Court Opinion

ID: 9856345
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:45:32.286447+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:37.492407
License: Public Domain

McHUGH, Justice,
concurring:
I agree with the result reached by the majority in this case in that it should be remanded to the Circuit Court of Mason County for resentencing. I do, however, have concerns relating to the language used by the majority to resolve two of the issues.
My first concern relates to the confusion that I perceive to be created by the majority opinion by what appears to be the synonymous use of double jeopardy concepts with due process concepts.
In the case now before us, I agree that upon a retrial, the defendant may not be convicted of an offense greater than that for which he was convicted in his first trial because of double jeopardy considerations. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957).
The majority, however, bases its result in the case now before us upon the case of State v. Eden, 163 W.Va. 370, 256 S.E.2d 868 (1979). That case held, incorrectly I believe, that the due process provision of the West Virginia Constitution (Art. Ill, § 10) precluded a circuit judge, upon a trial de novo, from imposing a harsher sentence upon a defendant than that imposed by a justice of the peace (now magistrate). The rationale of the case of Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 1953, 32 L.Ed.2d 584 (1972) was rejected. Colten v. Kentucky held that there was no due process problem in a court system similar to that in West Virginia when a greater sentence was imposed, after a trial de novo, in a superior court than that which was imposed by the inferior court. I would follow the principles set forth in Colten v. Kentucky, which also refused a double jeopardy argument.
If presented with the opportunity, I would also alter the principles enumerated in Syl. pt. 3, State v. Cobb, 166 W.Va. 65, 272 S.E.2d 467 (1980), to clarify that under certain circumstances a harsher penalty may be imposed upon a defendant after conviction at a second trial than was received at the original trial. Accordingly, language contained in State v. Gwinn, 169 W.Va. 456, 288 S.E.2d 533 (1982), relating to Eden and Cobb should be modified.
I would follow the logic and law of Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 93 S.Ct. 1977, 36 L.Ed.2d 714 (1973).
My second concern relates to the handling in the majority opinion of the issue of sequestration of the jury. I would have disposed of this issue by holding that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to sequester the jury. Instead, the majority has chosen, I believe unneces*19sarily, to interject a due process constitutional law concept involving the sequestration of a jury. The majority has traced the common law and statutory history of sequestration of a jury. It seizes upon the “due administration of justice” language in State v. Robinson, 20 W.Va. 713, 760-61 (1882), and propels itself into what I believe will result in confusion in the administration of justice in trial courts. Several observations are in order. Quite correctly, the majority states that, “It has been noted that the question of jury sequestration has assumed increasing importance in recent years accentuated by the protracted length of many criminal trials, the pervasiveness of the media in modern society, and the cost of housing and living facilities for a sequestered jury.” Omitted, however, from the majority opinion is additional language which appears in footnote 5 of An-not., 72 A.L.R.3d 131 (1976).
[T]he trend of modern decisions seems to constantly taper off from the ancient idea that the confinement of the jury in a criminal case is a prerequisite to insure an uninfluenced verdict. Judicial discretion and proper supervisory powers appear to be meeting with constantly added support, and the basis of determination seems to be whether or not the record indicates any actual or possible prejudice by reason of the departures indulged in.
In State v. Magwood, 290 Md. 615, 624, 432 A.2d 446, 450-51 (1981), the Court of Appeals of Maryland rejected an argument that sequestration of a jury had constitutional status under the Article 5 guaranty of trial by jury contained in the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The Maryland court noted:
[W]e point out that the ancient common law doctrine prohibiting jury separation is not generally thought to be such an integral part of the right to a jury trial that sequestration has constitutional status. Consequently, the federal courts, perceiving no constitutional issue, have relegated jury separation, whether before or during deliberations, to the discretion of the trial judge, and, absent ‘an affirmative showing of prejudice and abuse of discretion,’ the decision will not be questioned. [Cases cited m support thereof omitted].
The majority also states “that in appropriate circumstances, sequestration is a matter which should be raised sua sponte by the trial court. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (1966).” The Sheppard opinion details the bizarre coverage given by the media to the Sam Sheppard case. By any rational judgment, Sheppard was denied due process of law because of prejudicial news coverage which affected his right to an impartial jury free from outside influences. The Court chastised the trial judge for his failure to control the trial. One of the suggested means to avoid the result of the Sheppard case is the raising by the trial judge, sua sponte, with counsel the issue of jury sequestration. Clearly, the trial judge has the duty to insure an orderly and fair judicial proceeding. But, we should be vigilant to keep the “appropriate circumstances” in perspective, lest every denial of jury sequestration be raised to a constitutional due process level.
If the majority pursues with vigor what I fear may be implied in this decision on this issue, West Virginia will be far afield from the main line of judicial thought.