Court Opinion

ID: 9377618
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-08 16:00:52.69415+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:15.244739
License: Public Domain

20-4265
     Singh v. Garland
                                                                             BIA
                                                                   Christensen, IJ
                                                                   A209 937 952
                             UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                   SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

 1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
 2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
 3   United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
 4   New York, on the 8th day of March, two thousand twenty-
 5   three.
 6
 7   PRESENT:
 8            ROBERT D. SACK,
 9            DENNY CHIN,
10            RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
11                 Circuit Judges.
12   _____________________________________
13
14   KULWINDER SINGH,
15            Petitioner,
16
17                      v.                                  20-4265
18                                                          NAC
19   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
20   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
21            Respondent.
22   _____________________________________
23
24   FOR PETITIONER:                    Suraj Raj Singh, Esq., Richmond
25                                      Hill, NY.
26
27   FOR RESPONDENT:                    Brian M. Boynton, Acting Assistant
28                                      Attorney General; Kohsei Ugumori,
 1                                     Senior Litigation Counsel; David
 2                                     Kim, Trial Attorney, Office of
 3                                     Immigration Litigation, United
 4                                     States Department of Justice,
 5                                     Washington, DC.

 6         UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

 7   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

8    ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

9    is DENIED.

10         Petitioner Kulwinder Singh, a native and citizen of

11   India, seeks review of a December 14, 2020 decision of the

12   BIA affirming an April 19, 2018 decision of an Immigration

13   Judge   (“IJ”),     which    denied    his   application     for     asylum,

14   withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention

15   Against Torture (“CAT”).          In re Kulwinder Singh, No. A209 937

16   952 (B.I.A. Dec. 14, 2020), aff’g No. A209 937 952 (Immig.

17   Ct.   N.Y.   City   Apr.    19,   2018).       We   assume   the    parties’

18   familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.

19         We have reviewed both the IJ’s and BIA’s decisions “for

20   the sake of completeness.”            Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland

21   Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006).                  The applicable

22   standards of review are well established.                    See 8 U.S.C.

23   § 1252(b)(4)(B) (“[T]he administrative findings of fact are

24   conclusive    unless       any    reasonable    adjudicator        would   be
                                           2
 1   compelled to conclude to the contrary.”); Hong Fei Gao v.

 2   Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018) (reviewing adverse

 3   credibility determination “under the substantial evidence

 4   standard”).

 5         “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all

 6   relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility

 7   determination on the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of

 8   the   applicant . . . , the        inherent   plausibility    of   the

 9   applicant’s . . . account,         the   consistency     between   the

10   applicant’s     or    witness’s    written    and   oral   statements

11   . . . , the internal consistency of each such statement,

12   [and] the consistency of such statements with other evidence

13   of record . . . without regard to whether an inconsistency,

14   inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s

15   claim,     or   any    other      relevant    factor.”        8 U.S.C.

16   § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).             “We    defer . . . to      an    IJ’s

17   credibility determination unless . . . it is plain that no

18   reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility

19   ruling.”    Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir.

20   2008); accord Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76.                Substantial

21   evidence supports the adverse credibility determination.

                                         3
 1       As an initial matter, the agency did not err in relying

 2   on the record of Singh’s credible fear interview because it

 3   bears     sufficient    indicia   of    reliability:   while   not     a

 4   transcript, the interview is “memorialized in a typewritten

 5   document setting forth the questions put to [Singh] as well

 6   as [his] responses”; the interview was conducted with a

 7   Punjabi interpreter, whom Singh stated he could understand;

 8   and the asylum officer explained the purpose of the interview,

 9   the fact that Singh could seek clarification at any point,

10   and asked Singh questions about past and future harm that

11   were designed to elicit an asylum claim.               Ming Zhang v.

12   Holder, 585 F.3d 715, 725 (2d Cir. 2009).        As Singh’s credible

13   fear interview “was both (1) conducted in a non-coercive and

14   careful    manner,     and   (2) appropriately   documented    by    the

15   interviewing authorities . . . the record of that interview

16   was sufficiently reliable to merit consideration.”             Id. at

17   725–26 (quotation marks and citations omitted).

18       Secondly, the inconsistencies between that interview and

19   Singh’s testimony cut to the heart of Singh’s claim.            Singh

20   stated in his credible fear interview that he was attacked by

21   members of a rival political party on September 5, 2013 and

                                         4
 1   May 8, 2016, but he testified that the attacks occurred on

 2   April 5, 2016 and September 1, 2016.     See Xiu Xia Lin, 534

 3   F.3d at 167 (noting agency “may rely on any inconsistency”);

 4   Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 78 (“inconsistencies created by

 5   direct contradictions in evidence and testimony” are more

 6   probative than omissions).    The agency also reasonably relied

 7   on inconsistencies between Singh’s testimony and interview as

 8   to whether he recognized his attackers and was injured in the

 9   second attack, as well as whether he was approached or

10   threatened by rival party members prior to the first attack.

11   See Xian Tuan Ye v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 446 F.3d 289, 295

12   (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that a “material inconsistency in an

13   aspect of [the] story that served as an example of the very

14   persecution     from         which     [Petitioner]     sought

15   asylum . . . afforded substantial evidence to support the

16   adverse credibility finding”); see also Likai Gao v. Barr,

17   968 F.3d 137, 145 n.8 (2d Cir. 2020) (“[E]ven a single

18   inconsistency might preclude an alien from showing that an IJ

19   was compelled to find him credible. Multiple inconsistencies

20   would so preclude even more forcefully.”).       Moreover, the

21   agency was not required to accept Singh’s explanations that

                                     5
 1   he could not remember what he said in his interview or that

 2   he was scared.    See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d

 3   Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must do more than offer a plausible

 4   explanation for his inconsistent statements to secure relief;

 5   he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be

 6   compelled    to   credit   his   testimony.”    (quotation   marks

 7   omitted)).

 8       Finally, the agency reasonably found that Singh did not

 9   rehabilitate his claim with reliable corroboration.           “An

10   applicant’s failure to corroborate his . . . testimony may

11   bear on credibility, because the absence of corroboration in

12   general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony

13   that has already been called into question.”         Biao Yang v.

14   Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007).        Singh provided

15   letters from his parents, a witness to one of his attacks, a

16   friend, a local elected official from his hometown, a party

17   official, his Sikh temple in India, and a doctor he claimed

18   treated him after one of the attacks.          The IJ did not err

19   when it afforded this evidence minimal weight, as none of the

20   authors were available for cross examination, Singh’s parents

21   were interested witnesses, and the letter from his political

                                      6
 1   party   contained   an   erroneous   statement   that   Singh   was

 2   targeted by that party as well as the opposing party.           See

 3   Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 332, 334 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding

 4   that “[w]e generally defer to the agency’s evaluation of the

 5   weight to be afforded an applicant’s documentary evidence”

 6   and upholding BIA’s decision to afford little weight to letter

 7   from applicant’s spouse in China); see also Likai Gao, 968

 8   F.3d at 149 (concluding that “IJ acted within her discretion

 9   in according . . . little weight” to letters from applicant’s

10   wife and friend “because the declarants (particularly [the

11   applicant’s] wife) were interested parties and neither was

12   available for cross-examination”); Siewe v. Gonzales, 480

13   F.3d 160, 167 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Where there are two permissible

14   views of the evidence the factfinder’s choice between them

15   cannot be clearly erroneous.    Rather, a reviewing court must

16   defer to that choice so long as the deductions are not

17   illogical or implausible.” (quotation marks and citation

18   omitted)).

19       The inconsistencies and lack of reliable corroboration

20   provide substantial evidence for the adverse credibility

21   determination.   See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Likai Gao,

                                     7
 1   968 F.3d at 145 n.8; Biao Yang, 496 F.3d at 273.   This adverse

 2   credibility   determination    is   dispositive    of    asylum,

 3   withholding of removal, and CAT relief because all three forms

 4   of relief are based on the same discredited factual predicate.

 5   See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2006).

 6       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

 7   DENIED.   All pending motions and applications are DENIED and

8    stays VACATED.

 9                                 FOR THE COURT:
10                                 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
11                                 Clerk of Court

                                    8