Court Opinion

ID: 9905458
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-29 16:05:17.932879+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:32.134857
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                               FOURTH DISTRICT

                        JOSHUA TERREL BROWN,
                              Appellant,

                                       v.

                           STATE OF FLORIDA,
                                Appellee.

                              No. 4D2022-1488

                            [November 29, 2023]

  Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, St.
Lucie County; William L. Roby, Judge; L.T. Case No. 562021CF001955A.

   Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Mara Herbert, Assistant Public
Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

   Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Alexandra A. Folley,
Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

GROSS, J.

    Joshua Terrel Brown appeals his convictions for two counts of lewd or
lascivious exhibition in the presence of a correctional facility employee,
entered after a jury trial. We reject his double jeopardy argument and
affirm the convictions, but we reverse certain costs imposed at sentencing.
We affirm on all other issues. 1

   The evidence at trial demonstrated that Brown intentionally
masturbated in his cell within the clear view of two members of the
correctional facility’s mental health staff.

1 As to appellant’s contention that he was entitled to a twelve-person jury, we

affirm. See Guzman v. State, 350 So. 3d 72 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022), rev. denied, No.
SC2022-1597, 2023 WL 3830251 (Fla. June 6, 2023), cert. pending, No. 23-5173
(U.S. July 21, 2023). Additionally, without further discussion, we affirm as to
appellant’s argument regarding fundamental error in the sentencing process.
   On appeal, Brown argues that his two convictions for lewd or lascivious
exhibition violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. He argues that
the statute does not allow for multiple convictions “for a single act of lewd
behavior when it is done in the presence of multiple employees.”

   In pertinent part, section 800.09(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2021), is
directed at a person who “intentionally masturbate[s] . . . in the presence
of a person he or she knows or reasonably should know is an employee.”
Subsection (1) defines “employee” to include “[a]ny person employed at or
performing contractual services for a county detention facility.”         §
800.09(1)(a)4., Fla. Stat. (2021).

   “The intent of the Legislature is to convict and sentence for each
criminal offense committed in the course of one criminal episode or
transaction . . . .” § 775.021(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (2021). One exception to this
rule of construction is for “offenses which require identical elements of
proof.” § 775.021(4)(b)1., Fla. Stat. (2021). If a defendant is charged with
two counts of the same statutory offense, the “allowable unit of
prosecution” standard applies to the double jeopardy analysis. Mauldin v.
State, 9 So. 3d 25, 27 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). The “unit of prosecution”
means “the aspect of criminal activity that the Legislature intended to
punish.” McKnight v. State, 906 So. 2d 368, 371 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005).
Determining the unit of prosecution “is a task of statutory construction.”
Id. “Double jeopardy is not violated if the legislature intended separate
punishments.” Mauldin, 9 So. 3d at 28.

    To determine the unit of prosecution, courts look first to the statute’s
actual language. State v. Losada, 175 So. 3d 911, 913 (Fla. 4th DCA
2015). “If the statutory language is unclear, we apply rules of statutory
construction and explore legislative history to determine legislative intent.”
Bautista v. State, 863 So. 2d 1180, 1185 (Fla. 2003). “In performing this
analysis, a court must consider the statute as a whole, including the evil
to be corrected and the language, title, and history of its enactment to
decipher the statute’s intent.” Losada, 175 So. 3d at 913 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Finally, if the statute is still
ambiguous, a court will apply the rule of lenity and construe the statute
in favor of the accused. Id.

   “[A]bsent clear legislative intent to the contrary, the a/any test serves
as a valuable but nonexclusive means to assist courts in determining the
intended unit of prosecution.” Bautista, 863 So. 2d at 1188. Under this
test, “when the article ‘a’ precedes the item described in a statute, it is the
intent of the Legislature to make each separate item subject to a separate
prosecution.” Allen v. State, 82 So. 3d 118, 121 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). By

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contrast, “when the word ‘any’ precedes the item, an ambiguity may arise
as to the intended unit of prosecution.” Losada, 175 So. 3d at 914. Still,
the unit of prosecution is not “automatically rendered ambiguous
whenever a statute uses the word ‘any.’” Bautista, 863 So. 2d at 1188.

   Here, appellant’s two convictions under section 800.09 for a single lewd
act in the presence of two correctional facility employees did not violate
double jeopardy. Section 800.09 is unambiguous and allows for separate
convictions for each employee present during the lewd act.

   Section 800.09(2)’s use of the word “a” in the phrase “presence of a
person” indicates that each victim present at an exposure will support a
separate charge. Applying the “a/any test,” we conclude that the allowable
unit of prosecution is the number of employees, not the number of lewd
acts.

    This interpretation is consistent with cases allowing multiple
convictions for a single act where the statutory language reflected an intent
to punish on a per-victim basis. See Suggs v. State, 72 So. 3d 145, 149
(Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (“[T]he statute’s plain focus is on ‘the person’ to whom
such letter or communication is sent. Thus, we hold that, under section
836.10, the unit of allowable prosecution is determined by the number of
persons to whom a letter or communication is sent, and not the number
of letters or communications sent.”) (internal citation omitted); Mauldin, 9
So. 3d at 28 (“It is clear from the assault statute that the legislature
intended to punish the criminal defendant separately for each victim the
defendant placed in fear by his or her threat.”).

   We reject Brown’s focuses on the word “any” in the section
800.09(1)(a)4. definition of “employee.”       To determine the unit of
prosecution, the crucial provision of section 800.09(2)(a) is the subsection
prohibiting the behavior, not the statute’s definition of an “employee.”

    Brown’s reliance upon section 775.021(4)(b)1., Florida Statutes (2021),
is similarly misplaced. Under section 775.021(4)(b)1., an exception to the
legislature’s intent to convict for “each criminal offense committed in the
course of one criminal episode” applies where the “offenses require
identical elements of proof.” Id. Here, Count I required proof that the lewd
act was committed in the presence of victim A.D., while Count II required
proof that the lewd act was committed in the presence of victim K.J. Each
count involved a different victim, so the counts did not require identical
elements of proof. See Simon v. State, 615 So. 2d 236, 238 (Fla. 3d DCA
1993) (holding that “[w]ithout dispute, each of the six false imprisonment

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offense involved a different victim and therefore did not require identical
elements of proof”).

    We distinguish the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in State v.
Hernandez, 596 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1992). There, the supreme court held
that a single lewd act, though seen by more than one child, was subject to
only one conviction under section 800.04(3), Florida Statutes (1987). Id.
at 672. However, the statute at issue in Hernandez proscribed the
knowing commission of lewd act in the presence of “any child.” The court
reasoned that the statute’s focus was not on the number of victims, but
rather was “on the commission of the lewd act whether in the presence of
one or more children[.]” Id. (quoting Lifka v. State, 530 So. 2d 371, 373
n.1 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)). The court explained: “The size of the audience
or the number of witnesses should not determine the number of allowable
convictions under subsection 800.04(3); rather, the number of distinct
lewd acts should be determinative.” Id. By contrast, because of the use
of the article “a” instead of “any,” section 800.09(2)’s focus is on the
number of employees present during the commission of a lewd act, not the
number of distinct lewd acts committed.

   As the State concedes, certain costs were imposed in error. We reverse
and remand with instructions to impose a $100 cost of prosecution instead
of $200 and to strike the $50 cost of investigation, the $151 cost for the
Rape Crisis Trust Fund on each count, and the $201 for the Domestic
Violence Surcharge on each count. Brown preserved these issues for
appeal by filing a post-trial motion.

   Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.

GERBER and CONNER, JJ., concur.

                           *         *        *

   Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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