Court Opinion

ID: 9522234
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:20:33.99831+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:02:25.594632
License: Public Domain

Nolan, J.
(dissenting, with whom Lynch and O’Connor, JJ., join). I dissent from part 3 of the court’s opinion. The court’s reasoning concerning the police officer’s duty clearly flies in the face of our decision in Dinsky v. Framingham, 386 Mass. 801 (1982).
In Dinsky, supra at 810, this court declined to depart from the “public duty” rule which provides that in the absence of a special duty owed to specific plaintiffs, “different from that owed to the general public at large,” no cause of action for negligence against a town or town officials can be maintained.
The rule in a majority of jurisdictions in public service cases requires the presence of two factors before an actionable special duty of the police is found. “First, there must be some form of privity between the police department and the victim that sets the victim apart from the general public. . . . Second, there must be specific assurances of protection that give rise to justifiable reliance by the victim.” Warren v. District of Columbia, 444 A.2d 1, 10 (D.C. Ct. App. 1981) (Kelly, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See Jackson v. Clements, 146 Cal. App. 3d 983, 987-989 (1983) (no special duty arose when police officers failed to prevent intoxicated minors from driving); Shore v. Stonington, 187 Conn. 147 (1982) (failure to arrest after stopping the drunken operator did not subject identifiable victim to imminent harm); Crouch v. Hall, Ind. App. , - (1980) (406 N.E.2d 303, 304-305 [Ind. App. 1980]) (no special duty owed to rape victim for negligent inves*776tigation of earlier rape); Fusilier v. Russell, 345 So. 2d 543, 546 (La. App. Ct. 1977) (police officer’s failure to arrest intoxicated individual did not give rise to a special duty to motorist); Evers v. Westerberg, 38 A.D.2d 751 (1972), aff’d, 32 N.Y.2d 684 (1973) (failure to arrest intoxicated driver did not give rise to a special duty).
In the present case, the court departs from this majority position and imposes a duty on police officers in the absence of an identifiable victim. The police had no privity with the plaintiffs in this case and gave no specific assurances of protection. The plaintiffs have not demonstrated the requisite special relationship which creates the duty (and duty is still an element of the tort of negligence).
Moreover, some of the very cases which the court cites as authority support the traditional rule of public duty. For instance in DeLong v. County of Erie, 60 N.Y.2d 296, 301 (1983), a specific individual initiated the 911 emergency call, received specific assurances of protection and relied on the assurances. And there are other cases. See Lorshbough v. Buzzle, 258 N. W.2d 96, 102 (Minn. 1977) (known risk of fire to surrounding identifiable landowners). Cf. Taplin v. Chatham, 390 Mass. 1, 2-5 (1983) (emergency medical technicians negligently failed to bring identifiable victim to a hospital); Slaven v. Salem, 386 Mass. 885, 887 (1982) (duty owed by prison officials to a person within their custody and control); Prigden v. Boston Hous. Auth., 364 Mass. 696, 709 (1974) (landowner owes a duty of reasonable care to avoid injury to trespasser whose trapped position is known).
The court’s reliance on those decisions addressing the duty of liquor store owners to the general public is entirely off the mark. Supra at 757-760. The public duty rule is simply not applicable in the private sector and the cases cited cannot serve as analogues.
The court has essentially abandoned the public duty rule and has imposed a new “common law duty” upon police officers while still using the rubric of the public duty rule. The court extends the duty to all possible plaintiffs, thereby discarding the requisite (and reasonable) finding of a special relationship. *777If the court thought it wise to follow this path, I suggest that it should have summoned the courage to abolish explicitly the generally accepted rule in public service cases. See Ryan v. Arizona, 134 Ariz. 308, 310-311 (1982). The course of action taken by the court today is regrettable. Its effect on tomorrow is frightening.
My dissent from part 3 makes it unnecessary to reach part 5. If I were to reach part 5, I would agree with the court.