Court Opinion

ID: 9635222
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:42:17.83083+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:53:52.990417
License: Public Domain

MICHAEL A. WOLFF, Judge,
concurring.
The trial judge was correct in determining that the railroad and its attorneys violated the duty seasonably to supplement, under our Rule 56.01(e), as to the existence of surveillance videotapes of plaintiff Gidden. We should interpret the word “seasonably” to refer to the time standard for interrogatories. Applying the time standard for interrogatories to this case, the railroad had an obligation to correct its answer to the interrogatory within 30 days after it learned that it had videotapes of Giddens.
‘We have come a long way since the days of the ‘sporting theory of justice.’ “ State ex rel. State v. Riley 992 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Mo. banc 1999). Pre-trial discovery performs important and legitimate functions. Liberal discovery aids in overall trial preparation, narrowing of issues, promotion of early settlements, and most importantly, the ascertainment of truth. Our rules should be interpreted to promote the search for truth and evenhandedly minimize game playing by lawyers on both sides of counsel table.
The supplementation rule promotes the search for truth. It eliminates the need for periodic waves of repetitive interrogatories. Prior to the 1970 version of Federal Rule 26, upon which our Rule 56.01 is based, federal decisions recognized that a court, in ordering a party to answer an interrogatory, could expressly provide that the interrogated party was under a continuing duty to supplement in light of new information. Some courts held that the discovering party itself could make the interrogatories continuing by so providing in its interrogatories, while other courts refused to allow this. See 8 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Richard L. Marcus, Federal Practice and PROCEDURE sec. 2048 (2d ed.1994).
Rule 56.01(e) requires a party “seasonably” to supplement its interrogatory answers as to the identity of witnesses, including experts, or when the party learns that an interrogatory response was incorrect when made or is no longer true. If we were to deem these interrogatories as continuing, then the duty “seasonably” to supplement would logically incorporate the time limit in our Rule 57 .01(a), which in this instance would be 30 days after the date that “the party obtains information upon the basis of which the party knows that the response (A) was incorrect when made or (B) though correct when made is no longer true.” Rule 56.01(e)(2).
There is no reason the time limit for supplementing an interrogatory answer should be different from the time limit for answering an interrogatory in the first place.
The use of the word “seasonably” in the rule, rather than specific reference to time limits, recognizes the flexibility needed when a trial date is imminent, which was not the case here. The court of appeals in State ex rel. Missouri Highway and Transportation Commission v. Pully, 737 S.W.2d 241, 244-45 (Mo.App.1987), reads the word “seasonable” to mean “reasonable.” In cases where trial is imminent, use of a 30-day time limit would be unreasonable. This interpretation would track the flexibility given in Rule 57.01(a) for the court to allow a shorter or longer time than 30 days for the answering of interrogatories. The presumption in all cases *826should be that the 30-day time limit for interrogatories applies to the duty to supplement. The presumption is overcome where circumstances, such as the timing of the trial setting or pretrial discovery order, warrant a shorter or longer time. No such circumstances appear in this case.
If a party with a surveillance videotape wishes to withhold that evidence from discovery until the plaintiff has been deposed, the party — in this case the railroad— should seek a protective order under Rule 56.01(c) or an order under Rule 56.01(d) as to the sequence and timing of discovery. To fail to disclose even the existence of such materials, which have properly been requested, does not further the search for truth and violates our discovery rules.
Federal courts sometimes permit a delay in production of a plaintiffs statements by issuing a protective order allowing the defendant to delay disclosure of statements until after the plaintiffs deposition has occurred. See Torres-Paulett v. Tradition Mariner, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 487, 489 (S.D.Cal.1994); Smith v. Central Linen Service Co., 39 F.R.D. 15, 18 (D.Md.1966). Where no protective order has been requested, federal courts have held that the statement must be produced. See, e.g., Willard v. Constellation Fishing Corp., 136 F.R.D. 28 (D.Mass.1991). The same protective order provisions are available under our Rule 56.01(c).
With due respect to the federal precedents, a motion for protective order does not precisely fit this situation, because the grounds for such an order are “to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.”1 The more appropriate motion, it seems to me, is a motion under Rule 56.01(d)2 which allows the court, “in the interest of justice,” to set the sequence of discovery.3 Thus, under this provision, a court could order that the videotapes be withheld until the plaintiffs deposition has been taken. Rule 56.01(c) requires a party to show “good cause” to obtain a protective order, and Rule 56.01(d) recites “as justice requires.” The federal trial court cases cited above suggest that a defendant would be entitled to a protective order by simply asserting that the defendant wants the benefit of an unrefreshed recollection of the facts. Other trial judges, however, *827might require a party to show, by reference to pleadings and discovery, the possibility that a plaintiffs claims may be overblown.
Requiring a party possessing statements or surveillance video to move for an order will prevent knowing concealment of discoverable materials that have been properly requested. When a party is required to seek an order to withhold disclosure of such material temporarily, the defendant may still have the benefit of getting the plaintiffs version of the facts on the record before producing a statement that might affect plaintiffs testimony. An order should also ensure that the plaintiff will have the statement in time to prepare for trial.
This interpretation would have the salutary effect of ensuring that the deponent is careful not to exaggerate, because the deponent cannot be sure what written or videotaped statement may be produced in discovery after the deposition. See 23 Am. Jur. 2d Deposition and Discovery sec. 46 (1983).
In this case, when plaintiffs counsel was served with a notice that his client was to be deposed again, the railroad should have moved for an order allowing it not to disclose the videotaped surveillance until after the deposition was taken. If such a motion is not required, the option is for plaintiffs counsel to file a specific request for supplementation of the previous interrogatories, or a repetitive set of interrogatories, and then go to the court to have the time shortened for the responses so that the attorney can get answers before the client’s deposition. While our Rule 56.01(e)(3) allows for such repetitive requests, we should not clutter up the discovery process by encouraging their use.
When we interpret the word “seasonably” as presumptively incorporating the time limits of the interrogatory rules, we have a more precise standard for determining when the supplementation rule is violated. In this case, the railroad was required to disclose the videotapes no later than June 15, and July 3,1997, which were 30 days following the respective dates on which the railroad’s attorney received the two videotapes. However, the videotapes were not disclosed until July 8, 1997, after the plaintiffs deposition was concluded. Under this standard, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a sanction on the railroad for failing seasonably to supplement its answers.4
If we uphold the trial judge’s conclusion that the railroad violated its duty “seasonably” to supplement its interrogatory answers, then the trial judge’s sanction— prohibiting use of the deposition at trial— makes sense. The resolution by the trial judge furthered the trial as a search for truth. The trial judge appropriately allowed the railroad to use the surveillance videos to minimize the plaintiffs injuries. What the trial judge prohibited was the use of the alleged “gotcha” deposition; at most the deposition may have shown that Giddens had previously exaggerated his injuries or the extent of his disability. Juries of course do penalize plaintiffs, sometimes in the measure of damages, if they believe a plaintiff has exaggerated, lied, or is a malingerer. What the railroad was deprived of, in this instance, was perhaps the opportunity for some jury justice that would not have been legally relevant to the real issues in the case, i.e., whether the railroad was negligent and what were the nature and extent of the plaintiffs injuries.
I would uphold the trial judge’s resolution of this issue. I concur in the result reached by the principal opinion, and in the analyses of the other issues in the principal opinion.

.Rule 56.01(c) provides:
(c) Protective Orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the court may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the following:
(1) that the discovery not be had;
(2) that the discovery may be had only on specified terms and conditions, including a designation of the time or place;
(3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other than that selected by the party seeking discovery;
(4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the discovery be limited to certain matters;
(5) that discovery be conducted with no one present except persons designated by the court;
(6) that a deposition after being sealed be opened only by order of the court;
(7) that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way;
(8)that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court.
If a motion for a protective order is denied in whole or in part, the court may, on such terms and conditions as are just, order that any party or person provide or permit discovery. The provisions of Rule 61.01 apply to the award of expenses incurred in relation to the motion.
(Rule 56.01(c) is similar to federal Rule 26(c).)

. (d) Sequence and Timing of Discovery. Unless the court upon motion, for the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interests of justice, orders otherwise, methods of discovery may be used in any sequence and the fact that a party is conducting discovery, whether by deposition or otherwise, shall not operate to delay any party’s discovery.

. Our Rule 56.01(d) is similar to federal Rule 26(d).

. The deposition was held on July 3, 1997. It is possible that the second videotape would not have been seasonably produced, under this standard. But certainly the first videotape, from May 15, 1997, would have been disclosed, or an appropriate order sought.