Court Opinion

ID: 9627410
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:43:15.364556+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:36:43.019542
License: Public Domain

ROONEY, Chief Justice,
dissenting, with whom BROWN, Justice, joins.
The majority opinion concludes that the sanction for violation of the sequestration order in this case (disallowing the testimony of the two witnesses) was too severe. While not saying so, such opinion implies that the trial court should have allowed the testimony with comment to the jury by the court that the witnesses had violated the sequestration order.
I believe the analysis should go beyond this point, and I believe the analysis by the trial court did so. The trial court held the testimony to be
“ * * * not only of dubious relevance but is also cumulative to what the Defendant has already testified to, and to which no one has challenged. * * * ”
Thus, the court considered allowing the testimony accompanied by the cautionary comment of the court, and then it considered such testimony in light of Rule 403, W.R.E. That rule provides:
“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of *51undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”
I believe the court acted in this matter within the discretion afforded to it by Rule 403, W.R.E. Within the scope of this rule we have said that admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court, which discretion will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of it. Sanville v. State, Wyo., 593 P.2d 1340, 1345 (1979); Hopkinson v. State, Wyo., 632 P.2d 79,101 (1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 922, 102 S.Ct. 1280, 71 L.Ed.2d 463 (1982). And appellant has the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion. Nimmo v. State, Wyo., 603 P.2d 386, 392 (1979); Buhrle v. State, Wyo., 627 P.2d 1374, 1380 (1981).
Applying the rule to this case, we must ascertain (1) the probative value of the evidence, and (2) the consideration of needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Then, we must weigh the first determination against the second to conclude whether or not there was a clear abuse of the trial court’s discretion.
If the trial court had admitted the evidence under the conditions set forth in the majority opinion, the jury would have had to be advised that the credibility of the testimony of appellant’s father and of his sister should be considered in view of the fact that they were in the courtroom at the time appellant testified in violation of the direct order of the court that they be then excluded, and that the potential existed for them to have tailored their testimony to conform with the testimony of appellant. The jury would then have heard them testify that appellant’s wife told them that she had purchased the property in question, appellant having already told the jury that his wife had told him the same thing. The stolen property consisted of a commercial microwave oven taken from the Casper Hilton Inn; a stereo, television and microwave oven taken from the Lundine residence; a toolbox, calculator, and resin taken from Moltec; drill bits taken from Triangle Sales and Service, Inc.; and an auger taken from Michaels Fence. Appellant testified that these items found in his bedroom were obtained by his wife who said she purchased them from her cousin’s friend. The probative value of testimony by appellant’s father and sister to the effect that appellant’s wife had told them she purchased this random assortment of personal property from her cousin’s friend would not only be weakened by the relationship between appellant and the two witnesses but also by the court’s comment relative to their violation of the sequestration order.
Against this “probative value” of the testimony of the two witnesses, the trial court had to weigh the desirability for not presenting cumulative evidence.1 In doing so, the court found the latter to outweigh the former.
The question on appeal is not whether the decision of the trial court was that which we would have made. We are not to weigh the factors ourselves. Our determination is whether or not the trial court’s decision was a clear abuse of discretion.
“A court does not abuse its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances. In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could reasonably conclude as it did. An abuse of discretion has been said to mean an error of law committed by the court under the circumstances. * ⅝ * ” Martinez v. State, Wyo., 611 P.2d 831, 838 (1980).
I do not believe the trial court acted in a manner which clearly exceeded the bounds of reason under the circumstances; which clearly was other than in a reasonable manner; or which was clearly an error of law committed under the circumstances.
Not finding a clear abuse of discretion in excluding the testimony of the two sequestered witnesses, I would affirm.

. Cumulative evidence is "additional or corroborative evidence to the same point.” Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979), p. 343.