Court Opinion

ID: 9964009
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-26 18:10:21.105609+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:07.894190
License: Public Domain

J-S04005-24

 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA              :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                           :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                           :
              v.                           :
                                           :
                                           :
 GERALD DICKENS                            :
                                           :
                    Appellant              :   No. 1068 EDA 2023

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 8, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-51-CR-0001427-2020

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and LANE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                              FILED APRIL 26, 2024

      Gerald Dickens appeals from the judgment of sentence of ten to twenty

years of imprisonment imposed on convictions for, inter alia, rape, involuntary

deviate sexual intercourse (“IDSI”), aggravated indecent assault, and sexual

assault. We affirm in part and vacate in part.

      Appellant’s convictions are based upon his sexual assaults of his

daughter, J.D. At trial, and in a forensic interview also admitted into evidence,

J.D. explained that Appellant’s sexual abuse began around 2010 when she

was five years old, last occurred when she was eleven or twelve, and involved

his penetration of her vagina with his mouth and his fingers. J.D. did not tell

anyone about it at the time because she was afraid that Appellant would hurt

her, as he had been physically abusive since she was young, and only

unburdened herself to her aunt when the aunt discovered that J.D. had been
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self-harming. See N.T. Trial, 5/19/22, at 13-28; Commonwealth Exhibit 1

(video recording at 19:20-29:30).

       Appellant was charged with twenty-three criminal counts, and he opted

to waive his right to a jury trial. Following a bench trial held on May 19, 2022,

the court convicted him of the offenses listed above, among others.1

According to the trial court, the convictions were founded upon four specific

incidents of abuse:

       (1) one instance in which [Appellant] penetrated J.D.’s vagina with
       his tongue, (2) J.D.’s subsequent statement that such oral
       penetrations occurred “multiple times” (meaning on multiple
       occasions), (3) one instance in which [Appellant] forced J.D. to
       touch his genitals, and (4) one instance in which [Appellant]
       digitally penetrated J.D.’s vagina.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/14/23, at 1 (cleaned up).2

       On December 8, 2022, the trial court sentenced Appellant as noted

supra.    He filed a timely post-sentence motion alleging that some of his

convictions were unsupported or should have merged for sentencing

purposes. The motion was denied by operation of law on April 18, 2023, and

____________________________________________

1 Appellant was also convicted of one or more counts of indecent assault,
unlawful contact with a minor, and endangering the welfare of children.
Appellant does not challenge his sentences for those convictions in this appeal.

2 J.D. described the first penetration of her vagina by Appellant’s tongue as

follows: “I was woken up when he moved, like near my leg and then he like
pulled them apart and I was afraid, so I pretended that I was still asleep.”
N.T. Trial, 5/19/24, at 16. She indicated that this “same thing” happened
“multiple times.” Id. at 19-20. Without more information about the number
of occurrences of oral penetration, the trial court concluded that this testimony
proved two occurrences beyond a reasonable doubt.

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this timely appeal followed.    The trial court directed Appellant to file a

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement and he timely complied. The trial court then

authored a Rule 1925(a) opinion.

      Appellant presents the following questions for our consideration:

      1.    Should one of Appellant’s rape convictions and all of
      Appellant’s IDSI convictions merge with the remaining two rape
      convictions?

      2.   Should Appellant’s sentences for aggravated indecent
      assault at counts 3, 17, 18, and 19 merge under Appellant’s
      sentence for aggravated indecent assault at count 20?

      3.   Should Appellant’s conviction for sexual assault at count 4
      merge with Appellant[’]s rape convictions?

Appellant’s brief at 7.

      We begin with a review of the principles applicable to adjudicating

Appellant’s claims. Whether convictions merge for purposes of sentencing is

a question of law that implicates the legality of the sentence.    See, e.g.,

Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 985 A.2d 830, 833 (Pa. 2009). Accordingly,

we undertake a de novo, plenary review. Id.

      Our legislature has addressed the merger of sentences in the following

statute:

      § 9765. Merger of sentences

      No crimes shall merge for sentencing purposes unless the crimes
      arise from a single criminal act and all of the statutory elements
      of one offense are included in the statutory elements of the other
      offense. Where crimes merge for sentencing purposes, the court
      may sentence the defendant only on the higher graded offense.

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42 Pa.C.S. § 9765.     Hence, “merger is appropriate only when two distinct

criteria are satisfied: (1) the crimes arise from a single criminal act; and (2)

all of the statutory elements of one of the offenses are included within the

statutory elements of the other.”     Commonwealth v. Kimmel, 125 A.3d

1272, 1276 (Pa.Super. 2015) (en banc) (cleaned up).

      Here, Appellant focuses his entire two-page argument on whether

certain convictions were based upon the same instance of abuse.              See

Appellant’s brief at 9-10. As the Commonwealth aptly highlights, however,

Appellant then summarily claims that some offenses merge, “without

performing    any    merger     analysis     or   citing   apposite   caselaw[.]”

Commonwealth’s brief at 5. Indeed, Appellant does not even acknowledge

the applicable legal principles, let alone articulate or contend that the elements

of some offenses were wholly included within others for which he was

sentenced.

      An attack on the legality of a sentence is not subject to the usual issue

preservation requirements and, therefore, “[a]n appellate court may address,

and even raise sua sponte, challenges to the legality of an appellant’s

sentence” when it otherwise would find it waived.           Commonwealth v.

Armolt, 294 A.3d 364, 376 (Pa. 2023). Nonetheless, “regardless of whether

a particular claim implicates the legality of a sentence, it is well settled that

an appellant bears the burden of sufficiently developing his arguments to

facilitate appellate review.”   Id.   By not referencing the law applicable to

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sentencing merger, or even mentioning the elements of the offenses he

contends should have merged, Appellant plainly failed to develop his

arguments and we could find his issues waived.        Id. at 378 (“[E]ven with

respect to legality of sentencing claims, appellate courts retain discretion to

enforce procedural rules . . . and require such claims be properly presented at

the time they are raised in order to obtain review thereof.” (cleaned up)).

      However, the trial court agreed that there is merit to Appellant’s

challenges, albeit without itself performing a comparison of statutory

elements. The Commonwealth, which in its brief does address the elements

of the offenses, likewise concedes the illegality of some of the sentences.

Thus, despite the glaring deficiencies in Appellant’s brief, we choose to address

the issues herein as if we were raising the legality of the sentences sua sponte,

rather than requiring him to seek relief through the Post Conviction Relief Act.

      We first consider whether Appellant was validly sentenced on all three

rape convictions.    Appellant was convicted of, and received concurrent

sentences of, ten to twenty years of confinement for each of the following

three subsections of the rape statute:

      (a) Offense defined.--A person commits a felony of the first
      degree when the person engages in sexual intercourse with a
      complainant:

            (1) By forcible compulsion.

            (2) By threat of forcible compulsion that would prevent
            resistance by a person of reasonable resolution.

             ....

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       (c) Rape of a child.--A person commits the offense of rape of a
       child, a felony of the first degree, when the person engages in
       sexual intercourse with a complainant who is less than [thirteen]
       years of age.

18 Pa.C.S. § 3121. We observe that sexual intercourse, “[i]n addition to its

ordinary meaning, includes intercourse per os or per anus, with some

penetration however slight; emission is not required.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 3101.

Forcible compulsion means “[c]ompulsion by use of physical, intellectual,

moral, emotional or psychological force, either express or implied.” Id.

       Appellant contends that, since digital penetration of the vagina does not

constitute sexual intercourse,3 there were only two instances of sexual

intercourse found by the court and, consequently, only two convictions and

sentences for rape can be sustained.           See Appellant’s brief at 9.   As the

Commonwealth notes, Appellant’s “perfunctory argument seems to imply that

he could not be convicted under separate subsections of the same statute for

a single course of conduct,” and that “he can only be sentenced on one crime

per criminal act.” Commonwealth’s brief at 7 n.2.

       It is beyond peradventure “that a single course of conduct may

constitute a violation of more than one statutory provision.” Commonwealth

v. Kriegler, 127 A.3d 840, 844 (Pa.Super. 2015);             see also 42 Pa.C.S.

____________________________________________

3  See Commonwealth v. Kelley, 801 A.2d 551, 555-56 (Pa. 2002)
(providing that digital penetration can be classified as sexual intercourse or
deviate sexual intercourse only it is of the mouth or anus because the
statutory definitions of those terms do not include digital penetration of the
vagina).

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§ 9303 (“[W]here the same conduct of a defendant violates more than one

criminal statute, the defendant may be prosecuted under all available

statutory criminal provisions without regard to the generality or specificity of

the statutes.”). As discussed above, the imposition of separate punishments

for multiple convictions founded upon the same criminal act is only improper

if all the statutory elements of one offense are included within the other. See

Kimmel, 125 A.3d at 1276; 42 Pa.C.S. § 9765.

       Manifestly, each of Appellant’s three rape convictions required proof of

an element not included in the others. The Commonwealth cogently explains:

“Rape of a child requires only that the complainant be under the age of

[thirteen], but does not require the use of force or a threat in commission of

the crime. Rape by force and rape by threat do not have an age element, but

require   the    use   of   force   and    the   use   of   a   threat,   respectively.”

Commonwealth’s brief at 7. Accordingly, none of Appellant’s rape sentences

merged, even if all three convictions were premised upon a single instance of

penetration.4 Accord Commonwealth v. Hitchcock, 565 A.2d 1159, 1162

(Pa. 1989) (“[F]orcible rape and statutory rape do not merge into a single

offense. We need say no more than such is the clear mandate. The appellant

____________________________________________

4 Since, as noted above, J.D. described one rape and indicated that the same

thing happened multiple times, no evidence factually distinguishes one from
the other. Thus, the trial court must have concluded that the scenario she
described involved both forcible compulsion and threat of forcible compulsion.
The significance of all rape convictions being sustained by one of the two
instances is discussed infra.

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was properly convicted of both and he should have been sentenced for each

separately.”).

        Next, Appellant asserts that his three IDSI convictions merged with his

rape convictions.5 Again, he bases that on the notion, which we just dispelled,

that he could only be punished for one crime for each time he penetrated his

daughter’s vagina with his tongue. See Appellant’s brief at 9. Rather, we

determine the legality of these sentences by considering whether they were

based upon the same criminal act and whether all the elements of one offense

are included within the other.

        The statute defining the offense of IDSI states as follows in pertinent

part:

        (a) Offense defined.--A person commits a felony of the first
        degree when the person engages in deviate sexual intercourse
        with a complainant:

                     ....

              (2) by threat of forcible compulsion that would prevent
              resistance by a person of reasonable resolution; [or]

                     ....

              (7) who is less than [sixteen] years of age and the person
              is four or more years older than the complainant and the
              complainant and person are not married to each other.

____________________________________________

5 The court sentenced Appellant to ten to twenty years of incarceration for
each IDSI conviction, with all running concurrently with each other and with
the sentences for his three rape convictions and his conviction for aggravated
indecent assault of a child.

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      (b) Involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with a child.--A
      person commits involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with a
      child, a felony of the first degree, when the person engages in
      deviate sexual intercourse with a complainant who is less than
      [thirteen] years of age.

18 Pa.C.S. § 3123. Deviate sexual intercourse means:

      Sexual intercourse per os or per anus between human beings and
      any form of sexual intercourse with an animal. The term also
      includes penetration, however slight, of the genitals or anus of
      another person with a foreign object for any purpose other than
      good faith medical, hygienic or law enforcement procedures.

18 Pa.C.S. § 3101.

      Appellant was not convicted of a rape offense due to his being four years

older than a victim who was less than sixteen, nor an IDSI offense premised

upon forcible compulsion, so there is no basis for merger of his § 3121(a)(1)

or § 3123(a)(7) convictions even if based upon the same criminal act.

However, this Court has held that “the statutory elements of rape of a child

and IDSI with a child, where the underlying act is oral sex, are the same.”

Commonwealth v. Brown, 159 A.3d 531, 534 (Pa.Super. 2017). Hence, if

Appellant’s child-rape convictions for violating § 3121(c) and § 3123(b) are

based upon the same criminal act, then they would merge for sentencing

purposes. Similarly, if the threat-of-forcible-compulsion convictions pursuant

to § 3121(a)(2) and § 3123(a)(2) are founded on the same criminal act, they

too would merge.

      The Commonwealth asserts that the rape and IDSI convictions did not

arise from the same criminal acts. Specifically, the Commonwealth argues:

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             [Appellant] inserted his tongue into the victim’s vagina on
      two occasions. [He] thus subjected the victim to two separate
      acts of sexual intercourse or deviate sexual intercourse. These
      acts are separately capable of sustaining [Appellant]’s rape and
      IDSI convictions, such that none of [Appellant]’s IDSI convictions
      arose from the same criminal act as his rape convictions. In other
      words, [Appellant]’s first act of penetration was sufficient to
      sustain each of his rape convictions, and his second act was
      sufficient to separately sustain each of his IDSI convictions. Since
      [Appellant]’s rape and IDSI convictions did not arise from the
      same criminal act, they appropriately did not merge for
      sentencing, notwithstanding any shared elements.

Commonwealth’s brief at 8-9 (cleaned up).

      We agree. If the Commonwealth had proved only one instance of oral

penetration, then some of the IDSI sentences would merge with the

corresponding rape convictions based upon the overlap of statutory elements.

Yet the Commonwealth proved that the same set of circumstances occurred

at least two times. Therefore, applying the appropriate de novo review of the

evidence, Appellant was properly sentenced for each of the rape convictions

based upon one of the criminal acts, and for each of the IDSI convictions for

the second criminal act. Merger does not apply.

      Appellant’s next challenge concerns his sentences for aggravated

indecent assault. He was convicted of five counts of that offense, one for each

of the following statutory provisions:

      (a) Offenses defined.--Except as provided in sections 3121
      (relating to rape), 3122.1 (relating to statutory sexual assault),
      3123 (relating to involuntary deviate sexual intercourse) and
      3124.1 (relating to sexual assault), a person who engages in
      penetration, however slight, of the genitals or anus of a
      complainant with a part of the person’s body for any purpose other

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      than good faith medical, hygienic or law enforcement procedures
      commits aggravated indecent assault if:

            (1) the person does so without the complainant’s consent;

            (2) the person does so by forcible compulsion;

                  ....

            (7) the complainant is less than [thirteen] years of age; or

            (8) the complainant is less than [sixteen] years of age and
            the person is four or more years older than the complainant
            and the complainant and the person are not married to each
            other.

      (b) Aggravated indecent assault of a child.--A person
      commits aggravated indecent assault of a child when the person
      violates subsection (a)(1), (2), (3), (4), (5) or (6) and the
      complainant is less than [thirteen] years of age.

      (c) Grading and sentences.--

            (1) An offense under subsection (a) is a felony of the second
            degree.

            (2) An offense under subsection (b) is a felony of the first
            degree.

18 Pa.C.S. § 3125. Pertinent to Appellant’s sentencing challenge, the trial

court imposed a sentence of five to ten years of confinement for the subsection

(b) conviction, and concurrent terms of five years of probation for the four

subsection (a) convictions.

      Appellant asserts that each of his subsection (a) convictions, all

premised upon the single occurrence of his digital penetration of J.D.’s vagina

that supported his guilt under subsection (b), merged into the subsection (b)

conviction for sentencing purposes.     See Appellant’s brief at 9-10.      The

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Commonwealth concedes that Appellant was improperly sentenced separately

for his subsection (a)(1) violation because a finding of “‘forcible compulsion

subsumes a lack of consent.’”       Commonwealth’s brief at 11 (quoting

Commonwealth v. Banniger, 303 A.3d 1085, 1093 (Pa.Super. 2023)).

      However, the Commonwealth argues that subsections (a)(2), (a)(7),

(a)(8), and (b) do not merge. It observes that subsection (b) requires both

proof that the victim was less than thirteen and also proof of an enumerated

subsection(a) offense, such as the use of force that is an element of (a)(2).

It maintains that, since (a)(2) contains no age element, (a)(7) includes no

force requirement, and (a)(8) specifies no use of force but does add elements

concerning age and marital status, each subsection has unique elements. See

Commonwealth’s brief at 10.

      We address each of the § 3125(a) convictions seriatim.      Concerning

Appellant’s subsection (a)(1) conviction, we concur with both parties that it

merged into (a)(2) for sentencing purposes because “forcible compulsion

encompasses a lack of consent[.]”). See Commonwealth v. Buffington,

828 A.2d 1024, 1031 (Pa. 2003). That sentence must be vacated.

      Regarding subsection (a)(2) and (a)(7), we agree with Appellant that

he could not be separately sentenced for these convictions in addition to his

sentence for violating (b).   Based upon the plain language of the statute,

violations of subsection (a)(2) and (a)(7) are both elements that had to be

proven to sustain the subsection (b) conviction. In other words, both of those

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second-degree felonies are lesser offenses included within subsection (b).

Consequently, the sentences for both of those second-degree felony

convictions must also be vacated, as those offenses merge into the first-

degree felony defined by subsection (b).     See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9765 (“Where

crimes merge for sentencing purposes, the court may sentence the defendant

only on the higher graded offense.”).

      As for Appellant’s subsection (a)(8) conviction, the Commonwealth is

correct that it does not merge with any other § 3125 conviction since the

elements concerning the age of less than sixteen, a four-year age difference,

and the lack of a marital relationship are exclusive to that provision. In the

absence of a complete subsumption of elements within another offense,

merger does not result even though the convictions were based upon the same

criminal act.   Accord Commonwealth v. Merced, 308 A.3d 1277, 1282

(Pa.Super. 2024) (holding convictions for IDSI of a child and IDSI of a person

under sixteen, while based upon one criminal act, did not merge for sentencing

purposes).

      In sum, upon review of Appellant’s challenges to his multiple aggravated

indecent assault sentences, we conclude that the only permissible sentences

that Appellant received were those imposed for his subsection (a)(8) and (b)

convictions.    All other aggravated indecent assault convictions merged for

sentencing purposes. Accordingly, while we affirm the sentences imposed for

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§ 3125(a)(8) and (b), we vacate the sentences for § 3125(a)(1) (count three

of the information), (a)(2) (count seventeen), and (a)(7) (count eighteen).

      Appellant’s final contention is that he was illegally sentenced to five

years of probation for sexual assault in addition to his sentences for rape and

IDSI. See Appellant’s brief at 10. Here we must again agree that relief is

due. Sexual assault is defined as follows: “Except as provided in [§] 3121

(relating to rape) or 3123 (relating to [IDSI]), a person commits a felony of

the second degree when that person engages in sexual intercourse or deviate

sexual intercourse with a complainant without the complainant’s consent.” 18

Pa.C.S. § 3124.1. Our Supreme Court has held that sexual assault is a lesser-

included offense of rape or IDSI by forcible compulsion. See Buffington, 828

A.2d at 1032. Consequently, we vacate the sentence of probation imposed

for Appellant’s violation of § 3124.1 (count four of the information).

      Critically, all the illegal sentences that we have vacated were imposed

concurrent with valid sentences. As such, our decision does not disturb the

trial court’s overall sentencing scheme. With the length of Appellant’s term of

incarceration unaltered, we need not remand for resentencing.       See, e.g.,

Commonwealth v. Lekka, 210 A.3d 343, 359 (Pa.Super. 2019) (“In this

case, the correction does not upset the sentencing scheme and no further

action is required of the sentencing court; therefore remand for resentencing

is not warranted.”). Instead, we amend Appellant’s sentencing order directly

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to vacate the sentences imposed at counts three, four, seventeen, and

eighteen. We affirm his judgment of sentence in all other respects.

      Judgment of sentence vacated as to counts three, four, seventeen, and

eighteen, and affirmed in all other respects. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Date: 4/26/2024

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