Court Opinion

ID: 9366265
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-26 16:00:30.684243+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:51.315648
License: Public Domain

20-4247-cv
Seneca Nation v. Hochul

                           In the
               United States Court of Appeals
                  For the Second Circuit
                               ________

                          AUGUST TERM 2021

                      ARGUED: JANUARY 20, 2022
                      DECIDED: JANUARY 26, 2023

                            No. 20-4247-cv

         Seneca Nation, a federally recognized Indian tribe,
                          Plaintiff-Appellee,

                                   v.

  Kathleen C. Hochul, in her official capacity as Governor of New
  York, Letitia A. James, in her official capacity as New York State
 Attorney General, Marie T. Dominguez, in her official capacity as
Commissioner of the New York State Department of Transportation,
 Thomas P. DiNapoli, in his official capacity as Comptroller of the
 State of New York, and the New York State Thruway Authority,
                       Defendants-Appellants. ∗
                               ________

            Appeal from the United States District Court
              for the Western District of New York.

   ∗
     Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Governor
Kathleen C. Hochul is automatically substituted as a defendant for former
Governor Andrew M. Cuomo and Commissioner Marie T. Dominguez is
automatically substituted as a defendant for former Acting Commissioner
Paul A. Karas. The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the caption as set
forth above.
2                                                        No. 20-4247

                              ________

Before: KEARSE, WALKER, and SULLIVAN, Circuit Judges.
                           ________

      Plaintiff Seneca Nation brought this lawsuit seeking relief from
defendants’ ongoing use of an invalid easement over its tribal land.
Defendants appeal from the denial of their motion to dismiss.
Defendants contend that the Nation is collaterally estopped from
bringing this present action based on a 2004 judgment of this court
and that this lawsuit is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Because
these challenges lack merit, we AFFIRM.

            Judge Sullivan dissents in a separate opinion.

                              ________

                  JAMES E. TYSSE (Donald R. Pongrace, Merrill C.
                  Godfrey, Jenny Patten Magallanes, Aileen M.
                  McGrath, on the brief), Akin Gump Strauss Hauer
                  & Feld LLP, Washington, D.C. and San Francisco,
                  CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

                  BEEZLY J. KIERNAN (Barbara D. Underwood, Jeffrey
                  W. Lang, on the brief), for Letitia James, Attorney
                  General of the State of New York, Albany, NY, for
                  Defendants-Appellants.

                  Michael L. Roy, on the brief, Hobbs, Straus, Dean &
                  Walker LLP, Washington, D.C., for amicus curiae
                  United South and Eastern Tribes Sovereignty
                  Protection Fund in support of Plaintiff-Appellee.

                              ________
3                                                                 No. 20-4247

JOHN M. WALKER, JR., Circuit Judge:

        Plaintiff Seneca Nation brought this lawsuit seeking relief from
defendants’ ongoing use of an invalid easement over its tribal land.
Defendants appeal from the denial of their motion to dismiss.
Defendants contend that the Nation is collaterally estopped from
bringing this present action based on a 2004 judgment of this court
and that this lawsuit is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Because
these challenges lack merit, we AFFIRM.

                             BACKGROUND

        This lawsuit arises from a 1954 agreement between Seneca
Nation (“the Nation”), a federally recognized Indian tribe, and New
York State, acting through the New York State Thruway Authority.
In that agreement, the Nation granted New York an easement over
approximately 300 acres of the Cattaraugus Reservation tribal land,
on which easement the State was permitted to build a portion of the
New York State Thruway. In exchange, New York paid the Nation
$75,500. At the time of the agreement, 25 U.S.C. § 177 (commonly
called the “Non-Intercourse Act”) provided that any easement over
Indian land required the consent of the United States. According to
the complaint, the 1954 agreement received no such consent. 1

        In 1993, the Nation sued New York State, the New York
Thruway Authority, and the Thruway Authority’s Executive
Director, seeking to invalidate the easement based on the State’s
failure to comply with the Non-Intercourse Act, as well as ejectment
and compensatory damages. 2 The district court dismissed the suit,
ruling that New York State was an indispensable party under Federal

    1 For the purposes of this appeal, we accept as true the factual allegations
in the complaint. See Palin v. N.Y. Times Co., 940 F.3d 804, 809 (2d Cir. 2019).
    2 Seneca Nation of Indians v. New York, 383 F.3d 45, 47 (2d Cir. 2004) (per

curiam).
4                                                                No. 20-4247

Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b) and that the State was immune from suit
under the Eleventh Amendment. 3 In 2004, this court affirmed in what
we will call Seneca I.

        On April 11, 2018, the Nation filed the present lawsuit in district
court, asserting that the operation of the Thruway constitutes a
“continuing unauthorized use . . . of operating a toll road without a
valid easement.” 4 The complaint alleges that the continuing use of
the Thruway “violates the federal treaties and laws establishing the
Reservation and protecting it against alienation,” such as the
Canandaigua Treaty of 1794, and also violates federal law regulating
easements across Indian lands. 5

        Critical to our analysis is the relief that the Nation asks this
court to provide. The complaint requests (1) an injunction requiring
defendants (other than the Comptroller) to “obtain a valid easement
for the portion of the Nation’s Reservation on which the Thruway is
situated, so as to bring continued public use of and public benefit
from those Indian lands into compliance with federal law, on terms
that will in the future equitably compensate the Nation pro rata for
future use of its lands; or, in the alternative, an order enjoining []
[d]efendants . . . from collecting tolls for the portion of the Nation’s
Reservation on which the Thruway is situated without first obtaining
a valid easement”; (2) an injunction requiring the Comptroller to
“segregate and hold in escrow all future toll monies collected on the
Thruway that are fairly attributable to the portion of the Thruway”
on the Nation’s lands until defendants obtain a valid easement; and
(3) a declaration that defendants (other than the Comptroller) are
“violating federal law by not obtaining a valid easement for the

    3 Id.
    4 Joint App’x 20.

    5 Joint App’x 11 (25 U.S.C. § 323 and 25 C.F.R. Part 169).
5                                                             No. 20-4247

portion of the Thruway over the Nation’s Reservation lands, and that
some of the funds being collected by the Thruway and being
deposited with the Comptroller on a continuing basis are derived
from this violation of federal law.” 6

         Defendants moved to dismiss the suit on the basis that it was
collaterally estopped and was barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
The district court (Vilardo, J.) referred the motion to a magistrate
judge (Scott, M.J.), who issued a Report and Recommendation
(“R&R”) that the motion to dismiss be granted. 7 After the Nation
objected to the R&R, the district court reviewed the motion de novo,
rejected the R&R, and denied the motion to dismiss. 8 The district
court permitted defendants to apply to this court for an interlocutory
appeal, which defendants did.

                               DISCUSSION

         On appeal, defendants argue that (1) the Nation is collaterally
estopped by the holding of Seneca I from relitigating whether the
Eleventh Amendment bars this challenge to the easement, and that,
in the alternative, (2) the complaint must be dismissed because the
Nation’s challenge to the easement is barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. We find no merit to either argument and thus affirm
the district court.

I.       Collateral Estoppel

         This court reviews de novo a district court’s decision granting or
denying collateral estoppel. 9 Collateral estoppel bars parties from

     Joint App’x 23.
     6

   7 Seneca Nation v. Cuomo, No. 18-CV-429V, 2018 WL 6682265, at *9

(W.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2018).
   8 Seneca Nation v. Cuomo, 484 F. Supp. 3d 65, 79 (W.D.N.Y. 2020).

   9 Perez v. Danbury Hosp., 347 F.3d 419, 426 (2d Cir. 2003).
6                                                                   No. 20-4247

relitigating an issue that has previously been determined by a valid
and final judgment if: “(1) the identical issue was raised in a previous
proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated and decided in the
previous proceeding; (3) the [losing] party had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issue; and (4) the resolution of the issue was
necessary to support a valid and final judgment on the merits.” 10
Defendants argue that in Seneca I this court decided the same issue
the Nation seeks to litigate in the current lawsuit. We disagree.

         The issue litigated and decided in Seneca I is not present here.
In Seneca I, the issue was whether, under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 19, New York State was an “absent and indispensable
party” to the 1993 lawsuit brought by Seneca Nation. 11 We held that,
because it owned the easement, the State was a necessary party to the
lawsuit at issue. We then held that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in finding that, under Rule 19(b), the action could not
proceed against only the Thruway Authority and its Executive
Director without the State because the State was an indispensable
party, but that the State could not be joined because of its sovereign
immunity.12

         Rule 19(b) enumerates factors the court should consider when
determining “whether, in equity and good conscience, the action
should proceed among the existing parties or should be dismissed”
because a necessary party cannot be joined; if the action cannot
proceed, that party is indispensable under the Rule. 13 The language
of the Rule makes clear that it is focused on whether a lawsuit can
proceed with the parties currently before the court. Accordingly, the

    10 Bear, Stearns & Co. v. 1109580 Ontario, Inc., 409 F.3d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 2005)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
    11 Seneca I, 383 F.3d at 46.

    12 Id. at 47-48.

    13 Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b) (emphasis added).
7                                                              No. 20-4247

Supreme Court has noted that a court’s ruling on this question under
Rule 19(b) is a “case-specific inquiry.” 14 It has further stated that
“[w]hether a person is ‘indispensable,’ that is, whether a particular
lawsuit must be dismissed in the absence of that person [under Rule
19(b)], can only be determined in the context of particular litigation.” 15

         Seneca I was focused on the narrow issue of whether a lawsuit
to invalidate the easement could proceed against the Thruway
Authority and its Executive Director in the absence of New York State
which, under the circumstances of that suit, enjoyed sovereign
immunity. It did not determine whether an action seeking relief from
the invalid easement could proceed against other state officials in the
absence of the State. 16 Indeed, it could not have done so because, in
performing a Rule 19(b) analysis, a “court does not know whether a
particular person is ‘indispensable’ until it has examined the situation
to determine whether [the suit] can proceed without him.” 17 And
“dismissal [under Rule 19] does not bar a new action that corrects the
deficiency of parties.” 18 Because we did not consider in Seneca I
whether a lawsuit could proceed in the absence of the State if the
defendants were other New York state officials sued in their official

    14Republic of Philippines v. Pimentel, 553 U.S. 851, 864 (2008).
    15Provident Tradesmens Bank & Tr. Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 118
(1968).
   16 See Am. Trucking Ass’n, Inc. v. N.Y. State Thruway Auth., 795 F.3d 351,

357 n.2 (2d Cir. 2015) (noting that Seneca I “stands for the unsurprising
proposition that an absent sovereign may be a necessary party to a lawsuit
that calls into question a real property interest of the sovereign” (emphasis
added)).
   17 Provident Tradesmens Bank & Tr. Co., 390 U.S. at 119.

   18 18A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 4438

(3d ed. 2021).
8                                                                   No. 20-4247

capacities, the issue in this case was not actually decided in Seneca I
and so collateral estoppel does not apply here. 19

II.        Eleventh Amendment

           In the alternative, defendants contend that the lawsuit must be
dismissed for the separate reason that it is barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. We review de novo a district court’s denial of a motion
to dismiss under that amendment. 20 A state may be sued in federal
court by, among others, Native American tribes only if the state
consents. 21       A plaintiff, however, “may avoid the Eleventh
Amendment bar to suit” by suing individual state officers in their
official capacities, as opposed to the state, “provided that [the]
complaint (a) alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and (b) seeks
relief properly characterized as prospective.” 22 Such suits comport
with the Supreme Court’s decision in Ex parte Young, 23 which carved
out an exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity in such a case. It
is this type of suit the Nation purports to bring here to challenge the
validity of the easement. Defendants, however, assert that the lawsuit

      19Whether the lawsuit can proceed against these individual state
defendants without the State as a party is a separate question from that of
collateral estoppel. Defendants here did not move to dismiss the lawsuit
on the basis that the State was an absent but indispensable party under Rule
19. As the district court noted, should discovery make it clear that the state-
official defendants cannot adequately represent the State’s interest such
that the action should be dismissed under Rule 19 because the State is a
necessary and indispensable party, defendants may so move at summary
judgment.
    20 Vega v. Semple, 963 F.3d 259, 281 (2d Cir. 2020).

    21 In re Dairy Mart Convenience Stores, Inc., 411 F.3d 367, 371 (2d Cir. 2005);

W. Mohegan Tribe & Nation v. Orange Cnty., 395 F.3d 18, 20 (2d Cir. 2004)
(per curiam).
    22 In re Deposit Ins. Agency, 482 F.3d 612, 618 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal

quotation marks omitted).
    23 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
9                                                                No. 20-4247

does not meet the requirements of that doctrine. In determining
whether the case falls under Ex parte Young, a court need only conduct
a “straightforward inquiry” into whether the complaint alleges an
ongoing violation of federal law and seeks prospective relief. 24

    A. Ongoing Violation of Federal Law

         Defendants argue that the lawsuit does not allege an ongoing
violation of federal law but only that the 1954 grant of the easement
violated federal law. We disagree.

         To be sure, the invalidity of the easement is critical to plaintiff’s
case, but this suit is concerned with the ongoing effect of the invalidity.
The complaint alleges that “[t]he Nation is suffering and will continue
to suffer irreparable harm without injunctive relief because its
property will continue to be invaded without authorization.” 25 In
particular, it contends that “[d]efendants’ continuing operation of the
Thruway without a valid easement violates the federal treaties and
laws     establishing    the   Reservation”     and,   in   particular,   the
Canandaigua Treaty of 1794, which states that “[t]he land of the
Seneca Nation is . . . to be the property of the Seneca Nation,” which
shall not be disturbed “in the [Nation’s] free use and enjoyment
thereof.” 26 We have held that the term “free use and enjoyment” in
the Canandaigua Treaty is to be “interpreted as preventing American

    24Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Maryland, 535 U.S. 635, 645
(2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
   25 Joint App’x 22 (emphasis added).

   26 Joint App’x 11. It also alleges that defendants’ ongoing operation of

the Thruway is an ongoing violation of federal law that comprehensively
regulates rights-of-way across Indian lands, such as 25 U.S.C. § 323 and 25
C.F.R. Part 169.
10                                                                No. 20-4247

encroachment onto Seneca lands, or interference with the Seneca
Nation’s use of its lands.” 27

          The Supreme Court has noted that easements “burden land
that continues to be owned by another,” 28 and if unlawfully obtained
by the state amount to a taking under the Fifth Amendment. 29 The
complaint’s allegation that the Nation’s free use and enjoyment of its
protected land is continuously impaired by the presence of an
unlawful easement therefore reflects an ongoing harm to the Nation. 30
Accordingly, Ex parte Young’s first requirement is satisfied.

     B. Prospective Relief

          Defendants and our dissenting colleague also contend that the
complaint does not seek prospective relief, but rather seeks
compensation for a past wrong. They rely upon the Supreme Court’s
decision in Papasan v. Allain. 31 The Nation responds that its complaint
seeks only prospective relief and also relies on Papasan. Properly
read, Papasan supports the Nation. In that case, Mississippi school
officials and schoolchildren asserted two claims against Mississippi:
(1) that a prior sale of land, the proceeds of which were supposed to
be used to fund public education but were not so used, abrogated the
State’s ongoing trust obligations to the schoolchildren, and (2) that the
present unequal distribution of state funds in public education
violated the schoolchildren’s equal protection rights because children
in schools that received less funding were denied a minimally

     27Perkins v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 970 F.3d 148, 158 (2d Cir. 2020).
     28United States Forest Serv. v. Cowpasture River Preservation Ass’n, 140 S.
Ct. 1837, 1845 (2020).
    29 United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261-63 (1946).

    30 See Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 124 F.3d 904, 914

(8th Cir. 1997) (permitting a case that asserted continuing violations of a
Tribe’s federal treaty rights to proceed under Ex parte Young).
    31 478 U.S. 265 (1986).
11                                                          No. 20-4247

adequate level of education while children in schools that received
more funding were not. 32

          The Court held that, with respect to the second claim, the
alleged ongoing constitutional violation of “unequal distribution by
the State of the benefits of the State’s school lands [] is precisely the
type of continuing violation for which a remedy may permissibly be
fashioned under Young.” 33 It noted that such a claim that “serves
directly to bring an end to a present violation of federal law is not
barred by the Eleventh Amendment even though accompanied by a
substantial ancillary effect on the state treasury.” 34    The Court’s
resolution of that claim guides our resolution of this case.          As
described above, the Nation alleges that its free use and enjoyment of
its land is continually violated by the presence of an unlawful
easement that began in 1954.        Thus, it is like the Papasan equal
protection violation, which, while it stemmed from a past wrong,
continued to cause constitutional violations in the form of ongoing
unequal distribution of state funds. In Papasan, the Court found that
relief sought for those ongoing harms was prospective and thus
permitted by Ex parte Young. After examining the relief sought in this
case, we similarly conclude the relief sought from the ongoing
violation of the Nation’s free use and enjoyment is prospective.

          Contrary to defendants’ and the dissent’s argument, the Nation
does not seek relief for a “past loss” equivalent to that which the
Papasan plaintiffs sought in their first claim and that the Court found
barred by the Eleventh Amendment. In discussing that first claim,
the Court held that “[r]elief that in essence serves to compensate a
party injured in the past by an action of a state official” is improper

     32 Id. at 274-75.
     33 Id. at 282.

     34 Id. at 278.
12                                                              No. 20-4247

under Ex parte Young “if the relief is tantamount to an award of
damages for a past violation of federal law.” 35 It noted that the
plaintiffs sought the “equivalent . . . to a one-time restoration of the
lost [trust] itself.” 36 But here the Nation seeks no monetary damages
for past use of the easement. Instead, it seeks to compel defendants to
“obtain a valid easement for the portion of the Nation’s Reservation
on which the Thruway is situated on terms that will in the future
equitably compensate the Nation pro rata for future use of its
lands.” 37 There is thus no “accrued monetary liability” 38 the Nation
would recover here.

          Accordingly, the complaint alleges an ongoing violation of
federal law and seeks prospective relief. 39

     35Id.
     36Id. at 281.
    37 Joint App’x 11-12 (emphasis added).

    38 Papasan, 478 U.S. at 282.

    39    The dissent additionally suggests that the Nation’s request for a
declaratory judgment that defendants “will continue to violate federal law
by not obtaining a valid easement” is retrospective. Dissenting Op. 2
(quoting Joint App’x 22). As we explain above, the Nation alleges an
ongoing harm premised on defendants’ interference with the Nation’s
continued free use and enjoyment of its property. A declaration that the
status quo constitutes an ongoing violation of federal law is thus properly
prospective under Papasan. Nor are we persuaded by the dissent’s
argument that the Nation lacks standing to seek an escrow of future toll
monies attributable to defendants’ ongoing violation of the Nation’s
property rights or that such relief is retrospective. Although the Nation
does not specifically request that escrowed future toll monies be remitted
to it, its complaint ties this relief to its demand that defendants purchase a
valid easement. See Joint App’x 23. Such relief both redresses the Nation’s
asserted injury for purposes of Article III standing and properly constitutes
prospective relief under the Ex parte Young analysis.
13                                                           No. 20-4247

     C. Quiet Title Exception

          Defendants’ remaining argument is that the lawsuit falls within
an exception to the Ex parte Young doctrine outlined by the Supreme
Court in Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho. 40 Under the “particular
and special circumstances” of that case, 41 the Court held the Ex parte
Young exception inapplicable to a suit alleging an ongoing violation
of federal law in which prospective declaratory and injunctive relief
was sought against an officer named in his individual capacity, and
thus held the suit barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Defendants
allege that this suit is analogous to that case and therefore cannot
proceed. We disagree.

          In Coeur d’Alene Tribe, a Native American tribe sought to bring
an Ex parte Young lawsuit to establish its entitlement to the exclusive
use, occupancy, and right to quiet enjoyment of certain submerged
lands that, while within the boundaries of the tribe’s reservation, had
been claimed and governed by Idaho for centuries. The tribe also
sought declaratory relief that all Idaho laws and regulations were
invalid as applied to that land. 42 The Court began by noting that the
Eleventh Amendment was “designed to protect” the “dignity and
respect afforded a State.” 43 It then concluded that the tribe’s suit was
“the functional equivalent of a quiet title action . . . in that
substantially all benefits of ownership and control would shift from
the State to the Tribe,” and that the Eleventh Amendment bars such
an action by a tribe against a state. 44 It then held that “if the Tribe
were to prevail, Idaho’s sovereign interest in its lands and waters
would be affected in a degree fully as intrusive as almost any

     40 521 U.S. 261, 270 (1997).
     41 Id. at 287.

     42 Id. at 265.

     43 Id. at 268.

     44 Id. at 281-82.
14                                                                 No. 20-4247

conceivable retroactive levy upon funds in its Treasury,” 45 which a
state’s sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment
prohibits. 46 Accordingly, “[u]nder these particular and special
circumstances, . . . the Young exception [was] inapplicable.” 47

          The “particular and special circumstances” that led the Court
to conclude that the tribe could not proceed in Coeur d’Alene Tribe are
not present here. This case is not the functional equivalent of a quiet
title action. Here, the Nation holds fee title to the land in question,
and New York State’s only interest is a possessory one granted by the
permanent easement. 48 “[T]here is a difference between possession of
property and title to property,” and a court may properly find under
Ex parte Young “that an official has no legal right to remain in
possession of property, ‘thus conveying all the incidents of ownership
to the plaintiff,’ but without ‘formally divesting the State of its title.’” 49
The Fifth Circuit has held that a suit in which the plaintiff owned
property and was disputing whether the state could constitutionally

     45Id. at 287.
     46Id. at 277.
    47 Id. at 287.

    48 We have previously distinguished cases from Coeur d’Alene Tribe

because they did not involve land as to which the state held title. See, e.g.,
Islander E. Pipeline Co. v. Conn. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 482 F.3d 79, 92 (2d Cir.
2006) (distinguishing the case because it did not involve an issue of land
ownership, but rather involved a company’s use of eminent domain to
obtain a right of way for a natural gas pipeline); In re Dairy Mart, 411 F.3d
at 372 (noting that “the Court concluded in Coeur d’Alene Tribe that the Ex
parte Young fiction cannot be employed where certain sovereignty interests
are present, as they are when the administration and ownership of state land
is threatened” (emphasis added)).
    49 In re Deposit Ins. Agency, 482 F.3d at 620 (quoting Coeur d’Alene Tribe,

521 U.S. at 290 (O’Connor, J., concurring)) (also noting that a federal court
has never been prevented “from providing relief from governmental
officials taking illegal possession of property in violation of federal law,” id.
at 619).
15                                                                No. 20-4247

impose an easement on it was not the functional equivalent of a quiet
title action like Coeur d’Alene Tribe and so could proceed under Ex
parte Young. 50 The same holds true here.

          Moreover, unlike in Coeur d’Alene Tribe, the State has not
historically governed the land in question. In addition, here the
Nation does not contend that the State’s laws and regulations do not
apply to the land in question. The present action is thus even further
removed from Coeur d’Alene Tribe, in which the tribe “sought
relief . . . extinguishing state regulatory control over a vast reach of
lands and waters long deemed by the State to be an integral part of its
territory.” 51 Nor do the “special sovereignty” interests that existed in
that case exist here. The Court attached considerable importance to
the fact that the tribe claimed ownership over submerged lands in
navigable waters, which due to their “public character” made them
inextricably intertwined with Idaho’s sovereignty. 52 Here, nothing
comparable to submerged lands in navigable waters is at issue. 53

          In sum, Seneca Nation does not assert property rights over land
to which New York State has traditionally held the title and does not

     50See Severance v. Patterson, 566 F.3d 490, 495 (5th Cir. 2009).
     51In re Deposit Ins. Agency, 482 F.3d at 620 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
    52 Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 286; see also W. Mohegan Tribe & Nation,

395 F.3d at 22 n.3 (noting that “significant to the Court’s reasoning was the
fact that the Coeur d’Alene Tribe’s claims implicated the authority of the
State of Idaho over submerged lands,” which possess “a unique status in
the law” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
    53 We have applied the Coeur d’Alene Tribe exception only once.           In
Western Mohegan Tribe and Nation, we considered a Native American tribe’s
claim that New York and its Governor, in his official capacity, were in
violation of the Non-Intercourse Act by wrongly possessing land, including
submerged land, contained in ten New York counties. The tribe sought “a
declaration of [it]s ownership and right to possess their reservation lands
16                                                              No. 20-4247

seek a declaration that the State’s laws and regulations do not apply
to the area in dispute. Therefore, the quiet title exception to Ex parte
Young outlined by the Court in Coeur d’Alene Tribe has no application
here.

        Accordingly, the lawsuit falls under the Ex parte Young
exception to the Eleventh Amendment.              Thus, neither collateral
estoppel nor the Eleventh Amendment bars the Nation from
proceeding in this case.

                             CONCLUSION

        For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the order of the district
court denying the motion to dismiss.

in the State of New York,” and to “exclude all others, including holders of
fee simple title.” W. Mohegan Tribe & Nation, 395 F.3d at 20, 22 (internal
quotation marks and emphasis omitted). We found that the claims were
“virtually identical” to those in Coeur d’Alene Tribe because the tribe sought
to exclude all others from the land and sought a declaration that the lands
in question were not within the regulatory jurisdiction of the State. Id. at
21. We thus held that the lawsuit was the functional equivalent of a quiet
title action and did not permit it to proceed under Ex parte Young. No such
deep incursion into the ownership rights of the State is presented here.
RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

       I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that Seneca Nation

(the “Nation”) is seeking relief that can properly be characterized as prospective.

In my view, the Nation’s lawsuit seeks only retrospective relief against New York

State (the “State”) and is thus barred by the Eleventh Amendment. I would

therefore reverse the district court’s order denying dismissal. 1

       When determining whether relief is permitted under the Eleventh

Amendment, courts consider the “substance rather than the form of the relief

sought.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 279 (1986). Although the Nation has styled

its requests for relief as prospective, each request seeks to redress a past wrong –

the State’s purported failure to comply with the Non-Intercourse Act when it

purchased from the Nation an easement permitting it to extend a portion of the

New York State Thruway (the “Thruway”) over tribal land in 1954.                              In its

complaint, the Nation seeks (1) a declaration that the Defendants (the “State

Officials”) are perpetrating a continuing violation of federal law by failing to

obtain a valid easement, (2) an injunction requiring the State Officials to obtain a

1 I agree, however, with the majority that neither collateral estoppel nor the Supreme Court’s
decision in Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261 (1997), provides an independent basis
for dismissing the Nation’s claim.
valid easement for the portion of the Thruway on the Nation’s land, and (3) an

order barring the State’s collection of tolls for such portion of the Thruway (or else

requiring those toll monies to be segregated and escrowed). Taking each in turn,

I am not persuaded that any of these requests for relief is proper under Ex parte

Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).

      First, what the Nation characterizes as a request for declaratory relief is

retrospective in nature. The Nation seeks a declaration that the State Officials “will

continue to violate federal law by not obtaining a valid easement.” J. App’x at 22.

I see no daylight between such a declaration and a backward-looking judgment

that the State’s easement is invalid. At bottom, both judgments would turn on a

prior act: the validity of the State’s 1954 purchase of the easement. Surely, if that

purchase had complied with federal law, the State would have no need to procure

another “valid easement.” Id. Therefore, in my view, the declaration now sought

by the Nation is nothing short of a judgment that the State has “violated federal

law in the past,” which is surely barred by the Eleventh Amendment. P.R.

Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993); see also Ward

v. Thomas, 207 F.3d 114, 120 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment

                                          2
bars retrospective relief in the form of a declaration “that Connecticut had violated

federal law in the past”).

      Second, the Nation’s request for an injunction directing the State to obtain a

valid easement is squarely barred under the Supreme Court’s holding in Papasan

v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265 (1986).      In Papasan, the plaintiffs brought both a

breach-of-trust claim and an equal-protection claim against Mississippi officials

for their unlawful sale of land held in trust for the schools of the Chickasaw Indian

Nation.   478 U.S. at 279, 282.     The Supreme Court held that the Eleventh

Amendment barred the plaintiffs’ attempt to recover the trust corpus because it

was a “past loss.” Id. at 281. The Supreme Court did, however, permit the suit

over the “alleged ongoing constitutional violation” – the disparity in funding for

Chickasaw schools relative to non-Indian schools in Mississippi – to proceed,

reasoning that, even though the disparity has its roots in the past sale of the land,

“the essence of the equal protection allegation is the present disparity in the

distribution of the benefits of state-held assets.” Id. at 282 (emphasis added).

      Like the breach-of-trust claim in Papasan, the Nation’s request for an

injunction seeks compensation for a “past loss.” Id. at 281. Here, the “past loss”

is the 1954 easement transaction that the Nation alleges violated federal law. Id.

                                          3
To remedy this injury, the Nation seeks an injunction ordering the State to

purchase the easement anew. But we cannot order the State to “use its own

resources” to remedy a historical wrong. Id. So while the Nation has carefully

framed its request for relief as injunctive in nature, we must analyze what the relief

“in essence” seeks to accomplish. Id. at 278; see, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,

668 (1974) (focusing on the “practical effect” of the requested relief); Ernst v. Rising,

427 F.3d 351, 368 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting that “[w]hile some of these requests for

relief have an equitable ring to them[,] . . . that fact does not alter the monetary

nature of the relief requested”).       Because making the State repurchase the

easement is “[r]elief that in essence serves to compensate a party injured in the

past by an action of a state official in his official capacity that was illegal under

federal law,” the Eleventh Amendment bars the Nation from seeking this relief.

Papasan, 478 U.S. at 278.

      The majority’s attempt to find refuge in Papasan’s equal-protection holding

misses the mark. In Papasan, the “essence” of the equal-protection claim was the

“present disparity in the distribution of the benefits of state-held assets and not the

past actions of the State.” Id. at 282 (emphasis added). Accordingly, because the

equal-protection claim sought to compel “compliance in the future,” it was not

                                           4
barred. Id. (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted). By contrast, the

Nation’s request for an injunction ordering the State to repurchase the easement

would merely serve to redress a past wrong – it would not remedy any “present”

or “future” harm.

      Third, we lack jurisdiction to order the State to escrow toll monies for the

portion of the Thruway that runs over the Nation’s land – for two independent

reasons. First, if the Nation is not requesting that these toll monies be remitted to

it – and it appears it is not – it lacks standing to ask for an order that serves no

purpose other than to deprive a third party of benefits. Under Article III, “a

plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought.”

Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000).

Standing requires a party seeking relief to plead – and, ultimately, demonstrate –

that it is “likely” that its “injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Lujan

v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, the Nation frames its injury as the State’s unlawful use of its land. Simple

enough. But to redress this injury, the Nation seeks an order prohibiting the State

from profiting from that use. I fail to see any colorable argument as to how such

                                           5
an order would redress the Nation’s injury, as opposed to merely inflicting pain on

the State.

       Alternatively, if the Nation does intend to ultimately acquire the escrowed

toll monies, we again lack jurisdiction because such relief is barred by the Eleventh

Amendment and Papasan. Under Papasan, asking for the income stream from an

asset in perpetuity is “essentially equivalent in economic terms” to asking for the

value of the asset itself. 478 U.S. at 281. Thus, if the Eleventh Amendment bars a

plaintiff from seeking the return or cash equivalent of the asset, it likewise

prohibits a plaintiff from seeking the perpetual income stream derived from that

asset. See id.

                                       *   *    *

       In sum, because none of the relief sought by the Nation falls within the Ex

parte Young exception to the Eleventh Amendment, I would reverse the order of

the district court and instruct it to dismiss this case.

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