Court Opinion

ID: 9565058
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:14:05.85697+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:21.829681
License: Public Domain

HEDRICK, Judge.
Since the letter dated 25 September 1971 was admittedly in the handwriting of and signed by Dr. Mucci, our primary *431concern on this appeal is whether the letter was intended by Dr. Mucci to be a testamentary disposition of his property.
“The distinguishing feature of all genuine testamentary instruments, whatever their form, is that the paper-writing must appear to be written animo testandi.
It is essential that it should appear from the character of the instrument, and the circumstances under which it is made, that the testator intended it should operate as his will, or as a codicil to it.” Spencer v. Spencer, 163 N.C. 83, 88, 79 S.E. 291, 293 (1913).
Whether the requisite testamentary intent is present must be determined not only from a consideration of the language in the paper itself but from a consideration of the facts and circumstances attendant to its preparation and either the manner of its deposit among the valuable papers of the author or its delivery to a third party for safekeeping. In re Will of Gilkey, 256 N.C. 415, 124 S.E. 2d 155 (1962) ; Rountree v. Rountree, 213 N.C. 252, 195 S.E. 784 (1938) ; In re Southerland, 188 N.C. 325, 124 S.E. 632 (1924) ; In re Bennett, 180 N.C. 5, 103 S.E. 917 (1920) ; Spencer v. Spencer, supra.
We are cited by propounder to In re Will of Ledford, 176 N.C. 610, 97 S.E. 482 (1918) and Rountree v. Rountree, supra, in support of his contention that a letter wholly in the handwriting of and signed by its author may be probated as a valid will. Suffice it to say that the language contained in the letters in each of the cited cases expressed the writer’s testamentary intent more explicitly than the letter in the present case, but a more distinguishing feature is to be found in the cited cases ,in that in each case the letter was deposited by its author in a safe with other valuable papers and found there after his death.
In In re Will of Gilkey, supra at 420, 124 S.E. 2d at 158, addressing himself to G.S. 31-3.4(a) (3), as it relates to a holographic will being found among the valuable papers of the testator and the will being deposited with a third party for safekeeping, Justice Rodman wrote :
“The requirement that the writing be found after death among testatrix’s valuable papers was to show the author’s evaluation of the document, important because lodged with important documents, to become effective upon death because left there by the author, thereby establishing the necessary animus testandi.
*432If the document had been placed among the author’s valuable papers without her knowledge and consent, it would of course have no validity as a will even though found among the papers after the author’s death.”
Thus, if Dr. Mucci had addressed the letter to Mr. Johnson and had deposited it himself among his valuable papers and it had been found there after his death or if he had sent the letter to Mr. Johnson with instructions for its safekeeping, propound-er’s contention would be more tenable. In our opinion, the total absence of any evidence in the letter or otherwise that Dr. Mucci sent the letter to his attorney with any directions or instructons for its safekeeping, coupled with evidence that he repeatedly refused to execute a formal codicil prepared by Mr. Johnson after he wrote the letter in question, negates any suggestion that he intended that it operate as a codicil to his will. In re Bennett, supra. The letter and all of the evidence of the facts and circumstances attendant to its preparation and delivery to Mr. Johnson and its deposit by him in his office with the will points unerringly to the conclusion that Dr. Mucci did not intend that it operate as a codicil to his will; and a peremptory instruction to the jury on the issues raised by the caveat was necessary. In re Will of Simmons, 268 N.C. 278, 150 S.E. 2d 439 (1966) ; In re Will of Roberts, 251 N.C. 708, 112 S.E. 2d 505 (1960) ; In re Bennett, supra.
Propounder also contends the court erred in directing a vérdict for the caveators. In In re Will of Redding, 216 N.C. 497, 498, 5 S.E. 2d 544, 545 (1939), we find the following cogent statement:
“The proceedings to caveat a will are in rem without regard to particular persons, and must proceed to judgment, and motions as of nonsuit, or requests for direction of a verdict on the issues, will be disallowed. In re Will of Hinton, 180 N.C., 206; In re Will of Westfeldt, 188 N.C., 702.”
See also Surety Co. v. Casualty Co., 11 N.C. App. 490, 181 S.E. 2d 727 (1971) and In re Will of Hodgin, 10 N.C. App. 492, 179 S.E. 2d 126 (1971). Thus, it was error for the court in the present case to direct a verdict for the caveators and the proceeding must be remanded to the superior court for a new trial in accordance with this opinion.
*433Reversed' and remanded.