Court Opinion

ID: 9536898
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:09:07.433301+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:55:29.335300
License: Public Domain

ARMIJO, Judge (dissenting). In my opinion, the court misinterpreted the Workmen’s Compensation Act and failed to apply the facts controlling to the instant case. Undisputed facts developed in the trial, in addition to those related by the majority, were: appellants’ son went to work for appellee-employer in Albuquerque on June 28, 1966 and died August 11, 1966. His total earnings for the period were approximately $242.00. During this time he received one paycheck of $33.00 and gave his parents $20.00 from these earnings which they used for family purposes. (Other earnings were received by them after his death.) Shortly before his death, and after it became apparent that his father would be receiving no income because of an impending strike, he assured his parents that he would continue to assist them financially. At the time of the workman’s death it was not known how long his father would be without income because of the strike. Additionally, the record shows decedent contributed to his parents in cash, and by other means, during the summer months of 1965 and 1966. Appellants were persons of modest means. They lived in Truchas; the husband had seasonal employment at Los Alamos; the wife attended to household duties and was not gainfully employed. At the time of the son’s death the father was unemployed. The major portion of his last paycheck received approximately one week prior to his son’s death, was exhausted on obligations due. Appellants had no savings, were in debt and had no other independent source of income. Both parents testified they were dependent on their son for support. In determining dependency it is necessary to establish actual contribution by the workman and reliance thereon in whole or in part by the claimants for their livelihood. Wilson v. Mason, 78 N.M. 27, 426 P.2d 789 (Ct.App.1967) ; Ferris v. Thomas Drilling Co, 62 N.M. 283, 309 P.2d 225 (1957). The Workmen’s Compensation Act dictates that this determination be made “at the time of the workman’s death.” Section 59-10-18.7 (D), N.M.S.A.1953. The majority places prime emphasis on events which transpired during a period extending for more than a year prior to the date of death. These facts and circumstances should be considered as corroborative of the ultimate fact and not determinative thereof. The statute compels determination of the ultimate fact as of the time of death and the facts as they existed át that point should determine the issue. Prior facts and circumstances should then be considered to either support or contradict. Admittedly, liberal construction of our Workmen’s Compensation Act, in order that its beneficent purpose may not be thwarted, applies to the law and not to the facts. But, is not that portion of the statute “at the time of the workman’s death” part of the law? And if so, are we to say it is meaningless or ignore it ? After finding that the workman contributed money to his parents, the trial court qualified it as not being substantial, nor regularly made and not relied upon by the recipients for their support and livelihood. The substantiality of the contribution does not seem to be a controlling factor under the applicable statute unless it is without substance; however, under the facts of this case, a contribution of $20.00 from $33.00 would constitute substantial contribution. It obviously could not be classified as trivial, inconsequential or meaningless, especially when compared to the maximum compensation of $14.00 per week, for a number of weeks limited by the Act, to which appellants would have been entitled had they prevailed. With respect to the regularity of contributions, or lack thereof, it should be noted that decedent had just started to work. Because of the family need for assistance and other circumstances occurring shortly before his death he had made assurances of financial assistance to his parents. Under these circumstances a determination based on the number of times contribution was made seems immaterial to a decision on the ultimate fact. A prolonged history of contribution and dependency is not a prerequisite of the statute. Section 59-10-18.7(D), N.M.S.A.1953. On the issue of reliance by appellants on their son for their support, the undisputed testimony supports a conclusion of dependency. It would seem that if dependency existed then reliance would follow as a matter of course since to be dependent there must be reliance on assistance for the necessities of life. The requirement is that dependency of the parents must be actual, but ne'ed only be partial, Dimas v. Albuquerque and Cerrillos Coal Co., 35 N.M. 591, 3 P.2d 1068 (1931), and there must be reliance upon such earnings in whole or in part for their livelihood. Wilson v. Mason, supra. Partial dependency means “if dependent to any extent.” Ferris v. Thomas Drilling Co., supra. The uncontradicted testimony supported the issues of contribution and reliance as of the time of the workman’s death and from the trial court’s announcement following the close of plaintiff’s case, it cannot be said the trial court disbelieved the witnesses. Compare Dimas v. Albuquerque and Cerrillos Coal Co., supra. The present case seems to be governed by the principles announced in Frederick v. Younger Van Lines, 74 N.M. 320, 393 P.2d 438 (1964) where it was stated: “ * * * We think it clear, howéver, ■ that evidence which is unimpeached, and uncontradicted, either by direct testimony, suspicious circumstances, or adverse inferences may not be unceremoniously cast aside and disregarded, and findings diametrically opposed thereto lack support * ;|c * a A trier of fact may disbelieve the testimony of a witness but may not disregard it and thereby hold in effect that there is no such testimony. Wilhelm v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeals Board, 255 Cal.App.2d 50, 62 Cal.Rptr. 829 (1967). I dissent.