Court Opinion

ID: 9655811
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 19:22:54.881021+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:22.104489
License: Public Domain

Sharpe, J.
I am not in accord with the opinion of Mr. Justice Boyles for reasons hereinafter stated.
In the case at bar, deceased, George Carner, owed the positive duty to exclusively engage in work for his employer from 8:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. His injury occurred about 5:08 p.m. When deceased left Battle Greek to go to Marshall, he was engaged in the business of his employer. When he reached the intersection of Michigan avenue and Linden street, his duty required him to turn left on Linden street and travel 2 blocks north to Prospect street and about 1/2 block east on Prospect street to the residence of his customer, but instead of going the most direct route to his customer, he deviated and took his wife to the home of her sister in the southeast part of Marshall. He then drove to the northeast part of the city until he came to Prospect street. He then turned west on Prospect street, and was injured when approximately 6 blocks east of the residence of his customer. When deceased failed to turn north *229on Linden street, he departed from the ambit of his employment and entered upon a course of action disassociated from his work and was on a personal mission. While deceased was upon a personal mission, his employer could not be charged with the risk of deceased incurring injury.
It is admitted that when deceased deviated from the route at the intersection of Linden street and Michigan avenue, he was no longer in the relationship of an employee. This is so for the reason that the increased perils of the highway were not contemplated by the employer and were unrelated to the service deceased was to perform for his employer. The problem before us is to determine at what point, if any, deceased again resumed the relationship of an employee in his return from the home of his sister-in-law.
In Meehan v. Marion Manor Apartments, 305 Mich 262, we had occasion to determine when an accident arises out of employment.  We there said:
“An accident, to be compensable, must be one arising ‘out of’ as well as ‘in the course of’ the employment. Appleford v. Kimmel, 297 Mich 8. To arise ‘out of’ the employment the injury sustained must have a causal connection with the work to be performed; it must be one which follows as a natural incident to the employment, be connected with it, and not the result of a risk disassociated therefrom. See Appleford v. Kimmel, supra; Dent v. Ford Motor Co., 275 Mich 39; Rucker v. Michigan Smelting & Refining Co., 300 Mich 668.”
See, also, Murphy v. Flint Board of Education, 314 Mich 226.
In Appleford v. Kimmel, 297 Mich 8, the following language from McNicol’s Case, 215 Mass 497 (102 NE 697, LRA1916A, 306), was quoted with approval:
*230“But it excludes an injury which, cannot fairly be traced to the employment as a contributing proximate cause' and which comes from a hazard to which the workman would have been equally exposed apart from the employment. The causative danger must be peculiar to the work and not common to the neighborhood. It must be incidental to the character of the business and not independent of the relation of master and servant. It need not have been foreseen or expected, but after the event it must appear to have had its origin in a risk connected with the employment, and to have flowed from that source as a rational consequence.”
In Murphy v. Kuhartz, 244 Mich 54, we had occasion to determine when the relationship of an employee is restored after a deviation. We there said:
“There are cases which hold that where a servant in driving his master’s truck so deviates from his regular route as to suspend the relation of master and servant, it is immediately restored when he starts to return.. A leading case of this class is Riley v. Standard Oil Co., 231 NY 301 (132 NE 97, 22 ALR 1382). .But by better authority it is held that the relation of master and servant is not restored until he has returned to the place where the deviation occurred or to a corresponding place, some place where, in the performance of his duty, he should be.”
We, also, held in the above case that the driver of the car. did not resume his master’s service until he reached a point on his route less distant than the place of departure from his master’s business.
In Irwin v. Williamson Candy Company, 268 Mich 100, we had occasion to comment on our opinion in the Murphy Case, supra. We there held that the “master is not liable for negligent act of servant who had departed from direct route and had not returned to a place where his duty required him to be, al*231though the place of occurrence of act was less distant from destination than point of deviation.” We there said:
“Brinkman v. Zuckerman, 192 Mich 624, as indicated in Murphy v. Kuhartz, supra, is authority for the rule that, in case of a departure from the route, the master is not liable until the servant gets back on a direct route to the place where his duty requires him to be. As applied to the instant case, Mills had not reached the direct route to Flint when he crossed Second at Seward. The effect of appellant’s argument would be to construe Murphy v. Kuhartz, supra, as holding that when a servant reaches a point less distant from his proper destination than the point of deviation, he would then reenter the employment of his master. Such is not the meaning of the decision, nor is it a proper construction of the language of the opinion. * * *
“The emphasis must be placed on the last sentence of the quotation. To place a different construction upon the decision would result in absurd applications of the rule. Cases would be determined by comparisons of distances rather than upon proper consideration of the facts. Servants who engage in larks or escapades of their own, wholly unrelated to the business of their master, would thereby subject the master to damages. Such is neither the contemplation of the law nor the intent of our holding in that case.”
In my opinion, the purpose of the decision in the Irwin v. Williamson Candy Company Case, supra, was to close the door to the possibility of using the Murphy v. Kuhartz, decision, supra, in such a way as to allow a determination that the employer and employee relationship has been resumed on a comparison of distances alone. Something more is required, and that is that the employee must be in the exclusive business of his employer and not engaged in any business of his own. The effect of the *232decision of Mr. Justice Boyles would be to open the door to a determination being based on a finding that the employee was on a direct route to performing some duty for his employer, regardless of the distance away from the place of employment.
Other cases helpful in determining at what point the employer-employee relation is resumed after a deviation are collected in 22 ALR 1409, 45 ALR, 486, 50 ALR 1450, and 68 ALR 1056. The answer to the question of, at what point does. an. employee resume the relationship of an employee after deviation, is answered in the Murphy Case, supra, on the-question of “distance,” and the Irwin Case, supra, on the question of “being engaged in the exclusive business. of the employer.” Both of these conditions .must exist before there can be recovery. It is conceded that deceased cannot meet the requirment of' “distance.”
The award is vacated, with costs to appellant..
Dethmers, C. J., and Carr and Reid, JJ., concurred with Sharpe, J.
Butzel, J.; did not sit.