Court Opinion

ID: 9928398
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-31 17:10:29.183993+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:48:06.785786
License: Public Domain

468                   January 31, 2024          No. 55

        IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                STATE OF OREGON

              LANDWATCH LANE COUNTY,
                      Respondent,
                            v.
                    LANE COUNTY,
                      Respondent,
                          and
                     Kim HELSEL,
                       Petitioner.
                Land Use Board of Appeals
                   2023037; A182319

  Submitted November 7, 2023.
  Bill Kloos filed the brief for petitioner.
  Sean Malone filed the brief for respondent LandWatch
Lane County.
  No appearance for respondent Lane County.
  Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, and Mooney, Judge, and
Pagán, Judge.
  PAGÁN, J.
  Affirmed.
Cite as 330 Or App 468 (2024)                                               469

           PAGÁN, J.
         Petitioner seeks judicial review of a final opin-
ion and order issued by the Land Use Board of Appeals
(LUBA).1 Petitioner challenges LUBA’s determination that
ORS 197.307(4) applied only to housing development on land
within an urban growth boundary, and, therefore, that it did
not apply to petitioner’s application to build a relative farm
help dwelling on land zoned for exclusive farm use (EFU).2
As a result, according to LUBA, petitioner was not relieved
from compliance with county requirements for building a
relative farm help dwelling. Based on the statute’s text, con-
text, and legislative history, we hold that ORS 197.307(4)
applied only to housing development on land within an
urban growth boundary. We therefore affirm.
         We review LUBA’s order to determine whether it is
“unlawful in substance or procedure[.]” ORS 197.850(9)(a).
“A LUBA order is unlawful in substance ‘if it represent[s]
a mistaken interpretation of the applicable law.’ ” Kine
v. Deschutes County, 313 Or App 370, 372, 496 P3d 1136,
rev den, 369 Or 69 (2021) (quoting Mountain West Investment
Corp. v. City of Silverton, 175 Or App 556, 559, 30 P3d 420
(2001)). We review LUBA’s construction of a statute for legal
error. 1000 Friends of Oregon v. Clackamas County, 309
Or App 499, 504, 483 P3d 706, rev den, 368 Or 347 (2021).
        We begin with some relevant background facts.
Petitioner applied to Lane County for approval of a relative
farm help dwelling on land zoned EFU. Permitted uses in
an area zoned EFU include:
    “[a] dwelling on real property used for farm use if the dwell-
    ing is occupied by a relative of the farm operator or the
    farm operator’s spouse, which means a child, parent, step-
    parent, grandchild, grandparent, stepgrandparent, sibling,

     1
       Before LUBA, Landwatch Lane County was the petitioner, Lane County
was the respondent, and Kim Helsel was the intervenor-respondent. Here, Kim
Helsel is the petitioner and Landwatch Lane County is the respondent.
     2
       ORS 197.307(4) was amended in 2017 and those amendments became effec-
tive on August 15, 2017. Or Laws 2017, ch 745, §§ 5, 14. Unless otherwise speci-
fied, when we refer to ORS 197.307(4), we are referring to the version that became
effective on August 15, 2017. That subsection of the statute was subsequently
amended in 2023, see Or Laws 2023, ch 533, §§ 1, 2. However, our focus is on the
version enacted in 2017.
470                      LandWatch Lane County v. Lane County

    stepsibling, niece, nephew or first cousin of either, if the farm
    operator does or will require the assistance of the relative in
    the management of the farm use and the dwelling is located
    on the same lot or parcel as the dwelling of the farm operator.”
ORS 215.213(1)(d). The Land Conservation and Development
Commission (LCDC) has adopted rules governing relative
farm help dwellings. See OAR 660-033-0130(9) (containing
requirements to qualify for a relative farm help dwelling).
Lane County has adopted code provisions implementing
the rules. See, e.g., Lane Code (LC) 16.212(8)(b) (setting out
qualifications for a relative farm help dwelling).
         A planning director approved petitioner’s applica-
tion for a relative farm help dwelling and a county hearings
officer affirmed the decision. The hearings officer applied
ORS 197.307(4), which is one of Oregon’s “needed housing
statutes.” Warren v. Washington County, 296 Or App 595,
597, 439 P3d 581, rev den, 365 Or 502 (2019). That statute
sought to remove restrictions on the development of housing
by requiring local governments to apply “clear and objec-
tive” standards. Id. As a result of applying that statute, the
hearings officer determined that petitioner was not required
to comply with the discretionary approval criteria in LC
16.212(8)(b).3 Landwatch Lane County petitioned LUBA
for review, asserting that the hearings officer had miscon-
strued applicable law by applying ORS 197.307(4) to review
of a relative farm help dwelling on farmland outside of an
urban growth boundary. LUBA ultimately reversed and
remanded. LUBA determined that ORS 197.307(4) applied
only to housing development within an urban growth bound-
ary, and, therefore, it did not apply to the application for a
dwelling on land zoned EFU.4 Thus, as a result of LUBA’s
    3
      The parties do not challenge the hearings officer’s determination that those
criteria are not clear and objective. As explained by the hearings officer, the
approval criteria for a relative farm help dwelling consist of four elements: “(1)
the dwelling must be occupied by a relative of the farm operator; (2) there is an
existing commercial farm operation; (3) the farm operator must continue to play
the predominant role in the management of the farm; and (4) the assistance of the
relative is required by the farm operator.” Having determined that those criteria
were not clear and objective, the hearings officer did not require petitioner to
satisfy them before affirming the planning director’s approval of the application.
    4
      In a concurring opinion, one of the LUBA board members determined
that whether or not the statute applied to housing on land within urban growth
boundaries, it did not apply on land zoned EFU. Because we conclude that the
Cite as 330 Or App 468 (2024)                                              471

decision, the county will be required to consider and apply
the discretionary approval criteria before approving the
application, including, for example, considering whether the
dwelling will be occupied by a relative of the farm operator
and whether that operator will continue to play the predom-
inant role in management of the farm.
         On judicial review, the sole assignment of error
concerns whether LUBA correctly construed the scope of
ORS 197.307(4). “To assess petitioner’s statutory construc-
tion argument, we examine the text and context of ORS
197.307(4) as amended in 2017 and, to the extent it appears
useful, the legislative history. We begin with the statute’s
text, which is the most persuasive evidence of the legisla-
ture’s intent.” Warren, 296 Or App at 599 (citation and inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
         The text of ORS 197.307(4) provided, in relevant
part, that “a local government may adopt and apply only
clear and objective standards, conditions and procedures
regulating the development of housing, including needed
housing.” Dictionary definitions of “housing” include “shel-
ter, lodging,” and “dwellings provided for numbers of people
or for a community.” Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary
1097 (unabridged ed 2002).
         Petitioner argues that the statutory text was plain
and unambiguous, and that the statute applied broadly to
any application for “housing,” including an application for
a relative farm help dwelling on farmland. According to
petitioner, LUBA impermissibly usurped the role of the leg-
islature and essentially amended the statute when LUBA
determined that the statute did not apply to an application
for a dwelling on land zoned EFU. We are not persuaded by
petitioner’s argument.
       In Warren, we construed the same statutory text.
296 Or App at 599. We explained:
       “Nothing in the wording of that provision suggests that
    the requirement that local governments regulate housing
    development only through ‘clear and objective’ standards

majority opinion correctly interpreted the statute, we do not address the conclu-
sions advanced in the concurring opinion.
472                     LandWatch Lane County v. Lane County

   applies only to housing development on ‘buildable land.’ To
   the contrary, ORS 197.307(4) plainly states that the ‘clear
   and objective’ requirement applies broadly to local govern-
   ments’ application of standards, conditions, and procedures
   ‘regulating the development of housing’ generally, includ-
   ing ‘needed housing.’ Reading that provision to apply only
   to housing that is developed on buildable land would imper-
   missibly insert a limitation on the provision’s scope[.]”
Id. at 599-600. Because the legislature had amended the
statute in 2017 to apply to “housing, including needed hous-
ing,” and because the legislature removed the reference to
“buildable land,” those changes certainly expanded the stat-
ute’s scope.
          Nevertheless, Warren did not address whether the
statute applied to all housing regardless of the location.
Warren concerned an application for approval of a subdivi-
sion on land that was included in Metro’s Buildable Land
Inventory.5 296 Or App at 596-97 n 2. That land appears to
have been within an urban growth boundary because Metro
is required to “ ‘[i]nventory the supply of buildable lands
within the urban growth boundary and determine the hous-
ing capacity of the buildable lands.’ ” Housing Land Advocates
v. LCDC, 311 Or App 326, 329, 492 P3d 765, rev den, 368 Or
702 (2021) (quoting ORS 197.296(3)(a)). Thus, although the
legislature expanded the scope of ORS 197.307(4) in 2017, it
is less clear that the legislature intended to apply “clear and
objective standards” to applications for housing development
on farmland outside an urban growth boundary.
         Because the text of the statute does not resolve
the issue, we consider the statute’s context. Statutory con-
text includes other parts of the same statute, other rele-
vant statutes, and other parts of the same bill. See Unger
v. Rosenblum, 362 Or 210, 221, 407 P3d 817 (2017) (“[W]e do
not consider the meaning of a statute in a vacuum; rather,
we consider all relevant statutes together, so that they may
be interpreted as a coherent, workable whole.”); see also Lane
County v. LCDC, 325 Or 569, 578, 942 P2d 278 (1997) (“[W]e
    5
      Metro is a metropolitan service district that includes land in Clackamas,
Multnomah, and Washington counties, and one of its responsibilities is the adop-
tion of a regional urban growth boundary. Housing Land Advocates v. LCDC, 311
Or App 326, 328, 492 P3d 765, rev den, 368 Or 702 (2021).
Cite as 330 Or App 468 (2024)                                             473

construe each part [of a statute] together with the other
parts in an attempt to produce a harmonious whole.”); see
also Hon. Jack L. Landau, Oregon Statutory Construction,
97 Or L Rev 583, 640 (2019) (“The idea that the legislature
was likely aware of other parts of the ‘same statute’ refers to
other parts of the same bill[.]”).
         Here, the 2017 amendments to ORS 197.307 were
part of Senate Bill (SB) 1051 (2017),6 which, among other
changes, added language to ORS 215.416 and ORS 227.175.
Or Laws 2017, ch 745, §§ 2, 3, 5. ORS 215.416(4) was amended
to include paragraph (b), which provided:
       “(b)(A) A county may not deny an application for a
   housing development located within the urban growth
   boundary if the development complies with clear and objec-
   tive standards, including but not limited to clear and objec-
   tive design standards contained in the county comprehen-
   sive plan or land use regulations.
       “(B) This paragraph does not apply to:
     “(i) Applications or permits for residential develop-
   ment in areas described in ORS 197.307(5); or
      “(ii) Applications or permits reviewed under an alter-
   native approval process adopted under ORS 197.307(6).”
Or Laws 2017, ch 745, § 2 (emphasis added). ORS 227.175(4)
was amended in the same way to provide that a city may
not deny an application for a housing development located
within an urban growth boundary if the development com-
plies with clear and objective standards, and it included
the same exclusions for applications or permits reviewed or
considered under ORS 197.307(5) and ORS 197.307(6). Or
Laws 2017, ch 745, § 3. And ORS 197.307(4), the statute at
issue here, was amended to expand the kinds of housing
for which local governments were required to adopt clear
and objective regulatory standards. Or Laws 2017, ch 745,
§ 5. At that time, the legislature would have understood
that local governments include cities and counties. See ORS
197.015(13) (2017) (“ ‘Local government’ means any city,
county or metropolitan service district * * * or an association

   6
     The relevant bill was introduced as House Bill (HB) 2007 (2017), but it was
enacted as SB 1051 (2017). See Or Laws 2017, ch 745.
474                    LandWatch Lane County v. Lane County

of local governments performing land use planning func-
tions * * *.”).7 Thus, based on the concurrent amendments to
ORS 215.416 and ORS 227.175, the most plausible reading of
ORS 197.307(4) is that it was also intended to apply only to
the development of housing within an urban growth bound-
ary. See Unger, 362 Or at 221 (we interpret relevant statutes
together “as a coherent, workable whole”).
          The legislative history of the 2017 amendments
provides the clearest indication of what the legislature
intended in this instance. Representative Tina Kotek, who
was Speaker of the House in 2017, provided testimony in
support of HB 2007, the bill that became SB 1051. Kotek
explained that the goal of the bill was to remove barriers
to the development of affordable housing. Testimony, House
Committee on Human Services and Housing, HB 2007, Apr
13, 2017 (statement of Rep Tina Kotek). According to Kotek,
the bill
   “will require cities and counties to approve applications
   that meet clear and objective standards as outlined in
   local zoning or planning codes within urban growth bound-
   aries. I understand that some cities have concerns about
   having to state clear and objective standards, but I have
   also heard from cities that have no issue with this require-
   ment because it is their status quo. It is possible to have a
   permitting process that allows for local control regarding
   design and clear and objective standards related to those
   design preferences.”
Id. (Underscoring in original; emphasis added.) A summary
of the bill prepared for the same hearing stated that the
bill addressed applications for housing within urban growth
boundaries. Summary, Taylor Smiley Wolfe, Office of the
Speaker of the House, House Committee on Human Services
and Housing, Apr 13, 2017. At another public hearing on HB
2007, Representative Duane Stark testified:
   “Think of the alternative, if we need more homes, we have
   a couple of options, we can build inside the * * * UGB [urban
   growth boundary] or we can build outside it. And I haven’t
   seen a lot of fans in this state that want to go out onto farm-
   lands, that want us to sprawl out into rural communities;

    7
      ORS 197.015 was subsequently amended by Or Laws 2023, chapter 13, sec-
tion 76.
Cite as 330 Or App 468 (2024)                                     475

   and instead, we say * * * let’s make it difficult to build * * *
   outside those limits but also let’s make it so that there
   are good, productive, thought out, strategic ways to build
   within the urban growth boundary.”
Audio Recording, Joint Committee on Ways and Means,
Subcommittee on Natural Resources, HB 2007 A, June 22,
2017, at 39:07 (comments of Rep Duane Stark), https://olis.
oregonlegislature.gov (accessed January 23, 2024). That leg-
islative history provides strong support for LUBA’s conclu-
sion that ORS 197.307(4) addressed housing on land within
an urban growth boundary.
         In arguing against reliance on those legislative his-
tory materials, petitioner quotes from State v. Gaines, 346
Or 160, 173, 206 P3d 1042 (2009), in which the Supreme
Court indicated that “[w]hen the text of a statute is truly
capable of having only one meaning, no weight can be given
to legislative history that suggests—or even confirms—that
legislators intended something different.” But, in Gaines,
the Supreme Court also pointed out that
   “we no longer will require an ambiguity in the text of a
   statute as a necessary predicate to the second step—con-
   sideration of pertinent legislative history that a party may
   proffer. Instead, a party is free to proffer legislative history
   to the court, and the court will consult it after examin-
   ing text and context, even if the court does not perceive
   an ambiguity in the statute’s text, where that legislative
   history appears useful to the court’s analysis.”
Id. at 171-72. In addition, “a party * * * may use legislative
history to attempt to convince a court that superficially
clear language actually is not so plain at all—that is, that
there is a kind of latent ambiguity in the statute.” Id. at 172.
         Here, petitioner suggests that the language of ORS
197.307(4) was plain and unambiguous, but petitioner’s own
interpretation of the statute relies on its context because
petitioner argues that the differences between earlier ver-
sions of the statute, which included reference to housing
development on “buildable lands,” shows that we must con-
strue the version enacted in 2017 more broadly. See State v.
Bostwick, 319 Or App 762, 772, 512 P3d 855 (2022) (stating
that the context of a statute includes prior versions of the
476                     LandWatch Lane County v. Lane County

statute). Petitioner’s own reliance on the statute’s context
undermines petitioner’s suggestion that the text of ORS
197.307(4) was plain and unambiguous.
         Petitioner urges us to adopt an expansive reading
of ORS 197.307(4), but “the fact that a statutory provision
describes something in relatively broad terms does not
always mean that the legislature intended the most expan-
sive meaning possible.” Lake Oswego Preservation Society v.
City of Lake Oswego, 360 Or 115, 129, 379 P3d 462 (2016). We
decline petitioner’s invitation to interpret the statute in a
manner that would permit counties to dispense with the dis-
cretionary approval criteria set out in ORS 215.213, and in
related LCDC rules and county code provisions that address
relative farm help dwellings on land zoned EFU. Focusing
on the context and the legislative history of the 2017 amend-
ments, we conclude that ORS 197.307(4) applied only to hous-
ing within an urban growth boundary.8 Consequently, it did
not apply to petitioner’s application for a relative farm help
dwelling on land zoned EFU, and it did not relieve petitioner
from compliance with the requirements for such a dwelling
contained in the Lane Code.
           Affirmed.

     8
       The parties also point to subsequent amendments of the statute, which
clarify that it applies to housing, including needed housing, on land within an
urban growth boundary. Or Laws 2023, ch 533, § 1. Generally, later enacted
statutes are not relevant context for what the legislature intended earlier. See,
e.g., Stull v. Hoke, 326 Or 72, 79-80, 948 P2d 722 (1997). Therefore, we do not
rely on the subsequent amendments. However, to the extent that the earlier text
alone was ambiguous when taken out of context, we separately note that the 2023
amendments clear up that ambiguity.