Court Opinion

ID: 9908495
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-08 21:00:46.850316+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:12.628998
License: Public Domain

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                                                              [PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-10057
                           ____________________

        THERESA PHILLIPS,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        LEGACY CABINETS,

                                                     Defendant-Appellee.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Alabama
                     D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cv-01548-CLM
                           ____________________
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        2                           Opinion of the Court                 22-10057

        Before WILSON and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges and COVINGTON,*
        District Judge.
        JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judge:
               Theresa Phillips worked for over six years at a factory run
        by Legacy Cabinets. Her manager, Derrick O’Neal, fired her in
        2019. Phillips is a white woman; O’Neal is a Black man. O’Neal says
        he fired Phillips for insubordination after she repeatedly com-
        plained about having to work over the weekend and then publicly
        insulted him on the factory floor. Phillips says O’Neal fired her be-
        cause she is white. She denies insulting O’Neal and claims that two
        Black coworkers who complained about their schedule alongside
        her were not punished at all.
                After her termination, Phillips sued Legacy, alleging em-
        ployment discrimination under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The
        district court granted Legacy’s motion for summary judgment,
        concluding that Phillips had presented no evidence of discrimina-
        tory intent. We disagree.
              Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Phillips,
        as we must at this stage, we hold that a reasonable jury could find
        that Legacy discriminated against Phillips when it punished her
        more harshly than her Black coworkers for similar conduct. And so
        we reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Leg-
        acy and remand for further proceedings.

        ∗ Honorable Virginia M. Covington, United States District Judge for the Mid-

        dle District of Florida, sitting by designation.
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        22-10057                  Opinion of the Court                         3

                                 I.      BACKGROUND
                   A. Phillips’s Termination
               Legacy Cabinets, LLC, is a cabinet manufacturer based in
        Eastaboga, Alabama. Theresa Phillips, a white woman, began
        working for Legacy in 2013, first as a temporary worker and even-
        tually as a full-time employee. Phillips worked on a “hanging line,”
        inspecting and repairing cabinets overhead with about 18 other em-
        ployees.
               Phillips and her coworkers on the hanging line were super-
        vised by a line leader and an operations manager, who oversaw
        other departments as well. When she was terminated, Phillips’s
        line leader was Shayne Hanna, a white man, and her operations
        manager was Derrick O’Neal, a Black man. Around the time
        O’Neal took over as operations manager, Legacy was busy enough
        that employees “started working longer hours and longer shifts,”
        sometimes putting in “12 to 14 hours Monday through Sunday.”
        Doc. 15-1 at 16. 1 By the time Phillips was fired, this schedule was
        beginning to take its toll on employee morale.
              One Friday, O’Neal gathered his team for their daily “hud-
        dle” and informed them that they would have to work the next
        day—with the promise that they would have Sunday off.

        1 “Doc.” numbers refer to the district court’s docket entries.
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        4                     Opinion of the Court                  22-10057

        Predictably, Phillips and her coworkers were unhappy about the
        news, and many expressed frustration that they were working so
        much.
               The next day, several members of the team were late or ab-
        sent. Derrick Stockdale, one of Phillips’s Black coworkers, arrived
        two hours late, coming in only after someone called to remind him.
        Even Hanna, the line leader, failed to show up on time. Because of
        these absences, the team fell further behind schedule, and the plant
        managers decided that the employees would need to work on Sun-
        day after all. Once again, O’Neal gathered the employees for their
        daily huddle and relayed the news.
               Phillips and Legacy agree that most team members were un-
        happy and there was “moaning and groaning” all around. Doc. 15-
        2 at 21. They also agree that Phillips, Stockdale, and Tavia Craig—
        another of Phillips’s Black coworkers—all spoke up during the hud-
        dle. But Phillips and Legacy disagree about the way in which Phil-
        lips addressed O’Neal in that moment, and they dispute what hap-
        pened between Phillips and O’Neal later.
                               1. Phillips’s Version of the Facts
               According to Phillips, when O’Neal announced that employ-
        ees would have to work on Sunday, Stockdale and Craig “were
        loud,” saying that “they didn’t want to work” and “cussing” with
        words like “hell and damn and the ‘F’ word.” Doc. 15-1 at 23. Phil-
        lips nodded her head in agreement with Stockdale and Craig but
        did not speak up until O’Neal specifically asked, “Have you got
        something you want to say?” Id. Phillips responded that “it was
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        22-10057                Opinion of the Court                           5

        unfair that [she and her coworkers] had been working these late
        hours and long weeks” and pleaded that they were “all tired.” Id.
        At this point, O’Neal “started blowing up” and “getting really an-
        gry.” Id. He told Phillips that Alabama was a right-to-work state
        and he could set whatever hours he wanted. O’Neal then sent eve-
        ryone home except Phillips, whom he asked to stay back and go to
        his office with Hanna.
               Once in his office, O’Neal suspended Phillips until Monday.
        During their conversation, O’Neal reminded her that he had re-
        cently given her a ten-dollar Chick-fil-A gift card “[f]or doing a good
        job.” Id. at 16. Phillips replied that the gift card was still in her car
        “if he wanted it back,” but O’Neal said that he did not. Id. at 26–27.
        Phillips then walked out of the office with O’Neal, while Hanna
        walked in the other direction.
                As soon as Hanna was gone, O’Neal turned around “real
        quick,” “got in [Phillips’s] face,” and, unprovoked, told her she was
        fired. Id. at 27. He also said that she should not apply for unemploy-
        ment or look for another job in the cabinet industry “because he
        would make sure [she] didn’t get it.” Id. at 25. Then, while Phillips
        was “just standing there,” O’Neal called someone on the radio and
        said that Phillips was being “irate.” Id. When Phillips told O’Neal
        that this was “stupid” because she had just been “standing there”
        silently, O’Neal falsely relayed on the radio that Phillips had called
        him stupid. Id. Phillips eventually gathered her belongings and was
        escorted off the premises. Legacy later told Phillips that she had
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        6                          Opinion of the Court                       22-10057

        been fired for “insubordination,” but it would not elaborate fur-
        ther. 2
                                    2. Legacy’s Version of the Facts
                Legacy presents a different version of events. According to
        O’Neal, when he gathered his team for their Saturday huddle and
        told them they would need to work on Sunday, “[Phillips] and a
        couple more guys[] kept interrupting.” Doc. 15-2 at 21. Unlike Phil-
        lips, neither O’Neal nor Hanna recalled any cursing from Stockdale
        or Craig. When O’Neal asked for the chirping to stop, “everyone
        except [Phillips] kind of backed off and let [him] finish talking.” Id.
        But Phillips continued to interrupt, “saying it’s against the law, that
        you can’t schedule us to work on Sunday.” Id. Once he was done,
        O’Neal dismissed everyone except Phillips. He then asked her and
        Hanna to come to his office because he was “shocked at [Phillips’s]
        attitude.” Id. at 22.
               As the trio walked to his office, O’Neal said, Phillips contin-
        ued to insist that he could not schedule her to work on Sunday.
        O’Neal responded that he could “schedule it and you can choose
        to come or not.” Id. at 22. Phillips then “went on telling [O’Neal]
        that this place [is] going to crap . . . because of [him]” and that he
        “didn’t know what [he] was doing.” Id. Noting that she was

        2 The Legacy employee handbook states that conduct such as: (1) “deliber-
        ately interfering with operations”; (2) “insubordination or refusal to carry out
        any instruction from a supervisor”; or (3) using “profanity” could result in dis-
        ciplinary action “up to and including immediate termination of employment.”
        Doc. 15-1 at 52–53.
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        22-10057                  Opinion of the Court                         7

        “disgruntled,” O’Neal suggested that Phillips go home until Mon-
        day—though he assured her that she was not fired. Id.
               After they left O’Neal’s office, Phillips continued to be dis-
        ruptive, stopping other employees to complain and calling O’Neal
        “stupid” several times. O’Neal warned Phillips that if she called him
        stupid again he would have to fire her. Undeterred, she responded,
        “[y]ou are stupid, and this place is going to shit.” Id. at 23. As prom-
        ised, O’Neal fired Phillips on the spot and escorted her out of the
        building. Later, during his deposition, O’Neal explained that he
        fired Phillips “[f]or being insubordinate and disrespectful out on the
        floor” and for resorting to “name calling” because he “didn’t want
        that to spread through the floor . . . the way she was being disre-
        spectful to a manager.” Id. at 30.
                   B. Phillips’s Lawsuit Against Legacy
               Phillips sued Legacy, alleging that she was fired because of
        her race in violation of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Her com-
        plaint alleged that race was the but-for cause of her firing—known
        as a “single-motive” or “pretext” theory of discrimination—or, in
        the alternative, that it was “at least a motivating factor in the ter-
        mination decision”—known as a “mixed-motive” theory.
              After discovery, Legacy moved for summary judgment, ar-
        guing that Phillips could not satisfy the three-part burden-shifting
        framework for single-motive discrimination cases articulated in
        McDonnell Douglas. 3 Legacy argued that Phillips could not establish

        3 McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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        8                          Opinion of the Court                       22-10057

        a prima facie case of discrimination because she could not point to
        a valid non-white comparator whom O’Neal treated more favora-
        bly than her. Even if Phillips could establish a prima facie case, Leg-
        acy argued, summary judgment was appropriate because the com-
        pany had proffered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for fir-
        ing her—insubordination—and she had no evidence showing that
        this reason was pretextual. 4
               Phillips urged the court to deny Legacy’s motion and allow
        her to proceed to trial. In support of her prima facie case, Phillips
        identified at least 14 non-white employees whom she said Legacy
        had treated more favorably than her. Specifically, she pointed to
        Stockdale and Craig, both of whom made disruptive comments at
        the Saturday huddle without punishment. She also presented disci-
        plinary records from Legacy showing 12 instances in which other
        non-white employees engaged in insubordinate conduct but were
        not fired. At least three of these employees—Tavia Slater, Kathy
        Groce, and Taneesha Williams—were supervised by O’Neal. Alt-
        hough O’Neal’s testimony suggested that Phillips had been more
        disruptive than her proposed comparators, Phillips’s own testi-
        mony contradicted that account. Given these competing

        4 Legacy’s motion for summary judgment did not explicitly address Phillips’s
        mixed-motive theory. Prodded sua sponte by the district court, Legacy filed
        supplemental briefing on this issue, arguing that (1) Phillips could not rely on
        a mixed-motive theory because she would not concede that Legacy had any
        legitimate reasons for firing her, and (2) even if Phillips could assert a mixed-
        motive theory, she had no evidence that race was “a motivating factor” in her
        termination.
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        22-10057               Opinion of the Court                         9

        narratives, Phillips argued, a reasonable jury could find that she
        was punished more harshly than her non-white comparators for
        similar conduct; therefore, she satisfied the first step of the McDon-
        nell Douglas framework.
               Next, Phillips argued that her own testimony’s incon-
        sistency with Legacy’s proffered reason for her termination sup-
        ported an inference of pretext. According to Phillips, this evidence
        of pretext, combined with her comparator evidence, was enough
        for a reasonable jury to find that race was the real “but for” cause
        of her termination. Alternatively, she argued that her comparator
        evidence supported an inference that race was at least “a motivat-
        ing factor” in O’Neal’s decision to fire her, precluding summary
        judgment on her Title VII claim under a mixed-motive theory of
        discrimination.
                   C. The District Court’s Decision
               The district court granted Legacy’s motion for summary
        judgment. To start, the court agreed with Phillips that she had es-
        tablished a prima facie case of discrimination, satisfying the first
        step of the McDonnell Douglas framework. Rejecting Legacy’s argu-
        ment to the contrary, the court found that Phillips had identified at
        least two valid, non-white comparators, concluding that “a reason-
        able juror could find . . . that Phillips was similarly situated to
        Stockdale and [Craig] during the Saturday group meeting or to
        other minority employees that O’Neal called to his office but did
        not fire.” Doc. 29 at 12. Because these non-white comparators were
        treated more favorably than Phillips for (by her telling) similar
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                  22-10057

        conduct, the court determined that Phillips had made out her
        prima facie case. But the court also concluded that Legacy had suf-
        ficiently rebutted any presumption of discrimination by presenting
        a valid, nondiscriminatory reason for Phillips’s termination—her
        insubordinate comments to O’Neal both during the huddle and af-
        ter they met in his office.
                The final blow to Phillips’s case came at the pretext stage, in
        which the court considered whether Phillips could establish that
        Legacy’s proffered reason for her termination was merely a pretext
        for racial discrimination. The court concluded that, even accepting
        Phillips’s testimony and viewing the facts in the light most favora-
        ble to her, Phillips had established only “pretext of something.” Id.
        at 13. In the court’s view, “Phillips ha[d] no evidence from her in-
        cident that would prove that O’Neal fired her because she was
        white.” Id. at 14. Although disciplinary records showed that O’Neal
        had failed to fire Black employees for insubordinate conduct, the
        court said, these records, “viewed as a whole, tend[ed] to disprove
        Phillips’[s] claim,” because at least two white employees were
        spared as well. Id. The court made no mention at this stage of
        Stockdale or Craig, the two comparators closest to Phillips.
                The district court also granted Legacy’s motion with respect
        to Phillips’s mixed-motive theory. According to the court, “Phillips
        fail[ed] to prove a mixed-motive case for the same reasons” that she
        failed to establish pretext—there was simply no “evidence that
        would allow a reasonable juror to find that race played a role in
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        22-10057                Opinion of the Court                        11

        O’Neal’s decision to fire Phillips.” Id. at 17. The district court thus
        entered summary judgment for Legacy.
               This is Phillips’s appeal.
                         II.    STANDARD OF REVIEW
               “We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de
        novo, viewing all evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in
        favor of the non-moving party.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
        Spangler, 64 F.4th 1173, 1178 (11th Cir. 2023). Summary judgment
        is appropriate when the evidence, viewed in that light, presents no
        genuine dispute of material fact and compels judgment as a matter
        of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
        322–23 (1986). A factual dispute is genuine if it has a real basis in
        the record and the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
        rule in favor of the nonmovant. Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321,
        1325–26 (11th Cir. 2005). “Credibility determinations, the weighing
        of evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts
        are jury functions, not those of a judge.” Strickland v. Norfolk S. Ry.
        Co., 692 F.3d 1151, 1154 (11th Cir. 2012).
                                III.    DISCUSSION
                Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful
        for an employer “to discriminate against any individual with re-
        spect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
        ployment, because of such individual’s race.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–
        2(a)(1). Similarly, “[s]ection 1981 prohibits intentional race discrim-
        ination in the making and enforcement of public and private con-
        tracts, including employment contracts.” Ferrill v. Parker Grp., Inc.,
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        12                       Opinion of the Court                     22-10057

        168 F.3d 468, 472 (11th Cir. 1999); see 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Discrimina-
        tion claims brought under Title VII may be pursued under a “sin-
        gle-motive” theory—in which the employee alleges that unlawful
        bias was “the true reason” for an adverse employment action,
        Quigg v. Thomas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 814 F.3d 1227, 1235 (11th Cir.
        2016)—or a “mixed-motive” theory—in which she alleges that bias
        was simply “a motivating factor” for the adverse action, “even
        though other factors also motivated the practice,” 42 U.S.C.
        § 2000e–2(m) (emphasis added). Section 1981 claims brought
        alongside Title VII claims may be pursued under the single-motive
        theory only. See Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media,
        140 S. Ct. 1009, 1019 (2020). 5
              Phillips argues that she should be allowed to proceed to trial
        on both theories. For the reasons stated below, we agree.
                   A. Phillips’s Single-Motive Theory
               Where, as here, an employee bases her single-motive dis-
        crimination claim on circumstantial evidence, we generally apply
        the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. McCann v. Till-
        man, 526 F.3d 1370, 1373 (11th Cir. 2008). Under this framework,
        the employee must first establish a prima facie case of discrimina-
        tion by showing that (1) “she belong[ed] to a protected class,” (2)
        “she was subjected to an adverse employment action,” (3) “she was

        5 Single-motive discrimination claims brought under Title VII and § 1981 “are
        subject to the same standards of proof and employ the same analytical frame-
        work.” Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1296 n.20 (11th Cir. 2009).
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        22-10057               Opinion of the Court                         13

        qualified to perform the job in question,” and (4) her “employer
        treated similarly situated employees outside her class more favora-
        bly.” Lewis v. City of Union City, 918 F.3d 1213, 1220–21 (11th Cir.
        2019) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). If the em-
        ployee establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the em-
        ployer to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its ac-
        tions. Id. at 1221. If the employer articulates such a reason, the em-
        ployee must then show that the employer's stated reason was
        merely a pretext for unlawful discrimination. Id.
               Here, the district court determined that Phillips had made
        out a prima facie case and could show that Legacy’s proffered rea-
        son was “pretext of something.” Doc. 29 at 13. But the court con-
        cluded that Phillips had failed to show that unlawful discrimination
        was the true reason for her termination.
               Phillips argues that this conclusion was flawed. Her evi-
        dence of pretext, combined with the comparator evidence consid-
        ered by the court at the prima facie stage, should have been enough
        to send her case to the jury, she says. Legacy disagrees. It argues
        that the district court erred in the first place by concluding that
        Phillips had made out a prima facie case. And even if she could
        make out a prima facie case, Legacy says, she failed to show that its
        explanation for her firing was pretextual, let alone that it was a pre-
        text for racial discrimination.
                We begin by addressing Legacy’s contention that Phillips
        failed to make out a prima facie case. We then consider whether
        she has presented sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury
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        14                         Opinion of the Court                        22-10057

        could determine that Legacy’s proffered explanation for her firing
        was a pretext for race discrimination.
                    1. Phillips Has Made Out a Prima Facie Case of Dis-
                       crimination.
                Legacy does not dispute that Phillips made out the first three
        elements of a prima facie case: (1) she was a member of a protected
        class, (2) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) she
        was qualified for her position. The only issue at this stage, then, is
        the fourth element, whether Phillips has shown that Legacy
        “treated similarly situated employees outside her class more favor-
        ably.” Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1221. We agree with the district court that
        Phillips has met this burden. 6
               “[A] plaintiff asserting an intentional-discrimination claim
        under McDonnell Douglas must demonstrate that she and her prof-
        fered comparators were similarly situated in all material respects.”
        Id. at 1218 (internal quotation marks omitted). Generally, this
        means that a comparator will (1) have engaged in the same basic
        conduct as the plaintiff; (2) have been subject to the same employ-
        ment policy, guideline, or rule as the plaintiff; (3) have been under

        6 An employee may also satisfy the fourth element of her prima facie case by
        showing that she was “replaced by someone outside of [her] protected class.”
        Flowers v. Troup Cnty., Ga., Sch. Dist., 803 F.3d 1327, 1336 (11th Cir. 2015).
        Here, as the district court found, “Phillips sufficiently established that she was
        replaced by a non-white employee.” Doc. 29 at 10 n.2.
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        22-10057                Opinion of the Court                         15

        the jurisdiction of the same supervisor as the plaintiff; and (4) share
        the plaintiff’s employment or disciplinary history. Id. at 1227–28.
               Phillips identified at least 14 non-white comparators who
        worked with her at Legacy, but much of her argument focuses on
        just two: Stockdale and Craig. Phillips says that both men were pre-
        sent during the Saturday huddle and “started fussing” when O’Neal
        mentioned that they would need to work on Sunday, raising their
        voices to argue with O’Neal and using words like “[h]ell and damn
        and the ‘F’ word” to express their displeasure. Doc. 15-1 at 23. De-
        spite this disruptive and disobedient conduct, Phillips says, O’Neal
        focused his anger—and disciplinary actions—on her, even though
        she simply “agreed that it was unfair that [they] had been working
        these late hours and long weeks.” Id.
               We conclude that a reasonable jury could find that Stockdale
        and Craig engaged in similar conduct yet were treated differently.
        Legacy does not dispute that these men were subject to the same
        workplace policies as Phillips, fell under the same supervisor, and
        had similar employment histories. Nevertheless, Legacy argues
        that Stockdale and Craig are not similarly situated to Phillips be-
        cause “neither of them continued to interrupt O’Neal as he was
        speaking to the group” in the Saturday huddle, and neither of them
        made “disrespectful and insubordinate comments towards O’Neal”
        after being taken to his office. Appellee’s Br. at 29. But this distinc-
        tion turns on conduct that Phillips denies—a dispute of fact that
        renders this issue unsuitable for adjudication at the summary judg-
        ment stage. See Strickland, 692 F.3d at 1154 (“Credibility
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        16                     Opinion of the Court                 22-10057

        determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of
        legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of
        a judge.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
                Although it is a closer question, a reasonable jury could also
        find that three more of Phillips’s coworkers—Slater, Groce, and
        Williams—engaged in similar conduct without comparable pun-
        ishment. According to Legacy’s own records, O’Neal disciplined
        each of these employees for insubordination during their time with
        the company. Slater, for example, was verbally reprimanded for
        telling O’Neal that “she [was] going home” if he did not turn on a
        fan, Doc. 17-4 at 5; Groce was given a written warning for “using
        offensive profanity towards her supervisor,” id. at 12; and Williams
        was admonished for repeatedly “verbaliz[ing] negative opinions
        about other team members and superv[isors] in group settings,” id.
        at 2. Likewise, Legacy’s records reflect that when O’Neal heard
        Williams continue to “comment” on the issue, he asked her to re-
        turn to his office, but she refused. Id. This is evidence from which
        a jury could find that, like Phillips, each of these employees en-
        gaged in some form of insubordinate conduct. Unlike Phillips,
        none of them was fired.
                As with Stockdale and Craig, Legacy argues that Slater,
        Groce, and Williams are not valid comparators because they did
        not “engage[] in the same[] highly unique conduct as Phillips”—
        that is, continuing to argue with and make disrespectful comments
        toward O’Neal after being told to stop. Appellee’s Br. at 30. But,
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        22-10057                Opinion of the Court                         17

        again, this argument presupposes that O’Neal’s version of events is
        correct, a determination that this Court is not permitted to make.
               Because a reasonable jury could decide to credit Phillips’s
        testimony over O’Neal’s—and thus find that Phillips was punished
        more harshly than her similarly situated non-white coworkers—
        the district court did not err in determining that Phillips had made
        out her prima facie case.

                   2. Phillips Has Presented Evidence of Pretext for Racial
                      Discrimination.
                Phillips does not dispute that Legacy has proffered a legiti-
        mate reason for her termination. Indeed, O’Neal’s account of Phil-
        lips’s repeated insubordination—if true—would be an understand-
        able reason to end her employment. O’Neal’s testimony thus was
        sufficient to dispel any presumption created by Phillips’s prima fa-
        cie case and shift the burden back to her to demonstrate that this
        explanation was simply a pretext for unlawful discrimination. See
        Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1528 (11th Cir. 1997).
        The district court concluded that Phillips had fallen short: although
        a reasonable juror could find that Legacy’s reason was “pretext of
        something,” the court said, Phillips had presented no evidence that
        it was a pretext for racial discrimination. We disagree.
               Once an employer has offered evidence of a legitimate, non-
        discriminatory reason for its action, the burden shifts to the plaintiff
        to show the asserted reason was pretextual. This burden “merges
        with the ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been
        the victim of intentional discrimination.” Tex. Dep’t of Comm. Affairs
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        18                     Opinion of the Court                  22-10057

        v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981). “She may succeed in this either
        directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more
        likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the
        employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” Id.
        However, “[s]howing only that the employer’s proffered reason is
        false does not necessarily entitle a plaintiff to get past summary
        judgment.” Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Devs., Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1264 (11th
        Cir. 2010). To survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must present
        sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude “not just that
        [the employer’s] proffered reasons for firing her were ill-founded
        but that unlawful discrimination was the true reason.” Id. at 1267.
               We start by considering whether Phillips has presented suf-
        ficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Legacy’s
        proffered reason for firing her was pretextual. We then address the
        question at the core of this appeal: whether Phillips can show that
        the true reason for her termination was unlawful discrimination.
                             (a) Phillips’s Evidence of Pretext
               To establish pretext, an employee must “cast sufficient
        doubt on the [employer’s] proffered nondiscriminatory reasons to
        permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that [they] were not
        what actually motivated its conduct.” Combs, 106 F.3d at 1538 (in-
        ternal quotation marks omitted). The employee achieves this by
        demonstrating “such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies,
        incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legiti-
        mate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could find
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        22-10057                Opinion of the Court                         19

        them unworthy of credence.” Id. (internal quotation marks omit-
        ted).

                Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Phillips,
        we conclude that she can show that Legacy’s proffered reason for
        firing her was false. Although O’Neal says that he fired Phillips for
        arguing with him during the huddle and then repeatedly calling
        him “stupid” and criticizing his leadership after he suspended her
        for the weekend, Phillips denies that any of this happened. Thus, if
        a jury chooses to believe Phillips over O’Neal, it will likely con-
        clude that Legacy’s proffered explanation is false and that she was
        fired for some other reason.
               Legacy argues that Phillips’s “general denials” are not
        enough to establish pretext. Appellee’s Br. at 24. “Phillips may dis-
        pute some of what she said,” and she may deny being disrespectful
        or insubordinate, “but she cannot demonstrate that O’Neal’s rea-
        sons to terminate her were false or that O’Neal’s subjective re-
        sponse to the comments that she made to him was false.” Id. at 34.
               Legacy is correct that an employee is “not allowed to recast
        an employer’s proffered nondiscriminatory reasons or substitute
        [her] business judgment for that of the employer.” Id. at 32 (quot-
        ing Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1030 (11th Cir. 2000)
        (en banc)). It is also correct that “[t]he inquiry into pretext centers
        on the employer’s beliefs” about the employee’s conduct, “not the
        employee’s beliefs” about her own actions. Id. at 33 (quoting Alva-
        rez, 610 F.3d at 1266); see also Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d
        1079, 1092 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Whether [an employee’s] conduct was
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        20                         Opinion of the Court                       22-10057

        insubordinate is not an issue for this Court to referee.”), abrogated
        on other grounds by Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1218. Phillips could not prevail,
        then, by arguing that she did not believe her actions to be insubor-
        dinate or that she should not have been fired for her insubordinate
        conduct—but that is not what she says. Instead, Phillips insists that
        the conduct itself never happened.
               Phillips does admit that she and others spoke up during the
        Saturday huddle and complained about having to work on Sunday.
        But Legacy has never suggested that this conduct alone was the
        reason for her termination. Nor could it, given Phillips’s claim that
        Stockdale and Craig were also “fussing” and “cussing” at O’Neal
        during that time. 7 Doc. 15-1 at 23. Indeed, Legacy argues that Phil-
        lips was not fired until after she accompanied O’Neal to his office
        and “continued to make disrespectful and insubordinate comments
        towards O’Neal,” Appellee’s Br. at 29—comments that Phillips de-
        nies making at all.8 Because the plausibility of Legacy’s proffered

        7 To be clear, Legacy is free to argue before a jury that Phillips’s conduct dur-
        ing the huddle was measurably worse than that of Stockdale and Craig and
        thus warranted disparate treatment. At the summary judgment stage, how-
        ever, this claim conflicts with Phillips’s own testimony that she spoke up only
        after O’Neal asked for her opinion and then said only: “I don’t think it’s fair.
        We’re all tired.” Doc. 15-1 at 22.
        8 According to Legacy, Phillips “does not dispute” that she made insubordi-
        nate comments after being called into O’Neal’s office, including saying that “it
        was illegal to work on Sundays,” that O’Neal “did not know how to talk to
        people or how to treat people,” and that she would return the Chick-fil-A gift
        card O’Neal gave her for being a good worker. Appellee’s Br. at 34. This
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        22-10057                   Opinion of the Court                                21

        reason for firing Phillips depends entirely on disputed issues of fact,
        the district court did not err in concluding that a reasonable jury
        could find that this reason was pretextual. But the core question
        remains: is there sufficient evidence for a jury to find that the real
        reason was unlawful discrimination?
                                (b) Phillips’s Evidence of Racial Discrimination
                “The critical decision that must be made is whether the
        plaintiff has create[d] a triable issue concerning the employer’s dis-
        criminatory intent.” Flowers v. Troup Cnty., Ga., Sch. Dist., 803 F.3d
        1327, 1336 (11th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Ti-
        tle VII functions only as a bulwark against unlawful discrimination;
        it does not substitute the business judgment of federal courts for
        any other nondiscriminatory reason.” Id. at 1330. As this court re-
        peatedly has recognized, “employers are free to fire their employ-
        ees for a good reason, a bad reason, a reason based on erroneous
        facts, or for no reason at all, as long as its action is not for a discrim-
        inatory reason.” Id. at 1338 (internal quotation marks omitted). It
        is not enough, in other words, for Phillips to prove that Legacy is
        lying about the true reason for her termination; to escape summary

        argument falls flat. To start, Phillips does appear to dispute telling O’Neal that
        it was illegal to work on Sundays, and she does not admit telling O’Neal that
        he did not know how to treat people. And even though Phillips agrees that she
        offered to give back the Chick-fil-A gift card, O’Neal never suggested that this
        statement influenced his decision to fire her.
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        22                      Opinion of the Court                  22-10057

        judgment, she must produce sufficient evidence for a reasonable
        jury to find that the true reason was discrimination.
                The district court concluded that Phillips had not met that
        burden. We think she has. Put simply, Phillips’s evidence of pre-
        text, combined with her testimony describing how O’Neal treated
        her more harshly than her similarly situated non-white compara-
        tors, is sufficient for a reasonable jury to find discriminatory intent.
        This is especially true with respect to Stockdale and Craig, two
        non-white employees who allegedly engaged in similar conduct as
        Phillips at a similar time and yet went unpunished.
                Legacy argues that this evidence is not enough. “Even if the
        Court were to . . . consider [Stockdale and Craig],” Legacy says,
        “that plus the limited record that Phillips presented of other disci-
        plinary records is not sufficient to establish evidence of discrimina-
        tion.” Appellee’s Br. at 14. Legacy’s argument is twofold. First, it
        says, Phillips was treated differently for different conduct, under-
        mining any claim of discrimination. “[W]hat happened to Phillips
        is not comparable to [Stockdale or Craig],” Legacy argues, because
        neither of them engaged in the same disruptive and insubordinate
        conduct as Phillips—during the huddle or after. Id. at 36. This ar-
        gument, rejected at every stage of our analysis so far, is no more
        convincing here. It again ignores the fact that, by Phillips’s telling,
        she did not engage in the conduct O’Neal alleged. Whether this
        testimony is credible is a matter for the jury to decide. Should a
        jury believe it, however, O’Neal’s decision to single out Phillips for
        punishment while ignoring similar—or worse—conduct from
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        22-10057                   Opinion of the Court                                23

        Stockdale and Craig provides at least some evidence of discrimina-
        tory intent. The same may be said of O’Neal’s more forgiving treat-
        ment of Slater, Groce, and Williams—Phillips’s other non-white
        comparators. 9
               Second, Legacy argues that “a prima facie case does not, on
        its own, establish pretext.” Id. at 40. Quoting this Court’s decision
        in Flowers, Legacy insists that “making a prima facie case and
        merely contradicting the [defendant]’s proffered legitimate, non-
        discriminatory reason” is no longer enough to escape summary
        judgment. Id. (quoting 803 F.3d at 1339). Now, an employee must
        “produce additional evidence suggesting discrimination after con-
        tradicting their employer’s stated reasons.” Id. (quoting 803 F.3d at
        1339) (emphasis added by Legacy).

        9 The district court made no mention of Stockdale or Craig at the pretext stage
        of its analysis. Addressing Phillips’s other comparators, however, the court
        concluded that “the disciplinary records, when viewed as a whole, tend to dis-
        prove Phillips’[s] claim of racial bias” because O’Neal had not fired two other
        white employees for insubordinate conduct at other times in his tenure. Doc.
        29 at 14 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). But Title VII does not “give
        an employer license to discriminate against some employees on the basis of
        race or sex merely because he favorably treats other members of the employ-
        ees’ group.” Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 455 (1982). The ultimate question
        is not whether O’Neal discriminated against all white subordinates, but
        whether he discriminated against Phillips because she was white. Evidence
        that O’Neal failed to fire other white employees for insubordination, “alt-
        hough relevant” to the question of his intent, “is certainly not dispositive,” and
        is better left to the jury to weigh against Phillips’s own comparator evidence.
        Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 153 (2000).
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        24                        Opinion of the Court                       22-10057

               It is true that, in Flowers, this Court determined that the em-
        ployee’s evidence of pretext, combined with his prima facie case,
        was not enough to support a finding of discrimination—but the key
        component of that decision was the employee’s lack of valid com-
        parators. 803 F.3d at 1338–40. In that case, we explicitly rejected
        the employee’s proposed comparator evidence, noting that “[t]he
        obvious differences between Flowers’s circumstances and those of
        his purported comparators are hardly the stuff of an apples-to-ap-
        ples comparison.” Id. at 1340. 10 Lacking valid comparators, this
        Court noted that “[t]he only evidence that Flowers offers that even
        touches on his race is the fact that he became the first black head
        football coach in Troup County since 1973.” Id. at 1338.
               Here, the mere fact that Phillips can establish her prima facie
        case and show “pretext of something” is insufficient to escape sum-
        mary judgment. But the specific evidence she used to get to that
        point—including evidence of potential comparators—is enough
        that a reasonable jury who believes Phillips’s testimony may find
        discriminatory intent. See Wilson, 376 F.3d at 1088 (“[E]vidence of
        pretext may include . . . the same evidence offered initially to es-
        tablish the prima facie case.”); see also Ross v. Rhodes Furniture, Inc.,
        146 F.3d 1286, 1291 (11th Cir. 1998) (recognizing that “the evidence

        10 The district court in Flowers determined that the employee had established
        his prima facie case “without evidence that similarly situated comparators
        were treated differently” because he was replaced by someone of a different
        race. Flowers v. Troup Cnty, Ga., Sch. Dist., 1 F. Supp. 3d 1363, 1366 (N.D. Ga.
        2014); see also id. at 1371 n.8. Neither party challenged this determination on
        appeal. Flowers, 803 F.3d at 1333.
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        22-10057                  Opinion of the Court                               25

        in a prima facie case might be strong enough to also show pretext”).
        It is certainly true that “a plaintiff’s prima facie case, combined with
        sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted justification
        is false,” will not always be enough to support a finding of unlawful
        discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S.
        133, 148 (2000). 11 But, depending on the circumstances, that com-
        bination may be enough to send the issue to a jury. Id. The district
        court thus erred in granting Legacy’s motion for summary judg-
        ment on Phillips’s single-motive theory of discrimination.
                   B. Phillips’s Mixed-Motive Theory
               Unlike Title VII claims brought under a single-motive the-
        ory of discrimination—which “require a showing that bias was the
        true reason for [an] adverse action”—claims brought under a
        mixed-motive theory require the employee to show only “that ille-
        gal bias . . . ‘was a motivating factor for’ an adverse employment
        action, ‘even though other factors also motivated’ the action.”
        Quigg, 814 F.3d at 1235 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)). This re-
        quirement “can be established with either direct or circumstantial
        evidence.” Id. But, because the mixed-motive theory does not de-
        pend on “proof of a single, ‘true reason’ for an adverse action,” an

        11 “For instance, an employer would be entitled to [summary judgment] if the
        record conclusively revealed some other, nondiscriminatory reason for the
        employer’s decision, or if the plaintiff created only a weak issue of fact as to
        whether the employer’s reason was untrue and there was abundant and un-
        controverted independent evidence that no discrimination had occurred.”
        Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148. Neither of these circumstances is present here.
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        26                         Opinion of the Court                        22-10057

        employee relying on circumstantial evidence is not required to sat-
        isfy the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. Id. at 1237.
        Instead, she can survive summary judgment simply by producing
        “evidence sufficient to convince a jury that: (1) the defendant took
        an adverse employment action against the plaintiff and; (2) [a pro-
        tected characteristic] was a motivating factor for the defendant’s
        adverse employment action.” Id. at 1232–33.
                Here, the district court concluded that Phillips could not
        proceed under her mixed-motive theory “for the same reasons”
        that she “could not prove pretext under McDonnell Douglas—i.e.,
        [she] fail[ed] to present evidence that would allow a reasonable ju-
        ror to find that race played a role in O’Neal’s decision to fire [her].”
        Doc. 29 at 17. 12 Unsurprisingly, Legacy agrees. According to Leg-
        acy, “[t]he only possible evidence of discrimination that Phillips
        cites in support of her argument that race was a motivating factor
        [is] O’Neal’s allegedly more favorable treatment of other black

        12 Phillips argues that Legacy failed to move for summary judgment on her
        mixed-motive theory of relief and that the district court erred by sua sponte
        directing Legacy to brief the issue. But Legacy acknowledged Phillips’s mixed-
        motive theory in its motion for summary judgment and argued that Phillips
        had failed to provide evidence of any discriminatory intent, an argument ap-
        plicable to either theory. The district court then allowed the parties to submit
        additional briefing on Phillips’s mixed-motive theory. “[S]o long as the party
        against whom judgment will be entered is given sufficient advance notice and
        has been afforded an adequate opportunity to demonstrate why summary
        judgment should not be granted, then granting summary judgment sua sponte
        is entirely appropriate.” Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1204 (11th
        Cir. 1999).
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        22-10057                   Opinion of the Court                                 27

        employees.” Appellee’s Br. at 48. This comparator evidence, Leg-
        acy argues, “falls short of [implying] that Phillips’s race was a mo-
        tivating factor” in her termination. Id. But we have already held
        that Phillips’s comparator evidence is sufficient for her to proceed
        to trial on her arguably more burdensome single-motive theory.
        Therefore, the district court erred in granting Legacy’s motion for
        summary judgment on Phillips’s mixed-motive theory of discrimi-
        nation.13

        13 In addition to its arguments on the merits, Legacy insists that Phillips can-
        not proceed under a mixed-motive theory because she “has always disputed
        that she engaged in behavior that warranted her termination and has consist-
        ently asserted that the reason for her termination was pretextual and false.”
        Appellee’s Br. at 44. According to Legacy, in other words, Phillips cannot claim
        that racial discrimination was “a motivating factor” in her termination without
        first conceding that it was not the “single, true reason” for it. To support its
        position, Legacy cites a series of unpublished decisions for the proposition that
        “a single-motive case is not transformed into a mixed-motive case merely be-
        cause the employer raises a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its ac-
        tions.” Id. at 45 (quoting Smith v. Vestavia Hills Bd. of Educ., 791 F. App’x 127,
        131 (11th Cir. 2019) (unpublished). Unpublished decisions, of course, are not
        binding. Searcy v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 902 F.3d 1342, 1355 n.5 (11th Cir.
        2018). Further, unlike the plaintiffs in Legacy’s cited cases, Phillips has pleaded
        and argued a mixed-motive theory from the start. Compare Doc. 1 ¶ 35
        (“[E]ven if [Legacy] had legitimate reasons for terminating her, [Phillips’s]
        white race was at least a motivating factor in the adverse employment actions
        [Legacy] took against her.”), with Fonte v. Lee Mem’l Health Sys., No. 20-13240,
        2021 WL 5368096, at *4 (11th Cir. Nov. 18, 2021) (unpublished) (“[The em-
        ployee] did not allege a mixed-motive claim before the district court.”), and
        Stevenson v. City of Sunrise, No. 20-12530, 2021 WL 4806722, at *7 (11th Cir.
        Oct. 15, 2021) (unpublished) (concluding that the employee failed to plead a
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        28                       Opinion of the Court                    22-10057

                                IV.     CONCLUSION
               For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s
        grant of summary judgment and remand to the district court for
        further proceedings.
               REVERSED and REMANDED.

        mixed-motive claim), and Smith, 791 F. App’x at 131 (“[The employee] did not
        plead or prove a mixed-motive case.”). We are thus unpersuaded that Phillips
        cannot proceed under a mixed-motive theory of discrimination.