Court Opinion

ID: 9588780
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:38:39.347179+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:00.284191
License: Public Domain

Justice Webb
dissenting.
I dissent because I believe there were two errors in the trial requiring a new sentencing proceeding.
At a pretrial conference, the State indicated that if the defendant was found guilty, it would introduce evidence at the sentencing proceeding that the defendant had previously been convicted of first-degree murder and rape. The defendant’s attorney then told the court that he wished to inform the jury during the voir dire that thé defendant had been convicted previously of first-degree murder and ask each prospective juror whether he or she could still consider the mitigating circumstances before rendering a verdict. The court held that this would be a stake-out question and would not allow it.
Counsel may not pose hypothetical questions designed to elicit in advance what a juror’s decision will be under a certain state of evidence or upon a given state of facts. Such questions tend to stake out the juror and cause him to pledge himself to a future course of action. State v. Vinson, 287 N.C. 326, 336, 215 S.E.2d 60, 68 (1975), death sentence vacated, 428 U.S. 902, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1206 (1976). In State v. Bond, 345 N.C. 1, 17, 478 S.E.2d 163, 170-71 (1996), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 138 L. Ed. 2d 1022 (1997), we held it was not a stake-out question when the district attorney during voir dire informed the jury of uncontroverted facts and asked the jurors whether they could impose the death penalty in view of these uncontroverted facts.
I believe we are bound by Bond. As in Bond, the defendant in this case wanted to inform the jurors of uncontroverted facts and ask them how these facts would affect their votes. He should have been allowed to do so.
The majority attempts to distinguish Bond from this case. It acknowledges that the predicate for this State’s inquiry in *452Bond involved an uncontroverted fact, but says this indicates only this Court’s conclusion that the superior court did not abuse its discretion. The majority reads something in Bond that I do not read. As I read Bond, we held that if the jurors are informed of an uncontroverted fact and are asked how this fact would affect their votes, the question is not hypothetical and is not a stake-out question.
The majority contends that this case is governed by State v. Robinson, 339 N.C. 263, 273, 451 S.E.2d 196, 202 (1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1135, 132 L. Ed. 2d 818 (1995), in which we held it was an improper stake-out question to ask a juror if he could follow the judge’s instructions and consider life in prison as a sentencing option if the juror found that the defendant had committed a murder in addition to the three for which he was being tried. This case is distinguished from Robinson in that the matter about which the defendant wanted to inquire in Robinson was controverted.
I also believe it was error for the superior court not to grant the defendant’s request to instruct the jury that he is ineligible for parole under his federal sentence. The majority says this was unnecessary because the State’s argument in regard to future dangerousness was limited to dangerousness while the defendant is in prison. I cannot agree. When the prosecuting attorney argued that “[t]here is only one way you can ensure that this Defendant does not kill again, and that is to impose the . . . death penalty,” I believe Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 129 L. Ed. 2d 133 (1994), required that the court instruct the jury as requested by the defendant. I do not believe this statement was so related to a previous argument that the jury would know the prosecuting attorney was referring only to killings in prison.
I vote for a new sentencing proceeding. State v. Conner, 335 N.C. 618, 440 S.E.2d 826 (1994).