Court Opinion

ID: 9723785
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:31:35.552586+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:51.673147
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
Jackson, J.
I am unable to concur in the majority opinion herein and dissent thereto.
It appears this action was started originally by the relator as an action in ejectment against his tenants George Michels and National Culvert Company. In due time, within the statute, relator filed its affidavit for immediate possession, pursuant to Acts 1927, ch. 254, § 1, p. 741, being § 3-1301 et seq., Burns’ 1968 Repl. The court thereupon (presumably pursuant to Acts 1947, ch. 215, § 1, p. 779 being § 2-4727 Burns’ 1968 Repl.) fixed the amount of the bond or undertaking at $40,000.00. Presumably, the clerk thereupon issued an order to the sheriff of the county directing the sheriff to seize the possession of the property described in said complaint and affidavit pursuant to Acts 1927, § 2 (or § 3-1305 Burns’) as well as summons. We assume the sheriff obeyed the law as embodied in the Act § 2 or § 3-1305.
*295Defendants failed to present their written undertaking to the sheriff within five (5) days after the service or posting of notice. Neither the defendant nor some person in his behalf, within five days after the service or posting of such notice executed a written undertaking payable to the plaintiff, with sufficient surety to be approved by the sheriff, to the effect that the defendant will safely keep and preserve said property, that the same will not be in any way injured or damaged, as provided by § 3, Acts 1927, or § 3-1306, Burns’ 1968 Repl. Upon failure of defendants to give the written undertaking relator tendered to the sheriff its written undertaking, with surety, which bond was received by the sheriff, filed by him, examined as to surety and approved. Relator’s brief shows the action in ejectment was brought below by Young Metal Products, Inc., a Corporation, against co-defendants George Michels and National Culvert Company, Inc.
As I interpret the law, under the plain wording of the statute, if the defendants, or some person in their behalf failed to give the bond or undertaking required within five days after May 21, 1969, then the plaintiff had five days within which to file such bond and in such event on approval of the bond by the Sheriff, the Sheriff was required to deliver possession of the property to the plaintiff. If however the plaintiff failed to file its bond within the succeeding five (5) days, i.e., before June 3, 1969, then the defendant would normally retain possession of the real estate until the outcome of the suit was determined on the merits.
In the case at bar while it looks like, and while I greatly dislike the maneuvers of the court and defendants’ counsel, that with the service of the order on May 21, 1969, time began to run. I am of the opinion that when the court on May 15, 1969, fixed the bond for possession at $40,000.00 and the clerk issued the summons and the order to the sheriff to seize immediate possession, the court had acted under the 1947 Act, § 2-4727 Burns’ and no longer had any jurisdiction *296with regard to the bond, extension of time or reduction thereof, but exercised all the discretion and jurisdiction granted under the 1947 Act.
That being the case then, plaintiff had to before June 3, 1969, file its proper bond to the satisfaction of the sheriff. Failing to do so, I am of the opinion the defendants are entitled to hold possession until at least the outcome of the case on the merits. Bear in mind the 1947 Act gives the court only the power to fix “the penalty” of the bond in such amount as he in his discretion may deem adequate, but in no event less than one hundred dollars, and that power is granted only in certain instances specified by such Act. Even under the 1947 Act the court did not have the power to approve the bond or undertaking, that duty remains with the sheriff.
Plaintiff in my opinion should have tendered a proper bond to the sheriff in the sum of $40,000.00 prior to June 3, 1969, failing so to do, it was not, and is not now, entitled to the possession of the property described in the ejectment action, by compliance with the 1927 Act, hence in my opinion is not entitled to the relief sought in the instant action.
However, should the court determine that the 1947 Act, ch. 215, § 1, p. 779 being Burns’ § 2-4727, did not in fact operate as a repeal of § 4, Acts 1927, ch. 254, then the action of respondent Judge of the Lake Superior Court, Eoom 5, was and is a nullity and in excess of his jurisdiction because Acts 1927, supra, placed the duty of fixing the amount of the bond or undertaking, and approving the same, on the sheriff, and no one else could perform that duty. Eegardless of that fact, the record shows service of the required notice and order on defendant on May 21, 1969. No bond or undertaking was filed by or on behalf of defendants within the five days allowed. Plaintiff then had five days within which to file its bond. The record shows plaintiff first tendered its bond or undertaking on June 5,1969.
In connection with the effect of the 1947 Act as it relates *297to the 1927 Act, I am inclined to the belief that it does not operate as a repealer of § 4 of the 1927 Act as it does not purport to repeal any other Act, and the title of the Act reads “AN ACT entitled ‘An Act providing for limitation of liability on open undertakings.’ ” In any event, in my opinion, it does not affect the matter now before us.
The key to the rights of the parties turned, after the filing of the affidavit for immediate possession, and the issuance of the clerk’s order provided by § 3-1305 Burns’ on strict compliance with §3-1306 Burns’ “* * * within five (5) days after the service or posting of such notice,” etc.
The 1927 Act (§ 3-1301 et seq.) providing for the immediate possession of real estate is a specific and special statute. Relief thereunder must be had within the purview of the act, or not at all. In my opinion the plaintiff-relator has not brought himself within the purview of the act, has suffered laches and is therefore not entitled to the relief sought and now erroneously granted by this Court. The temporary writs heretofore issued by this Court should be dissolved and the permanent writs denied.
Note. — Reported in 258 N. E. 2d 853.