Court Opinion

ID: 9850965
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:05:00.746328+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:46.159294
License: Public Domain

Adams, J.
(concurring in reversal). I agree with Justice Smith. The trial court erroneously discharged a legislative function. The trial judge concluded by finding the ordinance was “unreasonable and unconstitutional”; but, if his opinion is read as a whole, it is clear his concern was with the suitability of the land for a use he thought was needed.
“Plaintiff’s property is particularly well suited for a desirable shopping center for the area in question.”
The fallacy with this is that the trial court did not have the power to zone plaintiff’s property for a shopping center. The court could declare the existing zoning unconstitutional but it could not replace the void this made in the city’s zoning with what it thought desirable. Northwood Properties Company v. Royal Oak City Inspector, 325 Mich 419, 423, 424; Tel-Craft Civic Association v. City of Detroit, 337 Mich 326, 331; Roll v. City of Troy, 370 Mich 94, 99. The only proper concern of the court was whether *250plaintiff had established the unreasonableness of the zoned use.
Justice Kelly shifts plaintiff’s burden of proof upon that issue to the defendant:
“We do not agree with the city that it has met the test of reasonableness by showing that plaintiff’s property is adapted to residential use.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The burden is not on the city to meet any test. A zoning ordinance is presumed to be reasonable. Highland Oil Corporation v. City of Lathrup Village, 349 Mich 650, 660; Scholnick v. City of Bloomfield Hills, 350 Mich 187, 196. Anyone attacking its validity must bear the burden of proving it unreasonable. Patchak v. Township of Lansing, 361 Mich 489, 495; Alderton v. City of Saginaw, 367 Mich 28, 33; Padover v. Township of Farmington, 374 Mich 622, 633, 641.
Even if one shifts the burden of proof to the city, the evidence for the plaintiff is scanty indeed. All the experts, save one, testified that the property was suitable for residential purposes. All the experts, save one, testified that commercial zoning would result in uses detrimental to the area.
Kelly, J.
(for affirmance). After carefully considering the 176 pages of the appendix recording the testimony of plaintiff’s 8 and defendant’s 5 witnesses, I dissent, because I cannot conclude that I would have arrived at a different result had I been in the position of the trial judge.
That this is a proper test before reversing a trial judge in a zoning case is made clear by the following-quotation from Christine Building Company v. City of Troy, 367 Mich 508, at p 517:
*251“We hear and consider chancery cases de novo on the record on appeal. * * * [Cases cited.] This Court, however, is inclined to give considerable weight to the findings of the trial judge in equity cases. This is primarily because the trial judge is in a better position to test the credibility of the witnesses by observing them in court and hearing them testify than is an appellate court which has no such opportunity. We do not ordinarily disturb the findings of the trial judge in an equity ease unless, after an examination of the entire record, we reach the conclusion we would have arrived at a different result had we been in the position of the trial judge. The trial judge here found, after listening to the witnesses testify and examining the exhibits, that the plaintiffs had shown the zoning-ordinance to be unreasonable and arbitrary. After an examination of the entire record, we feel the trial judge reached a correct conclusion.”
In addition to seeing and hearing the witnesses testify, the trial judge, in the instant case, had the added advantage of inspecting plaintiff’s and adjoining property.
I believe it is obvious that such inspection would be unusually helpful, after considering the following-terse description of plaintiff’s and adjoining property located at the corner of Inkster road and Nine Mile road as given by the city’s main witness, vis., city planner George Vilican, Jr.:
“Beginning in the north-east quadrant, north of Nine Mile road and in the city of Southfield we have a rather rugg-ed piece of terrain developed in acreage, single-family development. It is commonly known as the Ravines, I think this a proper name of the subdivision. However, the area in question is built on sloping sites, some flat sites. It is rapidly developing for the size of the lots. It is a rapidly developing residential area. This lies north of the property in question and goes well beyond *252it to the east but on the north side of Nine Mile. Moving to the southeastern quadrant, including the property in question we have a good deal of undeveloped land, beginning at the corner and approximately 500, 600 feet to the east of the intersection we have a ravine crossing through the property in question, not necessarily the parcel in question, the court case, but owned by this plaintiff, exactly east of the parcel now in court and this is undeveloped primarily I would imagine because of the rugged terrain.
“The land to the south of the ownership of the plaintiff is developed in single-family residential, not totally but I would say predominately because more than 50% of the land area is developed in residential immediately to the south. To the west of Inkster and across from the parcel in question we have a single-family residential subdivision, built in 1959 basically. The plat was approved in 1958, and it is totally built.
“And in the northeast, northwest quadrant, north of Nine and west of Inkster we have an area that still has a good amount of open land but in the immediate intersection there again is a subdivision built on topography of extreme grade differences, that is, built up with acreage development.”
I disagree with my Brother’s claim that the trial judge, in his written opinion, discharged “a legislative function in determining the ‘desirability’ and ‘need’ for a shopping center” which constituted reversible error because “the line must continually be drawn between what is the proper province of the local legislative body and a reviewing court.”
In the written opinion, the trial judge did make known what he believed the testimony proved in re supermarkets, but he did not, in his findings of fact, in any way refer to the supermarkets in the final paragraph of his opinion, as revealed by the following quotation:
*253“It is therefore the finding of facts, the conclusion of law and the opinion of this court that the ordinance of the defendant city of Southfield is unreasonable and unconstitutional as applied to plaintiff’s property.
“An appropriate judgment restraining enforcement may be entered accordingly, with costs taxed to the plaintiff.”
Likewise, the judgment in no way referred to supermarkets, but was confined to the finding that the ordinance was “unreasonable and unconstitutional insofar as the said ordinances restrict the use of the land of the plaintiff to residential purposes” and further provided that defendant was enjoined from enforcing the ordinance “insofar as the said ordinances restrict the use of the land of the plaintiff to residential purposes.”
The court did not discharge a legislative function in finding the ordinance unreasonable and the record discloses no reason why this Court should criticize the trial court for the way the trial was conducted.
I cannot agree with my Brother’s statement that “the Brae Burn Case is particularly helpful in resolving the instant case because it presented several issues strikingly similar to one presented here.”1
In Brae Burn, we were considering 40 acres zoned and used as residential, a former estate with a main building of 20 rooms and 8 baths and a number of accessory buildings set back a substantial distance from Woodward avenue.
The zoning board, in granting plaintiff a variance, set forth in the variance grant that they did so because of the fact that a denial would create a great hardship for him and that plaintiff, who had purchased the property with the intention to operate *254it as a convalescent home, was granted that right upon his express promise “that not more than 30 persons will be cared for in said home” and that plaintiff “will not change the character of the neighborhood involved and will conform to the spirit of the ordinance.”
After operating for some time under his promise, plaintiff started his suit to invalidate the ordinance because he was denied a building permit to enlarge the quarters to accommodate more than the agreed upon 30 patients, and also to construct a 3-story office building on the premises.
In our present case plaintiff, Mrs. Bowman, had, for 18 years prior to the enactment of the 1959 ordinance, conducted a successful business progressing from a retail butter, eggs, poultry, and baked goods business to a retail and wholesale catering business, to picnic facilities on the grounds for business organizations, and weddings from noon until 5 o’clock and evenings from 6 to 11, accommodating as many as 400 in a day. After the city zoned her property residential, she continued to operate commercially, not by city grant but by legal grant as a nonconforming use, developing a business of $120,-000 per annum.
Mrs. Bowman commenced this action after she was denied a building permit to add to the rear of her building additional space for baking and taking care of food.
The city of Southfield is bounded on the south by Eight Mile road, on the east by Greenfield road and on the west by Inkster road. The mile roads run east and west through the city of Southfield and such mile roads are intersected at one mile intervals by north and south highways, as a result of which each mile road intersects 7 north and south highways within the city. On Eight Mile road all 7 of such intersections are zoned commercial ^ or *255industrial. On Nine Mile road, 6 of the 7 intersections are zoned commercial or industrial, the sole exception being the property of the plaintiff at Nine Mile road and Inkster road. On Ten Mile road, 6 of the 7 intersections are zoned commercial or industrial. Plaintiff’s property is zoned contra to the general practice of zoning intersection property commercial.
Plaintiff’s witnesses testified in detail why plaintiff’s use of her land should not be restricted to residential use and gave reasons why plaintiff’s land was adapted to commercial use, especially for a neighborhood market. There was ample testimony to sustain the trial judge’s conclusion in this regard.
An important question that the zoning authorities should have asked and answered, and that this Court must ask and answer, is: Can plaintiff’s property be used commercially without detrimental effect to adjoining property?
My Brother states:
“As to the character of the area and the effect of commercial zoning upon the surrounding property, it was conceded that the area is residential in character and there was substantial testimony that commercial zoning would have an adverse effect upon surrounding residential properties.”
The Court concluded:
“The present use of plaintiff’s property and its future use as a shopping center are not detrimental in any respect to any of the surrounding property.”
The city’s main witness, city planner George Vilican, Jr., admitted that plaintiff had conducted her commercial use of the property for many years in a way that was not detrimental to adjoining property.
*256No testimony was offered by any resident, or association of residents, that changing plaintiff’s restriction would be detrimental to adjoining property.
That the city did not conclude that all the property adjoining the intersection must be kept residential is evidenced by allowing a real-estate office to operate across the street from plaintiff’s property at the northeast corner of Inkster and Nine Mile road.
Five witnesses testified in re effect of the proposed use of surrounding property, 3 for plaintiff and 2 for defendant.
Defendant’s witness, city planner George Yilican, Jr., expressed the opinion that commercial development would be detrimental, but admitted that the subject property was effectively screened from the residential area to the east and north. Defendant’s witness Bliss, an appraiser, expressed the same opinion as city planner Yilican.
Plaintiff’s witness, city planner Carl Goldschmidt, testified that commercial zoning, such as neighborhood convenience facilities, would not in any way be detrimental to the surrounding residential area and, city planner Norman Bowman (plaintiff’s son) testified that using plaintiff’s property for commercial purposes would not be detrimental to the surrounding residential area. Ralph W. Conselyea testified as follows:
“Q. You have also stated another use for the property could be commercial?
“A. That is correct, sir. Now, you are referring to the corner?
“Q. Yes, sir.
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. In your opinion as a broker, would a commercial use of this corner have an adverse effect *257on the properties to the west? The residential property facing the city property?
“A. I could concede it could have a beneficial effect.
“Q. Could it also have an adverse effect?
“A. Depending on the type and usage of type of building.
“Q. Type of use and type of layout?
“A. That is correct, sir.”
"We find nothing in the present record that would cause us to disagree with the trial court who, after seeing and listening to witnesses testify and inspecting the neighborhood property, concluded:
“The present use of plaintiff’s property and its future use as a shopping center are not detrimental in any respect to any of the surrounding property.”
In a recent decision (Smith v. Village of Wood Creek Farms, 371 Mich 127 [syllabus 4]), we again made known our position in regard to diminution of property values caused by zoning ordinances, stating:
“The extent to which property values are diminished by provisions of a municipal zoning ordinance must be given consideration in determining whether the invasion of property rights under a purported police power is unreasonable and confiscatory.”
The testimony in the present case establishes that defendant city, by restricting plaintiff’s property to residential use, has reduced the value of her property considerably more than 50 per cent.
We do not agree with the city that it has met the test of reasonableness by showing that plaintiff’s property is adapted to residential use, and agree with the trial court’s conclusion that:
“Though the property might conceivably be used for residential purposes, it would be only at a greatly deflated and unjustifiable reduced value.”
*258Defendant city’s ordinance, as applied to plaintiff’s property, fails to meet the test that we have often applied, viz:
“A municipal zoning ordinance, to be valid, must bear a direct and substantial relation to the objectives of police power, the preservation of the public health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the community as a whole.”2
The judgment of the trial court, that the ordinance of defendant city of Southfield is unreasonable and unconstitutional as applied to plaintiff’s property, is affirmed. Costs to appellee.
O’Hara, J., concurred with Kelly, J.
T. M. Kavanagh, C. J., and Black, J., concurred in the result.

 Brae Burn, Inc., v. City of Bloomfield Hills, 350 Mich 425.

 Alderton v. City of Saginaw, 367 Mich 28 (Syllabus 1).