Court Opinion

ID: 9405810
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-29 15:01:46.946345+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:24.779093
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                           For the Eighth Circuit
                       ___________________________

                               No. 21-3537
                       ___________________________

Anthony Vines, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated; Dominique
         Lewis, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated

                      lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiffs - Appellants

                                          v.

         Welspun Pipes Inc.; Welspun Tubular LLC; Welspun USA, Inc.

                     lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees
                                      ____________

                    Appeal from United States District Court
                  for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Central
                                  ____________

                             Submitted: May 11, 2023
                               Filed: June 29, 2023
                                  [Unpublished]
                                  ____________

Before SMITH, Chief Judge, COLLOTON and BENTON, Circuit Judges.
                              ____________

PER CURIAM.

      Anthony Vines and Dominique Lewis brought a class action against the
defendant companies (collectively, “Welspun”) under the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA) and the Arkansas Minimum Wage Act (AMWA). The district court1
ultimately approved the wage-claim settlement. Thereafter, Vines and Lewis moved
for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs. The district court partially granted the
motion, awarding $1.00 in fees to the plaintiffs because of the billing practices of
their law firm, Sanford Law Firm, PLLC (SLF). Alternatively, the district court noted
that it would award $25,000 in fees if $1.00 was improper.

       On appeal, we “vacate[d] the award of attorneys’ fees” “[b]ecause the record
contain[ed] no lodestar calculation.” Vines v. Welspun Pipes Inc. (Vines I), 9 F.4th
849, 857 (8th Cir. 2021). In doing so, we expressly “note[d] that ‘[i]t is well within
the district court’s broad discretion . . . to consider . . . the party’s unprofessional
conduct in the case’” “after the district court calculates the lodestar and has moved
on to reducing that number.” Id. (second, third, and fourth alterations in original)
(quoting Wescott Agri-Prods., Inc. v. Sterling State Bank, Inc., 682 F.3d 1091, 1095
(8th Cir. 2012) (contractual fee award)); see also Skender v. Eden Isle Corp., 33 F.4th
515, 522 (8th Cir. 2022) (FLSA case quoting Wescott).

       On remand, the district court proceeded exactly as we directed: First, it
calculated a lodestar of $14,056.50. Second, it reduced the attorneys’ fee award to
$500.00 “based on SLF’s egregious conduct.” R. Doc. 103, at 23. The district court
detailed a multitude of reasons for the reduction, including SLF’s rejection of “a
substantial settlement offer,” id. at 24; an “[u]nearned fee demand[],” id. at 25; and
“deterrence for [SLF’s] unprofessional conduct,” id. at 29 (internal quotation marks
omitted).

       Vines and Lewis then moved to amend the judgment under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 59(e) and for leave to file a supplemental petition for costs and fees.

      1
       The Honorable Billy Roy Wilson, United States District Judge for the Eastern
District of Arkansas.

                                          -2-
They requested an opportunity to petition for fees related to their successful Vines I
appeal. The district court denied the motion. It concluded that they were not a
prevailing party on appeal “because there has been no definitive ruling on the fees
award and all [p]laintiffs’ other claims for relief were unequivocally rejected by the
Eighth Circuit.” R. Doc. 112, at 2.

      Vines and Lewis once again appeal the attorneys’ fee award. This time, they
argue that the district court erroneously

      (1) award[ed] a fee amount that was not based in the lodestar
      calculation; (2) us[ed] the FLSA’s statutory fee award as a vehicle for
      sanctions; (3) fail[ed] to provide [them] with notice and an opportunity
      to respond prior to entering sanctions; and (4) f[ound] that [they] were
      not prevailing parties and refus[ed] to award any fees related to the
      appeal.

Appellants’ Br. at 2.

       We find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s award of $500.00 in
attorneys’ fees. See Vines I, 9 F.4th at 855 (standard of review). The district court
complied to the letter with our directive on how to calculate an award of attorneys’
fees and provided ample justification for reducing the lodestar based on SLF’s
unprofessional conduct. See id. at 857. “As we’ve said before, ‘[t]he trial court knows
the case best. It knows what the lawyers have done, and how well they have done it.
It knows what these efforts are worth.” Skender, 33 F.4th at 522 (alteration in
original) (quoting Young v. City of Little Rock, 249 F.3d 730, 737 (8th Cir. 2001)).

      Nor did the district court err in determining that Vines and Lewis are not
prevailing parties. See Yarbrough v. Cuomo, 209 F.3d 700, 703 (8th Cir. 2000) (“We
review for clear error the court’s factual findings underlying its determination of
prevailing party status, but we consider de novo the legal question whether those facts

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suffice to render the plaintiff a prevailing party.”). The FLSA provides that a “court
in such action shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs,
allow a reasonable attorney’s fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action.”
29 U.S.C. § 216(b). “An additional attorney’s fee for services rendered on appeal is
permissible under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).” Clymore v. Far-Mar-Co, Inc., 576 F. Supp.
1161, 1164 (W.D. Mo. 1983) (citing Montalvo v. Tower Life Bldg., 426 F.2d 1135,
1150 (5th Cir. 1970)).” But, “[i]n general, if a plaintiff prevails in the district court,
but then seeks and fails to obtain greater relief on appeal, he or she ‘will be hard
pressed to demonstrate an entitlement to . . . attorney’s fees on appeal.’” Warnock v.
Archer, 397 F.3d 1024, 1026 (8th Cir. 2005) (alteration in original) (quoting Ustrak
v. Fairman, 851 F.2d 983, 990 (7th Cir. 1988)).

       Vines and Lewis did not obtain the “greater relief on appeal” that they sought
in Vines I. See id. First, we rejected their argument “that the district court erred in
denying the March 2020 motion for approval of settlement.” Vines I, 9 F.4th at 853.
Second, we rejected their request for us to reassign the case to a new district judge on
remand. Id. at 858. Third, while we did vacate the district court’s award of attorneys’
fees and remand for further proceedings, we never definitively ruled on the fee-award
issue. See id. As a result, the district court correctly concluded that Vines and Lewis
were not prevailing parties in Vines I entitled to an award of appellate attorneys’ fees.

      Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
                     ______________________________

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