Court Opinion

ID: 9725802
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:11:04.469228+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:19.896693
License: Public Domain

THOMPSON, J.
I reluctantly dissent. My reluctance stems from the undoubted guilt of the appellant of the offense not charged—brandishing a deadly weapon. My dissent is impelled by my reading of the record and of the applicable decisional law.

Facts

Appellant was charged with violation of Penal Code section 245 (assault with a deadly weapon). His theory of defense was diminished capacity based upon People v. Fanning, 265 Cal.App.2d 729, 734 [71 Cal.Rptr. 641]. During the proceedings, appellant’s counsel proposed a jury instruction to the effect that the offense of brandishing a deadly weapon is a lesser included offense within the charge of assault with a deadly weapon. Appellant’s counsel then withdrew the instruction and requested that it not be given. The court nevertheless erroneously gave the withdrawn instruction, and the jury *806having been so instructed found appellant guilty of the “lesser offense.” The evidence amply supports appellant’s guilt, if he was properly charged.
While the majority and I read the record alike to the extent of the foregoing, I am unable to agree with the majority’s statement of fact in the following particulars: (1) My reading of the record discloses no “lengthy argument” on the proposed instruction here pertinent—the total discussion occupies less than a page in the record; and (2) I find nothing whatsoever in the record to support the statement that the case was tried upon the theory that appellant could be found guilty of either the offense charged or the offense of brandishing a deadly weapon because of appellant’s having proposed an instruction on the latter crime. To the contrary, the trial judge stated unmistakably (record of trial, pp. 175, 176): “I think the testimony in this case would indicate to me it [brandishing a deadly weapon] is a necessarily included offense here.”

Issue on Appeal

The issue on appeal as framed by the majority (but not by the trial court or counsel) concerns the scope of the rule of implied amendment of an accusatory pleading. In the context of the record in the case at bench, it is properly phrased as: does action of a defendant in proposing and then withdrawing a jury instruction to the effect that an offense not charged is a lesser included offense standing alone impliedly amend the accusatory pleading to charge that offense? In my opinion that query should be answered in the negative.

Lesser Included Offense

Appellant was charged with a violation of Penal Code section 245 (assault with a deadly weapon). He was convicted of a violation of Penal Code section 417 (exhibiting a deadly weapon in a rude or threatening manner). The latter offense is not necessarily included within the former. (People v. Leech, 232 Cal.App.2d 397 [42 Cal.Rptr. 745]; People v. Torres, 151 Cal.App.2d 542 [312 P.2d 9].) The trial court, therefore lacked jurisdiction to convict appellant of the violation of Penal Code section 417 (In re Hess, 45 Cal.2d 171 [288 P.2d 5]) unless the accusatory pleading had been informally amended to charge the crime of which appellant was convicted.

Implied Amendment of Accusatory Pleading

An accusatory pleading may be informally amended to charge an offense not originally charged where the amendment is accomplished with the ex*807press or implied consent of the accused. (People v. Francis, 71 Cal.2d 66 [75 Cal.Rptr. 199, 450 P.2d 591].) The question raised by the case at bench concerns the sufficiency of the conduct of appellant’s counsel to constitute an implied consent.
Informal amendment of an accusatory pleading to charge a lesser related but not necessarily included offense has been found in the following: Where the defendant has submitted the matter upon the transcript of his preliminary hearing and has not objected to the finding of guilt of the lesser but not included offense. (People v. Francis, 71 Cal.2d 66, 74 [75 Cal.Rptr. 199, 450 P.2d 591]; People v. Powell, 236 Cal.App.2d 884, 887 [46 Cal.Rptr. 417].) Where the defendant was found guilty of the offense charged against him and the charge was reduced to a lesser but not included offense at his initiative on a motion for a new trial. (People v. Hensel, 233 Cal.App.2d 834, 840 [43 Cal.Rptr. 865]; People v. Blunt, 241 Cal.App.2d 200 [50 Cal.Rptr. 440].) Where the defendant requested that the trial court find him not guilty of the offense charged but guilty of a lesser but not included offense. (People v. Taylor, 273 Cal.App.2d 471 [78 Cal.Rptr. 51].) Where a jury instruction on the lesser but not included offense proposed by the defendant was not withdrawn and was given by the trial court. (People v. Mayes, 262 Cal.App.2d 195 [68 Cal.Rptr. 476]; see also People v. Asher, 273 Cal.App.2d 876, 908 [78 Cal.Rptr. 885].)
The decisions holding that an accusatory pleading has been informally amended to charge a lesser but not included offense contain one common element—the acquiescence of the defendant in the procedure by which he was convicted of the lesser crime at the time the case was submitted for decision. That element is lacking in the case at bench. While appellant’s counsel had proposed an instruction on “lesser included offense” which erroneously treated a violation of Penal Code section 417 as necessarily included within a charge of a violation of Penal Code section 245, that proposed instruction was withdrawn before the jury was instructed. Appellant’s counsel also specifically objected to the giving of the instruction. It cannot, therefore, be said that appellant acquiesced in the procedure followed by the trial court.
It is conceivable that an informal amendment of an accusatory pleading can result from conduct on the part of a defendant during trial which causes the matter to be tried upon the theory that he is charged with a lesser but not included offense not formally charged in the indictment or information. *808I can find no such conduct in the record of the case at bench. That there was confusion at the trial as emphasized by the majority is inescapable. The confusion, however, was not caused by appellant and had nothing to do with the giving of the instruction on Penal Code section 417 by the trial judge. It rather was the product of uncertainty of the requirement of specific intent as an element of the crime of assault with a deadly weapon and the availability of diminished capacity as a defense to a charge of that crime.1 The jury instruction which resulted in a guilty verdict of a crime neither charged nor necessarily included in a crime charged flowed not from the confusion or from a theory of trial adopted by appellant bui from an erroneous conception of the trial judge on the law.2
The majority opinion adopts the proposition that a defendant who proposes a jury instruction by that act alone consents to an implied amendment of the accusatory pleading to encompass a theory compatible with the instruction even if he withdraws it before the jury is actually instructed and even if the court does not rely upon the proposed instruction in framing the issues of the case. I view that doctrine-as a potentially undesirable extension to the existing rule of informal amendment.
The proposition, if it becomes the law of California, must inevitably cause counsel for defendants in criminal cases to hesitate before proposing a jury instruction. The doctrine of mandatory sua sponte instructions already places a premium upon passivity of defense counsel who may hope for a reversal through a mistake of the trial judge in failing to give a .mandatory instruction. There is no substitute for active advocacy in preventing, reversible error. The adoption of a doctrine which further encourages passivity and discourages active advocacy in the area of jury instructions may salvage this one tenuous criminal conviction. It does so, however, at the real risk of reversal of future cases.
I would reverse the judgment.

The trial court was faced with the dilemma posed by conflicting Court of Appeal decisions. People v. Fanning, 265 Cal.App.2d 729 [71 Cal.Rptr. 641] holds that specific intent is an element of the crime of assault with a deadly weapon and that diminished capacity is a defense to the charge. People v. Morrow, 268 Cal.App.2d 939 [74 Cal.Rptr. 551] is contra. The conflict in the decisions will undoubtedly be resolved by our Supreme Court which has granted hearing in a similar case, People v. Seals *(Cal.App.) 80 Cal.Rptr. 710.

The trial judge states at pages 175 and 176 of the record of trial: “I think the testimony in this case would indicate to me it [a violation of Penal Code section 417] is a necessarily included offense here.”

A hearing was granted by the Supreme Court on November 12, 1969. The opinion of that court is reported in 1 Cal.3d 574 [82 Cal.Rptr. 873, 462 P.2d 993].