Court Opinion

ID: 9353243
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-11 16:02:46.437404+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:07:02.736581
License: Public Domain

Third District Court of Appeal
                               State of Florida

                       Opinion filed January 11, 2023.
       Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                            ________________

                             No. 3D21-1646
                       Lower Tribunal No. 20-11484
                          ________________

                        Laurentina Kocik, etc.,
                                  Appellant,

                                     vs.

                       Jorge Fernandez, et al.,
                                 Appellees.

    An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, William
Thomas, Judge.

     Nelson Mullins Riley and Scarborough, and Mark F. Raymond,
Kimberly J. Freedman, and Francisco Armada, for appellant.

    Legon Fodiman & Sudduth, P.A., and Todd R. Legon, and Jeffrey A.
Sudduth, for appellees.

Before SCALES, LINDSEY, and LOBREE, JJ.

     LINDSEY, J.
      Appellant Laurentina Kocik appeals from a final judgment in favor of

Appellee Jorge Fernandez, which requires her to sell all her stock in Gem

Paver, Inc. for $450,000.      This case turns on whether Fernandez has

standing to enforce a Buyout Clause in the Shareholder Agreement.

Because Fernandez has standing as an agent of Gem Paver under Florida’s

party in interest rule, we affirm.

   I. BACKGROUND

      In 1990, four married couples entered into a Shareholder Agreement

for Gem Paver.      The Agreement authorized 1,000 shares of stock and

distributed the shares among Jorge and Anna Fernandez, Jurek and

Laurentina Kocik, Roman and Angela Lannes, and Pablo and Mercedes

Diaz. The Agreement contains a Buyout Clause that requires each wife to

sell all her shares at a specified price upon the death of her husband:

            A Stockholder (or the personal representative of his estate)
      shall sell all of his stock in the Corporation, and the Corporation
      shall purchase all of said stock at a price equal to Ten Thousand
      Dollars ($10,000.00) for each one percent (1%) of the authorized,
      issued and outstanding shares of the Corporation owned by that
      Stockholder . . . upon the occurrence of: (i) as to the stock owned
      by Kocik, the death of Jurek; (ii) as to the stock owned by
      Fernandez, the death of Jorge; (iii) as to the stock owned by
      Lannes, the death of Roman; or (iv) as to the stock owned by
      Diaz, the death of Pablo.

      Throughout the years, numerous transactions took place redistributing

the shares among the couples. Two transactions are worth mentioning. The

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first occurred in 2000 when Roman Lannes was diagnosed with a terminal

illness. The Kociks and Fernandezes had an agreement with Roman to

purchase his shares, but Roman died before this agreement could be

executed.   The Buyout Clause was not invoked, and the Kociks and

Fernandezes paid Roman’s estate the previously agreed upon price. 1

     The second transaction occurred in 2003 when the Fernandezes

purchased the Diazes’ remaining shares. These transactions resulted in the

Kociks and Fernandezes becoming the only remaining shareholders. After

a mediated settlement, it was determined that the Kociks owned 45% of Gem

Paver while the Fernandezes owned 55%.

     In 2019, Jurek Kocik passed away.        Upon Jurek’s death, Jorge

Fernandez sent a letter to Laurentina Kocik (the personal representative of

Jurek’s estate) notifying her that he was invoking the Buyout Clause. Jorge

sought to purchase the Kociks’ 45% interest in Gem Paver and tendered

Laurentina a check for $450,000. Laurentina refused to sell, resulting in

Jorge’s underlying action to enforce the Buyout Clause.

     Relevant to this appeal, Jorge Fernandez seeks specific performance

against Laurentina Kocik, requiring her to sell the Gem Paver shares for

1
  The Kociks and Fernandezes paid Roman’s estate $125,925.91 for an
8.5% interest. Under the Buyout Clause, the payment would have been
$85,000.

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$450,000. In response, Kocik asserted multiple affirmative defenses, filed a

counterclaim for a declaration that she owned the shares, and requested an

accounting and distribution.    Both parties filed cross motions for partial

summary judgment.

      The lower court initially denied Fernandez’s motion for partial summary

judgment, concluding that he lacked standing to enforce the Buyout Clause

because he had brought the claim in his individual capacity and that only

Gem Paver had standing to seek specific performance. On rehearing the

court issued an amended order in favor of Fernandez based on his standing

as an agent of Gem Paver. 2 The circuit court subsequently rejected Kocik’s

affirmative defenses and granted summary judgment against her on her

counterclaim. Kocik appealed.

    II. ANALYSIS

      As this case is before the Court upon a grant of summary judgment,

our standard of review is de novo. See Volusia County. v. Aberdeen at

Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 130 (Fla. 2000). “The court shall grant

summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as

2
  Because we affirm the trial court’s determination of standing based on
agency, we need not address Fernandez’s standing in his individual
capacity.

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to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(a).

      On appeal, Kocik challenges Fernandez’s standing to sue for specific

performance on behalf of Gem Paver. Though Fernandez brought this action

in his own name, it is clear from the allegations and relief requested in the

Complaint that Fernandez sought specific performance on Gem Paver’s

behalf. Specifically, under Count I for Specific Performance, the Complaint

provides as follows:

                  43. Paragraph 4 of the Shareholders’
            Agreement requires Defendant to sell all of the
            Kocik Shares to Gem Paver Systems, Inc. at a
            price of $10,000 for each one percent (1%) of the
            corporation owned by the Kocik Shareholder upon
            the death of Jurek Kocik.

                  44. Accordingly, following the death of Jurek
            Kocik, Defendant was and remains obligated to sell
            the Kocik Shares, which represent 45% of the
            outstanding shares of Gem Paver Systems, Inc., to
            Gem Paver Systems, Inc. for the price of
            $450,000.00.

            ....

                 51. Upon a finding by this Court that Kocik has
            breached the Shareholders’ Agreement, Plaintiff
            demands     specific     performance       of    the
            Shareholders’     Agreement       by    Defendant,
            requiring Defendant to accept the $450,000.00
            payment for the Kocik Shares, convey title for the
            Kocik Shares back to Gem Paver Systems, Inc. .
            ...

                                     5
(Emphasis added).

     Consistent with the Complaint, Fernandez submitted an affidavit, as

the corporate representative of Gem Paver, with his motion for summary

judgment, which averred that “when Mr. Kocik passed away in September

2019, I became the sole director and/or officer of Gem Paver.” The affidavit

further stated that Fernandez was “acting as Gem Paver’s agent in

prosecuting this action on its behalf, and Gem Paver has authorized Mr.

Fernandez to prosecute and proceed in whatever matter and/or method of

practice that Mr. Fernandez deems appropriate in pursuing this action on

Gem Paver’s behalf.” The affidavit also ratified all past action taken by

Fernandez in enforcing the Shareholders’ Agreement.

     In her response to Fernandez’s motion for summary judgment, Kocik

objected to the affidavit as false and self-serving. But Kocik never objected

to Fernandez’s authority to act on behalf of Gem Paver. Because this was

never objected to, the trial court concluded that it was undisputed Fernandez

was Gem Paver’s agent:

                 The undisputed evidence is that Gem Pavers
           appointed Fernandez as its agent in the case. In
           doing so, Gem Pavers authorized each and every
           action taken by Fernandez and has agreed to be
           legally bound by any action taken to judgment in this
           case. Pursuant to Florida rules of civil procedure
           1.210, Fernandez has standing to pursue these

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            claims on Gem Pavers behalf and the fact that Gem
            Pavers authorized Fernandez to act as his agent
            after the lawsuit was filed does not alter this Court’s
            decision. See Kumar Corp. v. Nopal Lines, Ltd., 462
            So. 2d 1178 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985).

      On appeal, Kocik raises for the first time an argument that Gem Paver

could not appoint Fernandez as its agent because doing so would require

unanimous shareholder approval under the Agreement.             Because this

argument was not made in the trial court, it cannot be presented for the first

time on appeal. See, e.g., Sunset Harbour Condo. Ass’n v. Robbins, 914

So. 2d 925, 928 (Fla. 2005) (“As a general rule, it is not appropriate for a

party to raise an issue for the first time on appeal. ‘In order to be preserved

for further review by a higher court, an issue must be presented to the lower

court and the specific legal argument or ground to be argued on appeal or

review must be part of that presentation if it is to be considered preserved.’”

(citations omitted) (quoting Tillman v. State, 471 So. 2d 32, 35 (Fla.1985))).

      We therefore find no error with the trial court’s conclusion that the

undisputed evidence was that Gem Paver appointed Fernandez as its agent.

Accordingly, we agree that pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.210,

Fernandez had standing to sue on behalf of Gem Paver in his own name.

See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.210(a) (“Every action may be prosecuted in the name

of the real party in interest, but a personal representative, administrator,

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guardian, trustee of an express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a

contract has been made for the benefit of another, or a party expressly

authorized by statute may sue in that person’s own name without joining the

party for whose benefit the action is brought.”); see also Kumar, 462 So. 2d

at 1185 (“Florida real party in interest rule is permissive only, and a nominal

party, such as an agent, may bring suit in its own name for the benefit of the

real party in interest. . . . It is a fundamental proposition of the law of agency

that a principal may subsequently ratify its agent’s act, even if originally

unauthorized, and such ratification relates back and supplies the original

authority.” (footnote and citations omitted)).

         a. Kocik’s Affirmative Defenses

      Kocik raised two affirmative defenses as to why the Buyout Clause is

unenforceable. First, that Fernandez waived enforcement of the Clause

through his past transactions—specifically, the purchase of Roman Lannes’s

shares after his death. Second, that the Buyout Clause discriminates on the

basis of gender and violates the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S.

Constitution as well as Article 10, Section 5 of the Florida Constitution.

               i. Waiver

      Waiver is the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right,

and “[a] party may waive any rights to which he or she is legally entitled, by

                                        8
actions or conduct warranting an inference that a known right has been

relinquished.” Torres v. K-Site 500 Assocs., 632 So. 2d 110, 112 (Fla. 3d

DCA 1994).

      Kocik argues that the Buyout Clause is unenforceable because it was

not invoked after the death of Roman Lannes, thus resulting in Fernandez

waiving his right to enforce the Clause in this case. However, the transaction

involving Lannes’s shares is different from the situation here. Roman Lannes

was diagnosed with a terminal illness and reached an oral agreement with

the Kociks and Fernandezes to sell his remaining shares.            Following

Roman’s death, both the Kociks and Fernandezes paid Lannes’s estate the

amount orally agreed upon.

     This is a materially different scenario than the present case and does

not evince an intent by either the Kociks or Fernandezes to intentionally

waive enforcement of the Buyout Clause in the future. Additionally, none of

the other transactions that occurred between the shareholders involved the

Buyout Clause as they were all inter vivos transfers, and the Buyout Clause

is only relevant upon the death of one of the husbands. Thus, we find no

waiver occurred here.

              ii. Equal Protection

                                      9
      Kocik also argues that the Buyout Clause violates both the Equal

Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution and Article 10, Section 5 of the

Florida Constitution.   Kocik reasons that because the Buyout Clause is

contingent upon one of the male husbands dying, it discriminates against the

female shareholders based on gender. We reject this argument as there is

no state action. This is a private contract between private parties. Kocik

argues, nonetheless, that Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) is

applicable.   Shelley’s application, however, has been limited to racial

discrimination. See Davis v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 59 F.3d 1186, 1191 (11th

Cir. 1995) (“The holding of Shelley, however, has not been extended beyond

the context of race discrimination.”). We therefore find no constitutional

violations.

         b. Kocik’s Counterclaim

      Kocik brought a counterclaim requesting a declaration that she owned

the disputed Gem Paver shares. She also requested an accounting and

distribution. Because we affirm the lower court’s order enforcing the Buyout

Clause, we affirm the court’s grant of summary judgment against Kocik on

her counterclaim.

   III. CONCLUSION

                                    10
     For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the final summary judgment

in favor of Fernandez on his action to enforce the Buyout Clause and affirm

the circuit court’s judgment in favor of Fernandez on Kocik’s counterclaim.

     Affirmed.

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