Court Opinion

ID: 9734674
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:42:19.026085+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:26.769300
License: Public Domain

GARGANO, J.
I dissent. In my judgment the facts of this case are distinguishable from People v. Fioritto, 68 Cal.2d 714 [68 Cal.Rptr. 817, 441 P.2d 625], relied upon by the majority to overturn the judgment. In Fioritto the conduct of the police officers was obviously calculated to trick the defendant into talking after he had elected to exercise his constitutional right to remain silent, and if countenanced could lead to innumerable attempts to circumvent the mandate of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 486 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 10 A.L.R.3d 974] ; after the defendant declined to waive his rights the officers confronted him with his accomplices, an argument ensued, the accomplices were taken away, and the officers again asked the defendant if he would like to sign a waiver of his rights and confess, which he did. Thus, the ¿Supreme Court, in reversing Fioritto’s conviction, pointed to *397the ‘ ratio decidendi” of Miranda and stated: “A principal objective of that decision was to establish safeguards that would liberate courts insofar as possible from the difficult and troublesome necessity of adjudicating in each case whether coercive influences, psychological or physical, have been employed to secure admissions or confessions.” (People v. Fioritto, 68 Cal.2d at p. 717.) (Italics added.)
In the instant ease Deputy Sipe did not attempt, by trickery or otherwise, to induce defendant to talk against his will. At the most the officer experienced a normal reaction to appellant’s sudden decision to be represented by counsel. The police were informed that defendant was voluntarily coming to the sheriff’s office to clear his roommate, MeGriff, who had been charged with committing certain burglaries in the Oil-dale area near Bakersfield, California. Moreover, when the police officers met defendant in the parking lot adjacent to the sheriff’s office and asked if he came to talk to them, he answered “Yes.” Later, after defendant was arrested and advised of his rights he said he wanted a lawyer. At this point he was correctly informed by Deputy Sipe that the officers could no longer talk to him. However, Sipe understandably added that the officers were of the opinion that defendant had come to the sheriff’s office to clear MeGriff and to admit some burglaries that were committed in the Oildale area. Defendant responded to this observation by stating that he wanted to talk to the officers. He was again advised of his rights and, when he said he understood, bis statement was taken. According to Deputy Sipe this preliminary discussion took only two minutes.
It seems to me that the majority view has the effect of insulating, with what sometimes could be disastrous results, a defendant against the slightest tactical error by an interrogating officer no matter how innocent or innocuous the tactical error may be. Manifestly, this result impedes law enforcement without substantially serving the interests of justice. I believe that People v. Fioritto, supra, should not be construed to stand for this proposition.
A petition for a rehearing was denied January 14, 1969. Gargano, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted. Respondent’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied February 13,1969.