Court Opinion

ID: 9457450
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 20:22:20.84222+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:21.387142
License: Public Domain

LEVENTHAL, Circuit Judge
(dissenting in part):
I respectfully dissent from the reversal of Mitchell’s conviction under 18 U. S.C. § 1201.
When Mitchell’s counsel complained there was no evidence that Mitchell knew the kidnapping would cross the state line, the trial judge said this would be taken care of in the charge on aiding and abetting.
His charge instructed the jury on the elements of the substantive offenses of robbery; assault with a dangerous weapon ; unauthorized use of a motor vehicle; and violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (“the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he [the defendant] knowingly transported in interstate commerce a person who had been unlawfully seized ■X- * -K”)
He then turned to the instruction on aiding and abetting, which he told the jury applies to each of the four counts and offenses. This charge instructed the jury that a defendant is guilty of these crimes and is punishable as a principal, if he “advises, incites or connives at an offense” or “aids or abets the principal offender” even though he did not personally commit each of the acts constituting the offense and was not even personally present. He continued, “[A] person aids or abets another in the commission of a crime if he knowingly associates himself in some way with a criminal venture with the intent to commit the crime, if he participates in it as something he wishes to bring about and seeks by some action of his own to make the venture succeed.”
Defense counsel did not object to any part of the charge. The charge on aiding and abetting is in the language of Judge L. Hand in United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938), quoted with approval in Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619, 69 S.Ct. 766 (1949).
The sufficiency of the evidence on the charge that Mitchell aided and abetted the violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201 is established by the testimony of the prosecution witnesses indicating that it was Mitchell who masterminded the crime and instructed Matthews to get rid of the victim. Mitchell got out of the auto after they had been proceeding eastward on Gallatin Avenue, when they came to the intersection of New Hampshire Avenue. No point in the District of Columbia is far from the Maryland line; this point was a couple of miles away.
*991The jury could rightly infer Mitchell subjectively contemplated that the victim would not be released by Matthews within the limits of urban Washington, situated as it is with ready access to telephones and hence the police, but in a more rural or at least suburban area, which, as the jurors would know, meant Maryland.
I think the jury verdict was also justified by an inference that Mitchell was a knowing participant not only in the beginning of the kidnapping, but in the intent that the victim be turned loose wherever Matthews thought suitable for purposes of their concerted action, which I think comprehends knowing participation in a release across the nearby state line if Matthews thought this best. A different problem would be presented if Mitchell testified or otherwise contended that Matthews somehow departed from the venture as understood by Mitchell. Nothing of that kind is in the case. Mitchell is contending that although he was knowingly involved in violation of the law prohibiting kidnapping within the District, D.C.Code § 22-2101, exposing him to the same sentence, the prosecutor did not prove he subjectively “knew” there would be a crossing of the nearby border.1 Under the circumstances I feel no sense of injustice as to either the charge or verdict.
Defense counsel would have been entitled to ask the judge to amplify his general charge by explaining that the fact that Mitchell had knowingly associated in the kidnapping venture did not necessarily establish that he had knowingly associated in a venture to transport the victim across the state line. But the charge was both standard in the jurisdiction and accurate, and the failure to provide an amplification that was not requested does not condemn it.
If such a refinement had been requested by defense counsel the prosecutor would have been entitled to an amplification that defendant would be guilty of violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201 even though he did not subjectively contemplate the prospect that interstate lines would be crossed, if either of two conditions Were found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt—
(a) that the two men were acting in concert, which is a conspiracy, and that the substantive offense (of kidnapping and knowing crossing of state lines) “was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy and as a part of it,” 2 or
(b) that Mitchell was responsible for aiding and abetting Matthews in the offense (of kidnapping plus knowing crossing of state lines) because there was a “community of unlawful intent” and the act is one “which in the ordinary course of things was the natural or probable consequence of the crime [of kidnapping] that he advised or commanded, although such consequence [of crossing state lines] may not have been intended by him.” 3
In view of this learning, Mitchell obviously was not entitled to a directed verdict at the time he sought one. The problem now raised by Mitchell could plainly have been obviated by refinement of the instruction. A question arises as to whether he did not have to renew the motion for directed verdict after the giving of the instructions, on the ground— now accepted by the majority — that there was not sufficient evidence to show that the defendant knowingly associated himself with the criminal venture with the intent to commit the crime. I do not *992reach that issue because in my view the evidence was sufficient.
I would, however, have accompanied an affirmance of the conviction with a notation that I was disturbed by the cumulative sentences, in which Mitchell’s sentence for robbery, 5 to 15 years, was heightened by an additional sentence for kidnapping of 10 to 30 years, when the transportation of the victim was done in a completion of the robbery — with no violence or ransom. But on this I would have remanded to the district judge for further consideration of the sentence.
I respectfully dissent from the reversal.
On Petition for Rehearing
Opinion filed by FAHY, Senior Circuit Judge.
Concurring opinion filed by LEVEN-THAL, Circuit Judge.
FAHY, Senior Circuit Judge: The petition of appellant Matthews for rehearing has led us to reconsider our affirmance of his convictions. In United States v. Hammonds, 138 U.S.App.D.C. 166, 425 F.2d 597 (1970), involving a similar problem of ineffective assistance of counsel, the court reversed Hammonds’ convictions because of constitutional error there found. In that case as in this the conduct of the same counsel was involved, and the same kind of casual summation to the jury occurred. Moreover, the evidence of guilt in Hammonds was no less strong than the evidence of guilt in Matthews’ case.
The opinion of the court in Hammonds does refer to instances of claimed ineffectiveness, aside from the summation, which are not present to the same degree in Matthews’ case. Such differences, however, do not enable us sufficiently to distinguish the two cases, in both of which constitutional error was found in the conduct of counsel. An affirmance here, therefore, in reliance upon the rule of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), and Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 23 L.Ed.2d 284 (1969), notwithstanding the constitutional error, would weaken the value and importance of Hammonds. This we are unwilling to do. Upon reconsideration of Matthews’ case we accordingly are persuaded that because of the ineffective assistance of his counsel his convictions should be reversed.
We deny the petition for rehearing of Mitchell.
Appropriate judgments will be entered.

. Appellant Mitcliell contends he did not possess “any attitude at all, positive or negative” toward the element of knowing interstate transportation of the kidnap victim.

. Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 618, 69 S.Ct. 766 (1949).

. McClanahan v. United States, 230 F.2d 919, 924 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied 352 U.S. 824, 77 S.Ct. 33, 1 L.Ed.2d 47 (1956) ; Bussell v. United States, 222 F.2d 197, 199 (5th Cir. 1955).