Court Opinion

ID: 9673724
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:17:13.779469+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:23.766731
License: Public Domain

Robert W. Hansen, J.
(dissenting). Under the laws of this state any town board, village board or common council may issue liquor licenses for the operation of a tavern to an “entitled person,”1 at a particular location in the town, village or city,2 for a limited period of time.3 Such license may be transferred from one location to another, but only with the permission of the licensing authority and on application of the license holder.4
In the case before us, the defendant, Harold K. Losinske, held such liquor license and operated such tavern in the city of Berlin until the leased building in which the tavern was located was torn down to make room for new construction. Having no place to move to, the defendant did not apply for a transfer of license to another location. At that time Variance, Inc., had purchased land, intending, in the words of its president, “. . . to make that into a nightclub, restaurant establishment.” So the company president drafted and Variance, Inc., entered into an agreement with defendant whereby defendant agreed “to sell, convey and transfer my Class A and B Liquor License that I presently hold” to Variance, Inc.5
*43The right to hold a liquor license in this state is a privilege,6 not normally assignable.7 Issuance or transfer of liquor licenses is at the discretion of the licensing authority.8 Parties by contract cannot bind or interfere with the discretion of the licensing board.9 However, our court has held that a provision for the assignment of a liquor license is unenforceable against the licensing authority but not necessarily void for all purposes.”10 The sale or assignment here can be construed, as was the lease provision in Spreeher, as no more than an agreement that the license holder “. . . would not seek to have the liquor license transferred or a new license issued.”11 So construed, the agreement is enforceable, and a construction favoring enforceability should be adopted.
In setting the “terms” for payment of the $1,500 due (all except the $50 down payment), the agreement of the parties provided that such balance due was to be paid “. . . upon acceptance by the City Council of buyer’s application for said license.” The agreement entered into on November 18, 1972, also provided: “This transaction is to be concluded on or before December 30, 1972.” This second provision was complied with on December 12, 1972, when Variance, Inc., paid to defendant the $1,450 balance due under the agreement.
Variance, Inc., contends that “acceptance by the city” was a condition precedent to its being required to pay the $1,450 balance due under the agreement. But it did pay such balance on December 12, 1972, before it attempted any application for a liquor license. No claim is *44made that the balance was then paid under duress, fraud or mistake of fact. Whatever the intent of Variance as to consequences, the balance due was voluntarily paid in advance of either application to or acceptance by the city of an application by Variance for a license. The situation is completely analogous to that in the case where an offer to purchase was subject to and contingent upon the buyers obtaining “any and all licenses necessary” for the operation of a tavern-restaurant. Without waiting for the obtaining of such licenses, the buyer went ahead and closed the transaction.12 By so electing to purchase and assume control of the property, one buyer, our court held, “. . . waived the condition as to obtaining the licenses.”13 The general rule in this state is that a party to a contract can waive a condition for his benefit.14 Here the provision as to when the balance due was required to be paid was clearly for the benefit of Variance, Inc., and the earlier voluntary payment of such balance due is, as a matter of law, a clear waiver of its right under the contract to delay payment of such balance until action by the city on its application for a liquor license.
While an intention to relinquish the right in question is an essential element of waiver,15 the search for intent as a question of fact to be resolved is to be made only “ ‘. . . where the inference does not conclusively arise *45as a matter of law.’ ”16 Here, where actual payment was voluntarily made in advance of the date required for payment in the contract, intent to waive the right to delay payment until the contract-established date must be inferred as a matter of law from the very fact of the earlier payment made by the party for whose benefit the delayed payment provision was inserted in the contract.17 When Variance paid the balance due in December, it extinguished, as well as waived, its right to delay such payment to a later date.
The writer would reverse the judgment of the trial court, and remand with directions to enter judgment for the defendant, dismissing the complaint of plaintiff corporation, with costs.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice Leo B. Hanley and Mr. Justice Connor T. Hansen join in this dissent.

 Sec. 176.05 (1), Stats.

 See. 176.05 (5), Stats.

 Sec. 176.05 (la), Stats.

 Sec. 176.05 (14), Stats.

 In what is identified as “Terms,” the agreement provided: (1) For payment of $50 at the signing, and $1,450 upon acceptance by the city council of the buyer’s application for said license; (2) for seller to submit a letter of withdrawal of his license upon the city’s acceptance of the buyer’s application; and (3) the transaction to be concluded before December 30, 1972, unless extended by both parties.

 Marquette Savings & Loan Asso. v. Twin Lakes (1968), 38 Wis. 2d 310, 315, 156 N. W. 2d 425.

 Sprecher v. Weston’s Bar, Inc. (1971), 52 Wis. 2d 677, 679, 191 N. W. 2d 212.

 Marquette Savings & Loam Asso. v. Twin Lakes, supra, footnote 6, at page 315.

 Spreeher v. Weston’s Bar, Inc., supra, footnote 7, at page 680.

 Id. at page 680.

 Id. at page 680.

 Fun-N-Fish, Inc. v. Parker (1960), 10 Wis. 2d 385, 389, 103 N. W. 2d 1.

 Id. at page 390.

 Godfrey Co. v. Crawford (1964), 23 Wis. 2d 44, 49, 126 N. W. 2d 495, citing Fun-N-Fish, Inc. v. Parker, supra, footnote 12, at page 389. In Godfrey, where under a contract of sale it was provided that failure to consummate a zoning change by March 1, 1963, would nullify the contract of sale, our court held that the buyer had the right to waive the provision inserted in the contract for his benefit.

 Hanz Trucking, Inc. v. Harris Brothers Co. (1965), 29 Wis. 2d 254, 265, 138 N. W. 2d 238.

 Id. at page 265, quoting Nelson v. Caddo-Texas Oil Lands Co. (1922), 176 Wis. 327, 329, 186 N. W. 155.

 Id. at page 265, quoting Nelson v. Caddo-Texas Oil Lands Co., supra, footnote 16, at page 329.