Court Opinion

ID: 9905792
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-30 16:01:12.310703+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:53.266839
License: Public Domain

22-2803-cv
    Flextronics Da Amazonia Ltda., et al v. CRW Plastics USA, Inc.

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                          SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007 IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

           At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at
    the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
    on the 30th day of November, two thousand twenty-three.

    PRESENT:
                RICHARD C. WESLEY,
                JOSEPH F. BIANCO,
                EUNICE C. LEE,
                      Circuit Judges.
    _____________________________________

    Flextronics Da Amazonia Ltda., Flextronics
    Tecnologia Do Brasil Ltd., Flextronics Industries
    Singapore Ltd.,

                                Plaintiffs-Appellants,

                       v.                                                                 22-2803-cv

    CRW Plastics USA, Inc.,

                      Defendant-Appellee.
    _____________________________________

    FOR PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS:                                       EMILY J. MATHIEU, Thompson Hine, LLP, New
                                                                     York, NY
         Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of

New York (Stanton, J.).

         UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

DECREED that the order of the district court is VACATED and the case is REMANDED for

further proceedings consistent with this order.

         Plaintiffs-Appellants Flextronics Da Amazonia Ltda., Flextronics Tecnologia Do Brasil

Ltd., and Flextronics Industries Singapore Ltd. 1 (collectively, “Flextronics”) appeal the district

court’s order, entered on October 3, 2022, denying their motion for default judgment and sua

sponte dismissing their complaint without prejudice due to lack of personal jurisdiction over

Defendant-Appellee CRW Plastics USA, Inc. (“CRW USA”). 2 We assume the parties’ familiarity

with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the arguments on appeal, to which we refer

only as necessary to explain our decision.

                                           BACKGROUND

         In September 2018, Flextronics entered into an Asset Purchase and Sale Agreement and

Other Covenants (the “Purchase Agreement”) with non-party buyers 4C Force Holding A.S. and

MC Indústria de Plásticos da Amazônia Ltda., and with CRW USA and CRW Indústria e Comércio

de Plásticos Ltda. as guarantors. The Purchase Agreement primarily concerns the sale of certain

assets relating to Flextronics’ manufacturing facility in Brazil to the non-party buyers, and is

1
  Flextronics Da Amazonia Ltda. is a limited liability company organized under the laws of Brazil, with its
principal place of business in Brazil; Flextronics Tecnologia Do Brasil Ltd. is incorporated and has its
principal place of business in the Cayman Islands; and Flextronics Industries Singapore Ltd. is incorporated
and has its principal place of business in Singapore.
2
    CRW USA is incorporated and has its principal place of business in Michigan.

                                                     2
“governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the Federative Republic of Brazil.”

App’x at 46. Additionally, the Purchase Agreement states that any disputes arising out of the

agreement “shall be submitted to arbitration according to the Arbitration Rules of the Centro de

Arbitragem e Mediação da Câmara de Comércio Brasil – Canadá (‘CAM-CCBC’), pursuant to

Brazilian Arbitration Legislation (Lei 9.307/96).” Id. CRW USA, owner of the non-party

purchasers, agreed to guarantee the buyers’ obligations under the Purchase Agreement and a

separate lease agreement.

        CRW USA then entered into the Parent Guaranty with Flextronics on November 1, 2018,

to “absolutely, irrevocably and unconditionally guarantee[] to [Flextronics] the timely payment,

when due, of . . . the Purchasers’ obligation to pay any amount due to [Flextronics] . . . [and]

Purchasers’ obligation to pay [Flextronics] the Purchase Price . . . .” App’x at 84. Section 4 of

the Parent Guaranty contains an exclusive remedy clause which states: “This Guaranty shall be

the sole and exclusive remedy available to [Flextronics] . . . against [CRW USA] in connection

with the Obligations. All claims by [Flextronics] . . . against [CRW USA] shall be made in

accordance with and shall be subject to the terms and conditions of this Guaranty and with respect

to the Indemnification Obligations, Section 9 of the Purchase Agreement, including the limitations

set forth in Section 9.7 of the Purchase Agreement.” Id. at 86. The Parent Guaranty also contains

a governing clause which states that:

       THIS GUARANTY SHALL BE IN ALL RESPECTS GOVERNED BY, AND
       CONSTRUED IN ACCORDANCE WITH, THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF
       NEW YORK, WITHOUT REGARD TO PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICTS OF
       LAWS. ANY PROCEEDING ARISING OUT OF OR RELATING TO THIS
       GUARANTY MAY BE BROUGHT IN ANY COURT LOCATED IN NEW
       YORK CITY, STATE OF NEW YORK, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, AND
       EACH OF PARENT AND THE SELLERS IRREVOCABLY SUBMITS TO THE

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        EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF EACH SUCH COURT IN ANY SUCH
        PROCEEDING, WAIVES ANY OBJECTION IT MAY HAVE TO VENUE OR
        TO CONVENIENCE OF FORUM, AGREES THAT ALL RELATED CLAIMS
        SHALL BE HEARD AND DETERMINED ONLY IN ANY SUCH COURT AND
        AGREES NOT TO BRING ANY PROCEEDING ARISING OUT OF OR
        RELATING TO THIS GUARANTY IN ANY OTHER COURT.

Id. at 88.

        Flextronics alleges that the non-party buyers failed to make payments under the lease

agreement, and that Flextronics provided CRW USA with notice of this failure. CRW USA,

according to Flextronics, was obligated and failed to make payments on the non-party buyers’

behalf under the Parent Guaranty, because both they and CRW USA “intended and agreed that

CRW USA would guaranty Purchasers’ performance under the Lease Agreement.” Id. at 21.

        On April 30, 2021, Flextronics filed a complaint against CRW USA in the Southern District

of New York, asserting claims for breach of contract, attorneys’ fees, and costs of recovery

pursuant to the Parent Guaranty; reformation of the Parent Guaranty to reflect the parties’ actual

agreement; and a judgment declaring that Flextronics is entitled to recover all such amounts from

CRW USA. Although CRW USA was served with process on May 6, 2021, and there is evidence

that it had actual notice of this litigation, it has not answered or otherwise filed a response to

Flextronics’ complaint or appeared in the litigation. On July 23, 2021, a certificate of default was

entered by the Clerk of Court against CRW USA and, on March 16, 2022, Flextronics filed a

default judgment motion. CRW USA did not file an opposition.

        On October 3, 2022, the district court issued an opinion and order denying the default

judgment and dismissing the complaint sua sponte without prejudice due to lack of personal

jurisdiction. See Flextronics Da Amazônia Ltda. v. CRW Plastics USA, Inc., No. 21 Civ. 3863,

                                                 4
2022 WL 4780804, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2022). Specifically, the district court held that the

forum selection clause in the Parent Guaranty was permissive and thus did not constitute consent

by CRW USA to personal jurisdiction in a New York court. Id. Accordingly, the district court

denied the default motion and dismissed the complaint without prejudice to renew in the United

States District Court in Detroit, Michigan, which it concluded is the only judicial district in which

CRW USA is subject to personal jurisdiction. Id. This appeal followed. 3

                                             DISCUSSION

        Flextronics asserts that the district court, in denying the default judgment and sua sponte

dismissing the complaint, erroneously held that the forum selection clause in the Parent Guaranty

was permissive. We agree. As set forth below, we conclude that the forum selection clause is

mandatory and provided a basis for personal jurisdiction over CRW USA in New York as to the

claims asserted in this case.

        A district court may raise the issue of personal jurisdiction sua sponte before entering a

default judgment against an absent defendant. See Sinoying Logistics Pte Ltd. v. Yi Da Xin Trading

Corp., 619 F.3d 207, 213–14 (2d Cir. 2010). 4 “We review district court decisions on personal

jurisdiction for clear error on factual holdings and de novo on legal conclusions.” D.H. Blair &

Co., Inc. v. Gottdiener, 462 F.3d 95, 103 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations

3
  Flextronics also filed a motion for reconsideration in the district court. On May 12, 2023, the district
court denied the reconsideration motion.
4
  Although we have held that a district court may raise personal jurisdiction sua sponte in the context of a
default judgment, we have left open whether the court must address that issue. See Sinoying Logistics Pte
Ltd., 619 F.3d at 213 n.7 (“We need not—and explicitly do not—address here whether a district court must
investigate its personal jurisdiction over defendant before entering a default judgment. We leave that issue
for another day and hold only that a court may raise personal jurisdiction sua sponte when a defendant has
failed to appear.”).

                                                     5
omitted). Here, because the district court denied the default motion and dismissed the complaint

“based on a purely legal matter of contractual interpretation”—namely, whether the forum

selection clause in the contract was framed in mandatory or permissive terms—we review that

determination de novo. See Rabinowitz v. Kelman, 75 F.4th 73, 82 (2d Cir. 2023).

       In Phillips v. Audio Active Ltd., 494 F.3d 378 (2d Cir. 2007), we set forth a four-part

framework for determining whether to dismiss a claim based on a forum selection clause:

       The first inquiry is whether the clause was reasonably communicated to the party
       resisting enforcement. The second step requires us to classify the clause as
       mandatory or permissive, i.e., to decide whether the parties are required to bring
       any dispute to the designated forum or simply permitted to do so. Part three asks
       whether the claims and parties involved in the suit are subject to the forum selection
       clause.

       If the forum clause was communicated to the resisting party, has mandatory force
       and covers the claims and parties involved in the dispute, it is presumptively
       enforceable. The fourth, and final, step is to ascertain whether the resisting party
       has rebutted the presumption of enforceability by making a sufficiently strong
       showing that “enforcement would be unreasonable or unjust, or that the clause was
       invalid for such reasons as fraud or overreaching.”

Id. at 383–84 (quoting M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972)) (other internal

citations omitted).

       Although “federal law should be used to determine whether an otherwise mandatory and

applicable forum clause is enforceable under Bremen, i.e., step four in our analysis,” Phillips, 494

F.3d at 384, we generally apply the body of law selected by the parties to govern their agreement

in an otherwise valid choice-of-law clause “[i]n answering the interpretative questions posed by

parts two and three of the four-part framework,” Martinez v. Bloomberg LP, 740 F.3d 211, 217–

18 (2d Cir. 2014). Therefore, as here, where “we are called upon to determine whether a particular

                                                 6
forum selection clause is mandatory or permissive, . . . we apply the law contractually selected by

the parties.” Id. at 218 (citation omitted).

       The Parent Guaranty specifies that it is governed by New York law. Under New York law,

“a contract is to be construed in accordance with the parties’ intent, which is generally discerned

from the four corners of the document itself.” MHR Cap. Partners LP v. Presstek, Inc., 12 N.Y.3d

640, 645 (2009). Consistent with our precedent under federal law, New York courts have made

clear that “[t]he general rule in cases containing forum selection clauses is that when only

jurisdiction is specified the clause will generally not be enforced without some further language

indicating the parties’ intent to make jurisdiction exclusive.” Fear & Fear, Inc. v. N.I.I. Brokerage,

L.L.C., 50 A.D.3d 185, 187 (4th Dep’t 2008) (quoting John Boutari & Son, Wines & Spirits, S.A.

v. Attiki Imps. & Distribs. Inc., 22 F.3d 51, 52 (2d Cir. 1994)); see also Aguas Lenders Recovery

Grp. LLC v. Suez, S.A., 585 F.3d 696, 700 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[W]here parties contract to a so-called

permissive forum selection clause, that is, one that designates a forum in advance, but does not

preclude a different choice, the M/S Bremen presumption of enforceability does not apply.”

(citation omitted)).

       The district court concluded that the forum selection clause in the Parent Guaranty was

permissive “because it hangs on the governing words ‘may be’” and “[t]he phrase ‘may be’ does

not carry with it mandatory force, especially when it is not used in reference to a particular

location.” Flextronics Da Amazônia Ltda., 2022 WL 4780804, at *4. To be sure, the use of the

phrase “may be” in a forum selection clause can indicate that the clause is permissive. See, e.g.,

Blanco v. Banco Indus. De Venezuela, S.A., 997 F.2d 974, 976, 979 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that

forum selection clause stating that disputes “may be brought in the High Court of Justice in

                                                  7
England, the Courts of the State of New York, the Courts of the United States of America in New

York or the Courts of the City of Caracas, Venezuela” was a permissive consent-to-jurisdiction

provision). However, consistent with our precedent, New York courts have repeatedly held that a

facially permissive forum selection clause becomes mandatory when combined with other

language of exclusivity in the contractual provisions, such as a waiver of venue and forum

objections by the parties. See, e.g., Trump v. Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Ams., 65 A.D.3d 1329, 1330–

32 (2d Dep’t 2009) (holding forum selection clause was mandatory, notwithstanding the use of the

phrase “may . . . be instituted in any federal or state court in New York County, New York” where

the clause also contained a waiver of venue and forum objections and an irrevocable submission

to the jurisdiction of any such court); Fear & Fear, Inc., 50 A.D.3d at 186–87 (holding forum

selection clause was mandatory, notwithstanding the phrase “may be litigated,” where parties

submitted to the “exclusive jurisdiction” of Manhattan courts and waived “any objection that any

such court is an improper or inconvenient forum”); Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Control Components,

161 Misc. 2d 636, 643 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993) (holding forum selection clause was mandatory, even

though parties merely agreed to the jurisdiction of New York, where parties also waived other

requirements as to personal jurisdiction or venue).

       Here, although the forum selection clause in the Parent Guaranty states that legal actions

arising from the Guaranty “may be brought” in any court located in New York City, the clause

also contained an irrevocable submission to the exclusive jurisdiction “of each such court” for all

claims “arising out of or relating to this Guaranty,” and a waiver of venue and forum objections.

App’x at 88. We conclude that the forum selection clause, combined with the waiver of venue and

forum objections, constitutes a mandatory forum selection clause under New York law that is

                                                8
entitled to a presumption of enforceability. As the Fourth Department explained in holding that

an analogous forum selection clause was mandatory:

       [W]e . . . conclude that the use of the phrase “may be litigated in any federal or state
       court of competent jurisdiction located in the Borough of Manhattan” does not
       negate the mandatory nature of the forum selection clause. Indeed, that phrase
       merely makes clear that the party commencing an action may choose whether to
       litigate the action in either federal or state court in Manhattan. That is the extent of
       the party’s choice. The phrase in the agreement otherwise requires the parties
       thereto to submit to the personal and exclusive jurisdiction of one or the other of
       the Manhattan courts identified.

Fear & Fear, Inc., 50 A.D.3d at 188.

       We reached the same conclusion in Aguas in analyzing a contract with similar language.

Specifically, in Aguas, one of the contracts at issue contained “a New York choice of law

provision, a forum selection clause providing that ‘any legal action . . . may be brought in the

courts of the State of New York or of the United States of America for the Southern District of

New York,’ a forum non conveniens waiver, and a provision binding successors.” 585 F.3d at 698

n. 2 (first emphasis added). We explained that “[w]e need not decide whether the forum selection

clauses . . . are, standing alone, mandatory or permissive,” because the contract “contains a waiver

of any claims of forum non conveniens in addition to the forum selection clause” and “[t]he

combination of these clauses amounts to a mandatory forum selection clause at least where the

plaintiff chooses the designated forum.” Id. at 700. In other words, where there is “unambiguous

language providing that [a party] shall not object to venue on the ground of inconvenient forum,”

this is dispositive and thus there is “no reason to engage in further inquiry as to the mandatory or

non-mandatory nature of the forum selection clauses standing alone.” Id. (alterations adopted)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

                                                   9
        Here, like in Fear & Fear and Aguas, the Parent Guaranty contains unambiguous language

that the parties “waive any objection [they] may have to venue or to convenience of forum,” App’x

at 88, and thus there is “no reason to engage in further inquiry” as to whether aspects of the forum

selection clause, including the use here of the phrase “may be brought,” could be interpreted as

permissive standing alone. Aguas, 585 F.3d at 700. Accordingly, the forum selection clause at

issue here is mandatory. 5

        Although the district court did not reach the other requirements under our four-part

framework for the enforceability of a forum selection clause, there is nothing in the record to

suggest that any of those other requirements are lacking with respect to the forum selection clause

in the Parent Guaranty. First, the forum selection clause was printed in capital letters in a written

agreement that CRW USA executed, and there is no evidence to suggest that it was not reasonably

communicated to CRW USA. Second, the forum selection clause covers the claims and parties

here as it explicitly states that the agreement is between CRW USA and Flextronics, and that it

5
   The district court additionally noted that the forum selection clause in the Parent Guaranty merely
provided “New York as an alternative to [the Purchase Agreement], which calls for all disputes to be
arbitrated in Brazil, where the transactions were conducted.” Flextronics Da Amazônia Ltda., 2022 WL
4780804, at *4. We find that this was error. Although the Purchase Agreement states that claims under
that Agreement must be arbitrated in Brazil, it does not govern the Parent Guaranty, which states that it is
the “sole and exclusive remedy available to [Flextronics] against [CRW USA].” App’x at 86. Indeed, it is
the Parent Guaranty that Flextronics’ complaint seeks to enforce and reform. Moreover, while the Parent
Guaranty makes clear that all claims against CRW USA “shall be made in accordance with and shall be
subject to the terms of conditions of this Guaranty and with respect to the Indemnification Obligations,
Section 9 of the Purchase Agreement, including the limitations set forth in Section 9.7 of the Purchase
Agreement,” id., it noticeably does not refer to the governing law or dispute resolution provisions set forth
in Sections 11.12 and 11.13 of the Purchase Agreement. Finally, as noted supra, the Parent Guaranty states
that the parties “submit[] to the exclusive jurisdiction of each such court” and may “not bring any
proceeding arising out of or relating to this Guaranty in any other court.” Id. at 88 (capitalization omitted).
In this context, the language in the Purchase Agreement cited by the district court does not undermine the
mandatory nature of the forum selection clause for claims, as asserted here by Flextronics against CRW
USA, arising from the Parent Guaranty.

                                                      10
covers “any proceedings arising out of or relating to th[e] Guaranty.” App’x at 88. Thus, on this

record, the forum clause is presumptively enforceable. See Phillips, 494 F.3d at 383–84. This

presumption may be rebutted if “enforcement would be unreasonable or unjust, or . . . the clause

was invalid for such reasons as fraud or overreaching.” Id. at 383–84 (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted). We find nothing in the current record to suggest that enforcement of the

forum selection clause here is either unreasonable or unjust, or that there has been fraud or

overreaching by Flextronics.

       In sum, the district court erred in denying the motion for default and dismissing the case

for lack of personal jurisdiction.

                           *                     *                    *

         For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE the order of the district court and REMAND

 the case for further proceedings consistent with this order.

                                              FOR THE COURT:
                                              Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

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