Court Opinion

ID: 9745839
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 13:34:55.919794+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:05.034710
License: Public Domain

*901BENKE, J., Concurring.
I
Liability Provided by Statute
I agree with my colleagues that the County of San Diego’s (County) relationship with Ronald S. prior to his adoption imposed upon the County a duty to protect Ronald from injury inflicted by Merlin Mundy. (Johnson v. State of California (1968) 69 Cal.2d 782, 785-786 [73 Cal.Rptr. 240, 447 P.2d 352]; see also MacDonald v. State of California (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 319, 334 [281 Cal.Rptr. 317].)
I also agree that following Ronald’s adoption by the Mundys, the County had the same relationship with Ronald it had with any other child. (See Civ. Code, § 221.74; MacDonald v. State of California, supra, 230 Cal.App.3d at p. 334.)
Nonetheless, I believe the majority errs in concluding that following the adoption, no new “special relationship” was created by the County’s conduct. (See maj. opn., ante, p. 895, fn. 4.) In particular, I note the record is clear that on at least two occasions following his adoption Ronald was held at the Hillcrest Receiving Home and the County regained complete physical custody over him. In my view while Ronald was in the receiving home, the County again had practical and legal control over him sufficient to support a duty to protect him from further harm. (See Rodriguez v. Inglewood Unified School Dist. (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 707, 713 [230 Cal.Rptr. 823]; see also Jackson v. Clements (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 983, 987-988 [194 Cal.Rptr. 553].)
My disagreement over the temporal scope of the County’s duty, however, is not my major point of departure from the majority’s analysis. I believe the majority errs in resolving the bulk of Ronald’s claims by finding the County’s conduct was immune under Government Code section 820.2 without more thoroughly examining what, if any, statutory violation supports the County’s liability. This failure leads the majority into unnecessary conflict with our prior holding in Elton v. County of Orange (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 1053, 1058 [84 Cal.Rptr. 27] (Elton).
As the majority acknowledges, in California “all government tort liability must be based on statute.” (Duarte v. City of San Jose (1980) 100 Cal.App.3d 648, 653 [161 Cal.Rptr. 140]; see also Gov. Code, § 815.) The majority relieves Ronald—and any number of other plaintiffs with claims against governmental entities—of the burden of identifying a specific statutory basis for his claims by assuming that if a duty to act affirmatively has been breached by a governmental entity—in this case, the County—there will *902always be an individual within the entity—a County employee—who has breached the same duty. (See fn. 1, maj. opn., ante, pp. 891-892.) Given this assumption, the majority concludes governmental agencies will therefore always be subject to statutory liability under Government Code section 815.2. (See fn. 1, maj. opn., ante, pp. 891-892.)
I have considerable difficulty with the majority’s reliance on Government Code section 815.2. Government Code section 815.2 imposes vicarious liability on an agency for injuries caused by an employee if the employee was acting within the scope of his employment and if the employee’s “act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his personal representative.” The majority has failed in this case to identify either by name or job classification an individual county employee who, during the pre-adoptive period, had a special relationship which would give rise to a duty to protect Ronald from Merlin Mundy and breached that duty.
For instance, in his briefs and at trial Ronald has pointed to the conduct of his adoptions worker, Sharon Katz. Ronald faults Katz for failing to properly review the Mundys’ responses to questionnaires, for failing to conduct postplacement visits and for failing to take any action after learning the Mundys had discontinued Ronald’s therapy.
However, as an individual, Katz did not have the practical and legal control over Ronald which would support existence of a duty to protect Ronald from Merlin Mundy. At most the record suggests Katz’s responsibility was to conduct an appropriate investigation and make a recommendation to the department’s placement committee. This role is far more circumscribed than that of the school principal and wrestling coach discussed in Leger v. Stockton Unified School Dist. (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 1448, 1460-1461 [249 Cal.Rptr. 688] (Leger), who had direct authority over students while they were in school.
In my view the only individuals in the pre-adoptive bureacracy who had the practical control over Ronald which is in any way analagous to the power of the school principal and coach discussed in Leger were two social workers, Grace Blasekowski and Marie Ebiner, both of whom expressed reservations to Katz about the proposed adoption by the Mundys. Because they expressed their reservations to the person responsible for review of the adoption, the social workers could hardly be found individually liable for any failure to act.
Having considered the roles of the individual County employees who participated in Ronald’s case prior to his adoption, I am unwilling to assume *903there must have been a single employee of the County who (1) had the level of control over Ronald which gave rise to a duty to act and (2) acted negligently. Rather, this record suggests to me that, given the myriad ways in which authority in government agencies may be distributed, it is entirely possible that while one employee within a governmental entity may have the practical power over a plaintiff which would create a special relationship, another employee who lacks such power actually causes a plaintiff’s injury. In such a case, reliance on the vicarious liability provided by Government Code section 815.2 is unavailing because there is no single individual who, apart from the statute, can be held liable.
Unwilling as I am to rely on Government Code section 815.2, I turn briefly to Government Code section 815.6, which makes a governmental entity liable for failing to discharge a mandatory duty provided by an “enactment.” A statute imposes a mandatory duty within the meaning of Government Code section 815.6 if the statute “ ‘is designed to protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury.' [Citation.]” (Rodriguez v. Inglewood Unified School Disk, supra, 186 Cal.App.3d at p. 720.)
None of the child protection and dependency statutes Ronald relies on (see e.g. Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 16100 et seq., 300 et seq.; id., former § 8006; Civ. Code, § 224, subd. (n); Prob. Code, §§ 1501, 2104) are specifically designed to detect the likelihood a prospective adoptive parent will abuse a dependent child. Rather, these statutes require that the County provide a system of care and custody of children who have been abused or are otherwise dependent on the County for their care.
I also note the record here is replete with evidence of Katz’s failure to meet the requirements of a number of County guidelines governing the adoption process. However, such internal guidelines do not meet the thresh-hold of an “enactment” within the meaning of Government Code section 815.6 (See Lehto v. City of Oxnard (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 285, 294-295 [217 Cal.Rptr. 450].)
In sum then with respect to the pre-adoptive period, rather than reaching the question of any immunity, I would reverse because, in this case, this plaintiff has failed to identify a statutory basis for liability.1 (See Rodriguez v. Inglewood Unified School Dist, supra, 186 Cal.App.3d at pp. 722-723.)
*904I recognize that, having substantially expanded the scope of statutory liability, my colleagues have attempted to avoid the impact of their expansion by creating a broad doctrine of statutory immunity in adoption cases. However, in the future our courts will confront governmental agencies, outside the adoption process, which have breached affirmative duties to act. The plaintiffs in these cases, unhindered by the broad adoption immunity created by the majority, are going to find the majority discussion of statutory liability of immense and, I believe, unwarranted assistance.
II
Immunity
According to the majority, because there are a number of discretionary aspects in the adoption process, immunity attaches to each step within the process. While I confess there is a great deal of efficiency in the majority’s approach in that it disposes of all adoption cases by making the entire adoption process immune from liability, I believe the efficiency comes at too dear a cost. More particularly, in my mind using the duty discussion in Smith v. Alameda County Social Services Agency (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 929 [153 Cal.Rptr. 712] (Smith) as a means of undermining, if not overruling, the immunity holding in Elton, supra, 3 Cal.App.3d 1053, is simply “too much of a stretch.”
Discretionary immunity under Government Code section 820.2 turns on whether a plaintiff was injured by the basic policy decision of a coordinate branch of government, in which case immunity attaches, or whether the injury arose from a ministerial act, which is not immune. (Johnson v. State of California, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 797.) By its terms and by the majority’s own admission, Smith is not an immunity case. Its holding is limited to its determination there is no compensable duty to find a permanent placement for a dependent child. (Smith, supra, 90 Cal.App.3d at pp. 937-938.) In rejecting the notion social service agencies may be found liable in tort when, in an individual case, they are unsuccessful in providing a permanent home, the Smith court’s separation of powers discussion, which the majority relies upon, is helpful and persuasive. However, Smith, in no way supports the principle that every step in the adoption process is immune from judicial review by way of a negligence action.
Illustrative of the problems posed by the majority’s immunity analysis are Civil Code sections 222.40, 224.49 and Health and Safety Code section *9051522.1. These statutes require that county social service agencies obtain the fingerprints and criminal records of prospective adoptive parents and submit the names of the prospective parents to the Department of Justice’s Child Abuse Registry. (See Pen. Code, § 11170.) It is not difficult to imagine that in the course of an adoption proceeding a social services agency might negligently fail to meet the requirements of these statutes and that such failure would result in injuries similar to those suffered by Ronald. As I interpret the majority’s immunity analysis, even though the collection and submission of the data required by these statutes can hardly be described as discretionary, because these duties are part of the adoption process they are nonetheless subject to discretionary immunity. (See maj. opn., ante, p. 897.) The incongruity of such an outcome suggests to me that the majority has cast the immunity net too far.
I also disagree with the majority’s reliance upon the judicial and administrative immunity provided by Government Code section 821.6. As against claims by a natural parent who is losing parental rights or a prospective parent who, as a result of the process, is prevented from adopting a child, I have little difficulty with application of Government Code section 821.6. As against such parties, it is fair to describe the department’s activities as being limited to institution of judicial proceedings.
As against claims by a dependent child or ward, however, I believe the role and duties of the department are far greater than participation in judicial proceedings. As the majority notes in concluding the County owed Ronald a duty, Ronald was entirely dependent upon the County to protect his safety and his interests in the dependency and adoption proceedings. (Maj. opn., ante, p. 895.) In my judgment the duty to protect Ronald’s safety is in no way related to the unfettered access to judicial and administrative forums which is protected by Government Code section 821.6.
In light of the conclusions expressed herein, I concur in the judgment.
Respondent’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied September 16, 1993. Mosk, J., and Kennard, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

With respect to the postadoptive period, during which I believe the County also had a duty to act, I would find a statutory basis for liability under Government Code section 815.2. The record supports the conclusion that while Ronald was at Hillcrest Receiving Home, he was under the control of child protective services worker Ham, and that Ham acted negligently in releasing him to the Mundys. However, I also believe the County was immune under Government Code section 818.2, which protects entities from liability for failing to enforce *904laws. Unlike the situation alleged in Elton, supra, 3 Cal.App.3d at page 1059, Ham’s decision to release Ronald to the Mundys plainly involved use of the County’s coercive power over Ronald and the Mundys and hence the decision to return Ronald would come within the narrow definition of law enforcement set forth in Clemente v. State of California (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 374, 378 [161 Cal.Rptr. 799].