Court Opinion

ID: 9964097
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-26 21:03:28.049988+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:10.113967
License: Public Domain

2024 IL App (1st) 221713-U
                                            No. 1-22-1713
                                       Order filed April 26, 2024
                                                                                        Sixth Division

     NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in
     the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

                                                 IN THE

                                  APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                                            FIRST DISTRICT

     REVITE CORPORATION, an Illinois                      )
     Corporation and DR. HALYNA                           )
     BORYSLAVSKA,                                         )
                                                          )      Appeal from the Circuit Court
            Plaintiffs-Appellants,                        )      of Cook County.
                                                          )
     v.                                                   )
                                                          )      No. 2017 L 1016
     2424 CHICAGO, INC., an Illinois corporation,         )
     VINTAGE REALTY, INC., an Illinois                    )      The Honorable
     corporation, LILIA KULAS ZAPARANIUK, an              )      Michael F. Otto,
     individual, MICHAEL ZAPARANIUK, an                   )      Judge, presiding.
     individual, and JERRY KULAS, an individual,          )
                                                          )
            Defendants-Appellees.                         )

           JUSTICE HYMAN delivered the judgment of the court.
           Presiding Justice Oden Johnson and Justice Tailor concurred in the judgment.

                                                ORDER

¶1         Held: Affirming order dismissing condominium purchasers’ breach of contract and
           negligent misrepresentation claims against sellers and order granting summary judgment
           to sellers on plaintiffs’ claims that sellers’ statements violated the Real Estate License Act
           of 2000 and constituted negligent misrepresentations.
     1-22-1713

¶2          Dr. Halyna Boryslavska and her company, Revite Corporation, purchased three units and

        two parking spaces in a condominium building owned and developed by 2424 Chicago, Inc.

        Boryslavska and Revite filed a 10-count complaint against 2424 Chicago, Inc., its owners,

        Jerry Kulas and Michael and Lilia Zaparaniuk, as well as Vintage Realty (collectively, “the

        Sellers”).

¶3         The trial court dismissed several counts, granted summary judgment on other counts, and

        dismissed the complaint after the parties settled remaining claims.

¶4          Relevant here, Boryslavska contends the trial court erred in dismissing (i) claims alleging

        breach of contract for construction defects because the notice provision in the purchase

        agreement was ambiguous; (ii) claims relating to the commercial units’ roof rights, (iii)

        allegations that the Sellers violated the Act by failing to inform her Revite could not install a

        fence without Condo Board approval and to advise her to retain an independent inspector, and

        (iv) the claim of breach of contract for failing to record the Reciprocal Easement Agreement.

        Boryslavska also contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on (i) the claim

        that the Sellers violated the Illinois Real Estate License Act of 2000, 225 ILCS 454 (Act), by

        falsely stating Revite could install a fence and (ii) the negligent misrepresentation claim

        because questions of material fact remained as to whether Boryslavska reasonably relied on

        the Sellers’ statements that Revite could install a fence.

¶5         We affirm. The trial court properly dismissed Boryslavska’s breach of contract and

        negligent misrepresentation claims and summary judgment was warranted where no questions

        of fact remained regarding allegations that the Sellers’ statements about Revite’s right to install

        a fence violated the Act or constituted negligent misrepresentations.

¶6                                              Background

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¶7           In 2014, Dr. Halyna Boryslavska relocated her home and medical practice to a new

          condominium building at 2424 Chicago Avenue, Chicago. Lilia Zaparaniuk, her husband

          Michael Zaparaniuk, and Lilia’s brothers, Jerry and Paul Kulas, owned the condominium

          development company 2424 Chicago Inc. The Zaparaniuks also owned Vintage Realty, Inc.,

          the property’s real estate broker, with Lilia as the managing agent and Michael and Jerry as

          brokers. Jerry also served as the president and secretary of JMK Builders, the development’s

          general contractor. Paul Kulas, who is not a defendant, was the Sellers’ attorney.

¶8           In late April 2014, Boryslavska, a physician and the president of Revite Corporation,

          contacted Vintage Realty to inquire about purchasing a residential unit, two ground floor

          commercial units on behalf of Revite to operate a medical clinic, and two parking spaces. On

          May 7, 2014, Boryslavska and Wayne Swanberg, a Revite officer, met with the Zaparaniuks

          at the building. Boryslavska told Michael that Revite would need a fence in front of the

          commercial units as her patients included pregnant women and children, and the street was

          heavily trafficked. Michael told her that area in front of the commercial units would belong to

          Revite and she could install a fence, but a sign for the clinic would require Board approval.

¶9           Two days later, Boryslavska and Swanberg met with Michael at the property a second time.

          Michael showed them several residential units and told them Unit 201 had roof rights, garage

          roof rights, and a deeded parking space. According to Swanberg, during this second meeting,

          Michael reiterated that Revite could do what it wanted with the outdoor space, a fence would

          not be a problem, but signage required Condo Board approval. Michael also told them to look

          at buildings in the neighborhood to determine how to install a fence.

¶ 10         Boryslavska and Swanberg met Michael at Vintage Realty’s office the next day.

          Boryslavska asked Michael if he could be her agent while simultaneously representing the

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          Sellers. Michael agreed, saying he and Lilia would represent her and protect her interests.

          Michael presented Boryslavska with purchase agreements for a residential unit, commercial

          units, and two parking spaces. Michael is listed as the broker for Boryslavska and Revite, and

          Vintage Realty is listed as the Sellers’ broker on both purchase agreements.

¶ 11         A Certificate of Limited Warranty in the purchase agreements stated in relevant part:

                   Warranty provisions. (a) Seller shall deliver to Purchaser at Closing a “Certificate of

                   Limited Warranty” covering construction of the Commercial Unit, a copy of which has

                   been reviewed, approved and accepted by Purchaser and will be executed by Purchaser

                   at Closing, in the form attached hereto. Making of final payment by Purchaser to Seller

                   of the Purchase Price shall constitute a waiver and complete release of all claims by

                   Purchaser against Seller with respect to the Commercial Unit and this Contract, except

                   those which are expressly covered by the warranty hereafter provided or are expressly

                   stated herein to survive the closing.

¶ 12         The Limited Warranty expressly excluded express and implied warranties for the

          commercial unit, which, by signing the agreement, the purchaser acknowledged and

          understood. Section 3 of the Limited Warranty further stated that the seller would remedy

          defects in workmanship and material as long as brought to its attention within one year of the

          date of closing. Section 6 provided that “any notices or claims to be made under the warranty

          be in writing and delivered to” the Sellers’ attorney.

¶ 13         The Purchase Agreement for the commercial units provided for a Reciprocal Easement

          Agreement between the commercial units and the Condo Association, stating, in relevant part,

                   “The property containing Commercial Unit and the Parking Unit (if any) has been or

                   will be, prior to Closing (as hereinafter defined) subject to that Reciprocal Easement

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                   Agreement entered into with the 2424 West Chicago Condominium Association (the

                   “Association”). The Association and the unit owners of the Association own the

                   residential condominium units located on the second, third and fourth floors of the

                   Property. Purchaser acknowledges receipt of the Reciprocal Easement Agreement

                   (“REA”) and has had an opportunity to review the REA prior to Purchaser’s execution

                   of this Agreement. Seller reserves the right at any time and from time to time to modify

                   the REA in its sole and absolute discretion, provided that Seller shall notify Purchaser

                   or obtain Purchaser’s approval of any changes in the REA when and if such notice or

                   approval is required by law.”

¶ 14         Boryslavska signed the purchase agreements the same day and the Sellers accepted them

          on May 12, 2014. The following day, Lilia emailed several documents to Boryslavska,

          including the signed purchase agreements and an August 1, 2013, property report containing

          proposed Condominium Declaration and By-laws and the Reciprocal Easement Agreement.

¶ 15         The Declaration defines Limited Common Elements to include “Balconies/Terraces and

          “yard space.” Common Elements include “all Limited Common Elements.” The Declaration

          further provides, in relevant part, that “There shall be no obstruction of the Common Elements

          *** without the prior consent of the Association” and “Nothing shall be altered or constructed

          in or removed from the common elements except as constructed or altered by or with the

          permission of the Developer at any time before the first annual meeting of the Unit Owners

          without written consent of the Association.”

¶ 16         Under the draft Declaration, the commercial units were not part of the Condo Association.

          But during the five-day attorney review period, Boryslavska asked her attorney to negotiate

          for Revite to be an Association member so that she could acquire a percentage ownership in

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          the common elements, which she believed would include rooftop rights. The Sellers agreed

          and modified the Declaration accordingly, granting the commercial units a percentage

          ownership in the common elements before recording it with the Cook County Recorder of

          Deeds on June 10, 2014. They did not record the Reciprocal Easement Agreement.

¶ 17         The sale of the residential unit closed in January 2015; the commercial units closed in

          March. A short time later, Boryslavska met with Jerry Kulas and one of his subcontractors to

          discuss installing a fence, but she decided to hire a different contractor. Construction was

          completed in early October 2015. At an October 15, 2015, meeting of the Condo Board,

          attended by the Zaparaniuks, a majority of the Board determined the area in front of the

          commercial units was part of the common elements under the Declaration. The Board sued

          Revite to remove the fence, as Revite hadn’t first obtained its approval. 2424 Chicago

          Condominium Association v. Revite Corporation, 2021 IL App (1st) 200906-U (affirming

          summary judgment for declaratory and injunctive relief mandating removal of fence).

¶ 18         After the closings, Boryslavska discovered construction defects in both the residential and

          commercial units, including, allegedly, building code violations. Boryslavska raised the

          defects at a February 24, 2016, Condo Board meeting attended by Michael. Swanberg later left

          voice mail messages for Michael that went unreturned. More than a year after the closings,

          Boryslavska gave written notice of the defects, sending Michael a letter with a copy by email.

¶ 19                                         Procedural History

¶ 20         Boryslavska filed a seven-count complaint against the Sellers to which she later added two

          more counts. Counts I and II alleged the Zaparaniuks and Vintage Realty breached their duties

          of honest dealing and full disclosure by failing to (i) disclose and obtain written consent for

          dual representation as required by section 15-40 of the Act (225 ILCS 454/15-45 (West 2022)

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          (Act))); (ii) make required disclosures under section 15-35 of the Act (225 ILCS 454/15-35

          (West 2022)); and (iii) promote her best interests or exercise reasonable care in performing

          brokerage services in violation of section 15-15 of the Act (225 ILCS 454/15-15 (West 2022)).

¶ 21         Count I also alleged, in part, that the Zaparaniuks breached their duties by (i) falsely

          representing to Boryslavska that Revite could install a fence or failing to tell the Condo Board

          that the area in front of the commercial units belonged to Revite, (ii) failing to advise

          Boryslavska to bring an inspector to the final walk-through of the residential unit, and (iii) and

          inducing Boryslavska to buy the residential unit by falsely stating she would have roof rights.

¶ 22         Count III alleged Jerry Kulas breached his duties as a licensee under section 15-25(a) of

          the Act (225 ILCS 454/15-25(a) (West 2022) by failing to inform Revite it did not own the

          area in front of the commercial units and could not install a fence.

¶ 23         Counts IV and V alleged common law fraud against the Zaparaniuks and Vintage Realty

          and counts VI and VII alleged negligent misrepresentation against them for failing to disclose

          materials facts, which Boryslavska reasonably relied on to her detriment. Counts VIII and IX

          sought damages for breach of contract, alleging the commercial and residential units had

          numerous construction defects.

¶ 24         The Sellers filed a combined motion to dismiss under section 2-619.1 of the Code (735

          ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2022)). The trial court dismissed the fraud claims (counts IV and V)

          under section 2-615 without prejudice and denied the motion as to the remaining counts.

¶ 25         Boryslavska filed a second amended complaint, identical to the amended complaint, with

          an added count X, alleging the Sellers breached their contract with Revite by failing to execute

          and record the Reciprocal Easement Agreement. Specifically, Boryslavska alleged that

          because the Sellers failed to have the Reciprocal Easement Agreement signed and recorded

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          against the property, Revite was subject to arbitrary governance by the Condo Association,

          which sued Revite to remove the fence.

¶ 26         The Sellers again moved to dismiss. The trial court denied the motion as to counts I, II, VI,

          and VII and allowed the earlier dismissal of counts IV and V to stand. The remaining counts

          were dismissed: (i) count III for failing to allege Jerry Kulas was a broker or owed Boryslavska

          duties under the Act, (ii) counts VIII and IX, alleging building code violations because

          Boryslavska failed to notify the Sellers of defects within the one-year warranty period required

          by the limited warranty, and (iii) count X because Boryslavska negotiated for Revite’s Condo

          Association membership and ownership of the common elements in place of the Reciprocal

          Easement Agreement and, thus, could not state a breach of the contract.

¶ 27         Eventually, the Sellers moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion

          as to those parts of counts I and II that alleged failure to disclose dual agency and held that

          Boryslavska failed to identify damages resulting from non-disclosure of the relationship. Also,

          as to counts I and II, the trial court agreed with the Sellers that Michael’s statements about

          installing a fence before Boryslavska asked him to act as her agent could not constitute

          violations of the Act.

¶ 28         Trial was set solely on the claims of misrepresentations on Boryslavska’s roof rights for

          her residential unit. But, the parties settled, and the court dismissed those claims with prejudice.

¶ 29                                                Analysis

¶ 30                                           Motion to Dismiss

¶ 31         The motion to dismiss was filed under Section 2-619.1 of the Code, which includes both

          section 2-615 and 2-619 grounds. Henderson Square Condominium Ass'n v. LAB Townhomes,

          LLC, 2015 IL 118139, ¶ 32. A section 2-615 motion attacks the legal sufficiency based on

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          defects apparent on its face. Veazey v. Board of Education of Rich Township High School

          District 227, 2016 IL App (1st) 151795, ¶ 32. A section 2-619 motion admits as true all well-

          pleaded facts, along with all reasonable inferences that can be gleaned from them, but asserts

          an affirmative defense or other matter that avoids or defeats the claim. Id. ¶ 23. Under both

          sections, we interpret the pleadings and supporting documents in the light most favorable to

          the nonmoving party. Id. at ¶32 and ¶ 23.

¶ 32         We review dismissal under sections 2-615 and 2-619 de novo. Solaia Technology, LLC v.

          Specialty Publishing Co., 221 Ill. 2 d 558, 579 (1997).

¶ 33                            Breach of Contract for Construction Defects

¶ 34         Boryslavska contends the trial court erred in dismissing counts VIII and IX of the second

          amended complaint, alleging breach of contract for construction defects. The trial court

          dismissed those counts under section 2-619, finding Boryslavska failed to notify the Sellers of

          the defects in writing within one year of the closing date as required by paragraph 6 of the

          limited warranty certificate.

¶ 35         Boryslavska contends the trial court erred because paragraphs 6 and 7 of the purchase

          agreements are separate from the limited warranty certificate, have no notice requirement, and

          required the Sellers to remedy a “punch list” of items in the commercial units and comply with

          “local building codes” in constructing the residential unit.

¶ 36         Boryslavska also contends the notice provisions in the limited warranty are conflicting

          because paragraph 3 requires defects to be “brought to the attention of the Seller within one

          year of closing” but does not mandate written notice. Conversely, paragraph 6 provides “any

          notice or claims to be made under this warranty shall be in writing and delivered to seller.”

          Boryslavska argues she brought defects “to the attention of the Seller” within one year of

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          closing by raising them at a February 24, 2016, Condo Board meeting, which Michael

          Zaparaniuk attended and leaving voice mail messages for him. She asserts paragraph 6 does

          not apply to the defects she raised because they do not constitute a “claim.” Boryslavska asserts

          that the limited warranty’s paragraphs 3 and 6 are ambiguous, at best, and should be strictly

          construed against the drafter. See Dowd & Dowd, Ltd. v. Gleason, 181 Ill. 2d 460, 479 (1998).

¶ 37         To the extent Boryslavska relies on paragraphs 6 and 7 of the purchase agreement to

          support her breach of contract claim, she waived those provisions once the sales of the units

          closed. As noted, the purchase agreements provide, “Making of final payment by Purchaser to

          Seller of the Purchase Price shall constitute a waiver and complete release of all claims by

          Purchaser against Seller with respect to the *** Unit and this Contract, except those which are

          expressly covered by the warranty hereafter provided or are expressly stated herein to survive

          the closing.” After the closings, the limited warranty controlled.

¶ 38         We disagree that the notice provision in the limited warranty is ambiguous. Paragraph 3

          provides the seller will remedy “any defect of workmanship and material brought to the

          attention of seller within one year of date of closing.” Paragraph 6 states, “any notices or claims

          to be made under this warranty shall be in writing and delivered to seller.” Boryslavska argues

          notice of a defect is not necessarily a “claim,” so paragraph 6 doesn’t apply. Yet, Paragraph 6

          applies to claims and “any notices” made under the warranty. Thus, the “in writing”

          requirement applies to notice of a defect. Boryslavska acknowledges she did not provide

          written notice of the defects until over a year after the units closed.

¶ 39         The trial court did not err in dismissing her breach of contract claims in counts VIII and IX

          of the second amended complaint.

¶ 40                    Negligent Misrepresentation Regarding Revite’s Roof Rights

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¶ 41         Boryslavska contends the trial court erred in dismissing count VII, alleging negligent

          misrepresentation relating to Revite’s roof rights. Boryslavska asserts Revite agreed to become

          a member of the Condo Association, in part, to obtain roof rights and did not discover until

          after the closing that the Sellers had recorded an amended Declaration depriving Revite of

          those rights. The trial court dismissed this claim under section 2-615 because “Revite does not

          plead that it was induced to buy the commercial property based on the roof rights, as the

          complaint focuses on Boryslavska’s inducement to purchase a residential unit based on the

          representations of the roof rights.”

¶ 42         The tort of negligent misrepresentation requires proof of “(1) a false statement of material

          fact, (2) carelessness or negligence in ascertaining the truth of the statement by the [speaker],

          (3) an intention to induce the other party to act, (4) action by the other party in reliance ***,

          and (5) damage to the other party resulting from such reliance, (6) when the party making the

          statement is under a duty to communicate accurate information.” Id. Critically, “the reliance

          by the plaintiff must be justified, i.e., [they] must have had a right to rely.” Kopley Group V.,

          L.P. v. Sheridan Edgewater Properties, 376 Ill. App. 3d 1006, 1018 (2007); see also Neptuno

          Treuhand-Und Verwaltungsgesellschaft Mbh v. Arbor, Z, 295 Ill. App. 3d 567, 575 (1998)

          (“no recovery for fraudulent misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment or negligent

          misrepresentation is possible unless plaintiffs can prove justifiable reliance, i.e., that any

          reliance was reasonable”).

¶ 43         Boryslavska’s brief alleges, “Revite agreed to become part of the Condo Association in

          large part to obtain roof rights.” She also alleges she told her attorney Revite would purchase

          the commercial units if Revite obtained ownership rights in the common elements of the Condo

          Association and, accordingly, had rights to the common areas of the building and rooftop

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          rights. The second amended complaint does not, however, allege the Sellers told her Revite

          would have roof rights. Instead, it alleges, “To induce Boryslavska to purchase Unit 201,

          Michael Zaparaniuk expressly told her that Unit 201 would have garage roof rights, roof rights,

          and a deeded parking space***.” As the trial court noted, those allegations go to Michael’s

          statements to induce Boryslavska to buy the residential unit but say nothing about statements

          he may have made to induce Revite to purchase the commercial units.

¶ 44         Absent allegations that Michael (or anyone else) made false statements to Boryslavska or

          Swanberg about Revite’s right to use the roof area, we must affirm dismissal of count VII

          alleging negligent misrepresentation under section 2-615.

¶ 45                                     Claim Against Jerry Kulas

¶ 46         Boryslavska contends the trial court erred in dismissing count III of the second amended

          complaint, alleging Jerry Kulas breached duties under section 15-25 of the Act (225 ILCS

          454/15-25(a) (West 2022)) by not informing her that the area in front of the commercial units

          was part of the common elements and Revite could not install a fence without Condo Board

          approval.

¶ 47         Section 15-25(a) states, “Licensees shall treat all customers honestly and shall not

          negligently or knowingly give them false information. A licensee engaged by a seller client

          shall timely disclose to customers who are prospective buyers all latent material adverse facts

          pertaining to the physical condition of the property that are actually known by the licensee and

          that could not be discovered by a reasonably diligent inspection of the property by the

          customer.” 225 ILCS 454/15-25(a) (West 2022).

¶ 48         In dismissing count III against Jerry Kulas under section 2-615, the trial court summarized

          the extent of Revite’s and Jerry’s relationship, stating (i) the second amended complaint made

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          no factual allegations suggesting Jerry was a broker or for any reason owed a duty under the

          Act, (ii) Jerry was not a part of the 2424 Chicago Condominium Association or on the Board,

          and (iii) while as president and secretary of the builder he agreed to build the fence, Revite

          retained a different contractor.

¶ 49         Boryslavska contends Jerry had a duty to disclose all material information about the

          transaction to Revite and disclose his financial interest in the property. For support,

          Boryslavska cites Sawyer Realty Group, Inc. v. Jarvis Corp., 89 Ill. 2d 379, 386 (1982), which

          held that real estate brokers occupy a position of trust to the purchaser they represent and must

          “exercise good faith and disclose any personal interest they have in property they list for sale.”

¶ 50         The Sellers contend that because the second amended complaint does not allege Jerry was

          a broker “with respect to this transaction,” it fails to state a claim under section 15-25(a) of the

          Act. Boryslavska asserts that as a broker for Vintage Realty Jerry had duties under section 15-

          25(a) even if he wasn’t the broker on this transaction.

¶ 51         If, as Boryslavska alleges, Kulas had duties to Revite under section 15-25(a) even if he was

          not the broker on this sale, the allegations involve conversations between Boryslavska and

          Jerry after the sale of the commercial units closed. Kulas would not have duties under the Act

          after the broker-customer relationship ceased. The trial court properly dismissed count III of

          the second amended complaint.

¶ 52                                     Inspection of Residential Unit

¶ 53         Boryslavska argues the trial court erred in dismissing the claims in counts II and III,

          alleging the Zaparaniuks and Vintage Realty violated duties under section 15-15(a)(3) of the

          Act to “exercise reasonable skill and care in the performance of brokerage services” by not

          advising her to bring a licensed home inspector to the final walk through of the residential unit.

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          She asserts that when, as here, a broker acts as a dual agent, the broker “can *** [h]elp the

          buyer *** to arrange for property inspections.” 225 ILCS 454/25-45(a)(6) (West 2022)).

¶ 54         In dismissing the allegation, the trial court noted that while before the residential unit’s

          closing, Michael phoned Boryslavska and told her to have the inspection the same day but said

          nothing about her bringing an inspector, “this fails to state a claim for violation of the Act

          [because] Boryslavska does not allege Michael told her not to bring an inspector, indeed, she

          acknowledges he told her to have an inspection that day. The failure to advise to bring an

          inspector cannot be categorized as false information, which was material to Boryslavska’s

          purchase which caused damages.”

¶ 55         Boryslavska contends the trial court erred because she was not alleging Michael provided

          false information but rather failed to exercise reasonable skill and care as her real estate agent,

          as required by section 15-15(a)(3) and under section 25-45 of the Act, he “should” have helped

          her arrange for a property inspection. We disagree. As noted, section 25-45 provides that when

          acting as a dual agent, the broker “can” help the buyer arrange for an inspection. It does not

          require it. Moreover, the trial court found that Michael had told Boryslavska to have an

          inspection the same day but had not told her to bring the inspector. Boryslavska fails to explain

          how that advice violated duties under section 15-15(a)(3) to “exercise reasonable skill and care

          in the performance of brokerage services.”

¶ 56                                   Reciprocal Easement Agreement

¶ 57         The trial court dismissed count X, alleging breach of contract for the Sellers’ failure to

          record the Reciprocal Easement Agreement on the grounds that Boryslavska and Revite

          “negotiated away” the duty to record. In short, the trial court found that on Revite’s behalf,

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          Boryslavska negotiated for ownership rights in the common elements to take the place of the

          Reciprocal Easement Agreement, and thus, the Sellers did not breach the purchase agreement.

¶ 58         Boryslavska contends the trial court made impermissible fact findings in concluding the

          Sellers were released from their obligation to record the Reciprocal Easement Agreement due

          to her having negotiated for Revite to join the Condo Association. She further asserts that the

          trial court accepted the Sellers’ argument without written evidence that she waived the Sellers’

          duty to record the Reciprocal Easement Agreement.

¶ 59         To plead a cause of action for breach of contract, a plaintiff must allege: (i) the existence

          of a valid and enforceable contract, (ii) substantial performance by the plaintiff, (iii) a breach

          by the defendant, and (iv) damages. Gonzalzles v. American Express Credit Corp., 315 Ill.

          App. 3d 199, 206 (2000). Only a duty imposed by the terms of a contract can give rise to a

          breach. Gallagher Corp. v. Russ, 309 Ill. App. 3d 192, 199 (1999).

¶ 60          Boryslavska cites no authority imposing a duty on the Sellers to record the Reciprocal

          Easement Agreement and the purchase agreement does not provide that the Sellers must

          record. Under Section 28 of the Conveyances Act “Deeds, mortgages, powers of attorney, and

          other instruments relating to or affecting the title to real estate in this state, shall be recorded

          in the county in which such real estate is situated.” In construing that provision, Macon County,

          Illinois v. MERSCORP, Inc., 742 F. 3d 711, 714 (7th Cir. 2014), held the Conveyances Act

          does mandate recording of a mortgage or other real estate instruments. Boryslavska cited no

          cases holding otherwise. Absent a duty, Boryslavska cannot state a claim for breach of contract.

¶ 61                                          Summary Judgment

¶ 62         Summary judgment applies where “the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file,

          together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact

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          and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c)

          (West 2022). The court construes the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits strictly

          against the movant and liberally in the opponent’s favor. Adams v. Northern Illinois Gas Co.,

          211 Ill. 2d 32, 43 (2004). Triable issues precluding summary judgment exist where material

          facts are disputed, or undisputed but reasonable persons might draw different inferences from

          them. Id. Courts grant summary judgment when the movant’s right is clear and free from doubt.

          Id. We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. Argonaut Midwest Insurance Co. v.

          Morales, 2014 IL App (1st) 130745, ¶ 14.

¶ 63                                    Representations About Fence

¶ 64         Boryslavska contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the portions

          of counts I and II alleging violations of sections 15-15, 15-35, and 15-45 of the Act by telling

          Boryslavska that Revite could install a fence. Sections 15-15 and 15-35 address a broker’s

          duties to promote a client’s best interests and disclose designated agents and other facts.

          Section 15-45 requires a licensee to obtain a client’s informed consent to act as a dual agent.

¶ 65         The trial court found that none of these provisions applied; Boryslavska and Swanberg

          acknowledged in their depositions that Michael discussed the fence with them on May 7 and

          9, 2014, before she asked Michael to act as her agent on May 10. Boryslavska did not allege

          Michael made statements about the fence after May 9. We agree. Sections 15-15, 15-35, and

          15-45 apply to a relationship between a licensee and client, and Boryslavska has not alleged

          Michael made false statements about the fence after she became a client.

¶ 66         Notably, section 15-25 addresses duties a licensee owes a customer, “Licensees shall treat

          all customers honestly and shall not negligently or knowingly give them false information.”

          Boryslavska first argued Michael violated section 15-25 in her response to the motion for

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          summary judgment and raises it again here. But she did not plead a violation of section 15-25

          in the second amended complaint, and, as the trial court noted, first raised it in response to the

          summary judgment motion. See Pagano v. Occidental Chemical Corp., 257 Ill. App. 3d 905,

          911 (1994) (plaintiff’s remedy “is to move to file an amended complaint before the summary

          judgment is granted under section 2-616(a) or after under section 2-1005(g)”).

¶ 67          The second amended complaint did not plead that the Sellers violated section 15-25, and

          Boryslavska cannot now complain that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment

          because the evidence may support a theory of recovery she did not plead.

¶ 68          In granting summary judgment on count VII, alleging negligent misrepresentation for

          Michael’s statements that Revite could install a fence, the trial court found Boryslavska’s

          reliance on the statements when he first showed her the property was not reasonable. As the

          trial court explained, she later decided to install the fence because, in the interim, she had

          negotiated for Revite to join the Condo Association. As a result, Revite was subject to the

          Condominium Declaration, requiring Association consent to alter the common elements.

¶ 69          Boryslavska argues the reasonableness of her reliance presents a question of fact. For

          support, she relies on Zimmerman v. Northfield Real Estate, Inc., 156 Ill. App. 3d 154, 167

          (1986). In addition to holding that “the issue of reasonable reliance is a question of fact,” that

          case also held that a court must consider the question “in light of all of the facts which plaintiffs

          had actual knowledge of as well as those which they might have discovered by the exercise of

          ordinary prudence.” Id. Other courts have similarly held that “a party is not justified in relying

          on representations made when he [or she] has ample opportunity to ascertain the truth of the

          representations before he [or she] acts.” Kopley Group V., L.P, 376 Ill. App. 3d at 1019

          (quoting Schmidt v. Landfield, 20 Ill. 2d 89, 94 (1960). An individual afforded the opportunity

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          to know the truth of the representations is chargeable with knowledge; an individual who does

          not avail themselves of the means of knowledge open to them cannot say that

          misrepresentations deceived them. Id.

¶ 70         The Condominium Declaration, which the Sellers provided to Boryslavska months before

          the closing on the commercial units, precluded “construct[ion] in” or “alter[ation] of the

          Common Elements” before the Unit Owners’ first annual meeting without written Association

          consent, and generally barred “obstruction of’ the Common Elements. Article IX section (b)

          permitted the Commercial Unit owner to use “portions of the Common Elements” for “any

          lawful commercial purposes.” Still, this permission was expressly conditioned on “the prior

          consent of the Board.” The Declaration defined common elements to include

          Balconies/Terraces and “yard space.”

¶ 71         As noted, to state a claim for negligent misrepresentation, a plaintiff must prove reliance

          on the defendant’s statements was justified and reasonable. Neptuno Treuhand-Und

          Verwaltungsgesellschaft Mbh v. Arbor, 295 Ill. App. 3d 567, 575 (1998) (“no recovery for ***

          negligent misrepresentation is possible unless plaintiffs can prove justifiable reliance, i.e., that

          any reliance was reasonable”). Reliance on statements Michael made during negotiations that

          Revite could install a fence was not reasonable after Boryslavska negotiated for Revite to join

          the Association and become subject to its declaration, which required the Board’s approval.

          We affirm summary judgment on the negligent misrepresentation allegations.

¶ 72         Affirmed.

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