Court Opinion

ID: 9855802
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:31:22.203918+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:37:04.705462
License: Public Domain

BLATZ, Chief Justice
(concurring specially)-
While I concur in the judgment of the court, I write separately to emphasize the limits of the holding in this case. The facts of this case presented a very close call on the Fifth Amendment issue. Although the police tactics in this case did not meet the constitutional test for coercion, the police indicated a willingness to use trickery to circumvent the requirements of Miranda which is not to be condoned. Additionally, I stress that the court’s decision does not determine the legality of the police conduct in this ease under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, article I, section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution, or the related federal and state communications statutes, as these issues were not presented to this court.1 Police are cautioned that the prac*727tice of placing suspects together and secretly taping their conversations may violate the suspects’ privacy rights under these constitutional and statutory provisions.2 Without deciding the issue, it would seém disingenuous for the police to develop investigatory practices such as the covert taping in the instant case, the success of which depends upon the privacy expectations of individuals, and then later claim that these expectations are not reasonable.

. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution protect "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” These protections are for people, not places. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351, 88 S.Ct. 507, 511, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). To obtain Fourth Amendment protection, an individual must have an actual expectation of privacy and that expectation must be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Id. at 361, 88 S.Ct. at 516 (Harlan, J., concurring). The federal Wire Interception and Interception of Oral Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et. seq. (1997) and the state’s *727Privacy of Communications Act, Minn.Stat. ch. 626A (1996) have adopted this standard in defining oral communications which are protected from unauthorized interception or taping. An oral communication is "any oral communications uttered by a person exhibiting, an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2), Minn.Stat. § 626A.01, subd. 4.

. See Carol M. Bast and Joseph B. Sanborn, Jr., Not Just Any Sightseeing Tour: Surreptitious Taping in a Patrol Car, 32 Crim. L. Bull. 123 (1996). This article discusses the applicability of Katz and the related federal and state communications statutes to conversations held in police cars. It concludes that such conversations are protected because they are communications which an ordinary person would believe are privileged. Id. at 132. Significantly, the article points out that this issue affects not only arres-tees, but "the unsuspecting private citizen seeking shelter or simply a place of refuge” in the back seat of a closed police car. Id. at 133. Indeed, a determination on this issue Would even affect whether police officers themselves have a right to privacy in their squad cars to protect them from secret taping by their superiors.