Court Opinion

ID: 9910546
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-15 20:02:37.323672+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:53:09.549045
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/15/23 Jelincic v. Cal. Public Employees Retirement System etc. CA1/1
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                   DIVISION ONE

 JOSEPH JOHN JELINCIC, JR.,
           Plaintiff and Appellant,
                                                                        A165562
 v.
 CALIFORNIA PUBLIC                                                      (Alameda County
 EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT                                                  Super. Ct. No. RG21090970)
 SYSTEM BOARD OF
 ADMINISTRATION,
           Defendant and Respondent.

         Plaintiff Joseph John Jelincic, Jr., filed a petition for writ of mandate
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief for alleged violations of the Bagley-
Keene Open Meeting Act (Bagley-Keene Act; Gov. Code, § 11120 et seq.) in
connection with an August 17, 2020 closed session meeting of the California
Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) Board of Administration
following the resignation of its former chief investment officer (CIO), Ben
Meng. Among other things, plaintiff sought a declaration that CalPERS
improperly relied on Government Code1 section 11126, subdivision (a)(1)
(section 11126(a)(1)) to discuss matters pertaining to the CIO in closed

         1 All further statutory references are to the Government Code unless

otherwise indicated.
session, and injunctive relief prohibiting CalPERS from citing that section to
authorize closed session discussions related to its CIO in future.
      The trial court concluded the August 2020 meeting had been
improperly closed and ordered the production of records and most of the
transcript from the meeting. As to the application of section 11126(a)(1), the
so-called “personnel exception” to open-meeting requirements, the trial court
ruled it was “[o]bjectively” not a basis to close the meeting in this case
because none of the subjects authorized to be discussed in closed session
under that section were discussed at the meeting. The trial court determined
the injunctive relief sought by plaintiff was moot.
      On appeal, plaintiff contends that CalPERS may not rely on
section 11126(a)(1) to discuss matters related to its CIO in closed session, and
may not cite that section on meeting agendas to justify closed sessions about
the CIO. The parties disagree as to whether this appeal presents a
justiciable issue, and if so, whether section 11126(a)(1) authorizes CalPERS
to hold closed sessions to have discussions related to its CIO.
      As we explain below, we conclude that the question is justiciable.
However, whether the personnel exception in the Bagley-Keene Act applies to
the CalPERS CIO ultimately depends on whether the CIO is a public officer
within the meaning of the statute. Because the resolution of that question is
a mixed question of law and fact that plaintiff failed to raise in the trial court
and we are unable to resolve on this undeveloped record, we will affirm.
                              I. BACKGROUND
      On August 5, 2020, CalPERS CIO Ben Meng resigned, following
accusations he had violated conflict-of-interest laws and failed to make
financial disclosures required under California’s Political Reform Act of 1974
(§ 81000 et seq.). A meeting of the CalPERS Board of Administration (the

                                        2
Board) was noticed for August 17, 2020. The agenda for the meeting listed as
its sole substantive item the “ ‘Chief Executive Officer’s Briefing on
Performance, Employment, and Personnel Items,’ ” which was to be a closed
session pursuant to section 11126, subdivisions (a)(1), (e), and (g)(1). The
Board held the closed session on August 17. After the meeting, plaintiff and
his counsel submitted a public records request to CalPERS for a copy of the
closed session transcript. CalPERS denied the request, asserting the meeting
had been properly closed to discuss personnel matters under section 11126,
subdivisions (a) and (g) (hereafter section 11126(a) and section 11126(g),
respectively).
      On March 8, 2021, plaintiff filed a petition for writ of mandate and
complaint for equitable relief in the Alameda County Superior Court, alleging
violations of the Public Records Act (former § 6250 et seq.) and the Bagley-
Keene Act in connection with the closed session meeting held by the Board
following Meng’s resignation. Among other things, plaintiff alleged in his
verified petition that (1) section 11126(a)(1) does not apply to discussions
regarding the CalPERS CIO, and that such discussions are instead governed
exclusively by section 11126, subdivision (g)(1) (section 11126(g)(1)); (2) the
August 17 meeting was improperly closed to discuss matters related to the
CalPERS CIO, and CalPERS continues to take the position it was lawful to
do so; and (3) unless enjoined, CalPERS would continue to expend public
funds by improperly closing its meetings and listing section 11126(a)(1) on its
agendas when the only personnel matters it planned to discuss relate to the
employment of the CIO.

                                        3
      In addition to seeking disclosure of the full meeting transcript,2
plaintiff sought a declaration from the court that the “August 17, 2020 closed
session violated the Bagley-Keene Act because the Board discussed matters
that were not covered in its disclosure and that cannot lawfully be discussed
in closed session,” and that “§ 11126(a) does not authorize the Board to hold a
closed session to discuss matters relating to its CIO, and that closed sessions
to discuss such matters are instead governed by § 11126(g).” Plaintiff further
asked the court to order the Board “not to cite Government Code § 11126(a)
on its agendas as authority to close a session when the only personnel
matters to be discussed in that closed session relate to the CIO.”
      On December 20, 2021, the trial court issued an order granting
judgment and issuing a writ of mandate, which ordered disclosure of most of
the closed session transcript. The court concluded CalPERS appropriately
withheld a few small portions of the transcript as attorney-client privileged
material and under section 11126(g)(1), but that “the vast majority” of the
transcript should have been disclosed because “the primary purpose of the
closed session appears to have been to have a wide-ranging discussion of
existing CalPERS conflict of interest rules, procedures, and processes” rather
than a briefing by or for the chief executive officer (CEO) related to
“ ‘Performance, Employment, and Personnel Items’ ” as indicated on the
meeting agenda.

      2 Plaintiff’s petition for writ of mandate and complaint for equitable

relief sought records related to the closed meeting on August 17, 2020, and
separately sought records related to investments with a market value lower
than their reported value under former section 6254.26. Plaintiff does not
raise any challenge to the public records aspects of the proceedings in this
appeal.

                                        4
       With respect to the application of section 11126(a)(1), the trial court’s
order stated: “Plaintiff argues that the Court should not consider whether
the August 17, 2020 meeting could be closed under Section 11126(a)(1)
because employment issues relating to the Chief Investment Officer fall
under the more-specific Section 11126(g). The Court disagrees and will
consider both exceptions. Both Sections materially overlap. That said,
Section 11126(a)(1) does not appear to carve out any particular subset of
employees. Nor does Section 11126(g) indicate that the protections under
Section 11126(a)(1) are not also applicable to Board discussions about the
CIO.
       “The agenda for the August 17, 2020 closed session indicated that the
Board would hear the ‘Chief Executive Officer’s Briefing on Performance,
Employment, and Personnel Items.’ . . . While this opaque description
suggests that someone thought section 11126(a)(1) might be a basis for
closing the meeting, further thought needed to be given before closing it.
       “On August 5, 2020, Mr. Meng resigned as the CalPERS Chief
Investment Officer. Conflict of interest issues appeared to motivate his
resignation. . . . No one at the August 17 closed session had a copy of a
performance evaluation for the CIO. It does not objectively appear that the
Board intended to discuss his performance. He was not being appointed or
hired/employed, and he was not being dismissed. Again, Mr. Meng had just
resigned. Objectively, Section 11126(a)(1) could not be the basis for closing
the meeting.” The court rejected CalPERS’s argument that the meeting was
properly closed under section 11126(a)(1) to discuss the CEO’s “ ‘oversight
and implementation of policies and safeguards’ ” or the CEO’s performance
evaluation.

                                         5
      Several months later, on April 12, 2022, the trial court issued a second
order with respect to certain portions of the transcript withheld under the
public interest exemption of the Public Records Act. The court entered
judgment granting in part and denying in part the petition for writ of
mandate.
      Plaintiff subsequently filed a petition for writ of mandate with this
court, seeking review of the trial court’s findings that CalPERS properly
withheld the privileged portions of the transcript. We denied the petition on
the merits and the California Supreme Court denied review. While the writ
proceeding was pending in this court, plaintiff appealed from the judgment.
                              II. DISCUSSION
      Plaintiff contends the sole issue in this appeal is a question of statutory
interpretation—whether CalPERS may hold a closed session to discuss the
“appointment, employment, evaluation of performance, or dismissal” of its
CIO under the general personnel exception of section 11126(a)(1), or whether
CalPERS may only rely on section 11126(g)(1) to hold closed sessions related
to “recruitment or removal” of the CIO. Although plaintiff characterizes the
pertinent inquiry as a straightforward question of law, our analysis is
complicated by (1) CalPERS’s contention that the issue is not justiciable;
(2) the language, structure, and history of section 11126; and (3) plaintiff’s
assertion (for the first time on appeal) that the CalPERS CIO is a “public
officer” under a four-part test that depends on a factual record not developed
in the trial court.
      While we disagree with CalPERS about justiciability, we agree that
plaintiff forfeited his argument that the CalPERS CIO is a public officer by
failing to raise the issue below. Because the question of whether the CIO is a
public officer turns on disputed issues such as the creation of the position, the

                                        6
nature of the position, and the responsibilities of the CIO, plaintiff’s failure to
raise it in the trial court has resulted in an undeveloped record that impedes
our ability to fully resolve his appeal. As to the questions of law raised by
plaintiff regarding the meaning of section 11126, however, we conclude
section 11126(g)(1) does not necessarily conflict with section 11126(a)(1) so as
to preclude the application of the personnel exemption to the CalPERS CIO.
Based on the record before us, plaintiff has not demonstrated reversal is
warranted, and accordingly, we affirm.
A. Bagley-Keene Act
      “The Bagley-Keene Act requires that, with certain exceptions, ‘[all
meetings of a state body shall be open and public . . . .’ (§ 11123, subd. (a).)
The policy behind this rule is set forth in section 11120, which states that
public agencies and public servants exist to help conduct the public’s
business, that they may not decide what the public should know, and that the
proceedings of public agencies must be conducted openly.” (Travis v. Board of
Trustees of California State University (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 335, 341
(Travis).)
      Two exceptions to the open meeting requirement are relevant to the
question plaintiff presents in this appeal. The first is the broad personnel
exception set forth in section 11126(a)(1), which states: “Nothing in this
article shall be construed to prevent a state body from holding closed sessions
during a regular or special meeting to consider the appointment,
employment, evaluation of performance, or dismissal of a public employee or
to hear complaints or charges brought against that employee by another
person or employee unless the employee requests a public hearing.” The
second exception is found in section 11126(g)(1), which states: “This article
does not prevent . . . [¶] (1) The Teacher’s Retirement Board or the Board of

                                        7
Administration of the Public Employees’ Retirement System from holding
closed sessions when considering matters pertaining to the recruitment,
appointment, employment, or removal of the chief executive officer or when
considering matters pertaining to the recruitment or removal of the Chief
Investment Officer of the State Teachers’ Retirement System or the Public
Employees’ Retirement System.”
B. Justiciability
      At the outset, we will address (and reject) CalPERS’s assertion that
plaintiff’s appeal must be dismissed because it fails to present a justiciable
issue. CalPERS contends we should dismiss plaintiff’s appeal because he
already received effective relief when the trial court ruled that CalPERS
improperly relied on section 11126(a)(1) to hold a closed session on
August 17, 2020, and that the possibility of a future controversy over the
application of section 11126(a)(1) to the CIO is too remote and speculative to
warrant declaratory relief.
      Plaintiff, on the other hand, contends the case presents a justiciable
controversy because CalPERS has relied on section 11126(a)(1) improperly to
discuss matters relating to its CIO at least five times and will continue to do
so unless enjoined. Specifically, plaintiff contends that the parties’
disagreement matters because section 11126(a)(1) “is significantly broader”
than section 11126(g)(1), in that subdivision (a)(1) allows closed discussions
of job performance, while subdivision (g)(1) does not. Plaintiff further asserts
that because CalPERS has unlawfully invoked section 11126(a)(1) in the past
and continues to claim that the personnel exception applies to its CIO, he is
entitled to declaratory, mandamus, and/or injunctive relief.
      “California courts will decide only justiciable controversies. [Citations.]
The concept of justiciability is a tenet of common law jurisprudence and

                                        8
embodies ‘[t]he principle that courts will not entertain an action which is not
founded on an actual controversy . . . .’ ” (Wilson & Wilson v. City Council of
Redwood City (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1559, 1573; Stonehouse Homes LLC v.
City of Sierra Madre (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 531, 540.)
      The concept of justiciability is also incorporated in the equitable
remedy of declaratory relief. “ ‘A declaratory relief action requires an actual
controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the respective parties’
[citation], not merely ‘ “ ‘an abstract or academic dispute.’ ” ’ [Citation.]
‘ “The ‘actual controversy’ language in . . . [Code of Civil Procedure]
section 1060 encompasses a probable future controversy relating to the legal
rights and duties of the parties . . . [that] ‘. . . is “ripe” when it has reached,
but has not passed, the point that the facts have sufficiently congealed to
permit an intelligent and useful decision to be made.’ ” ’ [Citation.] In other
words, ‘ “[d]eclaratory relief operates prospectively to declare future rights,
rather than to redress past wrongs,” ’ thus ‘ “ ‘set[ting] controversies at rest
before they lead to repudiation of obligations, invasion of rights or
commission of wrongs; . . . the remedy is to be used in the interests of
preventative justice, to declare rights rather than to execute them.’ ” ’ ”
(TransparentGov Novato v. City of Novato (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 140, 148,
italics added by TransparentGov Novato.)
      CalPERS first contends this case fails to present a justiciable
controversy because the trial court has already resolved plaintiff’s Public
Records Act claim seeking the closed session transcript in his favor. Thus,
CalPERS asserts, resolution of this appeal will have no practical effect on the
issues raised in the trial court because even if this court reverses the trial
court’s ruling regarding the application of section 11126(a)(1), it will not
cause any more of the transcript to be disclosed.

                                          9
       As plaintiff points out, however, he is not seeking review of an order
withholding or releasing records. Plaintiff has already pursued his Public
Records Act claim regarding the transcript to finality in the prior writ
proceeding. On appeal, plaintiff seeks review of his claim that he is entitled
to declaratory, mandamus, and injunctive relief to stop CalPERS from relying
on the personnel exception to hold closed session discussions regarding the
CIO.
       CalPERS next argues we should not consider plaintiff’s claim on the
merits because he “in essence” asks us to review the analysis underlying the
trial court’s decision (in favor of plaintiff) that no portion of the August 17,
2020 closed session transcript was properly withheld under
section 11126(a)(1). CalPERS asserts this is contrary to the foundational
rule that a “ruling or decision, itself correct in law, will not be disturbed on
appeal merely because given for a wrong reason.” (Davey v. Southern Pacific
Co. (1897) 116 Cal. 325, 329.) Because plaintiff sought declaratory relief to
determine the applicability of section 11126(a)(1) to the August 17, 2020
closed session, and the trial court already determined the personnel exception
did not apply because the Board did not discuss Meng’s appointment,
performance, or dismissal, CalPERS asserts that plaintiff is not entitled to
review of the trial court’s reasoning for its decision.
       But CalPERS fails to acknowledge the scope of the relief plaintiff
sought in the trial court. As explained above, in addition to a declaration
from the court that the “August 17, 2020 closed session violated the Bagley-
Keene Act because the Board discussed matters that were not covered in its
disclosure and that cannot lawfully be discussed in closed session,” plaintiff
sought a declaration that “§ 11126(a) does not authorize the Board to hold a
closed session to discuss matters relating to its CIO, and that closed

                                        10
session[s] to discuss such matters are instead governed by § 11126(g).”
Plaintiff further asked the court to “order the Board not to cite Government
Code § 11126(a) on its agendas as authority to close a session when the only
personnel matters to be discussed in that closed session relate to the CIO.”
The trial court rejected plaintiff’s legal argument that the personnel
exception cannot apply to the CIO, implicitly rejecting any relief in
association with that claim. Thus, even if plaintiff’s claim for declaratory
relief with respect to the past violation was resolved in his favor, his request
for declaratory, mandamus, and injunctive relief with respect to threatened
future actions was not. (See, e.g., Eye Dog Foundation v. State Board of
Guide Dogs for the Blind (1967) 67 Cal.2d 536, 541 [appeal will not be
dismissed despite mootness if there remain material questions for the court’s
determination; in action for declaratory relief, court must do complete justice
once jurisdiction has been assumed].)
      The Bagley-Keene Act authorizes “any interested person [to] commence
an action by mandamus, injunction, or declaratory relief for the purpose of
stopping or preventing violations or threatened violations of this article or to
determine the applicability of this article to past actions or threatened future
action by members of the state body.” (§ 11130, subd. (a), italics added.)
Here, plaintiff alleged in his verified petition that when his counsel wrote to
the Board about the August 17, 2020 closed session, he complained that
CalPERS was improperly relying on section 11126(a) to close discussions
related to its CIO and asked the agency to stop doing so. CalPERS responded
that the meeting was properly closed under sections 11126(a) and (g).
Plaintiff further alleged that “CalPERS continues to take the position that
§ 11126(a) authorizes closed-session discussions relating to employment of its
CIO,” citing and attaching copies of five public meeting agendas in December

                                        11
2020 and March 2021 for which CalPERS cited section 11126(a) to authorize
a closed session to discuss the CIO position. CalPERS admitted in its answer
that the agendas listed section 11126(a)(1) and with respect to most of them
“the only personnel matter identified in those agendas to be discussed during
the closed sessions relates to the CIO position.” On this record, the
undisputed facts demonstrate that CalPERS has repeatedly cited the
personnel exception under section 11126(a) to authorize closed sessions
related to its CIO.3
      Moreover, at no point in the litigation has CalPERS conceded that
section 11126(a)(1) is inapplicable to its CIO. To the contrary, it argued in
the trial court, in the writ proceedings in this court, and in its briefing on
appeal, that it may rely on the personnel exception to hold closed sessions
regarding the CIO. When parties disagree whether a public agency has
violated an open meeting law, and the agency refuses to admit its conduct
violates the law, courts have determined a justiciable controversy exists.
(See California Alliance for Utility etc. Education v. City of San Diego (1997)
56 Cal.App.4th 1024, 1029–1030 [declaratory relief action was ripe where
parties disagreed whether city had violated Brown Act4 and city failed to

      3  Plaintiff also asks us to take judicial notice of an agenda from June
2022, which he contends further demonstrates CalPERS is continuing to rely
on section 11126(a)(1) to hold closed sessions regarding the CIO. As we
explain further below, we decline to take judicial notice of this meeting
notice, which did not exist at the time the trial court rendered its judgment,
and which is unnecessary to resolution of the appeal. CalPERS emphasizes
in its briefing on appeal that plaintiff cannot make a showing a justiciable
issue exists by relying on this postjudgment agenda, but it does not address
the five meeting agendas described in and attached to the complaint and writ
petition which cited section 11126(a)(1) as authority for closed sessions
relating to the CIO.
      4 Ralph M. Brown Act (§ 54950 et seq.; Brown Act).

                                        12
concede its conduct constituted a violation]; Shapiro v. San Diego City
Council (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 904, 915–917 (Shapiro) [injunctive relief was
justified because trial court could reasonably infer from city’s past acts and
continuing contentions that its practices complied with the Brown Act that
there was a likelihood such conduct would recur in future]; Common Cause v.
Stirling (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 518, 524 [city attorney’s refusal to concede
Brown Act violations provided reason to believe it would continue illegal
procedure in future absent judicial intervention]; cf. TransparentGov Novato
v. City of Novato, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at pp. 150–153 [no justiciable
controversy existed where city council adopted specific policy to avoid
complained-of Brown Act violations in future]; see also Alameda County Land
Use Assn. v. City of Hayward (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1716, 1723 [“An action
for declaratory relief lies when the parties are in fundamental disagreement
over the construction of particular legislation, or they dispute whether a
public entity has engaged in conduct or established policies in violation of
applicable law.”].)
      Accordingly, we conclude a controversy between the parties exists and
the appeal should not be dismissed.
C. Statutory Interpretation
      Having determined plaintiff’s claim presents a justiciable issue, we
turn to the question of statutory interpretation.
      As explained above, the personnel exception in the Bagley-Keene Act
allows state bodies to hold closed sessions to consider “the appointment,
employment, evaluation of performance, or dismissal” of public employees.
(§ 11126(a)(1); Travis, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at pp. 341–342.)
Section 11126, subdivision (b) provides that “[f]or the purposes of this section,
‘employee’ does not include any person who is elected to, or appointed to a

                                       13
public office by, any state body.”5 Section 11126(g)(1) contains language
specific to the CIO of CalPERS, authorizing CalPERS to hold a closed session
to consider “matters pertaining to the recruitment or removal” of the CIO.
      On appeal, plaintiff asserts essentially two arguments with respect to
the construction of these three provisions: first, that the more specific
language of section 11126(g)(1) applies to the exclusion of subdivision (a)(1),
and second, that the CalPERS CIO is a public officer under subdivision (b),
and thus not an employee under subdivision (a)(1). CalPERS responds that
subdivision (g)(1) does not preclude subdivision (a)(1) from applying to the
CalPERS CIO because the two statutes overlap. Further, the legislative
history indicates that the exception in subdivision (g)(1) for the CalPERS CIO
was created because at the time, the CIO was a contractor, not an employee.
CalPERS further asserts plaintiff has forfeited the question of whether the
CIO is a public officer because he did not adequately raise or brief the issue
in the trial court, and contends we should not adopt his definition of a public
officer because it presents a fact-intensive inquiry we cannot resolve on an
undeveloped record. In the alternative, CalPERS contends if we reach the
merits, the CIO is an employee, not a public officer.
      We will address each of these arguments in turn.
      1. General Principles
      “ ‘Under general settled canons of statutory construction, we ascertain
the Legislature’s intent in order to effectuate the law’s purpose.’ [Citation.]
We ‘ “look first to the words of the statute, ‘because they generally provide
the most reliable indicator of legislative intent.’ ” ’ ” (Preven v. City of Los
Angeles (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 925, 932.) If the language of the statute is

      5 The parties do not dispute CalPERS is a state body within the

meaning of the statute. (§§ 11121, subd. (a), 20090.)

                                         14
clear and unambiguous, there is no need for judicial construction and our
task is at an end. If the language is reasonably susceptible of more than one
meaning, however, we may examine extrinsic aids such as the apparent
purpose of the statute, the legislative history, the canons of statutory
construction, and public policy. (Even Zohar Construction & Remodeling, Inc.
v. Bellaire Townhouses, LLC (2015) 61 Cal.4th 830, 838; Shapiro v. Board of
Directors (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 170, 180.)
      2. Section 11126(g)(1)
      Plaintiff first asserts (as he did in the trial court) that we need not
reach the question of whether the CIO is an “employee” or “public officer”
because closed sessions related to the CalPERS CIO are authorized only by
the “more-specific” section 11126(g)(1) rather than the general personnel
exception under subdivision (a)(1). Plaintiff contends we should rely on the
principle that specific statutes prevail over general ones to conclude that only
subdivision (g)(1) applies. For several reasons, we reject plaintiff’s argument
that this canon of statutory construction is determinative of the question
whether subdivision (a)(1) applies to the CalPERS CIO.
      “ ‘As in any case involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental
task here is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s
purpose.’ ” (Skidgel v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (2021)
12 Cal.5th 1, 14.) Looking first to the plain words of the statute, there is no
language in section 11126 that precludes both subdivisions (a)(1) and (g)(1)
from applying to the CalPERS CIO. Section 11126(g)(1), allowing closed
sessions for “recruitment and removal,” clearly applies to the CIO because
the position is specifically identified in the text of the statute. But there is no
language in subdivision (g)(1) indicating that the personnel exception under
subdivision (a)(1), allowing closed sessions for public employees to consider

                                        15
“appointment, employment, evaluation of employment, and dismissal” cannot
also apply to the CalPERS CIO if the CIO is a public employee. Moreover,
neither subdivision (a)(1) nor subdivision (b) of section 11126 specifically
exclude the CalPERS CIO from the definition of an employee—rather, under
those subdivisions the relevant inquiry is whether the individual is an
employee (under § 11126(a)(1)), or appointed to a public office by a state body
and thus not an employee (under § 11126, subd. (b)). Because the statutory
language is ambiguous as to whether section 11126(g)(1) functions as the
exclusive exception for the CalPERS CIO, we turn to other indicators of
legislative intent.
      We look next to the legislative history. As originally enacted,
section 11126 allowed for closed session discussions of personnel matters for
both employees and public officers. (Former § 11126, added by Stats. 1967,
ch. 1656, § 122, pp. 4026–4028.) In 1975, the statute was amended to exclude
those appointed to public office from the definition of employee. (Stats. 1975,
ch. 959, § 5, pp. 2238–2240.) Thereafter, multiple amendments were made to
permit closed sessions for specific positions within various government
bodies. (See e.g., Stats. 1977, ch. 730, § 5, pp. 2318–2320 [Postsecondary
Education Commission Director]; Stats. 1980, ch. 1197, § 1, pp. 4043–4045
[Executive Officer of Franchise Tax Board]; Stats. 1981, ch. 180, § 1,
pp. 1096–1099 [Executive Secretary of State Board of Equalization].)
      In 1986, the Legislature amended section 11126 to allow the Teachers’
Retirement Board to hold a “closed session when considering matters
pertaining to the appointment or removal of the chief executive officer” of
that system. (Stats. 1986, ch. 575, pp. 2013–2017.) Three years later, the
Legislature expanded this provision to allow closed sessions for the CalPERS
CEO, as well as the CIOs of both CalPERS and the State Teachers’

                                       16
Retirement System (CalSTRS). (Stats. 1989, ch. 177, § 2, pp. 1138–1142.)
The language added in 1989 remains unchanged from the language
appearing in section 11126(g)(1) today, and provides authorization for both
bodies to hold closed sessions “when considering matters pertaining to the
recruitment, appointment, employment, or removal of the chief executive
officer or when considering matters pertaining to the recruitment or removal
of the chief investment officer.” (Stats. 1989, ch. 177, § 2, p. 1142; § 11126,
subd. (g)(1).)
      A Department of Finance analysis for the bill that added the exception
for the CalPERS and CalSTRS CEOs and CIOs, Assembly Bill No. 1284
(1989–1990 Reg. Sess.) (Assem. Bill 1284), suggests that the specific language
used for the CIO positions was chosen because the position was a contract
position. In the analysis, the bill summary indicates that Assem. Bill 1284
would authorize CalPERS and the Teacher’s Retirement Board to meet in
closed session to consider matters pertaining to the recruitment or removal of
the CIO and to consider personnel matters relating to the CEO. The
summary further states that it “appears to be appropriate” to have closed
session meetings during interviews or removal discussions for both positions.
(Dept. of Finance, Analysis of Assem. Bill 1284 (1989–1990 Reg. Sess.) as
amended Apr. 6, 1989, p. 1, italics added.) In the “Specific Findings” portion
of its analysis, the report states: “The Teachers’ Retirement Board is
authorized to meet in closed session to consider matters related to the
appointment or removal of the State Teachers’ Retirement System (STRS)
Chief Executive Officer (CEO). The Board of Administration of the Public
Employees Retirement System (PERS) does not have this exemption from the
Bagley-Keene Open Meeting Act. Neither Board is authorized to meet in

                                       17
closed session to consider matters related to the Chief Investment Officer (CIO)
because these are contract positions.” (Id. at pp. 1–2, italics added.)
      The analysis further notes, “During the past year, both STRS and
PERS conducted interviews of candidates for their CIO positions in open
session. It appears that the requirement that the interviews be held in public
session may have prevented some potential candidates from applying for the
positions. Interviewing in public session involves high potential for a
candidate’s employer finding out that the candidate has applied for another
job and revealing details about a candidate’s professional and/or personal
background that a candidate may prefer to remain confidential between the
candidate and the employer.” (Dept. of Finance, Analysis of Assem. Bill 1284
(1989–1990 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 6, 1989, p. 2.)
      Another bill analysis from the Assembly Committee on Public
Employees, Retirement and Social Security reflects the same concerns with
privacy during hiring for the CEO and CIO positions, noting, “Both PERS
and STRS feel that conducting full job interviews in public session for their
Chief Executive Officer and Chief Investment Officer prevents qualified
candidates from applying because of the greatly enhanced possibility that the
candidate’s current employer will find out that they have applied for another
job.” (Assem. Com. on Public Employees, Retirement and Social Security,
Analysis of Assem. Bill 1284 (1989–1990 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 6, 1989,
p. 2.) Comments in the Republican analysis of Assem. Bill 1284 reflect
similar concerns with respect to firing: “Current law only permits STRS to
meet behind closed doors to consider ‘matters pertaining to’ appointment or
removal of its CEO. [¶] Both systems desire more privacy when discussing
these matters. When PERS fired its last executive officer, Sid McCausland,
an action which split the board, it had to be done in the open because the

                                        18
open meeting act demanded it and McCausland wouldn’t cooperate and just
resign. This caused a lot of publicity, which angered many board members
and administration officials.” (Assem. Ways & Means Com., Republican
analysis of Assem. Bill 1284 (1989–1990 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 6, 1989,
p. 1.)
         An analysis by the Public Employees’ Retirement System Legislative
Analyst explained, in a background section, that the bill would “authorize the
Board to meet in closed session for the purpose of hiring and firing the
Executive Officer and the Investment Officer. The State Teachers’
Retirement System currently has statutory authority for recruitment matters
associated with the Executive Officer. This bill would grant the same
authority to the PERS Board and would permit both systems to similarly
handle Investment Officer recruitment. [¶] The appointment and
consideration of these two officers is typically a matter of the Board’s internal
management and consideration of these employment matters in closed
session does not impair the purpose of the Open Meeting Act, which is to
allow the public to monitor the conduct of the affairs that pertain to it. PERS
does not support the concept of closing its meetings when it conducts general
business that affects the System’s membership.” (Public Employees’
Retirement System Legis. Analyst, Analysis of Assem. Bill 1284 (1989–1990
Reg. Sess.), p. 1.)
         From this somewhat sparse legislative history we can discern the
following with regard to the purpose of the statute regarding the CalPERS
CIO at the time of enactment: (1) the Legislature intended to allow closed
sessions to provide additional privacy for the CIO, and (2) closed sessions
were not already authorized for the CIO because it was a contract position.
This history sheds little light on whether section 11126(a)(1) could apply to

                                        19
the CIO if the CIO is an employee of CalPERS, rather than an independent
contractor.6
      Plaintiff urges us to rely on the principle “repeatedly explained” by our
Supreme Court that “ ‘ “ ‘ “[a] specific provision relating to a particular
subject will govern in respect to that subject, as against a general provision,
although the latter, standing alone, would be broad enough to include the
subject to which the more particular provision relates.” ’ ” ’ ” (People v.
Superior Court (Jimenez) (2002) 28 Cal.4th 798, 808.) Plaintiff asserts
because section 11126(g)(1) specifically refers to the CIO, it applies to the
exclusion of section 11126(a)(1). The principle on which plaintiff relies,
however, “is not one of constitutional or statutory mandate, but serves as an
aid to judicial interpretation when two statutes conflict.” (People v. Walker
(2002) 29 Cal.4th 577, 586.) As our Supreme Court has explained, “ ‘The
principle that a specific statute prevails over a general one applies only when
the two sections cannot be reconciled. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] If we can
reasonably harmonize ‘[t]wo statutes dealing with the same subject,’ then we
must give ‘concurrent effect’ to both, ‘even though one is specific and the
other general.’ ” (Garcia v. McCutchen (1997) 16 Cal.4th 469, 478; Tafoya v.
Hastings College (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 437, 447–448 [where subject matter
is covered by inconsistent provisions, a specific provision prevails over a
general one as an exception thereto, unless a contrary intent appears].)

      6 It appears at some point, CalPERS stopped relying on outside

investment managers for its investment operations and established the
“internal” position of CIO, which was exempt from civil service and appointed
directly by the CalPERS Board. (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor
Analyses, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 269 (2003–2004 Reg. Sess.) p. 3.) The
parties do not dispute that the CalPERS CIO is no longer a “contract
position.”

                                        20
       Here, the two subdivisions (a)(1) and (g)(1) do not obviously conflict,
and it may be possible to harmonize them. First, the terms used in the
general personnel exception are not the same as those in the special CIO
exception. (Compare § 11126(a)(1) [permitting closed session to consider
appointment, employment, evaluation of performance, or dismissal] with
§ 11126(g)(1) [permitting closed session to consider recruitment or removal].)
Because the provisions do not expressly overlap, there does not appear to be
any conflict on the face of the statute. Second, as discussed above, the
legislative history suggests that the CIO exception in section 11126(g)(1) was
necessary because the CIO was a contract position; thus, there is nothing
inconsistent about applying the personnel exception if the CIO is an
employee, as opposed to a contractor.
      Moreover, the prevalence of a specific statute over a general statute is a
tool to assist us in deciphering legislative intent, not a static rule for rote
application. “[T]he canons of statutory construction are not dispositive but
rather are guides courts can resort to when a statute’s plain language and
legislative history do not compel a particular result.” (Grassi v. Superior
Court (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 283, 306.) On the other hand, “when the
legislative history answers the question of legislative intent, or at least
provides clues to legislative intent, the legislative history is a more reliable
indicator of the legislative intent than inferences of intent based on canons of
statutory construction.” (People v. Superior Court (Ortiz) (2022)
81 Cal.App.5th 851, 862.) Here, as explained above, the legislative history
suggests that the Legislature established the CIO exception in
section 11126(g)(1) to cover “recruitment or removal” but not employment
because the CIO was a contract position.

                                        21
      In his reply brief, plaintiff argues the legislative history for the 1989
amendment “simply confirms that the Legislature originally intended for
§ 11126(g)(1) to provide the sole authority for closed-door discussions of the
CIO,” and CalPERS has shown no evidence of a contrary intent. Plaintiff
asserts that the Legislature’s failure to amend section 11126(g)(1) when it
amended a different statute in 2003, shows the Legislature’s intent that only
subdivision (g)(1) would apply to the CalPERS CIO. Specifically, plaintiff
asserts, “The Legislature was presumably aware of the specific provisions in
§ 11126(g)(1) governing closed session discussions of the CIO when it added
the CIO position to § 20098, and if it had intended to abrogate them it would
have done so.”
      We are not persuaded. Section 20098 provides authority for the
CalPERS Board to “appoint . . . [and] fix the compensation of an executive
officer, a general counsel, a chief actuary, a chief investment officer, a chief
financial officer, a chief operating officer, a chief health director, and other
investment officers and portfolio managers . . . .” (Id., subd. (a), italics
added.) As plaintiff recognizes, the 2003 amendment was a response to
Westly v. Board of Administration (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1095, in which the
Third Appellate District held CalPERS lacked plenary authority under
article XVI, section 17 of the California Constitution to designate its
employees exempt from civil service and pay them compensation in excess of
amounts approved by the Department of Personnel Administration. (Westly,
at pp. 1099, 1110–1113, 1116–1117.) After the Westly decision, the
Legislature amended section 20098 to provide CalPERS authority to appoint
certain positions and pay salaries in excess of amounts allowed by the civil
service laws. (Stats. 2003, ch. 856, §§ 1, 3, pp. 6262–6263, 6264–6265.) As
the Legislature declared in enacting the legislation, “The express purpose of

                                        22
this act is to enable the Board of Administration and the Teachers’
Retirement Board to attract and retain key personnel by empowering those
boards to establish both appropriate classifications within the civil service for
its senior executive and investment management employees and the
compensation paid to those employees, competitive with the compensation
paid to employees in other retirement and financial service entities,
consistent with the holding of Westly v. Board of Administration, and
notwithstanding the provisions of the Government Code that provide the
State Personnel Board and the Department of Personnel Administration that
authority.” (Id., § 1, p. 6263.)
      The 2003 amendment was clearly aimed at providing CalPERS
authority to offer certain employees competitive salaries. Neither the
statutory language nor the legislative history makes any mention of the
Bagley-Keene Act or discusses whether it might apply to any of the positions
identified in section 20098. We are not convinced the Legislature’s silence
about open meeting requirements when evaluating whether CalPERS should
be given authority to pay higher salaries under a different law is indicative of
legislative intent about the scope of section 11126.7
      Plaintiff also asserts that allowing both section 11126(a)(1) and
section 11126(g)(1) to apply to the CIO would violate the rule that a
construction that renders a word surplusage should be avoided. Specifically,
plaintiff argues if section 11126(a)(1) (allowing closed session discussions of
“appointment, employment, evaluation of performance, or dismissal”) applies

      7 In this regard, we also observe in the words of our Supreme Court,

that “[i]t is axiomatic that in assessing the import of a statute, we must
concern ourselves with the Legislature’s purpose at the time of the
enactment.” (In re Pedro T. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1041, 1048; Reznitskiy v. County
of Marin (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 1016, 1025–1026.)

                                       23
to the positions listed in section 11126(g)(1), it would render the use of the
terms “appointment,” “employment,” and “removal” in subdivision (g)(1)
surplusage.
      First, the terms “appointment” and “employment” in section 11126(g)(1)
are used only with reference to the CalPERS CEO, not the CIO. Whether
section 11126(a)(1) can apply to the CEO is not at issue here. Second, in his
opening brief, plaintiff concedes that “dismissal” and “removal” have “slightly
different connotations,” arguing that employees are dismissed, while public
officers are removed. It is also possible, however, that the Legislature used
those terms for the CIO in section 11126(g)(1) because the position was a
contract position to which the personnel exception did not apply. Because
that reason is supported by the legislative history, it is a stronger indication
of legislative intent than a general canon of construction. (See, e.g., Skidgel
v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 21
[“ ‘the canon against surplusage is [merely] a guide to statutory
interpretation and is not invariably controlling.’ [Citation.] . . . “We will not
use it ‘to defeat legislative intent’ as gleaned from available sources,
including the rest of the words in the statute, related statutes, the ‘legislative
history and the “wider historical circumstances” of the enactment.’ ”].)
      We also recognize, as plaintiff emphasizes, that statutory exceptions
authorizing closed sessions under California’s open meeting laws are
construed narrowly, while the Bagley-Keene Act is construed liberally in
favor of openness in conducting public business. (See Travis, supra,
161 Cal.App.4th at p. 343; Shapiro, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 917 [stating
same principle with respect to the Brown Act].) However, the personnel
exception under section 11126(a)(1) exists “ ‘ “to permit free and candid
discussions of personnel matters” ’ ” for public employees who are not public

                                        24
officers. (Travis, at p. 342.) Our review of the legislative history of
section 11126(g)(1) reveals an understanding on the part of the Legislature at
the time of enactment that closed sessions were not authorized for the CIO
because it was a contract position. Accordingly, we reject plaintiff’s premise
that section 11126(a)(1) cannot apply to the CIO merely because
section 11126(g)(1) specifically does.
D. Public Officer
      Plaintiff next contends section 11126(a)(1) cannot apply to the
CalPERS CIO because the CIO is a public officer, not an employee. We agree
that whether section 11126(a)(1) applies to the CalPERS CIO turns on the
answer to this question. CalPERS, however, argues we should not reach this
issue for two reasons: first, because plaintiff forfeited the issue by failing to
raise it in the trial court, and second, because his failure to raise it in the
trial court has resulted in an undeveloped record on issues of fact necessary
to resolution of the appeal.8 We agree with CalPERS that plaintiff forfeited
this issue by failing to raise and brief it in the trial court and that we should
not decide it on an undeveloped record.
      “ ‘As a general rule, theories not raised in the trial court cannot be
asserted for the first time on appeal; appealing parties must adhere to the
theory (or theories) on which their cases were tried. This rule is based on
fairness—it would be unfair, both to the trial court and the opposing
litigants, to permit a change of theory on appeal.’ ” (Nellie Gail Ranch

      8 Plaintiff argues in his reply brief that CalPERS “makes a strange

waiver claim” regarding his argument that the CIO is not an employee—
plaintiff asserts CalPERS “does not claim that he has waived this entire
argument,” only that he “cannot rely on the Attorney General’s opinion to
support it.” We have carefully reviewed CalPERS’s opposition brief and have
concluded this is not an accurate characterization of CalPERS’s argument.

                                         25
Owners Assn. v. McMullin (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 982, 997.) “Appellate courts
are loath to reverse a judgment on grounds that the opposing party did not
have an opportunity to argue and the trial court did not have an opportunity
to consider. [Citation.] In our adversarial system, each party has the
obligation to raise any issue or infirmity that might subject the ensuing
judgment to attack. [Citation.] Bait and switch on appeal not only subjects
the parties to avoidable expense, but also wreaks havoc on a judicial system
too burdened to retry cases on theories that could have been raised earlier.”
(JRS Products, Inc. v. Matsushita Electric Corp. of America (2004)
115 Cal.App.4th 168, 178.)
      Although we have discretion to consider pure questions of law raised
for the first time on appeal, we will not exercise such discretion here because
whether the CalPERS CIO is a public officer is a mixed question of law and
fact that is inappropriate to decide on an undeveloped record. (See, e.g., NBC
Universal Media, LLC v. Superior Court (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1222, 1237
[declining to consider issue requiring application of equitable principles to
undeveloped record]; City of Newport Beach v. Sasse (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 803,
811–812 [court would not consider new defense involving legal and factual
questions open to controversy and not presented at trial].)
      As both parties argue, the terms “public office” and “public officer” have
no fixed meaning in California, and the distinction between an employee and
a public officer varies according to context. (Brown v. Pacifica Foundation,
Inc. (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 915, 928 [“California does not recognize a single
legal definition of the term ‘public office’ ”; “The term ‘public office’ is
ambiguous on its face and its meaning depends on issues of context and
intent”]; Spreckels v. Graham (1924) 194 Cal. 516, 530 [“It is difficult,
perhaps impossible, to frame a definition of public office or public officer

                                         26
which will be sufficiently accurate, both as to its inclusion and its exclusion,
that meet the requirements of all cases.”]; 68 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 34, 37 (1985)
[issue of whether a particular position at a state agency is an employee or a
public officer is often controversial and “ ‘[r]esolution of the issue usually
depends on the facts involved in a particular case’ ”].)
      Although plaintiff asserts he “raised” the issue in the trial court in a
paragraph in his motion for judgment, his argument consisted of two
sentences asserting section 11126(a)(1) cannot apply to the CIO because the
position is appointed by the CalPERS Board pursuant to section 20098 and
CalPERS is a state body. Plaintiff also cited to the 1985 opinion of the
Attorney General concluding the Director of the California Transportation
Commission is a public officer, but he did not discuss it. Nor did plaintiff
assert the CIO was a public officer, discuss the legal test for a public officer,
or present any evidence or argument in the trial court as to why the CIO is a
public officer. Indeed, plaintiff expressly argued in his reply brief that the
trial court did not have to consider whether the CIO was a public officer,
because it was irrelevant and there is no fixed definition of a public officer.
(See, e.g., GECCMC 2005-C1 Plummer Street Office Limited Partnership v.
NRFC NNN Holdings, LLC (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 998, 1003, fn. 3 [declining
to consider new argument on appeal where appellant disclaimed reliance on
contention in trial court].)
      Although CalPERS argued in its opposition to the motion for judgment
that the CIO is an employee, not a public officer, it cited only to the
legislative history for section 20098 to argue that the use of the term
“employee” in the Legislature’s statement of purpose demonstrates the CIO is
an employee. Certainly the four-part test that plaintiff advocates on appeal
was not proposed or discussed in the trial court, and no factual findings were

                                        27
made by the trial court based on any of the evidence cited by plaintiff on
appeal. In light of the complexity of the “public officer” inquiry and the
absence of any findings by the trial court, we decline to exercise our
discretion to determine the issue for the first time on appeal.9 (Farrar v.
Direct Commerce, Inc. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1257, 1275–1276, fn. 3 [“Whether
an appellate court will entertain a belatedly raised legal issue always rests
within the court’s discretion.”]; Humane Society of U.S. v. Superior Court
(2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1273 [appellate court refused to exercise
discretion to consider new issue on appeal concerning question of public
interest because it did not present pure question of law].)
E. Requests for Judicial Notice
      The parties ask us to take judicial notice of various materials that were
not before the trial court.
      Plaintiff asks us to take judicial notice under Evidence Code
section 452, subdivisions (c) and (h) of a copy of a June 3, 2022 meeting
notice/agenda packet downloaded from CalPERS’s website. Plaintiff
contends the agenda packet is relevant to this proceeding because it shows
that CalPERS is continuing to rely on section 11126(a) to discuss matters
relating to the CIO. The notice reflects that one of seven items on a closed

      9 At oral argument, plaintiff requested that we remand the matter to

the trial court to hold a hearing on the issue of whether the CIO is an
employee or public officer, citing to Li v. Jin (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 481, 496–
497. Li, however, was an anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public
participation) case in which the appellate court determined it was
appropriate to remand for the trial court to conduct a second-step analysis as
to whether the plaintiffs’ claims had “minimal merit,” after it reversed the
trial court on the first step analysis regarding whether the allegations of the
complaint arose from protected activity. Unlike this case, it did not concern a
party’s forfeiture of an issue on appeal by failing to address a mixed question
of law and fact in the trial court.

                                       28
session agenda scheduled for June 13, 2022 was “Chief Investment Officer—
Personnel, Employment and Performance,” and the agenda states the session
will be closed under section 11126(a)(1) and subdivisions (c)(16) and (e).
Plaintiff concedes the agenda did not exist when the trial court issued its
judgment.
      CalPERS opposes the request for judicial notice on the grounds that we
should not take judicial notice of matters occurring after the entry of
judgment absent exceptional circumstances, the request is problematic
because it asks us to make new factual findings on appeal, and even if we
considered the agenda, it would not result in reversal of the judgment.
      “Generally, reviewing courts do not take judicial notice of facts not
presented to the trial court. Rather, ‘normally “when reviewing the
correctness of a trial court’s judgment, an appellate court will consider only
matters which were part of the record at the time the judgment was
entered.” ’ ” (Weiss v. City of Del Mar (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 609, 625 (Weiss).)
It is undisputed the material in the June 3, 2022 meeting notice was not in
existence when the trial court entered its judgment, and thus we conclude it
would be inappropriate to take judicial notice. Plaintiff identifies no
“exceptional circumstances” to depart from this general rule. (Ibid.) In any
event, because it is unnecessary to our determination regarding the
justiciability of plaintiff’s claims, we decline to take judicial notice of the
meeting agenda packet for this additional reason.
      Plaintiff also requests we take judicial notice of material pertaining to
the legislative history of section 20098, a State Personnel Board specification
for the position of CalPERS CIO, and portions of CalPERS’s briefing in the
prior writ proceeding in this court. The request for judicial notice of the State
Personnel Board specification is denied, as it was not before the trial court in

                                         29
deciding this matter.10 (Weiss, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 625.) Plaintiff’s
requests for judicial notice of the legislative history of section 20098 and
CalPERS’s prior briefing are granted. CalPERS’s request for judicial notice
of material relating to the legislative history of section 11126(g)(1) is granted.
                              III. DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed. The parties are to bear their own costs on
appeal.

      10 For the first time in his reply brief (and not in his request for judicial

notice), plaintiff asserts we must take judicial notice of the State Personnel
Board specifications because, under Evidence Code section 459, we are
required to take judicial notice of each matter that the trial court was
required to notice under Evidence Code section 451. The trial court was not
required to take judicial notice of material not presented to it. In any event,
even were we to take judicial notice of the State Personnel Board
specifications, they are not dispositive of whether the CIO is an employee or
public officer as they address only one of the several elements plaintiff
proposes as the test for a public officer.

                                        30
                                           MARGULIES, J.*

WE CONCUR:

HUMES, P. J.

GETTY, J.†

A165562
Jelincic v. California Public Employees’ Retirement System Board of
Administration

      * Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate
District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
      † Judge of the Solano County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.