Court Opinion

ID: 9794755
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:11:03.730461+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:48.586769
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Hall
specially concurring in part and dissenting in part:
Properly presented to this court for consideration and resolution is one question: ARE CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF SENATE BILL NO. 1 VIOLATIVE OF THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 47, ARTICLE V, OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF COLORADO?
Senate Bill No. 1, herein referred to as No. 1, the validity of which is questioned, provides that there shall be more than one senatorial district in several named counties.
Section 47, Article V, provides:
“Senatorial and representative districts — [1] Senatorial and representative districts may be altered from time to time, as public convenience may require. [2] When a senatorial or representative district shall be composed of two or more counties, they shall be contiguous, and the district as compact as may be. [3] No county shall be divided in the formation of a senatorial or representative district.” (Numbering mine.)
As I view Section 47, the people, in 1876, undertook by the first sentence [1] to grant to the legislature *304authority to alter senatorial districts from time to time. Coupled with and made an integral part of the grant, they imposed a qualification limiting the authority granted to situations “as public convenience may require.” This sentence [1] is complete, the words used are words in common usage and readily understandable. The language is so plain that there can be no doubt as to what the people said and meant.
The second sentence [2], unlike the first, does not purport to grant power, but rather to further qualify and limit the power granted in [1]. The sentence places two further limitations on the grant of power by [1]. First, in saying that counties “shall be contiguous,” it necessarily follows that they may not be noncontiguous. There is nothing fuzzy, doubtful, or nebulous about this limitation on the power granted.
The second limitation, to the effect that the district be “as compact as may be,” is a rather nebulous limitation, and legislators might well be in disagreement as to whether a multiple county district was as “compact as may be.”
The third sentence [3] serves as a very definite further limitation of the rather broad and general power granted by [1], — “No county shall be divided * * *.” The language is clear, the words used meaningful.
No doubt the people in 1876 had under consideration the question as to whether the legislature should be authorized to divide a county. One of three answers could have been made: (a) they may; (b) they must; (c) they must not. Their answer was: “No county shall be divided * * *.” Did the people with those words say a county may be divided, a county must be divided? The answer is obvious.
Clearly, those sections of No. 1 dividing counties into districts are in flagrant violation of Article V of the Constitution — they are void and should be struck down and exterminated, now, once and for all, and without any spark of life left therein.
*305No. 1 contains several unconstitutional sections. If those sections are severed and nullified the remainder of No. 1 becomes meaningless, unconstitutional, and void. Severability is not possible. No. 1 must fall in toto.
I am in complete disagreement with the end result as pronounced by the majority.
I do not subscribe to the language of the majority that “it is incumbent on this court to fashion a remedy.” As a member of the court I feel no incumbency to fashion a remedy — the extent of my feeling of incumbency is to properly resolve the problem presented, namely, is No. 1 constitutional? Were it incumbent upon me to fashion a remedy, I would certainly use my best efforts to see to it that the remedy fashioned be legal and constitutional.
Final disposition of the case is made by the majority in these words: “Accordingly, the writ is made absolute, but we stay the effect of the judgment until the convening of the regular session of the 45th General Assembly in 1965.”
In my opinion this language is contradictory. By stating: “* * * the writ is made absolute,” the majority has admonished Anderson — “Do not proceed in conformity with No. 1.” Why? Because No. 1 is unconstitutional and void. Following that admonition the majority tells Anderson: “* * * but we stay the effect of the judgment [nullifying No. 1] until after the convening of the regular session of the 45th General Assembly in 1965.”
I find nothing to “stay.” The judgment has no effect — it is a mere pronouncement of the impotency of No. 1. The judgment, unlike a judgment for money, specific performance, possession, etc., which one may use as a means for attaining an ultimate goal, does not lend itself to further proceedings; it cannot be used as a means to an end; it is simply declaratory of that which is and has been.
Needless to say, I do not subscribe to procedures *306whereby the judiciary tells a public official, one under oath to support the Constitution, having statutory and constitutional duties to perform, to knowingly conduct the affairs of his office in an unlawful and unconstitutional manner for a limited time, or at all.
I can readily understand that members of the court are deeply concerned. I too am deeply concerned. I am sure the people of the State of Colorado are deeply concerned. Possibly the governor and the legislators are deeply concerned — they should be. They and they alone are duty bound to make provision for lawful apportionment. Upon them rests the duty to “fashion a remedy” by constitutional legislative action. Such could be achieved with a minimum of effort, small expense and within a very, very few days. Those upon whom the responsibility rests can do it. They should do it. The judiciary cannot do it.
In my opinion the rule should be made absolute.
Mr. Justice Moore authorizes me to state that he concurs in all that I have said with reference to the pronouncement of the majority, that “we stay the effect of the judgment.”