Court Opinion

ID: 9570213
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:21:06.177813+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:05:07.180961
License: Public Domain

FITZPATRICK, C.J.,
dissenting.
Based on the reasoning in Hansel v. Commonwealth, 118 Va. 803, 88 S.E. 166 (1916), and Thornton v. Commonwealth, 22 Va.App. 2, 467 S.E.2d 820 (1996), I would affirm the trial court’s ruling. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
The trial court ruled that, at Ampazzio Warren’s trial for failing to appear, appellant “was testifying, in essence, not only in Mr. Warren’s behalf, but also in her own behalf.” Appellant’s testimony established that Warren was her boyfriend and that, at both the time she encouraged him to flee the jurisdiction and at the time she testified at his resulting trial for failing to appear, she was pregnant with his child. Cf. Code § 16.1-228 (recognizing intensity of relationship that may result from such status by defining “Family or household member” to include “any individual who has a child in common with the person, whether or not the person and that individual have been married or have resided together at any time” for purposes of juvenile and domestic relations district court’s *362jurisdiction); Code § 18.2-57.2 (imposing heightened penalties for repeated assault and battery against a “family or household member” as defined in Code § 16.1-228); Bennett v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 22 Va.App. 684, 691-92, 472 S.E.2d 668, 672 (1996) (discussing duty of parents to provide support for minor child).
Appellant admitted she encouraged Warren to flee his trial for drug and weapons offenses on June 5, 2000, because she did not want “[her] boyfriend and the father of this child[ ] going to prison.” A reasonable inference is that her feelings were the same when she testified at Warren’s trial of September 8, 2000, for failing to appear and that she hoped to help him avoid incarceration for that offense or at least to lessen his punishment. Thus, although the facts are not identical, the evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that appellant had the type of personal, financial and familial interests set out in Hansel and Thornton and, thus, that her testimony from Warren’s trial for failing to appear was admissible in her subsequent trial for aiding and abetting that offense.
Although no charges were pending against appellant when she testified in Warren’s trial for failing to appear and no evidence established that appellant obtained legal advice before giving self-incriminating testimony at Warren’s trial, nothing in the case law holds that such advice is a prerequisite to the admissibility of such testimony in a subsequent proceeding. See Thornton, 22 Va.App. at 8, 467 S.E.2d at 823 (noting that resolution of admissibility issue “may depend, in part, upon circumstances of the prior legal examination”); id. (noting that, in Hansel, prior testimony in civil suit was given before filing of criminal charges against Hansel). We merely recognized, in reciting the facts in Thornton, that the accused had received such advice. Id. at 4, 467 S.E.2d at 821.
Further, appellant clearly contemplated that the institution of a criminal prosecution against her was likely to result from her testimony in Warren’s trial for failing to appear. She expressly testified that the reason she “came to Court” for that proceeding was “to accept ... responsibility” for encour*363aging Warren to flee “and whatever punishment seems fit for it.” When asked by the prosecutor, “[D]o you have any comprehension that you have just admitted to committing a felony?” appellant responded, ‘Tes sir.” Thus, despite the fact that appellant had not yet been charged with aiding and abetting Warren’s flight, she expressly recognized the possibility that charges for aiding and abetting might be forthcoming.
Although Code § 19.2-270 is designed to “beneflt[ ] both the witness-in-jeopardy and the accused by immunizing the witness,” we have recognized that “[a] third, and equally important benefit, accrues to the truthfinding process.” Cunningham v. Commonwealth, 2 Va.App. 358, 363, 344 S.E.2d 389, 391 (1986). As the legislature acknowledged in amending the statute after Kirby v. Commonwealth, 77 Va. 681 (1883), and as this Court and the Supreme Corat have acknowledged in interpreting the amended language, applying the statute to immunize (a) a defendant on retrial or (b) a witness with strong ties to a defendant, on whose behalf he has testified, so that both the witness and the defendant may avoid liability for a particular crime, would subvert rather than protect the truth-finding process.
Because I believe the evidence supports a finding that . appellant testified “as a witness in [her] own behalf’ at Warren’s trial for failing to appear, I would hold the trial court’s admission of that testimony in appellant’s subsequent trial for aiding and abetting Warren’s offense was not error. Thus, I would affirm appellant’s conviction and respectfully dissent.