Court Opinion

ID: 9727847
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:51:09.346175+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:22:22.952270
License: Public Domain

M. J. Kelly, J.
Defendant Michael Fairbanks was charged with two counts of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree, MCL 750.520b; MSA 28.788(2), and one count of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). On December 4, 1985, a bench trial was held in Detroit Recorder’s Court. Defendant was found guilty of only one count of assault with *553intent to commit criminal sexual conduct in the second degree, MCL 750.520g(2); MSA 28.788(7X2). On January 30, 1986, defendant was sentenced to four years probation, the last year to be served in the Wayne County jail. The probation order included requirements of no contact with the complainant and no assaultive behavior, and defendant was required to pay court costs and make restitution.
This case arose out of an incident on the night of July 24, 1985, in the City of Detroit. The fifteen-year-old complainant had been involved in an argument with her uncle that evening and was asked to leave his home. She walked to the nearby Country Boy Store, near Burgess and Fenkell, and approached defendant and two other men at around 11:00 p.m. After the complainant explained her problem, defendant told her she could spend the night at his house. She briefly returned to her uncle’s, picked up some clothing, and went to defendant’s home.
The complaintant testified that arrangements were made for her to sleep on defendant’s bed while he would sleep on the couch. She prepared for bed, and when she came out of the bathroom, the house was dark. She proceeded to the bed, wherein she discovered defendant. The complainant testified she told defendant to choose where he wanted to sleep and she would sleep in the other location. Defendant then told her she "wasn’t going anywhere.” Defendant held her on the bed, crawled on top of her and proceeded to pull her clothes off. The complainant was fighting and kicking and at one point defendant struck her on the leg. Defendant eventually forced her to have intercourse with him.
Defendant then ordered the complainant to take a shower. When she came out of the shower, *554another struggle ensued. Defendant momentarily left the room and returned with a pistol. Defendant loaded the gun in front of her and told her "he would blow [her] away right now, bury [her] somewhere and nobody would ever know about it.” Defendant again forced sexual relations. During this time, the gun was on the nightstand next to the bed. The complainant then took another shower and defendant drove her to a friend’s house. She told two people there she had been raped and called her aunt and the police. Christine Demetri testified that the complainant was in tears and her hair was wet that night. Detroit Police Officer Veda Sims testified that the complainant was teary, upset, and scared that night and that she did indicate defendant had possessed a gun. The parties stipulated that a doctor’s report was inconclusive as to whether there had been any sexual contact.
Defendant testified on his own behalf. He admitted seeing the complainant at the Country Boy Store that night. He testified that after taking her to her uncle’s to pick up some clothes, he dropped her off near the corner of Pilgrim and Blackstone. That, according to defendant, was the extent of his contact with the complainant that night.
A comment made by the trial court is the basis for this appeal. The judge stated: "We have here an assault with intent to commit criminal sexual conduct in the second degree and I think that under the circumstances that the testimony about the gun, I believe that the felony-firearm wouldn’t be supported by the evidence . . . .”
Defendant appeals as of right urging that the trial court’s verdict is inconsistent with its findings of fact, and we agree.
To support a conviction of assault with intent to commit criminal sexual conduct in the second *555degree there must be assault with a sexual purpose and the facts very well may have supported such a charge as to the second incident. The prosecutor did not charge such an assault and we think properly so as the facts recited by the complaining witness are completely consistent with two completed incidents of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree. The trial judge’s pertinent findings of fact follow:
The Court: All right. The Court has reviewed the evidence. It was a very short case and I do remember the evidence and what I have to consider here is [the victim] making up a story and if she is, why would she do it.
* * *
It was indicated through the testimony that she was mad with her uncle. All right. Fine. I’ll accept that, but there’s no actions taken against the uncle in this case. She didn’t take revenge on him and there’s been no evidence in this case that Mr. Fairbanks has ever done anything to her and there’s no reason to show that she hated him or had any grudge against him or had any motivation to take this out on him or to make any false report against him for any reason. Again, in any kind of a rape case or any kind of personal assault case, the only witnesses are the two people involved. Either it’s a question of consent where one party says well, this occurred but it was consensual, and there was no testimony that it was consensual in this case.
The testimony of Mr. Fairbanks was that it didn’t happen. So we still have a one-on-one situation. So the trier of fact has to look not only at the testimony of the witnesses, but all of the surrounding circumstances that are presented by the evidence in this case.
[The victim] testified that she was in the house and that she had to take a bath and she cleaned up and took a bath and then she was driven to a *556friend’s house. The friend and the police both testified, I believe, that when they saw her that she was distraught, she was upset and her hair was wet. There’s no evidence at all that it was raining. So that supports — she must have been in that house for some reason. Her hair was wet. Also, there’s no evidence that she knew where Mr. Fairbanks lived. She had never been to that house before, but the officer testified that she took them right by there and pointed that house out to them that night. Again, I usually have suspicions about people reporting that they were assaulted a month or two or three months later or even a week later, but we have something here where this came up the same night and she was seen by the police and she was in a bad condition and it could be argued because of the other thing with the uncle, but from the testimony she was pretty upset and she stated right then and there what had happened to her. I believe we have a young lady who was out there by herself and Mr. Fairbanks was out there and she went to his house which was unwise and he decided to take advantage of the situation.
We have here an assault with intent to commit criminal sexual conduct in the second degree and I think that under the circumstances that the testimony about the gun, I believe that the felony firearm wouldn’t be supported by the evidence, but I think there was some contact, some activity involving [the victim] and Mr. Fairbanks and I don’t think that she made this story up. There’s nothing to get even with him about.
I’ve heard all of the arguments and the evidence in the case and I’ve heard all of the witnesses. I’ve heard the arguments of the attorneys. I heard everything. I already made a judgment. I believe in this case that Mr. Fairbanks is guilty of one count of assault with intent to commit criminal sexual conduct in the second degree. So I’ll refer the matter to the Probation Department for a Presentence Report.
I’ll continue the bond.
*557Why would the court believe the complaining witness, or at least state that he believed her because she identified the defendant’s house, her hair was wet, and she was in that house for some purpose and yet disbelieve her on the critical element of whether or not the defendant possessed a firearm? Furthermore why would the court disbelieve the complaining witness as to one of the counts of criminal sexual misconduct and believe her as to the other? It was apparently a case of reducing the prosecutor’s charge to comport with some idea of equity or some element of fairness and to reduce the charge to an included offense.1 We find the facts do not support the trial court’s findings or conclusions that there was an assault within the meaning of MCL 750.520g(2); MSA 28.788(7X2) because the only aggravating circumstance applicable in this case was possession of a firearm, as to which the trial judge specifically found in favor of the defendant, although inexplicably so.
Reversed.2
C. M. Forster, J., concurred.

 While we agree with the dissent that "there is much in the present record that is not available to us” we are resolutely opposed to a remand for an evidentiary hearing that would require recording of matters purposefully omitted from the record. Such a roundabout to infinity is beyond the pale of an appellate court’s drill.

 We leave the question of double jeopardy for resolution in the trial court if there is further prosecution.