Court Opinion

ID: 9667177
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:37:26.600168+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:35.692413
License: Public Domain

HIGGINS, Senior Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent, respectfully, from the majority opinion in its reversal of conviction and remand for new trial.
Paul N. Waller was convicted of voluntary manslaughter of Larry Tyler and related armed criminal action. He concedes the sufficiency of evidence to sustain his convictions.
■ Waller claims, nevertheless, that he should be awarded a new trial because the trial court excluded defendant’s proffered evidence of a prior act of violence by the
victim, Larry Tyler, against a third person, one David Todd. This claim does not qualify as a charge of reversible error because the trial court’s exclusionary ruling was consistent with the traditional rule of evidence in Missouri that evidence of a victim’s specific acts of violence having no connection with the defendant is inadmissible. State v. Duncan, 467 S.W.2d 866 (Mo.1971); State v. Maggitt, 517 S.W.2d 105 (Mo.banc 1974); State v. Buckles, 636 S.W.2d 914 (Mo.banc 1982).1
In order to accomplish its reversal and remand, the majority abrogates the traditional Missouri rule by a deference to rules of evidence employed in other jurisdictions. The rationale of those rules does not persuade an override of the five concededly valid reasons recited by the majority, at 215, in support of the Missouri rule. The majority’s new rule, although purporting to vest “new discretion in the trial court,” is accompanied by a caveat that the courts “must exercise caution” in application of the new rule. The majority then gives directions in seven situations requiring precautionary instructions to the jury with respect to its considerations. No such admonitions or limitations on the trial court’s discretion have been considered necessary in administering the existing rule. Because of necessity under the new rule, numerous collateral issues will be raised where the victim has engaged in various previous encounters with third parties in attempts to demonstrate his violent and turbulent nature. This will, in turn, cause trials to be lengthened, issues to be clouded and juries to be confused. A trial could be thus subverted and converted to a trial of the victim instead of a trial of the defendant.
I would not use this case to nullify the Missouri rule and overrule the cases that have applied it consistently and without difficulty. I would, instead, continue to recognize the rule as “sound, practical and logical,” Duncan, 467 S.W.2d at 869, and, *219on the unchallenged sufficiency of evidence, affirm the judgment of conviction.

. By way of contrast, Missouri does provide for admission of evidence of a victim’s prior acts of violence if directed to the defendant personally. See for discussion, distinction and application, State v. Hafeli, 715 S.W,2d 524, 530 (Mo.App.1986).