Court Opinion

ID: 9765967
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:26:57.295808+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:17.583076
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Spaeth, J.:
I agree with Judge HOFFMAN that more than an indecent request is necessary to support a conviction under section 2709(3) of the Crimes Code, Act of *554December 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334, §1, eff. June 6, 1973, 18 Pa.C.S. §2709. The section provides that:
“[a] person commits a summary offense when, with intent to harass, annoy or alarm another person:
“(3) he engages in a course of conduct or repeatedly commits acts which alarm or seriously annoy such other person and which serve no legitimate purpose.”
The behavior proscribed by this subsection is a “course of conduct” or “repeatedly committed] acts.” The terms “act” and “conduct” are specifically defined in the Preliminary Provisions of the Crimes Code, supra, 18 Pa.C.S. §103, as follows:
“ ‘Act’ or ‘action.’ A bodily movement whether voluntary or involuntary.
“ ‘Conduct.’ An action or omission and its accompanying state of mind, or, where relevant, a series of acts and omissions.”
Thus a conviction under subsection three requires a showing of repeated bodily movements or a series of omissions; oral communications alone are by definition insufficient.
Here, in addition to the oral communications, the Commonwealth proved only that appellant’s face was close to complainant’s face when she awoke. No other movement or gesture was proved. From the proximity of appellant’s face, a bodily movement may be inferred; however, it was only one movement or act, not the required “course of conduct.”
That the legislature intended subsection 2709(3) to be inapplicable to situations involving words alone is further supported by a comparison of it with other provisions of the Crimes Code. As one commentator points out:
“The Code’s provision for Simple Assault, §2701, requires ‘bodily injury’, unlike the former law, where simple assault included every offensive touching, no *555matter how slight. This provision [§2709] is designed to cover an obvious potential loophole.” S. Toll, Reporter’s Comment, Pennsylvania Crimes Code Annotated, §2709 (1974).
The obvious loophole referred to is clearly harassment by offensive touching or bodily movement, not harassment by oral communication. The latter situation does not present a “loophole” since it is specifically dealt with in section 5504, which is entitled “Harassment by communication or address.” That section provides:
“A person commits a misdemeanor of the third degree if, with intent to harass another, he:
“(2) makes repeated communications anonymously or at extremely inconvenient hours, or in offensively coarse language.”
The legislature has thus covered each potential situation - bodily injury, non-injurious bodily movements, and offensive oral or written communications - with a distinct statutory section.1
The correctness of this interpretation is further demonstrated by a study of the New York harassment statute. Subsection three of §2709 was adopted verbatim from §240.25 of the New York Penal Law, L. 1965, c. 1030; amended 1967, c. 791, §41, eff. Sept. 1, 1967, §240.25, as were subsections one and two. The New York courts have interpreted their counterpart of subsection three to exclude situations of offensive language only.2 In People v. Paradiso, 58 Misc. 2d 370, 295 N.Y.S. 2d 561 (1968), for example, the defendant allegedly used abusive and obscene language at the home of the complainant. *556The court there held that such behavior did not fall within the counterpart of subsection three since the definitional section
"... of the Penal Law defines ‘Act’ as ‘a bodily movement’ and ‘Conduct’ as ‘an act or omission and its accompanying mental state.’ It appears therefore that the use of abusive and obscene language is not an act within the meaning of the Penal Law or a course of conduct within the meaning of the same. It is therefore not prosecutable except where expressly provided under the Penal Law.” 58 Misc. 2d at 374, 295 N.Y.S. 2d at 564-5.
And in People v. Smolen, 69 Misc. 2d 920, 331 N.Y.S. 2d 98 (1972), where the defendant, observing a police officer attempting to serve a summons on a peddler, asserted that the peddler was being unjustly harassed and accused the policeman of taking bribes, the court concluded “that the offensive speech directed at the police officer neither accompanied by a physical battery, nor being of a continuous and repetitive nature so as to amount to a course of conduct, does not support a charge of harassment.” 69 Misc. 2d at 922, 331 N.Y.S. 2d at 101.
Even if prosecution for oral communications were permitted under subsection three, however, I, like Judges HOFFMAN and PRICE, do not believe the requirement of a course of conduct has been met. Although appellant may have repeated his oral statement three or four times, the repetition was during a single encounter only minutes in length. This is not enough to constitute a course of conduct, which implies not one isolated incident but, rather, a pattern of conduct embracing several incidents.
Once again New. York law is instructive. For example, in People v. Caine, 70 Misc. 2d 178, 333 N.Y.S. 2d 208 (1972), the defendant was charged with harassment under the New York counterpart of subsection three when he behaved offensively to a police officer who had stopped him for a traffic violation. While the officer *557was writing the ticket, the defendant approached him and argued with him. At the advice of the officer, he went back to his car but returned shortly and uttered obscenities at the officer. When asked by the officer what he had said, the defendant repeated the remark. When the officer advised him to return once more to his car, further obscenities were uttered and after questioning by the officer, were repeated. The court held that this encounter was a single episode of immature behavior not amounting to a course of conduct. Similarly, in People v. Smolen, supra, although several accusations were made against the police officer, and some pushing and shoving occurred, the court held that the behavior was not so continuous and repetitive as to constitute a course of conduct. 331 N.Y.S. 2d at 101.
I would reverse the judgment of sentence.

. The issue of the constitutionality of legislation criminalizing non-injurious petty behavior resulting in minor private annoyance is not now before us, although it may be noted that when it does arise that issue will require careful examination. See dissenting opinions of Judges HOFFMAN and PRICE.

. Harassment by abusive language is covered in a separate subsection of §240.25.