Court Opinion

ID: 9534885
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:43:21.433294+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:06.945602
License: Public Domain

Ciparick, J. (dissenting).
Because the parties’ collective bargaining agreement (CBA) may be interpreted to manifest a clear intent to arbitrate the question of whether an employee who lacks the requisite credentials for employment can be terminated under the CBA’s contract grievance and discipline procedures, I respectfully dissent and would compel arbitration.
In both of these cases the majority permanently stays arbitration, holding that the parties to the CBA did not agree to arbitrate their disputes involving termination of employees who *284did not maintain professional credentials. The effect of this ruling is to deny the employees disciplinary due process, as established in the CBA, and permit their summary termination. It has long been settled that a dispute is arbitrable if the arbitration is not barred by “any statutory, constitutional or public policy” and the parties “in fact agreed to arbitrate the particular dispute” (Matter of County of Chautauqua v Civil Serv. Empls. Assn., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, County of Chautauqua Unit 6300, Chautauqua County Local 807, 8 NY3d 513, 519 [2007] [internal quotation marks omitted]). We have read the second of these requirements broadly; if there is a “reasonable relationship between the subject matter of the dispute and the general subject matter of the CBA,” the dispute is arbitrable (Matter of Board of Educ. of Watertown City School Dist. [Watertown Educ. Assn.], 93 NY2d 132, 143 [1999]). The arbitrator can then “make a more exacting interpretation of the precise scope of the substantive provisions of the CBA, and whether the subject matter of the dispute fits within them” (id.).
Under the CBA at issue here between New York State and the New York State Public Employees Federation (PEF), it would not be unreasonable for an arbitrator to conclude that the parties agreed to arbitrate this dispute. As the majority notes, article 34 of the CBA defines a “contract grievance” as “a dispute concerning the interpretation, application, or claimed violation of a specific term or provision of this Agreement” (§ 34.1 [a]). Because PEF, Lanterman, and Ortiz claim that the employers violated the procedural mandates of article 33 of the CBA, their claims fall under this definition. Notably, prior to these two matters, the State and PEF had a long-standing practice of following the disciplinary process set forth in article 33 whenever state agencies sought to terminate employees for lack of credentials. Whether article 33’s disciplinary procedure applies here is undoubtedly a dispute over the application of a term of the CBA and, therefore, it should be resolved by the arbitrator, not a court.
This result is buttressed by our traditionally expansive reading of CBA arbitration clauses as a means of resolving public sector labor disputes. Generally, if a court “determine[s] that the arbitration clause is broad enough to encompass the subject matter of the dispute, ‘[t]he question of the scope of the substantive provisions of the contract is itself a matter of contract interpretation and application, and hence it must be deemed a matter for resolution by the arbitrator’ ” (Matter of Board of *285Educ. of Watertown City School Dist. v Watertown Educ. Assn., 74 NY2d 912, 913 [1989], quoting Board of Educ. of Lakeland Cent. School Dist. of Shrub Oak v Barni, 49 NY2d 311, 314 [1980]). This is true even where the substantive merits of a claim are weak (Matter of Franklin Cent. School [Franklin Teachers Assn.], 51 NY2d 348, 357 [1980]).
The Office of Alcoholism and Substance Abuse Services (GA-SAS), the Office of Children and Family Services (OCFS), and the Governor’s Office of Employee Relations (GOER) argue that Ortiz and Lanterman’s terminations were not based on “misconduct or incompetence” and, thus, were not disciplinary actions. However, this “incompetency or misconduct” language comes from Civil Service Law § 75, which article 33 of the CBA supplants. Instead, the CBA provides that discipline may be imposed for “just cause.” It would certainly be reasonable for an arbitrator to determine that, as Lanterman and Ortiz argue, failure to maintain a license constitutes “just cause” for discipline under the CBA. Because addressing this claim requires an interpretation of the CBA and the arbitrator alone has the power to determine the scope of the contract provisions, the dispute should be arbitrable.
In holding otherwise, the majority’s reliance on Matter of Felix v New York City Dept. of Citywide Admin. Servs. (3 NY3d 498 [2004]) is misplaced, since that case did not involve a CBA or any language of comparable breadth to that used in article 34. In Felix, we interpreted a provision of the Administrative Code of the City of New York requiring a municipal employee to maintain a residence within the city and the statutory language of Civil Service Law § 75. The majority asserts that because article 33 replaces the procedure of Civil Service Law § 75, the contract language should be interpreted as we interpreted section 75 in Felix, where we distinguished between failure to comply with requirements that define eligibility and acts of misconduct or incompetence. In these cases, however, we are interpreting contractual language, including a provision specifying that any disputes regarding the interpretation of that language are themselves arbitrable. Moreover, section 12-120 of the New York City Administrative Code—the employment requirement at issue in Felix—expressly provides that failure to maintain residency constitutes a forfeiture of employment (id. at 502, citing Administrative Code of City of NY § 12-120). Here, because no specific statutory provision calls for automatic forfeiture of employment upon the loss of certification, the *286arbitrator would have discretion to fashion a remedy. Furthermore, the notice and opportunity to contest procedures contained in the Administrative Code satisfied due process concerns in Felix, but are not available here.
Since I believe that the parties agreed to arbitrate these disputes, it is necessary to consider whether any public policy precludes the arbitration. I know of no such policy and, contrary to the Appellate Division’s dispositive finding in Lanterman, do not think that the public policy of having well-qualified, certified teachers precludes arbitration here. A dispute is nonarbitrable if a court can “conclude, without engaging in any extended factfinding or legal analysis that a law [or policy] prohibits, in an absolute sense, the particular matters to be decided” by arbitration (County of Chautauqua, 8 NY3d at 519, quoting Matter of New York City Tr. Auth. v Transport Workers Union of Am., Local 100, AFL-CIO, 99 NY2d 1, 8-9 [2002] [internal quotation marks and brackets omitted]). “Put differently, a court must stay arbitration where it can conclude, upon examining the parties’ contract and the implicated statute on their face, ‘that the granting of any relief would violate public policy’ ” (id., quoting Matter of City of New York v Uniformed Fire Officers Assn., Local 854, IAFF, AFL-CIO, 95 NY2d 273, 284 [2000]). Here, although the law clearly prohibits the parties’ continued employment in their current positions without the requisite licensing, it does not require their termination; other remedies may be available.
In Lanterman’s case, OCFS and GOER argue that arbitration of Lanterman’s termination was barred by public policy,1 but they fail to demonstrate that any relief granted by the arbitrator would violate public policy (see Matter of Committee of Interns & Residents [Dinkins], 86 NY2d 478, 484 [1995]; County of Chautauqua, 8 NY3d at 519). For example, in keeping with the expansive powers of an arbitrator, Lanterman could have been suspended without pay2 until she received her certification *287or she could have been reassigned to a non-teaching position.3 Although the regulations of the Education Department provide that “[a]ll professional instructional personnel shall have the required certificates as set forth in Part 80 of this Title” (8 NYCRR 116.3 [b]), the law nowhere expresses that a lapsed certificate will result in immediate termination.4
Indeed, in previous cases where we have found that public policy favors termination of a tenured civil servant without a hearing, the applicable statute or regulation has made that policy clear. For example, the federal Hatch Act expressly provides that an employee employed in connection with a program financed by federal funds is subject to discharge if he or she becomes a candidate for partisan elected office (5 USC §§ 1502-1506). Similarly, Public Officers Law § 30 provides for the forfeiture by law of employment for conviction of a felony, and section 12-120 of the New York City Administrative Code expressly provides that failure to maintain residency constitutes a forfeiture of employment (see Felix, 3 NY3d at 502). Here, in stark contrast, no specific statutory provision calls for the automatic forfeiture of employment upon a loss of certification. Thus, the public policy exception to arbitrability of a dispute should not apply here and we should maintain our clear policy of discouraging judicial interference with public sector arbitration, as contemplated by the Taylor Law (Civil Service Law art 14).
Therefore, in Lanterman, I would reverse the order of the Appellate Division, dismiss the petition to stay arbitration, and grant the cross motion to compel arbitration. In Ortiz, I would affirm the Appellate Division order that dismissed the petition to stay arbitration and granted the cross motion to compel arbitration.
Judges Graffeo, Read, Pigott and Jones concur with Judge Smith; Judge Ciparick dissents and votes to reverse in a separate opinion in which Chief Judge Lippman concurs.
*288In Matter of New York State Off. of Children & Family Serus. v Lanterman: Order affirmed, with costs.
Judges Graffeo, Read, Pigott and Jones concur with Judge Smith; Judge Ciparick dissents and votes to affirm in a separate opinion in which Chief Judge Lippman concurs.
In Matter of New York State Off. of Alcoholism & Substance Abuse Servs. v Ortiz: Order reversed, etc.

. OASAS and GOER do not press a public policy argument in the Ortiz case, but merely contend that the dispute is not arbitrable as a contract grievance under article 34 of the CBA.

. OCFS maintains that article 33 of the CBA prohibits the suspension of Lanterman without pay pending the resolution of a disciplinary proceeding. Article 33 provides that OCFS may suspend an employee pending a full hearing before an arbitrator where OCFS determines that probable cause exists that the employee’s “continued presence on the job . . . would severely interfere with operations” (§ 33.4 [a] [1]). Of course, an arbitrator can address *287whether the lack of professional certification constitutes “severe interference” with operations and what, if any, remedy is appropriate.

. Article 33 of the CBA contemplates this remedy and provides that “[w]here the appointing authority has determined that an employee is to be temporarily reassigned pursuant to this Article, the employee shall be notified in writing of the location of such temporary reassignments and . . . such reassignment may involve the performance of out-of-title work” (§ 33.4 [b] [1]).

. Similarly, OASAS’ automatic dismissal of Ortiz from service for failure to maintain a required credential may not be appropriate under the circumstances and there may be other available remedies for an arbitrator to fashion.