Court Opinion

ID: 9538425
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:36:20.727999+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:57:52.111772
License: Public Domain

*343CLARK, J., Dissenting.
The majority of this court once again usurp the role of the Legislature.
In California all felony convictions are deemed probative on the issue of credibility. (Evid. Code, § 788.)1 In enacting section 788 the Legislature considered and rejected a proposal that would have changed California law by limiting impeachment to proof of a crime in which “an essential element” is “dishonesty or false statement.” (Witkin, Cal. Evidence (2d ed. 1966) Introduction of Evidence at Trial, § 1243, p. 1146.) Therefore, by holding that “a prior felony conviction . . . not involving] the character trait of truthfulness . . . must be excluded as irrelevant” to credibility (ante, p. 335), the majority clearly nullify legislative intent.
Evidence Code section 788 is essentially a recodification of the law as it existed under Code of Civil Procedure section 2051. (Legis. Committee com. to Evid. Code, § 788.)2 As the California Law Revision Commission pointed out, “under existing law any felony conviction may be used for impeachment purposes even though the crime involved has no bearing on the witness’ honesty or veracity.” (7 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1965) p. 143.)3 The Law Revision Commission originally proposed to change the law by limiting impeachment to a prior felony conviction in which “[a]n essential element of the crime is dishonesty or false statement.” {Id., at pp. 141-143.) As originally introduced in the Assembly the legislation enacting the Evidence Code followed the recommendation of the Law Revision Commission in this respect. (Assem. Bill No. 333 (1965 Reg. Sess.) § l.)4 However, as Mr. Witkin points out, “Strong opposition, *344arguing the difficulties of classifying crimes in this manner and the disadvantages of the separate hearing interrupting the trial, led to abandonment of this reform. (See People v. Stewart [(1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 1, 7, fns. 1 & 2 (50 Cal.Rptr. 26)].) Accordingly, Ev.C. 788 restates the, rule of former C.C.P. 2051 . . . .” (Witkin, Cal. Evidence (2d ed. 1966) Introduction of Evidence at Trial, § 1243, p. 1146.) That is, it did until this court convened itself as a super-legislature.
This particular arrogation of legislative power can be traced to People v. Beagle (1972) 6 Cal.3d 441 [99 Cal.Rptr. 313, 492 P.2d 1], Having held the trial judge has discretion under Evidence Code section 352 to exclude evidence of prior felony convictions when their probative value on credibility is outweighed by their risk of undue prejudice, this court proceeded to specify factors to be considered by the trial judge in exercising that discretion, quoting with approval the discussion of such factors in Gordon v. United States (D.C.Cir. 1967) 383 F.2d 936. “ ‘In common human experience acts of deceit, fraud, cheating, or stealing, for example, are universally regarded as conduct which reflects adversely on a man’s honesty and integrity. Acts of violence . . . generally have little or no direct bearing on honesty and veracity. A “rule of thumb” thus should be that convictions which rest on dishonest conduct relate to credibility whereas those of violent or assaultive crimes generally do not.’ ” (People v. Beagle, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 453.)
What this court appears to have overlooked in Beagle is, of course, that the federal court of appeals in Gordon was not bound by the California Evidence Code in fashioning a “rule of thumb” for the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. If a court is free to consult “common human experience,” rather than being constrained to give effect to a statute with an unambiguous history, there may be some appeal in the view that “convictions which rest on dishonest conduct relate to credibility whereas those of violent or assaultive crimes generally do not.”5 However, as has been repeatedly stated herein, this is a view which our Legislature clearly rejected.
Having determined that James Johnson’s prior felony convictions for voluntary manslaughter and for possession of a concealable firearm by an ex-felon—like all prior felony convictions—are probative on the issue of *345his credibility, we proceed to consider the remaining factors in the Beagle balancing test. The priors being relatively recent, “remoteness” is no problem here; I do not understand the majority to claim that it is. The twd factors identified in Beagle as bearing on prejudice are: (1) the possibility a defendant may not take the stand, thus depriving the jury of his side of the stoiy, in order to avoid being impeached with prior convictions; and (2) the possibility a defendant impeached with a prior conviction similar to that for which he is on trial may be convicted by the jury on the unacceptable ground that if he did it before, he is more likely to have done it this time. (People v. Beagle, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 453.) However, as the Court of Appeal pointed out: “Those factors have no application to a witness who is not a defendant. A nondefendant witness may not decline to testify for fear of impeachment, and the proof of a prior conviction cannot operate to incline the jury’s mind toward convicting him again when he is not under charge.”
The majority’s response to this is remarkable. They argue that a defendant may, nevertheless, be prejudiced by impeachment of his witness with prior felony convictions because the jury may consider the priors in assessing the witness’ credibility, and, realizing this, the defendant may decide not to call the witness. {Ante, p. 338.) It is, of course, quite true that a witness’ prior felony convictions may tip the balance when the jury weighs his credibility. But what of that? The Legislature clearly intended that a witness with prior felony convictions, as well as a party who would call him, be “prejudiced” in this respect. As this court pointed out in Beagle, no witness is entitled to the “false aura of veracity” he would have if his prior felony convictions were to be suppressed. (6 Cal.3d at p. 453.) That a defendant may choose not to call a witness if the witness will be deprived of that false aura of veracity is no cause for concern unless this court now proposes to do what it disclaimed any intention of doing in Beagle, namely, “encouraging] or countenancing] a form of blackmail by defendants.” (Id.)
In conclusion, the trial court clearly acted properly in admitting evidence of Johnson’s prior felony convictions for purposes of impeachment. There was no reason to exclude the priors. They were probative on the issue of Johnson’s credibility, they were recent, and defendant would suffer no cognizable prejudice from their admission.
Accordingly, the judgment should be affirmed.

Section 788 provides in pertinent part: “For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, it may be shown by examination of the witness or by the record of the judgment that he has been convicted of a felony. . . .”

Section 2051 provided: “A witness may be impeached by the party against whom he was called, by contradictory evidence or by evidence that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad, but not by evidence of particular wrongful acts, except that it may be shown by the examination of the witness, or the record of the judgment, that he had been convicted of a felony unless he has previously received a full and unconditional pardon, based upon a certificate of rehabilitation. (Enacted 1872, amended by Stats. 1949, ch. 333, § 1, p. 616, and repealed by Stats. 1965, ch. 299, § 126, p. 1366.)

The commission’s statement assumes, of course, some felony convictions do not reflect on one’s “honesty or veracity”—a view, as will be seen, the Legislature ultimately rejected.

Under this proposal Evidence Code section 788 would have provided in relevant part: “(a) Subject to subdivision (b), evidence of a witness’ conviction of a felony is admissible for the purpose of attacking his credibility if the court, in proceedings held out of the presence and hearing of the jury, finds that: [H] (1) An essential element of the crime is dishonesty or false statement. . . .”

On the other hand, in this matter, as in most, human experience does not speak with one voice. It is just as consistent with human experience to assume that one who has disregarded society’s most serious rules—felonies—will also disregard his obligation to tell the truth under oath. It is sufficient for our purposes that the Legislature has spoken on the issue.