Court Opinion

ID: 9807157
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 19:52:29.989966+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:26:31.135280
License: Public Domain

Andrias, J.
(dissenting in part). Plaintiff alleges that she tripped and fell while exiting a misleveled elevator on the first floor of a building owned by defendant One East River Place Realty and managed by defendant Solow Management. Commencing September 1, 2007, Solow had entered into a full-service maintenance contract with defendant New York Elevator & Electrical (NYEE) for the building’s seven elevators, including weekly maintenance and emergency callback service.
I agree with the majority that One East River and Solow are entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint against them. I also agree that the motion court should have considered the motion of NYEE for summary judgment because it seeks the same relief and addresses the same issues as One East River and Solow’s timely motion (Gubenko v City of New York, 111 AD3d 471 [1st Dept 2013]). The majority would, however, deny NYEE’s motion on the ground that plaintiff has raised sufficient facts which, if believed by a jury, would support her claim against NYEE under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. I do not agree, and dissent in part.
Contrary to the majority’s holding, under the circumstances before us, plaintiff cannot rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. There is no evidence of any defective leveling condition and “plaintiff’s fall could have occurred in the absence of negligence and could have been caused by a misstep on [her] part” (Cortes v Central El., Inc., 45 AD3d 323, 324 [1st Dept 2007]; see also Meza v 509 Owners LLC, 82 AD3d 426, 427 [1st Dept 2011]).
Plaintiff testified at her deposition that at the time of the accident she was carrying office supplies in both hands. Plaintiff also testified that because she was in a hurry, she did not look down to see where the cab had stopped relative to the hallway before she began to move, and that she never “determine [d] where the elevator cab was relative to the hallway floor.” It was only after NYEE moved for summary judgment, supported, inter alia, by expert evidence that a misleveling of up to one inch was acceptable in the elevator maintenance industry, that plaintiff submitted an affidavit in which she for the first time stated that the elevator was about two inches below the lobby floor when she stepped out. However, because this affidavit contradicted her earlier deposition testimony, it “can only be *167considered to have been tailored to avoid the consequences of [such] earlier testimony” and is deemed to be a feigned issue and, consequently, is insufficient to defeat summary judgment (Fernandez v VLA Realty, LLC, 45 AD3d 391, 391 [1st Dept 2007] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see also Beahn v New York Yankees Partnership, 89 AD3d 589 [1st Dept 2011]). Disregarding the tailored affidavit, as we must, plaintiff has failed to meet her burden of showing that her fall could only have been caused by negligence and not by a misstep over a differential, within acceptable bounds, between the elevator cab and the hallway floor, and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is inapplicable.
The majority disagrees, stating that there is no basis to conclude, as a matter of law, that the “estimate” in plaintiffs affidavit is feigned. Citing plaintiffs deposition testimony that she tripped over an elevator that was not flush with the floor and that she had observed the elevator mislevel anywhere between 1 and 2V2 inches in the past, the majority posits that plaintiffs testimony that she never determined a height differential at the time of the accident “is not inconsistent with her ‘estimate’ of the height differential.” However, this analysis understates plaintiff’s testimony and would allow her to defeat NYEE’s motion by what is, at best, mere speculation.
Particularly, while plaintiff did testify that after safely stepping out of the elevator with her left foot, the lip of the floor stopped her right foot, she also testified that
“Q. You told me before that you felt your foot get caught on something?
“A. Yes.
“Q. And as you were falling and starting to fall you saw it caught against the lip, correct?
“A. Yes.
“Q. Now, at that time, did you determine where the elevator cab was relative to the hallway floor while you were falling?
“A. No, sir.
“Q. At any time, thereafter, did you determine where the elevator cab was relative to the hallway floor at the time you began to fall?
*168“A. No, sir.”
Thus, plaintiff’s testimony demonstrates that she did not observe the differential before she started to move, while she was falling, or at any time after she fell. The majority’s analysis fails to appreciate the significance of this testimony which establishes that plaintiff had no way of determining the alleged height differential that existed when she tripped by anything other than speculation, and that her affidavit was tailored to create an issue of fact as to whether an actionable height differential existed.
The admission by plaintiff that she never determined the height differential cannot be negated by plaintiff’s “estimate,” allegedly based on prior observations of misleveling. When asked at her deposition if the elevator cab would stop at the same level below the floor each time it misleveled, plaintiff responded, “I really couldn’t say.” When asked if the elevator misleveled in March or April, plaintiff described a differential of one or two inches. Accordingly, based on her past experience, plaintiff could only speculate that the alleged differential at the time of her fall was actionable.
“Because plaintiff’s expert’s conclusions are based on the feigned facts in plaintiff’s affidavit, the expert’s affirmation also fails to raise a triable issue of fact” (Feaster-Lewis v Rotenberg, 93 AD3d 421, 422 [1st Dept 2012], lv denied 19 NY3d 803 [2012]; see also Luciano v Deco Towers Assoc. LLC, 92 AD3d 606 [1st Dept 2012]).
Renwick and Richter, JJ., concur with Gische, J.; Andrias, J., dissents in part in a separate opinion in which Tom, J.R, concurs.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County, entered February 24, 2014, modified, on the law and the facts, and in the exercise of discretion, to grant defendant New York Elevator & Electrical Corp.’s motion for consideration of its untimely motion for summary judgment, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.