Court Opinion

ID: 9475018
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:14:55.065638+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:27.661818
License: Public Domain

BARRETT, Circuit Judge,
specially concurring:
I file this special concurrence to address an issue raised on appeal which I believe merits special consideration: the validity of the interim presumption in 20 CFR § 727.-203(a)(3).
Big Horn contends that the interim presumption in 20 CFR § 727.203(a)(3) is invalid because it can be triggered by arterial blood gas (ABG) test results which are neither adjusted for altitude or other factors nor endorsed as reliable by the administering physician. Big Horn’s challenge to the interim presumption is that it is arbitrary and capricious as promulgated. This is a procedural challenge which ostensibly resembles a petition to review final agency rulemaking. Under the facts and circumstances of this case, I would reach this issue and hold that Big Horn is barred from bringing such a challenge.
The interim presumption of section 727.-203(a)(3) was promulgated on August 18, 1978, by the Employment Standard Administration, DOL, as an informal rule under 5 U.S.C. § 553. See 43 Fed.Reg. 36,819 (1978). Any person adversely effected by this regulation had sixty days after it was promulgated to file a petition challenging its validity. 30 U.S.C. 811(d). Big Horn, therefore, had the opportunity to challenge the use of raw ABG scores to trigger the interim presumption of section 727.-203(a)(3).
The time limits for reviewing final rules of administrative agencies are jurisdictional in nature and may not be enlarged by the courts. Natural Resources Defense Council v. NRC, 666 F.2d 595, 602 (D.C. Cir.1981). The purpose of these time limits is to impart finality into the administrative process, thereby conserving administrative resources and protecting the reliance interests of those who might conform their conduct to the administrative regulation. Id. This purpose is not only undermined by considering petitions to review filed after the time period has expired, but also when a final agency rule is collaterally challenged in a subsequent agency action. Therefore, absent exceptional circumstances*11701, would not consider collateral procedural challenges to final agency actions after the time limit for the courts to review procedural challenges has expired.
Several courts have held that “a party aggrieved by an agency ruling is not es-topped from challenging the validity of an agency’s standard that it has not objected to at the time of its promulgation.” These courts, however, have based their holdings on the failure of petitioner or appellant to object to a proposed rule or regulation before it became final. Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Hayes, 691 F.2d 57, 60 (1st Cir.1982). See also, City of Seabrook v. EPA, 659 F.2d 1349, 1360-61 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 822, 103 S.Ct. 51, 74 L.Ed.2d 57 (1982); American Motorcyclist Asso. v. Watt, 543 F.Supp. 789, 795 (C.D.Cal.1982); Dobbs v. Train, 409 F.Supp. 432, 434-35 (N.D.Ga.1975), aff'd sub nom., Dobbs v. Costle, 559 F.2d 946 (5th Cir.1977). In Dobbs, supra, the court set forth its reasoning in permitting the plaintiffs to collaterally attack a rule to which they did not object either during the notice and comment period or during the time period within which to file a petition to review:
If the failure to participate in the rule-making process estopped a litigant from bringing suit in court challenging the rule adopted, the vast majority of potential litigants could not sue. All persons would have to be on guard to assure some agency did not promulgate some rule that might some day deny them a benefit to which they otherwise would have been entitled. As the agency herein noted, no one filed any comments to the proposed definition herein questioned. If one accepts the defendants’ argument, then there is no one who may now challenge the definition adopted by the agency. That is, since no one participated in the rulemaking process, the rule would not be immune from attack. Such a result is neither desirable, nor is the law____
409 F.Supp. at 435. Other courts which have considered the issue have adopted this reasoning. See, e.g., City of Seabrook v. EPA, supra, at 1360-61 (“courts should not generally hold a petitioner estopped from objecting to an agency rule because a specific objection was not made during the notice and comment period. The rule urged by EPA would require everyone who wishes to protect himself from arbitrary agency action not only to become a faithful reader of the notices of proposed rulemak-ing published each day in the Federal Register, but a psychic able to predict the possible changes that could be made in the proposal when the rule is finally promulgated. This is a fate this court will impose on no one.”).
The “estoppel rule” rejected in the cases cited above presupposes that a party’s objection during the notice and comment period preserves his right to contest a promulgated rule either during the sixty-day time limit or collaterally at a later time and failing to so object during the notice and comment period forever waives the party's right to contest the validity of the regulation even within the sixty days normally provided to file a petition to review. This should not be the rule. The rule should be that unless a petitioner can demonstrate that an agency rule is invalid ab initio because it is constitutionally infirm or exceeds the agency’s statutory authority, the petitioner is estopped from challenging the procedural promulgation of the rule after the time period for filing such a challenge has expired, regardless of whether petitioner objected during the notice and comment period. I base this proposed rule on the principle of finality and the jurisdictional nature of the time limits which Congress enacted for the purpose of permitting a party to challenge the procedural validity of a regulation.
Big Horn’s challenge to section 727.-203(a)(3) illustrates the reasons for this rule. Big Horn’s challenge to the interim presumption does not depend on the facts
*1171of this case. Big Horn simply argues that in promulgating the section 727.203(a)(3) ABG presumption, the Secretary failed adequately to weigh and address comments by medical experts offered during the notice and comment period and failed to offer a rational explanation between the facts found and the choices made. Assuming, without deciding, that these allegations are true, a court has nb jurisdiction to consider this challenge, which is in effect a petition to review the promulgation of a rule after the sixty-day time period has lapsed. Any objection to procedural defects in the rule’s promulgation are waived as Congress has decided by establishing these time limits.
Big Horn summarizes its arguments regarding the validity of the regulation as follows:
The DOL’s references to unnamed medical sources as supporting the § 203(a)(3) ABG standards, the lack of discussion or analysis of the altitude or other ABG variables in the rulemaking announcement, and the Board’s post hoc reliance on time pressure and alleged complexity do not insulate the DOL’s 1978 regulation from overturning on the basis of Motor Vehicle Mfrs. and Burlington Truck Lines. The failure of the Secretary of Labor to adjust the 20 CFR § 727.203(a)(3) for altitude, age, weight, and other ABG quality-control variables is arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion, and contrary to the authorizing legislation.
(Petitioner’s Opening Brief, pp. 30-31.) Big Horn’s challenge could have been advanced in 1978 when notice of rulemaking was first published. The "problems” with the promulgation of section 727.203(a)(3) which Big Horn raises were identifiable and should have been addressed in 1978. It is inappropriate to reopen the administrative process on a procedural challenge to the regulation years after the time period for such a challenge has expired. The administrative record regarding section 727.-203(a)(3) is not part of the record on appeal. The regulation has been in effect for several years. Big Horn’s challenge is not of constitutional dimension. Although Big Horn argues, it does not show how the agency exceeded its statutory authority in promulgating the section 727.203(a)(3) interim presumption. Under these circumstances, I would address the issue raised by Big Horn and deny its collateral challenge to the procedural validity of the regulation.

. The “exceptional circumstances" to the rule which it proposes is when the rule is invalid ab initio such as when it is constitutionally infirm or outside the agency's statutory authority.