Court Opinion

ID: 9555678
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-14 19:04:15.17141+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:41:18.355864
License: Public Domain

Filed 8/14/23 P. v. Quickle CA2/6
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,                                                   2d Crim. No. B324372
                                                           (Super. Ct. No. 21F-04967)
     Plaintiff and Respondent,                              (San Luis Obispo County)

v.

JASON ALVIN QUICKLE,

     Defendant and Appellant.

       Jason Alvin Quickle appeals an order imposing probation
conditions after he admitted a probation violation following his
conviction of assault with force likely to produce great bodily
injury. (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4).)1 We conclude, among
other things, that 1) Quickle knowingly and intelligently waived
his right to a probation violation hearing; and 2) the trial court
properly imposed a probation term that he not use, possess, or

       All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
         1

stated otherwise.
cultivate marijuana or frequent places where the sale of
marijuana is the principal business. We affirm.
                               FACTS
       On August 9, 2021, Noel Burleson and Gabriela Salibo
were walking their dog. They saw Quickle chase a bike rider
away. Quickle then turned around, yelled at Burleson and
Salibo, “flipped open a pocketknife,” and yelled, “ ‘I’m going to
carve you up.’ ” As Burleson and Salibo ran away, Quickle
repeated that he would ”carve them up.” As Burleson “fled the
area,” he saw Quickle “throw rocks at his car.” The police
arrested Quickle.
       In 2021, Quickle pled no contest to assault with force likely
to produce great bodily injury. (§ 245, subd. (a)(4).) He was
placed on probation. His probation terms prohibited him from
using illegal drugs and being in possession of drugs or drug
paraphernalia. He was required to submit to urinalysis drug
testing. Quickle was allowed, however, to use marijuana as
provided in Health and Safety Code section 11362.5
(Compassionate Use Act of 1996) during probation.
       In August 2022, Quickle’s drug testing results showed he
was positive for “methamphetamine and alcohol.” He was
“verbally reprimanded for drug use.”
       In September 2022, Quickle admitted to his probation
officer that he had violated his probation terms because he had
used illegal drugs including methamphetamine and fentanyl. He
was also in possession of drugs and drug paraphernalia. On
September 7, 2022, the probation officer went to Quickle’s trailer.
In the trailer was a “plastic Pepsi bottle filled with marijuana
along with 4 bottles of butane gas and a large plastic bag of
marihuana.” The Pepsi bottle had a hole on the top cap of the

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bottle and a small hole at the bottom of the bottle. The probation
officer was “concerned” that Quickle “was involved in the
manufacturing of concentrated cannabis (‘honey oil’).” (Italics
added.) Quickle was arrested.
       In the probation report, the probation officer said Quickle
had been allowed to use marijuana during his probation period.
But he had been using the marijuana to manufacture
concentrated marijuana known as honey oil. The officer
recommended a modified probation term that Quickle is “[n]ot to
use, possess or cultivate marijuana or frequent places where the
sale of the same is principal business.”
       At his probation violation hearing, the trial court asked
Quickle, “Do you wish to admit you violated probation and give
up your right to a hearing?” Quickle responded, “Yes, ma’am.”
The court asked Quickle’s counsel whether he would “join in
[Quickle’s] waivers.” Counsel responded, “Yes, Your Honor.” The
court found Quickle had “freely, voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently waived” his right to a hearing on the probation
violations.
       The trial court reinstated probation for Quickle on “all the
same terms and conditions” of his previous probation, except 1)
Quickle was ordered to serve 90 days in county jail; and 2) in an
added term No. 16, he was “ordered not to use, possess, or
cultivate marijuana or frequent places where the sale of
marijuana is the principal business.”
       Quickle responded, “I have my medical marijuana license,
ma’am.” The trial court said, “Term [No.] 16 is now being
imposed.” The court then asked, “Anything further on his case,
counsel?” Counsel responded, “No, Your Honor.” Quickle made
no response.

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      A Knowing, Intelligent Waiver of the Right to a Hearing
       Quickle knowingly and intelligently waived his right to a
probation violation hearing. “Knowing and intelligent waivers
are generally required when a criminal defendant gives up ‘any
significant right.’ ” (People v. Trujillo (2015) 60 Cal.4th 850, 859.)
The “active participation of the trial judge is encouraged to
ensure that the record adequately reflects a valid waiver of an
important constitutional right.” (Ibid.)
       Here Quickle appeared with his counsel and waived his
right to a probation violation hearing and admitted the
violations. Before doing so, the trial court advised him that by
admitting the probation violations, he would be giving up the
right 1) to a hearing where the People “have to prove you violated
probation,” 2) to be represented by an attorney at all stages of
that proceeding, 3) to remain silent, 4) to question witnesses, 5)
to subpoena witnesses, 6) to present a defense, and 7) to call
witnesses. The court advised him that it would impose a 90-day
jail sentence for the probation violations.
       When Quickle’s counsel suggested the alternative to “set”
the case “for a hearing,” Quickle responded “No.” The trial court
found he “freely, voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived
[his] right to a hearing.”
       Quickle contends he was not advised that a new probation
condition, term No. 16, would preclude him from possessing
marijuana. But that new condition was the recommendation in
the probation report. Quickle notes that his counsel had the
opportunity to review the probation report because he knew the
report’s recommended sentence. Before accepting his admissions,
the trial court told his counsel that it was going to follow the
recommendations in the probation report. Counsel then asked

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Quickle, “Do you wish to admit the violation?” Quickle
responded, “Yes sir.”
       After accepting Quickle’s admission of the probation
violations, the trial court said, “[Y]ou’re ordered not to use,
possess, or cultivate marijuana or frequent places where the sale
of marijuana is the principal business.” Quickle told the court he
had his “marijuana license.” But the court repeated that it was
imposing that condition.
       If Quickle had an objection or wanted to vacate his
admissions, he had the opportunity to raise those objections or
ask for a hearing at that time. The trial court asked, “Anything
further on his case, counsel?” Counsel said, “No, Your Honor.”
Quickle made no objection. Quickle claims he would have
demanded a hearing had he known about the new condition. But
he was advised about the new condition, and he did not demand a
hearing during a period where such a request could have been
raised in the trial court. Quickle did not file a motion to vacate
his admission of the probation violations in the trial court.
Moreover, this record does not support his claim that he wanted a
probation violation hearing. When that option came up during
the hearing, he said “No.”
            The New Probation Condition – Term No. 16
       Quickle contends the trial court abused its discretion by
adding probation term No. 16 because the condition prohibiting
the use of marijuana has “no relationship” to assault with force
likely to produce great bodily injury.
       But “ ‘conditions of probation aimed at rehabilitating the
offender need not be so strictly tied to the offender’s precise
crime’ [citation] so long as they are ‘reasonably directed at
curbing [the defendant’s] future criminality.’ ” (In re Ricardo P.

                                5
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113, 1122.) “[C]ourts may properly base
probation conditions upon information in a probation report that
raises concerns about future criminality unrelated to a prior
offense.” (Ibid.)
       Quickle claims that “using medical marijuana for chronic
pain is not reasonably related to future criminality.” But
“ ‘seriously ill Californians have the right to obtain and use
marijuana for medical purposes where that medical use is
deemed appropriate and has been recommended by a physician.’ ”
(People v. Urziceanu (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 747, 767, italics
added.) The law that approves such medical use of marijuana,
however, does not “ ‘condone the diversion of marijuana’ ” for
other purposes. (Id. at p. 768, italics added.)
       Here the probation report shows Quickle was not using
marijuana for a medical purpose. He was involved in using it for
the “manufacturing of concentrated cannabis (‘honey oil’).”
Manufacturing honey oil is a criminal offense. (People v. Bergen
(2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 161, 164.) Quickle’s criminal history is
significant, and it includes drug crimes and violent crimes. In
1994, he was convicted of smuggling marijuana. In 1995, he was
convicted of assault (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)), a felony, and he served
six years in prison. In 2005, he was convicted of battery. In
2015, he was convicted of possession of a controlled substance
and a threat “to perform act of violence.” In 2019, he was
convicted of resisting a public officer. (§ 148, subd. (a)(1).)
       When Quickle’s manufacturing of honey oil is combined
with 1) his probation violations for using other illegal drugs and
possession of drug paraphernalia and 2) his criminal history, a
trial court could reasonably find term No. 16 was “directed at

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curbing [Quickle’s] future criminality.” (In re Ricardo P., supra, 7
Cal.5th at p. 1122.)
                          DISPOSITION
      The order is affirmed.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                     GILBERT, P. J.

We concur:

             YEGAN, J.

             CODY, J.

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                  Jacquelyn H. Duffy, Judge

           Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo

               ______________________________

      Patricia S. Snyder, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Rene Judkiewicz, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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