Court Opinion

ID: 9535391
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:48:48.862095+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:14.221108
License: Public Domain

BURKE, J., dissenting: Any damage to the wall was done in the spring of 1946. On March 12, 1947, defendant was incorporated in Ohio, to do a trucking business. On July 1, 1947, with the approval of the Interstate Commerce Commission, defendant acquired the trucking business of Ralph E. Kinnear and assumed certain debts of Kin-near. The defendant did not assume any tort liability of Kinnear. The principal office of the corporation is in Cincinnati, Ohio and there is a branch office in Chicago. It is clear that the defendant is not liable for a tort committed by Kinnear a year before it was incorporated. The burden was on plaintiff to prove that the corporation assumed the tort liability of Kin-near. It made no attempt to do this. The record shows that, on the contrary, there was no assumption of tort liability. See Herndon v. Germania Mutual Savings Society, 146 Ill App 401; Chicago Smelting & Refining Corp. v. Sullivan, 252 Ill App 259, 261-2; Lawrence v. Nyberg Automobile Works, 162 Ill App 348, 352; Western Screw & Mfg. Co. v. Cousley, 72 Ill 531; Safety Deposit Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 65 Ill 309; Knass v. Madison & Kedzie State Bank, 269 Ill App 588, 610; Alexander v. State Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 281 Ill App 88, 96. Defendant’s acquisition of the trucking franchise had to be approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission. The Commission’s approval of the sale to defendant was made upon application showing specifically the obligations defendant assumed. It is doubtful whether the Commission would have approved the transfer had there been an assumption of unliquidated claims for tort. The prior owner, Kinnear, was not an incorporator. The record is silent as to stock ownership in the corporation. Plaintiff’s remedy was an action against Kinnear, the alleged tort feasor. Should plaintiff obtain a judgment against Kinnear, an execution would issue in due course. The record is silent as to the financial standing of Kinnear. Assuming that he owns a substantial number of shares of defendant corporation, these shares and thus Kinnear’s interest in the corporation could be sold to satisfy the. judgment. Section 73 of the Civil Practice Act and other provisions afford adequate steps by which a judgment creditor may reach assets and credits of a judgment debtor. There is no basis in our law and the facts of the case on which to sustain the judgment. I am of the opinion that other errors were committed in the trial of the case. The testimony of plaintiff’s witness Gerstein recounting conversations with the terminal manager of Kinnear a year before the incorporation was not admissible against the corporation. The testimony of the witness, Gellatley, should be disregarded. The transaction whereby the corporation took over the business was effected in Cincinnati. This witness had no knowledge of the transaction. The giving of plaintiff’s instruction #1, constitutes prejudicial error. This instruction relieved plaintiff from proving that the. defendant assumed the alleged liability of Kinnear for damage to the wall. This instruction seeks to inform the jury of the issues presented by the pleadings, but omits the most important issue. I think the judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded with directions to enter a judgment against plaintiff.