Court Opinion

ID: 9724331
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:53:05.315795+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:59.343437
License: Public Domain

HABHAB, Judge
(specially concurring).
I agree with the conclusion reached by the majority. However, I disagree with the analysis utilized in determining the judgment should be reversed.
My difficulty with the majority analysis is two-fold. First, I disagree with the majority’s characterization of this situation as an ex post facto problem. The Iowa Supreme Court recently discussed ex post facto in State v. Raster, 469 N.W.2d 671 (Iowa 1991), saying:
We have repeatedly held that legislation violates the ex post facto clause of both the Iowa and federal constitutions when it “punishes as a crime an act previously committed, which was innocent when done, which makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission, or which deprives one charged with crime of any defense available according to the law at the time when the act was committed.” State v. Soppe, 374 N.W.2d 649, 652 (Iowa 1985) (quoting Beazell v. State, 269 U.S. 167, 169-70, 46 S.Ct. 68, 68, 70 L.Ed. 216, 217 (1925)); State v. Anderson, 338 N.W.2d 372, 375 (Iowa 1983); see also In re Ponx, 276 N.W.2d 425, 428 (Iowa 1979); State v. Quanrude, 222 N.W.2d 467, 470 (Iowa 1974).
Here, Bean was charged with a crime that was in existence at the time she committed the crime — that being burglary. She is not being punished for a crime that was “innocent when done.” Additionally, it seems to me the purpose of ex post facto is to prevent people from being charged or sentenced to a greater extent because of the enactment of a new statute. Bean pleaded guilty to a crime that carried a lesser sentence than the one she was charged with. The charge accompanying attempted burglary was not more punitive in nature. I do not believe the majority’s use of ex post facto is correct.
*123Secondly, I disagree with the majority’s jurisdictional argument. There is no question the district court has jurisdiction of criminal cases. That aside, I believe this case turns on whether the trial court acted beyond its authority because it could not impose a sentence for a crime which was not in existence at the time the crime was committed. I believe the majority’s reliance on ex post facto and jurisdiction is misplaced and would reverse based on the trial court’s lack of authority to impose a lawful sentence.