Court Opinion

ID: 9782780
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 19:16:04.734694+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:11.958498
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE BURKE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justice Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion. Justice Freeman specially concurred, with opinion, joined by Justices Thomas and Karmeier. Justice Garman dissented, with opinion, joined by Chief Justice Kilbride. OPINION The single issue in this case is whether claims brought by plaintiff, Kristen Kaufmann (Kaufmann), against Jersey Community Hospital (JCH) are time-barred. Kaufmann initially filed suit against Dr. Roger A. Schroeder (Schroeder) and JCH on December 31, 2007, to recover for injuries suffered during a hospitalization in January 2006. The circuit court of Jersey County found that the one-year limitation period found in section 8 — 101(a) of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Tort Immunity Act or Act) (745 ILCS 10/8 — 101(b) (West 2006)) applied with respect to claims brought against JCH. Because Kaufmann’s suit was filed more than one year from the date of her alleged injuries, the circuit court dismissed the claims against JCH as time-barred. Kaufmann appealed contending that her complaint was timely filed with respect to JCH because she is seeking recovery for injuries “arising out of patient care” and, thus, the two-year statute of limitations in section 8 — 101(b) of the Tort Immunity Act applies. The appellate court affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal order. 396 Ill. App. 3d 729. For reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court. BACKGROUND On December 31, 2007, Kaufmann filed an initial two-count complaint against Schroeder and JCH. She amended the complaint on June 23, 2008. In her amended complaint, consisting of 10 counts, Kaufmann alleged that she had been hospitalized at JCH in January 2006 by Dr. Schroeder, who had been her obstetrician-gynecologist since 2004. Kaufmann further alleged that during her hospitalization she was sedated by Dr. Schroeder for “an unnecessary exam and/or procedure which did not require sedation” and that, after she was sedated, Dr. Schroeder committed a deviant act of a sexual nature on her. Specifically, Kaufmann claimed that, as she began to regain consciousness after being sedated, she became aware that Dr. Schroeder was licking her breasts. As to JCH, Kaufmann’s complaint contained allegations that JCH had been aware that Dr. Schroeder had sexually attacked other patients yet continued to permit him to examine female patients without having a nurse or other staff member present. Kaufmann also alleged that she notified the Illinois State Police of the incident and the police instructed her to refrain from filing suit against Dr. Schroeder until the police were able to collect certain unspecified evidence regarding Dr. Schroeder’s sexual assault of Kaufmann and other patients.1  Counts I through III of the amended complaint were brought against Dr. Schroeder and alleged battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence. Counts IV through X of the amended complaint were brought against JCH and alleged negligent hiring, negligent retention, negligent supervision, “negligence (willful and wanton),” intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress and vicarious liability for the misconduct of Dr. Schroeder as alleged in counts I through III. On July 3, 2008, JCH moved for the dismissal of Kaufmann’s amended complaint, alleging that it was time-barred. The hospital argued that, because it is a municipal corporation, the governing statute of limitations is section 8 — 101(a) of the Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/8 — 101(a) (West 2006)). That provision requires that any suit brought against a local governmental entity be commenced within one year of the date the injury was received or the cause of action accrued. Because Kaufmann filed suit more than one year from the date the injury was received, JCH contended that the cause of action should be dismissed. Kaufmann disagreed. She argued that because her injuries arose out of patient care, the two-year statute of limitations in section 8 — 101(b) of the Act (745 ILCS 10/ 8 — 101(b) (West 2006)) applied and, thus, her complaint was timely. The circuit court granted the hospital’s motion and dismissed counts IV through X of Kaufmann’s complaint. Kaufmann sought reconsideration. However, after a hearing, the circuit court denied plaintiff’s motion and expressly held, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 304(a), that there was no just reason to delay appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 304(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 2006). Plaintiff appealed and on December 8, 2009, the appellate court filed an opinion affirming the circuit court’s dismissal of Kaufmann’s complaint. 396 Ill. App. 3d 729. A majority of the court held that the one-year limitations period applied because “[pllaintiff s injuries arose from Schroeder’s act of sexual gratification, which was clearly separate from her patient care.” 396 Ill. App. 3d at 742. Presiding Justice Myerscough dissented. She agreed with plaintiff that the two-year statute of limitations applied. In her view plaintiffs injuries arose out of patient care because, “This is not a case of sexual assault that just happened to occur in a medical setting. Rather, this is a case of sexual assault that is inextricable from patient’s medical care.” 396 Ill. App. 3d at 744 (Myerscough, EJ., dissenting). We granted plaintiffs petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Feb. 26, 2010). ANALYSIS As noted earlier, the single issue before this court is whether, with regard to JCH, Kaufmann’s complaint was timely filed. JCH is a municipal corporation and, as such, the time period in which a claim may be brought against it is limited by the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act. Section 8 — 101 of the Act, which sets forth the limitation periods, provides in subsection (a): “No civil action other than an action described in subsection (b) may be commenced in any court against a local entity or any of its employees for any injury unless it is commenced within one year from the date that the injury was received or the cause of action accrued.” (Emphasis added.) 745 ILCS 10/8 — 101(a) (West 2006). The exception referred to in subsection (a) and contained in subsection (b) is as follows: “No action for damages for injury or death against any local public entity or public employee, whether based upon tort, or breach of contract, or otherwise, arising out of patient care shall be brought more than 2 years after the date on which the claimant knew, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have known, or received notice in writing of the existence of the injury or death for which damages are sought in the action, whichever of those dates occurs first, but in no event shall such an action be brought more than 4 years after the date on which occurred the act or omission or occurrence alleged in the action to have been the cause of the injury or death.” (Emphasis added.) 745 ILCS 10/8 — 101(b) (West 2006). In the case at bar, JCH argues that the circuit and appellate courts below correctly found that the one-year limitations period in section 8 — 101(a) applied to the seven counts brought against it in Kaufmann’s complaint. Kaufmann, however, contends that the lower courts were incorrect and that the limitations period found in subsection (b) applies because the injuries for which she seeks recovery are injuries arising out of patient care. The ultimate issue before this court, therefore, is whether the injuries for which Kaufmann seeks recovery in her claims against JCH are injuries “arising out of patient care” within the meaning of section 8 — 101(b) of the Act. In the seven counts brought by Kaufmann against JCH, Kaufmann seeks recovery based on various claims of independent negligence by JCH, as well as its vicarious liability for the negligence of its employee, Dr. Schroeder. However, in all instances, Kaufmann seeks recovery for damages based on the injuries she suffered as a result of the sexual battery committed by Dr. Schroeder. Kaufmann concedes this to be so, but contends that the sexual battery occurred during her hospitalization and in the course of her treatment by Dr. Schroeder. Thus, she contends her injuries stemming from the sexual battery arose out of patient care. We disagree. Although we have never interpreted section 8 — 101(b) of the Act, we have interpreted the identical language contained within the limitations provision in section 13— 212 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/13 — 212 (West 2006)), which pertains to civil actions brought against a physician or hospital. See Brucker v. Mercola, 227 Ill. 2d 502 (2007); Orlak v. Loyola University Health System, 228 Ill. 2d 1 (2007). Section 13 — 212 provides: “Except as provided in Section 13 — 215 of this Act [735 ILCS 5/13 — 215], no action for damages for injury or death against any physician, dentist, registered nurse or hospital duly licensed under the laws of this State, whether based upon tort, or breach of contract, or otherwise, arising out of patient care shall he brought more than 2 years after the date on which the claimant knew, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have known, or received notice in writing of the existence of the injury or death for which damages are sought in the action, whichever of such date occurs first, but in no event shall such action be brought more than 4 years after the date on which occurred the act or omission or occurrence alleged in such action to have been the cause of such injury or death.” (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/13 — 212(a) (West 2006). It is entirely appropriate that we should interpret the “arising out of patient care” language contained in subsection (b) of section 8 — 101 of the Tort Immunity Act in conformity with section 13 — 212 because the two provisions were intended to be harmonious. In 2003, the legislature amended the Tort Immunity Act, adding subsection (b) in an effort to bring it in alignment with section 13 — 212. As Representative Hultgren explained, by adding subsection (b), a person who suffers injuries arising out of patient care would not be disadvantaged by a shortened limitations period simply because he or she happened to obtain treatment at a public facility rather than a private one. See 93d Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, April 15, 2003, at 7-8 (statements of Representative Hultgren). Turning to our previous interpretation of the “arising out of patient care” language, we first look to Brucker. In Brucker, this court concluded that an injury arises out of patient care if the injury is causally connected to the patient’s medical care and treatment. See Brucker, 227 Ill. 2d at 523. Although we agreed that “arising out of patient care” was to be construed broadly, we emphasized that our interpretation was not so broad as to encompass “but for” causation. Brucker, 227 Ill. 2d at 523-24. Similarly, in Orlak, this court reiterated that “arising out of patient care” did not encompass “but for” causation. Rather, it meant that the injury had “ ‘[t]o originate; to stem (from),’ or ‘to result (from)’ ” the patient’s medical care or treatment. See Orlak, 228 Ill. 2d at 14-15 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 115 (8th ed. 2004)). In the case before this court, Kaufmann did not allege that she was injured because of the medical treatment she received. In other words, she did not claim that the “unnecessary” exam and sedation she received during her hospitalization harmed her in any way. Rather, the harm resulted from the sexual assault. The sedation that was given and the “unnecessary” exam (if one was, in fact, performed) were not part of Kaufmann’s medical treatment, but simply a means by which Schroeder was able to accomplish his sexual assault on Kaufmann. In sum, we find that Kaufmann’s injury arose out of Dr. Schroeder’s sexual assault and not any medical care she received from him. The sexual assault, itself, was not medical care, nor was there even any pretense that Dr. Schroeder’s sexual acts were necessitated by, or in any way related to, the medical care he was providing to Kaufmann. There was no suggestion by Schroeder that there existed a medical reason for his actions. CONCLUSION Kaufmann’s injury did not arise from patient care. For this reason, subsection (b) of the Tort Immunity Act, containing the two-year limitations period for injuries “arising out of patient care,” is inapplicable and, thus, the claims brought against JCH were properly dismissed as time-barred. For the reasons stated, the appellate court judgment is affirmed. Affirmed.   This factual allegation was made in relation to Kaufmann’s alternative argument before the appellate court that, if the one-year statute of limitations in section 8 — 101(a) of the Tort Immunity Act applied, the limitations period should be equitably tolled because she was prevented from filing her civil suit while the criminal investigation was pending. The appellate court found no basis for tolling the statute of limitations because Schroeder was indicted in May 2006, which left Kaufmann more than six months to file her claims against JCH before the one-year limitations period expired. 396 Ill. App. 3d at 743. Kaufmann does not raise equitable tolling as an issue in her appeal before this court.