Court Opinion

ID: 9729273
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:30:34.719448+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:20:59.342420
License: Public Domain

Stephan, J.,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. In my view, the trial record affords an insufficient basis for determining whether trial counsel for Kimberly Sue Faust was constitutionally ineffective, and therefore I would not reach that issue in this direct appeal. Because I perceive no prejudicial error occurring at trial, I would affirm.
The majority concludes that reversal is necessary because the trial court received certain testimony which the majority determines to be inadmissible under the statutory rules of evidence which govern criminal trials in Nebraska. However, those rules provide in part:
(1) Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and:
(a) In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground of objection, if a specific ground was not apparent from the context[.]
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-103 (Reissue 1995). From this rule, we derive a basic tenet of appellate review that a prerequisite to an appeal based upon error in the admission of evidence is a timely objection stating the grounds therefor, unless the grounds are apparent from the context. State v. Harris, 263 Neb. 331, 640 N.W.2d 24 (2002). The failure to make a timely and proper objection or motion to strike will ordinarily bar a party from later claiming error in the admission of testimony. Id. Put simply, no trial error ordinarily results from receiving evidence to which there is no objection.
*885With a single exception, there was no objection to the testimony on which the majority predicates reversible error. The majority bridges this gap by accepting Faust’s argument that her trial counsel performed in a constitutionally deficient manner by failing to object, thereby enabling the majority to consider whether an objection, if made, would have resulted in exclusion of the evidence. The majority acknowledges the well-established principle that where ineffective assistance of counsel is claimed, there is a strong presumption that counsel acted reasonably. See, State v. Zarate, 264 Neb. 690, 651 N.W.2d 215 (2002); State v. Al-Zubaidy, 263 Neb. 595, 641 N.W.2d 362 (2002). Under this principle, trial counsel is afforded due deference to formulate trial strategy and tactics, and an appellate court will not second-guess reasonable strategic decisions made by counsel. State v. Al-Zubaidy, supra; State v. Buckman, 259 Neb. 924, 613 N.W.2d 463 (2000). The decision whether to object or not to specific questions posed to a witness is a strategic decision made by trial counsel to which this rule applies. State v. Williams, 259 Neb. 234, 609 N.W.2d 313 (2000).
Today, for the first time in our jurisprudence, this court determines from a record on direct appeal that defense counsel was constitutionally deficient in not making certain evidentiary objections at trial. The majority concludes that it is “unable to conceive of any reasonable trial strategy” which would have supported a decision not to object to the questions which elicited testimony regarding Faust’s actions toward her estranged husband, Bruce Faust, and Shannon Bluhm during the period of their extramarital relationship. This reasoning ignores the reality that trial strategy is often shaped by factors known to trial counsel which do not necessarily appear in the record on direct appeal and are, therefore, unknown to a reviewing court.
Evidence introduced during a criminal trial “will be devoted to issues of guilt or innocence, and the resulting record in many cases will not disclose facts necessary to decide either prong of the Strickland analysis.” Massaro v. United States, No. 01-1559, 2003 WL 1916677 at *4 (U.S. Apr. 23, 2003). Although the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged in Massaro that there may be cases in which a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel could be resolved on the basis of the appellate record, it also reasoned that *886“few such claims will be capable of resolution on direct appeal,” 2003 WL 1916677 at *6, and that the “better-reasoned approach” is to permit ineffective assistance claims to be asserted in the first instance in a collateral proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000), the federal postconviction remedy, 2003 WL 1916677 at *3. The Court reasoned that “in most cases a motion brought under § 2255 is preferable to direct appeal for deciding claims of ineffective-assistance,” noting that a collateral postconviction proceeding affords “the forum best suited to developing the facts necessary to determining the adequacy of representation during an entire trial.” Massaro, 2003 WL 1916677 at *4.
Indeed, while we may consider and resolve claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel asserted on direct appeal, we frequently decline to do so because the record is insufficient to permit meaningful review. See, e.g., State v. Long, 264 Neb. 85, 645 N.W.2d 553 (2002); State v. McLemore, 261 Neb. 452, 623 N.W.2d 315 (2001); State v. Lotter, 255 Neb. 456, 586 N.W.2d 591 (1998), modified on denial of rehearing 255 Neb. 889, 587 N.W.2d 673 (1999). In the limited number of cases in which we or the Nebraska Court of Appeals have reached the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal, the record presented questions of law, not questions of trial strategy. State v. Cody, 248 Neb. 683, 539 N.W.2d 18 (1995) (finding because defendant lacked reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to areas searched, counsel not deficient in handling motion to suppress); State v. Morley, 239 Neb. 141, 474 N.W.2d 660 (1991) (finding evidence sufficient to support charge and thus counsel not deficient in failing to move for directed verdict), abrogated on other grounds, State v. Pierce, 248 Neb. 536, 537 N.W.2d 323 (1995); State v. Fletcher, 8 Neb. App. 498, 596 N.W.2d 717 (1999) (finding enhancement evidence reliable as matter of law and thus counsel not deficient in offering additional evidence on subject). Where claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are dependent upon facts which do not appear in the trial record, Nebraska appellate courts consistently defer resolution to postconviction review. See, State v. Hert, 192 Neb. 751, 224 N.W.2d 188 (1974) (declining to reach on direct appeal whether counsel deficient in failing to file motion to discharge); State v. Kellogg, 10 Neb. App. 557, 633 N.W.2d 916 (2001) *887(declining to reach on direct appeal whether counsel deficient in forgoing presentence investigation).
I see no reason in this case to depart from this sound practice. In my view, the strong presumption that trial counsel acted reasonably cannot be overcome by speculation regarding strategy. Thus, whether a court can or cannot examine the trial record and “conceive” of a reason why defense counsel did not object to certain questions during trial is not the issue. On direct appeal, a reviewing court “may have no way of knowing whether a seemingly unusual or misguided action by counsel had a sound strategic motive or was taken because the counsel’s alternatives were even worse.” Massaro, 2003 WL 1916677 at *4. Without knowing the reasons, and strategic considerations, if any, upon which defense counsel acted or refrained from acting, we are simply not in a position to judge whether counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient. This determination will ordinarily require consideration of facts extrinsic to the trial record. Our statutory postconviction remedy, which is designed to determine whether a conviction should be set aside because it was obtained through a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the accused, specifically provides for an evidentiary hearing where a proper allegation of denial of constitutional rights cannot be refuted by the files and records of the original prosecution. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-3001 (Reissue 1995). See, also, State v. Nesbitt, 264 Neb. 612, 650 N.W.2d 766 (2002); State v. Caddy, 262 Neb. 38, 628 N.W.2d 251 (2001). In a case such as this, where, in my view, the trial record does not clearly establish or refute a claim of deficient performance of counsel, the presumption that counsel acted reasonably is not overcome on direct appeal. A subsequent postconviction proceeding affords a more complete and objective basis for deciding the issue. I would therefore decline to reach the claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on this direct appeal.
The only assigned error preserved by a trial objection involved the testimony of Jeff Bluhm (Bluhm) regarding a confrontation between Faust and Shannon in January or February 2000.1 agree with the majority that this testimony was not admissible on the narrow issue of Faust’s character under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-405 (Reissue 1995). While I believe that this evidence may have been *888independently relevant on the issue of Faust’s motive, and thus admissible under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-404(2) (Reissue 1995), it was ultimately not offered for this purpose, and the procedures outlined in State v. Sanchez, 257 Neb. 291, 597 N.W.2d 361 (1999), were not followed. Nevertheless, I conclude that the error in admitting Bluhm’s testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Harmless error review looks to the basis on which the jury actually rested its verdict; the inquiry is not whether in a trial that occurred without the error a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but, rather, whether the actual guilty verdict rendered in the questioned trial was surely unattributable to the error. State v. Duncan, ante p. 406, 657 N.W.2d 620 (2003); State v. Brouillette, ante p. 214, 655 N.W.2d 876 (2003). Based upon my review of the record, I am satisfied that the guilty verdict was surely unattributable to the erroneous admission of evidence relating to Faust’s confrontation with Shannon several weeks prior to the homicides. I reach this conclusion for two reasons.
First, to the extent that the evidence in question raised an inference that Faust is a person capable of violence, it is cumulative. As the majority acknowledges, Faust admitted that the physical abuse in her marriage sometimes “went both ways” and admitted to incidents in which she was physically aggressive toward Bruce.
More importantly, however, I regard the admission of the character evidence as harmless because the record reflects overwhelming evidence of guilt which is not in any way dependent upon character evidence. Utilizing DNA evidence, the State proved that blood found on the exterior and interior of the driver’s side of Faust’s vehicle was that of the victims. It is undisputed that the fatal shots were fired from the handgun which was in Faust’s possession before and after the crimes were committed. Faust admitted that she was present when the shootings occurred and that the shots were fired from the handgun that she carried in her vehicle.
Faust’s defense was that Bruce shot the victims while she helplessly watched. The State was able to substantially impeach this testimony without resort to Bluhm’s testimony. On cross-examination, Faust admitted that her trial testimony was inconsistent with two prior accounts she had given regarding the *889events at the crime scene. The State was also able to establish inconsistencies between Faust’s trial testimony and certain known time sequences. According to Faust’s testimony, she and Shannon arrived at the rural location where Faust had left her vehicle sometime after 9:20 p.m. This location was approximately 5 miles from Eagle. Faust testified that as she and Shannon sat and talked in Shannon’s vehicle, Bruce arrived and entered the vehicle from the front driver’s side. Faust testified that she and Bruce had an argument at that time which led to a physical altercation occurring inside the vehicle between the three of them. Faust testified that she then exited the vehicle, entered her own vehicle, and drove a short distance away. After several minutes, Faust returned to the area where Shannon’s vehicle was parked and observed that the vehicle was on fire.
Bruce denied committing the murders. In direct contrast to Faust’s testimony, telephone records reveal that Bruce was at his home in Eagle talking to his daughter on the telephone between 9:22 and 9:29 p.m. Witnesses observed the burning vehicle between 9:25 and 9:35 p.m. Desiree Parminter reported the burning vehicle in a 911 emergency dispatch call to the Otoe County sheriff’s office that was received at approximately 9:43 p.m. On this evidence, the jury could reasonably have chosen not to believe that Bruce traveled approximately 5 miles from his home to the crime scene, entered Shannon’s vehicle, engaged in a physical altercation with Faust and Shannon in the vehicle, and then set fire to Shannon’s vehicle, all within what at most would amount to a 14-minute time period. Most importantly, the jury could have arrived at such conclusion without considering the erroneously admitted character evidence in any manner.
For these reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the district court.
Hendry, C.J., joins in this dissent.