Court Opinion

ID: 9882637
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:17:48.667545+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:00:38.244341
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Sprouse, 2023-Ohio-2983.]

                             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                 SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                      LUCAS COUNTY

State of Ohio                                     Court of Appeals No. L-22-1230

        Appellee/Cross-appellant                  Trial Court No. CR0202002013

v.

Cole Sprouse                                      DECISION AND JUDGMENT

        Appellant/Cross-appellee                  Decided: August 25, 2023

                                              *****

        Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and
        Jessica M. Worley, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

        Laurel A. Kendall, for appellant.

                                              *****

        SULEK, J.

        {¶ 1} Appellant, Cole Sprouse, appeals the August 30, 2022 judgment of the

Lucas County Court of Common Pleas which, following guilty pleas to three counts of

illegal use of a minor in nudity-oriented material or performance, second-degree felonies,

one count of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor, a fourth-degree felony, two counts of
pandering obscenity involving a minor, fourth-degree felonies, and one fifth-degree

felony count of importuning, imposed an aggregate sentence of 15 years and 10 months

of imprisonment and 3 years of postrelease control.

       {¶ 2} The state cross-appeals, maintaining that the trial court failed to: (1)

sentence Sprouse to a mandatory five-year postrelease control term under R.C.

2967.28(B); and (2) include Sprouse’s Tier I and Tier II sex offender status in the

sentencing entry.

       {¶ 3} For the reasons set forth below, the trial court did not err in imposing

consecutive sentences or in failing to include Sprouse’s Tier I and Tier II sex offender

status in the sentencing judgment; however, the trial court did err in failing to impose a

five-year postrelease control term. Accordingly, the postrelease portion of Sprouse’s

sentence is vacated and the matter is remanded for a limited resentencing on the issue of

postrelease control pursuant to R.C. 2929.191.

                             I. Facts and Procedural History

       {¶ 4} On August 26, 2020, a grand jury indicted Sprouse on eight counts of illegal

use of a minor in a nudity-oriented material or performance, five counts of pandering

obscenity involving a minor, one count of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor, one

count of importuning, and one count of interfering with custody. The charges involved

multiple victims and encompassed the time frames of April 25, 2017, to April 25, 2018,

and February 1-27, 2020

2.
       {¶ 5} Following plea negotiations with the state, Sprouse pleaded guilty to three

counts of illegal use of a minor in nudity-oriented material or performance, one count of

unlawful sexual conduct with a minor, two counts of pandering obscenity involving a

minor, and one count of importuning. The state agreed to enter a nolle prosequi as to the

remaining counts.

       {¶ 6} At the plea hearing held pursuant to Crim.R. 11, the trial court informed

Sprouse of the potential penalties including the maximum possible prison term, the five-

year mandatory postrelease control term, and Tier I and Tier II sex-offender registration

requirements (and that the Tier I reporting requirements would be absorbed into the Tier

II requirements.) Sprouse’s signed plea form reflected the notifications.

       {¶ 7} On August 29, 2022, the trial court sentenced Sprouse to consecutive

sentences totaling 15 years and 10 months of imprisonment. The court also imposed a

mandatory 18-months to 3 years of postrelease control and notified Sprouse of his Tier I

and II sex offender status and the registration requirements. Sprouse also signed an

explanation of duties form acknowledging his registration requirements. The form was

filed in the record.

       {¶ 8} The August 30, 2022 sentencing judgment entry reflected the sentence

imposed at the hearing excepting the omission of Sprouse’s specific sex offender

designations. This appeal and cross-appeal timely followed.

3.
                                II. Assignments of Error

      {¶ 9} Sprouse asserts the following assignment of error:

             The trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences for counts

      for an aggregate sentence of 15 years, ten months, which this court should

      find is disproportionate to the harm caused in this matter.

      {¶ 10} The state’s cross-appeal raises two assignments of error:

             I. Appellant is subject to a mandatory term of five years of post-

      release control.

             II. Appellant’s sex offender registry designation should be included

      in the sentencing judgment entry.

                                      III. Analysis

                                   A. Proportionality

      {¶ 11} Sprouse’s sole assignment of error argues that his 15-year, 10-month

consecutive sentence is disproportionate to the harm caused in this case. Sentencing

challenges are reviewed under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). The statute permits an appellate

court to increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence, or vacate a sentence and

remand the matter for resentencing where the court finds:

             (a) That the record does not support the sentencing court’s findings

      under division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of

4.
      section 2929.14, or division (I) of section 2929.20 of the Revised Code,

      whichever, if any, is relevant;

             (b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.

R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)

      {¶ 12} Prior to imposing a consecutive sentence, a trial court must consider the

factors under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), which relevantly provides:

             (4) If multiple prison terms are imposed on an offender for

      convictions of multiple offenses, the court may require the offender to serve

      the prison terms consecutively if the court finds that the consecutive service

      is necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the

      offender and that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the

      seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the danger the offender poses

      to the public, and if the court also finds any of the following:

             ***

             (b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of

      one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the

      multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single

      prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses

      of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender’s conduct.

5.
              (c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that

       consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime

       by the offender.

       {¶ 13} When imposing consecutive sentences, “[t]he trial court must engage in the

correct analysis, state its statutory findings during the sentencing hearing, and incorporate

those findings into its sentencing entry.” State v. Gregory, 2023-Ohio-331, 208 N.E.3d

166, ¶ 110 (6th Dist.), citing State v. Beasley, 153 Ohio St.3d 497, 2018-Ohio-493, 108

N.E.3d 1028, ¶ 253; State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio-3177, 16 N.E.3d

659, ¶ 37.

       {¶ 14} Relying on State v. Gwynne, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-4607,1 Sprouse

claims that his aggregate total sentence of nearly 16 years exceeds what is necessary to

protect the public and inflict punishment and is therefore disproportionate to the

seriousness of his conduct and the danger he poses to the public.

       {¶ 15} In Gwynne, the Supreme Court of Ohio explained a trial court’s obligations

when imposing consecutive sentences and the scope of an appellate court’s review of the

sentence. The court interpreted R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) as requiring the trial court’s

consideration of the number of consecutive sentences and the aggregate term of the

consecutive sentences that will result.

1
 An application for reconsideration was filed in Gwynne on January 3, 2023, and remains
pending at the time of this decision.

6.
       {¶ 16} Appellate review begins with a determination of whether the trial court

made the required R.C. 2929.14 (C)(4) findings. If not, the sentence if contrary to law

and it must be vacated or remanded for resentencing. Id. at ¶ 25. If the findings have

been made, appellate review of consecutive sentences under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), requires

that the court consider only the R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) findings actually made by the trial

court, the court then determines whether clear and convincing evidence supports the

findings, and finally, whether the findings are supported by the record. An appellate

court’s review of the record is de novo and assesses the “both the quantity and quality of

the evidence.” Id. at ¶ 23, 29.

       {¶ 17} Further, the “‘proportionality analysis [required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)]

“does not occur in a vacuum, but, instead, focuses upon the defendant’s current conduct

and whether this conduct, in conjunction with the defendant’s past conduct, allows a

finding that consecutive service is not disproportionate [to the seriousness of the

defendant’s conduct and to the danger the defendant poses to the public].”’” State v.

Johnson, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-22-1095, 2023-Ohio-2008, ¶ 35, quoting State v. Kelly,

2d Dist. Clark No. 2020-CA-8, 2021-Ohio-325, ¶ 80, quoting State v. Crim, 2d Dist.

Clark No. 2018-CA-38, 2018-Ohio-4996, ¶ 11.

       {¶ 18} Here, the trial court made the necessary R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) findings.

Imposing consecutive sentences the trial court stated:

7.
              The Court finds these sentences are to be served consecutively to

       one another, this being necessary to fulfill the purposes of Revised Code

       2929.11, 2929.14(E), and not disproportionate to the seriousness of the

       offender’s conduct or the danger the offender poses.

              The court further finds to protect the public from future crime or to

       punish the offender that the harm caused was great and unusual, that no

       single prison term is adequate, and that your criminal history requires

       consecutive sentencing.

       {¶ 19} Next, under Gwynne the court conducts a de novo review considering

whether the record clearly and convincingly supports the trial court’s findings. The

record demonstrates that a man in his 30s befriended a 15-year-old boy on social media

and attempted to entice him in to a sexual relationship through expensive gifts. He

specifically asked the boy if he could perform oral sex on him and sent him sexually

explicit texts. A search of Sprouse’s computer revealed over 1000 photographs of

teenage boys in stages of undress or naked. A second victim, identified from the photos,

stated that when he was 14 or 15, Sprouse contacted him and they entered into a sexual

relationship. The victim stated that Sprouse pressured him into sexual relations and

would become angry if he refused. Sprouse had a juvenile sex conviction and sex

offender treatment and prior police and agency contact relating to allegations of

inappropriate contact with minors. Sprouse was also on probation for theft.

8.
       {¶ 20} Reviewing the record de novo, we do not clearly and convincingly find that

it does not support the trial court’s findings. The above facts do not lead this court to a

firm belief that a lengthy sentence is not necessary to protect the public from Sprouse.

Nor do we have a firm belief that the sentence is disproportionate to Sprouse’s conduct.

Sprouse’s assignment of error is not well-taken.

                                   B. The Cross-appeal

       {¶ 21} As the aggrieved party, the state properly raises the following alleged

sentencing defects: the imposition of an improper postrelease control term and the

court’s failure to provide Sprouse’s sex offender designation in the sentencing judgment

entry. See State v. Bates, 167 Ohio St.3d 197, 2022-Ohio-475, 190 N.E.3d 610.

                                   1. Postrelease Control

       {¶ 22} The state’s first cross-assignment of error asserts that the trial court failed

to sentence Sprouse to a mandatory five-year postrelease control term. Sprouse argues

that any error in the imposition of postrelease control renders that portion of the sentence

void or, at minimum, requires resentencing.

       {¶ 23} Section R.C. 2967.28(B) of the postrelease control statute, provides:

              (B) Each sentence to a prison term, other than a term of life

       imprisonment, for a felony of the first degree, for a felony of the second

       degree, for a felony sex offense, or for a felony of the third degree that is an

       offense of violence and is not a felony sex offense shall include a

9.
       requirement that the offender be subject to a period of post-release control

       imposed by the parole board after the offender’s release from

       imprisonment. * * *. Unless reduced by the parole board pursuant to

       division (D) of this section when authorized under that division, a period of

       postrelease control required by this division for an offender shall be of one

       of the following periods:

              (1) For a felony sex offense, five years[.]

       {¶ 24} As elaborated upon in Bates, the above-quoted section requires the trial

court provide notice of postrelease control at the sentencing hearing and in the sentencing

judgment entry. Id. at ¶ 11-12, quoting State v. Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio-

6085, 817 N.E.2d 864, ¶ 23, overruled on other grounds, State v. Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d

480, 2020-Ohio-2913, 159 N.E.3d 248, ¶ 40. At both the sentencing hearing and in the

sentencing judgment entry, “[t]he trial court must advise the offender * * * of the term of

supervision, whether postrelease control is discretionary or mandatory, and the

consequences of violating postrelease control.” Id., citing State v. Grimes, 151 Ohio

St.3d 19, 2017-Ohio-2927, 85 N.E.3d 700, ¶ 11. “[S]entencing errors in the imposition

of postrelease control render the sentence voidable, not void, and the sentence may be set

aside if successfully challenged on direct appeal.” Harper at ¶ 42; see Bates at ¶ 13.

“And if a court improperly imposes postrelease control on a sentence imposed on or after

July 11, 2006, it may correct the sentence in accordance with the procedures set forth in

10.
R.C. 2929.191, which provides that a court must hold a hearing before issuing the

correction.” State v. Schleiger, 141 Ohio St.3d 67, 2014-Ohio-3970, 21 N.E.3d 1033,

¶ 15.

        {¶ 25} Sprouse was apprised of the mandatory 5-year postrelease control term for

felony sex offenses at the plea hearing and on the plea form. At the sentencing hearing

and in the sentencing judgment entry, however, the trial court incorrectly sentenced

Sprouse to an 18-month to 3-year postrelease-control term. The imposition of an

incorrect postrelease control term renders that portion of his sentence voidable, not void;

thus, the state’s first cross-assignment of error is well-taken.

                                   2. Sex-Offender Designation

        {¶ 26} The state’s second cross-assignment of error addresses the court’s failure to

properly include Sprouse’s designation as a Tier I and Tier II sex offender in the

sentencing judgment entry. Sprouse states that because he received proper notification at

sentencing, the exclusion of the designation was harmless error.

        {¶ 27} Where the sex-offender designation is properly imposed at sentencing but

either omitted from or incorrectly designated in the sentencing judgment entry, such error

may properly be corrected by a nunc pro tunc judgment entry. See State v. Knox, 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107414, 2019-Ohio-1246, ¶ 72; State v. Straley, 4th Dist. Highland

No. 12CA3, 2013-Ohio-3334, ¶ 17 (the offender’s Tier III sex-offender designation was

omitted from the sentencing judgment entry).

11.
       {¶ 28} R.C. 2929.19(B)(3)(a) states that “the court shall include in the offender’s

sentence a statement that the offender is a tier III sex offender/child-victim offender.”

(Emphasis added.) There is, however, no statutory requirement to include an offender’s

Tier I or Tier II sex offender designation in a final sentencing judgment.

       {¶ 29} Sprouse pleaded guilty to multiple felony sex crimes qualifying him as a

Tier I and Tier II sex offender. Although the trial court did not include Sprouse’s sex-

offender designation in the entry, there is no statutory requirement that it do so. The trial

court did, however, notify Sprouse at the sentencing hearing of his sex-offender

designation and the registration requirements in accordance with R.C. 2950.03(A)(2).

Sprouse also signed an acknowledgment that his duties under R.C. Chapter 2950 were

fully explained.

       {¶ 30} As a final matter, it is necessary to note that the First and Tenth Districts

have held that, although there is no statutory language requiring Tier I and Tier II sex

offender classifications to be included in the sentencing entry, “all sex offender tier

classifications under the AWA are part of the sanction [imposed] and must be included in

the sentencing entry.” State v. Sipple, 2021-Ohio-1319, 170 N.E.3d 1273, ¶¶ 31-32 (1st

Dist.); see also State v. Wright, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 22AP-275, 2023-Ohio-2134, ¶ 24,

citing Sipple. We disagree. Although a trial court may include Tier I and Tier II

designations in a sentencing judgment, there is no requirement that it do so.

       {¶ 31} Accordingly, the state’s second cross-assignment of error is not well-taken.

12.
                                     IV. Conclusion

       {¶ 32} The trial court’s judgment is vacated, in part, and the matter is remanded

for a limited resentencing on postrelease control pursuant to R.C. 2929.191(C). Under

App.R. 24, Sprouse is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal.

                                                                 Judgment vacated, in part,
                                                                           and remanded.

       A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.

Gene A. Zmuda, J.                              ____________________________
                                                       JUDGE
Myron C. Duhart, P.J.
                                               ____________________________
Charles E. Sulek, J.                                   JUDGE
CONCUR.
                                               ____________________________
                                                       JUDGE

       This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
  Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
       version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
                http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.

13.