Court Opinion

ID: 9739731
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:20:10.977763+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:13.667936
License: Public Domain

Jansen, P.J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the November 16, 1988, judgment entered by the Wayne Circuit Court declaring defendants’ 1977 Pontiac automobile to be a nuisance and terminating their interest in the automobile.
Defendants contend that the trial court erred in denying their motion for summary disposition brought pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8). Specifically, defendants argue that plaintiffs complaint failed to allege more than one isolated instance of use of the 1977 automobile for purposes of lewdness, assignation, or prostitution and failed to allege knowledge of, consent to, or acquiescence in the alleged nuisance by Tina Bennis. I disagree.
A motion for summary disposition based on a failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is to be tested by reference to the pleadings alone, and all well-pleaded material allegations must be taken as true. State ex rel Oakland *679Co Prosecutor v Motorama Motel Corp, 105 Mich App 224, 226; 307 NW2d 349 (1981). The standard is whether the plaintiff’s claims are so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development could possibly justify a right to recovery. Id.
Defendants maintain that plaintiff’s complaint was insufficient because it failed to allege that Tina Bennis had knowledge of, consented to, or acquiesced in the use of the automobile by her husband to create a nuisance. The majority held that "the prosecution was obligated to demonstrate that defendants knew of the use of the vehicle as a nuisance before the nuisance could be ordered abated.” (Emphasis added.) I disagree.
It is not disputed that the title to the 1977 automobile indicated that Tina Bennis and John Bennis were its owners. MCL 600.3815(2); MSA 27A.3815(2) specifically and unambiguously provides that "[p]roof of knowledge of the existence of the nuisance on the part of the defendants or any of them, is not required.” The statute expressly obviates the necessity of proof of knowledge of the existence of the nuisance on the part of defendants. People ex rel Wayne Prosecuting Attorney v Bitonti, 306 Mich 115, 119, 121; 10 NW2d 329 (1943); State ex rel Attorney General v Robinson, 250 Mich 99, 103; 229 NW 403 (1930). But see People v Schoonmaker, 241 Mich 177; 216 NW 456 (1927); State ex rel Wayne Prosecuting Attorney v Weitzman, 21 Mich App 705; 176 NW2d 463 (1970). "Obviously, where proof of knowledge is unnecessary, allegations of the owner’s knowledge are not required to state a statutory cause of action.” State ex rel Oakland Co Prosecuting Attorney v Weaver, 74 Mich App 462, 464; 254 NW2d 68 (1977).
I recognize that our Supreme Court has held, as *680noted by the majority, that proof of knowledge is required for abatement. Schoonmaker, supra. However, I also recognize that subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court have held that the statute, MCL 600.3815(2); MSA 27A.3815(2), obviates the need for proof of knowledge. Bitonti, Robinson, supra. See also People ex rel Wayne Prosecuting Attorney v Tate, 306 Mich 667, 669; 11 NW2d 282 (1943). Given the clear, unambiguous language of the statute, I am convinced that Bitonti, Tate, Robinson, and Weaver are correct. I would hold that plaintiff was not required to allege knowledge on the part of Tina Bennis.
Defendants also claim that plaintiff failed to allege more than one isolated instance of use of the 1977 automobile for the purpose of lewdness, assignation, or prostitution. I would hold that plaintiff was not required to allege more than one use of the vehicle for the purposes proscribed in the statute.
Because of the unique characteristics of an automobile, and in particular its mobility, I would follow the opinion of Justice Bushnell in Bitonti, supra. In Bitonti, the Court held "that proof of only one isolated instance of violation of the statute was sufficient.” Id., p 122. I am convinced that this is the proper interpretation to be given the public nuisance statute when a vehicle is used for the purpose of lewdness, assignation, or prostitution. The statute specifically provides that any vehicle used for the purpose of lewdness, assignation, or prostitution is declared a nuisance. MCL 600.3801; MSA 27A.3801. The statute does not require protracted use of the vehicle for purposes of lewdness, assignation, or prostitution, and in a case such as this, where the automobile is used as an indispensable part of the statutory violation, I *681would hold that a single incident is sufficient to sustain a finding of nuisance.
I am mindful that cases such as Motorama Motel Corp, supra, have held that a "nuisance involves the notion of repeated or continuing conduct and should not be based upon proof of a single isolated incident unless the facts surrounding the incident permit the reasonable inference that the prohibited conduct was habitual in nature.” Id., pp 229-230. However, Motorama Motel Corp involved a police officer who was accosted and solicited by a female at the Last Chance Bar and was then taken across the street to the defendant’s motel by the female. Id., p 225. The officer’s affidavit indicated that the motel was only used for that purpose on a single occasion. Id., p 230.
Given the obvious and inherent differences between a stationary or fixed building or structure and a mobile vehicle, it is my opinion that the better-reasoned rule allows a finding of public nuisance on the basis of a single instance of conduct involving the use of a vehicle for the purpose of lewdness, assignation, or prostitution. A building or fixed structure may be subject to continuous surveillance for the purpose of determining whether the premises are continuously or repeatedly being used for the purpose of lewdness, assignation, or prostitution. However, when a vehicle is used for any of the purposes set forth in MCL 600.3801; MSA 27A.3801, the authorities would have to determine that the same car was being used on a continuous or repeated basis for purposes proscribed by the statute. Because of the mobility of a vehicle, this would surely be nearly impossible.
As the majority notes, the purpose of the statute is to eliminate the use of property in connection with gambling, prostitution, and the illicit sale of *682liquor. People ex rel Wayne Prosecuting Attorney v Sill, 310 Mich 570, 575; 17 NW2d 756 (1945); State ex rel Oakland Prosecuting Attorney v Ginell, 159 Mich App 679, 681-682; 407 NW2d 59 (1987). To require plaintiff to prove that the same vehicle was used on numerous occasions for purposes proscribed by the statute would thwart the purpose of the public nuisance statute.
Defendants also argued that the trial court erred in finding that a public nuisance existed where the evidence failed to show that John Bennis engaged in more than one isolated instance of proscribed conduct. Defendants further argue that there was no evidence presented to establish that Bennis paid Palarchio for performing the sexual act and that the conduct between Bennis and Palarchio was consensual.
As I have stated, it is my opinion that when a vehicle is used for the purpose of lewdness, assignation, or prostitution, proof of a single instance of conduct will support a finding that the vehicle constitutes a public nuisance pursuant to MCL 600.3801; MSA 27A.3801. Additionally, I am convinced that sufficient evidence was presented to establish that the Bennises’ vehicle was used for the purpose of lewdness, assignation, or prostitution.
In State ex rel Macomb Co Prosecuting Attorney v Mesk, 123 Mich App 111; 333 NW2d 184 (1983), this Court noted that the Supreme Court, in State ex rel Wayne Co Prosecutor v Diversified Theatrical Corp, 396 Mich 244; 240 NW2d 460 (1976), found the meaning of the terms lewdness, assignation, and prostitution, as used in the abatement statute, to be clear. Mesk, p 116. Although the Court in Diversiñed Theatrical Corp did not expressly define the terms, it quoted from Chicago v *683Geraci, 30 Ill App 3d 699, 703; 332 NE2d 487 (1975), as follows:
However, we find no confusion in the meaning of these terms. Although traditionally the term "lewdness” is viewed as being broader than and including the term "prostitution,” . . . such terms refer to the same general class of activities which are normally associated with houses of prostitution (or whatever such establishments may be called). They are intended to designate and prohibit sex acts of whatever nature which are performed for money. [Citation omitted; emphasis in Diversified Theatrical Corp, 396 Mich 250, n 13.]
The majority states that John Bennis apparently was only charged with one count of gross indecency, MCL 750.338b; MSA 28.570(2), "presumably because there was no proof that the activities in which Mr. Bennis and Ms. Palarchio engaged were in exchange for payment.” However, a review of plaintiffs complaint reveals that Bennis and Palarchio were arrested and charged with indecent and immoral conduct, specifically, engaging the services of a prostitute, MCL 750.449a; MSA 28.704(1), and gross indecency between male and female persons, MCL 750.338b; MSA 28.570(2).
Testimony indicated that on March 3, 1988, John Bennis was driving home from work in the 1977 Pontiac automobile. Bennis stopped the car at the corner of Eight Mile and Sheffield, where a young woman, Palarchio, was standing. At the time Bennis stopped his vehicle, he was being observed by two Detroit police officers who were working undercover for the vice squad.
Before Bennis stopped his vehicle, the officers observed Palarchio "flagging” cars in an effort to get them to stop. When Bennis stopped his vehicle, Palarchio walked to the passenger’s side and en*684tered the car. Bennis drove down the street, made a U-turn, parked, and turned off the car’s headlights.
The officers followed, and parked approximately three car lengths behind the 1977 Pontiac. Officer Anthony testified that he saw two heads in the car, a female head on the right side and a male head on the left. Immediately after the officers parked their vehicle, the female head disappeared toward the driver’s side of the car. The officers approached the vehicle and observed Palarchio performing an act of fellatio on Bennis.
Officer Anthony testified that it was a known fact that Palarchio had been working as a prostitute. She had been arrested many times before on charges of accosting and soliciting, indecent and obscene conduct, and disorderly conduct. Palarchio had also been arrested for "flagging” vehicles in an attempt to get them to stop.
I would find that the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that John Bennis used his vehicle for the purpose of lewdness, assignation, or prostitution. The trial court could properly infer from all the evidence presented that John Bennis, while occupying the 1977 Pontiac, engaged the services of Palarchio for the purpose of lewdness, assignation, or prostitution. Clearly, prostitution includes an act of fellatio. Mesk, p 117.
Additionally, the trial court did not err in ordering abatement of the nuisance and extinguishing the proprietary interest of the innocent co-owner, Tina Bennis. As noted above, MCL 600.3815(2); MSA 27A.3815(2) obviated the requirement of proof of a defendant’s knowledge of the existence of the nuisance. Tate, Bitonti, Robinson, Weaver, supra. Plaintiff was not required to show knowledge on the part of Tina Bennis.
*685I would affirm the judgment of the trial court declaring defendants’ 1977 Pontiac automobile to be a nuisance and terminating their interest in the automobile.