Court Opinion

ID: 9942741
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-21 20:04:18.368392+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:42:23.723495
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/21/24 In re Ruby C. CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

In re RUBY C., a Person Coming                            B323925
Under the Juvenile Court Law.                             (Los Angeles County
                                                          Super. Ct. No. 22CCJP01703)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.

MICHELLE C.,

         Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Linda L. Sun, Judge. Affirmed.
     Emery El Habiby, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Melania Vartanian, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                             ******

      Michelle C. (mother) appeals jurisdictional findings and
dispositional orders involving her daughter Ruby C. (born August
2007), who was 14 years old when these proceedings commenced.
Mother also challenges the juvenile court’s preliminary finding
that the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C.
§ 1901 et seq.) and related California statutes are inapplicable.
We find no error and affirm the orders of the court.

         COMBINED FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
                         BACKGROUND
The family
       Ruby lived in San Bernardino County with mother, her
stepfather, and three half-siblings: Audrey (born July 2011),
Solomon (born August 2013), and Gwyneth (born July 2018).1
       Ruby’s father, Patrick F. (father), resides in Glendale,
California.2 Mother had custody and father had monitored
visitation.

1     Audrey, Solomon, and Gwyneth have a different father. A
cross-report to San Bernardino County Child Protective Services
was made as to these children. They are not subjects of this
appeal.
2     Father is not a party to this appeal.

                                 2
Initial referral and investigation
       A social worker from the Los Angeles County Department
of Children and Family Services (DCFS) responded to the
Glendale Police Department on May 1, 2022. Ruby had run away
from home on April 11, 2022. Mother, who discovered the child
was with father in Glendale, contacted San Bernardino police,
who in turn contacted Glendale police. Ruby had been with
father since April 11, 2022. Father reported Ruby had called him
and asked him to pick her up. She had been reported missing in
the system from the previous year and was considered a habitual
runaway.
       When Glendale police first interviewed Ruby, she came out
of father’s home crying and informed police that mother is mean
to her, slaps her, and curses at her. The child reported an
incident in which mother was on top of her threatening to cut her
hair with scissors. Ruby had small cuts on her arm and reported
cutting herself the prior year. On April 7, 2022, mother removed
Ruby from school to be homeschooled. When Ruby told mother
this upset her, mother slapped Ruby. That night Ruby called
father, and he picked her up a few houses down from her home.
       Mother did not want Ruby to be with father because when
she was young Ruby made comments about father sexually
molesting her. Father had not seen Ruby in nine years before
November 2021, when Ruby observed contact between father and
mother and contacted father. Mother said father and Ruby have
inappropriate contact as they discuss guns and father encourages
Ruby to be disrespectful to mother. Mother reported that Ruby
has a snapchat account and sends inappropriate pictures in her
underwear to other juveniles. Mother told police she threw

                                3
Ruby’s phone through a window because she was upset. Ruby
did not want to return to mother for fear of being hit.
       In an interview of Ruby by a DCFS social worker, Ruby
admitted to using marijuana from May through December 2021
about three times per month, but stopped because it was not
helping her. Ruby said when she was younger, if mother was
missing something, mother would slap Ruby, Solomon and
Audrey until one of them disclosed who took the missing item.
Mother stopped doing this when Ruby was 12 or 13. The last
time mother slapped Ruby was two weeks earlier, because Ruby
had talked back to her. Mother spanked Solomon on the buttocks
with her hand and a hanger. This happened too many times to
count. Ruby also reported mother slapped Audrey in March
2022, but she did not know why. When Ruby was younger,
mother would have Ruby lay on the floor and would hit her with
a belt. When Ruby was seven to nine years old, mother would
drag her by her hair on the floor and then lay her on her stomach
and hit her with a belt on the lower back and butt area.
       Ruby reported that she and mother argued a few months
earlier because mother was upset that Ruby contacted father’s
family through social media. Mother got on top of Ruby on the
bed and was threatening to cut her hair off with scissors. Mother
tapped the child’s face with the scissors. Mother regularly calls
Ruby a “bitch” and a “slut.” Two weeks earlier mother called
Ruby a “bitch,” “slut,” “weird,” and a “whore.” Ruby reported
mother curses at her about twice a week.
       Ruby was once on a psychiatric hold for about a week
because her former boyfriend told school staff that she wanted to
kill herself. Ruby said she only wanted to harm herself. She
denied having been hospitalized since then, her only

                                4
hospitalization. She was diagnosed with depression, anxiety, and
PTSD. She was given medication but had stopped taking it in
December 2021, when she ran away and forgot the medication.
After she returned mother did not follow up with Ruby’s
treatment.
       Ruby reported she was cutting herself with a box cutter
last year. She started cutting herself in the seventh grade on her
arms or upper legs twice a week for about one and a half years
but stopped in October 2021. Ruby had suicidal ideations in the
past. Last March or May, she took some of mother’s pills in an
attempt to kill herself. She felt sick and dizzy and never told
anyone. About a month later Ruby took some vitamins and felt
sick, but never told anyone.
       Ruby had run away with father about six times. Prior to
the end of 2021, she had not seen father in nine years. Mother
accused father of molesting Ruby and made Ruby say this. Ruby
denied that father ever molested her.
       Ruby said she could not stay with mother, who hit Ruby
and forced her to say things about father. Ruby recalled an
incident when she was nine years old, mother slapped her over
and over again. Last summer, mother hit Ruby repeatedly with a
cooking spoon because mother did not think Ruby was going to
watch the soup. Mother told Ruby she should go kill herself.
       The social worker observed a few very superficial cuts on
Ruby’s left arm. There were two older scars on her upper arm,
closer to her elbow, which Ruby said happened a long time ago
when mother scratched her.
       The social worker interviewed mother, who reported father
sexually abused Ruby when she was small. DCFS investigated
and believed the child. Mother went to San Bernardino family

                                5
court in 2015, and father received monitored visitation but did
not follow through. Mother was concerned Ruby was having sex
with father and questioned why the child was running away with
father.
       Mother confirmed Ruby was placed on a psychiatric hold
from August through September 2021 because she was writing
goodbye letters to her friends but then said it was a joke. Mother
claimed Ruby had been receiving counseling services since she
was in second grade. Ruby was diagnosed with PTSD during her
psychiatric hold and was prescribed Prozac and Prazosin for her
nightmares. After about one and a half months, Ruby refused to
take her medication and told people that mother took her to a
“crackpot” doctor. Mother wanted Ruby to be reevaluated.
Mother believed Ruby has a personality disorder.
       Mother denied slapping any of her children and stated that
as a form of discipline she made sure they did not have
electronics and did chores. Mother denied cutting Ruby’s hair.
She admitted to spanking the children years ago but could not
remember the last time. Mother denied telling Ruby to kill
herself or saying nasty things about father’s family. Mother said
father would tie Ruby with a rope and did not feed her.
       Father, who lived in Glendale with his brother, Parker, and
the paternal grandmother, Rebecca (PGM), was interviewed.
Father had a trailer at the home of paternal grandfather (PGF).
Father denied the sexual abuse allegations against him. When
Ruby reached out to him, father and his brother Paul took her to
lunch without mother’s permission. Not long after, Ruby reached
out to him again. Father had the child mostly in Glendale
between his and his brother Paul’s places.

                                6
Prior child welfare history
       The family had an extensive prior child welfare history in
San Bernardino County. Between June 2012 and April 2022, the
family had 22 referrals. In December 2021, Ruby disclosed that
mother hit her and her siblings with a belt and had punched and
choked her in the past. Two days before, mother had climbed on
top of her and threatened to cut off her hair with scissors because
Ruby contacted father’s family on Facebook. In September 2021,
Ruby was on a psychiatric hold due to suicidal ideations and self-
harm. In April 2021, Ruby disclosed that she had been sexually
abused by father when she was four to five years old. In 2018,
2015, 2014 and 2013, Ruby disclosed that she had been sexually
abused by father and her two uncles.
       Older allegations included mother using methamphetamine
in 2012 and mother and stepfather cultivating marijuana in the
family’s backyard.
Dependency petition and detention hearing
       DCFS filed a dependency petition on behalf of Ruby on
May 3, 2022, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section
300, subdivisions (a), (b)(1), (c), and (j).3 The petition alleged
mother physically abused Ruby and her siblings (counts (a)(1)–
(a)(3); (b)(1)–(b)(3)); mother engaged in medical neglect by failing
to ensure Ruby took her psychotropic medication (count (b)(4));
mother was unable to provide Ruby with ongoing care and
supervision due to Ruby’s mental, emotional and behavioral
problems (count (b)(5)); mother emotionally abused Ruby by
failing to ensure she took her medication, telling the child to kill

3     All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

                                 7
herself, and calling the child derogatory names (count (c)(1)); and
Ruby was at risk due to mother’s abuse of Ruby’s siblings (counts
(j)(1) and (j)(2)).
        At the May 4, 2022 detention hearing, mother and father
were present with counsel. Mother submitted on the issues
regarding detention, and her counsel asked that DCFS be ordered
to assess whether it would be appropriate for the matter to be
transferred to San Bernardino County.
        The court ordered Ruby detained from mother and father,
who were granted monitored visitation.
        After a prerelease investigation, on June 3, 2022, the court
ordered the child released to the paternal uncle, Paul.
Jurisdiction/disposition report
        A jurisdiction/disposition report was filed on June 28, 2022.
Mother had been a dependent of the juvenile court when she was
a minor.
        On May 25, 2022, Audrey reported mother “takes”
marijuana and drinks alcohol. Sometimes mother gets drunk.
Audrey also reported mother and the stepfather fight a lot,
including violence and suicidal statements by both mother and
stepfather. Solomon denied any suicidal statements by his
parents. Ruby reported mother worked at a group home and
provided nicotine to the children in the home. Mother gave Ruby
nicotine and threatened to get children from the group home to
beat up Ruby.
        A police report from San Bernardino County Sheriff’s
Department dated December 20, 2021, indicated when Ruby was
six years old, she claimed mother choked and punched her.
Recently, Ruby reported mother was upset because Ruby reached

                                 8
out to father. Mother got on top of Ruby with a pair of scissors
and tried to cut off her hair.
       In an extensive interview with Ruby on May 18, 2022, Ruby
said mother’s abuse got progressively worse over the years.
Mother hit her on her bottom, hit her with a shoe on her face
leaving a purple bruise, and slapped her after making her take a
pregnancy test. When Ruby was seven, mother hit her
repeatedly until she heard Ruby’s grandmother arrive.
Sometimes mother would have Ruby lay on the floor and would
hit her on her bottom with a belt. Things like that happened
three times per week. The previous summer, mother got mad at
Ruby because she thought Ruby was not watching the food cook.
Mother began hitting Ruby with a big copper cooking spoon.
When mother could not hit her, mother pinched her. Ruby
recalled an incident when mother threw her on a bed, began
choking her and calling her names. Ruby recounted mother’s
abuse of Audrey and Solomon as well.
       Ruby also recounted emotional abuse, such as mother
calling her “a bitch, useless,” and telling her “to walk in the road
in front of a car because I am a waste of time.” Mother also
referred to Ruby as a “slut” and a “whore.” This behavior
occurred for three years.
       Ruby had suicidal thoughts due to mother’s name-calling.
Ruby took vitamins and one of her mother’s prescriptions. Ruby
was being blamed for mother and stepfather’s arguments. She
was told that everything was her fault. Mother saw Ruby’s arm
once after Ruby cut herself, and mother grabbed Ruby’s arm and
tried to break it with her hands.
       Ruby forgot to take her medication during winter break
and did not take it for two weeks. When she returned to mother’s

                                 9
home in January 2022, mother stopped giving her the pills and
did not try to get Ruby back on them. Mother said she would
take Ruby to a psychiatrist but never did. Ruby opined that she
only needed something for her nightmares. Ruby’s nightmares
are mainly about mother hitting her or being chased by mother
and running from her.
      Ruby said she lied when she told the police her suicidal
thoughts stemmed from a sexual assault at age four. Ruby did
not want to tell police that the real reason was because of mother,
saying, “she . . . would only get even more pissed off at me
because of that. I was so depressed during that time she . . . was
treating me like shit and I was feeling like shit because of her.”
      Ruby reported that mother “smokes weed” and takes Xanax
given to her by a friend. If mother knows the children are not
there, she “get[s] really fucked up on alcohol.” Ruby had been
told by many people that mother needed psychiatric help. Ruby
claimed to have abused substances because mother had given her
nicotine to smoke. Ruby admitted to using marijuana and trying
heroin one time.
      Ruby denied father sexually abused her, stating she did not
know where such allegations came from.
      Ruby disclosed she and her half siblings had “gotten used
to” domestic violence between mother and stepfather, and mother
was the instigator.
      In an interview on May 16, 2022, mother described Ruby as
“secretive and vengeful.” Mother accused Ruby of pulling
Audrey’s hair, cutting herself, and poking holes in mother’s soap
bottle with a thumbtack. Mother said Ruby has had very explicit
sexual conversations on Snapchat and that father told Ruby he
was going to cut off her arms if she told anyone about him

                                10
sexually abusing her. Mother said father tied Ruby with rope,
did not feed her, and put tape on her mouth. Mother denied both
the incident with the scissors and hitting Ruby with a cooking
spoon. Mother denied hitting or scratching any of her children.
       Mother said Ruby was diagnosed with major depressive
disorder at Loma Linda. Ruby was given Prozac and prazosin for
sleep, PTSD and nightmares. Mother said Ruby was feeling
dizzy with the prazosin, so mother gave her melatonin instead.
Ruby did not take the Prozac because she did not like the way it
made her feel. Mother claimed she tried her best to make Ruby
take it. Mother admitted Ruby had tried to kill herself three or
four times. She described the child as “manipulative.” Mother
opined that Ruby needed treatment, explaining that the child is
“just dark and mean.”
       Mother had been a dependent of the juvenile court due to
maternal grandmother (MGM) threatening suicide. At the age of
12, as a dependent of the court, mother was prescribed Zoloft. At
the age of 14, mother was placed on a section 5150 psychiatric
hold because she was drunk. Mother had suicidal ideations
because she felt alone, and her brother was mean to her while
MGM was at work. Mother admitted to a history of substance
abuse before Ruby was born, having taken ecstasy in 2004 or
2005. She smoked marijuana less than 40 times and also used
cocaine, but was not a chronic user of either drug. She abused
cocaine, Vicodin, Norco, oxycodone, ecstasy, marijuana and
alcohol with father. However, she had not used these drugs since
2015. Mother admitted to smoking marijuana in 2021 for
medical care. She claimed to have been drunk five or six times
since Ruby was born but not around the children.

                               11
        On May 25, 2022, the social worker interviewed Audrey,
who admitted witnessing mother hit Ruby two times “because she
was texting her dad and sex things to other people.” Audrey
stated Ruby cuts herself, and mother hits Ruby with her hands
and “yes she . . . did hit her with a belt, but barely . . . .” Audrey
admitted mother slapped and used scissors to try to cut Ruby’s
hair. Audrey said mother had also done that to her, but she had
done it to Ruby twice, and “Ruby was screaming so loud.” After
the incident, “Ruby stayed in bed crying. She (Ruby) was scared.
They . . . have a bad relationship. She . . . tries to stay away from
my mom. My mom did scratch her . . . . She (Ruby) was getting
in trouble and as my mom walked away, she [(mother)] scratched
her (Ruby’s) arm, but my mom said it was an accident.” Audrey
disclosed that she and Ruby get hurt by mother because they are
older, saying, “We get hit on the arms with her hands and it
leaves a mark. Then we (she and Ruby) feel really bad like why
did we do that. We should have thought about her [(mother)]
first. It’s normal I guess (to get hit). It’s not bad (to get hit).”
Audrey also disclosed that when she was five, mother
“accidentally hit me across the head with a shower head, and I
know I blacked out.” Mother also hit her one time “because I was
slacking off at school.”
        Solomon was also interviewed on May 25, 2022. He
explained that he did not like his Halloween costume and his
mom hit him, saying, “[s]he only hit me one time though, and it
was because I was being rude.” Solomon stated, “I don’t like to
remember it because I don’t like to think about it. I don’t know if
it left [a] mark or bruise because to me it doesn’t exist
anymore . . . .” Solomon recounted an incident when mother
threw a dustpan and hit his face, but stated that it was an

                                 12
accident because “she wasn’t looking.” Solomon acknowledged
fighting between the parents but said he doesn’t “pay attention
when they fight with each other.” Solomon claimed, “I don’t
remember a lot of stuff because I forget a lot of stuff.” He
remembered mother hitting Ruby but could not remember
mother hitting Audrey. Solomon appeared uncomfortable talking
about the allegations.
       Paternal uncle Paul and aunt Janet were also interviewed.
Janet recalled Ruby saying her siblings were being beaten by
mother and specifically recalled the incident when Solomon did
not like his Halloween costume, and “the mom beat him badly
because of it.” Paul recalled being told by Ruby that mother
“[got] mad at the little boy (Solomon) because he was trying to
sweep and she . . . got frustrated that he wasn’t sweeping good
enough so she threw a dust pan at him and he has a scar on his
face because of it.” Ruby was “bothered . . . by how hard the mom
would hit her siblings.”
       Ruby requested that the case remain in Los Angeles
County, as she believed she would not have the same
opportunities to receive and take part in services if the case was
transferred to San Bernardino County. DCFS assessed it
appropriate for Ruby’s case to remain in Los Angeles County.
First amended petition
       A first amended petition was filed on June 23, 2022,
including allegations under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (c),
concerning father’s emotional abuse of Ruby. Under count b-6,
the petition alleged that father has subjected Ruby to emotional
abuse by having inappropriate conversations with the minor
about case-related matters, causing her sadness, depression, and
anxiety. The same allegation was included in count c-2. On

                               13
June 24, 2022, the juvenile court accepted the first amended
petition and dismissed all prior petitions.
Further reports
       In an addendum report dated June 24, 2022, Ruby reported
father was harassing her through text messages. DCFS reported
father was engaging in emotional manipulation towards the child
and was shown to “bully the child, distort information,” and was
attempting to gain empathy and trying to make the child feel
guilty. Father displayed a dismissive attitude towards the child’s
feelings while attempting to excuse his own behaviors. The
father’s actions had caused the child a great deal of emotional
harm.
       On August 15, 2022, a last minute information for the court
was filed. Father and PGM refused contact with DCFS. Ruby
remained unenrolled in school, and mother was refusing contact
with the child’s caretakers and to provide documents needed for
Ruby’s enrollment in school. Mother and Ruby disagreed on the
school Ruby should attend. DCFS recommended limiting
mother’s educational and developmental rights over Ruby as her
actions were causing further emotional distress and delaying the
child’s education.
       Mother was enrolled in anger management classes but had
been unable to schedule other classes. Mother wanted Ruby
removed from her uncle and placed in a foster home, while an
unresolved referral was still pending in San Bernardino County.
       On August 16, 2022, the juvenile court found mother’s
actions caused unnecessary delay as to the child’s enrollment in
school and designated the caregiver, paternal uncle Paul, as co-
educational rights holder.

                               14
Facts concerning ICWA
       On May 1, 2022, mother and father were each asked about
Native American background. Both denied any Native American
ancestry.
       Mother’s and father’s parental notification of Indian status
(ICWA–020) forms indicated in response to questions regarding
Native American ancestry, “None of the above apply.”
       At the May 4, 2022 detention hearing, the juvenile court
noted that the parents denied Native American ancestry. The
court asked the paternal uncle, Paul, who was present in the
courtroom, about Indian ancestry.4 The court inquired, “So for
your mother, on your mother’s side of the family, do you know
whether they have any American Indian heritage?” The paternal
uncle replied, “Not that I’m aware of, Your Honor.”
       The court found it had no reason to know that ICWA
applied, and ordered DCFS to continue the inquiry by inquiring
of “the mother’s and father’s extended family members.”
       On May 16, 2022, mother continued to deny any Native
American ancestry.
       On June 10, 2022, DCFS interviewed PGM, who stated that
a DNA test showed Native American ancestry that dated back to
the 1500’s. She was given information that she is a direct
descendant of Lady Rebecca Ann Powhatan (believed to be
Pocahontas) and Lady Rebecca’s father, Chief Wahunseneca
Paramount Chief of the Powhatan Tribe (believed to be
Pocahontas’s father). DCFS was in the process of collecting the
information from PGM in order to send out ICWA notices.

4     Father and the paternal uncle Paul were half siblings as
they shared the same mother.

                                15
      In her interview for the June 28, 2022
jurisdiction/disposition report, mother reiterated she has no
Native American ancestry.
      On June 24, 2022, DCFS reported it was still trying to
reach PGM to inquire about the family’s Native American
ancestry. On June 21, 2022, the social worker called PGM twice
but was unable to leave a voice message due to PGM’s voicemail
being full. The social worker sent a text message with her
telephone number, but as of the date of the report, had not
received a response. Efforts would continue to contact PGM in
order to obtain the information.
      In a last minute information for the court filed on
August 15, 2022, DCFS reported PGM continued to give no
response to the dependency investigator’s attempts to contact her
regarding the family’s Native American ancestry.
Adjudication and disposition hearing
      The juvenile court conducted the adjudication and
disposition hearing on August 23, 2022.
      MGM was present in court, and the juvenile court inquired,
“Do you or any family members of yours—do you know whether
they are eligible for membership to any Indian tribes?” MGM
replied, “No. We are Indians from Mexico, not from here.”
      The hearing continued, and the court admitted DCFS’s
exhibits into evidence and heard argument. The court sustained
counts a-1, b-1, b-4, c-1 and c-2 of the section 300 petition.
Counts a-1 and b-1 alleged physical abuse of Ruby by mother;
count b-4 alleged medical neglect by mother; count c-1 alleged
emotional abuse by mother; and count c-2 alleged emotional
abuse by father.

                               16
       The juvenile court found Ruby’s statements regarding
mother’s abuse to be consistent between school counselors and
law enforcement and corroborated by Audrey, whom the court
found to be “very credible.”
       The juvenile court proceeded to disposition. Mother’s
counsel objected to the case plan, stating, “[m]other would submit
on a parenting class and individual counseling. She would object
to all other proposed terms of the case plan.” Additionally,
mother argued the case should be transferred to San Bernardino
County as that is the residence of the mother and child.
       The juvenile court ordered Ruby removed from mother and
father and suitably placed. Mother was ordered to complete
parenting, conjoint counseling with Ruby, anger management,
and individual counseling. The parents were granted monitored
visitation in a neutral setting. The court ordered DCFS to assess
whether San Bernardino County was the appropriate jurisdiction
for the case.
       On September 26, 2022, mother filed a notice of appeal.
Last minute information for the court
       On September 26, 2022, DCFS filed a last minute
information for the court document. Mother informed DCFS that
she wanted the case transferred to San Bernardino County
because she thought Ruby would be moved from her current
placement to a placement within San Bernardino County. DCFS
thought mother’s motivation was to have Ruby removed from the
paternal uncle’s home.
       The social worker found Ruby was distressed and afraid of
the prospect of having the case moved to San Bernardino County,
being adamant that she would not feel safe if the case was moved
to San Bernardino County because she did not feel San

                               17
Bernardino County CPS had fulfilled its duty to protect her in
the past. Ruby said she had to run away from mother to Los
Angeles County in order to find help and be protected. During
previous investigations, San Bernardino CPS had refused to
remove Ruby from mother, which caused Ruby to feel unsafe and
frustrated. Ruby disclosed the physical and emotional abuse for
years and San Bernardino CPS did not protect her.
      Ruby further disclosed that mother works for group homes
in San Bernardino County and “knows people,” which was why
Ruby was not removed from mother in the past.
      DCFS reported that mental health services in San
Bernardino County were more limited than those available in Los
Angeles County, and Ruby’s current mental health services
would be interrupted if the case were transferred to San
Bernardino County.
      For these reasons, DCFS took the position that transferring
the case to San Bernardino County would be contrary to Ruby’s
best interests and to the reunification process.
      On September 30, 2022, the juvenile court declined to
transfer the matter to San Bernardino County.

                            DISCUSSION
I.     Justiciability of challenges to jurisdictional findings
       We first address the parties’ arguments regarding the
justiciability of mother’s jurisdictional challenges.
       When a dependency petition alleges multiple grounds for
jurisdiction, a reviewing court can affirm the juvenile court’s
finding of jurisdiction over the minor if any one of the statutory
bases for jurisdiction is supported by substantial evidence. In
such a case, the reviewing court need not consider whether any or

                               18
all of the other alleged statutory grounds for jurisdiction are
supported by the evidence. (In re Alexis E. (2009) 171
Cal.App.4th 438, 451.) “However, we generally will exercise our
discretion and reach the merits of a challenge to any
jurisdictional finding when the finding (1) serves as the basis for
dispositional orders that are also challenged on appeal [citation];
(2) could be prejudicial to the appellant or could potentially
impact the current or future dependency proceedings [citations];
or (3) ‘could have other consequences for [the appellant], beyond
jurisdiction’ [citation].” (In re Drake M. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th
754, 762-763, disapproved on other grounds in In re D.P. (2023)
14 Cal.5th 266, 283.)
        Because father does not challenge the jurisdictional
findings sustained concerning his behavior, even if mother
succeeds in her challenges, the juvenile court will still retain
jurisdiction over Ruby. Thus, DCFS argues, this court should
decline to address mother’s jurisdictional challenges.
        Mother argues each of the jurisdictional findings she
challenges served as the basis for the juvenile court’s
dispositional order removing the minor from the mother’s
custody. The removal order is also challenged on appeal. In
addition, mother argues the jurisdictional findings are prejudicial
to mother and could potentially impact the current or future
dependency proceedings or custody proceedings.
        DCFS points out that mother failed to object to the removal
order at the dispositional hearing. Thus, DCFS argues, mother
should not be permitted to challenge jurisdictional findings on
the basis of a removal order she did not challenge in the juvenile
court. However, the record shows mother did make a general
objection to all terms of the case plan with the exception of a

                                19
parenting class and individual counseling. We find mother’s
objection sufficient to challenge the removal order. Because the
jurisdictional findings mother challenges led to the removal order
she also challenges, we address the merits of mother’s
jurisdictional challenges.
II.    Jurisdictional findings
       Mother challenges each of the jurisdictional findings
involving her behavior: physical abuse, medical neglect, and
emotional abuse.
       A.    Standard of review
       A juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings are reviewed on
appeal for substantial evidence. (In re D.B. (2020) 48
Cal.App.5th 613, 620.) “‘Substantial evidence is evidence that is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value.’” (In re Christopher C.
(2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 73, 84.) The juvenile court’s judgment is
presumed correct, and “[a]ll conflicts are resolved in favor of the
judgment and all legitimate inferences are indulged in to uphold
the juvenile court’s determinations.” (In re K.S. (2016) 244
Cal.App.4th 327, 337.) “We adhere to the principle that issues of
fact, weight and credibility are the provinces of the juvenile
court.” (In re R.C. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 930, 941.)
       “‘While evidence of past conduct may be probative of
current conditions, the question under section 300 is whether
circumstances at the time of the hearing subject the minor to the
defined risk of harm.’” (In re Ricardo L. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th
552, 565.) “Thus previous acts of neglect, standing alone, do not
establish a substantial risk of harm; there must be some reason
beyond mere speculation to believe they will reoccur.” (Ibid.)
However, remote conduct may support a finding that a minor is
at risk of substantial harm under section 300. Such conduct

                                20
must be viewed in context. (In re J.K. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th
1426, 1439.) The severity of the abuse, the number of incidents of
abuse, the lapse of time between instances of abuse and the filing
of the dependency petition, and whether the parent has taken
steps to address the issues that led to the abusive conduct all
may be considered in determining whether the child remains at
risk of harm. (Id. at pp. 1439-1440.)
       B.    Physical harm
       Section 300, subdivision (a) authorizes dependency
jurisdiction if a child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk
that the child will suffer, serious physical harm inflicted
nonaccidentally upon the child by the child’s parent or guardian.
Section 300, subdivision (b) authorizes dependency jurisdiction if
a child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk the child will
suffer, serious physical harm or illness as a result of the failure
or inability of the parent to adequately supervise or protect the
child. The juvenile court sustained allegations of physical abuse
by mother against Ruby under both of these provisions.
       Substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s
findings. Ruby consistently alleged physical abuse by mother
over the course of several years. Ruby disclosed mother’s abuse
of her began when she was four years old and became worse over
the years. Mother slapped Ruby when she was upset, most
recently in April 2022. Ruby recalled that mother at times would
force Ruby to lay on the floor while mother hit her bottom.
Mother would hit Ruby with a belt on her lower back and buttock
area. Ruby also reported an incident when mother was on top of
her, threatening to cut her hair with scissors. Audrey’s testimony
substantiated Ruby’s testimony regarding this incident. Mother
hit Ruby with a cooking spoon and tried to break her arm.

                                21
       Ruby’s siblings’ testimony supported Ruby’s allegations.
Audrey reported having seen mother hit Ruby twice. Audrey also
reported mother hit Ruby with a belt, slapped Ruby, and
scratched Ruby. Audrey said she and Ruby were hit by mother,
leaving marks. Solomon also reported abuse and recalled seeing
mother hit Ruby.
       Mother argues that her physical discipline of the child was
protected by the reasonable parental discipline doctrine and did
not constitute sufficient evidence to justify dependency
jurisdiction. Mother cites In re D.M. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 634
[holding that a parent’s spanking of her children on the buttocks
with her bare hand and with a sandal does not categorically
constitute “serious physical harm” sufficient to invoke
dependency jurisdiction under § 300, subds. (a), (b), and (j)].)
However, as D.M. instructs, whether a parent’s use of discipline
exceeds the scope of the parental right to discipline turns on
three considerations: “(1) whether the parent’s conduct is
genuinely disciplinary; (2) whether the punishment is
‘necess[ary]’ (that is, whether the discipline was ‘warranted by
the circumstances’); and (3) ‘whether the amount of punishment
was reasonable or excessive.’” (Id. at p. 641.)
       Mother’s extensive, ongoing abuse of Ruby does not fall
within the parental right to reasonable discipline. There is no
evidence in the record that it was genuine discipline. Further, it
was excessive and unreasonable given Ruby’s purported
misbehavior: talking back to mother, not watching the soup, or
reaching out to father and the paternal family. Thus, there was
substantial evidence the reasonable parental discipline exception
did not apply.

                               22
       Mother further argues that her acts of dragging and
scratching the child were remote in time and unlikely to recur.
We disagree. The evidence showed Ruby was afraid of mother
and had run away from mother six times in order to avoid abuse.
Ruby did not want to return to mother’s home due to mother’s
physical and emotional abuse. Under the circumstances, the
juvenile court was justified in finding mother’s abuse of Ruby was
sufficiently recent to place Ruby at current risk of serious harm.
       C.    Medical neglect
       Mother argues there is a lack of substantial evidence to
support the medical neglect allegations under section 300,
subdivision (b)(1). She argues she made reasonable efforts to
ensure Ruby took her psychotropic medication. Mother cites to
her own testimony that she tried to get the child to take the
medication, but Ruby did not want to do so. Mother ignores
Ruby’s testimony that mother never followed up with her
medications. In addition, although Ruby was exhibiting
troubling behavior, the minor testified that mother told her she
would take her to a psychiatrist but never did.
       The juvenile court was not required to believe mother’s
testimony over Ruby’s testimony. Issues of fact, weight and
credibility are within the province of the juvenile court, and we
will not disturb the juvenile court’s decision to believe a child
over a mother. (In re R.C., supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 941.)
Given mother’s failure to ensure that Ruby received the mental
health treatment she needed, the juvenile court did not err in
sustaining the allegation of medical neglect.

                               23
       D.    Emotional abuse
       Mother argues the juvenile court improperly sustained an
allegation of emotional abuse under section 300, subdivision (c).5
Specifically, mother argues that DCFS did not prove parental
conduct, causation, and serious harm or risk of harm.
       Mother points to her own testimony denying she called
Ruby derogatory names. To the extent she did call Ruby names,
she argues, it was a result of Ruby’s behavior and mother’s
frustration. Mother insists DCFS lacked causation, as Ruby was
diagnosed with serious mental health problems and father’s
emotional abuse was to blame. Finally, mother argues DCFS did
not prove serious emotional harm. Ruby was diagnosed with
depression, anxiety, and PTSD, but not with severe anxiety,
depression, or PTSD.
       Mother’s arguments are not well taken in light of the
competing evidence showing mother emotionally abused Ruby
causing her to suffer serious emotional damage. There was
evidence Ruby suffered from nightmares, sadness, and anxiety
due to mother’s behavior. Ruby testified her nightmares were
about mother hitting her, about running away from mother and
being chased by mother. Ruby reported mother cursed at her,
called her “a bitch, useless,” and told Ruby to walk in front of a
car because she is a waste of time. Mother had called Ruby a
“slut” and a “whore.” Mother forced Ruby to accuse her father of

5     Pursuant to section 300, subdivision (c), a child comes
within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court if the child is
suffering serious emotional damage, or is at risk of serious
emotional damage, evidenced by severe anxiety, depression,
withdrawal, or untoward aggressive behavior towards self or
others, as a result of the conduct of a parent or guardian.

                                24
doing sexual things to her when she was young. Ruby attempted
suicide on two occasions because of mother. She also cut herself
because of mother, disclosing, “I’d cut myself after an argument
with my mom because I would use it as a form of punishment on
myself.” Ruby ran away from home approximately six times
because of mother, who does not dispute that Ruby’s acts were
caused by mother’s behavior.
      The evidence from Ruby supported the juvenile court’s
determination that mother’s conduct caused Ruby severe
emotional upset, resulting in a serious risk of harm to the minor.
III. Dispositional orders
      A.    Applicable law and standard of review
      A juvenile court “may direct any reasonable orders to the
parents or guardians of the child who is the subject of any
[dependency] proceedings . . . as the court deems necessary and
proper to carry out this section.” (§ 362, subd. (d).) Such order
“may include a direction to participate in a counseling or
education program.” (Ibid.) “The program in which a parent or
guardian is required to participate shall be designed to eliminate
those conditions that led to the court’s finding that the child is a
person described by Section 300.” (Ibid.)
      The juvenile court has broad discretion to determine what
would serve a child’s interest and issue dispositional orders
accordingly. (In re Christopher H. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1001,
1006.) A reviewing court will not disturb a discretionary order
unless it was arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd. (In re
Raymundo B. (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1447, 1456.)
      B.    Dispositional orders
      Mother challenges the juvenile court’s dispositional orders
removing the minor from mother’s custody, ordering mother to

                                 25
participate in anger management, parenting, and individual
counseling, and restricting mother to monitored visits with the
minor. Because mother specifically stipulated to parenting and
individual counseling below, we decline to discuss mother’s
objections to these dispositional orders and consider those
arguments forfeited. As set forth below, we reject mother’s
remaining objections to the dispositional orders.
             1.     Removal order
       A juvenile court may not remove a minor from the custody
of his or her parent unless the court finds by clear and convincing
evidence that there would be a substantial danger to the physical
health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of
the child, and there are no reasonable means by which the child
can be protected without removal from the parent’s custody.
(§ 361, subd. (c)(1).)
       Mother argues the juvenile court’s order removing Ruby
from her custody was improper because it was not supported by
substantial evidence. Mother argues her acts of physical abuse of
the child were protected by the reasonable parental discipline
standard and reasonable alternatives to removal existed.
       We review the juvenile court’s removal order for
substantial evidence, keeping in mind the juvenile court was
obligated to find clear and convincing evidence supporting
removal. In cases such as this, “‘the question before the appellate
court is whether the record as a whole contains substantial
evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it
highly probable that the fact was true.’” (In re V.L. (2020) 54
Cal.App.5th 147, 155.) In making this assessment, we view the
record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below
and give deference to the fact finder’s evaluations of credibility,

                                26
resolution of conflicting evidence, and reasonable inferences.
(Ibid.)
       Bearing the heightened standard in mind, we find that
substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s order removing
Ruby from mother’s custody. As set forth in detail above, mother
physically and emotionally abused Ruby and medically neglected
her. Considering such evidence, the juvenile court did not err in
determining Ruby’s physical and emotional health would be at
risk if Ruby remained in mother’s custody. Further, mother
provided no evidence that alternatives to removal were
acceptable. Mother declined to accept responsibility for her
actions. She denied physically harming Ruby and denied telling
Ruby to kill herself. Instead, she blamed the child, stating that
Ruby was “secretive and vengeful” and describing the child as
“manipulative,” “dark and mean.” Mother’s refusal to take
responsibility for her actions shows Ruby to be at continued risk
from mother’s abuse. This continued risk to Ruby supports the
juvenile court’s determination alternatives to removal were not
reasonable under the circumstances.
             2.    Anger management
       As mother has forfeited her challenges to the juvenile
court’s dispositional orders requiring parenting classes and
individual counseling, we address only mother’s challenge to the
requirement that she attend anger management. Mother argues
she does not need to attend anger management. Mother argues
her frustration at Ruby’s behavior was caused by Ruby, who did
things like send nude photographs of herself to other minors, had
sex at a young age, and experimented with drugs. Mother argues
her acts of physical discipline and calling the child names were a
result of Ruby’s actions and were thus justified.

                               27
       The juvenile court has broad discretion to order parental
programs that will serve a child’s best interest. (In re
Christopher H., supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at p. 1006.) Dispositional
orders should be designed to address potential obstacles to
reunification. (Ibid.) We will not disturb a juvenile court’s
dispositional orders unless the court has abused its discretion.
(In re Raymundo B., supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at p. 1456.)
       The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in ordering
mother to complete an anger management program. The juvenile
court found credible the allegations that mother physically
abused Ruby, called her names, and encouraged her to kill
herself. Mother’s extreme reactions to Ruby’s behaviors
warranted an anger management program, and it was within the
juvenile court’s broad discretion to order one.
             3.    Monitored visitation
       Mother argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion
in restricting her to monitored visits with Ruby, arguing that
monitored visits were not in the best interest of the minor, as
unmonitored visits were necessary to rebuild the bond between
mother and Ruby. Mother cites section 362.1, subdivision
(a)(1)(A), which provides that “[v]isitation shall be as frequent as
possible, consistent with the well-being of the child.” A juvenile
court’s order restricting visitation between a parent and child will
not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. (In re
D.P. (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 1058, 1070.)
       The juvenile court’s determination that mother should have
monitored visits with Ruby was well within the juvenile court’s
discretion given the circumstances of this case. Ruby attempted
suicide and had nightmares, sadness, and anxiety because of
mother’s behaviors. Mother failed to understand the minor’s

                                28
health needs and failed to provide her with necessary mental
health treatment. Mother lashed out at the child with physical
and verbal abuse. Throughout much of the pendency of the
proceedings up until the jurisdiction/disposition hearing, Ruby
was unwilling to visit with mother at all. The juvenile court did
not err in determining that it was in Ruby’s best interest to have
monitored visits with mother.
IV. ICWA
       Mother asserts the juvenile court failed to conduct an
adequate inquiry into Ruby’s possible American Indian heritage
by failing to interview extended family members such as the
paternal uncle, PGF and maternal grandfather about such
possible heritage. Mother asks that we order a limited reversal
of the jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders for DCFS to
conduct a sufficient inquiry and investigation.
       A.     Applicable law and standard of review
       ICWA and related California statutes reflect the
Legislature’s intent “to protect the best interests of Indian
children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes
and families by the establishment of minimum Federal standards
for the removal of Indian children from their families.” (25
U.S.C. § 1902; see In re K.R. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 701, 706,
fn. 3.) An “Indian child” is defined as any unmarried person
under the age of 18 who is either a member of an Indian tribe or
is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological
child of a member of an Indian tribe. (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4); Welf.
& Inst. Code, § 224.1, subds. (a), (b).)
       “Because it typically is not self-evident whether a child is
an Indian child, both federal and state law mandate certain
inquiries to be made in each case. These requirements are

                                29
sometimes collectively referred to as the duty of initial inquiry.”
(In re Benjamin M. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 735, 741
(Benjamin M.).) “The duty to inquire begins with the initial
contact, including, but not limited to, asking the party reporting
child abuse or neglect whether the party has any information
that the child may be an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a).) The
court and child welfare department “have an affirmative and
continuing duty” to inquire whether a child for whom a petition
under section 300 may be or has been filed may be an Indian
child. (§ 224.2, subd. (a).)
       Under California law, the child welfare department’s initial
duty of inquiry includes, but is not limited to, “asking the child,
parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family
members, others who have an interest in the child, and the party
reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may be,
an Indian child and where the child, the parents, or Indian
custodian is domiciled.” (§ 224.2, subd. (b).) Under ICWA, the
term “extended family member” is “defined by the law or custom
of the Indian child’s tribe or, in the absence of such law or
custom, shall be a person who has reached the age of eighteen
and who is the Indian child’s grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother
or sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or
second cousin, or stepparent.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2).)
       The juvenile court must also inquire at each participant’s
first appearance in court whether the participant knows or has
reason to know that the child is an Indian child. (§ 224.2, subd.
(c).) In addition, the juvenile court must instruct the parties to
inform the court if they subsequently receive information that
provides reason to know the child is an Indian child. (§ 224.2,
subd. (c).)

                                 30
       If the “initial inquiry creates a ‘reason to believe’ the child
is an Indian child, then the Agency ‘shall make further inquiry
regarding the possible Indian status of the child, and shall make
that inquiry as soon as practicable.’ ([§ 224.2], subd. (e), italics
added.) [I]f that further inquiry results in a reason to know the
child is an Indian child, then the formal notice requirements of
section 224.3 apply. (See § 224.2, subd. (c) [court is obligated to
inquire at the first appearance whether anyone ‘knows or has
reason to know that the child is an Indian child’]; id., subd. (d)
[defining circumstances that establish a ‘reason to know’ a child
is an Indian child]; § 224.3 [ICWA notice is required if there is a
‘reason to know’ a child is an Indian child as defined under
§ 224.2, subd. (d)].)” (In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041,
1052.)
       We review a juvenile court’s ICWA findings under the
substantial evidence test, “‘which requires us to determine if
reasonable, credible evidence of solid value supports’ the court’s
ICWA finding.” (In re Dezi C. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 769, 777,
review granted Sept. 21, 2022, S275578 (Dezi C.).) Even if
substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s ICWA
findings, we may not reverse unless we find that error was
prejudicial. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; Benjamin M., supra, 70
Cal.App.5th at p. 742.)
       At this time, California appellate courts have taken varying
positions on the rules for assessing whether a defective initial
inquiry is harmless. The varying approaches have led to “a
continuum of tests for prejudice stemming from error in following
California statutes implementing ICWA.” (In re A.C. (2022) 75
Cal.App.5th 1009, 1011; see Dezi C., supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 777-778, review granted.) Our division has adopted the

                                 31
following rule: “[A]n agency’s failure to conduct a proper initial
inquiry into a dependent child’s American Indian heritage is
harmless unless the record contains information suggesting a
reason to believe that the child may be an ‘Indian child’ within
the meaning of ICWA, such that the absence of further inquiry
was prejudicial to the juvenile court’s ICWA finding. For this
purpose, the ‘record’ includes both the record of proceedings in
the juvenile court and any proffer the appealing parent makes on
appeal.” (Dezi C., at p. 779.)6
       B.     Mother has failed to show reversible error
       Mother argues that DCFS breached its duty of inquiry by
failing to interview extended family members such as paternal
uncle, PGF, and maternal grandfather regarding Ruby’s possible
Indian heritage. Mother requests we impose the “automatic
reversal rule” set forth in In re Y.W. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 542,
554 (mother’s denial of Indian ancestry at the outset of
dependency proceedings did not end the department’s duty of
inquiry, especially where relevant contact and identifying
information was readily available). By failing to interview
extended family members pursuant to section 224.2, subdivision
(b), mother argues, DCFS failed to conduct an adequate inquiry
as to the minor’s possible Indian ancestry.

6      The California Supreme Court granted review of Dezi C. on
September 21, 2022, S275578. In its opinion granting review, the
Supreme Court has stated that pending review, Dezi C. “may be
cited, not only for its persuasive value, but also for the limited
purpose of establishing the existence of a conflict in authority
that would in turn allow trial courts to exercise discretion under
Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450,
456, to choose between sides of any such conflict.” (In re Dezi C.,
S275578, Supreme Ct. Mins., Sept. 21, 2022, p. 1155.)

                                32
      We disagree. Both mother and father denied Indian
ancestry to the juvenile court. The court interviewed paternal
uncle about Indian ancestry at the detention hearing, which he
denied. MGM denied Indian heritage, and mother reported she
did not know her father’s identity.7
      As to the paternal grandparents, PGM reported they had
Native American ancestry dating back to the 1500’s. PGM was
given information she was a direct descendant of Lady Rebecca
Ann Powhatan (believed to be Pocahontas) and her father, Chief
Wahunseneca Paramount Chief of the Powhatan Tribe. DCFS
reported it was attempting to collect information from PGM in
order to send out ICWA notices, and once the ICWA notices were
complete, the information would be provided to the juvenile court.
Thus, the investigation as to the paternal family remained
ongoing. DCFS had twice reported that its efforts to follow up
with PGM were fruitless, as PGM failed to respond to repeated
inquiries. ICWA does not require DCFS or the court to obtain
information from relatives who refuse to talk to DCFS. (In re
A.M. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 303, 323.)8

7     There is no evidence that any maternal relative had contact
information for mother’s unknown father. DCFS was not
required “to conduct an extensive independent investigation for
information.” (In re C.Y. (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 34, 40.)
“Without reliable contact information, DCFS could not
reasonably have been expected to interview” mother’s paternal
relatives. (In re Q.M. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 1068, 1083.)
8     In addition, Ruby was placed with a paternal uncle, a
preferred placement under ICWA if there was Indian ancestry in
the paternal family. (See In re J.W. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 384,
390-391 [finding inquiry error harmless because child was placed
with grandparent and under the Dezi C. standard].)

                               33
      This appeal is from the jurisdictional and dispositional
phase; therefore the matter is ongoing. DCFS and the juvenile
court have an ongoing duty to comply with ICWA and related
California law throughout the pendency of these proceedings.
Although the juvenile court made an initial finding ICWA does
not apply in this case, it retains the power and duty to
subsequently change that finding if new information gives the
court reason to believe that the subject children are Indian
children. (In re S.H. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 166, 176.) “[A]n
ICWA appeal at the jurisdiction and disposition stage” is
premature “where there will necessarily be further dependency
proceedings in the juvenile court (at which continuing ICWA
duties apply) and a basis for later appeal if for some reason the
remedial ICWA investigation [DCFS] is now undertaking falls
short.” (In re Baby Girl M. (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 635, 638.)
      Based on the evidence provided thus far in the proceedings,
the juvenile court did not err in making its preliminary
determination that ICWA was inapplicable. DCFS reports
adequately documented its inquiry of Indian ancestry, and the
juvenile court provided necessary oversight. Because the record
before us makes clear the ICWA investigation was ongoing below,
should it become known, or should there be reason to know, that
the child is an Indian child, the notice requirement will be
activated, and the relevant tribes will need to be notified. The
jurisdictional and dispositional findings regarding mother need
not be reversed in order to direct the juvenile court and DCFS “to
do something they recognize they must do anyway.” (In re S.H.,
supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 177.)

                               34
V.     Transfer to San Bernardino County
       Finally, mother argues the juvenile court erred in declining
to transfer the case to San Bernardino County. Mother argues it
was in Ruby’s best interest to transfer the matter as mother
requests.
       Section 375 provides that a juvenile court “may” transfer a
case to the county where the child’s previously custodial parent
resides. (§ 375, subd. (a).) The statute does not require the court
to do so. California Rules of Court, rule 5.610(c), also permits,
but does not require, the juvenile court to transfer the case to the
juvenile court of the child’s residence. The juvenile court must
consider the best interest of the minor when it decides whether to
transfer a case. (In re J.C. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 984, 992.) We
review the court’s decision for abuse of discretion. (Id. at p. 993.)
       The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in declining
mother’s request to transfer the matter to San Bernardino
County. The social worker’s conversations with Ruby show the
child was distressed, frustrated, and afraid at the prospect of the
case being transferred. She felt she would not be safe in the
hands of San Bernardino County CPS because the agency had not
fulfilled its obligation to protect her in the past. Ruby’s
emotional state was fragile. She had a history of suicidal
ideation. DCFS was concerned that transferring the case would
potentially cause Ruby to relapse into unsafe thoughts and
behaviors. DCFS also reported that mental health services in
San Bernardino County were more limited than those available
in Los Angeles County, and Ruby’s current mental health
services would be interrupted if the matter were transferred to
San Bernardino County.

                                 35
      Further, mother’s interest in having the matter transferred
to San Bernardino County appeared to be rooted in mother’s
desire to have Ruby removed from the care of the paternal uncle.
During the interview, mother stated she wanted Ruby removed
from paternal uncle’s home and moved to a foster home. She
stated she wanted the case transferred because she assumed if
the case was transferred, Ruby would be moved to another
placement in San Bernardino County.
      Based on the above-described evidence, the juvenile court
did not abuse its discretion in determining Ruby’s best interests
were served by keeping the matter in Los Angeles County and
declining to transfer it to San Bernardino County.

                       DISPOSITION
     The findings and orders are affirmed.

                                    ___________________________
                                    CHAVEZ, J.

We concur:

_______________________________
ASHMANN-GERST, Acting P. J.

_______________________________
HOFFSTADT, J.

                               36