Court Opinion

ID: 9601465
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:44:28.26989+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:33:58.993195
License: Public Domain

SUMMERS, Justice,
dissenting.
My analysis of the relevant statutes is that when a judgment is pronounced on a jury verdict the thirty-day time to appeal begins to run from the date the journal entry of judgment is filed in the case. This analysis is contrary to the court’s recent opinion in Jaco Production Co. v. Luca, 823 P.2d 364 (Okla.1991), and, of course, to today’s case.
Prior to January 1, 1991 an appeal was commenced in this Court by filing a petition in error within thirty days of the date of the final order or judgment. 12 O.S.1981 § 990.1 In Warehouse Market, Inc. v. Berry, 459 P.2d 853 (Okla.1969) we decided that “the date of the ... judgment” was the date the judgment was pronounced and became effective. This view followed long standing precedent.2 In Warehouse Market we also contrasted the date a judgment was pronounced with the date the journal entry of judgment was filed. Id. 459 P.2d at 854.
Beginning on January 1, 1991 prior law was repealed3 and the thirty-day appeal time began to run only when the judgment was “filed” with the district court clerk. 12 O.S.Supp.1990 § 1004.4 The judgment was not the pronouncement from the bench, but an instrument whose form was prescribed by statute. 12 O.S.Supp.1990 § 1001. Sections 1001 and 1004 were in effect for only five months.5
Starting June 1, 1991, and continuing to the present, the thirty-day appeal time begins to run on the date “judgment is filed.” 12 O.S.1991 § 990A.6 While documents and exhibits can be filed, an oral declaration or “pronouncement” cannot. Thus, this new statutory scheme retained the concept of a judgment, for the purposes of computing time to appeal, as being some instrument filed in the case, and rejected the idea that time to appeal would run from the date the judgment was pronounced. Section 990A does not specify the form or nature of the instrument to be filed, and that is part of the problem in this case.
The majority’s analysis on calculating the time to appeal this judgment based on a jury’s verdict can be expressed by this syllogism:
1. The verdict is a judgment.
2. The verdict was filed on the day it was returned.
*4203. Therefore, the judgment was filed on the day the verdict was returned.
My departure from this analysis begins with its first premise. A verdict is not a judgment. Not under the common law, and not under 12 O.S.1991 § 696.1.
The majority recognizes that at common law a verdict is not a judgment. It concludes, however, that § 696.17 transforms a verdict “eo instante” into a judgment. I disagree with this theory of transmogrification. When a jury trial has occurred a “judgment must be entered by the clerk in conformity with the verdict”. 12 O.S.1991 § 696.1. The judgment pronounced (or accepted) by the court upon the verdict is “entered” on the appearance docket by the clerk. Title 12 O.S.1991 § 23 provides that the clerk has the duty to “enter” on the appearance docket “an abstract of all judgments and orders of the court”.8
Section 696.1 simply requires a clerk to enter a judgment on the proper court record conforming to a verdict. The judgment is deemed to have been “rendered” by operation of law; i.e., “the judgment is, by operation of law, rendered when the verdict of the jury is returned and accepted.” Peoples Electric Co-Op. v. Broughton, 191 Okla. 229, 127 P.2d 850, 853 (1942). But neither the verdict nor the entry amounts to the judgment. As we explained in Walker v. St. Louis San Francisco Ry., 671 P.2d 672, 673 (Okla.1983), it is the judge, not the clerk by its entry, nor the jury by its verdict, who renders judgment in a case tried to the jury. See also Ashinger v. White, 106 Okla. 19, 232 P. 850 (1924), where after a verdict was returned no judgment was pronounced on the verdict by the court, nor entered on the journal, though the verdict was entered on the appearance docket.
Entering a judgment deemed to have been pronounced by the court is not a judicial act, but a ministerial one. “Entry of judgment” is defined as “a ministerial act performed by the clerk of the court by means of which permanent evidence of [a] judicial act in rendering judgment is made a record of the court.” Black’s Law Dictionary, 625 (4th ed. 1951). Our case-law is in agreement; “The entry of judgment ordinarily consists of the ministerial act of spreading the same upon the proper judgment record or writing it at large in the book of judgments.” De Watteville v. Sims, 44 Okla. 708, 146 P. 224, 227 (1915). See also Abernathy v. Huston, 166 Okla. 184, 26 P.2d 939, 944 (1933); City of Clinton v. Cornell, 191 Okla. 600, 132 P.2d 340, 342 (1942); Miller v. Miller, 664 P.2d 1032, 1034 (Okla.1983). The entry is not the judgment, but a record or evidence of a judgment. Abernathy v. Huston, 166 Okla. 184, 26 P.2d 939, 944 (1933); Boynton v. Crockett, 12 Okla. 57, 61, 69 P. 869, 871 (1902).
And, of course, entry of a judgment is not synonymous with rendering or pronouncing a judgment. Peoples Electric Co-Op. v. Broughton, 127 P.2d at 853. See St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. Taliaferro, 58 Okla. 585, 160 P. 610, 612 (1916), (we explained that at that time an appeal must have been brought within six months of the rendition of the judgment, and not within six months from the “entry” of the judgment); Jaqua v. Harkins, 40 Ind.App. 639, 82 N.E. 920, 922 (1907); Beetchenow v. Bartholet, 162 Wash. 119, 298 P. 335, 336 (1931). Thus, the act of entering a judgment is a ministerial act, distinct from the judicial act of pronouncing a judgment.
Likewise, the “entry” of judgment cannot be equated with “filing” of a judgment. “Filing” is defined as “[t]o deliver an instrument or other paper to the proper officer for the purpose of being kept by him in the proper place.” Black’s Law Dictionary, 755 (4th ed. 1951). Filing a document, and entry of an order or judgment refer to two different *421procedures. In State ex rel. Morgan v. Lamm, 9 S.D. 418, 69 N.W. 592 (1896) the Supreme Court of South Dakota explained the difference between the terms “entry” and “filed”, noting that an “entry” is “[r]ecording in due form and order a thing done in court” and to “file” is “receiving a paper into custody, and giving it a place among other papers”. Id. 69 N.W. at 592. The court said: “The terms ‘entered’ and ‘filed’ frequently occur in the statute, hut they are never used as synonymous terms.” Id. (Emphasis mine). This court subsequently defined the term “filed” and in doing so relied upon the South Dakota decision. Aaron v. Farrow, 113 Okla. 27, 238 P. 202, 204 (1925).
These opinions make perfect sense, because a clerk has a dual duty (1) to make the proper “entry” on a docket, 12 O.S.1991 § 696.1, and (2) to “file together and carefully preserve in his office, all papers delivered to him for that purpose in every action or special proceeding.” 12 O.S.1991 § 29. The clerk does not “enter” together papers delivered to him or her in a case, and neither does the clerk “file” an entry on a docket. The term “filed” cannot be equated with “entry”, and when a judgment is “entered” upon the proper court record the same act is not properly described as a “filing”. Thus, when the clerk enters an abstract of judgment pronounced on a jury verdict that “entry” does not constitute the filing of a judgment so as to start the thirty-day time to appeal.
I conclude that a clerk’s “entry” on a docket is a distinct and separate act from when an instrument is “filed” in a case, that both of these are distinct from the act of pronouncement or rendition of a judgment, and all may occur on different dates. It is true that the clerk will often fulfill his or her duty by entering a judgment on the proper docket upon the date the verdict is returned, i.e., upon rendition. That was done in this case. But we are concerned here with the nature of the instrument required by § 990A to be “filed” as a judgment for the purpose of appeal
While a verdict may be filed in the ease and used to enter a judgment on the proper docket, it cannot be “filed” as a “judgment”, since the verdict itself is not a judgment. The majority appears to hold that a verdict is the judgment for the purpose of an appeal when the verdict is filed in the case. I must respectfully disagree.
In my view, it is the journal entry of judgment that satisfies the descriptive statutory phrase in our present § 990A. This maintains the recognized legal distinctions in the terms used by the legislature commencing January 1, 1991 and continuing to date, as well as the long recognized distinctions between a “verdict” and a “judgment”. The Legislature could have started appeal time from the date the judgment becomes effective, or is rendered, or entered, or when a verdict is returned or filed, but it chose not to do so. It said “from the date the final order or judgment is filed.” (emphasis mine) It made no attempt to distinguish between judgments based on common law jury verdicts, judgments based on non common-law jury verdicts, or judgments rendered by the court without a jury. My analysis of these statutes would require the time to appeal from a judgment on a jury verdict to begin when the journal entry of judgment is filed in the case. 12 O.S.1991 § 990A. Such a view treats all trial court judgments the same for calculating time to appeal, and avoids the majority’s result of unnecessarily creating a subclass of judgments that may escape appellate review because of unwary litigants. Here I believe judgment was rendered, and entered, on March 6, but not filed until March 26, which would make timely the Petition In Error filed April 17, 1992.
The majority misreads this writing. Of course there is only one judgment upon a single cause of action. That judgment occurs when it is rendered, or pronounced. In this ease judgment was rendered when the court accepted the verdict of the jury, on March 6th. The Legislature, in a commendable attempt to bring clarity and uniformity to appeals, has gone out of its way to declare that the time for appeal no longer starts when the judgment is rendered, but rather when it is filed. It is only on what constitutes the filing of a judgment that I differ from the majority — I maintain that the verdict itself is not a judgment, and that the judgment, though in existence and even “entered”, is not “filed” *422for purposes of starting appeal time until the journal entry reaches the clerk’s hands.
The majority yearns for symmetry in the appeals process, but does not, and in fact cannot, extend it. Jaco itself creates great unevenness, but whether Jaco is retained or rejected, there will still remain the fact that in a bench-tried case the judgment will be rendered and effective the moment it is pronounced, but the time to appeal it will not commence until filing of the journal entry. The legislature has so spoken. I believe the law should be, and, in fact, is, the same for jury-based judgments. Section 696.1 does not mandate otherwise. I respectfully' submit that if symmetry in the appellate process is a goal, Jaco is not a solution.
The principle of stare decisis is that courts often uphold principles from prior opinions even though they would decide otherwise were the question a new one, and consider the importance of the law’s stability and the effect of judicial holdings upon property, contracts, and titles. Oklahoma Preferred Finance & Loan Corp. v. Morrow, 497 P.2d 221, 223-224 (Okla.1972); Oklahoma County v. Queen City Lodge No. 197, I.O.O.F., 195 Okla. 131, 156 P.2d 340, 345 (1945); Webb v. Semans, 110 Okla. 72, 235 P. 1074 (1925), (Syllabus by the Court). But the court will not follow prior opinions when they are manifestly erroneous and there are cogent reasons for overruling them. Oklahoma County v. Queen City Lodge No. 197, I.O.O.F., supra. More recently we have said that a substantial departure from precedent should be based upon either unsatisfactory experience with the application of the precedent, or in light of an altered historic environment. Phillips v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 577 P.2d 1278, 1285-1286 (Okla.1978). This rule applies to matters of procedure. Harris v. Hudson, 122 Okla. 171, 250 P. 532, 533 (1926), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 743, 47 S.Ct. 336, 71 L.Ed. 869 and cert, denied sub nom. Owens v. Harris, 273 U.S. 743, 47 S.Ct. 336, 71 L.Ed. 869 (1927), (the supremacy of the law can be maintained only by and through the orderly procedure prescribed by the law itself).
I believe Jaco was erroneous when it was decided and is still erroneous. As to its “experience in application”, one only has to look to the majority opinion, which cites several very recent cases invoking the rule of Jaco, although it has had but a short lifetime. If only two, as the opinion states, have resulted in dismissals, that low number may be attributed to the prospective application given the doctrine. It is safe to predict there are others in the same pipeline as today’s appellant, and that more will follow. Jaco established a continuing trap for the unwary litigant who relies on the statutory language only to have his or her right to appeal lopped off. The case should be overruled and this appeal held timely.

. Section 990 stated in part: "An appeal to the Supreme Court may be commenced from an appealable decision of a court or tribunal by filing with the Clerk of the Supreme Court a petition in error, within thirty (30) days from the date of the final order or judgment sought to be reviewed.”

. Historically, a judgment was considered an act of a court and was thus dated from the rendition or pronouncement by the court and not its entry. See Mooney v. First State Bank, 48 Okla. 676, 149 P. 1173, 1175 (1915) where the court discussed Revised Laws 1910 § 5138 (now 12 O.S. 1991 § 696.1) and In re McQuown, 19 Okla. 347, 91 P. 689 (1907).

. 12 O.S.1981 § 990 repealed by Laws 1990, c. 251, § 20, eff. Jan. 1, 1991.

. 12 O.S.Supp.1990 § 1004 stated in part: "An appeal from a judgment or appealable order of a court or tribunal may be commenced by filing a petition in error with the Clerk of the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days after the date of the judgment or appealable order sought to be reviewed. For the purpose of an appeal, the date of judgment shall be the date it was filed with the court clerk.”

. 12 O.S.Supp.1990 §§ 1001 and 1004 were repealed by Laws 1991, c. 251, § 22 eff. June 1, 1991.

. Section 990A states in part: "An appeal to the Supreme Court may be commenced by filing a petition in error with the Clerk of the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from the date the final order or judgment is filed.”

. “When a trial by jury has been had, judgment must be entered by the clerk in conformity to the verdict, unless it is special, or the court order the case to be reserved for future argument or consideration." 12 O.S.1991 § 696.1. This statute is not new, as its former codification at 12 O.S. 1981 § 696 dates back to Territorial days. See Statutes of Oklahoma Territory, 1893 § 4300.

. At one time a clerk was required to enter a judgment on the judgment docket upon rendition of the judgment. See, e.g., 12 O.S.1941 § 25. Now a judgment need not be entered on the judgment docket until after the rendition of the judgment and the filing of an affidavit of judgment. 12 O.S.1991 § 25.