Court Opinion

ID: 9397911
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-26 21:02:09.863897+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:28.675024
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-11040    Document: 12-1      Date Filed: 05/26/2023    Page: 1 of 4

                                                   [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 23-11040
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

       In re: IRVIN RANDAL KARR,
                                                                   Debtor.
       _________________________________________________
       DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANIES,
       as Trustee under the Pooling and Servicing Agreement,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
       versus
       ROCCO J. LEO,
       as Trustee of the Bankruptcy Estate of Irvin Randal Karr,

                                                    Defendant-Appellee.
USCA11 Case: 23-11040     Document: 12-1      Date Filed: 05/26/2023    Page: 2 of 4

       2                      Opinion of the Court                23-11040

                            ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Alabama
                     D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cv-00787-AMM
                           ____________________

       Before WILSON, LAGOA, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Upon our review of the record and the parties’ responses to
       the jurisdictional questions, this appeal is DISMISSED for lack of
       jurisdiction.
              Appellant seeks review of the district court’s order affirming
       the bankruptcy court’s March 7, 2022 grant of partial summary
       judgment to Appellee. In that order, the bankruptcy court deter-
       mined that Appellant had no right to Debtor’s interest in the prop-
       erty in which he resides, and the bankruptcy estate was entitled to
       a one-half interest in that property. The bankruptcy court did not
       resolve Appellee’s claims requesting a judgment allowing for sale
       of the property and an order requiring turnover of the property to
       the estate, nor did it address Appellant’s counterclaim for sale of
       the property and distribution of proceeds.
                We conclude that the bankruptcy court did not properly cer-
       tify its order, which did not resolve all claims and counterclaims in
       the adversary proceedings, for immediate review under Fed. R.
       Bankr. P. 7054(a). See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7054(a) (providing that Fed.
       R. Civ. P. 54(b) applies in adversary bankruptcy proceedings);
USCA11 Case: 23-11040      Document: 12-1       Date Filed: 05/26/2023      Page: 3 of 4

       23-11040                Opinion of the Court                           3

       Dzibowski v. Boomer’s Sports & Recreation Ctr., Inc. (In re Boca Arena,
       Inc.), 184 F.3d 1285, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999) (stating that a bankruptcy
       court order disposing of fewer than all claims in an adversary pro-
       ceeding is not immediately appealable absent Rule 7054 certifica-
       tion). Specifically, the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in de-
       termining that there was “no just reason for delay.” See Lloyd No-
       land Found., Inc. v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 483 F.3d 773, 777 (11th
       Cir. 2007) (holding that to certify a case under Rule 54(b), a court
       must determine, inter alia, that there is “no just reason for delay” in
       permitting an immediate appeal).
              As an initial matter, the bankruptcy court did not provide
       any reasoning or explanation for its certification decision. It simply
       stated, summarily, that there was no just reason for delay. Accord-
       ingly, we accord no deference to the bankruptcy court’s certifica-
       tion. See Ebrahimi v. City of Huntsville Bd. of Educ., 114 F.3d 162, 166–
       67 (11th Cir. 1997).
              Here, the “special circumstances” we have identified as war-
       ranting departure from the historic federal policy against piece-
       meal appeals are not present. See Doe #1 v. Red Roof Inns, Inc.,
       21 F.4th 714, 722–23 (11th Cir. 2021); Peden v. Stephens, 50 F.4th 972,
       978–79 (11th Cir. 2022). The Rule 54(b) certification did not occur
       at an early stage of the litigation but after two years of litigation,
       including a related removal and remand of a state court action.
       There are not a large number of defendants, and it does not appear
       that substantial discovery still awaits. Neither the bankruptcy court
       nor the parties have identified any particular dangers of hardship
USCA11 Case: 23-11040      Document: 12-1      Date Filed: 05/26/2023     Page: 4 of 4

       4                      Opinion of the Court                  23-11040

       or injustice associated with delaying appellate review until final res-
       olution of the entire bankruptcy proceeding, and our review of the
       record reveals no obvious reason to permit an immediate appeal.
       See Peden, 50 F.4th at 978 (explaining that Rule 54(b) certification
       should be limited to “instances in which immediate appeal would
       alleviate some particular danger of hardship or injustice associated
       with delay”).
              Further, allowing an immediate appeal would likely result
       in future piecemeal appeals involving similar factual backgrounds.
       See Ebrahimi, 114 F.3d at 167 (noting that when the factual under-
       pinnings of adjudicated and unadjudicated claims are intertwined,
       courts “should be hesitant” to employ Rule 54(b)). The factual un-
       derpinnings of the adjudicated issue of who is entitled to Debtor’s
       interest in the property are intertwined with the unadjudicated is-
       sues of whether the property should be sold, and if so, how to dis-
       tribute the proceeds of such a sale. Thus, potential later appeals
       would involve essentially the same facts presented in this appeal,
       and judicial administrative interests would not be advanced by hav-
       ing multiple panels of this Court familiarize themselves with this
       case. See id. Accordingly, the parties’ needs do not outweigh the
       costs and risks of multiplying the proceedings and overcrowding
       our docket.