Court Opinion

ID: 9954948
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-27 14:12:02.609028+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:07.179748
License: Public Domain

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
                         In The Supreme Court

            Candise Gore, Plaintiff,

            v.

            Dorchester County Sheriff's Office; Dorchester County;
            Carol Brown; Kiesha Baldwin; Sheriff L.C. Knight;
            Richard Darling; Sharon Branch; Wanda Taylor; and
            Willis Beatty, Defendants.

            Appellate Case No. 2023-000922

               ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE UNITED
             STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT
                       OF SOUTH CAROLINA

                              Opinion No. 28196
                  Heard January 9, 2024 – Filed March 27, 2024

                   CERTIFIED QUESTION ANSWERED

            John Thomas Gentry, III, of Charleston, for Plaintiff.

            Robin Lilley Jackson, of Senn Legal, LLC, of
            Charleston, for Defendants.

PER CURIAM: Candise Gore sued various individuals and governmental entities
in the court of common pleas, alleging she was wrongfully strip-searched at the
Dorchester County Detention Center after being arrested for domestic violence. The
Dorchester County Sheriff's Office is the governmental entity that operates the
facility. Included in her causes of action is a state law claim against the Sheriff for
reckless infliction of emotional distress. Because Gore also asserts claims under
federal law, the defendants removed the case to the United States District Court.
Pursuant to Rule 244, SCACR, the District Court certified the following question to
this Court:

        Does the bar under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act of claims of
       "intentional infliction of emotional harm," S.C. Code [Ann.] § 15-78-
       30(f), apply to claims of reckless infliction of emotional distress?

      Answering the question correctly requires us to review South Carolina case
law governing the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, also known as
outrage, and requires us to interpret various provisions of the South Carolina Tort
Claims Act, S.C. Code Ann. §§ 15-78-10 to -220 (2005 & Supp. 2023) ("the Act").
                                             I.

        In Ford v. Hutson, 276 S.C. 157, 276 S.E.2d 776 (1981), we recognized the
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress and adopted the rule of liability set
forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts: "[o]ne who by extreme and outrageous
conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is
subject to liability for such emotional distress . . . ." Id. at 162, 276 S.E.2d at 778.
We clarified that in order for a plaintiff to prevail on this cause of action, the plaintiff
must establish, among other things, that "the defendant intentionally or recklessly
inflicted severe emotional distress or was certain or substantially certain that such
distress would result from his conduct . . . ." Id. (quoting Vicnire v. Ford Motor
Credit Co., 401 A.2d 148, 154 (Me. 1979)).
      Other jurisdictions have held that intentional infliction of emotional distress
and reckless infliction of emotional distress are the same cause of action. See, e.g.,
Leistner v. Vanini, 208 A.D.3d 1625, 1626 (N.Y. App. Div. 2022) ("[R]eckless
conduct is encompassed within the tort denominated intentional infliction of
emotional distress." (quoting Dana v Oak Park Marina, 230 A.D.2d 204, 209 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1997)); Rogers v. Louisville Land Co., 367 S.W.3d 196, 205 n.6 (Tenn.
2012) (holding intentional infliction of emotional distress and reckless infliction of
emotional distress are not separate torts); Bibbs v. Durham Sch. Servs., L.P., 666
S.W.3d 327, 334 n.5 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2022) ("Intentional infliction of emotional
distress and RIED are not different causes of action."); Zalaski v. City of Hartford,
704 F. Supp. 2d 159, 176 (D. Conn. 2010) (holding under Connecticut law, there is
no distinct cause of action for reckless infliction of emotional distress; rather; such
a claim is encompassed by a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress);
Ess v. Eskaton Properties, Inc., 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 240, 247 (2002) (holding reckless
infliction of emotional distress is "an aspect of the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress"); Nancy P. v. D'Amato, 517 N.E.2d 824, 827 (Mass. 1988)
(recognizing reckless and intentional infliction of emotional distress have been
placed in the same category).

        The foregoing authorities align with our view of the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Reckless infliction of emotional distress is merely
a subset of intentional infliction of emotional distress. We hold there is no separate
cause of action in South Carolina for the reckless infliction of emotional distress.
For that reason, the certified question may be moot, as there would be no reason to
consider potential recovery for a cause of action that does not independently exist in
South Carolina.

                                           II.
       However, to ensure a complete response to the certified question, we will
construe the definition of "loss" in section 15-78-30(f) of the Act. The Act was
adopted by the General Assembly in 1986, in response to our decision in McCall v.
Batson abolishing sovereign immunity. 1

        The Act renders governmental entities liable for torts committed by their
employees acting in the scope of their official duties, but at the same time limits the
liability of governmental entities in numerous respects. Section 15-78-40 of the Act
provides,
        The State, an agency, a political subdivision, and a governmental entity
        are liable for their torts in the same manner and to the same extent as a
        private individual under like circumstances, subject to the limitations
        upon liability and damages, and exemptions from liability and
        damages, contained herein.

1
    McCall v. Batson, 285 S.C. 243, 329 S.E.2d 741 (1985).
S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-40 (2005) (emphasis added).

       Crucially, section 15-78-200 of the Act requires us to construe the provisions
of the Act in a manner that limits the liability of the governmental entity:

      The provisions of this chapter establish limitations on and exemptions
      to the liability of the governmental entity and must be liberally
      construed in favor of limiting the liability of the governmental entity.

Id. § 15-78-200 (emphasis added).

      As the certified question reveals, one limitation upon liability and damages is
found in the definition of a recoverable "loss" contained in section 15-78-30(f):
      "Loss" means bodily injury, disease, death, or damage to tangible
      property, including lost wages and economic loss to the person who
      suffered the injury, disease, or death, pain and suffering, mental
      anguish, and any other element of actual damages recoverable in
      actions for negligence, but does not include the intentional infliction of
      emotional harm.
Id. § 15-78-30(f) (emphasis added).
       Gore concedes section 15-78-30(f) bars recovery for the intentional infliction
of emotional distress, but she contends she is entitled to pursue recovery for the
reckless infliction of emotional distress. In that sense, she splits the tort of outrage
into two torts from which she claims she may choose—intentional infliction of
emotional distress and reckless infliction of emotional distress. In Bass v. South
Carolina Department of Social Services, this Court had an opportunity to resolve
this issue but decided the case on different grounds. 414 S.C. 558, 780 S.E.2d 252
(2015). The plaintiffs' outrage claim was based on DSS's reckless, rather than
intentional, conduct. As the Sheriff does here, DSS raised the definition of "loss" in
subsection 15-78-30(f) as a complete bar to recovery for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Id. at 565, 565 n.4, 780 S.E.2d at 255, 255 n.4. However, we
did not address whether 15-78-30(f) barred recovery for "reckless" infliction of
emotional distress; instead, we concluded as a matter of law that DSS's conduct did
not rise to the level of outrage (conduct so extreme and outrageous as to exceed all
possible bounds of decency and must be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable
in a civilized society). Id. at 576, 780 S.E.2d at 261. 2 Importantly, we again
recognized that the tort of outrage can be proven by evidence of either reckless or
intentional conduct. Id. at 575, 780 S.E.2d at 260.
       The wording of the definition of "loss" in section 15-78-30(f) is uneven. First,
the definition lists eight elements of actual damages for which a plaintiff may recover
against a governmental entity and then includes "any other element of actual
damages recoverable in actions for negligence." However, the definition of "loss"
ends with an exclusion prohibiting recovery not for a specific element of actual
damages, but rather for an entire cause of action—the intentional infliction of
emotional distress. The definition is therefore arguably ambiguous. Regardless, we
construe the statute as section 15-78-200 says we must—liberally and in favor of
limiting the liability of the governmental entity. Because the reckless infliction of
emotional distress is a subset of the tort intentional infliction of emotional distress,
the bar to recovery for the intentional infliction of emotional distress in section 15-
78-30(f) necessarily bars recovery for any conduct by a governmental entity that
may be merely reckless, but yet satisfies the elements of the cause of action
intentional infliction of emotional distress. 3

                                          III.
      The bar to recovery for the intentional infliction of emotional distress in
section 15-78-30(f) applies to the subset of claims for the reckless infliction of
emotional distress. The District Court's question is

2
  We also declined to disturb the verdict because the plaintiff's outrage claim and
gross negligence claim were submitted to the jury on a general verdict form, and it
was therefore impossible to determine whether the jury found for the plaintiffs on
the outrage claim, or the gross negligence claim, or both. Id.
3
  When we adopted the tort of outrage in Ford in 1981, we clearly stated the tort
encompassed both the reckless and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Ford,
276 S.C. at 162, 276 S.E.2d at 778. When the General Assembly enacted the Act in
1986, it was presumed to have knowledge of our holding in Ford. See State v.
Bridgers, 329 S.C. 11, 14, 495 S.E.2d 196, 197-98 (1997) ("The General Assembly
is presumed to be aware of the common law.").
ANSWERED.

BEATTY, C.J., KITTREDGE, FEW, HILL, JJ., and Acting Justice James
Edward Lockemy, concur.