Court Opinion

ID: 9739088
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:08:36.644575+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:09.949157
License: Public Domain

SABERS, Justice
(dissenting).
The fatal defect in the majority opinion readily appears in the too narrow statement of the issue. The correct question presented is:
WHETHER A CLAIM OF THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION IS EQUAL TO AN ABSOLUTE REFUSAL TO PERFORM TESTS.
This question is one of first impression in South Dakota. Our holding should be:
WHEN A PERSON IS SUBJECT TO COMPULSION AND NOT FREE TO LEAVE, AND CLAIMS HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION, HE CANNOT BE COMPELLED TO GIVE EVIDENCE UNIQUELY WITHIN HIS CONTROL. FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS, WHETHER VERBAL OR NON-VERBAL, ARE UNIQUELY WITHIN THE CONTROL OF THE PERSON TO PERFORM OR NOT PERFORM.
The privilege against self-incrimination is recognized in both the state and federal constitutions. Article VI, Section 9 of the South Dakota Constitution provides: “No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to give evidence against himself....” (emphasis added). The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “No person ... shall be compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness against him-self_” (emphasis added). The prohibition in both constitutions is against compulsion by the state in a criminal case.
The United States Supreme Court in Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1620, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 715 (1966), recognized the danger of improperly compelled evidence and prohibited its use against a defendant in a criminal ease:
[O]ur accusatory system of criminal justice demands that the government seeking to punish an individual produce the evidence against him by its own independent labors, rather than by the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it from his own mouth.
This court has addressed improper coercion by the state following the assertion of a right guaranteed by Miranda. In State v. Cody, 293 N.W.2d 440 (S.D.1980), the defendant was informed of his Miranda rights prior to his questioning by a DCI agent. The defendant requested an attorney several times during the questioning, but the questioning continued. This court reversed his conviction, holding that the questioning should have ceased after the defendant requested an attorney. Cody held that the defendant did not waive his rights under Miranda by continuing to answer questions after he had asserted the right. The state has a heavy burden to demonstrate a person has waived the privilege against self-incrimination. Satter v. Solem, 434 N.W.2d 725 (S.D.1989), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 109 S.Ct. 2432, 104 L.Ed.2d 989 (1989); Cody, supra.
Since Miranda, the Supreme Court has consistently held that the use of “physical or moral compulsion” on a person asserting a Fifth Amendment right is prohibited. South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 103 S.Ct. 916, 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983) (.Neville I); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 96 S.Ct. 1569, 48 L.Ed.2d 39 (1976); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 764, 35 L.Ed.2d 67 (1973). In Neville I, the Court found that a DWI suspect’s refusal to take a blood test was not compelled, as a suspect was given the choice between taking the test or refusing the test and suffering the statutory penalties for refusal. The Court stated:
Here the State did not directly compel respondent to refuse the test, for it gave him the choice of submitting to the test or refusing.
... Nor is this a ease where the State has subtly coerced respondent into *53choosing the option it had no right to compel, rather than offering a true choice, (emphasis added).
Id., 459 U.S. at 562-64, 103 S.Ct. at 922, 74 L.Ed.2d at 758-9.
On remand from the Supreme Court, we also discussed the question of moral compulsion in State v. Neville, 346 N.W.2d 425 (S.D.1984) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Hoenscheid, 374 N.W.2d 128 (S.D.1985)) (Neville II). Neville II states that moral compulsion is exerted where the state improperly attaches a penalty, punishment or detriment on an individual’s particular course of action. “If a defendant produces self-incriminating evidence to escape unwarranted consequences, that evidence is considered compelled and thus constitutionally inadmissible.” Id. at 429 (citing People v. Thomas, 46 N.Y.2d 100, 412 N.Y.S.2d 845, 385 N.E.2d 584 (1978)).
These cases protect defendants in criminal cases who have asserted or not clearly waived the privilege against self-incrimination. However, these cases differ from Meek’s in that each involves either of two situations. One is where the state has informed or failed to inform a suspect of his Miranda rights during a custodial interrogation. The other is where a person has asserted the privilege to avoid testifying. In this case, no Miranda warnings were necessary and Meek did not assert the privilege to avoid testifying. Instead, Meek asserted the privilege1 in a situation where he was not free to leave and was then inveigled and compelled by Officer Hofeldt to give incriminating evidence2 uniquely within his control.
As indicated above, this is a case of first impression in South Dakota. We should base our decision on the independent state grounds of S.D. Const, art. VI, § 93 and on the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Miranda.
The State raises two arguments in support of its claim that the trial court improperly suppressed the evidence in question. First, the State claims that the field sobriety tests were administered while Meek was being questioned pursuant to a routine traffic stop, and was not under custodial interrogation. State argues that the privilege against self-incrimination does not apply where an individual is not in custody. The State cites Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984); Hoenscheid, supra; and State v. Hall, 353 N.W.2d 37 (S.D.1984), to support this claim.
In Berkemer, the Court recognized that any traffic stop curtails “freedom of action,” but held that under the circumstances of the roadside stop in Berkemer the defendant was not in custody for purposes of a Miranda warning. However, Ber-kemer refused to set out a bright line rule that a suspect need not be advised of his rights until he is formally placed under arrest.
If a motorist who has been detained pursuant to a traffic stop thereafter is subjected to treatment that renders him “in custody” for practical purposes, he will be entitled to the full panoply of protections prescribed by Miranda.
Id., 468 U.S. at 440, 104 S.Ct. at 3150, 82 L.Ed.2d at 335.
Unlike Berkemer, Meek does not claim that Officer Hofeldt failed to inform him of his Miranda rights. Rather, he argues that he specifically asserted his privilege *54against self-incrimination while he was not free to leave Officer Hofeldt’s vehicle, and that Officer Hofeldt then inveigled and compelled him to give incriminating evidence.
This court addressed the question of when a routine traffic stop rises to the level of a custodial interrogation in Hoen-scheid and Hall. In both Hoenscheid and Hall, the court held that a DWI suspect was not entitled to Miranda warnings because there was no custodial interrogation. Neither case involved a specific assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination followed by statements by the officer aimed at coercing incriminating evidence from the suspect. Further, neither involved a suspect being detained in the officer’s vehicle. Although these circumstances may indicate Meek was “in custody,” we need not base our decision on that determination. The privilege against self-incrimination applies in diverse situations even though the potential defendant is not entitled to be informed of his Miranda warnings. 3 Whartons Criminal Procedure, § 394-96 (12th ed. 1975). In other words, even though the State was not required to inform Meek of his rights under Miranda, he retained the right to remain silent and not incriminate himself.
The State also claims that the verbal sobriety tests were non-testimonial evidence and not within the reach of the privilege against self-incrimination. The Supreme Court has held that the federal constitutional right against self-incrimination applies only to testimonial or communicative evidence. Schmerber v. State of California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966). Non-testimonial or real evidence is not protected by the right against self-incrimination. Neville I, supra; Schmerber, supra. This distinction is based on the language of the Fifth Amendment which protects an individual from being compelled “to be a witness against himself.” The Court acknowledged difficulty in determining this question and stated that “a distinction is not readily drawn.”4 Schmerber, supra, 384 U.S. at 764, 86 S.Ct. at 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d at 916; Neville I, supra.
Despite the broader language of the South Dakota Constitution, which by its terms protects against the compulsion of any evidence, this court has also distinguished between testimonial and non-testimonial evidence under the South Dakota Constitution. Hoenscheid, supra; Neville II, supra; State v. Roadifer, 346 N.W.2d 438 (S.D.1984); State v. Maher, 272 N.W.2d 797 (S.D.1978). The State and the majority opinion argue that this case is controlled by Hoenscheid and Roadifer, which state that sobriety tests are real physical evidence and not protected by the privilege against self-incrimination.
The State and the majority fail to recognize the distinction between this case and Hoenscheid and Roadifer. Meek specifically asserted his privilege against self-incrimination. Officer Hofeldt then coerced Meek into incriminating himself by misleading him to believe it would be to his “advantage.” As found by the trial court: “the purpose for seeking those field sobriety tests was to obtain further evidence against defendant and not for any purpose which would be beneficial to Meek.” This is exactly the type of coercion which our state and federal constitutions prohibit. We have specifically rejected the argument that the “use of the rubber hose, icy showers or marathon interrogations” is necessary to create a presumption of compulsion. Satter, supra, at 728. The distinction between testimonial and non-testimonial evidence is inadequate under these circumstances.
When a person is subject to compulsion and not free to leave, and claims his constitutional right against self-incrimination, he cannot be compelled to give evidence uniquely within his control. Field sobriety tests, whether verbal or non-verbal, are uniquely within the control of the person to *55perform or not perform. This is evidence from a person’s mind and heart. Accordingly, the State may not coerce a defendant to give such evidence after the specific assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination. Meek’s assertion of the privilege in this ease was the equivalent of refusing to perform the tests.
This rule would not prohibit the State from using real or physical evidence, such as fingerprints, photographs, measurements, appearance, hair, stance, body position, blood samples, and other physical evidence. Roadifer, supra. Nor would the rule prohibit officers or witnesses from testifying as to their observations of defendant’s appearance, speech, demeanor or other observations that may be taken from him without his consciousness or cooperation. Likewise, under proper circumstances, a court can clearly require a defendant to submit to voice prints, writing samples, gesturing or other tests which require his cooperation.
To permit the State to coerce or deceive a person into incriminating oneself after asserting the privilege is improper under the South Dakota Constitution, which prohibits the use of “compelled evidence.” This proposed holding is in line with Schmerber, which first created the distinction between testimonial and non-testimonial evidence. Schmerber states:
To compel a person to submit to testing in which an effort will be made to determine his guilt or innocence on the basis of physiological responses, whether willed or not, is to evoke the spirit and history of the Fifth Amendment. Such situations call to mind the principle that the protection of the privilege “is as broad as the mischief against which it seeks to guard[.]” (citation omitted).
Id., 384 U.S. at 764, 86 S.Ct. at 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d at 916.
The trial court was also correct in excluding testimony concerning Meek’s assertion of this constitutional right. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965). This situation is distinguished from both Hoenscheid and Neville II where the court held the refusal to provide non-testimonial evidence did not violate the privilege against self-incrimination. The refusals in Hoenscheid and Neville II did not involve assertion of a protected constitutional right.
We should affirm the trial court's suppression of all testimony concerning Meek’s assertion of his right against self-incrimination and all statements made by Meek to Officer Hofeldt subsequent thereto, including the three verbal sobriety tests.

. Defense counsel points out the irony of the situation:
Some minutes after Defendant had attempted, on three occasions, to assert his privilege against self-incrimination, Officer Hofeldt formally placed the Defendant under arrest and then, ironically, informed Mr. Meek that he had certain rights, including the right against self-incrimination.

. During one of the sobriety tests, Meek admitted his nervousness and his belief that there was reason to be nervous.

.The State argues that Hoenscheid and Neville II hold that the privilege against self-incrimination, under our state constitution, is no broader than under the federal constitution. However, the language of our state constitution differs and the prohibition against compelled evidence is stronger. In addition, neither Hoenscheid nor Neville II involved the compulsion of evidence following the specific assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination, as here. See supra at p. 51-52.

. This difficulty can be seen in Neville I, where the Supreme Court avoided the question of whether the verbal refusal to take a blood test was testimonial evidence. The Court asserted that the line between testimonial and non-testimonial evidence was difficult to draw, and instead rested its decision upon the determination that there was no coercion.