Court Opinion

ID: 9576717
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:27:30.09041+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:13:25.674701
License: Public Domain

WADE, Justice
(concurring in the result).
I agree that the court properly allowed expert testimony that Dastrup’s storage facilities did not comply with standard safety practices in the oil industry, not because that is not an ultimate fact, for I think that makes no difference, but because such evidence would tend to aid the jury in arriving at the truth. The so-called rule that opinion evidence is not admissible on ultimate facts even though it would aid in ascertaining the truth because it invades the province of the jury is a spurious doctrine and should be completely discarded.1
“The purpose of a trial is to investigate the facts so as to ascertain the truth, and the modern tendency is to regard it as more important to get to the truth of the matter than to quibble over distinctions * * * a witness may be permitted to state a fact known to him *266because of his expert knowledge, even though his statement * * * may involve the ultimate fact to be determined by the jury.”2
I think it unfortunate that the prevailing opinion should dodge the real question presented and sustain the trial court on the ground that the question is not ultimate, for the only-sound reason this evidence is admissible is because it tends to aid the jury in determining the truth. Whether it is the ultimate question or an evidentiary one is immaterial for it is more important for the jury to arrive at the truth on ultimate questions than on mere evidentiary ones from which the ultimate questions might be inferred, for the ultimate questions are determinative of the case whereas other questions may not be.
It is not dicta to hold as above indicated. Certainly the court may choose the most logical ground on which to base its decision where there is more than one theory which will support its conclusions.
As to the rest of the points discussed in the prevailing opinion I concur for the reason that I find no prejudicial error. Although I believe that several of the court’s rulings were erroneous, and the grounds for sustaining the court in the prevailing opinion are technical rather than substantial, I think no prejudicial error was committed.

See my dissenting opinion on this question in Jiminez v. O’Brien, 117 Utah 82, 213 P. 2d 337, and the authorities cited and quoted therein; also my concurring opinion in Hooper v. General Motors Corp., 123 Utah 515, 260 P. 2d 549.

Cropper v. Titanium, Pigment Co., 8 Cir., 47 F. 2d 1038, 1043, 78 A. L. R. 737 at page 745.