Court Opinion

ID: 9739222
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:10:49.45966+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:10.761625
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE LYTTON, dissenting: I agree with the majority that Johannsen v. General Foods Corp. (1986), 146 Ill. App. 3d 296, 496 N.E.2d 544, does not require the automatic admission of requested facts if a party’s response is filed late. The majority makes clear that this district is not bound by an irreducible, broad rule allowing for no discretion. However, after liberating the trial court from the strictures of "no discretion,” the majority clamps the shackles back on the trial judge by imposing a strict requirement of "just cause” onto the court’s discretion. The majority still does not trust the trial court to act appropriately. I would give the trial courts of this State meaningful discretion to manage their own dockets, insure justice, control discovery and make certain that a litigant is not unduly punished for a practitioner’s error. The majority relies on Supreme Court Rule 183 (134 Ill. 2d R. 183) to find its good cause exception. I believe a more fundamental analysis is appropriate. It is generally accepted in the more recent case law that requests for admissions are a discovery tool like other methods of discovery, such as interrogatories and depositions. (See Smoot v. Knott (1990), 200 Ill. App. 3d 1082, 1097, 558 N.E.2d 794; Homer G. Dickson & Co. v. Barraza (1983), 115 Ill. App. 3d 5, 7, 449 N.E.2d 990; Bluestein v. Upjohn Co. (1981), 102 Ill. App. 3d 672, 677-78, 430 N.E.2d 580; Illinois State Toll Highway Authority v. Humphrey Estate (1978), 62 Ill. App. 3d 316, 326, 379 N.E.2d 626.) The majority also appears to accept the premise that requests for admissions are a discovery tool. Indeed, the historical and practice notes to Supreme Court Rule 216 (134 Ill. 2d R. 216) make this clear. The introductory paragraph indicates that requests for admission are "a discovery device,” and the discussion under paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) of Rule 216 relate them to other discovery rules. See Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 110A, par. 216, Historical & Practice Notes, at 366-67 (Smith-Hurd 1985). In this case and, I am convinced, in many cases, the late filing of responses to requests for admissions is the responsibility of the party’s attorney who has no "just cause” under the Rule 183 standard. This problem affects plaintiffs and defendants equally, but it can be resolved through traditional methods. By treating a request for admissions as a discovery tool, the trial court would have, under its broad, inherent discretionary power to prevent injustice, the ability to allow a late filing when it deems appropriate. (Bluestein, 102 Ill. App. 3d 672, 430 N.E.2d 580.) Bluestein quotes with approval the trial court’s statement that "[I]f I were to find those requests have been admitted by a lawyer’s carelessness, without more, I would be depriving a party of his right to a trial by jury on a basic issue of this case.” 102 Ill. App. 3d at 678. I agree with the reasoning in Bluestein that the trial courts of this State should have the power to control discovery, whether confronting dilatory admissions, answers to interrogatories, requests for production of documents, or any of the myriad of discovery techniques available to practitioners. In the recent case of Sohaey v. Van Cura (1994), 158 Ill. 2d 375, our supreme court reviewed Rule 220 (134 Ill. 2d R. 220) requirements for disclosure of witnesses. The language of Rule 220 mandates the disqualification of an expert witness who is not disclosed prior to 60 days before trial. When the plaintiff’s witness was not disclosed in a timely manner, the trial court barred the witness. The appellate court reversed (Sohaey v. Van Cura (1992), 240 Ill. App. 3d 266), and the supreme court affirmed the appellate court. The supreme court found that the trial court should have exercised its discretion. "[F]or Rule 220 to serve the purpose for which this court adopted it, trial courts must have the discretion to impose sanctions other than outright disqualification for technical violations.” Sohaey, 158 Ill. 2d at 383. Similarly, the purpose and intent of admissions under Rule 216 is to narrow issues, not to eliminate them. (See Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 110A, par. 216, Committee Comments, Historical & Practice Notes, Introduction, at 366 (Smith-Hurd 1985).) Requests for admissions are a discovery tool used to refine and focus a case, and to reduce the cost and length of litigation. See Wintersteen v. National Cooperage & Woodenware Co. (1935), 361 Ill. 95, 108, 197 N.E. 578. In this thoughtful analysis in Smoot v. Knott (1990), 200 Ill. App. 3d 1082, 558 N.E.2d 794, Justice Chapman found the sound discretion of the trial court is the correct standard to apply here. His review of appellate court decisions on this issue is exhaustive and needs no further examination by this court. I resist, however, the great temptation to follow Justice Chapman’s suggestions as to how a trial court should proceed in exercising its discretion. Instead, I believe the trial court should review all of the circumstances surrounding the late filing and should consider, among other things: (1) prejudice to the opposing party; (2) centrality of the issues presented; (3) the length of the delay; (4) whether the delay was caused by inadvertence or deliberate act; (5) any burden caused by the delay; (6) just cause, if any, for the delay; (7) repeated tardy conduct by the party or attorney; and (8) timeliness of the actions of the party seeking relief. In the instant case, justice and truth would be better served in allowing the responses to the request for admissions to be filed. A trial judge has the inherent power to manage his or her court so that justice is served. Any expenses incurred by the requesting party can be levied against the delinquent party if appropriate. Such a rule allows all issues to be considered in allowing late responses or in determining when and whether to impose costs, fees or other sanctions. This standard is in concert with our Supreme Court Rule 2 (134 Ill. 2d R. 2) and section 1—102 of the Civil Practice Law (735 ILCS 5/1—102 (West 1992)), which encourage courts to reach the substantive rights of the parties. To have substantive issues eliminated or skewed by admissions deemed to be true that are not in fact true because an attorney is one day late in a response seems the grossest kind of perversion of the discovery process. The purpose of discovery is, after all, the "full disclosure” of facts that help to expedite "the ascertainment of the truth and ultimate disposition of the lawsuit.” Monier v. Chamberlain (1966), 35 Ill. 2d 351, 361, 221 N.E.2d 410. I would reverse.