Court Opinion

ID: 9396433
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-22 16:08:19.872539+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:16.938772
License: Public Domain

J-S15008-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :
 LAMONT CRADLE                            :
                                          :
                   Appellant              :   No. 1558 MDA 2022

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 21, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-41-CR-0001369-2020

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                               FILED: MAY 22, 2023

     Lamont Cradle appeals from his judgment of sentence of four and one-

half to nine years of imprisonment followed by twelve months of reentry

supervision after a jury convicted him of delivery of a controlled substance

and criminal use of a communication facility. We affirm.

     The trial court offered the following summary of the history of this case:

     [Appellant] was charged with counts of delivery of fentanyl and
     criminal use of a communication facility in Lycoming County on
     two separate dates: August 30, 2019 and September 24, 2019.
     The deliveries were made to a police informant involved in
     controlled buys. The confidential informant (“CI”), who testified
     at trial, was socially familiar with [Appellant]. . . .

           The . . . CI testified that he was arrested for a third offense
     DUI in 2018. He decided to cooperate with the police to gain some
     benefit on his pending case. He eventually met with Trooper
     Edward Dammer in February 2019. He told Trooper Dammer that
     he could buy drugs from individuals on the street as he was in an
     active addiction for oxycontin and heroin. He agreed to make
J-S15008-23

     controlled buys for the police. He mentioned [Appellant] as a
     potential seller and stated he could purchase from [Appellant].

           In the September 24, 2019 transaction, the CI set up a deal
     to buy heroin from [Appellant], who he knew by the nickname
     “Mont.” [Appellant] was going to sell $70 worth of heroin to the
     CI. [Appellant] told the CI to meet him in Lock Haven.

           On this occasion, Trooper Dammer got into the backseat of
     the CI’s vehicle and they drove to the Lock Haven area to meet
     “Mont,” the [Appellant].

          The CI corresponded with [Appellant] by cell phone text
     messages. Trooper Dammer photographed the text messages.
     [Appellant] texted the meeting place to the CI, who with Trooper
     Dammer in the back seat, went and picked up [Appellant].

            [Appellant] got into the vehicle and sat in the front
     passenger seat. [Appellant] was uneasy with someone else being
     in the vehicle with the CI and [Appellant] instructed the CI to drive
     to the Weis Market in Lock Haven.

           The CI and [Appellant] then left the vehicle and they went
     into the restroom at the Weis Market where [Appellant] sold
     heroin/fentanyl to the CI.          Apparently, [Appellant] was
     uncomfortable with the fact that a third party, the trooper,
     observed him, and he asked the CI if he was setting [Appellant]
     up. Despite the uneasiness, [Appellant] completed the sale to the
     CI. [Appellant] then left the restroom and walked away from the
     CI, who returned to the vehicle.

            . . . [B]oth Trooper Dammer and the CI unequivocally
     identified [Appellant] as “Mont” and as the individual involved in
     the delivery of fentanyl on September 24, 2019.

          [Appellant] did not testify in his defense.      On cross-
     examination, defense counsel elicited testimony from the CI that
     he was addicted to heroin and that he was getting drugs from
     [Appellant] in the summer of 2019 — May, June and July.

           [Appellant] entered a stipulation with the Commonwealth
     that [Appellant] was incarcerated in the Lycoming County Prison
     from April 10, 2019 to July 22, 2019, to dispute the CI’s assertion

                                     -2-
J-S15008-23

     that he was buying heroin from [Appellant] in the time frame from
     May through July 2019.

          On re-direct, the CI explained that the transactions must
     have occurred before [Appellant] went to jail.

           In defense, [Appellant] called Gregory White, who noted
     that [Appellant] is his nephew and they are very close. He had
     contact with [Appellant] in September 2019 and on November 28,
     2019, for a Thanksgiving dinner.

           Mr. White was shown Commonwealth Exhibit 2, a
     photograph of [Appellant], which the Commonwealth used at trial
     in identifying [Appellant]. The photograph was obtained by
     Trooper Dammer and was a Pennsylvania Identification
     photograph of [Appellant]. Trooper Dammer testified that he
     obtained the photograph so that they would have a photograph of
     who “Mont” was.

           Mr. White testified that he went to a baseball game with
     [Appellant] in August 2019 and that on November 28, 2019 his
     wife took photographs of [Appellant]. [Appellant] introduced the
     photographs into evidence as [Appellant] Exhibits 1, 2, and 3.
     Mr. White testified [Appellant] was heavier in the time period of
     the photos and that his hair was in long dreads. The court
     permitted the defense to show the photographs to the jury.

          Defense    counsel   had    Mr.  White   examine    the
     Commonwealth’s photograph, Commonwealth Exhibit 2, and
     Mr. White opined that in August, September, and November of
     2019, [Appellant] appeared as he was depicted in the defense
     photographs.

            On cross-examination, Mr. White acknowledged that the
     individual in Commonwealth Exhibit 2, as well as defense exhibits
     1, 2, and 3, were all photographs of [Appellant].

           On rebuttal, the Commonwealth recalled Trooper Dammer,
     who testified that Commonwealth Exhibit 2 was not taken in
     August or September of 2019. Trooper Dammer further testified
     that his identification of [Appellant] was based on his observations
     of [Appellant]’s face when he entered the CI’s vehicle. Trooper
     Dammer noted that [Appellant] looked directly at him and that
     [Appellant] was within 18 inches in fro[nt] of his face.

                                    -3-
J-S15008-23

Trial Court Opinion, 11/4/22, at 4-7 (cleaned up).

       Appellant proceeded to a jury trial on February 24, 2022.       The jury

convicted Appellant of one count of each offense in connection with the

September delivery, but found him not guilty on the charges as to the alleged

August sale. Appellant was sentenced as indicated above on April 21, 2022.

On May 11, 2022, he filed an untimely post-sentence motion that the trial

court subsequently deemed to be filed nunc pro tunc.             Following oral

amendment and argument, the trial court denied the motion by order filed

November 4, 2022. This appeal followed.1

       Appellant presents two questions for our consideration:

       I.     Whether the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence
              of all the elements of the charged offense, such that he
              could be proven guilty of delivery of a controlled substance
              beyond a reasonable doubt.

       II.    Whether Appellant’s conviction is against the weight of the
              evidence, in that the Commonwealth failed to produce
              physical evidence of the buy and there was insufficient
              circumstantial evidence.

____________________________________________

1  Pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(3)(a), Appellant’s post-sentence motion
was denied by operation of law on September 8, 2022, and the thirty-day
appeal period began to run on that date. Appellant did not file this appeal
until November 7, 2022. However, since the clerk of courts did not enter and
serve an order to that effect in accordance with Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(3)(c),
and the trial court informed Appellant that he had thirty days after the
November 4, 2022 order denying the post-sentence motion to file his appeal,
we conclude that this appeal is properly before us. See Commonwealth v.
Khalil, 806 A.2d 415, 421 (Pa.Super. 2002) (exercising jurisdiction over the
merits of an appeal where a similar “breakdown of the processes of the trial
court that caused [the a]ppellant’s untimely appeal”).

                                           -4-
J-S15008-23

Appellant’s brief at 7.

       The following legal principles govern our review of Appellant’s claim that

the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions:

       The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
       is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light
       most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence
       to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond
       a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh
       the evidence and substitute our judgment for a fact-finder. In
       addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by
       the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of
       innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be
       resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and
       inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be
       drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth
       may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime
       beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
       evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record
       must be evaluated and all evidence received must be considered.
       Finally, the trier of fact, while passing upon the credibility of
       witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to
       believe all, part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Haahs, 289 A.3d 100, 104 n.2 (Pa.Super. 2022) (cleaned

up).

       Appellant asserts that “[i]n this case, the issue was identity, and the

Commonwealth failed to produce enough circumstantial evidence to convict

Appellant[.]” Appellant’s brief at 15. Specifically, Appellant argues that: (1)

“[t]he Commonwealth relied solely on an outdated picture in order to identify

‘Mont,’” (2) Trooper Dammer did not record details of his interaction with

“Mont” when they were in different parts of the same vehicle, (3) the CI

alleged that he bought drugs from Appellant at a time Appellant was

                                      -5-
J-S15008-23

incarcerated, (4) Trooper Dammer did not adequately control the controlled

buy, and (5) the Commonwealth failed to connect Appellant with the phone

number, car, or pre-recorded funds used in the buys. Id. at 13-16.

      Appellant’s arguments essentially suggest that the jury should have

weighed    the   evidence   differently   and    acquitted   him   because    the

Commonwealth did not present all conceivable forms of evidence to preclude

any possibility of Appellant’s innocence. Such is contrary to our standard of

review. See Haahs, supra at 104 n.2.

      Both the CI and Trooper Dammer, who had a full and clear opportunity

to view the seller of fentanyl on September 24, 2019, identified Appellant as

that man.     See N.T. Trial, 2/24/22, at 69-70, 164-65, 178-79, 194.

Additionally, Trooper Robert Williamson, who assisted in the surveillance of

the September delivery, also identified Appellant as the person who got into

the car with the CI and Trooper Dammer. Id. at 143-48.

      The testimony of any one of those witnesses was sufficient evidence to

establish Appellant’s identity as “Mont.”       See, e.g., Commonwealth v.

Johnson, 180 A.3d 474, 481 (Pa.Super. 2018) (“[T]he uncorroborated

testimony of a single witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction for a criminal

offense[.]”); Commonwealth v. Trinidad, 96 A.3d 1031, 1038 (Pa.Super.

2014) (observing that “a positive identification by one witness is sufficient for

conviction” and rejecting challenges to identification evidence that “relate to

                                      -6-
J-S15008-23

the weight of the evidence, not to its sufficiency”).         Thus, Appellant’s

sufficiency challenges merit no relief.

      Appellant next asserts that, even if we find that the evidence was

sufficient, “the verdict was against the weight of the evidence based on [the]

evidentiary flaws demonstrated in the previous argument.” Appellant’s brief

at 18.   He further posits that, since “[t]he jury clearly did not believe the

circumstantial evidence based on it finding Appellant not guilty of the August

30, 2019 delivery,” the guilty verdict for the September 24, 2019 delivery

should shock the conscience of the court[.]” Id.

      The following law applies to our review of Appellant’s weight claim:

      A motion for a new trial based on a claim that the verdict is against
      the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the
      trial court. A new trial should not be granted because of a mere
      conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same facts
      would have arrived at a different conclusion. Rather, the role of
      the trial judge is to determine that notwithstanding all the facts,
      certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them
      or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice.

      An appellate court’s standard of review when presented with a
      weight of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard of review
      applied by the trial court. Appellate review of a weight claim is a
      review of the exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question
      of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Arias, 286 A.3d 341, 352 (Pa.Super. 2022) (cleaned up).

Consequently, our task is to determine whether the trial court, in rejecting

Appellant’s weight challenge, “abused its discretion by reaching a manifestly

unreasonable judgment, misapplying the law, or basing its decision on

                                      -7-
J-S15008-23

partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049,

1056 (Pa. 2013) (cleaned up).

      The trial court observed that an acquittal as to any given charge “cannot

be interpreted as a specific finding in relation to some of the evidence.” Trial

Court Opinion, 11/4/22, at 8 (citing, inter alia, Commonwealth v. Moore,

103 A.3d 1240, 1246 (Pa. 2014) (“[J]ury acquittals may not be interpreted as

specific factual findings with regard to the evidence, as an acquittal does not

definitively establish that the jury was not convinced of a defendant’s guilt.

Rather, it has been the understanding of federal courts as well as the courts

of this Commonwealth that an acquittal may merely show lenity on the jury’s

behalf, or that the verdict may have been the result of compromise, or of a

mistake on the part of the jury.” (cleaned up)). The court opined that the CI’s

identification of Appellant, additionally corroborated by Trooper Dammer as to

the September delivery, was sufficient to convince it beyond a reasonable

doubt as to that incident, and that the “verdict did not shock the court’s

conscience.” Id. at 9.

      The trial court accurately stated the law. See, e.g., Moore, supra at

1246; Commonwealth v. Talbert, 129 A.3d 536, 545 (Pa.Super. 2015) (“An

acquittal cannot be interpreted as a specific finding in relation to some of the

evidence.” (cleaned up)).     Furthermore, nothing in the certified record

suggests that the court’s failure to find its conscience shocked is a result of

manifestly unreasonable judgment or an improper motive. Accordingly, we

                                     -8-
J-S15008-23

have no cause to disturb the trial court’s denial of a new trial based upon the

weight of the evidence.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 5/22/2023

                                     -9-