Court Opinion

ID: 9596353
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:48:40.293121+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:45.211619
License: Public Domain

McINTYRE, Chief Justice
(concurring).
My opinion was first written as a proposed opinion for the court. It failed to obtain majority approval. We now seem to be in substantial agreement, however. Therefore, even though there may be some duplications, I am putting my original opinion in the form of a special concurrence with the majority.
The plaintiffs brought an action in district court for a declaratory judgment. They allege § 2, Art. 6, Wyoming Constitution, and §§ 22 — 118.3(j) and 22-157, W.S. 1957, 1971 Cum.Supp. and Chapter 4, § 10, Wyoming S. L., 1971 Special Session, are unconstitutional insofar as they provide for any durational requirements as a precondition for voter registration. Their claim is based on the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The trial court held § 2, Art. 6, Wyoming Constitution, and §§ 22-118.3(j) and 22-157, and ch. 4, § 10, of our statutory laws unconstitutional, insofar as they require residence for one year in Wyoming as a qualification for voting. Such requirement was found to be in conflict with the equal protection clause of the federal constitution.
Regarding the requirements of residence in the county for 60 days and in the precinct for 10 days, the trial court considered these periods necessary for a compelling state interest and held such requirements constitutional and valid. By appropriate appeal, the decision of the district court has been brought to us for review.
Section 2, Art. 6, Wyoming Constitution provides:
“Every citizen of the United States of the age of twenty-one years and up*1252wards, who has resided in the state or territory one year and in the county wherein such residence is located sixty days next preceding any election, shall be entitled to vote at such election, except as herein otherwise provided.”
The minimum age has been lowered to 18 by the 26th Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Section 22-118.3 (j), as amended by Laws 1971, Sp.Sess., Ch. 4, § 7, defines a qualified elector as follows:
“The term ‘qualified elector’ includes every male and female citizen of the United States who will be at least eighteen (18) years of age on the day of a general election at which he may offer to vote, and who on or before such election day shall have resided in the State of Wyoming for at least one (1) year, and in the county wherein he may offer to vote for at least sixty (60) days, and in the precinct wherein he may offer to vote for at least ten (10) days * *
Section 22-157 and Ch. 4, § 10, have to do with the method and manner of voting and the oath to be executed by an applicant for registration.
All of the parties here involved seem to agree the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed. 2d 274, is controlling and that our determination must necessarily be in keeping with its pronouncements.
In his memorandum opinion, the trial judge in the instant case has said the decision in Dunn is written in such positive form that it meets most arguments which can be advanced to justify a durational residence requirement in excess of 30 days. He has pointed out there is only a narrow strip left in which the State of Wyoming can maneuver to establish a valid distinction between the situation in Tennessee and the situation in Wyoming.
No evidence has been offered to show any substantial difference in the situation in Wyoming and Tennessee. Even if we were to take judicial notice of the density of population, communication difficulties and other conditions in Wyoming, we would have trouble evaluating differences and similarities with Tennessee where our judicial knowledge does not extend.
In any event, the United States Supreme Court has clearly held that 30 days is an adequate duration of residence to qualify as an elector in the State of Tennessee. No matter how much we may disagree with the holding, and even though we give the trial judge “E” for effort, it is a losing battle to try to reason that there is a compelling state interest in Wyoming which justifies a longer durational residence requirement than the 30 days which was said to be adequate for Tennessee.
A mention of some of the pronouncements made in the Dunn opinion will serve to illustrate why I say it is futile to try to claim a compelling state interest in Wyoming which would justify making our state an exception to the general rule.
1. Durational residence requirements, the court has stated, completely bar from voting all residents not meeting the fixed du-rational standards. The court held laws which deny some citizens the right to vote deprive them of a fundamental political right; and a citizen has a constitutionally protected right to participate in elections on an equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction.
2. Although the test to be applied is whether the exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling state interest, Tennessee’s laws were condemned because they classified bona fide residents on the basis of recent travel to the state. Such classification was expressly disapproved because persons who have gone from one jurisdiction to another during the qualifying period are penalized.
*12533. This classification was also rejected because it impinges on another fundamental personal right — the right to travel. Freedom to travel throughout the United States, including the right to enter and abide in any state in the Union, was declared to be a basic right under the Constitution.
4. In sum, the Dunn opinion clearly states durational residence laws are unconstitutional unless the state can demonstrate such laws are “necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest.” 5. The opinion recognizes and declares that states have the right and power to require that voters be bona fide residents of the relevant political subdivisions. In the exercise of this right, it is declared a state has a legitimate and compelling interest in preventing election fraud by nonresidents who temporarily invade the state or county, falsely swear that they are residents, and by voting allow a candidate to win by fraud.
I construe the pronouncements in the Dtmn case to mean the most a state can require with respect to residency for voting is that a voter must be a bona fide resident of the place where he offers to vote. However, to complete whatever administrative tasks are needed to prevent fraud and insure purity of the election box, a state may require prior registration. In this regard, the United States Supreme Court has clearly taken the position that a period of 30 days is ample to complete necessary administrative tasks.
The Congress of the United States has passed the Federal Voting Rights Act of 1970. Section 1973aa-l(b), Title 42, U.S. C.A., 1972 Cumulative Annual Pocket Part, states unequivocally that Congress declares, in order to secure and protect the rights of citizens under the Constitution, to enable citizens to better obtain the enjoyment of such rights, and to enforce the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is necessary to “completely abolish the durational residency requirement” as a precondition to voting for President and Vice President.
Subsection (d) of the act specifies that each state shall provide for the registration or qualification of duly qualified residents who apply, “not later than thirty days” immediately prior to any presidential election.
Thus, in the Dunn decision by the United States Supreme Court and in the enactment of Congress pertaining to elections for President and Vice President, we have the same philosophy adhered to.
No testimony was taken in the case we are dealing with. The matter was submitted to the district court on a stipulation of facts. There are then two reasons why we should hold, as far as this case is concerned, that no compelling state interest has been shown for a 60-day durational residency requirement in the county where a voter offers to vote.
First, there is no evidence on which a finding of such a compelling interest can be predicated; and even if we take judicial notice of conditions in Wyoming, there still are insufficient facts and conditions to make Wyoming an exception to the general rule.
Second, while both the Dunn opinion and the Federal Voting Rights Act of 1970 recognize the reasonableness of a period of 30 days within which to close registrations and complete such administrative tasks as are needed to prevent fraud and insure purity of the ballot box, the Wyoming legislature has seen fit to allow registrations in Wyoming at any time prior to 15 days before any election.1 If that is not sufficient time, the legislature and not the courts will have to change it — up to but not exceeding 30 days before any election.
*1254My conclusion is that all requirements in our state constitution and state laws for a durational residence of one year in the state and all requirements for residence of 60 days in the county, as a precondition for voting, are repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment, United States Constitution, as construed by the United States Supreme Court in Dunn v. Blumstein.
All requirements for a voter to be a bona fide resident of Wyoming and the place where he offers to vote, including residence in his precinct for ten days, are constitutional and should stand.
In view of what I have said, it is apparent I am in agreement with my colleagues in holding that the judgment of the trial court should be modified by changing the 60-day residence requirement to 30 days.

. See § 22-156, W.S.1957.