Court Opinion

ID: 9550334
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:34:06.770894+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:21:23.824678
License: Public Domain

LACAGNINA, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent from the majority opinion because I find that the State of Arizona had jurisdiction, and that service of process was valid. I would affirm the trial court’s refusal to set aside the default judgment. The rule of sovereign immunity does not apply, nor should it be extended to govern the facts of this case. If sovereign immunity does apply, the tribal corporation waived its immunity and consented to be sued by operating its gravel truck off of the reservation within the jurisdiction of the State of Arizona while covered by sufficient insurance to compensate the injuries caused by its conduct.
The majority opinion leads to an unjust result, and the authorities relied on as support for the opinion are governed by factual situations falling within the following general categories, none of which apply to the facts of the present case:
1. Events occurring on an Indian reservation.
2. Events resulting from contracts with Indians and their communities exclusively covered by the United States Constitution and Congressional acts governing trade with Indians.
3. Events within the exclusive jurisdiction of Indian tribes because of their right to self-government over tribal members and tribal territories.
4. State action in attempting to extend state jurisdiction onto an Indian reservation to govern and control conduct of the tribe and its members for acts occurring on the reservation. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez (suit brought by an Indian against the tribe under the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C.A. 1301, et seq.); Ramey Construction Co. v. Apache Tribe of Mescalero Reservation (civil rights action by construction company against tribe under contract with tribe to construct a hotel complex on the reservation); Atkinson v. Haldane (suit against tribe under civil rights act for wrongful death occurring on the reservation); and Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe (suit by non-Indian *123lessees against tribe seeking injunction on enforcement of tribe’s oil and gas severance tax for oil produced on reservation land).
The use of tribal “sovereign immunity” to deprive a citizen of Arizona from recovering damages for personal injuries inflicted by an Indian corporation in an automobile-truck accident occurring off the reservation in a metropolitan city is a travesty of justice. There is nothing in the United States Constitution, acts of Congress, or federal court decisions which purports to create and extend “Indian sovereign immunity” over the citizens of Arizona to prevent liability for personal injuries inflicted on a citizen, of Arizona by an Indian corporation operating a gravel truck in a commercial venture off the reservation.
To begin with, the concept or rule of sovereign immunity from torts was abolished in Stone v. Arizona Highway Commission, 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107 (1963), in a well-reasoned opinion based upon the premise that when the reasons for a rule no longer exist, the rule should be abandoned. The court said:
Sovereign or governmental immunity began with the personal prerogatives of the King of England upon the theory that “the King can do no wrong,” and even though at a very early date in American history we overthrew the reign of the .English King the doctrine somehow became entrenched in our judicial code. Professor Borchard has termed this phenomenon as “one of the mysteries of legal evolution.” Borchard, Governmental Liability in Tort, 34 Yale L.J. 1, 4. Its survival for such a great period of time in this country, where the royal prerogative is unknown, has perhaps been even more remarkable, considering it has been universally criticized as an anachronism without rational basis. Most writers and cases considering this fact have claimed that its only basis of survival has been on grounds of antiquity and inertia. ******
It has been urged by the adherents of the sovereign immunity rule that the principle has become so firmly fixed that any change must come from the legislature. In previous decisions (the latest being Lee v. Dunklee, supra) this court concurred in this reasoning. Upon reconsideration we realize that the doctrine of sovereign immunity was originally judicially created. We are now convinced that a court-made rule, when unjust or outmoded, does not necessarily become with age invulnerable to judicial attack. This doctrine having been engrafted upon Arizona law by judicial enunciation may properly be changed or abrogated by the same process.
Id. at 388, 393, 381 P.2d at 109, 113 (footnotes omitted).
In the absence of federal legislation giving Indians and Indian tribes or their corporations immunity from liability for injuries to citizens of Arizona beyond the boundaries of their territorial lands, Stone is the applicable law in this case. A tribal corporation doing business and operating a gravel truck off the reservation is not entitled to claim “Indian sovereign immunity.” As indicated from the accident report, the driver was cited in this case for maintaining a speed not reasonable and prudent. Three witnesses to the accident gave signed written statements and agreed that the driver of the truck did not slow down prior to the collision with the rear end of Dixon’s car.
There is no federal legislation or constitutional authority which would allow Indians to violate the motor vehicle statutes while driving on state highways. Picopa does not argue the driver in this case was immune from the state’s exercise of jurisdiction for violation of its motor vehicle statutes. As the supreme court stated in Smith Plumbing Co. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety, 149 Ariz. 524, 530, 720 P.2d 499, 505 (1986), “[a]s the activity in question moves off the reservation, the State’s governmental and regulatory interest increases dramatically and federal protectiveness of Indian sovereignty lessens,” citing, Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 75, 82 S.Ct. 562, 571, 7 L.Ed.2d 573 (1962). Compare Wauneka v. Campbell, 22 Ariz.App. 287, 526 P.2d 1085 (1974) (state lacks jurisdiction to enforce Arizona *124Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act on the reservation). See also Enriquez v. Superior Court, 115 Ariz. 342, 565 P.2d 522 (App.1977) (action brought by non-Indian plaintiff for injuries occurring in automobile accident on reservation with Indian defendant). In both Wauneka and Enri-quez the court'ruled that the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them in Indian country. Off the reservation, this analysis fails.
In the event the above analysis is insufficient, then I believe the tribe has consented to be sued or has waived its immunity in this case. If one considers the tribal corporation to be a nonresident of this state because it was created by the tribe under tribal laws, then its operation of a gravel truck in Arizona off the reservation subjects it to A.R.S. §§ 28-502(A)(2) and (A)(3) and 28-502(B), which, at the time of Dixon’s injury, provided as follows:
§ 28-502. Appointment by nonresident of attorney upon whom to serve process
A. The rights and privileges conferred by § 28-501 and paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of § 28-412, shall be deemed accepted, and such acceptance evidenced, by a nonresident:
2. When the nonresident, by himself or his agent, operates a motor vehicle on a public highway in this state otherwise than under the provisions of such section.
3. When a motor vehicle owned by a nonresident is operated on a public highway in this state with his express or implied permission under such circumstances as would render a resident motor vehicle owner liable for damages to person or property caused by such operation.
B. The acceptance of the rights and privileges set forth in subsection A of this section shall be deemed to constitute and be the appointment of the vehicle superintendant by the nonresident as his true and lawful attorney upon whom may be served all legal process in an action against such nonresident growing out of any accident or collision in which the nonresident, his agent or other person operating a motor vehicle owned by him with his express or implied permission on a public highway in this state is involved.
I would hold that this statute applies to Picopa and the Community and is a form of consent to be sued under the facts of this case. Although process was not served as permitted by A.R.S. § 28-503 and under Rule 4(e)(5), Ariz.R.Civ.P., 16 A.R.S., by service upon the superintendent of motor vehicles, sufficient and lawful process was obtained pursuant to Rule 4(e)(1) and (6). Service of process permitted by § 28-503 and Rule 4(e)(5) does not preclude or invalidate service by other lawful means.
In the present case, Dixon attempted personal service of the summons and complaint on the reservation by Indian officers authorized to deliver the summons and complaint as contemplated and approved in Francisco v. State, 113 Ariz. 427, 556 P.2d 1 (1976), but her attempts were frustrated by refusal of the Indian officers to assist in the service of process. This conduct gave Dixon the right to use registered mail, an alternate method of service as provided by Rules 4(e)(2)(a) and 4(e)(6)(a)(IV).
This reasoning does not project Arizona law onto the reservation nor does it allow an unauthorized process server the right to exercise authority on the reservation, nor does it interfere with tribal sovereignty over tribal members or tribal lands. In keeping with the decision in Francisco, I reason the United States mail carrier does not receive his authority to deliver mail on the reservation from the State of Arizona and is not an officer of the State of Arizona. The tribe does not argue that the mail carrier was unauthorized to deliver mail on the reservation or that he exceeded his authority by delivering registered mail in this case. There is nothing in the record to indicate the tribe has not consented to receive United States mail on the reservation. The mail carrier, not acting under any power vested in him by the State of Arizona, is not serving process, but is only delivering mail. The process in this case was not *125complete and did not occur until Dixon filed the proper affidavit showing delivery and receipt of the mail by the tribe, which event occurred in the clerk’s office in Maricopa County, off the reservation.
In this case, I find no United States treaty or act of Congress prohibiting exercise of state jurisdiction based on proper alternate service of process by registered mail where the tribal corporation caused injuries off the reservation. The responsibility for the injuries suffered by Dixon has nothing to do with any perceived state interference with the exercise of tribal sovereignty over its members or lands. See Kadota v. Hosogai, 125 Ariz. 131, 608 P.2d 68 (App.1980).
To those who would argue that tribal sovereign immunity should be recognized to cover the facts of this case because Indian lands and assets should be protected from alienation and depletion and should be immune from execution, subject only to restraints stated in acts of Congress, I find compelling the fact that in this case the Community is protected by an insurance policy in an amount which far exceeds the amount of Dixon’s judgment.
I find inapplicable the decision in S. Unique, Ltd. v. Gila River Pima-Marico-pa Indian Community, 138 Ariz. 378, 674 P.2d 1376 (App.1984), because it arose out of contract, the delivery and use of the chemical was on the reservation, and service of process was found insufficient.
In addition, the court of appeals decision in Graves v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 117 Ariz. 32, 570 P.2d 803 (App.1977), is not controlling in this case because that involved a non-Indian employee working for an Indian tribe on Indian land where the tribe itself had liability insurance to protect against negligent acts of the tribe, its agents and its employees.
Nothing proposed in this dissent would interfere with the supremacy of federal law as it pertains to the Indian communities, the use of their lands, trade with non-Indians, or their right to self-government. What I propose is to permit a citizen of Arizona the right to recover damages for personal injuries suffered in Arizona by reason of the negligent operation of a truck by an Indian corporation off the reservation, which damages are covered by the proceeds of an insurance policy.