Court Opinion

ID: 9389497
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-25 18:03:34.375705+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:28.039137
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
  UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                  AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                     IN THE
              ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                 DIVISION ONE

       IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO K.L.

                              No. 1 CA-JV 22-0248
                                FILED 4-25-2023

            Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
                              No. JD39605
                 The Honorable Robert Ian Brooks, Judge

                                   AFFIRMED

                                    COUNSEL

Maricopa County Public Advocate, Mesa
By Suzanne W. Sanchez
Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Bailey Leo
Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

Maricopa County Office of the Legal Advocate, Phoenix
By Aimee D. Youngblood
Counsel for Appellee K.L.
            IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO K.L.
                        Decision of the Court

                        MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Michael S. Catlett delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie and Judge Michael J. Brown joined.

C A T L E T T, Judge:

¶1            Emeryald M. (“Mother”) appeals the juvenile court’s order
terminating her parental rights as to K.L. (“Child”), arguing the
Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) did not provide sufficient
reunification efforts because DCS should have provided more services.
Because Mother did not request additional services or object to the services
DCS provided before the severance hearing, we affirm.

             FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2           In October 2020, the juvenile court made a dependency
finding that Mother was “unable to provide effective parental care due to
substance abuse, mental health, and failure to provide for the child’s
medical care.” DCS provided Mother with relevant services, including
substance abuse treatment, a parenting aide, and therapy. Mother
completed substance abuse treatment on November 3, 2021, but thereafter
continued to test positive for marijuana and alcohol. She was referred to
treatment two additional times. Mother was also documented arriving at
an appointment smelling of alcohol.

¶3            Child has chronic asthma. Child’s placement family brought
him to frequent medical appointments, which Mother was also expected to
attend. The medical appointments were scheduled twice a week, generally
at 7:30 a.m., 8:30 a.m., or 3:30 p.m., and included breathing treatments.
Mother could not purchase a personal breathing machine, but she did not
ask questions about the process for otherwise obtaining one.

¶4             Mother drove her vehicle to Child’s medical appointments
that were forty-five minutes away from her home and did not request
transportation from DCS. She would only provide DCS with same-day
notice if she was going to miss an appointment. DCS prioritized the family
who has Child in their care by allowing the family to reschedule medical
appointments, if necessary, instead of Mother. Mother could reschedule
other appointments, such as visitations, if necessary.

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             IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO K.L.
                         Decision of the Court

¶5            DCS reminded Mother that the medical office had a policy
prohibiting a parent who was not on time from participating. DCS advised
Mother to arrive five to ten minutes early to avoid missing an appointment.
Mother responded to the advice by stating she “d[id] not have a problem
getting to my sons [sic] appointments on time . . . .” and “[o]n time is on
time.” In the five months before the severance hearing, Mother missed
approximately eight out of fifty appointments.

¶6            Prior to the severance hearing, the court granted six separate
motions finding reasonable efforts to finalize permanency, and Mother did
not object by requesting additional services. After the severance hearing,
the court made extensive factual findings and determined the services
provided did “constitute reasonable and diligent efforts by [DCS] to reunify
Mother with the child.” The court further found that additional
reunification efforts would be futile because Mother continued to abuse
marijuana and alcohol. The court terminated Mother’s parental rights to
Child under A.R.S. §§ 8-533(B)(3) and 8-533(B)(8).

¶7             Mother timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under A.R.S. §
8-235(A).

                                 DISCUSSION

¶8              Mother appeals the termination decision on one (and only
one) ground—DCS did not provide diligent reunification efforts because
additional services were not provided. “Parents have a fundamental right
to raise their children as they see fit, but that right is not without limitation.”
Minh T. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 202 Ariz. 76, 79 ¶ 14 (App. 2001). We
“will affirm a severance order unless it is clearly erroneous.” Alma S. v. Dep’t
of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 151 ¶ 18 (2018). We view the evidence in the
light most favorable to sustaining the court’s ruling and will not disturb a
factual finding unless there is no reasonable evidence to support it. Adrian
E. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 239 Ariz. 240, 241 ¶ 2 (App. 2016); Mary Lou C. v.
Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 47 ¶ 8 (App. 2004).

¶9            The juvenile court must “consider the totality of the
circumstances when determining whether DCS has made diligent efforts.”
Donald W. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 247 Ariz. 9, 23 ¶ 49 (App. 2019). “[A]
diligent effort requires—at the least—DCS to identify the conditions
causing the child’s out-of-home placement, provide services that have a
reasonable prospect of success to remedy the circumstances as they arise
throughout the time-in-care period, maintain consistent contact with the

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             IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO K.L.
                         Decision of the Court

parent, and make reasonable efforts to assist the parent in areas where
compliance proves difficult.” Id. at 23 ¶ 50 (citation omitted).

¶10          Mother argues DCS’s reunification efforts were deficient
because DCS did not help her by (1) rescheduling Child’s medical
appointments; (2) providing transportation to Child’s medical
appointments; or (3) providing a breathing machine for Child. We disagree
for two reasons.

¶11            First, Mother waived her argument. When the juvenile court
record shows that DCS ordered specific services according to a case plan,
and the juvenile court finds during the implementation of the plan that DCS
made reasonable efforts to provide those services, a parent who does not
contemporaneously object cannot later challenge that finding on appeal. See
Shawanee S. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 234 Ariz. 174, 178–79 ¶ 16 (App. 2014);
Bennigno R. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 233 Ariz. 345, 349 ¶ 19 (App. 2013).
Here, the juvenile court considered six separate motions requesting
confirmation that DCS was making reasonable efforts to finalize
permanency. Each resulting minute entry contained findings that DCS
made reasonable efforts. See Shawanee S., 234 Ariz. at 179 ¶ 17. Mother did
not object to any of the six motions and did not otherwise request additional
services before the severance hearing. See id.; Bennigno R., 233 Ariz. at 349
¶ 19. Mother, thereby, waived her deficient services argument.

¶12            Second, notwithstanding waiver, we have reviewed the
record and conclude it contains sufficient evidence supporting the juvenile
court’s factual findings and its conclusion that DCS made reasonable efforts
under the circumstances to provide Mother with appropriate reunification
services, and any additional services would be futile. See Bennigno R., 233
Ariz. at 350 ¶ 20. Mother contradicted her deficient services argument by
unreasonably refusing to take steps to cure issues with attendance at the
Child’s medical appointments, such as asking questions or failing to begin
her commute earlier. In any event, the services that Mother identifies as
lacking would not, for the most part, address the multiple reasons why the
superior court severed Mother’s parental rights—prolonged substance
abuse (see A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3)) and length of time in out-of-home placement
(see A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)) due to Mother’s abuse of marijuana and alcohol,
failure to address her mental health issues, and inability to recognize and
meet Child’s special needs. DCS is not “required to provide every
conceivable service . . . .” See Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-501904, 180
Ariz. 348, 353 (App. 1994).

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           IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO K.L.
                       Decision of the Court

                             CONCLUSION

¶13           We affirm the juvenile court’s judgment terminating Mother’s
parental rights.

                           AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                           FILED: AA

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