Court Opinion

ID: 9812304
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:38:50.664339+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:24:45.078479
License: Public Domain

"Walker, J\,
dissenting: Concurring in so much of the Court’s opinion as annuls the contract between the defendants and Spitzer & Co., I am compelled to dissent from so much of the decision by the Court as holds that the bonds are valid, and especially from that part which affirms the power in the State and county to levy a poll tax exceeding $2, even with the special approval of the General Assembly, *452to pay tbe bonds and interest. Tbe poll tax, in my opinion, can never exceed $2 for any purpose, ordinary, general, or special, and tbe proceeds of it can bei applied to no purpose other than education and the support of tbe poor. I do not deem it necessary 'to discuss any feature of tbe case except tbe one relating to tbe levy of tbe poll tax, in view of tbe admission in tbe opinion of tbe Court, wbicb receives my full concurrence, tbat if tlie second of tbe “three contentions, as to tbe construction of section 1 of Article V,” is adopted, tbe statute under wbicb it is proposed to issue these bonds is ineffectual (as to this tax) “in its entirety,” because, after directing a levy of a poll and property tax, it links tbe two together and makes it impossible to .separate them, by using tbe words “always observing tbe constitutional equation between tbe taxes on tbe property and tbe taxes on the poll.” The second of these three contentions is thus stated in tbe opinion: “Tbat tbe limitation on tbe poll tax is absolute and can never be exceeded for any purpose, but tbat tbe limitation upon property tax may be exceeded for a special purpose with the approval of tbe General Assembly.” My purpose will, therefore, be to maintain tbat the second of said contentions, so far as tbe poll tax is concerned, should be adopted now, as it has been before, and this can be done, in my judgment,. both easily and successfully, by a recurrence to the plain and emphatic language of tbe Constitution and the recent decisions of this Court.
Whatever may be gathered, if anything stable or reliable, from the decisions of this Court prior to 1908, it is very certain tbat in'the year named we passed upon the very question after full consideration and an elaborate discussion of it by Justice Connor in Southern Railway Co. v. Board of Commissioners of Mecklenburg County, 148 N. C., 220. The personnel of the Court was the same then as now, with one exception, and we all surely thought at that time tbat tbe question was ripe for a decision, or if any one was of a contrary opinion be gave no expression to it. If it was not then properly before us, we consumed uselessly a great deal of valuable time and labor in tbe discussion of a moot question.
In order to show clearly that tbe question of tbe maximum of tbe poll tax was involved in that case (148 N. C., 220), we need only to say tbat the opinion of the Court shows manifestly tbat it was considered and treated not only as a question in the case, but as the main question presented by tbe record, and tbat it was, in fact, involved, as appears by this language of tbe Court at p. 245: “We decide tbat tbe commissioners of Mecklenburg County acted in accordance with tbe *453statute in failing to levy more than $2 on the poll, and that the statute is a valid exercise of power by the Legislature. This conclusion renders it unnecessary to discuss the much vexed question as to what is or what is not a special purpose within the meaning of section 6 of Article Y.” The question was whether the commissioners could levy more than $2 on the poll, or the Legislature could authorize them to do so. It further appears from the following language of the Court, if more is required: “We are brought to the conclusion that the act of 1905, ch. 840, is in accordance with the correct interpretation of the Constitution; that the last clause in section 1, Article Y, 'and the State and county capitation tax combined shall never exceed $2 on the head,’ is imperative and prohibits the levy of any tax upon the poll for any purpose in excess of that sum; that section 2 applies the poll tax to the purposes of education and the support of the poor, and that this language withdraws it for any other purpose. Wa are not inadvertent to the fact that the conclusion in the last respect is not in harmony with what was said in Board of Education v. Board of Commissioners, 131 N. C., 310. As we have said, in that case the tax had been collected, and the only question was which of two contradictory provisions should control. Under the construction which we give Article Y, the question cannot again arise.” We should not overlook the fact that in the outset of the opinion in R. R. v. Comrs. a carefully formed doubt is expressed as to “whether the question (now) raised upon the record has been decided by this Court,” and this is the conclusion: “It is evident that the question-is regarded as an open one, and must be settled upon some permanent basis.” The Court then proceeded to settle, finally and forever, this vexed question of taxation which for so long had been the subject of variant individual opinions expressed by the judges. The Court not only held that the question as to the constitutional limit of the poll tax was raised in that case, but it was actually presented, as one point was whether the Legislature, in giving its assent to the levy, was bound to require the equation to be observed, so that a poll tax would be levied with the property tax, even though no poll tax in the county had reached the limit of $2, the railroad company contending that the Legislature was compelled to do so or discriminate against it as a taxpayer. The Court decided that it was not. required, as the poll tax limit could not be exceeded. It cannot be successfully contended that the question was not directly involved in R. R. v. Commissioners of Buncombe, heard at the same term, 148 N. C., 248. The language of the Court is too plain for misunderstanding, and conclusively shows that it was. It is there said: “The defendant board of commission*454ers, at- tbe time of levying said taxes, were advised and believed that they bad no right, under the - Constitution, Art. Y, sec. 1, and all the acts mentioned in the complaint, to (levy) a capitation tax in excess of $2. His Honor, being of the opinion that the levy of the several taxes set ont on the property, without the levy of a corresponding tax upon taxable polls in Buncombe County, was illegal and void, and that the taxes charged to the plaintiff are for that reason illegal, made an order continuing the injunction to the hearing. Defendant board of commissioners appealed.” Again it was said: “The question, there-foi’e, upon which the plaintiff’s right to -maintain its action depends is whether section 1, Article V, makes it imperative upon the legislature to impose a poll tax in excess of $2, when a property tax in excess of the same amount is levied upon projierty for any and all purposes, or whether the words, ‘that the State and county capitation tax combined shall never exceed $2 on the head,’ prohibit a poll tax in excess of that sum for any purpose. "We have given the subject our best thought and investigation in the Mecklenburg case, and reached the conclusion therein announced.” After cCmmenting on the excessive poll tax already levied, the Court further said: “This is significant of the operation of the Constitution, when the imperative command that the capitation tax shall never exceed $2 on the head is disregarded.” In that case the decision was placed on what the Court held had been presented, fully discussed, and finally adjudicated in the Mecklenburg case, supra, that the poll tax could never exceed $2 for any purpose. In the Buncombe case the Superior Court had held that the poll tax must be levied, even if it did exceed the limit and was for .a special purpose, and that ruling was reversed, for the only reason, as the Court said, that the poll tax could not go beyond the constitutional limit of $2. Again, in Perry v. Comrs., 148 N. C., 528, Justice Connor, who wrote the opinion in R. R. v. Comrs., supra, said in a concurring opinion: “My investigation, however, in R. R. v. Comrs., ante, 220, impressed upon my mind the conviction that the framers of the Constitution of 1868 did not anticipate that any poll tax should be levied for other than 'State and county purposes,’ and for those it should not exceed $2, and should be applied only to the purposes of education and the support of the poor.” And the Court itself, through Justice Hoke, was very pronounced in the expression of its opinion as to what was presented and decided in R. R. v. Comrs., supra. There is no uncertain sound or discordant note in what I am about to quote from Perry’s case, but it rings clear and true, and leaves no peg upon which to hang a doubt as to what was meant. I will 'italicize the important words. Here it is, as taken literally from the *455opinion of Justice Hoke in Perry v. Comrs., 148 N. C., at pp. 522, 523:
“While the question presented in this appeal is one of commanding interest and far-reaching importance to the entire State, its correct solution, in our opinion, is readily deducible from decisions of this Court heretofore made and which bear upon the subject with more or less directness. Article V, section 1, of the Constitution, after direction that the General Assembly shall levy a capitation tax on, every male inhabitant of the State over 21 and under 50 years of age, and that this poll tax on each shall be equal to the tax on property valued at $300, provides that the State and county capitation tax combined shall never exceed $2 on the head. Section 2 of the article provides that the State and county capitation tax shall be applied to the purposes of education and the support of the poor, and that not more than 25 per cent of such tax in any one year shall be appropriated to the support of the poor. Section 6 of the same article provides that the taxes levied by the board of commissioners for county purposes shall be levied in like manner as the State taxes, and shall never exceed the double of the State tax, except for a special purpose and with the special approval of the General Assembly. Construing these sections, the Supreme Court, at the last term, in Railway v. Board of Commissioners of Mecklenburg County and Railway v. Board of Commissioners of Buncombe County, held that this restriction on the amount of the poll tax contained in section 1 shall be given the significance which its terms clearly import — that the State and county capitation tax combined shall never exceed $2 on the bead, and that this limit fixed on- the poll tax for the purposes indicated, that is, for the State and county, shall be always observed, notwithstanding that a given tax may be for some special purpose and with the special approval of the General Assembly.”
What does all this mean, if not that the question as to the limitation of the poll tax for all purposes was presented in R. R. v. Comrs., and decided ?
Surely, it was not intended to say that the Court by a mere dictum had “construed those sections” (Art. V, secs. 1, 2, and 6) and “held” that the amount of the poll tax cannot in any case exceed $2, as the learned justice said that is the “significance which its terms clearly import.” I am not referring to these as the views of only one justice, but as those of all of them, reinforced by a separate concurring opinion of J’ustice Connor, who spoke for the Court in R. R. v. Comrs., as to what was then before us by the concurrent testimony of all the judges, and as to what was decided, and intended to be written into *456Ms opinion, wMcb was aftenvwards unanimously accepted and approved by tMs Court. The personnel of the Court when Perry’s case was. decided was the same as when R. R. v. Comrs. was decided, and as it is now, with one exception as heretofore noted.
So- far I have attempted to) show, and, I think, have shown, by the words of other judges with whom I concurred, that this question as to the maximum limit'of the poll tax had been before the Court recently in the cases cited, and had been decided. It was decided in Perry’s case, for the general question of taxation was there open for discussion, and especially the question as to the extent of the power to tax both in State, counties, and municipalities. What was said by Justice IJoTce was clearly pertinent to the question in hand, and was a clear-cut decision of it.
In R. R. v. Schutte, 103 U. S., 118 (26 L. Ed., 336), the Court said on the doctrine of precedents: “Although the bill in the case was finally dismissed because it was not proved that airy of the State bonds had been sold, the decision was in no such sense a dictum. It cannot be said that a case is not authority On one point because, although that point was properly presented and decided in the regular course of the consideration of the cause, something else was found in the end which disposed of the whole matter. Here the precise question was properly presented, fully argued, and elaborately considered in the opinion. The decision on this question was as much part of the judgment of the Court as was that on any other of the several matters on which the case as a whole depended.” R. R. v. R. R., 199 U. S., 160.
This brings me to the important question as to what was decided in those cases, and in regard to this there can be no reasonable doubt, if the words are given their plain and unmistakable meaning. In R. R. v. Comrs., supra, the Court says at pp. 240 and 241: “The suggestion that after that limit ($2 on $300 worth of property) was passed, the amount of poll tax is left to the uncontrolled discretion of the General Assembly, we do not think finds support in the language of the Constitution, but is excluded by the positive command that 'the State and county tax combined shall never exceed $2 .on the head,’ and the further provision limiting its application to the purposes of education and the support of the poor.” Eeviewing the two different constructions of the tax provisions in the Constitution, the Court then proceeds as follows: “If we adopt the other construction we confine the poll tax 'fori all purposes’ to $2, as provided by the Constitution, and apply it to the purposes directed — education and the support of the poor — and 'to no other purpose.’ It makes the capitation tax uniform throughout the State, thus restoring the principle incorporated in the *457Constitution of 1776 as amended in 1835. It conforms to the express declaration of the people, as expressed in the amendment ratified in August, 1900, which provides that ‘every person presenting himself for registration shall pay, and before he shall be entitled to vote he shall have paid, on or before the first day of May of the year in which he proposes to vote, his poll tax for the previous year, as prescribed by Article V, section 1, of the Constitution.’ It is a strange anomaly to say that, while the right to vote is restricted by the payment of a poll tax which ‘shall never exceed $2,’ the voter may be disfranchised for failure to pay a poll tax the amount of which is left to the discretion of the General Assembly, the Constitution thus guaranteeing to every citizen otherwise qualified the right to vote by paying a poll tax of $2, and, by construction, giving the General Assembly the power to increase it to any amount they may deem proper. Whatever may have been the construction prior to 1 January, 1901, we find in this amendment, which then beeáme a part of the Constitution by the vote of the people, a construction which gives full force and effect to the provision that the State and county capitation tax combined shall never exceed $2, as prescribed in Article Y, section 1.” And finally the Court decided that Article Y, section 1, is mandatory in the prohibition of any poll tax for any purpose whatsoever beyond $2, and that the proceeds of the tax, when levied and collected, must be applied to the specific purposes designated in section 2, and to no other.
How the Court could have' expressed itself with less ambiguity, I am at a loss to conceive. There is but one meaning that can be given to such plain and unmistakable language, namely, that $2 is the ne flus ultra of poll taxation, as clearly indicated in the Constitution by the use of the word “never,” which is the universal adverb of negation. But, as we have shown, when discussing another branch of the subject, the Court afterwards deliberately construed the opinion in R. R. v. Comrs., if we may speak of something which is perfectly clear as having been construed' — and thus stated its view of that case: “It was held that this restriction on the amount of the poll tax contained in section 1 shall be given the significance which its terms clearly import — that the State and county capitation tax combined shall never exceed $2 on the head, and that this limit is fixed on the poll tax for the purposes indicated — that is, for the State and county —shall be always observed, notwithstanding that a given tax may be imposed for some special purpose and with the special approval of the General Assembly.” Summing up the matter, we find this to have been held in R. R. v. Comrs., 148 N. C., 220:
1. That the question had not been decided before, but was then an *458open one, ready to receive an authoritative consideration and final settlement of it upon a permanent basis.
2. That the State and county poll tax can never for any purposes, or for all purposes, exceed $2.
3. That the poll tax must always be applied to the purposes of education and the support of the poor.
That decision, in respect to the poll tax, was unanimous, with four of the justices now sitting in the Court. The question was involved in the case, because the Court said it was, and was at great pains to decide, it being one of great importance, and the learned justice who wrote the opinion reviewed all the pertinent authorities at some length, because the question was in the case for decision, and after unanswerable argument the Court arrived at the conclusions which I have just stated, and it was then said that the question was finally closed and could not arise again. Could language be more clear, direct, and emphatic than it was in that case, and in the subsequent case of Perry v. Comrs.?
It is -unnecessary to discuss previous cases, as it is the last utterance of the Court that counts, and gives the binding rule of action. If other rulings have been made of a character to justify reliance upon them as settling the law, and individuals have entered into contracts because of them, the latter may be valid under another principle; but so far as the present case is concerned, where no such thing can possibly have occurred and no vested right has been acquired, or other right which is under the protection of the Federal or State Constitution, and as the transaction is still in fieri, no sound- reason can be advanced for our not being controlled by the last decisions, even, if it be conceded that there are others of prior date to the; contrary. The last word in such a ease is, and should be, the prevailing one. There may have been a variety of opinions expressed or intimated in former cases, many if not all of which were dicta, in the true sense of that word; but whether so or not, those cases were reviewed carefully and minutely by this Court in R. R. v. Comrs., supra, and held not to conflict with the decision in that case, as it was stated by the Court that the question had not been closed, but was still open for debate and final decision, and the Court then proceeded to establish finally the true rule and to foreclose the controversy so that it cannot arise again.
The Court in that case did not limit itself to a discussion of the question as to how much poll tax could be levied for what has been called “Ordinary expenses,” but the opinion took a much broader sweep, and resulted in a decision as to what was the extreme limit of the poll tax for all purposes — “ordinary” and “special” — and the con-*459elusion was that no greater sum than $2 could be levied for the two-combined, or for any and all purposes, that being the only permissible meaning of the words of Article Y, section 1, “the State and county" capitation tax combined shall never exceed $2 on the head.” The framers of the Constitution used the most intensive and at the same-time extensive word within the English vocabulary in order to set an impassable limit to the poll tax, which would apply to- all cases of taxation, and the term, “shall never exceed $2,” allows of no exception, but is as broadly inclusive as any words could possibly be. The section says that the State and county tax combined shall never exceed $2. Is a tax any less a county tax because it is levied for a special purpose? Is not a tax for road purposes of any kind a county tax? How, then, could any term employed to express the will of the people-in forming their organic law be moré all-embracing? Besides, there is no authority to be found in any other article or section of the Constitution for levying a poll tax, except in section 1 of Article Y. There-is no mention of a poll tax in section 6 of that article or elsewhere, except in section 2, Article Y, which provides how the proceeds of the poll tax shall be applied; and this answers the suggestion that the-amendment of 1900 (Const., Art. YI, see. 4), prescribing the qualification of voters, refers only to the payment of the poll tax provided for in Article Y, section 1. The latter section is the only one which authorizes any poll tax for State and county purposes of whatever kind,' and therefore the reference to it embraces the entire range of' taxation on the poll for those purposes. The quotation in the opinion of the Court from Perry v. Gomrs. with reference to this matter does not militate against this view, but rather supports it. The learned justice who wrote the opinion was referring altogether to taxation by a school district and not by a county, and when he mentions the State and county poll tax authorized by Article Y, section 1, he says, as he had said before in the same opinion, “This poll tax, as we have seen, can never exceed $2.” Justice Connor also adopted this view for the Court in R. R. v. Comrs., supra, and at the risk of some repetition, but in order to make the point perfectly clear, I will again quote that part of his language relating to this feature of the case: “It is a strange anomaly to say that, while the right to vote is restricted by the payment of a poll tax, which ‘shall never exceed $2,’ the voter may be disfranchised for failure to pay a poll tax the amount of which is left to the discretion of the General Assembly, the Constitution thus guaranteeing to every citizen otherwise qualified the right to vote by paying a poll tax of $2, and, by construction, giving the General Assembly the power to increase it to any amount they may *460deem proper. Whatever may have been the construction prior to 1 January, 1901, we find in this amendment, which then became a part of the Constitution by the vote of the people, a construction which gives full force and effect to the provision that the State and county capitation tax combined shall never exceed $2, as prescribed in Article Y, section 1.” This ’ conflicts with the view of the Court in this case upon the subject. Article Y, section 1, established the ratio of taxation between poll and property, and section 6, the ratio between the State and the -county tax, but all authority to levy the poll tax is derived from Article Y, section 1, and its maximum is thereby fixed at $2.
Nothing can be gained for the argument of the Court by a reference to Article YII, section 7. That section does not confer any power to tax upon counties, for they already had the power under Article Y; but it merely restricts the power to tax, so as to require a vote of the people where the proposed tax is not for necessary expenses. It is not an enabling but a disabling clause; not creative, but clearly restrictive. Its words are those of prohibition instead of authorization, at least as to counties, who already had been invested with the power of taxation. Why give it to them again, if they already had it? This Court has always regarded that section as giving no new or additional power, but as curbing that already given to counties, and this our decisions will show. Municipal corporations, such as cities, towns, school districts, etc., have, with respect to their power of taxation, been placed on a different basis from the State and its counties, as our decisions will show.
If taxes have been levied in the past, beginning in 1868-9, in violation of the plain words of the Constitution, it is no good reason for changing its meaning by judicial construction to meet the exigencies of the hour.
Judge Cooley, the eminent author and expounder, in his treatise on Constitutional Limitations (7 Ed.), at p. 75, says: “The Constitution of the State is higher in authority than any law, direction, or order made by any body or any officer assuming to act under it, since such body or officer must exercise a delegated authority, and one that must necessarily be subservient to the instrument by which the delegation is made. In any case of conflict the fundamental law must govern, and the act in conflict with it must be treated as of no legal validity. But no mode has yet been devised by which these questions of conflict are to be discussed and settled as abstract questions, and their determination is necessary or practicable only when public or private rights would be affected thereby. They then become the subject of legal *461controversy; and legal controversies must be settled by the courts. Tbe courts Lave thus devolved upon them the duty to pass upon the constitutional validity, sometimes of legislative and sometimes of executive acts. And as judicial tribunals have authority not only to judge but also to enforce their judgments, the result of a decision against the constitutionality of a legislative or executive act will be to render it invalid through the enforcement of the paramount law in the controversy which has raised the question.” If we give full rein to every other department of the Government in the construction of the Constitution, we would soon be confronted by the very evil which it was adopted to prevent. While we will treat with proper deference and consideration any established departmental practice or usage, as perhaps indicating, by the impression made upon those who have followed it, what the Constitution means, where the custom has been continued throughout a series of many years, we are not bound by it, and, as Judge Cooley says, the courts must, at last, determine what that meaning is as expressed therein. The Court cannot abdicate its right to construe the Constitution, or assign it to any one else. It may be that in the enormous growth, progress, and development of the State we may find a potent reason for enlarging the limit of taxation adopted in 1868. This can be done though, not by us, whose province is to interpret only what has been written, but by one of the two methods prescribed by the Constitution itself, which would require the assent of the people. (Art. XIII.)
Something has been said about the advantage to the citizen, under the statute now being construed, in the new. system of repairing the roads over the old; but the question involved here is much broader, and more far-reaching in its results, than is anything contained in the statute under consideration. It concerns the general power of the counties to tax the poll, with the consent of the Legislature, without any limit and for any special purpose, and is not restricted to a poll tax of 35 cents and a property tax of $1.05, which are the limits fixed by this statute. Under the Constitution an unlimited power of taxation was not intended to reside anywhere. The framers of the Constitution could no more estimate what rate of taxation would be required for the “ordinary” usual or “everyday” expenses of a county than they could for its other expenses. Some counties would require more than others, and therefore one rate was fixed for all, which was supposed, at the time, to be sufficient for the government of the counties, if economically administered. If they miscalculated, we are not at liberty to correct the error.
My conclusion is that the poll tax provided for in this statute is not authorized by the Constitution, and, if it is, that the proceeds thereof *462cannot be paid on the. bonds, or the interest, but should be applied, as directed by the Constitution, Art. V, sec. 2, to the purposes of education and the support of the poor. This being so, the statute in question is invalid, upon the principle stated in the majority opinion, that the statute must stand or fall in its entirety, because after directing a levy of a poll tax and a property tax, it links the two together in such a manner as to make them indissoluble, by providing that the constitutional equation between the two kinds of taxes shall always be observed. It is impossible for me to see why this is not the logical and inevitable result, if my position is correct, that the levy of the poll tax is void. This invalidates the entire statute, as the one tax cannot exist without the other, but both must coexist; being united as it were by an insev-erable ligament. We applied the same principle most recently in Keith v. Lockhart, 171 N. C., 451. It was there said by Justice Hoke for a unanimous Court: “It is insisted for defendant that only the proviso being unconstitutional, this can be eliminated and the statute authorizing a special tax upheld. It is the recognized principle that ‘Where a part of the statute is unconstitutional, but the remainder is valid, the parts will be separated, if possible, and that which is constitutional will be sustained.’ In Black on Constitutional Law the rule is said to be: ‘If the invalid portions can be separated from the rest, and, if after their excision there remains a complete, intelligible, and valid statute capable of being executed, and conforming to the general purpose and intent of the Legislature as shown in the act, the same will not be adjudged unconstitutional in toto, but sustained to that extent.’ The position, however, is not allowed to prevail when the parts of the statute are so connected and dependent, the one upon the other, that to eliminate one will work substantial change to the portion which remains. Thus, in Black’s work the author further says, page 63 : ‘And if the unconstitutional clause cannot be rejected without causing the statute to enact what the Legislature did not intend, the whole statute must fall.’ Speaking to the same subject in the first of the Employer’s Liability Cases, 207 U. S., pp. 463-501, the present Chief Justice White said: ‘Equally clear is it, generally speaking, that when a statute contains provisions which are constitutional and others which are not, effect must be given to the legal provisions by separating them from the illegal. But this applies only to a case where the provisions are separable and not dependent one upon the other, and does not support the contention that what is indivisible may be divided. Moreover, even in a case where legal provisions may be severed in order to save, the rule applies only when it is plain that the Legislature would have enacted the legislation with the unconstitutional provisions eliminated. Citing Illinois Central R. R. v. McKenonill, 203 U. S., 514.”
*463Another reason is that the tax scheme in this statute is and was intended to be an entire and indivisible one, and if any essential part of it is stricken from it, and the remainder enforced, it would result in doing something which was never contemplated, or authorized to be done, and, therefore, lack legislative sanction. Having reached the conclusion that the statute in its present form is void, I need not discuss the other phases of the case, as the one reason assigned for my view is all-sufficient to sustain it, if I am right in the conviction that the poll tax is limited by the Constitution, for all purposes, to $2, or, in the language of the instrument itself, can never exceed that amount. Justice Rodman thought that the poll and property tax were so proportioned that each class of taxpayers might exercise a restraint upon the other, and for this reason they were inseparably linked together. R. R. v. Holden, 63 N. C., 410. And the same was said in Russell v. Ayer. 120 N. C., 180. Justice Clark said very truly that the poll and property tax, as fixed by Article V, section 1, are standards for each other, whatever the poll is, placing a limit on the property tax, and the property tax creating the equation between the two. Hnder this adjustment the property tax on $100 worth of property could not exceed one-third of the poll tax, and the entire poll tax must be equal to and never exceed three times the property tax on a like amount of property. This was supposed to' fairly apportion the burden on these two subjects of taxation — polls and property; and out of this adjustment there resulted a balancing of the two opposing forces, by which one is protected against oppression by the other.
We cannot suppose that the levy in this statute of one %oo dollars on the poll and 35 cents on property was intended to be otherwise than additional to the tax which had already been levied in Alexander County up to the limit of $2, because the statute expressly says it shall be. There is no way, therefore, of reconciling this levy with the constitutional mandate as to the amount of the entire poll tax, and no escape from the conclusion that if it is void the statute falls with it. We cannot argue that it shall stop at $2 when the statute expressly provides to the contrary.
It will be seen, therefore, that I agreei with the Chief Justice, that in no event can the poll tax exceed $2 for any or for all purposes; but I concur with the majority that if this be so, the statute is nugatory (as to this tax), as there was one entire and indivisible scheme of taxation contemplated by the Legislature, which is composed of poll tax and property taxes at the rates designated in the statute, and which must stand .or fall as a whole.
I may properly add that the quotation from my opinion in Collie v. Comrs., 145 N. C., 183, made in the opinion of the Court, had refer*464ence to the particular question tben before us, as to the school tax under Article IX of the Constitution, and when read with the context will be found to harmonize, in every respect, with the views herein stated. I said then that the poll tax could not exceed $2, except, perhaps, under Article IX, and my reasons for so holding were fully given and need not be repeated here.
It has not been denied that there are some ill-considered dicta, favoring the view of the majority, which may be picked up here and there, like flotsam and jetsam, from the current of judicial opinion; but they were jettisoned long ago, and in 1908 this Court through Justice Connor, reviewed, as he said, “every case from which any light may be found upon this difficult question” (148 N. C., 239), and most exhaustively (naming all of those cited by the majority), and deliberately concluded, first, that the poll tax can never exceed $2 for any purpose, ordinary, general, or special, and, second, that the proceeds of the poll tax must be applied to the purposes mentioned in the Constitution and to no other, in the latter respect repudiating what was said in Board of Education v. Board of Commissioners, 137 N. C., 310, decided in 1904, and upon which the majority rely and from which they quote. “We are not inadvertent to the fact that our conclusion, in this last respect, is not in harmony with what was said in Board of Education v. Board of Commissioners, 137 N. C., 310,” is the exact language of the Court, by Justice Connor, in the Mecklenburg- case (148 N. C., at p. 245), and the “last respect” to which he referred was “that Constitution, Article I, sec. 2, applies the poll tax to the purpose of education and the support of the poor, and this language withdraws it for any other purpose.” The distinct question in the Mecklenburg case (148 N. C., 220) was whether a poll tax above $2 could be levied, the railroad company insisting that it. should be, so as to prevent unjust discrimination against it, and the Court held that the poll tax, for any and all purposes, was absolutely restricted to $2. So that the question was there undoubtedly presented and decided,- if such a thing was possible. And in the Buncombe case the issue was, if anything, more clear-cut and pronounced, and the decision more-emphatic. The point, and the single point, was whether the Superior Court held correctly that the poll tax could exceed $2 in any case. Justice Connor thus stated the one and only question to be: “Whether the words, That the State and county capitation tax shall never exceed $2 on the head,’ prohibit a poll tax in excess of that sum for any 'purpose,” and the answer was that they do, and that was the ratio decidendi. The great value of the discussion in the Ferry case is that the Court told us, in the most explicit and unmistakable language, what the Mecklenburg *465and. Buncombe cases bad decided, as to tbe limit of tbe tax, botb in respect to ordinary and special purposes.
Tbe three cases in 148 N. C., therefore, are tbe latest authoritative decisions and precedents upon tbe distinct subject of this appeal, and for that reason I follow and feel bound by them. I dissented in Hargraves v. Comrs., as tbe record shows, but by inadvertence my dissent was not entered in tbe official volume (168 N. C., 628) of tbe reports. This question was not discussed or decided in that case. The decision there was based upon a question entirely foreign to this discussion.
It remains only for me to say that tbe meaning of a Constitution— statutes and other instruments as well' — is fixed at tbe time they are written, and is not changed by subsequent events. Construction, therefore, should be confined to tbe written word, and it is utterly immaterial how individual judges may apparently have assented to dicta, tbe question finally being whether we should follow as binding precedents the well considered and final judgments of this Court, which were rendered in 1908, upon this very question, or reject them. It is obvious that what is said in Perry v. Comrs. about taxation by subdivisions of a county, such as school districts, can have no bearing upon the limitation of the State and county capitation tax, as it does not apply to that form of taxation, and, therefore, there can be no possible conflict between Perry’s case and the Mecklenburg case.
We are concerned not with results or consequences, but only with what the law is. Expediency has nothing to do- with the question. Suspension of business and ultimate bankruptcy are not ordinarily products of frugality.' “Live within your means” is the safest rule in public as well as in private affairs, and was commended to us by this Court in French v. Comrs., 74 N. C., 692, when discussing this same question of taxation, as one of great practical wisdom.
I deem it of the utmost importance that we should adhere to what has already been deliberately and solemnly adjudged, stare decisis being not only a wise but a wholesome maxim of the law, to which strict observance is due, and changes in construction should not be made except for the most cogent reasons. The power of expounding the laws — which includes the great and responsible duty of deciding whether legislatures, State and municipal, have transcended in their past action the limits of their authority as defined by the Constitution —belongs to the judiciary. Sedgwick St. and Const. Law, p. 253. If it turns out that any -change in the law is necessary for the public welfare, and - to meet new conditions which require an extension of the legislative power, let it be done by the people in the regular exercise of their sovereign will, and not otherwise. Until it is thus done, I *466must read tbe Constitution as, in my opinion, it is plainly expressed, and endeavor to enforce its provisions accordingly, for sucb is my duty. In performing tbis duty, though, I will always regard and consider with respect and deference the opinions of my learned brethren.
It may be that my brethren of the majority are right, and that I am wrong; but however this may he, their decision shall hereafter be the law with me, as I have a strong conviction that a question of construction touching the organic law of the State should be settled once for all, and not be subjected constantly to the varying opinions or the personal notions of the judges. It should be made to rest upon a permanent and unchangeable basis. As said by one of my predecessors, in a similar case, “my only object in expressing my views at all has been to call attention to the subject, so that, if deemed necessary, steps may be taken to make the law perfectly free from doubt, one way or the other,” and thus entrench and secure it firmly against the alternation of opinion.
Per Curiam. Since the opinions in this case were handed down our attention has been called to the objection made to the form of the bonds. The objection is made that the form of the bonds is not in accordance with the statute. The defendants contend that the bonds are proper in form and payable as required by the statute.
"We are of opinion that the form of the bonds is correct and that they are issued and payable substantially as required by law.
The judgment of the Superior Court in that respect is
Affirmed.