Court Opinion

ID: 9482286
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:45:41.579586+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:48:53.139844
License: Public Domain

GIBBONS, District Judge,
concurring.
I agree with the judgment of the court reversing the conviction of Danny Wade Arthur and with all parts of the opinion except II.C. I also offer some additional thoughts concerning the issue discussed in part II.B of the opinion.
I agree with the court’s conclusion that the trial court erred in excluding from evidence the confession made by Larry Fields to the FBI under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) and its analysis of this issue, as set out in part II.B of the opinion. I also have a view not addressed by the court concerning the proper interpretation of Rule 804(b)(3)’s requirement of “corroborating circumstances clearly indicating] the trustworthiness of the statement,” when the statement tends to expose the declarant to criminal liability and is offered to exculpate the accused.
The court recites the ample corroboration for Fields’ confession. Requiring any more corroboration than was present in this case would contravene the judge’s proper role as determiner of the legal issue of admissibility of the evidence and make the judge, rather than the jury, the ultimate decision-maker with respect to the truth of the statement. Rule 804(b)(3)’s requirement that corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement does not mean that the judge must decide whether he personally believes the statement and use that personal belief as a basis for the evidentiary ruling. Given the degree of corroboration here, the failure to admit the statement was an abuse of discretion.
A trial court is not required to consider the trustworthiness or reliability of most categories of statements admissible under Federal Rules of Evidence 803 and 804. Exceptions to this general approach are the catch-all provisions of Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5), the business and public records provisions of Rule 803(6), (7) and (8), and the portion of Rule 804(b)(3) which is at issue in this case. The only one of these provisions which requires corroboration in deciding the issue of trustworthiness is Rule 804(b)(3). This requirement certainly involves the trial court in weighing evidence to a greater extent than is contemplated by other evidentiary rules under which trustworthiness is evaluated, particularly in view of the additional requirement that clear indications of trustworthiness exist. Yet nothing suggests that the drafters of the rule intended that trial judges should do anything other than determine the reliability of the statement for purposes of admissibility.
In discussing the appropriate approach to trustworthiness determinations under the Federal Rules of Evidence, several courts have distinguished between the court’s proper role in determining the reliability of a statement and the jury’s proper role in determining its credibility. See Moss v. Ole *220South Real Estate, 933 F.2d 1300, 1306-07 (5th Cir.1991) (“credibility is not the focus of the trustworthiness inquiry” under Rule 803(8)(C); “the focus is the report’s reliability”); United States v. Peak, 856 F.2d 825, 834 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 969, 109 S.Ct. 499, 102 L.Ed.2d 535 (1988) (argument that trial court properly excluded Rule 803(3) state of mind statement for lack of trustworthiness is without merit because it focuses on credibility of declar-ant rather than degree of reliability inherent in the statement; district judge does not have discretion to exclude evidence because he does not believe the witness). Cf. United States v. DiMaria, 727 F.2d 265 (2d Cir.1984).
This approach is in no way inconsistent with the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 804(b)(3), which say that “the requirement of corroboration should be construed in such a manner as to effectuate its purpose of circumventing fabrication.” The reliability determination, properly made, certainly drastically reduces the possibility that an untrue statement will be admitted. In order to find a statement trustworthy under the rule, the corroboration must be sufficient to clearly indicate the statement’s reliability. More than an ordinary assessment of reliability is required, but the rule does not contemplate that an assessment of trustworthiness is the same exercise as a determination of credibility.
I also disagree with the view articulated in Judge Boggs’ concurring opinion that the statement that must be corroborated is the one exculpating the accused, not the confession of the witness. The rule does not draw such a distinction. The fact that parts of a statement are corroborated may make it likely that all parts of a statement are trustworthy. In any event, here there was some corroboration of the portion of Fields’ statement exculpating Danny — Terry’s statement and the government’s own proof showing that only two men actually carried out the robbery.
With respect to the trial court’s refusal to allow Terry Keith Arthur to put on a wig and cap before the jury, discussed in section II.C. of the court’s opinion, I do not agree that this refusal was reversible error. While, under the circumstances of this case, seeing Terry in a wig and cap might have been helpful to the jury, the decision not to permit that demonstration does not rise to an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Brady, 595 F.2d 359, 361 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 862, 100 S.Ct. 129, 62 L.Ed.2d 84 (1979).
For these reasons, I concur in all of the court’s opinion except section II.C.