Court Opinion

ID: 9426073
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:16:43.900111+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:58.928401
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Brennan, with whom Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Marshall join,
dissenting.-
The question for decision in this case is one of procedure: is the criminal contempt of nonviolently and respectfully refusing to testify at a criminal trial punishable summarily by the trial judge pursuant to Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 42 (a), or must the trial judge prosecute the contempt on notice pursuant to Rule 42(b), allowing a reasonable time for the preparation of the defense?1 A trial judge in the District *323Court for the Southern District of New York summarily punished respondents under subdivision (a) of Rule 42 for refusing to testify at a trial. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and remanded on the ground that Harris v. United States, 382 U. S. 162 (1965), and the Court of Appeals’ own prior decision in United States v. Marra, 482 F. 2d 1196 (1973), which had relied upon Harris, compelled the conclusion that the proper course was to prosecute on notice under subdivision (b) of the Rule. 488 F. 2d 1231 (1973). I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
One Anderson was on trial in the District Court on March 29, 1973, under an indictment for armed robbery of two banks, one in Tuxedo, N. Y., and the other in Mount Ivy, N. Y. Before the trial respondent Wilson pleaded guilty to participation in the Tuxedo bank robbery and respondent Bryan pleaded guilty to participation in the Mount Ivy bank robbery. Neither respondent had been finally sentenced on his plea, however,2 and each refused to testify against Anderson on self-incrimination grounds, and persisted in that refusal even though the trial judge granted him immunity under 18 U. S. C. §§ 6002-6003.3 The trial judge thereupon *324summarily adjudged each in criminal contempt and sentenced each to six months’ imprisonment to be served consecutively to his sentence on the robbery conviction,4
*325The Court today declines the Government’s invitation to overrule Harris v. United States, supra, and in that circumstance Harris clearly compels affirmance of the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Harris interpreted subdivision (a) of Rule 42 as having a narrowly limited scope and expressly excluded its application to a nonviolent, respectful refusal to answer questions on the ground of self-incrimination.5 The Court emphasized *326that subdivision (a) reached a narrow category of situations and “was reserved ‘for exceptional circumstances’ . . . such as acts threatening the judge or disrupting a hearing or obstructing court proceedings.” 382 U. S., at 164. Such acts, the Court held, are not present in the case of a nonviolent, respectful refusal to answer questions on the ground of self-incrimination because in such a case “the dignity of the court was not being affronted: no disturbance had to be quelled; no insolent tactics had to be stopped.” Id., at 165.6
The Court stated its rationale for the narrow interpretation of subdivision (a) as follows:
“We reach that conclusion in light of ‘the concern long demonstrated by both Congress and this Court over the possible abuse of the contempt power’ . . . and in light of the wording of the Rule. Summary contempt is for ‘misbehavior’... in the ‘actual presence of the court.’ Then speedy punishment may be necessary in order to achieve ‘summary vindication of the court’s dignity and authority.’ ” Id., at 164.
The Court continued:
“Summary procedure, to use the words of Chief Justice Taft, was designed to fill ‘the need for immediate penal vindication of the dignity of the *327court...We start from the premise long ago stated in Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 231, that the limits of the power to punish for contempt are ‘[t]he least possible power adequate to the end proposed.’ In the instant case, the dignity of the court was not being affronted: no disturbance had to be quelled; no insolent tactics had to be stopped. The contempt here committed was far outside the narrow category envisioned by Rule 42 (a).” Id., at 165.
Only last Term, the Court again emphasized that summary punishment for contempt “ ‘always and rightly, is regarded with disfavor’ ” in light of the “heightened potential for abuse posed by the contempt power,” Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U. S. 488, 498, 500 (1974), and is to be resorted to only when necessary for “ ‘immediate penal vindication of the dignity of the court.’ ” Id., at 498 n. 6.
I see no escape from the application of Harris to this case based on the difference that respondents were witnesses at an ongoing trial while the witness in Harris was a grand jury witness, brought before the judge and asked the same questions he had not answered before the grand jury. The Court argues that while the delay necessitated by Rule 42 (b) procedures would be unlikely seriously to disrupt grand jury proceedings it would have substantial disruptive effects in a trial. I doubt that compliance with Rule 42 (b) procedures necessarily would have substantial disruptive effects in a trial7 but in any *328event those effects are not the kind of obstruction of court proceedings, Harris, supra, at 164, that justify summary punishment under subdivision (a). For Harris limits application of that subdivision to conduct in the presence of the judge “where immediate corrective steps are needed to restore order and maintain the dignity and authority of the court.” Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U. S. 212, 214 (1971).8 In the case of respondents’ nonviolent, respectful refusal to answer questions on the ground of self-incrimination, “the dignity of the court was not being affronted,”9 Harris, supra, at 165, and the absence of that *329crucial element in respondents’ refusal to answer questions foreclosed application of subdivision (a) by the trial judge.

 Rule 42 (a) provides:
“(a) Summary Disposition.
“A criminal contempt may be punished summarily if the judge certifies that he saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt and that it was committed in the actual presence of the court. The order of contempt shall recite the facts and shall be signed by the judge and entered of record.”
Rule 42 (b) provides:
“(b) Disposition Upon Notice and Hearing.
“A criminal contempt except as provided in subdivision (a) of this rule shall be prosecuted on notice. The notice shall state the time and place of hearing, allowing a reasonable time for the preparation of the defense, and shall state the essential facts constituting the criminal contempt charged and describe it as such. The notice shall be given orally by the judge in open court in the presence of the defendant or, on application of the United States attorney or of an attorney appointed by the court for that purpose, by an order to show cause or an order of arrest. The defendant is entitled to a trial by jury in any case in which an act of Congress so provides. He is entitled to admission to bail as provided in these rules. If the contempt charged involves disrespect to or criticism of a judge, that judge is disqualified from presiding at the trial or hearing except with the defendant’s consent. Upon a verdict or finding of guilt the court shall enter an order fixing the punishment.”

 The trial judge who presided at Anderson’s trial had deferred sentencing respondent Wilson. Another trial judge, who had been assigned respondent Bryan’s indictment, had imposed a provisional 25-year sentence pending an evaluation under 18 U. S. C. § 4208 (b).
After Anderson’s trial, Wilson was committed as a young adult offender for an indeterminate term pursuant to 18 U. S. C. § 5010 (b), while Bryan’s sentence was reduced to 10 years.

 When the privilege was invoiced, Wilson’s counsel was present and, in the absence of Bryan’s counsel, attempted with the court’s approval to represent both witnesses.
Sections 6002-6003 provide:
“§ 6002. Immunity generally.
“Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against *324self-incrimination, to testify or provide other information in a proceeding before or ancillary to—
“(1) a court or grand jury of the United States,
“ (2) an agency of the United States, or
“(3) either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two Houses, or a committee or a subcommittee of either House,
“and the person presiding over the proceeding communicates to the witness an order issued under this part, the witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination; but no testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any information directly or. indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order. “§ 6003. Court and grand jury proceedings.
“ (a) In the case of any individual who has been or may be called to testify or provide other information at any proceeding before or ancillary to a court of the United States or a grand jury of the United States, the United States district court for the judicial district in which the proceeding is or may be held shall issue, in accordance with subsection (b) of this section, upon the request of the United States attorney for such district, an order requiring such individual to give testimony or provide other information which he refuses to give or provide on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, such order to become effective as provided in section 6002 of this part.
“(b) A United States attorney may, with the approval of the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, or any designated Assistant Attorney General, request an order under subsection (a) of this section when in his judgment—
“(1) the testimony or other information from such individual may be necessary to the public interest; and
“(2) such individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify or provide other information on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination.”

 The contempt sentences were provisional and stayed pending appeal. The Court of Appeals rejected the Government’s contention *325that- the witnesses had not adequately objected to the use of summary contempt procedures:
“[U]nder the circumstances, the request by counsel for Wilson for more time to research the fifth amendment issue constituted sufficient objection. And we refuse to penalize appellant Bryan for his failure to make timely objection to the Rule 42 (a) proceeding, since his own counsel was not present. Although counsel for Wilson did her best to protect Bryan, the court having sanctioned her efforts in this regard, only a defendant’s own lawyer could be fully aware of the considerations which might be raised in his behalf to mitigate a charge of contempt or the sentence thereunder, and of the likely usefulness of a hearing for development of these considerations.” 488 F. 2d 1231, 1234 (CA2 1973).
At the close of the Government’s case, the trial judge granted Anderson’s motion for a judgment of acquittal on the Mount Ivy robbery. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the Tuxedo robbery. At a second trial, Anderson was convicted of the Tuxedo robbery.

 Respondents’ self-incrimination claim was based upon a concern that their testimony might prejudice their sentencing. The merits of the claim are not before us. The Court of Appeals rejected respondents’ contention that the immunity given was not coextensive with the privilege against self-incrimination on the ground that neither respondent had properly raised the issue of “forbidden use”:
“If appellant Wilson doubted the ability of Judge Lasker to put out of his mind Wilson’s statements at Anderson’s trial, he should nevertheless have testified as ordered, but requested a different judge for sentencing on the robbery charge. Cf. Goldberg v. United States, 472 F. 2d 513,516 (2d Cir. 1973). Similarly, if Bryan genuinely feared an increased sentence on his guilty plea as a result of testifying in the Anderson case, he, too, should have given evidence, then asked *326that proper precautions be taken (e. g., sealing the record) to insure that Judge Cooper would not be privy to the statements made under grant of immunity. Both were, however, required to obey the mandate of 18 U. S. C. §6002 that ‘the witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination ....’” 488 F. 2d, at 1233.

 Harris overruled the broader reach given subdivision (a) in Brown v. United States, 359 U. S. 41 (1959). This was believed necessary to achieve the objective of its framers that the subdivision be “ ‘substantially a restatement of existing law.’ ” 382 U. S., at 165 n. 3.

 In United States v. Marra, 482 F. 2d 1196 (CA2 1973), the Court of Appeals rejected that argument, stating:
“In an uncomplicated case of the present type, where the facts are simple and a brief consultation between the witness and his retained •or assigned counsel should be sufficient to enable him to prepare for a Rule 42 (b) hearing, there appears to be no sound reason why the hearing could not be held within a day or two of the witness’ refusal to obey the court’s order. Since the hearing would in all likelihood require no more than an hour or two of the court’s time, *328trial of the criminal case could be suspended with a minimum disruption to the judicial process. Such a procedure, furthermore, lessens the risk that the witness’ contumacy is the result of fright, confusion, or misunderstanding. Indeed, with the advice of counsel, or faced with imposition of a criminal sentence, he may decide to cooperate.” Id., at 1202.
See also United States v. Pace, 371 F. 2d 810 (CA2 1967).
The Court of Appeals said of the situation in the instant case:
“If . . . counsel had been given ‘a reasonable time for the preparation of the defense,’ Fed. R. Crim. P. 42 (b), she might have marshalled and presented facts in mitigation of the charge. Significantly, the record reveals the possibility of a psychiatric defense, at least for Wilson [cf. Pánico v. United States, 375 U. S. 29 (1963)]. . . .
“Finally, because of the posture of the case, the record is silent on other facts which may well exist in defense or mitigation of the charge against both appellants, and which could be properly developed at a plenary hearing.” 488 F. 2d, at 1234-1235.
The trial judge has broad discretion to specify the time for preparation of a defense to a charge of criminal contempt. See Nilva v. United States, 352 U. S. 385, 395 (1957).

 “[Rule 42 (b)] is controlling in any case of contempt occurring outside the actual presence of the court, but it applies too to most cases of contempt in the court’s presence.” 3 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure 171-172 (1969).

 It is undisputed that respondents asserted their Fifth Amendment rights nonviolently and respectfully. Indeed, the trial judge commented after respondent Bryan asserted the privilege: “I don’t *329consider him to have a chip on his shoulder towards the Court or towards me.” App. 32.