Court Opinion

ID: 9691652
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 20:56:13.209672+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:17:47.434773
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
KLEIN, J.:
¶ 1 I respectfully dissent. The majority states that even conceding service upon Cole was defective, because he appeared and defended the matter in court, his claim is waived.5 I disagree. The fact remains *502that Cole asserted in his preliminary objections that the person who was served with plaintiffs complaint at his apartment building was not the manager of the budding (as alleged by plaintiff), but merely the security guard who had no authority to accept service.6 Because the trial court never held a hearing on Cole’s preliminary objections, which raised a colorable claim of improper service, the judgment should be vacated. Moreover, Cole was never given the opportunity to file an answer to the complaint due to the alleged improper service, and, therefore, was foreclosed from raising any waivable affirmative defenses in new matter.
¶2 According to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1028, when preliminary objections raising the issue of improper service are filed, the court is required to review further evidence, and not just rely upon facts of record. See Note, Pa.R.C.P. 1028. Rule 1028 also requires that the court shall determine all preliminary objections promptly and if an issue of fact is raised, consider evidence from depositions or otherwise. See Pa.R.C.P. 1028(b)(2).
¶ 3 Presently the trial court delayed a hearing on Cole’s preliminary objections, and issued an order stating that “the parties [shall conduct discovery or take depositions] within 45 days of the day the order is docketed.” The court also stated that the parties would have 15 days to file supplemental documentation and briefs supporting their positions. Apparently, no depositions, discovery or briefs were filed by either party in response to the court’s order. In fact, the preliminary objections were not ultimately ruled upon by the court until after settlement negotiations prior to the commencement of trial. When the court reconvened, after unsuccessful settlement attempts, the court denied the objections but stated that Cole could bring up the service issue later via a compulsory nonsuit. Cole then did contest service by moving for a nonsuit, which the court ultimately denied, stating:
Denied. You are here, you are at trial, you have defended, so I don’t see where the service issue is an issue at all at this . point. ,
¶ 4 In so ruling, the court misses fundamental constitutional and jurisdictional principles. Namely, regardless of how an action is commenced (i.e., by writ of summons or complaint), service of process is essential to commencing the action. Proper service is a prerequisite to a court acquiring personal jurisdiction over a defendant. Cintas Corporation v. Lee’s Cleaning Services, Inc., 549 Pa. 84, 700 A.2d 915 (1997). Without holding a hearing and taking evidence from the parties, the court was unable to confirm if, in fact, Cole was properly served with plaintiffs complaint and whether it acquired personal jurisdiction over him. Moreover, im*503proper service is synonymous with lack of notice — a due process violation.
¶ 5 In Szekely v. Abilene Flour Mills Co., 211 Pa.Super. 442, 237 A.2d 242 (1967), our court found that it was required to remand the case where the trial court had decided the issue of service in favor of plaintiff without taking additional testimony on the matter, either in court or by deposition. Although defendant had filed two affidavits from its agent that allegedly accepted service and the plaintiff filed one to support service, our court noted that neither party had filed written interrogatories. Instead, the trial court found that the defendant had failed to establish lack of personal jurisdiction by relying principally on the averment that the defendant had directed that one of defendant’s agents obtain prepayment from plaintiff — clearly a fact of record. In that case, our court stated:
It is our belief, however, that both parties misconceived the nature of the fact-finding process on preliminary objections. We believe it appropriate, therefore, to remand this record to the lower court with directions that an order be entered allowing the parties a reasonable period of time in which to present evidence by deposition, interrogatories or otherwise which will allow for the proper resolution of issues of fact.
Id. at 245.
¶ 6 It is imperative that we keep in mind that our court reviews the denial of preliminary objections challenging personal jurisdiction to determine whether the record evidence fairly supports the trial court’s disposition. Barr v. Barr, 749 A.2d 992 (Pa.Super.2000). In Szekely, supra, even where the parties had filed affidavits to support or reject the claim regarding lack of jurisdiction and improper service, our court found it necessary to remand the matter for further proceedings to determine whether the record supported the trial court’s decision. Presently, the parties have not even produced one affidavit, let alone any evidence via deposition, interrogatory or otherwise to prove their claim regarding service.
¶7 In sum, I find that the trial court improperly overruled Cole’s preliminary objections without holding a hearing in which it was obligated to review additional evidence submitted by the parties regarding whether Lorraine Childs could accept service on Cole’s behalf. See Pa.R.C.P. 1028. The court’s summary dismissal of the objections at the beginning of trial was neither a prompt resolution of the matter, nor proper under the rules. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment and remand for a hearing on Cole’s preliminary objections, first giving the parties the opportunity to supplement the record with evidence of whether service was proper.

. The majority relies on Webb v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n., 227 Pa.Super. 508, 323 A.2d 737 (1974), to support its conclusion that because Cole appeared at trial and defended himself he waived any claim of defective service. In Webb, our court stated the following in a footnote:
Appellant claims that service below was defective. Because it appeared and defended on the merits, any defect of this sort was waived. Pa.R.C.P. 1032.
Id. at 738 n. 2. First, the case does not state exactly why appellant claimed the service was defective. Second, Rule 1032 states that a *502party waives defenses and objections which are not presented by preliminary objection or another type of required pleading. Presently, it is undisputed that Cole timely filed preliminary objections in which he properly raised the issue of improper service.

. Specifically, Cole’s preliminary objections stated, in part:
17. Plaintiff indicates in its affidavit of service that it served the instant complaint upon "Lorraine Childs, manager of lodging in which defendant resides."
18. Lorraine Childs is a security guard at 4041 Ridge Avenue, Pennsylvania, PA and is not the manger of premises located there.
22. Plaintiff's alleged service of the Complaint does not meet the requirements of PA.R.C.P. 402 as defendant was never properly served.
Def.’s Preliminary Objections of 5/5/00 at 3, 4.