Court Opinion

ID: 9681587
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:52:58.329693+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:34.674886
License: Public Domain

Robert L. Brown, Justice, concurring. I disagree with the majority that evidence of Brad McLean’s fingerprint on one of the trap-guns would have added little to Gordon’s defense. The majority bases this conclusion on the fact that there was testimony from others that McLean was involved in marijuana growing. But that proof hardly equates to evidence that McLean’s fingerprints were on one of the deadly devices responsible for wounding Officer. Carr. Gordon’s attempted defense was that someone else — Brad McLean in particular — did it. Thus, any curtailment of Gordon’s ability to point to McLean as the culprit was crucial. As the majority points out, the prosecutor opened the door to testimony about other suspects with this colloquy with Officer Beach on direct examination: PROSECUTOR: The technician, you were saying, explained to you what? BEACH: That he had found one, partial latent print on one of the devices and that ... PROSECUTOR: On one of the booby trap devices? BEACH: Yes sir, and that as a result of his comparison to the known prints that were submitted, the print was not suitable to identify any potential suspect, there were not enough points of identification to identify any one person. PROSECUTOR: Okay, so what he found was a partial print on one of those devices but it didn’t have enough of a print to make up, sufficient points to make a comparison with the known prints you were submitting? BEACH: That’s correct, there were not enough points to identify any one particular suspect. This testimony by Officer Beach, which was admittedly hearsay of what the fingerprint expert told him, left the distinct impression with the jury that that expert (Ralph Turbyfill) had no suspect in mind. On cross-examination, Gordon’s counsel tried to clarify through Officer Beach that Turbyffll had in fact matched five points on the latent fingerprints taken from the trap-gun with Brad McLean’s fingerprints. The trial court refused to allow this questioning on grounds that Gordon’s counsel had not objected to the first hearsay statement by Officer Beach and, as a second reason, that what counsel was now attempting to elicit was hearsay of his own. I further take issue with the conclusion by the majority that there is no authority allowing the defense to do what it sought to do in this case. This court has recognized the principle that once a party has opened the door with inadmissible evidence, the opposing party can do likewise: Since Walder, (Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954)), we have recognized the propriety of “fighting fire with fire” when one of the parties opens the door with an untruthful statement, introduces inadmissible evidence, or makes an improper closing argument. Larimore v. State, 317 Ark. 111, 121, 877 S.W.2d 570, 574 (1994); see also Porter v. State, 308 Ark. 137, 823 S.W.2d 846 (1992). That is what we have here. Officer Beach first alluded to statements by Turbyfill that were hearsay, and defense counsel, as a result, tried to correct the misleading statements by eliciting additional hearsay from the police officer. Under the authority of Walder v. United States and Larimore v. State, that is permissible. The treatise, Jones on Evidence, confirms the principle: Evidence that is irrelevant or otherwise inadmissible, if offered by a party in the first instance, may become properly admissible to rebut or explain evidence offered by another party. 2 Clifford S. Fishman, Jones on Evidence Civil and Criminal, § 11:34, at 352 (7th Ed. 1994). This is known as the rule of verbal completeness. Id. at § 11:35; p. 355. The treatise goes on to state that while one state (Ohio) would not permit this, [t]he better view ... is that the “rule of completeness” permits introduction of otherwise inadmissible evidence for the limited purposes of explaining or putting other, already admitted evidence, into context, or avoiding misleading the jury. Id. at § 11:39, p. 370. (Emphasis added.) An analogous rule is the rule of curative admissibility which is a discretionary rule of evidence based on principles of fairness. 2 Clifford S. Fishman, Jones on Evidence Civil and Criminal, § 11:41, at 374 (7th Ed. 1994). The rule is described as follows: If one party has gotten away with a breach of the rules, sometimes the only practical way to undo the unfair advantage (other than a mistrial) is to allow the other party a compensatory breach. Thus, if one party has been allowed to present irrelevant or otherwise inadmissible evidence, the judge should allow the opposing party to present similar evidence if such is necessary to offset the unfair advantage or prejudicial effect of the earlier improper evidence. Id. Finally, I question whether Gordon’s sole recourse to combat the testimony of Officer Beach was calling Turbyfill as his own witness. Our case law holds that Gordon had the right to fight fire with fire and correct the missimpression left with the jury. See Larimore v. State, supra; Porter v. State, supra. This rationale should apply irrespective of whether the party subsequendy calls the de-clarant as a witness. The issue that places me in the posture of concurring is whether a party must object to the initial hearsay. The Iowa Supreme Court says this is not necessary: [The] doctrine [curative admissibility] provides that when one party introduces inadmissible evidence, with or without objection, the trial court may allow the adverse party to offer otherwise inadmissible evidence on the same subject if it is responsive to the evidence in question. Lala v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. of Cedar Rapids, 420 N.W.2d 804, 807-808 (Iowa 1988). Nevertheless, this court has not addressed that issue, and I cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in requiring an initial objection. For that reason, I concur in the result.