Court Opinion

ID: 9542449
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:34:34.470202+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:07:58.540730
License: Public Domain

SACKETT, Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I concur in part and dissent in part.
Defendant was charged after his daughters, six and eight years old, said defendant put a dirty video tape in the VCR, ordered them to undress, touched them improperly, and performed oral sex in the summer of 1995. At the time, they were in his care during visitation, his marriage to their mother having been dissolved.
*367The girls had given statements before defendant was asked to come to the police department to answer questions. After agreeing on a date and time, defendant was interviewed by Officer Venema. The interview was recorded on video tape. The video tape was admitted into evidence. The trial court heard the case without a jury and in reaching its verdict of guilt said it had considered defendant’s confession to Venema and found the statements made by defendant at that time corroborated the children’s testimony.
Defendant claims the failure of Venema to advise him according to the dictates of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 706 (1966), render the confession he gave inadmissible. The State admits Venema did not issue the warning of constitutional rights to remain silent and to have an attorney in the manner prescribed in Miranda.
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Venema testified that as an interrogation technique he did not place defendant in custody and did not advise him of his Miranda rights. Venema further testified that regardless of what was said during the interview, defendant would be arrested on the basis of the children’s statements. I do not approve of this technique where an arrest is planned. I construe the majority’s opinion does not approve of it either.1
The video tape shows Venema had defendant in the corner of an interrogation room at the police station and sat on a chair directly in front of him. Venema left the room twice, both times shutting the door behind him and opening it on his return. Defendant, of limited education and unsophisticated in matters of the law, appears to be constrained by Venema to remain during the course of Venema’s questions. When defendant asked to leave, Venema lied saying he was not going to arrest defendant though at trial Venema testified he intended to at all times.
The majority found Venema not truthful on several issues that came up during the interview. He told defendant the police had DNA evidence.2 They did not. Venema also told defendant he had a search warrant for defendant’s apartment, although he did not.
A Miranda inquiry is not triggered unless there is both custody and interrogation. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45, 86 S.Ct. at 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d at 706-07; see State v. Brown, 341 N.W.2d 10, 16 (Iowa 1983); State v. Cook, 330 N.W.2d 306, 312 (Iowa 1983); State v. Kyseth, 240 N.W.2d 671, 673 (Iowa 1976). Custodial interrogation is the “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom in any way.” State v. Davis, 446 N.W.2d 785, 788 (Iowa 1989).
I concur with the majority a Miranda inquiry was not triggered because defendant was not in custody as defined by applicable case law. I am disturbed, however, that the officer, who admittedly had decided to arrest defendant, circumvented giving the Miranda warning by questionable interview tactics. I consider this factor, among others, in dissenting from the majority decision on the next issue; that is, defendant’s contention his statements were involuntary because they were based upon improper promises of leniency and “psychological coercion” by Vene-ma’s untruths about the search warrant and the DNA testing and statements Venema made that indicated there were different kinds of sexual abuse.
I consider the following in finding the confession involuntary: Defendant was not warned he had a right to remain silent and a right to an attorney. See State v. Hodges, 326 N.W.2d 345, 348 (Iowa 1982). The Miranda warning was not given because Vene-ma decided not to advise' defendant of his rights as an interrogation technique. See id. The confession came pursuant to an interrogation. See State v. Snethen, 245 N.W.2d 308, 313 (Iowa 1976). The interviewer inten*368tionally lied to defendant telhng him the State had a search warrant for his apartment though it did not.3 See id.; but see State v. Boren, 224 N.W.2d 14, 16 (Iowa 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1008, 95 S.Ct. 2630, 45 L.Ed.2d 671 (1975). The interviewer told defendant he was not going to arrest him despite his intention to do so. There was subtle deception in the interviewer’s discussion of DNA technology. See Snethen, 245 N.W.2d at 313. The interviewer gave the implication there are good and bad sex offenders and because defendant loved his daughters he came under the category of a good sex offender, and if he confessed to being the good type of sexual abuser they could work it out or take care of it. Direct or implied promises of leniency can render a confession involuntary. See State v. Hrbek, 336 N.W.2d 431, 436 (Iowa 1983); State v. Kase, 344 N.W.2d 223, 225 (Iowa 1984); see also State v. Hilpipre, 242 N.W.2d 306, 312 (Iowa 1976).
Our courts expect honesty and fair dealing. Honesty and fair dealing are the cornerstones of our system of justice. A police officer who skirts the rules and plays with the truth reflects poorly on the many dedicated officers who operate within the letter of the law and are truthful. For society to respect officers, society must be assured they can believe officers at all times. I believe as judges we must demand honesty and not be willing to look for excuses for less than honesty.
For a statement to be considered free and voluntary, it must not be obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any improper influence. Davis, 446 N.W.2d at 787. The State has the burden of establishing by the preponderance of evidence the confession is voluntary. State v. Oliver, 341 N.W.2d 25, 28 (Iowa 1983); State v. Cullison, 227 N.W.2d 121, 127 (Iowa 1975).
I believe the State has failed to meet this burden and the confession should have been suppressed. The trial court relied on the confession in convicting defendant. I would reverse the trial court and remand for a new trial.
HUITINK, J., joins in this partial dissent.

. The majority in a footnote says, “That does not mean, however, this court endorses the technique used by Venema in his interrogation.”

. Though the majority does not find Venema told defendant the police had DNA evidence, my viewing of the video tape convinced me he did. Even if he did not, the only finding that can be made is that the statements are deceptive.

. The majority, while setting forth Venema’s statement, "I have a search warrant for your house, yeah,” finds this not untruthful. Based on defendant’s ignorance of the legal process, I find it a deliberate untruth.