Court Opinion

ID: 9728629
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:12:49.338156+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:50.448557
License: Public Domain

McDERMOTT,
concurring and dissenting.
I agree with that part of the opinion which holds that an adverse ruling on a motion-in-limine is appealable by the Commonwealth on the grounds that the ruling substantially prejudices the Commonwealth’s case. I also agree in principle with those comments of Mr. Justice Zappala and Mr. *570Justice Cappy that the effects of the majority’s decision will likely alter the manner in which motions-in-limine practice will proceed. Thus, in anticipation of that fact I offer the following suggestions. First, if a motion-in-limine is filed, the trial judge must enter a ruling on it prior to trial; if a judge refuses to so rule, a mandamus action will lie. Second, once ruled upon, the ruling is not reversible during the course of the trial; and if the trial court attempts to reverse a motion-in-limine ruling favorable to the Commonwealth during the course of the trial, the Commonwealth should be entitled to an immediate stay and subsequent expedited appellate review of that determination. This latter procedure is necessary to insure that the Commonwealth will not be adversely affected in its trial preparation by an unfulfilled reliance upon the finality of the motion-in-limine ruling. The same urgency is not attendant to a changed ruling vis a vis the defendant since the system already provides him protection via the avenue of post trial motions.
Turning to the merits of the majority opinion, I am compelled to dissent.
In his first trial the appellant was tried for murder generally, and was found not guilty of first degree murder but guilty of third degree murder. He appealed and for reasons other than the propriety of that verdict a new trial was ordered. Having been acquitted of first degree murder, the intentional killing of another, he now argues that on retrial for third degree murder, the unintentional killing where death results from a malicious intent to do bodily harm, evidence of an actual intent to kill should be excluded.
Because the elements of third degree murder do not include a specific intention to kill does not mean that the intention to cause serious bodily harm that might result in death is irrelevant. The majority’s view is a view that encompasses settled facts; however, the facts are not yet settled by verdict. The Commonwealth in this new trial will still be required to prove a malicious intent and the Commonwealth should be permitted to put forth that evidence which demonstrates that malice.
*571The evidence at issue here, that the victim had previously threatened to kill the defendant because of defendant having fathered a child with the victim’s girlfriend, and that the appellant had sought the assistance of others to preemptively kill the victim, went directly to prove that defendant here knew the victim and that the defendant had an intent to seriously harm the victim.
Without question the Commonwealth cannot seek a conviction on a crime for which a previous jury refused to convict, here, the first degree murder charge; however, there is no reason to hold that a defendant who receives a retrial on a basis other than evidentiary weight is entitled to prevent the Commonwealth from introducing evidence of mens rea in a second trial, which evidence warranted the conviction in the first.