Court Opinion

ID: 9352168
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-05 16:00:33.737481+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:58:18.052986
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 21-1328       Document: 010110793325        Date Filed: 01/05/2023      Page: 1
                                                                    FILED
                                                        United States Court of Appeals
                         UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS         Tenth Circuit

                               FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                          January 5, 2023
                           _________________________________
                                                                           Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                               Clerk of Court
     UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

          Plaintiff - Appellee,

     v.                                                          No. 21-1328
                                                       (D.C. No. 1:20-CR-00039-RBJ-1)
     MARIO RAYMOND SANCHEZ,                                       (D. Colo.)

          Defendant - Appellant.
                         _________________________________

                               ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                           _________________________________

 Before HARTZ, KELLY, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
                   _________________________________

          Defendant-Appellant Mario Sanchez was convicted of being a felon in possession

 of a firearm and ammunition in a bench trial and sentenced to 37 months’ imprisonment

 to be followed by three years’ supervised release. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He appeals the

 denial of his motion to suppress evidence. Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C.

 § 1291, and we affirm.

 *
   This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of
 the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive
 value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 21-1328     Document: 010110793325        Date Filed: 01/05/2023     Page: 2

                                         Background
        The parties are familiar with the underlying facts and so we recount them herein

 only as necessary to our disposition.

        Mr. Sanchez was a person of interest in a homicide investigation. On January 23,

 2020, law enforcement officers located Mr. Sanchez at the home of his mother, Serapia

 Gutierrez. Ms. Gutierrez was present with her grandson, Mario Jr., and his dog. She

 welcomed the officers, encouraging them to “search anything on the property that [they]

 wanted,” including cars and a detached garage. 3 R. 183. The officers declined to search

 the home at that time, instead opting to wait for a warrant. Warrant application pending,

 the officers secured the home and informed Ms. Gutierrez that they “may or may not be

 securing a [warrant],” which could take a while. Id. 223. As a security measure and to

 prevent destruction of evidence, the officers indicated anyone walking around in the

 home would be followed. While Ms. Gutierrez and Mario Jr. were present, Mr. Sanchez

 was handcuffed and removed. Ms. Gutierrez then left the house to be interviewed by law

 enforcement. Only the officers remained.

        Approximately two hours later, Mr. Sanchez’s ex-wife Victoria Mandujano

 (Mario Jr.’s mother) arrived to retrieve the dog from the bathroom, where it had been

 secured while the officers performed a “cursory sweep of the house.” Id. 156, 181–82.

 Ms. Mandujano looked around the home for a leash. One of the officers, Deputy Sean

 Allegar, followed her as she did so. Ms. Mandujano opened a dresser drawer in Mario

 Jr.’s bedroom (where Mr. Sanchez had slept the previous night) in which there was a gun.

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Appellate Case: 21-1328     Document: 010110793325         Date Filed: 01/05/2023     Page: 3

 Both she and the officer saw it. This observation was included in the application for a

 search warrant. The officers remained in the home for about two to three hours before

 the warrant arrived. “The officers then executed the search warrant [and] recovered the

 gun, which turned out to be a nine-millimeter handgun.” Id. 331. “Mr. Sanchez’s DNA

 was found on the gun, and . . . . [t]he bullet from the apartment that was found near the

 [victim’s] body matched th[e] gun.” Id. Mr. Sanchez admitted to possessing the gun.

        Mr. Sanchez moved to suppress the firearm as derivative evidence on the basis

 that the warrant lacked probable cause and the house was improperly impounded during

 the application for the warrant. Mr. Sanchez contended that there was no nexus between

 the suspected criminality and the home. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court

 denied the motion. The court determined that the search warrant was based on probable

 cause, even excluding the gun, concluding the officers had reason to believe that Mr.

 Sanchez would be in the home along with a “very portable device” like the handgun at

 bar. 3 R. 265–66, 322, 333. The court then ruled that the gun was found, not because of

 a consent search or any search for that matter, but because the deputy “properly”

 followed Ms. Mandujano into the bedroom and observed the gun “by chance” and “in

 plain view.” Id. 333.

                                         Discussion
        Our review of a denial of a motion to suppress proceeds with a view of the

 evidence in the light most favorable to the government, and the district court’s factual

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Appellate Case: 21-1328     Document: 010110793325         Date Filed: 01/05/2023      Page: 4

 findings will be upheld unless clearly erroneous. United States v. Romero, 749 F.3d 900,

 903–04 (10th Cir. 2014). We review the district court’s legal conclusions regarding

 Fourth Amendment reasonableness de novo. United States v. Johnson, 43 F.4th 1100,

 1107 (10th Cir. 2022).

        Mr. Sanchez argues that the initial impoundment of the home violated the Fourth

 Amendment because it was not supported by probable cause at its inception. Aplt. Br.

 32. While ordinarily a seizure “require[s] probable cause (as well as a warrant or exigent

 circumstances),” Manzanares v. Higdon, 575 F.3d 1135, 1147 (10th Cir. 2009), none was

 required in this case because Ms. Gutierrez’s unbounded permission overrode any such

 requirement. See Soza v. Demsich, 13 F.4th 1094, 1105 (10th Cir. 2021). Here, Ms.

 Gutierrez volunteered her home unprompted, including her vehicles and garage for the

 officers to view. She repeatedly advised that she had “nothing to hide.” 3 R. 224, 328.

 Her testimony supports the district court’s view of the evidence that Ms. Gutierrez

 patently indicated she would cooperate. Id. 52–53. Given this manifest consent, it is

 immaterial whether the officers’ conduct constituted a search or seizure.

        To the extent Mr. Sanchez argues that Ms. Gutierrez’s consent was somehow

 limited or invalidated, this is legally and factually incorrect. See Aplt. Reply Br. 2–5. As

 discussed, when the officers arrived, Ms. Gutierrez gave the officers permission, then

 sometime later she was voluntarily transported to the police station to be interviewed. 3

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Appellate Case: 21-1328     Document: 010110793325          Date Filed: 01/05/2023     Page: 5

 R. 46–47, 186–87.1 There is nothing in the record to suggest that during that time, she

 withdrew her permission or was unaware that the officers would remain in the home. See

 United States v. Ortiz, 669 F.3d 439, 445 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[A]ny consent given is valid

 until it is withdrawn by the defendant.”). Thus, the consent remained valid throughout

 the duration of the officers’ presence in the home.

        The gun was observed in plain view when Deputy Allegar appropriately followed

 Ms. Mandujano into the back room. The parties don’t dispute that the gun was visible to

 Ms. Mandujano and Deputy Allegar when Ms. Mandujano opened the dresser drawer.

 As Deputy Allegar was lawfully present from that vantage point, the plain-view

 exception to the warrant requirement applies. Johnson, 43 F.4th at 1110. In sum, the

 district court did not err in concluding that the officers had consent to be in the home and

 that Deputy Allegar lawfully followed Ms. Mandujano into the bedroom where the gun

 was observed in plain view.

        AFFIRMED.

                                               Entered for the Court

                                               Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
                                               Circuit Judge

 1
   Although her memory was admittedly fuzzy, Ms. Gutierrez recalled being transported in
 a non-law enforcement vehicle, while Deputy Travis Wilson (also present on scene)
 remembered escorting Ms. Gutierrez, who drove her own vehicle. In either event, Ms.
 Gutierrez was asked and agreed to be interviewed. 3 R. 185–86.
                                              5