Court Opinion

ID: 9857200
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 13:56:38.68094+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:08.263817
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, Justice,
dissenting.
The inartistically drawn complaint blends together allegations tending to establish a personal injury action arising out of the physical assault and also an action for malicious prosecution or false arrest. Paragraph VIII suffices to allege that the prosecution terminated in the favor of plaintiff — that there was no prosecution of the *171criminal complaint under which plaintiff was arrested and jailed, in essence that the action was dismissed for lack of prosecution. The sole problem with the sufficiency of the complaint is that it nowhere avers that the defendants were actuated with malice. This is a defect in the pleading which the plaintiff could have readily remedied, given the opportunity.
The case never proceeded beyond the motion stage. The City of Pocatello and Jensen moved to dismiss on grounds of failure to state a claim, and on the basis that suit was barred by three enumerated statutes of limitations: I.C. § 5-219, the two-year personal injury statute; I.C. § 5-220, the one-year statute applicable to officers seizing, damaging, or detaining personal property; and I.C. § 5-224, the four-year statute for other relief. The Railroad moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and also on I.C. § 5-219 and § 5-224; additionally, the Railroad sought to invoke I.C. § 5-218, the three year statute applicable to trespass, trover, replevin, fraud, and the statutory liabilities.
I.C. § 5-220 and § 5-218 are inapplicable, leaving for consideration the other two. I.C. § 5-219 does bar the personal injury cause of action unless there be defenses to its application, a matter which is difficult to ascertain where the limitations defense is made on a 12(b) motion. This leaves for consideration the applicability of I.C. § 5-224, the four-year statute, which, as the majority points out, applies to a complaint sounding in malicious prosecution or wrongful arrest.
Other than the dismissal of the criminal action filed against plaintiff, every other act or occurrence here involved took place more than four years prior to the filing of the complaint. Where the defendants were careful to plead the four-year statute, as well as the two-year statute, it is readily apparent that they did so with full realization that they were faced with a malicious prosecution action as well as a personal injury action. This is fortified by an allegation of the complaint that plaintiff was specially damaged for “attorneys fees for his defense in said criminal action in the amount of $325.00.” Also, it is most important to note that the defendant Railroad raised the bar of the statute of limitations as a defense only to “the alleged assault.” Following the pleading of the three statutes, separately set forth as paragraph 4 of its motion, it says this:
“That on the face of the complaint there is no allegation that this defendant was in any way connected with the charges or prosecution under the criminal complaint.”
The trial court, in dismissing the complaint, did not pass upon the sufficiency of the allegations of the complaint to state a claim for relief on either theory, or at all. In fact, aside from the Railroad’s manner of stating its motion, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the trial court considered any allegation other than a personal injury claim. His order of dismissal, drawn for his signature by counsel for the City and Jensen, states only that the dismissal motions are “allowed on the grounds that the Statute of Limitations has run against all the parties.” From this use of the singular, it may very well be that the trial court dismissed solely on the applicability of the two year limitation of I.C. § 5-219.
Had the trial court ruled that the “Statutes” had run, both I.C. § 5-219 and § 5-224, then the dismissal order would clearly incorporate the erroneous premise that the four-year statute governing malicious prosecution actions had commenced running with the complaint, arrest, and incarceration. But the trial court did not declare that he found the complaint insufficiently stated — no matter what theory.
It is the majority who, here in this Court, put the plaintiff out of court because of his failure to adequately state a claim for relief. There is nothing whatever in the record to show that the trial court so ruled, so understood, or so concluded. The dismissal order speaks otherwise. Moreover, I am convinced, under our present day liberality of pleadings doctrine that, had the plaintiff’s counsel brought the trial court to realize that there was an interwoven cause *172of action for malicious prosecution, and had defense counsel then brought his attention to the omission of any allegation that the defendants were activated by malice, any order dismissing for failure to state a claim for relief would have allowed the usual time period in which to amend. I do not recall a case where a district judge entered a final judgment of dismissal, on a motion for failure to state a claim for relief, without automatically affording the opportunity of at least one amendment.
That is not to say that an action might not be dismissed without leave to amend where a trial court sees no way that an amendment could be made so as to state a cause of action, but that is another matter. This is exactly what did happen in Gough v. Tribune-Journal Co., the last paragraph of which states:
“The trial judge was correct in his conclusion that the complaint failed to state a cause of action and could not be amended so as to state a cause of action.” (My emphasis.) 73 Idaho 173, 181, 249 P.2d 192, 196.
Nor should the Walker case be here applied to appellants’ detriment. As noted in the majority opinion, Walker involved a dismissal on a motion for summary judgment, something different from the situation here — in Walker there existed ample opportunity to file an amended complaint. That same opportunity was not present here. In Walker the trial court ruled in a memorandum decision dated June 22, 1972, that the action would be dismissed, and asked for an order of dismissal to be drawn. The appellants in that case had over 45 days in which to amend before dismissal was entered on August 8, 1972. Here, however, there was no such 45-day period of time, nor any period of time whatever; the court ruled and dismissed at the same time.
Dismissal admittedly would still leave the court with some jurisdiction, but only to entertain post-judgment motions. Among those motions is not one for leave of court to amend the complaint in an action which has been dismissed. I do not doubt for a moment that the trial judge here, in fact most trial judges, would allow a motion to reopen, in order that leave to amend the complaint could be sought. This procedure could be urged as proper under a liberal construction of I.R.C.P. 60(b). See, Petty v. Petty, 66 Idaho 717, 168 P.2d 818 (1946), wherein, under I.C. § 5-905 (now repealed), this Court held that it was error for the trial court to deny a motion to reopen the case so as to obtain leave to amend an answer.
But, I say only the Rules and interpretation of the Rules are not that clear, nor presently that well known, to exact of the appellants here that they were duty bound to have comprehended such a probable avenue when confronted with a final judgment of dismissal entered on a statute of limitations defense raised by a 12(b) motion.
I would reverse, and thereby afford the trial court an opportunity to hear plaintiffs on a motion to reopen pointed toward amendment of their complaint.