Court Opinion

ID: 9752642
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 18:26:01.832119+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:44:48.663590
License: Public Domain

DANA, Justice,
with whom ROBERTS, Justice joins, dissenting.
36 M.R.S.A. § 1811 imposes a tax on the “value of all ... taxable services sold at retail in this State.” Included within the definition of “taxable services” is “[telephone or telegraph service.” 36 M.R.S.A. § 1752(17-A)(C) (1990). “Telephone or telegraph service” is further defined as, inter alia, “all telecommunications or telegraph service, including installation or use of telecommunication or telegraphic equipment.” 36 M.R.S.A. § 1752(18-A) (Supp.1995). The Assessor takes the position that CTC’s sale of repair, labor, and maintenance contracts are taxable because they fall within the meaning of “all telecommunications ... service.” Because I do not agree that the phrase “all telecommunications ... service” was intended by the Legislature to include anything more than the actual provision of telephone (and other telecommunications) service, I respectfully dissent.
*428It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that statutes imposing taxes are construed most strongly against the government and may not be extended by implication beyond the clear import of the language used. Capitol Bank & Trust Co. v. City of Waterville, 343 A.2d 213, 218 (Me.1975); see Camp Walden v. Johnson, 156 Me. 160, 165, 163 A.2d 356, 358 (1960); see also Blaney v. Town of Shapleigh, 455 A.2d 1381, 1386 (Me.1983) (recognizing principle that when tax statute is susceptible of more than one interpretation courts will interpret statute in light most favorable to citizen).
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (2d College Edition 1985) defines “telecommunication” as “communication by electronic transmissions of impulses.” The meaning of “telecommunication service” has been defined in the statute to include both the installation and the use of telecommunication equipment. It has not been defined to include the transportation, storage, painting, repairing, servicing, or dismantling of that equipment. The Court appears to rule otherwise.
Furthermore, “repair and maintenance” cannot possibly be an “installation or use” of telecommunications equipment. Repair and maintenance is neither “installation” nor “use” as commonly understood.1
In addition, the fact that the Legislature expressly listed “installation” and “use” as subject to tax strongly implies that other things not mentioned, such as repair and maintenance, were intended to be excluded from the tax. Cf. Violette v. Leo Violette & Sons, Inc., 597 A.2d 1356, 1358 (Me.1991); Lee v. Massie, 447 A.2d 65, 68 (Me.1982) (following the maxim “expressio unius est exclusio alterius” — the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another — which maxim is “well recognized in Maine”). This principle of statutory construction is especially applicable here, given that the Legislature generally excludes separately charged repair services from the sales and use tax in 36 M.R.S.A. § 1752(14)(B)(4). Because of that general exclusion, if the Legislature had intended to tax the repair or servicing of telecommunications equipment, it certainly would have specifically provided for an exception to the general rule, either in section 1752(14)(B)(4) or in section 1752(18-A), just as it did in section 1752(18-A) for the installation of telecommunications equipment.
In view of the general exclusion of repair labor in section 1752(14)(B)(4), we cannot rely on the word “including” as implying that other things not listed, such as repair labor, should be taxed. Moreover, if the description of taxable items in section 1752(18-A) was not intended to be exclusive, neither a taxpayer, the Assessor, a court, nor anyone else could know what else is subject to tax. The Legislature would never have intended such uncertainty in a system of taxation. The list of taxable services in 36 M.R.S.A. § 1752(17-A) demonstrates that when the Legislature intends to tax a particular service, it knows how to define it with specificity.
I would affirm the judgment of the Superi- or Court.

. In addition, repair is not "use” as defined in the Maine sales and use tax law. First, the statutory definition of the term "use” is confined to situations where the user owns the property he or she is using. 36 M.R.S.A. § 1752(21) (1990). That is not the situation in this case.
Second, the term "use” cannot possibly encompass repair and maintenance. If that were the case, there would be a use tax on repair and maintenance of all tangible personal property since Maine imposes a use tax on the “use” of all tangible personal property in this State, the sale of which would be subject to sales tax. 36 M.R.S.A. § 1861 (1990). That is clearly not the case.
Third, in 1995 the Legislature repealed the word “use” in section 1752(18-A). P.L.1995, ch. 477 (enacting 36 M.R.S.A. § 1752(18-B)). That legislation, entitled "An Act to Permit the Equitable Taxation of Leased Equipment” was accompanied by a Statement of Fact which stated that the purpose of the bill was to provide for "the elimination of the sales tax on lease payments.” Comm.Amend. A to L.D. 667, No. H-283, Statement of Fact (117th Legis.1995) (emphasis added). The Statement of Fact mentioned no other effects of removing the word "use." Thus, these legislative documents make it crystal clear that the word "use” previously found in section 1752(18-A) was in the statute for the sole purpose of taxing leases of telecommunications equipment.