Court Opinion

ID: 9957514
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-04 16:10:55.98714+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:22.990782
License: Public Domain

140 Nev., Advance Opinion $ 1-1
                         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

                   KWAME DE-MARKQUISE MORRISON,                         No. 85868-COA
                   Appellant,
                   vs.
                   THE STATE OF NEVADA,                                         MED
                   Respondent.
                                                                                 APR 0 4 202
                                                                             ELI      - TH A B!-ZOW
                                                                           CLE        SU'    ME       RT
                                                                                        •
                                                                           BY
                                                                                cElEF DEPUTi CLERK

                               Appeal from a judgment of conviction, pursuant to a jury
                   verdict, of three counts of sexual assault upon a minor under 14 years of age
                   and one count of use of a minor under the age of 14 in producing
                   pornography.    Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Mary Kay
                   Holthus, Judge.
                               Affirmed.

                   Law Office of Amanda Pellizzari, LLC, and Amanda Pellizzari, Las Vegas,
                   for Appellant.

                   Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General, Carson City; Steven B. Wolfson, District
                   Attorney, Alexander G. Chen and Karen L. Mishler, Chief Deputy District
                   Attorneys, Clark County,
                   for Respondent.

                   BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS, GIBBONS, C.J., and BULLA and
                   WESTBROOK, JJ.

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                                                     OPINION
                   By the Court, WESTBROOK, J.:
                               A jury convicted appellant Kwame De-Markquise Morrison of
                   three counts of sexual assault upon a minor under 14 years of age and one
                   count of use of a minor under the age of 14 in producing pornography.
                   Morrison contends that the district court committed reversible error by
                   instructing the jury that a lack of knowledge or a mistake as to the victim's
                   age is not a defense to a charge of using a minor in producing pornography.
                   We agree that the instruction was inaccurate because the State is required
                   to prove that the defendant "knowingly" used "a minor" in producing
                   pornography.     See NRS 200.710(1).        Nevertheless, for purposes of
                   determining the appropriate penalty for the offense, the State is not
                   required to prove that the defendant knew or should have known that the
                   victim was under the age of 14.      See NRS 200.750(2).      Here, because
                   Morrison admitted that he believed A.M. was 16 years old—and therefore a
                   minor—during their sexual relationship, the district court's instructional
                   error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We also reject Morrison's
                   remaining claims on appeal, and accordingly, we affirm Morrison's
                   judgment of conviction.
                                  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
                               In 2016, 21-year-old IVIorrison initiated a sexual relationship
                   with A.M., who was only 12 years old at the time. In June 2017, A.M.
                   discovered that she was pregnant and disclosed the relationship to her
                   mother, who filed a police report that identified Morrison as A.M.'s sexual
                   partner. In October 2017, shortly after turning 13 years old, A.M. gave birth
                   to a boy who was later adopted.

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                               Thereafter, A.M. participated in a forensic interview with Las
                   Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) Detective Becky Salkoff.
                   During her interview, A.M. identified Morrison as her sexual partner.
                   Detective Salkoff then conducted two recorded forensic interviews with

                   Morrison in July and August 2018.           During the interviews, Morrison

                   admitted he had sex with A.M. two to three times but stated that he believed
                   A.M. was 16 years old.'      Subsequently, Detective Salkoff subpoenaed

                   Morrison's Facebook records, which included sexually explicit pictures that
                   A.M. had taken of herself and sent to him at his request. Detective Salkoff
                   also collected DNA from Morrison, A.M., and A.M.'s child, which confirmed
                   that Morrison was the child's father.
                               The State ultimately charged Morrison by indictment with six
                   counts of sexual assault upon a minor under 14 years of age and one count
                   of use of a minor under the age of 14 in producing pornography. Morrison's
                   jury trial was scheduled for early June 2022, with calendar call one week
                   prior to trial. Three days before calendar call, Morrison filed a motion to
                   dismiss his appointed counsel in which he requested the appointment of
                   new counsel. At calendar call, the district court denied Morrison's request
                   to appoint new counsel. Although Morrison initially indicated that he might
                   be interested in representing himself at trial, he subsequently told the court
                   that he did not want to be canvassed to represent himself. Though his jury
                   trial was continued, at no point thereafter did Morrison ever raise any
                   additional concerns about counsel, nor did he ever renew his request to
                   represent himself.

                         'Although the parties did not include the interview transcripts in the
                   record on appeal, the closing arguments reflect that Morrison made these
                   admissions during the interviews.
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                               Morrison's three-day jury trial commenced in October 2022.
                   A.M. testified that Morrison lived in the house next door to her and knew
                   some of her other siblings. She first met Morrison in August 2016, on her
                   first day of sixth grade when she and her siblings walked past his house on
                   their way to school. A.M. was 11 years old at the time.2

                               According to A.M., her first sexual interaction with Morrison
                   occurred when she was playing with her younger siblings in front of her
                   house. Morrison asked her to come over to him, gave her a candy bar, and
                   then propositioned her for sex. Although A.M. could not recall whether they
                   had sex on that occasion, A.M. testified in detail about five other incidents
                   that occurred while she was between the ages of 12 and 13. A.M. stated
                   that on each occasion, Morrison inserted his fingers into her vagina and
                   then had sexual intercourse with her. A.M. testified that the first incident
                   occurred on a bathroom floor at Morrison's house, the second incident
                   occurred in Morrison's bedroom, the third incident occurred behind a
                   McDonald's durnpster, and the fourth incident occurred at her house. The

                   fifth incident occurred in November or December 2017 in her backyard,
                   after the birth of her son.3
                               Next, the State published an exhibit containing Morrison's
                   Facebook communications with A.M. and asked her about several of the
                   messages. A.M. testified that, at Morrison's request, she sent him sexually
                   explicit pictures of herself over Facebook, which included nude photos of her
                   breasts and vagina. A.M. testified that in January 2017, when she was 12

                         2The State introduced into evidence A.M.'s birth            certificate,
                   establishing that she was born in October 2004.

                         3The State also introduced into evidence A.M.'s son's birth certificate,
                   establishing that he was born in October 2017 when A.M. was 13 years old.
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                   years old, Morrison sent her a message directing her to "[t]urn on the light,"
                   and she sent him a photo in response. A.M. also testified about a message
                   she received after she sent Morrison a photo, where Morrison told her,
                   "Open your legs more. You don't have a flash." Finally, A.M. testified about
                   a message she received from Morrison in December 2017, when she was 13
                   years old, requesting another photo of her vagina.
                               The State presented testimony from two LVMPD forensic
                   scientists establishing that Morrison was the father of A.M.'s son. Finally,
                   Detective Salkoff testified about her investigation into Morrison's case. She
                   testified about her forensic interview with A.M.; her collection of DNA from
                   A.M., A.M.'s son, and Morrison; and her two recorded interviews with
                   Morrison. During her testimony, the State published the transcripts of
                   Detective Salkoffs interviews with Morrison and played the recordings of
                   those interviews for the jury.      Although neither party included those
                   transcripts in the record on appeal, the State's closing argument indicates
                   that Morrison told Detective Salkoff that he had sex with A.M. two or three
                   times, and Morrison did not object to that representation of the evidence.
                   Likewise, Morrison argued in closing that, in his statement to Detective
                   Salkoff, "he told you he believed she was 16. And I'm sure that he believed
                   that a 16 year old can consent to sex, as that is the law." Finally, the State's
                   rebuttal closing argument reflects that Morrison told Detective Salkoff he
                   had sex with A.M. by a dumpster at McDonald's and on his bathroom floor,
                   corroborating two of the incidents to which A.M. testified. Morrison did not
                   object to this description of the evidence either.
                               While settling jury instructions, the State proposed an
                   instruction providing that a defendant's lack of knowledge or mistake as to
                   the victim's age is not a defense to either of the charged crimes—sexual
                   assault upon a minor under the age of 14 or use of a minor under the age of
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                   14 in the production of pornography. Although Morrison agreed that the
                   instruction was correct as applied to the sexual assault charges, he objected
                   to its application to the pornography charge. Over Morrison's objection, the
                   district court included the State's proposed jury instruction for all charges.
                                  Ultimately, the jury found Morrison guilty of three counts of
                   sexual assault upon a minor under 14 years of age and one count of use of a
                   minor under the age of 14 to produce pornography. The jury acquitted
                   Morrison of the remaining three sexual assault charges. The district court
                   sentenced Morrison to imprisonment for life with the possibility of parole
                   after 35 years for each sexual assault conviction and life with the possibility
                   of parole after 10 years for using a minor under 14 to produce pornography,
                   with all sentences to run concurrently. Morrison timely appealed.
                                                     ANALYSIS
                                  Morrison contends that the district court incorrectly instructed
                   the jury that a lack of knowledge or mistake of fact as to the victim's age is
                   not a defense to the charge of use of a minor in producing pornography. In
                   addition, he argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying
                   his motion to disrniss counsel and by failing to conduct a Faretta4 canvass,
                   and that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by knowingly
                   allowing A.M. to testify falsely and by improperly commenting on the
                   evidence. We address each argument in turn.
                   Although the district court provided an inaccurate jury instruction, the error
                   was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
                              Morrison argues that the district court conirnitted reversible
                   error when it gave the following instruction to the jury:
                                  The lack of knowledge of the age, or a reasonable
                                  mistake as to the age, of a child victim of sexual

                         4   Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
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                              assault of a minor under the age of fourteen and use
                              of a minor under the age of fourteen in producing
                              pornography is not a defense to the crimes of sexual
                              assault of a minor under the age of fourteen and use
                              of a minor under the age of fourteen in producing
                              pornography.
                   Morrison contends that this instruction misstated NRS 200.710(1), which
                   criminalizes "knowingly" using "a minor" to produce pornography.
                               District courts have "broad discretion" in settling jury
                   instructions; therefore, this court generally reviews a district court's
                   decision regarding jury instructions for abuse of discretion or judicial error.
                   Crawford v. State, 121 Nev. 744, 748, 121 P.3d 582, 585 (2005). However,
                   whether a jury instruction is an accurate statement of the law is reviewed
                   de novo.   Nay v. State, 123 Nev. 326, 330, 167 P.3d 430, 433 (2007).
                   Additionally, when interpreting a statute, this court will "interpret clear
                   and unambiguous statutory language by its plain meaning unless doing so
                   would lead to an unreasonable or absurd result." Moore v. State, 136 Nev.
                   620, 622-23, 475 P.3d 33, 36 (2020).
                               Morrison was charged under NRS 200.710(1) with using a
                   minor in producing pornography. NRS 200.710(1) provides that "[a] person
                   who knowingly uses, encourages, entices or permits a minor to simulate or
                   engage in or assist others to simulate or engage in sexual conduct to produce
                   a performance is guilty of a category A felony and shall be punished as
                   provided in NRS 200.750." (Emphasis added.) For purposes of this statute,
                   the term "minor" means an individual under the age of 18. State v. Hughes,
                   127 Nev. 626, 628-29, 261 P.3d 1067, 1069 (2011). Morrison argues that the
                   use of the word "knowingly" in NRS 200.710(1) means that the State must
                   prove that Morrison knew or had reason to know that A.M. was a minor at
                   the time of the crime. We agree.

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                               As the Nevada Supreme Court explained in Garcia v. Sixth
                   Judicial District Court, "[w]hen an intent requirement is supplied in the
                   statute, in order to sustain a conviction, that intent must be proven as to
                   each element of the crime." 117 Nev. 697, 701, 30 P.3d 1110, 1112 (2001).
                   In Garcia, the supreme court addressed NRS 202.055, which criminalizes
                   the sale of alcohol to persons under 21 years of age. Because NRS 202.055
                   made it unlawful to "knowingly . . . [s]ell[ ] . . . an alcoholic beverage to any
                   person under 21 years of age," the court concluded that the statute required
                   proof of "either actual or constructive knowledge of the purchaser's age." Id.
                   at 698, 30 P.3d at 1111. In reaching this conclusion, the supreme court
                   distinguished NRS 202.055 from "other age-specific statutes" that did not
                   contain a knowledge element, including NRS 202.2493(2) (sale of tobacco to
                   persons under 18), NRS 200.366-.368 (sexual assault and statutory sexual
                   seduction), and NRS 463.350 (presence of persons under 21 years in gaming
                   institutions). Id. at 701 n.9, 30 P.3d at 1113 n.9. The supreme court pointed
                   out that, unlike the other statutes, "a defendant's state of mind (knowingly')
                   has expressly been included in NRS 202.055, thus requiring a defendant's
                   knowledge of each element to be proven." Id. at 701-02, 30 P.3d at 1113.
                               The United States Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion
                   in Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646 (2009). There, the Court
                   analyzed a statute that imposes a criminal penalty if the defendant
                   "knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means
                   of identification of another person."        Id. at 647 (quoting 18 U.S.C.
                   § 1028A(a)(1) (emphases in original)). The Supreme Court concluded that
                   the knowledge requirement applied to each element of the statute and, as a
                   result, the government was required to prove that the defendant knew that
                   the means of identification belonged to someone else. Id. at 657.

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                               The Court explained that in ordinary English usage, "whe[n] a
                   transitive verb has an object, listeners in most contexts assume that an
                   adverb (such as knowingly) that modifies the transitive verb tells the
                   listener how the subject performed the entire action, including the object as
                   set forth in the sentence." Id. at 650. For example, if someone says that "a
                   child knowingly takes a toy that belongs to his sibling, we assume that the
                   child not only knows that he is taking something, but that he also knows
                   that what he is taking is a toy and that the toy belongs to his sibling." Id.
                   at 651 (emphasis in original). Because courts interpret criminal statutes in
                   accordance with this ordinary English usage, courts "ordinarily read a
                   phrase in a criminal statute that introduces the elements of a crime with
                   the word 'knowingly' as applying that word to each element." Id. at 652.
                   Therefore, the Supreme Court determined that the modifying adverb
                   "knowingly" in § 1028A(a)(1) applied to the statute's transitive verbs
                   ("transfers, possesses, or uses") and the verbs' object ("a means of
                   identification of another person"). See id. at 650.
                               Applying this reasoning to the plain language of NRS
                   200.710(1), we conclude that the word "knowingly" applies to each element
                   of the crime of use of a minor in the production of pornography, including
                   the transitive verbs ("uses, encourages, entices or permits") and the verbs'
                   object ("a minor"). Therefore, to obtain a conviction under NRS 200.710(1),
                   the State must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant knew
                   or had reason to know that the victim was a minor—under the age of 18—
                   at the time of the crirne.
                               The State posits that because NRS 200.710(1) is intended to
                   protect children from sexual abuse, the term "knowingly" should be
                   interpreted like the term "willfully" to require only general intent. To
                   support this argument, the State relies on Jenkins v. State, 110 Nev. 865,
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                   877 P.2d 1063 (1994), which held that a reasonable mistake of fact as to the
                   age of a victim is not a defense to the crime of statutory sexual seduction,
                   and Moore v. State, 136 Nev. 620, 475 P.3d 33 (2020), which held that a
                   mistaken belief as to the victim's age is not a defense to the crime of
                   lewdness with a child under the age of 16.
                               However, both Jenkins and Moore—and the statutes cited
                   therein—are distinguishable. Unlike the crime of use of a minor in the

                   production of pornography, the crimes of statutory sexual seduction and
                   lewdness do not contain an express knowledge requirement.            Statutory
                   sexual seduction is a general intent crime,5 which requires only "an intent
                   to do the act, rather than any intent to violate the law or injure another."
                   Jenkins, 110 Nev. at 870, 877 P.2d at 1066. And while the crime of lewdness
                   with a child under 16 is a specific intent crime,6 the structure of that statute
                   differs from NRS 200.710(1). In NRS 201.230, the age element precedes the
                   specific intent element, and the "plain language [does not] otherwise require
                   the State to prove that the defendant knew or should have known that the
                   child was under the age of 16." Moore, 136 Nev. at 623-24, 475 P.3d at 36.

                         5NRS 200.364(10) ("Statutory sexual seduction' means ordinary
                   sexual intercourse, anal intercourse or sexual penetration committed by a
                   person 18 years of age or older with a person who is 14 or 15 years of age
                   and who is at least 4 years younger than the perpetrator.").

                         6 NRS 201.230(1)(a) (defining the crime of lewdness with a child under
                   16 as occurring when a person "18 years of age or older . . . willfully and
                   lewdly commits any lewd or lascivious act . . . upon or with the body . . . of
                   a child under the age of 16 years, with the intent of arousing, appealing to,
                   or gratifying the lust or passions or sexual desires of that person or of that
                   child" (emphasis added)).
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                               Furthermore, unlike the term "willfully," which can be
                   interpreted to refer to a general intent crime in the context of child abuse
                   statutes, see Jenkins, 110 Nev. at 870, 877 P.2d at 1066, the term
                   "knowingly" requires actual or constructive knowledge, see NRS 193.017
                   ("Knowingly' imports a knowledge that the facts exist which constitute the
                   act or omission of a crime, and does not require knowledge of its
                   unlawfulness. Knowledge of any particular fact may be inferred from the
                   knowledge of such other facts as should put an ordinarily prudent person
                   upon inquiry."). To interpret the word "knowingly" as imposing only a
                   general intent requirement would conflict with the term's statutory
                   definition. See Williams v. State, Dep't of Corr., 133 Nev. 594, 596, 402 P.3d
                   1260, 1262 (2017) ("This court 'avoid[s] statutory interpretation that
                   renders language meaningless or superfluous.'" (quoting Hobbs v. State, 127
                   Nev. 234, 237, 251 P.3d 177, 179 (2011))).
                               Nevertheless, while the State was required to prove beyond a
                   reasonable doubt that Morrison knew or should have known that A.M. was
                   a minor under the age of 18 to impose criminal liability under NRS
                   200.710(1), the State was not required to prove that Morrison knew or
                   should have known that A.M. was, in fact, under the age of 14 for purposes
                   of determining the appropriate penalty at sentencing.        NRS 200.710(1)
                   provides that a defendant who is guilty of using a minor in the production
                   of pornography shall be "punished as provided in NRS 200.750."           NRS
                   200.750 sets forth the two possible penalties for a violation of NRS
                   200.710(1), depending on whether the minor is "14 years of age or older" or
                   "less than 14 years of age."
                               Here, the State charged Morrison under NRS 200.750(2), on the
                   basis that A.M. was "less than 14 years of age" when the crime was
                   committed. Yet, unlike NRS 200.710(1), NRS 200.750 does not contain the
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                   word "knowingly.' And where the plain language of NRS 200.750 does not
                   include the element of knowledge, we agree with the State that requiring it
                   to prove the defendant knew or should have known that the victim was
                   under the age of 14 would contravene Nevada's strong public policy of
                   protecting minors from sex crimes. See Moore, 136 Nev. at 623-24, 475 P.3d
                   at 36-37 (holding that the State need not prove that the defendant knew or
                   should have known that a minor was under the age of 16 to obtain a
                   conviction for lewdness where the statute's plain language did not include
                   the element of knowledge).
                               Although the State was not required to prove that Morrison
                   knew or had reason to know that A.M. was under the age of 14 to impose
                   the sentence set forth in NR.S 200.750(2), we conclude that the jury
                   instruction given in this case was inaccurate insofar as it instructed that
                   the State did not need to prove that Morrison knew or had reason to know
                   that A.M. was a minor under the age of 18 to establish criminal liability
                   under NRS 200.710(1).      As a result, we must determine whether the
                   instructional error in this case requires reversal.
                               When a jury instruction is inaccurate, we review for harmless
                   error. Honea v. State, 136 Nev. 285, 289, 466 P.3d 522, 526 (2020). An
                   erroneous jury instruction is harmless only if this court is "convinced
                   beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury's verdict was not attributable to
                   the error and that the error was harmless under the facts and
                   circumstances of [thel case."    Id. at 289-90, 466 P.3d at 526 (quoting
                   Crawford, 121 Nev. at 756, 121 P.3d at 590). In this case, we are convinced
                   beyond a reasonable doubt that the instructional error was harmless.
                               Initially, we note that the jury was properly instructed on the
                   statutory elements of the crime of use of a minor in producing pornography

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                   in a separate instruction.' More importantly, however, Morrison stated in
                   his recorded interview—that was admitted by stipulation and relied on by
                   his attorney in closing argument—that he believed A.M. was 16 years old
                   at the time of their sexual relationship. That Morrison knew A.M. was a
                   minor is further supported by overwhelming evidence, including A.M's
                   testimony that Morrison was her neighbor, she first met him while walking
                   to middle school at the age of 11, and he subsequently propositioned her by
                   offering her a candy bar while she was outside playing with her siblings.
                   Although Morrison argues that A.M. "looked like a grown woman," he does
                   not point to any evidence in the record to support that assertion. Cf. Garcia,
                   117 Nev. at 703, 30 P.3.1 at 1113 (reversing a conviction under NRS 202,055
                   where the State failed to establish that the defendant had actual or
                   constructive knowledge that the purchaser of alcohol was under the age of
                   21 where "[t]he record reveals that [the minor] looked substantially older
                   than twenty-one years of age, had a full beard, wore a hat and perhaps even
                   sunglasses when he bought the alcohol" and "all of the petitioners testified
                   that he looked twenty-four to twenty-seven years old"). And, because
                   Morrison conceded his awareness that A.M. was under the age of 18, and
                   therefore a minor, we conclude that the jury's verdict was not due to the

                         'Specifically, Jury Instruction 16 provided, in relevant part, that
                               [a] person who knowingly either (1) uses,
                               encourages, entices or permits a minor to simulate
                               or engage in or assist others to simulate or engage
                               in sexual conduct to produce a performance, or
                               (2) uses, encourages, entices, coerces or permits a
                               minor to be the subject of a sexual portrayal in a
                               performance regardless of whether the minor is
                               aware that the sexual portrayal is part of a
                               performance, has committed the crime of Use of
                               Minor in Producing Pornography.
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                   inaccurate instruction; thus, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable
                   doubt.
                   The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Morrison's rnotion
                   to dismiss counsel
                               Morrison argues that the district court abused its discretion
                   when it denied his motion to dismiss appointed counsel because the court
                   failed to adequately inquire about his ineffective assistance claim as
                   required by Young v. State, 120 Nev. 963, 102 P.3d 572 (2004).
                               We review a district court's denial of a motion to disiniss or
                   substitute counsel for an abuse of discretion. Garcia v. State, 121 Nev. 327,
                   337, 113 P.3d 836, 842-43 (2005) (applying the Young factors to a motion to
                   dismiss counsel), modified on other grounds by Mendoza v. State, 122 Nev.
                   267, 130 P.3d 176 (2006). When reviewing the district court's decision, we
                   consider three factors: "(1) the extent of the conflict between the defendant
                   and counsel, (2) the adequacy of the [district] court's inquiry into the
                   defendant's complaint, and (3) the timeliness of the motion and the extent
                   of any inconvenience or delay." Young, 120 Nev. at 965, 102 P.3d at 574.
                               As to the first factor, Morrison fails to establish an
                   irreconcilable conflict with his appointed counsel. Morrison filed a single
                   motion to substitute counsel shortly before his scheduled trial. When given
                   the opportunity to describe the alleged conflict, Morrison claimed that
                   counsel failed to communicate with him. but then acknowledged that they
                   had recently attended two settlement conferences together. Morrison's
                   allegations do not demonstrate a significant breakdown in his relationship
                   with appointed counsel that would warrant substitution. Cf. id. at 969, 102
                   P.3d at 576 (finding a "significant breakdown" in the attorney-client
                   relationship that warranted substitution of counsel where defendant

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                  complained about counsel to the court on five separate occasions and
                  counsel violated a court directive to visit the defendant in jail).
                               Morrison also fails to demonstrate that the district court's
                  inquiry was inadequate.      Morrison accepted his counsel's assurance of
                  future communication as a resolution to the communication issue and never
                  renewed his request to dismiss counsel. See Garcia, 121 Nev. at 339, 113
                  P.3d at 844 (concluding that the district court's inquiry, albeit limited, was
                  adequate where "[the defendant's] attorney addressed the court on the
                  motion [to substitute counsel] and agreed to resolve the issues in due
                  course").8   Therefore, although the district court's inquiry was limited, it
                  was adequate.
                               As to the third factor, the district court noted that Morrison's
                  request was made approximately one week prior to trial, and Morrison
                  concedes on appeal that his motion was "admittedly quite untimely." See
                  id. at 338-39, 113 P.3d at 843 (finding a request for substitution of counsel
                  untimely when it was made at calendar call, just days before trial was set
                  to begin). Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
                  discretion by denying Morrison's motion to dismiss counsel.
                  The district court did not err by failing to conduct a Faretta canvass
                               Morrison next asserts that the district court abused its
                  discretion when it failed to perform a Faretta9 canvass after he requested to

                        8We also note that Morrison blanketly asserts that the district court's
                  inquiry was deficient but fails to provide any legal authorities or record
                  citations in support of his claim. See Maresca v. State, 103 Nev. 669, 673,
                  748 P.2d 3, 6 (1987) (explaining that this court need not consider an
                  appellant's argument that is not cogently argued or lacks the support of
                  relevant authority); NRAP 28(a)(10).

                        9 Faretta, 422 U.S. 806.

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                   represent himself at calendar call. Though Morrison initially asked to be
                   canvassed, following his counsel's assurance of future communication, he
                   withdrew his request.       Because Morrison withdrew his request for self-
                   representation, he invited any alleged error in this regard. See LaChance
                   v. State, 130 Nev. 263, 276, 321 P.3d 919, 928 (2014) (holding that "a party

                   will not be heard to complain on appeal of errors which he himself has
                   induced or provoked"). Therefore, Morrison is not entitled to relief on this
                   claim.
                   The State did not commit prosecutorial misconduct
                                  Citing Hanley v. Sheriff, 85 Nev. 615, 460 P.2d 162 (1969),
                   Morrison argues that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by
                   knowingly allowing A.M. to provide false testimony. Morrison contends
                   that A.M. falsely testified that she did not initiate sex or sexual
                   conversations with Morrison and that Morrison forced her to have sex.
                   Morrison further contends that the State had a duty "to correct" this
                   testimony, which was elicited during his cross-examination of A.M.
                                  Morrison did not object at trial, so we review his claim for plain
                   error. See Rose v. State, 123 Nev. 194, 208-09, 163 P.3c1 408, 418 (2007)
                   (providing that plain error review applies when the appellant failed to object
                   to   alleged    prosecutorial   misconduct).     Prosecutorial   misconduct    is
                   considered plain error if the error either "(1) had a prejudicial impact on the
                   verdict when viewed in the context of the trial as a whole, or (2) seriously
                   affects the integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings." Id.
                   (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
                                  In Hanley, the Nevada Supreme Court addressed a claim of
                   prosecutorial misconduct, noting that "[i]f the state knows that its witness
                   has testified falsely on a point relevant to the credibility of that witness,
                   and fails to correct that falsehood, the conviction is constitutionally infirm."
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                   85 Nev. at 617, 460 P.2d at 163 (citing Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264
                   (1969)).   There, the defendant argued that prosecutorial misconduct
                   required his release from custody because a key witness for the State
                   subsequently recanted his preliminary hearing testimony that implicated
                   the defendant in a murder. See id. However, the supreme court disagreed,
                   finding nothing in the record to establish that the State "knowingly offered
                   false testimony." Id.

                                In   this   case,   Morrison   cannot    establish   prosecutorial
                   misconduct, let alone a plain error requiring reversal. At the outset, we
                   note that Morrison does not cite any evidence in the record demonstrating
                   that A.M. testified falsely, that the State knew of any alleged falsehoods, or
                   that the State knowingly elicited false testimony from A.M.           Cf. NRAP
                   28(e)(1) ("[E]very assertion in briefs regarding matters in the record shall
                   be supported by a reference to the page and volume number, if any, of the

                   appendix where the matter relied on is to be found.").
                                To establish that the State "knew" A.M. testified falsely,
                   Morrison summarily asserts that the State "had all these records, including
                   Facebook and text messages," which contradicted A.M.'s trial testimony.
                   Morrison failed, however, to provide this court with any of the relevant
                   messages to support this claim." The trial transcript reflects that Morrison

                          wAlthough the parties stipulated to admit two exhibits containing
                   A.M.'s Facebook communications with Morrison, Morrison did not include
                   any of those communications in the record on appeal. See NRAP 10(a)
                   (stating that "[t]he trial court record consists of the papers and exhibits filed
                   in the district court"); NRAP 10(b)(1) (providing that the parties shall
                   include in an appendix "the portions of the trial court record to be used on
                   appeal"); see also NRAP 10(b)(2) (stating that "[i]f exhibits cannot be copied
                   to be included in the appendix the parties may request transmittal of the
                   original exhibits"). Likewise, Morrison did not include in the record on

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                   referenced A.M.'s Facebook communications while cross-examining A.M. in
                   an effort to impeach her credibility;" however, the State did not conduct
                   any redirect thereafter.    To the extent Morrison implies that Hanley
                   required the State to conduct redirect and highlight the alleged
                   inconsistencies identified by Morrison on cross-examination, we disagree.
                   Even if some of the Facebook messages appeared to be inconsistent with
                   A.M.'s testimony during cross-examination, Morrison has not established
                   that the State engaged in misconduct by subsequently failing to "correct"
                   her testimony.
                               Likewise, Morrison has not established a prejudicial impact on
                   the verdict. In his closing argument, Morrison took full advantage of the
                   alleged contradictions between the Facebook messages and A.M.'s
                   testimony on cross-examination to argue that "everything [A.M.] said to you
                   yesterday was a lie" and ask the jury to disregard her testimony. Arguably,
                   Morrison benefited from his impeachment of A.M., with the jury acquitting
                   him of the three counts of sexual assault that were not independently

                   appeal any text messages between himself and A.M. As a result, we cannot
                   determine whether A.M.'s trial testimony was inconsistent with her
                   Facebook or text messages, let alone that her trial testimony was "false."
                   And because it is the appellant's burden to ensure that a proper appellate
                   record is prepared, we necessarily presume that the missing documents
                   support the challenged decisions, including the jury's verdict. Cf. Cuzze v.
                   Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sy.s. of Neu., 123 Nev. 598, 603, 172 P.3d 131, 135
                   (2007).
                          "On cross-examination, Morrison sought to portray his sexual
                   relationship with A.M. as consensual and to depict A.M. as a liar. Initially,
                   A.M. testified that Morrison forced her to have sex. After confronting A.M.
                   with Facebook messages that purportedly indicated otherwise, at the end of
                   her cross-examination, A.M. conceded that she "agree[d]" to have sex with
                   Morrison.
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                    corroborated by his own admissions. Furthermore, even if A.M. did testify
                    falsely on matters of force or consent, the State was not required to prove
                    that Morrison forced A.M. to have intercourse or that A.M. did not consent
                    to intercourse. See NRS 200.366(1)(b) ("A person is guilty of sexual assault
                    if the person. . [c]ommits a sexual penetration upon a child under the age
                    of 14 years . . . ."). We therefore conclude that Morrison has not established
                    plain error.
                    The State did not improperly comment on the evidence during closing
                    argument
                                   Morrison argues that the district court erred in overruling his
                    objection to the State's comment during closing argument that Morrison
                    attended high school with A.M.'s older brother and therefore would have
                    known that A.M. was not age 16 or older at the time of the offenses.
                    Morrison contends on appeal, as he did below, that the prosecutor's
                    comment was based on inadmissible hearsay because Detective Salkoff
                    made that statement during a recorded interview that Morrison stipulated
                    to admit into evidence. The district court overruled the objection, finding
                    that the statement was admissible since Morrison's "acquiescence" in
                    response to Detective Salkoffs statement effectively adopted it.12

                           ' 2Morrison argues that the court's ruling violated his Fifth
                    Amendment right to remain silent in response to Detective Salkoffs
                    comment; however, Morrison has not provided this court with the video
                    recording or a transcript of the recorded interview, so we necessarily
                    presume that he waived his right to remain silent at the outset of the
                    interview. See Cuzze, 123 Nev. at 603. 172 P.3d at 135; see also Anderson
                    v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404, 408 (1980) (holding that "a defendant who
                    voluntarily speaks after receiving Miranda warnings has not been induced
                    to remain silent" and may be questioned about why they did not correct an
                    officer's factual statement during an interview).
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if))   I
                                A district court's evidentiary rulings, and its rulings regarding

                   the latitude allowed to counsel in closing argument, are reviewed for an
                   abuse of discretion. Glover v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 125 Nev. 691, 704, 220
                   P.3d 684, 693 (2009). Here, because Morrison stipulated to admit the video
                   recording of the interview and did not object when it was played for the jury,
                   Morrison forfeited any claim that Detective Salkoffs statements during
                   that interview were inadmissible hearsay. See Jeremias v. State, 134 Nev.

                   46, 50, 412 P.3d 43, 48 (2018) ("The failure to preserve an error, even an
                   error that has been deemed structural, forfeits the right to assert it on
                   appeal.").
                                While Morrison challenges the State's reference to the
                   interview during its closing argument, "Nile State is free to comment on
                   testimony, to express its views on what the evidence shows, and to ask the
                   jury to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence." Randolph v. State,
                   117 Nev. 970, 984, 36 P.3d 424, 433 (2001). Because the video recording
                   was admitted by stipulation, the State's reference was a permissible
                   comment on the evidence presented at trial. Therefore, Morrison is not
                   entitled to relief.
                                                  CONCLUSION
                                The district court erred when it instructed the jury that a lack
                   of knowledge or a reasonable mistake as to the age of a child victim is not a
                   defense to the crime of use of a minor under the age of 14 in producing
                   pornography. Although the State did not need to prove that Morrison knew
                   or had reason to know that A.M. was under the age of 14 to impose a
                   sentence under NRS 200.750(2), the State did need to prove beyond a
                   reasonable doubt that Morrison knew or had reason to know that A.M. was
                   a minor under the age of 18 for the jury to convict him under NRS

                   200.710(1). Because Morisson admitted to police that he believed A.M. was
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                   16 years old during their sexual relationship, however, the district court's
                   instructional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Finding no
                   other errors, we affirm the judgment of conviction.13

                                                                                      J.

                   We concur:

                   Bulla

                           13We reject Morrison's argument that his convictions and sentence are
                   unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment because the underlying
                   statutes were "meant to punish pedophiles" and Morrison "doesn't have an
                   attraction to small children." And Morrison does not cogently argue why
                   the punishment imposed in this case violates the Equal Protection Clause.
                   See Maresca, 103 Nev. at 673, 748 P.2d at 6. Insofar as Morrison has raised
                   any other arguments that are not specifically addressed in this opinion, we
                   have considered the same and conclude that they do not present a basis for
                   relief.
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