Court Opinion

ID: 9899967
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 00:03:38.524645+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:57.304334
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/17/23 P. v. Martinez CA2/2
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has
not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

 THE PEOPLE,                                                 B325280

      Plaintiff and                                         (Los Angeles County
 Respondent,                                                Super. Ct. No. BA361997)
           v.

 SANTOS MARTINEZ,

      Defendant and
 Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Renee F. Korn, Judge. Affirmed.
      Joanna McKim, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Plaintiff and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Thomas C. Hsieh, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
       Defendant and appellant Santos Martinez (defendant)
appeals the order denying his petition for vacatur of his murder
conviction and resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6
(formerly section 1170.95)1 entered after an evidentiary hearing
held pursuant to subdivision (d) of that statute. Defendant
contends substantial evidence did not support the trial court’s
finding that he directly aided and abetted the killing with intent
to kill. We conclude substantial evidence does support the trial
court’s order and thus affirm.

                         BACKGROUND
The 2013 murder conviction
      In 2013 defendant and his codefendant Francisco Gutierrez
were convicted of first degree murder, with true findings that a
principal personally used and intentionally discharged a firearm
causing great bodily injury or death and that the crime was
committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang. Defendant
was sentenced to a term of 50 years to life in prison. On direct
appeal we affirmed the judgment in People v. Martinez (Dec. 10,
2014, B253468) (nonpub. opn.).
Trial evidence
      On August 31, 2007, between 10:00 and 11:00 p.m., Angel
Bautista, an associate of the Drifters gang, and Abdon Solis were
waiting outside Best Buy Markets, when an SUV drove into the
driveway and stopped, facing a nearby alley. Defendant emerged

1      All further unattributed code sections are to the Penal
Code, and we henceforth refer to former section 1170.95 solely by
its renumbered section 1172.6.

                                 2
from the driver’s side,2 approached and asked Bautista, “Where
you from?”3 When Bautista replied, “Drifters,” defendant
punched him. Bautista returned the blow, and the two men
fought. Within about 30 seconds Bautista appeared to get the
better of defendant, and Gutierrez got out of the passenger side of
a nearby black or dark-colored SUV wearing black clothing and a
ski mask, carrying a shotgun. Gutierrez approached and fired
the shotgun three times, with the third and fatal shot directly to
Bautista’s head. Gutierrez got back into the SUV, which
defendant drove quickly away.
      The SUV was later found abandoned and crashed into a
wall in the alley near the Best Buy Markets. DNA taken from
blood and items left in the SUV was identified as belonging to
defendant and Gutierrez and indicated defendant was in the
driver’s seat and Gutierrez in the backseat. A shotgun found in a
garage about a quarter mile away from the market contained a
spent 12-gauge Schonebeck shell. Two such shells were found
near Bautista’s body. Gutierrez’s DNA was found on the
shotgun.
      The medical examiner who performed the autopsy opined
that while lying on the ground, Bautista was struck by shotgun
slugs twice from within three or four feet before the shotgun

2     As neither party challenges the trial court’s finding that
defendant was the man who approached and Gutierrez was the
actual shooter, we refer to them without summarizing
identification evidence in depth.
3     “Where you from” is the “ultimate challenge” in gang
culture according to the testimony of gang expert Los Angeles
Police Department Officer Shane Bua.

                                3
barrel touched or nearly touched Bautista’s head and was fired a
third time, removing half his head.
       Defendant was located and arrested nearly two years later,
charged with an unrelated crime and interviewed by Detective
Gilbert Alonso, the investigating officer in this case. Defendant
told the detective he knew the police were looking for him since
the day after his car had been stolen by members of a different
gang, who beat him and took the car. Defendant admitted he
never reported the car theft or the beating.
       In recorded conversations with cellmates defendant said he
knew he was “fighting a murder case” and the police had
obtained his DNA and his car after he crashed it and bled.
Defendant explained it was the “same day that I did . . . that I
pulled the job, fool, the cops were following me. So I crashed my
car, fool, but I was able to get the fuck outta there, but I left blood
in the car and they just caught me.” Defendant acknowledged he
was a member of the Playboys gang. Defendant said the police
did not have the gun so he told detectives some guys took his car
and beat him up, and maybe some blood was left in the car. In
another conversation, defendant said he was “screwed,” that the
police had the car he had driven and his blood. He added the
only thing the police did not have was the gun used in the
murder.
       Officer Bua testified as the prosecution’s expert on gang
culture with particular expertise regarding the Playboys and
Drifters gangs,4 describing the Playboys’ territory, and its

4     As the validity of the gang enhancement is not at issue in
this appeal, we summarize only those portions of Officer Bua’s
testimony relevant to state of mind and of motive, as “evidence of

                                  4
importance to gangs. He explained that because other gangs
were afraid to enter its territory, it elevated the home gang’s
status and prevented narcotics sales by anyone not affiliated with
that gang. On August 31, 2007, there were over 600 documented
members of the Playboys gang and its cliques, and at least 200 of
them were then considered active or semi-active. Based on their
many Playboys gang-themed tattoos and Officer Bua’s
acquaintance with both defendants, it was his opinion that at the
time of the murder, defendant and Gutierrez were active
members of the Playboy gang.
       The Drifters gang was one of the Playboys gang’s main
rivals, and the two gangs had never gotten along. Bautista’s
murder was committed in Drifters’ territory. Also at that time,
Playboys’ territory was vast compared to the Drifters’ territory
and the Playboys gang was dominating the Drifters. At the time
of the shooting the two gangs were in a struggle over control of
schools in the area where students from both territories attended
and where the gangs recruited members. This resulted in fights
designed to make students want to join the stronger gang and
afraid to join the weaker gang. Officer Bua estimated that there
had been five attacks by Playboys on Drifters for every attack by
Drifters on Playboys.
       In Officer Bua’s expert opinion, the Playboys gang’s
primary activities were narcotics sales, robberies, assaulting
rivals, witnesses and others, extortion, tagging, assaults with a
deadly weapon, murder, and coming together to intimidate the

motive is often probative of intent to kill.” (People v. Smith
(2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 741.)

                                 5
community. Among weapons commonly used were handguns,
shotguns, and rifles.
       Officer Bua explained that generally in gang culture,
committing crimes with other gang members to benefit the gang,
such as tagging or physically assaulting an enemy in rival
territory, may be called “going on a mission” and “putting in
work.” Each gang member would be given a specific job on the
mission, such as getaway driver, tagger, robber, or keeper of the
firearm with the responsibility to protect others on the mission.
Anyone on the mission who failed to “step up” could suffer great
consequences within the gang. Gang members on missions in
rival gang territory would go in groups for backup and
camaraderie, and to be more intimidating to their victims.
       Because gang members generally take weapons with them
on missions in rival territories it would be unlikely for anyone in
the car not to know when someone was armed. Officer Bua
added that he had been told by many different gang members it
was a matter of respect to inform a fellow gang member of the
presence in the car of a concealed firearm, a large amount of
narcotics, or anything else that could create trouble with the
police if stopped. It would then be up to the individual to decide
whether he wanted to be in the car.
       The important concept of respect in gang culture was also
explained. Gang members equated fear with respect, and thus
earned respect by committing crimes and by dominating and
victimizing rival gangs. Individual gang members earned the
respect of their gang by committing crimes. The more hardcore
the crimes, the greater the respect for the gang and the
individual member within the gang. Losing a fight to a rival
gang member would cause the loser’s gang to appear weak,

                                 6
resulting in the member’s loss of respect and requiring retaliation
by any means necessary in order gain back the gang’s respect.
       It was Officer Bua’s opinion that the following hypothetical
facts would describe an activity that would benefit a gang:
“[T]wo or more gang members from Playboys went into territory
for Drifters and one of the occupants of that car had a shotgun
and a ski mask going into that rival territory, one of the
occupants of the car got out and said to a young man on the
sidewalk, ‘Where are you from?’ The young man responds,
‘Drifters,’ and a fistfight follows in which the Drifter gang
member is winning the fistfight and another occupant of the car
gets out with a shotgun and shoots and kills the Drifters gang
member . . . .” Going on a mission to challenge a rival in his
territory, particularly if armed with a visible weapon such as a
shotgun and then killing the rival to prevent him from winning
the fight, would demonstrate to the rival gang and the
community that the Playboys gang was incredibly bold and to be
feared. This enhanced reputation would benefit the gang by
enabling its members to get away with committing more crimes.
The shooter’s status would also be elevated within the gang by
showing his willingness to commit murder to protect his fellow
gang member.
Petition for resentencing
       Effective 2019, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill
No. 1437, which eliminated murder liability under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine and amended the
requirements for murder liability in sections 188 and 189.
(People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 849; see Stats. 2018, ch.
1015, § 1, subd. (f).) The Legislature also provided a procedure
for those convicted of murder to seek retroactive relief if they

                                7
could not be convicted under sections 188 and 189 as amended
effective January 1, 2019. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952,
957; see § 1172.6.)
       In February 2020, defendant filed a petition for
resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6. On April 16, 2020, after
reviewing the court’s file, including our appellate opinion in
People v. Martinez, supra, B253468, the trial court found
defendant ineligible for relief and summarily denied the petition
without having appointed counsel for defendant. We reversed
that order and remanded the matter to the superior court for the
issuance of an order to show cause and further proceedings in
accordance with subdivision (d) of section 1172.6. (See People v.
Martinez (Aug. 18, 2021, B306140) [nonpub. opn.].)
       On remand, the trial court appointed counsel for defendant,
ordered the prosecution to file a response to the petition, issued
an order to show cause why relief under section 1172.6 should not
be granted, and scheduled briefing. Prior to the hearing the trial
court read the transcripts of defendant’s 2013 trial. At the
hearing the court heard the argument of counsel, who did not
submit new or additional evidence. The trial court denied the
petition and issued a memorandum of decision on August 26,
2022. The court found the evidence established beyond a
reasonable doubt that defendant directly aided and abetted the
murder by his codefendant, and the evidence established both
express and implied malice beyond a reasonable doubt.
       Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal from the order of
denial.

                                8
                            DISCUSSION
       Defendant contends substantial evidence does not support
the trial court’s decision that defendant could be convicted under
current law of either first or second degree murder.
       At the hearing stage, “the burden of proof shall be on the
prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, . . . that the
petitioner is ineligible for resentencing.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
As the trial court sits as an independent fact finder (People v.
Vargas (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 943, 951), the court must “‘review
all the relevant evidence, evaluate and resolve contradictions,
and make determinations as to credibility, all under the
reasonable doubt standard . . .’” (People v. Oliver (2023) 90
Cal.App.5th 466, 480, quoting People v. Clements (2022) 75
Cal.App.5th 276, 298). Either party may present new evidence.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) If the evidence shows beyond a
reasonable doubt that petitioner could still be convicted of
murder under current law, the petitioner is not entitled to
resentencing. (People v. Guillory (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 326, 333.)
       Under current law and with exceptions not relevant here,
“in order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall
act with malice aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a
person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.”
(§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) “For a defendant to be liable as a direct
aider and abettor, ‘the prosecution must show that the defendant
aided or encouraged the commission of the murder with
knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator and with
the intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, or facilitating
its commission. [Citation.] . . . [Citations.] ‘An aider and
abettor who knowingly and intentionally assists a confederate to
kill someone could be found to have acted willfully, deliberately,

                                 9
and with premeditation, having formed his own culpable intent.
Such an aider and abettor, then, acts with the mens rea required
for first degree murder.’” (In re Lopez (2023) 14 Cal.5th 562,
579.)
        Second degree implied malice murder remains a valid
theory of murder liability (although it may not be based upon the
natural and probable consequences theory). (People v. Gentile,
supra, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 850-851.) “‘Malice is implied when the
killing is proximately caused by “‘an act, the natural
consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act was
deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct
endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious
disregard for life.’” [Citation.] In short, implied malice requires a
defendant’s awareness of engaging in conduct that endangers the
life of another . . . .’” (People v. Cravens (2012) 53 Cal.4th 500,
507.) “‘Current law thus provides that the actual killer, or a
direct aider and abettor of the killing who knew that his (or her)
conduct endangered the life of another and acted with conscious
disregard for life, may be guilty of second degree murder.’”
(People v. Glukhoy (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 576, 588, quoting People
v. Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 972, 979.)
        On appeal from the denial of a petition after hearing, we
review the ruling for substantial evidence. (People v. Reyes
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 988.) We do so by applying the usual
substantial evidence standard of review. (See People v. Sifuentes
(2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 217, 233-234.) We thus view the evidence
in the light most favorable to the court’s order to determine
whether any reasonable trier of fact could have made the same
determination beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Reyes,
supra, at p. 988.) We “presume in support of the judgment the

                                 10
existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the
evidence.” (People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 314.) “The
same standard applies when the conviction rests primarily on
circumstantial evidence.” (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978,
1053.) “An appellate court must accept logical inferences that the
[trier of fact] might have drawn from the circumstantial
evidence.” (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 396.) “The
standard is deferential, but the evidence in support of the
judgment must be reasonable, credible, and of solid value; ‘a mere
possibility’ or ‘[s]peculation is not substantial evidence [citation].”
(People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 120.) Reversal on a
substantial evidence ground “is unwarranted unless it appears
‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial
evidence to support [the conclusion of the trier of fact].’” (People
v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.)
       “[B]ecause ‘we must begin with the presumption that the
evidence . . . was sufficient,’ it is defendant, as the appellant, who
‘bears the burden of convincing us otherwise.’” (People v. Hamlin
(2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1430.) Here, defendant has failed
to “[p]rovide a summary of the significant facts limited to matters
in the record.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(2)(C).) The
trial court based its decision on the evidence given at defendant’s
2013 trial. The significant facts are found in the reporter’s
transcripts of that trial. However, defendant merely purports to
incorporate by reference the summary of facts set forth in the
appellate opinion in People v. Martinez, supra, B253468.5

5       Defendant also summarizes facts contained in the
arguments of counsel at the evidentiary hearing on the petition.
“‘[I]t is axiomatic that the unsworn statements of counsel are not
evidence.’” (People v. Wallace (2004) 33 Cal.4th 738, 754, fn. 3.)

                                  11
Although it is his burden to demonstrate the trial evidence was
insufficient to support the court’s decision, defendant’s briefs fail
to refer to that evidence, as required by rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) and
(2)(C).
       As defendant has not set forth in his opening brief all the
material evidence in the light most favorable to the decision of
the trier of fact, he cannot prevail on a sufficiency of the evidence
argument. (People v. Sanghera (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1567,
1574.) “The focus of the substantial evidence test is on the whole
record of evidence presented to the trier of fact, rather than on
‘“isolated bits of evidence.”’” (People v. Cuevas (1995) 12 Cal.4th
252, 261, quoting People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 577.)
       Furthermore, a defendant “does not show the evidence is
insufficient by citing only his own evidence, or by arguing about
what evidence is not in the record, or by portraying the evidence
that is in the record in the light most favorable to himself.”
(People v. Sanghera, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 1573.) This is
precisely what defendant has done here.
       In essence, defendant points out that it was Gutierrez who
was in possession of the ski mask and gun, while there was no
evidence showing defendant was armed, that defendant asked
Gutierrez to shoot the victim or for help, that defendant and
Gutierrez had previously discussed killing the victim, or that
defendant and Gutierrez had a motive based upon some prior
experience with the victim. Finally, defendant argues neither
knowing that Gutierrez was armed nor defendant’s gang
membership alone can prove intent to kill.6 From these facts and

6     To illustrate the point that gang membership alone cannot
prove intent to kill, defendant cites to the facts of several cases in
which the evidence of malice was found insubstantial, but he does

                                 12
argument, defendant draws inferences contrary to those
supporting the court’s decision and concludes the evidence was
insufficient to prove defendant shared Gutierrez’s intent to kill,
necessary for liability as a direct aider and abettor.
       Defendant has failed to meet his burden on appeal. We
have read the transcripts of the trial evidence (summarized
above), and the People have provided a thorough summary of
that evidence, all of which amply supports the trial court’s
finding defendant harbored an intent to kill at the time he and
Gutierrez drove into Drifters’ gang territory with a shotgun in
order to hunt down a Drifters gang member.
       “Evidence of a defendant’s state of mind is almost
inevitably circumstantial, but circumstantial evidence is as
sufficient as direct evidence to support a conviction.” (People v.
Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1208.) Direct evidence of intent to
kill rarely exists, but often may be inferred from the
circumstances of the crime and the defendant’s act (People v.

so without showing those facts were comparable to the facts here,
except gang members were involved and the defendant was with
fellow gang members at the time of the shooting. (See, e.g.,
People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 988 [defendant rode bicycle
with fellow gang members close to rival gang territory without
knowing one was armed]; Juan H. v. Allen (9th Cir. 2005) 408
F.3d 1262, 1266-1267, 1277 [minor defendant was near his
brother when the brother shot the victim outside their home in a
trailer park].) A comparison of the facts of different cases to
demonstrate the insufficiency of evidence is not useful, as each
case necessarily depends on its own facts. (People v. Thomas
(1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 516.) This is especially so when the issue is
the defendant’s state of mind. (See People v. Mendoza (2011) 52
Cal.4th 1056, 1075.)

                                13
Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 411, 457), and “evidence of motive is
often probative of intent to kill” (People v. Smith, supra, 37
Cal.4th at p. 741).
       Motive in gang shootings is reasonably inferred from
hatred felt for rival gang members. (People v. Sanchez (2001) 26
Cal.4th 834, 849.) Here, Officer Bua testified that the Drifters
gang was one of the Playboys gang’s main rivals, that the two
gangs had never gotten along, and at the time of the shooting the
two gangs were in a struggle over control of recruitment in the
local schools, which had resulted in fights, most of them
instigated by Playboys gang members.
       Defendant’s apparently decisive and purposeful actions
suggest he was searching for and intending to shoot a rival gang
member. He drove his fellow gang member into rival territory
probably knowing Gutierrez was armed with a shotgun, as a
shotgun carried by his only passenger would be hard to miss and
defendant does not claim the evidence was insufficient to show he
knew the shotgun was in the car. Defendant approached
Bautista immediately upon arrival at the market in Drifters gang
territory and issued the ultimate gang challenge by asking,
“Where you from?” When Bautista replied, “Drifters,” defendant
punched him, beginning the fight. Within just 30 seconds,
Gutierrez emerged and shot Bautista three times with the
shotgun.
       Substantial evidence that defendant’s intent to kill was
premeditated may be demonstrated by categories of evidence
suggested by the California Supreme Court in People v. Anderson
(1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 26-27, such as planning activity, preexisting
motive, and manner of killing. (People v. Mendoza, supra, 52
Cal.4th at p. 1069.) There is no requirement that all three

                               14
factors be established or that any factor must be shown by direct
evidence. (People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1124-1125.)
       Planning may be reasonably inferred from evidence the
defendants armed themselves before the shooting. (See, e.g.,
People v. Caro (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1035, 1050; People v. Villegas
(2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1224.) The gang expert testified
gang members are generally armed for missions in rival territory,
which are inherently dangerous, and inform one another when
there is a firearm in the car. In addition to motive, discussed
above, the presence of the ski mask and the shotgun, along with
defendant’s jailhouse conversation about a “job” he did with a
gun, also gave rise to a reasonable inference that the shooting
was planned. Defendant also aided his accomplice by driving him
into rival territory prior to the shooting and demanding a rival
gang member identify himself and his gang. That defendant did
so knowing that Gutierrez was armed strongly suggests they had
planned the shooting.
       In sum, substantial evidence demonstrates that with the
motive to seek out and commit violence upon a Drifters gang
member, defendant drove his accomplice into Drifters’ territory
with a shotgun and a disguise, issued a challenge to the victim,
assaulted him when he identified his gang as Drifters, and then,
just 30 seconds later, the accomplice emerged and shot the victim
three times, delivering the third and fatal wound to the head
before fleeing in defendant’s car. These facts do not suggest a
rash reaction to a random encounter with a rival gang member,
and the timing does not reasonably support a conclusion that a
more innocent encounter was planned but unexpectedly escalated
once the two Playboys members began to execute the plan.
Considering the facts in the context of all the trial evidence, we

                               15
conclude substantial evidence supports the finding that
defendant directly aided and abetted the murder by his
codefendant, and he did so with express or implied malice, such
that any reasonable trier of facts would so find beyond a
reasonable doubt.
       As an alternative to outright vacatur of his murder
conviction, defendant suggests that because the trial court made
no express finding he premeditated and deliberated the murder,
his conviction should be reduced to second degree murder. He
concludes from the lack of an express finding of premeditation
that the prosecution failed to prove first degree murder beyond a
reasonable doubt.
       “In the context of first degree murder, ‘“premeditated”
means “considered beforehand . . .’.” (People v. Lee (2011) 51
Cal.4th 620, 636.) The trial court implicitly found premeditation
as demonstrated by its statement, “Applying the law to the facts
in this case illustrates that Petitioner intended to kill when he
and Codefendant drove into Drifters gang territory . . . .
Petitioner and Codefendant took a shotgun and a ski mask and
went to find a Drifters gang member.” We have found
substantial evidence to support the court’s finding that defendant
harbored a premeditated intent to kill prior to entering Drifters’
gang territory and that he and Gutierrez planned their “job.”
“‘“[D]eliberate” means “formed or arrived at or determined upon
as a result of careful thought and weighing of considerations for
and against the proposed course of action.”’” (Ibid.) Providing
transportation into rival gang territory to an armed accomplice
with a disguise and then confirming the identity of a rival gang
member for him moments before the accomplice shoots him,
suggests a carefully considered plan.

                               16
       Defendant cites no authority for his apparent underlying
assertion, that the trial court’s finding of implied malice somehow
vitiates the finding of the elements of first degree murder beyond
a reasonable doubt. Moreover, “[r]educing a first degree murder
conviction to second degree murder is not an option under section
1172.6.” (People v. Gonzalez (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 869, 881.)7
       We conclude that the trial court did not err in denying the
petition.

                        DISPOSITION
      The August 26, 2022 order denying defendant’s petition is
affirmed.

                                     ___________________________
                                     CHAVEZ, J.

We concur:

_______________________________
ASHMANN-GERST, Acting P. J.

_______________________________
HOFFSTADT, J.

7    As we reject defendant’s contentions regarding second
degree murder, we need not reach the People’s forfeiture
argument.

                                17