Court Opinion

ID: 9680237
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:27:12.454744+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:57.424163
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
PER CURIAM.
On motion for rehearing, Angelina states Dickens died on August 11, 2003, more *394than a year after he gave his deposition testimony. Angelina says the cases cited by this Court on witness competency “almost all involved situations where the trial court had an opportunity to observe the witness.” Angelina argues “[bjecause Dickens is dead, the trial court will not have the opportunity to observe him with an eye toward his ability to perceive, recall, and relate events.”
The record includes clear deposition testimony from Dickens and a judicial finding by the probate court that Dickens retained capacity to make testamentary dispositions and to vote, despite that court’s review of the medical records. The trial court must determine whether, at the time the events occurred, the witness was capable of intelligently perceiving the events, and whether at the time the witness was called to testify- — here, at the time Dickens gave his deposition testimony — the witness possessed the ability to recall the events and narrate adequately that recollection. The issue of witness competency was not presented to the trial court at the time Dickens testified by deposition — although the partial deposition transcript indicates Angelina had the medical report at that time — and the trial court therefore did not have the opportunity to observe him. On remand the trial court may consider additional evidence to clarify the records and the issue of Dickens’ competency as a witness at the relevant times.
Angelina says the best evidence of Dickens’ competency at his deposition would be “the medical findings, judicial findings, and the deposition testimony in the record.”1 The records will be helpful to the trial court. However, additional information, such as clarification from the reporting expert who examined and treated Dickens, Dickens’ colleagues’ observations,2 or other reliable information presumably will be available to clarify the issue of Dickens’ competency as a witness.
Angelina argues the trial court correctly granted summary judgment even if Dickens’ testimony is considered. In its motion for rehearing, Angelina says this Court “concluded that the ‘sole issue’ arising out of the [McDonnell Douglas ] procedural framework here is whether there is any evidence Angelina’s legitimate articulated reasons for its employment decision ‘were a pretext for discrimination based on race, sex, or age.’ ” Angelina takes a partial quote out of context. The partial quotation of our opinion is from a paragraph referring to Angelina’s motion for summary judgment. The “sole issue” presented in the motion for summary judgment was whether there is evidence Angelina’s stated reasons were pretextual. However, we stated the sole issue as the Supreme Court did in Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 124 S.Ct. 513, 157 L.Ed.2d 357, (2003). If the employer meets its burden of production, the only relevant question is whether the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence the employer made its decision based on race, gender, or age despite the employer’s proffered explanation. Id., 540 U.S. at 53.
Angelina also argues this Court misapplied the law of stray remarks by holding Dickens’ testimony raised a fact issue precluding summary judgment. We conclude the testimony was direct evidence, not mere stray remarks.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.

. The record contains only brief excerpts from Dickens’ deposition. Dickens’ complete deposition may provide additional evidence for the trial court to review on remand.

. Dickens remained the Director of Angelina s Liberal Arts Division until December of 2000.