Court Opinion

ID: 9367712
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-01 18:01:00.645903+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:02.868468
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 21-14210    Document: 43-1      Date Filed: 02/01/2023   Page: 1 of 10

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 21-14210
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiff-Appellee,
        versus
        MINNELA ORDIN MOORE,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cr-20153-KMM-1
                           ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                 21-14210

        Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Minnela Ordin Moore appeals following his conviction and
        sentence for one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm,
        18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Moore asserts the district court clearly
        erred, in connection with denying his motion to suppress, by find-
        ing that police did not unreasonably extend his detention and by
        finding police secured consent to search his bag. Moore also con-
        tends the district court plainly erred at sentencing because a 2018
        conviction for violating Fla. Stat. § 893.13 did not qualify as a con-
        trolled substance offense for U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 purposes. After re-
        view, we affirm.
                                  I. DISCUSSION
        A. Unreasonable Extension of Detention
               In response to a domestic violence 911 call, City of Miami
        Police Department Officers arrived on the scene to find a female
        who identified Moore as the man that had assaulted her. Moore
        asserts that police unlawfully prolonged his detention as officers
        said they were prepared to release him if either he or the alleged
        victim had another place to go, meaning that officers no longer
        had a reasonable suspicion to think he had assaulted the alleged
        victim. He also asserts the police unlawfully detained him by in-
        vestigating a nearby disturbance that unlawfully delayed his de-
        tention.
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        21-14210                  Opinion of the Court                     3

                The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable searches
        and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “Evidence obtained in vio-
        lation of the Fourth Amendment must be suppressed.” United
        States v. Jordan, 635 F.3d 1181, 1185 (11th Cir. 2011). Under the
        Fourth Amendment, law enforcement officers may conduct a
        brief, investigatory stop, known as a Terry 1 stop, when (1) the of-
        ficers have reasonable suspicion the suspect is involved in criminal
        activity and (2) the stop is “reasonably related in scope to the cir-
        cumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” Id.
        at 1186 (quotation marks omitted). We look to the totality of the
        circumstances to determine the existence of reasonable suspicion.
        Id.
               Officers do not have “unfettered authority to detain a per-
        son indefinitely” even if they have reasonable suspicion. United
        States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 881 (11th Cir. 2022). “The de-
        tention is limited in scope and duration”; officers must conduct
        their investigation diligently, and cannot unlawfully prolong a
        stop. Id. (quotation marks omitted). “Unrelated inquiries are
        permitted so long as they do not add time to the stop.” Id. at 882.
        “[A] stop is unlawfully prolonged when an officer, without rea-
        sonable suspicion, diverts from the stop’s purpose and adds time
        to the stop in order to investigate other crimes.” Id. at 884. “In
        other words, to unlawfully prolong, the officer must (1) conduct
        an unrelated inquiry aimed at investigating other crimes (2) that

        1 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                21-14210

        adds time to the stop (3) without reasonable suspicion.” Id. “If an
        officer prolongs a stop, any evidence uncovered as a result may be
        suppressed.” Id. at 885.
               Police did not unlawfully prolong Moore’s detention, and
        the district court did not err in denying suppression based on this
        ground. See Jordan, 635 F.3d at 1185 (stating, in reviewing a mo-
        tion to suppress, we review the district court’s factual findings for
        clear error and its application of the law to the facts de novo). Of-
        ficers were diligently carrying out the investigation throughout
        the time Moore was detained and the officers’ discussion regard-
        ing an incident nearby did not amount to investigating other of-
        fenses. First, police had reasonable suspicion to stop or detain
        Moore based on the initial call and report of an altercation. As for
        reasonable suspicion to continue the stop, the alleged victim said
        that there was a video of the assault on her cellphone, but Moore
        had deleted it. She had sent the video to a friend and was trying
        to get a copy back from the friend. Officer Earl Simington testi-
        fied that he and Officer Nentwig were waiting at the scene for the
        video evidence the alleged victim had stated was being sent to her
        phone. Additionally, Officer Simington testified it was important
        to wait for the evidence, especially because if the evidence had
        materialized they would have arrested Moore for assault. Con-
        struing this evidence in the light most favorable to the Govern-
        ment as the prevailing party, police retained reasonable suspicion
        over the case as they were diligently conducting their investiga-
        tion by waiting for more evidence to arrive. Campbell, 26 F.4th at
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        21-14210               Opinion of the Court                         5

        881; United States v. Gordon, 231 F.3d 750, 754 (11th Cir. 2000)
        (stating we construe the facts in the light most favorable to the
        prevailing party).
               Officers did not unlawfully prolong Moore’s detention
        when the separate disturbance occurred. Officer Simington testi-
        fied that discussing a plan in case the disturbance escalated was
        part of his work as was investigating the disturbance for safety
        reasons. Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to
        the Government, this does not qualify as investigating criminal
        activity unrelated to the stop. Campbell, 26 F.4th at 884. Neither
        officer appeared to be using the opportunity to investigate crimes
        more generally, but rather the ultimate purpose of creating the
        plan related back to maintaining the safety of the current investi-
        gation.
        B. Consent to Search
               Moore contends the length of his detention, the presence
        of armed officers, the repeated questions by police, the assump-
        tion he was the sole wrongdoer, the repeated requests for consent
        to search his bag, the continued detention despite other incidents
        and repeated claims by the alleged victim, and his psychological
        vulnerability due to his mental illnesses, potential illegal drug use,
        and the ongoing situation pointed toward police conduct being
        coercive.
              The Fourth Amendment protects against searches without
        probable cause. U.S. Const. amend. IV. A search is reasonable
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        6                        Opinion of the Court                    21-14210

        and does not require a warrant if law enforcement obtain volun-
        tary consent. United States v. Spivey, 861 F.3d 1207, 1213 (11th
        Cir. 2017). Determining voluntariness is an inquiry conducted on
        a case-by-case analysis based on the totality of the circumstances.
        Id. Relevant factors to consider include the “voluntariness of the
        defendant’s custodial status, the presence of coercive police pro-
        cedure, the extent and level of a defendant cooperation with po-
        lice, the defendant’s awareness of his right to refuse to consent to
        the search, the defendant’s education and intelligence, and, signif-
        icantly, the defendant’s belief that no incriminating evidence will
        be found.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
               “Coercion is determined from the perspective of the sus-
        pect.” Id. at 1215 (quotation marks omitted). Coercion includes
        intimidation, threats and physical or psychological abuse. United
        States v. Jones, 475 F.2d 723, 730 (5th Cir. 1973). 2 Coercion is
        more easily found if the person consenting to the search has been
        placed under arrest. See United States v. Hall, 565 F.2d 917, 920
        (5th Cir. 1978). Interrogations of “exhaustively long duration”
        weigh against the voluntariness of consent. See Miller v. Dugger,
        838 F.2d 1530, 1537 (11th Cir. 1988).
              Weighing the totality of the circumstances, the district
        court did not err in determining Moore’s consent was voluntary.

        2 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en
        banc), this Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former
        Fifth Circuit handed down prior to close of business on September 30, 1981.
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        21-14210              Opinion of the Court                       7

        As for Moore’s custodial status, he was detained by officers
        throughout his detention, but he was able to move around the
        yard, play with his dogs, and was not handcuffed. Spivey,
        861 F.3d at 1213. Additionally, there was no coercion as there
        were no threats, intimidation, physical or psychological abuse,
        and the questioning was not “exhaustively long,” although there
        was some repeated questioning by Officer Simington to see the
        bag. These facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the pre-
        vailing party, weigh in favor of voluntariness. Id.; Gordon, 231
        F.3d at 754. Moore’s actions after Officer Simington found the
        pistol imply that Moore understood he should not be in posses-
        sion of the firearm, which does not weigh in favor of voluntari-
        ness. Spivey, 861 F.3d at 1213. Further, although Officer Sim-
        ington did not inform Moore of his right to refuse consent to
        search, Officer Simington did not have to inform Moore of that.
        Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 234 (1973) (stating
        knowledge of a right to refuse consent is not a perquisite to vol-
        untary consent). The factors supporting the consent was volun-
        tary outweigh those supporting that it was involuntary, and thus
        we affirm the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress.
        C. Controlled Substance Offenses
               Moore argues, for the first time on appeal, that his 2018
        Florida conviction for possession of cannabis with intent to sell,
        manufacture or deliver the same, did not qualify as a controlled
        substance offense at the time of his 2021 sentencing. Specifically,
        Moore contends that at the time he was convicted in 2018, the
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                  21-14210

        Florida drug schedule included a broader definition of cannabis
        than current federal or state law.
               Arguments raised for the first time in a criminal appeal are
        reviewed for plain error. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725,
        731 (1993). To prove plain error, a defendant must show there is
        an error, that is plain, that affects substantial rights, and the error
        seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of ju-
        dicial proceedings. United States v. Monroe, 353 F.3d 1346, 1349
        (11th Cir. 2003). “An error is plain if it is obvious and clear under
        current law.” United States v. Eckhardt, 466 F.3d 938, 948 (11th
        Cir. 2006). Unless the explicit language of a statute or rule specifi-
        cally resolves an issue, there can be no plain error without prece-
        dent from the Supreme Court or this Court directly resolving the
        issue. United States v. Hesser, 800 F.3d 1310, 1325 (11th Cir.
        2015).
               Under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2), a district court shall assign a
        defendant a base offense level of 24 if he committed the offense of
        conviction subsequent to sustaining at least two felony convic-
        tions of a controlled substance offense. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2).
        Under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b), a controlled substance offense is de-
        fined as an offense under federal or state law, punishable by im-
        prisonment for a term exceeding one year, that prohibits the
        manufacture, import, export, distribution, or dispensing of a con-
        trolled substance or the possession of a controlled substance with
        the intent to do the same. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b).
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        21-14210                  Opinion of the Court                               9

               At the time of Moore’s sentencing, the Florida Controlled
        Substances Act prohibited the sale, manufacture, or delivery, or
        possession with the intent to do the same, of a controlled sub-
        stance. Fla. Stat. § 893.13(1)(a) (2021). One such controlled sub-
        stance is cannabis. Fla. Stat. § 893.03(1)(c) (2021). Florida defined
        cannabis as all parts of any plant of the genus Cannabis, whether
        growing or not; the seeds thereof; the resin extracted from any
        part of the plant; and every compound, manufacture, salt, deriva-
        tive, mixture, or preparation of the plant or its seeds or resin, but
        that does not include hemp. Fla. Stat. § 893.02(3) (2021). At the
        time of Moore’s 2018 cannabis offense, hemp was still included as
        part of the cannabis definition. Fla. Stat. § 893.02(3) (2018).
               The district court did not plainly err. See Olano, 507 U.S. at
        731. There are no cases published by this Court or the Supreme
        Court holding whether to apply the version of a controlled sub-
        stance offense from the time of earlier conviction or the time of
        the sentencing in the current case for the purpose of determining
        whether it is a controlled substance offense under U.S.S.G.
        § 4B1.2(b). 3 Therefore, as there is no precedent from the Su-

        3 In United States v. Jackson, 55 F.4th 846, 855 (11th Cir. 2022), we recently
        held that McNeill v. United States, 563 U.S. 816 (2011) required us to read the
        Armed Career Criminal Act’s definition of a “serious drug offense” under
        state law to incorporate the version of the federal controlled-substances
        schedules in effect when the defendant was convicted of his prior state drug
        offenses. We have no such precedent as it relates to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b).
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        10                   Opinion of the Court               21-14210

        preme Court or this Court directly resolving the issue, there can
        be no plain error. See Hesser, 800 F.3d at 1325.
                               II. CONCLUSION
              We affirm Moore’s conviction and sentence.
              AFFIRMED.