Court Opinion

ID: 9790599
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:55:46.12908+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:30.497192
License: Public Domain

Ott, C. J.
(dissenting)'—-The salient facts which gave rise to this appeal are as follows: A man with a handkerchief over his face entered the office of the housing project and, at the point of a gun, ordered the cashier to “Give me the money.” The cashier placed the money in a paper sack, together with a petty cash slip indicating a payment of $1.75 for a cleaning bill. The man left in an automobile. Defendant was later apprehended, and the sack containing the money and the petty cash slip, together with a gun, was found in his automobile.
*257After the state’s witnesses had testified to these facts, and while a police officer was being interrogated, the following occurred:
“Q. Upon arriving at the office of the Project what did you find? A. Well, on our arrival we discovered Detective Panton had already arrived and that the person that had performed the stick-up had left. Mr. Haley: I will object to the conclusion of the officer here. . . . The Court: Are you denying that there was a robbery at the housing project at that time on that date? Mr. Haley: I don’t know, your Honor. I think that is what we are here to determine. . . . The Court: Don’t you think we are getting a little ridiculous, or aren’t we?” (Italics mine.)
Thereafter, the defendant testified as follows:
“ . . . So as I say, I had been drinking and I was on parole from Walla Walla and it certainly would be obvious if I am sitting there with the bag and money in the car and I would be the one that had committed the robbery, so the only thing I could do would be to get away from there. So that is just exactly what I did.” (Italics mine.)
The defendant admitted that a robbery had, in fact, been committed. The trial judge’s statement of this fact was not a comment upon the evidence within the constitutional prohibition.
In State v. Browder, 61 Wn. (2d) 300, 302, 378 P. (2d) 295 (1963), we stated:
“Our oft repeated interpretation of Art. 4, § 16, of the state constitution is that the assumption of admitted facts is not a comment on the evidence. [Citing cases.]”
Assuming, arguendo, that the court’s statement to counsel, in ruling on the objection, was a comment on the evidence, in my opinion it did not deny the defendant a fair trial for two reasons: (1) The court’s statement was neither a negative nor an affirmative assertion of the established fact, and (2) the defendant admitted that there had been a robbery; therefore, the court’s comment was simply corroborative of the defendant’s admission.
In Blackburn v. Groce, 46 Wn. (2d) 529, 536, 283 P. (2d) 115 (1955), we said:
*258“ . . . All comment is prohibited, but it does not follow that every comment constitutes grounds for a mistrial or that a new trial will be granted in consequence thereof. The test is, Was the party complaining of the comment prejudiced thereby? [Citing cases.]” (Italics mine.)
The facts in the instant case fall squarely within the rule announced in Blackburn v. Groce, supra. The complaining party failed to show prejudice.
Finally, the majority hold that any comment upon the evidence by the trial judge establishes a prima facie presumption of prejudice which merits a new trial, unless the state overcomes the presumption. The cases which the majority rely upon in support of this point of view were discussed in State v. Levy, 8 Wn. (2d) 630, 113 P. (2d) 306 (1941), and the rule now adopted by the majority was there expressly rejected.
The majority’s newly announced rule is in direct conflict with the rule of the Blackburn case, supra, and the cases cited therein, which requires the complaining party to establish prejudice. It is also contrary to the law announced by the Supreme Court of the United States in Beck v. Washington, 369 U. S. 541, 558, 8 L. Ed. (2d) 98, 82, S. Ct. 955 (1962) as follows:
“ While this Court stands ready to correct violations of constitutional rights, it also holds that “it is not asking too much that the burden of showing essential unfairness be sustained by him who claims such injustice and seeks to have the result set aside, and that it be sustained not as a matter of speculation but as a demonstrable reality.” ’ United States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy, 351 U. S. 454, 462 (1956). . . .” (Italics mine.)
Where, as here, a defendant admits the fact upon which the alleged prejudice to him is predicated, he has not sustained the burden of proving prejudice “as a demonstrable reality.”
For the reasons stated, the judgment and sentence should be affirmed.
Hill, J., concurs with Ott, C. J.