Court Opinion

ID: 9781720
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 17:17:24.834958+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:13:25.435735
License: Public Domain

KENNARD, J., Dissenting.
Defendant pled guilty to two counts of driving
with a blood-alcohol level in excess of 0.08 percent by weight. (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (b).) The trial court placed him on three years of supervised probation. Among the conditions of probation was that defendant, who had no history of animal abuse or keeping dangerous animals, notify the probation officer before obtaining any pets, and that he give 24 hours’ written notice “prior to any changes.” A divided Court of Appeal upheld this condition, as does a majority of this court. But in my view, the condition, which has no connection to defendant’s “drunk driving” conviction, is overbroad and invalid. Hence, my dissent.
In granting probation, a trial court may in its discretion impose reasonable conditions. (Pen. Code, § 1203.1, subd. (j).) A probation condition is valid if it (1) has a connection to the crime committed, (2) relates to conduct that is criminal, or (3) reasonably relates to future criminality. (People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486 [124 Cal.Rptr. 905, 541 P.2d 545].)
Here, there is no relationship between the pet probation condition and defendant’s “drunk driving” conviction. Nor is it criminal conduct to have a pet. With respect to the third factor—whether the condition has a reasonable relationship to future criminality—the majority’s answer is a resounding “yes.” I disagree.
As the majority sees it, any probation condition that makes it easier for a probation officer to supervise a probationer is one that reasonably relates to deterring future criminality and thus is valid. (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 378 *388[“condition facilitates the effective supervision of probationers and, as such, is reasonably related to deterring future criminality”]; id., at p. 380 [“provides information that is useful for effective probation supervision”]; id., at pp. 380-381 [“A condition of probation that enables a probation officer to supervise his or her charges effectively is, therefore, ‘reasonably related to future criminality.’ ”].) Pets, the majority insists, can be potentially dangerous as they could pose a safety threat to probation officers and could interfere with unscheduled visits and unannounced searches by acting as a warning system. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 380, 381, 382.)
The flaw in the majority’s reasoning is that it treats all pets alike. The majority’s concern is that some pets may “pose a great or even life-threatening hazard to persons . . . .” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 381.) Most pets do not fall into that category. Yet the majority, in upholding the probation condition, treats any pet as potentially “life threatening.” Falling within that reach would be Jaws the goldfish, Tweety the canary, and Hank the hamster, hardly the kinds of pets one would expect to strike fear in a probation officer. The majority’s safety concern could easily be met by a more limited probation condition related to the keeping of dangerous animals.
The majority expresses concern that pets may warn the probationer of the probation officer’s presence, thereby interfering with unannounced visits and searches. I find that concern puzzling for two reasons. First, the probation condition does not solve the problem the majority poses because the probationer need only give notice that he or she has a pet; nothing in the condition prohibits probationers from having a pet. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 382-383.) Second, warning the probationer is irrelevant, because a probation officer cannot just barge into a probationer’s residence. The law requires knocking or other means of notice of the officer’s presence, and an announcement of the purpose of the visit. (People v. Mays (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 969, 973, fn. 4 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 519]; see Pen. Code, §§ 844, 1531; People v. Murphy (2005) 37 Cal.4th 490, 495-496 [36 Cal.Rptr.3d 125, 123 P.3d 155].) This requirement itself warns the probationer of the officer’s presence.
Because it treats all pets alike, the San Bernardino County probation condition requiring petitioners to notify their probation officers of all pets at their residences, and of any change in the status of those pets, is overbroad and thus invalid. Most pets—including domestic cats, tropical fish, and song birds like canaries—present no conceivable risk of impairing or interfering with probation supervision. Indeed, the overbroad pet notification condition may itself interfere with achievement of probation’s rehabilitative goals *389because the notification burdens it imposes may discourage pet ownership, thereby depriving probationers of the well-documented physical and mental health benefits of animal companionship at home. To eliminate these unnecessary and counterproductive burdens, I would require probation authorities to draft a narrower and more rational probation condition.
Moreno, J., concurred.