Court Opinion

ID: 9901569
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-22 04:00:24.264139+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:35.115424
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                     For the First Circuit

No. 23-1902

                      JOHN ANTHONY CASTRO,

                      Plaintiff, Appellant,

                               v.

        DAVID SCANLAN, New Hampshire Secretary of State;
                        DONALD J. TRUMP,

                     Defendants, Appellees.

          APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
               FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

         [Hon. Joseph N. Laplante, U.S. District Judge]

                             Before

                       Barron, Chief Judge,
              Gelpí and Montecalvo, Circuit Judges.

     John Anthony Castro, pro se.
     Samuel R.V. Garland, Senior Assistant Attorney General, New
Hampshire Department of Justice, with whom John M. Formella, New
Hampshire Attorney General, and Anthony J. Galdieri, New Hampshire
Solicitor General, were on brief, for appellee David Scanlan.
     Gary M. Lawkowski, with whom Ronald D. Colman, Dhillon Law
Group, Inc., Richard J. Lehhmann, and Lehmann Major List, PLLC,
were on the brief, for appellee Donald J. Trump.

                        November 21, 2023
                 BARRON, Chief Judge.   Does Section 3 of the Fourteenth

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution ("Section 3") bar the former

President, Donald J. Trump, from "holding" the Office of President

of the United States again on the ground that he "engaged in

insurrection or rebellion against [the U.S. Constitution], or

[gave] aid or comfort to the enemies thereof"?1                   John Anthony

Castro filed suit in the federal District Court in New Hampshire

alleging that Section 3 does impose that bar, and, on that basis,

he sought to enjoin the New Hampshire Secretary of State (the

"Secretary") from "accepting or processing" the former President's

"ballot access documentation" for the 2024 Republican presidential

primary in that state.         The District Court then dismissed the suit

on jurisdictional grounds, ruling that Castro lacked standing

under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, see U.S. Const. art.

III,       § 2    (limiting    "the   judicial    power"    to    "Cases"     or

"Controversies"),        and   that   his   Section   3   claim   presented   a

nonjusticiable "political question," see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.

       Section 3 provides: "No person shall be a Senator or
       1

Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice-
President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United
States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath,
as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or
as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or
judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the
United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion
against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof.
But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove
such disability." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 3.

                                      - 2 -
186 (1962); Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).   Castro

now challenges the rulings in this appeal.

           Castro's underlying suit raises a host of questions

about the meaning of Section 3 and the role, if any, that federal

courts may play in enforcing it.   The questions range from whether

Section 3 applies to a political party's primary election to

whether the provision's prohibition is self-executing to what kind

of conduct constitutes "engag[ing] in insurrection or rebellion

against the [U.S. Constitution], or giv[ing] aid or comfort to the

enemies thereof."   We may address such questions, however, only if

Castro's suit is a "Case[]" or "Controversy[]" within the meaning

of Article III of the U.S. Constitution.   And, as we will explain,

we conclude that Castro's suit is not because, although he is a

registered political candidate for president, he has failed to

show that he can satisfy what is known as the "injury-in-fact"

component of Article III standing.      Accordingly, we affirm the

District Court's judgment.

                                I.

           Appearing pro se, Castro filed his complaint in the

District of New Hampshire on September 5, 2023.      The complaint

named as defendants both the Secretary, David Scanlan, and the

former President, Donald J. Trump.2    The New Hampshire Republican

     2   In their briefings on appeal, the parties dispute former

                               - 3 -
State Committee later intervened as a party of interest pursuant

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24.

            Castro      alleged in    his complaint       that he        is a U.S.

Citizen, a resident of Mansfield, Texas, and a "Republican primary

presidential       candidate . . . for         the       2024      [p]residential

election."        He    further   alleged   that    he   was    registered    as   a

candidate    in    that    election    with   the    U.S.       Federal    Election

Commission (the "FEC") and that he was "currently competing against

Donald J. Trump for the Republican nomination for the Presidency

of the United States."

            Castro attached a "Verification" to his complaint in

which he "declare[d]" that he "intend[ed] to either appear on the

2024 Republican primary ballot in [New Hampshire] or to file

documentation to be a formally recognized write-in candidate in

both the primary and general elections."3                   The complaint also

alleged     that       "[b]ecause    [New   Hampshire]         permits     write-in

candidates and their votes to be counted, ballot placement is not

President Trump's status as a merely "nominal defendant" against
whom Castro seeks no redress. Because we do not reach the issue
of redressability, however, we need not resolve this dispute.
     3 "A copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a
pleading is a part of the pleading for all purposes." Fed. R.
Civ. P. 10(c); see also Newman v. Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., 901
F.3d 19, 26 (1st Cir. 2018).

                                      - 4 -
legally determinative of the legal inquiry as to whether an

individual is a 'candidate' under [New Hampshire] law."

                 The    complaint   asserted    that    Section     3    "creates   an

implied cause of action for a fellow candidate to obtain relief

for     a    political      competitive    injury       by     challenging     another

candidate's constitutional eligibility on the grounds that they

engaged in or provided 'aid or comfort' to an insurrection."                        The

complaint also asserted that Section 3's bar applies to the Office

of the President of the United States and that the bar applies to

the former President because his conduct in relation to the last

presidential election amounted to providing "'aid or comfort' to

an insurrection."           The complaint then described various specific

actions that the former President assertedly took before and after

the 2020 presidential election that, according to the complaint,

constitute the kind of conduct that triggers Section 3's bar.

                 Castro moved on September 17 for a temporary restraining

order       to    prevent    the    Secretary    from        accepting   the   former

President's declaration of candidacy and requested an expedited

preliminary injunction hearing consolidated with a bench trial on

the merits.            Castro noted in the motion that the Secretary had

announced, on September 13, that the filing period for declarations

of candidacy, which candidates must submit along with a $1,000

filing fee in order to appear on the primary ballot in New

                                        - 5 -
Hampshire,4 would open on October 11 and close on October 27, and

Castro asserted that he intended to file his declaration of

candidacy and pay his filing fee on October 11.

            The Secretary opposed the motion on the ground that

Castro lacked standing under Article III of the Constitution, which

limits    the   judicial   power   to   the   resolution   of   "Cases"   and

"Controversies."     U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see Webb v.

Injured Workers Pharmacy, LLC, 72 F.4th 365, 371 (1st Cir. 2023).

To establish standing, a plaintiff must allege the "'familiar

amalgam of injury in fact, causation, and redressability,' which

injury must be 'both concrete and particularized and actual or

imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.'"          Efreom v. McKee, 46

F.4th 9, 21 (1st Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted)

(quoting Hochendoner v. Genzyme Corp., 823 F.3d 724, 731 (1st Cir.

2016)).

            Castro alleged in his complaint that he had standing

under the doctrine of "political competitor standing," as he

alleged that he would "suffer a concrete competitive injury" in

     4 See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§655:47 ("The names of any persons
to be voted upon as candidates for president at the presidential
primary shall be printed on the ballots upon the filing of
declarations of candidacy with the secretary of state"), 655:48
("No candidate for the office of president shall have his or her
name placed on the ballot for the presidential primary unless the
candidate shall pay to the secretary of state at the time of filing
the declaration of candidacy a fee of $1,000.").

                                   - 6 -
the form of "a diminution of votes and/or fundraising" in New

Hampshire if the former President were permitted to appear on New

Hampshire's 2024 Republican primary ballot despite Section 3.                  The

Secretary    argued,      however,   that    Castro      could   not     establish

standing    because    he    could     not     satisfy     the   causation     and

redressability requirements.         According to the Secretary, Castro's

alleged    injury   was    traceable    only    to   the   former      President's

candidacy itself and not to the Secretary's acceptance of the

former President's ballot-access documentation.              In advancing that

contention, the Secretary pointed out that the former President

could run as a write-in candidate in the primary even if the

Secretary were enjoined from placing the former President's name

on the primary ballot.        The Secretary took no position, however,

on whether Castro had alleged an injury in fact, though the

Secretary did urge the District Court to fulfill its "independent

obligation to assure that standing exists."              Sec. State Obj. Pl.'s

Req. Injunctive Relief at ¶ 19, Castro v. Scanlan, Civ. No. 23-

0416-JL (D.N.H. Sept. 29, 2023), ECF No. 27 (quoting Hernández-

Gotay v. United States, 985 F.3d 71, 77 (1st Cir. 2021)).

            On the same day that the Secretary filed his opposition

to Castro's motion, the former President moved to dismiss Castro's

complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).             The former President's

                                     - 7 -
motion incorporated the Secretary's causation and redressability

arguments and asserted that Castro had not established standing

because he had failed to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement.

The motion argued that Castro had "fail[ed] to plausibly allege

that [competing with the former President] injures him in any

particularized or concrete fashion," such as by "identif[ying] a

single voter who identifies Castro as his or her 'second choice'

after Donald Trump" or otherwise "support[ing] the inherently

improbable claim that there is a latent Castro movement that would

surface, if only Trump [were] not on the ballot."             In addition,

the motion asserted that Castro's Section 3 claim presented a

nonjusticiable political question.

          The   District   Court    held   an   evidentiary    hearing   on

October 20 on the question of jurisdiction.       Prior to the hearing,

Castro submitted an affidavit and receipt showing that on October

11, which was five weeks after he had filed his complaint, he had

filed his New Hampshire declaration of candidacy and paid the

requisite $1,000 filing fee to the Secretary.        At the evidentiary

hearing, the District Court admitted into evidence both Castro's

affidavit and receipt as well as the parties' joint stipulation of

facts.

          The District Court then heard the testimony of Michael

Dennehy, a witness put forward by the New Hampshire Republican

                                   - 8 -
State   Committee         and    a    political       consultant            and   campaign

strategist.    Dennehy testified to his opinion that Castro "[i]s

not a serious candidate" for president and that Trump's absence

from the New Hampshire primary ballot "would have no impact" on

Castro's    primary   chances         "[b]ecause      there       is   no    activity   to

[Castro's] campaign."           Dennehy did acknowledge that he had located

and viewed a website advertising Castro's presidential campaign,

but he described the website as "amateur," "incomplete," and

"certainly    not    what       you   would    consider       a    national       campaign

website."

            Finally, the District Court heard testimony from Castro,

who asserted that he planned to "ramp up [his campaign] activities"

leading up to the New Hampshire primary. But on cross-examination,

Castro admitted that his campaign, to date, had employed no staff

in New Hampshire or any other state, had run no advertisements in

New Hampshire or any other state, and had engaged in no campaign

activities    in    New    Hampshire     or     any   other       state      "apart   from

lawsuits" similar to this one.                Castro also confirmed that, in a

series of Twitter posts published on November 18, 2021, he had

"stated [his] belief that Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment

disqualified Donald Trump from holding public office," written

that "only a fellow Republican presidential primary candidate has

federal judicial standing to sue Trump to remove him from the

                                        - 9 -
ballot," and then announced that he "intend[ed] to pursue the

Republican nomination for the presidency of the United States in

2024 [and to] bring a federal lawsuit against Trump to disqualify

him from being on the ballot in every swing state."             As to the

issue of his forward-looking "campaign strategy," Castro averred,

"Keep watching and learn."

          A week after the hearing, on October 27, the District

Court issued a memorandum and order that denied Castro's request

for injunctive relief and granted the former President's motion to

dismiss   Castro's    complaint     for     lack   of   subject       matter

jurisdiction.    The District Court reasoned that Castro had failed

to establish that he had standing and that his Section 3 claim

presented a political question.

          With   respect   to   standing,    the   District   Court   first

determined that Castro had failed to satisfy the injury-in-fact

requirement.    The District Court reasoned that Castro had made "no

attempt to demonstrate that he is actually competing with Trump

for votes and contributions, as required under the operative

competitor standing theory"; that the alleged injury was too

"speculative, as it depends on what voters and contributors . . .

may do if Trump's name is not listed on the New Hampshire primary

ballot"; and that, by filing as a Republican presidential primary

candidate, Castro had impermissibly attempted to "creat[e] his own

                                  - 10 -
injury in order to manufacture standing to challenge Trump's

eligibility to run for president."

           The District Court also concluded that Castro failed to

establish standing because had not met his burden to satisfy the

causation and redressability requirements.          The District Court

reasoned that Castro had not shown that his alleged injury was

traceable to the Secretary or that it could be redressed by the

requested relief because "Castro acknowledges[] that [the former

President's] absence from the primary ballot would not affect the

number of votes or contributions Castro would receive."

           The District Court then shifted focus and explained why,

the issue of standing aside, the complaint had to be dismissed

because   Castro's   Section   3   claim    presented   a   nonjusticiable

political question.     Here, the District Court determined that

"state and federal district courts have consistently found that

the U.S. Constitution assigns to Congress and the electors, and

not the courts, the role of determining if a presidential candidate

or president is qualified and fit for office -- at least in the

first instance."

           In so ruling, the District Court rejected as "wholly

underdeveloped and unsubstantiated" Castro's argument that the

political question doctrine did not bar his suit because the

political question cases that the defendants cited "were initiated

                                   - 11 -
or    decided    after        the   political    parties      held   their       national

conventions      to    select       presidential     nominees,"      and    that    "this

circumstance alone 'proves that the political question doctrine

applies    only       after     the    major    political     parties      hold     their

conventions.'"          Observing that Castro had not presented "any

factual or legal authority" on which to rest such a distinction,

the   District        Court    found    that    it   could    not    accept      Castro's

position.

            Castro timely filed his notice of appeal.                            He then

requested an expedited briefing schedule, which we granted, though

we denied his motion for initial hearing en banc.

            In his brief on appeal, Castro takes aim at both grounds

that the District Court gave for dismissing the complaint.                         Castro

notes in his brief, with respect to standing, that on October 23,

the former President filed his declaration of candidacy in New

Hampshire       and    paid     the    requisite     $1,000    filing      fee    to   the

Secretary.5       Castro also argues that the District Court erred by

not "reserv[ing] ruling on jurisdiction to allow the facts [to]

       Because the sole relief that Castro seeks is an injunction
       5

preventing the Secretary from "accepting [or] processing . . .
Trump's ballot access documentation," there is a question as to
whether this case is moot. See Harris v. Univ. Mass. Lowell, 43
F.4th 187, 191–92 (1st Cir. 2022). But because we conclude that
Castro lacks standing, we need not address this potential
alternative ground for dismissal, which we note the parties have
not briefed.

                                         - 12 -
materialize" that Castro claims establish his standing, including

that he ultimately registered as a New Hampshire primary candidate

and has since "dispatched campaign staffers to New Hampshire to

knock on doors and place hundreds of campaign signs" and ordered

"thousands of postcards" to mail to New Hampshire voters.        He

asserts in that regard that the District Court's standing ruling

rested on a "baseless assumption that [Castro] would never engage

in any campaign activity in New Hampshire," and he asks us to

reverse and remand for a trial on the merits of his request for

injunctive relief.

                                II.

          The District Court dismissed Castro's complaint on two

independently sufficient jurisdictional grounds.    See Schlesinger

v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 215 (1974)

(summarizing that "the concept of justiciability . . . embodies

both the standing and political question doctrines," such that

"either the absence of standing or the presence of a political

question suffices to prevent the power of the federal judiciary

from being invoked by the complaining party").      We confine our

analysis, however, to the issue of standing and, specifically, to

the question of whether Castro has met his burden to satisfy the

injury-in-fact requirement, see TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S.

Ct. 2190, 2207–08 (2021).   We do so both because Castro has clearly

                               - 13 -
failed to meet that burden and because of the limited nature of

the arguments that he makes about the more generally consequential

political question issue.         Cf. Doe v. Bush, 323 F.3d 133, 139–40

(1st Cir. 2003) (clarifying that this court affirmed dismissal

"based on ripeness rather than the political question doctrine,"

and noting that like the Supreme Court, "[o]ur court has been

similarly   sparing   in    its   reliance    on   the   political   question

doctrine").

                                      A.

            In undertaking our independent obligation to ensure that

Castro   has   met    his   burden    to     satisfy     the   injury-in-fact

requirement, Hernández-Gotay, 985 F.3d at 77, we emphasize that

the facts that matter are "the facts as they existed at the time

the [operative] complaint was filed."         Steir v. Girl Scouts of the

USA, 383 F.3d 7, 15 (1st Cir. 2004) (citing Mangual v. Rotger-

Sabat, 317 F.3d 45, 58 (1st Cir. 2003)); see Keene Corp. v. United

States, 508 U.S. 200, 207–08 (1993) (in affirming a motion to

dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, considering the facts as they

existed at the time the complaint was filed, rather than, as

plaintiff urged, at the time of the trial court's ruling on the

motion to dismiss); see also Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S.

555, 569 n.4 (1992) (rejecting the theory that events after the

filing of a suit's operative complaint had "retroactively created

                                    - 14 -
a redressability (and hence a jurisdiction) that did not exist at

the outset" of litigation).      Castro thus cannot show that he has

satisfied      the   injury-in-fact   requirement     on   the    basis    of

developments that concern his participation in the New Hampshire

Republican presidential primary that occurred after he filed his

complaint, even assuming that those developments might suffice to

establish that he did have standing as of that time but not before.

            Notably, Castro does not suggest that his claimed injury

stems from a restriction that has been placed on his ability to

run in the 2024 New Hampshire Republican presidential primary.              He

contends that his injury stems solely from the absence of a

restriction on the ability of someone else to run in that race.

Castro thus premises his claimed injury-in-fact entirely on a

theory    of    political   competitor    standing,    see,      e.g.,    Tex.

Democratic Party v. Benkiser, 459 F.3d 582, 586–87 (5th Cir. 2006);

Shays v. FEC, 414 F.3d 76, 83, 87 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Fulani v.

League of Women Voters Educ. Fund, 882 F.2d 621, 626–27 (2d Cir.

1989), even though neither our Circuit nor the Supreme Court of

the United States yet has had occasion to expressly recognize that

theory.

            That said, the theory of standing that Castro asks us to

accept derives its logic from a standing doctrine that the Supreme

Court and our Circuit have expressly recognized: the doctrine of

                                 - 15 -
economic competitor standing.         See Clinton v. City of New York,

524 U.S. 417, 433 (1998); Adams v. Watson, 10 F.3d 915, 921–22

(1st Cir. 1993).      Under that doctrine, a plaintiff can satisfy the

injury-in-fact       requirement   based     on   a    showing   of     "probable

economic injury resulting from [governmental actions] that alter

competitive conditions."       Clinton, 524 U.S. at 433 (alteration in

original) (quoting 3 K. Davis & R. Pierce, Admin. L. Treatise 13–

14 (3d ed. 1994)).

           The logic of the economic competitor standing doctrine

is "firmly rooted in the basic law[] of economics" that one direct

competitor's gain of market share is another's loss.                      United

Transp. Union v. Interstate Com. Comm'n, 891 F.2d 908, 912 n.7

(D.C. Cir. 1989).      Not surprisingly, therefore, "[i]mplicit in the

reasoning"      of   the   cases   that    recognize     economic     competitor

standing is "a requirement that in order to establish an injury as

a competitor a plaintiff must show that he personally competes in

the same arena with the party to whom the government has bestowed

the assertedly illegal benefit."          In re U.S. Cath. Conf. (Abortion

Rights Mobilization Inc. v. Baker), 885 F.2d 1020, 1029 (2d Cir.

1989).

           In other words, the notion that a competitive injury can

satisfy   the    injury-in-fact     requirement        is   "premised    on   the

[plaintiff's] status as a direct and current competitor whose

                                    - 16 -
bottom line may be adversely affected by the challenged government

action."   New World Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 294 F.3d 164, 170 (D.C.

Cir. 2002) (emphasis in original).     At the same time, to show such

an injury, a plaintiff need not show "currently realized economic

loss." Watson, 10 F.3d at 920–21 (emphasis in original). However,

if a plaintiff who seeks to show such an injury does not show an

already realized loss, then the asserted injury must be premised,

"at a minimum, on particularized future economic injury which,

though latent, nonetheless qualifies as imminent."6     Id.

           We do also note, however, that although the parties make

no mention of it, there is precedent from our Circuit that draws

on the logic of the theory of political competitor standing without

directly adopting it.    See Becker v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 230

F.3d 381, 385–89 & n.5 (1st Cir. 2000) (concluding that third-

party presidential candidate Ralph Nader had standing to challenge

     6 In a case upon which Castro relies heavily, Mendoza v.
Perez, 754 F.3d 1002, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 2014), the D.C. Circuit held
that a group of plaintiffs had standing to challenge conditions in
the sheep herding market even though they did "not currently work
as herders and ha[d] not filled out formal job applications." This
was because the plaintiffs were nonetheless still "informal[ly]"
but directly and currently "involve[d] in [the] market" due to
their continued monitoring of it with the intention and ability to
enter it "if conditions improve[d]."     Id.   In recognizing that
"informal" involvement in a market can satisfy competitor
standing, Mendoza did not undermine the rule that a plaintiff must
show that they are "in fact a direct and current competitor" to
have competitor standing. Air Excursions LLC v. Yellen, 66 F.4th
272, 280 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (discussing Mendoza) (internal quotation
marks omitted).

                              - 17 -
FEC regulations permitting corporate sponsorship of presidential

debates because the regulations "threatened to force Nader to

decline an invitation to participate in the debates, and that

threat affected the conduct of his campaign" and put him "at a

competitive disadvantage in the presidential race"); see also Vote

Choice,   Inc.    v.    DiStefano,    4   F.3d   26,   37   (1st    Cir.   1993)

(concluding      that   a   gubernatorial     candidate     had    standing   to

challenge a state public campaign financing scheme in part because

"having decided to forgo [public financing], she had to structure

her campaign to account for her adversaries' potential receipt of

television time, fundraising advantages, and the like").                We draw

on this precedent, too, in the analysis that follows.

                                       B.

           Castro contends that he can satisfy the injury-in-fact

requirement here because he can show that he is "a direct and

current competitor"         of the former     President in the        2024 New

Hampshire Republican presidential primary, New World Radio, 294

F.3d at 170 (emphasis in original).           Thus, Castro's contention on

appeal is that the District Court erred in determining that he

failed to show that he was a competitor of such a direct and

current kind.

           Because political markets are hardly governed by the

same "basic law[]" as economic ones, United Transp. Union, 891

                                     - 18 -
F.2d at 913 n.7, there is necessarily some uncertainty as to how

we should analogize the political realm to the economic one for

standing purposes.    As a result, there is also some uncertainty as

to what it means to be a "direct and current" competitor in the

political context.     We find some guidance, though, in the fact

that Article III empowers federal courts to address only "Cases"

or "Controversies."

            This   limitation   on   the    judicial    power   prevents    a

plaintiff from invoking the Article III jurisdiction of a federal

court by asserting what is merely a "general interest common to

all members of the public."      Carney v. Adams, 141 S. Ct. 493, 499

(2020) (quoting Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 440 (2007) (per

curiam)).    Therefore, we must be careful not to define "a direct

and current competitor" in the political context, New World Radio,

294 F.3d at 170 (emphasis omitted), in a manner that would "weaken

the longstanding legal doctrine preventing [federal courts] from

providing advisory opinions at the request of one who, without

other   concrete   injury,   believes      that   the   government   is   not

following the law."     Carney, 141 S. Ct at 501.

            As a result, we cannot define a "direct and current

competitor" in the political context so loosely that a claim of

political competitor injury becomes a means by which a federal

court entertains a suit based on what is, in effect, a generalized

                                 - 19 -
concern that a particular individual is not lawfully entitled to

run for office.        We must define such a competitor in a manner that

ensures   that        the    plaintiff    who     claims    political    competitor

standing has "[t]he requisite personal interest," id. at 499

(citation and quotation marks omitted), in the determination of

the   constitutionality         of   a   rival    candidate's     eligibility   for

office in consequence of a "concrete, particularized 'injury in

fact' over and above the abstract generalized grievance suffered

by all citizens . . . who (if [the plaintiff] is right) must live

in a State subject to an unconstitutional" electoral process.                   Id.

           This conclusion accords, we add, with our decision in

Becker. There, we held that a presidential candidate, Ralph Nader,

had   standing    to        challenge    the     FEC's     regulations   permitting

corporate sponsorship of debates put on by the Commission on

Presidential Debates ("CPD").              Becker, 230 F.3d at 385-89.           We

explained that Nader satisfied the injury-in-fact requirement by

showing that the FEC's regulations put him to the "coerced choice"

of either participating in a presidential debate with corporate

sponsorship      or    suffering     a    competitive       disadvantage   by   not

participating.        See id. at 387.

           We then went on in a footnote to describe as "flawed"

the FEC's contention that Nader could not satisfy the causation

component of standing.          See id. at 387 n.5.          We explained that the

                                         - 20 -
FEC had argued that insofar as Nader was claiming standing based

on the FEC's having placed him at a competitive disadvantage in

the presidential race, the FEC had so placed him only by giving a

benefit to the CPD.     See id.    Yet, the FEC emphasized, Nader was

not "compet[ing] in the same arena" as the CPD itself.           Id.   We

were not persuaded because, as we pointed out, the FEC's argument

ignored the fact that the challenged FEC regulations resulted in

"free   television    exposure    for   the   debate   participants;   and

obviously Nader      competes in the same arena with these other

candidates."   Id. (emphasis added).

           Against this backdrop, we conclude that for Castro to

show that he was a "direct and current competitor" at the time he

filed his complaint he must show, at the very least, that at that

time he was "competing" with the former President and that he was

doing so in the 2024 New Hampshire Republican presidential primary

itself.   Otherwise, we do not see how Castro can show that at the

time he was "compet[ing] in the same arena" with the former

President, id., and that he stood to be "adversely affected [in

that arena] by the challenged government action." New World Radio,

294 F.3d at 170.     In addition, we conclude that for Castro to show

that he was a "direct and current" competitor at that time,

id. -- or, to use Becker's way of putting it, that he was a

competitor "in the same arena," 230 F.3d at 387 n.5 -- he must

                                  - 21 -
show that he was then competing with the former President for

voters and/or contributors in that primary.

              Our reasons for this last conclusion are as follows.

Not even Castro disputes that, to distinguish his claimed injury

from a generalized interest in ensuring legal compliance, he must

show that his status as a political candidate gave rise to the

kind of injury that he claims.          And Castro himself describes his

injury   in    his    complaint   as   "a   diminution     of   votes   and/or

fundraising" in the primary at issue.           Thus, it stands to reason

that he must show that, at the time of his complaint, he was

competing with the former President for voters or contributors in

relation to the New Hampshire race itself -- or, at the least,

that it would not be overly speculative to conclude that he would

do so.   For, otherwise, his claimed injury would not be "concrete

and   particularized,"      and   would     instead   be   "conjectural    or

hypothetical."       Carney, 141 S. Ct. at 498 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S.

at 560–61).

                                       C.

              Having laid out the applicable legal framework in some

detail, we are now ready to apply it to the record at hand.              As we

will explain, we conclude that, reviewing de novo, see Bingham v.

Massachusetts, 616 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2010), Castro has failed to

show that he was a "direct and current competitor."

                                   - 22 -
                                   1.

          As an initial matter, Castro did not allege in his

complaint that, when he filed it, he was on the ballot in the 2024

New Hampshire Republican presidential primary, had taken the steps

necessary for him to appear on that ballot, or even intended to

take such steps.    Instead, with respect to that primary, he merely

stated in the "Verification" attached to his complaint that he

"intend[ed] to either appear on the 2024 Republican primary ballot

in [New Hampshire] or to file documentation to be a formally

recognized write-in candidate in both the primary and general

elections" (emphasis added).     It was on that limited basis that,

at the time of the complaint's filing, he asserted: "As such, I

will maintain 'standing' throughout the course of this litigation"

(emphasis added).

          The   Verification's   conditional phrasing   shows   -- at

least concretely -- no more than that Castro intended, at the time

of the complaint, to seek documentation that would permit him to

become a "formally recognized" write-in candidate in the New

Hampshire Republican presidential primary.     Moreover, the record

reveals that thereafter Castro made no showing that, as of the

time of filing his complaint, he was in fact competing for votes

or contributions in that contest, let alone competing with the

former President for them.    In fact, while Castro alleged that at

                                 - 23 -
the time of the complaint's filing he had registered with the FEC

as a candidate for President, he stipulated (and later confirmed

through his testimony at the evidentiary hearing) that, as of that

time, and indeed for weeks afterward, he did "not yet have a

campaign office in New Hampshire," did "not yet have employees in

New Hampshire," was "not yet running any advertisements in New

Hampshire," and was "not yet engaging in campaign activities in

New Hampshire other than this lawsuit" (emphasis added).                   And,

with   respect   to   the    question   of   whether   he   had   a   "campaign

strategy," Castro asserted, "Keep watching and learn."

            Thus, the record from the evidentiary hearing reveals

what is at most an overly speculative basis for finding that, as

of the time of the filing of the complaint, Castro intended to do

more than take steps that would enable him to qualify as an

"officially recognized" write-in candidate.            But no authority of

which we are aware -- or that Castro has identified -- suggests

that the mere statement of an intention to seek write-in votes

suffices in and of itself to make an individual a "current and

direct competitor."         New World Radio, 294 F.3d at 170.         In fact,

persuasive authority is directly to the contrary, as Sibley v.

Alexander   explains    that    a   plaintiff's   "status    as   a    write-in

candidate is insufficient" to establish injury-in-fact, 916 F.

Supp. 2d 58, 61 (D.D.C. 2013), "because if it were sufficient any

                                    - 24 -
citizen could obtain standing (in violation of Article III of the

U.S.    Constitution)   by   merely   'self[-]declaring.'"           Sibley    v.

Obama, No. 12–5198, 2012 WL 6603088, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 6, 2012)

(internal citation omitted).

            Thus, for all the record shows, Castro was, at least as

of the time of the complaint, in a similar position to the

plaintiffs in Liberty Legal Foundation v. National Democratic

Party of the USA, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 2d 791 (W.D. Tenn. 2012),

aff'd 575 F. App'x 662 (6th Cir. 2014).            Those plaintiffs claimed

to be "candidates" for the presidency in the 2012 general election

in Tennessee and they claimed on that basis to have standing to

challenge then-President Obama's eligibility to appear on the

ballot in that contest.       Id. at 800-01.      But those plaintiffs were

deemed not to have satisfied the injury-in-fact requirement for

standing because they had not alleged that they were "truly in

competition" with their claimed rival, as they had not shown either

that they "w[ould] appear" on the relevant ballot or that "[they

were]    campaigning    in   the   state   of   Tennessee,    [or]   that     any

registered voter in Tennessee intend[ed] to cast a vote for

[them]."    Id.   The district court in that case, we note, also

determined that those plaintiffs had not done anything to show

"that President Obama's presence on the ballot [would] in any way

injure either candidate's campaign."            Id. at 801.

                                    - 25 -
            Notwithstanding Sibley and Liberty, Castro develops no

argument that he can satisfy his obligation to show injury-in-fact

at the time of his complaint if he can show no more than the

unsuccessful litigants in those cases did. And even though neither

Sibley nor Liberty binds us here, we do not see how we may accept

a definition of a "direct and current competitor" in the political

context that is based on a plaintiff's mere "self-declaration" of

political candidacy.

            Were we to do so, we would be doing what the Supreme

Court explained that it was taking care not to do in Carney:

"weaken[ing]       the   longstanding    legal      doctrine"     that     prevents

federal courts from offering advisory opinions about whether the

law is being followed.        141 S. Ct. at 501.        We would be doing so,

moreover, in a case that asks us to render an opinion on a matter

as important to our democratic system of government as any that is

likely to arise in connection with a claim of political competitor

standing:    may    a    former   President   run    for    the   Office    of   the

President of the United States again even if he is shown to "have

engaged     in     insurrection     or   rebellion         against   the     [U.S.

Constitution], or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof"?

The nature of the question itself shows the need for us to ensure

that the limits on our power to render advisory opinions remain as

                                     - 26 -
strong after we decide this case as they were before it came to

us.

           We add, too, that our analysis in Becker points in the

same direction.   We made clear there that we should not "second-

guess a candidate's reasonable assessment of his own campaign" by

"assum[ing]" the "guises" of "campaign consultants or political

pundits" in assessing the candidate's assertion of how a challenged

governmental action affects their capacity to compete politically.

Becker, 230 F.3d at 387 (emphasis added).   But, at the same time,

we were careful in Becker not to adopt a rule that would "grant[]

standing to any political entrant to challenge" any aspect of an

election that might "someday" affect them, id. at 386 n.4 (emphasis

in original) (internal quotation marks omitted), and we therefore

required the candidate to show a "plausible" chance of being

competitively affected by the conditions that they challenged.

Id.

           It follows that, on this record, we must conclude that

Castro has not shown what he must to establish that he was a direct

and current competitor at the time that he filed his complaint.

Accordingly, it follows that he has not shown that, as of that

time, he had satisfied the injury-in-fact component of the standing

inquiry.

                              - 27 -
                                   2.

           We are not quite finished.       The reason is that we are

aware that there is evidence in the record that shows that, after

Castro filed the operative complaint, he expressed his intent to

travel to New Hampshire on October 11 to file his declaration of

candidacy and pay the $1,000 filing fee to appear on the state's

2024 Republican presidential primary ballot -- and that on October

11, he did so.

           True, Castro did not amend his complaint at that time.

And, as we have explained, he cannot predicate his standing on

post-complaint developments.      See Keene Corp., 508 U.S. at 207–

08.   Nor is it evident what issues concerning mootness or remedies

may arise in relation to any new complaint that may be filed based

on those developments.     Nonetheless, Castro does appear to be

contending that a plaintiff who sues to block another's access to

the ballot necessarily shows that he is a direct and current

competitor    --    and   thus     satisfies      the   injury-in-fact

requirement -- by showing that he will appear (or is likely to

appear) on the relevant ballot.           And if that contention were

correct, it would be evident that an amended complaint in this

case might be filed that could suffice to satisfy the injury-in-

fact requirement.

                                 - 28 -
            The precedents that Castro cites in support of this

contention, though, do not support such a sweeping proposition, at

least given the nature of the plaintiffs who were involved in those

cases and the circumstances of them.           See Shays, 414 F.3d at 82

(sitting members of Congress seeking re-election); Fulani, 882

F.2d   at    625–26    ("significant"      third-party   candidate   for

presidential election contesting the criteria for invitation to

national    debate,   which   invited   only   "significant"   candidates

belonging to a major party, and "not claim[ing] the [debate] was

obligated to include . . . every individual who had announced his

or her candidacy").       Nor are we aware of any case that, when

considered in context, would support such a broad proposition.

Cf. Becker, 230 F.3d at 386 (observing that it was "certainly

possible that Nader would be able to meet the . . . fifteen-percent

showing of support in the national polls" required to qualify for

the presidential debates at issue).

            We also do not see how the logic of political competitor

standing requires this categorical conclusion.        In some cases, the

record might reveal that the only activity in relation to the race

in which a plaintiff seeking such standing engaged -- beyond, that

is, taking steps to secure ballot access like those Castro took

here -- was the pursuit of the legal challenge itself.           And, in

such cases, the record might also show scant indication that any

                                  - 29 -
foreseeable future activity by the plaintiff in relation to that

race would amount to anything more than the further pursuit of

that legal challenge.

            In cases with such a record, though, we could not agree

that the plaintiff had political competitor standing.            And that is

because, given that record, we could not agree that the likely

prospect of the plaintiff's nominal appearance on the ballot would

suffice in and of itself to show a competitive injury with the

requisite degree of concreteness and particularity.

            After all, although steps to secure ballot placement may

suffice on their own to show some kinds of injury-in-fact, cf.

Carney, 141 S. Ct. at 502, a plaintiff like Castro who asserts

political   competitor    standing   does   not   predicate   the   claimed

injury on a bar to the plaintiff's right to receive votes or

campaign funds.    Rather, such a plaintiff predicates the claimed

injury on a failure to limit someone else's right to campaign or

receive votes, as it is that failure that is claimed to give rise

to the competitive injury.

            Thus, because a plaintiff incurs the kind of competitive

injury that grounds Castro's assertion of standing by actually

being   a   putative     rival's   competitor     for   either    votes   or

contributions, we cannot agree that a showing that a plaintiff has

taken the steps required to be placed on the ballot in the primary

                                   - 30 -
contest at issue necessarily always suffices to show such an

injury.   Indeed, if the rule were otherwise, then the theory of

political competitor standing would seem to offer those invoking

it a significant means of effecting an end-run around the usual

bar to a federal court's power to remedy what is in the end merely

a   generalized   grievance.          For,   under   a    rule   of   that   sort,

plaintiffs   would     be     permitted      to    secure    standing    without

adequately distinguishing their interest in the legal outcome of

the case from that of anyone in the same state who is interested

in ensuring legal compliance with that state's ballot access rules

for candidates.      And, we note once again, Becker shows that our

own precedent is not to the contrary.             See Becker, 230 F.3d at 386

n.4 (declining to adopt a rule that would "grant[] standing to any

political entrant to challenge" any aspect of an election that

might   "someday"    affect    them    (emphasis     in   original)     (internal

quotation marks omitted)).

           This general point can be made more concrete by zeroing

in on the features of the record that show what Castro did, post-

complaint, when he went to New Hampshire to secure his placement

on the ballot. Notably, the record gives no indication that Castro

was competing even as of that time in the primary race at hand in

a way that could show that he had suffered -- or was at imminent

risk of suffering -- a diminution in either votes or contributions

                                      - 31 -
absent his requested relief.        Cf. Shays, 414 F.3d at 82; Fulani,

882 F.2d at 625–26.

           In that regard, Castro's brief points to nothing in the

record   that   refutes    the   District    Court's      determination   that

"Castro makes no attempt to demonstrate that he is actually

competing with Trump for votes and contributions."                Indeed, the

record shows that, beyond taking steps to be placed on the ballot,

Castro's efforts to compete for votes and contributors in the

specific New Hampshire primary at issue were non-existent.                And,

consistent with that conclusion, we note that Castro's brief also

cites to nothing in the record that undermines the District Court's

findings that Castro neither "provided any evidence suggesting

that he has voters or contributors in New Hampshire" nor made any

showing that "he will benefit from voter or contributor defections

from Trump to himself."7

           Thus,   on     this   record,    any   claim    that   the   former

President's presence on the ballot in the contest at issue will

diminish Castro's votes or contributions is simply too speculative

to credit, even allowing for the probabilistic nature of a claim

     7 We note that the District Court found Castro's testimony
"about his media coverage" unpersuasive because "[t]he court ha[d]
no way of knowing whether the purported media coverage focused on
Castro as a candidate actually seeking the Republican nomination
for president, or as a litigant seeking to disqualify Trump."
Castro points to nothing in the record that contradicts that
assessment.

                                   - 32 -
of competitive injury.           And we see no reason to conclude that a

claim of political competitive injury that is purely conjectural

fares    any    better    than   a   purely    conjectural   claim   of   injury

otherwise does.          Cf. Watson, 10 F.3d at 923 (explaining that an

allegation of standing must be more than "unadorned speculation").8

                                       III.

               For these reasons, the judgment of the District Court is

AFFIRMED.

     8 The District Court also concluded that Castro could not
satisfy the causation and redressability elements of standing
because "Trump's absence from the primary ballot would not affect
the number of votes or contributions Castro would receive." On
this record, as discussed above, we have concluded that Castro did
not show injury because he was not competing at all. We thus have
no reason to address those other components of standing in this
case. We do note, though, that, as the District Court recognized,
if a further claim of standing is advanced based on post-complaint
developments in the relevant primary race, assessments of
causation and redressability, like injury-in-fact, will depend on
the state of the record as it will exist at the time of the
advancement of that claim.

                                      - 33 -