Court Opinion

ID: 9940490
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-14 17:09:12.441763+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:44:54.968884
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This decision of the New Mexico Court of Appeals was not selected for publication in
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          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

No. A-1-CA-40067

ANDRAS SZANTHO, as Personal Representative
of the Wrongful Death ESTATE OF DIANE
WILKINS,

      Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

PEAK MEDICAL NEW MEXICO NO. 3,
LLC d/b/a RIO RANCHO CENTER; GENESIS
HEALTHCARE, LLC; SUMMIT CARE, LLC;
SILLED HEALTHCARE, LLC; GEN
OPERATIONS I, LLC; GEN OPERATIONS
II, LLC; and GHC HOLDINGS II, LLC,

      Defendants-Appellants.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SANTA FE COUNTY
Brian P. Biedscheid, District Court Judge

Ron Bell Injury Lawyers
Lee Coleman
Albuquerque, NM

Reddick Law, PLLC
Brian D. Reddick
Robert W. Francis
Matthew D. Swindle
Little Rock, AR

for Appellee

Quintairos, Prieto, Wood & Boyer, P.A.
Frank Alvarez
Dallas, TX
for Appellants

                              MEMORANDUM OPINION

BLACK, Judge Pro Tem.

{1}     This appeal concerns the validity and enforceability of two mandatory arbitration
agreements signed on behalf of the deceased Diane Wilkins for her admission to the
Rio Rancho Center, a skilled nursing and therapy rehabilitation center. Plaintiff Andras
Szanthos, as personal representative of the estate of Ms. Wilkins, contested the legal
validity and enforceability of the arbitration agreements based on the substantive
unconscionability allegedly created by the carve-out provision permitted for small
claims. Defendants Peak Medical New Mexico No. 3, LLC, along with various
associated corporate entities affiliated with Rio Rancho Center (collectively,
Defendants) appeal and contest the district court’s order denying their motion seeking to
compel arbitration and rather compelling discovery and evidentiary briefing on the
substantive unconscionability issue. We reverse and remand with directions to refer the
case to arbitration.

BACKGROUND

{2}    Ms. Wilkins was a resident of the Rio Rancho Center on various dates from
February 18, 2018 to March 26, 2018. At the time of her first admission on February 21,
2018, Ms. Wilkins signed a “Resident Representative Designation,” which appointed her
daughter, Amanda Wilkins, to act on her behalf. On two occasions after Ms. Wilkin’s
admission, her daughter signed admission packets, which included Voluntary Binding
Arbitration Agreements (Agreements). The Agreements were entirely voluntary, stating
multiple times that Ms. Wilkins would still receive appropriate services even if the
Agreements were rejected. The Agreements provide in relevant part:

      2. Disputes to be Arbitrated Any and all claims or controversies arising
      out of or in any way relating to this Agreement or the Patient’s stay at the
      Center, including all prior stays at the Center, including disputes regarding
      interpretation and/or enforceability of this Agreement, whether arising out
      of state or federal law, whether existing now or arising in the future,
      whether for statutory, compensatory or punitive damages and whether
      sounding in breach of contract, negligence, tort or breach of statutory
      duties (including, without limitation, claims based on personal injury or
      death), regardless of the basis for any duty or of the legal theories upon
      which the claim is asserted, shall be submitted to binding arbitration.
      However, where the amount in controversy does not exceed the amount
      provided by state law for the jurisdiction of the small claims court, at the
      Patient’s or Center’s option, such dispute may be heard in small claims
      court.
{3}     Each Agreement clearly advised of the right to have them reviewed by an
attorney and stated clearly that Ms. Wilkins had the option of revoking the Agreements
within thirty days of signing. Neither Agreement was revoked. Finally, each of the
agreements also contained the following in bold all capital letters:

             THE PARTIES CONFIRM THAT EACH OF THEM HAS READ
       ALL 4 PAGES OF THIS AGREEMENT, HAS HAD AN OPPORTUNITY
       TO ASK QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS AGREEMENT, VOLUNTARILY
       INTENDS TO BE LEGALLY BOUND AND UNDERSTANDS THAT BY
       SIGNING BELOW, EACH OF THEM HAS WAIVED THE RIGHT TO A
       TRIAL BY JUDGE OR JURY, EACH OF THEM CONSENTS TO ALL
       TERMS OF THIS AGREEMENT AND EACH OF THEM UNDERSTANDS
       THAT THIS AGREEMENT IS VOLUNTARY AND IS NOT A
       PRECONDITION TO RECEIVING SERVICES AT THE CENTER.

{4}    On March 27, 2018, Ms. Wilkins died due to septic shock and respiratory failure.

{5}     Mr. Szanthos as personal representative of Ms. Wilkins’s estate filed a complaint
against Defendants on October 23, 2018, alleging wrongful death, negligence, and
unfair trade practices. Defendants timely filed a motion to dismiss and compel
arbitration based on the Agreements previously signed on behalf of Ms. Wilkins and
argued that the Agreements’ delegation clause required that any questions of
enforceability—including unconscionability—be decided by arbitration. In response to
Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff challenged the Agreements on the basis that they “lack[ed]
mutuality of obligation” due to the carve-out exclusion of claims, which could optionally
be brought in small claims court, were substantively unconscionable and unenforceable
as a whole, and the district court had jurisdiction to decide “the [e]nforceability [i]ssue.”

{6}     At the hearing on Defendants’ motion, the district court voiced its decision to
follow our then recent opinion in Peavy v. Skilled Healthcare Group, A-1-CA-35494,
mem. op. (N.M. Ct. App. Oct. 22, 2018) (nonprecedential), and denied Defendants’
motion to compel arbitration. The district court reasoned that Peavy required the parties
to conduct discovery to determine whether the small claims court exclusion was
unconscionably one-sided in its likely application. In the order denying arbitration, the
district court initially ruled that the motion was denied without prejudice pending an
evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether the arbitration agreement was unfairly one-
sided.

{7}     Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration of their motion to dismiss and
compel arbitration. An oral hearing was initially set for January 30, 2020, but the district
court issued a written order on January 21, 2020, vacating the hearing and denying
Defendants’ motion for reconsideration without a hearing.

{8}   Pursuant to the district court’s order, appealed herein, the parties engaged in
discovery on the issue of substantive unconscionability. The district court then granted
the parties’ request to submit this issue of substantive unconscionability on written
briefs.

{9}     On June 23, 2021, Defendants filed a supplemental motion to compel arbitration
focusing on the issue of substantive unconscionability. On September 14, 2021, the
district court held a hearing on Defendants’ supplemental motion. The court again
voiced its decision to follow its interpretation of Peavy and denied Defendants’ motion to
dismiss and compel arbitration and the supplemental motion to compel arbitration on
the basis that the Agreements were unfairly one-sided so as to make it substantively
unconscionable. The district court reasoned that the claims Plaintiff is most likely to
bring were excluded from arbitration. The district court filed the order denying
Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration and supplemental motion to compel arbitration
on September 24, 2021.

DISCUSSION

I.     Standard of Review

{10} “[W]hether the parties have agreed to arbitrate presents a question of law, and
[appellate courts] review the applicability and construction of a contractual provision
requiring arbitration de novo.” Cordova v. World Fin. Corp. of N.M., 2009-NMSC-021, ¶
11, 146 N.M. 256, 208 P.3d 901 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Appellate courts also apply a de novo standard of review to a district court’s denial of a
motion to compel arbitration. Lopez v. Transitional Hosp. of N.M., LLC, 2023-NMCA-
058, ¶ 4, 534 P.3d 1030; see Piano v. Premier Distrib. Co., 2005-NMCA-018, ¶ 4, 137
N.M. 57, 107 P.3d 11 (same); Heye v. Am. Golf Corp., 2003-NMCA-138, ¶ 4, 134 N.M.
558, 80 P.3d 495 (same).

{11} When a party agrees to a nonjudicial forum for dispute resolution, it should be
held to that agreement so long as the agreement is voluntary and not substantively or
procedurally unconscionable. See Juarez v. THI of N.M. at Sunset Villa, LLC, 2022-
NMCA-056, ¶¶ 13, 27 40, 517 P.3d 918. Plaintiff asserted that the Agreements were
facially one-sided, in that either party can exclude from arbitration all claims where the
amount in controversy does not exceed $10,000 but the effect of the provision is that
Defendants’ most likely claims can be brought to court and Plaintiff’s most likely claims
will be subject to arbitration. Plaintiff thus has the burden of proof to establish
substantive unconscionability. See Strausberg v. Laurel Healthcare Providers, LLC,
2013-NMSC-032, ¶ 40, 304 P.3d 409 (stating that, because unconscionability is an
affirmative contract defense, the party alleging unconscionability bears the burden of
proof).

II.    Plaintiff Must Specifically Challenge the Delegation Clause

{12} Plaintiff admits to challenging the delegation clause only by generally challenging
the total arbitration clause as unconscionable. In Juarez, this Court noted that the
plaintiff’s argument was “challenging the contract as a whole and [was] not clearly
directed against the validity of the delegation clause alone,” 2022-NMCA-056, ¶ 38
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted) as required by Felts v. CLK
Management, Incorporated, 2011-NMCA-062, 149 N.M. 681, 254 P.3d 124. This Court
then quoted the United States Supreme Court in Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson,
561 U.S. 63, 70 (2010) in opining that “challenges [to] the contract as a whole” are not
“relevant to a court’s determination whether the arbitration agreement at issue is
enforceable.” Juarez, 2022-NMCA-056, ¶ 38.

{13} Here, Plaintiff argues that her general unconscionability challenge to the
arbitration provision in the Agreements is a sufficient challenge to the delegation
provision, relying on Felts and federal cases from the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third and Fourth Circuits. Such reliance is misplaced. Both the federal district court
for New Mexico and this Court, however, have decided against different plaintiffs on
virtually identical language and facts as presented here.

{14} In Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Society v. Moreno, 277 F. Supp. 3d
1191, 1198 (D.N.M. 2017), the court noted that the delegation clause, similar to that at
bar, gave the arbitrator the “exclusive authority to resolve any disputes related to the
existence and/or enforceability of” the arbitration agreement. As here, the plaintiff
challenged the entire arbitration agreement, inter alia, on the ground it was
unconscionable because it only relegated plaintiff’s, but not defendant’s, most likely
causes of action to arbitration. Id. at 1202. Recognizing the authority of Rent-A-Center,
the court found that the party challenging the delegation clause must do so specifically
otherwise the court “‘must treat the delegation clause as valid and enforce it.’” Moreno,
277 F. Supp. 3d at 1212 (quoting Rent-A-Center, 561 U.S. at 70) (alteration omitted).
Finding no such specific objection to the delegation clause, the court dismissed the
plaintiff’s challenge and referred the case to arbitration. See id. at 1227, 1239; see also
Casa Arena Blanca LLC v. Green, No. 1:20-CV-00314-JCH-SCY, 2022 WL 839800, at
*5 (10th Cir. Mar. 22, 2022).

{15} This Court recently considered virtually identical arbitration language in a similar
factual setting in Green v. St. Theresa Healthcare and Rehabilitation Center, LLC, A-1-
CA-40157, mem. op. (N.M. Ct. App. July 13, 2023) (nonprecedential). Indeed, several of
the defendants in the combined cases reviewed by this Court in Green are also
defendants in the present case.1 As here, the arbitration agreement contained the
following language: “[A]ny and all claims or controversies arising out of or in any way
relating to this [a]greement or the patient’s stay at the center . . . including disputes
regarding interpretation and/or enforceability of this [a]greement . . . shall be submitted
to binding arbitration.” Id. ¶ 3 (internal quotation marks omitted).

{16} “[I]n cases where a delegation provision granting an arbitrator the authority to
determine the validity of an arbitration agreement exists, a district court is precluded
from deciding a party’s claim of unconscionability unless that claim is based on the
alleged unconscionability of the delegation provision itself.” Felts, 2011-NMCA-062, ¶

1Some of these defendants include Genesis Healthcare, LLC; Summit Care, LLC; Skilled Healthcare,
LLC; Gen Operations I, LLC; Gen Operations II, LLC; and another subsidiary of Peak Medical.
20. While the parties may agree to delegate these issues to the arbitrator through a
delegation clause, the delegation provision can be found inapplicable only if a party has
made a specific challenge to the delegation clause. Id.

{17} In Green, we began, therefore, by analyzing the delegation clause to determine
what was delegated to the arbitrator. On virtually identical language to that herein, the
Green court recognized that “the delegation clause clearly delegates threshold matters
of arbitrability to arbitration.” A-1-CA-40157, mem. op. ¶ 9. This Court stated, “The next
step in our analysis requires that [the p]laintiffs specifically challenged the delegation
clause in order to give the district court authority to make such threshold
determinations.” Id. ¶ 10. In finding that the district court in one of the combined cases
lacked the necessity and authority to take evidence on the one-sidedness of the
agreement, Judge Hanisee, writing for the Court, reasoned:

       The Jacquez estate argues that delegating language within the damage
       limitation provision reiterating that “all disputes regarding availability of
       compensatory and punitive damages shall be decided by the arbitrator or
       arbitration panel” is sufficient to read its challenge to the damage limitation
       to also attack the delegation provision. We disagree. Looking to the
       Jacquez estate’s response to [the d]efendant’s motion to compel
       arbitration below, the arguments focus on the one-sidedness and ensuing
       substantive unconscionability of the damage limit, as well as challenges to
       a small claims appeal provision and general procedural unconscionability
       that were later abandoned. As we read the Jacquez estate’s arguments
       below, nothing about the delegation provision is alleged as one-sided such
       that the challenges based on unconscionability also meaningfully
       undermine the delegation clause.

Id. ¶ 14. (alterations and omission omitted). Consequently, based on virtually identical
contractual arbitration language as in the case at hand, this Court reversed, stating:

       We decline to read [the d]efendants’ valid, lawful, and repeated insistence
       on delegating threshold issues to their detriment by extending the estate’s
       argument beyond its logical reach. Therefore, we also hold that the district
       court erred in determining that it had the authority to determine the
       Jacquez estate’s threshold issues because of demonstrated clear and
       unmistakable intent to arbitrate within the contract and the estate’s failure
       to issue a specific challenge to the delegation provision.

Id.; see Strausberg, 2013-NMSC-032, ¶ 48.

{18} Given the agreement language in Green and in the present case are the same,
and the Green court ruled that the district court erred in denying arbitration, we must
also reach the same result. Thus, we hold that the district court here also erred in
denying arbitration.
CONCLUSION

{19} For the above stated reasons and based on the legal authority herein, we
reverse and remand with directions to submit the case to arbitration.

{20}   IT IS SO ORDERED.

BRUCE D. BLACK, Judge Pro Tem

WE CONCUR:

J. MILES HANISEE, Judge

KATHERINE A. WRAY, Judge