Court Opinion

ID: 9761680
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:50:14.577628+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:25.428075
License: Public Domain

DOUGLAS, Judge
(dissenting).
The majority overrules the State’s motion for rehearing. I dissent. The majority is holding that the trial court’s finding of fact that the prosecutrix was seventeen years of age at the time of the offense without the facts being before us is not subject to review by this Court. The trial court concluded that the relief sought should be denied.
This Court has repeatedly held that a trial court’s findings of facts and conclusions of law in habeas corpus proceedings are not binding on this Court:
“Initially, it should be noted that this court is not bound by the findings of the trial court in a habeas corpus proceeding. . Therefore, this court is required to determine if the record developed supports the trial judge’s recommendation.” Ex parte Young, 479 S.W.2d 45 (Tex.Cr.App.1972).
See also Ex parte Bagley, 509 S.W.2d 332 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); McCuin v. State, 504 S.W.2d 512 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Ex parte Greer, 505 S.W.2d 295 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Ex parte Swinney, 499 S.W.2d 101 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Ex parte Williams, 486 S.W.2d 566 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Ex parte Slaton, 484 S.W.2d 102 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Ex parte Marez, 464 S.W.2d 866 (Tex.Cr.App.1971); Ex parte Young, 418 S.W.2d 824 (Tex.Cr.App.1967); Ex parte Johnson, 153 Tex.Cr.R. 619, 224 S.W.2d 240 (1949); Ex parte Bazemore, 430 S.W.2d 205 (Tex.Cr.App.1968).
Before the original opinion, the holdings were that this Court reviewed findings of fact by examining “evidence” presented at an evidentiary hearing in support of petitioner’s application for habeas corpus. The majority now concludes that the findings of fact need not be supported by evidence if the “fact-finding procedure . . . was adequate . . . for reaching reasonably correct results.”
The majority is apparently holding that “adequate fact-finding procedures” always result in correct findings of fact. Therefore, this Court need not review evidence supporting findings of fact. The error is obvious. Without the facts, we cannot determine if there was an “adequate fact-finding procedure” in the instant case. The majority concludes that the procedure was adequate because (1) the trial judge stated that his findings were based upon “the files and records of this case and upon the pleadings; (2) the State’s failure to dispute the prosecutrix’s age; and (3) the detailed nature of the trial court’s findings of fact.
This Court should review such files and records. Until this decision, allegations in *547pleadings had no probative value. Evidence had to be introduced to prove the factual allegations in motions for new trial, motions for continuances, motions to suppress, motions to quash and other pleadings. See Garza v. State, 502 S.W.2d 155 (Tex.Cr. App.1973); Turner v. State, 486 S.W.2d 797 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Tsamouris v. State, 472 S.W.2d 141 (Tex.Cr.App.1971); Webb v. State, 460 S.W.2d 903 (Tex.Cr.App.1970) and Vaughn v. State, 456 S.W.2d 141 (Tex.Cr.App.1970). The factual allegations in an application for habeas corpus should be afforded no greater probative value than the factual allegations contained in other pleadings.
The fact that the State has not disputed the age of the prosecutrix is not controlling. The State is not required to contest a petitioner’s application for habeas corpus.1 Nor is the age of the prosecutrix exclusively within the knowledge and control of the State.
Finally, the majority concludes that the fact-finding procedure was adequate because the trial court entered “detailed” findings of fact. The detailed findings of fact may suggest that evidence was presented to the trial court on the prosecu-trix’s age, possibly at some unrecorded, extrajudicial proceeding. Such evidence should be subject to review by this Court.
The majority’s holding will encourage trial courts to dispense with evidentiary hearings in habeas corpus proceedings. A trial court may now refuse a request for an evidentiary hearing and enter findings of fact. The evidence supporting such findings is not subject to review by this Court if “the fact-finding procedure was adequate.” Yet, if the trial court conducts an evidentia-ry hearing, his findings of fact will be tested against the record.
The majority’s holding also appears to be in conflict with Parris v. State, 453 S.W.2d 505 (Tex.Cr.App.1970); Morrow v. State, 481 S.W.2d 144 (Tex.Cr.App.1972) and Reed v. State, 481 S.W.2d 814 (Tex.Cr.App.1972). In each of these cases there was no notice of appeal. The appellants did file applications for writ of habeas corpus alleging various errors in their trials and a denial of their right of appeal. The trial courts granted each appellant an out-of-time appeal without an evidentiary hearing. This Court dismissed the out-of-time appeals in each case because the trial court failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing. In Morrow, this Court wrote:
“The record reflects that an evidentia-ry hearing was never held on appellant’s application for writ of habeas corpus.
“Article 11.07, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P., which governs the procedure to be taken in post conviction writs, was construed by this Court in Ex parte Young, Tex.Cr.App., 418 S.W.2d 824, where it was said:
“ ‘If the undisputed facts or the facts resolved by him after hearing warrant such proceedings, the judge of the convicting court may be in position to afford the applicant rights which have been denied him, such as counsel on appeal; record on appeal; effective aid of counsel on appeal; determination of voluntariness of confession; and nunc pro tunc proceedings to supply or correct the record. See Ex parte Brown, Tex.Cr.App. [152 Tex.Cr.R. 3], 210 S.W.2d 597; Ex parte Church, 163 Tex.Cr.R. 357, 292 S.W.2d 120; Ex parte Hannen, 155 Tex. Cr.R. 10 [228 S.W.2d 864], 230 S.W.2d *548236; Ex parte Brian, Tex.Cr.App., 389 S.W.2d 467; Ex parte Mixon, Tex.Cr.App., 396 S.W.2d 417.’
“In Parris v. State, 453 S.W.2d 505, this Court said:
“ ‘The procedure discussed in Ex parte Young, supra, was not designed to authorize a trial judge without a hearing to utilize the office of an out of time appeal to resolve disputed fact issues presented to him by an application for post conviction habeas corpus relief.’
“In the instant case, an evidentiary hearing was not had upon appellant’s application for writ of habeas corpus. No hearing was had upon the question of appellant’s right to an out of time appeal.
“The determination by the trial court that appellant was entitled to an out of time appeal is reviewable by this Court. In the instant case we are unable to review the trial court’s action in granting an out of time appeal, since the basis for the court’s determination is not before us. See Reed v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 481 S.W.2d 814.”
See also McCuin v. State, 504 S.W.2d 512 (Tex.Cr.App.1974).
This cause should be remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine the evidence offered during the trial. There may be facts to show that forcible rape was committed. If so this would amount to conduct punishable under the present penal code. See Rockwood v. State, 524 S.W.2d 292 (Tex.Cr.App.1975), and Ambers v. State, 527 S.W.2d 855 (Tex.Cr.App.1975).
Since the application for habeas corpus does not contain enough facts at the trial, this Court does not have the basis to hold that the allegations if taken as true would entitle him to the relief sought.
If enough of the record to determine that the relief should be granted is not required, then a district judge could bypass Article 11.07, V.A.C.C.P., and could be the final authority to release convicted felons even after an affirmance of a conviction by this Court. Article 11.07 and its predecessor were enacted to prevent district judges from releasing convicted felons from the penitentiary without review by the Court of Criminal Appeals.
The motion for rehearing should be granted and an evidentiary hearing granted to develop the facts before finally passing upon this cause.
MORRISON, J., joins in this dissent.

. Article 11.07, Section 2(b), V.A.C.C.P., provides:
“When a petition for writ of habeas corpus presented to the judge of the convicting court contains sworn allegations of fact, which, if true, would render petitioner’s confinement under the felony conviction illegal, the attorney representing the state in said court and the Attorney General of Texas shall be afforded an opportunity to answer such allegations, and if it appears that there are issues of fact which are material on the question of whether the petitioner is illegally restrained which have not been resolved, the petitioner may be granted a hearing on such issues of fact and the judge conducting such hearing shall make and file his findings of fact and conclusions of law.” (Emphasis supplied)