Court Opinion

ID: 9724882
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:19:02.921548+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:07.507811
License: Public Domain

RATLIFF, Judge,
dissenting, sitting by designation.
I dissent. The contemplated use of the residence in question by The Villages as a group home for abused, abandoned, and neglected children in a simulated family environment constitutes a single-family dwelling within the restrictions of the zoning ordinance. Although the courts of Indiana have not had occasion to deal with this problem, that the proposed use meets the definition of single-family residence is clearly established by decisions from our sister states. Hessling v. City of Broomfield, (1977) 193 Colo. 124, 563 P.2d 12; Hamner v. Best, (1983) Ky.App., 656 S.W.2d 253; Group House of Port Washington v. Board of Zoning, (1978) 45 N.Y.2d 266, 408 N.Y.S.2d 377, 380 N.E.2d 207; City of White Plains v. Ferraioli, (1974) 34 N.Y.2d 300, 357 N.Y.S.2d 449, 313 N.E.2d 756; Saunders v. Clark County Zoning Department, (1981) 66 Ohio St.2d 259, 421 N.E.2d 152. In fact, it has been held that use of a residence for treatment of six or fewer mentally retarded children living with a resident foster parent was not violative of a restrictive covenant restrict ing use to single-family residences. Bellarmine Hills Association v. Residential Systems Co., (1978) 84 Mich.App. 554, 269 N.W.2d 673. In my view, an examination of these cases compels a decision opposite to that reached by the majority.
Hommner is nearly identical factually to this case. There, a non-profit entity desired to use a large older home as a child care facility to house one married couple and from six to eight children. The applicable zoning ordinance restricted use of property within the area to single-family dwellings. Like the ordinance in question, the ordinance in Hamner did not define either "family" or "single family". The children would not be either juvenile offenders or mentally retarded requiring institutional type regulation. They would at tend community schools and no professional counselors would live in the home. The Kentucky Court of Appeals held the proposed use was for a family residence rather than as an institution, saying:
"[The record contains substantial evidence that the residents of the home would function as, and resemble that of, any other single-family household. In fact, the evidence clearly indicates that the entire purpose of the group home is to provide a traditional home environment for the children; ...
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Clearly, the term 'family', as determined by our highest court in the context of land use cases or zoning, may include unrelated individuals and has not been construed to refer only to those related by blood, marriage, or adoption."
656 S.W.2d at 255-56.
In Hessling, the Colorado court upheld the use of a residence as a live-in home for a married couple who would act as surrogate parents and not to exceed six mentally retarded children ranging in age from five to nine, as constituting a family thus meeting the zoning restriction limiting use to one family dwellings, so long as family characteristics were maintained.
Group House of Port Washington involved a non-profit corporation which had purchased a home for use as a group home which would consist of two surrogate par-. ents and seven children. The home was intended as a replacement family for vie tims of unhappy homes and not as a detention center. The zoning ordinance restricted use to one-family residences and defined a family as one or more persons related by blood, marriage or legal adoption residing in a single housekeeping unit and allowed not more than two boarders all living in a common household. The New York Court of Appeals found no zoning violation and stated:
*372"The surrogate family which petitioner hopes to create is in fact a permanent family structure, and not a temporary residence for transients....
Finally, we would emphasize that our decision today is limited to homes such as that described in this opinion, which serve as the functional equivalent of a family, for the exclusion of such groups would in no way further any valid public purpose. Whether a particular 'group home' comes within this description is essentially a factual question. Different factors would exist were petitioner to convert its group house, for example, from the type of operation described above into a home for delinquents or the mentally disturbed, and we express no opinion as to the proper result in such a case. Thus, we conclude only that the 'group home' described in this opinion is a permitted use as a one-family dwelling under the town zoning ordinances. Should the nature of the house change with the passage of time, however, should it become less of a surrogate family and more of an institution, it might then become an unpermitted use. On this record, however, we must conclude that petitioner's 'group home' is indeed a family."
45 N.Y.2d at 273-74, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 381, 380 N.E.2d at 211.
The New York Court of Appeals in Fer-raioli, stated the issue thus:
"'The issue is a narrow one: whether the 'group home', consisting of a married couple and their two children, together with 10 foster children, qualifies as a single 'family' unit, under the ordinance. It is concluded that the group home, set up in theory, size, appearance and structure to resemble a family unit, fits within the definitions of family for purposes of a zoning ordinance."
34 N.Y.2d at 300, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 450-451, 313 N.E.2d at 757.
In Ferraioli, a non-profit corporation licensed by the state to care for neglected and abandoned children had a group home consisting of the persons described in the court's statement of the issue. The couple was paid a salary and all expenses were paid by the corporation. "The children, natural and foster, live[d] together as if they were brothers and sisters and [the couple] were their common parents. The household [was] maintained as a family would be in a single housekeeping unit with kitchen facilities." 34 N.Y.2d at 304, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 451, 313 N.E.2d at 757. The zoning ordinance permitted single family dwellings for one housekeeping unit only. "Family" was defined as "one or more persons limited to the spouse, parents, grandparents, grandchildren, sons, daughters, brothers or sisters of the owner or the tenant or of the owner's spouse or tenant's spouse living together as a single housekeeping unit with kitchen facilities." 34 N.Y.2d at 304, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 451, 313 N.E.2d at 758. The court held the use was within the zoning restriction. The court stated:
"Whether a family be organized along ties of blood or formal adoptions, or be a similarly structured group sponsored by the State, as is the group home, should not be consequential in meeting the test of the zoning ordinance. So long as the group home bears the generic character of a family unit as a relatively permanent household, and is not a framework for transients or transient living, it conforms to the purpose of the ordinance....
In short, an ordinance may restrict a residential zone to occupancy by stable families occupying single-family homes, but neither by express provision nor construction may it limit the definition of family to exclude a household which in every but a biological sense is a single family. The minimal arrangement to meet the test of a zoning ordinance, as this one, is a group headed by a householder caring for a reasonable number of children as one would be likely to find in a biologically unitary family."
34 N.Y.2d at 305-06, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 452-453, 313 N.E.2d at 758-59.
*373A like result was reached in Saunders. There, a minister and his wife and five children lived at a large residence with as many as nine foster children. The home was later incorporated as a non-profit corporation. A few persons were employed to assist in caring for the children. The zoning was for single-family detached residences and the ordinance contained the following relevant definitions:
"4.08: Boarding or Lodging House. A building or part thereof, other than a hotel or restaurant, where meals and/or lodging are provided, for compensation, for five (5) or more persons not transients.
4.171: Dwelling, Single-Family. A building designed for or used exclusively by one family or housekeeping units.
4.174; Dwelling Umit. One room, or a suite of two or more rooms, designed for or used by one family for living and sleeping purposes and having only one (1) kitchen or kitchenette.
4.18: Family. A person living alone, or two or more persons living together as a single housekeeping unit, in a dwelling unit, as distinguished from a group occupying a boarding house, lodging house, motel or hotel, fraternity or sorority house."
66 Ohio St.2d at 262, 421 N.E.2d at 155. The zoning administrator issued a cease and desist order claiming the house was a boarding house. The Ohio Supreme Court found no violation of the ordinance. The court said:
"The definition of 'family' in this resolution is a broad one. In our view, any resolution seeking to define this term narrowly would unconstitutionally intrude upon an individual's right to choose the family living arrangement best suit ed to him and his loved ones. Those loved ones can just as easily be foster children as natural children for parents with compassion. A state or local government cannot constitutionally invade the private realm of family life. A family unit, which performs the social function of child-rearing, regardless of its relationship or composition or whether it includes foster children as well as natural children, is constitutionally protected against governmental intrusion not supported by a compelling governmental interest.
Therefore, ... 'we hold a family based group foster home for delinquent boys, who are unrelated by affinity or consanguinity to the foster parents, is a permitted use in an 'R-1 suburban residence district' where the zoning resolution defines the term 'family' as 'two or. more persons living together as a single family housekeeping unit, in a dwelling unit, where it defines 'dwelling unit' as 'one room or a suite of two or more rooms, designed for or used by one family for living and sleeping purposes and having only one (1) kitchen or kitchenette, and where it defines 'single-family dwelling' as '[a] building designed for or used exclusively by one family or housekeeping unit.'
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We now interpret the term 'family' broadly in order to permit appellees to operate a foster home in an 'R-1 suburban residence district' Such a board definition of 'family' is mandated by the Clark County Zoning Resolution, fundamental principles of zoning law, and immutable constitutional principles guaranteeing the right of every American to live with his family free from official harassment. [Citations omitted; footnote omitted.]"
66 Ohio St.2d at 263-65, 421 N.E.2d at 155-57.
The majority relies on an earlier Ohio case, Carroll v. Washington Township Zoning Commission, (1980) 63 Ohio St.2d 249, 408 N.E.2d 191, a case which is not even mentioned in Saunders. In my view, Carroll is not a sound decision, and I agree with the dissenting opinion of Justice Brown that "[the majority's resolution of this case [Carroll] is supported neither by logic nor by case law from [that] jurisdiction or any other." 63 Ohio St.2d at 253, 408 N.E.2d at 194.
*374The majority attempts to evade the holdings in Saunders and other cases cited herein by attempting to distinguish them "on the basis that the ordinances concerned broadly defined family to encompass unrelated individuals operating as a single-housekeeping unit." At 370. In fact, the ordinances in Saunders, Ferraioli, and Group House of Port Washington contained narrow definitions of family, but the courts, nevertheless, found the homes in question were not violative of the ordinance restricting use to single-family dwellings.
In my opinion, the group home proposed by The Villages meets the test of a single-family residence under the authorities herein cited. I would affirm the judgment.