Court Opinion

ID: 2963809
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:15:27.216962+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:37:20.954514
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

          No. 95-1113

                                    UNITED STATES,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                                   RAYMOND J. GARY,

                                Defendant - Appellant.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

                       [Hon. Mary M. Lisi, U.S. District Judge]
                                           ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                          Selya and Boudin, Circuit Judges,
                                            ______________

                             and Saris,* District Judge.
                                         ______________

                                _____________________

               Marie T. Roebuck for appellant.
               ________________
               Sheldon  Whitehouse,  United   States  Attorney,  with  whom
               ___________________
          Gerard B.  Sullivan  and  Margaret E.  Curran,  Assistant  United
          ___________________       ___________________
          States Attorneys, were on brief for appellee.

                                 ____________________

                                   January 5, 1996
                                 ____________________

                              
          ____________________

          *  Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.

                    SARIS,  District Judge.    After his  first jury  trial
                    SARIS,  District Judge.
                            ______________

          ended  in  deadlock,  defendant  Raymond  J.  Gary  ("Gary")  was

          convicted by a second jury of possession of a firearm by a felon,

          in violation of  18 U.S.C.    922(g).  He  was sentenced to  over

          twenty-four  years  incarceration  as  an  armed  career criminal

          pursuant to 18 U.S.C.   924(e).

                    Gary  raises  six issues  on appeal:   (1)  whether the

          district court  violated his Sixth Amendment  right to compulsory

          process  by precluding  him from  calling a  defense witness  who

          would provide exculpatory  information on direct examination  but

          would assert  the Fifth Amendment with  respect to non-collateral

          issues on cross-examination; (2) whether the district court erred

          in finding that  this defense  witness had not  waived his  Fifth

          Amendment privilege against self-incrimination  by virtue of  his

          testimony at the first trial; (3) whether the government properly

          sought  authorization   to  prosecute  under  the   U.S.  Justice

          Department guidelines regarding  dual federal-state  prosecutions

          (i.e.,  the "Petite  policy"); (4)  whether Gary  was selectively

          prosecuted  on account of his  race; (5) whether  Gary received a

          fair  trial  in light  of the  government's  reliance on  what he

          contends was "perjured testimony  by a law enforcement official";

          and (6) whether the district court misapplied U.S.S.G.   4B1.4 in

                                         -2-

          determining  Gary's   total  offense  level.1     We  affirm  the

          conviction and sentence.

                              I.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE
                              I.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE
                                  _____________________

                    A.  FACTS
                    A.  FACTS

                    We set forth the evidence  in the light most  favorable

          to  the verdict.  United States  v. Tuesta-Toro, 29 F.3d 771, 773
                            _____________     ___________

          (1st Cir. 1994), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 115 S. Ct. 947 (1995).
                           ____________

                    On May 14, 1994, Gary and a friend, Eric Hopkins, spent

          part  of  the  evening  going to  nightclubs.    After  midnight,

          Patrolman  James  Joseph Corry  of  the  North Providence  Police

          Department encountered Gary and Hopkins when they were attempting

          to break into  Rhode Island  Auto Radio.   Earlier that  evening,

          they  had stolen some vases  from a furniture  store elsewhere in

          North  Providence.  Upon seeing  Corry, Hopkins fled  on foot and

          Gary attempted to escape by car at high speed.  Gary lost control

          of the vehicle, which left the  road and struck the foundation of

          an adjacent  building.    Corry  caught up  to  Gary  as  he  was

          attempting to exit the wrecked automobile.  Gary resisted arrest,

          and the efforts of several officers were necessary to subdue him.

          Once the officers successfully apprehended Gary, they conducted a

          "pat-down" search for weapons.  At that time, a loaded and fully-

          operable  Colt .25  caliber handgun  fell from  Gary's waistband.

          Hopkins  also  was   arrested, and  a  Dickson .25  caliber semi-

                              
          ____________________

          1  Gary also contends he did not receive a fair trial in light of
          the  totality and cumulative effect of  the trial court's errors.
          Since we do not find error with  respect to any of the issues, we
          do not address this claim separately.

                                         -3-

          automatic  pistol was seized from him.  Hopkins later admitted to

          possessing the firearm.

                                         -4-

                    B.  PROCEEDINGS BELOW
                    B.  PROCEEDINGS BELOW

                    Gary and  Hopkins each were initially  charged in state

          court  with violations  of the  Rhode Island  General Laws.2   On

          June 9,  1994,  a  federal  grand  jury  returned  an  indictment

          charging  both with  possession  of  a  firearm  by  a  felon  in

          violation  of 18  U.S.C.    922(g).    On  August 31,  1994,  the

          government filed a notice  that, if Gary was convicted,  it would

          seek  a penalty enhancement pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal

          Act ("ACCA"),  18 U.S.C.    924(e)(1).   Hopkins pled  guilty, on

          September 8, 1994.

                    From October 13 to  17, 1994, Gary was tried by  a jury

          before Judge Raymond J. Pettine.  Hopkins, who was represented by

          counsel, testified on Gary's behalf and was cross-examined by the

          government  concerning the  break-ins, the  circumstances  of the

          arrest,  and the firearms.   The proceedings ended  in a mistrial

          when the jury announced that it was unable to reach a verdict.

                    Gary's case then was transferred to Judge Mary M. Lisi,

          before  whom the second jury trial commenced on October 25, 1994.

          When  Gary attempted to call  Hopkins to the  stand, however, the

          government objected on the grounds  that Hopkins would invoke his

          Fifth  Amendment right  against self-incrimination  during cross-

          examination.  At  a conference and  subsequent voir dire  outside

          the presence  of  the jury,  Gary  proffered that  Hopkins  would

          testify that, while they were together at nightclubs on the night
                              
          ____________________

          2  Gary  was charged with  possession of a firearm,  breaking and
          entering,  conspiracy,  assault  with  a  dangerous  weapon,  and
          reckless driving.  

                                         -5-

          of  May 14, 1994, he  never saw Gary  possess a firearm  and that

          they were together until  approximately ten minutes preceding the

          automobile  wreck after  which Gary  was arrested.   In  the voir

          dire, Hopkins asserted  his privilege against  self-incrimination

          in response to questioning about the breaking and entering, which

          immediately preceded his arrest.  Hopkins was then facing pending

          state  breaking  and entering  charges  and  a parole  revocation

          proceeding and had not yet been sentenced on the federal charge.

                    Although  Hopkins  had  testified in  the  first  trial

          regarding the  breaking and  entering  and had  been assisted  by

          counsel at that time, the court held that his prior testimony was

          not a  voluntary, knowing, and  intelligent waiver  of his  Fifth

          Amendment  privilege,  particularly  because   Hopkins'  separate

          counsel for  the  state proceedings  had not  been informed  that

          Hopkins would  be appearing  in federal  court.3   Moreover,  the

          court  held  that  the  government's  intended  cross-examination

          regarding   the   breaking  and   entering   was   "germane"  and

          "permissible" and thus refused to restrict its scope.

                    After  excusing  Hopkins  from  testifying,  the  court

          permitted Gary  to introduce  Hopkins'  prior recorded  testimony

          from the  first trial by having  it read to the  jury by Hopkins'

          state counsel.  Notwithstanding this ruling, Gary argued that his
                              
          ____________________

          3   Hopkins was represented  by three different  attorneys in the
          various  federal and  state  proceedings who  apparently did  not
          communicate in advance of Hopkins'  testimony in the first trial.
          In addition,  when Gary's counsel interviewed  Hopkins to solicit
          information  upon which  his  testimony in  the  first trial  was
          based,  she asked  permission only  of the  attorney representing
          Hopkins on the federal charges.  

                                         -6-

          Sixth  Amendment right  to  compulsory process  was violated  and

          moved for a mistrial on that ground.  This motion was denied.

                    The jury  returned a verdict  of guilty on  October 28,

          1995.   Gary was sentenced as an armed career criminal to twenty-

          four years and two months imprisonment, five  years of supervised

          release, and a $50  special assessment.  Judgment was  entered on

          January 19, 1995, and Gary filed a timely notice of appeal.  

                                    II.  ANALYSIS
                                    II.  ANALYSIS
                                         ________

                    A.  Sixth Amendment Compulsory Process
                    A.  Sixth Amendment Compulsory Process

                    This case requires us to harmonize a conflict between a

          defendant's Sixth Amendment right "to have compulsory process for

          obtaining witnesses in his favor," U.S. Const. amend. VI, and the

          government's  interest in  cross-examining a defense  witness who

          has invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.

                    Gary contends that his  right to compulsory process was

          denied  when the trial court refused to permit Hopkins to testify

          and  instead only  permitted  Hopkins' testimony  from the  first

          trial to be read to  the jury.  Gary argues that the  trial court

          should have  required Hopkins to  invoke his right  against self-

          incrimination during cross-examination in the jury's presence. 

                    "The right to  offer the testimony of witnesses, and to

          compel their  attendance,  if necessary,  is in  plain terms  the

          right to present a defense  . . . .  This right  is a fundamental

          element  of due process  of law."  Washington  v. Texas, 388 U.S.
                                             __________     _____

          14,  19 (1967); see also  Chambers v. Mississippi,  410 U.S. 284,
                          ________  ________    ___________

                                         -7-

          302 (1973).  The  Sixth Amendment, however, does not  provide "an

          unfettered  right   to  offer  testimony  that   is  incompetent,

          privileged,  or  otherwise inadmissible  under standard  rules of

          evidence."  Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410 (1988).  As the
                      ______    ________

          Supreme Court  noted  in an  opinion  upholding a  trial  judge's

          decision to preclude a defense witness's testimony on evidentiary

          grounds,  "[t]he  Sixth Amendment  does not  confer the  right to

          present  testimony  free  from  the  legitimate  demands  of  the

          adversary  system; one  cannot invoke  the Sixth  Amendment as  a

          justification for presenting what  might have been a half-truth."

          United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 241 (1975).
          _____________    ______

                    While  the  government's  interest  in  cross-examining

          defense  witnesses is not rooted  in the Constitution, see United
                                                                 ___ ______

          States  v. Pardo, 636  F.2d 535, 542 n.21  (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("The
          ______     _____

          government   of  course   has   no  Sixth   Amendment  or   other

          constitutional right to  cross-examine defense witnesses."),  one

          of the legitimate demands of the adversary system is the right of

          cross-examination.   See Fed. R. Evid.  611(b) (permitting cross-
                               ___

          examination "limited to subject  matter of the direct examination

          and  matters affecting  the  credibility of  witness").   "Cross-

          examination is the principal means by which the  believability of

          a  witness and the truth of his  testimony are tested."  Davis v.
                                                                   _____

          Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974).  As Professor Wigmore stated:
          ______

                      The   main   and  essential   purpose  of
                      confrontation  is  to   secure  for   the
                                         ______________________
                      opponent   the   opportunity  of   cross-
                      _________________________________________
                      examination.      The  opponent   demands
                      ___________
                      confrontation, not for  the idle  purpose
                      of gazing  upon the witness, or  of being

                                         -8-

                      gazed upon by him, but for the purpose of
                      cross-examination,  which  cannot be  had
                      except by the direct and personal putting
                      of  questions   and  obtaining  immediate
                      answers.

          5  J. Wigmore,  Evidence    1395, at  150 (Chadbourne  rev. 1974)
                          ________

          (emphasis  in original), quoted in Davis, 415 U.S. at 315-16; see
                                   _________ _____                      ___

          also United States v. Stubbert, 655 F.2d 453, 457 (1st Cir. 1981)
          ____ _____________    ________

          (quoting same).

                    Courts have not permitted  defendants to call witnesses

          to the  stand who have indicated that  they will refuse to answer

          the government's questions  on cross-examination with respect  to

          non-collateral matters.  In United States v. De La Cruz, 996 F.2d
                                      _____________    __________

          1307 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 114 S. Ct. 356 (1993),
                           ____________

          the  defendant called  his friend  and former  co-defendant  as a

          witness, but in a voir dire examination, he refused to answer any

          questions other  than his name and  address on self-incrimination

          grounds.  In  response to  the suggestion  that the  government's

          cross-examination should be limited so that the defense witness's

          privilege need  not be  invoked, we  held that  "effective cross-

          examination would have been  seriously impaired if the prosecutor

          were denied latitude  to explore the joint  criminal history" and

          affirmed  the trial judge's decision not to permit the witness to

          testify.   Id. at 1312-14.  See  also United States v. Parcels of
                     ___              _________ _____________    __________

          Land, 903 F.2d 36, 43 (1st Cir. 1990) ("It is well-accepted  that
          ____

          a witness's direct testimony  can be stricken if she  invokes the

          fifth amendment  on  cross-examination to  shield that  testimony

          from scrutiny.")  (citing cases);  United States v.  Zirpolo, 704
                                             _____________     _______

                                         -9-

          F.2d  23,  25-26  (1st  Cir.) (when  defense  witness  rightfully

          refuses to answer questions based  on the privilege against self-

          incrimination, trial  court need not limit  scope of government's

          cross-examination    on    conversations   relating    to   other

          contemporaneous  drug  offenses),  cert.  denied,  464  U.S.  822
                                             _____________

          (1983);  accord Denham v. Deeds, 954 F.2d 1501, 1503-04 (9th Cir.
                   ______ ______    _____

          1992) ("We . . . join with those circuits that have permitted the

          exclusion of a  defense witness's testimony when the  witness has

          refused  on cross-examination  to  respond to  questions on  non-

          collateral matters."); United States  v. Esparsen, 930 F.2d 1461,
                                 _____________     ________

          1469-70  (10th Cir.  1991) (same),  cert. denied,  502 U.S.  1036
                                              ____________

          (1992);  United States v. Doddington, 822 F.2d 818, 822 (8th Cir.
                   _____________    __________

          1987) (trial  court properly  struck direct testimony  of defense

          witness who invoked Fifth Amendment during cross-examination).

                    Attempting to  combat this solid phalanx  of precedent,

          Gary cites  cases in which courts  permitted government witnesses

          to   invoke  the  privilege   against  self-incrimination  during

          defendant's cross-examination without violating the Confrontation

          Clause  of the  Sixth Amendment.   See  United States  v. Berr o-
                                             ___  _____________     _______

          Londo o,  946 F.2d 158, 160-61 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502
          _______                                         ____________

          U.S. 1114 (1992);  Stubbert, 655 F.2d at  457-58.  Each  of these
                             ________

          cases  rely on the Second  Circuit's much-cited holding in United
                                                                     ______

          States  v. Cardillo, 316 F.2d  606, 611 (2d  Cir.), cert. denied,
          ______     ________                                 ____________

          375 U.S. 822 (1963) that:

                      In determining whether the testimony of a
                      witness who invokes the privilege against
                      self-incrimination      during     cross-
                      examination  may  be  used   against  the

                                         -10-

                      defendant,  a  distinction must  be drawn
                      between cases  in which the  assertion of
                      the  privilege  merely precludes  inquiry
                      into collateral matters  which bear  only
                      on  the credibility  of  the witness  and
                      those cases in which the assertion of the
                      privilege  prevents inquiry  into matters
                      about  which  the  witness  testified  on
                      direct examination.

          When  cross-examination  is   precluded  only  with   respect  to

          collateral issues, the Sixth Amendment does not require the court

          to  strike the witness's testimony.  See Berr o-Londo o, 946 F.2d
                                               ___ ______________

          at  161   (refusing  to  strike  direct   testimony  when  cross-

          examination limited to  issues "not relevant to  Berr o-Londo o's

          guilt or innocence"); Stubbert, 655 F.2d at 457-58.
                                ________

                    When  cross-examination on  material  issues raised  on

          direct  examination is  curtailed  because of  a witness's  valid

          claim of privilege, however, the trial court,  in its discretion,

          may refuse to permit  that witness's testimony.  See  De La Cruz,
                                                           ___  __________

          996 F.2d at 1313-14.  Just as the trial court must be vigilant in

          ensuring  that a defendant has a full and fair cross-examination,

          see  Cardillo, 316 F.2d at  611, it must  similarly safeguard the
          ___  ________

          government's  cross-examination  "to prevent  coconspirators from

          'whitewashing'  each   other  through   the   use  of   testimony

          unchallengeable for one reason or another."  Zirpolo, 704 F.2d at
                                                       _______

          26 (quoting United States  v. Lowell, 649 F.2d 950, 962  (3d Cir.
                      _____________     ______

          1981)).

                    We have  recognized that it "may  sometimes be feasible

          for  a  district  court to  reconcile  the  defendant's right  to

          present  witnesses  with  a  witness's  privilege  against  self-

                                         -11-

          incrimination by  limiting the scope of  the latter's testimony."

          Id.  at  26.   In  striking  the  appropriate  balance between  a
          ___

          defendant's Sixth Amendment rights and  the government's interest

          in cross-examination, a "trial  judge may or even must  limit the

          government's cross-examination on collateral matters if this  can

          be  done without unduly limiting  the government and  if doing so

          will preserve the defendant's ability to  call a material witness

          who would otherwise  claim the privilege."  De La  Cruz, 996 F.2d
                                                      ___________

          at 1313; see also Pardo, 636  F.2d at 544 ("[W]here the rights of
                   ________ _____

          the  defendant   and  the  government  can   be  reconciled,  the

          defendant's constitutional  right  to procure  testimony  in  his

          favor must prevail.").

                    Where, as here, a  defense witness's claim of privilege

          shields material testimony from cross-examination,  however, this

          balance weighs against  the defendant.   The trial  court held  a

          voir  dire  hearing  to  determine  whether  the  subject  matter

          concerning  which  the  witness  intended  to  assert  the  Fifth

          Amendment  was collateral.  She fairly concluded that it was not.

          See Fed.  R. Evid.  611(b)  (giving court  authority to  exercise
          ___

          reasonable  control over  examination of  witnesses to  "make the

          interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of

          the truth").

                    In  considering  similar  types  of  challenges brought

          under the  Confrontation Clause of  the Sixth Amendment,  we have

          applied an abuse of discretion standard.  See Berr o-Londo o, 946
                                                    ___ ______________

          F.2d  at  160  (holding  that  trial  court  did  not  abuse  its

                                         -12-

          discretion by  refusing to  strike witness's testimony  on direct

          examination when  witness asserted Fifth Amendment  on collateral

          matters  on  cross-examination,  particularly  when  witness  was

          required  to invoke privilege in presence of jury).  We apply the

          same  abuse   of  discretion  standard   in  determining  kindred

          challenges  under  the Compulsory  Process  Clause  of the  Sixth

          Amendment.   See United States v.  Blum, 62 F.3d 63,  67 (2d Cir.
                       ___ _____________     ____

          1995)   (applying  abuse   of  discretion   standard  to   review

          evidentiary  decision  challenged  on Compulsory  Process  Clause

          ground).  We find no abuse of discretion here.

                    According  to  Gary's  proffer,  "Hopkins   would  have

          testified that during  the course of the evening,  he was able to

          observe  [Gary] and never visually  saw a firearm  on his person,

          nor  was one detected  by the metal detectors,  or doorman at the

          nightclubs."   Hopkins' testimony  certainly was material  to the

          defense  as  it  showed  that,  after  a  significant  period  of

          observation, he did not see Gary possess a firearm.   However, at

          the  first  trial,  Hopkins  testified that  the  pair  had  been

          involved in two instances of breaking and entering after  leaving

          the clubs and that he did not know whether Gary had hidden  a gun

          in his car before going to the clubs.  Had Hopkins been permitted

          to testify  and  to  refuse to  answer  questions  regarding  the

          breaking  and  entering,  as he  told  the  court  he would,  the

          government's  cross-examination   of  Hopkins  would   have  been

          rendered ineffective.  

                                         -13-

                    Thus  the trial  court found,  "[t]he matters  that Mr.

          Hopkins  would have testified to and, in  fact, did testify to at

          the previous trial were closely related in time  and space to the

          matter  that is before the Court in which the jury must consider.

          And  therefore,  all  of  the information  that  would  have been

          elicited  or attempted  to have  been elicited by  the Government

          would have been  germane and  would have been  permissible."   We

          discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court's determination

          that  the subject  matter of  the cross-examination  as to  which

          Hopkins  would  have  asserted  his privilege  was  material  and

          relevant.   Any limitation  on cross-examination would  have been

          unduly prejudicial to the government.

                    Furthermore, in striking  the appropriate balance,  the

          trial court took into consideration that Gary was not deprived of

          an opportunity  to present Hopkins' testimony.   Although Hopkins

          did not appear personally in the second trial, his testimony from

          the first trial was read  in full to the jury.  It  was read with

          counsel  for  the government  and  for  Gary each  reading  their

          respective parts  and a third person  reading Hopkins' responses.

          Indeed,  at  oral argument  Gary's  counsel  engaged in  a  brief

          thespian demonstration intended to  convey the desiccated  manner

          in which Hopkins' testimony was read at  Gary's second trial.  We

          noted  then,  and  reiterate   today,  that  whenever  transcript

          testimony  is admitted in a trial, the fact-finder is deprived of

          a full-fledged opportunity to assess directly the credibility and

          demeanor of  the  declarant.   The  rules of  evidence,  however,

                                         -14-

          permit such evidence to be admitted at trial.  See  Fed. R. Evid.
                                                         ___

          804(b)(1) (former testimony exception to hearsay rule).

                    Gary suggests that, rather than  prohibit Hopkins' live

          testimony  altogether,  the  trial  court  should have  permitted

          Hopkins to testify on direct examination and forced him to invoke

          the   Fifth  Amendment  privilege  on  cross-examination  in  the

          presence of the jury.  That solution, Gary argues, strikes a more

          appropriate balance between the  government's and the defendant's

          interests because "the government  could have used the transcript

          to impeach this testimony  or could have relied upon  the adverse

          inference  of  the witness's  invocation  of  the Fifth."    This

          approach  finds some support in United States v. Kaplan, 832 F.2d
                                          _____________    ______

          676 (1st Cir. 1987),  cert. denied, 485 U.S. 907 (1988), where we
                                ____________

          held that when "a non-party government witness  invokes the Fifth

          Amendment on cross-examination at  trial, the court should permit

          the assertion of the privilege in the presence of the  jury.  The

          invocation of the privilege acts as a form of  impeachment."  Id.
                                                                        ___

          at 684.  

                    In Kaplan,  we distinguished United  States v. Johnson,
                       ______                    ______________    _______

          488 F.2d 1206 (1st Cir. 1973), in which we held that a  court did

          not abuse its discretion  in refusing to allow a  defense witness

          to  take the stand when,  after direct examination was completed,

          that witness would assert the Fifth Amendment  as to "essentially

          all" questions on cross-examination.  Id. at 1211.  The basis for
                                                ___

          the distinction follows:

                      A  different case is  presented where, as
                      here, the defense seeks  to cross-examine

                                         -15-

                      a  government witness within the scope of
                      his direct  and then the  witness asserts
                      the privilege.  We  note, first, that the
                      impact on the  jury's deliberations  from
                      asserting  the privilege  has to  be less
                      here than in Johnson  from the fact  that
                                   _______
                      Brown   did   not  claim   the  privilege
                      comprehensively.  Instead, Brown answered
                      most questions put to him by the  defense
                      and could have refused to answer at trial
                      only those bearing on the alleged cocaine
                      abuse.   And whatever  danger exists that
                      the jury may give too much weight to this
                      line   of   questioning   is   small   in
                      comparison to its impeachment value.

          Kaplan, 832 F.2d at 684.
          ______

                    Unlike  Kaplan,  where  the  invocation  of  the  Fifth
                            ______

          Amendment  pertained to  a  collateral matter  --  the effect  of

          alleged  cocaine  abuse  on  the  witness's  power  of memory  or

          observation --  here the  assertion of  the privilege would  have

          shielded the witness from testifying on a core issue addressed on

          direct  examination.   Hopkins'  claim  of  privilege would  have

          precluded government inquiry into  the intervening events between

          the  time Hopkins observed the  defendant to have  no firearm and

          the time the police officer testified he saw a gun in defendant's

          possession.  Such testimony would have been directly relevant  to

          Gary's guilt  or innocence.   Accordingly, while the  trial judge

          may have had the discretion to  strike a balance along the  lines

                                         -16-

          proposed by the defendant,4  there was no abuse of  discretion in

          striking the balance a different way.5

                    B.  Waiver of Fifth Amendment Privilege
                    B.  Waiver of Fifth Amendment Privilege
                        Against Self-Incrimination
                        Against Self-Incrimination

                    Gary asserts that Hopkins  waived his privilege against

          self-incrimination by virtue of his testimony in the first  trial

          regarding the breaking and entering.  Therefore, he contends, the

          trial court wrongly sustained Hopkins' claim of privilege  in the

          second trial.

                    The  Fifth Amendment  privilege is "fundamental  to our

          system  of constitutional  rule."   Miranda v. Arizona,  384 U.S.
                                              _______    _______

          436,  469   (1966).    However,  "the   privilege  against  self-

          incrimination  presupposes  a  real  danger  of  legal  detriment

          arising  from the disclosure."  Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S.
                                          ______    _____________

          367, 372-73 (1951).  Thus the privilege may be waived, see id. at
                                                                 ___ ___

          370-71,  or obviated by a  prosecutorial grant of  immunity.  See
                                                                        ___

          Kastigar  v. United  States,  406 U.S.  441,  461-62 (1972);  cf.
          ________     ______________                                   ___

          United States v. Angiulo,  897 F.2d 1169, 1191 (1st  Cir.) (court
          _____________    _______

          ordinarily  cannot grant  immunity), cert.  denied, 498  U.S. 845
                                               _____________

          (1990).  

                              
          ____________________

          4  There is no evidence in the record that the defendant proposed
          this particular solution to the trial judge. 

          5   We also note that if Gary  had opted to testify as to whether
          he possessed a  gun at the time of his arrest,  he would not have
          been  permitted to take the  Fifth Amendment with  respect to the
          breaking and  entering offenses which immediately  preceded.  See
                                                                        ___
          Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 155-57 (1958) (holding that
          _____    _____________
          defendant's exercise of right to testify in own behalf waives his
          Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination).

                                         -17-

                    Once    a   witness   voluntarily   has   revealed   an

          incriminating  fact, "the  privilege cannot  be invoked  to avoid

          disclosure of the details."   Rogers, 340 U.S. at 373.   However,
                                        ______

          "[i]t  is  hornbook  law  that  the  waiver  is  limited  to  the

          particular  proceeding in  which  the witness  appears."   United
                                                                     ______

          States  v. Cain,  544  F.2d  1113,  1117  (1st  Cir.  1976)  (co-
          ______     ____

          defendant's   submission  to  deposition  in  unrelated  criminal

          proceeding not waiver  of Fifth Amendment in proceeding  in which

          co-defendant called  as witness); see  also Johnson, 488  F.2d at
                                            _________ _______

          1210-11 (witness's disclosures in entering guilty plea at Rule 11

          hearing do  not constitute waiver of  privilege at co-defendant's

          trial); Kirane v. City of Lowell, 622 F. Supp. 262, 265 (D. Mass.
                  ______    ______________

          1985)  ("[A] person who waives his privilege  as to the one trial

          [is not] estopped  from asserting  the privilege as  to the  same

          matter in  a subsequent  trial or  proceeding.");  8 J.  Wigmore,

          Evidence   2276,  at 470-72 (McNaughton  rev. 1961) ("The  waiver
          ________

          involved is  limited to  the particular proceeding  in which  the
                       _____________________________________

          witness volunteers the testimony or the accused takes the stand .

          . . .  Nor is his testimony at a first trial a waiver for a later
                                                                      _____

          trial.")  (emphasis in  original).  Therefore,  Gary's contention
          _____

          that  Hopkins  waived  his  privilege  in  the  second  trial  by

          testifying in the first trial is misplaced.6
                              
          ____________________

          6  The trial court arrived at the same conclusion  by a different
          path, namely,  that Hopkins'  decision to  testify  at the  first
          trial was not a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of his
          Fifth Amendment privilege because he had  not been fully apprised
          of  the consequences of his  testimony with respect  to the state
          proceedings.    In light  of the  above  discussion, we  need not
          address  the propriety of this  decision.  See  In re Morganroth,
                                                     ___  ________________

                                         -18-

                    C.  The "Petite Policy"
                    C.  The "Petite Policy"

                    Gary contends that his federal prosecution violated the

          Justice Department's  policy guarding against  dual federal-state

          prosecutions.  See Petite  v. United States, 361 U.S.  529 (1960)
                         ___ ______     _____________

          (per curiam) (vacating conviction at government's request because

          prosecution  contravened  internal   Justice  Department   policy

          forbidding  multiple prosecutions  for  same  criminal  conduct).

          "The  Petite  policy is  an  internal  Justice Department  policy

          forbidding   federal  prosecution   of  a   person  for   alleged

          criminality  which  was  'an   ingredient  of  a  previous  state

          prosecution against that person'; exceptions are made only if the

          prosecution  will  serve  'compelling  interests  of  federal law

          enforcement.'"   United States v.  McCoy, 977 F.2d  706, 712 (1st
                           _____________     _____

          Cir.  1992) (quoting Thompson v. United States, 444 U.S. 248, 248
                               _________________________

          (1980)) (citation omitted).   See also Rinaldi v. United  States,
                                        ________ _______    ______________

          434  U.S.  22,  24 n.5  (1977)  (per  curiam)  (policy bars  dual

          federal-state  prosecution).   We have  repeatedly held  that the

          Petite  policy does  not  confer substantive  rights on  criminal

          defendants.  See McCoy, 977 F.2d  at 712; United States v. Booth,
                       ___ _____                    _____________    _____

          673 F.2d 27, 30 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 978 (1982).  
                                      ____________

                    D.  Selective Prosecution
                    D.  Selective Prosecution

                    Gary's   contention  that   he  was   entitled  to   an

          evidentiary  hearing on  the ground  of selective  prosecution is

          similarly without merit.   Although the exercise of prosecutorial

                              
          ____________________

          718  F.2d  161,  165 (6th  Cir.  1983)  (holding  that waiver  of
          privilege against self-incrimination is "proceeding specific"). 

                                         -19-

          discretion is  subject to  the constitutional guarantee  of equal

          protection   and  "may   not  be   deliberately  based   upon  an

          unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary

          classification,"    Wayte v.  United  States, 470  U.S.  598, 608
                              _____     ______________

          (1985)  (internal quotation  marks  and citations  omitted),  the

          prosecutor  is entitled  to  "a threshold  presumption that  [he]

          acted 'in good faith for reasons  of sound governmental policy.'"

          United  States v. Pe agar cano-Soler, 911 F.2d 833, 837 (1st Cir.
          ______________    __________________

          1990) (quoting United States  v. Saade, 652 F.2d 1126,  1135 (1st
                         _____________     _____

          Cir. 1981)).

                    As  an initial matter, we note that Gary did not timely

          raise this issue before the district court.  In a brief  colloquy

          on the morning of trial, Gary's counsel first raised the issue of

          selective  prosecution to the  trial judge but  admitted that she

          had  not filed  a  motion for  an  evidentiary hearing.    In the

          absence of  exceptional circumstances  -- and none  are presented

          here -- a claim of selective prosecution that is not raised prior

          to  trial is  deemed waived.   Tracey v. United  States, 739 F.2d
                                         ______    ______________

          679, 682 (1st Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1109 (1985).
                                    ____________

                    Even if the motion had been timely filed, the burden is

          upon the defendant to make an initial showing that an evidentiary

          hearing  is warranted.    "A selective  prosecution claim  merits

          evidentiary hearing if it alleges sufficient 'facts a) tending to

          show  that [defendant]  has  been selectively  prosecuted and  b)

          raising   a  reasonable   doubt  about   the  propriety   of  the

          prosecution's  purpose' . .  . unless the  government can present

                                         -20-

          countervailing  reasons."   Pe agar cano-Soler, 911  F.2d at  838
                                      __________________

          (quoting Saade, 652 F.2d  at 1135).  A trial judge's decision not
                   _____

          to  hold  an  evidentiary  hearing  is  reviewed  for   abuse  of

          discretion.  See id.  
                       ___ ___

                    Here,  Gary did not  make any threshold  showing to the

          trial court  tending to  show selective prosecution,  i.e., "that

          [he] was  prosecuted while  others similarly situated  were not."

          United  States v.  Bassford, 812  F.2d 16,  20 (1st  Cir.), cert.
          ______________     ________                                 _____

          denied, 481 U.S. 1022 (1987).  Gary attempts to make the required
          ______

          showing  to this  Court by  appending "statistics"  purporting to

          demonstrate evidence  of  systemic selective  prosecution in  the

          District  of Rhode Island.  Gary did not present this information

          to   the  trial  court,  and  we  will  not  consider  on  appeal

          evidentiary submissions  that were  not presented below.   United
                                                                     ______

          States v. Kobrosky, 711 F.2d 449, 457 (1st Cir. 1983).7
          ______    ________

              E.  Reliance on Perjured Testimony
              E.  Reliance on Perjured Testimony

                    Gary  contends that his  conviction was somehow tainted

          by allegedly perjurious testimony that was elicited in his  first
                                                                      _____

          trial.   Specifically, he contends that  Officer John Arzoomanian
                              
          ____________________

          7    These so-called  statistics,  compiled  by  hand by  defense
          counsel based  on "information and belief,"  are comprised solely
          of a list of prosecutions brought in the District of Rhode Island
          under 18 U.S.C.    922 and 924 from 1990-1994 purporting to  show
          that 70% of those prosecuted were members of a minority racial or
          ethnic group.   The statistics  do not address  whether similarly
          situated  whites  were  not  prosecuted.   Given  the  procedural
          posture  of this case, we need not resolve the difficult question
          as  to   when  raw  data  demonstrate   a  statistical  disparity
          sufficient  to trigger the need for a hearing.  See Pe agar cano-
                                                          ___ _____________
          Soler, 911 F.2d at 837-38. 
          _____

                                         -21-

          of the  North Providence  Police Department committed  perjury at

          the first trial when  testifying as to why he did not fingerprint

          the firearm that was seized from Gary.  In Gary's first trial, in

          response  to a question on re-direct examination as to why he did

          not attempt to recover fingerprints, he answered:  "As far as the

          size of  the gun --  the surface of  the weapon, also  the people

          involved in the case both had gloves on."  (emphasis  added).  On
                               __________________

          re-cross, Arzoomanian hedged:

                      Q.  And you  didn't bother to  attempt to
                          lift a  print  in this  case  because
                          this man had gloves on;  is that your
                          testimony?

                      A.  Well,  there were gloves found at the
                          scene and gloves found in the vehicle
                          also.

          At the  second trial,  however, Arzoomanian testified  that after

          the  arrest,  but before  the first  trial,  he learned  that the

          gloves  actually belonged  to  rescue personnel.   He  explained:

          "You asked  the reason  why I  didn't print the  weapon.   I said

          because he had gloves on.   And I found out later, he didn't.  At

          that point, the  evidence was  handled by too  many people."   As

          Gary's   counsel   ably   emphasized  during   cross-examination,

          Arzoomanian's testimony in the two  proceedings was inconsistent.

          Gary asserts that Arzoomanian therefore committed perjury.

                    Arzoomanian's testimony in the second trial did  differ

          in  a troubling  way from  that given  in the  first trial.   His

          explanation of  the inconsistency  is weak  because at  the first

          trial he testified that Gary actually had worn gloves at the time

          of arrest  -- not  that he  mistakenly believed  at  the time  of

                                         -22-

          arrest  that Gary was wearing  gloves.  However,  it is axiomatic

          that inconsistent testimony is not per se perjurious.  See United
                                             ______              ___ ______

          States v. Dunnigan, __ U.S. __,  113 S. Ct. 1111, 1116 (1993) ("A
          ______    ________

          witness  testifying under oath  or affirmation  [commits criminal

          perjury]  if  she gives  false  testimony  concerning a  material

          matter with the willful intent to provide false testimony, rather
                          ______________

          than  as  a  result of  confusion,  mistake  or faulty  memory.")

          (emphasis added).  The defendant neither asked the trial court to

          make any findings  of perjury, nor  moved for a mistrial  on that

          basis.   We decline defendant's  invitation to make  a finding of

          willful  intent to  provide false  testimony based  solely on  an

          inconsistency.  

                    Moreover, because Gary's first  trial did not result in

          a conviction, he was not prejudiced even if Arzoomanian testified

          falsely.  Cf. Kyles v. Whitley, __ U.S. __, 115 S. Ct. 1555, 1565
                    ___ _____    _______

          n.7  (1995)  ("[A]  conviction obtained  by  the  knowing use  of

          perjured testimony is fundamentally unfair, and must be set aside

          if there  is any reasonable  likelihood that the  false testimony

          could have  affected the judgment of the  jury.") (quoting United
                                                                     ______

          States  v.  Agurs, 427  U.S.  97, 103  (1976)).   Here,  there is
          ______      _____

          neither a  conviction nor any  evidence that  indicates that  the

          prosecution  intentionally used  perjured testimony.   The  first

          trial ended with a hung jury, and Gary received a second trial at

          which  he   was  fully  able  to  impeach  Arzoomanian  with  his

          inconsistent testimony at the first trial.  In order to bootstrap

          an allegation of prejudice stemming from Arzoomanian's testimony,

                                         -23-

          Gary  argues that  his  second trial  was  barred by  the  Double

          Jeopardy Clause.  This  suggestion that double jeopardy prohibits

          a  second   trial  because  of  the   unknowing  presentation  of

          purportedly   perjured  testimony  by   a  prosecutor  is  wholly

          unsupported by case law.

                    Indeed, courts have  held that prosecutorial misconduct

          must rise  to an  egregious level  for double jeopardy  to bar  a

          retrial.     A  defendant  cannot  be  retried  only  "where  the

          misconduct of the  prosecutor is undertaken  . . . to  prevent an

          acquittal that [he] believed at the  time was likely to occur  in

          the  absence of his misconduct."   United States  v. Wallach, 979
                                             _____________     _______

          F.2d  912,  916  (2d   Cir.  1992)  (holding  that  prosecutorial

          misconduct  bars retrial  after conviction overturned  because of

          perjured testimony only where this stringent standard met), cert.
                                                                      _____

          denied, __  U.S. __, 113 S.  Ct. 2414 (1993); see  also Oregon v.
          ______                                        _________ ______

          Kennedy, 456 U.S.  667, 679 (1982)  (retrial after defense  moves
          _______

          for  mistrial barred by  double jeopardy only  where "the conduct

          giving rise  to the  successful  motion .  .  . was  intended  to

          provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial"); United States
                                                              _____________

          v. Cartagena-Carrasquillo,  No. 94-1235,  slip op. at  17-19 (1st
             ______________________

          Cir. Dec. 1, 1995) (when no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct,

          defendant's  successful  motion  for mistrial  does  not  trigger

          double  jeopardy).  In this case, there is absolutely no evidence

          to  buttress  a finding  of deliberate  prosecutorial misconduct,

          and,  at  worst,  Arzoomanian's  alleged  perjury  related  to  a

                                         -24-

          collateral matter.  Therefore, the Double Jeopardy Clause did not

          prohibit Gary's second trial and subsequent conviction.

                    F.  Application of Sentencing Guidelines 
                    F.  Application of Sentencing Guidelines 

                    Gary asserts that the  trial judge erred in calculating

          his sentence under U.S.S.G.    4B1.4.  This provision  determines

          the offense  level and criminal  history category of  persons who

          are subject to an enhanced  sentence under the ACCA, 18  U.S.C.  

          924(e).   Gary  does  not  contest that  he  is  an armed  career

          criminal.   Rather, he  argues that  the trial  judge incorrectly

          applied U.S.S.G.    4B1.4(b)(3)(A) to arrive at  an offense level

          of 34  when she should  have used    4B1.4(b)(1) to  arrive at  a

          lower level.8   We review  questions of interpretation  under the
                              
          ____________________

          8  U.S.S.G. 4B1.4 provides in pertinent part:

                      (a) A  defendant who  is  subject  to  an
                          enhanced    sentence     under    the
                          provisions  of 18 U.S.C.    924(e) is
                          an armed career criminal.

                      (b) The offense level for an armed career
                          criminal is the greatest of:
                          (1)  the  offense   level  applicable
                               from Chapters Two and Three; or
                          (2)  the  offense level  from   4B1.1
                               (Career Offender) if applicable;
                               or
                          (3)(A)  34, if the defendant  used or
                                  34
                                  possessed   the  firearm   or
                                  ammunition in connection with
                                  a   crime   of  violence   or
                                  controlled substance offense,
                                  as defined  in   4B1.2(1), or
                                  if  the firearm  possessed by
                                  the defendant was  of a  type
                                  described   in    26   U.S.C.
                                    5845(a)[]; or
                             (B)  33, otherwise.[ ]
                                  33

                                         -25-

          guidelines de  novo.  See United  States v. Fiore, 983  F.2d 1, 2
                     ________   ___ ______________    _____

          (1st  Cir.  1992), cert.  denied, __  U.S.  __, 113  S.  Ct. 1830
                             _____________

          (1993).

                    U.S.S.G.    4B1.4  instructs the  sentencing  judge  to

          select  the  offense  level  that  is  the  "greatest"  of  three

          categories.   First, there is  the offense level  applicable from

          the underlying offense,  which here is  U.S.S.G.   2K2.1  dealing

          with unlawful  possession of a firearm.  As Gary had at least two

          prior  felony  convictions of  either a  crime  of violence  or a

          controlled substance offense, he  would receive a minimum offense

          level  of 24  under  this  provision.    Because  Gary  "used  or

          possessed"  the  firearm  "in  connection  with"  another  felony

          offense  (i.e.,  breaking  and  entering), which  results  in  an

          increase  of four  levels  under U.S.S.G.    2K2.1(b)(5),  Gary's

          presentence  report calculated his base offense level at 28.  PSR

             14-15.   The  report then  added a  three-level victim-related

          adjustment for assaulting a police officer pursuant to U.S.S.G.  

          3A1.2(b) to reach an adjusted offense level of 31.  PSR   20.

                    Gary  disputes this  interpretation of  the guidelines.

          This Court  recently held that use of a firearm in an assault and

          battery  warranted  the  four-level  enhancement  under  U.S.S.G.

            2K2.1(b)(5).   United States v. Sturtevant, 62 F.3d 33, 34 (1st
                           _____________    __________

          Cir. 1995) (per curiam).   Gary's possession of a  firearm during

          the breaking  and entering  similarly qualifies as  possession in

          connection with  another felony and would  require enhancement to

          level 28  were we to find that   2K2.1 controls.  Thus, including

                                         -26-

          the  victim-related  adjustment, the  correct  underlying offense

          level "from Chapters  Two and  Three" of the  guidelines was  31.

          U.S.S.G.   4B1.4(b)(1).

                    The second  category,  which would  adopt  the  offense

          level from U.S.S.G.   4B1.1, is  not applicable here.  U.S.S.G.  

          4B1.1 does  not apply because the "instant offense" (i.e., felon-

          in-possession of  a firearm)  is not  a crime of  violence.   See
                                                                        ___

          U.S.S.G.   4B1.2 comment n.2; United States v. Doe, 960 F.2d 221,
                                        _____________    ___

          226 (1st Cir. 1992).

                    The  third  category  directs  the court  to  adopt  an

          offense  level  of 34  if the  "defendant  used or  possessed the

          firearm  or ammunition in connection with a crime of violence" or

          33  in  all  other cases.    Because  the judge  must  select the

          greatest  of the three  categories, 33  is the  minimum "default"
                                                          _______

          offense level  available under this provision  without a downward

          adjustment for  acceptance of responsibility.   See United States
                                                          ___ _____________

          v.  George, 56 F.3d 1078, 1086  (9th Cir.), cert. denied, __ U.S.
              ______                                  ____________

          __, 116 S. Ct. 351 (1995).  Gary's arguments for an offense level

          any lower than 33 are misplaced.

                    Finding that Gary  possessed the firearm  in connection

          with a  violent crime (i.e.,  breaking and  entering), the  trial

          judge   adopted  34   as  the   offense  level   pursuant   to   

          4B1.4(b)(3)(A).9  The court  calculated the guidelines sentencing
                              
          ____________________

          9    At  Gary's  sentencing,  the  trial  court  held  that  "the
          possession of a gun must be found to have either  been used or to
          have  facilitated   the  commission   of  another   offense"  and
          determined that  Gary's possession  of a firearm  facilitated the
          commission of the breaking and enterings. 

                                         -27-

          range to be  262-327 months (offense  level 34, criminal  history

          category VI) and imposed a sentence of 290 months.  Gary contests

          the trial court's  interpretation of  U.S.S.G.    4B1.4(b)(3)(A).

          Because  a felon-in-possession  charge  is not  itself a  violent

          crime,  see Doe,  960 F.2d  at 226,  Gary argues  that the  court
                  ___ ___

          should not have imposed an offense level of 34.  He also contends

          that  the  breaking and  entering charge  cannot  be used  as the

          predicate violent crime because  there is an insufficient "nexus"

          between the firearm and the alleged state offense.

                    Making  a determination under U.S.S.G.   4B1.4(b)(3)(A)

          involves  a  two-step inquiry.    First,  the court  must  decide

          whether the predicate offense  is a violent felony.   Second, the

          court must  consider whether  the defendant  used or possessed  a

          firearm in connection with that violent predicate offense.

                    In  making the first inquiry, the court is to employ "a

          formal categorical  approach" irrespective of the  actual factual

          circumstances  of  the  underlying  offense.   Taylor  v.  United
                                                         ______      ______

          States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990) (holding that court must look to
          ______

          statutory definition  of ACCA predicate offenses).   To determine

          what constitutes a violent crime under U.S.S.G.   4B1.4(b)(3)(A),

          the court must  turn to  the definition provided  in    4B1.2(1).

          "[That] guideline proceeds to  define as a crime of  violence any

          offense which 'otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious

          potential  risk of physical injury to another.'"  Fiore, 983 F.2d
                                                            _____

          at  4 (quoting U.S.S.G.    4B1.2(1)(ii)).  In  that case, we held

          that a prior  conspiracy conviction for burglary of  a commercial

                                         -28-

          premise was a violent  crime for purposes of the  career offender

          guideline,  U.S.S.G.     4B1.2.10     Fiore,  983  F.2d  at  4-5.
                                                _____

          Breaking and entering similarly is a violent crime under U.S.S.G.

            4B1.4.  Cf. United States v. Patterson, 882 F.2d  595, 602 (1st
                    ___ _____________    _________

          Cir. 1989)  (holding  that breaking  and entering  as defined  in

          Massachusetts  is  violent crime  because  unauthorized entry  of

          premises  of  another  is   a  "crucial  factor"  in  determining

          applicability of catch-all provision  of ACCA), cert. denied, 493
                                                          ____________

          U.S. 1027 (1990).  

                    With regard  to the  second  part of  the inquiry,  the

          trial  court found  that  the defendant  possessed  a firearm  in

          connection with the breaking and entering.  Here, the court is to

          consider the  facts to  determine whether  there is a  sufficient

          nexus  between possession of  the firearm  and commission  of the

          underlying offense.  See United States v. Samuels, 970 F.2d 1312,
                               ___ _____________    _______

          1316 (4th Cir.  1992) (determining whether  firearm was used  "in

          connection with" crime of violence "requires the sentencing court

          to consider the factual circumstances surrounding the [18 U.S.C.]

            922(g) offense.").  

                    In construing a similar guidelines  provision, U.S.S.G.

            2K2.1(b)(5), we have held that "the phrase 'in connection with'

          should  be  interpreted broadly  and  [  ]  where  a  defendant's

                              
          ____________________

          10  We also note that  in Fiore, as here, the commercial burglary
                                    _____
          occurred in  Rhode Island,  which defines  burglary, in  part, as
          breaking and entering a shop with the intent to commit robbery or
          larceny.  983 F.2d  at 4 n.6;  see also R.I.  Gen. Laws    11-8-4
                                         ________
          (1994).    This  offense is  a  felony  punishable  by ten  years
          imprisonment.  R.I. Gen. Laws   11-8-4. 

                                         -29-

          possession  of a  firearm aids or  facilitates the  commission of

          another offense, the  requisite link is present."   United States
                                                              _____________

          v. Thompson,  32 F.3d 1,  7 (1st Cir.  1994).  In  Sturtevant, 62
             ________                                        __________

          F.3d at 33-34, we found that a felon who assaulted  a victim with

          his  hands but carried a  concealed shotgun used  the firearm "in

          connection with" the  offense of  assault and battery.   This  is

          because "the weapon provides an added sense of security and has a

          substantial potential  for use  in the course  of the  particular

          crime in question."  Id. at 34; United States v. Brewster, 1 F.3d
                               ___        _____________    ________

          51,  54-55 (1st Cir. 1993) (selling drugs and automatic weapon to

          undercover  agent satisfied "in  connection with"  requirement of

          U.S.S.G.   2K2.1(b)(5)).  We see no reason to treat the identical

          "in  connection  with"  language  in  U.S.S.G.     4B1.4(b)(3)(A)

          differently from that of   2K2.1(b)(5).

                    We  therefore have  no difficulty  upholding the  trial

          court's findings  that Gary possessed the  firearm "in connection

          with" the breaking and entering.  Gary and Hopkins  broke into at

          least  two commercial  establishments.   When arrested,  both men

          were in possession of  firearms, and merchandise from one  of the

          stores was  found in Gary's car.  The trial court found that Gary

          and  Hopkins armed  themselves  when they  decided to  commit the

          breaking and entering for the purpose of facilitating that crime.

          "[W]e review the court's factfinding for clear  error, giving due

          deference  to the  court's application  of the guidelines  to the

          facts."   Thompson, 32  F.3d at 4  (citing 18  U.S.C.   3742(e)).
                    ________

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          There was ample support  for the trial judge's findings  of fact,

          and we affirm Gary's sentence under U.S.S.G.   4B1.4.11

                                   III.  CONCLUSION
                                   III.  CONCLUSION
                                         __________

                    For  the  reasons  stated  herein,  the conviction  and

          sentence of Raymond J. Gary are AFFIRMED.
                                          AFFIRMED
                                          ________

                              
          ____________________

          11  Subsequent  to oral argument in this case,  the Supreme Court
          issued  an opinion in  Bailey v.  United States,  __ U.S.  __, 64
                                 ______     _____________
          U.S.L.W.  4039 (Dec. 6, 1995),  which defined the  word "use" for
          purposes  of 18  U.S.C.    924(c)(1) (imposing  five-year minimum
          term of imprisonment upon  person who "during and in  relation to
          any  crime of violence  or drug trafficking  crime . .  . uses or
          carries a firearm.").   The Court held that a conviction  under  
          924(c) requires the government to prove more than mere possession
          but rather to show  "active employment of the firearm."   Bailey,
                                                                    ______
          64  U.S.L.W. at 4041 (emphasis omitted).  This decision does not,
          however,  affect  Gary's  sentence.   Bailey  does  not  apply to
                                                ______
          U.S.S.G.    4B1.4(b)(3)(A), which  reaches offenses in  which the
          defendant  either "used or possessed"  a firearm.   Id.; see also
                                                              ___  ________
          Bailey,  64   U.S.L.W.  at  4043  (recognizing   that  sentencing
          ______
          guidelines  may  provide  enhancements  for  mere  possession  of
          firearm during other offense).

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