Court Opinion

ID: 9604847
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:27:28.073336+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:24.595986
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Johnson’s main alibi witness, the only person who allegedly was with him on a trip to Florida at the time the drug transaction took place, was Wayne Bryant. Although defendant called five witnesses regarding his whereabouts, none could say with certainty that he was elsewhere when the sale occurred. Only the absent Bryant could so testify.
The jury would be permitted to draw, as reasonable, the inference that Bryant would have so testified if he had been called but was unavailable for some reason unknown to the jurors. On the other hand, the jury could infer that the absence of the witness meant that he would not corroborate Johnson’s alibi; the State is permitted to make such an argument. Shirley v. State, 245 Ga. 616, 618 (1) (266 SE2d 218) (1980), cert, denied 449 U. S. 879 (101 SC 227, 66 LE2d 102) (1980). This inference would portend rejection of the sole defense. The question about Bryant’s conviction of sales made by him seven and nine days before defendant’s sale to the undercover agent was relevant to the issue of the validity of the alibi. It tended to explain why defendant did not call Bryant as a witness; even if Bryant would have testified that he and Johnson were on a trip to Florida at the crucial time, he would have been impeached by his conviction of crimes of moral turpitude. Such is permitted. Doggett v. Simms, 79 Ga. 253, 257 (2) (4 SE 909) (1887); Cross v. State, 136 Ga. App. 400, 405 (6) (221 SE2d 615) (1975), cert. denied 233 Ga. 960 (214 SE2d 374) (1975); OCGA § 24-9-84.
This, of course, would weaken the inference that Bryant was ab*592sent for a legitimate reason and strengthen the inference that Bryant could not honestly testify that Johnson was not out in front of his corner grocery store in Alma at 8:30 p.m. on September 23, 1988.
Decided January 28, 1992.
Garland & Samuel, Donald F. Samuel, for appellant.
Harry D. Dixon, Jr., District Attorney, George E. Barnhill, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
Thus, unlike the situation in Hill v. State, 176 Ga. App. 509, 510 (3) (336 SE2d 276) (1985), the evidence was relevant to an issue in the case, i.e., the absence of the only witness who allegedly could give direct evidence that defendant was not present at the scene when the crime as charged occurred. The State’s question addressed the absent witness’ character, not the character of the witness/defendant. So it did not violate the principle that “[a] witness can not be impeached by proving association with a man of bad character.” Western & Atlantic R. Co. v. Vaughan, 113 Ga. 354 (1) (38 SE 851) (1901).
“[T]he right of cross examination is thorough and sifting, and ... a defendant who elects to testify in his own behalf shall be examined and cross-examined as any other witness. . . .” Pritchard v. State, 160 Ga. App. 105,108 (4) (286 SE2d 338) (1981); OCGA § 24-9-20 (b).