Court Opinion

ID: 9762621
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:27:23.685295+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:35.873695
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Senior Judge Kalish:
I respectfully dissent.
The Commonwealth contends that the first field test was simply a prearrest test given solely to determine whether appellant should be placed under arrest, in accordance with section 1547(k) of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C. S. §1547(k), and that this test was completely independent of any subsequent breath test required for license suspension purposes. Since the police officer may require this prearrest test, it is specifically provided that the refusal of the prearrest test shall not be considered a refusal for suspension purposes, pursuant to section 1547(b) of the Vehicle Code. Thus, the sole purpose of the prearrest test is to assist the police officer in determining whether or not the person should be placed under arrest. Where suspension of license is sought, the second test (section 1547(a) of the Vehicle Code) is required.
In Department of Transportation v. McFarren, 514 Pa. 411, 525 A.2d 1185 (1987), our Supreme Court has said that the purpose and remedial objective of section 1547 of the Vehicle Code is to provide the police with evidence to prosecute an intoxicated driver and that, while a chemical test is a search and seizure, that such a test without a search warrant is necessary because of *404the exigent circumstances. However, the court indicated that in order to justify a second intrusion the police officer must establish circumstances which support the reasonableness of a second test. Otherwise, it would be an unreasonable search in violation of our Constitution. In 67 Pa. Code §77.24(b), in setting forth the procedure for conducting any breath test, it is provided that two consecutive breath tests be given, with the lower of the two actual tests to be used for prosecution.
In Bush v. Commonwealth, 112 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 510, 535 A.2d 754 (1988), we held that this procedure requiring two consecutive tests establishes a scheme intended to ensure valid test results and that even though two consecutive tests, are required, the request for the second test is per se reasonable.
However, in the instant case, unlike Bush, where only one test involving the suspension was requested, the appellant submitted not only to that prearrest breath test, but was then requested to take the other test as well.
While section 1547(b) of the Vehicle Code provides that the two procedures are for independent purposes, the first for criminal prosecution and the second for civil purposes (suspension of license), such independence of purpose would not justify a second test to meet the requirement of reasonableness where one test would suffice. The sole purpose for the second test (suspension of license) was to enhance that possibility. The reasonableness of this search should not depend on the proceeding involved. The circumstances are such that the second request for the breath test is unreasonable.