Court Opinion

ID: 9880907
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-28 23:03:28.096165+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:58:01.265449
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/28/23 People ex rel. Tonti v. Avee Laboratories CA2/1
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION ONE

 THE PEOPLE ex rel. ALISON                                            B322999
 TONTI,

           Plaintiff and Appellant,                                   (Los Angeles County
                                                                      Super. Ct. No. BC674091)
           v.
                                                                      ORDER MODIFYING
 AVEE LABORATORIES, INC.,                                             OPINION (NO CHANGE
 et al.,                                                              IN JUDGMENT) AND
                                                                      ORDER DENYING PETITION
                                                                      FOR REHEARING
           Defendants and Respondents.

THE COURT:
      The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on August
29, 2023 is modified as follows:

         1.        On page 21, the entire paragraph that begins with “A
                   defendant may also make this showing” is deleted.

         2.        On pages 23–24, the paragraph that begins with
                   “Tonti argues that this evidence is insufficient to
            preclude a triable question” is deleted and replaced
            with the following paragraph:
       Tonti argues that this evidence is insufficient to preclude a
triable question as to the laboratories’ intent for several reasons.
First, she contends that neither laboratory offered any proof that
it actually performed the confirmatory urine tests billed to Blue
Shield, and that if the laboratories billed for tests they never
performed, this is ample basis for inferring an intent to defraud
an insurer. Assuming Tonti sufficiently alleged in the operative
complaint that Millennium or Avee (as opposed to the
rehabilitation centers) defrauded Blue Shield by billing for tests
not performed (as opposed to by performing and charging for
medically unnecessary and duplicative tests), and thus that this
issue is within the scope of summary judgment (see AARTS,
supra, 179 Cal.App.3d at p. 1064), Avee’s discovery responses and
the declarations are evidence that the laboratories actually
performed tests on what was presented to them as Tonti’s urine.
Nothing in the record contradicts these documents, nor did Tonti
seek discovery that might contradict them.

      3.    On pages 25–27, part B.3. of the Discussion (the
            heading and all text contained in that subsection,
            including footnote 4) is entirely deleted.

      4.    At the bottom of page 28, the following sentence is
            deleted:
      In addition, as to Avee’s motion, Avee provided Tonti’s
factually devoid discovery responses to interrogatories requesting
she identify “the basis of [her] allegation that ‘. . . [Living] Rebos

                                  2
acted as a runner, capper, or steerer . . . to procure testing
services’ for Avee.”
      5.    In the last paragraph on page 30, the first sentence
            of that paragraph is deleted and replaced with the
            following sentence:
       But the only evidence Tonti identifies to support her
contention that Avee did not bill her for the copayments she
would otherwise owe under the terms of her insurance contract
with Blue Shield is her declaration stating that she never
received bills from Avee, and evidence that the amounts Avee
billed Blue Shield were more than the amounts Blue Shield paid
Avee.

      6.    The paragraph on pages 31–32 that begins, “As to
            Millennium,” is entirely deleted (along with footnote
            5) and replaced with the following paragraph and
            revised footnote:

      As to Millennium, Tonti identifies similar evidence
regarding Millennium’s billing to support her contention that
Millennium did not bill her for the copayments she would
otherwise owe. But the explanation of benefits documents
prepared by Blue Shield reflect that, under the terms of the Blue
Shield insurance contract applicable to Tonti, Tonti did not have
any copayment or other financial obligations for the services that
Millennium charged to the insurer on her behalf.1 Tonti has not

      1 Millennium represents in its brief that all of these
explanation of benefits documents generated by Blue Shield
and attached to the Cartier declaration reflect a $0 patient

                                  3
explained—let alone presented an evidentiary basis reflecting—
how Millennium’s failure to bill Tonti for copayments Blue Shield
concluded were not owed can support any inference regarding
Millennium conferring a benefit to Sobertec.

      7.    On pages 36–37, the sentence at the bottom of page
            36 that begins, “The declaration provides no facts,” is
            deleted and replaced with the following sentence:

responsibility amount, and Tonti does not dispute this
characterization of the documents. Our own review of the
documents reflects that 10 of these explanation of benefits
documents show a $0 copayment obligation and a $0 amount for
the portion of the services not covered by insurance. One of these
explanations of benefits documents is for services dated August 5,
2014. There are also two exact copies of another explanation of
benefits document itemizing services Millennium provided to
Tonti on August 5, 2014; that document reflects that Tonti does
have a copayment obligation, and that a portion of the charges for
services Millennium provided to her are not covered. None of the
Blue Shield explanation of benefits documents identifies services
provided by name, but rather by billing code and using the term
“office medical.” (Capitalization omitted.) Given that Tonti
does not dispute the characterization of these documents as
reflecting Tonti has no copayment or other financial obligations
for the urine testing Millennium billed to Blue Shield, she has
conceded the point. Nor is evidence that Blue Shield did not
pay for the entire cost of the services Millennium provided to
Tonti contrary to the $0 patient responsibility amount reflected
in these explanation of benefits documents, because the amount
of coverage and an insured’s financial obligation are distinct and
unrelated issues. Tonti does not attempt to connect these two
issues with evidence or argument.

                                 4
The declaration provides no facts to establish counsel’s personal
knowledge, based on which he is able to declare the documents
are true and correct copies of what they purport to be.

      8.    Due to footnote 4 (on page 26) being deleted (see ante,
            p. 2), all footnotes after page 26 are renumbered.

     These modifications do not constitute a change in the
judgment.

     The petition for rehearing filed on September 13, 2023 is
denied.

____________________________________________________________

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.               CHANEY, J.            BENDIX, J.

                                5
Filed 8/29/23 People ex rel. Tonti v. Avee Laboratories CA2/1 (unmodified opinion)
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION ONE

 THE PEOPLE ex rel. ALISON                                         B322999
 TONTI,
                                                                   (Los Angeles County
           Plaintiff and Appellant,                                Super. Ct. No. BC674091)

           v.

 AVEE LABORATORIES, INC.,
 et al.,

           Defendants and Respondents.

       APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Michael P. Linfield, Judge. Affirmed.
       Medvei Law Group and Sebastian M. Medvei for Plaintiff
and Appellant the People of the State of California ex rel. Alison
Tonti.
       Polsinelli, Jonathan Buck and J. Alan Warfield for
Defendant and Respondent Millennium Health, LLC.
       Kirkland & Ellis, Sierra Elizabeth and James R.P. Hileman
for Defendant and Respondent Aveo Laboratories Inc.

                                                    1
       In the instant appeal, appellant Alison Tonti (Tonti) on
behalf of the People of the State of California argues the trial
court erred in granting respondent Avee Laboratories, Inc.’s
(Avee) and respondent Millennium Health, LLC’s (Millennium)
motions for summary judgment of Tonti’s claim under the
Insurance Fraud Prevention Act (IFPA) (Ins. Code, § 1871 et seq.;
Pen. Code, §§ 549, 550, 551). Tonti further argues the court
improperly excluded certain evidence she offered in opposing the
motions and erred in refusing her request to continue the motions
to allow her to conduct additional discovery.
       We conclude respondents met their burden to show that
there was no triable question of fact regarding Tonti’s IFPA claim
on either of the legal theories in her complaint, and that Tonti
did not meet her burden to present admissible evidence sufficient
to rebut that conclusion. Finally, we conclude the court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Tonti’s requested continuance
because Tonti failed to make the necessary showing to justify
the continuance under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c,
subdivision (h).
       Accordingly, we affirm.

            FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
I.    Relevant Law: IFPA
      To provide context, we begin with an overview of the IFPA
and the provisions most relevant to this appeal. Insurance Code
section 1871.7, subdivision (a), makes it “unlawful to knowingly
employ runners, cappers, steerers, or other persons to procure
clients or patients to perform or obtain services or benefits . . .
under a contract of insurance or that will be the basis for a claim
against an insured individual or his or her insurer.” (Ibid.) The

                                 2
statute does not define “runners,” “cappers,” or “steerers,” but
the terms generally refer to an individual or entity that procures
clients or patients for an improper purpose. (See State ex rel.
Wilson v. Superior Court (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 579, 588
(Wilson); People ex rel. Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Cruz
(2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1184, 1192 (Cruz).) We will use the
terms “steerer” or “steering” to refer to such conduct.
       Insurance Code section 1871.7, subdivision (b) “prescribes
civil penalties and other remedies for violation of either
subdivision (a) . . . or Penal Code sections 549 . . . [or] 550.”
(Wilson, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 588.) Penal Code
section 550 prohibits “[k]nowingly present[ing] or caus[ing] to
be presented any false or fraudulent claim” (Pen. Code, § 550,
subd. (a)(1)) under an insurance contract, or presenting, making,
or preparing any “written or oral statement . . . knowing that
the statement contains any false or misleading information
concerning any material fact” in connection with an insurance
claim. (Pen. Code, § 550, subd. (b)(1).) Penal Code section 549
prohibits “solicit[ing], accept[ing], or refer[ring] any business to
or from any individual or entity with the knowledge that, or with
reckless disregard for whether, the individual or entity for or
from whom the solicitation or referral is made, or the individual
or entity who is solicited or referred, intends to violate [Penal
Code] [s]ection 550.” (Pen. Code, § 549.)
       The IFPA permits “[a]ny interested persons . . . [to] bring
a civil action for a violation of [the IFPA] for the person and for

                                 3
the State of California . . . in the name of the state.”1 (Ins. Code,
§ 1871.7, subd. (e)(1).)

II.   Operative Complaint
       When reviewing a summary judgment, we start with the
allegations of the complaint, because these frame the causes of
action by which plaintiff seeks to recover. (AARTS Productions,
Inc. v. Crocker National Bank (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 1061, 1064
(AARTS); Sales v. City of Tustin (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 265, 268.)
       The complaint here alleges various laboratories
that conduct urine testing, including Avee and Millennium,
engaged in a scheme with certain nonmedical substance abuse
rehabilitation centers—respectively, Living Rebos LLC (Living
Rebos), not a party to this appeal, and Sobertec LLC (Sobertec),
also not a party to this appeal—to collect urine samples
from patients at the rehabilitation centers for excessive and
unnecessary urine testing at the laboratories for the purpose
of collecting insurance compensation from the patients’ insurers.
       Both Living Rebos and Sobertec offer a sober living
residential program and an offsite intensive outpatient program,
sometimes referred to as an IOP. Tonti is a former resident of
Living Rebos’s and Sobertec’s respective sober living facilities,
and a former participant in their IOPs. Part of the IOP at both

      1 The IFPA addresses the potential for duplicative
recovery, an issue not raised by this case, by further providing
that, “[w]hen a person or governmental agency brings an action
under this section, no person other than the district attorney
or commissioner may intervene or bring a related action based
on the facts underlying the pending action unless that action
is authorized by another statute or common law.” (Ins. Code,
§ 1871.7, subd. (e)(5).)

                                  4
facilities was laboratory testing of Tonti’s urine for drugs and
alcohol. Although Tonti’s insurer, Blue Shield, does not provide
coverage for fees associated with residence in a sober living
facility, it does cover intensive outpatient programs. Living
Rebos and Sobertec “ ‘permitted’ [Tonti] to live at” each entity’s
respective sober living facilities without paying any out-of-pocket
costs. “Instead of billing a patient’s insurance for the ‘sober
living’ services . . . the [rehabilitation center] provider[s] bill[ed]
the insurance for the IOP services at a higher rate, in an
intentional effort to recoup for the sober living services that
are not covered.” At the time she was admitted to each facility,
Tonti was informed “that her insurance[,] [Blue Shield,] would
cover all services.” Blue Shield was charged for various services
associated with Tonti’s participation in the Living Rebos and
Sobertec IOPs, including urine analysis conducted by Avee and
Millennium. Tonti, however, never received any bills from any
laboratory, including Avee and Millennium, for urine tests during
her stay at either center.
       The complaint further alleges that, before sending
Tonti’s urine samples to the laboratories for testing, the centers
adequately tested the samples using their own test kits, and
that further testing by any laboratory, including Avee and
Millennium, was medically unnecessary. On some occasions,
the centers also allegedly requested such medically unnecessary
confirmatory testing by both Avee or Millennium and another
laboratory. Because the laboratories’ charges allegedly “far
exceed the cost and necessary frequency of such treatment, . . . it
is clear that [Avee and Millennium] [were] actually double billing
for lab[oratory] tests, or . . . billing for unnecessary lab[oratory]
tests to churn additional profits.”

                                  5
       The complaint asserts this conduct violated Insurance Code
section 1871.7, subdivision (a) in that it constitutes a steering
scheme, and that it violated Penal Code sections 549 and 550 in
that it reveals a scheme of intentionally making false insurance
claims to Blue Shield.
       As to the Penal Code sections 549 and 550 violations,
the complaint alleges Avee and Living Rebos, and Millennium
and Sobertec, “knowingly and with the intent to obtain extra
payments from Blue Shield, authored, created and/or approved
false, fraudulent, and misleading medical reports, records,
and bills to Blue Shield for payment.” Avee and Millennium
both “knew, or were reckless in not knowing, that the charges
they submitted were captured in other billing codes, involved
excessive and medically unnecessary treatment or testing,
and attempted to [obtain] payment for services not covered
by Blue Shield.” As to the steering scheme under Insurance
Code section 1871.7, subdivision (a), the complaint alleges
that Living Rebos “act[ed] as a runner, capper, or steerer . . .
to procure testing services for [Avee],” and that Sobertec played
the same role for Millennium. This alleged relationship involved
the laboratories employing the centers to drum up demand for
the laboratories’ urine testing services by secretly submitting
the urine of center residents to the laboratories for medically
unnecessary testing.
       Based on these two legal theories (Pen. Code, §§ 549, 550
& Ins. Code, § 1871.7, subd. (a) violations), Tonti alleged a single
cause of action under the IFPA as a qui tam action on behalf of
the state.

                                 6
III.   Relevant Procedural History
       A.   Stipulated Trial Date Continuance
       The court set the initial trial date for November 26,
2018, with a fact discovery cut-off date of October 29, 2018.
Defendants timely noticed Tonti’s deposition, and Tonti informed
them she was not available to be deposed until October 10, 2018.
Although this date was before the discovery cut-off, it was after
the deadline to file a summary judgment motion. The parties
therefore agreed to continue the trial date to February 25, 2019,
thereby extending the deadline for summary judgment motions
as well. The court continued the trial date, but not the discovery
cut-off date, and provided that no further continuances would be
granted.

       B.   Discovery
            1.    Written discovery
       Tonti sought virtually no discovery. Tonti characterizes
this as her “avoid[ing] early blunderbuss discovery because of
the risk of keying in [Avee and Millennium] as to what crucial
evidence to spoliate.” The only discovery Tonti propounded were
form and special interrogatories to Avee on January 24, 2018,
which Avee answered. Tonti propounded no further written
discovery, and did not serve any document requests.
       Avee and Living Rebos served special interrogatories on
Tonti, to which Tonti responded. Millennium also propounded
special interrogatories and requests for production on Tonti,
but Tonti contends she “did not receive [the] requests, [and]
the responses were not compelled.” Tonti never served any
responses, documents, or objections to Millennium’s written
discovery requests.

                                7
      On September 17, 2018, Avee served a demand for
exchange of expert disclosures. Tonti served objections on
October 8, 2018, urging that the date by which Avee demanded
the disclosure (October 8, 2018) did not account for the five days’
additional notice required for mail service. That same day, Avee
sent a notice to all parties stating they had five additional court
days for the exchange, until October 15, 2018. Respondents
represented to the court below that they did not receive any
expert disclosures from Tonti until December 2018, in connection
with summary judgment briefing.

            2.    Depositions
      Tonti’s deposition commenced on October 12, 2018, but was
not completed. After the discovery cut-off passed, the trial court
found good cause for reopening discovery for the sole purpose of
completing Tonti’s deposition and ordered Tonti to appear for
deposition. Tonti never completed her deposition.2
      Tonti did not take any depositions or pursue any third-
party discovery.

      C.    Summary Judgment
      Millennium and Avee filed motions for summary judgment.

      2 The dispute between the parties regarding Tonti’s
deposition, which relates at least in part to the treatment
of personal health information, is not germane to the issues
raised on appeal. We thus do not summarize the circumstances
under which she did not complete her deposition.

                                 8
            1.    Evidence submitted on summary judgment
                  a.     Millennium’s and Avee’s evidence
      Both Millennium and Avee argued that there was no
triable issue as to their alleged intent to defraud Blue Shield, nor
was there a triable issue as to their “employing” a rehabilitation
center as a steerer. In support of these arguments, Millennium
offered the declaration of Scott Cartier, Millennium’s vice
president of revenue services, based on his “personal knowledge
of Millennium[’s] . . . relationships with insurers and treatment
centers as well as . . . processes and procedures regarding receipt
of requests for laboratory testing analysis services, and billing
and payment of claims for such services.” Cartier also based
his declaration on his “review[ ] [of] . . . the records related to
the laboratory services provided by Millennium . . . to . . . Tonti,”
which records Millennium “maintains . . . in the ordinary course
of business.”
      Cartier’s declaration provided both general information
about Millennium’s practices and procedures and information
specific to Tonti. Cartier declared that Millennium “performs
laboratory testing services that are requested and ordered . . .
by a patient’s treating physician at a rehabilitation center
or medical office” and “does not see or treat patients itself.”
Millennium “has no involvement in what tests a patient’s
treating physician or rehabilitation center orders or requests,
and has no knowledge or involvement in whether such physicians
or rehabilitation centers send samples from their patients to
other laboratories for testing.” Cartier declared Millennium
does not employ, pay, or receive compensation from any other
defendant in this case.

                                  9
        Cartier declared that “[d]uring the time period
in which Millenium . . . provided laboratory services to . . .
Tonti . . . , Millennium . . . maintained written contracts
with . . . Tonti’s insurer, . . . Blue Shield” and “[p]ursuant to
such contracts, Millennium . . . provided requested laboratory
services to Blue Shield’s members in exchange for agreed upon
compensation by Blue Shield for such services.” The declaration
attached billing records to Blue Shield for laboratory testing
for Tonti and numerous “explanation of benefits” documents
Blue Shield provided to Millennium “describing Blue Shield’s
processing and payment of . . . claim[s] submitted by
Millennium . . . [regarding Tonti].” (Capitalization omitted.)
The explanation of benefits documents reflect that the amount
not covered by Blue Shield was $0 and that Tonti’s copayment
and deductible amount due to Millennium was likewise $0.
       The declaration also attached “test requisition form[s] . . .
sent by [Sobertec] to Millennium . . . requesting Millennium . . .
perform lab[oratory] testing services for . . . Tonti.” These
forms appear to be forms created by Millennium, as they bear
a copyright attributed to Millennium. They include a section
entitled “Practice Information,” in which the name and address
of Sobertec has been filled in electronically. At the bottom of
the section, “Dr. Montano” is handwritten on a space provided
for “Requesting Provider.” The forms also have a section for
“Diagnosis Code(s),” and Tonti’s name, gender, and date of birth,
all of which are handwritten on the forms. The form contains
different boxes to check to identify the tests being requested,
including a box for requesting a “Custom Profile” set up by
the physician that should be used to determine the tests to be
performed. The “Custom Profile” box is checked on the forms

                                 10
in the record. In a section entitled “Patient Authorization,”
there is a signature. (Full capitalization omitted.) This section
is below language authorizing Millennium to perform the
testing identified on the form. There is also a line provided
for “Authorized Healthcare Provider Signature” on which no
signature appears.
       Avee offered the declaration of Linda Pelletier, the
“revenue cycle manager of toxicology billing at Avee.”
(Capitalization omitted.) Pelletier declared she “ha[s] personal
knowledge of Avee’s toxicology and billing practices, processes,
and records, including Avee’s test request and insurance billing
records” and that she had “reviewed Avee’s records for . . .
Tonti,” which records Avee “maintained . . . in the regular
course of business.” Like Cartier, Pelletier declared both general
information about the processes at the laboratory, as well as
information regarding Tonti. The declaration states that “Avee
is a laboratory testing company and does not see patients itself.
Avee performs tests that physicians request and is not able to
make its own determination about which tests are medically
appropriate or necessary for a particular patient.”
       According to Pelletier, “[i]n May and June 2014, Avee
received test requests from . . . Tonti’s physicians. . . . [¶] . . . Avee
performed the tests that medical staff at Living Rebos requested
and billed . . . Blue Shield . . . for these tests.” The declaration
attaches Blue Shield explanation of benefits records and Blue
Shield checks to Tonti associated with her stay at Living Rebos
and testing by Avee. Also attached are Avee billing statements
addressed to Tonti at Living Rebos’s address, which specified
Tonti was responsible for a portion of the cost for Avee’s services.
The declaration further states that “Tonti was responsible for

                                   11
[a portion of the cost] but did not pay her portion.” Finally, the
declaration provides that “Living Rebos is a separate company
from Avee, and Avee is not privy to . . . what tests Living Rebos
orders other laboratories to conduct.”
      Both Millennium and Avee also offered the discovery
requests and responses served in the litigation and excerpts
from Tonti’s unfinished deposition. Portions of this discovery
are summarized below in more detail, as relevant.

                  b.    Tonti’s evidence
      In opposing both motions, Tonti argued the laboratories
had not made the showing required to shift the burden to her,
and even if they had, she had successfully rebutted it with the
evidence she offered. Tonti argued her evidence created a triable
issue as to whether the laboratories “employed” the centers as
steerers and whether the laboratories harbored an intent to
defraud when they sought reimbursement from Blue Shield.
      Among the evidence Tonti offered in opposing the motion
was a document entitled “response to demand for exchange of
expert trial witness information,” which identifies Charles Hill
as her expert, as well as Hill’s declaration and a proof of service
for both documents dated October 15, 2018. (Boldface &
capitalization omitted.) Tonti describes Hill as “an expert in the
addiction treatment and law enforcement field.” According to
Tonti, the declaration was relevant to both the intent to defraud
and the steering scheme issues, and supported “that Avee[’s] . . .
tests were part of a corrupt practice of excessive and medically

                                 12
unnecessary urine testing designed to generate expensive and
fraudulent claims for remuneration to insurance companies.”3
       Tonti also submitted, by way of her attorney’s declaration,
a compilation of documents comprised primarily of internal
Avee and Millennium documents, apparently produced in other
litigation. Tonti describes these documents as circumstantial
evidence of the laboratories’ willingness to lie and defraud
in order to increase the sales of their urine testing services.
The collection also included what appear to be various other
publicly available documents, such as public records regarding
the corporate structure of the laboratories and printouts from
government and news websites about the physicians the
laboratories identified as having requested Tonti’s urine tests.
In the declaration to which these are attached, Tonti’s attorney
states that, based on his personal knowledge, the documents
are what they purport to be. We discuss the contents of these
documents as necessary in our analysis below.
       Tonti also relied on her own deposition testimony,
declaration, and discovery responses in which Tonti represents
that she never authorized treatment by, nor interacted with, the
purported prescribing physicians identified by Avee (specifically,
Dr. Austin Elguindy and Dr. Mark Honzel) and Millennium
(specifically, Dr. Carlos Montano) or any other licensed medical
professional at the rehabilitation centers. She also cited evidence
that Living Rebos and Sobertec made requests for testing on her
behalf before she even enrolled in a rehabilitation center or after
she had already left. She argued this evidence supports that the
laboratories’ testing was not medically necessary, which further

      3 The Hill declaration does not address Millennium
specifically.

                                13
supports that the laboratories intended to defraud Blue Shield
when they billed for the testing.
      As to how her evidence created a triable question regarding
employment of the rehabilitation centers as steerers, Tonti
argued a quid pro quo arrangement existed between the
laboratories and the centers that was tantamount to such an
employment relationship. Tonti claimed that both laboratories
waived copayments that would otherwise be due for testing
Tonti’s urine, as shown by the centers “repeatedly [telling
her] that she would not have to pay anything for services she
purportedly received.” Tonti argued that, as a result of the
laboratories waiving the copayments for urine testing, the
rehabilitation centers were able to convince their residents
to participate in intensive outpatient programs, something for
which, unlike use of the center’s sober living facilities, the centers
could recover from Tonti’s insurer. In this way, she argued, the
laboratories’ waiver of copayments served as compensation to the
centers for steering their residents’ urine to the laboratories.

            2.     Exclusion of Tonti’s evidence
       Avee and Millennium each objected to Tonti’s proffered
documentary evidence attached to her attorney’s declaration
as well as to Hill’s declaration. They also moved jointly in
limine to exclude Hill’s declaration on the ground he was not
timely disclosed as Tonti’s expert. In support, counsel for four
defendants submitted declarations stating that none of them
had received a copy of Tonti’s expert disclosure in October 2018
or at any time before Tonti filed her oppositions to the summary
judgment motions.
       The court sustained the objections and granted the motion
in limine to exclude Hill’s declaration.

                                 14
            3.    Tonti’s request to reopen discovery and
                  continue summary judgment hearing and
                  trial
       On January 2, 2019, Tonti moved ex parte under Code
of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (h), to continue the
hearings on the motions and to reopen discovery and continue
trial. The court denied the motion, but granted her leave to
conduct limited depositions of Cartier and Pelletier. Tonti,
however, never deposed them.

            4.    Order granting summary judgment
       The trial court determined that Avee and Millennium
had met their initial burdens on summary judgment as to each
laboratory’s alleged intent to defraud and as to the employment
relationship element of Tonti’s steering theory. The court
further concluded that the burden had then shifted to Tonti
to identify admissible evidence that created a triable question
of fact as to either issue, but she had failed to do so. The court
therefore granted the motions.

      D.    Appeals and Appealability
      On January 29, 2019, Tonti requested, and the superior
court clerk entered, a dismissal of the entire action with
prejudice. Tonti attempted to appeal from the dismissal,
but this court dismissed the appeal on the ground that Tonti
did not have the power to dismiss an IFPA action without first
obtaining consent from the trial court, and/or consent from the
commissioner or district attorney. (See Ins. Code, § 1871.7,
subd. (e)(1).)
      On June 20, 2022, a default judgment was entered for Tonti
against the defaulting defendants, who are not parties to this

                                15
appeal. The judgment did not mention or in any way relate to
Millennium or Avee.
       On August 18, 2022, Tonti filed the notice of appeal giving
rise to the instant appeal, in which she purports to appeal from
the June 20, 2022 judgment as a “judgment [issued] after an
order granting a summary judgment motion,” although no
such judgment was entered in favor of Millennium or Avee on
June 20, 2022 (or at any other time), and the judgment against
the defaulting defendants on that date did not in any way relate
to or result from the motions for summary judgment in the
litigation. Nevertheless, we exercise our discretion to “amend
the order granting summary judgment to make it an appealable
judgment and construe the notice of appeal as applying to the
judgment.” (Dover v. Sadowinski (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 113,
115; Lieding v. Commercial Diving Center (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d
72, 73–74 [nonappealable order granting motion for summary
judgment treated as a judgment].)

                          DISCUSSION
      Tonti argues the trial court reversibly erred in (1) granting
the motions for summary judgment; (2) overruling her objections
to the Cartier and Pelletier declarations, excluding the Hill
declaration, and sustaining Avee’s and Millennium’s objections
to the documentary evidence attached to her attorney’s
declarations; and (3) denying her request to reopen discovery and
continue the hearing on summary judgment and continue trial.

I.    The Court Properly Considered the Pelletier and
      Cartier Declarations
     Because the Pelletier and Cartier declarations formed a
primary basis for Avee’s and Millennium’s summary judgment

                                16
motions and the court’s ruling thereon, before analyzing the
summary judgment rulings themselves, we consider Tonti’s
argument that the trial court erred in overruling her objections
to these declarations. We review such an evidentiary ruling
for an abuse of discretion. (Alexander v. Scripps Memorial
Hospital La Jolla (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 206, 226 [“[a]lthough
in Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 535 . . . , the
California Supreme Court expressly declined to reach the issue
of the appropriate standard of review for reviewing a trial court’s
rulings on evidentiary objections made in connection with a
summary judgment motion, the weight of authority, both before
and after Reid, holds that an appellate court applies an abuse of
discretion standard under these circumstances”].) We find none.

      A.    Pelletier Declaration
       Tonti argues the Pelletier declaration is “conclusory,
incompetent and unfounded” because Pelletier “was not . . .
employed by Avee Lab[oratories]” during the relevant time
period. But Pelletier’s declaration is based on her “personal
knowledge of Avee’s toxicology billing practices, processes,
and records, including . . . test request[s] and insurance billing
records” and her review of records maintained by Avee in the
normal course of business. (See People ex rel. Owen v. Media
One Direct, LLC (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1480, 1484 (Owen)
[“[t]he personal knowledge of a witness regarding a matter may
be shown by any otherwise admissible evidence, including the
witness’s own testimony”].) Tonti does not suggest, let alone
identify a basis on which to conclude, that these practices have
changed in the four years between when Living Rebos sent
requests to Avee to perform the tests and when Pelletier issued
her declaration. And, as to the information supporting the

                                17
admissibility of attached documents, a personal knowledge
or foundational objection is properly overruled where, as here,
a declarant states under penalty of perjury that he or she is
employed by the corporation whose records and practices are
described in and attached to his declaration, “and that the facts
contained in [his] declaration are true and correct based on [his]
own personal knowledge or based on [his] review of records.”
(Ibid.) The court did not abuse its discretion in relying on the
Pelletier declaration.

      B.    Cartier Declaration
      Tonti next argues that the court should not have relied
on the Cartier declaration because the declaration provides that
the information therein “is true and correct . . . to the best of
my knowledge, information and belief and based on my review
of company documents maintained in the ordinary course of
business.” (Italics added.) Tonti cites Bowden v. Robinson (1977)
67 Cal.App.3d 705, 719 and Lopez v. University Partners (1997)
54 Cal.App.4th 1117, 1124 for the proposition that “[d]eclarations
based on information and belief are insufficient to satisfy the
burden of either the moving or opposing party on a motion for
summary judgment or adjudication.” (Lopez, supra, at p. 1124.)
These cases stand for the noncontroversial proposition that
declarations to support summary judgment must be based on
“personal knowledge” (Bowden, supra, at pp. 719–720; Lopez,
supra, at p. 1124) and thus must “ ‘show affirmatively that
the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated in
the affidavits or declarations.’ (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c,
subd. (d) . . . .)” (Lopez, supra, at p. 1124, italics omitted; see
Bowden, supra, at pp. 719–720.) But the Cartier declaration
does “ ‘show affirmatively that [Cartier] is competent to testify

                                18
to the matters stated in the . . . declaration[ ].’ ” (Lopez, supra,
at p. 1124, italics omitted.) Specifically, as to the portions of
the declaration regarding Millennium, Cartier explained at
the outset of his declaration that he has personal knowledge,
by virtue of his position, of Millennium’s relationships with
insurers and rehabilitation centers, its processes and procedures
regarding receipt of requests for laboratory testing analysis
services, and billing and payment of claims for such services.
With regard to Tonti, although Cartier did not have personal
knowledge about the testing requested for her, he declared
sufficient personal knowledge of Millennium’s record keeping
practices to lay the foundation for the documents attached
to his declaration regarding these requests. (See Owen, supra,
213 Cal.App.4th at p. 1484.) The reference to information and
belief at the end of the declaration does not undo the specific
personal knowledge to which Cartier elsewhere attests.
The court did not abuse its discretion in relying on Cartier’s
declaration.

II.   Ruling on Millennium’s and Avee’s Summary
      Judgment Motions
       We now turn to Tonti’s arguments directly challenging the
court’s ruling on the motions for summary judgment. We review
a trial court’s summary judgment rulings de novo. (Saelzler v.
Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 768 (Saelzler).)
“In performing our de novo review, we must view the evidence
in a light favorable to [Tonti] as the losing party [citation],
liberally construing her evidentiary submission while strictly
scrutinizing [respondents’ respective] showing[s], and resolving
any evidentiary doubts or ambiguities in plaintiff ’s favor.” (See
ibid.)

                                 19
      A.    Summary Judgment Analytical Framework
       “A motion for summary judgment must be granted if all
of the papers submitted show ‘there is no triable issue as to any
material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law. In determining whether the papers show . . .
there is no triable issue as to any material fact[,] the court
shall consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers, . . .
and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence . . . .’
([Code Civ. Proc.,] § 437c, subd. (c).)” (Scheiding v. Dinwiddie
Construction Co. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 64, 69 (Scheiding).)
“[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial
burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the
nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries
his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing
party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to
make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue
of material fact.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25
Cal.4th 826, 850 (Aguilar).)
       To the extent a defendant seeks summary judgment based
on the lack of any evidence of a necessary element, the defendant
must make a “ ‘ “showing” that one or more elements of the cause
of action cannot be established.’ ” (Saelzler, supra, 25 Cal.4th
at p. 768 [burden shifts to the opposing party only after such
a showing]; Wiener v. Southcoast Childcare Centers, Inc. (2004)
32 Cal.4th 1138, 1142 [citing Saelzler for this point].) This
“require[s] . . . evidence[;]” merely “point[ing] out that the
plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed
evidence” is not enough. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 854,
fn. omitted.)

                                20
       A defendant may also make this showing by presenting
evidence of the plaintiff ’s “ ‘factually devoid’ discovery responses
from which an absence of evidence [to support a necessary
element of the claim] can be inferred.” (Scheiding, supra, 69
Cal.App.4th at p. 83.) For example, a plaintiff ’s responses to
form discovery requests “requir[ing] plaintiffs to state all of
the facts which supported [an element of the claim]” that cited
beliefs, not facts, and merely “reserved the right to further
respond” have been deemed “sufficient to require plaintiffs
to prove their case concerning [that element]” and shift the
summary judgment burden. (Union Bank v. Superior Court
(1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 573, 580–581.)

      B.    Avee and Millennium Met Their Initial Burdens
            Regarding Intent To Defraud Blue Shield
            1.     Affirmative evidence presented by the
                   laboratories met their initial burdens
                   to show they had no intent to defraud
      As set forth above, to the extent Tonti’s IFPA claim
is based on a violation of Penal Code sections 549 or 550, it
requires, inter alia, that Avee and Millennium acted with a
specific intent to defraud. (See Cruz, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 1192–1193; People v. Booth (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1247, 1252;
People v. Singh (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1343, 1370–1371.) The
only basis for inferring an intent to defraud that Tonti pleaded
in her complaint was that Millennium and Avee “knew, or were
reckless in not knowing, that the charges they submitted were
captured in other billing codes, involved excessive and medically
unnecessary treatment or testing, . . . [or] not covered by Blue
Shield.” On summary judgment, Millennium and Avee offered
uncontradicted evidence establishing that there was no reason

                                  21
they would have known—or were required by law to determine—
whether the tests were medically necessary. Avee and
Millennium offered declarations attesting that each laboratory
is not involved in determining the medical need for such testing,
nor in any patient’s treatment plan. Further to this point
with respect to Avee, Avee’s interrogatory responses provided
that “Avee performed and billed for tests based on orders
from [Tonti’s] treating physicians and does not and cannot
independently choose which tests to perform.” The employee
declarations Avee and Millennium submitted state that each
laboratory received physician requests to perform certain tests
on Tonti’s urine. Avee also offered its interrogatory responses,
which state that two physicians had “submitted requests for
analysis of [Tonti’s] urine samples to Avee and specified the
tests to be performed.” And Millennium also provided requisition
forms identifying the name of the requesting physician and the
other information required by regulations.
       Nothing in the record suggests that either laboratory’s
appropriate role was other than to perform urine testing
when requested to do so in the manner set forth in Avee’s and
Millennium’s evidence. Indeed, the applicable regulations
do not require any independent determination by a laboratory
as to the need for testing, and instead permit a laboratory to
perform testing when requested by an authorized prescriber,
such as a physician. (See Bus. & Prof. Code, § 1288 [“[a]ny
person conducting or operating a clinical laboratory may accept
assignments for tests only from . . . persons licensed under
the provisions of law relating to the healing arts or their
representatives”]; id., § 1220, subd. (d)(2) [incorporating certain
federal regulations into California law governing laboratory

                                22
testing] & 42 C.F.R. § 493.1241(a) (2023) [“[t]he laboratory must
have a written or electronic request for patient testing from an
authorized person”]; see also United States ex rel. Groat v. Boston
Heart Diagnostics Corporation (D.D.C. 2017) 296 F.Supp.3d
155, 159 [concluding “a laboratory cannot and is not required to
determine medical necessity, but rather is permitted to rely on
the ordering physician’s determination that the laboratory tests
billed . . . are medically necessary”].) Nor could the frequency of
the test requests on Tonti’s urine provide a basis for reasonably
inferring that the laboratories knew or should have known that
they were requesting reimbursement for testing that was not
medically necessary, given the lack of evidence in the record
suggesting this frequency was somehow out of the ordinary.
       Avee’s and Millennium’s proffered evidence supports a
basis for inferring the laboratories did not harbor an intent to
defraud Blue Shield.

            2.    Tonti’s arguments to the contrary are
                  unconvincing
       Tonti argues that this evidence is insufficient to preclude a
triable question as to the laboratories’ intent for several reasons.
First, she contends that neither laboratory offered any proof that
it actually performed the confirmatory urine tests billed to Blue
Shield, and that if the laboratories billed for tests they never
performed, this is ample basis for inferring an intent to defraud
an insurer. This argument is beyond the scope of summary
judgment, because Tonti did not plead that Millennium or Avee
defrauded Blue Shield by billing for tests not performed, but
rather by performing and charging for medically unnecessary
and duplicative tests. (See AARTS, supra, 179 Cal.App.3d
at p. 1064.) Tonti first raised this argument in her oppositions

                                 23
to summary judgment. Because the pleadings frame the issues
on summary judgment, the lack of an allegation that either
laboratory did not actually perform the tests for which they
charged precludes this as a ground for opposing the laboratories’
motions. (Ibid.) And in any event, Avee’s discovery responses
and the declarations are evidence that the tests were actually
performed. Nothing in the record contradicts these documents,
nor did Tonti seek discovery that might contradict them.
       Tonti next argues that the Millennium requisition forms
in the record were not signed by the physician identified as
requesting the tests, and that this is circumstantial evidence
from which the trier of fact could infer Millennium knew or
should have known that a doctor did not actually request the
tests. According to Tonti, if Millennium billed Blue Shield for
tests Millennium knew or should have known were not properly
prescribed, that would provide circumstantial evidence of an
intent to defraud Blue Shield. But the law does not require the
signature of the requesting authorized physician in order for a
laboratory to legally perform a laboratory test; rather, it requires
such a request contain certain information, such as the name
of the authorizing physician and certain identifying information
for the patient, all of which appeared on the requisition forms
Millennium submitted. (See 42 C.F.R. § 493.1241(a) & (b)
(2023).) The lack of a signature is thus not a basis on which
Millennium should have known or suspected anything was
amiss with the requests. Tonti further points to the prohibition
of a nonmedical rehabilitation center like Sobertec to employ a
physician authorized to request laboratory testing. But neither
the requisition forms provided, nor any other evidence in the

                                 24
record, suggests that the requesting physician identified on the
form is employed by Sobertec or any other rehabilitation center.
       Tonti next argues that a declaration, like Cartier’s
and Pelletier’s, denying the requisite intent is not sufficient
evidence of lack of requisite intent. But their declarations are
not simply denials; rather, each contains a detailed description
of each laboratory’s practices, which is inconsistent with the only
theory of intent and knowledge pleaded in Tonti’s complaint.
       Finally, Tonti argues that the evidence identified by Avee
and Millennium is insufficient to preclude a triable question on
knowledge and intent, given the evidentiary presumption that
one is presumed to know and intend the natural and probable
consequences of one’s actions. (See Evid. Code, §§ 665, 668;
Gomez v. Acquistapace (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 740, 746.) But
the only acts of Millennium and Avee reflected in the evidence
are that they tested the urine of Tonti and billed her insurance
for it. A fraudulent intent is not a natural and probable
consequence of those actions.

            3.    Avee also met its initial burden as
                  a result of Tonti’s factually devoid
                  discovery responses regarding intent
      To support its motion for summary judgment, Avee also
offered Tonti’s discovery responses to Avee’s interrogatories
asking Tonti to identify the basis for her allegations supporting
fraudulent intent.4 These responses provide another basis on
which the court could have granted Avee summary judgment.
Specifically, these interrogatories asked Tonti to identify “the
basis of [her] allegation that Avee ‘engaged in a conspiracy,

      4 Tonti did not respond to Millennium’s discovery requests.

                                25
common enterprise, and common course of conduct, the purpose
of which is and was to engage in the violation of the [IFPA],’ ”
and the “allegation that Avee ‘knew, or [was] reckless in not
knowing, that the charges [it] submitted were captured in other
billing codes, involved excessive and medically unnecessary
treatment or testing, and attempted to attain payment for
services [not] covered by Blue Shield by using deceptive billing
codes and medical descriptions/records.’ ” Tonti’s response to the
first of these interrogatories was comprised entirely of objections,
and she responded to the second by “object[ing] on the grounds
that the information sought is more readily available to [Avee]
and/or third parties, who[ ] are identified in the request” and
responding as follows: “[p]ropounding party and its agents,
employees, and/or representatives.” These responses are
devoid of any facts. To the extent her limited responses can be
understood as suggesting that Avee itself had evidence on these
points, Tonti chose not to seek any information about it in her
interrogatories to Avee, or via document requests or depositions
of Avee employees or third parties—even after the trial court
extended discovery for the purpose of deposing Pelletier
regarding her summary judgment declaration. This “discovery
was sufficiently comprehensive, and [Tonti’s] responses so devoid
of facts, as to lead to the inference that plaintiffs could not prove
[intent] upon a stringent review of the direct, circumstantial
and inferential evidence contained in their interrogatory answers
and deposition testimony.” (Andrews v. Foster Wheeler LLC
(2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 96, 107; see ibid. [“[i]f plaintiffs respond
to comprehensive interrogatories seeking all known facts with
boilerplate answers that restate their allegations, or simply
provide laundry lists of people and/or documents, the burden

                                 26
of production will almost certainly be shifted to them once
defendants move for summary judgment and properly present
plaintiffs’ factually devoid discovery responses”].) This also
“met [Avee’s] initial burden of presenting evidence sufficient to
make a prima facie showing that a triable issue of fact did not
exist regarding [intent].” (Andrews, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at
p. 107.)

      C.    Tonti Did Not Produce Admissible Evidence of
            a Triable Issue of Fact Regarding Intent
       Tonti argues that, even if Avee and Millennium
successfully shifted the burden to her to establish a triable issue
of fact regarding the laboratories’ intent to defraud, the admitted
evidence she offered in opposition met that burden.
       She argues that the requisite intent can be reasonably
inferred from (1) evidence that Tonti was not treated or examined
by the physicians Avee and Millennium contend requested the
testing and (2) evidence that Tonti was not even a patient at
the rehabilitation centers at the time some of the tests were
performed. But Tonti offers no evidence from which the trier of
fact could infer that either laboratory knew that Tonti was not
seen by these physicians, or that either laboratory knew when
she was a patient at a particular rehabilitation center. The
evidence Tonti identified in opposition supports an inference
that the tests at issue were not medically necessary—for
example, because they were ordered by a physician that had
never seen Tonti—but absent some basis for inferring that
Millennium or Avee knew this, it is not a basis for inferring any
intent or knowledge on the laboratories’ behalves.

                                27
      D.    Millennium and Avee Met Their Initial Burdens
            of Establishing No Triable Question Existed
            That They Employed the Centers To Steer
            Business to Them
       Unlike Tonti’s Penal Code section 550 theory of her
IFPA claim, her theory under Insurance Code section 1871.7,
subdivision (a) does not require an intent to defraud.
       To establish a violation of that section (and an IFPA
claim based thereon), the laboratories must have “employed” the
rehabilitation center as a steerer. (Cruz, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1192 [“ ‘[t]he conduct made unlawful by [Insurance Code
section 1871.7,] subdivision (a) is identified by a single verb:
To employ. Subdivision (a)’s single verb makes a single act
unlawful: Employment’ ”].) Millennium and Avee successfully
showed in their summary judgment motions that no triable
question existed as to such employment. Contrary to Tonti’s
arguments on appeal, Millennium and Avee did not merely
point to a lack of evidence that they employed the rehabilitation
centers as steerers. Rather, they pointed to uncontradicted
evidence of the nature of their relationships with the centers,
wherein the centers provide a laboratory with a testing request
from a purported treating physician, and, in accordance
with applicable regulations, the laboratory bills the patient’s
insurance for that testing. Nothing about this relationship
tends to show that they “employed” the rehabilitation centers
to steer business to them. In addition, as to Avee’s motion,
Avee provided Tonti’s factually devoid discovery responses
to interrogatories requesting she identify “the basis of [her]
allegation that ‘. . . [Living] Rebos acted as a runner, capper,
or steerer . . . to procure testing services’ for Avee.”

                               28
      E.    Tonti Did Not Create a Triable Issue as
            to Whether the Laboratories Employed
            the Centers To Steer Business to Them
       Tonti argues that, even if Avee and Millennium
successfully shifted the burden to her on this issue, the
admitted evidence she offered in opposition met that burden.
Tonti correctly notes that evidence of a formal employment
relationship is not necessary, and that a triable issue can exist
based on evidence that the allegedly employing entity provided
some benefit to the steerer in exchange for the latter procuring
patients to whom the employer could provide services. (Cruz,
supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 1198 [rental payment that
exceeded fair market value could potentially reflect a payment
establishing employment for the purposes of an Insurance
Code section 1871.7, subdivision (a) claim].) In opposing the
laboratories’ summary judgment motions, Tonti offered her
declaration that the centers told her that she would have no
financial obligation related to her stay at their sober living
facilities, as long as she also participated in a corresponding
intensive outpatient program, for which she likewise would
have no financial responsibility. She declared that these IOPs
involved “sometimes receiv[ing] counseling, but it wasn’t every
day and it was never . . . clinical counseling. Most of the time
was spent going to the gym, waiting around the sober living
home, or providing urine samples.” Tonti further declared
that neither laboratory ever charged her a copayment. Her
declaration outlined the amounts charged to her insurance
by Living Rebos and Sobertec for her participation in their
respective IOPs. She argues that these charges by the
rehabilitation centers include both charges for the centers
conducting point of contact testing of Tonti’s urine and their

                                29
handling and storing of the same urine samples that they sent
to the laboratories for testing.
       Tonti’s theory is as follows: If the laboratories waived
their copayments for laboratory testing services, as she claims
they did, it would make it easier for the rehabilitation centers
to convince residents like Tonti to participate in IOPs, either
because the centers could have physicians order the tests without
obtaining the residents’ consent, or because they could convince
the residents to consent to laboratory testing by promising it
would not cost them anything. And if, as declared, the centers
charged Blue Shield for Tonti’s participation in an IOP comprised
largely of preparing urine samples for laboratory testing, one
can reasonably infer that the laboratories’ waiver of copayments
facilitated the rehabilitation centers’ collecting this insurance
reimbursement for their unnecessary work—thereby conferring
a benefit on the centers. In other words, the laboratories waived
their fees in order to encourage the centers to send them work.
Thus, the rehabilitation centers were given a benefit in exchange
for steering the work to the laboratories.
       But the only evidence Tonti identifies to support her
contention that Avee did not bill her for the copayments she
would otherwise owe under the terms of her insurance contract
with Blue Shield is her declaration stating that she never
received bills from Avee. Under certain circumstances, that
a document was not received by its intended recipient may be
circumstantial evidence from which one can infer the document
was never sent. But such circumstances cannot reasonably
be inferred from the evidence before the court here. Pelletier
attested to Avee having sent Tonti bills for her copayments, and
her declaration attaches billing statements addressed to Tonti at

                               30
the address for Living Rebos, dated several months after Tonti’s
stay there concluded. That Tonti did not receive statements
addressed to her at Living Rebos after she was no longer living
there does not, without more, support a reasonable inference that
the statements were not actually sent. Nor do we see anything
untoward about Avee addressing these statements to Tonti at
the Living Rebos facility address, as this is the only address the
evidence supports Avee had for Tonti.
      As to Millennium, the only evidence Tonti identifies to
support her contention that it did not bill her for the copayments
she would otherwise owe are the explanation of benefits
documents prepared by Blue Shield reflecting that, under the
terms of the Blue Shield insurance contract applicable to Tonti,
Tonti did not have any copayment obligations for the services
that Millennium charged to the insurer on her behalf.5 Tonti has

      5 Millennium represents in its brief that all of these
explanation of benefits documents generated by Blue Shield
and attached to the Cartier declaration reflect a $0 copayment
obligation, and Tonti does not dispute this characterization
of the documents. Our own review of the documents reflects
that 10 of these explanation of benefits documents show a $0
copayment obligation and a $0 amount for the portion of the
services not covered by insurance. One of these explanations of
benefits documents is for services dated August 5, 2014. There
are also two exact copies of another explanation of benefits
document itemizing services Millennium provided to Tonti on
August 5, 2014; that document reflects that Tonti does have
a copayment obligation, and that a portion of the charges for
services Millennium provided to her are not covered. None of the
Blue Shield explanation of benefits documents identifies services
provided by name, but rather by billing code and using the term

                                31
not explained—let alone presented an evidentiary basis
reflecting—how Millennium’s failure to bill Tonti for copayments
Blue Shield concluded were not owed can support any inference
regarding Millennium conferring a benefit to Living Rebos.

      F.    Tonti’s Arguments the Court Improperly
            Excluded Some of Her Proffered Evidence
            Do Not Change the Result
      Tonti argues that the court erred in excluding Hill’s
declaration and the documents attached to her attorney’s
declaration. We disagree.

            1.    Documents regarding the prescribing
                  physicians
      Among the excluded documents Tonti offered through
her attorney’s declaration were several regarding Dr. Montano,
the physician Millennium identified as having requested testing
on Tonti’s urine, and Dr. Elguindy, one of the two physicians
Avee identified as having requested such testing.
      The documents regarding Dr. Montano are described as
follows in Tonti’s attorney’s declaration: (1) a “true and correct

“office medical.” (Capitalization omitted.) Given that Tonti
does not dispute the characterization of these documents as
reflecting Tonti has no copayment obligations for the urine
testing Millennium billed to Blue Shield, she has conceded the
point. Nor are Tonti’s declared statements that Blue Shield
did not pay for the entire cost of the services Millennium
provided to Tonti contrary to the $0 copayment obligation
reflected in these explanation of benefits documents, because
the amount of coverage and an insured’s copayment obligation
are distinct and unrelated issues. Tonti does not attempt to
connect these two issues with evidence or argument.

                                32
copy of an official release from the Office of Orange County
District Attorney” dated July 25, 2018 “on the official letterhead
of the Orange County District Attorney” “detailing a massive
fraudulent urine harvesting scheme wherein . . . Montano . . .
pled guilty to counts of insurance fraud” and (2) “a true and
correct copy of [a July 27, 2018] article from the Los Angeles
Times” regarding, inter alia, Montano’s guilty plea. But Tonti
concedes that Montano was still properly licensed at the time
Millenium claims he requested it perform tests on Tonti’s urine
(i.e., in 2014). Thus, even if in 2018 Montano pleaded guilty to
committing insurance fraud and the press reported as much, such
facts could not support a reasonable inference that Millenium
knew or should have known in 2014 that the requests it claims
it received from Dr. Montano were in some way improper or not
medically necessary. Thus, even if admitted, these documents
could not support a triable issue as to Millennium’s intent.
        The documents regarding Dr. Elguindy are described in
Tonti’s attorney’s declaration as follows: (1) “a true and correct
copy of a printout from the Los Angeles County Department of
Medical Examiner—Coroner website, indicating case status for
Dr. Austin T. Elguindy . . . date of death 01/12/2016[,]” (2) “a true
and correct copy of a medical board decision pertaining to . . .
Elguindy . . . obtained from the Department of Consumer Affairs
website located at dca.ca.gov via search of [his] name” reflecting
he “was placed on a three[-]year probation effective September
26, 2012, in connection with a felony conviction[,]” and (3) “a
true and correct computer printout of the November 2, 2010
article titled ‘Lake Elsinore: Man jailed in road-rage clash’ from
the Press-Enterprise, a Riverside publication,” which appears to
involve Dr. Elguindy. That Dr. Elguindy died two years after he

                                 33
purportedly ordered the tests on Tonti’s urine is of no assistance
to Tonti in creating a triable issue of fact regarding Millennium’s
intent to defraud Blue Shield by performing those tests. Nor do
the documents purporting to reflect that Dr. Elguindy was on
probation with the California Medical Board at the time Avee
claims to have received testing requests from him support a
reasonable inference that Avee knew or should have known such
requests were not medically necessary, such that Avee intended
to defraud Blue Cross by requesting reimbursement for them.
The disciplinary document the trial court excluded provides that
Dr. Elguindy’s license was “revoked,” but that “the revocation
[was] stayed, and [he] [was] placed on probation for three (3)
years on [certain] terms and conditions.” Nothing in the record
supports an inference that a doctor on probation is not qualified
to order medical tests, let alone an inference that the laboratories
intentionally requested reimbursement for tests they knew
Dr. Elguindy had ordered at a time he was not so qualified.
      Thus, even if the court erred in excluding any of these
documents regarding Drs. Elguindy and Montano, any such error
was not prejudicial.

            2.    The Hill declaration
      Citing Staub v. Kiley (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1437,
1446-1447, Tonti argues that Avee’s demand for exchange
of expert designations on “a premature date” (italics omitted)
abolished her obligation to timely designate an expert, and
thus that the court abused its discretion in excluding the Hill
report as untimely. In Staub, the court excused an untimely
expert disclosure on the basis that the demand to which it was
responding was not in “ ‘complete and timely compliance with
[Code of Civil Procedure] [s]ection 2034.260’ ” (Staub, supra, 226

                                34
Cal.App.4th at p. 1446) because it, like Avee’s demand here,
requested exchange only 20 days after it was served by mail,
thereby failing to allow for the additional five days that section
requires as a result of mail service. (Id. at pp. 1446–1447.) But
a demand for expert disclosures is not forever “void” because
it is untimely, nor does “the statute . . . state that an ‘internally
defective’ demand cannot be amended.” (Zellerino v. Brown
(1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1097, 1108.) Here, unlike in Staub, the
evidence supports that Avee’s “mistake was innocent and the
steps [Avee] took to correct it were reasonable” (id. at p. 1109)—
namely, immediately upon the error being brought to Avee’s
attention, Avee agreed to give Tonti the initially-omitted five
extra days, thereby ultimately complying with the statutory
timeline. Where, as here, the recipient of an internal defective
expert demand refuses to participate in the exchange despite
such good faith efforts to correct the defect, and “instead treat[s]
the issue as some sort of tactical windfall[,]” the party is not
excused from complying with the demand as corrected.6

      6 To the extent Tonti argues that the court erred in
excluding the Hill report as untimely because Tonti actually
did timely serve an expert disclosure regarding Hill, this
presents a factual issue, which we review for substantial
evidence. Accordingly, we must resolve all evidentiary conflicts
and draw all legitimate inferences in favor of the trial court’s
decision and, where the evidence supports more than one
inference, we may not substitute our deductions for those of the
trial court. (Lake v. Reed (1997) 16 Cal.4th 448, 457.) The court
was presented with a declaration of Tonti’s counsel attesting to
having served the disclosure in October 2018, and declarations of
Avee’s counsel and Millennium’s counsel, attesting to their never
having received such a disclosure. On this record, substantial

                                  35
(Zellerino, supra, 235 Cal.App.3d at p. 1111.) The court did not
abuse its discretion in excluding the Hill report.

            3.    Documents apparently produced or filed
                  in connection with other litigation
        The remainder of the documents attached to Tonti’s
counsel’s declarations primarily consisted of internal Avee and
Millennium documents, apparently produced in other litigation,
such as emails between executives and salespeople at each
of the laboratories, sales and marketing material from each
of the laboratories, and internal memoranda from each of the
laboratories. The collection also included what appears to be a
declaration of a former Millennium employee in prior litigation
unrelated to Sobertec or Tonti. But Tonti failed to properly
authenticate any of these documents. Authentication requires
“the introduction of evidence sufficient to sustain a finding
that it is the writing that the proponent of the evidence claims
it is,” or the establishment of such facts by other legal means.
(Evid. Code, § 1400.) Tonti argues that her counsel’s declaration
authenticated these documents by describing information that
appears on the face of the documents—for example, the date,
title, author, and recipients. We disagree. The declaration
provides no facts to establish counsel’s personal knowledge, based
on which he is able to declare the documents are true and correct
copies of what they purport to be, or even how each document

evidence supports the court’s implicit factual finding that Tonti
did not timely serve a notice designating Hill as an expert.

                                36
came to be in counsel’s possession.7 (Cf. Greenspan v. LADT
LLC (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 486, 523 [“[a]s is routine in law
and motion practice, most of [the] exhibits were authenticated
through declarations submitted by [the party’s] attorneys, who
had personal knowledge of how [they had been] obtained . . . ,
how they had been identified, who had identified them, and
their status as true and correct copies of the ‘originals’ ”]; see
also The Luckman Partnership, Inc. v. Superior Court (2010)
184 Cal.App.4th 30, 34 [finding attorney laid proper foundation
where he “had personal knowledge that the documents attached
to his declaration were . . . verified interrogatory responses” filed
in the case].)
       Accordingly, the court did not reversibly err in excluding
these documents attached to Tonti’s attorney’s declarations.

III.   Denial of Discovery Continuance
      Finally, Tonti argues that the court abused its discretion in
denying her request to reopen discovery and continue the hearing
on summary judgment and trial. Tonti made this request under
Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (h), which
“mandates a continuance of a summary judgment hearing upon
a good faith showing by affidavit that additional time is needed
to obtain facts essential to justify opposition to the motion.”
(Cooksey v. Alexakis (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 246, 253–254
(Cooksey); Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (h) [“[i]f it appears from
the affidavits submitted in opposition to a motion for summary

       7 We thus need not address what attested basis would be
sufficient to properly authenticate the documents and/or whether,
had Tonti’s counsel provided such an attestation, the documents
would be inadmissible on some other basis.

                                 37
judgment or summary adjudication, or both, that facts essential
to justify opposition may exist but cannot, for reasons stated,
be presented, the court shall deny the motion, [or] order a
continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or discovery to
be had, or make any other order as may be just”].)
       Tonti argues the court lacked discretion under this section
to deny her request to continue the hearing, because she supplied
the requisite affidavit. “Continuance of a summary judgment
hearing is not mandatory, however, . . . when the submitted
affidavit fails to make the necessary showing under [Code of Civil
Procedure] section 437c, subdivision (h).” (Cooksey, supra, 123
Cal.App.4th at p. 254.) The necessary showing is: “(1) the facts
to be obtained are essential to opposing the motion; (2) there is
reason to believe such facts may exist; and (3) the reasons why
additional time is needed to obtain these facts.” (Wachs v. Curry
(1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 616, 623.) In connection with the third
requirement, “[t]here must be a justifiable reason why the
essential facts cannot be presented. An inappropriate delay
in seeking to obtain the facts may not be a valid reason why
the facts cannot then be presented.” (Cooksey, supra, 123
Cal.App.4th at p. 257.) Thus, “[w]e agree with the majority of
courts holding that lack of diligence may be a ground for denying
a request for a continuance of a summary judgment motion
hearing.” (Ibid.)
       The record here supports a lack of diligence in pursuing
discovery, based on which the court acted within its discretion in
denying Tonti’s requested continuance. The declaration of Tonti’s
counsel did not establish—nor does the broader record on appeal
reflect—that the additional discovery Tonti desired could not
have been obtained sooner with reasonable diligence. Tonti’s

                               38
counsel references concerns that defendants would have
spoliated evidence, had she engaged in early discovery efforts,
but identifies no specific basis for these concerns. Nor is this a
legitimate reason for delaying discovery until after a motion for
summary judgment is filed by the opposition. In any case, the
proffered declaration does not identify any impediment to Tonti
serving simple interrogatories and document requests as a means
of obtaining the information the declaration identifies. Finally,
the declaration blames Tonti’s failure to earlier seek discovery
in part on her counsel’s misunderstanding of the trial date
continuance as extending the discovery cut-off. But the
stipulation effecting that continuance does not mention discovery
deadlines, and Tonti’s counsel declared he was aware no later
than October 5, 2018—that is, before the close of discovery—that
opposing counsel did not understand the discovery cut-off to have
been extended past the end of October 2018. Tonti did not seek
any discovery upon learning this, nor did she seek the court’s
assistance in obtaining additional time for discovery until
over two months later. Code of Civil Procedure section 437c,
subdivision (h) is intended “ ‘[t]o mitigate summary judgment’s
harshness’ ” (Frazee v. Seely (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 627, 634) “for
an opposing party who has not had an opportunity to marshal the
evidence.” (Mary Morgan, Inc. v. Melzark (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th
765, 770.) Tonti had such an opportunity, so the court properly
denied her relief under this section.
      Finally, we find unpersuasive Tonti’s arguments that
the denial of a continuance denied her due process. The
authority Tonti cites to support this argument addresses a
failure to comply with local rules (not, as here, the Code of Civil
Procedure) (Garcia v. McCutchen (1997) 16 Cal.4th 469, 475–476

                                39
[interpreting and applying Code of Civil Procedure section 575.2];
see also Code Civ. Proc., § 575.2, subd. (b) [“[i]t is the intent of
the Legislature that if a failure to comply with [local] rules is the
responsibility of counsel and not of the party, any penalty shall
be imposed on counsel and shall not adversely affect the party’s
cause of action or defense thereto”]), and the right to a jury trial
(not, as here, a discovery continuance). (See Cooks v. Superior
Court (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 723, 726 [right to a jury trial which
cannot be abridged out of case management concerns or other
nonsubstantive defaults].)

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                       DISPOSITION
      The court’s order on Avee’s and Millennium’s summary
judgment motions and the judgment from which Tonti appeals
are affirmed. Respondents are awarded their costs on appeal.
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                   ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:

                 CHANEY, J.

                 BENDIX, J.

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