Court Opinion

ID: 9743980
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:51:32.360344+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:25:23.586076
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE STEIGMANN, specially concurring in part and dissenting in part: I agree that defendant’s conviction should be affirmed, but because I do not agree that the cause should be remanded for amendment of the sentencing order, I respectfully dissent from that portion of the opinion. Although I agree with the suggestions and much of the analysis contained in the majority opinion, I do not believe that opinion goes far enough in clarifying what procedures the trial courts should employ when determining a defendant’s credit for time served. Section 5 — 8—7(b) of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 1005—8—7(b)) provides that a defendant “shall be given credit on [his] *** sentence *** for time spent in custody as a result of the offense for which the sentence [to prison] was imposed.” That section does not specifically provide that the trial judge shall determine how much credit is to be given a defendant, but any contrary reading of the statute makes no sense. After all, sentencing is a judicial function, and just as trial judges determine the sentence to impose, they are responsible for determining how much credit a defendant is due under section 5 — 8—7(b) of the Code for time served. I disagree with the statement in the majority opinion that “computation of the credit [for time served] is basically an administrative function, but sentencing itself is a judicial function.” (226 Ill. App. 3d at 779.) I fear that ambiguous statement may be viewed by some trial judges as an invitation to delegate their responsibilities. In my opinion, this judicial function is not delegable to personnel from the sheriff’s office, the circuit clerk’s office, the State’s Attorney’s office, the public defender’s office, or anywhere else. Instead, the trial judge retains the responsibility to ensure that the sentenced defendant receive all of the statutorily mandated credit for time served to which he is entitled. Given the frequency with which the parties dispute, or are uncertain about, how much credit a defendant is due, the trial judge should resolve this issue at the time of the sentencing hearing after the judge has given the parties an opportunity to address it on the record. In order to perform its judicial function of determining how much credit for time served a defendant is due, the trial court should direct the probation office to include within its presentence report both a listing of all of the days defendant was in custody on the charge for which he is to be sentenced and the total of days for which defendant is entitled to credit. By adding together the days of the defendant’s custody and providing this figure in the presentence report, the probation office relieves the court and counsel of the need to do so themselves. In obtaining this information regarding the number of days defendant was in custody, the probation office should consult the sheriff’s department and State’s Attorney, as well as defendant and his counsel, in order to ensure the accuracy of the information it provides to the court. In People v. Powell (1990), 199 Ill. App. 3d 291, 294-95, 556 N.E.2d 896, 898, this court wrote the following regarding information presented in the presentence report at the sentencing hearing and the duty of defendants with regard thereto: “Given the quoted statutory provisions regarding presentence reports and sentencing hearings, we hold that all information appearing in a presentence report may be relied upon by the sentencing judge to the extent the judge finds the information probative and reliable. In so holding, we are not requiring the judge to specify for the record those portions of the presentence report upon which the judge is relying. To the extent that either the defendant or the State may believe that the presentence report contains inaccuracies, we hold that they have the burden to call any such inaccuracy to the court’s attention at the start of the sentencing hearing. The better practice would be for the court, at the start of the sentencing hearing, to inquire of all counsel whether they have received the presentence report and whether they found any inaccuracies therein. However, irrespective of whether this practice is followed, we hold that the failure to object to any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence report waives that claim on appeal.” (Emphasis in original.) I see no reason why information contained in the presentence report regarding how much credit defendant is due under section 5 — 8— 7(b) of the Code should be treated differently than any other information contained in that report. Accordingly, this court should hold that a defendant’s failure at the sentencing hearing to contest the information contained in the presentence report regarding how much credit he is due for time served (which figure the court ultimately accepts) waives any claim as to insufficient credit for purposes of appeal. In support of this position, I note that section 5 — 3—4(b)(2) of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 1005—3—4(b)(2)) requires that the presentence report be provided to the prosecutor and defense counsel at least three days prior to the sentencing hearing. That statutory mandate ensures that the parties will have sufficient time to investigate (to the extent that they wish) the calculations in the presentence report regarding how much credit the defendant is due for time served. On the other hand, if trial courts fail to follow these guidelines, causing the question of defendant’s credit for time served not to be fully addressed at the sentencing hearing, or causing uncertainty in the record as to whether the trial judge or some other official ultimately resolved that issue, this court should hold that defendant has not waived the issue on appeal. In appropriate cases, we should reverse and remand on that issue when our calculations from the record on how much credit defendant is due differ from the credit defendant seems to have been given at the trial level. In the present case, the presentence report listed the days defendant was in custody but did not total them. The trial court must have done so, however, because it gave defendant credit for 81 days spent in custody. On appeal, defendant claims he is entitled to 84 days of credit. The State concedes defendant is entitled to additional credit, but disputes the amount, claiming he is entitled instead only to 83 days of credit. The majority agrees with the State and remands with directions that the sentencing order be amended to give defendant credit for 83 days served, instead of the 81 days presently shown on the sentencing order. I disagree with that remand. Although the better practice for the trial court in the present case would have been to direct the probation office, when preparing the presentence report, to total the number of days of credit defendant was due, the presentence report nonetheless set forth the days defendant was in custody. At no time during defendant’s sentencing hearing did he raise the issue of credit for time served. He elects to do so for the first time on appeal, and the majority opinion does not explain why we should let him. The only comment by the majority on this point is the following: “Because of the statutory right to the credit, we hold that the error in computing the credit is not waived by failure of the defendant in this case to call the error to the trial court’s attention.” 226 Ill. App. 3d at 779. The majority’s analysis does nothing to distinguish this defendant’s claim on appeal for the proper amount of credit for time served from some other defendant’s claim on appeal that his restitution order was not calculated in compliance with the applicable statutory provisions. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 1005—5—6.) Yet the latter was precisely the argument that this court rejected in Powell. There we held that the defendant waived the issue of whether the presentence report contained inaccuracies regarding the restitution he should pay because he failed to raise that issue at the trial level. See Powell, 199 Ill. App. 3d at 294-95, 556 N.E.2d at 898. The sound use of our limited judicial resources requires that we impose a duty upon litigants to make their grievances known to the trial court, instead of requesting relief for the first time on appeal. To hold otherwise squanders these precious resources. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.