Court Opinion

ID: 9367943
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-02 16:04:33.556287+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:04.564573
License: Public Domain

2023 IL 127538

                                        IN THE
                               SUPREME COURT
                                           OF
                         THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

                                   (Docket No. 127538)

               THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.
                       LANCE M. DAVIDSON, Appellant.

                              Opinion filed January 20, 2023.

        JUSTICE O’BRIEN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

        Chief Justice Theis and Justices Neville, Overstreet, and Holder White
     concurred in the judgment and opinion.

        Justices Cunningham and Rochford took no part in the decision.

                                        OPINION

¶1       The State charged defendant, Lance M. Davidson, in the circuit court of
     Montgomery County with aggravated battery in violation of section 12-
     3.05(d)(4)(i) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (Code) (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(d)(4)(i)
     (West 2018)). A jury found defendant guilty, and the court sentenced him to a term
     of 3½ years’ imprisonment. He appealed, arguing that the State failed to prove him
     guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because the State failed to present any evidence
     that his conduct insulted or provoked the victim. The appellate court affirmed (2021
     IL App (5th) 190217-U), and we allowed defendant’s petition for leave to appeal.
     Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). For the following reasons, we affirm the
     appellate court’s judgment.

¶2                                     BACKGROUND

¶3       The State charged defendant by information with aggravated battery (720 ILCS
     5/12-3.05(d)(4)(i) (West 2018)). The information alleged that on March 28, 2018,
     defendant knowingly, without legal justification, pushed Correctional Officer Jim
     Stitt in the chest with his hands, knowing Officer Stitt to be a correctional institution
     employee engaged in the execution of his official duties.

¶4       At a jury trial, Officer Stitt testified that on March 28, 2018, he was employed
     and on duty at the Montgomery County Jail. Officer Stitt was stationed in the
     booking area when he heard loud banging coming from the hallway. He went into
     the hallway and noticed that a dry erase board had been knocked off the wall.
     Officer Stitt proceeded down the hallway to the “North Day 2” area.

¶5       As Officer Stitt approached North Day 2, he observed defendant standing
     directly behind the door, looking out the window while screaming and swearing.
     Officer Stitt explained that any yelling or screaming at the jail needed to be stopped
     immediately to reduce the likelihood of escalation among the inmates. Officer Stitt
     asked defendant to explain the situation, but defendant continued to scream and
     swear. Officer Stitt told defendant to calm down. Defendant refused to stop, so
     Officer Stitt informed him that he would be placed on lockdown. Defendant refused
     to comply and told Officer Stitt he “would have to make [him] go on lock down.”

¶6       Officer Stitt called dispatch to open the cell door. He stepped inside the cell and
     told defendant he would be placed on lockdown. Defendant ran to the other side of
     the cell when Officer Stitt stepped toward him. As Officer Stitt moved toward
     defendant, defendant jumped across the table in the cell. Officer Stitt stepped over
     to block defendant from running back across the cell. Defendant pushed out his
     hands and shoved Officer Stitt in the chest, which caused Officer Stitt to take a step

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       backwards. However, Officer Stitt managed to spin defendant around, lock his
       arms, and escort him into his individual cell for lockdown.

¶7         Officer Stitt was not physically injured by defendant. Officer Stitt did not testify
       that he felt insulted or provoked by defendant’s push. He also did not testify as to
       any outward reaction he made in response to defendant’s actions. However, Officer
       Stitt knew that defendant had recently returned from court. Officer Stitt believed
       that something must have happened in court that made defendant upset because
       defendant’s behavior started after he returned from court.

¶8         Defendant testified on his own behalf. Defendant admitted to yelling and
       swearing because he learned in court that he would not be released from prison that
       day. This, combined with family problems, caused defendant to act out. Defendant
       denied hitting Officer Stitt but admitted to running away from Officer Stitt and
       refusing lockdown.

¶9         Ultimately, the jury found defendant guilty of aggravated battery. The trial court
       sentenced defendant to 3½ years’ imprisonment.

¶ 10       On appeal, defendant argued that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a
       reasonable doubt. 2021 IL App (5th) 190217-U, ¶ 12. Defendant contended that the
       State failed to present evidence that Officer Stitt was insulted or provoked by the
       contact. Id. The appellate court affirmed, noting that it was not necessary for a
       victim to testify that he was insulted or provoked. Id. ¶ 15 (citing People v.
       Wrencher, 2011 IL App (4th) 080619, ¶ 55). The court explained that the trier of
       fact must consider the context of defendant’s conduct when determining whether
       the contact was insulting or provoking. Id. (citing People v. Fultz, 2012 IL App (2d)
       101101, ¶ 49).

¶ 11       The appellate court found that the physical contact in this case was precipitated
       by defendant’s intentional disregard of Officer Stitt’s verbal command to lock down
       and subsequent taunting of Officer Stitt by his statement that Officer Stitt would
       have to “ ‘make him’ ” go into lockdown. Id. ¶ 16. The court concluded that
       defendant amplified the situation by moving directly toward Officer Stitt and
       contacting Stitt with the intention of avoiding capture and lockdown. Id. In this
       context, the court concluded that it would be reasonable for the jury to infer that
       defendant’s act of defiance was insulting. Id. The court also explained that it would

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       be equally reasonable for the jury to infer that defendant’s escalation to physical
       contact would be considered as provoking Stitt into a physical altercation. Id.

¶ 12                                       ANALYSIS

¶ 13       In this court, defendant maintains that the State failed to prove his guilt beyond
       a reasonable doubt for the offense of aggravated battery. The narrow issue in this
       appeal involves the parties’ dispute regarding the proof required to establish
       defendant made “physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with” Officer
       Stitt. See 720 ILCS 5/12-3(a) (West 2018)). Defendant contends the State must
       present evidence proving Officer Stitt subjectively found the physical contact
       insulting or provoking. By contrast, the State asserts that it need only present
       evidence that a reasonable person under the circumstances would have found the
       physical contact insulting or provoking. This is a question of statutory
       interpretation, which we review de novo. In re Jarquan B., 2017 IL 121483, ¶ 21.

¶ 14       The primary objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect
       to the General Assembly’s intent. People v. Pearse, 2017 IL 121072, ¶ 41. The best
       indicator of legislative intent is the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory
       language. In re Hernandez, 2020 IL 124661, ¶ 18. When the statute is clear and
       unambiguous, we will apply it as written without resort to aids of statutory
       construction. People v. Williams, 2016 IL 118375, ¶ 15.

¶ 15       The relevant statutory provisions provide that a person commits aggravated
       battery when, “in committing a battery, *** he or she knows the individual battered
       to be *** [a] correctional institution employee *** performing his or her official
       duties.” 720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(d)(4)(i) (West 2018). A person commits a battery if
       “he or she knowingly without legal justification by any means *** makes physical
       contact of an insulting or provoking nature with an individual.” Id. § 12-3(a).

¶ 16       We find the clear and unambiguous language of section 12-3(a) of the Code
       demonstrates that the question of whether the contact is insulting or provoking is
       an objective inquiry. The use of the noun “nature” after the adjectives “insulting”
       and “provoking” means that those terms describe the requisite “nature” of the
       contact, taking it outside the scope of the victim’s subjective view. The plain
       meaning of “nature” in this context reflects an intent to look outside the victim’s

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       viewpoint and to that of a reasonable person’s perspective. Put another way, it is
       the nature of the contact, not the actual impact on the victim, that must be
       established. Consequently, we hold that the trier of fact is asked to determine
       whether a reasonable person under the circumstances would find the physical
       contact insulting or provoking in nature. See e.g., People v. Williams, 2020 IL App
       (4th) 180554, ¶ 50.

¶ 17       The legislature could have, but did not, expressly provide that an individual’s
       physical contact must cause a victim to feel insulted or provoked. Had the
       legislature intended this, it would have used the same language it used when
       defining battery involving bodily harm. Battery involving bodily harm is
       committed if the individual knowingly “causes bodily harm to an individual.”
       (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 5/12-3(a) (West 2018). Battery involving insulting or
       provoking contact, however, is committed if the individual knowingly “makes
       physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with an individual.” (Emphasis
       added.) Id. By defining the first type of battery in terms of the result of the action
       and the second by the nature of the action, the legislature expressed an intention to
       distinguish the two forms of battery. Therefore, whether the victim subjectively
       found the contact insulting or provoking is not necessary to establish that defendant
       committed this form of battery.

¶ 18       To hold otherwise would lead to absurd results. There are many reasons why a
       victim may not display an emotional reaction or deny being insulted or provoked.
       For example, “[v]ictims of domestic violence might not show outward emotion
       because of stoicism, fear of reprisal, pride, shame, humiliation, or even feelings of
       guilt and self-loathing.” People v. Ward, 2021 IL App (2d) 190243, ¶ 102 (Zenoff,
       J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Similarly, such a holding would
       foreclose prosecution in cases where an unconscious victim is physically contacted
       in an insulting or provoking way. Williams, 2020 IL App (4th) 180554, ¶ 51. There
       may also be instances where the victim is unable to comprehend or understand if
       certain contact is insulting or provoking. And in the instance case, Officer Stitt
       testified that any yelling or screaming at the jail needs to be stopped immediately
       to reduce the likelihood of escalation among the inmates, so it is certainly
       understandable that a correctional officer would try to limit any outward reaction
       to behavior like defendant’s for the same reason. Applying a reasonable person

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       standard is consistent with the plain language of the statute and avoids absurd
       results.

¶ 19       With the above interpretation in mind, we address the split in our appellate court
       districts concerning whether the victim must subjectively find the contact insulting
       or provoking. The court in Williams held that that an objective, reasonable person
       standard applied. Id. ¶ 50. The Ward court, which defendant relied upon in support
       of his argument, held that the State must prove that the victim subjectively found
       the contact insulting or provoking. Ward, 2021 IL App (2d) 190243, ¶ 50. The
       decision in Ward is flawed for several reasons. First, the Ward court’s analysis is
       inconsistent with the plain language of the statute. Second, the Ward court
       determined that focusing on the nature of the contact under a reasonable person
       standard precluded a consideration of the context in which the contact occurred. Id.
       ¶ 52. The Ward court was under the mistaken assumption that the reasonable person
       standard limited the trier of fact’s consideration to only the type of physical contact
       that occurred without consideration of the context. The opposite is true. “Nature”
       is defined, in relevant part, as “a kind or class usually distinguished by fundamental
       or     essential    characteristics.”     Merriam-Webster        Online     Dictionary,
       https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/nature (last visited Jan. 10, 2023)
       [https://perma.cc/H359-75SM]. Determining the “essential characteristics” of the
       physical contact requires a consideration of the surrounding context. To the extent
       the appellate court in Ward held that the inquiry is a subjective question, that
       decision is overruled. See Ward, 2021 IL App (2d) 190243, ¶ 50.

¶ 20        Defendant also calls our attention to the decisions in Fultz, 2012 IL App (2d)
       101101, Wrencher, 2011 IL App (4th) 080619, People v. DeRosario, 397 Ill. App.
       3d 332 (2009), People v. Peck, 260 Ill. App. 3d 812 (1994), People v. d’Avis, 250
       Ill. App. 3d 649 (1993), and People v. Dunker, 217 Ill. App. 3d 410 (1991). He
       contends these decisions demonstrate that nearly every case construing the phrase
       “insulting or provoking” agrees the statute requires evidence that the victim finds
       the contact insulting or provoking. We disagree; the court in these decisions was
       not asked to determine whether the victim must subjectively feel insulted or
       provoked by the contact, so any reliance on these cases for that proposition is
       misplaced.

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¶ 21       Additionally, we believe that defendant’s reading of d’Avis, Peck, and
       DeRosario is too broad. These decisions all stand for the proposition that the
       context must be considered when determining if the contact was insulting or
       provoking in nature, which is true under the reasonable person standard. Notably,
       the court in these decisions focused the analysis on the nature of the physical
       contact without mention of the victim’s subjective reaction. See d’Avis, 250 Ill.
       App. 3d at 651 (“Thus, it was perfectly reasonable for the trial court to have found
       that the otherwise noninsulting medical procedure performed on Lopez became an
       insulting and provoking contact once Lopez realized that d’Avis was using the
       rectal examination as a vehicle to bring about his own sexual gratification.”); Peck,
       260 Ill. App. 3d at 814-15 (“Although we can envision contexts in which a
       defendant’s spitting might not constitute insulting or provoking behavior,
       defendant’s spitting in the face of a police officer in this case clearly amounts to
       insulting or provoking contact.”); DeRosario, 397 Ill. App. 3d at 334 (“[T]he trial
       court reasonably concluded that defendant intentionally sat where he was bound to
       come in contact with the victim and that he knew that this conduct would provoke
       her.”).

¶ 22       We acknowledge that the court in Wrencher, Fultz, and Dunker considered the
       context of the physical contact in terms of its subjective effect on the victim. See
       Wrencher, 2011 IL App (4th) 080619, ¶ 55 (“The victim does not have to testify he
       or she was provoked; the trier of fact can make that inference from the victim’s
       reaction at the time.” (citing Dunker, 217 Ill. App. at 415)); Fultz, 2012 IL App (2d)
       101101, ¶ 50 (“The jury could also have reasonably inferred that Horton was
       insulted and/or provoked where he reacted by pushing defendant aside.”).
       However, the defendants in these decisions never raised this issue, and the court
       proceeded under the assumption that the State must prove the victim subjectively
       found the contact to be insulting or provoking. To the extent those decisions can be
       read as requiring the State to prove the victim was insulted or provoked by the
       contact, those decisions are overruled.

¶ 23      Having found that the State must prove that a reasonable person would find the
       physical contact insulting or provoking, this court need not address defendant’s
       additional argument that the evidence in this case was insufficient. His argument is
       based on his belief that the State must prove that the victim subjectively found the
       physical contact insulting or provoking. Since we have rejected defendant’s

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       interpretation, we need not address this argument. We therefore affirm the appellate
       court’s decision affirming defendant’s conviction and sentence.

¶ 24                                    CONCLUSION

¶ 25       The State is not required to prove that a victim of a battery subjectively felt
       insulted or provoked by the contact. Instead, the State need only prove that a
       reasonable person would have felt insulted or provoked by the physical contact.
       Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court affirming defendant’s
       conviction and sentence.

¶ 26      Affirmed.

¶ 27      JUSTICES CUNNINGHAM and ROCHFORD took no part in the
       consideration or decision of this case.

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