Court Opinion

ID: 9845904
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:30:47.969037+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:25.684307
License: Public Domain

*229Justice PLEICONES,
concurring:
I concur in the majority’s decision to reverse appellant’s capital sentence but write separately because I would decide certain issues differently.
Specifically, 1 view the admission of Ms. Northcutt’s letter to Dr. Andrews as error, and would find the solicitor’s closing argument improper in at least one aspect deemed acceptable by the majority. As to the letter, I find Ms. Northcutt’s reason for declining to speak with Dr. Andrews simply irrelevant. See e.g., State v. Burkhart, 371 S.C. 482, 640 S.E.2d 450 (2007) , (evidence in the sentencing phase must be relevant to the defendant’s character or the circumstances of the crime). As to the solicitor’s closing argument, in my view it was improper for him to argue the jury would be responsible for any future criminal acts of appellant if a life sentence were returned. This argument, which projects personal responsibility upon jurors and plays to their fear, “injects an arbitrary factor” into the sentencing decision. State v. Shuler, 353 S.C. 176, 577 S.E.2d 438 (2003). 1 cannot agree with the majority that it was a “permissible argument ... based on the record and reasonable inferences from it.” Technically, perhaps, the crying, the “kick the baby some more,” and the dehumanizing of appellant arguments are within allowable parameters, but it is beyond dispute that the closing argument here repeatedly transgressed firmly established boundaries and precedents. It does not serve justice for a prosecutor to engage in such histrionic gamesmanship, especially where a jury is being asked to make a life or death decision.
With these qualifications, I concur in the majority’s decision to reverse appellant’s capital sentence and remand the matter for a new proceeding.