Court Opinion

ID: 9751635
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 16:41:25.167186+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:53.121855
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
Judge COHN JUBELIRER.
Because I believe that the Commission properly concluded that Kistler violated subsections (a) and (f) of Section 1103 of the Public Official and Employee Ethics Act (Act),1 I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
The Commission concluded that Kistler unintentionally violated Section 1103(a) of the Act on June 17, 2002, by voting to authorize Roth to pursue construction of the LLAS Facility while he was engaged in seeking a subcontract with Roth and/or Cornerstone R.E., LLC, to construct a pole building for the Transportation Facility “and had a reasonable expectation that he would receive such” subcontract. (Commission Final Adjudication (Adjudication), Conclusions of Law (COL) ¶ 5.) According to the majority, however, “because Kistler did not intend there to be any connection between his LLAS vote and the Transportation Facility contract with Roth ... Kistler did not violate Section 1103(a) of the Act.” Kistler v. State Ethics Commission, 958 A.2d 1092, 1100 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2007) (emphasis in original).
I disagree that Kistler had to intend there to be a connection between his LLAS vote and the Transportation Facility contract with Roth in order to violate Section 1103(a) of the Act. Section 1103(a) of the Act provides that “[n]o public official ... shall engage in conduct that constitutes a conflict of interest.” 65 Pa.C.S. § 1103(a). Section 1102 of the Act defines “conflict of interest” as:
[u]se by a public official or public employee of the authority of his office or employment or any confidential information received through his holding public office or employment for the private pe*1101cuniary benefit of himself, a member of his immediate family or a business with which he or a member of his immediate family is associated.
65 Pa.C.S. § 1102.
This Court previously addressed the issue of whether intent is required in order to find a violation of the Act in Yocabet v. State Ethics Commission, 109 Pa.Cmwlth. 432, 581 A.2d 536 (1987). In that case, the Commission determined that Yocabet violated Section 3(a) of the former version of the Act2 by participating in his appointment as secretary/treasurer for Luzerne Township and then receiving compensation for that office which was not set by Lu-zerne Township’s auditors as required by law. Id. at 538. On appeal to this Court, Yocabet argued that he could not have violated Section 3(a) because he did not intend to use his office to obtain financial gain. Id. at 539. This Court ultimately concluded that the Commission was correct in finding that Yocabet had violated Section 3(a), even if he lacked the intent to do so. Id.
We expanded upon our discussion of the intent issue in McGuire v. State Ethics Commission, 657 A.2d 1346 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1995). In that case, the Commission determined that McGuire and another individual, Marchitello, had violated Section 3(a) of the former version of the Act by receiving excess compensation for serving as board members and officers of the North Versailles Township Sanitary Authority. Id. at 1348-50. On appeal to this Court, McGuire and Marchitello argued that the Commission erred because a violation of Section 3(a) requires more than mere passive and unknowing acceptance of excessive compensation. Id. at 1350-51. The Commission countered by arguing that: based on this Court’s decision in Yocabet, intent is not required to find a violation of Section 3(a); and an employee’s acceptance of excess compensation is not passive. Id. at 1351. This Court responded as follows:
While Yacobet [sic] does not require intent in order to find a violation of Section 3(a) of the Ethics Act has occurred, it does not mean that a public official does not have to take action to fall within that section’s prohibition. Section 3(a) of the Ethics Act requires that a public official “use” his public office to obtain financial gain. “Use”, however, is not defined. The [Commission]’s belief that mere acceptance of a check constitutes “use” of a public office reaches beyond the limits of the normal interpretation of that term in the context provided. “Use” of public office requires action by a public official that in some way facilitates his receipt of compensation to which he is not entitled, such as in Yacobet [sic] where the individual voted to increase his own salary without having authority to do so. Mere mistaken acceptance by a public official of a compensation check in an amount that was determined prior to his term in office is devoid of the type of action needed to constitute “use” of office for the purpose of obtaining personal financial gain.
Id. at 1351-52. Thus, based on my reading of the Act, as well as our precedent, I *1102believe that a public official may violate Section 1103(a) of the Act, even if he lacks the intent to do so; the public official need only take some action related to his public office which results in a private pecuniary benefit to himself, a member of his immediate family, or a business with which he or a member of his family is associated.
In the present case, Roth gave Kistler an initial commitment, on May 2, 2002, to use Kistler Pole Building Company for the construction of the Transportation Facility. Kistler subsequently voted, on June 17, 2002, to authorize Roth to pursue construction of the LLAS Facility. Just 12 days later, on June 29, 2002, Roth made a definite commitment to Kistler to use Kistler Pole Building Company for the construction of the Transportation Facility. Even though Kistler may not have intended such a result, it appears that Kistler Pole Building Company received the subcontract from Roth to construct the Transportation Facility as a result of Kistler’s actions in voting to authorize Roth to pursue construction of the LLAS Facility. I believe that this is precisely the type of situation that, if left unchecked, will cause the public to distrust and lose confidence in their government officials, which is what the Act ultimately seeks to prevent. See Section 1101.1(a) of the Act, 65 Pa.C.S. § 1101.1(a).3 Given Kistler’s ongoing personal business dealings with Roth, Kistler should have abstained from participating in the vote for Roth to pursue construction of the LLAS Facility. See Snyder v. State Ethics Commission, 686 A.2d 843, 849 (Pa. Cmwlth.1996) (concluding that the appellant “should not have considered and voted on issues involving his personal business dealings”).4 Because I believe that Kist-ler’s failure to do so constituted a conflict of interest in violation of Section 1103(a) of the Act, I would affirm the Commission’s determination in this regard.5
*1103The Commission also concluded that, because the Carbon-Lehigh Intermediate Unit (CLIU) did not award the contracts for the Transportation Facility and the LLAS Facility to Roth through an open and public process, which included competitive bidding, Kistler violated Section 1103(f) of the Act by entering into subcontracts with Roth to construct those facilities. (Adjudication COL ¶¶ 7-8.) According to the majority, the Commission erred in interpreting Section 1103(f) as requiring competitive bidding because it does not contain the language, “to the lowest responsible bidder,” which is normally used by the General Assembly when it seeks to require competitive bidding. Kistler, op. at 1097-98. The majority also opines that the Commission’s interpretation of Section 1103(f) of the Act would lead to absurd and unreasonable results because it conflicts with Sections 515(1) and 516 of the Commonwealth Procurement Code (Procurement Code), 62 Pa.C.S. §§ 515(1) and 516, which create exceptions to the general rule requiring competitive bidding for all Commonwealth agency contracts. Kistler, op. at 1098.
Again, I respectfully disagree with the majority opinion. Section 1103(f) of the Act provides that:
No public official ... or any business in which the person ... is associated shall enter into any contract valued at $500 or more with the governmental body with which the public official ... is associated or any subcontract valued at $500 or more with any person who has been awarded a contract with the governmental body with which the public official ... is associated, unless the contract has been awarded through an open and public process, including prior pub-lie notice and subsequent public disclosure of all proposals considered and contracts awarded.
65 Pa.C.S. § 1103(f). Although Section 1103(f) of the Act does not contain the-language “to the lowest responsible bidder,” which is often present in other statutes, I believe that interpreting Section 1103(f) to not require competitive bidding is inconsistent with the purpose behind the Act, which is to promote public trust in government. I believe that, in order to be consistent with the purpose of the Act, the phrase “open and public process” used in Section 1103(f) of the Act must be interpreted to require more than merely holding discussions at public meetings about the intent to build a facility or enter into a contract with a particular contractor, distributing notice of such meetings to the public, and distributing agendas to the media. Instead, there must be a meaningful opportunity for competitors to submit bid proposals following the solicitation of such bid proposals through publicly distributed notices or advertisements of the available contracts. This competitive bidding process serves as a safeguard to ensure that public officials are awarding contracts to benefit the public which they serve, rather than to benefit their own interests and personal dealings.
Moreover, while the majority believes that interpreting Section 1103(f) of the Act to require competitive bidding would conflict with Sections 515(1) and 516 of the Procurement Code, I disagree. In this regard, I initially point out that the Procurement Code is not implicated in this case because the CLIU is not a Commonwealth agency. See Section 103 of the Code, 62 Pa.C.S. § 103;6 see also 22 Pa. *1104Code § 4.3 (defining an “[i]ntermediate unit” as “[a] regional educational service agency ... which provides educational services to participating school districts as part of the public school system of this Commonwealth”). Further, even if the Procurement Code were implicated, there is no reason why interpreting Section 1103(f) of the Act to generally require competitive bidding would cause the exceptions created by Sections 515(1) and 516 of the Procurement Code to lose their current effect. In fact, I believe that interpreting Section 1103(f) of the Act to generally require competitive bidding would be more consistent with the requirements of the Procurement Code.
Here, the CLIU awarded the general contracts for the Transportation Facility and the LLAS Facility to Roth without soliciting bid proposals from competitors through publicly distributed notices or advertisements of the available contracts. (Adjudication, Findings of Fact ¶¶ 44, 64.) This did not satisfy the “open and public process” requirement of Section 1103(f). Because the general contracts for the Transportation Facility and the LLAS Facility were not awarded to Roth through an open and public process that included competitive bidding, I believe that Kistler violated Section 1103(f) of the Act when he entered into subcontracts with Roth, which were valued at more than $500, to construct pole buildings for those facilities. Therefore, I would also affirm the Commission’s determination as to the violation of Section 1103(f) of the Act.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.

. 65 Pa.C.S. § 1103(a), (f).

. Act of October 4, 1978, P.L. 883, formerly 65 P.S. § 403(a), amended by the Act of June 26, 1989, P.L. 26, repealed by the Act of October 15, 1998, P.L. 729. Section 3(a) of the former version of the Act provided:
No public official or public employee shall use his public office or any confidential information received through his holding public office to obtain financial gain other than compensation provided by law for himself, a member of his immediate family, or a business with which he is associated.

. Section 1101.1(a) of the Act provides, in relevant part, that:
The Legislature hereby declares that pub-lie office is a public trust and that any effort to realize personal financial gain through public office other than compensation provided by law is a violation of that trust. In order to strengthen the faith and confidence of the people of this Commonwealth in their government, the Legislature further declares that the people have a right to be assured that the financial interests of holders of or nominees or candidates for public office do not conflict with the public trust.
65 Pa.C.S. § 1101.1(a).

. According to the majority, Snyder is inapplicable to the present case because it involved a situation where a township supervisor voted on two projects while he was actively engaged in business relationships with respect to those projects, and here Kistler abstained from voting once he became involved with the LLAS Facility. Kistler, op. at 1100 n. 15. However, I disagree that Snyder is inapplicable. There is no reason why this Court should require a public official to abstain from voting on projects while he is actively engaged in business relationships with respect to those projects, and not also require abstention in situations, such as this one, where a public official who has an ongoing business relationship with a company as to one project votes to use that same company for a second project. Clearly, in this latter situation, the public official can still be said to have "used” his office to obtain a private pecuniary benefit, even though the "use” of office and the private pecuniary benefit may span across two different projects. The reasons for this become even more obvious where, as here, the public official also later receives a pecuniary benefit by entering into a subcontract for the second project.

.Although the Commission found that Kist-ler's violation of Section 1103(a) of the Act was unintentional and, thus, did not impose any sanctions, this does not alter the fact that a violation of Section 1103(a) occurred. By finding that Kistler did not intentionally violate Section 1103(a), the Commission excused Kistler for his past conduct which he did not understand to be improper, but, at the same time, put Kistler, as well as other public officials, on notice that the conduct in which Kistler engaged is prohibited and will not be tolerated in the future.

. The Code defines a “Commonwealth agency” as "[a]n executive agency, an independent agency or a State-affiliated entity.” 62 Pa. C.S. § 103. “Executive agency” is defined as "[t]he Governor and the departments, boards, commissions, authorities and other officers *1104and agencies of the Commonwealth. The term does not include any court or other officer or agency of the unified judicial system, the General Assembly and its officers and agencies or any independent agency or State-affiliated entity.” 62 Pa.C.S. § 103. "Independent agency” is defined as:
Boards, commissions and other agencies and officers of the Commonwealth which are not subject to the policy supervision and control of the Governor. The term does not include any State-affiliated entity, any court or other officer or agency of the unified judicial system, the General Assembly and its officers and agencies, any State-related institution, political subdivision or any local, regional or metropolitan transportation authority.
62 Pa.C.S. § 103. "State-affiliated entity” is defined as:
A Commonwealth authority or a Commonwealth entity. The term includes the Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission, the Pennsylvania Housing Finance Agency, the Pennsylvania Municipal Retirement System, the Pennsylvania Infrastructure Investment Authority, the State Public School Building Authority, the Pennsylvania Higher Educational Facilities Authority and the State System of Higher Education. The term does not include any court or other officer or agency of the unified judicial system, the General Assembly and its officers and agencies, any State-related institution, political subdivision or any local, regional or metropolitan transportation authority.
62 Pa.C.S. § 103.