Court Opinion

ID: 9747194
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:02:32.023126+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:08.720521
License: Public Domain

COLEMAN, J.,
dissenting.
The question presented by this appeal is not whether a variance runs with the land, about which there is no debate. The Appellate Division in this case acknowledged that “use variances are not *441personal to the owner, but run with the land.” Stop & Shop, supra, 315 N.J.Super. at 434, 718 A2d 1218. Rather, the question is whether the new owner’s intended use of the land so significantly differs from the variant use as to unreasonably affect a legitimate land use purpose. Berninger v. Board of Adjustment, 254 N.J.Super. 401, 405, 603 A.2d 954 (App.Div.1991), aff'd o.b., 127 N.J. 226, 603 A.2d 946 (1992). Unlike the majority, I would affirm the decision of the Springfield Board of Adjustment (Board). Stop & Shop (S & S) failed to present evidence showing that its intended use of the property is significantly similar in kind, nature, or use intensity to the retail merchandising conducted by Saks Fifth Avenue (Saks), in terms of the qualitative nature and intensity of use of the parking lot.
Absent proofs to the contrary, the Board could infer that S & S’s intended use of the premises to conduct business activities related to the operation of a mega supermarket differs substantially from Saks’s operation of an upscale retail department store. The Board also could reasonably infer that the change in use will substantially increase vehicular and pedestrian traffic and hours of operation that will have a significant and unreasonable land use impact. I wholeheartedly agree with the Appellate Division that because S & S failed to demonstrate that its proposed use does not represent an insubstantial change in the variant use, a new application to the Board was required. Stop & Shop, supra, 315 N.J.Super. at 431, 437, 718 A.2d 1218. Henee, I dissent from the majority’s contrary holding.
I.
In 1956, the Board granted a use variance permitting Saks to use the rear portion of the property for a parking lot accessory to its planned retail department store. The Board found that the rear portion of the property did not “practically lend [itself to] the construction of houses.” In 1968, the Board granted Saks another use variance, allowing it to extend the rear portion of its store into the residential zone. The Board found that the extension would *442not impair the value or use of the surrounding areas. Thus, Saks was granted a variance to operate a suburban department store with off-street parking in the rear.
S & S purchased the property in 1996 without any contingency, intending to construct and operate a mega supermarket. S & S applied to the Springfield Zoning Officer for a permit authorizing such use of the property. The officer denied the application, finding that S & S was required to apply to the Board for a new use variance. S & S appealed to the Board and sought a special question interpretation regarding the extent to which S & S was entitled to rely on the Saks variances. At the hearing, S & S presented a witness who testified that S & S intended to erect a new 85,443 square foot supermarket with seven loading docks. The existing building is 83,330 square feet with one loading dock. Three objectors testified, complaining mostly about the potential for increased truck and automobile traffic and noise.
On May 26, 1996 the Board concluded that S & S needed to apply for a new use variance. Specifically, the Board found that S & S “has not demonstrated ... that the supermarket business it intends to operate on the property ... is of a similar nature, kind or use intensity as that of the Saks operation....” S & S appealed the Board’s decision to the Law Division. A group of residents, called the Colonial Association, and the Township of Millbum, were allowed to intervene as defendants.
The Law Division ruled that the Board abused its discretion, and therefore, S & S did not need a new use variance. The court noted that most of the existing building is located in the commercial zone, where supermarkets are permitted by ordinance. Regarding the rear expanded portion of the store and the entire parking lot, both of which are located in the residential zone, the court concluded that S & S’s proposed uses are in conformity with the variances previously granted to Saks. The court further found that whether S & S’s use of the property was qualitatively similar to Saks’s use was irrelevant because the Springfield zoning ordi*443nance does not distinguish between types of “retail and service stores.”
The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s decision in a published opinion. 315 N.J.Super. 427, 437, 718 A.2d 1218 (1998). The appellate panel concluded that “a use created by a variance may not be significantly altered or intensified without further application to the board of adjustment.” Id. at 434, 718 A.2d 1218. The panel noted the strong policy in favor of land use planning by ordinance rather than by variance. See also Elco v. R.C. Maxwell Co., 292 N.J.Super. 118, 126, 678 A.2d 323 (App.Div.1996). The panel acknowledged that although variances run with the land, the scope of the use permitted by the variance is limited to those uses that are essentially duplicative of the use contemplated by the original variance. The court found guidance in cases involving the expansion or enlargement of a nonconforming use. Therefore, “any proposed change in the use ... that is not negligible or insubstantial should require further consideration by the board of adjustment.” Stop & Shop, supra, 315 N.J.Super. at 436-37, 718 A.2d 1218. Furthermore, the court noted that S & S presented no evidence that its proposed use was qualitatively similar to the prior use by Saks. Id. at 437, 718 A.2d 1218.
II.
The two variances granted to Saks pursuant to our present day N.J.S.A 40:55D-70d required a showing of special reasons and .satisfaction of the negative criteria. Variances should be strictly construed because they are to be granted only upon a showing of special reasons. See Burbridge v. Mine Hill Zoning Bd. of Adj., 117 N.J. 376, 384-85, 568 A.2d 527 (1990). A variance allows relief from restrictions imposed by ordinances that are otherwise uniformly applicable to the zone as a whole. Elco, supra, 292 N.J.Super. at 126, 678 A.2d 323. Variances should be granted sparingly because they “impair sound zoning” and because of “the strong legislative policy favoring land use planning by ordinance rather than by variance.” Ibid.; see also N.J.S.A. 40:55D-62; *444Kohl v. Mayor & Council of Fair Lawn, 50 N.J. 268, 275, 234 A.2d 385 (1967).
The Board was interested in hearing evidence from S & S to permit the Board to determine whether the impact on the zone created by the intended mega supermarket business would be substantially similar to that of Saks’s operation. S & S elected not to present such evidence. I believe the Board should be permitted to determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether a proposed change in the variant use is significant enough to require a new use variance. I believe that is what the Legislature intended when it provided in N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70a that appeals from a zoning officer’s interpretation of a variance must be heard by the Board. The Board’s concern advances legitimate land use purposes and does not represent any attempt to limit the life of the variances issued during the original grantee’s ownership of the property.
The Board was likely concerned about whether S & S’s mega supermarket would substantially alter its prior determination regarding the negative criteria and, therefore, cause violence to the zoning plan. Both the 1956 and 1968 variances were required because Saks wanted to expand its commercial operations into a residential zone. In other words, most of the land required for the parking lot and the store’s 19,000 square foot expansion was zoned residential, then and now. Although the land use ordinance involved here permits retail stores on the commercially zoned portion of the property for off-premises consumption of the products sold, a mixed commercial use ordinance “does not signify every type of commercial use.” Manalapan Realty v. Township Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 385, 658 A.2d 1230 (1995). Moreover, “the law presumes that boards of adjustment ... will act fairly and with proper motives and for valid reasons.” Kramer v. Board of Adjustment, Sea Girt, 45 N.J. 268, 296, 212 A.2d 153 (1965).
Increase in traffic is a legitimate concern of the Board both when considering whether to approve use variances in the first *445instance, Price Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Union, 279 N.J.Super. 327, 334, 652 A.2d 784 (Law Div.1993), aff'd, 279 N.J.Super. 207, 652 A.2d 723 (App.Div.1994), and when considering whether a new proposed use is substantially different from the variant use. S & S’s need for seven loading docks for its large truckloads of merchandise in contrast to Saks’s need for only one dock graphically depicts the anticipated substantial increase in traffic and hours of operation. Virtually all of the parking lot for 750 ears and about 15.5 percent of the store area are located in a residential zone. The Board is thoroughly familiar with its community and is vested with wide discretion to determine whether the proposed use would substantially alter its prior determination of the negative criteria. See Ward v. Scott, 16 N.J. 16, 23, 105 A.2d 851 (1954); Kramer, supra, 45 N.J. at 296, 212 A.2d 153.
The non-conforming use cases that focus on expanding those uses are instructive. There are two basic types of non-conforming uses. The most commonly recognized illustration is one that preexisted “the adoption of the ordinance which rendered the use or structure nonconforming.” N.J.S.A. 40:55D-68. The second type of non-conforming use arises when a variance is created by a zoning board of adjustment pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70c and d, by a planning board pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-60a, or as otherwise provided by law. See Pieretti v. Mayor & Council of Bloomfield, 35 N.J. 382, 387, 173 A.2d 296 (1961); Township of Stafford v. Zoning Bd., 299 N.J.Super. 188, 192-93, 690 A.2d 1043 (App.Div.1997), aff'd, 154 N.J. 62, 711 A.2d 282 (1998); William M. Cox, New Jersey Zoning and Land Use Administration § 11-1.2 (1999 ed.).
The fact that the controlling ordinance permitted Saks to operate a retail store in the zone was relevant only to the special reasons requirement for the section 70d use variance. The Board’s position focuses on whether the proposed use will substantially affect its prior negative criteria determination. That concern is consistent with this Court’s suggestion in Paruszewski v. Township of Elsinboro, 154 N.J. 45, 56-57, 711 A.2d 273 (1998), *446that, when an applicant seeks a certificate of non-conformity under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-68 and there exists a concern about the need to protect the integrity of either the master plan or the zoning scheme, the applicant may be required to submit proofs, substantially similar to those required to satisfy the negative criteria for a section 70d variance. Under the Municipal Land Use Law separation of powers doctrine, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-20 and N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70, the issue of whether S & S’s intended use of the property is essentially duplicative of the variant use lies within the Board’s exclusive jurisdiction. Planning boards’ authority to impose land use restrictions is generally limited to applications for subdivision, site plan, and conditional use approval. N.J.S.A. 40:55D-60; Dresner v. Carrara, 69 N.J. 237, 240-41, 353 A.2d 505 (1976).
The majority concedes that not “all successors in interest to property that has benefitted from a use variance may assert the rights accorded by that variance.” Ante at 435, 744 A2d at 1178. Yet, the majority neither articulates a standard for determining which successor does not benefit from the variance nor indicate who makes the determination. Unlike the majority, I believe the Board was entitled to require S & S to prove that its intended use of the premises would not substantially alter the impact upon the zoning plan and the surrounding community. That uniform standard is required to guide the Board. The grant of a variance is subject to the conditions of the controlling ordinance. When there is a change in the structure or use for which a variance was obtained, the issue for the Board becomes whether the structure or variant use is “essentially duplicative in all respects of that previously in existence pursuant to the variance.” Industrial Lessors, Inc. v. City of Garfield, 119 N.J.Super. 181,183, 290 A.2d 737 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 61 N.J. 160, 293 A.2d 390 (1972). Thus, I agree with the appellate panel in the present case that a change in use is significant if it is not essentially duplicative of the original variant use. Stop & Shop, supra, 315 N.J.Super. at 436, 718 A.2d 1218.
*447Industrial Lessors, which also involved a variance, was reaffirmed last year by this Court in the non-conforming use case of Rogers v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Ridgewood, 158 N.J. 11, 726 A.2d 258 (1999). There, we approved the Appellate Division’s adoption of Judge Skillman’s dissenting opinion in Camara v. Board of Adjustment of Belleville, 239 N.J.Super. 51, 61, 570 A.2d 1012 (App.Div.1990), wherein he stated that when there is a change from one permitted use to another, the only issue is whether the change in use has substantially changed the nonconforming structure. Id. at 63, 570 A.2d 1012. Similarly, where there exists a non-conforming use or variance regarding off-street parking, a change in the nature and intensity of the principle business to which the parking is accessory allows a board of adjustment to decide whether the non-conforming use or variant use should continue. See Wawa Food Market v. Planning Bd., 227 N.J.Super. 29, 37, 545 A.2d 786 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 114 N.J. 299, 554 A.2d 853 (1988).
In the present case, the upscale Saks department store is nothing like a mega supermarket. Traffic will obviously be heavier given the nature of the supermarket business. For me, that the proposed change in use is significant is almost as obvious as the difference between a restaurant and a discotheque, recognized in Town of Belleville v. Parrillo’s, Inc., 83 N.J. 309, 314-15, 416 A.2d 388 (1980). To assist in determining whether the proposed change in use is essentially duplicative, the reasons for granting the variance are instructive.
When granting the 1956 use variance, the Board made it plain that it was to facilitate the construction and operation of a “suburban department store with off-street parking.” Such a store was a newly emerging concept. The Board was persuaded that the variance would prevent an increase in commercial and other traffic through residential neighborhoods. It also sought to enhance property values by productively developing the general area rather than allowing haphazard and inconsistent development. The Board concluded that the variance furthered the intent *448and purpose of the zoning ordinance by allowing an upscale department store to operate in this suburban neighborhood.
When the use variance was approved in 1956, the Board found that the intended use was consistent with then-existing land use ordinances. It was not possible for the Board or the planner in 1956 to anticipate future potential retail uses on a scale of S & S’s intended mega supermarket that would have caused the Board to deny or place specific conditions on the original use variance. Nor was it possible for the Board to foresee that, when it stated in 1956 that the residential portion of the property did not lend itself to the construction of houses, this Court would eliminate exclusionary zoning in the Mount Laurel cases, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975) and 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983), or that the Legislature would enact the New Jersey Fair Housing Act of 1985, N.J.S.A. 52:27D-301 to -329, requiring even municipalities with virtually no undeveloped land to contribute a fair share of affordable housing.
I, therefore, reject the majority’s determination that the Board’s 1956 conclusion that the land used for the parking lot was unsuitable for housing is res judicata. Common sense dictates that the Mount Laurel doctrine has forced many municipalities, planning boards, and boards of adjustment, including Springfield, to revisit many earlier decisions affecting housing. Moreover, this Court has recently recognized that even in a case in which res judicata is applicable, it does not preclude a board of adjustment from considering a second application for a variance if the application contains sufficient changes. Bressman v. Gash, 131 N.J. 517, 527, 621 A.2d 476 (1993); Russell v. Board of Adjustment of Tenafly, 31 N.J. 58, 66, 155 A.2d 83 (1959).
III.
The scope of review of the Board’s decision requires a reviewing court to give deference to the Board’s discretionary determination. That decision should not be overturned absent a showing that it was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. Bressman, supra, 131 *449N.J. at 529, 621 A.2d 476. Because I find the Board acted properly, I would affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division.
Justice GARIBALDI joins in this opinion.
For reversal and remandment — Chief Justice PORITZ and Justices O’HERN, STEIN, LONG and VERNIERO — 5.
For affirmance — Justices GARIBALDI and COLEMAN — 2.