Court Opinion

ID: 9684926
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:18:56.760126+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:01.161651
License: Public Domain

STRUTZ, Judge.
This is an action brought by the plaintiffs against the City of Fargo, a municipal corporation, and against four construction companies for alleged damages to the plaintiffs’ property arising out of the building of a dike along the Red River to protect property owners along the river from annual flooding. Land necessary for the construction of such dike was acquired and paid for by the City. The Federal Government paid for construction of the dike, and entered into a contract with the four defendant contractors for the building of the dike according to plans and specifications prepared by Army engineers. The project was commenced in June of 1959 and completed in the fall of 1960. The equipment used by the defendant contractors was ordinary earth-moving machinery, and it is contended that the work was done according to plans and specifications. The defendants further contend that no complaint was made by the plaintiffs of the defendants’ work during the course of construction, and that no claim for damages was made until some time after the work on the project had been completed.
The record discloses that the plaintiffs’ property adjoined the construction project on the west. At the rear of the plaintiffs’ home, and between the plaintiffs’ home and the project, a retaining wall had been erected some years before. This wall was along the plaintiffs’ property line and separated the plaintiffs’ property from the area on which the project was constructed, the taking line for the project being within a few inches of the retaining wall. Since no part of the plaintiffs’ property was taken, they were not reimbursed in any sum for the construction of the dike adjacent to their property.
The plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that the defendant City of Fargo, through the acts of its agents, servants, and the defendant corporations, has taken and damaged the plaintiffs’ property for a public use without just compensation, in violation of Section 14 of the Constitution of the State of North Dakota. Plaintiffs further allege that the defendant corporations did trespass on the plaintiffs’ property, removing support for the plaintiffs’ residence, and that they negligently operated their equipment on and adjacent to the plaintiffs’ property, causing extensive damage to such property.
In its decision, the trial court held that the City of Fargo had participated in the construction only to the extent that the City had agreed with the United States of America to provide, without cost to the United States, all lands, easements, rights of way, and spoil-disposal areas necessary for the construction and the subsequent maintenance of the dike, and to save the United States free from damages due to such construction and maintenance. It further pointed out that, courts having uniformly held that there is no liability on the part of the United States for remote or consequential damages in the construction of public works, and no right on the part of a landowner for damages suffered, there could be no liability, on the part of the City since there had been no liability proved against the United States. It therefore ordered the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ complaint as against the City of Fargo.
In its decision, the court failed to find that the defendant contractors were negligent in the performance of the contract, but *730did find that, under Section 14 of the North Dakota Constitution, which provides that no private property shall he taken “or damaged” for a public use without just compensation being paid, the defendant contractors are liable to the plaintiffs for consequential damages to their property arising out of the construction of this public project, even though there was no actual taking of the plaintiffs’ land. The trial court found for the plaintiffs against the defendant construction companies and ordered judgment in the sum of $5,000.
The construction companies have appealed from the judgment entered against them, demanding trial de novo. The plaintiffs also filed a cross-appeal from the judgment in favor of the City of Fargo and have demanded trial de novo of all of the issues.
We first will consider the appeal of the defendant contractors. It is conceded that the dike constructed by the contractors was built under authority granted by the laws of the State of North Dakota and by laws enacted by the Congress of the United States. The trial court found that the defendant contractors are liable for damages under Section 14 of the North Dakota Constitution, providing that private property shall not be taken “or damaged” for public use without just compensation first being paid. It should be noted that Section 14 of the Constitution does not deal with damages resulting from the negligence of public corporations or their agents, but only with those damages that are the consequence of the exercise of the power of eminent domain. Hamilton v. City of Bismarck, 71 N.D. 321, 300 N.W. 631. Any damages resulting from such taking for public use, even though no part of the property damaged actually is taken, are to be assessed by the court or jury. Sec. 32-15-22(3), N.D.C.C.
Generally, courts 'have held that contractors employed to make public improvements authorized by statute, who perform the work with proper care and skill, are not liable for damages resulting to abutting property owners. Such contractors are liable only for negligence in the performance of their work. Meier v. Frank Mashuda Co. (Ohio App.), 168 N.E.2d 319; Daly v. Earl W. Baker & Co. (Okl.), 271 P.2d 1114; Hamilton v. Harkins, 146 Cal.App.2d 566, 304 P.2d 82; Anderson v. Fay Improvement Co., 134 Cal.App.2d 738, 286 P.2d 513; Alisal Sanitary District v. Kennedy, 180 Cal.App.2d 69, 4 Cal.Rptr. 379.
We believe this to be a sound rule. Thus, where the United States of America contracted for the construction of a dike according to plans and specifications prepared by the Army Corps of Engineers and the contractors performed their work with proper care and skill and in accordance with the plans and specifications submitted to them, such contractors are not liable for injury to adjacent property, if there is any. If such contractors should fail to follow the contract, plans, or specifications, or should perform their work in an improper, careless, or negligent manner and, as a result of their carelessness or negligence, injury should result to adjacent property, then the contractors would be responsible for any damages so resulting and the owner of the adjacent property so injured would have a cause of action against the contractors.
The trial court failed to find the defendant contractors guilty of any negligence in the performance of their contract in this case. Nor did the trial court find that the contractors had failed to perform according to plans and specifications. While we are not bound by the trial court’s findings, we do give such findings appreciable weight. A thorough reading of the evidence fails to show facts which would compel a finding of negligence on the part of the contractors. There being no proof of negligence nor any evidence to show that the contractors failed to perform according to the plans and specifications, the judgment against the contractors must be reversed.
*731We next consider the cross-appeal of the plaintiffs from the judgment dismissing their complaint against the City of Fargo. The trial court held that, since there was no liability on the part of the United States of America to the plaintiffs, the courts of the United States having uniformly held that there is no liability for remote or consequential damages in the construction of public works, the City of Fargo would have no responsibility to the plaintiffs, either; that without any proved liability on the part of the United States, there could be no liability on the part of the City.
Under its agreement with the United States of America, the City was obligated to provide, without cost to the United States, all lands, easements, rights of way, and spoil-disposal areas necessary for the construction and subsequent maintenance of the dike, and to save the United States harmless from damages due to the construction or subsequent maintenance of such dike. The City had the power, under Section 14 of the North Dakota Constitution, to acquire such lands, easements, and rights of way. But, in so acquiring these rights, it first was required to pay just compensation for any property taken “or damaged” for such public use.
Counsel for the City contend, however, that if the United States is not liable for consequential damages, then the City of Fargo cannot be held liable, for the only obligation of the City under its agreement with the United States was to save the United States free from damages. Counsel further argue that consequential damages to property not taken in connection with municipal, State, or Federal flood-protection measures are damnum absque injuria; that is, it is a loss which does not give rise to an action for damages against the party causing it. It is further contended that this project was performed under the police powers of the State, and therefore the municipality is not liable for consequential damages.
While it is true that in the exercise of the police power of the State, in the protection of the health, safety, and morals of the people, uncompensated submission of property owners is exacted where such power is exercised to meet sudden emergencies such as fires or floods, where eminent domain is exercised in the State of North Dakota it is the constitutional right of the owner of property to be compensated, not only for the taking of his property but also for consequential damaging of his property. Sec. 14, N.D. Constitution. The framers of our State Constitution wanted to take care of any consequential damages which a property owner might suffer resulting from the exercise of the power of eminent domain. Therefore, they provided in Section 14 for compensation for damages suffered by a property owner not only from the taking of his property for public use but also for the damaging of such property in consequence of the taking. We cannot, therefore, agree with the contentions of the City of Fargo.
This court has held that, under Section 14 of the Constitution, private property cannot be taken “or damaged” for public use without just compensation, and has pointed out that this provision was intended to secure to the owners of property not only the possession of their property but to secure to them as well those rights which make their possession valuable. Donaldson v. The City of Bismarck, 71 N.D. 592, 3 N.W.2d 808.
In the Donaldson case, we had before us a question of compensation for alleged damages to an adjoining property owner because of noxious and offensive odors coming from the operation of a public dump near the plaintiff’s property. It cannot be contended that the operation of such dump was not in the exercise of the police power of the city and that it was not for the protection of the public health. Yet this court held that, where a city establishes and operates a public dump near a private dwelling, with the result that the property of the *732plaintiff is damaged by noxious and offensive odors from the dump, such property has, in fact, been “damaged” within the purview of Section 14 and the city is liable to the owner for such damage.
In the case before us, the City, in the exercise of its power of eminent domain, authorized and made possible the project, the construction of which damaged the plaintiffs’ property. Such damage must be paid for by the municipality. The contractors, on the other hand, contracted for the performing of work according to plans and specifications, and, where the work was performed according to such plans and specifications with proper care and skill and without negligence, but where the work so done nevertheless results in consequential injury to adjacent property, the liability, if any, for the payment of damages must be upon the public corporation which authorized the project to be constructed, under its obligation to compensate for damages resulting from the exercise of power of eminent domain for a public purpose.
For reasons stated in this opinion, the judgment in favor of the plaintiffs against the defendant construction companies is reversed, and complaint against such companies is dismissed. The judgment in favor of the defendant City of Fargo, dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint against the City, is reversed, and the case is remanded to the district court for proper determination of the damages to be awarded to the plaintiffs for the consequential damaging of their property resulting from the construction of the dike.
BURKE, C. J., and ERICKSTAD and KNUDSON, JJ., concur.
TEIGEN, Judge.