Court Opinion

ID: 9908679
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-11 17:08:19.519058+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:26.619963
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Anderson, 2023-Ohio-4463.]

STATE OF OHIO                     )                   IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                                  )ss:                NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF MEDINA                  )

STATE OF OHIO                                         C.A. No.      23CA0007-M

        Appellee

        v.                                            APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
                                                      ENTERED IN THE
RAYSHON M. ANDERSON                                   COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
                                                      COUNTY OF MEDINA, OHIO
        Appellant                                     CASE No.   20CR0868

                                 DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: December 11, 2023

        HENSAL, Presiding Judge.

        {¶1}     Rayshon Anderson appeals his convictions by the Medina County Court of

Common Pleas. This Court affirms.

                                                 I.

        {¶2}     On August 24, 2020, an Ohio State Patrol Trooper initiated a traffic stop after

observing a vehicle traveling southbound on Interstate 71 at 94 miles per hour. The trooper learned

that the driver, Mr. Anderson, had a suspended license and warrants for his arrest from another

jurisdiction. While conducting an inventory search so that the vehicle could be towed, another

trooper noticed a baggie containing a white, powdery substance in the driver’s door compartment.

Upon further search of the vehicle, a scale was also identified. The contents of the baggie were

later determined to contain heroin. Mr. Anderson was charged with possession of heroin and, in a

supplemental indictment, assault against a police officer.
                                                  2

       {¶3}    A jury found Mr. Anderson guilty of the drug charge and found that the amount of

heroin involved was more than one hundred grams. Mr. Anderson then pleaded guilty to assault.

The trial court found that Mr. Anderson was a major drug offender and sentenced him to a

mandatory eleven-year prison term for possession of heroin. The trial court also sentenced him to

a concurrent nine-month prison term for assault. Mr. Anderson appealed, assigning five errors for

this Court’s review. This Court has rearranged his assignments of error for purposes of disposition.

                                                 II.

                                 ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II

       THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED MR. ANDERSON[’S]
       [MOTION TO] CONTINUE THE TRIAL FOR MR. ANDERSON TO
       CONDUCT INDEPENDENT ANALYSIS OF THE SUBSTANCE IN
       VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION.

       {¶4}    Mr. Anderson’s first assignment of error argues that the trial court erred by denying

his request for a continuance so that additional testing of the substance at issue could be conducted.

This Court does not agree.

       {¶5}    According to Revised Code Section 2925.51(E), any defendant accused of a drug

offense “is entitled, upon written request made to the prosecuting attorney, to have a portion of the

substance that is * * * the basis of the alleged violation preserved for the benefit of independent

analysis performed by a laboratory analyst employed by the accused person, or, if the accused is

indigent, by a qualified laboratory analyst appointed by the court.” The prosecuting attorney must

provide the sample to the defendant’s analyst at least fourteen days before trial. Id. The purpose

of Section 2925.21(E) is to guarantee that individuals accused of committing drug offenses can

prepare a defense when the composition of the drugs at issue is in question. State v. Napier, 12th

Dist. Butler No. CA2020-03-038, 2020-Ohio-5457, ¶ 19. Section 2925.21(E) therefore guarantees

that, upon request, a sample of the drugs at issue will be preserved and provided to the defendant’s
                                                  3

analyst—but Section 2925.21(E) does not create a right to testing itself. See State v. Ojezua, 2d

Dist. Montgomery No. 27768, 2018-Ohio-3812, ¶ 27-28.

       {¶6}    Although Mr. Anderson frames his assignment of error in terms of the requirements

of Section 2925.21(E), the record demonstrates that those requirements are not at issue. There is

no dispute that the drug evidence in this case has been preserved—rather, Mr. Anderson’s

assignment of error challenges the trial court’s denial of a continuance that he requested on the eve

of trial to compel independent drug testing to be conducted in a specific manner.

       {¶7}    On October 13, 2022, Mr. Anderson, who was represented by a retained attorney

providing services pro bono, moved the trial court to grant independent testing of the drugs at the

State’s expense. The trial court awarded Mr. Anderson $2,000 for that purpose on October 18,

2022, and set the case for a jury trial commencing on December 12, 2022. Nothing further related

to the testing appears on the record until four days before trial, when Mr. Anderson moved the trial

court to compel the Medina County Drug Task Force to release a sample of the drugs to his expert

for testing. In that motion, Mr. Anderson represented that his expert’s initial position was that he

wanted the entire remaining sample released, but that he had modified his request to include a

representative sample of one gram. Mr. Anderson also explained that his request of the State had

been to send the sample from their custody to his expert but that the State had refused to do so

absent a court order to that effect. Mr. Anderson represented that the cost of compensating his

expert for his travel to Ohio to conduct the independent analysis would consume most of the $2,000

that the trial court had previously awarded and, consequently, he asked the trial court to compel

the State to send the sample to his expert by hand delivery or common carrier.

       {¶8}    On the date that the trial began, Mr. Anderson requested a continuance for the first

time, reiterating the request that the trial court compel the State to send a sample to his expert. The
                                                  4

State indicated that it would not consent to a sample being transported out of its custody to a third

party for testing. The State explained:

       So we’re not going to give up a gram of the drug evidence in a major drug offender
       case to send it out somewhere that we don’t know. We don’t even know this person.
       You know, that’s just not the way it’s done. It’s always done in the custody and
       control of the State of Ohio, as this Court is well aware, and throughout the years,
       it’s never been made to do otherwise.

The trial court also noted the unusual nature of Mr. Anderson’s request:

       I have * * * had independent analysis and testing for cases on my docket for twenty-
       three years, and I don’t remember a single instance where the drug wasn’t tested at
       the agency by the independent analyst, and the - - I don’t know that there’s a way
       to do it otherwise. I’ve never ordered drugs released from BCI for analysis.

       ***

       * * * [W]e’ve had other analysts * * * drive to BCI. The evidence doesn’t leave
       BCI. They do whatever testing is necessary and they prepare a report. That’s what
       I’ve seen, and I’m trying to figure out why that couldn’t be done in this case.

In that respect, the trial court noted that the motion for independent testing at the State’s expense

had been granted almost two months before trial was scheduled to begin. The trial court observed

that the appropriate motion would have been for Mr. Anderson to request any additional funds that

were necessary for his expert to travel to BCI but noted that no such motion had been filed and

that Mr. Anderson had not brought the matter to the trial court’s attention until the eve of trial.

       {¶9}    The decision to grant or deny a continuance is committed to the discretion of the

trial court. State v. Unger, 67 Ohio St.2d 65 (1981), syllabus. In this case, the trial court observed

that the motion for independent testing had been granted almost two months earlier but noted that

the motion to compel was not filed before the Court until the eve of trial. In addition, it appears

from the record of that hearing that on the day of trial, Mr. Anderson maintained his position that

the trial court should grant a continuance and compel the State to release the sample to his expert

by common carrier. Given these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its
                                                 5

discretion by denying that continuance. In doing so, we also note that Mr. Anderson had the

opportunity to thoroughly cross-examine the analyst during trial. Compare State v. Buis, 2d Dist.

Montgomery No. 27778, 2018-Ohio-1727, ¶ 13-14 (considering an argument under Section

2925.51(E) that the State failed to preserve evidence that was later destroyed). Mr. Anderson’s

second assignment of error is overruled.

                                 ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I

       THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BECAUSE THE STATE
       FAILED TO ESTABLISH ON THE RECORD SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
       SUPPORT THE CHARGES LEVIED AGAINST MR. ANDERSON.

       {¶10} Mr. Anderson’s first assignment of error argues that his conviction and the trial

court’s determination that he is a major drug offender are not supported by sufficient evidence.

This Court does not agree.

       {¶11} “Whether a conviction is supported by sufficient evidence is a question of law that

this Court reviews de novo.” State v. Williams, 9th Dist. Summit No. 24731, 2009-Ohio-6955, ¶

18, citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997). The relevant inquiry is whether the

prosecution has met its burden of production by presenting sufficient evidence to sustain a

conviction. Thompkins at 390 (Cook, J., concurring). For purposes of a sufficiency analysis, this

Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Jackson v. Virginia, 443

U.S. 307, 319 (1979). We do not evaluate credibility, and we make all reasonable inferences in

favor of the State. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 273 (1991). The evidence is sufficient if it

allows the trier of fact to reasonably conclude that the essential elements of the crime were proved

beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

       {¶12} Mr. Anderson was convicted of possessing heroin in violation of Section

2925.11(A), which prohibits any person from knowingly obtaining, possessing, or using a
                                                6

controlled substance. Under Section 2955.11(C)(6)(f), possession of heroin is a first-degree felony

when the amount involved is equal to or greater than one hundred grams, the offender is classified

as a major drug offender, and the maximum penalty for a first-degree felony is mandatory.

       {¶13} To “possess” something, for purposes of R.C. 2925.11(A), is to have control over

it. R.C. 2925.01(K). Possession cannot be inferred from “mere access * * * through ownership

or occupation of the premises upon which the thing or substance is found.” Id. Nonetheless,

possession may be either actual or constructive. State v. Hilton, 9th Dist. Summit No. 21624,

2004-Ohio-1418, ¶ 16, citing State v. McShan, 77 Ohio App.3d 781, 783 (8th Dist.1991).

“Constructive possession exists when an individual knowingly exercises dominion and control

over an object, even though that object may not be within his immediate physical possession.”

State v. Jackson, 9th Dist. Summit No. 28691, 2018-Ohio-1285, ¶ 38, quoting State v. Hankerson,

70 Ohio St.2d 87 (1982), syllabus. Presence in the vicinity of an item, standing alone, does not

establish constructive possession, but other factors taken together—such as proximity to the item

in plain view or knowledge of its presence—may be circumstantial evidence of possession. State

v. Owens, 9th Dist. Summit No. 23267, 2007-Ohio-49, ¶ 23.

       {¶14} The trooper who undertook an inventory search of Mr. Anderson’s vehicle testified

that when he opened the driver’s door, he noticed a baggie containing a white, powdery substance

in the cupholder area of the door compartment. He noted that the baggie was in plain view when

he opened the door, and he explained that it was in an area that would have been next to the left

leg of the driver. The trooper agreed that the baggie was easily accessible to someone seated in

the driver’s seat. According to the troopers who testified, Mr. Anderson was the driver of the

vehicle, and he was its only occupant. See State v. Sprouse, 9th Dist. Summit Nos. 29406, 29407,

2020-Ohio-91, ¶ 9-10.
                                                 7

         {¶15} Considering the troopers’ testimony alone and making all inferences in favor of the

State, as this Court must do when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, a trier of fact could

reasonably conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Anderson had dominion and control over

the baggie and its contents. This Court also notes, however, that Mr. Anderson testified in his own

defense and acknowledged that the baggie and its contents belonged to him.

         {¶16} Mr. Anderson has also argued that the State did not present sufficient evidence that

he possessed an amount of heroin equal to or greater than one hundred grams. In his Criminal

Rule 29 motion, Mr. Anderson argued that the State did not produce sufficient evidence that he

possessed the drugs at issue. He did not argue that the State failed to prove that the weight of the

heroin was greater than or equal to one hundred grams. This Court has consistently held that when

an appellant articulates specific arguments in support of a Rule 29 motion, all other arguments are

forfeited for purposes of appeal. State v. Navest, 9th Dist. Summit No. 28339, 2017-Ohio-5561, ¶

27. Because Mr. Anderson articulated specific arguments in support of his Rule 29 motion, he has

forfeited his argument related to the weight of the heroin for purposes of his first assignment of

error.

         {¶17} Mr. Anderson’s conviction for possession of heroin and his designation as a major

drug offender are not supported by insufficient evidence. His first assignment of error is overruled.

                                 ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III

         MR. ANDERSON’S CONVICTION WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST
         WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE IN VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS
         CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION.

         {¶18} In his third assignment of error, Mr. Anderson has argued that his conviction and

his designation as a major drug offender are against the manifest weight of the evidence. This

Court does not agree.
                                                 8

       {¶19} When considering whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the

evidence, this Court must:

       review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider
       the credibility of witnesses and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the
       evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest
       miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.

State v. Otten, 33 Ohio App.3d 339, 340 (9th Dist.1986). A reversal on this basis is reserved for

the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction. Id., citing State

v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist.1983).

       {¶20} Mr. Anderson has argued that the evidence did not establish that he knowingly

possessed one hundred grams or more of heroin because, according to his own testimony, he

believed that the substance inside the baggie was fake. “A person acts knowingly, regardless of

purpose, when the person is aware that the person’s conduct will probably cause a certain result or

will probably be of a certain nature.” R.C. 2901.22(B).

       {¶21} The Medina County Drug Task Force submitted the substance at issue in this case

to BCI for analysis. According to the analyst who tested the substance, a presumptive color test

yielded “a very slow faint purple, which is indicative of an opiate substance.” Having identified

the type of substance, she testified, she then used two separate gas chromatograph/mass

spectrometer instruments to test two different samples of the substance. Based on the results of

those tests, the analyst determined that the substance contained heroin.

       {¶22} Mr. Anderson testified that during a period of time in which he was unable to find

consistent work and short on funds, an acquaintance gave him a package of drugs to sell.

According to Mr. Anderson, he paid the acquaintance an advance in exchange for the package,

which the friend told him contained heroin. Mr. Anderson testified that he believed he could sell

the contents of the package for $60,000-$70,000 if the quality was high, so he provided samples
                                                   9

to some people who had purchased drugs from him on previous occasions. He recalled that his

customers told him that it did not affect them, so they refused to purchase it. Mr. Anderson testified

that he suspected they had a high tolerance, so he tested the substance on his tongue. He explained

that he would expect heroin to have a strong, medicine-like taste, but that the substance tasted like

“just a lot of cut” but with “a slight like medicine taste.”

        {¶23} Mr. Anderson testified that after he was unsuccessful in finding buyers, he decided

to offer the drugs to another acquaintance with less experience for $3,000. According to Mr.

Anderson, that person refused but offered to help him with a job opportunity instead. Mr.

Anderson explained that he started working with that acquaintance in June 2020, quit the job in

August, and spent all his earnings on a trip to Las Vegas. He testified that he was rehired and was

speeding on the date of the traffic stop because he had overslept on the day of his orientation. Mr.

Anderson remembered putting the baggie in the door compartment because he hoped he could still

make a sale, but he testified that he had forgotten it was there on the day of the incident. During

cross-examination, Mr. Anderson testified that he thought the heroin was fake, but he also

acknowledged that it was also possible that it was a bad batch. He reiterated that there was a

slightly medicinal taste to the substance and explained that it tasted like something was wrong with

it.

        {¶24} The weight of the evidence does not support the conclusion that Mr. Anderson did

not knowingly possess heroin because he believed that the substance in the baggie was fake. Even

if the baggie contained a significant amount of filler, as Mr. Anderson maintains, the analyst

testified that her initial test indicated the presence of opiates and that two subsequent tests

identified heroin in two different samples.         Possession of heroin in violation of Section

2925.11(C)(6) includes “a compound, mixture, preparation, or substance containing heroin.” Id.
                                                 10

Compare State v. Gonzalez, 150 Ohio St.3d 276, 2017-Ohio-777, ¶ 9-10 (concluding that the

amount of cocaine possessed under Section 2925.11(A) includes “the whole compound or

preparation of cocaine, including fillers” because “the statutory definition of cocaine plainly

encompasses a compound or preparation that includes cocaine.”). The jury did not clearly lose its

way by concluding that Mr. Anderson knowingly possessed the heroin found in his car.

       {¶25} Mr. Anderson also argues that his conviction and his designation as a major drug

offender are against the manifest weight of the evidence because the evidence did not establish

that he possessed one hundred or more grams of heroin. Mr. Anderson himself, however, testified

that he believed the package contained about one hundred grams. The analyst testified that the

first step in her testing procedure includes “obtain[ing] a weight of the substance prior to any

testing * * *.” (Emphasis added.) She explained that weight was 102.26 grams, and there was no

testimony that implied otherwise. This argument is also not well taken.

       {¶26} This Court cannot conclude that this is the exceptional case in which the evidence

weighs heavily against the conviction. See Otten, 33 Ohio App.3d at 340. Mr. Anderson’s

conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence, and his third assignment of error is

overruled.

                                ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV

       MR. ANDERSON WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.

       {¶27} Mr. Anderson’s fourth assignment of error argues that he was denied effective

assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s unusual behavior while his case was pending and

counsel’s failure to obtain independent testing of the substance at issue.

       {¶28} In order to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant most show

(1) deficiency in the performance of counsel “so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
                                                 11

‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment” and (2) that the errors made by

counsel were “so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial[.]” Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). A defendant must demonstrate prejudice by showing that, but for

counsel’s errors, there is a reasonable possibility that the outcome of the trial would have been

different. Id. at 694.

        {¶29} In a direct appeal, ineffective assistance of counsel must be demonstrated by

evidence within the record. See generally State v. Madrigal, 87 Ohio St.3d 378, 390-391 (2000).

“[A] claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal cannot be premised on decisions

of trial counsel that are not reflected in the record of proceedings * * * [and] [s]peculation

regarding the prejudicial effects of counsel’s performance will not establish ineffective assistance

of counsel.” State v. Zupancic, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 12CA0065, 2013-Ohio-3072, ¶ 4, quoting

State v. Leyland, 9th Dist. Summit Nos. 23833, 23900, 2008-Ohio-777, ¶ 7.

        {¶30} The record supports Mr. Anderson’s representation that trial counsel missed two

pretrial appearances and was not aware that a motion had been set for a hearing. When the trial

court expressed concern about trial counsel’s absences, trial counsel insisted that they reflected a

scheduling error on his part. Mr. Anderson’s proposed alternative explanation for counsel’s

actions is based on facts that are not contained within the record on appeal, and they cannot form

the basis for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Madrigal at 390-391.

        {¶31} Mr. Anderson has also argued that trial counsel was ineffective because he waited

until four days before trial to request a continuance or otherwise bring the failure to obtain

independent testing of the substance at issue to the trial court’s attention. “A defendant’s failure

to satisfy one prong of the Strickland test negates a court’s need to consider the other.” Id. at 389,

citing Strickland at 697. Mr. Anderson suggests that independent testing would have established
                                                  12

that the substance was not, in fact, heroin. Consequently, he maintains, he would not have been

convicted had the testing been conducted. There is no evidence in the record that supports Mr.

Anderson’s assertion, and prejudice resulting from ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be

established through speculation. Zupancic at ¶ 4, quoting Leyland at ¶ 7.

       {¶32} Mr. Anderson has not demonstrated that he received ineffective assistance of trial

counsel. His fourth assignment of error is, therefore, overruled.

                                  ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR V

       THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED INTRODUCTION OF
       RELEVANT EVIDENCE.

       {¶33} In his fifth assignment of error, Mr. Anderson argues that the trial court erred by

prohibiting him from questioning the analyst about the purity of the drugs at issue. This Court

does not agree.

       {¶34} Under Evidence Rule 401, evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the

existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or

less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Evid.R. 401. Relevant evidence is generally

admissible. Evid.R. 402. “The trial court has broad discretion in the admission of evidence, and

unless it has clearly abused its discretion and the defendant has been materially prejudiced thereby,

an appellate court should not disturb the decision of the trial court.” State v. Issa, 93 Ohio St.3d

49, 64 (2001). See also Evid.R. 103(A) (“Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which * * *

excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected * * *.”).

       {¶35} The trial court did not prohibit Mr. Anderson from questioning the analyst about

the purity of the substance. Instead, Mr. Anderson asked the analyst to clarify that her duties were

confined to the presence or absence of a controlled substance. Over the State’s objection, the trial

court permitted the analyst to clarify that “BCI does not test for the purity of a substance. It is only
                                                  13

a qualitative analysis, whether a substance is present [or] not.” Without excluding any testimony,

the trial court instructed the jury as follows:

        The unambiguous law in the State of Ohio is that the weight of the substance – the
        weight of the substance for the purposes of this case – includes the entire
        compound, mixture, preparation, or substance including any fillers that are part of
        the usable drug. Okay? So we don’t have a purity test in the State of Ohio with
        regard to this matter.

The trial court did not limit Mr. Anderson’s own testimony about his belief that the purity of the

substance was compromised. Consequently, the record does not demonstrate that the trial court

excluded any testimony on this point, whether it was relevant or not. Mr. Anderson’s fifth

assignment of error is overruled.

                                                  III.

        {¶36} Mr. Anderson’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Medina

County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

                                                                               Judgment affirmed.

        There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

        We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common

Pleas, County of Medina, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of

this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.

        Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period

for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to
                                                14

mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the

docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.

       Costs taxed to Appellant.

                                                     JENNIFER HENSAL
                                                     FOR THE COURT

STEVENSON, J.
CONCURS.

FLAGG LANZINGER, J.
DISSENTS.

APPEARANCES:

YU MI KIM-REYNOLDS, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.

S. FORREST THOMPSON, Prosecuting Attorney, and VINCENT V. VIGLUICCI, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.