Court Opinion

ID: 9567984
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:59:30.035184+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:24:07.155066
License: Public Domain

*299Justice FRYE
dissenting.
The majority holds, quite correctly I believe, that it was error for the trial court to refuse to allow the neuropsychologist, Dr. Sciara, to attempt to resolve any of the apparent conflicts between his and Dr. Lindley’s testimony. I do not agree, however, with the majority’s conclusion that the error was not prejudicial. Assuming that the majority is correct that the test for prejudice for this error is whether there is a reasonable possibility that had the error not occurred, a different result would have been reached at this capital sentencing proceeding, I conclude that defendant has met his burden of showing that such a possibility exists. N.C.G.S. § 15A-1443(a) (1988). Finding the error prejudicial, I vote for a new capital sentencing proceeding.
I note first that defendant pled guilty to murder in the first degree, thus admitting that he unlawfully killed the victim with malice, premeditation and deliberation. The purpose of the sentencing proceeding was to have the jury recommend to the court whether defendant should be sentenced to death or to life imprisonment for this crime. In making this binding recommendation, at least some of the jurors may have found it significant whether the abrupt changes in defendant’s behavior were attributable to his recent brain injury and subsequent operation, or whether defendant was simply a “mean young man.” The testimony of Dr. Sciara would support the former conclusion while the testimony of Dr. Lindley would suggest the latter. Yet, when Dr. Sciara tried to explain Dr. Lindley’s testimony “because I think its important,” the trial judge interrupted by telling Dr. Sciara that “the jury has heard his testimony too, its for them to decide what his testimony is, not for you to explain it to them, what somebody else’s testimony was, Doctor.” I conclude that this was error prejudicial to defendant for the following reasons, among others.
First, the neurosurgeon made it clear that a neuropsychologist would be better qualified than he to determine the extent of personality and behavior changes caused by brain damage. As a neuropsychologist, Dr. Sciara attempted to explain the apparent inconsistencies between his testimony and that of the neurosurgeon. Preventing him from doing so was prejudicial to defendant. Dr. Sciara’s testimony in this regard could have been helpful to the jury in weighing the mitigating circumstances against the ag*300gravating circumstances in order to determine if the aggravating circumstances called for imposition of the death penalty.
During the jury argument, the prosecutor took advantage of the apparent inconsistencies in the evidence by arguing that defendant’s expert witnesses had contradicted one another. The prosecutor argued at length about the contradictions between the testimony of the two experts —placing emphasis on the qualifications of Dr. Lindley as “Chief Resident of Neurosurgery at Baptist Hospital” while emphasizing that Dr. Sciara “was not a medical doctor, he was a psychologist.” Likewise, the prosecutor told the jury that the neurosurgeon had testified that the chance that the brain damage might have caused some personality change “was pure hypothesis” while the psychologist “came in and said I know for a fact that this brain damage has caused this change.” The prosecutor continued: “Here is a psychologist, who is totally, totally contradicting what the Chief Resident of Neurosurgery at Baptist Hospital says.”
The majority concludes that the prosecutor’s argument was supported by the evidence. If so, that is an additional argument for concluding that the error in not permitting the neuropsychologist to attempt to explain the apparent contradictions between his testimony and that of the neurosurgeon was prejudicial to defendant. Apparently the jury was troubled by the differences in the testimony of the two experts. The jury requested a copy of the testimony of the neurosurgeon and the neuropsychologist. The trial judge denied the request, telling the jurors, inter alia, that it was their “duty to use [their] own recollection and recall the evidence as [they had] heard it from the witness stand.” However, because of the judge’s interruption of the witness’ response on cross-examination, the jury had been prevented from hearing all of the evidence that should have been given from the witness stand. Thus, the judge’s rulings related to this issue permitted the prosecutors’ contentions to prevail: 1) that the neurosurgeon’s testimony was true, and 2) the conflicting testimony of the neuropsychologist should be ignored.
I conclude that there is a reasonable possibility that had this error not occurred, a different result would have been reached at the sentencing proceeding. N.C.G.S. § 15A-1443(a). Had the neuropsychologist been permitted to fully explain the apparent contradictions between his testimony and that of the neurosurgeon, the *301jury may have concluded that the terrible crimes committed by defendant were at least partially attributable to his recent brain damage and brain operation and that his punishment should be life imprisonment rather than death.
Finally, Dr. Sciara’s testimony was consistent with that of numerous lay witnesses who testified that defendant’s behavior underwent extreme changes following the brain operation. Had the court not interrupted Dr. Sciara’s explanation, his testimony would have lent credence to the lay witnesses’ testimony that defendant changed from being a polite, nonviolent, considerate, and clean young man, before the operation, to one who was unclean, lethargic, unreliable, perverse and demanding after the operation.
Because I find prejudicial error in the sentencing proceeding entitling defendant to a new capital sentencing proceeding, I find it unnecessary to reach the issue of whether the sentence of death in this case is disproportionate, considering both the crime and defendant, when compared to the pool of similar cases.
Chief Justice EXUM joins in this dissenting opinion.