Court Opinion

ID: 9517007
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 23:59:41.23907+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:42:55.365165
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE WRIGHT, specially concurring: For the reasons set forth in the discussion below, I specially concur in the result reached by the majority. At the onset, I emphasize that defendant challenges only the accuracy of the jury instructions regarding the offense of aggravated criminal sexual assault rather than contesting the sufficiency of the charging instrument in the case at bar. With this observation in mind, I note that it is difficult to substantively consider any instructional error without preliminarily reviewing the charges contained in the indictment in this case. For purposes of this appeal, a brief history of the aggravated criminal sexual assault statute cannot be avoided. As part of Public Act 91—404 (Pub. Act 91—404, §5, eff. January 1, 2000), the legislators redefined the elements of aggravated criminal sexual assault formally codified under section 12—14(a)(1) of the Code by specifically excluding a firearm from consideration as a dangerous weapon under the new, revised section 12—14(a)(1) of the Code and then adding a 10-year enhancement to any sentence based on a violation of this subsection. Additionally, after eliminating a firearm from consideration under section 12—14(a)(1), the newly created provisions of section 12—14(a)(8) provided for an even greater enhanced sentence of 15 years for criminal sexual assaults involving a firearm. Turning to the indictment in the case at bar, in count I, the State charged this defendant with the newly codified but enhanced category of aggravated criminal sexual assault committed by use of a firearm under section 12—14(a)(8). 720 ILCS 5/12—14(a)(8) (West 2006). As to count II, the State inexplicably reverted to the outdated 1998 language when indicting defendant for a violation of section 12— 14(a)(1). 720 ILCS 5/12—14(a)(1) (West 1998). The parties agree that the jury instructions in this case, corresponding to the issues set out in count II of the indictment, were erroneously based on outdated language. The State urges this court to consider the cumulative information provided by all of the jury instructions to defeat plain error. Following the State’s suggestion, I carefully reviewed every instruction provided to the jury as well as the verdict forms the jury received. After doing so, I discovered that in spite of the two separate counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault contained in the indictment, the jury received only one issues instruction with regard to the elements set out in count II.2 In other words, the jury did not receive a specific issues instruction for the charges set out in count I based on the violation of section 12—14(a)(8). As to the only issues instruction the jury received, State’s instruction No. 16 attempted to outline the issues for a violation of section 12—14(a)(1) contained in count II, but was inaccurate. The inaccuracy involved the third proposition in State’s instruction No. 16, which mirrors the outdated language of the indictment verbatim and appears to be based on the former version of section 12—14(a)(1). 720 ILCS 5/12—14(a)(1) (West 1998). This instruction directed the jury to consider whether: “[T]he defendant displayed or threatened to use a dangerous weapon or an object fashioned or utilized in such a manner as to lead the victim under the circumstances reasonably to believe it to be a dangerous weapon.” (Emphasis added.) Consequently, I begin by considering the first prong of plain error to determine whether this defendant suffered any actual prejudice based on the singular issues instruction, State’s Instruction No. 16, and conclude that he did not. Plain Error—First Prong Although error occurred, the evidence was not closely balanced. The majority points out that the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that the use of a firearm was not established by the State’s evidence. This finding, requested for purposes of sentencing defendant in this case, fortuitously avoided any potential prejudicial impact which might have been created by the inaccurate statement of the law contained in the issues instruction regarding count II, State’s instruction No. 16. In my view, the jury’s evaluation of the evidence negated the inaccurate and outdated language in State’s instruction No. 16 by excluding the use of a firearm from its consideration based upon the evidence. Consequently, the absence of an accurate statement of the law as to count II did not tip the scales of justice against this defendant. Therefore, I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the first prong of plain error has not been established with regard to a violation of section 12—14(a)(1) as detailed in count II of the indictment. Plain Error—Second Prong Under the second prong, “[prejudice to the defendant is presumed because of the importance of the right involved, ‘regardless of the strength of the evidence.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 187 (2005), quoting People v. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d 99, 138 (2000). It must be remembered that the second prong of the plain error analysis does not require defendant to demonstrate actual prejudice. Generally speaking, a firearm is a dangerous weapon. Thus, based on the outdated language of the single issues instruction this jury received, the same “firearm” could have supported a guilty verdict on either count I pertaining to the use of a firearm or count II pertaining to a dangerous weapon, which could include a firearm, or as alternatively charged, an object reasonably perceived to be dangerous by the victim. In light of the fact that the State elected to charge defendant with separate counts of the same offense, the precise statutory basis for this guilty verdict becomes important because the degree of enhanced punishment is tied directly to the statutory provision violated, rather than a specific factor or element of the offense. To illustrate this principle, I refer to the statute itself. Section 12—14(d) provides: “A violation of subsection (a)(1) is a Class X felony for which 10 years shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court. A violation of subsection (a)(8) is a Class X felony for which 15 years shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court.” 720 ILCS 5/12—14(d)(1) (West 2006). In this case, it is true that the jury rejected the premise that a firearm was used for purposes of enhancement alone. However, this jury was not instructed to consider the use of a firearm as an element of the offense under count I and exclude the same firearm from consideration as a dangerous weapon with regard to count II. The State has requested this court to draw a negative inference from the jury’s special finding for purposes of sentencing that the aggravated criminal sexual assault did not involve the use of a firearm. The State argues, based on negative inference, we can be confident the jury intended to convict on count II of the indictment alone. Employing reasonable conjecture arising out of a negative inference may be helpful in this case, but justifying a conviction by negative inference establishes a dangerous precedent that is inconsistent with the presumption of innocence in my opinion. Regardless, the negative inference the State urges us to adopt is logically incomplete. State’s instruction No. 16 gave the jury a disjunctive choice regarding two issues, specifically, whether defendant used either a dangerous weapon or an object reasonably perceived to be dangerous by the victim. As to the enhancement by 10 years, we simply do not know, beyond a reasonable doubt, whether this jury signed the guilty verdict because all 12 jurors agreed the State proved the object was a “dangerous weapon,” even though it was not a firearm, or whether the jurors signed the guilty verdict form because they unanimously agreed the victim reasonably believed defendant had threatened her with a dangerous weapon, or based on some combination of both possibilities, which is also troubling. That being said, either conclusion the jury could have drawn regarding a dangerous weapon or an object the victim reasonably believed to be dangerous would have resulted in a conviction for the offense of aggravated criminal sexual assault as charged in count II and would have required a sentence enhanced by 10 years, as ordered by the trial court in this case. Two separate issues instructions corresponding to each count of the indictment could have eliminated any confusion resulting from a single “guilty” verdict pertaining to the two separate counts of the indictment. Similarly, it would have been preferable for the State to submit multiple special instructions requesting the jury to make a finding for each one of the three factors identified in the indictment that could potentially add either 10 or 15 years to defendant’s sentence. Most importantly, the State should have tracked the language of the current law in the separate counts of the indictment and jury instructions. With regard to the second prong of plain error based on instructional issues, our supreme court has said that instructional errors do not require a defendant to “ ‘prove beyond doubt that her trial was unfair because [an instructional error] misled the jury to convict her. It does require that she show that the error caused a severe threat to the fairness of her trial.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) People v. Durr, 215 Ill. 2d 283, 299 (2005), quoting People v. Hopp, 209 Ill. 2d 1, 12 (2004). With regard to the fairness of this trial, based on the specific arguments presented by defendant in this appeal and the unique facts in this case, I must concur with the majority’s conclusions that: (1) the evidence was overwhelming; (2) prejudice has not been established; and (3) structural error did not challenge the integrity of the judicial process in this case because the special finding salvages the jury’s verdict. Therefore, I concur plain error does not apply. I also agree with the majority that the single conviction for aggravated criminal sexual assault and the corresponding enhanced sentence must be affirmed based on the fact that this defendant forfeited the errors arising from these instructions. I emphasize that my concern regarding the uncertain basis of the enhanced sentence stems solely from my decision to accept the State’s invitation to consider the cumulative impact of the instructions as a whole in the context of a plain error analysis. Hopefully, at a minimum, the expanded concerns expressed in this special concurring decision will be carefully considered. At the risk of sounding harsh, using the outdated language of the Criminal Code, which was revised several years before the preparation of this indictment, is very problematic and could result in the reversal of a conviction or sentence under different circumstances not presented for our review in this appeal. See People v. Holley, 377 Ill. App. 3d 809 (2007). At the very least, the significant interests of the victim, as well as due process considerations for the accused, merit much more careful attention from the State when prosecuting the offense of aggravated criminal sexual assault and instructing other juries. For these reasons, I respectfully and specially concur in the decision of the majority.  The State did prepare and the jury did receive a separate instruction for purposes of the enhanced sentence, State’s instruction No. 19, requesting the jury to determine whether a firearm was used during the “Aggravated Criminal Sexual Assault.”