Court Opinion

ID: 9732152
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:09:54.591435+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:24.167139
License: Public Domain

*538CLIFFORD, J„
with whom RUDMAN and ALEXANDER, JJ., join, dissenting.
[¶ 51] Sound public policy requires that most of the information contained in the investigative files currently in the possession of the Attorney General should be, and, pursuant to a correct interpretation of the relevant statutory law, is protected from public dissemination. Maine’s Criminal History Record Information Act, 16 M.R.S.A. § 614(1)(C) (Supp.2004), protects the information contained in those - files because there is more than a “reasonable possibility” that its public release would “[c]onstitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”
[¶ 52] In my view, the Court erroneously concludes that the personal privacy interests in the information contained in the files have been seriously diminished by the way the incidents of alleged abuse have been reported. Moreover, the Court departs dramatically from precedent and employs much too lenient a standard in concluding that there is a significant public interest that outweighs the privacy interests involved and warrants disclosure of the information. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
[¶ 53] Section 614(1) of the Criminal History Record Information Act expressly excepts certain information from public disclosure pursuant to Maine’s Freedom of Access Act (FOAA), 1 M.R.S.A. §§ 401-410 (1989 & Supp.2004).15 Pursuant to section 614(1)(A) and (C), if the information to be disclosed contains “intelligence and investigative information” and is confidential, it may not be released as long as there is a “reasonable possibility” that public release or inspection will interfere *539with law enforcement or will “[c]onstitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy”
[¶ 54] The language of our Criminal History Record Information Act excepting criminal history information from public disclosure is nearly identical to the language in the federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(7)(C) (1996). In interpreting FOAA to determine when information in the possession of public officials should or should not be released, we have said that we are guided by cases construing the federal FOIA counterpart.16 Campbell v. Town of Machias, 661 A.2d 1133, 1136 (Me.1995).
[¶ 55] The language of the federal statute and our statute, as well as corresponding precedent, instructs that we should balance the private interests against the public interests that may be involved in deciding whether disclosure would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. See Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 171-72, 124 S.Ct. 1570, 158 L.Ed.2d 319 (2004); United States Dep’t of Def. v. FLRA 510 U.S. 487, 495, 114 S.Ct. 1006, 127 L.Ed.2d 325 (1994); United States Dep’t of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 175, 112 S.Ct. 541, 116 L.Ed.2d 526 (1991); United States Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 762, 109 S.Ct. 1468, 103 L.Ed.2d 774 (1989).
[¶ 56] In the present case, the information in the subject files contains the identities of the alleged victims of sexual abuse by priests of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Maine and the names of the accused priests. Federal courts have wisely observed that people do not want their names connected with criminal investigations, Mack v. Dep’t of the Navy, 259 F.Supp.2d 99, 106 (D.D.C.2003), and that the disclosure of names of potential witnesses in criminal cases carries “the potential for future harassment,” Neely v. FBI, 208 F.3d 461, 464-65 (4th Cir.2000). Such disclosure, not only of names, but also of the substance of their statements, carries the potential for future humiliation and embarrassment. Id. at 465. Except for those persons who have voluntarily made their allegations public, the victims and witnesses whose names are contained in the files have a “substantial interest” in not having their names released to the public. Davis v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 968 F.2d 1276, 1281 (D.C.Cir.1992) (quotation marks omitted).
[¶ 57] Title 16 M.R.S.A. § 614(1)(C) reflects the Legislature’s recognition of the great harm that can result from unwarranted public dissemination of information collected by law enforcement agencies. By its very nature, intelligence and investigative information is often sensitive and implicates the privacy and other fundamental rights of the individuals affected by it. The means by which intelligence and investigative information is collected is essential to the relationship between the government and its citizenry. Collection of such information depends upon the willingness of private citizens to voluntarily provide information, as well as the unique power of the government to compel citizens to disclose information through the exercise of its warrant and subpoena authority. The use and dissemination of intelligence and investigative information by *540prosecutors and law enforcement agencies are vital to effective law enforcement and to the protection of individual rights.
[¶ 58] I disagree with the Court’s conclusion that the privacy interests of the people who reported the incidents, but who did not do so publicly, are diminished to any substantial degree. Although there has been some public disclosure of some of the names contained in the records,17 most of the information, including the most private facts such as the names of victims, witnesses, and accused perpetrators, has not yet been publicly disclosed. Further, almost all of the reports were made to the Diocese and not to prosecutors,18 and thus most of those who came forward to report alleged abuse did not do so with the certain expectation that prosecution would ensue. In my view, the privacy interests of those who made the reports have not been diminished to any substantial degree by the way the incidents were reported. Although the Court ultimately orders the names of the alleged victims to be redacted, it does so not because their privacy rights outweigh what the Court concludes is in the public interest, but rather, because in the present case it is neither impractical nor onerous to do so, and what the Court depicts as the public interest will not be undermined by the redaction.
[¶ 59] The federal courts have concluded that there are some “reputational interests and family-related privacy expectations [that] survive death,” Campbell v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 164 F.3d 20, 33 (D.C.Cir.1998). I agree, and would not conclude that such interests in this case have been completely extinguished. In Favish, the United States Supreme Court recently recognized the privacy interest of a deceased person’s immediate family members and what the survivors describe as the right, “to be shielded by the exemption to secure their own refuge from a sensation-seeking culture for their own peace of mind and tranquility, not for the sake of the deceased.” Favish, 541 U.S. at 166, 124 S.Ct. 1570. Although I agree that the privacy interests of the families of the deceased priests have significantly diminished over time, I would not conclude that such residual privacy interests are so minimal that their names can be subjected to disclosure without any substantial showing of a significant public interest to make such disclosure “warranted” within the meaning of 16 M.R.S.A. § 614(1)(C). If there is no public interest that would be served by disclosure of the names, there is no balancing to be done because the existence of some privacy interest must necessarily outweigh no public interest. Computer Prof'ls for Soc. Responsibility v. United States Secret Serv., 72 F.3d 897, 905 (D.C.Cir.1996).
[¶ 60] The Court additionally errs in the present case by concluding that, there is a public interest within the meaning of our jurisprudence that is to be balanced against those privacy interests, much less a significant public interest that compels disclosure. The Court reaches this conclusion only by straying far from the case law that we have said we should rely on to interpret FOAA.
[¶ 61] That it is a newspaper publisher that seeks the information does not estab*541lish the existence of a public interest sufficient to warrant an invasion of personal privacy. The existence of a public interest in the disclosure of investigation records does not turn on the identity of the person or organization requesting the information. FLRA, 510 U.S. at 499, 114 S.Ct. 1006. If investigative records are subject to disclosure, they are subject to disclosure to anyone who requests them.19 Favish, 541 U.S. at 172, 124 S.Ct. 1570.
[¶ 62] The decision of whether a possible invasion of privacy is warranted turns on the nature of the requested information and whether its disclosure will advance the central purpose for the disclosure of investigative records. In weighing whether the public interest justifies such an invasion of privacy, a court should determine whether the disclosure of the investigative records would serve the central purpose of FOAA:
[Although there is undoubtedly some public interest in anyone’s criminal history, especially if the history is in some way related to the subject’s dealing with a public official or agency, the FOIA’s central purpose is to ensure that the Government’s activities be opened to the sharp eye of public scrutiny, not that information about private citizens that happens to be in the warehouse of the Government be so disclosed.
Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 774, 109 S.Ct. 1468 (emphasis added).
[¶ 68] The Supreme Court made clear in Reporters Committee that the purpose of the FOIA is to serve the public interest in determining the existence or extent of any government impropriety. See id. Thus, the requested disclosure of private information that implicates no wrongdoing on the part of a governmental entity generates insufficient public interest and therefore falls well outside the scope and application of FOAA. A public interest sufficient to overcome the privacy interest protected by the privacy exemption cannot be established unless there is a claim of governmental wrongdoing and evidence to support that claim. See Computer Prof'ls for Soc. Responsibility, 72 F.3d 897 at 905.
[¶ 64] To allow disclosure in the absence of such evidence establishing governmental wrongdoing would render the exception to disclosure established by section 614(1)(C) ineffective. Law enforcement investigatory records would become subject to disclosure based only on a claim that there is a general public interest in the subject of an investigative record. General public interest in an investigation — i.e., that the subject has become the focus of public attention or concern — does not comport with FOAA’s central purpose. Such a relaxed standard will be impractical to implement in view of the hundreds or possibly thousands of law enforcement investigations that are of interest to the general public, and which lead to the filing of so many criminal cases in our courts each year. If such a low threshold for disclosure is adopted as the standard for determining whether sensitive confidential information is to be disclosed, the chilling effect on the willingness of individuals to cooperate in criminal investigations could be substantial. If victims and witnesses, understandably reluctant to participate in criminal investigations, come to understand that confidential records documenting their cooperation will be readily subject to disclosure to anyone who can establish a general *542public interest in the subject, that cooperation will be vastly more difficult to achieve.
[¶ 65] Accordingly, to establish the existence of a public interest that would warrant disclosure of the names in the files in the present case, Blethen should be required to produce evidence “that would warrant a belief by a reasonable person that ... alleged Government impropriety might have occurred.” Favish, 541 U.S. at 174, 124 S.Ct. 1570. This it has failed to do. Blethen’s Rule 80B complaint alleges only that “there is a great public interest in disclosure of the scope and extent of alleged sexual abuse by the clergy.” The complaint does not assert any government impropriety, nor does the record suggest or address any impropriety in the investigation conducted by the Attorney General or other governmental agencies. Most of the records were turned over voluntarily to the Attorney General, or to the District Attorney, not by the people asserting the abuse, but rather by the Diocese. Although, as suggested by Blethen, the records may be relevant to whether the Diocese of Portland mishandled allegations of sexual abuse by its priests, the Diocese is a private actor. The disclosure of records that may reflect on the conduct of the Diocese does not fall within FOAA’s central purpose of subjecting government activities to public scrutiny.
[¶ 66] Blethen failed to allege, and certainly has not established, that any government impropriety has occurred. In my view, the Court deviates from established precedent to improperly conclude that general public curiosity meets the. “substantial public interest” standard, and is sufficient to warrant the invasion of the privacy interests concerned.
[¶ 67] Even though the Court comes to a final conclusion that the names of the witnesses making the allegations should be redacted prior to disclosure of all the other information in the files, it does so only after determining that the redaction can be easily accomplished. The protection of the privacy interests of witnesses who come forward in criminal investigations should not depend on the broad discretion of a trial court to determine, perhaps years later, whether the act of redacting the names of those witnesses before the files containing their names are released is “impractical” or “onerous,” or whether redaction will undermine a vague and general public interest. Such a standard has serious implications for the ability of law enforcement agencies to gather investigatory information.
' [¶ 68] Police and prosecutors will not be able to give complete assurance of confidentiality to persons contemplating reporting crimes and evidence of crimes. Knowledge that criminal investigative files may be released and publicized on demand by any organization or person will have the effect of deterring the reporting of criminal activity out of fear that, even if prosecution is not initiated, humiliating and embarrassing events in personal lives may be revealed years later. Especially affected will be victims of traumatic and sensitive crimes, such as sexual assault.
[¶ 69] I would vacate the judgment and remand for the entry of a judgment in favor of the State of Maine and the Department of the Attorney General.

. Title 16 M.R.S.A. § 614(1) provides:
1.Limitation on dissemination of intelligence and investigative information. Reports or records that contain intelligence and investigative information and that are prepared by, prepared at the direction of or kept in the custody of a local, county or district criminal justice agency; the Bureau of State Police; the Department of the Attorney General; the Maine Drug Enforcement Agency; the Office of State Fire Marshal; the Department of Corrections; the criminal law enforcement units of the Department of Marine Resources or the Department of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife; or the Department of Conservation, Division of Forest Protection when the reports or records pertain to arson are confidential and may not be disseminated if there is a reasonable possibility that public release or inspection of the reports or records would:
A. Interfere with law enforcement proceedings;
B. Result in public dissemination of prejudicial information concerning an accused person or concerning the prosecution’s evidence that will interfere with the ability of a court to impanel an impartial jury;
C. Constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
D. Disclose the identity of a confidential source;
E. Disclose confidential information furnished only by the confidential source;
F. Disclose trade secrets or other confidential commercial or financial information designated as such by the owner or source of the information or by the Department of the Attorney General;
G. Disclose investigative techniques and procedures or security plans and procedures not generally known by the general public;
H. Endanger the life or physical safety of any individual, including law enforcement personnel;
I. Disclose conduct or statements made or documents submitted by any person in the course of any mediation or arbitration conducted under the auspices of the Department of the Attorney General;
J. Disclose information designated confidential by some other statute; or
K. Identify the source of complaints made to the Department of the Attorney General involving violations of consumer or antitrust laws.
16 M.R.S.A. § 614(1) (Supp.2004).

. The language of the federal statute prevents disclosure if disclosure ‘‘could, reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(7)(C) (1996) (emphasis added). The language of our statute is more protective of privacy rights, prohibiting release of the information if there is only a "reasonable possibility " that disclosure will "[constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 16 M.R.S.A. § 614(1)(C) (emphasis added).

. A few of the complaining witnesses whose names are included in the files at issue in the present case have made their allegations public.

. The information was provided to the Attorney General by the Diocese without regard to whether the alleged acts were criminal pursuant to Maine law, whether the statute of limitations had run, how long ago the alleged acts may have occurred, or whether the allegations were credible.

. This could include not only members of print and other media, but also individual curiosity seekers or other people or organizations in what the Favish opinion characterizes as "a sensation-seeking culture.” Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 160-61, 166-67, 124 S.Ct. 1570, 158 L.Ed.2d 319 (2004).