Court Opinion

ID: 9397605
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-25 18:01:06.958281+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:26.161847
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-13123      Document: 39-1      Date Filed: 05/25/2023   Page: 1 of 11

                                                      [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                      In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                           For the Eleventh Circuit

                             ____________________

                                   No. 22-13123
                             Non-Argument Calendar
                             ____________________

        KEITH TAIG,
        individually, and on behalf of others similarly situated,
                                                         Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        CITY OF VERO BEACH,
        LIEUTENANT JOHN PENDERSEN,
        in his individual capacity,
        DETECTIVE PHIL HUDDY,
        in his individual capacity,
        DETECTIVE SEAN CROWLEY,
        in his individual capacity,
        DETECTIVE MIKE GASBARRINI, et al.,
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                 22-13123

                                                      Defendants-Appellees.

                             ____________________

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Southern District of Florida
                      D.C. Docket No. 9:21-cv-80391-RLR
                            ____________________

        Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and JORDAN and BRANCH, Cir-
        cuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Keith Taig appeals the dismissal of his complaint against the
        City of Vero Beach and the summary judgment in favor of Chief
        David Currey, retired Captain Kevin Martin, Lieutenant John
        Pedersen, Detective Phil Huddy, Detective Sean Crowley, and De-
        tective Mike Gasbarrini. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Taig filed a putative class
        action alleging violations of his Fourth Amendment rights after the
        police department monitored and recorded him during its investi-
        gation of prostitution, racketeering, and human trafficking at a
        massage spa. The district court dismissed the complaint against the
        city for failure to state a claim and entered summary judgment in
        favor of the officers based on qualified immunity. We affirm.
                                I. BACKGROUND
              After police began receiving anonymous complaints about a
        local massage spa, the police department’s special investigations
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        22-13123                 Opinion of the Court                            3

        unit and the United States Department of Homeland Security be-
        gan investigating the spa for suspected prostitution, racketeering,
        and human trafficking. An undercover detective visited the spa
        twice in September 2018, and both times he was asked if he wanted
        sexual acts performed for money. Officers spoke with two men
        who had left the spa, and both men reported that a woman had
        offered them sexual acts in exchange for money. Officers con-
        ducted trash pulls and retrieved items including used condoms and
        tissues with semen on them. Three weeks of surveillance revealed
        that women working at the spa slept there overnight, and the spa
        had only male customers. Based on these findings, officers sought
        an order authorizing surreptitious video surveillance inside the spa.
                On November 27, 2018, a state judge issued an “Order for
        the Surreptitious Entry and Installation of Electronic Surveillance
        Camera.” The order provided: “[Y]ou . . . are hereby commanded
        in the name of the state of Florida, . . . to enter and install . . . video
        surveillance cameras, and to monitor these surveillance cameras
        for a period of no longer than 30 days. . . .” The order further
        stated, “[T]he executing officers shall take steps to minimize the in-
        vasion of privacy to any parties not engaged in the unlawful acts
        set forth in the affidavit. The officers shall also make efforts to min-
        imize the disclosure of this surveillance operation to only those
        sworn law enforcement officers pertinent and relevant to this sur-
        reptitious investigation . . . .” On December 28, 2018, a second or-
        der with identical language extended the surveillance period for 30
        days. The order did not expressly prohibit or authorize recording
        the video surveillance.
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        4                     Opinion of the Court                 22-13123

                On November 29, 2018, video-only cameras were installed
        at the front desk and in two massage rooms. The cameras transmit-
        ted a live feed to monitors inside a controlled room at the police
        department. The silent video feed, which could not be turned off
        remotely, was recorded on a hard drive. The police department re-
        quired a username and password to access the video feed in the
        controlled evidence room and logged the time and date that any-
        one entered the room. In January 2019, the State Attorney’s Office
        directed the officers to stop recording sex acts and to focus on in-
        vestigating racketeering and human trafficking. The officers cur-
        tailed monitoring the video feed within the spa and focused on
        monetary and mobile surveillance.
               During the 30 days that the officers monitored the video
        feed, the officers saw 145 customers enter massage rooms, and 142
        of those customers participated in sex acts with a masseuse. Taig
        was one of those customers. He was arrested for soliciting prosti-
        tution based on his visit to the spa on December 27, 2018. Later,
        Taig successfully moved to suppress the video evidence, and an in-
        termediate appellate court upheld the suppression order.
               Taig sued the city and various police officials alleging that
        the video surveillance violated the Fourth Amendment. 42 U.S.C.
        § 1983. His amended complaint alleged that the city and officers
        violated his right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure and
        that they had a custom or policy of failing to train and supervise
        employees in minimization techniques. He cited Florida statutes
        that prohibited video recording in areas like restrooms or changing
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        22-13123               Opinion of the Court                         5

        rooms and limited the availability of audio surveillance to certain
        major criminal offenses. He also moved to certify the class and to
        appoint a class representative and class counsel.
               The district court granted the city’s motion to dismiss for
        failure to state a claim. It ruled that Taig alleged no prior miscon-
        duct that could support his argument that the city had a custom of
        allowing or had adopted policies allowing constitutional violations.
        It ruled that Taig also failed to allege facts to support his argument
        that the city deliberately chose not to train and supervise employ-
        ees of the police department, and his allegation that the city was
        deliberately indifferent to his rights was conclusory.
                The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
        officers based on qualified immunity. It ruled that Taig failed to
        identify any clearly established law prohibiting the officers from
        conducting or recording the surveillance, and the Florida statutes
        were inapposite. It ruled that Taig failed to identify any clearly es-
        tablished law that put the officers on notice that their mitigation
        measures were constitutionally inadequate. It rejected his alterna-
        tive argument that the surveillance and minimization techniques
        were so egregious that every reasonable officer would have known
        that their conduct violated the Fourth Amendment. It explained
        that the warrant expressly permitted video surveillance, and the of-
        ficers used at least some minimization techniques by restricting and
        logging physical entry into the secured room and requiring a
        username and password to access the video feed. The district court
        also rejected Taig’s failure-to-train claim because he failed to
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        6                       Opinion of the Court                  22-13123

        provide evidence establishing that the officers had actual or con-
        structive notice that an omission in their training program caused
        the officers to violate his rights. The district court ruled that, with-
        out evidence of any prior misconduct or a violation of a clearly es-
        tablished right, the officers could not be liable under a theory of
        supervisory liability. The district court denied Taig’s motion for
        class certification.
                           II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
               We review de novo the dismissal of Taig’s amended com-
        plaint against the city. Turner v. Williams, 65 F.4th 564, 577 (11th
        Cir. 2023). The alleged facts “must make a claim for relief not
        merely possible, but plausible.” Id. “We review de novo
        whether . . . [law enforcement] officers are entitled to immunity.”
        Black v. Wigington, 811 F.3d 1259, 1265 (11th Cir. 2016). We resolve
        any issues of material fact in Taig’s favor and then address the legal
        question whether the officers are entitled to qualified immunity.
        See Penley v. Eslinger, 605 F.3d 843, 848–49 (11th Cir. 2010).
                                  III. DISCUSSION
               We divide our discussion in two parts. First, we address
        Taig’s claims against the city. Second, we address his claims against
        the officers.
               A. Taig’s Claims Against the City Fail.
               Taig argues that the district court erred by dismissing his
        claims against the city. He argues that he sufficiently alleged that
        the officers had a repeated policy or custom of failing to minimize
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        22-13123               Opinion of the Court                             7

        their video surveillance, which “demonstrated practices on the part
        of the City that constituted Fourth Amendment violations.” He ar-
        gues that the facts supporting his failure-to-train-and-supervise
        claim against the city were sufficient to withstand dismissal.
                To impose liability on the city, Taig must allege facts that
        would establish that the city had a policy or custom that consti-
        tuted deliberate indifference to a right protected by the Constitu-
        tion. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Be-
        cause Taig attributes the alleged constitutional violation to the
        city’s failure to train, he must plead facts establishing there existed
        “[a] pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained em-
        ployees,” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011); see Gold v. City
        of Miami, 151 F.3d 1346, 1351 (11th Cir. 1998). He has not done so.
                Taig’s amended complaint identified no other instance in
        which the police department’s surveillance of suspected criminal
        activity rose to the level of a constitutional violation. Even assum-
        ing that a constitutional violation occurred, Taig sought to impose
        liability on the city based on one investigation. Because “random
        acts or isolated incidents are insufficient to establish a custom or
        policy,” Depew v. City of St. Marys, 787 F.2d 1496, 1499 (11th Cir.
        1986), the district court did not err by dismissing the amended com-
        plaint against the city for failing to state a claim for relief.
               B. Qualified Immunity Bars Taig’s Claims Against the Officers.
               Qualified immunity shields officials acting within their dis-
        cretionary authority from liability when their conduct does not vi-
        olate a federal constitutional right that was clearly established at
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        8                       Opinion of the Court                    22-13123

        the time of the challenged action. Williams v. Aguirre, 965 F.3d 1147,
        1156 (11th Cir. 2020). If the official is acting within the scope of his
        discretionary authority when he commits the allegedly unlawful
        actions, the plaintiff must prove “that qualified immunity is not ap-
        propriate.” Penley, 605 F.3d at 849. “We are required to grant qual-
        ified immunity to a defendant official unless the plaintiff can
        demonstrate two things: (1) that the facts, when construed in the
        plaintiff’s favor, show that the official committed a constitutional
        violation and, if so, (2) that the law, at the time of the official’s act,
        clearly established the unconstitutionality of that conduct.” Sin-
        gletary v. Vargas, 804 F.3d 1174, 1180 (11th Cir. 2015). We may con-
        sider these two requirements in any order. Pearson v. Callahan, 555
        U.S. 223, 227 (2009).
                Taig argues that the officers were not entitled to qualified
        immunity because they failed to minimize their invasion of the spa
        customers’ privacy as the warrant required. He argues that the of-
        ficers had clear guidance that customers in a private massage room
        were entitled to an expectation of privacy because various state
        statutes prohibited video recording in areas like restrooms or
        changing rooms and limited the availability of audio surveillance
        to certain major criminal offenses. See Fla. Stat. §§ 810.145(1)(c),
        877.26, 934.07, 933.02.
               Taig failed to establish that the officers’ conduct violated a
        clearly established constitutional prohibition. See Singletary, 804
        F.3d at 1180. Qualified immunity may only be denied when the of-
        ficers have “fair and clear warning of what the Constitution
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        22-13123               Opinion of the Court                         9

        requires,” such that a reasonable officer would understand that his
        conduct violates a constitutional right. City & Cnty. of San Francisco
        v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600, 617 (2015). A constitutional violation may
        be “clearly established” by controlling precedent with indistin-
        guishable facts, a broad statement of principle in the Constitution
        that clearly establishes the violation, or where the officer’s conduct
        so egregiously violated the constitutional right that prior caselaw
        was unnecessary to provide fair notice. See Lewis v. City of West Palm
        Beach, Fla., 561 F.3d 1288, 1291–92 (11th Cir. 2009).
               Taig identifies no caselaw clearly establishing minimization
        requirements for covert, silent video surveillance of criminal activ-
        ity pursuant to a warrant. Instead, he cites to United States v.
        Mesa-Rincon, 911 F.2d 1433, 1442 (10th Cir. 1990), and the decision
        of the Fourth District Court of Appeal of Florida upholding the sup-
        pression of the spa video. But neither were decided at the time of
        the relevant conduct by the Supreme Court, this Court, or the Flor-
        ida Supreme Court. See J W by & Through Tammy Williams v. Bir-
        mingham Bd. of Educ., 904 F.3d 1248, 1259 (11th Cir. 2018). And the
        state statutes Taig cites do not clearly establish a federal constitu-
        tional right.
               The officers’ actions also were not so egregious that every
        reasonable officer would have known that they violated the Fourth
        Amendment. See Lewis, 561 F.3d at 1291–92. The officers, working
        with the Department of Homeland Security, obtained several war-
        rants authorizing the surreptitious video surveillance. Although
        the warrants did not expressly allow video recording, the warrants
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                  22-13123

        did not prohibit it either. The cameras transmitted no audio, which
        complied with the order. And the officers employed at least some
        minimization techniques, including reducing the number of hours
        each day that officers monitored the video feed, restricting access
        to the video feed with a username and password, monitoring the
        video feed for only 30 out of 60 available days, and securing the
        hard drive in the evidence room. Moreover, although the order re-
        quired the officers to “take steps to minimize the invasion of pri-
        vacy to any parties not engaged in the unlawful acts set forth in the
        affidavit,” Taig did not fall within that class of persons.
               Taig argues that the facts established that the officers failed
        to train and supervise other officers and each other and that, if they
        had, they would not have violated his Fourth Amendment rights.
        We disagree. To succeed on this claim, Taig was required “to
        demonstrate that the [supervisory officers] had actual or construc-
        tive notice that a particular omission in their training program
        causes [his or her] employees to violate citizens’ constitutional
        rights and that armed with that knowledge the supervisor chose to
        retain that training program.” Keith v. DeKalb County¸ Georgia, 749
        F.3d 1034 (11th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted, second alter-
        ation in original). But Taig failed to establish that the officers knew
        or should have known that the department’s minimization tech-
        niques were constitutionally deficient or that the alleged deficiency
        was caused by an omission in their training. Because the district
        court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of the
        officers, we need not address Taig’s argument that the district court
        erred by denying his motion for class certification.
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        22-13123             Opinion of the Court                    11

                              IV. CONCLUSION
               We AFFIRM the dismissal of Taig’s complaint against the
        city and the summary judgment in favor of the officers.