Court Opinion

ID: 9906549
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-04 15:05:52.627743+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:25:12.019074
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-1237-22

MARILEE NEGRON,

          Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

JEAN C. BENITEZ,

     Defendant-Respondent.
_________________________

                   Argued October 25, 2023 – Decided December 4, 2023

                   Before Judges Enright and Paganelli.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
                   Chancery Division, Family Part, Cumberland County,
                   Docket No. FD-06-1555-11.

                   Marilee Negron, appellant, argued the cause pro se.

                   Respondent has not filed a brief.

PER CURIAM

          In this one-sided appeal, plaintiff challenges the November 16, 2022 order

denying her motion to stay or reconsider the parties' April 28, 2022 consent
order. Following our review of the record and the applicable legal principles,

we affirm.

      We recite the facts and procedural history from the Family Part record.

Plaintiff and defendant are the parents of a fifteen-year-old son. Since 2016, the

parties abided by an order that provided plaintiff with primary residential

custody of the parties' son, fixed defendant's child support obligation and

granted him "a substantial amount of parenting time."

      On January 10, 2022, defendant filed an emergent application, seeking to

be designated the parent of primary residence. He alleged: plaintiff kept hitting

their son; her "boyfriend and brother [would] hold their . . .        [son]"; the

"boyfriend tried to grab [their son]"; and the son was "tired of the physical and

mental abuse" in plaintiff's home, had run away from her home, and no longer

wanted to live with plaintiff. The judge granted the emergent application and

awarded defendant "temporary sole custody" of the child until further order of

the court. The parties were referred to the Division of Child Protection and

Permanency (DCP&P).

      On January 19, 2022, the matter returned to court. Present for the hearing

were: plaintiff, her attorney, defendant, and a representative from DCP&P. The

DCP&P representative reported to the court that there were "no signs of abuse

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or neglect; no history of DCP&P involvement and both parties' homes were safe

and appropriate." The representative also stated the matter in dispute seemed to

be a "custody issue."

      The parties agreed the child "probably" wanted to reside with defendant.

Therefore, despite "no real change of circumstance" and "no abuse or neglect[]"

finding by DCP&P, the judge entered an order on January 21, 2022 that provided

for the parties to share parenting time on a "50/50" basis. Further, the order

required the child to appear "for an in[-]being interview with [the judge] to take

place in . . . chambers" and for the matter to return "for a hearing to discuss the

issues of custody and parenting time."

      On February 2, 2022, the parties returned to court for another hearing.

The parties addressed concerns with "conflicts" in plaintiff's home and

"miscommunication" between plaintiff and the child. Plaintiff acknowledged

that the child might not want to spend time with her and there were concerns

with their level of communication. Therefore, she was "agreeable to do therapy

with [the child]."

      On February 7, 2022, the judge entered an order providing, in pertinent

part: (1) the "parties shall have joint custody of the minor child . . . with

[defendant] as the parent of primary residence and [plaintiff] as the parent of

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alternate residence"; (2) "the child shall have no unexcused absences from

school"; (3) plaintiff "shall have open and liberal parenting time with the minor

child and the child shall spend no less than two days per week with [plaintiff]

on days to be worked out between [plaintiff] and the child"; (4) "[t]he parties

shall allow the child to move between both parties' homes"; and (5) plaintiff

shall "set up counseling sessions to include [plaintiff] and the child . . . . The

sessions may include [defendant] to the extent that the counselor believes

[defendant] should be included."

      On March 16, 2022, the judge interviewed the child. The child explained

that defendant encouraged him to see plaintiff. However, he was "half/half"

about seeing her; had to think about how often he wanted to see her; and did

"not really" "want to spend a couple days a week with" her. Nonetheless, the

child agreed to "visit" plaintiff and "work [his] way into staying over."

      On April 11, 2022, the judge conducted another hearing with the parties.

The child had only seen plaintiff "maybe three times" and the two had not

engaged in counseling. Plaintiff recognized the living situation "probably was

not going to go back to the way it was . . . ," but wanted "something where she

could see [the child] on the weekends, or every other weekend . . . ." She also

acknowledged the child "could not be forced."

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      The judge executed the parties' consent order, as prepared by plaintiff's

attorney, on April 28, 2022, which memorialized the parties' revised custody

agreement. The consent order provided:

             (1) [t]he parties shall continue to share joint legal
             custody of the minor child . . . with the [d]efendant
             designated as the parent of primary residence and the
             [p]laintiff designated as the parent of alternate
             residence; (2) the [p]laintiff shall exercise parenting
             time every other weekend . . . with additional parenting
             time being open and liberal as agreed between the
             parties; . . . (4) [a]ll other provisions of the previous
             orders shall remain in full force and effect.

      Following the entry of the April 28 consent order, plaintiff filed a pro se

motion for reconsideration. The judge addressed the motion on July 18, 2022.

He characterized her application as an attempt to "revert back to the [2016]

order, agreement of custody and parenting time where she was [the parent of]

primary [residence] and dad was [the parent of] alternate [residence], with a

parenting time schedule . . . ."

      Plaintiff argued that the custody arrangements under the April 28 consent

order were not in the child's best interest because: (1) defendant posted a picture

with the child and a water gun; (2) defendant permitted his seventeen-year-old

niece to accompany the child to a doctor's appointment; (3) the child "was late

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to school all the time"; (4) defendant posted a picture of marijuana; and (5)

defendant posted "derogatory" or "unpleasant" messages about plaintiff.

      The judge was not persuaded by these arguments, and noted that plaintiff

"entered into a consent order when represented by experienced counsel. And

[she] rather promptly filed a motion to seek to modify the consent order that

[she] entered into." The judge entered an order on July 18, 2022, denying the

motion after finding "plaintiff was represented by very competent counsel";

there was no evidence the [April 28] consent order was entered into "without

due consideration of the parties who measured the pros and cons of proceeding

to a final hearing"; and "there's been no change of circumstances." The judge

explained that he did not find plaintiff an unfit mother, rather, after his interview

with the child and considering all the facts, he determined "the best interests of

the child" required the change in custody and parenting time. The judge also

included in the July 18 order a prohibition against "the parties post[ing]

derogatory remarks on any social media platform about each other or regarding

the minor child."

      On August 10, 2022, plaintiff filed another motion to modify the existing

custodial arrangements.     The judge heard argument on the application on

November 16, 2022. The judge described the motion as "really being the same

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[as the] motion [for reconsideration] that was . . . heard previously." He noted

plaintiff's "verbiage [wa]s the same with . . . additional language." Plaintiff

described her motion as a request for a stay so she could appeal from the April

28, 2022 order. Therefore, the judge considered plaintiff's application as a

request for a stay of the April 28 order, denied the request, and denied plaintiff's

motion for reconsideration. He entered a conforming order on November 18,

2022.

        On appeal, plaintiff argues:

              I. The trial court judge erred by changing custody to
              the defendant when there was no substantial change in
              circumstances.

              II. The trial judge erred by being more concerned with
              keeping his orders in place than the well-being of my
              child.

              III. The trial judge erred by not considering the
              evidence presented, even though the defendant showed
              to be a dangerous role model.

        "We have a strictly limited standard of review from the fact-findings of

[a] Family Part judge." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. I.H.C., 415 N.J.

Super. 551, 577-78 (App. Div. 2010) (citing Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411

(1998)). "The general rule is that findings by the [judge] are binding on appeal

when supported by adequate, substantial, [and] credible evidence." Cesare, 154

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N.J. at 411-12. We will only reverse if the judge's findings were "so manifestly

unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably

credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice, and [we] . . . ponder[]

whether, on the contrary, there is substantial evidence in support of the . . .

judge's findings . . . ." Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J.

474, 484 (1974) (internal citations omitted).           However, "[a judge's]

interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established

facts are not entitled to any special deference." N.J. Div. Of Youth & Family

Servs. v. R.L., 388 N.J. Super. 81, 89 (App. Div. 2006) (quoting Manalapan

Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)).

      In custody cases, "the primary and overarching consideration is the best

interest of the child." Kinsella v. Kinsella, 150 N.J. 276, 317 (1997). Our

"Legislature [has found] and declare[d] that it is the public policy of this State

to assure minor children of frequent and continuing contact with both parents

. . . ." N.J.S.A. 9:2-4. In this pursuit, the statute requires that "[t]he [judge]

shall order any custody arrangement which is agreed to by both parents unless

it is contrary to the best interests of the child." N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(d) (emphasis

added). The Legislature's intent is clear, the judge is mandated to sign the order

when the parents agree to a custody arrangement unless the judge finds it is not

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in the child's best interests. See Harvey v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 30 N.J.

381, 391 (App. Div. 1959) (the word "shall" is generally mandatory).

      When "making an award of custody," courts must consider the following

factors under N.J.S.A. 9:2-4 in a "best interests" analysis:

            the parents' ability to agree, communicate and
            cooperate in matters relating to the child; the parents'
            willingness to accept custody and any history of
            unwillingness to allow parenting time not based on
            substantiated abuse; the interaction and relationship of
            the child with its parents and siblings; the history of
            domestic violence, if any; the safety of the child and the
            safety of either parent from physical abuse by the other
            parent; the preference of the child when of sufficient
            age and capacity to reason so as to form an intelligent
            decision; the needs of the child; the stability of the
            home environment offered; the quality and continuity
            of the child's education; the fitness of the parents; the
            geographical proximity of the parents' homes; the
            extent and quality of the time spent with the child prior
            to or subsequent to the separation; the parents'
            employment responsibilities; and the age and number
            of the children.

            [N.J.S.A. 9:2-4.]

      "The decision to deny a motion for reconsideration falls 'within the sound

discretion of the [judge], to be exercised in the interest of justice.'"   In re

Belleville Educ. Ass'n., 455 N.J. Super. 387, 405 (App. Div. 2018) (quoting

Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374, 384 (App. Div. 1996)).

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            Reconsideration should be utilized only for those cases
            which fall into that narrow corridor in which either [(]1)
            the [judge] has expressed [his or her] decision based
            upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or [(]2) it
            is obvious that the [judge] either did not consider, or
            failed to appreciate the significance of probative,
            competent evidence. Said another way, a litigant must
            initially demonstrate that the [judge] acted in an
            arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable manner, before
            the [judge] should engage in the actual reconsideration
            process.

            [D'Atria v. D'Atria, 242 N.J. Super. 392, 401 (Ch. Div. 1990).]

      Here, the judge's denial of plaintiff's motion for reconsideration rests on

three interrelated but separate findings: (1) the parties agreed to a custody

arrangement on April 12, 2022, which was incorporated into the April 28, 2022

consent order; (2) the child's best interests were protected under the April 28,

2022 consent order; and (3) there were no changed circumstances between the

filing of the April 28, 2022 consent order and the filing of plaintiff's motion in

August 2022.

      The judge did not abuse his discretion in denying plaintiff's motion for

reconsideration of the parties' April 28, 2022 consent order. Indeed, the parties

agreed to a revised custody arrangement in April 2022, and because the judge

found the new custody arrangement was in the child's best interests, the judge

satisfied his statutory obligation and effectuated the parties' custody and

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parenting time decision with the entry of the April 28, 2022 consent order.

N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(d).

      In considering the appropriate statutory factors under N.J.S.A. 9:2-4 and

determining the child's best interests were served by the April 28 consent order,

the judge concluded the evidence established: (1) the parents agreed to the

revised "custody arrangement"; (2) defendant was willing to accept custody of

the child; (3) plaintiff and the parties' son had a strained "interaction and

relationship"; (4) the child's "preference" to live with defendant; 1 (5) defendant's

home was "safe and appropriate"; and (6) the child's ability to remain in the

same school.     Therefore, the judge's determination that the custody and

parenting time arrangement outlined under the April 28, 2022 consent order was

in the child's best interests is "support[ed] by adequate, substantial, [and]

credible evidence." Cesare, 154 N.J. at 411-12.

      We are also persuaded that the judge properly rejected plaintiff's argument

that recent social media posts, the child's tardiness at school, and the fact

defendant allowed a seventeen-year-old niece to accompany the child to the

1
  In determining the "preference of the child," N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c), the judge,
without objection, conducted an in-camera interview with the child. R. 5:8-6.
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doctor, evidenced a substantial change in circumstances and demonstrated the

April 28 consent order as not in the child's best interests.

      "A party seeking to modify custody must demonstrate changed

circumstances that affect the welfare of the child[]." Hand v. Hand, 391 N.J.

Super. 102, 105 (App. Div. 2007). "In custody modification cases, the burden

is on the party seeking modification to show that, 'due to a substantial change in

circumstances from the time that the current custody arrangement was

established, the best interests of the child would be better served by a transfer

in custody.'" Chen v. Heller, 334 N.J. Super. 361, 380 (App. Div. 2000) (quoting

Voit v. Voit, 317 N.J. Super. 103, 121 (Ch. Div. 1998)). A prior custody order,

"whether reached by consent or adjudication, embodies a best interests

determination." Todd v. Sheridan, 268 N.J. Super. 387, 398 (App. Div. 1993).

With that determination having been made in a prior custody order, a party

seeking to modify the order "must bear the threshold burden of showing changed

circumstances which would affect the welfare of the child[]." Ibid.

      Guided by these principles, we are convinced the judge correctly

determined plaintiff failed to satisfy her burden in showing circumstances had

substantially changed between the entry of the April 28 consent order and the

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filing of her reconsideration motion less than four months later to justify the

transfer of primary residential custody back to plaintiff.

      To the extent not addressed, plaintiff's remaining points lack sufficient

merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e).

      Affirmed.

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