Court Opinion

ID: 9849273
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:37:29.656989+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:12.801260
License: Public Domain

Judge MARTIN
dissenting.
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Dr. Ponzi’s testimony as to Tammy Ingram’s symptoms, as related to him by Tammy and her mother, was inadmissible hearsay. I would find that his testimony was admissible as substantive evidence under G.S. 8C-1, Rule 803(4). Rule 803(4) excludes from the hearsay rule: “[statements made for the purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.” (Emphasis added.) The reason for the admission of such statements is grounded upon their reliability due to the declarant’s motivation to assist the physician in diagnosis or treatment. Not only are statements by the patient admissible, but a statement made to a physician by a third person as to the patient’s symptoms would also be admissible if made for purposes of diagnosis and treatment of the patient, and if the court determines that the statement is likely to be reliable. 4 J. Weinstein & Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence p. 803-(4)[01] at 145 (1985). “In the case of a child, a court would undoubtedly assume the absence of any motive to mislead on the part of his parents.” Id.
The majority opinion narrowly interprets Rule 803(4) as applying solely to “a diagnosis for the purpose of treating a disease.” Such a restrictive interpretation obviously excludes statements reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment of other medical conditions, e.g., broken bones, drug and alcohol addiction and psychological disorders. I would not so restrict the interpretation of the rule, but would instead apply the following test to determine the admissibility of the declarant’s out of court *25statement: is the declarant motivated to tell the truth because diagnosis or treatment depends on what she says; and is it reasonable for the physician or health care provider to rely on this information in diagnosis or treatment. See United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F. 2d 77 (8th Cir. 1980).
The majority also states that it is obvious that Tammy Ingram’s visit to Dr. Ponzi on 13 July 1984 was “in preparation for going to court” rather than diagnosis or treatment. I see nothing in the record to indicate that the reason for her visit was solely in preparation for Dr. Ponzi’s court testimony rather than for assistance with the symptoms described by Tammy and her mother. The mere fact that both declarants were aware of the pending court proceeding does not render inadmissible their statements to him made for a medical purpose. Dr. Ponzi testified that he attempted to make a medical diagnosis. Both Tammy and her mother responded to questions asked by Dr. Ponzi and their answers provided him with information as to Tammy’s physical, emotional and mental well-being; information which could serve as a basis for diagnosis and treatment of her condition. As such, the statements were within the scope of admissible hearsay permitted by Rule 803(4). See United States v. Iron Thunder, 714 F. 2d 765 (8th Cir. 1983); State v. Hebert, 480 A. 2d 742 (Me. 1984).
The concurring opinion finds error in the admission of Dr. Ponzi’s testimony concerning the symptoms comprising “rape trauma syndrome.” In my view this testimony was relevant and its admission was not an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.
Dr. Ponzi was accepted by the court as an expert witness in the field of pediatric medicine and testified that he had treated many patients, from infants to college age, upon complaints of sexual abuse. He testified that he is familiar with the complex number of symptoms medically recognized as rape trauma syndrome. He testified as to what those symptoms were and also testified as to the symptoms exhibited by Tammy Ingram, as related to him by Tammy and her mother. He did not testify that Tammy’s symptoms were produced by rape, or that her disorder resulted from sexual abuse at the hands of defendant. He did not express an opinion that Tammy Ingram suffered from rape trauma syndrome.
*26Expert testimony regarding the symptoms of an alleged victim’s psychological response to rape or sexual assault has been admitted in several jurisdictions, State v. Middleton, 294 Or. 427, 657 P. 2d 1215 (1983); State v. Marks, 231 Kan. 645, 647 P. 2d 1292 (1982); People v. Reid, 123 Misc. 2d 1084, 475 N.Y.S. 2d 741 (1984) and rejected in others, see State v. Saldana, 324 N.W. 2d 227 (Minn. 1982); State v. Allewalt, 61 Md. App. 503, 487 A. 2d 664 (1985). Admission of such evidence has been advocated by some legal authors, see Massaro, Experts, Psychology, Credibility and Rape: The Rape Trauma Syndrome Issue and Its Implications for Expert Psychological Testimony, 69 Minn. L. Rev. 395 (1985) and criticized by others, see Note, Checking the Allure of Increased Conviction Rates: The Admissibility of Expert Testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome in Criminal Proceedings, 70 Va. L. Rev. 1657 (1984). Until now, however, the issue has not been addressed by North Carolina’s appellate courts.
I would hold such expert testimony admissible. There is recognized scientific authority for the medical conclusion that there exists a complex and unique number of physical and emotional symptoms exhibited by victims of rape, which are similar, but not identical, to other post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms. Massaro, supra (reviewing scientific studies). An understanding of those symptoms, the unique reactions of victims of rape, is not within the common knowledge or experience of most persons called upon to serve as jurors. Therefore, expert testimony as to the symptoms of the syndrome and its existence, is admissible to assist the jurors in understanding the evidence and in drawing appropriate conclusions therefrom. G.S. 8C-1, Rule 702; State v. Wilkerson, 295 N.C. 559, 247 S.E. 2d 905 (1978) (“battered child syndrome,” expert testimony admissible).
To say that such evidence is irrelevant misinterprets relevance. G.S. 8C-1, Rule 401 makes relevant “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Just as evidence of physical injury has been admissible as relevant to the issue of rape, so should evidence of emotional injury to the victim be relevant to show that it is more likely that a rape occurred. Neither should the expert testimony be excluded on the grounds of unfair prejudice. In my view, the admission of expert testimony as to the *27symptoms or existence of rape trauma syndrome is no more inflammatory, prejudicial or invasive of the province of the jury as the judges of credibility and fact than any other expert testimony.
I would hold that there was no error in the admission of Dr. Ponzi’s testimony.