Court Opinion

ID: 9945496
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-27 21:03:27.290936+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:30.923890
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/27/24 P. v. Cervantes CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,                                                          D081281

      Plaintiff and Respondent,

                v.
                                                                     (Super. Ct. No. SCD294710)
ALEXIS V. CERVANTES,

      Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Kimberlee A. Lagotta, Judge. Affirmed.
         Britton Donaldson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Paige B.
Hazard and Heather B. Arambarri, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
         Alexis V. Cervantes appeals from a judgment following a conviction on
one count of inflicting corporal injury to a dating partner in violation of
section 273.5, subdivision (a), of the Penal Code.1 Cervantes acknowledges
that he stabbed his boyfriend, B.D. But he contends that he did so in self-
defense and that the conviction should be reversed because there is no
substantial evidence that he acted other than in self-defense. The Attorney
General disagrees, and so do we. Hence we affirm the conviction.
      B.D. sustained his injuries inside a tent that he shared with Cervantes,
his dating partner, in a homeless encampment and in which the two of them
had quarreled and fought shortly before the stabbing. Although there were
no eyewitnesses to the quarrel, to the fight or to the stabbing that ensued,
two individuals occupying the neighboring tent testified at trial that they had
heard, that night, what sounded like two men scuffling in the tent, followed
by a period of “complete[ ] quiet” estimated to have lasted between 2 and 10
minutes, and then cries along the lines of “ ‘You stabbed me!’ ” or “ ‘Get off
me. Help. I’ve been stabbed.’ ”
      These two witnesses also testified that, during some portion of this
time, they (in the case of one witness) heard or (in the case of the other
witness) saw the tent moving or shaking “pretty drastically.” One of these
witnesses further testified that, shortly after the events described above, he
had seen the two men exit the tent, with B.D. bleeding and Cervantes helping
B.D. This same witness also testified that Cervantes had said, “Don’t call the
police.”
      A trauma surgeon testified that the injuries sustained by B.D. included
multiple severe stab wounds requiring emergency surgery and that one of
these wounds involved “evisceration, meaning an inside the body organ is
now in the outside the body world” and was potentially life-threatening. A
police officer testified that he had interviewed Cervantes on the night of the

1     All statutory references in this opinion are to the Penal Code.

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stabbing, and that Cervantes had given multiple different accounts, each of
which was vague and involved Cervantes being away from the tent at the
time of the stabbing. The officer testified that Cervantes had said nothing
about having been attacked by B.D. or about having acted in self-defense. In
addition, a former romantic partner of Cervantes testified about an incident,
several years earlier, in which he had strangled her.
      Testifying in his defense, Cervantes acknowledged having strangled the
former romantic partner and admitted that he had done so other than in self-
defense. He also acknowledged having stabbed B.D. In his telling, it was
B.D. who initiated the scuffle and who introduced the knife:
         “After the verbal [argument], he started striking me . . . ,
         and we eventually ended up on the floor. I remember
         telling him to stop and get off of me so we could talk. [¶]
         And at one point it stopped, and I felt weird. So when I
         looked down – because he was still directly above me – I
         saw him, like, with a knife. I think he was trying to open it
         or something. [¶] And I believe I – at that moment I tried
         to take it away from him. And I eventually – I did end up
         taking it away from him. [¶] And I – I guess I just used it
         at one point.”
Cervantes further testified that he was “able to get th[e] knife away without
the blade ever touching” him.
      Regarding the aftermath of the stabbing, Cervantes testified that he
tried to stop B.D.’s bleeding and asked one of the witnesses mentioned above
to call for an ambulance. As for his encounter with the police that night,
Cervantes acknowledged under questioning by defense counsel that, “for a
number of reasons,” he had been less than forthcoming:
         “For one, I wasn’t really too focused on what he was asking
         or what anybody was telling me. I was kind of just focused
         on making sure that [B.D.] was all right and that he got the
         attention that he needed.

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         “And when I did answer, I just more or less kind of gave
         him, like, vague answers so he would just stop questioning
         me and just, like, leave me alone. I didn’t really feel like
         talking to – to anybody at that point.”
Then, on cross-examination, Cervantes acknowledged that the statements he
had made to the police regarding his whereabouts at the time of the stabbing
had been lies.
      The jury rejected Cervantes’s version of events and found him guilty of
having inflicted corporal injury to a dating partner in violation of section
273.5, subdivision (a). Thereafter, Cervantes timely appealed.
      The sole ground on which Cervantes premises his appeal is a
contention that the evidence at trial was insufficient to sustain a conviction
under section 273.5, subdivision (a), because that evidence did not suffice to
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he had acted other than in self-
defense. As the court properly instructed the jury:

         “The defendant acted in lawful self-defense if:
         “One. The defendant reasonably believed that he was in
         imminent danger of suffering bodily injury;
         “Two. The defendant reasonably believed that the
         immediate use of force was necessary to defendant against
         that danger;
         “And three. The defendant used no more force than was
         reasonable and necessary to defend against that danger.
         “[¶] . . . [¶]
         “The People have the burden of proving beyond a
         reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in lawful
         self-defense. If the People have not met this burden, you
         must find the defendant not guilty.”
Thus the question at hand is whether there was substantial evidence—that
is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value (see People v.
Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 432; People v. Wolfe (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 673,

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681)—supporting the jury’s conclusion that the three elements enumerated
above had been satisfied.

      We conclude the answer to this question is, yes.2
      Although the jury’s conviction of Cervantes tells us that it did not
believe Cervantes acted in self-defense, it could well have credited portions of

his testimony in arriving at that conclusion.3 From the testimony that
Cervantes had succeeded in wresting the knife away from B.D. without being
touched by the blade, and from the testimony of the people in the adjacent
tent that a significant period of silence had elapsed between the initial scuffle
and B.D.’s cry of “You stabbed me!” the jury could reasonably have inferred
that Cervantes had disarmed B.D., and that Cervantes had had an adequate
opportunity to withdraw before he stabbed B.D. On this basis, the jury could
reasonably have found (with regard to the first element of self-defense) that

2      This is not to say the evidence supporting conviction was unblemished.
By way of example, one of the two witnesses from the neighboring tent
testified that she had “issues with memory” due to “a severe car wreck,” the
other such witness acknowledged that he smokes marijuana every day, and
that same witness contradicted his own testimony regarding whether
Cervantes had said not to call the police. But, in applying the substantial
evidence standard of review, “[w]e do not reweigh the evidence, resolve
conflicts in the evidence, or reevaluate the credibility of witnesses.” (People v.
Jennings (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 664, 671.) Rather, as Cervantes
acknowledges in his opening brief: “ ‘A reversal for insufficient evidence “is
unwarranted unless it appears ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there
sufficient substantial evidence to support’ ” the jury’s verdict.’ (People v.
Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357, citing People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th
297.)”
3     The jury was instructed that it could believe “all, part, or none of any
witness’s testimony,” and that in evaluating such testimony, it could consider
whether the witness had “a personal interest in how the case is to be decided”
and whether the witness made “a statement in the past that is consistent or
inconsistent with his or her testimony.”

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Cervantes did not reasonably believe that he was in imminent danger of
suffering bodily injury or (with regard to the second element) that immediate
use of force was not necessary to defend against such a danger. Further,
based on the severity of B.D.’s resulting injuries, the jury could reasonably
have found (with regard to the third element) that the force Cervantes used
was excessive. Such findings, moreover, could have been reinforced by
Cervantes’ admission that he had previously strangled a romantic partner
other than in self-defense. Further, the jury could have considered that
Cervantes’s evasive and dishonest responses to questioning by the police
revealed consciousness of guilt. On this record, there was sufficient evidence
from which the jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that
Cervantes had not acted in self-defense when he stabbed B. D.
                               DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.

                                                                   KELETY, J.

WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

O’ROURKE, J.

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