Court Opinion

ID: 9370724
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-14 17:08:34.619445+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:23.287707
License: Public Domain

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                         :
              v.                         :
                                         :
                                         :
 EDWIN DAVIS                             :
                                         :
                   Appellant             :   No. 230 MDA 2022

    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 13, 2021
             In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
           Criminal Division at No(s): CP-36-CR-0004855-2018

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                         :
              v.                         :
                                         :
                                         :
 EDWIN DAVIS                             :
                                         :
                   Appellant             :   No. 231 MDA 2022

    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 13, 2021
             In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
           Criminal Division at No(s): CP-36-CR-0002873-2018

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.:             FILED: FEBRUARY 14, 2023

     Edwin Davis brings these consolidated appeals seeking to overcome his

designation as a Sexually Violent Predator (“SVP”) and to obtain resentencing

for a judgment of sentence that he claims to be excessive. We affirm.

     For purposes of this appeal, the facts underlying Davis’s convictions are

uncontested. On March 30, 2018, victims B.O., age thirteen, and V.O., age
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twelve, were at their home when Davis, age 43, approached them and struck

up a conversation. Davis managed to exchanged phone numbers with both

girls and left the area. However, he immediately started texting B.O. and

asked her to meet him. B.O. refused the invitation because she was going to

go for a walk with her friend that evening. As B.O. was returning home from

the walk, she came across Davis in an alley. Davis proceeded to physically

attack B.O. and then penetrated her vagina with his fingers and then his penis.

Davis also forced his penis into B.O.’s mouth. B.O. managed to get off the

ground and run out of the alleyway.

       As she left the area, B.O. came across Megan Bigler standing outside of

her home. B.O. told Bigler that she had just been assaulted, and Bigler

directed B.O. to run home while Bigler contacted the police.1 When B.O. got

home, she reported the incident to her mother. B.O.’s mother and father

immediately took B.O. to the hospital.

       Meanwhile, Davis had also been texting V.O. from the time the two

exchanged numbers earlier in the day. After B.O. and her parents left for the

hospital, V.O. texted Davis asking why he had raped her sister. Davis

responded by asking V.O. to send him pictures of her body. He also made

repeated references to his penis and invited V.O. to have sexual contact with

____________________________________________

1 Bigler came across Davis in the alley and remained on the 911 call until
police arrived. Although police confirmed Davis’s identity and phone number,
Davis was permitted to leave because the police did not know the identity of
the victim.

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him. V.O. sent multiple texts to Davis refusing his requests and reminding him

that she was twelve-years old. Undeterred, Davis appeared at V.O.’s home,

tried to gain entry, and began throwing rocks at the window. V.O. called the

police and Davis was arrested.

      Regarding his contact with B.O., Davis was charged at trial court docket

number 2873-2018 with rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse,

unlawful contact with a minor-sexual offenses, aggravated indecent assault of

a person less than 16 years old, corruption of minors, indecent assault, and

sexual assault. For his contact with V.O., at trial court docket number 4855-

2018, Davis was charged with unlawful contact with a minor-sexual offenses,

criminal solicitation-rape of a child, criminal solicitation-involuntary deviate

sexual intercourse with a child, and criminal solicitation-child pornography.

      The cases were consolidated for trial. On June 23, 2021, a jury convicted

Davis on all counts. The trial court ordered the preparation of a presentence

investigative report and an assessment by the Pennsylvania Sexual Offenders

Assessment Board (“SOAB”) for a determination of whether Davis fits the

criteria of an SVP.

      On December 13, 2021, the trial court conducted an SVP hearing and a

sentencing hearing. At the SVP portion of the hearing the Commonwealth

presented the report and detailed testimony of Robert Martin Stein, Ph.D.

(“Dr. Stein”), a licensed clinical psychologist and member of the SOAB. At the

conclusion of the SVP hearing, the court determined that the Commonwealth

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had met its burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that Davis

should be classified as an SVP. Immediately after the trial court reached its

SVP conclusion, the court sentenced Davis to serve an aggregate term of

incarceration of thirteen to forty years for the crimes against B.O. For the

crimes against V.O., the trial court sentenced Davis to serve an aggregate

term of incarceration of six and one-half to twenty years. Further, the trial

court directed that the sentences for each victim were to run consecutively to

each other, which resulted in a total aggregate sentence of nineteen and one-

half to sixty years of incarceration.

      Davis filed a timely post-sentence motion that the trial court denied on

December 28, 2021. This timely appeal followed. Both Davis and the trial court

have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Davis now presents issues questioning

whether the Commonwealth properly established that he is an SVP and

whether the trial court abused its discretion in fashioning his judgment of

sentence.

      Davis first argues that the trial court erred in finding that he is an SVP.

See Appellant’s Brief at 17-21. Davis contends the Commonwealth failed to

present clear and convincing evidence to support the finding. Davis claims the

trial court ignored the fact that his underlying struggle with alcoholism was

present throughout his criminal history and contributed to his prior criminal

offenses. He further alleges that his prior sexual offenses should be discounted

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from consideration because, as indecent exposure convictions, they did not

involve any physical touching. We disagree.

       When considering the sufficiency of the evidence to support an SVP

designation, we apply the following standard of review:

       In order to affirm an SVP designation, we, as a reviewing court,
       must be able to conclude that the fact-finder found clear and
       convincing evidence that the individual is an SVP. As with any
       sufficiency of the evidence claim, we view all evidence and
       reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the
       Commonwealth. We will reverse a trial court’s determination of
       SVP status only if the Commonwealth has not presented clear and
       convincing evidence that each element of the statute has been
       satisfied.

Commonwealth v. Hollingshead, 111 A.3d 186, 189 (Pa. Super. 2015)

(citation and brackets omitted).

       SORNA2 defines an SVP as an individual who has been convicted of one

of the enumerated offenses, and “who is determined to be a[n SVP] under

section 9799.24 (relating to assessments) due to a mental abnormality or

personality disorder that makes the individual likely to engage in predatory

sexually violent offenses.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.12. Further, an act is

considered “predatory” under SORNA if it is “directed at a stranger or at a

person with whom a relationship has been initiated, established, maintained

or promoted, in whole or in part, in order to facilitate or support victimization.”

Id.

____________________________________________

2SORNA stands for Pennsylvania’s Sex Offender Registration and Notification
Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.10-9799.41.

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      Section 9799.24(a) of SORNA provides that “a court shall order an

individual convicted of a sexually violent offense to be assessed by the

[SOAB].” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.24(a); see also id. § 9799.12 (defining

sexually violent offense). Following the entry of such an order, the SOAB is

responsible for conducting an assessment to determine whether the individual

should be classified as an SVP. Id. § 9799.24(b). The assessment must

consider the following factors:

      whether the instant offense involved multiple victims; whether the
      defendant exceeded the means necessary to achieve the offense;
      the nature of the sexual contact with the victim(s); the
      defendant’s relationship with the victim(s); the victim(s)’ age(s);
      whether the instant offense included a display of unusual cruelty
      by the defendant during the commission of the offense; the
      victim(s)’ mental capacity(ies); the defendant’s prior criminal
      record; whether the defendant completed any prior sentence(s);
      whether the defendant participated in available programs for
      sexual offenders; the defendant’s age; the defendant’s use of
      illegal drugs; whether the defendant suffers from a mental illness,
      mental     disability,  or    mental     abnormality;    behavioral
      characteristics that contribute to the defendant’s conduct; and any
      other factor reasonably related to the defendant’s risk of
      reoffending.

Hollingshead, 111 A.3d at 190 (citation omitted); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. §

9799.24(b)(1)-(4). After the SOAB completes its assessment, the trial court

holds a hearing to “determine whether the Commonwealth has proved by clear

and convincing evidence that the individual is a[n SVP].” Id. § 9799.24€(3).

      Here, the trial court observed that the record “demonstrates that Dr.

Stein carefully considered each required statutory factor and each element of

the definition of [SVP]. The record also demonstrates that [the trial judge]

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carefully considered the evidence presented, including the role that [Davis’s]

prior sexual offenses played in Dr. Stein’s opinion that [Davis] should be

classified as a[n SVP].” Trial Court Opinion, 4/3/22, at 14. Our review of the

record is in concord with these observations.

      During the SVP hearing, Dr. Stein offered detailed testimony regarding

his assessment of Davis. Addressing the initial seven factors, Dr. Stein noted

that this matter involved multiple victims, Davis used physical and verbal

force, the sexual contact was oral, vaginal and anal, there was no relationship

between Davis and the victims, as they were strangers, and the victims were

12 and 13 years old. See N.T., 12/13/21, at 10-11. These five assessment

factors suggest an SVP classification. The remaining two factors offer some

mitigation as Dr. Stein noted there was no unusual cruelty involved in the

crimes and the victims were of normal mental capacity. See id. at 11.

      Dr. Stein also addressed the three factors pertaining to Davis’s prior

offense history. In doing so, he reiterated the details of Davis’s sexual and

nonsexual criminal history, which dates back approximately twenty years and

began as noncontact crimes and escalated to the crimes that involved physical

contact with a minor. See id. at 11. Regarding completion of prior sentences,

Dr. Stein observed that Davis has a history of probation violation. See id. at

11-12. The doctor further observed that, in relation to a sexual offense in

2014, Davis was admitted into and unsuccessfully discharged from sex

offender treatment. See id. at 12.

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      The next four factors concern the characteristics of the individual being

assessed. Dr. Stein offered testimony reflecting upon Davis’s age in relation

to that of the victims, evincing a difference of thirty years. See id. Also, Davis

has reported the use of marijuana in the past. See id. Further, Dr. Stein

discussed the fact that Davis had previously been prescribed anti-depressants

that suggests a degree of depression. At this junction, Dr. Stein noted that on

a prior occasion Davis remarked that he had a history of difficulty with alcohol.

See id. Dr. Stein offered the following testimony addressing the behavioral

characteristics contributing to Davis’s conduct:

      The course of conduct since 1996 is consistent with sustained
      sexual deviance, including sexual misconduct that victimized
      others, which would be the indecent exposure offenses in 1996
      and 2014. The 2015 evaluation noted deception as a primary
      defense mechanism. He was repeatedly deceptive with the victims
      in this case and with authorities in the instance offense, also
      consistent with antisocial traits.

Id. at 12-13.

      Finally, Dr. Stein listed the following factors associated with a greater

risk of Davis reoffending: “having four or more sentencing dates in the past,

having a prior sex offense, having a prior noncontact sex offense, having

unrelated victims, and having stranger victims.” Id. at 13.

      Dr. Stein summarized his analysis of the factors with the conclusion that

“[t]here is sufficient evidence for the diagnosis of Other Specified Paraphilic

Disorder, nonconsent, based on a pattern.” Id. As such, Dr. Stein opined that

Davis “meets the criteria to be classified as a[n SVP].” Id. at 15.

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      Regarding Davis’s allegation that the trial court ignored the fact that his

underlying struggle with alcoholism was present throughout his criminal

history, we note that on multiple occasions Dr. Stein offered testimony about

the general use of alcohol and Davis’s specific use of alcohol. See N.T.,

12/13/21, at 13, 18-20, 25, 26-27. In addition, defense counsel also argued

that “alcohol seems to be the consistent trigger” throughout Davis’s history.

Id. at 30. Accordingly, the trial court was quite aware of Davis’s history with

alcohol when it made its conclusion concerning Davis’s SVP status.

      Concerning Davis’s claim that his prior sexual offenses should be

discounted from consideration because, as indecent exposure convictions,

they did not involve any physical touching, Dr. Stein disagreed: “[t]he two

prior indecent exposures, and the fact that this case represented two

additional victims and an escalation of offending, compared to the previous

offense.” N.T., 12/13/21, at 23. Dr. Stein reiterated that all the criminal acts

involved nonconsenting sexual behavior, and the pursuit of females without

their consent. See id. at 23. Also, the crimes escalated in nature over the

course of time. See id. at 23-24. Again, the trial court was well-aware of the

nature of the crimes committed over the course of Davis’s criminal history and

knew that the severity escalated, and the age of the victims decreased. To the

extent Davis contends his prior criminal acts should not have been considered

in assessing his status as an SVP, this argument is not compelling as it would

require an incomplete assessment of the statutory factors.

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      In summary, the trial court credited Dr. Stein’s testimony and his

opinions regarding the criteria necessary for designating Davis as an SVP. See

Trial Court Opinion, 4/4/22, at 13. The court stated, “[t]hroughout his

testimony reviewing the required statutory factors, Dr. Stein clearly and

convincingly addressed all of the elements required to show that [Davis]

meets the definition of [an SVP].” Id. We may not disturb the trial court’s

credibility determinations on appeal. See Commonwealth v. Blackham, 909

A.2d 315, 320 (Pa. Super. 2006) (stating that “[i]t is not for this Court to

overturn the credibility determinations of the fact-finder.”).

      Upon review, we conclude that the evidence presented at the SVP

hearing, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, supports

the trial court’s finding that Davis should be classified as an SVP. See

Hollingshead, 111 A.3d at 189. As the trial court observed, “Dr. Stein went

to great lengths to explain why [Davis’s] conduct was predatory and discussed

why [Davis] is likely to reoffend.” Trial Court Opinion, 4/4/22, at 13. Our

review confirms that Dr. Stein’s testimony, which was credited by the trial

court, was sufficient to support his conclusion. Accordingly, we cannot grant

Davis relief on this issue.

      Davis last argues that the trial court erred in fashioning his sentence.

See Appellant’s Brief at 21-30. Davis claims that his consecutive sentences,

the aggregate of which resulted in a sentence of nineteen and one-half to sixty

years, is so manifestly excessive as to constitute an abuse of discretion. He

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further claims that the sentence ignores his rehabilitative needs precipitated

by his apparent addiction to alcohol. Therefore, he contends the trial court

failed to consider pertinent factors in creating his sentence.

      Our standard of review is one of abuse of discretion. Sentencing is a

matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing judge, and a sentence

will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. See

Commonwealth v. Shugars, 895 A.2d 1270, 1275 (Pa. Super. 2006).

      It is well settled there is no absolute right to appeal the discretionary

aspects of a sentence. See Commonwealth v. Hartle, 894 A.2d 800, 805

(Pa. Super. 2006). Rather, where an appellant challenges the discretionary

aspects of a sentence, the appeal should be considered a petition for allowance

of appeal. See Commonwealth v. W.H.M., 932 A.2d 155, 163 (Pa. Super.

2007).

      As we observed in Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162 (Pa.

Super. 2010):

      An appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence
      must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:

            We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1)
            whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal,
            see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was
            properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to
            reconsider and modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P.
            720; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal defect,
            Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a
            substantial question that the sentence appealed from
            is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42
            Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

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Moury, 992 A.2d at 170 (citation and brackets omitted).

      Here, the first three requirements of the four-part test are met. Davis

brought an appropriate appeal, filed a post-sentence motion, and included in

his appellate brief the necessary concise statement of the reasons relied upon

for allowance of appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). We next determine

whether he has raised a substantial question requiring us to review the

discretionary aspects of the sentence imposed.

      Whether a particular issue constitutes a substantial question about the

appropriateness of sentence is a question to be evaluated on a case-by-case

basis. See Commonwealth v. Kenner, 784 A.2d 808, 811 (Pa. Super.

2001). As to what constitutes a substantial question, this Court does not

accept bald assertions of sentencing errors. See Commonwealth v.

Malovich, 903 A.2d 1247, 1252 (Pa. Super. 2006). Rather, an appellant must

show actions by the trial court inconsistent with the Sentencing Code or

contrary to the fundamental norms underlying the sentencing process. See

Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 893 A.2d 735, 737 (Pa. Super. 2006).

      In his Rule 2119(f) statement, Davis argues the trial court abused its

discretion by failing to consider certain mitigating factors, including Davis’s

rehabilitative needs, when it imposed consecutive sentences that resulted in

an unduly excessive sentence. See Appellant’s Brief at 13-16. This Court has

held that an assertion that a sentence was excessive and that the trial court

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failed to properly consider the factors set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b)3

raises a substantial question. See Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117 A.3d

763, 770 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc). See also Commonwealth v. Raven,

97 A.3d 1244, 1253 (Pa. Super. 2014) (stating that “an excessive sentence

claim—in conjunction with an assertion that the court failed to consider

mitigating factors—raises a substantial question”) (internal citation omitted).

We therefore grant permission to appeal and proceed to review the merits of

this issue of Davis’s sentencing claim.

       In his appellate brief, Davis argues that the trial court “glossed over

[his] history with alcohol, failing to recognize that alcohol played a major role

in [his] offense history, including the current offenses.” Appellant’s Brief at

27. Specifically, Davis offers the following concerning his history with alcohol:

       The Presentence Investigation revealed that Mr. Davis likely has
       had a significant problem with alcohol. He self-reported that he
       began drinking at age 21. By age 31, he increased his usage so
       much that he was consuming a 6[-]pack of beer every few days.
       He was also frequently drinking liquor at that time. Although Mr.
       Davis reported his drinking decreased around age 38, he very
       likely still had a significant alcohol problem.

Id.

       Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing

judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse

____________________________________________

3 The factors to be considered under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b) include: the
protection of the public, gravity of offense in relation to impact on victim and
community, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
9721(b).

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of discretion. See Fullin, 892 A.2d at 847. In this context, an abuse of

discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. See id. Rather, an

appellant must establish by reference to the record that the sentencing court

ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality,

prejudice, bias, or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

See id.

      The sentencing judge has broad discretion in determining the proper

penalty, and this Court accords the sentencing court great deference, as it is

the sentencing court that is in the best position to view a defendant’s

character, displays of remorse, defiance, or indifference and the overall effect

and nature of the crime. See Commonwealth v. Walls, 926 A.2d 957, 961

(Pa. 2007) (quotations and citations omitted). As we have stated, “[a] court

is required to consider the particular circumstances of the offense and the

character of the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Griffin, 804 A.2d 1, 10 (Pa.

Super. 2002) (citation omitted). “In particular, the court should refer to the

defendant’s prior criminal record, his age, personal characteristics and his

potential for rehabilitation.” Id. (citation omitted).

      In addition, “[o]ur Supreme Court has determined that where the trial

court is informed by a pre-sentence report, it is presumed that the court is

aware of all appropriate sentencing factors and considerations, and that where

the court has been so informed, its discretion should not be disturbed.”

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Commonwealth v. Ventura, 975 A.2d 1128, 1133 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citing

Commonwealth v. Devers, 546 A.2d 12 (Pa. 1988)).

      Our review of the record reflects that, at Davis’s sentencing, the trial

court received and reviewed a presentence report, and no corrections were

requested. N.T.,12/13/21, at 33-34. The trial court also heard argument from

defense counsel. See id. at 35-37. Defense counsel observed that: Davis has

been a model prison while in the county jail; Davis has a strong work history;

and Davis has had an education beyond the high school level. See id. In

addition, defense counsel discussed that the presentence report reflects a

struggle with alcohol. Id. at 37.

      Immediately prior to announcing the judgment of sentence, the trial

court meticulously detailed its reasoning for imposing the sentence, which

included a thorough discussion of all the relevant sentencing factors. See id.

at 44-51. At the outset of its discussion, the trial court indicated that it had

taken into consideration all of the information in the presentence report, which

“would include [Davis’s] history of substance abuse.” Id. at 44. After noting

Davis’s alcohol usage over the course of time, the trial court observed that

“[Davis] denies ever using illegal substances and has never participated in

treatment.” Id. The trial court also stated that it “believes a sentence of total

confinement is necessary because [Davis] is in need of correctional treatment

that can be best provided most effectively by his commitment to an

institution.” Id. at 51.

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      In addition, the trial court noted the following in addressing the

sentencing issue in Davis’s post-sentence motion: “[Davis] states the court

failed to properly consider his rehabilitative needs and alcohol history. [Davis]

is mistaken as the court specifically referenced [Davis’s] history of alcohol

consumption and noted he has never participated in any treatment.” Order,

12/28/21, at 1 n.1.

      We conclude the reasons the trial court offered for the sentence imposed

were more than sufficient to conclude that the court properly considered all

relevant factors in fashioning Davis’s sentence, including Davis’s history of

alcohol usage. Also, because the trial court had been fully informed and relied

upon the presentence report, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in creating the instant sentence. Ventura, 975 A.2d at 1133.

Accordingly, Davis’s claim that the trial court failed to consider the appropriate

factors in imposing the sentence lacks merit.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 2/14/2023

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