Court Opinion

ID: 9943051
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-22 18:01:49.07742+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:00.172957
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-10528    Document: 45-1     Date Filed: 02/22/2024   Page: 1 of 9

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-10528
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       JARVIS LOCKETT,
       a.k.a. J-Rock,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Georgia
                 D.C. Docket No. 5:21-cr-00003-TES-CHW-1
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       2                          Opinion of the Court                         22-10528

                                ____________________

       Before JORDAN, GRANT, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               Jarvis Lockett pleaded guilty after being caught dealing
       cocaine and participating in a dog fighting ring. His sentence was
       enhanced because a firearm was found at the home where he dealt
       the drugs, and the district court varied upward based on its
       conclusion that the applicable Guidelines range did not adequately
       reflect the seriousness of Lockett’s misconduct. Because the
       district court did not err in either of those determinations, we
       affirm Lockett’s sentence.
                                               I.
              Lockett was indicted along with ten co-defendants for his
       participation in a criminal organization based out of Roberta,
       Georgia that was involved in both cocaine distribution and dog
       fighting. He pleaded guilty to one count of distribution of cocaine
       and one count of conspiracy to participate in an animal fighting
       venture. In exchange, the remaining counts against him were
       dismissed. The plea agreement also included a stipulation of facts
       that Lockett agreed the government could prove beyond a
       reasonable doubt. 1

       1 Our statement of the facts derives primarily from this stipulation, as well as

       the parts of the presentence investigation report to which Lockett did not
       object. See United States v. Wade, 458 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir. 2006) (“It is the
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       22-10528                   Opinion of the Court                                  3

              The evidence showed that Lockett purchased some
       $250,000 worth of cocaine and cocaine base (also known as crack
       cocaine) from his co-conspirators for the purpose of distribution.
       Operating out of his mother’s house, Lockett sold both forms of
       the drug to a confidential informant. Lockett’s cell phone records
       revealed that he texted several of his co-conspirators that his
       customers were upset by the low quality of the cocaine that he was
       selling them. He also said, referring to the possibility of being
       arrested on drug charges: “Man feds can kiss my a**, I kill the feds
       before them b****es lock me up for something talking about
       talking to a b****. Hell yea they gotta die boy, imma kill me some
       b****es.” When law enforcement executed a search warrant at
       Lockett’s mother’s house, they found over $2,500 in cash and
       plastic bags containing cocaine and cocaine base in a bedroom.
       They found several more bags of narcotics outside the residence.
       Agents also found two guns belonging to Lockett’s stepfather and
       one unclaimed handgun in another bedroom. In total, Lockett is
       accountable for over 900 grams of cocaine and cocaine base.
               Lockett also played a leadership role in the gang’s
       dogfighting operations. He organized and attended several dog
       fights, brought his own dogs to fight, acted as a referee for at least
       two dog fights, and discussed killing several dogs. This dog fighting
       ring involved over 150 animals. When law enforcement searched
       Lockett’s mother’s house, they found fourteen dogs that had

       law of this circuit that a failure to object to allegations of fact in a PSI admits
       those facts for sentencing purposes.”).
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                 22-10528

       scarring consistent with dog fighting, as well as break sticks, photos
       of dogs fighting, blood-stained carpet and walls, and a dog fighting
       pit. When law enforcement searched Lockett’s home, they found
       a pit bull with extreme injuries that had been crudely stapled shut
       rather than stitched. The dog died two days later. Agents also
       found still more evidence of dog fighting, such as medicine, a scale,
       veterinary paperwork, breeding certificates, and several bags of
       cash.
               The Probation Office prepared a Presentence Investigation
       Report (PSI) to aid the district court in sentencing. For the drug
       distribution offense, the PSI calculated a base offense level of 24
       under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 2D1.1(a)(5) (Nov. 2021). It
       increased this base offense by two levels pursuant to U.S.S.G.
       § 2D1.1(b)(1), which provides for a two-level increase if a firearm
       was possessed. This left an adjusted offense level of 26. For the
       dog fighting, the base offense level is 16 under U.S.S.G.
       § 2E3.1(a)(1). Because Lockett was an organizer or leader of this
       exceptionally large animal-fighting ring, the PSI applied a four-level
       increase pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). So his adjusted offense
       level for conspiracy to participate in an animal fighting venture was
       20.
              Next, the PSI applied the grouping rules for multiple
       offenses and calculated a combined adjusted offense level of 27.
       U.S.S.G. §§ 3D1.1(a), 3D1.4. The PSI then reduced that by two
       levels because Lockett had accepted responsibility, and by one
       more level because of Lockett’s guilty plea. U.S.S.G. §§ 3E1.1(a),
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       22-10528               Opinion of the Court                         5

       (b). His total final offense level was thus 24. This, combined with
       a criminal history category of III, resulted in a Guideline
       imprisonment range of 63 to 78 months. The statutory maximum
       for the drug charge is 240 months, and the maximum for the dog
       fighting is 60 months. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C); 18 U.S.C. § 49.
       Lockett objected to the application of the two-level enhancement
       for possessing a firearm in connection with the offense.
              At sentencing, the district court overruled Lockett’s
       objection, finding that it was not “clearly improbable” that the
       unclaimed gun found at Lockett’s mother’s house was connected
       to the drug distribution Lockett was conducting there. The court
       then used its discretion to vary upward from the Guideline range
       of 63 to 78 months and instead sentenced Lockett to 120 months
       on count two and 60 months on count nine, to be served
       concurrently. The district court explained its reasons: (1) that
       Lockett was the “mastermind” of the dog fighting, which was
       “heinous” and “awful”; (2) that he was “very involved in the
       distribution of drugs,” and that this was bad for the community; (3)
       that Lockett used his mother’s house for the drug distribution; (4)
       that Lockett said he was going to kill the federal agents before being
       caught; (5) the “extent of the $250,000 of drugs”; and (6) the
       sentences given to co-defendants and ensuring that “there is no
       disparity” between them.
             Lockett appealed, arguing first that the application of the
       two-level enhancement was in error, and second that his above-
       Guidelines sentence is substantively unreasonable.
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                  22-10528

                                         II.
              “We review the district court’s findings of fact under
       U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) for clear error, and the application of the
       Sentencing Guidelines to those facts de novo.” United States v. Gallo,
       195 F.3d 1278, 1280 (11th Cir. 1999). “We review the substantive
       reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of discretion.” United States
       v. Hayes, 762 F.3d 1300, 1307 (11th Cir. 2014). In conducting this
       review, “we will reverse a sentence as substantively unreasonable
       only if we are left with the definite and firm conviction that the
       District Court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the
       factors by arriving at a sentence outside the range of reasonable
       sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” United States v. Alberts,
       859 F.3d 979, 985 (11th Cir. 2017) (quotations omitted).
                                        III.
                                         A.
               The district court did not procedurally err when it imposed
       an enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1), which provides for
       a two-level increase in a defendant’s base offense level if he
       possessed a dangerous weapon. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1). This
       enhancement “reflects the increased danger of violence when drug
       traffickers possess weapons.” Id. § 2D1.1 cmt. n.11(A). The
       commentary to the Guidelines explains that the enhancement
       should be applied “if the weapon was present, unless it is clearly
       improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense.” Id.
             Our cases have held that the enhancement should apply so
       long as the government can “establish by a preponderance of the
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       22-10528               Opinion of the Court                         7

       evidence that the firearm was present at the site of the charged
       conduct.” United States v. Carrasquillo, 4 F.4th 1265, 1272 (11th Cir.
       2021) (quotation omitted). In short, the mere presence of a firearm
       at the location of the alleged crime is all that is required for the
       government to meet its initial burden. Id. After that, the burden
       shifts to the defendant to show that “a connection between the
       weapon and the offense was clearly improbable.” Id. (quotation
       omitted).
               The government met that initial burden, and Lockett failed
       to rebut it. The district court concluded that it was more likely
       than not that two of the three guns at Lockett’s mother’s house
       belonged to Lockett’s stepfather, but that the third gun was
       unclaimed. So there was at least one unclaimed firearm present at
       the home where it is undisputed that Lockett repeatedly sold drugs.
       On the basis of those facts, we agree with the district court that it
       is not clearly improbable that this gun was possessed in connection
       with the drug offense.
                                        B.
              Lockett’s sentence of 120 months imprisonment is not
       substantively unreasonable.       Lockett bears the burden of
       demonstrating that this sentence is unreasonable “in light of the
       record and the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Gonzales, 550 F.3d
       1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008). Section 3553(a) sets out factors that a
       sentencing court must consider, including (but not limited to): “the
       nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
       characteristics of the defendant”; the need for the sentence “to
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       8                      Opinion of the Court                 22-10528

       reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the
       law, and to provide just punishment for the offense”; the need for
       the sentence to afford adequate deterrence and to protect the
       public from further crimes; the kinds of sentences available and the
       sentencing range; and “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence
       disparities among defendants” charged with similar conduct. 18
       U.S.C. § 3553(a). A sentence that is “well below the statutory
       maximum” is an indicator that the sentence is reasonable. United
       States v. Taylor, 997 F.3d 1348, 1355 (11th Cir. 2021).
              Lockett argues that the district court abused its discretion
       because it gave significant weight to an improper factor.
       Specifically, he contends that the district court based the upward
       variance primarily on the dog fighting charges, which carry a
       statutory maximum of 60 months. But a closer look at the record
       reveals that this premise is faulty.
               The district court explained that “this is one of those times”
       where the Guideline range “substantially understates the
       seriousness of the offense.” True, “one of the things” that the
       district court considered was Lockett’s “mastermind” role in the
       dog fighting, which the court described as “heinous” and “awful.”
       But the court also took into account many other factors relating to
       the drug charges. The court considered (1) that Lockett was “very
       involved in the distribution of drugs,” which is harmful to the
       community; (2) that Lockett used his mother’s house to distribute
       drugs; (3) that Lockett said he would “kill the feds” before he would
       go to prison; (4) the magnitude of the drugs Lockett distributed;
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       22-10528               Opinion of the Court                        9

       and (5) the need to ensure that Lockett’s sentence was consistent
       with the sentences imposed on his co-defendants. Taking all of
       those factors together, the court used its discretion to vary upward
       and sentence Lockett to 120 months imprisonment, which is still
       well below the statutory maximum for the drug charge.
               On this record, Lockett’s contention that the court “said
       little about the drug charges in imposing the sentence,” is simply
       implausible. Five of the six reasons given for the upward variance
       were unrelated to the dog fighting charge. We are not convinced
       that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in
       imposing this sentence, nor that the sentence is outside the range
       of reasonableness dictated by the facts of the case. See Alberts, 859
       F.3d at 985.
                                  *     *      *
             For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court
       is AFFIRMED.