Court Opinion

ID: 9382993
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-29 14:17:11.458737+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:42.973041
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Cincinnati v. Fourth Natl. Realty, L.L.C., 2023-Ohio-1012.]

                      IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                  FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
                       HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

 CITY OF CINCINNATI,                                    :      APPEAL NO. C-220209
                                                               TRIAL NO. A-1503539
           Plaintiff-Appellee,
                                                        :
     vs.
                                                        :
 FOURTH NATIONAL REALTY, LLC,                                          O P I N I O N.

           Defendant-Appellant.                         :

Civil Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: March 29, 2023

Emily Smart Woerner, City Solicitor, Marion E. Haynes, III, Deputy Solicitor, and
Mark R. Manning, Assistant City Solicitor, for Plaintiff-Appellee,

Holzapfel Law, LLC, and Eric C. Holzapfel, for Defendant-Appellant.
                   OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

BOCK, Judge.

       {¶1}   Defendant-appellant Fourth National Realty, LLC, appeals the trial

court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff-appellee City of Cincinnati

(“the City”). Fourth National argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it

denied Fourth National leave to amend and supplement its answer, and that the City’s

off-site and outdoor-advertising sign prohibitions violate its free-speech rights. For

the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                              I. Facts and Procedure

       {¶2}   This is the third time this case is before us on appeal. See Cincinnati v.

Fourth Natl. Realty, LLC, 2017-Ohio-1523, 88 N.E.3d 1278 (1st Dist.) (“Fourth I”),

and Cincinnati v. Fourth Natl. Realty, LLC, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-180156 and C-

180174, 2019-Ohio-1868 (“Fourth II”). The dispute concerns an advertisement

(“sign”) affixed to the exterior of a building owned by Fourth National in the City’s

“Downtown Development” (“DD”) zoning district:

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶3}   Fourth National hung the sign without securing the necessary permit

and zoning variance. Fourth II at ¶ 4. The sign ran afoul of the Cincinnati Zoning Code

(“Zoning Code”) as an off-site sign prohibited by Zoning Code 1427-17. Id. It was an

off-site sign under former Zoning Code 1427-03-O because it “direct[ed] attention to

a business, commodity, service, person or entertainment conducted, sold, or offered

elsewhere than on the premises where the sign is maintained.” Id. at ¶ 6. In addition,

it contravened the Zoning Code’s prohibition on outdoor-advertising signs in the DD

zoning district. Id. at ¶ 4. The sign fell under former Cincinnati Municipal Code

(“Municipal Code”) 895-1-O’s definition of outdoor-advertising signs because it was

“affixed to a structure, visible from any street, highway, or other public way or park,

displaying a message or promoting goods, products, services, events, activities, ideas,

opinions, and candidates for public office.” Id.

       {¶4}   The City filed for injunctive relief against Fourth National, requesting a

preliminary and permanent injunction ordering Fourth National to remove the sign.

In response, Fourth National raised free-speech, equal-protection, and tort

counterclaims. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the

City’s motion for summary judgment, ordered the removal of the sign, and dismissed

Fourth National’s counterclaims. On appeal, we reversed the trial court’s judgment

and remanded the case, holding that Fourth National had standing to raise both as-

applied and facial challenges under the First Amendment to the United States

Constitution and Section 11, Article I, of the Ohio Constitution. Fourth I at ¶ 47.

       {¶5}   Meanwhile, the City passed Ordinance No. 372-2017, which amended

parts of the Zoning Code, including the definition of outdoor-advertising signs to “have

the same meaning as ‘Off-Site-Sign.’ ” Fourth II, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-180156 and

C-180174, 2019-Ohio-1868, at ¶ 15. And the ordinance narrowed the definition of off-
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                       OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

site signs under former Zoning Code 1427-03-O as follows:

        Commercial Sign (i) that proposes or promotes a commercial

        transaction to be conducted on a premises other than the premises on

        which the sign is located; or (ii) directs attention to a good, product,

        commodity, business, service, event, or other object that serves as the

        basis of a commercial transaction that is not conducted on the same

        premises as the premises on which the sign is located.

        {¶6}     In the trial court, Fourth National unsuccessfully moved to add

additional counterclaims. Again, the parties filed competing summary-judgment

motions. Relevant here, the trial court ruled that the 2017 ordinance “changed the

legal effect of the City’s sign code” and mooted Fourth National’s free-speech claims.1

We affirmed, in part, agreeing that the 2017 ordinance mooted Fourth National’s facial

challenge. Fourth II at ¶ 37. But we reversed the trial court’s ruling that Fourth

National’s as-applied challenge was moot, explaining:

        Fourth National’s proposed sign would indisputably advertise products

        not sold on the premises and would qualify as an off-site sign both

        before and after the enactment of Ordinance No. 372-2017.

        Consequently, the sign remained in violation of [Zoning Code] 1411-39

        and 1427-17. The restriction as applied to Fourth National remained

        unaltered by the ordinance and prohibited off-site signs while allowing

        on-site signs, which, according to Fourth National is an impermissible

1In addition, the trial court rejected the City’s jurisdictional challenge based on Fourth National’s
alleged failure to serve the Attorney General in violation of R.C. 2721.12. The City appealed that
decision. See Fourth II at ¶ 17. We rejected the City’s claim that the trial court lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction. Id. at ¶ 52. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed and remanded the case to the trial court
to consider Fourth National’s free-speech claim. City of Cincinnati v. Fourth Natl. Realty, L.L.C.,
163 Ohio St.3d 409, 2020-Ohio-6802, 170 N.E.3d 832, ¶ 2.
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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       content-based prohibition. We therefore hold that Fourth National’s as-

       applied challenge was not rendered moot by Ordinance No. 372-2017,

       and that the trial court erred in determining otherwise.

Fourth II at ¶ 42. We remanded the case to the trial court.

       {¶7}   In November 2020, the City passed Ordinance No. 280-2020 (“2020

Ordinance”), which uncoupled the meanings of outdoor-advertising signs and off-site

signs under the Zoning Code. Now an outdoor-advertising sign is either:

       (i) a sign for which its owner or operator receives, or is entitled to

       receive, rent or other consideration from another person or entity in

       exchange for the use of the sign, including for the placement of a

       message on the sign; or (ii) a sign that is offered or made available by its

       owner or operator for use by another person or entity, including for the

       placement of a message on the sign, in exchange for rent or other

       consideration.

       {¶8}   Fourth National attempted to reassert its four original counterclaims in

an April 2021 motion for leave to file an amended and supplemental counterclaim.

The trial court denied that motion. In September 2021, the parties filed competing

summary-judgment motions. Relevant here, Fourth National cited the definition of

outdoor-advertising signs, as amended by the 2020 Ordinance.

       {¶9}   Then in October 2021, Fourth National filed a motion for leave to amend

its answer and counterclaims, citing the amendments made by the 2020 Ordinance.

Fourth National again tried to revive its facial challenge to the Zoning Code, equal-

protection claim, and damages claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Fourth National also

alleged a broad claim that the Zoning Code’s restrictions constituted a taking in

violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The trial court
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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

denied Fourth National’s motion for leave to amend its answer and counterclaims.

Months later, the trial court again granted summary judgment for the City.

       {¶10} Fourth National appeals. In two assignments of error, Fourth National

asks us to reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and denial of its motion

for leave to amend its answer and counterclaims.

                               II. Law and Analysis

                 Fourth National’s Motion For Leave Was Untimely

       {¶11} In its first assignment of error, Fourth National argues that the trial

court abused its discretion when it denied Fourth National’s third motion for leave to

file an amended answer and counterclaims. Fourth National argues that amending its

answer and counterclaims under Civ.R. 15(A) was proper because of the change to the

Zoning Code and its timely request.

       {¶12} We review the denial of a motion for leave to amend a pleading for an

abuse of discretion. See Meehan v. Mardis, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-210399, 2022-

Ohio-1379, ¶ 4, citing Turner v. Cent. Local School Dist., 85 Ohio St.3d 95, 99, 706

N.E.2d 1261 (1999). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is

unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. AAAA Ents. v. River Place Community

Urban Redevelopment Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161, 553 N.E.2d 597 (1990).

       {¶13} Relevant here, Civ.R. 15(A) provides that “a party may amend its

pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave. The court

shall freely give leave when justice so requires.” While the rule advocates for granting

leave when justice so requires, “motions to amend pleadings pursuant to Civ.R. 15(A)

should be refused if there is a showing of bad faith, undue delay, or undue prejudice

to the opposing party.” Meehan at ¶ 5, quoting Turner at 99.

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶14} Fourth National claims its motion for leave was timely. The City

disagrees. Ordinarily, delay is generally not enough to deny leave to amend without a

showing of prejudice from the delay. But as we have explained, “ ‘where a motion for

leave to file an amended complaint is not timely tendered and there is no apparent

reason to justify the delay, a trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying a

proposed amendment.’ ” Meehan at ¶ 6, quoting Franciscan Communities, Inc. v.

Rice, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109889, 2021-Ohio-1729, ¶ 37.

       {¶15} The City passed the 2020 Ordinance on November 12, 2020. Fourth

National cited the amended definition in its September 2021 motion for summary

judgment. The City moved for summary judgment three days later. And roughly one

month later, Fourth National filed its third motion for leave to amend, attempting to

revive its dismissed claims and add its takings claim. While Fourth National argues

that the City passed the 2020 Ordinance in a clandestine manner, the record shows

that the 2020 Ordinance was published in the City’s bulletin in November 2020.

       {¶16} With no apparent reason to justify this delay, the trial court did not

abuse its discretion when it denied Fourth National’s motion. See Franciscan

Communities at ¶ 40 (“ ‘where information relied upon in seeking leave to amend

should have been known to a plaintiff earlier, a plaintiff’s delay in seeking leave to

amend can be considered unjustified,’ and a trial court can reasonably deny a motion

for leave to amend on that basis.”). Thus, we overrule the first assignment of error.

           The City’s Commercial-Speech Restrictions Are Constitutional

       {¶17} In its second assignment of error, Fourth National challenges the trial

court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the City. Fourth National maintains

that the Zoning Code restrictions violate its free-speech rights guaranteed by the Ohio

and United States Constitutions.
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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶18} We review a trial court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Collett v.

Sharkey, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-200446, 2021-Ohio-2823, ¶ 8. “Summary

judgment is appropriately granted when there exists no genuine issue of material fact,

the party moving for summary judgment is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,

and the evidence, when viewed in favor of the nonmoving party, permits only one

reasonable conclusion that is adverse to that party.” Id.

       {¶19} Zoning Code 1427-17 restricts the zoning districts where an off-site sign

may be displayed. It prohibits off-site signs in the DD zoning district. Under Zoning

Code 1427-03-O, off-site signs are commercial signs that promote (1) off-premises

commercial transactions or (2) off-site goods, products, commodities, services, events,

businesses, or other objects. And Zoning Code 1411-39(a)’s restriction of outdoor

advertisements applies to signs displayed by a property owner in exchange for

consideration. Municipal Code 891-1-O.

       {¶20} Fourth National acknowledges that regulations distinguishing off-site

signs from on-site signs have been upheld as constitutional under the First

Amendment to the United States Constitution. See City of Austin v. Reagan Natl.

Advertising of Austin, LLC, ___U.S.___, 142 S.Ct. 1464, 1469, 212 L.Ed.2d 418

(2022) (recalling that “federal, state, and local governments have long distinguished

between signs (such as billboards) that promote ideas, products, or services located

elsewhere and those that promote or identify things located onsite.”). Instead, Fourth

National attempts to distinguish federal precedent upholding these distinctions under

the United States Constitution from state-court opinions interpreting Section 11,

Article I of the Ohio Constitution, which provides that “no law shall be passed to

restrain or abridge the liberty of speech.” To this end, Fourth National relies heavily

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

on the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Norton Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v.

Arlington Hts., 69 Ohio St.2d 539, 542, 433 N.E.2d 198 (1982).

       {¶21} We are not persuaded. The Ohio Supreme Court has repeatedly stated

that “the free speech guarantees accorded by the Ohio Constitution are no broader

than the First Amendment, and that the First Amendment is the proper basis for the

interpretation of Section 11, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.” Eastwood Mall v.

Slanco, 68 Ohio St.3d 221, 222, 626 N.E.2d 59 (1994) (collecting cases).

       {¶22} At oral argument, Fourth National agreed that the restrictions target

commercial speech, which receives lesser protection than other constitutionally-

protected speech. See City of Austin at 1469; see also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp.

v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 447 U.S. 557, 562-563, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 65 L.Ed.2d 341 (1980).

Indeed, commercial speech may be subjected to “ ‘modes of regulation that might be

impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression.’ ” Bd. of Trustees v. Fox,

492 U.S. 469, 477, 109 S.Ct. 3028, 106 L.Ed.2d 388 (1989), quoting Ohralik v. Ohio

State Bar Assn., 436 U.S. 447, 456, 98 S.Ct. 1912, 56 L.Ed.2d 444 (1978). And it is well-

settled that commercial-speech restrictions receive a lesser form of scrutiny, and

courts “distinguish commercial speech from speech at the First Amendment’s core.”

Florida Bar v. Went for It, 515 U.S. 618, 623, 115 S.Ct. 2371, 132 L.Ed.2d 541 (1995).

       {¶23} We review the commercial-speech regulations in this case under the test

set forth in Cent. Hudson. When the government attempts to regulate non-misleading

commercial speech related to a lawful activity, the government must assert a

substantial interest achieved by the regulation, the regulation must directly advance

the state interest, and it must be no more extensive than necessary to serve that

interest. Cent. Hudson at 564-566. The parties do not dispute that the City is

regulating nonmisleading speech relating to lawful activity. And “it is far too late to
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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

contend” that public safety and aesthetics are not substantial government interests.

Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 508, 101 S.Ct. 2882, 69 L.Ed.2d

800 (1981) (collecting cases). Rather, the central issue in this case is whether the

speech restrictions directly advance the City’s interest in public safety and aesthetics,

and whether the restrictions are no more extensive than necessary.

       {¶24} The City’s commercial-speech restrictions must directly advance its

stated interests in aesthetics and public safety. In Cent. Hudson, the Court considered

whether the state’s interest was directly advanced by the restriction in question,

looking for an “immediate connection” or “direct link” between the restriction and

interest. Cent. Hudson at 569. The City must show, “that the harms it recites are real

and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree.” Went For It at

626, quoting Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 487, 115 S.Ct. 1585, 131

L.Ed.2d 532 (1995), quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767, 113 S.Ct. 1792, 123

L.Ed.2d 543 (1993). In its motion for summary judgment, the City relied on expert

reports from several of its employees, including a traffic engineer, a senior city

planner, and a zoning administrator.

       {¶25} Beginning with public safety, we hold that the zoning provisions directly

advance the City’s interest. The reports established that advertisements for off-site

businesses or products distract drivers without providing any navigational assistance

to drivers. Most buildings in the DD zoning district “are built to the sidewalk and are

several stories high,” making signs such as Fourth National’s difficult to read while

driving. The lack of a wayfinding element in off-site and outdoor-advertising signs,

and potential for driver distraction, increase the risk of a severe injury because of the

speed limits in the DD zoning district and significant pedestrian activity. Infact, Fourth

National’s sign is within roughly 111 feet of a crosswalk. While on-site signs were
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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

acknowledged in the reports as “unavoidable distractions,” prohibiting additional off-

site signs temper the amount of driver distractions, to some degree.

       {¶26} In addition, we hold that the zoning provisions directly advance the

City’s interest in aesthetics. The reports established that off-site and outdoor-

advertising signs, in an attempt to compete with on-site signs, are indiscriminately

placed, obscure architectural features, spoil natural views and scenic ways, and

“generally overwhelm[] the urban environment.” The DD zoning district includes a

large historic district featuring “the architectural features of the style and time period.”

That same report concluded that the restrictions “preserve the historic and aesthetic

character of our residential areas and neighborhood business districts.” It is

incontrovertible that “billboards [and signs] by their very nature, wherever located

and however constructed, can be perceived as an ‘esthetic harm.’ ” Metromedia, 453

U.S. at 510, 101 S.Ct. 2882, 69 L.Ed.2d 800. Absent an impermissible purpose,

minimizing the presence of these structures typically advance the goal of preserving

aesthetics. Id. In other words, there is a direct link between the sign restrictions and

the City’s interest in preserving aesthetics.

       {¶27} While Fourth National contends that the existence of on-site signs

undercuts the City’s reliance on its stated interests, this line of argument has been

repeatedly rejected by federal and state courts. See, e.g., Suburban Lodges of Am., Inc.

v. City of Columbus Graphics Comm., 145 Ohio App.3d 6, 15, 761 N.E.2d 1060 (10th

Dist.2000) (citing Metromedia to reject an argument that under-inclusivity was fatal

to a commercial-speech restriction and refusing to question the city’s “common-sense

conclusion that limiting the text of advertising signs generally reduces visual clutter

along the highway and reduces the possibility of traffic accidents.”). And while Fourth

National offered an expert report that attempted to challenge the findings made by the
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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

City’s experts, her conclusions cannot overcome the “common-sense conclusion” that

limiting the proliferation of signs in a pedestrian-dense, historic neighborhood

advances the City’s interests in public safety and aesthetics.

       {¶28} Finally, the regulations must be no more extensive than necessary to

advance aesthetics and public safety. The constitutional guarantees of free speech do

not require a perfect fit, but one that is reasonable. See Fox, 492 U.S. at 480, 109 S.Ct.

3028, 106 L.Ed.2d 388. On one hand, the City must show that the regulation is

“carefully calculated,” not that the regulation is the “least restrictive” way to achieve

its interests. Id. On the other hand, “if there are numerous and obvious less-

burdensome alternatives to the restriction on commercial speech, that is certainly a

relevant consideration in determining whether the ‘fit’ between ends and means is

reasonable.” Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 410, 417, 113 S.Ct. 1505, 123

L.Ed.2d 99 (1993), fn. 13. The City’s expert reports established that the off-site and

outdoor-advertising signs were permitted in other parts of Cincinnati, in areas with

“less multiple simultaneous driver distractions, where the scale of the signs correlated

to the speed of traffic and where generally residential uses were not disrupted by the

scale, lighting, and messages.” Like those in Metromedia and Suburban Lodges, the

restrictions do not constitute a complete ban on off-site and outdoor-advertising signs.

Therefore, the Zoning Code’s commercial-speech restrictions of off-site and outdoor-

advertising signs are reasonable, and are calculated to advance the City’s interests.

       {¶29} In sum, the City’s sign restrictions in the Zoning Code directly advance

the City’s substantial interests in public safety and aesthetics, and the restrictions are

no more extensive than necessary. Fourth National’s second assignment of error is

overruled.

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

                                     III. Conclusion

       {¶30} For the reasons stated, we overrule Fourth National’s two assignments

of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                                      Judgment affirmed.

CROUSE, P.J., and WINKLER, J., concur.

Please note:

               The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.

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