Court Opinion

ID: 9949815
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-12 17:03:12.174621+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:33:39.075888
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
 UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                 AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                    IN THE
             ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                DIVISION ONE

      IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.F.

                             No. 1 CA-JV 23-0181
                              FILED 3-12-2024

          Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
                            No. JS520513
          The Honorable Sigmund G. Popko, Judge Pro Tempore

                                  AFFIRMED

                                   COUNSEL

Maricopa County Legal Defender's Office, Phoenix
By Jamie R. Heller
Counsel for Appellant

Stuart & Blackwell, PLLC, Chandler
By Cory A. Stuart
Counsel for Appellee

                       MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge James B. Morse Jr. delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Angela K. Paton and Judge Michael S. Catlett joined.
            IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.F.
                        Decision of the Court

M O R S E, Judge:

¶1           Bryanna M. ("Mother") appeals from the juvenile court's order
terminating her parental rights. For the following reasons, we affirm.

             FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2            Mother and Johnny F. ("Father") are the biological parents of
C.F. ("Child"), born in May 2015. Mother and Father began living together
in 2014. A couple of years later, Father and Mother stopped living together
and ended their relationship. Father and Mother then agreed to an
alternating-week parenting-time schedule for Child.

¶3           In May 2016, Father petitioned the court to memorialize the
parenting-time schedule. Mother continued to exercise her parenting time
with Child.

¶4            In March 2017, Father petitioned the court to modify legal
decision-making, parenting time, and child support. The court awarded
Father sole legal decision-making authority, modified Mother's parenting
time, and established her child support obligation. The court explained that
if Mother submitted to weekly random drug testing for three consecutive
months, without missed or diluted tests, her parenting time would revert
to the alternating-week schedule. Mother continued to exercise her
parenting time with Child as modified by the court.

¶5           In February 2020, Father again requested that the court
modify Mother's parenting time. The court modified Mother's parenting
time to supervised visitations. The court also provided that if Mother
submitted to weekly random urinalysis testing for three consecutive
months, without missed or diluted tests, her parenting time would revert
to unsupervised visitation. Following this modification, Mother requested
phone calls with Child, but Father refused and told her to arrange
supervised visitations. Mother did not set up supervised visitations
through an agency, and Father rejected Mother's requests for supervised
visits with maternal grandmother or paternal grandmother. On other
occasions, Mother asked for Child's school and medical information, but
Father refused to provide it. During this time, Mother did not submit to
weekly drug testing as required by the court's modification orders and was
behind on child support payments.

¶6            In November 2022, Father married. The following month,
Father filed a termination petition, alleging Mother abandoned Child and
was unable to parent Child due to chronic substance abuse. Mother

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             IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.F.
                         Decision of the Court

contested Father's petition. The court set an adjudication hearing for June
2023.

¶7             After a three-day hearing, the court denied termination under
the chronic-substance-abuse ground but granted it as to the abandonment
ground and concluded Father had proven by clear and convincing evidence
that Mother abandoned Child without just cause. The court based its
finding on Mother's failure to pay child support, maintain regular contact
with Child, and provide normal parental supervision over Child "for a
period far more than the statutory six months." The court also concluded
that Father's actions—which may have made it difficult for Mother to
maintain regular contact with Child—or his failure to "comply with the
family court order to keep Mother informed of certain details of Child's
life," did "not amount to a defense under Calvin B. v. Brittany B., 232 Ariz.
292 (App. 2013)." The court also found by a preponderance of the evidence
that termination was in Child's best interests because Father's spouse
("Stepmother") was willing to adopt Child.

¶8            Mother timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction under
A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A)(1), and 12-2101(A)(1).

                                 DISCUSSION

¶9             Parents have a fundamental right to the custody and control
of their children, but that right is not absolute. Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep't of
Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 248, ¶¶ 11–12 (2000). To terminate a parent's rights,
a court must (1) find a statutory ground for termination under A.R.S. § 8-533
by clear and convincing evidence and (2) determine, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that termination is in the child's best interests. Brionna J. v.
Dep't of Child Safety, 255 Ariz. 471, 474, ¶ 1 (2023); see A.R.S. § 8-533(B)
(requiring at least one statutory ground and a best-interests finding).
Because the juvenile court "is in the best position to weigh the evidence,
observe the parties, judge the credibility of witnesses, and resolve disputed
facts," Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, 334, ¶ 4 (App. 2004),
we accept the court's findings of fact if reasonable evidence supports them
and will affirm the "court's legal conclusions" terminating parental rights
unless they are clearly erroneous, Brionna J., 255 Ariz. at 478–79, ¶ 31. The
court's findings are not clearly erroneous unless this Court determines "as
a matter of law that no one could reasonably find the [supporting]
evidence" meets the applicable burden of proof. Brionna J., 255 Ariz. at 478–
79, ¶ 31 (quoting Murillo v. Hernandez, 79 Ariz. 1, 9 (1955)).

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            IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.F.
                        Decision of the Court

I.     Abandonment.

¶10           Parental rights may be terminated when a parent abandons a
child. A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(1). Abandonment is defined in A.R.S. § 8-531(1):

       "Abandonment" means the failure of a parent to provide
       reasonable support and to maintain regular contact with the
       child,    including     providing     normal    supervision.
       Abandonment includes a judicial finding that a parent has
       made only minimal efforts to support and communicate with
       the child. Failure to maintain a normal parental relationship
       with the child without just cause for a period of six months
       constitutes prima facie evidence of abandonment.

Abandonment is assessed objectively based on the parent's conduct, not her
subjective intent. Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 249–50, ¶ 18; see Kenneth B. v. Tina
B., 226 Ariz. 33, 36–38, ¶¶ 15–16, 22 (App. 2010) (concluding a court could
find abandonment despite an absent parent's subjective intent not to
abandon a child).

¶11           Mother argues that she "made more than minimal efforts to
maintain a relationship with [Child] and Father's actions hindered the
parent-child relationship." The court must consider "whether a parent has
provided reasonable support, maintained regular contact, made more than
minimal efforts to support and communicate with the child, and
maintained a normal parental relationship." Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 249–50,
¶ 18.

¶12            Mother specifically argues that she made more than minimal
efforts to support and communicate with Child by having Child on her
health insurance plan since birth, purchasing gifts for Child, providing
items to her mother to give to Child, requesting phone calls with Child after
the 2020 modification order, and contacting agencies and offering names of
relatives to supervise visits. The court heard evidence that Mother claimed
to have purchased thousands of dollars' worth of gifts for Child and
provided gifts to Child through her mother but also heard evidence that
Mother was in arrears of child support payments and noted that Mother
offered "no explanation" as to "why that money could not have been used
to make child support payments over time." Further, the court heard
testimony from Mother and Father that he prohibited Mother from
speaking with Child on the phone after the 2020 modification order, and
the record shows that Mother contacted Father "approximately 12 times"
attempting to speak with Child during that time. But the court noted that

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             IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.F.
                         Decision of the Court

aside from her testimony, "Mother offered no corroborating evidence and
was unable to offer specific details of her attempts" to contact agencies and
offer names of other individuals that could have supervised visits. The
court also noted that Mother did not "offer any explanation of why she did
not ask the family court to review Father's refusals" as unreasonable. The
court "credit[ed]" Father's testimony and evidence that Mother did not have
regular contact with Child nor provided normal parental supervision over
Child. We do not reweigh the evidence considered by the juvenile court.
Oscar O., 209 Ariz. at 336, ¶ 14.

¶13           Mother also argues that Father hindered her from
maintaining a normal parental relationship with Child. Mother specifically
argues that the court's 2018 and 2020 modification orders indicated that
Child had a good and positive relationship with Mother and that nothing
in the record demonstrates that phone calls with Child would have been
detrimental to Child. Mother argues that Father "was aware [Child] was in
counseling because she missed" Mother and that he withheld information
from Mother concerning Child's health and education. But the court
concluded that Father's actions did not amount to a defense under Calvin B.

¶14            In Calvin B., the mother interfered with the father's ability to
develop a normal relationship with their child by violating a court-ordered
visitation plan, and the father "actively sought more involvement" and
pursued legal remedies despite the mother's efforts to restrict his access to
their child. 232 Ariz. at 295, 297–98, ¶¶ 11, 22, 29. In contrast, here the court
found and the record shows that (1) Father "sought to enforce the existing
family court order" by requiring Mother to submit to weekly drug tests to
revert back to unsupervised visitations, (2) Father's requirement for Mother
to provide clean drug tests "was nothing like the [mother's] contumacious
conduct in Calvin B.," and (3) Mother failed to "vigorously and persistently"
assert her legal rights by seeking court action. The record shows that
Mother did not seek court action after Father refused her requests. Even
though Mother claims that she could not afford supervised visitations,
Mother did not vigorously attempt to arrange supervised visitation—she
did not inform the court of her inability to pay for supervised visitation
through an agency nor suggest any other supervision alternatives after
Father declined to allow the grandmothers to supervise. More importantly,
Mother could have unilaterally eliminated the requirement for supervised
visitation by submitting to weekly drug tests, which she failed to do for
over two years. Nor did she seek any relief from the court regarding weekly
drug tests.

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             IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.F.
                         Decision of the Court

¶15           Although contested, reasonable evidence supports the court's
factual findings that Mother abandoned Child, and we cannot conclude that
the court clearly erred in terminating Mother's parental rights.

II.    Best Interests.

¶16            Termination is in a child's best interests "if either: (1) the child
will benefit from severance; or (2) the child will be harmed if severance is
denied." Alma S. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 150, ¶¶ 12–13 (2018)
("The 'child's interest in stability and security' must be the court's primary
concern." (quoting Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 4, ¶ 15 (2016))).
The best-interests finding "focuses primarily upon the interests of the child,
as distinct from those of the parent." Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 287,
¶ 37 (2005). In conducting the best-interests inquiry, "courts must consider
the totality of the circumstances existing at the time of the severance
determination, including the child's adoptability." Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 148,
¶ 1.

¶17           Mother argues that the court did not consider the totality of
the circumstances, including Mother's rehabilitation efforts, Child's need
for counseling because she missed Mother, and Father's actions to prevent
Child from having relationships with maternal relatives. In addition to
Child's adoptability, the court noted that Mother had not "offered any
substantial evidence of her rehabilitation," even though Mother testified
that she "had engaged in drug treatment." The court gave "little weight to
Mother's testimony in this regard" and was in the "best position" to weigh
any other factors in conducting its best-interests inquiry, notwithstanding
Child's need for counseling and Father's efforts to prevent Child from
developing relationships with maternal relatives. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. at 334,
¶ 4.

¶18            As to adoptability, a "current adoptive plan is one
well-recognized example" of a benefit of termination. Id. at 334, ¶ 6; see
Audra T. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 194 Ariz. 376, 377, ¶ 5 (App. 1998) ("One
factor the court may properly consider in favor of [termination] is the
immediate availability of an adoptive placement."). The court found
Stepmother is "ready, willing, and able to adopt Child" and "that Child is in
a loving and supportive environment and all her needs are being met." The
court also concluded that "Child has bonded with [Stepmother] and she
parents [Child] as a natural mother would." The record supports these
findings. Thus, based on Stepmother's desire to adopt Child, the court did
not clearly err in finding that termination was in Child's best interests.

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      IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.F.
                  Decision of the Court

                    CONCLUSION

¶19    We affirm.

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