Court Opinion

ID: 9893528
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-27 16:09:26.358284+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:24.985649
License: Public Domain

J-A11001-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  BARBARA J WOLFE                              :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1051 WDA 2022

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 31, 2022
                In the Court of Common Pleas of Forest County
             Criminal Division at No.: CP-27-CR-0000038-2021

BEFORE:      BENDER, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                         FILED: October 27, 2023

       Appellant Barbara J. Wolfe appeals from the August 31, 2022 judgment

of sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Forest County (“trial

court”), following her nolo contendere plea to conspiracy to commit rape of a

mentally ill victim and indecent assault.1 Upon review, we affirm.

       The facts and procedural history of this case are undisputed.          As

summarized by the trial court:

       On July 19, 2021, [Appellant] was charged with involuntary
       deviate sexual intercourse with a child under the age of 16, a
       felony of the first degree, conspiracy to commit rape of a mentally
       ill or deficient victim, a felony of the first degree, aggravated
       indecent assault, a felony of the second degree, indecent assault,
       a misdemeanor of the first degree, and photographing, filming or
       depicting on a computer a sex act with a child, a felony of the
       second degree. The offense date was February 1, 1994, and the
____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 903, and 3126(a)(6), respectively.
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     statutes in question were the ones in effect on that date.
     [Appellant] was charged after her husband delivered a video
     recording and note to a county district attorney’s office. The video
     depicted [Appellant] and her husband sexually assaulting the
     husband’s 11-month-old granddaughter at the couple’s home in
     Forest County.       The video depicted [Appellant] digitally
     penetrating and manipulating the infant’s vagina and [Appellant]
     performing oral sex upon the child. She also filmed her husband
     doing the same as well as her husband penetrating the victim’s
     vagina with his penis. The note indicated who the individuals were
     in the recording and where and when the offenses occurred. The
     husband indicated that he intended to commit suicide and
     immediately did that after he delivered the materials.

     On April 20, 2022, [Appellant] entered a plea of nolo contendere
     to conspiracy to commit rape of a mentally ill, a felony of the first
     degree, and indecent assault, a misdemeanor of the first degree.
     The plea was entered as an “open” plea with no sentence
     agreement. The Commonwealth and [Appellant] stipulated at the
     time of the plea that there would be no registration requirement
     as the offenses predated the Megan’s Law and Sex Offender
     Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) statutes, and no
     sexually violent predator assessment by the sexual offender’s
     assessment board was mandated. On August 31, 2022, the court
     sentenced [Appellant] to a state correctional institution for forty-
     seven (47) months to ninety-four (94) months for conspiracy to
     commit rape, and a consecutive sentence of eleven (11) months
     to twenty-two (22) months for indecent assault. The aggregate
     sentence was for a minimum of fifty-eight (58) months to a
     maximum of one hundred sixteen (116) months. Both sentences
     were at the high end of the standard range of the sentencing
     guidelines in effect at the date of the offense.

     No timely post sentence motion was filed by [Appellant]. On
     September 14, 2022, [Appellant] filed a timely appeal to the
     Pennsylvania Superior Court. On September 15, 2022, the court
     entered an order directing [Appellant] to file a concise statement
     of matters complained of on appeal within twenty-one (21) days.
     [Appellant] filed a timely concise statement on October 3, 2022.
     Also, on October 3, 2022, [Appellant] filed a motion to modify
     sentence nunc pro tunc. On that date, the court entered an order
     dismissing the motion as the court lacked jurisdiction under
     Pa.R.A.P. 1701(b)(3).       [Appellant’s] statement of matters
     complained of on appeal set forth the solitary issue that “the court

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      erred in imposing a sentence that was manifestly excessive in
      length.”

Trial Court Opinion, 10/20/22, at 1-3 (unnecessary capitalizations and

footnotes omitted).

      On appeal, Appellant repeats the same argument, i.e., the trial court

abused its discretion “in imposing a sentence manifestly excessive in length.”

Appellant’s Brief at 6.

      Appellant’s sole issue implicates the discretionary aspects of sentencing.

In this regards, it is well-settled that “[t]he right to appeal a discretionary

aspect of sentence is not absolute.” Commonwealth v. Dunphy, 20 A.3d

1215, 1220 (Pa. Super. 2011). Rather, where an appellant challenges the

discretionary aspects of a sentence, an appellant’s appeal should be

considered as a petition for allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. W.H.M.,

932 A.2d 155, 162 (Pa. Super. 2007). As we stated in Commonwealth v.

Moury, 992 A.2d 162 (Pa. Super. 2010):

      An appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence
      must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:

         [W]e conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether
         appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P.
         902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved
         at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify
         sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether appellant’s
         brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether
         there is a substantial question that the sentence appealed
         from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42
         Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

Id. at 170 (citing Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528 (Pa. Super.

2006)). Whether a particular issue constitutes a substantial question about

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the appropriateness of sentence is a question to be evaluated on a case-by-

case basis. See Commonwealth v. Kenner, 784 A.2d 808, 811 (Pa. Super.

2001), appeal denied, 796 A.2d 979 (Pa. 2002).

      Here, we must note at the outset that Appellant has waived his

sentencing claim for multiple reasons. As the Commonwealth points out and

our review of the record confirms, she principally failed to preserve this claim

for our review because she did not raise it before the trial court at sentencing

or in the post-sentence motion.      See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(1); see also

Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 935 (Pa. Super. 2013) (holding

objections to discretionary aspects of sentence are generally waived if not

raised at sentencing or preserved in a post-sentence motion).                In

Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030 (Pa. Super. 2013), we explained

that “issues challenging the discretionary aspects of a sentence must be raised

in a post-sentence motion or by presenting the claim to the trial court during

the sentencing proceedings.       Absent such efforts, an objection to a

discretionary aspect of a sentence is waived.” Cartrette, 83 A.3d at 1042

(citation omitted). Relatedly, it is axiomatic that “[i]ssues not raised in the

trial court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”

Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). Additionally, as happened here, an appellant may not raise

an issue for the first time in a Rule 1925(b) Statement. Commonwealth v.

Tejada, 107 A.3d 788, 799 (Pa. Super. 2015). Finally, another reason why

Appellant’s sentencing issue is waived is because she failed to include in her

appellate brief a Rule. 2119(f) statement and the Commonwealth has objected

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to its absence.   See Commonwealth v. Kiesel, 854 A.2d 530, 533 (Pa.

Super. 2004) (noting that we are precluded from reviewing the merits of a

sentencing claim if the Commonwealth objects to the omission of a Rule

2119(f) statement). Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled to relief.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Date: 10/27/2023

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