Court Opinion

ID: 9379389
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-15 16:00:25.566538+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:51.426144
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

     UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
          FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

WINSTON IVAN GUTIERREZ-                            No. 17-71012
ALM,
                                                    Agency No.
                      Petitioner,                  A070-031-172

    v.
                                                     OPINION
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

                      Respondent.

          On Petition for Review of an Order of the
              Board of Immigration Appeals

          Argued and Submitted December 13, 2022
                    Pasadena, California

                      Filed March 15, 2023

    Before: Kenneth K. Lee and Holly A. Thomas, Circuit
       Judges, and Richard D. Bennett, * District Judge.

                   Opinion by Judge Bennett

*
 The Honorable Richard D. Bennett, United States District Judge for the
District of Maryland, sitting by designation.
2                   GUTIERREZ-ALM V. GARLAND

                          SUMMARY **

                           Immigration

    Denying Winston Gutierrez-Alm’s petition for review of
a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals, the panel
held that: 1) an Order to Show Cause (“OSC”) that fails to
disclose the time and place of an immigrant’s deportation
proceedings is sufficient to trigger the stop-time rule in a
transitional rules case; 2) Gutierrez’s OSC triggered the
stop-time rule, making him ineligible for suspension of
deportation; and 3) substantial evidence supported the denial
of withholding of removal and protection under the
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).
    In 1989, Gutierrez entered the United States without
inspection. In 1993, he was served an OSC, the charging
document that initiated immigration proceedings prior to the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”). Gutierrez’s OSC did not list the
time and place of his proceedings. Gutierrez sought
suspension of deportation, a form of relief available prior to
IIRIRA. As relevant here, an applicant for suspension of
deportation was required to accrue at least seven years of
continuous physical presence in the United States prior to
applying. However, IIRIRA provided that continuous
physical presence is deemed to end when the applicant is
served with a notice to appear (“NTA”). Under IIRIRA’s
transitional rules, which apply to individuals, like Gutierrez,
whose proceedings were pending when IIRIRA was enacted,

**
  This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                  GUTIERREZ-ALM V. GARLAND                    3

this stop-time rule applies retroactively to proceedings
initiated by an OSC. Accordingly, Gutierrez’s continuous
physical presence was deemed to end when he was served
his OSC—only four years after his arrival, and thus short of
the required seven years.
    Gutierrez contended that the Supreme Court’s decision
in Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018), instructs that
his OSC was statutorily defective and that the stop-time rule
was therefore inapplicable. In Pereira, the Supreme Court
held that a putative NTA that fails to designate the time or
place of removal proceedings does not trigger the stop-time
rule. The panel wrote that the issue of whether Pereira
applies to an OSC was an open issue, but it was not a close
one: Every circuit to address the question has held that
Pereira does not apply.
    In joining those circuits and holding that an OSC that
fails to disclose the time and place of proceedings is
sufficient to trigger the stop-time rule in a transitional rules
case, the panel explained that Pereira turned on the statutory
definition of an NTA under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a), which
unambiguously requires an NTA to disclose the time and
place of proceedings. The central reasoning in Pereira was
that a document must meet all of the requirements set forth
by § 1229(a) to trigger the stop-time rule. Comparatively,
the pre-IIRIRA provision defining an OSC instructed
officials to provide written notice of the time and place of
deportation proceedings “in the order to show cause or
otherwise.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252b(a)(2)(A) (1994). The panel
explained that the inclusion of the phrase “or otherwise”
indicates that an OSC was not required to include the time
and place information. Therefore, the panel concluded that
Pereira’s logic, which rests on the “clear and unambiguous”
mandate that a NTA include time-and-place information, is
4                GUTIERREZ-ALM V. GARLAND

inapplicable to an OSC, which contains no such
requirement. As applied to Gutierrez, the panel concluded
that he was ineligible for suspension of deportation because
his physical presence was deemed to end with the service of
his OSC.
    Next, the panel concluded that substantial evidence
supported the denial of withholding of removal. First,
Gutierrez claimed that he would face persecution in
Nicaragua due to his father’s opposition to the Sandinista
government. The panel concluded that substantial evidence
supported the BIA’s findings, as Gutierrez offered no
credible, direct, and specific evidence that he would be
perceived as an enemy of the Ortega regime and be
persecuted on account of an imputed political opinion. The
panel also observed that Gutierrez and his family had not
faced persecution on account of his father’s actions.
    Second, Gutierrez claimed that he would be persecuted
on account of membership in one of four putative particular
social groups. With respect to his first two social groups—
(1) persons fearing gang recruitment; and (2) individuals
deported from the United States—the panel concluded that
Gutierrez made no arguments related to those proposed
social groups and therefore had waived those claims.
    The panel concluded that Gutierrez’s third proposed
social group, “family members of people who opposed the
government in the 1980s,” was coextensive with his imputed
political opinion claim and failed for the same reason: the
record did not compel the conclusion that Gutierrez would
be targeted for persecution based on his father’s opposition
to the Sandinista government. As to his fourth proposed
social group, “persons who the authorities would suspect as
being a gang member,” the panel concluded that it failed for
                 GUTIERREZ-ALM V. GARLAND                   5

lack of social distinction. The panel explained that, although
this Court has recognized that persons who are incorrectly
perceived to be gang members may constitute a cognizable
social group, the applicant bears the burden to demonstrate
that the proposed country of removal recognizes the group
in question. Here, Gutierrez offered nothing beyond his own
speculation to suggest that Nicaragua views “those
perceived as gang members” as a distinct identity.
    Finally, the panel concluded that substantial evidence
supported the denial of CAT relief. The panel concluded
that Gutierrez’s contentions were entirely speculative and
unsupported by the record, noting that, although the
Sandinista regime has taken action against political
dissidents, Gutierrez offered no evidence he will be
perceived as such an adversary or targeted for
torture. Moreover, the panel observed that Gutierrez left
Nicaragua over twenty-five years ago, his family was able to
reside in the country without issue following his father’s
departure in 1988, and his brother was not tortured upon his
return in 2007.

                        COUNSEL

Alejandro Garcia (argued), Law Offices of Alejandro
Garcia, Commerce, California, for Petitioner.
Leslie McKay (argued) and Keith I. McManus, Assistant
Directors, Office of Immigration Litigation; Maarja Luhtaru
and John Beadle Holt, Trial Attorneys; Joseph H. Hunt,
Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division; Office of
Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice;
Washington, D.C.; for Respondent.
6                   GUTIERREZ-ALM V. GARLAND

                            OPINION

BENNETT, District Judge:

    Petitioner Winston Gutierrez-Alm (“Gutierrez” or
“Petitioner”) is a native and citizen of Nicaragua who
entered the United States in 1989, one year after his father
fled the country following his incarceration for taking up
arms against the Sandinista regime. The government served
Gutierrez an Order to Show Cause (“OSC”) in 1993, and he
has remained entangled in deportation proceedings for thirty
years. He now seeks review of a decision of the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) upholding a ruling of an
Immigration Judge (“IJ”), who denied his application for
suspension of deportation under pre-1996 immigration law
and rejected his application for withholding of removal and
relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). 1
    This petition arrives in a unique procedural posture. The
government initiated deportation proceedings against
Gutierrez in 1993, under the statutory scheme that preceded
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-
208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996). Among other changes,
IIRIRA implemented the “stop-time rule,” which provides
that an immigrant ceases to accrue physical presence in the
United States upon service of the charging document in an

1
  United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465
U.N.T.S. 85. The Convention was codified by the Section 2242 of the
Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105–
227, 112 Stat. 2681–822. Its protections are implemented primarily
through regulations. See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 200.1; 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16–
1208.18.
                  GUTIERREZ-ALM V. GARLAND                    7

immigration case. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1). The transitional
rules that accompany IIRIRA require us to grant the stop-
time rule retroactive effect over immigration proceedings
that were pending at the time IIRIRA was adopted.
Accordingly, the stop-time rule applies to Gutierrez’s
petition.
    This case presents an issue of first impression: Does an
Order to Show Cause that fails to disclose the time and place
of an immigrant’s deportation proceedings trigger the stop-
time rule? Gutierrez contends that the Supreme Court’s
decision in Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018),
instructs that such an order would not trigger the stop-time
rule, rendering him eligible for suspension of deportation.
For the reasons that follow, we hold that Pereira is
inapplicable, and that an Order to Show Cause lacking the
time and place of an immigrant’s deportation hearing is
sufficient to trigger the stop-time rule in a transitional rules
case. Accordingly, we hold that Gutierrez is ineligible for
suspension of deportation. We further hold that substantial
evidence supports the BIA’s denial of his application for
withholding of removal and CAT protection.
                      BACKGROUND
    Petitioner Winston Gutierrez-Alm is a native and citizen
of Nicaragua, who entered the United States without
inspection on March 25, 1989. At the time he entered the
United States, Gutierrez was about eight years old.
Accompanied by his mother and his three brothers, he
travelled to join his father, who had fled to the United States
one year prior. He was served an Order to Show Cause
8                  GUTIERREZ-ALM V. GARLAND

(“OSC”) 2 in 1993 and has remained entangled in
immigration proceedings ever since.
    I. Initial Deportation Proceedings
    On August 3, 1993, Gutierrez was detained by officers
of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) and
served an Order to Show Cause, charging him with
deportability as an alien who entered without inspection, in
violation of former Section 241(a)(1)(B) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)(B)
(1993). This OSC did not disclose the time and place of
Gutierrez’ deportation hearing; it provided only that a
deportation hearing was “to be calendared,” and that notice
was to be provided by an Immigration Judge.
    Three years elapsed before the government scheduled a
deportation hearing. By March 1996, Gutierrez had been
living in the United States for a continuous period of seven
years, as required to apply for suspension of deportation. On
May 16, 1996, the INS filed his OSC with the Immigration
Court. That same day, the Immigration Court mailed
Gutierrez a Notice of Hearing (“NOH”), advising him that a
hearing had been scheduled before an IJ on September 6,
1996. At this initial hearing, Gutierrez admitted the factual
allegations set forth in the OSC and conceded the charge of
deportability, but expressed his intention to apply for
suspension of deportation, asylum, withholding of removal,
and relief under the Convention Against Torture.
Accordingly, the IJ postponed proceedings to the following
year.

2
  As noted throughout, an OSC was the charging document in
immigration proceedings prior to the enactment of IIRIRA. See Ram v.
INS, 243 F.3d 510, 512–13 (9th Cir. 2001).
                  GUTIERREZ-ALM V. GARLAND                    9

    Immigration law went through two substantial changes
while Gutierrez’ proceedings remained pending. First, on
September 30, 1996, Congress enacted IIRIRA, which
instituted sweeping changes to the immigration laws, and
generally “made it harder for aliens to adjust their
immigration status.” Rivera Vega v. Garland, 39 F.4th 1146,
1150 (9th Cir. 2022). Subsequently, in 1997, Congress
passed the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American
Relief Act (“NACARA”), Pub. L. No. 105-100, 111 Stat.
2160, 2193 (1997). Enacted to ameliorate the effects of
IIRIRA for “Central Americans . . . who came to the United
States because their lives and families had been torn apart by
war and oppression,” NACARA authorized certain
Nicaraguan immigrants who had entered the United States
prior to 1995 to apply for lawful permanent resident status.
Hernandez-Mezquita v. Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 1161, 1164 (9th
Cir. 2002) (quoting 143 Cong. Rec. S12258-01, S12261
(daily ed. Nov. 9, 1997)).
    Accordingly, on November 10, 1998, Gutierrez
informed the IJ that he intended to seek adjustment of status
pursuant to NACARA. The IJ found that Gutierrez was
prima facie eligible for relief, and administratively closed his
deportation proceedings with the consent of all parties.
Gutierrez submitted his NACARA application on April 28,
2000, but was deemed inadmissible due to his criminal
record. However, his proceedings remained closed for seven
years.
10                   GUTIERREZ-ALM V. GARLAND

     II. Application for Suspension and Withholding of
         Deportation
    The Department of Homeland Security reinstated
deportation proceedings against Gutierrez in January 2007. 3
Following five years of intermittent proceedings, Gutierrez
applied for asylum, withholding of deportation, and CAT
relief on June 26, 2012. At a hearing before another IJ,
Gutierrez and his father, Julio Rafael Gutierrez (“Julio”),
testified in support of his application.
    Julio testified that he immigrated to the United States on
June 15, 1988, to seek asylum after fleeing political
persecution in Nicaragua. At the time, the Nicaraguan
government had been controlled by the Sandinista party. In
1987, the Sandinista government arrested Julio for
possession of weapons and explosives and incarcerated him
from November 1987 to February 1988. Julio testified that
the government prosecuted him for taking up arms with the
“Partido Liberal Independiente,” or “Independent Liberal
Party,” which had engaged in armed conflict against the
Sandinista regime in the late 1980s. The government beat
Julio in custody and forced him to serve the Sandinista
military after his release, prompting him to desert and flee to
the United States three months later. In the months after he
fled, Julio feared for his family’s safety, as he was concerned
that the Nicaraguan government would retaliate against them

3
  It appears that Gutierrez was in government custody when the
Government moved to reopen his application. During the nine-year
period in which his proceedings were administratively closed, Gutierrez
was arrested and convicted of several offenses, including use of
controlled substances, manufacture and possession of a dangerous
weapon, carrying a concealed dirk or dagger, burglary, theft, and driving
with a suspended license.
                 GUTIERREZ-ALM V. GARLAND                  11

for his political opposition. However, he acknowledged that
his wife and children had been able to remain in Nicaragua
without issue for eight months following his departure.
    Testifying on his own behalf, Gutierrez explained that he
had entered the United States with his family in 1989, one
year after his father fled Nicaragua. He acknowledged that
he had never been involved in “any kind of political party
either here or in Nicaragua,” and that he was unaware of
whether the Sandinista party had returned to power in
Nicaragua. However, he claimed that he did not wish to
return to Nicaragua because he was unfamiliar with the
country’s culture and concerned about its poor economic
conditions. Gutierrez recounted that Julio was afraid that
Gutierrez would be targeted because of Julio’s actions.
Additionally, he indicated that his brother Norvin, a gang
member, had been incarcerated in Nicaragua for three weeks
following his deportation from the United States, and has
since been followed by police. Gutierrez expressed concern
he would be viewed as a gang member because of his
relationship with Norvin and imprisoned immediately upon
his arrival. He also insisted that he could not leave his wife
and children behind in the United States.
   III. Decisions of the Immigration Judge and the
        Board of Immigration Appeals
    On August 14, 2012, the Immigration Judge denied
Petitioner’s application for relief. First, the IJ denied
Gutierrez’s application for suspension of deportation,
concluding that the stop-time rule paused his accrual of
continuous physical presence on August 3, 1993, the date he
was served with an Order to Show Cause under the pre-
IIRIRA immigration laws. See INA § 240A(d)(1), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b(d)(1); In re Nolasco-Tofino, 22 I. & N. Dec. 632
12                GUTIERREZ-ALM V. GARLAND

(BIA 1999). Second, the IJ determined that Gutierrez’s
asylum application was untimely, as he had failed to file it
within one year of his arrival in the United States. Third, the
IJ concluded that Gutierrez could not demonstrate a
reasonable fear of persecution on a protected ground and that
his fear of torture was speculative. In rejecting these claims,
the IJ observed that Gutierrez’s family had been able to
reside in Nicaragua without incident for eight months after
his father fled the country, and that the Nicaraguan
government had enacted a law granting amnesty to
individuals who took up arms against the government prior
to 1994. Additionally, although his brother Norvin had been
imprisoned following his deportation, this was attributable
to his criminal offenses and his membership in a criminal
gang—not to the political activities of his father.
    Gutierrez appealed, and the Board of Immigration
Appeals dismissed his appeal on March 12, 2014. The BIA
affirmed the IJ’s finding that the service of the OSC on
Gutierrez paused the accrual of physical presence and
precluded his application for suspension of deportation. The
BIA specifically reasoned that an OSC is not required to
include the time and place of deportation proceedings, unlike
a Notice to Appear (“NTA”), the charging document under
current immigration law. The BIA also concluded that
Gutierrez’s proposed particular social groups were not
cognizable, and that he failed to establish a likelihood of
future persecution or torture by the Nicaraguan government.
    On April 7, 2014, Gutierrez petitioned this Court for
review of the BIA’s denial of his application. Shortly
thereafter, the Government filed a motion to remand in light
of intervening case law that adjusted the definition of the
“particular social group” protected ground. See generally
Pirir-Boc v. Holder, 750 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2014); In re M-
                       GUTIERREZ-ALM V. GARLAND                       13

E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227 (BIA 2014); In re W-G-R-, 26
I. & N. Dec. 208 (BIA 2014). We granted this motion and
remanded to the BIA, which subsequently remanded to the
IJ. However, Gutierrez presented no new witnesses or
evidence in support of his application, and the IJ again
denied all forms of relief. 4
    Gutierrez once again appealed to the BIA. On March 15,
2017, the BIA dismissed his appeal without addressing his
arguments regarding suspension of deportation. In so ruling,
the BIA found that three of Gutierrez’s claimed particular
social groups—“individuals deported from the United
States,” “persons fearing gang recruitment,” and “persons
who the authorities would suspect as being a gang
member”—were not legally cognizable. Addressing his
political persecution claim and his proposed social group of
“family members of people who opposed the government in
the 1980s,” the BIA concluded that Gutierrez failed to
establish an objectively reasonable fear of persecution in
Nicaragua on either ground. Consequently, the BIA upheld
the IJ’s conclusion that it was unlikely Gutierrez would be
persecuted based on his relationship to his father.
       This petition followed.
                    STANDARD OF REVIEW
   This Court reviews the factual findings of the Board of
Immigration Appeals for substantial evidence. 8 U.S.C. §
1252(b)(4)(B). Substantial evidence exists when the BIA’s
conclusions “are ‘supported by reasonable, substantial, and
probative evidence in the record.’” Dawson v. Garland, 998
F.3d 876, 882 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Melkonian v.

4
    The IJ incorporated his August 14, 2012, decision by reference.
14               GUTIERREZ-ALM V. GARLAND

Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2003)). “This strict
standard bars the reviewing court from independently
weighing the evidence and holding that the petitioner is
eligible for asylum, except in cases where compelling
evidence is shown.” Kotasz v. INS, 31 F.3d 847, 851 (9th
Cir. 1994); see also Guo v. Sessions, 897 F.3d 1208, 1212
(9th Cir. 2018). Accordingly, the agency’s factual findings
“are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be
compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Zehatye v. Gonzales,
453 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting 8 U.S.C. §
1252(b)(4)(B)); see also Silva-Pereira v. Lynch, 827 F.3d
1176, 1185 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[I]n order to reverse the BIA,
‘we must determine that the evidence not only supports a
contrary conclusion, but compels it—and also compels the
further conclusion that the petitioner meets the requisite
standard for obtaining relief.’” (emphasis in original)
(quoting Huang v. Holder, 744 F.3d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir.
2014))). Issues of law, mixed questions of law and fact, and
constitutional issues are reviewed de novo. Zhi v. Holder,
751 F.3d 1088, 1091 (9th Cir. 2014); Vargas-Hernandez v.
Gonzales, 497 F.3d 919, 921 (9th Cir. 2007).
                        ANALYSIS
     I. Suspension of Deportation
    First, Gutierrez argues that he is eligible for suspension
of deportation under the pre-1996 Immigration and
Nationality Act. Suspension of deportation, the predecessor
of cancellation of removal, was a form of relief available
prior to IIRIRA, which consolidated deportation and
exclusion proceedings into a single statutory pipeline. See
Romero-Torres v. Ashcroft, 327 F.3d 887, 889 (9th Cir.
2003). “In IIRIRA, Congress created proceedings—with
different names and slightly different requirements—that
                  GUTIERREZ-ALM V. GARLAND                   15

paralleled the pre-IIRIRA deportation scheme.” Ram, 243
F.3d at 513. “Before IIRIRA, aliens were placed in
deportation proceedings after being served with an OSC, and
could seek relief by applying for ‘suspension of deportation.’
After IIRIRA, aliens are placed in removal proceedings after
being served with a notice to appear, and can seek relief by
applying for ‘cancellation of removal.’” Mendiola-Sanchez
v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 937, 939 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Ram,
243 F.3d at 513); see also Campos-Hernandez v. Sessions,
889 F.3d 564, 567 n.3 (9th Cir. 2018) (“IIRIRA . . . changed
the terms previously used in immigration statutes, replacing
‘deportation’ with ‘removal’ . . . .”).
    Gutierrez’s case arrives in an unusual procedural
posture. “When Congress enacted IIRIRA, it included in the
statute a set of ‘transitional rules’ specifying that particular
provisions of the permanent statute should apply to
petitioners against whom the INS had already initiated
proceedings before the statute’s effective date.” Garcia-
Ramirez v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 935, 940 (9th Cir. 2005);
accord Mendiola-Sanchez, 381 F.3d at 939 (“Congress
enacted transitional rules that instruct us to apply the pre-
IIRIRA rules to cases that were pending when IIRIRA was
enacted subject to limited exceptions.”); IIRIRA § 309(c)(1),
Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (Sept. 30, 1996)
(transitional rules). Gutierrez entered the United States in
1989 and was served with an OSC in 1993. Congress enacted
IIRIRA in 1996, after his proceedings were initiated but
before they were administratively closed. As Gutierrez’s
proceedings were pending when IIRIRA was enacted, the
transitional rules govern this case.
    “The transitional rules that apply to these petitions
instruct us to apply the law of suspension of deportation as
it existed in 1996.” Mendiola-Sanchez, 381 F.3d at 939 &
16                GUTIERREZ-ALM V. GARLAND

n.3 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)). Prior to IIRIRA, an
immigrant was eligible for suspension of deportation if:

       (1) he or she had been physically present in
       the United States for a continuous period of
       not less than seven years immediately
       preceding the date of the application for
       suspension of deportation; (2) he or she was
       a person of good moral character; and (3)
       deportation would result in extreme hardship
       to the alien or to an immediate family
       member who was a United States citizen or a
       lawful permanent resident.

Ram, 243 F.3d at 513 (cleaned up) (quoting 8 U.S.C. §
1254(a)(1) (1994)). Gutierrez sought suspension of
deportation under this provision in his 2012 application, as
he has resided in the United States for more than thirty years.
    However, IIRIRA and the transitional rules that
accompany it adjust the framework for this analysis. IIRIRA
changed the calculation of physical presence by providing
that an immigrant’s continuous physical presence is
“deemed to end . . . when the [immigrant] is served with a
notice to appear.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1). The transitional
rules mandate that this “stop-time rule” has retroactive effect
over deportation proceedings initiated by an OSC that was
issued prior to the enactment of IIRIRA. Ram, 243 F.3d at
516; accord Garcia-Ramirez, 423 F.3d at 939–41 (observing
that the transitional rules “contain unambiguous
congressional intent that the Act’s stop-time and 90/180-day
rules apply retroactively”). Accordingly, in a transitional
rules case, an immigrant’s continuous physical presence in
the United States is deemed to have ended when the
                  GUTIERREZ-ALM V. GARLAND                   17

immigrant was served with an OSC under the pre-IIRIRA
deportation scheme. The stop-time rule presents a problem
for Gutierrez, who entered the United States in 1989 and
received an OSC in 1993—only four years later.
    At issue in this case is whether an Order to Show Cause
that does not disclose the time and place of an immigrant’s
deportation proceedings is sufficient to trigger the stop-time
rule. Gutierrez’s OSC did not list the time and place of his
deportation proceedings, providing only that a hearing was
“to be calendared” with “notice to be provided” by an
Immigration Judge. The government did not provide
Gutierrez with information regarding the time and place of
his hearing until it sent him an NOH in May 1996—about
two months after he would have accrued the seven years of
continuous physical presence necessary to be eligible for
suspension of deportation under the statutory framework that
preceded IIRIRA. Gutierrez contends that the Supreme
Court’s decision in Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105
(2018), instructs that his OSC is statutorily defective and that
the stop-time rule is therefore inapplicable.
    In Pereira, the Supreme Court considered whether a
Notice to Appear (“NTA”) that does not list the time and
place of removal proceedings triggers the stop-time rule. 138
S. Ct. at 2113. The Court characterized this issue as a
“narrow question” that “lies at the intersection of [two]
statutory provisions,” and it predicated its analysis on the
“clear and unambiguous” language of IIRIRA. Id. at 2110,
2113. The plain language of 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1)(A)
provides that the stop-time rule requires service of “a notice
to appear under section 1229(a).” Id. at 2109–10 (quoting 8
U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1)(A)). That provision defines an NTA as
a “‘written notice . . . specifying’ several required pieces of
information, including ‘[t]he time and place at which the
18                GUTIERREZ-ALM V. GARLAND

[removal] proceedings will be held.’” Id. (alterations in
original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(G)(i)).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that “[a] putative
notice to appear that fails to designate the specific time or
place of the noncitizen’s removal proceedings is not a
‘notice to appear under section 1229(a),’ and so does not
trigger the stop-time rule.” Id. at 2113–14; see also Niz-
Chavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct. 1474, 1482 (2021) (holding
that an NTA must consist of “a single document” containing
all requisite information).
    This Court has not issued a binding opinion on the issue
of whether Pereira applies to an Order to Show Cause.
While this is an open issue, it is not a close one: Every circuit
to address this question has held that Pereira does not apply
to an OSC, a charging document issued before IIRIRA under
a separate statutory framework with distinct requirements.
See, e.g., Jiang v. Garland, 18 F.4th 730, 734–35 (2d Cir.
2021) (per curiam); Maradia v. Garland, 18 F.4th 458, 462–
63 (5th Cir. 2021); Perez-Perez v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 371,
375 (7th Cir. 2021); see also United States v. Escobar, 970
F.3d 1022, 1026–27 (8th Cir. 2020); Bilek v. Att’y General,
793 F. App’x 929, 933 n.1 (11th Cir. 2019). We now hold
the same.
    This result flows directly from the text and structure of
the pre-IIRIRA immigration laws. Pereira turned on the
statutory definition of a Notice to Appear. Its central
reasoning was that a document must meet all of the
requirements set forth by 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) to trigger the
stop-time rule. Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2109–10. That
provision unambiguously requires an NTA to disclose the
time and place of an immigrant’s removal proceedings. Id.
at 2110; see 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1).
                    GUTIERREZ-ALM V. GARLAND                         19

     Comparatively, the pre-IIRIRA provision defining an
Order to Show Cause instructed immigration officials to
provide written notice of the time and place of deportation
proceedings “in the order to show cause or otherwise.” 8
U.S.C. § 1252b(a)(2)(A) (1994). The inclusion of the
qualifying phrase “or otherwise” indicates that an OSC,
unlike an NTA, was not required to include the time and
place of the immigrant’s deportation proceedings, and that
this information could be provided in a separate document. 5
Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2117 n.9 (“[O]rders to show cause did
not necessarily include time-and-place information.”);
accord Ortiz-Santiago v. Barr, 924 F.3d 956, 962 (7th Cir.
2019) (“The Order to Show Cause had to include largely the
same information as the later Notice to Appear, except that
it did not need to specify the time and place of the hearing.”);
Jiang, 18 F.4th at 735 (“In other words, the OTSC statute
explicitly acknowledged the permissibility of giving an alien
in deportation proceedings notice of the time and place of
the hearing by separate document.”); Escobar, 970 F.3d at
1026–27; Banuelos v. Barr, 953 F.3d 1176, 1182 (10th Cir.
2020); Santos-Quiroa v. Lynch, 816 F.3d 160, 162 n.2 (1st
Cir. 2016) (same).
    It necessarily follows that Pereira’s logic, which rests on
the “clear and unambiguous” mandate that a Notice to
Appear include time-and-place information, is inapplicable
to an Order to Show Cause, which contains no such
requirement. Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2113; accord Jiang, 18

5
  Prior to IIRIRA, it was common practice for immigration officials to
initiate deportation proceedings with an OSC, and to later furnish an
NOH that disclosed this information. See, e.g., Dobrota v. INS, 311 F.3d
1206, 1210 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussing the statutory requirements for a
pre-IIRIRA NOH).
20                   GUTIERREZ-ALM V. GARLAND

F.4th at 734–35; Maradia, 18 F.4th at 462–63; Perez-Perez,
988 F.3d at 375. Accordingly, we hold that an Order to Show
Cause that fails to disclose the time and place of an
immigrant’s deportation proceedings is sufficient to trigger
the stop-time rule in a transitional rules case. 6 The
immediate result of this holding is that Gutierrez is ineligible
for suspension of deportation. As Gutierrez was served an
OSC in 1993, only four years after entering the United
States, his physical presence is deemed to have ended at that
time.
     II. Application for Relief
    As Gutierrez is ineligible for suspension of deportation,
we turn now to his application for relief. Gutierrez seeks
withholding of removal under both asylum law and the
Convention Against Torture. “[T]he standards for the two
bases of relief are distinct and should not be conflated.”
Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 2003). To
receive withholding under asylum law, a petitioner must
show that “it is more likely than not that he or she would be
persecuted on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(2); see also Vasquez-
Rodriguez v. Garland, 7 F.4th 888, 892 (9th Cir. 2021).
Comparatively, to qualify for protection under the

6
  This holding extends only to an OSC that satisfies the remaining
statutory requirements articulated in 8 U.S.C. § 1252b(a)(2)(A) (1994)
and any additional prerequisites to trigger the stop time rule prescribed
by IIRIRA. This Court expresses no opinion regarding the sufficiency of
an OSC that contains additional defects. Nor does this Court opine as to
the effect of a defective NOH, such as a notice that inaccurately details
the location of an immigrant’s hearing or provides an improper date and
time.
                  GUTIERREZ-ALM V. GARLAND                  21

Convention, a petitioner must demonstrate that “it is more
likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed
to the proposed country of removal.’” 8 C.F.R. §
1208.16(c)(2); see also Lalayan v. Garland, 4 F.4th 822, 840
(9th Cir. 2021). The Board of Immigration Appeals denied
both forms of relief. For the reasons that follow, we hold that
the BIA’s decision is supported by substantial evidence.
   A. Withholding of Removal – Persecution
    Gutierrez seeks statutory withholding of removal based
on his fear of future persecution in Nicaragua. “To be
eligible for withholding of removal, an applicant must
demonstrate that [his] life will be ‘threatened in that country
because of [his] race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion.’” Plancarte
Sauceda v. Garland, 23 F.4th 824, 832 (9th Cir. 2022)
(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A)). “Similar to asylum, a
petitioner may establish eligibility for withholding of
removal (A) by establishing a presumption of fear of future
persecution based on past persecution, or (B) through an
independent showing of clear probability of future
persecution.” Tamang v. Holder, 598 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th
Cir. 2010) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1), (2)).
    In order to sustain an application for withholding of
removal based on future persecution, the applicant’s fear of
persecution must be “both subjectively genuine and
objectively reasonable.” Lolong v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 1173,
1178 (9th Cir. 2007); accord Lalayan, 4 F.4th at 840. The
subjective component may be established through credible
testimony evincing a genuine fear of persecution on account
of a statutorily protected ground. See Siong v. INS, 376 F.3d
1030, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). The objective component
requires the applicant to show that their fear is reasonable by
22                GUTIERREZ-ALM V. GARLAND

furnishing “‘credible, direct, and specific evidence’ that the
petitioner faces an individualized risk of persecution or that
there is a pattern or practice of persecution against similarly
situated individuals.” Lolong, 484 F.3d at 1178 (quoting
Cordon-Garcia v. INS, 204 F.3d 985, 990 (9th Cir. 2000));
see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.13.
    First, Gutierrez claims that he will face persecution in
Nicaragua due to his father’s opposition to the Sandinista
government. To establish future persecution on account of
political opinion, the applicant must show that (1) he holds
an actual or imputed political opinion; and (2) he faces a
likelihood of persecution because of that opinion. Rodriguez
Tornes v. Garland, 993 F.3d 743, 752 (9th Cir. 2021);
Ahmed v. Keisler, 504 F.3d 1183, 1192 (9th Cir. 2007).
Gutierrez and his father, Julio, credibly testified that Julio
took up arms against the Sandinistas in the 1980s. In
retaliation for this opposition, Julio was arrested, beaten in
custody, and pressed into service by the Sandinista military,
before he deserted the army and fled the country in 1988.
Consequently, Julio has expressed concern that the
Nicaraguan government will realize that Gutierrez is related
to Julio and persecute him as a perceived opponent of the
Sandinista regime. Gutierrez reflected these concerns
secondhand during his deportation hearing.
   In support of his application, Gutierrez notes that the
Sandinista government has aggressively targeted its political
adversaries. This Court has recently observed that “[t]he
Sandinista National Liberation Front or ‘Frente Sandinista
de Liberación Nacional’ . . . regained control of the
Nicaraguan government in 2007 under Daniel Ortega.”
Flores Molina v. Garland, 37 F.4th 626, 630 (9th Cir. 2022).
Gutierrez offers the 2011 Human Rights Report by the State
Department, indicating that the Ortega regime has arrested,
                 GUTIERREZ-ALM V. GARLAND                  23

imprisoned, persecuted, and killed protesters and dissidents
since the Sandinista party returned to power. Among other
offenses, this report details arbitrary detentions, excessive
force, censorship of the media, and politically motivated
killings. Cf. id. at 630 (“The Guardian reported that between
April and July 2018, it was estimated that over 300 protesters
were killed by the police and government operatives.”).
     The BIA rejected these contentions and concluded that
Gutierrez failed to demonstrate “that an anti-Communist,
anti-government political opinion would be imputed to
him.” Cf. Lolong, 484 F.3d at 178 (requiring the applicant to
show “an individualized risk of persecution”). Substantial
evidence supports the BIA’s findings, as Gutierrez offers no
“credible, direct, and specific evidence” that he would be
perceived as an enemy of the Ortega regime and persecuted
on account of imputed political opinion. Id. As the BIA
observed, Gutierrez was “a child of about 8 years when he
left Nicaragua,” suggesting that “it is unlikely that he would
be perceived as having any political opinion at that time.”
Moreover, in his testimony before the IJ, Gutierrez
acknowledged that he has never been involved in a political
party, indicating that he has no intention to engage in
protests or political activism upon his return. Cf. Mairena v.
Barr, 917 F.3d 1119, 1126 (9th Cir. 2019).
    Additionally, the record reflects that Gutierrez and his
family have not faced persecution on account of his father’s
actions. Cf. Lolong, 484 F.3d at 1178 (noting that an
applicant may show a likelihood of future persecution
through “a pattern or practice of persecution against
similarly situated individuals”). Gutierrez, his mother, and
his three brothers were able to remain in Nicaragua without
incident for eight months after his father deserted the
military and fled the country in 1988, and the Nicaraguan
24                GUTIERREZ-ALM V. GARLAND

government has since passed a law granting amnesty for
political crimes that were committed in the 1980s. Moreover,
there is no evidence that Gutierrez’s brother Norvin faced
political persecution upon his deportation to Nicaragua in
2007. Although Norvin was imprisoned for three weeks
upon his return and has allegedly been followed by police,
these actions are attributable to his membership in a criminal
gang. There is no evidence that Norvin was prosecuted and
imprisoned, much less persecuted, on account of actual or
imputed opposition to the Nicaraguan government. As the
record does not “compel” us to conclude that Gutierrez has
been the victim of past persecution or faces a clear
probability of future persecution based on imputed political
opinion, Tamang, 598 F.3d at 1091, substantial evidence
supports the BIA’s denial of withholding of removal on this
ground.
    Second, Gutierrez claims that he will be persecuted on
account of membership in one of four putative particular
social groups. “[T]o establish that a proposed social group is
cognizable for purposes of withholding of removal, an
applicant must show that the proposed social group is ‘(1)
composed of members who share a common immutable
characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially
distinct within the society in question.’” Conde Quevedo v.
Barr, 947 F.3d 1238, 1242 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting In re M-
E-V-G-, 26 I & N Dec. at 237); see also Reyes v. Lynch, 842
F.3d 1125, 1131 (9th Cir. 2016) (discussing the effects of In
re M-E-V-G-).
    “The ‘social distinction’ prong of the analysis ‘refers to
social recognition.’” Conde Quevedo, 947 F.3d at 1242
(quoting Rios v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 1123, 1127 (9th Cir.
2015)). The concept of “social distinction” turns not on
“ocular” visibility, but on “the extent to which members of a
                 GUTIERREZ-ALM V. GARLAND                  25

society perceive those with the characteristic in question as
members of a social group.” In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec.
at 239–40 (quoting In re E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 591, 594
(BIA 2008)); see also In re W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208,
222 (BIA 2008). This analysis requires an “evidence-based
inquiry as to whether the relevant society recognizes [the]
proposed social group.” Pirir-Boc, 750 F.3d at 1084.
Carrying this burden ordinarily requires “[e]vidence such as
country conditions reports, expert witness testimony, and
press accounts of discriminatory laws and policies, historical
animosities, and the like.” In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec.
at 244. Consequently, while the ultimate “particular social
group” decision is a question of law that we review de novo,
“[t]he BIA’s conclusion regarding social distinction—
whether there is evidence that a specific society recognizes
a social group—is a question of fact that we review for
substantial evidence.” Conde Quevedo, 947 F.3d at 1242.
    Before the BIA, Gutierrez claimed membership in four
putative particular social groups, specifically:

       (1) “Persons fearing gang recruitment”;
       (2) “Individuals deported from the United
           States”;
       (3) “Family members of people who opposed
           the government in the 1980s”; and
       (4) “Persons who the authorities would
           suspect as being a gang member.”

The BIA denied Gutierrez’s family-based claim on the same
grounds as his political opinion claim. The agency rejected
his remaining claims for a lack of particularity and social
distinction, finding that “there is nothing in the record that
26                   GUTIERREZ-ALM V. GARLAND

shows that people who fear gang recruitment, or are
suspected of being gang members, are perceived,
considered, or recognized by Nicaraguan society to be
distinct social groups.”
    Gutierrez makes no arguments related to the proposed
social groups defined as “people fearing gang recruitment”
and “individuals deported from the United States” and has
therefore waived these claims. Brown v. Rawson-Neal
Psychiatric Hosp., 840 F.3d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 2016)
(instructing that issues “not raised in the appellant’s opening
brief” are ordinarily waived). 7 His third proposed social
group, “family members of people who opposed the
government in the 1980s,” is coextensive with his imputed
political opinion claim and fails for the same reason. While
it is generally accepted that “the family remains the
quintessential particular social group,” Rios, 807 F.3d at
1128 (citing Thomas v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1177, 1180 (9th

7
  While these arguments are waived, this Court has previously rejected
similar proposed social groups, suggesting that substantial evidence
supports the BIA’s conclusion that these proposed groups lacked
particularity and social distinction. See, e.g., Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d
1125, 1139 (9th Cir. 2016) (rejecting particular social group defined as
“deportees from the United States to El Salvador”); Delgado-Ortiz v.
Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1150–52 (9th Cir. 2010) (rejecting proposed
particular social group featuring “Mexicans returning home from the
United States who are targeted as victims of violent crime as a result”);
Barrios v. Holder, 581 F.3d 849, 854–55 (9th Cir. 2009), abrogated on
other grounds, Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2013)
(rejecting proposed particular social group of “young men in Guatemala
who resist gang recruitment”); Ramos-Lopez v. Holder, 563 F.3d 855,
862 (9th Cir. 2009), abrogated on other grounds, Henriquez-Rivas v.
Holder, 707 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that retribution for
refusal to join a gang does not constitute persecution on account of a
protected ground).
                 GUTIERREZ-ALM V. GARLAND                 27

Cir. 2005) (en banc)), the record does not compel the
conclusion that Gutierrez would be targeted for persecution
based on his father’s opposition to the Sandinista
government in the 1980s.
    Gutierrez’s claim that he would be persecuted as a
suspected gang member fails for a lack of social distinction.
Although this Court has recognized that “persons who are
not members of a gang but who are incorrectly perceived to
be gang members” may constitute a cognizable social group
in some circumstances, Vasquez-Rodriguez, 7 F.4th at 898,
the applicant bears the burden to demonstrate that the
proposed country of removal recognizes the group in
question, Pirir-Boc, 750 F.3d at 1084. Gutierrez offers
nothing beyond his own speculation to suggest that
Nicaragua views “those perceived as gang members” as a
distinct social identity. Cf. In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec.
at 244 (explaining that an applicant must establish social
distinction by adducing “evidence such as country
conditions reports, expert witness testimony, and press
accounts of discriminatory laws and policies, historical
animosities, and the like”). Accordingly, substantial
evidence supports the BIA’s denial of withholding of
removal on this ground.
   B. Withholding of Removal – Convention Against
      Torture
    The Convention Against Torture provides mandatory
relief for any immigrant who can demonstrate that “it is more
likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed
to the proposed country of removal.” Hamoui v. Ashcroft,
389 F.3d 821, 826 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting 8 C.F.R. §
208.16(c)(2)); see also Khup v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 898, 907
(9th Cir. 2004) (requiring applicant to demonstrate “at least
28                   GUTIERREZ-ALM V. GARLAND

a 51% chance” of future torture). Applicable regulations
define torture as “an extreme form of cruel and inhuman
treatment,” requiring the “intentional inflict[ion]” of “severe
pain or suffering . . . by, or at the instigation of, or with the
consent or acquiescence of, a public official or other person
acting in an official capacity.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1), (2).
In conducting this analysis, the agency is to “consider all
relevant evidence; no one factor is determinative.”
Maldonado v. Lynch, 786 F.3d 1155, 1164 (9th Cir. 2015)
(en banc). 8 However, we review the BIA’s denial of CAT
relief for substantial evidence. Nuru v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d
1207, 1215 (9th Cir. 2005).
    Ultimately, Gutierrez’s CAT claim suffers from the same
deficiencies as his political persecution claim: He alleges
that his father’s opposition to the Nicaraguan government
“will surely subject [him] to harassment and discrimination
that in all likelihood will also lead to torture, whether mental
or physical,” and that he will be “completely ostracized from
Nicaraguan society.” These contentions are entirely
speculative and unsupported by the record. As discussed
above, although the Sandinista regime has taken action
against political dissidents, Gutierrez offers no evidence he
will be perceived as such an adversary or targeted for torture.
See Dhital v. Mukasey, 532 F.3d 1044, 1051 (9th Cir. 2008)
(holding that “the petitioner must demonstrate that he would
be subject to a ‘particularized threat of torture’” (emphasis

8
  Regulations implementing the CAT instruct the BIA to consider, inter
alia: (1) “Evidence of past torture inflicted upon the applicant;” (2)
“Evidence that the applicant could relocate to another part of the country
where he or she is not likely to be tortured;” (3) “Evidence of gross,
flagrant or mass violations of human rights within the country of
removal;” and (4) “Other relevant information regarding conditions in
the country of removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3).
                     GUTIERREZ-ALM V. GARLAND                           29

in original) (quoting Lanza v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 917, 936
(9th Cir. 2004))). Gutierrez left Nicaragua over twenty-five
years ago, his family was able to reside in the country
without issue following his father’s departure in 1988, and
his brother was not tortured upon his return in 2007.9
Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial
of CAT relief.
                          CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, we DENY the petition for
review.

9
  To the extent Gutierrez predicates his CAT claim on fears of gang
violence, substantial evidence supports the IJ’s conclusion that Petitioner
failed to demonstrate that the Nicaraguan government is likely to
“acquiesce in any harm gang members might inflict on him.”