Court Opinion

ID: 9634930
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:29:18.70547+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:45:04.516093
License: Public Domain

KELLER, Justice,
concurring.
I also vote to affirm the judgment of the Madison Circuit Court, but I write separately because I disagree with Part *95III, in which the majority addresses Appellant’s argument that the trial court’s jury instructions erroneously broadened the allegations in the indictment. Although, the majority “find[s] no error in the instructions,”1 I would hold that the discrepancies between the indictment and instructions constituted an error, but one that was harmless in this case. In my view, Appellant has not demonstrated that the indictment, which charged him with “inducing [J.R.] ... to expose, in an obscene manner, her breasts which he photographed,” misled him as to the nature of the Commonwealth’s allegation and thereby prejudiced his ability to mount a defense to the charges. In fact, I believe the record refutes Appellant’s assertion that, because of the language in the indictment, he failed to anticipate that the Commonwealth would seek, and the trial court would ultimately give, jury instructions permitting a guilty verdict if the jury believed beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant knowingly “employed, authorized, or induced [J.R.] to engage in a sexual performance or consented to [J.R.’s] engagement in a sexual performance.” Because our rules permit amendments to indictments “any time before verdict or finding if no additional or different offense is charged and if substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced,”2 and neither limitation is implicated in the variance between indictment and instruction here, the discrepancy between the indictment and the instructions easily could have been avoided if the Commonwealth had moved the trial court to permit an amendment of the indictment to include all theories of liability under KRS 531.310 that were supported by the evidence. Thus, although a “step was skipped” in this case when the trial court instructed the jury as it did without first permitting the Commonwealth to amend the indictment, that error does not justify reversal of Appellant’s convictions.
In discharging its duty “to instruct the jury in writing on the law of the case,”3 a trial court should draft instructions that not only track the evidence at trial, but also “substantially follow the language of the indictment and submit the elements of the' offense contained in the indictment.”4 As early as the late 19th Century, our predecessor characterized an instruction that strayed from the indictment as “erroneous.” 5 And, under the former Criminal Code of Practice (“Criminal Code”), the Court treated any variance between the indictment and the evidence presented (or instructions given) as error, but assessed the prejudice associated with the error in a manner similar to today’s harmless error review.6 Reversal was appropriate only when a variance was “fatal” or “material” — i.e., when the variance “misleads the accused in making his defense or exposes *96him to danger of a second conviction of the same offense.”7 Since we adopted the Rules of Criminal Procedure, which “place more emphasis on fair notice and fair trial than upon rigid technicality”8 and provide for more liberal amending of indictments,9 the issue of whether the indictment could have been amended to eliminate the variance has become central to an analysis of the prejudice associated with a variance between an indictment and an instruction.10 Admittedly, in cases such as the one at bar — where RCr 6.16’s first limitation is not implicated because the variance between the instructions and the indictment does not charge a separate or additional offense — this determination is a close parallel to harmless error review under RCr 9.24, which directs courts to “disregard any error or defect in the proceeding that does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.”11 By framing the inquiry in terms of the possibility of an amendment of the indictment under RCr 6.16, however, we access a body of precedent in which “it is well-settled that any variance which misleads the accused in making or preparing his defense is fatal.” 12 And, we thus evaluate prejudice to the defendant’s substantial rights by examining the de facto amendment’s effect upon defense strategy.
Here, the jury instructions unquestionably broadened the indictment’s specific allegation and permitted the jury to find Appellant guilty without finding that Appellant undertook some affirmative act to cause J.R. to participate in a sexual performance.13 I conclude, however, that the in*97dictment did not mislead Appellant or cause him to believe that the Commonwealth was alleging liability only under KRS 531.310 “induces” language. Four (4) months before trial, Appellant filed a Motion to Consolidate Counts in which he stated both that he was “charged with eleven counts of ‘employ[ing], consenting] to, authorizing], or inducing] a minor to engage in a sexual performance’ ” and that “[t]he key element as pertaining to the defendant’s guilt is whether he employed, consented to, authorized, or induced a minor to engage in a sexual performance.” In my view, this motion evidences Appellant’s understanding that the Commonwealth would seek to impose liability for each of the bases outlined in KRS 531.310, and, as such, it reflects knowledge that refutes Appellant’s assertion that he was misled. Further, the actions taken (and not taken) by Appellant after the trial court overruled his motion for a directed verdict (and informed counsel that it intended to instruct the jury on not only the “induces” basis, but also the “employs” and “authorizes” bases of KRS 531.310 liability14) are not what one would expect from someone who had just been “sucker-punched” by an unexpected, mid-trial change of theory on the part of the Commonwealth. Specifically, Appellant, through his trial counsel: (1) made little effort to minimize his exposure to allegedly unexpected bases of liability and, in fact, argued that, if the court had decided not to limit liability to “induces,” it should instruct on all of the KRS 531.310 bases of liability, including “consents to,” which the trial court had indicated its intention not to include in the instructions; (2) did not ask for a continuance to retool the defense; (3) presented no evidence in his own defense, and did not recall any of the Commonwealth’s witnesses in order to mount a factual defense to the alternative bases for KRS 531.310 liability; and (4) focused his closing argument upon a technical, legal argument, which was wholly unrelated to the difference between “induces” and the other KRS 531.310 bases of liability and which Appellant had raised previously in a pre-trial motion four (4) months prior to trial. I also observe that, in support of this argument, counsel referenced the previous day’s cross-examination testimony *98and utilized poster-sized exhibits reproducing statutory language during his closing— suggesting that this defense was not cobbled together overnight after a surprise ruling by the trial court. In short, Appellant’s trial counsel, no doubt recognizing that he had little ability to muster a factual defense to this offense given his client’s admission that he took nude photographs of his pre-teen step-granddaughter, made a clever attempt — albeit a bit of a “Hail Mary” — to win a directed verdict on a technicality. Appellant, however, “was not misled, surprised or thrown off guard except insofar as he chose to shoot the gap in reliance upon a mere technical defect of which he was fully aware.”15 And, here, even “reliance” was absent because, when the trial court denied Appellant’s motion for a directed verdict of acquittal — and thereby prevented Appellant from exploiting this technicality — Appellant was equipped to mount a defense against the indictment on legal rather than factual grounds. As such, Appellant’s defense preparations would not have been prejudiced by an amendment of the indictment, and the variance between the indictment and the instruction was thus a harmless error.
Although I believe that the de facto amendment of this indictment did not, in fact, mislead Appellant as to the nature of the Commonwealth’s allegations, I should emphasize that I can envision how, in other cases, a defendant may be misled by an indictment that identifies one or more bases or theories of liability and excludes others. After all, under the theory of notice pleading incorporated within our criminal rules, indictments are supposed to “fairly inform[] the defendant of the nature of the crime with which he is charged,” 16 and RCr 6.10 accordingly provides that “[t]he indictment ... shall contain ... a plain, concise and definite statement of the essential facts constituting the specific offense with which the defendant is charged.”17 Because our rules allow— but do not require — an indictment to specify the means by which a defendant committed an offense,181 find it reasonable for a defendant to conclude that the Commonwealth intends to hold him or her liable for an offense only under the bases identified if bases are specified in the indictment. Accordingly, I simply do not agree with the notion that, as long as the indictment complies with RCr 6.10(3) and “statefs] ... the official or customary citation of any applicable statute, rule, regulation, or other provision of law which the defendant is alleged therein to have violated,”19 a defendant has notice that the Commonwealth may seek instructions as to any and all statutory means of committing the offense named. After all, if the mere citation of an applicable statute is sufficient notice, then the other provisions of RCr 6.10 are superfluous because the indictment need only state that the defendant violated the statute. I am confident from my review of the record that the Commonwealth’s eleventh-hour request for instructions permitting the jury to find Appellant guilty if it found that Appellant “authorized,” “employed,” or “consented to” J.R.’s participation in a sexual performance was not delayed deliberately for *99tactical gain. This case, however, illustrates the need for diligence on the part of both prosecutors — in reviewing evidence prior to presenting cases to the grand jury, in drafting proposed indictments, in reviewing indictments during subsequent preparations for trial, and in seeking amendments as soon as trial preparations reveal that the evidence will support additional bases of liability — -and defense attorneys — in reviewing indictments returned by the grand jury in light of discovery and independent investigations and, if necessary, seeking a bill of particulars under RCr 6.22 when additional details regarding an accusation are needed in order to prepare a defense. In future cases, adequate preparation should help to eliminate any risk of confusion.
COOPER, J., joins this concurring opinion.

. Majority Opinion, 103 S.W.3d 90, 94 (2003).

. RCr 6.16.

. RCr 9.54.

. 1 Cooper, Kentucky Instructions to Juries (Criminal) § 1.13 at 29 (Anderson Publishing Co. 1999) (hereinafter “Cooper”). See also Taylor v. Commonwealth, 256 Ky. 667, 76 S.W.2d 923, 926 (1934) (“Instructions in criminal cases should follow the language of the indictment and submit to the jury the elements of the offense charged, as contained in the indictment ....”).

. See McBride v. Commonwealth, 76 Ky. 337, 13 Bush 337, 338 (1877).

. Code of Practice in Criminal Cases (1877) (repealed 1963) § 353 ("The judgment shall be reversed for any errors of law appearing on the record when, upon consideration of the whole case, the court is satisfied that the substantial rights of the defendant have been prejudiced thereby.”).

. Braswell v. Commonwealth, Ky., 339 S.W.2d 637, 638 (1960).

. Robards v. Commonwealth, Ky., 419 S.W.2d 570, 573 (1967). See also Finch v. Commonwealth, Ky., 419 S.W.2d 146, 147 (1967) (explaining that the new Rules of Criminal Procedure "have adopted the principle of notice pleading” and that, although “all details of the charge” need not be set forth in the indictment, "if the defendant needs information concerning the details of the charge against him to enable him to prepare his defense, he should be supplied them through a requested bill of particulars.”).

. Compare Code of Practice in Criminal Cases, supra note 6 at § 126(5) ("The court may at any time cause the indictment to be amended in respect of any defect, imperfection, or omission in the matter of form only." (emphasis added)) with RCr 6.16, supra. See also International Shoe Co. v. Commonwealth, 300 Ky. 806, 190 S.W.2d 553, 554 (1945) (holding that § 126(5), which was adopted in 1942, will not "permit the Commonwealth's Attorney to amend an indictment by supplying substantial averments omitted by the Grand Jury.”).

. Johnson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 864 S.W.2d 266, 273 (1993) ("[Tlhe indictment here ought to have been amended (to be more accurate, it ought to have been more carefully drafted), but the failure to amend was unquestionably harmless.”); Commonwealth v. Day, Ky., 599 S.W.2d 166, 169 (1980) ("[U]nder RCr 6.16 the indictment could and should have been amended to include the period through July 3, 1977, the date shown by the proof and used in the instructions. However, the failure to do so did not affect Day’s substantial rights.”); Robards v. Commonwealth, supra note 8 at 573 ("The indictment could and should have been amended at the conclusion of the testimony, but it cannot reasonably be held that a failure in that respect affected the defendant’s substantial rights.”); Berry v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 84 S.W.3d 82, 92 (2002).

. RCr 9.24.

. Davis v. Commonwealth, Ky., 399 S.W.2d 711, 713 (1966).

. See Holbrook v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 662 S.W.2d 484, 488 (1984) ("’[C]onsent to’ or ’authorize’ as used in [KRS 531.310] does not require an affirmative act to cause Diaz to participate in the movie. To employ or induce a minor to engage in the performance of sexual acts would necessitate such an affirmative act; however, the definition of the offense is not limited to such affirmative acts.”).

. Although not raised as an allegation of error in either the trial court or on appeal to this Court, the manner in which the trial court dealt with Appellant’s Motion for Directed Verdict may have allowed the jury to return a non-unanimous verdict. The basis for Appellant’s Motion for Directed Verdict was that the Commonwealth had failed to prove that Appellant had "induced” J.R. to participate in a sexual performance as alleged in the indictment. Although the trial court denied Appellant’s motion, it did so because it found that the evidence would support a guilty verdict for one of the alternative bases of KRS 531.310 liability ("authorizes” and "employs”), but the trial court never addressed (on the record, anyway) whether the evidence would support the "induces” theory it submitted to the jury. If the evidence would not have permitted a jury reasonably to conclude that Appellant had "induced” J.R. into a sexual performance, even if it would have supported a guilty verdict under the other KRS 531.310 bases, the trial court risked reversible error by including the “induced” basis in the jury instructions. See Neal v. Commonwealth, Ky., 95 S.W.3d 843 (2003). As Appellant does not question the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, did not object to including "induces” in the instructions, and actually requested that the trial court include "consents to” after the trial court expressed its preliminary belief that the evidence did not support a conviction on that basis, I mention the possibility of error only to caution the bench and bar of the need to tailor jury instructions to the evidence presented. See Cooper, supra note 4 at § 1.06 at 18-19 ("[T]he instructions must have a source within the framework of the evidence actually introduced at trial.... The jury should not be instructed on a theory of the case not sustained by the evidence, or on a theory opposed to the evidence.” (footnotes omitted)).

. Robards v. Commonwealth, supra note 8 at 573.

. Finch v. Commonwealth, supra note 8 at 147.

. RCr 6.10(2) (emphasis added).

. RCr 6.10(3) (“It may be alleged in any count that the means by which the defendant committed the offense are unknown or that the defendant committed it by one or more specified means.”).

. Id.