Court Opinion

ID: 9897293
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:09:46.998047+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:42.575006
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                          Sep 07 2023, 8:43 am

                                                                              CLERK
                                                                          Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                             Court of Appeals
                                                                               and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                     ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Jason M. Kuchmay                                           STARKE SOLAR, LLC D/B/A
Snyder Morgan Federoff & Kuchmay,                          MAMMOTH SOLAR
LLP                                                        Rachel S. Bir
Syracuse, Indiana                                          Kaylin O. Cook
                                                           Christopher D. Shelmon
                                                           Gutwein Law
                                                           Lafayette, Indiana
                                                           ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
                                                           PULASKI COUNTY COUNCIL
                                                           Mark J. Crandley
                                                           Barnes & Thornburg LLP
                                                           Indianapolis, Indiana
                                                           Kevin C. Tankersley
                                                           Winamac, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Connie Ehrlich, et al.,                                    September 7, 2023
Appellants-Petitioners,                                    Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                           22A-PL-1738
        v.                                                 Appeal from the Pulaski Superior
                                                           Court
Starke Solar, LLC d/b/a                                    The Honorable Richard R.
Mammoth Solar, and the Pulaski                             Stalbrink, Jr., Special Judge
County Council,                                            Trial Court Cause No.
Appellees-Respondents                                      66D01-2201-PL-1

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1738 | September 7, 2023                             Page 1 of 22
                                        Opinion by Judge May
                                 Judges Crone and Weissmann concur.

      May, Judge.

[1]   Connie Ehrlich, et al. (collectively “Remonstrators”) appeal the trial court’s

      order upholding a designation by the Pulaski County Council (“the Council”)

      of approximately 9,205 acres in Pulaski County (“the Property”) as an

      Economic Revitalization Area (“ERA”) and the approval of a tax abatement

      for that Property. Starke Solar, LLC d/b/a Mammoth Solar (“Mammoth”)

      plans to develop a commercial solar-power facility (“Solar Project”) on the

      Property. Remonstrators raise multiple issues, which we consolidate and

      restate as whether, as a matter of law, farmland on which drainage tiling and

      irrigation systems have been installed qualifies as land that has been

      “developed” and “improved” for purposes of the statutory definition of an

      ERA. On cross-appeal, Mammoth and the Council (collectively “Appellees”)

      assert Remonstrators lack standing to appeal the Council’s decision. Because

      Remonstrators have standing but their legal arguments fail, we affirm.

      Facts and Procedural History
[2]   In order to develop the Solar Project, Mammoth sought a tax abatement by

      having the Property designated an ERA. Remonstrators are landowners in

      Pulaski County. On August 9, 2021, the Council held a public meeting to

      consider Mammoth’s request. At that meeting the Council passed and adopted

      Pulaski County Resolution No. 2021-09 (the “Preliminary Resolution”)

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1738 | September 7, 2023    Page 2 of 22
      establishing the Property as an ERA for a period of 40 years. (Appellants’ App.

      Vol. II at 39.) In conjunction with the Preliminary Resolution, maps and plats

      were provided that identified the Property. The Council set October 25, 2021,

      as the date for a public hearing for receiving remonstrations and objections from

      interested persons prior to adopting a final resolution on the ERA, but that

      public hearing was moved to December 13, 2021, due to the amount of

      information to consider.

[3]   The Council appointed a steering committee to review all the relevant

      information and to make recommendations to the Council. Remonstrators

      submitted written objections and written remonstrances prior to the hearing on

      December 13, 2021, and Remonstrators also received draft copies of reports

      that Mammoth had provided regarding the impact of the Solar Project on

      Pulaski County. The public hearing was held on December 13, 2021, with

      Remonstrators appearing individually and by counsel. Time was given for

      public comment, and then the Council continued the public meeting until

      January 10, 2022, so that it had time to review and consider the evidence

      presented. The Council invited individuals to submit additional written

      commentary and evidence regarding the ERA designation and proposed tax

      abatement. In response thereto, Remonstrators presented Supplemental

      Objections.

[4]   On January 10, 2022, the Council held the continued public meeting. At that

      meeting, the Council confirmed the Preliminary Resolution, designated the

      Property an ERA, and approved the tax abatement. The “Confirmatory

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1738 | September 7, 2023   Page 3 of 22
Resolution” – “Pulaski County Resolution No. 2021-15/2022-01” – states, in

necessary part:

        1. the [Property] is within the County and the [Property] has
        become undesirable for, or impossible of, normal development
        and occupancy because of a lack of development, cessation of
        growth, deterioration of improvements or character of
        occupancy, age, obsolescence, substandard buildings, or other
        factors which have impaired values and prevented a normal
        development of property and use of property;

        2. the [Property], described in Exhibit A and located at locations
        within Pulaski County described by the maps included as Exhibit
        B, are designated an Economic Revitalization Area for a period
        of 40 years commencing this day, confirming the prior
        resolution;

        3. this Economic Revitalization Area allows abatement of
        property taxes attributable to redevelopment or rehabilitation
        activities and the installation of new manufacturing equipment,
        all as defined in I.C. 6-1.1-12.1-1 and permitted under I.C. 6-101-
        121-3 and I.C. 6-1.1-12-4.5;

        4. such redevelopment or rehabilitation activities and such
        manufacturing equipment as described in part 3, above, are
        limited strictly to investments made for the purpose of generating
        electricity from solar energy for the public grid and to activities
        and equipment in direct support of such efforts, or to other
        purposes related thereto and fully compliant with the Pulaski
        County Unified Development Ordinance, as amended, and any
        actions taken by the Pulaski County Advisory Plan Commission
        or Pulaski County Board of Zoning Appeals in their efforts to
        enforce and interpret aforesaid ordinance;

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1738 | September 7, 2023     Page 4 of 22
        5. based on the information in the Statement of Benefits
        describing the Project:

                 (a) the estimate of the cost of the Equipment is reasonable
                 for equipment of that type;

                 (b) the estimate of the number of individuals who will be
                 employed or whose employment will be retained can be
                 reasonably expected to result from the installation of the
                 Equipment;

                 (c) the estimate of the annual salaries of those individuals
                 who will be employed or whose employment will be
                 retained can be reasonably expected to result from the
                 installation of the Equipment;

                 (d) the other benefits about which information was
                 requested are benefits that can be reasonably expected to
                 result from the proposed installation of the Equipment;

                 (e) the totality of benefits is sufficient to justify the granting
                 of personal property tax deductions to the Applicant
                 pursuant to IC 6-1.1-12-4.5;

                                               *****

        8. having made its findings in the affirmative, the Council
        approves the aforesaid tax abatement and confirms the
        Preliminary Resolution[.]

(Id. at 69-70.)

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1738 | September 7, 2023            Page 5 of 22
[5]   On January 20, 2022, Remonstrators filed a petition for judicial review in the

      Pulaski Superior Court to challenge the Confirmatory Resolution. The petition

      for review alleged “the adoption of the Confirmatory Resolution is: (i) contrary

      to economic revitalization area law; (ii) arbitrary and capricious; (iii)

      unsupported by the evidence; (iv) in violation of the Petitioners’ Due Process

      rights; and (v) otherwise contrary to Indiana law.” (Id. at 37.) On April 1,

      2022, Mammoth filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings challenging

      Remonstrators’ standing to bring the judicial review action based on

      Mammoth’s assertion that Remonstrators were not aggrieved by the Council’s

      decision. The trial court heard argument on April 25, 2022. None of the

      parties submitted additional evidence as permitted by Indiana Code section 6-

      1.1-12.1-2.5(e). Remonstrators argued the question before the court – whether

      farmland could qualify as an ERA – was a question of law, rather than facts.

      On June 30, 2022, the trial court issued an order confirming the Council’s

      designation of the Property as an ERA and approval of a tax abatement. 1 The

      trial court’s order included the following conclusions of law:

                 17. Creation of an ERA is a discretionary tool that allows the
                 County Council to designate an area for economic revitalization.
                 IC 6-1.1-12.1-1.

                 18. Once the ERA is established, taxpayers in the ERA may
                 apply for a property tax abatement.

      1
          The trial court’s order did not address Remonstrators’ standing to appeal the Confirmatory Resolution.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1738 | September 7, 2023                             Page 6 of 22
        19. The County Council began this process by establishing an
        ERA in Preliminary Resolution No. 2021-09 wherein they
        designated approximately 9,205.33 acres owned by several
        different owners, none of whom are petitioners in this matter.

        20. On December 13, 2021, and January 10, 2022, public
        hearings were held wherein the County Council reviewed
        evidence submitted by the remonstrators and by Mammoth.
        Ultimately, the decision was made to allow the designation of the
        ERA and allow the tax abatements.

        21. The Petitioners first argue that the ERA set by the County
        does not qualify under the standards for an “economic
        revitalization area” as defined by Ind. Code § 6-1.1-12.1-1(1).
        The County Council was required to weigh the facts and apply
        them to the governing standard. A territory can be designated as
        an ERA if it is:

                 an area which is within the corporate limits of a city, town,
                 or county which has become undesirable for, or impossible
                 of, normal development and occupancy because of a lack
                 of development, cessation of growth, deterioration of
                 improvements or character of occupancy, age,
                 obsolescence, substandard buildings, or other factors
                 which have impaired values or prevent a normal
                 development of property or use of property.

        Ind. Code § 6-1.1-12.1-1(1). The County Council determined
        that the ERA territory satisfies this definition because of “lack of
        development” or “cessation of growth” where there is no
        development occurring in the ERA territory. Id.

        22. The words “development” and “growth” must be given their
        “plain meaning” and the Court must “consider the structure of

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1738 | September 7, 2023          Page 7 of 22
        the statute as a whole.” Abbott v. State, 183 N.E.3d 1074 (Ind.
        2022).

        23. There are no structures or other improvements on the parcels
        in the ERA. By contrast, “development” of property typically
        means adding improvements such as buildings or other
        structures. For instance, Black’s Law Dictionary defines
        “development” as “a substantial human-created change to
        improved or unimproved real estate, including the construction
        of buildings or other structures.” Development, BLACK’S LAW
        DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).

        24. The General Assembly uses the term “development” to mean
        the same thing. Just four subsections after the provision defining
        an ERA, the General Assembly defined “redevelopment” to
        mean “the construction of new structures, in economic
        revitalization areas, either: (A) on unimproved real estate; or (B)
        on real estate upon which a prior existing structure is demolished
        to allow for a new construction.” Ind. Code § 6-1.1-12.1-1.

        25. The term “development” is used elsewhere throughout the
        Indiana Code to work hand-in-hand with “improvements” to
        property. See also Ind. Code § 36-7-4-1303 (“As used in this
        series, “development” means an improvement of any kind on
        land.”); Ind. Code § 6-3.6-2-8.

        26. The County Council was within its discretion to determine
        that the ERA did not include these types of improvements or
        otherwise showed any “growth” or “development.” The
        property is unimproved, undeveloped farmland with no
        opportunities for growth or development outside the [S]olar
        [P]roject.

        27. The language defining an ERA does not exempt land that is
        currently being farmed from its scope. The ERA statutes apply

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1738 | September 7, 2023     Page 8 of 22
        when there is no “development” or “growth,” even if the
        property is being farmed. Ind. Code § 6-1.1-12.1-1(1).

        28. The General Assembly left it to local elected bodies to
        determine where development is needed. If the General
        Assembly intended to limit these ERAs on farmland, it would
        have said so. Orange v. Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 92
        N.E.3d 1152, 1155 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). The Petitioners cannot
        read that limitation into the statute when there is no language to
        support that reading. Id. (“[I]t is just as important to recognize
        what a statute does not say as it is to recognize what it does
        say.”) (quoting Rush v. Elkhart Cty. Plan Comm’n, 698 N.E.2d
        1211, 1215 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998)). The Petitioners may not
        “engraft new words” or create new restrictions under the guise of
        statutory construction. Kitchell v. Franklin, 997 N.E.2d 1020,
        1026 (Ind. 2013).

        29. The General Assembly recently amended Indiana Code § 6-
        1.1-12.1-1, effective July 1, 2022, to add language allowing ERAs
        to include “an area of land classified as agricultural land for
        property tax purposes that, as a condition of being designated an
        economic revitalization area, will be predominately used for
        agricultural purposes for a period specified by the designating
        body.” See P.L. 8-2022 (S.E.A. 119).

        30. The Court notes the General Assembly’s recent amendment
        to Indiana Code § 6-1.1-12.1-1 to the extent that it provides
        context and insight into the legislative intent behind the already
        existing general definition of an ERA.

        31. The amendment specifies that land that will continue to be
        used for agricultural purposes can be designated as an ERA.
        This language does not in any way suggest that the existing
        language of Ind. Code § 6-1.1-12.1-1 excluded farm property

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1738 | September 7, 2023        Page 9 of 22
              from being designated as an ERA for purposes of improvements
              and other development.

              32. While the amendments are instructive as to the legislative
              intent to include agricultural land, the Court applies the language
              as it currently exists.

              33. In any event, the statute allows an ERA when there is
              “obsolescence” or “other factors” warranting the designation.
              Ind. Code § 6-1.1-12.1-1(1). The [S]olar [P]roject is located near
              where NIPSCO has installed high tension lines, making the area
              uniquely situated to easily provide energy to the grid. This
              unique feature creates an opportunity that renders the use of the
              property “obsolete” for farming.

              34. The Council’s determination that the real estate is an ERA is
              supported by substantial evidence in the record. It is
              unimproved, underdeveloped, and limited solely to agricultural
              use which has caused a cessation of growth.

              35. Because Council’s determination is supported by substantial
              evidence, the Council’s determination is not arbitrary and
              capricious. See, City of Indianapolis v. Woods, 703 N.E.2d 1087,
              1093 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).

      (Appellants’ App. at 26-29) (formatting in original).

      Discussion and Decision
      1. Standing
[6]   Appellees’ challenge to Remonstrators’ standing to appeal from the Council’s

      ruling is a “threshold issue[,]” which we must address first. Solarize Indiana, Inc.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1738 | September 7, 2023    Page 10 of 22
      v. S. Ind. Gas & Elect. Co., 182 N.E.3d 212, 216 (Ind. 2022). To be entitled to

      have a court decide a legal dispute, “a plaintiff must be a ‘proper person’ to

      invoke the court’s authority.” Id. (quoting Horner v. Curry, 125 N.E.3d 584, 589

      (Ind. 2019)). Standing may be conferred by statute or by common law, id., and

      when the legislature has provided a standing requirement for review of specific

      forms of government action, that is the requirement that we apply. Id. at 217.

      Regardless of the alleged basis for standing, if “plaintiffs allege no injury, there

      is no justiciable dispute.” City of Gary v. Nicholson, 190 N.E.3d 349, 351 (Ind.

      2022). We review questions of standing de novo. Mammoth Solar v. Ehrlich, 196

      N.E.3d 221, 236 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022).

[7]   Regarding the appeal of a decision about an ERA, our legislature provided: “A

      person who filed a written remonstrance with the designated body under this

      section and who is aggrieved by the final action taken may . . . initiate an

      appeal of that action . . . .” Ind. Code § 6-1.1-12.1-2.5(d). The Remonstrators

      filed written remonstrances with the Council. Appellees allege, however, that

      Remonstrators were not “aggrieved” by the Council’s decision.

              To be aggrieved, the petitioner must experience a substantial
              grievance, a denial of some personal or property right or the
              imposition . . . of a burden or obligation. The . . . decision must
              infringe upon a legal right of the petitioner that will be enlarged
              or diminished by the result of the appeal and the petitioner’s
              resulting injury must be pecuniary in nature. A [petitioner] must
              show some special injury other than that sustained by the
              community as a whole.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1738 | September 7, 2023      Page 11 of 22
      Bagnall v. Town of Beverly Shores, 726 N.E.2d 782, 786 (Ind. 2000) (internal

      citation and quotation marks omitted).

[8]   Remonstrators note Mammoth challenged their standing when Remonstrators

      previously appealed the decision of the Pulaski County Board of Zoning

      Appeals (“BZA”) granting a special exception for Mammoth to build the same

      Solar Project at issue herein. See Mammoth Solar, 196 N.E.3d 221. Therein, we

      held Remonstrators had standing to challenge the BZA’s decision because their

      “evidence that they would suffer a pecuniary loss was sufficient to show that

      they were aggrieved.” Id. at 237. That evidence included the following:

              Pulaski County real estate agent Stevenson submitted to the BZA
              a written report, wherein Stevenson concluded that the property
              values of rural homes, recreational land, and farmland would all
              decrease if the [Commercial Solar Energy Systems] were to be
              constructed. In addition, real estate broker Spooner, who
              conducted six months of research on the impact of a proposed
              solar farm in Madison County, submitted a report wherein she
              concluded that houses surrounded by a solar farm on three or
              four sides would be worthless, houses affected on two sides
              would suffer a 40% decrease in value, houses within one mile of
              a solar farm would suffer a 10% to 40% decrease in value, and
              houses within three miles of a solar farm would suffer a 10% to
              20% loss. Indeed, even the BZA’s decision specifically
              concluded that it was “undeniable and unavoidable” that a
              significant number of the 220 homes within one mile of the
              proposed site would see a decrease in property values.

      Id. Remonstrators assert “[t]he standard in this case is the same, and the result

      should be the same here as well.” (Appellants’ Reply Br. (hereinafter “Reply

      Br.”) at 9.)
      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1738 | September 7, 2023   Page 12 of 22
[9]    Appellees argue that, while the “aggrieved” standard is the same, the decision

       being appealed – and thus the injury that needed to be demonstrated by

       Remonstrators – is not the same. The Council argues Remonstrators did not

       demonstrate they were aggrieved by “the grant of a tax abatement to their

       neighbors’ property[.]” (Council Br. at 13.) According to Appellees, this was

       the particular injury that Remonstrators needed to demonstrate to have

       standing to appeal the ERA decision. In support, Mammoth points to our

       Indiana Supreme Court’s decision last year in Solarize Indiana, Inc. v. Southern

       Indiana Gas and Electric Co., 182 N.E.3d 212 (2022).

[10]   In Solarize, the Court was determining whether Solarize had standing to appeal

       a ruling by the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission. The Court noted

       standing to appeal such rulings was created by statute and gave standing to

       parties who were “adversely affected by any final decision, ruling, or order of

       the commission[.]” Ind. Code § 8-1-3-1. The Court reiterated that

       demonstration of being “adversely affected” required a party to show three

       elements: “(1) it must have a personal (rather than general) interest in the

       outcome; (2) it must have suffered or be in immediate danger of suffering an

       injury; and (3) the injury must be a direct result of the final decision, ruling, or

       order.” Solarize, 182 N.E.3d at 218-19. The Court noted a “‘direct injury’ is

       ‘[a]n injury resulting directly from a particular cause, without any intervening

       causes.’” Id. at 220 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019)). The Court

       then held Solarize did not have standing to appeal the Commission’s decision

       because the injury Solarize alleged – fewer customers entering the solar market,

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1738 | September 7, 2023      Page 13 of 22
       which will decrease Solarize’s funding – “would be the indirect result of

       intervening causes—market forces—on its potential customers and suppliers.”

       Id. at 220.

[11]   Mammoth argues:

                Petitioner-[Remonstrators] failed to present any argument as to
                how they could plausibly suffer an injury as a direct result of the
                County Council’s determination designating the [Property] as an
                ERA. In fact, all of Petitioner-[Remonstrators]’ “grievances” are
                a result of the Solar Project itself, raised only in other litigation in
                which most Petitioner-[Remonstrators] are parties, which is
                irrelevant for Petitioner-[Remonstrators]’ standing to challenge
                the County Council’s Confirmatory Resolution designating the
                [Property] as an ERA.

       (Mammoth Br. at 26-27.)

[12]   Appellees are correct that the available evidence suggests the Remonstrators

       will not sustain pecuniary injury from the tax abatement itself, as the abatement

       is predicted to decrease property taxes for taxpayers in Pulaski County.

       (Mammoth App. Vol. II at 34-35.) Nor can the Remonstrators rely on their

       arguments that “there would be a loss of jobs and income in the county” (Reply

       Br. at 9), and “the price at which Remonstrators could rent or acquire farmland

       in the County would be negatively impacted,” 2 (id.), as those injuries will be

       2
         Remonstrators also allege “[t]hey suffered due process violations in the manner in which the tax abatement
       hearings were conducted[.]” (Reply Br. at 9.) However, as the alleged due process violations occurred before
       the entry of the Confirmatory Resolution, those alleged violations did not result from the Council’s adoption
       of the Confirmatory Resolution.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1738 | September 7, 2023                           Page 14 of 22
       borne by the community generally. See, e.g., Pflugh v. Indianapolis Historic

       Preservation Comm’n, 108 N.E.3d 904, 910 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (additional

       noise, traffic, and children in the street – “harms that would be common to the

       community as a whole” – do not qualify as the personal special injury required

       to confer standing), trans. denied.

[13]   The remaining injury alleged by Remonstrators is “their property values would

       decrease[.]” (Reply Br. at 9.) Appellees argue the decrease in property value is

       not a “direct injury” of the ERA declaration and abatement, but rather a

       product of the decision of the BZA. We would be inclined to agree with

       Appellees if the ERA designation and tax abatement were for business

       development generally, but in fact, the Council’s decision explicitly applies only

       to the development of the Solar Project. The Confirmatory Resolution

       provided:

               4. such redevelopment or rehabilitation activities and such
               manufacturing equipment as described in part 3, above, are
               limited strictly to investments made for the purpose of
               generating electricity from solar energy for the public grid and
               to activities and equipment in direct support of such efforts, or
               to other purposes related thereto and fully compliant with the
               Pulaski County Unified Development Ordinance, as amended,
               and any actions taken by the Pulaski County Advisory Plan
               Commission or Pulaski County Board of Zoning Appeals in their
               efforts to enforce and interpret aforesaid ordinance[.]

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1738 | September 7, 2023    Page 15 of 22
       (Appellants’ App. Vol. II at 69) (emphasis added). Thus, it seems clear the

       Council’s adoption of this Confirmatory Resolution was as necessary for the

       Solar Project as was the decision of the BZA.

[14]   Furthermore, we believe there is a distinction between the “market forces”

       referenced in Solarize and the market forces at play when a landowner’s

       property value will shrink due to a government body’s decision regarding

       adjacent land. Solarize involved a business and the market forces that might

       cause that business to no longer be as profitable due to shrinkage of customers

       or suppliers. That holding is more akin to EP MSS LLC v. Merrillville Board of

       Zoning Appeals, 192 N.E.3d 981 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied, wherein we

       held the owner of a storage facility does not have standing to appeal the grant of

       a special exception for another business to open a storage facility, because

       businesses do “not have a right to be free from competition” and the danger of

       losing business is not a ”special injury.” Id. at 987. In contrast, the injuries to

       property values expected to be experienced the Remonstrators herein are no less

       direct than when the Remonstrators were appealing the BZA’s grant of the

       application for a special exception that would permit the building of the Solar

       Project. Both this Confirmatory Resolution by the Council and the grant of the

       special exception by the BZA make possible the development of the Solar

       Project on the Property. Accordingly, we hold Remonstrators have standing to

       appeal the Council’s Confirmatory Resolution. See Mammoth Solar, 196 N.E.3d

       at 237 (decrease in property values expected to occur due to development of

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1738 | September 7, 2023     Page 16 of 22
       solar farm confers standing on property owners to appeal special exception

       granted by BZA).

       2. Definition of an ERA
[15]   Remonstrators argue the trial court erroneously read the statutory definition of

       an ERA to include farmland and failed to properly consider the legislature’s

       recent amendment of the statute defining an ERA. Interpretation of a statute is

       a pure question of law that we review de novo. 3 Jones v. Lofton, 201 N.E.3d 676,

       678 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied. Our goal when interpreting a statute is

       to give effect to the legislature’s intent, and the best evidence of that intent is the

       language of the statute itself. Id. If a statute is unambiguous, we must give it its

       clear and plain meaning. Id. That parties disagree about the meaning does not

       make a statute ambiguous. Southwest Allen Cnty. Fire Protection Dist. v. City of

       Fort Wayne, 142 N.E.3d 946, 954 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied.

       3
         The parties disagree about what our standard of review should be. Remonstrators assert the Council’s
       declaration of the ERA is a quasi-judicial action like a zoning board’s grant of a variance, (see Appellants’ Br.
       at 7), while Appellees argue the grant of an ERA is a legislative action like the passage of any other
       resolution. (See Council’s Br. at 11.) Because Remonstrators raise questions of law that we review de novo,
       we need not determine the precise contours of the appellate standard of review to be applied to other types of
       questions on appeal from a trial court’s confirmation of the designating body’s final action. Nevertheless, we
       note that, unlike in appeals from a zoning board, trial courts are authorized to “hear evidence on the appeal”
       from a council’s declaration of an ERA. Compare Burton v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals of Madison Cnty., 174 N.E.3d
       202, 209 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (“A trial court and an appellate court both review the decision of a zoning
       board with the same standard of review. A proceeding before a trial court or an appellate court is not a trial
       de novo[.]”), trans. denied, with Ind. Code § 6-1.1-12.1-2.5(e) (“The court shall hear evidence on the appeal,
       and may confirm the final action of the designating body or sustain the appeal.”). This distinction alone
       suggests our standard of review from a trial court’s determination regarding a council’s resolution creating an
       ERA would be distinct from our standard of review for a BZA’s grant of a special exception. See GKN Co. v.
       Magness, 744 N.E.2d 397, 401 (Ind. 2001) (When “a trial court conducts an evidentiary hearing, we give its
       factual findings and judgment deference.” However, when the trial court makes factual findings based on a
       paper record, we give no deference to the trial court’s factual findings.).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1738 | September 7, 2023                              Page 17 of 22
[16]   Prior to July 1, 2022, an ERA was defined by statute as

               [a]n area which is within the corporate limits of a city, town, or
               county which has become undesirable for, or impossible of,
               normal development and occupancy because of a lack of
               development, cessation of growth, deterioration of improvements
               or character of occupancy, age, obsolescence, substandard
               buildings, or other factors which have impaired values or prevent
               a normal development of property or use of property. The term
               “economic revitalization area” also includes:

               (A) any area where a facility or a group of facilities that are
               technologically, economically, or energy obsolete are located and
               where the obsolescence may lead to a decline in employment and
               tax revenues; and

               (B) a residentially distressed area, except as otherwise provided in
               this chapter.

       Ind. Code § 6-1.1-12.1-1(1) (2013).

[17]   In the early months of 2022, Indiana’s legislature amended that statute by

       adding a third subsection to statute that provides:

               (C) an area of land classified as agricultural land for property tax
               purposes that, as a condition of being designated as a
               revitalization area, will be predominantly used for agricultural
               purposes for a period specified by the designating body.

       Ind. Code § 6-1.1-12.1-1(1) (2022). No modifications were made to the pre-

       existing portions of the statute.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1738 | September 7, 2023      Page 18 of 22
[18]   Remonstrators argue “the Amended ERA Statute creates a presumption that

       the ERA statute governing this proceeding was intended to be changed to

       include agricultural/farmland, where it was excluded before.” (Appellants’ Br.

       at 11.) In support, Remonstrators quote an Indiana Supreme Court case that

       states:

                 A fundamental rule of statutory construction is that an
                 amendment changing a prior statute indicates a legislative intent
                 that the meaning of the statute has changed. Such an
                 amendment raises the presumption that the legislature intended
                 to change the law unless it clearly appears that the amendment
                 was passed in order to express the original intent more clearly.

       (Id.) (quoting United Nat. Ins. Co. v. DePrizio, 705 N.E.2d 455, 460 (Ind. 1999))

       (emphasis added by Remonstrators).

[19]   We take no issue with the statement of law quoted by Remonstrators. We do,

       however, disagree with the inference that Remonstrators draw from the

       statutory change that occurred. The trial court determined:

                 31. The amendment specifies that land that will continue to be
                 used for agricultural purposes can be designated as an ERA.
                 This language does not in any way suggest that the existing
                 language of Ind. Code § 6-1.1-12.1-1 excluded farm property
                 from being designated as an ERA for purposes of improvements
                 and other development.

       (Appellants’ App. Vol. II at 28.) We agree. The legislature’s creation of a

       category of ERA that “will be predominately used for agricultural purposes for

       a period specified[,]” Ind. Code § 6-1.1-12.1-1(1) (2022), does not preclude the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1738 | September 7, 2023    Page 19 of 22
       prior-existing definition of ERA from applying to farmland that will no longer

       be used for agricultural purposes, presuming of course the land meets the prior-

       existing definition provided in Indiana Code section 6-1.1-12.1-1(1) (2013).

[20]   Remonstrators next argue that farmland that contains drainage tiling or

       watering systems has been “improved” or “developed” in a manner that

       precludes it from being designated an ERA. The statute’s controlling language

       provides:

               “Economic revitalization area” means an area which is within
               the corporate limits of a city, town, or county which has become
               undesirable for, or impossible of, normal development and
               occupancy because of a lack of development, cessation of
               growth, deterioration of improvements or character of
               occupancy, age, obsolescence, substandard buildings, or other
               factors which have impaired values or prevent a normal
               development of property or use of property.

       Id.

[21]   We in no way underestimate the value and importance of farming as a hobby,

       profession, or even sacred calling because it produces the food required to

       sustain human life on this planet. Nevertheless, in the context of real property,

       derivations of the terms “develop” and “improve” consistently refer to the

       addition of buildings or structures to land. For example, “development” is: “1.

       A substantial human-created change to improved or unimproved real estate,

       including the construction of buildings or other structures. 2. An activity,

       action, or alteration that changes undeveloped property into developed

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1738 | September 7, 2023   Page 20 of 22
       property.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY “development” (10th ed. 2004). A

       “developer” is a “person or company whose business is to buy land and then

       either to build on it or to improve the existing buildings there.” Id. “developer”.

       “Improved land” is “[l]and that has been developed; esp., land occupied by

       buildings and structures.” Id. Moreover, the ERA statute itself indicates:

               “Redevelopment” means the construction of new structures, in
               economic revitalization areas, either: (A) on unimproved real
               estate; or (B) on real estate upon which a prior existing structure
               is demolished to allow for a new construction.

       Ind. Code § 6-1.1-12.1-1(5) (2013). See also Ind. Code § 6-1.1-12.1-1(15) (2022)

       (defining “[n]ew agricultural improvement” as a “term [that] includes a barn,

       grain bin, or silo”). Based on these authorities, we cannot read “development”

       or “improvement” in the ERA definition to include drainage tiling or watering

       systems. Because the Property at issue was “undesirable for, or impossible of,

       normal development and occupancy because of a lack of development,” Ind.

       Code § 6-1.1-12.1-1(1) (2013), the Council committed no error of law when it

       declared the Property an ERA and approved the tax abatement.

       Conclusion
[22]   Remonstrators had standing to appeal the Council’s declaration of an ERA and

       grant of a tax abatement because the only development permitted in the ERA

       zone was the Solar Project, which undisputed evidence indicated would

       decrease Remonstrators’ property values. Nevertheless, as a matter of law, the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1738 | September 7, 2023     Page 21 of 22
       farmland at issue met the definition required to be declared an ERA.

       Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

[23]   Affirmed.

       Crone, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1738 | September 7, 2023   Page 22 of 22