Court Opinion

ID: 9546035
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:23:59.960923+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:15:54.944093
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Hall
dissenting:
I dissent.
The majority opinion affirms a judgment of the district court which in turn affirmed an award of the industrial commission which granted to Shook compensation for alleged injuries. Shook’s claim for compensation is predicated on C.R.S. ’53, 81-13-2, which provides:
“The right to the compensation provided for in this chapter, in lieu of any other liability whatsoever, to any and all persons whomsoever, for any personal injury accidentally sustained or death resulting therefrom, shall *387obtain in all cases where the following conditions occur:
“(1) Where, at the time of the accident, both employer and employee are subject to the provisions of this chapter; and where the employer has complied with the provisions thereof regarding insurance.
“ (2) Where, at the time of the accident, the employee is performing service arising out of and in the course of his employment.
“ (3) Where the injury or death is proximately caused by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, and is not intentionally self-inflicted.” (Emphasis supplied.)
From the above it will be observed that the legislature has provided that a claimant (Shook) must meet certain conditions before being entitled to:
“The right to * * * compensation * * * for any personal injury accidentally sustained * * (Emphasis supplied.)
The conditions prescribed are the following: there must be an accident; there must be an injury; the accident and the injury must arise out of and in the course of the employment.
The commission found that:
“ * * * The claimant’s work position produced an unexpected and unusual result from an extraordinary and unusual position and it is therefore found to constitute an accident ” (Emphasis supplied.)
I am unable to find a particle of evidence in the record to warrant a finding that Shook suffered an injury during his employment; there is not a particle of evidence that Shook ever suffered an accident. So far as the record discloses, Shook may have had a herniated disc for ten or more years. Just when did he suffer this alleged injury and alleged accident? Was it on the first day of his work, the last day, or an intervening day? Morning or afternoon? While climbing into or out of his cramped quarters, or while eating his lunch, or bowling a few frames after work, or in 1944 when he incurred a *388back injury during military service? The record is entirely silent with respect to these matters, and yet the commission generously supplies facts that Shook was unable to produce.
The referee who heard the testimony and who had Shook and his witnesses before him and an opportunity to observe them, an opportunity which the commission did not have, found that Shook had not suffered injuries or an accident during the course of, and arising out of, his employment. The referee, among other things, found:
“Claimant’s medical history disclosed that the claimant had trouble with his back in 1955, at which time he experienced typical symptoms of intervertebral disc injury with pain radiating down his right leg and, in the meantime, had experienced intermittent difficulty and pain. The facts established herein do not disclose any accidental injury. There is no evidence of trauma; no evidence of over-exertion, and no evidence of accidental strain. The only thing which points to the claimant’s disability as being occupational in nature is the position in which he worked.
“ * * * claimant was suffering from a pre-existing back injury and that the present condition of the claimant, if due to claimant’s occupation, is due to aggravation of a pre-existing injury by reason of the nature of the claimant’s work and is not due to accidental injury. Unfortunately, the aggravation, if occupational in origin, is not covered by the highly restricted provisions of the Colorado Occupational Disease Disability Act.”
The findings of the referee are amply supported by the testimony; the findings of the commission do not rise above the dignity of unbridled speculation and conjecture.
I do not subscribe to the statement (finding) of the majority that:
“ * * * there is ample evidence to show that * * * *389claimant * * * had been, and was, a normally healthy man * *
The commission made no such finding. The referee found to the contrary. The record contains testimony of Shook that he had: (a) in 1944, while in military service, incurred an injury to his back; (b) in 1955 had trouble which he thought “was an arthritic condition of my knee which I think was causing it”; (c) while working at the Martin plant was disabled, “but the Vets called me into the hospital in Denver for a physical check-up and gave me an okay bill, all of me but the arthritic condition of my knee”; (d) stated: “Once in awhile I get an arthritic condition in the knees and once in awhile I have a backache.”
The above precludes me from subscribing to the diagnostic pronouncement of the majority.
I am not unmindful of the myriad of variegated, irreconcilable pronouncements of this court as to what constitutes an accident or injury. Many of them have my hearty disapproval, for the reason that they, in my opinion, are in direct conflict with the plain terms of the statute.
The wording of the Workman’s Compensation Act precludes a recovery under the facts as disclosed by this record. There is no proof of an accident; there is no proof of an accidental injury arising out of or during the course of the employment. Plain words — “accident” “injury” — should be given plain meaning and should not be held to have a “particular” meaning when used in the act.
I am of the opinion that this court has, in this case and a series of previous cases, notably, Industrial Commission v. La Foret Camps, et al, 125 Colo. 503, 245 P. (2d) 459; Industrial Commission, et al, v. Corwin Hospital, et al, 126 Colo. 358, 250 P. (2d) 135, and Industrial Commission v. Havens, et al, 136 Colo. 111, 314 P. (2d) 698, done a hangup job of putting compensation insurance carriers in the life and health insurance business, *390as well as that in which they voluntarily entered — industrial accident insurance.
The judgment should be reversed and Shook’s claim denied.
Mr. Justice Day joins in this dissent.