Court Opinion

ID: 9696067
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:34:53.743245+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:18.133960
License: Public Domain

T. M. Burns, J.
(dissenting). I cannot subscribe to the result reached by the majority. In Meli v General Motors Corp, 37 Mich App 514; 195 NW2d 85 (1972), an accelerator spring on an automobile became disconnected and caused an accident. Although we affirmed the entry of a directed verdict for the defendant (the manufacturer) on the grounds that there was no evidence at all by which a jury could conclude that the spring became disconnected because of a defect in the spring mechanism, we noted that where an enclosed part such as a braking device failed, it could be reasonably concluded that the defect was caused by the manufacturer rather than by an independent cause. Here in light of the fact that the alleged defect occurred in a "closed” power braking system and the plaintiff testified that the brake pedal would not depress when he attempted to stop the auto, a reasonable person could logically infer that the brake mechanism was defective and that such defect existed when the vehicle left the defendant’s control, and, of course, this question of fact would be for the jury to determine.
Therefore, it is my opinion that there was a sufficient amount of evidence presented to warrant the denial of defendant’s motion for directed verdict. However, balancing the plaintiffs’ testimony against the investigating officer’s testimony that the brakes of defendant’s vehicle were in good working order immediately after the accident and especially the officer’s testimony as to the existence of skid marks left by the auto at the scene of the accident, I find the jury’s verdict to be against *672the great weight of the evidence. Consequently rather than reversing and remanding for the entry of a directed verdict as the majority has done, I would reverse and remand the case for a new trial.