Court Opinion

ID: 9768408
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 06:01:15.082836+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:40.568134
License: Public Domain

DORSEY, Justice,
dissenting.
Appellant is complaining of the failure of the State to reduce the speed limit on Highway 83 near a school. The State’s immunity from suit bars appellant’s action unless the State has agreed to be sued by waiving immunity under the Tort Claims Act.1 The majority finds such a waiver by stretching the language of a section, together with its interpretive cases, and disregarding another section in which the State has unequivocally retained its immunity from suit. Accordingly, I dissent.
A general overview of the Tort Claims Act is instructive. Title 5 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code is entitled “Governmental Liability” and it begins with Chapter 101, “Tort Claims.” Subchapter A concerns general provisions, such as the short title and definitions. Subchapter B, “Tort Liability of Governmental Units,” states the rules of governmental liability and the waiver of sovereign immunity, and begins with § 101.021. Subchapter C addresses “Exclusions and Exceptions.”
Section 101.021 states, “A governmental unit in this state is hable for: (1) property damage, personal injury and death” that results for the negligence of an employee using a motor driven vehicle or equipment, and “(2) for personal injury and death caused by a condition or use of tangible personal or real property_” Section 101.025 waives governmental immunity “to the extent of liability created by this chapter.”' Unless the State has accepted the potential liability under a provision of § 101.021, it is immune from suit.
Applying those provisions to the facts of the present action, the only claim against the state is one caused by a condition or use of tangible personal or real property. Included in the term “use” of tangible personal property is the misuse or non-use of that type of property. Robinson v. Central Texas MHMR Center, 780 S.W.2d 169, 171 (Tex.1989). A road sign stating the speed limit is tangible personal property.
However, contained within Subchapter C, “Exclusions and Exceptions,” is found section *677101.060, “Traffic and Road Control Devices,” which provides:
(a) This chapter [accepting potential liability and waiving immunity from suit] does not apply to a claim arising from:
(1) the failure of a governmental unit initially to place a traffic or road sign, signal, or warning device if the failure is a result of discretionary action of the governmental unit; .... (Emphasis Added)
By this language the legislature expressly declined to waive immunity for the non-use of certain tangible personal property: the initial placement of traffic or road signs when it is a discretionary action.
The majority attempts to avoid the clear exclusionary provision of § 101.060(a)(1) quoted above by relying on the next paragraph, (a)(2), which provides:
(a) This chapter does not apply to a claim arising from:
(2) the absence, condition, or malfunction of a traffic or road sign, signal, or warning device unless the absence, condition, or malfunction is not corrected by the responsible governmental unit within a reasonable time after notice; ...
The majority says,
Under normal circumstances, a 45 mph speed limit sign functions properly and as intended by the State. However, under the existing special circumstances created by the recent construction of Alamo Junior High School, the 45 mph sign may mislead the public into believing that it is reasonable and safe to drive at this speed when in actuality it is an excessive speed for this area.
Opinion at p. 675.
For this conclusion the majority relies principally on Sparkman v. Maxwell, 519 S.W.2d 852 (Tex.1975). Sparkman involved a collision that occurred after the city altered a traffic light commanding a left turn lane. The City of Wichita Falls modified a standard three light (red, yellow and green) traffic signal by placing a template over all three fights with a left turn arrow cut into the template. The result was that motorists attempting to turn left saw — when the light was red — a red arrow pointing to the left. Mrs. Sparkman stopped briefly at the intersection, saw the red arrow, but drove into the intersection before the signal had changed, causing the collision. Police officers had earlier reported the confusion the signal was causing motorists. The traffic light had been changed for a two week'trial period; Mrs. Sparkman’s collision happened one week after the modified fight had been installed.
The Court, in holding a waiver of immunity under the Tort Claims Act, relied on Subdivision 12 of Section 14, the predecessor of section 101.060(a)(2).
We agree with the Court of Civil Appeals that the term ‘condition’ in Subdivision 12 refers to either an intentional or an inadvertent state of being, and here the City was notified of the condition of the fight and the problems it was causing.
Id. at p. 858. Because the modified condition of the light caused confusion among motorists, recovery against the City was proper.
Here, however, we do not have a modification of an existing traffic control device as in Sparkman. The traffic signal there was unique, and its uniqueness caused the confusion. Here a speed limit sign, posting the correct maximum speed, is involved.
Appellants argue that the existing speed limit is unreasonable for the highway near the junior high school; they do not contend that the condition of an existing sign is at issue, but rather that a different sign should be placed on the highway near the school stating a lower speed limit. A number of cases have construed the word “condition” as used in the Tort Claims Act. None of those cases support liability for circumstances where the plaintiffs’ allege that a different speed limit should have been posted rather than the one that was.2 Although the maxi*678mum speed allowed may have been excessive under the circumstances, because of the proximity of the school, there was nothing wrong with the condition of the sign itself.
The majority’s holding nullifies the immunity of the state for the initial placement of a traffic or road sign reserved by section 101.-060(a)(1). I respectfully dissent.

. Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code ch. 101 (Vernon 1986).

. Lorig v. City of Mission, 629 S.W.2d 699, 700-01 (Tex.1982) (tree branches obstructing a stop sign were a condition of the sign within the meaning of the Tort Claims Act article 6252-19 section 14(12)); Sparkman v. Maxwell, 519 S.W.2d 852, 857-58 (Tex.1975) (defining “condition’.' as “an intentional or inadvertent state of being" applied *to a traffic light which operated as intended but which endangered the public); Texas Dep't of Transp. v. Henson, 843 S.W.2d *678648, 652 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (attachment of a sign by nails to a barrel was a condition of the traffic control device); Creek v. Texas State Dep't of Highways and Pub. Transp., 826 S.W.2d 797, 802 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (adopting the definition in Lawson); Lawson v. Estate of McDonald, 524 S.W.2d 351, 356 (Tex.Civ.App.-Waco 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (“condition ... refers to the maintenance of a sign or signal in a condition sufficient to properly perform the function of traffic control for which it is relied upon by the travelling public.”); City of Denton v. Mathes, 528 S.W.2d 625, 630 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that condition included an intended, if dangerous, cycling of a traffic light).