Court Opinion

ID: 9761212
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:34:33.633492+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:21.050226
License: Public Domain

McDERMOTT, Justice,
dissenting.
I acknowledge that finding in personam jurisdiction in this case is difficult under the “minimum contacts” standard, especially in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Worldwide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980). However, I would approach this case in the manner advocated by Justice Brennan in his dissenting opinion in Worldwide Volkswagen, to wit: take a broader view of the concept of in personam jurisdiction and focus not merely on “contacts, but on whether the particular exercise of jurisdiction offends ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ (citations omitted).” Id. 444 U.S. at 300, 100 S.Ct. at 581.
This is not a situation where an individual is being “haled” into a foreign jurisdiction to defend a case which he had no reason to suspect would ever arise. See, e.g. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 98 S.Ct. 1690, 56 L.Ed.2d 132 (1978). Rather, this case involves an insurance company, experienced in defending lawsuits, which accepted premiums under a policy forming the basis of the claimants’ suit, and which would have been contractually required to defend the claimants in a Pennsylvania Court had a liability suit been brought against them. That company now seeks to hide *662behind a litmus paper curtain of “contacts”, contending that it would be unfair to require them to litigate the present question in Pennsylvania. In my view, what is unfair is to require a Pennsylvania carrier, not a party to the insurance contract and which never received any premiums, to pay benefits to claimants without a chance to fully litigate their entitlement, and then to require the Pennsylvania carrier to go to Indiana to institute an action in subrogation.
Therefore, I dissent.
LARSEN and ZAPPALA, JJ., join in this dissenting opinion.