Court Opinion

ID: 9409786
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-19 15:05:15.809551+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:53.447547
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                              FOURTH DISTRICT

                      LAWRENCE TYLER HOWARD,
                             Appellant,

                                     v.

                          STATE OF FLORIDA,
                               Appellee.

                              No. 4D22-2656

                              [July 19, 2023]

   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit,
St. Lucie County; Steven J. Levin, Judge; L.T. Case No. 56-2019-CF-
001586-A.

  Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Paul Edward Petillo, Assistant
Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

   Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Anesha Worthy,
Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

DAMOORGIAN, J.

    Lawrence Tyler Howard (“Defendant”) appeals his conviction and
sentence for one count of leaving the scene of an accident involving death
following an open plea of no-contest, and the denial of his rule 3.800
motion to correct sentencing error. Defendant raises several issues on
appeal, only one of which has merit. He argues the trial court erred in
imposing a special condition of probation prohibiting early termination of
probation without the State’s approval. We agree and reverse.

   By imposing the special condition prohibiting early termination of
probation without the State’s approval, the trial judge effectively prevented
the circuit court in the future from exercising its authority to discharge
Defendant’s probation early. This is impermissible. See Baker v. State,
619 So. 2d 411, 412 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (striking special condition
providing the defendant could not be considered for early termination of
probation “because a trial judge is not authorized to divest the Department
of Corrections of its authority to recommend early termination of
probation” or “empowered to prevent the circuit court in the future from
exercising its authority to discharge a probationer”); Jones v. State, 666
So. 2d 191, 192 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (striking condition which prohibited
early termination of probation until the probationer completed a sex
offender program because the condition was impermissibly calculated to
divest the Department of Corrections of its authority to recommend early
termination of probation and, consequently, to prevent the circuit court in
the future from exercising its authority to discharge the probationer).

   Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the trial court to strike the
condition of probation prohibiting early termination of probation without
the State’s approval. We otherwise affirm Defendant’s conviction and
sentence.

   Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.

WARNER and KUNTZ, JJ., concur.

                           *         *        *

   Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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