Court Opinion

ID: 9646220
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 12:53:07.316051+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:36.337877
License: Public Domain

Francis, J.
(dissenting). The defendants Peetros and Koskinas pleaded not guilty to the indictment charging them with the armed robbery of John Daly on June 23, 1961 in the Borough of Collingswood, Camden County. In his report to the police Daly fixed the hour of the event at about 10:45 a.m. Both men claimed they were elsewhere at the time and so it was impossible for them to have been present physically at the scene.
Peetros, who lived in the City of Philadelphia, testified at the trial that from 10:00 a.m. until after 11:00 a.m. on the day in question he was in a dentist’s office in Philadelphia receiving treatment. He was corroborated by the dentist who produced his daybook showing the appointment. The record reveals no substantial attack on the regularity of the book or the integrity of the dentist.
Koskinas lived in suburban Philadelphia with his family on June 23, 1961. He could not remember where he was on that day but knew he did not come over to Camden or Collingswood. So he did not participate and could not have participated in the robbery.
*550Daly, the victim of the robbery, was the only witness of any consequence who identified the defendants as the perpetrators. Discussion of his testimony at length is not necessary for present purposes. It is sufficient to say that although leaving much to be desired, his statements clearly made out a case calling for jury determination.
I.
When a defendant in a criminal trial offers an alibi he relies on a principle of criminal law which has had recognition for hundreds of years. Unfortunately in many places it has been loosely and erroneously called a “defense.” That description gave the matter a distorted focus and in some jurisdictions resulted in rulings which were at odds with basic principles imposing and controlling the burden of proof of guilt in criminal trials. For example, until recently, Pennsylvania espoused the illogical doctrine that a defendant who asserted he was “elsewhere” when the crime with which he was charged was committed, had the burden of proving that fact by the preponderance of the evidence. The difficulty thus presented caused the appellate courts to impose a mandatory duty on the trial judges to charge the jury with respect to that burden lest the jury conclude, in the absence of such instruction, that the defendant had to prove his alibi beyond a reasonable doubt. The incongruity of advising the jury that the burden of proving defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt rested on the state and never shifted, and in the next breath saying the defendant had the burden of proving by the greater weight of the evidence that he was elsewhere at the time of the crime and thus could not have committed it, became apparent and produced an abandonment of the rule. Compare Commonwealth v. Stein, 305 Pa. 567, 158 A. 563 (Sup. Ct. 1932); Commonwealth v. Trygar, 121 Pa. Super. 525, 184 A. 271 (Super. Ct. 1936); and Commonwealth v. Jordan, 328 Pa. 439, 196 A. 10 (Sup. Ct. 1938) *551with Commonwealth v. Bonomo, 396 Pa. 222, 151 A. 2d 441 (Sup. Ct. 959).
An alibi is not an affirmative defense. It is simply a denial that the accused committed the crime; a denial of a specific element of the charge which the .State has the burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt. It must be regarded in the same íight as any other evidence tending to negative or weaken or destroy the prosecutor’s case. 21 Am. Jur. 2d, Criminal Law, § 136, p. 206; State v. Mucci, 25 N. J. 423, 431 (1957). Although alibi has been spoken of in New Jersey also as a defense, we have never regarded it as imposing any affirmative burden of proof on the defendant, or as lightening the substantive burden traditionally resting on the State.
In our State the law has always been and still is that where presence of the defendant at the scene of the crime is essential to show its commission by him, the burden of proving that presence beyond a reasonable doubt is upon the State. The defendant has neither burden nor duty to show that he was elsewhere at the time and so could not have committed the offense. If he does offer evidence that he was elsewhere and that evidence alone or when considered by the jury in conjunction with all of the other circumstances of the case, whether introduced by the State or defense, leaves a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors as to defendant’s presence at the place of the crime or as to whether he committed it, he should not be convicted. The offer of an alibi does not change the presumption of innocence or relieve the State of its responsibility to show defendant’s presence and his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Even if the evidence offered by the defendant is insufficient of itself to satisfy the jury that he was not present, it cannot be rejected but must be considered by the jury with all the other facts in the case in deciding whether the 'State has satisfied its burden to the necessary degree. State v. DeGeralmo, 83 N. J. L. 135 (Sup. Ct. 1912). If the evidence that he was elsewhere falls short of itself of establishing the fact, but leaves in the minds of *552the jurors such doubt or uncertainty that they cannot find for or against the alibi, they are bound to carry such doubt into the case for the prosecution, and to array it there as an element of the reasonable doubt beyond which the prosecution must prove guilt. The defendant is entitled as much to the benefit of such doubt as he is to any other doubt raised by the evidence or lack or insufficiency of evidence.
When a defendant claims he was elsewhere when the alleged crime was committed, under the law he puts in issue every element of the offense to the same extent as if he simply asserted the general plea of not guilty. His duty under R. R. 3 :5-9 to notify the State of the claim of alibi does not affect the nature of the prosecutor’s proof obligation. But I cannot escape the conviction that the language of the Court in State v. Garvin, 44 N. J. 368 (1965), augmented by the majority opinion herein, reveals an intention to write out of the law the probative value which has always attached to a claim of alibi and the evidence adduced by the defendant to support it.
It is unrealistic to hold that the ordinary instructions on presumption of innocence, burden of proof and reasonable doubt are ample definition of the issues and provide sufficient enlightenment for the jury in cases where alibi is involved. Such a rule results in a prejudicial streamlining of criminal trials whenever a defendant offers proof to1 show that he was elsewhere when the alleged crime was perpetrated. And the unfortunate aspect of the new approach is that no appreciable benefit to the administration of the criminal law can possibly result. It may be conceded that from a layman’s standpoint the word “alibi” in some respects has taken on an unfavorable connotation. Radio, television, newspapers, novels, etc. have tinged it with an aura of contrivance and suspicion. Yet we know the offer of proof in an appropriate case that the accused was elsewhere is a sound, necessary and just element of a criminal trial. Certainly no one would object to eliminating use of the word “alibi” at the trial, and the substitution of a statement such as that the defendant claims he was not present at the scene of the crime, or that he claims he was *553elsewhere at the time, or simply that he has offered evidence to show he was at a particular place other than the site of the crime at the time.
The claim of alibi as it is known in the law cannot be looked at in a vacuum. Practical and psychological considerations intimately associated with human nature stand in the way. When a defendant pleads not guilty and claims he was elsewhere, psychologically he is more vulnerable to conviction than in the usual case. Unlike the defendant who defends generally on all issues, the accused with an alibi in effect puts his eggs in one basket. He cannot launch too strenuous an attack on the commission of the offense itself, or at least as vigorous an attack as is open to the ordinary defendant, for fear of exciting suspicion in the minds of the jurors as to why he concerns himself with that aspect of the ease. Obviously he is on sensitive ground in most situations when the cross-examination of the State’s witnesses moves beyond the issue of his identification as an actor at the scene of the crime. Eor this reason, I believe that when for all practical purposes a defendant’s sole defense is that he was elsewhere when the crime was perpetrated, and where proof is introduced to support the claim, the trial court ought to be under a duty to charge the jury specifically (1) as to the obligation of the State to prove defendant’s presence and participation in the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, (2) as to the absence of burden on the part of defendant to prove that he was elsewhere when the offense took place, (3) the factual contentions of the parties as to presence at and absence from the scene, and (4) the significance of defendant’s claim and supporting evidence, either alone or in conjunction with all the evidence or the lack of evidence in the case, as explained above, in relation to the duty of the jury to acquit unless the State has satisfied them beyond a reasonable doubt of the accused’s presence at the scene and his commission of the crime. This may be done easily without use of the word “alibi.” In the type of situation described, where presence of the defendant at the scene is a controverted element of the *554case, the accused’s right to the explanatory charge should not depend upon a specific written request for it. Cf. Commonwealth v. Bonomo, supra (151 A. 2d, at 444, 445, 446-447); Poe v. State, 212 Tenn. 413, 370 S. W. 2d 488 (Sup. Ct. 1963); State v. Spencer, 266 N. C. 487, 124 S. E. 2d, 175 (Sup. Ct. 1962); and see, Annotation, 118 A. L. R. 1303, 1316-1317 (1939). In this respect I agree with the view taken by the Appellate Division in State v. Searles, 82 N. J. Super. 210 (App. Div. 1964), and in this case also in revers1ing the conviction for the insufficiency of the trial court’s charge.
When an accused’s only real chance of acquittal depends upon an alibi, the trial judge’s treatment of the case ought not to be considered legally sufficient treatment if his charge is Emited to a perfunctory definition of reasonable doubt and a statement of the State’s burden of proof. In a case where the accused’s claim that he was elsewhere stands out sharply as the crucial issue, if nothing specific is said about its significance in the law, the jurors have no adequate standard to determine its effect. They may well feel authorized to adopt their own idea of its worth; or to conclude that if defendant’s proof of itself is not of sufficient strength to establish the alibi clearly, it should be disregarded. Any rule which actually or in effect takes from the evidence of alibi (either alone or in conjunction with all other evidence in the case, particularly where identification is open to question) its capacity to raise a reasonable doubt does a disservice to the administration of criminal justice.
Aside from these general observations on the subject, it seems plain in the present ease that the charge of the court, in light of the nature and conduct of the trial, did not satisfy even the requirements of State v. Garvin, supra. There the Court, after suggesting there is no need to speak of alibi in separate terms because to do so is more Ekely to obscure the case than to clarify it, added this qualification:
*555“If a defendant’s factual claim is laid beside the State’s and the jury understands that a reasonable doubt may arise out of the defense testimony as well as the State’s, the jury has the issue in plain, unconfusing terms.” 44 N. J., at p. 274.
The charge of the trial court here was a bare-bones exposition of a few basic principles of law applicable to criminal trials; and that was its beginning and end. It did not contain a single reference to the evidence adduced by either the State or the defense; it did not lay the defendant’s factual claim beside that of the State. In fact, if the indictment were not read to the jury during the course of the charge there would have been no statement of the date, place and victim of the alleged robbery. Anyone reading the instructions would not have the slightest notion that either defendant claimed he was elsewhere when the robbery was perpetrated. True, presumption of innocence, burden of proof and reasonable doubt were explained (although the jury was not told such doubt could arise from lack of evidence; see State v. Driver, 38 N. J. 255, 293 (1962)), but the office of a charge is more than that; basically it is to explain the factual contentions of the parties and to declare the rules of law applicable to any set of facts which may be found from the evidence. 5 Wharton’s Criminal Law and Procedure, § 2090, p. 255 (1957). It should cover all important phases of the case which have any support in the evidence, and it should be directly addressed to the facts proved. Here the jury was permitted to roam at large among the facts and to do their best to apply the litany of legal principles given to them by the court.
Not only could the charge given here be applied to any robbery ease by simply changing the names of the defendants, but in its generality it was deceptive and susceptible of erroneous interpretation as well. Without relating the statement in any way to the facts, the judge said to the jury:
“Principally, this case involves a question of fact, and that fact is whether or not the State’s witnesses in their testimony as to what happened are telling the truth, or whether the defendants in their *556respective denials as to the circumstances of the case are telling the truth.”
Tlius, in effect the jury was told that if they decided the robbery victim Daly was telling the truth when he identified Peetros and Koskinas as the robbers, a verdict of guilty could be returned. But Daly’s truthfulness is not the test — certainly not the sole test. He might well be entirely truthful and yet be entirely mistaken in identifying the defendants as the perpetrators of the robbery.1 Obviously the instruction was not only incorrect and incomplete, but it had the effect of equating a finding of Daly’s truthfulness with absence of reasonable doubt of defendants’ guilt. Koskinas objected to this portion of the charge but the trial court declined to alter his language.
Under all the circumstances, in my judgment it was plain error not to charge' the jury specifically on the law respecting the effect of the alibi testimony. Consequently, I would affirm the action of the Appellate Division.
II.

The Examination of Koskinas Concerning His Criminal Record

As the opinion of the Appellate Division and the majority opinion of this Court indicate, Koskinas was asked preliminarily if his previous conviction of crime in Pennsylvania involved “firearms” or “use of firearms, guns, or anything like that.” Immediately after a negative answer was given, defense counsel objected to the question as being prejudicial and suggested that since the assistant prosecutor seemed to be reading from a record, he should not ask the question unless the record showed the firearms conviction. Following a *557side bar discussion, the court said he would allow the negative answer to stand, as he saw no harm in it. Then, although the assistant prosecutor had neither a certified copy of the record of conviction nor satisfactory proof of a conviction, he asked if Koskinas was not charged with “violation of the Firearms Act, assault with intent to ravish, and given a sentence of $250 fine and 9 to 18 months in jail.” The defendant answered that he was “charged but not found guilty of the gun charge.” Pursuit of the matter continued with a further question whether Koskinas had received “a sentence of $250 fine and 9 to 18 months in jail.” Again the answer came: “Not for the gun charge.” The fact was that on the charge of assault with intent to ravish, defendant was sentenced to pay a fine of $250 and costs, and to serve 9 to 18 months in jail; but if the fine and costs were paid, he was to be paroled “under terms not to contact girl or family in any way.” After the trial the prosecutor verified Koskinas’ statement that he had not been convicted on a gun charge.
Since this is an armed robbery case, the advantage sought by the State in attempting to prove Koskinas has been convicted previously on a charge involving a gun, is obvious. Moreover, the course of the questioning impelled the defendant to explain the gun charge by saying that when arrested on the assault complaint he was placed in the police car. “Later on,” he said, a gun was found in their car and they tried unsuccessfully to charge him with it. This whole discussion about the gun under the circumstances of this case was unfairly damaging to the defendant — regardless of the good faith of the assistant prosecutor. While I appreciate the administrative problem of going beyond the State Bureau of Identification in these cases, yet the potential prejudice to a defendant is so great if sole reliance is placed on such record as a basis for cross-examination, and it turns out to be inaccurate, that the prosecutor must be deemed to have employed it at his peril. Certainly the defendant should not suffer as the result. All the discussion about the gun in this kind of case, coupled with both defendants’ admission of *558other convictions of crime, although not of robbery (Peetros’ convictions were for bookmaking, lottery and being a common gambler), constituted prejudicial error, particularly in view of the court’s strong charge on the effect of proof of convictions. Compare State v. Arnwine, 67 N. J. Super. 483 (App. Div. 1961). He said:
“I charge you that this evidence [convictions of crime] shall be considered by you for the purpose of affecting your belief in the respective defendant’s testimony, * *
III.
The evidence revealed that Peetros and Koskinas knew each other in Philadelphia before this crime was committed. Peetros’ brother was a friend of Koskinas. The impression is inescapable from the record that in the jurors’ minds what affected one defendant affected the other, and that the fate of one should be the fate of the other. Although on the whole case Peetros seems to have suffered the greater prejudice because of the disregard by the court of his corroborated alibi claim, yet in the framework of the case Koskinas was erred against also, and in sum the prejudice to which both were subjected can be remedied only by a reversal of the convictions.
For the reasons stated, I would affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division, and remand the matter for retrial.

 An excellent illustration of an obviously honest but mistaken identification in a robbery appeared in the New York Herald Tribune of Tuesday, September 28, 1965 while this dissent is being written. The victim of the mistake spent six months in prison before his exoneration.