Court Opinion

ID: 9794588
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:08:16.988294+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:01.442134
License: Public Domain

ROSSMAN, J.,
specially concurring.
I concur in the result in this case. However, in characterizing the handcuffing issue as a “red herring,” the majority, I believe, has glossed over an important question rather than come to grips with it.
Defendant contends:
“* * * [E]ven if the stop were reasonable in its inception, the circumstances and length of the stop were not. Indeed, the handcuffing and placement of defendant in the police car are more aptly described as an arrest. See, State v. Groda, 285 Or 321, 591 P2d 1354, 1356 (1979); ORS 133.005. That it was an arrest without probable cause is undeniable, ORS 131.005(11).”
Defendant was “stopped,” albeit in handcuffs, and was not under arrest until after the officers found the revolver in defendant’s automobile. See ORS 131.605, 131.615 and 133.005(1). See also 3 LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 9.2 (pertinent portion quoted in slip opinion at 5 n 1). Furthermore, in my opinion, under the applicable principles, defendant’s handcuffing was justified.
ORS 131.605(5) defines a “stop” as a “temporary restraint of a person’s liberty.” (Emphasis supplied.) ORS 131.615 authorizes the detention of persons lawfully stopped for the period necessary for reasonable inquiry. What method may be reasonably necessary to effect the authorized restraint depends on the circumstances of the individual case. Although it may be true that the majority of suspects voluntarily submit to police questioning, I am aware of no constitutional or statutory requirement that a police officer, when confronted by suspects who may be armed and who do not cooperate, must “turn 'em loose and duck.”1 Such a rule would jeopardize the *108safety of the public and the police. We cited with approval in State v. McGregor, 57 Or App 78, 81, 643 P2d 1315 (1982), the following language from State v. Miller, 45 Or App 407, 410-11, 608 P2d 595, rev den 289 Or 275 (1980):
“A law enforcement officer, in the process of making an arrest or questioning a person suspected of criminal activity, may take reasonably necessary measures to protect himself and other persons from injury. State v. Riley, [240 Or 521, 402 P2d 741 (1965)], Terry v. Ohio, 392 US 1, 88 S Ct 1868, 20 6L Ed 2d 889 (1968). * * *” (Emphasis supplied.)
Those “necessary measures” may sometimes include the use of reasonable force. See, e.g., United States v. Merritt, 695 F2d 1263 (10th Cir 1982). In addition, under some circumstances, the use of force may be required in order for the officers to proceed with the investigation. See, e.g., United States v. Purry, 545 F2d 217 (D.C. Cir 1976) (holding that handcuffing the defendant was an appropriate method of maintaining the status quo while further inquiry was made). As the court explained in United States v. Bautista, 684 F2d 1286, 1289-90 (9th Cir 1982), involving an investigatory stop of suspects in a bank robbery:
“On the one hand, handcuffing substantially aggravates the intrusiveness of an otherwise routine investigatory detention and is not part of a typical Terry stop. On the other hand, police conducting on-the-scene investigations involving potentially dangerous suspects may take precautionary measures if they are reasonably necessary. The purpose of the Terry frisk is ‘to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of violence.’ Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1923, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972).
*109“Defendants argue that they were automatically under arrest once they were handcuffed because from that moment on they were ‘not free to leave.’ * * * A brief but complete restriction of liberty, if not excessive under the circumstances, is permissible during a Terry stop and does not necessarily convert the stop into an arrest. [United States v. Patterson, 648 F2d 625, 632-33 (9th Cir 1981)]. * * *
“The initial handcuffing in this case was not excessive. It was not unreasonable for Officer Gaspar to take adequate protective measures before remaining with two men suspected of armed bank robbery, particularly when ‘the suspects appeared extremely nervous and suspect Bautista kept pacing back and forth and looking, turning his head back and forth as if he was thinking about running.’ Continued use of the handcuffs after Officer Powers had returned from the house presents a much closer question. But the fact is that defendants were suspected of robbery in which three men with guns participated and the third robber might still have been in the vicinity. The handcuffs eliminated the possibility of an assault or escape attempt during the questioning, particularly if an arrest became imminent. * * *” (Emphasis supplied; footnotes omitted.)
Here, the officers had reason to believe that defendant and others had been involved in the reported shooting and that defendant was presently armed and dangerous. It was appropriate for the officers to frisk him and to detain him while examining his car for weapons. He physically resisted the officer’s attempt to frisk him.2 The force used to detain defendant during the stop was reasonably necessary to ensure the safety of the officers and others and to maintain the status quo while the inquiry proceeded.

The Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure § 110.2(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1975) provides that an officer may use such force (other than deadly force) as may be reasonably necessary to stop a suspect or to cause him to remain in the officer’s presence. As the draftsmen point out:
“* * * [I]t would be frustrating and humiliating to the officer to grant him an authority to order persons to stop, and then ask him to stand by while his order is flouted. Nor is it anomalous that this section authorizes force to compel the persons to stop but relies thereafter on the person’s cooperation. Certainly a person who has had to be forcibly stopped is unlikely to prove cooperative *108thereafter, but the officer may wish to immobilize such a person in order to check a description or identification, or simply to procure a period of time during which he can decide whether to make an arrest. By this provision he is not forced to arrest at once.
“There is ground for concern that encounters in which moderate force is used may escalate into deadly force; but this possibility does not seem so serious as to warrant rejecting an authority which is essential to a coherent scheme of police powers. Moreover, if force were not authorized to enforce an order to stop, in all probability it would be used anyway, because a person who flees upon an order to stop will usually be subject to lawful arrest and thus the force authorized to effect an arrest. The net effect of authorizing force is, therefore, to allow the officer to avoid making an arrest in cases where the circumstances would usually justify this more drastic alternative.” Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure, supra, at 284-85.

Defendant does not challenge the officers’ testimony concerning the confrontation between them at the door of the laundromat.