Court Opinion

ID: 9712412
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:53:18.45933+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:11.980286
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Roberts:
I believe that the Orphans’ Court of Allegheny County had jurisdiction of this case and that its decision on the merits was correct. Thus I must register a strong dissent to the action of the majority, which has misapprehended the purpose of the jurisdictional rule of §22, comment i, of the Conflicts Restatement to work a result which without question runs contrary to the best interests of the children.
At the outset, some additional facts should be set out. After the military authorities gave custody of the children to Mrs. Fossleitner, apparently without the consent of the father, the father did consent to having appellee, his brother, appointed as guardian of the children. Appellee and the father then jointly filed a petition in the Austrian courts, requesting an order requiring Mrs. Fossleitner to deliver the children to diplomatic officials for transfer to appellee in the United States. The Austrian courts in effect held that they could take no such action until an American court ruled that appellee was entitled to custody. This action was then brought in Allegheny County.
The majority correctly states that jurisdiction depends on whether a “person’s relationship to the state is such as to make the exercise of such jurisdiction *341reasonable.” Restatement (2d), Conflict of Laws §24(1) (Prop. Off. Draft 1967). Unfortunately tbe majority then goes on to completely ignore that principle.
The theory of jurisdiction over minor children is essentially based on the domicile of the children, which in turn is tied to the domicile of the parent. The parent’s domicile in a given state is sufficient for that state to retain jurisdiction over a minor child in order to decide exactly the type of case which is now before us. Since the father’s domicile is Allegheny County,1 jurisdiction over the minor children ordinarily would attach in Allegheny County, since the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and more particularly the County of Allegheny, retain an interest in deciding issues concerning the family relationships of the Huck family.
The majority goes astray when it reads Restatement §22, comment i, as being applicable to this case. Comment i states that a child acquires the domicile of a grandparent or another person standing in loco parentis to the child “if both parents of a child are dead, or if the child is abandoned by both parents or by a surviving parent, and no guardian of the child’s person is appointed. ” (Emphasis supplied.) Initially it would seem sufficient to say that since the case before us is for the appointment of a guardian, it is rather odd to put a litigant out of court under §22, comment i, which by its terms is inapplicable when a guardian is appointed. But beyond this, §22, comment i speaks only to situations where both parents are dead, or where both or a surviving parent has abandoned the child. Neither is the case here. The father is, of course, *342quite alive, and rather than abandoning the children, almost since the commencement of their stay with Mrs. Fossleitner, has been endeavoring to have them placed with appellee, his brother.
The root of the majority’s confusion is in its belief that the fact that the father is incompetent2 is the equivalent of his having abandoned the children under §22, comment i. This position is in my view untenable and ignores the rationale of the jurisdictional principle of Restatement §24(1), supra. “Abandonment” is a technical term which applies to only two situations: where the parent deserts the child, or where the parent gives custody of the child to a third party “with the intention of relinquishing his parental rights and obligations.” (Emphasis added.) Restatement §22, comment e. In light of this definition, the policy of §22, comment i is clear. When the child is abandoned, or of course where both parents are dead, the state in which the parent(s) live(d) no longer has an interest in overseeing the family relationship between the parentis) and child. That relationship in effect has been legally dissolved, either by death or by explicit act of the parent(s). The view of the parent(s), if living, is now that the child belongs to another, and as a result the parents’ state no longer retains a sufficient interest to exercise jurisdiction over the child. If both parents are deceased, of course, the same situation prevails.
Here, however, although the father is institutionalized, he still is concerned with the welfare of the children and has done none of the acts constituting *343an abandonment. The father did not desert the children; rather they were taken from him, and given to Mrs. Fossleitner by the military authorities, no doubt as a matter of convenience. Nor did the father relinquish the children to Mrs. Fossleitner with the intention of having her take over his parental rights and responsibilities, but instead he has actively attempted to have the children taken away from Mrs. Fossleitner. Since the interest of the father in his children is continuing, the interest of the Allegheny County court in the relationships of this family likewise is continuing, and that court, in my view, retains jurisdiction.
On the merits, there can be no doubt that the decision of the court below should be sustained. After appellant’s preliminary objections were dismissed, the court below ordered appellant to answer within fifteen days. Although no answer was filed, a hearing was held as scheduled. The hearing established, in part through the testimony of an eminent Austrian lawyer, that the schools which the children would attend in Austria provided neither the facilities nor the opportunities that would be available to the children if they lived with appellee, and that college training would likely be impossible. Furthermore, Mrs. Fossleitner’s home facilities were described as barely adequate for her, her common-law husband, and the children.
The court below also found that in Austria, the children would have a limited choice of occupations in a primarily rural area. Religious instruction for the children would be lacking, and the parish priest of the village in which the children were residing was unable to testify concerning Mrs. Fossleitner’s qualifications and character because of lack of knowledge. Appellee, on the other hand, is active in civic, educational, and religious activities.
*344On this record, I do not believe that there can be any question that the unanimous, four judge decision of the court below awarding guardianship to appellee was a proper exercise of the court’s discretion. That decision should be affirmed.

 Since the father did not establish a new domicile, either by his service in the military or by his institutionalization for his mental difficulties, see Restatement 2d, Conflict of Laws, §17, comment d; §23, comment d (Prop. Off. Draft 1967), his domicile remains in Allegheny County.

 It is not clear to me that the father has been legally adjudicated incompetent. He, of course, presumably could be institutionalized for the treatment of a mental disease without being legally incompetent. However, even if I assume this point arguendo, I believe that the majority’s disposition is in error.