Court Opinion

ID: 9753987
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:37:28.772593+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:46.225096
License: Public Domain

CLIFFORD, J.,
dissenting.
I subscribe generally to the Court’s position on insurance carrier liability under circumstances, in which, as here, the carrier casts its insured adrift. Furthermore, on the issue of reasonableness of a settlement negotiated by a forsaken insured with an injured claimant, I agree that the burden of going forward with the evidence should be on the insured, with the ultimate burden of proof remaining on the carrier.
*371However, in this case I would hold the settlement entered into by Griggs and Bertram to be of no effect as a matter of law. The record as it presently stands is of course incomplete on all the details of the settlement, but it is sufficient for me to conclude without hesitation that the settlement was an utter sham, a transparent device conjured up by the parties thereto for the sole purpose of euchring the insurance company. The Court recognizes the cloud hovering over the settlement, see ante at 368-369, but views that cloud simply as raising a question of fact on whether the parties were in cahoots. I harbor no doubts on the issue.
Bertram agreed, on the advice of counsel, to let judgment for $9000 be taken against him. He had coverage with Franklin Mutual Insurance Company for $100,000. Inasmuch as Griggs promised not to pursue Bertram personally and indeed promised to furnish Bertram with a warrant for satisfaction of judgment no matter what the outcome of the claim against the insurance company, it mattered not to Bertram whether the settlement was for $9000 or $90,000. His indifference in this regard is manifested by the fact that he consented to a judgment against him without having obtained depositions or even a physical examination of Griggs. (Any claims adjuster paying $9000 without a physical examination report in the file, on a claim ostensibly involving a couple of exuberant high school youngsters having at each other after a basketball game, would swiftly join the ranks of the unemployed.)
Under the circumstances the settlement before us can hardly be deemed to have been entered into in good faith. I would therefore leave the parties to this shabby transaction just where the law found them. I vote to reverse and enter judgment for defendant.
For affirmance in part and reversal in part — Chief Justice WILENTZ and Justices PASHMAN, SCHREIBER, HANDLER, POLLOCK and O’HERN — 6.
For reversal — Justice CLIFFORD — 1.