Court Opinion

ID: 9895594
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-07 21:00:38.980279+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:37.021877
License: Public Domain

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                                                           [PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                               No. 23-11056
                         ____________________

        GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY,
        GEICO INDEMNITY COMPANY,
        GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
                             Plaintiﬀs-Counter Defendants-Appellants,
        versus
        GLASSCO INC.,

                               Defendant-Counter Claimant-Appellee,

        JASON WILEMON,
        JOHN BAILEY,
        ANDREW VICTOR,
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        2                       Opinion of the Court                 23-11056

                                                       Defendants-Appellees.

                             ____________________

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Middle District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 8:19-cv-01950-KKM-JSS
                            ____________________

        Before JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
        HULL, Circuit Judge:
                This appeal turns on the interpretation of Florida’s Motor
        Vehicle Repair Act (“Repair Act”). The questions presented are
        sufficiently unsettled, important, and likely to recur that we believe
        the best course is to certify them to the Supreme Court of Florida,
        the final arbiter of Florida law. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684,
        691 (1975) (noting the United States Supreme Court “repeatedly
        has held that state courts are the ultimate expositors of state law”);
        In re Cassell, 688 F.3d 1291, 1292 (11th Cir. 2012) (stating the final
        arbiter of state law is the state supreme court).
                               I.     BACKGROUND
            A.    The Parties
             The plaintiffs Government Employees Insurance Company,
        GEICO Indemnity Company, and GEICO General Insurance
        Company (collectively “plaintiff GEICO” or “GEICO”) sell
        automobile insurance policies with comprehensive coverage (the
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        23-11056               Opinion of the Court                        3

        “policy”). The defendant Glassco Inc. (“Glassco”) is a windshield
        repair shop in Florida, and defendants Jason Wilemon, John Bailey,
        and Andrew Victor are the owners of Glassco (collectively the
        “Glassco owners”).
               Plaintiff GEICO sued defendants, alleging eight causes of
        action, all premised on defendants’ purported violations of the
        Repair Act. The district court dismissed Count 8 and granted
        summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the remaining
        counts. Plaintiff GEICO appeals. We set forth the facts, the
        procedural history, the Repair Act, and the certified questions.
           B.      Facts
               Beginning in 2016, Glassco provided windshield repairs to
        Florida individuals insured by GEICO. Glassco gave a written
        work order to the insureds, which they signed. Glassco’s work
        order stated the repairs are at “no cost” to the insured. Under
        Florida law, an insurer, like GEICO, is not allowed to charge its
        insureds a deductible for windshield repairs. Fla. Stat. § 627.7288.
               In the work order, the insureds assigned to Glassco all rights
        to insurance payments for windshield repair and/or replacement
        (collectively “repairs”). The insureds’ assignment expressly
        assigned Glassco the right to make a demand for payment for the
        repairs and to receive “direct payment” from GEICO.
               Notably, the assignment also stated, “I hereby authorize the
        above repairs, including sublet work, along with the necessary
        materials. Glassco Inc. and its contractors may operate my vehicle
        for the purpose of inspection and delivery at my risk.” (emphasis
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                  23-11056

        added). GEICO’s policy granted its insureds the sole discretion to
        select a repair shop to repair a windshield. Glassco ran its business
        almost entirely through independent contractors.
               Pursuant to the assignment, Glassco made repairs and
        submitted its invoice for reimbursement to GEICO. GEICO’s
        policy provided that GEICO would reimburse the repair shop for
        windshield repairs at the “prevailing competitive price” for a
        “competent and conveniently located” repair shop. GEICO relied,
        in part, on the National Auto Glass Specifications (“NAGS”) to
        determine the “prevailing competitive price.” In early 2012,
        GEICO circulated a letter to repair shops, stating that it would only
        reimburse a deeply discounted amount of NAGS’s pricing
        standards.
               Between 2016 and 2019, 1,773 of GEICO’s insureds selected
        Glassco to repair their windshields. Glassco completed the repair
        work, and this appeal involves no customer complaints. Yet, for
        nearly all of these 1,773 claims, GEICO did not pay Glassco’s full
        invoiced price but instead made only deeply discounted payments
        to Glassco.
                In response, Glassco filed small claims actions in Florida
        state court to collect the difference between its invoiced prices and
        the discounted amounts GEICO paid. In state small claims court,
        11 of the 1,773 cases were consolidated, tried, and resulted in a final
        judgment for Glassco’s invoiced prices against GEICO. Glassco,
        Inc., a.a.o. J. Bazan et al. v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 16-CC-026608, 16-
        CC-031286, 16-CC-029315, 16-CC-029301, 16-CC-034756, 16-CC-
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        23-11056                 Opinion of the Court                             5

        036273, 16-CC-037057, 16-CC-037082, 16-CC-037125, 16-CC-
        039072, 17-CC-000870 (Fla. Hillsborough Cnty. Ct. Small Cl. Div.
        Aug. 20, 2020). The state small claims court determined that “the
        ‘prevailing competitive price’ is more than the [discounted]
        amount GEICO paid” and that Glassco’s “invoiced amount did not
        exceed the ‘prevailing competitive price.’” Id. In so ruling, the
        state small claims court followed the holding in Government
        Employees Insurance Co. v. Superior Auto Glass of Tampa Bay, Inc., 26
        Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 876a (Fla. Cir. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 27, 2018).
        The Florida appellate court affirmed those 11 judgments in a
        summary order. See GEICO Gen. Ins. Co. v. Glassco, Inc., 343 So. 3d
        565 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2022). GEICO settled an additional 53 cases.
        It appears Glassco’s other 1,709 cases remain pending in state court.
           C.      Procedural History
               While these state court actions were pending, GEICO
        brought suit offensively against defendants in federal court.
        GEICO’s complaint alleged that defendants violated the Repair Act
        in five ways, and therefore defendants were not entitled to any
        payment at all for any completed windshield repairs. GEICO seeks
        to recover over $700,000 that it paid to Glassco from 2016 onward. 1
              GEICO’s alleged five Repair Act violations are: (1) Glassco
        subcontracted the repair work without its insured customers’
        knowledge or consent; and although customers signed Glassco’s

        1 The vast majority of this $700,000 represents the 1,700+ claims that GEICO
        paid at discounted amounts below Glassco’s invoiced price.
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                23-11056

        work orders for repairs at “no cost” to them, Glassco failed to give
        them the required (2) written notice of the option to obtain a
        written estimate; (3) written repair estimates; (4) invoices upon the
        completion of repairs; and (5) odometer readings on work orders
        and invoices.
               GEICO’s original complaint asserted eight causes of action
        based on (1) a Repair Act theory alone or (2) both a Repair Act
        theory and a fraud theory. Underlying all of GEICO’s claims is the
        contention that (1) Glassco did not comply with the Repair Act,
        (2) Glassco is not entitled to any reimbursements at all, and (3) all
        of Glassco’s claims presented to GEICO were thus fraudulent and
        unlawful.
               Count 1 seeks a declaratory judgment that Glassco has no
        right to receive any payment by virtue of its Repair Act violations.
        Count 2 is a federal RICO claim, and Count 3 is a federal RICO
        conspiracy claim, both against the Glassco owners. Count 4 is a
        Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act claim against all
        defendants. Count 5 is a Florida RICO claim against the Glassco
        owners. Count 6 is a common law fraud claim and Count 7 is an
        unjust enrichment claim, both against all defendants. Count 8 is a
        Repair Act statutory claim against all defendants brought under
        Fla. Stat. § 559.921(1).
               Defendants each filed a motion to dismiss GEICO’s
        complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil
        Procedure 12(b)(6). The district court granted defendants’ motions
        as to GEICO’s statutory Repair Act claim (Count 8) on the basis that
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        23-11056               Opinion of the Court                         7

        (1) the Repair Act grants a private right of action to only
        “customers,” (2) GEICO is not a “customer” as defined by the
        Repair Act, and (3) the Repair Act thus does not grant GEICO a
        statutory cause of action. The district court denied defendants’
        motions on Counts 1 through 7.
               After discovery, all parties moved for summary judgment.
        The district court denied plaintiff GEICO’s motion and granted in
        part and denied in part defendants’ motions. Even assuming
        Glassco violated the Repair Act, the district court concluded that
        Glassco’s violations (1) were at most technical violations of the
        Repair Act and (2) did not render Glassco’s claims non-
        compensable vis-à-vis GEICO.               Therefore, Glassco’s
        reimbursement claims submitted to GEICO were not fraudulent
        or unlawful.
               The district court granted judgment to the defendants on
        (1) Count 1, the declaratory judgment claim, and (2) Counts 2, 3,
        and 5, the RICO claims based on Repair Act violations and fraud,
        for lack of scienter and continuity required under state and federal
        RICO laws. As to Counts 4, 6, and 7, the district court granted
        judgment for all defendants to the extent those counts were based
        on Repair Act violations, but permitted them to continue based on
        GEICO’s traditional fraud allegations.
               GEICO filed a motion for reconsideration or, in the
        alternative, for certification for interlocutory review pursuant to 28
        U.S.C. § 1292(b). The court denied GEICO’s motion.
               To appeal immediately, GEICO filed a motion to amend its
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        8                        Opinion of the Court                 23-11056

        complaint to remove its surviving fraud theory claims. The district
        court granted GEICO’s motion and entered judgment for all
        defendants on all counts. GEICO appealed.
            D.      GEICO’s Two Appeals
               In GEICO’s first appeal, this Court held that although
        GEICO attempted to amend its complaint to remove the fraud
        theory claims, GEICO did not sufficiently remove them, and there
        was no final decision. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Glassco, Inc., 58 F.4th
        1338 (11th Cir. 2023). We dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate
        jurisdiction. Id. at 1346.
               On remand, GEICO again sought leave to amend its
        complaint to drop further the fraud theory. The district court
        granted GEICO’s unopposed motion, and this second appeal
        ensued. The operative complaint contains only claims premised
        on GEICO’s theory that Glassco (1) violated the Repair Act in five
        ways, (2) was not entitled to any payment for any repairs, and
        (3) thus owes approximately $700,000 back to GEICO.
               In this second appeal, GEICO conceded that if a court
        determines that the alleged Repair Act violations do not void the
        repair invoice and preclude Glassco from receiving any payment,
        all eight counts in the operative complaint fail. The issues now
        involve only the effect, if any, of Glassco’s five alleged violations of
        the Repair Act and whether GEICO can sue for them.
                          II.    STANDARD OF REVIEW
                 We review de novo a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure
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        23-11056                 Opinion of the Court                          9

        to state a claim. Boyle v. City of Pell City, 866 F.3d 1280, 1286 (11th
        Cir. 2017). We review de novo a district court’s summary judgment
        order, drawing all inferences in the light most favorable to the non-
        moving party. Smith v. Owens, 848 F.3d 975, 978 (11th Cir. 2017).
               We review a district court’s interpretation of state law de
        novo. Fla. VirtualSchool v. K12, Inc., 735 F.3d 1271, 1273 (11th Cir.
        2013). In this diversity case, we must apply Florida law and decide
        issues of state law “the way it appears the state’s highest court
        would.” Ernie Haire Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 260 F.3d 1285, 1290
        (11th Cir. 2001) (quotation marks omitted).
                              III.   THE REPAIR ACT
                We start by reviewing Florida’s Repair Act.
           A.      Five Alleged Statutory Violations
               First, GEICO asserts that Glassco subcontracted the repair
        work without its customers’ “knowledge or consent,” in violation
        of § 559.920(14), which provides:
                It is a violation of this act for any motor vehicle repair
                shop or employee thereof to . . . [h]ave repair work
                subcontracted without the knowledge or consent of
                the customer unless the motor vehicle repair shop or
                employee thereof demonstrates that the customer
                could not reasonably have been notified.
        Fla. Stat. § 559.920(14).
              Second, GEICO contends Glassco failed to give its
        customers “written notice” about the customers’ option to request
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        10                      Opinion of the Court                  23-11056

        or not request a written estimate, in violation of § 559.905(2),
        which requires a notice with the following statement, in capital
        letters of at least 12-point type:
               Please read carefully, check one of the statements
               below, and sign:
               I understand that, under state law, I am entitled to a
               written estimate if my final bill will exceed $100.
               _____ I request a written estimate.
               _____ I do not request a written estimate as long as
               the repair costs do not exceed $___. The shop may
               not exceed this amount without my written or oral
               approval.
               _____ I do not request a written estimate.
               Signed _______________ Date _____
        Fla. Stat. § 559.905(2) (font altered).
               Third, GEICO asserts Glassco failed to provide its customers
        a “written repair estimate” before doing the windshield repairs, in
        violation of § 559.905(1), which provides:
               When any customer requests a motor vehicle repair
               shop to perform repair work on a motor vehicle, the
               cost of which repair work will exceed $100 to the
               customer, the shop shall prepare a written repair
               estimate, which is a form setting forth the estimated
               cost of repair work, including diagnostic work, before
               effecting any diagnostic work or repair.
        Fla. Stat. § 559.905(1). This section requires 14 items to be included
        in a “written repair estimate.” Fla. Stat. § 559.905(1)(a)–(n).
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        23-11056                Opinion of the Court                         11

                Fourth, GEICO contends Glassco failed to provide its
        customers an invoice upon the completion of repairs, in violation
        of § 559.911, which states: “The motor vehicle repair shop shall
        provide each customer, upon completion of any repair, with a
        legible copy of an invoice for such repair. The invoice may be
        provided on the same form as the written repair estimate . . . .” Fla.
        Stat. § 559.911. This section requires six items to be included in the
        invoice. Fla. Stat. § 559.911(1)–(6).
               Fifth, GEICO contends Glassco failed to include the
        vehicle’s odometer reading on work orders and invoices, in
        violation of § 559.911(1) and § 559.920(11). Section 559.911(1)
        provides that invoices must include “[t]he current date and
        odometer reading of the motor vehicle.” Fla. Stat. § 559.911(1).
        Section 559.920(11) provides:
               It is a violation of this act for any motor vehicle repair
               shop or employee thereof to . . . [c]ause or allow a
               customer to sign any work order that does not state
               . . . the automobile’s odometer reading at the time of
               repair.
        Fla. Stat. § 559.920(11).
               In response, defendants dispute the alleged Repair Act
        violations.   Defendants contend that Glassco’s customers
        consented to subcontract work because they signed a work order
        authorizing “sublet work” and Glassco’s “contractors” to operate
        the vehicle. Further, customers have the option not to request a
        written estimate. Defendants argue that no written estimate is
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        12                         Opinion of the Court             23-11056

        required when a repair shop does not charge anything to the
        customer. Allstate v. Auto Glass Am., LLC, 418 F. Supp. 3d 1009,
        1024–25 (M.D. Fla. 2019). Defendants also argue that Glassco’s
        work orders are effectively a “zero to the customer” estimate that
        every customer signed. There is no evidence that Glassco’s
        customers did not understand or accept the estimate of “no cost”
        on Glassco’s work orders. Because Glassco’s work orders were at
        “no cost” to its customers, defendants contend Glassco properly
        submitted its invoices to GEICO who paid them, albeit at a deeply
        discounted price.
              Defendants also point out the Repair Act provides that even
        if such violations occur, the repair shop can still recover a
        “reasonable value of such repairs,” as follows:
               If, in any proceeding brought pursuant to this part, it
               is determined that the repairs and costs thereof were
               in fact authorized, orally or in writing, the repairs
               were completed in a proper manner, and the
               consumer benefited therefrom, then the enforcing
               authority may consider such factors in assessing
               penalties or damages and may award the reasonable
               value of such repairs.
        Fla. Stat. § 559.921(7).
               For purposes of the summary judgment motions, the district
        court assumed that Glassco violated the Repair Act in the five
        alleged ways and held those violations did not void the repair
        invoices and did not preclude payment to Glassco. So, for purposes
        of this appeal and certification, we assume that GEICO’s alleged
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        23-11056                 Opinion of the Court                         13

        Repair Act violations occurred.
           B.      Remedies Section of the Repair Act
               For violations, the remedies section of the Repair Act creates
        a private right of action for “[a]ny customer,” stating:
                Any customer injured by a violation of this part may
                bring an action in the appropriate court for relief. . . .
                The customer may also bring an action for injunctive
                relief in the circuit court.
        Fla. Stat. § 559.921(1). The Repair Act defines a “customer” as:
                [T]he person who signs the written repair estimate or
                any other person whom the person who signs the
                written repair estimate designates on the written
                repair estimate as a person who may authorize repair
                work.
        Fla. Stat. § 559.903(2). GEICO admits it did not request the repair
        work and did not sign a work order or a repair estimate.
                We now turn to GEICO’s operative complaint.
            IV.     COUNT 8: REPAIR ACT’S CAUSE OF ACTION
           A.      District Court’s Dismissal of Count 8
               In dismissing Count 8, the district court concluded that
        (1) only a “customer” may bring a private action under § 559.921(1)
        of the Repair Act, but (2) GEICO is not a “customer” as defined by
        § 559.903(2) of the Repair Act as (a) “the person who signs the
        written repair estimate” or (b) the person designated “as a person
        who may authorize repair work.” See Fla. Stat. §§ 559.903(2),
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        14                     Opinion of the Court                  23-11056

        559.921(1); see also Allstate, 418 F. Supp. 3d at 1025 (concluding that
        an insurance company alleging fraudulent windshield repair
        practices was not a customer under the text of the Repair Act).
               The district court recognized that the Repair Act is
        “remedial” and warrants a statutory construction that gives its
        terms the most extensive and broadest meaning to which they are
        reasonably susceptible. But the district court noted that the written
        estimate is provided “[w]hen any customer requests a motor
        vehicle repair shop to perform repair work on a motor vehicle.”
        Fla. Stat. § 559.905(1). The district court reasoned that when no
        written estimate is provided or signed, the only reasonable
        interpretation of “customer” is the person who requested or
        authorized the repair shop to perform the windshield repair work.
               Since GEICO was not a person who requested or authorized
        Glassco to repair the vehicles, the district court concluded that “no
        reasonable construction permits GEICO—an insurer—to sue as a
        ‘customer’ under the Repair Act.” At bottom, the district court
        determined the § 559.921(1) cause of action, read with the
        § 559.903(2) customer definition and the § 559.905(1) written
        estimate requirement, did not grant GEICO a private cause of
        action and, thus, dismissed Count 8 for failure to state a claim.
              The district court also stressed that GEICO is not without a
        remedy. Under § 559.921(2) of the Repair Act, GEICO can
        complain to the Florida Department of Agricultural & Consumer
        Services (“FDACS”) about the defendants’ non-compliance with
        the Repair Act, and § 559.921(4) grants FDACS the power to
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        23-11056                 Opinion of the Court                           15

        impose a civil penalty, including a fine, an injunction against
        specified activity, and a revocation of the repair shop’s registration.
        See Fla. Stat. §§ 559.903(3), 559.921(2), 559.921(4). The district
        court found that the existence of “an administrative remedy further
        confirms that the Repair Act restricts the private right of action to
        the customer only.”
           B.      GEICO’s Contentions Regarding Count 8
               GEICO argues the district court erred in dismissing Count
        8. On appeal, GEICO concedes that it is not a “customer” under
        the Repair Act’s definition, but nonetheless asserts that it is entitled
        to bring a statutory private cause of action under § 559.921(1) of
        the Repair Act. 2 GEICO contends that the Repair Act, as a remedial
        statute, is entitled to a liberal construction in order to advance the
        remedy provided where it is consistent with the legislative
        purpose. See Raymar Constr. Co., Inc. v. Lopez-Soto, 547 So. 2d 282,
        284 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989). GEICO emphasizes that the purpose
        of the Repair Act was “to protect consumers against
        misunderstandings arising from oral estimates of motor vehicle
        repairs and the legal disputes and litigation that result from the ‘fait
        accompli’ nature of claims for repair work already done.” Citron v.
        HGC Auto Collision, Inc., 342 So. 3d 795, 798 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
        2022) (quotation marks omitted).

        2 GEICO does not argue that the law of subrogation permits it to assert the

        insured’s private right of action under the Repair Act. At oral argument,
        GEICO also acknowledged that it does not have any assignment of any
        customer’s potential claim under the Repair Act.
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        16                      Opinion of the Court                  23-11056

               GEICO also argues that a strict application of § 559.903(2)’s
        definition of “customer” creates a hole in the Repair Act. Because
        defendants never provided anyone with the requisite written
        estimate, no one was able to sign an estimate, and therefore no one
        could ever bring a private action against defendants under Fla. Stat.
        § 559.921(1). GEICO contends that the district court’s narrow
        construction of “customer” insulates repair shops from liability for
        their own Repair Act violations. GEICO argues that under the
        circumstances here—where no one met the strict statutory
        definition of a “customer”—the district court construed the Repair
        Act in a way that undermines its remedial purpose.
               GEICO also relies on the decision in 1616 Sunrise Motors, Inc.
        v. A-Leet Leasing of Florida, 547 So. 2d 267 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
        Sunrise involved a § 559.919 lien under the Repair Act. At the time,
        § 559.919 provided that a repair shop may not “refuse to return a
        customer’s motor vehicle by virtue of any miscellaneous lien, nor
        may it enforce such a lien in any other fashion if it has failed to
        substantially comply with the provisions of this part.” Fla. Stat.
        § 559.919 (1980). In Sunrise, A-Leet owned the car but leased it;
        after an accident, Sunrise repaired the car, but the lessee failed to
        pay for the repairs. Sunrise, 547 So. 2d at 268. After Sunrise filed a
        lien, A-Leet, the owner-lessor, filed a bond to release the car, and
        Sunrise tried to collect on A-Leet’s bond for the repairs. Id.
              Because Sunrise had not received written or oral
        authorization to do the repairs, the Florida court concluded Sunrise
        could not recover on its claim against A-Leet’s bond—even though
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        23-11056                  Opinion of the Court                              17

        A-Leet “may not be a ‘customer’ within the definition portion of
        the Act.” Id. The Florida court determined that allowing Sunrise,
        an errant repair shop, to recover would undermine the purposes of
        the Act. Id. Based on Sunrise’s expansive interpretation of the
        Repair Act, GEICO argues “[a]ny customer” in the remedies
        provision should also be construed broadly to include GEICO,
        even though GEICO was not a customer, because otherwise
        Glassco avoids the Repair Act’s requirements. 3
           C.      Defendants’ Contentions Regarding Count 8
               Defendants respond that the district court correctly
        dismissed Count 8. Defendants submit that GEICO ignores the
        plain language of the Repair Act, which grants a private right of
        action to only customers, and GEICO concedes that it is not a
        customer. Defendants point to Allstate, where a federal district
        court, like here, concluded that the insurer failed to meet the
        statutory definition of a “customer” and was not covered by the
        Repair Act. 418 F. Supp. 3d at 1025. Defendants also argue that
        Florida courts begin and end statutory construction with the plain
        language of the statute, and we should too in this diversity case. In
        re A.W., 816 So. 2d 1261, 1263–64 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
              Defendants further contend that the Repair Act does not
        provide recovery, restitution, or money back when GEICO

        3 At the time of Sunrise, “customer” was defined, under an older version of the
        Repair Act, as “someone who uses an automobile for personal use, or in
        connection with a business owning or operating fewer than five vehicles.”
        Sunrise, 547 So. 2d at 268.
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        18                     Opinion of the Court                 23-11056

        directly pays its insured’s assigned benefits to a non-compliant
        repair shop. As to this point, defendants argue that the Repair Act
        does not contain a voiding penalty that disentitles Glassco from
        recovering any compensation for services actually performed, even
        if Glassco violated the Repair Act. Instead, the Act expressly
        contemplates that a non-compliant repair shop may still be
        awarded the reasonable value of its services.
               Defendants also emphasize that GEICO’s reliance on Sunrise
        is misplaced. First, defendants argue that Sunrise, like GEICO’s
        other cited Florida decisions about liens, is inapposite because this
        case does not involve (1) the enforcement of a possessory lien, (2) a
        claim where Glassco, a repair shop, retained possession of a
        customer’s vehicle due to an unpaid repair invoice, or (3) a claim
        in which Glassco is attempting to enforce a Chapter 713 lien. See
        State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. At Home Auto Glass, LLC, 2021 WL
        6118102, at *5 n.4 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 27, 2021) (finding that because
        defendant was not attempting to enforce a lien, Sunrise “is therefore
        of no help to [plaintiff]”).
               Second, defendants stress that (1) Sunrise predates the 1993
        amendment to the Repair Act that added § 559.921(7), which
        allows non-compliant repair shops to recover the reasonable value
        of their services; and (2) Sunrise involved a previous definition of
        “customer,” see n.3, supra, and was limited to the circumstances of
        that case.
               Third, defendants rely on America Atlantic Transmission v.
        Nice Car, Inc., 112 So. 3d 639 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013). At the time
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        23-11056                    Opinion of the Court                                 19

        of the car repairs by AAT, plaintiff Nice Car already had a lien on
        the car. After the owner failed to pay, the AAT repair shop filed a
        lien and proposed sale. Nice Car, 112 So. 3d at 640. Nice Car posted
        a cash bond to obtain release of the car. Id. at 641. The AAT repair
        shop refused to release the car and sold it. Id. The Florida court
        held that the lienholder, Nice Car, who is neither the customer nor
        the vehicle owner, was not entitled to obtain possession of the car
        by posting a cash bond. 4 Id. at 642–43. Defendants point out that
        Nice Car: (1) rejected the proposition that Sunrise allows a non-
        customer to prevail against the interest of a non-compliant repair
        shop; (2) found that “[h]ad the legislature intended to define
        ‘customer’ to include ‘any person claiming an interest in or lien on
        the vehicle,’ it would have done so”; and (3) concluded that Sunrise
        was of “no precedential value” because it involved the owner A-
        Leet, whereas “Nice Car is neither the owner, nor the customer as
        that term [is] defined in section 559.917.” Nice Car, 112 So. 3d at
        643.
                To put a finer point on the issue, reimbursement claims for

        4 After Nice Car, the lien statute was expanded to allow both customers and a
        person claiming a lien to obtain release of a vehicle by posting a bond. Compare
        Fla. Stat. § 559.917 (2019) (“Any customer may obtain the release of her or his
        motor vehicle . . . .”) with Fla. Stat. § 559.917 (“A customer or a person of
        record claiming a lien against a motor vehicle may obtain the release of the
        motor vehicle . . . .”). Nice Car is thus superseded by statute. See Toyano’s Auto
        Repair Servs. v. S. Auto Fin. Co., LLC, 331 So. 3d 186, 188 n.1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
        2021). Defendants submit Nice Car is still relevant to show how GEICO
        misreads Sunrise.
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        20                     Opinion of the Court                 23-11056

        windshield repairs under Florida law are somewhat inherently of a
        fait accompli nature as to the insurance company. That is because
        (1) insurers in Florida cannot require a person with comprehensive
        coverage to pay a deductible for windshield repairs, Fla. Stat.
        § 627.7288, and (2) insureds have sole discretion to select the repair
        shop, at “no cost” to them. After notifying the insurer about
        windshield damage, insureds can assign their rights to payment for
        repairs to a repair shop of their choosing in exchange for the shop’s
        performance. Then, acting as the insured’s assignee, the repair
        shop performs the repair and seeks payment directly from the
        insurer. The remedial nature of the Repair Act—to protect
        consumer customers from oral estimates and misunderstandings—
        is arguably not designed to protect insurers, such as GEICO.
                               V.     COUNTS 1–7
               Even without a statutory cause of action under the Repair
        Act, GEICO argues Glassco’s violations of the Repair Act rendered
        its invoices non-payable and Glassco’s submission of such invoices
        for payment to GEICO constituted fraudulent and unlawful
        conduct for which GEICO can recover. As noted earlier, GEICO
        admits that if Glassco’s alleged Repair Act violations do not void
        the repair transaction, Counts 1 through 7 fail.
             A. District Court’s Ruling on Counts 1–7
              The district court granted summary judgment on GEICO’s
        remaining claims premised on Repair Act violations, concluding
        the Act does not have a provision voiding reimbursement invoices
        from non-compliant repair shops. The district court reasoned that
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        23-11056               Opinion of the Court                         21

        “the Repair Act contains no provision rendering [non-]payable
        claims for repair work actually performed by noncompliant repair
        shops, meaning these claims are not considered unlawful under
        Florida law.” The district court observed that, in contrast, other
        Florida statutes clearly contain a voiding penalty. See State Farm
        Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Performance Orthopaedics & Neurosurgery, LLC,
        278 F. Supp. 3d 1307, 1330 n.26 (S.D. Fla. 2017) (listing Florida
        statutes that void reimbursement claims submitted by a non-
        compliant entity). The district court noted that the absence of this
        kind of provision in the Repair Act is “strong evidence that the
        Florida legislature did not consider such claims fraudulent or
        unlawful.”
                The district court also concluded that the Florida decisions
        cited by GEICO were not on point. See, e.g., Osteen v. Morris, 481
        So. 2d 1287 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986), Gonzalez v. Tremont Body &
        Towing, Inc., 483 So. 2d 503 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986), and Safari
        Tours, Inc. v. Pasco, 255 So. 3d 415 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018). In the
        district court’s view, these Florida decisions were distinguishable
        because “in each of these decisions, the customer refused to pay for
        repairs because the repair shop either failed to furnish the written
        estimate or exceeded the written estimate, and the customer
        asserted the private right of action under the Repair Act.” The
        district court also found GEICO’s other cited cases “similarly
        unavailing.” Thus, in light of the absence of a voiding penalty, the
        court determined that “[c]laims under the Repair Act for repairs
        performed by noncompliant repair shops are not fraudulent or
        unlawful vis-à-vis the insurance company.”
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        22                     Opinion of the Court                  23-11056

             B. GEICO’s Contentions Regarding Counts 1–7
               GEICO argues the district court erred in granting
        defendants’ summary judgment motions on Counts 1 through 7.
        GEICO asserts that any violation of the Repair Act renders
        Glassco’s reimbursement claims for repair work, even if
        performed, wholly non-compensable. GEICO contends that
        Florida courts have held that a repair shop that violates the Repair
        Act may not collect, even in quantum meruit. See Osteen, 481 So.
        2d at 1289–90; Gonzalez, 483 So. 2d at 504; Sunrise, 547 So. 2d at 268;
        Perez-Priego v. Bayside Carburetor & Ignition Corp., 633 So. 2d 1190,
        1191 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Safari Tours, 255 So. 3d at 417; see
        also FGAP Inv. Corp. v. A1 Body & Glass of Coral Springs, LLC, 325 So.
        3d 1006, 1008 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2021). GEICO argues that its
        status as a non-customer does not alter the analysis or result.
              GEICO asserts it does not matter whether the Repair Act
        includes a statutory voiding penalty because Florida courts have
        held that non-compliant repair shops cannot recover. Because
        defendants’ Repair Act violations make their invoices non-payable,
        GEICO argues Glassco submitted fraudulent and unlawful claims.
             C. Defendants’ Contentions Regarding Counts 1–7
               Defendants respond that the district court correctly entered
        summary judgment in their favor. Defendants stress that the
        Repair Act does not contain a voiding penalty “which would
        disentitle Glassco from receiving any compensation for services
        rendered if Glassco violated any singular provision of the Repair
        Act.” Rather, defendants point to Fla. Stat. § 559.921(7), which
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        23-11056                 Opinion of the Court                           23

        allows a non-compliant repair shop to recover the reasonable value
        of its repairs. Section 559.921(7), defendants argue, evinces the
        Florida Legislature’s “clear intention that the Repair Act not only
        (1) does not provide a voiding penalty for a violation of the Repair
        Act, but rather, (2) does contemplate a quantum meruit award to a
        non-compliant repair shop in an action brought by a customer
        under the remedies section of the Repair Act.”
               Defendants further argue that all Florida decisions cited by
        GEICO involved lawsuits between the customer and the repair
        shop—not by an insurer who paid the repair costs for completed
        repair work requested by a satisfied customer. Defendants also
        contend that GEICO’s cited cases do not apply here because:
        (1) some pre-date § 559.921(7), which allows a repair shop in
        substantial compliance to recover the reasonable value of its
        repairs; (2) Glassco has not attempted to enforce a lien against a
        customer; and (3) Glassco has not refused to return a vehicle to a
        customer.
               Defendants also cite to other Florida decisions that allowed
        a non-compliant repair shop to recover the reasonable value of its
        repairs. See Lieberman v. Collision Specialists, Inc., 526 So. 2d 102 (Fla.
        Dist. Ct. App. 1987); KT’s Kar Kare, Inc. v. Laing, 617 So. 2d 325, 326
        (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993). Defendants contend that because
        Glassco prepared a “zero to the customer” estimate which was
        signed by each customer, Glassco is entitled to compensation for
        the repairs it performed. Defendants argue that because the alleged
        violations were, at most, technical and without costs to the insured
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        24                    Opinion of the Court                 23-11056

        customer, Glassco was in substantial compliance with the Repair
        Act and not barred from receiving payment on its repair invoices.
               Defendants also argue that because the Repair Act does not
        expressly or impliedly render repair services non-payable when
        performed by a non-compliant repair shop, a statutory violation of
        the Repair Act does not render the repair invoices non-payable.
        Defendants assert that “[b]ecause the Repair Act contains no
        express or implied voiding penalty, the matter is firmly settled
        against [GEICO].”
        VI.    QUESTIONS CERTIFIED TO THE SUPREME COURT
                            OF FLORIDA
               After careful review, and with the benefit of oral argument,
        we could find no decision from the Supreme Court of Florida,
        Florida appellate courts, or this Court answering the issues in this
        appeal. As the district court here aptly observed, “district courts
        within the circuit have routinely confronted similar Repair Act
        claims without binding precedent to apply,” and “clarification—
        sooner rather than later—about the scope of Florida law appears
        advantageous to all.” Moreover, the issues in this appeal will
        impact thousands of windshield repair claims.
               Principles of federalism and comity counsel us not to
        attempt to divine the answers to these challenging and important
        questions of Florida statutory law. See Cassell, 688 F.3d at 1300.
        “When there is substantial doubt about the correct answer to a
        dispositive question of state law, a better option is to certify the
        question to the state supreme court.” Id. For the reasons discussed
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        23-11056               Opinion of the Court                         25

        above, this case falls into that category. Accordingly, we certify to
        the Supreme Court of Florida the following questions:
             (1) DOES FLA. STAT. § 559.921(1) GRANT AN
        INSURANCE COMPANY A CAUSE OF ACTION WHEN A
        REPAIR SHOP DOES NOT PROVIDE ANY WRITTEN REPAIR
        ESTIMATE?
             (2) DO THE VIOLATIONS HERE UNDER THE REPAIR
        ACT VOID A REPAIR INVOICE FOR COMPLETED
        WINDSHIELD REPAIRS AND PRECLUDE A REPAIR SHOP
        FROM BEING PAID ANY OF ITS INVOICED AMOUNTS BY AN
        INSURANCE COMPANY?
                The phrasing used in these certified questions should not
        restrict the Supreme Court of Florida’s consideration of the
        problems posed by this case. Of course, our statement of any of
        the questions certified does not “limit the inquiry” of the Supreme
        Court of Florida or restrict its consideration of the issues that it
        perceives are raised by the record certified in this case. Cassell, 688
        F.3d at 1301 (internal quotation marks omitted). This extends to
        the Supreme Court of Florida’s restatement of the issues and the
        manner in which the answers are given.
               To assist the Supreme Court of Florida’s consideration of
        this case, the entire record on appeal, including copies of the
        parties’ briefs, shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court of Florida
        along with this certification.
               QUESTIONS CERTIFIED.