Court Opinion

ID: 9919629
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-18 20:02:58.999531+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:35.905684
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/18/24 Vess v. Salem CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 BRYAN C. VESS et al.,                                                D081614

           Plaintiffs and Respondents,

           v.                                                         (Super. Ct. No. 37-2022-00047041-
                                                                      CU-OR-CTL)
 AUDAY SALEM et al.,

           Defendants and Appellants.

         APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Joel R. Wohlfeil, Judge. Request for judicial notice denied; motion to strike
denied. Affirmed.
         LiMandri and Jonna, Charlies S. LiMandri, Paul M. Jonna and Jeffrey
M. Trissell for Defendants and Appellants.
         Bryan C. Vess, in pro. per., for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
      Bryan and Jora Vess (collectively, the Vesses) own a home in La Mesa,
California. Auday Salem (through a family trust) owns the residence next
door. When Salem began discussing plans to tear down and remodel his
home—plans that included a new retaining wall between the two
properties—the Vesses became concerned that the exact location of the
property line was unclear. They filed a complaint for quiet title, asserting
that their deed describes the property in metes and bounds, that there are
insufficient corner monuments, and that there is no Record of Survey
conclusively establishing the common property line between the Vess
property and the Salem property. The complaint seeks an order quieting
title, declaratory relief and costs.
      Salem responded by filing an anti-SLAPP motion to strike the
complaint, arguing that the Vesses’ claim arises from the building permit
process, which is protected activity under Code of Civil Procedure section

425.16, subdivision (e).1 The trial court denied the motion, concluding that
their complaint arises from Salem’s plan to build the retaining wall close to a
supposed property line, not the permit for the plan. We agree.
      While Salem’s pursuit of a major grading permit might evidence his
intention to build the retaining wall, it does not provide the basis for the
Vesses’ claim. Their complaint arises from the prospect that Salem will build
upon their property. Salem therefore failed to meet his burden to show that
the claim at issue arises from protected conduct under the first step of the
anti-SLAPP procedure, and the trial court properly denied Salem’s anti-
SLAPP motion on that ground.

1     Further undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure. “SLAPP” is an acronym for “[s]trategic lawsuit against public
participation.” (Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19
Cal.4th 1106, 1109, fn. 1.)
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              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A.   The Vesses’ Claim

      The complaint filed by the Vesses asserts a single claim to quiet title,
alleging Salem made written promises that a proposed retaining wall would
be 13 feet back from the supposed property line. They maintain that Salem
reneged on those promises and sought a permit to build within two feet of the
supposed property line. The Vesses learned of the change two years after
Salem’s purported promise when they received a letter requesting comments
on the major grading permit. The Vesses now seek clarity on the property
line in order to prevent an adverse claim to their property.

B.   Salem’s Anti-SLAPP Motion

      Salem responded to the Vesses’ complaint with a meet-and-confer letter
threatening an anti-SLAPP motion that would expose them “to a significant
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award of attorneys’ fees, a malicious prosecution action, and abuse of process
action.” When the Vesses replied that their complaint only alleged a “garden-
variety property-line dispute,” Salem asserted that their claims “center on
petitioning for permits.” Consistent with these communications, Salem then
filed a motion to strike under section 425.16. The trial court denied Salem’s

anti-SLAPP motion, and Salem now appeals.2

                                 DISCUSSION

A.   The Anti-SLAPP Procedure

      Section 425.16 provides for a “special motion to strike” when a plaintiff
asserts claims against a person “arising from any act of that person in
furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United
States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public
issue.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) Claims arising from protected conduct must
be stricken “unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established
that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (Ibid.)
      Thus, ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion necessitates a two-step process.
In the first step, the “moving defendant bears the burden of identifying all
allegations of protected activity, and the claims for relief supported by them.”
(Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 396 (Baral).) At this stage, the

2      Salem requests we take judicial notice of a series of superior court anti-
SLAPP orders in different cases, as well as a trial court order and a vacated
Court of Appeal opinion in a case ultimately decided by the Supreme Court.
Superior court orders have no precedential value, persuasive or otherwise.
(See, e.g., City of Bakersfield v. West Park Home Owners Assn. & Friends
(2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 1199, 1210 [denying request for judicial notice]; Bolanos
v. Superior Court (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 744, 761 [same].) We likewise
decline Salem’s other requests as either unnecessary (because the documents
are included in the record on appeal), improper, or unnecessary to resolve the
issue before us.
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defendant must make a “threshold showing” that the challenged claims arise
from protected activity. (Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1056.)
If the defendant makes this initial prima facie showing, in the second step
the “burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that each challenged claim
based on protected activity is legally sufficient and factually substantiated.”
(Baral, at p. 396.)
      Section 425.16, subdivision (b) defines the categories of acts that are in
“furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech.” Those categories
include “any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative,
executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized
by law,” and “any written or oral statement or writing made in connection
with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or
judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law.” (Id., subd.
(e)(1)–(2).)
      We review the grant or denial of an anti-SLAPP motion de novo.
(Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 269, fn. 3.)
We evaluate independently whether, based on our review of the record, the
challenged claim arises from protected activity. (Schwarzburd v. Kensington
Police Protection & Community Services Dist. Bd. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th
1345, 1350.) “We do not, however, weigh the evidence, but accept the
plaintiff’s submissions as true and consider only whether any contrary
evidence from the defendant establishes its entitlement to prevail as a matter
of law.” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017)
2 Cal.5th 1057, 1067 (Park).)

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B.   A Claim Arises From Protected Conduct Only if the Protected Conduct
     Supplies an Element of the Claim

      To show that a claim arises from protected activity under section
425.16, subdivision (b)(1), it is not sufficient to show that the claim “was filed
after, or because of, protected activity, or when protected activity merely
provides evidentiary support or context for the claim.” (Rand Resources, LLC
v. City of Carson (2019) 6 Cal.5th 610, 621 (Rand Resources).) “Rather, the
protected activity must ‘supply elements of the challenged claim.’ ” (Ibid.,
quoting Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1064.) Accordingly, in this case, Salem
needed to show that one or more elements of the claim for quiet title rested
on his petition for a grading permit in order to meet his moving burden.
(Park, at p. 1063; Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871,
887.) The trial court concluded otherwise, and we agree.
      Salem relies upon Weeden v. Hoffman (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 269
(Weeden) to support his assertion that the trial court erred in denying his
motion. In Weeden, this court found that the filing of an abstract of judgment
constituted protected activity, which gave rise to Weeden’s three causes of
action (for quiet title, slander of title, and cancellation of an instrument) and
satisfied the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis. (Weeden, at pp. 286–
288.) We distinguish the claim before us from the three claims in the Weeden
complaint. In Weeden, the only basis for the defendant’s claim to the
property at issue—a judgment lien—was the filing of the abstract of
judgment and, necessarily, that protected conduct formed the basis of all
three causes of action. In this case, Salem’s grading permit petition was only
indicative of his planned construction project and it was the construction, not
the petition, that gives rise to the Vesses’ suit.

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C.   The Vesses’ Claim Does Not Arise from Protected Conduct

      The Vesses do not allege any claim based on Salem’s conduct in
petitioning the County for a grading permit. They do not, for example, assert
a cause of action alleging fraud, misrepresentation, or other improprieties in
connection with the permitting process. Instead, they bring a claim for quiet
title, seeking declaratory relief and costs. The claim for quiet title has

nothing to do with petitioning activity.3
      Salem seems to argue that the Vesses’ claim arises from petitioning
activity because, without the petitioning activity, Vess would not be aware of
the proposed location of the retaining wall. This argument confuses the legal
basis for the quiet title claim with the evidentiary basis to support it.
Salem’s pursuit of permits shows his intention to construct a retaining wall
within two feet of an arguably ambiguous property line. He could
demonstrate this same intention in any number of ways that have nothing to
do with the petitioning activity or statements made in seeking permits, such
as preparing final plans, engaging a landscaping and construction firm, or
clearing and marking the land in preparation for construction. As we have
explained, it is the planned construction, not the application for a permit,
that forms the basis for the Vesses’ claim. Although the grading permit had
to be approved for Salem to proceed, the incidental need for a permit does not
transform a boundary dispute into a claim arising from protected petitioning
activity. (See Wang v. Wal-Mart Real Estate Business Trust (2007) 153
Cal.App.4th 790, 794.) The anti-SLAPP statute does not “swallow a person’s

3       Under section 761.020, a verified complaint for quiet title requires a
description of the property, the basis for the title, the adverse claims to the
title, the date of determination sought, and the prayer for relief.
                                        7
every contact with government.” (Rand Resources, surpa, 6 Cal.5th at
p. 630.)
      If Salem had never applied for a grading permit and instead proceeded
to build a retaining wall in the proposed location, the Vesses would certainly
have become aware of the wall’s location and still had grounds to pursue
quiet title. “[A] claim is not subject to a motion to strike simply because it
contests an action or decision that was arrived at following . . . petitioning
activity.” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1060.) Where protected actions merely
serve as evidence of a claim but are not elements of a claim, an anti-SLAPP
motion is inappropriate. (Id. at p. 1068.)
      Salem acknowledges that the thrust of the Vesses’ complaint is not his
petitioning activities. At argument on the anti-SLAPP motion, he referenced
the comment in the court’s tentative ruling that “the only issue is the location
of the property line” and unequivocally stated, “we don’t dispute that.”
Further, Salem indicates in his opening brief that the lawsuit is “meant to

chill a neighbor from building a new home.”4 Significantly, he does not
contend that the Vesses meant to chill his petitioning activity—to deter him
from applying for grading permits. We agree that “the only issue is the
location of the property line” and must conclude that Salem cannot use his
petition for a grading permit as a shield from a property line dispute. The
Vesses were not required to wait until Salem began actual construction to file
this lawsuit.

4     The Vesses filed a motion to strike portions of Salem’s opening brief; we
deny this request as the challenged briefing is not necessary to decide this
appeal.

                                        8
      At best, Salem’s arguments support a theory that the Vesses’ action
was “filed after, or because of” Salem’s petitioning activity, and that the
permit request may provide “evidentiary support or context for the claim.”
(Rand Resources, LLC v. City of Carson (2019) 6 Cal.5th 610, 621.) The
petitioning conduct, therefore, does not constitute an element of the Vesses’
claim. Salem did not make a prima facie case and, accordingly, we need not
address the second prong of the anti-SLAPP motion analysis. Given the
failure at the prima facie stage, the trial court properly denied Salem’s anti-
SLAPP motion.
                                DISPOSITION

      The trial court’s order is affirmed. The Vesses are entitled to their
costs on appeal.

                                                                       DATO, J.

WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

KELETY, J.

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