Court Opinion

ID: 9658322
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:55:20.546907+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:53.615143
License: Public Domain

Wilkie, J.
(dissenting in part). I agree with the majority in its reversal of the trial court with respect to the judgment in favor of Luisa Rodriguez. I, too, would reinstate the jury verdict.
*287I disagree, however, with the majority in its affirmance of the trial court with respect to the judgment in favor of Frances Arias. As in the case of Boodry v. Byrne 1 I agree with the majority that the jury verdict setting Mrs. Arias’ general damages at $25,000 was excessive. However, as in Boodry, I dissent here for the reason that in fixing the option at $8,500, or a reduction of $16,500, I believe the trial court has arrived at a figure that is below the range of reasonably debatable amounts for a jury award under the facts of the case, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Here I would follow the procedure set forth in my dissent in Boodry, supra, and raise the amount of the option, first holding that the trial court abused its discretion in setting the amount of the option, and second, determining a reasonable sum (in lieu of the sum fixed by the trial court) as the total amount of the general damage award.
I realize that since Powers 2 there has been no case wherein (1) our court has affirmed a trial court’s finding that a jury award is excessive, and (2) our court has found a sum deemed reasonable by the trial court to be inadequate and below the range of reasonably debatable amounts for a jury award. I would say that this presents just such a case. So, too, did Boodry. In effect, I would rewrite the option, raising the figure to a sum that is within the range of reasonably debatable amounts. To do this requires no modification of the Powers rule, but merely a new and logical refinement for the application of that rule.
The chief criticism of adopting this procedure is the fear that it might invite supreme court review of more jury verdicts. I cannot see how this would be the case. The only instances where the option would be adjusted would be where *288first, the trial court correctly decides that the verdict is excessive, and second, the trial court sets an option amount that is below the range of reasonably debatable amounts. This court, in making its review to ascertain whether an amount set by the trial court falls within the range, at the same time is determining whether, on the contrary, the amount set is below the range. Where the court reaches the latter conclusion, the court should adjust the option and set a reasonable figure. The basic purpose of the Powers rule, i.e., the elimination of unnecessary retrials, would be furthered by following this procedure.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice Hallows joins in this dissent.

 (1964), 22 Wis. (2d) 585, 126 N. W. (2d) 503.

 Powers v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1960), 10 Wis. (2d) 78, 102 N. W. (2d) 393.