Court Opinion

ID: 9576882
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:29:50.329006+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:19:42.112950
License: Public Domain

Brachtenbach, J.
(dissenting) — I dissent. The majority holds that Burton's convictions for petit larceny and shoplifting do not involve "dishonesty or false statement," and therefore are not automatically admissible to impeach his testimony pursuant to ER 609(a)(2). This holding ignores the plain language of the rule. The term "dishonest" implies the act or practice of telling a lie, or of cheating, *13deceiving, and stealing. Webster's New World Dictionary 419 (College ed. 1968). Obviously, the crimes of larceny and shoplifting fall within this definition. Accordingly, Burton's convictions were admissible under ER 609(a)(2), and the Court of Appeals should be affirmed.
The majority argues in support of its "restrictive approach" to admissibility of evidence under ER 609(a)(2) that the rule presents the defendant in a criminal action with a Hobson's choice:6 either refuse to testify and risk the effect of not presenting one's side of the story, or testify and risk the inherent prejudice associated with prior conviction evidence. I share the majority's concern. However, I do not believe that the solution to this problem is to ignore the plain language of the rule. Instead, research into the history of impeachment by prior conviction, and the consequences of such impeachment to the defendant with a prior record, convinces me that it is time to abandon the procedure, with very limited exceptions.
I
The historical development of ER 609 may be traced into the antiquity of the common law. In 17th century England, a person who had been convicted of crime was disqualified as a witness, a disqualification thought to have originated as an additional punishment for the crime. Ashcraft, Evidence of Former Convictions, 41 Chicago B. Rec. 303, 304 (1960). Because the disqualification had the effect of also punishing innocent persons in need of the convict's testimony, however, jurists soon based it on a different theory: that the convict was of such poor moral character that he could not be expected to tell the truth. 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 519, at 726 (rev. 1979).
The common law rule disqualifying convicts as witnesses *14persisted into the early 18th century, when it met the determined resistance of Jeremy Bentham. In an oft-quoted passage, Bentham exposed the illogic of the rule:
Take homicide in the way of duelling. Two men quarrel; one of them calls the other a liar. So highly does he prize the reputation of veracity, that, rather than suffer a stain to remain upon it, he determines to risk his life, challenges his adversary to fight, and kills him. Jurisprudence, in its sapience, knowing no difference between homicide by consent, by which no other human being is put in fear — and homicide in pursuit of a scheme of highway robbery, of nocturnal housebreaking, by which every man who has a life is put in fear of it, — has made the one and the other murder, and consequently felony. The man prefers death to the imputation of a lie, — and the inference of the law is, that he cannot open his mouth but lies will issue from it. Such are the inconsistencies which are unavoidable in the application of any rule which takes improbity for a ground of exclusion.
J. Bentham, 7 Rationale of Judicial Evidence 406 (Bowring's ed. 1827), quoted in 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 519, at 728 (rev. 1979).
Wigmore credits Bentham with turning the tide of legal thought against the common law disqualification of convicts. By 1843, England had abolished the disqualification by statute. 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 524, at 734 (rev. 1979). One by one, the states of the United States followed suit.7
The same statutes which abolished the convict's testimonial incompetency generally provided that the convict could be impeached with evidence of his prior convictions. RCW 5.60.040, as originally enacted in 1854, is illustrative:
No person offered as a witness shall be excluded from giving evidence, by reason of conviction for crime, but such conviction may be shown to effect his credibility: *15Provided, That no person who shall have been convicted of the crime of perjury, shall be a competent witness in any case, unless such conviction shall have been reversed or unless he shall have received a pardon.
(Italics mine.) Laws of 1854, p. 186, § 292.
Thus, the modern rule permitting impeachment by prior conviction had its genesis in the common law disqualification of convicts. However, it is important to note that the common law disqualification of convicts had no application to the defendant in a criminal action, who was already incompetent to testify under the common law. Ashcraft, Evidence of Former Convictions, 41 Chicago B. Rec. 303 (1960). In fact, England waited some 55 years after establishing the competency of convicts before finally abolishing the defendant's disqualification in the Criminal Evidence Act of 1898. Seventy-Two Years at the Bar; a Memoir of Sir Harry Bodkin Poland 26 (Bowen-Rowlands ed. 1924), quoted in 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 576, at 817 (rev. 1979). Accordingly, there is no precedent at common law for impeachment by prior conviction insofar as the defendant in a criminal action is concerned. Ashcraft, at 304.
England immediately recognized the need to shield the defendant in a criminal action from impeachment by prior conviction. The Criminal Evidence Act of 1898, which established the competency of the defendant, also provided that the defendant could not be asked or required to answer any question tending to show that he had committed, been charged with, or been convicted of any crime other than that with which he was then charged. The act provided exceptions to this rule only where the prior conviction evidence was admissible to show guilt, where the defendant had given evidence of his own good character or impugned the character of the prosecutor or prosecution witnesses, and where the defendant had given evidence against a codefendant. Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, 61 & 62 Viet., ch. 36, § 1(f).
Early attempts to provide similar protection to defendants in this country were unsuccessful. Both the Model *16Code of Evidence and the Uniform Rules of Evidence prohibited the introduction of prior conviction evidence to impeach the accused, except where the accused had first introduced evidence to support his own credibility. Moreover, even where impeachment by prior conviction was permitted, only convictions for crimes involving dishonesty or false statement were admissible. Model Code of Evidence, Rule 106 (1942); Unif. R. Evid. 21 (1953). The call for procedural reform was heeded only in Kansas, which adopted Uniform Rule 21. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-421 (1976); Spector, Rule 609: A Last Plea for Its Withdrawal, 32 Okla. L. Rev. 334, 337 n.20 (1979).
The first significant attempt to limit impeachment by prior conviction came in Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965). At the time Luck was written, the relevant District of Columbia statute, 14 D.C. Code § 305 (1967), provided that a witness' prior conviction "may be given in evidence to affect his credibility as a witness". Luck, at 768 n.6. Seizing upon the permissive word "may," the Luck court interpreted the statute as placing the admission of prior convictions within the discretion of the trial court:
There may well be cases where the trial judge might think that the cause of truth would be helped more by letting the jury hear the defendant's story than by the defendant's foregoing that opportunity because of the fear of prejudice founded upon a prior conviction. There may well be other cases where the trial judge believes the prejudicial effect of impeachment far outweighs the probative relevance of the prior conviction to the issue of credibility. This last is, of course, a standard which trial judges apply every day in other contexts; and we think it has both utility and applicability in this field.
(Footnotes omitted.) Luck, at 768.
In 1970, Congress eliminated the Luck doctrine in the District of Columbia by the simple expedient of amending 14 D.C. Code § 305 to read that, for the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence of prior convictions "shall" be admitted if offered. Reform and Criminal Proce*17dure Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, § 133, 84 Stat. 473. However, the concept of permitting the trial court to determine whether the prejudicial effect of admitting the prior convictions outweighed their probative value survived, and was ultimately incorporated into Congress' final version of Fed. R. Evid. 609:
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from him or established by public record during cross-examination but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was convicted, and the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.
(Italics mine.)
Significantly, no judicial discretion was granted with respect to prior convictions for crimes involving dishonesty or false statement. The House-Senate Conference Committee, which drafted the final version of Fed. R. Evid. 609, reasoned that "[s]uch convictions are peculiarly probative of credibility and, under this rule, are always to be admitted." H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 7098, 7103. By creating a distinction between crimes of "dishonesty and false statement" and other crimes, Congress paved the way for decisions like that of the majority today, which stretches the concept of "dishonesty" to the breaking point in order to hold that convictions for larceny and shoplifting are not automatically admissible pursuant to ER 609(a)(2).
This court adopted ER 609 in 1979. See 91 Wn.2d 1117, 1149 (1978).
II
The basic assumption underlying ER 609 is that prior convictions are relevant to witness credibility. This assumption is in turn based on another, twofold assump*18tion: (1) that a person with a criminal past has a bad general character and (2) that a person with a bad general character is the sort of person who would disregard the obligation to testify truthfully. 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Evidence ¶ 609[02], at 609-54 (1982).
I question the validity of these assumptions. To begin with, ER 609 permits the trial court to admit prior convictions of any felony. Yet, many felonies, particularly violent felonies such as murder, assault and rape, have no rational bearing on veracity. Note, To Take the Stand or Not To Take the Stand: The Dilemma of a Defendant With a Criminal Record, 4 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 215, 217 (1968). Moreover, ER 609 permits the assumed unreliability of a witness to be predicated on the basis of a single act, which is hardly a scientific method of determining character. See Ladd, Credibility Tests — Current Trends, 89 U. Pa. L. Rev. 166,176-78 (1940). Indeed, as one commentator has noted, current psychological theory has retreated from the notion of general character traits; experiments have revealed that how a person behaves depends on the specific situation in which he finds himself. For example, it is argued that a prior conviction for perjury has value as a predictor of willingness to lie in a given situation only if all surrounding facts and circumstances are identical. Spector, Rule 609: A Last Plea for Its Withdrawal, 32 Okla. L. Rev. 334, 349-52 (1979).
Furthermore, even if prior convictions were relevant to credibility, I question whether ER 609 can be applied to the defendant in a criminal action without seriously prejudicing his right to a fair trial. Commentators have identified two ways in which prior conviction evidence may prejudice the jury. First, the jury may conclude that the defendant is a "bad person" who deserves to be sent to prison whether guilty of the crime presently charged or not. Second, the jury may perceive the prior convictions as proof of the defendant's general propensity to commit crimes, making it more likely that the defendant committed the crime charged. Note, To Take the Stand or Not To Take the *19Stand: The Dilemma of the Defendant With a Criminal Record, 4 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 215 (1968). Of course, these are the same dangers underlying the propensity rule of ER 404(b), which provides that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Evidence ¶ 609[02], at 609-56 (1982).
Statistical studies confirm that prior conviction evidence significantly increases the chances of a guilty verdict. Based upon a review of actual criminal trials, one study concluded that the acquittal rate for a defendant without a record was 42 percent, but only 25 percent for a defendant with a record. H. Kalven & H. Zeisel, The American Jury 161 (1966). Other studies of both actual and simulated trials also reach the conclusion that evidence of a prior record increases the conviction rate. See Doob & Kirshenbaum, Some Empirical Evidence on the Effect of s. 12 of the Canada Evidence Act Upon an Accused, 15 Crim. L.Q. 88, 93 (1972); Hans & Doob, Section 12 of the Canada Evidence Act and the Deliberations of Simulated Juries, 18 Crim. L.Q. 235, 243 (1976); Myers, Rule Departures and Making Law: Juries and Their Verdicts, 13 Law & Soc'y 781, 792 (1979); L.S.E. Jury Project, Juries and the Rules of Evidence, 1973 Crim. L. Rev. 208, 222.
It may be argued that prejudice to the defendant may be eliminated by instructing the jury to utilize prior conviction evidence solely for the purpose of evaluating the defendant's credibility. However, surveys substantiate Judge Hand's complaint that limiting instructions are "the recommendation to the jury of a mental gymnastic which is beyond, not only their powers, but anybody's else." Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 285 U.S. 556 (1932). The Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems conducted a random survey by distributing a questionnaire nationally to trial judges and criminal defense attorneys. When asked whether juries were able to follow an instruction to consider prior conviction evidence *20only for the purpose of evaluating the defendant's credibility, 98 percent of the attorneys and 43 percent of the judges gave negative answers. Note, To Take the Stand or Not To Take the Stand: The Dilemma of the Defendant With a Criminal Record, 4 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 215, 218 (1968). Jury examinations conducted by the University of Chicago indicated that jurors were afflicted with an
almost universal inability and/or unwillingness either to understand or follow the court's instruction on the use of defendant's prior criminal record for impeachment purposes. The jurors almost universally used defendant's record to conclude that he was a bad man and hence was more likely than not guilty of the crime for which he was then standing trial.
Letter from Dale W. Broeder, Associate Professor, the University of Nebraska College of Law, to Yale Law Journal (March 14, 1960), quoted in Note, Other Crimes Evidence at Trial: Of Balancing and Other Matters, 70 Yale L.J. 763, 777 (1961).
Of course, the defendant with a prior record may invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and refuse to testify, thereby eliminating the State's opportunity to impeach him with his prior convictions. Not too surprisingly, statistics show that defendants with prior records "take the Fifth" more frequently than defendants without prior records. See H. Kalven & H. Zeisel, The American Jury 146 (1966). However, the defendant also jeopardizes his chances of acquittal by refusing to testify. He may be the only person with access to information which could exonerate him, such as an alibi or an explanation of his behavior consistent with innocence. Moreover, common sense suggests that a jury may infer guilt from the defendant's silence. One Gallup poll showed that 71 percent of those questioned believed that the use of the privilege against self-incrimination indicated guilt. L. Mayers, Shall We Amend the Fifth Amendment? 21 (1959). In the Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems survey, 94 percent of the attorneys questioned believed that jurors *21noticed and inferred guilt from the defendant's silence despite the fact that no comment may be made to the jury on the defendant's failure to testify. Eighty-eight percent of the attorneys and 89 percent of the judges questioned believed that there was a greater chance of acquittal if the defendant testified. Note, To Take the Stand or Not To Take the Stand: The Dilemma of the Defendant With a Criminal Record, 4 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 215, 221 (1968).
In sum, the defendant with a prior record is forced by ER 609 into a "choice between Scylla and Charybdis": if he takes the stand, he faces impeachment by prior conviction and the consequent danger that the jurors will disregard instructions and regard his convictions as evidence of guilt; and if he declines to testify, jurors are likely to infer from his silence that he is guilty. 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Evidence ¶ 609[02], at 609-57 (1982).
Ill
Four states have recognized this dilemma and adopted statutes or rules which protect the right of the defendant in a criminal action to a fair trial: Kansas, Hawaii, Georgia, and Montana. The texts provide in relevant part:
Limitation on evidence of conviction of crime as affecting credibility. Evidence of the conviction of a witness for a crime not involving dishonesty or false statement shall be inadmissible for the purpose of impairing his or her credibility. If the witness be the accused in a criminal proceeding, no evidence of his or her conviction of a crime shall be admissible for the sole purpose of impairing his or her credibility unless the witness has first introduced evidence admissible solely for the purpose of supporting his or her credibility.
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-421 (1976).
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime is inadmissible except when the crime is one involving dishonesty. However, in a criminal case where the defendant takes the stand, the defendant shall not be questioned or evidence introduced as to whether *22he has been convicted of a crime, for the sole purpose of attacking credibility, unless the defendant has himself introduced testimony for the purpose of establishing his credibility as a witness, in which case he shall be treated as any other witness as provided in this rule.
Hawaii R. Evid. 609.
(b) If a defendant in a criminal case wishes to testify and announces in open court his intention to do so, he may so testify in his own behalf. If a defendant testifies, he shall be sworn as any other witness and may be examined and cross-examined as any other witness, except that no evidence of general bad character or prior convictions shall be admissible unless and until the defendant shall have first put his character in issue.
Ga. Code Ann. § 38-415 (Supp. 1982).
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime is not admissible.
Mont. R. Evid. 609.
Thus, in Kansas, Hawaii and Georgia, the state may not introduce into evidence any prior conviction for the purpose of impeaching the accused, unless the accused "opens the door" by introducing evidence to support his own credibility. Montana takes this proscription one step further by providing that prior conviction evidence is inadmissible to impeach the credibility of any witness.8
By abolishing impeachment by prior conviction, these four states have protected the right of the defendant to a fair trial in two ways. First, they have eliminated the possibility that the jury will misuse prior conviction evidence by viewing it as evidence of guilt, or by deciding that the defendant is a "bad person" who deserves to go to prison *23regardless of guilt. Second, by eliminating this potential prejudice, these states have encouraged the defendant to exercise his constitutional right to testify in his own defense. On the other hand, the cost to the State of abandoning impeachment by prior conviction is small. The jury already has ample reason to be skeptical of a defendant's testimony. A person on trial for life or liberty has a strong motivation to lie; indeed, a defendant with an unblemished past has a greater incentive to perjure himself than a convict who is already familiar with prison life and has no reputation or honor to lose. Ashcraft, Evidence of Former Convictions, 41 Chicago B. Rec. 303, 305 (1968). Moreover, jurors are generally aware that the defendant is on trial because law enforcement believes he is guilty. This awareness will also cause jurors to view critically the defendant's testimony. Nichol, Prior Crime Impeachment of Criminal Defendants: A Constitutional Analysis of Rule 609, 82 W. Va. L. Rev. 391, 408-09 (1980).
Therefore, I conclude that our present ER 609 should be abandoned and replaced with a rule modeled after the Kansas, Hawaii, Georgia and Montana rules. At a minimum, this new rule should provide that no prior convictions shall be admissible to impeach the credibility of a defendant in a criminal action, unless the defendant has first introduced evidence solely for the purpose of supporting his credibility. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-421 (1976). I suggest we go one step further and adopt Montana's proscription against impeaching any witness with any prior conviction. This would relieve our courts of the pointless exercise of attempting to determine which crimes involve "dishonesty or false statement," or otherwise impugn the credibility of the witness. I would, however, add to the Montana rule a clause expressly providing that any prior conviction could be introduced to impeach the testimony of a witness who had first introduced evidence to support his own credibility.
In the meantime, since I disagree with the majority's holding that petit larceny and shoplifting are not crimes *24involving dishonesty or false statement within the meaning of the present ER 609, I dissent.

"Hobson's choice" is defined as the necessity of accepting one of two or more equally objectionable things. The term originated as a reference to the practice of Thomas Hobson, a 17th century English liveryman, of requiring every customer to take the horse which stood nearest the door. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1076 (1976).

Weinstein states that all state jurisdictions had abolished use of a felony convictití” disqualify by 1953; however, in a few jurisdictions conviction of perjury may hill render a witness incompetent to testify, at least in a civil case. 3 J. Wein ■ in & M. Berger, Evidence ¶ 601[03], at 601-19 (1982).

Montana's ban on the use of prior convictions to impeach is not as absolute as it appears, however. In State v. Austad, 197 Mont. 70, 641 P.2d 1373, 1384 (1982), the Montana Supreme Court held that where a criminal defendant testified he had never committed burglary, rule 609 did not prevent the State from introducing his prior conviction for burglary to impeach. Austad thus brings the Montana rule into line with the Kansas, Hawaii and Georgia rules, all of which permit impeachment by prior conviction where the defendant introduces evidence to support his credibility.