Court Opinion

ID: 9757570
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:47:54.202713+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:41.151538
License: Public Domain

Justice WALLACE,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
Some brief background is helpful. The original Workers’ Compensation Act allowed for compensation when an employee was injured or killed in an accident “arising out of and in the course of employment.” L. 1911, c. 95 § 7, now codified at N.J.S.A. 34:15-7. The Act did not contain a definition of employment. As a result, our courts developed principles to distinguish between “those accidental injuries[,] which may fairly be said to have some work connection and those[,] which may fairly be said to be unrelated to the employment.” Hornyak v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 63 N.J. 99, 102, 305 A.2d 65, 66 (1973).
To assist in distinguishing between compensable and noncompensable incidents, which occur off the premises, the courts devel*170oped the “going and coming” rule. That rule ordinarily precluded an award of compensation benefits for “injuries sustained during routine travel to and from an employee’s regular place of work.” Watson v. Nassau Inn, 74 N.J. 155, 158, 376 A.2d 1215, 1217 (1977). Further, an employee who had not yet arrived on the employer’s premises, or who had departed the premises at the conclusion of a scheduled work period, was not deemed to be in the course of employment for the purposes of N.J.S.A 34:15-7. Livingstone v. Abraham & Straus, Inc., 111 N.J. 89, 96, 543 A.2d 45, 49 (1988).
Gradually, “the basic going and coming rule ... became diluted by a series of exceptions.” Ibid. Those exceptions were so numerous that they “overshadowed” the basic rule. Watson, supra, 74 N.J. at 159, 376 A.2d at 1218.
To provide relief from the numerous exceptions to the “going and coming” rule that had evolved, while at the same time allowing for increased awards for more seriously injured and disabled workers, in 1979, the Legislature amended the Workers’ Compensation Act in several respects. Those amendments were designed to “provid[e] genuine reform and meaningful cost containment for New Jersey employers from unjustified workers’ compensation costs that [in the late 1970’s were] among the highest in the nation.” N.J. Senate Labor, Industry and Professions Committee, Joint Statement to Substitute for S. 802 & A 84.0 (Nov. 13,1979). The primary goals of the legislation “were to eliminate awards for minor partial disabilities, to increase awards for the more seriously disabled, and to contain the overall cost of workers’ compensation.” Ibid.
The current legislation contains a specific definition of employment. L. 1979, c. 283, § 12, which is now codified at N.J.S.A 34:15-36. That statute provides that employment shall be deemed to commence when
an employee arrives at the employer’s place of employment to report for work and shall terminate when the employee leaves the employer’s place of employment, excluding areas not under the control of the employer; provided, however, when the employee is required by the employer to be away from the employer’s place of *171employment, the employee shall be deemed to be in the course of employment when the employee is engaged in the direct performance of duties assigned or directed by the employer; but the employment of employee paid travel time by an employer for time spent traveling to and from a job site or of any employee who utilizes an employer authorized vehicle shall commence and terminate with the time spent traveling to and from a job site or the authorized operation of a vehicle on business authorized by the employer. Travel by a policeman, fireman, or a member of a first aid or rescue squad, in responding to and returning from an emergency, shall be deemed to be in the course of employment.
[N.J.S.A. 34:15-36 (emphasis added).]
In Zelasko v. Refrigerated Food Exp., we noted that the Chief Judge of Compensation had written an article shortly after the 1979 amendment to the Act expressing “that compensation for off-premises accidents was ‘sharply curtailed’ by the new definition of employment.” 128 N.J. 329, 335, 608 A.2d 231, 234 (1992) (citing Alfred J. Napier, Impact of the Reform Act of 1980, 96 N.J. Lawyer 17, 18 (August 1981)). We recognized that Judge Napier
specifically construed N.J.S.A. 34:15-36 ‘to remove from compensability certain cases heretofore held compensable where special hazards existed en route to the employer’s premises, [and] off-premises injuries sustained during lunch hour.’ However, he warned that the ‘basic pattern and objectives of our Workers’ Compensation Act remain unchanged.’
[Ibid, (citations omitted).]
In Jumpp v. City of Ventnor, we emphasized that the 1979 amendments for the first time defined on-premises and off-premises employment and that in Ward v. Davidowitz, 191 N.J.Super. 518, 468 A.2d 250 (App.Div.1983), our Appellate Division held that “off-premises ‘lunch break accidents’ are no longer compensable ‘as a matter of law.’ ” 177 N.J. 470, 480, 828 A.2d 905, 911 (2003) (quoting Ward, supra, 191 N.J.Super. at 524, 468 A.2d at 253). We rejected workers’ compensation benefits to a plaintiff where his job required him to travel throughout the city to inspect various facilities and he was injured when he fell returning to his vehicle from a purely personal trip because the plaintiff was not “performing his [ ] prescribed job duties at the time of injury.” Jumpp, supra, 177 N.J. at 482, 828 A.2d at 912.
More recently, in Lozano v. Frank DeLuca Const., we held that “when an employee establishes that his or her employer required *172participation in an activity of a recreational or social nature, courts should consider the activity as they would any other compensable work-related assignment.” 178 N.J. 513, 533, 842 A.2d 156, 168 (2004). To recover under that theory, which provides compensation for a required activity that was not part of a work-related assignment, we concluded that “the injured employee must establish that he or she engaged in the activity based on an objectively reasonable belief that participation was required.” Id. at 518, 842 A.2d at 159.
Lozano was decided after the Appellate Division here rejected plaintiffs claim for workers’ compensation benefits. Nonetheless, the panel correctly focused on the issue of whether plaintiff was required to leave his place of employment. The panel concluded that “[t]he reality of the situation was that petitioner and his coworkers voluntarily decided to leave to get something to eat because they did not know how long it would be before they would be able to return to their homes in New Jersey, [and] [t]hat Delvin, petitioner’s supervisor, made the decision to go, does not mean that petitioner was obligated to go.” Sager v. O. A Peterson Constr. Co., No A-67-24-01T2, (App.Div. Oct. 30, 2003) (slip op. at 7). The panel viewed petitioner’s “situation akin to a lunch-break type accident, which is no longer compensable since the passage of the 1979 amendments to the workers’ compensation laws.” Id. at 8 (citing Ward, supra, 191 N.J.Super. at 523, 468 A.2d at 252-53).
The majority decision criticizes the panel for being speculative and contrary to the credibility determination of the compensation court. I disagree.
The Compensation judge never made a finding that petitioner had an “objectively reasonable belief’ that he was required to go to dinner with his supervisor. See Lozano, supra, 178 N.J. at 518, 842 A.2d at 159. The judge merely used Devlin’s testimony that it was his decision to take the workers to get some food to conclude that the dinner trip qualified as a “special mission.” The judge failed to discuss petitioner’s testimony that the workers jointly *173decided to go to dinner. Moreover, because we had not yet decided Lozano, the Compensation judge was unaware of the necessity to decide whether petitioner had an objectively reasonable belief that participation in the trip for dinner was required.
The mere fact that the supervisor1 testified that he said “we will go out, we will have an early dinner, come back to the job,” is not dispositive of the issue. In the first place, it is difficult to conclude that the supervisor was ordering the men to go to dinner as opposed to merely suggesting a reasonable solution to address their inability to return home at the end of the workday. It is just as likely the supervisor used the word “will” to mean “let’s go” to dinner as opposed to a command that the workers must attend dinner. In any event, the touchstone here is the objective reasonable belief of the worker. Petitioner never testified that he believed he was required to go to dinner with the other men. In fact, it was his testimony that it was a group decision to go to dinner.
In sum, unlike the majority, I cannot conclude that the supervisor’s comment was a directive. In my view, petitioner’s testimony differed from his supervisor’s and the Compensation judge failed to address that potential conflict in the evidence. In light of the Compensation judge’s failure to apply the “reasonable belief standard” to petitioner’s decision to go to dinner, I would remand the ease for further proceedings.
Justice RIVERA-SOTO joins in this opinion.
For reversal and reinstatement — Chief Justice PORITZ and Justices LONG, LaVECCHIA, ZAZZALI and ALBIN — 5.
For remandment — Justices WALLACE and RIVERA-SOTO— 2.

The record discloses that at the hearing on February 8, 2000, petitioner testified that Supervisor Devlin also filed for workers’ compensation benefits. However, when Devlin testified on May 3, 2002, he was not asked whether he filed such a claim. In any event, the Compensation judge failed to address this factor in assessing Devlin's credibility.