Court Opinion

ID: 9372918
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:01:32.961819+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:38.847028
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     MARY G. VALENZUELA,                             DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                         SF-0752-22-0039-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,                         DATE: February 3, 2023
                 Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Bosko Petricevic, Esquire, Honolulu, Hawaii, for the appellant.

           Thomas J. Tangi, Jacksonville, Florida, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                     REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed her involuntary resignation appeal for lack of jurisdiction .        For the
     reasons discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition, VACATE the

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                    2

     initial decision, and REMAND the appeal to the Western Regional Office for
     further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

                                     BACKGROUND
¶2        The appellant was employed as a GS-15 Physician at a Naval Health Clinic
     in Hawaii. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 7 at 61. She had various serious health
     issues causing her to request Family and Medical Leave Act protected leave in
     October 2018, which was approved by the agency. IAF, Tab 7 at 14, 31, Tab 10
     at 44, 46-47. In April 2019, the appellant requested a reduced work schedule of
     three 8-hour days per week and the ability to take paid or unpaid leave as a
     reasonable accommodation. IAF, Tab 10 at 49-50. After the appellant provided
     the agency with requested documentation, the agency granted the appellant
     interim approval of her request in August 2019. Id. at 52-55, 57-59, 61. The
     appellant noted that during this time she was also allowed 3.5 hours of
     administrative time each week and was not required to have 100 bookable
     appointments per week. IAF, Tab 7 at 14-15, 31.
¶3        In March 2020, after the COVID-19 pandemic started, the appellant was
     placed on telework due to her high risk status resulting from her health
     conditions. IAF, Tab 7 at 15, 32. She had surgery in June 2020 and she was on
     medical leave until October 2020. Id. at 15, 32. In June 2020, a new individual
     assumed command of the Naval Health Unit and, in August 2020, he received a
     complaint from a local business owner alleging that the appellant committed a
     Hatch Act Violation. Id. at 15, 32, 63-69. He initiated an investigation into the
     purported Hatch Act violation. Id. at 15-16, 32-33.
¶4        Prior to her return to work, the appellant provided the new commander with
     a medical note recommending that she stay on a 3-day work schedule with 2 days
     of leave. IAF, Tab 10 at 55. In September 2020, the agency provided her with
     the “final approval” of her request for accommodation, which was a modified
     work schedule of four 10-hour days and the ability to schedule patients for
                                                                                           3

     30 minutes per appointment, which was more than the standard allowance of
     20 minutes.    Id.   The appellant also noted that the agency discontinued the
     3.5 hours of administrative time that her colleagues received and required her to
     have 100 bookable appointments each week, the same number as her colleagues.
     IAF, Tab 7 at 20, 35. The appellant returned to work in November 2020 on a four
     10-hour day schedule. Id. at 18, 35. The agency issued the appellant a Letter of
     Caution in January 2021 for a Hatch Act violation of engaging in partisan
     political activity while on duty. 2 IAF, Tab 10 at 84-85.
¶5         On April 11, 2021, the appellant requested a revision of her prior
     accommodation, asserting that it was insufficient, especially given the loss of the
     3.5 hours of administrative time per week, and she attributed the development of
     left arm neuropathy to her increased work hours. IAF, Tab 7 at 11 7-22, Tab 10
     at 87-90.   She requested three 8-hour days each week, including 3.5 hours of
     administrative time per week, scheduling in-person appointments in 30-minute
     blocks with 20 minutes for virtual appointments, a headphone assistive device,
     ability to take leave as directed by her treating specialists, an ergonomic
     assessment, and having no procedures scheduled until her left arm neuropathy
     was resolved. IAF, Tab 7 at 117. The agency confirmed receipt of the reasonable
     accommodation request on April 19, 2021. Id. at 121-22. That same day, the
     appellant emailed a letter of resignation to an agency human resources employee,
     stating that she was resigning due to health reasons. 3 IAF, Tab 10 at 92, 94.
     Following her resignation, on May 27, 2021, the agency rescinded the Letter of

     2
      The Letter of Caution stated that the appellant posted a photo while on duty that was
     considered political because it discussed the concept of “white privilege” and “white
     guilt” and how it is associated with “liberal indoctrination.” IAF, Tab 10 at 84.
     3
       In the April 19, 2021 email, the appellant noted that she intended for May 7 to be her
     last day. IAF, Tab 10 at 92. However, she subsequently requested to delay the
     effective date of her resignation to exhaust her leave and complete her work and other
     administrative tasks. Id. at 98. The appellant’s Standard Form 50 lists May 14 as the
     effective date of her resignation. Id. at 103.
                                                                                             4

     Caution, observing that only the Office of Special Counsel has jurisdiction to
     investigate Hatch Act violations. Id. at 105-06.
¶6         The appellant timely filed the instant appeal, 4 alleging that her resignation
     was involuntary based on intolerable working conditions. IAF, Tab 1 at 6. The
     administrative judge issued an order informing the appellant that the Board may
     not have jurisdiction over her appeal, apprising her of how to establish
     jurisdiction over an involuntary resignation appeal, and ordering her to file
     evidence and argument on the jurisdictional issue.            IAF, Tab 3 at 2-4.       In
     response, the appellant alleged that she was coerced into resigning when her new
     supervisor and a subordinate manager investigated her for a fabricated Hatch Act
     violation, issued her a Letter of Caution about engaging in partisan political
     activity while on duty, denied her requests for reasonable accommodation without
     engaging in the interactive process, and changed her schedule from part -time to
     full-time with no administrative time. IAF, Tab 7 at 12-23, 33-35, 38-39.
¶7         Without holding the appellant’s requested hearing, the administrative judge
     issued an initial decision dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.          IAF,
     Tab 11, Initial Decision (ID) at 1, 23. The administrative judge found that the
     appellant failed to nonfrivolously allege that her resignation was coerced based
     on intolerable working conditions and the agency’s denials of her reasonable
     accommodation requests. ID at 22. He further found that the appellant failed to
     nonfrivolously allege that she is a qualified person with a disability who could
     have performed the essential functions of her position with the requested
     accommodations. ID at 21-22.

     4
       On March 14, 2021, the appellant filed an equal employment opportunity (EEO)
     complaint alleging, among other things, that the agency discriminated against her based
     on her race, religion, and disability. IAF, Tab 6 at 5. She subsequently amended her
     EEO complaint to include a constructive discharge claim and a failure to accommodate
     claim. IAF, Tab 6 at 5-6, Tab 10 at 103. Thereafter, the agency issued a final agency
     decision, finding that the appellant failed to prove her discrimination claim . IAF, Tab 6
     at 5-18. As the administrative judge explained, there is no timeliness issue in this
     Board appeal. ID at 7 n.2.
                                                                                                5

¶8          The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision . 5 Petition
      for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. In her petition, the appellant reiterates that she
      was   coerced    into    resigning   because   of   the   denial   of    her   reasonable
      accommodation request and because of an improper Hatch Act investigation and
      the resulting Letter of Caution. PFR File, Tab 1 at 12-19. She opines that the
      administrative   judge     applied   the   incorrect   evidentiary      standard   at   the
      jurisdictional stage and improperly separated her allegations of intolerable
      working conditions into separate strands, which weakened the overall effect of
      her allegations. Id. at 7-12. The agency has filed a response, PFR File, Tab 3, to
      which the appellant has replied, PFR File, Tab 4.

                       DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶9          An employee-initiated action, such as a resignation, is presumed to be
      voluntary and, thus, outside the Board’s jurisdiction.        Vitale v. Department of
      Veterans Affairs, 107 M.S.P.R. 501, ¶ 17 (2007). An involuntary resignation,
      however, is tantamount to a removal and, therefore, is within the Board’s
      jurisdiction. Garcia v. Department of Homeland Security, 437 F.3d 1322, 1328
      (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc). To overcome the presumption that a resignation is
      voluntary, the employee must show that it was the result of the agency’s
      misinformation, deception, or coercion.        Vitale, 107 M.S.P.R. 501, ¶ 19.          The
      touchstone of a voluntariness analysis is whether, considering the totality of the
      circumstances, factors operated on the employee’s decision-making process that
      deprived her of freedom of choice. Id.
¶10         The appellant has the burden of proving the Board’s jurisdiction by a
      preponderance of the evidence. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(2)(i)(A). However, once
      5
        The appellant filed her petition for review in Hawaii, which is 5 hours behind Eastern
      time. All pleadings filed via e-Appeal Online are time stamped with Eastern Time.
      5 C.F.R. § 1201.14(m)(1). Although the appellant’s Board appeal was time stamped as
      being filed on January 8, 2022, at 12:42 a.m., Eastern Time, it was actually filed on
      January 7, 2022, at 7:42 p.m., Hawaii Time. PFR File, Tab 1 at 3. Thus, the
      appellant’s petition for review, which was due on January 7, 2022, was timely filed.
                                                                                             6

      the appellant presents nonfrivolous allegations of Board jurisdiction, she is
      entitled to a hearing.     Carey v. Department of Health and Human Services,
      112 M.S.P.R. 106, ¶ 6 (2009).            In determining whether the appellant’s
      submissions set forth a nonfrivolous allegation of jurisdiction entitling her to a
      hearing, the Board may consider the agency’s documentary submissions;
      however, to the extent that the agency’s evidence constitutes mere factual
      contradiction of the appellant’s otherwise adequate prima facie showing of
      jurisdiction, the Board may not weigh evidence and resolve conflicting assertions
      of the parties and the agency’s evidence may not be dispositive. Ferdon v. U.S.
      Postal Service, 60 M.S.P.R. 325, 329 (1994). 6
¶11         As noted, prior to the appellant’s return to work in November 2020, she
      provided the agency with an updated medical note requesting that she continue to
      work three 8-hour days.      IAF, Tab 10 at 63.       The agency did not grant this
      accommodation and instead assigned the appellant a work schedule of four
      10-hour days per week. In April 2021, the appellant again requested a reasonable
      accommodation, asserting, among other things, that her current schedule caused
      her “significant physical and mental stress, affecting [her] overall health,” and
      that she had developed left arm neuropathy because of her working conditions.
      IAF, Tab 7 at 117-22, Tab 10 at 87-90. She sought a restoration of her previous
      reasonable accommodation that had been in place prior to her return to work in
      November 2020.       IAF, Tab 7 at 117.         She also sought the 3.5 hours of
      administrative time provided to her colleagues. Id. The appellant resigned soon
      thereafter, citing health reasons. IAF, Tab 10 at 92, 94.

      6
        In her petition for review, the appellant argues that the administrative judge erred by
      not applying the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s decision in Hessami v.
      Merit Systems Protection Board, 979 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 20 20), regarding the weight
      to give evidence at the jurisdictional stage of a Board proceeding. PFR File, Tab 1
      at 7-9. We discern little difference between the court’s holding in Hessami and the
      Board’s holding in Ferdon in this regard. Having found that the appellant made a
      nonfrivolous allegation of Board jurisdiction, we need not discuss this issue further.
                                                                                        7

¶12        The denial of a reasonable accommodation that would have permitted an
      employee to continue working despite her medical conditions, and that leads to
      the employee’s resignation, is a wrongful action that can be the basis of an
      alleged involuntary resignation claim.     Hosozawa v. Department of Veterans
      Affairs, 113 M.S.P.R. 110, ¶¶ 2, 6-7 (2010) (finding that an appellant
      nonfrivolously alleged that her retirement was involuntary when she alleged that
      the agency denied her request for a reasonable accommodation that would have
      permitted her to continue to work full-time despite her medical conditions).
      Here, the appellant asserts that her resignation was involuntary because the
      agency denied her September 2020 request for accommodation that, according to
      her doctors, would have permitted her to continue to work despite her various
      health issues, and without which her health further worsened, causing her to
      develop left arm neuropathy in April 2021.
¶13         We recognize the passage of time between the denial of the reasonable
      accommodation request and the appellant’s resignation, but, at this stage of the
      proceedings, do not find it significant.     First, according to the appellant, her
      health condition deteriorated because of the agency’s September 2020 reasonable
      accommodation decision, and the fact that she worked under the accommodation
      imposed by the agency for several months does not mean that the agency’s failure
      was not the cause of the appellant’s resignation. Second, the Federal Circuit has
      held that at the jurisdictional stage of a Board proceeding, the Board should not
      discount the probative value of an allegation that supports a claim of
      involuntariness because of the passage of time.          Trinkl v. Merit Systems
      Protection Board, 727 F. App’x 1007, 1010-11 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
¶14        In addition to the denial of her reasonable accommodation request, the
      appellant also points to the Hatch Act investigation and the resulting Letter of
      Caution as facts that made her working conditions intolerable and caused her to
      resign. The Board has held that being subjected to unnecessary investigations
      and being unjustifiably threatened with discipline do es not suffice to establish an
                                                                                            8

      allegation of involuntary resignation. Baldwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
      109 M.S.P.R. 392, ¶¶ 19-20 (2008).           Nevertheless, in assessing whether a
      resignation was involuntary, the Board must look at the totality of the
      circumstances, and thus these individual incidents, when considered with the
      other record evidence, may support a finding of involuntariness. Brown v. U.S.
      Postal Service, 115 M.S.P.R. 609, ¶ 10 (stating that the issue in an involuntary
      resignation appeal is whether, considering the totality of the circumstances, the
      employee’s working conditions were made so difficult that a reasonable person in
      the employee’s position would have felt compelled to resign), aff’d, 469 F. App’x
      852 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Similarly, the appellant’s allegations of discrimination and
      reprisal must also be considered as part of the total circumstances that may
      support a finding of involuntariness even if the appellant’s evidence does not
      support a finding of discrimination. 7 Markon v. Department of State, 71 M.S.P.R.
      574, 578 (1996) (stating that at the jurisdictional stage of an involuntary
      retirement appeal, the Board will consider allegations of discrimination to the
      extent that they bear on the issue of voluntariness).
¶15         In sum, given the low evidentiary threshold required to constitute a
      nonfrivolous allegation that her resignation was involuntary, we find that the
      appellant has met that burden.        Accordingly, we remand this matter to the
      Western Regional Office for further proceedings, including the hearing requested

      7
        The administrative judge found that the appellant failed to nonfrivolously allege that
      she was a qualified individual with a disability and thus a failure to reasonably
      accommodate cannot support a finding of an involuntary resignation . ID at 21-22. The
      medical condition that the administrative judge found rendered the appellant unable to
      perform the essential functions of her condition, left arm neuropathy, was, according to
      the appellant, temporary and caused by the agency’s failure to accommodate her in the
      autumn of 2020. Thus, we do not agree with the administrative judge’s finding that the
      appellant failed to make a nonfrivolous allegation in this regard.
                                                                                               9

      by the appellant. To prevail on her claim, the appellant must now prove that her
      resignation was involuntary by preponderant evidence. 8

                                              ORDER
¶16         For the reasons discussed above, we vacate the initial decision and remand
      this case to the Western Regional Office for further adjudication in accordance
      with this Remand Order.

      FOR THE BOARD:                                       /s/ for
                                                   Jennifer Everling
                                                   Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.

      8
        In her petition for review, the appellant requests that if t he appeal is remanded, it be
      assigned to a different administrative judge. PFR File, Tab 1 at 20. Other than the
      administrative judge’s adverse ruling, the appellant cites nothing causing us to question
      the administrative judge’s ability to fairly adjudicate this appeal on remand. See
      Argabright v. Department of Defense, 113 M.S.P.R. 152, ¶ 10 (2010) (stating that an
      erroneous case-related ruling was insufficient to overcome the presumption of honesty
      and integrity that accompanies administrative judges); Lee v. U.S. Postal Service,
      48 M.S.P.R. 274, 281 (1991) (stating that the fact that an administrative judge has ruled
      against a party in the past, or mere conclusory statements of bias, do not provide
      sufficient bases for assignment of a new administrative judge). Accordingly, we deny
      the appellant’s request.