Court Opinion

ID: 9386473
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-12 16:06:44.793435+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:06.516093
License: Public Domain

J-S42044-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    SHAWN RICHARD COUDRIET                     :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 527 WDA 2022

          Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 5, 2022
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Crawford County
             Criminal Division at No(s): CP-20-CR-0000878-2019

BEFORE:      BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and COLINS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.:                           FILED: April 12, 2023

        Shawn Richard Coudriet appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed following an open guilty plea in which Coudriet pleaded guilty to

burglary and aggravated indecent assault.1 For these two offenses, in addition

to being adjudicated a sexually violent predator, Coudriet was aggregately

sentenced to 120 to 240 months of incarceration. Despite Coudriet filing a pro

se notice of appeal and concise statement of matters complained of on appeal,

Coudriet’s counsel, appointed post-notice, has filed a petition to withdraw

from representation and a corresponding brief pursuant to Anders v.

California. See 386 U.S. 783 (1967). After an exhaustive review of the

record, we affirm Coudriet’s judgment of sentence and additionally grant
____________________________________________

   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1  See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(a)(1)(i) and 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3125(a)(2),
respectively.
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counsel's petition to withdraw.

       As best that can be discerned, Coudriet pleaded guilty to an incident in

2019 wherein he unlawfully entered a residence in Meadville, Pennsylvania,

and thereafter, inter alia, forcibly placed his fingers in the genitals of the

victim. That victim happened to be the girlfriend of Coudriet’s brother.

Stemming from this event, Coudriet was charged with ten criminal offenses,

ranging from burglary to simple assault and harassment.

       Although Coudriet was represented by the Crawford County Public

Defender’s Office at or around the time that he waived his preliminary hearing,

Coudriet subsequently requested to proceed pro se, which the lower court

allowed. See Trial Court Opinion, 5/25/22, at 1 n.1 (“Coudriet was permitted

to proceed without representation following a competency and Grazier-type

hearing [see 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998)] held on May 11, 2020. A competency

examination was ordered and filed on January 1, 2021[.]”). Notwithstanding

his desire to proceed pro se, standby counsel2 provided at least some level of

assistance to Coudriet in him pleading guilty to the two above-mentioned

crimes, with the court ordering a nolle prosequi of the remaining charges.

       Following sentencing, Coudriet filed, pro se, a timely notice of appeal

and later, while still pro se, submitted a statement of matters complained of

on appeal. Several weeks after these filings, the court appointed him with

counsel. The relevant parties complied with their respective obligations under
____________________________________________

2 Coudriet’s standby counsel was the same attorney now representing him in
the present matter.

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Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925, and accordingly, this matter

is ripe for review.3

       Prior to any substantive consideration of appellate issues that may be

present, we must first consider counsel’s petition to withdraw. See

Commonwealth v. Garang, 9 A.3d 237, 240 (Pa. Super. 2010). By its very

nature, an Anders brief signals counsel’s belief that the current appeal is

frivolous. As such, to withdraw from representation, counsel must avail

himself or herself of a well-defined set of procedures. Specifically, counsel is

required to:

       (1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that after
       making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has
       determined the appeal would be frivolous;

       (2) file a brief referring to any issues that might arguably support
       the appeal, but which does not resemble a no-merit letter; and

       (3) furnish a copy of the brief to the defendant and advise him of
       his right to retain new counsel, proceed pro se, or raise any
       additional points [counsel] deems worthy of this Court's attention.

Commonwealth v. Edwards, 906 A.2d 1225, 1227 (Pa. Super. 2006)

(citation omitted). In Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa.

2009), our Supreme Court expounded upon the necessary components of an

Anders brief, mandating that counsel:

____________________________________________

3 As discussed, infra, the court’s opinion is responsive to Coudriet’s pro se
concise statement of matters complained of on appeal, finding all three issues
Coudriet has raised to be either unmeritorious or incoherent. See Trial Court
Opinion, 5/25/22, at 2-4.

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       (1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with
       citations to the record;

       (2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably
       supports the appeal;

       (3) set forth counsel's conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and

       (4) state counsel's reasons for concluding that the appeal is
       frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record,
       controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the
       conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.

Id., at 361. If there is compliance with Anders, this Court must then “conduct

a simple review of the record to ascertain if there appear on its face to be

arguably meritorious issues that counsel, intentionally or not, missed or

misstated.” Commonwealth v. Dempster, 187 A.3d 266, 272 (Pa. Super.

2018) (en banc).

       After delving into counsel's submissions, we conclude that there has

been satisfactory compliance with Anders. First, the petition to withdraw4

establishes that in addition to counsel’s “active involvement as standby

counsel[,]” counsel performed a “conscientious examination of the record” and

concluded that Coudriet’s appeal would be “frivolous.” Petition to Withdraw

as Legal Counsel, 10/29/22, at 7. Second, counsel's Anders brief substantially

conforms to the dictates of Santiago. Inter alia, the brief contains a well-

developed summary of this matter’s facts and procedural history. See Anders

____________________________________________

4 We note that on October 24, 2022, this Court issued an order requiring
counsel to file a petition to withdraw as counsel that was separate from the
Anders brief. Counsel complied with this directive on November 1, 2022.

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Brief, at 7-11. Third, counsel has included a copy of the letter that he sent to

Coudriet,    which    evinces    counsel's     clear   intention   to   withdraw   from

representation and, too, informs Coudriet of his right to either seek new

counsel or proceed pro se.5 See Petition to Withdraw as Legal Counsel,

10/29/22, at 14. As the technical requirements of Anders have been met, we

review the brief’s contents to ascertain the frivolousness of any issues counsel

has raised. Following that analysis, we independently review the record to

establish whether Coudriet’s appeal is without merit in all other capacities.

       In the Anders brief, while acknowledging that Coudriet suffers from

mental health issues, it explicitly states that “undersigned counsel does not

believe that there are any issues that support an appeal.” Anders Brief, at 5

(stating further that Coudriet underwent “three competency examinations …

[which] indicated that [he] was competent to stand trial[]”). The Anders brief

then details the facts underpinning Coudriet’s convictions, the very facts that

Coudriet inherently assented to by entering into both a written and oral guilty

____________________________________________

5  Coudriet has filed at least three pro se responses to counsel’s Anders brief.
However, the contents of these responses are, at times, unintelligible. See,
e.g., Brief of Appellant, 12/10/22, at 1 (“I was born noticeably genetically
advanced. Exturnally [sic] positive electromagnetic most are all inturnal [sic].
This has lead [sic] to medical extortions that have been harmful with sexual
depositions and various forms of idenity [sic] thieft [sic] and misreputations
[sic].”) (unnecessary capitalization omitted). However, later in that same
filing, Coudriet states that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his
convictions because of police misconduct. See id., at 4. Moreover, Coudriet
asserts that his guilty plea was unlawfully induced due to his innocence. See
id.

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plea.

        As Coudriet entered into a guilty plea, the Anders brief addresses the

limited bases from which a plea-taking appellant can appeal. In so doing, the

brief comprehensively compares those discrete precepts with Coudriet’s case

and finds that there is no arguable merit to anything that Coudriet could seek

on appellate review.

        “The entry of a guilty plea constitutes a waiver of all defenses and

defects except claims of lack of jurisdiction, invalid guilty plea, and illegal

sentence.” Commonwealth v. Messmer, 863 A.2d 567, 571 (Pa. Super.

2004); see also Commonwealth v. Roden, 730 A.2d 995, 997 n.2 (Pa.

Super. 1999) (“Upon entry of a guilty plea, a defendant generally waives all

defects and defenses except those concerning the validity of the plea, the

jurisdiction of the trial court, and the legality of the sentence imposed.”).

        Going in the order as discussed in the Anders brief, counsel quotes the

relevant portions of Coudriet’s guilty plea colloquy and concludes that said

plea was “voluntarily and understandingly made.” Anders Brief, at 10-11.

Moreover, counsel emphasizes that there is nothing apparent in the plea

colloquy, or anywhere else in the record, to establish that Coudriet was

unlawfully induced to enter the plea. See id., at 11.

        To the extent that there is any validity to a claim that Coudriet was

somehow induced into taking a plea,

        [a] defendant wishing to challenge the voluntariness of a guilty
        plea on direct appeal must either object during the plea colloquy

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      or file a motion to withdraw the plea within ten days of sentencing.
      Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(1), (B)(1)(a)(i). Failure to employ either
      measure results in waiver. Commonwealth v. Tareila, 895 A.2d
      1266, 1270 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2006). Historically, Pennsylvania
      courts adhere to this waiver principle because “[i]t is for the court
      which accepted the plea to consider and correct, in the first
      instance, any error which may have been committed.”
      Commonwealth v. Roberts, [352 A.2d 140, 141 (Pa. Super.
      1975)] (holding that common and previously condoned mistake of
      attacking guilty plea on direct appeal without first filing petition to
      withdraw plea with trial court is procedural error resulting in
      waiver; stating, “(t)he swift and orderly administration of criminal
      justice requires that lower courts be given the opportunity to
      rectify their errors before they are considered on appeal”; “Strict
      adherence to this procedure could, indeed, preclude an otherwise
      costly, time consuming, and unnecessary appeal to this court”).

Commonwealth v. Lincoln, 72 A.3d 606, 609–10 (Pa. Super. 2013).

      Here, there is no evidence that Coudriet objected to the plea during

either the oral or written colloquy. See, e.g., Plea Hearing, 6/2/21, at 13-15

(demonstrating Coudriet’s acquiescence to the charges he pleaded guilty to

by stating that he was entering the plea of his own free will, that he was not

threatened or coerced in any way, and that he engaged in the illicit activities

leading to his convictions). Furthermore, as the lower court writes, “[Coudriet]

did not file a post-sentence motion.” Trial Court Opinion, 5/25/22, at 2

(signaling the absence of a specific motion to withdraw the plea). Therefore,

Coudriet failed to properly preserve this issue and has waived review of such

a contention on appeal. See Commonwealth v. Tukhi, 149 A.3d 881, 888

(Pa. Super. 2016) (“An issue that is waived is frivolous.”).

      Next, the Anders brief discusses the legality of the sentences that were

imposed, which resulted in an aggregate incarceration term of ten-to-twenty

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years. The brief states that Coudriet’s burglary charge was a first-degree

felony, carrying a statutory maximum sentence of twenty years, and his

aggravated indecent assault conviction, a second-degree felony, featured a

maximum incarceration term of ten years. Individually, the sentences were

imposed as two consecutive terms of five-to-ten years.

      A challenge to the legality of a sentence:

      is essentially a claim that the trial court did not have jurisdiction
      to impose the sentence that it handed down.... A trial court
      ordinarily has jurisdiction to impose any sentence which is within
      the range of punishments which the legislature has authorized for
      the defendant's crimes.

Commonwealth v. Tucker, 143 A.3d 955, 960 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citations

omitted).

      18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1103(1) provides that, except as it relates to second or

subsequent offenses, first-degree felonies carry a maximum term of

incarceration of “not more than 20 years.” In addition, second-degree felonies

carry a maximum term of “not more than ten years.” Id., at § 1103(2).

Consequently, the constituent parts of Coudriet’s aggregate sentence do not

exceed the maximum incarceration terms allowable by statute. There is also

nothing evident of record to suggest any other legality of sentence issues. As

such, any appeal challenging the legality of his aggregate sentence would be

frivolous.

      As to jurisdiction, the Anders brief notes that the subject incident, filing

of the criminal complaint, guilty plea/conviction, and sentencing all occurred

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in Crawford County, Pennsylvania. “As such, … Crawford County, Pennsylvania

had proper jurisdiction over [Coudriet’s] case.” Anders Brief, at 12.

      “[S]ubject matter jurisdiction exists when the court is competent to hear

the case and the defendant has been provided with a formal and specific notice

of the crimes charged. [A] court's competency hinges upon a demonstration

that a criminal act occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.”

Commonwealth v. Jones, 929 A.2d 205, 208 (Pa. 2007). There is no

evidence that Coudriet did not receive a formal and specific notice of the

charges that were filed against him via criminal complaint. Coudriet appears

to have been present at all critical stages leading up until the point in which

he entered into the guilty plea, so any claim on jurisdictional grounds is

patently frivolous. In addition, the very language of Coudriet’s plea establishes

that the crimes he committed occurred within Crawford County.

      Finally, to the extent Coudriet could attempt to raise an ineffective

assistance of counsel argument, the Anders brief succinctly states that

Coudriet “chose voluntarily to represent himself in this case.” Anders Brief,

at 12. To that point, it is obvious that one cannot raise an ineffective

assistance of counsel argument against oneself, which makes any claim in this

domain meritless.

      Independent of the later-filed Anders brief, the trial court, in its opinion,

addressed the issues raised in Coudriet’s pro se statement of matters

complained of on appeal. In that statement, Coudriet presented three

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arguments for appellate review, with the first seemingly suggesting that the

evidence was insufficient to convict him.6

       Unfortunately, Coudriet waived his ability to seek review of such a

contention by assenting to the guilty plea. See Commonwealth v.

Rounsley, 717 A.2d 537, 539 (Pa. Super. 1998) (“It is well established that

any issue relating to sufficiency of the evidence is waived by entry of a guilty

plea[.]”). Accordingly, there is no merit to any of the issues he attempted to

raise in a pro se capacity.

       Pursuant to Anders, we have independently reviewed the record to

uncover other non-frivolous issues. However, this review has provided nothing

legally viable for Coudriet to have pursued on appeal.

       As we have found no non-frivolous issues and further see no merit to

anything explored in the Anders brief, we grant counsel's petition to withdraw

and affirm Coudriet’s judgment of sentence.

       Petition to withdraw from representation granted. Judgment of sentence

affirmed.

____________________________________________

6 Despite giving wide latitude to his writings, we agree with the lower court’s
conclusion that the other two matters are not able to be understood. See,
e.g., Statement of Matters … Complain[ed] of on Appeal, at 2 (“(3) Aiding
prisoner’s dangerous to society in extortive release by harm. Never came to
be now, advanced genetically to all things. Genetic weponization [sic] as law
is inefficient for the criminal capacity. Errored this way. People as we were
home invaded.”) (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 4/12/2023

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