Court Opinion

ID: 9776533
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:38:41.425524+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:39.518395
License: Public Domain

PHILLIPS, Chief Justice,
concurring.
I do not agree that a DTPA defendant who secures a finding that an action was brought for the purpose of harassment cannot recover attorney’s fees unless he also obtains a finding that the action was groundless. I, therefore, do not join in the court’s holding on that question.
This holding was not necessary to the disposition of this case, as Preston II did not complain of the trial court’s failure to find that the action was brought for the purpose of harassment. The court undertakes to decide this issue without the benefit of briefing or argument, rather than waiting until the question was properly before us.
Moreover, having undertaken to decide this issue, the court decides it wrongly. In my opinion, the plain language of the statute compels the opposite result. Prior to 1979, Tex.Bus. & Comm.Code § 17.50(c) provided as follows:
On a finding by the court that an action under this section was groundless and brought in bad faith or for the purpose of harassment the court may award to the defendant reasonable attorney’s fees in relation to the amount of work expended and court costs.
As amended, the section now reads:
On a finding by the court that an action under this section was groundless and brought in bad faith^, or brought for the purpose of harassment, the court shall award to the defendant reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and court costs. [Emphasis added.]
The underscored changes demonstrate the legislature’s intention that a finding of harassment alone will justify an award of attorney’s fees. As the court explained in Schott v. Leissner, 659 S.W.2d 752, 754 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1983), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 668 S.W.2d 686 (Tex.1984).
When the legislature amends a law, it is presumed that it intends to change the law. [Citations omitted.] We give effect to the legislature’s addition of the comma after the word “faith” and the insertion of the word “brought” a second time after the word “or” in the present version of section 17.50(c)_
Schott ... secured a finding that the suit against him was “brought for the purpose of harassment.” Therefore, under the present statute, as amended, he is entitled to his attorney’s fees.
[Emphasis original.] After this court refused to grant writ of error in Schott, the *640commentators have uniformly regarded this matter as settled. See, e.g., D. Bragg, P. Maxwell and J. Longley, Texas Consumer Litigation § 9.07 at Supp. 82 (2d ed. Cum.Supp.1988); W. Dorsaneo, 9 Texas Litigation Guide § 220.06[2][d] at 220-54 (1989); L. Hughes and T. Gavin, Commercial Torts and Deceptive Trade Practices, 39 Sw.LJ. 123, 147 (1985).
I admit that the distinction between “bad faith” and “harassment” is subtle, and the policy reasons for requiring one instance also to be groundless and not another are obscure. But this policy decision is one for the legislature, not the court, to make. Because I cannot justify our incursion into the legislative prerogative, I concur in the court’s decision.
GONZALEZ and COOK, JJ., join in this concurring opinion.