Court Opinion

ID: 9471751
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:40:12.474969+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:33.614288
License: Public Domain

JAMES C. HILL, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The parties agree that because the divorce decree did not specify or fix a sum certain or percentage of the payments for child support, the entire amount of Mr. Strealdorf’s payments to his former wife before her remarriage was properly treated for tax purposes as alimony. The tax court held that after the wife’s remarriage the entire amount became child support. I find the tax court’s decision illogical and contrary to Georgia law.
Under Ga.Code Ann. § 30-209 (1968), the obligation for alimony ceases upon the wife’s remarriage “unless otherwise provided in the decree.” The plain and unambiguous language of the decree provides that Mr.. Strealdorf shall pay his former wife $550 per month as “alimony and child support, for the support of herself and the three minor children.” The decree further reads that “said payments,” referring to alimony and child support payments, are to be reduced by one-third as each child dies, marries, reaches age 18, or becomes self-supporting.
In Wiley v. Wiley, 243 Ga. 271, 253 S.E.2d 750 (1979), payments to the wife were to continue until the wife died, except that the amount was to be reduced by one-half upon each child’s attaining the age of 18, dying, or marrying, or if custody of the child changed from the wife to the husband. The court found that the agreement indicated the parties’ contemplation that the payments would coincide with the period of time when the children were to be supported and would survive the wife’s remarriage, even though the payments were in the nature of alimony to the wife. The husband argued that under section 30-209 an agreement must specifically state that the remarriage of the wife will not terminate her right to alimony and the parties’ failure so to specify showed their intent that the payments were not to survive the wife’s remarriage. The court rejected the husband’s contention, holding that the parties otherwise provided in the agreement to allow the alimony to continue. Therefore, the automatic termination provision in section 30-209 would not apply.
As I read Wiley, the rule in Georgia is that where the parties agree to make the alimony payments coincide with the period of time when the children shall receive support, the parties have “otherwise provided” for alimony to continue after remarriage. This is what the parties provided for in this case — alimony payments to the wife and payments for child support shall both continue until the children no longer need sup*1528port. Indeed, it makes good sense for a husband to provide alimony during the period when the children are young -as the former wife may need the money in order to be able to devote more of her time to the needs of their children. When the children become self-supporting, there may be less need for the alimony since the ex-wife can then devote more of her available time to supporting herself. The tax court apparently concluded that the decree evidences an intent only to provide for the welfare of the children since all payments cease when the children no longer need support. This conclusion overlooks the reasoning in Wiley and the fact that there are reasons for alimony payments to coincide with the years when part of the wife’s energies are diverted by the task of raising the children.
The tax court’s decision relied primarily on Burns v. Rivers, 244 Ga. 631, 261 S.E.2d 581 (1979), but the case illustrates the error of the tax court’s determination that the payments must be treated exclusively as child support. In Burns, the divorce decree required the husband to pay the wife $650 as alimony and child support for the wife’s support and maintenance and for the support, maintenance, and education of the minor child. The decree further provided that upon the child’s 18th birthday, death, marriage, or becoming self-supporting, the payments shall be reduced by $250 per month. The court held that there was a basis in the parties’ agreement for the trial court to prorate the award between the wife and the child because the decree expressly provided that the wife would continue to receive $400 even after the child no longer received his $250 per month in support. Thus, the court concluded that because the decree could be prorated and because the agreement only provided for the conditions under which child support would cease and not for the conditions under which alimony would cease, the parties did not “otherwise provide” for the alimony to continue after remarriage.
In the present case, the tax court prorated the decree to provide $550 for child support and none for alimony although this finding has no basis in the decree. “An alimony decree awarding a given sum for the support of the wife and children is an award to the group as a family unit and cannot be prorated among the wife and children except as specifically provided in the decree.” Edwards v. Edwards, 235 Ga. 199, 200, 219 S.E.2d 117, 118 (1975); accord Lord v. Lord, 231 Ga. 164, 200 S.E.2d 759 (1973); Adams v. Adams, 225 Ga. 375, 376, 169 S.E.2d 160, 161 (1969); Blalock v. Blal-ock, 214 Ga. 586, 587-88,105 S.E.2d 721, 723 (1958). Applying the court’s holding in Blalock to the facts of our case, while the decree in this case allows a reduction, of one-third as each child becomes self-supporting, “the award is to the group as a family unit, and this court can not attempt to construe or clarify the decree so as to attempt to separate the amount awarded to the mother from the amount awarded to the children.” 214 Ga. at 588,105 S.E.2d at 723.
Unlike Burns, the decree in our case is to the wife and children as a group and provides no basis for the tax court’s mathmatical computations. Therefore, the tax court’s attempt to divide the group award between the wife and the children and attribute all the payment to child support was error. The tax court’s proration also violates the rule that favors the construction of a contract that gives meaning and effect to all of the terms over the construction that nullifies and renders meaningless a .part of the contract’s language. See, e.g., Burch v. Ragan, 92 Ga.App. 605, 607, 89 S.E.2d 541, 543 (1955); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 203(a) (1981). The tax court’s construction of the decree makes the terms “alimony” and “for the support of herself” meaningless because it concludes that the full amount of the payments were for the support of the children.
Therefore, because I think that under Wiley v. Wiley and section 30-209 the parties have “otherwise provided” for the alimony payments to continue until the children no longer need support, I dissent. I would hold that the payments continued to be alimony for tax purposes even after remarriage. The tax court’s attempt to prorate the alimony and child support and its effort to write the term alimony out of the decree is contrary to established Georgia *1529law. The error of the tax court can be seen from simply stating its anomalous conclusion: The payments to the wife are just for child support and have always been just for child support even though the divorce decree expressly provides that the payments are for “alimony and child support” and “for the support of the wife and the said three minor children” and even though the parties agree that the payments before the wife’s remarriage were properly treated as entirely alimony.