Court Opinion

ID: 9383125
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-29 17:00:39.892849+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:43.863599
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MAR 29 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MICHAEL A. HARTSELL,                            No.    21-56045

                Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No.
                                                3:16-cv-01094-LAB-LL
 v.

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO; TRENTON                    MEMORANDUM*
STROH, San Diego County Deputy Sheriff,

                Defendants-Appellees,

and

DOES, 1-15,

                Defendants.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of California
                    Larry A. Burns, District Judge, Presiding

                            Submitted March 16, 2023**
                               Pasadena, California

Before: PAEZ, CHRISTEN, and MILLER, Circuit Judges.

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
      Michael Hartsell (“Hartsell”) appeals the district court’s order denying his

post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 50(b), or alternatively for a new trial under Rule 59(a). A jury found in

favor of Deputy Trenton Stroh (“Stroh”) and the County of San Diego

(collectively, “the County”) on Hartsell’s claims for battery, negligence, and

violation of his Fourth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.

      1. Rule 50(b) Motion for Judgment. While fleeing arrest in May 2015,

Hartsell was bitten by a San Diego Sheriff’s Department canine. The dog, at the

direction of its handler, Stroh, entered a bush where Hartsell was hiding and bit

onto his left arm. Although Hartsell complied with Stroh’s commands to show his

hands after he was bitten, Stroh did not immediately command the dog to let go.

Instead, Stroh ordered Hartsell to crawl several feet forward out of the bush before

removing the dog from his arm. At trial, the sole issue before the jury was whether

Stroh used excessive force by failing to release the dog from its bite sooner.1

Hartsell challenges the jury’s verdict in favor of the County, arguing that the

evidence at trial established that Stroh acted unreasonably in violation of the

Fourth Amendment.

1
 Prior to trial, the district court found that Stroh’s initial deployment of the dog
was a reasonable use of force as a matter of law.

                                           2
      “We review de novo the district court’s denial of a Rule 50(b) renewed

motion for judgment as a matter of law. The test is whether ‘the evidence,

construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, permits only one

reasonable conclusion, and that conclusion is contrary to that of the jury.’” Est. of

Diaz v. City of Anaheim, 840 F.3d 592, 604 (9th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).

Under this deferential standard of review, we must uphold a jury verdict “if it is

supported by substantial evidence that is adequate to support the jury’s findings,

even if contrary findings are also possible.” Dunlap v. Liberty Nat. Prods., Inc.,

878 F.3d 794, 797 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted).

      The district court did not err by rejecting Hartsell’s Rule 50(b) motion. To

determine whether an officer used excessive force, the court inquires “whether the

officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances

confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.” Est. of

Diaz, 840 F.3d at 604-05 (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989)).

To assess objective reasonableness, courts consider the factors set forth in Graham

v. Connor, including “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses

an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is

actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest.” 490 U.S. at 396.

      Applying the Graham factors and considering the totality of the evidence,

the jury’s verdict is supported by substantial evidence. The evidence at trial

                                          3
showed that Stroh faced a difficult decision about how to release the dog safely.

Both Hartsell and the dog were located inside a dense bush, partially secreted from

Stroh’s view. Stroh and other officers testified that they are trained to physically

remove a biting dog while simultaneously issuing a verbal command, because it is

the safest way to ensure the animal does not bite again. Stroh testified that he

could not safely enter the bush to physically apprehend the dog, and he feared

issuing a verbal command would cause the dog to bite another part of Hartsell’s

body. Based on this evidence, the jury reasonably concluded that Stroh’s decision

to instruct Hartsell to crawl from the bushes before disengaging the dog was not an

excessive use of force.

      As Hartsell argues, some of the evidence at trial weighed in his favor. He

complied with Stroh’s commands, he was not known to be violent, and he was in

his underwear and was unlikely to have a weapon. Nonetheless, “[w]hen each of

the Graham factors is analyzed, the record does not ‘permit[] only one reasonable

conclusion . . . contrary to that of the jury.’” Est. of Diaz, 840 F.3d at 605

(alterations in original) (quoting White v. Ford Motor Co., 312 F.3d 998, 1010 (9th

Cir. 2002)). In light of the evidence supporting the jury’s verdict, Hartsell is not

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.2 See id. at 604 (holding that question of

2
  Hartsell also argues that the district court’s summary judgment ruling contradicts
the jury’s finding that Stroh’s actions were reasonable. Hartsell, however,
misconstrues the court’s ruling—by denying summary judgment to the County, the

                                           4
excessive force “was one for the jury” and upholding denial of motion for

judgment as a matter of law).

       2. Rule 59(a) Motion for a New Trial. Hartsell argues that he is entitled to

a new trial because counsel for the County made several prejudicial comments

during trial that improperly influenced the jury’s verdict. First, counsel referred to

Stroh as a “respected officer” during the County’s opening statement; second,

counsel used the phrase “Deputy Stroh and his family” during closing argument;

and third, counsel referred to Hartsell as a “drug dealer” who was suing for a

“payday” during closing argument.

      We review a district court’s denial of a motion for new trial under Rule

59(a) for abuse of discretion. Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 728 (9th

Cir. 2007). To assess whether improper comments were sufficiently prejudicial to

warrant a new trial, the court considers “whether counsel’s misconduct so

permeated the trial as to lead to the conclusion the jury was necessarily influenced

by passion and prejudice in reaching its verdict.” Cooper v. Firestone Tire &

Rubber Co., 945 F.2d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 1991).

      Hartsell failed to argue that counsel’s comments were prejudicial in his new

trial motion, likely waiving this issue. See Steam Press Holdings, Inc. v. Haw.

court merely found that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for Hartsell, not
that it must. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986).

                                          5
Teamsters, Allied Workers Union, Loc. 996, 302 F.3d 998, 1005 (9th Cir. 2002).

But even considering the merits, the statements Hartsell identifies did not

sufficiently prejudice the jury to warrant a new trial. The County’s counsel made

each statement only once during opening and closing arguments, and Hartsell’s

counsel never objected or moved for a mistrial on those grounds. See Kehr v.

Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 736 F.2d 1283, 1286 (9th Cir. 1984)

(upholding district court’s denial of Rule 59(a) motion). The comments in

question did not permeate the trial or necessarily influence the jury in reaching a

verdict.

      3. Evidentiary Rulings. Finally, Hartsell challenges the district court’s

ruling excluding two pieces of evidence: 1) evidence that the dog bit Stroh five

weeks after the incident; and 2) evidence that the dog failed to perform

satisfactorily on past bite-and-release evaluations. We review a district court’s

evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. Muniz v. Amec Constr. Mgmt., Inc.,

623 F.3d 1290, 1294 (9th Cir. 2010). “A party seeking reversal for evidentiary

error must show that the error was prejudicial, and that the verdict was ‘more

probably than not’ affected as a result.” Boyd v. City & County of San Francisco,

576 F.3d 938, 943 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting McEuin v. Crown Equip. Corp., 328

F.3d 1028, 1032 (9th Cir. 2003)).

      The district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence that the

                                          6
dog bit Stroh after the incident. As the court determined, the dog’s propensity to

bite was irrelevant to the issue of whether Stroh should have released the dog

sooner. Hartsell argues that Stroh could have testified about the painful effects of

being bitten by a dog, and Stroh’s testimony could have proved that Hartsell was

recoiling out of pain while being bitten. But no one at trial disputed that dog bites

are painful. The issues of Hartsell’s pain and his reaction to that pain were

adequately presented to the jury through Hartsell’s own testimony and other

evidence in the record.

      The district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence of the

dog’s subpar training evaluations with former handlers. At trial, Hartsell intended

to pursue the theory that Stroh “knew that [the dog] had some issues with releasing

upon command” when he became its handler. But upon further questioning by the

court, Hartsell’s counsel admitted that Stroh never said he had reviewed the

problematic evaluations, nor did Stroh “describe[] any problems that he was aware

of with [the dog].” The court held that Hartsell could not question Stroh about the

prior evaluations, but Hartsell could admit the evidence through the testimony of a

competent witness.

      On appeal, Hartsell argues that the dog’s evaluation history “was known to

the canine evaluators,” and was “directly relevant to whether Stroh’s conduct was

reasonable.” But Hartsell still does not address whether Stroh himself knew about

                                          7
the problematic evaluations. Absent that knowledge, it is doubtful that Hartsell

could have elicited helpful information from Stroh by questioning him about the

evaluations. Hartsell has not shown that exclusion of the evaluations was

prejudicial or that the verdict was “more probably than not” affected by their

absence. Boyd, 576 F.3d at 943 (citation omitted).

      AFFIRMED.3

3
  Hartsell filed a Motion to Transmit Physical Exhibits under Circuit Rule 27-14
(Dkt. No. 42), seeking to present two additional photographs that he failed to
include in his excerpts of record. We deny the motion. The photographs are
neither “[un]available on the electronic district court docket” nor “necessary to
resolution of an issue on appeal.” Circuit Rule 27-14. Hartsell’s Request for
Judicial Notice (Dkt. No. 13) is denied.

                                         8