Court Opinion

ID: 9742279
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:10:03.449896+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:30.598563
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE RYAN, concurring: I concur with the holding of the court in this case. However, I write this concurrence to avoid a possible misconstruction of the language of the opinion referring to liberal construction of the disconnection statute. The General Assembly enacted laws which make it possible for territories to be detached from municipal bodies. This, of course, was a recognition by the legislature that when certain conditions preváil, owners of property who desire to have that property detached from the municipality should be permitted to do so. The statute should not be viewed as favoring or disfavoring such- detachments, but should be viewed only as a vehicle for doing so. The opinion in this case finds that the provisions of the statute should be construed liberally in favor of disconnection. The appellate court, in this case, made a one-sentence declaration that “[c]ourts have liberally construed disconnection statutes in favor of disconnection.” (177 Ill. App. 3d 673, 677.) What does that statement mean? WTrat does the opinion of this court, in this case, mean when it proclaims that the liberal construction standard should be applied in favor of disconnection in this case? I fear that the language in this opinion may be construed as lessening the burden of the petitioners in a disconnection proceeding. Neither case cited by the appellate court in support of its statement that courts have liberally construed disconnection statutes in favor of disconnection concern the burden of proof which the petitioners must bear. In In re Disconnection of Certain Territory from the Village of Machesney Park (1984), 122 Ill. App. 3d 960, 965, the question presented concerned the time limitation within which a notice of the filing of the disconnection petition must be given. The court liberally construed the statutory requirement and held that it was directory, and that the failure of the court to give public notice within the time prescribed did not affect the validity of the proceedings. (122 Ill. App. 3d at 966.) In Indian Valley Golf Club, Inc. v. Village of Long Grove (1985), 135 Ill. App. 3d 543, the court liberally construed the statutory requirement that disconnection proceedings may not isolate one part of a municipality from the rest of the municipality. Thus, in both of these cases, in construing the statute, the courts gave the language of the statute liberal construction favoring disconnection. Indian Valley Golf Club, Inc. v. Village of Long Grove (1988), 173 Ill. App. 3d 909, 915, cited in our opinion in this case, is another appeal involving the same detachment proceedings which were involved in the case referred to above, cited by the appellate court and reported at 135 Ill. App. 3d 543. Here again, in speaking of liberal construction, it appears that the court was referring to liberal construction of the disconnection statute and not of evidence supporting disconnection. In re Certain Territory of Palos Heights (1961), 30 Ill. App. 2d 336, 340, also cited in this court’s opinion, concerns whether the city should have been estopped from raising a defense to the disconnection proceedings. After reciting the liberal construction rule, the appellate court found that the trial court’s finding that the city officials procured the delay in filing the disconnection petition was supported by the evidence. Thus, it is not clear, in this case, in what context the liberal construction rule was applied. In Van Bebber v. Village of Scottville (1957), 13 Ill. App. 2d 458, 465, the court applied the liberal construction rule to the language of the statute and noted that the legislature had fixed the conditions for disconnection, and the only question the courts are required to consider is whether the owner seeking disconnection has presented a case that brings the property involved within the statute. In reading the above cases, and indeed in reading the opinion of the court in this case, one may be led to believe that the evidence in the case must be construed liberally in favor of disconnection. I write this concurrence only to prevent a possible misconstruction of the holding in this case to that effect. The liberal construction rule should apply to construing the terms or requirements of the statute and should not be applied to the evidence presented in favor of disconnection. As noted in Van Bebber, the owner seeking disconnection has the burden of presenting a case which brings the property within the requirements of the statute. The person seeking detachment must prove his case; that is, that the property falls within the requirements of the statute, by a preponderance or a greater weight of the evidence. As in any judicial proceeding, the scales should not be tilted, but should be evenly balanced; that is, the evidence presented in favor of disconnection should not be liberally construed to favor disconnection and the evidence opposing disconnection should not be strictly construed against those who oppose the petition to disconnect. APPENDIX ZONING DISTRICTS BARRINGTON HILLS R -1 SINGLE FAMILY 5 ACRES R-3 SINGLE FAMILY 2 ACRES 8-3 GENERAL BUSINESS DISTRICT LID LIGHT INDUSTRIAL DISTRICT CARPLNTERSVILLE R 2 SINGLE FAMILY RESIDENTIAL R-4 MILTÍ f'AMU Y RFSiDENTIAl C-' NEIGHBORHOOD COMMERCIAL C- > GFNFRAL COMMFRC'AL