Court Opinion

ID: 9740764
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:41:27.502143+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:20.182344
License: Public Domain

ROBB, Judge,
dissents with opinion.
I respectfully dissent from the majority's conclusion that the warrantless search of Myers's vehicle did not violate the Fourth Amendment because if fell within the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. The automobile exception was first recognized in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 548 (1925). In Carroll, the Court held,
[T]he true rule is that if the search and seizure without a warrant are made upon probable cause, that is, upon a belief, reasonably arising out of cireum-stances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains that which by law is subject to seizure and destruction, the search and seizure are valid.
Id. at 149, 45 S.Ct. 280. The Court limited the applicability of the automobile exception, however, by holding, "[iIn cases where the securing of a warrant is reasonably practicable, it must be used...." Id. at 156, 45 S.Ct. 280.
In Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), the Court clarified when the securing of a warrant is not reasonably practicable. The Court stated,
[Alssuming the existence of probable cause, automobiles and other vehicles may be searched without warrants "where it is not practicable to secure a warrant, because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought."
Id. at 764 n. 9, 89 S.Ct. 2034, quoting Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153, 45 S.Ct. 280 (emphasis added). In other words, the ready mobility of a vehicle makes it impractical for the police to secure a warrant. Therefore, a warrantless search of a vehicle upon probable cause is proper only where the vehicle is readily mobile.
The Court reiterated its ready mobility requirement in Chambers In that case, the Court held a warrantless search of a vehicle is proper "where there is probable cause to search an automobile stopped on the highway; the car is movable, the occu*356pants are alerted, and the car's contents may never be found again if a warrant must be obtained." Id. at 51, 90 S.Ct. 1975 (emphasis added). The Court further held the automobile exception applies when the police first seize a vehicle, and the right to search the vehicle without a warrant does not disappear once the vehicle is immobilized; i.e., the occupants are arrested and the car is taken to the police station. Id. at 52, 90 S.Ct. 1975. Additionally, the Court noted that both probable cause and a "fleeting target" are required to justify a search. Id. at 51, 90 S.Ct. 1975 (emphasis added). See also California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 569, 111 S.Ct. 1982, 114 L.Ed.2d 619 (1991) (reiterating Chambers's holding that "the existence of exigent circumstances was to be determined at the time the automobile is seiged." (emphasis added)).
Thus, in each of the cases where the Supreme Court applied the automobile exception and upheld a warrantless search of a vehicle, the police first stopped and seized the vehicle either while an occupant was operating the vehicle on a highway, or while an occupant was inside the vehicle or near it and the vehicle was readily capable of being driven away by the occupant. See Dyson, 527 U.S. at 466-67, 119 S.Ct. 2013; Labron, 518 U.S. at 939-40, 116 S.Ct. 2485; Carney, 471 U.S. at 388-93, 105 S.Ct. 2066; Thomas, 458 U.S. at 261, 102 S.Ct. 3079 ("[WJlhen police officers have probable cause to believe there is contraband inside an automobile that has been stopped on the road, the officers may conduct a warrant, less search of the vehicle ...." (emphasis added)); Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67, 67-68, 96 S.Ct. 304, 46 L.Ed.2d 209 (1975) (per curiam); Chambers, 399 U.S. at 51-52, 90 S.Ct. 1975; Carroll, 267 U.S. at 162, 45 S.Ct. 280. Cf. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 478, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) (holding warrantless search of vehicle was improper where car was not stopped on a highway but was parked at a residence with no occupants inside or near the vehicle and capable of being driven away by the turn of an ignition key). The Supreme Court has never removed the ready mobility requirement from the automobile exception.
In essence, the majority's decision today allows any vehicle to be searched at any time as long as the police have probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband. However, this ignores the ready mobility requirement of the automobile exception the Supreme Court has recognized since its holding in Carroll. The majority discusses Carney and implies that even if a vehicle is not readily mobile, according to Carney another justification for the vehicle exception comes into play: a reduced expectation of privacy. While the Supreme Court has recognized a reduced expectation of privacy as a second justification for the automobile exception, the Court has not removed the requirement that the vehicle be readily mobile. In fact, the Court in Carney discussed the ready mobility of Carney's motor home in upholding the warrantless search. See Carney, 471 U.S. at 393, 105 S.Ct. 2066 ("Like the automobile in Carroll, [Carney's] motor home was readily mobile. Absent the prompt search and seizure, it could readily have been moved beyond the reach of the police."). See also Labron, 518 U.S. at 940, 116 S.Ct. 2485 (stating recent automobile exception cases provided reduced expectation of privacy as a further (not alternative) justification for the exception but continued to recognize ready mobility as a requirement before the exception applied).
If a reduced expectation of privacy alone was sufficient to justify the automobile exception, any vehicle licensed or registered could be searched upon probable cause alone. The United States Supreme Court explicitly rejected the notion that the auto*357mobile exception applies to all vehicles. "The word 'automobile' is not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth Amendment fades away and disappears." Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 461, 91 S.Ct. 2022.
If we were to agree ... that seizures and searches of automobiles are likewise per se reasonable given probable cause, then by the same logic any search or seizure could be carried out without a warrant, and we would simply have read the Fourth Amendment out of the Constitution.
Id. at 480, 91 S.Ct. 2022.
Furthermore, the majority states that the "Supreme Court has emphasized that the automobile exception has no separate exigency requirement." Op. at 354 (emphasis added). However, the Supreme Court never removed its initial exigency requirement that the vehicle be readily mobile. Instead, the Court held a separate (or additional) exigent cireumstance was not required. See Labron, 518 U.S. at 940, 116 S.Ct. 2485 (noting that the "first cases establishing the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement were based on the automobile's 'ready mobility,, an exigency sufficient to exeuse failure to obtain a search warrant once probable cause to conduct the search is clear.").
In the instant case, the warrantless search of Myers's vehicle was improper because the automobile exception to the warrant requirement did not apply. Regardless of whether probable cause existed that Myers's vehicle contained contraband, the ready mobility requirement was not met. When Myers's vehicle was first seized, it was not readily mobile. Myers was not stopped on the highway while driving his vehicle, nor was he inside or near his vehicle when it was seized. Even though Myers possessed the key to his vehicle, he was locked in a classroom during the canine sweep in the parking lot. Additionally, both police officers and school officials surrounded Myers's vehicle after the dog alerted to the presence of narcotics in his vehicle. Therefore, Myers's vehicle was neither readily mobile nor capable of being driven away. See Scott v. State, 775 N.E.2d 1207, 1210-11 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), trans. denied (holding automobile exeeption did not apply to war-rantless search of vehicle where vehicle was not readily mobile because the vehicle was legally parked in parking lot, occupants of vehicle were seated on a bench in the playground near the parking lot, police officers surrounded the vehicle, and the driver of the vehicle was handcuffed for safety purposes).
Additionally, it was reasonably practicable for the police to obtain a search warrant. The canine sweep at Austin High School was conducted on Thursday, December 12, 2002, at approximately 9:00 am. Myers was locked inside a classroom, and his car was parked in the school lot, police officers and school officials surrounded Myers's vehicle, and the vehicle was not obstructing traffic. The courts were probably open that day and a judge was likely available to sign a search warrant. See Shepherd v. State, 690 N.E.2d 318, 323 (Ind.Ct.App.1997), trans. denied (holding it was reasonably practicable to obtain warrant to search defendant's vehicle where courts were open on day of warrantless search and judges were available to sign warrant).
Accordingly, I would reverse the denial of Myers's motion to suppress and therefore dissent from the majority opinion.