Court Opinion

ID: 9651705
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 16:31:53.300507+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:37.734622
License: Public Domain

PHILLIPS, District Judge.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion, and shall undertake to state my reasons therefor:
Section 7 of Ordinance No. 350 of the city of Marysville, the validity of which ordinance is here in question, provides: “This ordinance shall be in force 'and take effect from and after its publication in the official city paper.” It was published on October 11, 1923, and hence went into force and effect on that date.
Section 5 of this ordinance provides: “Any person, firm or corporation violating any of the provisions of this ordinance shall upon conviction be adjudged to pay a fine of $25.00 for each such violation, and each day that any of the commodities herein referred to are stored in violation of the terms hereof shall constitute a separate and distinct offense hereunder.”
Section 6 of this ordinance provides: “Any person, firm or corporation now storing any of the commodities herein mentioned in a manner otherwise than that herein provided shall be given until the 10th day of November, 1923, in which to bring themselves within the provisions hereof and comply herewith.”
The appellees, Standard Oil Company and Sinclair Refining Company, were enaged in storing in Marysville the commodities regulated by the ordinance at the time it went into force and effect, and hence under its terms had until November 10, 1923, to comply therewith.
The authority of the city council of the city of Marysville for the enactment of the ordinance in question was stated by the Supreme Court of Kansas in the case of Cities Service Oil Co. v. City of Marysville, 117 Kan. 514, 515, 231 P. 1031 (43 A. L. R. 854), as follows:
“The authority for its enactment, however, is to be found in the grant of power to the council ‘to enact * * * any and all ordinances not repugnant to the Constitution and laws of this state, and such as it shall deem expedient for the good government of the city’ (R. S. 14-401), and ‘to enact and make all such ordinances, by-laws, rules, and regulations not inconsistent with the laws of the state as may be expedient for maintaining the peace, good government, and welfare of the city and its trade and commerce’ (R. S. 14-439), and perhaps also in the section authorizing the council to ‘regulate the construction of and order of suppression of * * * any apparatus used in any * * * business which may be dangerous in causing or promoting fires’ (R. S. 14-421). The ordinance is therefore open to attack, not only upon the ground of unconstitutionality, but also upon that of being unreasonable in the circumstances in which its enforcement is undertaken.”
The ordinance having been enacted under the general powers granted to the city of Marysville, its reasonableness is subject to inquiry by the courts. Cities Service Oil Co. v. City of Marysville, supra; Lusk v. Dora (D. C.) 224 F. 650; Moffitt v. Pueblo, 55 Colo. 112, 133 P. 754; Chicago Catholic Bishop v. Palos Park, 286 Ill. 400, 121 N. E. 561, 562; Huston v. Des Moines, 176 Iowa, 455, 156 N. W. 883, 892; Tarkio v. Cook, 120 Mo. 1, 25 S. W. 202, 203, 41 Am. St. Rep. 678; Carpenter v. Yeadon (C. C.) 151 F. 879, 882, Id. (C. C. A.) 158 F. 766; 43 C. J. 300.
A municipal ordinance will not be declared invalid on the ground of its unreasonableness, unless the unreasonableness thereof is made to clearly appear. Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U. S. 86, 11 S. Ct. 113, 34 L. Ed. 620; Guidoni v. Wheeler (C. C. A. 9) 230 F. 93. However, when such unreasonableness is clearly established, the courts may declare an ordinance invalid on that ground. Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U. *488S. 223, 238, 25 S. Ct. 18, 49 L. Ed. 169; Iowa City v. Glassman, 155 Iowa, 671, 136 N. W. 899, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 852; Standard Oil Co. v. Kearney, 106 Neb. 558, 184 N. W. 109, 110, 18 A. L. R. 95; 43 C. J. p. 312.
If there is room for a fair difference, of opinion as to the reasonableness of the ordinance, the courts will not hold it void on that ground. Hartman v. Chicago, 282 Ill. 511, 118 N. E. 731, 732; Wagner v. St. Louis, 284 Mo. 410, 224 S. W. 413, 415, 12 A. L. R. 495.
The presumption is in favor of the reasonableness of the ordinance and the burden of proof to show its unreasonableness rests on the person asserting it. Real Silk Hosiery Mills v. Portland (D. C.) 294 F. 587; Yee Gee v. San Francisco (D. C.) 235 F. 757, 763-764; Guidoni v. Wheeler (C. C. A.) 230 F. 93, 98; Puget Sound Electric R. Co. v. Benson (C. C. A. 9) 253 F. 710, 715; 43 C. J. p. 310, § 323. I do not understand the rule to he that there must be no conflict in the evidence, but that it is sufficient if the unreasonableness of the ordinance he established by clear and satisfactory proof. Standard Oil Co. v. Kearney, 106 Neb. 558, 184 N. W. 109, 110, 18 A. L. R. 95; 43 C. J. p. 312, § 325.
The obvious purpose of the ordinance in question was to promote the publie safety by protecting it from danger of fire and explosion. It is well settled that there must he a rational relation between the provisions of the ordinance and the purpose it is intended to accomplish. The provisions of the ordinance must tend toward the accomplishment of the object for which the power is granted. Ex parte San Chung, 11 Cal. App. 511, 105 P. 609, 611; Willison v. Cooke, 54 Colo. 320, 130 P. 828, 831, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1030; People v. Ericsson, 263 Ill. 368, 105 N. E. 315, 317, L. R. A. 1915D, 607, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 183; Froelich v. Cleveland, 99 Ohio St. 376, 124 N. E. 212, 216; Dayton v. City Ry. Co. (C. C. A. 6) 16 F.(2d) 401, 403; 19 R. C. L. p. 805, § 112, 43 C. J. pp. 227, 228.
In the instant case the provisions of the ordinance in question to he reasonable and valid must he reasonably calculated to promote the public safety by decreasing the danger of fire or explosion incident to the storage of the commodities, which the ordinance undertakes to regulate. Dayton v. City Ry. Co., supra, page 403.
The test in the instant ease is whether the requirements of the ordinance will tend to promote the public safety, when applied to the storage of gasoline and other like substances in large quantities. The question is whether storage of such commodities in large quantities below ground in accordance with the requirements of the ordinance is less hazardous than the existing practice generally adopted throughout the country of storing such commodities in large quantities in above ground tanks with approved safety devices.
The contention of the appellees was that-underground -storage of gasoline, kerosene, and kindred liquids, in large quantities, was much more hazardous • than above ground storage. On this point, the master made findings numbered 28, 45, and 60, which read as follows:
“XXVIII. That the burying by said plaintiff of tanks equal in capacity to those so maintained by it as aforesaid in the city of Marysville as required by said Ordinance No. 350 would he attended with hazards which would render the maintenance and operation thereof underground more dangerous to property and persons than the maintenance and operation of said plaintiff’s present tanks above ground.”
“XLV. That it is more dangerous from the standpoint of publie safety to keep and store gasoline or kerosene in quantities of 10,000 gallons or more under the ground than it is to store the same quantities thereof above ground.”
“ LX. That the burying of said plaintiff’s tanks, or new tanks of equal capacity, as required by Ordinance No. 350, would be attended by hazards which would render the maintenance and operation of such tanks underground more dangerous to property and persons! than the maintenance and operation of said plaintiff’s present tanks above ground.”
The master also made the following conclusions of law:
“II. That sections numbered 1 and 3 of said Ordinance No. 350 of the defendant, the city' of Marysville, Kansas, and each and every provision thereof, is arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory, unreasonable, and subversive of the rights of plaintiff, and void.”
“III. That Ordinance No. 350 of the defendant, the city of Marysville, is arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory, unreasonable, and subversive of the rights of the plaintiffs, and void.”
In support of their contention, appellees called a large number of witnesses of expert knowledge, based on practical and extensive experience in the storage and handling of gasoline, kerosene, and like commodities, in large quantities. These witnesses *489testified that the above ground storage was much safer, and gave very cogent reasons therefor. They stated that, in the storage of these products in large quantities, the greatest hazard of fire and explosion comes from leakage; that leakage is much more apt to result and less easily detected in underground storage; that leakage results from corrosion, from strain upon seams and rivets incident to insulation, from change in temperature, and like causes. They stated, further, that leakage in above ground tankage is first indicated by sweating; that it can be readily detected and repaired before the leakage in any substantial amount occurs. They further explained how such leakage underground could hot be detected, either from inspection or from measurement; that inspection is prevented, because the tank is covered up, and measurement is impossible, because, if the tank is not exactly horizontal, the measurement is certain to be inaccurate. They further explained how gasoline escaping from underground leakage would travel through the soil to earth pockets, cellars, sewers, and the like, and thereby create fire and explosion hazards. As against this, the appellants introduced evidence of witnesses who gave as their opinion that underground storage is the safer, but none of these witnesses were able to testify from knowledge gained through practical experience in the handling of such products in large quantities. A very analogous situation arose in the case of McCray v. City of Chicago, 292 Ill. 60, 126 N. E. 557. The court in that case said:
“It is argued by counsel for appellees that the evidence shows that there is a fair difference of opinion among those experienced in the use of such materials as to whether or not Preferred Bestwali is a good substitute for wood lath and plaster. It'is true that some of the witnesses for the city testified that ordinary Bestwali, or substitutes other than the one here under consideration, less than three-eighths of an inch thick, wei’e not equal to wood lath and plaster, but only one of these witnesses for the city, as we read the record, had ever had any experience with Preferred Bestwali three-eighths of an inch in thickness, such as is here under consideration, and he had only made one test of this Preferred Bestwall, and that while the ease was being tried in the superior court, by placing a piece a few inches in size in an oven, where it was tested under a temperature of 221 degrees Fahrenheit.
“A large amount of testimony was taken on behalf of appellants. * * *
“These witnesses were men of the highest standing in their respective lines of work, and their testimony was based on an extensive study through a large number of comparative experiments and tests of different kinds of wall material.”
In concluding, the court said:
“We agree with counsel for appellees that an ordinance is not discriminatory where it operates on all persons engaged in the same business or calling alike, and where there is no other calling or business in precisely the same position (2 Dillon on Mun. Corp. [5th Ed.] § 593); also that an ordinance that fairly tends to serve and promote the public health or safety is reasonable (Spiegler v. City of Chicago, 216 Ill. 114, 74 N. E. 718); that any one attacking an ordinance, because unreasonable, must show affirmatively wherein the ordinance is unreasonable (People v. Cregier, 138 Ill. 401, 28 N. E. 812; Swift v. Klein, 163 Ill. 269, 45 N. E. 219); that courts will not disturb an ordinance of the character here in question, when there is room for a difference of opinion as to whether or not the public safety will be promoted by the provisions of the ordinance (City of Chicago v. Mandel Bros., 264 Ill. 206, 106 N. E. 181); that, on a question whether or not a particular thing may or may not be detrimental to public safety, the determination by the legislative body, if it has not acted unfairly or arbitrarily, will be held conclusive (North Chicago City Railway Co. v. Town of Lake View, 105 Ill. 207, 44 Am. Rep. 788; Laugel v. City of Bushnell, 197 Ill. 20, 63 N. E. 1086, 58 L. R. A. 266). There can be no question, also, that the power to declare an ordinance void, because it is unreasonable, is one that should be carefully exercised, and the court will not interfere simply because it believes that a different regulation might have been wiser or better, but the court will not hesitate or interfere when it is clearly manifest from the evidence that the city authorities have acted in an arbitrary manner in passing an ordinance.
“We believe the ordinance in question is unjust and oppressive -in its discrimination as to the material to be used for the partitions and ceilings of the rooms in ordinary-dwelling houses. This being so, it must be held that these provisions of the ordinance are void, and should have been so declared by the trial court.”
Counsel for appellants make the contention that, because of the peculiar character of the soil at the points where the tanks of the appellees are located in the city of *490Marysville, danger frena seepage through the soil does not exist. They base this upon a test made by one of their witnesses in attempting to force water through such soil, under pressure. The majority opinion lays some emphasis on this experiment. Gasoline is to-day a commodity in common use. Its characteristics are a matter of common knowledge. They are so well and commonly known that a court, in my opinion, may take judicial notice thereof. We know that it is extremely difficult to hold gasoline within containers, that it will escape through the smallest opening, and that it will permeate any kind of soil. Dr. H. _ P. Cady, upon whose testimony the contentions with reference to the character of the soil are largely based, on cross-examination, testified:
“Nothing in the way of earth is impervious to water, and it is not as impervious to gasoline as it is to' water. Gasoline will leak through cracks that will hold water pretty well.”
I therefore am of the opinion that the conclusion is inevitable that gasoline escaping through leakage from underground tanks, regardless of the imperviousness of the soil, would probably travel to pockets, cracks, sewers, cellars, and like places, as testified to by the witnesses for the appellees.
The fact that the witnesses for the appellees base their opinions and conclusions upon knowledge gained through practical and extensive experience, the fact that they gave such cogent reasons for their conclusions, and the fact that the conclusions of the witnesses for the appellants were largely theoretical, and not based on practical knowledge and experience, lead me to the conclusion that the evidence on this controverted point clearly and satisfactorily established that the provisions of' the ordinance, instead of tending to promote the public safety, tended in the opposite direction, and - that compliance therewith would increase, instead of decrease, the hazard from fire and explosion resulting from the storage of gasoline and like substances in large quantities. If this be true, the findings above quoted, made by the master and ’ confirmed by the trial eourt, should be adopted by this eourt.
If these findings are true, the ordinance in question is not reasonably calculated to accomplish its intended purpose, and is therefore unreasonable and void.
Under the terms of the ordinance appellees were required to comply therewith on the 10th day of November, 1923. Instead of complying with the ordinance, they attacked its validity and obtained an injunction against its enforcement. If the ordinance is valid and may be enforced according to its terms, appellees are each subject to a fine of $25 for each day intervening since November 10, 1923, to the present day. Such fines would amount in the aggregate to many thousands of dollars.
In Cotting v. Kansas City Stockyards Co., 183 U. S. 79, 101, 102, 22 S. Ct. 30, 39 (46 L. Ed. 92), the court said:
“A statute (although in terms opening the doors of the courts to a particular litigant) which plaees upon him as a penalty for a failure to make good his claim or defense a burden so great as to practically intimidate him from asserting that which he believes to be his rights is, when no such penalty is inflicted upon others, tantamount to a denial of the equal protection of the laws. * * * It is doubtless true that the state may impose penalties such as will tend to compel obedience to its mandates by all, individuals or corporations, and if extreme and cumulative penalties are imposed only after there has been a final determination of the validity of the statute, the question would be very different from that here persented. But when the Legislature, in an effort to prevent any inquiry of the validity of a particular statute, so burdens any) challenge thereof in the courts that the party affected is necessarily constrained to submit rather than take the chances of the penalties imposed, then it becomes a serious question whether the party is not deprived of the equal protection of the laws.”
In Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, 147, 28 S. Ct. 441, 449 (52 L. Ed. 714, 13 L. R. A. [N. S.] 932, 14 Ann. Cas. 764), the court said:
“It may therefore be said that, when the penalties for disobedience are by fines so enormous and imprisonment so severe as to intimidate the company and its officers from resorting to the courts to test the validity of the legislation, the result is the same as if the law in terms prohibited the company from seeking judicial construction of laws which deeply affect its rights.”
See, also, Wadley Southern Ry. Co. v. Georgia, 235 U. S. 651, 661, 666, 35 S. Ct. 214, 59 L. Ed. 405; Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Nebraska, 217 U. S. 196, 207, 208, 30 S. Ct. 461, 54 L. Ed. 727, 18 Ann. Cas. 989; Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Tucker, 230 U. S. 340, 349, 33 S. Ct. 961, 57 L. Ed. 1507; Bonnett v. Vallier, 136 Wis. 193, 116 N. W. 885, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 486, 128 Am. St. Rep. 1061; State v. Crawford, 74 Wash. 248, 133 P. 590, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1039. In Bon*491nett v. Vallier, the validity of a police regulation concerning the construction of tenement houses was involved.
The majority opinion seems to recognize that the ordinance in question is subject to condemnation because it undertakes to impose extreme and cumulative penalties before there has been a final determination of its validity, because it directs that the decree shall accord the appellees a reasonable time, after such decree is entered, to comply with the provisions of the ordinance, and shall perpetually enjoin the appellants from enforcing the penalty provisions of the ordinance until the expiration of such time. I seriously doubt the power of the court to so decree. The effect of such a decree would he to amend the terms of the ordinance, which provide that it shall be in force and effect from and after the date of its publication. In other words, the court, in effect, reads into the ordinance that which, in order to render it valid, the legislative body of the city should have written into the ordinance, but did not, namely, that the cumulative penalty provisions should not attach until after a final determination of the validity of the ordinance. I think we must either permit the city to enforce the ordinance as written, or we must hold the penalty section of the ordinance void, because of the severe and cumulative penalties which it imposes.
It is my opinion that the decree below was right, and should be affirmed.