Court Opinion

ID: 9375854
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-01 00:00:34.859412+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:02.240484
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 21-3150     Document: 010110818915      Date Filed: 02/28/2023      Page: 1
                                                                               FILED
                                                                   United States Court of Appeals
                                       PUBLISH                             Tenth Circuit

                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                   February 28, 2023

                                                                      Christopher M. Wolpert
                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                       Clerk of Court
                          _________________________________

  WALT JASPER SAMUEL SHRUM,

        Plaintiff - Appellant,

  v.                                                          No. 21-3150

  DUSTIN COOKE, Investigator, Kingman
  County, Kansas Sheriff’s Office in his
  official and individual capacities; TRAVIS
  SOWERS, Sergeant, City of Kingman,
  Kansas Police Department in his official
  and individual capacities; KINGMAN
  COUNTY, KANSAS; CITY OF
  KINGMAN KANSAS; RANDY L. HILL,
  Sheriff, Kingman County, Kansas in his
  official and individual capacities; DAVID
  LUX, Chief, City of Kingman, Kansas
  Police Department in his official and
  individual capacities,

        Defendants - Appellees.
                       _________________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                               for the District of Kansas
                         (D.C. No. 6:20-CV-01314-JWB-GEB)
                        _________________________________

 Brian F. McCallister, The McCallister Law Firm, P.C., Kansas City, Missouri, for
 Plaintiff-Appellant.

 Lyndon W. Vix (Brooks Severson with him on the brief), Fleeson, Gooing, Coulson &
 Kitch, L.L.C., Wichita, Kansas, for Defendant-Appellees Travis Sowers, David Lux and
 City of Kingsman, Kansas.
Appellate Case: 21-3150     Document: 010110818915          Date Filed: 02/28/2023      Page: 2

 Allen G. Glendenning, Watkins Calcara, CHTD, Great Bend, Kansas, for Defendants-
 Appellees Dustin Cooke, Randy Hill and Kingman County.

                          _________________________________

 Before TYMKOVICH, PHILLIPS, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
                  _________________________________

 TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judge.
                   _________________________________

        While investigating the overdose death of Walter Shrum’s wife, law enforcement

 officers searched Mr. Shrum’s home and discovered drugs, firearms, and ammunition.

 He was charged with various crimes in federal court. Before trial he argued the officers

 had illegally searched his home, and that the evidence discovered could not be used

 against him at trial. The district court disagreed, and Mr. Shrum entered a conditional

 plea of guilty, reserving the right to appeal the suppression order. On appeal, we

 concluded the search violated the Constitution, and any resulting evidence should have

 been excluded.

        Without this evidence, the government dismissed its prosecution. Shrum then

 sued various state and federal law enforcement officials for civil rights violations arising

 from the illegal search and subsequent prosecution. The district court dismissed the

 action as time-barred and insufficiently pled.

        We agree. First, the district court did not plainly err by dismissing Shrum’s

 § 1983 search, seizure, and false arrest claims as time barred. Shrum fails to prove he is

 entitled to equitable tolling under Kansas or federal law. Second, reviewing de novo, we

 agree with him that the district court erred in concluding that his malicious prosecution

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 claim failed because he did not demonstrate the prosecution terminated in a way that

 demonstrated his innocence. But while that was true at the time the court reviewed the

 complaint, an intervening change in Supreme Court case law altered Tenth Circuit

 precedent to allow malicious prosecution claims to proceed when the government

 dismisses charges as it did here. Nevertheless, because Shrum’s complaint inadequately

 alleges all of the requirements for a malicious prosecution claim against the City and

 County defendants, we affirm the dismissal of that claim.

                                         I. Background

        A brief review of Shrum’s initial encounter with the police and subsequent history

 and timeline will clarify the issues.

        A. Underlying Search, Seizure, and Arrest

        Walter Shrum’s wife suffered a medical emergency around 5 a.m. in March 2015

 in Kingman, Kansas. He suspected that she overdosed on prescription drugs. Shrum

 called 911, an ambulance took her to the hospital, and she was pronounced dead within

 an hour.

        Meanwhile, a police sergeant from the City of Kingman, Travis Sowers, arrived at

 Shrum’s house, secured the premises, and apprised a county investigator, Dustin Cooke,

 of his actions. As a result, officers prohibited Shrum from entering his house for about

 twelve hours.

        The Kingman County Sheriff’s Office promptly began a criminal death

 investigation. Cooke arrived at the hospital to interview Shrum.

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        Cooke later asked Shrum to execute a “consent to search” form. This form would

 enable Cooke to retrieve Shrum’s wife’s prescription drugs. Shrum complied because he

 thought he had no other choice.

        Cooke, with Sergeant Sowers and the Kingman Chief of Police, David Lux,

 present, entered Shrum’s house and took pictures of the area where he found the

 medications. One photo captured ammunition in Shrum’s closet. Another officer

 reminded Cooke of Shrum’s felon status. Cooke contacted a federal officer who

 confirmed that Shrum was prohibited from possessing ammunition under federal law. A

 team of county, city, and federal actors (including Cooke and Sowers) executed a search

 warrant for Shrum’s house. They discovered firearms, ammunition, and

 methamphetamine.

        Shrum was arrested and spent about five days in custody.

        B. Shrum’s Criminal Prosecution

        A few weeks later, a federal grand jury indicted Shrum on various counts of being

 a felon in possession. Shrum moved to suppress the evidence supporting the search

 warrant and his arrest, arguing that officers obtained the evidence during an unreasonable

 search of his house. The court denied his motion.

        As a result, Shrum conditionally pled guilty to one count of possession of a

 firearm by a convicted felon. He reserved his right to appeal the suppression ruling. On

 appeal, we ruled that the extended seizure of Shrum’s home was unconstitutional because

 the officers lacked probable cause to seize the home in the first instance and no exigent

 circumstances justified the response. United States v. Shrum, 908 F.3d 1219, 1231–32

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 (10th Cir. 2018). We therefore reversed the district court’s suppression ruling. After the

 adverse ruling, the government voluntarily dismissed the charges against Shrum.

          C. Procedural History

          Shrum sued the state and federal officers and various municipal employers for

 violations of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and for intentional and

 negligent infliction of emotional distress under state law.

          The defendants moved to dismiss the claims, arguing they were time barred,

 insufficiently alleged, and jurisdictionally barred.

          The district court determined the statute of limitations barred the § 1983 claims for

 unlawful search, seizure, and arrest. As to the malicious prosecution claim, the court

 dismissed it after concluding the criminal prosecution did not terminate in favor of the

 plaintiff, as then required by Tenth Circuit precedent. The court would also have found

 the complaint deficient to state a malicious prosecution claim.

          Shrum appeals only the dismissal of his § 1983 claims, and only as to the state

 defendants.

                                         II. Analysis

          Shrum contends the district court erred by failing to extend the statute of

 limitations to his search and seizure claims, arguing Kansas law allows for equitable

 tolling during the time he faced criminal charges. He also argues the district court

 misapplied the “favorable termination” prong in dismissing his malicious prosecution

 claim.

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        A. Statute of Limitations

        Shrum first argues the district court erred by declining to provide equitable tolling

 for his § 1983 search, seizure, and arrest claims. He did not make this argument below,

 so we review for plain error.

        When a party fails to raise an issue before the district court, “we usually hold it

 forfeited.” Richison v. Ernest Group, Inc., 634 F.3d 1123, 1127 (10th Cir. 2011). “[W]e

 will reverse a district court’s judgment on the basis of a forfeited theory” only when the

 litigant “establish[es] the presence of (1) error, (2) that is plain, which (3) affects

 substantial rights, and which (4) seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public

 reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 1128. “In civil cases, this burden is

 extraordinary . . . and nearly insurmountable.” Somerlott v. Cherokee Nation Distrib.,

 Inc., 686 F.3d 1144, 1151 (10th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).

        Shrum failed to raise the equitable tolling argument below that he presents on

 appeal. To be sure, he raised an argument for equitable tolling before the district court.

 But that argument turned on general claims about the burdens of concurrent litigation he

 faced, a criminal proceeding in federal court and a simultaneous § 1983 civil action based

 on similar facts.

        In his briefs on appeal, Shrum shifted to a new theory based on equitable tolling.

 He grounded that theory in the principle that the government should not force an

 individual to give up one right to vindicate another. His argument is that to litigate his

 civil rights suit he would have to admit and use facts that could have then been used

 against him in the criminal proceeding. But the district court did not have the opportunity

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 to consider this theory, and “[c]hanging to a new theory on appeal that falls under the

 same general category as an argument presented at trial . . . is not adequate to preserve

 issues for appeal.” Okland Oil Co. v. Conoco Inc., 144 F.3d 1308, 1314 n.4 (10th Cir.

 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).

        Because Shrum forfeited his equitable tolling theory below, we review the district

 court’s judgment for plain error.1 Plain error requires a party to establish not just that the

 district court made an obvious error, but that that error affected his “substantial rights”

 and “seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial

 proceedings.” Richison, 634 F.3d at 1128.

        First, we find no plain error. In a § 1983 action, we look to state law for tolling

 rules. Under Kansas law, one party’s bad faith attempts to delay another party’s suit

 triggers equitable tolling. Fairness requires that the law not reward bad faith attempts at

 preventing another party from complying with the statute of limitations. Friends Univ. v.

 W.R. Grace & Co., 608 P.2d 936, 941 (Kan. 1980). Shrum points to Kansas cases that

 suggest a plaintiff might obtain equitable tolling when he has pursued his rights

 “diligently” but “some extraordinary circumstance stood in the way and prevented timely

 filing.” McClain v. Roberts, 304 P.3d 364, 2013 WL 3970215, at *3 (Kan. Ct. App.

 1
   Ordinarily, “[w]e review the district court’s refusal to apply equitable tolling for an
 abuse of discretion.” Garrett v. Fleming, 362 F.3d 692, 695 (10th Cir. 2004). But
 because Shrum did not raise his current theory below, we find plain error appropriate.
 Regardless, we would not find the district court abused its discretion in denying equitable
 tolling for the same reasons we offer here.
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 2013) (unpublished table decision); Harris v. Neill, 216 P.3d 191, 2009 WL 3082642, at

 *6 (Kan. Ct. App. 2009) (unpublished table decision).

        Shrum argues that requiring him to file his § 1983 suit during the pendency of his

 criminal trial would violate his constitutional rights, and that the spectre of that

 constitutes an “extraordinary circumstance” preventing timely filing. But we are aware

 of no case that supports this risk as extraordinary or even unusual. In fact, the Supreme

 Court does not characterize concurrent litigation as “unusual,” holding that “the risk of

 concurrent litigation . . . [is] an entirely common state of affairs,” and observing that it

 has never “been the law that a criminal defendant, or a potential criminal defendant, is

 absolved from all other responsibilities that the law would otherwise place upon him[.]”

 Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 396 (2007). We therefore find that Kansas law does not

 provide for equitable tolling.

        Next, even if Kansas law is unavailing, Shrum contends that tolling should apply

 as a matter of federal constitutional law. He argues the district court should have

 extended equitable tolling to avoid what he calls an unconstitutional Hobson’s choice.

 Namely, had he tried to timely vindicate his § 1983 claims, he would have needed to

 offer incriminating evidence in the civil case. The government could then have used that

 evidence against him in his pending criminal trial. Shrum styles this dilemma as

 requiring him to choose between vindicating his Fourth Amendment rights and

 maintaining his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The district court, he

 contends, should have extended equitable tolling to vindicate his rights.

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        For his argument, Shrum relies on Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968).

 In that case, the petitioner sought the exclusion of evidence at his criminal trial. But

 under contemporary law, he had to prove ownership of the evidence before contesting its

 use. And by providing proof, the petitioner provided incriminating testimony that the

 government then swiftly entered against him. The Court found it “intolerable that one

 constitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to assert another.” Id. at 394.

        The Simmons principle has not had a long shelf-life. Shortly after that case, the

 Supreme Court explained that “to the extent that [Simmons’s] rationale was based on a

 ‘tension’ between constitutional rights and the policies behind them, the validity of that

 reasoning must now be regarded as open to question, and it certainly cannot be given [a]

 broad thrust. . . .” McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 212–13 (1971). According to

 the Court, “[t]he criminal process, like the rest of the legal system, is replete with

 situations requiring the making of difficult judgments as to which course to follow . . .

 Although a defendant may have a right, even of constitutional dimensions, to follow

 whichever course he chooses, the Constitution does not by that token always forbid

 requiring him to choose.” Id. at 213 (internal quotation marks omitted).

        Lower courts similarly construe Simmons narrowly. See, e.g., United States v.

 Ashimi, 932 F.2d 643, 647–48 (7th Cir. 1991) (“Simmons does not apply, however, when

 a defendant is made to choose between a constitutional benefit and a statutory benefit.”);

 see also United States v. Wilks, 629 F.2d 669, 672 (10th Cir. 1980) (“The necessity of

 choosing between holding the government to the exact time limits of the Speedy Trial

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  Act and requesting time to prepare a defense does not, on the facts of this case, create the

  sort of trade-off of constitutional rights denounced by Simmons. . . .”).

           We do not think Simmons applies. Because the Supreme Court declined to give

  Simmons “broad thrust” and questioned the vitality of its underlying theory, we cannot

  endorse a claim that contends there is an unconstitutional “trade-off” between a statutory

  right—the § 1983 causes of action—and a constitutional right. McGautha, 402 U.S. at

  213. 2

           In summary, the district court did not plainly err by declining to extend equitable

  tolling. We affirm the court’s dismissal of Shrum’s search, seizure, and false arrest

  claims.

           B. Malicious Prosecution

           Shrum next argues that the district court erred by dismissing his malicious

  prosecution claim for failure to plead “favorable termination,” one of the five elements of

  a malicious prosecution claim. In light of intervening Supreme Court precedent, the

  district court misapplied this element. But because the district court’s decision can be

  2
    We are not persuaded that a trade-off even existed. The Supreme Court observed in
  different circumstances, “[i]f a plaintiff files a false-arrest claim before he has been
  convicted (or files any other claim related to rulings that will likely be made in a pending
  or anticipated criminal trial), it is within the power of the district court, and in accord
  with common practice, to stay the civil action until the criminal case or the likelihood of
  a criminal case is ended.” Wallace, 549 U.S. at 393–94. Surely a similar path would
  have been available to Shrum had he decided to take it.
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  supported for the alternative reason that Shrum failed to plead his complaint with the

  requisite specificity, we affirm the court’s judgment.3

         A § 1983 malicious prosecution claim includes five elements, with this argument

  turning on the second element: (1) the defendant caused the plaintiff’s continued

  confinement or prosecution; (2) the original action terminated in favor of the plaintiff; (3)

  no probable cause supported the arrest, confinement, or prosecution; (4) the defendant

  acted maliciously; and (5) the plaintiff sustained damages. Wilkins v DeReyes, 528 F.3d

  790, 799 (10th Cir. 2008).

         Under our precedent, a prosecutor’s dismissal, without more, did not constitute

  favorable termination. Wilkins, 528 F.3d at 802–03. Instead, we required that the

  prosecution was terminated for reasons tending to indicate the accused’s innocence. Id.

  An example of this is when a prosecutor enters a nolle prosqui (a voluntary dismissal of

  3
    While our affirmance turns on Shrum’s failure to plead his malicious prosecution claim
  with the specificity required by our precedents, we also note his failure to plead the
  “probable cause” prong. A key element of the § 1983 malicious prosecution claim
  requires “no probable cause supported the original arrest, continued confinement, or
  prosecution.” Margheim v. Buljko, 855 F.3d 1077, 1085 (10th Cir. 2017). Shrum makes
  only one allegation concerning the baselessness of the prosecution. He claims that
  “Defendants instigated and continued the unlawful prosecution of Plaintiff Shrum without
  probable cause and acting out of malice.” App. 30 (emphasis added). But “[t]hreadbare
  recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do
  not suffice” to satisfy our pleading standards. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
  (2009). On appeal, Shrum suggests the prosecution lacked probable cause because it was
  based on illegally obtained evidence. See Aplt. Br. at 34. While the argument enjoys
  intuitive appeal, we do not think the omission of evidence under the exclusionary rule
  necessarily retroactively vitiates probable cause in malicious prosecution claims. See
  Restivo v. Hessemann, 846 F.3d 547, 569–71 (2d Cir. 2017); see also Shaw v. Schulte, 36
  F.4th 1006, 1017–18 (10th Cir. 2022).

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  criminal charges) after deciding he cannot prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. But if

  an official concludes a prosecution out of mercy for the accused, for instance, the

  termination did not indicate the accused’s innocence. The district court correctly found

  under our existing precedent that Shrum’s prosecution did not terminate in a manner that

  indicated his innocence.

         After the judgment below the Supreme Court clarified the meaning of “favorable

  termination.” The Court found that a criminal prosecution terminates favorably, for the

  purposes of a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim, when the prosecution ends without a

  conviction. Thompson v. Clark, 142 S. Ct. 1332, 1335 (2022). The Court explained that

  “[t]o determine the elements of a constitutional claim under § 1983,” we should “first

  look to the elements of the most analogous tort as of 1871 when § 1983 was enacted, so

  long as doing so is consistent with the values and purposes of the constitutional right at

  issue.” Id. at 1337 (internal quotation marks omitted). And looking to American

  malicious prosecution tort law, most American courts held that “the favorable termination

  element of a malicious prosecution claim was satisfied so long as the prosecution ended

  without a conviction”—no affirmative indication of innocence required. Id. at 1338.

         As a result, our precedents applying the favorable termination element are no

  longer good law. The district court therefore erred in granting dismissal on this ground.

     C. Deficient Pleading

         We nonetheless affirm the district court for the alternative reason raised below.

  Shrum has failed to adequately plead with specificity all of the other required elements

  for malicious prosecution against the state officials. We apply a three-part test in

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  considering our discretion to affirm on an alternative ground. First, we consider whether

  the litigants fully briefed and argued the issue here and below. Second, we consider

  whether the parties had a fair opportunity to develop the factual record. And third, we

  consider whether our decision would involve only questions of law. Elkins v. Comfort,

  392 F.3d 1159, 1162 (10th Cir. 2004).

         All of those requirements are met here. First, the City of Kingman defendants

  raised the specificity argument below. App. 42. The district court noted that the

  “undifferentiated and non-specific allegations” in the malicious prosecution claim likely

  rendered the claim deficient. App. 216. On appeal, the city defendants re-asserted this

  argument. City Br. at 19–24. And Shrum addressed those arguments in his reply brief.

  Reply Br. at 18–22. Second, the factual record is not at issue because the alternative

  ground concerns only pleading defects. And third, the alternative ground concerns only a

  question of law.

         “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

  matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. A claim has

  facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

  the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,

  556 U.S. at 678 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

         While the federal pleading standard does not vary across subject matters, the

  degree of specificity required for factual allegations depends on context. In § 1983 cases,

  for example, defendants typically sue various government entities alongside various

  individual actors. In those cases, “it is particularly important in such circumstances that

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  the complaint make clear exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom.” Robbins v.

  Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1250 (10th Cir. 2008).

           We have repeatedly emphasized the importance of connecting defendants to

  misconduct in pleadings: “To recover damages from each of [multiple] Defendants

  under § 1983, [Plaintiff] had to show that such Defendant personally participated in the

  alleged constitutional violation.” Vasquez v. Davis, 882 F. 3d 1270, 1275 (10th Cir.

  2018).

           Specificity is particularly important in a complaint alleging malicious prosecution.

  A complaint could draw many actors into a malicious prosecution claim, but while “a

  wrongful arrest could be the first step towards a malicious prosecution[,]” “the chain of

  causation is broken by an indictment, absent an allegation of pressure or influence

  exerted by the police officers, or knowing misstatements made by the officers to the

  prosecutor.” Reed v. City of Chicago, 77 F.3d 1049, 1053 (7th Cir. 1996); Taylor v.

  Meacham, 82 F.3d 1556, 1564 (10th Cir. 1996) (adopting the Seventh Circuit’s logic).

           Shrum’s complaint casts a wide net over undifferentiated defendants and therefore

  falls short of our pleading standards. Consider first the City of Kingman defendants,

  Sergeant Sowers and Chief Lux. Shrum points us to the “Common to All Counts”

  allegations section in particular. He emphasizes that “Sowers’s name is referred to in the

  Complaint 19 separate times and Lux’s name is referred to in the Complaint 15 separate

  times.” Reply Br. at 21. True enough. But that does not tell us if the complaint makes

  out “who is alleged to have done what to whom.” Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1250.

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          Shrum highlights a few allegations that he thinks satisfies our pleading

  requirements. He points to his allegation that “Sowers, Chief Lux and Cooke knew that

  Walt’s house was seized without a warrant and without probable cause. . . .” App. 17.

  He directs us to the assertion that “[w]hen he secured Plaintiff’s home, Sowers excluded

  Plaintiff Shrum from his home and (a) did not have a warrant . . . (b) did not have

  probable cause to secure Plaintiff’s home; [and] (c) did not have probable cause to

  request a warrant be issued for the search. . . .” App. 18. And then he highlights the

  claim that “Cooke and Chief Lux acquiesced in Sowers’s seizure of Plaintiff Shrum’s

  home.” App. 18.

          The above allegations do not even concern the elements of the malicious

  prosecution claim. While the malicious prosecution claim does require a showing that

  the government acted without probable cause, Shrum’s allegations go to probable cause

  for the search. They do not concern probable cause for the “arrest, continued

  confinement, or prosecution.” Wilkins, 528 F.3d at 799. And even if the allegations did

  go to the prosecution’s probable cause, Shrum offers no complementary allegations that

  indicate what role, if any, Sowers and Lux played in the prosecution. See Meacham, 82

  F.3d at 1564. In fact, criminal charges were not brought until several weeks after the

  search and arrest, and nothing in the complaint alleges what role these state defendants

  had in pressuring federal prosecutors to bring charges. The complaint may have put

  Sowers and Lux on notice that they had been accused of malicious prosecution, but it

  falls short of properly alleging each officer’s role in a way that allows us reasonably to

  infer liability.

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          Consider next the Kingman County defendant, Dustin Cooke.4 Cooke features

  prominently throughout the “Common to All Counts” section. It alleges Cooke

  questioned Shrum, App. 19, prodded Shrum into signing a consent-to-search form under

  “false pretenses,” App. 21, illegally searched Shrum’s home, App. 23, and then secured a

  search warrant based on evidence from the illegal search. App. 25.

          What the complaint does not do is allege Cooke’s role in the malicious

  prosecution. To be sure, the complaint alleges that Cooke, like Sowers and Lux, lacked

  probable cause to search his home. But those allegations are insufficient for the same

  reasons listed above. And as to Cooke’s role in the prosecution, we are told nothing

  more.

          The “Common to All Counts” section offers only one remaining allegation

  pertaining to the prosecution:

                Armed with the fruits of the unlawful seizure and subsequent
                tainted search of Walt’s home and having denied Walt access
                to his home, Walt was unlawfully indicted based upon the
                tainted evidence, prosecuted and found guilty of significant
                federal crimes for which he should never have been
                prosecuted and spent a significant time in prison as a result of
                the unlawful prosecution.

  App. 25–26. The allegation does not identify an offending actor, much less a nameless

  group of state defendants.

          Having failed to piece together a cognizable malicious prosecution claim from the

  “Common to All Counts” section, we turn to “Count I” of the complaint, where Shrum

  4
   While Randy Hill, the Sheriff of Kingman County, is listed as an appellee, Shrum
  conceded below all of his claims against Hill.
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  explicitly housed the claim. The section almost exclusively uses the collective term

  “Defendants.” When Shrum does identify specific defendants, the allegations do not

  address any malicious prosecution elements.

         Only two allegations come close to invoking the elements of a malicious

  prosecution claim. First, Shrum alleges “[t]he actions of the Defendants mentioned under

  this Count resulted in multiple violations of Plaintiff’s rights . . . and subsequently

  resulted in the unlawful prosecution . . . of Plaintiff Shrum in the federal prison system.”

  App. 30. Second, Shrum claims “[b]y all of the above, Defendants instigated and

  continued the unlawful prosecution of Plaintiff Shrum without probable cause and acting

  out of malice.” Id. But neither allegation connects the “unlawful prosecution” with any

  particular actor—and Shrum levels the claim against six individuals. See VanZandt v.

  Okla. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 276 F. App’x 843, 849 (10th Cir. 2008) (finding that

  plaintiffs failed to plead a § 1983 action by “fail[ing] to individualize each Defendant’s

  alleged misconduct from the Defendants as a collective group.”).

         In short, Shrum’s complaint does not tell us who instigated the prosecution or who

  continued the prosecution. It does not connect the defendants to their allegedly unlawful

  conduct, and therefore fails to provide fair notice for the basis of the claims against each

  defendant. See Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1250 (citing “fair notice” as a reason for requiring

  allegations specific to each defendant). The district court’s dismissal of the malicious

  prosecution claim was appropriate on this alternative ground.

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                                     III. Conclusion

        For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Shrum’s

  § 1983 claims.

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