Court Opinion

ID: 9384976
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-05 18:03:03.885258+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:58.054507
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/5/23
                       CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION*

               IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                             THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                       (Sacramento)
                                              ----

    RUSSELL CHARLES EARNEST,                                          C095602

                 Plaintiff and Respondent,                    (Super. Ct. No. 34-2020-
                                                             80003566-CU-WM-GDS)
          v.

    COMMISSION ON TEACHER CREDENTIALING
    et al.,

                 Defendants and Appellants.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sacramento County, James P.
Arguelles, Judge. Affirmed.

      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Carl W. Sonne, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
Andrew M. Steinheimer, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Kevin W. Bell,
Deputy Attorney General, for Defendants and Appellants.

        Jonathan Turner for Plaintiff and Respondent.

*       Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105 and 8.1110, this opinion is
certified for publication with the exception of parts I and II of the Discussion.

                                               1
        The Commission on Teacher Credentialing (Commission) and its Committee of
Credentials (Committee) (collectively defendants) appeal from a judgment granting
Russell Charles Earnest’s petition for writ of mandate to set aside the Committee’s
disciplinary recommendation against him and to enjoin the Commission from acting on
that recommendation. Defendants assert the trial court erred in finding: (1) Earnest was
excused from exhausting his administrative remedies; and (2) the Committee lacked
jurisdiction to conduct a formal review pursuant to Education Code1 section 44242.5,
subdivision (d). They further assert the trial court should have denied the petition under
the doctrine of judicial restraint. We affirm.
        In the unpublished portion of the opinion, we conclude all three factors outlined in
Coachella Valley weigh in favor of excusing Earnest from exhausting his administrative
remedies: There is a significant public interest in obtaining a definitive resolution as to
the question concerning the Committee’s jurisdiction; Earnest makes a strong and
ultimately persuasive argument that the Committee acted in excess of its jurisdiction by
pursuing a formal review; and we are satisfied that judicial intervention would not
deprive us of the benefit of defendants’ administrative expertise. (Coachella Valley
Mosquito & Vector Control Dist. v. California Public Employment Relations Bd. (2005)
35 Cal.4th 1072, 1082 (Coachella Valley).) We further find defendants’ judicial restraint
argument unavailing.
        In the published portion of the opinion, we interpret the language of section
44242.5, subdivision (b)(3). Although section 44242.5, subdivision (b)(3) generally
provides a jurisdictional basis for the Committee to commence initial reviews, as
discussed post, the provision is also incorporated in section 44242.5, subdivision (d)(3) to
provide a jurisdictional basis for the Committee to commence formal reviews. It was this

1       Unless otherwise specified, all further statutory references are to the Education
Code.

                                                 2
jurisdictional provision the Committee relied upon in commencing a formal review of
Earnest’s fitness to hold a credential.
       Section 44242.5, subdivision (b)(3) provides, inter alia and pertinent to this
appeal, that the Committee has jurisdiction to commence a formal review of a credential
holder’s fitness to hold a credential upon receipt of a statement from an employer
notifying the Commission that, as a result of an allegation of misconduct, the employer
took an enumerated adverse employment action or the employee resigned or otherwise
left employment (notifying statement). The question presented is whether, if an employer
determines the circumstances do not meet the requirements for providing a notifying
statement, the Committee may later interpret an employer’s statements in response to an
inquiry from the Committee to indicate the existence of allegations of misconduct against
the employee when an enumerated action was taken, when the employer expressly states
no allegation of misconduct existed.
       We conclude the plain language of section 44242.5, subdivision (b)(3) imposes the
onus on the employer to determine whether to provide a notifying statement to the
Committee, and thus only the employer may determine whether an enumerated action
was the “result of an allegation of misconduct,” triggering the Committee’s jurisdiction.
Applying that interpretation to the facts of this case, we conclude the Committee does not
have jurisdiction to commence a formal review of Earnest’s fitness to hold a credential.
                           GENERAL LEGAL BACKGROUND
       “The Commission establishes the professional standards for obtaining teaching
credentials in California. [Citation.] The Commission is also authorized to take adverse
action against credential holders. [Citation.] The Commission may privately admonish
or publicly reprove a credential holder, or revoke or suspend a credential holder for
immoral or unprofessional conduct or persistent defiance of the laws regulating the duties
of persons serving in the public school system, or for any cause that would have

                                             3
warranted the denial of an application for a credential or the renewal thereof.” (Little v.
Commission on Teacher Credentialing (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 322, 327 (Little).)
       “The Commission appoints the Committee, an investigatory arm comprised of
seven members.” (Little, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 327.) “The Committee is charged
with investigating allegations of misconduct by credential holders.” (Ibid.)
       The procedures for investigating complaints against credential holders “can be
divided into three phases, each with their own requirements and limitations: the
preliminary review [citation], the initial review [citation], and the formal review
[citation].” (Little, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 330.) The Committee conducts “a
preliminary review of information received about a credential holder, subject to” certain
limitations. (Ibid.) “Following the preliminary review, the Committee ‘may either
determine to end the review or instruct staff to set the matter for initial review at a later
meeting.’ ” (Ibid.)
       The Committee “has jurisdiction” to commence the initial review “upon receipt”
of specified information. (§ 44242.5, subd. (b)(1)-(6).) “An initial review commences
when a credential holder is notified that his or her fitness to hold a credential is under
review. [Citations.] The credential holder must be given a reasonable opportunity to
provide written information to the Committee prior to the meeting, and the Committee’s
staff prepares a confidential investigative report for the Committee’s consideration.”
(Little, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 330.)
       A formal review may be held no more than six months after the commencement of
the initial review. (§ 44244, subd. (b)(1).) Pertinent to this case, the Committee “has
jurisdiction” to commence a formal review “upon receipt” of, among other things, a
notifying statement described in section 44242.5, subdivision (b)(3). (§ 44242.5,
subd. (d)(3).) The Committee thus has jurisdiction to commence a formal review upon
receipt of a statement from an employer “that, as a result of an allegation of misconduct,
or while an allegation of misconduct is pending,” the credential holder “has been

                                               4
dismissed, nonreelected, suspended for more than 10 days, or placed pursuant to a final
adverse employment action on unpaid administrative leave for more than 10 days, or has
resigned or otherwise left employment.” (§ 44242.5, subd. (b)(3)(A).) “[A] change in
status due solely to unsatisfactory performance” is not, however, “a result of an allegation
of misconduct.” (§ 44242.5, subd. (b)(3)(C).) The employer shall provide the notifying
statement to the Commission “not later than 30 days after the dismissal, nonreelection,
suspension, placement on unpaid administrative leave, resignation, or departure from
employment of the employee.” (§ 44242.5, subd. (b)(3)(B).)
       The notifying statement pursuant to section 44242.5 shall be made by the
superintendent of a school district in the form of a report. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5,
§ 80303, subds. (a)-(b); § 44030.5, subd. (a).) The report must include, inter alia, “all
known information about each alleged act of misconduct,” including contact information
for witnesses and “[a]n explanation of the allegation of misconduct or pending allegation
of misconduct.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 80303, subd. (b).) The superintendent must
also notify the credential holder in writing regarding the content of California Code of
Regulations, title 5, section 80303 (the regulation), if a notifying statement is required.
(Id., § 80303, subd. (e).) A superintendent’s failure to make the notifying statement in
the specified timeframe and form required or to provide information to a credential
holder regarding the content of the regulation, “constitutes unprofessional conduct” and
subjects the superintendent to investigation by the Committee. (Id., § 80303, subds. (d),
(e).) A superintendent failing to make a report (i.e., a notifying statement) as required is
subject to an adverse action by the Commission and criminal penalties. (§ 44030.5,
subds. (c), (d).) “Where the Commission has information or belief that a report has not
been made under this regulation, a letter shall be sent to the responsible superintendent
providing facts, detailing reporting responsibilities, and requesting a response.” (Cal.
Code Regs., tit. 5, § 80303, subd. (h).)

                                              5
       If the Committee commences a formal review, “[t]he credential holder may[, at the
hearing,] appear and respond under oath to questions from the Committee, and the
Committee may call material witnesses to provide testimony, subject to examination for
rebuttal evidence. [Citations.] The Committee then makes a probable cause
determination. [Citation.] ‘If there is no probable cause, the investigation is terminated.
If there is probable cause, the credential holder may request an adjudicatory hearing
pursuant to the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]
       “The Committee reports its probable cause findings and recommendation with
respect to any adverse action to the Commission. [Citations.] The Commission may
adopt the recommendation of the Committee without further proceedings if the credential
holder elects to forgo an adjudicatory hearing. [Citations.] If the credential holder
appeals from the Committee’s recommendation, the Commission files an accusation or
statement of issues.” (Little, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at pp. 330-331.)
                  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
       We quote, in substantial part, the undisputed material facts set forth in the trial
court’s ruling.
       In 2016, Earnest, while serving as the principal of Kennedy High School (School)
within the Anaheim Union High School District (District), “received an email from a
former [School] student who advised that one of [the School’s] assistant water polo
coaches (the ‘Coach’) had dated one student and was attempting to ‘get at’ another.
Earnest directed a [School] athletic director to investigate, and both the athletic director
and Earnest accepted the Coach’s explanation that any suspicion about inappropriate
conduct was a misunderstanding. Neither Earnest, nor the athletic director, nor other
[School] employees who had seen the email reported the Coach to law enforcement.

2     Earnest lodged the administrative record with the trial court. The parties did not
provide the administrative record to this court on appeal.

                                              6
       “Shortly thereafter, a third party came to suspect that the Coach had had sexual
contacts with a student. That party investigated his suspicions, which were later
conveyed to law enforcement. The Coach eventually [pled] guilty to several sex offenses
against students.
       “In December 2016, the District placed Earnest on paid administrative leave. In
March 2017, the District released Earnest from his position as [School] principal
effective June 31, 2017 [sic].[3] The District offered Earnest a position as a teacher, but
he resigned instead. The District did not at that time report its offer to reassign Earnest to
a teaching position, or Earnest’s resignation, to the Commission. Earnest is currently
employed as an administrator in a different school district.
       “In 2018, some of the Coach’s victims sued the District, the Coach, Earnest and
others in civil court. In February 2019, two of the victims’ attorneys provided the
Commission with copies of a crime report that law enforcement had generated while
investigating the Coach. The same attorneys accused Earnest of having failed [in
performing] his duties as a mandated reporter of child abuse. The Committee
subsequently commenced an informal review of Earnest’s ‘fitness to hold a credential.’ ”
       On January 3, 2020, the Commission sent a letter of inquiry to the District. The
District responded to the inquiry approximately two weeks later—in a January 17, 2020
letter from its counsel (the District’s letter). The District generally outlined the sequence
of events following Earnest’s receipt of the e-mail regarding the Coach’s inappropriate
conduct. The District then stated: “After the allegations of [the Coach’s] inappropriate
conduct came to light, on December 9, 2016, Mr. Earnest was placed on an
administrative leave of absence. On March 8, 2017, the District released Mr. Earnest of
his administrative position as of June 31, 2017 [sic]. The District found that Mr. Earnest

3     Presumably, the trial court meant June 30, 2017, given that June consists of only
30 days.

                                              7
failed in his duties to properly investigate the allegations as presented in the email. Mr.
Earnest was provided the option to continue in a teaching position within the District. On
April 14, 2017, Mr. Earnest’s administrative leave was concluded. Mr. Earnest then
voluntarily resigned from the District. A copy of the correspondences evidenc[ing] the
above is attached. Although Mr. Earnest failed to perform adequately in his job
performance, it was not determined to be misconduct.”4
       On January 31, 2020, Earnest responded to the Commission’s inquiry. We do not
discuss the specifics contained in Earnest’s letter because it has no bearing on the
question before us in this appeal.
       “In June 2020, the Commission served Earnest with notice that the Committee had
opened a formal review of his credentials” pursuant to its jurisdiction under section
44242.5, subdivision (d)(3). Thereafter, “In August 2020, the Commission notified
Earnest that the Committee had found probable cause for an adverse action and had
recommended that the Commission revoke his credentials. On September 2, 2020,
Earnest requested an administrative hearing. [Citation.] Such a hearing never took place.
Instead, Earnest advised the Commission that he intended to file a writ petition
challenging the Committee’s jurisdiction to conduct its formal review. [Citation.] This
action followed.”
       In his petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory relief, Earnest
sought, among other things, an order finding the Commission and Committee lacked
jurisdiction to take disciplinary action against him, asserting he “did not resign while
allegations of misconduct were pending or as a result of allegations of misconduct, and
. . . no other information . . . before the Commission [met] the criteria for jurisdiction to
investigate and take adverse action against [his] credentials.”

4      The attachments noted in the District’s letter were not included in the record on
appeal.

                                               8
       Defendants opposed the petition and complaint, arguing, pertinent to this appeal,
the Committee had jurisdiction to commence a formal review based on the District’s
letter “notif[ying] [the Committee] that [Earnest] was relieved of his administrative
position, and that he had voluntarily resigned as principal.” Defendants asserted, “The
letter stated that [Earnest] ‘failed in his duties to properly investigate the allegations as
presented in the email’ but concluded that ‘[a]lthough [Earnest] failed to perform
adequately in his job performance, it was not determined to be misconduct.’
Nevertheless, as a result of his failure to report the suspected child abuse to law
enforcement and the subsequent criminal investigation, [Earnest] ultimately resigned
from the District to seek employment elsewhere.”
       Pertinent to this appeal, the trial court found Earnest was excused from having to
exhaust his administrative remedies because, although Earnest would not suffer a burden
in exhausting his administrative remedy, defendants had already “had ample opportunity
to tender their interpretation” as to the jurisdictional provisions of the Education Code,
and Earnest presented a strong argument that the Committee lacked jurisdiction to pursue
a formal review pertaining to the disciplinary action.
       The trial court found the “language and grammatical construction [of section
44242.5, subdivision (b)(3)] plainly require the employer, as opposed to the Commission
or the Committee, to say whether a change in employment status was the result of an
allegation of misconduct or occurred while an allegation of misconduct was pending,”
and the District’s letter “fell short of the jurisdictional statement” in that regard. The trial
court rejected defendants’ view that it may “infer jurisdiction from statements attributing
no nexus between a change in employment status and an allegation of misconduct.”
       The trial court granted the petition for writ of mandate and ruled: “Let a Writ of
Mandate be issued, setting aside the [Committee’s] disciplinary recommendation against
[Earnest], and enjoining the Commission . . . from acting on the recommendation.” The
trial court also dismissed Earnest’s complaint for declaratory relief. Defendants appeal.

                                               9
                                      DISCUSSION
                                             I
           Earnest Was Excused From Exhausting His Administrative Remedies
        Defendants argue the trial court erred in finding Earnest was excused from
exhausting his administrative remedies because “the balance of the equities actually
favors [defendants].” (Boldface omitted.) Earnest retorts the trial court appropriately
found he was excused from exhausting his administrative remedies because he was
challenging the Committee’s jurisdiction to proceed with the formal review. We review
de novo whether Earnest was required to exhaust his administrative remedies before
resorting to the trial court. (Sierra Club v. City of Orange (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 523,
536.)
        “In general, a party must exhaust administrative remedies before resorting to the
courts.” (Coachella Valley, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1080.) “ ‘The exhaustion doctrine is
principally grounded on concerns favoring administrative autonomy (i.e., courts should
not interfere with an agency determination until the agency has reached a final decision)
and judicial efficiency (i.e., overworked courts should decline to intervene in an
administrative dispute unless absolutely necessary).’ ” (Ibid.) The doctrine requiring
exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject to numerous exceptions. (Public
Employment Relations Bd. v. Superior Court (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1816, 1826-1827.)
One such exception arises “when a party claims that ‘the agency lacks authority, statutory
or otherwise, to resolve the underlying dispute between the parties.’ ” (Coachella Valley,
at pp. 1081-1082.)
        The foregoing exception does not automatically apply whenever a party challenges
an agency’s jurisdiction. Rather, “In deciding whether to entertain a claim that an agency
lacks jurisdiction before the agency proceedings have run their course, a court considers
three factors: the injury or burden that exhaustion will impose, the strength of the legal
argument that the agency lacks jurisdiction, and the extent to which administrative

                                             10
expertise may aid in resolving the jurisdictional issue.” (Coachella Valley, supra,
35 Cal.4th at p. 1082.) Applying the Coachella Valley factors, we conclude the
exhaustion requirement was excused.
       Before delving into the three-factor analysis, however, we briefly address
defendants’ argument that “it is reasonable to assume . . . all three factors must be
decided in the plaintiff/petitioner’s favor” and thus the trial court erred because it “did not
even consider whether [its finding ‘that the first factor clearly did not favor’ Earnest]
should have stopped this inquiry cold, or whether [Earnest] could prevail without a
showing of unusual or irreparable injury.” We find no merit in these assertions.
       It is true that, in Coachella Valley, all three factors weighed in favor of excusing
the exhaustion requirement and in favor of judicial intervention. (Coachella Valley,
supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1083.) But our Supreme Court did not indicate or signal that, to
excuse the exhaustion requirement, all three factors had to be decided in the
plaintiff’s/petitioner’s favor. As explained in City of Fillmore, “The three-part test
involves a balancing of interests and provides a guide to the exercise of judicial
discretion. [Citation.] When all three factors weigh in favor of excusing the exhaustion
requirement, . . . the answer should be easy. When the three factors point in different
directions, however, the answer can be more difficult.” (City of Fillmore v. Board of
Equalization (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 716, 729, fn. omitted.) In the last instance, “ ‘more
judicial discretion is required for resolving the exhaustion requirement.’ ” (Id. at p. 728,
fn. 3.) Defendants present no reasoned argument as to why we should disagree with and
depart from City of Fillmore. (Id. at p. 728 [declining to determine whether the plaintiffs
had established a cognizable injury because “the second and third factors alone justif[ied]
excusing the exhaustion requirement”].) We thus decline to do so.
       We now turn to the three-factor analysis. To determine whether the first factor
weighs in favor of excusing the exhaustion requirement, we must consider whether the
injury or burden that exhaustion will impose would be “unusual or irreparable” or

                                              11
whether there is “a significant public interest in obtaining a definitive resolution of [a]
fundamental legal question.” (Coachella Valley, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1082.)
       Defendants argue “[t]he only injury identified by [Earnest] was lost time and
expense participating in the administrative process,” which “is not a sufficient injury for
this analysis.” Earnest disagrees, asserting he would be harmed if he were required to
proceed with the administrative proceeding because: (1) he “will likely incur many
thousands more dollars in attorney’s fees” given the hearing “will likely take at least a
week given the number of witnesses and roughly 1,000 pages of discovery”; (2) he will
have to “miss a number of work days to attend the hearing thus . . . potentially
jeopardizing his continued employment due to a prolonged absence”; and (3) “if the
matter is allowed to proceed, an Accusation per Government Code [section] 11503 will
be filed against [him], which is a public document, thus damaging his reputation.”
       We fail to see how Earnest’s claims of lost time, effort, and expense constitute an
unusual or irreparable injury in terms of participating in an administrative disciplinary
proceeding. The first factor is not met “merely because additional time and effort would
be consumed by” participation in the administrative process. (Omaha Indemnity Co. v.
Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1266, 1269; see Coachella Valley, supra,
35 Cal.4th at p. 1082.) The same is true as to expense. All individuals subject to an
administrative disciplinary proceeding will incur lost time, effort, and expenses to defend
themselves in such a proceeding. Earnest presented no evidence in the trial court to
establish his claim that his injury and burden would be unusual or irreparable. Further, as
defendants appropriately note, the potential harm to Earnest’s reputation resulting from
the filing of an accusation would be no more public than the judicial proceeding he
pursued in the trial court. We also fail to see how a public accusation would constitute an
unusual or irreparable injury or burden.
       Earnest also argues the first factor is met because there is “a ‘public interest’ in
obtaining a resolution of this legal question.” Earnest explains the question regarding the

                                              12
Committee’s jurisdiction does not only impact himself, but also impacts “California’s
thousands of credentialed educators.” Defendants, in turn, posit the “public interest”
factor cuts against Earnest because “the public interest here is in seeing that mandated
reporters such as [Earnest] carry out their legal and moral duties to investigate and report
suspected child abuse; that school districts not be rewarded for attempting to artfully
protect themselves from litigation by failing to identify misconduct for what it is; and that
schoolchildren and the education system are protected against those who fail to carry out
those duties.”
       We perceive a credible argument that the interpretation and application of section
44242.5, subdivision (b)(3) is a matter of public interest in that the legal issue is of
concern to a substantial number of people. It is fundamental that teaching credential
holders, a large group of individuals subject to the disciplinary authority of the
Commission and the investigatory authority of the Committee, know whether an
employer’s determination that, under the circumstances, no notifying statement is
required ends the potential for the commencement of a formal review, or whether the
Committee has authority to later commence a formal review based on its own
interpretation of information provided by the employer in response to a request for
information. Given the arguments advanced by defendants in this appeal, we conclude
the first Coachella Valley factor weighs in favor of judicial intervention. (Coachella
Valley, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1082.)
       Turning to the second Coachella Valley factor, Earnest makes “a strong and
ultimately persuasive argument” that the Committee acted in excess of its jurisdiction by
pursuing a formal review. (Coachella Valley, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1082.) We will
discuss the merits of Earnest’s argument momentarily. For the time being, it suffices to
say that the second factor also weighs in favor of judicial intervention. (Id. at p. 1083.)
       As for the third Coachella Valley factor, we are satisfied that judicial intervention
would not deprive us of the benefit of defendants’ expertise. (Coachella Valley, supra,

                                              13
35 Cal.4th at p. 1082.) Defendants argue the trial court had not yet had “the full benefit
of [their] expertise,” broadly stating “the agency would have had a far fuller opportunity
to apply its understanding and interpretation of the statutes and regulations” if the factual
record had been developed in an administrative hearing. Not so. The question presented
is whether the District’s letter triggered the Committee’s jurisdiction. We fail to see how
the admission of witness testimony and documentary evidence at the hearing would assist
in resolving that question.
       Although we ordinarily accord deference to an agency’s interpretation of
governing statutes and implementing regulations, the “ ‘weight’ ” of any such deference
is “fundamentally situational.” (Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Bd. of Equalization
(1998) 19 Cal.4th 1, 12, italics omitted.) The interpretation of section 44242.5 and its
application to the undisputed facts of this case are pure questions of law, which we are
well equipped to resolve. (Carmona v. Division of Industrial Safety (1975) 13 Cal.3d
303, 310.) The third Coachella Valley factor thus weighs in favor of judicial intervention
as well.
       Considering and weighing the three Coachella Valley factors, we conclude Earnest
was excused from exhausting his administrative remedies. Judicial intervention was and
is thus appropriate.
       We note defendants, in a footnote under the heading, “The exception to the
exhaustion requirement does not apply here; indeed, the balance of the equities actually
favors [defendants]” (boldface omitted), assert there was “an additional jurisdictional
defect in the writ” because “that writ was really a writ of prohibition” and such a writ
“may not lie to restrain a nonjudicial act.” An appellant must state “each point under a
separate heading or subheading summarizing the point.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.204(a)(1)(B).) The “[f]ailure to provide proper headings forfeits issues that may be
discussed in the brief but are not clearly identified by heading.” (Pizarro v. Reynoso

                                             14
(2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 172, 179.) We accordingly decline to consider the jurisdictional
defect argument.
                                              II
                   Defendants’ Judicial Restraint Argument Is Unavailing
       Defendants argue the trial court should have denied the petition under the doctrine
of judicial restraint because, “[b]y prematurely intervening in this matter, the trial court
engaged in ‘idle acts’ and unnecessarily engaged in judicial activism, where judicial
restraint was called for.” (Citing Civ. Code, §§ 3532 [“The law neither does nor requires
idle acts”], 3533 [“The law disregards trifles”].) It does not appear that defendants raised
this argument in the trial court. We need not consider arguments raised for the first time
on appeal. (See People ex rel. DuFauchard v. U.S. Financial Management, Inc. (2009)
169 Cal.App.4th 1502, 1512 [exhaustion requirements not raised in trial court deemed
forfeited on appeal].)
       Furthermore, even assuming the argument were properly before us, we would
reject it. We cannot say that requiring compliance with section 44242.5 was an idle act
or mere trifle. Nor can we say that the trial court should have refrained from resolving
the parties’ dispute, particularly given the Committee maintained it had jurisdiction to
pursue a formal review.
                                              III
         The Committee Did Not Have Jurisdiction To Conduct A Formal Review
       The primary question is whether the Committee may interpret the statements in the
District’s letter as notification Earnest was relieved as principal and later resigned as a
result of an allegation of misconduct. In that regard, defendants posit “the question at the
heart of this case” is “[w]ho gets to define ‘misconduct.’ ”
       Defendants argue the District’s letter conveyed “all of the information necessary”
to vest the Committee with jurisdiction to conduct a formal review, “namely: [¶] (1) that
[Earnest] committed misconduct when he ‘failed in his duties to properly investigate the

                                              15
allegations’ of sexual abuse by [the Coach] against minors on the girls’ water polo team;
and [¶] (2) that as a result of his failure to investigate and report the suspected child
abuse to law enforcement, [Earnest] was relieved as principal, and then resigned from the
District.” Defendants focus on the dictionary definition of “misconduct,” arguing
Earnest’s actions constituted a dereliction of duty by someone in a position of authority
or trust, and violated Penal Code section 11166 and the District’s own guidelines, which
imposed on Earnest a duty to report suspected child abuse. In essence, defendants argue
the Committee has authority to determine the statement in the District’s letter that Earnest
“ ‘failed in his duties to properly investigate the allegations’ ” against the Coach
constitutes a statement that Earnest resigned and the District took the adverse
employment action as a result of an allegation of misconduct for purposes of triggering
its jurisdiction under section 44242.5, subdivision (d).
       The interpretation of a statute and the application of a statute to undisputed facts
are legal issues subject to de novo review. (Farahani v. San Diego Community College
Dist. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1486, 1491; Poole v. Orange County Fire Authority (2015)
61 Cal.4th 1378, 1384.) In reviewing questions of law, we review the trial court’s ruling
and are not bound by the trial court’s stated reasons or rationales. (Scott v. Common
Council (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 684, 689; Kaiser Foundation Hospitals v. Superior Court
(2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 85, 107.)
       “ ‘ “ ‘As in any case involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental task . . . is
to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. [Citation.]
We begin by examining the statute’s words, giving them a plain and commonsense
meaning.’ ” ’ [Citation.] ‘[W]e consider the language of the entire scheme and related
statutes, harmonizing the terms when possible.’ ” (People v. Gonzalez (2017) 2 Cal.5th
1138, 1141; see People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, 357 [“ ‘[t]he words of the
statute must be construed in context, keeping in mind the statutory purpose, and statutes
or statutory sections relating to the same subject must be harmonized, both internally and

                                             16
with each other, to the extent possible’ ”].) If the language of the statute is clear and
unambiguous, there is no need for judicial construction and our task is at an end. If the
language is reasonably susceptible of more than one meaning, however, we may examine
extrinsic aids such as the apparent purpose of the statute, the legislative history, the
canons of statutory construction, and public policy. (Even Zohar Construction &
Remodeling, Inc. v. Bellaire Townhouses, LLC (2015) 61 Cal.4th 830, 838; People v.
Arias (2008) 45 Cal.4th 169, 177.)
       Before we delve into the analysis, we note defendants attack the trial court’s
reasoning on various grounds, e.g., that the trial court erred in its application of “non-
optional canons of [statutory] construction” and was misguided in “its purported reliance
on the 2013 passage of [Assembly Bill No.] 449 and its accompanying legislative
history.” Inasmuch as our standard of review is de novo and we review the trial court’s
ruling and not its rationale, we do not address defendants’ specific assertions of error
with regard to the trial court’s reasoning.
       Jurisdiction to conduct a formal review under section 44242.5, subdivision (d)(3)
is conferred on the Committee upon “receipt” of an employer’s statement “notifying” the
Committee about an enumerated change in a credential holder’s employment status “as a
result of an allegation of misconduct.” (§ 44242.5, subd. (b)(3)(A).) To “notify” means
to “inform.” (Black’s Law Dict. (7th ed. 1999) p. 1090, col. 2.) And a “result” means a
“consequence, effect, or conclusion.” (Black’s Law Dict. (rev. 4th ed. 1968) p. 1478,
col. 2; Black’s Law Dict. (10th ed. 2014) p. 1509, col 1.)
       By requiring that the Committee’s jurisdiction to conduct a formal review under
section 44242.5, subdivision (d) be triggered upon the Committee’s “receipt” of an
employer’s notifying statement, the Legislature imposed the onus on the employer to
determine whether to provide a statement to the Committee.
       Section 44242.5, subdivision (b)(3) provides: If an employer takes an enumerated
adverse employment action against a credential holder as a result of (i.e., a consequence

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of) an allegation of misconduct, it must provide the notifying statement to the Committee
within 30 days after taking such action. (§ 44242.5, subd. (b)(3)(B).) The employer must
also provide a notifying statement if it has information that the credential holder resigned
or otherwise left employment as a result of (i.e., as a consequence of) an allegation of
misconduct. (§ 44242.5, subd. (b)(3)(A).) Conversely, if an employer takes an
enumerated adverse employment action based solely on a credential holder’s
unsatisfactory performance or takes such action for reasons other than as a result of an
allegation of misconduct, the employer need not provide a notifying statement to the
Committee. (§ 44242.5, subd. (b)(3)(A), (C).)
       Plainly, the determination of whether an enumerated action was taken as a result
of (i.e., as a consequence of) an allegation of misconduct lays at the feet of the employer.
A necessary part of that determination is whether an allegation of misconduct existed or
was made in the first place. We find no ambiguity in the plain language of the statute.
       Applying the foregoing to the undisputed facts in this case, it is clear the
Committee has no jurisdiction to commence a formal review based on the District’s
letter. The District expressly wrote it did not take the adverse employment action as a
result of an allegation of misconduct. The District instead wrote the adverse employment
action was taken as a result of the District’s finding that Earnest “failed to perform
adequately in his job performance” because he “failed in his duties to properly investigate
the allegations as presented in the email.” The District further wrote Earnest voluntarily
resigned after his administrative leave concluded—with no indication as to the reason for
his resignation. Contrary to defendants’ argument, the District did not state that Earnest
failed to report suspected sexual abuse and that his failure to do so led to the adverse
employment action and his resignation.
       Defendants argue our interpretation fails to appropriately consider and defer to the
public protection purposes of the statutes and defendants’ interpretation because: (1)
“Education Code section 2 makes it explicit that all of the provisions of the Education

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Code must be read as broadly as possible to effect their public protection purposes”; and
(2) “courts are required to give the broadest possible reading to ‘remedial or protective
statutes and regulations,’ such as licensing acts.” The fact that the Education Code is to
be liberally construed to effectuate its protective purposes does not mandate that the
legislative directive regarding the Committee’s jurisdiction be ignored. (See Fuentes v.
Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1976) 16 Cal.3d 1, 8 [“The fact that the workers’
compensation laws are to be liberally construed ‘. . . does not mean that the legislative
mandate of [Labor Code] section 4750 is to be ignored’ ”]; Oda v. Elk Grove Union
Grammar School Dist. (1943) 61 Cal.App.2d 551, 556 [code provision requiring liberal
construction of the School Code “w[ould] not justify a disregard of the plain terms of a
statute”].)
       We are not unmindful that the Commission and Committee serve important roles
in protecting schoolchildren. The importance of defendants’ work does not, however,
override an express statutory directive. The District’s concern that the legislative scheme
allows school districts “to shield administrators and teachers from [Committee]
investigation and potential discipline by simply refusing to characterize their behaviors as
‘misconduct,’ even where they clearly are,” is best addressed to the Legislature. We
note, however, the Legislature has already provided the Commission with recourse
against a superintendent who fails to submit a notifying statement. The Committee may
investigate and the Commission may pursue an adverse action against a superintendent
who fails to comply with the mandatory reporting requirements. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5,
§ 80303, subd. (d); § 44030.5, subd. (c).) The superintendent may also be subject to
criminal penalties, if he, she, or they failed to file the required report. (§ 44030.5,
subd. (d).)
       For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the Committee does not have jurisdiction
to commence a formal review of Earnest’s fitness to hold a credential.

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                                     DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed. Earnest shall recover his costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), (2).)

                                                /s/
                                                ROBIE, Acting P. J.

We concur:

/s/
MAURO, J.

/s/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.

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