Court Opinion

ID: 4067113
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2016-09-29 23:03:06.322616+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:02:59.552134
License: Public Domain

PD-0930-15
                                                              COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
                                                                               AUSTIN, TEXAS
                                                              Transmitted 8/24/2015 4:23:23 PM
                                                                Accepted 8/26/2015 3:14:04 PM
                                                                                ABEL ACOSTA
                              PD-0930-15                                                CLERK

                  IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

                           DONNIE CARR

                                     Petitioner,

                                   v.

                        THE STATE OF TEXAS

                                    Respondent

              On Petition for Discretionary Review from the
                 Twelfth Court of Appeals, Tyler, Texas
                       Cause No. 12-14-00335-CR

                    ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

                                Austin Reeve Jackson
                                Texas Bar No. 24046139
                                112 East Line, Suite 310
                                Tyler, TX 75702
                                Telephone: (903) 595-6070
                                Facsimile: (866) 387-0152
                                JLawAppeals@gmail.com

August 26, 2015
                   IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL

Trial Court

Seventh District Court
Smith County, Texas
Hon. Kerry Russell
100 N. Broadway
Tyler, TX 75702

Attorney for Appellant

Appellate Counsel:
Austin Reeve Jackson
112 East Line, Suite 310
Tyler, TX 75702

Trial Counsel:
John Jarvis
326 S. Fannin
Tyler, TX 75702

Attorney for the State

Smith County District Attorney
Matt Bingham

Appellate Counsel:
Michael J. West
Assistant District Attorney, Smith County
4th Floor, Courthouse
100 North Broadway
Tyler, TX 75702

Trial Counsel:
Jeff Wood and Brian Jiral
Assistant District Attorneys, Smith County
4th Floor, Courthouse
100 North Broadway
Tyler, TX 75702

                                            ii
                                          TABLE OF CONTENTS

IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL ................................................................. ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS............................................................................................... iii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................................... iv
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT..................................................... 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE....................................................................................... 2
STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY............................................................. 2
GROUND FOR REVIEW .............................................................................................. 3

            THE TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY
            HELD THAT A DEFENDANT'S SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT
            TO SELF-REPRESENTATION IS PROTECTED WHERE THE
            TRIAL COURT FORCES HIM TO ELECT BETWEEN
            PROCEEDING WITH AN ATTORNEY WITH WHOM HE HAS
            A POOR ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP OR
            PROCEEDING BLINDLY WITHOUT ACCESS TO A LAW
            LIBRARY ........................................................................................................ 3

    Relevant Facts at Trial .............................................................................................. 3
    The Law at Issue ........................................................................................................ 5
    The Holding of the Twelfth Court of Appeals ........................................................... 6
    Why This Court Should Review this Issue ..................................................................

CONCLUSION AND PRAYER .................................................................................. 10
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ..................................................................................... 10
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ............................................................................ 11
APPENDIX A -- COPY OF OPINION FROM TWELFTH COURT ......................... 12

                                                             iii
                                     INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT:

Bounds v. Smith,
 430 U.S. 817, 97 S. Ct. 1491, 52 L. Ed. 2d 72 (1977) ...................................... 5

Faretta v. California,
 422 U.S. 806, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1975) .................................... 3, 5, 9

McKaskle v. Wiggins,
 465 U.S. 168, 177 S. Ct. 944, 79 L. Ed. 2d 122 (1984) .................................... 9

UNITED STATES FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEAL:

United States v. Morrison,
 153 F.3d 34 (2nd Cir. 1998) .......................................................................... 8

United States v. Oliver,
 630 F.3d 397 (5th Cir. 2011) ......................................................................... 8

TEXAS COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS:

Bright v. State,
 585 S.W.2d 739 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979) ........................................................ 6, 7

Dunn v. State,
 819 S.W.2d 510 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999) ........................................................ 5

Scarbrough v. State,
  777 S.W.2d 83 (Tex.Crim.App. 1989) .......................................................... 9

                                                        iv
TEXAS COURTS OF APPEAL:

Carr v. State,
 No. 12-14-00335-CR (Tex.App.—Tyler 2015) ............................................. 2

Johnson v. State,
  257 S.W.3d 778 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 2008) ............................................. 7, 8

Musgrove v. State,
 425 S.W.3d 601 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014) ............................. 7

STATUTES AND OTHER PROVISIONS:

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 1.051(f) ................................................................ 3, 5

TEX. CONST. art. 1 § 10 ..................................................................................... 3, 5

TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.01 ..................................................... 8 n.2

U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI .................................................................................... 3, 5

                                                           v
                                  PD-0930-15

                   IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

                               DONNIE CARR

                                         Petitioner,

                                       v.

                           THE STATE OF TEXAS

                                        Respondent

                  On Petition for Discretionary Review from the
                     Twelfth Court of Appeals, Tyler, Texas
                           Cause No. 12-14-00335-CR

TO THE HONORABLE JUSTICES OF THE COURT:

      COMES NOW, Austin Reeve Jackson, attorney for Donnie Carr and files

this petition pursuant to the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, and would show

the Court as follows:
                  STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

         Because this case presents an issue of constitutional interpretation and appli-

cation that could affect defendants across the state who elect to proceed at trial in a

pro se capacity, and because it represents a potential shift to the way in which at

least three intermediate courts have interpreted requirements relating to a defend-

ant’s Sixth Amendment rights, any solution to this issue crafted by the Court could

benefit from the exchange of ideas and concerns oral argument can offer.

                               STATEMENT OF THE CASE

         Donnie Carr seeks review of the Twelfth Court’s affirmance of his convic-

tion and sentence for the felony offense of delivery of a controlled substance origi-

nally rendered against him in the Seventh District Court of Smith County. After

pleading “not guilty” to this charge and electing to proceed to a trial by jury, Mr.

Carr was ultimately convicted and sentenced to a term of confinement for life.

Sentence was pronounced on 14 October 2014.

                     STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY

         On 30 June 2015 the Twelfth Court of Appeals, having reviewed the sole is-

sue raised on direct appeal, affirmed the underlying conviction in an unpublished

opinion. Carr v. State, No. 12-14-00335-CR (Tex.App.—Tyler June 30, 2015).1

No motion for rehearing was filed. Mr. Carr then filed a motion, granted by this

1
    A copy of the court’s opinion is attached as “Appendix A.”

                                                 2
Court, extending the deadline by which to file his petition for discretionary review

to 31 August.

                            GROUND FOR REVIEW

      THE TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY
      HELD THAT A DEFENDANT’S SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT
      TO SELF-REPRESENTATION IS PROTECTED WHERE THE
      TRIAL COURT FORCES HIM TO ELECT BETWEEN PRO-
      CEEDING WITH AN ATTORNEY WITH WHOM HE HAS A
      POOR ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP OR PROCEED-
      ING BLINDLY WITHOUT ACCESS TO A LAW LIBRARY.

                                   ARGUMENT

      Relevant Facts at Trial

      At trial, the Petitioner in this case, Mr. Donnie Carr sought to exercise his

right to self-representation. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitu-

tion guarantees this right with similar protections also found in state statute and the

Texas Constitution. US. CONST. amend. VI; Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806,

821, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1975); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 1.051(f);

TEX. CONST. art. 1 § 10.

      Mr. Carr first attempted to raise the issue with the district court on 2 Sep-

tember 2014, over a month before trial, but was told “today is not the day” to ad-

dress attorney-client conflict issues. (II RR 8-10). Instead, the trial court set the

case off a few weeks until 22 September. (II RR 10). On 22 September Mr. Carr

raised several complaints regarding what he believed to be the ineffective assis-

                                          3
tance being rendered by trial counsel and noted his desire to have the opportunity

to review his discovery “so I can go over and come up with my own defense.” (III

RR 9). This was the first indication he gave the court that he was looking “to de-

fend myself,” a process being hindered by his lack of access to the jail’s law li-

brary:

         I haven’t had time to prepare nothing for my own defense. … I’ve
         told [my lawyer] I’m not guilty of this. I’ve pleaded not guilty. And
         he’s done nothing but try to get me to plead out.

         I’ve turned down every offer that he’s made for me. I made that clear.
         Like I said, I just – I don't have any access to a law library. I put in
         for a law library over at Low Risk where I’m housed. … And they re-
         fused me law library then, too.

(III RR 8).

         The case returned to court on 6 October. (VI RR 1). At that point, Mr. Carr

again indicated to the court that he and his trial counsel had had continued prob-

lems. (VI RR 10). Initially, Mr. Carr stated he wanted to fire his trial counsel and

seek time to retain a new attorney. (Id.). As part of his discussion with the court

on that issue, Mr. Carr returned once more to the denial of access to Smith Coun-

ty’s inmate law library:

         But we never brought up the fact that I was held in Smith County for
         two-and-a-half months without access to a law library, without an at-
         torney. I requested to go to the law library so I could file motions
         with the Court, so I could file letters with the District Attorney’s Of-
         fice; and I was not able to do that.

                                            4
      (VI RR 21-22). After continued discussions with the trial court, Mr. Carr ul-

timately decided that he would like “to file a request to defend myself pro se.” (VI

RR 27-28). However, before the trial actually commenced Mr. Carr, noting that he

would be unable to defend himself without “any rights to a law library or anything

like that,” elected to proceed with counsel. (VI RR 70; VII RR 17, 41).

      The Law at Issue

      The law is clear that a defendant has a constitutional right to access to a law

library in order to prepare his defense. This right was first recognized by the Su-

preme Court in Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 97 S. Ct. 1491, 52 L. Ed. 2d 72

(1977). “In Bounds, the Supreme Court held that the fundamental constitutional

right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the

preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with ade-

quate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.” Dunn

v. State, 819 S.W.2d 510, 525 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999). In the instant case, however,

the trial court not only denied Mr. Carr this right, but did so as a means to denying

him his right to self-representation under both federal and state law. See US.

CONST. amend. VI; Faretta, 422 U.S. at 821; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 1.051(f);

TEX. CONST. art. 1 § 10.

                                         5
      The Holding of the Twelfth Court of Appeals

      Reviewing this situation on direct appeal, the Twelfth Court of Appeals con-

cluded, because Mr. Carr had been appointed standby counsel, the trial court did

not deny Mr. Carr his right to self-representation. Relying solely on this Court’s

opinion in Bright v. State, 585 S.W.2d 739 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979), the Twelfth

Court determined, regardless of the deteriorated and ineffective relationship be-

tween Mr. Carr and his former trial counsel, and despite Mr. Carr’s repeatedly ex-

pressed desire to go it alone, that because he had a lawyer seated next to him Mr.

Carr had no right to access a law library to assist him in making his own defense.

      There are however, two important distinctions between Bright and the in-

stant case. First, in Bright the defendant requested and was given a copy of both

the Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure. Bright, 585 S.W.2d at 744.

Thus, unlike Mr. Carr, the defendant in Bright had the opportunity to read the stat-

ue under which he was charged and to review the rules of procedure that would

govern his contesting of that charge. Second, in Bright there was no indication that

the defendant had the type of deteriorated and unworkable attorney-client relation-

ship present in this case. Here, Mr. Carr was being asked to rely on the same at-

torney about whom he felt was only trying to force Mr. Carr “to plead out,” to

conduct any actions Mr. Carr requested of him. (III RR 8-9). As opposed to the

situation in Bright where one could get the impression that the defendant wel-

                                         6
comed the assistance of trial counsel during trial, and therefore, had a need for ac-

cess to a law library that was greatly diminished compared to a defendant like Mr.

Carr. Id. (“[D]uring pretrial proceedings [] appellant requested that he be permit-

ted to represent himself … and from that date until .. the day trial testimony began

appellant acted as his own counsel.”).

      Through its interpretation of Bright, the Twelfth Court of Appeals has

adopted an understanding of the Sixth Amendment, one also adopted by at least

two other appellate courts, that says a defendant at trial has effectively two choic-

es: 1. Proceed bound to some form of counsel; or 2. Proceed blindly. See, e.g.,

Johnson v. State, 257 S.W.3d 778, 780 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 2008, pet. ref’d)

(holding that defendant who elected to defend himself pro se was not entitled to

law library access where he had standby counsel appointed); Musgrove v. State,

425 S.W.3d 601, 610 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d) (same).

This is a rule though that cuts against the heart of a defendant’s right to self-

representation, particularly in a case like the one currently before the Court.

      Why This Court Should Review this Issue

      It would appear largely meaningless to tell a defendant that if he and his ap-

pointed counsel are having the type of issues Mr. Carr and his trial counsel were in

this case that he has the option to proceed pro se, but only if he then must rely on

that same attorney for assistance to do so. The nature of this problem is highlight-

                                           7
ed by the fact that, outside of perhaps an ethical obligation under the Disciplinary

Rules,2 that appointed standby counsel is under no duty to render effective assis-

tance in that capacity nor can he really be held responsible for his failure do so.

See United States v. Oliver, 630 F.3d 397, 413-14 (5th Cir. 2011) (explaining that a

pro se defendant does not have a constitutional right to standby counsel and absent

this right the defendant is not entitled to relief for the ineffective assistance of

standby counsel); United States v. Morrison, 153 F.3d 34, 55 (2nd Cir. 1998)

(same). Thus, where as here a defendant has had a troubled relationship with his

attorney and believes that attorney to be disengaged from effective representation

and perhaps attempting to simply get a plea deal signed and the case moved, that

defendant is not only bound to that attorney under the Twelfth Court’s holding, but

is bound in such a way that he must still rely on that attorney for actual representa-

tion. In effect, the defendant is not really acting in a pro se capacity any more than

standby counsel is actually merely standing-by.

         Either a defendant has the right to represent himself, as the United States

Supreme Court has held, or he is bound to an attorney as either lead or standby

counsel as the Twelfth Court has held. But see Johnson, 257 S.W.3d at 780 (dis-

cussing the holdings of several federal circuit courts that have held that a defendant

who rejects appointed counsel is not automatically entitled to law library access).

2
    TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.01.

                                               8
Recognizing this, this Court has previously held that standby counsel cannot “in-

terfere with the accused’s actual control over his own defense ….” Scarbrough v.

State, 777 S.W.2d 83, 92 (Tex.Crim.App. 1989) (en banc). Yet the rule here

adopted by the Twelfth Court, and other courts, virtually requires standby counsel

to interfere with a pro se litigant’s presentation of his own defense. Absent mean-

ingful access to a law library, a defendant would have to rely on standby counsel to

provide him a copy of the statute under which he was charged, to decide what re-

search should be done, what the extent of that research would be, and inform the

defendant of any potential issues standby counsel’s research revealed that had not

previously been requested or discussed by the defendant.

      “The right [to self-representation] is either respected or denied….” McKask-

le v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8, 104 S. Ct. 944, 950, 79 L. Ed. 2d 122 (1984);

see also Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834, 95 S. Ct. 2525; Scarbrough, 777 S.W.2d at 92

(both holding that if he desires to do so a defendant must be allowed to conduct his

own defense). An understanding of that right, such as the one herein adopted by

the Twelfth Court of Appeals, that limits that right to either proceeding blindly or

relying on an attorney for representation as either actual or standby counsel fails to

respect the Sixth Amendment. For this reason the Twelfth Court of Appeals erred

in concluding that the Sixth Amendment condones the restricting of a defendant

who wishes to proceed at trial in a pro se capacity to either forced reliance on an

                                          9
attorney or the denial by the court of the means by which to defend one’s self. For

if the government can circumvent any meaningful opportunity for a citizen to de-

fend themselves in an educated manner we have no Sixth Amendment right to self-

representation.

      This Court should grant review to address that error.

                         CONCLUSION AND PRAYER

      WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Appellant prays, because the

Twelfth Court of Appeals has adopted an interpretation of the Sixth Amendment

inconsistent with the ability of a citizen to actually exercise his right to self-

representation, that the Court grant discretionary review and, ultimately, reverse

the holding of the Twelfth Court of Appeals.

                                               Respectfully submitted,

                                               /s/ Austin Reeve Jackson
                                               Texas Bar No. 24046139
                                               112 East Line, Suite 310
                                               Tyler, TX 75702
                                               Telephone: (903) 595-6070
                                               Facsimile: (866) 387-0152

                         CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

      I certify that a true and correct copy of this brief was delivered to counsel for

the State by efile on this the 24th day of August 2015.

                                               /s/ Austin Reeve Jackson

                                         10
                     CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

      I certify that this document complies with the requirements of Rule 9.4 and

consists of 2,273 words.

                                            /s/ Austin Reeve Jackson

                                       11
              APPENDIX A

       Opinion of the Twelfth Court of Appeals
         Carr v. State, No. 12-14-00335-CR

	
                       12	
  
                                  NO. 12-14-00335-CR

                             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

               TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

                                     TYLER, TEXAS

DONNIE DALE CARR,                                §      APPEAL FROM THE 7TH
APPELLANT

V.                                               §      JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

THE STATE OF TEXAS,
APPELLEE                                         §      SMITH COUNTY, TEXAS

                                  MEMORANDUM OPINION
       Donnie Dale Carr appeals his conviction for manufacture or delivery of four or more but
less than two hundred grams of methamphetamine, for which he was sentenced to imprisonment
for life. In one issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by constructively denying his
right to self-representation. We affirm.

                                           BACKGROUND
       Appellant was charged by indictment with manufacture or delivery of four or more but
less than two hundred grams of methamphetamine. He pleaded “not guilty” and the matter
proceeded to a jury trial.
       The evidence at trial showed that a Tyler police officer found Appellant and another
individual standing near a picnic table in a heavily wooded area near Bellwood Lake. The
officer observed syringes on the table, some with liquid in them. The officer called for backup,
and both suspects were arrested for possession of methamphetamine.
       A wrecker arrived to tow the two vehicles located at the scene. Because the trail was too
small for the wrecker to travel, the wrecker driver got into Appellant’s vehicle to drive it out of
the woods. When he closed the door, a black pouch containing what was later found to be 8.46
grams of methamphetamine, packaged in several small baggies, fell into his lap. The driver
alerted the police and turned the drugs over to them.
         Ultimately, the jury found Appellant “guilty” of manufacture or delivery of a controlled
substance and assessed his punishment at imprisonment for life. This appeal followed.

                                      SELF-REPRESENTATION
         In his sole issue, Appellant argues that the trial court constructively denied him his right
to self-representation by denying him his constitutional right to access a law library.
Standard of Review and Applicable Law
         We review the denial of a defendant’s request for self-representation for an abuse of
discretion. Alford v. State, 367 S.W.3d 855, 861 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet.
ref’d). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, and we imply
any findings of fact supported by the record and necessary to affirm the ruling when the trial
court did not make explicit findings. Id.
         The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution guarantee that a
criminal defendant may dispense with counsel and make his own defense at trial. Moore v.
State, 999 S.W.2d 385, 396 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806,
818-20, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 2533, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1975)). To be constitutionally effective, such a
decision must be made (1) competently, (2) knowingly and intelligently, and (3) voluntarily.
Moore, 999 S.W.2d at 396 (citing Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 400-01, 113 S. Ct. 2680,
2687, 125 L. Ed. 2d 321 (1993)); Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834-36, 95 S. Ct. at 2541). In order to
competently and intelligently choose self-representation, the defendant should be admonished
about the dangers and disadvantages of representing himself.           Blankenship v. State, 673
S.W.2d 578, 583 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (citing Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S. Ct. at 2541).
Thereafter, if the defendant maintains his desire to proceed pro se, he should be allowed to do so
as long as the assertion of his right to self-representation is unconditional and not asserted to
disrupt or delay the proceedings. Ex parte Winton, 837 S.W.2d 134, 135 (Tex. Crim. App.
1992).
         The right to self-representation does not attach until it has been clearly and
unequivocably asserted. Funderburg v. State, 717 S.W.2d 637, 642 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986)
(citing Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S. Ct. at 2541; Brown v. Wainwright, 665 F.2d 607, 610 (5th

                                                  2
Cir. 1982)). Once a defendant has asserted the right to self-representation, he may also waive
that right. Funderburg, 717 S.W.2d at 642 (citing McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 S.
Ct. 944, L. Ed. 2d 122 (1984); Brown, 665 F.2d at 611). Such a waiver may be found if it
reasonably appears to the court that the defendant has abandoned his initial request to represent
himself. Funderburg, 717 S.W.2d at 642 (citing Brown, 665 F.2d at 611). However, when a
trial court denies a defendant’s request to represent himself, the defendant does not waive the
right to self-representation by mere acquiescence to the trial court’s denial of it. Funderburg,
717 S.W.2d at 642 (citing Brown, 665 F.2d at 612).
Analysis
       After Appellant was charged, he claimed indigence, and the trial court appointed an
attorney to represent him. Early in the pretrial proceedings, Appellant expressed his displeasure
with his appointed counsel and his desire to “fire” him. After hearing Appellant’s complaints,
the trial court refused to replace his appointed counsel with new counsel, and informed Appellant
of his right to waive counsel and represent himself. The trial court also informed Appellant of all
the dangers and disadvantages of doing so. Thereafter, the trial court asked Appellant if he
wanted to represent himself, and Appellant did not state that he did.
       On the day before trial, Appellant again requested new appointed counsel.             In the
alternative, he requested to defend himself. In the latter case, he requested a continuance and
access to a law library. The trial court informed Appellant that the right to self-representation
does not guarantee better access to legal resources, and that the trial court could not force the
sheriff’s office to give him better access. Appellant refused to sign the waiver of counsel under
those conditions.
       On the day of trial, Appellant informed the trial court that he wanted to represent himself
and was willing to sign the waiver of counsel. He did so, and the trial court approved his self-
representation. The trial court removed his counsel and made him standby counsel. After a short
break in the proceedings and before the jury panel arrived, Appellant informed the trial court that
he wanted his appointed counsel reinstated. Appointed counsel then represented Appellant
throughout the trial.
       On appeal, Appellant argues that although the trial court was willing to let him represent
himself at trial, his right to self-representation was constructively denied because the trial court
did not ensure him access to a law library to prepare his defense. In support of his contention

                                                 3
that he had a right to law library access, he cites Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828, 97 S. Ct.
1491, 1498, 52 L. Ed. 2d 72 (1977). In Bounds, the United States Supreme Court held that “the
fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist
inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with
adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.” However, an
attorney was appointed to represent Appellant, and even after Appellant’s request to represent
himself was granted, this attorney was instructed to continue as standby counsel.          Thus,
Appellant was provided adequate assistance from persons skilled in the law. See Bright v. State,
585 S.W.2d 739, 744 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). We conclude that the trial court did not deny
Appellant’s right to self-representation, constructively or otherwise. Accordingly, we overrule
Appellant’s sole issue.

                                                   DISPOSITION
         Having overruled Appellant’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                                 JAMES T. WORTHEN
                                                                    Chief Justice

Opinion delivered June 30, 2015.
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.

                                             (DO NOT PUBLISH)

                                                          4
                                   COURT OF APPEALS

      TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                                           JUDGMENT

                                             JUNE 30, 2015

                                         NO. 12-14-00335-CR

                                       DONNIE DALE CARR,
                                            Appellant
                                               V.
                                      THE STATE OF TEXAS,
                                            Appellee

                                  Appeal from the 7th District Court
                         of Smith County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 007-0863-14)

                        THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record and briefs filed
herein, and the same being considered, it is the opinion of this court that there was no error in the
judgment.
                        It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the judgment
of the court below be in all things affirmed, and that this decision be certified to the court
below for observance.
                    James T. Worthen, Chief Justice.
                    Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.