Court Opinion

ID: 9961270
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-18 15:10:45.633785+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:31.203321
License: Public Domain

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        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION

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                                                    RENDERED: APRIL 18, 2024
                                                       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Supreme Court of Kentucky
                                  2022-SC-0510-MR

MICHAEL GARLAND                                                      APPELLANT

                  ON APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
V.                 HONORABLE JOHN D. SIMCOE, JUDGE
                             NO. 21-CR-01165

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                              APPELLEE

                   MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT

                                    AFFIRMING

      This appeal comes before the Court as a matter of right 1 from Hardin

Circuit Court. Michael Garland was convicted of first-degree trafficking in a

controlled substance (TICS) and first-degree persistent felony offender (PFO).

He was sentenced to twenty years in prison. He now argues that a palpable

error occurred when the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on the first-

degree TICS charge that included a theory of possession with intent to transfer.

He also argues that several palpable errors occurred in the sentencing phase

that cumulatively rendered the sentencing phase fundamentally unfair. For the

following reasons, we affirm the trial court.

                                     I.    Facts

      Garland and his friend, Angelica, were driving to a concert on December

1, 2021. Officer Chris Smith of the Grovetown Police Department observed the

      1 Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b).
vehicle carelessly driving and pulled the vehicle over. On approaching the

vehicle, Officer Smith observed that Garland was nervous and refused to look

at him. Officer Smith asked if there was any contraband in the vehicle and

Garland admitted there was some marijuana. When Garland was ordered out

of the vehicle and a pat down search was executed, Garland attempted to pull

away when Officer Smith was about to pat his right-hand pocket. Officer Smith

then detained Garland in handcuffs. Garland managed, nonetheless, to reach

inside his pocket and grab hold of two bags of drugs. After Officer Smith

secured the bags, one was revealed to be marijuana and the other he believed

to contain methamphetamine. Laboratory analysis would later confirm the

substance was methamphetamine and the amount was 10.646 grams.

      Garland was advised of his Miranda rights at the scene and Garland

informed Officer Smith that he was only a “middleman.” Garland testified this

was only a “cryptic” reference to the fact that the methamphetamine belonged

to Angelica, who apparently was crying after the drugs had been found.

      Garland denied knowing the bag contained methamphetamine. He

asserted that earlier that day, he and Angelica had gone to another woman’s

house, named Amanda. Angelica had used the bathroom while Garland looked

at Amanda’s car about possibly fixing it for her. When the two were about to

leave, Amanda had gone back into the house and found the bag of

methamphetamine. Not wanting the drugs in her house, she approached

Garland and stuck the bag in his pocket, merely informing him that it was

marijuana belonging to Angelica and that he should give it back to her.

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Garland testified he did not think to look at the bag nor he did he think to

immediately give the bag to Angelica, simply assuming when she wanted the

drugs, she would begin to look for them. Amanda was called to testify by

Garland and supported this story.

      The jury convicted Garland as described above and he was sentenced to

twenty years in prison. We now consider the merits of the appeal.

                             II.    Standard of Review

      An unpreserved error will only be reversed for manifest injustice. RCr 2

10.26. Any error in a jury instruction is presumptively prejudicial. Stewart v.

Commonwealth, 306 S.W.3d 502, 508 (Ky. 2010). Nonetheless, an unpreserved

error for jury instructions is still subject to palpable error review. Id. Thus, the

error must be “so manifest, fundamental and unambiguous that it threatens

the integrity of the judicial process.” Martin v. Commonwealth, 207 S.W.3d 1, 5

(Ky. 2006). “[A] reviewing court must plumb the depths of the proceeding . . . to

determine whether the defect in the proceeding was shocking or

jurisprudentially intolerable.” Id. at 4. Because all the errors alleged by

Garland are unpreserved, all are subject to the same standard. But Garland

has argued the sentencing phase errors had a cumulative impact. Under that

theory, “multiple errors, although harmless individually, may be deemed

reversible if their cumulative effect is to render the trial fundamentally unfair.”

Brown v. Commonwealth, 313 S.W.3d 577, 631 (Ky. 2010). But the individual

      2 Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.

                                         3
errors must be “substantial, bordering, at least, on the prejudicial.” Id. “[W]e

have declined to hold that the absence of prejudice plus the absence of

prejudice somehow adds up to prejudice.” Id.

                                   III.     Analysis

   A. Jury Instruction not Palpably Erroneous

      Garland has identified Instruction Number Four as the erroneous

instruction. It reads,

      You will find the Defendant guilty of First-degree Trafficking in a

   Controlled Substance (Two Grams or More of Methamphetamine) under

   this Instruction if, and only if, you believe from the evidence beyond a

   reasonable doubt all of the following:

      A. That in this county on or about the 1st day of December, 2021,

         and before the finding of the Indictment herein, he acting alone

         or in complicity with another, had in his possession a quantity

         of two (2) or more grams of methamphetamine; AND

      B. That he knew the substance so possessed by him was

         methamphetamine; AND

      C. That he had the methamphetamine in his possession with the

         intent of selling, distributing, or transferring it to another

         person or persons.

Garland argues that subpart C of this instruction erred by instructing the jury

on a possession with intent to transfer theory that is contrary to statute.

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      “A person is guilty of trafficking in a controlled substance in the first

degree when he or she knowingly and unlawfully traffics in . . . Two (2) grams

or more of methamphetamine[.]” KRS 3 218A.1412(1)(b). “Traffic” is defined as

“to manufacture, distribute, dispense, sell, transfer, or possess with intent to

manufacture, distribute, dispense, or sell a controlled substance[.]” KRS

218A.010(56). We have held that the statute excludes an understanding of

traffic as possession with intent to transfer. Commonwealth v. Rodefer, 189

S.W.3d 550, 552 (Ky. 2006). What we said in Rodefer remains just as true

under the current version of the statute, as it existed in 2006, so Rodefer

remains good law until the General Assembly chooses to alter the definition of

traffic to include possess with intent to transfer under the second definition

found in KRS 218A.010(56). Therefore, Garland is correct that the trial court

erroneously instructed the jury.

      But, just as in Rodefer, we do not believe this amounted to palpable error

because Garland’s own testimony did not negate an alternative theory of the

crime charged as instructed. Id. at 553. In Rodefer, the defendant “admitted

that the cocaine was his, and that he ‘shared’ the cocaine with one of his two

accomplices on the night of the crime.” Id.

      Thus, his own testimony would have supported a conviction of
      trafficking under the “transfer” alternative of KRS 218A.010(34),
      though not under the “possession with intent to [traffic]”
      alternative. In view of Appellant's own testimony that he, in fact,
      committed the offense of which he was convicted, albeit by an
      alternative method, we conclude that the faulty instruction did not
      result in manifest injustice, much less seriously affect the fairness,
      integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

      3 Kentucky Revised Statutes.

                                         5
Id. Similarly, Garland’s own testimony was that he was a “middleman” on

behalf of Angelica. He testified his admission to Officer Smith on the night of

the arrest was a “cryptic” attempt to alert the officer that the

methamphetamine belonged to Angelica. We do not believe this testimony was

an effective denial of possession. We have noted that KRS Chapter 218A does

not define possession, so we have referred to its common definition as

ownership. Pate v. Commonwealth, 134 S.W.3d 593, 598 (Ky. 2004). In so

holding, we have also held the statute allows for constructive or actual

possession. Id. (citing Houston v. Commonwealth, 975 S.W.2d 925, 927 (Ky.

1998)). And we have also held that possession does not require exclusivity. Id.

(citing Franklin v. Commonwealth, 490 S.W.2d 148, 150 (Ky. 1972)). All that is

necessary to establish constructive possession is evidence “that the contraband

was subject to the defendant's dominion and control.” Id. at 598-99 (cleaned

up).

       Thus, Garland’s testimony that he was only a “middleman” holding the

methamphetamine for Angelica at best was an attempt to say Angelica had

constructive possession of the methamphetamine. But Angelica’s constructive

possession does not negate Garland’s actual possession—and Garland did not

deny the methamphetamine was found in his pocket. Moreover, even if

Angelica had constructive possession, since possession does not require

exclusivity, Garland could also still be exercising possession either actual or

constructive simultaneously with Angelica. Thus, the evidence still supported

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conviction of the crime charged as trafficking in a controlled substance by

possession with intent to distribute. KRS 218A.010(56).

      “Distribute” simply means “to deliver other than by administering or

dispensing a controlled substance[.]” KRS 218A.010(13). “‘Transfer’ means to

dispose of a controlled substance to another person without consideration and

not in furtherance of commercial distribution[.]” Id. at (57). To support a

conclusion that Garland possessed the methamphetamine with intent to

distribute, there had to be evidence in the record establishing or supporting a

reasonable inference that Garland’s possession was to deliver with personal

consideration or in furtherance of commercial distribution or both. It is true

that Garland denied knowing he possessed methamphetamine, but the jury

obviously rejected that testimony, and it is not our place to second-guess that

factual determination now. The amount of methamphetamine found on

Garland’s person was slightly more than 10.5 grams and Officer Smith testified

the typical individual dose of methamphetamine was 0.25 grams. Therefore,

even if the jury believed Garland’s testimony about being a middleman, it was

allowed to make a reasonable inference that the methamphetamine was not for

his own personal use and that his deliverance of the methamphetamine to

Angelica at some future point would be in furtherance of commercial

distribution. Dawson v. Commonwealth, 756 S.W.2d 935, 936 (Ky. 1988)

(possession of numerous controlled substances in pill form as well as location

they were found in supported inference that pills were possessed with intent to

sell); McGuire v. Commonwealth, 595 S.W.3d 90, 98 (Ky. 2019) (possession of

                                        7
multiple baggies of methamphetamine, including one with 2.623 grams,

supported inference of intent to distribute); Jones v. Commonwealth, 567

S.W.3d 922, 926 (Ky. App. 2019) (constructive possession of more than three

grams of methamphetamine supported inference of intent to sell or distribute).

Therefore, “the faulty instruction did not result in manifest injustice, much less

seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial

proceedings.” Rodefer, 189 S.W.3d at 553.

   B. No Cumulative Error in Sentencing Phase

      Garland has argued that several unpreserved errors occurred in the

penalty phase of the trial that, cumulatively, rendered that phase

fundamentally unfair. First, he argues the Commonwealth improperly appealed

to the jury to protect the community in its closing argument. Second, that the

jury failed to fix an underlying sentence to the TICS charge prior to sentencing

on the PFO charge. Third, that evidence of his probation revocation for a

misdemeanor was improperly admitted. Finally, that the PFO jury instruction

violated unanimity because evidence had been submitted that he was on

probation for a misdemeanor at the time he committed the TICS offense. The

latter three allegations are not error in and of themselves, much less bordering

on the prejudicial. Brown, 313 S.W.3d at 631. Thus, Garland’s argument for

cumulative error fails.

      We have long maintained that following the bifurcated trial procedure of

Commonwealth v. Reneer, 734 S.W.2d 794 (Ky. 1987), is best practice, but “we

have not yet held that the failure to do so is palpable error.” Owens v.

                                          8
Commonwealth, 329 S.W.3d 307, 319 (Ky. 2011). Garland has not cited a case

either published or unpublished showing that Owens’ statement is now

incorrect. We have held that “a jury's failure to set a penalty for the underlying

offense before finding PFO status does not violate the provisions of the PFO

statute.” Id. (citing Montgomery v. Commonwealth, 819 S.W.2d 713 (Ky. 1991)).

And we have also held that “the failure to instruct according to Reneer is a

procedural issue which we need not review without a contemporaneous

objection.” Id. (citing Miller v. Commonwealth, 283 S.W.3d 690, 704 (Ky. 2009)).

The door is not closed on the possibility that a failure to follow the procedure

instructed in Reneer could be palpably erroneous. Id. at 320. But it has proven

to be a steep bar and Garland has not met it here.

      In like manner, Garland has not shown that admitting evidence of a

misdemeanor probation revocation in the penalty phase is erroneous, much

less palpably so. Although he cites to Conrad v. Commonwealth, 534 S.W.3d

779, 783-84 (Ky. 2017), for his argument, we find Conrad wanting in the

proposition argued. Conrad did involve an argument that evidence of probation

revocation was improperly admitted, but Conrad looked to Martin v.

Commonwealth, 409 S.W.3d 340 (Ky. 2013)—which did not involve that issue—

and found it controlling as to whether there was palpable error because there

was no evidence the impermissible evidence was sent back with the jury.

Conrad, 524 S.W.3d at 783-84. At best, Conrad simply assumed error and

proceeded to the palpable error analysis. But we have held that under KRS

532.055(2)(a), the list of relevant evidence for truth-in-sentencing is not

                                         9
exhaustive; only illustrative. Garrison v. Commonwealth, 338 S.W.3d 257, 260

(Ky. 2011) (quoting Cornelison v. Commonwealth, 990 S.W.2d 609, 610 (Ky.

1999)). Accordingly, we held that evidence of parole revocation is relevant

under the truth-in-sentencing statute even though not specifically listed in it.

Id. For the same reason, we do not believe evidence of probation revocation is

irrelevant, therefore there was no error in admitting this testimony.

      As to the unanimity issue, the PFO instruction read

         You will find the Defendant guilty of being a First-Degree Persistent

      Felony Offender under this Instruction if, and only if, you believe from

      the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt all of the following:

      A. That prior to December 1, 2021, the Defendant was

         convicted of 11-CR-00230: First-Degree Illegal Possession of

         a Controlled Substance Methamphetamine by final

         Judgment of the Hardin County Circuit Court on March 23,

         2012; AND that prior to committing the offense for which he

         was convicted on March 23, 2012, he was convicted of 09-

         CR-01121: Manufacturing Methamphetamine by final

         Judgment of the Jefferson County Circuit Court on May 27,

         2011;

      B. That he was eighteen years of age or older when he

         committed both of the two offenses of which you believe he

         was so convicted;

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      C. That pursuant to those 2 convictions, he was sentenced to a

         term of imprisonment of one year or more for each

         conviction;

      D. (1) That he completed the service of the sentence imposed on

         him pursuant to at least one such prior conviction no more

         than five years before December 1, 2021; OR

         (2) That he was discharged from parole or probation from the

         sentence imposed on him pursuant to at least one of such

         prior conviction no more than five years before December 1,

         2021; OR

         (3) That he was on probation, parole, conditional discharge,

         conditional release, or furlough or appeal bond, from at least

         one such prior conviction at the time he committed the

         offense of which you have found him guilty in this case; AND

      E. That he is now twenty-one years of age or older.

Garland argues that because the jury heard testimony that he was, at the time

of the offense, on probation for a misdemeanor conviction, that a juror might

have believed under Part D(3) of the instruction that said misdemeanor

probation was a qualifying offense and convicted him as a PFO for the

misdemeanor probation.

      “A jury must be credited with some intelligence and understanding[.]”

Fields v. Wilkins, 277 S.W.2d 467, 468 (Ky. 1954). “[I]t is presumed that the

jury will follow instructions issued to it by the trial court.” Goncalves v.

                                         11
Commonwealth, 404 S.W.3d 180, 197 (Ky. 2013) (quoting Morgan v. Scott, 291

S.W.3d 622, 643 (Ky. 2009)). Part A of the instruction clearly identified the two

felony convictions the jury was supposed to consider. We believe jurors of

ordinary intelligence understood the language in Part D—to wit: “one such

conviction”—was in reference to the two convictions listed in Part A. In Travis v.

Commonwealth, we considered the issue of jury instructions in the penalty

phase containing surplus language unsupported by any evidence presented.

327 S.W.3d 456, 462 (Ky. 2010). Garland is correct that Travis is not

controlling here but only because his case presents a fundamentally different

issue—that there was evidence in the record the jury might have used to

convict him if they had ignored Part A of the instruction. Tellingly, Garland

failed to cite Part A of the instruction in his brief, and his argument that a juror

might have relied upon evidence contrary to Part A is speculative—indeed, "too

speculative and doubtful to call for a consideration.” Huber & Huber Motor Exp.

v. Martin’s Adm’r, 96 S.W.2d 595, 599 (Ky. 1936).

      In a different context, we have held that “[s]o long as the instruction . . .

enables the jury to identify the instruction with a specific crime established by

the evidence and avoids the likelihood of confusion with other offenses

presented against defendant in the same trial, then the instructions are

adequately differentiated.” Banks v. Commonwealth, 313 S.W.3d 567, 573 (Ky.

2010). Part A identified the appropriate convictions to consider, and by so

doing excluded the evidence of his probation for a misdemeanor conviction

                                        12
from consideration; “and we believe reasonably intelligent men would not have

been misled by the instruction.” Wilkins, 277 S.W.2d at 468.

      Finally, we agree with Garland that the Commonwealth improperly

addressed the jury with an appeal to the sense of the community.

Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 165 S.W.3d 129, 132-33 (Ky. 2005). We decline to

review this particular error in depth, however, because a single error obviously

cannot justify relief under a cumulative error theory. Garland has not argued

this error alone justifies reversal for flagrant prosecutorial misconduct; nor has

he requested palpable error review under that theory. “[W]hen an issue is

unpreserved at the trial court, this Court will not review it unless a request for

palpable error review under RCr 10.26 is made and briefed by the appellant.”

Webster v. Commonwealth, 438 S.W.3d 321, 325 (Ky. 2014). Therefore,

Garland’s cumulative error theory fails.

                                 IV.    Conclusion

      For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm Garland’s convictions.

      All sitting. All concur.

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COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Erin Hoffman Yang
Assistant Public Advocate

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Russell M. Coleman
Attorney General of Kentucky

Thomas A. Van De Rostyne
Assistant Attorney General

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