Court Opinion

ID: 9429797
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:27:56.419761+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:21.638173
License: Public Domain

Justice Rehnquist,
with whom The Chief Justice and Justice Powell join,
dissenting.
The Court seizes upon petitioner’s seven-word response “Uh, yeah, I’d like to do that,” rendered during a colloquy which in its entirety could not have taken five minutes, and proclaims that petitioner thereby clearly asserted his desire to consult with an attorney before speaking to the police. In so doing, it decides this essentially factual inquiry contrary to the three other courts that have considered the question: the Illinois trial court, the Illinois Appellate Court, and the Supreme Court of Illinois. Under the guise of applying a rule of law which, however correct in the abstract, has little application to these facts, the Court permits its certiorari jurisdiction to be used to relitigate the facts, and reaches a conclusion that is no more demonstrably correct than that reached by the Illinois courts.
There is no dispute that Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477 (1981), requires interrogation to cease, if and when petitioner clearly asserts his right to the assistance of counsel. But here no “interrogation” was being conducted by the *101police; they were simply in the process of giving petitioner his full Miranda warnings. The very next statement by the police officer after petitioner’s “clear assertion” of his right to counsel was to tell petitioner that “[i]f you want a lawyer and you’re unable to pay for one a lawyer will be appointed to represent you free of cost, do you understand that?” Surely the police should have continued to give petitioner his full warnings, even had his earlier response had the talismanic quality that the Court attributes to it.
The Court also assumes that the statement, “Uh, yeah. I’d like to do that,” was announced affirmatively and without any tone of equivocation or inquiry. As the Illinois Appellate Court observed, the officer reading petitioner his rights did not understand the statement as a clear request. After first reading petitioner the fourth Miranda right, he immediately sought clarification by asking petitioner pointedly, “Do you wish to talk with me at this time without a lawyer being present?” To this query, petitioner responded, “Yeah and no, uh, I don’t know what’s what really.” The trial judge, who was able to observe the demeanor of the officers testifying as to what took place and to listen to the tape of the interrogation, implicitly concluded that petitioner’s initial statement was not a clear request.
The Court asserts that subsequent statements cannot be used to call into question the clarity of an earlier “request” for counsel. It may be that a crystal-clear statement could not be rendered ambiguous by subsequent responses to questions seeking clarification. But statements are rarely that clear; differences between certainty and hesitancy may well turn on the inflection with which words are spoken, especially where, as here, a seven-word statement is isolated from the statements surrounding it. But in the ordinary give-and-take of statement and response in a colloquy such as this, I see no reason why the entire flavor of the colloquy— lasting less than five minutes — cannot be considered by the trier of fact.
*102Edwards v. Arizona, supra, is entirely consistent with this approach. In that case Edwards, after being informed of his Miranda rights, agreed to talk to police, but during his interrogation while discussing a possible “deal” said, “I want an attorney before making a deal.” 451 U. S., at 478-479. The police then ceased questioning him, and he was returned to jail. The next morning two detectives went to the j ail and asked to see Edwards; Edwards replied that he did not want to talk to anyone, but the guard told him that “he had” to talk and then took him to meet with the detectives. The Court said:
“Here, the critical facts as found by the Arizona Supreme Court are that Edwards asserted his right to counsel and his right to remain silent on [the preceding day], but that the police, without furnishing him counsel, returned the next morning to confront him and as a result of the meeting secured incriminating oral admissions. Contrary to the holdings of the state courts, Edwards insists that having exercised his right on the [preceding day] to have counsel present during interrogation, he did not validly waive that right on the [next day]. For the following reasons, we agree.” Id., at 482.
Our other cases applying Edwards, Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U. S. 1039 (1983), and Solem v. Stumes, 465 U. S. 646 (1984), are cast in a similar mold; the suspect clearly asserts a right to counsel, questioning ceases, and then the police seek to resume interrogation at a later time. The facts of the present case simply do not fit that mold. The entire process by which petitioner was advised of his Miranda rights was transcribed in the few lines contained in the Court’s opinion, ante, at 92-93; it simply slices a legal abstraction thinner than common sense will permit to conclude on the basis of this colloquy that it may not be used in its entirety to determine whether petitioner “clearly asserted” his right to counsel.
*103The Court apparently assumes that the officers were trying to trick or coerce petitioner into waiving his right to counsel. This is belied by the fact that, immediately after petitioner agreed to talk, the interrogating officer stated plainly, “All you have to do is just tell me I don’t want to talk to you any more and that ends it.” Subsequently, during the interrogation, when petitioner stated, “I don’t want to talk to you no more. I wanta get a lawyer,” the police immediately ceased questioning and complied with this request.
The Court also implies that the officers badgered and coerced petitioner into changing his mind about obtaining a lawyer. In fact, between petitioner’s initial statement and his indisputable expression of uncertainty, all that the officers did was advise him of the right to appointed counsel and asked him what he wanted to do:
“A. Uh, yeah. I’d like to do that.
“Q. Okay. If you want a lawyer and if you’re unable to pay for one, a lawyer will be appointed to represent you free of cost, do you understand that?
“A. Okay.
“Q. Do you wish to talk with me at this time without a lawyer being present?
“A. Yeah and no, uh, I don’t know what’s what really.”
This can hardly be characterized as badgering.
The Court makes much of the officer’s subsequent clarifying explanation that “You either have to agree to talk to me at this time without a lawyer being present and if you do agree to talk with me without a lawyer being present you can stop any time you want to.” Tr. 230. The Court ignores the word “either.” The sentence appears to be incomplete. It may well be that petitioner’s response, “All right. I’ll talk to you then,” interrupted the completion of the sentence. The Court makes the unwarranted assumption that the officer was attempting to badger and overreach petitioner. Again, only the trier of fact can intelligently determine the import of the officer’s statement.
*104Common sense suggests that the police should both complete reading petitioner his rights and then ask him to state clearly what he elects to do, even if he indicated a tentative desire while he was being informed of his rights. This is entirely consistent with applicable language in Miranda itself:
“Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 473-474 (1966).
The reading of this short colloquy between petitioner and the police officer satisfies me that the police were faithfully attempting to follow our Miranda decision. The Court's opinion gives the impression that it is concerned about overreaching, badgering, and wearing down a suspect; but no fair reading of this 5-minute transcript can lead to the conclusion that those factors were present here.