Court Opinion

ID: 9819697
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:31:50.823538+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:27:21.173613
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE SOUTH, dissenting’: I would find that the crime was committed in a brutal and heinous manner, indicative of wanton cruelty. I therefore respectfully dissent. As the majority correctly notes, the issue is whether the Apprendi violation constituted plain error because defendant did not object at the time of trial. See People v. Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d 335, 347 (2001). I would find that the record supports a finding of brutal and heinous conduct. In People v. La Pointe, 88 Ill. 2d 482, 501 (1981), our supreme court held that the phrase “ ‘brutal or heinous behavior, indicative of wanton cruelty’ [citation]” did not require “ ‘torture or unnecessary pain upon [a] victim’ ” in order to find “brutal” or “heinous” behavior. The court stated: “ ‘Heinous’ is identified by Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (unabridged) as ‘hatefully or shockingly evil: grossly bad: enormously and flagrantly criminal’; ‘brutal’ includes ‘grossly ruthless,’ ‘devoid of mercy or compassion: cruel and coldblooded.’ ” La Pointe, 88 Ill. 2d at 501. The words “wanton” and “cruelty” as used in section 5 — 5—3.2 of the Unified Code of Corrections were defined in People v. Jones, 73 Ill. App. 3d 99, 103 (1979), in quotes from Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 546 (1976) (unabridged) and Bartolucci v. Failed, 382 Ill. 168, 174 (1943), as follows: “ ‘[C]ruelty’ [is] a ‘disposition to inflict pain or suffering or to enjoy it being inflicted.’ *** “*** To constitute an act wanton, the party doing the act or failing to act must be conscious of his conduct, and, though having no intent to injure, must be conscious, from his knowledge of surrounding circumstances and existing conditions, that his conduct will naturally and probably result in injury.’ ” Moreover, brutal or heinous behavior is not determined by the number of wounds sustained by a victim; a single act that causes death or injury may be sufficient to demonstrate brutal or heinous behavior considering the entire conduct of the defendant. People v. McGee, 121 Ill. App. 3d 1086, 1090-91 (1984). See also People v. Brown, 195 Ill. App. 3d 78, 85 (1990); People v. Taylor, 278 Ill. App. 3d 696, 699-700 (1996). In the case at bar, I believe that defendant’s conduct in the lounge that evening demonstrated brutal and heinous behavior. First, defendant’s disposition to inflict pain and his flagrant disregard for others can be inferred from the fact that he was armed with a loaded gun during an evening out in a crowded lounge and did not hesitate to pull it out and begin shooting at the first sign of confrontation. After the victim had retreated from the initial confrontation regarding the disturbance with the lounge’s owner, defendant pulled out a gun and began to fire at the unarmed victim. The victim and defendant then struggled for the gun, during which time defendant’s finger remained on the trigger and he continued to fire the gun, injuring the victim. When defendant gained control of the gun, he struck the victim on the head with the gun, and as the victim lay wounded on the ground, defendant pointed the gun at his head and attempted to fire the gun again. The only thing that prevented this case from being a case of first degree murder was the fact that the gun jammed. Moreover, defendant’s behavior showed a gross indifference to the safety and well-being of the other people in the lounge who could have been injured by the shooting. Finally, what is of most significance to me, is that the victim suffered substantial injuries as noted by the trial court: injury to his spleen which required its removal, injuries to his colon and pancreas that required their partial removal, injury to his lung, a broken vertebrae, and a bullet lodged in his back, three centimeters from his spine, the removal of which would cause permanent paralysis. The victim’s total medical expenses exceeded $126,000, and the victim was unable to work for a substantial amount of time following the shooting. In applying the plain-error analysis, I would find that defendant was not prejudiced by the Apprendi violation. Like the court in Crespo, I believe that on the basis of what I perceive to be overwhelming evidence that the crime was committed in a brutal and heinous manner, the Apprendi violation did not seriously affect the integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings because a jury, if confronted with these facts, would have found that the crime was committed in a brutal and heinous manner, indicative of wanton cruelty. For these reasons, I would affirm defendant’s convictions and sentences.