Court Opinion

ID: 9661499
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:40:26.427423+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:29.238933
License: Public Domain

DIXON, Chief Justice
(concurring!).
It was my intention not to participate in this appeal, for I was the Judge of the 95th District Court when the case was originally tried. However our Supreme Court in an opinion by Chief Justice Gaines has made this holding: “The grounds of disqualification of the judges of the courts in this state are specified in the constitution, and they are exclusive of all others; and the fact that a judge may have tried the case in a lower court, or participated in the decision in such court, is not made one of them. Const, art. 5, § 11; Taylor v. Williams, 26 Tex. 583. Therefore we are clearly of the opinion that Judge Williams was not only not disqualified, but that, since Judge Brown and myself could not agree
upon a decision of the case, it was his duty to act.” Galveston & H. Inv. Co. v. Grymes, 94 Tex. 609, 64 S.W. 778. Since my colleagues have not been able to agree as to the proper disposition of the appeal it now becomes my duty to act notwithstanding my reluctance to do so. The parties at interest are entitled to have this court render a decision on the appeal and my participation furnishes the only method by which a disposition can be accomplished. Burrage v. Hunt Production Co., Tex.Civ. App., 114 S.W.2d 1228.
I agree with Justice Cramer as to the disposition of the appeal.
It is of course well settled in Texas that a recovery of damages will not be allowed for fright or nervous shock or mental suffering alone. Harned v. E-Z Finance Co., Tex.Sup., 254 S.W.2d 81.
However it is equally well settled in this state that a recovery of damages will be allowed when physical injuries such as headaches, vomiting spells, loss of weight, fatigue, blackouts, or derangement of the nervous system, have been proximately ■caused by fright or nervous shock induced by negligent or intentional misconduct, though there may not have been any actual physical contact or impact. In a comparatively recent case our Supreme Court has again so held in an opinion in which the subject is discussed at some length, and numerous authorities are cited, many of them Texas cases. Houston Electric Co. v. Dorsett, 145 Tex. 95, 194 S.W.2d 546. Also see Levine v. Trammell, Tex.Civ.App., 41 S.W.2d 334, Ref.; St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Murdock, 54 Tex.Civ.App. 249, 116 SW. 139, Ref.; Hendrix v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 40 Tex.Civ.App. 291, 89 S.W. 461; Yoakum v. Kroeger, Tex.Civ.App., 27 S.W. 953.
Justice Cramer is undoubtedly correct in his statement that upon appellant’s refusal to agree to a remittitur I as trial judge might have set the judgment aside and granted a new trial, but that I did not have authority to reduce the amount of appellant’s judgment. My action in reducing the amount of the judgment was an error against appellant of which he is entitled to complain on appeal.
Of course this court too has authority to suggest a remittitur, and if appellant refuses, this court may reverse and remand the case for another trial. I still believe the verdict was excessive. Justice Cramer also thinks that it was. Therefore I agree that if appellant refuses to agree to the nemittitur the case will be reversed and remanded.