Court Opinion

ID: 9718886
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:37:08.154872+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:03.276361
License: Public Domain

MONTGOMERY, Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
I must respectfully dissent as to the order for a new trial. I find no basis in the record for the holding by my Brethren that the trial court committed error in its findings and verdict with respect to damages. It is asserted in the Majority Opinion that the lower court misunderstood the term “actual cash value”. The record clearly refutes such a conclusion.
The lower court cited and correctly explained Fedas v. Insurance Company of Pennsylvania, 300 Pa. 555, 151 A. 285 (1930), which is the lead case in our Commonwealth defining what is meant by “actual cash value”. The lower court recognized the distinction between “market value” and “ac*229tual cash value” enunciated by our Supreme Court in that case.1
Of course the lower court, sitting without a jury, is given quite broad discretion in fixing damages in a case such as this.2 I can find no abuse of that discretion in the award of damages in the amount of $23,500.00. The amount of that verdict seems fair and reasonable in light of the evidence presented and I believe that no ground exists for disturbing it on this appeal.
I note my agreement with my Brethren in the Majority that there is no merit in any of the remaining contentions offered by either of the parties in their separate appeals in this case. However, I must dissent as to the order for a new trial. I would affirm the order of the lower court.

. This distinction was recently reiterated by the Federal District Court in Commercial Union Assurance Co. v. Pucci, 523 F.Supp. 1310 (W.D.Pa.1981).

. The trial court’s findings, which were approved by the court en banc, carry the same weight as a jury verdict. Darlington Brick and Clay Products Co. v. Aino, 225 Pa.Super. 186, 187, 310 A.2d 401, 402 (1973).