Court Opinion

ID: 9483252
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:15:30.04624+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:31.078725
License: Public Domain

BEAM, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent for two reasons. First, although I agree that three of the four grounds cited for departure are improper, and that the fourth ground, inadequate criminal history, may properly be considered under § 5K2.0, I do not agree that the permissible ground supports de*1375parture of the magnitude found in this case.
Griess, who is now thirty-three years old, has a juvenile history which consists of two convictions for third-degree burglary when he was fifteen years old (for which he was committed to the State Training School for four months); a conviction for consumption of low point beer and possession of marijuana when he was sixteen years old (for which he was sentenced to one year on probation); a conviction for violation of probation involving daily use of marijuana, consumption of alcohol, and driving without a license when he was sixteen years old (for which his probation was revoked and he was remanded to the custody of the youth services program); and, finally, a conviction for driving while intoxicated when he was seventeen years old (for which he was fined fifty dollars, his driver’s license was revoked for forty-five days, and he was sentenced to thirty days — twenty days suspended — and six months probation). PSI at 4-5. As noted in the majority opinion, none of these convictions were counted in calculating Griess’s criminal history category. The majority correctly states that a sentencing judge may, under some circumstances, take these into consideration under § 5K2.0. Griess, however, received a sentence greatly in excess of that which he would have received if the juvenile convictions had in fact been used to calculate his criminal history category. If the juvenile convictions were counted, Griess would have a criminal history category of III.1 According to the Sentencing Table, a criminal history score of III, coupled with Griess’s offense level of fourteen, would result in a sentencing range of twenty-one to twenty-seven months. Griess was sentenced to forty-two months in prison — fifteen months more than the high end of the sentencing range had the offenses actually been counted. In order to receive a sentence of forty-two months, Griess would need a criminal history category of at least VI. Under the circumstances, a sentence of forty-two months is simply not reasonable. As a general rule, I would hold that if a sentence departs from the guideline range because of an inadequate criminal history category, it is unreasonable when it exceeds the guideline sentence calculated with the omitted criminal history taken into account.
Further, Griess’s juvenile history does not paint a picture of a hardened criminal. His probation officer noted that Griess’s problems began when he “fell into the wrong crowd.” PSI at 7. Most offenses are linked to alcohol abuse. Id. at 4-5, 7. Griess, who was thirty-one years old at the time of his sentencing, has been consistently employed all of his adult life and was highly regarded by his employers. Id. at 8. He has been married to his high school sweetheart for over ten years and the relationship is described as intact and strong. Id. at 7. He “expresses a great deal of remorse for the situation he has put his wife in”. Id. The probation officer found no factors warranting departure. Id. at 9. I repeat, I do not believe a departure of this magnitude is warranted by the facts in this case.2
Second, and more importantly, I dissent because my review of the record in this *1376case, and in other cases, convinces me that the primary reason for upward departure was Griess’s refusal to name his sources, a • reason expressly forbidden by -the guidelines. See U.S.S.G. § 5K1.2, p.s. It appears from this and other cases reviewed by this court that the district court has a practice of sentencing defendants to a severe sentence when the defendants refuse to name their sources. While I may personally agree with such an approach, the guidelines do not permit the practice and district courts should not advance their own sentencing policies if they are contrary to the guidelines. Although I strongly favor preserving the discretion of the district court in sentencing matters, I think we should not support a violation of the express mandates of the guidelines so long as they are in force. I would, therefore, hold that the district court has abused its discretion in the sentence imposed in this case.

. A defendant's criminal history category is determined with reference to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1. If we were to assume that all of Griess’s convictions were adult convictions and that they were less than ten years old, his criminal history category would be only III. This would be calculated as follows: Two points for Griess’s sentence for burglaries. See U.S.S.G. § 4Al.l(b). One point for his sentence for consumption of alcohol and possession of marijuana. See U.S.S.G. § 4Al.l(c). One point for his sentence for driving while intoxicated. Id. No points for violation of probation. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(k). These four points added to the one point for his adult driving while intoxicated conviction result in five points, or a criminal history category of III. See U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, Part A, Sentencing Table. Even if the probation violation were counted, the result would be six points, which is still a criminal history category of III. Id.

. Also, holding a person responsible for outdated acts as a juvenile defies the philosophy of the sentencing guidelines and our system of criminal law. In recognition of the shortcomings of youth, a person is deemed less culpable for his or her juvenile acts. The sentencing guidelines also exclude juvenile acts over ten years old for the reason that the evidence or information concerning the incidents is old and stale. Therefore, I am reluctant to put an inordinate reliance on juvenile acts.