Court Opinion

ID: 9687819
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:50:25.793086+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:07:54.406349
License: Public Domain

DYKMAN, J.
¶ 24. (dissenting). Discrimination is an evil that has been vigorously attacked by the Wisconsin Legislature. To combat discrimination in employment, the legislature enacted Wis. Stat. § 111.31(1) (2001-02),1 which provides, in pertinent part:
Declaration of Policy. (1) The legislature finds that the practice of unfair discrimination in employment against properly qualified individuals by reason of their age, race, creed, color, disability, marital status, sex, national origin, ancestry, sexual orientation, arrest record, conviction record, membership in the national guard, state defense force or any other reserve component of the military forces of the United States or this state or use or nonuse of lawful products off the employer's premises during nonworking hours substantially and adversely affects the general welfare of the state. Employers, labor organizations, employment agencies and licensing agencies that deny employment *553opportunities and discriminate in employment against properly qualified individuals solely because of their age, race, creed, color, disability, marital status, sex, national origin, ancestry, sexual orientation, arrest record, conviction record, membership in the national guard, state defense force or any other reserve component of the military forces of the United States or this state or use or nonuse of lawful products off the employer's premises during nonworking hours deprive those individuals of the earnings that are necessary to maintain a just and decent standard of living.
(Emphasis added.)
¶ 25. To emphasize this policy, the legislature enacted Wis. Stat. § 111.31(2), which provides in pertinent part:
It is the intent of the legislature to protect by law the rights of all individuals to obtain gainful employment and to enjoy privileges free from employment discrimination because of age, race, creed, color, disability, marital status, sex ....
(Emphasis added.)
¶ 26. Unfortunately, despite this strong policy the majority has concluded that a police department may hide from the public, evidence of sex discrimination within the City of Baraboo Police Department. I do not agree that this extension of open records exceptions into an area particularly suited to openness is the correct interpretation of the law or policy encompassed by Wisconsin's open records legislation.
¶ 27. First, I am impressed by the legislature's command and the judiciary's response to that command. Wisconsin Stat. § 19.31 provides for openness, not secrecy:
Declaration of policy. In recognition of the fact that a representative government is dependent upon an *554informed electorate, it is declared to be the public policy of this state that all persons are entitled to the greatest possible information regarding the affairs of government and-the official acts of those officers and employees who represent them. Further, providing persons with such information is declared to be an essential function of a representative government and an integral part of the routine duties of officers and employees whose responsibility it is to provide such information. To that end, ss. 19.32 to 19.37 shall be construed in every instance with a presumption of complete public access, consistent with the conduct of governmental business. The denial of public access generally is contrary to the public interest, and only in an exceptional case may access be denied.
¶ 28. This is not an exceptional case. In fact, it is a mine-run case, in which a police department does not want to reveal evidence of the sex discrimination going on within the department, or what steps the department has taken to insure that the policy of Wisconsin's anti-discrimination statute is being followed. That is understandable. Government does not like to be embarrassed by its mistakes, and secrecy can hide those mistakes from public scrutiny. The open records law, however, is designed to make this sort of information public.
¶ 29. Wisconsin's courts have recognized the legislative policy of openness. In Hathaway v. Green Bay School Dist., 116 Wis. 2d 388, 397, 342 N.W.2d 682 (1984), the court examined previous open records cases and concluded:
Section 19.21, Stats., in light of prior cases, must be broadly construed to favor disclosure. Exceptions should be recognized for what they are, instances in derogation of the general legislative intent, and should, *555therefore, be narrowly construed; and unless the exception is explicit and unequivocal, it will not be held to be an exception.
We are to give much weight to the beneficial public interest in open records. State ex rel. Bilder v. Delavan Tp., 112 Wis. 2d 539, 553, 334 N.W.2d 252 (1983). In Newspapers Inc. v. Breier, 89 Wis. 2d 417, 433, 279 N.W.2d 179 (1979), the court noted: "This court has consistently held that, in the process of balancing policy considerations favoring secrecy for whatever reason against those favoring the public's right of inspection, the public interest in open public records weighs heavily in every case."
¶ 30. So, with the legislature and the courts emphatically favoring openness in government, why has the majority voted for secrecy? First, the majority holds that "privacy issues" support keeping the information secret. But the supreme court has addressed that: "Although it must be conceded that the public interest in the protection of the reputations of individuals is not an insubstantial concern, that interest must be measured against the strong public interest which favors the right of inspection of public records." Newspapers Inc., 89 Wis. 2d at 438. The majority then focuses on a supposed effect of making discrimination complaints public: the victims might not come forward with information. But, as the majority notes, even when promised secrecy, an informant refused to give up information. Reluctant witnesses are an everyday occurrence in court proceedings. Wisconsin's response to that problem is our "John Doe" procedure, under which persons reluctant to divulge information about crimes are forced to tell what they know while under oath.2 *556Subpoenas are another method by which information can be obtained from those not inclined to divulge information at hearings or trials.
¶ 31. The important concept that the majority misses is this: If public employers are permitted to hide evidence of discrimination, we will never be able to overcome that discrimination. While a concern for the privacy of individuals is laudatory, the legislative purpose of ending discrimination will never be achieved if public employers are allowed to sweep evidence of discrimination under the rug and then successfully resist attempts to focus public opinion on the very evil the legislature has made unlawful. In my view, the short-term embarrassment and unsubstantiated fear of reprisal weighs like a feather against the long-term permission the majority has given government to hide evidence of discrimination.
¶ 32. Next, the majority holds that the open records request could be denied because the police department released the information, with only the names of witnesses and the victim redacted. I have made an exhibit of one of the redacted documents. To me, it reveals little more than nothing. The very information necessary to an inquiry into discrimination in the Baraboo Police Department has been censored. I am not convinced by a document such as this.
¶ 33. Nor am I convinced by the majority's citation to Linzmeyer v. Forcey, 2002 WI 84, ¶¶ 14-15, 254 Wis. 2d 306, 646 N.W.2d 811. The cited portion of the case says nothing about redaction, and nothing in the case supports the conclusion that the public's right to know is well protected by disclosing redacted documents. What Linzmeyer really teaches is that the privacy interest of a public school teacher accused of inappropriate behavior with a number of his female *557students is an insufficient reason to keep secret the report of an investigation into that behavior, even when, as in the case of the Baraboo Police Department, no arrest, prosecution or administrative disciplinary action ensued. Linzmeyer is the authority for requiring the Baraboo Police Department to give up the withheld information.
¶ 34. The majority notes that the media can question members of the Baraboo Police Department so as to publicize the issue of discrimination. Were this a reason to deny open records requests, all open records requests could be denied. After all, the media can question anyone about anything. The problem the majority misses is that the open records statutes do not require anyone to talk. An explanation that records can be kept secret because employees will be afraid to talk does not square with an explanation that records can be kept secret because the media can ask questions of those very employees.
¶ 35. There was no need for the precedent set by the majority's opinion here. The Baraboo Police Department will continue to operate whether or not it can keep internal evidence of discrimination secret. Police Department employees will survive and continue their employment whatever we do. But henceforth police departments as well as other government agencies can use the possible privacy concerns of their employees to shield themselves from discrimination investigations. I cannot agree with the balance the majority has struck. I therefore respectfully dissent.
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 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2001-02 version unless otherwise noted.

 See Wis. Stat. § 968.26.