Court Opinion

ID: 9410270
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-20 17:02:09.430744+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:56.411967
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        JUL 20 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MICHAEL L. MCLAUGHLIN,                          No.    20-35187

                Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No.
                                                3:19-cv-00154-TMB-MMS
 v.

CENTRAL PENINSULA GENERAL               MEMORANDUM*
HOSPITAL, a non-profit corporation;
TRENA RICHARDSON, President; JAMES
MCHALE, Vice President; MARK
DIXSON; SAL MATTERO; STEVE
MANLEY; RUSSELL PETERSON; MARK
PREMO; STEVEN HORN; STEVEN
HORN; GREGG MONTONAGA; DEBRA
SHUEY; JOHN BRAMANTE, CPGH
Directors; MICHAEL T. BLAKE, D.O.;
JASON HELTON; RACHEL GILLILAND;
DEBRA A. BLIZZARD; KATELIN E.
HIMES; MATTHEW M. MEADE;
DIANNE J. CRONIN, CPGH staff;
MICHAEL LEVY; LEVI DOSS; JESSICA
SMITH; HENRY KANE; CY COX; T.J.
COX, Nikiski Fire Dept; MARK PEARSON,
Sgt.; SAMUEL J. WEBBER; JOSEPH
MINNICK; CASEY HERSHBERGER,
Alaska State Troopers; IRVING CARLISLE,
Secretary/Treasurer,

                Defendants-Appellees.

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
                    Appeal from the United States District Court
                             for the District of Alaska
                   Timothy M. Burgess, District Judge, Presiding

                             Submitted July 19, 2023**

Before: WALLACE, O’SCANNLAIN, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.

      Michael L. McLaughlin appeals from the district court’s dismissal of this case

for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Because the facts are

known to the parties, we repeat them only as necessary to explain our decision.

                                           I

      McLaughlin contends that the district court erred in abstaining from

exercising jurisdiction over his civil rights claims under the Younger abstention

doctrine, which instructs that federal courts should refrain from enjoining state

criminal proceedings except in very rare circumstances. See Younger v. Harris, 401

U.S. 37, 41 (1971). A four-element test governs our application of Younger: a federal

court should abstain if (1) “a state-initiated procedure is ongoing,” (2) the procedure

“implicates important state interests,” (3) “the litigant is not barred from litigating

federal constitutional issues in that proceeding,” and (4) “the court’s action would

enjoin, or have the practical effect of enjoining, ongoing state court proceedings.”

      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

                                          2
AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Roden, 495 F.3d 1143, 1149 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting

Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 978 (9th Cir. 2004)).

        Under this standard, the case falls squarely within the proper application of

Younger. McLaughlin’s criminal proceedings remain ongoing. Enforcing Alaska

state law is undoubtedly an important state interest. Mr. McLaughlin is free to raise

his constitutional claims in state court and has done so. Finally, McLaughlin’s claims

are intertwined with his criminal case—ruling on appellant’s claims that his

constitutional rights were violated in the course of his arrest would have the

“practical    effect   of   enjoining[]    ongoing    state    court   proceedings.”

AmerisourceBergen Corp., 495 F.3d at 1149. In sum, to exercise jurisdiction in this

case would be to interfere with the State of Alaska’s judicial process. The district

court correctly held that these constitutional claims should be decided in the pending

state litigation.

                                          II

       McLaughlin additionally challenges the district court’s dismissal of his qui

tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA). But this court’s precedents

unambiguously establish that pro se litigators cannot become relators of FCA qui

tam actions. Stoner v. Santa Clara Cnty. Off. of Educ., 502 F.3d 1116, 1126 (9th Cir.

2007) (“While [28 U.S.C. § 1654] allows Stoner to prosecute his own actions in

propria persona, that right is personal to him… Stoner has no authority to prosecute

                                          3
an action in federal court on behalf of others than himself.”). The district court thus

did not err in dismissing McLaughlin’s qui tam action.

                                          III

      The judgment of the district court is

             AFFIRMED.

                                          4