Court Opinion

ID: 9829183
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:03:27.395144+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:58.011898
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellee has filed a very engaging and persuasive motion for rehearing, which we have, with much earnest interest, considered, having in mind the drastic effect of the court’s conclusion as expressed in the opinion thus sought to be reviewed. The motion is based on the following language of said opinion:
“Appellee alleges in its petition that it was a private corporation, existing under and by virtue of the laws of the state of Wisconsin, but it does not allege that there had been issued to it by the secretary of state a permit authorizing it to do business -in the state of Texas, and we find, as a fact, that such permit had not been issued to appellee.”
In reference to the finding of fact, to wit, that such permit had not been issued, appellee in its motion says:
“It is upon this portion of the court’s opinion that appellee takes most serious issue with the court. We do not believe that such a presumption, or such a finding of fact, can be indulged in to the damage and detriment of appellee. Surely the court will not say that, merely because appellee failed to allege a certain state of facts, it is warranted in finding that the converse of that state of facts is true.”
This court is not responsible for the condition of the record presenting this appeal, but, in dealing with same, must accept the record as faithfully presenting all of the proceedings incident to and connected with the prosecution of the ease in the court below, and the perfection of the appeal there from to this court.
We are to assume that all facts material, either to the right to maintain the suit, or in support of defense thereto, known to exist by the parties interested in presenting such facts, have been properly alleged, and, so far as they have been able, established by the introduction of proper evidence on the hearing of the 'cause. Especially is this so where, as in the instant case, the failure to establish and include the omitted fact is sought to .be justified, not on the ground that said fact *634was not known to exist, but on the ground that the establishment of such fact was not necessary to the right to prosecute the suit.
An appellate court, is bound by, and must act alone upon, the information contained in the transcript of the record and the statement of facts constituting the record on appeal, or by the admission of the parties made in such way as to authorize same to be accepted and acted upon in disposing of the appeal. The certificate attached to appellee’s motion for rehearing, as well-'as the certificate attached' to appellant’s reply thereto, seeking, on the one hand, to show that the necessary permit had been issued to appellee, and, on the other hand, that said permit had not been issued, cannot be considered by this court for any purpose, for to do so would be to receive evidence that should have been, but which was not, introduced before the trial court to determine the issue of fact so presented as to said permit.
The conclusion of this court, “that such permit had not been issued to appellee,” is not only supported, but, as we think, justified, by the acts and conduct of the appellee as reflected by the transcript of the record of the proceedings had in the trial court, and through the presentation of the ease on appeal by brief for appellee, to wit, appellee in its petition alleges that it is a “private corporation, organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the state of Wisconsin,” 'without alleging that a permit had been issued to it to transact business in the state of Texas. The insufficiency of the pleading in this respect was raised by general demurrer presented by appellant, which was overruled by the trial court. The question was again raised by appellant in its objection to the court’s charge by appellant’s requested peremptory instruction, and was pointed out in appellant’s motion for a new trial, covered by appropriate assignments of error.
Undoubtedly we are justified in assuming from the record that, in reply to the position of appellant, in reference to said permit, appellee claimed that it was exempt under article 1319, V. S. T. C. S. 1914, from obtaining a permit to do business in Texas as a foreign corporation, for under no other theory of the law, viz. title 25, c. 26, V. S. T. C. S. 1914, relating to foreign corporations transacting business in this state, could the court have overruled the propositions so timely and correctly advanced by appellant. In combatting appellant’s position in these respects, appel-lee devoted seven pages of its brief to an effort to show that, under article 1319, Id., it was relieved from complying with the provisions of said chapter 26, tit. 25, which clearly demonstrated that appellee tried the case in the court below on the theory that, in order for it to transact business in the state of Texas, it was not necessary to obtain a permit for that purpose, and therefore the logic of the situation was that it had not done so. Eor surely, if such permit had been obtained, it is btít reasonable to assume that, instead of appellee laboring to show that no necessity existed for it to obtain same, the issuance of the permit would have been alleged and duly established.
Appellee selected its own lines of procedure, and pursued same as if that were the only course available, and; having failed to follow the provisions of the law which would have secured to it a full hearing in the courts of this state upon its demand, it is not now in position to complain of the harshness of the law denying it the right to maintain its suit in the courts of the state for failure to comply with its provisions, for it was apprised, not only of the importance of complying therewith, but of the result that would follow a failure to so comply, as is clearly revealed by article 1318, V. S. T. C. S. 1914.
However, in view of the fact that the record does not, on its face, affirmatively show that appellee had not applied for and obtained a permit to do business in this state, the opinion will be modified to the extent of withdrawing therefrom the finding as a fact, as if, established affirmatively by the record, that such permit had not been duly obtained ; it being sufficient to sustain the judgment of this court to find that appellee was a foreign corporation, doing business within the state, within the meaning of article 1314, V. S. T. C. S. 1914, that it did not t allege that there had been issued to it a permit to do business in the state of Texas, and failed to establish such allegation by proper proof.
Motion for rehearing is therefore overruled.