Court Opinion

ID: 9567154
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:49:53.462373+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:00:16.155589
License: Public Domain

TOBRINER, Acting C. J.
I dissent.
I agree with the majority that plaintiff has no valid claim against the California Automobile Assigned Risk Plan (CAARP). CAARP bears no statutory or common law obligation to consider whether individuals who seek its insurance are fit drivers. I cannot agree, however, that plaintiff’s complaint states no conceivable viable claim against the insurance agent Klassen. In my view, the majority reaches its contrary conclusion either by improperly usurping the function of the trier of fact or by narrowly reading plaintiff’s complaint in violation of the accepted canons of appellate review.
I see no justification for a conclusion that an insurance agent stands free of any duty whatsoever to the public at large in the event that the agent, in the course of dealing with a client, acquires information suggesting that the client is unfit to drive. A bartender who knows that a customer will drive his car owes a duty to the public not to continue to serve drinks to the customer once the customer becomes obviously intoxicated. (Vesely v. Sager (1971) 5 Cal.3d 153, 164-167 [95 Cal.Rptr. 623, 486 P.2d 151]; see also Bernhard v. Harrah’s Club (1976) 16 Cal.3d 313, 324-325 [128 Cal.Rptr. 215, 546 P.2d 719].) If a patient tells a psychiatrist that he intends to kill someone, the psychiatrist may owe a duty to the intended victim to warn the victim. (Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425, 433-444 [131 Cal.Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334].) A bank owes a duty to homeowners to exercise *50supervisory responsibility if it puts itself in such a position that it can judge the adequacy of the plans of a housing developer to whom it has lent money. (Connor v. Great Western Sav. & Loan Assn. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 850, 864-867 [73 Cal.Rptr. 369, 447 P.2d 609, 39 A.L.R.3d 224].) An insurance company owes a duty to all members of the public who might be injured by a negligent motorist to investigate promptly a motorist’s insurability once the company has issued a policy to the motorist. (Barrera v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. (1969) 71 Cal.2d 659, 674-677 [79 Cal.Rptr. 106, 456 P.2d 674].) The situation of the insurance agent does not seem to me to be distinguishable from that of the bartender, the psychiatrist, the bank, and the insurance company: clearly, the agent owes some duty to the public.
Not surprisingly, therefore, the majority does not contend that an insurance agent may ignore the public interest. Instead, the majority concludes only that, should an agent acquire information indicating that a client is unfit, the agent need not inform CAARP. The majority suggests that this conclusion follows inexorably from its prior conclusion that CAARP need not consider an applicant’s fitness.1
The majority’s approach is grounded in either of two improper assumptions. On the one hand, the majority may assume that CAARP would do nothing with the information as to unfitness, that the agent consequently would accomplish nothing by informing CAARP, and therefore that the agent cannot possibly be negligent if he decides not to inform CAARP. It is not necessarily the case, however, that CAARP, because it need not consider fitness in issuing insurance, would simply throw such information away. Conceivably, CAARP officials could decide to pass the information on to officials at the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV). If CAARP officials took this course, the DMV might *51revoke the unfit individual’s license,2 the individual might decide not to drive, and members of the public might therefore escape the risk of injury occasioned by this particular individual’s unfitness.
Plainly, we cannot decide what CAARP officials would do with information as to unfitness or what the insurance applicant would do if his driver’s license were revoked. These are questions of fact, to be left to the trier of fact aided by the trial process. The majority’s conclusion, if it rests on such inevitably factual determinations, usurps the function of the trier of fact.
Alternatively, the majority’s approach could reflect a decision to hoist plaintiff on his own petard. In his complaint, plaintiff linked his claim against the insurance agent to his claim against CAARP by arguing that the agent’s breach of duty followed from the fact that CAARP, had it been informed of the information as to unfitness, would have denied the applicant insurance, and that the applicant, if not insured, would have ceased to drive his car. The majority, on this view, would hold plaintiff to his logic: since plaintiff treated CAARP’s duty as the premise of his argument, the majority, once it rejects this premise, apparently sees no injustice in also rejecting plaintiff’s conclusion.
Our function, however, is not to teach plaintiff the false charm of symmetry. The trial court dismissed plaintiff’s complaint without leave to amend. We must judge whether the trial court, in taking this action, abused its discretion. (See La Sala v. American Sav. & Loan Assn. (1971) 5 Cal.3d 864, 876 [97 Cal.Rptr. 849, 489 P.2d 1113].) Our concern is not so much with the defects in plaintiff’s complaint as with the possibility that plaintiff will be able to cure those defects. “It is axiomatic that if there is a reasonable possibility that a defect in the complaint can be cured by amendment or that the pleading liberally construed can state a cause of action, a demurrer should not be sustained without leave to *52amend.” (Minsky v. City of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 113, 118 [113 Cal.Rptr. 102, 520 P.2d 726].)
As it stands, plaintiff’s complaint is factually deficient. As we have seen, plaintiff connected his injury to the insurance agent’s failure to notify CAARP by alleging that CAARP, because it had a duty to consider fitness, would have denied the applicant’s request for insurance, that the applicant, if not insured, would have ceased driving, and that therefore the applicant would not have struck plaintiff’s truck with his car. If CAARP is under no duty to deny insurance to the applicant, plaintiff’s theory of causality obviously breaks down. To connect the agent’s failure to act with his injury, plaintiff, as we have also seen, might allege that CAARP would have notified the Department of Motor Vehicles, that the DMV would have revoked the applicant’s license, and that the applicant would not have driven without a driver’s license; alternatively, plaintiff might eliminate any reference to CAARP, and simply claim that the agent should have notified the DMV.
Because the statute of limitations had run by the time that the trial court dismissed plaintiff’s complaint, the question of whether plaintiff could have corrected the factual deficiencies in his complaint through amendment depends upon whether, despite the changes in factual allegations, the amended complaint would nonetheless state “the same general set of facts” as the prior complaint. (Austin v. Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co. (1961) 56 Cal.2d 596, 600 [15 Cal.Rptr. 817, 364 P.2d 681].) In Grudt v. City of Los Angeles (1970) 2 Cal.3d 575, 584-585 [86 Cal.Rptr. 465, 468 P.2d 825], we held that the Austin test was met where plaintiff, widow of a man shot to death by police, amended her complaint to allege not only that, the police had intentionally and wrongfully killed her husband, but also that the city was responsible for its negligent supervision of these particular police officers, inasmuch as it knew or should have known of their prior misconduct. We acknowledged that the amended complaint “added a significant new dimension to the lawsuit” (id, at pp. 583-584) inasmuch as it added the new allegations concerning the prior police misconduct and the city’s knowledge of that misconduct. Nonetheless, we held that the new facts were merely “additional.” (Id, at p. 584.) Plaintiff’s amended complaint asserted the same basic facts: it recited “the same acts by [the police] as the gravamen of the action,” and still sought recovery “to compensate plaintiff for the loss of her husband.” (Id.)
*53Grudt suggests that the new facts plaintiff would need to allege here would also be merely “additional.” The amended complaint would assert the same basic facts: the insurance agent would be charged with the same act of omission, the failure to take reasonable steps as to the information upon the applicant’s unfitness,3 and plaintiff’s injury would stay the same, that incurred in the accident. Because plaintiff, therefore, could have amended his complaint to correct its factual deficiencies, the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiff’s complaint without leave to amend, and the majority errs in judging the complaint as is.
To reach its result, the majority must either usurp the function of the trier of fact or hold plaintiff to his deficient pleading contrary to our usual rule of liberal construction. I would do neither. An insurance agent is not free to ignore his responsibility to the public at large in the event that the agent, in the course of dealing with a client, acquires information indicating that the client is unfit to drive. Fairly read, plaintiff’s complaint suggests that defendant Klassen breached his duty to the public. We should reverse the judgment of the trial court and allow plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint.
Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied March 30, 1977. Sullivan, J.,* did not participate therein. Tobriner, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

The majority also argues that holding the insurance agent liable for his failure to report the fitness information to CAARP would require the agent to choose between his duty to his client to obtain insurance coverage and his personal interest in avoiding tort liability. All too often, the majority fears, agents will resolve their conflict of interest by refusing to seek high risk insurance for their clients. I fail to see the conflict of interest. As the majority demonstrates, CAARP need not and does not take fitness into account in passing on insurance applications. If an agent forwards fitness information to CAARP, he would not block his client from obtaining insurance. Moreover, tort liability is not likely to chill significantly agents’ willingness to seek insurance for high risk clients. The steps which an agent must take, in order to fulfill his duty of care, are obvious and not costly: to protect himself fully, an agent need only notify CAARP, the DMV, and the client himself of the client’s evident unfitness.

In this case, Klassen, the insurance agent, had in his possession a letter from a physician stating that Warkentin, the applicant for insurance, was senile and therefore unfit to drive. Vehicle Code section 13359 authorizes the DMV to “revoke the privilege of any person to operate a motor vehicle upon any of the grounds which authorize the refusal to issue a license.” (See also Veh. Code, § 13800.) Vehicle Code section 12805, subdivision (f), prior to July 1, 1976, declared that “[t]he department shall not issue or renew a driver’s license to any person ... [w]hen it appears by examination or other evidence that such person is unable to operate a motor vehicle upon a highway safely because of physical or mental defect or lack of skill.” The DMV, therefore, would have had grounds to revoke Warkentin’s license had it received a copy of the physician’s letter.

 Read literally, plaintiff’s complaint alleges only that the agent failed to notify CAARP. This allegation, of course, might be sufficient if plaintiff were to proceed on the theory that CAARP would have notified the DMV. In order to find in plaintiff’s complaint an allegation that the agent notified no one, and thus a basis for the theory that the agent should have notified the DMV directly, we cannot read plaintiff’s complaint literally. An allegation that the agent did nothing whatsoever with the information seems to be implicit in plaintiff’s complaint, however; under the rule of liberal construction, therefore, we should treat this implicit allegation as part of the complaint. (Cf. Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 432, fn. 3 [allegation that psychiatrist failed to notify victim treated as part of complaint which literally alleges only that psychiatrist failed to notify victim’s parents].)

 Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assignment by the Chairman of the Judicial Council.