Court Opinion

ID: 9603100
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:03:15.650387+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:08.429135
License: Public Domain

Rosellini, J.
(dissenting) — The majority has misconstrued the statute in holding that the effective date is the completion date of the engineering.
When should the 1 year begin to run? It is the position of the department that the date when a compliance schedule was issued sets the time period within which emission standards must be met by the particular taxpayer. The position of plaintiffs before the department and the trial court was the date when the appropriate air or water pollution control agency approved, prospectively, particular facilities as satisfying its requirements. It should be noted the trial court did not agree with plaintiffs' position: "I don't see that in the statute."
*282When you consider RCW 82.34.010(5),
such application [for exemption] will bé deemed timely made if made within one year after the effective date of specific requirements for such facility promulgated by the appropriate control agency[,]
(Italics mine.) and
(6) "Appropriate control agency" shall mean the state water pollution control commission; or the operating local or regional air pollution control agency within whose jurisdiction a facility is or will be located, or the state air pollution control board, where the facility is not or will not be located within the area of an operating local or regional air pollution control agency, or where the state air pollution control board has assumed jurisdiction^]
the effective date comes into focus.
On the validity of the promulgation of the compliance schedule as the starting date, the director of revenue said in his decision:
Petitioners argue that "compliance schedules" set forth requirements for reducing pollutant sources not requirements for specific facilities to reduce pollutants. Thus, they contend that the date the facility is finally in operation, and in compliance, should be the starting date for the running of the one-year statute. I cannot accept that proposition. First, the interpretation does not give due consideration to the legislative use of the word "promulgate." The legislature provided that the promulgation by the appropriate control agency is the operative event for commencing the time period in which an application must be made. Second, this interpretation does not give due consideration to the legislative reference to a "facility required to be installed” which is clearly a future tense reference to the installation of equipment. Third, it is my opinion that the legislature's basic intent in enacting this incentive legislation was to hasten the elimination of air and water pollutants. The floor amendment to Section 1 (6) of House Bill 946 (House Journal, page 1538, March 21, 1967), providing time limitations on the right to the tax benefits, was clearly for the purpose of speeding the process for the elimination of such pollutant. The application deadline, which is a limitation on the time for filing applications, is a limitation upon the *283right granted by the legislature for such tax credit or tax exemptions.
Undoubtedly time difficulties did exist for the applicants. Similar problems were solved by other applicants. We are confronted here, however, with the legislative mandate that the one year statute of limitation commence with a "promulgation" which in my judgment requires a governmental décision with some degree of formality.
"Promulgate" is defined in the American Heritage Dictionary as
1. "To make known (a decree, law or doctrine) by public declaration; announce officially.
2. To put (a law) into effect by public pronouncement."
Black's Law Dictionary (1st Ed.) provides this definition
"to publish, to announce officially; to make public as important or obligatory."
I have concluded the issuance of a compliance schedule (for air) or a waste discharge permit (for water) is the act of promulgation that commences the year statute of limitation running. DOE and SWAPCA are not concerned with the specific type of facility to be installed but rather the time schedule for meeting performance standards. The specific compliance schedules are founded on previous or simultaneously published general emission control or effluent standards but are tailored to the requirements of a particular "facility" when it is determined that such facility is needed.
On the final point made by the director, the colloquy in the 1967 House Journal is instructive:
Mr. Holman [Vice-Chairman of the Committee on Revenue and Taxation, which reported the bill] moved adoption of the following amendment:
On page 2, section 1, line 17, strike the period and add the following: "for which application has been made not later than December 31, 1969: Provided, That with respect solely to a facility required to be installed in an industrial, manufacturing, waste disposal, utility, or other commercial establishment which is in operation or under construction as of the effective date of this act, such application will be deemed timely made if made within *284one year after the effective date of specific requirements for such facility promulgated by the appropriate control agency."
Yielding to Question
At the request of Mr. Adams, Mr. Holman yielded to question.
Mr. Adams:
"What is the effective date where the rules and regulations haven't been promulgated? Where do they stand?''
Mr. Holman:
"If no rules and regulations are yet promulgated, they would have until December 31, 1969 to make their application, and if by that date they still haven't been promulgated they would have a year after the date of promulgation."
Mr. Adams:
"If this amendment is not adopted, what date would apply or is the date anywhere in the act?"
Mr. Holman:
"There is no date in the act, as I understand it, as it now exists."
House Journal, 40th Legislature (1967), at 1538-39.
Where statutory language is ambiguous, statements made by the legislative committee spokesperson in response to questions on the floor may be taken as the committee's opinion as to the meaning of the legislation. Snow's Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Morgan, 80 Wn.2d 283, 494 P.2d 216 (1972).
Finally, the plaintiffs imply the compliance schedule date is somehow unfair to them in that the time between the promulgation of the compliance schedule and the completion of the engineering as contemplated by the compliance schedule is insufficient. The short answer to this complaint is that the dates on the compliance schedule were those originally proposed by the plaintiffs to the Department of Ecology and to the Southwest Air Pollution Control Authority.
A more complete answer is the statute itself never contemplated that the first application would contain all the information necessary for the final court determination under RCW 82.34.060. Rather, the statute refers to:
*285estimated . . . costs, plans and specifications ... to be incorporated . . . and . . . equipment. . . to be acquired . . . together with ... a time schedule for the acquisition and installation or attachment of the facility and the proposed operating procedure for such facility.
RCW 82.34.020. See also RCW 82.34.050-.060, and .100.
The position of the director comports with the purpose of the statute and provides for a harmonious working of it. See Publishers Forest Prods. Co. v. State, 81 Wn.2d 814, 505 P.2d 453 (1973). The position of the trial court and the majority simply misconstrues the statute and does violence to a carefully conceived plan.
I would reverse the trial court and restore the decision of the director.