Court Opinion

ID: 9397563
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-25 16:10:26.159533+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:25.747781
License: Public Domain

J-A04004-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    IN RE: ADOPTION OF: P.M., IV., A           :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    MINOR                                      :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
    APPEAL OF: S.L., MOTHER                    :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 1448 MDA 2022

              Appeal from the Decree Entered September 14, 2022
                 In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
                       Orphans' Court at No: 2022-0002a

BEFORE: STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                                 FILED MAY 25, 2023

       S.L. (“Mother”) appeals from the September 14, 2022 decree, in the

York County Court of Common Pleas, granting the petition of A.M. (“Paternal

Aunt”), terminating involuntarily her parental rights to her minor son, P.M.,

IV (“Child”), born in August 2017, pursuant to the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 2511(a)(1) and (b).1 After careful review, we reverse in part and remand

to the orphans’ court.

       Child has resided in Paternal Aunt’s physical custody since September

2020, as a result of Paternal Aunt initiating a custody action against Mother

and Father (collectively, “Parents”), who struggled with alcohol abuse and

____________________________________________

1 By the same decree, the court involuntarily terminated the parental rights
of Child’s father, P.M., III (“Father”). Father did not file a separate appeal or
otherwise participate in the instant appeal.
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mental illness, respectively.2 See N.T., 7/22/22, at 53, 56-57; see also N.T.,

5/20/22, at 79, 82. Paternal Aunt was temporarily awarded physical and legal

custody of Child, with supervised visitation awarded to Parents. See N.T.,

7/22/22, at 52-53; see also N.T., 5/20/22, at 82. By final order dated March

5, 2021, the court maintained physical and legal custody with Paternal Aunt.

Parents were awarded a total of one supervised visit per week for two to four

hours3 and virtual or phone contact two times per week for no more than 30

minutes each time. The court further found Parents presented a threat of

harm to Child. Mother’s Exhibit 27; see also N.T., 7/22/22, at 11, 52-53.

       After suffering a relapse with respect to her alcohol addiction and re-

entering in-patient rehabilitation in Florida in April 2021, Mother returned to

her parents’ home in Pennsylvania on July 3, 2021. See N.T., 7/22/22, at 64-

65, 99-100, 138. Mother then sought to again exercise her custodial rights to

virtual calls and visitation on July 22, 2021. See N.T., 7/22/22, at 65; see

____________________________________________

2 Prior to this time, Child was in the custody of Parents collectively, and then
Father. See N.T., 7/22/22, at 118-19. Mother testified that, in November
2019, she entered an in-patient rehabilitation program for alcohol abuse in
Florida for a period of nine months, followed by residence in a sober living
home. Id. at 56. She stated, “I knew that my mom . . . struggled with it, so
it was something that I was aware of. . . .[A]lso[,] . . .[the] separation
between [Father] and I was fairly new and I wanted to be sure I could show
up for [Child] to the best of my ability.” Id. at 57. During the time Child
remained with Father, Mother maintained regular contact. Id. at 57-58.

3This represented a decrease from the initial eight hours of visitation per week
afforded to Parents. See N.T., 7/22/22, at 104; see also N.T., 5/20/22, at
82.

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also N.T., 5/20/22, at 53. Explaining the gap in time, she testified, “I wanted

to make sure I could get my sobriety secured, find local meetings, secure a

job, a place of employment and get settled in at my family’s home before I

threw anything else onto my plate and make sure I could show up constantly

[sic].” N.T., 7/22/22, at 100.

       As acknowledged by Paternal Aunt, Mother engaged in FaceTime calls

and physical visitations from July 22, 2021, through November 2021. See

N.T., 7/22/22, at 20-21, 95-99; see also N.T., 5/20/22, at 41-44, 53-68; see

also Mother’s Exhibits 23, 24, 28A through 28E.           Mother additionally

participated in regular email communication with Paternal Aunt and/or

Paternal Grandmother regarding the logistics of calls and visitations and

related child-care concerns. See Mother’s Exhibits 1, 1a through 20, 22; see

also N.T., 7/22/22, at 20-21, 66-71.

       Notably, Paternal Grandmother served as the visitation supervisor

during this time.4 N.T., 7/22/22, at 12. Physical visitation occurred in the

home of the paternal grandparents, where Paternal Aunt and Child also

resided.   See Mother’s Exhibits 1a, 22; see also N.T., 5/12/22, at 14.

Paternal Aunt was also present during physical visits, which were strictly

limited to two hours by timer with a five-minute warning. See N.T., 7/22/22

at 11-12, 42, 72, 141; see also N.T., 5/20/22, at 74. Paternal Aunt, as Child’s

____________________________________________

4Mother and Paternal Grandmother had a contentious relationship. See N.T.,
7/22/22, at 59-63; see also N.T., 5/20/22, at 76.

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custodian, and Paternal Grandmother, as the visitation supervisor, each

enforced specific guidelines related to the request and/or confirmation of calls

and visits not prescribed in the controlling custody order. See N.T., 7/22/22,

at 17-18, 34-35, 84, 143; see also N.T., 5/20/22, at 58-60, 65; see also

Mother’s Exhibits 1a, 5.

       Thereafter, in November 2021, upon the recommendation of Child’s

therapist, Paternal Aunt filed a petition to suspend Mother’s visitation. The

court granted her request on November 16, 2021, following a special relief

hearing and/or presentation in Family Business Court, pending a future

hearing. Mother was present with counsel. See N.T., 7/22/22, at 37, 89-90;

see also N.T., 5/20/22, at 67-69, 50-51. Hearings were then held in January

2022 and February 2022, at which Mother was also present with counsel. See

N.T., 7/22/22, at 91; see also N.T., 5/20/22, at 51, 68-69. Pursuant to order

of February 10, 2022, the court permitted only therapeutic visits under control

and approval of Child’s therapist or designee. See N.T., 7/22/22, at 44-45,

113; see also N.T., 5/20/22, at 51.

       Contemporaneously, Paternal Aunt filed a petition for adoption and a

petition for the involuntary termination of parental rights on January 11, 2022.

She later filed an amended termination petition on March 22, 2022.5         The

____________________________________________

5Upon review, we discern no distinction between the original and amended
petitions. Mother testified that she was not served with a termination petition
until April 2022. See N.T., 7/22/22, at 91.

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orphans’ court conducted hearings on May 12, 2022, May 20, 2022, and July

22, 2022.6      Mother was present and represented by counsel at these

proceedings. Child, who was four years old at the time, was represented by

legal counsel and a guardian ad litem.7 Paternal Aunt presented the testimony

of Child’s play therapist, Laura Tauzin, via Zoom. Ms. Tauzin was accepted as

an expert in the field of child play therapy. N.T., 5/20/22, at 13. Paternal

Aunt additionally testified on her own behalf. Mother presented the testimony

of her stepmother, A.L. She also testified on her own behalf. Both Paternal

Aunt and Mother also proffered numerous exhibits which were admitted. At

the conclusion of the hearing, the court held the matter under advisement

____________________________________________

6 On May 12, 2022, the court proceeded and heard testimony as to the
termination of Father’s parental rights only. Paternal Aunt presented the
testimony of paternal grandparents, D.M. and P.M., Jr. (“Paternal
Grandparents”).    She additionally testified on her own behalf.        While
announcing its decision to involuntarily terminate Father’s parental rights at
the conclusion of the hearing, the court withheld the issuance of a decree.
See N.T., 5/12/22, at 37-42.

7  Child was represented by Carolyn J. Pugh, Esquire, as legal counsel on May
12, 2022. As Attorney Pugh was not available on May 20, 2022, Child was
thereafter represented by Alexis K. Swope, Esquire, as legal counsel. Further,
David T. Worley, Esquire, served as Child’s guardian ad litem. Attorney Swope
filed a closing memorandum with the orphans’ court arguing against the
termination of Mother’s parental rights and submitted a letter joining Mother’s
brief submitted to this Court. Attorney Worley filed a closing memorandum
with the orphans’ court in support of the termination of Mother’s parental
rights. He further filed a joint brief with Paternal Aunt with this Court.

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with all parties to submit memoranda and/or briefs within 30 days.8 N.T.,

7/22/22, at 158, 161-62.

       By decree dated September 13, 2022, and entered September 14, 2022,

the orphans’ court involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights. The court

further issued a contemporaneous opinion.9 Thereafter, on October 12, 2022,

Mother, through counsel, filed a timely notice of appeal, along with a concise

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.

1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).        The court filed an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.

1925(a) on October 19, 2022.

       On appeal, Mother raises the following issues for our review:

       A. Whether the [orphans’] court erred or abused its discretion in
       refusing to hear testimony establishing the whole history and
       background underlying the custody matter?

       B. Whether the [orphans’] court erred or abused its discretion by
       refusing to permit Father to testify on behalf of Mother?

       C. Whether the [orphans’] court erred or abused its discretion by
       failing to properly consider obstacles placed in Mother’s path to
       thwart her relationship with [] Child and by failing to analyze the
       custodial “gamesmanship” in this matter?

       D. Whether the [orphans’] court erred or abused its discretion in
       terminating Mother’s parental rights under 23 [Pa.C.S.A.] §
____________________________________________

8 The court requested that the parties specifically address the effect of the
custody orders on Mother’s obligations related to parental duties, and Mother’s
compliance thereto. N.T., 7/22/22, at 156-57, 159-60. All parties complied.

9 While the orphans’ court does not reference specific subsections of Section
2511 as it relates to the termination of parental rights in its decree, the court
addresses Section 2511(a)(1) and (b) in its accompanying opinion, those
subsections under which Paternal Aunt sought the termination of parental
rights.

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      2511(a)(1) where the evidence was insufficient to find it clear and
      convincing that Mother failed or refused to perform parental
      duties?

      E. Whether the [orphans’] court erred or abused its discretion in
      terminating Mother’s parental rights without sufficient evidence of
      the effect the termination would have on [] Child or [] Child’s
      developmental, physical, and emotional needs, and without
      sufficient evidence that the best interests of [] Child would be
      served by the termination?

Mother’s Brief at 5 (suggested answers omitted).

      We review involuntary termination orders for an abuse of discretion,

which our Supreme Court has explained “is limited to a determination of

whether the decree of the termination court is supported by competent

evidence.” In re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 358 (Pa. 2021). When

applying this standard, appellate courts must accept the trial court’s findings

of fact and credibility determinations if they are supported by the record.

Interest of S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d 1108, 1123 (Pa. 2021).            “Where the trial

court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence, an appellate court may

not disturb the trial court’s ruling unless it has discerned an error of law or

abuse of discretion.”    In re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580, 591 (Pa.

2021). An appellate court may reverse for an abuse of discretion “only upon

demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-

will.” Id.

      Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the

Adoption Act, which involves a bifurcated assessment.           If the trial court

determines    the   petitioner   established   grounds   for   termination   under

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subsection 2511(a) by clear and convincing evidence, then the court must

assess the petition under subsection 2511(b), which focuses on the child’s

needs and welfare. In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). Clear and

convincing evidence is evidence that is so “clear, direct, weighty, and

convincing as to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without

hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” C.M., 255 A.3d at 359

(quoting Matter of Adoption of Charles E.D.M., II, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa.

1998)).

      In this case, the orphans’ court terminated Mother’s parental rights

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), and (b), which provide as follows:

      (a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
      be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
      grounds:

          (1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at
          least six months immediately preceding the filing of the
          petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of
          relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or
          failed to perform parental duties.

                                    ...

      (b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
      of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
      physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
      of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
      environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
      income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
      control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
      to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
      efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
      which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
      filing of the petition.

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23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (b).

      In order to establish grounds for termination pursuant to Section

2511(a)(1) “[a] petitioner. . . must demonstrate by competent, clear and

convincing evidence, ‘[t]he parent by conduct continuing for a period of at

least six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition either has

evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has

refused or failed to perform parental duties.’” C.M., 255 A.3d at 363-64

(citation omitted) (footnote omitted). While undefined,

     our courts long have interpreted parental duties in relation to the
     needs of a child, such as love, protection, guidance and support.
     Parental duties are carried out through affirmative actions that
     develop and maintain the parent-child relationship. The roster of
     such positive actions undoubtedly includes communication and
     association. The performance of parental duties requires that a
     parent exert himself to take and maintain a place of importance
     in the child’s life.
L.A.K., 265 A.3d at 592 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Furthermore, “[f]ortitude is required, as a parent must act with ‘reasonable

firmness’ to overcome obstacles that stand in the way of preserving a parent-

child relationship and may not wait for a more suitable time to perform

parental responsibilities.” Id. at 592 (citation omitted).

      In assessing Section 2511(a)(1), trial courts should consider the entire

history of the case and avoid applying the statutory six-month requirement

mechanically.   C.M., 255 A.3d at 364.      However, the General Assembly’s

emphasis on the six months immediately preceding the filing of the

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termination petition indicates this timeframe is the “most critical period for

evaluation” of a parent’s conduct. L.A.K., 265 A.3d at 592.

       “[T]he question of whether a parent has failed or refused to perform

parental duties must be analyzed in relation to the particular circumstances of

the case.” In re Burns, 379 A.2d 535, 540 (Pa. 1977). Thus, “even where

the evidence clearly establishes a parent has failed to perform affirmative

parental duties for a period in excess of six months. . ., the court ‘must

examine the individual circumstances and any explanation offered by the

parent to determine if that evidence, in light of the totality of circumstances,

clearly warrants permitting the involuntary termination [of parental rights].’”

L.A.K., 265 A.3d at 593.           The totality of the circumstances includes

consideration of the following: “(1) the parent's explanation for his or her

conduct; (2) the post-abandonment contact between the parent and child, if

any, including any efforts made by the parent to reestablish contact with the

child; and (3) the effect that termination of parental rights would have on the

child pursuant to Section 2511(b).” Id. As explained by our Supreme Court,

“the purpose of this analysis is to give effect to our mandate that courts avoid

a mechanical application of the law regarding the termination of parental

rights. The law must be applied with the purpose of serving needs and welfare

of    each   individual   child   in   his   or   her   particular   circumstances.”

Id.

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      With respect to Section 2511(b), our Supreme Court has outlined the

inquiry as to a child’s needs and welfare as follows:

      [I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a
      court “shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
      physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23
      Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the
      child have been properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles such
      as love, comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M., 53 A.3d
      781, 791 (Pa. Super. 2012). In In re E.M., [620 A.2d 481, 485
      (Pa. 1993)], this Court held that the determination of the child’s
      “needs and welfare” requires consideration of the emotional bonds
      between the parent and child. The “utmost attention” should be
      paid to discerning the effect on the child of permanently severing
      the parental bond. In re K.M., 53 A.3d at 791. However, as
      discussed below, evaluation of a child’s bonds is not always an
      easy task.

T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267.

      Additionally,

      While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major
      aspect of the § 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is nonetheless
      only one of many factors to be considered by the court when
      determining what is in the best interest of the child.

            In addition to a bond examination, the trial court can
            equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and
            should also consider the intangibles, such as the love,
            comfort, security, and stability the child might have
            with the foster parent. . . .

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2105) (quoting

In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011)) (cleaned up).

      Instantly, we turn to Mother’s third and fourth issues, which we address

together as they are interrelated. With these issues, Mother challenges the

involuntary termination of her parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1),

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arguing that there was insufficient evidence that she failed or refused to

perform parental duties and that the court failed to consider evidence of

obstacles and custodial gamesmanship.

         The orphans’ court described Mother’s testimony as “incredible and self-

serving.”      Orphans’ Court Opinion, 9/14/22, at 4.         In support of its

determination that Mother failed to perform parental duties, the court asserted

that, similar to a parent who is incarcerated, a parent subject to the

constraints of a custody order must take affirmative action in relation to their

child.    Id. at 5-7, 9.   The court stated, “Custody orders and extraneous

circumstances, such as incarceration. . ., do not prohibit a parent from

exerting themselves and taking active steps. . . .” Id. at 9. As the court

noted, a custody order divests a parent of custody, not contact.             Id.

Dismissing Mother’s testimony of lack of knowledge and inability to initiate

contact as a result of the custody order, the court emphasized Mother’s failure

to contact Child’s therapist. Id. at 7-8. Recognizing that Child had treated

with his therapist since October 2020 and had 50 sessions at the time of the

hearing, the court stated, “[Mother] never once reached for updates. Such

decisions display a passive interest in the development of Child, not a desire

to exert herself within the relationship.” Id. The court further indicated that

Mother failed to exercise all of the visitation and calls available to her under

the custody order, pronouncing, “We are unpersuaded that Mother exerted

herself with every means possible to have regular contact with Child. . . .” Id.

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at 8-9. Finally, the court pointed to Mother’s failure to request a modification

of the custody order. Id. at 9-10. Specifically, the court addressed Mother’s

failure to challenge the finding of threat of harm.      Id. at 10.   The court

highlights Mother’s blame of others and found no barriers to Mother’s ability

to challenge the custody order. Id. at 11.

      Mother, however, contends that the court ignored that she had no legal

custody and could not contact Child’s therapist, as well as disregarded

testimony of herself, Paternal Aunt, and Child’s therapist. Mother’s Brief at

38-41. Mother asserts that Paternal Aunt conceded that Mother requested a

three-way meeting with Child’s therapist, but rather than advising Child’s

therapist, Paternal Aunt requested a letter from Child’s therapist. Id. at 39.

Moreover, Mother maintains that Child’s therapist admitted that she would not

be able speak with Mother without a release executed by Paternal Aunt.

Child’s therapist additionally confirmed that Paternal Aunt never informed her

that Mother desired a meeting and never executed a release. Id. at 40. As

such, Mother argues that “the court seemed to overlook the fact that Mother

had no legal custody. [Child’s therapist] could not have spoken to Mother

without signing a release.” Id.

      Mother further asserts that, while she did not file a petition to modify in

the custody matter, she appeared and defended her custodial rights, arguing

against suspension. Id. at 41-45. Mother contends that her failure to file a

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pleading in the custody matter does not justify termination of her parental

rights. Id. at 44-45.

       Mother recounts the undisputed affirmative parental duties and actions

performed, which she maintains evidenced her sincere interest in Child and

efforts to maintain communication and a relationship. Id. at 45-48.            She

faults the court for not recognizing her performance and instead focusing on

any imperfections or shortcomings.             Id. at 48-49, 53-54.   She similarly

asserts that the court failed to appreciate obstacles or barriers created by

Paternal Aunt and/or Paternal Grandmother, in particular as a result of their

expansive discretion related to calls and visitation. Id. at 55-56. Specifically,

       Mother testified extensively about the barriers that [Paternal]
       Aunt and the supervisor put up preventing Mother from furthering
       her relationship with [] Child, including, but not limited to, (1)
       limiting Mother’s calls to once a week instead of twice; (2)
       requiring Mother, outside the parameters of the Order, to email
       on Sunday before 5:00 [p.m.] to schedule calls; (3)
       requiring, outside the parameters of the Order, a confirmation of
       physical visits 24 hours in advance; (4) setting a timer to end
       Mother’s visits strictly after two hours even though the custody
       order permitted visits to be up to four hours; (5) [Paternal] Aunt
       being present for all visits between Mother and Child; and (6)
       [Paternal] Aunt ignoring Mother’s requests to schedule a session
       with [] Child’s therapist.

Id.     In addition, Mother suggests there is an element of custodial

gamesmanship with respect to these actions.10 Id. at 56-60.

____________________________________________

10While Mother additionally raises evidentiary claims related to the mechanical
application of the statutory six-month requirement in challenging the orphans’
court’s finding of grounds for termination pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1), we
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       Upon review, we agree. The record reveals the following undisputed

actions as it relates to Mother during the relevant six-month period

immediately preceding the filing of the petition, July 2021 through November

2021: one FaceTime call in July; three FaceTime calls and three physical visits

in August; three FaceTime calls in September;11 three FaceTime calls and two

physical visits in October; two FaceTime calls, one physical visit, and one court

appearance in November, when Mother’s visitation was then suspended

pending further hearing.12 See Mother’s Exhibits 23, 24, 28A through 28E;

see also N.T., 7/22/22, at 95-99; see also N.T., 5/20/22, at 41-44, 53-68.

Notably, Mother brought birthday gifts for Child to the first physical visit in

August and pumpkins to another visit. See N.T., 7/22/22, at 39-40, 75, 89,

105.

____________________________________________

reiterate that trial courts should consider the entire history of the case and
avoid applying the statutory six-month requirement mechanically. See C.M.,
255 A.3d at 364. Notwithstanding, the six months immediately preceding the
filing of the termination petition is the “most critical period for evaluation” of
a parent’s conduct. L.A.K., 265 A.3d at 592. Given our determination, we
need not address these claims.
11Mother quarantined due to COVID exposure and had no physical visits in
September 2021. See N.T., 7/22/22, at 34; see also N.T., 5/20/22, at 61-
62. The court indicated it did not hold this against her. See Orphans’ Court
Opinion, 9/14/22, at 8 n.2.

12 Mother reported an additional FaceTime call in August, and Paternal Aunt
testified to an additional physical visit in November. See N.T., 7/22/22, at
96; see also N.T., 5/20/22, at 42, 67. As we do not discern these to be
undisputed, we do not include them.

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        Throughout July 2021 to November 2021, there was additionally regular

email    contact    between      Mother        and   Paternal   Aunt   and/or   Paternal

Grandmother regarding scheduling these FaceTime calls and physical visits.

See Mother’s Exhibits 1, 1a through 20, 22; see also N.T., 7/22/22, at 20.

There were numerous other email communications regarding Child and his

well-being, inter alia, birthday gifts for Child, how visits and calls can go more

smoothly, additional calls, alternate visitation supervisors, Mother’s new

pregnancy and how to discuss this with Child, Father’s absence, Child’s

diagnoses and treatment plan, and Mother’s desire for a three-way meeting

with Child’s therapist. See Mother’s Exhibits 1, 1a through 22; see also N.T.,

7/22/22, at 20-21, 66-71.

        Notwithstanding, our review confirms that Paternal Aunt and Paternal

Grandmother generated extrajudicial obstacles which impeded Mother from

exercising additional calls and visits.13 As Child’s custodian and the visitation

supervisor, respectively, both exerted a great deal of discretion with regard to

calls and visitation. As indicated supra, each enforced specific guidelines

related to the request and/or confirmation of calls and visits, including that

the request for a call be received by Sunday at 5:00 p.m., and that Mother

confirm a physical visit 24 hours prior to a scheduled visit. N.T., 7/22/22, at

____________________________________________

13Mother acknowledged that she missed a call or two. See N.T., 7/22/22, at
82. She additionally canceled a physical visit due to the birth of her second
child. See N.T., 7/22/22, at 35-37, 82-83, 124.

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17-18, 34-35, 84; N.T., 5/20/22, at 58-60, 65; see also Mother’s Exhibits 1a,

5. These deadlines were not stipulated by the controlling custody order.14

N.T., 5/20/22, at 58-59; see also Mother’s Exhibit 27.

       Significantly, Paternal Aunt denied Mother’s request for a second call

each week, indicating that she was saving a call for Father should he decide

to re-engage.15, 16 N.T., 7/22/22, at 16-17, 83-84; N.T., 5/20/22, at 36, 52-

53; see also Mother’s Exhibit 6. Paternal Aunt chose the weeks of July 25,

2021, and November 21, 2021, as vacation weeks where no calls or visitation

were required, which she enforced. N.T., 7/22/22, at 123; N.T., 5/20/22, at

54, 68; see also Mother’s Exhibits 2, 17.          Further, Paternal Aunt did not

approve several calls, due to Child’s emotional well-being and/or Mother’s

request coming later than Paternal Aunt’s self-imposed deadline.17 See N.T.,

7/22/22, at 33; see also N.T., 5/20/22, at 63-65; see also Mother’s Exhibits

9, 16, 24. Lastly, Paternal Grandmother canceled one physical visit in August

____________________________________________

14 Paternal Aunt admitted that the requirement of confirmation 24 hours prior
to visitation was not included in the custody order. She instead indicated that
the judge in the custody matter verbally approved such restrictions by the
visitation supervisor. See N.T., 5/20/22, at 58-59.
15 Father had not visited with or had contact with Child since May 2021. See

N.T., 5/12/22, at 11-13.

16 Paternal Aunt explained, “The Judge at the other hearing told me not to
give her anything extra and to stick exactly to the order, so that’s what I did.”
N.T., 5/20/22, at 53.

17Paternal Aunt additionally canceled and rescheduled a call, citing Child
having a “stressful day”. Mother’s Exhibit 15; see also N.T., 5/20/22, at 65.

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and another in October as Mother’s confirmation was not received within the

specified deadline and/or did not affirmatively state her confirmation. See

N.T., 7/22/22, at 17-18, 34-35, 83-84, 124, see also N.T., 5/20/22, at 58-

59; see also Mother’s Exhibits 22, 23.

          Moreover, physical visitations occurred exclusively in the home of

Paternal Grandparents, where Paternal Aunt and Child also resided. See

Mother’s Exhibits 1a, 22; see also N.T., 5/12/22, at 14. As such, Paternal

Aunt was also present during physical visits, which were strictly limited to two

hours by timer with a five-minute warning. See N.T., 7/22/22, at 11-12, 42,

72, 141; see also N.T., 5/20/22, at 74. Mother stated, “The timer went off,

it was time to go. Walk to the door is what they would tell him to do.” N.T.,

7/22/22, at 72.       Mother and her stepmother described Paternal Aunt and

Paternal Grandmother as “overbearing” and “very very involved” in these

visits.    Id. at 80-81, 140.

          While Mother acknowledged that she did not seek to modify the custody

order,18 when asked how she addressed the custody situation, she indicated

that she took advantage of the limited custody afforded her and took care of

herself and her sobriety and focused on stability. See N.T., 7/22/22, at 115-

16, 118. This included seeking out local meetings and a sponsor and engaging

in counseling, which Mother felt were addressing the concerns of the court.

____________________________________________

18 Mother initially referenced a lack of awareness and advice and information
of former counsel once retained. See N.T., 7/22/22, at 101-02.

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See id. at 116-17. She further noted that she felt like she had begun to make

progress from July through November 2021 but did not believe she had

amassed enough to establish or form the basis of a legal modification. See

id. at 117, 125-26.     Mother explained, “From the month that I started

visitations with my son, including the month that we didn’t have visitation due

to COVID, all the way through November, it felt like we were just starting to

make some headway back into making progress again. It didn’t feel like I had

enough to stand on in court yet in order to modify anything.        I felt like I

wanted to continue building what we were building.” Id. at 126.

      In L.A.K., our Supreme Court reversed this Court’s order and remanded

for reinstatement of the trial court’s order denying termination where, after

no contact for three and a half years and maintaining a year of sobriety, the

father filed a petition to modify custody a week prior to the mother’s and

stepfather’s filing of a termination petition. 265 A.3d at 583-85. The Court

stated,

      This evidence supports the trial court’s findings that [f]ather
      struggled with alcoholism and made repeated attempts at
      obtaining sobriety between 2016 and 2019; that these struggles
      were the reason [f]ather did not contact the children during that
      time; that [f]ather’s quest for sobriety was driven by his desire to
      rebuild parental relationships with the children; and that [f]ather
      distanced himself from the children out of a concern for their best
      interests. It was within the trial court’s discretion to credit this
      testimony and conclude, as a finding of fact that the Superior
      Court was bound to respect, that in view of the totality of the
      circumstances, that [f]ather acted with reasonable firmness in
      overcoming the obstacles that kept him from performing parental
      duties. The trial court concluded that [f]ather’s conduct (his
      failure to maintain the parent-child relationship) was reasonably

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      explained, and in such circumstances, our law provides that
      parental rights will not be terminated. Finding no abuse of
      discretion in the trial court’s ruling that Appellees failed to prove
      their case under Section 2511(a)(1) by clear and convincing
      evidence, we conclude that the Superior Court erred in ruling to
      the contrary.
Id. at 599 (internal citations omitted).

      Here, Mother likewise dealt with alcohol issues and worked toward

obtaining sobriety and maintaining stability. However, while Mother did not

proactively file and initiate proceedings in the custody matter within the six

months prior to the filing of the termination petition, Mother sustained several

months of contact until two months prior to filing of termination petition when

visitation was suspended.            Further, she participated in the custody

proceedings and defended her custodial rights to Child.

      Acknowledging the parallel custody matter, the L.A.K. Court additionally

noted the trial court’s recognition of the “crucial future role of the custody

court” and that the “denial of the termination petition would not catapult

[f]ather   into   the   children’s   lives   without   necessary   acclimation   and

boundaries.” Id. at 598.

      Similarly, in the instant matter, denial of Paternal Aunt’s petition for

involuntary termination of parental rights with respect to Mother would not

place Child back in Mother’s custody. Pursuant to the February 2022 custody

order, Child would remain in Paternal Aunt’s custody. However, Mother would

be entitled to therapeutic visitation at the discretion of Child’s therapist and

have the opportunity to continue to establish her relationship with Child. If

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she is unable to do so, Paternal Aunt may then again file to involuntarily

terminate Mother’s parental rights.

      Hence, upon review, the above-recited uncontested activity between

July 2021 and November 2021 supports confirmation of Mother’s performance

of parental duties within the six months prior to the filing of the termination

petition. See L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580 (Pa. 2021). Mother actively participated

in the custody action by defending her custodial rights. While she did not file

a petition to modify, Mother’s conduct was clearly aimed at maintaining her

relationship with Child. See Adoption of S.H., 383 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa. 1978)

(stating, “a mere showing that the father could conceivably have pursued legal

action more promptly cannot justify termination of the father’s rights.”).

      Significantly, “the focus under Subsection 2511(a)(1) is not the degree

of success a parent may have had in reaching the child, but examines whether,

under the circumstances, the parent has utilized all available resources to

preserve the parent-child relationship.”       C.M., 255 A.3d at 365 (citations

omitted). Therefore, the evidence was insufficient to establish grounds for

termination pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) and the orphans’ court decree

should be reversed with respect to Mother.       As we find insufficient evidence

to establish grounds for termination pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1), we do

not address Section 2511(b) or the remainder of Mother’s issues.

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      For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decree as to Mother. We

remand to the orphans’ court for entry of an order denying Paternal Aunt’s

petition for involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights.

      Decree reversed in part. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.

      Judge McCaffery joins the memorandum.

      Judge Dubow files a dissenting memorandum.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 05/25/2023

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