Court Opinion

ID: 9757208
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:24:57.266148+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:36.196891
License: Public Domain

YEAGLEY, Associate Judge:
This is an appeal from a conviction of a charge of carrying an unlicensed weapon in violation of D.C.Code 1967, § 22-3204. Appellant assigns as error the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress the gun as evidence claiming that its seizure resulted from an illegal search of his car. Finding that the warrantless search was unreasonable, we reverse.
*749On September 21, 1971, at approximately 3:30 a. m., the arresting officer responded to a call for assistance from Sergeant John Hendrick who was in the alley in the rear of the 1300 block of Kenyon Street, Northwest. The sergeant did not testify on the motion to suppress, but did testify at trial substantially corroborating the officer’s testimony. On the motion to suppress the arresting officer testified that when he arrived he saw the sergeant talking to appellant in front of a 1963 Pontiac. The sergeant told the officer that while he was cruising the alley, he came upon appellant sitting in the automobile on the passenger side with its engine and lights off. The sergeant said that he talked to appellant and he noticed that appellant began to get nervous and “appeared to be attempting to conceal, or was fumbling with something ... in the area of his seat.” He told the officer that he summoned help on the radio and asked appellant to get out of the vehicle. When the officer and his companion arrived on the scene, the sergeant and appellant were standing in front of the Pontiac talking.
The sergeant told the officer to get his flashlight and to shine it inside the car. The appellant and another officer, who had accompanied the arresting officer to the scene, were standing in front of the car at the time. The sergeant went to the driver’s side of the car and looked in as the arresting officer opened the car door on the passenger side shining his flashlight in the interior. He testified that he saw a part of a handle of what proved to be a .32 caliber pistol protruding from under the front seat. After retrieving the gun, he placed appellant under arrest.
The appellant’s testimony was not unlike the officer’s in any material respect except he testified that the sergeant asked for his driver’s license and car registration. However, he said that before he could look for them the sergeant ordered him out of the car and he “didn’t get a chance” to produce them. There was no evidence offered on the motion to suppress as to ownership of the car, but there is no contention that it was stolen.
Appellant moved to suppress the gun contending it had been seized in violation of his rights under the fourth amendment. The Government argued that the investigation began as a lawful momentary detention for information “for which probable cause is not required”. We have no problem with this1 for the officers clearly had a right to investigate and inquire as to what the car and its occupant were doing there. However, the Government argued further that “[ajppellant’s furtive actions near the floorboard of the automobile in light of the time and the location in a high crime area must have aroused [the sergeant’s] suspicions” and that it was therefore reasonable for the officers to open the car door “so that they could see the area where appellant ‘fumbled’.”
Although furtive movements of a suspect when combined with other significant factors may warrant further investigation or even a search, there are very few articula-ble facts here indicating “that criminal activity may be afoot”. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, at 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, at 1884, 20 L. Ed.2d 889 (1968). While appellant’s presence in the alley may indicate a parking violation, the surrounding facts are meager at best to establish appellant as a criminal suspect. The sergeant’s observation, that appellant was beginning to get nervous and that he appeared to be fumbling with something in the area of his seat, without other grounds to believe the suspect might be engaging in criminal conduct, is not sufficient to support a warrantless search. Watts v. United States, D.C.App., 297 A.2d 790 (1972); United States v. Humphrey, 409 F.2d 1055 (10th Cir. 1969); People v. Superior Court of Yolo County, 3 Cal.3d 807, 91 Cal.Rptr. 729, 739, 478 P.2d 449, 459 (1970); People v. Pitts, 40 Mich.App. 567, 199 N.W.2d 271 (1972).
*750Neither do the facts bring this case within any of the exceptions to the warrant requirement set forth in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971). See generally Annot., 10 A.L.R.3d 314 (1966). We must deem the opening of the car door after appellant had exited the car the beginning of a search. But appellant here had not been accused of any criminal activity, nor had he been charged with illegally parking. In short, before the officers opened the car door there was no indication appellant had done anything for which he would be taken into custody. The Government’s reliance on McGee v. United States, D.C.App., 270 A.2d 348 (1970), where there was a search incident to an arrest for the purpose of protecting the officers, is misplaced. Here the search could be described as a search prior to an arrest which may not be sustained if made without a warrant or probable cause, or the owner’s consent.2 In a companion case to Terry v. Ohio, supra, the Supreme Court said: “It is axiomatic that an incident search may not precede an arrest and serve as part of its justification.” Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 63, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1902, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968).
The Government contends that the evidence came into the plain view of the officer and is therefore within an exception to the requirement of a warrant to search. It relies on United States v. Johnson, 143 U.S.App.D.C. 215, 442 F.2d 1239 (1971); Davis v. United States, D.C.App., 284 A.2d 459 (1971); and Dorsey v. United States, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 355, 372 F.2d 928 (1967).
None of these cases would seem to offer much, if any, support for the Government’s position. United States v. Johnson, supra, presented a situation of the police giving chase to a car that did not have a 1970 license sticker. The vehicle did not stop when the officers turned on their siren and dome light and it ran a red light before the car stalled. The United States Circuit Court for the District of Columbia held that the officer was lawfully entitled to approach the car, to require the driver to get out (if that would have been necessary, which it was not because appellee [Johnson] did so voluntarily) and to conduct a protective frisk for weapons. The court stated that “the [narcotic] capsules were thereby put in plain view of anyone approaching the car on lawful business” since Johnson got out of the car leaving the door open and the car floor illuminated by the automatic lighting of the interior dome light. The officer had a right to be where he was when the evidence came into plain view. Additionally, there was no search or intrusion such as occurred here.
Davis v. United States, supra, also stands on a different footing than the case at bar. In Davis the police had received a radio message that a man named Davis was sitting in a car in the vicinity with a gun. The car was identified as a white Rambler and its location and license plate number were given. The police checked out all of these factors before they asked appellant to get out and then opened the other car door. The court in Davis said that because the man in the car was reported to have a gun, asking him to get out constituted a reasonable investigative precaution. The court added that it was prudent police work for the officers to protect themselves by keeping a constant view of the man by opening the other car door as he exited. Such a justification does not exist in the case at bar as there was no police report accusing appellant of having a gun, nor was there any reason to believe a crime other than a parking offense had been committed. Further, appellant had already exited the car.
In Dorsey v. United States, supra, the officers were in an area at night where the squad constantly received complaints about narcotic peddling and the court held *751that when they recognized appellants (sitting in a car) as persons with narcotics records, they were entitled to extend the preventive patrolling mission to the extent of approaching the car and observing what was going on inside. The narcotics were seen by the officers in plain view through the car window. No doors were opened by the officers in Dorsey and the officers had a right to be where they were when they saw the narcotics. We have no problem with those decisions, but they are inappo-site here.
The United States Supreme Court has said that the plain view doctrine applies to . . . objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view. . . . [Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236, 88 S.Ct. 992, 993, 19 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1968).]
This raises the question as to whether or not the arresting officer had the right to be in the position he was in when the gun came into plain view. This court relied on the Harris opinion in deciding Wise v. United States, D.C.App., 277 A.2d 476 (1971), where the officers’ interest was prompted by a radio run regarding a robbery. There the court observed
. . . there was no search here. The narcotics were observed in plain view . . . . when appellant unsuccessfully attempted to conceal them. It follows that the legality of the seizure is not to be governed by the character of the arrest, if indeed one had occurred, but by the right of the officers to be in the position they were to obtain the plain view. . . [277 A.2d at 477.] (Footnotes omitted.)
We note in this regard that Justice Stewart, speaking for a plurality of four Justices3 in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, said:
Where the initial intrusion that brings the police within plain view of such an article is supported, not by a warrant, but by one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement, the seizure is also legitimate. . . .
In each case, this initial intrusion is justified by a warrant or by an exception such as “hot pursuit” or search incident to a lawful arrest, or by an extraneous valid reason for the officer’s presence. . . . [403 U.S. at 465, 467, 91 S.Ct. at 2037, 2039.]
The dissenting Justices did not disagree with the proposition enunciated in Harris that it must appear that the officer had “a right to be in the position to have that view” if the plain view doctrine is to be applied, but dissented for other reasons.
Justice Black, dissenting,4 recognized that “the ‘initial intrusion’ which brought the police within plain view of the automobile5 was legitimate.” And Justice White, dissenting, with whom the Chief Justice joined, noted that in that case “the Pontiac was in plain view of the officers who had legally entered Coolidge’s property to effect his arrest.” 6
We conclude that the aforementioned requirement for “plain view” in Harris v. United States, supra, has not been disturbed by Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra.
In the case at bar, the opening of the car door was an intrusion that has not been justified by appellee as coming within any of the exceptions to the need for a warrant to search. The Government has not shown that the officer who opened the door and upon using a flashlight saw the gun in plain view had "a right to be in the position to have that view.” The officer had opened the car door in order to see *752what was inside. He could not have been searching for the fruits, implements or evidence of a crime since there would be none for the offense of parking in an alley for which the only possible police action was a citation to the driver. Dickerson v. United States, D.C.App., 296 A.2d 708 (1972).
In our decision in Dickerson, supra, it was held that even where there had been a custodial arrest of the suspect (for altered tags and registration) the officer who drove the suspect’s car to headquarters conducted an unauthorized search when he reached under the front seat of the subject’s car.
Neither does the search appear to be reasonably related to the protection of the officers.7 “[T]he officers had no complaint or report of a crime, had never seen appellant before and did not observe him engage in unlawful conduct.” Robinson v. United States, D.C.App., 278 A.2d 458, 459 (1971). There was no reason to think that appellant was about to become the subject of a custodial arrest which would warrant the officers taking reasonable steps to protect themselves. He was standing at the time in front of the car with a third officer so that the contents of the car posed, at most, a minimal threat to the officers.
The dissent in this case relies on and, in our view, would extend the holding in Terry v. Ohio, supra. In that case the Supreme Court was careful to limit the scope of its decision when it said:
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others’ safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. . . . [Emphasis supplied.] [392 U.S. at 30, 88 S.Ct. at 1885.]
We do not find that the background facts here meet the foregoing standard.
Of equal significance to the legality of the search in this case is the language of the Supreme Court at page 19 of that opinion, at page 1878 of 88 S.Ct. wherein it limited the application of the Terry doctrine by saying: “The scope of the search must be ‘strictly tied to and justified by’ the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible.” , Despite our displeasure in feeling compelled to apply the suppression rule, we do not believe that we can relate Supreme Court language in Terry to the facts we have at hand.
Finding as we do that the warrantless search does not come within any of the exceptions and since we are still bound by the exclusionary rule,8 we reverse as the motion to suppress must be granted.
Reversed.

. Von Sleichter v. United States, D.C. Cir., 472 F.2d 1244 (Decided June 15, 1972); Hicks v. United States, 127 U.S.App.D.C. 209, 382 P.2d 158 (1967).

. See generally Annot., 89 A.L.R.2d 711) at 740 (1963); People v. Roache, 237 Mich. 215, 211 N.W. 742 (1927).; Boyd v. State, 198 Ind. 55, 152 N.E. 278 (1926); People v. Jordan, 37 Misc.2d 33, 234 N.Y.S.2d 323 (1962).

. Justice Harlan concurred in the result.

. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 506, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2058, 29 L.Ed. 2d 564 (1971).

. The automobile was treated as evidence against the defendant.

. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra note 4, at 522, 91 S.Ct. at 2066.

. Lane v. Commonwealth, 386 S.W.2d 743, (Ky.1964). See also Annot., 10 A.L.R.3d 314 (1966).

. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra note 4, but cf. Black, J., dissenting 403 U.S. at 496, 91 S.Ct. 2022.