Court Opinion

ID: 9954368
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-25 22:15:53.714313+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:12:05.966240
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

 DARREN L. ARENDS,                           No. 85870-0-I

                          Appellant,         DIVISION ONE
               v.

 STATE OF WASHINGTON,                        UNPUBLISHED OPINION

                          Respondent.

       SMITH, C.J. — Under former RCW 9.41.040, individuals could petition to

restore their firearm rights in their county of residence or in the court that entered

the relevant prohibition on firearm possession. In early 2023, the legislature

restricted the appropriate venue for firearm restoration petitions to the county that

entered the prohibition on firearm possession.

       A month after the new statute took effect, Darren Arends petitioned to

restore his firearm rights in Snohomish County Superior Court, his county of

residence. The superior court denied his petition, citing improper venue. On

appeal, Arends claims that the former firearm restoration statute applies to him

because his right to petition for restoration “vested” before the new statute took

effect. Therefore, he maintains, he can file his petition in his current county of

residence rather than in Davison County, South Dakota, the county that entered

the prohibition. Because the legislature did not intend to create a vested right to

petition for firearm restoration, we disagree and affirm.
No. 85870-0-I/2

                                       FACTS

                              Legislative Background

       Before July 2023, former RCW 9.41.040 governed the process of restoring

an individual’s right to possess a firearm. Under that statute, there were two

appropriate venues in which to file a restoration petition: (1) the court of record

that ordered the petitioner’s prohibition on possessing a firearm; or (2) the

superior court in the county in which the petitioner currently resided. Former

RCW 9.41.040(4) (2005).

       In early 2023, the legislature amended RCW 9.41.040 and added a new

section to chapter 9.41 RCW. LAWS OF 2023, ch. 295. Under the new section,

RCW 9.41.041, firearm restoration petitions can only be filed in the superior court

of the county that entered a prohibition on possession. LAWS OF 2023, ch. 295,

§ 4(3)(a). In its findings related to the amendments, the legislature noted that its

updates to the laws governing the unlawful possession of firearms and the

restoration of firearm rights aimed to “reduc[e] the risks of lethality and other

harm associated with gun violence, gender-based violence, and other types of

violence.” LAWS OF 2023, ch. 295. The legislature also found that easy access to

firearms is a risk factor that increases the likelihood of individuals engaging in

future violence and presenting further risk to public safety. LAWS OF 2023,

ch. 295, §1(4).

       On July 23, 2023, Substitute House Bill 1562 took effect, repealing

former RCW 9.41.040(4) and enacting RCW 9.41.041. LAWS OF 2023, ch. 295.

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No. 85870-0-I/3

                                   Present Case

       In August 2023, Darren Arends petitioned the Snohomish County Superior

Court to restore his firearm rights. His right had been restricted due to his

conviction for grand theft in Davison County, South Dakota. Although Arends

petitioned the court after RCW 9.41.041 took effect, Arends claimed that former

RCW 9.41.040(4) applied to him because he had completed the former statute’s

requirements before the new statute took effect. Arends contended that once he

completed the former statute’s requirements, his right to petition for restoration

“vested,” thereby allowing him to proceed under the former statute.

       The State opposed Arends’s petition, arguing that Snohomish County

Superior Court was not the proper venue because the prohibition had not been

entered there. The State also contended that Arends had not yet completed his

sentencing conditions. The court denied Arends’s petition and adopted the

State’s position in full.1

       Arends appeals.

                                    ANALYSIS

               Vested Right to Petition Under Former RCW 9.41.040

       Both parties contend that whether RCW 9.41.041 operates prospectively

or retroactively is determinative of whether a right vested under former

RCW 9.41.040. Arends maintains that because the precipitating event that

triggers application of former RCW 9.41.040 is completion of the statutory

       1In support of its order, the court attached the State’s response to
Arends’s petition rather than explain its reasoning.

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requirements, and because he completed the requirements before

RCW 9.41.041 took effect, his right to petition for restoration “vested” and his

claim under the former statute is preserved. The State counters that completion

of the statutory requirements does not result in a “vested” right because filing the

restoration petition is the precipitating event, not completion of the statutory

requirements.2 The State therefore maintains that Arends is subject to the new

statute because he filed his petition after it took effect.

       We disagree with both parties. The relevant inquiry here is not whether

the new statute operates prospectively or retroactively or what constitutes a

precipitating event, but whether the subject matter and language of former

RCW 9.41.040 indicate that Arends possessed a “vested right” to petition for

restoration once he met the statutory requirements for restoration of his

purported right to possess a firearm under the former statute. Because the

legislature intended firearm restoration procedures to further public safety, we

conclude that Arends’s right to petition for restoration did not “vest” when he

completed the statutory requirements of former RCW 9.41.040.

       The term “vested right” is not easily defined, but “has been commonly held

to connote ‘an immediate, fixed right of present or future enjoyment.’ ” Adams v.

Ernst, 1 Wn.2d 254, 264-65, 95 P.2d 799 (1939) (quoting Pearsall v. Great N.

Ry. Co., 161 U.S. 646, 16 S. Ct. 705, 40 L. Ed. 838 (1896)). A “vested right,

       2   Our Supreme Court previously determined that the precipitating event
for eligibility of restoration is when the statutory requirements are met, not when
the petition is filed. State v. Dennis, 191 Wn.2d 169, 177, 421 P.3d 944 (2018).

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entitled to protection from legislation, must be something more than a mere

expectation based upon an anticipated continuance of the existing law; it must

have become a title, legal or equitable, to the present or future enjoyment of

property, a demand, or a legal exemption from a demand by another.” Godfrey

v. State, 84 Wn.2d 959, 963, 530 P.2d 630 (1975) (emphasis omitted). “[A]

vested right must be definite, as opposed to an assumed expectation that one

will be able to exercise a certain privilege in the future.” Wash. State Ass’n of

Counties v. State, 199 Wn.2d 1, 19, 502 P.3d 825 (2022). “ ‘[A] mere

expectation based upon an anticipated continuance of the existing law’ is

insufficient to vest a legal right.” State v. Shultz, 138 Wn.2d 638, 646, 980 P.2d

1265 (1999) (emphasis omitted) (quoting State v. Hennings, 129 Wn.2d 512, 919

P.2d 580 (1996)).

       A right may vest in a number of ways, such as by final judgment or

contract. Wash. State Ass’n of Counties, 199 Wn.2d at 19; see, e.g., Bailey v.

Sch. Dist. No. 49, 108 Wash. 612, 614, 185 P. 810 (1919) (final judgment); Scott

Paper Co. v. City of Anacortes, 90 Wn.2d 19, 32, 578 P.2d 1292 (1978)

(contracts). Rights may also vest upon completion of statutory conditions in

certain limited circumstances. State v. T.K., 139 Wn.2d 320, 334, 987 P.2d 63

(1999) (T.K. II).3

   3   Because we cite to both the Court of Appeals’ and Washington State
Supreme Court’s decision in State v. T.K., we refer to the Supreme Court’s
decision as T.K. II and the Court of Appeals’ decision as T.K. I.

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No. 85870-0-I/6

       The subject matter of the statute and the statutory language guide our

analysis of whether completion of the statutory conditions results in a vested

right. See T.K. II, 139 Wn.2d at 331-32, 335. This inquiry implicates statutory

interpretation, a question of law that we review de novo. Dep’t of Ecology v.

Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 9, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). When interpreting a

statute, our purpose is to determine and give effect to the legislature’s intent, and

we begin with the plain language of the statute. Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wn.2d

at 9-10. “We derive the legislative intent of a statute solely from the plain

language by considering the text of the provision in question, the context of the

statute in which the provision is found, related provisions, and the statutory

scheme as a whole.” State v. Dennis, 191 Wn.2d 169, 172-73, 421 P.3d 944

(2018). When interpreting a criminal statute, “we give it a literal and strict

interpretation.” State v. Delgado, 148 Wn.2d 723, 727, 63 P.3d 792 (2003).

       1. Statutory Interpretation

       The statute at issue, former RCW 9.41.040, designates the requirements

that an individual must meet before petitioning the court:
       An individual may petition a court of record to have his or her right
       to possess a firearm restored . . .
       [i]f the conviction or finding of not guilty by reason of insanity was
       for a felony offense, after five or more consecutive years in the
       community without being convicted or found not guilty by reason of
       insanity or currently charged with any felony, gross misdemeanor,
       or misdemeanor crimes, if the individual has no prior felony
       convictions that prohibit the possession of a firearm counted as part
       of the offender score under RCW 9.94A.525.

Former RCW 9.41.040(4)(b), (a)(ii)(A).

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No. 85870-0-I/7

       After these requirements are met, an individual “may” petition the court for

relief. Former RCW 9.41.040(4)(b). Once the superior court determines that the

statute’s enumerated requirements are met, the court’s role is purely ministerial;

it must grant the petition. State v. Swanson, 116 Wn. App. 67, 78, 65 P.3d 343

(2003). However, the process of restoration is one of legislative grace; there is

no Second Amendment right to firearm restoration. See, e.g., ch. 9.41 RCW

(restoration of firearm rights exclusively governed by statute); see also District of

Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 171 L. Ed. 2d 637 (2008)

(“Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not

unlimited.”).

       Here, the subject matter of the statute and the legislature’s intent are

determinative of whether a vested right exists upon completion of the statutory

requirements. The statute creates a court-supervised procedure for firearm right

restoration to further public safety by reducing gun violence. At the heart of the

statute is public safety, clearly evidenced by the legislature’s repeated amending

of the statute to add more stringent requirements for restoration. See, e.g., H.B.

REP. ON H.B. 3095, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2008) (additional notice

required when person who was prohibited from possessing firearm due to

involuntary commitment has right to possess restored); FINAL B. REP. ON

H.B. 1498, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2009) (imposing burden of proof for

persons who have been involuntarily committed); FINAL B. REP. ON H.B. 1455,

62nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2011) (restricting venue where petition to restore

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No. 85870-0-I/8

rights may be filed); FINAL B. REP. ON S.B. 5205, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash.

2019) (persons found incompetent to stand trial and who have history of violent

acts must prove each restoration requirement by preponderance of evidence);

FINAL B. REP. ON S.H.B. 1562, 68th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2023) (restricting

venue where petition to restore rights may be filed).

       The legislature’s actions also evidence an intent to protect the public. For

example, in the wake of our Supreme Court’s Dennis decision, which interpreted

the statutory requirement that a petitioner be crime-free for five years before

petitioning for firearm restoration to mean any crime-free period following felony

conviction, the legislature amended the firearm restoration statute to clarify that

the five-year period must immediately precede filing of a restoration petition.

S.H.B. 1562, 68th Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2023) (“The legislature also finds it would

be helpful to refine statutory language that was at issue in the Washington state

supreme court’s decision in State v. Dennis, 191 Wn.2d 169 (2018).”);

RCW 9.41.041(2)(a)(i).

       Moreover, when the legislature most recently updated the restoration

procedures, it noted that the stricter venue provisions were aimed at “reducing

the risks of lethality and other harm associated with gun violence, gender-based

violence, and other types of violence.” LAWS OF 2023, ch. 295. The legislature

also found that easy access to firearms presents a risk to public safety. LAWS OF

2023, ch. 295, §1(4). To conclude that satisfaction of the statutory requirements

results in an absolute right to petition for restoration of one’s firearm rights runs

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No. 85870-0-I/9

contrary to the legislature’s intent. The legislature has repeatedly evidenced that

gun violence is an important issue of public safety and has taken steps to make

restoration of firearm rights increasingly difficult.

         We conclude that Arends had an expectation that he could petition the

court to restore his firearm rights once he complied with the statute, but not an

absolute, vested right regarding restoration of those rights. At any point before

he petitioned to restore his firearm rights, the legislature could have amended the

law to prevent him from doing so. Settled law dictates that the expectation of

being able to exercise a certain privilege in the future is insufficient to vest a legal

right.

         2. State v. T.K

         Still, Arends contends that T.K. II is dispositive of whether completion of

statutory requirements results in a vested right. We disagree.

         In T.K. II, the defendant pleaded guilty to first degree child molestation.

139 Wn.2d at 323. After T.K. completed the requirements of the disposition

order, he petitioned the juvenile court to vacate his duty to register under the sex

offender registration statute. State v. T.K., 94 Wn. App. 286, 288-89, 971 P.2d

121 (1999) (T.K. I).4 The court found that T.K. had been “fully rehabilitated” and

entered an order ending his registration requirement. T.K. I, 94 Wn. App. at 289.

At the time the court entered its order, T.K. was not eligible to request vacation or

sealing of his conviction records under RCW 13.50.050 because two years had

         4
        The facts of T.K. II are drawn from the Court of Appeals decision
because it includes more detail.

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No. 85870-0-I/10

not yet passed from the date he was discharged from supervision. T.K. I, 94 Wn.

App. at 289. Before T.K. could petition to have his juvenile records sealed, the

legislature changed the statutory requirements for sealing, increasing the

requisite waiting period. T.K. II, 139 Wn.2d at 323-24. After the statute was

amended, T.K. moved to expunge his juvenile record. T.K. I, 94 Wn. App. at

290. The juvenile court denied the motion, concluding that the updated statute

applied. T.K. I, 94 Wn. App. at 290.

       On appeal, this court reversed, determining that T.K.’s right to have his

record expunged under the former statute “matured”5 when he satisfied the

conditions of expungement. T.K. I, 94 Wn. App. at 291. Our Supreme Court

later affirmed, explaining that T.K.’s “right to sealing became absolute [i.e.,

vested] upon completion of the statutory conditions” after the two-year waiting

period had expired. T.K. II, 139 Wn.2d at 334. The court compared the waiting

period to a statute of limitations, noting that “ ‘[u]ntil the statute has run it is a

mere regulation of the remedy . . . subject to legislative control,’ ” but afterwards

it is “ ‘a defense, not of grace, but of right . . . absolute and vested, . . . not to be

taken away by legislative enactment.’ ” T.K. II, 139 Wn.2d at 332 (some

alterations in original (quoting State v. Hodgson, 108 Wn.2d 662, 668, 740 P.2d

848 (1987)). The court also considered the subject matter addressed by the

statute and the mandatory language of the statute. Because T.K.’s right vested

       5  We briefly note that “matured” and “vested” are used interchangeably in
vested rights analysis and possess substantially similar meanings. Compare
T.K. I, 94 Wn. App. at 290 (referring to a right as “matured”) with T.K. II, 139
Wn.2d at 332 (referring to a right as “vested”).

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No. 85870-0-I/11

before the change in the law, our Supreme Court reasoned that the new law

could not retroactively require T.K. to meet stricter conditions for sealing his

juvenile records. T.K. II, 139 Wn.2d at 334-35.

       But T.K. does not stand for the proposition that completion of statutory

requirements always resulted in a vested right. The Supreme Court in T.K. II

considered the subject matter of the statute and the language of the statute when

it concluded that T.K. possessed a vested right to have their convictions sealed.

139 Wn.2d at 331-32. Furthermore, since T.K. II, courts have not extended

vested rights analysis outside the arena of sealing or vacation. Compare State v.

D.S., 128 Wn. App. 569, 115 P.3d 1047 (2005) (vested right to have juvenile

records sealed) and In re Pers. Restraint of Carrier, 173 Wn.2d 791, 272 P.3d

209 (2012) (vested right in vacated status of former conviction) with State v.

Webb, 112 Wn. App. 618, 50 P.3d 654 (2002) (no vested right under former

offender scoring statute); State v. Sell, 110 Wn. App. 741, 43 P.3d 1246 (2002)

(no vested right to deferred DUI prosecution); State v. Varga, 151 Wn.2d 179, 86

P.3d 139 (2004) (no vested right in “washed out” status of prior convictions); In re

Pers. Restraint of Martin, 129 Wn. App. 135, 118 P.3d 387 (2005) (no vested

right to delay paying LFOs until after release); In re Pers. Restraint of Flint, 174

Wn.2d 539, 277 P.3d 657 (2012) (no vested right to remain in community

custody).

       Arends’s assertion that there is “no conceptual difference between the

juvenile sealing scheme and the firearm restoration scheme” is unpersuasive.

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No. 85870-0-I/12

The statutes at issue in T.K. II and the present case are markedly different. The

juvenile sealing scheme aims to “limit public access to juvenile court records in

recognition of the unique purpose of juvenile courts to rehabilitate and reintegrate

youth into society.” State v. S.J.C., 183 Wn.2d 408, 419, 352 P.3d 749 (2015).

The legislature has repeatedly recognized that “ ‘[c]hildren are different’ ” from

adults and that “ ‘our criminal justice system [must] address this difference when

punishing children.’ ” State v. Anderson, 200 Wn.2d 266, 285, 516 P.3d 1213

(2022) (second alteration in original) (quoting In re Pers. Restraint of Ali, 196

Wn.2d 220, 225, 474 P.3d 507 (2020). Rather than restoring a right, the act of

sealing gives juveniles new rights to protect their futures.

       In contrast, the firearm restoration scheme is carefully structured to further

public safety and prevent gun violence. Firearm restoration returns a right that

was purposefully taken away to protect the public. Although the two statutes

share some similarities, their vast difference in subject matter and legislative

intent sets them apart. T.K. II is readily distinguishable from the case at hand.

       Because we conclude that Arends did not possess a vested right to

proceed under former RCW 9.41.040, we conclude that the court did not err in

denying Arends’s restoration petition.

       3. Relief Available

       Finally, we briefly note that at oral argument, Arends revealed that he

successfully petitioned a South Dakota court to restore his right to possess a

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No. 85870-0-I/13

firearm.6 Arends claimed that a Washington court would not recognize the South

Dakota order and that there was no procedure available to seek recognition of

the South Dakota order.7 But under the full faith and credit clause of the United

States Constitution, a judgment rendered by another state is entitled to

recognition in Washington. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Full faith and credit shall be

given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every

other state.”). And Arends provides no evidence that no procedure exists for him

to petition the court for relief.

       We affirm.

WE CONCUR:

       6 Wash. Ct. of Appeals oral argument, State v. Arends, No. 85870-0-I
(Jan. 19, 2024), at 21 min., 38 sec. through 22 min., 5 sec., audio recording by
TVW, Washington State’s Public Affairs Network, http://www.tvw.org.
       7 Wash. Ct. of Appeals oral argument, supra.

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