Court Opinion

ID: 878711
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-06-04 22:52:01.676584+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:07:26.543581
License: Public Domain

No. 85-175
               IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
                                    1985

ROBINTECH, INC.,
                 Plaintiff and Respondent,

WHITE & McNEII, EXCAVATING, INC. ,
and TRANSAM.ERICA INSURANCE CO.,
                 Defendants and Appellants.

APPEAL FROM:     District Court of the Fourteenth Judicial District,
                 In and for the County of Musselshell,
                 The Honorable Roy RodQhiero, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

          For Appellant:
                 Landoe, Rrown, Planalp    &   Momrners; James M. Kommers,
                 Eozeman, Montana

          For Respondent:
                 Sardine, Stephenson, Blewett & Weaver; ~ i l l i a mD.
                 Jacobsen, Great Falls, Montana

                                    Submitted on briefs: Aug. 15, 1985
                                                    Decided: November 6, 1985

          NO!/ 6 - 985
Filed :

                                                     .,
                                                      .

                                    Clerk
Mr. Chief Justice J. A. Turnage delivered the Opinion of the
Court.
        Defendants, prime contractor and its surety on a public
works project, appeal summary judgment in favor of plaintiff,
a materialman and supplier to a subcontractor, entered in the
Fourteenth Judicial District, Musselshell County, on December
28, 1984.     The District Court determined that as a matter of
law plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment in the amount
of $47,639, pl-us interest at 6 percent and costs.
        We affirm.      We hold that White     &    McNeil Excavating,
Inc., as the prime contractor, was bonded by Transamerica
Insurance Company       to   assure payment    to    its materialman,
Robintech, under the public works bonding provisions in Part
Two of Title 18, Chapter 2, MCA.        We hold that White    &   McNeil
had adequate legal notice on Robintech's claim, and Robintech
was entitled to payment under the contract and under the
bonding statutes.
        Both parties moved for summary judgment claiming that
the material facts were undisputed.          For its first issue on
appeal, White   &   McNeil challenges the court's conclusion that
Robintech was a supplier or a materialman to a subcontractor,
alleging that Waterworks Supplies Company was a materialman
and not a subcontractor.         Therefore, appellant urges this
Court, Robintech supplied a materialman and is not protected
by the bond.        For its second issue, appellant alleges error
in     the   court's    ruling   that   Robintech      complied    with
$    18-2-206, I I A by
                JC,       mailing invoices but failing to send
notice by certified mail of any claim upon the bond.
        The facts material to the summary judgment follow.           On
June 9, 1982, the City of Roundup, Montana, entered into a
public works contract with White        &   McNeil Excavating, Inc.,
for the construction of water main improvements to be incor-
porated into the city water system.                 White   &   McNeil, prime
contractors on the project, executed a payment bond with
co-defend.ant Transamerica Insurance Company as surety.
      The payment             bond   contained    the   following language:
              NOW, THEREFORE, if the PRINCIPAL shall
               romptly make payment - - persons,
                                      to all
              Firms,  .& corporations furnishinq
                          -

              materia.1~for or ~erforminalabor in the
              prosecution of - - p;ovided
                             t151
Mont. 288, 443 P.2d       22.        Appellant contends that Robintech
was only entitled to proceed against the contractor if it had
strictly complied with          the provisions for notice to the
contractor concerning subcontractor under                §   18-2-206, MCA,
sending a certified letter within thirty days to the contrac-
tor, which is a separate requirement from 5 18-2-204, MCA.
We have held that statutory notice was waived and the notice
provisions were satisfied if the prime contractor had actual
knowledge that materials were being furnished for the project
by a particular supplier and consented thereto.                       Treasure
State Industries v. Leigland (19681, 151 Mont. 288, 297, 443
P.2d 22, 27.       To require more notice than White            &   McNeil had
from the beginning in contract discussions and periodically
from direct shipments and packing lists and receipts would,
as in Treasure State, "be to require an idle act and to
defeat its claim on this ground would        deny it justice."
Treasure State, 443 P.2d at 2 7 .
        We find appellant's argument particularly strained in
requiring all or nothing notice by certified mail, otherwise
foreclosing respondent's claim.      Section 18-2-206(1), MCA,
provides that every person, firm or corporation furnishing
materials to be used in the work for the [city] shall "deliv-
er - send by certified mail to the contractor a notice in
   or
writing stating - substance and effect that [it has provided
                in
materials] with the name of the subcontractor or agent order-
ing or to whom the same is furnished and [the contractor or
his bond will be held for the same]   ." (Emphasis added.)   The
accompanying packing lists and receipts were written notice
stating in substance that Robintech provided materials, and
White   &   McNeil's duty under the provisions of this part to
its materialmen sufficed to hold the contractor and his bond
liable to pay.      Robintech provided the materials to White   &

McNeil for its project, qualifying under the bonding statute,
5 18-2-201, MCA.    We therefore conclude that the requirements
for notice in Treasure State Industries v. Leigland, supra,
are satisfied.
        Affirmed.
We concur: