Court Opinion

ID: 9945697
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-28 15:00:46.917805+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:37.970403
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-12040     Document: 33-1      Date Filed: 02/28/2024   Page: 1 of 8

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                     In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                          For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                  No. 22-12040
                            Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

       EDWARD DANE JEFFUS,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
       versus
       JEFFREY F. MAHL,
       Judge, 18th Judicial Circuit Court,

                                                     Defendant-Appellee.

                           ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Florida
                  D.C. Docket No. 6:21-cv-01393-CEM-LHP
USCA11 Case: 22-12040      Document: 33-1      Date Filed: 02/28/2024     Page: 2 of 8

       2                      Opinion of the Court                  22-12040

                            ____________________

       Before WILSON, BRANCH, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Pro se Florida prisoner Edward Dane Jeffus appeals the dis-
       missal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint for failure to state a claim
       and the denial of his motion to alter or amend the judgment and
       amend his complaint pursuant to Rules 59(e) and 15(a).
              Where appropriate, we review de novo a district court’s sua
       sponte dismissal of a complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A for failure
       to state a claim. Leal v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 254 F.3d 1276, 1279 (11th
       Cir. 2001). Additionally, we review denials of Rule 59(e) motions
       as well as Rule 15(a) motions to amend a complaint for abuse of
       discretion. Lambert v. Fulton Cnty., Ga., 253 F.3d 588, 598 (11th Cir.
       2001); Bryant v. Dupree, 252 F.3d 1161, 1163 (11th Cir. 2001). We
       may affirm a district court’s judgment on any basis supported by
       the record. Big Top Koolers, Inc. v. Circus-Man Snacks, Inc., 528 F.3d
       839, 844 (11th Cir. 2008).
              Pursuant to § 1915A, a court shall review, as soon as practi-
       cable, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress
       from an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.
       § 1915A(a). A court shall dismiss the complaint if it fails to state a
       claim. Id. § 1915A(b)(1). The same standards that apply to a dis-
       missal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) apply to dismissals under
       § 1915A. Leal, 254 F.3d at 1278-79. To prevent dismissal under
       Rule 12(b)(6), the plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to state a
USCA11 Case: 22-12040       Document: 33-1      Date Filed: 02/28/2024      Page: 3 of 8

       22-12040                Opinion of the Court                           3

       claim for relief that is “plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
       Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “[A] claim has facial plausibility
       when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
       draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
       misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
               Filings by pro se litigants, “however inartfully pleaded,” are
       to be liberally construed and must be held to a less stringent stand-
       ard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. Erickson v. Pardus,
       551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation omitted). Nevertheless, district
       courts may not rewrite deficient pleadings in order to sustain an
       action, and complaints that fail to state a claim upon which relief
       can be granted must still be dismissed. See Campbell v. Air Jamaica
       Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168-69 (11th Cir. 2014). Additionally, even pro
       se litigants will be deemed to have abandoned a claim by: (1) mak-
       ing only passing reference to it, (2) raising it in a perfunctory man-
       ner without supporting arguments and authority, (3) referring to it
       only in the “statement of the case” or “summary of the argument,”
       or (4) the references to the issue are mere background to the appel-
       lant’s main arguments. Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739
       F.3d 678, 681-82 (11th Cir. 2014). Additionally, unpublished opin-
       ions are not controlling authority and are persuasive only insofar
       as their legal analysis warrants. Bonilla v. Baker Concrete Const., Inc.,
       487 F.3d 1340, 1345 n.7 (11th Cir. 2007).
              Further, if the district court’s order rested on two or more
       independent, alternative grounds, the appellant must challenge all
       of the grounds to succeed on appeal. See Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 680.
USCA11 Case: 22-12040      Document: 33-1       Date Filed: 02/28/2024     Page: 4 of 8

       4                       Opinion of the Court                  22-12040

       When an appellant fails to challenge properly on appeal one of the
       grounds on which the district court based its judgment, he is
       deemed to have abandoned any challenge of that ground, and it
       follows that the judgment is due to be affirmed. See id.
               Sua sponte dismissals for failure to state a claim are prohib-
       ited when: (1) the defendant has not answered and the plaintiff still
       has the right to amend, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15; (2) the plain-
       tiff brought his claim in good faith; and (3) the district court failed
       to provide the plaintiff notice of its intent to dismiss the complaint
       or offer the plaintiff an opportunity to respond. Am. United Life Ins.
       Co. v. Martinez, 480 F.3d 1043, 1056-57 (11th Cir. 2007). However,
       “[t]here is an exception to [the] general rule against dismissal with-
       out notice if the complaint is patently frivolous or if reversal . . .
       would be futile.” Tazoe v. Airbus S.A.S., 631 F.3d 1321, 1336 (11th
       Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
              “Where a more carefully drafted complaint might state a
       claim, a plaintiff must be given at least one chance to amend the
       complaint before the district court dismisses the action with preju-
       dice.” Bank v. Pitt, 928 F.2d 1108, 1112 (11th Cir. 1991), overruled in
       part by Wagner v. Daewoo Heavy Indus. Am. Corp., 314 F.3d 541 (11th
       Cir. 2002) (en banc); see also Silberman v. Miami Dade Transit, 927 F.3d
       1123, 1132 (11th Cir. 2019). However, the court need not grant a
       plaintiff leave to amend his complaint when further amendment
       would be futile. Silberman, 927 F.3d at 1133. Leave to amend is
       futile when the complaint as amended would still be dismissed. Id.
       The question in such cases is not whether the plaintiff has stated a
USCA11 Case: 22-12040       Document: 33-1      Date Filed: 02/28/2024      Page: 5 of 8

       22-12040                Opinion of the Court                           5

       claim, but instead, “when all is said and done, he can do so.” Id.
       (emphasis in original).
              Section 1983 provides a cause of action for private citizens
       against persons acting under color of state law for violating their
       constitutional rights and other federal laws. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It
       only imposes liability for a defendant’s “own personal actions.” See
       Holloman ex. rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1263 (11th Cir.
       2004).
               Under Rule 59, a party may ask a district court to reconsider
       an earlier ruling. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). A Rule 59(e) motion
       must be based upon “newly-discovered evidence or manifest errors
       of law or fact.” Arthur v. King, 500 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2007).
       It may not be used to relitigate old matters or raise arguments or
       present evidence that could have been raised prior to the initial en-
       try of judgment. Id.
               “Judges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from dam-
       ages for those acts taken while they are acting in their judicial ca-
       pacity unless they acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.”
       Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2000) (internal quota-
       tion marks omitted). However, state judges are not immune from
       declaratory relief in a § 1983 action. Id. at 1240. To warrant such
       relief, a plaintiff must show: (1) that there was a violation, (2) that
       there is a serious risk of continuing irreparable injury if relief is not
       granted, and (3) the absence of an adequate remedy at law. Id. at
       1242. Appealing a judge’s ruling or seeking the extraordinary writ
USCA11 Case: 22-12040      Document: 33-1     Date Filed: 02/28/2024     Page: 6 of 8

       6                      Opinion of the Court                 22-12040

       of mandamus both constitute adequate remedies at law. Id. at
       1243.
              The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that “lower federal
       courts are precluded from exercising appellate jurisdiction over fi-
       nal state-court judgments.” Nicholson v. Shafe, 558 F.3d 1266, 1268
       (11th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted). We have cautioned
       against broadly construing Rooker-Feldman and held that the doc-
       trine should be confined only to “cases brought by state-court los-
       ers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments ren-
       dered before the district court proceedings commenced and invit-
       ing district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Id.
       (quotation marks omitted).
              Following initial screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the dis-
       trict court dismissed Jeffus’s complaint sua sponte for failure to
       state a claim. It framed the “crux” of Jeffus’s claims as being that
       Judge Mahl “ha[d] failed to correct [Jeffus’s] sentence in accordance
       with state law and entered an order prohibiting his pro se filings in
       the state appellate court.” It then determined that Jeffus’s equal
       protection claim challenged the validity of his confinement or its
       duration, as opposed to the circumstances of his confinement, and,
       therefore, the claim could only be raised in a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 ha-
       beas corpus petition. It further found that he failed to state a claim
       for a violation of his right to access the courts, because Judge Mahl
       had not entered the order prohibiting further pro se filings in the
       state appellate court. It concluded by noting that Judge Mahl
       would also be entitled to judicial immunity from damages.
USCA11 Case: 22-12040         Document: 33-1         Date Filed: 02/28/2024         Page: 7 of 8

       22-12040                   Opinion of the Court                                7

              Following Jeffus’s Motion to Supplement and Motion to
       Amend, the district court found that he failed to show that newly
       discovered evidence or a manifest error of law or fact rendered the
       dismissal of the complaint improper. As to his claim for denial of
       access to the courts, it explained that the Clerk predicated its refusal
       to open an appeal from Judge Mahl’s orders on the Fifth DCA’s
       Spencer order, as opposed to any action taken by Judge Mahl, and
       the Clerk’s actions could not be imputed to Judge Mahl under §
       1983. It further found that, despite the Fifth DCA’s order prohibit-
       ing further pro se filings, he failed to demonstrate that he lacked an
       adequate remedy at law, because he could have appealed the Fifth
       DCA’s order to the Florida Supreme Court or sought a writ of man-
       damus.
               As to his equal protection claim, the court found that Jeffus
       failed to allege that Judge Mahl discriminated against him based on
       a constitutionally protected interest. It also determined that, to the
       extent that he requested that the court invalidate the Spencer 1 or-
       ders and consider the claims that he raised in state court challeng-
       ing his sentence, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine would preclude re-
       view of the state court decisions. Therefore, it concluded that Jef-
       fus failed to demonstrate an entitlement to relief under Rule 59(e),
       and amendment of the complaint would be futile.

       1 In State v. Spencer, 751 So. 2d 47, 48 (Fla. 1999), the Florida Supreme Court
       determined that courts may restrict pro se filings only after providing the liti-
       gant with notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond.
USCA11 Case: 22-12040      Document: 33-1     Date Filed: 02/28/2024     Page: 8 of 8

       8                      Opinion of the Court                 22-12040

               Here, Jeffus cites to no binding caselaw or any other support
       for his arguments, alleging broadly that the district court made er-
       roneous findings and ignored and/or overlooked various allega-
       tions he made against the defendant. Even construing his argu-
       ments liberally, Jeffus also attacks only one of the grounds upon
       which the district court based its findings—the applicability of judi-
       cial immunity—and cites only to nonbinding and distinguishable
       caselaw in doing so. Without more, Jeffus is entitled to no relief.
       Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 681-82. Had he not abandoned his challenge
       to the district court’s finding with respect to the absence of an ade-
       quate remedy at law, his appeal still fails because he was still able
       to challenge the Fifth DCA’s 2017 order by appealing to the Florida
       Supreme Court under Spencer or seeking a writ of mandamus.
       Bolin, 225 F.3d at 1242-43. Additionally, the district court properly
       found that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precluded its own review
       of the state court’s decisions regarding his confinement. Nicholson,
       558 F.3d at 1270.
               Because Jeffus’s § 1983 complaint was properly dismissed for
       failure to state a claim and his motion to amend properly denied
       for failure to identify any newly-discovered evidence or manifest
       errors of law or fact or show that amendment would not be futile,
       we therefore affirm.
             AFFIRMED.