls into the second category. The fifth district has

found that defendants who fall into the second category have two options: They may either “file a

motion seeking a hearing to have their pretrial conditions reviewed anew” under the Act’s

amendments to the Code or they “may elect to stay in detention until such time as the previously

set monetary security may be paid.” People v. Rios, 2023 IL App (5th) 230724, ¶ 16.

¶ 21   In this case, Mr. Cottrell chose the first option by filing a motion seeking a hearing to have

his pretrial conditions reviewed anew under the Act. In doing so, he necessarily sought to “reopen”

consideration of his conditions for release. People v. Davidson, 2023 IL App (2d) 230344, ¶ 18;

725 ILCS 5/110-5(e) (West 2022) (“If the reason for continued detention is due to the

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No. 1-23-1891B

unavailability or the defendant’s ineligibility for one or more pretrial conditions previously ordered

by the court or directed by a pretrial services agency, the court shall reopen the conditions of

release hearing to determine what available pretrial conditions exist that will reasonably ensure

the appearance of a defendant as required, the safety of any other person, and the likelihood of

compliance by the defendant with all the conditions of pretrial release.”) (Emphasis added.).

Because Mr. Cottrell filed a motion for reconsideration of his conditions for release, that in turn

permitted the State to petition the court to deny Mr. Cottrell’s release. See, Davidson, 2023 IL App

(2d) 230344, ¶ 18 (Defendant’s motion seeking to remove the monetary condition from his pretrial

release, “in turn, triggered consideration of defendant’s pretrial release conditions under the Code

as amended by the Act, under which, on the State's petition, the court could deny defendant’s

release altogether.”) (Emphasis in original.); Whitmore, 2023 IL App (1st) 231807, ¶ 8

(“Therefore, the State may petition for the denial of pretrial release of defendants who were ordered

released on bond but were still detained when the Act went into effect.”); People v. Kurzeja, 2023

IL App (3d) 230434, ¶ 15 (“ ‘The Code, as amended by the Act, allows the State to seek to modify

pretrial release conditions, which includes filing a responding petition where the defendant moves

for pretrial release.’ ”) (quoting People v. Jones, 2023 IL App (4th) 230837, ¶ 17). Accordingly,

we find that the court appropriately considered the State’s detention petitions where they were

filed as responsive pleadings to Mr. Cottrell’s motion to remove the financial conditions of his

pretrial release.

¶ 22    This resolution also addresses Mr. Cottrell’s timeliness issue under section 110-6.1(c). 725

ILCS 5/110-6.1(c)(1) (West 2022). The plain language of the Act and the authority cited above

are clear that where a defendant moves to modify the conditions of his pretrial release, the State

may file a responsive petition. “[O]nce a defendant elects to have their pretrial conditions reviewed

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No. 1-23-1891B

anew [citation], the matter returns to the proverbial square one, where the defendant may argue for

the most lenient pretrial release conditions, and the State may make competing arguments.”

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Gray, 2023 IL App (3d) 230435, ¶ 14 (quoting Jones,

2023 IL App (4th) 230837, ¶ 23). Accordingly, we find that once Mr. Cottrell moved to remove

the financial conditions of his pretrial release, the State was permitted to file a responsive petition

to detain Mr. Cottrell and the court did not err in simultaneously considering both the motion and

the petitions at a hearing. Id. ¶ 15.

¶ 23    Mr. Cottrell next contends that the State failed to meet its burden of proving by clear and

convincing evidence that he posed a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons

or the community and that there were no conditions or combination of conditions of pretrial release

that could mitigate that threat. He maintains that the State made only conclusory arguments

regarding the availability of other conditions and failed to establish that he was dangerous. Mr.

Cottrell asserts that the trial court only discussed aggravating factors and ignored the mitigating

factors, such as the fact that Mr. Cottrell was 18 years old, had no prior felony convictions,

previously attended high school, and had a stable job available to him.

¶ 24    Under the Act, we presume that all defendants are entitled to pretrial release. 725 ILCS

5/110-2(a), 6.1(e) (West 2022). The State has the burden of proving at a hearing that a defendant

should be denied pretrial release. Id. To meet its burden, the State must prove by clear and

convincing evidence that: (1) the proof is evident or the presumption great that the defendant has

committed an offense that qualifies for pretrial detention; (2) the defendant poses a real and present

threat to the safety of any person or persons in the community based on the specific and articulable

facts of the case; and (3) no condition or combination of conditions of pretrial release can mitigate

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No. 1-23-1891B

the real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons in the community, based on the

specific and articulable facts of the case. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(1)-(3) (West 2022).

¶ 25   In reviewing the trial court’s order granting, denying, or setting conditions on pretrial

release, we afford great deference to the trial court’s factual determinations and will reverse them

only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Rodriguez, 2023 IL App

(3d) 230450, ¶ 8. The trial court’s ultimate decision to detain or not detain, however, is reviewed

for an abuse of discretion. People v. Inman, 2023 IL App (4th) 230864, ¶ 10 (citing People v.

Simmons, 2019 IL App (1st) 191253, ¶ 9); Whitmore, 2023 IL App (1st) 231807, ¶ 18. An abuse

of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or when

no reasonable person would agree with the position adopted by the trial court. Simmons, 2019 IL

App (1st) 191253, ¶ 9.

¶ 26   We first note that that Mr. Cottrell does not contest that the proof was evident or the

presumption great that he committed a detainable offense. (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1), (e)(1) (West

2022)). In its proffer, the State alleged that Mr. Cottrell committed two separate forcible felonies

about a week apart involving three different victims. In one instance, Mr. Cottrell took money

from the purse of a victim before fleeing and in the other he physically beat both victims when one

of them attempted to call the police. The State also presented Mr. Cottrell’s criminal history which

showed that he was on probation for a juvenile 2022 criminal trespass to land and also had a

pending misdemeanor case for assault and unlawful use of a weapon.

¶ 27   In mitigation, defense counsel argued that Mr. Cottrell was 18 years old and was attending

high school. Mr. Cottrell had no prior felony convictions and lived in Chicago with his

grandmother. Before being arrested, Mr. Cottrell had a job that would still be available to him if

he were released from custody.

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No. 1-23-1891B

¶ 28   In granting the State’s petitions, the court addressed each of the factors required under the

Act. The court found that the proof was evident and the presumption great that Mr. Cottrell was a

threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community because of the “random” nature of

the offenses. The court found that Mr. Cottrell entered the homes of strangers and injured them or

stole from them. In doing so, he committed multiple felonies. The court also noted that Mr. Cottrell

allegedly attempted to stop one of the victims from contacting the police by physically attacking

her.

¶ 29   Based on the proffered evidence, we cannot say that the court’s findings were against the

manifest weight of the evidence. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(2)-(3)(i) (West 2022). The arguments

Mr. Cottrell advances before this court regarding his mitigating evidence is the same evidence he

presented to the trial court. The court considered this mitigating evidence but ultimately found that

the State satisfied its burden. On review, it is not our function to reweigh such factors and substitute

our judgment for that of the circuit court. See People v. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d 205, 214-15 (2010).

¶ 30   We briefly note that Mr. Cottrell argues that the court erred in detaining him because the

State did not “even attempt to meet its burden” of showing that no condition or combination of

conditions of pretrial release could mitigate Mr. Cottrell’s threat to the community. Section 110-5

outlines factors for the court to consider in determining the conditions of release. These factors

include the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, the weight of the evidence against

the defendant, and whether the defendant was on probation at the time of the offense. 725 ILCS

5/110-5(a)(1), (2), (3)(B), (4) (West 2022).

¶ 31   In its petition, and in its proffer, the State alleged that Mr. Cottrell should be detained

because of the violent nature of the charged offenses, which occurred in the victims’ own homes.

The State noted that Mr. Cottrell was on probation at the time of the offenses. One witness

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No. 1-23-1891B

positively identified Mr. Cottrell as the perpetrator in the residential burglary case and two

witnesses and a building security guard identified him as the perpetrator in the home invasion case.

Based on the proffer, the court found that no condition or combination of conditions of pretrial

release could mitigate Mr. Cottrell’s threat to the community. We therefore find Mr. Cottrell’s

contention that the State failed to “even attempt” to meet its burden unfounded.

¶ 32   Accordingly, we find that there were sufficient facts to support the circuit court’s

conclusion that the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that no condition or combination

of conditions could mitigate the real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or

the community and we find no abuse of discretion in the court’s decision to grant the State’s

petitions to detain Mr. Cottrell.

¶ 33                                   III. CONCLUSION

¶ 34   For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.

¶ 35   Affirmed.

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