Court Opinion

ID: 9856986
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 07:09:43.354651+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:37:46.827300
License: Public Domain

BERNSTEIN, Justice
(specially concurring).'’
The sole error assigned by appellant to the granting by the trial court of defendant’s motion for summary judgment is that there is a genuine issue of, fact whether or not appellant and defendant were on a “joint venture” at the time of the accident. On that issue I agree with the majority of the Court that, as a matter of law, plaintiff and defendant were not on a “joint venture” as that term has been interpreted by the courts of New Mexico and by other courts, generally, and that there is no genuine issue of fact relating thereto. See Silva v. Waldie, 42 N.M. 514, 82 P.2d 282; West v. Soto, 85 Ariz. 255, 336 P.2d 153.
The very narrow statement by appellant of the question on appeal, however, obfuscates the issue properly relevant to the New Mexico Guest Statute and requires further analysis.
The term “joint venture” has significance, generally, if not exclusively, in cases involving the issue of imputed negligence. In such cases, a third party sues or is being sued by a passenger of another car and seeks to impute to such passenger the negligence of the driver of the other car. The rule there is that the negligence of the driver will be imputed to his passenger if both are engaged in a “joint venture”, which is limited to the situation where the passenger has an equal right with the driver to direct and control the operation of the car. West v. Soto, supra; Silva v. Waldie, supra; Schmid v. Eslick, 181 Kan. *363997, 317 P.2d 459. Such a narrow construction of “joint venture” suggests the reluctance of the courts to hold a person liable in such case solely for the negligence of another party.
Here, by phrasing the question on appeal in terms of “joint venture,” appellant has gratuitously cast himself into the position of having to satisfy a test significantly stricter than one which might otherwise have resolved this appeal in his favor. Thus, although a finding of “joint venture” may preclude one of the parties thereto from being a “guest without payment,” the latter statutory term does not include all relationships other than “joint venture.” Indeed, there is authority to support the proposition that appellant here was not a “guest without payment” within the meaning of the New Mexico Guest Statute (Harris v. Harfmann, 113 Cal.App.2d 615, 248 P.2d 501; cf. Perini v. Perini, 64 N.M. 79, 324 P.2d 779; see, Hobbs v. Irwin, 60 N.M. 479, 292 P.2d 779; Dunakin v. Thomas, D.C.D.N.M., 141 F.Supp. 377; Woolf v. Holton, 240 Mo.App. 1123, 224 S.W.2d 861), or that, at the least, he was entitled to have that status resolved by the jury (Duff v. Schaefer Ambulance Service, 132 Cal.App.2d 655, 283 P.2d 91, 99; see 2 Harper & James, Law of Torts, § 16.15 p. 961 [1956]; cf. Mercer v. Vinson, 85 Ariz. 280, 336 P.2d 854).
My concurrence, therefore, is based on the belief not that the appellant is not a “guest without payment” within the meaning of the New Mexico Guest Statute, but that he has failed to support the sole issue of “joint venture” raised by him.
No citation of authority is needed for the proposition that this Court will confine itself to the errors assigned by appellants and to the issues raised by the parties. The administration of justice requires compliance with rules properly designed to facilitate the resolution of issues by the courts.