Court Opinion

ID: 9670044
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:13:06.669463+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:42:16.789733
License: Public Domain

HOOVER, EJ.
¶ 44. {concurring). I concur with the result. I write separately and briefly, however, to take issue with the majority's treatment of the immunity issue under Wis. Stat. § 895.48(1), the Good Samaritan Law. First, I am not entirely convinced that Stephani Switlick's activities did not constitute providing "emergency care" to Mueller. On the one hand, it could be plausibly argued that Stephani was not providing care in the sense that she was not addressing the root cause of Mueller's symptoms. Rather, Stephani was arguably effectively preventing or delaying provision of care for an apparent traumatic head injury that caused nausea. On the other hand, while Mueller presented with a bloody nose and nausea, she was nevertheless able to ambulate and converse cogently with Stephani, until 6 a.m. Then, for the first time, Mueller responded inappropriately to the questions Stephani asked for the purpose of monitoring Mueller's cognitive functioning. I am not fully persuaded that when dealing with a person the nature of whose injuries are such that the severity is not manifest, monitoring someone's cognitive functioning on an hourly basis does not qualify as emergency care. However, I need not resolve this issue, because I would hold that even if Stephani provided emergency care to Mueller, she did not do so at "the scene of any emergency or accident." See Wis. Stat. § 895.48(1).
¶ 45. The trial court held, and the majority evidently agrees, that an emergency travels with the injured party, on the theory that once removed from the scene, the injured person still requires care. Unfortunately, neither of the respondents' briefs provide any *179further analysis on this point. In particular, they provide no discussion on how this concept of "the scene of any emergency" pertains to the entire time after Mueller was injured until she was placed in the ambulance some eight hours later.
¶ 46. The language utilized by the legislature suggests to me that the scene of an emergency, similar to the scene of an accident, refers to the location where the event giving rise to the need for emergency care occurred. The statute serves to encourage strangers who happen upon the scene of an emergency to stop and render aid, rather than avert their conscience, if not their eyes, and pass by to avoid potential liability. To extend the "scene" through to wherever the injured person ends up appears to me to broaden the immunity beyond the statute's language. Such an approach could include everyone "down the line" who renders care associated with an emergency, regardless of their relationship to where the event giving rise to the need for care occurred, or their relationship to the immediacy of the care necessitated by the event.
¶ 47. Based upon my alternative view, I would hold that any care Stephani provided to Mueller was not provided at the scene of an emergency. I therefore concur with the majority that immunity does not apply under Wis. Stat. § 895.48(1).1