Court Opinion

ID: 9562678
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:32:38.848892+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:28.977957
License: Public Domain

Lovins, Judge:
This is a suit brought by Sidney J. Kwass against J. L. Kersey in the Circuit Court of Miercer County.
Essentially, it is an injunction suit seeking to enjoin the defendant from defaming the plaintiff. There are special prayers touching alleged threats of assault and *498attempted intimidation by the defendant against the plaintiff, and also concerning the damages allegedly suffered by the plaintiff from the defamatory words allegedly published by the defendant.
Upon the filing of the verified bill of complaint and a motion for a temporary injunction, the court'granted a temporary injunction without notice.
The defendant, his agents, servants, employees and representatives were enjoined: (1) from circulating or publishing a certain letter addressed to Walter G. Burton, (2) from circulating or publishing any written or printed matter charging the plaintiff, expressly or impliedly, with fraud, conspiracy; deceit, dishonesty or unethical conduct “or any other wrong-doing”, (3) from orally circulating or publishing charges of fraud, deception, conspiracy, dishonesty, unethical conduct, or any other wrong-doing, (4) from sending through the United States mails, or circulating or publishing in any manner whatsoever any written, printed or mimeographed letters, papers or documents, or from verbally making to any person or persons whatsoever, charges of unethical conduct, fraud, dishonesty, corruption, deception, or any other wrong-doing, (5) from making public or circulating any libelous or slanderous statements of any kind, character or description concerning the plaintiff, and (6) from interfering with, molesting, threatening, assaulting or attempting to intimidate the plaintiff.
After the award of a temporary injunction, the trial court entered a decree requiring the defendant to give a list of names and addresses of persons to whom copies of a letter, signed by the defendant and addressed to Walter G. Burton, was delivered or exhibited.
This suit grew out of the domestic troubles of the defendant’s daughter, Josephine Kersey Campbell, with her husband, Alexander D. Campbell, who had signed an agreement concerning their property rights and marital difficulties.
*499The plaintiff drafted an agreement supplemental to and revising the first agreement, and according to the theory of the defendant, plaintiff induced his daughter, Mrs. Campbell, to sign the same. The defendant seems to think that Mrs. Campbell was deprived of substantial property rights, and the right to have custody of her three infant children.
The plaintiff denies that he represented Mrs. Campbell. The defendant, with equal vigor, asserts that the plaintiff was regarded as Mrs. Campbell’s representative. In the course of negotiations, according to the charges made against the plaintiff, he advised Mrs. Campbell to go to Florida for the purpose of obtaining a divorce, and it seems that such effort was unsuccessful.
The instant suit was heard on the amended and supplemental bill of complaint, the demurrer of the defendant, Kersey, to such bill, which was overruled and the sworn answer of the defendant to such bill. The defendant thereupon moved the court to dissolve the injunction, which motion was overruled. This appeal followed.
A short synopsis of the salient facts alleged in the amended and supplemental bill of complaint discloses that the plaintiff is an attorney at law, residing in Bluefield; that he has a good reputation for honesty, integrity and ethical conduct; that he is wholly dependent for a livelihood upon the practice of his profession as an attorney at law; that he is a merhber of the Bar Association of his county and other organizations connected with the practice of the legal profession.
The plaintiff alleges that he represented Alexander D. Campbell and a corporation with which Campbell was connected for many years, prior to the institution of this suit; that at the request of said Alexander D. Campbell,.he prepared a written contract between Campbell and his wife under date of July 1, 1950. By that agreement, Campbell agreed to transfer to his wife all of the furniture, fixtures and household goods then owned by Campbell and located in the family home at Bluefield, West Virginia,, *500and. an automobile then owned by Campbell; that Mrs. Campbell should have custody of the three children, subject to “order of a court of competent jurisdiction and right of visitation by Mr. Campbell”; that Campbell should pay to his wife the sum of $75.00 per month for the support of each-of said children until said children reached the age of 18 years; that he would pay his wife the sum of $125.00 per month; that Campbell would continue to pay monthly payments on the mortgage covering the family home, amounting to about $13,000.00, until the mortgage was satisfied; that he would maintain insurance on his life for the protection of his wife and children to the limit of his financial ability.
Plaintiff further alleges that Campbell advised him that Campbell’s wife was dissatisfied with the provisions of the agreement; that she was tired of her duties as housekeeper and mother and desired to transfer those duties to her husband; and that it was her wish to leave Blue-field, “and make a life of her own at a place distant from Biuefield”.
The plaintiff alleges that Campbell advised him that Josephine Kersey Campbell had agreed to the revision of the contract of July 1, 1950, in certain particulars, which revision was accordingly made by the plaintiff.
Under the revised agreement, Mrs. Campbell was to convey the Campbell home in the City of Biuefield to her husband. The Campbell home wás worth approximately $16,500.00 at that time and was encumbered by a mortgage in the sum of $12,750.00. Campbell, in the revised agreement, was to pay his wife $200.00 for six months and if she was not gainfully employed, was to continue payment of $200.00 for a period of one year. Thereafter, the revised agreement provided that Campbell was to pay his wife $125.00 per month, as long as she lived or until she. remarried, and if she remarried, he was to pay her $500.00 a year, and that he would maintain life insurance on his life for the benefit of his wife and three children.
The plaintiff further alleged that Campbell requested *501him to prepare a supplemental agreement embodying the terms set forth above. The agreement was prepared and after two consultations, Campbell signed the agreement and informed the plaintiff that Josephine Kersey Campbell and her two brothers had inspected and approved the revised agreement.
On or about the 27th day of December, 1951, Campbell’s wife went to the office of the plaintiff signed and acknowledged the supplemental agreement, with full knowledge and appreciation of its terms and conditions.
The plaintiff alleged in his bill that he read the agreement to her and fully discussed the revised agreement with her. Plaintiff alleged that he had good cause to believe -from what Mrs. Campbell said to him that the revised agreement was acceptable to her; that at that time he suggested to Mrs. Campbell that she was free to discuss the agreement with other counsel; that if she did select such counsel that he would cause her husband to pay counsel fees involved in such consultations; but that Mrs. Campbell declined to consult another attorney and thereupon signed and acknowledged the revised agreement.
Plaintiff alleges that after the execution of the agreement, Mrs. Campbell and her father, the defendant, became dissatisfied with the revised agreement and without any justification, became very angry with the plaintiff and formulated a scheme to circulate as widely as possible among plaintiff’s friends, associates and the public in general, false reports which were in substance that the plaintiff was “dishonest, unscrupulous, unethical, a ‘shyster’, a deceiver and betrayer of clients”, and that the plaintiff should be disbarred as an attorney.
Plaintiff charges that Mrs. Campbell and the defendant, her father, entered into a conspiracy, having for its purpose the circulation of false reports concerning the plaintiff as a practicing attorney, for the object and purpose of destroying his reputation as a lawyer, and to cause prospective clients to believe that he was dishonest and to prevent him from being employed.
*502The plaintiff charges that pursuant to such arrangement between the defendant and his daughter, that they did circulate throughout Mercer County false reports, as above noted.
Plaintiff charges that the acts of the defendant and his daughter in the circulation of such reports have done him irreparable damage. Plaintiff also alleges that the defendant sent a letter to the plaintiff containing malicious falsehoods and statements of a scurrilous and defamatory nature. The plaintiff alleges that the defendant has exhibited copies of such letter to various persons and that doubt has been cast on his honesty and integrity; that a letter containing similar accusations, was sent to the Chairman of the Grievance Committee, West Virginia State Bar, Tenth District; that defendant has caused seventy-five copies of the letter addressed to such chairman to be mimeographed; and that in writing the letter and sending it to such chairman, the defendant was actuated by malice.
Plaintiff charges that the defendant has threatened bodily injury to him and also to have him disbarred from the practice of law. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant is not insolvent, but avers that he has not been employed for many years;.that his financial resources are limited; that defendant would be unable to pay any substantial judgment if any should be rendered against him; that some of his prospective clients and friends believe the charges of defendant and his daughter are true; and that if the defendant is not restrained from carrying out his libelous and defamatory scheme, he will suffer great damages. The bill prays that the defendant be required to furnish the names and addresses of all persons to whom the letter sent to the Grievance Committee Chairman has been sent; that he be enjoined from further circulation of such letter, as well as further circulation of the letter sent to the plaintiff direct; that defendant be enjoined from publishing any written or printed matter, impliedly or expressly charging the plaintiff with “fraud, deception, conspiracy, unethical conduct or any other wrong-doing” in connection with the affairs of Josephine *503Kersey Campbell; that defendant be enjoined from making oral charges of the nature noted above; that he be enjoined from sending any such printed or written,matter through the mail; that the defendant be enjoined from making pubic or circulating any libelous or slanderous statements of any kind and concerning the plaintiff; and that defendant be enjoined from threatening or assaulting the plaintiff. Plaintiff also prays that the defendant be required to pay such damages as he, the plaintiff has incurred or will incur from the libelous and slanderous statements.
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1 is a copy of a letter dated March 3, 1952, and addressed to the plaintiff and evidently mailed by the defendant. In this letter the defendant accuses the plaintiff, Kwass, of bad faith in drafting the revised agrees ment and denounces the conduct of plaintiff in emphatic terms. Plaintiff is advised by the defendant in that letter that the Bar Association or Court would be requested to examine his conduct. A similar letter, addressed to Walter G. Burton, Chairman of the Grievance Committee of the West Virginia State Bar, Tenth District, dated February 14, 1953, in which the accusations hereinbefore detailed, were repeated, ending with a request that an inquiry be made and that the public in general be protected from unscrupulous practitioners.
The defendant demurred to the plaintiff’s bill on six grounds, the substance of which is as follows: (1) That a court of equity has no jurisdiction, since the plaintiff has a plain, adequate and complete remedy at law, (2) that there is no allegation of contractual or trust relationship as between the defendant and the plaintiff, and that equity has no jurisdiction to enjoin the alleged libelous or slanderous statements, and particularly that equity has no jurisdiction to “enjoin the utterance of words or language tending to insults or violence or breach of peace”, (3) that the alleged conspiracy or intimidation are colorable only; (4) that under Article 3, Sections 7 and 8 of the Constitution of West Virginia, and Code, 55-7-2, the trial and vindication of rights of defamatory utterances is limited to *504actions at law and trial by jury, (5) that the granting of an injunction is in violation of Article III, Section 7, of the Constitution, as well as the first amendment of the Constitution of the United States for the reason it deprives the defendant of the right of freedom of speech, (6) that the allegedly libelous matter contained in the charges made to the Chairman of the State Bar Grievance Committee is privileged.
The demurrer was overruled. Thereupon, the defendant filed his answer. In it, the defendant denies any knowledge as to the standing of the plaintiff in the community. The defendant alleges that he is not fully informed concerning the representation of Alexander D. Campbell by the plaintiff or the corporation in which Campbell is interested.
The answer avers that Alexander D. Campbell is now the husband of Josephine Kersey Campbell and that Josephine Kersey Campbell is the daughter of this defendant. It is admitted by the defendant that his daughter and son-in-iaw were having domestic difficulties; that a written igreement had been prepared about January, 1950, between them and that said agreement was signed July 1, 1950; that Josephine Kersey Campbell employed the plaintiff to represent her in her difficulties with her husband.
The defendant avers upon information and belief that Josephine Kersey Campbell relied upon the plaintiff as her counsel, took his advice and that her employment of plaintiff contemplated a continuance of the relationship of at-, torney and client.
The defendant says that he is not informed as to whether Alexander D. Campbell advised the plaintiff that Josephine Kersey Campbell was dissatisfied with the provisions of the first contract of July 1, 1950, or as to any changes said Josephine Kersey Campbell desired to make in the first contract. Defendant however, says that if such representations were made by Alexander D. Campbell, that they were false. The defendant further answers and says that notwithstanding the relationship of attorney and *505client existing between Josephine Kersey Campbell and the plaintiff in this suit, that the plaintiff never informed her that he was representing her husband, and that the plaintiff knew that she was relying upon him to represent her.
The defendant further says that the plaintiff, without informing Josephine Kersey Campbell that he was representing her husband in negotiating and drafting the revised agreement between Campbell and his wife, persisted in requesting Mrs. Campbell to sign the revised agreement. Defendant avers that his daughter did not go voluntarily to the office of the plaintiff, but went upon persistent requests of plaintiff and signed the revised agreement after being urged and importuned to do so by the plaintiff.
The defendant denies that the plaintiff suggested that his daughter confer with other counsel, but on the contrary, after executing said agreement, the plaintiff insisted that Josephine Kersey Campbell leave the City of Blue-field 'and go to the State of Florida, there to consult an attorney concerning the recovery of the custody of her children, as well as the recovery of her property.
The defendant avers that the plaintiff knew, or should' have known that the Courts of Florida had no jurisdiction. But, notwithstanding this, the plaintiff arranged for Josephine Kersey Campbell to meet with him in the State of Florida and there employ counsel of plaintiff’s selection.
Defendant says that he and his daughter were dissatisfied with the provisions of the revised contract and that the plaintiff urged Mrs. Campbell to conceal from her father the existence of this contract during its preparation and execution; that the daughter of this defendant completely relied upon the plaintiff as her attorney and did so conceal the contents of the revised agreement.
The defendant alleged that he was angered by the conduct of the plaintiff, but denies entering into a scheme with his daughter to circulate defamatory matter. The *506defendant however avers that he did, upon learning the facts, conceive the idea of presenting a petition to the lawfully constituted authorities to inquire into the professional conduct of plaintiff, and that he did prepare and endeavor to file the same.
Defendant denies any unlawful combination or conspiracy existing between him and his daughter. He avers that he simply acted from his natural feelings toward his daughter, whom, he considered had been treated unfairly. Because of his devotion to her, he endeavored to have the plaintiff’s fitness to practice law inquired into.
Defendant denies that he widely circulated any false or untrue statements concerning plaintiff, but alleged that he has assembled the facts as he understood them. He admits sending a letter to the plaintiff, adverted to in the plaintiff’s bill of complaint, but he charges, upon information and belief, that the statements contained in such letter are true. He also admits that he wrote a letter to the Chairman of the Grievance Committee, West Virginia State Bar, Tenth District; that plaintiff’s exhibit No. 2 is a true copy of that letter.
Defendant denies that he has threatened to inflict bodily injury or make any assault upon the person of the plaintiff, but says that it was his intention to present the facts con-* tained in the letter to the Grievance Committee of the West Virginia State Bar.
Defendant says that he is not advised as to whether the plaintiff has sustained damages, irreparable or otherwise. Defendant denies that he is responsible for any injury to plaintiff because of his conduct as an attorney in handling the domestic difficulties between Campbell and his wife.
Pursuant to an interlocutory decree of the Circuit Court of Mercer County, the defendant furnished a list of the names and addresses of the persons to whom he had sent the copies of the letters mentioned above. The trial court, on July 8, 1953, overruled a motion to dissolve the temporary injunction.
*507The threshold question is: Does a court of equity have jurisdiction to enjoin the publication of defamatory statements, oral or written?
Other subsidiary questions are: (a) Does the plaintiff have an adequate and complete remedy at law? (b) Should the alleged defamation of the plaintiff’s professional standing be enjoined?
This suit presents a question which is of first impression in this jurisdiction. In fact, we have found no cases decided by this Court or the Supreme Court of Virginia, prior to 1863. “Equity has no jurisdiction when there is a full, complete remedy at law.” McGhee v. Stevens, 121 W. Va. 430, 3 S. E. 2d 615; Lewis v. Hall, 64 W. Va. 147, 61 S. E. 317; Coombs v. Shisler, 47 W. Va. 373, 34 S. E. 763; Michael v. Workman, 5 W. Va. 391.
“Bearing in mind the infamous history of the Star Chamber, it must be remembered that the subject matter of equity jurisdiction is the protection of civil rights and private property and not the prevention of crime or immoral acts when not in connection with violation of private rights. An injunction will not lie for the prevention of a crime or illegal or immoral act merely because of its illegality. One reason for noninterference in such case is the fundamental want of jurisdiction; another is the existence of an adequate remedy at law.” 10 M. J., Injunctions, §10. See Crossland v. Crossland, 53 W. Va. 108, 44 S. E. 424; State v. Ehrlick, 65 W. Va. 700, 64 S. E. 925; Ocean City Association v. Schurch, 57 N. J. Equity Reports, 268.
Jurisdiction of actions to award damages for defamation, written or spoken, is a well known function of courts of law in this jurisdiction. Sweeney v. Baker et al., 13 W. Va. 158.
It is a crime to use insulting words while on the enclosed lands of another to one lawfully on such lands. Code, 61-3-33.
The common law crime of defamation is still recognized in this jurisdiction. State v. Payne, 87 W. Va. 102, 104 S. E. *508288; State v. Clifford, 58 W. Va. 681, 52 S. E. 864; State v. Aler, 39 W. Va. 549, 20 S. E. 585.
The plaintiff in this suit has an adequate remedy at law: By action for damages, and as an added deterrent, a prosecution for the defamation by criminal prosecution. Citizens’ Light, H. & P. Co. v. Montgomery Light & W. P. Co., 171 Fed. 553.
We do not, however, express any opinion on the merits of a proceeding at law in either aspect.
It is a rule of general application in the United States that equity will not enjoin the publication of defamatory matter in the absence of a contractual or trust relation. An early case announcing that principle is Brandreth v. Lance, 8 New York Chancery Reports, 24 Paige, 8, decided in 1839. Headnotes of that case are as follows: “The court of chancery has not jurisdiction to restrain the publication of a libel, by injunction, upon a bill filed by the party whose character or business will be injured by the publication. An injunction to restrain a publication can only be granted in cases where the publication will interfere with the complainant’s right either of literary of other property in the subject matter of the publication.”
In the course of the opinion in Brandreth v. Lance, supra, the court uses the following language: “This bill presents the simple case of an application to the court of chancery to restrain the publication of a pamphlet which purports to be a literary work, undoubtedly a tale of fiction, on the ground that it is intended as a libel upon the complainant. The court of star chamber in England, once exercised the power of cutting off the ears, branding the foreheads, and slitting the noses of the libellers of important personages. (Hudson’s Star Chamber, 2 Collect. Jurid. 224.) And, as an incident to such a jurisdiction, that court was undoubtedly in the habit of restraining the publication of such libels by injunction. Since that court was abolished, however, I believe there is but one case upon record in which any court, either in this country or in England, has attempted, by an injunction or order of the court, to prohibit *509or restrain the publication of a libel, as such, in anticipation. In the case to which I allude the notorious Scroggs, chief justice of the court of king’s bench, and his associates, decided that they might be safely entrusted with the power of prohibiting and suppressing such publications as they might deem to be libellous.” The House of Commons of the Parliament of Great Britain impeached Scroggs for the exercise of such power.
“* * * where no breach of trust or of contract appears, a bill in equity will not lie to enjoin the publication of libelous statements injurious to the plaintiff’s business, trade or profession, or which operate as a slander of his title to property.” Finish Temperance Society Sovittaja v. Riavaaja Pub. Co. et al., (Mass.) 106 N. E. 561; Raymond v. Russell, (Mass.) 58 Am. Rep. 137. See Choate v. Logan, (Mass.) 133 N. E. 582; Lawrence Trust Co. v. Sun-American Pub. Co., (Mass.) 139 N. E. 655; Boston Diatite Company v. Florence Manufacturing Company, (Mass.) 19 Am. Rep. 310.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has receded somewhat from the doctrine immediately stated above. See the case of Menard v. Houle, (Mass.) 11 N. E. 2d 436, wherein it was held: “Where there is a continuing cause of unjustified and wrongful attack on a business man motivated by actual malice and causing damage to property rights as distinguished from injury to the personality affecting feelings, sensibility, and honor, equity will take jurisdiction, even though false statements and announcements are the means employed, and conspiracy or unfair competition does not appear, since there is no adequate remedy at law.”
The cases of Brandreth v. Lance, supra, and Finish Temperance Society Sovittaja v. Riavaaja Pub. Co. et al., supra, are in harmony with the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court of the United States. In Francis v. Flinn, 118 U. S. 165, 30 S. Ct. 385, 30 Law Ed. 386, wherein the following language is used: “The whole gist of the complaint is that the defendants do not treat the plaintiff as having a right to use his vessel as a pilot boat, and have *510publicly so stated, and that some of the parties mentioned have been subjected to suits for their acts in piloting. But if this be so, the plaintiff has a full remedy for his alleged wrongs in the courts of law. They furnish no ground for the interposition of a court of equity.” The decree of the lower court was reversed and the bill dismissed. A similar rule is enunciated by other courts of the United States. In Kidd v. Horry, 28 Fed. Rep. 773, it was held that the United States Courts are without jurisdiction to restrain the publication of libel. The following language used in the opinion is informative: “But neither the statute law of this country, nor any well-considered judgment of the courts, has introduced this new branch of equity, into our jurisprudence. There may be a case or two looking that way, but none that we deem of sufficient authority to justify us in assuming the jurisdiction.” See Edison v. Thomas A. Edison, Jr., Chemical Co., 128 Fed. 957; Black & Yates v. Mahogany Ass’n., 129 Fed. 2d 227; Toledo Computing Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co. (6 C. C. A.) 142 Fed. 919; American Malting Co. v. Keitel (2 C. C. A.) 209 Fed. 351; Oil Conservation Engineering Co. v. Brooks E. Co. (6 C. C. A.) 52 Fed. 2d 783; Dayton v. McGranery (U. S. C. A. Dist. of Col.) 201 Fed. 2d 711; Kuhn v. Warner Bros. Pictures (Dist. Ct., S. D. N. Y.) 29 Fed. Supp. 800.
A decision of the District Court of the Eastern District of Tennessee in the case of Starns v. Success Portrait Co., 28 Fed. Supp. 711, is to the effect that equity has no jurisdiction to enjoin the utterance of slander or the writing of libel, but if the “slander or libel is in bad faith, for the sole purpose of injuring the trade of the person defamed”,, an injunction may issue.
The case of Carter v. Knarpp Motor Co., (Ala.) 11 So. 2d 383, embodies a principle similar to that announced by the Massachussetts Court in Menard v. Houle, supra. In the Carter case, it was held the conduct of the defendant, was injurious and that an adequate remedy at law did not exist and that plaintiff was entitled to an injunction.
There is a line of cases, principally in the midwestern *511states which deny an injunction to restrain the publication of defamatory matter. See Life Assn. of America v. Boogher, 3 Mo. Appeal Rep. 173; Wolf v. Harris (Mo.) 184 S. W. 1139; Marx & Haas Jeans Clothing Co. v. Watson (Mo.) 67 S. W. 391; Howell v. Bee Pub. Co. (Neb.) 158 N. W. 358. See Montgomery Ward & Co. v. South Dakota R. M. & H. D. Ass’n. 150 Fed. 413.
The Supreme Courts of Missouri and Nebraska rest their decisions upon a constitutional provision, reading in substance as follows: “ -Every person may freely speak, write and publish on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty; and in all trials for libel, both civil and criminal, the truth when published with good motives, and for justifiable ends, shall be a sufficient defense.’ ” Under a similar provision of the constitution, it was held in the case of The New York Juvenile Guardian Society v. Roosevelt, 7 Daly’s Reports 188, that a court of equity was without jurisdiction to restrain publication of libelous matter.
Other jurisdictions however, without relying on such constitutional provisions above noted, have held that an injunction to restrain the publication of defamatory matter may not issue. In one instance, it was held that an injunction performing that function, awarded by a trial court, was an absolute nullity. State ex rel. Liversey et al. v. Judge Civil District Court, 34 La. Annual Rep. 741. See McMorries v. Hudson Sales Corp. (Texas) 233 S. W. 2d 938. Marlin Firearms Co. v. Shields, (N. Y.) 64 N. E. 163, is likewise authority for the proposition that injunction does not lie even though the manufacturer of a disparaged article has no remedy at law. The reasons assigned is that no special damages were shown. It is a rule of general application that in the absence of statute, equity has no jurisdiction to enjoin publication of defamatory matter, if no breach of trust or contract is involved. 43 C. J. S. Injunctions, §134.
“Although not a universal rule, it is one frequently acceded to and followed that in the absence of a showing of violation of some property right, or some breach of *512trust or contract, injunction is not available to prevent actual or threatened publications of a defamatory character, or to compel the retraction of such publications, at least if no property right is infringed.” 28 Am. Jur., Injunctions, §118.
In 2 High on Injunctions, Fourth Edition, §1015, the following language is used: “Upon the question of preventive relief in equity against the publication of libelous statements, affecting the character or business of plaintiff, the authorities, both English and American, indicate a noticeable want of uniformity, and are, indeed, wholly irreconcilable. The earlier English doctrine, and that which seems most in accord with the principles governing the jurisdiction of equity by way of injunction, was that the preventive jurisdiction being limited to the protection of property rights which are remediless by the usual course of procedure at law, courts of equity would not restrain the publication of libels or works of a libelous nature, even though such publications were calculated to injure the credit, business, or character of the person aggrieved, and that he would be left to pursue his remedy at law.” See Section 1093, id. In Newall Slander and Libel, Fourth Edition, §198, the following language is found: “The general rule in America is, and in England was, at least before the Common Law Procedure Act of 1854, that an injunction could not be issued to restrain a libel.” Citing Brandreth v. Lance, supra, and The New York Juvenile Guardian Society v. Roosevelt, supra.
Indeed, we have found no authority in the United States which holds that mere defamation can be enjoined. In some instances, as herein stated, Courts have enjoined it for the reason that it was connected with disparagement of tangible property generally for sale or manufactured by the defendant. See Weiss v. Levine, (N. J. Chancery) 32 A. 2d 574; Esskay Art Gallaries v. Gibbs, (Ark.) 172 S. E. 2d 924; Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence, Third Ed. §1358; XVIII A. and E. Encyclopaedia of Law, Libel and Slander, §XV et. seq.
The same rule prevailed in England, but since the adop*513tion of the Common Law Procedure Act of 1854 and the Judicature Act of 1873 by that country, jurisdiction to grant interlocutory injunctions enforcing libel and slander has been assumed.
An excellent article which argues eloquently that courts of equity should have jurisdiction to grant injunctions of the kind here discussed, written by Dean Roscoe Pound, will be found in 29 Harvard Law Review at page 640. Essentially, the article by Dean Pound is in part a criticism of the finding of Lord Eldon in the case of Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swans. 402, 36 English Reports Reprint 670. It is argued that the findings of Lord Eldon in the case of Gee v. Pritchard, supra, is dictum; and that it should be the law that equity has jurisdiction to enjoin the publication of libel' and slander. While the article by Dean Pound is very persuasive, we do not agree with the conclusion expressed therein.
Thus far, we have cited authorities of general application. The case of Gariepy v. Springer, (Ill. App.) 48 N. E. 2d 572, is in point with the case at bar. In the Gariepy case, the plaintiff sought and obtained an injunction in the trial court, enjoining alleged defamatory matter which had been allegedly published in derrogation of the plaintiff’s standing as a lawyer. The court held that equity, as a general proposition, would not enjoin the publication of defamatory matter, injuring the person’s credit and business standing. The second headnote in the Gariepy case reads as follows: “Equity is without jurisdiction to restrain publication of a libel except in cases involving conspiracy, intimidation, or coercion.”
There is no proof in this record of the allegations in the bill of complaint charging conspiracy against the plaintiff, of intimidation or coercion employed against him. True, conspiracy, intimidation and coercion are alleged, but such allegations are denied by the defendant’s answer.
A similar holding to that in the Gariepy case will be found in the case of Lietzman v. Radio Broadcasting Sta*514tion W. C. F. L. 282 Ill. App. 203. In the Lietzman case, a corporation was the plaintiff, the corporation being a practitioner of dentistry.
' If a right of trial by jury existed prior to the adoption of the constitution, the legislature cannot legally extend equity jurisdiction to such cases and thus deprive a litigant of a jury trial against his will. Lawhead v. Grand Lodge, 115 W. Va. 475, 176 S. E. 860; Cecil et al. v. Clark et al., 44 W. Va. 457, 30 S. E. 178. But, if at the time equity had jurisdiction in certain litigation, the clause of our constitution guaranteeing jury trial does not apply to such litigation or deprive equity of jurisdiction, therein to act without a jury. Cecil et al. v. Clark et al., supra.
Adverting again to the question of enjoining interference with property rights, we are aware that in Sloan v. Mitchell, 113 W. Va. 506, 168 S. E. 800, it was held that the right to practice medicine was a valuable property right and the unauthorized practice of medicine by Mitchell, the defendant, was enjoined. Similarly, it has been held that the right to practice law is a property right. Unger v. Landlords’ Management Corporation (N. J.) 168 A. 229; Fitchette v. Taylor (Minn.) 254 N. W. 910; Montgomery County Bar v. Rinalducci (Pa.) 197 A. 924.
The property right in the practice of a profession is ex necessitate, an intangible property, connected with the personality of a practitioner of such profession.
Many courts have distinguished between a continuing “trade libel” and defamation of personality. Black & Yates v. Mahogany Ass’n., supra. Such distinction seems to be part of the reason for the decisions in Menard v. Houle, supra, and Carter v. Knapp Motor Company, supra.
In the instant case, the suit is based on alleged defamation of plaintiff as a lawyer. The personality of the plaintiff and his professional standing as a lawyer cannot be separated on, a rational basis. Since there is no defamation of tangible personal property alleged or shown in this record, we do not think that any question of defama*515tion or disparagement of tangible personal property can be here considered.
Our attention has been directed to Article III, Section 7, Constitution of West Virginia, which reads as follows: “No law abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, shall be passed; but the Legislature may by suitable penalties, restrain the publication or sale of obscene books, papers, or pictures, and provide for the punishment of libel, and defamation of character, and for the recovery, in civil actions, by the aggrieved, party, of suitable damages for such libel, or defamation.”
In considering this part of our constitution, it was inferentially held in the case of Bailey v. Charleston Mail Association, 126 W. Va. 252, 27 S. E. 2d 837, that no special privilege or right is conferred thereby relative to the law of defamation, by that provision. “No case has been found in which any court, state or federal, has held that the communication or dissemination of falsehoods or of malicious statements by speech, press or otherwise is protected by any constitutional guaranty.” Blossom Dairy Co. v. International Brotherhood, Etc., 125 W. Va. 165, 23 S. E. 2d 645, 650. See 16 C. J. S. Constitutional Law, Section 215-e. But since we express no opinion on the merits of plaintiff’s cause of action, if any, we should not discuss further the question of freedom of speech, nor the question of whether the letter to the Chairman of the Grievance Committee of the West Virginia State Bar, Tenth District, is absolutely or qualifiedly privileged.
Section 8 of Article III of our Constitution, reads as follows: “In prosecutions and civil suits for libel, the truth may be given in evidence; and if it shall appear to the jury, that the matter charged as libelous, is true, and was published with good motives, and for justifiable ends, the verdict shall be for the defendant.” This provision of our Constitution, at least by.implication, indicates that a jury should pass upon the truth or falsity of allegedly defamatory matter.
Code, 55-7-2, dealing with insulting words, indicates *516that an intervention of a jury is necessary in passing thereon. We therefore refrain from passing on the truthfulness or falsity of the allegedly defamatory matter set forth in the plaintiff’s bill of complaint.
In accordance with the foregoing, we hold that the cause of action, if any, possessed by the plaintiff, was brought in the wrong forum and should have been instituted on the law side of the court.
Agreeable to the foregoing, the decree of the Circuit Court of Mercer County is reversed, the temporary injunction is dissolved and the bill of complaint is dismissed.

Reversed; temporary injunction dissolved; bill of complaint dismissed.