Court Opinion

ID: 9553144
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:23:00.042026+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:29:51.089476
License: Public Domain

THOMAS, Chief Justice,
specially concurring.
I have no essential disagreement with the disposition of this case as the majority has done. I would, however, be disposed to support the district judge in his conclusion that the appellant had no standing to object to the search and seizure of evidence in this case. It is my view that the focus in the context of standing to object to a search has come to be the legitimate expectation of privacy of the accused in the premises or articles which are searched. Rakas v. State of Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978), reh. denied 439 U.S. 1122, 99 S.Ct. 1035, 59 L.Ed.2d 83 (1979); Parkhurst v. State, Wyo., 628 P.2d 1369, 1374 (1981), cert. denied 454 U.S. 899, 102 S.Ct. 402, 70 L.Ed.2d 216 (1981). If the legitimate expectation of privacy is a threshold concept with respect to standing then I contend that one in possession of a stolen motor vehicle must bear the burden at a suppression hearing, with respect to evidence obtained from that stolen motor vehicle, of demonstrating a legitimate expectation of privacy with respect to the stolen motor vehicle and its contents. I do not understand the record in this case as containing a satisfaction of that burden by the appellant. Furthermore, I think it is questionable whether one in possession of a stolen motor vehicle could in most instances establish a reasonable expectation of privacy.