Court Opinion

ID: 9564215
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:56:10.173569+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:17.257368
License: Public Domain

PAYNE, Justice, dissenting. I respectfully dissent. The majority has held that the interception of the defendants’ conversations on the telephone violated the Abuse of Privacy Act, Section 30-12-1, N.M.S.A. 1978. Based upon that holding the evidence obtained through telephonic interceptions of conversations initiated by the defendants would be suppressed. The pertinent provisions of the Privacy Act state as follows: Interference with communications consists of: * * * reading, hearing, interrupting, taking or copying any message, communication or report intended for another by telegraph or telephone without his consent * * *. (Emphasis added.) I disagree with the conclusion reached by the majority that the phrase “without his consent” refers to the sender of the communication. Grammatically the word “his” must refer back to some person previously mentioned in the statute. The only previous reference to a person in the statute is in the phrase “intended for another.” This phrase is found immediately before the words “without his consent.” In this case Mr. Kelly, the intended recipient, had consented to the State’s agent hearing and copying the communication intended for him. There seems to be little rational basis for interpreting the statute to preclude the recipient of a conversation over the telephone from giving consent for its recording when (1) the recipient can himself testify from memory as to the conversation and what the defendants might have said, although from an evidentiary standpoint, the recorded testimony could be more reliable than the memory of the recipient of the message. (2) A face-to-face conversation could be recorded and used as evidence without the knowledge or consent of the initiator of the conversation. State v. Hogervorst, 90 N.M. 580, 566 P.2d 828 (Ct.App. 1977), cert. denied, 90 N.M. 636, 567 P.2d 485 (1977). (3) A person’s justifiable expectations of privacy lie not within the means of communicating a message, but with the confidence he has in the recipient. I respectfully dissent. EASLEY, J., concurs.