Court Opinion

ID: 9450545
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 16:51:31.738479+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:22.337952
License: Public Domain

WRIGHT, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
This action was filed in the District Court on December 9, 1959. It did not reach the pre-trial stage until July of 1963, at which time plaintiffs’ counsel filed a statement suggesting the death of plaintiff David Graham on May 17, 1963, and moving for a delay in the proceedings until a personal representative was qualified. On February 3, 1964, the ad-ministratrix of Graham’s estate moved to be substituted for him in these proceedings. On February 7, 1964, the defendants opposed the motion to substitute and moved to dismiss the action as to David Graham under the July 1, 1963 amendment to Rule 25, Fed.R.Civ.P., on the ground that 90 days had elapsed since the filing of the suggestion of death. The District Court granted this motion without stating reasons.
For me, it is not necessary to divine why the District Court granted the motion to dismiss, or to determine whether, under Rule 6(b) (2), Fed.R.Civ.P., the failure of counsel for Graham to act within the time prescribed by the amendment was the result of excusable neglect. When Rule 25(a) (1) was amended,1 Rule 86(e), Fed.R.Civ.P., was added to the Rules. It provides that the July *9171,1963 amendments will “govern * * * all further proceedings in actions then pending, except to the extent that in the opinion of the court their application in a particular action pending when the amendments take effect would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which eyent the former procedure applies.” Since applying the amendment here would work an obvious injustice, I would apply the Rule as it existed at the time of Mr. Graham’s death.
When Mr. Graham died, under Rule 25(a), as it then existed, his administra-trix had two years in which to move to be substituted for him in these proceedings. The motion to substitute was made within this two-year period. Intervening was the July 1, 1963 amendment to Rule 25(a), which limited the substitution period to 90 days after the filing of the suggestion of death. But the filing of the suggestion of death in this case was not made pursuant to the amended Rule. Plaintiffs’ counsel had no idea he was triggering the start of the 90-day period. The suggestion of death and motion for continuance was made pursuant to a practice long followed in the District of Columbia to obtain a delay in the proceedings until an administrator is appointed.2 Plaintiff’s counsel was unaware that Rule 25(a) had been changed. And it appears that in all probability counsel for defendants suffered from the same ignorance, because instead of filing his motion to dismiss 90 days after the filing of the suggestion of death, he coupled his motion to dismiss with the opposition to the motion for substitution which was filed over six months after the filing of the suggestion of death.
Apparently, therefore, counsel for both parties, and indeed the District Court,3 were operating under the old Rule — at least until the motion to dismiss was filed. Under that Rule the motion for substitution was timely. Under Rule 86(e), since the application of the July 1, 1963 amendment to Rule 25 (a) (1) to this pending action “would work injustice,” the former procedure should have been applied to the motion to substitute.4 In any event, I would not construe plaintiffs’ counsel’s bumbling motion for a continuance as a *918“Suggestion of Death” in the Rule 25(a) (1) sense.
It is a cruel irony that the amendment to Rule 25(a) (1) is here being interpreted to work the injustice it was intended to prevent.5

. The amendment to Rule 25(a) (1) was promulgated to prevent the automatic, and often unjust, dismissal of cases where a party plaintiff has died. The* Notes of the Advisory Committee on the 1963 Amendment to Rule 25(a) (1) (1963) indicate:
“Present Rule 25(a) (1), together with present Rule 6(b), results in an inflexible requirement that an action be dismissed as to a deceased party if substitution is not carried out within a fixed period measured from the time of the death. The hardships and inequities of this unyielding requirement plainly appear from the cases. See, e. g., Anderson v. Yungkau, 329 U.S. 482, 67 S.Ct. 428, 91 L.Ed. 436 (1947); Iovino v. Waterson, 274 F.2d 41 ([2d Cir.] 1959), cert. denied, [s«6 mom.] Carlin v. [I] ovino, 362 U.S. 949, 80 S.Ct. 860, 4 L.Ed.2d 867 (1960) ; Perry v. Allen, 239 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1956); Starnes v. Pennsylvania R. R., 26 F.R.D. 625 (E.D.N.Y.), aff’d per curiam, 295 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 813, 82 S.Ct. 688, 7 L.Ed.2d 612 (1962); Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 28 F.R.D. 346 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). See also 4 Moore’s Federal Practice H 25-.01[9] (Supp.1960); 2 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice & Procedure § 621, at 420-21 (Wright ed. 1961).”

. Although the filed statement was titled “Suggestion of Death of Male Plaintiff in Above Action,” it was in substance a motion for a continuance. It read as follows:
“Comes now Earl H. Davis, Esq., of counsel for the plaintiffs in the above captioned action, and suggests to the Court that he has just been informed that the male plaintiff herein, David Graham, died in North Carolina, on or about May 17, 1963; and by reason of which fact, counsel moves the Court to abate the above action until a personal representative for said deceased plaintiff can be substituted herein.”
Obviously, what counsel sought was to have the case continued, see Annot., 68 A.L.R.2d 470, 531 (1959), and not to start the Buie 25(a) (1) period running against his own client. Apparently the District Court also thought it was merely granting a continuance. Its order read:
“Order Striking Case From Beady Calendar
“The above action having been set for pretrial on July 23, 1963, and counsel for Plaintiff having suggested the death of male plaintiff, David Graham,
“Ordered
“That the action be and is hereby stricken from the Ready Calendar.
/s/ Edward M. Curran
Judge ”
Ordinarily, a suggestion under the new Rule 25(a) (1) would be filed by a defending party in order to compel the attorney for the claiming party to move for substitution within 90 days. See Notes of the Advisory Committee to Rule 25(a) (1) (1963).

. See Note 2 supra.

. See New Orleans Public Belt R. Co. v. Wallace, 5 Cir., 173 F.2d 145 (1949), in which the Fifth Circuit used Rule 86 to prevent an injustice caused by applying the amendment, rather than the old Rule, to pending litigation.

. See Note 1 supra.