Court Opinion

ID: 9899620
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-17 06:08:34.68619+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:42.610094
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                           COURT OF APPEALS

23771 BLACKSTONE, LLC,                                              UNPUBLISHED
                                                                    November 16, 2023
               Plaintiff-Appellant,

v                                                                   No. 364333
                                                                    Wayne Circuit Court
CONIFER INSURANCE COMPANY,                                          LC No. 20-013744-CB

               Defendant-Appellee.

Before: BOONSTRA, P.J., and GADOLA and MALDONADO, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

       Plaintiff appeals by right the trial court’s order granting summary disposition in favor of
defendant and denying plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary disposition. We affirm.

                   I. PERTINENT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

        On June 20, 2020, a fire occurred at plaintiff’s building in Warren, Michigan; the building
housed a marijuana growing operation. Defendant insured the property against fire and other
hazards under a commercial property insurance policy that defendant originally issued in 2017 and
renewed annually thereafter. The parties do not dispute that defendant’s policy included a
Protective Safeguards Endorsement (PSE), which provided, in pertinent part:

               PROTECTIVE SAFEGUARDS

               1. As a condition of this insurance, you are required to maintain the
       protective devices or services listed in the Schedule above.

               2. The protective safeguards to which this endorsement applies are
       identified by the following symbols:

                                             * * *

                                               -1-
                 “P-9” The protective system described in the Schedule. [Emphasis added.]

A text box on the first page of the PSE under the heading “SCHEDULE” contained the following
text:

          Describe any “P-9”: Premises #1:Automatic Extinguishing System.[1]

         After the fire, plaintiff filed a claim under the policy, but defendant denied the claim
because the property did not have an automatic extinguishing system (AES). Defendant’s denial
letter stated:

          After inspection of the property and verifying with your Public Adjustor with
          National Claims Service, LLC and in speaking with you during our initial
          conversation, we identified that the property does not possess a classified “P-9:
          Automatic Extinguishing System.” As per the . . . Protective Safeguards
          Endorsement, a classified “P-9: Automatic Extinguishing System is require[d] in
          the event of loss caused by fire. With no “P-9: Automatic Extinguishing System”
          in place, this loss is therefore excluded from coverage.

        Plaintiff sued, asserting claims for breach of contract (Count I) and equitable relief in the
form of reformation of the insurance policy (Count II). In Count II, plaintiff alleged that defendant
had repeatedly inspected the property and “was aware, or should have been aware, from the
inspection and other sources, that the property did not have an automatic sprinkler system.”
Plaintiff alleged that, under the circumstances, it would be “inequitable” to allow defendant to
deny coverage because it did not have an AES on the property, and argued that the policy should
be reformed to remove the exclusion that prohibited coverage if the property did not have an AES.

        The trial court entered a stipulated order recognizing that the parties agreed that plaintiff’s
property did not have an AES on the date of the fire. The order provided that “the fact that Plaintiff
did not maintain an automatic extinguishing system on June 20, 2020 at 23771 & 23871
Blackstone Ave, Warren, MI 48089, is hereby determined to be an established fact for purposes of
the present action.”

        Defendant moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that the
policy language was clear and unambiguous, and that because plaintiff did not have an AES on its
property, it was precluded from recovering fire protection benefits under the terms of the policy.
Defendant also argued that plaintiff was not entitled to equitable relief in the form of reformation
because it was deemed to have constructive knowledge of the terms of the insurance policy,
including conditions of coverage, and to the extent that it may have mistakenly believed that an
AES was not required as a condition of coverage, it was not a mutual mistake of fact because
defendant did not share that same belief or understanding.

     Plaintiff filed a response to defendant’s motion, as well as its own cross-motion for
summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that defendant was aware that plaintiff’s

1
    The parties agree that the fire occurred at “Premises #1” as listed in the PSE.

                                                   -2-
property did not have an AES—as indicated in multiple inspection reports that defendant
received—but continued to renew the policy. Accordingly, plaintiff argued that defendant should
be estopped from denying coverage for lack of an AES. Plaintiff also argued that the PSE was
ambiguous because it referred to an AES as a condition of coverage, but it did not actually define
the system. Plaintiff further argued that the policy should be reformed on the basis of a mutual
mistake between the parties, asserting that the parties did not intend to preclude coverage for a fire
loss on the basis of the absence on the property of an AES.

        The trial court granted defendant’s motion and denied plaintiff’s motion. It held that
defendant was entitled to summary disposition because the policy unambiguously precluded
coverage if the insured property did not have an AES, and it was undisputed that there was no AES
on plaintiff’s property. The trial court also held that defendant’s inspections of the property did
not operate as a waiver of the policy language requiring an AES. The court noted that the
inspections were for defendant’s purposes, not plaintiff’s benefit. The trial court also rejected
plaintiff’s arguments that defendant was estopped from enforcing the AES requirement, and that
the policy should be reformed to remove the AES requirement. This appeal followed.

                                  II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

       This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition.
Ass’n of Home Help Care Agencies v Dep’t of Health & Human Servs, 334 Mich App 674, 684;
965 NW2d 707 (2020).

               A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10), . . . tests the factual sufficiency of a
       claim. Johnson v VanderKooi, 502 Mich 751, 761, 918 NW2d 785 (2018). When
       considering such a motion, a trial court must consider all evidence submitted by the
       parties in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Id. A motion
       under MCR 2.116(C)(10) may only be granted when there is no genuine issue of
       material fact. Lowrey v LMPS & LMPJ, Inc, 500 Mich 1, 5; 890 NW2d 344 (2016).
       “A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record leaves open an issue upon
       which reasonable minds might differ.” Johnson, 502 Mich at 761 (quotation marks,
       citation, and brackets omitted in original). [El-Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc,
       504 Mich 152, 160; 934 NW2d 665 (2019).]

        This Court also reviews de novo issues of contract interpretation, including the
interpretation of policy language. Wilkie v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 469 Mich 41, 47; 664 NW2d 776
(2003). Additionally, we review de novo the applicability of the doctrine of equitable estoppel,
Sylvan Twp v City of Chelsea, 313 Mich App 305, 315-316; 882 NW2d 545 (2015), and a trial
court’s decision whether to grant equitable relief in the form of reformation of an insurance policy.
Johnson v USA Underwriters, 328 Mich App 223, 233-234; 936 NW2d 834 (2019).

                                         III. AMBIGUITY

       Initially, plaintiff argues that the language of the policy is ambiguous, and that it should be
construed against defendant and in favor of coverage because an AES is not defined in the PSE.
We disagree.

                                                 -3-
         When interpreting a contract, this Court’s goal is to determine the intent of the parties.
Barshaw v Allegheny Performance Plastics, Inc, 334 Mich App 741, 748; 965 NW2d 729 (2020).
If the language of a contract is unambiguous, we will enforce the contract as written, unless it is
contrary to public policy. Id. (citations omitted). Conversely, “[a] contract is ambiguous if its
words can be reasonably understood in different ways or when its provisions irreconcilably
conflict.” Wagner v Farm Bureau Mut Ins Co of Mich, 321 Mich App 251, 258; 908 NW2d 327
(2017). But a contractual provision is not ambiguous merely because a term is not defined or
because the parties may disagree on the meaning of a term. Wasik v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 341
Mich App 691, 696; 992 NW2d 332 (2022). This Court will construe an ambiguity in the contract
against the insurer and in favor of coverage, but “ ‘only . . . if all conventional means of contract
interpretation, including the consideration of relevant extrinsic evidence, have left the [factfinder]
unable to determine what the parties intended their contract to mean.’ ” Id., quoting Klapp v United
Ins Group Agency, Inc, 468 Mich 459, 471; 663 NW2d 447 (2003).

       We disagree with plaintiff that the language of the PSE is ambiguous because it does not
provide a definition of a “P-9” or AES. The PSE refers to a P-9 system as “the protective system
described in the Schedule,” and the schedule itself refers to the P-9 as an AES. Additionally,
§ A(2) of the PSE provides a definition of an “automatic sprinkler system,” stating that it means:

              a. any automatic fire protective or extinguishing system, including
       connected:

               (1) Sprinklers and discharge nozzles;

               (2) Ducts, pipes, valves, and fittings;

               (3) Tanks, their component parts and supports; and

               (4) Pumps and private fire protection mains.

               b. When supplied from an automatic fire protective system;

               (1) Non-automatic fire protective systems; and hydrants, standpipes, and
       outlets. [Emphasis added.]

Accordingly, we reject plaintiff’s contention that the PSE is ambiguous because it does not
adequately explain the meaning of an AES.2

       Plaintiff also relies on Westfield Ins Co v Enterprise 522, LLC, 34 F Supp 3d 737 (ED
Mich, 2014), in support of its argument that the policy is ambiguous.3 The plaintiff in that case

2
 Plaintiff does not explain how, under any reasonable interpretation of the PSE language, a reader
could have been left with the belief that no sprinkler system or other form of fire-protection system
was required as a condition of coverage.
3
 Decisions of lower federal courts are not binding on this Court, but may be considered for their
persuasive effect. See Abela v Gen Motors Corp, 469 Mich 603, 607; 677 NW2d 325 (2004).

                                                 -4-
issued a fire insurance policy after an insurance agent mistakenly represented on the defendant’s
application that the property had an automatic sprinkler system. In 2011, an inspector reported to
the plaintiff insurer that a sprinkler system was not in place, but the plaintiff still renewed the
policy with a reduced premium. Id. at 742. After a fire completely destroyed the defendant’s
building in 2012, the plaintiff insurer denied coverage because an automatic sprinkler system was
not in place. Id. at 743. The court held that the exclusion in question was “patently ambiguous”
on its face, and that a reading of the policy as a whole, including the endorsement and the
declarations page, failed to demonstrate that the exclusionary language was a condition of fire
coverage. Id. at 744. As the court in Westfield noted, the exclusion was only defined on one page
of the policy, the protective safeguards endorsement, but it was not actually listed on the schedule
of that endorsement. Id. The policy provided only that “as a condition of insurance [defendant]
is required to maintain the protective devices or services listed in the schedule above.” Id. at 742.
The court explained that

       “P–1 is the code for automatic sprinklers and it was not listed in the schedule. The
       schedule said “Information required to complete this Schedule, if not shown above,
       will be shown in the Declarations.” P-1 was referenced in the Declarations, but not
       listed as a limitation on coverage; instead, it was listed under “Optional Coverages.”
       [Id.]

In denying the plaintiff insurer’s motion for summary judgment, the court first noted that when
coverage under the policy was conditioned on an exclusion, the insurer said so explicitly, but that
the insurer did not so condition fire coverage on having a sprinkler system. Id. at 745. Further,
given the testimony of Westfield’s representatives that if the underwriters had corrected the file to
reflect that a sprinkler system was not in place, fire coverage would have still issued without the
P-1 condition, it was “clear that the exclusion was not intended to be part of the agreement.” Id.

        Westfield is factually distinguishable from this case. In Westfield, the exclusion did not
actually list a required protective device or service in the schedule, despite directing its insured to
“maintain the protective devices or services listed in the schedule above.” In this case, the PSE
clearly indicates that plaintiff was required to maintain a “P-9” system as a condition of insurance,
and as stated, defines both a P-9 and an AES with sufficient clarity to avoid confusion—at least in
this case, in which it is undisputed that plaintiff did not have any sort of automatic sprinkler or fire
extinguishing device in place. Accordingly, we agree with the trial court that Westfield is factually
distinguishable and does not support plaintiff’s argument that the policy is ambiguous. Wilkie,
469 Mich at 47.

                          IV. NOTICE AND EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL

       Plaintiff also argues that defendant should be precluded from denying coverage based on
both the terms of the policy and the doctrine of equitable estoppel. We disagree.

        Plaintiff argues that the language of the PSE prevents defendant from denying coverage
when it had notice that plaintiff did not have an AES on the property. In support of this argument,
plaintiff relies on § B(1) of the PSE, which provides:

                                                  -5-
                We will not pay for loss or damage caused by or resulting from fire if, prior
       to the fire, you:

               1. Knew of any suspension or impairment in any protective safeguard listed
       in the Schedule above and failed to notify us of that fact[.][4]

Plaintiff argues that defendant could not deny coverage under this provision because it applies
only if defendant was not notified of a suspension or impairment in a protective safeguard, and
that defendant had received actual notice, through its own inspections, that there was no AES on
the property. However, defendant did not rely on § B(1) as a basis for denying coverage. Rather,
defendant denied coverage under § A(1), which expressly provides that the presence of an AES on
the property is a “condition of this insurance.” It is undisputed that plaintiff did not have the
required AES on its property. It was the total absence of an AES on the property, not any
suspension or impairment of an existing system, that was the basis for defendant’s denial of
coverage. Therefore, plaintiff’s reliance on § B(1) is misplaced.

       Plaintiff also argues that defendant should be equitably estopped from denying coverage.
We disagree. In Lakeside Oakland Dev, LC v H & J Beef Co, 249 Mich App 517, 527; 644 NW2d
765 (2002), this Court explained the doctrine of equitable estoppel as follows:

               Equitable estoppel is not an independent cause of action, but instead a
       doctrine that may assist a party by precluding the opposing party from asserting or
       denying the existence of a particular fact. Equitable estoppel may arise where (1)
       a party, by representations, admissions, or silence intentionally or negligently
       induces another party to believe facts, (2) the other party justifiably relies and acts
       on that belief, and (3) the other party is prejudiced if the first party is allowed to
       deny the existence of those facts. [Citations omitted.]

        Plaintiff cites Gordon v St Paul Fire & Marine Ins Co, 197 Mich 226, 234; 163 NW 556
(1917), in which the Supreme Court held that an insurance company was equitably estopped from
“asserting a forfeiture for a condition of the premises existing at the time of [a] fire, which existed
to the knowledge of the company at the making of the contract, and which condition of the
premises it was not agreed by the contract of insurance was to be changed.” We find Gordon
distinguishable from this case. In Gordon, the policy at issue contained language indicating that
the entire policy was void if a building on the property “be or become vacant or unoccupied and
so remain for ten days.” The evidence at trial demonstrated that the property was vacant at the
time the defendant issued the policy and was periodically vacant over three years until the fire, and
further that the defendant was aware that the subject property was vacant at the time it issued the
policy and that the plaintiff would be renting the property to tenants. The Court held that the
insurer was estopped from relying on the property’s vacancy as a basis for excluding coverage,
noting that “the premises were in the same condition, to the knowledge of the company, as when

4
  § B(2) of the PSE also provided that defendant would not pay for fire loss or damage if the
plaintiff “[f]ailed to maintain any protective safeguard listed in the Schedule above, and over which
you had control, in complete working order.”

                                                 -6-
the contract of insurance was entered into; there was no agreement in the policy that the condition
of the premises should be changed.” Id. at 241.

         In this case, unlike in Gordon, the lack of an AES did not render the entire insurance policy
void; fire insurance was only a portion of the commercial insurance policy between plaintiff and
defendant, and the lack of an AES would only operate to deny certain types of claims. And there
was no evidence that defendant was aware at the time the policy was entered into that the property
lacked an AES and would continue to do so throughout the term of the policy and several renewals.
The language of the PSE can be read as informing plaintiff of a simple requirement for coverage
for fire damage, or in other words, “an agreement in the policy that the condition of the premises
should be changed” for there to be coverage. Gordon, 197 Mich at 241. Gordon therefore does
not aid plaintiff.

        Additionally, plaintiff presented evidence demonstrating that defendant had performed
regular inspections of the property, and had noted that the premises did not contain a sprinkler
system. As the trial court observed, however, the inspection reports were prepared solely for
defendant’s benefit, not for plaintiff, and there is no evidence of any “representations, admissions,
or silence” by defendant, intentionally or negligently, that induced plaintiff to believe certain facts.
Lakeside Oakland Dev, LC, 249 Mich App at 527. We agree with the trial court that plaintiff could
not rely on the inspection reports as modification, waiver, or abandonment of the otherwise clear
language of the PSE, which obligated plaintiff to have an AES as a condition of fire protection
coverage. The policy expressly required that any changes to “[the] policy’s terms . . . be amended
or waived only by endorsement issued by us and made a part of this policy.” Accordingly, the
trial court did not err by holding that there were no genuine issues of material fact regarding
whether defendant should be equitably estopped from denying fire protection coverage.

                                      V. MUTUAL MISTAKE

        Plaintiff also argues that the trial court erred by denying plaintiff’s claim that the insurance
policy should be reformed due to a mutual mistake by the parties. We disagree.

       In certain circumstances, a trial court has the equitable authority to reform an insurance
policy “so that it conforms to the agreement actually made.” Johnson v USA Underwriters, Inc,
328 Mich App 223, 234; 936 NW2d 834 (2019). In Wolf v Mahar, 308 Mich App 120, 129; 862
NW2d 668 (2014), this Court, quoting Casey v Auto Owners Ins Co, 273 Mich App 388, 398; 729
NW2d 277 (2007), explained:

       A court of equity has power to reform the contract to make it conform to the
       agreement actually made. To obtain reformation, a plaintiff must prove a mutual
       mistake of fact, or mistake on one side and fraud on the other, by clear and
       convincing evidence. A unilateral mistake is not sufficient to warrant reformation.
       A mistake in law . . . is not a basis for reformation.

A mistake of fact occurs when both parties share and rely on an erroneous belief regarding a
material fact that affects the substance of the transaction. Wolf, 308 Mich App at 126. Conversely,
a mistake of law is a mistake by one side or the other regarding the legal effect of an agreement.
Johnson, 328 Mich App at 234-235.

                                                  -7-
        Plaintiff asserts that the AES requirement should not bar coverage for its fire loss because
both it and defendant were fully aware that an AES did not exist at the property. Plaintiff was
aware because it owned the property, and defendant was aware because multiple inspections
revealed that there was no AES on the property. However, the mere fact that defendant and
plaintiff may have been aware that the property did not have an AES does not establish that the
parties mutually understood and agreed that an AES was not required as a condition of coverage.
As stated, the policy unambiguously required that the property have an AES as a condition of
coverage, and there is no evidence that defendant ever intended or agreed that an AES was not
necessary. At best, plaintiff has demonstrated that plaintiff was unaware of the impact of not
having an AES on its insurance coverage, but plaintiff has not demonstrated that defendant shared
this same belief or otherwise did not intend that plaintiff have an AES on its property as a condition
of coverage for a fire loss despite the express terms of the policy. Wolf, 308 Mich App at 126. We
agree with the trial court that there is no evidence of a mutually shared factual mistake by the
parties regarding the impact of not having an AES at the property on the availability of coverage.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err by failing to reform the insurance policy.

                                       VI. OTHER ISSUES

        Plaintiff also argues that defendant was not entitled to summary disposition because there
are genuine issues of material fact to be decided by a jury regarding (1) whether plaintiff’s existing
fire prevention equipment was sufficient to meet defendant’s expectations under the insurance
policy, and (2) whether defendant engaged in inequitable conduct by continuing to collect
premiums from plaintiff while knowing that it would not be liable for any fire loss because
plaintiff’s property did not have an AES. We disagree.

         In support of this claim, plaintiff argues that the inspection reports regarding the subject
property detail the lack of deficiencies and hazards, state “that the loss control efforts appear to be
effective,” and note that fire extinguishers were present on the premises. For example, a July 18,
2017 inspection report states that portable fire extinguishers are present on the premises, and, on
the basis of the survey, the risk of loss was considered to be “[s]atisfactory.” Similarly, a July 18,
2019 inspection report again notes the presence of fire extinguishers on the premises, and again
states that the risk was considered to be satisfactory.

        The evidence on which plaintiff relies merely establishes that fire extinguishers were kept
on the property. Defendant’s policy, however, required that the property have an “automatic” fire
extinguishing system. Plaintiff did not offer any evidence that its equipment was designed to
operate automatically in the event of a fire. Moreover, plaintiff stipulated that it “did not maintain
an automatic extinguishing system” on its property on the date of the fire and, due to that
stipulation, the trial court ordered that “the fact that Plaintiff did not maintain an automatic
extinguishing system on June 20, 2020 at 23771 & 23871 Blackstone Ave, Warren, MI 48089, is
hereby determined to be an established fact for purposes of the present action.” Plaintiff cannot
stipulate to facts and subsequently argue that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding those
same facts. See MCR 2.116(A)(2); Dana Corp v Appeal Bd of Mich Employment Sec Comm’n,
371 Mich 107, 110; 123 NW2d 277 (1963) (stating that “once stipulations have been received and
approved they are sacrosanct”). Accordingly, there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding
whether plaintiff’s fire prevention equipment was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the PSE.

                                                 -8-
        Plaintiff also asserts that summary disposition was not warranted because of a “question of
inequitable conduct, given that Defendant has accepted premiums knowing that it would not have
to pay a claim, should be properly placed before a jury.” We disagree. We have discussed the
issue of equitable estoppel. To the extent that plaintiff’s argument differs from its equitable
estoppel argument, plaintiff does not offer any meaningful legal argument or cite any legal
authority in support of it. Therefore, this argument has been abandoned. Badiee v Brighton Area
Sch, 265 Mich App 343, 359-360; 695 NW2d 521 (2005) (“A party waives an issue when it gives
the issue cursory treatment on appeal.”); ER Drugs v Dep’t of Health & Human Servs, 341 Mich
App 133, 146-147; 988 NW2d 826 (2022) (“It is not sufficient for a party simply to announce a
position or assert an error and then leave it up to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis
for his claims, or unravel and elaborate for him his arguments, and then search for authority either
to sustain or reject his position.”) (citation omitted).

       Affirmed.

                                                             /s/ Mark T. Boonstra
                                                             /s/ Michael F. Gadola
                                                             /s/ Allie Greenleaf Maldonado

                                                -9-