Court Opinion

ID: 9882479
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:10:26.453746+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:03:36.368025
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Lemaster, 2023-Ohio-3427.]

                       IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                           THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                UNION COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,

        PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,                               CASE NO. 14-23-10

        v.

TYLOR ANTHONY LEMASTER,
                                                          OPINION
        DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

                  Appeal from Union County Common Pleas Court
                            Trial Court No. 22-CR-0021

                                      Judgment Affirmed

                          Date of Decision: September 25, 2023

APPEARANCES:

        Alison Boggs for Appellant

        Raymond Kelly Hamilton for Appellee
Case No. 14-23-10

ZIMMERMAN, J.

       {¶1} Defendant-appellant, Tylor Anthony Lemaster (“Lemaster”), appeals

the February 21, 2023 judgment entry of sentence of the Union County Court of

Common Pleas. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

       {¶2} On January 28, 2022, the Union County Grand Jury indicted Lemaster

on Count One of pandering obscenity involving a minor or impaired person in

violation of R.C. 2907.321(A)(1), (C), a second-degree felony, and Count Two of

illegal use of a minor or impaired person in nudity-oriented material or performance

in violation of R.C. 2907.323(A)(1), (B), a second-degree felony. On June 14, 2022,

Lemaster appeared and entered pleas of not guilty to the indictment.

       {¶3} On January 20, 2023, Lemaster withdrew his pleas of not guilty and

entered a guilty plea, under a negotiated-plea agreement, to Count One of the

indictment. In exchange for Lemaster’s change of plea, the State agreed to dismiss

Count Two. The trial court accepted Lemaster’s guilty plea, found him guilty,

dismissed Count Two, and ordered a pre-sentence investigation.

       {¶4} On February 21, 2023, the trial court sentenced Lemaster to a minimum

term of six years to a maximum term of nine years in prison. (Doc. No. 37). The

trial court also classified Lemaster as a Tier II sex offender.

       {¶5} Lemaster filed his notice of appeal on March 22, 2022. He raises one

assignment of error for our review.

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Case No. 14-23-10

                                 Assignment of Error

       The Trial Court’s Imposition Of An Indefinite Sentence Pursuant
       To The Statutory Scheme Known As “The Reagan Tokes Law” Is
       Unconstitutional And Must Be Reversed.

       {¶6} In his assignment of error, Lemaster argues that his sentence, imposed

under Ohio’s current sentencing scheme (commonly known as the “Reagan Tokes

Law”), is unconstitutional. Specifically, Lemaster challenges the constitutionality

of the Reagan Tokes Law for violating his right to a trial by jury, and for violating

the separation-of-powers doctrine and due-process clause of the Ohio and United

States Constitutions.

                                  Standard of Review

       {¶7} Under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), an appellate court will reverse a sentence

“only if it determines by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not

support the trial court’s findings under relevant statutes or that the sentence is

otherwise contrary to law.” State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002,

¶ 1. Clear and convincing evidence is that “‘which will produce in the mind of the

trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.’” Id.

at ¶ 22, quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the

syllabus.

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Case No. 14-23-10

                                        Analysis

       {¶8} In this case, Lemaster challenges the constitutionality of the Reagan

Tokes Law—namely, Lemaster alleges that the Reagan Tokes Law violates his

constitutional right to a trial by jury in addition to violating the separation-of-powers

doctrine and due-process clause of the Ohio and United States Constitutions.

       {¶9} Generally, “‘“[a]n enactment of the General Assembly is presumed to

be constitutional, and before a court may declare it unconstitutional it must appear

beyond a reasonable doubt that the legislation and constitutional provisions are

clearly incompatible.”’” State v. Mitchell, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-21-02, 2021-Ohio-

2802, ¶ 12, quoting State v. Brown, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-10-12, 2010-Ohio-4546,

¶ 9, quoting State ex rel. Dickman v. Defenbacher, 164 Ohio St. 142 (1955),

paragraph one of the syllabus. “‘“That presumption of validity of such legislative

enactment cannot be overcome unless it appear[s] that there is a clear conflict

between the legislation in question and some particular provision or provisions of

the Constitution.”’” Id., quoting Brown at ¶ 9, quoting Xenia v. Schmidt, 101 Ohio

St. 437 (1920), paragraph two of the syllabus.

       {¶10} “‘A statute may be challenged on constitutional grounds in two ways:

(1) that the statute is unconstitutional on its face, or (2) that it is unconstitutional as

applied to the facts of the case.’” Id. at ¶ 13, quoting Brown at ¶ 10, citing Harrold

v. Collier, 107 Ohio St.3d 44, 2005-Ohio-5334, ¶ 37. “‘To mount a successful facial

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Case No. 14-23-10

challenge, the party challenging the statute must demonstrate that there is no set of

facts or circumstances under which the statute can be upheld.’” Id., quoting Brown

at ¶ 10. “‘Where it is claimed that a statute is unconstitutional as applied, the

challenger must present clear and convincing evidence of a presently existing set of

facts that make the statute unconstitutional and void when applied to those facts.’”

Id., quoting Brown at ¶ 10.

       {¶11} Nevertheless, Lemaster concedes that he is raising his constitutional

arguments for the first time on appeal.            Importantly, “‘“‘[t]he question of

constitutionality of a statute must generally be raised at the first opportunity and, in

a criminal prosecution this means in the trial court.’”’” Id. at ¶ 14, quoting State v.

Bagley, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-13-31, 2014-Ohio-1787, ¶ 70, quoting State v.

Rowland, 3d Dist. Hancock No. 5-01-28, 2002 WL 479163, *1 (Mar. 29, 2002),

quoting State v. Awan, 22 Ohio St.3d 120, 122 (1986). “This applies to challenges

to the facial constitutionality of a statute and to the constitutionality of a statute’s

application.’” Id., quoting Bagley at ¶ 70.

       {¶12} “‘The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that, “‘[f]ailure to raise at the

trial court level the issue of the constitutionality of a statute or its application, which

issue is apparent at the time of trial, constitutes a waiver of such issue and a

deviation from this state’s orderly procedure, and therefore need not be heard for

the first time on appeal.’”’” Id. at ¶ 15, quoting State v. Heft, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-

                                           -5-
Case No. 14-23-10

09-08, 2009-Ohio-5908, ¶ 29, quoting State v. Rice, 3d Dist. Allen Nos. 1-02-15, 1-

02-29, and 1-02-30, 2002-Ohio-3951, ¶ 7, quoting Awan at syllabus. “‘However,

the waiver doctrine * * * is discretionary; thus, “even where waiver is clear, a

reviewing court may consider constitutional challenges to the application of statutes

in specific cases of plain error or where the rights and interests involved may warrant

it.”’” Id., quoting Heft at ¶ 29, quoting Rice at ¶ 7. “Nevertheless, ‘“‘discretion will

not ordinarily be exercised to review such claims, where the right sought to be

vindicated was in existence prior to or at the time of trial.’”’” Id., quoting Heft at ¶

29, quoting Rice at ¶ 7, quoting State v. 1981 Dodge Ram Van, 36 Ohio St.3d 168,

170-171 (1988), quoting State v. Woodards, 6 Ohio St.2d 14, 21 (1966).

       {¶13} Because Lemaster did not object to the constitutionality of the Reagan

Tokes Law while his case was pending before the trial court or challenge the trial

court’s application of the Reagan Tokes Law at his sentencing hearing, he waived

his arguments on appeal. Accord id. at ¶ 16.

       {¶14} Notwithstanding Lemaster’s failure to raise his arguments in the trial

court, we will address the merits of his arguments in the interest of justice.

Imperatively, not only has this court rejected similar facial- and as-applied-

constitutional challenges to the Reagan Tokes Law, but the Supreme Court of Ohio

recently endorsed the constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Law. Accord State v.

Rentschler, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-22-50, 2023-Ohio-3009, ¶ 98; State v. Hacker,

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Case No. 14-23-10

___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2023-Ohio-2535, ¶ 41. We decline to diverge from such

formidable precedent. Accordingly, Lemaster’s sentence is not contrary to law.

       {¶15} Lemaster’s assignment of error is overruled.

       {¶16} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the

particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                                Judgment Affirmed

MILLER, P.J. and WALDICK, J., concur.

/jlr

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