Court Opinion

ID: 9772813
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:30:32.436614+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:48.606042
License: Public Domain

BLEIL, Justice,
dissenting.
I disagree with the majority’s legal conclusion that we are free to apply the harmless error rule to this venue error. Therefore, I dissent.

Does the harmless error rule apply to this venue error?

Not according to the law of this state. While I agree with the majority that the harmless error rule has not previously been applied to a denial of a mandatory right to a change of venue, Í am not willing to join the majority in deciding for the first time that the harmless error rule applies to appellate review of the trial court’s failure to grant a motion for change of venue which is unopposed by affidavit.
Our Supreme Court has spoken on this subject. In City of Abilene v. Downs, 367 S.W.2d 153 (Tex.1963), the Court held that when a motion for a change of venue is filed — and not attacked with a supporting affidavit pursuant to Tex.R.Civ.P. 258 — the trial court is required to grant the motion. The Court held that: “Rule 258 presupposes, and we think properly, that a change of venue is necessary in the interests of justice if the application therefor stands unchallenged in the manner prescribed.” 367 S.W.2d at 156. The facts in Downs are strikingly similar to those now before us. These similarities exist: (1) before trial the defendant moved for a change of venue; (2) no affidavit opposing the motion pursuant to Tex.R.Civ.P. 258 was filed; (3) the motion was overruled, apparently without a hearing; and (4) the trial court found that the motion was untimely filed and would cause a delay.
Today’s majority concedes that the Downs decision makes the trial court’s action mandatory when a properly filed motion for change of venue is not opposed. The trial court was required to change venue. It did not. The majority acknowledges that this trial court action, denying the motion for change of venue, was clear error. Without any judicial authority or precedent, the majority first determines that the harmless error rule applies in this setting, then promptly determines the error to be harmless. I would look to Downs for more guidance on the subject.
The Court in Downs had a perfect opportunity to apply the harmless error rule, but did not. However, the Court did address the meaning of the error, saying: “The trial judge was therefore under the duty of removing the cases pursuant to Petitioner’s application for change of venue and this cause must be reversed and remanded for this purpose,.... ” The Downs decision, as precedent binding on this Court, requires that this case be reversed and remanded.
Our Legislature has also spoken quite specifically on whether a venue error requires reversal, in enacting Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 15.064 (Vernon 1986),1 which provides:
(a) In all venue hearings, no factual proof concerning the merits of the case shall be required to establish venue. The court shall determine venue questions from the pleadings and affidavits. No interlocutory appeal shall lie from the determination.
(b) On appeal from the trial on the merits, if venue was improper it shall in no event be harmless error and shall be reversible error. In determining whether venue was or was not proper, the appellate court shall consider the entire record, including the trial on the merits.
(Emphasis added).
Applying this statutory provision, I conclude that once the motion to change venue was not attacked pursuant to Tex.R.Civ.P. *160258, venue in Morris County became improper. And, pursuant to Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code § 15.064(b), the trial court's error in no event is harmless; it is reversible error.2
Because of my conclusion that the venue error requires a reversal of the trial court’s judgment, I would not reach the other issues addressed by the majority of this Court.

. While the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code was enacted in 1985, the historical note in the annotation following Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 15.064 (Vernon 1986) dates the prior law to 1863.

. Interestingly, this does not appear to represent any change in our law. See, e.g., City of Abilene v. Downs, 367 S.W.2d 153 (Tex.1963); see also, Sneed v. Box, 166 S.W.2d 951 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1942, no writ); Wilson v. Ryan, 163 S.W.2d 448 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1942, no writ).