Court Opinion

ID: 9774082
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:08:20.13795+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:01.739899
License: Public Domain

SAM BASS, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent for the following reasons.
On February 23, 1987, appellant pled no contest in the 176th District Court to aggravated sexual assault. The transcript contains a “guilty” plea form signed by appellant and his attorney. In this form, appellant waived certain of his constitutional rights, in that he agreed to stipulate to the evidence against him, and he judicially confessed to the allegations in the indictment. The “guilty” plea form also contains an agreed recommendation on punishment of 10 years deferred adjudication. The trial court deferred adjudication of guilt and placed appellant on probation for 10 years. The hearing on the State’s motion to adjudicate guilt occurred in the 248th District Court after the cause had been transferred to that court.
Appellant argues he is entitled to a reversal and a new trial because he is unable, through no fault of his own, to obtain a statement of facts from the 1987 plea proceeding.
Under Tex.R.App.P. 50(e), if an appellant timely requests a statement of facts, but the court reporter’s notes and records have been lost or destroyed without appellant’s fault, the appellant is entitled to a new trial irrespective of a showing of harm. See also Dunn v. State, 733 S.W.2d 212, 215 (Tex.Crim.App.1987). The burden lies with appellant to show due diligence in requesting the statement of facts and that his failure to obtain the statement of facts was not due to negligence, laches, or other fault of him or his counsel. Id.
The issue is whether appellant has carried his burden of showing due diligence in obtaining the statement of facts from the 1987 plea proceeding. See Dunn, 733 S.W.2d at 215.
The majority opinion holds that the 248th District Court’s order, appointing appellate counsel for appellant and ordering the court reporter of the 248th District Court to prepare a statement of facts, placed a duty on the court reporter of the 248th at least to organize the preparation of the record, and that, in light of the judge’s order, timely notice to the official court reporter was timely notice to all court reporters taking testimony under the same cause. The majority opinion holds that appellant is entitled to a new trial by the court reporter’s failure to fulfill this duty.
However, I have found nothing in either the appellate rules or the statutes that would impose such a duty on the court reporter of the 248th. Instead, the rules place the burden of presenting a statement of facts showing error requiring reversal on appellant. Tex.R.App.P. 50(d), 53(a). When an appellant has properly requested the statement of facts, and it is unavailable through no fault of his own, then he is entitled to a new trial under Tex.R.App.P. 50(e).
I would hold that appellant had the burden of making a proper request to the former court reporter of the 176th District Court for the statement of facts from his 1987 plea proceeding before he can complain about the missing statement of facts on appeal. Tex.R.App.P. 53(a) (places the burden on appellant to make a written request to the official court reporter designating the portion of the evidence and other proceedings).
In this case, the trial court’s judgment adjudicating guilt was signed on July 10, 1990. Because appellant did not file a motion for new trial, the last day he could have timely perfected his appeal and timely requested a statement of facts from the original plea proceeding was August 9, 1990. Tex.R.App.P. 41(b)(1), 53(a). Thus, assuming the affidavit of the former court reporter of the 176th is properly before this Court, the record would reflect that appellant did not request the former court reporter of the 176th to prepare a statement of facts from the 1987 plea proceeding until over two months after the last day he could *844have timely requested it. Because he did not timely request the statement of facts, he has not carried his burden of showing due diligence in obtaining it, and, as a result, he is not entitled to a new trial. Dunn, 733 S.W.2d at 215; Tex.R.App.P. 50(e).
In its brief, the State cites, as contrary authority to its position on appeal, the cases of Martinez v. State, 802 S.W.2d 105 (Tex.App.— Amarillo 1990, no pet.), and McLennan v. State, 796 S.W.2d 324 (Tex.App.— San Antonio 1990, pet. ref d) (op. on reh’g). These cases, like the present case, are deferred adjudication cases where an adjudication of guilt was later entered upon an earlier guilty or nolo contendere plea. Martinez, 802 S.W.2d at 106; McLennan, 796 S.W.2d at 325. In both of these cases, the appellants made a timely, written request to the court reporters, who recorded the original plea proceedings, for the statement of facts from the original plea proceedings. Martinez, 802 S.W.2d at 106; McLennan, 796 S.W.2d at 325-26. The convictions were reversed because the appellants carried their burden of showing an inability to obtain the statement of facts from the original plea proceedings through no fault of their own. Martinez, 802 S.W.2d at 106; McLennan, 796 S.W.2d at 326-27.
The majority opinion says that Martinez and McLennan control the result in this case despite the factual distinctions that exist. However, I would hold that the factual differences between those cases and this case would compel a different result than that reached by the majority. In Martinez and McLennan, the appellants carried their burden of showing due diligence in obtaining the statement of facts; in this case, appellant has not.
In addition, the affidavit, attached as an exhibit to appellant’s brief, from the former court reporter of the 176th District Court has not been properly made a part of the record on appeal, and is, therefore, not before this Court. See Tex.R.App.P. 50(a), 55(b). The record before this Court shows that appellant made no request to the court reporter of the 176th District Court for the statement of facts from the 1987 plea proceeding. This is another reason appellant is not entitled to a new trial.
Additionally, the record reflects that appellant pled guilty; the transcript shows a guilty plea form signed by appellant and his attorney; appellant waived his constitutional rights, stipulated to the evidence against him, and judicially confessed to the allegations in the indictment.
Under these circumstances, a statement of facts from the guilty plea proceeding is completely unnecessary for this appeal since appellant raises no points of error regarding ineffectiveness of counsel, the validity of his plea, or the sufficiency of the evidence.
On the record before this Court, appellant has not carried his burden of showing due diligence in obtaining the statement of facts from the 1987 plea proceeding, and that his inability to obtain the statement of facts was through no fault of his own. Dunn, 733 S.W.2d at 215. Therefore, appellant is not entitled to a reversal under Tex.R.App.P. 50(e).
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the conviction.