Court Opinion

ID: 9586688
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:14:05.49702+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:47.847052
License: Public Domain

Bell, Judge,
dissenting. Since the defendant here chose to use a negotiable instrument payable to the order of three persons, I feel that it necessarily follows that the provisions of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, as enacted in Georgia, govern the instrument. Furthermore, while the typed portion of the instrument provides that the first $1,000 shall be payable to one of the three payees, I cannot conclude that this fact is sufficiently persuasive in itself to constitute a waiver by implication of the policy of the law that the instrument must be transferred in its entirety. This policy is derived from Code § 14-403 which makes clear that an indorsement must be an indorsement of the entire instrument and a transfer to two or more indorsees severally does not operate as a negotiation. This conclusion is further reinforced by Code § 14-412, which provides that where an instrument is payable to the order of two or more payees who are not partners, all must indorse unless the one indorsing has authority to indorse for the others. See Fulton Nat. Bank v. Didschuneit, 92 Ga. App. 527, 532 (88 S. E. 2d 853). These sections lead me to the conclusion that there is no authority to support a rule that a negotiable instrument may be transfei'red in part by an assignment by one of several joint payees. Furthermore, allowing an action to be maintained upon an attempted assignment of part of the proceeds of a negotiable instrument conflicts with prior holdings that a partial assignment does not give the assignee such title as can be enforced by a common-law action. See Graham v. Southern Ry. Co., 173 Ga. 573 (161 S. E. 125, 80 A. L. R. 407, and Shearer v. Shearer, 137 Ga. 51 (72 S. E. 428). In the latter case, it was held that a partial assignment of one’s interest in a primissory note is not binding on the maker of the note unless accepted or assented to by the *52latter. I cannot agree with the holding in Nagel v. Lutz, 41 App. Div. 193 (58 N. Y. S. 816), cited by the majority, to the effect that where the note provides for payment of a separate sum to two differ it payees, the instrument is in effect two instruments in on' And the payees may not sue jointly. It is to be noted that .is case was decided before the Uniform Negotiable Instr ients Law took effect in New York. The instrument the sued on was dated May 19, 1897, which was the date of mactment of the New York Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law; however, the New York law, while enacted May 19, 1897, did not become effective in that state until October 1, 1897. See Laws of New Yoi’k (1897), pp. 719, 757. In Nagel v. Lutz, the court stated, “The instrument set out in the complaint is a novelty. It contains two px’omissory notes, one of which is negotiable and was given for $750. The other is nonnegotiable and was given for $750.” That case was decided on a question of misjoinder of parties and was not decided under the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law which, in any event, could not have been applied to the case because the lights of the parties were fixed before the effective date of the act. I do not find anything in the instrument herein sued on which would constitute a consent to a separate suit by the assignee of one payee upon a negotiable instrument payable to the order of three payees jointly. I remain of the opinion that the maker, having chosen to use a negotiable instrument payable to the order of three persons, thereby elected to have the instrument governed by the laws applying to such instruments, and it naturally follows that more would be required of the maker to constitute a waiver than the mere original signing of the paper in its unique form. For these reasons I think Code §§ 14-403 and 14-412 govern this transaction.
I am authorized to say that Judge Nichols joins with me and concurs in these conclusions stated.