Court Opinion

ID: 9429942
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:28:23.300924+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:18.321370
License: Public Domain

Justice Marshall,
dissenting.
In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976) (per curiam), this Court upheld congressional limitations on contributions to candidates for federal office but struck down limitations on independent expenditures made on behalf of such candidates. In upholding the former, the Court stated that “the weighty interests served by restricting the size of financial contributions to political candidates are sufficient to justify the limited effect upon First Amendment freedoms caused by the $1,000 contribution ceiling.” Id., at 29. In striking down *519the latter, the Court noted that an expenditure limitation “fails to serve any substantial interest in stemming the reality or appearance of corruption in the electoral process,” and that “it heavily burdens core First Amendment expression.” Id,., at 47-48. Relying on Buckley, the Court today strikes down a limitation on expenditures by “political committees.” Although I joined the portion of the Buckley per curiam that distinguished contributions from independent expenditures for First Amendment purposes, I now believe that the distinction has no constitutional significance.
The contribution/expenditure distinction in Buckley was grounded on two factors. First, the Court reasoned that independent expenditures offer significantly less potential for abuse than contributions:
“Unlike contributions, such independent expenditures may well provide little assistance to the candidate’s campaign and may indeed prove counterproductive. The absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the candidate or his agent not only undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate, but also alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate.” Id., at 47.
Undoubtedly, when an individual interested in obtaining the proverbial ambassadorship had the option of either contributing directly to a candidate’s campaign or doing so indirectly through independent expenditures, he gave money directly. It does not take great imagination, however, to see that, when the possibility for direct financial assistance is severely limited, as it is in light of Buckley’s decision to uphold the contribution limitation, such an individual will find other ways to financially benefit the candidate’s campaign. It simply belies reality to say that a campaign will not reward massive financial assistance provided in the only way that is legally available. And the possibility of such a reward provides a powerful incentive to channel an independent expend*520iture into an area that a candidate will appreciate. Surely an eager supporter will be able to discern a candidate’s needs and desires; similarly, a willing candidate will notice the supporter’s efforts. To the extent that individuals are able to make independent expenditures as part of a quid pro quo, they succeed in undermining completely the first rationale for the distinction made in Buckley.
The second factor supporting the distinction between contributions and expenditures was the relative magnitude of the First Amendment interest at stake. The Court found that the constitutional interest implicated in the limitation on expenditures was the right to advocate the election or defeat of a particular candidate. This right, the Court reasoned, “is no less entitled to protection under the First Amendment than the discussion of political policy generally or advocacy of the passage or defeat of legislation.” Id., at 48. In contrast, the Court found that the limitation on contributions primarily implicated “the contributor’s freedom of political association.” Id., at 24-25. Although the Court acknowledged that this right was a “fundamental” one, id., at 25, it concluded that the expenditure ceiling imposed significantly more severe restrictions on political freedoms than the contribution limitation, id., at 23.
I disagree that the limitations on contributions and expenditures have significantly different impacts on First Amendment freedoms. First, the underlying rights at issue — freedom of speech and freedom of association — are both core First Amendment rights. Second, in both cases the regulation is of the same form: It concerns the amount of money that can be spent for political activity. Thus, I do not see how one interest can be deemed more compelling than the other.*
*521In summary, I am now unpersuaded by the distinction established in Buckley. I have come to believe that the limitations on independent expenditures challenged in that case and here are justified by the congressional interests in promoting “the reality and appearance of equal access to the political arena,” id., at 287 (opinion of.Marshall, J.), and in eliminating political corruption and the appearance of such corruption. Therefore, I dissent, substantially for the reasons expressed in Parts II-A, II-C, and II-D of Justice White’s dissent, from the Court’s decision today to strike down § 9012(f )’s limitation on independent expenditures by “political committees.”
Also, I join Part I of Justice White’s dissent, which concerns the standing of the Democratic National Committee.

At the time Buckley was decided, three of the eight Members who heard that ease agreed that contributions and expenditures should be treated in the same manner for First Amendment purposes. See 424 U. S., at 241 (opinion of Burger, C. J.) (“For me contributions and expenditures are two sides of the same First Amendment coin”); id., at 261 *521(opinion of White, J.) (“For constitutional purposes it is difficult to see the difference between the two situations”); id., at 290 (opinion of Black-mun, J.) (“I am not persuaded that the Court makes, or indeed is able to make, a principled constitutional distinction between the contribution limitations, on the one hand, and the expenditure limitations, on the other, that are involved here”).