Court Opinion

ID: 9587662
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:24:55.769717+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:44:45.697757
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
dissenting.
I concur in Divisions 2, 3, and 4 but respectfully dissent with respect to Division 1.
1. The indictment charges that defendant did “intentionally operate and participate in earnings of a gambling place, ... a residence. . . .” This is a violation of OCGA § 16-12-22 (a) (1).
A “gambling place” is defined as any “building ... or other property whatsoever, one of the principal uses of which is . . . the receiving, holding, recording, or forwarding of bets or offers to bet; . . . .” OCGA § 16-12-20 (3).
In defendant’s house were found, and introduced into evidence along with explanation by an Internal Revenue Service agent as an expert, the following items: approximately 300 parlay sheet stubs for football games, the majority of which bore names or initials as well as written dollar amounts; football line sheets; a bank bag with 3 complete parlay sheets; a paper with the handwritten words “Whatley 8 Parlay”; a ledger notebook with about 10 pages of handwritten names, football team names, dates, and dollar amounts; a notebook upon which was handwritten “Carlton N. Left. 137.50 will call Bet in *17710/26/86 -Sat- $100.00 Mich St — 21”; a paper with a newspaper clipping of world temperatures taped to it and the handwritten notation “Pick three cities with the hightes (sic) temp or three with the lowest. All cities most circle. Ties Loses (sic).” These items were in various parts of defendant’s house.
Decided October 18, 1988 —
Rehearing denied November 7, 1988
James C. Wyatt, for appellant.
Stephen F. Lanier, District Attorney, Fred R. Simpson, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
Although the obvious principal use of defendant’s house was as his and his family’s residence, the statutory definition of gambling places does not exclude residences or places used primarily as residences. It embraces buildings “one of the principal uses of which is” one of the forbidden activities. The proscribed conduct includes “holding . . . bets or offers to bet.” It also includes “recording . . . bets or offers to bet.” These would be included in the prohibition against “operating or participating in the earnings of a gambling place.”
There being evidence that defendant was engaged in such activity, and that one of the principal uses of his residence was to hold the bets and house his recording activity, the conviction of commercial gambling should be affirmed. “[T]he definition of ‘gambling place’ in § 16-12-20 (3) is sufficiently clear to warn persons of ordinary intelligence of what places to avoid, and is sufficiently clear to discourage or preclude arbitrary enforcement decisions concerning what places constitute ‘gambling places.’ ” Izzo v. State, 257 Ga. 109, 110 (356 SE2d 204) (1987).
2. As to Division 4, compare Dunn v. State, 178 Ga. App. 6 (1) (341 SE2d 877) (1986).
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Deen, Judge Carley, and Judge Pope join in this dissent.