Court Opinion

ID: 9674240
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:25:23.742941+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:26.320798
License: Public Domain

LARSEN, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I believe the majority has confused the proof needed to show lost wages in the past with the proof needed to show loss of earning capacity, the element of damage at issue here. The majority states that “there is no evidence as to how much Appellee actually had been earning prior to her injury.” While this may be of importance in reviewing a damage award for lost wages, it is not essential in reviewing an award for loss of wage earning capacity. The majority’s decision is based almost wholly upon this conclusion:
Appellee’s actual earnings prior to her injury were readily available to Appellee and could have been presented to the jury. This essential element would have permitted the jury to make a reasonable projection of Appellee’s future income potential.
The majority implies that a plaintiff must present evidence of her own work history, fringe benefits, and dashed hopes for advancement to sustain an award for future loss of earning capacity.1 Ms. Guadian undeniably did not present such evidence. The majority therefore holds that “[bjased upon the dearth of any such evidence in the record, the jury was simply left to speculate on Appellee’s actual earnings prior to her injury.” I disagree that this dangerously narrow interpretation of the law precludes plaintiffs recovery for loss of earning capacity here.
Proof of a plaintiffs own “actual earnings prior to her injury” is not essential to recovery for lost earning capacity. Indeed, courts have frequently deemed that very evidence irrelevant in examining such an award, holding that even where an injured party may work and earn more than before an injury, that does not bar recovery for loss of earning capacity. See Soriano v. Medina, 648 S.W.2d 426, 429 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1983, no writ); Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Sims, 615 S.W.2d 858, 864 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, no writ); City of Houston v. Riggins, 568 S.W.2d 188, 193 *901(Tex.Civ.App.-Tyler 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Proof of plaintiffs earning history is one method of proving lost earning capacity, but it is certainly not exclusive and courts have consistently held that diminished earning capacity is speculative, that the jury’s discretion is entitled to great deference, and that no particular evidence is required to demonstrate loss of earning capacity. Each case must be judged by its own peculiar facts. Tri-State Motor Transit Co. v. Nicar, 765 S.W.2d 486, 492 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, no writ). In Tri-State, the Court observed:
Factors such as stamina, efficiency, ability to work with pain, and the weakness and degenerative changes' which naturally result from an injury and from long suffered pain are legitimate considerations in determining whether or not a person has experienced an impairment in future earning capacity.
Id. Loss of earning capacity is thus properly based upon a composite of all factors affecting a person’s ability to work, and should not be reviewed solely upon the evidence of that individual’s work, actual work history prior to injury.
Crown Plumbing, Inc. v. Petrozak, 751 S.W.2d 936, 938-39 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied) illustrates my point. In that case, like this one, an employee sued his non-subscribing employer for negligence. Petrozak was a master plumber who had worked for Crown Plumbing only a short time when he was injured. He sustained serious back injuries when he fell through a ceiling after his plumber’s helper threw a lit torch towards him. As here, Petrozak presented no evidence of either his actual earnings during the years prior to his injury or his earning capacity after his injury. Petrozak at 938. Citing Texas Farm Products v. Leva, 535 S.W.2d 953 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1976, no writ), the Court found Petrozak had nevertheless clearly met his evidentiary burden:
[T]he matter to be determined is not what he actually earned before his injury, but what his earning capacity actually was, and to what extent that capacity has been impaired.
Petrozak at 938. The Petrozak Court also observed, citing Remuda Oil & Gas Co. v. Nobles, 613 S.W.2d 312 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1981, no writ):
In fact, the overwhelming weight of authority ... concurs that a plaintiff may submit either his actual earnings or a monetary measure of his earning capacity. [Emphasis in original].
Id. at 939. In this case, there was sufficient evidence from which a jury could determine plaintiff’s lost wage earning capacity. Ms. Guadian was a seamstress her entire working life; she sewed all day, was “always working.” Her injury prevented her from returning to this work, the only type she had ever known. Based upon the piece-rate system, she could earn anywhere from the minimum wage of $4.25 an hour up to $7.00 per hour. Testimony established that $5.50 is average for a good operator. Thus, I would hold this case is distinguishable from Bonney v. San Antonio Transit Co., 325 S.W.2d 117, 121 (Tex.1959), because there plaintiff presented no evidence of either his own earnings prior to injury or another monetary measure of his damages. Here, plaintiff did provide the jury with just such a monetary measure. I believe the majority errs in focussing solely upon the personal work history of Ms. Guadi-an, where other evidence upon which an award could be based was before the factfin-der. The jury was within its sound judgment and discretion in making this award, and I would hold that it should not be overturned on that basis.2

. The majority also finds it significant that Ms. Guadian did not prove how many hours per week she was working before her injury. Although this may likewise be significant in determining lost wages, it is not fatal to award lost wage earning capacity, which can be based upon full-time work even where a plaintiff is working part time, or is not employed outside the home when an injury occurs. See Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Richards, 704 S.W.2d 399, 402 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (part-time worker entitled to recover compensation for loss of earning capacity on full-time basis); C.E. Duke’s Wrecker Serv. v. Oakley, 526 S.W.2d 228, 236 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (woman not employed outside the home at time of injury entitled to recover loss of wage earning capacity).

. Because the majority opinion does not reach the issue of whether this element of damage was *902discounted to present value, I express no opinion on that issue, which I nevertheless believe is the true subject of this appeal.