Court Opinion

ID: 9941289
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-16 15:14:06.540927+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:30.366248
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: FEBRUARY 9, 2024; 10:00 A.M.
                   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

            Commonwealth of Kentucky
                   Court of Appeals

                     NO. 2023-CA-0146-MR

RYAN FEIDER, CHRISTINA HOSTETLER,
JASON HOSTETLER, DOUGLAS KEEN,
JOANNE KEEN, DAVID THOMAS MITCHELL,
SARAH MITCHELL, LAUREN TINKER,
RICHARD J. TINKER, AND ROBERT M. TYRRELL,
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS THE TRUSTEE OF
THE ROBERT M. TYRRELL REVOCABLE
LIVING TRUST                                     APPELLANTS

          APPEAL FROM EDMONSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.       HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER T. COHRON, JUDGE
                  ACTION NO. 21-CI-00069

PEGGY STURDIVANT, BARBARA ALLEN,
DOUGLAS ALLEN, DECEASED, DANNY
HOLLIDAY, TAMMY HOLLIDAY, HONACRES, L.L.C.,
BARRY JOHNSON, CATHY JOHNSON, AND WILLIS
STURDIVANT                                           APPELLEES

AND

                     NO. 2023-CA-0153-MR
HONACRES, LLC                                                     APPELLANTS

              APPEAL FROM EDMONSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.           HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER T. COHRON, JUDGE
                      ACTION NO. 21-CI-00069

PEGGY STURDIVANT, BARBARA ALLEN,
DOUGLAS ALLEN, DECEASED, RYAN FEIDER,
DANNY HOLLIDAY, TAMMY HOLLIDAY,
CHRISTINA HOSTETLER, JASON HOSTETLER,
BARRY JOHNSON, CATHY JOHNSON, DOUGLAS
KEEN, JOANNE KEEN, DAVID THOMAS MITCHELL,
SARAH MITCHELL, WILLIS STURDIVANT, LAUREN
TINKER, RICHARD J. TINKER, AND ROBERT M. TYRRELL,
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS THE TRUSTEE OF THE
ROBERT M. TYRRELL REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST
                                                                    APPELLEES

                                   OPINION
                                  AFFIRMING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; ECKERLE AND KAREM, JUDGES.

ECKERLE, JUDGE: The main issue in this case is: do short-term rentals

(“STRs”) of single-family houses in a small, gated, lake-house subdivision violate

a deed restriction prohibiting commercial uses? The Trial Court found a violation,

granted summary judgment, and entered an injunction. After our thorough de novo

review of the deed restrictions, we agree that STRs are prohibited commercial

uses. Hence, we affirm.

                                        -2-
                                   BACKGROUND

               Moutardier Bluffs is a small, deed-restricted and gated subdivision of

fewer than 50 houses located near Nolin Lake in Edmonson County, Kentucky. Its

development is of recent vintage. The developer, HonAcres, Inc. (“HonAcres”)

executed deeds of restrictions for the community in 2008 (the “2008 Restrictions”)

and again in 2010 (“2010 Restrictions”). There is little material difference

between the 2008 Restrictions and the 2010 Restrictions. The main deed

restrictions relating to this case are that each lot must contain only a single-family

house, and no lot may contain commercial uses.

               HonAcres then recorded a final plat for the subdivision, which on its

face listed the same deed restrictions. The lots were then sold and developed.

Approximately a decade into its development, more than 75 percent of the lots

were sold. While a few of the purchased lots remain empty, the constructed lots

only contain single-family residences. This 75-percent threshold triggered one of

the deed restrictions, which called for the developer’s powers and responsibilities

under the deed restrictions to be transferred to a to-be-formed homeowners’

association.

               Prior to this triggering event, the evidence in the record indicates that

some lot owners operated STRs in the community. Additionally, HonAcres

informed some, but not all, lot owners prior to purchase that STRs were allowed.

                                           -3-
It appears that many, if not all, of the Appellees in the instant case were to some

degree aware of the STRs before they purchased homes or lots. Some Appellees

even used the STRs at various times and encouraged extended family members to

use the STRs. Several “nuisances” had allegedly occurred at the STRs, including

firework usage by patrons, excessive parking that overflowed onto the

subdivision’s narrow road, people walking around the community while wearing

hoodies, people stealing firewood, and strangers being given the code to the

subdivision’s gate.

             Based in part on the issues some lot owners had with the STRs,

whether or how STRs would be allowed in the community became a contentious

issue during the attempted formation of the homeowners’ association, with the lot

owners having difficulties agreeing to by-laws for the homeowners’ association.

             HonAcres, believing it had the authority to amend the 2010

Restrictions, attempted to put the issue to rest. Prior to a scheduled lot-owners

meeting, HonAcres executed and recorded what purported to be amendments to the

deed restrictions (“2021 Amendments”). Among other changes to the 2008 and

2010 Restrictions, the 2021 Amendments expressly permitted STRs. HonAcres

claimed it had authority as the developer to amend the deed restrictions because

one of the deed restrictions permitted it “final say” over any disputes about the

deed restrictions.

                                         -4-
            Following the 2021 Amendments, the scheduled meeting about the

homeowners’ association was canceled. Several homeowners who were not

operating STRs (“Non-STR Lot Owners”) brought suit against fellow lot owners

who were operating STRs in the subdivision (“STR Lot Owners”). The Non-STR

Lot Owners also brought suit against HonAcres. The Non-STR Lot Owners

claimed certain deed restrictions prohibited STRs in the subdivision. Specifically,

one of the deed restrictions prohibited any lot from being “used for commercial

use.” The Non-STR Lot Owners sought an injunction prohibiting STRs from

being operated within the subdivision.

            Following almost two years of litigation, discovery, and the filing of

multiple depositions in the record, the Trial Court found operating STRs in the

community violated the deed restrictions, granted summary judgment in favor of

the Non-STR Lot Owners, and entered an injunction prohibiting further STR uses

in Moutardier Bluffs. HonAcres and STR Lot Owners appeal.

                           STANDARD OF REVIEW

            The appeal submitted to us is from a grant of summary judgment, and

appellate review of the same has been long-established:

            The proper standard of review on appeal when a trial
            judge has granted a motion for summary judgment is
            whether the record, when examined in its entirety, shows
            there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the
            moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
            The trial judge must view the evidence in a light most

                                         -5-
            favorable to the nonmoving party, resolving all doubts in
            its favor. Because summary judgment does not require
            findings of fact but only an examination of the record to
            determine whether material issues of fact exist, we
            generally review the grant of summary judgment without
            deference to either the trial court’s assessment of the
            record or its legal conclusions.

Bruner v. Cooper, 677 S.W.3d 252, 269 (Ky. 2023) (citing Hammons v. Hammons,

327 S.W.3d 444, 448 (Ky. 2010)).

            Additionally, “[i]nterpretation or construction of restrictive covenants

is a question of law subject to de novo review on appeal.” Hensley v. Gadd, 560

S.W.3d 516, 521 (Ky. 2018) (citing Triple Crown Subdivision Homeowners Ass’n,

Inc. v. Oberst, 279 S.W.3d 138, 141 (Ky. 2008)). Using these well-established

standards, we proceed to our de novo review.

                                   ANALYSIS

            We have grouped together the issues raised on appeal by HonAcres

and the STR Lot Owners into five general questions, each addressed separately

below.

   I.    Do the Moutardier Bluff deed restrictions prohibit STRs?

            The short answer to this question is, “yes.”

            Because deeds of restrictions are each unique creations, they must be

decided on their own merits and “construed according to their plain language.”

Hensley, 560 S.W.3d at 521 (citing Robertson v. W. Baptist Hosp., 267 S.W.2d

                                        -6-
395, 397 (Ky. 1954)). Deeds of restrictions are contracts that are interpreted as

such, and “[o]ne primary rule of construction relating to all instruments is that

every part of the instrument will be given meaning and effect when possible.”

McFarland v. Hanley, 258 S.W.2d 3, 5 (Ky. 1953).

             In Kentucky, we follow two guiding principles for interpreting deed

restrictions. First, we analyze the language in the written instrument unless there is

some patent ambiguity. Brandon v. Price, 314 S.W.2d 521, 523 (Ky. App. 1958)

(“[T]he language actually used in the declaration of restrictions, when considered

with the plat with which the restrictions are identified, is not so ambiguous as to

permit resort to extraneous evidence.”). As our Supreme Court recently

summarized:

             . . . courts are not to remake contracts for parties and
             create ambiguity where none exists. O.P. Link Handle
             Co. v. Wright, 429 S.W.2d 842, 847 (Ky. 1968). In O.P.
             Link, we admonished against giving a writing meaning
             which is not to be found in the instrument itself under the
             guise of interpretation based on direct evidence of
             intention. Id. (citing 4 Williston on Contracts, § 610A
             (3d ed. 1961)). Parties are bound by the clear meaning of
             the language used, the same as any other contract. See
             Larkins v. Miller, 239 S.W.3d 112, 115 (Ky. App. 2007)
             (stating that “a court should interpret the terms of the
             contract according to their plain and ordinary
             meaning[]”).

Hensley, 560 S.W.3d at 522.

                                         -7-
             Second, whether our analysis is confined to the written documents or,

in the case of ambiguity, expanded to include extraneous evidence of the general

scheme of the subdivision, we attempt to ascertain and give import to the intention

of the parties creating the restrictions. Id. at 521. We view restrictions as a

protection for the property owner and the public, and we no longer follow a

doctrine of strict construction. Id. (citing Oberst, 279 S.W.3d at 140). Said

another way:

             As a general proposition it may be said that, when
             building restrictions first came into use, they were looked
             upon as restrictions against the individual owner of
             property and were scrutinized carefully to avoid the
             untrammeled use of real property. In recent years,
             however, they have come into rather general use in
             metropolitan areas and are looked upon more in the
             nature of a protection to the property owner and the
             public rather than a restriction as to the use of property.

Dorsey v. Fishermen’s Wharf Realty Co., 306 Ky. 445, 449, 207 S.W.2d 565, 567

(1947). See, e.g., Brandon, 314 S.W.2d at 523 (rejecting the strict-construction

claim “that a restriction against two houses on one lot can be enforced only if

clearly and specifically expressed[,]” and, instead, interpreting “the phrase ‘all lots

shall be used for private single family residence purposes’” to mean “that only one

private single family residence shall occupy each lot”).

             When interpreting the restrictions, we seek to determine the intention

of the grantor from the language used, “considered in light of such factors as the

                                          -8-
general scheme of the subdivision.” Hensley, 560 S.W.3d at 522 (internal

quotation marks omitted). As quoted above, “courts are not to remake contracts

for parties and create ambiguity where none exists.” Id. (citing O.P. Link Handle

Co. v. Wright, 429 S.W.2d 842, 847 (Ky. 1968)). The parties are “bound by the

clear meaning of the language used, the same as any other contract[,]” as we will

not give “a writing meaning which is not to be found in the instrument itself under

the guise of interpretation based on direct evidence of intention.” Hensley, 560

S.W.3d at 522 (citations omitted).

               In sum, if what the grantor wrote in the deed of restrictions is of

“plain import[,]” then “[w]e may not substitute what the grantor may have intended

to say” with consideration of external factors. Mascolino v. Noland & Cowden

Enters., Inc., 391 S.W.2d 710, 712 (Ky. 1965) (cited by Hensley, 560 S.W.3d at

521-22).

               Here, the Trial Court found the deed restrictions were unambiguous

and prohibited STRs. Having reviewed the restrictions and our Supreme Court’s

holding in the recent and seminal case of Hensley,1 we are compelled to agree.

1
  HonAcres and STR Lot Owners claim Hensley is not controlling, arguing that we should follow
an older, not-to-be-published case from our Court. Notably, the Hensley Court called into doubt
the holding in that not-to-be-published case. 560 S.W.3d at 525 (“Irrespective of the correctness
of that conclusion . . . .”). We do not wade too deep into whether we should apply a not-to-be-
published opinion to the instant case, as our analysis, infra, demonstrates that Hensley’s holding
controls the instant case.

                                               -9-
                The Hensley Court concerned a similar fact pattern to the instant case.

There, a dispute arose over whether STRs were permitted in a lakeside

development. The development had a deed of restrictions requiring certain lots to

contain single-family residential structures and have only residential uses. 560

S.W.3d at 518-19. One specific lot in the community, however, was permitted to

have residential uses or certain, listed commercial uses, including usage as a hotel.

Id. at 519. The deed of restrictions further specified, “No trade, business, or

profession of any kind shall be carried out upon any residential lot nor shall

anything be done thereon which may become an annoyance or a nuisance to the

neighborhood[.]” Id. The restrictions did permit residential structures to have

signage indicating the “sale or rental thereof[.]” Id.

                One lot owner then began renting one of the residential-use lots as an

STR. A lawsuit ensued, and the parties ultimately requested the Trial Court to try

the case on depositions. CR2 43.04(1). The Trial Court then entered an order

finding the restrictions were unambiguous and prohibited STR use. Hensley, 560

S.W.3d at 520. On appeal, a panel of our Court reversed, holding in relevant part

that the deed restrictions were ambiguous, and because “in case of doubtful

meaning, restrictions should be construed in favor of the free use of property[,]”

the STR use was not prohibited. Id.

2
    Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.

                                           -10-
             The Kentucky Supreme Court granted discretionary review and

reversed. The Court ultimately held that the restrictions in Hensley were

unambiguous and prohibited STRs.

             To arrive at this conclusion, the Court in part contrasted the

commercial uses permitted on the one specified lot, which included hotel uses,

with the residential-use-only restriction on the remaining lots. Id. at 522-23. With

hotels being clearly labeled as commercial uses, the Court compared STRs to

hotels and made two pertinent conclusions: (1) the STR in Hensley ostensibly

operated in the same manner as a hotel, thus constituting a commercial use; and (2)

those staying in an STR do not constitute “residents,” thus violating the residential-

use-only deed restriction. Id. at 523-24.

             In light of Hensley’s analysis of similar deed restrictions and STRs,

we conclude that the 2010 Restrictions are unambiguous and prohibit STRs. The

2010 Restrictions collectively demonstrate an intention to create a small, gated,

single-family residential neighborhood that prohibits all commercial activity,

including STRs. We begin with the deed restriction in paragraph 4, “No lot shall

be used for commercial use.”

             Given Hensley’s strong conclusion that STRs are occupied by non-

residents, operate similarly to hotels, and constitute commercial uses, the STR Lot

Owners are clearly violating paragraph 4 of the 2010 Restrictions. As the Court in

                                        -11-
Hensley held, operating a single-family residence as an STR can “meet[] the very

statutory definition of a hotel: a ‘building or structure kept, used, maintained,

advertised, or held out to the public as a place where sleeping accommodations are

furnished to the public.’” 560 S.W.3d at 524 (quoting KRS 219.011(3)). Such

single-family STR use may even require the operator to register as a hotel and to

remit corresponding tax collection on the rental monies. Id. See also KRS

139.200(2)(a); and KRS 142.400(2).

             The STR Lot Owners in the instant case are operating much in the

same fashion as the STR in Hensley. The STR Lot Owners post their rentals on

popular vacation-rental websites. They offer nightly and weekly rates for

vacationers. They employ cleaners and maintenance persons to keep the facilities

clean and functioning for their patrons. At least one STR Lot Owner has remitted

some “Transient Room Taxes” on the rental income. And the STRs are clearly

operating for profit, with some of the STRs generating a net profit, and others

generating enough revenue to cover the mortgage and maintenance costs. We are

bound to follow the holding in Hensley, Supreme Court Rule 1.030(8)(a) (“The

Court of Appeals is bound by and shall follow applicable precedents established in

the opinions of the Supreme Court and its predecessor court.”); thus, we must

conclude that STR usage of single-family structures in Moutardier Bluffs is a

                                         -12-
commercial use akin to operating a hotel. Accordingly, the STRs operating in

Moutardier Bluffs constitute commercial uses.

             But our analysis does not end there. HonAcres and STR Lot

Operators argue that the commercial-use restriction in paragraph 4 is ambiguous

and, when read with the entire 2010 Restrictions, should not be viewed as so broad

that it encompasses STR usage. While we agree that we must examine the entirety

of the 2010 Restrictions, we find no ambiguity in paragraph 4’s restriction as it

relates to STR usage. Moreover, a careful examination of the 2010 Restrictions as

a whole demonstrates an intent to prohibit STRs in this small, gated, lake-house

community.

             First, STRs violate paragraph 1 of the deed restrictions, which

requires the community to consist of “residential lots for single family houses”

(emphasis added). Though the outward appearances of these STRs are single-

family homes, the lots are not being used as residential lots because they are not

occupied by residents. As our Supreme Court held, short-term tenants who occupy

STRs “cannot be considered ‘residents’ within the commonly understood meaning

of that word, or the use by such persons as constituting ‘residential.’” Hensley,

560 S.W.3d at 524. Paragraphs 5 and 6 of the 2010 Restrictions further bolster this

conclusion. Those paragraphs refer to “residence” and “[r]esidential dwelling.” In

other words, this subdivision is intended to be residential, not commercial, and

                                        -13-
each lot is to be used and occupied by residents. Cf. Brandon, 314 S.W.2d at 523

(“[T]he phrase ‘all lots shall be used for private single family residence purposes’

means that only one private single family residence shall occupy each lot.”).

             HonAcres argues against this interpretation, claiming the words

“residential” and “houses” in paragraph 1 are broad and ambiguous and do not

necessarily only require residential uses on the lots. Specifically, HonAcres notes

that “house” has been interpreted broadly in Kentucky law, to wit, “It has been said

that ‘house’ is all inclusive and may include any and every kind of structure,

depending upon the context in which it is used and the purpose sought to be

effected.” Dartmouth-Willow Terrace, Inc. v. MacLean, 371 S.W.2d 937, 939

(Ky. 1963) (citation omitted). Additionally, HonAcres notes the word “residence”

can connote a permanent or temporary structure, as paragraph 5 specifically

prohibits temporary, residential structures. Both arguments fail.

             First, MacLean reinforces that the intention of the 2010 Restrictions is

to create a community solely consisting of single-family houses. In MacLean,

deed restrictions permitted the lot owner to construct a “house, which shall . . . be

for residence purposes only.” 371 S.W.2d at 938 (ellipses in original). The lot

owner wanted to build a multi-family apartment building, arguing the same aligned

with the broadly-worded restrictions. Though the holding ultimately rested on a

change in the nature of the community since the deed restrictions were enacted, the

                                         -14-
MacLean Court noted that an apartment house should be permitted as “it would

have been easy to so word the restriction” to permit only single-family houses.

Here, the 2010 Restrictions follow MacLean’s caution and explicitly limit this

community to single-family houses. Furthermore, MacLean’s dicta liberally

interpreted “house” and “residence” to include multiple types of residential

structures; similar liberal interpretation of the term “commercial” in the 2010

Restrictions leads us to conclude STR is a commercial use.

             Moreover, HonAcres’s argument regarding paragraph 5 of the 2010

Restrictions further strengthens the conclusion that STRs are prohibited.

Paragraph 5 specifically prohibits using “structures of a temporary character” as

residences, and it prohibits using basements or certain temporary structures as

residences. These prohibitions reinforce: (1) that the community is for long-term

residents; and (2) the lots are for single-family use, not transient tenants. STRs

violate both of these principles: they are, by definition, for short-term or

temporary occupancy; and they are occupied by transient tenants.

             There are other restrictions that further support the long-term, single-

family, residential – and not commercial – nature of the community. For example:

             16. No more than two dogs or two cats shall be
             permitted per household and they shall be confined to the
             owners’ lot. Any outside dwelling pet shall be controlled
             by leash or pen. No fowl, livestock or any other animals
             shall be permitted.

                                         -15-
                This paragraph describes the occupants of a lot as a “household.” A

“household” connotes family units, residents, and people living together under the

same roof. See, e.g., Lynch v. Commonwealth, 74 S.W.3d 711, 713 (Ky. 2002)

(citation omitted) (interpreting “household” in KRE3 504 to mean a residence, a

place where one resides, and “a ‘factual place of abode or living in a particular

locality’”); Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gray, 814 S.W.2d 928, 929

(Ky. App. 1991) (citation omitted) (“In Kentucky, the term ‘household’ has, for

insurance purposes, been generally defined as ‘persons dwelling together as a

family under the same roof.’”); and Sutton v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 971 S.W.2d

807, 808 (Ky. App. 1997) (collecting definitions of “household” in insurance

contracts, noting the term is synonymous with “family” and generally means those

who dwell together under the same roof). The transient tenants of STRs are not

dwelling or residing together, nor are they necessarily even of the same household.

                Continuing, paragraph 17 of the deed restrictions states, “17. No

animals are to be raised for commercial purposes on said property.” This

restriction demonstrates how extreme the commercial use restriction was intended

to be. Accord Hensley, 560 S.W.3d at 522 (permitting certain commercial uses on

one lot in a subdivision). Of the two dogs or two cats permitted per household, not

even one of them can be an animal that the family is raising to sell commercially.

3
    Kentucky Rules of Evidence.

                                          -16-
If there were any ambiguity in paragraph 4 about whether any types of commercial

use were permitted, paragraph 17 lays that ambiguity to rest.

              Finally, paragraph 15 demonstrates the intention to keep the

subdivision as a quiet residential respite, providing that “[n]o noxious or offensive

activities shall be carried out upon any lot, nor shall anything be done thereupon

which may be an annoyance or nuisance to neighboring lot owners.” Moreover,

the use of the term “neighboring” as opposed to “adjacent” or “nearby” indicates

familiarity between the lot owners. Operating an STR with a revolving-door of

transient tenants flies in the face of the quiet, neighborhood community described

in this deed restriction.

              In sum, these deed restrictions are not ambiguous. They describe an

undisturbed, single-family, residential, lake house neighborhood filled with only

residential lots containing residential uses by long-term residents in households.

STRs are commercial uses that allow temporary, transient, non-residents and, often

times, non-households, to use the lots. Viewed as a whole, the deed restrictions

unambiguously prohibit STRs.

              To counter these unambiguous terms, STR Lot Owners point to the

facts borne out in the depositions and affidavits of the Non-STR Lot Owners and

HonAcres. Specifically, STR Lot Owners claim the Non-STR Lot Owners

“contradict their claims in this case” because they admitted to personally renting

                                         -17-
one of the houses within Moutardier Bluffs. Appellant STR Lot Owners’ Brf. at

12. Additionally, the developer “confirms that the commercial use restriction does

not apply to short-term rentals” because it admitted that it informed some parties

prior to purchase that STRs were permitted. Id. This argument goes toward a

waiver of the commercial use restriction due to arbitrary enforcement of covenants,

see, e.g., Colliver v. Stonewall Equestrian Estates Ass’n, Inc., 139 S.W.3d 521, 525

(Ky. App. 2003), which is not the focus of our inquiry into whether the deed

restrictions themselves are facially unambiguous and prohibit STRs. Moreover,

HonAcres’s ex post facto statements of what it intended to restrict when drafting

the deed of restrictions likewise do not hold, as “this court may not substitute what

the grantor may have intended to say for the plain import of what he said.” Id.

(cleaned up and citations omitted).

             Because the deed restrictions on their face unambiguously describe an

intention for Moutardier Bluffs to be a residential subdivision comprised of long-

term, single-family households that operate no commercial uses at all, the deed

restrictions prohibit any home from operating a STR. Accordingly, the Trial Court

properly granted summary judgment in favor of the Non-STR Lot Owners on this

issue.

                                        -18-
   II.    Did HonAcres have the authority to amend the restrictive covenants?

             The short answer here is “no.”

             HonAcres argues that paragraph 22 grants it authority to amend the

deed restrictions. That paragraph provides, “If at any time there is a dispute over

these restrictions, the developer shall have the final say.” Non-STR Lot Owners

argue this restriction does not permit the developer to amend the deed restrictions.

Instead, Non-STR Lot Owners argue that this restriction should apply only to

permit the developer final say in conflicts on the restrictions that explicitly

reserved discretion to the developer, i.e., paragraph 3’s prohibition against more

than one detached building “unless otherwise determined by developer.” We agree

that the restriction does not explicitly permit amendments to the deed restriction.

             Initially, we note that deeds of restrictions are contracts that “are to be

construed according to their plain language.” Hensley, 560 S.W.3d at 521. These

contractual restrictions are “‘mutual, reciprocal, equitable easements of the nature

of servitudes in favor of owners of other lots of a plot of which all were once a

part[,]’” and “‘they constitute property rights which run with the land so as to

entitle beneficiaries or the owners to enforce the restrictions[.]’” Id. (quoting

Ashland-Boyd Cnty. City-Cnty. Health Dep’t v. Riggs, 252 S.W.2d 922, 925 (Ky.

1952)).

                                          -19-
             The plain language here does not explicitly or implicitly grant

HonAcres authority to amend the deed restrictions. It only permits “final say”

when there is a “dispute over these restrictions[.]” The use of the term “final say”

implies that at least one other party has some say in how the restriction applies. Cf.

Cameron v. Beshear, 628 S.W.3d 61, 75 (Ky. 2021) (“[E]ven though a legislative

committee may find that a regulation is ‘deficient,’ . . . the executive branch retains

final say as to administrative regulations[.]”). Moreover, the term “final say”

implies at best power to make a yes/no decision, not the authority to amend the

contract. Cf. Lofton v. Fairmont Specialty Ins. Managers, Inc., 367 S.W.3d 593,

596 (Ky. 2012) (“The contract stated that Maxey had the final say in whether to

accept a settlement offer. . . . When a settlement offer was made, Lofton and

Maxey disagreed about whether to accept it. Lofton voluntarily withdrew from

representation when Maxey refused the offer.”). In other words, if a lot owner asks

permission to build a ranch-style house, HonAcres’s “final say” authority permits

it to say “yes” or “no” to the plan; HonAcres cannot instead dictate that the lot

owner build a cape-cod style house.

             Thus, application of “final say” to the instant case essentially grants

lot owners the authority to request permission for certain items and HonAcres

authority to affirm or deny those requests. Here, the deed restrictions permit lot

owners input by choosing styles, designs, or sizes of houses being constructed.

                                         -20-
The developer then has final say over these choices. There are numerous such

deed restrictions in the document, including:

            2. All structures shall be constructed with exteriors
            approved by developer.

            3. Detached garages or storage buildings will be
            permitted if the design is approved by the developer.
            Only one detached building will be allowed per lot,
            unless otherwise determined by developer.

            ...

            7. Plans and specifications must be approved by the
            developer.

            ...

            9. The development shall also restrict the property owner
            from the parking of tractor-trailer trucks, heavy farm
            equipment (50 horsepower or less tractors for gardens
            and attachments are excluded), trailers, mobile homes,
            any manufactured housing, or any other use that would
            be unsightly to the neighborhood as determined by the
            developer.

            ...

            11. Any fencing shall not be installed beyond the front
            corner of the house and shall not exceed 6 feet in height.
            The fencing shall be maintained and painted or stained if
            constructed of wood materials in a manner to improve the
            character of the neighborhood.

            12. Purchasers of these lots shall be responsible for
            installing adequate culvert tile and gravel to avoid
            damage to the road, ditch line, and grass.

                                        -21-
             13. It is the desire of the developer to preserve the
             natural vegetation of Moutardier Bluffs to the greatest
             extent possible and to preclude the cutting of trees
             unnecessarily. Therefore, no trees, shrubs or other
             vegetation shall be removed from any lot without
             approval from the developer.

             14. Each lot owner will keep appearance of lot
             acceptable to developer.

             The practical application of each of these deed restrictions highlights

the authority given to HonAcres by paragraph 22. Under paragraph 2, a lot owner

would submit construction design plans to a developer, who would then have “final

say” per paragraph 22. Under paragraph 3, a lot owner would submit plans to

construct more than one detached building on a lot, and the developer would then

have “final say” regarding whether more than one detached building may be

constructed. And so forth.

             In some sense, paragraph 22 appears to be surplusage, as the language

in other paragraphs impliedly indicates the developer already has final say.

However, we note that paragraphs 11 and 12 contain situations where a lot owner

has some say regarding how the lot is developed; yet they do not contain language

indicating that the developer has final say. While not an issue before us, paragraph

22 would appear to apply to those deed restrictions.

             Regardless, and as it pertains to the instant case, paragraph 22 does

not explicitly or implicitly permit HonAcres to amend the deed restrictions.

                                        -22-
Notably, the parties have pointed us to no Kentucky law that grants a developer

implicit authority to amend deed restrictions unilaterally.

             Accordingly, we agree with the Trial Court that summary judgment

was appropriate on this issue. HonAcres has no authority to amend the 2010

Restrictions, and any purported amendments filed cannot change the commercial

use prohibition to permit STRs.

   III.   Did HonAcres’ amendment of the restrictions materially change the

          character of the development?

             We elect to not give an advisory opinion on this question.

             HonAcres was without the authority to amend the restrictions.

Accordingly, we need not decide whether the 2021 Amendments materially

changed the character of the development. The 2021 Amendments, inasmuch as

they altered the terms of the deed restrictions prohibiting commercial uses,

exceeded the developer’s authority. Accordingly, we affirm the grant of summary

judgment on this issue.

   IV.    Does the injunction contain sufficient specificity to be lawful?

             The short answer to this question is, “yes.”

             HonAcres requests that we reverse and remand because the injunction

allegedly lacks specificity for HonAcres to understand what is enjoined. The

Order states in relevant part:

                                         -23-
             (2) Within thirty days of the entry of this Order,
             HonAcres shall send a certified letter to all current non-
             party owners, at their respective last known addresses,
             advising that short-term rentals are not permitted in
             Moutardier Bluffs. Until such time as a homeowner’s
             association is formed for Moutardier Bluffs, HonAcres
             shall advise all prospective purchasers and future owners
             that short-term rentals are not permitted in Moutardier
             Bluffs. In the event HonAcres learns of any new short-
             term rentals, it shall promptly take action to ensure that
             any new short-term rentals cease operating.

             HonAcres takes issue with the final sentence in the above paragraph.

HonAcres claims ambiguity as there is no specific “action” it has been ordered to

take in the event it learns of new STR. Additionally, HonAcres argues that

“promptly” is not a specific timeframe for said action.

             Non-STR Lot Owners initially claim the issue is not properly

preserved, as it was not raised in a CR 59 post-judgment motion. Additionally,

they argue that the order contains the requisite specificity.

             We need not address whether the issue is properly preserved, as the

injunctive language contains the required specificity. CR 65.02(1) requires the

language used in injunctions “shall be specific in terms and shall describe in

reasonable detail, and not by reference to the complaint or other document, the act

restrained or enjoined.” The purpose of CR 65.02 is to prohibit injunctions that are

“too broad” or “too vague.” Commonwealth v. Mountain Truckers Ass’n, Inc., 683

S.W.2d 260, 263 (Ky. App. 1984) (citing Fiscal Court of Jefferson County v.

                                         -24-
Courier-Journal and Louisville Times Company, 554 S.W.2d 72 (Ky. 1977)). The

language in the rule exists “to prevent uncertainty and confusion on the part of

those faced with injunctive orders, and to avoid the possible founding of a

contempt citation on a decree too vague to be understood.” Hensley, 560 S.W.3d

at 527 (internal quotation marks omitted).

             The language here is neither too broad nor too vague to be

understood. The term “promptly,” while not denoting a specific period of time, is

sufficient to put HonAcres on notice that it must not sit on information it receives

about STRs in the community. Likewise, while the term “action” is facially broad,

it must be read in light of the preceding sentence, which terminates HonAcres’s

duties under the injunction once a homeowners’ association is formed. In other

words, HonAcres’s duty is to act as the homeowners’ association and enforce the

deed restriction prohibiting STRs. See, e.g., Triple Crown Subdivision

Homeowner’s Ass’n, Inc. v. Oberst, 279 S.W.3d 138, 140 (Ky. 2008) (“[A]

homeowners’ association had standing to enforce restrictive covenants.”).

Notably, HonAcres has argued throughout the litigation that it has broad authority

under the deed restrictions to settle disputes. Undoubtedly, it can determine

appropriate actions to take against violative lot owners. Accordingly, we find no

error in the Trial Court’s injunctive language.

                                        -25-
   V.    Was summary judgment prematurely granted?

             The short answer to this question is, “no.”

             As a final argument, STR Lot Owners claim summary judgment was

prematurely granted before sufficient discovery was completed. They allege that

they need additional time to depose one of the Non-STR Lot Owners, a

homebuilder, and several Realtors. They claim the information in these

depositions could prove that the Non-STR Lot Owners were aware of STRs

occurring in the subdivision prior to their purchases of homes and lots. The Non-

STR Lot Owners in turn argue that STR Lot Owners had sufficient time – more

than a year – in which to conduct discovery. The Non-STR Lot Owners note that

STR Lot Owners did not attempt to schedule the additional depositions in the time

leading up to oral arguments on the summary judgment motion. Additionally,

Non-STR Lot Owners argue that any additional information will not change the

outcome of this case, which turns on the interpretation of the deed restrictions.

             “It is a well established principle that a trial court has broad discretion

over disputes involving the discovery process.” Sexton v. Bates, 41 S.W.3d 452,

455 (Ky. App. 2001). Here, there was no abuse of discretion. STR Lot Owners

had sufficient time to secure the additional deposition testimony. The issues in this

case involve the interpretation of deed restrictions that are not ambiguous. The

additional information sought would not alter the analysis.

                                         -26-
             “[T]he proper function of summary judgment is to terminate litigation

when, as a matter of law, it appears that it would be impossible for the respondent

to produce evidence at the trial warranting a judgment in his favor.” Steelvest, Inc.

v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 1991). The Trial

Court properly terminated this litigation based on the facially-unambiguous deed

restrictions. Accordingly, we decline to find error on this issue.

                                  CONCLUSION

             In light of Hensley, we hold that this small, residential, single-family,

lake house community that prohibits commercial uses in its deed restrictions

necessarily prohibits STRs. Additionally, we hold that after an appropriate amount

of discovery time had transpired, the Trial Court properly granted summary

judgment in favor of the Non-STR Lot Owners. Finally, we hold that the

injunction entered against HonAcres is sufficiently specific to comport with CR

65.02. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the order and injunction.

             ALL CONCUR.

                                         -27-
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS RYAN      BRIEF FOR APPELLEES PEGGY
FEIDER, CHRISTINA HOSTETLER,   STURDIVANT, WILLIS
JASON HOSTETLER, DOUGLAS       STURDIVANT, BARRY JOHNSON,
KEEN, JOANNE KEEN, DAVID       CATHY JOHNSON, AND
THOMAS MITCHELL, SARAH         BARBARA ALLEN:
MITCHELL, LAUREN TINKER,
RICHARD J. TINKER, AND         Colton W. Givens
ROBERT M. TYRRELL,             Bowling Green, Kentucky
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS THE
TRUSTEE OF THE ROBERT M.
TYRRELL REVOCABLE
LIVING TRUST:

Jason C. Vaughn
Louisville, Kentucky

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT
HONACRES, LLC:

Mark A. Smedal
Louisville, Kentucky

                           -28-