Court Opinion

ID: 9881114
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-29 17:09:50.293553+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:59:03.700664
License: Public Domain

J-A18023-23

                                2023 PA Super 191

 NICHOLE S. CHAPPELL                       :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                           :        PENNSYLVANIA
                    Appellant              :
                                           :
                                           :
              v.                           :
                                           :
                                           :
 HANNAH M. POWELL                          :   No. 253 WDA 2023

             Appeal from the Order Entered February 22, 2023
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County Civil Division at No(s):
                            No. 2022 GN 1013

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.

OPINION BY LAZARUS, J.:                        FILED: September 29, 2023

      Nichole S. Chappell appeals from the order, entered in the Court of

Common Pleas of Blair County, sustaining Appellee Hannah M. Powell’s

preliminary objections and dismissing Chappell’s complaint for failing to make

good faith efforts to serve Powell.     After careful review, we reverse and

remand.

      Chappell and Powell were involved in a motor vehicle accident on May

10, 2020, when Powell, attempting to make a left-hand turn directly in front

of Chappell’s approaching vehicle at an intersection, “failed to slow her vehicle

down or otherwise ensure traffic was clear[, and then] proceed[ed] through

and enter[ed] the intersection where she collided with” Chappell. Complaint,

4/25/22, at ¶ 10. On April 25, 2022, Chappell filed a negligence complaint

against Powell alleging that she sustained multiple injuries as a result of the
J-A18023-23

accident.    On April 28, 2022,1 Chappell unsuccessfully attempted to serve

Powell with the complaint at a residence located at 1519 Princeton Road,

Altoona.2    On August 22, 2022, Chappell received a letter, dated 8/15/22,

from the Postmaster indicating that there was a “good C[hange] o[f] A[ddress]

on file” for Powell.

   On August 26, 2022, the trial court entered an “Alternative Service Order,”

stating:

       AND NOW, THIS 26th DAY of August, 2022, OUR REVIEW OF
       THE DOCKET IN THE ABOVE[-]CAPTIONED MATTER INDICATES
       THAT SERVICE HAS BEEN ATTEMPTED BUT NOT MADE ON THE
       COMPLAINT. IN LIGHT OF OUR COMMITMENT TO PROMPT AND
       FAIR DISPOSITION OF CIVIL CASES, YOU WILL BE GIVEN FORTY-
       FIVE (45) DAYS FROM THE DATE OF THIS NOTICE TO PETITION
       THIS COURT FOR ALTERNAT[IV]E SERVICE,[3] UNLESS YOU
       ARE ABLE TO REINSTATE THE COMPLAINT (IF NECESSARY) AND
       PERFECT SERVICE WITHIN THIS FORTY-FIVE (45) DAY TIME
       FRAME.

       IF SERVICE IS NOT PERFECTED BY THIS DEADLINE OR YOU DO
       NOT PETITION THE COURT FOR ALTERNAT[IV]E SERVICE, THE
       COMPLAINT WILL BE DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE IN
       ACCORDANCE WITH THE POWER GIVEN TO THIS COURT UNDER
       RULE 1901 OF THE PENNSYLVANIA RULES OF JUDICIAL
       ADMINISTRATION.

____________________________________________

1 A sheriff’s county service cover sheet shows that service was attempted by

Chappell on 4/28/22 and that the server “spoke with homeowner on the phone
[who] stated that they just moved in [and] did not know a Hannah Powell[,
b]ut believed the last owners moved to NM.” Blair County Sheriff’s Office
Service Cover Sheet, 4/28/22.

2 The statute of limitations for Chappell’s negligence cause of action expired

on May 10, 2022. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5534(2).

3 The 45th day fell on October 10, 2022.

                                           -2-
J-A18023-23

Order, 8/26/22 (emphasis in original). On August 30, 2022, Chappell sent

the Postmaster a letter asking “what Ms. Powell’s current address is” and

included a self-addressed stamped envelope. See Letter, 8/30/22. Chappell

filed a praecipe to reinstate the complaint on September 12, 2022; the

complaint was reinstated on that date. See Pa.R.C.P. 401(b)(1).4 On October

5, 2022, in compliance with the trial court’s August 26, 2022 order, Chappell

filed a “Motion to Serve Powell Pursuant to Pa.R.C[.]P. 430,” seeking

permission to alternatively serve Erie Insurance Co. (Erie),5 Powell’s insurer,

on behalf of Powell. See Pa.R.C.P. 430.

       On November 2, 2022, the court issued an order granting Chappell’s

motion for alternative service, stating that “Chappell[] may serve Erie

Insurance . . . by mailing within 10 days . . . a copy of the [c]omplaint” in the

matter.    Order, 11/2/22.       One day later, on November 3, 2022, Chappell

served Erie with the complaint, on behalf of Powell.       A sheriff’s return of

service form in the record also reveals that Chappell served the complaint

personally on Powell on November 15, 2022. See Sheriff’s Return of Service,

12/1/22 (“11/15/2022 11:18 AM - The requested complaint in civil action

(CICA) was served by the Sheriff of Indiana County upon Hannah Powell,

personally, at 7919 Route 403 Hwy[.] South, Armagh, PA[,] 15290.            Dep.
____________________________________________

4 For unknown reasons, Chappell filed another praecipe to reinstate the
complaint on October 24, 2022. The docket indicates that the complaint was
reinstated on that date as well.
5 Chappell listed Erie’s home office located at 100 Erie Insurance Place, Erie,

Pennsylvania 16530, as the address to effectuate alternative service.

                                           -3-
J-A18023-23

Robert Mundorff, Sheriff, return of service attached to and made part of the

within record.”).

       On November 28, 2022,6 Powell filed preliminary objections seeking to

dismiss Chappell’s complaint on the basis that Chappell failed to make a good

faith effort to diligently and timely serve Powell with original notice.   See

Pa.R.C.P. 1028(a)(1). Specifically, Powell alleged that: (1) Chappell failed to

execute proper service upon her; (2) Chappell did not effectively reinstate the

complaint; (3) Chappell only attempted to serve her once, on April 28, 2022,

prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations; (4) from May through

August 2022, Chappell made no effort to reinstate the complaint or serve her;

and (5) the statute of limitations expired during this four-month period of

inaction. Powell’s Preliminary Objections, 11/28/22, at 1-3. Powell attached

a copy of an envelope to her preliminary objections; the envelope is addressed

to Erie Insurance Company,7 with a postmark of November 3, 2022, via first-

class mail. See Preliminary Objections, 11/28/22, at “Exhibit C.” Powell also

averred in her preliminary objections that “Plaintiff mailed the Complaint on

or about November 3, 2022.” See id. at ¶ 9.

       On December 16, 2022, Chappell filed a response to Powell’s preliminary

objections, attaching ten exhibits, to prove that she made good faith and

____________________________________________

6 On that same date, counsel for Powell entered her appearance.    See Notice
of Appearance, 10/28/22.

7The envelope was addressed to the address provided by Chappell in her
motion. See supra at n.5.

                                           -4-
J-A18023-23

reasonable efforts in attempting to serve Powell. Specifically, Chappell argued

that she “carried her burden to establish that a good faith effort was made to

serve [Powell by having] the sheriff attempt service [] at [Powell’s] address

listed in the police report just [three] days after the [c]omplaint was filed.”

Brief in Opposition to Preliminary Objections, at 5 (emphasis in original).

Moreover, Chappell explained that this initial service attempt was unsuccessful

because Powell “had moved away from her only known address.”               Id.

Chappell then averred that her counsel “used other means to locate [Powell’s]

new address, including social media searches, internet searches, public record

searches, and contacting the Postmaster of Blair County.” Id. at 6. When

none of these avenues proved fruitful, Chappell avers that she petitioned the

court for alternate service in compliance with the court’s August 26, 2022

order, and, after the court granted Chappell permission to alternatively serve

Powell’s insurer, Chappell timely complied and served the insurer the next

day.8

        On February 22, 2023, the trial court granted Powell’s preliminary

objections on the issue of service of process and dismissed Chappell’s

complaint.     The trial court determined that “the actions of [Chappell] in
____________________________________________

8 The court’s order permitting Chappell to effectuate alternative service on
Erie states that “[s]ervice shall be deemed to have been made on the date of
the mailings made in accordance with this [c]ourt [o]rder.” Order of Court,
11/2/22. A copy of the envelope in which the complaint was mailed to Erie
has a postmark of November 3, 2022.             See Defendant’s Preliminary
Objections, 11/28/22, at “Exhibit C.”       Thus, Chappell’s mailing of the
complaint to Erie “on or about November 3, 2022,” which was admitted by
Powell in her preliminary objections, is the date that we deem service was
made.
                                           -5-
J-A18023-23

attempting to perfect service of the [c]omplaint fell short of the requirement

of good faith and due diligence.”              Trial Court Opinion, 3/28/23, at 3.

Specifically, the court found that Chappell did not make “good faith” efforts to

serve Powell where “it was not until [after] the [c]ourt issued a case

management [or]der that [Chappell] took serious steps to attempt to

effectuate service.” Id. at 4.

       Chappell filed a timely notice of appeal and court-ordered Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal.           On appeal,

Chappell raises the following issue for our consideration:

       Did the trial court err in finding [Chappell] did not make a good
       faith effort to serve the [c]omplaint on Powell when[:] (1)
       [Chappell] attempted to serve the [c]omplaint on Powell via sheriff
       service immediately after filing [the complaint]; (2) [Chappell]
       made diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the Powell after
       learning that Powell did not reside at her last known address; and
       (3) [Chappell] perfected service by mailing the [c]omplaint to
       Powell’s insurance carrier in a timely manner, pursuant to the trial
       court[’]s August 26, 2022, [a]lternate [s]ervice [o]rder?

Appellant’s Brief, at 5.9
____________________________________________

9 Following is a succinct timeline of relevant facts:

   •   May 10, 2020 - cause of action arises (automobile accident);
   •   April 25, 2022 – complaint filed;
   •   April 28, 2022 – unsuccessful service of complaint attempted on
       Defendant at last known address;
   •   May 10, 2022 – statute of limitations deadline on underlying cause of
       action;
   •   August 22, 2022 – Chappell receives 8/15/22 letter from Postmaster
       indicating good change of address on file for Powell;
   •   August 26, 2022 – trial court issues case management order directing
       Chappell to reinstate complaint and perfect service or move for
       alternative service within 45 days;
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                           -6-
J-A18023-23

       In reviewing a trial court’s order sustaining preliminary objections for

improper service of process

       [o]ur standard of review . . . is to determine whether the trial
       court committed an error of law.          When considering the
       appropriateness of a ruling on preliminary objections, the
       appellate court must apply the same standard as the trial court.
       When considering preliminary objections, all material facts set
       forth in the challenged pleadings are admitted as true, as well as
       all inferences reasonably deducible therefrom.          Preliminary
       objections which seek the dismissal of a cause of action should be
       sustained only in cases in which it is clear and free from doubt
       that the pleader will be unable to prove facts legally sufficient to
       establish the right to relief.

Bellan v. Penn Presbyterian Med. Ctr., 271 A.3d 506, 509 (Pa. Super.

2022) (citation omitted).

       Chappell argues that she “made numerous attempts to locate Powell

after the [c]omplaint was filed [and that] credible evidence was offered to

show that [she] made good faith and reasonable efforts to locate Powell and

perfect service.” Appellant’s Brief, at 10. Chappell contends that she “was

____________________________________________

   •   August 30, 2022 – Chappell sends form to Postmaster asking for
       Defendant’s new address on file;
   •   September 12, 2022 – Chappell praecipes to reinstate complaint;
   •   September 12, 2022 – complaint reinstated;
   •   October 5, 2022 – Chappell files motion to alternatively serve Erie
       pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 430(a);
   •   October 24, 2022 – Chappell again praecipes to reinstate complaint;
   •   October 24, 2022 – complaint reinstated;
   •   November 2, 2022 – trial court issues alternative service order
       permitting service by mail to Erie; and
   •   November 3, 2022 – Chappell serves Erie by mailing complaint, via first-
       class mail.

                                           -7-
J-A18023-23

making proactive efforts to locate and serve [Powell] before the trial court’s

alternative service order,” id. at 21, and, “given the steps [Chappell] took to

discover [Powell’s] new address and [Chappell’s] compliance with the trial

court’s alternative service order, [Chappell] has satisfied her burden of

proving that good faith efforts were made to serve the complaint.” Id. at 22.

      Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1007 allows a plaintiff to commence

a civil action by filing either a praecipe for a writ of summons or a complaint.

See Pa.R.C.P. 1007(1)-(2). A plaintiff is required to serve the defendant with

original process within 30 days after the issuance of a writ or the filing of a

complaint. See Pa.R.C.P. 401(a). If the plaintiff does not effectuate service

within that time period, he or she can praecipe for reissuance of the writ or

reinstatement of the complaint.     See Pa.R.C.P. 401(b)(1).     As long as the

plaintiff files his or her writ or complaint before the expiration of the statute

of limitations applicable to the cause of action, the original filing, as well as

any subsequent reissuances or reinstatements, tolls the statute of limitations.

Gussom v. Teagle, 247 A.3d 1046, 1048 (Pa. 2021).

      In cases where “‘service cannot be made’ in the normal fashion,”

Sisson v. Stanley, 109 A.3d 265, 270-71 (Pa. Super. 2015) (emphasis in

original), “a plaintiff may move the court for a special order directing the

manner of service pursuant to Rule 430(a).” Deer Park Lumber, Inc. v.

Major, 559 A.2d 941, 944 (Pa. Super. 1989).          Pennsylvania Rule of Civil

Procedure 430 states, in relevant part:

      Rule 430. Service Pursuant to Special Order of Court. Publication

                                      -8-
J-A18023-23

             (a)   If service cannot be made under the applicable rule
                   the plaintiff may move the court for a special order
                   directing the method of service. The motion shall
                   be accompanied by an affidavit stating the
                   nature and extent of the investigation which has
                   been made to determine the whereabouts of the
                   defendant and the reasons why service cannot
                   be made.

Pa.R.C.P. 430(a) (emphasis added).10

       Our Court first interpreted Rule 430 in Deer Park, supra, stating:

       As set forth above, Rules 410 and 430 are clear on their face.
       . . . Where service cannot be made under these provisions, for
       example, where a defendant cannot be located, a plaintiff may
       move the court for a special order directing the manner of service
       pursuant to Rule 430(a). Under this approach, a plaintiff
       must provide, along with the motion, an affidavit stating
       the nature and extent of the investigation undertaken to
       locate the defendant. The purpose of this procedure is to
       provide proof that a good faith effort has been made to
       effect service under normal methods. Only after such proof
       has been offered is the court authorized to direct
       publication or another method of substitute service.

____________________________________________

10 The Note to Rule 430 lists examples of actions that constitute a “good faith”

effort to locate a defendant:

       (a)     Inquiries of postal authorities[;]

       (b)     Inquiries of relatives, neighbors, friends, and employers of the
               defendant;

       (c)     Examinations of local telephone directories, courthouse records,
               voter registration records, local tax records, and motor vehicle
               records, and

       (d)     A reasonable internet search.

Pa.R.C.P. 430, Note. Our courts have stated that this list is, by no means,
exhaustive. Deer Park, supra at 946.
                                           -9-
J-A18023-23

Id. at 944 (emphasis added).       “The availability of alternative methods of

service as provided in [R]ules[430(a)-(b)] assures that the vigilant plaintiff

need not be consigned to an endless cycle of reissuing and attempting

personal service.” Witherspoon v. City of Phila., 768 A.2d 1079, 1084 n.3

(Pa. 2001).

        Instantly, Chappell averred in her Rule 430 motion that, after she

unsuccessfully attempted to serve Powell on April 28, 2022, she contacted the

Altoona Postmaster, on August 15, 2022, who responded with “good C[hange]

o[f] A[ddress] on file, but did not provide Powell’s current address.” Plaintiff’s

Motion to Serve Powell Pursuant to Pa.R.C[.]P. 430, 10/5/22, at 1. Chappell

also averred that she reached out again to the Altoona Postmaster on August

30, 2022, for information on Powell’s current address, “however, to date,

plaintiff has not received further correspondence from the Postmaster.” Id.

at 2.    Thereafter, Chappelle averred that she “conducted numerous Lexis

Public Records searches[,] internet searches, and social media searches to

locate Powell, to no avail.” Id.

   Additionally, Chappell’s attorney, Paul G. Mater, Jr., Esquire, attached the

following affidavit to Chappell’s Rule 430 motion:

        1. I am the attorney for Plaintiff Nichole S. Chappell, in the
           above-captioned matter.

        2. This action was instituted as a result of a May 10, 2020 motor
           vehicle incident involving a vehicle operated by Hannah M.
           Powell.

                                     - 10 -
J-A18023-23

       3. Service was attempted on Powell’s address listed in the Police
          Report on April 28, 2022. No service was made by Blair County
          Sheriff as the Powell was no longer living at this address.

       4. A Postmaster inquiry was requested for Powell’s current
          address, however the address was not provided to plaintiff.

       5. Numerous internet and public record searches were attempted
          to locate Powell, however none of the searches revealed
          Powell’s current address.

Affidavit of Paul G. Mater, Jr., Esquire, 9/30/22.

       Instantly, Chappell technically complied with Rule 430(a) by attaching

to her motion “an affidavit stating the nature and extent of the investigation

which has been made to determine the whereabouts of [D]efendant and the

reasons why service cannot be made.” Pa.R.C.P. 430(a). Cf. Deer Park,

supra at 945 (trial court’s order permitting plaintiff to serve defendants by

publication was “clearly error,” where trial court did not inquire into plaintiff’s

investigation to uncover whereabouts of potential defendants, plaintiff failed

to provide any indication of types of procedures used to locate defendants;

alternative service can only be ordered “provided the requirements of Rule

430(a) have been met”); see also Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Colton, 217 A.3d

382, *4 (Pa. Super. filed May 9, 2019) (unpublished memorandum decision)

(Rule 430(a) affidavit must detail plaintiff’s good faith efforts to locate

defendant).11

____________________________________________

11 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (non-precedential decisions filed after May 1, 2019,

may be cited for persuasive value); see also Operating Procedure 65.37
(same).

                                          - 11 -
J-A18023-23

        Moreover, as explained in Deer Park, supra, a trial court may not

authorize alternative service under Rule 430 until there is “proof that a good

faith effort has been made to effectuate service under normal methods.” Deer

Park, 559 A.2d at 944. Accordingly, the trial court’s November 2, 2022 order,

granting Chappell’s motion for alternative service, indicates that the trial court

believed, as of that date, that Chappell had made the requisite showing of a

good-faith effort to serve Powell pursuant to the ordinary service rules. See

Northern Forests II, Inc. v. Keta Realty Co., 130 A.3d 19, *31 (Pa. Super.

2015) (affidavit accompanying Rule 430 motion “must demonstrate that the

plaintiff exhibited ‘due diligence and good faith’ in attempting to locate the

defendants”). See also Rosenberg v. Reading Hotel Park, Inc., 258 A.3d

521 (Pa. Super. filed June 14, 2021) (unpublished memorandum); City of

Phila. Water Revenue Bureau v. Towands Props., Inc., 976 A.2d 1244

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2009).

        Despite the court’s earlier finding that Chappell had made a good-faith

effort to serve Powell, in its February 22, 2023 opinion explaining the reasons

for granting Powell’s preliminary objections, the trial judge stated, in relevant

part:

        Plaintiff reinstated the complaint on September 9, 2022[,] and
        filed a motion to serve Erie Insurance on October 5, 2022. Said
        motion was granted. The defendant was also personally served in
        Indiana County on November 15, 2022. There is no explanation
        offered as to how Plaintiff located Powell for [the] purpose of
        making personal service.

        After the initial attempt at service, no efforts were made to
        attempt either personal service or alternative service. It was not
        until the [c]ourt intervened and issued the order on August 26,

                                      - 12 -
J-A18023-23

       2022[,] that efforts were made to serve the [c]omplaint. Had the
       [c]ourt not issued said order, this [j]urist suspects the
       [c]omplaint would have remained unserved for many more
       months. [Chappell] offers no explanation as to why these efforts
       could not have been in the nearly four months that passed
       between the initial attempt at service on April 28th and this
       [c]ourt’s order of August 26th. There is nothing in the record to
       suggest that Powell was aware of the filing of the lawsuit prior to
       service being made.

       [Chappell’s] lack of due diligence in serving the [c]omplaint is
       apparent. This [c]ourt finds that [Chappell] has failed to
       produce evidence of a good-faith effort to serve Powell
       with notice that the lawsuit had been filed prior to the
       expiration of the statute of limitations. Therefore, the action
       must fail.

Trial Court Opinion, 2/22/23, at 4-5 (emphasis added).

       This Court finds it confounding that the same jurist who issued the

August 26, 2022 case management order, explicitly granting Chappell 45 days

to either reinstate the complaint and perfect service or move for alternative

service, would ignore the fact that Chappell did exactly what the court ordered

her to do within the 45-day timeline—reinstate the complaint12 and petition

for alternative service. See Order, 8/26/22 (“In light of our commitment to

prompt and fair disposition of civil cases, you will be given forty-five (45)

days from the date of this notice to petition this court for alternative

service, unless you are able to reinstate the complaint (if necessary) and

perfect service within this forty-five (45) day time frame.”) (emphasis in

original (bold)) (emphasis added (italics bold)).     To extend Chappell the

____________________________________________

12 Admittedly, Chappell did not perfect service after reinstating the complaint,

within the 45 days, but she did continue to inquire with the Postmaster to
ascertain Defendant’s new address.

                                          - 13 -
J-A18023-23

opportunity, by order, to petition the court for alternative service (which she

did) and then find she did not put forth a good-faith effort to serve Powell

based on her pre-motion inactivity from April 28, 2022 (date of unsuccessful

service) to August 26, 2022 (date of case management/alternative service

order) is disingenuous. Rather, a clear reading of Rule 430 implicitly requires

a trial judge first make a determination of whether a petitioner has provided

proof that he or she has made a good faith effort to effect service under the

normal service rules before issuing an order authorizing a method of substitute

service.

       We also find it troubling that this jurist would fail to acknowledge the

fact that Chappell effectuated alternative service on Powell’s insurer13 just one

day after the same trial judge issued an order permitting Chappell to serve

Erie within 10 days pursuant to Rule 430. The record evidence shows that

Chappell served the complaint on Erie on November 3, 2022, just one day

following the court’s November 2, 2022 order14 granting her the right to

alternatively serve Powell’s insurer.          See Powell’s Preliminary Objections,

11/28/22, at ¶ 21 (“Ultimately, Powell was not served until November 3,

____________________________________________

13 The court’s alternative service order specifically stated that Chappell may

serve Erie a copy of the complaint “by regular U.S. First-Class Mail, postage
prepaid, and by certified mail, return receipt requested, to the following
address: 100 Erie Insurance Place, Erie, Pennsylvania 16530.” Order,
11/2/22. The envelope attached to Defendant’s preliminary objections
evidences that Chappell complied with this directive.

14 One can hardly conceive of any change of circumstances that occurred over

the course of a single day to warrant the grant of preliminary objections, nor
does the record show any such circumstance(s).
                                          - 14 -
J-A18023-23

2022[,] after the [c]ourt permitted Powell be served by way of her insurer.”).

Finally, any “suspicion” that the trial judge may have harbored regarding

whether the complaint “would have remained unserved for many more

months,” save for the court’s August 26, 2002 case management order, is of

no moment for purposes of deciding the issue on appeal. See Bellan, supra

(as reviewing court, we, like trial court, are tasked with, admitting as true,

“all material facts set forth in the challenged pleadings, as well as all

inferences reasonably deducible therefrom”).

      Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred as a matter of law in

granting Powell’s preliminary objections where: (1) on August 26, 2022, the

court explicitly gave Chappell 45 days to either effectuate proper service on

Powell or move for alternative service; (2) Chappell moved for alternative

service within 45 days of the court’s August 26, 2022 order; (3) on November

2, 2022, the court granted Chappell permission to alternatively serve Erie,

Powell’s insurer, within 10 days; and (4) Chappell served Erie one day later,

on November 3, 2022. Cf. Northern Forests II, supra at *31 (plaintiff failed

to satisfy Rule 430 requisites for service of process by publication where

plaintiff’s counsel “totally failed to describe what efforts he made to discover

the whereabout of any [defendant] holding an interest in the Property”).

      Because the trial court concluded Chappell made a good faith effort to

effectuate service under normal methods as of November 2, 2022, see Deer

Park, supra at 944, and Chappell fully complied with the court’s alternative

service order, the trial court erred in granting Powell’s preliminary

                                     - 15 -
J-A18023-23

objections.15 See Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Johnson, 121 A.3d 1056 (Pa.

Super. 2015) (where appellee effectuated service pursuant to “special [Rule

430] order,” appellant not entitled to have default judgment struck based on

claim appellee failed to prove service of original process under normal service

rules).

       Order reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 9/29/2023

____________________________________________

15  Defendant does not argue that the trial court erroneously granted
alternative service under Rule 430(a).
                                          - 16 -