Court Opinion

ID: 9450088
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 16:34:50.453811+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:08.715435
License: Public Domain

J. SPENCER BELL, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I must dissent from the opinion of the majority since in my view the district court’s finding that Post “intelligently, understandingly, and competently waived his right to counsel” is without support in the record.1 The Supreme Court has held that the federal standard of waiver, as established in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1024 (1938),2 is binding on the states under the fourteenth amendment. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 82 S.Ct. 884, 8 L.Ed.2d 70 (1962). And while the constitutional right to the assistance of counsel “does not justify forcing counsel upon an accused who wants none,” Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 161, 78 S.Ct. 191, 195 (1957), it nonetheless remains true that a high and serious duty is imposed upon a trial judge to determine whether an accused has competently and intelligently waived this constitutional right. As Mr. Justice Black has said:
“To discharge this duty properly in light of the strong presumption against waiver of the constitutional right to counsel, a judge must investigate as long and as thoroughly as the circumstances of the case before him demand. The fact that an accused may tell him that he is informed of his right to counsel and desires to waive this right does not automatically end the judge’s responsibility. To be valid such waiver must be made with an apprehension of the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses included within them, the range of allowable punishments thereunder, possible defenses to the charges and circumstances in mitigation thereof, and all other facts essential to a broad understanding of the whole matter. A judge can make certain that an accused’s professed waiver of counsel is understandingly and wisely made only from a penetrating and comprehensive examination of all the circumstances under which such a plea is tendered.” Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723-24, 68 S.Ct. 316, 323, 92 L.Ed. 309 (1948).
This duty is imposed on federal and state judges alike, and although Von *744Moltke v. Gillies, supra, involved a purported waiver of counsel in a federal court, the above cited language applies equally well to the case before us.
I think the record, even when given a reading most favorable to the contentions of the State, clearly indicates that the trial judge failed to discharge adequately this duty. With the exception of Post, the only witness to what transpired in the courtroom with respect to the appointment of counsel was the then Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, George M. Scott, who prepared the indictments. Pertinent portions of Scott’s testimony at the plenary hearing are quoted below:
“Q. I would like for you to tell the Court, Mr. Scott, what you recall about the question of whether he [Post] was offered counsel by the presiding judge at that time.
“A. Judge Lewis H. Miller was the presiding judge, and 1 do recall, with clarity, that the judge followed his usual custom, and did ask the defendant, Burton Junior Post, if he had an attorney, and asked him if he wanted an attorney, and the defendant replied with some decision in the matter, no indecision, certainly, that he didn’t want an attorney, that he wanted to plead guilty. (Emphasis added.)
“Q. And then what procedure did the judge follow after that in disposing of the cases pending against him? (Emphasis added.)
“A. The judge read the indictments in turn to the defendant and after reading them asked for a plea and in each case he responded his plea was guilty, except that, as I recall, in the case of statutory rape, charging the defendant with having sexual relations with Peggy Hosey, being a female under the age of 16 years, he pled not guilty to that charge.
“Q. Do you remember whether or not the judge made any explanation of the possible sentence on any of these indictments to the defendant?
“THE WITNESS: You mean before he asked him for a plea ?
“Q. That’s right.
“A. Judge Miller — again I don’t recall the specific language used— but he told him that he was charged with a number of very serious offenses, and I believe that he did tell him that the rape charge carried a possible death penalty. I believe that to be true.”
On cross-examination, after making the witness Scott repeat the above, Post’s attorney asked him:
“Q. You have testified that there was an offer from Judge Miller of a right to counsel and a subsequent refusal of that right by the defendant, Burton Post, is that all?
“THE WITNESS: What do you mean ‘Is that all?’ That’s what I testified to, yes.
“Q. Is that all that went on as far as the refusal and the offer?
“A. Well, Judge Miller didn’t argue with him. He asked him if he wanted a lawyer and he said no, and he started the arraignment— started reading the indictments.” (Emphasis added.)
Scott was the State’s chief witness at the plenary hearing, and was characterized by the district court as leaving “nothing to be desired as a witness.” The district court below and the majority here view Scott’s testimony as establishing that the trial judge, prior to accepting Post’s refusal of counsel, advised Post that he was charged with a number of serious offenses, including rape, which carried a possible death sentence. They draw the inference that Post rejected counsel only after the above remarks about the seriousness of the State’s charges were addressed to him from the bench. Although the matter is *745not entirely unambiguous, I think the more accurate reading of Scott’s testimony is that the trial judge first accepted Post’s refusal of counsel and thereafter warned Post of the serious nature of the charges against him. Thus, the sequence of events, as I read Scott’s testimony, is that the trial judge offered Post counsel; Post refused the offer; the trial judge then remarked on the seriousness of the charges, with emphasis on the rape charge; and lastly read down the list of indictments, accepting Post’s pleas to each.
But even if I am mistaken as to the import of Scott’s testimony, and even if the trial judge made an offer of counsel to Post after warning him of the serious nature of the State’s charges, this would by no means comply with the protective duty imposed on a trial judge in Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 68 S.Ct. 316 (1948). Here, the trial judge faced a twenty-five year old offender, whose formal education ceased after the eighth grade, and who had spent most of his adolescent and post-adolescent years in state mental institutions. Add to this Post’s very obvious desire to accept all blame in an effort to exculpate his female companion and accomplice, Peggy Ann Hosey. It would be difficult to imagine a defendant more in need of legal assistance. Post was entitled to be informed of his possible defense of insanity in view of his history; of the probable effect that his self-sacrificing guilty pleas and confessions might or might not have on his accomplice’s fate — after all she was only fourteen years old. Only after a thorough understanding of these matters should a man of Post’s intelligence and background have been allowed to decide whether to proceed without counsel. I think the trial judge failed to make the “penetrating and comprehensive examination of all the circumstances” that Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 724, 68 S.Ct. 316, 323 (1948), required. The trial judge having failed to do so, I find untenable the district court’s finding that Post’s waiver of counsel was competently and intelligently made. I would reverse.

. The State concedes that Post, who had been charged with thirteen serious felonies, was constitutionally entitled to legal assistance. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963). The question before the district court, therefore, was whether Post had effectively waived this constitutional guarantee at his state trial.

. “If the accused, however, is not represented by counsel and has not competently and intelligently waived his constitutional right, the Sixth Amendment stands as a jurisdictional bar to a valid conviction * * Waiver had been defined by the Court earlier in the opinion as an “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” 304 U.S. at 464, 58 S.Ct. at 1023.