Court Opinion

ID: 9930672
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-07 16:01:04.926634+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:24:25.708207
License: Public Domain

22-6117
    Marquez-Martinez v. Garland
                                                                                     BIA
                                                                               Gordon, IJ
                                                                     A209 289 049/050/051

                         UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                             FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                  SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.

          At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
    Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
    Square, in the City of New York, on the 7th day of February, two thousand
    twenty-four.

    PRESENT:
                    DENNIS JACOBS,
                    GERARD E. LYNCH,
                    JOSEPH F. BIANCO,
                     Circuit Judges.
    _____________________________________

    ENA MARITZA MARQUEZ-MARTINEZ,
    FRANKLIN JAVIER MEDINA-
    MARQUEZ, DANIEL ALEXANDER
    ROMERO-MARQUEZ,
            Petitioners,

                    v.                                           22-6117
                                                                 NAC
    MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
    STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
               Respondent.
    _____________________________________
FOR PETITIONERS:                      Rosemarie A. Barnett, Law Office of
                                      Rosemarie Barnett, PLLC, Freeport, NY.

FOR RESPONDENT:                       Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant
                                      Attorney General; Shelley R. Goad, Assistant
                                      Director; Julia J. Tyler, Senior Litigation
                                      Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation,
                                      United States Department of Justice,
                                      Washington, DC.

      UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

      Petitioners Ena Maritza Marquez-Martinez and her children, natives and

citizens of El Salvador, seek review of a February 11, 2022, decision of the BIA

affirming an April 30, 2019, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying their

applications for asylum and withholding of removal. 1 In re Ena Maritza Marquez-

Martinez, et al., Nos. A209 289 049/050/051 (B.I.A. Feb. 11, 2022), aff’g Nos. A209 289

049/050/051 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Apr. 30, 2019).             We assume the parties’

familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.

1
 We do not address Petitioners’ claim for relief under the Convention Against Torture
because they do not argue it on appeal. See Debique v. Garland, 58 F.4th 676, 684 (2d Cir.
2023) (“We consider abandoned any claims not adequately presented in an appellant’s
brief, and an appellant’s failure to make legal or factual arguments constitutes
abandonment.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
                                            2
      Under the circumstances, we have reviewed the IJ’s decision as the final

agency determination. See Shunfu Li v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 141, 146 (2d Cir. 2008).

We review the agency’s factual findings for substantial evidence and questions of

law and application of law to fact de novo. See Paloka v. Holder, 762 F.3d 191, 195

(2d Cir. 2014). “[T]he administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any

reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(b)(4)(B).

      Marquez-Martinez alleges that gang members in El Salvador repeatedly

threatened and extorted her, and that she was afraid to attend church as often as

usual after the gang threatened her. Based on these allegations she asserted past

persecution and a fear of future persecution based on four particular social groups:

(1) Salvadorans who are against paying a tax to a quasi-governmental entity; (2)

Salvadorans who are asked to pay compulsory payment levied by the gangs on

the individual’s income and business; (3) Salvadorans unable to pay for protection

from the gangs; and (4) Christian Salvadoran women unable to attend church.

      An applicant for asylum and withholding of removal has the burden to

demonstrate past persecution or a well-founded fear (asylum) or likelihood

(withholding) of future persecution, and that a protected ground was “one central

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reason” for the harm. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); see also id. § 1231(b)(3)(A);

Quituizaca v. Garland, 52 F.4th 103, 113–14 (2d Cir. 2022) (applying “one central

reason standard” to withholding of removal). In addition, where, as here, the

alleged and feared harm is from private actors, the applicant also has the burden

to establish that “the government is unable or unwilling to control” the alleged

persecutors. Singh v. Garland, 11 F.4th 106, 114 (2d Cir. 2021) (internal quotation

marks omitted); see also Scarlett v. Barr, 957 F.3d 316, 331 (2d Cir. 2020) (“An

applicant seeking to establish persecution based on the violent conduct of a private

actor . . . must show that the government [1] condoned the private actions or [2] at

least demonstrated a complete helplessness to protect the victims.” (internal

quotation marks and brackets omitted)).

      In addition to denying relief for failure to establish a nexus to a protected

ground, the IJ made an alternative, dispositive finding that Marquez-Martinez had

no evidence that the Salvadoran authorities would be unwilling or unable to

protect her. Even assuming Marquez-Martinez’s cursory recognition of this issue

on appeal does not constitute abandonment, see Debique v. Garland, 58 F.4th 676,

684 (2d Cir. 2023), she does not sufficiently establish with evidence that the

Salvadoran authorities would be unwilling or unable to protect her. Accordingly,

                                         4
we deny the petition. Moreover, as discussed below, even absent this dispositive

finding, we find no error in the IJ’s conclusion that Marquez-Martinez failed to

establish that she faces persecution on account of a protected ground.

      To constitute a particular social group, a group must be “(1) composed of

members who share a common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with

particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the society in question.” Paloka, 762

F.3d at 196 (quoting Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 (B.I.A. 2014)). A

social group lacks the required particularity where it is made up of “a potentially

large and diffuse segment of society.” Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 585

(B.I.A. 2008); see also Paloka, 762 F.3d at 196. A proposed social group fails the

social distinction test if the evidence does not demonstrate that the group would

be perceived as a group by society. Paloka, 762 F.3d at 196. There must also

be some evidence that the persecutors were motivated to harm the applicant

because of the applicant’s membership in the group. Id. at 196–97 (“Whether the

requisite nexus exists depends on the views and motives of the persecutor.”

(internal quotation marks omitted)); see also INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483

(1992) (requiring “some evidence” of motive, “direct or circumstantial”). There

may be “more than one motive for mistreatment, as long as at least one central

                                          5
reason for the mistreatment is on account of a protected ground.” Acharya v.

Holder, 761 F.3d 289, 297 (2d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).

      Marquez-Martinez’s proposed social groups—Salvadorans against paying

a tax to a quasi-governmental entity, who are asked to make compulsory

payments to gangs from the individual’s income and business, and who are unable

to pay for protection from the gangs—relate to wealth and refusal or inability to

pay the gang. The agency reasonably concluded that Marquez-Martinez failed to

establish how these groups satisfied the particularity and social distinction

requirements as she did not show that the groups were defined by more than the

harm suffered. See Paloka, 762 F.3d at 198 (distinguishing “between individuals

threatened by state-sponsored or state-condoned criminality on account of their

membership in a particular social group and individuals threatened only because

they live in a country with pervasive criminality” and reiterating that “a particular

social group is not cognizable merely because members have been subjected to

harm” (internal quotation marks omitted)). People who resist gang recruitment

efforts or extortion demands in El Salvador generally “are not in a substantially

different situation from anyone else in that country who has crossed the gang, or

who is perceived to be a threat to the gang’s interests.”       Quintanilla-Mejia v.

                                         6
Garland, 3 F.4th 569, 589 (2d Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks and brackets

omitted).   Indeed, “[w]hen the harm visited upon members of a group is

attributable to the incentives presented to ordinary criminals rather than to

persecution, the scales are tipped away from considering those people a ‘particular

social group’ within the meaning of the [Immigration and Nationality Act].”

Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 2007). While Marquez-Martinez

argues that her small business made her visible in the community, “the basis of

the group is still premised on wealth, or the perception of wealth, rather than a

particularized social status.” Lopez-Mendoza v. Holder, 564 F. App’x 635, 636 (2d

Cir. 2014) (summary order).

      To the extent Marquez-Martinez argues that the IJ failed to consider whether

she was persecuted due to an imputed political opinion for refusing to pay the

gang, her argument is misplaced. The IJ rejected this argument, reasoning that

Marquez-Martinez failed to establish that the gang members were motivated to

extort her because of an actual or imputed political opinion.           Moreover,

“disapproving of things that have a negative impact on one’s life or even one’s

country does not necessarily amount to a political opinion.” Zelaya-Moreno v.

Wilkinson, 989 F.3d 190, 201 (2d Cir. 2021).

                                          7
      For similar reasons, Marquez-Martinez’s final proposed social group of

Christian Salvadoran women unable to attend church fails the nexus requirement.

She testified only that the extortion made her afraid to attend; she did not identify

facts to support her speculation that the gang targeted her for extortion because

she was a Christian. See Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483. Additionally, Marquez-

Martinez’s country conditions evidence reflects that gang-related violence and

extortion are widespread problems in El Salvador, but that evidence does not

indicate that Christians are targeted more frequently than others or because of

their religion.

      For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending

motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

                                       FOR THE COURT:
                                       Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
                                       Clerk of Court

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