Court Opinion

ID: 9666726
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:26:23.259005+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:32.385828
License: Public Domain

KOBEKTSON, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
The majority, agreeing with the Dallas court in Polk v. State, 704 S.W.2d 929 (Tex.App.-Dallas, 1986, pet. granted), holds that a good faith exception does not exist under article 38.23 Tex.Code Crim.Proc.
If I properly understand, Polk and the majority opinion herein hold that if it is determined that an arrest was made without probable cause or a search is made on a search warrant not supported by an affidavit reciting sufficient probable cause, the evidence obtained in either instance is inadmissible, period. In other words, the inquiry immediately ends as there can be no exception. I do not understand that to be the law. For instance, state law prohibits an illegal arrest but an illegal arrest does not automatically render a confession inadmissible. The question under such circumstances is whether “the illegality is sufficiently attenuated to remove the taint.” Foster v. State, 677 S.W.2d 507 (Tex.Crim.App. 507 1984). Even though our state statutes do not recognize such exception, such an exception is allowed even in the face of article 38.23.
Our state statutes do not authorize an arrest or search under the “emergency doctrine,” but the court of criminal appeals had held such searches lawful. Bray v. State, 597 S.W.2d 763 (Tex.Crim.App.1980). Thus, again, an exception is permitted to the proscriptions of article 38.23.
Another somewhat similar example of such an exception is in the area of identification procedures. Even though a suspect is illegally arrested and identified by witnesses in an illegal line-up proceeding, this does not automatically result in suppression of such witnesses identifying the accused at the time of trial. Lujan v. State, 428 S.W.2d 336 (Tex.Crim.App.1968); Pichon v. State, 683 S.W.2d 422 (Tex.Crim.App.1984).
In short, I disagree with the Dallas court that there are no exceptions to article 38.-23. And in view of the exceptions pointed out above, I would apply the well-reasoned and logical good faith exception fashioned by the supreme court in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984).
Further, the state argues, and I agree, that the Texas search warrant statute has a built-in good faith exception. Article 18.-01(b), Tex.Crim Proc. provides:
(b) No search warrant shall issue for any purpose in this state unless sufficient facts are first presented to satisfy the issuing magistrate that probable cause does in fact exist for its issuance. A sworn affidavit setting forth substantial facts establishing probable cause shall be filed in every instance in which a search warrant is requested. The affidavit is public information if executed. [Emphasis supplied.]
As pointed out by the state, the key to article 18.01(b) is the requirement that the magistrate be satisfied that probable cause exists for the issuance of the warrant. If *726he determines that probable cause does exist, the results of the search should not be automatically rendered inadmissible in the event some reviewing court later determines the stated probable cause is lacking. The state argues:
The Legislature could have drafted the statute to read, “No search warrant shall issue ... unless a sworn affidavit setting forth substantial facts establishing probable cause be filed ...”; a purely objective test of probable cause would have resulted. Instead, the Legislature allowed the validity of the warrant to turn upon the subjective evaluation of probable cause by the issuing magistrate. Any other construction flies in the face of the unequivocal wording of the statute.
I agree, and therefore believe we should find the search valid and the drugs found as a result thereof admissible in evidence.