Court Opinion

ID: 9854554
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:09:08.377721+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:09.026748
License: Public Domain

McMurray, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
Plaintiff contends that he is entitled to contribution pursuant to OCGA § 23-2-71. In order for a party to be entitled to contribution, he must first show that he and the defendant shared a common liability. Snyder v. Elkan, 187 Ga. 164 (199 SE 891); Williams Bros. Lumber Co. v. Anderson, 210 Ga. 198 (78 SE2d 612); Horton v. Continental Cas. Co., 72 Ga. App. 594 (34 SE2d 605). Common liability is established by 26 USCA § 6013 which provides that both husband and wife are jointly and severally liable for tax deficiencies on joint returns.
Under the “innocent spouse rule” of 26 USCA § 6013 (e) a spouse may be relieved of liability for tax deficiencies on joint returns if she does not know or has no reason to know that there is a substantial understatement of taxes. Defendant in the case sub judice relies in part on the “innocent spouse” provision. The state court has determined that defendant’s evidence supports an innocent spouse claim and that plaintiff has presented no evidence that defendant is not an innocent spouse. However, regardless of the posture of the record before the state court the resolution of any pending “innocent spouse” claim by defendant will take place before the appropriate federal tribunal. Until such occurs defendant remains jointly liable for the tax deficiencies at issue.
The state court held that the doctrine of res judicata or estoppel by judgment bans plaintiff’s action as a matter of law. A final divorce decree binds the parties as to all matters put in issue, or which under the rules of law might have been put in issue until such decree shall be reversed or set aside. Mize v. Mize, 80 Ga. App. 441 (56 SE2d 121); Sumner v. Sumner, 186 Ga. 390 (197 SE 833). Relying upon recitals in the settlement agreement the state court determined that the parties intended to resolve all financial rights and obligations between themselves. The settlement agreement does mention the parties’ 1983 tax return. The state court responded that plaintiff also could have provided for the 1980, 1981 and 1982 tax liabilities but failed to do so and that at a minimum the tax claim at issue could have been raised in the divorce proceeding or alternatively was raised and decided in the divorce decree thereby barring any subsequent claims.
However, pretermitting any issue as to whether the state court’s *672reasoning and conclusion is correct, I would find error in its application to the facts of the case sub judice. At the time of the settlement agreement and divorce decree any tax liability arising from the audit of the 1980,1981 and 1982 joint tax returns was the joint obligation of both parties under 26 USCA § 6013. Nothing on the face of the record indicates that this has changed (although there is some evidence of a pending “innocent spouse” claim by defendant). Plaintiffs complaint does not attempt to alter the rights and obligations which were in place at the time of the settlement agreement and divorce decree; if anything, plaintiff relies upon the relative rights of the parties at that time. Instead plaintiffs complaint seeks to rectify events which occurred in 1985 following the divorce decree, when his funds were seized to satisfy the pre-existing joint liability for taxes arising from the audit of the 1980, 1981 and 1982 joint returns. Clearly the 1984 divorce decree incorporating the parties’ settlement agreement did not and could not have determined the rights of the parties in regard to the 1985 seizure of plaintiff’s funds.
Therefore, I respectfully dissent as I would hold that the state court erred in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment.