Court Opinion

ID: 9861229
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:49:54.068577+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:27:47.725726
License: Public Domain

GIVAN, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in its reversal of appellant's kidnapping conviction.
Citing the case of Kelley v. State (1936), 210 Ind. 380, 3 N.E.2d 65, the majority takes the position that because the trial court did not repeat its preliminary instructions as a part of its final instructions, the jury was neither expressly nor by reference informed that their verdict could be predicated only on a finding that appellant had committed the specific acts charged. I do not find the Kelley case to be dispositive of the issues in this case.
In the case at bar, the charging information set out in the majority opinion charges appellant with the intent to aid in the escape of Jimmy C. Evans, Charles J. Thomas, and Rodney D. Cooper. As the facts set out in the majority opinion clearly show, appellant in fact did effect the escape of Evans, Thomas, and Cooper.
In Kelley, the defendant was charged with conspiring with others to bomb the home of a named individual. However, the State's theory of the case was that he was a part of a union group whose purpose it was to force the closure of a non-union mine in southern Indiana by way of a series of unlawful acts. There, this Court correctly pointed out that you cannot charge one specific offense and then find the defendant guilty by showing that he committed similar offenses.
In the case at bar, there is no conceivable way the jury could have been confused. There was no variance at any time in the State's theory of the case, and the facts did support the charge.
I would affirm the trial court in its entirety.
SHEPARD, C.J., concurs.