Court Opinion

ID: 9945837
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-28 17:10:53.112578+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:22:15.668855
License: Public Domain

No. 145             February 28, 2024                 263

          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                  STATE OF OREGON

                 Conrad MOUTON,
                 Plaintiff-Appellant,
                           v.
 TRI-COUNTY METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION
             DISTRICT OF OREGON,
              a municipal corporation,
               Defendant-Respondent.
         Multnomah County Circuit Court
               22CV06834; A179342
                 Jennifer YEAGER,
                 Plaintiff-Appellant,
                           v.
             Chance MONTGOMERY,
               Defendant-Respondent.
           Douglas County Circuit Court
                22CV05877; A179618
               Brandon FLANDERS,
                 Plaintiff-Appellant,
                           v.
               WINCO FOODS, LLC,
        a foreign limited liability company,
               Defendant-Respondent.
         Multnomah County Circuit Court
                22CV11032; A179835

  In A179342, Leslie G. Bottomly, Judge; In A179618,
Robert B. Johnson, Judge; and, In A179835, Jenna R. Plank,
Judge.
   A179342, A179618, and A179835 argued and submitted
individually December 19, 2023.
  In A179342, Willard E. Merkel argued the cause for
appellant. Also on the briefs was Merkel & Conner, LLC.
264                                 Yeager v. Montgomery

   In A179342, Michael S. Shin argued the cause for respon-
dent. Also on the brief was Keith Garza.
  In A179342, Sara Kobak and Schwabe Williamson
& Wyatt, P.C., filed the brief amicus curiae for Oregon
Association of Defense Counsel.
   In A179342, Elizabeth C. Savage filed the brief amicus
curiae for Oregon Trial Lawyers Association.
  In A179618, Andrew R. Wilson argued the cause for
appellant. Also on the briefs was Black, Chapman, Petersen
& Stevens.
   In A179618, Casey S. Murdock argued the cause for
respondent. Also on the brief was Frohnmayer, Deatherage,
Jamieson, Moore, Armosino & McGovern, P.C.
   In A179618, Elizabeth C. Savage filed the brief amicus
curiae for Oregon Trial Lawyers Association.
  In A179618, Sara Koback and Schwabe, Williamson
& Wyatt, P.C., filed the brief amicus curiae for Oregon
Association of Defense Counsel.
   In A179835, Apolinar Montero-Sanchez argued the cause
for appellant. Also on the briefs were Lourdes Sánchez and
Law Offices of Lourdes Sánchez, P.C.
   In A179835, Patricia A. Brockway argued the cause for
respondent. Also on the brief was Goehler & Associates.
   In A179835, Elizabeth C. Savage filed the brief amicus
curiae for Oregon Trial Lawyers Association.
  In A179835, Sara Kobak and Schwabe, Williamson
& Wyatt, P.C., filed the brief amicus curiae for Oregon
Association of Defense Counsel.
   Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, Joyce, Judge, and
Jacquot, Judge.
  AOYAGI, P. J.
  Affirmed.
Cite as 331 Or App 263 (2024)   265
266                                                Yeager v. Montgomery

           AOYAGI, P. J.
          In these three civil cases, consolidated for purposes of
opinion, each plaintiff filed a negligence action in early 2022
that the trial court dismissed as time barred. Each plain-
tiff appeals, arguing that their complaint was timely filed in
light of temporary legislation enacted early in the COVID-19
pandemic that extended the statutes of limitations for civil
actions. Specifically, plaintiffs rely on House Bill (HB) 4212
(2020), as amended by Senate Bill (SB) 296 (2021) and SB
813 (2021). See Or Laws 2020, ch 12 (1st Special Session) (HB
4212), amended by Or Laws 2021, ch 199 (SB 296); Or Laws
2021, ch 499 (SB 813).1 Each defendant maintains that the
action against them was properly dismissed. The disputed
issue is one of statutory construction that requires us to
determine when the extended statute-of-limitations period
in HB 4212 ended: December 31, 2021 (the repeal date);
March 31, 2022 (90 days after the repeal date); or June 30,
2022 (90 days after the end of the COVID-19 state of emer-
gency). We conclude that the trial courts correctly construed
HB 4212 as extending the statutes of limitations through
December 31, 2021, and consequently did not err in dismiss-
ing the complaints. Accordingly, we affirm.
                                 I.   FACTS
           The relevant facts are procedural.
        Plaintiff Conrad Mouton alleges that he was injured
on February 2, 2020, while riding a public bus. On February
25, 2022, he filed a negligence action against Tri-County
Metropolitan Transportation District of Oregon (TriMet).
TriMet moved to dismiss under ORCP 21 A(1)(i), based on
the two-year statute of limitations in ORS 30.275(9). See
ORCP 21 A(1)(i) (allowing for dismissal where “the pleading
shows that the action has not been commenced within the
    1
      As temporary legislation, the enrolled versions of HB 4212, SB 296, and
SB 813 are not permanently codified in the Oregon Revised Statues, although
sections 7 and 8(2) of HB 4212, as amended by SB 296 and SB 813, are compiled
as a note after ORS 12.010 in the 2021 edition of the Oregon Revised Statutes. We
therefore use bill numbers and Oregon Laws citations to refer to the legislation.
Like the parties, for ease of reference, we use “HB 4212” to refer to HB 4212 as
amended by SB 296 and SB 813. To avoid any resulting confusion, when we mean
to refer to the original text of HB 4212, we use limiting language such as “origi-
nal” or “as originally enacted.”
Cite as 331 Or App 263 (2024)                              267

time limited by statute”). The trial court granted the motion,
concluding that the statute of limitations had expired on
February 1, 2022. Mouton appeals, assigning error to the
dismissal of his action.
         Plaintiff Jennifer Yeager alleges that she was injured
in a car accident on January 29, 2020. On February 16,
2022, she filed a negligence action against defendant Chance
Montgomery. Montgomery moved for summary judgment
under ORCP 47, based on the two-year statute of limitations
in ORS 12.110(1). See ORCP 47 C (providing for summary
judgment where there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter
of law). The trial court granted the motion, concluding that
the statute of limitations had expired on January 28, 2022.
Yeager appeals, assigning error to the grant of summary
judgment and resulting dismissal of her action.
         Plaintiff Brandon Flanders alleges that he was
injured on April 30, 2019, while delivering beverages to a
grocery store for his employer. On March 31, 2022, he filed
a negligence action against WinCo Foods, LLC (WinCo).
WinCo moved to dismiss under ORCP 21 A(1)(i), based on
the two-year statute of limitations in ORS 12.110(1). The
trial court granted the motion, concluding that the statute of
limitations, which normally would have expired on April 29,
2021, had been extended by HB 4212 and expired on
December 31, 2021. Flanders appeals, assigning error to the
dismissal of his action.
         In all three cases, the trial court construed HB 4212
as extending the applicable statute of limitations through
December 31, 2021, and rejected the plaintiff’s argument
for a longer extension period. In all three appeals, the only
aspect of the trial court’s decision that is challenged is that
construction of HB 4212.
                       II. ANALYSIS
         The correct construction of HB 4212 is a question
of statutory construction, so we review for legal error. Wells
Fargo Bank v. Clark, 294 Or App 197, 200, 430 P3d 1089
(2018). We seek to ascertain the intent of the enacting legisla-
ture by examining the disputed provision’s text and context,
268                                          Yeager v. Montgomery

as well as any helpful legislative history. State v. Gaines,
346 Or 160, 171-73, 206 P3d 1042 (2009). Text and context
“must be given primary weight in the analysis,” because
only the text “receives the consideration and approval of a
majority of the members of the legislature,” and “[t]he for-
mal requirements of lawmaking produce the best source
from which to discern the legislature’s intent.” Id. at 171.
“If the legislature’s intent remains unclear after examining
text, context, and legislative history, the court may resort to
general maxims of statutory construction to aid in resolving
the remaining uncertainty.” Id. at 172.
A.    HB 4212
          HB 4212 was originally enacted in a special legis-
lative session in June 2020. Or Laws 2020, ch 12 (1st Spec
Sess). It included a variety of temporary measures to address
the COVID-19 pandemic, such as allowing public bodies to
meet by telephone or video conference, allowing courts to
extend certain time periods and to allow party appearances
by telephone or video conference, extending the statutes of
limitations in civil actions, and making it easier to get a
permit to run an emergency shelter. Id.
         The dispute in this case focuses on the portion of
HB 4212 addressing judicial matters, which consists of sec-
tions 6, 7, and 8. Sections 6 and 7 are substantive, while
section 8 sets a repeal date. Section 6 gave the Chief Justice
of the Oregon Supreme Court and the presiding judges of
the circuit courts certain authority regarding extending or
suspending time periods for court proceedings and allowing
appearances by telephone or video conference. Id. § 6. Section
7 extended the statutes of limitations for civil actions, stat-
ing, as originally enacted:
         “SECTION 7. (1) If the expiration of the time to com-
     mence an action or give notice of a claim falls within the
     time in which any declaration of a state of emergency issued
     by the Governor related to COVID-19, and any extension of
     the declaration, is in effect, or within 90 days after the dec-
     laration and any extension is no longer in effect, the expira-
     tion of the time to commence the action or give notice of the
     claim is extended to a date 90 days after the declaration
     and any extension is no longer in effect.”
Cite as 331 Or App 263 (2024)                                  269

Id. § 7 (stating further, in subsections (2) and (3), that sec-
tion 7 applies to any statutory time limitation for commenc-
ing a civil cause of action or giving notice of a civil claim,
but not to criminal actions or most appeals). Finally, section
8 sets the repeal date for sections 6 and 7, stating, as origi-
nally enacted:
      “SECTION 8. (1) Sections 6 and 7 of this 2020 special
   session Act are repealed on December 31, 2021.
       “(2) The repeal of section 6 of this 2020 special ses-
   sion Act by subsection (1) of this section does not affect the
   release status of a defendant determined under section 6(3)
   of this 2020 special session Act.”
   Id. § 8.
         There is not much legislative history for HB 4212 as
originally enacted. Regarding section 7, the legislative his-
tory shows only that the legislature recognized the extraor-
dinary nature of extending the statutes of limitations for
civil actions but felt that it was appropriate in light of the
COVID-19 pandemic. Video Recording, Joint Committee
on the First Special Session of 2020, HB 4212, June 25,
2020, at 1:25:30, available at https://olis.oregonlegislature.
gov (accessed Jan 30, 2023) (statement of Senate President
Peter Courtney that extending the statutes of limitations
is “a very dramatic thing in the practice of law”). As for the
repeal date set in section 8, there is no helpful legislative
history as to why that specific date was chosen.
          During the 2021 regular session, the legislature
amended original HB 4212 in two ways relevant to these
appeals. First, in response to a request by the Chief Justice
of the Oregon Supreme Court, the legislature enacted
SB 296 (2021), amending section 8 to extend the repeal date
for section 6 by one year. Video Recording, Senate Committee
on Veterans’ Affairs and Emergency Preparedness, SB 296,
Feb 4, 2021, at 00:08:25, available at https://olis.oregonlegis-
lature.gov (accessed Feb 5, 2024) (statement of Chief Justice
Martha Walters, asking the legislature to extend section 6’s
“sunset clause of * * * December 31, 2021,” so that the courts
would continue to have needed flexibility if the pandemic
continued beyond December 31, 2021). SB 296 provides that
270                                        Yeager v. Montgomery

“Section 8, chapter 12, Oregon Laws 2020 (first special ses-
sion), is amended to read”:
      “[SECTION] 8. (1) Section 6, chapter 12, Oregon Laws
   2020 (first special session), is repealed on December 31,
   2022.
      “(2) Section 7, chapter 12, Oregon Laws 2020 (first
   special session), is repealed on December 31, 2021.
      “(3) The repeal of section 6, chapter 12, Oregon Laws
   2020 (first special session), by subsection (1) of this section
   does not affect the release status of a defendant determined
   under section 6(3), chapter 12, Oregon Laws 2020 (first spe-
   cial session).”
Or Laws 2021, ch 199, § 3 (bracketed former language omit-
ted and boldface used to identify new language omitted).
The legislative history of SB 296 contains no express men-
tion of section 7. However, by amending section 8 in the way
that it did, the legislature reaffirmed that “[s]ection 7, chap-
ter 12, Oregon Laws 2020 (first special session)” is repealed
on December 31, 2021. Or Laws 2021, ch 199, § 3; see also
Or Laws 2020, ch 12, § 8(2) (1st Spec Sess), amended by Or
Laws 2021, ch 199, § 3, compiled as a note after ORS 12.010
(2021).
        Second, in response to a federal district court rul-
ing that section 7 did not apply to civil actions for which the
applicable statute of limitations had expired before June 30,
2020 (the effective date of original HB 4212), the legisla-
ture enacted SB 813, adding a new subsection (4) that made
section 7 retroactive to the beginning of the state of emer-
gency. SB 813 provides that “[s]ection 7, chapter 12, Oregon
Laws 2020 (first special session), is amended” to include the
following:
       “(4) Subsection (1) of this section applies to expiration
   of the time to commence an action or give notice of a claim
   occurring:
      “(a) On or after March 8, 2020, and on or before the
   date 90 days after the declaration of a state of emergency
   issued by the Governor on March 8, 2020, and any exten-
   sion of the declaration, is no longer in effect; or
Cite as 331 Or App 263 (2024)                                                  271

         “(b) During the time in which any other declaration
     of a state of emergency issued by the Governor related to
     COVID-19, and any extension of the declaration, is in effect,
     or within 90 days after the declaration and any extension is
     no longer in effect.”
Or Laws 2021, ch 499, § 1 (effective July 14, 2021) (bold-
face omitted); see also Or Laws 2020, ch 12, § 7, amended
by Or Laws 2021, ch 499, § 1, compiled as a note after ORS
12.010 (2021). The legislative history is clear that the pur-
pose of SB 813 was to address the retroactivity issue. See,
e.g., Video Recording, Senate Committee on Judiciary and
Ballot Measure 110 Implementation, SB 813, Apr 12, 2021,
at 00:28:15, available at https://olis.oregonlegislature.gov
(accessed Feb 5, 2024) (statement of Arthur Towers of the
Oregon Trial Lawyers Association describing purpose of SB
813 and testifying in favor of the bill).
B.    Construction of HB 4212
         All three cases before us involve the same legal issue:
when the extended statute-of-limitations period in section
7 of HB 4212 ended. Defendants TriMet, Montgomery, and
WinCo maintain—and all three trial courts ruled—that it
ended on December 31, 2021, the repeal date in section 8.
Plaintiffs argue that it ended either on March 31, 2022, i.e.,
90 days after the repeal date, or on June 30, 2022, i.e., 90
days after the end of the COVID-19 state of emergency. In
their own ways, each plaintiff argues that the legislature
did not intend the extended statute-of-limitations period
in section 7 to end on December 31, 2021; that the legisla-
ture accidentally enacted an ambiguous provision; and that,
upon resort to maxims of statutory construction, we should
construe the statute in plaintiffs’ favor.2
         Having considered the text, context, and legisla-
tive history of sections 7 and 8 of HB 4212, both as origi-
nally enacted and as amended by SB 296 and SB 813, we
    2
       In addition to the briefs filed by the parties, the Oregon Trial Lawyers
Association has filed a brief as amicus curiae in support of each plaintiff (which is
identical in each case), and the Oregon Association of Defense Counsel has filed
a brief as amicus curiae in support of each defendant (which is identical in each
case). Although we do not expressly discuss the arguments made by amici curiae,
we have considered their arguments in conjunction with the arguments of the
parties whom they support.
272                                     Yeager v. Montgomery

are unpersuaded that the statute is ambiguous. Rather, we
agree with defendants that the trial courts correctly con-
strued it as extending the statutes of limitations for civil
actions through December 31, 2021. Essentially, reading
sections 7 and 8 together, the effect of the legislation was to
extend the statutes of limitation for civil actions such that, if
the statute of limitations for an action would have normally
expired between March 8, 2020, and December 30, 2021, it
did not expire until December 31, 2021. It follows that each
of the plaintiff’s actions was time barred. We will explain
our reasoning.
          Section 8 of HB 4212 as originally enacted unequiv-
ocally states that section 7 “is repealed on December 31,
2021.” Or Laws 2020, ch 12, § 8 (1st Spec Sess). HB 4212 as
amended by SB 296 also unequivocally states that section
7 “is repealed on December 31, 2021.” Or Laws 2020, ch 12,
§ 8(2), amended by Or Laws 2021, ch 199, § 3, compiled as
a note after ORS 12.010 (2021). When an act is repealed, it
is rescinded or revoked. Drainage Dist. No. 7 v. Bernards,
89 Or 531, 555, 174 P 1167 (1918) (“The general rule is that
the repeal of a statute without any reservation takes away
all remedies given by the repealed statute and defeats all
actions pending under it at the time of its repeal.”); Newsom
v. Greenwood, 4 Or 119, 121 (1871) (“[T]he effect of repealing
a statute is to obliterate the statute repealed as completely
as if it had never been passed * * *.”); see also Webster’s Third
New Int’l Dictionary 1924 (unabridged ed 2002) (defining
“repeal” as “to rescind or revoke (as a sentence or law) from
operation or effect : ABROGATE, ANNUL”); Black’s Law
Dictionary (11th ed 2019) (defining “repeal” as “rescind” or
“[a]brogation of an existing law by legislative act”). Thus,
the extension of the civil statutes of limitations provided in
section 7 ended when section 7 was repealed by operation of
section 8.
         Turning to context, HB 4212 as a whole suggests
that the legislature intentionally set different repeal dates
for different sections of HB 4212. Some sections were to
remain in effect only for a few months. See Or Laws 2020,
ch 12, § 12 (1st Spec Sess) (“Sections 10 and 11 of this 2020
special session Act are repealed 90 days after the effective
Cite as 331 Or App 263 (2024)                               273

date of this 2020 special session Act.”); id. § 14 (“Section 13
of this 2020 special session Act is repealed 90 days after
the effective date of this 2020 special session Act.”). Some
sections had no repeal date but were limited in duration by
their nature. See id. § 3 (amending garnishment statute to
limit garnishing of COVID-19 relief payments). Some sec-
tions were to remain in effect until the end of the COVID-
19 state of emergency, whenever that might be. See id. § 47
(“Sections 45 and 46 of this 2020 special session Act are
repealed on the date on which the declaration of a state of
emergency issued by the Governor on March 8, 2020, and
any extension of the declaration, is no longer in effect.”). One
section was to remain in effect until 30 days after the end
of the COVID-19 state of emergency, whenever that might
be. See id. § 2 (“Section 1 of this 2020 special session Act
is repealed 30 days after the date on which the declaration
of a state of emergency issued by the Governor on March
8, 2020, and any extension of the declaration, is no longer
in effect.”). Several sections—including section 7—were to
remain in effect until a specified calendar date, with those
dates varying. See id. § 32 (repealing sections 19, 20, and
27 “on June 30, 2021”); id. § 8(1) (repealing sections 6 and 7
“on December 31, 2021”); id. § 17 (repealing section 16 “on
January 2, 2022”).
         In two places in HB 4212, the legislature included
a savings clause to address the effect of a repeal on particu-
lar individuals, further evincing intentionality in the repeal
provisions. See id. § 8(2) (“The repeal of section 6 of this 2020
special session Act by subsection (1) of this section does not
affect the release status of a defendant determined under
section 6(3) of this 2020 special session Act.”); id. § 12a (“The
repeal of sections 10 and 11 of this 2020 special session Act
by section 12 of this 2020 special session Act does not affect
an application for the development of land for an emergency
shelter that was completed and submitted before the date
of the repeal.”). If the legislature had wanted to include a
savings clause for section 7, it knew how to do so.
        Nothing in the legislative history of HB 4212,
SB 296, or SB 813 sheds light on why the legislature chose a
hard repeal date for section 7, rather than tying its repeal to
274                                                 Yeager v. Montgomery

the end of the COVID-19 state of emergency, or why the leg-
islature specifically chose December 31, 2021. It is notable,
however, that the legislature reaffirmed that decision in July
2021, when it extended the repeal date for section 6 because
of the ongoing COVID-19 state of emergency, but kept the
existing repeal date for section 7. In considering SB 296, the
legislature had a clear opportunity to revisit the repeal date
for section 7 if it wished, and nothing in the legislative his-
tory of SB 296 suggests that any consideration was given to
changing section 7’s repeal date. Indeed, because of how sec-
tion 8 was written in original HB 4212, the legislature had
to entirely rewrite section 8 in SB 296, including the portion
addressing the repeal date for section 7, and chose to use the
same repeal date for section 7 as it had in original HB 4212.
         Taken together, the text, context, and legislative
history of HB 4212 all support the conclusion that sections
7 and 8, read together, extended the statutes of limitations
for civil actions through December 31, 2021. We disagree
with the suggestion that the legislature could not possibly
have intended the extension to end on December 31, 2021.
In extending the statutes of limitations for civil actions, the
legislature was aware that it was doing something extraor-
dinary in response to extraordinary times. By setting a
hard repeal date of December 31, 2021, the legislature may
have been balancing the practical realities of the early pan-
demic—such as courts not operating normally, lawyers’
offices not operating normally, and the general disruption
to people’s lives—against the important polices served by
statutes of limitations.3 See Board of Regents v. Tomanio,
446 US 478, 487, 100 S Ct 1790, 64 L Ed 2d 440 (1980) (“On
many prior occasions, we have emphasized the importance
of the policies underlying state statutes of limitations.
Statutes of limitations are not simply technicalities. On the

     3
       Moreover, even if the legislative history evinced an intent contrary to
the statutory text—which it does not—that would not overcome the plain text.
“Legislative history may be used to confirm seemingly plain meaning and even
to illuminate it; a party also may use legislative history to attempt to convince a
court that superficially clear language actually is not so plain at all—that is, that
there is a kind of latent ambiguity in the statute.” State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160,
172, 206 P3d 1042 (2009). However, “[w]hen the text of a statute is truly capable of
only one meaning, no weight can be given to legislative history that suggests—or
even confirms—that legislators intended something different.” Id. at 173.
Cite as 331 Or App 263 (2024)                              275

contrary, they have long been respected as fundamental to
a well-ordered judicial system.”); Eastman v. Crary, 131 Or
694, 697, 284 P 280 (1930) (recognizing as “a clear and accu-
rate statement of the law” that statutes of limitations are “a
legislative declaration of public policy”).
         Plaintiffs argue that HB 4212 is ambiguous and
urge us to resort to maxims of statutory construction to
resolve the ambiguity. However, we are unpersuaded that
the act is ambiguous as to when the extended statute-of-
limitations period ended. See State v. S.-Q. K., 292 Or App
836, 840, 426 P3d 659, adh’d to as modified on recons, 294
Or App 184, 426 P3d 258, rev den, 364 Or 209 (2018) (stat-
utory text is “ambiguous” if “it is susceptible to at least two
plausible interpretations”).
         We do not discount the possibility that some readers
of HB 4212 might have been confused as to when the exten-
sion period would end. Looking only at section 7, one would
understand civil statutes of limitations to be extended to
90 days after the end of the COVID-19 state of emergency.
See Or Laws 2020, ch 12, § 7 (1st Spec Sess) (extending the
statutes of limitations “to a date 90 days after the declara-
tion and any extension is no longer in effect”). However, one
cannot look only at section 7. Section 8 sets a repeal date of
December 31, 2021. Id. § 8(1); see also Or Laws 2021, ch 199,
§ 3. The only plausible interpretation of section 8 is that sec-
tion 7 ceases to have effect after December 31, 2021. That is
also the only interpretation of HB 4212 that gives effect to
the whole act. See SAIF v. Ward, 369 Or 384, 398, 506 P3d
386 (2022) (“As a general rule, when we interpret a statute
to determine what the legislature intended, we attempt to
do so in a manner that gives effect to all of the provisions of
the statute where possible.”).
         In hindsight, if the legislature had known with cer-
tainty in June 2020 that the COVID-19 state of emergency
would continue into 2022, it might have phrased section 7
differently, to avoid any potential confusion. But it did not
know when the state of emergency would end. Further, the
legislature drafted the repeal date for section 7 in a manner
consistent with how it drafted other repeal dates in origi-
nal HB 4212, essentially following the Office of Legislative
276                                                 Yeager v. Montgomery

Counsel’s Bill Drafting Manual. See Legislative Counsel
Committee, Bill Drafting Manual § 6.1 (2018) (Bill Drafting
Manual) (stating that “[a] drafter should never place tempo-
rary material in the same section as permanent material”
and providing two options for drafting temporary material,
one of which is to “creat[e] a separate section that expires
by its own terms or that is repealed by a specified date”
(emphasis omitted)).4
         Nothing in the text, context, or legislative history
supports reading HB 4212 to extend the statutes of limita-
tions to March 31, 2022, which is 90 days after the repeal
date.5 Section 7 is either repealed on December 31, 2021, or it
is not. Nothing links the “90 days” in section 7 to the repeal
date in section 8. To create that link, plaintiffs argue that
December 31, 2021, essentially stands in for the last day of
the state of emergency in section 7. See Or Laws 2020, ch 12,
§ 7 (1st Spec Sess) (extending the statutes of limitations
“to a date 90 days after the declaration [of a state of emer-
gency issued by the Governor related to COVID-19] and any
extension is no longer in effect”). However, that reading is
inconsistent with the statutory text.
        As for extending the statutes of limitations to June
30, 2020, as plaintiffs alternatively argue, that construction
of HB 4212 is supported by the text of section 7, but it would
require disregarding section 8, which we cannot do. “In the
construction of a statute, the office of the judge is simply
to ascertain and declare what is, in terms or in substance,
contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted, or
to omit what has been inserted; and where there are several
     4
       We note that, to use the language of the Bill Drafting Manual, section 7
seems to be written to “expire[ ] by its own terms,” while section 8 provides for
its “repeal[ ] by a specified date,” whereas the Bill Drafting Manual seems to
contemplate only one of those end-date mechanisms being used at a time. Bill
Drafting Manual § 6.1 (providing for the drafting of temporary material in “a
separate section that expires by its own terms or that is repealed by a specified
date”). However, the legislature presumably chose that approach because it did
not know which event would occur first—the expiration of section 7 by its own
terms (90 days after the end of the COVID-19 state of emergency) or the repeal
date (December 31, 2021).
     5
       Ninety days after section 7’s repeal date is March 31, 2022. That date nearly
coincides with the end of the COVID-19 state of emergency on April 1, 2022, but
that is happenstance. See Executive Order 22-03 (March 17, 2022) (ending state
of emergency effective April 1, 2022).
Cite as 331 Or App 263 (2024)                             277

provisions or particulars such construction is, if possible, to
be adopted as will give effect to all.” ORS 174.010. To avoid
that problem, plaintiffs argue that SB 813 replaced section
7 of original HB 4212 in its entirety and that, as a result,
the repeal provision in section 8 of original HB 4212 ceased
to have any effect. Under that view, section 8 of original
HB 4212 repeals section 7 “of this 2020 special session Act,”
and section 7 “of this 2020 special session Act” ceased to
exist when SB 813 was enacted.
          That argument is unpersuasive. Article IV, section
22, of the Oregon Constitution provides that any statutory sec-
tion that is amended “shall be set forth, and published at full
length.” The Bill Drafting Manual advises legislative drafters
that, to comply with Article IV, section 22, a bill amending an
existing statutory section must “show[ ] everything that has
been inserted and deleted as well as what has not changed
for each section.” Bill Drafting Manual § 13.8. Thus, “[w]hen
amending an existing statute, the draft [bill] must show every
difference, except capitalization, between the original version
and the amended version,” and any “[c]hanges are highlighted
by bracketing and italicizing deleted material and bolding
new material.” Id. at § 13.10 (emphasis omitted).
         SB 813 was drafted in accordance with the Bill
Drafting Manual. It identifies “Section 7, chapter 12, Oregon
Laws 2020 (first special session)” as the existing statute that
it is amending; sets forth the original language in ordinary
text to reflect that it is unchanged; and then sets forth new
subsection 4 in bold text to reflect new material. Or Laws
2021, ch 499, § 1. The unchanged portion of the statute was
set forth to comply with Article IV, section 22, not to “reen-
act” the unchanged text, such that cross-references in the
original bill would cease to function. Section 7 “of this 2020
special session Act” did not cease to exist when SB 813 was
enacted, nor did the enactment of SB 813 turn the internal
cross-reference to section 7 in section 8 into the legislative
equivalent of a dead link. See Or Laws, ch 12, § 7, amended
by Or Laws 2021, ch 499, § 1, compiled as a note after ORS
12.010 (2021) (compiling section 7, as amended by SB 813).
       Because the meaning of HB 4212 is clear upon
examination of its text, context, and legislative history, we
278                                              Yeager v. Montgomery

have no occasion to reach maxims of statutory construction
and therefore do not address the parties’ arguments in that
regard.6 See Gaines, 346 Or at 172 (allowing for resort to
maxims of statutory construction only when “the legisla-
ture’s intent remains unclear after examining text, context,
and legislative history”); see also, e.g., State v. Vasquez-Rubio,
323 Or 275, 283, 917 P2d 494 (1996) (“When the legislative
intent is clear from an inquiry into text and context, or from
resort to legislative history, * * * it would be inappropriate
to apply the absurd-result maxim. If we were to do so, we
would be rewriting a clear statute based solely on our con-
jecture that the legislature could not have intended a partic-
ular result.”).
          In sum, extending the statutes of limitations for
civil actions in light of the COVID-19 pandemic was a legis-
lative policy choice, and deciding the length of the extension
also was a legislative policy choice. Any number of policy
choices might have been made. The legislature made the one
that it did, and, in our view, HB 4212 is unambiguous that
the extension ended on December 31, 2021.7 It follows that,
in each case, the trial court correctly concluded that the
plaintiff’s action was time barred and dismissed the action
on that basis.
           Affirmed.

    6
       Plaintiffs invoke a number of maxims of statutory construction, including
the absurd-result maxim, which defendants contend either do not apply or do not
support plaintiffs’ proposed construction. Given our conclusion that the act is
unambiguous, we do not discuss the parties’ specific arguments regarding max-
ims of statutory construction.
    7
       To be clear, had the COVID-19 state of emergency ended before October
2021, the extension period would have ended earlier. It ended on December 31,
2021, because section 7 was repealed before the time that it would have expired
by its own terms.