Court Opinion

ID: 9649024
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:40:49.244324+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:07.168342
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE NEWMAN
DISSENTING.
“O heavens! [is] this □ my true-begotten father.”
William Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice, act II, sc. 2.
The Majority concludes that a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) has the authority to determine paternity within the context of a Workers’ Compensation Act (Act)1 benefits *359proceeding, and that paternity must be established by a preponderance of the evidence. Because I believe that paternity determinations must be rendered in the courts of common pleas, I must respectfully dissent.
At common law, a child born out of wedlock was subject to serious social and legal disabilities, with paternity actions governed by criminal law. See, e.g., Wilful separation or nonsupport, Act of June 24, 1939, P.L. 872, 18 P.S. § 4731 (a parent who “willfully neglects or refuses to contribute reasonably to the support and maintenance of a child born out of lawful wedlock” is guilty of the misdemeanor of “Neglect to Support Bastard”) (superceded by statute). The illegitimate child was viewed as the child of no one, films nullius, or a child of the people, filius populis, and could neither inherit nor assert entitlement to support from his or her mother or putative father. Justice Musmanno, in dissent in Commonwealth v. Dillworth, 431 Pa. 479, 246 A.2d 859, 867 (1968), described the beginning of enlightenment concerning children bom out of wedlock as follows:
[T]he Common Law, as it gradually emerged from the cruelties, superstitions and illogicalities of medieval customs, began to recognize the moral responsibility owed by the community to illegitimate children, and, in that recognition, it decided to impose a financial responsibility on the bastard father. This financial responsibility was in no way associated with the moral turpitude attached to the act which preceded the birth of the child. The offense of carnality beyond matrimonial relationship was a matter for the State to consider. Thus, arose the crime of fornication for which the State imposed a penalty.
The first amelioration of these harsh rules was the judicially created presumption of legitimacy when a child was born to a married woman. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Shepherd, 6 Binn. 283, 1814 WL 1374 (Pa.1814). Thus, if the woman was married at the time she gave birth to a child, there was an irrebuttable presumption that the child was the product of the marriage, unless the husband had no access to his wife. It was within this framework that this Court, in 1951, decided *360the case of Cairgle v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 366 Pa. 249, 77 A.2d 439 (1951) (superceded by-statute, Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6131, et seq.). While Cairgle stemmed from a decision by a referee2 concerning the paternity of three illegitimate children, the basic issue related to whether or not the presumption of legitimacy had been overcome. This Court held that it had and declared the children not the children of Mr. Cairgle. The issue of the jurisdiction of the referee to decide an issue of paternity was neither raised nor decided by this Court in that case.
Further inroads were made to combat the harshness of treatment afforded to illegitimate children. The stigma attached to offspring born out of wedlock subsequently eroded from the absence of any rights at all, to all the rights and privileges of children born as a result of an actual marriage, -with few exceptions. One of the rights bestowed on both legitimate and illegitimate children alike is the right to support, pursuant to the Act, when their father dies from a work-related injury. However, implicit in this right is the fact that the child is the legitimate or illegitimate child of the injured worker. This determination must be made as a condition precedent prior to filing the claim for support benefits, not, as here, during the proceeding itself. My esteemed colleague sees the instant matter as an eligibility issue, and I believe that he is correct. Eligibility for benefits is all that the WCJ is empowered to decide. The claimant child must bring to the WCJ proof of parentage in the form of a paternity determination that legitimizes his or her claim to support.
Proceedings to establish paternity have always been made in the courts of this Commonwealth. The Pennsylvania Civil Procedure Support Law, Act of July 13, 1953, P.L. 431, required every judicial district to establish a Domestic Relations Division for the purpose of keeping a full and complete record of all support proceedings. As originally enacted, this law did not provide for the support of illegitimate children. *361However, in 1963, the statute was amended to include an action for support of illegitimate children in the courts of common pleas. Act of August 14, 1963, P.L. 872, § 1. Prior to the adoption of this amendment, an order for support of an illegitimate child could only be entered after a determination of paternity had been established by criminal proceedings in the courts of common pleas pursuant to Section 506 of the Penal Code, 18 P.S. § 4506 (no longer in force). Dillworth, 246 A.2d at 862. Subsequently, the Act of April 28, 1978, P.L. 106, amending the Civil Procedure Support Law, abolished criminal actions and provided that the issue of paternity be resolved only in a civil action in the courts of common pleas. Enactments relative to the procedures and limitations of paternity actions were contained in the Judicial Code until the new Rule of Civil Procedure relating to paternity determinations, Pa.R.C.P.1910.15, was adopted on April 23, 1981. It sets forth the practice and procedure, as part of a support action, relative to paternity determinations. Thus, paternity actions have always been decided in this Commonwealth, whether civil or criminal, in the courts of common pleas.
The General Assembly and this Court, in establishing specific procedures for paternity determinations, have not conferred on administrative agencies the right to make these decisions. Section 4341 of the Domestic Relations Code indicates that a paternity proceeding is a civil action governed by the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure “governing actions of support.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 4341. Section 4343 of that same Code, 23 Pa.C.S. § 4343, relating to support matters generally, states in pertinent part:
Where the paternity of a child bom out of wedlock is disputed, the determination of paternity shall be made by the court in a civil action without a jury.
(Emphasis added.) Paternity determinations governed by the Domestic Relations Code break down generally into two divisions — those relative to paternal benefits and those related to decent and intestacy. Section 5102 of the Domestic Relations Code, which relates to paternal benefits, specifies that:
*362(b) Determination of paternity. — For purposes of prescribing benefits to children bom out of wedlock by, from and through the father, paternity shall be determined by any one of the following ways:
(1) If the parents of a child born out of wedlock have married each other.
(2) If, during the lifetime of the child, it is determined by clear and convincing evidence that the father openly holds out the child to be his and either receives the child into his home or provides support for the child.
(3) If there is clear and convincing evidence that the man was the father of the child, which may include a prior court determination of paternity.
23 Pa.C.S. § 5102 (emphasis added). It is beyond cavil that Ashley Rossa is seeking the benefit of support provided pursuant to the Act because of the work-related injury and death of Daniel Boyle. Further, the Rules of Civil Procedure, which are not applicable in a workers’ compensation proceeding, specifically address paternity determinations. See Pa. R.C.P. Nos. 1910.4, 1910.7, 1910.15 (support); 1915.3 (custody); and 1930.6 (filing of paternity actions outside of custody and support).
An action for workers’ compensation benefits by a child is a derivative action that cannot be brought by the child in common pleas against the employer, but may only be initiated in the workers’ compensation forum by the injured employee. It is the employee’s right to benefits and the corresponding provision for death benefits that provide the injured worker’s family a right to relief. The operative presumption here is that a member of the injured workers’ family must make application for those benefits. That presumption is satisfied, pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 5102, when the court of common pleas renders its paternity determination.
Upon review of the caselaw of other jurisdictions that have decided this issue, it appears that, in general, the courts have found that workers’ compensation judges (or the jurisdictional equivalent) have been accorded the authority to determine *363matters of paternity, usually by statute. Of the fourteen jurisdictions surveyed, eleven permit workers compensation judges to determine paternity with restrictions,3 one jurisdiction authorizes the determination without restriction,4 and two jurisdictions do not permit a workers’ compensation judge to decide paternity at all.5 It is noteworthy that, in those jurisdictions where the workers’ compensation judge may determine paternity, the requirements for that determination are similar or identical to the requirements set by our General Assembly for paternity determinations.
Manifestly, the legislative purpose of the evidentiary standards promulgated by the General Assembly in child support and inheritance statutes is to minimize the risk of fraudulent paternity claims. There is a similar risk in workers’ compensation petitions that is made even greater by the informality of the proceedings. While it should be axiomatic that a person who claims to be the child of a decedent has the burden of *364proving that the decedent was his or her parent, no documentary evidence of paternity was introduced in the instant matter.
I believe that the General Assembly and this Court have declared that the appropriate place in which to prove paternity is the court of common pleas. The determination of paternity is really a biological question to be resolved for the purpose of enforcing a civil duty, i.e. the obligation to support the child, wholly unrelated to the workplace injuries and loss of earning power of the workers’ compensation arena. The safeguards surrounding paternity actions should be even greater with the death of the putative father, not relaxed as in a workers’ compensation proceeding. As the Superior Court has stated, the “claims of paternity made after the lips of the alleged father have been sealed by death are in that class of claims which must be subjected to the closest scrutiny and which can be allowed only on strict proof so that injustice will not be done.” Estate of Hoffman, 320 Pa.Super. 113, 466 A.2d 1087, 1089 (1983). Further, this Court has stated that a putative father “has procedural and substantive due process rights” that must be met. John M. v. Paula T., 524 Pa. 306, 571 A.2d 1380, 1385 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 850, 111 S.Ct. 140, 112 L.Ed.2d 107 (1990). This is not accomplished by having a workers’ compensation judge determine paternity within the informality of a death benefits proceeding, outside the purview of the statutory guidelines. The initial WCJ afforded Patricia Rossa an opportunity to litigate the issue of paternity in the appropriate forum. She failed to do this over a period of several years and patently ignored her opportunity to have a proper paternity determination rendered. Accordingly, I believe that this Court should reverse the Order of the Commonwealth Court.

. Prior to the 1993 amendments to the Act, the role now fulfilled by workers’ compensation judges was performed by referees.

. Those jurisdictions were represented by the following cases: Rios v. Indus. Comm’n of Ariz., 120 Ariz. 374, 586 P.2d 219 (1978) (child must have been acknowledged and supported by father); Dillon v. Indus. Comm’n, 195 Ill.App.3d 599, 142 Ill.Dec. 341, 552 N.E.2d 1082 (1990) (must have genetic testing); Goins v. Lott, 435 N.E.2d 1002 (Ind.App. 1982) (child must have been acknowledged and supported); R.L.J. & J.JJ. v. Western Sprinklers, 17 Kan.App.2d 749, 844 P.2d 37 (1992) (only binding for workers compensation purposes); Copple v. Bowlin, 172 Neb. 467, 110 N.W.2d 117 (1961) (only if no question of inheritance and child has been acknowledged and supported); Carpenter v. Hawley, 53 N.C.App. 715, 281 S.E.2d 783 (1981) (child must have been acknowledged and supported by father); State of Ohio ex rel. Wilson v. Indus. Comm’n of Ohio, 2002 WL 1933350 (Ohio App.2002) (based on genetic testing); Cox v. State Indus. Court, 397 P.2d 668 (Okla.1964) (child must have been acknowledged and supported by father); In re Sassmen, deceased; Amos & Sassmen v. SAIF Corp., 72 Or.App. 145, 694 P.2d 998 (1985) (child must have been acknowledged and supported by father); Brown v. Ryder Truck Rental, 300 S.C. 530, 389 S.E.2d 161 (Ct.App.1990) (child must have been acknowledged and supported by father); and Allstate Messenger Serv. v. James, 220 Va. 910, 266 S.E.2d 86 (1980) (child must have been acknowledged by father).

. Bettelon v. Metalock Repair Serv., 137 Mich.App. 448, 358 N.W.2d 608 (1984) (no restrictions).

. Poole Truck Lines v. Coates, 833 S.W.2d 876 (Mo.App.1992) (only civil courts can determine paternity); and Taylor v. Morris, 88 Wash.2d 586, 564 P.2d 795 (1977).