Court Opinion

ID: 9915893
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-08 22:00:48.820059+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:21:30.256459
License: Public Domain

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
                                File Name: 24a0011n.06

                                           No. 23-5085

                          UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                               FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT                                  FILED
                                                                                    Jan 08, 2024
                                                                            KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk
                                                     )
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                                                     )
        Plaintiff-Appellee,                          )    ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
                                                     )    STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
                v.                                   )    THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF
                                                     )    TENNESSEE
 JERTERRIUS AKRIDGE                                  )
        Defendant-Appellant.                         )    OPINION
                                                     )
                                                     )

Before: WHITE, THAPAR, and BLOOMEKATZ, Circuit Judges.

       HELENE N. WHITE, Circuit Judge. Jerterrius Akridge appeals his fifty-four-month

sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to one count of possession of a firearm as a convicted

felon. He argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable and is impermissibly based on a

rehabilitative purpose. We AFFIRM.

                                                I.

       In the early morning of March 23, 2021, patrol officers from the Chattanooga Police

Department responded to a report of a man, later identified as Akridge, with a firearm at a

Volkswagen facility. Managers of the facility reported that, although Akridge was not threatening

anyone, they nonetheless wanted him removed from the property. The officers found Akridge in

possession of a semiautomatic pistol, which they secured, apparently without incident. Three days

later, the investigator assigned to the case learned that Akridge had prior felony convictions. She

secured a warrant for Akridge’s arrest and arranged for him to be taken into custody the following
No. 23-5085, United States v. Akridge

month at the Tennessee probation and parole office. Akridge was indicted on one count of

possession of a firearm as a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

       Akridge notified the district court and the government that he intended to plead guilty. But

at his change-of-plea hearing on July 21, 2022, Akridge evinced difficulty understanding what was

happening. Throughout the court’s plea colloquy, he expressed confusion at questions asking, for

example, whether he was a U.S. citizen (“What is that?” R. 41, PID 330), understood of which

offense he was admitting guilt (“Is it the firearm?” Id. at PID 332), received a copy of the

indictment (“What is the indictment?” Id. at PID 335), and was advised by counsel of the nature

and meaning of the charge against him (“What does that mean?” Id. at PID 336) and of potential

defenses to the charge (“Defenses? What does that mean?” Id. at PID 339). At multiple points,

often at the court’s insistence, counsel conferred with Akridge to ensure his comprehension. In

the end, the court did not “feel comfortable accepting his guilty plea” at the July 21 hearing, id. at

PID 350, and believed that “he might need a little bit more time to go through this so that he

understands or at least that the Court . . . is better satisfied that he understands,” id. at PID 349.

The court continued the hearing until August 3, 2022. Akridge did not evince the same confusion

at that hearing, and the court accepted his guilty plea.

       Akridge’s sentencing hearing took place on January 25, 2023. The court calculated

Akridge’s sentencing guidelines range using a total offense level of seventeen and a criminal-

history category of VI, resulting in a sentencing range of fifty-one to sixty-three months’

imprisonment. The parties agreed with the court’s calculation. The court then heard argument

regarding the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors.

       The government contended that a sentence “at or near the top of the guideline range,” such

as sixty months, would be appropriate. R. 43, PID 381. It stated that “hundreds of residents of

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No. 23-5085, United States v. Akridge

this community work[ed]” at the Volkswagen facility where Akridge possessed the firearm and

that Akridge “told law enforcement that he intended to sell” the firearm, “thus furthering the illegal

firearms trade in this community.” Id. at PID 382. The government also noted that Akridge “ha[d]

amassed [thirty-four] criminal history points at [twenty-eight] years of age.” Id. Akridge had

several prior convictions for theft and three convictions for the unlawful possession or use of

firearms—including one offense in which he discharged a firearm in a large crowd of people—

and he had evaded law enforcement and violated probation on multiple occasions. Thus, the

government argued, Akridge “ha[d] no respect for the law,” id. at PID 382, and “there is a need to

protect the public from” his conduct, id. at PID 384.

       Akridge’s counsel argued that although criminal-history category VI was technically

correct for guidelines-calculation purposes, the court should nonetheless sentence Akridge using

a guidelines range based on category V. Counsel contended that “Akridge’s criminal history score

grossly overstates the severity of his criminal history,” noting that if he “were given just one point

for his misdemeanor convictions, he would have [eleven] criminal history points in total,” and that

“the nature of his convictions—. . . the majority of which are . . . misdemeanors—[do not] merit

him being in criminal history category VI.” Id. at PID 384–85. Further, Akridge “was receiving

mental health treatment for both schizoaffective disorder and PTSD,” had been previously

hospitalized for suicidality, and suffered from Tourette Syndrome and “a high degree of paranoia.”

Id. at PID 385–87. Counsel argued that paranoia, not a desire to threaten or harm employees,

drove Akridge to bring the firearm to the Volkswagen facility. And counsel noted that Akridge

“was on disability as a child,” graduated high school with a special-education degree, and

“struggle[d] with significant literacy issues,” which, coupled with his Tourette Syndrome, impeded

his employment opportunities. Id. at PID 386–87.

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No. 23-5085, United States v. Akridge

         Akridge followed his counsel’s argument with a lengthy statement of his own. He

explained that his prior theft offenses occurred “a long time” ago, when he was young, and that he

had “struggled coming up” and “get[ting] a job.” Id. at PID 388. He disputed the government’s

characterization of one of his prior firearms offenses, stating that he “did not fire in a crowd of

people” but rather “shot in the air” and “never shot” or “hurt” anyone. Id. at PID 389. He attributed

some probation violations to his inability to “read or write,” id. at PID 391, and his failure to pay

probation fines to his finances, noting that he could not even “come up on money to be able to

afford food,” id. at PID 395. He further noted his faith and participation in his church’s choir as

well as his PTSD and thoughts of suicide. He acknowledged that he had “made some mistakes in

[his] past,” id. at PID 389, and that his “past [had] just caught up with [him],” id. at PID 393, but

noted that he has tried to “accept[] responsibility” for his conduct, id. at PID 389. He conceded

that a prison term of thirty to thirty-seven months might be appropriate but stated that “[fifty]

months, [sixty] months, that’s too long.” Id. at PID 393.1 He “miss[ed] [his] family” and was

“ready to go home.” R. 43, PID 396.

         After confirming that Akridge’s counsel and the government had nothing further to add,

the court stated that it “ha[d] considered the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history

and characteristics of the defendant, and the advisory guideline range, as well as the other factors

listed in” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and sentenced Akridge to a prison term of fifty-four months. Id. at

PID 396–97. The court recommended that Akridge receive medical and mental-health treatment

while incarcerated and specified conditions for his supervised release. The court asked whether

1
  The United States Probation Office originally calculated Akridge’s sentencing-guidelines range as thirty to thirty-
seven months but later revised the range to fifty-one to sixty-three months based on the government’s objection.

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No. 23-5085, United States v. Akridge

“either party ha[d] any objections to the sentence just pronounced by the Court that ha[d] not been

previously raised”; neither did. Id. at PID 399–400. The court then addressed Akridge directly:

       Mr. Akridge, to some degree, you’re absolutely correct when—in your statement
       that you said that your past had caught up with you a little bit.

       [Thirty-four] criminal history points is an enormous amount. I was fully prepared
       to give you a longer sentence, but I believe [fifty-four] months, which is a sentence
       inside that criminal history category V that your counsel asked for, is more than
       enough to protect the public from further crime from you but allow you some time
       in the Bureau of Prisons to get your life straightened out.

Id. at PID 400.

       The court expressed its “hope” that Akridge “avail [him]self of some of the programs that

are available to” him and wished him luck. Id. at PID 401. It asked whether there were “any other

matters to resolve in this case”; the parties said no, and the court concluded the hearing. Id.

                                                 II.

       “On appeal, district court sentencing determinations are reviewed for reasonableness. The

reasonableness inquiry has two components: procedural and substantive.” United States v. Gates,

48 F.4th 463, 468–69 (6th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). A claim of procedural unreasonableness

“goes ‘more to the process by which the district court arrived at the given sentence than to the

substantive aspect of the sentence (i.e., the relationship between the length of the sentence and the

strength of the reasoning under § 3553(a)).’” United States v. Cabrera, 811 F.3d 801, 808–09 (6th

Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Malone, 503 F.3d 481, 484 (6th Cir. 2007)). “A claim that a

sentence is substantively unreasonable is a claim that a sentence is too long (if a defendant appeals)

or too short (if the government appeals).” United States v. Rayyan, 885 F.3d 436, 442 (6th Cir.

2018). We review a challenge to the substantive reasonableness of a sentence under an abuse-of-

discretion standard. See United States v. Nunley, 29 F.4th 824, 830 (6th Cir. 2022). Our review

asks whether “the court placed too much weight on some . . . factors and too little on others in
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No. 23-5085, United States v. Akridge

sentencing the individual.” Rayyan, 885 F.3d at 442. Because sentencing “is a matter of reasoned

discretion, not math,” id., “[w]e give considerable deference to a district court’s decision about the

appropriate length, and we treat a within-[g]uidelines sentence, like the one [Akridge] received, as

presumptively reasonable,” United States v. Owen, 940 F.3d 308, 317 (6th Cir. 2019). We grant

relief only when we are left with “a ‘definite and firm conviction’ that the district court erred by

not imposing a lower sentence.” United States v. Johns, 65 F.4th 891, 894 (6th Cir. 2023) (quoting

United States v. Hymes, 19 F.4th 928, 933 (6th Cir. 2021)).

                                                 III.

                                                 A.

       Akridge first argues that his within-guidelines sentence is substantively unreasonable

because the district court did not adequately consider his personal circumstances, including his

challenging childhood and mental-health diagnoses, and that his criminal-history score

overrepresents the seriousness of his criminal record.

       To start, we observe that the district court said little about the bases for Akridge’s sentence.

Although it clearly was engaged and in dialogue with counsel and Akridge during the sentencing

proceeding, the court provided scant explanation for its sentence of fifty-four months’

imprisonment. And without some articulation of the court’s rationale, we cannot easily assess how

it weighed the § 3553 factors or accounted for Akridge’s sentencing arguments highlighting his

challenging childhood and mental-health issues. See United States v. Solano-Rosales, 781 F.3d

345, 351 (6th Cir. 2015). Still, Akridge does not challenge the adequacy of the district court’s

explanation for his sentence—a procedural reasonableness challenge—so “we limit our review to

whether the sentence was substantively reasonable,” United States v. Sexton, 889 F.3d 262, 265

(6th Cir. 2018). However, we reiterate the need for district courts “to explain to the parties and

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No. 23-5085, United States v. Akridge

the reviewing court [their] reasons for imposing a particular sentence.”            United States v.

Richardson, 437 F.3d 550, 554 (6th Cir. 2006). When viewed in total, a transcript must satisfy us

that the district court considered the parties’ arguments on the § 3553(a) factors and expressed a

reasoned basis for exercising its own legal decision-making authority in sentencing the defendant.

See United States v. Thomas, 498 F.3d 336, 341 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Rita v. United States, 551

U.S. 338, 356 (2007)).

       In undertaking that limited review, we conclude that Akridge’s sentence is substantively

reasonable. The district court said that Akridge was “absolutely correct” in acknowledging that

his “past had caught up with” him and suggested that he “avail [him]self of some of the programs

that are available to” him in prison, R. 43, PID 400–01, indicating that the court indeed considered

his personal circumstances. Further, Akridge had multiple prior convictions for firearms offenses,

including one in which he fired a weapon in a crowd of people, as well as numerous convictions

for theft. A district court may appropriately choose to emphasize one § 3553(a) factor over others

if the facts of the case call for it. See United States v. Zobel, 696 F.3d 558, 571–72 (6th Cir. 2012).

And the district court here could reasonably conclude that this criminal history justified Akridge’s

within-guidelines fifty-four-month sentence despite his challenging childhood and mental-health

issues. See, e.g., United States v. Kerns, 9 F.4th 342, 347 (6th Cir. 2021) (affirming a within-

guidelines sentence for kidnapping and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of

violence given that the court considered the defendant’s mental-health issues and concluded

nonetheless that the seriousness of the offense and the need to protect the public justified a sentence

at the top of the guidelines range).

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No. 23-5085, United States v. Akridge

                                                B.

       Akridge next argues that the district court improperly based his sentence on rehabilitative

concerns. In Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319 (2011), the Supreme Court held that “a court

may not impose or lengthen a prison sentence to enable an offender to complete a treatment

program or otherwise to promote rehabilitation.” Id. at 335. The Court reached this conclusion in

resolving the interplay between two provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a), which lists the factors—including rehabilitation—a district court must consider when

imposing a sentence generally, and 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a), which identifies the factors the court must

consider when imposing imprisonment in particular and requires that the court “recogniz[e] that

imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting correction and rehabilitation,” 18 U.S.C.

§ 3582(a); see Tapia, 564 U.S. at 325–26, 328–29; United States v. Adams, 873 F.3d 512, 521 (6th

Cir. 2017).

       “But this does not mean that a court cannot discuss rehabilitation at all.” United States v.

Bailey, 27 F.4th 1210, 1215 (6th Cir. 2022). “A court commits no error by discussing the

opportunities for rehabilitation within prison or the benefits of specific treatment or training

programs.” Tapia, 564 U.S. at 334. Nor does a court err if it “urge[s] the [Bureau of Prisons] to

place an offender in a prison treatment program.” Id. “But the court’s discussion of those things

must not be its explanation for the sentence it imposes. Instead, to comply with § 3582(a), the

court must set forth a rationale independent of rehabilitative concerns.” United States v. Rucker,

874 F.3d 485, 488 (6th Cir. 2017). “[O]nly where there is an identifiable basis for concluding that

the district court based the length of the sentence of incarceration in part on rehabilitation” does

the sentence fail to pass muster. United States v. Krul, 774 F.3d 371, 372 (6th Cir. 2014).

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No. 23-5085, United States v. Akridge

       Akridge contends that the district court expressly disavowed protecting the public as a

sufficient factor and impermissibly relied on a rehabilitative purpose when it stated:

       I believe [fifty-four] months, which is a sentence inside that criminal history
       category V that your counsel asked for, is more than enough to protect the public
       from further crime from you but allow you some time in the Bureau of Prisons to
       get your life straightened out.

R. 43, PID 400.

       We must review the court’s statement in context, however. The court began its statement

observing that it entered the sentencing hearing intending to impose a longer sentence based on

Akridge’s significant criminal history. The court then said, nonetheless, that the fifty-four-month

sentence it was imposing is “more than enough” to satisfy the concerns that drove the court to

gravitate to a longer sentence—protecting the community from further crime. But this remark says

nothing about the other § 3553(a) factors. To be sure, a more fulsome explanation would have

made clearer that the court was relying on permissible § 3553(a) factors in choosing Akridge’s

sentence. But it appears on the record as a whole that the court’s statement that the sentence would

“allow” Akridge to “straighten out” his life was merely an observation that his “term of

imprisonment will provide an opportunity to” participate in rehabilitative programming, not that

the court “calculated the length of [his] sentence to ensure that [he] receive certain rehabilitative

services,” Krul, 774 F.3d at 376 (quoting Tapia, 564 U.S. at 334–35). The record also indicates

that the fifty-four-month sentence reflected the court’s view of Akridge’s criminal history and,

specifically, that it adopted his counsel’s argument that his prior crimes were collectively better

characterized as category V rather than VI. See R. 43, PID 400 (explaining that fifty-four months

is “a sentence inside that criminal history category V that your counsel asked for”).

       The district court’s statements here, therefore, are unlike those in other cases where we

have concluded that, in context, the district court lengthened a sentence for rehabilitative purposes.
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No. 23-5085, United States v. Akridge

This case is unlike United States v. Gesing, 599 F. App’x 238 (6th Cir. 2015), on which Akridge

primarily relies. There, we held that a sentence ran afoul of Tapia because the district court not

only expressly agreed that the length of the sentence imposed was unnecessary to protect the public

or punish the defendant but also “candidly acknowledged that the most significant factor was [the

defendant’s] need for medical care.” Id. at 239. Nor can we say from context in the record that

Akridge’s sentence was targeted to achieve a particular rehabilitative goal, as in Adams, where the

court apparently selected a sentence length based on the amount of time the government claimed

was needed for a “drug addict to successfully battle his addiction,” 873 F.3d at 523. No such

purpose is apparent here.

                                               IV.

       For the reasons stated, we AFFIRM.

                                                10