Court Opinion

ID: 9618874
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:18:28.211366+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:32.920020
License: Public Domain

Finley, J.
(concurring) — I have signed and concur in the majority opinion. However, I have substantial reservations as to the substance and implications of footnote 1 of the majority opinion which reads as follows:
It must be made clear that the ultimate constitutional responsibility for guaranteeing a fair and impartial trial lies primarily with the judiciary, not the press. Here, the astonishing fact is that the prejudicial material publicized was not the result of overzealous news gathering and reporting, but was actually released to the news media by the state.
While in some contexts it may be said that “the ultimate constitutional responsibility for guaranteeing a fair and impartial trial lies primarily with the judiciary, not the press,” the statement is a generalization I cannot accept in relation to fair trial — free press problems without some further explanation and, I think, appropriate qualification. In other words, when a defendant in the trial of a particular criminal case asserts as a defense that news reporting regarding pretrial matters prejudiced his right to a fair trial, it then, of course, can be said that “the ultimate constitutional responsibility for guaranteeing a fair and impartial trial lies primarily with the judiciary, not the press.” At this stage of the proceedings, evaluation of the problem then raised, and a decision as to whether prejudice exists and a change of venue must be granted is unquestionably the responsibility of the trial judge, and is exclusively a judicial function in the indicated context. However, at a very early point in the history of our Voluntary, Cooperative Washington Bench-Bar-Press Program, it was recognized — and it became an underlying tenet of the program —that the responsibility is a joint and several one on the part of the bench, the bar, the press, and law enforcement personnel regarding that kind or manner of news reporting *57of pretrial and trial proceedings which would be likely to result in prejudicing the rights of a defendant to a fair and impartial constitutional-due process trial. Thus, responsibility for the news reporting — which, in the instant case, this court holds was prejudicial to the rights of the defendant and requires a change of venue — was a joint and several responsibility, to be recognized, and assumed at least in part — if not entirely — both by the prosecutor’s office as well as by the press.
As emphasized in the majority opinion, the deputy prosecutor arguing this case before us candidly admitted:
Parenthetically, we are not proud nor do we condone the publicity that was given in this particular case. We see the error in it and would submit that this should not happen again, nor will it.
I daresay the prosecutor’s office was aware of the decision in Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 16 L. Ed. 2d 600, 86 S. Ct. 1507 (1966), and its implications. Furthermore, I daresay that office was aware of the Washington Bench-Bar-Press Program and its efforts to guard against news reporting likely to prejudice the rights of an accused to a fair trial. However, consistent with the underlying precepts or basic philosophy of the Bench-Bar-Press Program, it will not do to place the blame for the resulting prejudice to the defendant’s right to a fair trial and the change of venue in this case totally upon the prosecuting attorney’s office.
It is a most significant, basic principle of our Voluntary, Cooperative Bench-Bar-Press Program that the press is entitled to information — in fact, to rather unrestricted access to information — but thereupon a responsibility devolves upon the press to exercise sound editorial judgment and journalistic responsibility under the Guidelines of the Bench-Bar-Press Program to avoid unnecessary prejudice to the rights of a criminal defendant to a fair and impartial trial. While the public relations activity of the prosecutor cannot be condoned, nevertheless, I think it must be very clearly stated, emphasized, and understood that in the instant case the responsibility for what happened should not *58be placed solely on the doorstep of the prosecuting attorney of Yakima County. The fault must be shared by the Yakima Herald Republic, unless it can be said that under (a) the Guidelines of the Bench-Bar-Press Program, and (b) the circumstances involved, freedom of the press and the interest of the public in being informed (i.e., knowing about the matters contained in the news stories and emphasized by this court in granting a new trial and a change of venue), were so supervening and so nearly absolute as to justify the publicity and the news reporting in this criminal case despite the potential prejudicial effect on the rights of the defendant to a fair and impartial trial in the truest constitutional sense. I am convinced this could hardly be said of the situation involved in this case.
Perhaps it is comparable to “Monday morning quarterbacking,” but considering (a) the evaluation by this court of the news reporting problem involved, and (b) the action of this court in granting a change of venue, I think the propriety of the judgment exercised by both the prosecutor’s office and the news media was extremely dubious, to say the least. Furthermore, I am convinced that the joint and several responsibility of all concerned (contemplated by our Bench-Bar-Press Program) was simply overlooked or disregarded — jointly and severally — by all concerned. The end result was the prejudicial publicity which has become the crucial factor in granting a new trial, and a change of venue in this criminal appeal.
Hunter, Neill, Stafford, and Wright, JJ., concur with Finley, J.