Court Opinion

ID: 9587771
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:26:04.210547+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:15.269515
License: Public Domain

Deen, Presiding Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
While concurring fully with Division 3 of the majority opinion and with the judgment of Division 2,1 cannot concur with the holding in Division 1 that the insurer was entitled to summary judgment on Sandner’s contract claim.
*282Decided October 19, 1988 —
Rehearings denied November 15, 1988
Kilpatrick & Cody, Robert E. Shields, Thomas H. Christopher, David P. Phippen, for appellant.
Neely & Player, John W. Winborne III, for appellee.
In concluding that no justiciable contract claim existed, the majority opinion holds Sandner to the requirement in the Brill insurance policy that “[t]he terms of this policy may not be change[d] or waived except by endorsement issued by us to be part of this policy. . .” The problem with that disposition, of course, is in holding Sandner to the terms of an insurance contract to which it was not a party.
Sandner’s contract claim, as I understand it, is that Sandner and Hoberg, as an agent with authority to bind Centennial, reached an agreement for insurance coverage. In a letter to Brill and Sandner, Hoberg confirmed that “[t]he underwriter has agreed to process an endorsement adding Sandner as additional named insured to your workers’ compensation policy. This endorsement should eliminate coverage questions involving Patrick Burton and workers’ compensation for Sandner.” Construing this letter in the light most favorable to Sandner as respondent to Centennial’s motion for summary judgment, it indicates that the insurer had definitely agreed to the endorsement. (Processing the endorsement presumably would entail physical preparation of the endorsement, and no doubt an adjustment on premiums.) The fact that the agreement was to be effectuated by adding Sandner as an insured under the Brill policy, rather than issuance of a new and separate policy, should provide no basis for defeating Sandner’s contract claim.
There was evidence that could support a finding that Centennial reneged on a binding agreement for insurance. Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent from the affirmance of the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for Centennial on this issue.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge McMurray joins in this opinion.