Court Opinion

ID: 9727363
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:32:41.388248+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:36.658629
License: Public Domain

FILES, P. J.
Dissenting. I would affirm the judgment without modification.
The disposition order in this case places the minor in the home of his parents on probation. The conditions of probation include the requirement that he make reparation through the probation officer and that he pay $100 to the general fund of the county in such manner as the probation officer shall order. The record shows that the minor is employed, he is living with his parents and has no dependents.
Welfare and Institutions Code section 730, last sentence, provides that when a ward is released on probation “[t]he court may impose and require any and all reasonable conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced.”
*355The requirement that this ward pay $100 to the county is an eminently reasonable step in the process of reform and rehabilitation. This minor’s offense was theft of money, at a time when he was not in any financial distress. Probation for such a youth, with no monetary sanction other than restitution, would teach him that even when crime doesn’t pay, it costs nothing. A $100 contribution towards the county’s outlay for his rehabilitation is the least that could have been asked.
The Legislature did not specify or limit the permissible conditions of probation which could be imposed upon a ward, provided only that they are reasonable and serve the ends of justice, reformation and rehabilitation. No other statutory authority is needed for the disposition ordered in this case.
A petition for a rehearing was denied December 18, 1979, and the petitions of both parties for a hearing by the Supreme Court were denied January 30, 1979. Clark, J., and Richardson, J., were of the opinion that the petitions should be granted.