Court Opinion

ID: 9902767
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 15:23:20.066098+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:58.951226
License: Public Domain

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                STATE OF FLORIDA
                 _____________________________

                       Case No. 5D23-251
                   LT Case No. 00-12377 CFA
                 _____________________________

T’SHUMBIE COLLINS,

    Appellant,

    v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

    Appellee.
                 _____________________________

3.850 appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval
County. Mark Borello, Judge.

T’Shumbie A. Collins, Bowling Green, pro se.

No Appearance for Appellee.

                        September 1, 2023

PER CURIAM.

     Appellant, T’Shumbie Collins, appeals the summary denial
of his successive motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, which alleged newly
discovered evidence. With his motion, Appellant provided an
affidavit from a co-defendant who testified against him at trial.
In the affidavit, the co-defendant recanted his testimony. The
trial court summarily denied Appellant’s motion because “the
recantation testimony is not of such a nature that it would
probably render a different outcome on retrial.” We affirm
because the trial court correctly denied Appellant’s motion but
write to address Appellant’s common, but misplaced, argument
that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing pursuant to the
Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Nordelo v. State, 93 So. 3d
178, 185 (Fla. 2012).

               Application of Davis and Nordelo

    In situations involving alleged newly discovered evidence in
the form of a recantation, it is generally recognized that an
evidentiary hearing is required “to evaluate the veracity of the
recanting witness.” Barros v. State, 254 So. 3d 1186, 1187 (Fla.
5th DCA 2018). Two frequently cited decisions that discuss the
requirements to obtain an evidentiary hearing are Davis1 and
Nordelo. Under the standard articulated in these cases, the trial
court should hold an evidentiary hearing “unless the affidavit is
inherently incredible or obviously immaterial to the verdict and
sentence.” See Nordelo, 93 So. 3d at 185 (quoting Davis, 26 So.
3d at 526).

     In Davis, the supreme court analyzed the trial court’s
summary denial of a defendant’s postconviction motion alleging
newly discovered evidence. 26 So. 3d at 528. Discussing the
probability prong of Jones II,2 the court found that the trial court
erred when it did not hold an evidentiary hearing based on the
newly discovered evidence that the defendant never said he
would “do away with” the victim. Id. at 529. In so doing, the
court explained “[t]his statement was a significant piece of
evidence directed to prove Davis’s premeditation during the guilt
phase and to support the imposition of an aggravating
circumstance in the penalty phase.” Id. at 529.

     Despite this error, the court found an alternative basis for
proper summary denial because “the recantation would not

    1   See Davis v. State, 26 So. 3d 519 (Fla. 2009).
    2   See Jones v. State, 709 So. 2d 512, 521 (Fla. 1998).

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eliminate the other evidence supporting premeditation to commit
the murder and the proportionality of the death sentence.” Id. at
529. Specifically, the supreme court observed that “Davis’s
confession that he stabbed the victim with two different knives,
coupled with the testimony of the medical examiner that the
victim sustained stab wounds to the back, chest, and neck,
support[ed] a finding of premeditated first-degree murder.” Id. at
530. Accordingly, after considering this other evidence which
supported premeditation and the aggravating circumstance
during the penalty phase, the supreme court affirmed the
summary denial “because the record conclusively demonstrate[d]
that [the defendant was] not entitled to relief.” Id. at 531.

     Nordelo, decided three years after Davis, also dealt with a
summarily denied postconviction motion alleging newly
discovered evidence. 93 So. 3d at 180–81. However, the trial
court in Nordelo did not attach anything from the record to its
order. Id. at 181. As the supreme court noted, “for an appellate
court ‘[t]o uphold the trial court’s summary denial of claims
raised in a 3.850 motion, the claims must be either facially
invalid or conclusively refuted by the record.” Id. at 182
(alteration in original) (quoting Peede v. State, 748 So. 2d 253,
257 (Fla. 1999)). In affirming the trial court’s summary denial,
the Third District Court improperly made factual determinations
regarding whether the claim was conclusively refuted without
examining the record and “concluded that the motion was ‘legally
insufficient.’” Id. at 181, 186–87. Consequently, both lower
courts “muddied the distinction between evaluation of the facial
sufficiency of the motion and the subsequent task of determining
if a facially sufficient motion is conclusively refuted by the
record.” Id. at 185. The lower courts’ failure to review and
attach the record required reversal and an evidentiary hearing.
Id. at 187–88.

    In this case, Appellant insists Nordelo requires an
evidentiary hearing to weigh the newly discovered evidence
against the evidence presented at trial. However, in light of the
holding in Davis, we read Nordelo much more narrowly.3 We

    3We acknowledge that Appellant’s reading of Nordelo finds
some support in the language of the opinion. Perhaps most

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interpret Davis as authorizing trial courts to weigh newly
discovered evidence against the evidence presented at trial
without an evidentiary hearing to the extent that the evidence at
trial conclusively refutes the claim and, as acknowledged in
Nordelo, the pertinent portions of the record are attached to the
order. Given that the newly discovered evidence in Davis at least
arguably weakened the State’s case, it appears that the supreme
court weighed the newly discovered evidence against the other

importantly, Nordelo remanded “for an evidentiary hearing”
without an opportunity to attach portions of the record which
conclusively refuted the claim. Nordelo, 93 So. 3d at 188.
Although the supreme court reasoned that the unknown contents
of a pretrial conversation with the co-defendant could not
conclusively refute the claim, the court did not explain why it
would be impossible for other portions of the record to
conclusively refute the claim.

       Similarly, even though Nordelo seems to be based on the
trial court’s failure to attach records, the opinion also conducts a
thorough review of the entire process, including discussion
regarding a court’s evaluation of whether a motion is legally
sufficient, a court’s determination of whether the motion is
refuted by the record, and the proper analysis after an
evidentiary hearing is granted. However, much of this discussion
is dicta.

      Finally, both Davis and Nordelo state that “[t]he
determination of whether the statements are true and meet the
due diligence and probability prongs of Jones II usually requires
an evidentiary hearing to evaluate credibility unless the affidavit
is inherently incredible or obviously immaterial to the verdict
and sentence.” Davis, 26 So. 3d at 526; Nordelo, 93 So. 3d at 185.
We need not determine exactly how often a newly discovered
evidence claim will ultimately require an evidentiary hearing,
but we cannot read this statement as broadly as Appellant.

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evidence at trial and determined that the remaining evidence
was strong enough to conclusively refute the claim.

     In our view, Nordelo reversed the trial court’s summary
denial because the order failed to include record attachments
conclusively refuting the newly discovered evidence claim. This
interpretation finds direct support in the plain language of rule
3.850. When a legally sufficient motion is denied without a
hearing “a copy of that portion of the files and records that
conclusively shows that the defendant is entitled to no relief shall
be attached to the final order.” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(f)(5)
(emphasis added).4 As such, there was nothing for the lower
courts in Nordelo to weigh against the newly discovered evidence.

     Thus, summary denial is appropriate where a legally
sufficient motion is conclusively refuted by the record, provided
that the court reviews the record and attaches relevant portions
of the record to its order. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(f)(5); see also
Hamilton v. State, 875 So. 2d 586, 591 (Fla. 2004) (“[A] defendant
is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a postconviction relief
motion unless (1) the motion, files, and records in the case
conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, or (2)
the motion or a particular claim is legally insufficient.”
(alteration in original) (quoting Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d
1055, 1061 (Fla. 2000))).

                            Conclusion

     Because the trial court accepted the allegations in
Appellant’s motion and affidavit as true to the extent they were
not refuted in the record, and attached multiple exhibits to its
order, including trial transcripts that conclusively refute the
claim made in the affidavit provided with the motion, summary
denial was appropriate.

    AFFIRMED.

    4   Subdivision (f) existed as subdivision (d) prior to its
redesignation in 2013. See In re Amends to Fla. R. Crim. P. &
Fla. R. App. P., 132 So. 3d 734, 738 (Fla. 2013).

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EDWARDS, C.J., EISNAUGLE, and KILBANE, JJ., concur.

                _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
               _____________________________

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