Court Opinion

ID: 9397315
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-25 00:00:36.118427+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:23.522675
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-20013     Document: 00516762942        Page: 1     Date Filed: 05/24/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                                 United States Court of Appeals
                                                                               Fifth Circuit

                                                                             FILED
                                                                         May 23, 2023
                                 No. 22-20279
                               c/w No. 23-20013                         Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                             Clerk

   Clifford F. Tuttle, Jr., as Representative of the Estate of Dennis W.
   Tuttle, Deceased; Robert Tuttle; Ryan Tuttle; Jo Ann
   Nicholas; John Nicholas,

                                                          Plaintiffs—Appellees,

                                      versus

   Eric Sepolio; Manuel Salazar; Thomas Wood; Oscar
   Pardo; Frank Medina; Clemente Reyna; Cedell Lovings;
   Nadeem Ashraf; Marsha Todd; Robert Gonzales,

                                                      Defendants—Appellants.

                 Appeals from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Texas
                   USDC Nos. 4:21-CV-270; 4:21-CV-272

   Before Richman, Chief Judge, and Elrod and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:
         This appeal concerns civil-rights claims brought by the estates of Den-
   nis Tuttle and Rhogena Nicholas in relation to the Houston Police Depart-
   ment’s attempt to execute a search warrant at 7815 Harding Street. Appel-
   lees are various police officers. They asserted qualified immunity and moved
Case: 23-20013      Document: 00516762942         Page: 2     Date Filed: 05/24/2023

                                     No. 22-20279
                                   c/w No. 23-20013

   to dismiss. The district court dismissed some claims and allowed others to
   proceed. We AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in part, and VACATE in part.
                                          I
          In reciting these facts, we accept all well-pleaded allegations as true
   and construe them in Plaintiffs’ favor, rejecting all naked assertions and legal
   conclusions. Walker v. Beaumont ISD, 938 F.3d 724, 735 (5th Cir. 2019). The
   controversy began with a phone call reporting suspected unlawful activity.
   Patricia Garcia called the police department, claiming that the residents in
   7815 Harding Street were involved in selling heroine and possessed various
   firearms, including machine guns. Tuttle owned that home, and lived there
   with Nicholas, his wife. Police officers investigated the home, observed no
   criminal activity, and forwarded their notes to Lieutenant Marsha Todd, a
   member of the department’s narcotics division and responsible in part for
   assigning cases to other narcotics officers.
          Todd relayed the information concerning Harding Street to Officer
   Gerald Goines, an officer in narcotics division Squad 15. Goines then took a
   series of actions to fraudulently obtain a search warrant for the residence at
   issue. First, Goines executed an affidavit swearing that a confidential inform-
   ant told him that the informant purchased heroine from the residence and
   observed firearms within the home. Based on the affidavit, Goines then ap-
   plied for and received a no-knock search warrant from a municipal judge.
          It turned out that the testimony contained in Goines’s affidavit was
   false. Goines later admitted that he had not paid any confidential informant
   to purchase drugs from the Harding Street home. He maintains that he pur-
   chased the heroine and witnessed the firearms himself, but Plaintiffs deny
   that allegation. In any event, Goines and Officer Steven Bryant organized
   Squad 15 officers to execute the search warrant. These are Eric Sepolio, Ma-
   nuel Salazar, Felipe Gallegos, Thomas Wood, Oscar Pardo, Frank Medina,

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                                  c/w No. 23-20013

   Clemente Reyna, Cedell Lovings, and Nadeem Ashraft.
          The events that followed are highly contested. Plaintiffs allege that
   officers fired without provocation, shooting and killing a dog owned by Tuttle
   and Nicholas. Plaintiffs further allege that officers, both inside the home and
   outside of it, began firing their weapons after the initial shot was fired. And
   they allege that all the officers mentioned above were on the scene and in-
   volved in executing the warrant. Nor do any of those officers deny being pre-
   sent and participating. Any firing done by Tuttle, Plaintiffs contend, was
   done purely in defense of himself and his wife. As a result of the gunfire,
   Tuttle and Nicholas were killed and four officers seriously injured.
          Also at issue is Lieutenant Robert Gonzales, the supervisor of Squad
   15. Plaintiffs contend that Gonzales was aware that Goines regularly violated
   City policy relating to confidential informants and regularly lied in order to
   obtain no-knock search warrants. And they assert that Gonzales knew that
   Goines had not actually investigated the Harding Street home.
          Plaintiffs brought multiple claims against various defendants pursuant
   to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As relevant here, they asserted two general categories
   of claims—that the officers used excessive force in executing the search war-
   rant and that the search and seizure were unlawful. As against the individual
   officers, Plaintiffs asserted both direct claims and claims premised on failure
   to intervene. And as against Gonzales and Todd, Plaintiffs asserted that the
   two lieutenants are directly liable for excessive-force and search-and-seizure,
   and liable on a failure to supervise theory. Finally, Plaintiffs also asserted
   wrongful death and survival as separate “causes of actions,” in their words.
          Several of the officers moved to dismiss, asserting qualified immunity.
   Those officers are Sepolio, Salazar, Gallegos, Wood, Pardo, Medina, Reyna,
   Lovings, and Ashraft, as well as Gonzales and Todd. As to Plaintiffs’ exces-
   sive-force claims, the district court denied the motions in full, including the

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                                   c/w No. 23-20013

   claims for failure to supervise. As to Plaintiffs’ search and seizure claims, the
   district court dismissed the claims against the individual officers, but allowed
   the failure-to-supervise claims to proceed. And the district court denied the
   motions to dismiss as to Plaintiffs’ claims for wrongful death and survival.
                                          II
          We have jurisdiction to review orders denying qualified immunity be-
   cause they are immediately appealable according to the collateral-order doc-
   trine. Carswell v. Camp, 54 F.4th 307, 310 (5th Cir. 2022). We review de novo
   a district court’s denial of a qualified-immunity defense. Allen v. Hays, 21-
   20337, slip op. at 4 (5th Cir. 2023). To overcome such a defense, the plain-
   tiffs must plead facts showing: (1) that the defendants violated their constitu-
   tional right; and (2) that the right at issue was clearly established at the time
   of the violation. Henderson v. Harris County, 51 F.4th 125, 132 (5th Cir.
   2022). We have discretion to consider those inquiries in whatever order best
   suits the particular case. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
                                          A
          We first consider the claims asserted against the officers who did not
   have a role in supervising other officers. That is, the claims asserted against
   Sepolio, Salazar, Gallegos, Wood, Pardo, Medina, Reyna, Lovings, and Ash-
   raft. As to those officers, Plaintiffs asserted claims for excessive force and
   unlawful search-and-seizure, based on direct liability and failure to intervene.
                                          1
          The district court denied the officers’ motions to dismiss Plaintiffs’
   excessive-force claims. To state such a claim, a plaintiff must establish that
   he was injured as a result of force that was “clearly excessive to the need” as
   well as “objectively unreasonable” in light of the relevant circumstances.
   Jackson v. Gautreaux, 3 F.4th 182, 186 (5th Cir. 2021).

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          Plaintiffs’ allegations state an excessive-force claim that overcomes
   qualified immunity. Accepting Plaintiffs’ version of events as true, the offic-
   ers fired upon Tuttle and Nicholas without provocation. Taken together, the
   facts alleged are sufficient at the pleading stage. The officers deny that they
   shot first, as is their right. But such a denial does not override our obligation
   to accept the well-pleaded facts. We find no error in the district court’s de-
   nial of the motions to dismiss these claims.
                                          2
          The district court granted the officers’ motions to dismiss Plaintiffs’
   search-and-seizure claims. It did not specify whether it dismissed the claims
   with prejudice. In such a case, we presume that claims are dismissed without
   prejudice. Marshall v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 378 F.3d 495, 500–01 (5th Cir.
   2004). The officers urge us to amend the dismissal to being with prejudice,
   but they cite no legal authority for the proposition that we have jurisdiction
   to consider an appeal from an order granting a motion to dismiss without
   prejudice. Indeed, they admit that the “claims of unlawful search [asserted
   against these defendants] . . . are not an active part of this case.” That ad-
   mission is appropriate. In this interlocutory posture, we lack jurisdiction to
   consider arguments “unrelated to the denial of qualified immunity.” Burn-
   side v. Kaelin, 773 F.3d 624, 626 n.1 (5th Cir. 2014).
                                          3
          Last, the district court denied the officers’ motions to dismiss Plain-
   tiffs’ claims for excessive force and unlawful search-and-seizure based on a
   failure-to-intervene theory. Such a theory requires a plaintiff to show that an
   officer was present while another officer violated someone’s constitutional
   right, was aware of the violation, and had a clear opportunity to intervene but
   failed to do so. See Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 343 (5th Cir. 2020). With
   respect to the excessive-force claims, even viewing the allegations in

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                                    No. 22-20279
                                  c/w No. 23-20013

   Plaintiffs’ favor, we must conclude that they fail to show that the officers had
   a sufficient opportunity to intervene while the firefight was in progress. And
   supposing that the facts as pleaded demonstrate such an opportunity, they
   certainly do not show a clearly established right to intervention. The same is
   true with respect to the search-and-seizure claims. The facts as alleged do
   not show that the officers were involved in obtaining the search warrant or
   otherwise knew the warrant was obtained fraudulently. Arizmendi v. Gabbert,
   919 F.3d 891, 897 (5th Cir. 2019). It therefore follows that they had no op-
   portunity to intervene and prevent the unlawful search. We thus hold that
   the district court erred in allowing these claims to proceed. The claims will
   be dismissed with prejudice because they are futile. See, e.g., Anokwuru v.
   City of Houston, 990 F.3d 956, 966 (5th Cir. 2021).
                                          B
          Next, we consider the claims asserted against the officers who alleg-
   edly had a role in supervising other officers: Lieutenants Todd and Gonzales.
   Against these defendants, Plaintiffs asserted claims for excessive force and
   unlawful search-and-seizure, based on direct liability and failure to supervise.
                                          1
          As an initial matter, Todd argues that the district court erred in ad-
   dressing her motion to dismiss in the order at issue here. We agree. Before
   entering the order from which the officers appeal, the district court had al-
   ready ruled on Todd’s motion to dismiss, and Todd had already appealed
   that order. Indeed, a separate appeal is proceeding specifically addressing
   those issues. See Tuttle v. Todd, No. 22-20233. The district court therefore
   lacked jurisdiction to enter any judgment respecting Lieutenant Todd. See
   Williams v. Brooks, 996 F.2d 728, 729–30 (5th Cir. 1993). The district court’s
   order must be vacated insofar as it concerns Todd.

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                                           2
          The district court denied Gonzales’s motion to dismiss the excessive
   force and search-and-seizure claims based on direct liability. We conclude
   that this was error because Gonzales was not personally involved in obtaining
   the search warrant or in effectuating the search. “Personal involvement is an
   essential element” of demonstrating liability under § 1983. Delaughter v.
   Woodall, 909 F.3d 130, 137 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Thompson v. Steele, 709
   F.2d 381, 382 (5th Cir. 1983)). As discussed below, it may conceivably be the
   case that Gonzales is liable for the actions of Goines and others based on his
   failure to supervise those officers. But the facts alleged show that Gonzales
   had no direct role in the allegedly unlawful activity at issue here. This claim
   should have been dismissed as a matter of law.
                                           3
          The district court denied Gonzales’s motion to dismiss the excessive
   force and search-and-seizure claims based on a failure-to-supervise theory. A
   “supervisory official may be held liable under section 1983 for the wrongful
   acts of a subordinate ‘when [the supervisory official] breaches a duty imposed
   by state or local law, and this breach causes plaintiff's constitutional injury.’”
   Smith v. Brenoettsy, 158 F.3d 908, 911 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting Sims v. Adams,
   537 F.2d 829, 831 (5th Cir. 1976)). We have understood this inquiry to con-
   tain three elements: (1) that the supervisor failed to train or supervise the
   subordinate; (2) a causal link between the failure to train or supervise and the
   constitutional violation; and (3) that the failure to train or supervise amounts
   to deliberate indifference. Roberts v. City of Shreveport, 397 F.3d 287, 292 (5th
   Cir. 2005); Smith, 158 F.3d at 911–12.
          The threshold for pleading a failure-to-supervise claim is high, but we
   conclude that it is satisfied here. Plaintiffs allege multiple specific instances
   in which Goines fraudulently obtained a search warrant and in which violence

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                                  c/w No. 23-20013

   occurred. They further allege that Gonzales—in his capacity as Goines’s su-
   pervisor—knew about these infractions, but did nothing to correct them. As
   such, these allegations present the uncommon case where deliberate indiffer-
   ence may be attributed to an officer’s supervisor. The facts alleged also sup-
   port the inference that Gonzales failed to supervise Goines, and that a causal
   link exists between his failure to supervise and the actions that ultimately oc-
   curred. The district court did not err in allowing this claim to proceed.
                                          C
          Finally, we address Plaintiffs’ state-law wrongful death and survival
   claims. The officers contend that those claims should be dismissed because
   they are not separate causes of action for purposes of state law. However, at
   this interlocutory posture, the officers have not adequately raised this issue.
   Federal qualified immunity does not apply to state-law claims, see Brown v.
   Miller, 519 F.3d 231, 238–39 (5th Cir. 2008), and the officers have not briefed
   the argument that they are entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of Texas
   law. Our jurisdiction extends only to issues concerning the denial of qualified
   immunity, and the officers have not framed this issue in that light. Burnside,
   773 F.3d at 626 n.1. We therefore do not address this topic.
                                         III
          For the reasons stated above, the judgment below is AFFIRMED in
   part, REVERSED in part, and VACATED in part. The district court de-
   nied the motions to dismiss the excessive-force claims asserted against Sepo-
   lio, Salazar, Gallegos, Wood, Pardo, Medina, Reyna, Lovings, and Ashraft.
   It also denied Robert Gonzales’s motion to dismiss as to Plaintiffs’ excessive
   force and search-and-seizure claims premised on a failure-to-supervise the-
   ory. Those aspects of the judgment are AFFIRMED.
          Next, the district court denied the motions to dismiss Plaintiffs’ ex-
   cessive-force and search-and-seizure claims premised on a failure-to-

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   intervene theory. It also denied Gonzales’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ ex-
   cessive-force and search-and-seizure claims premised on a direct-liability
   theory. Those aspects of the judgment are REVERSED and those claims
   are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
          In addition, the district court appears to have included Marsha Todd
   in its rulings. Because the district court was deprived of jurisdiction as to
   Todd when she filed a separate appeal, any aspects of the judgment relating
   to Todd are VACATED.
          Finally, the district court granted the motions to dismiss the search-
   and-seizure claims asserted against Sepolio, Salazar, Gallegos, Wood, Pardo,
   Medina, Reyna, Lovings, and Ashraft and denied the motions to dismiss the
   state-law wrongful death and survival claims asserted against all defendants.
   We lack jurisdiction to consider those components of the district court’s
   judgment and so do not address them.
          The case is REMANDED to the district court for proceedings con-
   sistent with this opinion.

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                                    No. 22-20279
                                  c/w No. 23-20013

   Andrew S. Oldham, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in
   part:
          In my view, Officer Gonzalez is entitled to qualified immunity because
   neither the plaintiffs nor the district court pointed to any clearly established
   law holding otherwise.
          Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense, and after it’s raised, it’s
   the plaintiffs’ burden to overcome it. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S.
   511, 526 (1985) (“Unless the plaintiff’s allegations state a claim of violation
   of clearly established law, a defendant pleading qualified immunity is entitled
   to dismissal before the commencement of discovery.”). Plaintiffs can meet
   their burden by pointing to a Supreme Court case that places “the statutory
   or constitutional question beyond debate.” Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148,
   1152 (2018) (per curiam) (quotation omitted); see Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna,
   142 S. Ct. 4, 7 (2021) (per curiam) (assuming published circuit precedent can
   in theory clearly establish law but only to reverse the Ninth Circuit’s reliance
   on it). That precedent must be “clear enough that every reasonable official
   would interpret it to establish the particular rule.” District of Columbia v.
   Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 590 (2018). Again and again, the Supreme Court has
   emphasized that the legal principle must “clearly prohibit the officer’s
   conduct in the particular circumstances before him.” Ibid. (emphasis added);
   Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (instructing courts not to define
   clearly established law at a “high level of generality” (quotation omitted));
   Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011) (same); Brosseau v. Haugen, 543
   U.S. 194, 198 (2004) (per curiam) (the clearly-established inquiry “must be
   undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general
   proposition” (quotation omitted)).
          Here, however, the district court did not apply the correct standard.
   In its analysis of the clearly established prong, the district court merely
   quoted general legal principles from Wanger v. Bonner, 621 F.2d 675, 680 (5th

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                                     No. 22-20279
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   Cir. 1980), and Brown v. Callahan, 623 F.3d 249, 253–55 (5th Cir. 2010). But
   neither case is even close to this one. See Salazar v. Molina, 37 F.4th 278, 287
   (5th Cir. 2022), cert. denied, No. 22-564, 2023 WL 3046124 (Apr. 24, 2023)
   (mem.). And the plaintiffs don’t attempt to point to a factually similar case
   either. Pls’ Supp. Br. 13–14.
          I therefore respectfully dissent from the majority’s denial of qualified
   immunity to Officer Gonzalez.

                                          11