Court Opinion

ID: 9385205
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-06 14:04:41.462474+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:59.760528
License: Public Domain

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SJC-13317

             COMMONWEALTH   vs.   QASIM Q., a juvenile.

       Barnstable.       January 4, 2023. - April 6, 2023.

 Present:   Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt,
                           & Georges, JJ.

Burning of Property. Attempt. Delinquent Child.      Intent.
     Evidence, Intent. Statute, Construction.

     Complaint received and sworn to in the Barnstable
County/Town of Plymouth Division of the Juvenile Court
Department on January 31, 2020.

    The case was heard by Mary O'Sullivan Smith, J.

     The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for
direct appellate review.

     Michelle Menken for the juvenile.
     Johanna Black, Assistant District Attorney, for the
Commonwealth.
     Cristina F. Freitas & Debbie F. Freitas for youth advocacy
division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services & others,
amici curiae, submitted a brief.

    CYPHER, J.    On August 27, 2020, the juvenile was arraigned

in the Juvenile Court on two counts of an attempt to burn a

public building, in violation of G. L. c. 266, § 5A (§ 5A or
                                                                   2

attempted arson statute), and two counts of malicious

destruction of property of $1,200 or less, in violation of G. L.

c. 266, § 127, after he performed the viral TikTok "penny

challenge" twice at his high school.    On November 2, 2021, the

juvenile waived his right to a jury trial, and he then proceeded

to trial before a judge.   Although the judge allowed the

juvenile's motion for a required finding of not delinquent on

the charges of malicious destruction of property, the judge

adjudicated the juvenile delinquent on the two charges of

attempting to burn a public building.

     The juvenile appeals, arguing that § 5A requires proof of

specific intent, and that the evidence presented at trial was

insufficient to demonstrate the juvenile acted with the specific

intent to burn or set fire to the building.   He further argues

that, if the court construes attempted arson to be a general

intent crime, its application to this case would violate

principles of due process and the evidence would remain

insufficient.   As we determine that § 5A is a specific intent

crime, we need not address the latter argument.   Having

concluded also that the evidence was sufficient to support the

juvenile's adjudications of delinquent on both counts of

attempted arson, we affirm.1

     1 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the youth
advocacy division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services;
Youth Advocacy Foundation; Children's Law Center of
                                                                     3

     Background.    1.   Facts.   "We recite the facts the [judge]

could have found, viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the Commonwealth . . . ."      Commonwealth v.

Witkowski, 487 Mass. 675, 676 (2021).

     Around the time of January 2020, a TikTok challenge

referred to as the "penny challenge" was gaining popularity

among teens.2    The challenge, as described by Deputy Fire Chief

Leo Foley of the Plymouth fire department (department), who saw

video recordings of the challenge being performed, involves the

use of a cell phone charger with a charging block,3 a penny, and

a wall outlet.    A performer of the challenge would plug the

charger into the wall outlet, leaving it slightly removed from

the wall, insert a penny behind the charging block, and push the

Massachusetts; Citizens for Juvenile Justice; Massachusetts
Advocates for Children; and Mental Health Legal Advisors
Committee.

     2 TikTok "is a short-loop video sharing [application]
presently used by over 100 million Americans." TikTok Inc. v.
Trump, 490 F. Supp. 3d 73, 77 (D.D.C. 2020). TikTok describes
itself as "the leading destination for short-form mobile video."
TikTok, About TikTok, https://www.tiktok.com/about?lang=en
[https://perma.cc/P6N4-D97Q].

     3 A charger is defined as "a device that is used to add
electricity to batteries." Britannica Dictionary, https://www
.britannica.com/dictionary/charger [https://perma.cc/8UZL-KKDT].
See TheStreet, Turbo-charge Your Devices With the Best USB-C
Charging Blocks (Feb. 27, 2023), https://www.thestreet.com
/review/usb-c-charging-block [https://perma.cc/WD7H-LM5D] (USB-C
charging block allows one to charge devices "on the go,"
"leverag[ing] USB-C power delivery technology to charge
compatible devices quickly").
                                                                    4

charger back in without causing the penny to make contact with

the prongs of the charger.    As the charger is pulled back out,

the penny slides down, hitting the two prongs of the charger,

causing a short circuit, and creating an "electrical arc."4

     The arc created appears visually as sparks and could start

a fire.    Depending on the level of insulation or whether a

circuit is "overloaded," outlets that short circuit frequently

will ignite a fire behind the wall.    It may cause damage to the

circuitry of the electrical system in the building, requiring

the outlet to be replaced and the circuit to be tested.

Superficial damage to the wall or outlet also may occur, and

would look "[l]ike black scorch marks where it [did not]

actually catch fire, so to speak, but was damaged by the

arcing."   After the arc is created, the prongs on the charging

block likely are to appear melted to some extent, as a result of

     4 Foley defined an electrical arc as "that bright white
light that you see like when recently we had all the damage with
the power lines . . . , when those are touching each other it
creates an electrical arc, like lightning." Britannica defines
"electric arc" as

     "[a] continuous, high-density electric current between two
     separated conductors in a gas or [vapor] with a relatively
     low potential difference, or voltage, across the
     conductors. The high-intensity light and heat of arcs are
     utilized in welding, in carbon-arc lamps and arc furnaces
     that operate at ordinary air pressure, and in low-pressure
     sodium-arc and mercury-arc lamps."

Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/science/electric-arc
[https://perma.cc/JM69-796W].
                                                                       5

the sparks.    It also could create charring on the plastic

portion of the charging block.5

     On January 14, 2020, Joelene McCusker, a history teacher at

Plymouth North High School, was helping a group of students in

her classroom.    Her classroom was set up to accommodate eight

different groups comprised of four desks and two tables in the

back of the classroom.    She was facing the front of the room,

with her back turned toward the rear wall, when she heard a loud

bang coming from the area where the juvenile6 and another student

were working, toward the back of the classroom.    She turned

around immediately and saw the juvenile kicking the wall.       When

she approached him to ask him what had happened, he told her

that his charger got stuck in the wall, and that he was kicking

it to get it out.    She noticed that his white cube charger,

which he had in his hand, was blackened and charred, and

appeared unusable.    She reminded him to behave appropriately for

school and instructed him to put away the charger, directing his

attention back to the assignment.    She then returned to the

students with whom she was working before the incident occurred.

     5 At around the same time as the second incident involving
the juvenile described infra, Foley received an advisory from
the State fire marshal's office warning the department about the
challenge and its potential to cause damage or fire.

     6   The juvenile was a special education student.
                                                                      6

At that time, she did not think anything of the incident, and

she did not look at the outlet.

     One week later, on January 21, 2020, Belinda Bechtold, a

biology teacher at the same school, and her coteacher, Patrick

McWalter, were teaching their biology class based in a science

laboratory (lab).     The middle of the classroom was comprised of

traditional two-person desks.     Bordering the desks, on each side

of the room, three lab benches jutted out from the wall.

     Bechtold was teaching at the front of the classroom with

the lights out, using an overhead projector.    At one point

during her lesson, Bechtold heard a crackling noise and noticed

a flash of light coming from the back corner.    McWalter signaled

to Bechtold that he would handle the situation.     She continued

teaching the class.    McWalter also heard a loud rattling sound

coming from the back of the room where the juvenile was sitting.7

When McWalter approached the students sitting at the back of the

room, a student brought his attention to a penny in between the

prongs of a cell phone charging block and the outlet nearby.

The outlet was about four feet high from the floor, placed above

a counter.   The juvenile was sitting in the seat closest to the

outlet, about an arm's length away.    He observed that the

outlet, which normally was white, had black charring on it, and

     7 This area of the classroom contained several outlets, as
the lab benches were set up for gas connections and computers.
                                                                     7

noticed some charring or blackness on the wall.    There was a

penny stuck between the prongs of the charging block.

    McWalter, concerned, told the students to stay away from

the outlet and walked toward Bechtold to discuss the incident

with her.   As he started making his way to the front of the

classroom, he heard a loud rattling noise again, causing him to

turn around.   He saw sparks coming out of the outlet for a

couple of seconds and noticed the juvenile reaching out and

grabbing the charging block at the same time.

    Once the students were working independently, Bechtold

walked to the back of the classroom to check on what had

happened when she was instructing the class.    Bechtold noticed

that there was "something going on with the wall."    She saw that

there was a cell phone charging block in the outlet, and the

outlet appeared to be charred in the areas surrounding the

block.    Not knowing if the arc still was "live," Bechtold

removed the charging block with rubber-plated tongs.    Similar to

the outlet, the side of the charging block attached to the

prongs was black and charred.   The charging block looked like it

had been burned, and the penny was stuck to it.    The penny was

misshapen and no longer round, and it was flush with the prongs

of the charging block as if it had been pushed down into the

prongs.
                                                                       8

      On that day, members of the department were present at the

school for unrelated reasons.      McWalter informed the

administration what had just happened, and the department

members, including Foley, went to observe the damage.       In the

lab classroom, Foley noticed the outlet had scorch marks

indicating a short circuit.       Foley then observed the outlet in

McCusker's classroom and noted that it had black scorch marks on

it.

      At some point around that time, McCusker returned to look

at the outlet where she had noticed the juvenile kick his

charger.8    She then noted that the outlet was blackened and

charred around the bottom and on the side.

      2.    Procedural history.   A complaint issued against the

juvenile on January 31, 2020.      Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, his

arraignment was rescheduled several times.      Ultimately, the

juvenile was arraigned on August 27.      The juvenile filed a

motion to dismiss on January 28, 2021.      There was a hearing on

the motion on February 23, where the juvenile argued that

probable cause was lacking to show that he caused the charring

in both the January 14 and January 21 incidents and to show

intentional burning with malice under the attempted arson

      8McCusker testified that she looked at the outlet about a
week after the January 14 incident.
                                                                      9

statute.9   After the hearing, the judge denied the motion.      In

issuing her decision, she stated,

     "[O]n a directed verdict standard I think I'd be hard
     pressed not to consider [whether the Commonwealth met the
     standard] very carefully. I think the biggest issue at
     that stage would be the maliciousness of the act.
     Certainly, it's willful. I have no doubt that it was
     willful. The malice, I think, is a little thinner, a
     little less clear."

     On November 2, 2021, the same judge conducted a colloquy

with the juvenile, and he waived the right to a jury trial.       A

bench trial was held the same day.    At the close of evidence,

the juvenile moved for a required finding of not delinquent on

all of the charges against him.     The juvenile asserted that

there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate beyond a

reasonable doubt that he engaged in acts that caused the

blackening of the outlets and that, even if the judge found that

the evidence was sufficient on that point, the evidence was

insufficient to demonstrate that he attempted to burn the

building and that he acted willfully and maliciously.     The judge

granted the juvenile's motion with respect to the counts

alleging malicious destruction of property.    As to the attempted

arson charges, the judge denied the motion, indicating that "[a]

burning is malicious if it is done with a wrong and unlawful

motive or purpose."

     9 The juvenile also argued that there was no probable cause
for the counts of malicious destruction of property.
                                                                   10

     After closing arguments, the judge adjudicated the juvenile

delinquent on both charges of attempting to burn a public

building.10   As to her finding on malice under § 5A, the judge

stated that the Commonwealth proved that the acts were

intentional and by design, showing that they were the "willful

doing of a harmful act without excuse."    The juvenile filed a

timely notice of appeal, and we allowed the juvenile's

application for direct appellate review.

     Discussion.   1.   Intent required by § 5A.   Both parties

assert that to violate § 5A one must have a specific intent

eventually to burn or set fire to a qualifying building,

structure, or property.   We review questions of statutory

interpretation de novo.   Commonwealth v. Fleury, 489 Mass. 421,

424 (2022).   If the language of the statute "is clear and

unambiguous, we 'must give effect to its plain and ordinary

meaning and . . . need not look beyond the words.'"    Id.,

quoting Shaw's Supermkts., Inc. v. Melendez, 488 Mass. 338, 341

(2021).   "The 'venerable distinction at common law between

general and specific intent has been the source of a good deal

of confusion' (citations and quotations omitted)."    Commonwealth

v. Pfeiffer, 482 Mass. 110, 115, cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 498

(2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Gunter, 427 Mass. 259, 268

     10The judge indicated that the January 14 incident was a
closer case than the January 21 incident.
                                                                    11

(1998), S.C., 456 Mass. 1017 (2010) and 459 Mass. 480, cert.

denied, 565 U.S. 868 (2011).    "[I]n a general sense, 'purpose'

corresponds loosely with the common-law concept of specific

intent, while 'knowledge' corresponds loosely with the concept

of general intent."   Gunter, supra, quoting United States v.

Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 405 (1980).    Specific intent requires not

only that the juvenile "consciously intended to take certain

actions, but that [he] also consciously intended certain

consequences."   Pfeiffer, supra, quoting Gunter, supra at 269.

We agree with both parties that the intent required under G. L.

c. 266, § 5A, is specific intent, as evidenced by both the plain

language of the statute and existing case law.

    "An attempt to commit a crime necessarily involves an

intent to commit that crime."    Commonwealth v. Hebert, 373 Mass.

535, 537 (1977).   See 2 W.R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law

§ 11.3, at 293 (3d ed. 2018) ("The crime of attempt consists of

[1] an intent to do an act or to bring about a certain

consequence which would in law amount to a crime; and [2] an act

in furtherance of that intent").    The crime of general attempt,

G. L. c. 274, § 6 (general attempt statute), is comprised of two

elements:   "(1) the specific intent to commit the substantive

crime at issue, and (2) an overt act toward completion of the

substantive crime."   Commonwealth v. LaBrie, 473 Mass. 754, 764

(2016) (elements of general attempt and attempted murder are
                                                                   12

same).   The substantive crime is important because the crime of

attempt is geared toward punishing acts bearing "a proximate

relation to that crime."    Id. at 763.   In Commonwealth v.

Peaslee, 177 Mass. 267 (1901), the court considered an attempt

to burn a building under an earlier version of the general

attempt statute.    Under Peaslee, whether an overt act "coupled

with an intent to commit the crime" meets the definition of an

attempt depended on the degree of proximity to the completion of

the crime.   Id. at 272.

       Section 5A was added to G. L. c. 266 by St. 1932, c. 192,

§ 5.    This section indicates:

       "Whoever wilfully and maliciously attempts to set fire to,
       or attempts to burn, or aids, counsels or assists in such
       an attempt to set fire to or burn, any of the buildings
       . . . mentioned in the foregoing sections, or whoever
       commits any act preliminary thereto or in furtherance
       thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment in the [S]tate
       prison for not more than ten years, or by imprisonment in a
       jail or house of correction for not more than two and one
       half years or by a fine of not more than one thousand
       dollars.

       "The placing or distributing of any flammable, explosive or
       combustible material or substance or any device in or
       against any building . . . mentioned in the foregoing
       sections in an arrangement or preparation with intent
       eventually to wilfully and maliciously set fire to or burn
       such building . . . or to procure the setting fire to or
       burning of the same shall, for the purposes of this
       section, constitute an attempt to burn such building
       . . . ."
                                                                     13

G. L. c. 266, § 5A.11    "The second part of § 5A . . . contains a

definition of 'attempt' in respect to arson and the related

offences there described."     Commonwealth v. Mehales, 284 Mass.

412, 416 (1933).     The enactment of the attempted arson statute

"changed the preexisting law."     Id.   "The purpose of its plain

words is to declare a comprehensive definition of 'attempt

. . . .'"    Id.   The definition of attempt in the second

paragraph of the statute superseded the "narrower conception"

articulated in Peaslee.12    Mehales, supra.   See Commonwealth v.

Jaffas, 284 Mass. 417, 421 (1933) ("It is apparent from a

reading of [St. 1932, c. 192], in its entirety that the design

of the General Court in enacting it was to broaden the scope of

the legislative enactments touching 'arson and certain related

offences.'    Some penalties are made less, but the description of

the offenses is somewhat less technical and more comprehensive

than in preexisting statutes").

     11The attempted arson statute was amended by St. 1977,
c. 975, inserting "by imprisonment in the [S]tate prison for not
more than ten years, or." See Commonwealth v. Banner, 13 Mass.
App. Ct. 1065, 1067 (1982) (prior to 1977 amendment, penalty
prescribed was limited to incarceration in jail or house of
correction, which "[t]he Legislature apparently determined . . .
was an inadequate punishment").

     12In Peaslee, the court stated that "an overt act although
coupled with an intent to commit the crime commonly is not
punishable if further acts are contemplated as needful."
Peaslee, 177 Mass. at 272. Peaslee required a preparation
coming "very near to the accomplishment of the act." Id.
                                                                     14

    By the plain language of the statute, the intent required

is specific.     Particularly, to meet the element of attempt, the

Commonwealth must show that the juvenile "plac[ed] or

distribut[ed] . . . any flammable, explosive or combustible

material or substance or any device in or against any building

. . . mentioned in the foregoing sections in an arrangement or

preparation with intent eventually to wilfully and maliciously

set fire to or burn such building" (emphasis added).      G. L.

c. 266, § 5A.     The mens rea requirement of a violation of § 5A

can be broken up into two elements:     (1) the specific intent to

burn or set fire to a qualifying building; and (2) acting

willfully and maliciously.     We examine each of these showings in

turn.

    Because attempt to burn a public building, contrary to the

substantive crime of arson, is a specific intent crime, a

showing that "a reasonable person in the [juvenile]'s position

would have known that there was a plain and strong likelihood

that some portion of a dwelling house would be set on fire or

burned" is not enough.     Pfeiffer, 482 Mass. at 121.   An intent

eventually to set fire to or burn a building is required for a

conviction.     G. L. c. 266, § 5A.   "Although specific intent

requires proof that the [juvenile] intended [his] conduct and

its consequences, it does not require proof that the

consequences [he] intended were as extensive as those realized
                                                                  15

. . . only that the consequences [he] intended are among those

covered by the statute."   Pfeiffer, supra at 122.   An intent to

"burn" or "char[]" some portion of the building is sufficient;

the juvenile need not have intended that the building be

destroyed or consumed by fire.   Id. at 122, 143 (Appendix).     See

A.F. Curtis, Treatise on the Law of Arson Covering the Decisions

of All American States and Territories, and Including Those of

England and the British Colonies § 63, at 80 (1936) (Curtis,

Treatise on the Law of Arson) ("In the absence of words

indicating a contrary intention, a statute will not be construed

as requiring an intent to destroy, but merely an intent to

burn"); 3 LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 21.3(b), at 319-320

(addition of "sets fire" to "burns" in arson statute sometimes

is construed to "extend[] arson liability to those rare cases in

which the fire does damage to the building without any 'burning'

of the building itself"; "[s]uch broadening of the law of arson,

it has been contended, is the 'better view' and 'clearly the

modern trend of authority today'" [citations omitted]).

    The term "willfully" means "intentional and by design in

contrast to that which is thoughtless or accidental."     Pfeiffer,

482 Mass. at 116, quoting Commonwealth v. McGovern, 397 Mass.

863, 868 (1986).   For the substantive crime of arson and, thus,

the crime of attempt to burn a public building, malice

"comprises only three components":   "[t]he wilful doing of an
                                                                    16

unlawful act without excuse."   Commonwealth v. Dung Van Tran,

463 Mass. 8, 26 (2012), quoting Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 431

Mass. 506, 513 n.6 (2000).   Malice, for the purposes of the

crime of arson, "need not be express, but may be implied; it

need not take the form of malevolence or ill will, but it is

sufficient if one deliberately and without justification or

excuse sets out to burn [a public building as defined by

statute]."   Commonwealth v. Lamothe, 343 Mass. 417, 419 (1961),

quoting State v. Pisano, 107 Conn. 630, 632 (1928).    This malice

requirement is just as applicable to the crime of attempted

arson under § 5A, as that offense "is so closely related to

arson that it is very unlikely that the Legislature intended the

word to be used in a different sense."     Lamothe, supra at 420.

See Mehales, 284 Mass. at 415 (malice for purposes of § 5A is

"all acts done with an evil disposition, a wrong and unlawful

motive or purpose; the wilful doing of an injurious act without

lawful excuse" [citation omitted]).

     Having defined the mens rea requirements for the crime of

attempting to burn a public building under § 5A, we move on to

consider whether the evidence presented against the juvenile was

sufficient to support his convictions.13

     13As we hold that G. L. c. 266, § 5A, requires a showing of
specific intent, we need not address the juvenile's arguments
that the statute's application would violate constitutional
principles of due process were it a general intent crime. See
Commonwealth v. Manolo M., 486 Mass. 678, 692 (2021), quoting
                                                                  17

     2.   Sufficiency of the evidence.   The juvenile argues that

the evidence was insufficient to prove that he intended to burn

or set fire to the building.   Relying on the judge's ruling that

the evidence was insufficient to prove malicious destruction of

property, he asserts that she "conveyed her belief that [he] did

not specifically intend to burn or set fire to the building."

He argues that the evidence supporting his attempt to perform

the challenge was insufficient to support an intent to set fire

to or burn the building.   The Commonwealth argues that the

evidence was sufficient to support the two charges of attempt to

burn a public building and asserts that the juvenile did not

raise the issue of specific intent before the judge at trial.14

Commonwealth v. Raposo, 453 Mass. 739, 743 (2009) (generally we
do "not . . . decide constitutional questions 'unless they must
necessarily be reached'").

     14The juvenile raised the issue of intent explicitly at the
motion to dismiss hearing; at trial, in his argument for a
directed verdict, he focused on the lack of a showing of malice,
but mentioned that there was insufficient evidence that he
"attempted to burn the building." Regardless of whether the
juvenile effectively raised this challenge below, we consider
his sufficiency argument, as "findings based on legally
insufficient evidence are inherently serious enough to create a
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice." Commonwealth v.
Grandison, 433 Mass. 135, 140 n.8 (2001), quoting McGovern, 397
Mass. at 867.

     We address whether the Commonwealth sufficiently proved
specific intent. Therefore, we need not address the juvenile's
argument that there was insufficient evidence under a general
intent requirement.
                                                                  18

    "In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider

'whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable

to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found

the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'"

Commonwealth v. Davis, 487 Mass. 448, 462 (2021) (Davis I),

quoting Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979).

"Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to find someone

[delinquent] beyond a reasonable doubt and inferences drawn from

such circumstantial evidence 'need only be reasonable and

possible; [they] need not be necessary or inescapable.'"    Davis

v. Commonwealth, 491 Mass. 1011, 1013 (2023), quoting Davis I,

supra.   Nonetheless, a conviction may not "be based on

conjecture or on inference piled upon inference."    Commonwealth

v. Jones, 477 Mass. 307, 316 (2017).

    We first assess the January 14 incident.15   We conclude that

the Commonwealth presented evidence sufficient to demonstrate

beyond a reasonable doubt that the juvenile intended to burn the

building through his performance of the challenge.   The

Commonwealth introduced testimony surrounding a "viral teen

video resulting in fire incidents," and Foley described this

video as utilizing a charging block, a penny, and a wall outlet

to create a short circuit and produce an electrical arc, or a

    15 As the juvenile does not contest any of the other
elements of an attempt to burn a public building, we focus our
analysis on the juvenile's specific intent.
                                                                    19

bright white light resembling sparks that may start a fire.

After creating the sparks, the prongs on the charger likely are

to appear melted and the sparks may create charring on the

plastic portion of the charging block and black scorch marks

indicating damage on the wall or outlet.    Bechtold described the

challenge as "[k]id[s] . . . putting pennies into . . . chargers

and using them to create sparks by plugging them into outlets."

    As McCusker was teaching her students, she heard a loud

bang coming from the area where the juvenile was sitting, and

she saw the juvenile kicking the wall.     She noticed that the

juvenile's white cube charging block, which he had in his hand,

was blackened and charred, and appeared unusable.    About a week

later, when McCusker went back to look at the outlet, she noted

it was blackened and charred around the bottom and on the side.

    The juvenile's specific intent to burn the building can be

inferred from the consequences of successfully performing the

challenge and the facts demonstrating his attempt to perform the

challenge that day.   The juvenile's charging block -- a white

cube -- matched the description of those typically used in

performing the challenge, a "white block charger."    The juvenile

kicked his charger out of the outlet, leading to a reasonable

inference that he knew it would be dangerous to touch, and thus

knew the consequences of performing the challenge.     When

McCusker noticed the charger in the juvenile's hand, it was
                                                                    20

blackened and charred, and appeared unusable.     When she looked

at the outlet a week later, she noticed that it was blackened

and charred.   This is consistent with the consequences of the

performance of the challenge.     The juvenile did not ask for

help, despite the fact that a "loud bang" was emitted and his

charging block appeared damaged.     See, e.g., Pfeiffer, 482 Mass.

at 123 (intent inferable where defendant left and locked door

without attempting to extinguish fire she set or call for help);

Dung Van Tran, 463 Mass. at 27-28 (defendant's failure to put

out fire or sound alarm supported inference that defendant

intended to burn apartment); Commonwealth v. Cavedon, 301 Mass.

307, 314-315 (1938) (failure to give alarm contributed to guilty

finding on arson charge).     "An inference drawn from

circumstantial evidence need only be reasonable and possible; it

need not be necessary or inescapable" (quotation omitted).       Dung

Van Tran, supra at 27, quoting Commonwealth v. Merola, 405 Mass.

529, 533 (1989).   "We are mindful that in arson cases the

Commonwealth often can prove guilt only by a web of

circumstantial evidence that entwines the suspect in guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt."     Pfeiffer, supra, quoting Choy v.

Commonwealth, 456 Mass. 146, 150, cert. denied, 562 U.S. 986

(2010).   A reasonable juror fairly could draw the inference that

the juvenile was aware of and intent on performing the challenge

to set off sparks on January 14 from the description of the
                                                                    21

challenge and its consequences provided by Foley, and from the

juvenile's actions, including both his failure to ask for help

and his kicking of the charger.

    The intent to create sparks, which is the "bright white

light" indicated in the challenge, is sufficient to demonstrate

an intent to burn.    The substantive crime of arson requires

proof only that some portion of the property was on fire or

burned.    Pfeiffer, 482 Mass. at 122.   Specific intent requires

that the juvenile intended his conduct and its consequences, and

that the intended consequences met the requirements of the

statute.   Id.   It does not require proof that his intended

consequences were as severe as the extant consequences of his

actions.   Id.   His intent to perform the challenge, the purpose

of which is to create sparks within the building, equates to an

intent to "burn" the property, meeting the requirements of § 5A.

See id. (charring sufficient for arson).     "Burn" is defined as

    "to consume fuel and give off light, heat, and gases . . .
    to give off light . . . to become altered by the action of
    fire or heat . . . to become charred, scorched, seared, or
    consumed by excessive heat . . . to injure by fire or heat:
    alter a property of by undue exposure to fire or heat."

Webster's Third New International Dictionary 299 (2002).

Performing a challenge designed to create sparks, or a "bright

white light," within a building would fall within the definition

of "burn."   For this reason, the juvenile's kicking of the

charger out of the outlet does not abate his intent to burn,
                                                                   22

i.e., his intent to cause the sparks and create the heat

resulting in charring.16   See Curtis, Treatise on the Law of

Arson § 120, at 141 ("intent to burn may be inferred from the

act itself, if the . . . particular purpose could not have been

effected without such burning, for every person is held

responsible for the necessary and natural consequences of his

acts and is held to intend to produce such consequences"); 3

LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 21.3(b), at 320 (broad view

of arson law "modern trend of authority today" [citation

omitted]).

     The facts presented regarding the January 21 incident

provided ample support for the charge of attempted arson.      After

he attempted the challenge on January 14, the juvenile was aware

that performing it would result in charring in addition to the

sparks.   Despite this awareness, only one week later, the

juvenile attempted the challenge again -- not once, but twice.

During another one of his classes, teachers saw a flash of light

and heard a loud "rattling" or "crackling" noise coming from the

area where the juvenile was sitting.     McWalter was informed that

there was a penny in between the prongs of a charging block and

an outlet in the classroom.   The juvenile was sitting within an

arm's length distance from the outlet.     McWalter observed

     16The juvenile's kicking of the charger also permits an
inference that he was aware that performing the challenge would
produce excessive heat.
                                                                   23

charring on the outlet and the wall.    He also noted a penny

stuck between the prongs of the charging block.    After McWalter

told the students to stay away from the outlet and turned around

to update Bechtold, he heard the same noise, saw sparks coming

out of the outlet for several seconds, and noticed the juvenile

simultaneously reaching out and grabbing the charging block.

The charging block looked like it was burned, and the outlet and

sides of the charging block were black and charred, indicating a

short circuit.   The penny was misshapen and flush with the

prongs of the charging block.

    In addition to the testimony discussed supra regarding the

popularity of and procedure for completing the penny challenge,

after the January 14 incident, the juvenile was well aware that

performing this challenge would create sparks and result in the

charring and damaging of his charger.    In the light most

favorable to the Commonwealth, he also would have been aware

that it resulted in the charring and blackening of the wall

outlet.   Even putting aside his performance of the challenge on

January 14, after the first attempt on January 21 resulting in

the penny's adherence to the prongs of the charging block, he

knew that engaging in this behavior would create sparks and

charring on the outlet and the wall.    In spite of that, he

ignored McWalter's command to stay away from the outlet and
                                                                   24

touched the charging block again, creating sparks.17    These

actions are sufficient to demonstrate an intent to burn the

building.   See, e.g., Pfeiffer, 482 Mass. at 122; Commonwealth

v. Beneche, 458 Mass. 61, 80 (2010) (prior bad acts admissible

to show intent).

     The juvenile asserts that "the judge found the evidence

insufficient to support a finding that [the juvenile] intended

to burn or set fire to the building."    He bases this argument on

the judge's statements in allowing the juvenile's motion for a

required finding of not delinquent on the malicious destruction

of property charges.   The judge stated that because the juvenile

was charged with malicious, and not wanton, destruction of

property, the malice requirement necessitated a showing not only

that he "act[ed] deliberately," but also that he acted out of

"cruelty, hostility[,] or revenge."     The judge indicated that

the juvenile performed the acts "out of means to be a prankster,

a very dangerous prank, no doubt, but clearly wanton

destruction."   Despite her finding as to the absence of malice

for the purposes of malicious destruction of property, the judge

found that the Commonwealth met its burden on the malice

requirement under § 5A, which she noted "[did] not require any

     17We note that although McWalter testified that the
juvenile "grabb[ed] the charging block," it reasonably may be
inferred that he did not remove the block, as Bechtold
ultimately removed it from the outlet herself.
                                                                   25

particular ill will against someone" but just that "it [was]

done with a wrong and unlawful motive or purpose."18

     The judge was correct that the malice requirements are

different, and she stated a proper understanding of the malice

requirements of each statute.19   Because the malice requirement

of malicious destruction of property requires a showing of

animus, the judge's references to "wanton" in regard to the

malicious destruction counts does not implicate her thought

process with respect to the specific intent requirement in § 5A.

As mentioned previously, the malice requirement for arson and,

thus, for attempted arson, is "[t]he wilful doing of an unlawful

act without excuse" (citation omitted).   Dung Van Tran, 463

Mass. at 26.   See Lamothe, 343 Mass. at 419-420 (meaning of

malice for arson is applicable to attempted arson).    "Although

both 'malicious' and 'wilful' require that a person act

     18In finding the juvenile delinquent on attempted arson
after closing arguments, the judge stated,

     "I feel that the Commonwealth has proved that it was a
     willful act, meaning intentionally and by design, not
     accidental or negligent; and that it was done maliciously,
     which does not require any particular ill will against
     someone. A burning is malicious if it's done with a wrong
     and unlawful motive or purpose, if it is the willful doing
     of a harmful act without excuse."

     19For malicious destruction of property, the Commonwealth
must show "that the [juvenile]'s conduct was 'motivated by
"cruelty, hostility or revenge."'" Commonwealth v. Armand, 411
Mass. 167, 170 (1991), quoting Commonwealth v. Schuchardt, 408
Mass. 347, 352 (1990).
                                                                  26

intentionally, the definitions shed no light on whether the

statute requires specific or general intent."   Pfeiffer, 482

Mass. at 116-117.   Attempt to burn a public building under § 5A

requires a finding of specific intent, in addition to a finding

of malice.   The fact that the judge found the juvenile to have

been acting as a "prankster" does not eliminate the possibility

that he acted with the specific intent to burn the building; as

discussed supra, that intent may have been formed by the desire

to perform a "prank," the purpose of which was to set off sparks

inside a public building.   We presume that the judge was aware

of this, and that she correctly instructed herself on the law.

Commonwealth v. Healy, 452 Mass. 510, 514 (2008).

    We recognize the "naiveté" and "immaturity" that children

often display.   Commonwealth v. Evelyn, 485 Mass. 691, 699

(2020).   Nonetheless, in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth, the evidence demonstrated that the juvenile

specifically intended his conduct and its consequences:     to

perform the challenge and emit sparks from the outlet.      This is

prohibited by the language of § 5A.   Accordingly, we must affirm

his delinquency adjudications.

                                    Judgment affirmed.