Court Opinion

ID: 9553928
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:37:31.558249+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:32:36.548904
License: Public Domain

SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON REHEARING
OPALA, Justice.
Appellants continue to press for invalidation of Crowl’s option as violative of the rule against perpetuities.1 They apparently view that option as “open-ended”2 and seem to suggest a possibility that the interest it created will neither vest nor fail within the rule’s limit.3 Their argument overlooks Oklahoma’s statutory commitment to constructional preference for validity and appears utterly to ignore the provisions of 60 O.S.1981 §§ 75 and 77,4 both enacted in 1971. The cited sections plainly require that the contested interest be accorded a construction that gives it legal efficacy5 and, if the stated terms of the *915option do indeed offend the rule, they must be reformed “... to give effect to the general intent of ... [their] creator .. .”.6
Because the option in suit was unmistakably intended to be exercisable immediately upon the death of Crowl — a life in being when the contractual right in the land stood created — the buyers’ acquired interest, first accrued as a claim at the end of Crowl’s life,7 must be construed as one that is certain either to vest or fail within the period during which a suit may be brought to enforce the promise by specific performance.8 In short, Crowl’s option clearly does not offend the rule against perpetuities. The interest conferred by its terms was both exercisable and extinguishable within the limits of the Oklahoma rule,9 i.e., “during the continuance of the lives of persons in being at the creation of the limitation or condition plus twenty-one (21) years.” 10 [Emphasis supplied.]
HODGES, SIMMS, WILSON, KAUGER and SUMMERS, JJ., concur.
HARGRAVE, V.C.J., and LAVENDER, J., dissent.

. The most universally accepted short definition . of the common-law rule against perpetuities is that found in Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities (4th ed.) 191. It is:
“No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the interest.” [Emphasis supplied.]

. Crowl’s option cannot be viewed as utterly open-ended. If no time is specified for the performance of an act, a reasonable time is allowed by law. 15 O.S.1981 § 173.

. The common-law rule is satisfied only if it is initially (when the time limit of the rule begins to run) certain that the interest created will either vest or fail within the period allowed by the rule. Melcher v. Camp, infra note 9 at 114, 115.

. The terms of 60 O.S.1981 § 75 provide:
“Any interest in real or personal property that would violate the rule against perpetuities shall be reformed, or construed within the limits of the rule, to give effect to the general intent of the creator of that interest whenever that general intent can be ascertained. This provision shall be liberally construed and applied to validate such interest to the fullest extent consistent with such ascertained intent.” [Emphasis supplied.]
The terms of 60 O.S.1981 § 77 provide in pertinent part:
“If an instrument violates the rule against perpetuities, but can be reformed or construed in accordance with the provisions of this act, it shall not be declared totally invalid. * * * " [Emphasis supplied.]

. Where an instrument is ambiguous — that is where it is fairly susceptible to two or more constructions, one of which causes a violation of the rule and the other of which does not — the construction that does not result in a violation of the rule should be adopted. Restatement of Property § 375 [1944]. Cases supporting this view include Southern Bank & Trust Co. v. Brown, 271 S.C. 260, 246 S.E.2d 598 [1978]; Davis v. Rossi, 326 Mo. 911, 34 S.W.2d 8 [1930]; Watson v. Goldthwaite, 345 Mass. 29, 184 N.E.2d *915340, 343 [1962]; Walker v. Bogle, 244 Ga. 439, 260 S.E.2d 338 [1979] and Drach v. Ely, 237 Kan. 654, 703 P.2d 746 [1985].

. 60 O.S.1981 § 75. Statutes enacted in three other states confer on the courts the power to reform instruments vulnerable for noncompliance with the rule against perpetuities. See, Cal.Civ.Code § 715.5 [West 1982]; Mo.Rev.Stat. § 442.555 [1978] and Tex.Property Code § 5.043 [Vernon 1984]. See also, Idaho Code § 55-111 [1948].

. The statute of limitations begins to run when the cause of action accrues, and a cause of action accrues when a claimant first could have maintained his action to successful conclusion. Sherwood Forest No. 2 Corp. v. City of Norman, Okl., 632 P.2d 368, 370 [1980].

. See Cline v. Hullum, Okl., 435 P.2d 152 [1967].

. The limits of Oklahoma’s rule against perpetu-ities are found in Art. 2 § 32, Okl. Const.; 60 O.S.1981 § 31; Melcher v. Camp., 435 P.2d 107, 111 [1967] and Producers Oil Co. v. Gore, Okl., 610 P.2d 772, 773-774 [1980].
See also Denney v. Teel, Okl., 688 P.2d 803 [1984].

. 60 O.S.1981 § 31. The provisions of § 31 govern interests and estates in real property. Melcher v. Camp, supra, note 9 at 108, 110-111.