Court Opinion

ID: 9898494
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:31:05.025488+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:08.187168
License: Public Domain

Filed
                                                                                        Washington State
                                                                                        Court of Appeals
                                                                                         Division Two

                                                                                          June 13, 2023

    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

                                         DIVISION II
 STATE OF WASHINGTON,                                               No. 57050-5-II

                               Respondent,

           v.

 WILLIAM ROBERT NAKAMURA,                                     UNPUBLISHED OPINION

                               Appellant.

       CRUSER, J. – In July 2021, William Nakamura was staying at his father’s home that was

partly rented out to several tenants, including Jermaine Michael Wilson Kelly. One night, Wilson

Kelly overheard Nakamura scream at someone to get out and he walked downstairs to investigate.

Nakamura verbally threatened Wilson Kelly with a rifle. After Wilson Kelly left the room to call

the police, he heard what sounded like a gun discharge into the ceiling and saw smoke coming

from the other room. While Wilson Kelly was attempting to exit the premises, Nakamura walked

out of the room with the gun in his hand, released the round, reloaded the rifle, and pointed it at

Wilson Kelly. Wilson Kelly exited the property unharmed. Nakamura was arrested and charged

with assault in the second degree, unlawful possession of a firearm in the second degree, and felony

harassment. A jury returned a verdict convicting Nakamura on all charges. Nakamura appeals,

arguing that his convictions for second degree assault and felony harassment violate double

jeopardy, and he contends that the felony harassment conviction, as the lesser offense, must be

vacated.
No. 57050-5-II

       We hold that Nakamura’s convictions for felony harassment and second degree assault

violate double jeopardy. We reverse Nakamura’s conviction for felony harassment and order the

trial court to vacate the felony harassment conviction on remand.

                                            FACTS

                                    I. UNDERLYING INCIDENT

       In July 2021, Wilson Kelly, his girlfriend, and another individual named Chrissy Peterson

lived in Ernie Nakamura’s house as tenants.1 At the time, Ernie’s son, William, resided at the

property as well. On the morning of July 8, 2021, Wilson Kelly heard a noise like a door getting

kicked in and somebody screaming “get the fuck out, get the fuck out.” Verbatim Rep. of Proc.

(VRP) at 74. Wilson Kelly ran downstairs to investigate. When Wilson Kelly arrived downstairs,

he saw that a door was kicked in and that William Nakamura was sitting on his father’s bed with

a rifle in his hand.2 Wilson Kelly told Nakamura that he could not force the roommate to leave

because she lived there and asked him why he had a gun. Wilson Kelly told Nakamura to put the

gun down and that the two should go outside to fight instead. Nakamura said, “don’t make me

shoot you.” Id. at 77. Wilson Kelly told Nakamura that he was “not going to shoot shit” and that

he was just going to sit there and run his mouth. Id. At this point, Nakamura told Wilson Kelly,

“don’t make me kill you.” Id. Wilson Kelly testified that he believed Nakamura was capable of

shooting and killing him.

1
  Spirit Hale and Orion Adamson were also in the residence at the time of the incident, but it is
unclear whether either of them were Ernie’s tenants and whether one of them was Wilson Kelly’s
girlfriend who lived in the house.
2
  The record does not disclose the name of the roommate that Nakamura was yelling at, however
it seems it was Chrissy Peterson.

                                                2
No. 57050-5-II

       Wilson Kelly then exited the room and called the police. While he was on the phone with

dispatch in the kitchen he heard a shot coming from the room that Nakamura and the other

roommate were in. Wilson Kelly heard a “boom,” saw smoke coming out of the room, and

observed that the property’s smoke alarm was going off. Id. at 78. This led Wilson Kelly to believe

that Nakamura fired the gun into the ceiling. The 911 dispatcher told Wilson Kelly to get outside.

As Wilson Kelly was walking through the living room to get outside, Nakamura walked out with

the gun in his hand, released the round, reloaded the rifle, and pointed it at Wilson Kelly. Wilson

Kelly told Nakamura that if Nakamura shot him, the police would shoot. Nakamura then lowered

the gun and Wilson Kelly exited the property unharmed. Nakamura was arrested after a six-and-

a-half-hour standoff with the police and subsequently charged with second degree assault, second

degree unlawful possession of a firearm, and felony harassment.

                                II. TRIAL AND JURY INSTRUCTIONS

       Two witnesses testified at trial consistent with the facts set forth above: Wilson Kelly and

Officer Jason Perkinson of the Aberdeen Police Department. However, the State’s case rested

primarily on Wilson Kelly’s testimony.3 When the prosecutor asked Wilson Kelly whether he was

scared, Wilson Kelly responded, “Hell, yeah. I mean, he just shot the gun in the house. He pointed

the gun at me. Hell, yea I was scared.” Id. at 79-80. In closing argument the State relied on Wilson

Kelly seeing Nakamura with the gun, the firing of the gun, and Wilson Kelly’s statement saying

that he was scared and in fear to prove the second degree assault charge. Likewise, the State

pointed to Nakamura’s verbal threat to Wilson Kelly, the firing of the gun into the ceiling,

3
 Nakamura stipulated to a prior felony conviction of assault in the third degree for the purpose of
determining his guilt on the second degree unlawful possession of a firearm charge.

                                                 3
No. 57050-5-II

Nakamura’s attempt to reload the gun, and the fact that Wilson Kelly said he was scared to prove

felony harassment.

         The trial court’s instruction 12 defined assault as:

         An assault is an act, with unlawful force, done with the intent to create in another
         apprehension and fear of bodily injury, and which in fact creates in another a
         reasonable apprehension and imminent fear of bodily injury even though the actor
         did not actually intend to inflict bodily injury.

Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 17.

         The trial court’s instruction 4 defined assault in the second degree:

         A person commits the crime of Assault in the Second Degree when he assaults
         another with a deadly weapon.

Id. at 15. Accordingly, the two elements that the State needed to prove second degree assault were

that (1) “on or about July 8, 2021, William Nakamura assaulted Jermaine Michael Wilson Kelly

with a deadly weapon,” and (2) “this act occurred in the State of Washington.” Id. at 16.

         The trial court’s instruction 6 defined felony harassment:

         A person commits the crime of Harassment when he, without lawful authority,
         knowingly threatens to cause bodily injury immediately or in the future to another
         person and when he by words or conduct places the person threatened in reasonable
         fear that the threat will be carried out and the threat to cause bodily harm consists
         of a threat to kill the threatened person or another person.

Id.

         The trial court’s instruction 18 stated that to convict Nakamura of the crime of harassment

as charged, the State had to prove each of the following elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt:

         1. That on or about July 8, 2021, William Nakamura knowingly threatened to kill
         Jermaine Michael Wilson Kelly immediately or in the future;
         2. That the words or conduct of William Nakamura placed Jermaine Michael
         Wilson Kelly in reasonable fear that the threat would be carried out;

                                                   4
No. 57050-5-II

         3. That William Nakamura acted without lawful authority; and
         4. That the threat was made or received in the State of Washington.

Id. at 18.

                                   III. VERDICT AND SENTENCING

         A jury found Nakamura guilty on all counts. The trial court found that the second degree

assault and felony harassment convictions were based on the same criminal conduct for the

purposes of sentencing. The trial court reasoned that the testimony demonstrated that it was “pretty

clear that it was the same victim, the same time, and, frankly, the same intent. It was to scare the

victim, make them believe they were going to be assaulted with a gun, but indeed they were not

actually physically assaulted.” VRP at 203. Nakamura appeals his convictions for second degree

assault and felony harassment.4

                                          DISCUSSION

                                       I. DOUBLE JEOPARDY

         Nakamura argues that his convictions for second degree assault and felony harassment

violate double jeopardy by punishing him multiple times for the same offense because the

convictions were the same in law and fact. Nakamura requests that we vacate the felony harassment

conviction because it is the lesser offense. The State argues that Nakamura’s convictions for

second degree assault and felony harassment did not violate jeopardy because as charged they were

neither the same in law nor in fact. We hold that Nakamura’s convictions violate double jeopardy.

4
    Nakamura does not appeal his conviction for second degree unlawful possession of a firearm.

                                                 5
No. 57050-5-II

A. LEGAL PRINCIPLES

       Under the United States and Washington constitutions, a defendant is provided a

constitutional guaranty against double jeopardy. U.S. CONST. amend. V; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 9.

The double jeopardy clause contains three guarantees. “First, it protects against a subsequent

prosecution for the same offense after an acquittal. Second, it protects against a subsequent

prosecution for the same offense after a conviction. Third, it protects against multiple punishments

for the same offense, imposed at a single criminal proceeding.” State v. Potter, 31 Wn. App. 883,

886, 645 P.2d 60 (1982). The protections against double jeopardy under the United States and

Washington constitutions are coextensive. State v. Muhammad, 194 Wn.2d 577, 600, 451 P.3d

1060 (2019) (plurality opinion). Because the legislature “has the power to define criminal conduct

and assign punishment for such conduct,” we cannot resolve a double jeopardy question “without

determining what punishments the legislative branch has authorized.” State v. Calle, 125 Wn.2d

769, 776, 888 P.2d 155 (1995).

       In making the determination of what punishments are authorized, we first look at the plain

language of the statutes at issue to see whether they “ ‘expressly authorize multiple punishments

for conduct that violates more than one statute.’ ” Muhammad, 194 Wn.2d at 617 (McCloud, J.,

concurring) (quoting State v. Louis, 155 Wn.2d 563, 569, 120 P.3d 936 (2005)); see also State v.

Freeman, 153 Wn.2d 765, 776, 108 P.3d 753 (2005). An example of this, as noted by the

concurrence in Muhammad, is the burglary anti-merger statute, in which the legislature stated

“[e]very person who, in the commission of a burglary shall commit any other crime, may be

punished therefor as well as for the burglary, and may prosecuted for each crime separately.” RCW

9A.52.050; Muhammad, 194 Wn.2d at 617 (McCloud, J., concurring). We undertake this step first

                                                 6
No. 57050-5-II

because if one or both of the statutes at issue contains express authorization for separate

punishment, we need not engage in further efforts at statutory construction. See In re Pers.

Restraint of Orange, 152 Wn.2d 795, 816, 100 P.3d 291 (2004); see also Muhammad, 194 Wn.2d

at 617 (McCloud, J., concurring).

        However, if we are unable to find such express statutory authorization, we then apply the

rule of statutory construction known as the “same evidence” test to determine whether the offenses

in question truly are the same. Muhammad, 194 Wn.2d at 617 (McCloud, J., concurring). Under

the same evidence test, a defendant’s double jeopardy rights are violated if the defendant is

convicted of offenses that are identical both in fact and in law, and there is no clear evidence of

contrary legislative intent. Calle, 125 Wn.2d at 777-82. We consider the elements of the crimes as

charged and proved, not merely on an abstract articulation of the elements. Muhammad, 194

Wn.2d at 620 (McCloud, J., concurring); Freeman, 153 Wn.2d at 777; Orange, 152 Wn.2d at 817-

20. Evidence of legislative intent can be found in the statute’s language, legislative history,

statutory structure, the fact the two statutes are directed at eliminating different evils, or any other

source of legislative intent. Freeman, 153 Wn.2d at 773; Calle, 125 Wn.2d at 776-81. It is

presumed that the legislature did not intend to punish criminal conduct twice when “ ‘the evidence

required to support a conviction upon one of [the charged crimes] would have been sufficient to

warrant a conviction upon the other.’ ” Freeman, 153 Wn.2d at 776 (emphasis omitted) (alteration

in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Orange, 152 Wn.2d at 820). We must

determine whether each statutory provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not. See

Orange, 152 Wn.2d at 818.

                                                   7
No. 57050-5-II

       If, after examining the record and applying the same evidence test we find that the State

relied on distinct acts for the prosecution of the separate offenses, then the offenses are not the

same in fact and the double jeopardy inquiry ends. See State v. Peña Fuentes, 179 Wn.2d 808, 826,

318 P.3d 257 (2014)5 ; see also Muhammad, 194 Wn.2d at 601.

       Sometimes an offense is identical in fact but different in law, as in the case of rape when

committed against a family member and incest. Calle, 125 Wn.2d at 778, 782. The statutes

proscribing rape and incest contain different elements and each requires proof of a fact the other

does not. Id. at 778. In such a case, the offenses are not the same and there is a presumption that

multiple punishments are therefore authorized. Id. at 780-82. A defendant may overcome this

presumption, however, by showing “clear indication of contrary legislative intent” that only a

single punishment is intended for crimes arising from the singular act in question. Id. at 778.

       In Calle, the court examined legislative intent and concluded that contrary to the

defendant’s contention otherwise, the legislature intended separate punishments for rape and incest

arising out of a single act. 125 Wn.2d at 780-82. This was so, the court held, because of the

different purposes served by the two statutes, the placement of the statutes in different sections of

the criminal code, and the fact that rape and incest were punished separately since before statehood.

Id. at 780-82.

5
              On this record, it is clear that the rape count was exclusively based on the
      two specific acts of penetration, and the molestation counts were exclusively based
      on the inappropriate behavior other than those two acts of penetration. Because of
      the clarity in the prosecutor's closing argument, we believe it is ‘manifestly
      apparent’ that the jury convicted Peña Fuentes based on separate and distinct acts.
Peña Fuentes, 179 Wn.2d at 826

                                                 8
No. 57050-5-II

       A different result was reached by this court in Potter, 31 Wn. App. at 886-89. In Potter,

the defendant was found guilty of both reckless endangerment and reckless driving for the same

singular act of driving his car in a reckless manner. 31 Wn. App. at 884-85. We observed that the

elements of the two crimes were different:

       [W]e note that reckless endangerment has a general conduct element while reckless
       driving can arise only out of the operation of a vehicle. If we compare these two
       elements without reference to what actually occurred, it is apparent that reckless
       endangerment can be committed without committing reckless driving.

Id. at 887–88.

       We then noted that despite the apparent dissimilarity of law, when reckless endangerment

is committed by the reckless operation of a vehicle the offenses became the same in law: “If,

however, the statutory elements are compared in light of what did in fact occur, we observe that

proof of reckless endangerment through use of an automobile will always establish reckless

driving.” Id. at 888 (emphasis omitted). We went on to express concern about “the efficacy of the

Blockburger test when the result turns on such subtle distinctions.” Id.

       Relevant here, where it is difficult to ascertain which act or acts a jury relied on to reach

its verdict and the verdict is therefore ambiguous, the rule of lenity applies and we resolve the

ambiguity in favor of the defendant. State v. Booth, 24 Wn. App. 2d 586, 614, 521 P.3d 196 (2022),

review denied, 1 Wn.3d 1006 (2023); see also Muhammad, 194 Wn.2d at 617, 620-22 (McCloud,

J., concurring); State v. Kier, 164 Wn.2d 798, 811-14, 194 P.3d 212 (2008) (applying rule of lenity

where jury’s verdict was ambiguous regarding robbery and assault convictions). It must be clear,

after considering the arguments made to the jury, the evidence, and the court’s instructions, that it

was manifestly apparent to the jury that the state was not seeking dual punishments for same

offense to avoid a double jeopardy violation. State v. Mutch, 171 Wn.2d 646, 664, 254 P.3d 803

                                                 9
No. 57050-5-II

(2011). When double jeopardy has been violated, the remedy is to vacate the lesser offense and

enter judgment solely on the greater offense. State v. Weber, 159 Wn.2d 252, 279, 149 P.3d 646

(2006) (holding that proper remedy for double jeopardy violation is to vacate the conviction

carrying lesser sentence); see also State v. Hughes, 166 Wn.2d 675, 686 n.13, 212 P.3d 558 (2009).

We review a double jeopardy claim de novo because it presents questions of law. Hughes, 166

Wn.2d at 681.

       With these principles and authorities in mind, we turn to the merits of Nakamura’s double

jeopardy claim.

B. ANALYSIS

       1. Explicit Legislative Intent

       Neither the felony harassment nor the second degree assault statutes explicitly disclose

whether separate punishments are authorized for the same conduct. RCW 9A.46.020(1), (2)(b);

RCW 9A.36.021(1)(c). As a result, we apply the same evidence test and then determine whether

there is clear evidence of contrary legislative intent to overcome the presumption that these

offenses should be punished separately. Calle, 125 Wn.2d at 777-82; see also Muhammad, 194

Wn.2d at 617-22 (McCloud, J., concurring).

       2. Same in fact

       Nakamura argues that the State relied on the same factual transaction to support both the

felony harassment and assault second degree charges. The State disagrees, arguing in its brief that

the felony harassment was based on Nakamura saying to Wilson Kelly, while sitting on the bed

holding a rifle, “ ‘don’t make me shoot you,’ ” and “ ‘don’t make me kill you,’ ” followed by

Nakamura shooting the gun toward the ceiling after Wilson Kelly had gone into the kitchen. Br.

                                                10
No. 57050-5-II

of Resp’t at 20. The State then argues that the second degree assault was based on Nakamura

entering the living room with the rifle in his hand, releasing a round from the gun, and pointing it

at Wilson Kelly.

       What the State ignores is that in its closing argument to the jury, the prosecutor expressly

relied on the same act to support both charges. As to the assault count, the entirety of the State’s

argument was as follows:

       An assault is an act with unlawful force done with intent to create in another
       apprehension and fear of bodily injury.

              You heard from the victim today, that he saw Mr. Nakamura with the gun,
       that Mr. Nakamura fired that gun, and that he was scared and that he was in fear.
       You could - he told you and explained that to you. And you can - you could see
       how upset he was when he was talking about it.

VRP at 153-54.

       As to the felony harassment count, the entirety of the State’s argument was as follows:

               Then moving to [Instruction] Number 18, to convict of harassment. That
       William Nakamura . . . knowingly threatened to kill Jermaine Wilson Kelly in the
       immediate future. You heard Mr. Wilson Kelly tell you, don’t make me shoot
       somebody, and he fired the gun at the ceiling and tried to reload it. He told you that
       he threatened his life there. He told you that he – that he was scared. He told you -
       you know, he even made the comment that he had a gun, of course I was scared.

               [Instruction] Number 19 says that threat to communicate is directly or
       indirectly with the intent to cause bodily injury. Even if there weren’t words to say
       I’m going to shoot you, don’t make me shoot someone, he fired a weapon in the
       direction of somebody else, then went to go reload it, and that would be indirectly
       threatening somebody.

Id. at 155-56.

       Thus, the State argued to the jury that Nakamura’s act in firing the gun at the ceiling while

in the bedroom was the act that formed the basis of both the assault and the harassment charge.

Importantly, it is the argument to the jury that is relevant to our analysis, not the argument now

                                                11
No. 57050-5-II

made on appeal. See Peña Fuentes, 179 Wn.2d at 825-26; State v. Sanford, 15 Wn. App. 2d 748,

755-58, 477 P.3d 72 (2020). At minimum, the State’s differing assertions of the act it relied on to

support each count requires us to apply the rule of lenity and conclude that if, in fact, the State was

relying on separate acts for each count, that was not made manifestly apparent to the jury. Booth,

24 Wn. App. 2d at 614; Sanford, 15 Wn. App. 2d at 756-58. Indeed, as it relates to the assault

charge, the State made no mention of what occurred in the living room or Nakamura’s pointing of

the gun at Wilson Kelly after he came out of the bedroom.

       Moreover, the testimony at trial further belies the State’s argument on appeal. Wilson Kelly

testified that he did not believe that Nakamura planned to shoot him when Nakamura said “don’t

make me shoot you.” VRP at 77. And while Wilson Kelly testified that he thought Nakamura was

capable of shooting and killing him, that is distinct from fearing that Nakamura would actually

shoot him. When the State asked Wilson Kelly about his subjective fear, Wilson Kelly stated “Hell,

yeah. I mean, he just shot the gun in the house. He pointed the gun at me. Hell, yeah. I was scared.”

Id. at 79-80. Notably, the shooting of the gun into the ceiling occurred in the bedroom and the

pointing of the gun occurred in the living room. They were separate acts. The State made no

attempt to differentiate when the felony harassment stopped and the assault began.

       These ambiguities must be resolved in Nakamura’s favor because the State’s evidence did

not make it manifestly apparent to the jury that the felony harassment and second degree assault

counts were based on separate and distinct conduct. Mutch, 171 Wn.2d at 664; Sanford, 15 Wn.

App. 2d at 756-58; see also Peña Fuentes, 179 Wn.2d at 825-26. We must conclude that the State

                                                  12
No. 57050-5-II

relied on the same factual transaction to support both charges. Sanford, 15 Wn. App. 2d at 756-58.

We next examine whether the convictions are the same in law.6

       3. Same in law

       To convict Nakamura of felony harassment, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable

doubt that he knowingly threatened to kill Wilson Kelly and that Wilson Kelly was placed in

reasonable fear that the threat to kill would be carried out. RCW 9A.46.020(1), (2)(b). In contrast,

to convict Nakamura of second degree assault as charged in this case, the State had to prove beyond

a reasonable doubt that Nakamura assaulted Wilson Kelly with a deadly weapon. RCW

9A.36.021(1)(c).

       Thus, in the abstract, second degree assault and felony harassment are not the same in law

because each crime has different elements and requires proof of a fact which the other does not.

Compare RCW 9A.36.021(1)(c), with RCW 9A.46.020(1), (2)(b). For example, the use of a deadly

weapon is not required to prove felony harassment, while it is required to prove the means of

second degree assault charged in this case. Compare CP at 16, with CP at 15. Additionally, felony

harassment requires a threat to kill, as well as subjective fear on the part of the victim that the

threat to kill will be carried out, whereas second degree assault merely requires an act that creates

in another a reasonable apprehension and imminent fear of bodily injury. Compare Id. at 16, with

6
  Although the jury was instructed that a separate crime was charged in each count and they must
decide each count separately, they were not instructed that the felony harassment and assault
second degree charges must be based on separate and distinct acts. See Sanford, 15 Wn. App. 2d
at 754 (noting that absence of separate and distinct acts instruction is a double jeopardy violation
if it was not “ ‘manifestly apparent to the jury that the State [was] not seeking to impose multiple
punishments for the same offense’ and that each count was based on a separate act.” (emphasis
omitted) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mutch, 171 Wn.2d at
664)).

                                                 13
No. 57050-5-II

Id. at 17. There is no requirement for second degree assault that the victim fear death, and no

requirement that the victim’s fear be reasonable. Id. at 15-17.

       However, our inquiry is not limited to an examination of the abstract elements of the

offenses as charged. We must also consider the elements of the crimes as proved. Muhammad, 194

Wn.2d at 620 (McCloud, J., concurring); Freeman, 153 Wn.2d at 777. For example, in Orange,

the court refused to generically compare the elements of the two charged crimes to determine

whether the convictions were the same in law. 152 Wn.2d at 817-20. There the court concluded

that the defendant’s convictions for first degree attempted murder and first degree assault were the

same in law because the evidence required to support the conviction for first degree attempted

murder was sufficient to convict the defendant of first degree assault. Id. at 820.

       Here, like in Orange, Nakamura’s convictions were the same in law because the evidence

required to support the conviction of felony harassment was sufficient to convict Nakamura of

second degree assault as proved by the State. Id. The evidence required to support the conviction

of felony harassment was sufficient to convict Nakamura of second degree assault because it is

unclear whether the jury relied on the same acts to convict Nakamura of felony harassment and

second degree assault. The jury may have relied on the gun shot and Nakamura’s act of then

reloading and pointing the gun at Wilson Kelly to convict him of both crimes. We apply the rule

of lenity to resolve the ambiguity. Booth, 24 Wn. App. 2d at 614; see also Muhammad, 194 Wn.2d

at 617, 620-22 (McCloud, J., concurring); Kier, 164 Wn.2d at 811-14. Under the rule of lenity, we

assume that the jury relied on the same acts to convict Nakamura of both felony harassment and

second degree assault. Booth, 24 Wn. App. 2d at 614; see also Kier, 164 Wn.2d at 811-14.

Therefore, we conclude that under the unique circumstances of this case Nakamura’s convictions

                                                 14
No. 57050-5-II

for felony harassment and second degree assault were the same in law after considering the

elements of the crimes as proved.

       4. No contrary legislative intent

       Having concluded, after application of the same evidence test, that under the unique facts

of this case the offenses are the same, and that dual punishments are therefore presumptively not

authorized, we must next consider whether there is clear evidence of contrary legislative intent

showing that these offenses should be punished separately. Muhammad, 194 Wn.2d at 620

(McCloud, J., concurring); Calle, 125 Wn.2d at 780.

       Here there is no clear evidence demonstrating a legislative intent to punish felony

harassment and assault separately when they are predicated on the same distinct act and cause the

same distinct harm. Importantly, the crimes as charged and proven in this case address the same

societal concern: threatening another person with a gun and inflicting terror on the victim. Finally,

we discern no independent purpose or effect for these offenses under these unique facts. See State

v. Mandanas, 163 Wn. App. 712, 718, 262 P.3d 522 (2011).7 We do not find the clear evidence

necessary to overcome the strong presumption that the two offenses are the same in this case. We

conclude that the legislature did not intend, under these particular facts, that multiple punishments

should be imposed for felony harassment and second degree assault.

7
  We note that the Mandanas Court opined that the felony harassment and second degree assault
statutes seek to address different societal harms. Mandanas, 163 Wn. App. at 719-720. In that case,
the defendant pointed a gun at the victim and threatened to kill him, and also repeatedly pistol
whipped the defendant on the head with the gun. Id. at 715, 721. The court went on to note that
the crimes in that case were predicated on distinct acts, making it distinguishable from this case.
Id. at 721. It is unclear why the Mandanas Court felt compelled to discuss the same evidence test
and legislative intent given their holding that the crimes were predicated on separate and distinct
acts.

                                                 15
No. 57050-5-II

        Therefore, we conclude that Nakamura’s convictions for second degree assault and felony

harassment violate double jeopardy because they were the same offense and there is no clear

evidence of contrary legislative intent to punish these offenses separately.

                                         CONCLUSION

        We hold that Nakamura’s convictions for second degree assault and felony harassment

violate double jeopardy. Because the judgment and sentence reveal that assault in the second

degree is the more serious offense of the two, we reverse Nakamura’s conviction for felony

harassment and order it vacated on remand.

        A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,

it is so ordered.

                                                     CRUSER, J.
 We concur:

 LEE, J.

 GLASGOW, C.J.

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