Court Opinion

ID: 9840235
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-15 16:06:19.397442+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:11:14.613648
License: Public Domain

STATE OF LOUISIANA

                           COURT OF APPEAL

                             FIRST CIRCUIT

                             2023 CA 0067

                           CYNTHIA MORALES

                                 VERSUS

      ALONZO WILDER; DR. STEPHEN McCULLOH; CHERYL SMITH;
 LAUREN MILTON; KARLIE VIKOWSKI; OTHER UNKNOWN LIVINGSTON
        PARISH MEDICAL PERSONNEL; AND LIVINGSTON PARISH

                                             Judgment Rendered:       SEP      2023

                               EWWWWW3

          On Appeal from the Twenty -First Judicial District Court
                    In and for the Parish of Livingston
                            State of Louisiana
                            Docket No. 164043
               Honorable Jeffrey Johnson, Judge Presiding

Emily H. Posner                          Counsel for Plaintiff/ Appellant
New Orleans, Louisiana                   Cynthia Morales

Michael M. Remson                        Counsel for Defendants/ Appellees
Craig J. Sabottke                        Alonzo Wilder, P. A. and
Courtenay S. Herndon                     Stephen McCulloh, M. D.
Baton Rouge, Louisiana

Christopher M. Moody                     Counsel for Defendants/ Appellees
Albert D. Giraud                         Parish of Livingston, Cheryl Smith,
Hammond, Louisiana                       Lauren Milton, and Karlie Vikowski

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         BEFORE:    McCLENDON, NESTER, AND MILLER, 11.
McCLENDON, J.

         Plaintiff appeals the trial court's judgment sustaining defendants' declinatory

exceptions pleading the objection of lack of subject matter jurisdiction and dismissing

plaintiff's claims. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

                           FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

         Plaintiff, Cynthia Morales, filed a petition in the Twenty -First Judicial District Court,

Parish of Livingston ( 21st JDC) on August 1, 2019, seeking damages allegedly sustained

as a result of receiving inadequate medical treatment while incarcerated at Livingston

Parish Detention Center ( LPDC). Ms. Morales claimed that when she was arrested on

August b, 2017, she was en route to the hospital to seek treatment for a sty that was

developing on her eye. She further alleged that despite informing LPDC medical staff of

the sty and her status as a carrier of MRSA bacteria, and despite clear and obvious

symptoms of orbital infection while incarcerated, she was refused adequate treatment

and transport to a hospital. Ms. Morales maintained that although she sought medical

treatment for her orbital infection after bonding out of LPDC on August 10, 2017, she

suffered a permanent decline in vision and disfigurement to her left eye. Therefore,

contending that defendants' alleged inadequate medical treatment caused her damages,

she   asserted    claims   of   negligence,     medical    malpractice,     negligent   supervision     and

training, gross negligence, and respondeat superior. Ms. Morales named as defendants

Stephen McCulloh, M. D.;         Parish of Livingston; Cheryl Smith, as the former medical

director of LPDC; unknown medical personnel who provided care to Ms. Morales at LPDC;

Lauren Milton; Karlie Vikowski; and Alonzo Wilder, P. A.

         In response to Ms. Morales' petition for damages, Dr. McCulloh filed a declinatory

exception pleading the objection of lack of subject matter jurisdiction.'                        Parish of

1 Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 922 recognizes only three exceptions: the declinatory exception,
the dilatory exception, and the peremptory exception. In this case, at the time the objection of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter was before the trial court, the objection was properly raised as a
declinatory exception pleading the objection of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter pursuant to LSA-
C. C. P. art. 925. we note, however, that effective August 1, 2023, LSA- C. C. P. art. 925 was amended and
reenacted by La. Acts 2023, No. 5, § 1, which deleted the objection of lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter from the objections raised through a declinatory exception. That objection has now been added as
an objection that is raised by peremptory exception under LSA- C. C. P. art. 927. See LSA- C. C. P, art. 925,
Official Revision Comments -- 2023.

Herein, for brevity, we sometimes refer to the exception at issue as an exception of lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.

                                                      2
Livingston,    Ms. Smith,      Ms.   Milton,   Ms. Vikowski ( collectively, the Livingston Parish

defendants), and Mr. Wilder joined with Dr. McCulloh' s exception and adopted and

incorporated his arguments and exhibits. The exceptions of lack of subject matter

jurisdiction maintained that Ms. Morales failed to exhaust the administrative remedies

available to her as required by the Louisiana Prison Litigation Reform Act, LSA- R. S.

15: 1181, et seq. ( PLRA), prior to filing her petition for damages, and her claims should

therefore be dismissed. 2

        Ms. Morales opposed the exceptions of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. While

she conceded that she had not exhausted LPDC' s administrative remedies prior to filing

suit, she also argued that it was immaterial whether she exhausted said administrative

remedies, because her claims were not subject to the PLRA. Alternatively, Ms. Morales

argued that even if her claims were subject to the PLRA' s requirement to exhaust

available administrative remedies, LPDC' s administrative remedies were not available to

her after she bonded out of LPDC on August 10, 2017.

        The exceptions of lack of subject matter jurisdiction fled by Dr. McCulloh, the

Livingston Parish defendants, and Mr. Wilder ( collectively, Appellees) were heard on

September 26, 2022. 3 Following oral arguments, the trial court maintained the objection

of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On October 5, 2022, the trial court executed a

written judgment in conformity with its oral rulings and dismissed Ms. Morales' claims.

The October 5, 2022 judgment was silent as to whether the dismissal was with or without

prejudice, and therefore, was without prejudice. 4

        On appeal, Ms.         Morales challenges the trial court's judgment sustaining the

objection of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Ms. Morales argues that the trial court

erred in determining the PLRA was applicable to her claims and finding she was therefore

required to exhaust LPDC' s administrative remedies prior to pursuing her claims in court.

2 The Livingston Parish defendants also filed a dilatory exception raising the objection of prematurity and
a peremptory exception raising the objections of no cause and/ or no right of action. These exceptions are
not at issue in this appeal.

3 we note that the court minutes do not reflect that the exceptions of lack of subject matter jurisdiction
were held on this date. However, the judgment and transcript of the hearing both confirm that the
exceptions of subject matter jurisdiction were, in fact, before the trial court on September 26, 2022.

4 See Collins v. Ward, 2015- 1993 ( La -App. 1 Or. 9/ 16/ 16), 204 So. 3d 235, 239.

                                                     3
Ms. Morales also contends that the trial court erred in finding that LPDC's administrative

remedies were available to Ms. Morales after she bonded out of LPDC. 5

Standard of Review

         The trial court' s determination of whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over a

case is subject to de novo review. Christian Schools, Inc. v. Louisiana High School

Athletic Association, 2020- 0762 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 5/ 18/ 22), 342 So. 3d 1068, 1072, writ

denied, 2022- 01015 ( La. 10/ 12/ 22), 348 So. 3d 78.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

         Jurisdiction is the legal power and authority of a court to hear and determine an

action of the parties and to grant the relief to which they are entitled. LSA- C. C. P. art. 1.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the legal power and authority of a court to hear

and determine a particular class of actions or proceedings, based upon the object of the

demand, the amount in dispute, or the value of the right asserted. LSA- C. C. P. art. 2.

Subject matter jurisdiction is created by the constitution or by legislative enactment; the

parties cannot confer or waive it. See LSA- C. C. P. art. 3; Christian Schools, Inc., 342

So. 3d at 1072. Generally, a district court shall have original jurisdiction over all civil and

criminal matters and shall have appellate jurisdiction as provided by law. La. Const. art.

V, § 16.

Burden of Proof

         At the time this matter was before the trial court, an objection to the lack of subject

matter jurisdiction was properly raised by a declinatory exception.                        LSA- C. C. P.   art.

925( A)( 6). Where the lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not apparent on the face of

the petition, the burden is on the defendant to offer evidence in support of the exception.

See LSA- C. C. P. art. 930; Beasley v. Nezi, LLC, 2016- 1080 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 9/ 8/ 17), 227

5 Specifically, Ms. Morales assigns the following errors to the trial court' s judgment:
  1)   The trial court's determination that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Ms. Morales' claims
       against Appellees is legally incorrect.
  2)   The trial court made a legally incorrect determination when it determined that Appellees presented
       sufficient evidence to meet their burden that Ms. Morales failed to exhaust the administrative
       remedies available to her.

  3)   The trial court made a legally incorrect determination when it determined that the PLRA applies to
       this case and requires Ms. Morales to exhaust administrative remedies prior to pursuing her claims
       in court.

                                                       D
So. 3d 308, 311. In this matter, Ms. Morales' petition explicitly alleged exhaustion of "all

administrative remedies that were available to her during as required ( sic) by the

Louisiana Prisoner Litigation Reform Act." Thus, the lack of subject matter jurisdiction

was not apparent on the face of the petition, and the onus was on Appellees to offer

evidence in support of their objection. See LSA- C. C. P. art. 930; Hill v. ] indal, 2014- 1757

 La. App. 1 Cir. 6/ 17/ 15), 175 So. 3d 988, 1001, writ denied, 2015- 1394 ( La. 10/ 23/ 15),

179 So. 3d 600.

Law and Analysis

          As set forth above, Appellees argue that because Ms. Morales did not exhaust her

administrative remedies prior to filing suit, her suit should be dismissed without prejudice.

In opposing Appellees' exceptions for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and challenging

the trial court's judgment sustaining the exceptions on appeal, Ms. Morales argues that

the PLRA, and in particular the PLRA' s requirement to exhaust administrative remedies

prior to filing suit, does not apply to her claims. After a thorough de nolo review of the

record before us and careful consideration of Ms. Morales' arguments, we find no merit

in Ms. Morales' contentions that the trial court improperly granted Appellees' exceptions

of lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

          The purpose of the PLRA is to provide for civil actions with respect to prison

conditions or effects of an official' s actions on prisoners' lives. 6 Warren v. Louisiana

Department of Public Safety & Corrections, 2020- 0247 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 2/ 19/ 21),

320 So. 3d 453, 455. " Prisoner suit" is defined as " any civil proceeding with respect to the

conditions of confinement or the effects of actions by government officials on the lives of

persons confined in prison." LSA- R. S. 15: 1181( 2). " Prison" means " any state or local jail,

prison,    or other correctional facility that incarcerates or detains juveniles or adults

accused     of,   convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for violations of

6 The PLRA also curtails baseless or nuisance suits by prisoners by requiring a trial court to dismiss any
prisoner suit that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a cause of action, seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. LSA-
R. S. 15: 1184( B);   Cheron v. LCS Corrections Services, Inc., 2002- 1049 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 2/ 23/ 04), 872
So. 2d 1094, 1098, n. 3, writ granted, 2004- 0703 ( La. 5/ 14/ 04), 872 So. 2d 532, and affirmed, 2004-0703
 La. 1/ 19/ 05), 891 So. 2d 1250.

                                                       5
criminal law." LSA- R. S.     15: 1181( 5).   Appellees' exceptions of lack of subject matter

jurisdiction rely on the following provision of the PLRA:

        No prisoner suit shall assert a claim under state law until such administrative
        remedies as     are available are exhausted.          If a prisoner suit is filed in
       contravention of this Paragraph, the court shall dismiss the suit without
        prejudice.

        LSA- R. S. 15: 1184( A)( 2).

       Where the law provides for an administrative remedy, a claim must be processed

through the administrative process before a trial court will have subject matter jurisdiction

to entertain the claim.     It is axiomatic that the party raising the objection of failure to

exhaust administrative remedies has the burden of proving it is available and that the

plaintiff failed to submit his claim before the administrative tribunal prior to filing suit.

Asmore v. Chaisson, 2013- 1734 ( La. App.                1 Cir. 6/ 9/ 14),   2014 WL 3611834, * 2

 unpublished), writ denied, 2014- 1440 ( La.        10/ 24/ 14), 151 So. 3d 603. Once the existence

of an administrative remedy is established, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove that

he has exhausted his administrative remedies available to him or that the present

situation is one of the exceptional situations where the plaintiff is entitled to judicial relief

because any administrative remedy is irreparably inadequate. Id.

        In this matter, Appellees offered into evidence numerous memorandums and

exhibits previously filed in support of the exceptions of lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

These included the following documents: the "[ LPDC] Inmate Services, Disciplinary Rules

and General Information Handbook[,]"             Paragraph D of which is titled " Administrative

Remedy Procedure the Grievance Process"; the " Policies and Procedures" for LPDC, titled

 Inmate Grievances," which stated that after other attempts to resolve a legitimate

complaint failed, an inmate may request a grievance form " in order to make his/ her

complaint known to a higher authority"; 7 and the " Livingston Parish Detention Center

 LPDC's Grievance Procedure follows a three-step process. At Step One, the inmate files a completed copy
of the grievance form, which is screened by the Warden. If the grievance form is accepted by the Warden,
it is then sent to a First Respondent. The First Respondent then issues a response to the inmate within
fifteen days. At Step Two, the inmate may request review of the First Respondent's response by the
Warden, if the inmate forwards his request to the Warden within five days. The Warden then issues a
response to the inmate. Finally, at Step Three, the inmate may request review of the Warden' s response
by the sheriff by submitting an appeal to the Sheriff within five days of receiving the Warden' s response.
The Sheriff renders a final decision for the inmate, at which point an inmate has completed LPDC' s
Grievance Procedure.

                                                    2
Inmate Grievance" form, which was required to be sent to the Warden within 30 days of

the incident complained of. Appellees additionally offered Ms. Morales' August 2, 2022

responses to discovery requests propounded by Dr. McCulloh. In particular, we note her

response to request for admission number one:

       RE_
         QUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 1:

             Please admit that [ Ms. Morales] failed to complete the three step
       Administrative Remedy Procedure ( ARP) provided by [ LPDC] prior[] to filing
       the [ instant suit].

       RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 1:

                 Ms. Morales]     admits that [ the] ARP process at [ LPDC] was not
       available to her, and that she is not obligated to complete the ARP process.

       With this     evidence,    Appellees affirmatively established the existence of an

administrative remedy, as well as Ms. Morales' failure to exhaust the administrative

remedy.$ Accordingly, the burden shifted to Ms. Morales to prove that she either

exhausted the administrative remedies available to her, or that the present situation is

one of the exceptional situations where the plaintiff is entitled to judicial relief because

any administrative remedy is irreparably inadequate. See Asmore, 2014 WL 3611834 at

 2.

       In opposition, Ms. Morales relies on LSA- R. S. 15; 1181( 6),         which provides:

                     means any person subject to incarceration, detention, or
        6) ` Prisoner"
       admission to any prison who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or
       adjudicated delinquent for a violation of criminal law or the terms or
       conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or a diversionary program.
       Status as a " prisoner" is determined as of the time the cause of action
       arises. Subsequent events, including post trial judicial action or release from
       custody, shall not affect such status.

Ms. Morales contends she was not a prisoner when her cause of action arose, and her

claims are not subject to the PLRA, because she did not discover the extent of her injuries

until after she bonded out of LPDC and sought treatment at Our Lady of the Lake Hospital.

Thus, we must determine when Ms. Morales' cause of action arose.

       The ultimate resulting damages from an act of malpractice do not determine when

a cause of action accrues and whether prescription commences to run. Mitchell v. Baton

B Appellees also offered into evidence the affidavit and declaration of Thomas Martin, which was executed
in connection with a federal court case and described LPDC' s three- step grievance process; discovery
responses; and Ms. Morales' medical records.

                                                    7
Rouge Orthopedic Clinic, L. L. C., 2021- 00061 ( La. 10/ 10/ 21), 333 So -3d 368, 382.

There is no requirement that the quantum of damages be certain or that they be fully

incurred, or incurred in some particular quantum, before the plaintiff has a right of action.

Thus, in cases in which a plaintiff has suffered some but not all of his damages,

prescription runs from the date on which he first suffered actual and appreciable damage,

even though he may thereafter come to a more precise realization of the damages he

has already incurred or incur further damage as a result of the completed tortious act.

Mitchell, 333 So. 3d at 382- 83, citing Bailey v. Khoury, 2004- 0620, ( La. 1/ 20/ 05), 891

So. 2d 1268, 1276.

          Here, Ms. Morales' petition alleges that at the time of intake into LPDC, " the sty

on her eye was visible and presented with the obvious signs of MRSA -caused orbital

cellulitis," and that during her incarceration, her `orbital infection continued to worsen[,]"

specifically that her eyelid was completely swollen shut, her vision was blurry, she was

light sensitive, and she was in extreme pain. Ms. Morales' medical records confirm that

after her release from LPDC, she presented to Our Lady of the Lake Regional Medical

Center on August 10, 2017, with orbital cellulitis. Thus, it is plain that Ms. Morales suffered

actual and appreciable damages while incarcerated at LPDC, sufficient for her cause of

action to accrue, regardless of whether she later came to more fully understand the

extent of those damages. Therefore, Ms. Morales' cause of action arose while she was an

incarcerated prisoner at LPDC, and the instant matter is subject to the PLRA.

          Ms. Morales also maintains that the PLRA does not require an inmate in her position

to complete an administrative remedy or grievance process prior to filing suit, because

there is no process for inmates who have bonded out of LPDC to file a grievance. This is

incorrect. Pursuant to the plain language of the PLRA, release from custody " shall not

affect"    prisoner status. See LSA- R. S. 15. 1181( 6);   Dailey v. Travis, 2004- 0744 ( La.

1/ 19/ 05), 892 So. 2d 17, 21. Therefore, Ms. Morales was not exempt from exhausting

LPDC' s administrative remedy procedure on the basis of later being released from

custody.

          Ms.   Morales further maintains that the PLRA only requires exhaustion of such

administrative remedies as are available prior to filing suit, and because Appellees did not

                                                N.
affirmatively establish that LPDC' s administrative remedy was made available to her after

she bonded out, the PLRA does not apply to her. This argument lacks merit. The PLRA,

LSA- R. S. 15: 1184( A)( 1),   provides the following specific definitions of the relevant terms

as follows:

         1)   For purposes of this Section, the following words have the following
        meanings:

                  a) "   Administrative remedies"         means written policies adopted by
        governmental entities responsible for the operation of prisons which
        establish an internal procedure for receiving, addressing, and resolving
        claims by prisoners with respect to the conditions of confinement or the
        effects of actions by government officials on the lives of persons confined
        in prison. Such " administrative remedies" need not be adopted or published
        in compliance with R. S. 15: 1171.

                  b) " Available"     means all administrative remedies adopted by
        governmental entities, which address claims of the kind asserted by the
        prisoner even if the administrative remedies do not allow the prisoner the
        particular kind of relief sought.

In this matter, Appellees established that administrative remedies, within the definition

set forth by the PLRA, both existed and were available to Ms. Morales. Appellees were

not required to also affirmatively establish that they made LPDC' s administrative remedy

available to her after she bonded out. Rather, after Appellees showed that the

administrative remedy existed, and that Ms. Morales failed to exhaust same, the burden

shifted to Ms. Morales to prove that she either exhausted the administrative remedies

available to her, or that the present situation is one of the exceptional situations where

the plaintiff is entitled to judicial relief because any administrative remedy is irreparably

inadequate. See Asmore, 2014 WL 3611834 at * 2. Ms.                           Morales did not offer any

evidence establishing either that she exhausted the administrative remedy, or that the

administrative remedy would have been inadequate.9 Therefore, this argument lacks

merit, and the trial court properly sustained Appellees' exceptions of lack of subject

matter jurisdiction. 10

9 We further note that Ms. Morales did not offer any evidence indicating that she attempted to obtain any
paperwork or forms or otherwise complete the administrative remedy.
10 Although Appellees did not cite the Louisiana Corrections Administrative Remedy Procedure ( CARP), LSA-
R.S. 15: 1171, etseq., as a basis for their exceptions of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Ms. Morales also
argues that she was not required to exhaust administrative remedy procedures prior to filing suit because
these particular defendants are not subject to CARP. More specifically, Ms. Morales contends that while
CARP applies to complaints and grievances against a sheriff, his deputies, and employees, her claims are
against the Livingston Parish defendants —that is, the Parish of Livingston, Ms. Smith, Ms. Milton, and Ms.
Vikowski — not employees of the Livingston Parish Sheriff's Office ( LP5O),   Having found that the trial court

                                                      0
                                            CONCLUSION

        For the foregoing reasons, the October 5, 2022 judgment of the trial court

sustaining the objection of lack of subject matter jurisdiction and dismissing Cynthia

Morales' claims against Stephen McCulloh, M. D., Alonzo Wilder, P. A., Parish of Livingston,

Cheryl Smith, Lauren Milton, and Karlie Vikowski, without prejudice, is affirmed."                    Costs

of this appeal are assessed to Cynthia Morales,

        AFFIRMED.

properly maintained Appellees' exceptions of lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of Ms. Morales'
failure to exhaust her administrative remedies as required by the PLRA, we need not address this issue.
  As noted herein, the October 5, 2022 judgment was silent as to whether the dismissal was with or without
prejudice. Therefore, the dismissal was without prejudice, and we affirm it as such. 5gg Collins v. Ward,
2015- 1993 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 9/ 16/ 16), 204 So. 3d 235, 239.

                                                     10