Court Opinion

ID: 9830149
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:55:31.173008+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:14.228099
License: Public Domain

On Appellants’ Motion for Rehearing.
We have concluded that in affirming the judgment of the trial court our holding is in conflict with the holding in Smith v. Sorelle, 126 Tex. 353, 87 S.W.2d 703, 705. In that case if the ownership of the land had been in itself a circumstance of description to lead to the identification of the land, the description in that case would have been sufficient. It is there stated: “The true rule, as deduced from the authorities, seems to be that this description should be so definite and certain upon the face of the instrument itself, or by other writing referred to, that the land can be identified with reasonable certainty. To hold otherwise would defeat the wise intention and object of the statute, by permitting to rest in parol extrinsic testimony, that which should have been embraced in the written instrument.” It is not enough, therefore, that by recourse to the deed records of Brazoria County, it could be determined that George Williams, on September 24, 1925, only owned an undivided half interest in 18% acres of land in the J. H. Bell League, which was in the J. H. Stark Subdivision in said League, and was also in the upper half of Block H. in said Subdivision, and that by recourse to such deed records the metes and bounds description of said 18% acres could be accurately determined.
We are constrained, therefore, to hold that the deed of September 24, 1925, from George Williams to Jessie Gaines, conveying “all that certain tract or parcel of land situated in the J. H. Bell League and out of the J. H. Stark Subdivision, and containing 18% acres of land, and is out of the upper one-half of Block H in said Stark Subdivision in Brazoria County, Texas,” is void, because of defective description. Title to the undivided half interest in the 18%-acre tract sued for was therefore in George Williams at the time he died intestate, and therefore vested in his heirs at his death. The motion for rehearing is therefore granted, and our former judgment is set aside, and the judgment of the trial court is reversed and rendered; and it is h.ere adjudged that appellants recover title to the land sued for.
Appellants’ motion for rehearing granted, former judgment set aside, and cause reversed and rendered.