Court Opinion

ID: 9738035
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:41:13.931096+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:03.299686
License: Public Domain

VANDE WALLE, Justice,
dissenting.
Except to note that “whether a person left employment ‘voluntarily’ is a mixed question of fact and law, where the evidence must support findings of fact which, in turn, must sustain the conclusion of ‘vol-untariness,’ ” little discussion can be found in the majority opinion of the standard of review applicable in appeals from decisions of administrative agencies. An examination of that standard, which applies to the review conducted by the district court on appeal as well as to this court, reveals that:
“1. We do not make independent findings of fact or substitute our judgment for that of the agency, but determine only whether a reasoning mind could have reasonably determined that the factual conclusions were supported by the weight of the evidence.
“2. We exercise restraint when we review administrative agency findings.
“3. It is not the function of the judiciary to act as a super board when reviewing administrative agency determinations.
“4. We will not substitute our judgment for that of the qualified experts in the administrative agencies.” Skjefte v. Job Service North Dakota, 392 N.W.2d 816, 817 (N.D.1986); Sec. 38-32-19, N.D.C.C.
Furthermore, when this court considers an appeal from a judgment of the district *696court reviewing the decision of an administrative agency, we review the decision of the agency, not the decision of the trial court. Skjefte, supra.
Although it may seem trite to constantly repeat these standards, it apparently is necessary to do so lest we rationalize, expressly or impliedly, that the court should really make the decisions which the Legislature has specified are to be made by the administrative agency.
Applying these standards of review to this case, I would reverse the decision of the district court and affirm the decision of Job Service North Dakota.
As the majority opinion notes, the district court apparently was influenced by this court’s decision in Carlson v. Job Service North Dakota, 391 N.W.2d 643 (N.D.1986). However, Carlson was a far different case from this. Carlson involved an employee who quit because she was told she was being fired for insufficient job performance and, as Justice Meschke, writing for the court, observed at page 646 of the reported decision: “[N]o purpose would be served by constructing a concept of ‘voluntariness’ that requires continuation of the necessarily unpleasant atmosphere between a fired employee and a frustrated supervisor.”
In this instance, however, the employer, Twin City Construction, closed the department in which Wahlstrom, the employee, worked, but nevertheless attempted to keep him employed by finding other work for him to do. We were informed that although this other work involved considerably less skill than was required in his position as a cabinetmaker, Twin City Construction continued to pay him at the same rate he earned while working as a cabinetmaker. I have difficulty in imagining two more different situations. Nor do I deem the statement in Ewert v. Job Service North Dakota, 403 N.W.2d 4 (N.D.1987), that “There may be circumstances where a quit in advance of a layoff would be for ‘good cause attributable to the employer,’ ” as being in any manner prophetic. Rather, it seems to me that it may be very difficult to rationalize a distinction between this case and Ewert in which a worker quit before a planned seasonal layoff. If the planned layoff is the key to these cases, there is no distinction. The only distinction between this case, Ewert, and Carlson is, in my estimation, the reason for the layoff. The concept of “voluntariness” is different for persons who are scheduled for planned layoffs that have nothing to do with job performance and those who quit because they are to be fired for insufficient job performance.
ERICKSTAD, C.J., concurs.