Court Opinion

ID: 9596428
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:49:32.101938+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:34.501331
License: Public Domain

CARLEY, Justice,
dissenting.
The majority adopts the standard of appellate review set forth in Brown v. State, 250 Ga. 66, 71-72 (2) (c) (295 SE2d 727) (1982), which. is applicable to a jury’s finding of sanity in a criminal case, rather than to a finding of competency to stand trial. It does so, based in part, on a Texas court’s opinion that a proceeding to determine competency to stand trial is “quasi-criminal.” To the contrary, however, it is well settled in Georgia that “[a] competency trial ‘ “is in the nature of a civil proceeding and the defendant has the burden to prove incompetency by a preponderance of the evidence. (Cit.)” (Cit.)’ [Cit.]” Stowe v. State, 272 Ga. 866, 867 (2) (536 SE2d 506) (2000). Nevertheless, because the presumption of competence remains even after the introduction of evidence in rebuttal, I do not disagree with the general conclusion in Division 1 of the majority opinion that the proper standard of appellate review under Georgia law is whether, “after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could have found that the defendant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was incompetent to stand trial. [Cit.]”Maj. op. p. 391. See also Nagel v. State, 262 Ga. 888, 892 (2) (b) (427 SE2d 490) (1993) (a civil proceeding). I do not, however, agree with the majority’s specific application of that standard to the evidence as set forth in Division 2. Accordingly, I dissent to the reversal of the Court of Appeals’ judgment in this case.
*394In determining that a rational trier of fact could not have found that Sims failed to prove his incompetency by a preponderance of the evidence, the majority chooses to ignore extensive case law derived from Brown over the period of more than two decades since it was decided. Under the clear and consistent holdings of this Court, the jury may still rely on the presumption of sanity or competency, each of which arises from OCGA § 16-2-3, and the jury’s determination that the defendant w¿s sane or competent should be upheld, “unless the proof of insanity [or incompetence] is overwhelming. [Cit.]” (Emphasis in original.) Rodriguez v. State, 271 Ga. 40, 42-43 (1) (518 SE2d 131) (1999). See also Whitner v. State, 276 Ga. 742, 745 (6) (584 SE2d 247) (2003); Boswell v. State, 275 Ga. 689, 691 (2) (572 SE2d 565) (2002).
Furthermore, the jury is not bound by the opinions of expert witnesses regarding a defendant’s mental state, but may instead decide what credibility and weight to give those opinions. Boswell v. State, supra. Here, Sims’ only expert was Michael Singletary, a mental retardation specialist who wanted to perform psychological testing, but who actually never evaluated or even met Sims. Singletary’s testimony of a high probability of incompetence based solely on Sims’ reported IQ may be sufficient to require that a competency hearing be conducted but, as the majority itself recognizes, it is not determinative of his ability to stand trial. See Holloway v. State, 257 Ga. 620-621 (1), (2) (361 SE2d 794) (1987). The court-appointed psychologist, Dr. Michael Shapiro, testified that Sims was competent in his knowledge of the charges against him, but was incompetent to participate or assist in his own defense, primarily because he would be unable to withstand cross-examination.
The expert testimony of Singletary and Dr. Shapiro was not undisputed. “Evidence conflicting with the conclusions reached by [these two] experts includes the presumption of [competency] but does not stop there.” Harris v. State, 256 Ga. 350, 355 (6) (349 SE2d 374) (1986). The State called Dr. Suzanne Canning, a psychiatrist who examined Sims and found that he was competent to stand trial because, as the majority summarizes, he “was aware of the charges against him, understood the consequences if convicted, and had the capacity to work with his attorney on his defense.” Maj. op. p. 392. In Dr. Canning’s opinion, Sims was capable of testifying in his own defense. Although Dr. Canning also recognized that having him testify may not be wise, the majority acknowledges that the capacity to testify if necessary to defense strategy is only one of many factors in determining a defendant’s ability to assist in his defense. As this Court unanimously held just four years ago,
*395Decided June 6, 2005.
Jo Carol Nesset-Sale, Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, John W. Bonds, Jr., Sidney L. Moore III, for appellant.
Kenneth W. Mauldin, District Attorney, Brian V. Patterson, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
the trier of fact is not necessarily bound by any one factor. [Cit.] “ ‘Ordinarily, the sufficiency of the reasons given by witnesses for their opinion [s] as to a person’s sanity or insanity cannot be determined as a matter of law by the court, but is a question for the jury.’ (Cits.)” [Cit.] Where a defendant cannot satisfy all of the ... functions or... factors which are used to assess competency, the question for the factfinder is whether “enough are satisfied to allow the trial to go forward.” [Cit.]
Stowe v. State, supra at 868-869 (2). Therefore, this case is clearly distinguishable from those in which “ ‘there was no contrary expert testimony tending to rebut the defendant’s’ ” experts. Barge v. State, 256 Ga. App. 560, 564 (2) (568 SE2d 841) (2002). Even extensive expert evidence introduced by the defendant does not demand a finding of incompetence where, as here, the State presents at least some conflicting expert testimony. See Brown v. State, 246 Ga. App. 60, 67 (4) (539 SE2d 545) (2000).
Assuming that the evidence of incompetence to stand trial “was strong, particularly the expert testimony, it was not overwhelming.” Wilson v. State, 257 Ga. 444, 450 (11) (359 SE2d 891) (1987). Therefore, the jury was “authorized to rely on the presumption of [competency] in OCGA § 16-2-3 because the evidence of [incompetence] was not overwhelming. [Cit.]” Stanley v. State, 242 Ga. App. 597, 598 (1) (530 SE2d 506) (2000). If the evidence is reviewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, it is clear that a rational trier of fact certainly could have found that Sims failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was incompetent to stand trial. The majority simply substitutes its finding of incompetency for the contrary finding reached by the jury. That is not proper application of the appellate standard of review, but a usurpation of the fact-finding function. As the evidence of Sims’ incompetence “was hardly overwhelming,” the judgment entered by the trial court on “the jury’s verdict [should] be affirmed. [Cit.]” Whitner v. State, supra.
I am authorized to state that Justice Thompson and Justice Hines join in this dissent.
*396Bondurant, Mixson & Elmore, Michael B. Terry, Sarah M. Shalf, Sabrina D. Rhinehart, James C. Bonner, Jr., amici curiae.