Court Opinion

ID: 9776521
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:38:33.073892+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:39.300634
License: Public Domain

HOWELL, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent. The rules clearly provide that, in certain instances, a dissatisfied party has the unqualified right to file a second motion for rehearing in this Court. TEX.R. APP.P. 100(d). If that right is to be meaningful it cannot simply be defeated at the opponent’s whim through the expedient of filing a precipitous application for writ of error.
The only sensible resolution is to hold that the writ application was premature and that jurisdiction remained with our *668Court of Appeals. A premature writ application can easily be abated with no loss of rights to any party. After our Court has ruled upon the second motion for rehearing, the precipitous party may so advise the Supreme Court and may have his choice of (1) asking that his premature writ application be considered in view of the fact that the prematurity has been dissolved, (2) filing a revised application, or (3) withdrawing the premature application and filing no application at all.1
The law, we are told is logic; any other recourse is illogical. I therefore dissent from the dismissal of the second motion for rehearing. It must be considered on its merits.

. Contrary to the assertion of our majority (slip op. 3), the facts of Ratcliff v. National County Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 745 S.W.2d 75, 77 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1988, writ dism'd w.o.j.) (on reh’g) are simple to distinguish. The same party there filed a writ application succeeded by his first motion for rehearing. In contrast, our case involves the opposing party’s action of filing a writ application. Furthermore, unlike Ratcliff, the motion now being dismissed by our majority is a second motion for rehearing. A second motion for rehearing is, in certain instances being here present, a permissible action. However, bear in mind that a first motion is jurisdictional; a second motion, even when available, is only optional. TEX.R.APP.P. 100(d).
Ratcliffs writ application was premature; inasmuch as it preceded a ruling on a timely first motion for rehearing, it was void. It appears that the Supreme Court treated it as such. Rat-cliff’s proper remedy would have been to withdraw his void and untimely writ application and thereafter press the Court of Appeals for a ruling on his motion for rehearing. If dissatisfied with the results of the rehearing, a timely and jurisdictional writ application could then have been prosecuted.
Presently, we deal with a second motion for rehearing. The writ application filed by the opponent to our movant was by no means void for preceding a first motion for rehearing. The law of appellate procedure must, nevertheless, be interpreted in a manner that will prevent an opponent from cutting off the valuable right of a litigant to present, and obtain from us, a ruling upon a second motion for rehearing. Any other approach opens the door to gamesmanship and sharp practice.