Court Opinion

ID: 9951001
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-15 15:17:23.056828+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:35:52.733857
License: Public Domain

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

                                           No. 126,431

             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

                                       STATE OF KANSAS,
                                           Appellee,

                                                 v.

                                    DYLLON ALAN TUCKER
                                         Appellant.

                                 MEMORANDUM OPINION

       Appeal from Shawnee District Court; MABAN WRIGHT, judge. Opinion filed March 15, 2024.
Affirmed.

       Submitted by the parties for summary disposition under K.S.A. 21-6820(g) and (h).

Before ARNOLD-BURGER, C.J., HURST and COBLE, JJ.

       PER CURIAM: Dyllon Alan Tucker appeals the district court's revocation of his
probation after he committed new offenses while on probation and failed to abide by
other conditions of probation. We granted a motion for summary disposition under
Supreme Court Rule 7.041A (2023 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 48). Finding no abuse of discretion
by the district court, we affirm.

                            FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       In July 2022, Tucker agreed to plead guilty in Shawnee County case No. 20CR263
(Case 1) to felony charges of criminal possession of a weapon and fleeing or attempting
to elude a police officer. Under the plea agreement, Tucker also agreed to plead guilty to

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felony charges of theft and interference with law enforcement in Shawnee County case
No. 19CR2161 (Case 2). In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss several other charges in
both cases. Tucker later moved for a dispositional departure to probation in both cases.

          At sentencing in September 2022, the district court granted Tucker's motion for a
departure but ordered the underlying sentences to run consecutive. The court found
Tucker had a criminal history score of A in Case 1 and imposed a total underlying
sentence of 24 months in prison suspended to the terms of a 12-month probation. In
agreeing to depart, the court noted Tucker had taken responsibility for his crimes, had
family support, needed to support his special needs daughter, his prior person crimes
were somewhat aged, and he was employed.

          Just three months later, the State moved to revoke Tucker's probation based on
several alleged violations, including failing to remain law abiding or remain drug free.
An affidavit included with the motion alleged that Tucker had been arrested on charges of
felony criminal possession of a weapon by a convicted felon, felony and misdemeanor
counts of possession of a stolen property, and felony use or possession with intent to use
of drug paraphernalia. Tucker had also admitted to using marijuana in September 2022—
the night before he was sentenced in this case.

          The district court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion to revoke his
probation in March 2023. The State presented testimony from three City of Topeka police
officers who had handled the vehicle theft investigation—during which the officers also
discovered marijuana and a firearm in Tucker's possession—that resulted in Tucker's new
arrest.

          Tucker's probation officer also testified. She noted that he had been reporting
consistently after bonding out of jail on the new charges in February 2023. Tucker had
completed several classes required for his probation, including moral recognition therapy

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and 24/7 Dads. Tucker also began working full-time the week before the evidentiary
hearing and had been attending outpatient treatment with no positive UAs. The probation
officer did not believe revocation was warranted because Tucker had been adhering to
every probation order set forth, stayed clean, and gotten a job. She believed a longer
sanction would derail the progress that Tucker had made because he would likely lose his
job.

       Based on the evidence presented, the district court found the State had proven the
probation violations by a preponderance of the evidence. As for disposition, Tucker
argued the recommendation by his probation officer justified a three-day sanction with
credit for time served and anything more would hinder Tucker's efforts at being
successful on probation.

       The district court revoked Tucker's probation, noting that he had received a
dispositional departure and had continued to engage in criminal behavior while on
probation. The court also took judicial notice of yet another pending case in which
Tucker had been charged with criminal restraint and domestic battery. The court stated
that any improvements Tucker had made were "too little too late."

       Tucker timely appealed.

                                        ANALYSIS

       Tucker argues the district court abused its discretion when it revoked his probation
and ordered him to serve his underlying sentence, rather than imposing an intermediate
sanction. To be clear, because this appeal only concerns Case 1, we are only tasked with
reviewing whether the district court acted appropriately in revoking probation and
ordering Tucker to serve the underlying 24-month sentence in that case.

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       The general procedure for revoking a defendant's probation is governed by K.S.A.
22-3716. Once the State has presented evidence establishing a violation of the conditions
of probation, the district court has discretion to revoke probation and impose the
underlying sentence. State v. Tafolla, 315 Kan. 324, 328, 508 P.3d 351 (2022). "A court
abuses its discretion if the judicial decision (1) is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable; (2)
is based on an error of law; (3) or is based on an error of fact." 315 Kan. at 328. As the
asserting party, Tucker must show that an abuse of discretion occurred. See 315 Kan. at
328.

       Tucker does not dispute that he violated his probation by committing new offenses
or that the district court had the legal authority to revoke his probation. See K.S.A. 22-
3716(c)(7)(B) (authorizing probation revocation without intermediate sanctions where
probation was originally granted because of a dispositional departure); K.S.A. 22-
3716(c)(7)(C) (authorizing probation revocation without intermediate sanctions where
offender commits a new felony or misdemeanor while on probation). Although the
district court did not specifically state it was relying on the dispositional departure
exception, as Tucker acknowledges, the Kansas Supreme Court has held courts are not
required to explicitly state reliance on that exception when revoking probation. See
Tafolla, 315 Kan. at 330-31.

       Tucker contends that revocation of probation was not warranted given (1) that it
was his first alleged violation hearing, (2) his probation officer did not believe revocation
was warranted; (3) a jail sanction would have been appropriate, and (4) he has a special
needs daughter. Yet Tucker does not claim the district court's decision resulted from a
legal or factual error, so we are left with determining whether no reasonable person
would agree with the district court's decision to revoke his probation and impose the
underlying sentence. See State v. Brown, 51 Kan. App. 2d 876, Syl. ¶ 4, 357 P.3d 296
(2015).

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       We cannot conclude that no reasonable person would agree with the district court's
decision to revoke Tucker's probation and impose the underlying sentence. While Tucker
is correct that a jail sanction is an appropriate disposition for an initial probation
violation, Kansas law authorizes the district court to bypass intermediate sanctions when
the probation was originally granted as a dispositional departure or when the probationer
commits new crimes. K.S.A. 22-3716(c)(7)(B), (c)(7)(C). Both factors are present here.
Tucker was facing a presumptive prison sentence because of his extensive criminal
history, yet the district court showed him leniency by granting probation. Tucker then
continued engaging in criminal behavior, including two new felonies and two new
misdemeanors only 3 months into his 12-month probation term. In addition, the fact that
Tucker committed his underlying offense while already on parole for a felony bolsters
this conclusion. As for Tucker's other asserted mitigating factors, we are not persuaded
the district court abused its discretion by reaching the conclusion it did based on the
circumstances.

       Affirmed.

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