Court Opinion

ID: 9831708
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:18:34.566271+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:37.215390
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
After a reconsideration of our former holding in this case to the effect that appellant is not liable on its policy of insurance and reversing and rendering judgment for it, we have concluded from the current authorities that we were in error in holding that the language in the policy was such as to exempt the appellant, insurance company, under the circumstances from responsibility for the result of the accident to appellee.
The undisputed evidence shows that the disability of appellee lasted for eight weeks and five days, caused “through external, violent or accidental means” as provided by the policy. The policy was a general accident policy expressly insuring against bodily injuries resulting in death, disability, etc., but does not by express language stipulate against liability for bodily injury which might result in cerebral hemorrhage. Not having used some express language to note the exemption, the general insurance clause will be held binding, and the insurance company liable. In support of this proposition we cite Bryant v. Casualty Co., 107 Tex. 582, 182 S. W. 675, L. R. A. 1916E, 945, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 517; Insurance Co. v. Hunter, 30 Tex. Civ. App. 489, 70 S. W. 798; Insurance Co. v. Harvey, 129 Ill. App. 104; Garvey v. Insurance Co., 123 App. Div. 106, 108 N. Y. Supp. *469186: Hall v. Association, 86 Wis. 518, 57 N. W. 366; Summers v. Aid Ass’n, 84 Mo. App. 605: Goodes v. Order United Commercial Travelers of America, 174 Mo. App. 330, 156 S. W. 995; Moon v. Order United Commercial Travelers of America, 96 Neb. 65, 146 N. W. 1037, 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1205, Ann. Cas. 1916B, 222; Rheinheimer v. Insurance Co., 77 Ohio St. 360, 83 N. E. 491, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 245; Omberg v. Association, 101 Ky. 303, 40 S. W. 909, 72 Am. St. Rep. 413; Cary v. Insurance Co., 127 Wis. 67, 106 N. W. 1055, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 926, 115 Am. St. Rep. 997, 7 Ann. Cas. 484; Accident Ass’n v. Alexander, 104 Ga. 709, 30 S. E. 939, 48 L. R. A. 188.
The insurance company is claiming exemption on account of an intervening secondary cause, that of hemorrhage, when the loss was caused by paralysis, which resulted from an external bodily injury which was the proximate causa of the disability.
In the case of Insurance Co. v. Hunter, supra, where Hunter was insured in an accident policy against death, “the evidence disclosed that the injury produced rheumatism, and that heart trouble followed therefrom, and death [resulted] from heart trouble.” The late Mr. Bookhout, then of this court, said:
“If the rheumatism which produced the death of Hunter was not caused by an accidental injury, then the company is not liable; but if such rheumatism was caused by the accidental injury, and was but a mere link in the chain of causation between the accident and death, then the death is attributable, not to the disease, but to the accident alone.”
In this case the appellee’s disability is attributable to the injury and the appellant is liable on its policy.
The authorities cited above support the principle announced in the Hunter Case, to which we adhere, and grant the motion for a rehearing and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
On Second Motion for Rehearing.
At a former sitting in this term of court we reversed and rendered the judgment for appellant in this cause. Subsequently we granted appellee’s motion for rehearing and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Now we are called upon by the appellant to reconsider that action and to reverse and render in its favor.
The point at issue has given us considerable trouble. Both counsel have presented exhaustive and able briefs and arguments and are to be commended for their zeal and efforts. After reconsidering the issue involved and further reviewing the authorities presented, we have concluded that the last construction we have placed upon the contract is not supported by the trend of authorities, i. e., that the clause, exempting appellant from the result of “cerebral hemorrhage.” is not broad and comprehensive enough to exempt appellant from liability for the accident. But after a more careful reconsideration of the authorities we have reached the conclusion that said clause does exempt the appellant from liability and that we were wrong in holding that it did not. To illustrate, one of the cases mainly relied on by us for holding said exemption clause was not sufficiently comprehensive to exempt appellant from liability was the case of Insurance Co. v. Hunter, 30 Tex. Civ. App. 489, 70 S. W. 798. In that case suit was brought on an accident policy that had no exemption clause, as in this case, and the conclusions there reached were correct but not applicable here.
We are of the opinion that we erred in granting appellee a rehearing, and now grant appellant’s motion for rehearing and return to our original holding reversing and rendering the judgment in favor of appellant