Court Opinion

ID: 9709424
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:47:16.480488+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:48.757159
License: Public Domain

OPINION
HARVEY A. HOLTAN, Judge.*
Steven Mark Loge was convicted under Minn.Stat. § 169.122, subd. 3, of keeping an open bottle containing intoxicating liquor in an automobile. At trial, Loge testified that he did not know the bottle was in the vehicle. The trial court nonetheless convicted Loge, concluding that subdivision 3 of the statute does not require proof that the driver acted knowingly. On appeal from the judgment of conviction, Loge challenges the trial court’s conclusion. Because we concur that Minn. Stat. § 169.122, subd. 3, sets forth a strict liability offense, we affirm.
FACTS
In September 1997, Albert Lea police officers stopped Steven Mark Loge for speeding. During a routine search of the automobile, the officers found a nearly empty bottle of beer in a brown paper bag underneath the front passenger seat. Based on this finding, they charged Loge with keeping an open bottle containing intoxicating liquor in an automobile, in violation of Minn.Stat. § 169.122, subd. 3.
At trial, Loge testified that the car he was driving belonged to his father and that he, as well as others, had driven it for the past two weeks. He also testified that the open bottle did not belong to him and that he did not know it was in the car.
Notwithstanding Loge’s testimony, the trial court convicted him, reasoning that Minn. Stat. § 169.122, subd. 3, “creates an absolute liability for Mr. Loge to inspect and determine[,] when he is going to operate the pickup truck[,] whether there are any containers that would violate the open receptacle law in Minnesota.”
On appeal, Loge claims the trial court erred in concluding that Minn.Stat. § 169.122, subd. 3, creates a strict liability *493offense. The state agrees with Loge and asks that the ease be remanded for a determination of whether Loge knew the open bottle was in the car.
ISSUE
Does Minn.Stat. § 169.122, subd. 3 (1996), make the driver of a private motor vehicle liable for unknowingly keeping in the vehicle, while on a public highway, an open bottle containing intoxicating liquor?
ANALYSIS
This appeal raises an issue of statutory interpretation. The interpretation of statutes is a question of law, which this court reviews de novo. Hibbing Educ. Ass’n v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 369 N.W.2d 527, 529 (Minn.1985).
Minn.Stat. § 169.122, subd. 2 (1996), imposes a general rule applicable to all occupants of a motor vehicle. It provides that “[n]o person shall have in possession while in a private motor vehicle upon a public highway, any bottle or receptacle containing intoxicating liquor * * * which has been opened.” Id. Possession means “either that the person had actual possession of the bottle or receptacle or that the person consciously exercised dominion and control over the bottle or receptacle.” Id. We agree with Loge that the legislature defined “possession” in a way that makes it clear that subdivision 2 of the statute requires proof that the occupants acted knowingly.
In contrast, subdivision 3, under which Loge was charged, imposes a limited rule applicable only to the owner of a private motor vehicle and to the driver if the owner is not present. It makes it unlawful for either one of them to “keep or allow to be kept in a motor vehicle when such vehicle is upon the public highway any bottle or receptacle containing intoxicating liquors * * * which has been opened.” Minn.Stat. § 169.122, subd. 3 (1996). We conclude that unlike subdivision 2, subdivision 3 does not require proof of mens rea. Instead, it imposes an affirmative duty on the owner and the driver of a private motor vehicle, without regard to fault, to ensure compliance with the open bottle law. Had the legislature intended to subject the owner and the driver to the same liability as the occupants, it would have done so in subdivision 2.
Although strict liability offenses are disfavored, Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 606, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 1797, 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994), states may create strict liability by defining criminal offenses without an element of scienter, see, e.g., State v. Morse, 281 Minn. 378, 380-82, 161 N.W.2d 699, 700-02 (1968) (excluding mistake of age as a defense to sexual conduct between an adult and a child under the age of consent). To impose criminal liability for conduct unaccompanied by fault, however, “the legislative intent to do so should be clear.” State v. Neisen, 415 N.W.2d 326, 329 (Minn.1987).
The legislature’s intent to impose strict liability in this case is clear. A reading of Minn.Stat. § 169.122 (1996) as a whole suggests that by carving a special rule for the owner and the driver of a private motor vehicle, rather than including them within the general prohibition in subdivision 2, the legislature intended, in the exercise of its police power for the protection of the public at large, to distinguish between the liability of occupants, who do not have charge of the automobile, and the liability of the owner and the driver, who do. Specifically, the legislature intended to hold the owner and the driver strictly liable for failing to ascertain that the car contained no open bottles before it entered a public highway, while holding other occupants hable only if they acted knowingly.
The plain language of the statute supports the same inference. Subdivision 3 makes it unlawful for the owner and the driver of an automobile “to keep or allow to be kept” in an automobile an open bottle containing intoxicating liquor. Minn.Stat. § 169.122, subd. 3. The legislature has not traditionally used the words keep or allow to indicate that criminal intent is an element of the offense. See, e.g., Minn.Stat. § 609.02, subd. , 9(1) (1996) (“When criminal intent is an element of a crime in this chapter, such intent is indicated by the term ‘intentionally,’ the phrase ‘with intent to,’ the phrase ‘with intent that,’ or some form of the verbs ‘know’
*494or ‘believe.’ ”). “To keep” means to “have charge” of a thing, person, or animal. 1 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 1476 (Lesley Brown ed., 1993). A person can keep or “have charge” of something without necessarily knowing of it. By having charge of an automobile, for example, the owner and the driver “have charge”, of its contents, whether or not they know of them. Thus, the word “keep” does not implicitly incorporate a mens rea requirement into Minn.Stat. § 169.122, subd. 3.
The same is true of the word allow. In a legal setting, allow means “to approve by not objecting.” Bryan A. Garner, A Dictionary of Modem Legal Usage 45 (2d ed.1995). It does not mean to permit. Id. In fact, “[t]he words allow and permit have an important connotative difference. Allow * * * suggests merely the absence of opposition * * *. In contrast, permit suggests affirmative sanction or approval.” Id. Thus, the owner and the driver of an automobile allow the presence of an open' bottle simply by failing to object to it, whether or not they know the bottle is in the vehicle. The legislature’s choice of the word allow, therefore, does not imply a knowledge requirement into subdivision 3. Had the legislature wanted to make knowledge of the open bottle an element of the offense, it would have chosen the word permit rather than the word allow.
Finally, Minn.Stat. § 169.122, subd. 3, like other provisions within the same chapter, is a regulatory statute designed to promote highway safety. The express language of subdivision 3 does not require proof of mens rea on the driver’s part any more than other traffic regulations within the same chapter do. See, e.g., Minn.Stat. § 169.14 (1996) (forbidding drivers from exceeding speed restrictions); Minn.Stat. § 169.34 (1996) (prohibiting drivers from parking a vehicle in certain specified locations including a public or private driveway and an intersection); Minn. Stat. § 169.48 (1996) (requiring vehicles to display specific lighted lamps and illuminating devices). The full protection regulatory statutes are designed to afford could not be secured if knowledge was a necessary element of the offense. Evasion would be so easy that the statutes would practically fail. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that had the legislature intended to depart from its standard practice with respect to regulatory statutes and make knowledge of the open bottle an element of the offense, it would have done so expressly by forbidding the owner and the driver from knowingly or intentionally keeping or allowing to be kept in a motor vehicle an open bottle containing intoxicating liquor.
The burden subdivision 3 imposes on the owner and the driver of an automobile is minimal compared to the mischief the legislature intended to prevent, namely, drinking intoxicating beverages while driving. The magnitude of the problems associated with drinking while driving fully justifies the minimal burden the legislature placed on the owner and the driver. Admittedly, subdivision 3 exposes unsuspecting owners and drivers to criminal liability. On occasion, this exposure may result in the conviction of what may be viewed as an innocent person. The greater public good, however, justifies an occasional, but only apparent, injustice. Moreover, any. injustice resulting from the imposition of strict liability could be effectively remedied at the time of sentencing. Strict liability, therefore, is not too high a price to pay for public safety and a legitimate legislative purpose. Thus, despite the severity of excluding lack of knowledge as a defense, we conclude that Minn.Stat. § 169.122, subd. 3, creates a strict liability offense.
DECISION
The evidence, which establishes that officers saw an open bottle containing intoxicating liquor underneath the passenger seat of the automobile Loge was driving on a public highway, is sufficient to support Loge’s conviction under Minn.Stat. § 169.122, subd. 3. Proof that Loge knew the bottle was in the automobile is not required to sustain the conviction.
Affirmed.

 Retired judge of the district court, serving as judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. Art. VI, § 10.