Court Opinion

ID: 9840389
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-18 09:08:05.097728+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:46:15.428541
License: Public Domain

In the
        Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
         at Fort Worth
     ___________________________
          No. 02-22-00492-CV
     ___________________________

     GARY BRUCE PEEK, Appellant

                      V.

      LINDA MAYFIELD, Appellee

  On Appeal from the 271st District Court
           Wise County, Texas
      Trial Court No. CV12-04-254

 Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Birdwell, JJ.
 Memorandum Opinion by Justice Birdwell
                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Appellant Gary Bruce Peek (Bruce) appeals an interim judgment in this trust

dispute. This is the second interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s receiver appointment

and the third appeal overall in this case. In two issues, Bruce contends that the trial

court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to appoint a receiver over the family trust and

that the evidence is insufficient to support that appointment. We affirm the trial court’s

interim judgment.1

                                    I. Background

      The first appeal in this case was taken from the trial court’s judgment after a

bench trial. Mayfield v. Peek (Peek I), 546 S.W.3d 253, 257–58 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017,

no pet).2 The El Paso Court of Appeals categorized the claims at issue as the

Guardianship Claim, the Will Claim, and the Trust Claim. Id. at 256–57. The

Guardianship Claim concerned the guardianship of Russell Peek. Id. at 257. The Will

Claim concerned the probate of Dorothy Peek’s will. Id. Russell and Dorothy are Bruce

and appellee Linda Mayfield’s parents. Id. at 256. The El Paso Court of Appeals reversed

the trial court’s judgment on the Will Claim and the Guardianship Claim and remanded

      1
       The appellee raises what appears to be a counter-issue asserting that the trial
court properly ordered interim relief. We need not address this counter-issue because
we overrule appellant’s issues and affirm the trial court’s interim judgment. See Tex. R.
App. P. 47.1.

      Originally appealed to this court, Peek I was transferred to the El Paso Court of
      2

Appeals by the Texas Supreme Court pursuant to its docket equalization efforts. See
Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 73.001.

                                            2
those claims to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction because the county court at law

had exclusive jurisdiction over the claims from its prior guardianship and probate

proceedings. Id. at 264, 267.

       The Trust Claim concerned Bruce’s alleged fiduciary-duty violations as trustee

of the Peek Family Revocable Living Trust (2000) (the Peek Trust), which was

established by Russell and Dorothy. Id. at 256–57. The El Paso Court of Appeals also

reversed the trial court’s judgment on the Trust Claim and remanded the claim for a

new trial, finding that the trial court had abused its discretion in refusing to hear the

claim. Id. at 266.

       After remand, the trial court held a bench trial on the Trust Claim and found that

Bruce had breached fiduciary duties as the Peek Trust’s trustee and unduly influenced

Dorothy to transfer certain assets from the trust. The trial court issued an “Interim

Judgment” appointing a receiver over the trust and ordering remedies for the breaches.

Bruce filed an interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s interim judgment. Peek v.

Mayfield (Peek II), No. 02-20-00107-CV, 2021 WL 3205061, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth July 29, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.). Although the parties asserted numerous issues

on appeal, we determined that the trial court’s interim judgment failed to require a bond

for the receivership. Id. at *5. Thus, we reversed the interim judgment’s receiver

appointment and remanded the case. Id.3

       3
        See Peek II, 2021 WL 3205061, at *1–3, for a full procedural and factual history.

                                            3
        After the second remand, Linda died, and her daughter Lainie Latshaw filed a

suggestion of death notifying the trial court that she would prosecute the claims as the

executor of Linda’s estate under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 151. See Tex. R. Civ. P.

151 (permitting an executor to be substituted for decedent and pursue claims brought

by plaintiff before she died).4 She also filed a motion to re-appoint a receiver with a

bond.

        Bruce filed a motion to dismiss or, alternatively, to abate. According to Bruce’s

motion, the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because Linda’s claims were

related to the county court at law’s probate of Dorothy’s will, giving that court dominant

jurisdiction. Bruce also filed an opposition to Linda’s motion to re-appoint a receiver,

reasserting his dominant-jurisdiction argument and arguing, among other things, that

the trial court’s interim judgment had been reversed in its entirety by our mandate in

Peek II, that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support a receiver

appointment, and that Linda’s claims were barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel.

Bruce also filed a supplemental answer, asserting additional affirmative defenses and

specifically denying the trial court’s jurisdiction because of the county court at law’s

dominant jurisdiction. The trial court denied Bruce’s motion to dismiss or abate and

issued an order appointing a receiver over the Peek Trust and requiring a $50,000 bond.

This appeal followed.

        We will continue to refer to appellee as Linda for continuity with the parties’
        4

briefing and our prior opinion in this case.

                                            4
                                     II. Discussion

      Bruce asserts two issues on appeal. In his first issue, Bruce contends that the trial

court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the Trust Claim because the county court

at law has exclusive jurisdiction over all claims “challenging [the] distribution of estate

assets” and the Trust Claim seeks to do just that. In his second issue, Bruce contends

that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the receiver’s

appointment. We address each issue in turn.

A. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

       In the prior appeals, Bruce argued that the trial court was barred from hearing

Linda’s Trust Claim because the county court at law had dominant jurisdiction. See Peek

I, 546 S.W.3d at 255; Peek II, 2021 WL 3205061, at *3. Bruce also raised dominant

jurisdiction in the trial court after both the first and the second remands. See Peek II,

2021 WL 3205061, at *2; supra Section I. Both times, he asserted that the county court

at law’s dominant jurisdiction deprived the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction over

the Trust Claim. See Peek II, 2021 WL 3205061, at *2; supra Section I. As we explained

in Peek II, however, dominant jurisdiction does not implicate a court’s subject-matter

jurisdiction but is more of a venue issue that cannot be raised by interlocutory appeal

from a receiver’s appointment. Peek II, 2021 WL 3205061, at *3–4 & n.2. Bruce now

contends that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the county court

at law had exclusive jurisdiction over the Trust Claim.

                                            5
   1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

       Subject-matter jurisdiction is essential to the authority of a court to decide a case.

Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. 1993). It “cannot be

waived or conferred by agreement and can be raised at any time, including in an

interlocutory appeal.” Bookout v. Shelley, No. 02-22-00055-CV, 2022 WL 17173526, at *3

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 23, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (internal quotation marks

omitted) (quoting Anderson v. Truelove, 446 S.W.3d 87, 91 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 2014, no pet.)). Whether a trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction and whether

a plaintiff has alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate a trial court’s subject-matter

jurisdiction are questions of law that we review de novo. City of Westworth Vill. v. City of

White Settlement, 558 S.W.3d 232, 239 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018, pet. denied) (citing

Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004)).

   2. Analysis

       The El Paso Court of Appeals held in Peek I that the trial court had subject-

matter jurisdiction over the Trust Claim. Peek I, 546 S.W.3d at 265. The court

specifically held, “As to the Trust Claim, the Property Code authorized the 271st

District Court to hear the issues raised.” Id. Noting the county court at law’s concurrent

jurisdiction over certain trust disputes, the court further concluded that “the issue is not

one of exclusive jurisdiction, but rather dominant jurisdiction.” Id.

       Bruce essentially contends that the El Paso Court of Appeals got it wrong.

According to Bruce, the Trust Claim seeks not only to void transactions by which

                                             6
Dorothy transferred certain assets from the Peek Trust several months before her

death, but it also seeks to reverse asset distributions under Dorothy’s will. Thus, Bruce

contends that the Trust Claim is in reality a will contest over which the county court at

law has exclusive jurisdiction. We disagree.

       Subject to limited exceptions, “a district court has original and exclusive

jurisdiction over all proceedings against a trustee and all proceedings concerning a

trust.” Id. (citing Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 115.001(a)). These exceptions include

determining facts affecting the administration, distribution, or duration of a trust;

relieving a trustee of duties; and requiring an accounting. Id. (citing Tex. Prop. Code

Ann. § 115.001(a)(6), (7), (8), and (9)). When such matters are related to a prior probate

proceeding in a county court at law, both courts have concurrent jurisdiction over the

matter. Id.

       As noted by the court in Peek I, Linda’s Trust Claim alleged that Bruce had

breached his duties as the Peek Trust’s trustee and (1) sought an accounting,

(2) complained of Bruce’s administration of trust assets, and (3) sought his removal as

trustee of the PK Revocable Living Trust, which had been set up by Bruce and received

assets improperly transferred from the Peek Trust. Id. Thus, the court concluded that

“the Trust Claim could have been heard by the 271st District Court, or one of the

county courts at law for Wise County if they were exercising original probate

jurisdiction.” Id. The record does not reflect that Linda amended her pleadings after the

                                            7
El Paso Court of Appeals remanded the case.5 Thus, her pleading at issue in Peek I is

still her live pleading.

       Bruce contends that we must disregard the substance of Linda’s pleading and

consider the “end result” to determine whether the trial court had subject-matter

jurisdiction over the Trust Claim. According to Bruce, “[t]he ‘end’ guides this analysis,

not the ‘means,’” and the “end” is “the setting aside of Dorothy’s will and the [county

court at law’s] distribution of estate assets.” Thus, he argues the county court at law has

exclusive jurisdiction over the Trust Claim. He cites Stodder v. Evans, 860 S.W.2d 651,

652 (Tex. App.—Waco 1993, writ denied) (op. on reh’g), as instructive to our analysis.

       Stodder concerned an heir’s attempt to contest a will outside of probate. Id. at 652.

Jody Stodder alleged that she was the sole heir of Richard Stodder, who had been

declared mentally incompetent before executing a will that was subsequently admitted

to probate in county court. Id. Jody alleged that Randall Evans, who was Richard’s

guardian and the independent executor of Richard’s will, knew that Richard lacked

testamentary capacity to execute the will. Id. Jody asserted numerous claims against

Evans and sought “an accounting[ ]and imposition of a constructive trust and equitable

       5
        Linda was originally a defendant in this case, which was brought by Dorothy in
2012. Linda answered and filed a counterclaim alleging that Bruce had breached his
fiduciary duties as the Peek Trust’s trustee by unduly influencing Russell and Dorothy
“to amend the trust, and ultimately to terminate the trust, to remove all other
beneficiaries except for himself and to transfer all of the trust property, ultimately, to
the PK Revocable Living Trust, a self-made trust by Gary Bruce Peek and his counsel.”
After the first remand, the parties were realigned, and Linda was named a plaintiff.

                                             8
lien on the estate’s assets,” but she did not expressly request that the will be set aside

for fraud or lack of testamentary capacity. Id. Although Jody mailed her petition to the

county clerk, it “was somehow filed in the district court instead.” Id.

       On appeal from the trial court’s summary judgment dismissing Jody’s claims, the

appellate court had to determine whether Jody’s suit asserted a will contest. Id. at 652–

53. The court observed that if Jody’s pleading could be construed as a will contest, the

district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. The court noted that Jody had

explicitly alleged lack of testamentary capacity and Evans’s fraud, deception, and

misrepresentation in probating the will. Id. at 653. The court also noted Jody’s failed

attempt to file her petition with the court that presided over the probate proceeding. Id.

       Although Jody had not expressly sought to set aside the will, the court concluded

that it could “supply the missing averment by inference because it is clearly implied by

what is alleged.” Id. (citing Roark v. Allen, 633 S.W.2d 804, 809 (Tex. 1982)). Specifically,

the court found that

       [c]onstruing the pleading as including a will contest harmonizes with the
       specific allegation that heirs at law are determined at the time a will is set
       aside, with requests for a constructive trust and equitable lien on the
       estate’s assets, and with the prayer that the court order Evans to convey
       the estate’s assets to Jody as [Richard’s] sole heir at law.
Id. The court further noted that “[a] constructive trust on and conveyance of specific

assets would be possible and necessary only if [Jody] were entitled to possession, and

she would have no right of possession unless the will were first set aside through a will

contest.” Id. Thus, the court concluded that the suit included a will contest. Id.

                                             9
      We disagree with Bruce’s contention that Stodder supports an “ends-based”

analysis. Although the Stodder court mentioned that the appellees had asserted in their

summary-judgment motion that Jody’s “request for possession of the estate’s assets is

equivalent to requesting that the will be set aside,” id., this did not control the court’s

decision. Rather, the court’s analysis focused on what was “clearly implied by what [was]

alleged.” Id. The court pointed to the appellee’s assertion as consistent with its own

conclusion that Jody could seek the requested relief only if she were an heir and the will

were set aside. Id. Here, Linda’s Trust Claim was not dependent on such an outcome.

Moreover, all of the claims in Stodder concerned Evans’s allegedly tortious acts in

probating Richard’s will or as the estate representative. Id. at 652. There was no trust or

prior testamentary instrument. Id. In contrast, Linda’s Trust Claim focused solely on

Bruce’s alleged actions related to the Peek Trust and did not concern his probating

Dorothy’s will or acting as her estate representative.6

      Linda’s Trust Claim alleged that the Peek Trust “was amended to remove [Linda]

as a beneficiary, [and] the assets of the trust transferred to Dorothy Peek.” She also

asserted that Bruce had “violated his duties to the beneficiaries as trustee of [the Peek

Trust].” She expressly sought an accounting of all assets taken from the Peek Trust,

      6
       Linda’s Will Claim is more akin to the Stodder claim. Specifically, Linda alleged
that Bruce and his counsel “made a new will for [Dorothy] that expressly disinherited
[Linda],” “took all actions necessary, using undue influence over Dorothy Peek . . . to
take for themselves the substantial and very valuable estate,” and engaged in a joint
enterprise to use “undue influence over Dorothy Peek to change her will to disinherit
Linda.”

                                            10
recovery of “all financial gain received by [Bruce] from the [Peek] Trust while he was

Trustee,” and “restor[ation of] all property removed from the [Peek] Trust.” Her Trust

Claim contained no heirship allegations, unlike the Stodder allegations.

       Bruce also cites In re Hannah, 431 S.W.3d 801, 808 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 2014, orig. proceeding) (per curiam), to support his “ends-based” proposition.

Yet Hannah contradicts his position. The relator in Hannah sued in district court for

tortious interference with an inheritance, slander, and conspiracy alleging that

defendants had interfered with the decedent’s bequest to relator. Id. at 804–05. The

relator did not contest the probate of the will, but she alleged that prior wills had

bequeathed significant assets to her. Id. at 804. On petition for writ of mandamus from

the trial court’s transfer of the case to the county court at law, the appellate court

concluded that relator’s claims did not qualify as a probate proceeding because they did

not contest property distribution under a probated will but, rather, alleged slander and

tortious interference with decedent’s prior wills. Id. at 808. The court concluded,

“Although the gravamen of relator’s suit is that relator was disinherited as a result of

the defendants’ alleged actions, that fact alone is insufficient to make her suit a probate

proceeding.” Id.

       Linda contends that she does not contest Dorothy’s will. She notes, and we agree,

that the trial court did not address the validity of Dorothy’s will. Indeed, the validity of

a will is not dependent on the assets that would be distributed under that will. See In re

Estate of Arrington, 365 S.W.3d 463, 466–67 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no

                                            11
pet.) (discussing requirements to admit a will to probate under version of Probate Code

applicable to probate of Dorothy’s will). In other words, the validity of the will has no

bearing on the relief sought in the Trust Claim. Like the claims in Hannah, Linda’s Trust

Claim concerns only Bruce’s alleged interference with her beneficiary interest in the

Peek Trust, and her allegation that she was disinherited because of his alleged actions is

insufficient to make the Trust Claim a probate proceeding. See Hannah, 431 S.W.3d at

808. Moreover, Bruce’s “ends-based” analysis would absurdly deprive district courts of

jurisdiction to hear cases contesting title to property distributed under a will. See, e.g.,

Gordon v. Jones, 196 S.W.3d 376, 381–82 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.)

(holding district court had subject-matter jurisdiction over heir’s trespass-to-try-title

action alleging fraud in probate of decedent’s will).7

       In Peek I, the El Paso Court of Appeals found three distinct claims and concluded

that the trial court had concurrent jurisdiction over the Trust Claim. Peek I, 546 S.W.3d

at 256–57, 265 (citing Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 115.001(a)). We cannot disturb this

       7
         Bruce cites other cases to support his “ends-based” proposition. These cases are
either inapplicable to the facts at issue or undercut his proposition. See Storm v. Storm,
328 F.3d 941, 948 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding Supreme Court precedent barred federal
district court from hearing pre-probate claim for tortious interference with inheritance
expectancy), abrogated by Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 311, 126 S. Ct. 1735, 1748
(2006) (concluding Storm court erroneously interpreted prior authority to withhold
federal court jurisdiction over matter “well beyond probate of a will or administration
of a decedent’s estate”); Narvaez v. Powell, 564 S.W.3d 49, 58 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018,
no pet.) (holding that claims for and arising from alleged improper payment of
attorney’s fees from estate property were probate proceedings under Section 31.001 of
the Texas Estates Code).

                                            12
ruling, see Wohlfahrt v. Holloway, 172 S.W.3d 630, 637–38 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 2005, pets. denied) (reasoning that law-of-the-case doctrine applied to disputed

holding from a different court of appeals when appellant provided “no argument

regarding changed issues or facts”), and we overrule Bruce’s first issue.

B. The Receiver’s Appointment

       In his second issue, Bruce contends the evidence is legally and factually

insufficient to support the receiver’s appointment over the Peek Trust because

(1) Dorothy dissolved the Peek Trust and the trial court has not issued a new order to

“resurrect” it;8 (2) res judicata bars the receiver’s appointment; and (3) the evidence is

insufficient to prove that Bruce breached his fiduciary duties as trustee and unduly

influenced Dorothy to transfer assets from the Peek Trust.

   1. Standard of Review

       In a trial to the court in which no findings of fact or conclusions of law are filed,

such as here, the trial court’s judgment implies all findings of fact necessary to support

it. Shields Ltd. P’ship v. Bradberry, 526 S.W.3d 471, 480 (Tex. 2017). When a reporter’s

record is filed, these implied findings are not conclusive, and an appellant may challenge

them by raising issues challenging the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to

support the judgment. Id. We apply the same standard when reviewing the sufficiency

       8
        Bruce’s brief discusses this point separately from his two issues. He does not
indicate how the point fits into his issues or request relief on this point. We interpret it
as an additional ground for this second issue and will address it as such.

                                            13
of the evidence to support implied findings that we use to review the evidentiary

sufficiency of jury findings or a trial court’s express findings of fact. Id. We must affirm

the judgment if we can uphold it on any legal theory supported by the record. Rosemond

v. Al-Lahiq, 331 S.W.3d 764, 766–67 (Tex. 2011).

       We may sustain a legal-sufficiency challenge—that is, a no-evidence challenge—

only when (1) the record bears no evidence of a vital fact, (2) the rules of law or of

evidence bar the court from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital

fact, (3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla, or

(4) the evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of a vital fact. Gunn v. McCoy, 554

S.W.3d 645, 658 (Tex. 2018). In determining whether legally sufficient evidence

supports the challenged finding, we must consider evidence favorable to the finding if

a reasonable factfinder could, and we must disregard contrary evidence unless a

reasonable factfinder could not. Cent. Ready Mix Concrete Co. v. Islas, 228 S.W.3d 649, 651

(Tex. 2007); City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005). We indulge “every

reasonable inference deducible from the evidence” in support of the challenged finding.

Gunn, 554 S.W.3d at 658 (quoting Bustamante v. Ponte, 529 S.W.3d 447, 456 (Tex. 2017)).

       When reviewing an assertion that the evidence is factually insufficient to support

a finding, we set aside the finding only if, after considering and weighing all the pertinent

record evidence, we determine that the credible evidence supporting the finding is so

weak, or so contrary to the overwhelming weight of all the evidence, that the finding

should be set aside and a new trial ordered. Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635

                                             14
(Tex. 1986) (op. on reh’g); Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Garza v. Alviar,

395 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex. 1965).

   2. Analysis

      a. Dissolution of the Peek Trust

      Bruce contends that Dorothy dissolved the Peek Trust before her death and that

our judgment in Peek II vacated the trial court’s Interim Judgment that “resurrected”

the Peek Trust. According to Bruce, Dorothy dissolved the trust by transferring its

assets, and it remains dissolved because the trial court did not reissue its order

resurrecting the trust by voiding Dorothy’s asset transfers.

      The evidence of the asset transfers and the trust provisions implicated in this

issue is undisputed. Thus, we review this issue de novo. See Reliance Nat’l Indem. Co. v.

Advance’d Temporaries, Inc., 227 S.W.3d 46, 50 (Tex. 2007) (noting appellate courts review

legal determinations de novo and concluding “[w]hat might otherwise be a question of

fact becomes one of law when the fact is not in dispute or is conclusively established”).

      At trial, copies of three special warranty deeds were admitted as evidence of the

transfers at issue. The deeds were executed by Dorothy and Bruce as trustees on April

9, 2012, and conveyed three tracts of real property identified as all or part of “Block

22” and “Block 40” of the “Smith County School Land Survey, Abstract No. 744” from

the Peek Trust to Dorothy. Copies of the trust documents and amendments admitted

into evidence reflected that the Peek Trust would terminate if all income and principal

were paid out. Bruce testified that the April 9, 2012 deeds transferred all of the real

                                            15
property in the Peek Trust to Dorothy. Thus, he contends that Dorothy dissolved the

trust in 2012.

       Each deed, however, reserved “all oil, gas, and mineral rights.” An October 18,

2010 Assignment of Oil, Gas and Mineral Lease admitted at trial reflects an assignment

of Russell and Dorothy’s “rights, title, and interest in and to the Oil, Gas, and Mineral

Lease[s]” on Blocks 22 and 40 to the Peek Trust. A December 31, 2018 Assignment of

Oil, Gas and Mineral Lease also admitted at trial reflects an assignment of “rights, title,

and interest in and to the Oil, Gas, and Mineral Lease[s]” on Blocks 22 and 40 from the

Peek Trust to Bruce’s PK Trust. Thus, contrary to Bruce’s contention, as late as

December 2018—six years after Dorothy’s death—assets remained in the Peek Trust.

       The trust documents and amendments also reflect that the trust would become

irrevocable “[u]pon the death of the first of [Russell or Dorothy] to die.” Dorothy

predeceased Russell on November 20, 2012. Bruce testified that the Peek Trust became

irrevocable on Dorothy’s death and that he was still the trustee at the time of trial in

February 2020.

       The record reflects that the April 2012 asset transfers did not dissolve the Peek

Trust by transferring all trust assets. At least one asset remained in the trust until

December 2018 and Bruce was still the trustee in 2020. Accordingly, the trial court’s

Interim Judgment did not “resurrect” the Peek Trust, and we need not address Bruce’s

contention that our Peek II judgment vacated that aspect of the trial court’s judgment.

See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1

                                            16
       b. Res Judicata

       Bruce next contends that res judicata barred the trial court from considering

undue-influence evidence because the same evidence was addressed by the county court

at law when Dorothy’s will was admitted to probate.

       Res judicata generally encompasses two categories of a prior judgment’s

preclusive effects: (1) issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, and (2) claim preclusion,

or res judicata. Barr v. Resol. Tr. Corp. ex rel. Sunbelt Fed. Sav., 837 S.W.2d 627, 628 (Tex.

1992). Collateral estoppel precludes relitigating issues resolved in a prior suit, and res

judicata precludes relitigating claims that were finally adjudicated or that arise out of the

same subject matter and should have been litigated in a prior suit. Id.

       According to Bruce, the county court at law’s order admitting Dorothy’s will to

probate is a final judgment on the question of his undue influence over Dorothy. Undue

influence, however, affects only one element of Linda’s breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim.

See Severs v. Mira Vista Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 559 S.W.3d 684, 703 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth 2018, pet. denied) (outlining the three elements of a breach-of-fiduciary-duty

claim). Thus, the question is whether this issue was addressed by the county court at

law in the probate proceeding, not whether the order admitting the will to probate

barred Linda’s breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim. See id.

       Collateral estoppel bars an issue if:

       (1) the facts sought to be litigated in one action were fully and fairly
       litigated in a prior action; (2) those facts were essential to the judgment in
       the prior action; and (3) the parties were cast as adversaries in the prior

                                               17
      action or the party against whom collateral estoppel is being asserted was
      a party to the prior litigation or is in privity with such a party.

Resurgence Partners, LLC v. Urbach, No. 02-21-00418-CV, 2023 WL 2033945, at *8 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth Feb. 16, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting Lavely v. Heafner, 976

S.W.2d 896, 899 n.4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.)).

      As previously discussed, the El Paso Court of Appeals found three separate

claims at issue in this case: the Guardianship Claim, the Will Claim, and the Trust Claim,

see Peek I, 546 S.W.3d at 256–57, and we cannot disturb that ruling, see Wohlfahrt, 172

S.W.3d at 637–38. Only the Trust Claim remains at issue in this case, and Bruce has not

directed us to any evidence showing that the facts alleged in the Trust Claim were either

addressed in the prior probate proceeding or essential to admit Dorothy’s will to

probate. See Resurgence Partners, 2023 WL 2033945, at *8.

      Although Bruce contends that the undue-influence evidence was presented in

the probate proceeding, he identifies only that the county court at law found that

Dorothy had the requisite testamentary capacity to execute the will. He points to no

ruling on undue influence. Indeed, the county court at law’s order admitting Dorothy’s

will to probate states only that the will was properly executed, self-proved, and not

revoked. See Arrington, 365 S.W.3d at 466–67.

      Testamentary capacity and undue influence are two separate issues. See Rothermel

v. Duncan, 369 S.W.2d 917, 922 (Tex. 1963) (“Undue influence in the procurement of a

testament is a ground for its avoidance separate and distinct from the ground of

                                           18
testamentary incapacity; for while testamentary incapacity implies the want of intelligent

mental power, undue influence implies the existence of a testamentary capacity

subjected to and controlled by a domina[n]t influence or power.”); see also Estate of Luce,

No. 02-17-00097-CV, 2018 WL 5993577, at *11 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 15,

2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting Rothermel). Additionally, undue influence over

Dorothy’s will could be raised only in a will contest, see Rothermel, 369 S.W.2d at 922

(“The burden of proving undue influence is upon the party contesting [the testament’s]

execution.”), and the Trust Claim does not present a will contest, see Peek I, 546 S.W.3d

at 256–57.

       Bruce notes in his appellate brief that Linda filed a will contest in the county

court at law in 2014 but that she did not pursue it, “and the County Court at Law never

acted upon it.” Copies of filings from the probate and guardianship proceedings that

were admitted at trial include Linda’s will-contest petition, but they do not contain any

ruling on the petition or any indication that the county court at law addressed it. Even

if it had been addressed, it would have no preclusive effect on the Trust Claim, which

is separate and distinct from the Will Claim. See id. Thus, neither res judicata nor

collateral estoppel barred the trial court from hearing the Trust Claim.

       c. Evidence

       Bruce contends that the evidence presented at trial was not only legally and

factually insufficient to show that he breached any fiduciary duty and unduly influenced

                                            19
Dorothy to transfer trust assets in April 2012 but also that “the evidence contravenes”

any such finding.

          i. Applicable Law

       Although Linda did not plead specific statutes in support of her allegation that

Bruce breached his fiduciary duties as the Peek Trust’s trustee, she submits two statutes

on appeal: Chapter 64 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code and Section

114.008 of the Texas Property Code. Because it is dispositive, we address only the

appointment of the receiver under the Texas Property Code. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.

       “High fiduciary standards are imposed upon trustees, who must handle trust

property solely for the beneficiaries’ benefit.” Moody Nat’l Bank v. Moody, No. 14-21-

00096-CV, 2022 WL 14205534, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 25, 2022,

pet. denied) (mem. op.) (quoting Ditta v. Conte, 298 S.W.3d 187, 191 (Tex. 2009), and

citing Tex. Prop. Code Ann. §§ 113.051–115.059). “A trustee owes an unwavering duty

of good faith, fair dealing, loyalty, and fidelity to the trust’s beneficiaries when managing

the affairs of a trust and its corpus.” Id. (first citing Tex. Prop. Code Ann. §§ 113.051–

.058; then citing Harrison v. Reiner, 607 S.W.3d 450, 462 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 2020, pet. denied); and then citing Ludlow v. DeBerry, 959 S.W.2d 265, 279 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no writ)). A trustee also has a duty to fully disclose

all material facts known to the trustee that might affect the beneficiaries’ rights. Id.

(citing Huie v. DeShazo, 922 S.W.2d 920, 923 (Tex. 1996) (“The trustee’s duty of full

disclosure extends to all material facts affecting the beneficiaries’ rights.”)); see also Tex.

                                              20
Prop. Code Ann. § 113.151(a) (requiring trustee to account to beneficiaries for all trust

transactions). Subject to exceptions not applicable here, a trustee must also avoid self-

dealing with trust assets. Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 113.053(a).

       A trustee commits a breach of trust when he breaches his statutory or common

law fiduciary duties. Id. §§ 113.051, 114.001(b), (c); see also Brault v. Bigham, 493 S.W.2d

576, 578–79 (Tex. App.—Waco 1973, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (“A trustee commits a breach of

trust not only where he violates a duty in bad faith, or intentionally although in good

faith, or negligently, but, also where he violates a duty because of a mistake.”).

       To succeed on a breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim, a plaintiff must establish,
       “(1) a fiduciary relationship between the plaintiff and defendant, (2) a
       breach by the defendant of his fiduciary duty to the plaintiff, and (3) an
       injury to the plaintiff or benefit to the defendant as a result of the
       defendant’s breach.”
Severs, 559 S.W.3d at 703 (quoting Lindley v. McKnight, 349 S.W.3d 113, 124 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth 2011, no pet.)).

       To remedy a breach of trust, a trial court may appoint a receiver to take

possession of trust property and administer the trust. Tex. Prop. Code Ann.

§ 114.008(a)(5). 9

       The rules that guide an undue-influence determination “apply substantially alike

to wills, deeds, and other instruments.” Wils v. Robinson, 934 S.W.2d 774, 780 (Tex.

       9
        Section 64.001(a) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code permits a trial
court to appoint a receiver in certain circumstances inapplicable here or “in any other
case in which a receiver may be appointed under the rules of equity.” Tex. Civ. Prac. &
Rem. Code Ann. § 64.001(a).

                                            21
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996), writ granted, judgm’t vacated w.r.m., 938 S.W.2d 717

(Tex. 1997); see also Rothermel, 369 S.W.2d at 922 (relying on, among other precedent,

Curry v. Curry, 270 S.W.2d 208, 213 (Tex. 1954), for undue-influence analysis involving

deed execution). To determine whether there has been undue influence, we consider

(1) whether an influence existed and was exerted; (2) whether the influence operated to

subvert or overpower the person’s mind when executing the document; and (3) whether

the person would have executed the document but for the influence. Wils, 934 S.W.2d

at 780. This is a fact-intensive inquiry, and courts generally consider the following

factors:

       • the circumstances surrounding execution of the instrument;

       • the relationship between the grantor and the grantee;

       • the motive, character, and conduct of the persons benefitted by the
         instrument;

       • the participation by the beneficiary in the preparation or execution of
         the instrument;

       • the words and acts of the parties;

       • the interest in and opportunity for the exercise of undue influence;

       • the physical and mental condition of the grantor at the time of the
         instrument’s execution, including the extent to which she was
         dependent upon and subject to the control of the grantee; and

       • the improvidence of the transaction by reason of unjust, unreasonable,
         or unnatural disposition of the property.

                                          22
Pulido v. Gonzalez, No. 01-12-00100-CV, 2013 WL 4680415, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] Aug. 29, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (first citing Pearce v. Cross, 414 S.W.2d 457,

462 (Tex. 1966); and then citing Guthrie v. Suiter, 934 S.W.2d 820, 831 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ)).

       “The person challenging the validity of an instrument generally bears the burden

of proving the elements of undue influence by a preponderance of the evidence.” Estate

of Klutts, No. 02-18-00356-CV, 2019 WL 6904550, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec.

19, 2019) (mem. op.) (first citing Quiroga v. Mannelli, No. 01-09-00315-CV, 2011 WL

944399, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 17, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.); and

then citing Rothermel, 369 S.W.2d at 922), withdrawn pursuant to settlement, No. 02-18-

00356-CV, 2020 WL 1646581 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 2, 2020, no pet.) (mem.

op.). “[I]n situations involving self-dealing in fiduciary or confidential relationships, a

presumption of unfairness arises that shifts both the burden of production and the

burden of persuasion to the fiduciary seeking to uphold the transaction.” Klutts, 2019

WL 6904550, at *5 (citing Stephens Cnty. Museum, Inc. v. Swenson, 517 S.W.2d 257, 260

(Tex. 1974) (observing that when a fiduciary relationship existed between sisters and

their brother, who was operating under their power of attorney and who was also a

director of the museum to which the sisters had made a contribution that they later

sought to set aside, “[u]nder such conditions, equity indulges the presumption of

unfairness and invalidity, and requires proof at the hand of the party claiming validity

and benefits of the transaction that it is fair and reasonable”)).

                                             23
          ii. Breach-of-Fiduciary-Duty Evidence

      The record reflects that Dorothy and Russell had made many changes to the

Peek Trust beneficiaries’ shares over the years. At trial, the witnesses expressed some

confusion about the latest amendment to the trust. The record reflects, however, that

Dorothy filed a petition to modify the Peek Trust on November 15, 2012—five days

before she died—to give herself the sole right to revoke and amend the trust. The

petition indicates that the final amendment to date was the fourth amendment, dated

October 18, 2010. The fourth amendment does not appear in the record, but testimony

and other evidence indicates that it removed Latshaw as trustee. Linda asserts that the

third amendment, dated May 19, 2010, was the last to alter the trust beneficiaries’

distribution percentages. Bruce does not dispute this assertion. The third amendment

requires the trustee to distribute the remaining trust property “[a]s soon as practicable

after the death of the survivor” as follows:

      Name                 Relationship         Share

      Gary Bruce Peek Son                       25.5%
      Linda P. Mayfield Daughter                22.5%
      Allen L. Latshaw Grandson                 21.5%
      Lainie K. Latshaw Granddaughter           24.5%
      Bryan G. Peek     Grandson                6.0%

      Russell died on May 12, 2014. No evidence was presented at trial of any

distributions after Russell’s death except for Bruce’s December 31, 2018 assignment of

“all of [the Peek Trust’s] rights, title, and interest in and to the Oil, Gas, and Mineral

Lease[s]” on Blocks 22 and 40 to his PK Trust. Bruce was the sole remaining trustee at

                                           24
that point. This self-dealing transaction gave rise to an unfairness presumption, and

Bruce had the burden to prove otherwise. See id. The record does not reflect any

evidence addressing this presumption or showing that Bruce redistributed the

transferred interest to the Peek Trust’s beneficiaries. This evidence alone is sufficient

to constitute a breach of fiduciary duty. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 113.053(a); Brault,

493 S.W.2d at 578–79.

       The record also reflects that Bruce failed to disclose to the trust beneficiaries

both this self-dealing transaction and the April 2012 property transfers that Bruce and

Dorothy had signed as co-trustees. Specifically, Linda testified that she had received no

information from Bruce about any of the transactions, and Latshaw testified that Bruce

had not communicated with her since she was removed as trustee and that she was

unaware that Bruce and Dorothy had transferred property from the Peek Trust in April

2012. Bruce offered no evidence to rebut these allegations but testified that he did not

know what was in the April 2012 deeds that he signed. The trial court was free to weigh

this evidence. See Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757, 761 (Tex. 2003)

(holding the factfinder is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight

to be given to their testimony). Evidence of Bruce’s failure to disclose material facts

affecting the trust beneficiaries’ rights is also sufficient to constitute a breach of

fiduciary duty. See Moody, 2022 WL 14205534, at *7; Brault, 493 S.W.2d at 578–79.

                                            25
          iii. Undue-Influence Evidence

      The evidence regarding Bruce’s alleged influence over Dorothy is mostly

testimonial. As the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be

given to their testimony, the factfinder may believe one witness and disbelieve another

and resolve inconsistencies in any testimony. Golden Eagle Archery, 116 S.W.3d at 761;

see also Figueroa v. Davis, 318 S.W.3d 53, 60 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no

pet.) (citing City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 819–20). We may not substitute our judgment

for that of the factfinder, even if the evidence would support a different result. Mar.

Overseas Corp. v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402, 407 (Tex. 1998).

      As evidence that Dorothy’s April 2012 transfers were not the result of undue

influence, Bruce first cites Linda’s and other family members’ “consistent[] misuse[] [of]

the gifts given them.” He contends that Dorothy “consistently reacted” to the misuse

“by limiting and, eventually, ceasing those gifts.” He also notes the acrimony between

himself and Linda and Linda’s admission that Dorothy always favored him. As evidence

of Linda’s allegedly contentious relationship with Dorothy, he cites Linda’s testimony

that she called Dorothy by her first name instead of “mom,” that she did not feel like

Dorothy was her mother, and that she referred to Dorothy as “Evil Dorothy.”

      He also contends that there is no probative evidence that he exerted any

improper influence over Dorothy or had sufficient control over the Peek Trust to self-

deal. He cites the testimony of Christy Lee, who had been legal counsel for the trustees.

Lee testified that Dorothy had made all trust decisions even though she was not the

                                           26
sole trustee. Lee also testified that Dorothy had made her own decisions and was “very

adamant about what she wanted to have happen[].” Although Lee testified on direct

examination that there was no undue influence over Dorothy’s decisions, on cross-

examination she admitted that she could not say whether Bruce had ever influenced

Dorothy’s decisions, noting that she (Lee) “was not with Bruce often.” Bruce also

testified that he had not tried to influence Dorothy because “[t]hat wouldn’t work.”

      Latshaw, Linda, and other witnesses told a different story. Latshaw testified that

Bruce had been estranged from his parents until 2008. She said that Bruce did not come

to Christmas gatherings and that Linda would pick up Bruce’s children and bring them

to the gatherings without him. She estimated that he had not attended the family

gatherings for about 35 years because “that’s about how long he and [Linda] had not

been speaking to one another.”

      Latshaw also testified that Russell and Dorothy had limited their gifts to Linda

because they did not approve of her husband but that they had set up a savings account

for Linda and wanted their “homestead to go to Linda.” A copy of the May 1, 2007

trust amendment corroborates this testimony. The amendment limited Linda’s trust

distributions to $4,000 per month out of concern for Linda’s and her husband’s

spending habits and allocated the “family residence” to Linda upon Russell’s and

Dorothy’s deaths.

      Latshaw and Bruce became the Peek Trust’s trustees in January 2010 when

Russell and Dorothy resigned. Dorothy removed Latshaw as trustee in October 2010

                                          27
when she suspected that Latshaw was attempting to increase Linda’s trust distributions.

Latshaw had been out of the country at the time and was told about the change only

when she returned. She further testified that when she called to confirm that Dorothy

had intended for Latshaw to resign, Dorothy said, “Bruce had told her --.”10

      Regarding Dorothy’s mental condition, Latshaw testified that in 2011, Dorothy

exhibited signs of dementia and was not able to “take care of the finances or do anything

like that.” She further noted that she had power of attorney over Russell and that Bruce

had power of attorney over Dorothy.

      Latshaw also testified that Bruce would comment that “life would be easier if

[Russell were] gone and [Dorothy] could live life in peace.” A private investigator that

the family had hired to surveil the family residence in 2011 also testified that he had

heard Bruce say that things would be much easier if Russell were dead. He also testified

that Dorothy had struggled to remember her name during a court appearance in 2011.

      April Geiger, a caregiver who was hired by the family in 2008, testified that she

had seen Bruce at the house frequently, sometimes every day. Geiger described those

times as tense and stated that when Bruce and Russell “saw each other, that was drama.”

She said that Bruce would talk with Dorothy in the bedroom and that afterward

Dorothy would “be very upset,” “wanted to be left alone,” or “seemed upset and

nervous and just fidgety.”

      10
        Bruce’s trial counsel interjected, but did not object, before Latshaw could finish
her sentence.

                                           28
      Geiger recounted an incident in which Dorothy had to go to the hospital. As it

happened, a royalty check came in the same day. She said that Bruce had called Dorothy

while she was at the hospital and said he was coming to get the royalty check. Dorothy

told him not to, “got upset,” and handed the phone to Geiger. Geiger told Bruce that

“[t]hings aren’t too good right now,” and Bruce responded, “I’m coming up there. Her

purse is there.” She said that Bruce arrived and wanted his check and that “[t]here were

some choice words, yelling, [and] security” when Russell arrived later. Geiger helped

calculate Bruce’s royalty share and wrote the check.

      She also testified that Dorothy “did what she wanted to do, but she could -- I

don’t want to say persuaded, but she just, kind of, gets rattled, and I guess goes against

what she wanted to do.” Geiger also said that she had heard about “Bruce wanting to

be in charge of the finances and stuff because of some issues that Russell had done.”

      Lauren Griffin, who was hired as a caregiver in August 2012, described Dorothy

as “weak,” “frail,” and suffering from hallucinations in the last few months of her life.

She also described Bruce’s controlling behavior, specifically noting that Bruce

prohibited anyone from coming to the house or the hospital to see Dorothy. She said

that Bruce had prohibited her from telling family members when Dorothy was in the

hospital, “even when [Dorothy] broke her hip.” According to Griffin, Bruce had also

prohibited her from telling anyone when Dorothy died.

      She also said that Bruce was “[v]ery aggressive” with his parents and that Russell

was afraid of him. According to Griffin, Russell would sometimes pretend to be asleep

                                           29
when Bruce came in. When several caregivers abruptly quit after Bruce had allegedly

berated them for bringing fast food into the house, Russell purportedly told Griffin,

“Please, please find my daughter and tell her I love her and that I’m okay. Please find

Linda.” She further testified that although Dorothy had been described as someone

who did what she wanted, “there was some influence there” and that “she was

influenced by Bruce quite a bit.” Griffin also said that during her time with the family,

Bruce was in control of Dorothy’s finances.

      Mary Kay Luker, another caregiver who was hired in 2010, testified about Bruce’s

relationship with Russell and Dorothy. She said that Bruce was at the house at least

once a day, sometimes two or three times a day, and he would call Dorothy every night

before she went to bed. Luker testified that Dorothy was “very sharp” and “knew what

she wanted.” She also testified that Dorothy had said, “When I die[,] Bruce is going to

have a fight on his hands with the family.” According to Luker, Dorothy “didn’t like

the situation, but that’s what she was dealing with.”

      Linda testified that she had a good relationship with Dorothy but that Dorothy

favored Bruce. She echoed Latshaw’s testimony that the family would gather with

Russell and Dorothy every Christmas, that Bruce would not attend, and that she would

bring Bruce’s children. She also said that Bruce “couldn’t stand” his parents and that

he regularly said he “can’t wait until they die.” Bruce disputed that he ever wished either

of his parents were dead or that he ever disrespected them.

                                            30
       Linda also confirmed Latshaw’s testimony that Dorothy had reduced Linda’s

trust distributions and was putting the amount reduced in a savings account. According

to Linda, Dorothy did not like Linda’s husband’s spending habits. She also clarified that

she did not refer to her mother as “Dorothy” while she was alive but that she did not

feel like Dorothy was her mother after she died. Linda also said that she was joking

when she called Dorothy “Evil Dorothy” but that Dorothy “was very partial to Bruce,

and that’s her right if she wanted to be, but it -- it hurt me [a] lot.”

       Regarding the alleged discord between herself and Dorothy over squandering

gifts, Linda testified that Russell and Dorothy had given her two acres near Russell and

Dorothy’s house. Despite her misgivings about living outside of town without a car,

she and her husband had built a house on the property. A year later, they sold the

property and moved into town because Linda felt that she was “stuck there with two

children in diapers and without a car” and that she was “going to lose [her] mind if [she

kept] doing this.” She also testified that her parents had never given any indication that

they would not leave her or her children anything when they died.

       The record reflects conflicting evidence of Bruce’s influence over Dorothy and

of Dorothy’s compromised mental and physical state in 2012. Specifically, trial

testimony described Bruce as Dorothy’s favorite child despite his early distant

relationship with her, his sudden interest in Dorothy’s well-being in her last few years

of life, his strict control over the family’s access to his parents at that time, his private

consultations with Dorothy and her agitated responses, and his desire and opportunity

                                             31
to control family finances. The conflicting testimony also described Dorothy as sharp

and determined, yet forgetful and showing signs of dementia as early as 2011. Thus,

there is some evidence that Bruce had motive and opportunity to unduly influence

Dorothy to remove assets from the trust and that Dorothy was susceptible to his

influence.

      The testimony also reflects that although Dorothy had reduced Linda’s trust

distributions, she did so because of Dorothy’s disdain for Linda’s husband, not Linda.

Indeed, some testimony indicated that Dorothy had retained the reductions in a savings

account for Linda. Bruce offered no evidence to contradict this testimony. Thus, there

is some evidence that Dorothy did not intend to eliminate Linda’s share of the trust

proceeds.

      We conclude that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the

trial court’s determination that Bruce committed a breach of trust, see Gunn, 554 S.W.3d

at 658; Pool, 715 S.W.2d at 635, and we overrule Bruce’s second issue.

                                  III.   Conclusion

      Having overruled both of Bruce’s issues, we affirm the court’s judgment.

                                                      /s/ Wade Birdwell

                                                      Wade Birdwell
                                                      Justice

Delivered: September 14, 2023

                                          32