Court Opinion

ID: 9728624
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:12:46.815743+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:50.420971
License: Public Domain

R. M. Maher, P.J.
(dissenting). I must dissent from the majority’s conclusion finding that the delay in bringing this defendant to trial was excusable because of the change in docketing systems in Detroit Recorder’s Court.
The 180-day rule, MCL 780.131; MSA 28.969(1), provides that an inmate of a penal institution who is charged with a criminal offense "shall be brought to trial within 180 days” of receipt of the requisite notice. If trial is not had within the 180-day period, the court loses jurisdiction over the defendant. The purpose of the 180-day rule is to give the incarcerated defendant with charges pending against him the opportunity to have all of the sentences run concurrently. People v Loney, 12 Mich App 288, 292; 162 NW2d 832 (1968).
In the case at bar, the defendant was arraigned on the warrant on April 14, 1976. A preliminary examination was held on June 6, 1976. A pretrial was held on June 11, 1976. On July 30, 1976, the trial date was set for November 15, 1976. On October 13, 1976, the prosecutor requested an adjournment of the trial until after December 1, 1976, because of the unavailability of a witness who was in the armed forces. The request was granted. Because the Recorder’s Court was then switching away from a central docket system, the *514case was reassigned, on December 2, 1976, a new pretrial was held, at which time the judge set a trial date of May 17, 1977.
The statute does not require actual trial within the 180-day period, but only the taking of good faith action to bring the case to trial. People v Hendershot, 357 Mich 300; 98 NW2d 568 (1959), People v Hill, 402 Mich 272; 262 NW2d 641 (1978).
In People v Asher, 32 Mich App 380; 189 NW2d 148 (1971), this Court excused delays in complying with the 180-day rule where the court system was congested with thousands of additional cases due to the 1967 riot. This overload of the system was outside of the court’s control, and some delay was inevitable despite all good faith efforts. Even so, the postponement in Asher due to court congestion was from August 2, 1967, until September 18, 1967, or approximately six weeks.
In People v Forrest, 72 Mich App 266; 249 NW2d 384 (1976), there was a 215-day delay not attributable to defendant, from March 29, 1975, until October 28, 1975. The prosecution contended that this delay was caused by the trial court in scheduling the case for trial due to docket congestion, was therefore an excusable delay, and should not be charged against the people. The Court said, 72 Mich App 273:
"In the case at bar the people have not made an affirmative showing of unavoidable delays which might justify this inaction. A mere recitation of the factor of a crowded docket, without more, cannot warrant visiting on the incarcerated defendant a longer imprisonment than might otherwise be in store. If congestion and delay result from inadequate court staffing or funding, the inevitable results of those delays must fall upon the people, who have the power to remedy court congestion.
*515"We hold that, if the defendant has not contributed to the delay, a period of otherwise unexplained inaction in excess of 180 days in the prosecution of a charge pending against an inmate is per se a violation of the statute, unless the people make an affirmative showing of exceptional and unavoidable circumstances which hamper the normally efficient functioning of the trial courts.”
In the case at bar, the trial judge testified on remand about the backlog of cases in the Detroit Recorder’s Court which was caused by the change in docketing system. He stated that at the time of the change-over, he had 256 cases, with 316 defendants, 60 of whom were in jail. His method of setting the cases for trial was "to set as early a trial as possible for those persons who were charged for serious offenses, capital offenses and were also in jail”. However, there is no indication whatsoever on this record that the trial judge took into account whether the incarcerated defendants were subject to the 180-day rule in setting the trial date.
I would find that the congestion in the Detroit Recorder’s Court was more analogous to the Forrest chronic congestion problem than to the Asher riot repercussions. While the change in procedures may have caused some judges to be assigned a heavier caseload than in their previous experience, there was no actual increase in the number of cases to be disposed of. Certainly, this new docketing system was a procedure under the direct control of the court, and could have been adjusted and manipulated to ensure compliance with the 180-day mandate. The fact that all jailed persons received the same priority in the eye of the judge would militate against a finding of "exceptional and unavoidable circumstances” in setting a trial *516date six months in the future for this defendant. Those incarcerated defendants who were entitled to be tried within 180 days should have received priority.
I would reverse and would discharge the defendant.