Court Opinion

ID: 9374497
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-23 09:09:46.154793+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:51.402693
License: Public Domain

In The
                                 Court of Appeals
                        Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

                                        No. 07-22-00123-CV

IN THE MATTER OF THE MARRIAGE OF JOSHUA CHASE DRAPER AND HALEIGH
 ELIZABETH DRAPER AND IN THE INTEREST OF R.L.D. AND K.R.D., CHILDREN

                            On Appeal from the 360th District Court
                                     Tarrant County, Texas
              Trial Court No. 360-677390-20, Honorable Patricia Bennett, Presiding

                                        February 21, 2023
                               MEMORANDUM OPINION 1
                        Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and DOSS, JJ.

       Joshua Chase Draper appeals from a final divorce decree. The latter ended his

marriage to Haleigh Elizabeth Draper. Their union resulted in the birth of two children.

Furthermore, its tenure encompassed instances of discord, drug use, and physical abuse

by both parties, according to the appellate record. Through five issues, Joshua questions

various aspects of the decree, including its designation of conservatorship, the

geographic restriction imposed, and the property division struck. We affirm.

       1   Because this appeal was transferred from the Second Court of Appeals, we apply its precedent
should it conflict with that of the Seventh Court of Appeals. TEX R. APP. P. 41.3.
        Issue One

        Joshua initially asserted that the trial court abused its discretion by appointing both

parents joint managing conservators of their children. He believed that wrong “given the

finds [sic] that [Haleigh] had committed family violence.” 2 We overrule the issue.

        Statute provides that a trial “court may not appoint joint managing conservators if

credible evidence is presented of a history or pattern of past or present . . . physical or

sexual abuse by one parent directed against the other parent, a spouse, or a child . . . .”

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.004(b). Per that statute, we concluded that the appointment

of joint managing conservators constituted abused discretion when the record contained

credible evidence of a history or pattern of family violence, which could consist of one

instance of violence. In re Marriage of Stein, 153 S.W.3d 485, 489 (Tex. App.—Amarillo

2004, no pet.); accord, Gerges v. Gerges, 601 S.W.3d 46, 62 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2020

no pet.) (stating that “a trial court may find that a parent has a ‘history’ of engaging in

conduct even though the parent may have only engaged in a single act”); Chacon v.

Gribble, No. 03-18-00737-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 10286, at *11 (Tex. App.—Austin

Nov. 27, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (noting that the trial court has the discretion to

determine whether a single incident, as well as multiple incidents, of family violence

evinced the requisite history or pattern). Yet, like Chacon, authority of the court from

which this appeal was transferred grants trial judges discretion to assess whether one

incident alone is enough. As said in C.C. v. L.C., No. 02-18-00425-CV, 2019 Tex. App.

LEXIS 5615 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 3, 2019 no pet.) (mem. op.), “we do not interpret

the word ‘history’ to mean that a single event must constitute a history that deprives the

          2 He said nothing about the finding that he too committed family violence as barring the appointment

of joint conservators.
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trial court of any discretion to appoint joint managing conservators.” Id. at 2019 Tex. App.

LEXIS 5615, at *38. Being bound by C.C., see TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3, we heed it here, and,

in doing so, note the following.

        The trial court expressly found that “[b]oth parents committed family violence . . .”

though “[n]either . . . had a ‘history or pattern’ of [it].” Other findings intimated that it found

the family violence a one-time event.                For instance, it wrote that “[n]o other party

intervened nor was there sufficient grounds to call CPS from a one-time event that was

not likely to occur in the future.” (Emphasis added). Yet, Joshua argues that additional

assaults by Haleigh had occurred. Our review of the record disclosed that the evidence

he cited to us came from his own testimony. Moreover, the trial court openly questioned

his credibility about it and other aspects of his testimony. 3 Indeed, the trial court’s doubts

about Joshua’s veracity influenced its decision to appoint an amicus. Given those doubts,

it was free to discredit the other alleged examples of violence he iterated. See In re E.D.,

No. 02-20-00208-CV, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 87, at *29 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 6,

2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (noting the trial court’s “better position to observe and assess

the witnesses’ demeanor and credibility”). And, we defer to its credibility choices. Id. So,

that leads us back to a sole act and the holding in C.C. that a single act does not

necessarily constitute a “history” of misconduct. Joshua does not address C.C. or explain

why the one incident involved here must be deemed a “history” under the C.C. equation. 4

        3The comments evincing as much consisted of the court saying: 1) “I’m feeling very uncomfortable.
There are several things. One is the father wanting to blame the mother for everything . . .”; 2) “[b]ut
everything seems to be the mother’s fault and nothing seems to be the father’s fault . . .”; 3) “as things are
lobbed against Ms. Draper, she’s been very quiet. I’ve not seen anger on her face”; and 4) “[y]ou say
anything about Mr. Draper, and the anger I see in his face is very concerning to me.”

        4 Indeed, this case illustrates the importance of precedent and utilizing that of the court adjudicating

the dispute to formulate one’s argument.
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And in deferring to the trial court’s authority to discredit Joshua’s testimony about other

incidents, we cannot say he proved an instance of abused discretion.

        Issue Two

        Through his second issue, Joshua alleged that the trial court abused its discretion

by imposing an arbitrary geographic residency restriction. The restriction at issue states:

“neither parent shall have the right to designate the primary residence of the children, but

the children shall remain within the Eagle Mountain Saginaw ISD.” More importantly, he

agreed to it, as evinced on page ten of volume five of the reporter’s record. Having so

agreed, he cannot now complain about it. See Guidry v. Guidry, No. 04-20-00311-CV,

2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 4977, at *7 (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 20, 2022, pet. denied)

(mem. op.) (stating that “[u]nder the doctrine of invited error, Margaret cannot be heard

to complain that the decree—the terms of which she previously agreed to—is not

enforceable”).

        Issue Three

        Next, Joshua argued that: “[a]s established by the recommendations of the Amicus

Attorney, the weight of the evidence supported that it was in the children’s best interest

that Appellant be appointed as the party with the exclusive right to designate the primary

residence of the children and that Appellee have a standard possession order.” 5 Because

the trial court opted not to follow the recommendations, the court purportedly abused its

discretion. We overrule the issue.

        5   The amicus also recommended that both parents have joint managing conservatorship over their
children.

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         The lower court ordered that neither parent have the exclusive right to designate

the primary residence of the children. Instead, it directed that “the children shall remain

within the Eagle Mountain-Saginaw ISD.” Nor did the trial court implement a standard

possession order. In lieu thereof, the parents where awarded what the court labelled

“Week On/Week Off.” Interestingly, Joshua says nothing about his having approved the

“week on/week off” or “50/50” periods of possession when testifying. He did initially voice

his preference to possessing the children during the week and leaving Haleigh with the

weekends. But, he followed that with 1) “I’m fine with the 50/50” and 2) “[a]bsolutely”

when asked “if the Court does decide to continue the 50/50, will you follow those

recommendations of the Court.” 6                 Having told the court he was fine with sharing

possession of the children “50/50,” he again invited the trial court to institute the

possession order it did and, thereby, deviate from the standard possession order. Thus,

he cannot now complain about its accepting the invitation. Guidry, supra.

         As for the remainder of the issue, amicus attorneys, like that appointed at bar,

serve the court, not the parent or child. In re R.H.B., No. 04-21-00038-CV, 2022 Tex.

App. LEXIS 2135, at *22 (Tex. App.—San Antonio March 30, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.).

They assist the trial court in fostering the child’s best interests. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §

107.001 (defining the role as an “attorney appointed by the court . . . whose role is to

provide legal services necessary to assist the court in protecting a child’s best

interests . . . .”). Yet, they are not the court. And, though Joshua insinuates that the

recommendations somehow impose an evidentiary burden upon a parent to prove the

recommendations wrong, we would have welcomed citation to legal authority so stating.

        6 The trial court wrote in its findings: “[a]t [the] last portion of final trial the father testified that he

believed that 50/50 visitation was working, and he believed that should continue.”
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None was cited, possibly for the reason that recommendations of the amicus attorney are

just that, recommendations without binding effect.

       So, we reject the notion posed by Joshua.               A trial court does not abuse its

discretion when deviating from a recommendation of an amicus after it wades into the

stormy sea of child custody and exercises its own judgment. This is especially so where,

as here, that sea contained evidence of 1) Joshua’s “homicidal and suicidal ideations,” 2)

an earlier instance of Joshua strangling a prior wife, 3) a witness assigned to evaluate

custody voicing “concerns about alienating behaviors between the father and the

children,” and 4) Joshua and one of his children “hav[ing] a very maladaptive attachment.”

The trial court undoubtedly sought to have both parents engage with each other in the

rearing of their children when neither parent was faultless. We do not see that as a

decision illustrating abused discretion under the circumstances here.

       Issue Four

       Joshua next believed that “[t]he trial court abused its discretion in modifying child

support arrearages without a proper request for relief.” Allegedly, he illustrated that

Haleigh owed “$3,735.96 in past due child support arrearages.” Yet, the trial court

awarded him none. 7 We overrule the issue.

       The purported arrearage encompassed child support apparently ordered via a

temporary order. Upon conducting its final hearing and through a document entitled

“Rendition After Final Trial on the Merits,” the trial court found that both parents had

interim, outstanding child support obligations. Following that, it said: “[t]his Court finds

the parties have had a 50/50 possession, and as a result of possession credits, the child

       7   Nor did it award Haleigh arrearages that he owed.
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support arrearage and medical support arrearage for both parents is zero.” This finding

occurred after Joshua had responded to questions about an exhibit depicting Haleigh’s

arrearage. The response consisted of his testifying: “I thought it was all -- all basically a

wash. I thought it was canceled out.” Again, it appears that the trial court simply followed

Joshua’s lead. He thought the arrearage was “a wash” and “canceled out,” and the trial

court made it so. And, we encounter no argument from Joshua about the trial court’s

lacking authority to offset competing arrearages when settling the marital estate. In short,

a trial court does not abuse its discretion when its decision has evidentiary support. In re

R.R.K., No. 02-20-00302-CV, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 2860, at *8-9 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

April 28, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.). The testimony of Joshua provided the requisite

evidentiary support and, therefore, insulated the trial court’s decision from attack.

       Issue Five

       Lastly, Joshua posited that “the property division in this case was so

disproportionate as to constitute an abuse of discretion.”       This was purportedly so

because the trial court awarded him a house without equity, directed him to sell the house,

obligated him to pay for the house until sold, failed to obligate Haleigh to return

government stimulus checks sent to the family, and allowed her to keep their 2013

Cadillac without accompanying the award with a directive that she somehow remove him

as an obligor on the debt. We overrule the issue.

       A trial court must divide the marital estate in a way it deems just and right, while

having due regard for the rights of each party and the children. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §

7.001. Moreover, we presume that the division made falls within those parameters until

shown otherwise. Martinez v. Martinez, No. 02-21-00353-CV, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS

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9529, at *13 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 29, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting Loaiza

v. Loaiza, 130 S.W.3d 894, 899 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.)). So too does

authority hold that the division need not be equal to be just and right. Martinez, 2022 Tex.

App. LEXIS 9529, at *12.

       In determining how to arrive at a just and right split, the trial court may consider a

myriad of factors. They include such things as 1) each spouse’s earning capacity and

financial condition, 2) the respective abilities, education, and business opportunities of

each spouse, 3) the size of their separate estates, if any, coupled with any future need

for support, 4) the respective health and age of the spouses, 5) the award of child custody,

6) the length of the marriage and fault, if any, in its end, 6) attorney’s fees, 7) a spouse’s

dissipation of the marital estate, if any, and 8) tax consequences, if any. Id. And, no

single factor controls. Id. Finally, the burden lies with the complaining party to illustrate

that the division struck was so unjust that the trial court abused its discretion, i.e., it acted

unreasonably or arbitrarily. Id. at 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 9529, at *13. That said, we turn

to Joshua’s issues.

       Joshua’s efforts to illustrate an arbitrary division focused only on the few

circumstances we mentioned in the opening paragraph to this issue. Nothing was said

about the factors mentioned in Martinez or how any favored his position. Nothing was

said about the size of the marital estate and other property or debt assigned to each

spouse. Nothing was said about the percentage of the estate each received or the

respective value of those percentages. Nor did he address the disparity in the income

potential between him and Haleigh. According to evidence of record, Joshua had a

steady job and his income ranged from $65,000 to $83,000 per year. Haleigh cleaned

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houses and bartended. She also testified that her employment experience was minimal.

Other evidence indicated she was preparing to file for bankruptcy.

          He received the house per his request; she did not. Having received the house

and ability to live in it until sold, one could say it was reasonable for him to carry its debt

during the interim. This seems especially so when Haleigh informed the court that she

could not afford the abode and was living with her mother in an apartment.

          As for the allegation about there being no equity in the home, evidence indicated

the outstanding mortgage approximated $185,000, while the appraisal district valued the

abode at $174,000.        Yet, the trial court noted the recent rise in housing prices.

Furthermore, as the court attempted to gather information about mortgage debt and home

value, Haleigh’s attorney said a particular real estate website valued it at $243,900. No

objection to that was heard from Joshua’s attorney. As said by our sister court, “[w]hen,

during an evidentiary hearing, counsel makes unsworn factual statements as an officer

of the court, on the record and without objection from opposing counsel, such statements

are properly considered as evidence.” Rasco v. Ducars Inv., No. 02-21-00375-CV, 2022

Tex. App. LEXIS 7125, at *20 n.3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 22, 2022, no pet.) (mem.

op.). Hearing no objection, the trial court could take the representation about the home

being valued in excess of $243,000 as evidence negating Joshua’s belief that it had no

equity.

          Additionally, Joshua received a truck he valued at over $4,000. Haleigh received

a Cadillac that, as Joshua acknowledged, had been repossessed and for which she could

not pay. Both received one half of Joshua’s retirement account. It held over $50,000.

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       Given Joshua’s lack of analysis and the evidence mentioned, we cannot say that

Joshua carried his burden. He did not establish that the trial court acted arbitrarily or

unreasonably in dividing the marital estate as it did.

       Having overruled each issue, we affirm the Final Decree of Divorce.

                                                         Brian Quinn
                                                         Chief Justice

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