Court Opinion

ID: 9514443
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:49:29.106791+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:17.498145
License: Public Domain

SABERS, Justice
(dissenting in part and concurring in part).
[¶ 35.] I dissent on Issue 1 as the majority’s conclusion is unsupported by the record, precedent, or logic. I would reach the merits on Issue 3 and determine that a claimant need not petition the Department prior to enrolling in a rehabilitation program. I agree that we should remand on Issue 2.
[¶ 36.] 1. THE AWARD OF REHABILITATION BENEFITS WAS NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.
[¶ 37.] This case presents an unusual situation where an employee with little experience and limited education was able to earn almost $40,000. ' The Department held that Kurtenbach’s successful completion of the engineering program at SDSM <⅞ T will not elevate his station in life, but “rather will simply restore him to suitable, substantial and gainful employment, especially considering Claimant’s [prior] earning level of approximately $40,000 per year.” Our task on appeal is to determine whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the agency’s decision, Hendrix v. Graham Tire Co., 520 N.W.2d 876, 879 (S.D.1994), not to find reasons to reverse, even if we would not have made a similar decision. Fenner v. Trimac Transp., Inc., 1996 SD 121, ¶ 15, 554 N.W.2d 485, 489 (citing Peterson v. Beck, 537 N.W.2d 375, 379 (S.D.1995)); accord Cox v. Sioux Falls Sch. Dist. No. 19-5, 514 N.W.2d 868, 876 (S.D.1994) (Miller, C.J., dissenting) (“It appears to me that Department and the majority are improperly searching for reasons to reverse the Board.”). The majority opinion disregards and damages the well-settled principle that workers’ compensation statutes are liberally construed in favor of the injured employee:
It is long-standing public policy that worker’s compensation statutes be liberally *877construed in favor of injured employees. S.D. Med. Service v. Minn. Mu%. Fire & Cas. Co., 303 N.W.2d 358 (S.D.1981). Worker’s compensation statutes are “remedial, and should be liberally construed to effectuate [their] purpose.” Moody v. L.W. Tyler, Custom Combiners, 297 N.W.2d 179,180 (S.D.1980).
Mills v. Spink Elec. Coop., 442 N.W.2d 243, 246 (S.D.1989); accord Great West Cas. Co. v. Bergeson, 1996 SD 73, ¶ 6, 550 N.W.2d 418, 419-20; Nilson v. Clay County, 534 N.W.2d 598, 601 (S.D.1995); Welch v. Automotive Co., 528 N.W.2d 406,409 (S.D.1995).
[¶ 38.] Evidence at the Department hearing showed that the average yearly salary offered to a newly graduated metallurgical engineer was $35,000. This statistic was provided through the January 1995 “CPC Salary Swvey,” a publication of the College Placement Council (CPC), which compiles starting salary offers provided by 365 career placement offices of various colleges and universities. Employer and the majority opinion make much of the fact CPC reported only 21 offers made in the metallurgical engineering field from September 1, 1994 to August 31, 1995; Employer states these were the only offers in the entire nation. That may or may not be trae — the disclaimer in CPC provides:
The offers reported in the Survey are a representative sample of actual job offprs made to new college graduates during the recruiting year and do not imply all job offers made to all college graduates.... In those categories where offers are relatively few, the data should be regarded only as indicative. (Emphasis in original).
Furthermore, the CPC statistics do not include any geographical data concerning the job offers, so the majority statement that “the only employment statistics presented by Kurtenbach were for nationwide opportunities, none of which were located in South Dakota” (supra at note 5) finds no support in this record.6
[¶39.] Employer’s own vocational expert, Ronald Ochs, testified that he learned from SDSM & T there would be employment available for metallurgical engineers in gold mines. Ochs’ testimony did not specifically mention the gold mines in the Black Hills, but it is difficult to fathom what other gold mines to which he may have been referring. The South Dakota Department of Environment & Natural Resources, Division of Environmental Services, Minerals & Mining Program reports that there are at least fourteen entities which do business in the Black Hills as gold, limestone, and gravel mining companies and which hire engineers. This includes the Department of Transportation and excludes “mom and pop” operations.7
[¶ 40.] Kurtenbach’s burden is to show that his rehabilitation program is reasonable by proving that it will restore him to “suitable, substantial, and gainful employment.” Hendrix, 520 N.W.2d at 883; Chiolis v. Lage Dev. Co., 512 N.W.2d 158, 160 (S.D.1994); Beckman v. John Morrell & Co., 462 N.W.2d 505, 507 (S.D.1990); Cozine v. Midwest Coast Transp., Inc., 454 N.W.2d 548, 553 (S.D. 1990). This is achieved by demonstrating that the program will enable the claimant to earn a salary roughly equivalent to seventy-five to eighty percent of his pre-injury salary. Chiolis, 512 N.W.2d at 160. Testimony *878showed that the salaries listed in CPC were approximately equal to starting salaries in South Dakota in the private sector ($29,000-$30,000); a state agency would pay a little less, with a starting salary of around $26,-000-$27,000. The placement rate for SDSM & T graduates is 90%, with 80% becoming employed and 10% being accepted for postgraduate studies.
[¶ 41.] In this case, the majority suddenly announces a new standard where the claimant also must prove the program will “actually restore” him to work in his community. This is in direct contravention with our line of eases in this area, where we have always focused on whether claimants are capable of realizing nearly the same pre-injury level of pay, not how may job offers they might receive. See, e.g., Hendrix, 520 N.W.2d at 881 (addressing whether employment at a comparable wage was available to claimant); Chiolis, 512 N.W,2d at 161 (weighing a two-year program against a four-year program and concluding that a four-year was unnecessary because claimant could realize pre-inju-ry wages via the two-year program). When Kurtenbach offered the CPC statistics, his purpose was to prove salaries in the engineering field; Employer and the majority seized on the reported 21 offers — ignoring the disclaimer (see ¶ 38 & attachment) — and thus put this matter at issue; however, when Employer advocated the two-year program, no evidence was offered to show how many job offers Kurtenbach could hope to receive after graduation from vocational school. In any event, I do not fault the Department and the circuit court for not demanding this information, given that this will be the first time this court has done so.
[¶ 42.] Kurtenbach met his burden by presenting evidence of 1) a 90% placement rate and 2) regional salaries ranging from $26,000 to $30,000. Therefore, his rehabilitation program will enable him to secure employment at 65% to 75% of his pre-injury salary. As noted, the goal is 75% to 80%. Thus, it defies logic for the majority to state “the program improperly elevates Kurtenbach’s station in life at the expense of Employer.” ¶ 25, supra. Approving rehabilitation benefits to enable Kurtenbach to go from Frito-Lay route salesperson to metallurgical engineer does not elevate his station in life. Our cases disapproving rehabilitation benefits because they would “elevate [a claimant’s] station in life” refer to programs which would result in a subsequent increase in wage, not a more flattering or more prestigious title. See, e.g., Chiolis, 512 N.W.2d at 161; Cozine, 454 N.W.2d at 554; Barkdull v. Homestake Mining Co., 411 N.W.2d 408, 410 (S.D.1987) (Barkdull II ).8 Here, Kurtenbach will actually realize a substantial drop in wages, making it preposterous to conclude his station in life is elevated.
[¶43.] The majority opinion states that Kurtenbach’s “willingness to relocate” does not meet the test for achieving suitable employment. This statement is curious, as it *879has no support in the record. Kurtenbaeh has never asserted a desire, a “willingness,” or a need to leave the Black Hills to secure employment. On the contrary, he offered testimony to show what the starting salaries for engineers were in South Dakota, both in the private sector and in government employment.
[¶ 44.] As noted above, this is an unusual situation where a person with very little post-secondary education was able to make nearly $40,000 per year. While I think there is substantial evidence in the record to support the Department’s decision, we should at least give Kurtenbaeh the opportunity to show whether his program will “actually restore” him to suitable employment in his community. According to our prior decisions, he did not have notice before now that this is the standard he must meet. See supra ¶ 24. In fact, in at least one prior case, this court denied a claimant rehabilitation benefits because his employer demonstrated that employment was available throughout the state. See Barkdull II, 411 N.W.2d at 410.
[¶ 45.] If the court adopts this new standard, then we have not been provided with an adequate basis from which to make an informed decision.9 We do not know whether Kurtenbaeh limited his opportunities by switching the focus of his program to metallurgical engineering. Will he be qualified to accept positions as a civil or other type of engineer? Are the gold mine jobs to which Ochs referred located in the Black Hills? Were any of the reported 21 offers made in the metallurgical engineering field extended for jobs in the Black Hills community? Without this information, it is difficult, under the majority opinion, to make a final determination whether Kurtenbaeh chose a reasonable means of restoring himself to suitable, substantial, and gainful employment. This issue can not be resolved absent additional information concerning these disputed facts. Therefore, we should remand issue 1 for more fact-finding regarding Kurtenbach’s regional employment opportunities upon graduation.10
[¶ 46.] 2. I AGREE WE SHOULD REMAND ON ISSUE 2
[¶47.] 3. KURTENBACH’S CLAIM WAS NOT DEFEATED BY ENROLLING BEFORE PETITIONING THE DEPARTMENT
[¶ 48.] Employer argues that Kurtenbaeh is completely barred from receiving rehabilitation benefits because he did not petition the Department for a hearing before he enrolled in the engineering program. The Department held that his petition was timely filed. Judge Zinter modified that holding to omit benefits owed from the time of enrollment to the time of petition. Kurtenbaeh appeals that holding by notice of review. Employer relies entirely on Chiolis for its position, which requires a review of that decision, specifically, the following statement:
Chiolis started his current college program before petitioning Department for rehabilitation benefits. Even recognizing that the primary purpose of rehabilitation benefits is to restore the injured employee to substantial and gainful employment, the worker may not unilaterally decide what training he or she may want to pursue and proceed to do so at the employer’s expense. Murdock v. MBPXL Corp., 12 Kan.App.2d 312, 742 P.2d 441, 446 (1987). “To approve such an independent approach to rehabilitation training by a claimant would result in untold administrative and economic chaos and a total'breakdown of the legislatively intended benefits to thé injured worker of rehabilitation training.” Id. “While such self-improvement is highly laudable, particularly in view of the claimant’s independent quest for it, unaided by the employer or carrier, it is outside the *880range of benefits” provided by South Dakota law. City of Salem v. Colegrove, 228 Va. 290, 321 S.E.2d 654, 656 (1984). To approve a procedure which allows an injured employee to select a rehabilitation program before petitioning Department or reaching an agreement with the employer would be putting the cart before the horse.
Chiolis, 512 N.W.2d at 161-62. First, this statement can be characterized as dictum because Chiolis was denied benefits, not because he enrolled prior to petitioning the Department but because he failed in his burden to show that a four-year degree program was necessary to return him to substantial, gainful employment. Fatal to the claimant in Chiolis was that a four-year program would go beyond restoring him to a pre-injury wage by elevating his station in life at the expense of his employer. Id. at 161.
[¶ 49.] Next, neither the statute nor our cases interpreting it establish a requirement that the Department must be petitioned before a claimant pursues a rehabilitation program. In fact, one cannot receive benefits until “such employee is engaged in a program of rehabilitation!)]” SDCL 62-4-5.1 (emphasis added). See also Hendrix, 520 N.W.2d at 883; Chiolis, 512 N.W.2d at 160; Beckman, 462 N.W.2d at 507; Cozine, 454 N.W.2d at 553 (unanimously listing only the previously discussed five requirements, reproduced supra at ¶ 9). Nowhere before or since Chiolis did we suggest that a petition to the Department was a prerequisite. The only mandatory language in the statute pertains to filing a claim with the employer, while providing that the claimant “may” petition the Department upon denial of its claim to the employer. SDCL 62-4-5.1.
[¶ 50.] Furthermore, the cases cited in Chiolis in apparent support of this proposition are not on point. See Murdock, 742 P.2d at 445-46 (denying rehabilitation benefits when claimant entered a medical assistant program even though 1) she was informed she was medically unsuitable for that program because of her injury; 2) she was acting without approval from her vocational counselors; 3) she was acting against court order). Murdock clearly does not stand for the proposition a claimant may not receive rehabilitation benefits simply because she enrolled in the program without petitioning the Department. See also Colegrove, 321 S.E.2d at 656 (holding that Virginia workers’ compensation statutes never encompass a four-year college degree program as a reasonable and necessary rehabilitation program). Cole-grove directly contradicts another statement in Chiolis: “We are not implying that a four-year college degree can never be a reasonable means of rehabilitation.” 512 N.W.2d at 161.
[¶ 51.] A more common-sense approach is that claimants may enroll in retraining programs at their own risk; that is, rehabilitation benefits will not be guaranteed for that particular program simply because that is the one the claimant wishes to pursue.11 The five requirements discussed above must still be met before rehabilitation benefits will be paid out. “It is [Kurtenbach’s] right to seek a college education, but [Employer] cannot be compelled to pay for such a program if it is not necessary.” Cozine, 454 N.W.2d at 554.
[¶ 52.] SDCL 62-4-5.1 was amended effective July 1, 1994, which does not affect this *881dispute; however, under the new version, a claimant must produce a certificate of enrollment to even request rehabilitation benefits. See SDCL 62-4-5.1 (Supp.1996). This may be further evidence that it makes sense to enroll in order to begin the process. Any other conclusion would force a claimant to wait for decisions from the Department,12 the circuit court, and this court. For Kurten-baeh, this would mean that he could not have safely commenced his rehabilitation program until after this court’s decision. This may mean the fall semester of 1997 — as it stands' now, he has completed all but a year and a half of his degree program.
[¶ 53.] Therefore, a petition to the Department before enrollment is not necessary to receive rehabilitation benefits, notwithstanding the statement to the contrary in Chiolis. We should reverse the circuit court’s denial of benefits for the time period between a claimant’s enrollment and petition to the Department, because that holding was based entirely on the circuit court’s correct reading of Chiolis, which we should now modify. The Department’s holding that this petition was timely filed was correct.
KONENKAMP, J., joins this special writing.
ATTACHMENT AVERAGE YEARLY SALARY OFFERS
Bachelor’s Degree Candidates
(Data Combined for Men and Women)
[[Image here]]
# ⅛ ⅝ ⅝
Metallurgical
Engineering 21 $35,000 $33,429 4.7 $38,100 $37,000 $30,000
⅜ ⅜ * ⅜
*882[[Image here]]

. In fact, the CPC does not release information regarding the college, the employer, or the individual offered the job; therefore, despite the majority opinion’s contrary interpretation of the report, it is impossible to tell where these offers were made. Clearly, Kurtenbach did not "advocate relocation” through this evidence. Copies of the relevant sections of the CPC are reproduced and attached to this dissent to allow the reader to view the evidence objectively.

. I concede that it would not be necessary to emphasize such readily ascertainable facts if the majority were applying the correct standard of review. In any event, that there are gold and other mining operations in the Black Hills which hire engineers can not reasonably be disputed and are the type of facts properly subject to judicial notice. See SDCL 19-10-2 (FedREvid 201(b)):
A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either
(1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or
(2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.
See also Poppen v. Walker, 520 N.W.2d 238, 246 (S.D.1994) ("We may take judicial notice of historical facts which are matters of general knowledge and specially those peculiarly connected with or affecting the state.”).

. Moreover, such shifts in occupation are not unprecedented under workers' compensation rehabilitation statutes. See, e.g., Beckman, 462 N.W.2d at 508-09 (from shackling cattle and boning hams to a printing technology course); Ranger Ins. Co. v. Speck, 145 Ga.App. 327, 243 S.E.2d 593, 594 (1978) (from police officer to degree program enabling a career in accounting or bookkeeping); Wilson v. Crown Cork & Seal, 503 N.W.2d 472, 475 (Minn. 1993) (from manual labor production worker to four-year program in accounting); Gilmore v. Little lack's Steak House, 292 N.W.2d 14, 15 (Minn.1980) (from bartender to program in accounting and business administration); Norby v. Arctic Enter. Inc., 305 Minn. 519, 232 N.W.2d 773, 774-75 (1975) (from small engine mechanic to program in accounting); Behrens v. Ken Corp., 191 Neb. 625, 216 N.W.2d 733, 734-35 (1974) (from motel maid to secretarial training); Smith v. North Dak. Workers Comp. Bureau, 447 N.W.2d 250, 251 & 259 (N.D.1989) (from winch truck driver to accounting program); Solo Cup Co. v. Brown, 660 P.2d 655, 658 (Okla.Ct.App.1983) (from forklift operator to jewelry making course); Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 275 Wis. 505, 82 N.W.2d 191, 192-93 (1957) (from pilot to social work program); see also Beloit Corp. v. State, Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 152 Wis.2d 579, 449 N.W.2d 299 (Wis.Ct.App.), review denied, 451 N.W.2d 297 (Wis. 1989) (awarding rehabilitation benefits for five-year mechanical engineering program to claimant who was 19 years old and only employed for one month at time of injury); cf. Wilson, 503 N.W.2d at 475 ("Rehabilitation efforts leading to a job with a higher economic status than would have occurred without the disability is permitted if it can be demonstrated that this rehabilitation is necessaiy to increase the likelihood of reemployment.”) (citation & internal quotation omitted).

. In fairness to counsel, the hearing examiner, and the circuit court judge, they evidently relied upon testimony regarding regional salaries and did not inquire into the number of potential job offers.

. Since the case is being remanded on Issue 3, it makes sense to resolve Issue 1 on remand as well. This would comport with principles of judicial economy and efficiency. It is unreasonable for the majority to invite Kurtenbaeh to propose a different program of rehabilitation when he has only a year and a half left on his current program.

. For a case reaching a similar conclusion, see Towne v. Bates File Co., 497 So.2d 967, 968 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1986):
A prior request to the Division [of Workers' Compensation] for evaluation of a claimant’s need for rehabilitation is not an indispensable condition precedent to an award of rehabilitation .... [T]he claimant is not precluded from obtaining services independent of the employer and the Division, but when he does so he obtains those services at the risk he will not persuade the depuly commissioner that those particular services were necessary.
(Citations and internal quotations omitted). See also Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 710 P.2d 1164, 1166 (Colo.Ct.App. 1985) ("[When] a claimant has established that unauthorized medical treatment or vocational rehabilitation has reduced the degree of permanent partial disability from which the claimant would otherwise have suffered and that the expenses thus incurred are reasonably proportionate to the benefit received, the employer is liable for such unauthorized but reasonable expenses.”); Freeman v. PoulanfWeed Eater, 630 So.2d 733, 740-41 (La. 1994) (holding that claimant's independent pursuit of a meaningful rehabilitation program "should not entirely relieve the employer of its rehabilitation obligation under the statute”).

. The Department’s findings of fact and conclusions of law were not filed until August 1995, nearly two years after Kurtenbach petitioned for a hearing.