Court Opinion

ID: 9752085
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 17:33:47.176278+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:06.582441
License: Public Domain

McEWEN, Judge,
dissenting.
The careful analysis and exceptional expression of the view of the majority will likely reveal dissent as improvident, but I, nonetheless, am compelled to this expression since I cannot agree that the Lemon Law definition of “Purchaser” is restricted to individuals who “retain possession and ownership of the vehicle”. Thus, I would vacate the order granting summary judgment and permit appellant to proceed in the trial court to seek refund of “the full purchase price”. The majority notes that this Court has displayed a reluctance to expand the definition of “Purchaser” to include the “lessee” of a motor vehicle. Industrial Valley Bank v. Howard, 368 Pa.Super. 263, 533 A.2d 1055 (1987) , appeal denied, 520 Pa. 576, 549 A.2d 136 (1988). If this Court is to persist in the reluctant mode, we would here refrain from expanding the legislative definition of “Purchaser” by adding, to the legislative requirement of ownership, a judicial requirement of “continued possession and ownership”. Nor, in my opinion, is a study of this appeal illuminated by the holding of this Court in Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Dunsmore, 374 Pa.Super. 303, 542 A.2d 1033 (1988) , since the manufacturer there was not, as it is here, a party to that litigation, and this Court was there obliged, maeste dictu consumptore, to view Ford Motor Credit Company, the financial institution, as an entity separate and distinct from Ford Motor Company, the manufacturer. This Court need not heed public policy arguments to afford *438the consumer the right to pursue his claim against this automobile manufacturer but need simply refrain from altering and restricting the definition provided by the legislature. Thus it is that I would vacate the order granting summary judgment.