Court Opinion

ID: 9895254
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-06 16:10:49.077489+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:48.041548
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. McIntosh, 2023-Ohio-4022.]

                                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

                            TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

                                               BUTLER COUNTY

 STATE OF OHIO,                                      :

        Appellee,                                    :         CASE NO. CA2022-04-040

                                                     :              OPINION
     - vs -                                                          11/6/2023
                                                     :

 JAMES E. McINTOSH,                                  :

        Appellant.                                   :

       CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
                          Case No. CR2020-09-1281

Michael T. Gmoser, Butler County Prosecuting Attorney, and Michael Greer, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Repper-Pagan Law, Ltd., and Christopher J. Pagan, for appellant.

        BYRNE, J.

        {¶ 1} James McIntosh admitted to two violations of community control. As a result,

the Butler County Court of Common Pleas revoked community control and sentenced

McIntosh to an indefinite prison term. McIntosh appeals that decision. We affirm the trial

court's decision.
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                         I. Factual and Procedural Background

       {¶ 2} In October 2020, a Butler County grand jury indicted McIntosh on one count

of felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), a second-degree felony.        The

indictment stemmed from allegations that McIntosh approached the victim in the victim's

driveway, struck the victim in the head, and knocked him to the ground, causing the victim

to lose consciousness. McIntosh then continued to assault the victim. The victim suffered

serious injuries.

       {¶ 3} In November 2020, McIntosh entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity

("NGRI"). McIntosh simultaneously moved for an evaluation to determine his mental status

at the time of the alleged offense. The court ordered that McIntosh be evaluated for

competency to stand trial and evaluated with respect to his plea of NGRI.

       {¶ 4} Following an evaluation by a psychologist, the court found McIntosh

competent to stand trial. Subsequently, three separate mental health evaluators issued

reports opining on whether McIntosh met the qualifications for a plea of NGRI. The first

opined that McIntosh did meet the criteria for a plea of NGRI. The second opined that

McIntosh did not meet the criteria. The third, privately retained by McIntosh, opined that

McIntosh did meet the criteria.

       {¶ 5} In October 2021, the matter proceeded to a bench trial on the NGRI issue and

on the felonious assault charge. The victim testified, as did the three mental health

evaluators. The court subsequently issued a written decision finding that McIntosh had not

met his burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence to demonstrate that he was

insane at the time of the offense. The court then found McIntosh guilty of felonious assault

as charged.

       {¶ 6} In November 2021, the court sentenced McIntosh to community control,

consisting of one year of the SAMI (Substance Abuse Mental Illness) Court Program and

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four additional years of basic supervision. The court advised McIntosh that a violation of

community control could lead to a prison term consisting of an indefinite prison sentence of

two to eight years, plus one half of the minimum prison sentence.

       {¶ 7} As part of his sentencing, McIntosh signed a document titled "General

Conditions of Supervision," which set forth the conditions, or rules, of his community control.

McIntosh also signed a document that contained the conditions of his participation in the

SAMI Court Program. One of the conditions in the SAMI Court Program document noted

that McIntosh could be recommended for residential treatment at Sojourner.

       {¶ 8} A few months later, in March 2022, the Butler County Adult Probation

Department filed a Report and Notice of Violation, which alleged that McIntosh had violated

two rules of the General Conditions of Supervision. The report contained the following

allegations:

               Rule 7: On 03/08/2022 the offender admitted to getting
               prescriptions for Lyrica and Ambien and then misusing those
               prescriptions. An admission form was signed.

               Rule 14: The offender was unsuccessfully discharged from
               Sojourner programming on 03/08/2022.

The court, through its magistrate, held a probable cause hearing at which McIntosh was

present. A probation officer repeated the allegations. Based on the testimony, the court

found probable cause that McIntosh had violated the conditions of his supervision.

Accordingly, the court scheduled McIntosh for a revocation hearing.

       {¶ 9} At the revocation hearing, the court recited the alleged rule violations and

asked how McIntosh wished to proceed. McIntosh's counsel indicated that McIntosh would

admit to both rule violations. The court then asked McIntosh if that was what he wanted to

do. McIntosh replied, "Yes, sir" and confirmed that he had talked to his attorney about his

decision to admit to the community control rule violations.

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       {¶ 10} The court accepted McIntosh's admissions and heard arguments for leniency

in sentencing from McIntosh's counsel, as well as a statement in mitigation from McIntosh.

Afterwards, the court revoked community control and imposed an indefinite prison term

consisting of a minimum stated prison term of six years and a maximum term of nine years.

       {¶ 11} McIntosh raises three assignments of error in this appeal. We will address

these assignments of error out of the order in which they were presented by McIntosh.

                                   II. Law and Analysis

                            A. State v. Qualls and Plain Error

       {¶ 12} McIntosh's second assignment of error states:

       {¶ 13} THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED                  PLAIN    ERROR AT THE

REVOCATION HEARING.

       {¶ 14} McIntosh argues that the trial court in the case before us committed plain error

by "failing to apply the mandated 1988 Qualls rule to decide the revocation and sentence."

McIntosh's reference is to State v. Qualls, 50 Ohio App.3d (10th Dist.1988). McIntosh

contends that the court erred by failing to consider whether insanity was a mitigating factor

before revoking his community control and sentencing him. McIntosh concedes that a plain

error standard of review is to be applied to this argument because his trial counsel failed to

raise Qualls or a Qualls-type argument before the trial court.

       {¶ 15} Crim.R. 52(B) provides that "Plain errors or defects affecting substantial

rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court." That

rule "places three limitations on a reviewing court's decision to correct an error not raised

before the trial court." State v. Fuell, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2020-02-008, 2021-Ohio-

1627, ¶ 70, citing State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St. 3d 21, 27 (2002). "First, an error, 'i.e., a

deviation from a legal rule,' must have occurred." Fuell at id., quoting Barnes at 27.

"Second, the error complained of must be plain, i.e., it must be 'an "obvious" defect in the *

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* * proceedings.'" Id. Stated otherwise, the error must be fundamental, palpable, and

obvious on the record such that it should have been apparent to the court without an

objection. State v. Barnette, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2012-05-099, 2013-Ohio-990, ¶ 30.

"Third, the error must have affected 'substantial rights.'" Fuell at ¶ 70, quoting State v.

Martin, 154 Ohio St.3d 513, 2018-Ohio-3226, ¶ 28. This means the error must have

affected the outcome of the proceedings. Barnes at 27. An appellate court will take notice

of plain error with "utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a

manifest miscarriage of justice." State v. Baldev, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2004-05-106,

2005-Ohio-2369, ¶ 12.

       {¶ 16} In Qualls, the Tenth District Court of Appeals rejected the argument that

insanity at the time of an act that results in the revocation of parole is a complete defense

to parole revocation. Id. at 59-60. But the Tenth District stated that while "insanity is not a

complete defense in a probation revocation hearing[,]" insanity was instead "a mitigating

factor which a court should consider when the issue is timely raised." Id. at 60. The trial

court in our case did not refer to Qualls in its analysis and did not refer to insanity as a

mitigating factor.

       {¶ 17} We find no error here, much less, plain error. First, Qualls was decided by

the Tenth District Court of Appeals, so it is not controlling precedent in this district. Second,

McIntosh cites no case from our court where we adopted Qualls' rule that insanity is "a

mitigating factor which a court should consider when the issue is timely raised" in the context

of a revocation hearing. Qualls at 60. Third, even if the Qualls rule had been adopted by

this court, it would not apply in this case because McIntosh did not claim or even suggest

at the revocation hearing that he was insane when he committed his community control rule

violations. Nor is there any evidence in the record suggesting that McIntosh was insane at

the time of those rule violations. McIntosh's appellate counsel merely speculates that

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McIntosh may have been able to argue for insanity in mitigation based on earlier mental

health issues.

       {¶ 18} Qualls stated that a trial court "should consider" insanity "when the issue is

timely raised" at a revocation hearing, but McIntosh never raised the possibility that he was

insane at the time of his community control violations, either at the hearing or at any other

time. Qualls is therefore irrelevant in this case.

       {¶ 19} For these reasons, the court did not commit plain error by failing to follow the

"Qualls rule" prior to revoking community control and proceeding to impose sentence. We

overrule McIntosh's second assignment of error.

                           B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

       {¶ 20} McIntosh's first assignment of error states:

       {¶ 21} TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE AT THE REVOCATION

HEARING.

       {¶ 22} McIntosh argues that his counsel provided ineffective assistance at the

revocation hearing in three ways, which we will address in turn.

       {¶ 23} The test for ineffective assistance of counsel requires a defendant to prove

(1) "that counsel's performance was deficient[,]" and (2) "that the deficient performance

prejudiced the defense." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052

(1984). In reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we examine whether

counsel's acts or omissions "were outside the wide range of professionally competent

assistance" while "recogniz[ing] that counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered

adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable

professional judgment." Id. at 690. To establish the second element of prejudice, the

defendant must demonstrate that there is a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694.

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       {¶ 24} Regarding the prejudice element, we have stated that "[i]n cases in which an

appellant alleges ineffective assistance with regard to a guilty plea, 'to show prejudice, the

defendant must demonstrate there is a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel's

errors, he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.'" State v.

Hawks, 12th Dist. Warren Nos. CA2021-11-103 and CA2021-11-104, 2022-Ohio-4137, ¶

21, quoting State v. Byrd, 12th Dist. Madison No. CA2021-07-011, 2022-Ohio-1364, ¶ 11.

Accord State v. Longworth, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2021-02-015, 2021-Ohio-4538, ¶ 35.

                                    1. Rule 7 Violation

       {¶ 25} Rule 7 of the General Conditions of Supervision applicable to McIntosh's

community control, which McIntosh agreed to follow, provided that,

              I will not possess, use, purchase, or have under my control any
              narcotic drug or other controlled substance or illegal drugs,
              including any instrument, device or other object used to
              administer drugs or to prepare them for administration, unless
              it is lawfully prescribed for me by a licensed physician. I
              agree to inform my supervising officer promptly of any such
              prescription and I agree to submit to drug testing if required by
              the Butler County Court of Common Pleas. I will also be
              subjected to mandatory DNA testing which will be conducted at
              the departments [sic] order.

(Bold emphasis added.) The Butler County probation department asserted that McIntosh

violated Rule 7 by "misusing" his prescriptions for Lyrica and Ambien.

       {¶ 26} McIntosh argues that his trial counsel provided deficient attorney performance

by permitting him to admit to a Rule 7 violation when, in fact, he did not violate Rule 7.

Specifically, McIntosh argues that he did not violate Rule 7 because he "possessed valid

prescriptions" for both Lyrica and Ambien.         McIntosh concedes that the probation

department alleged that he was misusing those prescriptions, but argues that the Report

and Notice contained no detail as to how he was misusing his prescriptions. McIntosh

contends that these prescriptions could have been used for treatment of his mental health

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issues, which would make their use permissible under Rule 7. He also contends that even

if he abused his prescriptions, such abuse was not a violation of Rule 7 because the rule

did not specifically forbid "abuse" of prescribed medication.

        {¶ 27} We first note that while McIntosh now contends that he did not violate Rule 7,

it remains the case that both McIntosh's counsel and McIntosh himself admitted to the Rule

7 violation at the April 14, 2022, hearing. McIntosh and his counsel did so after they had

heard a probation officer generally describe the alleged violations at an earlier probable

cause hearing. As a result, there was no need for the state to provide further evidence

regarding the details of the Rule 7 violation, and no details other than what was alleged in

the probation department's "Report and Notice of Violation" are in the record on appeal.

        {¶ 28} Upon review, we find that McIntosh has cited nothing in the record that would

support the contention that his trial counsel's representation was "outside the wide range of

professionally competent assistance." Strickland 466 U.S. at 690. Even if we assume that

McIntosh is correct in asserting that his Lyrica and Ambien prescriptions were meant to treat

his mental health issues, this does not change the fact that by admitting to "misusing" his

prescriptions as stated in the probation department's "Report and Notice of Violation,"

McIntosh admitted to violating Rule 7.1 While Rule 7 did not prohibit McIntosh from using

controlled substances that were lawfully prescribed by a physician, the rule stated that

McIntosh was not permitted to "use * * * [a] controlled substance * * * unless it is lawfully

prescribed for me by a licensed physician." Using a prescribed controlled substance in a

manner other than that "lawfully prescribed" is necessarily not "use" of that drug as "lawfully

1. In support of his contention that his Lyrica and Ambien prescriptions were meant to address his mental
health issues, McIntosh cites an exchange that occurred at trial between the prosecutor and one of the doctors
who evaluated McIntosh. Our review of this testimony does not clearly indicate to us that the doctor testified
that these medications were for mental health treatment. That is, there is some ambiguity in the testimony.
Regardless, for purposes of our analysis we assume that the Lyrica and Ambien prescriptions were prescribed
to address McIntosh's mental health issues.

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                                                                        Butler CA2022-04-040

prescribed," and in fact is abuse of that prescription. While Rule 7 may have been clearer

if it had explicitly listed "abuse" of a prescribed controlled substance as prohibited under the

terms of community control, the rule's text did in effect prohibit abuse of a prescribed

controlled substance. Accordingly, there is a basis in the record for McIntosh's counsel's

decision to not contest the violation of Rule 7 and instead rely on arguments in favor of

leniency at sentencing.

       {¶ 29} Moreover, McIntosh confirmed on the record that he wanted to admit to the

violation and that he had the opportunity to speak with his attorney about admitting. We do

not know the content of that attorney-client conversation, but the law does not require us to

presume that counsel provided constitutionally deficient advice to his client. To the contrary,

we presume that counsel rendered "adequate assistance and made all significant decisions

in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment." Strickland at 690. Given that there

was a basis for the Rule 7 violation, we find no evidence that would challenge that

presumption.

       {¶ 30} Finally, as other courts have held, oral notice coupled with a defendant's

complete admission to a community control violation at a preliminary hearing typically

satisfies any due process or effective assistance of counsel concerns. State v. Jimenez,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104735, 2017-Ohio-1553, ¶ 6, citing State v. Frazier, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 104596, 2017-Ohio-470, ¶ 10-11 and other cases. Accord State v. Clark, 3d

Dist. Union No. 14-22-01, 2022-Ohio-2539, ¶ 15-16; State v. Dye, 4th Dist. Athens No.

16CA17, 2017-Ohio-9389, ¶ 18. As in Jimenez, McIntosh had a preliminary hearing at

which he received oral notice of the alleged community control violations. He subsequently

made a complete admission to the violations at the revocation hearing.              McIntosh's

complete admission satisfied any concerns of effective assistance of counsel. Jimenez at

¶ 6.

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      {¶ 31} Accordingly, we find no merit to McIntosh's ineffective assistance argument

regarding his admission to a Rule 7 violation.

                                   2. Rule 14 Violation

      {¶ 32} Rule 14 of the General Conditions of Supervision, which McIntosh agreed to

follow, provided that he would,

             [F]ollow all rules and regulations regarding of [sic] treatment
             facilities or programs of any type in which I am placed or ordered
             to attend while under the jurisdiction of the Butler County Court
             of Common Pleas.

The probation department asserted that McIntosh violated Rule 14 by being "unsuccessfully

discharged from Sojourner programming * * *."

      {¶ 33} McIntosh argues that his trial counsel provided deficient attorney performance

by permitting him to admit to the Rule 14 violation when, he says, he did not violate Rule

14. He argues that the putative violation "deviated" from the court's sentence, which he

argues was to "complete the Community Correction Center program–not Sojourner * * *."

      {¶ 34} In support of this argument, McIntosh cites a transcript from a hearing held

November 18, 2021, at which McIntosh admitted to a community control violation and the

court ordered McIntosh to enter "CCC" (presumably the Community Correction Center

program) and said nothing about ordering him to Sojourner. But this November 18, 2021,

transcript concerned a hearing held not in the case before us (Butler County Case No.

CR2020-09-1281), but instead in an entirely different case (Butler County Case No.

CR2018-12-2243). Specifically, McIntosh admitted at the November 18, 2021, hearing that

his felonious assault conviction in this case (Butler County Case No. CR2020-09-1281)

violated the terms of the community control that had previously been imposed on him for

his offense in that second case (Butler County Case No. CR2018-12-2243). Given that the

transcript cited involves an entirely separate criminal case that is not before us on appeal,

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it is not certain how this transcript became part of our appellate record or whether we could

properly consider it.

       {¶ 35} Regardless, assuming the transcript is properly part of the appellate record, it

does not support McIntosh's argument that he was not ordered to complete the Sojourner

program while under the jurisdiction of the Butler County Court of Common Pleas in the

case before us on appeal. The transcript merely establishes that, in an entirely different

case, McIntosh was ordered to participate in "CCC."

       {¶ 36} Moreover, there is evidence in the appellate record to support the argument

that McIntosh could have been ordered to complete the Sojourner program as part of his

community control in the case before us. As discussed above, the court placed McIntosh

into the SAMI Court Program for one year. At sentencing, McIntosh signed an agreement

containing the conditions of his participation in the SAMI Court Program. That agreement—

titled "SAMI (Substance Abuse Mental Illness) COURT PROGRAM PARTICIPATION

AGREEMENT AND WAIVER OF RIGHTS"—states that McIntosh could be recommended

for "residential treatment" at any time during his participation in the SAMI Program. It also

states that "Sojourner Recovery Services for Men" was one of the residential treatment

programs used by SAMI to which McIntosh could be referred.

       {¶ 37} We do not know the precise basis for why McIntosh was "unsuccessfully

discharged" from Sojourner. This is because McIntosh did not contest the violation and

thus no record was developed on this subject. However, there is nothing in the record cited

by McIntosh that supports the conclusory statement in his appellate brief that he did not

violate Rule 14. To the contrary, the evidence in the record suggests that McIntosh agreed

to follow the rules of treatment facilities or programs in which he was placed and that he

was subject to being placed in Sojourner as part of the SAMI Court Program. Because

there is nothing in the record to support the argument that McIntosh had a reason to contest

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the Rule 14 violation, there is no support for the argument that his trial counsel was deficient

for not contesting the violation.

       {¶ 38} Moreover, as with the Rule 7 violation, McIntosh received oral notice of the

Rule 14 violation and completely admitted to the violation. His actions waived any effective

assistance of counsel concerns. Jimenez, 2017-Ohio-1553 at ¶ 6.

            3. Failure to Cite Qualls or Investigate a Mental Illness Defense

       {¶ 39} Next, McIntosh argues his counsel was ineffective because he failed to cite

or direct the court's attention to the Tenth District Court of Appeals' opinion in Qualls, and

its language directing trial courts to consider an offender's insanity at the time of a

community control rule violation, which we discussed above. Building on this argument,

McIntosh argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate potential defenses

to the Rules 7 and 14 infractions based on a mental illness defense.

       {¶ 40} McIntosh's argument fails for two reasons.          First, as we stated in our

discussion of McIntosh's first assignment of error, Qualls is not controlling precedent in the

Twelfth District and its reasoning has not been adopted by this court. As such we cannot

see any basis for concluding that trial counsel's performance in not citing or directing the

trial court's attention to Qualls was deficient.

       {¶ 41} Second, there is nothing in the record, other than appellate counsel's

suggestion, that McIntosh's community control violations were committed at a time when

he was legally insane. Thus, to hold that trial counsel was deficient for not investigating

potential defenses based on mental illness would require us to speculate and assume facts

not in the record. State v. Miller, 12th Dist. Brown No. CA2022-09-008, 2023-Ohio-1600, ¶

26 ("Speculation is not sufficient to establish ineffective assistance of counsel").

       {¶ 42} Because we do not find that McIntosh has established any instances of

deficient performance regarding his trial counsel's actions at the revocation hearing, we

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need not consider the issue of prejudice. See State v. Kaufhold, 12th Dist. Butler No.

CA2019-09-148, 2020-Ohio-3835, ¶ 54.

       {¶ 43} We overrule McIntosh's first assignment of error.

                                    C. Sentencing Issues

       {¶ 44} McIntosh's third assignment of error states:

       {¶ 45} MCINTOSH'S SENTENCE WAS CONTRARY TO LAW.

       {¶ 46} McIntosh makes three arguments regarding his sentence. We will examine

these arguments in turn.

                       1. Consideration of R.C. 2929.13(B) Factors

       {¶ 47} McIntosh first argues that the trial court erred by considering the R.C.

2929.13(B) factors in revoking community control and imposing sentence.

                       a. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

       {¶ 48} There are a number of statutes which discuss factors for trial courts to

consider when sentencing an offender. Three such statutes are relevant to our analysis in

this case. First, R.C. 2929.11 states that a sentencing court "that sentences an offender for

a felony shall be guided by the overriding purposes of felony sentencing * * *" and lists those

purposes and factors to be considered. R.C. 2929.11(A), (B). Second, R.C. 2929.12 lists

factors that a sentencing court "shall" consider in assessing the seriousness of the

offender's conduct and the offender's potential for recidivism. R.C. 2929.12(A), (B), (C),

(D), and (E). Third, R.C. 2929.13(B) provides that a sentencing court "shall" sentence an

offender to community control when the offender has been convicted of or pleads guilty to

a "felony of the fourth or fifth degree that is not an offense of violence or that is a qualifying

assault offense * * *[,]" provided that three conditions listed in the statute are satisfied. R.C.

2929.13(B)(1)(a)(i), (ii), and (iii). But R.C. 2929.13(B) also provides that a sentencing court

"has discretion to impose a prison term upon an offender who is convicted of or pleads guilty

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to a felony of the fourth or fifth degree that is not an offense of violence or that is a qualifying

assault offense if any of the following apply * * *[,]" and then lists ten scenarios. R.C.

2929.13(B)(1)(b)(i) thru (x).

       {¶ 49} R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) defines the standard of review for felony sentencing

appeals. State v. Day, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2020-07-042 and CA2020-07-043, 2021-

Ohio-164, ¶ 6. This remains true when the trial court does not impose the felony sentence

until a community control revocation hearing prompted by the offender's violation of the

terms of community control. See State v. Covington, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2020-10-103,

2021-Ohio-2983, ¶ 5, 11, 14. As applicable here, R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) provides:

               The appellate court may take any action authorized by this
               division if it clearly and convincingly finds either of the following:

               (a) That the record does not support the sentencing court's
               findings under division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division
               (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section 2929.14, or division (I) of section
               2929.20 of the Revised Code, whichever, if any, is relevant;

               (b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.

       {¶ 50} In State v. Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 242, 2020-Ohio-6729, the Ohio Supreme

Court clarified an appellate court's scope of review under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a) and (b).

First, the supreme court noted that R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a) permits an appellate court to

modify or vacate a sentence if the appellate court clearly and convincingly finds that the

record does not support the sentencing court's finding under certain specified statutory

provisions listed in the statute (that is, R.C. 2929.13[B] or [D], R.C. 2929.14[B][2][e] or [C][4],

or R.C. 2929.20[I]). Id. at ¶ 28. However, the supreme court noted that R.C. 2929.11 and

2929.12 are not among the statutory provisions listed in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a), and

therefore held that R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a) does not permit an appellate court to modify or

vacate a sentence based on a lack of support in the record for the trial court's findings under

R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 Id. at ¶ 28-29.

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       {¶ 51} Second, in Jones, the Ohio Supreme Court held that R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b)

"does not provide a basis for an appellate court to modify or vacate a sentence based on

its view that the sentence is not supported by the record under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12."

Id. at ¶ 39. The supreme court reasoned that "an appellate court's determination that the

record does not support a sentence does not equate to a determination that the sentence

is 'otherwise contrary to law' as that term is used in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b)." Id. at ¶ 32.

Instead, a sentence is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law where a trial court

"'considers the principles and purposes of R.C. 2929.11, as well as the factors listed in R.C.

2929.12, properly imposes postrelease control, and sentences the defendant within the

permissible statutory range.'" State v. Lopez-Cruz, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2022-07-068,

2023-Ohio-257, ¶ 8, quoting State v. Ahlers, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2015-06-100, 2016-

Ohio-2890, ¶ 8.

                                         b. Analysis

       {¶ 52} In its sentencing entry, the trial court stated that it considered "the principles

and purposes of sentencing under [R.C] 2929.11, and has balanced the seriousness and

recidivism factors [under R.C.] 2929.12." Based on its review of those factors, the trial court

found "that the defendant is not amenable to an available community control sanction."

(Emphasis omitted.)

       {¶ 53} The record therefore reflects that the court considered the R.C. 2929.11

principles and purposes of sentencing, as well as the R.C. 2929.12 factors. The record also

reflects that the court properly imposed postrelease control and properly sentenced

McIntosh within the permissible statutory range for a second-degree felony offense.

Accordingly, McIntosh's sentence is not contrary to law. Lopez-Cruz at ¶ 8.

       {¶ 54} But the trial court also stated in the sentencing entry that "The Court has

considered the factors under [R.C.] 2929.13(B) and finds the following defendant violated

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prior community control." McIntosh is correct that the R.C. 2929.13(B) factors were not

applicable in his case because he was convicted of a second-degree felony and the R.C.

2929.13(B) factors only apply to fourth- and fifth-degree felonies. There was therefore no

need for the trial court to consider the R.C. 2929.13(B) factors.

       {¶ 55} As stated above, R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a) authorizes us to take action with

respect to the sentence if we determine that the record does not clearly and convincingly

support the sentencing court's findings under R.C. 2929.13(B). But McIntosh did not argue

that the record failed to support any of the court's findings under R.C. 2929.13(B). Nor does

he argue that his sentence was clearly and convincingly contrary to law because the trial

court reviewed the R.C. 2929.13(B) factors when it was unnecessary to do so. He simply

argues that the trial court erred because it considered those factors when it was not required

to do so.

       {¶ 56} Pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), we are unable to modify or vacate McIntosh's

sentence based on any claimed error in the trial court's additional consideration of R.C.

2929.13(B) factors. But beyond our inability to modify or vacate the sentence, we note that

McIntosh fails to offer any explanation for how the court's additional consideration of the

R.C. 2929.13(B) factors prejudiced him. On this record, we can discern no prejudice. This

argument is meritless.

                           2. Reagan Tokes Law Notifications

       {¶ 57} McIntosh next argues that the trial court erred by failing to properly provide

the mandatory Reagan Tokes Law notifications set forth in R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c). McIntosh

concedes that the trial court properly advised him—orally—of the Reagan Tokes

notifications during the sentencing hearing. But he argues that the court erred by not also

including those notifications in its written sentencing entry. This court has not previously

decided whether the mandatory Reagan Tokes notifications must be included in a written

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sentencing entry.

       {¶ 58} We first turn to the text of the statute. See State v. Chappell, 127 Ohio St.3d

376, 2010-Ohio-5991, ¶ 16.        R.C. 2929.19(B)(2) states in relevant part that "if the

sentencing court determines at the sentencing hearing that a prison term is necessary or

required, the court shall do all of the following * * *." (Emphasis added.) The phrase "all of

the following" refers to multiple provisions concerning sentencing notifications, including but

not limited to R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c). That subsection states that the sentencing court must

"notify" the offender of five advisements, set forth in R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c)(i)-(v), when

imposing an indefinite prison term under the Reagan Tokes Law. The statute contains no

language whatsoever referencing any obligation for the sentencing court to include the

Reagan Tokes notifications in a written sentencing entry.         On the contrary, the plain

language of the statute indicates that the Reagan Tokes notifications are to be provided to

the offender "at the sentencing hearing," meaning the notifications must be orally delivered

at the hearing. Consistent with the statutory text, we conclude that R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c)

only requires that a sentencing court "notify" the offender of the Reagan Tokes advisements

orally "at the sentencing hearing," and does not require that the court repeat those

advisements in the written sentencing entry.

       {¶ 59} McIntosh offers no contrary textual analysis. Instead, he argues a corollary,

i.e., that because mandatory postrelease control notifications must be orally given at the

sentencing hearing and must also be included in the written sentencing entry, then

mandatory Reagan Tokes notifications must be as well. In making this argument, McIntosh

relies on the fact that the provisions regarding postrelease control notifications and Reagan

Tokes notifications are set forth in the same statute, R.C. 2929.19(B)(2). Indeed, mandatory

postrelease control notifications are described in R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(d) and (e). The same

"at the sentencing hearing" language in R.C. 2929.19(B)(2) that modifies the (c) subsection

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concerning Reagan Tokes notifications also modifies the (d) and (e) subsections concerning

postrelease control notifications. Likewise, the (d) and (e) postrelease control subsections

state that the sentencing court shall "notify" the offender of certain information, as does the

(c) subsection.

        {¶ 60} McIntosh also relies on Ohio Supreme Court case law holding that the R.C.

2929.19(B)(2)(d) and (e) postrelease control notifications must be delivered orally by the

court at a sentencing hearing and must also be stated, in writing, in the court's written

sentencing entry.2 E.g., State v. Grimes, 151 Ohio St.3d 19, 2017-Ohio-2927, ¶ 1, 8; State

v. Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio-6085, paragraph one of the syllabus, overruled on

other grounds by State v. Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio-2913; State v. Qualls,

131 Ohio St.3d 499, 2012-Ohio-1111, syllabus.3 McIntosh posits that "It would * * * be

nonsensical and inconsistent to require [postrelease control] notifications in the entry but

exempt the Reagan Tokes notifications from the entry."

        {¶ 61} As an intermediate appellate court, we are bound to follow the Ohio Supreme

Court's precedents on postrelease control notifications, and we have repeatedly done so.

See State v. Demangone, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2022-11-081, 2023-Ohio-2522, ¶ 22;

State v. Williams, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2018-03-055, 2018-Ohio-3990, ¶ 17 ("A trial court

must properly impose postrelease control at the sentencing hearing and in the sentencing

entry"). (Emphasis added). But must we follow the Ohio Supreme Court's precedents

regarding postrelease control notifications in the context of Reagan Tokes notifications?

No, for the reasons we explain below.

2. Some of the Ohio Supreme Court cases discussing the R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(d) and (e) postrelease control
notifications refer to different subsection numbers. These provisions were moved within R.C. 2929.19 after
the statute was amended to add the Reagan-Tokes notifications (now found at R.C. 2929.19[B][2][c]) to the
statute).

3. This is a different State v. Qualls, with a different appellant, than the Tenth District State v. Qualls case
discussed earlier in this opinion.

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       {¶ 62} In   many   cases,   McIntosh's    argument      that   our   analysis   of   R.C.

2929.19(B)(2)(c) must be consistent with the Ohio Supreme Court's interpretation of R.C.

2929.19(B)(2)(d) and (e) would be correct.           It is a well-known principle of statutory

interpretation that "If a statute uses words or phrases that have already received

authoritative construction by the jurisdiction's court of last resort * * * they are to be

understood according to that construction."           Scalia & Garner, Reading Law: The

Interpretation of Legal Texts, 322 (2012). However, this canon of construction may be

"overcome[]" by "other sound rules of interpretation." Id. at 324. Such is the case here,

where the Ohio Supreme Court has not justified its requirement that postrelease control

notifications be included in sentencing entries by providing any authoritative interpretation

of any specific words in R.C. 2929.19. That is, the supreme court's reasoning in Grimes,

Jordan, and similar cases does not rest on an interpretation of the phrase "at the sentencing

hearing" in R.C. 2929.19(B)(2), on the word "[n]otify" as used in R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(d) and

(e), or on any other word or phrase in the statute.

       {¶ 63} Instead, the Ohio Supreme Court's requirement that postrelease control

notifications must be included in a sentencing entry is "completely judge-made law"

divorced from the interpretation of any word or phrase in the statute. State v. Bates, 167

Ohio St.3d 197, 2022-Ohio-475, ¶ 56 (DeWine, J., dissenting). We agree with those justices

who have pointed out that the Ohio Supreme Court's requirement that postrelease

notifications be provided not only at the sentencing hearing but also in the sentencing entry

is not supported by the text of the postrelease control notification statutes. Bates at ¶ 33

(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (R.C. 2929.19 "does not require courts to incorporate that

[postrelease control] notice into the sentencing entry, but our caselaw does") and ¶ 45, 55-

59 (DeWine, J., dissenting) ("The only notifications concerning postrelease control are to

be provided 'at the sentencing hearing.' R.C. 2929.19[B][2]"); Grimes, 2017-Ohio-2927 at

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                                                                       Butler CA2022-04-040

¶ 42-45 (DeWine, J., concurring in judgment only) ("There is no statutory requirement that

anything regarding postrelease control be stated in [an offender's] sentencing entry"), and

¶ 26 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment only) ("I agree with the portion of Justice

DeWine's opinion concurring in judgment only that concludes that R.C. 2929.19[B[[2]

requires only that the two specified [postrelease control] notifications be provided 'at the

sentencing hearing'").

       {¶ 64} Instead of basing its rule regarding postrelease control notifications on the

statutory text, the Ohio Supreme Court has provided a non-textual justification for this judge-

made law. First, the supreme court has explained that "because a court is generally said

to speak only through its journal," the postrelease control notifications must be included in

a sentencing entry. Grimes at ¶ 8 (O'Connor, C.J.), citing Jordan, 2004-Ohio-6085 at ¶ 6.

We agree that a court generally speaks only through its journal. State v. Myers, 119 Ohio

App.3d 642, 645 (12th Dist.1997). But this general principle does not mean that all of a trial

court's oral decisions or statements must be recorded in a written entry. If that were the

case, many decisions or statements made by judges at trial—such as oral decisions

denying a Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal, or overruling objections to testimony—would be

legal nullities unless recorded in a written entry. We see no reason, then, why the general

principle that a court speaks through its journal would necessarily require that Reagan

Tokes notifications be included in a sentencing entry.

       {¶ 65} The supreme court has also cited the constitutional principle of the separation

of powers as a second basis for its holding that postrelease control notifications must be

included in a sentencing entry. Jordan at ¶ 19-22, citing Woods v. Telb, 89 Ohio St.3d 504,

512-513 (2000). The supreme court reasoned that the Adult Parole Authority cannot itself

impose postrelease control, and instead can only impose postrelease control when

postrelease control is part of a judge's sentence. Id. at ¶ 19. We do not see how the

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supreme court's separation of powers concerns in the postrelease control notification

context would also apply with respect to Reagan Tokes notifications. In State v. Hacker,

Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-2535, the Ohio Supreme Court held that because a judge sets

the minimum and maximum prison terms under Reagan Tokes, the Department of

Rehabilitation and Correction does not exercise judicial power in violation of the separation

of powers when it prolongs an offender's time in prison within that range. Id. at ¶ 13-25.

Nothing about the supreme court's analysis in Hacker suggests that the separation of

powers would be violated if the Reagan Tokes notifications were not included in a

sentencing entry.

        {¶ 66} Because the Ohio Supreme Court's reasoning in Grimes, Jordan, and Qualls

does not apply in the Reagan Tokes notification context, and because those opinions do

not apply to Reagan Tokes notifications under R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c), we are free to interpret

that statute independently of Grimes, Jordan, and Qualls.

        {¶ 67} Therefore, consistent with the text of the statute, we hold the Reagan Tokes

notifications required by R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c) must be given at a sentencing hearing, but

do not need to be restated in a sentencing entry. No statute requires that the notifications

be restated in a sentencing entry, and it is not our role to create a new law where there is

none.4 The trial court did not err by not including the Reagan Tokes notifications in the

sentencing entry.

                            3. Failure to Challenge Reagan Tokes Law

        {¶ 68} Finally, McIntosh argues that his attorney was ineffective for failing to raise a

4. We further note that even if McIntosh were correct that Reagan Tokes notifications were required to be
stated in a sentencing entry, as is the case with postrelease control notifications, then the trial court’s failure
to do so in this case would not constitute reversible error entitling McIntosh to a new sentencing hearing.
Instead, such an error would be a clerical error that could be corrected with a nunc pro tunc entry. See Qualls,
2012-Ohio-1111 at the syllabus ("When a defendant is notified about postrelease control at the sentencing
hearing, but notification is inadvertently omitted from the sentencing entry, the omission can be corrected with
a nunc pro tunc entry and the defendant is not entitled to a new sentencing hearing").

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constitutional challenge to the Reagan Tokes Law and that the trial court plainly erred by

"failing to acknowledge" that the Ohio Supreme Court had accepted jurisdiction over the

issue of the constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Law. McIntosh does not specify what

constitutional argument his attorney should have raised.

       {¶ 69} We have repeatedly found that the failure to raise a challenge to the

constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Law does not constitute ineffective assistance of

counsel. State v. McClendon, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2021-08-075, 2022-Ohio-2830, ¶

16; State v. Abner, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2021-05-048, 2021-Ohio-4549, ¶ 25; State v.

Luttrell, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2021-07-062, 2022-Ohio-1148, ¶ 30; State v. Roberson,

12th Dist. Warren No. CA2021-01-003, 2021-Ohio-3705, ¶ 43; and State v. Hodgkin, 12th

Dist. Warren No. CA2020-08-048, 2021-Ohio-1353, ¶ 18. Moreover, the Ohio Supreme

Court recently held that the Reagan Tokes Law is facially constitutional under the federal

Due Process Clause and does not violate the right to a jury trial or the separation-of-powers

doctrine. Hacker, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-2535 at ¶ 25, 28.

       {¶ 70} Finally, McIntosh's argument that the trial court erred by "failing to

acknowledge the pending Supreme Court cases" is inexplicable. McIntosh does not explain

this argument in his appellate brief, nor can we discern any reason as to why it was error

for the trial court not to have "acknowledged" pending Supreme Court cases. This argument

is meritless.

       {¶ 71} For the foregoing reasons, McIntosh's sentence is not contrary to law. We

overrule McIntosh's third assignment of error.

                                        III. Conclusion

       {¶ 72} The trial court did not plainly err at the revocation hearing by failing to consider

insanity in mitigation. McIntosh has failed to establish that his attorney provided ineffective

assistance at the revocation hearing. McIntosh failed to establish any error in his sentence.

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                                                                Butler CA2022-04-040

We therefore overrule all of McIntosh's assignments of error.

      {¶ 73} Judgment affirmed.

      PIPER, P.J., and HENDRICKSON, J., concur.

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