Court Opinion

ID: 9849926
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:49:46.137725+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:29.260055
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.
(<dissenting).
¶ 35. The majority opinion holds that the search leading to the recovery of the defendant's wallet was a valid Chimel search. Majority op., ¶ 22. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). I disagree.
¶ 36. I also write to address an issue of appellate practice, namely, how an attorney should advise this court of an erroneous statement in his or her brief or oral argument.
*763hH
¶ 37. A Chimel search is a search incident to a lawful arrest that allows law enforcement to search the area within the arrestee's "immediate control." Law enforcement may search the area immediately surrounding the arrestee, for their protection and to preserve evidence.1 Unless this search fits into the Chimel exception, it is a warrantless search and is per se unreasonable under Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.2
¶ 38. The only evidence of the arrestee's physical relation to the wallet was that the arrestee was on a couch in the same room as was the wallet. At the suppression hearing the officer who picked up and searched the wallet had the following to say about the wallet's location: "I think [the defendant] just nodded with his head and pointed to the area of the living room where the cedar chest was[; the wallet was under the cedar chest]." (R. 15:43.) This testimony suggests only that the wallet was in the living room, nothing more.
¶ 39. That the arrestee and the evidence are in the same room is simply insufficient under our case law to validate a search incident to an arrest. Our court has *764stated that "[although an entire room might be an area into which an arrestee might gain access to a weapon or evidence, the Chimel standard authorizes a more limited scope of search which recognizes that rooms differ in size, shape and design."3 Nothing in the record suggests the size, shape, and design of the living room. Nor does the record indicate where the officers and the defendant were in the undescribed living room. The State carries the burden of persuasion in justifying a Chimel search and this record is insufficient for that purpose.4
¶ 40. The State and the courts have struggled to find a theory to save the evidence from suppression. At the suppression hearing the State argued that the officer looked in the wallet only to confirm identity. The circuit court, in denying the motion to suppress, held that the officer picked up the wallet because he was directed to it by the defendant, or in the alternative, that the wallet was in plain view. The circuit court did not, however, find that the defendant had consented to the search.5 The court of appeals upheld the search on grounds not argued by the parties, namely, that the search of the wallet was a reasonable search incident to a lawful arrest. The court of appeals did not cite Chimel, and in citing Murdock only once, did not do so for any proposition related to a Chimel search.
*765¶ 41. The majority opinion agrees with the court of appeals, but must overcome a hurdle the court of appeals overlooked, namely, whether the search was confined to the area permissible under Chimel. To overcome this difficulty, the majority opinion "infer[s]" that the officer's search was confined to the area permissible under Chimel. Majority op., ¶¶ 21-22. Although the State may be entitled to reasonable inferences from the evidence presented, nothing in the record allows a court to infer the size, shape, and design of the room, facts necessary to justify a Chimel search under this court's and the U.S. Supreme Court's jurisprudence.6
¶ 42. The lack of this evidence is not surprising; it is perfectly understandable. The case was not tried on the theory of a reasonable search incident to an arrest, and through no fault of law enforcement officers, no testimony about the area within the arrestee's immediate control was introduced at the suppression hearing.
¶ 43. Cognizant of the record's deficiency and the weakness of its reliance on an "inference" that the wallet was within the permissible searchable area, the majority opinion relies on what it characterizes as the defendant's "apparent concession, that law enforcement's search was confined to the area immediately surrounding" him. Majority op., ¶ 21. The majority is apparently asserting that the defendant conceded the validity of the Chimel search because he did not argue that the wallet was outside the searchable area, even though he contested the validity of the search. The majority opinion cites no authority for its language about concession.
*766¶ 44. The defendant never made such a concession on the record or in his briefs. The court of appeals raised the question whether the search could be justified as a "protective sweep"7 and apparently the parties argued this issue before the court of appeals. Neither the State nor the defendant argued in any court about the Chimel issue of the scope of the search, although the defendant argued that the search of the wallet was not permissible within the scope of a pat down.
¶ 45. The majority opinion errs. That the search did not comply with Chimel is plain error. The scope of the search affects substantial constitutional rights of the defendant, and this court should reach the issue and hold that the State failed to meet its burden to prove that the search was in the area within the arrestee's immediate control. A reversal of conviction is required when plain error was committed.8 At a minimum the court should ask the parties to brief this issue, instead of relying on a non-existent concession or waiver.
¶ 46. The majority opinion has relieved the State of its burden of establishing that the evidence was within the arrestee's immediate control and that the search falls under one of the " 'jealously and carefully drawn'" exceptions to the warrant requirement. Indeed, by asserting the defendant's failure to argue a point upon which the State clearly has the burden of *767persuasion, the majority opinion flips the burden of persuasion from the State to the defendant.
¶ 47. Even if I were to agree with the remaining portions of the majority opinion — and I have my doubts —the record, despite the majority opinion's attempts to rectify its shortcomings, does not support the conclusion that the State has met its burden of persuasion under Chimel.
¶ 48. Professor LaFave writes that when reviewing Chimel searches, some courts view a defendant "as a combination acrobat and Houdini who might well free himself from his restraints and suddenly gain access to some distant place."9 Here, the majority opinion has magically produced a valid Chimel search without a record delineating the location of the evidence in relation to the location of the arrestee. Like any illusionist's magical sleight of hand, the majority opinion is mystifying and puzzling, but ultimately not what it appears. I therefore dissent.
II
¶ 49. I also write to address an issue of appellate practice, namely, how an attorney should advise this court of an erroneous statement in his or her brief or oral argument.
¶ 50. On November 17, 2004, five days after oral arguments in this case, the experienced Assistant Attorney General representing the State filed a motion entitled: "MOTION TO CORRECT STATEMENTS MADE DURING ORAL ARGUMENT." The State requested permission to submit a letter correcting statements made during oral arguments about an appellate decision, stating in part:
*768The state is not submitting the proposed letter with this motion because the state does not want to place the additional information before the court in the above-entitled case before receiving permission from the court to do so. A draft of the letter has been prepared and it would be approximately three pages long to identify the locations of the oral argument where the incorrect statements were made, to explain the correct holding of the appellate decision and to explain how the [State's] statements were incorrect in reporting the holding of the case.
¶ 51. What was remarkable about the State's motion is that the three-page double-spaced motion conspicuously and cryptically failed to mention the name of the erroneously represented case, the name of the "appellate court" issuing the erroneously represented case, the holding of the erroneously represented case, or how essential the erroneously represented case was to the State's position. In my nearly 28 years on this court I cannot recall ever seeing a similarly worded motion. The ordinary practice is for a party's counsel to submit a letter to the court and to opposing counsel correcting any misstatement.
¶ 52. The court denied the State's request in an unpublished order dated April 22, 2005, stating: "The court appreciates the candor of the State in wanting to correct any misstatement made during oral argument. However, because the court relied on its own reading of the cases used in its decision and not on any statement made by the State during oral argument, it is not necessary to correct the representation that was made."
¶ 53. Justice Ann Walsh Bradley and I were the sole dissenters to the order. We would have granted the State's motion, given the cost and time the parties invest in preparing for cases and the importance of the adversarial system.
*769¶ 54. This court should care about representations made by parties. When a party that will ultimately prevail (although the State could not have known that fact when it submitted the motion) submits a motion to this court offering to correct an error, we should be receptive. We need all the help we can get.
¶ 55. The message that emerges from this court's order denying the State's motion should not be that the court does not care about what you say during oral argument. The court does care. The message for future litigants is: Do not ask permission to correct misstatements made at oral arguments or in the briefs, just do it.
¶ 56. For the reasons set forth, I write separately.
¶ 57. I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY and Justice LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR. join this separate dissenting opinion.

 See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969); State v. Murdock, 155 Wis. 2d 217, 231, 455 N.W.2d 618 (1990); 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 6.3(b) (4th ed. 2004).
Under Chimel, police may conduct a limited search of the area immediately surrounding an arrestee, " 'the area from within which [the arrestee] might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.'" State v. Murdock, 155 Wis. 2d 217, 236, 455 N.W.2d 618 (1990) (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)).

 State v. Murdock, 155 Wis. 2d 217, 22, 455 N.W.2d 618 (1990).

 Murdock, 155 Wis. 2d at 236. We continued in Murdock, in language relevant here: "Thus, [a bright-line allowance of searches of the room in which the arrest takes place], while attractively clear cut on its face, is overly broad. As such, it is in direct conflict with the express language of Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763 ...." Id. at 217-18.

 Murdock, 155 Wis. 2d at 222.

 The majority opinion acknowledges that the defendant did not consent to the search. Majority op., ¶ 21 n.6.

 Murdock, 155 Wis. 2d at 217.

 See State v. Horngren, 2000 WI App 177, ¶ 20, 238 Wis. 2d 347, 617 N.W.2d 508 (relating to a protective sweep in a search incident to an arrest and a caretaker search). See Notice of Oral Argument, Wisconsin Court of Appeals, September 29, 2003.

 State v. King, 205 Wis. 2d 81, 87-91, 555 N.W.2d 189 (1996); State v. Sonnenberg, 117 Wis. 2d 159, 176-77, 344 N.W.2d 95 (1984).

 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 6.3(c) (2004).