Court Opinion

ID: 9724091
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:44:02.93869+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:55.371914
License: Public Domain

*415DICKSON, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
While concurring with the majority's decision to affirm these convictions, I would not affirm the present death sentence because of the State's misleading final argument and the presence of alternate jurors during the penalty phase deliberations.
With today's decision the Court wisely disapproves of and discourages the reading to the jury of certain excerpts from a minority opinion in United States v. Wade (1967), 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149, by prosecutors attempting to portray that the prosecutor and police officers have the duty to present the truth, but that defense counsel does not.1 The Wade excerpt is not decisional law, but only the dissenting opinion of three of nine justices. Reading it to a jury conveys judicial and institutional favoritism for the State and its witnesses, enhancing their credibility, undermines the presumption of innocence, and alters the State's burden of proof. Furthermore, it impinges upon a defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel and can significantly jeopardize the right to a fair trial and an impartial jury. See generally Bardonner v. State (1992), Ind.App., 587 N.E.2d 1353. Clearly, this misleading trial tactic will henceforth be curtailed.
I dissent to the majority's approval of the practice of permitting alternate jurors to sit with and listen to jury deliberations in death penalty cases. While our decisions have permitted this procedure in non-capital cases, it should be forbidden in death penalty cases.
I share the concerns expressed by Justice Pivarnik in Johnson v. State (1977), 267 Ind. 256, 369 N.E.2d 623 (Pivarnik, J., dissenting), cert. denied (1978), 436 U.S. 948, 98 S.Ct. 2855, 56 L.Ed.2d 791. He noted that it is "the alternate juror's lack of a right to deliberate, and his lack of right to vote on a verdict, which defines him as a stranger to the privacy of final deliberation." Id. at 263, 369 N.E.2d at 627. The mere presence of this "stranger" as "a third person during deliberations, without more, may inhibit the free flow of discussion in the jury room." Id. at 262-63, 369 N.E.2d at 627. I cannot dismiss the risk that an alternate juror's non-verbal communication are likely to influence one or more jurors. In addition, the alternate's presence alone may distort the psychological motivations of individual jurors, both as to their ultimate decisions and as to their openness and active participation in the deliberation process, thus interfering with their sworn duty.
*416We entrust to a capital jury the immense responsibility of recommending whether the death penalty should be imposed, and we accord substantial deference to any resulting recommendation against death. Kennedy v. State (1991), Ind., 578 N.E.2d 633, 637, cert. denied (1992), — U.S. —, 112 S.Ct. 1299, 117 L.Ed.2d 521; Martinez Chavez v. State (1989), Ind., 584 N.E.2d 731, 734. While our precedents clearly permit the presence of the alternate juror during guilt phase deliberations, I would not extend this practice to penalty phase deliberations. We should not compromise the integrity of a jury's death penalty recommendation by subjecting otherwise confidential jury deliberations to the serutiny and potential influence of a person who does not bear a full share of the moral responsibility for the resulting decision.
Because the misinformation given to the jury through the reading of excerpts from the Wade dissent and the presence of an alternate juror during the penalty phase deliberations jeopardize the integrity of a death recommendation, I cannot not share the majority's confidence that the death penalty was properly ordered. I would affirm the convictions, reverse the death sentence, and remand for a new death penalty hearing.

. The following passage is from the separate opinion of Justice White, joined by Justice Harlan and Justice Stewart, dissenting in part and concurring in part:
Law enforcement officers have the obligation to convict the guilty and to make sure they do not convict the innocent. They must be dedicated to making the criminal trial a procedure for the ascertainment of the true facts surrounding the commission of the crime. To this extent, our so-called adversary system is not adversary at all; nor should it be. But defense counsel has no comparable obligation to ascertain or present the truth. Our system assigns him a different mission. He must be and is interested in preventing the conviction of the innocent, but, absent a voluntary plea of guilty, we also insist that he defend his client whether he is innocent or guilty. The State has the obligation to present the evidence. Defense counsel need present nothing, even if he knows what the truth is. He need not furnish any witnesses to the police, or reveal any confidences of his client, or furnish any other information to help the prosecution's case. If he can confuse a witness, even a truthful one, or make him appear at a disadvantage, unsure or indecisive, that will be his normal course. Our interest in not convicting the innocent permits counsel to put the State to its proof, to put the State's case in the worst possible light, regardless of what he thinks or knows to be the truth. Undoubtedly there are some limits which defense counsel must observe but more often than not, defense counsel will cross-examine a prosecution witness, and impeach him if he can, even if he thinks the witness is telling the truth, just as he will attempt to destroy a witness who he thinks is lying. In this respect, as part of our modified adversary system and as part of the duty imposed on the most honorable defense counsel, we countenance or require conduct which in many instances has little, if any, relation to the search for truth.
Wade, 388 U.S. at 256-68, 87 S.Ct. at 1947-48, 18 L.Ed.2d at 1174-75 (White, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).