Court Opinion

ID: 9931387
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-08 21:01:30.1949+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:17:33.161605
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                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 21-14133
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        MICHAEL EDWIN HARDING,
                                                     Petitioner-Appellant,
        versus
        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                                   Respondent-Appellee.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Florida
                     D.C. Docket Nos. 2:18-cv-14359-RLR,
                              2:15-cr-14057-RLR-1
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        2                         Opinion of the Court                     21-14133

                               ____________________

        Before JORDAN, LAGOA, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
                Michael Harding is a federal prisoner serving a life sentence
        after pleading guilty to distributing and possessing child
        pornography (Counts 1-4) and nolo contendere to attempting to
        coerce a minor to engage in sexual activity (Count 5) and
        producing child pornography (Count 6). Harding appeals the
        district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate his
        convictions on Counts 5 and 6 on grounds that his plea-stage
        attorney rendered ineffective assistance. 1
                This Court granted a certificate of appealability (“COA”) on
        two issues: (1) “[w]hether the district court violated Clisby v. Jones,
        960 F.2d 925 (11th Cir. 1992), by failing to address specifically
        Harding’s claim that his plea was involuntary because his attorney
        did not advise him that he could be subject to post-incarceration
        civil commitment”; and (2) “[r]egardless of any potential Clisby
        error, whether Harding’s attorney rendered ineffective assistance
        by failing to advise him that his nolo contendere plea could result in
        post-incarceration civil confinement, and, if so, whether that
        ineffective assistance prejudiced him.” After careful review of the
        record and briefs, we find no Clisby error and affirm the district

        1 In the district court, Harding withdrew his § 2255 motion as to Counts 1

        through 4 and clarified that he sought to vacate only his nolo contendere plea
        as to Counts 5 and 6.
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        21-14133               Opinion of the Court                        3

        court’s denial of Harding’s ineffective assistance claim as to Counts
        5 and 6.
                                I. BACKGROUND
        A.    Offenses and Indictment
               In 2015, federal agents investigated Harding, a police officer
        in Port St. Lucie, Florida, for posting images of child pornography
        to a Kik Messenger chatroom. A subsequent search of Harding’s
        residence revealed a thumb drive containing hundreds of still
        images and videos of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct
        with other minors and adults.
               Pertinent to Counts 5 and 6, agents also searched a cell
        phone taken from Harding’s nightstand and found, among other
        things, messages with other individuals about engaging in sexual
        activity with minors. Between August and September 2015,
        Harding had conversations with an individual, identified as
        “daddydearaimee,” in which Harding claimed to have engaged in
        sexual activity with his nine-year-old stepdaughter. Harding and
        daddydearaimee discussed exchanging their minor children for the
        purposes of engaging in sexual acts with them. In interviews,
        Harding’s two stepdaughters, aged nine and five, both said Harding
        had engaged in sexual activity with them.
              Additional forensic examination of Harding’s cell phone
        uncovered a thumbnail image, created in November 2014, when a
        video was recorded on the phone. The thumbnail image depicted
        Harding’s then eight-year-old stepdaughter performing oral sex on
        Harding. In his chats, Harding had discussed the video and said he
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        4                       Opinion of the Court                  21-14133

        had deleted it because he feared getting caught. A sex toy found
        with the thumb drive at Harding’s residence was determined to
        contain the stepdaughter’s DNA.
               In a second superseding indictment, a federal grand jury
        charged Harding in Counts 1 through 3 with distribution of child
        pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) and (b)(1); in
        Count 4 with possession of child pornography, in violation of 18
        U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) and (b)(2); in Count 5 with attempting to
        entice a minor to engage in sexual activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
        § 2422(b); and in Count 6 with production of child pornography, in
        violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) and (e).
        B. Plea
               At a pretrial status conference, the parties advised the district
        court that Harding planned to enter an open plea of guilty to
        Counts 1 through 4. Defense counsel explained that Harding
        wanted to plead nolo contendere to the remaining two counts
        because the state of Florida was preparing to charge him with
        multiple counts of capital sexual battery based on Harding’s
        conduct with his stepdaughters, and Harding did not want to admit
        facts that could be used against him in his state criminal
        proceedings.
               The district court expressed confusion about why Harding
        wanted to enter a nolo contendere plea when his advisory
        guidelines sentence would likely be life imprisonment. Defense
        counsel explained that the state charges carried mandatory life
        sentences, and, in defense counsel’s view, a nolo contendere plea
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        21-14133               Opinion of the Court                        5

        to Counts 5 and 6 gave Harding a better chance of defending
        himself against those charges.
               At a February 2016 plea hearing, Harding entered an open
        plea of guilty to Counts 1 through 4 and of nolo contendere to
        Counts 5 and 6. The factual basis for Count 5 was Harding’s
        conversations with daddydearaimee about exchanging their minor
        children for the purposes of engaging in sexual activity. The factual
        basis for Count 6 was the deleted video recording of Harding
        engaging in sexual activity with his minor stepdaughter.
                Before accepting Harding’s pleas, the district court
        reviewed, among other things, the minimum and maximum
        penalties for each count, including a maximum of life
        imprisonment as to Count 5; that Harding’s guidelines sentence
        could be up to life imprisonment; and that because of the nature of
        Harding’s convictions, he would be subject to substantial
        restrictions on where he could live, work, and associate if he were
        released. Harding indicated that he understood all of these things.
               The district court did not discuss with Harding the
        possibility that he could face civil commitment upon release.
        C.    Sentencing and Direct Appeal
                At Harding’s May 2016 sentencing hearing, the district court
        determined, without objection, that under the Sentencing
        Guidelines, Harding’s total offense level was 43 and his criminal
        history category was I, which yielded an advisory guidelines range
        of life imprisonment. Defense counsel asked the district court to
        vary downward from the advisory guidelines sentence of life and
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        6                          Opinion of the Court                        21-14133

        impose a 360-month sentence. The district court imposed a total
        life sentence comprised of 240-month terms on Counts 1 though 4,
        a life term on Count 5, and a 360-month term on Count 6, all to be
        served concurrently.
               On direct appeal, Harding argued, inter alia, that his plea was
        involuntary because the district court did not mention during the
        plea colloquy that he would be required to register as a sex offender
        and subject to other restrictions under state and federal sex-
        offender registration laws. United States v. Harding, 696 F. App’x
        955, 957 (11th Cir. 2017). This Court reviewed Harding’s challenge
        to the plea colloquy for plain error, found none, and affirmed his
        convictions and sentences. Id. at 957-59.
        D.      Current § 2255 Motion
               On September 4, 2018, Harding, pro se, docketed the present
        § 2255 motion raising eight claims for relief, including several
        claims of ineffective assistance of his defense counsel in the district
        court. Relevant to this appeal, in Ground Two Harding alleged,
        under penalty of perjury, that his counsel: (1) failed to properly
        advise him as to the application of the Sentencing Guidelines,
        which resulted in an advisory guidelines range of life imprisonment
        and misadvised him that he would receive no more than a thirty-
        year sentence; 2 and (2) failed to advise him that his guilty and nolo

        2 The ineffective assistance claims raised in the first part of Ground Two are

        outside the scope of the COA and are discussed only for context. See Murray
        v. United States, 145 F.3d 1249, 1251 (11th Cir. 1998) (explaining that “appellate
        review is limited to the issues specified in the COA”).
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        21-14133                  Opinion of the Court                              7

        contendere pleas “would subject him to mandatory registration as
        a sex offender and possible indefinite civil commitment.” 3 Harding
        also stated under penalty of perjury that had his defense counsel
        advised him that he would be subject to possible indefinite civil
        commitment, he would not have entered his pleas and would have
        insisted on going to trial.
        E.     Evidentiary Hearing
               A magistrate judge appointed Harding new counsel and held
        a two-day evidentiary hearing on Ground Two, as it pertained to
        Counts 5 and 6. The majority of the hearing centered on the first
        part of Ground Two, which challenged counsel’s pre-plea advice
        about the possible length of Harding’s sentence.
               Both Harding and his former defense counsel testified at the
        hearing. Harding testified that his trial counsel discussed the
        Sentencing Guidelines with him, told him he was looking at a
        sentence in the thirty-year range, and advised him there was no
        way he would receive a life sentence. Harding said he would have
        insisted on going to trial if he had known his advisory guidelines
        sentence would be life imprisonment even with a three-level
        reduction in his offense level for acceptance of responsibility.
             Defense counsel, on the other hand, testified that a few
        months before the plea hearing, he had advised Harding that his

        3 The federal civil-commitment statute authorizes the Attorney General to

        detain a person released from the custody of the Bureau of Prisons if, after a
        hearing, the person is found to be “sexually dangerous.” 18 U.S.C. § 4248.
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        8                     Opinion of the Court                 21-14133

        guidelines sentence would be life but that he did not believe the
        judge would impose a life term. Defense counsel described
        Harding’s case as “very difficult” and not “a good trial case” given
        the government’s evidence and said that if the jury believed the
        thumbnail image on Harding’s phone was of Harding having sex
        with his stepdaughter, “it would be a very short verdict in this
        case.”
               Defense counsel explained that “one of the major driving
        considerations” in Harding’s case was the imminent state charges.
        Defense counsel advised Harding that pleading guilty to Counts 5
        and 6 would be an admission that could be used against him in his
        state case, which was something Harding “wanted to avoid at all
        costs.” Defense counsel’s strategy was to put Harding “in the best
        light possible” at sentencing by pleading nolo contendere to
        Counts 5 and 6 and seeking a downward variance from the
        advisory guidelines sentence of life based on “some very good
        mitigation.” Defense counsel testified that he explained this
        strategy to Harding, who understood it and agreed that “the better
        choice was to enter a plea” of nolo contendere to Counts 5 and 6
        rather than go to trial.
              At the hearing, Harding testified that, based on his
        experience as a police officer, he knew convicted sex offenders are
        required to register and have mandatory reporting requirements.
        However, at the hearing, no evidence was presented about what
        Harding knew, or what advice defense counsel gave or did not give
        him, about the possibility of post-incarceration civil commitment.
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        21-14133               Opinion of the Court                         9

        Nor did Harding testify that he would have insisted on going to
        trial had he been advised of the possibility of civil commitment.
        F.     Denial of Harding’s § 2255 Motion
                 The magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation
        (“R&R”), recommending that Harding’s § 2255 motion be denied
        in full.
               The R&R described Harding’s Ground Two as whether
        “counsel failed to advise him that a plea would subject him to a
        possible life sentence and to mandatory registration as a sex
        offender and possible indefinite civil commitment.” With regard
        to civil commitment, the R&R noted that Harding relied on this
        Court’s decision in Bauder v. Department of Corrections, 619 F.3d 1272
        (11th Cir. 2010). In Bauder, this Court held that defense counsel’s
        affirmative misadvice—that a state defendant’s conviction would
        not subject him to Florida’s civil commitment statute—was
        deficient performance under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
        (1984). 619 F.3d at 1274-75.
               In recommending that “this portion of Claim 2 should be
        denied,” the R&R noted, inter alia, that Harding, as the movant,
        had the burden to prove his ineffective assistance claim, but had
        “not put on any testimony that he received any misadvice
        regarding any indefinite civil commitment or registration as a sex
        offender.” As to the life sentence portion of Claim 2, the R&R
        discredited Harding’s testimony and credited trial counsel’s
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        10                      Opinion of the Court                    21-14133

        testimony that he advised Harding of the potential life sentence
        and thus “did not misadvise [Harding].” 4
             Over Harding’s objections, the district court adopted the
        R&R and denied his § 2255 motion.
                                  II. DISCUSSION
        A.     Clisby Error
                As already noted, this Court granted a COA on whether the
        district court committed Clisby error by failing to address Harding’s
        claim that his attorney did not advise him that he could be subject
        to post-incarceration civil commitment.
                Under Clisby v. Jones, district courts must resolve all claims
        for relief raised in a habeas petition prior to granting or denying
        relief. 960 F.2d 925, 936 (11th Cir 1992) (en banc); see also Long v.
        United States, 626 F.3d 1167, 1169 (11th Cir. 2010) (explaining that
        under Clisby, “any and all cognizable claims” should be included
        when conducting a merits review). A claim for relief “is any
        allegation of a constitutional violation,” and “an allegation of one
        constitutional violation and an allegation of another . . . constitute
        two distinct claims for relief, even if both allegations arise from the
        same alleged set of operative facts.” Clisby, 960 F.2d at 936. If the
        district court fails to address all claims prior to issuing judgment,

        4 The R&R also determined that even if Harding had been misadvised that he

        faced only a thirty-year sentence, Harding had not shown any prejudice
        because, during his plea colloquy, the district court advised him of the
        potential life sentence, and Harding “acknowledged that possibility.”
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        21-14133               Opinion of the Court                        11

        we “will vacate the district court’s judgment without prejudice and
        remand the case for consideration of all remaining claims.” Id. at
        938.
               Consistent with Clisby, the district court must “facilitate
        meaningful appellate review by developing adequate factual
        records and making sufficiently clear findings as to the key issues.”
        Long, 626 F.3d at 1170. “[R]eformulat[ing]” or “reframing” a
        movant’s claim is permissible, so long as the district court “get[s]
        to the root of the problem.” Senter v. United States, 983 F.3d 1289,
        1294 (11th Cir. 2020). We review de novo the legal question of
        whether the district court violated the rule in Clisby. Dupree v.
        Warden, 715 F.3d 1295, 1299-1300 (11th Cir. 2013).
                Here, the district court did not commit Clisby error. The
        R&R, adopted by the district court, addressed each alleged failure
        by defense counsel asserted in Ground Two, including Harding’s
        claim that his defense counsel failed to advise him of the possibility
        of civil commitment upon his release from prison. The district
        court correctly identified this claim and specifically addressed
        Bauder, the precedent Harding relied on for his civil commitment
        claim. By analyzing the civil commitment claim under Bauder, the
        district court reached “the root of the problem.” See Senter, 983
        F.3d at 1294.
               While the district court discussed Harding’s claims about
        sex-offender registration and civil commitment together in the
        same subsection, it concluded as to both claims that Harding failed
        to carry his evidentiary burden as the § 2255 movant because he
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        12                      Opinion of the Court                  21-14133

        did not testify about defense counsel’s “misadvice” as to either
        mandatory sex-offender registration or the possibility of civil
        commitment. This finding is sufficiently clear to permit
        meaningful appellate review. See Long, 626 F.3d at 1170.
               In sum, the district court’s resolution of Harding’s civil-
        commitment ineffective assistance claim, while brief, was sufficient
        to comply with Clisby. We therefore turn to the merits of
        Harding’s claim that his defense counsel was ineffective by failing
        to advise Harding of the risk of civil confinement.
        B.     Ineffective Assistance General Principles
               A movant under § 2255 bears the burden to prove he is
        entitled to relief. Beeman v. United States, 871 F.3d 1215, 1222 (11th
        Cir. 2017). To show ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant
        must show both that: (1) his counsel’s performance was deficient,
        meaning it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and
        (2) the deficient performance prejudiced his defense, that is, there
        was a reasonable probability that the results of the proceeding
        would have been different absent counsel’s errors. Strickland, 466
        U.S. at 687-88, 694.
                In reviewing a denial of a § 2255 motion, we review the
        district court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for
        clear error. Tribue v. United States, 929 F.3d 1326, 1328 n.2 (11th Cir.
        2019). Likewise, whether a movant’s counsel is ineffective is “a
        mixed question of law and fact” subject to de novo review. See
        Holladay v. Haley, 209 F.3d 1243, 1247 (11th Cir. 2000). We may
        affirm the denial of a § 2255 motion on any ground supported by
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        21-14133                Opinion of the Court                          13

        the record, regardless of the ground stated in the district court’s
        order or judgment. Beeman, 871 F.3d at 1221.
               Strickland’s familiar two-pronged test applies to whether
        counsel provided ineffective assistance in connection with the
        defendant’s plea. Riolo v. United States, 38 F.4th 956, 967 (11th Cir.
        2022). As to the first prong, the defendant must show his attorney’s
        representation in the guilty plea context fell below an objective
        standard of reasonableness. Id. This Court has held that defense
        counsel’s affirmative misrepresentation during plea negotiations
        that the defendant’s no contest plea would not subject him to post-
        incarceration civil commitment constituted constitutionally
        deficient performance. Bauder, 619 F.3d at 1274-75 (relying on
        Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), which held that attorneys
        must advise clients when their guilty pleas are likely to result in
        removal from the United States).
                As for the prejudice prong, the movant “must show that
        there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he
        would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going
        to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1985); see also Diveroli
        v. United States, 803 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2015). “Moreover,
        to obtain relief on this type of claim, a [movant] must convince the
        court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been
        rational under the circumstances.” Diveroli, 803 F.3d at 1263
        (quotation marks omitted).
               However, the Supreme Court has admonished courts to
        “not upset a plea solely because of post hoc assertions from a defendant
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        14                     Opinion of the Court                  21-14133

        about how he would have pleaded but for his attorney’s
        deficiencies. Judges should instead look to contemporaneous
        evidence to substantiate a defendant’s expressed preferences.” Lee
        v. United States, 582 U.S. 357, 369 (2017) (emphases added). Thus,
        “[t]he defendant’s own conclusory after-the-fact assertion that he
        would have accepted a guilty plea, without more, is insufficient to
        satisfy the first prong of the prejudice test.” United States v. Smith,
        983 F.3d 1213, 1222 (11th Cir. 2020) (emphasis added) (quotation
        marks omitted); see also Diaz v. United States, 930 F.2d 832, 835 (11th
        Cir. 1991) (concluding petitioner failed to establish prejudice where
        he offered only “after the fact testimony concerning his desire to
        plead”).
                Because the Supreme Court’s Lee decision is particularly
        instructive as to contemporaneous versus post hoc assertions, we
        briefly summarize it. In Lee, the defendant, a lawful permanent
        resident of 35 years, was primarily concerned with whether a
        criminal conviction would affect his immigration status. 582 U.S.
        at 360-61. Lee’s attorney assured him, incorrectly, that his guilty
        plea to possession of ecstasy with intent to distribute would not
        result in his deportation. Id. at 361-62. Because Lee “had no real
        defense to the charge,” going to trial would have been very risky.
        Id. at 360-61. Based on his attorney’s assurances that he would not
        be deported, Lee decided to accept a plea deal to obtain a lighter
        sentence than he would have faced had he gone to trial. Id. at 360-
        61.
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        21-14133               Opinion of the Court                       15

               After learning he faced mandatory deportation at the end of
        his sentence, Lee filed a § 2255 motion alleging ineffective
        assistance of counsel. Id. at 361-62. At an evidentiary hearing, both
        Lee and his plea-stage attorney testified that avoiding “deportation
        was the determinative issue” in deciding whether to plead guilty or
        go to trial. Id. at 362 (quotation marks omitted). Lee testified that
        he questioned his defense counsel so often about his immigration
        status that defense counsel became upset and admonished him for
        always worrying about something he did not need to worry about.
        Id. Defense counsel testified that, although Lee’s case was weak,
        he would have advised Lee to go to trial had he known Lee would
        be deported upon pleading guilty. Id.
               The Supreme Court concluded that Lee had shown he was
        prejudiced by his counsel’s erroneous advice under the “unusual
        circumstances” of his case. Id. at 369. As noted earlier, the
        Supreme Court distinguished between “post hoc assertions” from
        a defendant and “contemporaneous evidence” from discussions at
        the time of the plea. See id. The Supreme Court emphasized the
        undisputed testimony from Lee and his defense counsel that at the
        time of the plea, “deportation was the determinative issue in Lee’s
        decision whether to accept the plea deal” and that “Lee would have
        gone to trial if he had known about the deportation consequences.”
        Id. Because Lee’s claim that had he known he would be deported,
        he would not have accepted a plea was “backed by substantial and
        uncontroverted evidence,” the Supreme Court concluded that Lee
        had demonstrated “that, but for [his] counsel’s errors, he would not
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        16                    Opinion of the Court                21-14133

        have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Id.
        at 371 (alteration in original) (quoting Hill, 474 U.S. at 59).
        C.    Harding’s Ineffective Assistance Claim
              In Ground Two of his § 2255 motion, Harding averred,
        under penalty of perjury, that his defense counsel failed to advise
        him that his plea would subject him to possible indefinite civil
        commitment. While there was no testimony on this point at the
        evidentiary hearing, the government does not dispute Harding’s
        sworn statement.
                Instead, the parties vigorously dispute whether defense
        counsel’s silence—rather than the affirmative misadvice in
        Bauder—regarding exposure to civil commitment can constitute
        deficient performance. We need not, and do not, resolve that
        performance issue because, even assuming arguendo that defense
        counsel’s failure to advise Harding of the potential risk of civil
        commitment after his life sentence was objectively unreasonable
        performance, Harding has not shown he was prejudiced as a result.
        See Holladay, 209 F.3d at 1248 (explaining that because both prongs
        of Strickland must be met, the reviewing court “need not address
        the performance prong if the defendant cannot meet the prejudice
        prong”).
               Harding did not carry his burden to prove there was a
        reasonable probability that, but for his trial counsel’s failure to
        advise him of the possibility of post-incarceration civil
        commitment, he would have insisted on going to trial. See Diveroli,
        803 F.3d at 1263. According to former trial counsel’s statements at
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        21-14133               Opinion of the Court                         17

        the pretrial status conference in Harding’s criminal proceedings
        and his credited testimony at the § 2255 evidentiary hearing, the
        most significant factors in Harding’s decision to enter a plea of nolo
        contendere to Counts 5 and 6 was (1) to prevent harm to Harding’s
        defense to impending state charges for which Harding faced a
        mandatory life sentence; and (2) to avoid a possible life sentence in
        federal court (by improving his chances of a downward variance
        from the advisory guidelines sentence of life). These factors
        suggest, if anything, that the mere possibility of civil commitment
        after Harding served his federal sentence would not have caused
        him to insist on going to trial on those two counts and risk harming
        his state court defense.
               Moreover, neither Harding nor his former defense counsel
        even mentioned civil commitment during their hearing testimony.
        In other words, unlike in Lee, here Harding did not offer any, much
        less substantial, contemporaneous evidence suggesting that had he
        known of the possibility of post-incarceration civil commitment,
        he would have rejected his defense counsel’s strategy to enter a
        nolo contendere plea and instead gone to trial on Counts 5 and 6.
        See Lee, 582 U.S. at 362, 369.               And absent any such
        contemporaneous substantiating evidence, Harding’s bald, post
        hoc assertion in his § 2255 motion that he would have insisted on
        going to trial, cannot satisfy Strickland’s prejudice prong. See id. at
        369; Smith, 983 F.3d at 1222; Diaz, 930 F.2d at 835.
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        18                    Opinion of the Court                 21-14133

                               III. CONCLUSION
               The district court addressed Harding’s civil-commitment
        ineffective assistance claim in Ground Two as required by Clisby
        and properly denied that claim because Harding failed to satisfy his
        burden to show he suffered prejudice as a result of his defense
        counsel’s alleged deficient performance. For these reasons, we
        affirm the district court’s denial of Harding’s § 2255 motion.
              AFFIRMED.