Court Opinion

ID: 9491392
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:13:00.165265+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:54:42.881220
License: Public Domain

DeMOSS, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
Everyone agrees that the instructions given at Harris’ trial were infected with error of constitutional magnitude. Based upon our precedent in Gray v. Lynn, 6 F.3d 265 (5th Cir.1993), and my independent review of this record, I believe there is a reasonable possibility that the jury’s verdict was not based upon the required showing that Harris had a specific intent to kill. I likewise believe that the erroneous jury instructions, coupled with the erroneous argument presented by both defense counsel and the prosecuting attorney, create a reasonable probability that, but for trial counsel’s unprofessional errors, the outcome might have been different. For those reasons, I must register my dissent.
The jury instructions used at Harris’ trial allowed the jury to convict upon a showing of less than all of the essential elements of the offense. Specifically, the instructions permitted Harris’ conviction for attempted murder upon a showing of an intent to commit great bodily harm. The panel majority has nonetheless concluded that that error was harmless because (1) Harris did not argue at trial that he did not have a specific intent to kill, and (2) because Harris’ trial counsel did not object to the erroneous instructions.
While it is true that Harris did not present any evidence tending to negate the specific intent to kill at trial, it is also true that the state presented absolutely no evidence designed to show that Harris had such an intent. That is simply because intent was not an issue at trial. The entire case was tried upon the erroneous assumption that a specific intent to commit great bodily harm, *441coupled with Harris’ perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated kidnaping was sufficient to support his conviction for attempted murder. Similarly, while it is true that Harris’ defense counsel did not object to the erroneous instructions, that fact made clear that defense counsel simply did not understand what was required to convict his client; and that is the very deficiency that serves as the foundation for Harris’ ineffective assistance of counsel argument.
I.
There is no dispute that Louisiana law does not permit an attempted murder conviction to be based upon a mere showing of intent to commit great bodily harm. That principal has been well-established since at least 1975. State v. Butler, 322 So.2d 189, 192 (La.1975).
Nonetheless, the jury was first informed by defense counsel, then informed by the prosecuting attorney, and then instructed by the trial court that the statute permitted conviction upon a finding that Harris either (1) had a specific intent to kill, or (2) had an intent to commit great bodily harm and was engaged in the perpetration of one of the listed felonies, in this case aggravated kid-naping. Defense counsel told the jury:
First degree murder is the killing of a human being. Okay, you have got First Degree Murder, and then you have got another Article says Attempted. What is an attempt? He read both of those to you. They intend to prove in this case that the Defendant had first of all a specific intent to kill, that’s going to be up to you, that’s the element of the crime, or to inflict great bodily harm and is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated kidnaping.
The prosecuting attorney told the jury:
[A]nd so at this point the State would tell you that we have presented our case and it is up to you if in fact you find beyond any reasonable doubt that this Defendant attempted to take the life of this person, or at least inflicted enough serious injury upon her that he should have known that her life was threatened and moreover that he forced her into the car under threats and carried her away against her will then in fact it would be your duty to vote to find the Defendant guilty as charged.
Having heard those erroneous arguments, the jury was then read the objectionable charge, which likewise permitted a conviction for attempted murder upon a showing of intent to inflict great bodily harm.
On direct appeal, the Louisiana Court of Appeal rejected Harris’ challenge to his sentence, but held sua sponte that the evidence was insufficient to establish that Harris was engaged in an aggravated kidnaping. Given that aggravated kidnaping was an essential element of the first degree murder conviction, the Court of Appeal held that the conviction could not stand. The Court of Appeal further held, however, that Harris’ conviction could be upheld on the lesser responsive verdict of attempted second degree murder because “[i]n order for this jury to have determined that the defendant was guilty of attempted first degree murder, the jury must have concluded that the defendant has the specific intent to kill this victim.” That statement would generally hold true. But because the deficient performance of Harris’ counsel continued on appeal, Harris did not raise the possibility that his verdict was im-permissibly based upon an intent to commit great bodily harm. Given the argument of counsel, the evidence presented, and the jury instructions, the Louisiana Court of Appeal’s statement that the jury necessarily found a specific intent to kill was in error.
The majority opinion makes no attempt to evaluate the impact of the erroneous arguments presented by defense counsel and the prosecuting attorney. That omission is notable given this Court’s decision in Gray, 6 F.3d 265 (5th Cir.1993). Gray’s jury was likewise instructed that it could convict of attempted murder on a showing of specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. At Gray’s trial, however, the law was correctly argued to the jury by both defense counsel and the prosecutor. See id. at 270 & n. 13. The prosecutor’s opening statement, which is quoted at length in Gray, makes plain that the specific intent to kill is required for conviction of attempted murder. Id. The *442Gray panel nonetheless found that the correct rendition of the law by both counsel was insufficient to overcome the presumption that the jury could have followed the instructions given by the trial court and could have based its finding of guilt on the erroneous intent. Accordingly, the Court held that counsel’s failure to object to the erroneous instruction was itself ineffective assistance of counsel that required relief. See id. at 265 (reversing denial of habeas relief and remanding for issuance of writ absent prompt retrial). Here in Harris, the majority is willing to sweep the same error under the rug and to ignore completely the unsavory effect of incorrect argument by both defense counsel and the prosecuting attorney.
The majority argues that Gray is distinguishable because Gray availed himself of an opportunity to terminate his offense, supporting an inference that he had only a specific intent to commit great bodily harm, while Harris did not avail himself of several opportunities to terminate his offense, suggesting that he had a specific intent to kill Ms. Jackson. But Gray was undeniably tried on the theory that he intended to kill his victim. See id. at 270 & n. 13. Harris, on the other hand, was tried on the theory' that he was trying to kidnap his victim, the theory that was overturned on appeal. Given that kidnaping was the state’s controlling theory at trial, the majority is in effect deciding that the jury based its verdict upon a theory that was never argued or presented at trial.
I conclude that there is more than a reasonable possibility that the jury convicted Harris upon a finding that Harris had an intent to inflict great bodily harm while engaged in an attempt to kidnap Ms. Jackson. Such a showing is insufficient to support an attempted murder conviction in Louisiana. I would, therefore, not find the error harmless.
II.
I am also troubled by the panel majority’s conclusory statement in footnote 11 that a finding of harmless error under Brecht necessarily requires a finding that a habeas petitioner cannot make a showing of prejudice under Strickland. While it may be true in the abstract that the threshold for establishing harmless error is semantically more lenient to habeas petitioners than the threshold for establishing Strickland prejudice, I do not believe that there is such a congruence of interests and factual circumstances that we can establish such a precedent without thoughtfully considering each habeas claim under its own appropriate standards. Whether trial counsel’s failure to understand and to require an appropriate instruction upon the essential elements of the crime with which his client was charged, compounded by counsel’s own erroneous presentation of those elements to the jury, prejudiced Harris in this case should be fully developed in the opinion. We should not avoid our obligation to consider the impact of counsel’s conceded deficiencies by simply formulating some equation between the standards governing Harris’ due process claim and the standards governing his ineffective assistance claim. Moreover, I do not read Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 1566-67, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995), cited in footnote 11 by the majority, as even inferentially supporting such notion.
With regard to the Strickland prejudice inquiry, I would once again rely heavily upon our precedent in Gray. I realize that harmless error analysis and Strickland prejudice analysis are both highly dependent upon the factual circumstances of each case. That does not mean, however, that we are free to abandon what we have said before about the various factors and circumstances that are significant to those inquiries. I am unable to reconcile this Court’s conclusion that counsel’s failure to object to an obviously erroneous instruction with respect to an essential element of the crime was prejudicial in Gray, with the panel majority’s holding that the same failure, coupled with egregiously incorrect argument from both sides, was not prejudicial here in Harris.
I respectfully dissent.