Court Opinion

ID: 9622627
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:21:08.613112+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:28:48.445503
License: Public Domain

*830HUDSON, Justice.
This case presents the question whether the term of an appointed public officer ends immediately upon the appointment of his successor by the governor or when the successor takes the oath of office. We find that the General Assembly answered this question when it enacted N.C.G.S. § 128-7, which provides: “All officers shall continue in their respective offices until their successors are elected or appointed, and duly qualified.” Under the plain meaning of the statute, we conclude that the authority of an appointed officer continues until the date on which his successor takes the oath of the office in question and thereby becomes duly qualified to begin performing the duties of that office.
On 5 February 2007, by a two-to-one majority, a panel of the Full Commission filed an opinion and award ordering defendant Danny Nicholson, Inc. to pay plaintiff Robert Baxter workers’ compensation benefits, including: (1) total disability benefits and medical expenses from 13 July 1998 until the Commission orders otherwise; (2) a ten percent penalty on all unpaid installments of compensation from 13 July 1998 on; and (3) the standard attorney’s fee award in such cases, plus an additional attorney’s fee for the time spent by plaintiff’s counsel on this matter. The award stemmed from injuries that plaintiff sustained during a workplace accident on 23 December 1996, while employed by defendant. Much of the dispute before the Industrial Commission centered on the nature of plaintiff’s trial return to work and defendant’s alleged unilateral termination of plaintiff’s benefits.
Although the Full Commission’s opinion and award was filed on 5 February 2007, the document was signed and dated by the panel on 2 February 2007. On that same date, then-Governor Michael Easley sent a letter to Commissioner Thomas Bolch, a member of the two-person majority of the panel, informing him that his service as a Commissioner was at an end and that his successor had been appointed. Commissioner Bolch’s term had actually expired in 2004, and he had been holding over in his position since that time. The Governor sent another letter, also dated 2 February 2007, to the replacement Commissioner, Danny Lee McDonald, notifying him that his appointment was “effective immediately.” Commissioner McDonald did not take the oath of office until 9 February 2007.
According to an affidavit from a member of the Governor’s staff, “Commissioner Bolch was authorized to hold over in his position . . . until the date of the swearing in of Commissioner McDonald that *831took place on or about February 9, 2007. One of the important reasons for Commissioner Bolch being specifically authorized to hold over until the date of the McDonald swearing in was to give the Industrial Commission time to issue and file any decisions, such as the current Baxter case, which had already been heard on oral argument by panels involving Commissioner Bolch but which were pending the filing of a resulting formal written opinion and award.”
Based on the filing of the opinion and award after the date that Commissioner Bolch’s successor had been appointed, defendant filed a motion to vacate the decision and for reconsideration and rehearing. Defendant argued, and continues to maintain, that the. opinion and award was void as a matter of law because Commissioner Bolch no longer held his office, and the panel thus comprised only two members, who split their votes. On 13 March 2007, the Full Commission filed an order denying defendant’s motions, and defendant appealed that order, as well as the underlying 5 February 2007 opinion and award, to the Court of Appeals. In a unanimous opinion, the Court of Appeals agreed with defendant that Commissioner Bolch “was not a qualified commissioner at the time the Opinion and Award was filed because his term as commissioner had ended and his successor had been appointed.” Baxter v. Danny Nicholson, Inc., 191 N.C. App. 168, 170, 661 S.E.2d 892, 893 (2008). The Court of Appeals vacated the opinion and award as void and remanded the case to the Full Commission for rehearing. Id. at 173, 661 S.E.2d at 895. On 27 August 2009, we allowed plaintiff’s petition for discretionary review of the Court of Appeals holding, as well as the underlying substantive issues on appeal, which were not addressed by the Court of Appeals.
Article VI, Section 10 of the North Carolina Constitution, entitled “Continuation in office,” provides: “in the absence of any contrary provision, all officers in this State, whether appointed or elected, shall hold their positions until other appointments are made or, if the offices are elective, until their successors are chosen and qualified.” N.C. Const. art. VI, § 10. Moreover, under N.C.G.S. § 128-7, entitled “Officer to hold until successor qualified,” “[a]ll officers shall continue in their respective offices until their successors are elected or appointed, and duly qualified.” N.C.G.S. § 128-7 (2007). Defendant argues that, had the drafters of our Constitution intended for appointed officers to hold over until their successors are appointed and qualified, as provided by the statute, then Article VI, Section 10 would have specifically included language to the effect that *832appointed officers “shall hold their positions until other appointments are made and qualified.” Thus, according to defendant, the General Assembly essentially exceeded its legislative authority by enacting a statute that, in defendant’s view, conflicts with this constitutional provision.
When considering the constitutionality of a statute, this Court long ago articulated the following principles:
The Constitution is the supreme law. It is ordained and established by the people, and all judges are sworn to support it. When the constitutionality of an act of the General Assembly is questioned, the courts place the act by the side of the Constitution, with the purpose and the desire to uphold it if it can be reasonably done, but under the obligation, if there is an irreconcilable conflict, to sustain the will of the people as expressed in the Constitution, and not the will of the legislators, who are but agents of the people.
State ex rel. Att’y-Gen. v. Knight, 169 N.C. 396, 416, 169 N.C. 333, 352, 85 S.E. 418, 427 (1915). Thus, “[ejvery presumption favors the validity of a statute. It will not be declared invalid unless its unconstitutionality be determined beyond reasonable doubt. This is a rule of law which binds us in deciding this case.” Baker v. Martin, 330 N.C. 331, 334-35, 410 S.E.2d 887, 889 (1991) (brackets in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Tetterton v. Long Mfg. Co., 314 N.C. 44, 49, 332 S.E.2d 67, 70 (1985) (“A statute will not be declared unconstitutional unless it is clearly so, and all reasonable doubt will be resolved in favor of its validity.” (citation omitted)); In re Banks, 295 N.C. 236, 239, 244 S.E.2d 386, 388 (1978) (“A well recognized rule in this State is that, where a statute is susceptible to two interpretations — one constitutional and one unconstitutional — the Court should adopt the interpretation resulting in a finding of constitutionality.” (citations omitted)); Painter v. Wake Cty. Bd. of Educ., 288 N.C. 165, 177, 217 S.E.2d 650, 658 (1975) (“In considering the constitutionality of a statute, it is well established that the courts will indulge every presumption in favor of its constitutionality.” (citations omitted)).
In State ex rel. Martin v. Preston, we further explained the reasoning behind this deference:
Since our earliest cases applying the power of judicial review under the Constitution of North Carolina, . . . we have indicated that great deference will be paid to acts of the legislature — the *833agent of the people for enacting laws. This Court has always indicated that it will not lightly assume that an act of the legislature violates the will of the people of North Carolina as expressed by them in their Constitution and that we will find acts of the legislature repugnant to the Constitution only “if the repugnance do really exist and is plain."
Our acceptance of our duty to exercise the power of judicial review under the Constitution of North Carolina, tempered by our recognition of every reasonable presumption that the legislature as the lawmaking agent of the people has not violated the people’s Constitution, has led this Court in more recent generations to accept certain principles of state constitutional construction which are now well established. For example, it is firmly established that our State Constitution is not a grant of power. All power which is not expressly limited by the people in our State Constitution remains with the people, and an act of the people through their representatives in the legislature is valid unless prohibited by that Constitution.
325 N.C. 438, 448-49, 385 S.E.2d 473, 478 (1989) (emphases added) (citations omitted). Likewise, “all constitutional provisions must be read in pari materia." Stephenson v. Bartlett, 355 N.C. 354, 378, 562 S.E.2d 377, 394 (2002).
The statute here provides that “[a]ll officers shall continue in their respective offices until their successors are elected or appointed, and duly qualified.” N.C.G.S. § 128-7 (emphases added). Giving the words and construction of the statute their plain meaning, the phrase “and duly qualified,” immediately following the adjectives “elected or appointed,” serves to modify and describe both types of officer. Thus, under the statute, an appointed public officer holds over in his or her position until a successor is both appointed and duly qualified. By contrast, the constitutional provision explicitly only allows an elected officer to hold over until a successor is “chosen and qualified,” whereas appointed officers “shall hold their positions until other appointments are made.” N.C. Const. art. VI, § 10.
Such a variance renders the statute unconstitutional if and only if our Constitution evinces the drafters’ intent to limit the power of the legislature to address the policies advanced here — namely, to require an oath of office and to guard against vacancies in appointed offices — or to otherwise prohibit the legislature’s exercise of that power. See Preston, 325 N.C. at 449, 385 S.E.2d at 478; see also Baker, *834330 N.C. at 338-39, 410 S.E.2d at 891-92 (“Unless the Constitution expressly or by necessary implication restricts the actions of the legislative branch, the General Assembly is free to implement legislation as long as that legislation does not offend some specific constitutional provision.”). As for the oath, the drafters made their intentions clear by including a specific provision requiring an oath of office: Article VI, Section 7 states that, “[b]efore entering upon the duties of an office, a person elected or appointed to the office shall take and subscribe the following oath ....” Both N.C.G.S. § 128-7 and N.C.G.S. § 128-5, which imposes a fine on any officer required to take an oath who fails to do so “before entering on the duties of the office,” are consistent with and indeed promote this goal.
In addition, we find no language in our state Constitution suggesting any limitation on the legislature’s authority to advance the policy of guarding against vacancies in appointed offices. Cf. Moore v. Knightdale Bd. of Elections, 331 N.C. 1, 12, 413 S.E.2d 541, 547 (1992) (“The legislative attempt to require the resignation of those having plaintiffs’ status as holders of ‘another elective office’ imposes an additional qualification for elective office, not provided by our Constitution; thus, it fails to pass constitutional muster.”). But see Baker, 330 N.C. at 333-34, 339, 410 S.E.2d at 888-89, 892 (upholding as constitutional a statute requiring that candidates for appointment to fill unexpired terms of district court judges be members of the same political party as the vacating judge, because the Constitution does not limit disqualifications for appointed offices and “[t]he wording . . . also does not necessarily imply that additional disqualifications cannot be added by the General Assembly for those persons not elected by the people”).
Our reading likewise conforms with the long-standing public policy of this State against vacancies in both elected and appointed offices:
The provision that the incumbents of offices, both elective and appointive, shall hold until their successors are selected and qualified, is in accord with a sound public policy which is against vacancies in public offices and requiring that there should always be some one in position to rightfully perform these important official duties for the benefit of the public and of persons having especial interest therein.
[The provisions] in reference to these appointive offices .... are recognized both in our Constitution and general statutes, and *835whether regarded as part of an original term or a new and conditional term by virtue of the statute, the holders are considered by the authorities as officers de jure until their successors have been lawfully elected or appointed by the body having the right of selection, and have been properly qualified .....
Markham v. Simpson, 175 N.C. 135, 137, 175 N.C. 146, 148, 95 S.E. 106, 107 (1918) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). As noted by the State in its amicus brief here to this Court, “our state government would be less able to serve its citizens effectively if significant gaps in time existed between when one official leaves office and his or her successor begins serving.” As such, the State maintains that “it is imperative that there is no uncertainty as to when the authority of an incoming official commences and when the authority of the outgoing ceases,” and the General Assembly has provided that certainty by enacting N.C.G.S. § 11-7, requiring the oath of office before taking office, and § 128-7, directing that an appointed official hold over until his successor is duly qualified.
Here, when we place the constitutional and statutory provisions side by side, we see that the General Assembly has merely expanded on Article VI, Sections 7 and 10, to require that a public servant swear an oath before taking office, and to ensure that the office will not be made vacant by a delay between the appointment of a successor and his lawful entry into office upon becoming qualified, in this case, by taking the oath. See, e.g., N.C. Const. art. VI, § 7 (“Before entering upon the duties of an office, a person elected or appointed to the office shall take and subscribe the following oath . . . .”); N.C.G.S. § 11-7 (2007) (providing that “every person elected or appointed to hold any office of trust or profit in the State shall, before taking office or entering upon the execution of the office, take and subscribe to the following oath . . .”); Town of Hudson v. Fox, 257 N.C. 789, 790, 127 S.E.2d 556, 556 (1962) (noting that commissioners “were qualified by taking the required oath”); Sudderth v. Smyth, 35 N.C. (13 Ired.) 307, 308, 35 N.C. 452, 453 (1852) (observing that a deputy clerk is not qualified until he “tak[es] the oaths to support the constitutions of the United States and of this State, and an oath of office”).
By enacting N.C.G.S. § 128-7, the General Assembly has essentially provided the type of “assurance for the faithful discharge of the duties of the office,” State ex rel. Spruill v. Bateman, 162 N.C. 486, 489-90, 162 N.C. 588, 593, 77 S.E. 768, 769 (1913) (emphasis omitted), that this Court has previously recognized as well within the legislature’s role and the dictates of the Constitution. See also State ex rel. *836Lee v. Dunn, 73 N.C. 595, 604-08 (1875) (holding that the General Assembly could not impose any additional qualification on eligibility for elective office, other than what is provided in the Constitution, and concluding that requiring a sheriff to tender a bond and receipts for taxes collected is not an added qualification).1 Indeed, we conclude that the holdover language at issue here is consistent with the constitutional and statutory requirements that an elected or appointed officer must take the oath of office “[b]efore entering upon the duties” of that office, N.C. Const. art. VI, § 7; N.C.G.S. § 11-7, and also ensures that a vacancy will not be.created by a gap between appointment to office and assumption of the duties of that office upon taking the oath.
We decline to approve an interpretation that would result in a vacancy and cessation of the work of an appointed officer immediately upon the announcement of a successor. Voiding actions taken by a holdover official during the time between the announcement of a successor and that successor’s swearing-in could promote disruption and delay completion of important work already performed on the State’s behalf. We see no reason to act contrary to the reasoning outlined in Markham, or to conclude that immediately terminating an officeholder’s authority would represent a more sound public policy. We conclude instead that the statutory framework specifically provided by the General Assembly wisely and plainly avoids this problem of vacancies, and is consistent with the Constitution.
In sum, we find unpersuasive defendant’s arguments that we should ignore the plain language of N.C.G.S. § 128-7 and focus exclusively on the distinction drawn in Article VI, Section 10 between elected and appointed officers. We discern no conflict — and certainly no “plain repugnance” — between Article VI, Section 10 and N.C.G.S. § 128-7 that would defeat the presumption of constitutionality and *837require us to ignore the meaning of the statute, particularly in light of Article VI, Section 7. The constitutional and statutory provisions may reasonably be read and considered together, and nothing in our Constitution suggests that the drafters sought to limit the power of the legislature to require an oath and to guard against vacancies in appointed offices. Accordingly, we hold that Commissioner Bolch’s official authority continued from 2 February 2007 until Commissioner McDonald was sworn in as his successor on 9 February 2007. The opinion and award of the Full Commission filed in this case on 5 February 2007 stands as a valid exercise of that authority.2
We reverse the Court of Appeals opinion and remand to that court for consideration of the substantive issues raised in defendant’s appeal of the Full Commission’s opinion and award in favor of plaintiff.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.

. The concurring opinion is inconsistent with our past jurisprudence on the unconstitutionality of legislatively required additional qualifications for elective offices, as compared with the constitutionality of such qualifications for appointed offices. See, e.g., Baker, 330 N.C. at 341, 410 S.E.2d at 893 (“The plaintiff relies on Starbuck v. Havelock, 252 N.C. 176, 113 S.E.2d 278 (1960); Cole v. Sanders, 174 N.C. 112, 93 S.E. 476 (1917); Spruill v. Bateman, 162 N.C. 588, 77 S.E. 768; and State of N.C. by the At. Gen’l, Hargrove, ex rel. Lee v. Dunn, 73 N.C. 595 (1875), for the proposition that qualifications for holding office may not be added to those found in the Constitution. These cases deal with elections to offices and are not applicable to this case. This case deals with an appointment to office.”). As this Court noted in Baker, the General Assembly has enacted any number of statutes imposing additional qualifications for appointed offices, including for vacant seats to the General Assembly, notaries public, and the various state licensing boards. Id. at 339-40, 410 S.E.2d at 892.

. The concurring opinion states that “Mr. Bolch’s authority . . . could have been displaced by the actions of the newly appointed Mr. McDonald before Mr. McDonald took the oath.” However, the validity of any actions taken by Commissioner McDonald is not at issue here. This case involves only Mr. Bolch’s holdover authority to concur in a Full Commission opinion and award. As such, we decline to speculate on hypothetical actions taken by Mr. McDonald between 2 February and 9 February 2007, which issue is not before this Court.