Court Opinion

ID: 9739955
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:24:11.785681+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:14.957919
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE
¶ 85. (dissenting). In a refrain that has become all too familiar, the majority opinion dutifully repeats the principle that a "warrantless search is per se unreasonable unless one of the 'few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions' justifies the search,"1 and then proceeds to find yet another exception. I agree with U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia that the warrant requirement "has become so riddled with exceptions that it [has become] basically unrecognizable."2 Because the majority opinion recognizes another exception to the warrant requirement, I dissent.
¶ 86. This began as a civil case, a traffic violation. The initial encounter with the police involved the driver's violation of a municipal ordinance prohibiting *202drinking or possessing an open container of an alcoholic beverage in a motor vehicle.3 Here the beverage was beer. The driver was arrested for violating the ordinance, a civil offense.4 No misdemeanor or felony was alleged or suspected at the time of the driver's arrest.
I
¶ 87. The majority holds that the search by law enforcement of the passenger's (the defendant's) duffel bag was justified because it was a search incidental to the driver's arrest. The majority concludes that a "heightened threat to officer safety or a need to discover or preserve evidence justif[ied] the warrantless search" in this case. Majority op. at ¶ 42.
¶ 88. Although the passenger's duffel bag might have contained a weapon dangerous to the officer, which might have justified a search, no weapon was found. No alcoholic beverages were found during the search either. Nevertheless, the search of the duffel bag continued, proceeding beyond looking for a weapon *203or evidence of an open container of an alcoholic beverage. The officer saw a box of plastic bags and when the officer looked inside the box he saw plastic bags containing white powder. Because the officer exceeded the lawful grounds of the search, the evidence should not be admissible under the "search incident to arrest" rule of the Belton5 case as set forth by the majority opinion.
¶ 89. The majority opinion's lengthy discussion and attempted justification of its decision is puzzling given the majority's conclusion that"Belton6 and Fry7 allow the search of 'any containers' situated in the compartment [of the car]." Majority op. at ¶ 55. The majority opinion's discussion and justification suggest that the Belton/Fry rule permitting the search of any container in a vehicle is troubling. Indeed it is.
¶ 90. The U. S. Supreme Court's holding in Bel-ton has been widely criticized. Professor Wayne R. LaFave, whose endorsement of bright-line rules to guide police officers in resolving Fourth Amendment issues the Belton majority quoted with approval,8 concludes that Belton mistakenly allows automobile searches not based on probable cause, and thus creates the risk that "police will make custodial arrests which, they otherwise would not make as a cover for a search which the Fourth Amendment otherwise prohibits."9 A *204similar point was made by Justice William A. Bablitch in his dissent to Fry, 131 Wis. 2d 153, 187, 388 N.W.2d 565 (1986), which I joined, and by U.S. Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens in his dissent in Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 452 (1981).
¶ 91. The U.S. Supreme Court, in both civil liberties and other areas of law, is espousing a new federalism, with diminishing national powers and increasing state influence and importance.10 In keep*205ing with this new federalism, a significant number of state courts have refused to adopt Belton, holding that such a rule is inconsistent with their respective state constitutional guarantees.11 This court should follow these states and refuse to adhere to Belton as a correct interpretation of the Wisconsin Constitution.12
*206¶ 92. This court has a long history of recognizing the vitality of the Declaration of Rights of the Wisconsin Constitution (article I) and of interpreting article I, § 11.13 We should continue our traditional approach of examining our own constitution and our own precedents.14 In drafting the Wisconsin Constitution the framers relied on the bills of rights of other state constitutions, not on the federal bill of rights, to protect Wisconsin citizens against governmental invasion of individual rights. Justice Abram Smith's statement in *2071855 urging the Wisconsin supreme court to look to the Wisconsin Constitution should be heeded by this court today:
The people then made this constitution, and adopted it as their primary law. The people of other states made for themselves respectively, constitutions which are construed by their own appropriate functionaries. Let them construe theirs — let us construe, and stand by ours. Attorney General ex rel. Bashford v. Barstow, 4 Wis. 567 [*785](1855).
¶ 93. It is unfortunate that instead the majority follows the erratic course that the U.S. Supreme Court has set in the field of searches and seizures.
hH f — I
¶ 94. The majority opinion also holds that the search of the passenger's duffel bag was constitutionally permissible because the police had probable cause to believe that they would find the object of their search. Majority op. at ¶¶ 75-77. This holding is not necessary to the opinion, and I disagree with this dictum.
¶ 95. While the police may have had probable cause to believe that open containers of an alcoholic beverage would be found in the vehicle itself, the search of the passenger's duffel bag was unreasonable as a matter of constitutional law and common sense. According to the majority, the proper inquiry is whether "there is reasonable cause to believe that the specific things to be searched for and seized are located" within the container being searched. Majority op. at ¶ 70, quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 302 (1999). Similarly, Professor LaFave emphasizes that "for a warrantless search of a container *208inside a vehicle to be lawful, the probable cause to search the vehicle must be as to objects which. . .could be concealed in the container opened."15
¶ 96. The.circumstances of the present case do not meet the test the majority opinion and Professor LaFave put forth. The officer had already found the remnants of a twelve-pack of beer in the vehicle, containing both open and closed bottles. Majority op. at ¶ 11. It is simply not reasonable to expect to find open bottles of beer inside a duffel bag. The majority opinion concedes at ¶ 51 that it is "unlikely" that the defendant "would store spillable open bottles of beer in a duffel bag as the vehicle is in motion." The majority opinion's candor in this admission is diminished by its subsequent assertion that it was "conceivable" that the defendant put open bottles of beer in the duffel bag once the car was parked. Why would the defendant put open bottles of beer in a duffel bag while leaving a twelve-pack containing open and closed bottles of beer out in plain view in the vehicle? The mind boggles at the idea.
¶ 97. Try as the majority opinion will, its reasoning that the officer was looking for further evidence of the civil offense is not persuasive. The civil offense was completed when the officers found the open containers of alcoholic beverages. There is no showing that multiple containers constitute multiple offenses or increase *209the penalty. I conclude that the officer lacked probable cause to search the duffel bag and that the search cannot be justified as a search for further evidence of the original offense.
III
¶ 98. Today's opinion, together with the decisions in State v. Fry16 and State v. King,17 means that any violation of a civil state or municipal traffic law, no matter how minor, can result in a driver's arrest and the search of every piece of luggage and any container in a car, no matter to whom it belongs and no matter whether there is any reason to believe such a container holds a weapon or evidence.
¶ 99. I doubt that any member of this court would find it reasonable for a police officer to arrest him or her for a civil traffic offense and then search the entire passenger compartment and all the briefcases and luggage therein. The law relating to the scope of warrantless automobile searches has reached a shockingly low standard and is inconsistent with the principle espoused recently by this court in State v. Griffith, 2000 WI 72 at ¶ 70, 236 Wis. 2d 48, 613 N.W.2d 72, that "an individual traveling in an automobile does not lose all legitimate expectations of privacy."
¶ 100. For the reasons stated, I dissent.
*210¶ 101. I am authorized to state that Justices WILLIAM A. BABLITCH and ANN WALSH BRADLEY join this dissent.

 Majority op. at ¶ 29 (quoting State v. Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d 180, 196, 577 N.W.2d 794 (1998)).
Despite espousing this principle clearly at ¶ 29, the majority confusingly suggests differently at ¶ 59.

 California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 581 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).

 The Wisconsin statutes also prohibit such conduct and provide for a civil forfeiture of not more than $100. Wisconsin Stat. §§ 346.935 and 346.95(2m) (1997-98).

 No one challenged the validity of the arrest, and I do not address this issue. See Atwater v. Lago Vista, 195 F.3d 242 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, — S. Ct. — (Mem), 68 USLW 3566, 2000 WL 248718 (U.S., June 26, 2000) (certiorari granted to review whether Fourth Amendment allows custodial arrest for a "misdemeanor traffic offense" under Texas law punishable only by a fine). Cf. State v. Welsh, 108 Wis. 2d 319, 342-45, 321 N.W.2d 245 (1982) (Shirley S. Abrahamson, J., dissenting, expressing doubts about constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 345.22 (1977), authorizing warrantless arrest for a civil traffic offense committed outside the presence of an officer).

 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).

 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981).

 State v. Fry, 131 Wis. 2d 153, 176-77, 388 N.W.2d 565 (1986).

 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981).

 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, § 7.1(c) at 457 (3d ed. 1996).
A recent newspaper article quoted a Wisconsin state trooper as explaining his high number of drug seizures by saying that "[t]he secret is going beyond the traffic stop." Another *204trooper was quoted as saying that, in the search for drugs, the state police are "looking for any and all [traffic] violations. A bad headlight might turn into an arrest of a drunk driver, a drug dealer or a drug user." A third trooper was quoted as saying "I stopped them for not having a working trunk latch." Drug Busts Start as Traffic Stops, Wisconsin State Journal, June 26, 2000, at 3B.
Other academic commentators have also criticized the Bel-ton rule. For a lengthy discussion of the rule and its critics, see State v. Pierce, 642 A.2d 947, 955-58 (N.J. 1994); Commonwealth v. White, 669 A.2d 896, 907-08 (Pa. 1995) (Montemuro, J., concurring).

 For cases in which the U.S. Supreme Court reminded state courts that they are free to interpret their own constitutions as granting more protections to individuals than does the U.S. Constitution, see, e.g, California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43 (1988) (Fourth Amendment); City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 293 (1982) (First Amendment and vagueness); PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) (First Amendment and property rights).
For recent cases invalidating federal statutes as beyond Congress's powers, see, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 120 S.Ct. 1740 (2000) (Violence Against Women Act); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (Gun-Free School Zones Act). See also Sandra Day O'Connor, Our Judicial Federalism, 35 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1, 5-6 (1984-85); Sandra Day O'Connor, Trends in the Relationship Between the Federal and State Courts from the Perspective of a State Court Judge, 22 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. *205801, 803-804 (1981); William J. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489, 491 (1977).

 See, e.g., State v. Brown, 588 N.E.2d 113, 114-16 (Ohio 1992) (declining to follow Belton if Belton means that an arrest for a traffic offense automatically authorizes detailed search of arrestee's vehicle); State v. Pierce, 642 A.2d 947, 956, 959-60 (N.J. 1994) (declining to apply Belton to warrantless arrests for motor-vehicle offenses; discussing other state cases); Commonwealth v. White, 669 A.2d 896, 902 (Pa. 1995) (rejecting Belton rule and adhering to earlier decision limiting the warrantless search of a vehicle incident to an arrest to clothing and areas immediately accessible to the arrestee; see also concurrence at 906-08, discussing other cases).

 I note that the defendant has a strong argument, not addressed by the majority opinion, that because the police did not initiate contact with the driver of the car until he was outside of the car, the Chimel "immediate control" test should apply rather than the Belton/Fry bright-line rule. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). Under Chimel the search would not be reasonable because the search occurred after the driver had already been placed in the squad car. Therefore the arres-tee did not have access to the interior of the car. Many courts have held that the Chimel "immediate control" test applies when the police do not initiate contact with the person arrested until he or she is already outside of the vehicle. See, e.g., United States v. Strahan, 984 F.2d 155, 159 (6th Cir. 1993) (because defendant was approximately thirty feet from his vehicle when arrested, Belton inapplicable and the Chimel test governs; the passenger compartment of the vehicle was not within defendant's "immediate control" at the time of the arrest and thus *206"suppression is proper"); State v. Foster, 905 P.2d 1032, 1037-39 (Idaho 1995) (holding that Belton rule only applies when the defendant is arrested or the police at least make initial contact with the defendant in the vehicle; collecting a number of cases which apply this rule); Lewis v. United States, 632 A.2d 383 (D.C. App. 1983) (the Belton rule allowing search of vehicle upon arrest of occupant is confined to cases where the police confront, or at least signal confrontation, while the person is an occupant of a vehicle). See also Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, § 7.1(a) at 436-37 and n.26 (3d ed. 1996) (citing cases).

 See Jack Stark, The Wisconsin Constitution at 58 (1997) (discussing this court's interpretation of article I, § 3); Joseph A. Ranney, Trusting Nothing to Providence at 513-515 (1999) (Wisconsin was among the most innovative of states interpreting constitutional rights of criminal defendants).

 See, e.g., Jokosh v. State, 181 Wis. 160, 163, 193 N.W. 976 (1923); Hoyer v. State, 180 Wis. 407, 417, 193 N.W. 89 (1923). See also John Sundquist, Construction of the Wisconsin Constitution—Recurrence to Fundamental Principles, 62 Marq. L. Rev. 531 (1979); Comment, The Independent Application of State Constitutional Provisions to Questions of Criminal Procedure, 62 Marq. L. Rev. 596 (1979); Comment, Rediscovering the Wisconsin Constitution: Presentation of Constitutional Questions in State Courts, 1983 Wis. L. Rev. 483; Joseph A. Ranney, Trusting Nothing to Providence at 499-500 (1999).

 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, § 7.2(d) at 506 (3d ed. 1996) (discussing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982), and United States v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991)). See also LaFave, 1999 Supp. § 7.2 at 63 (noting that U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 302 (1999), does not change this analysis, as Houghton only allows searches of those passengers' belongings "capable of containing the object of the search").

 Fry, 131 Wis. 2d 153, 388 N.W.2d 565 (1986).

 State v. King, 142 Wis. 2d 207, 418 N.W.2d 11 (Ct. App. 1987).