Court Opinion

ID: 9384383
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-03 18:04:17.222254+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:53.110284
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/30/23 P. v. Imschweiler CA1/4

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

         IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                     FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                  DIVISION FOUR

 THE PEOPLE,
         Plaintiff and Respondent,                                     A165073
                           v.                                          (Sonoma County Superior Court,
 RYAN IMSCHWEILER,                                                     Case No. SCR7224191)
         Defendant and Appellant.

         Appellant Ryan Imschweiler was convicted on a no contest plea to one
count of possession of more than 600 images of child pornography in violation
of Penal Code section 311.11, subdivision (c)(1). His no contest plea followed
the denial of a motion to suppress evidence gathered in a search of his person
and property pursuant to a warrant. He now appeals the denial of that
motion to suppress. We affirm.
                                               I. BACKGROUND
     A. Investigation
         On November 13, 2018, Santa Rosa Police Detective Rick Boehm
sought a warrant to search appellant’s person, residence, electronic devices,
police academy locker, and vehicle, while investigating two child pornography
tips. Detective Boehm requested to search any places, under appellant’s
dominion and control where child pornography could be reasonably found.

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In support of the warrant, Detective Boehm included an affidavit, which in
summary stated the following:
      In November 2017, Detective Boehm received CyberTipline reports
from the Internet Crimes Against Children and National Center for Missing
and Exploited Children systems, which identified two separate child
pornography uploads to an anonymous website. Detective Boehm reviewed
the images accompanied by each tip.
      The image associated with the first tip was uploaded on August 23,
2017, and depicted a nude, prepubescent girl with her buttocks and vagina
exposed. The image associated with the second tip was uploaded on
October 13, 2017, and depicted a partially clothed prepubescent girl with her
vagina exposed. The tip reports indicated the upload times and the IP
address from which each image was uploaded.
      On the strength of this affidavit, Detective Boehm obtained a search
warrant for the IP address information. The return search warrant
information from Comcast Cable Communications showed that both IP
addresses were registered to Mrs. T. and showed a residential address in
Santa Rosa.
   B. Search of the T. Residence
      On November 7, 2018, Detective Boehm executed a search warrant for
the IP address residence. Shortly thereafter, he spoke with the occupants,
Mr. and Mrs. T. The couple denied viewing any child pornography. Detective
Boehm searched their electronic devices and did not discover any child
pornography. Mr. and Mrs. T. told Detective Boehm, however, that from
May 2017 through August 2018, the period when both uploads occurred, they
had rented a room in their house to appellant.
      The couple also told Detective Boehm that, while appellant lived in
their home, he possessed Internet accessible devices and access to their home

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Internet connection. The couple told Detective Boehm they did not believe
anyone other than themselves, their adult son, and appellant had access to
their Internet connection during the times when the uploads occurred.
      A check of personal background records relating to appellant turned up
his new address, his vehicle registration, and his previous address, which
matched the address of Mr. and Mrs. T.’s residence. Detective Boehm also
confirmed appellant’s attendance at a police academy.
   C. Search of Appellant’s Residence
      On November 9, 2018, Detective Boehm surveilled the new address
registered to appellant, noted the presence of the vehicle registered in
appellant’s name and saw appellant at the address. He then sought a
warrant supported by an affidavit sworn by him, this requesting
authorization to search appellant’s person and property.
      In the affidavit, Detective Boehm stated that he had been a police
officer for nearly 16 years. He said he had conducted hundreds of
investigations, received numerous advanced Police Officer Standards and
Training certifications, and completed training on sexual assault and child
abuse investigations, as well as search warrant training.
      Detective Boehm stated that based on his training, experience, and
discussions with other officers, people who possess child pornography rarely
delete the images, if ever. Detective Boehm explained that such people treat
child pornography images as keepsakes and prized possessions.
      Detective Boehm further noted that even if the images were deleted,
they were easily retrievable through peer-to-peer file sharing services and
that the images may be stored in hard drives and other storing devices.
Additionally, he requested a 90-day delay between the issuance of the
warrant and notification to the Santa Rosa Police Department and Comcast

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Cable Communications to avoid notifying appellant that he was under
investigation.
        On November 14, 2018, Detective Boehm and assisting officers
executed the search warrant. Upon contacting appellant, appellant
consented to the search of his residence and vehicle. Officers recovered
appellant’s electronic tablet, which contained thousands of child pornography
images.
   D. Motion To Quash and Ruling
        Appellant filed a motion to quash the warrant and suppress the
evidence of the child pornography obtained pursuant to the search of his
home.
        Appellant argued the warrant lacked probable cause because it did not
set forth any information that appellant, specifically, possessed child
pornography and it omitted the fact that Mr. T. “dealt with and counseled”
pornography addicts.
        Due to the delay between collection of allegedly suspicious information
upon execution of the first search warrant in 2017 and the application for the
subsequent warrant in 2018 seeking authorization to search appellant and
his property, appellant also asserted the warrant targeting him was based on
stale information and was not executed in good faith.
        The prosecutor argued that the affidavit established sufficient probable
cause; that Detective Boehm’s investigatory expertise—and specifically his
observation about hoarding behavior by collectors of child pornography—
overcame any staleness concerns; and that the good faith exception under
United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897, applied in any event.
        At the hearing on the motion, the parties reiterated their arguments.
The court denied appellant’s motion, finding the information provided in
Detective Boehm’s affidavit was sufficient to establish probable cause. In so

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ruling, the court found that the warrant was not stale given the information
that persons who possess child pornography maintain possession of the
images for a lengthy period of time. The court found the omission that Mr. T.
counseled people with pornography addictions was immaterial.
      The court stated that as “there were two separate [uploads] or
information about two separate [uploads] during this period of time, there
was confirmation that those were child pornography . . . , that the [couple’s]
electronics were searched, there was no child pornography located on their
electronic devices and that [appellant] was living there during the period of
time of which both [uploads] were said to have occurred, the Court believes
that that’s sufficient for probable cause.”
      Alternatively, the court concluded that even if the warrant lacked
probable cause, Detective Boehm executed the search warrant in good faith.
                              II. DISCUSSION
      “When reviewing issues relating to the suppression of evidence derived
from governmental searches and seizures, we defer to the court’s factual
findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence.
[Citation.] To determine whether, based on the facts so found, a search or
seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we exercise our
independent judgment.” (People v. Fayed (2020) 9 Cal.5th 147, 186.)
      Probable cause exists when, based on the totality of the circumstances
described in the affidavit, “there is a fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” (Illinois v. Gates
(1983) 462 U.S. 213, 238 (Gates); accord People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978,
1040–1041 (Kraft).) Probable cause “is less than proof beyond a reasonable
doubt [citation]; less than a preponderance of the evidence [citation]; and less
than a prima facie showing [citation].” (People v. Tuadles (1992)

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7 Cal.App.4th 1777, 1783.) It requires only a “ ‘substantial chance’ ” rather
than an actual showing of criminal activity. (Ibid.)
      The governing test is “whether the magistrate ha[s] a substantial basis
for concluding a fair probability existed that a search would uncover
wrongdoing.” (Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1040, citing Gates, supra,
462 U.S. at pp. 238–239.) In the first instance below, the “ ‘issuing
magistrate . . . simply . . . make[s] a practical, common-sense decision’ ” as to
whether probable cause is present. (People v. Carrington (2009) 47 Cal.4th
145, 161 (Carrington).) This is not an isolated inquiry but, rather, an
evaluation of the totality of the circumstances. (Gates, supra, 462 U.S. at
p. 233.)
      On appeal, we look through the trial court’s decision and review the
decision of the magistrate. The governing legal principles are the same,
except we give a measure of deference to the magistrate’s assessment of the
factual record. While exercising our independent judgment on the
magistrate’s ultimate legal conclusion that probable cause supported the
warrant application, we test the magistrate’s determination of historical
cases supporting that conclusion for substantial evidence. (Kraft, supra,
23 Cal.4th at p. 1040, citing Gates, supra, 462 U.S. at pp. 238–239.)
      Renewing the arguments he made below, appellant contends the
warrant lacked probable cause, arguing that the affidavit was based on stale
information and did not establish that appellant, specifically, possessed child
pornography rather than another person who may have had access to the T.’s
home Internet during the time in question. Appellant also argues that the
court’s alternative analysis under Leon was incorrect. We disagree with his
first argument and have no occasion to reach the second.

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      On this record, we conclude it was reasonable for the magistrate who
signed the search warrant to conclude that appellant was in possession of
images of child pornography. The CyberTipline information was highly
specific, detailing the exact time, location, and IP address of the uploaded
images. There is no dispute that the images reported were indeed child
pornography.
      Detective Boehm then visited the home associated with the IP address,
during which he learned only four people had access to the home’s secured
WiFi network during the time the uploads occurred. This effectively
narrowed the investigation to the couple that lived in the home; a third
person, their adult son, who visited there occasionally; and a fourth person,
appellant, who lived in the home at the time.
      Detective Boehm ruled out the couple after searching their electronic
devices and finding no child pornography. That appellant was the only other
person living in the home at the time in question and had access to the
Internet, provided a substantial basis for the magistrate to conclude that
there was a fair probability a search of appellant’s possessions would uncover
the pornographic images.
      Detective Boehm’s knowledge and experience as stated in the affidavit
further provided probable cause supporting the warrant. Detective Boehm
had been a police officer for nearly 16 years. He received extensive training,
totaling 80 hours, on child abuse and sexual assault crimes. He also received
over 30 hours of search warrant training, teaching him exactly when
probable cause could be found.
      Based on his training and experience, Detective Boehm was familiar
with the characteristics of individuals who produce, trade, or possess child
pornography images. Detective Boehm stated in the affidavit that such

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individuals “rarely, if ever, dispose of sexually explicit images of minors
because the images are treated as prized possessions.”
      The issuing magistrate was entitled to credit the officer’s experience
and statements, and any inferences resulting therefrom, when analyzing
probable cause. (People v. Williams (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 111, 125 [“ ‘[L]aw
enforcement officers may draw upon their expertise to interpret the facts in a
search warrant application, and such expertise may be considered by the
magistrate as a factor supporting probable cause’ ”], quoting People v.
Nicholls (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 703, 711.)
      Detective Boehm’s expertise, when considered in conjunction with the
facts related to the uploads, gave rise to a fair probability appellant had
committed the crimes in question. As the affidavit identified the child
pornography images, provided the exact time, IP address, and location where
the images were uploaded, established that appellant lived in the residence
at the time, and stated that individuals who possess such images rarely
discard them, the affidavit sufficiently provided probable cause that evidence
of child pornography would be found in appellant’s possession.
      Appellant maintains nevertheless that the warrant was deficient in
several regards. He argues that Boehm’s affidavit did not report whether the
couple was “questioned about other individuals (e.g., friends, acquaintances,
relatives, etc.) who may have visited the [T.’s] residence during the relevant
time period, or who had access to their Internet service. It did not disclose
whether the computer network used by the [T.’s] computers and electronic
devices could be access[ed] by someone who, for example, parked their car
near the [T.’s] house and used their ‘open wifi.’ ” He also points out that
there was no allegation that appellant was observed using the Internet in the
residence.

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       Probable cause does not require that the affidavit rule out any other
suspects. The affidavit need only establish a “ ‘substantial chance’ ” that
evidence of criminal activity would be found among appellant’s possessions.
(People v. Tuadles, supra, 7 Cal.App.4th at p. 1783.) Probable cause does not
require an affirmative showing that appellant is guilty of the charge, just
that there is a fair probability a crime is being committed.
       Detective Boehm stated in his affidavit that Mr. and Mrs. T. told him
no one aside from appellant and themselves had access to their Internet
during the time the images were uploaded. After confirming Mr. and Mrs. T.
did not possess child pornography, the only reasonable person to investigate
was appellant. These facts provided the magistrate the basis to conclude
there was a fair probability that appellant would be in possession of child
pornography.1
       As to appellant’s contention that the omission of Mr. T.’s counseling of
pornography addicts rendered the affidavit unreliable as a basis to search
appellant, that is simply a variation on appellant’s other third-party
culpability arguments. It indicates he may have had a defense at trial, not
that probable cause was lacking to justify issuance of a warrant directed to
him.
       Citing United States v. Zimmerman (3rd Cir. 2002) 277 F.3d 426 and
Dougherty v. City of Covina (9th Cir. 2011) 654 F.3d 892, appellant argues
that the affidavit was insufficiently specific and failed to tie him to the

       1Although at the preliminary hearing, Detective Boehm added the
detail that Mr. and Mrs. T. also mentioned their adult son as a person with
access to their Internet connection during the relevant period—an omission
from the affidavit we find troubling—appellant conceded at oral argument
that that simply meant there was also probable cause for a search of the
adult son. The People had no obligation to choose which suspect to
investigate first.

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evidence Detective Boehm had of uploaded child pornography. The cases are
distinguishable.
      In Zimmerman, the search warrant sought evidence of adult
pornography and child pornography. (United States v. Zimmerman, supra,
277 F.3d at p. 429.) But the affidavit supporting the warrant indicated only
that there had been one video clip of adult pornography accessed via the
Internet in the defendant’s home. (Ibid.) Finding that the affidavit provided
insufficient probable cause to search for child pornography, the court found
that “there was absolutely no information in the affidavit or anywhere else
indicating that child pornography was—or ever had been—located there.”
(Id. at p. 433.)
      In Dougherty, the Ninth Circuit held that a warrant to search the
defendant’s home electronics for child pornography lacked probable cause
because the affidavit provided no allegation regarding any child pornography
discovered or implicating appellant’s computer or electronic use. (Dougherty
v. City of Covina, supra, 654 F.3d at p. 895.) The only basis for the warrant
was allegations of an attempted molestation and inappropriate touching.
The affidavit contained no facts tying the acts of Dougherty as a possible
child molester to his possession of child pornography. (Id. at p. 898.)
      Here, on the other hand, the affidavit identified specific child
pornography images, established that child pornography was indeed
uploaded onto the Internet, and alleged that the images were uploaded from
the exact residence in which appellant lived and had Internet access.
      The affidavit also pointed specifically to the likely means of storage.
Detective Boehm explained in his affidavit that these kinds of images are
usually stored in hard drives and other storing devices and thus easily
retrievable. The tendency for child pornography to be retained made it likely

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these are the locations where such material would be found, and Detective
Boehm had information that appellant possessed devices that could be used
for that purpose.
      In addition, there was a temporal component to the information
Detective Boehm reported that was relevant here. He stated that the
uploads occurred nearly two months apart. From that, the issuing
magistrate could reasonably conclude these uploads were a periodic part of
appellant’s routine. (See People v. Mikesell (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1711,
1718–1720 [holding that information found between two to four years before
the execution of the warrant was sufficient because the evidence related to
ongoing criminal activity].)
      Appellant contends that nothing in Detective Boehm’s affidavit placed
him “within the category of ‘people who produce, trade, distribute or possess
images/pictures of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct.’ ” The totality
of the circumstances outlined in the affidavit supported the magistrate’s
finding that probable cause supported the warrant.
      Finally, appellant reiterates his staleness argument. Contending that
evidence gathered in November 2017 cannot supply probable cause for a
search warrant in November 2018, appellant argues that the information in
the affidavit was stale. We do not agree. While appellant’s premise about
stale information is correct (People v. Hulland (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1646,
1652), “[n]o bright-line rule defines the point at which information is
considered stale” (Carrington, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 163, citing People v.
Brown (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 1166, 1169). And on this record, we are not
persuaded that his legal conclusion about stale information is correct.
      Staleness is a highly fact-specific inquiry. (Carrington, supra,
47 Cal.4th at p. 163.) To determine whether information is stale, courts

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consider the “ ‘character of the crime . . . , of the criminal . . . , of the thing to
be seized . . . , [and] of the place to be searched . . . ,’ ” all of which are highly
variable. (People v. Wilson (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 742, 754.) “Substantial
delays do not render warrants stale where the defendant is not likely to
dispose of the items police seek to seize.” (People v. Stipo (2011)
195 Cal.App.4th 664, 672.)
      Information will not be rendered stale “ ‘[i]f circumstances would justify
a person of ordinary prudence to conclude that an activity had continued to
the present time.’ ” (Carrington, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 164, quoting People
v. Hulland, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 1652; see People v. Mikesell, supra,
46 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1718–1719 [holding that information found between
two to four years before the execution of the warrant was not stale because
evidence related to ongoing criminal activity].)
      As our Sixth District colleagues in People v. Rowland (2022)
82 Cal.App.5th 1099, recently explained, “Courts have recognized that
persons who possess child pornography are likely to retain it for lengthy
periods.” (Id. at p. 1121.) The Rowland court cited an array of cases,
including United States v. Wagner (10th Cir. 2020) 951 F.3d 1232, 1246
(“Courts are less receptive to staleness challenges when the warrant concerns
child pornography because ‘persons interested in those materials [are likely
to hoard them] in the privacy of their homes . . . for significant periods of
time.’ ”), and United States v. Irving (2d Cir. 2006) 452 F.3d 110, 125 (“When
a defendant is suspected of possessing child pornography, the staleness
determination is unique because it is well known that ‘images of child
pornography are likely to be hoarded by persons interested in those materials
in the privacy of their homes.’ ”).

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      Nor are we persuaded that Detective Boehm’s affidavit lacked the
necessary foundation in specially trained expertise to justify crediting his
observation about hoarding behavior. Detective Boehm stated in his affidavit
that he received child abuse and sexual assault investigation training.
He was a 15-year police officer and was assigned to the Sex Crimes and
Domestic Violence team. This was a highly experienced officer, with
considerable specialized training in sex offenses.
      Even assuming arguendo that an admissible expert opinion was
necessary to provide a foundation for Detective Boehm’s observation about
hoarding behavior by collectors of child pornography—an assumption we do
not necessarily accept, in light of the recognition of this phenomenon by many
courts—the magistrate could reasonably conclude on this record that
Detective Boehm’s background experience provided sufficient foundation for
an expert.2

      2  Appellant contends that the language in Detective Boehm’s affidavit
opining about hoarding behavior is taken virtually verbatim, without
attribution, from a source appellant describes as a guide written for law
enforcement officers about how to prepare search warrant affidavits in child
pornography cases. (Kreston, Computer Search and Seizure Issues in Internet
Crimes Against Children Cases (2004) 30 Rutgers Computer & Tech. L.J. 327,
338–339.) While we certainly do not condone plagiarism, if that is what
appellant means to suggest, all this shows—as pertinent to our Fourth
Amendment inquiry—is that Detective Boehm held the same opinion as
someone appellant describes as the author of guidebook material for the
preparation of affidavits supporting child pornography search warrant
applications. There was nothing substantively misleading about the opinion
itself, as presented by Detective Boehm. Appellant complains that the
guidebook author advocated for more individualized specificity than he
contends Detective Boehm supplied, but the required level of specificity, as a
Fourth Amendment matter, is something for courts to decide, not guidebook
authors.

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      In summary, on this record, the affidavit provided to the magistrate
established that two images of child pornography were uploaded to a chat site
on two separate occasions. And the images were uploaded from a residence
where appellant previously lived, during the period in which he lived there.
The affidavit further stated that appellant owned a cell phone and computer
with Internet capabilities and had access to the Internet at the time he lived
at that address. This was enough to meet the test of probable cause.
      Accordingly, we see no legal error in the issuing of the magistrate’s
conclusion that the facts in Detective Boehm’s affidavit supplied probable
cause for the challenged search.
                           III. DISPOSITION
      Affirmed.
                                                    STREETER, J.

WE CONCUR:

BROWN, Acting P. J.
WHITMAN, J.*

      *Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of Alameda,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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