Court Opinion

ID: 9454477
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 18:47:46.822976+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:34:08.130911
License: Public Domain

VAN DUSEN, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the last five paragraphs of the majority opinion (pp. 6-11). The docket entry covering the hearing of 9/15/67, which resulted in the opinion of 11/27/67 and the order of 12/13/67 1 from which this appeal is taken, reads as follows:
“9-15-67 Hearing on motions by (1) plaintiff for judgment on the pleadings; and, (2) defendant for an order permitting amendment to answer; and, (3) plaintiff *887for an order to strike interrogatories — Ordered motions held under advisement.”
The following first statements of the court and counsel for plaintiff at the September 15 hearing and the language in the transcript from pp. 2-11, inclusive, considered as a whole, indicate that the language quoted in the majority opinion was used solely as part of an argument on a Motion For Judgment on the Pleadings concerning issues of law and not to make a factual record: 2
“The Court: Mr. Davis, you are making the first motion, are you not, for judgment on the pleadings?
“Mr. Davis: Yes, sir. I think all these motions are kind of wrapped up together because your decision on the first motion, judgment on the pleadings, will have a decided effect on the other two.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Without any notice to the plaintiff that the court was considering the entry of judgment against it and without what seems to me proper proof on the record of the person who marked the uniform straight bill of lading prepaid,3 which is the basis of defendant’s estoppel defense, the District Court found that the carrier marked the bill of lading “prepaid” and that the doctrine of equitable estoppel applied (opinion at 18a and 21a).
Although summary judgment may be entered for the non-moving party where all the facts are before the court,4 I be*888lieve the following language of the Supreme Court of the United States in Fountain v. Filson, 336 U.S. 681, 683, 69 S.Ct. 754, 756, 93 L.Ed. 971 (1949), requires that this case be remanded to the District Court in order to give the plaintiff an opportunity to offer a defense to an appropriate motion by defendant or, at the trial, to submit its evidence of the lack of factual basis for the defendant’s estoppel claim:
“Summary judgment may be given, under Rule 56, only if there is no dispute as to any material fact. There was no occasion in the trial court for Mrs. Fountain to dispute the facts material to a claim that a personal obligation existed, since the only claim considered by that court on her motion for summary judgment was the claim that there was a resulting trust. When the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court should have considered a claim for personal judgment it was error for it to deprive Mrs. Fountain of an opportunity to dispute the facts material to that claim by ordering summary judgment against her. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is, therefore, reversed and the cause remanded to the District Court for further proceedings in accordance with the opinion of the Court of Appeals as here modified.”
See, also, Cram v. Sun Insuranc Office, Ltd., 375 F.2d 670 (4th Cir. 1967); cf. United States v. Blumenthal, 315 F.2d 351 (3rd Cir. 1963). In the Cram case, supra, at 675, the court said:5
“Cram moved for summary judgment on the theory that the written contract, together with the uncontradicted testimony of his and Wahab’s intent, removed all question of fact from the case. There is no evidence that he intended for the court to try the factual issues presented by the case in the event it rejected his theory of the ease. Once his theory of the case was rejected and it became apparent that material facts were in issue, Cram had the right to present to the trier of fact, all the evidence he could produce and to argue the facts in support of his interpretation of the contract.”

. It is noted that, since the transcript of the September 15 hearing was apparently not available in the District Court until February 1969 and was not added as a supplement to the record in this court until that month, counsel may have never seen this transcript and clearly had no opportunity to comment on it, either at oral argument or in their briefs filed in this appeal.

. The averments of the Answer “shall be taken as denied or avoided.” See F.R. Civ.P. 8(d) ; 2A Moore’s’ Federal Practice (2nd Edition), If 12.15, p. 2270. The affidavit filed by defendant’s president does not allege who made “the notation on the uniform straight bill of lading that freight had been prepaid.” Defendant claims it relied on this notation in paying the consignor the freight. The Form of Domestic (Straight) Bill of Lading prescribed by the Interstate Commerce Commission (52 ICC 671, after p. 740) contains the following, disclosing that some person, who in this case apparently could have been the consignor, must fill in the indication of prepayment as well as the receipt for the prepaid freight:
“If charges are to be prepaid, write or stamp here, ‘To be Prepaid.’
“Received $..........to apply in prepayment of the charges on the property described hereon.
Agent or Cashier,
Per ...............................
(The signature here acknowledges only the amount prepaid.)
Furthermore, there is no showing in the record that this part of the affidavit was made on personal knowledge or that “the affiant is competent to testify to” the above-quoted allegation in the affidavit, as required by F.R.Civ.P. 56(e).

. See 6 Moore’s Federal Practice (2nd Ed. 1965), If 56.12, at pp. 2243-2246, where this language appears:
“Care should, of course, be taken by the district court to determine that the party against whom summary judgment is rendered has had a full and fair opportunity to meet the proposition that there is no genuine issue of material fact to be tried, and that the party for whom summary judgment is rendered is entitled thereto as a matter of law.
* $ $ * *
“It should be very clear that all of the facts bearing on personal liability are before the court and that these establish the defendant’s personal liability as a matter of law. * * * A party moving for summary judgment, such as the defendant in the supposed case, may make certain concessions in favor of his adversary for purposes of the motion that do not carry over and support summary judgment for the adversary, the plaintiff in the supposed case. And, furthermore, a party in whose favor summary judgment is rendered has the burden of establishing that there are not disputed material facts. It does not, therefore, follow that because summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the issue of personal liability was erroneous that summary judgment for the plaintiff on that issue is proper. Un*888less, then, the case is clear, within the qualifications and limitations just stated, the appellate court should not order summary judgment for the non-moving party, but should remand for further development of the case, which may include the making of a motion for summary judgment by the prior non-moving party who prevailed on the appeal.”

.- Also, this language appears at pp. 673-674: “Neither party, by moving for summary judgment, concedes the truth of the allegations of his adversary other than for purposes of his own motion. A movant may contend that under his theory of the case, no substantial issue of fact exists, while under the adversary’s theory factual questions are in issue.”