Court Opinion

ID: 9382894
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-28 23:02:27.429314+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:42.358397
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/28/23

                CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION*

       IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                       FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                              DIVISION FOUR

 THE PEOPLE,
       Plaintiff and Respondent,           A162579
                 v.                        (San Mateo County Super. Ct.
 MARVYN OSBELI                             No. 18-NF-006137-A)
 BAUTISTA-CASTANON,
       Defendant and Appellant.

       A jury convicted defendant Marvyn Osbeli Bautista-Castanon of sexual
penetration of a child who was 10 years of age or younger and commission of
a lewd act upon a child under 14 years of age. The trial court imposed a
prison sentence of 15 years to life. In this appeal, Bautista-Castanon
contends, and the Attorney General concedes, that recent legislative changes
require a remand for resentencing, although the parties disagree as to some
issues and as to certain aspects of what should occur on remand. For the
reasons we explain below, we will vacate Bautista-Castanon’s sentence and
remand for resentencing.

       Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105(b) and 8.1110, this
       *

opinion is certified for publication with the exception of parts II.E.–F.

                                      1
                              I. BACKGROUND1
      The prosecution presented evidence that Bautista-Castanon digitally
penetrated his four-year-old niece while babysitting her. Evidence included
the victim’s statements, Bautista-Castanon’s pretrial admissions, and DNA
evidence.
      An information filed in August 2018 charged Bautista-Castanon with
sexual penetration of a child who was 10 years of age or younger (Pen. Code,2
§ 288.7, subd. (b); count 1) and commission of a lewd act on a child under 14
years of age (§ 288, subd. (a); count 2). As to count 2, the information alleged
Bautista-Castanon had substantial sexual conduct with the victim
(§ 1203.066, subd. (a)(8)).
      In February 2021, the jury found Bautista-Castanon guilty of both
charges and found true the allegation that he had substantial sexual conduct
with the victim.
      On April 30, 2021, the trial court sentenced Bautista-Castanon to
15 years to life in prison on count 1. The court did not impose a term for
count 2, mistakenly believing no sentence needed to be imposed because the
court was staying punishment under section 654. The court stated that, if it
had imposed a term for count 2, it likely would have imposed the upper term.
On May 4, 2021, after realizing it had erred in not imposing a term for
count 2, the court issued an order, nunc pro tunc, sentencing Bautista-
Castanon to the upper term of eight years on count 2 and staying that
punishment under section 654.

      1 Because the only issues raised on appeal pertain to sentencing, we
provide only a limited recitation of the facts underlying Bautista-Castanon’s
convictions.
      2   Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                        2
      As to its selection of the upper term for count 2, the court identified
several aggravating factors: (1) the crime “demonstrated a high degree of
cruelty and callousness,” as Bautista-Castanon “took advantage of his four-
year-old niece for sexual gratification,” (2) Bautista-Castanon was in a
position of trust, left alone with the victim while her parents were at work,
(3) the four-year-old victim was vulnerable, (4) the crime involved planning,
and (5) Bautista-Castanon had expressed no remorse since being found
guilty, indicating he was a “significant danger to the community.” The court
found one mitigating factor—Bautista-Castanon had no prior criminal record.
The court determined that, “on balance,” the upper term was appropriate.
      Bautista-Castanon appealed.
                              II. DISCUSSION
   A. Assembly Bill No. 518’s Amendments to Section 654
      The parties agree this court should remand for resentencing in light of
Assembly Bill No. 518 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 518), which took
effect on January 1, 2022, and amended section 654. We agree.
      Assembly Bill 518 amended section 654, subdivision (a), to provide in
relevant part: “An act or omission that is punishable in different ways by
different provisions of law may be punished under either of such provisions,
but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one
provision.” (Stats. 2021, ch. 441, § 1.) “Previously, under section 654, ‘the
sentencing court was required to impose the sentence that “provides for the
longest potential term of imprisonment” and stay execution of the other term.
[Citation.] . . . [S]ection 654 now provides the trial court with discretion to
impose and execute the sentence of either term, which could result in the

                                         3
trial court imposing and executing the shorter sentence rather than the
longer sentence.’ ” (People v. Jones (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 37, 45 (Jones).)
      The parties agree Bautista-Castanon’s sentence is potentially affected
by the amendment to section 654. The trial court imposed an indeterminate
term of 15 years to life on count 1 and stayed (under section 654) a
determinate eight-year term on count 2.
      We agree with the parties that Bautista-Castanon, whose convictions
are not final, is entitled to retroactive application of the ameliorative changes
effected by Assembly Bill 518. (People v. Mani (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 343,
379; see People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 305–306 [conviction is not
final while appeal is pending].) Remand is necessary for the court to
resentence Bautista-Castanon under amended section 654. (Jones, supra,
79 Cal.App.5th at p. 45.)
      We also agree with the parties that, because of Assembly Bill 518 and
other legislative changes we discuss below, a “full resentencing” is
appropriate. (Jones, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 46, citing People v. Buycks
(2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893.) “A full resentencing may involve the trial court’s
revisiting such decisions as the selection of a principal term, whether to stay
a sentence, whether to impose an upper, middle, or lower term, and whether
to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences.” (Jones, at p. 46.) In light of
the “ ‘changed circumstances’ ” (Buycks, at p. 893) resulting from the
application of the new legislation, the trial court should be free to reconsider
all aspects of the sentence.
   B. Senate Bill No. 567’s Revisions to Determinate Triad Sentencing
      Under Section 1170
      The parties also agree that Senate Bill No. 567 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.)
(Senate Bill 567), which amended section 1170 and took effect on January 1,

                                        4
2022, applies retroactively and requires that Bautista-Castanon’s sentence be
revisited. The parties disagree in part, however, as to what amended
section 1170 requires. We agree resentencing is required, and we agree with
the Attorney General as to the scope of the necessary proceedings on remand.
      “Senate Bill 567 amended section 1170, subdivision (b) to specify that,
when a sentencing court chooses a term from a statutory triad, the chosen
term shall not exceed the middle term, unless the facts supporting the
aggravating circumstances are (1) established by the defendant’s stipulation
to them, (2) proven to a jury (or to a court, if jury is waived) beyond a
reasonable doubt, or (3) based on prior convictions evidenced by a certified
record of conviction. (Stats. 2021, ch. 731, §§ 1.3, 3(c), adding Pen. Code,
§ 1170, subd. (b)(1)–(3), by amendment.)” (Jones, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at
p. 44.) Bautista-Castanon contends the court selected the upper term for
count 2 based on grounds that do not meet these requirements.
      In addition, Senate Bill 567 “added a provision that requires the court
to impose the low term if [the defendant’s youth or] the defendant’s
psychological, physical, or childhood trauma was a contributing factor in the
commission of the offense, ‘unless the court finds that the aggravating
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances [so] that imposition of
the lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice.’ (Stats. 2021,
ch. 731, § 1.3, adding Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (b)(6), by amendment; see
Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 3(c).)” (Jones, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 44.)3 As to

      3Bautista-Castanon cites Assembly Bill No. 124 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.)
as having amended Penal Code section 1170 to add this latter provision. As
we explained in Jones, however, it is Senate Bill 567 that added
subdivision (b)(6) to the statute. (Stats. 2021, ch. 731, §§ 1.3, 3(c); Jones,
supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 44, fn. 11.)

                                        5
this latter provision, Bautista-Castanon states that he was 19 years old at
the time of the crime,4 and that he may have experienced childhood trauma.
      The parties agree these statutory changes potentially affect Bautista-
Castanon’s sentence. The court, applying the pre-Senate Bill 567 version of
section 1170, imposed (but stayed) the upper term for the count 2 lewd act
conviction.
      We agree with the parties that Bautista-Castanon, whose convictions
are not final, is entitled to retroactive application of the ameliorative changes
effected by Senate Bill 567. (People v. Flores (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1032,
1039.) As discussed, we will remand for a full resentencing.5
      The parties disagree in part as to what should occur on remand. As to
the first change to section 1170 that we have discussed above (i.e., the proof
requirements for aggravating factors supporting an upper term under
section 1170, subdivision (b)(1)–(3)), the parties correctly agree the trial court
should allow the prosecution to elect (1) to seek to prove aggravating factors
beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury (or to the court, if jury is waived), or
(2) to accept resentencing on the existing record. (People v. Lopez (2022)
78 Cal.App.5th 459, 468.)6

      4A “youth” for purposes of section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) is any person
who was under 26 years of age on the date the offense was committed.
(§§ 1170, subd. (b)(6)(B), 1016.7, subd. (b).)
      5In his opening brief, Bautista-Castanon argued this court should
impose the lower term for count 2 without remanding the matter, but in his
reply brief he agrees we should remand for the trial court to select the term.
      6 We reject Bautista-Castanon’s suggestion in his reply brief that a jury
proceeding to consider alleged aggravating circumstances must begin within
the timeframe applicable to certain proceedings under an unrelated statute,
section 1172.6.

                                        6
      The parties diverge, however, as to how the trial court should apply the
second change to section 1170 (i.e., the presumption in favor of a lower term
that arises under subdivision (b)(6) of the statute when certain circumstances
are present). As noted, if a defendant’s youth or trauma contributed to the
commission of the present offense, the court must impose the lower term
“unless the court finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the
mitigating circumstances [so] that imposition of the lower term would be
contrary to the interests of justice.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6).) If this “interests of
justice” exception to the lower term applies (and if the prerequisites for
imposing an upper term set forth in subdivision (b)(1)–(3) have not been met),
the court may impose the middle term.
      Bautista-Castanon suggests that any aggravating circumstances
considered by the court in determining whether the lower term would be
“contrary to the interests of justice” under section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)
(thus permitting imposition of the middle term) must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt to a jury (or to the court, if jury is waived), a requirement
he suggests should be borrowed from subdivision (b)(2) of the statute. We
disagree. Section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) states no such requirement for the
equitable balancing determination it entrusts to the trial court. And
subdivision (b)(2) of the statute—the provision requiring proof to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt—is directed by its terms solely to the
prerequisites for imposing the upper term. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2) [“The court
may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only when there are
circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a
term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term, and the facts underlying
those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant, or have been

                                         7
found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a
court trial.” (Italics added.)].) We decline to import this requirement into
section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) as a prerequisite to imposing the middle term.
   C. The Trial Court Does Not Have Authority Under Section 1385
      To Strike a Factual Finding That Establishes Ineligibility for
      Probation Under Section 1203.066
      At sentencing, the court noted that, under sections 1203.065 and
1203.066, Bautista-Castanon is ineligible for probation based on his
convictions for violating sections 288.7 and 288 and the jury’s finding of
substantial sexual conduct in connection with the section 288 charge.
(§§ 1203.065, subd. (a) [probation prohibited for a person convicted of
violating § 288.7], 1203.066, subd. (a)(8) [same for a person who, in violating
§ 288, “has substantial sexual conduct with a victim who is under 14 years of
age”].)
      Bautista-Castanon argues that section 1385, as recently amended by
Senate Bill No. 81 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 81), allows the court
on remand to strike the jury finding under section 1203.066 (which he refers
to as an “enhancement”) and grant probation. We disagree. Although
amended section 1385 will apply at resentencing, it does not authorize the
court to strike the section 1203.066 finding or to grant probation here.
      Senate Bill 81, which took effect January 1, 2022, amended
section 1385 to specify factors a trial court must consider when deciding
whether to strike enhancements in the interest of justice; Assembly
Bill No. 200 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.), which took effect June 30, 2022, made
minor additional amendments to the statute. (Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1,
adding subd. (c) to § 1385; Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 15, amending § 1385,
subd. (c).)

                                       8
      Subdivision (c)(1) of section 1385 states: “Notwithstanding any other
law, the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of
justice to do so, except if dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by any
initiative statute.” Subdivision (c)(2) provides in part that, “[i]n exercising its
discretion under this subdivision, the court shall consider and afford great
weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any of [specified
mitigating circumstances] are present. Proof of the presence of one or more of
these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement,
unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger
public safety.”
      These requirements “shall apply to all sentencings occurring after
January 1, 2022.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(7).) Because the resentencing in this
case will take place after January 1, 2022, the new law will apply. (People v.
Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657, 674.)
      But section 1385 does not authorize any trial court action that would
make Bautista-Castanon eligible for probation. First, as to the section 288.7,
subdivision (b) sexual penetration conviction in count 1, he is ineligible
because section 1203.065, subdivision (a) specifies probation may not be
granted to anyone convicted of violating section 288.7. (§ 1203.065, subd. (a)
[“Notwithstanding any other law, probation shall not be granted to, nor shall
the execution or imposition of sentence be suspended for, a person who is
convicted of violating . . . Section 288.7 . . . .”].) Bautista-Castanon does not
develop any argument as to what action the court could take under
section 1385 that would alter the probation ban set forth in section 1203.065,
subdivision (a).

                                         9
      Second, as to the section 288, subdivision (a) lewd act conviction in
count 2, Bautista-Castanon is ineligible for probation because the jury found
true the allegation under section 1203.066, subdivision (a)(8) that he “had
substantial sexual conduct with the victim who was under the age of 14.”
As the Attorney General notes, section 1203.066 both (1) provides that
probation may not be granted when such a finding is made, and (2) specifies
that the finding may not be stricken under section 1385. Subdivision (a) of
section 1203.066 states: “Notwithstanding Section 1203 or any other law,
probation shall not be granted to, nor shall the execution or imposition of
sentence be suspended for, nor shall a finding bringing the defendant within
the provisions of this section be stricken pursuant to Section 1385 for, any of
the following persons: [¶] . . . [¶] (8) A person who, in violating Section 288 or
288.5, has substantial sexual conduct with a victim who is under 14 years of
age.” (Italics added.)
      Bautista-Castanon does not address section 1203.066, subdivision (a)’s
express prohibition on the use of section 1385 to strike a finding of
substantial sexual conduct. In light of that specific prohibition, we reject his
contention that on remand the trial court may strike the finding based on
section 1385, subdivision (c)’s guidelines about the striking of sentencing
enhancements.7
   D. Youth as a Mitigating Factor
      Bautista-Castanon argues that on remand the court should consider his
youth as a mitigating factor relevant to discretionary sentencing decisions.

      7  We decline to address Bautista-Castanon’s suggestion, raised for the
first time in his reply brief, that constitutional principles require a different
result.

                                        10
As discussed, we are remanding for a full resentencing. We agree with the
Attorney General that, at resentencing, Bautista-Castanon may urge the
court to consider any factors in mitigation that he believes are appropriate.
(People v. Whitmore (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 116, 132 [“On remand, the parties
are free to argue for the term they believe is appropriate under the applicable
law.”].) We decline Bautista-Castanon’s request that we direct the trial court
as to the factors it should consider or the weight it should assign to any
factor.
   E. Fines and Fees
      Bautista-Castanon argues some fines and fees imposed by the court at
sentencing must be vacated pursuant to section 1465.9, a provision enacted
by Assembly Bill No. 1869 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) and amended by Assembly
Bill No. 177 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) and Assembly Bill No. 199 (2021–2022
Reg. Sess.). (Stats. 2020, ch. 92, § 62; Stats. 2021, ch. 257, § 35; Stats. 2022,
ch. 57, § 21.) In addition, citing People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157,
he contends that fines and fees that remain authorized under current law
should not be imposed on remand unless he has the ability to pay them.
      As to the second point, the parties agree that at resentencing,
Bautista-Castanon may argue he is unable to pay certain fines or fees. As to
the first point, we agree with the Attorney General that Bautista-Castanon’s
argument is vague, as he does not clearly specify which fines or fees were
imposed by the court but are no longer authorized under current law. But in
any event, this issue too may be addressed on remand. We are vacating the
sentence. At resentencing, the court may determine which fines and fees
may be imposed under current law.

                                        11
   F. Custody Credits
      At the sentencing hearing on April 30, 2021, the trial court stated
Bautista-Castanon was entitled to credit for “1069 actual days plus 160 good
time/work time credits for a total of 1229 days credit for time served.”
Bautista-Castanon argues that, when the court corrected the sentence on
May 4, 2021, it should have revised these credit calculations to reflect he had
by then spent 1,073 days in custody, rather than 1,069. He urges this court
to direct such a recalculation on remand. The Attorney General opposes the
request.
      The parties’ limited briefing on this issue suggests their focus is on
determining the date on which sentence was imposed for purposes of
section 4019, which directs the application of a specific credit formula “[w]hen
a prisoner is confined in a county jail . . . or a city jail . . . following arrest and
prior to the imposition of sentence for a felony conviction.” (§ 4019,
subd. (a)(4); see In re Martinez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 29, 31 [“The Penal Code
provides that inmates in county jails and state prisons may have their
sentences reduced as a reward for their conduct, including work and good
behavior. The rate at which inmates accrue credit depends on numerous
factors, including whether the confinement is presentence or postsentence.”].)
      The trial court here imposed sentence on April 30, 2021, and then four
days later it corrected an error in the sentence (its initial failure to impose a
term for count 2 before staying it under section 654). We decline to
recharacterize the court’s description of its actions on May 4, 2021 (i.e., that
it was “just changing an error” in the sentence). In our view, sentence was
imposed on April 30, 2021. Beyond this, we express no opinion as to how
credits should be calculated.

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                           III. DISPOSITION
      The convictions are affirmed. The sentence is vacated, and the case is
remanded for resentencing.

                                                   STREETER, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

GOLDMAN, J.
WHITMAN, J.*

      *Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of Alameda,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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Trial Court: Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo

Trial Judge: Hon. Elizabeth K. Lee

Counsel:            Judith Kahn, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
                      for Defendant and Appellant.

                    Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
                      Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Senior Assistant
                      Attorney General, Eric D. Share, Supervising Deputy
                      Attorney General, Karen Z. Bovarnick, Deputy Attorney
                      General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

People v. Bautista-Castanon - A162579