Court Opinion

ID: 9965831
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-03 15:06:47.189031+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:44.997490
License: Public Domain

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

                                             No. 125,999

              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

                       SARAH E. THARRETT, as Successor Trustee of the
                           ROXINE POZNICH REVOCABLE TRUST,
                                       Appellee,

                                                  v.

                                        DAVID T. EVERETT,
                                           Appellant.

                                  MEMORANDUM OPINION

       Appeal from Bourbon District Court; ANDREA PURVIS, judge. Submitted without oral argument.
Opinion filed May 3, 2024. Appeal dismissed.

       David T. Everett, appellant pro se.

       Jacob T. Knight, of Knight Law, LLC, of Iola, for appellee.

Before ARNOLD-BURGER, C.J., MALONE and WARNER, JJ.

       MALONE, J.: David T. Everett appeals the district court's final order granting
declaratory relief, which authorized the final distribution of a trust and ordered him to
surrender $4,000 in attorney fees from his distribution to the trustee, Sarah E. Tharrett.
On appeal, David raises several procedural challenges to the proceedings in district court
and argues the court abused its discretion in granting Sarah's motion for attorney fees.
But the record reflects that David, after being sent the final distribution check from the
trust, which was calculated in accordance with the district court's final order, accepted the
payment and negotiated the distribution check. Kansas law is clear: because David

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voluntarily accepted the benefits of the district court's order, he cannot now take the
inconsistent position of appealing from it. Because David has acquiesced to the district
court's judgment, we lack jurisdiction over David's appeal and must dismiss the appeal.

                        FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       Roxine Poznich died testate on November 3, 2020. When Roxine passed away,
she had a revocable living trust, which had been executed on April 1, 2009, and amended
on August 17, 2015. The beneficiaries of the trust were Roxine's five children: David
Everett, Dwayne Everett, Sarah Tharrett, Fara Simon, and John Needham. The trust
named Sarah as the successor trustee, and she assumed that role on November 23, 2020.

       The trust specified that the inventory of Roxine's bookstore would pass to David,
and he would be given first option to buy the property where the bookstore was located at
a fair market value as appraised at the time of Roxine's death. The rest of the assets in the
estate were to "be liquidated at public auction and the proceeds thereof and the proceeds
from the sale of my business building be distributed to my five children, to be theirs
absolutely, share and share alike." By May 2021, David grew dissatisfied with Sarah's
actions as successor trustee, and he sued in an attempt to remove her from that role.
Although no filings from the lawsuit are in the record on appeal, the parties agree that
David's suit was dismissed in the summer of 2021.

       On October 12, 2021, Sarah sent a final trust report, including an accounting and
proposed distribution of the remaining trust assets to all the beneficiaries. All the
beneficiaries, except David, executed releases acknowledging the trust report and
approving of the final accounting, fees charged to the trust, administration of the trust by
Sarah, and the proposed schedule of distribution. David raised several objections about
the report and the disbursement schedule, which held up the closure of the trust.

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       On June 10, 2022, Sarah petitioned for declaratory judgment, naming David as the
defendant. Sarah requested that the district court enter a declaratory judgment—under
K.S.A. 60-1701 et seq. and K.S.A. 58a-201(c)—finding that she had acted within the
terms of the trust and the Kansas Uniform Trust Code and authorizing her to distribute
the trust estate as provided in the trust report. Sarah also asked the district court to assess
the costs against David under K.S.A. 58a-1004, "as his actions and unfounded claims
have necessitated the filing of this action to allow [her] to fulfill her duties as Successor
Trustee and to wind up administration of the Trust according to its terms." Finally, Sarah
asked the district court to authorize her to pay David's share of the trust to the clerk of the
court pending any determination on her request for attorney fees against him.

       In response to Sarah's petition, David filed several pro se pleadings. First, he filed
an "Answer, Defense, and Counter Claims" and a "Motion to Dismiss For Failure to State
A Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted." In his answer, David asked the district
court to open probate proceedings, requested court supervision of the administration of
the trust, broadly raised a range of allegations against Sarah, and requested her removal
as trustee. The motion to dismiss contained various arguments, including that Sarah
lacked standing, that Sarah failed to plead an actual case or controversy, and that her
requested relief was legally impossible. David later amended both pleadings. One of his
added claims was that Sarah could not request attorney fees because she had been denied
fees in the earlier case in which David tried to remove her as trustee. David also filed a
motion for disqualification of Sarah's counsel in part because one of the firm's prior
attorneys had briefly represented him in a criminal matter seven years before.

       Over the next month, the parties filed a series of responsive motions, and we need
not detail them all. On September 1, 2022, the district court held a motions hearing. At
the start of the hearing, Sarah's counsel asked the court to reprimand or sanction David
for engaging in "inappropriate behavior with regard to [the] journal entry." Sarah's
counsel alleged that David had emailed Sarah and two court clerks when listing his

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complaints to the proposed journal entry and noted that pro se litigants needed to follow
the same rules as any other attorney. The district court declined to sanction David but
reprimanded him for communicating directly with Sarah because she was represented by
counsel. The hearing then turned to David's motion to disqualify counsel, which the
district court denied without hearing additional evidence because the prior matter in
which the law firm had represented David was not the same or substantially related to
this case. The district court granted David's request to seek an interlocutory appeal of the
denial of his motion to disqualify counsel and permitted David to file the journal entry for
the motions hearing. There is no record that David ever filed the interlocutory appeal.

       David filed a journal entry under Supreme Court Rule 170 (2024 Kan. S. Ct. R. at
234) and Sarah promptly objected, contending his proposed journal entry did not
accurately reflect the district court's rulings at the September 1 hearing. The next month,
after the parties failed to come to agreement over the journal entry, the district court held
a status conference. After reviewing David's journal entry and Sarah's objections to it, the
district court found that Sarah's objections were "accurate." The district court then ruled
(1) that all pending motions were denied and dismissed; (2) that the trust could be closed;
(3) that Sarah was released from her duties as trustee; (4) that the remaining funds from
the trust would not be placed with the court but would be distributed from Sarah's
attorney's trust account and sent to the beneficiaries via certified mail; and (5) that Sarah
be awarded attorney fees in the amount of $4,000, which would be taken from David's
portion of the distribution from the trust due to the "extraordinary services performed in
defense of the estate" by Sarah's attorney in defending David's motions. The district court
memorialized its ruling in a journal entry on November 22, 2022. David filed a notice of
appeal on December 1, 2022, and he docketed the appeal on January 30, 2023.

       On December 7, 2022, Sarah's counsel sent David a letter enclosed with a
distribution check with a memo stating: "Full and Final Payment of Roxine Poznich Rev.
Trt.," as well as a spreadsheet detailing the division of the trust assets and the district

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court's final order. As detailed in the spreadsheet, David's check, which was for
$2,572.03, matched the district court's ruling—it was an equal share of the trust estate,
less the $4,000 that the district court ordered him to pay for Sarah's attorney fees.

       On April 6, 2023, Sarah filed a "Notice of Acquiescence," informing the district
court that David had acquiesced to the judgment "by knowingly and voluntarily accepting
and negotiating the distribution check" from the trust. The notice included a scanned
copy of the check showing that David had endorsed and negotiated the check without
stating any reservation. David did not respond to the notice of acquiescence.

              DID DAVID ACQUIESCE TO THE DISTRICT COURT'S JUDGMENT?

       On appeal, David argues: (1) The district court did not have jurisdiction to order
him not to contact Sarah because she was being represented; (2) the district court abused
its discretion by failing to remove Sarah as the trustee; (3) the district court abused its
discretion by failing to disqualify Sarah's attorney; (4) he was denied due process; (5) the
district court engaged in judicial misconduct because it was biased against him for
proceeding pro se; and (6) the district court abused its discretion in awarding Sarah
attorney fees. In response, Sarah contends that this court lacks jurisdiction because David
acquiesced to the final judgment of the district court when he cashed the final distribution
check. David's reply brief argues that Sarah failed to preserve the acquiescence issue; that
the record does not support her assertion; that the district court's judgment was void; that
the issues he raises are separable from the court's judgment; that his acceptance of the
final distribution check was not voluntary; and that this court should give him greater
leeway when considering whether he acquiesced because he represented himself.

       The doctrine of acquiescence provides that a party cannot take the inconsistent
position of challenging a judgment through an appeal after having already accepted either
the burdens or benefits of that judgment. Alliance Mortgage Co. v. Pastine, 281 Kan.

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1266, 1271, 136 P.3d 457 (2006). "[W]here a party is found to have acquiesced in the
judgment of the trial court, appellate jurisdiction is lacking and the party's appeal must be
dismissed." Varner v. Gulf Ins. Co., 254 Kan. 492, 497-98, 866 P.2d 1044 (1994).

       Acquiescence occurs when a party collects money obtained through a judgment—
i.e., when they accept a benefit from the judgment—so long as they have unconditionally
and voluntarily done so. Uhlmann v. Richardson, 48 Kan. App. 2d 1, 13, 287 P.3d 287
(2012). Likewise, it is inconsistent to receive a distribution of a judgment and then claim
on appeal that the judgment was insufficient. Troyer v. Gilliland, 247 Kan. 479, 481, 799
P.2d 501 (1990). A party may not accept the benefits of a money judgment and then
appeal "in the hope of obtaining greater damages on the same claims." Hemphill v. Ford
Motor Co., 41 Kan. App. 2d 726, 732, 206 P.3d 1 (2009).

       That said, even when a party makes or accepts a partial payment on a judgment,
acquiescence will not be found "'so long as the issues on appeal cannot affect the
payments made or burdens assumed and such payment or burden is not involved in the
issues on appeal.'" 41 Kan. App. 2d at 732. And because implied waivers are not favored,
acquiescence should only be found where a party's actions "'"clearly and unmistakably
show an inconsistent course of conduct or an unconditional, voluntary and absolute
acquiescence."'" Uhlmann, 48 Kan. App. 2d at 17 (quoting James v. Amrine, 157 Kan.
397, 403, 140 P.2d 362 [1943]). Also, "it is generally the rule that a waiver [will] not [be]
implied from measures taken by an appellant in defense of and to protect his rights or
interest." McDaniel v. Jones, 235 Kan. 93, 104, 679 P.2d 682 (1984).

       Whether a party acquiesced to a judgment is a question of law subject to unlimited
review. Alliance Mortgage Co., 281 Kan. at 1271. Because acquiescence involves
jurisdiction, the issue may be raised at any time, including on appeal or on the court's
own motion. See, e.g., Vorhees v. Baltazar, 283 Kan. 389, 397, 153 P.3d 1227 (2007).

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       Sarah contends that David acquiesced when he accepted the benefits of the district
court's final order by cashing the distribution check, which was paid to him consistent
with the order. She argues that David voluntarily took this action with the understanding
of what the check represented—that is, that he knew the district court had approved the
final distribution of the trust, her administration of the trust, and had ordered him to pay
$4,000 in attorney fees from his portion. She also maintains that he was not coerced into
accepting the payment, nor did he do so to protect his interests.

       Based on the copy of the endorsed check Sarah has included in the record, it
appears that David accepted—either by cashing or depositing—the $2,572.03 distribution
check, which was calculated consistent with the district court's final order. Because
David accepted a benefit or a burden of the district court's order, he acquiesced to the
judgment unless an exception to the doctrine of acquiescence applies. Based on the
arguments made by the parties, we will examine three possible exceptions that may
prevent David's appeal from being dismissed under the doctrine of acquiescence: (1)
whether the issues raised on appeal are separable from the judgment; (2) whether David
was coerced or otherwise accepted the check involuntarily and, relatedly; (3) whether
David was forced to accept the distribution check as a form of self-protection.

Separability

       The Kansas Supreme Court has explained that when a party to an appeal accepts
payment of the judgment as directed by the district court, that party shall not be deemed
to have acquiesced in the judgment when the issues on appeal do not affect the obligation
for the payment or the right to receive that portion of the judgment. McDaniel, 235 Kan.
at 101-02. In other words, if the issues raised on appeal are separable from the judgment,
an appellant's acceptance of payment does not necessarily equate to acquiescence. But the
separability exception is generally only applicable when a judgment consists of distinct
parts, so that acquiescence to one portion does not affect another. See, e.g., Wollard v.

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Peterson, 145 Kan. 631, 633, 66 P.2d 375 (1937) (payment of principal amount of
judgment was not acquiescence where appeal only challenged interest and attorney fees).

       David has raised six issues in his appeal, five of which directly challenge
procedural defects or deficiencies in the district court's order. These procedural issues are
directly tied to the distributions that have already been made from the trust—any
favorable ruling on appeal for David would affect the payment that he and the other
beneficiaries received from the trust as ordered by the district court. David contends that
the issues he raises in his appeal are separable from his acceptance of the distribution
check because he was entitled to receive a portion of the trust funds regardless of the
district court's judgment. But David fails to recognize that his right to receive a portion of
the estate was never in dispute—only the amount he would receive from the trust was
disputed. As noted, a party cannot accept a payment as ordered in a judgment and then
appeal in an attempt to obtain a bigger payment. See Hemphill, 41 Kan. App. 2d at 732.

       The only other issue David raises on appeal challenges the district court's award of
attorney fees in Sarah's favor, which effectively reduced the distribution payment he
accepted by $4,000. But this issue is plainly inseparable from the district court's
judgment—if this court were to rule in his favor it would directly affect the obligation for
payment from the trust, which has at this point been entirely distributed, and would
require a redistribution of the trust assets to the other beneficiaries. Because the issues
David raises on appeal directly affect both the payment made to him and the overall
distribution of the trust to the other beneficiaries, the issues are not separable.

Coercion/Voluntariness

       As noted above, acquiescence to a judgment occurs only when a party voluntarily
complies with a judgment. See Uhlmann, 48 Kan. App. 2d at 13. David argues that his
acceptance of the distribution check was not voluntary because he was forced to do so in

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the face of Sarah's attorney's alleged fraudulent actions and Sarah's own economic
threats. But David's fears and allegations that Sarah's attorney stole, or was planning to
steal, funds from the trust account are not supported by the record. Likewise, the record
does not support any claim that Sarah coerced David to accept the check. David's
allegations about how Sarah and her attorney would have acted are not enough to display
coercion and do not render his decision to endorse and negotiate the check involuntary.

       David accepted the distribution check with full knowledge that the amount he was
accepting represented the district court's judgment regarding Sarah's administration of the
trust as well as its determination that his distribution should be reduced by $4,000 in
attorney fees that Sarah incurred in defending his fruitless litigation. David knew what
the check represented as Sarah's attorney attached a letter explaining the check and a
spreadsheet documenting its calculation. David could have, but chose not to, contest the
amount of his distribution, but if he desired to do so he should not have accepted the
payment. Alternatively, he could have moved for a stay from the district court pending
this appeal. He did not do so. Instead, he knowingly and voluntarily accepted the
monetary benefit of the district court's judgment that he is now contesting on appeal.

Self-protection

       Finally, appellate courts generally will not find that a party has acquiesced to a
judgment where the actions that could amount to acquiescence were taken in defense of
and to protect their rights or interests. McDaniel, 235 Kan. at 104 (describing how
judgment debtor does not acquiesce by redeeming property after foreclosure sale). Here,
the only potential ground of self-protection is David's concern that Sarah's attorney would
pilfer his share of the trust if he did not immediately accept the funds from the trust
account. But, as discussed above, there is no basis in the record to support this threat.
Moreover, David's decision to accept the distribution check and either deposit or cash it

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did not protect his legal rights or interests. Because David's actions were not taken as an
act of self-protection, this exception to the acquiescence doctrine does not apply.

       Finally, David presents an overarching plea to this court to treat his actions
differently because he is a pro se litigant. But Kansas courts have consistently held that a
pro se litigant in a civil case must follow the same rules of procedure and evidence as a
party represented by counsel. "To have different rules for different classes of litigants is
untenable. . . . A pro se litigant in a civil case cannot be given either an advantage or a
disadvantage solely because of proceeding pro se." Mangiaracina v. Gutierrez, 11 Kan.
App. 2d 594, 595, 730 P.2d 1109 (1986). That David is a pro se litigant is of no import
regarding whether he acquiesced to the district court's judgment.

       The record establishes that David voluntarily accepted the distribution payment
from the trust based on the district court's final order. That act conflicts with his position
on appeal, and the issues he raises are not separable from the district court's judgment.
Because David acquiesced to the district court's judgment, we lack appellate jurisdiction
and must dismiss his appeal. See Varner, 254 Kan. at 497-98.

        SHOULD THIS COURT AWARD EITHER SARAH OR DAVID ATTORNEY FEES?

       Both parties have filed motions with this court to recover appellate costs and
attorney fees. David asks this court to order Sarah to pay for his filing fees, docketing fee,
and the costs of preparing transcripts in the amount of $314—he provides no rationale or
authority to support his request. Sarah filed a motion under Supreme Court Rule 5.05(c)
(2023 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 33) and Supreme Court Rule 7.07(c) (2023 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 52)
for expenses and attorney fees on appeal in the amount of $2,250. But our Supreme Court
has held that the court lacks jurisdiction to consider a request for appellate costs and
attorney fees—from either the appellant or the appellee—when the appeal is dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction. Kaelter v. Sokol, 301 Kan. 247, 250, 340 P.3d 1210 (2015); In re

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X.L., 63 Kan. App. 2d 853, 867, 540 P.3d 369 (2023) (following Kaelter). The Kansas
Court of Appeals is duty bound to follow Kansas Supreme Court precedent unless there is
some indication that the Supreme Court is departing from its previous position. State v.
Patton, 315 Kan. 1, 16, 503 P.3d 1022 (2022). We have no such indication here. Thus,
we lack jurisdiction to consider either party's request for appellate costs and attorney fees.

       Appeal dismissed.

                                            ***
       ARNOLD-BURGER, C.J., concurring: I concur with the majority opinion in this case
and write separately only to address the issue of attorney fees on appeal when a case has
been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Here, we have found that David Everett pursued
this appeal after acquiescing in the judgement. I agree that we are bound to follow
Supreme Court precedent and our Supreme Court has clearly held that the court lacks
jurisdiction to consider a request for appellate costs and attorney fees—from either the
appellant or the appellee—when the appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Kaelter
v. Sokol, 301 Kan. 247, 250, 340 P.3d 1210 (2015). But I simply question from whence
this blanket judicial rule originated.

       Supreme Court Rule 7.07(b) (2024 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 52) allows this court to assess
attorney fees in any case in which the district court had authority to enter attorney fees. In
addition, it allows us to assess a reasonable attorney fee if we find the appeal is frivolous
or taken for the purposes of harassment or delay. Supreme Court Rule 7.07(c). As the
Trustee points out in her motion for attorney fees, the Kansas Uniform Trust Code
specifically provides that "[i]n a judicial proceeding involving the administration of a
trust, the court, as justice and equity may require, may award costs and expenses,
including reasonable attorney fees, to any party, to be paid by another party or from the
trust that is the subject of the controversy." K.S.A. 58a-1004. Yet, according to the
blanket finding in Kaelter, if we find that we lack jurisdiction to hear the appeal, our

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hands are tied even though a party had to go to significant expense to defend the action.
This judicial rule also seems to be in direct conflict with Supreme Court Rule 5.05(c)
(2024 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 33) which allows this court to assess against the appellant the
costs and expenses incurred by the appellee before the dismissal date "that would have
been assessed against the appellant if the case had not been dismissed and the judgment
or order had been affirmed." The rule in Kaelter appears to render meaningless Rule 7.07,
Rule 5.05, and K.S.A. 58a-1004, yet our court has continued to follow it as we are bound
to do. See In re X.L, 63 Kan. App. 2d 853, 867, 540 P.3d 369 (2023).

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