Court Opinion

ID: 9579017
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:50:41.013342+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:34:10.426940
License: Public Domain

Pope, Judge,
dissenting.
I must dissent. As to the defense of entrapment, OCGA § 16-3-25 provides that “[a] person is not guilty of a crime if, by entrapment, his conduct is induced or solicited by a government officer or employee, or agent of either, for the purpose of obtaining evidence to be used in prosecuting the person for commission of the crime. Entrapment exists where the idea and intention of the commission of the crime originated with a government officer or employee, or with an agent of either, and he, by undue persuasion, incitement, or deceitful means, induced the accused to commit the act which the accused would not have committed except for the conduct of such officer.” In this case defendant Emanuel’s testimony clearly established a prima facie case of entrapment, which the State did not rebut. “The record is absolutely devoid of evidence . . . that the circumstances surrounding the solicitations by the . . . informant occurred in a way other than that testified to by [Emanuel].” Robinson v. State, 145 Ga. App. 17 (1) (243 SE2d 257) (1978). As was stated by this court in Perry v. State, 143 Ga. App. 227 (237 SE2d 705) (1977) “[i]f the informer’s testimony would disprove the defendant’s testimony, the state should have produced him.” Id. at 228.
However, and despite the total lack of evidence to rebut defendant Emanuel’s testimony establishing the defense of entrapment, the majority cites Goolsby v. State, 184 Ga. App. 390 (361 SE2d 684) (1987), for the proposition that there is no “per se rule” that a de*306fendant is entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal where the informant is not called to testify to rebut the defendant’s testimony of entrapment. Goolsby, however, provides no support for the majority’s position inasmuch as the defendant in that case was acquitted of the original sale initiated by the informant on the basis of entrapment. Moreover, in Goolsby, the evidence clearly established subsequent drug sales that were initiated by the defendant and it was on the basis of subsequent transactions that defendant was convicted of selling drugs. In contrast the undercover agent in this case, as well as defendant Emanuel, testified that the agent tried to contact the defendants following the initial sale for the purpose of buying more drugs but that they refused to have any further contact with him. Thus the majority’s reliance on Goolsby is both misplaced and misleading and offers no basis for the conclusion that the trial court did not err in refusing to grant a directed verdict of acquittal on the basis of defendants’ entrapment defense.
Moreover, regarding predisposition to commit the offense, which the majority posits as the distinguishing factor between this case and Perry, supra, I do not believe, as the majority suggests, that the State was required to show only “that the defendants had a criminal predisposition to possess drugs,” the offense of which they were found guilty, when they were charged with the offenses of selling cocaine and distributing marijuana. Furthermore, I do not believe that the State met its burden of showing the necessary predisposition to commit either the offense of possessing drugs or of selling and distributing drugs. As to the issue of possessing or using drugs the defendant testified that the only person who used drugs on the night in question was Evans, the confidential informant; the undercover agent, however, in response to an unrelated question, interjected testimony that defendants snorted cocaine on the night of the drug buy. The majority also relies on certain facts from which they contend it can be inferred that this was not the defendants’ first experience with drug trafficking. However, in my opinion, unresponsive testimony, inferences and suggestion are not sufficient to meet the State’s burden of showing “beyond a reasonable doubt that the [defendants’ were] predisposed to commit the [offenses.]” (Emphasis supplied.) Griffin v. State, 154 Ga. App. 261, 264 (267 SE2d 867) (1980). Under these circumstances, in which the State neither offered evidence to rebut defendants’ testimony that they were entrapped, nor offered evidence showing the defendants’ predisposition to commit the crimes for which they were charged or convicted, I believe the defendants were entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal. See Robinson v. State, supra; Perry v. State, supra. Consequently, I would reverse. For this reason, I would also find it unnecessary to reach defendants’ remaining enumerations of error. See Perry, supra at 2.
*307Decided March 16, 1990
Rehearing denied March 30, 1990
Herbert Shafer, Jerome J. Froelich, Jr., for appellants.
Lewis R. Slaton, District Attorney, Joseph J. Drolet, Rebecca A. Keel, Grover W. Hudgins, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Judge Sognier joins in this dissent.