Court Opinion

ID: 9684036
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:45:22.635176+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:52.493776
License: Public Domain

KELLER, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent for three reasons: (1) Appellant’s statements to the police were made after Miranda1 warnings were given and, therefore, are admissible; (2) Wong Sun’s2 “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine does not require the exclusion of Appellant’s statements to police or the derivative evidence discovered as a result of his statements, i.e., the identity of his other victims; and (3) Appellant was not “in custody” within the meaning of Miranda when he first confessed to counselors.
I. Statements to Police
The Supreme Court of the United States has previously addressed whether Miranda warnings given by police officers after an unwarned confession are effective. In Oregon v. Elstad,3 the Court rejected the application of the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine to a subsequently warned confession after an initial unwarned statement was given and held that an officer’s good-faith failure to give Miranda warnings did not require suppression of a post -Miranda statement.4 The *413Court recently clarified Elstad’s holding in Missouri v. Seibert,5 where it explained that if the police deliberately withhold the Miranda warnings so as “to obscure both the practical and legal significance of the admonition when finally given,”6 then any subsequent post-warning statements resulting from the violation are excluded. The Court reiterated that where the failure to give Miranda warnings was in good faith, e.g., where the questioner may not realize that Miranda warnings are required, any subsequent post-warning statements are not excluded. Here, it is undisputed that Appellant’s first statements were not the result of any plan by the counselors to subvert Miranda. Clearly the counselors did not realize that Miranda warnings might be required.7 Accordingly, Appellant’s post-Miranda statements to the police are admissible.
II. Identity of Other Victims
In United States v. Patane,8 the Court held that the failure to give Miranda warnings does not require suppression of the fruits of a defendant’s unwarned statement:
In this ease we must decide whether a failure to give a suspect the warnings prescribed by [Miranda ], requires suppression of the physical fruits of the suspect’s unwarned but voluntary statements. The Court has previously addressed this question but has not reached a definitive conclusion .... Because the Miranda rule protects against violations of the Self-Incrimination Clause, which, in turn, is not implicated by the introduction at trial of physical evidence resulting from voluntary statements, we answer the question presented in the negative.9
The SeZ/-Incrimination Clause does exactly what its name implies: It creates a right against self-incrimination. It does not create a right against incrimination by others. Thus, the Self-Incrimination Clause is not implicated by the introduction at trial of the testimony of others, e.g., the victim. The Appellant can assert his Fifth Amendment rights only to bar the introduction of statements that he has made, not statements made by others. Thus, even if we assume that Appellant’s statements should be suppressed, the fruits of his otherwise voluntary statements, i.e., the identity of his other victims, are not subject to suppression, and the newly identified victims may testify against him.
III. Custodial Interrogation
At first blush, it seems illogical to maintain that a person adjudicated a juvenile sexual offender and remanded to a treatment facility is not in custody when he is questioned. Of course Appellant was in *414custody, but that does not mean that Appellant was “in custody” for the purposes of Miranda when he first confessed to the counselors. And in Appellant’s situation, I do not believe that he was “in custody” within the meaning of Miranda.
Although Kentucky’s appellate courts have not previously addressed whether one who is imprisoned is per se “in custody” for purposes of Miranda, the Second, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Circuits of the United States Court of Appeals have addressed this issue and have held that merely because the defendant is in prison on an unrelated charge does not mean the defendant is “in custody” under Miranda.10 They uniformly hold that the totality of the circumstances determines the custody issue.11
Factors the courts considered in determining whether the prisoner was “in custody” include: the defendant’s freedom to leave the scene and the purpose, place and length of the questioning; a change in the surroundings of the prisoner which results in an added imposition on his freedom of movement; and whether circumstances suggest any measure of compulsion above and beyond the confinement.12
In U.S. v. Chamberlain,13 the Court stated that “[i]n determining whether [the investigators’] conversations with Chamberlain amounted to custodial interrogation, we are ‘concerned with the suspect’s subjective belief that “his freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest” and whether that belief is objectively reasonable under the circumstances.” ’14 The Court then utilized a six-factor analysis set out in United States v. Griffin15 to determine how a reasonable person would have felt in the situation:
A determination of how a reasonable person would have felt in this situation — whether a reasonable person would have thought he was in custody— requires close consideration both of how Chamberlain got to the interview room and of the atmosphere of the interviews once Chamberlain arrived for, and during, questioning.
*415The six factor analysis set out in United States v. Griffin provides guidance in making this determination:
(1) whether the suspect was informed at the time of questioning that the questioning was voluntary, that the suspect was free to leave or request the officers to do so, or that the suspect was not considered under arrest;
(2) whether the suspect possessed unrestrained freedom of movement during questioning;
(3) whether the suspect initiated contact with authorities or voluntarily acquiesced to official requests to respond to questions;
(4) whether strong arm tactics or deceptive stratagems were employed during questioning;
(5) whether the atmosphere of the' questioning was police dominated; or,
(6) whether the suspect was placed under arrest at the termination of the questioning.
All six of these factors need not be present for a finding of custody requiring a Miranda warning. Nor is this list exhaustive. The custody issue ultimately “focuses upon the totality of the circumstances.” 16
Here, Appellant voluntarily participated in the Sex Offender Treatment Program at the juvenile facility. It was his choice to attend the sessions, and a decision not to attend or participate would not increase his sentence.17 During the sessions, he was free to discuss his previous sex. offenses, or not. And the counselors, to whom he made his first statements, although employed by a state facility, questioned Appellant only for the purpose of treatment. The counselors were not law enforcement officers and did not create a police-dominated atmosphere during their sessions with him. Furthermore, the counselors did not require that Appellant confess to law enforcement officers when they came to interview him.
The counselors encouraged Appellant to discuss his previous offenses in an effort to provide treatment and not as a “strong arm tactic” or a “deceptive stratagem.” It is undisputed that the counselors were not seeking to elicit information from Appellant for the purpose of his prosecution. Unlike the situation in Estelle v. Smith18 where the psychiatrist performed an involuntary exam and testified at the prosecutor’s behest, the counselors in the present case worked with the Appellant for treatment purposes only. Notwithstanding the assertion by the majority, Appellant was not actually coerced by the counselors to disclose the information about his prior sexual offenses. — -encouragement does not equal coercion. Thus, I join in the trial court’s disagreement with Appellant that Appellant’s statements, first to the counselors, and then later to the sheriffs deputy and state trooper, were coerced.
I believe that the majority’s reliance on State v. Evans is misplaced given that the case precedes the Supreme Court’s decisions in Patane and Seibert, and other than sharing with the present case the general subject matter of a juvenile who confesses in a treatment program, Evans is factually different. In Evans, although the Court found that the counselors were not law enforcement officials or their *416agents, and thus no Miranda warnings were required, the Court suppressed two of the three statements made by the juvenile because the “grinding duration and inevitability” of the counselor’s questioning (where he was questioned until he gave an incriminating statement)19 and the threats for failure to confess to offenses of which he was suspected effectively created a situation in which the juvenile would be punished for exercising his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. In Appellant’s case, there is no evidence that Appellant was threatened with punishment for failure to admit committing the offense or that he was exhaustively questioned. There is also no evidence that the counselors suspected Appellant committed additional crimes and were seeking to obtain his confession.
Thus, I believe that although Appellant was imprisoned at the time he attended the sessions, he was not “in custody” for the purposes of Miranda when he made his admissions to the counselors.
For the above three reasons, or any one separately, I dissent and would affirm Appellant’s conviction.
GRAVES and WINTERSHEIMER, JJ., join this dissenting opinion.

. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).

. 470 U.S. 298, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985).

. Missouri v. Seibert, - U.S. -, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 2610 n. 4, 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (2004) ("In Elstad, 'a simple failure to administer the warnings, unaccompanied by any actual coer*413cion or other circumstances calculated to undermine the suspect’s ability to exercise his free will’ did not 'so tain[t] the investigatory process that a subsequent voluntary and informed waiver is ineffective for some indeterminate period.’ ”).

. - U.S. -, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (2004).

. Seibert, - U.S. at -, 124 S.Ct. at 2615, 159 L.Ed.2d at 660 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

. In State v. Evans, 144 Ohio App.3d 539, 760 N.E.2d 909 (2001), the Court of Appeals of Ohio determined that staff members of a juvenile treatment facility were not required to give Miranda warnings even though the juveniles were encouraged to confess past offenses because the staff members were not law enforcement officials or their agents.

. - U.S. -, 124 S.Ct. 2620, 159 L.Ed.2d 667 (2004).

. - U.S. at -, 124 S.Ct. at 2624, 159 L.Ed.2d at 673 (citations omitted; emphasis added).

. See United States v. Willoughby, 860 F.2d 15, 23 (2nd Cir.1988) ("[W]e believe that the mere fact of imprisonment does not mean that all of a prisoner’s conversations are official interrogations that must be preceded by Miranda warnings.”), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 846, 102 L.Ed.2d 978 (1989); United States v. Conley, 779 F.2d 970, 972 (4th Cir.1985) ("declin[ing] to read Mathis as compelling the use of Miranda warnings prior to all prisoner interrogations and [holding] that a prison inmate is not automatically always in 'custody' within the meaning of Miranda ”), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 830, 107 S.Ct. 114, 93 L.Ed.2d 61 (1986); U.S. v. Menzer, 29 F.3d 1223, 1232 (7th Cir.1994) (where no "added imposition on his freedom of movement” nor "any measure of compulsion above and beyond [imprisonment],” defendant held not "in custody" for the purposes of Miranda); Leviston v. Black, 843 F.2d 302, 304 (8th Cir.1988) ("While Miranda may apply to one who is in custody for an offense unrelated to the interrogation, [Mathis, 391 U.S. at 4-5, 88 S.Ct. at 1504-05], incarceration does not ipso facto render an interrogation custodial ....”), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 865, 109 S.Ct. 168, 102 L.Ed.2d 138 (1988); Cervantes v. Walker, 589 F.2d 424 (9th Cir.1978) (questioning of inmate by deputy sheriff about contents of matchbox containing a substance resembling marijuana during a routine search of an inmate’s belongings held noncustodial).

. See U.S. v. Menzer, 29 F.3d 1223, 1232 (7th Cir.1994).

. Id. (citations, internal quotation marks, brackets, and ellipses omitted; emphasis added).

. 163 F.3d 499 (8th Cir.1998).

. Id. at 503.

. 922 F.2d 1343 (8th Cir.1990).

. Chamberlain, 163 F.3d at 503 (citations omitted).

. See Martin v. Chandler, 122 S.W.3d 540 (Ky.2003) (holding requirement that prisoner complete Sex Offender Treatment Program to be eligible to earn discretionary good time credits towards his sentence did not result in increase in punishment).

. 451 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981).

. State v. Evans, 144 Ohio App.3d 539, 760 N.E.2d 909, 915 (2001) (“Hillcrest authorities deemed Evan’s first attempt to complete the ‘commitment offense paper’ unacceptable because ‘incomplete.’ The staff required that he try again. To assist him in being more thorough, a counselor provided Evans with a list of fourteen charges that at one time had been brought against him, and he was specifically told to write separately about each of them.”).