Court Opinion

ID: 9941913
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-19 11:09:39.258859+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:22.791275
License: Public Domain

In the
        Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
         at Fort Worth
     ___________________________

          No. 02-22-00322-CR
     ___________________________

    AARON YORK DEAN, Appellant

                    V.

         THE STATE OF TEXAS

  On Appeal from the 396th District Court
         Tarrant County, Texas
       Trial Court No. 1616871D

    Before Kerr, Bassel, and Walker, JJ.
   Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr
                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

      In the early morning hours of Saturday, October 12, 2019, Appellant Aaron

York Dean—a white Fort Worth Police Officer—shot and killed Atatiana Jefferson,

an African American woman, while responding to an open-structure call at her home.

A Tarrant County grand jury indicted Dean for murder. Dean twice moved to change

venue, first arguing that so great a prejudice existed against him in Tarrant County

that he could not obtain a fair and impartial trial and then additionally arguing that a

dangerous combination existed against him by influential persons in Tarrant County

by reason of which he could not expect a fair trial. The trial court denied both

motions.

      The case proceeded to trial in December 2022. The trial court charged the jury

on murder and the lesser-included offense of manslaughter along with two

justification defenses. The jury found Dean guilty of manslaughter and assessed his

punishment at 11 years, 10 months, and 12 days in prison. The trial court sentenced

him accordingly.

      Dean raises four points on appeal: (1) the trial court erred by instructing the

jury on the lesser-included offense of manslaughter; (2) the trial court abused its

discretion by not changing the trial’s venue because there existed a dangerous

combination against him by influential persons in Tarrant County; (3) the trial court

erred by not changing the trial’s venue because the State’s controverting affidavits

filed in response to his first venue motion were insufficient as a matter of law; and

                                           2
(4) the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on reasonable belief. Because the trial

court did not err or abuse its discretion by not granting Dean’s request to change

venue and because it did not err in instructing the jury, we will affirm Dean’s

conviction in this case, with all its levels of tragedy.

                                       I. Background

       Jefferson lived with her then-eight-year-old nephew Z.C. (Zeke) 1 and her

mother in Jefferson’s mother’s house in Fort Worth.2 In the early morning hours of

October 12, 2019, Jefferson and Zeke were playing video games in one of the home’s

bedrooms. The home’s front and side doors were open because Jefferson and Zeke

had burned hamburgers earlier that evening and were trying to clear out the smoke.

       Around 2:00 a.m., a neighbor saw that the front and side doors to the home

were open and that the home’s lights were on. The neighbor was concerned and

called the Fort Worth Police Department’s non-emergency number. Dean and fellow

Fort Worth Police Officer Carol Darch were dispatched to the home on an open-

structure call.

       As Dean and Officer Darch approached the home, they noticed that its front

and side doors were open, but the storm doors in those same doorways were closed.

They looked inside the house, and both thought that the home appeared to have been

       1
          We use an alias to refer to Z.C. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.10(a)(3).
       2
          At the time of the shooting, Jefferson’s mother was in the hospital due to poor
health.

                                              3
burglarized. Dean and Officer Darch then went around the side of the home to the

backyard. Dean opened the gate to the backyard, entered the backyard, and shined his

flashlight around. Officer Darch followed. Neither Dean nor Officer Darch

announced their presence.

       As Dean entered the backyard, he turned to face the house. Officer Darch

followed behind him with her back toward his. Meanwhile, Jefferson heard a noise

coming from the backyard. She took a handgun out of her purse and approached a

window facing the backyard.

       Dean testified that he saw an adult’s silhouette in the window. He then yelled,

“[P]ut your hands up, show me your hands.” He further testified that he saw the

barrel of a gun pointed at him and that he fired a single shot at the silhouette as he

yelled the commands. Officer Darch heard Dean yelling commands and quickly

turned around. As she turned, she heard the shot. She testified that she never saw a

firearm pointed out of the window but recalled seeing Jefferson’s face with eyes “as

big as saucers” through the window. Jefferson died as a result of Dean’s shooting her

in the torso.

       Dean was arrested on October 14, 2019, and a grand jury indicted him for

Jefferson’s murder just over two months later.

       In November 2021, Dean moved to change venue, arguing that there existed so

great a prejudice against him in Tarrant County that he could not obtain a fair and

impartial trial there. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 31.03(a)(1). Dean’s motion

                                          4
was supported by his affidavit, along with the affidavits from two Tarrant County

residents. The State objected to Dean’s venue motion and, in support of that

objection, filed three controverting affidavits stating that Dean and the other two

affiants were not credible in their claims that Dean could not obtain a fair and

impartial trial in Tarrant County.

       Judge David C. Hagerman, the then-presiding judge over the case, heard the

motion over three days in May 2022. Judge Hagerman found that while the news

media’s coverage of the incident was pervasive and prejudicial, it was not

inflammatory. He denied the motion.

       Dean later successfully moved to recuse Judge Hagerman from the case. The

presiding judge of the Eighth Administrative Judicial Region then transferred the case

to the 396th District Court.

       In November 2022, Dean renewed his venue motion with a supplemental

motion. In that motion, Dean maintained his argument that there existed so great a

prejudice against him in Tarrant County that he could not obtain a fair trial. See id. He

further alleged that there existed a dangerous combination against him by influential

persons in Tarrant County such that he could not expect a fair trial. See id.

art. 31.03(a)(2).

       Judge George Gallagher, the presiding judge of the 396th District Court, heard

Dean’s supplemental venue motion over two days in mid-November 2022. During

the hearing, Dean presented evidence from five witnesses and offered into evidence

                                           5
media clips and news articles about the shooting. Judge Gallagher deferred his ruling

until after jury selection, which began on November 28, 2022. After the jury was

seated, the trial court heard arguments from the parties regarding Dean’s

supplemental venue motion. The trial court denied the motion, and the case

proceeded to trial in Tarrant County.

      During the charge conference, the State requested that the trial court instruct

the jury on the lesser-included offense of manslaughter. Dean objected to its inclusion

in the charge on several grounds, but the trial court overruled Dean’s objections and

instructed the jury on manslaughter.

      The charge also included a self-defense instruction. In conjunction with that

defense, the trial court defined “reasonable belief” as “a belief that would be held by

an ordinary and prudent person in the same circumstances as the actor.” Although

this definition tracked that found in Section 1.07(a)(42) of the Texas Penal Code, see

Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(42), Dean objected to it, arguing that the

reasonableness of an accused’s belief must be viewed from his viewpoint at the time

he acted. The trial court overruled Dean’s objection.

      The jury found Dean guilty of manslaughter.

      Dean has timely appealed. He raises four points, two challenging the trial

court’s denial of his venue-change motions and two alleging jury-charge error. We

address the two venue points first because doing so aids in our disposition of the

appeal.

                                           6
                       II. Dean’s First Venue-Change Motion

       In his third point, Dean argues that the trial court erred by denying his first

venue-change motion because the State’s three controverting affidavits filed in

response to his motion were insufficient as a matter of law. Dean contends that all

three affidavits were legally deficient because they failed to attack his credibility and

that of his fellow affiants or to attack their “means of knowledge” as Texas Code of

Criminal Procedure Article 31.04 requires. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 31.04.

Dean acknowledges that his argument is foreclosed by existing Texas Court of

Criminal Appeals’ precedent—Burks v. State, 876 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994),

and Cockrum v. State, 758 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988)—but presents it to us to

preserve it for review by that court. Dean complains that the Court of Criminal

Appeals has interpreted Article 31.04 “to impose a much lower requirement for

controverting affidavits” that is contrary to the statute’s plain language.

       The United States and Texas Constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant a

fair trial by an impartial jury. See U.S. Const. amend. VI; Tex. Const. art. I, § 10.

“[W]hen a defendant demonstrates his inability to obtain an impartial jury or a fair

trial at the place of venue,” a venue change is proper and consistent with due-process

principles. Hathorn v. State, 848 S.W.2d 101, 109 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).

       Article 31.03(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides that a trial

court may grant a change of venue if the defendant establishes that “there exists in the

county where the prosecution is commenced so great a prejudice against him that he

                                             7
cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial” or “there is a dangerous combination against

him instigated by influential persons, by reason of which he cannot expect a fair trial.”

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 31.03(a). A defendant seeking a venue change must

file a written motion supported by his own affidavit and the affidavits of at least two

credible county residents asserting that the defendant cannot receive a fair trial in that

county due to either prejudice or a combination of influential persons against him. See

id. “If the defendant’s motion is proper on its face, he is entitled to a change of venue

as a matter of law, unless the State properly challenges the defendant’s motion.”

Janecka v. State, 937 S.W.2d 456, 467 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).

      The State may challenge the defendant’s motion by attacking the defendant’s

affiants’ credibility or their “means of knowledge” through an “affidavit of a credible

person.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 31.04. “The purpose of [an Article 31.04]

controverting affidavit is to provide a form of pleading [that] establishes that there is a

factual dispute in need of resolution.” Burks, 876 S.W.2d at 890. If the controverting

affidavit suffices to create a fact issue, the trial court must hold a hearing on the

motion. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 31.04; Burks, 876 S.W.2d at 890. But if

the controverting affidavit fails on its face to meet either of Article 31.04’s

requirements, the defendant is entitled to a change of venue as a matter of law.

Janecka, 937 S.W.2d at 467.

      Here, Dean’s first venue motion alleged that because of the considerable

publicity and extensive media coverage generated by the case, there existed so great a

                                            8
prejudice against him in Tarrant County that he could not obtain a fair and impartial

trial. As Article 31.03 requires, Dean supported these allegations with his own

affidavit and two affidavits from Tarrant County residents. The State responded by

objecting to Dean’s motion and submitting controverting affidavits from three

individuals: Reverend William T. Glynn, Michael P. Heiskell, and David Keltner. 3

      Dean contends that all three affidavits are facially insufficient. He asserts that

Reverend Glynn’s and Heiskell’s affidavits are conclusory because neither man

explained how Dean and his affiants lacked adequate knowledge or why they lacked

credibility. He also faults Reverend Glynn and Heiskell for equating support of

Dean’s position with bias in his favor. Dean describes Keltner’s affidavit as “the least

sufficient” of the three because “[i]t wholly omits even conclusory statements about

[Dean]’s affiants.” Dean further complains that Keltner conclusorily stated that Dean

could get a fair trial and “fail[ed] to either challenge the credibility of the affiants or

the basis of their opinions.”

      In Cockrum, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the following affidavit

language satisfied Article 31.04:

      My name is __________ and I am a resident of Bowie County, Texas. I
      have read the affidavits in support of Defendant’s Motion for Change of
      Venue in this cause. The affiants of said affidavits are not credible as
      they are prejudiced to said Defendant and their means of knowledge are
      not sufficient to support and justify the statements contained therein.

      Reverend Glynn is the pastor of Mount Olive Missionary Baptist Church in
      3

Fort Worth, and Heiskell and Keltner are practicing Tarrant County attorneys.

                                            9
758 S.W.2d at 582. In Burks, the Court of Criminal Appeals noted that the

controverting affidavit in that case was identical to the Cockrum affidavits’ wording

and thus held that the affidavit sufficed to create a factual dispute requiring a hearing.

876 S.W.2d at 890.

       Here, Reverend Glynn’s and Heiskell’s affidavits each state their names and

that they are Tarrant County residents. Reverend Glynn’s affidavit further states in

relevant part as follows:

       I have read the affidavits that have been filed in this case in support of
       the defendant’s motion for change of venue. . . . The defendant’s affiants
       are not credible because they are biased in favor of the defendant and
       lack an adequate means of knowledge to support their statements,
       including the statements that the defendant cannot obtain a fair and
       impartial trial.

Heiskell’s affidavit has virtually identical language.

       The language in Reverend Glynn’s and Heiskell’s affidavits is substantively

identical to that approved by the Court of Criminal Appeals in Burks and Cockrum. See

Burks, 876 S.W.2d at 890; Cockrum, 758 S.W.2d at 582; see also Busby v. State,

990 S.W.2d 263, 267 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (“Article 31.04 has remained unchanged

since Cockrum was decided in 1988 and was reaffirmed by Burks in 1994. Moreover,

the State may well have relied upon our interpretation in Cockrum in determining how

to proceed on the venue motion. Hence, even if we believed that appellant’s

interpretation necessarily followed from the language in Article 31.04 (which we do

                                             10
not), we would find that the interests underlying the doctrine of stare decisis are weighty

enough, in the present case, to adhere to our decision in Cockrum.”).

      We note that as an intermediate appellate court, we cannot reject or alter Court

of Criminal Appeals’ precedent. See Wiley v. State, 112 S.W.3d 173, 175 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth 2003, pet. ref’d). We therefore conclude and hold that under Burks and

Cockrum, Reverend Glynn’s and Heiskell’s controverting affidavits sufficed under

Article 31.04 to advise the trial court that a factual dispute existed requiring the trial

court’s resolution. See Burks, 876 S.W.2d at 890; Cockrum, 758 S.W.2d at 582. Because

Article 31.04 requires that the State file only one sufficient controverting affidavit, we

need not address Keltner’s affidavit. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 31.04 (“The

credibility of the persons making affidavit for change of venue, or their means of

knowledge, may be attacked by the affidavit of a credible person.” (emphases added)); see

also Tex. R. App. P. 47.1. We overrule Dean’s third point.

                III. Dean’s Supplemental Venue-Transfer Motion

       Dean argues in his second point that the trial court erred by denying his

supplemental venue-transfer motion because there was sufficient evidence developed

of the existence of a “dangerous combination” of “influential persons” in Tarrant

County. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 31.03(a)(2). Dean contends that the

Tarrant County District Attorney’s Office, led by then-Tarrant County District

Attorney Sharen Wilson, treated this case differently by deviating from office protocol

when investigating and prosecuting it. He additionally contends that Betsy Price, the

                                            11
Fort Worth mayor at the time of the shooting, and the then-Interim Police Chief

Edwin Kraus made incorrect statements about the case in the days immediately

following the shooting that were repeated by Jefferson’s family’s attorney; by national,

state, and local politicians and leaders; and by broadcast and print media. Dean posits

that a dangerous combination of people in Tarrant County—namely, Wilson, Price,

and Kraus—when mixed with the ongoing, widespread media coverage of this case

and “the already inflamed local and national tensions caused by the Amber Guyger

trial and [the] George Floyd murder,” made it impossible for him to have a fair trial in

Tarrant County.4

A. Applicable law and standard of review

      As noted, a trial court may grant a defendant’s request for a venue change if the

defendant establishes that “there exists in the county where the prosecution is

commenced so great a prejudice against him that he cannot obtain a fair and impartial

trial” or “there is a dangerous combination against him instigated by influential

persons, by reason of which he cannot expect a fair trial.” Id. art. 31.03(a). The

      4
        In September 2018, Guyger, an off-duty white Dallas police officer, shot
Botham Jean, a black man, inside his apartment after mistaking his apartment for hers
and him for an intruder. See Guyger v. State, No. 05-19-01236-CR, 2021 WL 5356043,
at *1–2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 17, 2021, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication).
Guyger was convicted of Jean’s murder. Id. at *1. Derek Chauvin, a white Minneapolis
police officer, was convicted of murdering George Floyd, a black man, while arresting
him in May 2020. See State v. Chauvin, 989 N.W.2d 1, 13–15 (Minn. Ct. App.
2023), review denied (July 18, 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 427 (U.S. 2023).

                                          12
defendant bears the burden to prove either of these bases for a venue change. See

DeBlanc v. State, 799 S.W.2d 701, 704 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).

      We review a trial court’s decision to deny a venue-change request for an abuse

of discretion. Freeman v. State, 340 S.W.3d 717, 724 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Gonzalez v.

State, 222 S.W.3d 446, 449 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Under this standard, we defer to

the trial court, which is in the best position to resolve issues involving conflicts in

testimony and to evaluate witness credibility. Gonzalez, 222 S.W.3d at 452. If the trial

court’s decision is within the zone of reasonable disagreement, we will affirm it. See

Freeman, 340 S.W.3d at 724; Gonzalez, 222 S.W.3d at 449.

B. Dean’s motion and supporting evidence

      Dean supplemented his motion to change venue in November 2022, nearly a

year after filing his first venue motion. In his supplemental venue motion, Dean

maintained that because of the extensive and prejudicial publicity and media coverage

generated by the case, he could not receive a fair and impartial trial in Tarrant County.

See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 31.03(a)(1). He additionally argued that he could

not expect a fair trial in Tarrant County because influential persons there—namely,

Price and Kraus—had instigated a dangerous combination against him by making

comments early on that were repeated by the media. See id. art. 31.03(a)(2).

Specifically, Dean claimed that “[i]n their dangerous combination,” Price and Kraus

“(1) touted the purported strength of evidence against . . . Dean, (2) made evidentiary

representations, (3) discoursed on various prosecution theories, and (4) essentially

                                           13
eliminated any defense available to . . . Dean for the benefit of the prospective jury

panel population in Tarrant County.”

       The trial court heard Dean’s supplemental venue-change motion over two days

in mid-November 2022. At the hearing, Dean presented testimony from five

witnesses—Price; Kraus; Robert Huseman, a former Tarrant County Assistant

District Attorney; Fort Worth City Councilmember Chris Nettles; and Dr. Jeanine

Galusha, a neuropsychologist—and offered into evidence numerous news articles and

media clips related to the shooting. 5

       Kraus testified that he was immediately called to the scene of the shooting in

the early morning hours of Saturday, October 12, 2019. He received briefings there

from his officers. Huseman—the Chief of the DA’s Office’s Law Enforcement

       5
         The bulk of Dean’s venue-related evidence was offered and admitted during
the hearing on his first venue-change motion. With the majority of that evidence,
Judge Hagerman stated that he was admitting it for purposes of that hearing only, and
he ruled on the motion before the case was transferred to Judge Gallagher’s court.
Judge Gallagher stated at the start of the hearing on Dean’s supplemental motion that
he was “aware that . . . the Defense believed that it had not been able to present all
[its] evidence [on the first venue motion], and [he] was going to allow the Defense to
continue to present whatever evidence that [it] wanted to present.” But at no point
did Dean request Judge Gallagher to judicially notice the earlier venue proceedings,
and Dean did not re-offer the exhibits from the first hearing into evidence. We
therefore consider only the evidence admitted at the hearing on Dean’s supplemental
venue motion.

                                         14
Investigation (LEI) team at the time of the shooting—also went to the scene, as was

standard protocol.6

      In Huseman’s capacity as LEI team chief, he was the lead investigator and

prosecutor in officer-involved shootings in Tarrant County and presented those cases

to the grand jury. Wilson requested that Huseman meet with her on October 14,

2019, the Monday morning following the shooting.7 Huseman and three other DA’s

Office employees—including the Chief of the Criminal Division—met with Wilson in

her office that morning. During the meeting, Wilson asked Huseman and the others

to leave the room while she took a call from Kraus on her cell phone, telling them to

come back in 15 minutes. When they returned, Wilson had finished the call.

      A Fort Worth Police Department detective prepared an arrest-warrant affidavit,

and on the evening of October 14, he and Huseman were present when a Tarrant

County district court judge signed Dean’s arrest warrant. Kraus was not present.

Kraus testified that he did not direct any of his officers to prepare Dean’s arrest

warrant but told them to follow the evidence and “make whatever determination they

needed to make.” Kraus did not recall speaking to Wilson about the offense before

Dean’s arrest, but he and Huseman confirmed that it was not unusual for the police

department to call the DA’s Office to discuss cases.

      6
       At the time of the hearing, Huseman was no longer employed by the DA’s
Office and was in private practice.
      7
       Wilson was still the DA at the time this case was tried.

                                          15
       Dean was arrested the same day the warrant was signed. Huseman testified that

in officer-involved shootings, the DA’s Office’s routine practice was to present the

case to a grand jury before the officer was arrested and that office protocol was that

the DA’s Office would not make a recommendation to the grand jury in cases in

which the officer had not been arrested. To deviate from that policy, an arrest was

required. Huseman agreed that Dean’s arrest in this case caused a deviation from

office policy.

       On October 14 and 15, 2019, Kraus and Price, along with Fort Worth City

Manager David Cooke, briefed the press on the investigation’s status. Before each

briefing, Kraus briefed Price. Both Kraus and Price testified that the briefings’

purpose was to update the public on the case’s status and that they intended to

convey correct and accurate information. During the press conferences, Price had

stated that a firearm found in Jefferson’s home was “irrelevant.” Kraus admitted,

however, that a few facts were incorrectly presented at the press conferences, notably,

that Dean was responding to a welfare check rather than an open-structure call and

that Jefferson’s having a firearm was irrelevant.

       Price testified that the shooting was a tragic situation and was thus an

important event in Fort Worth. In her opinion, the case had a racial aspect because it

involved a white police officer and an African American female. She admitted that

many people in Fort Worth’s African American community saw the case as racial,

“[b]ut not as a whole. There were a lot of people who didn’t see it as racial.” Price

                                           16
agreed that the mayor, chief of police, and district attorney, as well as state senators,

state representatives, county commissioners, and United States representatives, were

influential people.

       Price recalled that Kraus and Cooke had briefed her before the October 14 and

15 press briefings and that Kraus continued to brief her on the case thereafter. She

did not recall speaking to Wilson about the case and was not aware of whether her

then-chief of staff and current Fort Worth Mayor Mattie Parker had communicated

with Wilson.

       Huseman testified that the DA’s Office presented the case to the grand jury on

December 20, 2019. By that time, another prosecutor had been assigned to the case,

but Huseman had not been told that he was off the case. That prosecutor and Wilson

went into the grand-jury room before the case was presented to the grand jury.

Huseman remained in the waiting area outside the grand-jury room and was not in the

room when prosecutors presented the case. The grand jury returned a true bill of

indictment. After that, Huseman was not involved in the case.

       Councilmember Nettles testified that he successfully ran for Fort Worth City

Counsel in 2021 on a platform of seeking justice for Jefferson. In June 2021, he hand-

delivered a letter addressed to the DA’s Office and to the then-presiding judge over

Dean’s case requesting that they expedite Dean’s trial. Councilmember Nettles’s visit

to the courthouse to deliver the letter, along with the letter’s contents, was publicized

                                           17
by the media. Councilmember Nettles further testified that he did not believe that he

had a consensus from his fellow city councilmembers regarding those actions.

      Lastly, Dean presented testimony from Dr. Galusha, a neuropsychologist who

specializes in forensic psychology. She testified regarding the primacy effect,

confirmation bias, belief persistence, source-memory error, group polarization, and

predecisional distortion. Dr. Galusha explained that these principles had been applied

to the impact of pretrial media on jurors, and she opined that the more pretrial

publicity that potential jurors hear about a case, the more of an impact that publicity

will have on their memories and the more it can increase their bias. She further

explained that because of the primacy effect, pretrial publicity might hold more weight

with a juror than the evidence presented at trial. She additionally explained that

pretrial media publicity could increase the potential for bias in jurors, oftentimes

“outside of [their] conscious awareness” such that an instruction to disregard pretrial

publicity would be ineffective. Dr. Galusha opined that the publicity in this case

seemed to be emotional, which tends to create a stronger memory and bias toward

that information; was “largely negative” toward Dean; and was “pretty extensive and

pervasive across different platforms.” She admitted, however, that she had not studied

potential jurors in Tarrant County or the types of media that they had consumed.

      The trial court deferred ruling until after jury selection. Two hundred people

were summoned for the jury. After no-shows and potential jurors excused by the

                                          18
parties’ agreement, 190 potential jurors remained. Of those remaining, 109 indicated

that they had “read something, heard something, or seen something about” this case.

      The trial court conducted individual voir dire on those 109 potential jurors.

Forty-eight of them were excused due to their answers. From the 142 total remaining

potential jurors,8 the trial court was able to seat 12 jurors and two alternates. Of those

seated on the jury, only three had indicated that they had heard about Dean’s case. 9

      After the jury was seated, the trial court heard arguments on Dean’s

supplemental venue motion and denied it.

C. Analysis

       Dean argues that the trial court abused its discretion by not granting his venue-

change request because sufficient evidence established that a dangerous combination

of influential persons existed in Tarrant County such that he could not expect to

receive a fair trial in the county. Dean contends that he met this burden “by showing

that the motives of the dangerous combination were widely broadcast in the media to

the citizens of Tarrant County.” Dean specifically points to the DA’s Office’s

deviation from office protocol and to comments Price and Kraus made at press

      8
        The trial-court judge’s venire list indicated that 143 potential jurors were left
after the individual voir dire.
      9
        In its brief, the State arrived at the same conclusion: only three of the 12 jurors
had indicated to the trial court that they had heard about the case. During oral
argument, however, the State informed us that it believed that five of the 12 had
heard about the case. But after reviewing the record, we believe that the State’s initial
calculation was correct.

                                            19
conferences immediately following the shooting: that Dean was conducting a welfare

check rather than responding to an open-structure call at the time of the shooting and

that the fact that a handgun was found next to Jefferson’s body was “irrelevant.”10

Dean claims that he “was harmed by the circulation of the comments and opinions of

the participants in the dangerous combination.”

      “The basis for sustaining a change of venue challenge based on a dangerous

combination ‘comes not from a widely held prejudice but from the actions of a small

but influential or powerful group who are likely to influence in some manner the way

in which the trial proceeds.’” Ryser v. State, 453 S.W.3d 17, 36 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d) (quoting 42 George E. Dix & John M. Schmolesky, Texas

Practice Series: Criminal Practice & Procedure § 30:11 (3d ed. 2011)). We recognize that

Price, Kraus, and Wilson are influential persons, and we recognize that the media’s

coverage related to the shooting, Jefferson, and the trial continued from the shooting

in October 2019 through Dean’s trial in December 2022. Even so, Dean did not show

that Price, Kraus, and Wilson acted in a way that amounted to a “dangerous

combination” so that he could not expect a fair trial in Tarrant County.

      10
        During the venue hearing, Kraus explained how a welfare check differs from
an open-structure call: with “a welfare check, you’re going out to see if somebody is
okay, to check on the status of that person,” but with “[a]n open structure, you’re not
sure why the structure is open.” Because of that difference, the two types of calls are
handled differently. Kraus agreed that it would have been erroneous to state that
Dean had been dispatched on a welfare check that night.

                                          20
      Dean suggests that his quick arrest after the shooting and the DA’s Office’s

deviation from its standard procedure of presenting an officer-involved-shooting case

to a grand jury before an arrest are evidence of a dangerous combination. But Dean’s

swift arrest and the DA’s Office’s presentation of his case to the grand jury thereafter

do not show a dangerous combination. Cf. Myers v. State, 177 S.W. 1167, 1169 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1915) (concluding that proof that defendant was promptly arrested, a

grand jury reconvened, and the case set for “hearing” five days after indictment

showed only that “officials acted promptly in what they considered [to be] the

performance of their duty” and not a dangerous combination within the meaning of

the statute). Nor does the evidence show that Wilson, Kraus, and Price acted

improperly in pursuing Dean’s arrest and prosecuting the case. According to Kraus,

the officers with the Fort Worth Police Department prepared the arrest warrant but

did not do so at his direction. Rather, he “simply directed them to follow the evidence

and make whatever determination they needed to make.” After that, the DA’s Office

presented the case to the grand jury. According to Huseman, Dean’s arrest before the

case was presented to the grand jury would have allowed the DA’s Office to deviate

from its policy of not making a recommendation to the grand jury in officer-involved-

shooting cases.11

      11
        We do not know what happened during the grand-jury proceedings here
because grand-jury proceedings are secret. See generally Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann.
arts. 20A.201–.205.

                                          21
      Dean additionally argues that Price’s and Kraus’s comments to the press in the

days following the shooting—specifically, that Dean was conducting a welfare check

rather than responding to an open-structure call and that Jefferson’s having a gun was

irrelevant—which were repeated by other influential persons and the media, were

evidence of a “dangerous combination.” While these statements may have influenced

the views of some, nothing indicates that Price’s and Kraus’s statements “created a

coercive governmental force that could influence the trial proceedings to obtain a

conviction without regard to [Dean]’s constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury.”

Ryser, 453 S.W.3d at 36 (citing Cortez v. State, 69 S.W. 536, 538 (Tex. Crim. App.

1902)). First, Tarrant County is a large, populous county. See id. (noting Harris

County’s large size in analyzing dangerous-combination argument). Just over half of

the potential jurors had heard of the case, and after individual voir dire to ferret out

bias created by the media coverage, over 140 potential jurors remained. And although

Dr. Galusha testified about the impact of pretrial media on jurors generally, she

admitted that she had not studied potential jurors in Tarrant County or the types of

media they had consumed. Second, over three years elapsed between Price’s and

Kraus’s statements and Dean’s trial. During that time, intervening events occurred

that dominated the news cycle and people’s lives, namely the COVID-19 pandemic

and the 2020 presidential election. Cf. id. (noting that the fact that case had been “off

the radar” for many months between press conference held by district attorney,

mayor, and police chief and the beginning of trial “counsel[ed] against a view that

                                           22
influential people were acting to impede the fair-trial process”). Moreover, as time

went on, the media correctly reported that Dean had been dispatched on an open-

structure call and also that Zeke had told a forensic interviewer immediately after the

shooting that Jefferson had raised her handgun and pointed it at the window.

      In sum, although the media coverage in this case was intense and the DA’s

Office deviated from its standard practices in officer-involved-shooting cases, the trial

court could have reasonably concluded that Dean failed to show a dangerous

combination against him that was led by influential persons such that he could not

expect a fair trial in Tarrant County. See Buntion v. State, 482 S.W.3d 58, 73–74 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2016) (holding trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying venue

motion based on media attention stemming from district attorney’s erroneous

statement to a newspaper that defendant would be released on “mandatory parole” if

he received a life sentence in his capital murder trial where witnesses testified that they

were unaware of any dangerous combination and affidavits offered by the defendant

in support of the motion contained mere conclusory allegations that the district

attorney’s false statement prejudiced the defendant and constituted a dangerous

combination working to deny him a fair trial). But cf. Cortez, 69 S.W. at

538 (concluding that a dangerous combination of influential persons existed where

60 to 70 influential people, along with the county commissioners’ court, contributed

financially to hunt for and arrest defendant and no local attorney would agree to

defend him but many volunteered to prosecute). To the extent that the evidence

                                            23
could have supported a contrary conclusion, under the governing standard of review

we hold that the trial court’s decision was within the zone of reasonable disagreement

and thus within the trial court’s discretion. We overrule Dean’s second point.

              IV. The Trial Court’s Manslaughter Jury Submission

      In his first point, Dean contends that the trial court erred by submitting the

lesser-included offense of manslaughter to the jury. He argues that the State should

have been required to satisfy both prongs of the so-called Royster–Rosseau test12 that a

defendant must meet to prove his entitlement to an instruction on a lesser-included

offense: (1) the requested offense is a lesser-included offense of the charged offense

and (2) some evidence in the record would permit a jury to rationally find that, if the

defendant is guilty, he is guilty only of the lesser-included offense. See Grey,

298 S.W.3d at 645; Bullock v. State, 509 S.W.3d 921, 924–25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).

Dean acknowledges that under Grey, the State—unlike a defendant—need not satisfy

the second prong of the Royster–Rosseau test when it requests a lesser-included-offense

instruction, see Grey, 298 S.W.3d at 645, and that we are bound by the Court of

Criminal Appeals’ precedent. He nevertheless challenges Grey’s viability to preserve

the argument for presentation to the Court of Criminal Appeals. He alternatively

      12
        The Court of Criminal Appeals “established a two-pronged test for
determining when a trial judge should submit to the jury a lesser-included offense that
is requested by the defendant” in the Royster–Rosseau line of cases. Grey v. State,
298 S.W.3d 644, 645 & n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); see also Rousseau v. State,
855 S.W.2d 666, 672–73 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Royster v. State, 622 S.W.2d 442,
446 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (plurality op. on reh’g).

                                          24
contends that Grey does not apply here and that Grey, as applied, constructively

deprived him of notice of the charges against him and violated his due-process and

equal-protection rights.

       We must review “all alleged jury-charge error . . . regardless of preservation in

the trial court.” Kirsch v. State, 357 S.W.3d 645, 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). In

reviewing a jury charge, we first determine whether error occurred; if not, our analysis

ends. Id.

       Grey instructs that when the State requests the submission of a lesser-included

offense, it need not show that “some evidence must exist in the record that would

permit a jury rationally to find that if the defendant is guilty, he is guilty only of the

lesser offense.” 298 S.W.3d at 645 (quoting Rousseau, 855 S.W.2d at 673). The

requested offense must be merely a lesser-included offense of the charged offense. See

id.; see also Bullock, 509 S.W.3d at 924; Rousseau, 855 S.W.2d at 672–73. Here, as Dean

concedes, manslaughter is a lesser-included offense of murder, the charged offense.

See Cavazos v. State, 382 S.W.3d 377, 384 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). Under Grey, the trial

court thus properly granted the State’s request to include manslaughter in the jury

charge.

       Dean maintains, however, that Grey is inapplicable here because unlike Grey,

this case does not involve a “neat and tidy lesser[-]included[-]offense scenario”

because this case involves self-defense and because the mens rea of the lesser-included

offense of manslaughter (recklessness) does not fit within the mens rea of the charged

                                           25
offense of murder (intentionally or knowingly).13 The Court of Criminal Appeals’

holding in Grey did not turn on the case’s facts or the specific lesser-included offense

requested there. 298 S.W.3d at 646–51. Rather, the court analyzed the state of the law

and its precedent related to the submission of lesser-included offenses without

reference to the case’s facts. Id. In doing so, the court articulated a clear rule: “the

State is not bound by the second prong of the Royster–Rousseau test.” Id. at 645. The

only reference to the case’s facts was to illustrate the detrimental consequences of

requiring the State to meet both prongs of the Royster–Rousseau test. Id. at 650. We are

thus unpersuaded by Dean’s attempts to distinguish Grey.

      Dean further argues that the State’s failure to include manslaughter in the

indictment deprived him of notice that he had allegedly committed a reckless act. He

contends that this failure violated his constitutional and statutory rights to notice of

the charges against him.

      Both the Texas and United States Constitutions grant criminal defendants the

right to fair notice of the charged offense. See U.S. Const. amend. VI; Tex. Const.

art. 1, § 10; State v. Zuniga, 512 S.W.3d 902, 906 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). A charging

      13
         Dean also asserts that it was improper to submit both murder and
manslaughter along with his self-defense and defense-of-third-person defenses to the
jury. Justification defenses apply to both murder and manslaughter. See Alonzo v. State,
353 S.W.3d 778, 781–82 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). This is true regardless of whether
the State or the defense requested the inclusion of manslaughter in the charge. Id. at
780 (noting that determining which party requested the inclusion of manslaughter was
“irrelevant for our analysis”).

                                          26
instrument is sufficient if it provides enough notice to allow the accused to prepare a

defense. See Zuniga, 512 S.W.3d at 906 (citing Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d 394, 398 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2000)). “Toward that end, Chapter 21 of the Texas Code of Criminal

Procedure governs charging instruments and provides legislative guidance concerning

the requirements and adequacy of notice.” Id. (citing State v. Moff, 154 S.W.3d 599,

601 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Ferguson v. State, 622 S.W.2d 846, 849–50 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1981) (op. on reh’g)).

      Dean claims that the indictment—which charged him with murder only—did

not provide him with notice that he had acted recklessly because it did not comply

with Article 21.15 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Article 21.15 requires that the

State allege the act or acts relied upon to constitute recklessness whenever

recklessness is a part or element of the charged offense, or it is charged that the

accused acted recklessly in the commission of an offense:

      Whenever recklessness . . . enters into or is a part or element of any
      offense, or it is charged that the accused acted recklessly . . . in the
      commission of an offense, the complaint, information, or indictment in
      order to be sufficient in any such case must allege, with reasonable
      certainty, the act or acts relied upon to constitute recklessness . . . , and
      in no event shall it be sufficient to allege merely that the accused, in
      committing the offense, acted recklessly . . . .

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 21.15. But Article 21.15 “does not apply in this

situation because the indictment [alleged murder but] did not include manslaughter,

which was a lesser-included offense” of murder. Ramos v. State, 407 S.W.3d 265,

270 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).

                                           27
       Here, the indictment charged Dean with murder for the shooting death of

Jefferson on October 12, 2019. As noted, Article 21.15 did not apply to Dean’s

indictment because it charged the offense of murder, and it did not include the lesser-

included offense of manslaughter or any other offense that implicated recklessness.

See id. Even so, the indictment “still put [Dean] on notice regarding the specific

offense of manslaughter” because he was charged with murder and “the events

surrounding the [shooting death of Jefferson on October 12, 2019] were unique.” Id.

at 271. We hold that the State’s indictment for murder provided Dean sufficient

notice to prepare a defense for the charged offense of murder and the lesser-included

offense of manslaughter. See id.; see also Zuniga, 512 S.W.3d at 906.

       Finally, Dean argues that Grey “offends due process and equal protection by

lowering the burden for the State to obtain a lesser-included instruction while keeping

in place a higher burden for a defendant to obtain such an instruction,” which “puts

the State on more advantageous footing.” He asserts that “[a] criminal defendant is

entitled to a level playing field” and points out that “[o]ur jurisprudence is replete with

examples where due process and equal protection ensure that criminal defendants are

not victimized by the prosecution.” Dean explains that his defense “was built on his

acting intentionally in self-defense” and that “[a]dding a charge after the close of the

evidence that lower[ed] the mens rea . . . fundamentally alter[ed] the nature” of the

charge he had to defend against.

                                            28
      In Grey, the Court of Criminal Appeals explained the rationale behind, and the

justification for, allowing the State to obtain a lesser-included-offense charge without

satisfying the second prong of the Royster–Rousseau test:

      If the lesser offense is viewed in isolation, a jury’s verdict would be
      rational so long as the lesser offense is included in the charging
      instrument and supported by legally sufficient evidence. The “guilty-
      only” prong of the Royster–Rousseau test requires, however, that we view
      the rationality of the lesser offense, not in isolation, but in comparison to
      the offense described in the charging instrument. But why should we
      make that comparison? The answer must be that the State is entitled to
      pursue the charged offense and, therefore, is entitled to receive a
      response from the jury on whether the defendant is guilty of the charged
      offense. Is the defendant similarly entitled to a response from the jury on
      the charged offense? The answer to that question is clearly no. It is the
      State, not the defendant, that chooses what offense is to be charged. In
      fact, the State can abandon an element of the charged offense without
      prior notice and proceed to prosecute a lesser-included offense. If the
      State can abandon the charged offense in favor of a lesser-included
      offense, there is no logical reason why the State could not abandon its
      unqualified pursuit of the charged offense in favor of a qualified pursuit
      that includes the prosecution of a lesser-included offense in the
      alternative.

             ....

              The cautious approach for the prosecutor to take would be—or at
      least should be—to request the lesser-included offense. Allowing
      submission of lesser offenses when requested by the prosecutor would
      serve at least two important interests. First, society has an interest in
      convicting and punishing people who are guilty of crimes. When, in the
      prosecutor’s judgment, submission of the lesser-included offense will
      enhance the prospects of securing an appropriate criminal conviction for
      a defendant who is in fact guilty, society’s interests are best served by
      allowing the submission. Second, the prosecutor has “the primary
      duty . . . not to convict, but to see that justice is done.” Even if the
      prosecutor believes in a given case that he will secure a conviction on the
      charged offense if the only alternative is acquittal, he might also believe

                                           29
      that the jury should be given the option to decide whether a conviction
      on the lesser offense is more appropriate.

Grey, 298 S.W.3d at 649–51 (footnotes omitted).

      We have recently rejected a complaint that allowing the submission of an

uncharged lesser-included offense violated a defendant’s due-process rights. See

Villarreal v. State, No. 02-19-00405-CR, 2021 WL 1323414, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth Apr. 8, 2021, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). We do so

again here. See id. And, based on Grey’s rationale, we cannot see how including an

uncharged lesser-included offense violates a defendant’s equal-protection rights. See

Downs v. State, 244 S.W.3d 511, 518 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, pet. ref’d)

(explaining that to prevail on an equal-protection claim, “the party complaining must

establish two elements: (1) the party was treated differently than other similarly

situated parties; and (2) the party was treated differently without a rational basis by the

government” and that under the first element, “it is axiomatic that the Equal

Protection Clause does not require things different in fact be treated in law as though

they were the same”).

      Again, as an intermediate appellate court, we are in no position to reject or alter

the precedent of the Court of Criminal Appeals. See Wiley, 112 S.W.3d at 175. We are

therefore bound by Grey’s holdings that “the State can abandon an element of the

charged offense without prior notice and proceed to prosecute a lesser-included

offense” and that it may do so without showing that a rational jury could find the

                                            30
defendant guilty of only the lesser offense. 298 S.W.3d at 645, 650–51. The trial court

thus did not err by including the lesser-included offense of manslaughter in the jury

charge. See id.

       We overrule Dean’s first point.

              V. The Trial Court’s Reasonable-Belief Jury Instruction

       In his fourth and final point, Dean asserts that the trial court erroneously

instructed the jury on “reasonable belief” in conjunction with his self-defense and

defense-of-a-third-person defenses. The trial court instructed the jury that “reasonable

belief” means “a belief that would be held by an ordinary and prudent person in the

same circumstances as the actor.” This definition is virtually identical to that in Penal

Code Section 1.07(a)(42). See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(42) (“‘Reasonable belief’

means a belief that would be held by an ordinary and prudent man in the same

circumstances as the actor.”).

       Dean objected to this definition, pointing out that the self-defense statute uses

the phrase “reasonably believes” rather than “reasonable belief” and arguing that the

definition of “reasonable belief” would direct “the jury to consider the self-defense

issue from the standpoint of a reasonable and prudent person in the same

circumstances as the actor” rather than “from the circumstances of the actor alone,”

which Dean claimed the statute and caselaw require. He thus requested that the trial

court instruct the jury that the reasonableness of the defendant’s belief should be

                                           31
viewed from the defendant’s viewpoint alone at the time he acted. The trial court

overruled Dean’s objections and denied his requested instruction.

      A trial court must instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case. Tex. Code

Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 36.14. The Penal Code provides that deadly force used in self-

defense or in defense of another is a defense to prosecution for manslaughter if using

that force is “justified.” See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 9.02 (“It is a defense to

prosecution that the conduct in question is justified under this chapter.”); 9.31–

.33 (setting forth substantive requirements for establishing claim of self-defense or

defense of third person). Section 9.31 provides that, subject to certain exceptions, a

person is justified in using force against another “when and to the degree the actor

reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect the actor against the

other’s use or attempted use of unlawful force.” Id. § 9.31(a). A person is justified in

using deadly force against another if he would be justified in using force against the

other under Section 9.31 and, as relevant here, “when and to the degree the actor

reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately necessary . . . to protect the actor

against the other’s use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force.” Id. § 9.32(a)(1),

(a)(2)(A). Regarding defense of a third person, a person is justified in using deadly

force against another to protect a third person if (1) “under the circumstances as the

actor reasonably believes them to be, the actor would be justified under” Section

9.32 in using deadly force to protect himself against the unlawful deadly force “he

reasonably believes to be threatening the third person he seeks to protect,” and

                                          32
(2) “the actor reasonably believes that his intervention is immediately necessary to

protect the third person.” Id. § 9.33.

       Dean contends that the reasonable-belief standard in Sections 9.31, 9.32, and

9.33 differs from the definition in Section 1.07(a)(42). According to Dean, the

definition of “reasonable belief” in Section 1.07 is “based on the concept of the

ordinary and prudent man in the same circumstances as the actor,” while self-defense

and defense of a third person—which hinge on what the actor “reasonably

believes”—are “based on the actor’s belief in the situation.” In other words, in

measuring whether an actor’s belief was reasonable in a self-defense or defense-of-a-

third-person case, the statute requires that a jury be instructed to assess the

reasonableness of the defendant’s belief from the defendant’s standpoint alone, not

from the standpoint of an “ordinary and prudent person in the same situation.” We

disagree.

       First, the fact that Section 1.07 defines “reasonable belief” while Sections 9.31,

9.32, and 9.33 use the phrase “reasonably believes” is of no moment because “[t]he

definition of a term in this code applies to each grammatical variation of the term.”

Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(b). Second, the Court of Criminal Appeals has expressly

stated that “[a] ‘reasonable belief’ in [the self-defense] context is defined as ‘one that

would be held by an ordinary and prudent man in the same circumstances as the

actor.’” Braughton v. State, 569 S.W.3d 592, 606 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (quoting Tex.

Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(42)). The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that using

                                           33
Section 1.07(a)(42)’s definition in the jury instructions correctly instructed the jury on

the law of self-defense. See id. at 606–07.

       We have likewise held that when a defendant asserts self-defense, his rights are

fully preserved and the jury charge is proper when it (1) states that a defendant’s

conduct is justified if he reasonably believed that the deceased was using or

attempting to use unlawful deadly force against the defendant, and (2) correctly

defines “reasonable belief.” Bundy v. State, 280 S.W.3d 425, 430 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth 2009, no pet.). We concluded that the correct definition of “reasonable belief”

is the definition provided in Section 1.07(a)(42). See id. at 430–31. And we are not

alone in this conclusion. See, e.g., Buford v. State, 606 S.W.3d 363, 371 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, no pet.) (holding that the trial court properly instructed the

jury on self-defense and correctly defined “reasonable belief” pursuant to Section

1.07(a)(42), thus instructing the jurors on the law applicable to the case).

       We conclude and hold the trial court did not err by including Section

1.07(a)(42)’s definition of “reasonable belief” in conjunction with Dean’s self-defense

and defense-of-a-third-person defenses and thus correctly instructed the jury on those

defenses. We overrule Dean’s fourth point.

                                     VI. Conclusion

       Having overruled all four of Dean’s points, we affirm the trial court’s

judgment.

                                              34
                                    /s/ Elizabeth Kerr
                                    Elizabeth Kerr
                                    Justice

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: February 15, 2024

                               35