Court Opinion

ID: 9394408
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-15 11:07:32.360541+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:59.946704
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued May 11, 2023

                                      In The

                              Court of Appeals
                                     For The

                          First District of Texas
                           ————————————
                              NO. 01-21-00438-CR
                            ———————————
                       CYNTHIA D. WILLIS, Appellant
                                        V.
                       THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                    On Appeal from the 208th District Court
                            Harris County, Texas
                        Trial Court Case No. 1584804

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

      A jury convicted appellant Cynthia D. Willis of the first-degree felony offense

of murder and sentenced her to fifty years’ imprisonment. See TEX. PENAL CODE

§§ 19.02(b)(1), (2), (c), 12.32(a). Willis raises three issues on appeal. First, she
argues that her trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. Also in her first issue—

which we construe as her second issue—Willis complains that the trial court erred

by not sua sponte instructing the jury on the lesser-included offense of manslaughter.

In her third issue, Willis argues that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of an

extraneous offense. We affirm.

                                     Background

       Willis was married to Eric “Mickey” Willis, and they had three children

together. Mickey had other adult children from prior relationships, and Willis also

had a child from a previous relationship. Willis, Mickey, and their three children

lived in a rental house in Spring. Willis’s child from a prior relationship would stay

there from time to time as well.

       The last time anyone saw Mickey alive was on March 9, 2018. He recently

had begun having an extramarital affair with a woman he had known since middle

school. On the evening of March 9, Mickey had dinner with his girlfriend, picked up

his son from a friend’s house just before midnight, and returned home and went to

bed.

       Early in the morning on March 10, Willis woke up her children, told them to

pack a bag with some clothes, and drove them to Humble. She did not explain why

they were leaving, and Mickey did not go with them. Willis and the children stayed

in a hotel in Humble for a couple of nights before she took the children to her sister’s

                                           2
house in Humble on March 12. Willis stayed at her sister’s house for a few nights,

but the children stayed there for several weeks.

      On March 19, one of Mickey’s grown daughters contacted the police and

requested a welfare check for Mickey. Neither Mickey’s children nor his father, who

worked with him, had heard from Mickey since March 9, and he had not shown up

to work since then. Someone also contacted Mickey’s landlord, who had keys to the

Mickey’s rental house. Before officers arrived at Mickey’s house for the welfare

check, Mickey’s father met the landlord at the house. The landlord unlocked the

front door and immediately smelled a noxious odor. Fearing the odor might be gas,

the landlord shut the door and called the gas company. A representative of the gas

company arrived but did not believe the smell was gas.

      Shortly thereafter, Deputy Shawanna Mosley-Banks with the Harris County

Sheriff’s Office arrived at Mickey’s house to conduct the welfare check. Upon

entering the residence, she smelled the odor and recognized it as a decaying body.

Mosley-Banks, Mickey’s father, and the landlord entered the house. They first

checked the three secondary bedrooms, finding no one occupying them. Upon

reaching the closed door of the primary bedroom, they heard a loud noise coming

from a television inside the bedroom. When Mosley-Banks opened the door, she saw

a silhouette of a body lying on the bed covered by a blanket. She approached the

bed, pulled back the covers, and discovered Mickey’s body in a state of decay. She

                                          3
ushered Mickey’s father and landlord out of the house and called for additional

officers. The officers determined that there was no sign of forced entry into the

house. The investigation and a later autopsy revealed that Mickey died from a single

gunshot wound to the head. Police never located the firearm.

      A Harris County grand jury indicted Willis for murder. See TEX. PENAL CODE

§ 19.02(b)(1), (2). She was arrested in Houston on March 24.

      Trial occurred over seven days. Mickey’s children and coworkers testified that

Mickey owned a construction company and had a reputation for a good work ethic.

He was also an attentive father both to his children and to Willis’s child. Mickey’s

absence from work and his failure to call his coworkers and children after March 9

were unusual, eventually prompting the request for the welfare check.

      Family and coworkers also testified about problems in Mickey and Willis’s

marriage. One of Mickey’s coworkers testified that he saw Willis stab Mickey with

a knife in 2000 or 2001 outside the couple’s home after the coworker dropped

Mickey off after work. The coworker called the police, but police were unable to

find Mickey or Willis at the house by the time they arrived. Consequently, no

charges were filed against Willis.

      Coworkers also testified that they knew Mickey recently began dating another

woman, and text messages Willis sent to Mickey before his death showed that she

was aware of the affair. Mickey had contacted a lawyer about divorcing Willis. He

                                         4
had paid the lawyer a partial retainer and obtained some documents to start the

divorce proceeding, but he had not filed for divorce before his death.

      The trial evidence included cell phone records showing that Willis’s and

Mickey’s cell phones travelled together on the morning of March 10, 2018, from the

house to the hotel in Humble, indicating that Willis took Mickey’s cell phone with

her. Although Willis had called or texted Mickey numerous times before that

morning, the records showed that she never contacted him again afterwards. She also

texted a friend on the morning of March 9 discussing problems she was having with

Mickey and telling her friend, “Putting my plan into motion.”

      Willis called in sick to work for several days beginning on March 9, and she

never went to work again after March 9. Willis’s sister, however, testified that while

Willis and the children stayed at her house for a few days after March 12, Willis did

not appear to be sick. Text messages Willis sent to her children around this time also

conflicted with her excuse for missing work due to illness. At some point, Willis left

her children at her sister’s house.

      After the State rested during the guilt-innocence phase of trial, defense

counsel made a motion for directed verdict, which the trial court denied. After the

defense rested, both sides gave closing arguments. The jury returned a verdict of

guilty.

                                          5
      During the punishment phase of trial, Willis testified about Mickey’s

character. She expressly refused to accept the jury’s guilty verdict, denying her

involvement in the murder. She testified that Mickey had “always cheated” on her,

but she nevertheless stayed with him “to keep the family together.” She testified that

Mickey had been a drug dealer, had been in and out of prison, and owed money to

people at various times, including in 2018, for which he had received threats. She

also testified that Mickey had pulled a gun on her in 2003, but the charges were later

dropped. She denied having ever stabbed Mickey.

      After both sides rested and presented closing arguments, the jury sentenced

Willis to fifty years’ imprisonment. Willis filed a motion for new trial arguing that

her trial counsel was ineffective. The trial court did not hold a hearing on the motion

for new trial, and it was overruled by operation of law. TEX. R. APP. P. 21.8(c). This

appeal followed.

                         Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

      In her first issue, Willis argues that her trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to investigate, prepare for trial, properly object, raise “crucial issues” such as sudden

passion during trial, request a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of

manslaughter, and present mitigating evidence at the punishment phase of trial. She

argues that these failures establish her ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

                                           6
A.    Standard of Review and Governing Law

      The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees that in

“all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance

of Counsel for his defence.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The “right to counsel is the

right to the effective assistance of counsel.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

686 (1984) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970)). To

establish that counsel’s assistance was ineffective, the defendant must show that

(1) counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) the deficient performance

prejudiced the defense. Id. at 687; see Johnson v. State, 624 S.W.3d 579, 587 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2021) (stating that prejudice prong requires showing reasonable

probability that but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, result of proceeding would

have been different). The defendant bears the burden to prove both prongs by a

preponderance of the evidence, and the “failure to satisfy one prong of the Strickland

test negates a court’s need to consider the other prong.” Williams v. State, 301

S.W.3d 675, 687 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Richardson v. State, 606 S.W.3d 375, 381

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, pet. ref’d).

      Under the first prong, counsel’s performance is deficient if it falls below an

objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88; Johnson, 624

S.W.3d at 585. “[J]udicial review of whether counsel’s performance was deficient

                                            7
must be highly deferential to trial counsel and avoid the deleterious effects of

hindsight.” Richardson, 606 S.W.3d at 381.

      At the outset, there is a “strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within

the wide range of reasonable professional assistance” and that the conduct

constituted sound trial strategy. Johnson, 624 S.W.3d at 586 (quoting Thompson v.

State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)). To defeat this presumption,

counsel’s ineffectiveness must be affirmatively demonstrated in the appellate record.

Id. “It is not sufficient that the appellant show, with the benefit of hindsight, that his

counsel’s actions or omissions during trial were merely of questionable competence.

Rather, the record must affirmatively demonstrate trial counsel’s alleged

ineffectiveness.” Id. at 585 (quoting Mata v. State, 226 S.W.3d 425, 430 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2007)). The defendant must demonstrate that no plausible reason exists for the

challenged act or omission. Bone v. State, 77 S.W.3d 828, 836 (Tex. Crim. App.

2002); Richardson, 606 S.W.3d at 382.

      Generally, trial counsel should be provided an opportunity to explain

challenged conduct on the record before a court finds that counsel was ineffective.

Johnson, 624 S.W.3d at 586; Rylander v. State, 101 S.W.3d 107, 111 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2003); see Lopez v. State, 343 S.W.3d 137, 144 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (stating

that otherwise silent record may be “supplemented through a hearing on a motion

for new trial” to produce additional information about counsel’s trial strategy). “In

                                            8
the majority of cases, the appellant is unable to meet the first prong of the Strickland

test because the record is underdeveloped and does not adequately reflect the alleged

failings of trial counsel.” Richardson, 606 S.W.3d at 382. A silent record that

provides no explanation for counsel’s actions will not overcome the strong

presumption of reasonable assistance. Johnson, 624 S.W.3d at 586; see Rylander,

101 S.W.3d at 110–11. When the record is undeveloped, counsel will be found

ineffective only if the conduct was “so outrageous that no competent attorney would

have engaged in it.” Johnson, 624 S.W.3d at 586 (quoting Goodspeed v. State, 187

S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)).

B.    Analysis

      Willis challenges numerous aspects of her counsel’s representation at trial.

She argues that trial counsel did not conduct a pretrial investigation, prepare for trial,

raise proper objections and “crucial issues” such as sudden passion during trial,

request inclusion in the jury charge of an instruction on the lesser-included offense

of manslaughter, or investigate and adduce mitigating evidence during the

punishment phase.

      However, the appellate record does not support these arguments. See id. at

585–86. Willis does not argue and the record does not show that her trial counsel

was provided an opportunity to answer these allegations. See id. at 586; Rylander,

101 S.W.3d at 111. Although Willis filed a motion for new trial and raised

                                            9
ineffective assistance of her trial counsel, she did not request a hearing on the motion

to present testimony from her trial counsel explaining his actions. See Lopez, 343

S.W.3d at 144; TEX. R. APP. P. 21.2 (“A motion for new trial is a prerequisite to

presenting a point of error on appeal only when necessary to adduce facts not in the

record.”). Nor does the record otherwise contain any explanation from counsel for

the challenged conduct. Furthermore, Willis does not argue and the record does not

show that the challenged actions were “so outrageous that no competent attorney

would have engaged in” the actions. See Johnson, 624 S.W.3d at 586 (quoting

Goodspeed, 187 S.W.3d at 392).

      1.     Pretrial Investigation

      Willis asserts generally that her trial counsel did not conduct an adequate

pretrial investigation based in part on his failure to call more witnesses at trial. To

assert an issue on appeal, an appellant’s brief must contain “a clear and concise

argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to

the record.” TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). An appellant waives an issue on appeal if she

does not adequately brief the issue by providing supporting argument and

appropriate citations to authorities and to the record. Id.; Lucio v. State, 351 S.W.3d

878, 896–97 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Chaves v. State, 630 S.W.3d 541, 555 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, no pet.). In arguing that counsel failed to conduct

a pretrial investigation, Willis does not cite to any part of the appellate record or

                                          10
provide substantive analysis showing that counsel was ineffective. See TEX. R. APP.

P. 38.1(i); Lucio, 351 S.W.3d at 896–97; Chaves, 630 S.W.3d at 555. Thus, she has

waived appellate review of this sub-issue.

      But even if she had not waived this sub-issue, we would conclude that the

record does not affirmatively demonstrate counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness. See

Johnson, 624 S.W.3d at 585–86. “[C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable

investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations

unnecessary.” Ex parte Bowman, 533 S.W.3d 337, 350 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017)

(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691). “In any ineffectiveness case, a particular

decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the

circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgment.” Id.

(quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521–22 (2003)). “[S]trategic choices made

after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are

virtually unchallengeable[.]” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690).

      The record is silent concerning whether defense counsel conducted a pretrial

investigation. As stated above, counsel was not provided an opportunity to explain

his pretrial investigation or lack thereof. See Johnson, 624 S.W.3d at 586; Rylander,

101 S.W.3d at 111. Because the record is silent concerning counsel’s pretrial

investigation, including his reasons for not contacting or calling specific witnesses

at trial, we cannot conclude that counsel was deficient on this basis. See Johnson,

                                         11
624 S.W.3d at 586; Ex parte Flores, 387 S.W.3d 626, 633 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)

(stating that defendant must overcome presumption that counsel’s decision not to

call witness is sound trial strategy).

      2.     Trial Preparation

      Willis also argues that defense counsel did not adequately prepare for trial.

She argues that counsel filed a motion to continue trial one day before trial began,

did not make an opening statement, and did not cross-examine several witnesses

against her. She also argues that counsel could not hear the proceedings or was not

attentive, and the court and the witnesses could not hear counsel. Willis’s appellate

brief does not provide any substantive analysis showing that these purported failures

constitute a deficient performance. Willis has therefore waived appellate review of

this sub-issue. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); Lucio, 351 S.W.3d at 896–97; Chaves,

630 S.W.3d at 555.

      But even if she had not waived this sub-issue, the record does not affirmatively

demonstrate that counsel was unprepared for trial. First, contrary to Willis’s

assertion, counsel filed a motion for continuance three days before voir dire and ten

days before the guilt-innocence phase of trial began. Counsel argued in the motion

and at a hearing on the motion prior to voir dire that a continuance was appropriate

because voir dire was to be conducted at NRG stadium due to the COVID-19

pandemic. Conducting voir dire in that manner would prevent adequate observation

                                         12
of the venire members’ non-verbal communication, such as facial expressions and

body language, and it would be difficult to see and hear each individual venire

person. On their face, counsel’s arguments supporting the motion appear to be a

reasonable strategic decision to seek a better venue for the voir dire proceeding.

      Second, counsel’s decision to waive an opening statement is an “inherently

tactical” decision. Brennan v. State, 334 S.W.3d 64, 77 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009,

no pet.) (quoting Taylor v. State, 947 S.W.2d 698, 704 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

1997, pet. ref’d)); see Darkins v. State, 430 S.W.3d 559, 570 (Tex. App.—Houston

[14th Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d) (“Whether to deliver an opening statement is entirely

optional. ‘Few matters during a criminal trial could be more imbued with strategic

implications than the exercise of this option.’”) (citation omitted). Counsel gave

closing arguments at the end of both phases of trial. The record is silent concerning

counsel’s reason for not giving an opening statement.

      Third, Willis cites to only one instance in which she asked her counsel to

speak up during his closing argument at the guilt-innocence phase. Our review of

the record indicates that there were other instances over the course of the seven-day

trial in which counsel could not hear or be heard. However, the reasons counsel could

not hear or be heard are not clear on the face of the appellate record. Willis does not

point to any part of the record indicating that the failures to hear or to be heard caused

any issue. We cannot conclude that this constituted an unsound trial strategy.

                                           13
      Fourth, Willis challenges defense counsel’s decision not to cross-examine

several witnesses. Willis does not provide substantive analysis of this issue or record

citations supporting her argument. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); Lucio, 351 S.W.3d at

896–97; Chaves, 630 S.W.3d at 555. She has therefore waived appellate review of

this sub-issue.

      In any event, “[c]ross-examination is inherently risky, and a decision not to

cross-examine a witness is often the result of wisdom acquired by experience in the

combat of trial.” Jones v. State, 500 S.W.3d 106, 115 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (quoting Ex parte McFarland, 163 S.W.3d 743, 756 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2005)). An ineffective cross-examination can bolster a witness’s credibility

and “underscore the very points that are sought to be impeached.” Id. (quoting

Dannhaus v. State, 928 S.W.2d 81, 88 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, pet.

ref’d)). Thus, unless a good reason exists to cross-examine a witness, “it can be more

effective to refrain from cross-examining a damaging witness to minimize the

impact of his testimony.” Id. (quoting Dannhaus, 928 S.W.2d at 88). Counsel’s

decision not to cross-examine certain witnesses can constitute a sound trial strategy,

and the record does not affirmatively demonstrate that this strategy was unsound.

      3.     Lodging Objections and Raising “Crucial Issues” at Trial

      Willis next argues that her counsel lodged only one objection at trial, which

was to the admission of a photograph of Mickey’s deceased body, and counsel for

                                          14
the State had to assist defense counsel in making this objection. Our review of the

record, however, reveals that counsel raised numerous objections during voir dire

and the seven-day trial in this case. Thus, we disagree with Willis’s assertion that

her counsel lodged only one objection and therefore counsel’s performance was

deficient.

             a.    Extraneous Offense Evidence

      Willis also argues that her counsel should have objected to “highly prejudicial

testimony” about a remote, uncharged extraneous offense under Rule of Evidence

403. See TEX. R. EVID. 403 (providing that court may exclude relevant evidence if

its probative value is substantially outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice). During

the guilt-innocence phase of trial, Joseph Ballard testified that he observed Willis

stab Mickey with a knife in 2000 or 2001. Willis’s counsel did not object to this

testimony.

      Assuming without deciding that this evidence should have been excluded

under Rule 403 and counsel was deficient in not objecting to it, Willis has not

established prejudice, or a reasonable probability that excluding the evidence would

have resulted in a different outcome. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Johnson, 624

S.W.3d at 587. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Johnson, 624 S.W.3d at 587.

If the deficient performance might have affected a guilty verdict, the question is

                                         15
whether there is a reasonable probability that without the errors the factfinder would

have had a reasonable doubt regarding guilt. Johnson, 624 S.W.3d at 587. Appellate

courts examine the totality of the representation and the evidence in evaluating

counsel’s effectiveness. Id.

      The evidence at trial showed that Mickey had been having an affair for a few

months prior to his death and that he intended to divorce Willis. Willis’s text

messages revealed that she knew about the affair, and she texted a friend the day

before Mickey’s death that she was “[p]utting [her] plan into motion” when

discussing her marital problems. Very soon after Mickey died, Willis left the house

in Spring with her children, took Mickey’s cell phone, and went to Humble. Neither

she nor the children ever returned to the Spring house. Willis did not call or text

Mickey at all after his death, even though she had called and texted him numerous

times in the days before his death. Willis also called in sick to work for several days

around the time of Mickey’s death, but the evidence showed that she was not actually

ill. Furthermore, when law enforcement discovered Mickey’s body, there were no

signs of forced entry into the house.

      Considering this evidence, we cannot conclude that a reasonable probability

exists that the jury would have had a reasonable doubt regarding Willis’s guilt if the

evidence of the extraneous offense had been excluded at trial. See id. Therefore,

Willis has not established the second prong of an ineffective assistance claim on this

                                          16
sub-issue. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 694; see also Williams, 301 S.W.3d at

687 (stating that failure to satisfy one Strickland prong negates need to consider

other prong).

             b.    Sudden Passion Instruction

      Willis also argues that her counsel failed to raise sudden passion at the

punishment phase of trial. Willis does not point to any trial evidence supporting

sudden passion or provide substantive analysis showing that the evidence entitled

her to a jury instruction on sudden passion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); Lucio, 351

S.W.3d at 896–97; Chaves, 630 S.W.3d at 555. Willis has therefore waived appellate

review of this sub-issue.

      Nevertheless, the record before us does not affirmatively demonstrate that

counsel was ineffective for failing to raise sudden passion. Our review of the record

does not reveal any evidence tending to show that Willis “caused [Mickey’s] death

under the immediate influence of sudden passion arising from an adequate cause.”

See TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.02(d) (defining sudden passion). She did not admit to

shooting Mickey, but rather she denied doing so when she testified during the

punishment phase of trial. It is possible that evidence of sudden passion existed and

that counsel was deficient in not investigating or presenting such evidence at trial.

See id. (stating that defendant has burden to prove sudden passion by preponderance

of evidence and, if proved, offense is reduced to second-degree felony). But on the

                                         17
silent record before us, we cannot conclude that counsel was deficient in not raising

sudden passion in this case.

      4.     Instruction on Lesser-Included Offense of Manslaughter

      Willis also argues generally that counsel was ineffective for failing to object

to the omission of a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of manslaughter.1

However, her argument focuses only on the prejudice prong of an ineffective

assistance claim. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Willis offers no argument or

analysis showing that she was entitled to the instruction or that counsel’s

performance was deficient. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); Lucio, 351 S.W.3d at 896–

97; Ex parte Nailor, 149 S.W.3d 125, 133–34 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (stating that

counsel does not perform deficiently by not requesting jury instruction to which

defendant is not entitled); Shanklin v. State, 190 S.W.3d 154, 159 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. dism’d) (stating that defendant must establish

entitlement to jury instruction on lesser-included offense to establish counsel’s

deficient performance in failing to request instruction). Moreover, the record is silent

concerning counsel’s reasons for not requesting a manslaughter instruction. See

1
      A person commits manslaughter if she recklessly causes the death of an individual.
      TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.04(a). Neither party disputes that manslaughter is a lesser-
      included offense of murder. See Gilbert v. State, 196 S.W.3d 163, 165 (Tex. App.—
      Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d).

                                          18
Johnson, 624 S.W.3d at 585–86. Therefore, we cannot conclude on the record before

us that counsel was ineffective for failing to request a manslaughter instruction.

      5.     Mitigating Evidence

      Willis also generally argues that her counsel was ineffective for failing to

investigate potential mitigating evidence or present any mitigating evidence during

the punishment phase of trial.

      Defense counsel’s “failure to uncover and present voluminous mitigating

evidence at sentencing is not a reasonable tactical decision where counsel has not

‘fulfilled their obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant’s

background.’” Ex parte Garza, 620 S.W.3d 801, 824 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021)

(quoting Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 522). “[C]ounsel can only make a reasonable decision

to forgo presentation of mitigating evidence after evaluating available testimony and

determining it would not be helpful.” Lair v. State, 265 S.W.3d 580, 595 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. ref’d). In assessing the reasonableness of an

attorney’s investigation, a court “must consider not only the quantum of evidence

already known to counsel, but also whether the known evidence would lead a

reasonable attorney to investigate further.” Ex parte Garza, 620 S.W.3d at 824

(quoting Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 527). “When trial counsel does not conduct a complete

investigation, his conduct is ‘reasonable only to the extent that reasonable

                                         19
professional judgments support the limitations on investigation.’” Id. (quoting

Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 533).

      Willis relies only upon her motion for new trial to support her argument.

However, a motion for new trial is not self-proving and does not constitute evidence.

Lamb v. State, 680 S.W.2d 11, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); Burrus v. State, 266

S.W.3d 107, 112 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, no pet.). Willis attached four

affidavits to the motion for new trial, but these affidavits do not constitute evidence

until they are offered and admitted into evidence at a hearing on the motion for new

trial. Lamb, 680 S.W.2d at 13; Burrus, 266 S.W.3d at 112. Willis did not request a

hearing on her motion for new trial, and the motion was denied by operation of law

without a hearing. Thus, neither the motion nor its supporting affidavits are

competent evidence.

      Because the record in this direct appeal does not affirmatively demonstrate

that defense counsel performed deficiently, Willis has not met her burden to defeat

the strong presumption that counsel’s trial conduct fell within the wide range of

reasonable professional assistance.2 See Johnson, 624 S.W.3d at 585–86; see also

Williams, 301 S.W.3d at 687 (stating that failure to satisfy one Strickland prong

2
      Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel rejected on direct appeal may be
      resubmitted in an application for a writ of habeas corpus. Johnson v. State, 624
      S.W.3d 579, 588 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021); Lopez v. State, 343 S.W.3d 137, 143
      (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).

                                          20
negates court’s need to consider other prong). We overrule Willis’s first issue to the

extent she argues that her trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel.

            Instruction on Lesser-Included Offense of Manslaughter

      Within her first issue, Willis raises a separate issue which we construe as her

second issue: whether the trial court erred by failing to sua sponte include a jury

instruction on the lesser-included offense of manslaughter. The State contends that

Willis did not preserve error on this issue by objecting to the omission of a

manslaughter instruction in the trial court.3

      In each felony criminal case, the trial court must submit to the jury “a written

charge distinctly setting forth the law applicable to the case.” TEX. CODE CRIM.

PROC. art. 36.14; see Williams v. State, 662 S.W.3d 452, 460 (Tex. Crim. App.

2021). A jury charge should include “all of the law applicable to the criminal offense

3
      The State also argues that Cynthia’s sub-issue concerning omission of a jury
      instruction on the lesser-included offense of manslaughter is impermissibly
      multifarious because it argues both that counsel was ineffective for not requesting
      the instruction and that the trial court erred by not sua sponte including such an
      instruction. A point of error is multifarious when it is based on more than one legal
      theory. Davis v. State, 329 S.W.3d 798, 820 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). By combining
      more than one contention in a single point of error, an appellant risks rejection of
      the entire point of error on the ground that nothing will be presented for review.
      Foster v. State, 101 S.W.3d 490, 499 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no
      pet.). However, an appellate court may address a multifarious point that is
      sufficiently developed in the brief. Id.; see Davis, 329 S.W.3d at 820 (deciding to
      review multifarious point of error “in the interest of justice”). Although we agree
      with the State that the sub-issue is multifarious, Cynthia sufficiently developed both
      points such that the Court can identify the points she has made. In the interest of
      justice, we will consider Cynthia’s multifarious point.

                                            21
that is set out in the indictment or information” as well as other general

admonishments. Mendez v. State, 545 S.W.3d 548, 552 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018)

(quoting Delgado v. State, 235 S.W.3d 244, 249 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). “These

matters are always ‘law applicable to the case[,]’” and a trial court must instruct the

jury on these issues sua sponte without prompting from counsel because “the trial

judge is ultimately responsible for the accuracy of the jury charge and accompanying

instructions.” Id. (quoting Delgado, 235 S.W.3d at 249).

      Generally, a defendant may raise a claim of jury-charge error on appeal

regardless of whether the defendant preserved the alleged error in the trial court. See

Williams, 662 S.W.3d at 460–61; Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1984) (op. on reh’g); State v. Sciacca, 518 S.W.3d 460, 464 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.). If the defendant properly objected, the

reviewing court determines whether the error caused some harm. Williams, 662

S.W.3d at 460. If the defendant did not object, the reviewing court determines

whether the error caused egregious harm. Id. at 460–61.

      When, however, the defendant complains about the omission of a defensive

instruction in the jury charge, this framework with its two standards of review does

not apply. Id. at 461. Rather, “unrequested defensive instructions are still subject to

ordinary rules of procedural default.” Id.; see Posey v. State, 966 S.W.2d 57, 62

(Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (holding that defensive issue is not law applicable to case

                                          22
unless defendant timely requests inclusion or objects to omission in jury charge).

Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1 provides that, as a prerequisite to presenting a

complaint for appellate review, the record must show that the complaint was made

by a timely request, objection, or motion stating the grounds of the complaint with

sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of the complaint and the trial court

ruled or refused to rule on the complaint. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a). Requiring a timely,

specific objection serves two purposes: (1) it notifies the trial court of the objection

and affords an opportunity for a ruling; and (2) it affords opposing counsel an

opportunity to respond to the complaint. Williams, 662 S.W.3d at 460. A defendant

must preserve error in a defensive instruction before he may seek appellate review

of the error. Id. at 461.

       The Court of Criminal Appeals has held that rules governing preservation of

error apply to the omission of an unrequested lesser-included offense instruction

from a jury charge. Id.; Mendez, 545 S.W.3d at 552; Tolbert v. State, 306 S.W.3d

776, 781 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Posey, 966 S.W.2d at 61–62. Like other defensive

instructions, lesser-included offense instructions “frequently depend upon trial

strategy and tactics,” and therefore lesser-included offenses are not considered “the

law applicable to the case.” Williams, 662 S.W.3d at 461 (quoting Tolbert, 306

S.W.3d at 780–81); see Mendez, 545 S.W.3d at 552. Consequently, a criminal

defendant must request a lesser-included offense instruction and object to the

                                           23
omission of such an instruction in writing presented to the trial court before the

charge is read to the jury. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 36.14; Williams,

662 S.W.3d at 461; Posey, 966 S.W.2d at 61–62. Absent a request, a trial court is

not required to instruct the jury on lesser-included offenses. Williams, 662 S.W.3d at

461; Tolbert, 306 S.W.3d at 780–81; Posey, 966 S.W.2d at 62. And absent an

objection to the omission of a lesser-included offense instruction, the defendant has

not preserved error and may not present the complaint for review on appeal.

Williams, 662 S.W.3d at 461.

      On appeal, Willis acknowledges that she did not object to the omission of a

jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of manslaughter. See TEX. R. APP. P.

33.1(a). She nevertheless relies on the dual standard of review generally applicable

to jury charge error, under which reviewing courts will reverse unpreserved jury

charge error upon a showing of egregious harm. See Williams, 662 S.W.3d at 460–

61; Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171. However, this dual standard does not apply when,

as here, the complaint concerns the allegedly erroneous omission of a defensive

instruction, such as an instruction on a lesser-included offense. See Williams,

662 S.W.3d at 461. Because Willis did not object to the omission of a jury

instruction concerning the lesser-included offense of manslaughter, we conclude that

she did not preserve this complaint for appellate review. See id.; Tolbert, 306 S.W.3d

at 781 (holding that, in capital murder case, “trial court had no duty to sua sponte

                                         24
instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of murder and that a jury instruction

on this lesser-included offense was not ‘applicable to the case’ absent a request by

the defense for its inclusion in the jury charge”). We overrule Willis’s second issue.

                  Admissibility of Extraneous Offense Evidence

      In her third issue, Willis argues that the trial court erred by admitting evidence

that she had stabbed Mickey twenty years earlier because it was too remote in time

to be admissible and it caused undue prejudice. The State contends that Willis failed

to preserve this issue for appellate review. We agree with the State.

      As stated above, to preserve error for appellate review, the record must show

that the complaint was made to the trial court by a timely request, objection, or

motion with sufficient specificity to apprise the trial court of the complaint. TEX. R.

APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A). If a defendant does not timely object to the admission of

evidence, she does not preserve error in the admission of that evidence for appellate

review. Saldano v. State, 70 S.W.3d 873, 889–90 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Zill v.

State, 355 S.W.3d 778, 789 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.);

Thompson v. State, 4 S.W.3d 884, 886–87 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999,

pet. ref’d) (stating that defendant must object to preserve error in admission of

extraneous offense evidence).

      At trial, the State called Mickey’s longtime friend to testify. Anticipating the

witness’s testimony, the State asked to approach the bench and, outside the presence

                                          25
of the jury, informed the court that the State intended to elicit testimony about a

stabbing incident that had been disclosed to defense counsel. Defense counsel did

not object to the testimony. The friend then testified that he witnessed Willis stab

Mickey with a knife outside the couple’s home in 2000 or 2001.

      Willis did not object to this testimony. Accordingly, we hold that she did not

preserve error on the admissibility of this extraneous offense evidence. See TEX. R.

APP. P. 33.1(a); Saldano, 70 S.W.3d at 889–90; Zill, 355 S.W.3d at 789; Thompson,

4 S.W.3d at 886–87. We overrule Willis’s third issue.

                                   Conclusion

      We affirm the judgment of conviction by the jury.

                                                April L. Farris
                                                Justice

Panel consists of Justices Hightower, Rivas-Molloy, and Farris.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

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