Court Opinion

ID: 9954167
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-25 18:13:03.37942+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:11:51.540319
License: Public Domain

J-S11042-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                    Appellee              :
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
 DANIEL OWEN JEFFRIES                     :
                                          :
                    Appellant             :       No. 1616 EDA 2022

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 18, 2022
            In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
          Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0002167-2021

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                    Appellee              :
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
 DANIEL JEFFRIES                          :
                                          :
                    Appellant             :       No. 1618 EDA 2022

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 18, 2022
            In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
          Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0000384-2021

BEFORE: OLSON, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                             FILED MARCH 25, 2024

      Appellant, Daniel Owen Jeffries, appeals from the judgment of sentence

entered in the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, following revocation

of his probation. We vacate and remand for further proceedings.

      In its opinion, the trial court set forth some of the relevant facts and

procedural history of this case as follows:

         On November 1, 2020, Appellant was arrested (No. CP-23-
J-S11042-23

          CR-384-202[1]) [(“docket 384-2021”)] for violations of the
          Crimes Code including … simple assault, public
          drunkenness, disorderly conduct, and harassment arising
          from a fight that took place at the Sungate Diner in Marcus
          Hook, Delaware County, Pennsylvania, when he engaged in
          combative and menacing criminal behavior and assaulted
          his coworkers and victims, Jason McAndrews, Arbrey
          Salmons, and Juwan Brooks.

          On December 6, 2020[,] Appellant was arrested (No. CP-
          23-CR-2167-2021) [(“docket 2167-2021”)] for violations of
          the Crimes Code including aggravated assault, recklessly
          endangering another person [(“REAP”)], and defiant
          trespass when he entered Cocco’s Pizza in Brookhaven,
          Delaware County, Pennsylvania, at a time when it was
          closed to the public and he remained in the food prep area
          after being advised by staff to leave the premises. After
          Cocco’s staff forced him out of the building, Appellant
          assaulted the investigating officer and resisted arrest.

          On March 15, 2021[, at docket 384-2021,] Appellant
          entered a negotiated guilty plea to simple assault [in
          exchange for the Commonwealth dismissing the remaining
          charges]. The court imposed judgment of sentence upon
          Appellant to a term of 2 years [of] county probation;
          additionally Appellant specifically agreed and was ordered,
          inter alia, to complete a drug and alcohol evaluation and
          comply with the recommendations.

          On February 14, 2022[,] Appellant entered into a negotiated
          guilty plea [at docket 2167-2021] to [REAP], resisting
          arrest, and defiant trespass[, in exchange for the
          Commonwealth dismissing the remaining charges at this
          docket]. [The] court imposed judgment of sentence upon
          Appellant to an aggregate term of 3 years [of] county
          probation (one year on each count to run consecutively);
          additionally Appellant specifically agreed and was ordered,
          inter alia, to complete a drug and alcohol evaluation and
          comply with the recommendations.[1]
____________________________________________

1 The sentencing sheet at each docket specified under the section titled
“Requirements/Restrictions” that Appellant must, inter alia, comply with the
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                           -2-
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(Trial Court Opinion, filed 9/20/22, at 1-3) (internal citations and footnotes

omitted).

       On March 28, 2022, while on probation for simple assault at docket 384-

2021 and for REAP at docket 2167-2021, Probation Officer Debra Lamberto

alleged that Appellant had violated the following conditions of his probation:

(1) violation of Rule #9—refrain from overt behavior which may endanger

oneself or others; specifically, Appellant was accused of pulling a razor and

threatening staff at the White Deer Run inpatient treatment center, where he

had been residing; Appellant was further accused of choking his roommate;

(2) violation of Rule #10A—failure to pay costs; specifically, Appellant had an

outstanding balance of costs/fees of $535.00; and (3) violation of Rule #10C—

complete special conditions; specifically, as a result of the alleged violation of

Rule   #9,    Appellant     had    not   successfully   completed   the   treatment

recommended as a result of his drug and alcohol evaluation.

       On April 5, 2022, the court held a Gagnon I hearing,2 after which the

____________________________________________

rules and regulations governing probation and/or parole and general rules,
and undergo a substance abuse and psychological evaluation.

2 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973).

See also Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 761 A.2d 613 (Pa.Super. 2000)
(explaining that when parolee or probationer is detained pending revocation
hearing, due process requires determination at pre-revocation hearing
(Gagnon I hearing) of probable cause to believe violation was committed;
upon finding of probable cause, second, more comprehensive hearing
(Gagnon II hearing) follows before court makes final revocation decision).

                                           -3-
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court found probable cause to believe Appellant was in violation of his

probation for exhibiting threatening and overt behavior, failure to pay costs,

and failure to complete court-ordered treatment or other special conditions of

his sentence.3

       The court held a Gagnon II hearing on May 18, 2022. At the beginning

of the hearing, the Commonwealth asked Officer Lamberto to present the

violations and the recommendation. (See N.T. Gagnon II Hearing, 5/18/22,

at 3). Officer Lamberto then stated:4

          Good morning Your Honor, Debra Lamberto on behalf of
          adult probation and parole. Our recommendation Your
          Honor is as follows: On this case indictment [docket 384-
          2021,] count one, [Appellant] be found in violation of his
          probation and his probation be revoked. It is recommended
          that [Appellant] be resentenced to 12 to 24 months to be
          served in an SCI prison. Credit from March 26, 2022. On
          this case, indictment [docket 2167-2021,] count two.
          [Appellant] be found in violation of his probation and his
          probation be revoked. It is recommended that [Appellant]
          be resentenced to 12 to 24 months to be served in a SCI
          prison, credit from 3/26/22. It should be noted that
          indictment [docket 2167-2021,] counts three and four [for
          resisting arrest and defiant trespass, Appellant] is not found
          in violation of his probation. Adult probation and parole
          would recommend that the one year probation running
          consecutively to both counts remain as originally sentenced
          and should be noted on the sentencing sheet.

(Id. at 3-4). Although Officer Lamberto made recommendations, she did not

____________________________________________

3 The record does not contain a transcript from the Gagnon I hearing, but a

document summarizing the Gagnon I hearing results is included in the
record.

4 Officer Lamberto was not sworn in on the record before speaking.

                                           -4-
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specify on the record Appellant’s alleged probation violations. (See id.)

        Appellant’s counsel disputed that Appellant had violated the terms of his

probation. Specifically, Appellant’s counsel stated that no witnesses were at

the hearing to support a violation of Rule #9. Appellant’s counsel conceded

that Appellant had not paid all costs owed, but counsel claimed there was no

evidence of a willful failure to pay, such that Appellant could be in violation of

Rule #10A. Regarding the alleged Rule #10C violation, Appellant’s counsel

insisted that Appellant did not complete his treatment because he was

administratively discharged from White Deer Run.             Appellant’s counsel

maintained that Appellant had some serious mental health conditions that

impacted his behavior at White Deer Run, but counsel stated, “that’s about

what we can agree to that he was discharged from the program.” (Id. at 4-

5).     Appellant’s counsel disagreed with the recommendation to revoke

probation and resentence Appellant to a period of incarceration. (See id. at

5-6).

        The Commonwealth then referred to a report from White Deer Run

detailing the reasons for Appellant’s administrative discharge. Counsel for the

Commonwealth stated: “He has not been compliant with Deer Run, with White

Deer, his treatment there. Not complying with them, using a razor blade, the

allegations that they indicate he does….”      (Id. at 6).   Appellant’s counsel

objected to the court considering anything that Officer Lamberto had alleged

in her written Rule #9 violation concerning the details of Appellant’s

                                       -5-
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administrative discharge from White Deer Run.             Appellant’s counsel

maintained that Appellant did not admit those allegations and claimed that

the Commonwealth was required to call a witness to support such allegations.

(Id. at 7). The Commonwealth explained that it had a treatment summary

report from White Deer Run detailing the reasons for Appellant’s discharge.

At that point, Appellant’s counsel objected to the discharge report from White

Deer Run as hearsay. (Id. at 8). The court did not rule on the objection, and

the treatment summary from White Deer Run was not marked or admitted

into evidence at the hearing.5 (See id.)

        When asked if Appellant wanted to tell the court anything, Appellant

stated: “I was only using the razor blade to cut the towels to clean…the place

because the place was filthy and it was very overwhelming for me, the rehab.”

(Id.)   Appellant further stated: “I’m not an aggressive person, I was only

____________________________________________

5 The treatment summary is contained in the certified record.    The summary
states, in pertinent part:

          Throughout treatment, [Appellant] was progressing toward
          recovery and completion of the program but was
          administratively     discharged       due    to    becoming
          aggressive/assaultive towards his peers. [Appellant] was
          involved in multiple aggressive interactions with other
          Clients. It was reported he entered several unauthorized
          areas including other units and Women’s Program. Due to
          what presented as an altered mental status and risk of
          safety for Clients and Staff, Probation was contacted and he
          was administratively discharged from the program.

(White Deer Run/Cove Forge Behavioral Health System Treatment Summary
at 1) (undated).

                                           -6-
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messing with the people, I wasn’t acting in an assaultive way in order to cause

any injury to anybody. And it was just, that’s about all I have to say.” (Id.)

       At the conclusion of the hearing, the court revoked Appellant’s probation

for simple assault at docket 384-2021 and for REAP at docket 2167-2021, and

it resentenced Appellant at each of those counts to concurrent terms of 12 to

24 months’ imprisonment.6 The court did not revoke probation for Appellant’s

resisting arrest or defiant trespass convictions at docket 2167-2021, as

Appellant had not yet been placed on probation for those offenses when he

committed the violations at issue.             Thus, the court reimposed the original

consecutive terms of one year each of probation for those offenses, to

commence following Appellant’s revocation sentence of imprisonment.

       Appellant timely filed post-sentence motions at each docket on May 27,

2022, which the court denied without a hearing on June 2, 2022. On June 16,

2022, Appellant timely filed notices of appeal at each docket, which this Court

consolidated. On June 28, 2022, the court ordered Appellant to file concise

statements of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b),

and Appellant complied on July 11, 2022.

       Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

          Whether the evidence introduced at the revocation hearing
          was insufficient as a matter of law to establish a violation of
          probation inasmuch as the Commonwealth failed to
          establish any violation of any specific condition of probation
____________________________________________

6 The court did not provide any reasons for its revocation decision on the
record at the time of the hearing.

                                           -7-
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         and the trial court relied upon inadmissible hearsay and
         information not made part of the record?

         Whether the trial court imposed an illegal sentence by failing
         to afford Appellant all of the credit he was due for time
         served incarcerated?

         Whether the trial court imposed an illegal sentence by
         anticipatorily revoking his probation sentences for resisting
         arrest and defiant trespass on docket [2167-2021], in
         violation of Commonwealth v. Simmons, 262 A.3d 512
         (Pa.Super. 2021)?

         Whether the trial court erred and violated the requirements
         of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9771(c) by sentencing Appellant to total
         confinement absent him having been convicted of a new
         crime, absent any indication that he was likely to commit a
         new crime, and absent a showing that the sentence was
         “essential to vindicate the authority of the court”?

         Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law and violated
         the discretionary aspect of sentencing when it imposed a
         manifestly excessive and unreasonable sentence, inasmuch
         as the trial court did not state adequate grounds for
         imposing such a sentence, such a sentence lacked sufficient
         support in the record, was disproportionate to the alleged
         violations and such sentence failed to give individualized
         consideration to Appellant’s personal history and
         background, and was in excess of what was necessary to
         address the gravity of the offense, the protection of the
         community and Appellant’s rehabilitative needs?

(Appellant’s Brief at 4-5).

      When reviewing the outcome of a revocation proceeding, this Court is

limited to determining the validity of the proceeding, the legality of the

judgment of sentence imposed, and the discretionary aspects of sentencing.

Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030 (Pa.Super. 2013) (en banc). In

general, “[r]evocation of a probation sentence is a matter committed to the

                                     -8-
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sound discretion of the trial court and that court’s decision will not be disturbed

on appeal in the absence of an error of law or an abuse of discretion.”

Commonwealth v. Colon, 102 A.3d 1033, 1041 (Pa.Super. 2014), appeal

denied, 631 Pa. 710, 109 A.3d 678 (2015).

      In his first issue, Appellant argues that the record is devoid of any

evidence that Appellant violated the conditions of his probation. Appellant

asserts that the court placed no reasons on the record at the revocation

hearing for why the court found Appellant in violation of his probation.

Appellant maintains that he did not admit to any violation of his probation at

the revocation hearing. Appellant emphasizes that the Commonwealth did not

admit into evidence at the revocation hearing the Gagnon II report authored

by Probation Officer Lamberto specifying Appellant’s alleged probation

violations. Appellant stresses that no one made a record at the hearing of

what conditions of probation Appellant allegedly violated, in contravention of

Pa.R.Crim.P. 708(B) and 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9771(b).

      Appellant insists that the only alleged violation brought up at the hearing

was that Appellant was administratively discharged from a treatment facility.

Appellant contends that he objected to admission of the summary from the

treatment facility as hearsay, and the summary was never moved into

evidence at the hearing. Appellant stresses that hearsay is inadmissible at a

Gagnon II hearing except for good cause shown. Appellant further claims

that an administrative discharge from the treatment facility does not

                                       -9-
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constitute a violation of his probation in any event, particularly where

Appellant’s discharge was based on his mental health issues.            Appellant

suggests that the court improperly revoked his probation based merely on the

court’s findings that probation had been an ineffective tool of rehabilitation for

Appellant.

      Appellant also submits that the court’s reasoning for revoking probation

as set forth in the court’s Rule 1925(a) opinion was not expressed on the

record at the revocation hearing. Moreover, Appellant claims that the alleged

violations discussed in the court’s Rule 1925(a) opinion were not specific

conditions of Appellant’s probation as set forth in the sentencing orders.

Appellant concludes the evidence was insufficient to revoke his probation, and

this Court must vacate the revocation sentence and remand for imposition of

Appellant’s original sentence. On this record, we agree with Appellant that

relief is due.

      Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 708 governs violations of

probation, in pertinent part, as follows:

          Rule 708.    Violation of Probation, Intermediate
          Punishment, or Parole: Hearing and Disposition

             (A) A written request for revocation shall be filed with
          the clerk of courts.

             (B) Whenever a defendant has been sentenced to
          probation or intermediate punishment, or placed on parole,
          the judge shall not revoke such probation, intermediate
          punishment, or parole as allowed by law unless there has
          been:

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           (1) a hearing held as speedily as possible at which the
        defendant is present and represented by counsel; and

           (2) a finding of record that the defendant violated a
        condition of probation, intermediate punishment, or parole.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 708(A)-(B).   With respect to revocation of probation, Section

9771 of the Sentencing Code provides:

        § 9771.      Modification or revocation of order of
        probation

           (a) General rule.—The court has inherent power to at
        any time terminate continued supervision, lessen the
        conditions upon which an order of probation has been
        imposed or increase the conditions under which an order of
        probation has been imposed upon a finding that a person
        presents an identifiable threat to public safety.

           (b) Revocation.—The court may increase the
        conditions, impose a brief sanction under section 9771.1
        (relating to court-imposed sanctions for violating probation)
        or revoke an order of probation upon proof of the violation
        of specified conditions of the probation. Upon revocation
        the sentencing alternatives available to the court shall be
        the same as were available at the time of initial sentencing,
        due consideration being given to the time spent serving the
        order of probation. The attorney for the Commonwealth
        may file notice at any time prior to resentencing of the
        Commonwealth’s intention to proceed under an applicable
        provision of law requiring a mandatory minimum sentence.

           (c) Limitation       on      sentence        of      total
        confinement.—The court shall not impose a sentence of
        total confinement upon revocation unless it finds that:

           (1) the defendant has been convicted of another
        crime; or

            (2) the conduct of the defendant indicates that it is
        likely that he will commit another crime if he is not
        imprisoned; or

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             (3) such a sentence is essential to vindicate the
          authority of the court.

             (d) Hearing required.—There shall be no revocation
          or increase of conditions of sentence under this section
          except after a hearing at which the court shall consider the
          record of the sentencing proceeding together with evidence
          of the conduct of the defendant while on probation.
          Probation may be eliminated or the term decreased without
          a hearing.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9771.

       Additionally, “[i]n imposing probation, the court shall…specify at the

time of sentencing the conditions of probation…[.]” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9763(a).

Further, “[t]he court shall attach [to its order of probation] reasonable

conditions authorized by section 9763 (relating to conditions of probation)[7]

as it deems necessary to ensure or assist the defendant in leading a law-

____________________________________________

7 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9763(b) (stating court may attach any of following
conditions upon defendant as it deems necessary: (1) to meet family
responsibilities; (2) to be devoted to specific occupation, employment or
education initiative; (3) to participate in public or nonprofit community service
program; (4) to undergo individual or family counseling; (5) to undergo
available medical or psychiatric treatment or to enter and remain in specified
institution, when required for that purpose; (6) to attend education or
vocational training; (7) to attend or reside in rehabilitative facility or other
intermediate punishment program; (8) to not possess firearm or other
dangerous weapon unless granted written permission; (9) to make restitution
of fruits of crime in affordable amount and on schedule that defendant can
afford to pay; (10) to be subject to intensive supervision while remaining
within jurisdiction of court and to notify court or designated person of any
change in address or employment; (11) to report as directed to court or
designated person and to permit designated person to visit defendant’s home;
(12) to pay fine; (13) to participate in drug or alcohol screening and treatment
programs, including outpatient programs; (14) to do other things reasonably
related to rehabilitation).

                                          - 12 -
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abiding life.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9754(b). “The failure to do so is a violation of

this statutory mandate.” Commonwealth v. Foster, 654 Pa. 266, 272 n.5,

214 A.3d 1240, 1244 n.5 (2019).

      Our Supreme Court has explained:

         We find the language of the pertinent statutory provisions
         to be clear and unambiguous. The law provides a general
         condition of probation—that the defendant lead “a law-
         abiding life,” i.e., that the defendant refrain from
         committing another crime. [42 Pa.C.S.A.] § 9754(b). To
         insure that general condition is met, or to assist the
         defendant in meeting that general condition, the order must
         also include certain “specific conditions” from the list
         enumerated in section 9754(c). Only upon the violation of
         any of the “specified conditions” in the probation order
         (general or specific) may a court revoke the defendant’s
         probation. Id. § 9771(b). In other words, a court may find
         a defendant in violation of probation only if the defendant
         has violated one of the “specific conditions” of probation
         included in the probation order or has committed a new
         crime. The plain language of the statute does not allow for
         any other result.

Id. at 282, 214 A.3d at 1250 (internal footnote omitted).

      A probationer’s due process rights at a revocation hearing include: (1)

written notice of the claimed violation(s); (2) disclosure of the evidence

against him; (3) an opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses

and documentary evidence; (4) the right to confront and cross-examine

adverse witnesses; (5) a neutral and detached hearing body; and (6) a written

statement by the factfinder as to the evidence relied on and reasons for

revocation. Commonwealth v. Kates, 452 Pa. 102, 118, 305 A.2d 701, 709

(1973). Once these requirements are met, the court must decide following a

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hearing

          whether the parolee or probationer has in fact acted in
          violation of one or more conditions of his parole or
          probation. It is this fact that must be demonstrated by
          evidence containing probative value. Only if it is determined
          that the parolee or probationer did violate the conditions
          does the second question arise: should the parolee or
          probationer be recommitted to prison or should other steps
          be taken to protect society and improve chances of
          rehabilitation?

Commonwealth v. Sims, 770 A.2d 346, 349 (Pa.Super. 2001) (internal

citations and quotation marks omitted).       “Unlike a criminal trial where the

burden is upon the Commonwealth to establish all of the requisite elements

of the offenses charged beyond a reasonable doubt, at a revocation hearing

the Commonwealth need only prove a violation of probation by a

preponderance of the evidence.”        Id. at 350 (internal quotation marks

omitted).

      Further, “hearsay is not admissible at a Gagnon II hearing absent a

finding of good cause for not allowing confrontation.”     Commonwealth v.

Allshouse, 969 A.2d 1236, 1241 (Pa.Super. 2009). Likewise, “[r]eliance on

documents not admitted into evidence is error.” Id. (holding court erred in

revoking defendant’s probation where court relied on documents that were

hearsay and not entered into evidence at violation of probation hearing and

not contained in certified record; court further erred by relying on statements

made by probation officer whose testimony was unsworn at hearing;

admission of such evidence was not harmless because absent hearsay,

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evidence was not sufficient to show by preponderance of evidence that

defendant violated no-contact order; although defendant admitted he failed

to pay outstanding court costs, term of probation may not be revoked for

failure to pay fines absent certain considerations by revocation court

concerning defendant’s ability to pay).

      Instantly, the trial court explained its rationale for revoking Appellant’s

probation in its Rule 1925(a) opinion as follows:

         During the May 18, 2022 Gagnon II hearing, and before
         Appellant was found in violation of the conditions of
         probation and this court imposed judgment of sentence,
         Appellant 1) volunteered a statement explaining away and
         playing down his behavior at the inpatient facility and 2)
         agreed he had been administratively discharged from the
         facility and owed costs.

                                  *     *      *

         Appellant   contends     the   evidence     used    by   the
         Commonwealth was insufficient “as a matter of law to
         establish a violation of any specific condition of probation
         inasmuch as the Commonwealth failed to establish any
         violation of any specific condition of probation.”      The
         evidence of record belies Appellant’s allegation.

         In the present case, at the May 18, 2022 Gagnon II
         hearing, Agent Debbie Lamberto from Adult Probation and
         Parole Services in Delaware County alleged Appellant
         violated conditions of probation that required him to
         “Refrain from overt behavior which may endanger oneself
         or others,” “Pay all Court Imposed fees, costs, and
         restitution,” and “Complete Special Conditions.”4 During the
         hearing     Appellant   acknowledged      he    had    been
         administratively discharged from the inpatient treatment
         facility but disagreed with the underlying allegations
         concerning the reasons for the discharge.          Appellant
         voluntarily stated the conditions of the inpatient facility
         “resulted in my mental health going overboard…I’m not an

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       aggressive person, I was only messing with people, I wasn’t
       acting in an assaultive way in order to cause any injury to
       anybody.” The record is clear no one forced Appellant to
       make these statements, and Appellant freely volunteered
       them. Additionally, Appellant admitted he failed to pay
       costs and had an outstanding balance. … This court
       concluded the evidence of Appellant’s own statement at the
       Gagnon II hearing was of sufficient probative value to
       prove the violations by a preponderance of the evidence. Of
       importance to note, Appellant’s statement he is not an
       aggressive person stands in stark contrast to his convictions
       in these cases for assaultive behavior; also this court views
       Appellant’s statement he was “only messing with people” as
       an acknowledgment he was involved with and engaging in,
       at a minimum, behavior inconsistent with the standard
       behavior expected while at the inpatient facility. As a result
       of Appellant’s own voluntary testimony attempting to
       diminish the seriousness of his behavior, this court was
       convinced Appellant violated the specific conditions of his
       probation and proved this by a preponderance of the
       evidence for the Commonwealth. Appellant’s claim lacks
       merit.

          4 Appellant is alleged to have assaulted and choked
          his roommate and threatened staff using a razor, and
          subsequently he was placed in custody and
          imprisoned in Union County Jail in Lewisburg. While
          Appellant was in Union County Jail, he is alleged to
          have assaulted two correctional officers and as a
          result was transported to George W. Hill Correctional
          Facility in Delaware County.

                                *     *      *

       In this case, this court’s determination that Appellant
       violated the conditions of probation was based on
       Appellant’s voluntary statement at the May 18, 2022
       Gagnon II hearing: his acknowledgment he had been
       administratively discharged from the inpatient facility; his
       testimony downplaying his behavior at the inpatient facility,
       “I’m not an aggressive person, I was only messing with
       people, I wasn’t acting in an assaultive way in order to cause
       any injury to anybody”; and his acknowledgment he failed
       to pay costs and had an outstanding balance. During the

                                    - 16 -
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         hearing, Appellant objected to the Commonwealth reporting
         the information received from the inpatient facility
         concerning the underlying factual reasons for the
         administrative discharge, and importantly, without
         admitting to the underlying conduct resulting in the
         discharge, Appellant agreed he had been administratively
         discharged from the facility and owed costs.

         Appellant’s argument this court relied on hearsay evidence
         in making its determination absolutely is untrue. This court
         did not need to rely on any inadmissible hearsay in
         concluding Appellant violated probation. Additionally, this
         court is capable of recognizing, and appropriately
         discounting, inadmissible hearsay. As a result of Appellant’s
         testimonial evidence, and not hearsay evidence, this court
         found Appellant himself proved by a preponderance of the
         evidence the charges he violated conditions of probation.
         Appellant’s claim lacks merit.

(Trial Court Opinion at 8-11) (internal record citations omitted).

      On the record before us, we cannot agree with the court’s rationale. At

the outset, contrary to the court’s statement in its opinion, Probation Officer

Lamberto did not detail or specify any of the alleged probation violations at

the time of the Gagnon II hearing. Although she was asked to do so, she

testified (unsworn on the record) only as to her recommendations. (See N.T.

Gagnon II Hearing at 3-4). Additionally, the Commonwealth did not admit

into evidence at the hearing the Gagnon II report authored by Probation

Officer Lamberto detailing the alleged violations.   Nevertheless, the record

demonstrates that Appellant was aware of the alleged violations, as

Appellant’s counsel discussed the alleged violations and disputed that

Appellant was in violation. (See id. at 4-6).

      In the Gagnon II report, Probation Officer Lamberto had alleged that

                                    - 17 -
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Appellant was in (1) violation of Rule #9—refrain from overt behavior which

may endanger oneself or others, based on accusations against Appellant at

the White Deer Run inpatient facility that Appellant had pulled a razor,

threatened staff, and choked his roommate; (2) violation of Rule #10A—

failure to pay costs, where Appellant had an outstanding balance of costs/fees

in the amount of $535.00; and (3) violation of Rule #10C—complete special

conditions; specifically, Appellant had not successfully completed the

treatment recommended as a result of his drug and alcohol evaluation.

      We reiterate that Appellant objected to admission of the treatment

summary from White Deer Run. The court did not rule on Appellant’s objection

at the hearing, and the Commonwealth did not admit the summary into

evidence. Further, the Commonwealth did not call any witnesses from White

Deer Run to testify about Appellant’s behavior at the inpatient facility. In its

opinion, the trial court discusses the allegations contained in the White Deer

Run treatment summary, but then states that it did not base its revocation

decision on any information contained in that summary.        Instead, the trial

court maintained that it based its revocation decision solely on Appellant’s own

testimony and acknowledgments/admissions at the hearing.

      Appellant stated at the hearing: “I was only using the razor blade to cut

the towels to clean…the place because the place was filthy and it was very

overwhelming for me, the rehab.” (Id. at 8). Appellant further stated: “I’m

not an aggressive person, I was only messing with the people, I wasn’t acting

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in an assaultive way in order to cause any injury to anybody. And it was just,

that’s about all I have to say.” (Id.) However, removing these statements

from the context of the treatment summary from White Deer Run, which we

cannot consider, we disagree with the trial court that these statements alone

admitted to a violation of a probation (particularly where Appellant’s counsel

disputed that Appellant was in violation), or evidenced a violation of probation

of Rule #9 by a preponderance of the evidence.        See Commonwealth v.

Heilman, 876 A.2d 1021, 1027 (Pa.Super. 2005) (holding revocation hearing

did not satisfy requirements of Gagnon II where Commonwealth presented

no witnesses; only evidence of appellant’s probation violation of being

terminated from sex offenders’ treatment program came from his own sworn

testimony, as well as from unsworn statements of ADA and probation officer,

neither of whom was present at therapy session from which appellant was

expelled; appellant and his attorney indicated that appellant had legitimate

explanation for his failure to complete program; revocation court failed to

inquire into specific reasons for appellant’s discharge; revocation sentence

reversed and case remanded for proper Gagnon II hearing).

      Additionally, regarding any violation of Rule #10A for failure to pay

costs, Appellant’s counsel maintained that the failure to pay was not willful,

and the court did not inquire into Appellant’s ability to pay. See Allshouse,

supra. Moreover, later in its opinion, the court clarified that it did not revoke

probation based on Appellant’s failure to pay costs. (See Trial Court Opinion

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at 13) (stating: “Appellant’s failure to pay costs is not the reason this court

ultimately found Appellant in violation of probation; rather this failure is

recognized by this court as a symptom of greater problems, to wit, Appellant’s

failure to make progress toward rehabilitation and failure to address the

underlying reason for his poor performance on probation”).

      With respect to the Rule #10C violation for failing to complete the

special conditions of probation concerning drug and alcohol treatment

recommendations, the record makes no mention of the details of any

treatment recommendations for Appellant. Instead, the record confirms only

that Appellant was residing at White Deer Run inpatient facility and was

administratively discharged from the facility. Because the record does not

disclose the treatment recommendations that Appellant was required to

comply with as a condition of his probation, and the reasons for Appellant’s

administrative discharge were not introduced at the hearing (as we cannot

consider the White Deer Run treatment summary which was not entered into

evidence at the hearing), we cannot agree that the record in this case was

sufficient to prove Appellant violated this condition of his probation by a

preponderance of the evidence.

      Under these circumstances, the best resolution of this case is to vacate

the revocation sentence and to remand for a new Gagnon II hearing where

the Commonwealth can develop the record adequately concerning Appellant’s

alleged violations of probation.       See Heilman, supra.          See also

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Commonwealth v. Mullins, 591 Pa. 341, 918 A.2d 82 (2007) (collecting

cases where this Court has remanded for new revocation hearing when

probation revocations are vacated due to insufficient evidence of violation;

explaining that even where violation of probation hearing record is insufficient

to sustain revocation of probation, court that granted probation should not be

precluded from determining whether probation remains proper course only

because Commonwealth failed to include formalities in record; thus, remand

for new hearing, instead of reinstatement of original sentence, is proper

remedy in such instances).8 Accordingly, we vacate and remand for further

proceedings consistent with this memorandum.

       Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded for further proceedings.

Jurisdiction is relinquished.

Date: 3/25/2024

____________________________________________

8 Based on our disposition, we decline to reach Appellant’s remaining issues

on appeal.

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