Court Opinion

ID: 9885840
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 15:13:10.514108+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:49:17.536283
License: Public Domain

On Petition to Rehear.
The only grievance presented by the petition to rehear is that in the former opinion of this Court we undertook a construction of Code section 10606(1) when no construction was necessary and when the language of the legislative Act was clear and left no room for doubt. With this contention we cannot at all agree..
A reading of section 10506(1) reveals (and we italicized these portions of the section in our opinion) that the Legislature enacted that with regard to appeals from Chambers decrees, “they (appellants) shall have the same right of appeal as if the cause were heard in term; *394provided, that said appeal be prayed at the time, or -within twenty days after, the decree is rendered by the chancellor. ’ ’
In section 9047 which regulates the time for taking appeals from decrees in term, there is no mention of the period of twenty days. •
Therefore under the issues presentéd by the case before us, it became necessary for us to construe section 10506 (1), and say whether that clause of the section which gave to the appellants from Chambers decrees the same rights as appellants from decrees in term, should prevail over the proviso giving twenty days from the date of the entry of the decree, as was insisted by petitioner-complainant. We think it clear beyond serious argument, that a construction of the statute was imperative, to decide the issues before us.
It is then insisted, in the Petition to Rehear, that the right of appeal, and the time within which the right is to be exercised, are‘separate and distinct. In other words, that in the first clause of the section above quoted, the Legislature gave appellants from Chambers decrees the right to all forms of appeal that were open to appellants from decrees in term; and that in fixing the twenty-day limit in the latter part of the section without modifying it by inserting the words found in section 9047, “if the court holds so long, otherwise before the adjournment of the court”, the Legislature meant to give appellants from Chambers decrees twenty days from the entry of the decree, whether the court held so long or not. If the “twenty days” was to be allowed the appellant from Chambers decrees in all events, and not under the condition that the Court “holds so long,” the final provision of section 10506(1) of the Code would have no meaning or application. This provision is,
*395“. . . and tlie chancellor shall have the right to allow the appellant time, not to exceed thirty days, in which to perfect appeal by giving’ bond or otherwise complying with the law and the terms of the decree. ’ ’
The clear application of this provision is — that if the term is about to end within the twenty days, the Chancellor may enter an order extending the time for perfecting’ the appeal, as he may do under section 9047.
The 'contention that since there is no limitation to a current term an appellant from a Chambers decree shall have “twenty days” in any event without limit, is ingenious hut entirely overlooks another section of the Code which we think applicable to decrees in Chambers and decrees in term, and which was so held in our former opinion. This section 8980 is:
“A rehearing can only be applied for at the term of the court at which the decree sought to be affected is rendered.”
This is a general provision of the Code applicable both to Chambers decrees and to those entered in term, and would, without our construction of section 10506 (1), which we reaffirm, prevent an acceptance of the insistence of petitioner.
The petition to rehear is denied.