Court Opinion

ID: 9916955
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-10 21:08:12.340172+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:12.366590
License: Public Domain

01/10/2024
                IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                           AT KNOXVILLE
                                   July 20, 2023 Session

      ERIC WAYNE BARTON v. MECHELLE SCHOLMER BARTON

                  Appeal from the Chancery Court for Blount County
                 No. 2015-021      Telford E. Forgety, Jr., Chancellor
                       ___________________________________

                              No. E2022-01574-COA-R3-CV

                        ___________________________________

This is an appeal of a trial court’s valuation of a marital asset, division of a marital estate,
and award of alimony in solido as a result of the divorce of Eric Wayne Barton
(“Husband”) and Mechelle Scholmer Barton (“Wife”). In its 2018 Final Judgment of
Divorce (“2018 Judgment”), the Chancery Court for Blount County (“the Trial Court”)
found that Husband’s 100% interest in Vanquish Worldwide, LLC, (“Vanquish
Worldwide”) was marital property and that Vanquish Worldwide’s outstanding claim for
potentially $32 million against the U.S. Government (“Government Claim”) was marital
property. The Trial Court accordingly awarded to Wife a portion of the Government
Claim. In Husband’s first appeal, this Court reversed the Trial Court’s finding that the
Government Claim was marital property and its awarded portion to Wife. This Court,
concluding that the Government Claim was nevertheless relevant to an accurate valuation
of Vanquish Worldwide and the total value of the parties’ marital business interests,
instructed the Trial Court on remand to revalue Vanquish Worldwide, and in doing so, to
consider the Government Claim. On remand, the Trial Court found that Husband had
dissipated $12.375 million of the Government Claim proceeds by using the funds to
satisfy a personal judgment against him. The Trial Court accordingly added the
dissipated $12.375 million to its $4 million valuation of Vanquish Worldwide. Husband
has appealed, contesting the Trial Court’s consideration of the Government Claim
proceeds in its valuation of Vanquish Worldwide, as well as its overall division of the
marital estate, award of alimony in solido, and placement of a lien and an assignment in
trust to Wife on Husband’s ownership interests in his numerous LLCs, including
Vanquish Worldwide. We affirm the Trial Court’s finding that Husband dissipated
marital property and its valuation of Vanquish Worldwide but modify the Trial Court’s
judgment to the extent it awarded interest on Wife’s award of alimony in solido. The
balance of the Trial Court’s judgment is affirmed, including its division of the marital
estate and award of alimony in solido to Wife. We further decline to award Wife
attorney’s fees on appeal.
      Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court
               Affirmed in Part, Modified in Part; Case Remanded

D. MICHAEL SWINEY, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which THOMAS R.
FRIERSON, II, and KRISTI M. DAVIS, JJ., joined.

C. Scott Taylor, Elizabeth M. Towe, and Karen G. Crutchfield, Knoxville, Tennessee, for
the appellant, Eric Wayne Barton.

Melanie E. Davis, Ashley Bentley, and Joel Reeves, Maryville, Tennessee, for the
appellee, Mechelle Scholmer Barton.

                                       OPINION

                                      Background

       As noted by the parties and the Trial Court, this case involves an “extensive and
complicated” marital estate. This is the second time Husband has appealed the Trial
Court’s valuation and division of marital assets. This Court, in its opinion styled, Barton
v. Barton, No. E2019-01136-COA-R3-CV, 2020 WL 6580562 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 10,
2020) (“Barton I”), described the procedural history of the parties’ divorce as follows:

              This is an appeal of a divorce case and centers on the classification,
       valuation, and division of an extensive marital estate amassed during an 18-
       year marriage. Eric Barton (“Husband”) and Mechelle Barton (“Wife”) met
       while Husband was in the Marine Corps, stationed at Camp Lejeune, North
       Carolina and Wife was employed at the PX on the base. The two were
       married in North Carolina in 1998. Each had a child from a previous
       marriage, and together, they had a daughter in 2000. In 2005, they adopted
       two sons, who were ages 3 and 4 at the time. The family later moved to
       Blount County, Tennessee in 2006.

             In 2005, Husband began doing private government contract work
       with the United States Army in Iraq. He subsequently began his own
       business, entering into contracts directly with the United States
       Government involving security, vehicle maintenance, and logistics. In
       2007, he started Vanquish Worldwide, LLC (“Vanquish Worldwide”), a
       company that contracted with National Afghan Trucking to transport
       government goods to 400 military bases in Iraq. The business was very
       successful, and the parties amassed considerable assets during the years
       2011-2015 until the contract was terminated in December 2015, a year

                                           -2-
before it was set to expire. Husband also started many other businesses and
acquired significant real estate during the course of the marriage.

       Around this same time the marriage relationship deteriorated, and
the parties separated in February 2015. Husband filed a complaint for
divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences on March 11, 2015.
Wife filed an answer and counter-complaint for divorce on April 2, 2015,
alleging irreconcilable differences and inappropriate marital conduct. The
parties were able to settle most of their issues relating to parenting and
child support prior to trial, but the trial court was called upon to resolve the
grounds for awarding the divorce, divide the marital property, and resolve
Wife’s claim for alimony and attorney’s fees.

       Following a three-day trial in September 2016 at which Husband,
Wife, and Wife’s accounting expert testified, the court entered a
Memorandum and Order on November 14, 2016, in which it adjudicated
some, but not all, issues in the case. The Final Judgment for Divorce was
ultimately entered on July 6, 2018, adjudicating all outstanding matters.

        In the Final Judgment for Divorce, which incorporated the
Memorandum and Order, the trial court granted Wife a divorce on the
ground of Husband’s inappropriate marital conduct and classified, valued,
and divided the marital estate, with Wife receiving approximately 55
percent and Husband 45 percent. Husband was ordered to pay Wife the
sum of $7,294,570.30 as alimony in solido to adjust the marital distribution
in the estate, payable over a period of 10 years, with 119 monthly payments
of $30,394.04 and a final balloon payment of $3,677,679.54. The Final
Judgment also confirmed that the court awarded a lien on real property
“whether the property is titled in the name of Eric Wayne Barton, Lexlin
Gypsy Ranch, Vanquish Worldwide, LLC, and/or Vanquish Leasing” to
secure payment of the alimony in solido award. Wife was also awarded her
attorney’s fees in the amount of $43,571.57 as additional alimony in solido.

       The trial court also concluded, as it had in its Memorandum and
Order, that a certain “contingent contractual claim” of Vanquish Worldwide
against the U.S. Government, potentially worth $32 million dollars, was a
marital asset subject to division. The court then proceeded to allocate the
first $6,664,000.00 of any recovery from Vanquish Worldwide’s claims,
after litigation expenses were paid, to Husband, and allocated “any
recovery beyond the first $6,664,000.00 as 55% to the Wife, and 45% to
the Husband, net after reasonable litigation expenses.”

                                     -3-
              Both parties filed motions to alter or amend the Final Judgment.
       Wife subsequently voluntarily dismissed her motion. Husband’s motion
       was granted in part, in that the paragraph of the Final Judgment concerning
       the contractual claim was amended to provide that each party would be
       responsible for his or her pro rata share of taxes accrued from the amounts
       received. The court denied Husband’s motion in part, refusing to strike the
       liens awarded to Wife on LLC assets to secure her alimony in solido award.
       Husband filed a timely appeal.

Id. at *1-2 (footnotes omitted).

        In Barton I, Husband contested the Trial Court’s classification of certain business
entities as marital property, valuation of marital property, division of marital property,
and award of $43,571.57 in alimony in solido for payment of attorney’s fees. One issue
raised by Husband in Barton I was whether the Trial Court had erred in classifying
Vanquish Worldwide as a marital asset. Id. at *3. He specifically took issue with the
following language from the Trial Court’s 2018 Judgment: “Vanquish Worldwide, LLC
is a marital asset and the Wife has an interest in Vanquish Worldwide, LLC as a marital
asset.” Id. This Court concluded that notwithstanding the Trial Court’s imprecise
language, it was evident that the Trial Court intended to classify Husband’s interest in
Vanquish Worldwide as marital property, which it awarded to Husband. Id. This Court
accordingly affirmed the Trial Court’s classification of Husband’s ownership interest in
Vanquish Worldwide as a marital asset. Id.

       This Court also considered whether the Trial Court “had jurisdiction to act on the
assets of the LLCs themselves once Husband was awarded his full membership interest in
the LLCs as part of the court’s division of the assets”, whether the Trial Court had “erred
in classifying an asset of Vanquish Worldwide, i.e., the $32.8 million contractual claim
against the United States Government, as marital property”, and whether the Trial Court
had erred “in awarding Wife a lien to secure her alimony in solido payment against
various parcels of real property that were owned by the LLCs and not Husband,
individually.” Id.

       With respect to the liens placed on real estate owned by Husband’s LLCs, this
Court concluded:

               Here, the trial court’s judgment attempts to reach the real estate
       assets of both Husband and of three LLCs owned by Husband to secure his
       alimony in solido obligation. While Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-
       4-121(f)(2) grants courts the authority to impose a lien to effectuate an
       equitable distribution, and the court’s judgment, once recorded, operates as
       a lien on the real property owned by Husband, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 25-5-
       101(b)(1), there is no statutory authority here for the court to act upon
                                            -4-
       parcels of real estate owned by the LLCs. Despite Husband’s 100 percent
       ownership interest in the LLCs that owned these parcels of real estate,
       Tennessee Code Annotated section 48-249-502(a) provides that “[a]
       member has no interest in specific LLC property. All property transferred
       to or acquired by an LLC is property of the LLC.” See also Tenn. Code
       Ann. § 48-215-101(a).

              There is no debate that the LLCs were not parties in this case, even
       though Vanquish Worldwide filed a motion to intervene, which was denied.
       Thus, the court did not have jurisdiction over these entities and their assets,
       only the parties’ ownership interest in the LLCs themselves. We, therefore,
       conclude that the real property owned by the LLCs could not be subjected
       to a lien to guarantee payment of Husband’s alimony obligation, and we
       vacate those portions of the trial court’s judgment granting Wife a lien on
       those parcels of real property owned by the LLCs.

Id. at *5.

     In considering whether the Trial Court had erred in how it treated Vanquish
Worldwide’s contractual claim against the U.S. government, this Court concluded:

               Because the assets of an LLC are separate from those of its
       members, we conclude that the contractual claim was not marital property
       and was therefore not subject to distribution to Wife. We, therefore, vacate
       the trial court’s award to Wife of any interest in the contractual claim of
       Vanquish Worldwide.

              In view of the fact that the trial court’s order clearly reflects that it
       treated the contractual claim as an asset of Husband, separate from the
       value of the marital interest in Vanquish Worldwide, the value of Vanquish
       Worldwide and the net martial business interests have necessarily not been
       accurately computed.        Indeed, the contractual claim of Vanquish
       Worldwide is relevant to an accurate valuation of Vanquish Worldwide and
       the total value of the parties’ marital business interests. Therefore, we
       vacate that portion of the trial court’s order pertaining to the valuation of
       the parties’ marital business interests and remand this case so that the trial
       court can consider the impact of the contractual claim on the court’s
       valuation. The trial court is free to take additional proof on the valuation of
       Vanquish Worldwide.

Id.

                                            -5-
       This Court also found that the Trial Court had erred in its calculation of the total
value of the parties’ business interests. This Court accordingly provided the following
instruction:

       Although it is clear that the trial court overvalued the net marital business
       interests based upon its own findings, the court’s calculations were, as
       alluded to earlier in this Opinion, divorced from a proper consideration of
       the impact of the contractual claim held by Vanquish Worldwide. The trial
       court effectively treated that contractual claim as a personal asset of
       Husband’s that was subject to division. As we have concluded, it was an
       asset of the LLC, not subject to division. Its relevance relates to the value
       of Vanquish Worldwide. On remand, when the trial court reconsiders the
       valuation of the parties’ marital business interests, the court should only
       specifically revalue Vanquish Worldwide in light of its previous failure to
       properly account for the contractual claim. It should then take the above
       calculation error into account when reevaluating the value of the total
       marital business interests.

Id. at *11. Husband also contested the Trial Court’s division of the marital estate and
award of attorney’s fees to Wife, but this Court declined to weigh in on those matters
given that it was remanding for the Trial Court to reconsider the value of the parties’
marital business interests. As a result, it vacated the Trial Court’s distribution of marital
property and award of attorney’s fees to Wife. Id.

       Upon remand, the Trial Court entered an order in February 2022, deciding that it
would value Vanquish Worldwide based upon its value at the time of the upcoming
hearing. The Trial Court conducted a hearing to adjudicate the issues on remand from
this Court on August 16 and 17 of 2022.

       At the beginning of the hearing, the parties stipulated that Husband had made
payments in the amount of $3,073,484.49 toward his alimony obligation to Wife since
2016 and that all child support issues had been resolved. The parties also agreed that the
Trial Court should revalue only Vanquish Worldwide as of the day of the hearing and
then consider this value in making a new equitable division of marital assets in
accordance with Barton I.

        During the hearing, Husband and Greg Guiney, executive vice president of
Vanquish Worldwide, testified about the current state of the company. Husband testified
that Vanquish Worldwide had been operating at a net loss during the past few years and
that it was only surviving because he had been using his personal funds to keep it afloat.
He speculated that the company would likely shut down by the end of the year or early
next year. With respect to the Government Claim, Husband explained that Vanquish
Worldwide had received $30 million after five years of litigation with the U.S.
                                          -6-
government and that $8 million of those funds were used to pay attorney’s fees. After
receiving the Government Claim proceeds, Husband, Vanquish Worldwide, and various
other LLCs owned by Husband entered into a settlement agreement with the Koshani
family, who had previously sued Husband and won a $33 million judgment against him
personally (“Koshani Judgment”). According to Husband, the Koshani settlement
agreement (“Koshani Settlement”) provided that Husband, Vanquish Worldwide, and his
other LLCs would pay the Koshani family $14.65 million dollars in an exchange for a
release of any claims of debts or liabilities. In addition, Husband testified that Vanquish
Worldwide owed the U.S. government $3 million for a Paycheck Protection Program
(“PPP”) loan it had received during the COVID-19 pandemic. This would be repaid in
the form of a credit to the U.S. government.

       Husband’s expert witness, Andrew Lowe, testified as to the value of a 100%
equity interest in Vanquish Worldwide. Mr. Lowe utilized a valuation date of December
31, 2021, and valued the equity interest in Vanquish Worldwide at $1,040,000. Wife’s
expert witness, Renee Harwell, testified that she valued a 100% equity interest in
Vanquish Worldwide as of June 30, 2022. She valued the equity interest at $7.47
million, but provided a value of $30.27 million if the proceeds from the Government
Claim had remained in Vanquish Worldwide.

       On October 10, 2022, the Trial Court entered an extensive “Memorandum and
Order” (“2022 Judgment”) adjudicating the valuation of Vanquish Worldwide and
division of the marital estate. In its judgment, the Trial Court reiterated that the main
issue upon remand was the current valuation of Vanquish Worldwide and the impact of
the proceeds from the Government Claim. The Trial Court first noted that Vanquish
Worldwide had received $22 million from its successful litigation with the U.S.
government, after payment of $8 million in attorney’s fees. The Trial Court determined
that Vanquish Worldwide had transferred $18 million to other companies 100% owned
by Husband, “VC3” and “Vanquish Leasing.” The Trial Court emphasized that these
transfers were made without agreement of the parties and without consultation with Wife.

      The Trial Court also determined that Husband had used the Government Claim
“proceeds or the products thereof” to pay the Koshanis $14.65 million in settlement of a
judgment against him personally. The Trial Court noted that Husband testified that the
Koshani Settlement released not only him personally but also Vanquish Worldwide. The
Trial Court also noted Husband’s testimony that the funds transferred to VC3 and
Vanquish Leasing were “paid out for claims handling services rendered to” Vanquish
Worldwide.

      The Trial Court ultimately concluded that there was strong evidence that Husband
had used the Government Claim proceeds to “enrich himself and/or to dissipate or hide
them.” The Trial Court did not credit Husband’s valuation of Vanquish Worldwide or his
explanation of the expenditure of the Government Claim proceeds. The Trial Court
                                         -7-
attributed very little weight to Mr. Guiney’s testimony about the company’s value. The
Trial Court found that Mr. Lowe had given “no real consideration to the impact of the
receipt of the proceeds from the government claim.” Ultimately, the Trial Court chose a
mid-range value, setting Vanquish Worldwide’s base value at $4 million.

       In making an equitable division of marital property, the Trial Court found that no
factors as set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c) weighed in Husband’s favor. The
Trial Court found that factors (2), (3), and (4) weighed heavily in Wife’s favor. The Trial
Court found that factor (5), “contribution to preservation or dissipation of the marital
property,” strongly favored Wife. The Trial Court found that Husband had dissipated a
portion of the proceeds from the Government Claim by using the funds to satisfy the
Koshani Judgment. As a result, the Trial Court adjusted the value to Vanquish
Worldwide “for distribution purposes” to reflect the receipt of these proceeds. Although
Vanquish Worldwide was released along with Husband via the Koshani Settlement, the
Trial Court emphasized that the Koshani Settlement was a result of a personal judgment
against Husband. Accordingly, the Trial Court allocated a 10% benefit to Vanquish
Worldwide as a legitimate business expense. The remaining 90% was treated as
dissipated marital funds in that the settlement agreement primarily benefitted Husband
personally—not the company. The Trial Court therefore added back 90% of the
dissipated funds to the base value of $4 million.

       In doing so, the Trial Court deducted the LLC tax rate of 27.5% from the $30
million Government Claim proceeds and then deducted the $8 million owed in attorney’s
fees for a total of $13.75 million. Assigning a 10% benefit to Vanquish Worldwide, the
Trial Court determined that Husband had dissipated 90% of the funds, or $12.375
million. After adding this number to the base value of $4 million, the Trial Court found
that Vanquish Worldwide would be valued at $16.375 million.

       In dividing the marital estate, the Trial Court again awarded Husband all of the
marital business interests, which were assigned a net value of $11,347,502.11. Given the
Trial Court’s award of the business interests to Husband, the marital estate was divided
such that $19,918,123.50 in property was awarded to Husband and $3,052,236.50 in
property was awarded to Wife. However, the Trial Court retained its original 2018
determination that the equitable division of the marital estate should result in a 55%
award to Wife and 45% award to Husband. Therefore, the Trial Court went through the
same process it did in its 2018 Judgment by awarding Wife alimony in solido to adjust
the imbalance in the division of the marital estate, this time with the new valuation for
Vanquish Worldwide accounted for.

       The Trial Court accordingly ordered Husband to pay to Wife $6,507,977.50 as
alimony in solido plus interest. This value was on top of the $3,073,484 that Husband
had already paid to Wife in alimony. With alimony in solido taken into consideration,
the equitable division of marital property was as follows: $12,633,698 to Wife and
                                          -8-
$10,336,662 to Husband. The Trial Court did not award to Wife attorney’s fees as
alimony in solido inasmuch as she did not offer proof of her current income or needs.

       Given Husband’s previous threats to bankrupt the parties’ businesses or hide
assets, the Trial Court impressed a lien and an assignment in trust to Wife upon
Husband’s ownership interests “in all of the businesses” listed in Exhibit 1 of its 2022
Judgment. The Trial Court provided that: “so long as any part of the alimony obligation
remains unpaid the Husband will be enjoined and prohibited from making any transfers
or expenditures of, or from the businesses except those made in the usual and ordinary
course of business.”

       On October 26, 2022, the Trial Court entered an “Order Amending Judgment,”
correcting some mathematical errors, which we have accounted for in our above-stated
summary of the Trial Court’s final division of marital property and award of alimony in
solido. Husband timely appealed.

                                       Discussion

       Although not exactly stated as such, Husband raises the following issues on
appeal: (1) whether the Trial Court erred in its valuation of Vanquish Worldwide, (2)
whether the Trial Court erred in awarding 55% of the marital estate to Wife and 45% to
Husband, (3) whether the Trial Court erred in awarding Wife $6,507,977.50 with interest
in alimony in solido, and (4) whether the Trial Court erred in placing a lien and an
assignment of trust to Wife upon Husband’s ownership interests in his LLCs. Upon our
review, we modify the Trial Court’s award of interest on Husband’s payment of alimony
in solido. We affirm the balance of the Trial Court’s judgment including its
consideration of the Government Claim proceeds in its valuation of Vanquish
Worldwide, and specifically its finding that Husband dissipated assets meant to be
accounted for in the valuation of Vanquish Worldwide.

       Our review is de novo upon the record, accompanied by a presumption of
correctness of the findings of fact of the trial court, unless the preponderance of the
evidence is otherwise. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); Bogan v. Bogan, 60 S.W.3d 721, 727
(Tenn. 2001). A trial court’s conclusions of law are subject to a de novo review with no
presumption of correctness. S. Constructors, Inc. v. Loudon Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 58
S.W.3d 706, 710 (Tenn. 2001). With respect to credibility determinations, the Tennessee
Supreme Court has instructed:

             When it comes to live, in-court witnesses, appellate courts should
      afford trial courts considerable deference when reviewing issues that hinge
      on the witnesses’ credibility because trial courts are “uniquely positioned to
      observe the demeanor and conduct of witnesses.” State v. Binette, 33
      S.W.3d 215, 217 (Tenn. 2000). “[A]ppellate courts will not re-evaluate a
                                           -9-
       trial judge’s assessment of witness credibility absent clear and convincing
       evidence to the contrary.” Wells v. Tennessee Bd. of Regents, 9 S.W.3d
       779, 783 (Tenn. 1999); see also Hughes v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville &
       Davidson Cnty., 340 S.W.3d 352, 360 (Tenn. 2011). In order for evidence
       to be clear and convincing, it must eliminate any “serious or substantial
       doubt about the correctness of the conclusions drawn from the evidence.”
       State v. Sexton, 368 S.W.3d 371, 404 (Tenn. 2012) (quoting Grindstaff v.
       State, 297 S.W.3d 208, 221 (Tenn. 2009)). Whether the evidence is clear
       and convincing is a question of law that appellate courts review de novo
       without a presumption of correctness. Reid ex rel. Martiniano v. State, 396
       S.W.3d 478, 515 (Tenn. 2013), (citing In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d 586,
       596-97 (Tenn. 2010)), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 224, 187
       L.Ed.2d 167 (2013).

Kelly v. Kelly, 445 S.W.3d 685, 692-93 (Tenn. 2014). Insofar as the issues on appeal
implicate the abuse of discretion standard, “[a]n abuse of discretion occurs when the trial
court causes an injustice by applying an incorrect legal standard, reaches an illogical
result, resolves the case on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or relies on
reasoning that causes an injustice.” Gonsewski v. Gonsewski, 350 S.W.3d 99, 105 (Tenn.
2011).

                                       A. Dissipation

       The primary issue on appeal is the Trial Court’s valuation of Vanquish
Worldwide. Husband particularly contests the Trial Court’s consideration of the
Government Claim proceeds in its valuation of Vanquish Worldwide. However, we note
that Husband does not argue that the Trial Court erred in assigning Vanquish Worldwide
a base value of $4 million. Husband rather argues that the Trial Court erred by adding
the portion of the Government Claim proceeds that Husband spent to satisfy the Koshani
Judgment to the value of Vanquish Worldwide. The Trial Court added $12.375 million
to Vanquish Worldwide’s value based upon its finding of dissipation. Therefore,
considering that Husband does not contest the Trial Court’s initial $4 million valuation of
Vanquish Worldwide, we conclude that this issue is more appropriately considered
through the lens of the division of marital assets and, specifically, the issue of dissipation.

       Regarding dissipation of marital assets, this Court has previously explained:

              Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-121(c)(5)(B) provides that
       “dissipation of assets means wasteful expenditures which reduce the marital
       property available for equitable distributions and which are made for a
       purpose contrary to the marriage either before or after a complaint for
       divorce or legal separation has been filed.”

                                            - 10 -
        A party’s dissipation of marital or separate property is one of many
factors a trial court may take into consideration in making an equitable
division of a marital estate. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c)(5). While
there is no statutory definition of dissipation, the term typically refers to the
use of marital property for a purpose unrelated to the marriage, often to
“hide, deplete, or divert” marital property after a marriage is irretrievably
broken. Larsen-Ball v. Ball, 301 S.W.3d 228, 235 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010).
“The concept of dissipation is based on waste.” Altman v. Altman, 181
S.W.3d 676, 681 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).

       In determining whether dissipation has occurred, the court “must
distinguish between dissipation and discretionary spending.” Larsen-Ball,
301 S.W.3d at 235. While discretionary spending may be ill-advised, “it is
typical of the parties’ expenditures throughout the course of the marriage.”
Id. Expenditures that constitute dissipation, on the other hand, are so far
removed from normal expenditures that they can be characterized as
wasteful or self-serving. See Watson v. Watson, 309 S.W.3d 483, 490
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2009). In Watson, this Court discussed the appropriate
analysis for allegations of dissipation:

               In determining whether dissipation occurred, we find
       trial courts should consider the following: (1) whether the
       evidence presented at trial supports the alleged purpose of the
       various expenditures, and if so, (2) whether the alleged
       purpose equates to dissipation under the circumstances. The
       first prong is an objective test. To satisfy this test, the
       dissipating spouse can bring forward evidence, such as
       receipts, vouchers, claims, or other similar evidence that
       independently support the purpose as alleged. The second
       prong requires the court to make an equitable determination
       based upon a number of factors. Those factors include: (1)
       the typicality of the expenditure to this marriage; (2) the
       benefactor of the expenditure, namely, whether it primarily
       benefitted the marriage or primarily benefitted the sole
       dissipating spouse; (3) the proximity of the expenditure to the
       breakdown of the marital relationship; (4) the amount of the
       expenditure.

Id. at 490-91 (quoting Ward v. Ward, No. W2001-01078-COA-R3-CV,
2002 WL 31845229, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2012)). The party
alleging dissipation has “the initial burden of production and the burden of
persuasion at trial.” Larsen-Ball, 301 S.W.3d at 235. Once the party
alleging dissipation establishes that the money has been dissipated, “the
                                     - 11 -
      burden shifts to the party who spent the money to produce evidence to
      show that the expenditures were appropriate.” Watson, 309 S.W.3d at 491
      (quoting Wiltse v. Wiltse, No. W2002-03132-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL
      1908803, at *4-5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 24, 2004)). The trial court’s
      determination of whether a party dissipated marital assets is a finding of
      fact. See Altman v. Altman, 181 S.W.3d 676, 682 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).
      Dissipation is generally “intentional and purposeful conduct that has the
      effect of reducing the funds available for distribution.” Id. (citation
      omitted). A court may look at whether the spouse “intended to hide,
      deplete, or divert a marital asset.” Id. (quoting Long v. Long, No. M2006-
      02526-COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL 2649645 at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 3,
      2008)).

Trezevant v. Trezevant, 568 S.W.3d 595, 616-17 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2018).

     In its 2022 Judgment, the Trial Court made the following findings related to
Husband’s testimony:

             In its Memorandum and Order of November 14, 2016 this Court
      noted that the Husband had valued all of the parties’ business interests at
      zero. The Court found that it simply could not accredit the Husband’s
      testimony. Memo and Order of November 14, 2016 at p.p. 6, 7. More
      importantly to the current proceeding, the Court noted:

             *The Wife testified that on multiple occasions the Husband
             told her he would bankrupt the businesses and/or hide assets
             so that she would get nothing in the divorce. And it may very
             well be that an element of this exists in this case. Id at p. 7,
             Emphasis added.

             In addition to the direct evidence, there is strong circumstantial
      evidence to the effect that the Husband was trying to use the proceeds from
      the government claim in such a way as to enrich himself and/or to dissipate
      or hide them so that the Wife could get no benefit from them. For example:

             *The proceeds from the government claim were received in
             2018, after this Court’s judgment of Nov. 2016.

             *This Court had found that the government claim was a
             marital asset and had awarded the Wife a share of them. Nov.
             14, 2016 Order at p. 8. (The Court of Appeals found that the
             ownership of Worldwide was a marital asset and that the
             government claim should be reflected in the value of the
                                         - 12 -
              Company. Of course, the Wife had a marital interest in the
              value of the Company.)

              *At least some $18,000,000 of the claim proceeds were paid
              out of Worldwide and into VC3 and Leasing in 2018-19
              while this case was on appeal. This was done without
              permission of the Court and without agreement by the Wife.[1]

              *VC3 and Leasing are owned 100% by the Husband. They
              are located in the same building as Worldwide. VC3 has
              three employees—one of whom is Mr. Barton—and Leasing
              has none. Ex. 10, Harwell Report p.p. 14-17.

              *Some $14.65 million of the claim proceeds or the products
              thereof, were used by the Husband to settle a $33,000,000
              judgment against him personally, and not against Worldwide.
              This was done in July 2020, before the Court of Appeals
              released its opinion in November of 2020. And again, this
              was done without consultation with any Court or agreement
              of the Wife.

             Of course, any fact can be proven by direct evidence, circumstantial
       evidence, or a combination of the two. In Re M.O. 173 S.W. 3d 13, 20
       (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) perm app den.; State v Phillips, 138 S.W. 3d 224,
       230-31 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) perm. app. den.

              Based on all of the evidence the Court concludes it cannot accredit
       the Husband as to the valuation of Worldwide, or as to his explanation of
       the expenditure of the proceeds from the government claim (except as to
       the payment of the personal judgment against him). Furthermore, to the
       extent the Husband’s witnesses attempted to testify as to the legitimacy of
       the transfer of the funds from Worldwide to VC3 and Leasing for claims
       handling services, the Court does not accredit them either. Finally, the
       Court concludes that the Husband handled the proceeds of the claim so as
       to enrich himself; to minimize the value of Worldwide on paper; and to
       defeat or minimize the value of the Wife’s interest in the Company. In
       other words, he did just what he had threatened he would do.

1
  Testimony from Husband and Ms. Harwell indicated that funds from the Government Claim
were first used to pay off contractual consulting fees to VC3 and Vanquish Leasing before being
used to settle the Koshani Judgment against Husband.
                                            - 13 -
       The Trial Court then considered the factors enumerated in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-
4-121(c) in dividing the marital property. The Trial Court found that Husband’s
dissipation or failure to preserve the value of Vanquish Worldwide strongly weighed in
Wife’s favor, citing to factor (5), which provides:

       (5)(A) The contribution of each party to the acquisition, preservation,
       appreciation, depreciation or dissipation of the marital or separate property,
       including the contribution of a party to the marriage as homemaker, wage
       earner or parent, with the contribution of a party as homemaker or wage
       earner to be given the same weight if each party has fulfilled its role;

       (B) For purposes of this subdivision (c)(5), dissipation of assets means
       wasteful expenditures which reduce the marital property available for
       equitable distributions and which are made for a purpose contrary to the
       marriage either before or after a complaint for divorce or legal separation
       has been filed.

In considering factor (5), the Trial Court made the following findings:

              The evidence here clearly establishes that the Husband as owner of
       Worldwide failed “to save that which already existed”—i.e., the
       $22,000,000 proceeds of the government claim came into Worldwide, and
       now it is gone. Further, Husband spent it without consent of the Wife or
       the Court. And, with the bulk going to settle a $33,000,000 judgment
       against himself personally. This payment was certainly not a “usual and
       ordinary” business expense. The Court also finds that all four of the
       “dissipation” factors are met in this case. Thus, it is appropriate that the
       Court “. . . adjust the division of marital property accordingly”. Kholgi [v.
       Aliabadi, No. M2019-01793-COA-R3-CV, 2020 WL 5607816,] at *62
       [(Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2020)]. The adjustment could be made by using
       the Court’s value of Worldwide found above without adding anything for
       the proceeds from the government claim, and then adjusting the percentages
       of the marital estate awarded to the parties. Or, it could be made by
       adjusting the value of Worldwide for distribution purposes to reflect the
       receipt of all, or a portion of the claim proceeds. It is this latter method
       which the Court will use.

       ***

       According to Mr. Barton he paid some $14,650,000 in money and property
       out of the proceeds to settle the federal court judgment against him. . . . The
       Husband claims that Worldwide got the benefit of the $14,650,000 in
       settlement funds paid because it was released along with VC3, Leasing and
                                            - 14 -
       five other entities owned by him when the case was resolved. Trial Ex. 2.
       However, the fact remains that the judgment was a personal liability to the
       Husband and not to Worldwide. And, once again, the Husband has not
       provided any details as to the basis for the judgment against him, or the
       other suits which were released without litigation in the settlement of the
       claim against him. (The settlement agreement refers to a claim by
       Vanquish Worldwide as Plaintiff against Mr. Khoshani,[2] and an
       interpleader action filed by a third party against Mr. Barton, Mr. Khoshoni
       and certain others. See, Trial Ex. 2.) In sum, the great majority of the
       benefit of the $14.65 million in settlement funds paid inured to Mr. Barton
       individually. Nevertheless, perhaps Worldwide did receive some benefit
       from the settlement and release. Therefore, the Court will allocate 10% or
       $1,465,000.00 of the benefit to Worldwide.[3]

        On appeal, Husband argues that the Trial Court erred in finding that he had
dissipated marital assets by using proceeds from the Government Claim to settle the
Koshani Judgment against him. Husband specifically argues that “there was no
testimony or evidence presented at trial that the Husband dissipated marital assets”, “no
testimony or evidence at trial that Vanquish’s use of the proceeds from its claim with the
U.S. Government was not in the ordinary course of its business”, and “no testimony or
evidence at trial that the transactions between Vanquish Worldwide and related entities to
settle and resolve the Koshani Judgment through the Confidential Settlement Agreement
was not made in the ordinary course of business, or did not benefit Vanquish
Worldwide.” Husband’s contention that there was no testimony or evidence that the use
of the Government Claim proceeds was not in the ordinary course of business or that his
use of these funds mostly benefitted himself personally, ignores Husband’s own
testimony and the particularly important fact that the Trial Court did not accredit
Husband’s explanation for the expenditure.

        We emphasize that we “accord considerable deference to the trial court’s factual
findings” when “issues of credibility and weight of testimony are involved” and because
“trial courts are in a far better position than this Court to observe the demeanor of the
witnesses, the weight, faith, and credit to be given witnesses’ testimony lies in the first
instance with the trial court.” See Keyt v. Keyt, 244 S.W.3d 321, 327 (Tenn. 2007). We
further note that whether dissipation has occurred is often a “fact and credibility driven
decision.” Kholghi v. Aliabadi, No. M2019-01793-COA-R3-CV, 2020 WL 5607816, at
*15 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2020) (quoting Slocum v. Slocum, No. M2016-01881-

2
 “Koshani” is spelled a number of different ways in the record. We base our spelling of
“Koshani” on the Koshani Settlement agreement.
3
 These numbers were adjusted in the Trial Court’s “Order Amending Judgment” based upon a
mathematical error.
                                          - 15 -
COA-R3-CV, 2017 WL 4804553, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2017)). The Trial Court
did not find Husband to be credible, specifically finding that his testimony regarding the
valuation of Vanquish Worldwide and his explanation for the expenditure of the proceeds
from the Government Claim lacked credibility. As this Court has explained many times
before, “appellate courts will not re-evaluate a trial judge’s assessment of witness
credibility absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.” Wells v. Tenn. Bd. of
Regents, 9 S.W.3d 779, 783 (Tenn. 1999). Husband has not pointed us to any evidence
that would compel us to re-evaluate the Trial Court’s credibility determination, and we
accordingly defer to the Trial Court’s credibility determination in this instance.

       Upon our review, we conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the
Trial Court’s findings. In its 2018 Judgment, the Trial Court ordered that Husband would
receive the first $6.664 million of the Government Claim and that the remainder of the
proceeds would be allocated 55% to Wife and 45% to Husband. On August 3, 2018,
Husband filed a Rule 59 motion to alter or amend, arguing, inter alia, that the Trial Court
should strike its award to Wife of any of the proceeds from the Government Claim
inasmuch as Vanquish Worldwide was not a party and that the Trial Court had no
jurisdiction to make such an award of the nonparty LLC’s property. In an order entered
on June 6, 2019, the Trial Court granted in part Husband’s motion to alter or amend but
specifically denied the argument set forth above. Husband thereafter appealed.

        On June 10, 2019, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Tennessee (“the federal court”) entered a judgment in favor of Shafiqullah Koshani
against Husband personally, as it related to a breach of a “Profit Sharing Agreement.” As
a result, Mr. Koshani entered into a settlement agreement with Husband, Vanquish
Worldwide, and several other LLCs owned by Husband. The settlement agreement was
executed on July 31, 2020, while Barton I was pending. According to Husband, the price
of the settlement was $14.65 million, mostly paid with transfers of property. A portion of
the Government Claim proceeds was used by Husband to pay off the debts on these
properties as part of the Koshani Settlement. Husband acknowledges in his appellate
brief that he testified that “the money received by Vanquish Worldwide, LLC on its claim
with the federal government . . . ultimately went to fund the majority of the Confidential
Settlement Agreement to conclude the multiple claims and judgments involving the
Koshani family.” This factual finding is therefore undisputed by Husband.

       As this Court determined in Barton I, the Trial Court erred in treating the
Government Claim as marital property and distributing a portion to Wife. See Barton,
2020 WL 6580562, at *5. Nevertheless, this Court very clearly stated that “the
contractual claim of Vanquish Worldwide is relevant to an accurate valuation of
Vanquish Worldwide and the total value of the parties’ marital business interests.” Id.
This Court likewise affirmed that Husband’s 100% interest in Vanquish Worldwide was
marital property. Id. at *3 (“We affirm the trial court’s classification of Husband’s
ownership interest in Vanquish Worldwide as a marital asset.”). Therefore, given that the
                                        - 16 -
proceeds from the Government Claim were ordered by this Court to be accounted for in
its valuation of Vanquish Worldwide on remand, the Trial Court was specifically tasked
with considering the impact of the Government Claim on Vanquish Worldwide’s value.
Consideration of the Government Claim as part of the value of Vanquish Worldwide was
in fact the purpose of the remand from this Court in Barton I. Yet, this purpose was
thwarted by Husband, who spent a large portion of the Government Claim proceeds,
apparently while the appeal in Barton I was still pending. We therefore are unable to
agree with Husband that the Trial Court acted improperly by considering the Government
Claim in its valuation of Vanquish Worldwide.

       In reviewing the Trial Court’s finding of dissipation, we find this Court’s prior
opinion, Kholghi v. Aliabadi, No. M2019-01793-COA-R3-CV, 2020 WL 5607816 (Tenn.
Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2020), analogous to the facts of the present case. In Kholghi, the
husband and his father owned a rug business called MSM Industries (“MSM”). Kholghi,
2020 WL 5607816, at *1. The husband had historically taken out “shareholder loans”
from MSM every month in addition to traditional compensation. Id. at *3. As explained
by this Court’s Kholghi opinion,

      When the bill arrived each month, they would simply tell the company’s
      accountant which expenses they deemed “personal” or “business.” The
      designated “business” expenses would be expensed through the business.
      The “personal” expenses would also be paid by MSM but would be
      recorded as a “loan” to each shareholder. . . . According to the company’s
      records, MSM paid Husband traditional W-2 compensation of around
      $215,000 per year. However, each month Husband would void his
      paycheck, and the amount of the voided paycheck would then be credited as
      a payment toward his shareholder loans. In August 2016, the month before
      the complaint for divorce was filed on September 8, MSM records showed
      that Husband owed $592,285.96 in shareholder loans. By November 2018,
      just before trial, his shareholder loan balance had increased to
      $1,781,624.46, the largest balance in the history of the company. . . .
      Husband’s “personal” charges making up the shareholder loans included
      some items that benefitted Wife, such as payment of the mortgage for the
      marital home and the parties’ attorney’s fees. However, other expenditures
      did not benefit Wife, such as Husband’s apartment rent and related bills, a
      portion of the payment for his Porsche, and expenses for his grown
      children.

Id.

      The husband’s 50% interest in MSM was deemed a marital asset awarded to the
husband, much like Husband’s 100% interest in Vanquish Worldwide was awarded to
him in the present case. Id. at *10, 20. In Kholghi, the trial court valued the husband’s
                                          - 17 -
one-half interest in MSM at $2,170,000. Id. at *9. In considering the husband’s request
that this value be “offset against the amount of the loans” he owed the company, the trial
court noted that “if it subtracted the $1.7 million in shareholder loans from its finding as
to the value of the marital asset, Husband’s interest in MSM would only be valued at
$388,376” and declined to do so. Id. The trial court instead decided that of the
$1,781,624 borrowed from the company, $1,350,000 constituted legitimate marital
expenses but that the remaining $431,624 constituted the husband’s “dissipation in the
amount of $249,581 and approximately $182,043 in separate debts” for which the trial
court would not give him credit against the value of the company. Id. The trial court
determined that some expenditures did not benefit the wife, that some “were detrimental
to her by reducing the value of her equitable interest in the parties’ share of the business,”
and that by listing these expenditures as loans from MSM, the husband had diminished
the value of his and the wife’s ownership interest. Id. at *16 (emphasis added).

        The trial court accordingly found that the value of MSM was $820,000 after
offsetting the $1,350,000 that the trial court characterized as legitimate expenses from its
initial valuation of $2,170,000. Id. On appeal, this Court affirmed the trial court’s
finding of dissipation and valuation of MSM. Id. at *16-20. This Court explained:
“Given the trial court’s responsibility to consider Husband’s ‘preservation’ or
‘depreciation’ of marital assets, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c)(5), we discern no
reversible error in the trial court’s decision to recognize 75 percent of the shareholder
loan balance as legitimate and 25 percent as illegitimate.” Id. at *19.

       In the present case, the Trial Court similarly found that Husband had dissipated
funds of Vanquish Worldwide to diminish its value and benefit him personally. As
already explained, this determination was largely based on Husband’s testimony and the
Trial Court’s finding that Husband was not credible. It is undisputed that Husband used
proceeds from the Government Claim, the subject of ongoing litigation, to satisfy a
personal judgment against him. As a result, the Trial Court added the value of 90% of
the expenditure back into the value of Vanquish Worldwide as dissipated assets.
Although Husband testified that the Koshani Settlement was related to the National
Afghan Trucking contract and the Government Claim, it is nonetheless undisputed that
Husband entered into the Koshani Settlement agreement to satisfy a judgment entered
against him personally.

       In finding dissipation, the Trial Court considered the following four factors
outlined in Altman v. Altman, 181 S.W.3d 676, 682 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005):

       The factors that courts most frequently consider when determining whether
       a particular expenditure or transaction amounts to dissipation include: (1)
       whether the expenditure benefitted the marriage or was made for a purpose
       entirely unrelated to the marriage; (2) whether the expenditure or
       transaction occurred when the parties were experiencing marital difficulties
                                          - 18 -
       or were contemplating divorce; (3) whether the expenditure was excessive
       or de minimis; and (4) whether the dissipating party intended to hide,
       deplete, or divert a marital asset.

Id.4 The Trial Court found that all four factors indicating dissipation had been met.
Again, the Trial Court did not credit Husband’s testimony and found that this expenditure
primarily benefitted Husband rather than the marital asset. The Trial Court likewise
found that Husband had intended to deplete the value of his ownership interest in
Vanquish Worldwide, finding that Husband lacked credibility and referencing Wife’s
testimony from the 2016 trial that Husband had threatened to bankrupt his companies so
she would not receive anything and Husband’s initial valuation of Vanquish Worldwide
at $0 during the 2016 trial. This expenditure appears to have been made while this case
was pending on appeal in Barton I, approximately five years after Husband filed for
divorce. The expenditure of $12.375 million certainly was not de minimis, particularly
considering it consisted of the majority of the Government Claim net proceeds which
were intended to be used in the Trial Court’s re-valuation of Vanquish Worldwide. We
therefore discern no reversible error in the Trial Court’s analysis or finding of dissipation.

       Husband argues that the Trial Court erred by concluding that the Koshani
Settlement was a personal debt to Husband rather than to Vanquish Worldwide, given
that Vanquish Worldwide also was released from any further claims. However, the Trial
Court accounted for a portion of the Koshani Settlement benefiting Vanquish Worldwide
by allocating a 10% benefit to the company. Vanquish Worldwide was just one of many
of Husband’s LLCs released by the settlement agreement. Again, the Koshani Settlement
was in satisfaction of a personal judgment against Husband, and Husband used funds that
were the subject of active litigation to satisfy that judgment. In the alternative, Husband
contends that if the Koshani Settlement is his personal debt, then it should have been
considered a marital liability given that the Koshani Judgment arose from “the
performance of a U.S. Government National Afghan Trucking (“NAT”) Contract” in
2011 and 2012, during the marriage. Based upon our review of the record, we conclude
that Husband has waived this argument. Mr. Koshani filed suit against Husband and
Vanquish Worldwide in 2017 prior to the Trial Court’s 2018 Judgment. Yet, Husband
did not claim this as a marital liability or raise this argument until the current appeal.
Husband never claimed this as a marital liability on remand and cannot now raise this
issue on appeal for the first time. Ussery v. City of Columbia, 316 S.W.3d 570, 580
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2009) (“Generally, issues not raised at trial may not be raised for the first
time on appeal.”).

4
  The factors outlined in Altman v. Altman, 181 S.W.3d 676, 682 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) are
substantially similar to the factors previously quoted in this Opinion from Trezevant v.
Trezevant, 568 S.W.3d 595, 616-17 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2018).
                                            - 19 -
       Husband additionally argues that by finding dissipation, the Trial Court, in effect
pierced the corporate veil. Husband contends the following:

               As this Court recognized in the first appeal of this case, the Trial
       Court does not have jurisdiction over the assets of the non-party limited
       liability companies in which the Husband has an interest, without piercing
       the corporate veil. (Opinion at p. 8). All property transferred to or acquired
       by an LLC is property of the LLC. Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-249-502(a).
       Furthermore, a member of an LLC has no interest in specific property of
       the LLC. (Id.). In order to classify the entity and assets of Vanquish
       Worldwide, LLC as the parties’ marital property by piercing the corporate
       veil, the Trial Court must find that Husband Eric Barton is the alter ego of
       Vanquish Worldwide, LLC, and has committed misconduct as a principal
       and officer of the company. See Muroll Gesellschaft M.B.H. v. Tennessee
       Tape, Inc., 908 S.W.2d 211, 213 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) (“[d]iscarding the
       fiction of the corporate entity, or piercing the corporate veil, is appropriate
       when the corporation is liable for a debt but is without funds to pay the
       debt, and the lack of funds is due to some misconduct on the part of the
       officers and directors.”). There is no such finding by the Trial Court in this
       case, or evidence in the Record to support such a finding.

We find Husband’s argument unavailing.

       As this Court concluded in Barton I, despite its imprecise language, the Trial
Court classified Husband’s ownership interest in Vanquish Worldwide as marital
property—not Vanquish Worldwide itself. Furthermore, although this Court reversed
the Trial Court’s award of Vanquish Worldwide’s property, i.e. a portion of the
Government Claim proceeds, to Wife, it nevertheless remanded for Vanquish Worldwide
to be revalued after taking into account the Government Claim proceeds. Therefore, the
Trial Court rightly considered the proceeds of the Government Claim in its valuation of
Vanquish Worldwide, as instructed by this Court. In doing so, the Trial Court found that
Husband had dissipated assets of Vanquish Worldwide, of which his 100% interest is, in
fact, a marital asset. As discussed above, this Court has previously concluded that
diminishing the value of a marital business interest may constitute dissipation of marital
assets. See Kholghi, 2020 WL 5607816, at *17-20. The evidence demonstrated that
Husband did in fact dissipate a marital asset, his 100% ownership interest in Vanquish
Worldwide, by using the Government Claim proceeds as he did. Although, as explained
in Barton I, the Government Claim proceeds were a nonparty asset, these proceeds were
nevertheless to be used in the Trial Court’s valuation of Husband’s ownership interest in
Vanquish Worldwide. By expending these proceeds to satisfy a personal judgment
against him, he effectually diminished the value of his ownership interest to benefit
himself personally. We accordingly conclude that there was no need for the Trial Court
to pierce the corporate veil in finding that Husband had dissipated the marital asset of his
                                            - 20 -
100% ownership interest in Vanquish Worldwide, and affirm the Trial Court’s finding of
dissipation.

                              B. Division of Marital Estate

        In Keyt v. Keyt, 244 S.W.3d 321 (Tenn. 2007), the Tennessee Supreme Court
articulated the appellate standard of review for a trial court’s division of a marital estate
as follows:

              This Court gives great weight to the decisions of the trial court in
       dividing marital assets and “we are disinclined to disturb the trial court’s
       decision unless the distribution lacks proper evidentiary support or results
       in some error of law or misapplication of statutory requirements and
       procedures.” Herrera v. Herrera, 944 S.W.2d 379, 389 (Tenn. Ct. App.
       1996). As such, when dealing with the trial court’s findings of fact, we
       review the record de novo with a presumption of correctness, and we must
       honor those findings unless there is evidence which preponderates to the
       contrary. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston, 854
       S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993). Because trial courts are in a far better position
       than this Court to observe the demeanor of the witnesses, the weight, faith,
       and credit to be given witnesses’ testimony lies in the first instance with the
       trial court. Roberts v. Roberts, 827 S.W.2d 788, 795 (Tenn. Ct. App.
       1991). Consequently, where issues of credibility and weight of testimony
       are involved, this Court will accord considerable deference to the trial
       court’s factual findings. In re M.L.P., 228 S.W.3d 139, 143 (Tenn. Ct.
       App. 2007) (citing Seals v. England/Corsair Upholstery Mfg. Co., 984
       S.W.2d 912, 915 (Tenn. 1999)). The trial court’s conclusions of law,
       however, are accorded no presumption of correctness. Langschmidt v.
       Langschmidt, 81 S.W.3d 741, 744-45 (Tenn. 2002).

Keyt, 244 S.W.3d at 327.

       In Larsen-Ball v. Ball, 301 S.W.3d 228 (Tenn. 2010), our Supreme Court
effectively reasserted the deferential standard of review articulated in Keyt, stating:

               After classifying the divorcing parties’ assets as either separate or
       marital, the trial court must divide the marital estate equitably by weighing
       the relevant factors enumerated in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-
       121(c). We give great weight to the trial court’s division of marital
       property and “‘are disinclined to disturb the trial court’s decision unless the
       distribution lacks proper evidentiary support or results in some error of law
       or misapplication of statutory requirements and procedures.’” Keyt v. Keyt,

                                           - 21 -
      244 S.W.3d 321, 327 (Tenn. 2007) (quoting Herrera v. Herrera, 944
      S.W.2d 379, 389 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996)).

              Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-121(c) provides that in
      making an equitable division of marital property, the trial court shall
      consider all relevant factors. Because trial courts have broad discretion in
      dividing the marital estate, the division of marital property is not a
      mechanical process. Flannary [v. Flannary], 121 S.W.3d [647,] at 650
      [(Tenn. 2003)]. Rather, the trial court should weigh the most relevant
      factors in light of the facts of each case. Tate v. Tate, 138 S.W.3d 872, 875
      (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). We review the trial court’s findings of fact de novo
      with a presumption of correctness and honor those findings unless the
      evidence preponderates to the contrary. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); Blackburn
      v. Blackburn, 270 S.W.3d 42, 47 (Tenn. 2008). When issues of credibility
      and weight of testimony are involved, we afford considerable deference to
      the trial court’s findings of fact. Keyt, 244 S.W.3d at 327.

Larsen-Ball, 301 S.W.3d at 234-35 (footnote omitted).

      Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121 (West July 1, 2014 to June 30, 2015) provides:

      (c) In making equitable division of marital property, the court shall consider
      all relevant factors including:

      (1) The duration of the marriage;

      (2) The age, physical and mental health, vocational skills, employability,
      earning capacity, estate, financial liabilities and financial needs of each of
      the parties;

      (3) The tangible or intangible contribution by one (1) party to the
      education, training or increased earning power of the other party;

      (4) The relative ability of each party for future acquisitions of capital assets
      and income;

      (5)(A) The contribution of each party to the acquisition, preservation,
      appreciation, depreciation or dissipation of the marital or separate property,
      including the contribution of a party to the marriage as homemaker, wage
      earner or parent, with the contribution of a party as homemaker or wage
      earner to be given the same weight if each party has fulfilled its role;

                                           - 22 -
       (B) For purposes of this subdivision (c)(5), dissipation of assets means
       wasteful expenditures which reduce the marital property available for
       equitable distributions and which are made for a purpose contrary to the
       marriage either before or after a complaint for divorce or legal separation
       has been filed.

       (6) The value of the separate property of each party;

       (7) The estate of each party at the time of the marriage;

       (8) The economic circumstances of each party at the time the division of
       property is to become effective;

       (9) The tax consequences to each party, costs associated with the
       reasonably foreseeable sale of the asset, and other reasonably foreseeable
       expenses associated with the asset;

       (10) The amount of social security benefits available to each spouse; and

       (11) Such other factors as are necessary to consider the equities between the
       parties.

       The Trial Court awarded 55% of the marital estate to Wife and 45% to Husband.
In its 2022 Judgment, the Trial Court analyzed the factors in Tenn. Code Ann. §36-4-
121(c) and found that factors (2), (3), (4), and (5) “strongly indicate that the Wife should
receive the greater share of the estate.” With the exception of factor (5), the Trial Court
had weighed the same factors in favor of Wife in its 2018 Judgment. After the 2016 trial,
the Trial Court found that factor (8) had favored Wife, but in its 2022 Judgment
concluded that “there was no evidence as to the parties’ current incomes and exact
financial circumstances.” With respect to Husband, the Trial Court found there were “no
factors that favored the Husband, nor are there today.”

       Husband argues that the “preponderance of the evidence weighs against the Trial
Court’s unequal and inequitable division of the marital estate.” Husband specifically
contends that Wife’s award of $12,633,698 in marital assets far exceeds her monthly
expenses of $13,000, that Wife is not burdened with any liability or debts, and that Wife
is educated, skilled, and capable and desirous of employment. Husband further appears
to suggest that the Trial Court erred by dividing the marital estate and awarding alimony
in solido without hearing Wife’s testimony regarding her income, employment, and
financial status as of August 2022. On the other hand, Husband argues that the Trial
Court’s division of marital property “discounts the testimony and evidence presented by
the Husband at the trial on remand regarding the negative impact on the value of
Vanquish Worldwide and the Husband’s other business interests by the factors outlined
                                           - 23 -
above that were beyond the Husband’s control, as well as the Husband’s significant
contributions from his retirement accounts to Vanquish Worldwide, in order to keep the
business from closing down.”

       With respect specifically to Husband’s argument related to the value of Vanquish
Worldwide and Husband’s testimony regarding its valuation, we reiterate that Husband
does not contest on appeal the Trial Court’s finding that a 100% interest in Vanquish
Worldwide was valued at $4 million, notwithstanding the dissipated funds. Furthermore,
as we previously explained, the Trial Court did not find Husband’s testimony regarding
Vanquish Worldwide’s valuation to be credible, and we defer to that credibility finding.
We accordingly find Husband’s arguments related to the decline in his business interests
to be unavailing.

        Regarding Husband’s suggestion that the Trial Court needed to hear new
testimony regarding the status of Wife’s finances prior to dividing the marital estate and
awarding alimony in solido, Husband did not raise this issue with the Trial Court, or
claim that Wife’s circumstances had changed. We therefore find that Husband has
waived this issue by failing to raise this issue to the Trial Court. Furthermore, we look to
the language of this Court’s instructions in Barton I. In Barton I, this Court remanded for
the Trial Court to reconsider its valuation of Vanquish Worldwide in light of the
Government Claim proceeds. This Court specifically stated: “Here, a final division has
yet to occur in light of our disposition and remand, and we leave it to the trial court’s
discretion as to what proof is needed to reconsider its valuation of Vanquish Worldwide
as part of its reevaluation of the marital estate as it takes proper account of the contractual
claim of Vanquish Worldwide.” Barton, 2020 WL 6580562, at *11 (emphasis added).
Simply stated, this Court remanded for reconsideration of a particular marital asset and
provided that the Trial Court could hear new proof as it pertained to that asset. We did
not remand for a new trial or instruct the Trial Court to hear new evidence related to
anything other than Vanquish Worldwide and the impact of the Government Claim. The
Trial Court could have, of course, requested that the parties put on proof related to this
issue, but again, Husband did not raise this issue. We therefore are unpersuaded by
Husband’s argument.

        We find no error in the Trial Court’s findings that factors (2), (3), and (4) strongly
weighed in Wife’s favor. With respect to factor (2), the Trial Court found that Husband’s
skill and earning capacity far exceed Wife’s and that they both have substantial needs.
Regarding factor (3), the Trial Court found that Wife had contributed greatly to
Husband’s education, and concerning factor (4), the Trial Court found that Husband had
a much greater ability for future acquisition of assets. The evidence does not
preponderate against these findings.

      The evidence in 2016 and 2022 revealed that Husband was a successful
businessman who had earned several degrees and accumulated substantial business and
                                      - 24 -
real estate assets by the time he was 40 years old. During the marriage, Husband earned
a Master’s of Business Administration, Master’s of Public Administration, and a
Doctorate of Business Administration, as well as graduated from seminary. He also was
honorably discharged from the military as a captain. In contrast, while Husband was
pursuing higher education and his business ventures, Wife was a homemaker, who put off
seeking further degrees to afford Husband opportunities to do so.

        In 2016, the evidence demonstrated that Wife had a Bachelor’s of Science in Legal
Studies and had worked as a paralegal for two different law firms from 2000 to 2006, and
then worked for Vanquish Worldwide as a paralegal and partner from 2006 to 2015.
Wife testified that she did mostly secretarial work for Vanquish Worldwide. She also
testified that she worked for Lexlin Ranch, another LLC owned by Husband. During the
2016 trial, Wife testified:

       [O]ur whole marriage he was also seeking another degree, so it was very
       hard for me to ever get a degree because both of us could not go to school
       and have our families and work. Our children would have suffered. So it’s
       me who didn’t attend school or get my other degree.

Wife also explained that since Husband had filed for divorce in March 2015 she had
applied for a job at Belk as a makeup consultant, multiple jobs as a paralegal with law
firms, jobs with Clinique and Estee Lauder, and a job for a “legal private investigation
position.” She further testified that she was a finalist for a position at a company
involved in horse registrations. She stated that if she were to get that position, she would
make $35,000 per year. The evidence accordingly supports the Trial Court’s findings
regarding these three factors, as well as factor (5) which we already have addressed and
affirmed.

        Husband also posits that the “55/45” split is inequitable because Wife received
$2,297,036 more than he does without receiving any marital liabilities or debts.
Keeping in mind that we afford trial courts “wide latitude in fashioning an equitable
division of marital property . . . and appellate courts accord great weight to a trial court’s
division of marital property,” Altman, 181 S.W.3d at 683, we do not discern how a
differential of approximately $2 million renders the Trial Court’s division inequitable,
particularly considering the size of the marital estate and all the other factors properly
considered by the Trial Court. See id. (“A division of marital property is not rendered
inequitable simply because it is not precisely equal.”). Besides asserting that this
difference is “substantial,” Husband offers little explanation or argument on this point.
Moreover, with respect to Husband’s objection to Wife being awarded no debt, we fail to
discern what difference this makes to the overall net division of the marital estate.
Although the Trial Court allocated the marital business debts to Husband, the Trial Court
accounted for and subtracted these values from the assets Husband was awarded for a
total share of $10,336,662, or 45% of the marital estate.
                                            - 25 -
       Husband further argues that, by his calculations, the Trial Court’s division actually
renders him with a share of negative $14,230,990.50 and Wife with $13,235,015.50.
Husband’s argument on this point is as follows:

              Based on Husband’s figures, this results in Husband having a
       negative marital estate of minus $14,230,990.50, and the Wife receiving a
       marital estate as valued by Husband, of $13,235,015.50, a clearly
       inequitable result. (See Appellant’s Rule 7 Ta[b]le).

The entirety of his argument is the above-quoted assertion. Other than citing to his 45-
page Rule 7 table, Husband does not provide any explanation for how he arrives at these
totals other than they are “[b]ased on Husband’s figures . . .” rather than those found by
the Trial Court. We therefore conclude that Husband has waived this argument due to his
failure to comply with Tenn. R. App. P. 27(A).

       Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27 provides:

       (a) Brief of the Appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under
       appropriate headings and in the order here indicated:

                                            ***

       (7) An argument, which may be preceded by a summary of argument,
       setting forth:

       (A) the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented,
       and the reasons therefor, including the reasons why the contentions require
       appellate relief, with citations to the authorities and appropriate references
       to the record (which may be quoted verbatim) relied on[.]

Husband’s blanket assertion, without explanation, that he was awarded a negative share
of the marital estate does not comply with Rule 27 and is therefore waived. See Sneed v.
Bd. of Pro. Resp. of Supreme Court, 301 S.W.3d 603, 615 (Tenn. 2010) (“It is not the
role of the courts, trial or appellate, to research or construct a litigant’s case or arguments
for him or her, and where a party fails to develop an argument in support of his or her
contention or merely constructs a skeletal argument, the issue is waived.”); In re Estate of
Quinn, No. M2022-00532-COA-R3-CV, 2023 WL 5013257, at *11 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug.
7, 2023) (“[W]e are ‘under no duty to blindly search the record to find . . . evidence,’ nor
can Plaintiff shift this burden to us.”) (quoting Pearman v. Pearman, 781 S.W.2d 585,
588 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989)). As we have previously explained, we are “‘not like pigs,
hunting for truffles’ that may be buried in the record, or, for that matter, in the parties’
briefs on appeal.” Nunley v. Farrar, No. M2020-00519-COA-R3-CV, 2021 WL
                                              - 26 -
1811750, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 6, 2021) (citing Cartwright v. Jackson Cap.
Partners, Ltd. P’ship, 478 S.W.3d 596, 616 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015)).

      Upon our review of the record, we conclude that the evidence does not
preponderate against the Trial Court’s findings and affirm the Trial Court’s division of
the marital estate.

                                 C. Alimony in solido

      Our Supreme Court has previously explained the standard of review for awards of
alimony as follows:

             For well over a century, Tennessee law has recognized that trial
      courts should be accorded wide discretion in determining matters of spousal
      support. See Robinson v. Robinson, 26 Tenn. (7 Hum.) 440, 443 (1846)
      (“Upon a divorce . . . the wife is entitled to a fair portion of her husband’s
      estate for her support, and the amount thus to be appropriated is a matter
      within the legal discretion of the chancellor . . . .”). This well-established
      principle still holds true today, with this Court repeatedly and recently
      observing that trial courts have broad discretion to determine whether
      spousal support is needed and, if so, the nature, amount, and duration of the
      award. See, e.g., Bratton v. Bratton, 136 S.W.3d 595, 605 (Tenn. 2004);
      Burlew v. Burlew, 40 S.W.3d 465, 470 (Tenn. 2001); Crabtree v. Crabtree,
      16 S.W.3d 356, 360 (Tenn. 2000).

              Equally well-established is the proposition that a trial court’s
      decision regarding spousal support is factually driven and involves the
      careful balancing of many factors. Kinard v. Kinard, 986 S.W.2d 220, 235
      (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998); see also Burlew, 40 S.W.3d at 470; Robertson v.
      Robertson, 76 S.W.3d 337, 340-41 (Tenn. 2002). As a result, “[a]ppellate
      courts are generally disinclined to second-guess a trial judge’s spousal
      support decision.” Kinard, 986 S.W.2d at 234. Rather, “[t]he role of an
      appellate court in reviewing an award of spousal support is to determine
      whether the trial court applied the correct legal standard and reached a
      decision that is not clearly unreasonable.” Broadbent v. Broadbent, 211
      S.W.3d 216, 220 (Tenn. 2006). Appellate courts decline to second-guess a
      trial court’s decision absent an abuse of discretion. Robertson, 76 S.W.3d
      at 343. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court causes an
      injustice by applying an incorrect legal standard, reaches an illogical result,
      resolves the case on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or
      relies on reasoning that causes an injustice. Wright ex rel. Wright v.
      Wright, 337 S.W.3d 166, 176 (Tenn. 2011); Henderson v. SAIA, Inc., 318
      S.W.3d 328, 335 (Tenn. 2010). This standard does not permit an appellate
                                          - 27 -
      court to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court, but “‘reflects an
      awareness that the decision being reviewed involved a choice among
      several acceptable alternatives,’ and thus ‘envisions a less rigorous review
      of the lower court’s decision and a decreased likelihood that the decision
      will be reversed on appeal.’” Henderson, 318 S.W.3d at 335 (quoting Lee
      Medical, Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 524 (Tenn. 2010)).
      Consequently, when reviewing a discretionary decision by the trial court,
      such as an alimony determination, the appellate court should presume that
      the decision is correct and should review the evidence in the light most
      favorable to the decision. Wright, 337 S.W.3d at 176; Henderson, 318
      S.W.3d at 335.

Gonsewski v. Gonsewski, 350 S.W.3d 99, 105-06 (Tenn. 2011) (footnote omitted).

      With regard to alimony in solido specifically, our High Court has explained:

      Current Tennessee law recognizes several distinct types of spousal support,
      including (1) alimony in futuro, (2) alimony in solido, (3) rehabilitative
      alimony, and (4) transitional alimony.

                                          ***

              The second type of support, alimony in solido, is also a form of
      long-term support. The total amount of alimony in solido is set on the date
      of the divorce decree and is either paid in a lump sum payment of cash or
      property, or paid in installments for a definite term. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-
      5-121(h)(1); Broadbent, 211 S.W.3d at 222 (“Alimony in solido consists of
      a definite sum of money that is paid in a lump sum or in installments over a
      definite period of time.”). “A typical purpose of such an award would be to
      adjust the distribution of the parties’ marital property.” Burlew, 40 S.W.3d
      at 471. Alimony in solido “may be awarded in lieu of or in addition to any
      other alimony award, in order to provide support, including attorney fees,
      where appropriate.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(d)(5). Unlike alimony in
      futuro, the other form of long-term support, alimony in solido is considered
      a final judgment, “not modifiable, except by agreement of the parties,” and
      does not terminate upon the death or remarriage of the recipient or payor
      spouse. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(h)(2)-(3); see Riggs [v. Riggs], 250
      S.W.3d [453,] at 456 n. 3 [(Tenn. Ct. App. 2007)].

                                          ***

                                          - 28 -
      Finally, in determining whether to award spousal support and, if so,
determining the nature, amount, length, and manner of payment, courts
consider several factors:

      (1) The relative earning capacity, obligations, needs, and
      financial resources of each party, including income from
      pension, profit sharing or retirement plans and all other
      sources;

      (2) The relative education and training of each party, the
      ability and opportunity of each party to secure such education
      and training, and the necessity of a party to secure further
      education and training to improve such party’s earnings
      capacity to a reasonable level;

      (3) The duration of the marriage;

      (4) The age and mental condition of each party;

      (5) The physical condition of each party, including, but not
      limited to, physical disability or incapacity due to a chronic
      debilitating disease;

      (6) The extent to which it would be undesirable for a party to
      seek employment outside the home, because such party will
      be custodian of a minor child of the marriage;

      (7) The separate assets of each party, both real and personal,
      tangible and intangible;

      (8) The provisions made with regard to the marital property,
      as defined in § 36-4-121;

      (9) The standard of living of the parties established during the
      marriage;

      (10) The extent to which each party has made such tangible
      and intangible contributions to the marriage as monetary and
      homemaker contributions, and tangible and intangible
      contributions by a party to the education, training or increased
      earning power of the other party;

                                   - 29 -
              (11) The relative fault of the parties, in cases where the court,
              in its discretion, deems it appropriate to do so; and

              (12) Such other factors, including the tax consequences to
              each party, as are necessary to consider the equities between
              the parties.

       Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(i). Although each of these factors must be
       considered when relevant to the parties’ circumstances, “the two that are
       considered the most important are the disadvantaged spouse’s need and the
       obligor spouse’s ability to pay.” Riggs, 250 S.W.3d at 457. See also
       Bratton, 136 S.W.3d at 605; Robertson, 76 S.W.3d at 342; Burlew, 40
       S.W.3d at 470. Carefully adhering to the statutory framework for awarding
       spousal support, both in terms of awarding the correct type of support and
       for an appropriate amount and time, fulfills not only the statutory directives
       but also alimony’s fundamental purpose of eliminating spousal dependency
       where possible.

Id. at 107-10 (footnote omitted).

       Husband presents two arguments related to the Trial Court’s alimony in solido
award to Wife: (1) there was no evidence related to Wife’s current needs as of the
August 2022 hearing and (2) the Trial Court erred by awarding interest on the alimony in
solido award. We begin our review of this issue by presuming that the Trial Court’s
decision to award Wife alimony in solido in the amount of $6,507,977.50 is correct and
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to this decision. Husband did not raise
the issue of Wife’s change in circumstances or needs to the Trial Court on remand or
request that the parties resubmit proof related to their incomes or needs. From our careful
reading of the transcripts from the August 2022 hearing, the understanding between the
parties and the Trial Court was that proof was being submitted solely related to the re-
valuation of Vanquish Worldwide based upon the proceeds from the Government Claim.
Again, Husband did not dispute the purpose of the hearing, or make an argument at the
end of proof related to whether Wife was entitled to alimony in solido based upon a
change in her circumstances. We therefore find this issue waived as we did in addressing
Husband’s similar argument related to the Trial Court’s division of marital assets. We
further find that the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion by its award of alimony in
solido to Wife and that this award properly effectuates the equitable division of marital
property.

        With respect to Husband’s argument regarding the Trial Court’s award of interest
on Wife’s alimony in solido award, we agree with Husband. This Court has previously
reiterated the Supreme Court’s holding in Price v. Price, 472 S.W.2d 732, 734 (Tenn.
1971), explaining:
                                        - 30 -
      In Price, our supreme court explained that a recipient of alimony in solido
      payable in monthly installments was not entitled to post-judgment interest
      where “[the wife] only became entitled to the use of any part of the money
      represented by this judgment on the date the first installment was due.” Id.;
      see also Norman v. Norman, No. M2015-02364-COA-R3-CV, 2017 WL
      3705121, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2017) (“[T]he recipient of an
      award of alimony in solido payable in installments is not entitled to interest
      on the judgment from the date of entry.”).

Tarver v. Tarver, No. W2017-01556-COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 1200274, at *12 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Mar. 13, 2019). Wife did not present evidence, and the Trial Court did not find,
that Husband had been past-due on alimony payments. As this Court stated in Norman v.
Norman, No. M2015-02364-COA-R3-CV, 2017 WL 3705121, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Aug. 28, 2017), “interest is only payable after an installment is past due.” We, therefore,
modify the Trial Court’s award of post-judgment interest on Wife’s alimony in solido
award to provide for interest only after a payment is past due.

                      D. Lien on Husband’s Ownership Interests

       Husband lastly argues that the Trial Court erred by placing a lien upon and
ordering an assignment in trust to Wife of Husband’s ownership interests in his LLCs. In
the Trial Court’s 2022 Judgment, the Trial Court ordered the following:

      The Husband’s threats to bankrupt the parties’ businesses or hide assets so
      the Wife would receive nothing in the divorce, plus his post-divorce actions
      once again indicate the acute need to secure the alimony payments due to
      the Wife. Accordingly, the Court will impress a lien upon, and Order an
      assignment in trust to the Wife of the Husband’s ownership interests in all
      of the businesses listed in Ex. 1, however those interests are evidenced, to
      secure these payments. However, so long as the Husband is current in his
      alimony payments and the companies remain solvent, he may exercise all
      the rights incident to those interests, and the Wife shall take no enforcement
      actions against the businesses. Finally, so long as any part of the alimony
      obligation remains unpaid the Husband will be enjoined and prohibited
      from making any transfers or expenditures of, or from the businesses except
      those made in the usual and ordinary course of business.

(Paragraph numbering omitted.) (Emphasis added.) To the extent that the Trial Court’s
provision may be interpreted as a directive that liens be placed upon the property of or
that restrictions be put in place on the actions of nonparty LLCs owned by Husband, we
agree with Husband that that would present an issue and contravene this Court’s decision
in Barton I. As this Court stated in Barton I,
                                            - 31 -
       [T]here is no statutory authority here for the court to act upon parcels of
       real estate owned by the LLCs. Despite Husband’s 100 percent ownership
       interest in the LLCs that owned these parcels of real estate, Tennessee Code
       Annotated section 48-249-502(a) provides that “[a] member has no interest
       in specific LLC property. All property transferred to or acquired by an
       LLC is property of the LLC.”

Barton, 2020 WL 6580562, at *5. However, the Trial Court clearly intended to place a
lien and an assignment in trust to Wife upon Husband’s ownership interests in all of his
LLCs. Given that Husband’s ownership interests were marital property and that Husband
was obviously a party to this suit, we affirm this provision, while clarifying that it should
not be interpreted as a restriction upon the nonparty LLCs themselves, but only
Husband’s ownership interests.

                   F. Wife’s Request for Attorney’s Fees on Appeal

        Wife requests this Court grant her attorney’s fees on appeal as alimony in solido,
arguing that she is economically disadvantaged in comparison to Husband and that much
of the purported error that Husband complains of on appeal was “not error or was of his
own making.” We deem Wife’s request waived, however, due to her failure to designate
this as an issue. See Childress v. Union Realty Co., Ltd., 97 S.W.3d 573, 578 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 2002) (“We consider an issue waived where it is argued in the brief but not
designated as an issue.”); see also Barrios v. Simpkins, No. M2021-01347-COA-R3-CV,
2022 WL 16846642, at *14-15 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 10, 2022) (finding that the appellees
waived their request for attorney’s fees by failing to include a separate statement of the
issues in their responsive brief, despite including the issue in their brief’s table of
contents). We therefore deny Wife’s request for an award of attorney’s fees on appeal as
alimony in solido.

                                        Conclusion

        Upon our review, we modify the Trial Court’s award of interest on Wife’s award
of alimony in solido. We otherwise affirm the balance of the Trial Court’s judgment.
We additionally deny Wife’s request for attorney’s fees on appeal. This matter is
remanded to the Chancery Court for Blount County for collection of costs below. Costs
on appeal are assessed equally against the Appellant, Eric Wayne Barton, and his surety,
if any, and Appellee, Mechelle Scholmer Barton.

                                          _________________________________
                                          D. MICHAEL SWINEY, CHIEF JUDGE

                                           - 32 -