Court Opinion

ID: 9480895
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:02:13.509683+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:59.471281
License: Public Domain

LAY, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
This case is a rather simple one. It comes to this court on a grant of summary judgment by the district court. This means that if there exists any genuine issue of material fact that can be derived by giving the benefit of all reasonable inferences to the plaintiff, the case must be remanded. This case does not involve an attempt of guards to quell a riot, as was the case in Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986). Nor was there even a disturbance, until the guards entered Stenzel’s cell and began brutalizing him. On the evening in question, Stenzel refused to fully comply with a prison rule which required inmates to have some part of their bodies visible while sleeping. Sten-zel testified he placed the covers over his head because the light gave him a headache and the cell was cold. The guards knew he was in his cell because he briefly uncovered himself each time they passed and told him to sleep uncovered.
Although Stenzel’s reasons for refusing to follow the rule may have been sincere, his behavior violated a legitimate jail policy and the guards were seemingly justified in deciding to move Stenzel to an isolation cell. I take no issue with that decision. Stenzel’s refusal to follow this rule, however, did not give cause for the deputies to physically beat him while moving him to isolation. According to the plaintiff, whose account of events on a summary judgment motion is to be given full credibility, three guards entered his cell and beat him without provocation. The three guards pulled Stenzel’s hair, shoved him to the floor, pulled back a finger of his left hand causing excruciating pain, placed a knee .in the small of his back, and upon getting him upright smashed his head into the cell doors. One deputy grabbed him by the throat and cut off his air supply. During this time Stenzel did not resist other than to tuck his limbs under his chest to avoid further injury and pain. (Stenzel Deposition at 28-34). On these facts, I find it incredible that the majority does not at least find that a jury question exists about whether the guards employed excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
The majority strains to find that Sten-zel’s refusal to fully comply with a prison rule was a disturbance justifying application of the Whitley standard. Stenzel was locked in his cell attempting to sleep. Sten-zel’s actions were not bothering other inmates nor were they in general creating any sort of disturbance. Cf. Cowans v. *430Wyrick, 862 F.2d 697, 701 (8th Cir.1988) (McMillian, J., specially concurring) (questioning whether refusal by inmate locked in his cell to close food door can be said to be disturbance within meaning of Whitley). StenzeFs refusal to sleep uncovered may have been a provocative challenge to a legitimate jail policy justifying officials in taking remedial action, but his act was not the kind of disturbance envisioned by the Supreme Court when it formulated the Whitley standard.
An inmate’s provocative act that does not threaten jail security or order, however much it may annoy prison officials, does not justify the officials’ use of excessive force against the inmate. When the use of force is in retaliation for a provocative act of an inmate, force applied by guards is “more likely to be not an effort to restore order but instead either a motive for ‘maliciously’ striking the [inmate] 'for the purpose of causing harm’ or else summary, informal, unofficial and unsanctioned corporal punishment.” Ort v. White, 813 F.2d 318, 324 (11th Cir.1987) (citation omitted).
Whitley and other cases reflect the indisputable fact that prison officials must have the ability to act quickly, sometimes with force, to quell disturbances and restore order. That force, however, must be reasonable. The license to use reasonable force carries with it the “heavy responsibility to apply that force only when justified, and to terminate the use of force when the justification ceases. The continued unjustified application of force amounts to physical abuse of an inmate, abuse which is prohibited by the United States Constitution.” Smith v. Dooley, 591 F.Supp. 1157, 1172 (W.D.La.1984), aff'd, 778 F.2d 788 (5th Cir.1985). Here, there is ample evidence that the use of any force may have been completely unnecessary, and that the amount of force and its duration was excessive. The Court in Whitley sets out a complex set of factors that must be considered m deciding whether actions of prison officials were “wanton and obdurate.” 1 That task is for the jury and can be taken away from the jury only if the evidence supports no reliable inference of wantonness. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 1085. The majority twists the meaning of Whitley and its progeny to cut off StenzeFs right to present his case of cruel and unusual punishment to a jury, and in the process subverts the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.
CONCLUSION
The majority decision runs counter to this Circuit’s precedent denying summary judgment on Eighth Amendment claims of cruel and unusual punishment when there is a legitimate factual dispute over the necessity and propriety of actions taken by prison officials. See, e.g., Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1207 (8th Cir.1990); Lair v. Oglesby, 859 F.2d 605, 606 (8th Cir.1988) (per curiam); cf. Duncan v. Storie, 869 F.2d 1100, 1103 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 152, 107 L.Ed.2d 110 (1989) (holding that whether excessive force was used in making an arrest is a factual issue for which summary judgment is inappropriate when differing account of events exists). It is a total subversion of the trial court record to hold that these facts do not make out a prima facie factual dispute of excessive force. I dissent.

. These factors include the need for force, the correlation between the need for force and the amount of force used, the extent of the injury, the threat to the safety of the staff and inmates, and any attempt to temper the severity of the response. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321, 106 S.Ct. at 1085; majority opinion at 427.