Court Opinion

ID: 9898313
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:29:52.893676+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:16.101288
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

 In the Matter of the Marriage of
                                                  No. 83271-9-I
 DONNA M. COCHENER (f/k/a DONNA
 COCHENER-METCALFE),                              DIVISION ONE

       Respondent/Cross Appellant,                UNPUBLISHED OPINION

              and

 CHRISTIAN T. METCALFE,

       Appellant/Cross Respondent.

      BIRK, J. — Donna Cochener and Christian Metcalfe filed cross petitions to

modify the parenting plan for their two children, each seeking sole decision-making

for the children’s educational and health care needs. The trial court generally

granted sole decision-making to Cochener, including for educational and medical

decisions. Metcalfe appeals, asserting several errors. We affirm the trial court’s

grant of sole decision-making to Cochener among other rulings, we reverse in part,

and we remand as further described below.

                                         I

      Donna Cochener and Christian Metcalfe were previously married. Together

they share two sons, L. and E. Both children have complex special medical and

educational needs. Cochener and Metcalfe’s original parenting plan was entered

in 2016 and directed joint decision-making. In March 2020, both parties filed

petitions to change the parenting plan, each arguing they should be granted sole
No. 83271-9-I/2

decision-making authority. The cross petitions were presented over a six day trial

from June 28 to July 9, 2021.

       Metcalfe argued, generally, that Cochener was resistant to acknowledging

and had downplayed the extent of the special needs and mental health issues of

the children, did not advocate for the children, and did not cooperate with Metcalfe

in decision-making.    Cochener argued, generally, that Metcalfe engaged in

excessive conflict, made unreasonable demands of providers, and distorted

information between the parties and providers. Eighteen witnesses testified at trial.

Metcalfe called among others experts Wendy Marlowe, PhD, whom Metcalfe hired

to conduct a records review and prepare a report, and Theodore Mandelkorn, MD,

a behavioral medicine physician who had treated L.

       Metcalfe also called Jennifer Wheeler, PhD, who served as a court-

appointed parenting evaluator. Dr. Wheeler was appointed as an agreed, court

appointed expert and provided a report and testimony concerning her evaluation

of the parents’ respective parenting skills and their interactions with medical and

educational providers. Among other things, Dr. Wheeler based her report on

interviews with Metcalfe and Cochener, as well as 18 third party professionals

familiar with L.’s and E.’s educational and health needs. Dr. Wheeler reviewed L.’s

and E.’s educational and health care records. Without objection, the trial court

admitted Dr. Wheeler’s report and notes from her interviews with the various

witnesses. Dr. Wheeler recommended the court implement sole decision-making,

suggesting that Metcalfe be responsible for health care decision-making and that

Cochener be responsible for educational decision-making.

                                         2
No. 83271-9-I/3

       The trial court found joint decision-making was no longer feasible and

“splitting decision-making” was not appropriate because “education and healthcare

decisions for these children are so intertwined as to be inseparable.” This finding

is unchallenged and is accepted as true on appeal. In re Marriage of Magnuson,

141 Wn. App. 347, 351, 170 P.3d 65 (2007).             After granting a motion for

reconsideration in part which clarified the language of several provisions, the trial

court entered the amended final order and findings on petition to change a

parenting plan, and the amended parenting plan granting sole decision-making

authority to Cochener in all areas except religious upbringing.

                                          II

       We address first Metcalfe’s challenge to the trial court’s granting Cochener

sole decision-making authority. Metcalfe assigns error to several findings of fact,

and the trial court’s legal conclusions flowing from them. Metcalfe argues the trial

court “abused its discretion by ordering sole decisionmaking to [Cochener] for all

decisions except religious upbringing.” Metcalfe assigns error to the trial court’s

decisions that Cochener may make any major decision 14 days after notifying

Metcalfe, that Cochener may schedule all of the children’s appointments, and that

the parenting plan is in the best interests of the children. Metcalfe further argues

the trial court abused its discretion by finding any harm caused to the children by

changes to the parenting plan is outweighed by the benefits.

                                          A

       We first consider Metcalfe’s challenges to certain findings of fact. “The trial

court’s findings of fact will be accepted as verities by the reviewing court so long

                                          3
No. 83271-9-I/4

as they are supported by substantial evidence.” In re Marriage of Katare, 175

Wn.2d 23, 35, 283 P.3d 546 (2012).             “Substantial evidence is that which is

sufficient to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth of the matter asserted.” Id.

                                           1

       Metcalfe challenges portions of finding 17, among them, that Metcalfe’s

“reaction to tutor Eliza Furmansky’s request for [L.] not to use a calculator on

certain worksheets was outrageous. [L.] experienced discomfort as a result.”

       In November 2019, Metcalfe came into conflict with Eliza Furmansky, L.’s

tutor since 2016. Furmansky had instructed L. to complete a times table work

sheet without the aid of a calculator. Metcalfe sent an e-mail that stated L.’s IEP

(individualized education program) allowed use of a calculator in all school

settings, and that he would be “honoring that accommodation.”             Furmansky

explained her rationale regarding calculator use for this exercise.          Metcalfe

responded, “I understand your opinion, but you misunderstand your role with my

and [Cochener’s] son. You are not the decision maker. If you’ll neither honor [L.]’s

legal rights under his IEP or my co-equal decision making authority as his parent,

I wonder if you want to continue working with [L.]?” In the final e-mail on the

subject, Metcalfe said, “I also suspect that per Title III of the ADA / ADAAA[1] that

your business can not legally deny this reasonable accommodation to my son—

and that to do so would constitute discrimination.” “So to be clear if you are to

continue to work with [L.] you need to follow the IEP and allow him to use a

calculator—even for simple math. If you can’t follow that guideline then I do not

       1
           Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 37.

                                           4
No. 83271-9-I/5

believe you should continue to work with [L.]. If you still object ask yourself if

[Cochener] would succeed at getting a judge/arbitrator to go against [L.]’s

Dep[artment] of Education / Federally backed IEP. (I’d think that highly unlikely).”

Metcalfe took L.’s binder and attached “not one, but two calculators as well as

taping over [Furmansky’s directions].” Furmansky testified, “[I]t felt like he was

trying to get [L.] to start a fight with me.” Furmansky described Metcalfe’s e-mails

as “condescending, patronizing, threatening, hurtful, . . . and . . . ridiculous.” While

Furmansky continued to work with L. after the conflict with Metcalfe, she “would

not attempt to ask for him to support [L.] in specific ways at home again . . . because

that would cause more trouble than be a support.”

          Metcalfe’s e-mail communications with Furmansky and Furmansky’s

testimony are substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that his

reaction was “outrageous.” As a result of the conflicting instructions, L. “expressed

some embarrassment and sadness” when Furmansky began to erase answers

that had been completed with a calculator. This is substantial evidence supporting

the finding that L. experienced discomfort. This challenged aspect of finding of

fact 17 is supported by substantial evidence.

                                           2

          Metcalfe challenges the portion of finding of fact 17 stating Metcalfe’s

“interpersonal communication has alienated important people in [L.] and [E.]’s

lives.”

          Evidence showed that in fall 2018, Metcalfe abruptly and unilaterally

terminated L.’s ABA therapy services with Magnolia Behavioral Therapy (MBT)

                                           5
No. 83271-9-I/6

because he disagreed with changes to how L.’s behavior was tracked day to day.

When he learned of the change, Metcalfe requested a “pros and cons of this

approach,” and stated that if he was “not comfortable with the risks,” “I plan to

withdraw my consent for [L.] to receive services from MBT.”           Metcalfe later

responded, “Whether well intentioned or not I believe your actions and approach

to be flawed and not in the best long term interests of my son. . . . Please be

advised that as of end of day tomorrow, Fri 10/26, I withdraw my consent for you,

your firm and your providers to work with my son, [L.].” When MBT outlined the

discharge process, Metcalfe responded, “No need to complete the discharge steps

and after today MBT does not have my consent to discuss [L.] with anyone after

today. To be clear your firm and [L.’s therapist] were terminated because of her

very poor actions. This is not a mutual parting of ways. I ask for less and not more

additional actions by [MBT] so please clear out today.” Cochener testified L. was

“very upset to not say goodbye to [his therapist] and had some . . . outbursts over

it and some crying over it.” Dana Doering, Guardian Ad Litem (GAL) for both

children, affirmed that after Metcalfe’s decision to terminate MBT’s services, L. was

without ABA therapy for several months while the parties were in a dispute about

choosing a new therapist.

       Carla Hershman, L.’s mental health therapist, reported to Dr. Wheeler, “ ‘It

appeared to me that his dad is highly sensitive. . . it felt as though any wrong word

from me would potentially end the relationship. . . [L.] has not had the chance to

build long-term relationships with providers, with some exceptions, because dad

finds reasons that people are not good enough, and pulls him.’ ”

                                         6
No. 83271-9-I/7

       Metcalfe filed complaints against six providers. Metcalfe argues this is a

limited number out of the total number of service providers. Metcalfe assembled

a list of 57 providers by reviewing insurance claims. The list included providers

who had never interacted with the children.          The providers Metcalfe filed

complaints against were closely involved with the children, including E.’s daycare,

L.’s behavioral therapist, and the school both children attended for years. As

discussed in section II.A.4. below, multiple providers testified that Metcalfe’s

manner of interaction negatively impacted their relationships with Metcalfe and

affected the quality of services they were able to provide. There is substantial

evidence to support the finding that Metcalfe alienated important people in the

children’s lives.

                                            3

       Metcalfe challenges the portion of finding of fact 17 stating “that [Metcalfe]

engaged in ‘poor behaviors and actions.’ ” The trial court’s sentence reads in full:

“Intent cannot be an excuse for poor behaviors and actions; particularly when the

result negatively impacts [L.] and [E.].”

       In January 2019, when Metcalfe felt a teacher was not providing the level

of detail he wanted in a conversation, Metcalfe made a formal request for an in-

person meeting, in accordance with the Spruce Street School’s grievance policy.

The school asked Metcalfe to clarify what his grievance was. Metcalfe responded

with a lengthy e-mail further challenging the school’s response to his initial

complaint.    Throughout the exchange, Metcalfe’s e-mails were lengthy and

repetitive.

                                            7
No. 83271-9-I/8

       In May 2019, Metcalfe requested Spruce Street implement a specific

behavior log for L. Metcalfe said he was requesting the log “not because he’s

having significant difficulty right now, but rather to better support his success.”

When teachers stated that they did not think a behavior log was needed for L.,

Metcalfe responded, in part, “[I]f Spruce Street School is unwilling to workout [sic]

a compromise to better support [L.] this year it makes me question its ability and

willingness to support him next year.” On May 10, 2019, Metcalfe asked Dr.

Mandelkorn to provide a doctor’s note recommending the specific daily feedback

system for L. Dr. Mandelkorn provided such a note. The note stated L. “has been

diagnosed to have Autism Spectrum Disorder and Attention Deficit Disorder.” L.

had not been formally diagnosed with autism at that time, and Dr. Mandelkorn

testified he is not an expert in autism or special education. At a meeting on May

17, 2019, Metcalfe presented Spruce Street with Dr. Mandelkorn’s letter.

Cochener was not advised of the meeting beforehand, and Metcalfe did not send

her a copy of the letter until after the meeting.

       In June 2019, L. was formally diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder.

Cochener and Metcalfe agreed to refrain from telling L. about his diagnosis until

they could collaborate on how to discuss it with him. Metcalfe did not honor this

agreement, and instead informed Cochener by e-mail in late August 2019 that he

had shared L.’s diagnosis with him. Cochener reported this information was a

source of distress for L., and that “ ‘[i]t was hurtful to [her] that [she] wasn’t allowed

to be part of that conversation… it limited my ability to talk about his autism with

[L.] for a while.” (Some alterations in original.)

                                            8
No. 83271-9-I/9

       The GAL recommended the parties delay sharing the report of Metcalfe’s

retained litigation expert, Dr. Marlowe, with Seattle Public Schools as part of the

formulation of an IEP for L. Metcalfe ignored this recommendation and sent Dr.

Marlowe’s report to Seattle Public Schools. Doering stated it was not reasonable

to put this report into the IEP process, “or to have a non-neutral report that was

conflicted between parents confound what was supposed to have been a very

collaborative process.”

       Dr. Wheeler testified Metcalfe “has a very logical, rational basis for every

one of his efforts to get a third party involved to resolve these disputes or

dilemma. . . . [W]hat he misses . . . or fails to adequately . . . take into account is

the collective impact each of those individual efforts both on people’s impressions

of him as . . . being this high conflict person, but also the impact it has on

individuals.” Dr. Wheeler stated Metcalfe’s conduct is experienced by others as

“overwhelming and frustrating and intense and overcommunicating,” and that this

negatively impacts the children.

       There is substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that

Metcalfe engaged in behaviors and actions that negatively affected the children,

and were appropriately characterized as “poor” in that respect.

                                          4

       Metcalfe challenges the portion of trial court’s finding 13 that states

Cochener has “less deficits than [Metcalfe] in the area of interpersonal

communication.” (Boldface omitted.)

                                          9
No. 83271-9-I/10

       Dr. Wheeler’s report indicated Cochener had difficulty seeing merit in

Metcalfe’s perspective because of her perception of his fomenting conflict. This

led to Cochener “contribut[ing] to their ongoing high-conflict dynamic.” Furmansky

testified Cochener had “positive and really good, clear communication.”          Dr.

Wheeler testified Cochener was not resistant to accepting any diagnoses of the

children from medical professionals, and none of the professionals Dr. Wheeler

spoke to had concerns about Cochener’s decision-making in medical or

educational issues for the children.

       The GAL testified that Metcalfe revisited the same issues repeatedly, while

Cochener rarely did.

       Karen Brady, Executive Director of Ryther, which provided ABA services to

L., was reported by Dr. Wheeler as stating, “ ‘The amount of contact I have had

with [Metcalfe] is extraordinary… the number of phone calls and emails and

meetings I have had with him is extraordinary. It is unlike any other interaction I

have had in this job.’ ”   (Alteration in original.)   Brady stated Ryther had to

implement a communication plan under which Metcalfe was allowed to e-mail only

once per week because “ ‘[h]e had a pattern of emailing a variety of people and

asking for different things… it was hard to manage that.’ ” (Second alteration in

original.) Brady stated Metcalfe “ ‘was okay with [a therapist] working with his son

when he knew she didn’t have a certification,’ ” but then “ ‘filed a complaint with

[the Department of Health].’ ” After not receiving the outcome he sought in a

meeting, Metcalfe responded, “ ‘I am so sorry I have to do this, but I have to file a

complaint.’ ” Brady described Metcalfe as “extraordinary in terms of the amount of

                                         10
No. 83271-9-I/11

time and demands he has,” stating he stood out as “noteworthy” and “singular” in

Brady’s “28 years of being at Ryther.” A teacher at L.’s school similarly described

communicating with Metcalfe about days when L. lacked one-to-one support as

“unique in my 26 years of teaching” for “how belligerent and persistent” Metcalfe

could be.

       Briel Schmitz, head of Spruce Street School, testified, “[Cochener] has been

clear. I’ve never had any miscommunication.” When asked about communication

with Metcalfe, Schmitz said, “[O]ver time, . . . the dynamic . . . changed from the

school leading the conversation and providing . . . our expertise to [Metcalfe] never

being satisfied, . . . wanting to tell us how to do our work, not respecting our

opinions . . . it became very challenging to work together.” Spruce Street required

a parent communication plan be put in place in order to allow L. to continue

attendance. A court later ordered a parent communication plan to facilitate E.’s

attendance as well. Schmitz said, “I feel like I was emotionally abused in this

situation and taken advantage of.” Schmitz said, “I’ve worked with a lot of kids

who have different challenges and needs and this is, by far, the most extreme, the

most difficult.”

       This testimony, as well as the evidence noted above, is substantial evidence

supporting the trial court’s finding that between the two parents, communication

deficits manifested to a lesser extent with Cochener than with Metcalfe.

                                         5

       Metcalfe argues substantial evidence does not support a portion of the trial

court’s finding 10, which states, “Mother and Father have drawn other people and

                                         11
No. 83271-9-I/12

their children into their conflicts, such as when Father tried to persuade Spruce

Street volunteers and staff to rescind Mother’s nomination to the board of

directors.”

       In April 2019, Metcalfe contacted Spruce Street to discuss his conflict with

Cochener concerning an incident that occurred at E.’s daycare in May 2018. The

incident was before E. started at Spruce Street, in August 2018. Cochener served

on the board of the school. Citing the conflict, Metcalfe made three requests of

Spruce Street, including (1) that Cochener be precluded from serving on the

compensation or governance committees or as President so long as either of the

children are enrolled, (2) to “make the current and future President of the Board

aware of this situation,” (3) that administrators “work to maintain a strong working

relationship with both [Cochener] and me and . . . be willing to offer unvarnished

feedback to either or both of us that would benefit our children.” On April 30, 2019,

Metcalfe stated in an e-mail to Spruce Street staff: “Because of [Cochener]’s last

actions and if her role and power are likely to grow at spruce street school [sic],

especially if she were to have a say regarding [Schmitz’s] salary, I’m not sure I’ll

be comfortable having either or both of my kids continue to be students there.

(Regarding which I have joint decision making authority).”

       This evidence demonstrates Metcalfe requested Cochener’s role on the

board be limited, but it does not evidence precisely an attempt to have her

nomination rescinded. To that extent, the finding regarding Cochener’s position

on the Spruce Street board is not supported by substantial evidence precisely as

drafted. However, there is substantial evidence that the parents drew others into

                                         12
No. 83271-9-I/13

their conflict. Dr. Wheeler identified both parents’ interactions with providers as

contributing to a “high-conflict dynamic.”   Metcalfe met with Spruce Street to

discuss an incident that did not occur there. Metcalfe asked Spruce Street to limit

Cochener’s role on its board.      Finding of fact 10 is therefore supported by

substantial evidence, except to the extent it finds Metcalfe sought specifically to

have Cochener’s nomination to the board rescinded.

                                         B

       We turn next to the trial court’s grant of sole decision-making to Cochener,

the findings that doing so is in the best interest of the children and any harm is

outweighed by the benefits, and the court’s decision to impose provisions allowing

Cochener to make major decisions 14 days after inviting Metcalfe’s input, and to

schedule the children’s appointments.

       RCW 26.09.187(2)(b)(ii) states, “The court shall order sole decision-making

to one parent when it finds that . . . [b]oth parents are opposed to mutual decision

making.” A trial court’s decision to modify a parenting plan is reviewed for abuse

of discretion. In re Marriage of Zigler, 154 Wn. App. 803, 808, 226 P.3d 202 (2010).

A trial court’s decision will not be reversed unless the court’s reasons are

untenable. In re Marriage of McDole, 122 Wn.2d 604, 610, 859 P.2d 1239 (1993).

“A court’s decision is manifestly unreasonable if it is outside the range of

acceptable choices, given the facts and the applicable legal standard.” In re

Marriage of Fiorito, 112 Wn. App. 657, 664, 50 P.3d 298 (2002). “A trial judge

generally evaluates fact based domestic relations issues more frequently than an

appellate judge and a trial judge’s day-to-day experience warrants deference upon

                                        13
No. 83271-9-I/14

review.” In re Parentage of Jannot, 149 Wn.2d 123, 127, 65 P.3d 664 (2003).

When a trial court’s findings of fact are partly supported by substantial evidence

and partly not, we consider the extent to which the unchallenged and supported

findings justify the trial court’s legal conclusions. See Andren v. Dake, 14 Wn. App.

2d 296, 319, 472 P.3d 1013 (2020).

       The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted sole decision-

making to Cochener.       Both Metcalfe and Cochener were opposed to mutual

decision making.     The trial court considered evidence and witness testimony

presented over a multi-day trial, weighed that evidence, and arrived at findings of

fact that are either unchallenged and accepted as true on appeal, or, as discussed

above, supported by substantial evidence in the record. These findings provide a

tenable basis for the trial court to conclude that Cochener is better suited to hold

sole decision-making authority for L. and E.

       The trial court did not err when it found such a change is in the best interest

of the children and any harm is outweighed by the benefits. Metcalfe argues the

harm to L. and E. is that Cochener will not adequately advocate for appropriate

service levels from educational and health care providers. The trial court did not

enter a finding that this is true, and it was entitled to find that any risk was counter-

balanced by Cochener’s lesser likelihood of alienating important provider

relationships. In an unchallenged finding, the court stated, “Mother and Father

cannot co-parent, which is especially troubling because the special needs of their

children demand frequent decision-making and information sharing.” In another

unchallenged finding, the trial court stated, “The intensity of the co-parenting

                                           14
No. 83271-9-I/15

dynamic is so extreme that multiple expert and lay witnesses testified the children

are suffering. Their children have complained. The parents themselves agreed

during trial they cannot make decisions together without intervention or support

from intermediators.” These findings, together with the finding that Cochener has

less deficit in the area of interpersonal communication, provide a tenable basis for

the trial court to conclude it is in the best interests of the children that Cochener

hold sole decision-making, and that any harm of such an arrangement is

outweighed by the benefits. These findings also justified the ruling that Cochener

may make all of the children’s appointments, and may make major decisions 14

days after notifying Metcalfe.

                                          III

       Metcalfe asserts it was error for the trial court to place “great weight” on Dr.

Wheeler’s testimony, together with determining it would “not put great weight” on

Dr. Marlowe’s and Dr. Mandelkorn’s opinions. Metcalfe argues the trial court erred

by “rejecting the testimony of Dr. Marlowe and Dr. Mandelkorn and relying instead

upon lay opinions,” and challenges the finding that “Dr. Mandelkorn admitted he

had very little contact with Cochener upon which to formulate his opinion.” The

experts’ testimony provides support for the trial court’s weighing of their opinions.

       Metcalfe retained Dr. Marlowe as a litigation expert to conduct a records

review and prepare a report. The evidence before the trial court was that Dr.

Marlowe’s only contacts were with Metcalfe and his attorneys, and she reviewed

records that Metcalfe provided to her. Dr. Marlowe based her opinions of the

children’s academic performance on evaluations from 2019, and testified she did

                                          15
No. 83271-9-I/16

not know where E.’s reading levels were at the time of the hearing. Nevertheless,

Dr. Marlowe stated E. was not able to read at the time of the hearing, and that he

would come out of Spruce Street School a nonreader. In contrast, both Cochener

and the head of Spruce Street testified that at the time of trial, E. was a “voracious

reader.”

       Metcalfe called Dr. Mandelkorn, eliciting testimony that Metcalfe was

“pleasant to deal with,” and that Metcalfe’s e-mail communication “fell within the

expectations of the issues [they] were dealing with.” Dr. Mandelkorn had 14

appointments with L. Of those, Metcalfe attended “a preponderant number” and

Cochener attended seven. Based on only these interactions with Cochener at L.’s

appointments, in 2019, Dr. Mandelkorn stated in an e-mail to another provider that

Cochener “[h]as significant mental health problems and is [in] complete denial of

the issues.” Dr. Mandelkorn testified he had no personal knowledge of Cochener’s

mental health.

       Dr. Wheeler prepared a report by conducting 23.1 hours of interviews with

the parents, parent-child observation sessions at both parents’ homes,

psychological assessments and questionnaires with both parents and both

children, 12.3 hours of collateral interviews with medical and educational providers

involved in the children’s care, and reviewing records related to the case. Dr.

Wheeler testified Dr. Mandelkorn “was clearly given the impression . . . that

[Cochener] . . . suffered from . . . some kind of mental health disorder . . . and he

was given that impression by Mr. Metcalfe. . . . [T]hat certainly is an example of

. . . a provider being given an impression of her that . . . was inaccurate and

                                         16
No. 83271-9-I/17

negative.” Dr. Wheeler testified Dr. Marlowe was given mischaracterizations of

Cochener, stating, “[S]he was given the impression that Ms. Cochener wasn’t

involved . . . as much as she is.”

       “The factfinder is given wide latitude in the weight to give expert opinion.”

In re Marriage of Sedlock, 69 Wn. App. 484, 491, 849 P.2d 1243 (1993). The trial

court placed lesser weight on Dr. Marlowe’s testimony based on her having “had

limited interactions with Mother and the children, and her opinion is based on the

records provided by Father.”         While Cochener does not point to a particular

omission in the records Metcalfe provided to Dr. Marlowe, the context of the trial

court’s weighing of her testimony was in contrast to Dr. Wheeler’s evaluation,

which the trial court stated was “extremely thorough, and includes hours of

interviews with both parents, the children, and providers.” Likewise, the trial court

placed lesser weight on Dr. Mandelkorn’s opinion, because he “had very little

contact” with Cochener upon which to form his opinion.

       Metcalfe nevertheless relies on In re Marriage of Leaver, 20 Wn. App. 2d

228, 499 P.3d 222 (2021) to argue the trial court abused its discretion in making

these credibility determinations. There, in the context of spousal maintenance, a

spouse presented expert testimony, which was not countered by any other expert,

that his long-standing mental health conditions significantly impaired his ability to

join the workforce and gain financial independence. Id. at 230. However, the trial

court adopted the other spouse’s lay opinion that he “could do more if he would

just put his mind to it.” Id. This court found this was an abuse of discretion and

reversed. Id. at 231. We were careful to observe that the trial court was not

                                           17
No. 83271-9-I/18

necessarily required to arrive at a particular ultimate decision concerning

maintenance, even though it was required to base its decision on evidence that

did not violate the prohibition on lay opinion testimony. Id. at 241. Leaver is

distinguishable. First, in this case Dr. Marlowe’s and Dr. Mandelkorn’s testimony

are contrasted by Dr. Wheeler’s testimony, so it is not a case in which any one

expert’s views were without countervailing evidence. Second, the court did not

admit lay opinion testimony and credit it over qualified expert testimony. In placing

greater weight on Dr. Wheeler’s testimony than on Dr. Marlowe’s or Dr.

Mandelkorn’s, the trial court made an ordinary credibility determination, which we

do not revisit on appeal. See In re Marriage of Rideout, 150 Wn.2d 337, 352, 77

P.3d 1174 (2003).

                                         IV

       Metcalfe argues he was subjected to federally-prohibited retaliation by

Spruce Street School for “his advocacy on behalf of his children.” The Disability

Rights Education and Defense Fund (DREDF) submitted an amicus brief and

presented oral argument. DREDF argues “the trial court displayed a troubling lack

of consideration for father’s right to advocate for his son. The trial court made no

attempt to determine whether appellant’s advocacy was protected activity before

(mis)characterizing that advocacy as a defect in appellant’s parenting.” At oral

argument, counsel for DREDF argued their complaint is that the trial court did not

specifically mention that it was being careful not to hold advocacy against Metcalfe.

Wash. Court of Appeals oral argument, In re Marriage of Cochener, No. 83271-9

                                         18
No. 83271-9-I/19

(Jun. 15, 2023), at 2 min., 26 sec. to 2 min., 38 sec., https://tvw.org/video/division-

1-court-of-appeals-2023061201/.

       In its brief, DREDF cites cases in which third parties who had advocated for

disabled students sued school districts for failure to meet federal requirements.

For example, in North Kitsap School District v. K.W., 130 Wn. App. 347, 352-53,

123 P.3d 469 (2005), grandparents sued a school district for failing to provide a

free appropriate public education to their grandchild under the Individuals with

Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-91. DREDF also cites a case

holding that advocacy on behalf of disabled students is a protected activity under

the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12203; 28 C.F.R. §

35.130(b). Barker v. Riverside County Office of Educ., 584 F.3d 821 (9th Cir.

2009). In Barker a teacher sued a county office of education, alleging retaliation

after she filed a lawsuit on behalf of disabled students. Id. at 827. However,

neither Metcalfe nor DREDF cites authority holding that any federal law imposes

any substantive requirements on a state court deciding the issue of decision-

making in a parenting plan according to state law. Regulations under the IDEA

acknowledge that state courts may limit decision-making to one parent, providing

that if “a judicial decree or order identifies a specific person or persons under

paragraphs (a)(1) through (4) of this section to act as the ‘parent’ of a child or to

make educational decisions on behalf of a child, then such person or persons shall

be determined to be the ‘parent’ for purposes of this section.”          34 C.F.R. §

300.30(b)(2). A federal court has rejected a parent’s argument that her federal

rights under IDEA could supersede a state court’s authority to grant sole

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No. 83271-9-I/20

educational decision-making to the other parent. Taylor v. Vt. Dep’t of Educ., 313

F.3d 768, 772 (2nd Cir. 2002). There, the court stated, “We decline plaintiff’s

invitation to federalize the law of domestic relations and hold that the IDEA . . .

leave[s] intact a state’s authority to determine who may make educational

decisions on behalf of a child.” Id. Another federal court applying the IDEA stated

that “nothing in the IDEA overrides states’ allocation of authority as part of a

custody determination,” and observed that the rights granted to parents in IDEA

do not supersede state courts’ authority. Navin v. Park Ridge Sch. Dist. 64, 270

F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir. 2001).

       We do not agree the trial court based its determination concerning decision-

making on any actions by Metcalfe characterizable as advocacy protected by

federal law. The trial court focused on the manner of Metcalfe’s communications

with the children’s educational and health care providers, which the trial court

found was deleterious to the children’s relationship with key providers. The trial

court did not rely on the content of Metcalfe’s communications nor criticize at any

point his right to seek appropriate care for his children. Its findings were that his

communication style was interfering with the children’s ability to receive the

support they needed. Federal law contemplates, and Washington law directs, that

in such circumstances a state court may appoint one parent as sole decision-

maker. RCW 29.09.187; Taylor, 313 F.3d at 772.            Metcalfe’s and DREDF’s

argument that the trial court’s decision ran afoul of any federal protections for

students with disability is meritless.

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No. 83271-9-I/21

                                           V

       During a break between witnesses, while discussing the fact that testimony

had taken longer than expected, the trial court noted to Cochener’s counsel, “I

have noticed that with the professional witnesses . . . your budget for cross-

examination has been a little under,” and expressed concern that Dr. Wheeler’s

testimony the next day would take more than the planned time. Cochener’s

counsel stated, “[F]or the record . . . Dr. Marlowe was very defensive and . . . I

think also nonresponsive . . . she used up more time than I think was

necessary. . . . And with Dr. Mandelkorn, there were a lot of objections that

increased my time.” After some additional discussion, the trial court stated, “[I]t’s

a trend and . . . I shouldn’t say it’s a trend with . . . all the professional witnesses.

I think it’s just . . . happens to be with doctors that this has happened. . . . [A]nd

doctors are notoriously terrible witnesses, so I can appreciate.”

       Metcalfe argues this stated an opinion that doctors are “terrible witnesses”

and worked to his disadvantage because he relied on Dr. Mandelkorn and Dr.

Marlowe. Cochener counters that “[t]aken in context, the trial court was merely

commenting on the length of time that [Cochener]’s cross-examination of both Drs.

Mandelkorn and Marlowe was taking.” Further, quoting the trial court’s findings of

fact, Cochener argues, “The trial court was clearly not biased against ‘doctors’ . . .

because it ‘placed great weight on [Dr. Wheeler’s] testimony.’ ” The trial court’s

statement cannot fairly be construed either as a statement about the value of

testimony by doctors or as bias. We find no error, and even if we did, any error in

this isolated comment would be harmless. See State v. Gonzales, 90 Wn. App.

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No. 83271-9-I/22

852, 855, 954 P.2d 360 (1998) (a harmless error is one “which is trivial, formal, or

merely academic and which in no way affects the outcome of the case.”).

                                           VI

       During Dr. Marlowe’s testimony, the trial court asked, “[Y]ou are aware, of

course, that the Seattle Public Schools have been sued any number of times for

not providing meaningful education to children, right? . . . I’m just curious . . . in

general we’ve all had the experience, I think it’s common sense that Seattle Public

Schools does not have a stellar reputation for providing . . . specially designed

education services for children. So why do you think that they would do that for

[E.] when they haven’t done it for so many children?” Dr. Marlowe responded,

“Well, they did a good job in [L.’s] IEP.” She went on “[a]nd I know that they really

care about kids and . . . I have seen . . . the services that they’ve provided for kids.”

       Metcalfe portrays this as an injection by the trial court of its own impression

of events outside of the evidence. Metcalfe cites Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S.

540, 555, 114 S. Ct. 1147, 127 L. Ed. 2d 474 (1994). Liteky states,

       [O]pinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or
       events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior
       proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion
       unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that
       would make fair judgment impossible. Thus, judicial remarks during
       the course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile
       to, counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a
       bias or partiality challenge. They may do so if they reveal an opinion
       that derives from an extrajudicial source; and they will do so if they
       reveal such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make
       fair judgment impossible.

Id.

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No. 83271-9-I/23

       Even if the court’s comments were read as revealing an opinion from an

extrajudicial source, they do not “reveal such a high degree of favoritism or

antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible.” Id. The main issue was not

whether Spruce Street School or Seattle Public Schools would be a better fit for E.

Moreover, at the time of trial, L. was attending a Seattle public school. At no time

did the trial court question L.’s placement in Seattle Public Schools, and nothing in

the trial court’s final oral ruling or written orders suggests that its determination

about decision-making was based on an expectation about whether the children

would attend Seattle Public Schools, let alone an opinion by the court about the

appropriateness of their doing so. Further, even if the comment was error, any

error would be harmless in view of the evidence and issues in the case.

                                          VII

       Metcalfe challenges a provision of the parenting plan that reads in part: “No

parent will put down Christianity to or in front of the children, or allow other

members of their household to put down either parents’ spirituality.” Metcalfe

argues the trial court’s wording of the religious upbringing provision violates the

First Amendment.

       The provision was not discussed until a posttrial hearing.         Cochener’s

counsel stated, “Ms. Cochener just wants to be sure that Mr. Metcalfe does not

have the ability to block her from teaching the children about her religion.” The

Court inquired as to the parents’ religious practices. Cochener identified herself

as “a practicing Christian,” and Metcalfe stated, “I don’t identify with any particular

religion.” Metcalfe stated it would not be a problem for him to teach the children to

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No. 83271-9-I/24

respect Cochener’s religion, and “I think we should both expose the kids to different

things so they can find their own way in life and be respectful to the other’s views.”

Cochener stated, “[M]y only concern is that my children have expressed that they

have been told denigrating things about Christianity in their dad’s house. . . . I have

no concern about raising my children with a respect for all religions and beliefs and

non-beliefs.” The Court responded, “So any negative comments about Christianity

made to the children or in front of the children . . . will be adequate cause to change

the position to sole decision-making.” The trial court subsequently incorporated

Metcalfe’s and Cochener’s agreements in the written order: “Parents have agreed

to raise their children to affirm all religious traditions, appreciate the good in the

practice of other faiths, and respect those who have no religious preference. No

parent will put down Christianity to or in front of the children, or allow other

members of their household to put down either parents’ spirituality.”

       Parents have a fundamental right to make decisions regarding the care,

custody, and control of their children. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66, 120 S.

Ct. 2054, 147 L. Ed. 2d 49 (2000). The parental right to determine the child’s

religious upbringing derives both from the parents’ right to the free exercise of

religion and to the care and custody of their children. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406

U.S. 205, 215, 92 S. Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972) (“[O]nly those interests of the

highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims

to the free exercise of religion” in reference to universal compulsory education),

overruled on other grounds by Emp’t Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S. Ct.

1595, 108 L. Ed. 2d 876 (1990). A parent’s right to direct the religious upbringing

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No. 83271-9-I/25

of a child may be subject to limitation “if it appears that parental decisions will

jeopardize the health or safety of the child, or have a potential for significant social

burdens.” Id. at 233-34. Article 1, section 11 of the Washington State constitution

is more protective of religious freedom than the First Amendment. In re Marriage

of Jensen-Branch, 78 Wn. App. 482, 491, 899 P.2d 803 (1995). A Washington

court may restrict a parent from teaching children about faith “only upon a

substantial showing of potential or actual harm to the children as a result of the

children’s adverse reaction to parental conflict over the children’s religious

upbringing, and only to the degree necessary to prevent harm to the children.” Id.

at 483.

       Elsewhere, Massachusetts upheld a prohibition that a parent “shall not

share his religious beliefs with the children if those beliefs cause the children

significant emotional distress or worry about their mother or about themselves.”

Kendall v. Kendall, 426 Mass. 238, 241, 250, 687 N.E.2d 1228 (1997). A Colorado

court reversed a prohibition on homophobic religious teachings when the court

could not “determine from the findings whether the trial court applied the correct

standard in limiting [a parent’s] right to determine the child’s religious upbringing.

In re Interest of E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546, 564 (Colo. App. 2004). There, though the

other parent argued the restriction was a mere nondisparagement clause, the court

did not uphold it on that basis “because it is not so described in the trial court’s

order. Nor is it mutual.” Id.

       As written, the challenged provision limits religious topics the parents may

discuss with the children in potentially undefined and subjective ways, and is not

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No. 83271-9-I/26

specific to nondisparagement of the respective parents’ spirituality. The record

does not show the trial court analyzed whether parental decisions on religious

discussions will jeopardize the health or safety of the children. The parties agreed

at oral argument that their dispute is adequately resolved as long as the parenting

plan provides that neither parent shall disparage the other parent’s spirituality.

Wash. Court of Appeals oral argument, Cochener, No. 83271-9 (Jun. 15, 2023), at

2 min., 26 sec. to 2 min. (Cochener’s Counsel) and at 21 min. 12 sec. to 21 min.

18 sec. (Metcalfe’s Counsel), https://tvw.org/video/division-1-court-of-appeals-

2023061201/.       Such a provision would be consistent with orders concerning

religious upbringing that have been upheld. We reverse the religious upbringing

provision, and remand for the religious decision-making provision to be revised to

reflect the parties’ agreement that mutual nondisparagement of each parent’s

spirituality is sufficient.

        We otherwise affirm. We do not reach Cochener’s cross appeal. We

remand on the issue of religious decision-making only.

WE CONCUR:

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