Court Opinion

ID: 9398763
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-01 07:00:22.871997+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:36.069746
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     AMATULLAH R. MUHAMMAD,                          DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                         AT-0752-16-0777-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND                          DATE: May 31, 2023
       SECURITY,
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Shaun Yancey, Esquire, Atlanta, Georgia, for the appellant.

           Kenneth William, Atlanta, Georgia, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     sustained her removal from the agency for improper conduct and lack of candor
     and found that she did not meet her burden of proving the affirmative defense of
     race discrimination. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                          2

     following circumstances:     the initial decision contains erroneous findings of
     material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute
     or regulation or the erroneous application of the law t o the facts of the case; the
     administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial
     decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of
     discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and
     material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due
     diligence, was not available when the record closed.         Title 5 of the Code of
     Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).             After fully
     considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not
     established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
     Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision,
     which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).
¶2         The appellant worked for the agency as a GS-11 Immigration Services
     Officer. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 1, Tab 6 at 33. In this position, the
     appellant was responsible for granting or denying application s and petitions for
     immigration benefits, some decisions which determined whether immigrants were
     permitted to legally remain in the country. IAF, Tab 9 at 16.
¶3         Effective July 29, 2016, the agency removed the appellant for three
     specifications of improper conduct stemming from an April 17, 2014 lu nchtime
     incident at a Quiznos and three specifications of lack of candor relating to the
     appellant’s sworn interview with the agency’s Office of Security and Integrity
     (OSI) regarding the April 17, 2014 incident. IAF, Tab 6 at 33, 35-39.
¶4         The appellant appealed her removal to the Board and withdrew her hearing
     request. IAF, Tab 1, Tab 28 at 4. After thoroughly considering the evidence,
     including statements and affidavits from the appellant, the two co -owners of the
     Quiznos, the police officer who responded to the incident, a state victim’s
     advocate, and a local assistant state’s attorney, along with a recording from the
     restaurant’s security camera, the administrative judge sustained all three improper
                                                                                               3

     conduct specifications and two specifications of the lack of candor charge. IAF,
     Tab 40, Initial Decision (ID) at 1-10. The administrative judge found a nexus
     between the sustained charges and the efficiency of the service, that the removal
     penalty was reasonable, and that the appellant failed to prove her affirmative
     defense of race discrimination. 2 ID at 10-15.
¶5         On review, the appellant argues that the evidence was not justly and
     impartially considered, that the Quiznos co-owners fabricated their version of
     events, and that the administrative judge failed to consider that some of the
     statements against her were later recanted. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1
     at 2-3.   We agree with the administrative judge’s well -reasoned findings and
     discern no reason to disturb them.           See Clay v. Department of the Army,
     123 M.S.P.R. 245, ¶ 6 (2016) (finding no reason to disturb the administrative
     judge’s findings in the initial decision when she considered the evidence, drew
     appropriate    inferences,    and   made     reasoned    conclusions);     Broughton      v.
     Department of Health and Human Services, 33 M.S.P.R. 357, 359 (1987) (same).
¶6         The appellant also argues that the administrative judge relied on hearsay
     evidence. PFR File, Tab 1 at 2-3, Tab 6 at 2. It is well settled that hearsay
     evidence is admissible in Board proceedings and can be sufficient to sustain a
     charge.   Vaughn v. U.S. Postal Service, 109 M.S.P.R. 469, ¶ 9 (2008), aff’d,

     2
       Although the administrative judge categorized the evidence as direct and indirect in
     analyzing the appellant’s race discrimination affirmative defense, we find that she did
     not disregard any evidence on that basis and that she considered the evidence as a
     whole. ID at 12-15; see Gardner v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 123 M.S.P.R. 647,
     ¶¶ 30-31 (2016) (clarifying how the Board analyzes evidence offered in support of a
     Title VII claim), clarified by Pridgen v. Office of Management and Budget , 2022 MSPB
     31, ¶¶ 23-24. Therefore, any error in the analysis was harmless. See Panter v.
     Department of the Air Force, 22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282 (1984) (explaining that an
     adjudicatory error that is not prejudicial to a party’s substantive rights provides no basis
     for reversal of an initial decision). Because the appellant has offered no basis for
     disturbing the administrative judge’s finding that the appellant did not prove her race
     was a motivating factor in the agency’s removal decision, ID at 14 -15, we do not reach
     the question of whether discrimination was a “but-for” cause of the removal action. See
     Pridgen, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶¶ 22, 48.
                                                                                          4

     315 F. App’x 305 (Fed. Cir. 2009).       In the initial decision, the administrative
     judge properly considered the relevant factors for assessing the probative value of
     hearsay evidence. ID at 6-7; see Borninkhof v. Department of Justice, 5 M.S.P.R.
     77, 87 (1981).    The appellant also argues that the Douglas factors were not
     properly weighed, but the administrative judge found that the agency’s “deciding
     official properly and thoroughly considered all of the relevant Douglas factors.” 3
     ID at 11-12. Nothing on review causes us to stray from this conclusion.
¶7         The appellant further asserts on review that the agency improperly delayed
     a year and a half before initiating its investigation into the Quiznos incident, but
     the evidence of record does not support such a claim. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4; IAF,
     Tab 10 at 8-10. Many of the sworn written and verbal statements that the agency
     relied on to support its removal action against the appellant were made in April
     through July 2014. IAF, Tab 7 at 41; Tab 8 at 4; Tab 10 at 18 -26, 34, 46, 52, 54.
     The agency conducted an investigatory interview of the appellant in June 2015,
     after the State of Vermont dismissed the criminal charges. IAF, Ta b 10 at 59,
     Tab 11 at 10. The appellant’s argument does not diminish the strength of the
     agency’s evidence proving that she engaged in the charged misconduct. Although
     we have recognized that a charge may be dismissed if an agency’s delay in
     proposing the adverse action is unreasonable and prejudicial to the appellant,
     such circumstances do not exist in this appeal. Messersmith v. General Services
     Administration, 9 M.S.P.R. 150, 155-56 (1981) (holding that the delay between
     the misconduct and the agency issuing the proposal was not a reason to overturn
     the action, as the delay was caused by the seriousness of the charges, the
     corresponding investigation, involvement of the U.S. Attorney, and the appellant
     did not identify any prejudicial harm from the delay).

     3
       In Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 305-06 (1981), the Board
     articulated a nonexhaustive list of factors relevant to the penalty determi nation in a
     disciplinary action.
                                                                                          5

¶8         In her petition for review, the appellant claims that the local police
      department wrongfully arrested her for the Quiznos incident and did not
      “Mirandize” her. PFR File, Tab 1 at 3-4. The appellant then argues that the
      criminal charges were dropped and her record expunged, along with what appears
      to be a claim that she was subjected to double jeopardy through her removal.
      PFR File, Tab 1 at 3-5, Tab 6 at 1. The agency did not use any of the statements
      that the appellant made to the local police as a basis to remove her. IAF, Tab 9
      at 14-16. The agency was aware that the State of Vermont dismissed the criminal
      charges against the appellant before issuing the proposed removal. IAF, Tab 10
      at 59. As is the case here, when an appellant’s removal from an agency is based
      on her conduct, rather than her arrest and subsequent charges, the administrative
      action is not impacted by court action. Zimmerman v. Department of Health and
      Human Services, 19 M.S.P.R. 454, 456 (1984).          Moreover, the constitutional
      prohibition against double jeopardy applies to criminal proceedings and is not
      applicable here. Lemal v. U.S. Postal Service, 79 M.S.P.R. 241, 243 (1998).
¶9         On review, the appellant claims that she was questioned without
      representation in the June 5, 2015 investigatory interview conducted by OSI.
      PFR File, Tab 1 at 5. The evidence in the record establishes that days before the
      interview took place OSI sent the appellant written notice of her right to have
      representation present.   IAF, Tab 9 at 5-6, 8.     The appellant then signed this
      written notice on the day of the interview. IAF, Tab 11 at 6. As such, we see no
      merit to the appellant’s argument in this regard.
¶10        The appellant’s allegations on review that her civil rights were violated
      when she was arrested and incarcerated are not relevant to the issues before the
      Board. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5. As outlined above, the agency did not take action
      against the appellant based on her arrest and incarceration. IAF, Tab 9 at 14-16.
¶11        The appellant mentions on review that this “situation stems from my health
      conditions.” PFR File, Tab 1 at 5. However, she does not expound on how this is
      relevant to any of the conclusions in the initial decision. Lastly, many of the
                                                                                            6

      appellant’s other contentions on review are mere re-argument of the issues and
      findings of fact as determined by the administrative judge.          PFR File, Tab 1
      at 3-4, Tab 6 at 1-3. This is insufficient to warrant the granting of her petition
      for review.     See Hsieh v. Defense Nuclear Agency, 51 M.S.P.R. 521, 524-25
      (1991) (holding that mere re-argument of the same issues heard and decided by
      the administrative judge, with nothing more, does not constitute a basis to grant a
      petition for review), aff’d, 979 F.2d 217 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (Table).
¶12         Accordingly, we affirm the initial decision.

                               NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 4
            You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
      statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
      review and the appropriate forum with which to file.             5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
      Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
      Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
      appropriate for your situation and the rights described b elow do not represent a
      statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
      jurisdiction.   If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
      immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
      filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
      limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
            Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
      below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
      about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
      should contact that forum for more information.

      4
        Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
      the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
      Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                          7

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit    your   petition    to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of partic ular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review     of   cases      involving   a   claim      of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court (not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
                                                                                  8

receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court‑appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security.        See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                         Office of Federal Operations
                  Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                               P.O. Box 77960
                          Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                                                                                       9

                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review     pursuant    to   the   Whistleblower       Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 5 The court of appeals must receive your
petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                                 U.S. Court of Appeals
                                 for the Federal Circuit
                                717 Madison Place, N.W.
                                Washington, D.C. 20439

5
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction .
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                              10

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.