Court Opinion

ID: 9771293
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:38:36.273169+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:28.114915
License: Public Domain

GONZALEZ, Justice
concurring and dissenting.
I agree with the Court that res judicata bars any action by Getty against NL. I also agree that the summary judgment for INA and Youell should be reversed and remanded to the trial court. The Court concludes, however, that paragraph two of the contract is an additional insured provision that does not directly support an indemnity agreement. In so doing, the court takes a contract that is ambiguous and makes a factual determination as to its meaning. For this reason, I cannot join the majority opinion. I would hold that the contract is ambiguous as a matter of law, reverse the judgment of the court of appeals, and remand the cause to the trial court for a trier of fact to determine whether the parties intended paragraph two of HB-5357 to be an additional insured provision or an insurance provision in support of the indemnity agreement.
The pertinent rules of contract construction are set out in Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 393-94 (Tex.1983):
If the written instrument is so worded that it can be given a certain or definite legal meaning or interpretation, then it is not ambiguous and the court will construe the contract as a matter of law. A contract, however, is ambiguous when its meaning is uncertain and doubtful or it is reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning. Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law for the court to decide by looking at the circumstances present when the contract was entered. When a contract contains an ambiguity, the granting of a motion for summary judgment is improper because the interpretation of the instrument becomes a fact issue, (citations omitted).
*807This contract is reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation.1 Getty contends that paragraph two of HB-5357 is an additional insured provision and does not directly, cover the indemnity agreement, and the anti-indemnity statute was never intended to affect this type of insurance agreement or any other insurance arrangement that is not a direct indemnification. This Court agrees with Getty, relying on the fact that the indemnity provision already contains an insurance procurement provision separate and distinct from the “additional insured” provision; therefore, the indemnity provision already contemplates separate insurance coverage and is not dependent upon the coverages contained in the “additional insured” provision. The Court contends that this argument is strengthened by the languages in the “additional insured” provision which states that NL’s insurance shall extend to and protect Getty “whether or not required [by the other provisions of the contract].” This is a reasonable interpretation of these provisions. However, it is not the only reasonable interpretation.
INA and Youell argue that this insurance provision contemplates direct indemnification coverage, obligating NL to contractually indemnify Getty, and thus directly supports an indemnity agreement. This interpretation is also reasonable. Nowhere in HB-5357 is the term “additional insured” or any derivative thereof used. Paragraph one of the contract reads “INSURANCE AND INDEMNITY” and sets out the types and limits of insurance coverage NL is required to have under the contract. Both the provision extending NL’s insurance over Getty and the indemnity agreement are set out in this section. The last paragraph then states, “[t]he liability of Seller (NL), as herein provided, shall not be limited by the insurance coverage required of Seller.”
In construing a contract, courts should look at the contract as a whole in order to give effect to all the provisions. Coker, 650 S.W.2d at 393; Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Daniel, 150 Tex. 513, 243 S.W.2d 154, 158 (1951). No single provision will be given controlling effect; rather, all provisions must be considered with reference to the entire writing. Daniel, 243 S.W.2d at 393; Myers v. Gulf Coast Minerals Mgm’t Corp., 361 S.W.2d 193, 196 (Tex.1962). Taken as a whole, this “INSURANCE AND INDEMNITY” section seems to contemplate that the insurance coverages set out in these provisions, including the so called “additional insured” paragraph, directly cover any potential liability of NL under the indemnity provision.
*808Courts should construe contracts in order to give effect to the intention of the parties. Harris v. Rowe, 593 S.W.2d 303, 306 (Tex.1979). In this case the intention of the parties is not clear. Both parties present reasonable and logical interpretations, thus subjecting the contract to two reasonable and acceptable meanings, the determination of which is a question of fact. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand to the trial court for a trier of fact to determine the true intent of the parties.2
MAUZY and DOGGETT, JJ., join this concurring and dissenting opinion

. The contract provisions at issue read as follows:
4. INSURANCE AND INDEMNITY: Seller agrees to maintain at Seller’s sole cost and expense, from the time operations are commenced hereunder until Order is fully performed and discharged, insurance of all types and with minimum limits as follows, and furnish certificates to Purchaser’s Purchasing Department evidencing such insurance with insurers acceptable to Purchaser:
[The contract then sets out various required insurance and coverage limits required under the contract]
All Insurance coverages carried by Seller, whether or not required hereby, shall extend to and protect Purchaser, its co-owners and joint venturers (if any), to the full amount of such coverages and shall be sufficiently endorsed to waive any and all claims by the underwriters of insurers against Purchaser, its co-owners, joint venturers, agents, employees and insurance carriers.
Seller shall indemnify, defend and hold harmless Purchaser, its co-owners, joint ventur-ers, agents, employees and insurance carriers from any and all losses, claims, actions, costs, expenses, judgments, subrogations, or other damages resulting from injury to any person (including injury resulting in death), or damage (including loss or destruction) to property of whatsoever nature of any person arising out of or incident to the performance of the terms of this Order by Seller (including but not limited to, Seller’s employees, agents, sub-contractors, and others designated by Seller to perform work or services in, about, or attendant to, the work and services under the terms of this Order). Seller shall not be held responsible for any losses, expenses, claims, subrogations, actions, costs, judgments, or other damages, directly, solely, and proximately caused by the negligence of Purchaser. Insurance covering this indemnity agreement shall be provided by Seller.
The liability of Seller, as herein above provided, shall not be limited by the insurance coverage required of Seller.

. While this Court has determined that an additional insured provision is not covered by the Anti-Indemnity statute, it has left open the question of whether the statute applies to an insurance procurement provision that directly supports an indemnity agreement. Thus, if the trier of fact determines that this provision does support the indemnity agreement, the question of whether it violates the Anti-Indemnity statute would have to be resolved. Because Section 5 of the statute applicable in this case provides that a party to an oilfield indemnity agreement "shall be responsible for the results of his own actions,” Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. art. 2212b, § 5, I would hold that this agreement is void.