Court Opinion

ID: 9579911
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:59:50.06147+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:53.348146
License: Public Domain

*481DONALDSON, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I disagree with the majority opinion’s discussion in Part II that Jerry O’Neil established that the defendant church and its members intruded upon the seclusion of the O’Neil family. I must point out, however, that even if the church had obtained information about the O’Neil’s family relationships and religious beliefs without any consent on the part of Pauline, Jerry or the children, Jerry O’Neil would still have to have proved this intrusion was not only intentional, but was also malicious.
The religious freedoms protected by both the United States and Idaho Constitutions require this higher level of malice to be met when the alleged intrusion is a consequence of the exercise of the defendants’ religious beliefs. The first amendment of the United States Constitution states that, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof____” The Idaho Constitution, however, in the first clause of art. 1, § 4, states with greater specificity that, “The exercise and enjoyment of religious faith and worship shall forever be guaranteed____” The Idaho Constitution then goes further to state in the first clause of art. 21, § 19 that, “It is ordained by the state of Idaho that perfect toleration of religious sentiments shall be secured, and no inhabitant of said state shall ever be molested in person or property on account of his or her mode of religious worship.” Since these constitutional protections must be read together, it is clear that the scope of an individual’s privilege to practice and extoll his religious beliefs in this state is indeed very broad.
In some states, in order for a public official to be liable for intrusion into another’s seclusion, the plaintiff must show the official acted in bad faith or with a corrupt motive. Sustin v. Fee, 69 Ohio St.2d 143, 145, 431 N.E.2d 992, 994 (Ohio 1982). It is logical, therefore, to impose a similar requirement to show bad faith in order for a plaintiff to remove a defendant’s conduct from the protection of the defendant’s constitutional right to freely exercise his religion. Hence, where a defendant’s religious conduct is involved, in order for a plaintiff to make out a cause of action for invasion of privacy he must show the defendant’s conduct was motivated by a malicious or wilful desire to intrude on the plaintiff’s solitude, seclusion or private affairs, and that such conduct would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.
In evaluating whether the actions in this case rose to such a level of intentional and malicious conduct as to strip the defendants of their constitutional protections, the district court was faced with a very delicate task. It had to grapple with what were or were not “religious” beliefs and the motivations of the individuals who held and practiced them. The transcript of the trial is replete with examples where the court had to determine the relevance of evidence — both tangible and testimonial— that reflected on the merits of many of the tenets of the Fatima Crusade, particularly where they conflicted with currently held beliefs of the modem Roman Catholic Church. More often than not, evidence of questionable relevance was ruled admissible by the court or not objected to by opposing counsel.
O’Neil effectively highlighted the differences between the Fatima Crusaders and the modern Roman Catholic Church. He also revealed the existence of differences of belief among the members of the Crusade. He was unable, however, to produce any evidence that the beliefs of the members of the Fatima Crusade were not genuinely held and that the defendants’ actions were instead motivated by malice towards Jerry O’Neil or his family. Pauline was called to testify by the defense and said she joined the church because she genuinely wanted to start practicing her religion again. She had been raised in the Catholic church by her parents and she testified that she believed the Crusade was the only true Catholic church. Three of Pauline’s sisters and her mother were members of the Crusade at the time she joined. She also testified that her marriage to Jerry before she joined the church was not very *482happy and that she was frightened of her husband.
By the time the six-day trial came to a close, it appeared that O’Neil had put on trial the logic and validity of the beliefs of the Fatima Crusade, rather than the conduct of the defendants to intentionally and maliciously intrude upon the seclusion of the O’Neil family. O’Neil and his witnesses characterized the Crusade as a “cult.” In fact, Barbara Strakal of the Cult Awareness Center expressed her opinion that the Crusade was a “destructive cult.” Indeed, to the average person the evidence did seem to indicate the practices of the Crusade were unusual and perhaps even archaic. Their beliefs were similar to the modern Roman Catholic Church but with notable exceptions, not the least of which were their methods of dress and of prayer and their refusal to recognize the Popes in Rome after Vatican II as legitimate.
O’Neil apparently convinced the jury that the Crusade crossed the line between being a legitimate religious organization and a “cult.” That, however, is irrelevant to the issues of intent and malice in this cause of action. By characterizing a religious organization as a cult, one cannot thereby divest it of its constitutional rights. There is no requirement that a religion meet any organizational or doctrinal test in order to qualify for constitutional protection. Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 620 F.2d 1159, 1163 (6th Cir.1980).
The United States Supreme Court in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940), said
“In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political belief, sharp differences arise. In both fields the tenets of one man may seem the rankest error to his neighbor. To persuade others to his own point of view, the pleader, as we know, at times, resorts to exaggeration, to vilification of men who have been, or are, prominent in church or state, and even to false statement. But the people of this nation have ordained in the light of history, that, in spite of the probability of excesses and abuses, these liberties are, in the long view, essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of the citizens of a democracy.” Id. 310 U.S. at 310, 60 S.Ct. at 906.
In Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division, 450 U.S. 707, 101 S.Ct. 1425, 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981), the Supreme Court grappled with the term “religious” belief or practice and noted that any court determination of what that is should not “turn upon a judicial perception of the particular belief or practice in question; religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protection.” Id. 450 U.S. at 714, 101 S.Ct. at 1430. The Court then went on to hold that,
“Courts should not undertake to dissect religious beliefs because the believer admits that he is ‘struggling’ with his position or because his beliefs are not articulated with the clarity and precision that a more sophisticated person might employ____ Intrafaith differences ... are not uncommon among followers of a particular creed, and the judicial process is singularly ill equipped to resolve such differences in relation to the Religion Clauses. One can, of course, imagine an asserted claim so bizarre, so clearly nonreligious in motivation, as not to be entitled to protection under the Free Exercise Clause; ... and the guarantee of free exercise is not limited to beliefs which are shared by all of the members of a religious sect____ Courts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation.” Id. at 715-16, 101 S.Ct. at 1430-31.
The evidence of the defendants’ practices which O’Neil presented was not so bizarre and so clearly nonreligious in motivation that it should not be afforded constitutional protection. The district court reached the same conclusion as the Ohio Court of Appeals when it was faced with an almost identical fact situation involving the same defendants. There, the court overturned a jury verdict against the defendants and stated that
*483“the alleged misconduct by the defendants is the dissemination of the belief that a person should follow the Bishop Schuckardt approach to the Catholic faith and, if necessary, a person should leave a spouse who interferes with such practice of religion. This kind of advocacy of a religious faith and tenets incident thereto is not illegal.” Radecki, supra [50 Ohio App.2d] at [62], 361 N.E.2d at 544. See also Bradesku v. Antion, 21 Ohio App.[2d] 67, 255 N.E.2d 265.
“In the absence of improper motives, a religious sect has a lawful right to solicit members and to express views relevant thereto if there is nothing unlawful, improper, or immoral in such activity.” Radecki, supra at [62], 361 N.E.2d at 545. See also Hughes v. Holman, 110 Ore. 415, 223 P. 730 (1924).
It should also be emphasized that parents have considerable freedom to raise their children in their religious faith. As the United States Supreme Court noted in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-14, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 1532-33, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972), “the values of parental direction of the religious upbripging and education of their children in their early and formative years have a high place in our society” and must be “zealously protected.” In this case, Pauline wanted to raise her children in her faith just as her mother before her did. Any and all contacts that the O’Neil children had with the teachings and practices of the Fatima Crusade were directly due to their mother’s involvement in the church.
Again, what appears to have motivated the jury to find against the defendants with respect to the alleged invasion of the children’s privacy was the same evidence that depicted the Fatima Crusade as a “cult:” the children were dressed more conservatively; they said their prayers at length while kneeling on hard floors or in the bus on the way to school; they were taught that the Crusade was the only true church; and they were disciplined by spanking and rapping the knuckles with a stick. Defense witnesses testified that the atmosphere that the children were exposed to was no different than many Catholic schools before Vatican II. O’Neil had no evidence to rebut this, but preferred to contrast the Crusade’s methods with the arguably more “enlightened” practices of the modern Roman Catholic Church.
The district court found that when the evidence is scrutinized in the context of the defendants’ legitimate constitutional rights, reasonable minds could not reach the same conclusion as the jury did. In light of the direction given to us by the United States Supreme Court and our own state constitution, and in light of the evidence presented to the jury, it is clear that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the defendants’ conduct was motivated by an intentional and malicious desire to intrude upon the seclusion of the O’Neil family.
“[R]eligious freedom — the freedom to believe and to practice strange and, it may be, foreign creeds — has classically been one of the highest values of our society.” Yoder, supra 406 U.S. at 238, 92 S.Ct. at 1544 (White, J., concurring). The rights of the defendants to freely exercise their religious beliefs play a critical role in the evaluation of the evidence of this case. The district court clearly recognized this when it reviewed the jury’s verdict on defendants’ motion for judgment n.o.v. I would affirm the district court.
BAKES, J., concurs.