Court Opinion

ID: 9457689
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 20:29:50.286021+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:27.877234
License: Public Domain

FEINBERG, Circuit Judge
(dissenting) :
The Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act states with perhaps unfortunate precision that it shall be a misdemeanor for any person to “make or use an affidavit required under this section * * * knowing it to be false * * 50 U.S.C. App. § 520(2) (Emphasis added). I dissent from the holding that the word “affidavit,” appearing in this criminal statute, can be construed to mean an unsworn statement. Whether one looks to the dictionaries1 or to the cases,2 an oath is an essential characteristic of an affidavit. While we should not make a fortress out of the dictionary, see Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir.) (L. Hand, J.), aff’d, 326 U.S. 404, 66 S.Ct. 193, 90 L.Ed. 165 (1945), neither should we ignore the terms of a criminal statute. To uphold defendant Leo Kaufman’s conviction we must redraft the statute to forbid the false making not only of an affidavit, but also of a document purporting to be an affidavit. To do so, in my opinion, is beyond our powers.
Given the-absence of any legislative history precisely covering the issue raised by this case,3 we can only speculate about what Congress would have done had it focused on the question. Perhaps Congress would have used more expansive language as it has in other statutes, e. g., 38 U.S.C. § 787, which proscribes “a false or fraudulent affidavit * * * or ivriting purporting to be such.” (Emphasis added.) Or perhaps, as defendant suggests, Congress would have been content to prohibit only false “affidavits,” or sworn statements, leaving conduct such as we have here to be covered by state criminal laws, e. g., N.Y. Executive Law § 135-a (McKinney’s Consol.Laws, c. 18, 1951), which punishes notaries for performing their duties fraudulently. Our role, however, is not to determine which course may have appealed most to Congress, but to determine whether the statute as written can be fairly said to encompass this case. Cf. McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27, 51 S.Ct. 340, 75 L.Ed. 816 (1931). I reluctantly conclude that it cannot.
The Government, but happily not the majority opinion, relies upon United States v. Wiseman, 445 F.2d 792 (2d Cir. *3131971), for the novel proposition that Kaufman should be “estopped” from denying that he made valid affidavits because he admitted knowing that the documents he signed purported to be true affidavits. That case involved a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 242, which states:
Whoever, under color of any law * * * willfully subjects any in-hibitant of any State * * * to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such inhabitant being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year
The indictment in Wiseman charged that defendants had deprived various persons of their rights by routinely signing blank and false “affidavits of service.” We there noted that although the documents may not have been “affidavits,” presumably because no oath was administered, defendants were estopped from claiming that a variance existed between the facts and the indictment. 445 F.2d at 796 n. 4. We in no way indicated that the estoppel concept was applicable to a case where, as here, the statutory language provides that the making of an affidavit is a key element of the crime.
Accordingly, I conclude that the conviction below should be reversed. But, since the case was tried on the theory that an oath was not an essential element of the offenses charged under the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act,4 I would not direct dismissal of the indictment but would leave open the possibility of a new trial consistent with this opinion.

. A sworn statement in writing made esp. under oath or on affirmation before an authorized magistrate or officer; specif: such a statement under oath made ex parte and without cross-examination.
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1961).
A written or printed declaration or statement of facts, made voluntarily, and confirmed by the oath or affirmation of the party making it, taken before an officer having authority to administer such oath. ... A statement or declaration reduced to writing, and sworn to or affirmed before some officer who has authority to administer an oath or affirmation.
Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1957). See also Ballentine’s Law Dictionary (3d ed. 1969).

. See, e. g., Robbins v. United States, 345 F.2d 930, 932 (9th Cir. 1965); Williams v. Pierce County Bd. of Commissioners, 267 F.2d 866, 867 (9th Cir. 1959); Johnston Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 85 U.S.App.D.C. 40, 175 F.2d 351, 354 (1949); Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hammer, 83 F.Supp. 383, 386 (W.D. Va.), rev’d on other grounds, 177 F.2d 793 (4th Cir. 1949), cert, denied, Beverage v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 914, 70 S.Ct. 575, 94 L.Ed. 1339 (1950).

. In 1960 Congress amended the statute to provide that, where state law permits, a written statement certified to be true under penalty of perjury may be filed with the court in lieu of an affidavit. Defendant argues that this amendment “made it even clearer that the word ‘affidavit’ must be given its normal meaning, and that the crime it defines requires that perjury be committed.” Appellant’s Brief at 10. This legislative history lends a measure of support to defendant’s position.

. Since the trial court refused defendant’s request that the jury be charged that an oath was an essential element of the offense, no finding was made on the issue.