Court Opinion

ID: 9353775
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-12 19:01:16.977583+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:11:36.994174
License: Public Domain

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
                                File Name: 23a0028n.06

                                            No. 21-1723

                          UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                               FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT                                   FILED
                                                                                 Jan 12, 2023
                                                                             DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
                                                  )
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                                                  )
        Plaintiff-Appellee,                       )        ON APPEAL FROM THE
                                                  )        UNITED STATES DISTRICT
v.                                                )        COURT FOR THE WESTERN
                                                  )        DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
QUINTIN ANDRE CONLEY,                             )
        Defendant-Appellant.                      )
                                                                                    OPINION
                                                  )
                                                  )

Before: SUHRHEINRICH, CLAY, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

       CLAY, Circuit Judge. In July 2021, Defendant Quintin Andre Conley pleaded guilty to

possession with intent to distribute controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),

(b)(1)(A)(viii), and (b)(1)(C). The district court sentenced Conley to 120 months in custody. On

appeal, Conley challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress and its application

of a two-level sentencing enhancement. The Court AFFIRMS for the reasons set forth below.

                                       I.    BACKGROUND

                                  A.        Factual Background

       In the fall of 2020, a confidential informant told investigators that Conley possessed

firearms and sold illegal drugs. According to the informant, Conley drove a white Jeep SUV and

spent time in Muskegon, Michigan. In response to those tips, Detective Steve Liskey commenced

an investigation. During his investigation, Liskey corroborated some of the informant’s tips. For

example, Liskey learned that Conley owned a white Jeep. Subsequently, investigators learned

more through the Law Enforcement Information Network (the “LEIN”), which is a database upon
No. 21-1723, United States v. Conley

which police officers often rely. The LEIN indicated that the Jeep lacked valid insurance and that

Conley lacked a valid driver’s license.

        In October 2020, investigators observed Conley driving the white Jeep.                        Liskey

acknowledged in the moment that he lacked probable cause to search the Jeep, but he instructed

Michigan State Police Trooper Matthew Rose to stop Conley for driving without insurance. Liskey

hoped that by pulling Conley over, investigators could ultimately find justification to search the

car lawfully.

        Rose followed Liskey’s instructions and pulled Conley over.1 The dash camera video

shows Rose and his partner approaching the Jeep calmly, and without any weapons drawn. When

Rose reached Conley’s window, he asked Conley for the vehicle’s paperwork. Rose then told

Conley that it appeared that the Jeep lacked insurance coverage, but he did not mention the

suspected license violation. Rose testified later that he did not share that information because he

wanted to make the stop appear as routine as possible. Next, Rose asked Conley for identification

and Conley responded that he did not have any on him. Shortly thereafter, Conley’s girlfriend,

who was riding in the passenger seat, produced proof of insurance.

        After acknowledging that Conley had produced proof of insurance, Rose asked Conley to

step out of the vehicle. Rose testified that he removed Conley from the vehicle in accordance with

his “typical procedure” for drivers who lack proper identification. Hr’g Tr., R. 55, Page ID #369.

Conley exited the vehicle promptly and cooperatively. The parties dispute what happened next.

Rose testified that as Conley exited the vehicle, Rose saw an electronic digital scale in the driver’s

door pocket. Such scales are, according to Rose, commonly associated with drug dealing. Conley

        1
          Much of the factual summary that follows is based upon the Court’s review of dash camera videos. See
Ashford v. Raby, 951 F.3d 798, 800 (6th Cir. 2020) (“In describing what happened, we rely mainly on undisputed
video footage from police dashboard cameras on the scene.”).

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No. 21-1723, United States v. Conley

avers that Rose’s testimony lacks credibility. Rose could not have seen the scale, Conley argues,

because: (1) it was dark out; (2) Rose did not point a flashlight at the door; and (3) officers did

not point their spotlight or headlights at the door. In addition, Conley points to the fact that Rose

did not mention the scale until about fifteen minutes after Conley exited the Jeep. The district

court ultimately credited Rose’s testimony on the matter.

        Rose asked if Conley had any weapons on him and Conley said that he did not. Rose then

asked Conley if he was “good with [Rose] checking real quick” and the video reveals that Conley

responded in the affirmative. Def.’s Ex. A, R. 58, Page ID #479.2 Conley then put his hands in

the air, which the district court later held signified Conley’s consent to the pat down.

        Rose conducted an open-palmed pat down. According to Rose’s testimony, during the pat

down, he felt what he believed was a bag of drugs. Rose reached into Conley’s pocket and

discovered a bag containing two ounces of methamphetamine. After discovering the drugs, Rose

handcuffed Conley and asked him whether there was anything in the vehicle that Rose should

know about. Conley responded that he had “some stuff” in the car. Def.’s Ex. A, R. 58, Page ID

#479. Rose then told Conley that he was under arrest and informed him of his Miranda rights.

Shortly thereafter, law enforcement officers searched the Jeep and found two guns, both of which

Conley’s girlfriend explained were registered to her. Officers also found additional drugs, cash,

and cell phones.

                                            A. Procedural History

        Several months after his arrest, in February 2021, a grand jury indicted Conley on one

count of possession of controlled substances with the intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(viii), and (b)(1)(C).

        2
          While Conley disputes whether he consented to a pat down, he acknowledges in his appellate brief that he
said “yes” in response to Rose’s question. Pet’r’s Br., ECF No. 23, 12.

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No. 21-1723, United States v. Conley

        1. Motion to Suppress

        Three months after his indictment, Conley filed a motion to suppress that challenged the

validity of the evidence obtained during the stop. After both parties briefed the motion, the district

court held an evidentiary hearing on the matter. At that hearing, the court heard testimony from

Liskey and Rose. The court also reviewed the dash camera video, as well as documentary and

photographic evidence, including the LEIN documents and driver’s license records from the

Michigan Secretary of State. Those records corroborated Liskey’s testimony that investigators’

records indicated that Conley’s vehicle was uninsured, and that Conley lacked a valid driver’s

license at the time of the stop.

        After considering that evidence, the district court denied Conley’s motion to suppress. In

denying the motion, the court held that: (1) officers had probable cause to stop Conley based upon

the LEIN information that the Jeep lacked insurance and the information that Conley lacked a valid

driver’s license; (2) Conley consented to the pat down; (3) Rose saw the digital scale in the driver’s

side door when Conley exited the vehicle; (4) based upon his years of experience and seeing the

scale, Rose had reasonable suspicion that the bag contained drugs; and (5) having found the

methamphetamine lawfully, Rose was permitted to arrest Conley and search the Jeep. In ruling

on the motion, the district court did not consider Conley’s statement that there was “stuff in” the

Jeep, which Conley made before he was read his Miranda rights.

        2. Guilty Plea and Sentencing

        Following the denial of his motion to suppress, Conley pleaded guilty to the one-count

indictment, pursuant to the terms of a conditional plea agreement. The plea agreement preserved

Conley’s right to challenge the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress.

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No. 21-1723, United States v. Conley

        Before sentencing, the probation department prepared its Final Presentence Report (the

“Final PSR”). Based upon the discovery of the two firearms in the car, the probation department

included a two-point enhancement for possession of a dangerous weapon.               See U.S.S.G.

§ 2D1.1(b)(1). The Final PSR recommended the enhancement based in part on the fact that there

were two firearms found in the car “within easy reach of the defendant.” The report also cited

Conley’s knowledge that his girlfriend often carried firearms, and the fact that Conley had

previously possessed the guns while moving them out of the reach of the children. Perhaps most

importantly, the probation department relied upon the fact that after being read his Miranda rights,

Conley told officers where in the car they could locate one of the weapons, which indicated that

he knew that at least one gun was in the car. Based on a total offense level of 29 and a criminal

history category of II, the Guidelines imprisonment range was 97 to 121 months. However, the

statutorily required minimum sentence of 10 years was greater than the lower end of the applicable

Guidelines range; therefore, the Guidelines term of imprisonment was 120 to 121 months under

U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b). Conley objected to the two-level enhancement. In making his objection,

Conley argued that he “did not possess” the firearms in the vehicle, and that it was “clearly

improbable” that the firearms were connected to the offense. Def.’s Sentencing Mem., R. 49, Page

ID ##269–73. Despite that objection, Conley’s counsel acknowledged that Conley “was aware

that there was a gun in the car at the time” of the stop. Sentencing Hr’g Tr., R. 57, Page ID #463.

        The district court conducted a sentencing hearing in November 2021. At that hearing, the

government contended that Conley “was in constructive possession of the firearms . . . .” Id. at

Page ID #465. To support that contention, the government highlighted that the guns were in a car

registered to Conley and within his wingspan. The government also averred that it was not “clearly

improbable” that the guns were connected to Conley’s drug trafficking offense, noting that the

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No. 21-1723, United States v. Conley

handguns were of the type that are routinely seen in drug cases, that guns are “frequently cited as

tools of the drug trade,” and that the guns were near the drugs at issue. Id. at Page ID #466.

        The district court overruled Conley’s objection. In doing so, it held that whether Conley

possessed the gun was not “factually close” and that “the government [] established, at the very

least, constructive possession of the weapon.” Id. at Page ID ##466–67. Accordingly, the court

sentenced Conley to 120 months in custody, which was the mandatory minimum applicable to the

offense. Conley’s timely appeal followed.

                                         II.   DISCUSSION

                                       A. Motion to Suppress

        1. Standard of Review

        “This court reviews a district court’s decision on a motion to suppress under two standards.

Findings of fact are upheld unless clearly erroneous, while conclusions of law are reviewed de

novo.” United States v. Master, 614 F.3d 236, 238 (6th Cir. 2010) (quotations omitted). When

conducting such a review, the Court “views the evidence in the light most likely to support the

district court’s decision.” Id. (quoting United States v. McPhearson, 469 F.3d 518, 523 (6th Cir.

2006)). “A factual finding is clearly erroneous when, although there may be evidence to support

it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a

mistake has been committed.” Id. (quoting United States v. Blair, 524 F.3d 740, 747 (6th Cir.

2008)). Thus, a “denial of a motion to suppress will be affirmed on appeal if the district court’s

conclusion can be justified for any reason.” United States v. Moorehead, 912 F.3d 963, 966 (6th

Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Pasquarille, 20 F.3d 682, 685 (6th Cir. 1994)).

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No. 21-1723, United States v. Conley

        2. Analysis

        Conley contends that: (1) the traffic stop was unlawful; (2) Rose lacked reasonable

suspicion to prolong Conley’s detention after Conley produced proof of insurance; (3) Rose lacked

reasonable suspicion to conduct a pat down of Conley; (4) Rose exceeded the scope of his pat

down and lacked probable cause to search Conley for drugs; and (5) the statement that Conley

made after he was arrested but before he was read his Miranda rights was inadmissible. For those

reasons, Conley asserts that the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress.

             a. The Traffic Stop

        To make a traffic stop, “an officer must possess either probable cause of a civil infraction

or reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” United States v. Lyons, 687 F.3d 754, 763 (6th Cir.

2012) (citing Gaddis ex rel. Gaddis v. Redford Twp., 364 F.3d 763, 771 n.6 (6th Cir. 2004)).

“Probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief supported by less than prima facie proof but

more than mere suspicion.” Blair, 524 F.3d at 748 (citations omitted). This Court enforces the

prohibition of unlawful stops primarily “through the exclusionary rule, which requires the

suppression of any evidence seized during a vehicle search premised on an illegal traffic stop.”

Lyons, 687 F.3d at 763 (citations omitted).

        “[A] pretextual stop occurs when the police use a legal justification to make a stop . . . in

order to search a person or his vehicle, or interrogate him, for an unrelated and more serious crime

for which they do not have the reasonable suspicion necessary to support a stop.” United States v.

Huguenin, 154 F.3d 547, 559 n.10 (6th Cir. 1998) (alterations in original) (quotation omitted).

Police officers may make pretextual stops “for any infraction, no matter how slight . . . .” Blair,

524 F.3d at 748 (quoting United States v. Mesa, 62 F.3d 159, 162 (6th Cir. 1995)).

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No. 21-1723, United States v. Conley

        In denying Conley’s motion to suppress, the district court determined that officers had

probable cause to stop Conley based upon the information from the LEIN that the Jeep lacked

insurance and that Conley lacked a valid driver’s license. Conley disputes that finding and

contends that officers lacked probable cause because officers possessed inaccurate information.

The government, however, points to several district court cases from within this Circuit that stand

for the proposition that “[p]olice officers are allowed to rely upon information in LEIN to conduct

an arrest, even if it later turns out the information in LEIN was inaccurate.” United States v.

Lawrence, 425 F. Supp. 3d 828, 833 (E.D. Mich. 2019) (citing cases). Conley cites no authority

to the contrary, nor does he provide evidence that officers possessed inaccurate information with

respect to his driver’s license.

        The government is correct. While it appears that this Court has not held explicitly that

LEIN information is enough to establish probable cause, such a proposition is a natural extension

of this Court’s holding that a digital “license check” can establish probable cause to execute a

traffic stop. United States v. Sandridge, 385 F.3d 1032, 1036 (6th Cir. 2004). After all, both

situations involve officers reasonably relying on information found within a law enforcement

database. Moreover, such a holding is consistent with opinions from Michigan state courts and

federal district courts within this Circuit, which the Court finds persuasive. See, e.g., Scott v. City

of Port Huron, No. 15-11773, 2017 WL 877317, at *8 (E.D. Mich. March 6, 2017) (“Arguably, if

all that Peczeniuk had relied on was the LEIN, he could have reasonably believed that there was

probable cause to arrest Scott.”); Taggart v. Macomb Cnty., 587 F. Supp. 1080, 1081 (E.D. Mich.

1982) (“[A] LEIN check is an authoritative source upon which law enforcement officers may

justifiably rely in making an arrest.”); Shumate v. Cleveland, No. 09-11545, 2010 WL 2813334,

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No. 21-1723, United States v. Conley

at *4 (E.D. Mich. July 14, 2010); People v. Mazzie, 926 N.W.2d 359, 368–69 (Mich. Ct. App.

2018).

         With respect to Conley’s driver’s license, Conley’s argument is even weaker.             As

mentioned above, a digital “license check” can establish probable cause to execute a traffic stop.

Sandridge, 385 F.3d at 1036. Conley cites no authority contrary to that proposition. The stop was

lawful

             b. Prolonged Detention

         When an officer conducts a lawful stop, “the investigative methods employed should be

the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer’s suspicion in a short

period of time.” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (citations omitted). At the same time,

that “officer’s mission includes ‘ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop.’” Rodriguez v.

United States, 575 U.S. 348, 355 (2015) (alteration in original) (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543

U.S. 405, 408 (2005)). Such inquiries typically include “checking the driver’s license” and

“inspecting the automobile’s . . . proof of insurance.” Id. (citation omitted). Thus, by asking for

Conley’s license, Rose acted within the scope of his lawful “mission.” Id.

         Conley argues that Rose should have ended the stop once Conley produced proof of

insurance. That argument fails. Rose testified that he prolonged Conley’s detention because

Conley did not produce a valid driver’s license. The district court credited Rose’s testimony on

that matter, and Conley provides no evidence to leave this Court “with the definite and firm

conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Master, 614 F.3d at 238 (quotation omitted).

Because traffic stops may continue for as long as “is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the

stop” (but no longer than is necessary), and because one of the stop’s purposes was to investigate

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No. 21-1723, United States v. Conley

whether Conley lacked a driver’s license, the prolonged detention was lawful. Royer, 460 U.S at

500.

        The next issue is whether Rose lawfully asked Conley to step out of the vehicle. That issue

is settled by clearly established law. This Court has observed that during “the course of a stop

premised on a traffic violation, police may instruct the driver or occupant to exit the vehicle.”

United States v. Street, 614 F.3d 228, 232 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S.

106, 111 (1977)). Rose’s decision to ask Conley to exit the vehicle was particularly reasonable

given his testimony that he was concerned because he “had been aware that there was a potential

for a firearm in the vehicle.” Hr’g Tr., R. 55, Page ID #359. Thus, Rose did not act unlawfully in

prolonging Conley’s detention.

             c. Pat Down

        An officer may conduct a pat down when a person provides consent, or “[w]hen an officer

is justified in believing that the individual . . . is armed and presently dangerous . . . .” Terry v.

Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968). In this case, Rose’s pat down was justified because: (1) Conley

consented to the pat down; and (2) Rose had reasonable suspicion that Conley may have been

armed and dangerous.

                 i. Consent

        Conley argues that he did not consent to a pat down. “It is well-settled that a person may

waive his Fourth Amendment rights by consenting to a search.” United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d

584, 587 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 593–94 (1946)). “[C]onsent

has effect only if it is given freely and voluntarily.” Id. (citing Bumper v. North Carolina, 391

U.S. 543, 548 (1968)). A person may provide consent through “words, gesture, or conduct.” Id.

(quotation omitted). “When seeking to justify a search based on consent, the government has the

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No. 21-1723, United States v. Conley

burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the consent was ‘freely and voluntarily

given,’ and was not the result of coercion, duress, or submission to a claim of authority.” United

States v. Bueno, 21 F.3d 120, 126 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Bumper, 391 U.S. at 548)). “Whether

consent was free and voluntary so as to waive the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment

is ‘a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.’” Carter, 378

F.3d at 587 (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973)). Thus, the Court

reviews whether consent to a search was freely given “for clear error.” Id. (citing United States v.

Erwin, 155 F.3d 818, 822 (6th Cir. 1998) (en banc)).

        The district court found that when Conley put “his hands up in the air,” he did so “in a

fashion indicating that he [was] consenting to the pat down.” Hr’g Tr., R. 55, Page ID #430. For

that reason alone, it seems, the district court concluded that Conley consented to the pat down.

That finding alone is not clearly erroneous. But it omits the strongest evidence that Conley

consented to the pat down: Conley said “yes” when asked whether Rose could check him for

weapons. Considering Conley’s words and actions, the district court’s finding that Conley

consented to the pat down was not clearly erroneous, as it does not leave the Court “with the

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Master, 614 F.3d at 238

(quotation omitted); see also United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 207 (2002) (“Officer Lang

did not inform respondents of their right to refuse the search, he did request permission to search,

and the totality of the circumstances indicates that their consent was voluntary, so the searches

were reasonable.”).

                 ii. Reasonable Suspicion

        The pat down would have been lawful even if Conley had not consented. A police officer

may “perform a ‘patdown’ of a driver and any passengers upon reasonable suspicion that they may

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No. 21-1723, United States v. Conley

be armed and dangerous.” Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 118 (1998) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S.

at 88). Whether an officer has reasonable suspicion that a person may be armed and dangerous is

based upon an objective standard: would “a reasonably prudent person in the circumstances would

be warranted in believing that his safety or that of others was in danger”? United States v.

Campbell, 549 F.3d 364, 372 (6th Cir. 2008).

        Information from an informant that a person is likely to be armed may be sufficient to

establish reasonable suspicion. See United States v. Howard, 632 F. App’x 795, 798–800 (6th Cir.

2015). The strength of that information is buttressed when the informant has proven to be reliable

in the past. Id. at 799–800 (citing Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000)). In this case, Liskey

testified that an informant told investigators that if Conley was in a vehicle, he was likely to be

armed. Liskey also testified that the informant had provided law enforcement with information

for several years.

        In addition to information suggesting that Conley was armed, the district court found that

Rose had reason to suspect that Conley was dealing drugs. Rose testified that he saw a digital

scale in Conley’s door pocket, and that he associated digital scales with drug dealing. The district

court credited Rose’s testimony. While the dash camera video does not prove that Rose’s

testimony was truthful, it also does not indicate that he was untruthful. Thus, the district court’s

finding that Rose saw the digital scale does not leave this Court “with the definite and firm

conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Master, 614 F.3d at 238 (quotation omitted).

        “This Court has held many times that guns are ‘tools of the trade’ in drug transactions.”

United States v. Hardin, 248 F.3d 489, 499 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing cases). Accordingly, the

combination of the informant’s tip and the evidence that Conley was dealing drugs provided Rose

with the reasonable suspicion needed to justify a pat down. A reasonable person in Rose’s situation

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No. 21-1723, United States v. Conley

would have been warranted in believing that Conley may have been armed. See Campbell, 549

F.3d at 372.

                 iii. Scope of the Pat Down

          Conley contends that Rose exceeded the scope of the pat down when he squeezed the items

in Conley’s pocket. A pat down “is for the limited purpose of ensuring the safety of the officer

and others around him” and must therefore “be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably

designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police

officer.” United States v. Campbell, 486 F.3d 949, 955 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S.

at 29).

          At the same time, an officer conducting a pat down need not “ignore contraband should

any be discovered.” United States v. Pacheco, 841 F.3d 384, 394 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Minnesota

v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 374 (1993)). “If a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect’s outer

clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent, there

has been no invasion of the suspect’s privacy beyond that already authorized by the officer’s search

for weapons; if the object is contraband, its warrantless seizure would be justified . . . .”

Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 375–76. To determine “whether an object’s incriminatory nature is

immediately apparent, the court must ‘look to three factors, none of which is necessary but each

of which is instructive.’” Pacheco, 841 F.3d at 395 (quoting United States v. Garcia, 496 F.3d

495, 510 (6th Cir. 2007)). Those factors are:

          (1) a nexus between the seized object and the [suspected criminal activity];
          (2) whether the intrinsic nature or appearance of the seized object gives probable
          cause to believe that it is associated with criminal activity; and (3) whether the
          executing officers can at the time of discovery of the object on the facts then
          available to them determine probable cause of the object’s incriminating nature.

Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Garcia, 496 F.3d at 510).

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No. 21-1723, United States v. Conley

        In this case, the district court credited Rose’s testimony that he conducted an open-palm

search and immediately felt what he suspected to be drugs in Conley’s pocket. Based upon the

totality of the circumstances, the district court found Rose’s actions to be justified. Specifically,

the court found that the evidence of drug trafficking, especially the digital scale; the plain feel of

what the officer reasonably believed to be drugs on Conley’s person; and the information that

officers had about Conley’s potential involvement in drug trafficking made retrieving the drugs

from Conley’s pocket lawful. Based upon a consideration of the factors articulated in Pacheco

and Garcia, the district court’s holding that Rose acted lawfully when he reached into Conley’s

pocket to seize the drugs was well-supported.            See Moorehead, 912 F.3d at 966 (quoting

Pasquarille, 20 F.3d at 685).

                 iv. Fruit of the Poisonous Tree

        Conley also argues that “[t]o the extent the government relies on Mr. Conley’s statement

that he had ‘some stuff in the car’ for its basis of searching the vehicle, this statement must be

suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree.” Pet’r’s Br., ECF No. 23, 48–49; Nardone v. United

States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939). The Court need not consider that argument, since neither the

district court nor this Court relied upon that statement to find the search lawful. Because the stop,

pat down, and search were all lawful, the district court did not err when it denied Conley’s motion

to suppress.

                                          B. Sentencing

        1. Standard of Review

        The Court reviews a district court’s interpretation of the sentencing guidelines de novo.

United States v. West, 962 F.3d 183, 187 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing United States v. Orlando, 363 F.3d

596, 600 (6th Cir. 2004)). The Court reviews findings of fact for clear error. Id. (citation omitted).

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No. 21-1723, United States v. Conley

Under the clear error standard, “a reviewing court must ask whether on the entire evidence it is left

with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Id. (quotation omitted).

        2. Analysis

        “U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) authorizes district courts to apply a two-level enhancement to the

offense level for a drug-related conviction” if the defendant possessed “a dangerous weapon

(including a firearm) . . . .” Id. (quoting U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1)). District courts should apply the

enhancement “if the weapon was present, unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was

connected with the offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 cmt. n.11(A) (emphasis added). For a district court

to apply the enhancement, “the government must establish that (1) the defendant actually or

constructively possessed the weapon, and (2) such possession was during the commission of the

offense.” West, 962 F.3d at 187 (quoting United States v. Hill, 79 F.3d 1477, 1485 (6th Cir. 1996)).

The government must prove those elements “by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. (citing

United States v. McCloud, 935 F.3d 527, 531 (6th Cir. 2019)).

             a. Possession

        Whether Conley possessed the guns is a factual finding that this Court reviews for clear

error. Id. (citing United States v. Pryor, 842 F.3d 441, 452 (6th Cir. 2016)). “Constructive

possession exists when a person does not have actual possession but instead knowingly has the

power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion and control over an object, either

directly or through others.” United States v. Bailey, 553 F.3d 940, 944 (6th Cir. 2009) (quotation

omitted). When “the defendant is in nonexclusive possession of premises on which [illicit

contraband] [is] found, it cannot be inferred that he knew of the presence of such [contraband] and

had control of [it], unless there are other incriminating statements or circumstances tending to

buttress such an inference.” Bailey, 553 F.3d 940, 944 n.3 (6th Cir. 2009) (alterations in original).

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No. 21-1723, United States v. Conley

If a defendant in such a case “den[ies] any knowledge of a thing found in an area under his control,”

then “[t]he government then must offer evidence to prove that the defendant (1) knew that the

thing was present, and (2) intended to exercise [ ] dominion or control over it.” Id. at 945

(alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Jones, 484 F.3d 783, 788 (5th Cir. 2007)). In this

case, Conley acknowledged that he knew that at least one gun was in the car, and it is undisputed

that he had access to the guns.

        As a matter of fact, the district court found that the government “established, at the very

least, constructive possession of the weapon.” Hr’g Tr., R. 57, Page ID #467 (emphasis added).

That finding was not clearly erroneous. First, neither party disputes that Conley possessed the car,

albeit non-exclusively, which is where the guns were located. See Hill, 79 F.3d at 1485. Second,

the guns were within Conley’s reach. Third, after Conley was read his Miranda rights, he told

officers where they could find one of the guns, indicating that he knew that at least one gun was

in the car. Fourth, a relatively longstanding informant told officers that Conley frequently sold

drugs while armed. Based upon that evidence, the district court’s factual finding that Conley

possessed the guns does not leave this Court “with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake

has been committed.” West, 962 F.3d at 187 (quotation omitted).

             b. Possession During the Commission of the Offense

        Once the government establishes that a defendant possessed a dangerous weapon, “a

presumption arises that such possession was connected to the offense.” Hill, 79 F.3d at 1485

(quotation omitted). The burden shifts, therefore, “to the defendant to show that ‘it is clearly

improbable that the weapon was connected to the offense.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Sanchez,

928 F.2d 1450, 1460 (6th Cir. 1991)).         “[T]he weapon need not be possessed during the

commission of the actual offense of conviction.” West, 962 F.3d at 187 (citing United States v.

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No. 21-1723, United States v. Conley

Faison, 339 F.3d 518, 520 (6th Cir. 2003)). Instead, the government need only show that the

defendant possessed the dangerous weapon “during relevant conduct.” Id. (quotation omitted).

Relevant conduct includes all acts and omissions “that were part of the same course of conduct or

common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction.” Id. at 188 (quotation omitted). “Offenses

‘qualify as part of the same course of conduct if they are sufficiently connected or related to each

other as to warrant the conclusion that they are part of a single episode, spree, or ongoing series of

offenses.’” Id. (quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 cmt. n.5(B)(ii)). What constitutes “relevant conduct”

is a question of law subject to de novo review. Id. at 187–88.

        Conley has failed “to show that it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected to

the offense.” Hill, 79 F.3d at 1485 (quotation and citation omitted). First, Conley constructively

possessed the guns. Second, the guns were near the drugs and in a car that Conley was driving.

Third, Conley knew where at least one gun was. Fourth, a tipster informed investigators that

Conley often dealt drugs while armed. It was not, therefore, clearly improbable that the guns were

connected to Conley’s drug dealing. Accordingly, the district court did not err when it applied a

two-level sentencing enhancement.

                                       III.   CONCLUSION

        For the reasons set forth above, this Court AFFIRMS the judgment of the district court.

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