Court Opinion

ID: 9811214
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:13:02.08435+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:08:11.599306
License: Public Domain

CoNNOs, J.,
dissenting: I concur in the opinion of the Court that on the trial of this action in the Superior Court there was evidence tending to show a violation by defendant of an ordinance of the town of Par-melee.
This ordinance is as follows: “It is hereby declared a nuisance for a train or engine or any part thereof of a train, to stand on or across, or block any of the street crossings or sidewalk crossings in the town of Parmelee, North Carolina, longer than ten minutes at a time, under a penalty not to exceed five dollars for each and every offense.”
*729It is well settled by our decisions that if tbe jury shall find from tbe evidence that defendant violated tbis ordinance, sucb violation was negligence per se. I understand tbe court to bold tbat there was no evidence from which tbe jury could find tbat defendant was negligent in any other respect. In tbis I concur. Tbe ordinance of tbe Highway Commission requiring tbat a vehicle or other obstruction left standing in tbe roadway at night shall be protected by proper lights, is not applicable to a car left standing by a railroad company on a public crossing at night. Defendant’s negligence, consisting in its violation of tbe ordinance of tbe town of Parmelee, is not actionable, however, unless sucb negligence was tbe proximate cause of tbe collision which resulted in plaintiff's injuries. Ledbetter v. English, 166 N. C., 125, 81 S. E., 1066.
It is also well settled by our decisions tbat ordinarily where defendant’s negligence is established by tbe evidence, tbe question as to whether sucb negligence was tbe proximate cause of tbe injury, is for tbe jury. I do not understand, however, tbat tbis is always tbe case. There must be evidence from which tbe jury may find, or at least from which it may infer a causal relation between tbe negligence of tbe defendant and tbe injury to tbe plaintiff. Whether or not there is sucb evidence is a question of law to be determined by tbe court. Notwithstanding there is evidence of defendant’s negligence, if there is no evidence from which tbe jury may find tbat sucb negligence was tbe proximate cause of tbe injury, defendant’s motion for judgment as of nonsuit under C. S., 567, should be allowed. Peters v. Tea Co., 194 N. C., 172, 138 S. E., 595; Gillis v. Transit Corp., 193 N. C., 346, 137 S. E., 153.
In Leathers v. Tobacco Co., 144 N. C., 330, 57 S. E., 11, it is said by tbis Court: “While it is true tbat if there be any dispute regarding tbe manner in which tbe injury was sustained, or, if, upon tbe conceded facts, more than one inference may be fairly drawn, tbe question (as to whether defendant’s negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury) should be left to tbe jury, yet it is equally well settled tbat where there is no dispute as to tbe facts, and sucb facts are not capable of supporting more than one inference, it is tbe duty of tbe judge to instruct tbe jury, as a matter of law, whether tbe injury was tbe proximate result of tbe negligence of defendant.”
In tbe instant case, I am unable to see bow tbe violation of tbe ordinance bad any causal relation to tbe collision between tbe automobile in which plaintiff was riding, as a guest, and defendant’s car which was standing on tbe crossing. It was not negligence for defendant to leave its car standing on tbe crossing; it became negligence only after tbe car bad stood there more than ten minutes, in violation of tbe ordinance. Tbe collision occurred, so far as defendant was concerned, *730because its car was standing on tbe crossing. This was not negligence. Tbe collision did not occur because tbe car bad been standing on tbe crossing for more tban ten minutes, if sucb was tbe fact.
Tbe evident purpose of tbe ordinance was to prohibit tbe blocking of street crossings by defendant, and thereby prevent its interference with tbe flow of traffic over said crossings. It was not tbe purpose of tbe ordinance to protect travelers on tbe public streets from injuries resulting from collisions with engines or cars left standing on said crossings.
I think there was no error in tbe judgment dismissing tbe action upon defendant’s motion for nonsuit. I, therefore, dissent from tbe decision of tbe Court reversing tbe judgment of tbe Superior Court.
Adams, J., concurs in dissenting opinion.