Court Opinion

ID: 9849829
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:47:14.049672+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:26.708459
License: Public Domain

Johnson, Judge,
concurring specially.
I am constrained to concur with the holding in this case as Todd v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 258 Ga. 194 (366 SE2d 674) (1988) is controlling. However, I find Justice Weltner’s dissent in the Todd case, which provides a practical and workable method for circumscribing “approaches,” compelling.
In all likelihood the boundary line was not known to the plaintiff at the time the action was filed, and it made practical sense to name both the motel and the state as party defendants. During discovery, however, it was learned that the path extended an additional 169 feet across state property before it reached the hazard. It was the state which allowed a path to run into a dangerous condition without erecting either a fence, a warning sign, or illuminating the hazard. It makes more sense to me that the motel’s duty would end where the state’s begins under the particular facts and circumstances of this case.
Certainly the motel could foresee that seaside vacationers will follow a path to the water, however, and it is foreseeable that some may choose to do so in the dark of night. Following Todd, and Hackett v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 191 Ga. App. 442 (382 SE2d 180) (1989), *373which holds that the duty of a landowner begins when he is aware of the dangerous condition on his property, or an approach thereto, I reluctantly agree that the trial court properly denied Motel Properties’ motion for summary judgment.
Decided November 3, 1992 —
Reconsideration denied November 19, 1992
Forbes & Bowman, Morton G. Forbes, Johnny A. Foster, for appellant.
John P. Batson, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Judge Pope joins in this special concurrence.