Court Opinion

ID: 9410805
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-24 17:01:22.220051+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:00.485440
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 20-14695    Document: 67-1      Date Filed: 07/24/2023   Page: 1 of 18

                                                   [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 20-14695
                           ____________________

        JAMES MATHURIN,
                                                     Petitioner-Appellant,
        versus
        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                                   Respondent-Appellee.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Florida
                     D.C. Docket Nos. 1:19-cv-20830-RNS,
                              1:12-cr-20885-RNS-1
                           ____________________
USCA11 Case: 20-14695      Document: 67-1     Date Filed: 07/24/2023     Page: 2 of 18

        2                      Opinion of the Court                20-14695

        Before JILL PRYOR, NEWSOM, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
                James Mathurin, a federal prisoner, appeals the district
        court’s order denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate his con-
        viction for conspiring to use a firearm during a crime of violence,
        in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(o). He contends that the § 924(o)
        charge relies on Hobbs Act conspiracy as the predicate felony of-
        fense, and this crime is not a crime of violence after this Court’s
        decision in Brown v. United States, 942 F.3d 1069 (11th Cir. 2019).
        The government argues that Mathurin procedurally defaulted this
        claim. Our precedent in Granda v. United States, 990 F.3d 1272 (11th
        Cir. 2021), compels us to agree. Mathurin also challenges one of his
        convictions for using a firearm during a crime of violence, in viola-
        tion of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), on the ground that the predicate offenses
        for the charge—Hobbs Act conspiracy and attempted Hobbs Act
        robbery—are not crimes of violence following Brown and the Su-
        preme Court’s decision in United States v. Taylor, 142 S. Ct. 2015
        (2022). Because the government expressly waived any procedural
        default argument as to this claim, we reverse the denial of Mathu-
        rin’s § 2255 motion to the extent it challenged this conviction and
        remand to the district court for resentencing. We thus affirm in
        part, reverse in part, and remand.
                                 I. BACKGROUND
               Between July and December 2007, when Mathurin was 17
        years old, he and several other co-conspirators committed a series
USCA11 Case: 20-14695         Document: 67-1         Date Filed: 07/24/2023         Page: 3 of 18

        20-14695                   Opinion of the Court                                3

        of crimes that included breaking into at least one home, robbing
        several stores and restaurants, and committing two carjackings. A
        more detailed description of Mathurin’s crimes is set out in our
        opinion on his direct appeal. See United States v. Mathurin (Mathurin
        II), 868 F.3d 921, 924–26 (11th Cir. 2017). 1
               In 2012, a grand jury returned a 31-count indictment charg-
        ing Mathurin and others with substantive and conspiracy offenses
        arising out of the 2007 string of crimes. 2 The indictment charged
        Mathurin with the following offenses:
            • one count of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robberies, in
              violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (Count 1);
            • 12 counts of Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
              § 1951(a) (Counts 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 17, 19, 21, 22, and
              24);
            • two counts of attempted Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of
              18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (Counts 3 and 28); and

        1 Because we write for the parties, we include only what is necessary to explain
        our decision.
        2 Before Mathurin was indicted in this case, he previously was charged with
        several armed robbery and weapons offenses arising out of the same series of
        crimes. Although a jury convicted him, we vacated his convictions after con-
        cluding that the government violated the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161,
        and remanded the case for the district court to determine whether the indict-
        ment should be dismissed with or without prejudice. United States v. Mathurin
        (Mathurin I), 690 F.3d 1236, 1243 (11th Cir. 2012). After the district court dis-
        missed the indictment without prejudice, Mathurin was charged in this case.
USCA11 Case: 20-14695      Document: 67-1       Date Filed: 07/24/2023      Page: 4 of 18

        4                       Opinion of the Court                  20-14695

            • two counts of carjacking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119(1)
              (Counts 26 and 30).
        The indictment also charged him with the following crimes under
        18 U.S.C. § 924:
            • 13 counts of possessing a firearm in furtherance of a crime
               of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (Counts 5, 7,
               9, 11, 13, 15, 18, 20, 23, 25, 27, 29, and 31), and
            • one count of conspiracy to carry a firearm in furtherance of
               a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(o)
               (Count 2).
               Mathurin’s arguments in this appeal concern two of his con-
        victions: the § 924(o) offense charged in Count 2 and the § 924(c)
        offense charged in Count 29.
               Count 2 of the indictment charged that Mathurin:
               did knowingly and willfully combine, conspire, con-
               federate, and agree with others . . . to use and carry a
               ﬁrearm during and in relation to a crime of violence,
               and to possess a ﬁrearm in furtherance of a crime of
               violence, that is, a violation of Title 18, United States
               Code, Section 1951(a) and Title 18, United States
               Code, Section 2119(1), in violation of Title 18, United
               States Code, Section 924(c); all in violation of Title 18,
               United States Code, Section 924(o).
USCA11 Case: 20-14695         Document: 67-1        Date Filed: 07/24/2023        Page: 5 of 18

        20-14695                  Opinion of the Court                               5

        Crim. Doc. 5 at 2. 3 The indictment thus alleged that Mathurin vio-
        lated § 924(o) by conspiring to violate § 924(c), which makes it a
        crime to carry a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence. The
        count referenced § 1951(a), Hobbs Act robbery, and § 2119(1), car-
        jacking, as the predicate crimes of violence for the § 924(c) offense.
               By contrast, the district court’s instruction to the jury on
        Count 2 did not include any substantive crimes or other counts in
        the indictment that the jury should consider as predicate crimes of
        violence for the § 924(c) offense. Instead, the relevant part of the
        jury instructions read as follows:
               [Mathurin] can be found guilty of this crime only if
               all the following facts are proved beyond a reasonable
               doubt:

               First: That two or more persons in some way or man-
               ner came to a mutual understanding to accomplish a
               common and unlawful plan, as charged in the Indict-
               ment;

               Second: That [Mathurin], knowing the unlawful pur-
               pose of the plan, voluntarily participated in helping to
               accomplish the goal; and

        3 “Crim. Doc.” refers to the district court’s docket entries in Mathurin’s un-
        derlying criminal case. “Doc.” refers to the district court’s docket entries in
        this case.
USCA11 Case: 20-14695       Document: 67-1       Date Filed: 07/24/2023        Page: 6 of 18

        6                       Opinion of the Court                     20-14695

              Third: That, the object of the unlawful plan was to know-
              ingly use a ﬁrearm in relation to the violent crime or to pos-
              sess the ﬁrearm in furtherance of the crime of violence[.]

        Crim Doc. 176 at 15–16 (emphasis added). The jury was then given
        a general verdict form, which also failed to specify which counts in
        the indictment the jury should consider as predicate offenses for
        Count 2. The verdict form read as follows:
                    As to the conspiracy charged in Count 2, we,
              the Jury, unanimously ﬁnd the Defendant, JAMES
              MATHURIN:

              Guilty ____      Not Guilty _____

        Crim. Doc. 179 at 1.
                The jury convicted Mathurin of most of the charges against
        him, including the § 924(o) charge. The district court sentenced
        him to a total of 685 months in custody. On direct appeal, we af-
        firmed Mathurin’s convictions and sentence. Mathurin II, 868 F.3d
        at 927.
                Mathurin later filed a pro se motion to vacate his convictions
        under 18 U.S.C. § 2255. In his motion, he challenged his convic-
        tions on several grounds. As relevant to this appeal, he challenged
        his Count 2 conviction for violating § 924(o) by conspiring to carry
        a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence. He argued that his
        § 924(o) conviction was unlawful because the jury returned a gen-
        eral verdict that did not specify the predicate offenses it relied on—
        so, the jury could have convicted him on Count 2 based on
USCA11 Case: 20-14695        Document: 67-1         Date Filed: 07/24/2023        Page: 7 of 18

        20-14695                  Opinion of the Court                               7

        conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, which was not a crime
        of violence after the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in
        United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019), and this Court’s deci-
        sion in Brown, 942 F.3d at 1075–76.
               The district court denied Mathurin’s motion, concluding
        that he procedurally defaulted his challenge to the § 924(o) convic-
        tion by not arguing at trial or on direct appeal that § 924(c)’s resid-
        ual clause was unconstitutionally vague. Alternatively, the district
        court concluded that Mathurin’s motion would have failed on the
        merits. The court determined that the invalid Hobbs Act conspir-
        acy predicate was “inextricably intertwined” with other, still-valid
        predicates, including completed Hobbs Act robbery and carjacking.
        Doc. 124 at 13 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, any error
        was harmless. 4 Nevertheless, the district court granted a certificate
        of appealability on the following issue:
               Whether a § 2255 movant raising a Davis claim bears
               the burden to show that it is more likely than not that
               his § 924(c)/(o) conviction resulted solely from the
               application of § 924(c)’s unconstitutional residual
               clause and, if not, whether the movant is entitled to

        4 We note that in 2020 when the district court ruled on Mathurin’s § 2255 mo-
        tion, the court stated—correctly under then-current law—that attempted
        Hobbs Act robbery was a valid predicate for the § 924(o) charge. But, as the
        government acknowledges, attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a valid pred-
        icate since the Supreme Court’s decision in Taylor, in which the Court held
        that attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence under the ele-
        ments clause and thus not a valid predicate felony offense. 142 S. Ct. at 2020.
USCA11 Case: 20-14695        Document: 67-1        Date Filed: 07/24/2023        Page: 8 of 18

        8                         Opinion of the Court                     20-14695

               relief on his Davis challenge to his 924(o) conviction
               in Count 2.
        Id. at 17.
                After this appeal was fully briefed, we appointed counsel for
        Mathurin. His counsel filed a supplemental brief arguing that his
        Count 29 conviction for violating § 924(c) must also be vacated
        based on Davis, Brown, and Taylor because there is no valid predi-
        cate offense underlying the conviction A judge of this Court
        granted Mathurin’s motion to expand the certificate of appealabil-
        ity to include this claim. The government agrees that Mathurin’s
        Count 29 conviction should be vacated.
                Count 29 of the indictment alleged that Mathurin: “did
        knowingly use, carry, or discharge a firearm during and in relation
        to a crime of violence, and did possess a firearm in furtherance of a
        crime of violence” in violation of § 924(c). Crim. Doc. 5 at 15. Un-
        like the ambiguity in Count 2 and its corresponding jury instruc-
        tion, Count 29 identified Count 1 (Hobbs Act conspiracy) and
        Count 28 (attempted Hobbs Act robbery) as the predicate of-
        fenses. 5

        5 Though the errors are ultimately immaterial, the Court notes that both Ma-
        thurin’s and the government’s appellate briefs include errors in their discus-
        sion of the § 924(c) offense charged in Count 29. In his supplemental brief,
        Mathurin says that the Count 29 § 924(c) offense was based “solely” on at-
        tempted Hobbs Act robbery, but the indictment listed two predicate of-
        fenses—conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery (Count 1) and attempted
        Hobbs Act robbery (Count 28). Appellant’s Counseled Supp. Br. at 12. And the
USCA11 Case: 20-14695        Document: 67-1        Date Filed: 07/24/2023       Page: 9 of 18

        20-14695                 Opinion of the Court                              9

                              II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
               “In a Section 2255 proceeding, we review legal issues de novo
        and factual findings under a clear error standard.” Lynn v. United
        States, 365 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation
        marks omitted).
               Whether procedural default bars a § 2255 movant’s claim is
        a mixed question of law and fact that we review de novo. Granda,
        990 F.3d at 1286 (11th Cir. 2021).
                                     III. DISCUSSION
               Mathurin raises two issues on appeal. First, he argues that
        his Count 2 conviction for violating § 924(o) must be vacated be-
        cause this Court has held that one of the predicate offenses for
        Count 2—Hobbs Act conspiracy—is not a crime of violence and
        thus is an invalid predicate. Second, he argues that his Count 29
        conviction for violating § 924(c) must also be vacated because the
        Supreme Court and this Court together have held that neither of
        the two predicate offenses for Count 29—attempted Hobbs Act
        robbery and Hobbs Act conspiracy—are crimes of violence, so
        there is no valid predicate offense for the charge.

        government’s supplemental brief erroneously describes the § 924(c) predicates
        for Count 29 as “the Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy charged in Count 2, and
        the attempted Hobbs Act robbery in Count 28.” Appellee’s Supp. Br. at 13.
        The Hobbs Act conspiracy offense to which Count 29 refers is Count 1 of the
        indictment, not Count 2.
USCA11 Case: 20-14695     Document: 67-1      Date Filed: 07/24/2023       Page: 10 of 18

        10                     Opinion of the Court                20-14695

                By way of brief background, § 924(o) makes it a crime to
        conspire to commit an offense under § 924(c)—that is, to conspire
        to possess a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence or drug
        trafficking crime. 18 U.S.C. § 924(o). Section 924(c) defines the
        term “crime of violence” as a federal felony that either (1) “has as
        an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical
        force against the person or property of another”—known as the
        “elements” clause—or (2) “by its nature, involves a substantial risk
        that physical force against the person or property of another may
        be used in the course of committing the offense”—known as the
        “residual” clause. Id. § 924(c)(3). In Davis, the Supreme Court held
        that the residual clause, § 924(c)(3)(B), was unconstitutionally
        vague. 139 S. Ct. at 2336. Following Davis, this Court held that con-
        spiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery is not a “crime of violence”
        as defined in the elements clause. Brown, 942 F.3d at 1075 (internal
        quotation marks omitted). And the Supreme Court recently de-
        cided that attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not “a crime of vio-
        lence.” Taylor, 142 S. Ct. at 2025–26. Thus, neither Hobbs Act con-
        spiracy nor attempted Hobbs Act robbery can serve as a predicate
        felony offense for a § 924(c) or § 924(o) charge.
              We address Mathurin’s challenges to his Count 2 § 924(o)
        conviction and his Count 29 § 924(c) conviction in turn.
        A.    Mathurin Procedurally Defaulted his Davis Challenge to His
              Count 2 § 924(o) Conviction.
               Count 2 charged Mathurin with conspiring to use and carry
        a firearm during and in relation to, and possessing a firearm in
USCA11 Case: 20-14695      Document: 67-1      Date Filed: 07/24/2023      Page: 11 of 18

        20-14695                Opinion of the Court                         11

        furtherance of, a crime of violence, all in violation of 18 U.S.C.
        § 924(o). He argues that his conviction on this conspiracy offense
        must be vacated because the jury’s verdict was based on a § 924(c)
        charge for conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, which is an
        invalid predicate. The government responds that Mathurin proce-
        durally defaulted any challenge to this conviction by failing to ar-
        gue at trial or on direct appeal that § 924(c) was unconstitutionally
        vague. We agree with the government and affirm the district
        court’s denial of his § 2255 motion on this claim.
                Section 2255 motions to vacate are subject to the doctrine of
        procedural default. Granda, 990 F.3d at 1280. The doctrine bars a
        defendant from obtaining postconviction relief based on a chal-
        lenge that he did not—but could have—raised earlier. McKay v.
        United States, 657 F.3d 1190, 1196 (11th Cir. 2011). In Mathurin’s
        case, he did not argue in the trial court, or on direct appeal, that the
        Count 2 § 924(o) conviction was invalid because § 924(c)’s residual
        clause was unconstitutionally vague. “A defendant generally must
        advance an available challenge to a criminal conviction on direct
        appeal or else the defendant is barred from raising that claim in a
        habeas proceeding.” Granda, 990 F.3d at 1286 (alteration adopted)
        (internal quotation marks omitted). Because Mathurin did not raise
        the issue at any time before filing his § 2255 motion, it is procedur-
        ally defaulted, and therefore his claim must be denied, unless he
        can: (1) establish that “the alleged error is jurisdictional,” United
        States v. Bane, 948 F.3d 1290, 1294 (11th Cir. 2020), (2) “show cause
        to excuse the default and actual prejudice,” or (3) “show that he is
        actually innocent,” Granda, 990 F.3d at 1286 (emphasis omitted).
USCA11 Case: 20-14695      Document: 67-1      Date Filed: 07/24/2023    Page: 12 of 18

        12                     Opinion of the Court                 20-14695

               Mathurin first argues that his Davis claim cannot be proce-
        durally defaulted because it is jurisdictional. He then argues that
        even if his claim is not jurisdictional, we should nevertheless excuse
        his procedural default because he has demonstrated cause and prej-
        udice, and he has shown his actual innocence.
               i. Mathurin’s Davis Claim is Not Jurisdictional.
                In relevant part, § 924(o) provides that “[a] person who con-
        spires to commit an offense under [§ 924(c)] shall be imprisoned for
        not more than 20 years, fined under this title, or both.” 18 U.S.C.
        § 924(o). The thrust of Mathurin’s argument is that because the
        § 924(o) count had no valid predicate § 924(c) offense, the charge
        did not accuse Mathurin of any offense, and the district court had
        no authority to enter judgment against him on that count. Were
        Mathurin’s § 924(o) conviction based on invalid predicates only, he
        would be correct. But because the § 924(o) count also relied on
        valid Hobbs Act robbery and carjacking predicates, we must reject
        his jurisdictional claim.
               District courts have power to adjudicate “all offenses against
        the laws of the United States.” Id. § 3231. And an indictment that
        “charges the defendant with violating a valid federal statute as en-
        acted in the United States Code” is sufficient to invoke the court's
        jurisdiction under § 3231. United States v. Brown, 752 F.3d 1344, 1354
        (11th Cir. 2014). But “when the indictment itself fails to charge a
        crime, the district court lacks jurisdiction.” United States v. Moore,
        954 F.3d 1322, 1334 (11th Cir. 2020); see also United States v. Peter,
        310 F.3d 709, 713 (11th Cir. 2002) (“[A] district court is without
USCA11 Case: 20-14695      Document: 67-1       Date Filed: 07/24/2023      Page: 13 of 18

        20-14695                Opinion of the Court                          13

        jurisdiction to accept a guilty plea to a ‘non-offense.’”). An indict-
        ment could “fail to charge a legitimate offense” when, for example,
        the statute establishing the offense is unconstitutional or has some
        other defect. See United States v. Saac, 632 F.3d 1203, 1208 (11th Cir.
        2011).
               Mathurin argues that the Count 2 § 924(o) charge was pred-
        icated on an offense that does not satisfy § 924(c)’s elements clause.
        In his view, because Count 2, as a whole, fails to satisfy § 924(o)’s
        statutory definition, it fails to charge him with an offense over
        which the district court had jurisdiction, so his challenge cannot be
        defaulted. After Davis and Brown, Count 1 (conspiracy to commit
        Hobbs Act robbery) and Counts 3 and 28 (attempted Hobbs Act
        robbery) cannot qualify as valid crimes of violence under § 924(c);
        therefore, they cannot predicate the § 924(o) conspiracy charge. See
        Davis, 139 S. Ct. at 2336; Brown, 942 F.3d at 1075–76. This Court
        has suggested that an invalid-predicate claim might be jurisdic-
        tional if all predicate offenses underlying a particular charge were
        invalid. See United States v. St. Hubert, 909 F.3d 335, 344 (11th Cir.
        2019) (describing a defendant’s constitutional claim as jurisdictional
        where he challenged the validity of all underlying predicate of-
        fenses), abrogated in part on other grounds by Davis, 139 S. Ct. at 2336,
        and Taylor, 142 S. Ct. at 2025–26; see also Peter, 310 F.3d at 714 (de-
        scribing as jurisdictional a claim that “the indictment consisted only
        of specific conduct that, as a matter of law, was outside the sweep
        of the charging statute”). In this case, the indictment did not rely
        solely on invalid predicate offenses for the § 924(o) crime charged
        in Count 2. It identified other offenses, including 12 completed
USCA11 Case: 20-14695       Document: 67-1         Date Filed: 07/24/2023        Page: 14 of 18

        14                        Opinion of the Court                     20-14695

        Hobbs Act robbery offenses and two federal carjacking offenses.
        See Crim. Doc. 5. The jury found Mathurin guilty of all but one
        count of Hobbs Act robbery 6 (Counts 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 17, 19,
        22, and 24) and of both carjacking counts (Counts 26 and 30). 7
               Thus, any one or a combination of the 11 counts of com-
        pleted Hobbs Act robbery and/or the two counts of carjacking
        could have validly predicated Mathurin’s Count 2 § 924(o) convic-
        tion. Mathurin is correct that the indictment, jury instructions, and
        jury verdict form do not clarify which of the many charged offenses
        served as predicate crimes of violence. But in Granda we held that
        § 924(o) requires only one predicate offense that qualifies as a valid
        crime of violence. Granda, 990 F.3d at 1288–89 (explaining that “re-
        liance on any” one of the possible valid predicates “would have pro-
        vided a wholly independent, sufficient, and legally valid basis” to
        convict). Because Mathurin could have been convicted on Count 2
        based on other valid predicates, his jurisdictional argument fails.

        6 The indictment charged 12 counts of completed Hobbs Act robbery, but the
        jury found Mathurin not guilty on Count 21, leaving 11 counts of completed
        Hobbs Act robbery that could serve as predicates for the § 924(o) offense
        charged in Count 2.
        7 Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Davis, we have stated “carjacking
        qualifies as a crime of violence under the elements clause of § 924(c)(3)(A).”
        Steiner v. United States, 940 F.3d 1282, 1293 (11th Cir. 2019).
USCA11 Case: 20-14695     Document: 67-1      Date Filed: 07/24/2023     Page: 15 of 18

        20-14695               Opinion of the Court                        15

              ii. Mathurin Has Not Established Cause to Excuse His Default.
               Mathurin next argues that he has established cause to excuse
        his procedural default. This issue, too, is controlled by our decision
        in Granda.
                “Where a constitutional claim is so novel that its legal basis
        is not reasonably available to counsel, a defendant has cause for his
        failure to raise the claim.” Granda, 990 F.3d at 1286 (alteration
        adopted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The cause question is
        “not whether subsequent legal developments have made counsel’s
        task easier, but whether at the time of the default the claim was
        available at all.” McCoy v. United States, 266 F.3d 1245, 1258 (11th
        Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).
               In Granda, the defendant challenged his § 924(o) conviction
        based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Davis. 990 F.3d at 1286.
        We concluded that he had not established cause because his Davis
        claim was not sufficiently novel to excuse the default. Id. We ex-
        plained that, despite the Supreme Court’s announcement of a new
        constitutional rule when it declared § 924(c)’s residual clause un-
        constitutionally vague, Davis was not “a sufficiently clear break
        with the past” such that his attorney could not have raised the
        vagueness challenge on his direct appeal in 2009 based on due-pro-
        cess principles. Id. at 1286 (internal quotation marks omitted). The
        same is true for Mathurin. He filed his direct appeal in 2015. If
        Granda “did not lack the building blocks of a due process vagueness
        challenge to the § 924(c) residual clause” in 2009, then Mathurin
        plainly did not at the time of his direct appeal in 2015. Id. at 1287
USCA11 Case: 20-14695     Document: 67-1      Date Filed: 07/24/2023     Page: 16 of 18

        16                     Opinion of the Court                 20-14695

        (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, he cannot demonstrate
        cause.
               Mathurin argues that Granda was wrongly decided. But un-
        der this Court’s prior-panel-precedent rule, “a prior panel’s holding
        is binding on all subsequent panels unless and until it is overruled
        or undermined by the Supreme Court or by this Court sitting en
        banc.” United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008).
        We are therefore compelled to conclude that Mathurin’s cause ar-
        gument is foreclosed by Granda.
               We have held that “overcoming the procedural-default bar
        requires both cause and prejudice,” so Mathurin’s “failure to estab-
        lish cause is fatal.” United States v. Bane, 948 F.3d 1290, 1987 (11th
        Cir. 2020) (emphasis in original). We need not address whether he
        established actual prejudice.
               iii. Mathurin Has Not Demonstrated His Actual Innocence.
               Mathurin argues that “he has demonstrated . . . actual inno-
        cence” to excuse his default. Appellant’s Counseled Supp. Br. at 32
        n.5. We have held that the “actual innocence exception” requires a
        showing of “factual innocence” of the crime that serves as a predi-
        cate offense. McKay, 657 F.3d at 1199 (emphasis omitted). “To
        demonstrate actual innocence of the § 924(o) offense, [Mathurin]
        would have to show that no reasonable juror would have con-
        cluded he conspired to possess a firearm in furtherance of any of
        the valid predicate offenses.” Granda, 990 F.3d at 1292.
              Nowhere in his briefing does Mathurin claim he is factually
        innocent of the 11 Hobbs Act robberies and two carjackings that
USCA11 Case: 20-14695     Document: 67-1      Date Filed: 07/24/2023      Page: 17 of 18

        20-14695               Opinion of the Court                        17

        are valid predicate offenses for § 924(o) count. The closest he
        comes is by arguing that the government’s failure to specify the
        counts in the indictment that were intended to predicate the
        § 924(o) count leaves open the possibility that the jury relied on
        Hobbs Act conspiracy in Count 1—which is not a crime of vio-
        lence—as the predicate to convict him. But pointing to the lack of
        clarity in an indictment and a general jury verdict form was not
        enough to demonstrate factual innocence to cure the procedural
        default in Granda, and it is not enough to do so here. See id.; McKay,
        657 F.3d at 1199.
               We agree with the district court that Mathurin has proce-
        durally defaulted his claim based on Davis that the § 924(o) count is
        invalid. Because this claim is not jurisdictional, and because he has
        neither established cause to excuse his default nor demonstrated
        actual innocence, we deny his challenge to the Count 2 § 924(o)
        conviction.
        B.     Mathurin’s Count 29 § 924(c) Conviction Must be Vacated.
               Mathurin’s second argument on appeal is that his Count 29
        conviction for violating § 924(c) must be vacated. He points out
        that the predicate offenses for Count 29 were Hobbs Act conspiracy
        and attempted Hobbs Act robbery. Because the Supreme Court’s
        and this Court’s decisions, taken together, establish that neither of-
        fense is a crime of violence that can serve as a predicate offense,
        Mathurin says, this conviction must be vacated. See Davis, 139 S.
        Ct. at 2336; Taylor, 142 S. Ct at 2025–26; Brown, 942 F.3d at 1075–
        76.
USCA11 Case: 20-14695      Document: 67-1      Date Filed: 07/24/2023     Page: 18 of 18

        18                     Opinion of the Court                  20-14695

               Mathurin did not raise this argument at trial or on direct ap-
        peal. Although the government insists that Mathurin has defaulted
        his § 924(o) claim, it takes a different stance on this § 924(c) claim.
        The government concedes that Mathurin’s Count 29 § 924(c) con-
        viction should be vacated. It expressly waived all procedural-de-
        fault arguments. See Seabrooks v. United States, 32 F.4th 1375, 1384
        (11th Cir. 2022) (recognizing that procedural default is an affirma-
        tive defense the government may waive). Given the Supreme
        Court’s decisions in Davis and Taylor, and this Court’s decision in
        Brown, we conclude that Mathurin’s § 924(c) conviction in Count
        29 must be vacated and his case must be remanded to the district
        court for de novo resentencing. See United States v. Mixon, 115 F.3d
        900, 903 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that after a defendant’s § 924(c)
        conviction was vacated, the district court properly resentenced the
        defendant on related but unchallenged counts).
                                  IV. CONCLUSION
               For the above reasons, we aﬃrm in part, reverse in part,
        and remand. We aﬃrm the district court’s denial of Mathurin’s
        § 2255 motion as to his conviction on Count 2 for violating
        § 924(o). However, we reverse the district court’s denial of his
        § 2255 motion to the extent it raised a challenge to his Count 29
        conviction for violating § 924(c) and remand to the district court
        for resentencing.
            AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND
        REMANDED.