Court Opinion

ID: 9668540
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:17:36.934653+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:46.019113
License: Public Domain

Black, J.
(concurring). The special verdict considered in Mr. Justice Carr’s opinion was returned in accordance with practice dictated by an old statute, the substance of which appeared first in 1885 (PA 1885, No 15) and is now recorded in CL 1948, § 618.39 (Stat Ann § 27.1019).* Assuming that the question or questions answered by the jury are determinative of a controlling issue of fact, the answer or answers (see opinion on rehearing, Tyler v. *513Wright, 188 Mich 561, 567) become the governing verdict and, if they conflict with the jury’s general verdict, the latter falls before the former by command of the statute. This is such a case.
Plaintiff alleged in his choke-bored declaration— aimed so to speak at the Atlas bleachers alone — that the defendant school district was negligent in setting up the Atlas bleachers without stable and solid footing; that such negligence was the proximate cause of his admittedly serious injuries, and that he was entitled to recover against the school district on such pleaded theory. No other triable issue was made and the parties plaintiff and defendant squared off before the jury to settle it.
The special question, answer to which formed the pivotal special verdict in this case, was submitted by the defendant school district. Plaintiff did not object to its form or fitness below. Neither did he request an amendment of his declaration to meet or fend the purposed thrust thereof. He does object here, with high temperature, but we cannot under such circumstances criticize minutely the disclosed purpose of the question and the effect of its answer (Cooley, J., in Dupont v. Starring, 42 Mich 492, 495).
The special question pursued the school district’s defense of fact; that the proximate cause of collapse of the Atlas bleachers was not as claimed by plaintiff — that it consisted of cadenced swaying of exuberant fans, seated on adjacent Leavitt bleachers, the ultimate result of which hurled the weight-laden Leavitt bleachers laterally into the Atlas bleachers.
The jury, by its answer to such question, upheld the mentioned defense of fact. The special verdict thus negatives the ease made by plaintiff’s declaration and the testimonial case njade thereunder. Thorsen v. Babcock, 68 Mich 523, turning upon the same statute, dictates that judgment in such circumstances must follow the special and not the general *514verdict. The trial judge was consequently right in entering judgment for the defendant school district.*
Having arrived at conclusion that the jury’s special verdict calls for judgment as indicated, it becomes unnecessary to decide the question of immunity from liability as pleaded by the defendant school district.
I vote to affirm, with costs to defendant.
Sharpe, J., concurred with Black, J.

 The speeial verdict procedure authorized by section 7 of Court Rule No 37 (1945) is not involved in this case.

 This ease was submitted during our last October term. Since-then Hormel Estate v. Harris, 348 Mich 201, has been submitted and decided. In Hormel we unanimously ruled (p 205 of report) that a jury may not return a verdict for plaintiff on some different theory than that advanced by him, and that, if the jury’s answer to a special question is inconsistent with and rejects plaintifí’s theory, his case fails and a general verdict in his favor must yield to the inconsistent special finding. The rule of that case is controlling here, the statutory practice as invoked and applied m each ease being mandatory.
The 2 eases (Hormel and Riehards) pointedly renew bruited question whether there is any occasion for 2 variant rules of special question practice. They suggest again that consideration be givqn in our quarters to elimination of the statute with resultant confinement of the practice to that which may be done as a matter of discretion pursuant to present section 7 of Court Rule No 37 (1945). To require a jury to bring in general and special verdicts that might be contradictory is an arrant incongruity at best, and our reports disclose regular instances where the statutory practice has led to confusion and retrial rather than prompt and intelligent justice (For argument supporting employment of the Court Rule and discard of the statute, see Sunderland’s notes, pages 67-70 of 1931 revision of Michigan Court Rules).