Court Opinion

ID: 9925257
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-19 06:06:21.435578+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:48.951516
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                           COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                    UNPUBLISHED
                                                                    January 18, 2024
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                   No. 362434
                                                                    Calhoun Circuit Court
DONTEZ RYAN BOYKINS,                                                LC No. 2017-001941-FC

               Defendant-Appellant.

Before: GARRETT, P.J., and LETICA and MALDONADO, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

       Defendant appeals by right his jury conviction of two counts of first-degree criminal sexual
conduct (CSC-I), MCL 750.520b(1)(f) (personal injury); one count of kidnapping, MCL 750.349;
and one count of assault by strangulation, MCL 750.841(1)(b). The trial court sentenced defendant
as a second-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.10, to serve a life-sentence in prison for his
kidnapping conviction, 95 months to 15 years for his assault by strangulation conviction, and 45 to
75 years in prison for each of his CSC-I convictions.

        Defendant previously appealed his convictions and a panel of this Court issued a
per curiam opinion affirming defendant’s convictions, but “remand[ing] this matter for the
purposes of permitting the trial court to make a record whether its sentence would have been
different [if it had known that defendant was subject to lifetime electronic monitoring (LEM)] or
to resentence defendant if it so decides.” People v Boykins, unpublished per curiam opinion of the
Court of Appeals, issued January 21, 2021 (Docket No. 345846), p 15. At the hearing on remand,
the trial court stated that its sentencing decision would not have been impacted by the fact that
defendant was subject to LEM following his release from prison. Defendant now argues that the
trial court erred by failing to consider his updated presentence investigation report (PSIR) and by
failing to allow him to challenge the sentencing guidelines and the information contained in his
updated PSIR during the first hearing on remand. We affirm.

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                                 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

       The prior panel set forth the basic facts:

               Defendant and the victim made plans to go to a casino together on the night
       of March 24, 2017. Defendant picked up the victim from her cousin’s home at
       some point shortly before midnight. However, defendant drove to a motel rather
       than the casino.

               The victim testified that she had fallen asleep during the drive and woke up
       when they arrived at the motel. Defendant told her they were waiting for his
       cousins. According to the victim, she went into the motel room to use the bathroom
       and then had a brief conversation with defendant. The victim testified, “And then
       he just grabbed me by my throat and threw me on the bed and told me to ‘Shut the
       fuck up, B****, before I kill you.’ ” The victim continued her trial testimony by
       describing in detail how defendant sexually assaulted her while continuing to
       maintain his hold on her neck and choking her. She testified that she never
       consented to defendant’s actions. The victim further testified that at one point,
       defendant had his cell phone out and was trying to record the act, but the victim
       “smacked it out of his hand.”

              After the assault, defendant told the victim not to say anything to anybody,
       he opened the vehicle door, and the victim got in . . . . [Boykins, unpub op at 1-2.]

        Once the police became involved and interviewed defendant, he denied any sexual contact
with the victim, explaining that he never went into the motel room with her. Two days later,
however, defendant admitted he had sex with the victim and lied about it because he did not want
his girlfriend to find out about the matter. At trial, defendant maintained that he had engaged in
consensual sexual intercourse with the victim. The jury convicted defendant of both charges of
CSC-I, kidnapping, and assault by strangulation. Id. at 1. However, the jury found defendant not
guilty of CSC-III.
        At defendant’s initial sentencing, the trial court considered the fact that defendant had
several felony convictions on his record, including drug-related offenses, carrying a concealed
weapon, and assaulting, resisting, or obstructing a police officer. Defendant had also been
convicted of three misdemeanors. The trial court determined that defendant’s criminal history and
acts against the victim indicated that defendant was a danger to society. After the parties agreed
that LEM was not required, the trial court opted not to sentence defendant to LEM. The trial court
then sentenced defendant to life in prison for kidnapping, to 45 to 75 years’ imprisonment for each
CSC-I, and to 95 months to 15 years’ imprisonment for assault by strangulation.

        As already discussed, during defendant’s initial appeal, defendant argued that he was
entitled to resentencing because the trial court wrongly believed that defendant would not be
subject to LEM. The prior panel summarized the issue:

                Defendant contends that the trial court’s statement at the sentencing hearing
       that it believed defendant to be “an absolute danger to society” indicates that the
       severity of the trial court’s sentence was influenced by its mistaken belief that

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       defendant would not be subject to [LEM]. On this issue, the prosecution
       acknowledges error, but argues that the error can be cured without the need for
       resentencing. Defendant argues that resentencing is required. [Id. at 14.]

The prior panel then addressed defendant’s argument:

               At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel objected to the application of
       [LEM]. Both the prosecutor and the trial court agreed that defendant was not
       subject to [LEM], and the trial court stated that “it won’t be ordered as part of this
       sentence at this time.” The trial court announced its sentence on the record,
       sentencing defendant to 45 to 75 years’ imprisonment for each CSC-I conviction,
       life imprisonment with the possibility of parole for the kidnapping conviction, and
       95 months to 15 years’ imprisonment for the assault by strangulation conviction.
       However, thereafter, a judgment of sentence [JOS] was entered indicating that
       defendant was subject to [LEM] under MCL 750.520n, contrary to the trial court’s
       statement at the hearing. His sentence contained in the judgment otherwise
       corresponded to the trial court’s pronouncement on the record at the hearing.

               Clearly, the parties and the trial court were incorrect in agreeing at the
       sentencing hearing that defendant was not subject to [LEM]. “[T]he Legislature
       has mandated [LEM] for all CSC-I sentences except when the defendant is
       sentenced to life without the possibility of parole under § 520b(2)(c).” People v
       Comer, 500 Mich 278, 289; 901 NW2d 553 (2017). Defendant was sentenced to a
       term of years for his two CSC-I convictions and the victim was not under the age
       of 13. See MCL 750.520b(2)(b) and (c) (each providing punishment for different
       situations that involve a victim under the age of 13). Thus, defendant’s sentence
       implicates MCL 750.520b(2)(a) (stating that CSC-I is punishable “[e]xcept as
       provided in subdivisions (b) and (c), by imprisonment for life or for any term of
       years”). He was not sentenced to life without the possibility of parole under
       MCL 750.520b(2)(c).

               Defendant was therefore subject to [LEM]. MCL 750.520b(2)(d) (“In
       addition to any other penalty imposed under subdivision (a) or (b), the court shall
       sentence the defendant to [LEM] under section 520n.”); Comer, 500 Mich at 289.
       The trial court must have subsequently realized its mistake because the [initial JOS]
       indicates that defendant is subject to [LEM], although his sentences are otherwise
       the same as those announced by the trial court on the record at the sentencing
       hearing.

               “A defendant is entitled to be sentenced by a trial court on the basis of
       accurate information.” People v Francisco, 474 Mich 82, 88; 711 NW2d 44 (2006);
       see also MCL 769.34(10). Because we do not know what, if any, the trial court’s
       mistaken perception at the time of sentencing had on its sentencing decision, we
       remand this matter for the purposes of permitting the trial court to make a record
       whether its sentence would have been different or to resentence defendant if it so
       decides. See id. at 91-92. [Boykins, unpub op at 14-15.]

                                                -3-
The earlier panel “affirm[ed] defendant’s convictions but remand[ed] for purposes of allowing the
trial court to make an appropriate record with respect to defendant’s sentencing issue.” Id. at 16.

       Defendant then sought reconsideration in this Court, which was denied. People v Boykin,
unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered on February 12, 2021 (Docket No. 345846).
Thereafter, defendant sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, but it denied his application.
People v Boykins, 508 Mich 953; 964 NW2d 603 (2021).

        At the first hearing on remand, defense counsel attempted to raise arguments about the
sentence guidelines scoring and the habitual-offender notice. Defense counsel admitted that these
arguments were outside the scope of the prior panel’s remand. Nevertheless, defense counsel
maintained that the case was in a presentence posture. The trial court disagreed, explaining that
the only question before it was whether the addition of LEM to defendant’s sentence would have
changed the sentence it imposed on defendant. Although defense counsel admitted that the trial
court’s statement was accurate, counsel opined that the prior panel vacated defendant’s sentence.
Therefore, according to defendant, the case was in a presentence posture, allowing him to
challenge the scoring of the sentencing guidelines.

       The trial court determined that the prior panel had affirmed defendant’s convictions and
remanded the case in order to allow it to make an appropriate record with regard to defendant’s
sentencing. The one aspect of defendant’s sentencing at issue was the LEM. The trial court
declined to order resentencing and explained that defendant’s LEM did not change its original
sentence. The trial court ordered that a new JOS be entered, which reflected that the court had
sentenced defendant to LEM.

         After the first hearing on remand, defendant moved for resentencing. The parties then
engaged in a second hearing. During that hearing, defense counsel argued that the prior panel had
vacated defendant’s original sentence when it remanded the case back to the trial court. Therefore,
the trial court erred by not hearing defendant’s challenges to the guidelines. Defense counsel then
sought to discuss defendant’s challenges before the trial court.

        Once again, the trial court concluded that the prior panel’s orders on remand addressed
only one issue—the LEM—for which the trial court had created a new JOS. The trial court stated
that it had acted appropriately by conducting the first hearing on remand within the narrow
confines of this Court’s order. The trial court then denied defendant’s motion for resentencing.

       Defendant now appeals.

                                         II. ANALYSIS

                                          A. THE PSIR

       We review questions of law de novo. People v Odom, 327 Mich App 297, 303; 933 NW2d
719 (2019). “The proper interpretation of a court order is a question of law that we review de
novo.” See Cardinal Mooney High Sch v Mich High Sch Athletic Ass’n, 437 Mich 75, 80; 467
NW2d 21 (1991). “Whether a trial court followed an appellate court’s ruling on remand is a
question of law that this Court reviews de novo.” People v Lampe, 327 Mich App 104, 111; 933
NW2d 314 (2019) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

                                                -4-
        MCR 6.425(D)(1)(c) states that, during a sentencing hearing, a trial court must “give the
defendant, the defendant’s lawyer, the prosecutor, and the victim an opportunity to advise the court
of any circumstances they believe the court should consider in imposing sentence . . . .” This Court
has also held that “[w]ith respect to defendant’s right of allocution, . . . the court is required on the
record to give defendants an opportunity to advise the court of any circumstances they believe the
court should consider in imposing sentence.” People v Kammeraad, 307 Mich App 98, 149; 858
NW2d 490 (2014) (quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted). Failure to do so merits
resentencing. Id. This Court places a case in a presentence posture when it remands a case to a
lower court for “ ‘resentencing’ without any specific instructions . . . .” Lampe, 327 Mich App
at 112.

       “It is the duty of the trial court, on remand, to comply strictly with the mandate of the
appellate court according to its true intent and meaning.” People v Blue, 178 Mich App 537, 539;
444 NW2d 226 (1989). And, “[w]hen a case is remanded by an appellate court, proceedings on
remand are limited to the scope of the remand order.” People v Canter, 197 Mich App 550, 567;
496 NW2d 336 (1992). Therefore, a defendant may not raise issues outside the scope of our
“limited order of remand.” Id. at 567-568.

       Defendant’s arguments on this issue rest on a flawed assumption that the first hearing on
remand entailed a resentencing. Defendant relies on Lampe, 327 Mich App at 112, and People v
Lockmiller, 510 Mich 1085; 981 NW2d 727 (2022), to support his claim that this Court’s initial
opinion had placed his case in a presentence posture. But this case is distinguishable from those
cases because the prior panel did not remand this case for resentencing. See Boykins, unpub op
at 15. Rather, the prior panel remanded “for the purposes of permitting the trial court to make a
record whether its sentence would have been different or to resentence defendant if it so decides.”
Id. (emphasis added). The word “or” is disjunctive. See People v Kowalski, 489 Mich 488, 499,
n 11; 803 NW2d 200 (2011). Thus, the prior panel left the question of whether the remand would
or would not entail a resentencing to the trial court’s discretion. Boykins, unpub op at 15.

         On remand, the trial court clarified that defendant’s eligibility for LEM would not change
its sentence and it declined to resentence defendant. Consequently, the trial court was not required
to consider defendant’s updated PSIR or his challenges to the information it contained. As the
trial court explained, it was only obliged to consider the issue presented on remand by the prior
panel. In fact, defense counsel acknowledged that the defense arguments were beyond the narrow
scope of this Court’s remand. And, when the prior panel remanded this case, it made no reference
to the updated PSIR or to any of defendant’s proposed challenges regarding his sentence or the
PSIR. See id. As such, the trial court acted properly by strictly complying with the limited scope
of the prior panel’s directive. See Blue, 178 Mich App at 539, Canter, 197 Mich App at 567-568.
For these reasons, the trial court did not err by failing to consider defendant’s updated PSIR or his
remaining sentencing challenges.

                            B. DEFENDANT’S REMAINING ISSUES

       We decline to address defendant’s claims regarding the scoring of the sentence guidelines,
the habitual offender notice, or the proportionality of his sentence because they are outside the
scope of the prior panel’s remand.

                                                  -5-
         Our Supreme Court has held that “the scope of the . . . appeal is limited by the scope of the
remand.” People v Jones, 394 Mich 434, 436; 231 NW2d 649 (1975). Therefore, when “an
appellate court remands for some limited purpose following an appeal as of right in a criminal
case, a second appeal as of right, limited to the scope of the remand, lies from the decision on
remand.” People v Kincade (On Remand), 206 Mich App 477, 481; 522 NW2d 880 (1994).
Following defendant’s first appeal, the panel remanded this case “for the purposes of permitting
the trial court to make a record whether its sentence would have been different or to resentence
defendant if it so decides.” Boykins, unpub op at 15. As already discussed, the trial court chose
the former option.

       In this case, defendant did not challenge the trial court’s scoring of the offense variables or
the proportionality of his sentence until after the prior panel remanded the matter. Defendant also
did not challenge his status as a second habitual offender until the first hearing on remand.
Accordingly, we decline to rule on these remaining issues. Jones, 394 Mich at 436; Kincade (On
Rem), 206 Mich App at 481.

       Affirmed.

                                                              /s/ Kristina Robinson Garrett
                                                              /s/ Anica Letica
                                                              /s/ Allie Greenleaf Maldonado

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