Court Opinion

ID: 9377749
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-08 17:06:56.179846+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:16.139003
License: Public Domain

J-S01032-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    IN THE INTEREST OF: E.W., A                :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    MINOR                                      :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
    APPEAL OF: LAWERENCE COUNTY                :
    CHILD AND YOUTH SERVICES                   :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 950 WDA 2022

                 Appeal from the Order Entered July 18, 2022
       In the Court of Common Pleas of Lawrence County Civil Division at
                             No(s): 20 of 2020,
                                 2021-20040

    IN THE INTEREST OF: E.J.W., A              :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    MINOR                                      :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
    APPEAL OF: LAWRENCE COUNTY                 :
    CYS                                        :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 1084 WDA 2022

                  Appeal from the Order Entered July 18, 2022
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Lawrence County Orphans' Court at
                           No(s): 20040 of 21 O.C.-A

BEFORE:      BENDER, P.J.E., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.:                                FILED: MARCH 8, 2023

        Lawrence County Children and Youth Services (“LCCYS”) appeals from

the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lawrence County Orphans’ Court

(“orphans’ court”), which denied LCCYS’s petition for a goal change to

____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S01032-23

adoption and the termination of the parental rights of W.W. (“Mother”) to her

son, E.W. (“Child”), born in November 2017.1 After careful review, we affirm.

        The record shows that LCCYS’s supervision commenced with an initial

report regarding Child’s older sibling’s behavior, on January 30, 2020, when

Mother, Child, and Child’s older sibling were residing at a LCCYS crisis shelter

due to homelessness; the family was asked to leave the shelter due to the

older sibling’s behavior, which included assaulting Mother, self-harming,

running away, and marijuana and cocaine use.             LCCYS Shelter Care

Application, 2/27/20. According to the allegations contained in the shelter

care application, Mother signed a voluntary entrustment agreement for Child’s

older sibling, who was placed in a group home, and Mother and Child moved

into a friend’s home in Beaver County. Id.

        On February 19, 2020, Beaver County Child and Youth Services

(“BCCYS”) received a call from the Beaver County Police stating that Child had

been found wandering around alone outside the Beaver County residence

where Mother was staying with Child. Id. Mother admitted to a caseworker

____________________________________________

1 The orphans’ court also terminated the parental rights of Child’s unknown
natural father. See Order, 7/18/22. Initially, Mother could not identify Child’s
natural father, LCCYS filed a petition to give notice to the unknown father by
publication and service was properly made. However, Mother named M.M. as
possible father for the first time at a December 9, 2021 hearing, and the
orphans’ court ordered DNA paternity testing. As of the termination of
parental rights hearing, held on February 25, 2022, the test results were not
yet available. Following the testimony and presentation of evidence, the
orphans’ court recessed, to determine whether or not M.M. was in fact the
natural father of Child prior to rendering its decision. The DNA paternity tests
showed a zero percent probability that M.M. is the natural father of Child. Id.

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that she had relapsed on crack cocaine, and was awaiting admission to rehab

at the House of Healing in Erie, but there was not an opening until mid-March.

Id.   According to a LCCYS court summary prepared for the adjudicatory

hearing held March 9, 2020, on the date Child was found wandering outside,

a BCCYS supervisor contacted LCCYS supervisor Amber Pieri regarding Child,

and reported to her that after Child was found, and transported to the Beaver

County police station; Mother picked up Child there and the BCCYS caseworker

followed Mother back to the home where she was staying to ensure its safety.

LCCYS Court Summary, 3/3/20. The BCCYS caseworker found the home to

be safe, but the owner told her that Mother could remain there for only two

more days. Id.

      On February 24, 2020, an LCCYS caseworker contacted Mother

regarding Child’s older sibling and they discussed Mother’s desire that the

older child remain in the group home; Mother informed the LCCYS caseworker

that she intended to go to rehab and that she was still homeless. Id. On

February 26, 2020, a LCCYS caseworker met the Beaver County police at the

address where Mother was staying in Beaver Falls and found Mother standing

outside holding Child, who wore only a diaper; the caseworker explained that

Child would be removed and Mother “got the child dressed and did not show

any emotion,” and “did not ask where the foster home was located.”        Id.

Mother told the LCCYS caseworker that she was trying to find housing and

needed help. Id. Child was placed in a LCCYS foster home located in New

Castle, Lawrence County and remained there until April, when Child was

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transferred, with Mother’s consent, to a different foster home, also in

Lawrence County, where he has remained. Id.; Emergency Motion to Modify

Placement, 4/24/20. On the day after Child was removed from Mother’s care,

Mother tested positive for cocaine and marijuana; the summary indicates that

Mother has had previous children and youth services involvement in Beaver,

Crawford, Erie, and Venango Counties. LCCYS Court Summary, 3/3/20.

      The May 21, 2020 disposition order finding Child dependent indicates

that the LCCYS has made reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need

for removal of Child from the home. Disposition Order, 5/21/20.        A court

summary prepared by a LCCYS caseworker for the dependency hearing notes

frequent contact with Child’s maternal grandmother, who cannot keep Child

full-time, but who wishes to give Child’s foster family a break by taking Child

every other weekend, and notes that these visits were approved and began

on May 16, 2020. LCCYS Court Summary, 5/21/20. That summary further

notes that Mother completed inpatient drug and alcohol therapy at Alpine

Springs, in Crawford County, is currently residing in a three-quarter house in

Pittsburgh, and is enrolled in intensive outpatient drug and alcohol treatment

at Greenbriar Treatment Center, located in Pittsburgh. Id. In addition, the

summary states that Mother is also receiving mental health treatment at

Bloomfield-Garfield, in Pittsburgh. Id.

      The court summary prepared by LCCYS for the August 27, 2020

permanency review indicates that LCCYS spoke to Mother and staff at her

recovery house and it was reported that she left the house on July 31, 2020

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and had not returned, and did not wish to return. LCCYS Court Summary,

8/7/2020.      The summary states that on August 4, 2020, the LCCYS

caseworker received a letter from the Greenbriar Treatment Center stating

that Mother had not been attending the program, and that as of August 6,

2020, Mother was in between three-quarter houses, and staying with friends.

Id. The August 27, 2020 permanency review order indicates Mother’s minimal

compliance with the permanency plan and no progression in services.2

Permanency Review Order, 8/27/20. The order further indicates that LCCYS

has made reasonable efforts to finalize Child’s permanency plan, and “is

properly supervising this family,” and that the permanency plan developed for

Child is appropriate and feasible. Id.

       Permanency review orders issued following video conference hearings

held on February 22, 2021 and August 9, 2021 each indicate that LCCYS has

made reasonable efforts to finalize Child’s permanency plan and is properly

supervising the family. Permanency Review Orders, 2/22/21, 8/9/21.

       On September 23, 2021, LCCYS filed a petition to change the

permanency goal from reunification to adoption and to terminate Mother’s

parental rights to Child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(5), (8) and (b). A

____________________________________________

2 Mother’s family service plan/permanency plan objectives were as follows:
maintain positive and regular visitation with Child; demonstrate emotional and
personal stability; complete a psychological evaluation and follow any
recommendations; address drug and alcohol issues; provide clean drug tests;
follow recommendations regarding drug and alcohol treatment; secure and
maintain adequate housing; cooperate with LCCYS and all service providers;
and improve parenting skills. LCCYS Court Summary, 8/7/20.

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video conference hearing was held on February 7, 2022, and the permanency

review order issued following that hearing indicates that LCCYS has made

reasonable efforts to finalize Child’s permanency plan and is seeking

permanency for Child through adoption. Permanency Review Order, 2/7/22.

       The involuntary termination and goal change hearing was held on

February 25, 2022. At the hearing, the orphans’ court heard the testimony of

Mother and seven witnesses for LCCYS. Mother, who was incarcerated in the

Beaver County jail, participated remotely.3 Present at the hearing were both

legal counsel for Child and Child’s guardian ad litem, as well as counsel for

Mother, the unknown father, and LCCYS. Following the hearing, on February

28, 2022, the orphans’ court issued an order stating that it would schedule a

hearing for additional testimony if M.M., the possible father named by Mother,

was determined to be Child’s natural father, and if the paternity tests proved

him not to be the father, it would make its ruling regarding Mother and the

unknown father. Order, 2/28/22.

       Following receipt of the paternity test results, the orphans’ court issued

its July 18, 2022 order, finding, inter alia, that:

       “[t]he conditions which led to the removal and placement of
       [Child] (with the exception that [Mother] now claims to have a
       lease on an apartment in the Pittsburgh area) still remain and
       have not been resolved or cured by [Mother]. Unfortunately, the
____________________________________________

3 Although there was testimony that Mother was convicted of a DUI in August
or October of 2021, N.T., 2/25/22, at 20, the orphans’ court noted in its
opinion that “no evidence was presented to the [c]ourt as to why Mother was
[incarcerated at the time of the termination hearing] or as to how long she
would remain incarcerated.” Orphans’ Court 1925(a) Opinion at 6.

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      location of the services chosen by [LCCYS] to aid [Mother] in
      obtaining reunification with [Child] were located approximately
      fifty miles from [Mother’s] home. With regard to [Mother’s]
      missing one-half of the scheduled visits with [Child], it appears
      that the missed visits were a result of [Mother’s] lack of adequate
      transportation.

Orphans’ Court Order, 7/18/22 (“7/18/22 Order”), Findings of Fact, #25. The

orphans’ court concluded that:

      [Child] has been removed from the care of [Mother] for a period
      well in excess of six months (nineteen months) and the conditions
      which led to the removal and placement of [Child] continue to
      exist. The efforts of [LCCYS] to provide programs and counseling
      to assist Mother in remedying her parental defects would have
      been adequate if [Mother] was residing in the Lawrence County,
      Pennsylvania area. However, because [Mother] is residing in
      Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania (Allegheny County) and did not have
      adequate transportation to the services as arranged, the services
      to aid in reunification were inadequate. [Mother] needed programs
      and services closer to her home. Because such services were not
      provided, this Court is not convinced at this point in time that
      [Mother] cannot and will not remedy the conditions that led to the
      removal of [Child]. [Mother] has not made progress sufficient to
      allow the return of [Child] to [Mother] and this [c]ourt will consider
      at a later date whether or not [Mother] will be able to remedy the
      conditions within a reasonable time once adequate services to aid
      [Mother] in parenting and reconciliation have been provided to
      [Mother].

Id., Conclusions of Law, #27. The orphans’ court further concluded that due

to the fact that LCCYS had not provided the programs and services that Mother

needed, it was unable to determine to a clear and convincing standard that

terminating Mother’s parental rights to Child was in Child’s best interests. Id.,

Conclusions of Law, #28.

      LCCYS filed a timely notice of appeal on August 17, 2022. Before this

Court, LCCYS presents the following questions:

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      1. Whether the lower court committed an error of law when it
         found that [LCCYS] failed to make reasonable efforts, and as a
         result could not find clear and convincing evidence that
         [LCCYS] had proved grounds for termination and for a change
         of goal?

      2. Whether the lower court committed an abuse of discretion
         when it found that [LCCYS] failed to make reasonable efforts
         toward reunification, and as a result could not find clear and
         convincing evidence that [LCCYS] had proven grounds for
         termination and for a change of goal?

LCCYS’s Brief at 6.

      We apply the following standard of review in this appeal:

      The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
      requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
      credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
      by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
      courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
      or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse
      of   discretion    only    upon    determination      of    manifest
      unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
      court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
      the record would support a different result. We have previously
      emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand
      observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.

In the Interest of J.R.R., 229 A.3d 8, 11 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation

omitted).

      Here, the burden is upon LCCYS, as petitioner, to prove by clear and

convincing evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of

parental rights are valid. In the Interest of L.W., 267 A.3d 517, 522 (Pa.

Super. 2021).    The clear and convincing evidence standard is defined as

“testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the

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trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of

the precise facts in issue.” Id. (citation omitted).

         Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the

Adoption Act.        “Subsection (a) provides eleven enumerated grounds

describing particular conduct of a parent which would warrant involuntary

termination[.]” In re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 359 (Pa. 2021); see

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1)-(11). If the orphans’ court determines the petitioner

established grounds for termination under subsection 2511(a) by clear and

convincing evidence, the court must then assess the petition under subsection

(b), which focuses on the child’s needs and welfare.4 In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d

251, 267 (Pa. 2013).

        In its petition, LCCYS included as grounds for termination subsections

(a)(5) and (a)(8), which provide as follows:

____________________________________________

4   Section 2511(b) states:

        (b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights
        of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
        physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
        of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
        environmental facts such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
        income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
        control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
        to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
        efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
        which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
        filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b).

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       (a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
       be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
       grounds:
                                    ---

         (5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent
         by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency
         for a period of six months, the conditions which led to the
         removal or placement of the child continue to exist, the
         parent cannot or will not remedy those conditions within a
         reasonable period of time, the services or assistance
         reasonably available to the parent are not likely to remedy
         the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the
         child within a reasonable period of time and termination of
         the parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of
         the child.
                                      ---
         (8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent
         by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency,
         12 months or more have elapsed from the date of removal or
         placement, the conditions which led to the removal or
         placement of the child continue to exist and termination of
         parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the
         child.
                                      ---

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(5), (8); See Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights

of the Natural Parents, 9/23/21.

       Before this Court, LCCYS avers that the orphans’ court erred as a matter

of law when it based its denial of the petition on the determination that the

agency failed to make reasonable efforts.5 LCCYS’s Brief at 36. LCCYS argues

that of the two grounds for termination named in its petition, only one,
____________________________________________

5 In a Pennsylvania Supreme Court case relevant to this appeal, the Court
acknowledged that we employ a de novo standard of review when faced with
questions of law, “such as in this case, regarding whether an agency must
provide reasonable services to a parent before a court may grant a petition
seeking termination of parental rights.” In re D.C.D. 105 A.3d 662, 671 (Pa.
2014).

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subsection 2511(a)(5), requires consideration of reasonable services available

to the parent. LCCYS cites the decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in

In re D.C.D., 105 A.3d 662, 673 (Pa. 2014), wherein the Court recognized,

inter alia, that the legislature has considered the reasonable services available

to the parent in regard to subsection 2511(a)(5) (providing for consideration

of whether “the services or assistance reasonable available to the parent are

not likely to remedy the conditions which led to the removal or placement of

the child within a reasonable period of time”) but where such language is not

present, as in, e.g., subsection 2511(a)(2), it would be improper to add such

an element by judicial fiat.6 Id. LCCYS asserts that it established, by clear
____________________________________________

6 In In re D.C.D., the Supreme Court found that our Court erred in reversing
the trial court’s termination of a father’s parental rights under subsection
2511(a)(2) as a result of the agency’s failure to provide reasonable efforts to
enable father, who was incarcerated and serving a 7 ¾ to 16-year sentence,
to reunify with the child. Our Supreme Court concluded that the agency’s
“reasonable efforts” were not elements of the statutory grounds to terminate
parental rights pursuant to § 2511(a)(2), reasoning:

       Neither subsection (a) or (b) requires a court to consider the
       reasonable efforts provided to a parent prior to termination of
       parental rights. Nevertheless, this Court has observed that the
       provision or absence of reasonable efforts may be relevant to a
       court’s consideration of both the grounds for termination and the
       best interests of the child.      For example, as applicable to
       subsection (a)(2), a court may find an agency’s lack of assistance
       to a parent relevant to whether a parent’s incapacity “cannot or
       will not be remedied by the parent.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2).
       Indeed, we agree with Father that, at least in a situation involving
       a strong bond between parent and child prior to incarceration and
       a short term of incarceration, that a child welfare agency cannot
       refuse reasonable efforts to an incarcerated parent and then point
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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and convincing evidence, the grounds for termination of parental rights under

subsection 2511(a)(8) and the orphans’ court erred in denying its termination

petition under that subsection.          LCCYS further contends that even if the

reasonable efforts it has made are relevant, a review of both the testimony

and the dependency record support the finding that reasonable efforts were

in fact made. LCCYS’s Brief at 42.

       Initially, we note that the orphans’ court did not name the specific

subsection of Section 2511 it considered with regard to the termination of

Mother’s parental rights in either its 7/18/22 Order, which contains detailed

findings of fact and conclusions of law, or in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion
____________________________________________

       to the resulting erosion in the parental bond created by the agency
       as justification of parental rights. The fact that such a scenario
       can be articulated, however, does not transform the provision of
       reasonable efforts to reunite parents and children into a
       requirement for termination. Nothing in the law goes so far, and
       the Superior Court erred in so holding.

       Further, while we acknowledge that other states have included
       reasonable efforts as either an element or merely a factor in their
       termination provisions, the Pennsylvania legislature has not
       incorporated reasonable efforts into the language of 23 Pa.C.S. §
       2511(a)(2), and it would be improper and, indeed, unwise for this
       Court to add such an element to the statute by judicial fiat.

       In contrast, we recognize that the legislature included
       consideration of the reasonable services available to the parent in
       regard to another ground for termination, subsection 2511(a)(5)
       (providing for consideration of whether “the services or assistance
       reasonably available to the parent are not likely to remedy the
       conditions which led to the removal or replacement of the child
       within a reasonable period of time”).

105 A.3d at 672-73.

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issued on September 30, 2022. Indeed, the orphans’ court only mentions

Section 2511 once in its order, in a section relating to the parental rights of

the unknown father. See 7/18/22 Order at 7. However, we can glean the

orphans’ court’s reasoning with respect to subsections 2511(a)(5) and (a)(8)

from the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law.

      We first address the orphans’ court’s determination that LCCYS did not

meet its burden in proving that Mother’s parental rights should be terminated

under subsection 2511(a)(5).        To satisfy the requirements of Section

2511(a)(5), the moving party must produce clear and convincing evidence

regarding the following elements: (1) the child has been removed from

parental care for at least six months; (2) the conditions which led to the child’s

removal or placement continue to exist; (3) the parent cannot and will not

remedy the conditions which led to removal or placement within a reasonable

period of time; (4) the services reasonably available to the parent are unlikely

to remedy the conditions which led to removal or placement within a

reasonable period of time; and (5) the termination of parental rights would

best serve the needs and welfare of the child. 23 Pa.C.S, § 2511(a)(5); In

re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1273-74 (Pa. Super. 2003).

      Essentially, the orphans’ court concluded that, notwithstanding its

findings that Child has been removed from Mother’s care for nineteen months

and the conditions which led to Child’s removal continue to exist (the first two

conditions set forth in subsection (a)(5)), it could not reach a determination

as to whether Mother cannot and will not remedy the conditions which led to

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the removal of Child (the third element set forth in subsection (a)(5)) since

the court found that the services offered by LCCYS were inadequate. Further,

the order clearly states that the orphans’ court cannot “determine to a clear

and convincing standard that terminating Mother’s parental rights to the minor

child is in the best interest of the child,” the language of the final element set

forth in subsection (a)(5). 7/18/22 Order at 6.

      Here, LCCYS acknowledges that the provision of reasonable efforts may

be relevant to the orphans’ court’s consideration under subsection 2511(a)(5),

see In re D.C.D., supra, but argues that the services it offered were more

than reasonable.

      Mother testified that she attempted intensive outpatient mental health

treatment twice at the Greenbriar, a Pittsburgh treatment facility, but was

unable to complete the program, once after she lost her housing at a three-

quarter house in Pittsburgh and missed too many appointments, and on the

second attempt when she ran out of funds and had to leave Pittsburgh. N.T.,

2/25/22 (“N.T.”), at 25-26. When Mother was questioned regarding that fact

that she missed approximately half the scheduled visits with Child at LCCYS’s

visitation house she did not dispute the numbers, but added that those

visitations did not include the times that she had visited Child while he was

spending alternate weekends at the home of her mother, Child’s grandmother,

in Venango County. Id. at 30. Mother attributed her unsatisfactory visitation

record to the fact that Child had been placed at facilities in Lawrence County,

she didn’t have transportation, and “it was very hard for [her] to get anywhere

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if there was not a bus line.” Id. at 17. She stated that she had failed to

“follow through” with parenting skills classes through her own fault, and had

left the family reunification program when her funds ran out and she had to

leave Pittsburgh. Id. at 21-23. Mother indicated that while she had never

completed mental health treatment, she was attempting to do that now, while

incarcerated at Beaver County jail, and stated she was wait-listed for

parenting classes and was receiving mental health treatment there. Id. at

21-22.

     LCCYS former caseworker Molli Mucha testified that she was assigned

Mother’s case in the summer of 2020 and worked with her until she left the

agency in May 2021. N.T. at 35-36. Ms. Mucha began working with Mother

immediately following her discharge from the Pittsburgh intensive outpatient

treatment facility, and testified that Mother subsequently also began

treatment, but was then discharged from A.B.C. treatment, in Beaver County.

Id. at 38. She recalled that Mother had issues with regard to insurance, and

stated that she was frequently waiting for insurance cards to come in so that

she could receive mental health treatment. Id. at 39; see also N.T. at 112

(indicating that Mother received insurance through Venango County).

     Ms. Mucha also referred Mother to family reunification at the Child

Advocacy Center (“CAC”) in Lawrence County, where she failed to successfully

complete the program. Id. at 40. She stated that it was on ongoing issue

with Mother to try to figure out where she was staying, and that she did her

best to set up treatments for Mother wherever she was.      Id. at 41. With

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regard to Mother’s inconsistent visits with Child at the visitation house, Ms.

Mucha stated that at the time she began to work with Mother, Mother was

living in Pittsburgh, so there were transportation issues with regard to those

visits. Id. at 44, 59. The caseworker testified that she believed that Mother’s

frequent moves were attributable to her obtaining new jobs, and Mother’s

desire to live closer to the places where she found employment. Id. at 62.

      Ms. Tanya Montgomery, an employee of Cray Youth and Family Services

who supervised Mother’s visits with Child, testified that of twenty of Mother’s

missed visits, eight were not confirmed by Mother twenty-four hours in

advance as required; she was late or did not arrive at all four times; she was

ill on two occasions; she had a court hearing or was in jail on two occasions;

Child’s grandmother contacted the foster mother to inform her that Mother

would not be visiting one time; and she did not have transportation or the

Uber driver did not show up on three occasions. Id. at 67.

      Katherine Kerr, a LCCYS caseworker, assumed responsibility for

Mother’s case after Ms. Mucha left the agency. She testified that although

Mother seemed to be open to services at their first meeting, which was

conducted in Beaver County, it was difficult to get in touch with her, and she

rarely received a response from the frequent texts and follow-ups she sent.

Id. at 109-110. Ms. Kerr testified that when she first met Mother in 2021,

Mother told her that she had not completed any mental health treatment, did

not have a drug and alcohol assessment, and had not completed any parenting

classes at that time. Id. at 116. Ms. Kerr stated that she reviewed every

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contact in LCCYS’s database prior to the hearing, and “between the halfway

houses, the three-quarter houses and the addresses [LCCYS] received, [she]

counted 19 moves, and that is not including any time in jail.” Id. at 110.

      Kristen Clark, a family reunification counselor at CAC in Lawrence

County, testified that she was referred Mother’s case in July 2020; in order to

accommodate Mother, who was living in Beaver County, they made plans to

meet at Cray House, following Mother’s weekly visitation with Child, to

complete the intake process for the parenting services there, thus relieving

Mother of the need to travel to Lawrence County an additional time. Id. at 86-

87.   Mother could not remain after the visit for the reunification counseling

session, and a meeting was scheduled for the following week; however, Ms.

Clark did not hear from Mother throughout August and until September 21,

2020, when they met again and Mother explained that she had moved to

Beaver Falls, to another three-quarter house. Id. at 87. Mother was unable

to meet at Cray House with Ms. Clark for another parenting class beginning in

October, so Ms. Clark arranged for Mother to telephone in for counseling

sessions, but Mother had bad phone reception and could not participate in that

manner. Id. at 88. Ms. Clark last spoke with Mother in late October, but

Mother missed two more classes; she then sent a letter to Mother indicating

she had missed seventeen appointments, but the letter was returned due to

a bad address, and Mother’s case was closed out by the agency in November

2020. Id. at 88-89. Ms. Clark stated that after her letter to Mother was

returned, she contacted Ms. Mucha, the LCCYS caseworker, who informed her

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that Mother did not have a permanent address with LCCYS at that time. Id.

at 91. Ms. Clark acknowledged that if Mother had been living in Lawrence

County, she could have offered Mother bus passes or even possibly an agency

vehicle for transportation. Id. at 90.

      In late August 2021, Akilah Daniels, a family support specialist with

Lawrence County Community Action Partnership, an entity that provides

parenting classes to parents in jeopardy of losing their parental rights, was

referred to Mother. Id. at 94-45. She testified as to her repeated attempts

to contact Mother by phone calls, voicemails and follow-up texts throughout

September 2021, including one call wherein Mother answered the phone but

when Ms. Daniels identified her name and affiliation, Mother made no further

response.   Id. at 95-97.   Mother’s case with the partnership was formally

closed on September 30, 2022. Id. at 98.

      We observe that the record supports a conclusion that LCCYS attempted

throughout the case to accommodate Mother in myriad ways despite her

constant address changes, many of which were unknown to LCCYS through

no fault of its own, and did, in several instances, offer services to Mother in

both Allegheny and Beaver Counties. Moreover, we are disturbed by the fact,

as evidenced in the dependency record, that the orphans’ court conducted

regular permanency hearings at which it might have redirected the efforts at

reunification had it deemed it advisable, and did not do so, instead finding

consistently that LCCYS was properly supervising Mother and that its efforts

toward the goal of reunification were reasonable.      However, we are ever

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mindful that the abuse of discretion standard in termination cases is highly

deferential, and we must affirm the orphans’ court’s decision even where

evidence exists that would support a contrary determination. In re P.Z., 113

A.3d 840, 849 (Pa. Super. 2015). This Court may not search the record for

contrary conclusions or substitute its judgments for that of the orphans’ court.

Interest of S.K.L.R., 265 A.3d 1108, 1124 (Pa. 2021). The record here in

fact clearly shows that the bulk of the services offered to Mother were in

Lawrence County locations not easily accessible to where she was residing.

Accordingly, we will not disturb the orphans’ court’s determination, viewed

under subsection 2511(a)(5), that LCCYS failed to provide clear and

convincing evidence sufficient to warrant the termination of Mother’s parental

rights.

      We move then to a consideration of LCCYS’s other argument, that the

evidence it presented under subsection 2511(a)(8) clearly and convincingly

demonstrated the requisite grounds for termination of Mother’s parental

rights. To terminate parental rights under Section 2511(a)(8), the petitioner

must prove: (1) the child has been removed from parental care for 12 months

or more from the date of the removal; (2) the conditions which led to the

removal or placement of the child continue to exist; and (3) termination of

parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child. In re

K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 759 (Pa. Super. 2008). With respect to any petition

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(8), “the court shall not consider any efforts

by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which are first

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initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.” 23

Pa.C.S. § 2511(b).         Termination under subsection 2511(a)(8) does not

required the court to evaluate a parent’s current willingness or ability to

remedy the conditions that initially caused the placement, or the availability

or efficacy of the services provided by the local children and youth agency.

K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 759.        Here, the orphans’ court properly found that Child

had been removed from Mother’s care for more than 12 months and that the

conditions that led to Child’s removal still existed.7       The orphans’ court,

concluded, however, that LCCYS failed to present clear and convincing

evidence that termination was in Child’s best interests, the third element

necessary in an analysis under subsection 2511(a)(8).

       In its order, the orphans’ court noted that LCCYS’s petition does not

make any allegation that Mother abandoned Child, and that all of the visits

with Child that Mother attended at the visitation house went well. Id. at 3, 5.

The orphans’ court further concluded that during the nineteen months that

Child has been in LCCYS’s custody and placed in a foster home, “[M]other has

maintained a relationship and bond with [Child].” Id. at 5. The orphans’ court

noted that Mother had completed her drug program at the Alpine Spring rehab

facility and started, but failed to finish, other programs that were suggested

in the New Castle, Lawrence County area. Id. at 6. The orphans’ court stated:
____________________________________________

7 In its 7/18/22 Order, the orphans’ court acknowledged Mother’s testimony
that she now has a lease for an apartment, which she acquired in December,
2021, a date after the filing of the petition to terminate her parental rights.
7/18/22 Order at 3.

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      During the time that [Child] has been in the custody of LCCYS,
      [Mother] has maintained contact with [Child] and by all accounts,
      including the testimony of the LCCYS caseworker who handled the
      case from its initiation until May 2021, [Mother] and Child have a
      strong bond. According to this witness, [Child] was always excited
      to see [Mother] when she came for a visit and the visits were
      always appropriate. At all times, during this case, [Mother] lived
      in the Pittsburgh and Beaver County areas and had transportation
      problems that were well known to LCCYS. [Mother] made it to 19
      of the 36 scheduled visits (2 other visits were cancelled by the
      foster parents) and made it known to the caseworker that she was
      having difficulty finding transportation from the Pittsburgh/Beaver
      County area to the Lawrence County visitation house. Also, during
      the time that [Child] has been in custody, [Mother] had made
      arrangements with the foster parents to have video conference
      visits with [Child], which occurred on average two or three times
      each week and often included video meeting with [Child] every
      day of the week, and sometimes several times in a day. By all
      accounts, the video conferences went well.

Id. at 4-5. Mother testified, in response to a question about her relationship

with Child:

      I’m his mother. You got to teach at child at – at their level. I am
      not his friend, I’m his mother. So when he doesn’t do something
      he’s [ ] supposed to do, I do – I’m stern and I tell him, [ ], you
      cannot do that; you were told twice, now you have to go to time
      out. I am – my father was very strict and beat me a lot, and I
      had a mother that protected me, so I know the difference in the
      boundaries of friend, teacher, parent. I love him and I’m going to
      protect him and sometimes that means protecting him from
      myself. You know, that’s why I wanted to go to rehab… I’m not a
      friend, I’m his mom. So I teach him in a fun-loving stage for a 4-
      year-old, and I don’t think anything of how I taught him or how I
      was with him is any different from how my mom interacts with
      him.

N.T. at 32-33.

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      The orphans’ court noted the testimony of Larry Puntureri, Esq., Child’s

guardian ad litem (“GAL”), who did not file a brief in this appeal, but who

participated at the termination hearing and expressed his views on the record

at its conclusion.   See N.T. at 129-132.      Child’s GAL acknowledged that

Mother’s mental health is of concern, but noted that she is presently receiving

treatment while incarcerated and emphasized her testimony that she has been

clean and sober for over a year. Id. at 130. He pointed out that Mother has

maintained constant contact with Child throughout the case and that she has

been unable to take full advantage of the services offered by LCCYS because

she has not resided in Lawrence County. Id. at 132. Child’s GAL concluded

that it would not be in Child’s best interest to terminate Mother’s parental

rights. Id.

      Child’s legal counsel, Eugene Tempesta, Esq. stated on the record at the

hearing that his concerns were Mother’s inconsistency and instability, but he

believed that given that “logistics and the geography” may be the reason, he

preferred to err on the side of caution and was not in favor of involuntary

termination.   Id. at 132-33.    Notwithstanding this testimony, Child’s legal

counsel filed a brief in this Court in which he joined in LCCYS’s appellate brief,

asserting that the orphans’ court erred and abused its discretion and that

LCCYS had provided clear and convincing evidence that grounds for

termination of Mother’s parental rights existed and a goal change from

reunification to adoption was appropriate.

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      Upon review of the certified record, the parties’ briefs, the applicable

law, and the orphans’ court’s opinion, we conclude that, consistent with our

Supreme Court’s direction in In re D.C.D., the orphans’ court was free to

consider the services offered to Mother by LCCYS in regard to subsection

2511(a)(5) (providing for consideration of whether Mother “cannot or will not

remedy the conditions which led to removal or placement within a reasonable

period of time”) and was within its discretion in determining that LCCYS failed

to meet its burden under either subsection 2511(a)(5) or 2511(a)(8).

Accordingly, we affirm the orphans’ court’s decision to deny the goal change

to adoption and the petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/8/2023

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