Court Opinion

ID: 9740664
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:39:52.411221+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:19.562329
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE SLATER, dissenting: I must dissent from that aspect of the majority’s decision upholding the constitutionality of section 5 — 8—4(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) (730 ILCS 5/5 — 8—4(b) (West 1998)). Contrary to the majority’s opinion, I do not believe that the issue before us is whether the rationale for the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000), should be extended to invalidate the particular Code provision in controversy. Rather, I believe the question before us is whether section 5 — 8—4(b) can survive a faithful application of the holding in that case. In Apprendi, the Supreme Court expressed its holding in the following manner: “Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. With that exception, we endorse the statement of the rule set forth in the concurring opinions in [Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 143 L. Ed. 2d 311, 119 S. Ct. 1215 (1999)]: ‘[I]t is unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed. It is equally clear that such facts must be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 455, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63, quoting Jones, 526 U.S. at 252-53, 143 L. Ed. 2d at 332, 119 S. Ct. at 1228-29 (Stevens, J., concurring). Section 5 — 8—4(b) allows the trial court to find facts permitting the imposition of consecutive sentences. Absent this postverdict fact finding, the defendant would receive concurrent sentences. I believe reality and logic demand that we recognize that consecutive sentencing exposes a defendant to an increased penalty. Accordingly, section . 5 — 8—4(b) permits the trial court, after the jury has rendered its verdict, to find facts that expose the defendant to an increased range of punishment. Thus, section 5 — 8—4(b) authorizes the very thing that the Apprendi Court holds is contrary to a criminal defendant’s rights under the fifth and sixth amendments. Section 5 — 8—4(b) is, therefore, unconstitutional. As I understand it, the majority arrives at the contrary conclusion based on the following three propositions: (1) where a defendant is sentenced for multiple offenses, the rule in Apprendi is not violated so long as each term of imprisonment falls within the statutory .sentencing range prescribed for each corresponding offense; (2) the Supreme Court “could have, but chose not to consider consecutive sentencing” in Apprendi-, and (3) the rule oí Apprendi is somehow inoperable if the defendant cannot demonstrate that he was ignorant that the trial court might impose consecutive sentences based on its postverdict fact finding. With respect to the first proposition, the majority discovers a limitation to the Apprendi holding that is absent from the text of the Apprendi majority opinion. In addition to the paucity of textual support, the limitation fashioned by the majority lacks a cogent rationale. Indeed, it is a strange rule that a trial court may not impose a sentence for a single offense greater than the statutory maximum authorized by the jury’s verdict, but the trial court may impose, through its own postverdict fact finding, multiple consecutive sentences for multiple offenses where the jury’s verdict only authorizes concurrent sentences. As for the second proposition, contrary to the majority’s claim, the United States Supreme Court in Apprendi did not “expressly decline[ ] to consider the constitutionality of consecutive sentencing.” 322 111. App. 3d at 233. Rather, the Supreme Court was not presented with the question. The defendant in Apprendi did not receive consecutive sentences. The only mention of consecutive sentencing in the Apprendi majority opinion comes in the following context: “It is appropriate to begin by explaining why certain aspects of the case are not relevant to the narrow issue that we must resolve. First, the State has argued that even without the trial judge’s finding of racial bias, the judge could have imposed consecutive sentences on counts 3 and 18 that would have produced the 12-year term of imprisonment that Apprendi received; Apprendi’s actual sentence was thus within the range authorized by statute for the three offenses to which he pleaded guilty. [Citation.] The constitutional question, however, is whether the 12-year sentence imposed on count 18 was permissible, given that it was above the 10-year maximum for the offense charged in that count. The finding is legally significant because it increased — indeed, it doubled — the maximum range within which the judge could exercise his discretion, converting what otherwise was a maximum 10-year sentence on that count into a minimum sentence. The sentences on counts 3 and 22 have no more relevance to our disposition than the dismissal of the remaining 18 counts.” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 474, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 445, 120 S. Ct. at 2354. A fair reading of the foregoing passage simply does not permit an inference that the Supreme Court was expressly reserving the question of how the general principles enunciated in the rest of its opinion might apply to consecutive sentencing. Finally, I must take issue with the third and last pillar supporting the unstable edifice of the majority’s decision. The majority notes that “where, as here, the record does not indicate that the defendant was unaware that he faced potential consecutive sentences, he would be hard-pressed to show that the statute deprived him of fair notice.” 322 111. App. 3d at 233. While this observation may satisfy the majority’s concerns regarding notice of the potential penalties, it does nothing to address the fact that defendant was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to a jury determination of facts that exposed him to a substantially greater range of punishment. Accordingly, because I would hold that section 5 — 8—4(b) of the Code is unconstitutional under the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi, I dissent.