Court Opinion

ID: 9794224
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:01:28.372321+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:13:03.241670
License: Public Domain

LANE, Vice Presiding Judge:
concurring in result.
The appellant has raised valid propositions of error in addition to those addressed by the majority. Because this case has been reversed and remanded for new trial, these assertions should be addressed to provide guidance to the trial court.
Appellant alleges, and I agree, that his conviction was improper because the trial court allowed irrelevant and prejudicial comments by the prosecutor and witnesses into evidence, over objections of counsel, without admonishing the jury. Although the trial court generally has the discretion to ascertain the relevance of the evidence, Behrens v. State, 699 P.2d 156, 158 (Okl.Cr.1985), abuse of such discretion is grounds for reversal. Id. The instant facts unmistakably require reversal, as the testimony allowed into evidence totally lacks probative value.
Appellant first complains of the testimony of juvenile case worker, Patricia Bilyeu. In response to the prosecutor’s questions, and after being ruled an expert witness, Miss Bilyeu speculated that, “if he [Appellant] were to walk out of here without any assistance in dealing with things ... I do believe this very same thing could happen ... again.” Tr. 15, 16.
*846This evidence is irrelevant on its face. The statutory definition of “relevant evidence” is “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” 12 O.S. 1981, § 2401. Also see, Behrens v. State, 699 P.2d 156 (Okl.Cr.1985); President v. State, 602 P.2d 222 (Okl.Cr.1979). Clearly, the witness’ testimony as to the appellant’s future conduct is speculative and has no probative value. In no way does it make the material fact at issue, whether appellant committed First Degree Murder (21 O.S.1981, 701.7(C)), more or less probable. Behrens, at 158. To permit this type of evidence could cause a defendant to be convicted for what he might do rather than for what he has done. Such testimony may be admissible in the sentencing stage of a murder in the first degree trial, but it is not admissible in the guilt stage. See Brewer v. State, 650 P.2d 54 (Okl.Cr.1982).
Appellant also complains of the testimony of psychiatrist Hamilton. Because Hamilton’s testimony was similar to Miss Bilyeu’s, the same reasoning applies. Therefore, it was error to allow this testimony due to a complete lack of relevance.
For the foregoing reasons, I find the trial court abused its discretion in allowing irrelevant and prejudicial testimony. I therefore concur that this case is REVERSED and REMANDED FOR A NEW TRIAL consistent with this opinion.