Court Opinion

ID: 9854662
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:11:10.772985+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:12.401869
License: Public Domain

McMurray, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
The only issue considered by the majority opinion is whether the trial court erred in refusing to disqualify a prospective juror. The majority reverses. I disagree and respectfully dissent.
The record shows that prospective juror Marcia Nix was the wife of Detective Claude Nix who had transcribed defendant’s statement during his interrogation at the sheriffs office and later swore out the warrant for defendant’s arrest. Defense counsel moved that she “be struck for cause” on the ground that she was closely related to a state’s witness, who “might even be the prosecutor.” The trial court denied the motion, stating that the alleged victim was the prosecutor, not Detective Nix. Defense counsel thereafter used his ninth of twenty strikes to have Ms. Nix excused from the jury. The twenty strikes were exhausted after nine jurors were selected for the jury. See in this regard Foster v. State, 240 Ga. 858 (2) (242 SE2d 600). Compare Wesley v. State, 166 Ga. App. 28 (3) (303 SE2d 124).
OCGA § 15-12-163 (b) (formerly Code § 59-804) provides: “The state or the accused may make any of the following objections to the juror:... (4) That he is so near of kin to the prosecutor, the accused, or the victim as to disqualify him by law from serving on the jury.” The term “prosecutor” is not defined in the Code. However, the listing of “the victim” as an alternative to “the prosecutor” in OCGA § 15-12-163 (b)(4) (Code Ann. § 59-804), supra, certainly evinces a legislative intent that the two are not equivalent.
*217In Eady v. State, 10 Ga. App. 818 (1) (74 SE 303), the court stated: “A prosecutor is one who instigates a prosecution by making an affidavit charging a named person with the commission of a penal offense, on which a warrant is issued or an indictment or accusation is based. 6 Words & Phrases Judicially Defined, 5739.” This definition was adopted by the Supreme Court in Ethridge v. State, 164 Ga. 53 (2) (137 SE 784). Because Detective Nix was the affiant of the affidavit upon which the warrant for defendant’s arrest was issued, it can be argued that the cases of Eady v. State, supra, and Ethridge v. State, supra, mandate the conclusion that he was a prosecutor in the case sub judice.
In the case of Spence v. State, 238 Ga. 399 (233 SE2d 363), however, the Supreme Court implicitly retreated from the seemingly conclusive definition of “prosecutor” in Eady v. State, supra, and Ethridge v. State, supra. In Spence v. State, 238 Ga. 399, supra at 400, the court identified that definition as “[t]he general rule.” (See also Haynie v. State, 141 Ga. App. 688, 693, n. 1 (234 SE2d 406), revd. on other grounds, 240 Ga. 866 (242 SE2d 713).) The court in Spence v. State, supra, then reviewed the material cases on this point and evaluated all the factors bearing on the police officer’s involvement in the case (as was done in Ethridge v. State, supra). Spence v. State, supra, stands for the rule that the issue of whether an individual is a “prosecutor” is to be determined upon a consideration of all the circumstances of the individual’s involvement in the case, with whether or not he swore out the arrest warrant being a material factor in the consideration. Spence v. State, 238 Ga. 399, 400, 401, supra. See also Haynie v. State, 141 Ga. App. 688, supra, at p. 696 (Deen, P. J., dissenting).
In the case sub judice, Detective Nix’s involvement in the case appears to have been limited to transcribing defendant’s statement and swearing out the warrant. He was not identified as the prosecutor by the state. He was not called as a witness for the state at trial, nor did he assist the district attorney in the presentation of the state’s case. We find that “[t]he instant facts are not comparable to those of Ethridge,” (Spence v. State, 238 Ga. 399, supra at 401) nor are they comparable to those of Spence v. State, supra. I would hold that Detective Nix was not the prosecutor and therefore the trial court did not err in refusing to disqualify the detective’s wife.
The second issue presented (not considered by the majority) is whether the trial court erred in declaring the victim, who was four and one-half years old at the time of trial, competent to testify over the objection of defense counsel. The trial court carefully examined the victim to determine his competency. In Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 511 (277 SE2d 53), the Supreme Court held: “The test for determining *218the competency of a child to testify as a witness is enunciated in Jones v. State, 219 Ga. 245, 246 (132 SE2d 648) (1963): ‘The statutory test, Code § 38-1607, of the competency of a child to testify as a witness in a court of justice is that he understand the nature of an oath. The rule has been frequently applied. Moore v. State, 79 Ga. 498 (3) (5 SE 51); Minton v. State, 99 Ga. 254 (1) (25 SE 626). As demonstrated by the opinions of this court, the standard of intelligence required to qualify a child as a witness is not that he be able to define the meaning of an oath, nor that he understand the process under which the oath is administered, but rather that he know and appreciate the fact that as a witness he assumes a solemn and binding obligation to tell the truth relative to the case and concerning such matters as he may be interrogated on, and that if he violates the obligation he is subject to be punished by the court. Reece v. State, 155 Ga. 350 (116 SE 631); Style v. State, 175 Ga. 95 (165 SE 7). It is not even essential to the witness’s competency, although desirable, that he believe in a supreme being, Gantz v. State, 18 Ga. App. 154, 156 (2) (88 SE 993), or that he be aware of God’s existence, Bell v. State, 164 Ga. 292 (138 SE 238). Such lack of faith or knowledge is merely a matter to be considered in passing upon his credibility. Code § 38-1602.’ ”
In the case sub judice, this test was met. I would find no abuse of the trial court’s sound discretion in declaring the child of tender years competent to testify as a witness, leaving the child’s credibility to be determined by the jury. See Allen v. State, 150 Ga. App. 605, 607 (2) (258 SE2d 285). See also Sullivan v. State, 162 Ga. App. 297 (1) (291 SE2d 127); Hayes v. State, 152 Ga. App. 858 (2) (264 SE2d 307).
Accordingly, my examination of the case is such that I would affirm the judgment of conviction as in my view the trial court did not commit any reversible error.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Deen joins in this dissent.