Court Opinion

ID: 9642229
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:52:41.051473+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:44.899207
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
concurring.
For the felony offense of escape punishment was assessed at confinement for life, there being allegations of two prior felonies committed in the State of California. The judgment was reversed by the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals because it found that the two California convictions had been prosecuted on information, the State did not show what the law of California is in this respect and there is no proof that appellant validly waived indictment in order to be prosecuted on information.1 The State Prosecuting Attorney challenges the conclusion of the court of appeals that the two prior convictions could not be used for enhancement, and we granted his petition for discretionary review to determine whether that conclusion is correct.2
The indictment alleged convictions were in Cause No. 204904 and Cause No. 26371, *835respectively, in the Superior Court of the State of California, Fresno County, “upon an information then legally pending in said last named court and of which said court had jurisdiction ”3 et cetera. To support those allegations the State offered three exhibits, numbers 8, 9 and 10, which are loosely called “pen packets.”4 However, Exhibit 10, from which the issues in this cause mainly arise, is a compilation of records from the clerk of the Superior Court of Fresno County, viz:
In Cause 26371, an abstract of judgment and sentence and underlying felony information presented by the district attorney.
In Cause 204904, a combination judgment of commitment to state prison and minute order, and underlying felony information presented by the district attorney.
The papers in Exhibit 10 are duly and properly certified, attested and verified, and for good measure there is a separate but related verification, admitted as Exhibit 11.
When the State offered Exhibit 10, appellant objected inter alia:
“I object to 10 on the grounds that the prosecution is predicated — is a prosecution for a felony predicated on an information and there is no waiver of indictment in the file and the Court is well aware that the law in California is presumed to be the same as the law in Texas and no one may prosecute on an information without a waiver.”
All objections were overruled and Exhibit 10 was admitted.
In his motion for new trial appellant separately contended the trial court erred in admitting the information in causes 26371 and 204904, respectively, “because there was no waiver of an indictment demonstrated in the cause.” Apparently without hearing the motion was denied some six days later.
On direct appeal the first (and only) ground of error implicating Exhibit 10 is:
“There was insufficient evidence introduced by the State of Texas at the hearing on punishment to sustain enhancement of appellant’s punishment.”
Pointing out that nowhere in the record is there any proof that California law permits prosecution of felony cases upon indictment rather than information or that appellant waived indictment, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to authorize enhancement of his punishment to life under V.T. C.A. Penal Code, § 12.42(d). The State through its district attorney replies that all it had to prove was that appellant “has previously been finally convicted of two felony offenses”5 and, construing the argument of appellant as essentially a variance contention, relies on eases rejecting such; finally, the State asserts that once it made a prima facie case that enhancement allegations are true, appellant had the burden of proving “the convictions are void” in that prosecution in California could not be predi*836cated on an information “as is now the law in Texas.” The district attorney did not address the issue of waiver of indictment. As already pointed out, however, being unable to find in the record anything “from which we may infer a valid waiver,” the court of appeals held the California convictions could not be used for enhancement. See note 1, ante.
In response to the petition filed by the State Prosecuting Attorney, see note 2, ante, appellant insists that what he was and still is doing is to “object to the admissibility of the ‘pen packets,’ ” contending that the State has failed to meet its burden of proving up prior convictions it alleged. He disclaims any collateral attack on validity of the alleged convictions. The core of his position is: “There being no evidence introduced by the State at the trial of this cause that the Defendant ever waived his right to indictment, the ‘pen packets’ were inadmissible.”
That core proposition, as stated, is untenable. Being properly certified and linked to appellant, the exhibits were admissible as official records. Article 3731a, §§ 2 and 4; Stearn v. State, 571 S.W.2d 177, 178 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Ashley v. State, 527 S.W.2d 302, 304 (Tex.Cr.App.1975). Exhibit 10 was also relevant to the enhancement allegations, and appellant concedes he has not raised “any variance between the enhancement allegations in the indictment and the proof shown by the State.” Even without a waiver of indictment “in the file,” the exhibit was admissible and the trial court did not err in receiving it in evidence. If need be, the State was not limited by content of “the file” to show waiver of indictment— waiver may be shown de hors Exhibit 10.
However, as the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals correctly found, the State did not affirmatively prove waiver of indictment in either California conviction, nor could it be inferred from the record. Accordingly, as we understand the opinion of the court below, the court sustained the first ground of error which, to be recalled, complained that evidence introduced by the State was insufficient to support its enhancement allegations.
Though the court did not cite it, the opinion in Holcombe v. State, 424 S.W.2d 635, 637 (Tex.Cr.App.1968) squarely supports appellant and the conclusion of the court of appeals. Thus it has not been found in this cause that appellant mounted a “collateral attack” against the California convictions, nor held that they áre void. The premise of the question presented by review by the State Prosecuting Attorney without access to the appellate record, see note 2, is, therefore, false, and the petition seems to have been granted improvidently on that account.
On the other hand, the issue is important and the problem is a recurring one. See Hall v. State, 619 S.W.2d 156 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). What causes much difficulty is the socalled “presumption,” in the absence of proof to the contrary, that the law of another state on a given point is the same as this state. Hall v. State, supra, at 158. See Ray, Texas Law of Evidence (3rd Ed.1980) § 99, 1 Texas Practice 150. The presumption often serves to ameliorate the plight of a party who neglects to plead and prove a foreign law or fails in an attempt to do so: “if the law of the other state is not invoked and proven the court applies the local law,” Ray, op cit, § 173, 1 Texas Practice 213-214. But in some situations it has been the undoing of the case when the prosecution failed to prove the pertinent law in a sister state.6
Texas courts allowed the problem by adhering to the Texas common law when there is no procedural provision for taking judicial notice of laws of other states; that is, a trial judge may not of his own motion *837take judicial notice of the laws 'of other states. Ray, op cit., § 173,1 Texas Practice 211. The common law rule was adopted by English courts as a matter of convenience— sources of foreign law were scarce and the language was different. However, as Professor Ray points out:
“The reasons which led to the common law rule are not applicable today to our states. It seems clear that notice of the laws of sister states could be justified on the same basis as notice of local laws, namely, ascertainability with reasonable certainty. The source materials (statutes and reports) for ascertaining the laws of sister states are almost as accessible as those for local laws and counsel are available to find and present the materials to the judge in the same manner as where a point of local law is in question.”
Ray, op cit., § 178, 1 Texas Practice 214. We agree the point has merit, but here the State made absolutely no effort to present to the trial court applicable law of California. Thus, the presumption that California law is the same as Texas works against the State.
However, as excerpted ante, each enhancement paragraph in the indictment did allege respectively that the conviction was had upon an information “then legally pending ” in a court of proper jurisdiction, thereby implicitly invoking California law. While factual matters may ultimately be implicated, whether an information is “legally pending” is essentially a question of law. Whatever the limitations on a trial court, when a question of sufficiency of evidence depends on a matter of law we reject the notion that an appellate court must look just to the record made in the trial court for “evidence” of constitutional or statutory provisions in the law of a sister state. Prom readily available and easily accessible sources appellate judges are competent to ascertain with reasonable certainty whether the law of another state requires that an accused first waive prosecution by indictment in order for the prosecutor and trial court to proceed on an information.
By simply reading the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 4 S.Ct. 111, 28 L.Ed. 232 (1884) we learn that in the Constitution of the State of California 1879, Article 1, § 8 provided:
“Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment, shall be prosecuted by information, after examination and commitment by a magistrate, or by indictment, with or without such examination and commitment, as may be prescribed by law.”
Turning to the present constitution of that state we see that the first sentence of the same numbered article and section still so provides, and we have ascertained with reasonable certainty from the penal code and code of criminal procedure of that jurisdiction, that once an examining magistrate has found and certified sufficient cause to believe that an accused is guilty of “a public offense,” Penal Code, § 872, “it shall be the duty of the district attorney of the county in which the offense is triable to file in the superior court of that county within 15 days after commitment, an information against the defendant Criminal Procedure, § 739; see also §§ 738 and 740. In short, we are able to find and have determined that waiver of indictment is not required by California for a felony prosecution on an information to be “legally pending” in a court with jurisdiction.
Therefore, the socalled presumption is not applicable here, and failure of the State to prove a waiver of indictment by appellant regarding the California convictions does not render the findings of the jury that “the allegations with respect to said prior convictions, as alleged in the indictment are ‘true,’ ” insupportable by the evidence.
The judgment of the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals should be reversed and remanded for this reason.
McCORMICK, J., joins.

. The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals analyzed the situation thusly:
“Since the law in other states is presumed to be the same as the law of Texas when not proved to be different, Hall v. State, 619 S.W.2d 156, 158 (Tex.Cr.App.1980), the prohibition against use of prior convictions not obtained by indictment or valid waiver is applicable to foreign convictions unless the state proves their validity. No evidence of the California law was introduced in the trial of this case. Therefore, the California convictions could not be used absent proof of a valid waiver. Unlike the record in Gibbs v.
State, 544 S.W.2d 413 [403] (Tex.Cr.App.1977 [1976]), the record before us contains nothing from which we may infer a valid waiver.”

. The State Prosecuting Attorney presents the following question for review:
“May a defendant collaterally attack prior final California felony convictions, alleged for enhancement of punishment under V.T.C.A., Penal Code § 12.42, by the simple expedient of merely objecting to their admission into evidence on the ground that the California convictions were prosecuted by information, rather than indictment, and that the records *835of those convictions do not affirmatively reflect that appellant waived indictment pursuant to Art. 1.141, supra, or in the absence of proof that California permits felony prosecution by information in the absence of a waiver of indictment?”
We must observe that the State Prosecuting Attorney candidly admits his petition was drafted and filed without access to the appellate record. Since granting his petition, the Court has not been favored with a brief from the State.

. All emphasis is supplied by the writer of this opinion unless otherwise indicated.

. Exhibit 8 is not a pen packet in the usual sense for it is a collection seemingly of all intemal data obtained and maintained by the California Department of Corrections regarding appellant; Exhibit 9 is a hodgepodge of papers, including a completed abstract of judgment and a sentence in Cause No. 26371 and a completed combined judgment of commitment to state prison and minute order in Cause No. 204904, as well as such internal records as a cumulative case summary and a summary of sentencing data. (Needless to say, had the proof of convictions for enhancement failed, for the contents of Exhibits 8 and 9 to be examined and understood by a jury would be extremely harmful and prejudicial to appellant.)

.Emphasis added by the State.

. The rule seems to have been particularly troublesome in extradition cases; e.g., Ex parte Cooper, 163 Tex.Cr.R. 642, 295 S.W.2d 906 (1956); Ex parte Gardner, 159 Tex.Cr.R. 365, 264 S.W.2d 125 (1954); Ex parte Beeth, 142 Tex.Cr.R. 511, 154 S.W.2d 484 (1941). But see now, Uniform Extradition Act, Article 51.13, § 3, V.A.C.C.P., and e.g., Ex parte Clubb, 447 S.W.2d 185, 187 (Tex.Cr.App.1969) and Ex parte Harry, 482 S.W.2d 197, 199 (Tex.Cr.App.1972).