Court Opinion

ID: 9859440
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 21:41:06.37957+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:00:43.233704
License: Public Domain

*543Baldwin, J.
(dissenting). The trial court based its judgment upon the conclusion of the referee that Francis S. Fitch would not have transferred his reversionary interest to the state “had he not acted under the mistaken belief that it was a necessary step to be taken in order that the property could be legally conveyed by the corporate trustee to the State and thus make more certain the perpetuity of the trust through the maintenance of the Federal aid.” This conclusion must stand unless it lacks reasonable and logical support in the subordinate facts or they, in turn, lack support in the evidence. Cohn v. Hartford, 130 Conn. 699, 706, 37 A. 2d 237; Gowdy v. Gowdy, 120 Conn. 508, 509, 181 A. 462; Liefeld v. Coffin, 103 Conn. 279, 283, 130 A. 576; Ferguson v. Cripps, 87 Conn. 241, 245, 87 A. 792; Practice Book §§ 172, 352, 353; Maltbie, Conn. App. Proc., § 92.
The crux of the case stems from two sentences in a letter sent to Francis S. Fitch by the then governor’s secretary. One of the purposes in writing to Fitch was to advise him of a demand which federal authorities were making upon the state. The sentences are these: “Last fall a question was raised by the national government as to the right of the state to receive this money {the $25,000 annual grant} because the title to the Home was in a corporation and not in the state. In fact, the state was informed that unless title was placed in the state, we could receive no more federal aid.” Obviously, there is nothing in the foregoing which expressly suggests that the federal government was seeking an extinguishment of the reversionary interest. Its concern appeared to be directed solely to, getting title out of the corporation. In spite of this, the writer of the letter interpreted the demand to have a twofold aspect: First, a conveyance of the corporation’s title, and secondly, conveyance of Fitch’s interest.
*544The referee, on the other hand, making use of the same two sentences and fortifying himself by other available considerations, found that “[t]he only demand of the Federal Authorities was that title to the land and buildings should be vested in the State rather than in the corporation named as grantee in the deed of Benjamin Fitch” (italics supplied). The majority dispose of this vital finding with the comment that there was no evidence to support it. This, it seems to me, ignores the evidence and destroys the right of the trier to weigh it and draw such inferences as are proper and reasonable. The quoted finding was based upon an inference or a deduction from other facts. City Bank & Trust Co. v. Ruthinian Greek Catholic Church, 102 Conn. 609, 610, 129 A. 785; Maltbie, Conn. App. Proc., pp. 110, 123. The question is not whether this court would draw the same inference, for it is not within our power to usurp the power of the trier when legally exercised. General Petroleum Products, Inc. v. Merchants Trust Co., 115 Conn. 50, 58, 160 A. 296. The question is whether the inference is one that is fairly warranted from other facts. Fiala v. Connecticut Electric Service. Co., 114 Conn. 172, 175, 158 A. 211; Shaughnessy v. Morrison, 116 Conn. 661, 664, 165 A. 553; Rescigno v. Rosner, 124 Conn. 253, 255, 198 A. 751.
It was perfectly logical and reasonable for the referee to have found that the title which the federal government demanded be transferred to the state was die title held by the corporation, to wit, a title subject to a trust and a reversionary interest. In making an annual grant to the state, the federal government was interested only in the continued use of the premises as a soldiers’ home. If that use was stopped, so too would be the federal grant. Only upon that contingency would the reverter clause become operative. Accordingly, there was no impelling reason for the federal *545government to demand the extinguishment of the reversionary interest. This fact, undoubtedly, accounts for the absence of any reference to the reversionary interest in the explanation of the federal demands contained in the two sentences to which reference has been made. It was quite reasonable for the federal government to question the payment to the state of a grant for the maintenance of the home, title to which was in the corporation. The reversionary interest might well have played no part in the minds of federal authorities. The motivating factor could well have been that the grant was being paid to the state when it did not, in fact, have any title to the premises.
Whether the governor’s secretary misconstrued the extent of the federal demand by believing it required the reversionary interest to be lodged in the state was a question for the trier, and not this court, to decide. The referee was satisfied that the demand was misunderstood by the secretary, who unwittingly led Fitch into the same error. The referee’s crucial finding, previously mentioned, was reasonable and found support in other facts as well as in the evidence, if the latter was required. If the finding under discussion cannot be stricken, even the majority, I take it, would concede that the state has been unduly enriched and should be required to make restitution.
In this opinion O’Sullivan, J., concurred.