Court Opinion

ID: 9658553
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:04:39.109632+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:56.659554
License: Public Domain

WUEST, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
The majority would have this case reversed and remanded on the grounds the trial court committed reversible error when it held certain involuntary statements made by Brings Plenty could be used against him on cross-examination if he took the witness stand and testified in a manner inconsistent with such involuntary statements. I have no reservations in holding the statements at issue were, in fact, involuntary. However, I firmly believe it is unwise to reverse and remand this case on the basis of this issue because Brings Plenty did not testify at trial and thus did not subject himself to cross-examination. Because of this fact, I believe this issue was not properly preserved on appeal. Hence, I respectfully dissent.
On appeal, the State argued by electing not to testify, Brings Plenty waived the issue of whether the trial court erred in holding his involuntary statements could be used against him on cross-examination. The majority opinion disposed of this argument by the State, declaring: “We are not willing, and do not hold, that a defendant waives a constitutional defect in taking a confession when he does not testify.” I cannot agree with this holding.
The United States Supreme Court has held in New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 99 S.Ct. 1292, 59 L.Ed.2d 501 (1979) that a defendant may waive a constitutional defect in taking a confession if he does not testify. In Portash, a defendant was granted use immunity and testified before a grand jury. Later, he was charged with misconduct in office and extortion. During the trial of this matter, the trial court ruled that his grand jury testimony could be used to impeach his credibility if he testified. In rendering a decision as to whether the trial court erred in holding defendant’s grand jury testimony could be used against him on cross-examination, the United States Supreme Court held it was not precluded from addressing this issue simply because the defendant did not testify. The majority opinion held the issue of whether a defendant must testify under such circumstances is a procedural question that is within the authority of the state court to decide. See, Portash, supra, 440 U.S. at 462, 99 S.Ct. at 1299, 59 L.Ed.2d at 512 (Powell, J., and Rehnquist, J. concurring). In Portash, the majority stated that “federal law does not insist that New Jersey was wrong in not requiring [defendant] to take the witness stand in order to raise his constitutional claim.” Id., 440 U.S. at 456, 99 S.Ct. at 1295, 59 L.Ed.2d at 508. (Emphasis added). This very statement indicates a state court may require a defendant to take the witness stand in order to raise a constitutional claim such as the one at issue. It also indicates a state court need not require a defendant to take the witness stand in order to raise such a constitutional claim. In essence, it is up to the state court to decide whether a defendant must take the witness stand in order to raise a constitutional claim such as the one presently at issue.
I now discuss the issue of whether this court should require a defendant to testify in order for such defendant to raise a claim of constitutional error regarding the allow-*404anee of improper impeachment evidence. Initially, I note that this court has not dealt with this issue at great depth. In State v. Swallow, 405 N.W.2d 29 (S.D.1987) and State v. Cody, 323 N.W.2d 863 (S.D.1982), this court was presented with the above-mentioned issue. In both cases, we addressed the constitutional question although the defendant failed to testify. Our decision to address those constitutional issues, however, was not of great significance in those cases since the defendant’s constitutional challenges were ultimately rejected in both cases. Hence, our decision to address the constitutional issues in Cody and in Swallow essentially had no bearing on the outcome of the case.
It is significant to note that in Cody, Justice Henderson, writing for the majority, referred to the case of State v. Escamilla, 195 Neb. 558, 239 N.W.2d 270 (1976), in evaluating the issue of whether defendant’s due process rights were denied because the State’s potential use of unconstitutionally obtained statements chilled his ability to testify. In Escamilla, the Nebraska Supreme Court dealt with an issue similar to the one presently at issue. The majority opinion in Cody noted the following statement in Escamilla: “Under such circumstances it is for the defendant to decide whether or not he should testify. He has not been deprived of his right to testify, but has voluntarily elected not to.” Cody, supra at 869, citing Escamilla, supra, 239 N.W.2d at 271. This statement indicates that a defendant cannot refuse to testify and then later claim his due process rights were violated because his decision not to testify was due, in whole or in part, to the trial court’s failure to suppress certain unconstitutionally obtained statements. In spite of this statement, we have addressed constitutional challenges such as the one at hand although the defendant failed to testify. See Swallow, supra. Having re-evaluated this issue in light of the unique facts presented in this case, I believe the better rule with respect to the issue now before us is to require the defendant to take the stand and appeal a subsequent conviction. If the defendant has failed to do so, we should conclude the issue has not been properly preserved for appeal and thus we should decline to address the issue.
In support of my position I again refer to Portash, supra. In Portash, Justice Powell and Justice Rehnquist (now Chief Justice Rehnquist) concurred in writing, and indicated the proper way for a defendant to preserve an issue such as the one at hand is to take the stand and appeal a subsequent conviction. Specifically, these two Justices stated:
[The State] insists that, because [defendant] did not take the witness stand, his immunized testimony was not used against him and he therefore cannot complain of a violation of his Fifth Amendment privilege. The preferred method for raising claims such as [defendant’s] would be for the defendant to take the stand and appeal a subsequent conviction, if — following a claim of immunity— the prosecutor were allowed to use immunized testimony for impeachment. Only in this way may the claim be presented to a reviewing court in a concrete factual context. Moreover, requiring that the claim be presented only by those who have taken the stand will prevent defendants with no real intention of testifying from creating artificial constitutional challenges to their convictions.
Portash, supra, 440 U.S. at 462, 99 S.Ct. at 1299, 59 L.Ed.2d at 512 (Powell, J., and Rehnquist, J., concurring) (emphasis added). This rule was adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 105 S.Ct. 460, 83 L.Ed.2d 443 (1984). In Luce, the majority stated:
The preferred method for raising claims such as [petitioner’s] would be for the defendant to take the stand and appeal a subsequent conviction ... Only in this way may the claim be presented to a reviewing court in a concrete factual context.
Id., 469 U.S. at 43, 105 S.Ct. at 464, 83 L.Ed.2d at 448.
The reasoning set forth in these statements is very persuasive. A concrete fac*405tual context should be presented to this court before we rule on a constitutional issue. We should not base our opinions on mere conjecture. Also, in the present case, I find it highly unlikely that Brings Plenty would have testified if the trial court would have ruled his involuntary statements could not be used against him on cross-examination. There was a great deal of incriminating evidence presented against Brings Plenty at trial and subjecting himself to cross-examination would probably have been an unwise decision. Most importantly, and overlooked by the majority, is the fact Brings Plenty does not argue in his briefs he would have testified if the trial court had not made its ruling regarding impeachment. All of this leads me to believe Brings Plenty has simply created an artificial constitutional challenge to his conviction by asserting his due process rights were violated. This should be avoided and hence I believe, particularly in this case, a defendant should be required to take the witness stand in order to raise a constitutional claim such as the one now before this court.
It is also significant to point out that in Portash, Justice Blackmun and Chief Justice Burger dissented from the majority opinion, arguing that the Supreme Court should not have even addressed the defendant’s constitutional claim because he failed to testify. In arguing this point, these Justices stated the following:
But this claimed burden on the right to testify is too speculative to support the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the ultimate dispute concerning the use of immunized testimony. On this record, we cannot tell whether respondent would have taken the stand even had he obtained the ruling he sought from the trial court. The decision by a criminal defendant to testify is often the most important decision he faces in the trial, and it seldom turns on the resolution of one factor among many. Even had respondent taken the stand, there is no assurance he would have given inconsistent answers to questions.... Moreover, even had inconsistent answers been given, the trial court would have had to determine whether the answers were offered in response to relevant and material questions before it would have permitted impeachment. And even then, there is no certainty that the State actually would have sought to use the immunized materials to impeach respondent.
Portash, supra, 440 U.S. at 467, 99 S.Ct. at 1301, 59 L.Ed.2d at 515 (Blackmun, J., and Burger, C.J., dissenting). This excerpt elucidates several reasons why a defendant should be required to testify in order to raise a constitutional claim such as the one now before us. As noted in this excerpt, a defendant’s decision not to testify seldom turns on one factor among many. This explains, to a certain extent, why some courts have stated that defendants presented with circumstances similar to those presented to Brings Plenty are not deprived of their constitutional right to testify, but have voluntarily elected not to. See, Escamilla, supra; Cody, supra.
The majority’s decision to reverse and remand this case is based on pure conjecture. There is absolutely no indication Brings Plenty would have testified if the trial court would not have made the ruling in question. Further, it is likely on remand the defendant will again refuse to testify in spite of our holding the involuntary statements may not be used against him on cross-examination. In such case, it would be difficult to see what purpose the majority decision served other than to give Brings Plenty a new trial where plainly a new trial was not warranted. I readily admit the trial court erred in holding the involuntary statements could be used against the defendant on cross-examination. However, since the defendant failed to testify, I would hold he did not preserve the due process issue for appellate purposes.