Court Opinion

ID: 9658075
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:46:02.528372+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:51.265768
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(dissenting). The principal question presented concerns the construction and application of the pollution-exclusion clause of the comprehensive general liability (cgl) policy, and in particular the phrase "sudden and accidental.”
The majority holds that "sudden and accidental” is unambiguous, that "when considered in its plain and easily understood sense, 'sudden’ is defined with a 'temporal element that joins together conceptually the immediate and the unexpected,’ ”1 and that " '[accidental’ means '[occurring unexpectedly and unintentionally; by chance.’ ”2
Then, focusing solely on the definition of "sudden,” the majority finds that the leak from Upjohn’s underground storage tank "could not possibly be considered 'sudden’ because the release of by-product from tank fa-129 was not unexpected by Upjohn.”3
Upjohn’s daily inventory records indicated that tank fa-129 contained less fluid after the first batch of by-product was pumped into it than it had before. On the basis of this record, the majority finds that "the fact that the tank level on August 16, 1982, measured three inches or eighty gallons precludes this Court from ñnding anything other than that Upjohn must have expected a leak in tank fa-129.”4
The majority finds "as a matter of law” that Upjohn, under the theory of the "imputed-collective-knowledge standard,” possessed sufficient information on the first day of the campaign to "expect” that tank fa-129 was leaking and would *221continue to leak until Upjohn stopped using it.5 The majority concludes that, because the release of the by-product was not "sudden,” in that it was not unexpected, it does not fall within the "sudden and accidental” exception, with the result that coverage under the policy is not triggered.
Two of my colleagues concur in part and dissent in part. They concur in the holdings that the phrase "sudden and accidental” is unambiguous and that the definition of the word "sudden” includes a temporal element. They dissent because "the grant of summary disposition in this case wás inappropriate and because [they are] not convinced that this leak could not possibly, as a matter of law, have been sudden.”6 They would remand for a factual determination of whether the leak was "sudden and accidental.”
I would hold that the phrase "sudden and accidental” is ambiguous, and that it means "unexpected and unintended.” I would, with my dissenting colleagues, remand for trial. I join in their expression of disagreement with the extent to which the majority has acted as finder of fact to determine "as a matter of law” that the leak could not have been "sudden” or "unexpected.”
i
Upjohn annually manufactures the antibiotic clindamycin in two-month-long "campaigns.” Toxic by-products produced during the manufacturing process are pumped into a 10,000-gallon storage tank.7 During the first twenty-two days of the 1982 campaign, virtually all the 15,000 gallons of toxic *222by-product that were pumped into the tank leaked out. The leak was discovered during a monthly audit. According to Upjohn officials, daily tank level readings were taken by employees, recorded on separate sheets of paper, and turned in at the end of each day. These readings were audited monthly.
Immediately upon discovering the leak, Upjohn began a cleanup that included extracting the contaminant from the ground around the tanks and from groundwater. Upjohn provided drinking water for surrounding communities where wells had been contaminated. In 1987, the epa entered a consent order requiring Upjohn to continue monitoring, and in 1989 a cleanup order was entered. Upjohn expended $6.7 million on the cleanup.
Allstate is one of Upjohn’s excess liability insurers.8 While the policy’s indemnification provision reimburses Upjohn for both damages and expenses, and thus affords broader coverage than the standard cgl policy, the pollution exclusion is standard. Upjohn commenced an action against Allstate seeking to obtain coverage under the excess liability policy. The circuit court granted Upjohn’s motion for summary judgment, holding that coverage was not excluded by the pollution exclusion because the leak was "sudden and accidental.”9 The Court of Appeals affirmed.10 This Court granted leave to appeal and ordered this case consolidated with Polkow v Citizens Ins Co of *223America and Protective Nat'l Ins Co of Omaha v City of Woodhaven.11
II
The majority construes and applies the pollution-exclusion clause in the standard cgl policy issued by Allstate. In so doing, the majority asks and answers two questions: First, is "sudden and accidental” ambiguous? Second, if the phrase is unambiguous, what is the meaning?
Addressing the first question, the majority looks to three decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit "which find the terms of the pollution exclusion to be unambiguous.”12 Each of these decisions13 holds that there is a singular, "plain everyday” or commonsense meaning of the word "sudden.” This everyday meaning is found to incorporate a temporal element that joins the concepts of immediacy and the unexpected.14 "Accidental” is defined as "unexpected or unintended.” The majority declares that the three Sixth Circuit decisions are persuasive, adopts their definition of "sudden and accidental,” and holds that the phrase is unambiguous.
III
I would hold that the pollution exclusion,15 in *224particular the phrase "sudden and accidental,” may be construed in more than one way by reasonable laypersons. It is well established in insurance law that a policy term is ambiguous when it is susceptible to more than one reasonable definition.16 The reasonableness of a definition is to be assessed from the layperson’s point of view.17 In the presence of two differing interpretations, only one of which results in liability to the insurer, this Court has consistently declared that the policy should be read to provide rather than to exclude coverage.18 Further, as discussed in part iv, when a policy term is ambiguous, courts may look to *225extrinsic evidence of the term’s meaning.19 In this case, the extrinsic evidence — the drafting history of the pollution-exclusion clause — supports Upjohn’s claim for coverage under the cgl policy.
The policy does not define "sudden and accidental.”20 When determining the meaning of words, definitions in recognized dictionaries may be considered. Authoritative dictionaries differ on the meaning of "sudden.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, p 2285, defines "sudden” in a number of ways: first, as "happening without previous notice . . . occurring unexpectedly . . . not foreseen.” Then it lists synonyms for "sudden” that include "prompt” and "immediate.” The Random House Dictionary of the English Language (2d ed), p 1900, defines "sudden” in a temporal sense as "happening, coming, made, or done quickly.” Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed), p 1284, defines "sudden” as "[hjappening without previous notice or with very brief notice; coming or occurring unexpectedly; unforeseen; unprepared for.”21
*226Judicial efforts to define "sudden and accidental” reflect this diversity of definition. In New Castle Co v Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co, 933 F2d 1162 (CA 3, 1991), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit said that the numerous decisions construing the pollution exclusion appear to be evenly divided between the competing constructions of the phrase, with half the cases holding, as does the majority here, that the clause bars coverage, and half holding that it does not.22
In Just v Land Reclamation, Ltd, 155 Wis 2d 737; 456 NW2d 570 (1990), the Wisconsin Supreme Court found that "sudden and accidental” was ambiguous because the term "sudden” has different meanings. The court noted that Webster’s gives the primary meaning of "sudden” as unexpected, and a secondary meaning as "prompt,” while the Random House Dictionary gives the primary meaning as "quickly” and the secondary meaning as "unexpected.” This disparity, the court observed, is evidence of ambiguity. The court then quoted the Georgia Supreme Court:
"Perhaps, the secondary meaning is so common in the vernacular that it is, indeed, difficult to think of 'sudden’ without a temporal connotation: a sudden flash, a sudden burst of speed, a sudden bang. But, on reñection one realizes that, even in its popular usage, 'sudden’ does not usually describe the duration of an event, but rather its unexpectedness: a sudden storm, a sudden turn in the road, sudden death. Even when used to describe the onset of an event, the word has an elastic temporal connotation that varies with expectations: Suddenly, it’s spring. See also Oxford English Dictionary, at 96 (1933) (giving usage ex-*227ampies dating back to 1340, e.g., 'She heard a sudden step behind her’; and, 'A sudden little river crossed my path As unexpected as a serpent comes.’ ”[23] [Emphasis added.]
The Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that because "sudden and accidental” is reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning, including abrupt and immediate as well as unexpected and unintended, it is ambiguous as used in the pollution-exclusion clause.24
In short, the scope of the pollution-exclusion clause, particularly the phrase "sudden and accidental,” has been the subject of intense and frequent litigation since adoption by the insurance industry in the early 1970s. Such profound disagreement among courts over the construction of the same phrase in standard-form insurance policies itself is evidence of ambiguity.25 See cases^ cited *228in Just and New Castle Co, and see 13 Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice, § 7404, p 337, and cases cited in n 96. The extensive debate concerning the meaning of the phrase indicates that determining the correct construction is not "simple, direct [and] straightforward” as Allstate contends.
IV
Courts that find the phrase "sudden and accidental” to be reasonably susceptible to different meanings, and therefore ambiguous, generally turn to the well-documented drafting and marketing history of the cgl’s pollution exclusion.26 By and large, those courts finding that the phrase is unambiguous do not address this history, even to the extent of acknowledging its existence.27
The cgl policy’s drafting history has been extensively documented in many law review articles, and summarized in many cases. See Just, supra, p 747; Claussen v Aetna Casualty & Surety Co, 259 *229Ga 333; 380 SE2d 686 (1989); New Castle Co, supra. In brief, industrywide revisions of the cgl standard-form policy occurred in 1966 and in 1973. Before 1966, the standard cgl policy covered bodily injury and property damage "caused by accident.” The term "accident” was not defined in the policy, although insurers argued that the term encompassed only "brief catastrophic events” and not "gradual damage.” Courts generally rejected the insurers’ arguments, holding that "accident” encompassed "unintended injury or damage resulting from, among other things, extended exposure to pollutants.”28
In 1966 the insurance industry acknowledged case law and revised the standard language to provide "occurrence based” coverage. The revised standard-form policy defined "occurrence” as
an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which results during the policy period, in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured.
The 1966 standard occurrence-based policy thus explicitly covered property damage resulting from gradual pollution. Courts generally extended coverage to all pollution-related damage, even if it arose from the intentional discharge of pollutants, unless the ultimate loss was either expected or intended. At the time this policy change was implemented, representatives of the insurance industry stated that it was to be viewed as "a broadening of coverage,” and that under the new policy, an insured would be covered " 'until such time as *230[he] becomes aware that the damage was being done.’ ”29
In the early 1970s, the standard-form policy was revised to add the pollution exclusion at issue in this case. Under this provision, only pollution-related losses that arose from occurrences both "sudden” and "accidental” would be covered. One writer explains that the exclusion was designed to decrease claims for losses caused by expected or intended pollution by providing an incentive to improve manufacturing and disposal processes. Unintentional or unexpected damages would still be covered as an "occurrence” under the policy.30
The insurance industry submitted this revision to state regulatory authorities for approval. In West Virginia and Georgia, the dialogue between the insurance industry and the regulatory authority is a matter of public record.
The West Virginia Insurance Commissioner approved the terms of the pollution exclusion only on the basis of representations, made orally and in writing by the Mutual Insurance Rating Bureau, one of the two major insurance trade associations, that they were " 'merely clarifications of existing coverages as defined and limited to the definitions of the term "occurrence,” contained in the respective policies to which said exclusions would be attached.’ ”31
*231In Georgia, the Insurance Rating Board, the other major insurance trade association, represented to the Insurance Commissioner that the clause was intended to shut out only intentional polluters, that the change would have no effect on the vast majority of risks, and that it was intended only as a clarification of existing coverage.32
The insurance industry described the pollution exclusion to its agents as follows:
"In one important respect, the exclusion simply reinforces the definition of occurrence. [The policy] will not cover claims where the ’damage was expected or intended’ by the insured and the exclusion states, in effect, that the policy will cover incidents which are sudden and accidental — unexpected and not intended.”33
It is against this backdrop that at least half the cases construing the pollution-exclusion clause have found it to be ambiguous. Of these, some have read the clause to provide coverage for injury or damage caused by an unintentional and unexpected event. See New Castle Co, supra, and cases there cited. Other cases, which find the clause ambiguous, hold that "sudden and accidental” is simply a restatement of the definition of "occurrence” and that policies incorporating the pollution-exclusion clause cover claims where the alleged injury or harm was "neither expected nor intended.” See Just, supra, and cases there cited.
v
Once the phrase "sudden and accidental” is found to be reasonably susceptible of more than *232one meaning, it is ambiguous as a matter of law. Such ambiguity is resolved in favor of the insured: the exception to the pollution clause, intended by its drafters as a restatement of "occurrence,” covers "unexpected or unintended damage or results.” Taken as a whole, the pollution-exclusion clause and exception thus preclude coverage only when the insured intentionally or recklessly causes injury or damage.
VI
The majority determines that the phrase "sudden and accidental” is unambiguous and properly means "happening quickly and unexpectedly.” It then proceeds to review the evidence. However, rather than relying on the definition it has just adopted, the majority uses the definition that plaintiff Upjohn argues is appropriate, i.e., that "sudden and accidental” means "unexpected and unintended.”
The majority holds that the release of toxic material at issue "could not possibly be considered 'sudden’ because the release of by-product from tank fa-129 was not unexpected by Upjohn.”34 The majority thus resolves the issue solely on the basis of the "unexpected” component of the term "sudden,” despite its determination, following United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co v Star Fire Coals, Inc, 856 F2d 31 (CA 6, 1988), that "sudden” could not be defined without reference to its temporal component.35
The majority assumes the role of factfinder in applying "sudden and accidental” to the "facts.” The majority focuses on whether the leak was *233"unexpected,” and concludes, as a matter of law, that it was not. That conclusion is flawed, because the majority first fails to distinguish between raw data and knowledge, second, misapplies agency principles, and, third, turns a question of fact into a question of law.
The majority states, "as a matter of law, that the Upjohn Company had sufficient information available to it on August 16, 1982, to expect that a chemical by-product was escaping from a leak in tank fa-129.”36 Upjohn may be charged with this expectation, the majority says, because, under the "imputed-collective-knowledge standard,” information collected by the employees who recorded the level of fluid in the tank was immediately imputed to the corporation.37 The leak was expected because the company knew, on the first day the tank was used on the clindamycin manufacturing run, that fluid levels in the tank went down instead of up after the chemical was pumped into the tank.
The "imputed-collective-knowledge” standard employed by the majority stems from agency principles applicable to knowledge attributable to a corporation. In Gordon Sel-Way, Inc v Spence Bros, Inc, 177 Mich App 116, 124; 440 NW2d 907 (1989),38 cited by the majority for this "imputed-collective-knowledge” standard, the Court of Appeals considered what a corporation is deemed to know and when it is deemed to know it. The Court said that one of the burdens attendant upon the corporate form is that the law imputes the knowledge of individual officers and employees at a certain level of responsibility to the corporation. This principle speaks to persons representing a corporation who, acting in the scope of their em*234ployment and authority, learn or do something on behalf of the corporation.
According to Upjohn, the tank level inventory record, consisting of the separate slips of paper on which the daily readings were recorded, was audited on a monthly basis. The records covering the 1982 clindamycin campaign were audited, pursuant to standard Upjohn procedures, between September 1 and September 3, 1982. Only on September 3, 1982, did Upjohn employees at the appropriate level of responsibility determine that a leak had occurred. Further, Upjohn executives testified on deposition that tank pa-129 was specially manufactured of materials not subject to corrosion by clindamycin by-products.
Upjohn executives also testified on deposition that because tank pa-129 was part of a "tank farm,” a reduced tank level did not necessarily indicate a leak because materials could have been accidentally or unintentionally diverted to other tanks, production could have been interrupted, or materials may have been intentionally removed from the tank for disposal.
In conclusion, the majority errs in finding that Upjohn must have known on the first day of the clindamycin manufacturing campaign that tank fa-129 was leaking. What Upjohn possessed between August 16 and September 3, 1982, was raw, unanalyzed data, not knowledge. Upjohn could indeed have audited and analyzed the data and drawn conclusions on a daily basis. Those conclusions, if known to a person "at a certain level of responsibility,” might be imputed to the corporation. The adequacy of Upjohn’s procedures for auditing and analyzing the fluid level of the tank is a question of reasonableness under the circumstances, and therefore is not a question of law.
I would reverse and remand for trial.

 Riley, J., ante, p 207.

 Id., pp 207-208.

 Id., p 209 (emphasis added).

 Id., p 212 (emphasis added).

 Id., p 213.

 Cavanagh, C.J., ante, p 217.

 This tank was specially manufactured of materials that would not be corroded by waste products.

 Other coverage included property insurance, which reimbursed $3 million for cleanup costs, and primary liability insurance, which reimbursed almost $1 million.

 The circuit court also held that, while Upjohn was not entitled to reimbursement for damage to its own property it could recover for expenditures, including cleanup costs, to repair damage to the property of third parties, including groundwater, which is governmental property.

 178 Mich App 706; 444 NW2d 813 (1989).

 435 Mich 862 (1990).

 Riley, J., ante, p 207.

 United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co v Star Fire Coals, Inc, 856 F2d 31 (CA 6, 1988); United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co v Murray Ohio Mfg Co, 875 F2d 868 (CA 6, 1989); FL Aerospace v Aetna Casualty & Surety Co, 897 F2d 214 (CA 6, 1990).

 According to Star Fire, supra, p 34, "it is [not] possible to define 'sudden’ without reference to a temporal element that joins together conceptually the immediate and the unexpected.” (Emphasis added.)

 The pollution exclusion states as follows:
*224This policy shall not apply:—
(f) to bodily injury or property damage arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalies, toxic chemicals, liquids or gaseous waste materials or other irritants, contaminants or pollutants into or upon land, the atmosphere or any watercourse or body of water; but this exclusion does not apply if such discharge, dispersal, release or escape is sudden and accidental.

 See, e.g., Hecla Mining Co v New Hampshire Ins Co, 811 P2d 1083, 1091-1092 (Colo, 1991); Morgan v Prudential Ins Co, 86 Wash 2d 432; 545 P2d 1193 (1976); Prete v Merchants Property Ins Co, 159 W Va 508; 223 SE2d 441 (1976); Shadbolt v Farmers Ins Exchange, 275 Or 407; 551 P2d 478 (1976); Garriguenc v Love, 67 Wis 2d 130; 226 NW2d 414 (1975); Alvarez v Southwestern Life Ins Co, 86 NM 300; 523 P2d 544 (1974); Clark v Prudential Ins Co, 204 Kan 487; 464 P2d 253 (1970); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co v Westchester Fire Ins Co, 276 NC 348; 172 SE2d 518 (1970); English v Old American Ins Co, 426 SW2d 33 (Mo, 1968).

 See, e.g., Marston v American Employers Ins Co, 439 F2d 1035 (CA 1, 1971) (Puerto Rican law); Morgan v Prudential Ins Co, n 16 supra; C & H Plumbing & Heating, Inc v Employers Mutual Casualty Co, 264 Md App 510; 287 A2d 238 (1972); Reserve Ins Co v Staats, 9 Ariz App 410; 453 P2d 239 (1969); Logan v Victory Life Ins Co, 175 Kan 88; 259 P2d 165 (1953).

 Powers v DAIIE, 427 Mich 602; 398 NW2d 411 (1986); Ebert v Prudential Ins Co, 338 Mich 320; 61 NW2d 164 (1953); VanZanten v Nat’l Casualty Co, 333 Mich 28; 52 NW2d 581 (1952); Francis v Scheper, 326 Mich 441; 40 NW2d 214 (1949); Hooper v State Mutual Life Assurance Co, 318 Mich 384; 28 NW2d 331 (1947); Pietrantonio v Travelers Ins Co, 282 Mich 111; 275 NW 786 (1937); Boesky Bros Corp v USF&G Co, 267 Mich 628; 255 NW 307 (1934).

 Chicago Bd Options Exchange v Connecticut Gen’l Life Ins Co, 713 F2d 254 (CA 7, 1983); Aetna Ins Co v Getchell Steel Treating Co, 395 F2d 12 (CA 8, 1968); Great West Casualty Co v Truck Ins Exchange, 358 F2d 883 (CA 10, 1966); Fidelity & Casualty Co of New York v Seven Provinces Ins Co, 345 F2d 227 (CA 6, 1965); Union Ins Society v William Gluckin & Co, 353 F2d 946 (CA 2, 1965); Gribaldo, Jacobs, Jones & Associates v Agrippina Versicherunges AG, 3 Cal 3d 406; 91 Cal Rptr 6; 476 P2d 406 (1970); Transport Indemnity Co v Dahlen Transport, 281 Minn 253; 161 NW2d 546 (1968); Prince v Universal Underwriters Ins Co, 143 NW2d 708 (ND, 1966). See also Vigil v Badger Mutual Ins Co, 363 Mich 380; 109 NW2d 793 (1961).

 Some courts have found that the failure of an insurance policy to define crucial terms may in itself render those terms ambiguous. See, e.g., Buckeye Union Ins Co v Liberty Solvents & Chemicals, 17 Ohio App 3d 127, 132-133; 477 NE2d 1227 (1984); State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins Co v Shelton, 368 SW2d 734 (Ky, 1963).

 As urged by Allstate, the sequence in which definitions of a word appear in different dictionaries may correspond to the date of a particular definition’s first use rather than its currency or predominance. See Just v Land Reclamation, Ltd, 155 Wis 2d 737, 760; 456 NW2d 570 (1990) (Steinmetz, J., dissenting). Nonetheless, such differences in meaning are indicative of ambiguity.

 The cases are categorized and cited in ns 60 and 61, p 1195. See also Hecla Mining Co, n 16 supra, p 1091.

 155 Wis 2d 737, 745-746; 456 NW2d 570, quoting Claussen v Aetna Casualty & Surety Co, 259 Ga 333, 335; 380 SE2d 686 (1989).

 The Supreme Courts of Georgia and Colorado agree. Claussen, n 23 supra, p 335; Hecla Mining Co, n 16 supra.

 Several courts have concluded that the substantial conflict in authority regarding the meaning, even if not dispositive, suggests that there is indeed ambiguity. These include United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co v Thomas Solvent Co, 683 F Supp 1139, 1155-1156 (WD Mich, 1988) (Michigan law), Just, n 21 supra, 759-760, Grinnell Mutual Reinsurance Co v Wasmuth, 432 NW2d 495, 499 (Minn App, 1988), New Castle Co, supra, pp 1193-1194, and Hecla Mining Co, n 16 supra, p 21. The same conclusion has been reached in cases construing other insurance policy terms: Michigan Mutual Ins Co v Combs, 446 NE2d 1001, 1007 (Ind App, 1983) ("respectable lines of authority producing conflicting interpretations of the word 'upon’ ” contribute to a finding that the term is ambiguous as used in automobile policies); General Credit Corp v Imperial Casualty & Indemnity Co, 167 Neb 833, 843-844; 95 NW2d 145 (1959) (a clause requiring a mortgagee to pay premiums on a real-property policy could be read as either a condition or a covenant; conflicting authority indicates ambiguity); Olmstead & Co v Metropolitan Life Ins Co, 118 Ohio St 421, 426-427; 161 NE 276 (1928) (same); Gould Morris Electric Co v Atlantic Fire Ins Co, 229 NC 518, 520; 50 SE2d 295 (1948) (the phrase "collision of the conveyance on which the goods are carried” was ambiguous because it was reasonably susceptible of two meanings, as reflected in conflicting authority).

 I acknowledge that, as Allstate contended at oral argument, the drafting history of the pollution-exclusion clause was not made part of the record. I note, however, that industry representations were in some instances a condition precedent to approval of the revised phrasing by state insurance commissioners and other regulatory bodies, and that the proceedings leading to approval are matters of public record of which judicial notice may be appropriate. Courts that have considered the drafting history as extrinsic evidence of the meaning of "sudden and accidental” have done so without addressing the question whether the drafting history should have been made part of the record. If Allstate were to offer evidence that the version of the drafting history set forth here is inaccurate or incomplete, Allstate would be entitled to an opportunity to present such evidence.

 But see Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co v Belleville Industries, Inc, 407 Mass 675, 682; 555 NE2d 568 (1990), where the Massachusetts Supreme Court found that the term "sudden” unambiguously carries a temporal component. Only after finding the term unambiguous did the court state that "[bjecause the word 'sudden’ in the pollution exclusion clause is not ambiguous, we have no need to consider the drafting history of that clause or any statements made by insurance company representatives concerning the intention of its drafters.”

 This sketch of the drafting history is taken from the courts’ summaries in Claussen, Just, and New Castle Co.

 Lyman J. Baldwin, Jr., Secretary of Underwriting, Insurance Company of North America, quoted by Just, supra, p 749.

 Greenlaw, The cgl policy and the pollution exclusion clause: Using the drafting history to raise the interpretation out of the quagmire, 23 Colum J of L & Soc Prob 233 (1990).

 The Mutual Insurance Rating Bureau, which assisted in the draft of the exclusion endorsement, in a submission to the West Virginia Commissioner of Insurance, explained that the intent of the clause was to clarify " 'that the definition of occurrence excludes damages that can be said to be expected or intended.’ ” [Just, supra, pp 750-751.]

 Claussen, supra, pp 335-336.

 Excerpted from The Fire, Casualty & Surety Bulletin, as quoted in Just, supra, p 752 (emphasis added).

 Riley, J., ante, p 209.

 See n 1.

 Ante, p 212 (emphasis added).

 Id., p 215.

 Currently pending before this Court on other issues.