Court Opinion

ID: 9410575
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-21 21:00:41.393345+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:58.706761
License: Public Domain

USCA4 Appeal: 22-1697      Doc: 53         Filed: 07/20/2023     Pg: 1 of 14

                                             UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 22-1697

        WENDY MCKINNEY,

                             Plaintiff - Appellant,

                      v.

        CLEVELAND COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION; MARK PATRICK;
        STEPHEN FISHER; JENNIFER WAMPLER,

                             Defendants - Appellees.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at
        Charlotte. Max O. Cogburn, Jr., District Judge. (3:20-cv-00221-MOC-DCK)

        Submitted: May 1, 2023                                            Decided: July 20, 2023

        Before WILKINSON, AGEE, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: William Everett Moore, Jr., GRAY, LAYTON, KERSH, SOLOMON, FURR
        & SMITH, P.A., Gastonia, North Carolina, for Appellant. Colin A. Shive, Richard A.
        Paschal, THARRINGTON SMITH, L.L.P., Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees
        Cleveland County Board of Education, Stephen Fisher, and Jennifer Wampler. Sarah M.
        Saint, Gary M. Parsons, Locke G. Ho, BROOKS, PIERCE, MCLENDON, HUMPHREY
        & LEONARD, L.L.P., Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee Mark Patrick.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

                  Wendy McKinney (“Appellant”) worked for the Cleveland County School system

        for nearly 15 years before she was terminated in 2018. Appellant’s termination stems from

        her numerous absences from work during the 2017–2018 and 2018–2019 school years. In

        this appeal, Appellant challenges the district court’s dismissal of her civil action against

        her former employer which is rooted in her contention that she was wrongfully terminated

        for her inability to attend work due to her health-related issues. For the reasons below, we

        affirm.

                                                        I.

                  In January 2003, Appellant began working for the Kings Mountain Intermediate

        School (“KMIS”) as a substitute teacher. Later that year, KMIS merged with Cleveland

        County Schools. Aside from substitute teaching, Appellant worked in various roles for

        KMIS, including as a media assistant and a bus driver. In July 2013, Appellant accepted a

        position as a data manager with the North Shelby School (“NSS”), which is also in

        Cleveland County, and in 2015, she was promoted to bookkeeper. Appellant held the

        bookkeeper position until she was terminated by the Cleveland County Board of Education

        (the “Board”) on December 14, 2018.

                  In the fall semester of the 2017, Appellant was absent from work 16 times, for either

        a full or half day, excluding vacation days. In the spring semester of 2018, Appellant’s

        mother was diagnosed with cancer, and Appellant began to take leave pursuant to the

        Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) so that she could take her mother to her doctor’s

        appointments. In order to track Appellant’s absences and maintain school operations,

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        Appellant’s supervisor, Principal Mark Patrick (“Patrick”), asked Appellant to “prepare an

        unofficial spreadsheet of her absences, including the reason(s) why she would be absent,

        who would be substituting or covering for her during her absence(s), and stating whether

        the requested time would be covered under FMLA.” J.A. 817. 1 A few months after

        Appellant’s mother was diagnosed with cancer, Appellant learned that she was pregnant,

        and her pregnancy was classified as “high risk due to [her] age and health history.” Id. at

        818. Additionally, Appellant began to experience “severe and disabling arm pain,” which

        could not be treated by pain medications due to her pregnancy. Id. Appellant was

        eventually diagnosed with a ruptured disk. In May of 2018, “a neurosurgeon wrote

        [Appellant] out of work due to the diagnosed back condition and her related inability to

        use her left arm.” Id.

               At end of the 2017–2018 school year, Appellant received a “conditional evaluation”

        indicating that her overall work performance needed improvement. J.A. 336. Pursuant to

        the Board’s performance review policy, “[b]eing placed on a ‘conditional’ evaluation

        means that the employee’s job is in jeopardy and that significant and sustained

        improvement must be demonstrated for continued employment.” Id. Relevant here, the

        conditional evaluation noted, “[Appellant’s] numerous absences have resulted in office

        duties and management lacking efficiency and effectiveness. It has required other staff

        members to cover her duties, which has impacted the daily operation of the school.” Id. at

        339. The conditional evaluation also emphasized that excluding Appellant’s FMLA leave

               1
                   Citations to the “J.A.” refer to the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this appeal.

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        and other approved leave of absences, Appellant missed more than 38.3 days during the

        2017–2018 school year. The conditional evaluation also cited Appellant’s “quality and

        knowledge of work” as areas in which she needed to improve. Id. at 338. Appellant

        submitted a written objection to the conditional evaluation, which essentially disagreed

        with the factual basis for her “needs improvement” rating.

               Turning to the 2018–2019 school year, there is no dispute that Appellant’s FMLA

        leave was exhausted as of July 2, 2018. At some point before the 2018–2019 school year

        began, Appellant requested additional FMLA leave despite the fact that she did not qualify

        “due to not meeting the 1250 hours requirement.” Id. at 83. 2 Appellant’s request for

        additional unpaid leave was granted “due to her long service with the district of 15 years.”

        Id.   Appellant intermittently used the additional unpaid leave in July 2018, and

        continuously used it from September 2018 through November 2018. In September 2018,

        Appellant met with Assistant Superintendent Jennifer Wampler (“Wampler”) to request

        still more unpaid leave which would allow her to “deliver her baby in December 2018 and

        then undergo . . . ruptured disk surgery, which was expected to resolve [her] residual carpel

        tunnel symptoms.” Id. at 821. Wampler advised Appellant that she could not approve any

        additional leave and that she “would have to recommend dismissal due to [Appellant] being

               2
                 To qualify for FMLA leave, an employee must have been “employed (i) for at least
        12 months by the employer with respect to whom leave is requested and (ii) for at least
        1,250 hours of service with such employer during the previous 12 month period.” Babcock
        v. BellSouth Advert. & Publ’g Corp., 348 F.3d 73, 76–77 (4th Cir. 2003) (alteration adopted
        and internal quotation marks omitted).

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        in continued violation of Board Policy on Excessive Absences.” Id. at 822. Appellant

        subsequently submitted a written request to the Board seeking leave until January 2, 2019.

        On November 27, 2018, Wampler informed Appellant of the Board’s decision to deny her

        request for additional unpaid leave.

               On December 14, 2018, the Board sent Appellant a letter informing her of its

        decision to terminate her employment based on her “excessive absences.” J.A. 75–76. In

        that letter, the Board emphasized that Appellant “ha[d] missed over 70 full time days of

        work and 15 partial days” as of December 1, 2018. Id. at 75.

               On March 17, 2020, Appellant filed suit in state court against the Board, Patrick,

        Wampler, and the Cleveland County Schools Superintendent, Stephen Fisher (“Fisher”)

        (collectively, “Appellees”). In the complaint, Appellant asserted the following claims: (1)

        wrongful discharge; (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (3) negligent infliction

        of emotional distress; (4) violation of the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act pursuant to

        N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-25.2(5); (5) unlawful retention pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 115C-

        335.5, 168A-10, 126-85; (6) pregnancy discrimination pursuant to Title VII; (7) denial of

        a reasonable accommodation in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”);

        (8) violation of Appellant’s rights pursuant to the FMLA; (9) violation of Appellant’s

        constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (10) punitive damages. The case

        was removed to the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina

        on April 15, 2020.

               On November 19, 2020, the district court granted Appellees’ motion to dismiss

        pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) with respect to all of Appellant’s

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        claims except the FMLA, Title VII, and ADA claims. In doing so, the district court

        determined that Appellant’s wrongful discharge claim (count one) failed as matter of law

        because the Board is entitled to governmental immunity pursuant to North Carolina law.

        Next, the district court explained that the intentional and negligent infliction of emotional

        distress claims (counts two and three) must be dismissed because Appellant failed to allege

        intent to harm, nor did she allege “any facts supporting her conclusory allegation that she

        suffered severe emotional distress.” J.A. 224–25. Turning to the Wage and Hour Act claim

        (count four), the district court concluded that it failed as a matter of law for two reasons:

        (1) it was time-barred; and (2) Appellant’s travel time to required meetings and to make

        bank deposits was not compensable as a matter of law. As to Appellant’s state law

        retaliation claim (count five), the district court dismissed this claim after finding that it was

        time-barred. With respect to the punitive damages claim (count ten), the district court

        concluded that Appellant failed to allege that any of the individual defendants acted with

        the requisite intent and the Board was entitled to immunity from such a claim. Moving to

        the federal claims, the district court determined that Appellant’s section 1983 claim (count

        nine) failed as a matter of law because Appellant failed to allege a constitutional violation

        against any of the individual Appellees. However, as noted above, the district court

        allowed Appellant’s Title VII, FMLA, and ADA claims to proceed through discovery.

               On March 25, 2022, the district court granted Appellees’ motion for summary

        judgment and dismissed Appellant’s remaining claims. In the summary judgment order,

        the district court found that Appellant’s Title VII claim must be dismissed because

        Appellant failed to make out a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination. On this point,

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        the district court emphasized that the “conditional evaluation in July 2019 defeats

        [Appellant’s] ability to maintain a prima facie case under Title VII because [Appellant]

        was not working at a level that met her employer’s legitimate job expectations.” J.A. 833.

        Turning to the ADA claim, the district court concluded that summary judgment was

        appropriate because “[Appellant] has simply not shown that she could fulfill the essential

        functions of her position at the time she was terminated.” Id. at 836. Lastly, as for the

        FMLA claim, the district court dismissed it after finding that “[Appellant] has presented

        no evidence that she was terminated for taking FMLA leave or that [she] was not granted

        the full amount of FMLA leave to which she was entitled.” Id. Appellant subsequently

        filed a motion asking the court to reconsider its summary judgment order, which the district

        court denied on May 26, 2022.

               Appellant timely filed her notice of appeal.

                                                    II.

               We review the district court’s grant of Appellees’ motion to dismiss and motion for

        summary judgment de novo. See Vannoy v. Fed. Rsrv. Bank of Richmond, 827 F.3d 296,

        300 (4th Cir. 2016) (standard of review for motions for summary judgment); Weidman v.

        Exxon Mobil Corp., 776 F.3d 214, 219 (4th Cir. 2015) (standard of review for motions to

        dismiss). In both instances, we apply the same standard as the district court.

               “We review a denial of a motion for reconsideration under the deferential abuse of

        discretion standard.” United States ex rel. Carter v. Halliburton Co., 866 F.3d 199, 206

        (4th Cir. 2017).

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                                                    III.

                                                    A.

               Appellant argues that the district court erred in granting Appellees’ motion to

        dismiss with respect to her section 1983, wrongful discharge, and negligent infliction of

        emotional distress claims. 3 We address each claim in turn.

               With respect to the section 1983 claim, “[s]ection 1983 provides for liability on

        every person who, under color of state law, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen

        of the United States to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by

        the Constitution and laws.” Wilcox v. Brown, 877 F.3d 161, 170 (4th Cir. 2017) (alterations

        adopted and internal quotation marks omitted). However, “[a]n official can be liable under

        § 1983 only where it is affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in

        the deprivation of the plaintiffs’ rights.” Thomas v. City of Annapolis, 851 F. App’x 341,

        347–48 (4th Cir. 2021). Here, we agree with the district court that Appellant “failed to

        state a cognizable claim under § 1983 against any of the named defendants” because

        Appellant failed to sufficiently allege how any of the individual Appellees violated her

               3
                 The parties dispute which claims were sufficiently raised in Appellant’s notice of
        appeal and opening brief to merit appellate review. The notice of appeal makes clear that
        with respect to the motion to dismiss, Appellant is contesting the dismissal of the: (1)
        wrongful discharge in violation of public policy claim; (2) individual capacity claims
        against Patrick and Wampler; (3) negligent or reckless infliction of emotional distress
        claim; and (4) punitive damages claim. However, as Appellees’ point out, Appellant did
        not assert a reckless infliction of emotional damages in her complaint and Appellant did
        not affirmatively argue against the dismissal of her punitive damages claim in her opening
        brief. Accordingly, Appellant has waived appellate review of her punitive damages claim.

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        constitutional rights and Appellant has not identified a valid statutory basis to support her

        claim. J.A. 229.

               We turn now to the wrongful discharge claim, Appellant argues that the district

        court erred in determining that the Board was entitled to governmental immunity. Pursuant

        to North Carolina law, “the doctrine of governmental, or sovereign immunity bars actions

        against, inter alia, the state, its counties, and its public officials sued in their official

        capacity.” Herring ex rel. Marshall v. Winston-Salem/Forsyth Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 529

        S.E.2d 458, 461 (N.C. App. 2000).          However, a board of education may waive

        governmental immunity by obtaining liability insurance. See Cash v. Granville Cnty. Bd.

        of Educ., 242 F.3d 219, 226 (4th Cir. 2001) (applying North Carolina law). Relevant here,

        it is well-settled that a board of education does not waive governmental immunity by

        participating in the North Carolina School Board Trust (“NCSBT”). 4 See Willett v.

        Chatham Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 625 S.E.2d 900, 901 (N.C. App. 2006) (declining to consider

        the plaintiff’s argument that the board of education waived governmental immunity by

        entering into an agreement with the NCSBT because it was specifically rejected in another

        case). While Appellant disagrees with the Board that its agreement with the NCSBT does

        not constitute waiver of governmental immunity, she does not address the cases cited on

               4
                 The NCSBT “provides local boards of education the opportunity to budget funds
        for the purpose of paying all or part of a covered [c]laim made or civil judgment entered
        against the board or its members or [e]mployees or former members or [e]mployees, when
        such [c]laim is made or such judgment is rendered as damages on account of an act done
        or omission made, or an act allegedly done or omission allegedly made, in the scope of
        their duties as members of the local board of education or as [e]mployees.” J.A. 155.

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        this point nor does she offer a legal basis for the disagreement. Accordingly, because there

        is nothing in the record which suggests the Board waived its governmental immunity, we

        conclude that the district court did not err in dismissing Appellant’s wrongful discharge

        claim.

                 As for Appellant’s negligent infliction of emotional distress claim, Appellant

        contends that she “sufficiently alleged her emotional distress . . . with ample medical

        diagnoses and treatment to confirm her severe and disabling condition.” Appellant’s

        Opening Br. at 45. In order to establish a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress

        pursuant to North Carolina law, “a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant negligently

        engaged in conduct, (2) it was reasonably foreseeable that such conduct would cause the

        plaintiff severe emotional distress and (3) the conduct did in fact cause the plaintiff severe

        emotional distress.” Newman v. Stepp, 852 S.E.2d 104, 107 (N.C. 2020) (alteration

        adopted and internal quotation marks omitted).           The district court concluded that

        Appellant’s negligent infliction of emotional distress claim failed as a matter of law

        because North Carolina law precludes negligence actions against co-employees and

        Appellant “failed to allege any facts supporting her conclusory allegation that she suffered

        severe emotional distress.” J.A. 224. We agree with the district court. Simply put,

        Appellant has not identified any allegations in her complaint which support her conclusion

        that she suffered severe emotional distress. Consequently, the district court did not err in

        dismissing her claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress.

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                                                      B.

               Appellant argues that the district court erred in granting Appellees’ motion for

        summary judgment because genuine disputes of material fact exist with respect to her Title

        VII, ADA, and FMLA claims. We disagree.

               Starting with the Title VII claim, “[w]here, as here, a plaintiff does not allege direct

        evidence of discrimination, a plaintiff asserting discriminatory treatment under Title VII

        may avoid summary judgment by proceeding under the burden-shifting framework

        established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d

        668 (1973).” Haynes v. Waste Connections, Inc., 922 F.3d 219, 223 (4th Cir. 2019). This

        requires the plaintiff to establish: “(1) he was a member of a protected class; (2) he was

        satisfactorily performing his job at the time of the termination; (3) he was terminated from

        his employment; and (4) the prohibited conduct in which he engaged was comparable in

        seriousness to misconduct of other employees outside the protected class who received less

        severe discipline.” Id. (emphasis supplied); see also Holland v. Washington Homes, Inc.,

        487 F.3d 208, 214 (4th Cir. 2007) (noting that the employee must show “he was performing

        his job duties at a level that met his employer’s legitimate expectations at the time of the

        adverse employment action”). Here, there is no dispute that prior to the termination,

        Appellant received a “conditional evaluation” indicating that her job was in “jeopardy.”

        J.A. 336. While Appellant disagrees with Appellees’ assessment of her performance, she

        has failed to present any evidence -- other than her self-serving written objection to the

        evaluation -- from which the court could conclude that she was, in fact, meeting her

        employer’s expectations. As we have previously made clear, “[i]t is the perception of the

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        decision maker which is relevant, not the self-assessment of the plaintiff.” King v.

        Rumsfeld, 328 F.3d 145, 149 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal citation omitted). Because Appellant

        has not identified anything in the record which suggests that Appellees’ believed that she

        was satisfactorily performing her job at the time she was terminated, we conclude that the

        district court did not err in dismissing her Title VII claim.

               Appellant’s ADA claim was also properly dismissed.             The ADA prohibits

        employers “from discriminating against a qualified individual on the basis of disability.”

        Wilson v. Dollar Gen. Corp., 717 F.3d 337, 344 (4th Cir. 2013) (alteration adopted and

        internal citation omitted). “The ADA defines a qualified individual as an individual who,

        with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the

        employment position that such individual holds or desires.” Jessup v. Barnes Grp., Inc.,

        23 F.4th 360, 365 (4th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). In reaching the

        conclusion that summary judgment was appropriate on Appellant’s ADA claim, the district

        court pointed to our decision in Tyndall v. National Education Centers, Inc. of California,

        where we stated, “[a]n employee who cannot meet the attendance requirements of the job

        at issue cannot be considered a qualified individual protected by the ADA.” 31 F.3d 209,

        213 (4th Cir. 1994). In Tyndall, we further explained, “[e]xcept in the unusual case where

        an employee can effectively perform all work-related duties at home, an employee who

        does not come to work cannot perform any of his job functions, essential or otherwise.” Id.

        (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, there can be no genuine dispute that regular

        attendance is an essential function of Appellant’s bookkeeping position. Indeed, this is

        evidenced by the Board’s policy manual requiring “regular attendance . . . for all school

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        system employees,” J.A. 345, and the conditional evaluation, which explained that

        Appellant’s “numerous absences have resulted in office duties and management lacking

        efficiency and effectiveness,” id. at 339. Because Appellant did not regularly come to work

        at the time she was terminated, and thus, was not a qualified individual as defined by the

        ADA, we conclude that the district court did not err in dismissing Appellant’s ADA claim.

               With respect to Appellant’s FMLA claim, “[t]he FMLA entitles eligible employees

        to take twelve weeks of leave during any twelve-month period for a serious health

        condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of his job.” Vannoy v.

        Fed. Rsrv. Bank of Richmond, 827 F.3d 296, 301 (4th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks

        omitted). As noted above, the district court determined that Appellees were entitled to

        summary judgment on Appellant’s FMLA claim because it is undisputed that Appellant

        had exhausted her FMLA leave in July 2018 and “[Appellant] presented no evidence that

        she was terminated for taking FMLA leave or that [she] was not granted the full amount of

        FMLA leave to which she was entitled.” J.A. 836. We agree. Because Appellant has not

        identified any evidence which suggests that she was terminated for taking FMLA leave,

        the district court properly dismissed Appellant’s FMLA claim.

                                                    C.

                Lastly, Appellant argues that the district court improperly denied her motion to

        reconsider the grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellees.           Having already

        determined that the district court properly granted Appellees’ motion for summary

        judgment, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the

        motion for reconsideration.

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                                                 IV.

              For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the judgment of the district court. We

        dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

        presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional

        process.

                                                                                  AFFIRMED

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