Court Opinion

ID: 9458271
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 20:46:59.055864+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:41.745464
License: Public Domain

HASTINGS, Senior Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
Plaintiff Oberman seeks recovery of $500,000 general damages against defendant Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., in each of two counts of his complaint based upon his claim of libel from a commercial credit report issued by defendant. The material portions of the credit report are set out in the majority opinion.
Plaintiff alleges in substance that the credit report was false in that it understated his assets and financial condition, and that defendant was negligent in preparing the report. His sole claim of damage arises from the assertion that he was unable to purchase or lease a commercial building in Lincolnwood, Illinois for his magazine publishing business by reason of this report.
Plaintiff publishes a monthly trade magazine, Scrap Age, with an approximate circulation of 2,600 copies. He does *1387not own a printing plant but engages an independent job printer in Indiana to print his magazine. At the time of the suit his office was in Springfield, Illinois, and he had 15 employees.
Before suit Oberman had been negotiating with a real estate broker in Lincolnwood. The Prudential Realty Company, in response to its newspaper advertising, for a business location. Oberman first came to Prudential in July or early August, 1967. He was shown a drawing of a building then under construction on Hamlin Avenue in Lincolnwood. He inquired of Ranee, president of Prudential, whether Prudential could assist in arranging for a purchase mortgage if he decided to purchase the building rather than lease it. Ranee advised him he could inquire at a local bank where one of Prudential’s salesmen (Schoeneberger) was a director, but told him that if he wanted a mortgage he should submit his financial statements for the last three years. Oberman replied that he would rather not furnish financial statements, saying “I believe if you check my record you will find it good.”
Defendant issued its credit report in question on February 24, 1967. It was prepared by defendant’s reporter Fogelman. It had been reviewed and updated from year to year as best it could be done without Oberman’s cooperation. In 1966 and 1967 Fogelman made three personal calls on Oberman and one telephone call in an attempt to obtain credit report information. On each occasion Oberman flatly refused to furnish any facts or data to Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. pursuant to his own fixed policy.
Finally, when Oberman called defendant to complain about his credit report Fogelman arranged to call on him. Fogelman saw Oberman at the latter’s office the next day and gave him a copy of the February 24, 1967 report. This was the first time Oberman had ever seen the report. He questioned the accuracy of almost everything in the report, but in reply to Fogelman’s repeated requests Oberman still refused to give any information. A careful reading of Oberman’s deposition confirms the foregoing statements. In fact, the following colloquy appears between Oberman and defendant’s counsel:
Q. Right, and so the statement on the face of that report that the owner declined to give information is correct, isn’t it, Mr. Oberman ?
A. “On February 24th Mr. Oberman declined to give a statement.” [obviously, Oberman paraphrasing the report]
Q. So you did have this firm and unswerving policy of not giving any information to Dun & Bradstreet?
A. That is correct, I never did, and I have been in business more than thirty years and I have never given them an inch.
The deposition continues in detail to show that Oberman refused to give any information to correct Dun & Bradstreet’s February 24 report although it expressed a desire to send out a corrected report if there were errors.
The February 24 report does not assign a credit rating classification to Oberman but contains what is known as a “blank rating.” Defendant’s customers are advised that this indicates the owner declined to give information and no rating could be assigned. Subscribers are further directed they should seek information about the subject from other sources.
Prudential is not a subscriber of Dun & Bradstreet and defendant did not send them a report on Oberman. Schoeneberger requested The First National Bank of Skokie, Illinois, where he was a director while employed as a Prudential salesman, to order a Dun & Bradstreet report on Oberman after Oberman had expressed interest in obtaining a purchase mortgage. It is undisputed that defendant’s February 21 report was not mailed to the Skokie bank until August U, 1967.
However, it is equally clear and undisputed that the Hamlin Avenue building was sold to another buyer before anyone at Prudential Realty saw or *1388learned of Dnn & Bradstreet’s February 24 report on Oberman. On August 10, 1967, four days before the report was mailed to the Skokie bank, the Hamlin Avenue building was sold to a Mr. Dan Unger of Chicago for $133,000 and he instructed Ranee, of Prudential, to remove it from the lease market. When Oberman next contacted Prudential he was advised of the status of the Hamlin Avenue building. This prompted Oberman to inquire of Ranee whether a credit report had been obtained. Ranee continued to deal with Oberman in attempting to find him a suitable building.
It thus appears conclusive to me that since the Hamlin Avenue building was sold before the Dun & Bradstreet report was sent to the Skokie bank and since it was never sent to Prudential, the report could have had nothing to do with Oberman’s failure to obtain the building, from which failure his sole claim for damages derives.
I agree with the majority that the subject credit report is not libelous per se. I would go further in this case and hold under the foregoing factual statement that, as a matter of law, the report is not libelous in any sense of the word. In sum, I would hold as a matter of law that the credit report was privileged, was not published with actual malice, was not libelous per se or in any sense and could not have been the cause of plaintiff’s alleged damage.
All questions concerning the breadth of the rule in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), I leave to the future consideration of the Supreme Court in light of the illuminating dissent of Mr. Justice Douglas from the denial of a writ of certiorari in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Grove, 404 U.S. 898, 92 S.Ct. 204, 30 L.Ed.2d 175 (1971). In the case at bar, of course, Dun & Bradstreet was afforded no opportunity to publish a retraction due to Oberman’s recalcitrance. However, Mr. Justice Douglas aptly remarked in the concluding paragraph of his Grove dissent, at 906, 92 S.Ct. at 209:
“The financial data circulated by Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., are part of the fabric of national commercial communication. There is no doubt that an adverse credit rating can injure a subject. But one injured can inform his suppliers and creditors that a report is misleading. Indeed, in this case, Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., was willing to print a retraction. It is difficult to credit the claim that the ‘general damages’ suffered by the respondent resulted from the short-term confusion between the mispublication and the retraction. In any event, in my view, it has been predetermined that such speculative costs of unfettered communication are preferable to the chill upon free expression that libel laws impose.”
I would affirm the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant.