Court Opinion

ID: 9528337
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:40:04.499879+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:46.230555
License: Public Domain

WOLFE, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
It would indeed be a flinty hearted man who would not be affected by the plight of the little family of this unfortunate and conscientious man and who would not hope that the family would receive some monetary compensation. But the economic and social problem involved is far broader than the plight of one family. If, in these heart cases, the door is opened to cover cases where the self-insurers, who are among the bigger employers of labor, are compelled to pay benefits in cases of doubtful industry-connected deaths, then in times of plentitude of labor, as contrasted to this period of comparative shortage, we may expect strict physical examination of applicants for jobs. One of the *626pathetic aspects of our industrial life is to see men who ■ should normally still have long prospective earning periods . go from employer to employer only to be refused employment because a heart condition makes them an unnecessary risk in times of plentiful labor. While the conditions of our social-industrial life cannot weigh with us because our job is only to determine whether the Commission arrived at its conclusions without competent evidence, we cannot be blind to the fact that this may explain why the Commission scrutinizes these heart failure cases occurring in the course or duration of industry and why it must be satisfied that the cause is some specific even though somewhat prolonged occurrence which can definitely be attributed to industry. In these cases where the trauma or injury is both the failure of the heart and the accident, the cause of the cause is oft times difficult to trace to industry as being above and beyond the wear and tear which all action in life makes to heart deterioration.
At the outset it seems hardly necessary after all these years to say that the test of whether the Commission acted unreasonably in its conclusions is not as to whether it took the most or more reasonable view. The test is whether it acted without a basis of reason and the test of that is generally said to be whether any man acting with reason applied to the apposite case could have found as did the Commission. I expiated on this theme in my dissenting opinion in the case of Dole v. Ind. Comm., 115 Utah 311, 204 P. 2d 462. In these close cases, there is always a temptation to find the Commission arbitrary when its conclusions involve hardship and seem unreasonable to us but the objective “reasonable man” test which I analyzed in the Dole case still pertains. The instant case I consider closer than the Dole case. Had I been the Commission, I think I would have found difficulty in concluding that
“there is no evidence of exertion or fatigue and that deceased was not subjected to any of these factors in a degree materially in excess of the exertion, etc. to which all individuals in every walk of life or at home are subj'ected to.”
*627But I am not the fact finder. The law makes the Commission the fact finder and I, as one of the reviewers of questions of law, and of law alone under the Act, cannot say-as a matter of law that there was no basis of reason for such finding. I cannot say that objectively viewed no man in the exercise of reason applied to the evidence could have found as did the Commission.
Heart failure cases previously considered by this court: In the case of Dee Hospital v. Ind. Comm., 104 Utah 61, 138 P. 2d 233, the Commission made an award and we sustained it while in the case of Woodburn v. Ind. Comm., 111 Utah 393, 181 P. 2d 209, the Commission refused an award and we affirmed it. Likewise, in O’Brien v. Ind. Comm., 90 Utah 266, 61 P. 2d 418, we sustained the Commission in denying compensation. In Gerber v. Ind. Comm., 91 Utah 479, 64 P. 2d 1281, the Commission denied an award and we sustained. In Cherdron Construction Co. v. Simpkins, 61 Utah 493, 214 P. 593, the Commission made an award which we sustained. In Columbia Steel Co. v. Ind. Comm., 92 Utah 72, 66 P. 2d 124, where the Commission awarded compensation for death from a ruptured aorta caused by jolting while running a bulldozer, we sustained. In Hammond v. Ind. Comm., 84 Utah 67, 34 P. 2d 687, the Commission denied an award for death from acute dilation of the heart due to strain and we reversed because of an error of concept of law by the Commission in holding that all the evidence that the heart failure was industry-connected was hearsay. True, in Robertson v. Ind. Comm., 109 Utah 25, 163 P. 2d 331, we did reverse the Commission in denying an award. In the Robertson case, we reversed because we concluded that the Commission under the evidence was arbitrary in refusing an award. The writer dissented in the Robertson case. It may be stated that there is a presumption that the Commission acted with reason and unless it clearly appears that it did arbitrarily, that is, with no basis of reason in the matter, we should uphold the Commission.
*628In the instant case, three doctors presented a variation of views upon the causal relationship of the decedent’s employment to the result of fatal blood clot. Dr. E. D. Zeman and Dr. J. G. Olson, called by the plaintiffs, testified that there was a causal relationship. Dr. Drew Petersen, witness for the employer, testified that
“It possibly is related in this particular case but I don’t think you can dogmatically say that it is a cause and effect or it has no effect.”
He testified that medical literature was replete with statements that there was no relationship between effort and coronary thrombosis; also that the contrary view is expressed. In O’Brien v. Ind. Comm., supra, we affirmed a denial of compensation in a death case due to a tumor which it was contended was the result of an accident arising out of the employment. In answering plaintiff’s contention that the Commission was bound to make an award to plaintiff because a medical expert testified that it was probable that trauma had caused a tumor, we stated [90 Utah 266, 61 P. 2d 419]:
“The mere statement that the proposition is probable presupposes a conflict in the evidence, since the word probable as above defined means there ‘is more evidence in favor of its existence than against it.’ If there is evidence both in favor of and against the proposition, it is a matter of weighing evidence which is the prerogative of the commission and not of this court.”
Dr. Peterson in his use of the word “possibly”, taken in its frame of reference meant that there is less chance of an event occurring or being caused than if its likelihood is described as probable. He meant that there was only a chance that it was industry-connected, however unlikely but not impossible. He meant to save his opinion from being dogmatic or being absolute. The word “possibly” is defined in Webster’s New International Dictionary, 2d Ed., as
“In a possible manner; by possible means; * * * by merest chance; perhaps; maybe.”
*629If Dr. Petersen’s conclusion as to the causal result in this case was negative, then there was a conflict in the medical testimony properly resolved by the Commission as the fact finder. This court has only the written record before it. The Commission heard the witness, listened to the connotation of the word and the inflection in his voice as he described the causal result as being “possibly” related in this particular case. I submit that the phrase in this case may be interpreted by the fact finder without arbitrariness, as expressing the doctor’s conclusion that there was a chance or possibility of a causal relationship between decedent’s employment and the coronary occlusion which caused his death. Such a conclusion is negative and sufficient to sustain the Commission’s denial of compensation. The findings of the Commission on conflicting medical testimony cannot be disturbed on appeal, Campbell v. Eagle & Blue Bell Mining Co., 64 Utah 430, 231 P. 620. The idea in the main opinion that Dr. Petersen really meant to say that the exertion caused the death but possibly it had no relation to it, applied to a witness for the employer, which Dr. Petersen was, is born of a desire to harmonize his testimony with that of the other two doctors. It is not consistent either with a common sense interpretation nor with the rather plain meaning of his testimony. I submit Dr. Petersen’s testimony cannot be tortured into meaning that there was a causal connection but possibly there was not. He testified and he meant that there was no causal connection but he could not be positive; possibly there was. Thus construed, there was a conflict in the testimony.
The main opinion cites somewhat cavalierly the statement that
“this court has repeatedly held that the Workmen’s Compensation Act should be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes, and where there is doubt, it should be resolved in favor of coverage of the employee.”
*630The opinion seems to have confused the duty of the Commission and this Court on review to construe the statute liberally, with the duty of the Commission to find the facts. The two are entirely different duties and if properly understood are not inconsistent. The duty to liberally construe the Compensation Act so as to effectuate its purposes arises, not from anything contained in the Act itself, but from the general admonition contained in the various Compilations and Revisions of our statutes, the latest one being the Utah Code Annotated of 1943 of which Section 2 of Chap. 2, Title 88, deals with the duty to liberally construe statutes, viz; that the statutes of the State are
“to be liberally construed with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and to promote justice.”
It pertains not to questions of fact but to questions of law. The prevailing opinion cites M&K Corporation v. Ind. Comm., 112 Utah 488, 189 P. 2d 132, 134, as holding that
“where there is doubt, it should be resolved in favor of coverage of the employee.”
The case of M&K Corporation v. Ind. Comm., supra, was a case which involved the construction of the language of the Act. The question was as to whether an accident arose out of or in the course of the employment when a father allowed his young son — too young to legally drive — to convey a truck through Sardine Canyon as a result of which the father was killed. There was no question of fact involved. In the opinion this court stated:
“We have also repeatedly held that this statute [meaning the Workmen’s Compensation Act] should be liberally construed and if there is any doubt respecting the right to compensation it should be resolved in favor of recovery.” (Emphasis mine.)
Of course, what we meant in the M&K case was a doubt in statutory construction or application. Certainly we did not mean that in every doubtful case the Commission should *631make an award. The doubt in the instant case is not as to the meaning of the Act. The Act over a long term of years has been construed until there is probably little doubt as to the meaning of any part of it. The doubt in the instant case is one as to a conclusion of fact from the expert testimony. This has already been discussed above. The very phrase “liberally construed” does not fit a factual situation.
The rule that pertains in respect to a factual situation is that the applicant has the burden of proof in establishing his case. If, after all the facts are considered, the Commission finds the scales in balance, the situation is left in equipoise and the applicant cannot recover. In order to recover the evidence must, qualitatively and quantitatively considered, weigh or preponderate in favor of the applicant. As to whether the evidence does so preponderate is, of course, largely a matter of the judgment of the fact finder. But unless the Commission finds without basis of reason that the burden of proof has not been met either because it chooses to believe one doctor’s testimony as against two others or because it believes for other valid reasons that the failure of the heart was not industry-connected, we cannot reverse.
What would cause one man to find the proof insufficient and another ample to preponderate in favor of the applicant involves certain imponderables. Some minds are cautious, very conscientious and come to their conclusions with a great sense of responsibility and deliberation. But a slowly acting mind is not necessarily more accurate nor more sound than a fast one, and quickness of mind does not necessarily denote lack of consideration, although the impulsive, explosive, jerky or jumpy mind is more apt to be required more often to make revisions in its conclusions.
“Because there is a margin for different minds to react differently from the same evidence and even with the benefit of the imponderables, and still he within the area in which a mind may operate reasonably — that is with reason, we have in the past recognized the reasonable man test.” Sine v. Harper, 118 Utah 415, 222 P. 2d 571 at page 585.
*632I think the “reasonable man” test is a short way of telling the judge to be objective — that is, try to determine whether in the particular matter under consideration other minds acting reasonably could come to different conclcsions than he did.
HENRIOD, J., concurs in the results of the dissenting opinion by Mr. Chief Justice WOLFE.