Court Opinion

ID: 9490146
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:34:19.019539+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:53:55.487654
License: Public Domain

TASHIMA, Circuit Judge,
with whom PREGERSON and REINHARDT, Circuit Judges,
join, dissenting:
For the reasons set forth in the panel majority’s opinion, United States v. Moore, 84 F.3d 1567 (9th Cir.1996)(“Moore 7”), I dissent. The majority errs in several major respects. I briefly address these errors seriatim.
1. Mrs. Moore’s Consent
First, the majority refuses to recognize that the uncontradicted evidence establishes that Mrs. Moore consented to her son’s purchase of the handgun. That she did consent is demonstrated by “The Facts,” Part I.A., Op. at 1459, of the majority opinion. According to Bobby’s friend, Jason: “But Bob has a way of talking people into things, and so he kind of threw a tantrum and got all mad, and finally his mom said that she would do it.” (Emphasis added.) What Mrs. Moore agreed to do was to pawn the CD player.1 Bobby “would have to figure out a different way of getting the gun because she didn’t want her name on the papers.” As her later actions demonstrate, this was not a prohibition from Bobby purchasing the gun, it was only Mrs. Moore’s refusal to have “her name on the papers.” For, as the majority’s summary of the facts next states:
Mrs. Moore then pawned Bobby’s CD player and gave him the cash she received from the transaction. She did so knowing that he intended to use it to purchase a firearm.
The next day, Bobby went looking for someone else to help him acquire the weapon, as suggested by his mother.
Op. at 1459 (emphasis added). As the majority further states, .“Mrs. Moore then drove Wiley, Bobby, and Jason to the pawnshop.” During that trip, she told Wiley that the purchase of the gun “was all right with her,” “it was fine.” Finally, Mrs. Moore told the pawn shop clerk, “everything is fine with me.”2
Mrs. Moore consented to Wiley’s purchase of the handgun for Bobby.3 Short of purchasing the weapon herself, there was little else that Mrs. Moore could have done to facilitate the transaction.
2. The Parental Consent Exception
The majority’s second error is to ignore Mrs. Moore’s consent and, thus, the central issue in this case-the scope of the parental consent exception. The majority ignores Mrs. Moore’s consent to the sale because it does not want to deal with the consequences of recognizing it.
Even the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (“BATF”) agrees that Congress in*1469tended that guns purchased for juveniles by their parents be excepted from the Gun Control Act’s (“GCA”) prohibition, and has administered the GCA to recognize such an exception.4 However, the BATF would limit that exception to transactions in which the parent herself or himself is the purchaser— the “Transferee (Buyer).”
As the panel opinion makes clear, there is no justification in the legislative history to construe the parental consent exception as narrowly as does the BATF, particularly when construing a criminal statute. For the reasons stated in Parts III and IV of the panel opinion, Moore I, 84 F.3d at 1571-73, the majority errs in failing to recognize Congress’ intent that under the GCA, a parent may validly consent to the purchase of a gun for her minor child without being the physical purchaser.
Congress simply did not intend to criminalize acquisition of firearms by minors where the parent knows of and consents to the purchase.
The report of the Senate Judiciary Committee on the GCA listed among the serious national problems addressed by the legislation the acquisition of firearms by “juveniles without the knowledge and, consent of their parents or guardians____” S.Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N., 2112, 2114 (emphasis added). The report elaborated:
The clandestine acquisition of firearms by juveniles and minors is a most serious problem facing law enforcement and the citizens of this country. The controls proposed in the title are designed to meet this problem and to substantially curtail it.
Id. at 2167 (emphasis added).
The committee report made clear that Congress did not intend to frustrate all gun acquisitions by minors:
[UJnder the title, a minor or juvenile would not be restricted from owning or learning the proper usage of the firearm, since any firearm which his parent or guardian desired him to have could be obtained for the minor or juvenile by the parent or guardian.5

Id.

There is no indication that Congress intended to limit the exception for the purchase of a firearm for a minor exclusively to purchases made by the parent himself or herself. What the legislative history indicates is that Congress considered parental permission sufficient to allow a third party to purchase the firearm on behalf of a minor. The Senate Judiciary Committee’s report clearly indicates that Congress’ purpose was only to prohibit those acquisitions of firearms by minors that are “clandestine” or made “without the knowledge and consent of their parents.”
Moore I, 84 F.3d at 1571-72 (footnote omitted).
3. The Jury’s Finding
The majority also errs in pretending that the pivotal issue was fairly presented to and decided by the jury. The majority sets up a straw man and knocks it down. Under the majority’s hypothesis, the issue, which “was for the jury to decide,” was whether Wiley was Mrs. Moore’s agent or Bobby’s agent. Part I.D., Op. at 1461. That, of course, is not the issue.
As the instructions quoted by the majority show, if Bobby was the “true” purchaser, defendants were guilty as straw purchasers:
The limited charges against the defendants in Count 1 and 2 are that James Robert Lee Moore was the true purchaser of the firearm and that the defendants served merely as straw men for the purchase of the firearm in the place of James Robert Lee Moore.
*1470Part I.B., Op. at 1460. This instruction completely foreclosed the jury from finding that defendants were not guilty under the parental consent exception, if the jury found that Mrs. Moore had consented to Bobby’s purchase of the handgun. Thus, it is disingenuous to say that the issue was submitted to the jury for its determination.
4. No False Statement
According to the government’s theory of the case, the only material false statement made was made by Wiley when he signed the BATF form stating that he was the “transferee (buyer).”6 This statement was false, according to the government, because Bobby was the “true” purchaser and Wiley was a “straw man.” However, even under this theory, under the BATF’s own interpretation of what its own forms and regulations require, Wiley was required to state that he was the “transferee (buyer).”
According to the testimony of BATF Special Agent Sterling Nixon, when a parent purchases a gun for her child, even with the child’s own money, she is required to list her own name as the “transferee (buyer)”.7 BATF Form 4473 simply is not designed to accommodate a straw purchase, whether or not it is lawful.8 There was no place on the form where Wiley could have disclosed that he intended immediately to transfer the gun to Mrs. Moore, for eventual transfer to Bobby. Wiley did not make a false statement. He was, in fact, the “transferee (buyer)” and listed himself as such. Because he fully complied with the requirements of the BATF form and the form nowhere required disclosure of the “straw” aspect of the transaction, Wiley did not make a false statement by listing himself as the “transferee (buyer),” unless that action were criminalized by the “straw man” doctrine, discussed below.
Further analysis of the BATF’s- design9 and administration of its Form 4473 demonstrates the “Catch 22” in which straw purchasers are placed. According to BATF Agent Nixon’s testimony, straw purchasers are required to list themselves as the “transferee (buyer),” even though they are standing in for the “true” purchaser, e.g., where a parent is purchasing a firearm for her child. Thus, in the BATF’s view, straw purchasers are required to make a false statement. The BATF then, in its discretion, determines whether or not that false statement is material, i.e., whether or not Congress intended that transaction to be exempted from the BATF’s “true” purchaser requirement. Whatever the merits of such an administration of the GCA for regulatory purposes, it is hardly a fair way to administer the criminal law.
5. The Straw Man Doctrine
Although not directly acknowledging it, the majority seems to recognize that the “straw man” doctrine is a judicially-created gloss on the GCA — it imposes criminal liability where there is none under a plain, strict reading of *1471the statute. We agree that it is a proper and useful doctrine. See Moore I, 84 F.3d at 1571. Where the majority errs, however, is in the doctrine’s application, in deferring to the BATF to dictate its scope in construing the parental consent exception, when the BATF’s construction is clearly at odds with Congress’ intent. See Moore I, 84 F.3d at 1572-73 (Part III).
The application of the straw man doctrine to this case is bizarre and perverse. Mrs. Moore has been convicted of having aided and abetted the acquisition of a firearm by her son. Under 18 U.S.C. § 2, she is liable “as a principal.” But, as a principal, as even the government concedes, she had the right to purchase a firearm for her son. Thus, she stands convicted of having aided and abetted an offense for which she could not have been convicted of as a principal.
The majority concludes its defense of applying the straw man doctrine to this case by borrowing from the Sixth Circuit:
The result we reach here is necessary if the intentions of Congress as revealed in the Gun Control Act of 1968 are to be followed.
United States v. Lawrence, 680 F.2d 1126, 1128 (6th Cir.1982)(emphasis added). The majority, however, has pointed to no such intent. Application of the straw man doctrine here does not follow “the intentions of Congress.” No reported case has ever applied the straw man doctrine to criminalize the sale of a gun to a minor with a parent’s consent. As we have demonstrated, Congressional intent compels exactly the opposite conclusion. The majority’s novel application of that doctrine to this case does violence to the intent of Congress.
This court should not default to the BATF, or any other Executive Branch agency, the power to construe our criminal laws in derogation of the intent of Congress. Congress did not intend to criminalize the sale of a firearm to a minor, where the sale is made with the consent of the minor’s parent. If, as it should be, the underlying transaction is seen as one within the parental consent exception, then the sale was lawful and any false statement made to facilitate it could not have been of “any fact material to the lawfulness of the sale,” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6).
For these reasons, I would reverse the convictions. I respectfully dissent.

. This action, of pawning the CD player with the foreknowledge of what the money would be used for, also demonstrates Mrs. Moore’s consent. Indeed, as a minor, Bobby could not pawn the CD player himself. That is why he importuned his mother to pawn the CD player for him. In the eyes of the law, both the CD player and the money obtained from pawning it belonged to Mrs. Moore.

. Moreover, as the panel opinion pointed out, Mrs. Moore's conviction for aiding and abetting could not be sustained, unless she acted "knowingly and intentionally,” i.e., that she consented to the transaction. Moore I, 84 F.3d at 1573 n. 6.

. The majority’s summaiy of the facts also shows that Wiley, after purchasing the firearm, did not hand the gun to Bobby, but "gave the gun to Mrs. Moore____” Op. at 1460. Thus, not only did Mrs. Moore consent to the purchase of the firearm, according to the majority’s summaiy of the facts (i) the firearm was purchased with her money, (ii) she authorized Wiley to conduct the transaction, (iii) after purchasing the firearm, Wiley handed it to Mrs. Moore, and (iv) it was Mrs. Moore who actually handed over physical possession of the firearm to her son.

. No party has cited and the court has not found any reported case in which a straw purchaser has been prosecuted for buying a firearm for a juvenile where the straw purchaser is a parent or other close relative of the juvenile.

. The transaction at issue here meets this description-the firearm was “obtained for the minor” by Mrs. Moore through the arrangements that were made with Wiley with her substantial assistance and consent.

. The majority never precisely identifies the material false statement charged in this case; however, the government made clear at oral argument that the only statement it was relying on as false and material was Wiley’s identifying himself as the transferee (buyer). This is confirmed by the materiality instruction quoted by the majority. Part II, Op. at 1463-64.
Throughout its opinion, the majority implies that Wiley’s statements that he was Bobby's grandfather, and that he would hold the firearm until Bobby was 21 were material. However, they clearly were not material to the lawfulness of the sale. First, no one contends that the’ GCA authorizes a grandparent to act as a straw purchaser for his minor grandchild (absent a parent’s consent). Second, neither does anyone contend that a minor may purchase a handgun if he promises that an adult will retain possession of it until he turns 21.

. Agent Nixon further testified that this required listing of the parent’s name as transferee (buyer) would be true even if the parent intended immediately to transfer the firearm to her child, and that it would not be a false statement.

. As noted in the panel opinion, not all straw transactions are illegal. Moore I, 84 F.3d at 1570. The paradigmatic straw transaction is, of course, the legal stand-in of a parent for her or his minor child.

. The contents of the form are controlled by the BATF. See 27 C.F.R. §§ 178.21 (authorizing Director of BATF to prescribe forms), 178.124(f) (prescribing contents of Form 4473). Presumably, therefore, the BATF could require straw purchases, including those for minors with parental consent, to be disclosed on the form. Apparently, it has elected not to do so.