Court Opinion

ID: 9832498
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:57:32.436376+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:47.422780
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
We adhere to our conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdict that the value of the cotton was to be fixed by the market price in Belton. We were in error in saying that appellant remitted to appellee $3,000 on December 23d. The remittance was on December 20th. We still think, however, that the evidence is sufficient to show that appellant accepted appellee’s version of the contract that the price was to be fixed by the market price in Belton, and that appellee had elected to close the deal on November 27th.
But, if the contract provided that the price at the time selected by appellee was to be fixed by appellant’s “basis limit,” appellant could not deprive appellee of his option to fix the day of settlement by retiring from the market and having no basis limit. Appellant’s failure to have a basis limit on November 27th, and for about two months thereafter, was occasioned by his own default, and it matters not that it was on account of his illness. Appellant having deprived appellee of the privilege of settling at the time selected by him, on appellant’s basis limit, if such was the contract, appellee was entitled to the market price at that time. The evidence shows that,, if appellant had had a basis limit on November 27th, in all probability it would have been the same as the market price, though there are occasional exceptions to that rule.
If appellee did not notify appellant on November 27th that he elected to close the deal on that day, he did all that the contract contemplated that he should do in that regard. He went to appellant’s office, and notified those found in charge, whether they were appellant’s clerks or not; went to his house, *238and was denied admission, and tried to send word to appellant the next day by his brother that he had elected to close the deal on the previous day, though cotton had advanced, and supposed that his message had been delivered. If appellant did not receive the notice, his failure to do so was Occasioned by his own acts, and it matters not that on account of his sickness he could not avoid such acts. Appellee, having fully discharged his duty, should not be made to suffer on account of the misfortune of appellant.
Believing that we did not err in our opinion herein, appellant’s motion for a rehearing is overruled.
Motion overruled.