Court Opinion

ID: 9899753
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-17 17:06:37.847006+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:48.494068
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                          Nov 17 2023, 8:51 am

                                                                               CLERK
                                                                           Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                              Court of Appeals
                                                                                and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS
Denise F. Hayden
Lacy Law Office, LLC
Indianapolis, Indiana

                                           IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In Re: The Adoption of P.J.W.                             November 17, 2023
                                                          Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                          23A-AD-1254
James D. DeClerck and Marilyn
J. DeClerck,                                              Appeal from the Montgomery
                                                          Superior Court
Appellants-Petitioners,
                                                          The Honorable Daniel G. Petrie,
        v.                                                Judge
                                                          Trial Court Cause No.
Ronald J. Walters,                                        54D02-2204-AD-8

Appellee-Respondent.

                              Opinion by Judge Mathias
                                 Judge Riley concurs.
                      Judge Crone dissents with a separate opinion.

Mathias, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-AD-1254 | November 17, 2023                       Page 1 of 14
[1]   James D. DeClerck (“Grandfather”) and Marilyn J. DeClerck

      (“Grandmother”) (collectively, “Grandparents”) appeal the Montgomery

      Superior Court’s denial of their petition to adopt P.J.W. (“Child”).

      Grandparents present a single issue for our review, namely, whether the trial

      court abused its discretion when it found that adoption is not in Child’s best

      interests.

[2]   We affirm.

      Facts and Procedural History
[3]   Grandparents are the maternal great-grandparents of Child, born September 14,

      2016. Child’s father is Ronald Walters (“Father”), and Child’s mother is

      deceased. Child lived with Grandparents part-time until 2019, when he went to

      live with them fulltime in Illinois. Grandparents established their permanent

      guardianship over Child, without objection from Father, in September 2020.

[4]   Father has an extensive criminal history dating back to 2003, including felony

      convictions for strangulation 1 in 2019 and possession of methamphetamine in

      2021, and he has been incarcerated for much of Child’s life. In April 2022,

      Grandparents filed a petition to adopt Child. Father timely filed an objection

      and motion to contest the adoption.

      1
          Father strangled his own mother, who survived the attack.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-AD-1254 | November 17, 2023    Page 2 of 14
[5]   In February 2023, the trial court held a hearing to determine whether Father’s

      consent to the adoption was required. Father testified that he was participating

      in drug court, which included individual therapy and weekly drug screens. He

      testified that he was maintaining his sobriety and had stable employment.

      Father also testified that he had sent letters to Child, and he had messaged

      Grandmother over Facebook asking to see Child. Grandparents had never

      responded to any of Father’s attempts to communicate with or to see Child. At

      the conclusion of that hearing, the trial court concluded that Father’s consent to

      the adoption was not necessary. The court found in relevant part that Father

      had not provided financial support to Child when he was able to do so. The

      trial court did not find that Father was unfit to parent Child.

[6]   During the final adoption hearing in April, Grandparents testified that they

      have raised Child since 2019 and have provided significant and consistent care

      for Child since his birth. On the date of the final hearing, Grandfather was

      seventy-one and Grandmother was seventy-four years old. They admitted that

      they had received communications from Father over the years but did not pass

      along those communications to Child. Grandparents have, however, kept letters

      from Father in a box to show to Child when he is older. Father testified that he

      had stable employment and a home, he had close ties to his community, and he

      wanted to be a father to Child.

[7]   The trial court found and concluded in relevant part as follows:

              8. At the time [Child] reaches l8 years of age, [Grandparents] will
              be 82 and 86 years of age, respectively.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-AD-1254 | November 17, 2023     Page 3 of 14
                                                ***

        10. . . . [Grandparents] remain guardians of the Child at this
        time.

        11. Since January 2019, the Child has resided almost exclusively
        with [Grandparents].

        12. Father has an extensive criminal history, including a new
        criminal charge for driving while suspended which was filed
        during the pendency of this action.

        13. Father has made significant progress towards rehabilitation
        through his participation in the Montgomery County Drug Court
        (“Drug Court”). Father has progressed to the third phase of Drug
        Court, and he anticipates graduating this year. Since placement
        on Drug Court, Father has participated in or completed the
        following: (i) individual therapy; (ii) self-help meetings; (iii)
        individual outpatient therapy; (iv) drug screens; and (v) other
        services provided by or recommended by probation.

        14. Father has been sober since at least his placement in Drug
        Court on or about May 13, 2021, and he has not committed a
        new criminal offense since that date.

        15. Father is gainfully employed at this time, as he holds a part-
        time position and owns and operates a local business. He has had
        the ability, at times, to provide some type of support for the
        Child.

        16. Father has made inconsistent attempts to communicate with
        the Child since the appointment of the Child’s guardians. Father
        did, however, testify that he has made attempts to initiate contact
        at least every six (6) months with the Child since January 2019.
        At times, Father had repeated, consistent contact with the Child,
        often while in custody. Visitation he had while in custody was

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-AD-1254 | November 17, 2023     Page 4 of 14
        provided through Mother, prior to her passing, and occasionally
        the Child’s maternal grandmother.

        17. While in custody, Father often sent letters and pictures to the
        Child. He would send said correspondence to [Grandparents’]
        address, but he never received a response or any type of
        verification that his correspondence had been received. Father
        also sent correspondence to the Child’s maternal grandmother for
        delivery to the Child.

        18. On July 11, 2021, Father sent a lengthy message to
        [Grandmother] over Facebook, requesting, in part, to have
        contact with his Child. [Grandmother] testified that she received
        said message; she did not reply to Father, but rather blocked his
        account so that he could no longer attempt to initiate contact
        over Facebook.

        19. [Grandparents] testified that they have received a number of
        letters and pictures from Father for the Child. They further
        testified that no such correspondence has been provided to the
        Child and that they have at no point responded to Father to
        confirm their receipt of the same.

                                                ***

        22. Father did not and does not feel welcome at the home of
        [Grandparents]. [Grandparents] testified that Father has not been
        to their home since 2018; they further testified that Father has not
        been invited to the home since 2018. While [Grandparents]
        testified that Father had the ability to see the Child if he wanted,
        their actions do not align with said statement. Furthermore,
        Father is not permitted to travel out-of-state due to his placement
        on probation.

        23. [Grandparents] have made no effort to arrange or allow
        contact between Father and the Child. Indeed, [Grandparents]

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-AD-1254 | November 17, 2023       Page 5 of 14
        appear to have actively worked to prevent Father from having
        contact with the Child.

                                                ***

        26. [Grandparents] testified that the Child still remembers Father.
        The Court finds said testimony credible, and that a bond remains
        between Father and the Child.

        27. The Father, through testimony, clearly desires to act as the
        child’s father.

        CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

        1. In Indiana, broad discretion is allowed to the trial court in
        determining what is in the “best interests of a child.”

        2. The Court’s position is that it is inherently in a child’s best
        interest to be raised by a biological parent.

        3. The protection of rights of natural parents is carried to a
        further degree in adoption proceedings than in custody cases. . . .

        4. The Court in determining how to balance all relevant factors,
        sees two issues as the primary drivers in its decision-making:

                 a. First, that the Father has made significant steps in
                 the past several years through his participation in the
                 Montgomery County Drug Court and his
                 involvement in the community to show a reformation
                 from prior criminal activities.

                 b. Second, that [Grandparents], while healthy and
                 active currently, are asking to be the parent of this
                 child well into their 80’s. While this may be possible,
                 the Court does not see this as an ideal situation.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-AD-1254 | November 17, 2023        Page 6 of 14
              CONCLUSION

              Based on the foregoing, this Court FINDS that [Grandparents]
              have not met their burden of proof herein and that the adoption
              of [Child] by [Grandparents] IS NOT in the child’s best interest.
              The Petition for Adoption is hereby DENIED.

      Appellants’ App. Vol. 2, pp. 8-11. This appeal ensued.

      Discussion and Decision
[8]   Grandparents appeal the trial court’s denial of their petition to adopt Child. Our

      standard of review is well settled:

                       In family law matters, we generally give considerable
                       deference to the trial court’s decision because we
                       recognize that the trial judge is in the best position to
                       judge the facts, determine witness credibility, “get a
                       feel for the family dynamics,” and “get a sense of the
                       parents and their relationship with their children.”
                       MacLafferty v. MacLafferty, 829 N.E.2d 938, 940 (Ind.
                       2005). Accordingly, when reviewing an adoption
                       case, we presume that the trial court’s decision is
                       correct, and the appellant bears the burden of
                       rebutting this presumption. [N.R. v. K.G. and C.G.],
                       [(]In re Adoption of O.R.[)], 16 N.E.3d 965, 972-73
                       (Ind. 2014).

              J.W. v. D.F. (In re E.B.F.), 93 N.E.3d 759, 762 (Ind. 2018). We
              will not disturb the trial court’s decision in an adoption
              proceeding unless the evidence at trial leads to but one
              conclusion and the trial court reached the opposite conclusion.
              R.K.H. v. Morgan Cty. Ofc. of Fam. and Children (In re Adoption of
              M.W.), 845 N.E.2d 229, 238 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied.
              We will neither reweigh the evidence nor assess the credibility of

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-AD-1254 | November 17, 2023        Page 7 of 14
               witnesses, and we will examine only the evidence most favorable
               to the trial court’s decision. Id.

       C.G. v. O.M. (In re E.M.M.), 164 N.E.3d 779, 781-82 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans.

       denied.

[9]    “Even if a court determines that a natural parent’s consent is not required for an

       adoption, the court must still determine whether adoption is in the child’s best

       interests.” In re Adoption of O.R., 16 N.E.3d at 974 (quoting C.L.S. v. A.L.S (In re

       Adoption of M.S.), 10 N.E.3d 1272, 1281 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014)). Indiana Code

       section 31-19-11-1(a)(1) provides that a court cannot grant an adoption petition

       unless it is in the child’s best interests. To put it succinctly, “[t]he primary

       concern in every adoption proceeding is the best interests of the child.” In re

       Adoption of M.S., 10 N.E.3d at 1281.

[10]   Father did not file an appellee’s brief, and, in such a case, we “need not develop

       an argument for [Father] but instead will reverse the trial court’s judgment if

       [Appellants’] brief presents a case of prima facie error.” In re Adoption of E.B.,

       163 N.E.3d 931, 935 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (citation and quotation marks

       omitted). Prima facie error means “at first sight, on first appearance, or on the

       face of it.” Jenkins v. Jenkins, 17 N.E.3d 350, 352 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). “Still, we

       are obligated to correctly apply the law to the facts in the record to determine

       whether reversal is required.” Id.

[11]   Grandparents contend that the trial court abused its discretion when it found

       that adoption is not in Child’s best interests based on their advanced ages and

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-AD-1254 | November 17, 2023        Page 8 of 14
       Father’s purported rehabilitation. They emphasize the evidence regarding their

       stable lives and years of caring for Child as his guardians, and they contrast that

       evidence with Father’s history as a violent criminal. But Grandparents’

       argument is nothing more than a request that we reweigh the evidence, which

       we cannot do on appeal.

[12]   As the dissent’s separate opinion makes clear, this is an extremely close case.

       We cannot ignore Father’s extensive criminal history and ongoing battle with

       substance abuse. But Father testified to his continuing sobriety, stable

       employment, and involvement in his community. Father testified further

       regarding his desire to share with Child their Mexican heritage. The trial court

       clearly found Father’s testimony compelling and opted not to terminate

       Father’s parental rights. We simply cannot reassess Father’s credibility on

       appeal. As our Supreme Court has emphasized,

               [a] parent’s interest in the care, custody, and control of his or her
               children is “perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty
               interests.” Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147
               L.Ed.2d 49 (2000). And as we have acknowledged on more than
               one occasion “the parent-child relationship is ‘one of the most
               valued relationships in our culture.’” In re I.A., 934 N.E.2d 1127,
               1132 (Ind. 2010) (quoting Neal v. DeKalb Cnty. Div. of Family &
               Children, 796 N.E.2d 280, 285 (Ind. 2003)); see also Bester v. Lake
               Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005).

       In re Adoption of O.R., 16 N.E.3d at 972. The trial court here concluded that

       Father deserved more time to nurture a parental relationship with Child, and

       we cannot agree with the dissent that that conclusion is clearly erroneous.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-AD-1254 | November 17, 2023       Page 9 of 14
[13]   We are also mindful of the language of Article 1, Section 18 of Indiana’s

       Constitution, which counsels that our penal code is “founded on the principles

       of reformation, and not of vindictive justice.” However, the principles of

       reformation are not an exact science. Confirmation of reformation is an

       ongoing process. The best examples of this confirmation process are Indiana’s

       drug and veterans’ courts and the reporting hearings they hold. In a close case

       like this where the safety of a child may be at risk, those types of reporting

       hearings may not be out of place. Here, the trial court judge was clearly

       convinced that Father appears to have changed his life for the better. And we

       must be guided by the broad discretion of trial court judges in family relations

       cases.

[14]   Importantly, the Grandparents’ guardianship remains in full force and effect.

       We may not have made the same decision as the trial court, but that is not our

       standard of review.

[15]   For all these reasons, we cannot say that the trial court abused its broad

       discretion when it found that adoption is not in Child’s best interests and denied

       Grandparents’ adoption petition.

[16]   Affirmed.

       Riley, J., concurs.
       Crone, J., dissents with a separate opinion.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-AD-1254 | November 17, 2023     Page 10 of 14
       Crone, Judge, dissenting.

[17]   I agree with the majority’s general presumption of correctness afforded to trial

       court decisions in family law matters. Additionally, I agree that the lower prima

       facie standard applies here because Father did not file an appellee’s brief. I

       point out that we “owe no deference” to a trial court’s legal conclusions. In re

       Adoption of A.M., 930 N.E.2d 613, 616 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).

[18]   I cannot agree with the trial court’s legal conclusion 2 that “it is inherently in a

       child’s best interest to be raised by a biological parent.” Appellants’ App. Vol. 2

       at 10 (emphasis added). That does not constitute a proper legal conclusion. If it

       were so, the mere existence of a biological parent would preclude adoption in

       every instance. It is true that we “must strictly construe the [adoption] statute in

       favor of the rights of biological parents.” In re B.W., 908 N.E.2d 586, 592 (Ind.

       2009). However, that does not mean that it is always in a child’s best interests

       to be raised by a biological parent. Further, we have often stated our

       unwillingness to place a child “on a shelf” indefinitely in hopes that a biological

       parent can finally transform into a capable, appropriate caregiver. See Matter of

       Campbell, 534 N.E.2d 273, 275 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989). Again, the paramount

       consideration must be the best interests of the child.

[19]   Here, the testimony reveals that during the first two years of Child’s life,

       Appellants took care of him for “two weeks, three weeks out of every month.”

       Tr. Vol. 2 at 7. Thereafter, Appellants took two-year-old Child into their home

       to live full time, and in 2019 they filed an emergency petition for guardianship

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-AD-1254 | November 17, 2023       Page 11 of 14
       because both parents were facing criminal charges and incarcerated. Appellants’

       App. Vol. 2 at 17-18. The Appellants became permanent guardians without

       objection from either parent, and then Mother died. Indisputably, Appellants

       have raised Child, now seven years old, for the vast majority of his existence.

       Yet, within purported legal conclusion 4, the trial court’s stated “primary

       drivers in its decision-making” are Father’s “reformation from prior criminal

       activities” and the advanced ages of Appellants. Id. at 11. I view the former as

       speculative at best and the latter as another example of the trial court’s

       inappropriate bias with no basis in precedent or statute.

[20]   Father has a lengthy, varied, and serious criminal history that includes the

       following convictions: 2003 burglary, theft, and escape, 2006 DWI and

       possession of paraphernalia, 2012 battery, trespassing, and criminal mischief,

       2014 intimidation, 2015 criminal mischief, 2019 battery, strangulation, theft,

       and invasion of privacy, plus possession of methamphetamine. Of his four

       felonies, one includes strangling his own mother so severely that she lost

       control of her bodily functions. At the adoption hearing, Father claimed that he

       has made positive strides since his most recent felony conviction for

       methamphetamine possession. Such self-serving testimony was belied by the in-

       court revelation that he had committed a new criminal offense between the

       consent hearing and the best interests hearing. Father attempted to downplay it

       as “[j]ust a driving while suspended” charge. Tr. Vol. 2 at 109. Such disregard

       for the law does not demonstrate reformation from his long, violent history.

       Father also admitted that he has four other children but sees only two of them.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-AD-1254 | November 17, 2023    Page 12 of 14
       While Father has sent some correspondence to Child, 2 he has not financially

       supported Child.

[21]   As for Appellants, they have been married for forty-plus years. For thirty years,

       they have lived in the same three-bedroom house with a one-acre yard and a

       playhouse out back. Appellants each had careers, now have retirement accounts

       and social security, and currently work part time for the public school district

       attended by Child. Mr. DeClerck is a school bus driver, and Child gets to ride

       with him on the morning and afternoon routes. Mrs. DeClerck works part time

       as a bus monitor. Both Mr. and Mrs. DeClerck are in good health. Id. at 75, 76.

       Appellants don’t just feed, clothe, and house Child. Their activities include

       walking three miles per day, playing soccer and basketball with Child, going to

       the park with Child, and even roller skating with him. They take him for regular

       checkups at his pediatrician and dentist. They arrange play dates with other

       children, facilitate visits with relatives, and let him try karate, tumbling, tee ball,

       and swimming. They spend much of each summer at a campground where

       Child has numerous friends. Child, who has his own bedroom at their house, is

       well known and comfortable in his community. Regarding his relationship with

       Child, Mr. DeClerck testified:

                We do everything together. If I go to go outside, he goes outside.
                If I work on the cars, he wants to help me work on the cars. If
                I’m doing something around the house, he wants to help me do

       2
         Contrary to Finding 19, the testimony indicated that Appellants have read such letters to Child and placed
       them in a file so they are available to Child in the future. Tr. Vol. 2 at 22.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-AD-1254 | November 17, 2023                           Page 13 of 14
               something around the house. If I go somewhere, he wants to go
               with. I mean, he’s basically my shadow.

       Id. at 85. Similarly, Child helps Mrs. DeClerck with chores inside and outside

       the house, and they play and cook together. The family has a dog that Child

       refers to as “his dog.” Id. at 90. Child is polite, considerate, has no problems at

       school, requires no counseling, and is a “joy to be around.” Id. at 96.

[22]   Today, on average, people live longer, healthier, more productive lives than just

       a few generations ago. And, we trust people in their seventh and eighth decade

       with extraordinarily difficult responsibilities, including running our country. To

       cavalierly dismiss, simply because they will be in their eighties when Child

       becomes an adult, two “healthy and active,” fully committed relatives as

       adoptive parents when they are essentially the only parents that Child has

       known strikes me as being the opposite of the best interests of Child. See

       Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 11 (legal conclusion 4). If at some point our

       legislature sees fit to set a maximum age for adoptive parents, then I will

       reconsider. Until then, I cannot concur with utilizing clear age bias to justify

       denying Child the stability, financial support, and love of the DeClercks,

       particularly given Father’s history.

[23]   Concluding that Appellants have met their burden of rebutting the presumption

       that the trial court’s decision is correct, I would reverse with instructions to

       grant the petition for adoption.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-AD-1254 | November 17, 2023      Page 14 of 14