Court Opinion

ID: 9407382
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-06 18:03:49.417566+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:37.356250
License: Public Domain

Filed 7/6/23
                        CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

        IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                          FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                  DIVISION FOUR

 THE PEOPLE,
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                A164649
 v.
 RICKEY JACKSON,                                (San Mateo County
                                                Super. Ct. No. 16SF014002A)
           Defendant and Appellant.

       Defendant Rickey Jackson appeals after the trial court found he
violated his probation, terminated the probation unsuccessfully, and
sentenced him to time served. Jackson does not contest in this appeal that he
engaged in the alleged misconduct at issue. Instead, he contends that the
trial court had no jurisdiction to treat that misconduct as a violation of
probation because, due to a retroactive change in the law, his probationary
term had expired before the misconduct occurred. We agree with Jackson.
       The enactment at issue, Assembly Bill No. 1950, codified at Penal
Code 1 section 1203.1 and enacted effective January 1, 2021, reduced the
maximum probationary term for most felonies from five years to two years.
We must decide whether the bill applies retroactively, in cases not yet final
when the bill took effect, to prevent a court from finding a violation of
probation based on misconduct that occurred more than two years after a
defendant’s probationary term began, but before the bill’s effective date.

       1   All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                          1
      Appellate courts disagree about this issue. Jackson urges this court to
follow the holding in People v. Canedos (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 469, review
granted June 29, 2022, S274244 (Canedos), a decision by the Second
Appellate District, which held that Assembly Bill No. 1950 applied
retroactively to bar a court from considering an alleged probation violation
that occurred more than two years after the court had imposed a four-year
term of probation. The People, on the other hand, urge this court to follow a
contrary decision by our colleagues in Division Three, People v. Faial (2022)
75 Cal.App.5th 738, review granted May 18, 2022, S273840 (Faial), that
Assembly Bill No. 1950 does not apply retroactively in these circumstances.
The Supreme Court has accepted both cases for review. As noted above, we
agree with Jackson that Canedos reaches the correct conclusion.
                               BACKGROUND
      The facts are not in dispute. In January 2017, Jackson was convicted
through a no contest plea of felony second-degree burglary and was sentenced
to five years of probation, including less than a year in jail. In July 2020, he
was charged with having committed probation violations in July and October
2019 (i.e., more than two years after his probationary term began). In August
2020, the court summarily revoked probation pending a formal hearing.
      In January 2021, Assembly Bill No. 1950 took effect. (Assem. Bill
No. 1950 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) Stats. 2020, ch. 328, § 1.) The bill amended
sections 1203a and 1203.1 and decreased the maximum period of felony
probation (with certain exceptions not relevant here) to no more than two
years. (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Assem. Bill No. 1950 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.).)
The Legislature did not amend sections 1203.2 and 1203.3, the statutes
relating to probation violations.

                                        2
      In August 2021, Jackson moved to terminate probation, contending
that, because the bill had retroactively limited his probationary term to two
years, the term had expired in January 2019. The trial court denied the
motion, and this court summarily denied a petition for a writ of prohibition.
      In February 2022, the trial court held a hearing on the alleged
probation violations that had occurred in July and October 2019 and
sustained two of them, one of which involved a violation of section 211
(robbery) for which Jackson had been charged and convicted in Alameda
County. While declining to impose additional jail time, the court revoked and
terminated Jackson’s probation as unsuccessful. He timely filed an appeal. 2
                                DISCUSSION
      As set forth above, Jackson committed the misconduct at issue, and the
court summarily revoked probation, after the termination of the two-year
probation term as modified by Assembly Bill No. 1950, but before the
statute’s effective date. In determining whether Assembly Bill No. 1950
applies retroactively in such a case, we start with the familiar goal of
statutory construction, which is to determine legislative intent. (People v.
Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314, 319 (Brown).) In general, when the text of a
statute has not made the Legislature’s intent clear, we apply its declaration
that: “No part of [the Penal Code] is retroactive, unless expressly so
declared.” (§ 3; Brown, supra, at pp. 319–320.) However, that general rule is
subject to an exception established by In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740,
disapproved on another ground as stated in Californians for Disability Rights
v. Mervyn's, LLC (2006) 39 Cal.4th 222, 230) (Estrada): “When new

      2As noted, Jackson challenges only the court’s refusal to find that his
probationary term expired in January 2019, before the violations at issue; he
does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence of those violations.

                                       3
legislation reduces the punishment for an offense, we presume that the
legislation applies to all cases not yet final as of the legislation’s effective
date.” (People v. Esquivel (2021) 11 Cal.5th 671, 673 (Esquivel), citing
Estrada.) “Estrada presumed that our Legislature intends for ameliorative
enactments to apply as broadly as is constitutionally permissible.” (Id. at
p. 677.)
      “Appellate courts are so far unanimous in holding that Assembly Bill
No. 1950 applies retroactively to defendants who were serving a term of
probation when the legislation became effective on January 1, 2021; in such
cases, the courts have acted to reduce the length of their probation terms.”
(Faial, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 743; Canedos, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at pp.
475–476.) The Attorney General does not dispute that proposition. Appellate
courts have reached different conclusions, however, as to whether the statute
applies retroactively when, as here, the defendant has engaged in misconduct
that would constitute a probation violation under the original sentence, and
that misconduct occurred before the bill’s effective date, but more than two
years after the defendant’s sentencing. (See, e.g., Canedos, at p. 469; Faial, at
p. 738.) As noted, the question is now before our Supreme Court. (Faial,
supra, 75 Cal.App.5th 738, review granted May 18, 2022, S273840; Canedos,
supra, 77 Cal.App.5th 469, review granted June 29, 2022, S274244.)
      In short, we agree with Canedos that the Estrada presumption of
retroactivity applies to this case, because neither the trial court’s revocation
of probation nor Jackson’s original conviction was final under Estrada when
Assembly Bill No. 1950 took effect on January 1, 2021. (Canedos, supra,
77 Cal.App.5th at pp. 473–474.) Nothing in the statutory text or legislative
history mandates an exception to the “ ‘presumed legislative intent’ that an
ameliorative criminal statute applies retroactively to all defendants whose

                                          4
convictions were not yet final when the law became effective.” (Ibid., citing
Esquivel, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 680.) Based upon this presumption that the
bill retroactively caused Jackson’s probationary term to expire in January
2019, his conduct after that time could not constitute a violation of his
probation. The Attorney General does not identify any statutory text or
indicia of intent that clearly negate the Estrada presumption. (See, e.g.,
People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 631–632 (Frahs) [absent express
savings clause limiting statute to prospective application, question is
“whether the Legislature ‘clearly signal[ed] its intent’ to overcome the
Estrada inference”].)
      The starting point of the analysis, briefly sketched above, of how
Assembly Bill No. 1950 applies to a case like this is, as Canedos explains and
the Attorney General concedes, the central holding of Esquivel, supra,
11 Cal.5th 671, namely, that an order revoking probation does not render a
case final for purposes of Estrada. (Canedos, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 476.)
Jackson’s case is thus nonfinal for those purposes despite the August 2020
order summarily revoking his probation, which preceded the effective date of
Assembly Bill No. 1950, and despite the February 2022 order formally
revoking that probation. (Canedos, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 477.) The
Attorney General also does not dispute that Assembly Bill No. 1950 reduces
punishment in a way triggering the Estrada presumption of retroactive
application. (See People v. Sims (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 943, 958–959 (Sims)
[rejecting argument that probation is not punishment].)
      The Attorney General’s main argument for nonetheless affirming the
challenged order is that the retroactive sweep of Assembly Bill No. 1950 does
not encompass the court’s findings of probation violations, and its orders
revoking and terminating probation, because the text of the bill “does not

                                       5
target probation violations and therefore cannot be applied retroactively to
invalidate probation revocations based upon those violations.” For that
proposition, the Attorney General relies on the decisions of our colleagues in
Division Three in Faial, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th 738 and Kuhnel v. Superior
Court (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 726, review granted June 1, 2022, S274000
(Kuhnel). As discussed below, we agree with the Canedos court that Kuhnel is
distinguishable, and we respectfully disagree with the conclusion in Faial.
      It is true that, as the Faial court observed and the Attorney General
now emphasizes, Assembly Bill No. 1950 did not “undertake to amend section
1203.2 or section 1203.3—the statutes that confer and address [a trial court’s]
authority” to revoke and terminate probation when a defendant has violated
its terms. (Faial, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 744.) But no amendment of these
sections was necessary. The Legislature amended the code sections governing
the maximum length of a period of probation, e.g., section 1203.1. Those
amendments apply retroactively to limit all probation terms in not-yet-final
cases like this one. Accordingly, the conclusion that conduct occurring after
the end of the two-year probationary term cannot constitute a violation of
that probation does not involve any change in the operation of the preexisting
rules governing probation violations and revocations, in a way that would
have required some corollary amendment to sections 1203.2 or 1203.3. The
only retroactive alteration is to the length of a defendant’s probationary
term—not to the rules governing when misconduct must have occurred to
constitute a violation of probation.
      The Kuhnel court quoted section 1203.3 as stating—in a way
unmodified by Assembly Bill No. 1950—that a court “has the authority at any
time during the term of probation to revoke, modify, or change its order of
suspension of imposition or execution of sentence.” (§ 1203.3, subd. (a);

                                       6
Kuhnel, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 733.) Accordingly, “ ‘ “[a]n order revoking
probation must be made within the period of time circumscribed in the order
of probation. Otherwise, the probationary period terminates automatically on
the last day.” ’ ” (Kuhnel, at pp. 733–734.) Because a court has jurisdiction to
issue a revocation order only during the probationary period, it follows
a fortiori that such an order must rest on conduct occurring within that
period. (See People v. Leiva (2013) 56 Cal.4th 498, 502 (Leiva).) 3
      Here, Assembly Bill No. 1950 retroactively modified Jackson’s
probationary period so that it ended in January 2019. The conclusion that his
conduct in July or October 2019 cannot amount to a violation of that
probation thus involves a simple application of the unmodified sections
1203.2 and 1203.3 to the modified probation term. There was no need for the
Legislature to modify sections 1203.2 or 1203.3 to generate the result
mandated by Estrada in this case—nor any reason to expect the Legislature
to have noted the settled rule, which Assembly Bill No. 1950 in no way

      3 Leiva analyzed the provision in section 1203.2 stating that a summary
revocation of probation “shall serve to toll the running” of the probationary
period. (56 Cal.4th at p. 502.) The question was whether, if a court summarily
revokes probation during the probationary term but does not hold a formal
hearing on the alleged violations until after the term ends, may the court
order probation revoked based solely on conduct that occurred after the end of
the probationary term, or must any revocation be based on conduct that
occurred during the probationary term? (Id. at pp. 502, 505–506.) Leiva held
that the tolling provision “preserves the trial court's authority to adjudicate,
in a subsequent formal probation violation hearing, whether the probationer
violated probation during, but not after, the court-imposed probationary
period.” (Id. at p. 502.) The court had no occasion to state in general that a
revocation of probation must rest on conduct during rather than after the
term of probation, but its analysis unmistakably presumes that general
principle, and proceeds to address whether the “tolling” provision of section
1203.2 creates an exception to that principle.

                                        7
modified, that only conduct occurring during a probationary term can
constitute a violation of that probation.
      Kuhnel is not inconsistent with this conclusion, for Assembly Bill
No. 1950 retroactively limited the defendant’s misdemeanor probationary
term in that case to one year, yet she had committed a violation 11 months
into the term—i.e., within the period as limited by the new law. (Kuhnel,
supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at pp. 729–730.) Her claim was that, because the trial
court had not issued its order summarily revoking her probation until
13 months into the term, it had lost jurisdiction to find a violation. (Id. at
p. 729.) Division Three held that, since she had committed the violation
before Assembly Bill No. 1950 had even been introduced, “no one had any
reason to expedite summary revocation of probation to ensure the court’s
continued jurisdiction.” (Id. at pp. 735–736.) In Canedos—where, as here, the
purported violation occurred after the end of the modified probationary
term—the court distinguished Kuhnel on that basis, while endorsing its
analysis of the facts before it. (Canedos, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 480,
quoting Kuhnel, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 736.) We agree with Kuhnel and
with Canedos’s reading of it. But we must disagree with Faial, for we do not
believe that the Legislature’s failure to amend the provisions governing
probation violations and revocations means that the amendment can have no
downstream effects on such matters by virtue of the ordinary operation of
those provisions.
      The Attorney General also argues that “invalidating” probation
violations or revocations that occurred before Assembly Bill No. 1950 took
effect will not further the bill’s “legislative aims.” This argument fails for two
independent reasons. The first is that it misapprehends Estrada, which
creates a presumption of retroactivity that can be overcome only by clear

                                        8
signals of a contrary legislative intent. (Frahs, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 628.) To
trigger that presumption, a defendant in Jackson’s position need not
demonstrate that retroactivity will further an ameliorative statute’s
“legislative aims,” but only that the statute is ameliorative—which is not in
dispute here. If so, Estrada dictates retroactive application unless the
Legislature has clearly signaled otherwise; there is no need to show that
retroactive application will affirmatively further any “legislative aims”
unique to that statute. That said, the second reason the argument fails is
that the legislative history of Assembly Bill No. 1950 does in fact show that
treating Jackson’s probationary term as retroactively limited to two years for
all purposes, rather than creating an exception for purposes of violation and
revocation, will further one of the bill’s central aims—avoiding costly
reincarcerations due to violations of needlessly lengthy probation terms.
      In People v. Quinn (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 874 (Quinn), this court
summarized that history: “The legislative history reflects that the
Legislature’s concern was that lengthy probationary periods do not serve a
rehabilitative function and unfairly lead to reincarceration for technical
violations. The author’s statement with respect to the bill provides:
‘ “California’s adult supervised probation population is around 548,000—the
largest of any state in the nation, more than twice the size of the state’s
prison population, almost four times larger than its jail population and about
six times larger than its parole population. [¶] A 2018 . . . study [citation]
found that a large portion of people violate probation and end up incarcerated
as a result. The study revealed that 20 percent of prison admissions in
California are the result of supervised probation violations, accounting for the
estimated $2 billion spent annually by the state to incarcerate people for
supervision violations. Eight percent of people incarcerated in a California

                                        9
prison are behind bars for supervised probation violations. Most violations
are ‘technical’ and minor in nature, such as missing a drug rehab
appointment or socializing with a friend who has a criminal record. [¶]
Probation—originally meant to reduce recidivism—has instead become a
pipeline for re-entry into the carceral system. [¶] Research [citation] . . .
shows that probation services, such as mental healthcare and addiction
treatment, are most effective during the first 18 months of supervision.
Research also indicates that providing increased supervision and services
earlier reduces an individual’s likelihood to recidivate. A shorter term of
probation, allowing for an increased emphasis on services, should lead to
improved outcomes for both people on misdemeanor and felony probation
while reducing the number of people on probation returning to
incarceration.” ’ ” (Quinn, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at pp. 879–880.)
      Other courts have agreed with Quinn’s distillation of the bill’s aims,
while citing further passages in its legislative history to similar effect. (See,
e.g., People v. Shelly (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 181, 194, review granted Sep. 21,
2022, S276031 [quoting history showing “the Legislature’s concern that
‘ “[p]robation—originally meant to reduce recidivism—has instead become a
pipeline for re-entry into the carceral system” ’ ” and adding, “we agree with
those courts that have found Assembly Bill No. 1950 was enacted, in large
part, to ‘ensure that many probationers avoid imprisonment’ ”]; Sims, supra,
59 Cal.App.5th at p. 961 [noting that legislative history reflects “strong
concerns that probationers . . . face unwarranted risks of incarceration due to
the lengths of their probation terms” and quoting statements, e.g., that
“defendants ‘on probation for extended periods of time are less likely to be
successful because even minor or technical violations of the law may result in
a violation of probation’ ”].)

                                        10
      A central purpose of the bill was thus to help probationers avoid
reimprisonment, especially for technical violations, and to prevent probation
from serving as a pipeline for reentry to prison. We further that aim by
holding that the bill’s retroactive application to existing probationary terms
bars a court from treating conduct that occurred after the end of a modified
term as a violation warranting revocation and possible reincarceration.
      The Attorney General’s discussion of the legislative history does not
refute that conclusion. He asserts that “[t]he legislative analyses used in the
drafting of AB 1950 focused on the increased effectiveness of and financial
benefits to other supportive services that would result from having shorter
probation sentences.” Those goals in no way exclude or negate the above-
noted goal of minimizing reimprisonments. (See People v. Frahs, supra,
9 Cal.5th at p. 635 [“The report’s reference to cost savings tells us little, if
anything, about whether the Legislature intended the statute to apply
retroactively. Therefore, we do not regard the mention of cost savings in a
legislative report as a clear indication of contrary legislative intent”].) The
Attorney General also quotes and attempts to negate Canedos’s statement
that it is “counterproductive to incarcerate defendants for minor violations of
the terms of their probation committed more than two years after the original
offense.” (Canedos, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 479.) The Attorney General
disputes that point by arguing that the court thereby substituted its
judgments for the Legislature’s stated intent, and by arguing that Canedos’s
rule “would nullify not only probation revocations for ‘minor violations’ but
for major ones as well—like the robbery in this case.” The first argument is
incorrect, as shown by the above-cited passages expressing the legislative
intent. The second argument ultimately fails because, as Canedos notes, “if

                                         11
the violation is serious, as in this case, the defendant may be prosecuted for a
new crime.” (Canedos, supra, at p. 479.)
      In rejecting the latter argument, however, we acknowledge the
potential appeal of distinguishing technical from criminal violations of
probation. Given the Legislature’s intent to reduce reimprisonments
resulting from “minor” or “technical” violations of probation, it could have
chosen to calibrate the bill’s scope by specifying that courts should apply it
retroactively, as to misconduct occurring after the modified end date of an
existing probationary term, only if the misconduct would amount to a minor
or technical violation. But the Legislature did not clearly signal an intent to
limit the bill’s retroactive effect in that way. Estrada does not permit us to
read into the bill, for purposes of retroactivity, a distinction between
technical and criminal violations that the Legislature itself did not draw.
      However, as Canedos noted, this is not a significant problem: Applying
the usual presumption of retroactivity will not give defendants like Jackson a
free pass for criminal misconduct. (Canedos, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 479.)
While such misconduct no longer can amount to a violation of a probationary
term that was modified by Assembly Bill No. 1950 so as to expire before the
misconduct occurred, the People still can charge and prosecute the misconduct
as a new crime—as they did in Canedos, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th 469 and in
this case.
                                DISPOSITION
      The order revoking probation and terminating probation as
unsuccessful is reversed, and the matter is remanded with directions to enter
an order modifying the term of probation imposed on January 18, 2017, to
two years, in accordance with Penal Code section 1203.1, subdivision (a) as

                                       12
amended by Assembly Bill No. 1950; reinstating probation; and terminating
that probation nunc pro tunc to January 18, 2019.

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                                          _________________________
                                          Fineman, J. *

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Brown, P. J.

_________________________
Streeter, J.

A164649

     * Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

                                     14
People v. Jackson (A164649)

Trial Court:              San Mateo County

Trial Judge:              Hon. Elizabeth M. Hill

Attorneys:
               Christopher Stansell for Appellant.

            Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Assistant Attorney General, Donna
M. Provenzano, Amit Kurlekar and Kelly Anne Styger, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Respondent.

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