Court Opinion

ID: 9713940
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:26:45.239916+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:21.704652
License: Public Domain

DeBRULER, Justice,
dissenting and concurring.
Appellant was convicted pursuant to the provisions of Ind.Code § 35-41-2-4(1) for the murder of Stephen Skirpan. He thereupon became subject to another trial upon *910allegations of aggravating circumstances for the purpose of determining whether he should be given the death sentence. A burden was upon the prosecution to prove the alleged aggravating circumstances to the jury, and ultimately to the judge, beyond a reasonable doubt.
I.
The indictment and the jury instructions informed the jury that appellant was charged with “knowingly or intentionally” killing Stephen Skirpan by “knowingly or intentionally shooting” him. The jury received an instruction based upon Ind.Code § 35-41-2 — 2, defining both intentional and knowing conduct. The jury returned a verdict which stated simply: We, the jury, find the defendant, James Brewer, guilty of murder. As this general verdict is consistent with a conclusion of the jury that appellant had the knowing mental state and with a conclusion that appellant had the intentional mental state, it does not provide a basis for choosing which of the states of mind the jury actually determined. Only the culpability of an intentional killing can justify the death penalty pursuant to the aggravating circumstances alleged in this case, a knowing one cannot.
In instructing the jury at the sentencing hearing, the judge informed the jury that:
“In the first stage of this trial, you found that Defendant, JAMES BREWER, guilty of the charge of Murder as alleged in the State’s charging indictment.”
(Emphasis added.)
And he informed the jury:
“In the second or sentencing stage of this trial the State is seeking the death penalty by alleging that the Defendant, James Brewer ... did .. . knowingly or intentionally kill and murder ... Stephen Skirpan ... by ... knowingly or intentionally shooting ... him.” (Emphasis added.)
And he instructed the jury that the death penalty statute defined one of the aggravating circumstances as follows:
“1.) The defendant committed the murder by intentionally killing the victim while committing or attempting to commit arson, burglary, child molesting, criminal deviate conduct, kidnapping, rape, or robbery.” (Emphasis added.)
The jury returned the following recommendation:
“The Defendant, JAMES BREWER, having been found guilty of murder, we, the Jury, recommend to the Court that the death penalty be imposed.”
The judge at sentencing relied upon that verdict in stating his reasons for imposing the death penalty. He stated:
“In the first stage of the trial, the defendant, James Brewer, was found guilty of the intentional killing of one Stephen J. Skirpan. At the sentencing hearing, the burden was upon the State of Indiana to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the intentional murder was committed in the perpetration of a robbery as set forth in the addendum to the charging indictment. The State moved to incorporate by reference, the testimony presented in the first stage of the trial which motion was granted. The testimony showed that the defendant and his co-defendant announced to the Skirpan family that it was a ‘holdup’; that they drew guns and demanded money and left the Skirpan home with something in excess of One Hundred ($100) Dollars. The defendant, while contending that his co-defendant actually shot the victim, testified that the victim was shot in the commission of a robbery. Accordingly, the jury was justified in finding the existence of the aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis added.)
The sentencing judge concluded his statement with the following:
“In conclusion, the Court finds the aggravating circumstance, ruled [sic] upon by the State to have been proved beyond any doubt whatsoever and that there simply was not evidence of any mitigating circumstances to affect it. Accordingly, the court finds the jury recommendation to be proper and lawful and that the Court has a duty to follow such recommendation.” (Emphasis added.)
*911It is apparent from this record of proceedings that there has been to date no determination by the judge or jury that appellant “committed the murder by intentionally killing the victim” as required by subsections (b)(1), (e)(1) and (e)(2), of the death penalty statute. The judge made no determination himself and relied upon the general verdict of guilty to satisfy this requirement. That verdict does not contain a determination that the jury found appellant to have “intentionally” killed the victim. The judge’s conclusion that the State proved the aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt cannot stand.
II.
This Court is called upon to construe and apply the aggravating circumstance alleged against appellant made pursuant to Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9(b)(l), which provides:
“The aggravating circumstances are as follows:
(1)The defendant committed the murder by intentionally killing the victim while committing or attempting to commit arson, burglary, child molesting, criminal deviate conduct, kidnapping, rape or robbery.”
The aggravating circumstance identified here is the coexistence of two separate and distinct culpabilities with conduct constituting two separate crimes, in and by the same person, i. e., the commission of two offenses specified. The elements of this aggravating circumstance are the following:
(1) The death of the victim as the result of inflicted injuries.
(2) The defendant had the conscious objective to inflict injury upon the victim and cause his death. Ind.Code § 35-41-2-2 (definition of intentional)
(3) The defendant had the culpability required for the underlying felony, i. e., in this case he had the conscious objective to take property from the victim. Ind.Code § 35-42-5-1 (robbery statute)
(4) Conduct satisfying the remaining elements of intentional murder and the underlying felony.
In arriving at his final conclusion that the aggravating circumstance was proven, the sentencing judge found that the jury had found appellant guilty of the intentional killing. At trial on the charge, however, the jury was instructed as follows:
“It is a fundamental principal of law that where two or more persons engage in the commission of an unlawful act, each person is criminally responsible for the actions of each other committed in the execution of the common design or plan even though not intended as part of the original design or plan. It is not essential that participation of any one person to each element of the crime be established.”
Under this legal principal, the verdict of guilty may have been arrived at without a determination that appellant personally held the conscious objective in mind to kill the victim. I agree with the opinion of White, J. in Lockett v. Ohio, (1978) 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973, that
“death may not be inflicted for killings consistent with the Eighth Amendment without a finding that the defendant engaged in conduct with the conscious purpose of producing death . .. . ” 98 S.Ct. at 2981.
I would add to this as well that the conduct of the defendant must be immediately connected to the deliberate taking of the life of the victim. Cf. separate opinion of Black-mun, J., in Lockett v. Ohio, supra. I find the Indiana statute and the position taken by Justice White to be in accord. Our statute states: “The defendant committed the murder by intentionally killing the victim . .. . ” The phraseology “by intentionally killing” serves to stress this culpability and to exclude a “knowing killing”. The statute here is focusing upon the actual state of mind of the defendant at its primary and personal level and not at a vicarious level. I do not discount the support for the conclusion reached by the majority that evidence simply establishing guilt of the two offenses is necessarily and inevitably sufficient to establish the aggravating circumstance proscribed under subsection (bXl) above. Both views of this statute are *912supportable. However, in light of the irrevocable nature, of the penalty involved, the Legislature should make its purpose clear, if it be that persons having no actual conscious purpose of producing death are to be executed.
I vote to affirm the conviction, but to set aside the penalty of death.