Court Opinion

ID: 9643573
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:33:13.747114+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:01.508437
License: Public Domain

DENTON, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. The majority has placed an undue burden on the plaintiffs below in requiring proof that the defendant “knowingly permitted” the steer to run at large. The defendant’s answer contained only a general denial and allegations of specific acts of negligence on the part of the plaintiff and unavoidable accident. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for a judgment non obstante veredicto. This motion was based on the proposition that the evidence was uncontradicted that there was no common law duty on the part of the defendant to keep his steer penned on the occasion in question; alternatively, that there was no evidence or insufficient evidence to support any finding of common law negligence on the part of the defendant; and that there was no evidence or insufficient evidence to support a finding of a violation of Article 1370a, Texas Penal Code. The defendant further pleaded alternatively that the jury findings to the named special issues should be disregarded because such issues were not supported by any evidence; and that the undisputed evidence established that the defendant did not knowingly permit the steer to roam at large and that he adequately maintained the fence; and that the defendant had no knowledge prior to the accident that the *292animal was ac large. In granting this motion the trial court did not state the basis upon which it was granted. It obviously could not be based on the insufficiency of the evidence.
It was stipulated by the parties that the “steer in question was owned by C. G. Richardson, that he was the person owning and having responsibility for control of the animal,” and that the collision took place on the right-of-way of U. S. Highway 385, and that it was a U. S. highway within the meaning of Article 1370a. There was positive testimony that the steer in question was roaming at large unattended on the highway at the time of the accident. It has been held in cases construing 1370a that evidence that the defendant was the owner of an animal allegedly roaming at large on a fenced designated highway was sufficient to present a “prima facie case” of liability for damages resulting from a collision with that animal; without further proof that the defendant “permitted” the animal to roam at large or that the defendant had any knowledge of the fact the animal was on the highway. Adamcik v. Knight (Tex.Civ.App.), 170 S.W.2d 521. That case also held that the proof of ownership of such an animal raises a prima facie presumption of negligence and shifts the burden of offering the evidence to the owner. See also Dorman v. Cook (Tex.Civ.App.), 262 S.W.2d 744 (Writ Dismissed). I think these rules are applicable here under this record.
I also seriously question whether or not the trial court properly submitted the case to the jury on the theory of a violation of a criminal statute. If so, it was done by the submission of special issues la and lb. These issues simply inquire if the defendant’s steer ran at large on the occasion in question and, if so, was it a proximate cause of the collision and damages. Where cases of this general nature are submitted on the common law tort principle it is not necessary for the plaintiff to assume the burden of demonstrating criminal intent on the part of the defendant or that he “knowingly” permitted the steer to roam at large. Green v. Evans (Tex.Civ.App.), 362 S.W.2d 377.
I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the cause for retrial on its merits.