Court Opinion

ID: 9612292
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:06:46.055669+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:40:55.768911
License: Public Domain

LAMBERT, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Appellee waived her right to sue under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act, KRS 344 et seq. The compensation that Appellee received under the Workers’ Compensation Act was for the replacement of her diminished power to earn money. It did not compensate her for damages sustained under the civil rights statute.
The Court of Appeals concluded that Appellee’s “claims under the civil rights *694statute are not barred by her acceptance of a worker’s compensation award.” This conclusion was based on Meyers v. Chapman Printing Co.1 and Hardaway Management Co. v. Southerland 2 and language in those cases as follows
the workers’ compensation statute preempts only common law tort claims and does not preempt a statutory civil rights claim. This Court must presume that the General Assembly knew of the Workers’ Compensation Law preemption doctrine when it created a private cause of action for ‘actual damages’ caused by discrimination in the Kentucky Civil Rights Act, and that it intended to create an independent cause of action notwithstanding that the two statutes might provide alternative sources of statutory relief in those cases where the mental emotional injury inflicted causes work-related occupational disability.3
In Gardinella v. General Electric Co.,4 the plaintiff sought workers’ compensation benefits. The plaintiff and G.E. settled the claim and a release was given for injuries arising out of plaintiffs employment with G.E. The plaintiff then attempted to sue under the Kentucky Civfl Rights Act for discrimination, seeking compensation for lost wages, humiliation, mental and emotional distress. The U.S. District Court cited Meyers, supra, for the proposition that KRS 342.690 does not preclude claims under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act, “which provides a specific and independent cause of action to remedy employment discrimination.”5 Rejecting the view that workers’ compensation benefits preclude recovery under civil rights law, the Court said “the settlement agreement compensated Gardinella only for physical injuries to his right thumb and wrist. He does not seek compensation for those injuries in this action.”6 The court held that the settlement only prevented claims brought under the Workers Compensation Act.
The doctrine of election of remedies provides that “when a person has at his disposal two modes of redress, which are contradictory and inconsistent with each other, his deliberate and settled choice and pursuit of one will preclude his later choice and pursuit of the other.”7 In McNeal v. Armour,8 the plaintiff was permitted to sue under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act and a collective bargaining agreement. The Court of Appeals of Kentucky reasoned that
The United States Supreme Court has held that notions of ‘election of remedies’ are not applicable in civil rights litigation when persons choose to enforce their contractual rights as well as their statutory civil rights. Contractual rights are not displaced merely because a statutory right against discrimination has been provided, both rights are independent in their origin.
In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,9 the Supreme Court of the United States held *695that a party seeking to vindicate contract rights under a collective bargaining agreement was not precluded from asserting independent statutory rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
That doctrine [of election of remedies], which refers to situations where an individual pursues remedies that are legally or factually inconsistent, has no application in the present context. In submitting his grievance to arbitration, an employee seeks to vindicate his contractual right under a collective-bargaining agreement. By contrast, in filing a lawsuit under Title VII, an employee asserts independent statutory rights accorded by Congress. The distinctly separate nature of these contractual and statutory rights is not vitiated merely because both were violated as a result of the same factual occurrence. And certainly no inconsistency results from permitting both rights to be enforced in their respectively appropriate forums.10
In the present case, election of remedies is inapplicable. The remedies sought are not legally or factually inconsistent. Ap-pellee’s workers compensation award paid for lost wages and work related injuries. Her civil rights claim was for emotional illnesses resulting from the sexual harassment inflicted on her. Although the separate injuries arose from the same conduct, the remedies are not inconsistent.
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the Court of Appeals.
KELLER, J., joins this dissenting opinion.

. Ky., 840 S.W.2d 814 (1992).

. Ky., 977 S.W.2d 910 (1998).

. Hall v. Lyons, Ky.App., 1997-CA-002809-MR, slip op. at 4 (Oct. 8, 1999) (quoting Hardaway, 977 S.W.2d at 917).

. 833 F.Supp. 617 (W.D.Ky.1993).

. Id. at 619.

. Id.

. Collings v. Scheen, Ky., 415 S.W.2d 589, 591 (1967).

. Ky.App., 660 S.W.2d 957 (1983).

. 415 U.S. 36, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974).

. Id. at 49-50, 94 S.Ct. 1011 (footnote omitted).