Court Opinion

ID: 9851090
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:07:19.278025+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:48.496877
License: Public Domain

DUNN, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I believe the preliminary hearing testimony of Ilia Hammond was admissible under the former testimony exception to the hearsay rule. The nub of the issue is whether the claiming of a privilege renders a witness “unavailable” for purposes of the hearsay exception. The general rule is that exercise of a privilege does render a witness *565unavailable. McCormick on Evidence, § 253 at p. 612 (E. Cleary Ed., 2d Ed. 1972); Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 804(a)(1); Wharton’s Criminal Evidence, 13th Ed., § 651. These sources cite the use of the inter-spousal privilege as one of the circumstances in which the issue often arises, but make no distinction as to whether the defendant or the witness claims the privilege. Since the other requirements set out in State v. Carr, 1940, 67 S.D. 481, 294 N.W. 174, and State v. Nelson, 1974, S.D., 220 N.W.2d 2, are met in this case, the former testimony is admissible.
Although the former testimony would be open to objection when read at trial, an objection as to competency should not be sustained. McCormick devotes a chapter of his Evidence hornbook to the distinction between rules of privilege and rules of incompetency. McCormick on Evidence, Ch. 8 at 51 (E. Cleary Ed., 2d Ed. 1972). He argues convincingly that rules of incompetency have as their purpose to facilitate the ascertainment of the facts by guarding against evidence which is unreliable or calculated to prejudice and mislead, while the privilege rules are aimed at protecting certain social relationships, often at the expense of the facts needed for the administration of justice. The reading of the former testimony of one who is the defendant’s spouse at the time of trial should not be objectionable as being incompetent in light of this distinction.
The threats of the defendant to burn down the house of Ilia Hammond combined with the testimony of Dr. Nelson that there was a “human factor” involved in the fire provided enough evidence to withstand the defendant’s motion to dismiss. State v. Bates, 1955, 76 S.D. 23, 71 N.W.2d 641; State v. Best, 1975, S.D., 232 N.W.2d 447.
I would affirm the conviction.
I am authorized to state that Justice Porter joins in this dissent.