Court Opinion

ID: 9643590
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:33:37.532873+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:01.711213
License: Public Domain

CAPPY, Justice,
concurring.
I join the opinion issued by the majority today. However, I am constrained to write separately to emphasize that once it is determined that there is a vested life estate, a court cannot preclude the possessor of the life estate from receiving the proceeds from the sale of such estate.
A life estate arises when a conveyance or will expressly limits the duration of the created estate in terms of the life or lives of one or more persons, or when the will or instrument creating the interest, viewed as a whole, manifests the intent of the transferor to create an estate measured by the life or lives of one or more persons. Cornelius J. Moynihan, Introduction to the Law of Real Property, Chapter 2, §10 (1962); see also Ladner on Conveyancing in Pennsylvania, §1.03(b)(Timothy J. O’Neill 4th ed.1988). A life estate has the quality of alienability, thus the life estate can be conveyed to a third person; but, the life estate holder can not convey a greater interest than he/she possesses. Generally, the life estate holder is responsible for interest on any mortgage on the property, and has a duty to pay current taxes and assessments, by a municipality or other public authority, which do not exceed the probable duration of the life estate. Moynihan; Ladner.
Moreover, a life estate may be one of special limitation, subject to a condition subsequent or executory limitation. As a general rule, any restraint on alienation of the life estate is void, but a restraint in the form of forfeiture is valid.1 Moynihan, §12, supra. In determining whether the life estate holder’s powers are limited, the court looks at the four corners of the will. The testator’s intent is the polestar in the construction of every will. Bowman v. Brown, 394 Pa. 647, *496149 A.2d 56, 59 (Pa.1959). In interpreting a will, the court must give effect to every word and clause such that no provision will be made nugatory. Bowman.
The first issue in the instant case is whether based on the language of the will the testator intended to create a life estate.2 The plain language of the will creates a life estate, which vests upon the occurrence of two events: (1) Mrs. Colwell survives the testator by thirty days; and (2) she notifies the executors of her intent to occupy the apartment within 120 days of his death. She satisfied both of these requirements, and therefore, the life estate vested.3
The next issue is whether the remaining language of the clause at issue, limited her interest, such that she was not entitled to the proceeds of the sale of that interest. I find that *497the remaining language of the clause in question, which follows the grant of the life estate, makes plain that the testator did not intend to limit Mrs. Colwell’s life estate since the responsibilities to pay taxes and assessments would be the normal responsibilities of the possessor of the life estate. Therefore, I conclude that Mrs. Colwell was given a life estate in real property without any limitations on her power, and thus she had the right to sell her life estate and receive any proceeds from the sale of her life estate.4
Accordingly, the majority correctly determined that Ms. Colwell could receive her portion of the proceeds which represented the value of her life estate in the real property.

. An example of a restraint in the form of forfeiture is the following: to A, for life, so long as she remains a widow.

. Mr. Hewitt’s will provides, in pertinent part:
(B) I give to HELEN M. COLWELL, if she survives me by 30 days, for her life, my interest in real property located at 302 Fox Chapel Road, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15238, being Apartment No. 309 in Fox Chapel Mews II; provided however, that Mrs. Colwell shall advise my Corporate Executor of her election to occupy my apartment within 120 days following my death. Mrs. Colwell may occupy my apartment without bond and without liability for waste; provided, however; that she shall keep the apartment adequately insured, maintained and repaired and shall pay all real taxes, water and sewer rents, assessments, carrying charges and similar charges thereon. Upon Mrs. Colwell’s death, or if she should predecease me, upon my death (i) such apartment should be sold and the net proceeds distributed as part of my residuary estate as set forth in Article III. RR at 3a-5a.

. Moreover, as noted by the majority in fn. 5, the instant case is clearly distinct from Estate of Felice, 487 Pa. 342, 409 A.2d 382 (Pa.1979). In Felice, this court concluded that the testator had devised to Ms. Chase, only a life estate in the residuary trust, not a life estate in the real property. Thus, unlike the instant case, Ms. Chase would not have been able to alienate her life estate in the real property, since she had no interest in the real property which she could sell. This result is distinct from the instant case where Mrs. Colwell possesses a life estate in the real property. In the case sub judice, Mrs. Colwell could sell her life estate, and would be entitled to keep the proceeds from the sale of her life estate. Although, as Mr. Justice Nigro points out in his dissenting opinion, the value of a life estate is highly speculative, since a life estate is not, as a practical matter, a marketable commodity. But, I am not troubled by the use of the actuarial tables to value Mrs. Colwell's life estate, since a court would use such tables in determining the life estate holder’s portion of responsibility for any permanent improvement to the land.

. The possessor of a life estate and the remaindermen or executor with the power to sell may combine to sell the real property to a third party in fee simple. 14 P.L.E., Estates in Property, §72 (1959).