Court Opinion

ID: 9738195
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:44:46.407285+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:04.331585
License: Public Domain

DAVID T. PROSSER, J.
¶ 108. (dissenting). The facts often determine the law. My first purpose in this dissent is to set out the facts as clearly and completely as an inadequate record permits. My second purpose is to apply the law to these facts.
I
¶ 109. On December 13, 2003, the defendant, Patrick C. Carter, was arrested in Chicago. He was taken into custody on a probation violation arrest warrant that was issued by a Cook County judge on September 3, 2002. He also was arrested on a July 23, 2003, felony warrant issued in Wisconsin.
¶ 110. These grounds for arrest will be discussed in turn.
¶ 111. Patrick Carter was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI) in Cook County, Illinois, on June 10, 2002. He was released after being placed under 18 months of supervision. The court enumerated several conditions of release. Carter was ordered to report to a social services agency and to complete a "Comprehensive Correctional Intervention Assessment and fully comply with the Comprehensive Correctional Intervention Plan." In addition, Carter was to (a) pay all fines, costs, and assessments ordered by the court before his supervision expired; (b) not violate any criminal statute *50of any jurisdiction; and (c) refrain from possessing any firearm or any other dangerous weapon.
¶ 112. On September 3, 2002, a Cook County judge signed a warrant for Carter's arrest because he had violated his supervision. The warrant fixed bail at $5,000. Carter was picked up on this warrant on December 13, 2003. He was carrying a handgun. Possession of a firearm violated another condition of Carter's supervision.
¶ 113. The day before Carter's DUI conviction in 2002, he participated in the armed robbery of a liquor store on Devon Avenue in Chicago. He and another man entered the store and demanded money. Carter's partner was carrying a handgun and used it to strike the male proprietor in the head. Carter himself chased the female proprietor to the back of the store, demanded money, and struck her in the face with his fist. The two men escaped with money taken from the cash register.
¶ 114. A Chicago police report of the incident indicated that the male victim had seen the two perpetrators in the store before. A later police report indicated that Carter and Eric T. Minor were identified in a photo lineup on June 16, 2002. Minor was the subject of Chicago Police Department Investigative Alert #299908348 concerning the liquor store robbery. The record does not show whether Carter was the subject of a similar Investigative Alert, but that is likely because Carter was a convicted felon who had been identified by two witnesses as the other man who robbed the store.
¶ 115. An Investigative Alert is not an arrest warrant, but its issuance means that police have reasonable grounds to stop a suspect and detain him for a reasonable time to question him about a crime. Illinois law provides that a peace officer may arrest a person when the officer "has reasonable grounds to believe that *51the person. . . has committed an offense." 725 ILCS 5/107-2(c). Chicago police had reasonable grounds to arrest Carter for robbery based on his identification by two people in a photo lineup seven days after the crime.
¶ 116. On June 19, 2003, Patrick Carter was living in Wisconsin. On that evening, about midnight, after a friend was beaten up, Carter went out with a borrowed handgun and opened fire at people on the porch of a house on North 1st Street. The house was linked to people who had assailed his friend. One of Carter's gunshots hit Phillip Jordan, Jr., in the head. Jordan, 21, was taken to a hospital and later died.
¶ 117. After the shooting, Carter returned to Chicago. There, he was arrested about six months later on December 13. In the meantime, the Milwaukee County District Attorney's Office had charged Carter with recklessly endangering safety, first degree, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 941.30(1). The criminal complaint quotes Carter as telling a witness that he just "aired those [__] out," but it fails to mention that Phillip Jordan died from the shooting.
II
¶ 118. The day after he was arrested in Chicago, Carter was transferred to the Cook County Jail. He appeared in court on the Wisconsin warrant on December 15. The record does not indicate whether the court set bail or denied bail.
¶ 119. In another court on December 15, Carter's supervision on the DUI was revoked and he was sentenced to 30 days in the Cook County Department of Corrections, with sentence credit of three days. His sentence on the DUI was completed on December 21 — much less than 30 days. Consequently, Carter was *52in custody on the DUI from December 13 to December 21, 2003, a total of nine days.
¶ 120. In response to this court's order last term requesting additional facts, Milwaukee County Circuit Judge Patricia D. McMahon made several findings based on documents provided to her. These findings included the following:
6. On December 15, 2003, defendant appeared in Cook County Court and refused to waive extradition. Defendant could not agree to extradition because he had a pending local charge and that local charge had to be resolved before he could be sent back to Wisconsin.
7. On December 19, 2003, defendant was arrested on a charge of armed robbery, based on an incident which had occurred on June 9, 2002.
¶ 121. Some of these findings require comment. Judge McMahon's finding that Carter "refused to waive extradition" is not based on any official court document. It is based on a December 15 teletype from the Chicago Police Department Extradition Unit to the Milwaukee Police Department advising that "Your fugitive in our custody... . Appeared our ct this date & refused to waive formal extradition."
¶ 122. Judge McMahon relied on a September 24, 2004, transcript from an unrelated case, State v. Jeffrey Townsend, #01-CF-005345, Circuit Court, Milwaukee County, to explain Carter's refusal to waive extradition. In the Townsend transcript, a Cook County Sheriffs Department Extradition Unit officer was asked: "So how is it you knew he was not going to agree to extradition?" Answer: "Well, I knew that he couldn't agree to the extradition part because he had a local charge, and we had to finish that local charge before we send him back to Wisconsin." (Emphasis added.)
*53¶ 123. This testimony is the source of Judge McMahon's statement that "Defendant could not agree to extradition because he had a pending local charge and that local charge had to he resolved before he could be sent back to Wisconsin." The wording of the teletype about Carter is quite similar to the teletype described in the Townsend case testimony:
This is a teletype that we send automatically to the jurisdiction that wants the wanted subject that we have in custody. This is telling the Milwaukee Police Department ... that the above subject, Jeffrey Townsend, is in our custody, is fighting extradition back to your state of Wisconsin, and we also advise his next court date.
Given the explanation of the Townsend teletype in that testimony, there is no hard evidence that Carter actually "refused" extradition.
¶ 124. Judge McMahon's statement also does not specify what "local charge" the court is alluding to. The charge could be the DUI on which Carter would be serving time after revocation. On the other hand, the charge could be the robbery charges that were imminent. In either event, the court's finding is very important to- the resolution of this case. It is not relevant whether Carter waived extradition or refused extradition: he was not going anywhere until Illinois "finished] that local charge."
¶ 125. According to Chicago police documents, Patrick Carter was identified in a photo array on June 16, 2002, as a participant in the June 9, 2002, robbery. It is a little hard to believe that Chicago police knew about Carter's probation violation arrest warrant and the Wisconsin arrest warrant but were not aware that Carter had been identified by two people as a partici*54pant in an armed robbery, when they took him into custody on December 13, 2003.1
¶ 126. The Townsend transcript explains that authorities check on local charges before they take a prisoner to court on an out-of-state warrant, inasmuch as local charges will have priority. This could explain why several days after Carter's arrest, robbery investigators arranged for a "Writ and physical lineup including Carter" to be held on December 19, 2003. On that day, they picked Carter up at 9:15 a.m. at the jail and transported him to "Area 3" for the lineup. They gave him Miranda warnings at 9:25 a.m. Carter gave an oral statement and then a written statement, and he was identified by both victims as one of the June 9, 2002, robbers.2
¶ 127. Judge McMahon found that Carter was arrested on December 19, 2003, on a charge of armed robbery. On that date, Carter was still in jail serving his DUI sentence.
*55¶ 128. The record does not indicate when Carter made his initial appearance in Cook County court on the robbery charges. The next day, December 20, 2003, was a Saturday. Carter may not have appeared in court that Saturday or the next day, but a lengthy delay would have been inappropriate. At his initial appearance, Carter would have been entitled to bail. Under Illinois law, a defendant must post "a sum of money equal to 10% of the bail" to be eligible for release. 725 ILCS 5/110-7.
¶ 129. Notwithstanding his two inculpatory statements to police, Carter fought the robbery charges for many months. He remained in custody until October 19, 2004, when he entered a guilty plea and was sentenced on two robbery counts concurrently to 14 years in prison. Carter has not established that before this sentencing he was held exclusively or even primarily on the charge from Wisconsin.
Ill
¶ 130. The issue presented in this case is how much sentence credit, if any, Patrick Carter is entitled to on his Wisconsin conviction for reckless endangerment, first degree, for the time he spent in the Cook County Jail or other Illinois custody, from December 13, 2003, when he was arrested, through October 19, 2004, when he was convicted and sentenced on the liquor store robbery. This requires the court to interpret Wis. Stat. § 973.155, which reads in part:
Sentence credit. (1)(a) A convicted offender shall be given credit toward the service of his or her sentence for all days spent in custody in connection with the course of conduct for which sentence was imposed. As *56used in this subsection, "actual days spent in custody" includes, without limitation by enumeration, confinement related to an offense for which the offender is ultimately sentenced, or for any other sentence arising out of the same course of conduct, which occurs:
1. While the offender is awaiting trial;
2. While the offender is being tried; and
3. While the offender is awaiting imposition of sentence after trial.
(b) The categories in par. (a)... include custody of the convicted offender which is in whole or in part the result of a probation, extended supervision or parole hold under s. 302.113(8m), 302.114(8m), 304.06(3), or 973.10(2) placed upon the person for the same course of conduct as that resulting in the new conviction.
¶ 131. Wisconsin Stat. § 973.155(1) should be interpreted the same as other statutes by looking first at the language of the statute. "If the meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry." State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶ 45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (citation omitted).
¶ 132. The sentence credit statute carries a heavy burden because it must be applied in an "almost endless variety" of factual circumstances. State v. Elandis Johnson, 2009 WI 57, ¶ 23, 318 Wis. 2d 21, 767 N.W.2d 207. As a result, courts have often determined that the statute is ambiguous as to specific facts, see State v. Marcus Johnson, 2007 WI 107, 304 Wis. 2d 318, 735 N.W.2d 505; State v. Floyd, 2000 WI 14, 232 Wis. 2d 767, 606 N.W.2d 155; State v. Tuescher, 226 Wis. 2d 465, 595 N.W.2d 443 (Ct. App. 1999); State v. Gavigan, 122 Wis. 2d 389, 362 N.W.2d 162 (Ct. App. 1984); and they have looked beyond the text to extrinsic sources.
*57¶ 133. Wisconsin Stat. § 973.155 was part of 1977 Senate Bill 159, which became Chapter 353, Laws of 1977. The language in § 973.155(1)(a) has been the same since it became law in May 1978.
¶ 134. The language in § 973.155(1)(a) was derived from 18 U.S.C. § 3568 (1977), which read in part:
The sentence of imprisonment of any person convicted of an offense shall commence to run from the date on which such person is received at the penitentiary, reformatory, or jail for service of such sentence. The Attorney General shall give any such person credit toward service of his sentence for any days spent in custody in connection with the offense or acts for which sentence was imposed. (Emphasis added.)
¶ 135. One of the early cases interpreting § 973.155 was Gavigan, in which the court noted:
Section 973.155, Stats., was created by ch. 353, Laws of 1977. This section established an entitlement to sentence credit that was broader than prior case law and was intended to extend credit for all days spent in custody in connection with the course of conduct for which sentence was imposed.... Our supreme court recommended to the legislature that a simpler, more equitable system be enacted based on the federal system. Within a short time, sec. 973.155 was enacted and it is similar to the federal statute.
Gavigan, 122 Wis. 2d at 392 (footnotes omitted). State v. Boettcher, 144 Wis. 2d 86, 91-93, 423 N.W.2d 533 (1988), has a more extensive discussion of the history of § 973.155(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 3568. Boettcher noted that the state statute had its genesis in the federal statute and employs controlling words that are identical in meaning. Id. at 95.
*58¶ 136. These cases establish the link between § 973.155 and 18 U.S.C. § 3568. Both the Gavigan court and the Boettcher court utilized federal cases interpreting the federal statute as they made their own decisions. "Federal court cases dealing with similar facts and construing a similar statute have reached the same result." Gavigan, 122 Wis. 2d at 394 (footnote omitted). The federal statute is "persuasive authority in interpreting the Wisconsin statute." Boettcher, 144 Wis. 2d at 92.
¶ 137. In State v. Beets, 124 Wis. 2d 372, 369 N.W.2d 382 (1985), this court also cited federal cases "interpreting the analogous federal statute, 18 U.S.C., sec. 3568," for guidance in interpreting Wisconsin's sentence credit statute. Id. at 380-81.
¶ 138. Although 18 U.S.C. § 3568 was repealed and recreated in revised form in 1984,3 federal cases interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 3568 are highly relevant because the former statute was not only "analogous" but also the acknowledged source of Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1), and the Wisconsin statutory provision at issue has not changed.
*59¶ 139. When they interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 3568, federal courts consistently denied credit on federal sentences for time spent in state custody, with one notable exception. In Anglin v. Johnston, 504 F.2d 1165 (7th Cir. 1974), the court stated:
The only situation where credit has been given for the serving of time for a different offense is where a state prisoner has been denied release on bail solely because of an outstanding federal detainer lodged against him. In that case courts have held that he is in custody "in connection with" the federal offense and entitled to credit against his federal sentence for time spent in state custody under those circumstances.
Id. at 1169 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Anglin was the established law in the Seventh Circuit at the time Wisconsin adopted Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1) in 1978.
¶ 140. The interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3568 was summed up several years later in Boniface v. Carlson, 856 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir. 1988), where the court said:
A prisoner in state custody who cannot secure his release on bail because of a federal detainer is entitled to credit against his federal sentence for the time he would otherwise be out free on bail. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3568 (West 1985) (repealed 1984, effective Nov. 1, 1986). To secure this credit, however, the prisoner must establish not only that the federal detainer was the sole reason for the denial of bail, but also that the state did not credit his state sentence for that time.
Id. at 1436 (citations omitted).4
*60¶ 141. As noted, the legislature adopted § 973.155(1) in the 1977 session. Thereafter, the Wisconsin Criminal Jury Instructions Committee drafted special materials to suggest standards for the proper determination of sentence credit under the new statute. Wis. JI — Criminal, Part III, SM-34A. In 1982 the Committee attempted to define the phrase "in custody." It drew upon the definition of "custody" in Wis. Stat. § 946.42 (1981) and then gave examples:
*61The following situations would be within this definition of custody:
1. detention in the county jail before bail is set or thereafter;
2. detention in the county jail during nonworking hours as a condition of bail release or probation;
3. commitment for the determination of competency to stand trial under § 971.14(2) or commitment as not competent to stand trial under § 971.14(5);
4. detention in jail in another state when that detention is in connection with a course of conduct for which sentence is imposed in Wisconsin.
Wis. JI — Criminal SM-34A at 6 (1982) (emphasis added).
¶ 142. The Committee's out-of-state example was ambiguous. Three months before the Committee issued special materials on Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1), Attorney General Bronson C. La Follette released an opinion on sentence credit for revoked probationers and parolees. 71 Wis. Op. Att'y Gen. 102 (1982) (OAG 29-82). La Follette described a situation "where a parolee is picked up in the foreign jurisdiction on a parole violation warrant issued in Wisconsin but, prior to being returned to this state, is charged in the foreign jurisdiction with a new criminal violation." Id. at 105.
The intervening period between arrest on a parole violation warrant and the issuance of charges by the foreign jurisdiction would be the result of the Wisconsin revocation proceeding, and thus subject to the credit provisions .... Similarly, the period of custody between the completion of the parolee's custodial period in the foreign jurisdiction and the time he is picked up by Wisconsin authorities to be returned to this state would be credited.
*62Id. at 105-06. The period after the "issuance of charges" and "the completion of the parolee's custodial period in the foreign jurisdiction" would not lead to sentence credit. La Follette's opinion was consistent with federal court rulings.
¶ 143. By 1986 the committee had reconsidered the wording of its out-of-state example because it was too broad. It changed the special materials to read:
4. detention in jail in another state when that detention results exclusively from a Wisconsin warrant or detainer.
Wis. JI — Criminal SM-34A at 7 (1986).
¶ 144. The 1986 special materials then gave an additional example:
Not included within the definition of "custody" for sentence credit purposes are the following situations:
4. detention in another state based on an offense committed in that state, even if a Wisconsin warrant or detainer has also been filed.
Id. at 8.
¶ 145. These two examples were in complete conformity with the federal interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3568 and the Attorney General's opinion. The Committee explained its examples as follows:
4. Credit should be granted when, for example, a Wisconsin parolee is arrested in Illinois solely because of a Wisconsin warrant. Credit should not be granted when a Wisconsin parolee, already in custody on Illinois charges, has a Wisconsin hold or warrant filed against *63him. This is consistent with the conclusion that filing a detainer against one already in custody in Wisconsin does not result in "custody" under § 973.155 on the charge which is the subject of the detainer.
Comment to Wis. JI—Criminal SM-34A at 23 (1986). The Committee cited two Wisconsin cases: State v. Demars, 119 Wis. 2d 19, 348 N.W.2d 708 (Ct. App. 1984), and State v. Nyborg, 122 Wis. 2d 765, 364 N.W.2d 553 (Ct. App. 1985).
¶ 146. The 1988 version of the special materials contained the exact same examples and explanation. The 1991 version is the same except that the committee added State v. Rohl, 160 Wis. 2d 325, 466 N.W.2d 208 (Ct. App. 1991), as additional support for its examples.
¶ 147. The 1995 version of the special materials includes the same examples and explanation as the 1991 version, and the 1995 version is the latest to be issued on this point. In short, detention in another state based on an offense committed in that state, even if a Wisconsin warrant or detainer has also been filed, has been excluded from the interpretation of "custody" for sentence credit purposes since the early 1980s.5 Rohl's facts vindicated the committee's second sentence.
*64IV
¶ 148. In an opinion filed November 1, 2007, the court of appeals repudiated the examples set out in the special materials. State v. Carter, 2007 WI App 255, 306 Wis. 2d 450, 743 N.W.2d 700. The court rejected "the State's argument that, because [Carter] was not exclusively in custody on the Wisconsin charge, he was not entitled to sentence credit for the time he was in custody in Illinois." Id., ¶ 2. The court added:
We conclude that Carter is entitled to sentence credit for the days from December 14, 2003, when he was taken into custody in Illinois based on the charge in this case, until November 2, 2004, when he was sentenced on the Illinois charge.
Id., ¶ 31. According to the court of appeals, Carter was entitled to 324 days of sentence credit. Id.
¶ 149. In retrospect, the court of appeals was presented with incorrect facts. It also misconstrued the law. Some of the factual errors are revealed in the majority's opinion. The legal deficiencies are largely *65adopted in the majority opinion. Thus, although the correct rule to decide this case is stated in the special materials, the majority opinion, which changes the rule, requires a comprehensive response.
V
¶ 150. Determining sentence credit is one of the most common duties of a circuit court. This duty requires the circuit court to answer two questions. First, was the defendant "in custody" within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)? Second, was all or part of the "custody" for which sentence credit is sought "in connection with the course of conduct for which sentence was imposed"? Elandis Johnson, 318 Wis. 2d 21, ¶ 27 (citations omitted).
¶ 151. Sometimes the amount of sentence credit turns on the interpretation of the words "in custody." Other times it turns on the interpretation of the "in connection with" clause. On occasion, the court's determination requires interpretation of both factors.
A. "In Custody"
¶ 152. Almost from the beginning, Wisconsin courts have wrestled with the meaning of "in custody." In a lay sense, a person who is confined to a county jail in Wisconsin or another state is in custody. But confinement may not equal "custody" or qualify the person for sentence credit under the statute.
¶ 153. The special materials explain that "in custody" is not defined for purposes of § 973.155. The materials suggest that "the definition of 'custody' used for purposes of the criminal escape statute, § 946.42, may be applicable to the sentence credit issue: If any *66part of the offender's status would be considered 'custody' for purposes of the escape statute, credit is due." Wis. JI—Criminal, Part III, SM-34A, at 5. This court, in State v. Gilbert, 115 Wis. 2d 371, 379, 340 N.W.2d 511 (1983), used this standard and applauded the committee's work.
¶ 154. One implication of the committee's analysis is plain: A person confined to an Illinois jail is not "in custody" within the meaning of § 946.42 because Wisconsin may not prosecute an escape from an Illinois jail or any other out-of-state institution.
¶ 155. In State v. Demars, 119 Wis. 2d 19, 349 N.W.2d 708 (Ct. App. 1984), the court of appeals employed a different explanation of custody in a case involving a "detainer." The detainer was issued by Winnebago County against a person being held in Fond du Lac County. Demars was jailed on February 9, 1983, in Fond du Lac County solely on Fond du Lac County crimes. Id. at 21. On the same date, a probation hold was placed against him for absconding from probation. Id. A preliminary revocation hearing was held on March 10. Id. The following day, a fact-finder found probable cause for revocation and ordered that Demars be held in custody pending a final hearing on probation revocation. Id. All this happened in Fond du Lac County.
¶ 156. In the meantime, on February 22, 1983, the Winnebago County District Attorney filed unrelated criminal charges against Demars for Winnebago County crimes. Id. On February 25, the Winnebago County Sheriffs Department filed a "detainer" with Fond du Lac County, requesting that Fond du Lac County detain Demars if he should post bond and if his probation hold should be lifted. Id. Winnebago County subsequently made arrangements to bring Demars to Winnebago County, and Demars made his initial ap*67pearance there on May 2, 1983. Id. The Winnebago County court imposed $400 in cash bail, set a preliminary examination for May 18, and permitted Demars to be returned at once to Fond du Lac County. Id. at 21-22. When he was brought to Winnebago County a second time on May 18, Demars pled guilty and was sentenced to 33 months in prison.
¶ 157. The issue on appeal was whether Demars was entitled to sentence credit on the Winnebago County crimes for the period from February 25, when the Winnebago County detainer was filed, until May 18, the day Demars was sentenced — a total of 83 days. Id. at 22. The court of appeals said no, but it did award Demars credit for 17 days — May 2 through May 18 — on his Winnebago County sentence. Id. at 20-21.
¶ 158. Public Defender Glenn Cushing argued on appeal that the issue was "whether the defendant's custody in the Fond du Lac County jail was 'in connection with the course of conduct for which sentence was imposed' in Winnebago County." He contended that Demars' status changed when Winnebago County filed the detainer, inasmuch as Demars was no longer in custody in Fond du Lac solely on Fond du Lac County charges, as Winnebago County had lodged a formal "hold" request that would take effect if Demars posted bond and if his probation hold was lifted.
¶ 159. The court of appeals did not rely on the escape statute to decide the case. It used Black's Law Dictionary, which defined "custody," in part, as "the detainer of a man's person by virtue of lawful process or authority." Demars, 119 Wis. 2d at 23 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 347 (5th ed. 1979)). The court said:
A close analysis of all the cases cited by Demars shows the presence of a legal event, process or author*68ity which occasioned, at least in part, the custody of the defendant relative to the charge for which he was ultimately sentenced. We conclude that "custody" as used in sec. 973.155, Stats., must necessarily result from the occurrence of a legal event, process, or authority which occasions, or is related to, confinement on the charge for which the defendant is ultimately sentenced.
Demars, 119 Wis. 2d at 25-26.
¶ 160. The court explained:
Examples of lawful process or authority resulting in custody in a criminal case include arrest with or without a warrant, arrest upon a capias or bench warrant, unsatisfied bail requirements resulting in confinement, sentence to confinement, temporary detention pursuant to sec. 968.24, Stats., probation or parole holds, and periods of confinement imposed as a condition of probation.
Id. at 23.
¶ 161. A "detainer," the court said, did not meet this standard. "The term 'detainer' carries no custodial mandate in our jurisprudence." Id. at 24. Consequently, the court held, Demars was not in custody, within the meaning of the statute, until he was brought to Winnebago County and the court set bail. This constituted the "legal event" that changed his status in Fond du Lac County. Id. at 26.
¶ 162. The Demars analysis is very useful in establishing a second prerequisite of "custody." Carter's arrest in Chicago on a Wisconsin felony warrant was clearly the occurrence of a legal event, but it did not make Carter subject to prosecution under § 946.42 or any other Wisconsin statute for an escape from the Cook County Jail. Demars teaches that "custody" may depend on the existence of two elements: (1) a legal event, process, or authority that occasions, at least in *69part; (2) a status that subjects a person to an escape charge under a Wisconsin statute for leaving that status.
¶ 163. That "custody" requires both elements was made clear in State v. Magnuson, 2000 WI 19, 233 Wis. 2d 40, 606 N.W.2d 536. Magnuson was subject to eight criminal charges. He was unable to post bond. Id., ¶ 2. The court modified his bail to a $10,000 signature bond on each count, plus multiple other conditions of release, including a nightly curfew that confined him to the residence of his pastor between specified hours. Id., ¶ 4. "This home detention as a condition of bond was not pursuant to an order from the sheriff or the Department of Corrections under Wis. Stat. § 302.425 (1997-98)." Id., ¶ 5. The defendant was required to wear an electronic bracelet to ensure his presence in the pastor's home during curfew hours. Id., ¶ 6.
¶ 164. After pleading no contest to three counts, the defendant sought sentence credit for the six months he resided with his pastor as a condition of his bond. Id., ¶ 8. This court upheld the circuit court's denial of sentence credit. The court made the following statements:
[Njumerous cases have interpreted the sentence credit statute and concluded that the plain meaning of custody under the statute corresponds to the definition of custody contained in the escape statute, Wis. Stat. § 946.42.
[W]e determine that for sentence credit purposes an offender's status constitutes custody whenever the offender is subject to an escape charge for leaving that status.
In establishing this definition, we modify the approach set forth in Gilbert in that we do not limit the *70inquiry to the definition of custody contained only in Wis. Stat. § 946.42(1)(a). Instead, we acknowledge the importance of reading statutes in pari materia... and include for reference other statutory provisions in which the legislature has classified certain situations as restrictive and custodial by attaching escape charges for an unauthorized departure from those situations.

In sum, we determine that for purposes of sentence credit an offender's status constitutes custody whenever the offender is subject to an escape charge for leaving that status.

Id., ¶¶ 13, 25, 26, 31 (emphasis added).
¶ 165. It must be noted that the defendant in Magnuson was subjected to multiple court-ordered conditions of release occasioning his status, so that he met the standard set out in the Demars case. He did not get sentence credit, however, because he was not subject to an escape charge under any provision of Wisconsin law.
¶ 166. Patrick Carter was not "in custody" within the meaning of § 973.155 when he was confined in the Cook County Jail because he was not subject to an escape charge under any provision of Wisconsin law.6 Holding that Carter's Chicago confinement fits within the terms of § 973.155(1) would rewrite more than three decades of interpretation and eliminate any jurisdictional or geographic limitation to statutory "custody."
¶ 167. This analysis immediately raises the question whether a person held in Illinois solely on a Wisconsin warrant would be entitled to sentence credit on a Wisconsin sentence related to the warrant. The *71answer is yes. The reason sentence credit would be required is explained in Ballard v. Blackwell, 449 F.2d 868, 869 (5th Cir. 1971):
In interpreting § 3568 we are definitely committed to the position that time spent in State custody must be credited toward time served on a Federal sentence if the continued State confinement was exclusively the product of such action by Federal law-enforcement officials as to justify treating the State jail as the practical equivalent of a Federal one. Davis v. Attorney General, [425 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1970)]; United States v. Morgan, [425 F.2d 1388 (5th Cir. 1970)]. If the Federal detainer alone prevented Ballard's release from State confinement, credit must be given. Or, to state it affirmatively, if absent the Federal detainer and under available state procedures Ballard could have been released from the contemporary State confinement, credit must be given.
Id. (citation omitted).
¶ 168. Credit must be given in this hypothetical circumstance for a constitutional reason, not a statutory reason. See Klimas v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 244, 249 N.W.2d 285 (1977); State ex rel. Solie v. Schmidt, 73 Wis. 2d 76, 242 N.W.2d 244 (1976); Kubart v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 94, 233 N.W.2d 404 (1975). The law must "ensure that a person not serve more time than he is sentenced." Floyd, 232 Wis. 2d 767, ¶ 23 (citation omitted). Carter cannot rely on a constitutional argument because he was legitimately confined in Illinois for Illinois offenses that were unrelated to his offense in Wisconsin. He is seeking dual credit.
B. "In Connection With"
¶ 169. Determining that a defendant was "in custody" within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1) does not settle the issue of sentence credit. The court also *72must determine whether all or part of the custody for which sentence credit is sought was "in connection with the course of conduct for which sentence was imposed."
¶ 170. There are numerous cases in which a defendant's request for sentence credit was denied on grounds that his custody was not "in connection with the course of conduct for which sentence was imposed." See, e.g., Elandis Johnson, 318 Wis. 2d 21; Marcus Johnson, 304 Wis. 2d 318; Floyd, 232 Wis. 2d 767; Beets, 124 Wis. 2d 372; Tuescher, 226 Wis. 2d 465; State v. Beiersdorf, 208 Wis. 2d 492, 561 N.W.2d 749 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Morrick, 147 Wis. 2d 185, 432 N.W.2d 654 (Ct. App. 1988).
¶ 171. The Elandis Johnson case establishes that:
Wis. Stat. § 973.155 imposes no requirement that credit applied toward one sentence also be applied toward a second sentence if the basis for applying the same credit to both sentences is merely that the sentences are concurrent and are imposed at the same time. The fact that sentences are concurrent and are imposed at the same time does not alter the statutory mandate that credit toward service of a sentence be based on custody that is "in connection with" the course of conduct giving rise to that sentence: i.e., custody factually connected with the course of conduct for which sentence was imposed.
Elandis Johnson, 318 Wis. 2d 21, ¶¶ 3, 76.
¶ 172. The Elandis Johnson case pounds the necessity of a factual connection between custody and "the course of conduct for which sentence was imposed." Floyd emphasizes not only that a factual connection is necessary "for sentence credit... [but also that] a procedural or other tangential connection will not suffice." Floyd, 232 Wis. 2d 767, ¶ 17 (emphasis added).
*73¶ 173. Three cases illustrate some of the principles at play in the "in connection with" clause. These cases all present some factual "connection" or relationship between "custody" on Crime A and sentence on Crime B, but not all lead to sentence credit.
¶ 174. At one end of the "in connection with" spectrum is Beets. Beets was on probation for two drug crimes when he was arrested on a burglary charge. Beets, 124 Wis. 2d at 374. Shortly afterward he was also in custody on a probation hold because of the alleged violation of his probation by virtue of the burglary. Id. at 374. About one month later, Beets' probation was revoked and later he was sentenced on the two drug crimes. Id. at 375. Beets was given credit on the drug sentence for his days in custody from his arrest on the burglary to his sentencing on the drug crimes. Id.
¶ 175. About six months later, Beets pled guilty to the burglary and was sentenced to a prison term that was to run concurrent with the previously imposed sentence on his drug crimes. Id. He was granted sentence credit on the burglary sentence for the period from his arrest to the date he began his prison sentence on the drug crimes. Id. But Beets wanted more and filed a post-conviction motion asking for credit for the period subsequent to his sentencing on the drug crimes up to his sentencing on the burglary. Id.
¶ 176. The circuit court denied his request. Id. at 376. This determination was affirmed by the court of appeals and this court. Id. Beets contended that his sentence on the burglary was "related" to all custody with respect to the drug crimes, inasmuch as his burglary arrest had triggered the revocation of his probation and his ultimate sentence on the drug crimes. Id. at 377.
*74¶ 177. This court disagreed. It concluded that "the sentence on the drug charges was not related or connected to the burglary course of conduct." Beets, 124 Wis. 2d at 378.
[A]ny days spent in confinement after the revocation of probation and the imposition of sentence arise out of, and are connected not with the burglary, but the unrelated conduct which resulted in the drug convictions more than a year earlier. Thus, the offenses are not connected.

Id.

¶ 178. The court had to concede "a temporal connection ... because it was the burglary arrest that triggered the probation hold on Beets." Id. But, it said, "any connection which might have existed between custody for the drug offenses and the burglary was severed when the custody resulting from the probation hold was converted into a revocation and sentence." Id. at 379 (emphasis added).
¶ 179. All confinement in the Beets case qualified as "custody" under Floyd principles and under Demars principles. But any "connection" between the drug crimes and the burglary was "severed" by Beets' sentence on the drug crimes.
¶ 180. At the other end of the "in connection with" spectrum is State v. Thompson, 225 Wis. 2d 578, 593 N.W.2d 875 (Ct. App. 1999). Thompson involved the revocation of a juvenile's aftercare supervision (or juvenile "parole") as a result of new offenses committed after the defendant's 18th birthday. Id. at 580. Thompson was arrested for operating a vehicle without the owner's consent, fleeing from an officer, and possession of marijuana. Id. At the time of these offenses, he was released on juvenile aftercare from confinement as a delinquent for multiple previous *75offenses. Id. Following his arrest, Thompson made his initial appearance, the court set bail, a "hold" for violation of aftercare supervision was placed on Thompson, and he remained in adult custody. Id.
¶ 181. About a month later, Thompson's juvenile aftercare was revoked as a result of the new offenses. Id. Two months later, he pled to the adult criminal charges. Id. About three months later, he was sentenced on those charges. Id. Over the five-month period between revocation of juvenile aftercare and sentencing on the adult offenses, Thompson spent time in both a county jail and a juvenile correctional facility. Id. at 580-81. He was given credit for his time in county jail but not for his time at Ethan Allen. Id. at 581.
¶ 182. The denial of credit for the juvenile institution confinement was reversed by the court of appeals, which distinguished the situation in Thompson from the situation in Beets. Id. at 583-84. The court said, among several points, that revocation of aftercare was not a sentence; the duration of Thompson's juvenile custody was indefinite; the duration of juvenile custody was not shortened by credit for time spent in adult custody; and confinement in a secured juvenile facility was designed as treatment, not punishment. Id. at 584 n.2. Revocation of aftercare, the court said, represents a determination that new offenses require continuing treatment in a secured correctional facility. "Thompson's continuing confinement in the juvenile system was clearly and intimately related to the pending charge." Id. It constituted custody in the juvenile system, waiting for adult court disposition. Id.
¶ 183. In sum, the juvenile system custody after revocation was "in connection with the course of conduct for which sentence was imposed," and it required sentence credit.
*76¶ 184. The case of Marcus Johnson falls between Thompson and Beets. In June 2001 Marcus Johnson was committed to a secured juvenile institution after being found delinquent on multiple grounds. Marcus Johnson, 304 Wis. 2d 318, ¶ 11. His supervision was extended for a second year on May 20, 2002. Id. In June 2002 Johnson battered a fellow inmate and was charged for that offense in adult court. Id., ¶ 12. He was released back to the juvenile institution on a signature bond. Id., ¶ 13. The felony battery case was tried on February 27, 2003, and Johnson was convicted. Id., ¶ 15. On May 6, 2003, the juvenile court extended Johnson's juvenile supervision for a third year. Id., ¶ 16. He was not sentenced on the felony battery in adult court until February 2004. Id., ¶ 21. The issue before this court was whether Johnson was entitled to 608 days of sentence credit on his battery sentence for all custody between the time of his arrest on the battery charge and his sentence on that charge. Id., ¶ 32. Almost all confinement during this time period was in the juvenile institution.
¶ 185. The Marcus Johnson court reached the following conclusions: (1) Johnson's initial confinement in a secured juvenile institution was completely unrelated to the felony battery. Id., ¶ 9. Moreover, the extension of his supervision for an additional year on May 20, 2002, was unrelated to the felony battery because the battery had not yet occurred. Id. (2) The extension of Johnson's supervision for a third year on May 6, 2003, was related to the felony battery because the juvenile court did factor the battery into its decision to extend supervision. Id. (3) However, the circuit court made a reasonable determination that there was an "extremely high probability" that Johnson's supervision would have been extended regardless of the June 2002 battery. Id., ¶ 23.
*77¶ 186. This court said: "The issue ... is how large a factor did the June 2002 battery have to play in the decision to extend Johnson's juvenile supervision in 2003 for Johnson's juvenile custody to be 'in connection with' the June 2002 battery." Id., ¶ 67.
¶ 187. The court noted that the phrase "in connection with" was "subject to both a narrow and broad interpretation. Id., ¶ 68. "Beets suggests that a narrower interpretation of the statute is appropriate." Id., ¶ 69. Then the court added: "We stated that, from the time Beets began serving his sentence on the drug charges, it became irrelevant that he was also awaiting trial on the burglary charge." Id.
¶ 188. The court quoted and approved the following language from Beets:
[T]hat any connection which might have existed between custody for the drug offenses and the burglary was severed when the custody resulting from the probation hold was converted into a revocation and sentence.
From that time on, Beets was in prison serving an imposed and unchallenged sentence; and whether he was also awaiting trial on the burglary charge was irrelevant
because [Beets'] freedom from confinement — his right to be at liberty — was not in any way related to the viability of the burglary charge. His ability to make bail on the burglary charge became immaterial. Even had the burglary charge been dismissed, he would still have been in confinement. Thus, there is no logical reason why credit should be given on the burglary charge for his service of sentence on a separate crime.
Marcus Johnson, 304 Wis. 2d 318, ¶¶ 44, 69 (quoting Beets, 124 Wis. 2d at 379) (citation omitted).
*78¶ 189. The Marcus Johnson court went on to say:
The underlying purpose of the sentence credit statute is to afford fairness by ensuring "that a person not serve more time than that for which he is sentenced." A narrow interpretation of the phrase "in connection with" furthers this purpose. If Johnson would have been in custody even if the June 2002 battery had never occurred, he is not being treated unfairly by not receiving sentence credit for that time.
We... affirm the circuit court's finding that Johnson would have been in custody even if the June 2002 battery had not occurred. This finding is not clearly erroneous. It is amply supported by the record.... Johnson's time spent in juvenile custody was not in connection with the June 2002 battery, and he is not entitled to sentence credit under Wis. Stat. § 973.155 for the entire 608 days he spent in custody after his arrest awaiting adult sentencing.
Id., ¶¶ 70, 76 (emphasis added).
¶ 190. All of Marcus Johnson's custody, like Beets' custody, satisfied the requirements set forth in Floyd and Demurs. But part of his custody had no connection to his battery offense, while another part was deemed irrelevant because he would have been in custody "even if the June 2002 battery had never occurred." Id., ¶ 70.
¶ 191. This analysis is a second way of evaluating Carter's confinement in Chicago.
¶ 192. Judge McMahon found that Carter was arrested in Chicago on December 13, 2003, "on a probation violation warrant from Illinois and on the Wisconsin warrant." Accepting this as fact, it is undisputed that the Illinois warrant set bail at $5,000. Existence of a Wisconsin warrant firmed up the preex*79isting Illinois warrant because it indicated an additional violation of the conditions of Carter's release.
¶ 193. Carter appeared before an Illinois judge on December 15 on the Wisconsin warrant. The record does not tell us whether bail was set or denied. According to the record, however, the standard practice in Chicago is for law enforcement authorities to check on local charges before taking an extradition case before a judge. It is inconceivable that law enforcement authorities did not know anything about the robbery at the time they took Carter before a judge. Carter's own evidence says they knew. See ¶ 125 n. 1, supra. It cannot be disputed that authorities knew about the probation violation warrant, the $5,000 bond on that warrant, and Carter's need to satisfy his local obligations for violating supervision before being shipped off to Wisconsin.
¶ 194. When Carter's probation was revoked on December 15 and he was sentenced to 30 days in jail, less three days of sentence credit, his sentence severed any connection between his confinement and the Wisconsin warrant.
¶ 195. Before Carter's confinement in the jail could be "reconnected" to the Wisconsin warrant, he was arrested on the robbery. He eventually appeared in court on the robbery. Logic, experience, and common sense tell us that the court set conditions of release that Carter could not meet. It was Carter's burden to establish otherwise.
¶ 196. Carter might have chosen to fight extradition by not posting bond in the robbery case, or he might not have been able to post bond, but Judge McMahon found as a fact that "Defendant could not agree to extradition because he had a pending local charge and that local charge had to be resolved before *80he could be sent back to Wisconsin."7 This court is bound by that finding because it is not clearly erroneous.
¶ 197. In addition, Carter would have been arrested even if there had been no Wisconsin warrant.
¶ 198. Carter was on a $5,000 bond for an Illinois offense before he appeared in court on the Wisconsin warrant.
¶ 199. Carter's sentence on the DUI severed any connection between his confinement and the Wisconsin warrant.
¶ 200. Carter was charged with armed robbery before his DUI sentence expired.
¶ 201. If Carter was denied bail on the Wisconsin warrant, the denial served the acknowledged interests of Illinois at least as much as the interests of Wisconsin. The robbery charge and the unknown conditions of release on the robbery superseded and overwhelmed the effect of the Wisconsin warrant. Even if bail had been set on the Wisconsin charge and had been posted, *81it would not have mattered. Carter's waiver or refusal to waive extradition was irrelevant because Illinois would not have permitted Carter to leave Illinois under any circumstances until the charges against him had been resolved. As a result, he received 305 days of credit for his presentence confinement against his Illinois robbery sentence.
¶ 202. In any event, Carter deliberately delayed his return to Wisconsin by fighting the robbery charge from December 19 to October 19 — ten months. This squares with Judge McMahon's findings.
¶ 203. Carter cannot satisfy the requirement that his days of confinement in the Cook County Jail were "in connection with the course of conduct for which sentence was imposed" if this court follows the principles stated in Beets and Marcus Johnson.
VI
¶ 204. Carter's case is the embodiment of the hypothetical example set out in the special materials:
4. detention in another state based on an offense committed in that state, even if a Wisconsin warrant or detainer has also been filed.
¶ 205. The example denying sentence credit is the flip side of the example requiring sentence credit:
4. detention in jail in another state when that detention results exclusively from a Wisconsin warrant or detainer. (Emphasis added.)
¶ 206. As noted above, the Criminal Jury Instructions Committee provided the following explanation for its examples of out-of-state confinement:
*824. [1] Credit should be granted when, for example, a Wisconsin parolee is arrested in Illinois solely because of a Wisconsin warrant. [2] Credit should not be granted when a Wisconsin parolee, already in custody on Illinois charges, has a Wisconsin hold or warrant filed against him. [3] This is consistent with the conclusion that filing a detainer against one already in custody in Wisconsin does not result in "custody" trader § 973.155 on the charge which is the subject of the detainer.
¶ 207. The court of appeals asserted that the Demars and Nyborg cases do not support "the proposition that a person detained in jail in another state is not 'in custody in connection with' under Wis. Stat. § 973.155 unless the person is in custody exclusively pursuant to a Wisconsin warrant." Carter, 306 Wis. 2d 450, ¶ 13. The court of appeals went on:
Section IIIA(4) read together with the footnote references to Demars and Nyborg suggests that the detainer in those cases did not trigger sentence credit because the defendants were already in custody. However, that is not correct. As we explained in Demars, a "detainer"... simply notifies the jurisdiction in which the defendant is confined that 'his [or her] custody [is] desired elsewhere.'" We specifically distinguished between a detainer and a warrant for an arrest (and other lawful means of arrest).... [T]here is nothing in either Demars or Nyborg that supports the proposition that, if a defendant in custody in another state both because of an arrest under the law of the state and under a Wisconsin warrant, the defendant is not "in custody" under the Wisconsin warrant for purposes of Wis. Stat. § 973.155.
Id., ¶ 18.
¶ 208. The third sentence of the committee's comment is factually correct. The committee did not overstate its reliance on the two cases when it said that *83Demars and Nyborg were "consistent with" the statement that "credit should not be granted when a Wisconsin parolee, already in custody on Illinois charges, has a Wisconsin hold or warrant filed against him." See ¶ 145, supra.
¶ 209. The committee is clearly correct with respect to detainers based on the facts of Demars. The committee also is correct with respect to the mere existence of an arrest warrant. State v. Villalobos, 196 Wis. 2d 141, 537 N.W.2d 139 (Ct. Ap. 1995), is helpful in making this point. The court in Villalobos said:
Distinguishing Demars, Villalobos argues that here an arrest warrant with cash bail and complaint had been issued. We disagree that the difference in the form of the legal process changes the result. The teaching of Demars is that the mere existence of legal process does not, in and of itself, trigger custody. Demars offered some examples of custody which would qualify for sentence credit. Id. at 23. In a situation involving an arrest warrant, Demars did not say that the mere existence of the warrant was sufficient. Rather, Demars said that an arrest was necessary. See id. Thus, Demars requires that the process be accompanied by some legal event or occurrence which "occasions, or is related to, confinement" on the charge referenced in the process. Id. at 26.
Villalobos argues that he has shown this linkage because the Racine County jail records listing the various reasons for his custody include a reference to the Kenosha County charge in this case. We disagree that this kind of entry in a jail log demonstrates an "occurrence of a legal event, process, or authority" within the meaning of Demars. See id. Like the detainer in Demars, all this entry connotes is Racine County's awareness that Kenosha County had an outstanding warrant for Villalobos's custody.
Id. at 147-48 (citation omitted).
*84¶ 210. The record in the present case indicates that Carter was arrested simultaneously on two warrants, including the arrest warrant from Wisconsin. This makes the case closer in theory than a case in which an arrest warrant is issued for a person who is already in custody, either in another Wisconsin county or in another state.
¶ 211. In Wisconsin, when a court in one county issues an arrest warrant for a person who is in custody in another county, the person is not re-arrested and brought before a judge in the county where he is confined. Rather, the arrest warrant serves the same purpose as a detainer. The county issuing the arrest warrant does not acquire "custody" of the person until it issues a writ and brings the person before its court.
¶ 212. In this case involving an out-of-state arrest on two different warrants, the felony arrest warrant from Wisconsin, the Illinois fugitive warrant, and the subsequent demand for requisition from the governor of Wisconsin were all functionally equivalent to a detainer — a notice to the Cook County Jail that Carter's presence was desired in Wisconsin. Strong language is used in the governor's requisition demand, but Wisconsin had no way to enforce that demand as long as Illinois had legitimate local matters pending. Illinois would not permit Carter to waive extradition until Illinois resolved its local charge. The situation would have been completely different if the Wisconsin arrest warrant and subsequent documents had been the exclusive reason for holding Carter.
¶ 213. This court must look beyond the technicalities of various legal instruments to understand what actually happened in Carter's case. If Wisconsin were required to give Carter and similarly situated persons sentence credit in situations where this state is power*85less to bring those persons to Wisconsin and powerless even to speed up the process in a sister state, the state could be stripped of the ability to effectively enforce its own criminal laws. Courts must not reward a person with dual credit for committing crimes in Wisconsin and then fleeing to a jurisdiction where the person is already wanted for other crimes or where the person may commit new crimes.
¶ 214. The court of appeals also dismissed the Criminal Jury Instructions Committee's reliance on Rohl. The court said:
Rohl does not support the proposition that a defendant is not in custody in connection with a Wisconsin charge for purposes of Wis. Stat. § 973.155 if detained in another state "based on an offense committed in that state, even if a Wisconsin warrant or detainer has been filed." WIS JI — CRIMINAL SM-34A at p.6. The reason sentence credit was denied in Rohl was that the California and the Wisconsin post-parole revocation sentences were not concurrent; the reason was not that confinement in California did not result "exclusively from a Wisconsin warrant or detainer." Wis. JI— Criminal SM-34A at p.5.
Carter, 306 Wis. 2d 450, ¶ 22.
¶ 215. In Rohl, the defendant was released on parole in Wisconsin after serving time on two offenses including a homicide. Rohl, 160 Wis. 2d at 327. He was permitted to go to California where his parole was to be supervised. Id. at 328. Before the transfer of parole had been accomplished, Rohl was arrested and jailed in California on new crimes. This happened on November 24, 1986. Id. The Wisconsin Division of Corrections issued a parole violation warrant against Rohl on November 26, 1986. Id.
¶ 216. Rohl was convicted of the California offenses on September 15, 1987, and sentenced on Janu*86ary 28, 1988. Id. at 328. He was granted 431 days of sentence credit on his four-year California prison sentence: namely, the period between his November 24, 1986, arrest and his January 28, 1988, sentence. Id.
¶ 217. Upon completion of his sentence in California, Rohl was returned to Wisconsin where a hearing examiner revoked his parole and effectively imposed a three-year sentence by determining that Rohl should forfeit three years of accumulated good time on his previous sentence. Rohl demanded "sentence" credit for all time spent in custody in California. Id.
¶ 218. The decision of the hearing examiner granted "custody credit" from April 20, 1989, when Rohl was placed "in custody solely as a result of his Wisconsin detainer," until he was received at the Wisconsin institution. The examiner said that the time Rohl served in California after his arrest until April 20, 1989, "will not be granted as custody credit as he was not being held solely as a result of the Wisconsin detainer." The circuit court affirmed this determination, stating that Wis. Stat. § 973.155 has been "interpreted to be a mirror image of the federal statute and we find a reluctance in courts to grant a dual credit in these situations where an individual's in-custody status may reasonably and arguably be attributed to two separate and distinct crimes."
¶ 219. The court of appeals affirmed on the grounds that "Rohl's credit request constitutes impermissible double credit against two non-concurrent sentences." Rohl, 160 Wis. 2d at 327. The court said: "So-called 'dual credit' — where an offender can receive credit for a single episode of jail time toward two (or more) sentences — will be granted only for sentences which are concurrent." Id. at 330. In fact, this statement neither asserts nor implies that dual credit must be afforded on all concurrent sentences.
*87¶ 220. In reaching its decision, the Rohl court did not criticize the hearing examiner or the circuit court, nor did it say that a concurrent sentence must result in dual credit. It approvingly cited Boettcher, where the court noted that the "federal courts are firm and unanimous that there shall be no dual credit for the same presentence time served." Boettcher, 144 Wis. 2d at 95. Boettcher also indicates that § 973.155 gives courts "power to give dual credit in appropriate cases," id. at 99-100, namely, "when a new sentence is imposed to run concurrently with a revoked probation." Id. at 100 n.4. See Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(b).
¶ 221. A careful review of Rohl shows that it was not misread by the Criminal Jury Instructions Committee. Rohl's reference to concurrent sentences has been taken too far.
¶ 222. One case that generated confusion about sentence credit and concurrent sentences was State v. Ward, 153 Wis. 2d 743, 452 N.W.2d 158 (Ct. App. 1989). In Ward, the circuit court sentenced the defendant to indeterminate terms of three years incarceration on each of three drug convictions. The court made the three sentences concurrent with each other but gave the defendant 233 days of sentence credit on only one of the three sentences. The court of appeals reversed, saying:
Applying pre-sentence credit against only one of the concurrent three-year terms defeats the concurrent nature of the sentence because the first term is reduced to two years and 132 days, while the remaining two terms stand at three full years. Thus, implementation of the concurrent sentences imposed by the trial court requires that the 233-day credit be applied against each of the concurrent three-year terms.
Id. at 745 (footnote omitted).
*88¶ 223. Subsequent court decisions interpreted the Ward language as requiring identical sentence credit on all concurrent sentences imposed at the same time. This principle was shattered in State v. Elandis Johnson, 2008 WI App 34, 307 Wis. 2d 735, 746 N.W.2d 581, aff'd 2009 WI 57, 318 Wis. 2d 2, 767 N.W.2d 207, where the court of appeals showed that Ward's presentence custody was exactly the same in all three drug cases, which required that the same sentence credit be given in all three cases.
¶ 224. When this court reviewed Elandis Johnson, it unanimously affirmed the court of appeals' clarification of Ward. It also drew on supportive language in the special materials, see Elandis Johnson, 318 Wis. 2d 21, ¶ 63 (explaining that there will be situations when the periods of time for which credit is due on unrelated concurrent sentences will not line up with each other) (citing Wis. JI—Criminal SM-34A, at 12). The resulting principles of law are quoted in Elandis Johnson, 318 Wis. 2d 2, ¶ 66.
¶ 225. In sum, the court of appeals in this case was misled about the facts. It was not informed about and did not examine federal law interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 3568. It did not fully appreciate the bases for the examples in the special materials. It misread Marcus Johnson, and it did not have the benefit of the two Elandis Johnson decisions, explaining Ward and the relationship between sentence credit and concurrent sentences.
VII
¶ 226. The majority opinion attempts to straighten out the factual discrepancies between Judge McMahon's findings and the facts set out by the court of appeals. However, there is no way to sugarcoat the *89failure of the parties to submit the complete facts to Judge McMahon. The parties did not advise the circuit court about what conditions of release, if any, were set by Illinois courts on the Wisconsin warrant nor on the Illinois robbery. This serious failure was disrespectful to the court because it has deprived us of critical information that we requested.
¶ 227. With respect to the law, the majority opinion relies on the incorrect analysis of the court of appeals and a mistaken interpretation of the Elandis Johnson case to award Carter 305 days of credit on his Wisconsin sentence for virtually all of his presentence confinement in Illinois. Under the majority's mistaken interpretation of Elandis Johnson, it appears that Carter would be eligible for 305 days of sentence credit even if his Wisconsin sentence were consecutive to his Illinois sentence. At the same time, the opinion denies Carter any credit for the "actual days in custody" in Wisconsin awaiting a trial on the Wisconsin charge.
¶ 228. This dissent has previously addressed the court of appeals' legal analysis, but the Elandis Johnson case requires separate comment.
¶ 229. The Elandis Johnson case stands, in part, for the proposition that Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1) does not provide sentence credit for time in custody that is not related, or is only procedurally related, to the matter for which sentence was imposed. Elandis Johnson, 318 Wis. 2d 21, ¶ 45. That is why Johnson lost. He could not show a factual connection between "the four days of presentence custody in 2004 and the course of conduct for which the sentences in the 2005 case were imposed." Nor could he show "a factual connection between the 50 days of presentence custody in 2005 and the course of conduct for which the sentence in the first 2004 case was imposed." Id., ¶ 49. Thus, Johnson moved to a *90legal argument that when a defendant receives concurrent sentences on different offenses and those sentences are imposed at the same time, the defendant is entitled to the same sentence credit on all concurrent sentences, irrespective of whether he was in custody in connection with the course of conduct for which a particular sentence was imposed. The court unanimously rejected that contention.
¶ 230. In applying Wis. Stat. § 973.155 to the facts in Elandis Johnson, this court repeatedly emphasized that sentence credit must be based on "custody" that is factually connected to the course of conduct for which sentence was imposed. A factual connection is a prerequisite. The court did not say, however, that once a defendant shows some factual connection between confinement and the course of conduct for which sentence was imposed, he automatically earns sentence credit.
¶ 231. A defendant must establish, first, that he was "in custody" within the meaning of the statute, satisfying the tests in both Floyd and Demars. He then must show that the "custody" for which he claims credit is not only factually related, but also is not "precluded," or "severed," or made irrelevant by other facts or legal process. Here, we should ask how large a factor the Wisconsin warrant was in the decision to arrest Patrick Carter and keep him in custody from December 13, 2003, to October 19, 2004.
¶ 232. The majority is correct in recognizing that Carter is not entitled to sentence credit in Wisconsin for the time he spent in custody in Illinois on his sentence for DUI. He was sentenced to 30 days. He served only nine days, which included three days of credit, including the day his probation was revoked. He was on *91$5,000 bail until he was revoked. Carter is not entitled to credit for any of those nine days on his Wisconsin sentence.
¶ 233. The majority is also correct that Carter is not entitled to credit for any confinement in Illinois after his October 19, 2004, sentence on the Chicago robbery. This is standard analysis under Beets.
¶ 234. What the majority fails to appreciate is that Carter's confinement in the Cook County Jail between December 19, 2003, and October 19, 2004, is grounded almost entirely upon Illinois' insistence that he be present for his trial on the robbery. Carter had committed a serious, violent crime in Chicago. He was already a convicted felon who had once "beat[en]" a homicide charge in Cook County. He had violated the conditions of supervision on his DUI and been on the lamb for more than a year before he was picked up. When he was arrested, he was carrying a gun. Yes, Wisconsin wanted him, but Wisconsin would have to wait until Illinois "finish[ed] that local charge." According to Judge McMahon, Carter "could not agree to extradition because he had a pending local charge and that local charge had to be resolved before he could be sent back to Wisconsin."
¶ 235. Carter failed to establish that his detention in Illinois resulted exclusively from a Wisconsin warrant or detainer. Had he provided such evidence, he would have been entitled to credit for every day of such confinement. In fact, Carter's own evidence — the Townsend transcript, the affidavits of his own investigator, and his own statements in court — establish that Illinois would not have permitted Carter to leave Illinois because of the pending robbery charge. Thus, he is entitled to zero credit in Wisconsin for his Illinois *92confinement. The Wisconsin paperwork played virtually no part in Carter's continuing 10-month confinement.
¶ 236. In 2005 Carter was brought to Wisconsin for trial on the Wisconsin charge. At that time, he was unquestionably in Wisconsin "custody." He was awaiting trial on the Wisconsin charge for which he was sentenced. Carter was entitled to credit for all his presentence confinement in Wisconsin because he would not have been in a Wisconsin jail awaiting trial except for the Wisconsin charge. This credit would comply with the statute and in no way affect his sentence in Illinois.
¶ 237. The majority opinion is legally mistaken in many ways, but it is also problematic because it is likely to inspire countless motions for additional sentence credit based upon the new principles of law announced in the opinion.
¶ 238. For the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent.

 The record contains an Investigation Report from Mary E. Taylor, dated 6-13-06, to Assistant State Public Defender Richard D. Martin. The report recounts Taylor's telephone conversation, 6-13-06, with Wayne Layer, an investigator with the Cook County [Sheriff's] Department Extradition Unit. The report reads in part: "12/14/03 — Defendant booked in the Cook County Jail; Hold placed on defendant re: Robbery, DUI, and Extradition Cases." (Emphasis added.)

 If the Chicago Police Department maintained an Investigative Alert on Patrick Carter concerning the June 9, 2002, robbery, as they did on Eric Minor, Chicago officers may have decided not to arrest him for the robbery on December 13 so that they did not have to bring him before a judge on that charge. Police had other grounds on which to hold him. The delay gave police the opportunity to question Carter, obtain inculpatory statements from him, and arrange for a lineup before Carter was entitled to counsel on the robbery.

 See 18 U.S.C. § 3585, which reads in part:
(b) Credit for prior custody. — A defendant shall be given credit toward the service of a term of imprisonment for any time he has spent in official detention prior to the date the sentence commences—
(1) as a result of the offense for which the sentence was imposed; or
(2) as a result of any other charge for which the defendant was arrested after the commission of the offense for which the sentence was imposed;
that has not been credited against another sentence. (Emphasis added.)
The last clause of (b) puts into statutory language the longstanding disapproval of dual credit in federal courts.

 See also:
1. Shaw v. Smith, 680 F.2d 1104 (5th Cir. 1982):
*60In sum, the Attorney General is ordinarily not required to give credit toward a federal sentence for time spent by a prisoner serving a sentence imposed by another jurisdiction for an unrelated offense.
Case law has, however, established one general exception to this basic rule. Time spent in state custody, even if for an unrelated offense, must be credited toward time served on a federal sentence "if the continued state confinement was exclusively the product of such action by federal law-enforcement officials as to justify treating the state jail as the practical equivalent of a federal one." Ballard v. Blackwell, 449 F.2d 868, 869 (5th Cir. 1971). "If, for example, a state defendant is denied bail solely because of a federal detainer issued against him, the time spent in state custody awaiting trial must be credited to his federal sentence." United States v. Shillingford, 586 F.2d 372 (5th Cir. 1978).
Id. at 1106 (citations omitted).
2. United States v. Blankenship, 733 F.2d 433 (6th Cir. 1984):
However, the evolved legal precedent also teaches that the credit against the federal sentence attaches only when the federal detainer is the exclusive reason for the prisoner’s failure to obtain his release on bail.

.. . Since appellant's failure to obtain release on bond was not caused by the federal detainer, he is not entitled to a credit against his federal sentence.

Id. at 434 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

 The sentence credit rule explained in the special materials is not only the federal rule but also the rule in most states. "[T]he overwhelming majority of states allow for the granting of credit for time served in presentence confinement while awaiting extradition when the sole reason for the foreign incarceration is the offense for which the defendant is ultimately convicted and sentenced." Nieto v. State, 70 P.3d 747, 748 (Nev. 2003) (emphasis added); see also Kronz v. State, 462 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 1985) (allowing trial courts discretion to grant credit "when the defendant was incarcerated in another state solely because of the Florida offense for which he or she is being sentenced"); Jennings v. Hunt, 272 So. 2d 333, 334 (La. 1973) (authorizing sentence credit "where the out-of-state detention *64results solely from the sentencing state's detainer on a fugitive complaint"); State v. Brown, 348 N.W.2d 743, 748 (Minn. 1984) (applying credit "to time spent in jail in another state solely in connection with the offense of sentencing while awaiting extradition"); State v. Duran, 960 A.2d 697, 707 (N.H. 2008) (granting credit where "sole reason" for confinement was in-state warrant); Commonwealth v. Bortner, 326 A.2d 622, 623 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1974) (holding that the defendant should be given credit "if he was detained in Ohio solely by reason of the Pennsylvania charge and not by reason of the separate Ohio charges"); State v. Coe, 554 A.2d 656, 659 (Vt. 1988) (relying on state and federal precedent to conclude that a defendant "bears the burden of establishing that the charge on which sentence is imposed was the sole basis of the custody at issue").

 Cf. Herman v. Brewer, 193 N.W.2d 540 (Iowa 1972).

 On August 30, 2005, Patrick Carter entered a guilty plea on the reckless endangerment charge. In a colloquy with Milwaukee County Circuit Judge Mel Flanagan and others, Carter was asked how he had handled extradition. There is some ambiguity in the record about whether Judge Flanagan was speaking of extradition in 2003 before Carter's Illinois conviction or extradition in 2005 when Carter was in prison. The State said, "I think he pretty much waived extradition; is that correct?" Carter answered, "No, I had another case." Carter's defense attorney then interjected: "He [Carter] says they wouldn't let 'em, because he had another case, he was — you were incarcerated." Carter replied, "Right." This discussion makes more sense with reference to 2003 than 2005. Carter did not have "another case" in 2005. He was already in prison because of his 2004 conviction.