Court Opinion

ID: 9829204
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:04:52.607225+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:47.651108
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/1/23 P. v. Salazar CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                     (Sacramento)
                                                            ----

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                                   C096158

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      (Super. Ct. No. 14F01794)

           v.

 JOSE SALAZAR,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         A jury found defendant Jose Salazar guilty of second degree murder for his
participation in a gang fight that left one victim stabbed to death. Defendant later filed a
petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.61 and the trial court denied the
petition, finding him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We shall affirm on the basis
there is substantial evidence defendant aided and abetted an implied malice murder.

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. Defendant petitioned
for resentencing under former section 1170.95. Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature
renumbered former section 1170.95 as section 1172.6 without substantive changes.
(Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)

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                                     BACKGROUND
   A. Defendant’s Trial
       At defendant’s trial in early 2017, witnesses testified gang membership motivated
a brawl between two groups. It began when a codefendant’s classmate called him a
derogatory name based on the codefendant’s gang membership. The codefendant went
home and told defendant, codefendant Sebastian Torres, and two other classmates, who
were all members of the insulted gang, what happened. Defendant and Torres were
described as the two older members of the group, in their early twenties. Defendant was
also “significantly shorter and heavier than the other[s],” around five feet two inches tall
and 200 pounds, and Torres was around five feet eight inches tall and 200 pounds.
       With defendant in the passenger seat, Torres drove the group to the house where
the name-calling classmate and several other teenagers were, intending to fight them.
When they arrived, some of the teenagers were outside, defendant’s group swore and
yelled gang references, and they started fighting everyone at the house. Three people
were stabbed during the fight: Shannon Gregg, Brandon Moreno, and Michael Caicedo.
Witnesses testified to Torres stabbing Caicedo, but Caicedo testified it was a “[s]horter,
pudgier guy” who was the “heaviest of the group.” And witnesses saw Torres fighting
Moreno before he was stabbed, but Moreno testified to fighting “a short, fat one.” Gregg,
one of the teenagers’ father, came out of the house to stop the fight but was stabbed at
about the same time as Moreno, though at a different location at the fight scene.
Accounts varied as to who fought Gregg, but the witnesses only provided testimony
indicating it was either defendant or Torres. And the only evidence of who had knives
pointed to Torres and defendant. Right after Gregg yelled he had been stabbed,
defendant yelled, “Let’s go,” the group fled in the car, and either defendant or Torres
yelled out of the window they would return with bullets. Gregg eventually died from his
wounds.

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       A codefendant testified to seeing defendant in the car wipe blood off his knife and
defendant told him he had stabbed someone and “[d]on’t say nothing.” Defendant also
told the same codefendant after he was arrested not to say anything as the codefendant
was going to court. Defendant and Torres also fought the codefendant because he gave
police a statement.
       Defendant’s jury, which was instructed on the natural and probable consequences
doctrine for murder, found defendant guilty of second degree murder, among other
charges, and found true the crimes were committed for the benefit of a criminal street
gang. In 2017, defendant was sentenced to a determinate term of 11 years eight months
in prison, and an indeterminate term of 15 years to life.
   B. Defendant’s Petition for Resentencing
       In 2020, defendant filed a resentencing petition under section 1172.6, alleging he
could not now be convicted of second degree murder based on changes to the law. The
trial court issued an order to show cause and held an evidentiary hearing on April 29,
2022. The only evidence presented was the transcripts from defendant’s prior trial. After
counsels’ arguments on whether defendant could be guilty of second degree murder
under an implied malice murder theory, the trial court found: “Defendant Jose Salazar is
guilty of violation of Penal Code Section 187[, subdivision] (a), second degree murder of
Shannon Gregg. The petition is denied.”
                                      DISCUSSION
       Defendant argues the trial court’s finding lacked substantial evidence because the
evidence only shows he “was involved in a melee where he was not interacting with
Shannon Gregg or the person who actually stabbed him.” We disagree.
   A. Legal Standards
       The natural and probable consequence doctrine is no longer a valid basis for
murder liability effective January 1, 2019. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 2.) Section 1172.6
permits persons who were previously convicted of murder under the natural and probable

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consequence doctrine to petition for resentencing if they “could not presently be
convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189
effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).) After submittal of a petition
providing basic information, including a declaration of eligibility, the trial court must
“hold a hearing to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief.
If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing that the petitioner is entitled to relief, the
court shall issue an order to show cause.” (Id., subds. (b)-(c).) “[A]fter the order to show
cause has issued, the court shall hold a hearing to determine whether to vacate the
murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter conviction and to recall the sentence.” (Id.,
subd. (d)(1).) At the hearing, “the burden of proof shall be on the prosecution to prove,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted murder
under California law.” (Id., subd. (d)(3).)
       “[A] trial court’s denial of a section 1172.6 petition is reviewed for substantial
evidence. [Citation.] Under this standard, we review the record ‘ “ ‘in the light most
favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—
that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable
trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” ’ ” (People v.
Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 988.)
       Implied malice murder is a still valid legal theory to support a second degree
murder conviction after the changes to sections 188 and 189 effective January 1, 2019.
(People v. Powell (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 689, 714.) “Murder is committed with implied
malice when ‘the killing is proximately caused by “ ‘an act, the natural consequences of
which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed by a person who
knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious
disregard for life.’ ” ’ [Citation.] ‘ “To be considered the proximate cause of the victim’s
death, the defendant’s act must have been a substantial factor contributing to the result,

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rather than insignificant or merely theoretical.” ’ ” (People v. Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 988.)
       A nonperpetrator may also be guilty of implied malice murder. Notwithstanding
the “elimination of natural and probable consequences liability for second degree murder,
an aider and abettor who does not expressly intend to aid a killing can still be convicted
of second degree murder if the person knows that his or her conduct endangers the life of
another and acts with conscious disregard for life.” (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th
830, 850.) As summarized by another panel of this court: “direct aiding and abetting is
based on the combined actus reus of the participants and the aider and abettor’s own
mens rea. [Citation.] In the context of implied malice, the actus reus required of the
perpetrator is the commission of a life–endangering act.[2] For the direct aider and
abettor, the actus reus includes whatever acts constitute aiding the commission of the life
endangering act. Thus, to be liable for an implied malice murder, the direct aider and
abettor must, by words or conduct, aid the commission of the life–endangering act, not
the result of that act. The mens rea, which must be personally harbored by the direct
aider and abettor, is knowledge that the perpetrator intended to commit the act, intent to
aid the perpetrator in the commission of the act, knowledge that the act is dangerous to
human life, and acting in conscious disregard for human life.” (People v. Powell, supra,
63 Cal.App.5th at pp. 713-714; People v. Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 990-991
[quoting Powell].) “Factors to be considered by the trier of fact in determining ‘whether
one is an aider and abettor include presence at the scene of the crime, failure to take steps
to attempt to prevent the commission of the crime, companionship, flight, and conduct
before and after the crime.’ ” (People v. Garcia (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 261, 273.)

2 “The relevant act is the act that proximately causes death. [Citations.]”

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   B. Analysis
      Even assuming there is not sufficient evidence defendant was the perpetrator of
Gregg’s murder, there was substantial evidence he was a direct aider and abettor of
Torres’s implied malice murder of Gregg. The testimony at trial indicated defendant or
Torres stabbed the three victims. There was also evidence defendant committed at least
one of the stabbings because defendant was seen with a bloody knife and said he had
stabbed someone. And there was evidence different people stabbed Moreno and Gregg
because they were stabbed about the same time but in different locations. Thus, the
evidence supports either defendant stabbed Gregg, or he stabbed Moreno while Torres
stabbed Gregg. Defendant does not challenge this stating, “[t]he evidence showed
[defendant] stabbed Brandon Moreno and, perhaps, that he also stabbed Michael
Caicedo,” but asserts “there was not substantial evidence that [defendant] was involved in
the stabbing of Shannon Gregg.” But he need not have been directly involved;
knowingly aiding Torres’s act that was dangerous to human life is sufficient. Such
evidence existed here.
      The relevant act was Torres entering a fight with a knife to stab people. This is
unquestionably a life–endangering act. And there was evidence defendant knowingly
aided and abetted Torres in this act with conscious disregard for human life. Defendant
and codefendant were members of the same gang, went to the house together with
defendant riding in the passenger seat while Torres drove, both carried knives, and
defendant joined Torres in the fight and stabbed at least one other person. Defendant also
yelled for everyone to leave after Gregg yelled that he had been stabbed, and there was
evidence he threatened the victims they would return with bullets. After arrests were
made, defendant and Torres threatened, and ultimately beat up, a codefendant to silence
him. The evidence shows defendant and Torres acted as a team in stabbing opposing
fighters and trying to get away with it. That Torres was the one who may have stabbed
Gregg, and defendant may not have known Torres would stab Gregg specifically, is not

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determinative. It is instead enough there was substantial evidence defendant knowingly
aided Torres in executing an act dangerous to human life in conscious disregard to that
risk.
        Two cases particularly support our finding here. In People v. Vargas (2022)
84 Cal.App.5th 943, the defendant, who was associated with a gang, egged on members
of the gang to fight someone in their territory. She then told one of them to shoot the
person, but the person’s brother stepped between them and was shot, the shooter then
shot the brother in the head and killed him; the assailants fled together. The appellate
court found there was substantial evidence defendant was “inextricably involved in the
events that led to the murder,” she prompted the fight of the other person, prompted the
shooting, and was aware the eventual victim was nearby. (Id. at p. 954.) Thus, the
appellate court affirmed the denial of a section 1172.6 petition on the basis there was
substantial evidence the defendant “acted with implied malice in aiding and abetting the
murder.” (Vargas, at p. 955.)
        In People v. Superior Court (Valenzuela) (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 485, the
defendant got into an argument with a group and agreed to fight them later. He then
recruited some others, one a known gang member, and at the fight, the gang member
stabbed and killed someone. The trial court found this was not sufficient proof of implied
malice and dismissed a murder charge at the preliminary hearing. (Id. at pp. 490-491.)
The appellate court reversed, finding there was sufficient evidence of implied malice
because it was likely defendant and the perpetrator had discussed whether they should be
armed, and since he “travelled with him to the park, it is also reasonable to believe he
knew [the perpetrator] had a knife.” (Id. at p. 503.) This was also not “a simple fistfight”
but “a show of force and threat of deadly force, complete with gang challenges.” (Ibid.)
The court noted the low threshold at that stage and found “there need only be ‘ “ ‘some
rational ground for assuming the possibility that an offense has been committed and the

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accused is guilty of it,’ ” ’ ” so it concluded there was sufficient evidence the defendant
“aided or encouraged the commission of the life endangering act.” (Id. at p. 502.)
       These cases support our finding here. Like Vargas, the fight here was gang
motivated, deadly violence was predictable, and though both defendants may not have
specifically intended the particular victim to be killed, both knowingly aided the act
dangerous to life in conscious disregard for life by being inextricably involved in the
events leading to the murder. This case is also factually similar to Valenzuela, where the
defendant went to the fight scene with the perpetrator who had a knife in a show of force
after making gang challenges. Though the standard of review was less demanding in
Valenzuela, it still lends support to our conclusion here that, looking at the evidence in
the light most favorable to the finding, defendant, armed with a knife, knowingly aided
another gang member armed with a knife in a violent and gang-motivated show of force.
                                      DISPOSITION
       The order denying defendant’s petition for resentencing is affirmed.

                                                   /s/                         ,
                                                  WISEMAN, J.*

We concur:

 /s/                        ,
MAURO, Acting P. J.

 /s/                        ,
MESIWALA, J.

* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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