Court Opinion

ID: 9724404
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:55:36.563933+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:00.025988
License: Public Domain

BENKE, J.
Although I concur with the result and reasoning in part II of the majority’s opinion, I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s disposition of Nancy’s partition action. I believe that, on this record, Nancy may be able to establish that Larry was domiciled in California at .the time the partition action was filed.
The law controlling determination of a person’s domicile is well settled. (Hawes v. Club Ecuestre El Comandante (1st Cir. 1979) 598 F.2d 698, 701.) As Justice Holmes explained, “[t]he very meaning of domicil is the technically pre-eminent headquarters that every person is compelled to have in order that certain rights and duties that have been attached to it by the law *1176may be determined.” (Williamson v. Osenton (1914) 232 U.S. 619, 625 [58 L.Ed. 758, 761, 34 S.Ct. 442, 443].) Thus while a person may, at any given time, have more than one residence, he or she may have only one domicile at a time. (Hawes v. Club Ecuestre El Comandante, supra, 598 F.2d at p. 701; Rest.2d, Conflict of Laws (1971) § 19.) In order to establish a new domicile, a person must show . . (1) physical presence at the new location with (2) an intention to remain there indefinitely. . . .’ ” (Scoggins v. Pollock (11th Cir. 1984) 727 F.2d 1025, 1026, citing Mas v. Perry (5th Cir. 1974) 489 F.2d 1396, 1399, cert, denied (1974) 419 U.S. 842 [42 L.Ed.2d 70, 95 S.Ct. 74]; see also Rest.2d, Conflict of Laws (1971) § 18.)
More importantly, for our purposes, an established domicile is presumed to continue until a new one is acquired. (Sadat v. Mertes (7th Cir. 1980) 615 F.2d 1176, 1181; Hawes v. Club Ecuestre El Comandante, supra, 598 F.2d at p. 701; Gowins v. Gowins (La. 1985) 466 So.2d 32, 36; Rest.2d, Conflict of Laws (1971) § 19.) This presumption of continuing domicile is essential to any rational application of FUSFSPA. Under FUSFSPA the residence of a member of the military will not support a state court’s jurisdiction if the residence was “because of military assignment.” (10 U.S.C.A. § 1408(c)(4)(A).) Thus the residence of active duty members of the military will rarely, if ever, support a claim under FUSFSPA. This leaves jurisdiction based upon either domicile or consent. (10 U.S.C.A. § 1408(c)(4)(B), (C).) In the case of an uncooperative, but active, member of the military, no forum will meet the requirements of FUSFSPA unless effect is given to the presumption of a continuing domicile.
Indeed the concept of continuing domicile must of necessity be given effect if FUSFSPA is to have any logical meaning or application in the context of the case before us. In rejecting the concept of continuing domicile for purposes of FUSFSPA, we invite precisely the kind of conduct which took place below; conduct which, as the court below expressly held, saw Larry fraudulently lure his wife and children from California, where they had previously been residents and domiciliaries for approximately eight years, to another state, thereby acting to disengage any argument he was “domiciled” here in California when he filed for dissolution and when partition might first be requested. I cannot conclude Tarvin v. Tarvin, (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 56 [232 CaLRptr. 13], or FUSFSPA intend such a result. GP5
Nothing in the history of FUSFSPA indicates a rejection of the longstanding continuing domicile concept. In the absence of its rejection by Congress, we must assume congressional knowledge of its existence and acceptance of its application. To the extent authority such as Tarvin treats *1177domicile and residency interchangeably to the exclusion of the concept of continuing domicile, I would respectfully part company with it.
In this case there is nothing in the record which indicates that as of December 30, 1985, when Nancy filed her partition complaint, Larry had established a new domicile in either Georgia, Illinois, Alabama or the state he now claims is his “legal residence,” Michigan. In particular there is nothing which demonstrates, on or before that date, Larry’s physical presence in one of those states concurrent with an intent to remain in that state indefinitely. Indeed the trial court found Larry was never a resident or domiciliary of Georgia, the state where he filed for dissolution, and his then-current residence of Illinois had no connection with either party. In the absence of proof Larry intended to remain in any of the states he had resided in, the trial court could presume that Larry was still a California domiciliary at the time the partition action was filed. (Scoggins v. Pollock supra, 727 F.2d at p. 1027; Sadat v. Mertes, supra, 615 F.2d at p. 1181; Gowins v. Gowins, supra, 466 So.2d at p. 36.) Thus, I believe the record here could support a trial court ruling Larry was still legally domiciled in California when the partition action was filed.
Moreover, unlike the majority, I do not believe the briefing in this court prevents Nancy from pursuing a domiciliary theory. At trial, Nancy never conceded Larry’s domicile was other than California. In his opening brief, Larry conceded application of Miller v. Miller (CaLApp.), and interpreted it as holding that personal jurisdiction is to be determined as of the date of separation. The Supreme Court, however, had already ordered the Reporter of Decisions not to publish the opinion in Miller. Nancy, nonetheless, accepted Larry’s concession and argued that the parties were residents of California at the time of separation. In this context, her brief states: “[Appellant’s] contention that he is not a resident nor domiciliary at the time the complaint for partition was filed, is correct. It. is not certain though, whether appellant is a resident or domiciliary of the state of Michigan wherein he alleges he maintains his legal home of record; the state of [Ijllinois, where he is currently located; or the state of Arkansas where his wife maintains her home.”
Larry’s willingness to accept Miller, Nancy’s willingness to accept Larry’s premise and the foregoing statement in Nancy’s brief all suggest that neither party has considered the presumption of a continuing domicile and its role under FUSFSPA. This inadvertence is understandable in light of the parties’ reliance upon Larry’s interpretation of Miller. Indeed, having focused on circumstances which existed at the time of separation, all parties involved in this action, including Nancy and her counsel, like the court in Tarvin, seem to have ignored the distinction between domicile and residence *1178and unfortunately the issue of where Larry was actually legally domiciled at the time the partition action here was filed was simply not an express part of the argument or analysis at trial. Nor was the continuing domicile concept and its relationship to the facts of this case or FUSFSPA addressed below, or on appeal.
In prohibiting an examination of these questions at trial level here in California, we may effectively be excluding Nancy from access to the only forum which has proper jurisdiction over her partition action. Given the impact and significance of this possibility, and the confusing state of the law when this matter was first heard and then briefed, I cannot rely on the arguments presented at the time of this appeal.
In light of my concerns, I would grant the writ with instructions to the trial court that it determine Larry’s domicile as of the date the partition action was filed and in so doing, consider the concept of continuing domicile and its application to FUSFSPA.