Court Opinion

ID: 9678202
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:14:13.25377+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:02.479619
License: Public Domain

FOSHEIM, C.J.,
(concurring in result).
The majority opinion reaches the correct result but inaccurately states the law concerning the necessity of the circuit court to readvise Defendant of his rights prior to accepting a guilty plea. It fails to adequately note that Defendant’s initial appearance was not before a circuit judge and implicitly indicates that the first explanation of rights by a municipal judge was equivalent to having them explained by a circuit judge.
In State v. Sutton, 317 N.W.2d 414 (S.D. 1982), we made it clear that the circuit court is not excused from advising a defendant of his constitutional rights,-, before he enters a plea even though a magistrate explained these rights at- the preliminary hearing. In Sutton, we distinguished Clark v. State, 294 N.W.2d 916 (S.D.1980), where the defendant was arraigned twice, but both times in circuit court; the second arraignment accommodated a plea change. Sutton, 317 N.W.2d at 415. In Clark, readvisement was found unnecessary since the trial court could properly assume from its own record of the initial circuit court arraignment that the defendant had knowledge of his rights and the consequences of his guilty plea. Clark, 294 N.W.2d at 919. In Sutton, we noted that just as the trial court cannot assume that the defendant’s counsel has fully advised the defendant of his rights, much less can it be assumed that a lay-magistrate did so. Sutton, 317 N.W.2d at 415 (citing State v. Jameson, 71 S.D. 144, 22 N.W.2d 731 (1946), rev’d on other grounds).
It is of no consequence whether the preliminary hearing was before a lay-magistrate, as in Sutton, or before a municipal judge, as in this case. The initial advisement of rights was not before the only court where the guilty plea could be, and was, finally entered. Accordingly, the statement in the majority opinion that “[h]ere, we have a different judge and the second arraignment was fifty-seven days later” is misleading in two respects since it seems to equate a hearing before a municipal judge with a hearing before a circuit judge and it gives importance to the time between arraignments.
*579This case falls squarely within the rationale expressed in Sutton. The fifty-seven day delay is not a relevant factor on this appeal. The thrust of our decision in Sutton is that the validity of both arraignments as to the constitutional rights of the defendant must appear from the record in the circuit court. Sutton, 317 N.W.2d at 416. Since the circuit court did not fully advise Defendant of all his constitutional rights before he entered his plea, the arraignment is wanting. See Nachtigall v. Erickson, 85 S.D. 122, 178 N.W.2d 198 (1970) and Stacey v. State, 349 N.W.2d 439 (S.D.1984).