Court Opinion

ID: 9456197
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 19:45:18.070168+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:34:53.191906
License: Public Domain

MacKINNON, Circuit Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part):
I concur in the establishment of a rule that the trial court at the request of the defendant, after the witness has testified, should allow examination of grand jury testimony insofar as it is relevant to the witness' trial testimony, without any showing of particularized need, subject to the Government obtaining a protective order for good cause shown. I also join those who dissent as to the remand in this case.
In concurring in the establishment of the basic rule, however, I feel that should' be sufficient and that we should not then immediately set out to undercut the rule by inferring that a broader rule is on the way. I accordingly have some differences of opinion as to portions of the opinion and the footnotes, some of which delve into a number of matters that were not briefed or argued:
1. As for the holding in Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 86 S.Ct. 1840, 16 L.Ed.2d 973 (1966), I cannot agree that it should be considered as announcing a relaxation of the standard of “particularized need,” since same would be based on its dicta. Actually, Dennis represents a classic case of demonstrated particularized need based on five instances of particular needs. Cf. United States v. Youngblood, 379 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1967). And Dennis sought only limited portions of grand jury testimony.
2. Some of the cases seem to treat the release of grand jury testimony as though the Government is the only party concerned and fail to recognize that the privilege is that of the witness. It is the grand jury witness primarily that has to be protected against compulsory disclosure. We seem to lose sight of this by breaking down the bars generally and I believe our opinion should recognize whose privilege we are bandying about. In granting the motion, in addition to considering the likelihood of facilitating the possible fabrication of testimony, the court should weigh the privilege of the witness, who is usually not a party to the proceedings. Dennis rec*1131ognized the witness’ interest. 384 U.S. at 875, 86 S.Ct. 1840.
3. In the Seventh Circuit, the Government stated that it had “no objection” to such a prospective rule. United States v. Amabile, 395 F.2d 47 (7 Cir., 1968). I cannot interpret that position as being that the Government “advocates” the change in the rule. (See 1129, note 11.) Likewise, I consider it incorrect to say that the Government here “advocates” the change.
4. Instead of saying that the grand jury testimony is to be released to the defendant save where it is anticipated that the trial “will have unusual length,” a better standard, I suggest, would be whether the interests of justice might suffer. The time standard cannot be sufficiently definite and while at argument the United States Attorney referred to the length of the trial involved, they were actually using the interests of justice rule. I would restate footnote 16 to read substantially:
The United States Attorney should be alert to expedite the trial whenever he can but should have the right to withhold the release of testimony until after a witness testifies so that the premature release will not frustrate the effect that the separation of the witnesses might have on assuring truthful testimony. There are, at least, two considerations: the protection of the witness and protection of the truth-finding process.
The underlying theory in this comment is that it is wrong to make grand jury testimony more available than written statements and affidavits of other witnesses. The latter have always been available and, except as to informers, never had any privilege. Whereas, grand jury testimony has always been privileged until witnesses testified.. A proper “rule” should recognize this.
5. The majority opinion refers to Gibson v. United States, 131 U.S.App.D.C. 143, 403 F.2d 166 (1968), which states that unless there is substantial doubt that a witness will testify at trial there is no reason to wait until trial for disclosure. Actually there are many other reasons. Witnesses need protection against intimidating threats and assault, the Government needs protection against their witnesses being compromised and society needs the protection of criminal convictions that would flow from the production of truthful testimony . of criminal acts being presented in court.
6. The opinion proposes remand to the trial judge, notwithstanding a very insignificant variance between the grand jury testimony and the trial testimony, on the ground that whether a new trial is to be granted is a judgment that should be made at least in the first instance by the trial judge and not by an appellate court. On this point, the Fifth Circuit in Menendez v. United States, 393 F.2d 312 (1968), states that matter is in the sound discretion of the trial judge under the rule and that it is the better practice for the trial judge to inspect; but in so holding it affirmed a conviction as to one defendant where the trial judge did not inspect the grand jury record.
The Second Circuit in United States v. Hernandez, 290 F.2d 86, 89 (1961), held that the proper time for inspection is at trial and reversed where the discretion was not exercised by the trial judge. Obviously, a trial judge’s discretion cannot properly be exercised if he refuses to examine the grand jury record, and if there is the shadow of a doubt the case should be referred for that purpose. Here, however, the variance, if there is any, is so minor, that I conclude none of the “substantial rights” of the defendant have been “affected” and hence I would not remand. In my opinion, Fed. R.Crim.P. 52(a)1 requires that such a defect be disregarded. I consider the' appellate court under Rule 52 has a duty to weigh the alleged error and to deter*1132mine whether it affects “substantial rights,” and when it refuses to do so, it commits the same type of error as it accuses the trial court of committing when it fails to examine the grand jury record.

. “Any error, defect, irregularity or variance be disregarded.” Rule 52(a). which does not affect substantial rights shall