Court Opinion

ID: 9555818
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-15 13:11:24.002731+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:34:11.843723
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

              Present: Chief Judge Decker, Judges O’Brien and Lorish
UNPUBLISHED

              Argued at Lexington, Virginia

              RYAN MITCHELL ALLEN
                                                                           MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
              v.     Record No. 1247-22-3                              CHIEF JUDGE MARLA GRAFF DECKER
                                                                                 AUGUST 15, 2023
              COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                                FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PITTSYLVANIA COUNTY
                                              Stacey W. Moreau, Judge

                              James C. Martin (Martin & Martin Law Firm, on briefs), for
                              appellant.

                              Liam A. Curry, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares,
                              Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

                     Ryan Mitchell Allen appeals his conviction for the felony offense of driving under the

              influence of alcohol as a repeat offender in violation of Code §§ 18.2-266 and -270. He suggests

              that the trial court erred in three ways, by: denying his motion to suppress evidence, admitting a

              certificate of blood alcohol analysis over his chain-of-custody objection, and concluding the

              evidence was sufficient to support his conviction.1 We hold that the trial court did not err in any of

              the ways suggested. As a result, we affirm the conviction.

                     *
                         This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).
                     1
                       The appellant also initially assigned error on a fourth ground, alleging that convicting
              him of “felonious subsequent-offense [DUI]” was error because his driving rights had been
              restored. He has since withdrawn that claim.
                                          BACKGROUND2

       On the afternoon of October 25, 2020, Investigator Anthony Rouse of the Pittsylvania

County Sheriff’s Office learned that homeowners at a particular address complained that their

driveway was blocked by a vehicle whose occupant was “passed out behind the wheel.” The

investigator was further advised that the homeowners did not recognize the vehicle or the

occupant. Rouse and Pittsylvania Sheriff’s Deputy Justin Turner went to the residence, which

was located in a wooded area with only a winding, one-lane driveway visible from the road. The

officers, who were in uniform, recorded their encounter with the appellant using their body-worn

cameras.

       Deputy Turner approached the unidentified vehicle, which was a Ford station wagon, and

called in its license plate number. Dispatch notified him that the license plate was registered at a

different address than the driveway in which the car was parked and that the plate was for use on

a different vehicle, a Dodge.

       The Ford’s engine was running, the driver’s window was partially down, and the radio

was on. The man in the driver’s seat was alone in the vehicle and was either asleep or

unconscious. He gave no indication that he was aware of the officers’ presence, despite loud

noises emanating from their police radios. Deputy Turner called out to the man, but he did not

move or respond in any way.

       Investigator Rouse opened the driver’s door, turned off the ignition, and again spoke to

the man. At that point, the driver woke up but was “obviously . . . disoriented.” When Rouse

       2
          Under the applicable standard of review, this Court considers the evidence “in the light
most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party in the [trial] court,” and “accord[s it]
the benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible from the evidence.” Rich v. Commonwealth,
292 Va. 791, 799 (2016) (quoting Riley v. Commonwealth, 277 Va. 467, 482-83 (2009))
(sufficiency); see Williams v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 462, 472 n.2 (2020) (suppression and
admission of evidence).
                                                -2-
asked why he was “passed out behind the wheel,” the man said he was tired. At that time, his

speech was slurred.

       Rouse’s discussion with the driver revealed that he “didn’t really know where he was.”

When Rouse first asked him about his location, he mumbled “family” almost inaudibly and later

said he was in “[his] family’s driveway.” Investigator Rouse told him that the people who lived

there did not know him. Both officers noticed that he had “glossy” eyes and smelled of alcohol.

       The man identified himself as the appellant and got out of the car. Rouse asked him for

identification and also inquired whether he had any “weapons” or “anything like that” in his

pockets. The appellant said that he did not. Rouse patted him down and asked if he could

“grab” the appellant’s wallet. The appellant agreed, and Rouse retrieved the wallet from his

pants pocket. While removing the wallet, Rouse “s[aw]” a syringe in the pocket. Rouse

removed the syringe, which contained an unknown liquid.

       The appellant’s explanation for his possession of the syringe evolved. He first denied

any knowledge of it, then claimed he was a “borderline” diabetic, and finally admitted that he did

not have a prescription for any medications or “needles.” Rouse searched the same pocket where

he found the syringe and discovered a folded piece of paper. It contained a tan powder that he

suspected was an illegal drug. When Deputy Turner asked the appellant when he had last used

drugs, the appellant replied that “this [was] the first time” he had “used” in years.

       After discovering the suspected drugs, the officers searched the car. Investigator Rouse

found a grocery bag containing two cold cans of beer. The appellant admitted that he had

consumed alcohol before driving. Deputy Turner then performed the horizontal gaze nystagmus

(HGN) test on the appellant. Upon completing the test, Turner told the appellant that his eyes

                                                -3-
were “really jumping” on all six parts of the test, indicating intoxication.3 The appellant was

arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI).

       Deputy Turner and Investigator Rouse drove the appellant to the hospital to have blood

drawn for a determination of his blood alcohol concentration (BAC). Pursuant to a search

warrant, a hospital nurse drew the appellant’s blood using a Department of Forensic Science

(DFS) blood test kit that Deputy Turner provided to her.4 The kit containing the appellant’s

blood sample was sent to a DFS laboratory for testing. Testing of the sample yielded a BAC of

“0.185 + 0.010% by weight by volume.”

       The appellant was indicted for driving under the influence of alcohol after having been

convicted of a felony offense under Code §§ 18.2-266 and -270. He made a motion to suppress

the evidence obtained by police during their detention and searches of his person and his car, as

well as from the blood sample obtained with a warrant. The trial court denied the motion.

       At trial, the court admitted evidence of the blood test result over the appellant’s

chain-of-custody objection. It also denied the appellant’s motions to strike the evidence as

insufficient to prove that he was intoxicated. After convicting the appellant of felony DUI,

subsequent offense, the court sentenced him to five years in prison with three years and four

months suspended.5

       3
          Deputy Turner explained, based on both his training and his administration of the HGN
test on prior occasions, that if a subject “show[s] all six clues,” the person’s blood alcohol
concentration would “in general” be above the legal limit of 0.08%. See Code § 18.2-266
(setting the legal limit).

       All events at the hospital, like those at the scene, were recorded by the officers’
       4

body-worn cameras.
       5
         Simultaneously with the DUI offense, the appellant was tried for possessing fentanyl.
The court found the evidence sufficient to convict him but gave him first-offender status and
placed him on probation for it. The drug offense is not before this Court.
                                              -4-
                                             ANALYSIS

       The appellant contests the trial court’s ruling denying his motion to suppress evidence.

He also challenges its admission of the certificate of blood alcohol analysis into evidence.

Finally, he suggests that the court erred by holding the evidence was sufficient to prove he drove

while under the influence of alcohol.

                               I. Denial of the Motion to Suppress

       The appellant contends that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress.6

First, he asserts that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion or probable cause to detain,

search, and arrest him, or to search his vehicle. Second, the appellant argues that the officers

erred by failing to advise him of Virginia’s implied consent law before drawing his blood

pursuant to a warrant.

       In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress evidence based on an alleged violation of

Fourth Amendment rights, the appellant bears the burden of establishing that reversible error

occurred. Glenn v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 123, 130 (2008). The appellate court, in reviewing

the record, considers “evidence adduced at both the trial and the suppression hearing.” Carlson

v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 749, 758 (2019) (quoting Greene v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App.

606, 608 (1994)). Further, it examines the trial court’s application of the law de novo, including

its assessment of whether reasonable suspicion or probable cause supported a search. Brooks v.

Commonwealth, 282 Va. 90, 94-95 (2011); see Kyer v. Commonwealth, 45 Va. App. 473, 479

(2005) (en banc).

       6
          We assume without deciding that the appellant properly presented this claim for appeal.
See McGinnis v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 489, 501 (2018) (holding that in a case in which “the
ability of the Court to review an issue on appeal is in doubt,” the court “may ‘assume without
deciding’ that the issue can be reviewed” if it allows the court “to resolve the appeal on the best
and narrowest ground[]”). See generally Rule 5A:20(e) (providing that the appellant’s opening
brief “must contain . . . the argument (including principles of law and authorities) relating to each
assignment of error”).
                                                 -5-
       Regardless of the ultimate legal conclusion, however, the appellate court defers to the

trial court’s “findings of historical fact unless ‘plainly wrong’ or without evidence to support

them.” McGee v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 193, 198 (1997) (en banc). “This standard

requires [the reviewing court] ‘to give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by

resident judges and local law enforcement officers.’” Commonwealth v. White, 293 Va. 411, 414

(2017) (quoting Evans v. Commonwealth, 290 Va. 277, 280 (2015)). The factual findings to

which the court must defer include the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of the witnesses.

McCary v. Commonwealth, 36 Va. App. 27, 35 (2001). Those findings also include the trial

court’s view of video evidence. Meade v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 796, 805-06 (2022),

cited with approval in Commonwealth v. Barney, ___ Va. ___, ___ (Mar. 16, 2023). When the

trial court has not made specific findings of fact on an issue, we view the relevant evidence in the

light most favorable to the Commonwealth and afford it the benefit of all inferences fairly

deducible from that evidence. See Mason v. Commonwealth, 291 Va. 362, 367 (2016).

       We apply these well-established legal principles when examining the appellant’s

assignment of error regarding the suppression motion.

                          A. Reasonable Suspicion and Probable Cause

       The appellant contends that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop and detain

him. He also argues that they did not have probable cause to search him or his vehicle. Finally,

he suggests that they acted without probable cause to arrest him and to obtain a search warrant

for his blood.

       Reasonable suspicion must be more than an “unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch.’”

Bass v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 470, 475 (2000) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)).

Nonetheless, it “requires only ‘some minimal level of objective justification.’” Hairston v.

Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 552, 561 (2017) (quoting Branham v. Commonwealth, 283 Va.

                                                -6-
273, 280 (2012)). Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances “are sufficient to

warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is being

committed.” Park v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 635, 646 (2022) (quoting Al-Karrien v.

Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 35, 47 (2002)). “It involves a much lower evidentiary standard

than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.

       In determining whether reasonable suspicion or probable cause existed, the court

considers the “totality of the circumstances.” Mason, 291 Va. at 368 (quoting United States v.

Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002)) (assessing reasonable suspicion); see Curley v.

Commonwealth, 295 Va. 616, 622 (2018) (assessing probable cause). Although both reasonable

suspicion and probable cause must be based on “articulable facts of criminal activity,” the officer

need not articulate those facts expressly or subjectively rely on them as the basis for his actions.

See Mason, 291 Va. at 368; Raab v. Commonwealth, 50 Va. App. 577, 583 n.2 (2007) (en banc).

Rather, the record must establish the existence of objective facts proving reasonable suspicion or

probable cause, depending on which standard is required. See Raab, 50 Va. App. at 583 n.2;

Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812-13 (1996). “Also, because the constitutional standard

is one of objective rather than subjective reasonableness, it is irrelevant whether the accused is

prosecuted for, or even charged with, the offense that provided [reasonable suspicion or]

probable cause for . . . [the search or] seizure in the first instance.” Hairston, 67 Va. App. at 563.

       It is a fundamental principle that an officer who has reasonable suspicion of criminal

activity is permitted to briefly detain a vehicle and its occupants in order to confirm or dispel his

suspicion that a crime has been or is being committed. Id. at 562, 564. It is equally clear that if

probable cause to believe the individual has committed a criminal offense develops during the

detention, the officer may arrest him and “search him incident to that arrest.” See Slayton v.

Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 101, 108 (2003) (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218,

                                                -7-
224 (1973)). The officer also may obtain a sample of an accused’s blood and have it tested for

alcohol content pursuant to a valid warrant issued upon probable cause. See Schmerber v.

California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966), cited with approval in Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141,

148 (2013); cf. Aponte v. Commonwealth, 68 Va. App. 146, 162-63 (2017). Finally, the officer

may search the arrestee’s vehicle “where it is ‘“reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the

crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.”’” McGhee v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 620, 625

(2010) (quoting Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009)).

       Based upon these legal principles, the facts in the instant case entirely support the

officers’ actions. Here, the evidence before the trial court, viewed under the proper standard,

establishes that the officers had reasonable suspicion to detain the appellant when they first

approached his stationary vehicle. It was parked in the private driveway of homeowners who did

not know the appellant, blocking access to their home. The officers, who were dispatched to the

location, were aware that the license plate on the appellant’s Ford was registered to a wholly

different vehicle that was registered to a different address. When the officers went to the driver’s

door, he was asleep or unconscious in the running station wagon, and he did not respond to loud

noises or the officers’ original attempts to speak with him. Once the two officers on the scene

managed to rouse him, he was “obviously . . . disoriented” and spoke with slurred speech. They

also noticed that the appellant had “glossy” eyes and smelled of alcohol.

       These circumstances provided the officers with reasonable suspicion, at the very least, to

investigate further to determine whether the appellant was committing a variety of offenses,

including trespassing, a vehicle licensing violation, and a DUI offense. See Raab, 50 Va. App. at

582-83 (reasonable suspicion of trespassing offense); Lawrence v. Commonwealth, 40 Va. App.

95, 100 (2003) (reasonable suspicion of vehicle licensing violation); Sarafin v. Commonwealth,

288 Va. 320, 326-27 (2014) (holding that a person behind the wheel of a vehicle with the key in

                                                -8-
the ignition can be guilty of DUI); Wallace v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 497, 505 (2000)

(holding that detecting the odor of alcohol on a vehicle’s driver provides reasonable suspicion to

administer field sobriety tests).7

        The additional information gathered by the officers as they interacted with the appellant

confirmed rather than dispelled their suspicions that he was violating the law by driving while

under the influence of alcohol or drugs. While obtaining his identification, one of the officers

found a syringe with liquid in it and a folded piece of paper containing a suspected illegal drug.

The appellant admitted he was not a diabetic and did not have a prescription for the full syringe.

He also told the officers that “this [was] the first time” he had used drugs in years.

        Based on the discovery of the syringe and tan powder, as well as the appellant’s

admissions, the officers had probable cause to arrest him for illegal drug possession. That

probable cause to arrest provided them with justification to search his car for additional evidence

of that crime, during which they discovered two cold cans of beer, evidence of a DUI offense.

And the results from the appellant’s horizontal gaze nystagmus test supplied additional evidence

of intoxication. These facts, as well as the officers’ observations that he smelled of alcohol, had

“glossy” eyes, and was either passed out or asleep and disoriented upon waking, provided

probable cause to arrest him for driving while intoxicated.

        Finally, the same probable cause that supported the arrest of the appellant for driving

under the influence of alcohol also supported the issuance of the search warrant to draw and test

        7
         Contrary to the appellant’s assertion, the officers were not constitutionally limited to
acting in a community caretaking function because he was on private property. Virginia
precedent provides that an intoxicated person who is behind the steering wheel of a vehicle with
the key in the ignition while the car is located on private property can, in fact, be “guilty of
operating the vehicle while under the influence of alcohol within the meaning of Code
§ 18.2-266.” Sarafin, 288 Va. at 327-30 (quoting Enriquez v. Commonwealth, 283 Va. 511, 517
(2012)).
                                                 -9-
his blood.8 See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-71; cf. Wolfe v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 97,

105-06 (2016) (holding that the same probable cause that supported the defendant’s arrest for

driving while intoxicated also supported a warrantless blood draw based on implied consent).

       In light of the evidence and the way in which it developed, the officers had reasonable

suspicion to detain the appellant and then probable cause to search him and his vehicle.

Similarly, we conclude that the officers had probable cause to arrest him and obtain a search

warrant for his blood. Consequently, the trial court did not err by denying the motion to suppress

evidence.

                                        B. Implied Consent

       The appellant argues that because his station wagon was on private property, he was not

required to submit to a blood test. He claims that forcing him to do so, without advising him of

Virginia’s implied consent law, required exclusion of the test result, despite the fact that the

police had a warrant.

       Virginia’s implied consent statute provides, in pertinent part, that any person “operat[ing]

a motor vehicle upon a highway” “shall be deemed . . . to have consented” to a breath or blood

test to determine his blood alcohol content if he is arrested for any one of various enumerated

offenses involving driving under the influence. Code § 18.2-268.2(A) (emphasis added). Here,

it is undisputed that the appellant was not operating the station wagon on a highway and was

instead parked on private property when the police encountered him. Accordingly, the implied

consent statute did not apply. And contrary to his suggestion, this inapplicability of the implied

consent provision did not prevent law enforcement from obtaining a blood sample pursuant to a

valid search warrant.

       8
         The appellant’s only objection to the issuance of the search warrant is his claim that the
evidence that the officers had for the search warrant was the “same . . . insufficient evidence”
they had to establish probable cause for a DUI arrest.
                                               - 10 -
       Settled principles of statutory construction provide that a court may not add language to a

statute. Henthorne v. Commonwealth, 76 Va. App. 60, 67 (2022); see Kim v. Commonwealth,

293 Va. 304, 317 (2017). Additionally, statutes must be construed in harmony wherever

possible. See Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 279, 285 (2012).

       Nothing in Virginia’s implied consent statute states or even suggests that law

enforcement may obtain a breath or blood sample from an individual only by means of that

statute and no other statute or authorizing legal principle. Coexisting with the implied consent

statute is Virginia’s warrant statute, Code § 19.2-56. That statute permits an authorized judicial

officer to issue a search warrant upon a showing of probable cause. And well-settled

constitutional principles permit law enforcement to seize an accused’s blood and have it tested

for alcohol content pursuant to a valid warrant issued upon probable cause. See Schmerber, 384

U.S. at 770 (requiring a warrant, “absent an emergency,” where “intrusions into the human body

are concerned” for purposes of testing a defendant’s blood for alcohol content); cf. Aponte, 68

Va. App. at 162-63 (in a traffic accident case, upholding a warrantless blood test based on

probable cause and exigent circumstances when the three-hour window to which implied consent

applied had passed). Finally, since 2017, Code § 18.2-269(A) has expressly recognized the

admissibility of test results from blood drawn pursuant to a search warrant in certain DUI

prosecutions. See 2017 Va. Acts ch. 623.9

       Consequently, under settled principles of statutory construction and established law, the

implied consent statute does not supplant the ability of an officer to obtain a search warrant for a

defendant’s blood or breath in circumstances not covered by implied consent, such as when an

       9
         Code § 18.2-269(A), which contains several rebuttable presumptions potentially
applicable in the prosecution of various driving offenses, specifically provides that if all listed
conditions are met, those presumptions “shall” apply based on tests “performed by [DFS] . . . on
the suspect’s whole blood drawn pursuant to a search warrant.” (Emphasis added).
                                               - 11 -
individual has been detained for his behavior on private property rather than a public highway.

Implied consent has no relevance to the lawfulness of the seizure and search of the appellant’s

blood pursuant to a valid search warrant. Investigator Rouse and Deputy Turner did not advise

the appellant of Virginia’s implied consent law because it simply did not apply and has no

bearing on this case.10

       As a result, the alleged failure to advise the appellant of implied consent principles when

his blood was obtained pursuant to a valid warrant did not render the court’s ruling on the motion

to suppress erroneous.

                   II. Admission of the Certificate of Blood Alcohol Analysis

       The appellant challenges the proof of two different “links” in the chain of custody of the

certificate of blood alcohol analysis. First, he contends that the way in which the blood was

drawn and packaged at the hospital did not meet the standard for admissibility on

chain-of-custody grounds. Second, he argues that the evidence of who tested the sample at the

DFS lab was deficient and rendered the results inadmissible on those same grounds.

       We begin our analysis with the standard of review. Decisions regarding the admissibility

of evidence lie within the trial court’s sound discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal absent

an abuse of that discretion. Herndon v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 138, 143 (2010). “This

bell-shaped curve of reasonability [guiding] appellate review rests on the venerable belief that

the judge closest to the contest is the judge best able to discern where the equities lie.” Minh

       10
          This Court’s en banc decision in Stevens v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 122, 135
(2004), adhered to upon reh’g en banc, 46 Va. App. 234, 247 (2005), aff’d, 272 Va. 481 (2006),
cited by the appellant, does not require a different result primarily for two reasons. First, the
Supreme Court affirmed Stevens on harmless error grounds without addressing whether “any
error” actually occurred. See 272 Va. at 485-86. Second, Stevens involved a warrantless blood
draw “independently performed by hospital personnel,” as well as blood drawn and tested at the
request of law enforcement. See 272 Va. at 485-87 & n.2; 46 Va. App. at 241-42, 249.
Therefore, this Court’s holding in Stevens is inapplicable in this case.
                                                - 12 -
Duy Du v. Commonwealth, 292 Va. 555, 564 (2016) (quoting Sauder v. Ferguson, 289 Va. 449,

459 (2015)). A reviewing court can conclude that “an abuse of discretion has occurred” only in

cases in which “reasonable jurists could not differ” about the correct result. Commonwealth v.

Swann, 290 Va. 194, 197 (2015) (quoting Grattan v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 602, 620 (2009)).

“This deferential principle applies not only to ‘matters of witness credibility’ but also to the

factfinder’s ‘interpretation of all of the evidence, including video evidence’ presented at trial.”

Barney, ___ Va. at ___ (quoting Meade, 74 Va. App. at 806). Once “[t]he factfinder ‘views

video and other evidence to determine what it believes happened,’” the appellate court reviews

that evidence “‘for the limited purpose of determining whether any rational factfinder could have

viewed it as the [factfinder] did.’” Id. at ___ (second alteration in original) (quoting Meade, 74

Va. App. at 806).

       The appellant’s chain-of-custody challenges involve authentication. “[A]uthentication

does not set a high barrier to admissibility[] and is generally satisfied by any form of proof that

supports a finding that [the evidence] is what it purports to be.” Atkins v. Commonwealth, 68

Va. App. 1, 9 (2017) (first alteration in original) (quoting Charles E. Friend & Kent Sinclair, The

Law of Evidence in Virginia § 17-1, at 1164 (7th ed. 2012)). A court must find any facts upon

which the admissibility of evidence depends, such as those meeting authentication requirements,

by a preponderance of the evidence. See Hicks v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 255, 275 (2019)

(citing Bloom v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 814, 821 (2001)); Va. R. Evid. 2:901.

       “When the Commonwealth seeks to introduce evidence regarding the chemical properties

of an item, the burden is upon the [prosecution] to show with reasonable certainty that there has

been no alteration or substitution of the item.” Herndon, 280 Va. at 143. This burden, however,

“is not absolute.” Id. The Commonwealth need not “exclude every conceivable possibility of

substitution, alteration, or tampering.” Pope v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 114, 121 (1987), quoted

                                                - 13 -
with approval in Herndon, 280 Va. at 143. Instead, it must “establish each vital link in the chain

of custody by showing the possession and handling of the evidence from when it is obtained to

its presentation at trial.” Herndon, 280 Va. at 143. When the issue concerns the admissibility of

a certificate of blood analysis in a DUI case, a specific statutory scheme governs critical aspects

of the process. See Code §§ 18.2-268.1 to -268.12. But the statutory steps for collecting blood

evidence are “procedural and not substantive,” and blood evidence gathered in “[s]ubstantial

compliance” with these requirements is admissible. Code § 18.2-268.11.

       We examine the challenges to the admission of the certificate of analysis with these legal

principles in mind.

                                  A. Hospital Blood Withdrawal

       The appellant suggests that the “blood draw” procedure was deficient because the

evidence did not “meet the authentication requirement as to [the] qualifications” of the person

who drew his blood “and how she did the draw.” He asserts that Lori Crouch “stated repeatedly

on the video that she had never withdrawn blood before” and also that “the white piece of paper

that the officer said was in the box” was not there. Lastly, the appellant argues that the trial court

described what the nurse used to clean his arm as “beta iodine,” that “[sic]” appeared in the

transcript after the word, indicating an unknown solution, and therefore that the Commonwealth

did not prove substantial compliance with statutory requirements.

       First, the record contains sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s factual finding

that the person who drew the appellant’s blood was a registered nurse, who met the statutory

qualification requirement. See Code § 18.2-268.5 (listing a registered nurse as qualified). As to

the actual drawing of the blood, consistent with Investigator Rouse’s testimony, the videos show

that the person who drew the appellant’s blood used the white DFS test kit that the officers

provided. She also completed a “certificate of blood [with]draw[al] for alcohol determination”

                                                - 14 -
and attached the certificate to the vial as required by Code § 18.2-268.6. Then, when the blood

was tested at the DFS laboratory, the certificate of blood withdrawal was affixed to the certificate

of analysis produced by the lab, as directed by Code § 18.2-268.7(A). From the officers’

body-worn camera footage and the notations on that blood withdrawal form, the trial court found

that the appellant’s blood was taken by “Lori A. Crouch RN,” a registered nurse and therefore an

authorized person under Code § 18.2-268.5. This finding is supported by the record and is not

plainly wrong.

       The record also supports the trial court’s rejection of the appellant’s claim that Nurse

Crouch said she had never drawn blood before. Instead, the video evidence proves that what the

nurse said was that she had never before drawn blood for law enforcement for a blood alcohol

test.11 Further, the appellant’s allegation concerning the nurse’s reference to the missing “white

paper” does not render the certificate inadmissible. He points to the nurse’s isolated statement

that, as he characterizes it on brief, “the white piece of paper that the officer said was in the box

was not in fact in the box.” But the appellant does not explain the significance of the paper or its

absence. Rouse described the paper as simply calling for a brief statement about “what

happened.” Turner noted that its absence was “no big deal.” Detailed information about “what

happened” both at the scene and the hospital was readily available from testimony, the

body-worn camera videos, and the police report. In the absence of additional competing

evidence and argument regarding the missing paper, the appellant’s passing reference to it does

not defeat a finding of substantial compliance. See Code § 18.2-268.11. This conclusion is

particularly true in light of the videos, viewed by the trial court, which show the nurse’s careful

attention to detail before, during, and after she drew the blood.

       11
         We note that even if this claim were true, that fact would go to the weight of the
evidence rather than to its admissibility. Cf. Code § 18.2-268.11.
                                                - 15 -
        Finally, the appellant’s claim that the certificate of analysis was inadmissible because the

record did not establish that Nurse Crouch used a substance approved by Code § 18.2-268.5 to

clean his arm also fails. The fact that the transcript indicates that the judge may have referred to

the substance as “beta iodine” is not dispositive. The officers’ body-worn camera footage clearly

indicates that Crouch confirmed in the video that she used “Betadine” on the appellant’s arm.12

The appellant himself referred to the product she was using as “Betadine,” and the nurse

confirmed it. Betadine is a brand name for povidone-iodine, a “topical anti-infective,” which is

one of the cleaning solutions specifically authorized for use by Code § 18.2-268.5. See Betadine,

Sloane-Dorland Annotated Medical-Legal Dictionary (Supp. 1992); Povidone-iodine, id. This

evidence distinguishes the appellant’s case from Hudson v. Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 184,

186 (1995), in which the only evidence was that the defendant’s arm was cleaned with a

“benadine solution,” which this Court held was “an unknown solution” not listed in the statute.

Unlike the “benadine” at issue in Hudson, Betadine is an alcohol-free, statutorily authorized

cleaning solution. See 5 David L. Faigman et al., Modern Scientific Evidence: The Law and

Science of Expert Testimony § 39.64 (2022-2023 ed.) (describing Betadine as “a non-alcohol

containing antiseptic”).

        None of the appellant’s challenges to the manner in which the blood was drawn

establishes that the trial court erred by admitting the certificate of analysis because a vital link in

the chain of custody was missing. Instead, the trial court properly found that the Commonwealth

substantially complied with the statutory scheme, and the certificate was properly admitted.

        12
           The trial court’s presumed finding from the bench that the substance was “beta iodine”
may be a typographical error in the transcript. Nonetheless, an appellate court “must rely on the
transcript as certified to us by the trial court.” Huntt v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 737, 738 n.2
(1972). Based on the clear conflict between the videos and the transcript, we conclude any
finding that the substance was “beta iodine” is plainly wrong. See Meade, 74 Va. App. at
805-06.
                                                  - 16 -
                                    B. DFS Laboratory Testing

       The appellant contests the proof of the chain of custody at the DFS lab due to “doubts”

about who analyzed the blood.13 He notes that the “examiner” who testified at trial “did not

bring [the] file since she was no longer working for the lab,” and he suggests that without the

file, the certificate of analysis was “useless.” He argues that the certificate and any derivative

evidence must be excluded. The appellant relies on two interrelated legal points. He first cites

the authentication requirements of Virginia Rule of Evidence 2:901. Second, he acknowledges

the substantial-compliance provisions of Code § 18.2-268.11 but points to the principle that “the

Commonwealth must prove every ‘vital link’ in the chain of custody.” He suggests that

substantial compliance was not achieved because a vital link in the chain was missing and,

consequently, that the certificate was improperly admitted. 14

       With respect to blood analysis in a DUI case, Code § 18.2-268.11 addresses the steps in

Code §§ 18.2-268.2 through -268.9 “relating,” in part, to “handling” and “identifying” blood

samples. It establishes that those “steps . . . are procedural and not substantive.” Code

§ 18.2-268.11. Code § 18.2-268.11 further provides that “[s]ubstantial compliance” with those

procedures “shall be sufficient” and any “[f]ailure to comply with any steps or portions

       13
           The appellant did not argue below that the Confrontation Clause or any constitutional
or statutory principle other than those in Code §§ 18.2-268.5 and -268.11 supports his
assignment of error. See Hicks v. Commonwealth, 60 Va. App. 237, 245 n.2 (2012) (holding
under Rule 5A:18 that a hearsay objection did not preserve a Confrontation Clause objection for
appeal); see also Bethea v. Commonwealth, 297 Va. 730, 743 (2019) (requiring that an objection
must be “specific . . . so that the trial judge would know the particular point being made in time
to do something about it” (emphasis omitted) (quoting Dickerson v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App.
351, 356 (2011))). His chain-of-custody arguments on brief in this Court also do not present
such a claim on appeal. See Rule 5A:20(e); cf. Jay v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 510, 518-20
(2008) (permitting an appellate court to consider an assertion for which the appellant does not
present legal authority as waived if that failure is significant). Consequently, we address only his
chain-of-custody arguments.
       14
         The appellant also cites Code § 18.2-268.5. That statute, however, is limited to the
circumstances under which blood is drawn, not analyzed.
                                             - 17 -
thereof . . . shall go to the weight of the evidence” rather than its admissibility. To the extent a

defendant contests compliance with those procedures, the statute permits the defendant to

challenge the test results by “introduc[ing] evidence” of “noncompliance” and arguing that “his

rights were prejudiced” as a result. See id.

       We hold that the challenged certificate of analysis was properly admitted under

substantial compliance principles authorized by law. Mika Smith, a DFS employee at the time

she signed the certificate’s attestation clause as the examiner, testified at trial. Smith provided a

detailed explanation of how evidence was received in and processed by the DFS lab where the

appellant’s blood sample was tested. She explained that the toxicology section “work[ed] kind

of like . . . an assembly line” and that “different people c[ould] do different analyses.” Smith

further testified that only eight or nine people worked in that section. Any of them could have

performed the test, and all of them had “undergo[ne] a rigorous training program,” including

competency and proficiency testing. See generally Branham, 283 Va. at 282 (recognizing the

principle that the Commonwealth is entitled to “a presumption that everyone performs his

official duties” “until the contrary is shown”). She additionally confirmed that no one else would

have had access to the blood or the test results. Specifically, Smith explained that her job as the

signer of the certificate was to look at all of the data “with the [specific] case” and “generate” the

certificate “based [on] that data.” Although Smith did not know whether she personally tested

the appellant’s blood, she was the official “examiner” for the appellant’s case.15 She examined

       15
           Smith explained that she could have been the person who performed the blood alcohol
test but that she could not be certain because she no longer had access to the file containing that
information.
                                                - 18 -
the data produced as a result of the laboratory’s analysis and “ma[d]e sure all of the data ma[de]

sense” and “passe[d] all of [DFS’s] quality control criteria.”16

       This evidence was adequate under substantial compliance principles to support the trial

court’s admission of the certificate of analysis over the appellant’s chain-of-custody objection.

Further, the appellant highlighted the absence of evidence regarding who actually performed the

BAC analysis, but he did not request a continuance to obtain the laboratory’s records or

articulate any specific claim of prejudice. See Code § 18.2-268.11 (permitting a defendant who

contests compliance with the statutory scheme to challenge the test results by “introduc[ing]

evidence” of “noncompliance” and arguing that “his rights were prejudiced” as a result). We

hold that under these circumstances, the certificate was admissible and it was up to the trier of

fact to determine what weight to give it.

                                  III. Sufficiency of the Evidence

       The appellant’s only challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence hinges on his assertion

that the certificate of blood alcohol analysis was inadmissible. Because we conclude that the

certificate was properly admitted, we do not address his limited sufficiency challenge. See

Rozario v. Commonwealth, 50 Va. App. 142, 146 (2007) (en banc) (holding that the defendant’s

sufficiency argument was moot because its sole “premise—that the [BAC] results were admitted

in error—[was] untrue”).

                                            CONCLUSION

       We hold that the trial court did not err by denying the appellant’s motion to suppress

evidence or admitting the certificate of blood alcohol analysis over his chain-of-custody objections.

       16
          Smith further testified that after this procedure, the case would have been reviewed
again by “a separate person who did not touch the test at all.” That person would “make sure of
the same things, that everything passe[d] and that the certificate c[ould] be generated based [on
DFS’s] standard operating procedures.”
                                                  - 19 -
Finally, we reject his narrow challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence because the certificate of

analysis was admissible. Accordingly, we affirm the challenged conviction.

                                                                                             Affirmed.

                                                - 20 -