Court Opinion

ID: 9721157
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:49:55.585368+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:23.679254
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice KeingbiEE, dissenting: I am compelled to express my objection to what seems to me a clear instance of judicial legislation in the guise of construction. The practice of shaping the meaning of words to accord with ideas of what the legislature should have said, instead of what it did say, must ultimately result in rendering statutory language of such unpredictable, vague import that no course of conduct can be safely undertaken without a prior judicial “interpretation.” The function of language is to convey with as much precision as possible the particular thought or idea. When accepted definitions are judicially disregarded in favor of tortuous, far-fetched and unjustified constructions, this precision is destroyed, making it necessary for persons to1 guess what kind of interpretation a court might decide to put upon common, ordinary words. The particular litigation may be of limited significance, of course, but the delimitizing of meaning goes to the very foundations of the law. Granting that the legislature is free, within reasonable limits, to define “teacher” without regard to its common meaning, what has it actually done here? It has said merely that a teacher is an employee who is required to be certified “under laws relating to the certification of teachers.” When reference is made to the laws relating to the certification of teachers, in force when this litigation arose, we discover the simple provision that no one shall “teach” who does not hold a certificate. By what rational process is it found that a certification provision which does not mention superintendents, amplifies a definition provision governing, in turn, the scope of the tenure provision, neither of which says anything at all about supervisory personnel ? The opinion points out that under sections applying to districts of a different class, superintendents are expressly included. But instead of applying the accepted rule in such cases, the court holds that the difference in language evidences an intended identity of meaning! If the legislature had intended to include superintendents or others having some administrative or supervisory duty, nothing would have been simpler than to have said so, as it did in preceding sections. Failure to do- so shows an intention to exclude them. The provision relied on here provided that no one shall “teach” who is not certified. By subsequent amendment, not applicable here, its scope was expanded to provide that no one shall “teach or supervise” who is not certified. Here, again, by a novel doctrine of interpretation, the difference in language is held evidence of identity of content. If no change was intended, why the amendment ? If teaching is supervising, why specify both in the disjunctive? If a supervisor is a teacher, and if supervising is teaching, the words “or supervise,” as contained in the later amendment, must be pure surplusage. If a superintendent is a teacher, whom does he teach? What subjects does he teach? Section 7-11 makes the superintendent the executive officer of the board, and assigns him the duty to carry out its administrative and executive functions. He is an administrator, not a teacher. In the case at bar the evidence is undisputed that decedent did no teaching, and that his services were solely administrative in character. In the absence of specific statutory direction, supervisory and administrative officers of a school district should not, by a process of judicial construction, be brought within the coverage of provisions in terms applicable only to teachers. Both in law and in practice such positions constitute a class distinct from that of a teacher. As the Minnesota court observed in Eelkema v. Board of Education, 215 Minn. 590, 11 N.W.2d 76, “The character of the services of a superintendent of schools to the district and of his relations to the board is such that it should require a clear declaration of legislative intent to bring him within the continuous employment effected by the tenure act.” Other statutory provisions referred to in defendant’s brief indicate that the legislature was aware of the distinction between the two types of activity, and that it would have included express provisions had it intended the term “teacher” to refer as well to a supervisor. The Teacher Tenure Law created a new liability on the part of school boards. In such cases the courts will not extend or enlarge the liability by construction, nor will they go beyond the clearly expressed provisions of the statute. (Anderson v. Board of Education, 390 Ill. 412.) In that case we pointed out that "The Teacher Tenure Law clearly creates a new liability where none would otherwise exist; it makes a contract for the parties by operation of the law, where otherwise none would exist.” By a well-reasoned opinion the Appellate Court for the First District, in Biehn v. Tess, 340 Il. App. 140, concluded that the principal of a high school district is not a “teacher,” within the meaning of the Teacher Tenure Law, and I think a similar result is required here. A court cannot properly read into a statute abnormal definitions that are not found therein either by express inclusion or by fair implication (See Anderson v. Board of Education, 390 Ill. 412, 425) ; nor can interpretations contained in administrative announcements or school board journals take the place of legislation. The legislature may wish at some future time to bring superintendents within the application of tenure provisions. But, on the other hand, there are reasons why it may not wish to do so. As representatives of the people, the board of education is the body charged with the primary responsibility in formulating educational policy and supervising school administration. In order for the board to discharge these responsibilities and be responsive to the wishes of the electorate, it would seem essential that they have the right to choose, in their discretion, the district’s chief executive officer. Otherwise, the board would have duties but lack the necessary means of fulfilling them. If the decision were predicated upon the estoppel contention I should have refrained from expressing my views. But to base it on the present distortion of terminology has consequences which I feel can only aggravate whatever confusion and uncertainty now exist in the law. I would affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court. Mr. Justice HershEy concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.