Court Opinion

ID: 9549333
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:16:24.897384+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:20:09.327101
License: Public Domain

VAN HOOMISSEN, J.,
dissenting in part and concurring in part.
I would hold that the trial court committed reversible error when it refused to suppress statements made by defendant to the police during the 6:40 p.m. interrogation on August 22, 1980.
Although I accept the trial court’s historical factual findings, Ball v. Gladden, 250 Or 485, 488, 443 P2d 621 (1968), the evidence here does not support the court’s conclusion that the state carried its burden to prove that defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his rights to counsel and to remain silent.1 See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 US 458, 464, 58 S Ct 1019, 82 L Ed 1461 (1938); State v. Singleton, 288 Or 89, 602 P2d 1059 (1979). Therefore, I reject that conclusion. See State v. Davie, 56 Or App 507, 513, 642 P2d 680, rev den 293 Or 146 (1982).
Defendant testified that after he was arrested, he twice indicated he wanted an attorney and that the police held him in custody for more than 29 hours before he was brought before a judge, who then appointed counsel.2
*690Defendant’s parents likewise were frustrated in their efforts to secure an attorney for him. His step-father testified that he had contacted the Washington County Sheriffs Office and expressed his interest in seeing that defendant had an attorney. He said that the police brushed off his questions about an attorney, saying that an attorney would be appointed later.3 In the meantime, teams of police from several jurisdictions were interrogating defendant about various crimes.
When defendant was arraigned in District Court, the judge advised him that he had a right to an attorney. He asserted that right, and the judge appointed an attorney. An attorney-client relationship was thereby created. The police and the prosecutor were aware that an attorney had been appointed.4
*691About 6:40 p.m., before defendant had had an opportunity to meet with his attorney, Detectives Dorney and Orr initiated contact with defendant in hope of continuing their interrogation.5 The majority holds that defendant waived his right to counsel, because he did not invoke that right during the 6:40 p.m. interrogation. It is fundamental that the right to counsel means the right to the effective assistance of counsel. What could be more antithetical to the effective assistance of counsel than an uninvited custodial interrogation before defendant had had an opportunity to confer with his appointed counsel? I find *692it difficult to believe that a defendant who had formally invoked his right to counsel in court less than three hours earlier, and who had been informed by the judge that an attorney would be appointed for him, was required to reinvoke his right to counsel before he had had any opportunity to consult with his court-appointed attorney. It is self-evident that defendant’s right to counsel was not “scrupulously observed.” Michigan v. Mosley, 423 US 96, 104, 96 S Ct 321, 46 L Ed 2d 313 (1975); United States v. Rodriguez-Gastelum, 569 F2d 482 (9th Cir), cert den 436 US 919 (1978).
The Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Haynes, 288 Or 59, 602 P2d 272 (1979), and our decisions in State v. Taylor, 56 Or App 703, 643 P2d 379 (1982); State v. Bradshaw, 54 Or App 949, 636 P2d 1011 (1981), rev den 292 Or 568, cert allowed_US_ (1982), and State v. Fuller, 54 Or App 815, 636 P2d 447 (1981), rev den 292 Or 356 (1982), are all consistent with a conclusion that it was error to deny defendant’s motion to suppress the statement made after the appointment of counsel.
I would hold that once the police know that a person in custody on a formal charge is represented by counsel, the police may not initiate contact with that person for the purpose of interrogation. Because the statements made by defendant during the 6:40 p.m. interrogation on August 22, 1980, were made in violation of this rule, they should have been suppressed. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 US 477, 101 S Ct 1880, 68 L Ed 2d 378 (1981); United States v. Henry, 447 US 264, 100 S Ct 2183, 65 L Ed 2d 115 (1980); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 US 291, 100 S Ct 1682, 64 L Ed 2d 297 (1980); Brewer v. Williams, 430 US 387, 97 S Ct 1232, 51 L Ed 2d 424 (1977); Massiah v. United States, 377 US 201, 84 S Ct 1199, 12 L Ed 2d 246 (1964).6
I concur with the majority’s disposition of defendant’s other assignments of error.

 The question of waiver is not one of historical fact but one that requires the application of constitutional principles to the facts found. Brewer v. Williams, 430 US 387, 403, 97 S Ct 1232, 51 L Ed 2d 424 (1977).

 The trial judge found:
“8. That at no time during questioning in this case did the defendant ever assert his right to counsel or his right to remain silent. Nor did the state interfere with his right to consult with counsel.”
It is not clear to me whether this finding was intended to encompass the entire period defendant was under arrest (from approximately 11 a.m. on August 21, *6901980), or only the period of “questioning in this case.” If the former, it is inconsistent with defendant’s testimony. If the latter, however, it is not inconsistent with that testimony.

 Defendant’s stepfather testified that on learning of defendant’s arrest he called Captain Cleve at the Washington County Sheriffs Department and asked him if defendant had an attorney and if he and his wife could visit their son. Cleve answered:
“Hey, [defendant’s] been taken care of very nicely. He will have a court-appointed attorney and I will be back in touch with you if there’s any changes.”
When the step-father told Cleve that he wanted to hire an attorney to be present with defendant because of the serious charges, Cleve advised him:
“[Defendant] would have an attorney appointed and that they went into detail that he had to be an adequate attorney and he had to have tried, you know, capital cases and et cetera and et cetera.”
Cleve denied defendant’s parents’ request to visit defendant at that time.

 Detective Dorney testified that he knew counsel would be appointed for defendant at his arraignment. He did not check with anyone to determine who had been appointed. Detective Orr testified that he knew an attorney would be appointed at defendant’s arraignment. After Dorney and Orr had interrogated defendant the first time, Orr contacted Deputy District Attorney Sheldahl and informed him that he had interrogated defendant concerning this case. Sheldahl instructed Orr to reinterview defendant and “get specific details regarding the actions of [defendant].” Orr informed Sheldahl that defendant was being arraigned at that time.
Sheldahl testified that he had received a telephone call from Detective Orr about 3:30 p.m. on August 22, 1980. Orr informed Sheldahl that defendant had been interrogated and that his statement had been taped. Sheldahl instructed Orr to “go back, reinterview the defendant, and obtain, if he could, a blow-by-blow description of what had occurred in as much detail as he could get.” Sheldahl *691knew that defendant was being arraigned and that an attorney would be appointed for defendant at the arraignment. Sheldahl testified that after he was advised that attorney Alexander was appointed to represent defendant he instructed the detectives not to interview defendant unless they went through him and he contacted Mr. Alexander. Sheldahl testified:
“Q. That’s the way you wanted that interview conducted after an attorney was appointed; is that right?
“A. After I had knowledge that he had an attorney, yes, sir. As a member of the Bar, like yourself, I don’t contact adverse parties except through their counsel.
« * * * * *
“ * * * [0]nce I knew an attorney was appointed, I asked Detectives Dorney and Orr not to contact Jackson without advising me.
(I ******
Sheldahl apparently reasoned that his ethical obligation did not commence until he knew the name of defendant’s court-appointed attorney. I know of no authority for such a narrow interpretation of the rule.

 In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 US 477, 101 S Ct 1880, 68 L Ed 2d 378 (1981), the Supreme Court emphasized that:
“ * * * it is inconsistent with Miranda [v. Arizona, 384 US 436, 86 S Ct 1602, 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966)] and its progeny for the authorities, at their instance, to reinterrogate an accused in custody if he has clearly asserted his right to counsel.” 451 US at 485.
Edwards is factually distinguishable. Nevertheless, I conclude that it supports defendant’s contention.
Detectives Dorney and Orr first interrogated defendant about 1:55 p.m. on August 22, 1980. They took a taped statement from him from 3:05 p.m. until about 3:27 p.m. The second interrogation commenced about 6:40 p.m. and was concluded about 7 p.m. Orr denied that they were trying to reinterrogate defendant before an attorney had had an opportunity to talk to him. Orr testified that:
“ * * * we interviewed him in close proximity because we know that we would lose our memory of the first interview if we delayed too much longer.”
Orr was hard-pressed to explain that answer in view of the fact that the detectives had a tape of defendant’s earlier statement.

 The conclusion I have reached is consistent with the rationale expressed by Denecke, C. J., in his dissenting opinions in State v. Atherton, 242 Or 621, 629, 410 P2d 208, cert den 384 US 1025 (1966); State v. Rosenburger, 242 Or 376, 380, 409 P2d 684 (1966); State v. Sanford, 245 Or 397, 406, 421 P2d 988 (1966); and State v. Whitewater, 251 Or 304, 308, 445 P2d 594 (1968).