Court Opinion

ID: 9406164
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-30 05:05:37.471772+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:27.376267
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

                                                                     UNPUBLISHED
In re L J L BURNEY, Minor.                                           June 29, 2023

                                                                     No. 363843
                                                                     Macomb Circuit Court
                                                                     Family Division
                                                                     LC No. 2021-000093-NA

Before: MARKEY, P.J., and JANSEN and K. F. KELLY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

       Respondent appeals by right the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights to the
minor child, LJLB, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) (failure to provide proper care or custody), (j)
(reasonable likelihood child will be harmed if returned to parent), (i) (rights previously terminated
to another child for serious and chronic abuse and neglect), and (l) (rights to another child were
voluntarily terminated after neglect proceedings were commenced). We affirm.

                 I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

        Respondent’s parental rights to two other children were previously terminated in December
2020, primarily because of physical abuse, neglect, and an inability to benefit from a parent-agency
agreement. When respondent gave birth to LJLB in April 2021, he was immediately removed
from her care because of her history with children’s protective services, her failure to obtain
prenatal care, and her mentally unstable behavior in the hospital. During the next year, LJLB lived
with a foster family who were also caring for his half-siblings. Respondent exercised once weekly
supervised visitation. The case moved slowly as LJLB’s father, who lived in Florida, attempted
to obtain custody of the child.

        On May 10, 2022, at the adjudication, respondent pleaded no contest to the allegations in
a second amended petition for termination, thereby establishing the trial court’s jurisdiction.
Respondent also stipulated to the existence of the statutory grounds for termination, solely leaving
for resolution whether the termination of respondent’s parental rights was in LJLB’s best interests.
The trial court held an evidentiary best-interests hearing on August 31, 2022. After considering
all the evidence and testimony provided by the parties, the trial court concluded that it was in
LJLB’s best interests to terminate respondent’s parental rights. This appeal followed.

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              II. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF CHILD PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS

        To give context to our discussion and analysis, we shall provide a brief overview of child
protective proceedings in Michigan. The proceedings consist of an adjudicative phase followed
by a dispositional phase. In re Ferranti, 504 Mich 1, 15-16; 934 NW2d 610 (2019). “The question
at adjudication is whether the trial court can exercise jurisdiction over the child (and the
respondents-parents) under MCL 712A.2(b) so that it can enter dispositional orders, including an
order terminating parental rights.” Id. at 15. A trial court can exercise jurisdiction if a respondent
enters a plea of admission or no contest with respect to the allegations in a petition, or if the
petitioner proves the allegations at a trial by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. “Once the trial
court’s jurisdiction is established, the case moves to the dispositional phase.” Id. at 16. During
the dispositional phase, the court has broad authority to enter various orders and hold review
hearings. Id. If, upon authorization by the trial court, the petitioner pursues a termination petition,
the court, as factfinder, will conduct a termination hearing as part of the dispositional phase. Id.
At the hearing, if the trial court finds that a single statutory ground for termination under MCL
712A.19b(3) has been proven by clear and convincing evidence and that the petitioner has also
established by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of parental rights is in the best
interests of a child, MCL 712A.19b(5), the court is mandated to terminate the respondent’s parental
rights to the child. Id.; In re Mota, 334 Mich App 300, 320; 964 NW2d 881 (2020).

                                     III. THE STIPULATION

          Respondent first argues on appeal that the trial court committed clear error by not ensuring
that respondent’s stipulation to the statutory grounds for termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g),
(j), (i), and (l) was knowing and voluntary. Respondent contends that she did not speak during the
stipulation, that she was not informed by the court that a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard
applied in relation to petitioner’s burden of proof in regard to the statutory grounds, that she was
not told that under the stipulation, petitioner needed only to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that termination was in the child’s best interests, and that the court’s failures constituted
a violation of respondent’s due-process rights. Although not contained in a statement of the
questions presented on appeal, respondent also maintains that counsel was ineffective for failing
to confirm on the record that respondent was making an informed decision, i.e., a knowing and
voluntary decision, with respect to the stipulation to the statutory grounds for termination.
Respondent argues that the trial court’s error and counsel’s defective performance resulted in an
unconstitutional waiver of her fundamental liberty interest to parent her child. We note that
respondent makes no claim that she would not have stipulated to the statutory grounds for
termination had she been properly advised by the trial court.

        Respondent’s no-contest plea to the allegations in the termination petition for purposes of
adjudication was in compliance with the requirements of MCR 3.971, and there is no argument to
the contrary. Indeed, our review of the record indicates that the trial court meticulously obtained
a valid waiver from respondent relative to her rights connected to the adjudicative phase of the
proceedings. The trial court, apparently thinking that it had fully covered the no-contest plea to
the exercise of jurisdiction and a stipulation to the statutory grounds for termination with respect
to the dispositional phase, began discussing a date to hold a best-interests hearing. Petitioner
interjected in an attempt to clarify the record, resulting in the following colloquy:

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                 [Petitioner]:   And—and, your Honor, just so that we can be clear, because
                                 I want the record to be clear, that not only is [respondent]
                                 pleading no contest to the allegations in the petition for
                                 purposes of adjudication, but also stipulating that they would
                                 make a factual basis for the statutory grounds that are listed
                                 in the petition . . . .

                 The Court:      All right. Is that correct?

                 [Counsel]1:     Yes, your Honor.

                 The Court:      Okay. It should be so stipulated then that they’re—that—or
                                 so ordered that the plaintiff is now—sorry. The [respondent]
                                 is now stipulating to use those factors towards making a
                                 determination that she’s stipulating to the amended petition
                                 for purposes of the best interest trial and adjudication.

                 [Petitioner]:   And—

                 The Court:      And use that as a basis for statutory grounds.

                 [Petitioner]:   Your Honor, I guess I should say that it should be
                                 specifically—and I’ll make sure that it’s in the order—that
                                 it’s—she’s pleading for purposes of adjudication and
                                 statutory grounds only.

                 The Court:      Okay.

                 [Petitioner]:   And we’ll be setting it for a best interest hearing.

                 The Court:      Gotcha. Okay. So that’s what the Court’s prepared to do
                                 today. Any objections to that?

                 [L-GAL]:        No.

                 [Petitioner]:   And Counsel, is that your understanding?

                 [Counsel]:      That’s correct.

                 The Court:      Okay.

                 [Counsel]:      That’s my understanding.

                 The Court:      All right. I probably muddled that with my wording.

1
    We shall refer to respondent’s attorney as “Counsel” for purposes of this colloquy.

                                                   -3-
        Respondent was not questioned in relation to the stipulation to the statutory grounds for
termination under MCL 712A.19b(3), and she was not informed that she was waiving her right to
have petitioner prove at least one of the statutory grounds for termination by clear and convincing
evidence at a termination hearing. Respondent was also not told that petitioner now only needed
to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of respondent’s parental rights
was in the child’s best interests. We note that at an earlier hearing in the proceedings, the trial
court did advise respondent that if a termination hearing occurred in the future, petitioner would
have to prove a statutory ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence along with
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that termination was in the child’s best interests. We
further note that an order entered by the court following the stipulation indicated that there was
clear and convincing evidence of the statutory grounds for termination as established by
respondent’s no-contest plea. Respondent, however, made no attempt thereafter to withdraw the
plea or stipulation, and the case proceeded to a best-interests hearing.

       A waiver of constitutional rights must be voluntary and knowing and reflect an intelligent
act done with full awareness of the pertinent circumstances and likely direct consequences. In re
Pederson, 331 Mich App 445, 464; 951 NW2d 704 (2020). “The clearly erroneous standard shall
be used in reviewing the court’s findings on appeal from an order terminating parental rights.”
MCR 3.977(K). But “[w]hether child protective proceedings complied with a parent’s right to
procedural due process presents a question of constitutional law, which we review de novo.” In
re Sanders, 495 Mich 394, 403-404; 852 NW2d 524 (2014).

        Given that respondent’s counsel affirmatively voiced agreement to the stipulation to the
statutory grounds as presented and discussed on the record, we first conclude that respondent’s
argument challenging the validity of the stipulation was waived. See People v Carter, 462 Mich
206, 215; 612 NW2d 144 (2000) (waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right; one
who waives her rights may not then seek appellate review of a claimed deprivation of those rights
because the waiver has extinguished any error). Counsel cannot harbor error in the lower court
and then use that error as an appellate parachute. People v Kowalski, 489 Mich 488, 505; 803
NW2d 200 (2011). Minimally, respondent’s argument was not preserved for appeal. See
Pederson, 331 Mich App at 462 (the plain-error standard applies to unpreserved claims of error
arising out of child-protective proceedings).2 Under plain-error review, reversal is warranted only
when a plain error, i.e., a clear or obvious error, affected substantial rights by prejudicing a
respondent and the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the
judicial proceedings. Ferranti, 504 Mich at 29-30; Pederson, 331 Mich App at 463. Respondent
also bootstraps a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, which requires a demonstration that
counsel’s performance was deficient, falling below an objective standard of reasonableness, and
that prejudice was incurred. Mota, 334 Mich App at 311. Prejudice occurs when an error affected
the outcome of the lower court proceedings. Pederson, 331 Mich App at 463.

2
  The Pederson panel found that the respondents failed to preserve an argument challenging
adjudication pleas where they did not move to withdraw their pleas in the trial court or otherwise
object to the advice of rights that they were given. Pederson, 331 Mich App at 462-463.

                                               -4-
        We proceed here on the assumption that respondent’s argument was forfeited and not
waived, that the trial court committed plain error by failing to advise respondent of her rights
relative to a termination hearing and the burdens of proof, and that her counsel’s performance was
deficient for failure to object or raise an issue with respect to the advisement and waiver of
respondent’s rights. As such, the critical question—in regard to plain-error or ineffective-
assistance analysis—is whether respondent was prejudiced, i.e., whether the court’s error or
deficient performance affected the outcome of the proceedings.

        We conclude that there was no prejudice to respondent. First, in earlier proceedings
concerning LJLB and before the stipulation was entered, respondent was informed by the trial
court of the evidentiary burdens that petitioner must satisfy to terminate parental rights in the
dispositional phase. Second, respondent previously had her parental rights terminated to two other
children; therefore, she necessarily had familiarity with the process and petitioner’s evidentiary
burdens. Third, the trial court entered an order before the best-interests hearing memorializing the
stipulation to the statutory grounds and acknowledging the application of the clear-and-
convincing-evidence standard, yet respondent proceeded to the best-interests hearing without
voicing any protest or attempting to withdraw her plea to the statutory grounds. Finally, and
importantly, respondent does not even argue that she was prejudiced or that the errors were
outcome-determinative. Respondent does not claim that had she been informed of the evidentiary
burdens, she would not have stipulated to the statutory grounds for termination under MCL
712A.19b(3). Accordingly, we hold that reversal is unwarranted.

                                      IV. BEST INTERESTS

        Respondent argues that the trial court clearly erred by ruling that termination of her parental
rights was in LJLB’s best interests. In support, respondent contends that she had stable
employment, that she resided in appropriate housing, that she completed parenting and anger
management classes, that she attended individual therapy, that there was a strong bond between
her and the child, that terminating her parental rights would not provide LJLB with stability and
permanency because the child was going to be placed with his father in Florida and not the foster
family, and that the trial court failed to consider LJLB’s relative placement with his father when
assessing the child’s best interests.

        Petitioner had to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of respondent’s
parental rights was in the child’s best interests, and the trial court’s finding that the burden was
met is reviewed for clear error. Mota, 334 Mich App at 320. A finding is clearly erroneous when
the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made. Id. “When
applying the clear error standard in parental termination cases, regard is to be given to the special
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses who appeared before it.” Id.
The Mota panel discussed the best-interests analysis, stating as follows:

               With respect to a child’s best interests, we focus on the child rather than the
       parent. In assessing a child’s best interests, a trial court may consider such factors
       as a child’s bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for
       permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the
       parent’s home. The trial court may also consider a parent’s history of domestic
       violence, the parent’s compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent’s

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       visitation history with the child, the children’s well-being while in care, and the
       possibility of adoption. The trial court may also consider how long the child was in
       foster care or placed with relatives, along with the likelihood that the child could
       be returned to the parents’ home within the foreseeable future, if at all. [Id. at 321
       (quotation marks, citations, and brackets omitted).]

        The trial court found that the testimony of a foster-care worker was credible and that
respondent was “less credible than the worker and . . . her answers appeared performative at times.”
The court observed that LJLB was thriving with his foster family and that the testimony by the
foster-care worker demonstrated that the child was “in a loving, safe, stable, and nurturing
placement where all of his needs [were] being met.” The trial court noted that LJLB had bonded
with his foster mother and siblings, whom he had been with for over a year and a half. The court
believed the foster-care worker’s testimony about respondent’s aggressive, hostile, and
uncooperative behavior directed toward caseworkers throughout the proceedings, which
respondent acknowledged and tried to excuse on the basis that she was in a stressful situation. The
trial court also referred to respondent’s mental instability, indicating that she continuously
prioritized her desires instead of providing for the child’s basic needs. The trial court further found
that although a bond was beginning to develop between respondent and LJLB, the developing
bond did not overcome respondent’s “inability to demonstrate progress in her capacity to properly
care for her young child.” The court doubted that respondent would comply with or benefit from
any parent-agency agreement or services “in light of her historical behavior.” The trial court
concluded that petitioner established by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of
respondent’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests.

        On clear-error review and given that we defer to the trial court’s credibility assessments,
we hold that the court did not clearly err in finding by a preponderance of the evidence that
termination of respondent’s parental rights was in LJLB’s best interests. We are not left with a
firm and definite conviction that a mistake was made. The trial court’s specific findings in support
of its best-interests determination were supported by the record. But we must discuss further a
couple of points argued by respondent with respect to the child’s father, relative placement, and
the foster family. In In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App 35, 43; 823 NW2d 144 (2012), this Court
discussed the topic of placement with relatives:

               [B]ecause a child’s placement with relatives weighs against termination
       under MCL 712A.19a(6)(a), the fact that a child is living with relatives when the
       case proceeds to termination is a factor to be considered in determining whether
       termination is in the child’s best interests. Although the trial court may terminate
       parental rights in lieu of placement with relatives if it finds that termination is in
       the child’s best interests, the fact that the children are in the care of a relative at the
       time of the termination hearing is an explicit factor to consider in determining
       whether termination was in the children’s best interests. A trial court’s failure to
       explicitly address whether termination is appropriate in light of the children’s
       placement with relatives renders the factual record inadequate to make a best-
       interest determination and requires reversal. [Quotation marks and citations
       omitted; emphasis added.]

                                                  -6-
“[A] child’s placement with relatives weighs against termination.” In re Mason, 486 Mich 142,
164; 782 NW2d 747 (2010).

         Although LJLB’s father, who was living in Florida, was apparently in the process of
obtaining physical custody of the child, LJLB was still living with his foster family at the time of
termination. Moreover, “a child’s biological parent is not that child’s ‘relative’ for purposes of
the statute,” and thus the rule stated in Mason and Olive/Metts does not apply to a biological parent.
Mota, 334 Mich App at 322. Accordingly, in this case, we reject respondent’s argument that the
child was placed with a relative, his father, which weighed against termination. We do opine that
the trial court’s discussion of how LJLB was thriving in a stable environment with his foster family
was somewhat questionable because the child will probably end up with his father and not the
foster family. Nevertheless, we find it clear that the trial court would have similarly ruled absent
consideration of the foster family because of the court’s various concerns about respondent’s
conduct and behavior, and it plainly was of the view that respondent could not provide the child
with permanency and stability. Moreover, as already noted, at the time of termination, LJLB was
still residing with his foster family, and any consideration of the child’s life with his father would
necessarily have entailed some level of conjecture and speculation.

       We affirm.

                                                              /s/ Jane E. Markey
                                                              /s/ Kathleen Jansen
                                                              /s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly

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