Court Opinion

ID: 9401032
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-09 19:10:32.896424+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:50.275205
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Lacy, 2023-Ohio-1923.]

                             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                 SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                       ERIE COUNTY

State of Ohio                                        Court of Appeals No. E-22-043

        Appellee                                     Trial Court No. 2021 CR 0173

v.

Mario Lacy, Sr.                                      DECISION AND JUDGMENT

        Appellant                                    Decided: June 9, 2023

                                              *****

        Kevin J. Baxter, Erie County Prosecuting Attorney, and
        Kristin R. Palmer, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

        Henry Schaefer, for appellant.

                                              *****

        SULEK, J.

                                           I. Introduction

        {¶ 1} Appellant Mario Lacy, Sr., appeals the September 9, 2022 judgment of the

Erie County Court of Common Pleas which, following Lacy’s guilty plea, sentenced him

to an indefinite prison term. Lacy maintains that indefinite sentencing pursuant to the

Reagan Tokes Law, R.C. 2967.271, is unconstitutional because it violates his right to due
process, the separation of powers doctrine, and his right to trial by jury. For the reasons

that follow, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

                                  II. Relevant Background

       {¶ 2} In the spring of 2021, Lacy was coaching a youth team in a basketball

tournament when he got into an altercation with a parent inside the gymnasium. The

confrontation eventually continued outside in the parking lot, with much of it recorded on

video. Lacy, who was prohibited from carrying a firearm at the time, pulled out a gun

and shot at the parent four times, causing serious physical harm. Lacy then fled the scene

in his truck with his children. He disposed of the firearm in a nearby pond.

       {¶ 3} Following these events, the Erie County Grand Jury indicted Lacy on three

counts of attempted murder, two counts of felonious assault, one count of having

weapons under disability, two counts of tampering with evidence, two counts of

improperly handling firearms in a motor vehicle, one count of inducing panic, and three

counts of endangering children.

       {¶ 4} On June 14, 2022, Lacy pled guilty to: (1) one count of felonious assault,

with an amended firearms specification; (2) one count of having weapons under

disability; and (3) one count of inducing panic. In exchange, the state agreed to dismiss

the remaining charges.

       {¶ 5} On September 9, 2022, the trial court sentenced Lacy to serve an indefinite

prison term of 6 to 9 years for the felonious assault, a mandatory 3 years for the firearm

specification, 30 months for having weapons under disability, and 17 months for inducing

2.
panic. The trial court ordered all of the sentences to be served consecutively, for a total

indefinite prison term of 155 to 191 months. It is from this sentencing decision that Lacy

now appeals.

                                 III. Assignment of Error

       {¶ 6} Lacy asserts the following assignment of error on appeal:

               I. As amended by the Reagan Tokes Act, the Revised Code’s

       sentences for first and second degree qualifying felonies violate the United

       States and Ohio Constitutions. The court erred in issuing an indefinite

       sentence pursuant to the Act.

                                        IV. Analysis

                                       A. Due Process

       {¶ 7} Lacy first argues that R.C. 2967.271 violates his right to due process under

the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 16 of

the Ohio Constitution by depriving him of adequate notice and a fair hearing.

       {¶ 8} R.C. 2967.271(C) allows for the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation

and Corrections (ODRC) to rebut a presumption of release after the minimum

prison sentence has been served if, at a hearing, it is found that:

               (1) Regardless of the security level in which the offender is

       classified at the time of the hearing, both of the following apply:

               (a) During the offender’s incarceration, the offender committed

       institutional rule infractions that involved compromising the security of a

3.
      state correctional institution, compromising the safety of the staff of a state

      correctional institution or its inmates, or physical harm or the threat of

      physical harm to the staff of a state correctional institution or its inmates, or

      committed a violation of law that was not prosecuted, and the infractions or

      violations demonstrate that the offender has not been rehabilitated.

               (b) The offender’s behavior while incarcerated, including, but not

      limited to the infractions and violations specified in division (C)(1)(a) of

      this section, demonstrate that the offender continues to pose a threat to

      society.

               (2) Regardless of the security level in which the offender is

      classified at the time of the hearing, the offender has been placed by the

      department in extended restrictive housing at any time within the year

      preceding the date of the hearing.

               (3) At the time of the hearing, the offender is classified by the

      department as a security level three, four, or five, or at a higher security

      level.

      {¶ 9} Here, the ODRC has not yet sought to extend Lacy’s presumptive

minimum sentence and therefore his claim is merely a facial challenge to the law.

“When a statute is challenged on its face, the challenger must provide proof

beyond a reasonable doubt that no set of circumstances exists under which the

4.
statute would be valid.” State v. Eaton, 2022-Ohio-2432, 192 N.E.3d 1236, ¶ 21

(6th Dist.). Lacy has not met this burden of proof.

       {¶ 10} In support of his assignment of error, Lacy argues that there is a lack of

notice due to the vague standards of “not been rehabilitated” and “pose a threat to

society.” This court has addressed these facial claims of vagueness regarding these

phrases in State v. Bothuel, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-20-1053, 2022-Ohio-2606, ¶ 42. This

court reasoned that “‘[a] facial challenge requires that the challenging party * * * show

that the statute is vague not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to

an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no

standard of conduct is specified at all.’” Id. at ¶ 43, quoting State v. Carrick, 131 Ohio

St.3d 340, 2012-Ohio-608, 965 N.E.2d 264, ¶ 15. In holding that the facial claim of

vagueness failed, this court concluded that “a standard is specified in the statute.”

(Emphasis sic.) Id.

       {¶ 11} Lacy also argues that R.C. 2967.271 provides “no structure

regarding the manner in which the hearing will be conducted” and therefore it

violates his due process right to a fair hearing. Again, however, this is merely a

facial challenge to the constitutionality of the law and this court has held that

“R.C. 2967.271 does not, on its face, violate the constitutional right to due process

because even though the specific procedures for the applicable ‘hearing’ are not

set forth in the law itself, the law may ultimately be applied in a manner that is not

unconstitutional.” State v. Printke, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-21-1233, 2022-Ohio-

5.
2981, ¶ 7, citing State v. Stenson, 2022-Ohio-2072, 190 N.E.3d 1240, ¶ 33 (6th

Dist.).

          {¶ 12} Therefore, Lacy has not established that R.C. 2967.271 violates his

right to due process.

                                   B. Separation of Powers

          {¶ 13} Lacy next argues that R.C. 2967.271 is unconstitutional as it violates the

separation-of-powers doctrine by transferring sentencing authority from the judicial

branch to the ODRC, an agency of the executive branch.

          {¶ 14} In Eaton, this court addressed this same issue and concluded that R.C.

2967.271 did not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine, holding that a thirteen-year

minimum and eighteen-year maximum sentence, with the option of parole at the ODRC’s

discretion, did not delegate sentencing authority to branches outside of the judiciary.

Eaton, 2022-Ohio-2432, 192 N.E.3d 1236, at ¶ 60. See also State v. Rice, 6th Dist. Wood

No. WD-22-022, 2023-Ohio-743; State v. Anderson, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-22-013,

2022-Ohio-3680; Stenson, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-20-1074, 2022-Ohio-2072; State v.

Gifford, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-21-1201, 2022-Ohio-1620. Lacy’s separation of powers

argument is not well taken.

                                   C. Right to Trial by Jury

          {¶ 15} Finally, Lacy argues that R.C. 2967.271 violates the Sixth Amendment to

the United States Constitution because it permits an additional punishment for conduct

not found by a jury. Like the issues above, this court has addressed an identical argument

6.
in Bothuel and found it unavailing. R.C. 2967.271 does not allow for the ORDC to

extend the sentence beyond the maximum permitted by statute and imposed by the

judiciary. Bothuel at ¶ 23; State v. Williams, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-21-1152, 2022-Ohio-

2812, ¶ 16. Thus, it is the trial court, not ODRC that determines Lacy’s maximum

possible punishment. Lacy has not been deprived of his right to a trial by jury.

                                     D. Summary

       {¶ 16} In sum, Lacy has not demonstrated that R.C. 2967.271 is

unconstitutional; the Act does not, on its face, deprive individuals of their right to

due process, it does not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine, and it does not

violate an individual’s right to a trial by jury.

       {¶ 17} Accordingly, Lacy’s assignment of error is not well-taken.

                                        IV. Conclusion

       {¶ 18} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Erie County Court of

Common Pleas is affirmed. Lacy is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to

App.R. 24.

                                                                          Judgment affirmed.

7.
                                                                              State of Ohio
                                                                         v. Mario Lacy, Sr.
                                                                         C.A. No. E-22-043

       A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.

Christine E. Mayle, J.                           ____________________________
                                                            JUDGE
Myron C. Duhart, P.J.
                                                 ____________________________
Charles E. Sulek, J.                                        JUDGE
CONCUR.
                                                 ____________________________
                                                            JUDGE

          This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
     Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
          version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
                   http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.

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