Court Opinion

ID: 9655454
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 19:10:57.919622+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:18.627040
License: Public Domain

STEINMETZ, J.
(dissenting). In analyzing Virgil v. State, 84 Wis. 2d 166, 267 N.W.2d 852 (1978), and State *704v. Sonnenberg, 117 Wis. 2d 159, 344 N.W.2d 95 (1984), including Chief Justice Beilfuss’s concurring opinion in Virgil, it appears that the plain error rule should only be examined if the evidence complained about was not objected to at trial. The application of it should be used sparingly by the terms of sec. 901.03(4), Stats., “and only in cases . . . where a basic constitutional right has not been extended to the accused.” Virgil, 84 Wis. 2d at 195, C.J. Beilfuss concurring.
“The rule focuses on whether the error is ‘plain’ and whether it affects ‘substantial rights.’ As such, the rule serves a different purpose than the ‘interest of justice’ rule contained in sec. 251.09, Stats, [now sec. 751.06] Unlike sec. 251.09, the plain-error rule does not implicate issues such as miscarriage of justice or probable different result on retrial. See, Pappas v. Jack O.A. Nelsen Agency, Inc., 81 Wis. 2d 363, 375, 260 N.W.2d 721 (1978).” Virgil, 84 Wis. 2d at 189-90, n. 2.
“ ‘Harmless error’ is error raised at trial but found not to affect substantial rights. ‘Prejudicial’ or ‘reversible’ error is error raised at trial which is found to affect substantial rights. ‘Plain error’ is error not raised at trial, but nevertheless considered by a reviewing court, which is found to affect substantial rights. The distinction between harmless and reversible error thus turns on whether substantial rights are affected, and the distinction between harmless and plain error on whether the particular error in the case at hand excuses the party’s failure to bring it properly to the trial court’s attention.” Weinstein and Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence, Vol. 1, at 103-6 to 103-7.
In Virgil, this court held that the defendant’s conviction had been obtained through- a violation of his confrontation rights under both the United States and the Wisconsin Constitutions. We stated:
“This violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights is so serious, viewed in the context of the other evidence properly admitted in this case, that we conclude that the *705admission of the evidence constitutes plain error, requiring a reversal of the conviction.
“The needs of our system of justice also bolster our view that the conviction must be reversed. A trial conducted in violation of the defendant’s confrontation rights is a trial that flouts fundamental concepts of justice basic to our system. Where a defendant is convicted in a way inconsistent with the fairness and integrity of judicial proceedings, then the courts should invoke the plain-error rule in order to protect their own public reputation. United States v. Vaughan, 443 F.2d 92, 95 (2d Cir. 1971).” 84 Wis. 2d at 192.
In Sonnenberg, we found no denial of any fundamental constitutional right nor a substantial impairment of the right of a fair trial. 117 Wis. 2d at 178. Therefore, we applied the harmless error test of Wold v. State, 57 Wis. 2d 344, 356-57, 204 N.W.2d 482 (1973). We concluded in Sonnenberg: “[T]here was sufficient evidence independent of and uninfluenced by Cathy Herman’s testimony to have permitted the jury to reach the conclusion that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” 117 Wis. 2d at 180.
As stated in Virgil: “[P]lain error on its face is ipso facto prejudicial; and once plain error is determined, no inquiry in respect to whether it is prejudicial is necessary or permissible.” 84 Wis. 2d at 190. We did not change this ruling in Sonnenberg. In that case we found plain error did not take place during the trial. Justice Ceci’s concurring opinion cites to Sonnenberg, 117 Wis. 2d at 179, and states: “Reversal is required when it appears that the result might probably have been more favorable to the complaining party had this error not occurred.” Reliance on the foregoing test is not consistent with the concurring opinion’s finding the error was plain error.
The test for plain error was not met since the introduction of the defendant’s son’s no contest plea did not deny the defendant a basic constitutional right. See, Sonnenberg, 117 Wis. 2d at 178.
*706In the instant case after considering all of the evidence, I do not find plain error and under the total circumstances of the case, find the error was harmless. In addition, I would not, as three members of this court conclude, overrule Lomagro. I would, therefore, affirm the court of appeals since I would not grant this defendant a new trial.
I am authorized to state that Justice Roland B. Day joins in this dissenting opinion.