Court Opinion

ID: 9861702
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 00:20:30.315388+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:28:50.294948
License: Public Domain

BECKER, Justice
(dissenting).
I concur in the majority opinion except for Division VII. As to that Division, I dissent.
In State v. Ramos, Iowa, 149 N.W.2d 862, 865, we state: “The general rule that all statutes must be so construed as to avoid unconstitutionality if that can reasonably be done is adhered to in this state. Thus where a statute is fairly open to two constructions one of which will render it constitutional and the other unconstitutional or of doubtful constitutionality, the construction by which it may be upheld will be adopted. Kruck v. Needles, [259] Iowa [470, 478], 144 N.W.2d 296 [301, 302]; Kruidenier v. McCulloch, 258 Iowa 1121 [1133], 142 N.W.2d 355 [362].”
Sections 7 and 12 do not directly authorize expenditures of funds for public highways or other purposes outside the state. Only by noting that one end of the bridge and the approaches in connection therewith will necessarily be outside the state, and so interpreting the statute as to illegally allow expenditures of road funds, do we reach such a result. On the other hand if we construe sections 7 and 12 within the framework of our Iowa, constitution there is no doubt the Highway Commission has no authority to use primary road funds for any portion of the bridge or approaches located outside the state of Iowa. This is the constitutional interpretation of the statute and is the interpretation we should adopt.
It is also the interpretation adopted by the Highway Commission in its bond resolution when it provided the primary fund, if used at all, shall he used only on that portion of the bridge lying within the state of Iowa.
We have said the General Assembly cannot by subsequent legislation define the scope of constitutional provisions. That is a judicial function. But legislative construction will be given serious weight by the courts. Edge v. Brice, 253 Iowa 710, 113 N.W.2d 755; Carlton v. Grimes, 237 Iowa 912, 23 N.W.2d 883. Executive interpretation is also entitled to our careful consideration.
In State ex rel. McElhinney v. All-Iowa Agricultural Assn., 242 Iowa 860, 48 N.W.2d 281, 285, we said: “A well recognized rule is that, while not controlling, courts give much weight to the construction of statutes by administrative officials charged with their operations and enforcement. Especially where such construction is of long standing it will not be lightly discarded by the courts. (Cases cited).
“Another rule is that the practical construction of a statute, the meaning given it by contemporary usage, is presumed to be the true one and will not be disturbed except for cogent reasons. (Cases cited).”
The above views are also supported in: Allen v. Burkhart, Okl., 377 P.2d 821; State ex rel. W. Va. Board of Education v. *588Sims, 143 W.Va. 269, 101 S.E.2d 190; State ex rel. Curators of University of Mo. v. Neill, Mo., 397 S.W.2d 666.
Here the concurrent executive interpretation of sections 7 and 12 clearly excludes the idea the Highway Commission can expend primary road funds on any portions of the bridge outside the state of Iowa. It recognizes any such action would be unconstitutional and thus illegal.
We should interpret sections 7 and 12 to empower the Highway Commission to use primary road funds for bridge construction and maintenance only of those parts of the bridge within the state of Iowa. So interpreted, both by the Highway Commission and this court, the provisions would be constitutional.
GARFIELD, C. J., and SNELL and STUART, JJ., join in this dissent.
Supplemental Opinion
LeGRAND, Justice.
The opinion filed herein November 12, 1969 is hereby supplemented as follows:
In Division VIII of that opinion we declared all of section 313A.20, Iowa Code Annotated, invalid because it illegally attempted to bind future legislatures as to certain matters involving the Iowa State Highway Commission.
The section in question, however, also deals with another entirely independent and separable subject: the remedies available to bondholders to compel compliance by. state departments and officers with the provisions of chapter 313A. This portion of the section was not challenged by plaintiff and is a valid and enforceable statutory enactment.
We now hold only the following provision contained in section 313A.20 to be invalid: “While any bonds issued by the commission remain outstanding, the powers, duties or existence of the commission or of any other official or agency of the state shall not be diminished or impaired in any manner that will affect adversely the interest and rights of the holders of such bonds. * *
The reasons for this conclusion are set out in Division VIII of our original opinion.
The remainder of section 313A.20 is specifically held to be valid.
Except as modified herein our opinion of November 12, 1969 is reaffirmed and upon the filing of this supplemental opinion defendants’ petition for rehearing is denied.
All Justices concur, except REES, J., who takes no part.