Court Opinion

ID: 9473764
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:38:55.893582+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:43.195503
License: Public Domain

KENNEDY, Circuit Judge:
The Government moves for reconsideration of our reversal of the district court’s pretrial detention order. Because the Government has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Motamedi poses a flight risk, the motion for reconsideration must be denied.
Motamedi was arrested on charges of conspiracy to export items without a license, in violation of the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1982). The United States Magistrate conditioned his pretrial release upon the posting of a $400,-000 secured appearance bond, with special conditions including intensive Pretrial Services supervision, travel restrictions, and surrender of both passport and greencard. Motamedi complied with these conditions and was released.
A month and a half elapsed, and Motamedi was indicted on one count of conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371, and fourteen counts of unlicensed exportation of items attended by false shipper’s deelarations, under 22 U.S.C. § 2778(c) (1982), 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) (1982). The maximum sentence on the conspiracy count is five years, and the maximum sentence on each of the exportation counts is two years.
Motamedi voluntarily appeared for arraignment at which time the Government requested a detention order on the ground that Motamedi posed a serious risk of flight. Based on the information presented, the magistrate found that Motamedi, an Iranian citizen, was acting as a de facto purchasing agent for the current Iranian government and could return to Iran with impunity; that he maintained large foreign bank accounts with most, if not all, of the deposits being made by the Iranian government; that he persisted in his allegedly illegal exporting activities despite warnings by agents of the United States Customs and Federal Bureau of Investigation that it was illegal to export the items in question; and that the nature and circumstances of the offenses charged are serious. Based on her findings, the magistrate concluded that the Government had demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that no condition or combination of conditions would reasonably assure the appearance of Motamedi for further proceedings in the case, and ordered him detained.
Faced with detention, Motamedi moved the district court, pursuant to section 3145(b) of the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3145(b) (1984),1 to revoke the detention order and to set bail. A second hearing was held at which the parties presented the same information that was before the magistrate. The court concluded that the magistrate’s factual findings were not clearly erroneous and that it would reach the conclusion that no condition or combination of conditions would reasonably assure Motamedi’s appearance, regardless of whether the applicable burden of proof was preponderance of the evidence or clear and convincing evidence. The dis*1405trict court affirmed the detention order and this appeal followed.
We reversed and ordered release on the same financial terms and conditions as had been granted prior to revocation of bail. The Government moved for reconsideration and clarification of our release order. Without passing on the arguments presented in the Government’s motion, we authorized the district court to increase the monetary amount of the bond, with the condition that it be an amount that Motamedi could post. The bond is set at $750,000. Because the parties raise issues of first impression under the Bail Reform Act of 1984, concerning the applicable burden of proof to be met in the district court and the proper standard of review in this court, we heard oral argument and now issue this opinion in support of our order.
In determining the applicable standard of review, we bear in mind that federal law has traditionally provided that a person arrested for a noncapital offense shall be admitted to bail. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4, 72 S.Ct. 1, 3, 96 L.Ed. 1 (1951); United States v. Honeyman, 470 F.2d 473, 474 (9th Cir.1972). Only in rare circumstances should release be denied. Sellers v. United States, 89 S.Ct. 36, 38, 21 L.Ed.2d 64 (1968) (Black, J., in chambers); United States v. Schiavo, 587 F.2d 532, 533 (1st Cir.1978); United States v. Abrahams, 575 F.2d 3, 8 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821, 99 S.Ct. 85, 58 L.Ed.2d 112 (1978). Doubts regarding the propriety of release should be resolved in favor of the defendant. Herzog v. United States, 75 S.Ct. 349, 351, 99 L.Ed. 1299 (1955) (Douglas, J., in chambers); United States v. McGill, 604 F.2d 1252, 1255 (9th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1035, 100 S.Ct. 708, 62 L.Ed.2d 671 (1980).
Release pending trial is governed by the Bail Reform Act of 1984 which, like its predecessor, the Bail Reform Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146-3152 (1982) (repealed October 12, 1984), mandates release of a person facing trial under the least restrictive condition or combination of conditions that will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(2) (1984); see Honeyman, 470 F.2d at 474-75; Banks v. United States, 414 F.2d 1150, 1153 (D.C.Cir.1969). The Fifth and Eighth Amendments’ prohibitions of deprivation of liberty without due process and of excessive bail require careful review of pretrial detention orders to ensure that the statutory mandate has been respected.
We review the district court’s factual findings under a deferential, clearly erroneous standard. United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1200 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 105 S.Ct. 101, 83 L.Ed.2d 46 (1984). In a release determination, however, the conclusion based on those factual findings presents a mixed question of fact and law. The inquiry transcends the facts presented and requires both the consideration of legal principles and the exercise of sound judgment about the values which underly those principles. McConney, 728 F.2d at 1202. In reviewing a district court’s order denying pretrial release, we must ensure not only that the factual findings support the conclusion reached, but also that the person’s constitutional and statutory rights have been respected. See Truong Dinh Hung v. United States, 439 U.S. 1326, 1328-29, 99 S.Ct. 16, 17-18, 58 L.Ed.2d 33 (1978) (Brennan, J., in chambers); Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. at 4, 72 S.Ct. at 3. Accordingly, we may make an independent examination of the facts, the findings, and the record to determine whether the pretrial detention order is consistent with those constitutional and statutory rights. McConney, 728 F.2d at 1202.
This conclusion is supported by the standard of review applied by Supreme Court Justices when reviewing detention orders. See Sup.Ct.R. 35, 50. In light of the important constitutional dimensions involved, the Justices have consistently recognized “a nondelegable responsibility to make an independent determination of the merits of the application.” See Truong Dinh Hung, 439 U.S. at 1328, 99 S.Ct. at 17; Mecom v. United States, 434 U.S. 1340, 1341, 98 S.Ct. *140619, 20, 54 L.Ed.2d 49 (1977) (Powell, J., in chambers); Harris v. United States, 404 U.S. 1232 at 1232, 92 S.Ct. 10 at 12, 30 L.Ed.2d 25 (1971) (Douglas, J., in chambers); Sellers, 89 S.Ct. at 37-38; Reynolds v. United States, 80 S.Ct. 30, 32, 4 L.Ed.2d 46 (1959) (Douglas, J., in chambers). It would be incongruous for us to apply a more narrow standard of review than that applied by the Circuit Justice. See United States v. Provenzano, 605 F.2d 85, 92 (3d Cir.1979).
We hold that the applicable standard of review for pretrial detention orders is one of deference to the district court’s factual findings, absent a showing that they are clearly erroneous, coupled with our right of independent examination of the facts, the findings, and the record to determine whether an order of pretrial detention may be upheld.
We must further determine the Government’s burden of proof in establishing risk of flight under the 1984 Act. If the Government may establish such risk by a mere preponderance of the evidence, it is entitled to know that we rule against it in what has become a close case. In the trial court and in this court, the Government must establish risk of flight by a clear preponderance of the evidence, not by the higher standard of clear and convincing evidence. We reach this conclusion from the language and structure of the present statute, considered in light of the rules which pertained at the time of the enactment.
The Bail Reform Act of 1966 authorized pretrial detention without bail only in those cases where conditions could not reasonably assure the defendant’s presence at trial. See 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a) (1982) (repealed 1984). In contrast, the 1984 Act permits the pretrial detention of a defendant without bail where it is demonstrated either that there is a risk of flight or no assurance that release is consistent with the safety of another person or the community. Danger to another or to the community is a statutory addition that constitutes a significant departure from the previous law. S.Rep. No. 98-147, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1983).
Under the 1984 Act, a finding that a person presents a danger to the community must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (1984). The statute, however, is silent with regard to the burden of proof governing the finding that a person poses a risk of flight. The language and structure of the 1984 Act lead us to conclude that the flight risk determination is governed by a standard other than that of clear and convincing evidence.
In the related context of a defendant’s right to bail pending appeal, Congress expressly required the defendant to negate both danger to the community and flight risk by clear and convincing evidence. 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a) (1984). Had Congress desired to achieve a similar result regarding the right to bail pending trial, it would have so provided.
We must presume that Congress acts with deliberation, rather than by inadvertence, when it drafts a statute. The statute’s silence regarding the burden of proof for flight risk determinations should be considered in light of its explicit edict that the heavy burden of clear and convincing evidence applies to a finding of danger to an individual or to the community. The most plausible interpretation for this statutory pattern is that Congress intended the two inquiries to be governed by different standards.
This determination does not, however, conclude the analysis, for we must now ascertain the standard of proof properly applicable to findings of flight risk under the 1984 Act. Presumably, the congressional silence on this point evinces a legislative intent to incorporate the standard applicable to this determination under the 1966 Act. Although the old Act did not include an express statement regarding the standard which governed findings of flight risk, its language strongly suggested the applicability of the preponderance standard. In determining the conditions of re*1407lease, judges were provided with a list of factors to consider in reaching their conclusions. 18 U.S.C. § 3146(b) (1982) (repealed 1984). Such a balancing approach normally implies utilization of the preponderance standard. Further, in reviewing appeals from orders imposing conditions on release, courts were instructed to affirm so long as the order was “supported by the proceedings below.” 18 U.S.C. § 3147(b) (1982) (repealed 1984). The Supreme Court has found, under this provision, a duty to affirm so long as there was evidence which would have justified the lower courts “in reasonably believing that there is a risk of applicant’s flight.” Truong Dinh Hung, 439 U.S. at 1328-29, 99 S.Ct. at 17-18. This interpretation of the statute further indicates the applicability of the preponderance standard. Finally, because the standard of proof usually applicable to pretrial proceedings is the preponderance of the evidence, see United States v. Orta, 760 F.2d 887, 891 n. 20 (8th Cir.1985) (en banc), we conclude that the congressional silence with regard to the applicable standard of proof in demonstrating risk of flight is the preponderance of the evidence. Orta, at 891 n. 20.
Such differential treatment comports with the congressional recognition of danger to another or to the community as a discrete, independent basis for the denial of pretrial release. Since bail was determined under the former law by the likelihood of defendant’s appearance at trial, and without explicit recognition of the need to protect the community, it is reasonable to subject the Government to a higher standard of proof when the second purpose is added as an explicit statutory category. Further, a finding of danger to the community is likely to involve more specific and quantifiable evidence than is a finding of risk of flight. For instance, prior convictions, police reports, and other investigatory documents are, as a matter of course, used to show past histories of violence. From these objective sources, trial judges may infer a present danger to the community. Such data is not often available regarding the risk of flight. Thus, it is wholly feasible for the Government to satisfy the higher burden in showing danger to the community.
In concluding that the Government’s burden in denying bail on the basis of flight risk is that of the preponderance of the evidence, we are not unmindful of the presumption of innocence and its corollary that the right to bail should be denied only for the strongest of reasons. See Truong Dinh Hung, 439 U.S. at 1329, 99 S.Ct. at 18; Harris, 404 U.S. at 1232, 92 S.Ct. at 12; Sellers, 89 S.Ct. at 38. This rule, however, pertains to the nature of the permissible factors to be utilized in denying an application for bail, not to the quantum of proof required to establish the presence of such factors.
Having determined both the applicable standard of review and the proper burden of proof, we must consider whether the Government has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure Motamedi’s appearance. Section 3142(g) specifies the various factors to be considered by the court in determining whether conditions of release may be imposed that will reasonably assure the appearance of the person. The court must take into account available information concerning the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, the weight of the evidence against the person, the history and characteristics of the person, including his character, physical and mental condition, family ties, employment, financial resources, length of residence in the community, community ties, past conduct, history relating to drug and alcohol abuse, criminal history, record concerning appearance at court proceedings, and the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the person’s release. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (1984).
There are many factors listed in section 3142(g) which point toward the conclusion that Motamedi should be released. Motamedi is a 27-year old Iranian citizen who *1408has been admitted for permanent residence in this country. He has been living in the Los Angeles area since 1976 and has applied for citizenship. He has approximately eighty-five relatives in the Los Angeles area, many of whom are citizens. His immediate family, including his wife, brothers, mother, and father, all reside in the area. His parents have posted their residence as security on the $750,000 bond. He has no prior criminal record, and no history of alcohol or drug abuse. He has not violated any conditions of his release, and has made all court appearances.
In denying Motamedi’s motion for revocation of the detention order, the district court relied on the magistrate’s findings that the charges against Motamedi are serious; that he exported military items after being warned that it was illegal to do so, and after telling the United States Attorney that he had ceased doing so; that he is an Iranian citizen who may return to Iran with impunity; and that he maintains large bank accounts in foreign countries. These findings appear to be drawn primarily from allegations contained in the indictment. The district court stated that it found most persuasive the fact that Motamedi is an Iranian citizen allegedly acting as an agent of the Iranian government who could return to Iran with impunity.
With all due respect for the district court’s determinations, our independent review leads us to a contrary conclusion. It is apparent from the record below that the district court accorded great weight to the charges against Motamedi and the Government’s assertions of his guilt. Our court has stated, however, that the weight of the evidence is the least important of the various factors. Honeyman, 470 F.2d at 474. Although the statute permits the court to consider the nature of the offense and the evidence of guilt, the statute neither requires nor permits a pretrial determination that the person is guilty. See United States v. Edson, 487 F.2d 370, 372 (1st Cir.1973); United States v. Alston, 420 F.2d 176, 179 (D.C.Cir.1969). These factors may be considered only in terms of the likelihood that the person will fail to appear or will pose a danger to any person or to the community. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g); Edson, 487 F.2d at 372. Otherwise, if the court impermissibly makes a preliminary determination of guilt, the refusal to grant release could become in substance a matter of punishment. See Alston, 420 F.2d at 179-80. In the instant case, both parties present persuasive arguments regarding the weight of the evidence. Accordingly, we conclude that this factor does not tip the balance either for or against detention.
Similarly, the factor of alienage, upon which the district court also placed much weight, may be taken into account, but it does not point conclusively to a determination that Motamedi poses a serious risk of flight. See, e.g., Truong Dinh Hung, 439 U.S. at 1329; 99 S.Ct. at 18; Honeyman, 470 F.2d at 474-75. Motamedi argues that because all of his family’s property was confiscated after the fall of the Shah, and his family was forced to flee, he is not free to return to Iran. Moreover, he contends that evidence concerning the present existence of large foreign bank accounts is lacking. Again, both parties present strong arguments on the implications of Motamedi’s alienage, and we conclude that the factor does not tip the balance either for or against detention.
The Government argues that Motamedi poses a serious risk of flight because of the additional charges contained in the indictment. Motamedi states that he has known of the investigation into his exporting activities since January 1984. Moreover, he was informed upon his arrest that the Government would seek an indictment on the current charges, but he was nevertheless released on conditions for several weeks before issuance of the indictment. Accordingly, he argues, there is no greater risk that he will flee now than there has been since his arrest and release on conditions. We agree.
Having reviewed the facts, the findings, and the record, we conclude that the grounds upon which the district court based its determination that Motamedi po*1409ses a serious risk of flight, and that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure his appearance as required, are insufficient. In this case, the Government has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Motamedi presents a serious risk of flight. For this reason, the Government’s motion for reconsideration is DENIED.

. The Bail Reform Act of 1984 may be found at Act of Oct. 12, 1984, Pub.L. No. 98-473, 1984 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News (98 Stat.1976).