Court Opinion

ID: 9956836
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-02 23:02:04.704137+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:54.979208
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/2/24 P. v. Thomas CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

 THE PEOPLE,                                                B330403

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                        (Los Angeles County
                                                            Super. Ct. No. A963974))
           v.

 AHMAD DEREK THOMAS,

           Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Shelly Torrealba, Judge. Affirmed.
     Ralph H. Goldsen, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
     No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                                     __________________
      Ahmad Derek Thomas appeals from a postjudgment order
summarily denying his petition for resentencing under Penal
Code section 1172.6.1 No arguable issues have been identified by
Thomas’s appointed appellate counsel following his review of the
record or by Thomas in his supplemental letter brief to this court.
We affirm.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A.     The Murders and the Information
       As this court explained in People v. Thomas (Oct. 8, 1991,
B043359) (nonpub. opn.), Thomas confessed to the murders of two
of his neighbors, Ona Paul and Josie Jones, and at trial Thomas’s
counsel conceded that Thomas committed the murders but
argued the murders were second degree, not first degree.2
       According to the evidence presented at trial, on the evening
of July 28, 1987 Paul was home alone eating dinner when
Thomas knocked on his door, and Paul let him in. Thomas took a
two-pronged barbeque fork and stabbed Paul to death. Paul
customarily carried a large amount of cash in his wallet.
Following the killing, no money was found in Paul’s wallet at the
scene of the crime.

1     Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2      We provide a brief recitation of the facts from the trial as
background and do not rely on the facts for purposes of this
appeal. (See People v. Lee (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1164, 1183 [“the
factual summary . . . may not be used to determine a petitioner’s
eligibility at the prima facie stage”]; People v. Bratton (2023)
95 Cal.App.5th 1100, 1113 [same].)

                                 2
       On February 4, 1988 Thomas knocked on Jones’s door.
Jones let him in, and Thomas stabbed Jones to death with a pair
of scissors. Jones kept a cloth purse containing money tucked
into her bra, secured with a safety pin. After the killing, the
cloth purse was missing, but a safety pin was found near her
body.
       In April 1988 an information charged Thomas with seven
felony counts relating to three incidents. Thomas was the only
defendant. As to the killing of Paul and Jones, the information
charged Thomas with two counts of willful, deliberate, and
premeditated murder (§ 187; counts 1 & 4) with a special
circumstance allegation that the murders occurred while Thomas
was engaged in a robbery or burglary (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)). The
information further alleged a multiple-murder special
circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)). Also with respect to Paul
and Jones, the information charged Thomas with two counts of
residential robbery (§ 211; counts 2 & 5) and two counts of
residential burglary (§ 459; counts 3 & 6). As to counts one
through five, the information alleged Thomas personally used a
deadly and dangerous weapon (a “stabbing instrument”), within
the meaning of section 12022, subdivision (b). The information
also charged Thomas with residential burglary (§ 459; count 7)
involving a third victim, Marie Card.

B.    The Jury Instructions
      The trial court instructed the jury on murder (CALJIC
No. 8.10 (5th ed. 1988)),3 malice aforethought (CALJIC No. 8.11),

3     All references to the CALJIC instructions are to the
1988 edition.

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willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder (CALJIC No 8.20),
and a modified instruction on first degree felony murder (CALJIC
No. 8.21).4 The court did not instruct the jury on aiding and
abetting principles or the natural and probable consequences
doctrine. CALJIC No. 8.10 stated, “Every person who unlawfully
kills a [human being] [with malice aforethought] [or] [during the
commission or attempted commission of robbery or burglary] is
guilty of the crime of a murder in violation of Section 187 of the
Penal Code.” CALJIC No. 8.20 stated, “All murder which is
perpetrated by any kind of willful[], deliberate and premeditated
killing with express malice aforethought is murder in the first
degree.” CALJIC No. 8.20 explained the difference between
implied and express malice.
        The modified CALJIC No. 8.21 instruction on felony
murder stated, “The unlawful killing of a human being, whether
intentional, unintentional, or accidental, which occurs during the
commission of burglary is murder of the first degree when one of
the intents of the perpetrator is to enter a residence with the
specific intent to steal and take away the property of another.
[¶] . . . [¶] The unlawful killing of a human being, whether
intentional, unintentional, or accidental, which occurs during the
commission of robbery is murder of the first degree when the
perpetrator has the specific intent to commit such crime. [¶]
However, this does not apply if the robbery is merely incidental
to the murder. The robbery is incidental to the murder where, at
the time of the murder, the defendant’s sole criminal intent is to
kill and not to steal.”

4    The trial court also instructed on second degree murder
and manslaughter.

                                4
       The trial court also instructed the jury on the special
circumstance allegations (CALJIC No. 8.80), the multiple-murder
special circumstance allegation (CALJIC No. 8.81.2), and a
modified instruction on murder in the commission of robbery or
burglary (CALJIC No. 8.81.17). CALJIC No. 8.80 stated in part,
“If you find [the] defendant in this case guilty of murder of the
first degree, you must then determine if [one or more of] the
following special circumstance[s] [are] true or not true: murder in
the commission of robbery, murder in the commission of burglary
and multiple murder.” The modified CALJIC No. 8.81.17
instructed that to find a defendant guilty of murder in
commission of a robbery, the jury must find: “1. The murder was
committed while [the] defendant was engaged in the
[commission] of a robbery. [¶] 2. The murder was committed in
order to carry out or advance the commission of the crime of
robbery . . . . The special circumstance referred to in these
instructions is not established if the robbery was merely
incidental to the commission of the murder. In other words,
where the defendant’s criminal intent is not to steal but to kill,
the robbery is merely incidental to the murder.” CALJIC
No. 8.81.17 for murder in commission of a burglary stated, in
part, that “1. The murder was committed when the defendant
was engaged in the commission of a burglary; [¶] . . . [¶] 3. The
murder was committed in order to carry out or advance the
commission of the crime of burglary . . . . In other words, the
special circumstance referred to in these instructions is not
established if the burglary was merely incidental to the
commission of the murder.”

                                 5
      The trial court instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 17.16
that to find true the allegation of the personal use of a deadly or
dangerous weapon the jury had to find the “defendant personally
used a deadly or dangerous weapon in the commission of” the
crimes. The instruction defined the term “‘used a deadly or
dangerous weapon’” to mean “to display such a weapon in a[n
intentionally] menacing manner or intentionally to strike or hit a
human being with it.”

C.     The Convictions, Sentencing, and Petition for Resentencing
       During the jury trial, Thomas pleaded guilty to the
residential burglary of Card. In May 1989 a jury convicted
Thomas on both murder counts and the residential robbery count
as to Jones, and it found true that in the commission and
attempted commission of the crimes, Thomas “personally used a
deadly and dangerous weapon, to wit, a stabbing instrument.”
The jury also found true the special circumstances that Thomas
murdered Jones while engaged in the commission of a robbery
and Thomas committed “at least one crime of murder in the first
degree and another crime of murder in the first or second
degree.” The trial court sentenced Thomas to an aggregate term
of 31 years to life. We affirmed Thomas’s convictions on appeal.
(People v. Thomas, supra, B043359.)
       On March 14, 2022 Thomas filed a form petition for
resentencing pursuant to former section 1170.95 (now
section 1172.6). He checked all of the boxes on the form
indicating his eligibility for relief, including the box requesting
appointment of counsel. The superior court appointed counsel.
The People opposed the petition and attached our opinion from
the direct appeal, a copy of the jury instructions that were given,

                                 6
and the sentencing hearing transcript. The People argued that
“[w]ithout weighing conflicting evidence or making credibility
determinations, the record of conviction irrefutably established as
a matter of law that the jury determined Petitioner was the
actual killer.” Thomas filed a reply brief arguing the People
improperly relied on our opinion from the direct appeal “to
bolster their assertion of ineligibility,” the jury instruction for
personal use of a dangerous or deadly weapon (CALJIC
No. 17.16) “did not automatically equate “‘use’ with ‘use it to kill
someone,’” and the destruction of the trial transcripts prohibited
the superior court from concluding Thomas was ineligible for
relief as a matter of law.
       On May 8, 2023, following a hearing, the superior court
denied Thomas’s petition. The court considered the parties’
briefs, oral argument, the record of conviction (including the jury
instructions), the abstracts of judgment, and the sentencing
transcript. The court concluded, “Although petitioner/defendant’s
jury was instructed on felony murder, he was the actual killer
and the sole participant in both murders.” The court observed
that the jury had not been instructed on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine and the jury’s finding that Thomas
“personally used a stabbing instrument and was the sole
participant in both murders” established Thomas was the actual
killer.5 Thomas timely appealed.

5      The record does not reflect a specific jury finding that
Thomas was the sole participant in the murders or the actual
killer, although the trial court may have assumed this based on
the jury instructions and verdict forms.

                                 7
       We appointed counsel to represent Thomas in this appeal.
After a review of the record, Thomas’s appellate counsel filed a
brief pursuant to People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216
(Delgadillo) stating he did not identify any arguable issues and
advised Thomas he could submit a supplemental brief identifying
contentions this court should consider. On January 2, 2024
Thomas filed a timely supplemental brief.

                          DISCUSSION

A.     Senate Bill 1437 and Section 1172.6
       Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate
Bill 1437) eliminated the natural and probable consequences
doctrine as a basis for finding a defendant guilty of murder and
significantly limited the scope of the felony-murder rule. (People
v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707-708; People v. Lewis (2021)
11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis); People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th
830, 842-843, 847-848; see People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981,
984.) Section 188, subdivision (a)(3), now prohibits imputing
malice based solely on an individual’s participation in a crime
and requires proof of malice to convict a principal of murder,
except under the revised felony-murder rule as set forth in
section 189, subdivision (e). (Reyes, at p. 986; Gentile, at pp. 842-
843.) Section 189, subdivision (e), now requires the People to
prove specific facts relating to the defendant’s individual
culpability: The defendant was the actual killer (§ 189,
subd. (e)(1)); although not the actual killer, the defendant, with
the intent to kill, assisted in the commission of murder in the
first degree (§ 189, subd. (e)(2)); or the defendant was a major
participant in an underlying felony listed in section 189,
subdivision (a), and acted with reckless indifference to human life

                                  8
as described in section 190.2, subdivision (d) (the felony-murder
special circumstance provision) (§ 189, subd. (e)(3)). (See Strong,
at p. 708.)
       Senate Bill 1437 also provided a procedure in
section 1170.95, now codified in section 1172.6, for an individual
convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and
probable consequences theory to petition the sentencing court to
vacate the conviction and be resentenced on any remaining
counts if the individual could not have been convicted of murder
under Senate Bill 1437’s changes to sections 188 and 189.
(Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 959; People v. Gentile, supra,
10 Cal.5th at p. 847.)
       If the section 1172.6 petition contains all the required
information, including a declaration by the petitioner that he or
she is eligible for relief based on the requirements of
subdivision (a), the sentencing court must appoint counsel to
represent the petitioner upon his or her request pursuant to
section 1172.6, subdivision (b)(3). Further, upon the filing of a
facially sufficient petition, the court must determine whether the
petitioner has made a prima facie showing of entitlement to
relief. (See § 1172.6, subd. (c).) Where a petitioner makes the
requisite prima facie showing the petitioner falls within the
provisions of section 1172.6 and is entitled to relief, the court
must issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary
hearing to determine whether to vacate the murder, attempted
murder, or manslaughter conviction and resentence the
petitioner on any remaining counts. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c) &
(d)(1).)

                                 9
B.     Thomas Is Ineligible for Relief as a Matter of Law
       In his supplemental brief Thomas contends the superior
court engaged in inadmissible factfinding in reaching its
conclusion that he was ineligible for relief as a matter of law.
Thomas also argues that because the trial transcripts have been
destroyed, the People cannot meet their burden to show he is
ineligible for sentencing relief as the actual killer, and the
superior court should not have excluded the possibility that the
prosecutor did not rely on a now-invalid theory of imputed malice
based on the limited record of conviction.
       Although the People’s opposition attached and referenced
the facts set forth in our opinion from the direct appeal, the
record does not support Thomas’s contention that the superior
court improperly relied on our opinion or otherwise engaged in
impermissible factfinding at the prima facie review stage. The
superior court may rely on the record of conviction in determining
whether a petitioner has stated a prima facie case for relief.
(Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 970-971.) Here, the documents
identified by the superior court in reaching its decision, including
the jury instructions and verdict forms, are part of the record of
conviction and properly considered at the prima facie review
stage. (People v. Jenkins (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 924, 935 [record
of conviction includes “the charging document, verdict forms,
closing arguments, and jury instructions”].)
       Nor does the absence of trial transcripts preclude a finding
that Thomas is ineligible for relief as a matter of law. A review of
the jury instructions and verdict forms shows that the jury must
have found Thomas was the sole participant and actual killer.
(Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 233 [no relief available under
section 1172.6 when “the record . . . makes clear that [the

                                10
defendant] was the actual killer and the only participant in the
killing”]; Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 967 [section 1172.6
“‘ensure[s] that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is
not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not
a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with
reckless indifference to human life’”]; People v. Harden (2022)
81 Cal.App.5th 45, 47 (Harden) [affirming summary denial of
section 1172.6 resentencing petition where “the jury instructions
and verdicts conclusively establish—with no factfinding, weighing
of evidence, or credibility determinations—that in 2001 Harden
was convicted as the actual killer”].)
       The trial court instructed on malice murder (CALJIC
Nos. 8.10, 8.11, and 8.20) and felony murder (CALJIC No. 8.21),
but there were no instructions on aider and abettor liability or
the natural and probable consequences doctrine. (See Harden,
supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 53 [where the defendant’s jury “was
instructed on felony murder, but not on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine,” the “only possible basis for section
[1172.6] relief is if at least one juror convicted her of felony
murder on a theory other than being the actual killer”].)
       Further, the malice murder instruction (CALJIC No. 8.10)
stated that “[e]very person who unlawfully kills a [human being]
[with malice aforethought] . . . is guilty of the crime of murder.”
“‘This language on its face tells the jury that “the person who
unlawfully kills” is guilty of murder. In common understanding,
this would refer to the person who inflicted the fatal injury.’”
(Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 55.) In other words, “the
person who inflicted the fatal injury” is the actual killer.
Notably, as to felony murder, the trial court did not give CALJIC
No. 8.27, which instructs on vicarious liability that “[i]f a human

                                 11
being is killed by any one of several persons engaged in the
commission or attempted commission of the crime of [robbery or
burglary], all persons, who either directly and actively commit
the act constituting that crime, or who with knowledge of the
unlawful purpose of the perpetrator of the crime and with the
intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, or facilitating the
commission of the offense, aid, promote, encourage, or instigate
by act or advice its commission, are guilty of murder of the first
degree, whether the killing is intentional, unintentional, or
accidental.” Because the trial court did not give CALJIC No. 8.27
and only instructed on the felony murder rule “as a rule of strict
liability and of degree-fixing,” the jury instructions “indicated
that to be guilty of murder at all, [the] defendant had to be the
actual killer.” (People v. Bratton (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1100,
1123.)
       The special circumstance instructions similarly omitted any
reference to liability based on a theory other than that Thomas
was the actual killer. The introductory instruction for the special
circumstances instruction (CALJIC No. 8.80) did not include the
third paragraph from the form instruction, which the Use Note
explained “should be given with respect to all special
circumstances . . . where there is evidence that the defendant is
an aider and abetter rather than the actual killer.”6 Similarly,

6     The third paragraph of the CALJIC No. 8.80 form
instruction read, “[If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant was [a co-conspirator] [or] [an aider or abetter] [either
[the actual killer] [a coconspirator or an aider or abetter, but you
are unable to decide which], then you must also find beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant intended either to kill a
human being or to aid another in the killing of a human being in
order to find the special circumstance to be true.] [On the other

                                 12
the Use Note for the instruction on the special circumstance
involving murder during the commission of a robbery or burglary
(CALJIC No. 8.81.17) explained, “If the defendant was an
accomplice or an aider and abettor, the fourth paragraph of
CALJIC No. 8.80 must be given.” The trial court did not include
in its instruction the fourth paragraph of CALJIC No. 8.80.7
Taking the instructions together, the jury could only have found
Thomas guilty of the murders as the actual killer.
       No cognizable legal issues have been raised by Thomas’s
appellate counsel or by Thomas. Further, we have independently
reviewed the record and are satisfied no arguable issue exists.
The order denying the section 1172.6 petition must be affirmed.
(See Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp.231-232; see generally
People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 118-119; People v. Wende
(1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441-442.)

hand, if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
was the actual killer, you need not find that the defendant
intended to kill a human being in order to find the special
circumstance to be true.]”
7     The fourth paragraph of the CALJIC No. 8.80 form
instruction read, “[You must decide separately [as to each of the
defendants] the existence or nonexistence of each special
circumstance alleged in this case. If you cannot agree as to all
the defendants, but can agree as to one [or more of them], you
make your finding as to the one [or more] upon which you do
agree.”

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                       DISPOSITION

      The postjudgment order denying Thomas’s petition is
affirmed.

                                        FEUER, J.
We concur:

     SEGAL, Acting P. J.

     MARTINEZ, J.

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