Court Opinion

ID: 9957607
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-04 17:15:33.037605+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:30.836747
License: Public Domain

J-S09012-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 IN THE INTEREST OF: I.B., A MINOR       :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                         :
 APPEAL OF: M.B., MOTHER                 :
                                         :
                                         :
                                         :
                                         :
                                         :   No. 3039 EDA 2023

              Appeal from the Order Entered November 6, 2023
            In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
            Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-DP-0001357-2020

 IN THE INTEREST OF: I.M.B., A           :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                                   :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                         :
                                         :
 APPEAL OF: M.B., MOTHER                 :
                                         :
                                         :
                                         :
                                         :   No. 3040 EDA 2023

             Appeal from the Decree Entered November 6, 2023
            In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
            Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000599-2022

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., NICHOLS, J., and BECK, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.E.:                       FILED APRIL 04, 2024

      In these consolidated appeals, M.B. (“Mother”) appeals from the decree

and order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County which

granted the petitions of Philadelphia County Department of Human Services

(“DHS”) to change the permanency goal of I.B. (d.o.b. 7/2019) (“Child”) to

adoption and involuntarily terminate Mother’s parental rights to Child pursuant
J-S09012-24

to Sections 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8) and (b) of the Adoption Act, 23

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511-2514.1 We affirm.

       Mother is Child’s biological mother. Child and Mother came to DHS’s

attention in November 2020 when DHS received information that Mother lived

in a shelter, often left Child unattended, suffered from mental illness, and used

illegal drugs. Shortly thereafter, DHS obtained an order of protective custody

and placed Child in foster care after Mother presented at Einstein Medical

Center hallucinating, believing her death was imminent, and asking hospital

staff to take care of Child. When DHS visited her the same day, Mother

believed that she had died. Child exhibited signs of petit mal seizures and did

not display age-appropriate behavior and skills.

       In December 2020, DHS and the Community Umbrella Agency (“CUA”)

established Mother’s single case plan (“SCP”), with family reunification as the

permanency goal. Mother was required to ensure Child’s basic needs were met

and Child’s medical, dental and vision appointments were current. Mother also

was to be available to the CUA, comply with the CUA’s services, apply for

Child’s services, and participate in a parenting program. Objectives for

Mother’s mental health, visitation and compliance with court-ordered

objectives also were added by the court in December.

____________________________________________

1 The court also terminated the parental rights of Child’s father and unknown

putative father. They have not appealed.

                                           -2-
J-S09012-24

      On May 19, 2021, Child was adjudicated dependent and committed to

DHS’s custody. The court ordered Mother to comply with mental health,

substance abuse, and disability related assessments and services. At all

permanency review hearings in 2021, 2022, and 2023, the court found Mother

non-compliant with the permanency plan and that she had not made any

progress toward alleviating the conditions that led to Child’s placement.

      On October 27, 2022, DHS filed petitions to terminate Mother’s parental

rights and to change Child’s permanency goal to adoption. The following

individuals testified on behalf of DHS at the goal change/termination of

parental rights (“TPR”) hearing: Michael Flowers, Child’s proposed placement

resource; Katina Alexander, Interim Supervisor, Children’s Crisis Treatment

Center (CCTC); Katherine D’Amora, DHS psychologist; Lashonna McRae, CUA

case manager; Adrien Gale, CUA case manager; Latoya Davenport, resource

parent; and Janice DeShields, Child Advocate social worker. The court

apparently interviewed Child in camera, but the interview was not recorded or

transcribed. Mother testified on her own behalf. The following testimony was

provided.

      Gale testified that during the previous two years, Child’s placement was

changed four times, and included the removal from her current foster parent,

Davenport, due to allegations of abuse, and then Child’s return to her after

the allegations were unfounded. Child transitioned well to each of the

placements. Child has been diagnosed with adjustment disorder with

                                     -3-
J-S09012-24

disturbance of emotion and conduct. Child is aggressive, spits on others,

chokes peers, and often screams. Child needed eye surgery at one point, but

it was delayed for five months because the CUA was unable to find Mother to

sign the consents for anesthesia for the surgery.

      Gale testified she was the individual who advised Mother of Mother’s

SCP and court-ordered objectives in December 2020. Gale has reached out to

remind Mother of her objectives, which included visitation, but Mother has not

requested or tried to arrange visitation with Child. According to Gale, Mother

failed to meet any of her objectives or to alleviate the conditions that

necessitated Child’s continued placement. Mother has not obtained suitable

housing and Gale could not comment on Mother’s current living arrangements

since Gale was not able to assess the accommodations at Ruth’s House (the

mental health treatment facility where Mother was enrolled at the time of the

TPR hearing). Mother never provided the CUA with proof of completion of any

mental health treatment program and failed to complete any of her substance

abuse objectives, which were intended to address Mother’s history of Percocet

abuse.

      Flowers is the husband of Child’s maternal aunt. Flowers and his wife

have custody of Mother’s fifteen-year-old severely autistic son. The Flowers

wish to adopt Child and are prepared to address Child’s adjustment disorder

diagnosis. During this case, Flowers and his wife have had sixteen virtual and

                                    -4-
J-S09012-24

three in-person visits with Child. Gale and McRae, the CUA case manager

supervisor, have no concerns about the Flowers as adoption resources.

      Davenport, Child’s current resource parent, testified Child was placed in

her care when Child was approximately seventeen months old. Child was

removed from her home for over a year after DHS received a report of abuse,

which was later determined to be unfounded. Davenport has two sons, ages

nine and thirteen, who live in her home. Although Child is aggressive with the

younger son, Davenport said he does not retaliate and hit her back.

      According to Davenport, Child is bonded with her. Alexander, the

supervisor from CCTC, believes severing the bond would have a detrimental

impact on Child, but that a family that “commit[s] to her[,] … [has] some type

of bond with her” and attends to her needs would be an appropriate

placement. N.T. TPR Hearing, 11/6/23, at 58.

      DeShields, child advocate social worker, saw Child more than seventeen

times over the course of the case. At first, Child did not walk or talk and was

developmentally behind for her age. Child progressed in Davenport’s care and

regressed when she was temporarily removed.

      Mother conceded she has not completed her objectives for reunification,

but she does not want her rights to Child terminated because her failure to

achieve her objectives was due to her chronic homelessness and disability.

Mother also attributed her long absences from the case and lack of contact

with the CUA to homelessness, although she acknowledged she knew the

                                     -5-
J-S09012-24

CUA’s contact information. Id. at 188. Mother also stated her lack of contact

with the CUA was due to her incarceration from October 2022 to May 2023,

but she also testified she used her telephone privileges to stay in contact with

the CUA and her dependency court attorney.

      Mother said she generally failed to reach out to the CUA because she

was “too busy trying to get [her] mental health together[.]” Id. at 188-89.

Mother stated she has been diagnosed with depression, bipolar disorder, and

schizophrenia, and that as of June 1, 2023, she was engaged in mental health

treatment. However, she was unable to provide documentation to confirm

either her diagnoses, her participation in the mental health program, or an

anticipated discharge date from the program. Mother does not plan to continue

her mental health treatment because she “battle[s] homelessness so much.”

Id. at 191. Mother asserted that she submits monthly drug screens, which

have all had negative results.

      Mother agreed she only participated in two virtual visits with Child in

2023 and had last seen Child approximately 18 months prior to that. Mother

claimed she missed visits because she incorrectly responded to the CUA’s

emails requesting confirmation of them. Mother stated that she did not know

where Child was enrolled in school, the name of Child’s primary care physician,

when Child was last seen by a doctor, or about Child’s adjustment disorder

diagnosis, which Mother stated she learned for the first time in court that day.

                                     -6-
J-S09012-24

       Gale opined the termination of Mother’s parental rights to free Child for

adoption was in Child’s best interest, particularly because Mother does not

meet any of Child’s needs and Child does not look to her as a parental

resource. Gale opined she did not believe that reunification was a viable goal

because Child could not safely be returned to Mother’s care due to Mother’s

ongoing issues, including with her mental health and housing. Gale stated she

did not believe Child would suffer irreparable harm if Mother’s parental rights

were terminated because Child does not have a bond with Mother, due to

Mother’s lack of consistent contact with Child. Gale further noted that the

Flowers and Davenport have each expressed a desire to adopt Child.

       At the close of the hearing, the orphans’ court found that DHS met its

burden of providing clear and convincing evidence to support its petitions. The

court entered an order changing Child’s permanency goal to adoption and a

decree terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(1),

(a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8) and (b) of the Pennsylvania Adoption Act.2 Mother timely

appealed and filed a contemporaneous statement of errors complained of on

appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i).

       Mother argues: (1) the orphans’ court committed an abuse of discretion

and an error of law when it concluded DHS presented clear and convincing

____________________________________________

2 The court held the decision to remove Child from Davenport’s home under

advisement. A hearing has been scheduled to determine whether it would be
in Child’s best interest to be adopted by Davenport or the Flowers.

                                           -7-
J-S09012-24

evidence that the termination of Mother’s parental rights was in Child’s best

interest pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5) and (a)(8) and

§ 2511(b); and (2) the orphans’ court abused its discretion in changing Child’s

goal to adoption.3

       Our scope and standard of review are as follows:

             In an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, our
       scope of review is comprehensive: we consider all the evidence
       presented as well as the trial court’s factual findings and legal
       conclusions. However, our standard of review is narrow: we will
       reverse the trial court’s order only if we conclude that the trial
       court abused its discretion, made an error of law, or lacked
       competent evidence to support its findings. The trial judge’s
       decision is entitled to the same deference as a jury verdict.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).

       Further, we have stated:

             Where the hearing court’s findings are supported by
       competent evidence of record, we must affirm the hearing court
       even though the record could support an opposite result.

                     We are bound by the findings of the trial court
              which have adequate support in the record so long as
              the findings do not evidence capricious disregard for
              competent and credible evidence. The trial court is
              free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence
____________________________________________

3 In her statement of questions involved, Mother also claims that the orphans’

court erred by failing to appoint separate legal counsel for Child. This issue is
waived for Mother’s complete abandonment of it in the argument section of
her brief. Even if the issue were not waived it lacks merit. The record reflects
the court appointed Child’s guardian ad litem (“GAL”) as Child’s legal counsel
after the GAL stated he agreed with DHS’s position and there was no conflict
between Child’s best and legal interests. We discern no error. See In re T.S.,
E.S., 192 A.3d 1080, 1088 (Pa. 2018) (in accordance with Section 2313(a) of
the Adoption Act, a guardian ad litem may represent a child’s legal interest
where there is no conflict between child’s legal and best interests).

                                           -8-
J-S09012-24

            presented, and is likewise free to make all credibility
            determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.
            Though we are not bound by the trial court’s
            inferences and deductions, we may reject its
            conclusions only if they involve errors of law or are
            clearly unreasonable in light of the trial court’s
            sustainable findings.

In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted).

      The orphans’ court terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8), and (b). We examine the

orphans’ court’s finding that DHS provided clear and convincing evidence to

support termination pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1). See In re B.L.W., 843

A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc) (stating that in order to affirm the

termination of parental rights, this Court “need only agree with [the orphans’

court’s] decision as to any one subsection” of Section 2511(a)).

      Requests to have a natural parent’s parental rights terminated are

governed by 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511 of the Adoption Act, which provides, in

pertinent part:

      (a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
      be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
      grounds:

            (1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of
            at least six months immediately preceding the filing of
            the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of
            relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused
            or failed to perform parental duties.

                                     *     *   *

      (b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights
      of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,

                                     -9-
J-S09012-24

      physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
      of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
      environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
      income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
      control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
      to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
      efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
      which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
      filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1), (b).

      A petitioner must satisfy both Sections 2511(a) and (b) by clear and

convincing evidence, which is evidence that is so “clear, direct, weighty, and

convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without

hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re Adoption of C.M.,

255 A.3d 343, 359 (Pa. 2021) (citation omitted).

      To establish grounds for termination pursuant to section 2511(a)(1),

“[a] petitioner ... must demonstrate by competent, clear and convincing

evidence, [that] [t]he parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six

months immediately preceding the filing of the petition either has evidenced

a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or

failed to perform parental duties.” C.M., 255 A.3d at 363-64 (citation,

footnote, and internal quotation marks omitted).

      [O]ur courts long have interpreted parental duties in relation to
      the needs of a child, such as love, protection, guidance and
      support. Parental duties are carried out through affirmative
      actions that develop and maintain the parent-child relationship. …
      The performance of parental duties requires that a parent exert
      himself to take and maintain a place of importance in the child’s
      life.

                                     - 10 -
J-S09012-24

In re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580, 592 (Pa. 2021) (brackets, internal

citations and quotation marks omitted).

      When considering the applicability of Section 2511(a)(1), the orphans’

court should consider the entire history of the case rather than mechanically

apply the statutory six-month requirement. See C.M., 255 A.3d at 364. This

includes   consideration   of   “the       parent’s     explanation   [and]   the   post-

abandonment contact between the parent and child[,]” including the parent’s

efforts to maintain contact. Id. (citation omitted).

      Instantly, in concluding that DHS provided clear and convincing

evidence to support the termination of Mother’s parental rights under Section

2511(a), the orphans’ court explained:

            … I don’t take pleasure in having to reach the decision that
      the [c]ourt is reaching today. But [DHS] has met its burden to
      involuntarily terminate … Mother’s rights ….

             I am sympathetic to the situation that Mother has been
      living through and commend her for now stepping forward to avail
      herself to get the help she needs. But there has been no indication
      that she is a potential reunification source for [Child] today, nor
      has she been a potential reunification resource throughout the life
      of this case. And [Child] came into care over 35 months ago.

                                       *     *      *

           This petition was filed a year ago. In the six months prior to
      October of 2022, … Mother … [failed to] demonstrate[] any
      purpose or any ability to parent this [C]hild. In fact, [she] refused
      to perform parental duties for the six months immediately
      preceding the filing of the petition.

             … [Mother] didn’t even reach out to even see [C]hild. In
      fact, she hasn’t seen [C]hild up until more recently, for more than
      a year.

                                           - 11 -
J-S09012-24

                                   *     *      *

             … [T]here has been a repeated and continued incapacity and
      inability to parent [C]hild … or provide any necessary care for this
      [C]hild’s physical or mental wellbeing for the life of this case. And
      there is no indication that the causes of the incapacity … would be
      remedied by [Mother] …, as this [C]hild has again been in care for
      more than 35 months. …

N.T. TPR Hearing, 11/6/23, at 223-25.

      We commend the orphans’ court for its sensitive review of Mother’s

history of homelessness and drug dependency. We certainly join in the nature

of these remarks. That being said, the record aptly supports the orphans’

court’s findings. Mother admitted that DHS took custody of Child in December

2020 because Mother was hospitalized for her mental health and there was no

one to care for Child. See id. at 185-86. Child was adjudicated dependent due

to DHS’s concerns about Mother’s mental health, her use of drugs and alcohol,

her housing instability and Mother’s poor supervision of Child. See

Dependency Petition, 12/29/20, at ¶ 5f; Order of Adjudication and Disposition,

5/19/21, at 1-2. Gale testified she told Mother about all her SCP and court-

ordered objectives in December 2020; despite Mother’s claim she did not

realize visitation with Child was a reunification objective. See N.T. TPR

Hearing, 11/6/23, at 195, 199.

      Mother has been completely noncompliant with the permanency plan

throughout the life of this case and has not made any progress in alleviating

the conditions that led to Child’s removal. See Permanency Review Orders,

                                       - 12 -
J-S09012-24

12/20/21, 3/21/22, 6/13/22, 8/29/22, 11/21/22, 1/30/23, 5/8/23. Mother

conceded she did not complete her objectives for reunification but blamed her

failure to complete them on her homelessness, mental health issues, and brief

incarceration. See N.T. TPR Hearing, 11/6/23, at 188-89, 196-97.

      Although the hospital discharged Mother only five days after her

December 2020 mental health admission, Mother did not contact the CUA to

ask for Child’s return because “she lost her phone” and her sister was in

contact with the CUA and keeping her informed about the case. See id. at

187-88. After Gale stayed in contact with Mother for approximately fifteen

months, Mother disappeared from March 2022 until December 2022, when

Gale learned Mother was incarcerated. When Gale reminded Mother of her

objectives in December 2022, including visitation with Child, Mother again did

not request any visits. See id. at 202. Gale explained Mother had not seen

Child for 18 months prior to Mother’s two visits with Child in early 2023, which

was after the petitions had been filed. See id. at 202-03. Mother did not

dispute this version of her visitation history, stated she does not know what

school Child is enrolled in, the name of Child’s primary care doctor or when

Child was last seen by a doctor, and that she did not know Child had been

diagnosed with adjustment disorder until court that day. See id. at 196-98.

      Mother never obtained suitable housing and Gale was unable to assess

Mother’s living accommodations at Ruth’s House. See id. at 203-04. Gale

stated that, although Mother provided general information about the Ruth’s

                                     - 13 -
J-S09012-24

House program, Mother did not provide the CUA with proof of completion of

any mental health program. See id. at 204. Although Mother claimed to be

engaged in mental health treatment at Ruth’s House for her diagnoses of

depression,   bipolar   disorder,   and    schizophrenia,   Mother   provided   no

documentation of her diagnoses, her participation in the Ruth’s House

program, or her anticipated discharge date. See id. at 189-91, 213. Mother

admitted she did not successfully complete a mental health program, and she

testified she did not intend to do so because of her lack of either a home or a

car. See id. at 191-92. Mother provided no documentation to support her

allegation that she completed the ordered psychological evaluation. See id.

at 194.

      Based on the foregoing, we agree with the orphans’ court that DHS

provided clear and convincing evidence to satisfy the termination of Mother’s

parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) of the Adoption Act.

      Mother also argues the orphans’ court erred in finding that termination

of her parental rights is in Child’s best interest pursuant to Section 2511(b).

Mother maintains that she and Child “could have meaningful visits” since

Mother “has now found stable housing and is now receiving mental health

treatment.” Appellant’s Brief, at 19.

      Pursuant to Section 2511(b) of the Adoption Act, a trial court “shall give

primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs

and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).

                                        - 14 -
J-S09012-24

      Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are
      involved when inquiring about the needs and welfare of the child.
      The court must also discern the nature and status of the parent-
      child bond, paying close attention to the effect on the child of
      permanently severing the bond.

In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1009 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted). “[I]n

cases where there is no evidence of a bond between a parent and child, it is

reasonable to infer that no bond exists.” In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d

321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted).

      The orphans’ court found Child would not suffer irreparable harm if

Mother’s parental rights were terminated because Mother and Child do not

have a parental bond. See N.T. TPR Hearing, 11/6/23, at 228. The court

observed that Child had only recently seen Mother at a few virtual visits and

that Child neither looks at Mother as her parent nor seeks Mother out for her

daily needs. See id.

      We discern no abuse of discretion. Mother does not identify any bond

between her and Child and our independent review of the record confirms the

court’s inference that none exists. Gale opined that terminating Mother’s

parental rights is in Child’s best interest since Mother does not meet any of

Child’s needs, fails to provide Child with safety and stability, and Child does

not look to her as a parental resource. See id. at 212. Gale stated she did not

believe Child would suffer irreparable harm if Mother’s parental rights were

terminated because Child does not have any bond with Mother due to Mother’s

                                    - 15 -
J-S09012-24

lack of consistent contact with Child. See id. at 21-13. Gale further noted that

Child has multiple potential adoption resources. See id. at 209-10.

      Mother maintains that Child told the court in an off-the-record in camera

discussion that she does not want Mother’s rights terminated. However, other

than Mother’s bald assertion that this is what Child said, there is no record

evidence to support this claim. Even if Child did make the statement, we note

that it is not availing. Certainly, it did not change the analysis of the Orphans’

Court.

      A “child’s preferred outcome is not controlling, especially where th[e]

[C]hild is under twelve, and … her consent is not necessary to effectuate an

adoption.” Interest of D.R.-W., 227 A.3d 905, 916 (Pa. Super. 2020)

(citation omitted); see 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2711(a) (“[C]onsent to an adoption

shall be required of ... [t]he adoptee, if over 12 years of age.”).

      Child is approximately four years old. Her alleged preference is at odds

with the evidence of record that shows she barely saw Mother since she her

removal from Mother’s care over three years ago, and the testimony is that

termination of Mother’s parental rights is in Child’s best interest. It was within

the court’s discretion to give Child’s alleged preference little weight.

      Based on the foregoing, the record supports the court’s finding that

termination of Mother’s parental rights is in Child’s best interest pursuant to

Section 2511(b). Mother’s challenge to the termination of her parental rights

lacks merit.

                                     - 16 -
J-S09012-24

      Mother also argues the court erred in changing Child’s permanency goal

to adoption because “reasonable efforts over a period of time would allow

[M]other to stabilize …, complete more visits and work on her other

objectives.” Appellant’s Brief, at 20-21.

      As a preliminary matter, in light of our decision to affirm the court’s

termination decree, this issue is moot. See Interest of D.R.-W., 227 A.3d at

917; In re D.A., 801 A.2d 614, 616 (Pa. Super. 2002) (“An issue before a

court is moot if in ruling upon the issue the court cannot enter an order that

has any legal force or effect.”) (citations omitted). Even if it were not moot,

this issue would not merit relief.

      We review goal change orders for an abuse of discretion. See Interest

of D.R.-W., 227 A.3d at 917. The focus of “goal change proceedings, is on

the safety, permanency, and wellbeing of the child and the best interests of

the child must take precedence over all other considerations.” Interest of

H.J., 206 A.3d 22, 25 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted). Section 6351(1)

of the Juvenile Act provides, in pertinent part, that, when considering a

petition for a goal change, the orphans’ court must consider, in pertinent part:

      (1) The continuing necessity for and appropriateness of the
      placement.

      (2) The appropriateness, feasibility and extent of compliance with
      the permanency plan developed for the child.

      (3) The extent of progress made toward alleviating              the
      circumstances which necessitated the original placement.

                                     - 17 -
J-S09012-24

      (4) The appropriateness and feasibility of the current placement
      goal for the child.
                                * * *

      (6)   Whether the child is safe.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(f)(1)-(4), (6). “Once the court makes these findings, it

must determine whether reunification, adoption, or placing the child with a

legal guardian is best suited to the child’s safety, protection, and physical,

mental and moral welfare.” In re K.J., 27 A.3d 236, 242 (Pa. Super. 2011)

(citation omitted); see 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(f.1). “The [C]ourt cannot and

will not subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stability to

a parent’s claims of progress and hope for the future.” In re Adoption of

J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 325 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted).

      Instantly, the evidence supports Child’s goal change from reunification

to adoption. Gale testified Child’s goal of reunification with Mother was

inappropriate. See N.T. TPR Hearing, 11/6/23, at 211. Child was removed

from Mother’s home over three years ago, and Mother has made minimal

efforts for reunification. See id. Mother has made very little progress in

alleviating the circumstances that necessitated the original placement.

Changing the goal to adoption is appropriate for Child’s stability, safety and

welfare, particularly where there are multiple resources available to adopt her.

See id. at 212.

      The court did not abuse its discretion in changing Child’s permanency

goal to adoption. We affirm the order changing Child’s permanency goal from

                                     - 18 -
J-S09012-24

reunification to adoption and the decree involuntarily terminating Mother’s

parental rights.

      Order and decree affirmed.

Date: 4/4/2024

                                   - 19 -