Court Opinion

ID: 9812812
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:48:48.044736+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:26:42.143181
License: Public Domain

Bkogden, J.,
concurring in result: Anne Cannon Reynolds II bad two guardians duly appointed and qualified. On 4 August, 1931, a decree bad been entered in Forsyth Superior Court in her behalf, whereby she received $500,000 in full settlement and satisfaction of all claim, right and interest in tbe estate of her father, Smith Reynolds, and in certain trust funds set up in tbe wills of her grandfather and grandmother. Her father died before reaching twenty-one, and by reason of tbe far-reaching change in her status occasioned by the death of her father, it appeared that she would probably be entitled to receive twelve million dollars unless she was foreclosed by the decree awarding her a half-million dollars. She could not act for herself by reason of the fact that she was an infant of tender years. Should those who had her property rights in charge undertake to assert a claim to the twelve million dollars or to assume that her rights had been foreclosed by the Forsyth County judgment as though “she had never been born?”
The solution of this question by reason of the large amount involved, constituted a momentous decision, particularly for one who, by reason of legal disability, was unable to either speak or think for herself. The guardians disagreed as to the proper course to pursue. The grandmother of the infant was firmly of the opinion that the Forsyth judgment ought to stand for the reason, among others, that it was the product of patient negotiation within the councils of the families and interested parties. Upon the other hand, the Cabarrus Bank and Trust Company, the other guardian, held the view that, by reason of changed circumstances resulting from the death of the father, the minor ought to have a fair chance and an open field in which to assert her property rights, and that a difference between a half-million and twelve millions in money was of too much moment to justify inaction.
Thereupon the Cabarrus Trust Company called to the coguardian to join in an attack upon the Forsyth County judgment, which unassailed obviously stood as an estoppel upon the assertion of the future or contingent rights of the minor. The coguardian refused to join in the attack. Consequently, the Cabarrus Trust Company filed a petition in the Superior Court of Cabarrus County, setting out the history of the proceeding in Forsyth and asked specifically for “the advice and instructions of the court as to whether it and its coguardian, Mrs. Annie L. Cannon, should be ordered and directed forthwith to make the proper motion in the Superior Court of Forsyth County in the case of Anne *296Cannon Reynolds, a minor, acting by and through, her next friend, J. F. Cannon, and Anne Cannon Reynolds II, a minor, acting by and through her next friend, Howard Rondthaler v. Zachary Smith Reynolds, a minor, and others for the purpose of having the alleged contract and decree of said court attempting to confirm the same and authorize the execution thereof by the parties therein named set aside and declared null and void insofar as they affect any of the property rights of any and every nature and description of his said ward, Anne Cannon Reynolds II, in the trust estates created for her benefit by the wills of her paternal grandparents, and in the personal estate of her deceased father,” etc. Obviously, the petitioner could not in Cabarrus County attack a final judgment in Forsyth County; nor could the judge sitting in Cabar-rus County set aside or modify the said judgment in Forsyth. Cahoon v. Brinkley, 176 N. C., 5, 96 S. E., 650; Gaster v. Thomas, 188 N. C., 346, 124 S. E., 609; Bisanar v. Suttlemyre, 193 N. C., 711, 138 S. E., 1. Hence, the sole question before the chancellor was whether the minor, Anne Cannon Reynolds II, had the right to proceed to Forsyth County and lodge a motion to set aside a judgment which shut the door of the law in her face so far as asserting any further right' in and to the property specified. There were no parties before the court except the guardians. The petition alleged grave irregularities and fatal defects in the Forsyth judgment. These allegations were denied and evidence offered in support of such denial. The New York will was not upon the lap of the chancellor. The family settlement and the laudable intentions of the family were not upon the lap of the chancellor. The actual validity of the Forsyth judgment was not upon the lap of the chancellor. The ultimate question was whether the minor had alleged and shown the existence of such facts or probable facts as to entitle her to be heard by the law of her country in a proceeding in Forsyth County to unloose the bar of that judgment. The guardians held in good faith opposite opinions as to the wisest course to pursue. Notwithstanding, it must be borne in mind that Anne Cannon Reynolds II is the heroine of the play and the clashing judgment of the guardians is incidental and secondary.
The trial judge found that it was not for the best interest of the minor to be allowed to be heard in Forsyth County. Both the history and traditions of equity as held and applied in this State demonstrate that it always lends an attentive ear to the call of widows, orphans and minors, and in determining the bare right to be heard upon the merits of a proposition, it has not required the highest and most technical degree of proof. I am of the opinion that the facts disclosed in the record are sufficient to entitle Anne Cannon Reynolds II to a chance to* be heard in the courts in a proper proceeding in Forsyth County. Of course, even a minor ought not to be heard in an assault upon a final judgment for inconsequential or captious reasons. Neither should the right to be *297beard upon the merits be denied because the evidence produced is not “horse bigb, bull strong and pig tight.” Therefore, I am of the opinion that the trial judge erred in denying to the minor the right to be heard upon the merits of the controversy.
The Forsyth decree may have been eminently proper and advantageous not only at the time it was rendered, but even now. The proposed family settlement may be eminently wise and proper. That, however, is not the point. The right of the minor to question the proceeding in Forsyth in the due and orderly manner prescribed by law, is the point as I conceive it, and that right has been improvidently denied by the judgment rendered.