Court Opinion

ID: 9715294
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:59:33.169752+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:33.183973
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE REINHARD, specially concurring: I agree with the majority’s opinion insofar as it holds that the nolle prosequi order in the criminal proceedings is not necessarily fatal to a showing of termination of those proceedings in plaintiff’s favor. I further agree that the preliminary hearing finding of probable cause in the underlying criminal proceedings is, at most, evidence of probable cause in the civil proceedings. (Lyons v. Kanter (1918), 285 Ill. 336, 341.) Finally, while I agree with the majority that probable cause was demonstrated here and that defendants were entitled to judgment in their favor as a matter of law, I write separately to set forth what I consider to be the proper analysis of this issue. Here, both parties submitted to the trial court copies of the transcript of the preliminary hearing in the criminal proceeding in support of their respective positions with regard to the entry of summary judgment. While both parties apparently agreed below upon the underlying factual circumstances as detailed in the transcript, they disagreed as to whether such circumstances were sufficient to establish probable cause as a matter of law. The majority cites the statement made in plaintiff’s memorandum in opposition to the motion for summary judgment that “an examination of the transcript of [the preliminary] hearing does not reveal any connection between the alleged shortage and any criminal act with which the [plaintiff] was charged.” (See 207 Ill. App. 3d at 407.) The majority mistakenly dismisses this statement as a “mere conclusory assertion [which] does not raise a question of fact.” (207 Ill. App. 3d at 407.) This statement was not purported to be a fact, but was advanced as an argument regarding the inferences which could be drawn from the undisputed facts. Normally, an issue of fact should be determined by the jury and not on summary judgment where reasonable persons could draw different inferences from the facts which are not in dispute. (Pyne v. Witmer (1989), 129 Ill. 2d 351, 358.) The issue of probable cause in an action for malicious prosecution, however, presents a mixed question of law and fact. Whether the circumstances proved to show probable cause are true is a question of fact, but, if true, whether they amount to probable cause is a question of law to be decided by the court. Angelo v. Faul (1877), 85 Ill. 106, 108; Ely v. National Super Markets, Inc. (1986), 149 Ill. App. 3d 752, 758; see also Restatement (Second) of Torts §673 (1977). Here, there is no dispute presented regarding the facts which purport to show probable cause, so the issue is one of law. I agree with the majority that the undisputed facts presented would lead a man of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest and strong suspicion, that plaintiff committed the offense charged. (See Freides v. Sani-Mode Manufacturing Co. (1965), 33 Ill. 2d 291, 295-96.) Defendants’ actions showed a careful attempt to determine which of their employees was responsible for the falsified return slips. Accordingly, I agree that the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of defendants should be affirmed, but upon a basis different from that articulated by the trial court.