Court Opinion

ID: 9380703
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-21 06:00:10.655043+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:26.865171
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     MARGARET J. THOMAS-JORDAN,                      DOCKET NUMBERS
                   Appellant,
                                                     DA-0752-16-0343-X-1
                  v.                                 DA-0752-16-0343-C-1

     DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,
                 Agency.
                                                     DATE: March 20, 2023

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Margaret J. Thomas-Jordan, Benton, Louisiana, pro se.

           Treva Grandpre-Cadres, New Orleans, Louisiana, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                Tristan L. Leavitt, Member 2

                                       FINAL ORDER
¶1         On April 27, 2017, the administrative judge issued a compliance initial
     decision finding the agency in noncompliance with the Board’s final decision in
     the underlying appeal and granting the appellant’s petition for enforcement.

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
     2
       Member Leavitt’s name is included in decisions on which the three -member Board
     completed the voting process prior to his March 1, 2023 departure.
                                                                                         2

     Thomas-Jordan v. Department of the Army, MSPB Docket No. DA-0752-16-
     0343-C-1, Compliance File (CF), Tab 19, Compliance Initial Decision (CID);
     Thomas-Jordan v. Department of the Army, MSPB Docket No. DA-0752-16-
     0343-I-1, Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 46, Initial Decision (ID). The appellant
     has filed a petition for review of the compliance initial decision. Thomas-Jordan
     v. Department of the Army, MSPB Docket No. DA-0752-16-0343-C-1,
     Compliance Petition for Review (CPFR) File, Tab 1.         The agency has filed a
     statement of compliance, asserting that it has complied with the Board’s final
     order. Thomas-Jordan v. Department of the Army, MSPB Docket No. DA-0752-
     16-0343-X-1, Compliance Referral File (CRF), Tab 1.
¶2        For the reasons discussed below, we DENY the appellant’s compliance
     petition for review and AFFIRM the compliance initial decision, which is now the
     Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b). We further find that the agency
     in now in compliance and DISMISS the appellant’s petition for enforcement.
     5 C.F.R. § 1201.183(c)(1)).

                                      BACKGROUND
¶3        The agency removed the appellant from her Federal position as a Project
     Manager effective April 25, 2016.      IAF, Tab 8 at 13.      The appellant timely
     appealed her removal to the Board, raising discrimination and due process claims.
     IAF, Tabs 1, 9, 14, 28.        In a December 12, 2016 initial decision, the
     administrative judge reversed the appellant’s removal on due process grounds and
     ordered the agency to cancel the removal, retroactively restore the appellant
     effective April 25, 2016, and provide her the appropriate amount of back pay and
     benefits in accordance with Office of Personnel Management regulations.            ID
     at 4-8, 24. The administrative judge additionally found that the appellant failed
     to prove her discrimination claims. ID at 8-23. The initial decision became the
     Board’s final decision after neither party petitioned for administrative review.
                                                                                          3

¶4         The appellant filed a petition for enforcement of the initial decision,
     claiming that the agency had not fully complied with the administrative judge’s
     orders. CF, Tab 1. The agency submitted evidence showing that it cancelled the
     appellant’s removal effective April 25, 2016, returned her to duty on January 17,
     2017, and paid her back pay in net amount of $36,366.86, which included
     adjusted gross back pay in the amount of $65,982.08 and interest in the amount of
     $920.09, minus deductions totaling $30,535.31 for              Federal income tax
     ($20,038.61),   Medicare     ($953.61),   Social    Security   ($4,077.52),    Federal
     Employment Retirement System (FERS) contributions ($2,045.45), Federal
     Employee Health Benefit (FEHB) debt ($215.60), life insurance premiums
     ($28.05), and state income tax ($3,176.47). CF, Tab 4 at 11-12, Tab 6 at 5, 7,
     Tab 7 at 15. The agency also provided evidence reflecting that the appellant had
     a number of disputes with the agency’s calculation of the back pay award,
     including the tax and FEHB deductions, but that the Defense Finance and
     Accounting Service (DFAS) had investigated her concerns and determined the
     award was correct. CF, Tabs 4-8, 11. The appellant maintained that the agency
     was not in compliance with the Board’s final order. CF, Tabs 12 -18.
¶5         In an April 27, 2017 compliance initial decision, the administrative judge
     found that the agency failed to show that it paid the appellant the appropriate
     amount of back pay, withheld the correct amount in taxes, or provided her the
     opportunity to make a retroactive contribution to her Thrift Savings Plan (TSP)
     account.    CID at 4-5.      Accordingly, the administrative judge granted the
     appellant’s petition for enforcement and ordered the agency to submit evidence
     showing that it had correctly calculated and paid the appellant back pay and
     benefits, made the correct tax deductions, and allowed her an opportunity to make
     retroactive contributions to her TSP account for the back pay period. 3 CID at 6-7.

     3
       In the compliance initial decision, the administrative judge stated that the back pay
     period included the period from April 25, 2016, through January 8, 2017. CID at 6-7.
     However, the back pay period did not end until January 17, 2017, the day the agency
                                                                                            4

     The administrative judge informed the agency that, pursuant to MSPB
     regulations, if it decided to take the actions required by the decision, it must
     submit to the Clerk of the Board a statement that it had taken the actions
     identified in the compliance initial decision, along with evidence establishing that
     it had taken those actions. CID at 7-8. In addition, he informed the parties that
     they could file a petition for review if they disagreed with the compliance initial
     decision. CID at 8-9.

                    DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS AND EVIDENCE
                        ON REVIEW AND ON COMPLIANCE
     Compliance Petition for Review

¶6         On May 31, 2017, the appellant filed a petition for review of the compliance
     initial decision. CPFR File, Tabs 1-2. Generally, we grant petitions such as this
     one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous
     findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous
     interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous a pplication of the law to
     the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of
     the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or
     involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affec ted the outcome of
     the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite
     the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. 5 C.F.R.
     § 1201.115.
¶7         Here, on petition for review, the appellant does not challenge the
     administrative judge’s specific findings in the compliance initial decision; rather,

     instructed the appellant to return to work. CF, Tab 4 at 11-12. Although the
     administrative judge’s reference to January 8, 2017, as the end of the back pay period is
     incorrect, the error appears to be harmless. In evidence later submitted by the agenc y,
     it is clear that the agency correctly considered the back pay period as running through
     January 16, 2017. E.g., CRF, Tab 7 at 7 (reflecting that the agency paid the appellant
     48 hours of back pay for the pay period ending on January 21, 2017).
                                                                                           5

     she continues to argue that the agency is in noncompliance with the initial
     decision and seeks compensatory damages in the amount of $24.2 million to
     remedy the agency’s noncompliance and its alleged discriminatory treatment of
     her.   CPFR File, Tabs 1-2.       As to the appellant’s request for compensatory
     damages, the Back Pay Act does not authorize the Board to award compensatory
     damages to a prevailing appellant. Wingate v. U.S. Postal Service, 118 M.S.P.R.
     566, ¶ 3 n.2 (2012). In addition, because the appellant did not prevail based on a
     finding of discrimination, she is not entitled to compensatory damages on that
     basis. See id.
¶8          After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the
     petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the
     petition for review. 4 Accordingly, we deny the appellant’s petition for review
     and affirm the administrative judge’s findings in the compliance initial decision. 5

     Petition for Enforcement

¶9          As noted above, in the compliance initial decision, the administrative judge
     found that the agency was not in full compliance with the Board’s final decision
     because it had not demonstrated that it correctly calculated and paid the
     appellant’s back pay and benefits, made the correct tax deductions, and allowed
     her an opportunity to make retroactive contributions to her TSP account . CID
     at 1-6.   Accordingly, the administrative judge ordered the agency to submit

     4
       We have reviewed the appellant’s alleged new evidence submitted on review and have
     determined that it is either contained in the record below or is not material to her
     appeal. CPFR File, Tabs 1-2. Therefore, it provides no basis to disturb the compliance
     initial decision. Russo v. Veterans Administration, 3 M.S.P.R. 345, 349 (1980) (holding
     that the Board will not grant a petition for review based on ne w evidence absent a
     showing that it is of sufficient weight to warrant an outcome different from that of the
     initial decision); Meier v. Department of the Interior, 3 M.S.P.R. 247, 256 (1980)
     (holding that evidence that is already a part of the record is not new).
     5
       On July 18, 2017, the appellant filed a motion to enter additional evidence into the
     record. CPFR File, Tab 8. Because we find the additional evidence immaterial to her
     petition for review of the compliance initial decision, we DENY the motion.
                                                                                             6

      evidence explaining its calculations and demonstrating that it allowed the
      appellant an opportunity to make retroactive contributions to her TSP account for
      the back pay period, as well as evidence that the agency made appropriate
      adjustments to the back pay amount, employer contributions, and tax liabilities in
      light of the TSP election. CID at 6-7.
¶10         On June 1, 2017, the agency submitted a response to the compliance initial
      decision stating that it had taken the ordered actions and was now in compliance
      with the Board’s orders.      CRF, Tab 1.      The agency asserted that it paid the
      appellant the correct amount of back pay and interest, minus appropriate
      deductions, and provided evidence showing that, in addition to the first gross
      back pay award of $36,366.86, the agency paid the appellant an additional
      payment in the net amount of $1,344.14, which included adjusted gross back pay
      in the amount of $1,821.16 and interest in the amount of $39.32, minus
      deductions totaling $516.34 for Federal income tax ($38.98), Medicare ($23.28),
      Social Security ($99.55), FERS contributions ($56.44), FEHB debt ($215.60), life
      insurance premiums ($2.25), state income tax ($57.24), and a voluntary allotment
      ($23.00). 6 Id. at 6-7, 15, 23. The agency stated that the appellant had opted not
      to deduct FEHB premiums during the back pay period but that she owed a FEHB
      debt of $1,293.60 for a time period prior to her separ ation, which resulted in an
      ongoing deduction from her pay. Id. at 6-7, 28.
¶11         Regarding the appellant’s TSP benefit, the agency provided a sworn
      affidavit from a human resources specialist stating that the agency had credited

      6
        The agency also alleged that the appellant was not ready, willing, and able to perform
      her duties during at least a portion of the back pay period. CRF, Tab 1 at 8-10. There
      is no indication, however, that the agency withheld back pay for any part of th e back
      pay period on this basis. CRF, Tabs 1, 7; CID at 4 n. 2 (noting that, although the
      evidence called into question the appellant’s claim that she was ready, willing, and able
      to perform her duties during the back pay period, the agency apparently acc epted her
      claim as true and paid her back pay without deduction for any period of time in which
      she may not have been available to report to duty). Accordingly, we need not address
      the appellant’s ability to work during the back pay period.
                                                                                        7

      the appellant’s TSP account with the agency automatic (1%) contribution for the
      full back pay period upon her reinstatement. Id. at 38. Regarding the appellant’s
      TSP contributions, however, the human resources specialist explained that the
      appellant made a hardship withdrawal from her TSP account in February 2016
      and that, as a condition of the hardship withdrawal, she could not contribute to
      her TSP account for 6 months.          CRF, Tab 1 at 38, 40.     Thus, she was not
      contributing to her TSP account at the time of her April 2016 removal a nd was
      not eligible to resume contributions until September 2016.          Id.   The human
      resources specialist further explained that, although the appellant was eligible to
      make up her TSP contributions for the part of the back pay period beginning in
      September 2016, the agency had been unable to process the makeup contributions
      because the appellant had not elected a contribution amount or percentage despite
      being advised to contact the Army Benefits Center to do so. Id. at 39, 43. The
      human resources specialist averred that, once the appellant advised the agency of
      her contribution election, the agency could process her makeup TSP contributions
      and that she would receive a debt letter to that effect. Id. at 38-39.
¶12        The appellant responded to the agency’s compliance submission on June 20,
      2017, arguing that the agency did not explain how it calculated the tax
      deductions, incorrectly stated she had a FEHB debt, and did not contribute the
      correct amount to her TSP account, provide her a TSP election form, or tell her to
      contact the Army Benefits Center to make an election. CRF, Tab 3 at 6-7. She
      also argued that she should have been eligible to resume her TSP contributions in
      August 2016 at the latest. Id. at 7.
¶13        In a June 19, 2019 Order, the Board identified technical deficiencies in the
      agency’s compliance submission and requested additional explanation and
      evidence. CRF, Tab 6. In particular, the Board directed the agency to provide
      the following: a detailed accounting and explanation of all tax deduction s from
      the back pay award; an explanation of all TSP deductions from the back pay
      award; evidence demonstrating that the ability to restart TSP deductions was
                                                                                     8

      communicated to the appellant and that she was given an opportunity to do so;
      legible spreadsheets detailing back pay and deductions for the entire back pay
      period, along with a narrative explanation of the payments and any deductions; a
      written explanation of the source and amount of the appellant’s alleged FEHB
      debt; and a narrative explanation of all these payments and deductions. Id. at 4.
      The order advised the appellant that she could reply to the agency’s submission
      within 15 calendar days of service and that, if she did not respond, the Board
      might assume that she was satisfied and dismiss her petition for enforcement. Id.
      at 4-5.
¶14         On December 10, 2019, the agency responded to the Board’s order,
      asserting again that it was in full compliance with the Board’s orders.     CRF,
      Tab 7.    In support, the agency provided a detailed sworn declaration from a
      DFAS analyst and several spreadsheets reflecting the agency’s calculations of the
      back pay owed and appropriate deductions. Id. at 6-21. According to the DFAS
      analyst, the appellant’s back pay award was paid in the two installments
      described above: the first on March 2, 2017, in the net amount of $36,366.86,
      and the second on May 25, 2017, the net amount of $1,344.14 to account for the
      late-processed May 26, 2016 within-grade-increase.     Id. at 7-14.   The DFAS
      analyst explained that the appellant’s FEHB debt arose from the agency paying
      FEHB premiums on her behalf for 6 pay periods prior to the start of the back pay
      period and that the debt was being collected one premium ($215.60) at a time out
      of the appellant’s current pay, including one premium out of each back pay
      installment.   Id. at 9, 12.   Regarding the appellant’s TSP contributions, the
      agency stated that it did not have evidence demonstrating that it had
      communicated to the appellant that she could restart her TSP contributions
      because she made a hardship withdrawal through TSP, which is a separate
      agency. Id. at 5. The agency explained that, because the appellant had worked
      directly with TSP to make the hardship withdrawal, it was unaware of the
                                                                                         9

      hardship withdrawal and would not have known to notify her when she could
      restart her contributions. Id.
¶15        The appellant did not respond to the agency’s second compliance
      submission.
¶16        When the Board reverses a personnel action, it orders that the appella nt be
      placed, as nearly as possible, in the same situation she would have been in had
      the wrongful personnel action not occurred.           Vaughan v. Department of
      Agriculture, 116 M.S.P.R. 319, ¶ 5 (2011). The agency bears the burden to prove
      compliance with the Board’s order by a preponderance of the evidence. 7 Id.;
      5 C.F.R. § 1201.183(d). An agency’s assertions of compliance must include a
      clear explanation of its compliance actions supported by documentary evidence.
      Vaughan, 116 M.S.P.R. 319, ¶ 5. The appellant may rebut the agency’s evidence
      of compliance by making specific, nonconclusory, and supported assertions of
      continued noncompliance. Id.
¶17        As described above, in the compliance initial decision, the administrative
      judge found that the agency failed to establish that it had complied with its
      obligation to pay the appellant the appropriate amount of back pay for the back
      pay period, that it made the correct tax deductions, and that it allowed her an
      opportunity to make retroactive contributions to her TSP account for the back pay
      period.   CID. The agency’s submissions and the appellant’s decision not to
      respond to the agency’s second compliance submission establish that the agency
      has now reached full compliance with its obligations.
¶18        As set forth above, the agency’s submissions demonstrate how it determined
      the back pay and interest due to the appellant, as well as the appropriate
      deductions from the total back pay amount, and reflect that it paid the appellant
      $36,366.86 (adjusted gross back pay of $65,982.08 plus $920.09 in interest minus

      7
       A preponderance of the evidence is the degree of relevant evidence that a reasonable
      person, considering the record as a whole, would accept as sufficient to find that a
      contested fact is more likely to be true than untrue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(q).
                                                                                        10

      deductions of $30,535.3) on March 2, 2017, and $1,344.14 (adjusted gross back
      pay of $1,821.16 plus $39.32 in interest minus $516.34 in deductions) on May 25,
      2017. CRF, Tabs 1, 7. Although the appellant argued that the agency’s first
      compliance submission contained incorrect information and failed to adequately
      explain its back pay calculations, she did not respond to the agency’s second
      submission, despite being notified both of her opportunity to do so and that the
      Board might construe her decision not to respond as evidence that she was
      satisfied with the agency’s compliance.       CRF, Tabs 3, 6.      Accordingly, we
      assume that the appellant is satisfied with the agency’s back pay calculations and
      payments and find the agency in compliance with its obligation to calculate and
      pay the correct amount of back pay and interest minus appropriate deductions.
      See   Baumgartner    v.   Department    of   Housing   and    Urban    Development,
      111 M.S.P.R. 86, ¶ 9 (2009) (assuming that an appellant who did not res pond to
      the agency’s evidence of compliance was satisfied with the agency’s compliance).
¶19         Regarding the appellant’s TSP account, the regulations implementing the
      Back Pay Act require that an agency correct errors affecting an employee’s TSP
      account consistent with the regulations prescribed by the Federal Retirement
      Thrift Investment Board. Rittgers v. Department of the Army, 123 M.S.P.R. 31, ¶
      7 (2015); 5 C.F.R. § 550.805(h). Pursuant to these regulations, the employing
      agency must give a reinstated employee who would have been eligible to
      contribute to her TSP account but for the erroneous separation the opportunity to
      submit a new contribution election for purposes of makeup contributions or to
      reinstate the contribution election she had on file at the time of her separation for
      makeup contributions. 5 C.F.R. § 1605.13(a)(2). The regulations also provide
      the employee’s makeup contributions must be accompanied by attributable
      agency matching contributions and that, even if the reinstated employee does not
      elect to make up her employee contributions, the employing agency must make
      all appropriate agency automatic (1%) contributions associated with the back pay
      award. 5 C.F.R. § 1605.13(c)(3).
                                                                                            11

¶20         Here, the record reflects that the agency credited the appellant’s TSP
      account with the agency automatic (1%) contribution for the back pay period but
      was unable to process her makeup contributions because she was not contrib uting
      to her TSP account at the time of her separation and had not made an election of
      the amount or percentage of her pay for makeup contributions .             CRF, Tab 1
      at 6-7, 38. In its first compliance submission, the agency explained that, to make
      such an election, the appellant needed to contact the Army Benefits Center and
      that, once she did so, the agency could process her makeup TSP contributions.
      Id. at 38-39. The agency also provided a May 24, 2017 email, reflecting that an
      agency official informed the appellant of the appropriate point of contact
      regarding her TSP issues and “for an “overview on what is [sic] going to take for
      you to make contributions for previous pay periods and how it would be
      processed.” 8   Id. at 43.   There is no indication, however, that the appellant
      contacted that person, or anyone in the Army Benefits Center, or that she made an
      election regarding the amount or percentage of her pay she wanted to
      retroactively contribute to her TSP account. Accordingly, we find that the agency
      has taken all of the actions with respect to the appellant’s TSP account for the
      back period that it possibly could have given the appellant’s failure to make the
      necessary election. See Coe v. U.S. Postal Service, 101 M.S.P.R. 575, ¶¶ 13-14
      (holding that, when an appellant does not cooperate with the agency’s efforts to

      8
        The agency’s statement in its second compliance submission that it did not have
      evidence demonstrating that the appellant was informed that she could restart her TSP
      contributions or that she was given an opportunity to do so is contradicted by the
      evidence in its first compliance submission. CRF, Tab 1 at 38, 42, Tab 7 at 5. In
      particular, the May 24, 2017 email reflects that the agency official provided the
      appellant the appropriate point of contact to resolve outstanding issues with her TSP
      makeup contributions. CRF, Tab 1 at 43. Moreover, the agency’s first compliance
      submission informed the appellant of what she must do to enable the agency to process
      her makeup TSP contributions. Id. at 38. Accordingly, notwithstanding the apparently
      incorrect representation in the agency’s second compliance submission, we find that the
      agency has satisfied its obligation under 5 C.F.R. § 1605.13(a)(2) to give the appellant,
      as a reinstated employee, an opportunity to submit a new contribution election for
      purposes of makeup TSP contributions.
                                                                                           12

      achieve compliance, the Board may deny the petition for enforcement) , aff’d,
      208 F. App’x 932 (Fed. Cir. 2006).        Moreover, because the appellant did not
      respond to the agency’s second compliance submission, we assume that she is
      satisfied with the actions it has taken regarding her TSP contributions.
      Baumgartner, 111 M.S.P.R. 86, ¶ 9.
¶21         In light of the foregoing, we find that the agency is now in compliance and
      dismiss the petition for enforcement.      This is the final decision of the Merit
      Systems Protection Board in this compliance proceeding. Title 5 of the Code of
      Federal Regulations, section 1201.183(c)(1) (5 C.F.R. § 1201.183(c)(1)).

                       NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING
                             YOUR RIGHT TO REQUEST
                            ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
            You may be entitled to be paid by the agency for your reasonable attorney
      fees and costs. To be paid, you must meet the requirements set out at Title 5 of
      the United States Code (5 U.S.C.), sections 7701(g), 1221(g), or 1214(g). The
      regulations may be found at 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.201, 1201.202, and 1201.203. If
      you believe you meet these requirements, you must file a motion for attorney fees
      and costs WITHIN 60 CALENDAR DAYS OF THE DATE OF THIS DECISION.
      You must file your motion for attorney fees and costs with the office that issued
      the initial decision on your appeal.

                               NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 9
            You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
      statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
      review and the appropriate forum with which to file.              5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
      Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
      Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most

      9
        Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
      the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
      Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter .
                                                                                      13

appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
jurisdiction.   If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.
      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit   your   petition   to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is
available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular relevance
is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is contained
within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
                                                                                    14

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      (2) Judicial   or   EEOC     review   of   cases     involving    a   claim   of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).              If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
                                                                                     15

with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or by a
method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant     to   the    Whistleblower      Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 10 The court of appeals must receive your

10
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
                                                                                 16

petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov . Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                       17

      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                  /s/ for
                                        Jennifer Everling
                                        Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.