Court Opinion

ID: 9376832
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-04 00:02:05.462807+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:09.706658
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/3/23 Birke v. Lowe’s Home Centers, LLC CA2/3
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION THREE

JOHN BIRKE,                                                      B314138

         Plaintiff and Appellant,                                Los Angeles County
                                                                 Super. Ct. No.
         v.                                                      20CHCV00510

LOWE’S HOME CENTERS, LLC,
et al.,

         Defendants and Respondents.

      APPEAL from an order and a judgment of dismissal of the
Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Melvin D. Sandvig, Judge.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part.

         John Birke, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

      Tharpe & Howell, Stephanie Forman and Eric B. Kunkel
for Defendants and Respondents.
                  _________________________
                          INTRODUCTION
       Plaintiff John Birke, an attorney representing himself,
appeals from the trial court’s order awarding almost $95,000
in sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure1 section 128.7
to defendants Lowe’s Home Centers, LLC (Lowe’s) and Levi
Renderos, a Lowe’s store manager (collectively, defendants),
and a judgment of dismissal after the trial court sustained
defendants’ demurrer to plaintiff’s first amended complaint
(FAC).
       Plaintiff’s lawsuit arose from an incident at a Lowe’s store
he visited in late June 2020 after California’s public health
department directed—in response to the COVID-19 pandemic—
all people in the state to wear face coverings2 while in an indoor
public space. He alleged an unmasked store customer spat in
his face after plaintiff, who wore a mask, asked the shopper how
he got into the store without wearing a mask and then tracked
the maskless man’s location through the store while trying to
call the police on his phone. Plaintiff alleged Lowe’s employees
did not intervene, call the police, or try to stop the spitter from
leaving the store, despite plaintiff’s entreaties that they do so.
       Plaintiff’s FAC alleged defendants committed fraud,
created and maintained a public nuisance, and were grossly
negligent based on their failure to require customers inside the
store to wear masks and their lack of response to the incident.

1    Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure unless otherwise stated.
2     We use the terms “face covering” and “mask”
interchangeably.

                                 2
Defendants demurred to the FAC and, in their motion for
sanctions, contended the FAC was frivolous and had been
filed for an improper purpose. The trial court sustained
the demurrers, granted the sanctions motion, and dismissed
the action.
       We affirm the dismissal of plaintiff’s FAC but reverse
the order granting defendants’ motion for sanctions. We also
deny defendants’ request for appellate sanctions.
          FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       Consistent with the applicable standard of review, we draw
our statement of facts from the allegations in the FAC and
matters properly subject to judicial notice, including the initial
complaint.3 (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318 (Blank);
Landmark Screens, LLC v. Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP (2010)
183 Cal.App.4th 238, 240; Continental Ins. Co. v. Lexington
Ins. Co. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 637, 646.) We treat as true “ ‘all
material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions

3     The trial court properly took judicial notice of plaintiff’s
original complaint and FAC; Governor Newsom’s March 4, 2020
proclamation of a state of emergency in response to the
COVID-19 pandemic and executive orders issued on March 12,
March 19, and May 4, 2020; the June 18, 2020 California
Department of Public Heath (CDPH) order for Guidance for
the Use of Face Coverings (6/18/20 order); COVID-19 Industry
Guidance (Retail) issued by the CDPH and Cal-OSHA on May 7,
2020 and reissued on July 29, 2020, as well as their COVID-19
checklist for retail employees issued on July 2, 2020; and
Los Angeles City Council Ordinance No. 186809, passed
November 4, 2020. (Evid. Code, §§ 451, subd. (f), 452, subds.
(b)–(d) & (f), 453.)

                                 3
or conclusions of fact or law.’ ” (Blank, at p. 318.) We discuss
the facts relating to the sanctions motion separately below.
1.     Allegations relating to the incident at Lowe’s
       On June 18, 2020, a few months after Governor Newsom
proclaimed a state of emergency in response to the COVID-19
pandemic, the Governor issued an emergency executive order
requiring everyone in California to wear a mask or face covering
while indoors in any place of business open to the public.
       Ten days later, on June 28, 2020, plaintiff visited a
Lowe’s store in West Hills. He was wearing a mask. In his FAC,
plaintiff alleged that, when he entered the store, there were no
signs outside advising shoppers that masks and social distancing
were required, nor an employee or security guard at the door
refusing entry to customers not donning masks.
       About three to five minutes after he entered the store,
plaintiff saw a male customer who was not wearing a mask.
From about 40 feet away, plaintiff asked the man “how he got
into the [s]tore without a mask.” When the man responded as if
he didn’t understand the question, plaintiff allegedly told him
California law required him to wear a mask inside the store.
The man responded, “ ‘Fuck off, go do your fucking business,’ ”
took out his cell phone, and began recording plaintiff while
shouting at him.
       Plaintiff’s initial complaint alleged that, after the man
cursed at him, plaintiff replied, “ ‘You’re violating California
law,’ ” and told the man he was going to tell an employee.
In response, the man told plaintiff to “ ‘fucking stop bothering
[him],’ ” before taking out his cell phone apparently to record
plaintiff.

                               4
       Plaintiff alleged he “retreated” down the next aisle to
tell Lowe’s employees a “man was maskless and moving about
the [s]tore.” He asked two employees to tell the man “to comply
with the law.” They ignored plaintiff and “refused to speak
further to” him.
       Plaintiff originally alleged that, at this point, the maskless
shopper was “walking all around the store, playing a cat and
mouse game” with him. While “keeping an eye on the man’s
location from a distance,” plaintiff called 911 on his cell phone.
Plaintiff’s FAC, on the other hand, alleged plaintiff—“left [with]
no other recourse” because he had not yet found the item he
wanted—told the man he was calling the police, while “trying
to track the man’s location from a safe distance as the man
moved about the [s]tore.”
       Upon “seeing” plaintiff on his cell phone, the man allegedly
“approached to within 2 feet” of plaintiff and “spat” in his face
“four times in rapid succession.” The man then turned to an
employee, who had been standing about 15 feet away, and
said, “ ‘This guy’s bothering me because I don’t have a mask,’
to which the employee responded, ‘Well you just spit in his face.’ ”
Plaintiff asked that employee to call someone, but the employee
did not respond or do anything.
       Plaintiff continued to “tr[y] to monitor the attacker’s
location” within the store as he attempted “to engage any
employee about the attack.” Plaintiff alleged he was “ignored,”
and “[e]very employee refused to intervene or call a manager
or the police.” No one asked plaintiff if he was “all right.”
       After “several minutes,” the man headed toward the store’s
front exit, stopping to tell customers and employees—“loudly”—
that plaintiff was “ ‘bothering’ him because he was not wearing

                                  5
a mask.” Apparently, someone gave the man a mask, which
he put on before walking through the store again. Plaintiff
continued to “implore employees to call the police.”
      The man allegedly “confronted” plaintiff “threateningly”
in an aisle. Plaintiff backed up and then “stood his ground,” as
the man approached to within a few feet of him. As an employee
with a name tag “Oscar” approached the two men, plaintiff asked
him to call the police because the maskless man was “threatening
him again and had spat in his face.” Oscar told plaintiff, “ ‘We’re
not allowed to call the police,’ and walked away, saying, ‘You
guys need to move away from each other.’ ” After “[s]everal
minutes,” the man left the store. Plaintiff found Oscar and again
asked him to call the police because “a crime had been committed
against [plaintiff] in the [s]tore.” Oscar “refused” to do so.
      Oscar allegedly told plaintiff he “needed to leave the
store” and “refused” to call the store manager Renderos. On
information and belief, plaintiff alleged Oscar was “carrying out”
Renderos’s “order” not to let plaintiff speak to him. Plaintiff
waited “in vain” for police and then left to make a report at
a nearby police station, but it was closed.
      Plaintiff returned to the store and, after he waited for
“several more minutes in the customer service line,” Renderos
came out to talk to him. Plaintiff told him the details about what
had happened. Renderos did not write down or record plaintiff’s
statement nor give plaintiff “any information about reporting
the attack to the corporate office.”
      Plaintiff feared he would contract the COVID-19 virus as
a result of the incident, but he did not.

                                 6
2.     Allegations relating to false advertising
       The FAC alleged Lowe’s advertised to the public, through
June 28, 2020, “ ‘[O]ur customers’ health is our priority during
the COVID-19 virus.’ ” Plaintiff allegedly heard this
representation in radio advertisements before his visit. He
alleged he would not have entered the store had he not heard
those advertisements, or if he thought he would encounter
customers not wearing masks.
       After plaintiff entered the store, he heard a recording
stating Lowe’s’ priority was the health of its customers. Plaintiff
“understood” the message to refer to the COVID-19 pandemic
and measures Lowe’s was taking to protect its customers and
employees from exposure to COVID-19. Plaintiff alleged he
“entered and remained” in the store in reasonable reliance
on Lowe’s representations, and “on the ensuing belief that the
[s]tore was at least complying with the [6/18/20] Order.”
       Plaintiff alleged Lowe’s’ representations were false based
on his encounter with the maskless man and on Lowe’s’ and its
employees’ conduct in response to the incident. Plaintiff alleged
Lowe’s “violat[ed] the June 18, 2020[ ] Emergency Order” and
“sid[ed] with maskless shoppers against customers with masks
that objected.” Plaintiff alleged Lowe’s and its employees
“allow[ed]” the unmasked man “to commit a possibly lethal
battery” against him.
       As to Renderos specifically, plaintiff alleged on information
and belief that he was the “store manager on duty” at the time
of the alleged events and was aware “of the attacker’s presence
in the [s]tore” and the “attack” on plaintiff.

                                 7
3.     Plaintiff’s original lawsuit
       On July 16, 2020—a little over two weeks after the incident
—plaintiff sued Lowe’s for fraud (intentional misrepresentation)
and public nuisance. He named its Chief Executive Officer
Marvin R. Ellison as a defendant a month later. (In his FAC,
plaintiff alleged Ellison announced on July 17, 2020, after
becoming aware of plaintiff’s lawsuit, that Lowe’s would require
all employees and customers to wear face coverings in its stores,
nationwide.)
       In his claim for fraud, plaintiff alleged he relied on
representations by Lowe’s that it complied with recommendations
for protecting customers from COVID-19 and prioritized its
customers’ health and safety. In his claim for public nuisance,
plaintiff alleged Lowe’s created and maintained a public nuisance
on its premises by allowing customers to enter without wearing
a mask. Plaintiff sought $20,000,000 in compensatory damages,
an award of punitive damages, and an injunction.
       Lowe’s removed the action to federal court on August 18,
2020, on diversity grounds based on Lowe’s’ and Ellison’s
North Carolina citizenship. Plaintiff then dismissed the case.
4.     The current action
       On September 1, 2020, plaintiff filed a new complaint
in the superior court, alleging the same claims as he had before
plus a third claim for negligence per se. He also added Levi
Renderos as a defendant. Plaintiff’s new negligence claim
alleged defendants violated the 6/18/20 order and the City of
Los Angeles’s mask ordinance, issued May 13, 2020, by inviting
shoppers to patronize the store regardless of whether they wore
a mask, and defendants’ violation of these public health laws was
a substantial factor leading to plaintiff’s harm from the maskless

                                8
shopper who spat in his face, “dramatically increasing” his
and the public’s risk of contracting, and spreading to others,
the COVID-19 virus. Plaintiff sought the same relief as in
the original action.
      On October 9, 2020, Lowe’s again removed the complaint
to federal court on diversity grounds, asserting that Renderos,
a California resident, was a sham defendant.
      Plaintiff moved to remand. The district court granted
plaintiff’s motion, explaining that for purposes of fraudulent
joinder, “a claim is valid if there is any possibility that state
law might impose liability on a resident defendant under the
circumstances alleged in the complaint or in a future amended
complaint.” Applying this standard to plaintiff’s complaint,
the court stated “there exists at least a possibility that state law
imposes liability on Defendant Renderos for negligence under the
circumstances alleged in the complaint or in a future amended
complaint,” and Renderos thus was not a sham defendant.
      After the case was remanded to the superior court,
defendants demurred to the complaint on December 16, 2020,
setting the hearing for March 12, 2021.4 Before the demurrers
could be heard, on March 2, 2021, plaintiff filed his FAC.
For the most part, the FAC substantively was the same as the
complaint.5 Plaintiff repleaded the prior negligence per se claim

4     The superior court also granted Ellison’s motion to quash
service of summons and dismissed him from the action. Plaintiff
does not challenge that ruling on appeal.
5    Instead of $20,000,000 in damages, however, plaintiff
asked for no less than $250,000.

                                 9
as a claim for gross negligence/recklessness. He alleged that,
in violating the 6/18/20 order, defendants breached the duty of
reasonable care they owed plaintiff “as a licensee or invitee” of
the store, and he was one of the class of persons the 6/18/20 order
and local COVID-19 orders were designed to protect. Plaintiff
alleged all three causes of action—fraud, public nuisance,
and negligence—against both Lowe’s and Renderos.6
       A week later, on March 10, 2021, plaintiff substituted
himself in pro. per. for his counsel (Michael Sohigian).
Defendants served plaintiff with a motion for monetary and other
appropriate sanctions under section 128.7 by overnight delivery
and email on March 12, 2021. They then demurred to, and
moved to strike portions of, the FAC on March 30, 2021. After
plaintiff did not withdraw the FAC, defendants filed their
motion for sanctions on April 7, 2021.
5.     Hearing on demurrers and motion for sanctions
       On June 18, 2021, after continuances, the court heard
defendants’ separate demurrers and joint motion to strike
(Renderos also filed a joinder in Lowe’s’ demurrer), as well as
defendants’ motion for sanctions. Plaintiff and defendants’
counsel appeared remotely by video. Although the court had
posted its tentative rulings in favor of defendants that morning,
neither plaintiff nor defendants’ counsel had seen them. The
court thus gave the parties time to review the rulings and
present argument.

6     On May 10, 2021, plaintiff dismissed Renderos, without
prejudice, from his fraud cause of action.

                                10
       Defendants submitted. The court’s minute order states,
“Plaintiff declines to review the Court’s tentative rulings.
No further arguments are presented.” Accordingly, the court
adopted its tentative rulings as its final rulings, sustained the
demurrers without leave to amend, and granted defendants’
motion for sanctions, awarding them $94,704.33. (The motion
to strike became moot.) There is no reporter’s transcript.
       In sustaining the demurrers, the court found the 6/18/20
order imposed no duty on Lowe’s to require its customers to wear
face masks, and all of plaintiff’s claims related to defendants’
“alleged failure to enforce (i.e., require/force customers in their
store to wear face coverings) the Emergency Executive Order
issued in California on 6/18/20.”
       In the alternative, the court found that, even if the order
imposed a duty on Lowe’s to require its customers to wear face
coverings, Lowe’s would be immune from liability for failing to
enforce the order under the California Emergency Services Act
(CESA) (Gov. Code, § 8550 et seq.).
       The court then found each of plaintiff’s causes of action
failed for additional reasons, and plaintiff could not allege facts
to cure their defects.
       As for defendants’ motion for sanctions, the court found
the claims in plaintiff’s FAC were legally and factually frivolous
under section 128.7, subdivision (b)(2)–(3), and filed for an
improper purpose under subdivision (b)(1). The court awarded
defendants their attorney fees and costs, totaling $94,704.33.
Plaintiff appealed.

                                11
                            DISCUSSION
1.     The court did not err in sustaining the demurrers
       to the FAC without leave to amend
       a.    Standards of review
       “We review a judgment of dismissal after an order
sustaining a demurrer de novo, exercising our independent
judgment about whether the complaint states a cause of action
as a matter of law.” (Hanouchian v. Steele (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th
99, 106.) In so doing, we accept as true “ ‘all material facts
properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions
of fact or law.’ ” (Blank, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 318.) “We also
accept as true all materials properly ‘subject to judicial notice,’
and disregard any allegations in the operative complaint that
those judicially noticed facts contradict or negate.” (Schep v.
Capital One, N.A. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1331, 1335.) We also
“give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, and read it
in context.” (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th
1074, 1081 (Schifando).)7
       We also “must decide whether there is a reasonable
possibility the plaintiff could cure the defect with an amendment.
[Citation.] If we find that an amendment could cure the defect,

7      Plaintiff contends the trial court failed to adhere to
these principles by, among other things, drawing inferences in
defendants’, rather than plaintiff’s, favor and deciding questions
of fact. As we independently determine whether plaintiff’s FAC
states a cause of action, applying the above principles, we need
not individually address here each inference plaintiff argues
the court should or should not have made or each fact plaintiff
contends the trial court decided.

                                12
we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion and we
reverse; if not, no abuse of discretion has occurred. [Citation.]
The plaintiff has the burden of proving that an amendment
would cure the defect. [Citation.]” (Schifando, supra, 31 Cal.4th
at p. 1081.)
       Finally, “ ‘we do not review the validity of the trial court’s
reasoning but only the propriety of the ruling itself. [Citations.]’
[Citation.]” (Align Technology, Inc. v. Tran (2009) 179
Cal.App.4th 949, 958.) Accordingly, we will affirm the “ ‘trial
court’s decision to sustain the demurrer [if it] was correct on
any theory. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
       b.    At the time of the incident, Lowe’s did not owe
             plaintiff a duty to ensure its customers abided by
             the 6/18/20 order
       As the trial court noted, all of plaintiff’s claims arise
from defendants’ “alleged failure to enforce (i.e., require/force
customers in their store to wear face coverings)” the 6/18/20
order. Plaintiff referred to and relied on the 6/18/20 order
throughout the FAC’s general allegations, all of which were
incorporated into the allegations about each specific cause
of action.8 For example:
          • Plaintiff told the maskless man that “California law
             required him to wear a mask inside” the Lowe’s store,

8     For that matter, the allegations specific to the fraud
cause of action also were incorporated into the causes of action
for public nuisance and negligence, and the allegations specific
to the public nuisance cause of action were incorporated into
the cause of action for gross negligence/recklessness.

                                 13
             and his initial complaint quoted himself as telling
             the man, “ ‘You have to have a mask on in here.’ ”
          • Plaintiff asked Lowe’s employees to tell the maskless
             man to “comply with the law.”
          • Defendants were “violating the June 18, 2020 . . .
             Order” and “actively siding with maskless shoppers
             against customers with masks [who] objected.”
          • Plaintiff “reasonabl[y] expect[ed] that Defendants
             at least complied with California law as an operating
             retail store in California.”
          • Defendants “inflicted” injuries on plaintiff and
             “thousands, if not tens of thousands, of people” by
             “flouting California health directives.”
      Each specific cause of action also was based on allegations
relating to the 6/18/20 order. For example:
          • As to fraud, plaintiff alleged he believed Lowe’s’
             representations about “ ‘our customers’ health is our
             priority during the COVID-19 virus’ ” meant the store
             “was at least complying with the [6/18/20] Order”;
             and Defendants “concealed the fact[ ] . . . [t]hey would
             take no steps to protect customers from potentially
             infected shoppers not wearing face coverings.”
             (Italics omitted.)
          • As to public nuisance, plaintiff alleged defendants
             “operated, managed and maintained a retail store
             that patently violated not just the [6/18/20] Order,
             but what even in June 2020 were months old CDC
             and local pandemic control guidelines.”

                                 14
            • As to negligence, plaintiff alleged that “[i]n violating
               the [6/18/20] Order, . . . Defendants breached a duty
               of reasonable care” they owed plaintiff.
         The court properly took judicial notice of the content of
the 6/18/20 order “as an official act of the executive department
of any state of the United States.”9 (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (c);
see also Evid. Code, § 453.) The 6/18/20 order expressly states,
“People in California must wear face coverings when they are . . .
[i]nside of, or in line to enter, any indoor public space.” “The
following individuals are exempt from wearing a face covering:
. . . [p]ersons with a medical condition, mental health condition,
or disability that prevents wearing a face covering.”
         To be sure, the 6/18/20 order required all individuals to
wear a face covering inside stores, unless exempt. If he wasn’t

9      Plaintiff, and the trial court, referred to the 6/18/20 order
as an “Emergency Executive Order” issued by the Governor.
On March 4, 2020, Governor Newsom proclaimed a state of
emergency due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Governor then
issued the following Executive Orders on March 12, March 19,
and May 4, 2020, respectively: Executive Order No. N-25-20
that ordered “[a]ll residents . . . to heed any orders and guidance
of state and local public health officials”; Executive Order No.
N-33-20 that “directed” all residents “to immediately heed the
current State public health directives”; and Executive Order No.
N-60-20 that “directed” all residents “to continue to obey State
public health directives,” and authorized “the State Public Health
Officer to take any action she deems necessary to protect public
health.” CDPH’s June 18, 2020 “Guidance for the Use of Face
Coverings” thus was an order, guidance, and/or directive of the
CDPH authorized by the Governor and subject to the Executive
Orders directing residents to comply with it.

                                  15
exempt, the unmasked man should have been wearing one.
Nevertheless, nothing in the express language of the order
requires business proprietors to enforce it against their patrons
or customers. Thus, as the trial court explained, based on
its “plain language,” the 6/18/20 order “did not impose a duty
on Lowe’s . . . to require its customers to wear face masks.”
       All of plaintiff’s causes of action therefore fail to the extent
they are based on the presumption that defendants “violated”
the 6/18/20 order by not enforcing it against their customers, or
had a duty to ensure their customers complied with the order.
       Because we conclude the 6/18/20 order did not impose a
duty on defendants to make shoppers put on masks,10 we need
not address whether Lowe’s was immune from liability for failing
to enforce the order under CESA. To the extent plaintiff’s causes
of action are based on other facts, they also fail, as we discuss
below.11

10    We do not opine on whether Lowe’s, or any other business,
was required to bar unmasked customers from entering their
stores, or to ensure customers wore masks while inside their
stores after June 28, 2020. The rules, regulations, and mandates
governing mask wearing and other measures to prevent the
spread of the COVID-19 virus evolved throughout the pandemic.
11     Our analysis of plaintiff’s claims applies to both Lowe’s
and Renderos. To the extent a claim fails as to Lowe’s it also
fails as to Renderos, as Renderos’s alleged negligence and
participation in the alleged public nuisance occurred while
he was acting for Lowe’s.

                                  16
      c.     Plaintiff otherwise has failed to state a cognizable
             claim for negligence
             i.     Duty
       “To establish a cause of action for negligence, a plaintiff
must allege facts showing a legal duty to use due care, breach
of the duty, causation, and damages. [Citation.] Duty is a
threshold issue, a question of law for the court, and reviewed
de novo on appeal. [Citation.] Every person has a duty in his or
her activities to exercise reasonable care for the safety of others.
(Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (a).)” (Colonial Van & Storage, Inc. v.
Superior Court (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 487, 496.)
       As we discussed, the 6/18/20 order did not impose a duty on
Lowe’s or Renderos to require or force customers in the store to
wear face coverings. Plaintiff alleged defendants “violat[ed]” the
6/18/20 order and thus “breached a duty of reasonable care” they
owed to plaintiff, as a “licensee or invitee” of the store on June 28,
2020. Plaintiff’s cause of action for gross negligence/recklessness
based on this ground thus fails as a matter of law.
       Plaintiff nevertheless argues his claim for negligence also
is based on defendants’ duty to keep him safe while on their
premises—i.e., prevent the spitting incident—and a reasonable
juror could find defendants breached that duty when they did
nothing about the incident. The FAC alleged that, in addition
to violating the 6/18/20 order, defendants’ “acts and omissions
precipitating the attack, during the attack, and after the attack”
breached a duty of reasonable care they owed plaintiff. We thus
consider whether these allegations state a claim for negligence.
       “A defendant may owe an affirmative duty to protect
another from the conduct of third parties, or to assist another
who has been attacked by third parties, if he or she has a ‘special

                                 17
relationship’ with the other person.” (Morris v. De La Torre
(2005) 36 Cal.4th 260, 269 (Morris), cited by plaintiff.) Such
a special relationship exists between business proprietors, such
as Lowe’s, and their patrons or invitees, like plaintiff. (Ibid.)
         “[A]lthough a store owner is not an insurer of the safety
of its patrons, the owner does owe them a duty to exercise
reasonable care in keeping the premises reasonably safe.”
(Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200, 1205; Delgado
v. Trax Bar & Grill (2005) 36 Cal.4th 224, 229 (Delgado), relied
on by plaintiff [business proprietors “owe a duty to their patrons
to maintain their premises in a reasonably safe condition”].)
That duty “includes an obligation to undertake ‘reasonable steps
to secure common areas against foreseeable criminal acts of
third parties that are likely to occur in the absence of such
precautionary measures.’ ” (Delgado, at p. 229.) Plaintiff argues
that, as a patron at the Lowe’s store, he “had a recognized right
to . . . precautionary measures, e.g., posting a security guard
outside, responding to [his] requests to speak to the violator,
[and] calling the police or manager that could have prevented
the attack on him.”
         Lowe’s does not dispute it owed a duty to maintain the
safety of its premises, including to “guard against foreseeable
acts by third parties.” Thus, we “must consult the factors
described in Rowland [v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108
(Rowland)] to determine whether relevant policy considerations
counsel limiting that duty.”12 (Brown v. U.S.A. Taekwondo

12    The Rowland factors include “the foreseeability of harm
to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered
injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s

                                  18
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 204, 209 (Brown) [articulating “two-step
inquiry” to determine if “a defendant has a legal duty to take
action to protect the plaintiff from injuries caused by a third
party”: the court first determines whether an affirmative duty
to protect exists and then “consult[s]” the Rowland factors].)
      “ ‘The most important’ ” of the Rowland factors “ ‘is
whether the injury in question was foreseeable.’ ” (Regents of
University of California v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607,
629.) “In examining foreseeability, ‘the court’s task . . . “is not
to decide whether a particular plaintiff’s injury was reasonably
foreseeable in light of a particular defendant’s conduct, but
rather to evaluate more generally whether the category of
negligent conduct at issue is sufficiently likely to result in
the kind of harm experienced that liability may appropriately
be imposed.” ’ ” (Ibid. [framing question not as to whether
university could predict specifics of attack but “whether a
reasonable university could foresee that its negligent failure
to control a potentially violent student, or to warn students
who were foreseeable targets of his ire, could result in harm
to one of those students,” and concluding it could], quoting
Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 764, 772.)
Moreover, “ ‘[f]oreseeability, when analyzed to determine

conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to
the defendant’s conduct, the policy of preventing future harm,
the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to
the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting
liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence
of insurance for the risk involved.” (Rowland, supra, 69 Cal.2d
at p. 113.)

                                 19
the existence or scope of a duty, is a question of law to be
decided by the court.’ ” (Delgado, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 237.)
      Here, plaintiff asserts his negligence claim is based on
defendants’ negligence in having “invited” persons violating the
6/18/20 order—i.e., unmasked customers—into the Lowe’s store.
Even if defendants had a general duty to require customers to
wear masks—or to communicate with them that they should13—

13     For the first time in his reply brief, plaintiff argued
defendants violated Cal-OSHA rules in effect at the time, thus
“establish[ing] a rebuttable presumption of negligence.”
Although the trial court, on defendants’ motion, took judicial
notice of the May 7, 2020 Cal-OSHA guidance containing those
rules, plaintiff never made this argument below. (See Hanna v.
Mercedes–Benz USA, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 493, 513 [“ ‘ “As
a general rule, theories not raised in the trial court cannot be
asserted for the first time on appeal.’ ” ”]; see also SCI California
Funeral Services, Inc. v. Five Bridges Foundation (2012) 203
Cal.App.4th 549, 573, fn. 18 [“An appellant cannot salvage a
forfeited argument by belatedly addressing the argument in
its reply brief.”].) In any event, amending the FAC to refer to
the Cal-OSHA guidance would be futile. First, the guidance
does not require retailers to ensure customers wear masks,
as plaintiff suggested at oral argument. The guidance states
“[k]ey prevention practices include . . . use of face coverings
by employees . . . and customers/clients.” The guidance
also provides, “Retailers must take reasonable measures
to communicate with the public that they should use face
coverings.” As we discuss, because defendants’ failure to comply
with any duty to advise customers to wear masks is not, as
a matter of law, “sufficiently likely to result in” an unmasked
customer attacking another customer, the Rowland factors
counsel us to limit defendants’ duty here.

                                 20
we conclude that duty did not extend to preventing the maskless
man from attacking plaintiff. Plaintiff has alleged no facts,
nor can he, to show a reasonable retailer could anticipate that
allowing an unmasked shopper into the store—or failing to tell
him he should wear a mask—could result in that individual
attacking another shopper.14 As plaintiff alleged, the purpose
behind Lowe’s’ alleged duty to prohibit unmasked shoppers
from entering the store was to prevent those individuals from
potentially infecting other shoppers with the COVID-19 virus.
But that is not the harm plaintiff alleged here. Plaintiff never
contracted COVID-19. Rather, plaintiff alleged he was harmed
because the unmasked man spit in his face, leading him to fear
he had been infected with the COVID-19 virus. It was the
unmasked man’s attack that allegedly harmed plaintiff, not
his mere presence in the store.
      Moreover, the measures plaintiff alleged Lowe’s was
required to take to fulfill its duty to protect him against the
man’s attack—barring his entry and making him put on a mask
—would require heightened foreseeability. Plaintiff alleged there
was “no employee or security guard at the door refusing entry to
maskless customers”; and Lowe’s employees did not “tell the man
to comply with the law,” “refus[ed] to intervene in a criminal
battery,” and “allow[ed] [the attacker] to leave without
hindrance.”

14     Plaintiff alleged a woman was assaulted by a maskless
shopper at a Lowe’s store in Virginia in July 2020, but that was
after the events alleged in plaintiff’s FAC.

                               21
       In Delgado, our Supreme Court explained a business is
not required to hire guards unless “ ‘heightened’ foreseeability
of third party criminal activity on the premises exists—shown
by prior similar incidents or other indication of a reasonably
foreseeable risk of violent criminal assaults in that location.”
(Delgado, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 240.) Plaintiff alleged no
such facts here that would have required Lowe’s to post guards.
He alleged he “discovered there was [a guard] at Defendants’
primary competitor, Home Depot,” when he went to a Home
Depot store the next day. That another store chose to hire
a guard does not impose a duty on Lowe’s to do so, however.15
As we said, the 6/18/20 order did not impose a duty on Lowe’s to
enforce it, and the attack on plaintiff did not have even a minimal
degree of foreseeability, much less the heightened foreseeability
necessary to impose a duty on Lowe’s to post guards. (Morris,
supra, 36 Cal.4th at pp. 270–271 [“ ‘[A]s a general matter,
imposition of a high burden requires heightened foreseeability,
but a minimal burden may be imposed upon a showing of a lesser
degree of foreseeability.’ ”]; Delgado, at p. 237 [“ ‘the scope of duty

15     Months later, around November 4, 2020, the Los Angeles
City Council passed Ordinance No. 186809, to “empower[ ]”
business owners and operators “to require every patron to wear
a face covering when on the premises of a business or when
seeking or receiving services.” The ordinance thus “authorized”
any business in the City of Los Angeles “to refuse admittance
or service to any person who refuses or fails to wear a [f]ace
[c]overing when on the premises of the business or when seeking
or receiving service.” The ordinance does not require businesses
to refuse admittance or service to unmasked individuals,
however. In any event, it was passed long after the incident.

                                  22
is determined in part by balancing the foreseeability of the harm
against the burden of the duty to be imposed’ ”].)
       Nor is a proprietor’s “duty to warn patrons of known
dangers . . . and, in circumstances in which a warning alone
is insufficient, . . . to take other reasonable and appropriate
measures to protect patrons or invitees from imminent or
‘ongoing’ criminal conduct” implicated by plaintiff’s allegations.
(Delgado, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 241.) In Delgado, the plaintiff,
who was patronizing the defendant bar, received menacing stares
from another bar patron and his friends. (Id. at pp. 230–231.)
Plaintiff’s wife warned the bar’s indoor security guard, and the
couple left to avoid a fight. (Id. at p. 231.) The inside guard
did not accompany them to their car and the outside guard was
not at his post. Plaintiff was attacked in the parking lot. (Ibid.)
The high court concluded that, because the defendant bar “had
actual notice of an impending assault,” it had “an obligation to
take reasonable, relatively simple, and minimally burdensome
steps to attempt to avert that danger.” (Id. at p. 250.) As it was
foreseeable an assault would occur if the hostile bar patrons were
not separated from plaintiff, those measures included using the
bar’s existing security guard to dissuade the group from leaving
and ensuring the existing outside guard was available to help
maintain the separation. (Id. at pp. 245–247, 250.)
       Plaintiff can allege no similar facts here. Despite plaintiff’s
contention, he has not alleged he was facing danger from
“imminent or ongoing criminal assaultive conduct” to which
defendants would have a duty to take reasonable measures
to respond. (Morris, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 270.) Plaintiff saw
the man and “[f]rom about 40 feet away,” questioned him about
how he got in the store. Plaintiff alleged he sought out store

                                 23
employees to tell them “the man was maskless and moving about
the [s]tore.” He allegedly asked the employees “to tell the man
to comply with the law,” not that he feared an impending assault.
Indeed, plaintiff alleged he continued “to track the man’s location
from a safe distance as the man moved about the [s]tore,” not
that he moved away from the man or left him alone for fear he
would be attacked.
       Assuming the truth of plaintiff’s allegations, and drawing
all reasonable inferences from them, no reasonable juror could
find plaintiff’s complaint to the store’s employees that a shopper
wasn’t wearing a mask would have put the employees on notice
that the maskless shopper would attack plaintiff by spitting
on him or otherwise. (Delgado, supra, 36 Cal.4th at pp. 235–236
[noting duty to take reasonable steps to protect an invitee or
patron from third party act arises where “proprietor . . . has
reason to believe from observation or experience, that the conduct
of another endangers” the invitee or patron].) Accordingly, the
face of the FAC reveals the store’s employees had no reason to
believe the unmasked man was a danger to plaintiff so as to give
rise to a duty to speak to him or take some other action, as in
Delgado. Nor has plaintiff alleged facts to support a reasonable
inference the employees could have anticipated the man would
attack plaintiff if they did not ask him to put on a mask or
remind him that he should wear one.
       Furthermore, a business owner has a duty to take only
reasonable measures to protect its invitees from foreseeable
third party conduct. Requiring employees of a home
improvement store—who were not hired to provide security as
were the guards in Delgado—to detain a customer, or otherwise
prevent the customer from leaving the store, not only is

                                24
objectively unreasonable, but imposes a burden on the employees
not warranted by the unforeseeable nature of the incident.
(Indeed, by not pursuing the unmasked man as he left the store,
defendants effectively diffused the situation.) Nor can we
reasonably infer from the alleged facts that less burdensome
measures—such as posting a sign reminding customers to wear
a mask—would have been effective in preventing the attack.16
(Delgado, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 238 [scope of duty is determined
“ ‘by a balancing of “foreseeability” of the criminal acts against
the “burdensomeness, vagueness, and efficacy” of the proposed
security measures’ ”].)
       Finally, plaintiff apparently contends he sufficiently
alleged defendants’ failure to act after the incident was a breach
of their duty of care. He contends he alleged defendants “failed
to summon aid or police, or to try preventing the spitter’s
departure,” arguing that, had they done so, he “could have
insisted his attacker be tested for Covid.” Plaintiff does not
allege, nor can he, that the unmasked man injured him—or
was about to injure him—to give rise to Lowe’s duty “to provide
‘ “assistance [to] their customers who become ill or need medical
attention.” ’ ” (Morris, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 270.) The attack
here was not ongoing as in Morris, so that calling the police
or a manager would have been a reasonable action to take to
prevent a foreseeable harm. In Morris, a restaurant’s employees
did not call police as they watched—over a period of seven or

16     Assuming the burden of posting a sign or otherwise
communicating with customers about mask wearing is low,
that Rowland factor would not compel imposing liability in
this case given the absence of foreseeability.

                                25
eight minutes—an individual get into a fistfight with the plaintiff
in the restaurant’s parking lot, run inside the restaurant and
grab a knife, stab the plaintiff in the parking lot, and then chase
the plaintiff down and stab him again. (Id. at pp. 266–267.)
The court explained when “assaultive conduct is imminent . . .
or occurring in plain view,” it isn’t difficult “ ‘ to appreciate the
strong possibility of serious injury’ to persons against whom such
imminent or ongoing criminal conduct is aimed.” (Id. at p. 271.)
Thus, the restaurant owed a duty to “summon aid” for the
plaintiff by having its employees call 911—a “generally
minimally burdensome method of seeking assistance”—or by
other “similar minimal measures” that would be “ ‘appropriate
and reasonable under the circumstances.’ ” (Id. at pp. 276–277.)
       Here, in contrast, after the man spit in plaintiff’s face,
the attack was over. Plaintiff alleges no facts indicating the man
continued to attack him or was on the verge of attacking him
again. Plaintiff alleged the man “approached again to within
a few feet,” but does not allege anything else happened between
them or that he was further harmed by that approach. The man
left the store “[s]everal minutes later.” Accordingly, after the
spitting incident—that did not leave plaintiff physically injured
or in need of medical aid—there was no minutes-long “imminent,”
“ongoing” criminal conduct to which defendants had a duty to
respond, as in Morris. (Cf. Janice H. v. 696 North Robertson,
LLC (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 586, 596 [premises owner has “ ‘a duty
to respond to events unfolding in its presence’ ” (citing Delgado,
supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 245, italics added)].) Moreover, plaintiff
alleged the employee—who said he was not allowed to call the
police—did act. He told the men “ ‘to move away from each
other.’ ” And, as discussed, requiring a mere employee to stop

                                 26
a third party from leaving the store is by no means a “minimal
measure[ ]” that would be appropriate or reasonable.
        In short, the FAC alleged no facts—nor has plaintiff
articulated any facts that he could allege—to demonstrate
defendants could foresee the unmasked man would attack
plaintiff if the precautionary measures plaintiff suggested
(posting a guard, talking to the man, calling a manager or police)
weren’t taken, regardless of whether those precautions were
burdensome or not. Defendants’ duty thus did not extend to
protect plaintiff from the spitting attack. As the third party
conduct here was not foreseeable, we need not address the
remaining Rowland factors. (See Delgado, supra, 36 Cal.4th
at p. 237, fn. 15 [other Rowland factors “may dictate against
expanding the scope of a landowner’s duty to include protecting
against third party crime, even where there is sufficient evidence
of foreseeability” (italics added)]; Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
pp. 217–218 [Rowland factors are applied to determine whether
duty should be excused or limited].)
              ii.    Causation
        In any event, based on the facts pleaded, plaintiff
cannot establish defendants’ alleged negligent conduct was
the proximate cause of plaintiff’s harm as a matter of law.
“ ‘ “[P]roximate cause ‘is ordinarily concerned, not with the
fact of causation, but with the various considerations of policy
that limit an actor’s responsibility for the consequences of his
conduct.’ ” ’ ” (State Dept. of State Hospitals v. Superior Court
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 339, 353.) “Causation in the law of negligence
is not determined by a linear projection from a ‘but for’ premise.
Instead, it is expressed in terms of ‘foreseeability’ and is limited
by the policy that cause must be ‘proximate.’ ” (Brewer v. Teano

                                 27
(1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1024, 1030 (Brewer).) “ ‘Ordinarily,
proximate cause is a question of fact which cannot be decided
as a matter of law from the allegations of a complaint. . . .
Nevertheless, where the facts are such that the only reasonable
conclusion is an absence of causation, the question is one of
law.’ ” (State Hospitals, at p. 353.)
       “ ‘An intervening force is one which actively operates
in producing harm to another after the actor’s negligent act or
omission has been committed.’ ” (Brewer, supra, 40 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 1030–1031, quoting Rest.2d Torts, § 441, subd. (1).) “ ‘A
superseding [also known as supervening] cause is an act of a
third person or other force which by its intervention prevents the
actor from being liable for harm to another which his antecedent
negligence is a substantial factor in bringing about.’ ([Rest.2d
Torts,] § 440.) If the cause is superseding, it relieves the actor
from liability whether or not that person’s negligence was a
substantial factor in bringing about the harm. ([Rest.2d Torts,]
§ 440, com. b.)” (Brewer, at pp. 1030–1031.)
       A third party’s intervening, intentional conduct is not
necessarily a supervening cause. (Cole v. Town of Los Gatos
(2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 749, 770.) Rather, “ ‘[i]f the likelihood
that a third person may act in a particular manner is the hazard
or one of the hazards which makes the actor negligent, such
an act whether innocent, negligent, intentionally tortious,
or criminal does not prevent the actor from being liable for
harm caused thereby.’ ” (Bigbee v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. (1983)
34 Cal.3d 49, 58, quoting Rest.2d Torts, § 449.) In other words,
if an injury occurred due to “ ‘ “a later cause of independent
origin” ’ ” the question of causation revolves around whether the
later or intervening cause “ ‘ “was foreseeable by the defendant,

                                28
or if not foreseeable, whether it caused the injury of a type
which was foreseeable.” ’ ” (Cole, at p. 770.) “ ‘ “[I]f, however,
it is determined that the intervening cause was not foreseeable
and that the results which it caused were not foreseeable, then
the intervening cause becomes a supervening cause and the
defendant is relieved from liability for the plaintiff’s injuries.” ’ ”
(Ibid.)
       Here, the risk of physical attack was not the hazard to
which defendants allegedly exposed plaintiff by allowing an
unmasked customer in the store or by failing to communicate
with customers that they should wear masks. Again, the purpose
of mask wearing is to prevent the unintentional infection of
others with the COVID-19 virus. As we discussed, plaintiff does
not allege he contracted the COVID-19 virus at all, much less
because the unmasked man was in the store. His alleged harm
stems from his fear of contracting the virus because the man
intentionally spit in his face. And, again, no reasonable person
would conclude that allowing an unmasked individual into the
store, or not asking him to wear a mask, could lead to a physical
attack, much less one involving the plaintiff being spit upon.
Being spit at is not the type of injury anyone would expect from
the presence of an unmasked shopper in a store.
       Moreover, the unmasked man intentionally spit on plaintiff
after plaintiff—not the unmasked man—made the first move, so
to speak, and continued to “track” him through the store, despite
the man’s rudely expressed desire that plaintiff leave him alone.
No reasonable retailer could have anticipated the scenario that
unfolded. Not only did plaintiff purposefully engage with the
unmasked shopper despite his fear of catching a contagious virus
from him, but the unmasked shopper’s reaction to plaintiff’s

                                  29
pestering by spitting in plaintiff’s face could be described only
as extraordinary. (Brewer, supra, 40 Cal.App.4th at p. 1032
[“ ‘if the independent intervening act is highly unusual or
extraordinary, not reasonably likely to happen and hence
not foreseeable, it is a superseding cause, and the defendant
is not liable’ ” (quoting 6 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed.
1988) Torts, § 975, p. 366)].)
        Nor can we infer from the FAC that the employees’ failure
to call the police, or to try to prevent “the spitter’s departure”
—after the man already had spit on plaintiff—contributed to
plaintiff’s harm. Plaintiff argues that, if they had, he “could have
insisted his attacker be tested for Covid.” Because defendants
did not stop the unmasked man, plaintiff argues, he “was left
to suffer the distress of fearing he contracted the virus until he
could be tested weeks later.” Plaintiff contends “[t]hat is the real
injury creating a triable issue of whether [defendants] breached
their duties.” Plaintiff, however, has not alleged, nor proffered,
any facts from which one reasonably could infer the spitter could
have been forced to take an immediate COVID-19 test—or that
an immediate test was even available—thereby preventing
plaintiff’s alleged emotional distress. Moreover, plaintiff asserted
he was unable to be tested for “weeks” after the incident. His
argument the unmasked man somehow could be made to test
and would have been able to test sooner than plaintiff is mere
conjecture that we need not accept.
              iii.   Damages
        Plaintiff’s negligence claim fails, in any event, because
the injury he suffered due to defendants’ alleged breach of duty
—emotional distress stemming from his fear of contracting the
COVID-19 virus and becoming seriously ill or infecting his wife—

                                30
does not constitute a compensable injury or support a claim for
damages, as plaintiff has not alleged he actually was exposed to
the virus. (Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal.4th
965, 975, 999–1000 (Potter).) Plaintiff admits he did not contract
the virus, and he did not allege he otherwise was physically
injured by defendants’ alleged negligence. Rather, plaintiff
alleged he suffered “personal fear and anguish” from the
conditions at the store that led to the incident.
       In Potter, our high court addressed a plaintiff’s ability
to recover damages for negligently inflicted emotional distress
in the absence of a physical injury or illness, based on a fear of
cancer after exposure to a toxin. The plaintiffs there had been
exposed to toxic chemicals in domestic water wells that increased
their risk of developing cancer in the future, although none
suffered from cancer. (Potter, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 975.) Our
high court held plaintiffs could recover such damages if they
were “exposed to a toxic substance which threatens cancer”
due to defendant’s negligence, and their “fear stem[med] from a
knowledge, corroborated by reliable medical or scientific opinion,
that it is more likely than not that [they would] develop the
cancer in the future due to the toxic exposure.” (Id. at p. 997.)
       Our Supreme Court also held that, where a defendant has
acted with oppression, fraud, or malice in breaching its duty—
as plaintiff alleged here—the plaintiff need not meet the “more
likely than not threshold.” (Potter, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 999.)
In those circumstances, the court held, “in the absence of a
physical injury or illness, a plaintiff may recover damages for
negligently inflicted emotional distress engendered by a fear of
cancer . . . if the plaintiff pleads and proves that: (1) as a result
of the defendant’s negligent breach of a duty owed to the plaintiff,

                                 31
he or she is exposed to a toxic substance which threatens cancer;
(2) the defendant, in breaching its duty to the plaintiff, acted with
oppression, fraud or malice as defined in Civil Code section 3294;
and (3) the plaintiff’s fear of cancer stems from a knowledge,
corroborated by reliable medical or scientific opinion, that the
toxic exposure caused by the defendant’s breach of duty has
significantly increased the plaintiff’s risk of cancer and has
resulted in an actual risk of cancer that is significant.” (Id. at
pp. 999–1000, fn. omitted.)
        Plaintiff contends he sufficiently alleged his ability to
recover emotional distress damages under this standard because
whether his “fear [of contracting COVID-19] has medical and
scientific corroboration is a question of fact.” We do not disagree,
but plaintiff has missed the trial court’s and defendants’ point.
Applying Potter here, the “toxic substance” is the COVID-19 virus
itself, which threatens to infect an individual and make the
individual severely ill.
        Here, plaintiff essentially alleged he feared he would
contract the COVID-19 virus—and therefore become ill or infect
his wife and make her ill—because the unmasked shopper spat
on him. He does not allege the maskless man had the COVID-19
virus, however. Thus, plaintiff has not alleged he was exposed
to a toxic agent—here, the virus itself—such that he could
have been infected with it. Plaintiff therefore has not alleged
a required element to recover emotional distress damages based
on defendants’ alleged negligence. And, as plaintiff will not
be able to prove the unmasked man had the COVID-19 virus,
amendment here would be futile. Because he cannot allege

                                 32
recoverable damages, plaintiff cannot allege a viable cause
of action for negligence.17
        For all the above reasons, plaintiff’s negligence claim
against Lowe’s and Renderos—whom plaintiff has sued in his
capacity as “the store manager on duty” who allegedly “directed,
authorized, supervised, and approved the conditions, policies and
practices” that plaintiff “encountered”—fails as a matter of law.
        d.     Plaintiff’s public nuisance claim also fails
        Civil Code section 3479 defines a nuisance as “[a]nything
which is injurious to health . . . or is indecent or offensive to
the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to
interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property . . . .”
A public nuisance is “one which affects at the same time an
entire community or neighborhood, or any considerable number
of persons, although the extent of the annoyance or damage
inflicted upon individuals may be unequal.” (Civ. Code, § 3480.)
“A private person may maintain an action for a public nuisance,
if it is specially injurious to himself, but not otherwise.” (Civ.
Code, § 3493.) In other words, “[t]he damage suffered must be
different in kind, not merely in degree, from that suffered by

17    Plaintiff claims he need allege only defendants’ breach
of duty caused him nominal damages under Civil Code section
3360. As defendants note, that is not the case. (See Duarte v.
Zachariah (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1652, 1661–1662 [“ ‘[A]ctual
damage’ in the sense of ‘harm’ is necessary to a cause of action in
negligence; nominal damages are not awarded.”]; Fields v. Napa
Milling Co. (1958) 164 Cal.App.2d 442, 447–448 [availability of
nominal damages under Civil Code section 3360 does not apply
to negligence cause of action].)

                                 33
other members of the public.” (Kempton v. City of Los Angeles
(2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1344, 1349.)
       The alleged public nuisance that plaintiff sought to enjoin
is defendants allegedly having allowed and encouraged customers
to enter the West Hills store without wearing a mask. Plaintiff
alleged defendants did so despite knowing maskless customers
“might be” carriers of COVID-19 with a “potential” to infect
“many times their number and contribute to the uncontrolled
spread of the coronavirus, with staggering consequences to
the public.” Plaintiff also alleged these “conditions”—the
allowing of unmasked persons into the store, who might have had
COVID-19—were “unlawful, noxious, indecent, and offensive—
and in fact, potentially lethal to a reasonable person, and affected
a substantial number of persons.”
       Plaintiff further alleged this nuisance was “specially and
particularly injurious” to him because he “was assaulted and
battered” in a manner that “significantly increased his likelihood
of contracting COVID-19 on top of the unreasonable risk of
exposure to which Defendants subjected him and all members
of the public.”
       Plaintiff’s alleged harm is not “different in kind” from that
other members of the public allegedly suffered from unmasked
shoppers being allowed inside the store: an alleged increased
risk of being exposed to, and infected with, COVID-19. Rather,
plaintiff alleged he suffered a different degree of harm—a
“significantly increased . . . likelihood of contracting COVID-19.”
(Cf. Birke v. Oakwood Worldwide (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1540,
1543, 1549–1550 (Birke), relied on by plaintiff [in public nuisance
case based on landlord’s failure to abate secondhand smoke
in common area, plaintiff’s alleged “aggravation” of childhood

                                34
asthma and chronic allergies due to the secondhand smoke was
sufficiently different in kind from “increased asthma and lung
cancer” the general public faced].) He thus had no standing
to state a claim for public nuisance based on defendants
having allowed unmasked shoppers in the West Hills store.
       Plaintiff nevertheless argues his alleged emotional
distress from the spitting attack, “that caused him to fear that
he contracted” COVID-19, was “a personal bodily injury both
‘special and peculiar’ and ‘different in kind’ from the exposure to
[COVID-19]” he alleged other customers suffered. (Citing Birke,
supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at p. 1550 [noting “Restatement Second
of Torts recognizes, ‘When the public nuisance causes personal
injury to the plaintiff . . ., the harm is normally different in kind
from that suffered by other members of the public and the tort
action may be maintained.’ (Rest.2d Torts, § 821C, com. d,
p. 96.)”].) Plaintiff alleged the nuisance—unmasked shoppers
invited into the store—“allowed” the spitting attack to occur,
which resulted in his alleged personal injury of emotional
distress. According to the FAC, however, the unmasked
man spat on plaintiff—causing his alleged personal injury—
after plaintiff initiated verbal contact with him, tracked his
movements in the store, and announced to the man that he
was calling the police.
       Nevertheless, as we discussed, plaintiff did not, and cannot,
allege facts from which a reasonable juror could find defendants
could have foreseen that allowing unmasked shoppers into the
store would lead to one of them spitting on a masked shopper.
And, it is the man having spit on plaintiff that he contends
makes the harm he suffered different in kind from the potential
exposure to COVID-19 that shoppers generally would experience

                                 35
from the presence of unmasked individuals. As the trial court
explained, “When a negligence and a nuisance cause of action
rely on the same facts regarding lack of due care, as is the case
here, the nuisance claim is considered a negligence claim and
‘stands or falls with the determination of the negligence cause
of action.’ ” (Citing Melton v. Boustred (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th
521, 542.) As we have concluded plaintiff’s negligence claim fails
because defendants neither owed plaintiff a duty to require the
unmasked shopper to comply with the 6/18/20 order, nor could
have foreseen the spitting “attack,” plaintiff’s nuisance claim
fails for the same reasons.
       Finally, plaintiff sought injunctive relief in connection
with his claim for public nuisance, but there is nothing to enjoin.
As the trial court noted, the spitting incident that resulted in
plaintiff’s alleged injury occurred in the past, and plaintiff has
alleged no facts demonstrating an ongoing problem of unmasked
patrons spitting on masked patrons. Moreover, as defendants
note, the CDPH allowed its universal indoor masking
requirement to expire a year ago on February 15, 2022.
(Citing  [as of Mar. 3, 2023],
archived at .) Accordingly, even
if plaintiff could allege a different or foreseeable injury, he could
not state a claim for relief. (E.g., Donald v. Café Royale, Inc.
(1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 168, 184 [“Injunctive relief will be denied
where, at the time of the order or judgment, no reasonable
probability exists of the recurrence of the past acts. An
injunction should not be granted as punishment for past acts
where it is unlikely that they will recur.”].)

                                 36
        e.    Plaintiff has not pleaded a valid claim for fraud18
        The elements of fraud are misrepresentation, knowledge
of falsity, intent to defraud (induce reliance), justifiable reliance,
and resulting damage. (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12
Cal.4th 631, 638.) A fraud cause of action must be specifically
pleaded. (Tindell v. Murphy (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1239, 1249.)
        Plaintiff alleged he “entered and remained” (italics added)
in the West Hills store in reasonable reliance on Lowe’s’ recorded
statements19—on the radio and in the store—about Lowe’s’
priority being the health of its customers, which he believed
meant Lowe’s was complying with the 6/18/20 order; and those
representations were false.
        As the trial court found, the alleged false representations
are not sufficiently specific. Plaintiff did not allege how the
statement, “ ‘[O]ur customers’ health is our priority during the
COVID-19 virus,’ ” is equivalent to an affirmative representation
that Lowe’s would ensure its customers wore masks in its store.
Plaintiff did not allege what Lowe’s said or did that justifiably
made him believe that was the case. Moreover, the statement
itself is too vague to be actionable—it is a generalized assertion
that makes no promise as to specific actions. (See, e.g., Wilson

18    Plaintiff argues he has stated, or can amend to state,
a claim of fraud against Renderos. Defendants argue he can’t.
Based on our review of the record, plaintiff dismissed that
cause of action against Renderos before the court ruled on
the demurrers.
19    The FAC also mentions “written” representations but
does not allege what those are. Plaintiff does not mention any
on appeal.

                                  37
v. Houston Funeral Home (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1124, 1139
[representation that funeral home “ ‘would provide for a dignified
and respectful funeral and burial service’ ” would be too general
to support fraud claim but finding other allegations on different
issue sufficiently specific to support claim].)
       Notably absent from the FAC are any allegations that
Lowe’s made any statement about requiring patrons to wear
masks in its stores on or before June 28, 2020. Indeed, the
FAC’s allegations demonstrate plaintiff was not justified in his
interpretation that it would. Plaintiff alleged there were no
signs outside the store advising shoppers masks were required.
Moreover, plaintiff alleged he remained in the store in reliance
on Lowe’s purported representation that it would enforce the
6/18/20 order, yet he saw the unmasked man only a few minutes
after entering the store.
       Plaintiff’s fraud claim thus fails and cannot be amended
to state a viable claim. Plaintiff also alleged Lowe’s concealed
several “facts”—all of which relate to his allegations of what
Lowe’s employees failed to do before, during, and after the
incident. He does not allege, nor can he, that Lowe’s had a duty
to disclose any of those “facts.” (See, e.g., Hambrick v. Healthcare
Partners Medical Group, Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 124, 162
[duty to disclose fact to plaintiff required element for fraudulent
concealment].) They thus are not actionable.
       f.     The district court’s remand order does not require
              reversal as to Renderos
       Plaintiff contends that, because the district court found
Renderos was not a sham defendant, his causes of action
against Renderos necessarily are sufficient to survive demurrer.
Plaintiff’s contention is not well-taken. The district court merely

                                38
found “there exists at least a possibility that state law imposes
liability on . . . Renderos for negligence under the circumstances
alleged in the complaint or in a future amended complaint.” That
finding, however, was made in the limited context of determining
whether Renderos was fraudulently joined to defeat diversity
jurisdiction and contains no legal analysis of the issues.
Accordingly, we give it no weight.
2.     Sanctions awarded under section 128.7
       a.     Applicable law and standard of review
       Section 128.7 provides that an attorney or unrepresented
party, who presents—whether by signing, filing, submitting,
or later advocating—a pleading, motion, or other similar paper,
certifies it has legal and factual merit, and has not been
“presented primarily for an improper purpose.” (§ 128.7,
subd. (b)(1)–(3).)
       “A claim is factually frivolous if it is ‘not well grounded
in fact’ and it is legally frivolous if it is ‘not warranted by existing
law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law.’ ” (Peake v. Underwood (2014) 227
Cal.App.4th 428, 440 (Peake).) “In either case, to obtain
sanctions, the moving party must show the party’s conduct
in asserting the claim was objectively unreasonable. [Citation.]
A claim is objectively unreasonable if ‘any reasonable attorney
would agree that [it] is totally and completely without merit.’ ”
(Ibid.)
       “ ‘Because our adversary system requires that attorneys
and litigants be provided substantial breathing room to develop
and assert factual and legal arguments, [section 128.7] sanctions
should not be routinely or easily awarded even for a claim that is
arguably frivolous’ [citation], and instead ‘should be “made with

                                  39
restraint.” ’ [Citation.] Indeed, even if a plaintiff could not
successfully defend against either demurrer or summary
judgment, that alone is insufficient to support the sanction
of dismissal.” (Kumar v. Ramsey (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 1110,
1121 (Kumar), fn. omitted.)
       The moving party first must serve, without filing, the
motion and allow the opposing party 21 days to withdraw the
offending pleading. (§ 128.7, subd. (c)(1).) If the pleading is not
withdrawn, the moving party may file the motion. (Ibid.)
       We review a section 128.7 sanctions award for abuse
of discretion. (Peake, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 441.) “We
presume the trial court’s order is correct and do not substitute
our judgment for that of the trial court. [Citation.] To be entitled
to relief on appeal, the court’s action must be sufficiently grave
to amount to a manifest miscarriage of justice.” (Ibid.)
       b.     The court erred in granting defendants’ motion
       Here, defendants served their separately noticed motion
on plaintiff—who by then was in pro. per.—about 10 days
after plaintiff filed his FAC. Defendants filed the motion more
than 21 days later, after plaintiff did not dismiss the FAC.
Defendants’ motion thus complied with the procedural
requirements of section 128.7, subdivision (c).
       Defendants asserted sanctions were warranted because
the FAC’s claims had no legal or factual support under section
128.7, subdivision (b)(2)–(3). But their primary argument was
that plaintiff had presented the FAC for an improper purpose
under subdivision (b)(1).
       In support of their motion, defendants submitted evidence
that, in the summer of 2020, including around the time plaintiff
visited the Lowe’s store, plaintiff had played softball with other

                                40
players, some of whom did not wear masks, and sometimes
himself did not wear a mask while actively playing. Defendants
also asked the court to take judicial notice—which it did—
of plaintiff’s lawsuit filed in December 2020 against people
with whom he played softball, alleging they had not abided by
mask orders issued by the State and the City of Los Angeles.
       Defendants argued this evidence showed plaintiff had
filed the FAC against defendants for an improper purpose—
primarily to coerce them to settle—because plaintiff was willing
to participate in games where others did not wear masks and
to violate City orders. Defendants also argued plaintiff’s lawsuit
against the softball defendants itself was filed in retaliation
of those defendants and frivolous, demonstrating his suit here
also was filed for purposes other than to vindicate a right.
       The trial court agreed. The court ruled it “appear[ed]”
the claims in the FAC were presented and maintained for an
improper purpose based on (1) their lack of legal and evidentiary
support; and (2) plaintiff’s “conduct as evidenced in this case
and the [softball] case.” The court found it “appear[ed] that
the true reason for filing and maintaining the action is to coerce
settlement and/or retaliate against Defendants because they
did not act in the manner Plaintiff desired.”
       We do not find substantial evidence supports the court’s
factual findings. We cannot conclude that plaintiff’s tactics in an
unrelated lawsuit filed months after this one, and against parties
unrelated to the defendants here, has any bearing on whether
the FAC here was filed for an improper purpose, “such as to
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in
the cost of litigation.” (§ 128.7, subd. (b)(1).) If the defendants
in the softball action believe plaintiff has sued them for an

                                41
improper purpose then they can move for sanctions against him
in that case.
       We agree the record shows plaintiff can be overzealous
at times. But plaintiff’s unrelated lawsuit and participation
in outdoor softball games with unmasked players does not
demonstrate the primary purpose for filing and maintaining
the FAC here was to retaliate against defendants. Moreover,
the record shows plaintiff actively litigated his suit, and thus
was not primarily using it to attempt to “extract a settlement”
from defendants. (See Peake, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 449
[plaintiff who did not engage in affirmative discovery for more
than a year after filing lawsuit against one of the defendants
or otherwise prosecute her claims against him showed lack of
good faith belief in validity of claims].)
       Nor do we find the record supports finding plaintiff’s
conduct in asserting the FAC’s claims was objectively
unreasonable. The court found plaintiff’s claim that Lowe’s had
a duty to enforce the 6/18/20 order without evidentiary support,
in part because plaintiff had violated City orders that had closed
the softball fields, and had participated in games with unmasked
individuals. The court found plaintiff’s conduct demonstrated
plaintiff’s shopping in a store with unmasked individuals did
not expose him to an unreasonable risk of contracting COVID-19.
We do not see how playing softball outdoors with unmasked
people is the same as shopping indoors with unmasked people.
Accordingly, that evidence does not support the court’s finding.
       And, although we have concluded the court properly
sustained defendants’ demurrers to the FAC, we cannot conclude
that is sufficient to support sanctions. (Kumar, supra, 71
Cal.App.5th at p. 1121.) Plaintiff’s attorney—who filed both

                                42
the initial complaint and the FAC—declared he would not
have filed plaintiff’s case “if [he] did not believe Defendants
had violated the law and caused [plaintiff] significant harm.”
He also declared his reasons for substituting out of the case
did not reflect “doubts about the merits” of plaintiff’s claims or
have anything to do with plaintiff having played softball games
around the time of the incident or his lawsuit against the softball
defendants. We thus cannot say “ ‘any reasonable attorney
would agree [plaintiff’s claims are] totally and completely
without merit.’ ” (Peake, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 440.)
       Even if plaintiff’s claims were legally frivolous, however,
the sanctions imposed here do not reflect the purpose of the
statute. Section 128.7, subdivision (d) provides, “A sanction
imposed for violation of subdivision (b) shall be limited to what
is sufficient to deter repetition of this conduct or comparable
conduct by others similarly situated.” Attorney fees and
expenses “incurred as a direct result of the violation” may be
awarded. (§ 128.7, subd. (d).) Here, however, the court awarded
defendants the total amount of attorney fees they had incurred
since plaintiff filed his initial complaint (when he was
represented), including in removing the case to federal court,
and their fees in responding to plaintiff’s original complaint that
he dismissed. Defendants did not serve their sanctions motion,
however, until March 2021. In these circumstances, we cannot
conclude awarding nearly $95,000 in sanctions was limited to
what would be sufficient to deter the filing of a frivolous action.
       Accordingly, we conclude the court abused its discretion
in granting defendants’ motion and awarding $94,704.33 in
sanctions against plaintiff.

                                43
3.     Defendants’ motion for sanctions on appeal
       On June 7, 2022, defendants filed a motion in this court
asking us to award monetary sanctions against plaintiff under
rule 8.276 of the California Rules of Court on the ground
plaintiff’s May 24, 2022 motion to augment the record on appeal
was frivolous. Plaintiff sought to augment the record with a
declaration a witness signed on May 23, 2022. Plaintiff argued
the declaration “refute[ed]” false statements one of the softball
defendants made in a declaration defendants submitted to the
trial court in support of their section 128.7 motion for sanctions.
The “refut[ed]” testimony relates to the timing of plaintiff’s
participation in softball games, mentioned above.
       We denied the motion to augment and plaintiff’s motion
to take evidence on appeal,20 filed November 2, 2022, for the
reasons stated in defendants’ oppositions to those motions. We
did not give notice that we were considering imposing sanctions.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.276(c).)
       California Rules of Court, rule 8.276 authorizes a Court
of Appeal, on its own or a party’s motion, to impose sanctions
on a party or attorney for “[f]iling a frivolous motion.” (Rule
8.276(a)(3).) As defendants note, the declaration plaintiff sought
to add to the record on appeal never was before the trial court.
It thus was not the proper subject of a motion to augment. (See
rule 8.155(a)(1)(A) [on party’s motion court may order record
augmented to include “[a]ny document filed or lodged in the case

20    In that motion, plaintiff asked us to admit into evidence
a declaration from the softball defendant correcting his earlier
declaration about the timing of the softball games.

                                44
in superior court”]; Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc.
(1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444, fn. 3 [“Augmentation does not
function to supplement the record with materials not before
the trial court.”].)
       Defendants also assert plaintiff filed the motion for an
improper purpose, “namely, to influence the justices who will
decide the appeal by placing the issue before them even if his
motion to augment is denied.” Defendants attached an email
from plaintiff to their counsel, stating, “Regardless of the
Court of Appeal’s ruling, . . . this will put the matter of the false
evidence you presented to the court below and relied on in your
Respondent’s Brief, before the Court of Appeal and the California
Supreme Court.”
       Whether to impose appellate sanctions is a matter within
our discretion. (Winick Corp. v. County Sanitation Dist. No. 2
(1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1170, 1181–1182.) We are troubled by
plaintiff’s use of a motion to augment to try to fix his admitted
“mistake” in not refuting the purported false declaration in the
trial court. Plaintiff is a licensed attorney and should know
better. Nevertheless, giving plaintiff the benefit of the doubt,
he appears to have done so not for an improper purpose but
to correct a misstatement on which he honestly believed the
trial court improperly relied. Moreover, defendants’ requested
sanctions of $5,760 in attorney fees is excessive. Defendants’
counsel declared her firm spent 36 hours to meet and confer with
plaintiff, oppose his motion, and draft the motion for sanctions.
Plaintiff’s motion was not complex. Responding to it, and
drafting the motion for sanctions, did not warrant almost
an entire work week of attorney time. We decline to exercise
our discretion to impose sanctions.

                                 45
                          DISPOSITION
      We affirm the dismissal of plaintiff’s FAC. We reverse
the order awarding $94,704.33 in sanctions against plaintiff.
The trial court is directed to enter a new judgment striking
the sanctions award. The parties are to bear their own costs
on appeal.

      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                    EGERTON, J.

We concur:

             EDMON, P. J.

             LAVIN, J.

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