Court Opinion

ID: 9914660
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-02 18:07:07.369974+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:14:17.020924
License: Public Domain

J-S32038-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  JUAN ANTONIO SANCHEZ                         :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 73 MDA 2023

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 26, 2022
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-06-CR-0002093-2017

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                            FILED: JANUARY 2, 2024

       Appellant Juan Antonio Sanchez appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed after the trial court convicted him of aggravated assault and related

offenses. Appellant’s counsel (Counsel) has filed a petition to withdraw and

an Anders/Santiago1 brief.           After review, we grant Counsel’s petition to

withdraw and affirm the judgment of sentence.

       The trial court summarized the factual history of this case as follows:

       On June 11, 2016, Luis Salame, along with his friend “Gordo,”[fn3]
       was at the auto body shop of William Marrero located in Glenside,
       Reading, Berks County, Pennsylvania.        Gordo borrowed a
       motorcycle from Mr. Marrero to go riding with Luis Salame,
       nicknamed “Chewy,” who was riding another small motorcycle.
       The borrowed motorcycle belonged to Mr. Marrero’s son Antonio.

____________________________________________

1 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Commonwealth v. Santiago,

978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009).
J-S32038-23

          [fn3] The nickname was the only name provided during any

          trial testimony.

       At the intersection of Avenue B and Avenue C [in Reading], Gordo
       crashed and fell off Antonio’s motorcycle, damaging it. William
       Marrero came to the scene of the crash. Mr. Marrero was upset
       about the damage to the motorcycle and an argument ensued,
       causing a crowd to gather. Mr. Salame wanted to return to the
       garage and fix the motorcycle. [Appellant], who was watching the
       argument, stated that “if it was him, he would have charged me
       for the motorcycle right there[.]” [Appellant] and Mr. Salame had
       never met before this incident.

       Mr. Salame, pacing angrily and animatedly around the area,
       argued with Mr. Marrero and then turned to argue with [Appellant]
       after he interjected himself into the discussion about the
       motorcycle. During the verbal argument between Mr. Salame and
       [Appellant], [Jose Santiago a.k.a.] “Joselito,” a friend of Mr.
       Salame, approached. The three men were arguing in close
       proximity, with Mr. Salame indicating that he wanted to fight. Mr.
       Salame was waving his arms and lifted his shirt indicating “he did
       not have a gun and if there was going to be a fight, to fight like a
       man.” At some point, [Mr. Santiago] pushed [Appellant]. Neither
       [Mr. Santiago] nor Mr. Salame were armed. [Appellant] pulled
       out a gun and shot, first at [Mr. Santiago], and then at Mr.
       Salame, who suffered a gunshot wound to his right leg.

Trial Ct. Op., 4/24/23, at 3-4 (citations omitted and some formatting altered).

       Subsequently, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with two counts of

aggravated assault, one count of recklessly endangering another person

(REAP), and one count of possession of an instrument of crime (PIC).2

       On January 9, 2018, Appellant filed an omnibus pre-trial motion, which

included a motion for a writ of habeas corpus.       Appellant argued that the

Commonwealth had failed to establish a prima facie case as to all charges.

____________________________________________

2 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2702(a)(1), 2702(a)(4), 2705, and 907(b), respectively.

                                           -2-
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Appellant’s Omnibus Pre-trial Mot., 1/9/18, at 2-3 (unpaginated). The trial

court held a hearing January 17, 2018. The Commonwealth presented the

testimony of Mr. Salame and a surveillance video. N.T. Omnibus Mot. Hr’g,

1/17/18, at 4-23.       At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied

Appellant’s habeas corpus motion. Id. at 25.

       On January 7, 2019, the trial court held a trial on stipulated facts,

including the transcript from the January 17, 2018 hearing and the

surveillance video. Appellant argued that he opened fire in self-defense. The

trial court initially held its verdict under advisement, and on January 14, 2019,

the trial court found Appellant guilty of all counts.

       After Appellant failed to appear for the sentencing hearing scheduled on

February 13, 2019, the trial court issued a bench warrant.        Appellant was

eventually arrested in New Jersey and extradited to Pennsylvania. On October

26, 2022, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of four and

one-half to twenty-two years’ incarceration followed by three years’

probation.3

____________________________________________

3 Specifically, the trial court sentenced Appellant to four to twenty years’
incarceration for count one, aggravated assault, a consecutive term of six
months to two years’ incarceration for count three, REAP, and a consecutive
term of three years’ probation for count four, PIC. Lastly, the trial court
determined that count two, aggravated assault, merged with count one.

                                           -3-
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       Appellant filed a timely motion requesting permission to file a post-

sentence motion nunc pro tunc on November 28, 2022.4            The trial court

granted Appellant’s motion the same day.         Appellant filed a timely post-

sentence motion nunc pro tunc seeking reconsideration of sentence and

challenging both the sufficiency and weight of the evidence.       Specifically,

Appellant argued that his convictions were against the weight of the evidence

because he did not have the opportunity to retreat, shot the complainant in

self-defense, and the video of the altercation contradicted Mr. Salame’s

testimony. Post-Sentence Mot., 12/15/22, at 1-2 (unpaginated). The trial

court denied Appellant’s post-sentence motion on December 23, 2022.

       Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. Appellant and the trial court

both complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

____________________________________________

4 A post-sentence motion nunc pro tunc will toll the appeal period if the
defendant requests permission to file a post-sentence motion nunc pro tunc
and the trial court explicitly grants the request within thirty days of the
imposition of sentence. Commonwealth v. Dreves, 839 A.2d 1122, 1128-
29, 1128 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2003) (en banc).

Appellant’s request to file a post-sentence motion nunc pro tunc and the trial
court’s order granting that request were filed within the thirty-day appeal
period because the last day of the appeal period fell on Friday November 25,
2022, and the Berks County Courthouse was closed on that day in observation
of   the   Thanksgiving      holiday.     See    “2022    Holiday  Schedule”
https://www.countyofberks.com/getmedia/58f0c308-c22a-4e4f-8cf1-
4c5d332d42c0/2022-Holiday-Listing.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2023).
Accordingly, the last day of the appeal period was Monday, November 28,
2022. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1908 (excluding holidays and weekends from time
computations).

                                           -4-
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         Counsel has identified the following issues in the Anders/Santiago

brief:

         1. Whether the [trial] court erred in denying the post-sentence
            challenge to the weight and sufficiency of the evidence.

         2. Whether the [trial] court imposed an excessive sentence on
            Appellant, thereby abusing its discretion.

Anders/Santiago Brief at 10 (formatting altered).

         “When faced with a purported Anders[/Santiago] brief, this Court may

not review the merits of any possible underlying issues without first examining

counsel’s request to withdraw.”     Commonwealth v. Wimbush, 951 A.2d

379, 382 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted). Counsel must comply with the

technical requirements for petitioning to withdraw by (1) filing a petition for

leave to withdraw stating that after making a conscientious examination of

the record, counsel has determined that the appeal would be frivolous; (2)

providing a copy of the brief to the appellant; and (3) advising the appellant

that he has the right to retain private counsel, proceed pro se, or raise

additional arguments that the appellant considers worthy of the court’s

attention. See Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 928 A.2d 287, 290 (Pa. Super.

2007) (en banc). In an Anders/Santiago brief, counsel must set forth the

issues that the defendant wishes to raise and any other claims necessary to

effectuate appellate presentation of those issues.       Commonwealth v.

Millisock, 873 A.2d 748, 751 (Pa. Super. 2005).

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      Additionally, counsel must file a brief that meets the requirements

established in Santiago, namely:

      (1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with
      citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that
      counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth
      counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state
      counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous.
      Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling
      case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion
      that the appeal is frivolous.

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361.

      “Once counsel has satisfied the above requirements, it is then this

Court’s duty to conduct its own review of the trial court’s proceedings and

render an independent judgment as to whether the appeal is, in fact, wholly

frivolous.” Goodwin, 928 A.2d at 291 (citation omitted). This includes “an

independent review of the record to discern if there are any additional, non-

frivolous issues overlooked by counsel.” Commonwealth v. Flowers, 113

A.3d 1246, 1250 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation and footnote omitted); accord

Commonwealth v. Yorgey, 188 A.3d 1190, 1197 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en

banc).

      Here, Counsel has complied with the procedural requirements for

seeking withdrawal by filing a petition to withdraw, sending Appellant a letter

notifying Appellant of his intent to withdraw, explaining his appellate rights,

informing Appellant of his right to proceed pro se or with private counsel, and

supplying Appellant with a copy of the Anders/Santiago brief.               See

Goodwin, 928 A.2d at 290. Counsel also provided this Court with a copy of

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his letter to Appellant informing him of his rights.        Moreover, Counsel’s

Anders/Santiago brief complies with the requirements of Santiago.

Counsel includes a summary of the relevant factual and procedural history,

refers to the portions of the record that could arguably support Appellant’s

claim, and sets forth the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.           See

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361. Accordingly, we conclude that Counsel has met

the technical requirements of Anders and Santiago, and we will proceed to

address the issues presented in Counsel’s Anders/Santiago brief.

                            Sufficiency of the Evidence

       The first issue identified by Counsel is that the evidence was insufficient

to sustain Appellant’s convictions because Appellant had presented a defense

of justification.5   Anders/Santiago Brief at 22-25.      Specifically, Appellant

contends that he was justified in shooting the complainant, Mr. Salame, in the

leg because Appellant was reasonably in fear that one of the other men

involved had a gun, he did not have the ability to retreat because he was

surrounded, and he did not provoke the confrontation. Id. at 23-24.

       In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, our standard

of review is as follows:

____________________________________________

5  Because Appellant challenges both the sufficiency and weight of the
evidence, we address the sufficiency of the evidence first.               See
Commonwealth v. Spence, 290 A.3d 301, 308 n.4 (Pa. Super. 2023)
(stating that because “a successful sufficiency of the evidence claim warrants
discharge on the pertinent crime, we shall address this issue first” (citation
omitted)).

                                           -7-
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     Because a determination of evidentiary sufficiency presents a
     question of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope
     of review is plenary. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence,
     we must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial and all
     reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in the light most
     favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, were sufficient
     to prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
     The facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth
     need not preclude every possibility of innocence. It is within the
     province of the fact-finder to determine the weight to be accorded
     to each witness’s testimony and to believe all, part, or none of the
     evidence. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving
     every element of the crime by means of wholly circumstantial
     evidence. Moreover, as an appellate court, we may not re-weigh
     the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the fact-
     finder.

Commonwealth v. Palmer, 192 A.3d 85, 89 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation

omitted and formatting altered).

     Under the Crimes Code, self-defense is a defense of justification, which

is a complete defense to criminal liability. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 502. We have

explained that

     [t]he use of force against a person is justified when the actor
     believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose
     of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by the other
     person. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 505(a). When a defendant raises the
     issue of self-defense, the Commonwealth bears the burden to
     disprove such a defense beyond a reasonable doubt.

Commonwealth v. Bullock, 948 A.2d 818, 824 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation

omitted).

     To disprove a defendant’s claim of self-defense, the Commonwealth

must establish at least one of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

     1) the accused did not reasonably believe that he was in danger
     of death or serious bodily injury; or 2) the accused provoked or

                                    -8-
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      continued the use of force; or 3) the accused had a duty to retreat
      and the retreat was possible with complete safety. It remains the
      province of the [fact-finder] to determine whether the accused’s
      belief was reasonable, whether he was free of provocation, and
      whether he had no duty to retreat.

Commonwealth v. McClendon, 874 A.2d 1223, 1230 (Pa. Super. 2005)

(citations and quotation marks omitted).

      “The complainant can serve as a witness to the incident to refute a self-

defense claim. Although the Commonwealth is required to disprove a claim

of self-defense arising from any source beyond a reasonable doubt, a fact-

finder is not required to believe the testimony of the defendant who raises the

claim.”   Commonwealth v. Smith, 97 A.3d 782, 788 (Pa. Super. 2014)

(citations omitted and formatting altered).

      Here, the trial court addressed Appellant’s claim as follows:

      [Appellant] alleges he properly raised this affirmative defense and
      that it was not rebutted by the Commonwealth beyond a
      reasonable doubt. Specifically, he asserts that he “had reason to
      believe that at least one of his assailants might have had a gun
      on him—which, in view of this man’s known violent propensities
      and his history of being guided by undue violent impulses in his
      use of that gun, gave [Appellant] additional reason for imminent
      fear of death, especially given the evidence that this particular
      assailant was aggressively looking for a fight.” While [Appellant]
      does not specify which person to whom he is referring, [Mr.
      Salame] or [Mr. Santiago], the record is devoid of any knowledge
      on behalf of [Appellant] as to these purported propensities or
      history for either of the persons at whom he shot. Mr. Salame
      was the only fact witness and testified that he had never seen
      [Appellant] before that day. If [Appellant] was unaware of the
      alleged reputation and history, if they do in fact exist, they could
      not be the basis for his belief that he was in imminent danger.

      [Appellant’s] actions, when viewed in the light most favorable to
      the Commonwealth, establish each of the crimes of which he was

                                     -9-
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      convicted. As the finder of fact in this matter, this court rejected
      the self-defense claim put forth by [Appellant]. The credibility of
      witnesses and the weight to be accorded the evidence produced
      are matters within the province of the trier of fact, who is free to
      believe all, some, or none of the evidence. [Appellant’s] use of
      the gun in this circumstance was unlawful. After viewing the video
      and hearing the unrebutted testimony of Mr. Salame, this court
      found that [Appellant] was the initial aggressor beginning with his
      verbal intervention into the motorcycle situation, in which he had
      no personal interest, and his actions continued to escalate and
      inflame the situation. The video established that [Mr. Salame]
      was unarmed. The court viewed [Mr. Salame] lift [up] his shirt
      making his waistline, where a gun would have been concealed,
      visible. The court found Mr. Salame credible when he testified
      about his comments about there being a fair fight and that it
      meant a fist fight. Further, [Mr. Salame] was retreating at the
      time he was shot by [Appellant]. [Appellant] describes Mr.
      Salame and [Mr. Santiago] as “frenzied assailants” and the
      onlookers as a “developing mob,” and further that [Appellant’s]
      decision making was “in violent and tempestuous circumstances.”
      However, colorful language is not a substitute for evidentiary
      support. The video, Commonwealth exhibit 2A, shows that the
      actors were limited to Mr. Marrero (who had no interaction with
      [Appellant]), [Mr. Salame], and [Mr. Santiago]. Although there
      were onlookers, they were not otherwise involved. There is
      nothing to indicate that if [Appellant] had attempted to retreat,
      that he would have been stopped by an onlooker.

      [Appellant] had no reasonable belief that he was in imminent
      danger of death or serious bodily injury, to justify escalation to
      the use of deadly force. [Appellant] provoked the aggression from
      Mr. Salame and continued to escalate the situation and then failed
      to retreat from the continued confrontation. [Appellant] could
      have avoided the necessity of using any force, and more
      specifically deadly force, with complete safety by retreating. He
      failed to do so or even to attempt to do so. Instead, [Appellant]
      chose to draw his weapon and shoot at the retreating [Mr.
      Salame] and striking him in the rear of his thigh and also
      potentially endangering bystanders. [Appellant] was properly
      convicted.

Trial Ct. Op. at 5-7 (citations omitted and some formatting altered).

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      Following our review of the record, we agree with trial court’s

conclusions. See Palmer, 192 A.3d at 89. As noted by the trial court, the

Commonwealth presented evidence that Appellant was the aggressor in the

confrontation with Mr. Salame and Mr. Santiago and that Appellant had an

opportunity to safely retreat without interference from the onlookers. See

Trial Ct. Op. at 5-7. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth as the verdict winner, the Commonwealth has disproven

Appellant’s claim of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.                See

McClendon, 874 A.2d 1230; Bullock, 948 A.2d at 824. Additionally, this

Court will not re-weigh the evidence presented at trial. See Palmer, 192

A.3d at 89. Therefore, we conclude Appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of

the evidence supporting his convictions based on his justification defense is

meritless and no relief is due.

                          Weight of the Evidence

      The next issue identified by Counsel is that Appellant’s convictions were

against the weight of the evidence because Appellant had presented a defense

of justification. Anders/Santiago Brief at 22-24.

      In reviewing a weight claim, this Court has explained:

      The weight of the evidence is a matter exclusively for the finder
      of fact, who is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence
      and to determine the credibility of the witnesses. A new trial is
      not warranted because of a mere conflict in the testimony and
      must have a stronger foundation than a reassessment of the
      credibility of witnesses. Rather, the role of the trial judge is to
      determine that notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so
      clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal
      weight with all the facts is to deny justice.

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      On appeal, our purview is extremely limited and is confined to
      whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the jury
      verdict did not shock its conscience. Thus, appellate review of a
      weight claim consists of a review of the trial court’s exercise of
      discretion, not a review of the underlying question of whether the
      verdict is against the weight of the evidence. An appellate court
      may not reverse a verdict unless it is so contrary to the evidence
      as to shock one’s sense of justice.

Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 109 A.3d 711, 723 (Pa. Super. 2015)

(citations and quotation marks omitted).

      As this Court has repeatedly stated:

      The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of fact, who
      is free to believe all, none, or some of the evidence and to
      determine the credibility of the witnesses. Resolving contradictory
      testimony and questions of credibility are matters for the finder of
      fact. It is well-settled that we cannot substitute our judgment for
      that of the trier of fact.

                                   *     *      *

      Because the trial judge has had the opportunity to hear and see
      the evidence presented, an appellate court will give the gravest
      consideration to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial
      judge when reviewing a trial court’s determination that the verdict
      is against the weight of the evidence. One of the least assailable
      reasons for granting or denying a new trial is the lower court’s
      conviction that the verdict was or was not against the weight of
      the evidence and that a new trial should be granted in the interest
      of justice.

      Furthermore, in order for a defendant to prevail on a challenge to
      the weight of the evidence, the evidence must be so tenuous,
      vague and uncertain that the verdict shocks the conscience of the
      court.

Spence, 290 A.3d at 311 (citations omitted and formatting altered).

      Here, the trial court addressed Appellant’s weight-of-the-evidence claim

as follows:

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      As this was a bench trial, the court was free to accept or reject
      the various arguments put forth by the Commonwealth and
      [Appellant] in this case. [Appellant] was the only armed party.
      The actions of Mr. Salame in lifting his shirt along with his
      statements about fighting like a man indicated that he was
      unarmed. While Mr. Salame was agitated, it was directly in
      response to [Appellant’s] unnecessary interference into the
      already heated discussion over how to handle the motorcycle
      accident. This court did not find that Mr. Salame was the initial
      aggressor nor that his actions allowed for the use of deadly force
      by [Appellant] against him.       There was nothing preventing
      [Appellant] from retreating and leaving the area as he was not
      involved in the motorcycle accident in any way. Further, the entry
      of the bullet was to the rear of Mr. Salame’s thigh indicating that
      he was the person retreating at the time the shot was fired.

      After reviewing the record, and considering this court sat as the
      finder of fact, the verdict, while disappointing to [Appellant], is
      certainly not shocking. The evidence presented at trial was not
      contrary to the verdict. This issue has no merit.

Trial Ct. Op. at 8-9.

      Based on our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion by

the trial court in denying Appellant’s weight claim. See Gonzalez, 109 A.3d

at 723.    We note that credibility determinations and the resolution of

conflicting evidence are exclusively within the province of the fact-finder, and

that this Court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the fact-finder,

instantly, the trial court in a bench trial. See Spence, 290 A.3d at 311. The

record amply supports the trial court’s conclusion that Appellant did not act in

self-defense because Appellant was the initial aggressor, and it was possible

for Appellant to safely retreat. See Trial Ct. Op. at 8-9. Therefore, Appellant

is not entitled to relief on his weight-of-the-evidence claim.

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                    Discretionary Aspects of Sentence

      The final issue identified by Counsel is Appellant’s claim that the trial

court imposed an excessive sentence without considering mitigating factors.

Anders/Santiago Brief at 20-22.       This issue presents a challenge to the

discretionary aspects of Appellant’s sentence. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.

Ahmad, 961 A.2d 884, 886 (Pa. Super. 2008) (explaining that “[a] challenge

to an alleged excessive sentence is a challenge to the discretionary aspects of

a sentence” (citation omitted)).

      “[C]hallenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not entitle

an appellant to review as of right.” Commonwealth v. Derry, 150 A.3d 987,

991 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citations omitted). Before reaching the merits of such

claims, we must determine:

      (1) whether the appeal is timely; (2) whether Appellant preserved
      his issues; (3) whether Appellant’s brief includes a [Pa.R.A.P.
      2119(f)] concise statement of the reasons relied upon for
      allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of
      sentence; and (4) whether the concise statement raises a
      substantial question that the sentence is inappropriate under the
      sentencing code.

Commonwealth v. Corley, 31 A.3d 293, 296 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations

omitted).

      “To preserve an attack on the discretionary aspects of sentence, an

appellant must raise his issues at sentencing or in a post-sentence motion.

Issues not presented to the sentencing court are waived and cannot be raised

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for the first time on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Malovich, 903 A.2d 1247,

1251 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citations omitted); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).

     “The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be

evaluated on a case-by-case basis.” Commonwealth v. Battles, 169 A.3d

1086, 1090 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).     “A substantial question

exists only when the appellant advances a colorable argument that the

sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific

provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms

which underlie the sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. Grays, 167 A.3d

793, 816 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).

     Instantly, Appellant preserved his sentencing issue in a post-sentence

motion, a timely appeal, and a Pa.R.Crim.P. 2119(f) statement in the

Anders/Santiago brief.     See Corley, 31 A.3d at 296.       Additionally, we

conclude that Appellant has raised a substantial question for review.     See

Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1253 (Pa. Super. 2014) (stating

“an excessive sentence claim-in conjunction with an assertion that the court

failed to consider mitigating factors raises a substantial question” (citation

omitted)).

     Our well-settled standard of review is as follows:

     Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
     sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal
     absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse
     of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather,
     the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the
     sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its

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      judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or
      arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

      Additionally, our review of the discretionary aspects of a sentence
      is confined by the statutory mandates of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c) and
      (d). Subsection 9781(c) provides:

            The appellate court shall vacate the sentence and remand
            the case to the sentencing court with instructions if it finds:

               (1) the sentencing court purported to sentence within the
               sentencing guidelines but applied the guidelines
               erroneously;

               (2) the sentencing court sentenced within the sentencing
               guidelines but the case involves circumstances where the
               application of the guidelines would be clearly
               unreasonable; or

               (3) the sentencing court sentenced outside the
               sentencing guidelines and the sentence is unreasonable.

            In all other cases the appellate court shall affirm the
            sentence imposed by the sentencing court.

      42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c).

      In reviewing the record, we consider:

            (1) The nature and circumstances of the offense and the
            history and characteristics of the defendant.

            (2) The opportunity of the sentencing court to observe the
            defendant, including any presentence investigation [(PSI)].

            (3) The findings upon which the sentence was based.

            (4) The guidelines promulgated by the commission.

      42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(d).

Raven, 97 A.3d at 1253-54 (some citations omitted and some formatting

altered).

      The balancing of the sentencing factors is the sole province of the

sentencing court, which has the opportunity to observe the defendant and all

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witnesses firsthand. See Commonwealth v. Kurtz, 294 A.3d 509, 536 (Pa.

Super. 2023), appeal granted on other grounds, --- A.3d ---, 289 MAL 2023,

2023 WL 7123941 (Pa. filed Oct. 30, 2023). In conducting appellate review,

this Court “cannot reweigh sentencing factors and impose judgment in place

of sentencing court where lower court was fully aware of all mitigating

factors[.]” Id. (citation omitted).

        “When imposing a sentence, the sentencing court must consider the

factors set out in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b), [including] the protection of the public,

[the] gravity of [the] offense in relation to [the] impact on [the] victim[s] and

[the]    community,   and   [the]   rehabilitative   needs   of   the   defendant.”

Commonwealth v. Fullin, 892 A.2d 843, 847 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation

omitted and formatting altered). Additionally, the trial court “must consider

the sentencing guidelines.” Id. at 848 (citation omitted). Where a PSI report

exists, this Court will “presume that the sentencing judge was aware of

relevant information regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those

considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.” Commonwealth v.

Watson, 228 A.3d 928, 936 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation omitted). This Court

may only disturb a standard-range sentence if we find that the circumstances

of the case rendered the application of the guidelines “clearly unreasonable.”

42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c)(2).

        “Generally, Pennsylvania law affords the sentencing court discretion to

impose its sentence concurrently or consecutively to other sentences being

imposed at the same time or to sentences already imposed. [An a]ppellant is

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not entitled to a ‘volume discount’ on his multiple convictions by the imposition

of concurrent sentences.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 249 A.3d 1206, 1216

(Pa. Super. 2021) (citations omitted and formatting altered).

      Here, in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court explained:

      There was a [PSI that this court] reviewed prior to imposing
      sentence. The court considered the that the use of firearms was
      a serious matter but also indicated that there were no separate
      aggravating factors. The sentence imposed at each count were
      standard range sentences. Where a sentence is within the
      standard range of the guidelines, Pennsylvania law views the
      sentence as appropriate under the Sentencing Code. Because
      [Appellant] created a danger to the bystanders in his discharge of
      the weapon, the court imposed a consecutive sentence on the
      charge of recklessly endangering another person. Long standing
      precedent recognizes that the Sentencing Code affords the
      sentencing court discretion to impose its sentence concurrently or
      consecutively to other sentences being imposed at the same time
      or to sentences already imposed. The court did not impose
      impermissibly excessive maximum sentences, as they were within
      the maximum term provided by statute.

      Finally, a bottom of the standard range sentence of probation was
      imposed for the [PIC] count. [Appellant] was presented with his
      right to allocution at which time he apologized for his failure to
      appear at the original sentencing date indicating it was for safety
      concerns for his family based on the behavior of [Mr. Salame]
      after the incident, as described by [Appellant’s] counsel.

      The trial court is in the best position to determine the proper
      penalty for a particular offense based upon an evaluation of the
      individual circumstances before it. This is the basis for the broad
      discretion afforded to trial court judges. When considering the
      nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
      characteristics of [Appellant] and the multiple opportunities the
      sentencing court had to observe [Appellant], there is no basis to
      conclude there was an abuse of discretion. The sentence entered
      in this case is not manifestly excessive nor grossly
      disproportionate to the actions of [Appellant]. Sufficient reasons
      for the imposition of the sentence were placed on the record.
      While the sentence was significant, the court’s exercise of

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      judgment was not manifestly unreasonable when considered in
      relation to the facts, the guidelines, the allocution of [Appellant],
      and arguments of counsel.

Trial Ct. Op. at 9-11 (citations and footnotes omitted).

      Based on our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion by

the trial court. See Raven, 97 A.3d at 1253. The record reflects that the

trial court considered the PSI report before imposing Appellant’s sentence.

See N.T. Sentencing Hr’g, 10/26/22, at 4, 10; see also Trial Ct. Op. at 9.

Therefore, we presume that the trial court was aware of and weighed

mitigating factors. See Watson, 228 A.3d at 936; see also Kurtz, 294 A.3d

at 536. On this record, we have no basis upon which to conclude that the trial

court’s application of the guidelines was “clearly unreasonable” or that the

trial court abused its discretion in structuring Appellant’s sentences

consecutively. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c)(2); Brown, 249 A.3d at 1216.

      For these reasons, we agree with Counsel’s assessment that the claims

presented in the Anders/Santiago brief are frivolous.              Further, our

independent review of the record does not reveal any additional, non-frivolous

issues. See Flowers, 113 A.3d at 1250; see also Goodwin, 928 A.2d at

291. For these reasons, we grant Counsel’s petition to withdraw and affirm

the judgment of sentence.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed. Counsel’s petition to withdraw granted.

Jurisdiction relinquished.

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Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 1/2/2024

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