Court Opinion

ID: 9705705
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:17:17.002872+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:13.994662
License: Public Domain

*209Hehek, J.
(dissenting). As the Chief Justice says, the basic inquiry here has to do with the meaning of L. 1947, c. 178, entitled “An Act concerning the elimination of grade and other crossings of railroad tracks and highways, amending sections 48:12-62, 48:12-70, 48:12-71, 48:12-77 and supplementing chapter twelve of Title 48 of the Eevised Statutes.”
The immediate question is whether the cost of constructing a new fireproof bridge to replace the existing “Deep Cut Bridge” built in 1831 or thereabouts over the railroad’s right of way across Washington Eoad in Sayreville, and reconstructed in 1901, is apportionable at the rate of 85% to the State and 15% to the railroad. The railroad concedes the public need for the new structure; the contention is that the cited act of 1947 provides for the sharing of the expense of the improvement at the given ratio of 85%-15%, and if L. 1903, c. 257, B. S. 48:12-49, has not been thereby overridden in this regard, and the entire burden is laid upon it, then the statute is unconstitutional as declaring “a fixed and arbitrary rule, which permits no consideration of what is fair and reasonable, or of any judgment whatsoever,” citing Nashville C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Walters, 294 U. S. 405, 55 S. Ct. 486, 79 L. Ed. 949 (1935), and Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 346 U. S. 346, 74 S. Ct. 92, 98 L. Ed. 51 (1953).
And the finding of my colleagues is that the “existing bridge erected in 1901 * * * is narrow and is now a bottleneck,” and the “improvement here involved is necessary to meet local transportation needs reflecting the growth of the community,” just as much so as the 1901 bridge served the needs of that day; but that the 1947 statute “was intended to foster elimination of existing grade crossings; that the Legislature was willing that the State share in the cost of combatting existing hazards at grade, but did not intend it to assume any part of the railroads’ burden as to eliminations already accomplished,” although the cost of alterations and reconstruction of State highway-road cross*210ings not at grade is to be shared according to the 85%-15% ratio, and a “decision to confine the expenditure of the State moneys to the removal of still existing grade crossings cannot be said to be capricious or arbitrary.”
Construction will be aided by a review of the statutes in historical perspective. L. 1903, c. 257, § 26, B. 8. 48:12-49, known as the “Railway Act,” laid upon every railroad the duty, at its own expense, to “construct and keep in repair” good and sufficient bridges and passages over, under and across the railroad or right of way where any road or street then or thereafter established shall cross the same, so that public travel on the road is not impeded. The bridges and passages were required to be “of such width and character as shall be suitable to the locality in which they are situated.” As just said, it was under the presumed authority of this act that the railroad here has been assessed the expense of the proposed Sayreville bridge.
This statute was followed by L. 1913, c. 57, the “Eielder Grade Crossing Law,” which empowered the then recently created Board of Public Utility Commissioners to eliminate railroad-highway grade crossings that had elements of danger to public safety or impeded traffic. The railroad was chargeable with the entire cost of “such alterations, changes, relocation or opening, including damages to adjacent property,” save that a street railway using the crossing could be assessed not more than 10% of the expense directly chargeable to the crossing.
Later on, by L. 1930, c. 101, now B. 8. 48:12-61 et seq.', the act was amended, section 1, to limit its operation to public highways other than state highways in accord with a recently enacted statute, L. 1929, c. 88, B. 8. 48:12-68 et seq., placing within the jurisdiction of the State Highway Commission the “elimination of railroad crossings at grade on State highways, the improvement, relocation and reconstruction of crossings of railroad and State highways not at grade, and the location and construction of new crossings of railroads and State highways not at grade,” the cost of the work to be borne’by the State and the railroad in equal *211shares. By section 2 of the 1930 Act, B. 8. 48:12-62, the expense of the grade separation was laid equally upon the State and the railroad.
The 1930 act, as amended hy L. 1931, c. 29, B. S. 48:12-61, authorized the Board to order the railroad to “alter” such grade crossing involving “a public highway, other than a State highway,” the “alterations” to be made (a) “by substituting” a crossing not at grade “either by carrying such public highway under or over such railroad” or by “reconstructing” the railroad “under or over such public highway”; or (b) hy vacating, relocating or changing the lines, width, direction or location of such highway “and the opening of a new highway in the place of the one vacated”; or (c) by relocating the tracks of the railroad where the elimination of the crossing would “unduly injure” the owners of property. And the provision for the equal division of the expense remained as it was, covering “such alterations, changes, relocation or opening, including damages to adjacent property” and the cost of removing, relaying or relocating municipal pipes, conduits and subways.
It is said in argument that the “important thing to note about the Fielder Law is that since its inception it has applied only to the elimination of grade crossings”; that this act, B. 8. 48:12-61 et seq., “is in Article 12 of Title 48, as contrasted with B. 8. 48:12-49 which is found in Article 11”; and that the “primary purpose” of the 1947 Act “was to change cost allocation from 50% to 85% under the Fielder Grade Crossing Law and the State highway crossing law.” But this classification would seem to be at variance with the outstanding principle and policy of the statute, to apportion such burdens more in keeping with the socio-economic needs and interests attending the great expansion and development of motor vehicle transportation of passengers and freight in our rapidly growing communities, not at all comparable to the demands of an earlier and simpler society, so much so that the railroad, no longer the prime source of danger, is itself in need of protection from the hazards of motor transportation, not to mention *212the changed economic factors in this highly competitive field. See Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Walters, supra. There has long been evidence of ever-increasing financial stress of railroads from the competition of modern transportation facilities by land and air. The motor and air era has revolutionized transportation. Also, the avoidance of traffic interruptions is a major service to highway users; and grade separations, even on secondary roads, are now deemed a significant public service that may well be regarded in assessing the relative benefits of the improvement for a fair and just allocation of the cost as between the State and the railroad, none of which is borne directly by the commercial users of the highway. It goes without saying that an individual’s share of the cost of advancing the public convenience must bear some rational relation to the evils to be eradicated or the advantages to be had. Nashville, supra. We live and have our being in an era of constant adjustment to changing social and economic concepts related to essential public needs and conveniences; and the 1947 act is but a legislative assessment of the relative responsibilities of the State and the railroads in the vital field of transportation and traffic regulation and security for the common good and welfare, such as is now accorded general recognition in the federal and many of the state jurisdictions. See Eederal Highway (Aid) Act, 23 U. S. C. A., sections 1-25.
Indeed, the introducer of the Senate Bill which became the act of 1947 affirmed in the appended explanatory statement that the purpose of the measure was "to bring the grade crossing elimination laws of New Jersey more nearly in line with the Eederal-Aid Highway Act of 1944 and the grade crossing elimination laws in certain other States,” and w[i]t will also progress the elimination of hazards of highway-railroad crossings at grade and reduce the impediments to highway traffic, occasioned by such crossings, in advancement of the recommendations contained in the 35th Annual Report of the Board of Public Utility Commissioners.”
*213The then current policy of other state jurisdictions was to bring the reconstruction of existing grade separations within the cost apportionment ratio. Eor example: Ohio, Page’s Rev. Code Ann., sec. 4957.01; Indiana, Burns Stat. Ann., sec. 55-1810; Michigan, Stat. Ann. sec. 9.1141; West Virginia, Code Ann., sec. 1465(9), 1470(14), 1473(1) (17a).
And the Federal Highway (Aid) Act, sections 2, 6, supra, covers the construction and reconstruction of “primary or interstate” and “secondary or intercounty” highways.; and the term “highway” includes “bridges” and “tunnels.”
Our act of 1947 is not entitled “An Act to amend * * *” a given statute by title or numerical designation, but rather “An Act concerning the elimination of grade and other crossings of railroad tracks and highways, amending” the stated sections 48:12-62, 48:12-70, 48:12-71 and 48:12-77 “and supplementing” chapter 12 of the Revised Statutes. Thus, the title reveals a legislative design to regulate, not alone the elimination of grade crossings but “other crossings of railroad tracks and highways” as well, and to supplement the coverage of chapter 12 of the Revised Statutes. And the regulatory provisions of the Act are quite clearly directed to that end.
By sections 3, 4 and 5 of the act, R. S. 48:12-70; 48:12-71 and 48:12-77 were amended to provide for sharing the cost, R. S. 48:12-68, of eliminating state highway-railroad grade crossings, and the improvement, relocation, alteration and reconstruction of such crossings not at grade, and the location and construction of new crossings of railroads and State highways not at grade where such construction will replace an existing grade crossing there or in the vicinity, according to the stated 85%-15% ratio rather than by an equal division of the burden.
Section 1 of the 1947 act amended R. S. 48:12-62, the Fielder Law, to prescribe the very same ratio of 85%-15% in sharing the expense of “such alterations, reconstructions, changes, relocation or opening,” of grade crossings not involving state highways, permissible under R. S. 48:12-61, *214omitting a preexisting proviso allowing the nse of allotted Government aid in reduction of the railroad’s share. Here, for the first time, the word “reconstructions” was inserted between “alterations” and “changes,” even though there had been no controversy over the years as to the meaning of the clause.
And the significance of the added term was accentuated by the succeeding section 2 of the 1947 act, which is not in form an amendment of the preexisting statute but a supplement ,to chapter 12, providing that “Sections 48:12-61 to 48:12-66 (the Fielder Law) * * * shall apply to all alterations, reconstructions, changes, relocations or openings ordered” by the Utility Commissioners, "after the effective date of this act, and also to any alterations, reconstructions, changes, relocations or openings ordered prior to such effective date,” if no part of the work so ordered had been “actually commenced on the ground prior to such date.” And “No further application” to the Board “shall be necessary in any proceedings in which an order of the board had been made prior to the effective date of this act to bring the alterations, reconstructions, changes, relocations or openings, so ordered, within the provisions of said sections ifS:lS,-61 to Jp8:l£-66 of this Title.” [Emphasis supplied.] The section was then made inapplicable to “any grade crossing elimination under a State Highway Commission program, pursuant to the provisions of sections 48:12-68 to 48:12-77 of this Title.”
And so, the measure is not an amendment of but rather a supplement to the Fielder Law, comprised in chapter 12 of the Revised Statutes as subdivision “A,” sections 48:12-61 to 48:12-66, covering all crossings not involving a state highway; and it expressly makes these particular sections applicable to “all alterations, reconstructions, changes, relocations or openings” ordered by the Board after the act became effective, and before under the conditions stated, including section 48:12-62, amended by the prior section 1 of the 1947 act itself to provide for the 85%-15% ratio, between the State and the railroad, in the division of the *215cost of “such alterations, reconstructions, changes, relocation or opening” there provided for, the pronoun “such,” in contrast to “all” in section 2, referring in all seeming to the prior section 48:12-61. Unless section 2 of the 1947 act be so read, as inclusive of all such local crossings, whether at grade or not, then it can have no meaning whatever. The use of the adjective “all” in this section is in itself significant of that intent. In the narrower view taken by respondents, section 1 of the 1947 act would be sufficient in itself. The offered distinction contra would run counter to normal English usages and suffer the taint of false perception. There is no casus omissus here.
A supplement was not needed merely to implement, as counsel argue, “the section of the act specifying when the new division of costs is to begin”; the appropriate place for this regulation would have been section 1, amending B. S. 48:12-62, to prescribe the new ratio, or B. S. 48:12-67. This “new schedule of cost participation” plainly has reference to the enlarged ratio coverage of grade separation, improvements and reconstructions embodied in the section itself; the “effective date clause” is but an incident of the substantive provision expanding the crossing construction made subject to the new cost assessment ratio. The effective date provision governs crossing construction now, for the first time, included in the class subject to the apportionment of the attendant expense between the State and the railroad, that is to say, it is applicable to work of the enumerated class ordered by the Board after the act became effective and also work ordered before if not in part commenced on the ground prior to that day. There was no need for a like provision in relation to state highway-railroad crossings; hence, the express exclusion from the operative force of this regulation of “any grade-crossing elimination under a State Highway Commission program pursuant to” sections 48:12-68 to 48:12-77.
And the title of the 1947 act suggests subject matter comporting with this intent. It declares the object of the measure to be the elimination of “grade and other crossings *216of railroad tracks and highways”; and it affirms a purpose to “supplement” the new ratio coverage of Chapter 12. When the words of the enacting clauses of a statute are of doubtful import (and this is not to say that such is the case here), resort may be had to the title in aid of the discovery of the legislative intent. Pancoast v. Director General of Railroads, 95 N. J. L. 428 (E. & A. 1921); Paul v. Gloucester County, 50 N. J. L. 585, 589 (E. & A. 1888). This, in accordance with Article IY, Section VII, paragraph 4 of the 1947 Constitution, providing that “* * * every law shall embrace but one object, and that shall be expressed in the title.” By force of this provision, “the title of a statute is not only an indication of the legislative intent, but is also a limitation upon the enacting part of the law”; it “can have no effect with respect to any object that is not expressed in the title.” Hendrickson v. Fries, 45 N. J. L. 555, 563 (E. & A. 1883); Gibbs v. Township Committee of Northampton Township, 52 N. J. L. 496 (Sup. Ct. 1890); Dobbins v. Northampton, 50 N. J. L. 496 (Sup. Ct. 1888).
It is particularly significant in this regard that the embodiment of this provision was by means of a supplement to chapter 12 by a title that included “other crossings.” A supplement is in its very nature a complement or addition to the original statute. Packard v. Bergen Neck Ry. Co., 54 N. J. L. 229 (Sup. Ct. 1892); Edwards v. Stein, 94 N. J. Eq. 251 (Ch. 1922). “The ordinary meaning of the word ‘supplement’ doubtless is ‘a supplying by addition of what is wanting’ ”; but usage has given the term a special and broader meaning. Rahway Savings Institution v. City of Rahway, 53 N. J. L. 48 (Sup. Ct. 1890). “A supplemental act is one designed to improve an existing statute, by adding something thereto without changing the original text.” First State Bank of Shelby v. Bottineau County Bank, 56 Mont. 363, 185 P. 162, 8 A. L. R. 631 (Sup. Ct. 1919). A supplemental act “is that which supplies a deficiency, adds to, or completes, or extends that which is already in existence, without changing or modifying the original.” McCleary v. *217Babcock, 169 Ind. 228, 82 N. E. 453 (Sup. Ct. 1907). “Supplementary” means added as a supplement; additional; being, or serving as, a supplement. Swanson v. State, 132 Neb. 82, 271 N. W. 264, 268 (Sup. Ct. 1937). The term “supplemented” is frequently used “in apposition to the term ‘amended’ to designate the legal effect of an ordinance subsequently adopted adding to the provisions of the original ordinance without making any changes in its phraseology or effect.” Lehman v. McBride, 15 Ohio St. 573 (Sup. Ct. 1863); City of Cincinnati v. Hillenbrand, 103 Ohio St. 286, 133 N. E. 556 (Sup. Ct. 1921); Caldwell v. Cleveland, 12 Ohio N. P., N. S., 483, 24 Ohio Law Abs. 233 (1937). A “supplementary” or “supplemental” act is generally “an act not purporting to amend but which makes an addition to a prior statute without impairing any existing provision thereof.” Sutherland’s Statutory Construction, 3d ed., section 1924.
Subdivision B of chapter 12, B. S. 48:12—68 to 78, covers all State highway-railroad intersections; and, as we have seen, B. S. 48:12-68, the jurisdiction of the State Highway Commission also extended to improvements, alterations and reconstruction of crossings not at grade, and new crossings not at grade in replacement of grade crossings in the vicinity. Hence, the express limitation of section 2 of the 1947 act to secondary highway-railroad intersections, as a means of placing all highway-railroad intersections in the one category in respect of sharing the expense of grade separation improvements and reconstructions.
Section 2 of the 1947 act was given the compilation number 48 :12-67.1 by the Law Revision and Bill Drafting Commission pursuant to B. S. 1:3-l, as amended by L. 1941, c. 19. Section 48:12-67 provided that sections 48:12-61 to 48:12-66 should apply to “any alterations, changes, re-locations or openings” ordered by the Board prior to April 14, 1930, if no part of the work under such order had been actually commenced. There was no mention here of “reconstructions.”
The Attorney-General invokes the purely interpretive *218doctrine that repeals by implication are not favored in the law; and, absent an express repealer, the indication of an intention to effect a repeal of prior legislation must be clear and compelling. Since the question is essentially one of legislative intent, it follows that where, as here, the later statute is manifestly intended to prescribe the exclusive governing rule, it necessarily supersedes the prior inconsistent legislation. Town of Montclair v. Stanoyevich, 6 N. J. 479, 494 (1951). And even where the two laws on the same subject “are not repugnant in terms, yet if the later act covers the whole subject matter, and it appears that it was intended as a substitute for the first act, it will operate as a repeal of that act.” Roche v. Mayor and Council of Jersey City, 40 N. J. L. 257 (Sup. Ct. 1878). To the same effect: Hartman v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 127 N. J. L. 170 (Sup. Ct. 1941). See also Hourigan v. North Bergen Township, 113 N. J. L. 143 (E. & A. 1934).
A statute is not to be given an arbitrary construction, according to the strict letter, but such as will advance the sense and meaning fairly deducible from the context. The reason and spirit of the law, i. e., the motive which led to the making of it, prevails over the literal sense of terms; its obvious policy is an implied limitation of the sense of general terms and a touchstone for the expansion of narrower terms. Words are but symbols of thought and expression which of necessity take color and significance from their surroundings and the evident purpose of the law. Fischer v. Fischer, 13 N. J. 162 (1953). Reason is the soul of law; the reason of the law being changed, the law is also changed. 7 Coke 7. And where the reason of the regulation is general, though the provision is special, it has a general acceptation. Wright v. Vogt, 7 N. J. 1 (1951). The end design of construction is to bring the operation of the statute within the apparent intention of the Legislature. Nagy v. Ford Motor Co., 6 N. J. 341, 350 (1951).
Neither the collocation of words and phrases of the act nor the rules of syntax should control in disregard of the *219evident legislative intent. Costanzo v. Tillinghast, 287 U. S. 341, 53 S. Ct. 153, 77 L. Ed. 350 (1932). The dominant consideration is the sense and meaning of the statute when read as a whole, and regard is to be had to the subject matter as well as the language. Bayonne Textile Corporation v. American Federation of Silk Workers, 116 N. J. Eq. 146 (E. & A. 1934). And to this end, it is proper to consider the history of the times and the attending circumstances when the act was adopted, including the social, economic and governmental conditions of the State or country. District of Columbia v. Murphy, 314 U. S. 441, 62 S. Ct. 303, 86 L. Ed. 329 (1941). If the intent of the Legislature cannot be gathered from the statute itself, taken as a whole, resort may be had to such extrinsic matters as the Legislature presumably had in mind at the time of the adoption of the law. In re Taft’s Estate, 110 Vt. 266, 4 A. 2d 634, 120 A. L. R. 1382 (Sup. Ct. 1939). Chief Justice Marshall said: “Where the mind labors to discover the design of the legislature, it seizes everything from which aid can be derived.” United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch 358, 2 L. Ed. 304 (1804).
The majority view is that the “role of section 3 [of the 1947 Act] was merely to spell out the effective date of the new 85-15 formula and nothing more.”
But, as plaintiffs acknowledge, and quite properly so, the normal course to this end would have been the amendment of the Act itself. The argument is that the unconventional supplement served the selfsame purpose, thus ignoring the apparently discriminating use of both the amendment and the supplement in the one Act. It is fairly to be presumed, barring a clear showing contra, that in such context the supplement was employed in its conventional usage as a complement or addition to the original Act. Manifestly, these were not used casually as convertible terms; the frame of the Act itself denotes beyond reasonable doubt their purposive use as words of art having essentially different connotations.
*220And the absence of a specific appropriation is of no significance as to the legislative meaning and purpose; to hold the contrary is to beg the question. There was no current need for an appropriation to fulfill the statutory purpose. The elimination of existing grade crossings was then and still is a continuous process according to an “annual program” that requires annual appropriations. But such is not the case in the reconstruction of grade separations; the need here is not continuous but sporadic, and appropriations may be made as the intermittent need arises. It is shown that since 1930 there were but seven reconstructions of local highway-railroad crossings not at grade, and the entire cost of at least three of these projects was borne by the State’s allotment of Federal funds supplied by the Works Progress Administration. And it was conceded on the oral argument that, although not wholly sufficient, the State Utility Commission was then in possession of moneys that could be devoted to this purpose, if the obligation were the State’s in part, presumably undedicated funds usable for general purposes.
But however this may be, the want of an appropriation cannot be determinative of the meaning of the Act, especially in this context; if the apportionment is provided as of right, then the full burden cannot be cast upon the railroad because the State’s share is now unavailable. There is quite obviously no need for an annual appropriation to this end, unlike the elimination of existing grade crossings according to an annual program; and it is but fair to assume that the Legislature deemed it prudent economy to await the need from time to time, irregular as it must necessarily be.
And it is purely conjectural to suppose that the insertion of the word “reconstructions” in B. 8. 48:12-62, by the amendment effected by section 1 of the 1947 Act, was designed “to avoid any possible contention that the 85-15 formula would be inapplicable * * *.” There had been no doubt as to the meaning of the section in all the years of its operation. The words “alterations, changes, relocation *221or opening” amply conveyed the sense -which it is now thought was merely restated by the addition of the term “reconstructions,” and this by common consent over the years; and so it is sound hypothesis that the purpose was to relate the section to an expanded coverage of the new cost-sharing formula; there is no other reasonable alternative. The suggestion of simple clarification overlooks the significance of the terms “changes” and “relocation,” not to mention “opening.”
The proposal here is a new bridge to replace the 1901 structure now outmoded and inadequate for the ever-increasing flow of motor vehicle traffic, generally such in character and volume as to demand new highways and expansion of the old, an apt illustration of the design of the supplement to place all crossing reconstructions and improvements to satisfy modern requirements in the one category. The need for the new overpass grew out of the necessitous conditions now obtaining.
It would seem to be a distortion of the essential reason of the legislative policy to hold that, as to secondary grade crossings, the cost of crossing separations alone is shared, even though the replacement be a substantial extension of the old construction, required in the imperative public interest to meet the great and continuing increase in the volume of traffic different in character. And on this general hypothesis, the statute in terms covers all secondary crossing reconstructions, whether or not at grade. Such is the obvious principle of the legislative policy.
I am clear that the Legislature intended to deal with the problem in principle as in the Federal jurisdiction and other states; and that this intent is evident in the expression.
I would reverse and remand for judgment accordingly.
For affirmance—Chief Justice Weirtraub, and Justices Burlirg, Jacobs and Proctor—4.
For reversal—-Justices Heher, Wachereeld and Erarcis —3.