Court Opinion

ID: 9483671
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:28:28.229318+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:46.533851
License: Public Domain

*542KAREN LeCRAFT HENDERSON,
Circuit Judge, concurring:
Because the Government failed to argue that Officer Webb had a reasonable articu-lable suspicion when he stopped Donald Wood, I must reluctantly concur in the result. I write separately to explain that reasonable suspicion did exist and to emphasize that a seizure requiring probable cause is not effected merely because a police officer tells a citizen to stop.
Although the majority’s recounting of the facts is generally accurate, it has omitted some facts and minimized others, presenting a somewhat skewed picture of the incident. Initially, Officer Brevard drove by the group that included Wood, turned around and got out of his car. Both Officer Brevard and Officer Webb, who was walking on the sidewalk toward Wood, noticed Wood walk quickly away from the group. As Wood was heading toward the apartment building at 1606 17th Street, S.E., he was looking over his shoulder at Officer Brevard. Despite the hot weather that evening, Wood wore a long-sleeved, dark navy-blue top jacket. As Wood hurried toward the apartment building, he had his arms cradled across his midsection as if he were carrying or hiding something beneath his jacket. Approximately three to five seconds elapsed from the time Wood left the group until he entered the building. With his gun holstered, Officer Webb followed Wood into the building. Officer Bre-vard was a few steps behind him. When Officer Webb saw Wood try to enter an apartment on the left, he told Wood to stop. There is no evidence in the record as to the tone of Officer Webb’s voice. After Officer Webb told Wood to stop, a dark heavy object, which turned out to be a TEC-9 machine gun, fell from Wood’s waist to the ground between his feet. Officer Webb, reacting to the “loud thud,” drew his gun and grabbed Wood. According to Officer Webb’s testimony, no more than ten to fifteen seconds elapsed from the time he entered the apartment building until the gun fell.
Contrary to the majority’s statement, the Government did not concede that these facts did not raise a reasonable articulable suspicion sufficient to support a Terry stop. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). For whatever reason, the Government simply did not contend that there was articulable suspicion. Appellee Br. at 14. Because of this failure, we are foreclosed from determining what, to me, manifestly occurred, that is, a Terry stop based on reasonable articulable suspicion. See United States v. Pavelski, 789 F.2d 485, 490 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 917, 107 S.Ct. 322, 93 L.Ed.2d 295 (1986).
When “evaluating the validity of a stop such as this, we must consider ‘the totality of the circumstances — the whole picture.’ ” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981)). “[Ijnnocent behavior will frequently provide the basis for a showing of" reasonable suspicion. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 244 n. 13, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2335 n. 13, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). Moreover, the incident must “be viewed through the eyes of a reasonable and cautious police officer on the scene, guided by his experience and training.” United States v. Hall, 525 F.2d 857, 859 (D.C.Cir.1976).
In my view, reasonable articulable suspicion existed. Wood walked quickly away from the group, (toward obvious sanctuary) and was looking back at Officer Brevard. See United States v. Campbell, 843 F.2d 1089, 1094-95 (8th Cir.1988) (walking quickly and looking over shoulder three times factors); United States v. Espinosa, 827 F.2d 604, 608 (9th Cir.1987) (walking away at fast pace a factor), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 968, 108 S.Ct. 1243, 99 L.Ed.2d 441 (1988). He had his arms cradled across his body as if he were carrying or hiding something beneath his jacket — a jacket he was wearing even though it was a hot summer evening. See Campbell, 843 F.2d at 1094-95 (wearing winter coat in middle of summer a factor); cf. United States v. Abokhai, 829 F.2d 666, 668 (8th Cir.1987) (wearing light jackets in winter suspicious behavior), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 907, 108 S.Ct. 1082, 99 L.Ed.2d 241 (1988). It also bears emphasis *543that this incident occurred in a high crime area as evidenced by the fact that the officers on duty that evening were working with a neighborhood watch group and the National Guard. United States v. Stanley, 915 F.2d 54, 56 (1st Cir.1990) (characteristics of area in which encounter occurred a relevant factor); United States v. McFadden, 722 F.Supp. 807, 809 (D.D.C.1989) (knowledge that area is high drug-trafficking neighborhood a factor).
As numerous courts have recognized, there are three categories of lawful police encounters with the public: (1) consensual encounters that fall outside the fourth amendment, (2) Terry-type detentions that require reasonable articulable suspicion, and (3) arrests that require probable cause. See United States v. Diggs, 522 F.2d 1310, 1326 (D.C.Cir.1975) (Justice, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 852, 97 S.Ct. 144, 50 L.Ed.2d 127 (1976); United States v. Watson, 953 F.2d 895, 897 n. 1 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1989, 118 L.Ed.2d 586 (1992); United States v. Morgan, 936 F.2d 1561, 1566 (10th Cir.1991), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1190, 117 L.Ed.2d 431 (1992); United States v. High, 921 F.2d 112, 115 (7th Cir.1990); United States v. Espinosa-Guerra, 805 F.2d 1502, 1506 (11th Cir.1986). Because of the Government’s position in this case, we are forced to characterize the stop as either a consensual encounter or an arrest. It would be near impossible to conclude that Officer Webb’s and Officer Brevard’s encounter with Wood was consensual in view of the totality of the circumstances. See United States v. Lewis, 921 F.2d 1294, 1297 (D.C.Cir.1990) (relevant factors to determine whether seizure occurred include time of day, place, tone of voice, displaying weapon, in uniform). Officers Webb and Brevard wore uniforms and their weapons, although holstered, were visible. The encounter took place at night in a dark location and the officers were positioned so that Wood’s movement was restricted in the apartment entranceway. See id. at 1298-99 (“location relevant but far from decisive,” especially where constraints caused by factors independent of police conduct). Finally, Officer Webb told Wood to stop.
Because this incident cannot be categorized as a Terry stop or a consensual encounter, we are left with no choice but to conclude that an arrest occurred. At the time Wood submitted to Officer Webb’s show of authority, no probable cause existed. Probable cause did not exist until the gun fell from Wood’s midsection.
I believe that the majority opinion should not be read to imply that whenever a police officer tells a person to stop, he needs probable cause. It is only because of the Government’s litigating position that we are forced to conclude that probable cause was required to support the seizure. But simply saying “stop” does not turn an otherwise unobjectionable Terry stop into an arrest requiring probable cause.