Court Opinion

ID: 9792110
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:23:14.552974+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:40.594873
License: Public Domain

ELLETT, District Judge
(dissenting).
I dissent. I am of the opinion that the law stated in the case of In re Kelley’s Will cited in the main opinion is not the proper basis for taking the money from the widow and placing it in the estate of her deceased husband. The law as set forth in the case of Steinmetz v. Steinmetz, 130 N.J.Eq. 176, 21 A.2d 743, 745, more nearly sets forth what the law ought to be in Utah.
In that case the husband and wife during their joint lives deposited money in a joint bank account. While the husband was insane, the wife withdrew all of the money and placed it in another account in her own name. The court used the following language:
" * * * But the wife took advantage of her husband’s disability and seized the entire joint funds in an inequitable attempt to deprive him of all interest and rights therein. Had he then not been under disability and had he brought suit against his wife for accounting for his share of their joint funds, there can be no doubt that on the facts as disclosed in this case he would have been adjudged to have an interest in the joint funds. * * *
“In the case of joint tenancy in personal property four unities must continue to exist, viz: Unity of interest, title, time and possession. Either joint owner may destroy one or more of the constituent unities in such manner as to sever his interest from the joint fund and so destroy its existence, thereby ending his right of survivor-ship. * * * By Mrs. Steinmetz’s act she severed the unity of interest and possession which had theretofore existed between her husband and herself and she thereby destroyed the joint tenancy so far as her interest was concerned, including her right to have the joint funds as survivor. The joint accounts no longer existed and she made herself a tenant in common of the joint funds to the extent of her one-half interest therein and she held the half share of her co-tenant as agent or trustee for him.”
*413The law ought to be to the effect that when one of two joint tenants, during the lifetime of the other, withdraws all of the funds in an attempt to gain the exclusive possession of the same and to deprive the other joint tenant of all rights therein, he destroys the joint tenancy relationship theretofore existing and takes the fund one-half as his own and one-half in trust for the other joint tenant.
Our own court in the case of Tracy-Collins Trust Company v. Goeltz, 5 Utah 2d 350, 301 P.2d 1086, held that when a husband placed a mortgage upon real property held in joint tenancy, he severed and terminated the joint tenancy estate theretofore existing between the parties and converted the holding into a tenancy-in-common relationship. That holding opens the door for this court to follow the Steinmetz case, and I would be in favor of doing that in this appeal.
There are cases which hold that the withdrawal of all the funds of a joint account by a joint tenant does not terminate the joint tenancy relationship, hut most of those cases deal with the situation where the wrongdoer, that is, the one who withdraws all of the funds, dies first, and the survivor has been permitted to take all of the funds. The case of State v. Gralewski’s Estate, an Oregon case reported in 176 Or. 448, 159 P.2d 211, 161 A.L.R. 66, and the cases therein cited are authority l'or this proposition. However, those cases differ from this matter wherein the sitr-vivor is the one who attempted to take and claim all of the money.
The defendant in this case cashed $9,700 worth of United States savings bonds which were held in joint tenancy between herself and her deceased husband. She contends that she is entitled to all of the $9,700 by reason of Treasury regulations of the United States Government. It is contended that these regulations have the force and effect of law and that the savings bonds are contracts between the United States Government and the co-owners named therein and that the surviving co-owner is the absolute owner of the funds and that during the lifetime of the co-owners either party may cash the bonds and hold the funds as the absolute owner.
Some states have so held, and some states have passed statutes providing that the laws of descent and distribution do not apply to such funds. However, the Treasury rules were meant to give the Government immunity in paying the bonds to either one of the joint owners, and it is a state matter to determine between the parties thereto whether or not one of them would hold funds in trust for the other. Under the facts of this case the Treasury regulations are of no importance except to discharge the United States Government in its contractual liabilities in connection with the bonds. The $9,700 obtained by *414the defendant from the cashing of the bonds should be held fifty per cent for the defendant and fifty per cent in trust for the executor of the estate of the decedent.
I particularly dissent from the proposition often stated by this court that there not only is a right to make findings of fact in an equity case but that this court has a duty to do so. I could concur in the statement if the case was tried as old equity cases always were tried, namely, upon depositions and affidavits, because in such cases this court would be in equally as good a position to determine the credibility of the witnesses as was the trial court who read the documents. I cannot believe that this court is .in any better position to make findings of fact in an equity cause tried on oral testimony than it would be in a law case where the issues of fact are determined by the jury.
Article VIII, Section 9, of the Utah Constitution provides as follows:
“From all final judgments of the district courts, there shall be a right of appeal to the Supreme Court. The appeal shall be upon the record made in the court below and under such regulations as may be provided by law. In equity cases the appeal may be on questions of both law and fact; in cases at law the appeal shall be on questions of law alone. * * * ” Nothing is said about making findings,
and a reading of the proceedings in the constitutional convention when this section was under consideration will show that no such power was ever intended to be conferred upon this court.
Fear was expressed by some of the members of the constitutional convention that the article as ultimately passed would give to the Supreme Court the right to try cases anew. In Volume II of the proceedings of the constitutional convention at pages 1511 and 1512 Mr. Evans of Weber County made the following statement:
“The record may show the strongest kind of a case in favor of a client, when you read it coldly as written out, and yet a judge sitting upon the bench might read right in the face of that witness a lie in every word and sentence that he utters; and you would permit the supreme court, would you, to pass on that question, when it is without the necessary and essential means of determining the truth or falsity of the testimony? And another thing, if this principle be adopted, that an equity case can be reviewed upon a conflict in the evidence, then take for illustration one of those classes of cases which are familiar to you all. Take a water case among the’farmers. One set of witnesses will swear that a certain quantity of water was appropriated at a certain time by a certain person. Another set of witnesses will swear that the appropriation was made *415prior to that time by the other party. There will be a direct conflict in the evidence. The trial judge in many cases goes out and examines the water ditches; he looks at the quantity of water flowing; he examines the premises. This is frequently the case in equity cases, not only in water cases, but also in mining cases. He goes down into the shaft, through drifts and stopes and levels, and examines everything to ascertain whether or no the witnesses have told the truth. Now, gentlemen, if this cold fact can be reviewed by the supreme court, the supreme court would not be likely to do these things. It would not examine the witnesses, it would not see their deportment, probably would not examine the premises, or go into the mines and make an examination to ascertain what the fact is, but would take a conflict of evidence before it, and have the right to determine which set of witnesses told the truth and which swore falsely. I do affirm, that no such system of jurisprudence was ever inaugurated in any civilized government, English or American.
“The rule is this, that the chancellor hears all the evidence; from that evidence he makes a finding of fact, which finding of fact may be reviewed by the supreme court, or all the evidence might be taken up with the finding of fact for the purpose of ascertaining whether the chancellor came to the correct conclusion or found the proper facts. And if the evidence shows that he did not find the proper facts, or if the facts do not justify the conclusion, then the supreme court, as a matter of law, reverses the chancellor and his case is retried, hut not tried by the supreme cotirt. It is returned to the chancellor again for a retrial where the witnesses can again he summoned and brought into court and examined as they were originally. But this system would simply overturn every foundation principle of American jurisprudence, to permit a supreme court, sitting away from the people and away from the witnesses, to determine what their motives and their promptings were at the time they gave their evidence.” (Emphasis added.)
On pages 1512 and 1513 of the volume above quoted Mr. Thurman had this to say:
“In equity cases, it may be upon both questions of the law and fact. In cases at law it shall be upon questions of law alone. Now, there is an appeal allowed to-day for insufficiency of the evidence, whereby the supreme court can even review the facts passed upon by a jury, and in some cases say that the jury found wrongly. There they passed upon the facts, and I take it that that is what this means, that we *416do not want to permit the supreme court to pass upon even the sufficiency of the evidence. Because for the trial judge to say to a jury that they shall be the sole judges of the facts and the sufficiency of the evidence and the weight of it, and after they have decided it under those instructions, to have some other man or set of men review that and say that the jury decided wrong, is not to leave the facts with the jury, and for that reason we want it understood here that in cases at law where a jury passes upon the facts, there should be no review of the facts by the supreme court; 'but in cases of equity that it might continue just as it is to-day under existing law. Now, I will be frank, it may be my ignorance — if that means anything more than it does to-day, that the court may review the facts for the purpose of determining the sufficiency of the evidence, then I agree with the gentleman and am not in favor of it, but I take it that that is all it means.”
At page 1507 of the volume above quoted Mr. Varian stated to the convention what the general rule in regard to equity causes was at that time:
“The general rule in regard to equity causes is that the evidence is taken by what we call depositions; that is, it is taken down in writing; witnesses are never called in equity cases, except in accordance with the code statute, and this means appellate jurisdiction. Whatever may be in the record of the court below would be taken to the court above.”
The three gentlemen above quoted were lawyers and were relied upon by the members of the constitutional convention in explaining these matters.
It has become the practice in the courts now to try equity causes upon oral testimony the same as law cases are tried. This is a natural outgrowth of the administration of the two systems of jurisprudence in the same court and in the same case when required.
I am opposed to this court’s becoming a trier of the facts. It should confine its efforts to a review of the alleged errors of law and to a passing upon facts in equity cases only when it is in the same position as is the district court judge, viz., when the facts are established by documentary evidence only. This court should put emphasis upon a determination of what the law is or ought to be and leave factual situations based upon oral testimony to be determined by the trial judge in causes in equity the same as in law actions.
I would require each party to bear its own costs in connection with this appeal, and would remand the case with directions to the trial judge to determine if the taking possession by the wife was done with the *417intent, wrongfully, to deprive the husband of his rights in the joint property, and if it was so found, then to award one-half thereof to her and one-half to the Executor of the estate of her deceased husband; and unless the taking was wrongful, then I would affirm the judgment.
CALLISTER, J., having disqualified himself, does not participate herein.