Court Opinion

ID: 9830764
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 20:27:25.471081+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:26.486309
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing by Appellant.
We have reached the conclusion that we were in error in holding that the trial court properly excluded the testimony of the two witnesses to the effect that under the printed rules of appellee it was within the scope of a brakeman’s duty to eject trespassers from trains. The general rule stated in our opinion is correct. However, the issue presented in the instant case falls, we think, within the following well-established rule:
“Where the nature of the action or defense, or the form or, contents of the pleadings, give notice to the adverse party that it is fairly incumbent upon him, in his own interest, to be prepared to produce a particular instrument or writing, no other notice to produce the instrument is necessary before introducing secondary evidence of its contents.” 22 C. J. 1060, § 1360.
This rule has been repeatedly followed in this state; the following cases presenting its various applications; Hamilton v. Rice, 15 Tex. 382; Reliance Lumber Co. v. Telegraph Co., 58 Tex. 394, 44 Am. Rep. 620; Ellis v. Sharp, 20 Tex. Civ. App. 482, 49 S. W. 409; Harlan v. Harlan (Tex. Civ. App.) 125 S. W. 950; Givens v. Turner (Tex. Civ. App.) 225 S. W. 403; Curlee Co. v. Lowery (Tex. Civ. App.) 275 S. W. 730; Central State Bank v. First State Bank (Tex. Civ. App.) 276 S. W. 941 (error refused). See also 10 R. C. L. p. 920, § 79.
The gist of plaintiff’s action was compensation for an injury inflicted by a brakeman of defendant. The petition alleged:
“ * * ⅝ That in so acting and in making such assault said brakeman was acting for and on behalf of the defendant railway company and was acting in the course of his employment and while transacting the defendant’s business.”
The alleged fact that the brakeman was “acting in the course of his employment” was an essential element to recovery, and the terms of the employment, if in writing or represented by printed rules of defendant, constituted one of the essential bases of plaintiff’s suit; and while no express notice to produce was given, such notice we think was clearly implied under the above rule, which is thus stated in 10 R. C. L. 920:
“Notice to produce is always dispensed with, and secondary evidence allowed, when from the very nature and character of the suit the party must know that he is charged with the possession of the instrument, in such a case, the reason for giving notice and the necessity for giving it cease.”
Furthermore, testimony excluded was by oral deposition taken some months before the trial, at which taking defendant was represented by counsel. Defendant was therefore cognizant of the testimony, and that it would be offered at the trial. It related to printed rules of the defendant for the government of its employees which necessarily must have been in its possession!
The following is from a note in 22 O. J. 1060:
“The object of requiring notice to produce an original document, before secondary evidence of its contents can be given, is to afford a sufficient opportunity to the opposite party to produce the writing and thereby secure, if he desires it, the best evidence of its contents, and is not to enable him to prepare evidence to explain or confirm the document. McDowell v. Ætna Ins. Co., 164 Mass. 444, 41 N. E. 665; Dwyer v. Collins, 7 Exch. 639; 12 Eng. L. & Eq. 532, 155 Reprint 1104; Carte v. Dennis, 5 Terr. L. 30, 21 CanLTOcc Notes 267.”
The record clearly shows that such opportunity was afforded.
The motion for rehearing is granted, our former judgment is set aside, and the trial court’s judgment is reversed and the cause remanded to that court for a new trial.
Motion granted.
Cause .reversed and remanded.