Court Opinion

ID: 9926477
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-24 20:03:24.228351+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:58.512669
License: Public Domain

FOURTH DIVISION
                                 DILLARD, P. J.,
                             RICKMAN and PIPKIN, JJ.

                     NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
                     physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
                     days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
                                https://www.gaappeals.us/rules

                                                                     January 24, 2024

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
 A23A1307. BUENRROSTRO v. THE STATE.

       PIPKIN, Judge.

       Following a jury trial, Luis Buenrrostro was convicted of two counts of

aggravated child molestation and was sentenced to 25 years to serve in prison followed

by life on probation. Buenrrostro appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for new

trial, raising three claims of trial court error, numerous claims of ineffective assistance

of trial counsel, and a claim of cumulative error. For the reasons discussed below, we

affirm.

       1. Factual Background and Procedural History
      In November 2021, Buenrrostro was re-indicted1 by a Fulton County grand jury

on six counts of aggravated child molestation against C.R. Counts 1 through 3 of the

indictment were identical to each other and charged Buenrrostro with criminal sexual

acts committed on July 1, 2020. Specifically, Buenrrostro was charged with

“unlawfully commit[ting] an immoral and indecent act to [C.R.], a child under the age

of sixteen (16) years, by placing his mouth on her vagina, with the intent to arouse and

satisfy [the] accused’s sexual desires; said act involving an act of sodomy.” Counts 4

through 6 of the indictment were, again, identical to each other, and charged

Buenrrostro with committing criminal sexual acts on June 1, 2020. These counts

alleged that Buenrrostro “unlawfully commit[ted] an immoral and indecent act to

[C.R.], a child under the age of sixteen (16) years, by placing his penis in her anus,

with the intent to arouse and satisfy [the] accused’s sexual desires; said act involving

an act of sodomy.”

      1
        As explained in the order denying Buenrrostro’s motion for new trial,
Buenrrostro was originally charged with committing two counts of child molestation
and one count of aggravated child molestation “sometime between June 1 and July 1,
2020.” This indictment, however, was dismissed based upon the trial court’s grant
of Buenrrostro’s special demurrer to the indictment.
                                           2
      The evidence presented at trial showed that Buenrrostro and C.R. were cousins

who lived across the street from each other. At all relevant times, Buenrrostro was 17

years old; C.R. was 12 years old at the start of the summer of 2020 and turned 13 on

July 17, 2020. In August 2020, Buenrrostro sent C.R.’s older sister some text

messages asking if he could send her pictures of his penis because he wanted to have

sex with J.M., his 14-year-old girlfriend, and he wanted to “make sure that it wasn’t

small.” Then, at Thanksgiving 2020, one of C.R.’s sisters found lewd Snapchat

messages between Buenrrostro and C.R., wherein Buenrrostro described sexual acts

he would like to try with C.R. and made numerous requests for her to come to his

house. C.R.’s sister and mother confronted her about the messages, and C.R.

disclosed that she and Buenrrostro had engaged in anal sex.

      C.R. testified at trial and described the acts of anal and oral sodomy Buenrrostro

committed against her. She testified that the abuse started when she was 12 years old

and continued after her 13th birthday; however, she could not remember the exact

dates that the molestation occurred.

      Buenrrostro took the stand in his own defense, denied the allegations, and

provided a partial alibi defense. Specifically, he testified that, during the summer of

                                           3
2020, he worked with his father Monday through Saturday. He would wake up at 5

a.m., leave with his father around 6 a.m., work anywhere from 9 to 12 hours for his

father’s construction company, and go home; regarding the specific dates in the

indictment, Buenrrostro testified that he was at work “until night time.” He also

testified that a friend of his created a Snapchat account for him in the summer of 2019

and that they both had access to that account; he denied sending any of the Snapchat

messages to C.R.2

      The jury acquitted Buenrrostro of Count 3 but found him guilty of all remaining

counts. The trial court sentenced Buenrrostro to concurrent sentences of 25 years to

serve followed by life on probation on Counts 1 and 4; the remaining counts were

merged for sentencing purposes.

      2. Trial Court Errors

      On appeal, Buenrrostro alleges that the trial court erred by: (a) denying his

amended special demurrer, (b) admitting extrinsic act evidence concerning J.M., and

(3) charging the jury that the indicted offenses could be proven at any time within the

      2
       The record reflects that the messages sent from Buenrrostro’s Snapchat
account to his cousins utilized nicknames that he called the girls.
                                          4
statute of limitations even though Buenrrostro had provided an alibi at trial. We

address each claim in turn.

       (a) Buenrrostro contends that the trial court erred by denying his pre-trial

amended special demurrer because the counts in his indictment were not sufficiently

particular to “distinguish identical counts from one another.” “A defendant who has

timely filed a special demurrer is entitled to an indictment perfect in form and

substance. In a post-conviction appeal of a trial court’s pretrial ruling denying a special

demurrer, however, we apply a harmless error standard of review.” (Citations and

punctuation omitted) Huber v. State, 368 Ga. App. 401, 408 (3) (890 SE2d 271)

(2023). Indeed, a defendant “must show that he was prejudiced by being tried on a

defective accusation; without harm, an erroneous overruling of a special demurrer is

not a basis for reversal.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Andemical v. State, 336

Ga. App. 661, 665 (2) (786 SE2d 238) (2016).3

       Here, even assuming that the trial court erred in denying the special demurrer

because Counts 1 through 3 were identical to one another as were Counts 4 through

6, Buenrrostro does not argue, nor is there anything in the record to indicate that he

       3
        Instead, Buenrrostro argues, incorrectly, that no showing of prejudice is
required for this claim.
                                             5
was prejudiced by any alleged deficiencies in the indictment. As discussed above,

Buenrrostro testified in his own defense that he could not have committed the crimes

because he worked long hours during the entire summer of 2020, including the two

specific days listed in the indictment. Moreover, Buenrrostro was only sentenced on

two of the six charged counts and those counts specifically alleged different acts of

sodomy. Consequently, this enumeration fails. See O’Rourke v. State, 327 Ga. App.

628, 633 (2) (760 SE2d 636) (2014) (affirming the overruling of a special demurrer to

an indictment that alleged a range of dates that offense could have occurred where

defendant failed to show that he was surprised or otherwise prejudiced by alleged

deficiency in indictment).

      (b) Next, Buenrrostro contends that the trial court erred by admitting messages

of a sexually explicit nature between Buenrrostro and J.M. Specifically, Buenrrostro

alleges that the messages were inadmissible under OCGA §§ 24-4-404 (b), 24-4-413,

and 24-4-414 of the evidence code. However, nothing in the record or the briefs of the

parties reflect that the complained of messages were actually admitted as evidence at

trial. Accordingly, this claim is without merit.

                                           6
      (c) In his last claim of trial court error, Buenrrostro contends that the trial court

plainly erred when it instructed the jury that the offenses charged could be proven on

any date within the statute of limitations when Buenrrostro had presented an alibi

defense. It is well settled that, to show plain error, an appellant

      must show an error: (1) that has not been “affirmatively waived”; (2)
      that is “clear or obvious”; and (3) that affected his “substantial rights.”
      In other words, if an alleged error regarding a jury instruction has not
      been affirmatively waived, then the proper inquiry is whether the
      instruction was erroneous, whether it was obviously so, and whether it
      likely affected the outcome of the proceedings.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Jefferson v. State, 360 Ga. App. 75, 76 (1) (860

SE2d 614) (2021). Applying this standard, we see no error let alone plain error.

      Buenrrostro relies on the following language from our Supreme Court’s

decision in Reed v. State, 294 Ga. 877 (757 SE2d 84) (2014), to argue that the trial

court clearly erred: “except where the exact date of the offense is alleged to be an

essential element thereof or where the accused raises an alibi defense, any variance

between the date listed in the indictment and the date on which the crime is proven

to have occurred is of no consequence.” Id. at 879 (3). Buenrrostro argues that this

language constituted a settled legal rule supporting a jury charge “that [his] alibi

defense required the State to prove the counts on the dates alleged in the indictment”

                                            7
rather than the instruction given by the trial court “that the offenses could be proven

on any date within the statute of limitations.” We disagree.

      As an initial matter, appellate counsel conceded at oral argument that the dates

charged in the indictment were not material, and also agreed that this is a novel issue

of law. These concessions defeat Buenrrostro’s argument that the trial court

committed clear and obvious error.4 See Williams v. State, 315 Ga. 490, 496 (2) (883

SE2d 733) (2023) (“An error is plain if it is clear or obvious under current law. An

error cannot be plain where there is no controlling authority on point and where the

most closely analogous precedent leads to conflicting results.” (citation omitted)).

      Even if counsel had not conceded these points, however, we disagree that the

language relied upon in Reed shows that the trial court erred in its instruction to the

jury. The Reed decision emphasizes that “even though it has been held that a definite

date of an offense should be alleged in an indictment, the State is not restricted to

proof of the date stated. It is sufficient if the evidence demonstrates that the offense

was committed at any time within the statute of limitation[].” Id. at 879 (3). Instead,

when it comes to the interplay of the statute of limitation and a defendant’s alibi

      4
        The jury was not charged on the defense of alibi, and Buenrrostro does not
claim that this amounted to plain error.
                                           8
defense, well settled Georgia precedent states that “[a]libi evidence does not make the

date alleged in the indictment material unless proof of a different date effectively barred

an alibi defense.” (Emphasis supplied.) Lovelace v. State, 241 Ga. App. 774, 775 (1) (527

SE2d 878) (2000). Here, Buenrrostro was not “effectively barred” from presenting

an alibi defense because his testimony provided, at best, a partial alibi. Therefore, any

deviation by the State from the specific dates charged in the indictment did not

prejudice Buenrrostro’s alibi defense. See Pickstock v. State, 235 Ga. App. 451, 451

(509 SE2d 717) (1998). To the extent that Buenrrostro claims that he “was surprised

by any alleged variance between the allegata and the probata, it was incumbent upon

him to seek a continuance or some other relief in the trial court.” Shindorf v. State, 303

Ga. App. 553, 556 (2) (694 SE2d 177) (2010).

       Accordingly, there is no error, let alone plain error, with the trial court’s

instruction of the jury that the State only needed to prove that the offenses occurred

within the statute of limitation.

       3. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

       Buenrrostro alleges that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel by

counsel’s failure to: (a) strike venire person 40 from the jury panel, (b) request a jury

                                              9
charge on alibi, (c) object to the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on

misdemeanor aggravated child molestation, and (d) subpoena C.R.’s records from the

Department of Family and Children Services (“DFCS”) for in camera inspection by

the trial court. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show

that his counsel’s performance was professionally deficient and that, but for such

deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the trial

would have been different. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (III) (104 SCt

2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). If the defendant fails to satisfy either prong of the

Strickland test, this Court is not required to examine the other. See Green v. State, 291

Ga. 579, 580 (2) (731 SE2d 359) (2012).

      “A court considering a claim of ineffective assistance must apply a ‘strong

presumption’ that counsel’s representation was within the ‘wide range’ of reasonable

professional assistance.” (Citation omitted.) Harrington v. Richter, 562 U. S. 86, 104

(IV) (131 SCt 770, 178 LE2d 624) (2011). Indeed, “[t]rial tactics and strategy . . . are

almost never adequate grounds for finding trial counsel ineffective unless they are so

patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have chosen them.”

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) McNair v. State, 296 Ga. 181, 184 (2) (b) (766

                                           10
SE2d 45) (2014). “In reviewing the trial court’s decision, we accept the trial court’s

factual findings and credibility determinations unless clearly erroneous, but we

independently apply the legal principles to the facts.” (Citation and punctuation

omitted.) Wright v. State, 291 Ga. 869, 870 (2) (734 SE2d 876) (2012). With these

principles in mind, we review Buenrrostro’s claims of ineffective assistance.

      (a) Buenrrostro contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to either

move to strike Juror 40 from the venire for cause or to remove Juror 40 by use of a

peremptory strike. The record shows that, during the statutory qualifying questions,

Juror 40 indicated that he had potential bias and that his mind was not perfectly

impartial between the State and the defense. However, upon further questioning by

the prosecutor, Juror 40 stated, “Now[] that I thought about it I think I could be

impartial,” and when asked if “after hearing everything you’ve heard thus far[,] have

you decided the guilt[] or innocence of this defendant,” Juror 40 replied, “No.” Later

in voir dire, Juror 40 explained that he had a prior bad experience with law

enforcement wherein he was wrongfully accused of being in possession of drugs. Juror

40 explained that, because of that bad experience, he felt “inferior” and he “tend[s]

                                          11
to identify” and is “going to side with” the person who was arrested.5 He also

disclosed that his mother had been molested by a family member when she was young.

The prosecutor asked Juror 40 if his mother’s experience would prevent him from

being a fair and impartial juror in the instant case, to which Juror 40 replied “It could

be. I try to be fair and impartial but it could be.” When asked if he was willing to wait

for the evidence in the case “before you decide whether or not it could be,” Juror 40

replied, “yes.”

      (i) Removal for Cause

      Buenrrostro contends that Juror 40 made “statements wavering on

impartiality” and expressed bias against the defense in the case, was never

rehabilitated, and that trial counsel’s failure to request that Juror 40 be removed for

cause amounted to ineffective assistance. Pursuant to OCGA § 15-12-164 (d),

      [t]he court shall also excuse for cause any juror who from the totality of
      the juror’s answers on voir dire is determined by the court to be
      substantially impaired in the juror’s ability to be fair and impartial. The
      juror’s own representation that the juror would be fair and impartial is
      to be considered by the court but is not determinative.

      5
       Notably, Juror 40 referred to the person who was arrested and accused as “the
victim.”
                                           12
“A juror can be disqualified for cause only if it can be shown that an opinion held by

the potential juror is fixed and definite such that the potential juror would be unable

to set aside the opinion and decide the case on the evidence or the court’s charge upon

the evidence.” (Citation omitted.) Barmore v. State, 323 Ga. App. 377, 379-380 (1)

(746 SE2d 289) (2013). “A prospective juror’s doubt as to his or her own impartiality

does not demand as a matter of law that he or she be excused for cause. . . . Nor is

excusal required when a potential juror expresses reservations about his or her ability

to put aside personal experiences.” (Citations omitted.) Holmes v. State, 269 Ga. 124,

126 (2) (498 SE2d 732) (1998). And, “[i]n the context of an ineffective assistance of

counsel claim, the question is whether considered from the perspective of voir dire

and not from hindsight, counsel’s failure to move to strike the juror for cause was

objectively unreasonable.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Barmore, 323 Ga. App.

at 380 (1).

       Here, though Juror 40 expressed some doubts and reservations about his ability

to remain impartial and put aside his personal experience with his mother’s prior

trauma, he did not state that he had already formed an opinion about the case. Instead,

he expressly affirmed that he had not formed an opinion about Buenrrostro’s guilt or

                                          13
innocence. Accordingly, Buenrrostro has failed to show that Juror 40 had an opinion

so fixed or definite that he was unable to decide the case based upon the evidence and

should have been stricken for cause. See Byrd v. State, 277 Ga. 554, 556 (2) (592 SE2d

421) (2004). And because Buenrrostro has failed to show that a motion to strike for

cause would have been successful, then he cannot show that trial counsel was deficient

for failing to move to strike Juror 40 for cause. See Barmore, 323 Ga. App. at 381 (1).

      (ii) Use of Peremptory Strike

      Buenrrostro also contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to use a

peremptory strike to remove Juror 40 from the panel. It is well settled that,

      [t]rial counsel’s decisions about which jurors to strike and which to keep
      are tactical. And counsel’s decisions on matters of tactic and strategy,
      even if unwise, do not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel.
      Indeed, tactical decisions by counsel will not form the basis for an
      ineffective assistance claim unless the decisions are so patently
      unreasonable that no competent attorney would have chosen them.

(Citation omitted.) Ware v. State, 321 Ga. App. 640, 642 (3) (742 SE2d 156) (2013).

Applying these standards, we cannot say that Buenrrostro has overcome the strong

presumption that his counsel’s decisions during jury selection were reasonable. The

record shows that counsel had used all nine peremptory strikes prior to reaching Juror

40, and Buenrrostro has not put forth any evidence or argument that counsel’s use of

                                          14
his other peremptory strikes was unreasonable. Even assuming that counsel had a

remaining peremptory strike to use on Juror 40, we cannot say that not utilizing that

strike would have been so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would

have chosen to keep Juror 40 on the panel. Juror 40 testified that he had a prior bad

experience with law enforcement and that, based upon this experience, he identified

with persons who had been wrongfully arrested and accused. Given that trial counsel

argued to the jury that law enforcement did not do a thorough criminal investigation

and that Buenrrostro had been falsely accused of committing these crimes, we cannot

say that trial counsel’s jury selection was “so patently unreasonable that no competent

attorney would have followed such a course.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.)

Hicks v. State, 295 Ga. 268, 276 (3) (b) (759 SE2d 509) (2014).

      (b) Buenrrostro also argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

request a charge on alibi, his sole defense at trial. Assuming without deciding that trial

counsel was deficient for failing to request this charge, Buenrrostro cannot prove

prejudice. “The defense of alibi involves the impossibility of the accused’s presence

at the scene of the offense at the time of its commission. The range of the evidence in

respect to time and place must be such as reasonably to exclude the possibility of

                                           15
presence.” OCGA § 16-3-40. Further, “[w]here the defense of alibi and the question

of personal identity are virtually the same defense, the omission of the court to

instruct separately on alibi is not error.” Herring v. State, 238 Ga. 288, 289 (3) (232

SE2d 826) (1977). See also Hill v. State, 290 Ga. App. 140, 142 (2) (658 SE2d 863)

(2008) (explaining that “alibi is not an affirmative defense; since the true effect of an

alibi defense is to traverse the State’s proof that the defendant committed the crime,

the charge that the burden is on the state to prove that the defendant committed the

crime beyond a reasonable doubt itself necessarily covers the question of whether the

evidence of alibi was sufficient to create a reasonable doubt” (citation omitted.)).

      Here, the trial court fully instructed the jury on identity, the burden of proof,

the presumption of innocence, and grave suspicion. Moreover, Buenrrostro’s alibi

testimony did not establish the impossibility of his presence at the scene of the

charged crimes. The evidence at trial showed that Buenrrostro and C.R. lived across

the street from one another at the time of the alleged crimes; Buenrrostro also testified

that, throughout the summer of 2020, he worked up to 12 hour days Monday through

Saturday, but not Sunday. While Buenrrostro testified that he started work early on

the days in question and continued working “until nighttime,” he did not fully

                                           16
account for his whereabouts that day. Based on the foregoing, we cannot say that

Buenrrostro has shown a reasonable probability of a different outcome had the alibi

instruction been given. See Hollis v. State, 359 Ga. App. 249, 254 (6) (b) (857 SE2d

254) (2021).

      (c) During the charge conference, trial counsel requested that the court charge

the jury on the lesser-included misdemeanor offense of aggravated child molestation,

arguing that there was slight evidence to support the charge that C.R. was 13 years old

at the time the abuse occurred and Buenrrostro was 17 years old. See OCGA § 16-6-4

(d) (2). The trial court denied the request to charge, finding no slight evidence to

support it, and trial counsel did not object. Buenrrostro alleges that trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to object to the trial court’s ruling. We disagree.

      OCGA § 16-6-4 (d) (2) provides that a person is guilty of the misdemeanor

aggravated child molestation where, in relevant part, “[t]he victim is at least 13 but

less than 16 years of age;” and “[t]he person convicted of aggravated child

molestation is 18 years of age or younger and is no more than four years older than the

victim.” (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at (A), (B). The evidence presented below showed

that C.R.’s date of birth is July 17, 2007, and that she was 12 years old during parts of

                                            17
the summer of 2020, while the jury learned that Buenrrostro was 17 throughout the

summer of 2020. Accordingly, C.R. was not “at least 13” when the abuse began. And

as to the portion of time when C.R. was 13, the record shows that Buenrrostro was 17

years old at all relevant times, whereas C.R. was 12 when the abuse started and 13

when the abuse ended. Therefore, Buenrrostro is more than four years older than

C.R., and the trial court correctly determined that there was no slight evidence to

support the requested misdemeanor charge. Based on the foregoing, Buenrrostro has

failed to show that trial counsel could have properly objected to the trial court’s

ruling, and, thus, failed to establish that trial counsel acted deficiently. See Wesley v.

State, 286 Ga. 355, 356 (3) (a) (689 SE2d 280) (2010) (trial counsel cannot be deficient

by failing to make a meritless objection).6

      (d) Buenrrostro alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain

C.R.’s DFCS records because, he argues, the records provided slight evidence to

      6
        Buenrrostro also alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request
a special verdict form for the jury to make factual findings concerning C.R.’s age at the
time of the abuse. However, because Buenrrostro was not entitled to the misdemeanor
jury instruction, he cannot show that trial counsel was deficient for failing to request
a special verdict form on the issue of the victim’s age.
                                           18
support the requested instruction for misdemeanor aggravated child molestation. For

the reasons discussed in Division 3 (c) above, however, this claim fails.7

      4. Finally, Buenrrostro contends that the cumulative effect of the alleged errors

of counsel and the court prejudiced the outcome of his trial. “Under State v. Lane, 308

Ga. 10 (838 SE2d 808) (2020), we must consider collectively the prejudicial effect, if

any, of trial court errors, along with the prejudice caused by any deficient performance

of counsel.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Talley v. State, 314 Ga. 153, 165-166

(4) (875 SE2d 789) (2022). “To establish cumulative error, [Buenrrostro] must show

that (1) at least two errors were committed in the course of the trial; and (2)

considered together along with the entire record, the multiple errors so infected the

jury’s deliberation that they denied [Buenrrostro] a fundamentally fair trial.” Jackson

v. State, 317 Ga. 95, 107 (4) (891 SE2d 866) (2023). Here, we assumed one trial court

error and two instances of deficient performance. That said, given our conclusions

      7
        Buenrrostro also claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain
the DFCS records because, he contends, they included prior inconsistent statements
made by C.R. concerning the allegations of molestation. However, the DFCS records
specifically noted that all information included in the report was “secondhand
information,” and a review of the records shows that they did not include any
statements made by C.R. Given the lack of evidentiary value of these records,
Buenrrostro cannot show prejudice.
                                           19
above and reviewing the record as a whole, we conclude that Buenrrostro has failed

to establish that the combined prejudicial effect of these errors requires a new trial.

      Judgment affirmed. McFadden, P. J., and Dillard, P. J., concur.

                                          20