Court Opinion

ID: 9608702
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:15:58.681486+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:07:38.680661
License: Public Domain

Coleman, J.,
with whom Cole, J.* joins, dissenting.
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the evidence was insufficient to prove that Paul Daniel Stanley, Jr., possessed cocaine with an intent to distribute it. Accordingly, I dissent.
Paul Daniel Stanley, Jr., and a companion were stopped and searched incident to a lawful arrest after the officers observed the two emerge from an apartment complex and enter the car. From the small travel bag which Stanley had been carrying, the officers found account papers and ledgers containing quantity and money figures consistent with records for the distribution and sale of cocaine. They also found several envelopes labeled “Cocaine Distribution Company” or “Cocaine Importing Company of Miami, Florida,” glassine type bags and cut twist ties, Inositol powder, caps from hypodermic needles, and a triple beam balance scale and a plastic straw, both of which contained cocaine residue. From Stanley’s companion, the officers seized a film canister which contained a substance that appeared to be cocaine. In my. view, this evidence is sufficient to prove that Stanley possessed cocaine with an intent to distribute cocaine.
To establish that Stanley violated Code § 18.2-248, the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) he possessed cocaine, and (2) he intended to distribute cocaine. I agree with the majority that the “intent to distribute” must be contem*873poraneous with the possession. However, in my view, the Commonwealth satisfies its burden by proving possession of a controlled substance and by proving that the accused had the intent to distribute that substance, even though he was not then in possession of a distributable amount. In other words, the Commonwealth can meet its burden by proving that at the time an accused possessed a residue or modicum of a controlled drug, he or she at the same time intended to distribute the drug. In my view, this view of our statutes is compelled by the decision of our Supreme Court in Robbs v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 153, 154, 176 S.E.2d 429, 430 (1970), where the Court rejected the argument that a “usable” amount of drugs must be present to sustain a conviction for simple possession of a controlled substance. Robbs makes clear that in order to prove the element of possession, it is only necessary for the Commonwealth to prove that an individual possessed a “modicum” or trace amount of drugs. Id. at 154-55, 176 S.E.2d at 430. The element that distinguishes a charge of simple possession from the more serious offense of possession with intent to distribute is the element of the intent with which the drugs are possessed. I believe that this construction of the statute is necessary to fully carry out the intent of the legislature to distinguish between those who possess drugs for personal use and those who possess drugs as dealers or distributors. Regardless of the amount of the drugs possessed, if a person possesses drugs as a seller or a distributor, the legislature intended by Code § 18.2-248 that the person be punished more severely.
An intent to distribute drugs, regardless of the amount possessed, may be inferred from the surrounding circumstances. The Supreme Court repeatedly has held that quantity is just one factor to be considered along with all other circumstances in determining whether the possession is with an intent to distribute. Adkins v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 437, 439-40, 229 S.E.2d 869, 871 (1976). While a small quantity usually implies possession for personal use, Monroe v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 154, 156, 355 S.E.2d 336, 337 (1987), it may, when considered along with the other circumstances, support a finding that the drugs are for distribution or are the remainder of a larger supply which has been distributed, destroyed, secreted or held elsewhere for distribution. See Colbert v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 1, 4, 244 S.E.2d 748, 749 (1978). Indeed, where the facts support a finding that a defendant has recently consummated a sale or a distribution, that circum*874stance may support the inference that the person in possession has an intent to distribute drugs. Id.; Dutton v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 762, 765, 263 S.E.2d 52, 54 (1980); Hambury v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 435, 438, 350 S.E.2d 524, 525 (1986).
Thus, I do not believe that our statute requires proof that the intent to distribute necessarily relate to a distributable amount of the drug possessed, so long as the Commonwealth proves the accused harbors a present intent to distribute drugs and is in possession of some discernible amount. The Supreme Court made clear in Robbs that proof of an amount necessary for personal use is not required. Code § 18.2-248 “is intended to curtail the sale of illicit drugs as a commercial enterprise.” Bentley v. Cox, 508 F. Supp. 870, 873 (E.D. Va. 1981). It does not define the offense based upon the amount of drugs possessed. Thus, in my view, a person who knowingly possesses a trace amount of a controlled substance, even a residue found upon drug paraphernalia, and harbors a present intent to sell or distribute drugs, has violated the statute.
Even were I to accept the majority’s view that the Commonwealth must prove that an accused once actually possessed an amount sufficient to be distributed, I would find that the circumstantial evidence in this case was sufficient to permit the fact finder to infer that the residue was but part of a larger supply Stanley recently had possessed with the intent to distribute. Based upon the various paraphernalia in Stanley’s immediate possession and records of drug transactions which he maintained and had with him, the discernible amount which he possessed under these circumstances supports the inference that Stanley had recently been in possession of a larger amount of cocaine for distribution. See Commonwealth v. LaPerle, 19 Mass. App. 424, 429, 475 N.E.2d 81, 84-85, appeal denied, 394 Mass. 1104, 478 N.E.2d 1274 (1985); United States v. Campbell, 732 F.2d 1017, 1020 (1st Cir. 1984).
The majority further holds that “no. evidence was presented as to when or where the supply had been either possessed or distributed.” Thus, according to the majority, even if the circumstantial evidence supported an inference that Stanley had recently possessed a distributable amount, the evidence failed to establish when or in what jurisdiction the crime occurred. The Supreme Court of South Carolina addressed and rejected this same contention in State v. Simpson, 275 S.C. 426, 272 S.E.2d 431 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981). The majority adopts the identi*875cal reasoning expressed by Justice Gregory in his dissent in Simpson, wherein he stated that, even if the circumstantial evidence proved possession of a distributable amount, it failed to establish when or where. Id. at 532-33, 272 S.E.2d at 432. I would adopt the majority view expressed in Simpson that possession of a trace amount of drugs, together with paraphernalia for distribution, justifies the inference by the fact finder of recent possession within the jurisdiction of a distributable amount with the intent to distribute.
I do not find the majority’s reasoning or Justice Gregory’s dissent to be persuasive or based on sound precedent. In my view, possession by Stanley of the drug paraphernalia, with records, in the company of a companion who also possessed cocaine, was sufficient for the fact finder to infer that possession of a distributable amount was recent and occurred in the same jurisdiction where Stanley possessed the drug paraphernalia, records and the drug residue. In fact, seven years later, Justice Gregory, writing for the majority in State v. Adams, 291 S.C. 132, 352 S.E.2d 483 (1987), cited with approval the majority holding in Simpson and stated: “Conviction of possession with intent to distribute does not hinge upon the amount involved .... Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence of the various drug paraphernalia and the residue of controlled substances was sufficient to submit the case to the jury.” Id. at 134, 352 S.E.2d at 483 (emphasis added).
In my view, the holding of the majority unduly restricts the use and value of circumstantial evidence and the permissible inferences which the fact finder may draw from such circumstances. Rarely are perpetrators of crimes apprehended “red-handed” during the commission of an offense. After a crime has been committed, proof of it generally depends upon circumstantial evidence. Proof of where and when an offense occurred are elements which may be proven by circumstantial evidence. The fact that certain aspects or elements of the offense occurred at a certain location may be sufficient, where other circumstances so indicate, to permit the fact finder to conclude that the offense was of recent vintage and occurred where the remnants of the offense were found.
We do not interpret statutes based on our view of how the Commonwealth may seek to prove the elements of its case. In my view, however, the holding today imposes a nearly insurmountable bur*876den of proof to establish that a distributable amount of drugs was possessed at a particular location. Frequently, drug dealers are apprehended with only, a residue of drugs in their possession but under circumstances where, as here, it is clear that they recently have sold, distributed, destroyed, or “flushed” a distributable amount of the drug. In these circumstances, given the proper evidence, a conviction for possession of a drug with intent to distribute should be possible.

 Judge Cole participated in the hearing and decision of this case prior to the effective date of his retirement on April 30, 1991 and thereafter by designation pursuant to Code § 17-116.01