Court Opinion

ID: 9795013
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:16:03.829156+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:22:52.179039
License: Public Domain

CARTER, J.
I dissent in this case upon the same grounds, and for the same reasons set forth in my dissent in Loving & Evans v. Blick, ante, p. 606 [204 P.2d 23], this day decided.
The position taken by the majority in each case has the effect of declaring null and void the express provisions for arbitration, confirmation of the award of the arbitrators and the grounds upon which such awards may be set aside as set forth in the Code of Civil Procedure (§ 1280 et seq.).
Section 1288 of the Code of Civil Procedure specifically sets forth the grounds upon which the award of an arbitrator may be set aside. It is to be noted that such alleged “illegality” as appears in these two cases is not among them. To hold that the facts of these two cases bring them within the subdivision providing that an award may be set aside when the arbitrators have exceeded their powers appears to me to be a tortured way of adding a new provision to those expressly provided for by the Legislature.
The majority opinion is clearly inconsistent in holding that the portion of the award relating to the carpeting work may be confirmed because appellant makes no objection thereto, but the portion relating to the painting must be vacated and *634set aside because of appellant’s objection to the confirmation of the award. So far as appears, there was one contract for both the carpeting and painting and the controversy over both items was submitted to arbitration. The award made by the arbitrator covered both items. Obviously!; if the contract was illegal because of respondents’ failure to obtain a contractor’s license, this illegality affected the carpeting work as well as the painting and no recovery should be permitted under the theory on which the majority opinion is based.
The majority opinion in the case at bar demonstrates the soundness of the argument advanced in my dissenting opinion in the Loving & Evans case {supra) to the effect that in any case where it is possible to raise a question of illegality, it is idle to submit such a controversy to arbitration for the reason that the entire matter must be heard and determined by the superior court upon the application of either party to the proceeding; that is, as I understand the majority opinion, it holds that whenever the question of illegality is raised, it is a matter for the court to determine regardless of whether the question was raised before the arbitrator. This holding, in effect, will remove from the field of arbitration many controversies which have been the subject of arbitration in the past, for if a court is not bound by the award of an arbitrator, where the latter determines upon conflicting evidence that a contract is legal and binding, it would be idle to submit such matters to arbitration and then have to retry the entire issue before a court. This will be the situation if the majority opinion becomes the law of this state.
. The appeal in this case was first heard by the District Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division 3, and an opinion was rendered by said court affirming the judgment (83 A.C.A. 131 [188 P.2d 60]). This opinion, prepared by. Mr. Justice Vallée and concurred in by Presiding Justice Shinn and Associate Justice Wood, contains a clear and correct statement of the law and I adopt it as a part of this dissent.
Schauer, J., concurred.
Respondents’ petition for a rehearing was denied April 14, 1949. Shenk, J., Carter, J., and Schauer, J., voted for a rehearing.