Court Opinion

ID: 9691959
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 15:33:10.809229+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:29.188193
License: Public Domain

Justice SAYLOR,
concurring and dissenting.
I join the result reached by the majority insofar as it affirms Housman’s convictions, but respectfully dissent from the denial of relief as to the death sentence.
While I agree with Mr. Justice Baer, writing in dissent, that the trial court’s error in failing to sever Appellant’s trial from that of co-defendant Beth Ann Markman was substantially prejudicial when viewed in isolation, in the present matter the Commonwealth’s case against Appellant for first-degree murder was overpowering. Significantly, the prosecution was not premised on circumstantial evidence or identification testimony. Rather, it was undisputed at trial that Housman placed *634the phone call luring the victim to the trailer and that he intentionally strangled her there. His defense was merely that he was frightened into doing this. His purported “fright,” however, amounts to something short of coercion, because at trial he conceded that he was criminally liable for third-degree murder, which subsumes a malicious mental state. Thus, he did not pursue a conventional duress defense. Further, the only evidence that Housman was hit and/or threatened during the episode was exceptionally weak, since it derived solely from his own self-serving statement to police, brought onto the record during the prosecution’s case-in-chief. Indeed, Housman did not testify at trial to create a credibility issue under Commonwealth v. Young, 561 Pa. 34, 87 & n. 16, 748 A.2d 166, 194 & n. 16 (1999) (reargument opinion), as did Markman.
Given the remarkable strength of the Commonwealth’s case for first-degree murder, the absence of any viable defense or testimony creating a credibility issue, and with full appreciation that the prejudice resulting from the trial court’s refusal to sever was substantial, I conclude that such error may be deemed harmless for purposes of preserving Housman’s convictions under the third method of establishing harmless error referenced by both the majority and the dissent. See Majority Opinion, op. at 618 n. 7, 986 A.2d at 835 n. 7; Dissenting Opinion, op. at 645-46, 986 A.2d at 851-52 (Baer, J.).1 However, in light of the significant possibility of spillover prejudice which may have affected the penalty determination, I would vacate Housman’s death verdict and remand for a new sentencing hearing.

. I also agree with the majority that Housman's other guilt-phase claims are meritless.