Court Opinion

ID: 9698303
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:46:49.454331+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:39.951040
License: Public Domain

Connoe T. Hansen, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion of the court.
The facts of this case do not require that the petitioner be granted habeas corpus relief. It is my opinion that the record in this case does not present a situation in which this court should exercise its discretion and permit issues to be raised in a habeas corpus proceeding which are generally not considered to be within the scope of such a proceeding. Furthermore, I do not consider this case to be an appropriate vehicle to consider the adoption of any further rules relating to plea agreements.
The facts in this case support a finding that the petitioner knowingly, voluntarily and understandingly entered his plea of guilty. The preliminary examinations *33of the petitioner, Raymond White, and his brother Joseph, were consolidated. The facts testified to at the preliminary examination revealed that the burglarized dwelling was unoccupied at the time of the incident. A woman who lived across the street knew this and observed the entire incident. She observed the petitioner and his brother approach the house, one going to the front door and the other to the back of the house. When no one responded, the petitioner went to the back of the house. She observed the petitioner leaving the house with a blonde television set. She alerted the police who arrived in time to interrupt petitioner’s operation and caused him to leave on the run after abandoning the television set. This woman made a positive in-court identification of the petitioner. The police recovered the television set where it had been abandoned and the owner identified the television set, not only by the general appearance and make, but also by the unusual fact of having the serial number. The petitioner was wearing cowboy-type boots at the time and the police officer testified that they exactly fit the marks in the snow at the scene of the burglary. He also testified a back window of the house had been forced open.
Petitioner was bound over for trial and on his first appearance in trial court entered a plea of not guilty. Several days later he again appeared in trial court and withdrew his not guilty plea and entered a plea of guilty. Before accepting the plea, the trial court very thoroughly examined the petitioner as to whether he was knowingly, understandingly and voluntarily entering his plea of guilty. When inquiring about the possible maximum sentence, the petitioner responded to the court’s inquiry by stating that it was ten years. Ultimately, the court accepted the plea of guilty and ordered a presentence investigation, the report of which was made available *34to petitioner’s counsel. Among other things, the pre-sentence report contained nearly two pages of petitioner’s past criminal record and reflected that approximately six months prior to the instant offense the petitioner had been placed on probation after having been found guilty of burglary in Milwaukee county.
Some three months after petitioner was sentenced, he moved the trial court to vacate the plea and sentence. This motion was primarily based upon the fact that the plea was involuntary because it was entered for the reason that the prosecution against his brother would be dismissed.
The only testimony adduced at this hearing was that of the petitioner and his brother, Joseph. The petitioner very specifically remembered the details of the trial court proceeding at arraignment and sentencing which he thought were favorable to him, and could not recollect any of his statements which were unfavorable to him. He testified that his trial counsel told him he would probably get a three-year sentence and that it would have been all right with him if he had received a three-year sentence. The trial court stated that the petitioner’s testimony at this hearing was “incredible.” While the majority of this court appears to have some doubt as to what the trial court meant by the use of the word “incredible,” this writer is at a loss to think of a word that would more appropriately describe his testimony.
No appeal was taken from the denial of the petitioner’s motion to vacate the plea and sentence. Now, long after the appeal time has expired and by means of a habeas corpus proceeding, the majority of the court reaches out to consider: (1) The voluntariness of the plea; (2) whether the plea bargain was against public policy; and (3) whether the petitioner was denied effective assistance of trial counsel. In reaching these issues in a *35habeas corpus proceeding, it is my opinion that this court is establishing a precedent which, for all practical purposes, makes the statutory provisions for timely appeals a nullity.
It is my opinion that this case is expressly subject to the mandate of the United States Supreme Court in North Carolina v. Alford (1970), 400 U. S. 25, 91 Sup. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162.1 In Alford, the defendant, who proclaimed his innocence, entered a plea of guilty to second-degree murder which provided for a maximum thirty-year sentence, rather than stand trial for first-degree murder which provided for life imprisonment, and under certain circumstances the death penalty. In affirming the convictions of second-degree murder based upon the bargained plea, the United States Supreme Court stated in Alford, swpra, page 31:
“We held in Brady v. United States, 397 U. S. 742 (1970), that a plea of guilty which would not have been entered except for the defendant’s desire to avoid a possible death penalty and to limit the maximum penalty to life imprisonment or a term of years was not for that reason compelled within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. Jackson [United States v. Jackson (1968), 390 U. S. 570] established no new test for determining the validity of guilty pleas. The standard was and remains whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant. . . .”
This is precisely the choice the petitioner made in this case, and in my judgment a reading of the record leads to the inescapable conclusion that the petitioner voluntarily, knowingly and understandingly made his choice.
*36The majority of the court is of the opinion that before the issue of voluntariness of the plea can be determined, a further hearing is required. In reaching this decision, the majority seems to rely heavily on the dissenting Reporter’s comment to the tentative draft of the Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure of the American Law Institute and two cases from other jurisdictions 2 decided considerably prior to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Alford, swpra. I do not consider these to be persuasive authorities for the decision reached by the majority.
It is undisputed that the plea arrangement was not within the knowledge of the trial court at the time sentence was imposed. However, the majority opinion acknowledges that the time sequence of the decision in Austin v. State (1971), 49 Wis. 2d 727, 183 N. W. 2d 56, and the sentencing of the petitioner in the instant case is such that the Austin decision probably was not available to the trial court.
Although the plea arrangement is not set forth upon the record in the trial court, my examination of the record leaves no doubt but what there was, in fact, such a plea arrangement. The record now before us also reveals that the ultimate disposition of the case of the petitioner and his brother are exactly as contemplated by the plea arrangement. Such being the situation, and if this writer understands the mandate of the majority correctly, it is now the law of the case that the petitioner must be permitted to withdraw his plea, have his conviction set aside, and have new counsel appointed. *37This result is reached, so reasons the majority, because some sort of conflict of interest existed because the same lawyer represented both the petitioner and his brother. I do not find a conflict of interest in the instant case. Both the petitioner and his brother consented to the dual representation in open court. There is not the slightest indication in the record of any dissatisfaction with the representation afforded, much less any indication of any belief or feeling of conflict so far as either the petitioner or his brother are concerned. The thought or idea of conflict of interest first comes into being months after petitioner had pleaded guilty and been sentenced. The ultimate conclusion of the majority seems to be that once the plea arrangement had been made by counsel and his clients, it was incumbent upon counsel to inform the court, withdraw from the case and have other counsel appointed to review his efforts. I cannot subscribe to such a result and conclude by observing that henceforth the trial judges could, with considerable justification, be reluctant to ever accept a plea of guilty in a criminal case. Relief should be denied.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice Hanley and Mr. Justice Robert W. Hansen join in this dissent.

 See: Young v. State (1971), 49 Wis. 2d 361, 366, 182 N. W. 2d 262; Farrar v. State (1971), 52 Wis. 2d 651, 654, 191 N. W. 2d 214; and Salters v. State (1971), 52 Wis. 2d 708, 713, 191 N. W. 2d 19.

 The American Law Institute, A Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure, Tentative Draft No. 5 (1972), at page 106. See also: Crow v. United States (10th Cir. 1968), 397 Fed. 2d 284, and People v. Hollman (1968), 12 Mich. App. 231, 162 N. W. 2d 817.