Court Opinion

ID: 9786026
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 23:45:35.146103+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:40.855688
License: Public Domain

LUMPKIN, J.:
Concur in part/dissent in part.
¶ 1 I agree that if the Court applies our prior decisions without asking the underlying question regarding what is the purpose of the provisions of 22 O.S.2001, § 857, then stare decisis would dictate the result reached in this case. However, I would like to submit a deeper analysis of the statutory language in conjunction with the realities of the trial of a criminal case in the District Court of Oklahoma, and propose a more supportable statutory interpretation.
¶ 2 First, we must recognize the question presented is not one of constitutional magnitude, either federal or state. It is the proper application of a state statute. In fact, it is a common practice in federal and other state jurisdictions for jurors to be allowed to separate even during the course of deliberations. See U.S. v. Eldred, 588 F.2d 746, 752 (9th Cir.1978); U.S. v. Phillips, 540 F.2d 319, 332 (8th Cir.1976); U.S. v. Palacio, 477 F.2d 560, 561 (5th Cir.1973); People v. Austin, 185 Colo. 229, 523 P.2d 989, 993 (1974); State v. Bynum, 282 N.C. 552, 193 S.E.2d 725, 729 (1973); State v. Atwood, 83 N.M. 416, 492 P.2d 1279, 1284 (N.M.App.1971); Bryant v. State, 246 Ind. 17, 202 N.E.2d 161, 163-64 (1964); People v. Nick, 360 Mich. 219, 103 N.W.2d 435, 437-38 (1960).1
¶ 3 Second, as a matter of law, we presume jurors follow the instructions given to them during the course of the trial. Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 540, 113 S.Ct. 933, 939, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993), United States v. Carter, 973 F.2d 1509, 1513 (10th.Cir.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 922, 113 S.Ct. 1289, 122 L.Ed.2d 681 (1993); Turrentine v. State, 965 P.2d 955, 968 (Okl.Cr.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1057, 119 S.Ct. 624, 142 *50L.Ed.2d 562 (1998), Jones v. State, 764 P.2d 914, 917 (Okl.Cr.1988).
¶ 4 As the opinion points out, the trial judge in this case repeatedly admonished the jurors not to discuss the case, consider matters other than evidence presented in the courtroom, and not to begin deliberations until the case was finally submitted to them. More importantly, Instruction No. 37, the final instruction in the guilt stage written jury instructions, directed the jurors as follows:
After you have retired to consider your verdict, select one of your number as foreperson and enter upon your deliberations. When you have agreed on a verdict, your foreperson alone will sign it, and you will, as a body, return it in open court. Your verdict must be unanimous. Forms of verdict will be furnished. You will now listen to the argument of counsel which is a proper part of this trial.
¶ 5 This is Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instruction-Criminal 10-10, General Closing Charge — Closing Instruction. In 1958, when Page v. State, 332 P.2d 693 (Okl.Cr.1958) was decided, judges did not have the benefit of these uniform instructions. In fact, it was not until 1981 that the first uniform instructions were adopted.2 Prior to that time there was no uniformity. Why does that make a difference as we address the issues presented in this case? Today, every juror in a criminal case in Oklahoma knows that deliberations are not to commence until they have been removed to the jury room and selected their foreperson. The sole purpose of Section 857 is to ensure the sanctity of the deliberations of the jury. If, by the instructions given by the Court, those deliberations cannot begin until they have retired and selected a foreperson, then there can be no prejudice.
¶ 6 Third, anyone who has ever tried a criminal case realizes there is a certain sequence of events at the conclusion of the trial whereby the jury is committed into the custody of the bailiff to ensure the provisions of Section 857 are enforced. When the case is to be finally submitted to the jury for deliberation, the bailiff is brought forward and the judge administers an oath, an acknowledgment of which places the jury into the bailiffs custody for movement to the jury room to begin their work. It is clear to everyone by this procedure when the deliberations begin. However, it is not uncommon in the courtrooms of this state, prior to the bailiff taking the oath, for judges to allow restroom breaks, and time for Court reporters to ensure all the exhibits admitted into evidence are delivered to the jury room and time for other necessary administrative matters to be addressed. These are the realities of the everyday life of trials in the District Courts of Oklahoma. And, that is what was done in this case. Prior to the administration of the oath to the bailiff (Tr. Pg.1401), the jury was released to go to lunch, reminded of the prior admonitions, and advised the case would be submitted to them at 1:30 p.m. and they would be allowed to deliberate at that time. When they returned from lunch, the bailiff was sworn and the jury retired to begin deliberations.
¶ 7 I believe our statutes should be applied with a pragmatic understanding of how the trial courts must operate and a view toward what the statute is actually seeking to protect. Needless to say, today no one would expect a jury to reach a decision in the jury box, yet the statute says they can. If a judge tried to get them to come to a verdict in open court, this Court would certainly chastise the judge. Therefore, we all should be able to agree some common sense must be applied in the interpretation of these procedures.
¶ 8 Due to the fact the Uniform Jury Instructions, approved and adopted by this Court, now provide a uniform direction to juries throughout this state as to when the deliberative process begins, I submit the arbitrary and impractical time alluded to in Page, etal., should be overruled. Instead, this Court should recognize the actual practice in the District Courts of Oklahoma and hold that the provisions of Section 857 apply *51upon the bailiff taking the oath and the trial judge remanding the jury to the custody of the bailiff to commence their deliberations in the ease. This fulfills both the legislative intent and preserves the sanctity of the jury deliberations. Applying this more tenable interpretation, and one that will not only be accepted but respected by lawyers and lay persons alike, I would find no prejudice has been shown and affirm the judgment and sentence in this case. For these reasons,' I respectfully dissent to the Court’s decision to reverse and remand this case for a new trial.

. In fact, there are a total of forty-four (44) states that follow this majority view. While Oklahoma is one of only six (6) states that adhere to the minority position that does not allow separation during deliberations, I acknowledge this has no impact on the language of Section 857, however, it should at least bring into question the application of presumed prejudice upon violation of the statute.

. See 12 O.S.Supp.1968, § 577.1 (authorizes Court of Criminal Appeals to adopt uniform jury instructions.)