Court Opinion

ID: 9549945
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:26:48.663291+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:21:05.018216
License: Public Domain

KLEINSCHMIDT,
Presiding Judge, concurring in part.
I disagree with Judge Lankford in only one respect. I think the trial judge abused his discretion in removing the members of the board who were elected at the last election and ordering the prior holders of those seats to resume office. The only proper remedy under the facts of this case is to give nothing more than prospective effect to the invalidation of the statute.
*528Article 22, section 13 of the Arizona Constitution, which provides that the term of office for every elected officer shall extend until his successor is elected and qualified, does not appear to apply to this situation. The provision does not address what happens if a statute which governs an election is invalidated long after the election has taken place.
There is, however, case law that does prescribe the proper remedy for this problem. In Hendon v. North Carolina State Bd. of Elections, 710 F.2d 177 (4th Cir.1983), the court concluded that certain state election laws were unconstitutional. Those who had challenged the election law had no explanation as to why they had not brought suit until after the election had taken place. The court held that under those circumstances, the election should not be set aside and that the challengers were entitled to prospective relief only. Id. at 182; see also Toney v. White, 488 F.2d 310, (5th Cir.1973) (vacating order requiring special election as relief for unconstitutional election because the next regular election was only five months away). See generally Kenneth W. Starr, Federal Judicial Invalidation as a Remedy for Irregularities in State Elections, 49 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 1092 (1974).
Laches should not be applied to preclude all relief for the plaintiffs. The time between the board’s adoption of the ward system and the election was relatively short. The delay in bringing the suit was explained and was not wholly unreasonable. On the other hand, the facts do not warrant the disruption of removing board members from office. The statute we now hold unconstitutional was adopted in good faith by the legislature in response to pressure from the federal government, and the school board and the candidates, in attempting to follow it, were indisputably acting in good faith. Under these circumstances, it was an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to select the harshest remedy available. The members of the board should remain in office and subsequent school board elections should be conducted by voting at large, unless and until the legislature, in a manner consistent with the Constitution, provides for a different method.