Court Opinion

ID: 9383114
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-29 16:18:27.006029+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:43.607644
License: Public Domain

J-S04005-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    LUIS MIRANDA                               :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1614 EDA 2022

          Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 17, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                        No(s): CP-51-CR-0000949-2021

BEFORE:      MURRAY, J., KING, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                               FILED MARCH 29, 2023

        Luis Miranda (Appellant) appeals the judgment of sentence entered

following his conviction at a bench trial of persons not to possess a firearm,

carrying a firearm without a license, and carrying a firearm on a public street

in Philadelphia.1 We affirm.

        Appellant challenges the denial of his pre-trial suppression motion.

Relevant to this appeal, the trial court summarized the evidence presented at

the suppression hearing:

              The Commonwealth offered credible evidence of probable
        cause at the suppression hearing on March 22, 2022, through
        testimony from Police Officer Mouzon. Mouzon is a 25[-]year
        veteran of the Philadelphia Police Department. He has been
        involved in hundreds of narcotics investigations. N.T. at 26.
____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1   See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6105, 6106, 6108.
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            The Philadelphia Police Narcotics Field Unit to which Mouzon
      was assigned made five controlled buys of crack cocaine from a
      drug house at 2116 East Cambria Street, Philadelphia, in January
      and February 2020. Id. at 12-[1]5, 17-[1]8, 20. Mouzon and his
      fellow Narcotics Field Unit officers used a confidential informant
      (CI) to make the buys. Id. at 14, 16-[1]7, 19[.] They searched
      the CI before each controlled purchase, gave the CI pre-recorded
      buy money, watched the CI approach, enter, and leave the drug
      house, searched the CI upon his/her return, and recovered from
      the CI crack from the drug house. Id.

            Officer Mouzon served as “the eyes” on the buys. Id. at 26.
      On two of the five buys, Mouzon saw [Appellant] arrive at the drug
      house minutes after the CI knocked on the door. Id. at 15-[1]8.
      On both days, February 4th and 7th, the CI purchased two tubes
      of crack cocaine and left the house minutes after [Appellant] had
      appeared. Id.

            [Appellant] did not, at first, appear at the drug house during
      the … controlled buys on February 12th. Id. at 23-[2]4. The
      police executed a search warrant as soon as the CI emerged from
      the house that day after buying more crack. Id. [Appellant],
      however, appeared on the 2100 block of Cambria Street a few
      doors away from the drug house shortly after the search began.
      Id. at 24-[2]5, 38. The police noticed him in the street and
      arrested him. [Appellant] volunteered he had a firearm. Id. at
      25. The police recovered a black .32 caliber Colt handgun with
      ivory grips from the front of his pants. Id.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/15/22, at 2-3.

      The Commonwealth charged Appellant with the firearms offenses and

related charges. On July 21, 2021, Appellant filed a motion to suppress the

firearm recovered by police, asserting:

      4. … [L]aw enforcement stopped, frisked and/or searched
      [Appellant] on the public streets and as a result recovered
      contraband which – on information and belief – the
      Commonwealth intends to offer against [Appellant] at trial.

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       5. It is most respectfully submitted that law enforcement lacked
       reasonable suspicion/probable cause to stop, frisk, seize, search
       and or detain [Appellant].

Suppression Motion, 7/21/21, ¶¶ 4-5.             On March 22, 2022, following a

hearing, the trial court denied Appellant’s suppression motion. N.T., 3/22/22,

at 48-51.

       A bench trial immediately followed, based on the suppression hearing

record and several evidentiary stipulations.2 Id. at 56-59. The trial court

thereafter found Appellant guilty of all charges. Id. at 59-60. On June 17,

2022, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate 1½ - 3 years’

incarceration, followed by two years of reporting probation. Appellant timely

filed a notice of appeal.      Appellant and the trial court have complied with

Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

       Appellant raises the following issue:

       Whether the lower court erred in denying [Appellant’s] motion to
       suppress under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania
       Constitution and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
       United States Constitution[,] where Philadelphia Police arrested
       and searched [Appellant] in the absence of probable cause to
       believe that he was or had been involved in criminal activity?

Appellant’s Brief at 7.

       Appellant argues he was arrested and searched based on “supposition

and conjecture.” Id. at 14. Appellant argues the evidence established only

____________________________________________

2The parties stipulated that the firearm was tested and found to be operable.
Id. at 55. The parties additionally stipulated to Appellant’s status as a person
not to possess firearms under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105.

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his mere presence at the house; “there was nothing to connect [him] to the

drug sales or illegal activity aside from his presence at the property.” Id. at

15.

      Appellant argues law enforcement “did not have the requisite probable

cause to believe that [he] was committing (or had committed) a crime.” Id.

at 14. Appellant asserts:

      From the testimony adduced during the suppression hearing,
      [Appellant] arrived at and was admitted to a house where a
      confidential informant purchased narcotics on two separate days.
      No evidence was offered to explain why [Appellant] was at the
      house and what if anything [he] did while inside….

Id. at 14-15. Appellant claims the only witness “did not testify he was able

to see what occurred inside of the house, and did not know what conversations

the CI had while inside of the house.” Id. at 15. Appellant maintains there

was no probable cause he was involved in illegal activity. Id. He argues, “To

conclude that he was involved in the drug transactions at issue was pure

speculation on the part of the suppression court.” Id.

      Our review of the denial of a suppression motion

      is limited to determining whether the factual findings are
      supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn
      from those facts are correct. We are bound by the suppression
      court’s factual findings so long as they are supported by the
      record; our standard of review on questions of law is de novo.
      Where, as here, the defendant is appealing the ruling of the
      suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the
      Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as
      remains uncontradicted. Our scope of review of suppression
      rulings includes only the suppression hearing record and excludes
      evidence elicited at trial.

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Commonwealth v. Singleton, 169 A.3d 79, 82 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citations

omitted).

      The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and Article I,

Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, prohibit unreasonable searches

and seizures. Int. of T.W., 261 A.3d 409, 416 (Pa. 2021).         The Fourth

Amendment provides:

      The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
      paper, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
      shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
      probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
      particularity describing the place to be searched, and the persons
      or things to be seized.

U.S. Const. amend. IV.    Similarly, Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania

Constitution provides:

      The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
      possessions from unreasonable searches and seizure, and no
      warrant to search any place or to seize any person or things shall
      issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor without
      probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation subscribed to by
      the affiant.

PA. Const. art. I, § 8.

      Our Supreme Court explained:

      “Probable cause” is a practical, non-technical concept.
      Commonwealth v. Coleman, 574 Pa. 261, 830 A.2d 554, 560
      (Pa. 2003). To establish probable cause, the Commonwealth must
      demonstrate that a search meets the requirements of the totality-
      of-the-circumstances” test. Commonwealth v. Jones, 605 Pa.
      188, 988 A.2d 649, 655-56 (Pa. 2010)….

Commonwealth v. Barr, 266 A.3d 25, 40 (Pa. 2021).

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     “[P]olice have probable cause where the facts and circumstances
     within the officer’s knowledge are sufficient to warrant a person
     of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is
     being committed.” Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 594 Pa.
     319, 935 A.2d 1275, 1284 (Pa. 2007) (quoting Commonwealth
     v. Rogers, 578 Pa. 127, 849 A.2d 1185, 1192 (Pa. 2004)).
     Whether police had probable cause to conduct a warrantless
     search also is evaluated under a traditional totality-of-the-
     circumstances test. Id.

Id. This Court further expounded:

     Probable cause does not involve certainties, but rather the factual
     and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable
     and prudent men act. It is only the probability and not a prima
     facie showing of criminal activity that is a standard of probable
     cause. To this point on the quanta of evidence necessary to
     establish probable cause, … finely tuned standards such as proof
     beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence,
     useful in formal trials, have no place in the probable-cause
     decision.

Commonwealth v. Dommel, 885 A.2d 998, 1002 (Pa. Super. 2005)

(internal citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).

     Mere     presence at   the   scene   of   a   crime   is   not   sufficient   to

establish probable cause for an arrest. Commonwealth v. Wilson, 631 A.2d

1356, 1359 (Pa. Super. 1993); Commonwealth v. Reece, 263 A.2d 463,

466 (Pa. 1970). However,

     [w]hen executing a warrant to search a residence, the police have
     authority to detain individuals who happen to be present.
     However, in order to search or arrest them, the police must
     establish independent probable cause.

Commonwealth v. Wilson, 631 A.2d 1356, 1359 (Pa. Super. 1993).

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        Viewed in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence in

established more than Appellant’s “mere presence” at the scene.                See

Wilson, 361 A.2d at 1359. As the trial court explained:

        Here, police had probable cause to arrest and search [Appellant].
        The totality of the circumstances indicated a probability that
        [Appellant] had illegally distributed drugs. Over five days of
        investigation, police saw [Appellant] at 2116 Cambria Street — a
        known drug house — three times. N.T.[, 3/22/22,] at 16-20. On
        two of those days, [Appellant] arrived at the drug house minutes
        after a confidential informant knocked on the door to buy drugs.
        Id. at 16-8. The CI left with crack cocaine a few minutes after
        [Appellant] arrived. Id. [Appellant’s] arrival within minutes of
        the informant, and the informant’s departure with crack cocaine a
        few minutes later, support a reasonable inference that [Appellant]
        supplied — or at least controlled — the crack cocaine. [Appellant]
        appeared at the drug house for a third time while the police were
        executing a search warrant immediately following the last
        controlled buy. The police saw [Appellant] standing in the street
        outside the house as the police processed evidence. [Appellant’s]
        appearance immediately after the final drug purchase while the
        police executed a search warrant supports an inference that he
        controlled the drugs.

        The police had ample probable cause to arrest [Appellant]. The
        recovery of the firearm from his person incident to his arrest did
        not violate either the federal or state constitution.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/15/22, at 4. Discerning no error or abuse of discretion,

we adopt the trial court’s well-reasoned analysis and conclusion.3 See id.

Appellant’s claim merits no relief. See Singleton, 169 A.3d at 82.

____________________________________________

3   As the trial court observed to Appellant at the suppression hearing:

        I find that it’s either you’re the unluckiest person in the world to
        just show up at a drug house at precisely the wrong time twice,
        or there is something there. And I think that your arrival at the
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/29/2023

____________________________________________

       drug house so shortly after the [CI] arrived twice is more than
       coincidence, and it supports a reasonable inference by the police
       officer that you were engaged in a drug trafficking conspiracy with
       [co-defendant]….

N.T., 3/22/22, at 49-50.

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