Court Opinion

ID: 9724126
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:45:26.761581+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:56.206661
License: Public Domain

EVANS, Acting P. J.
Although I concur in the judgment (order), I write separately on the topic of husband’s representation by the district attorney.
In the underlying proceeding seeking to modify a dissolution decree and order to invoke the provisions of the “Agnos Child Support Standards Act of 1984” (Civ. Code, § 4720 et seq.), appellant husband is represented by the office of the District Attorney of San Joaquin County. The reason or justification for such representation escapes my scrutiny. Husband’s declaration reveals his gross income to be $2,603.04 per month, exclusive of any sums earned by his present wife who is employed in the office of the District Attorney of San Joaquin County. Their joint income is purported to be in excess of $4,100 per month.
The mother of the child, respondent herein, reveals a gross total income of $1,119 per month and is privately represented in this proceeding. Upon questioning at oral argument the deputy district attorney, when asked for justification for his representation of the appellant husband, referred to Welfare and Institutions Code section 11475 (more reasonably the section should have been 11475.1) and Civil Code section 4801.7. His reliance on either of those sections is totally misplaced.
Welfare and Institutions Code section 11475.1, subdivision (a), provides in pertinent part, “Each county shall maintain a single organizational unit located in the office of the district attorney which shall have the responsibility for promptly and effectively enforcing child and spousal support obligations .... The district attorney shall take appropriate action, both civil and criminal, to enforce this obligation when the child is receiving public assistance, and when requested to do so by the individual on whose behalf the enforcement efforts will be made when the child is not receiving public assistance. ... In any action brought or enforcement proceedings instituted by the district attorney pursuant to this section for payment of child or spousal support, an action to recover an arrearage in support payments may be maintained by the district attorney .... [^[] In any action for child support brought by the district attorney in the performance of duties under this section, the district attorney may make a motion for an order effective during the pendency of that action, for the support, maintenance, and education of the child or children that are the subject of the action. This order shall be referred to as an order for temporary support.” (Italics added.)
*512When read in its entirety, Welfare and Institutions Code section 11475.1 renders counsel’s reliance and explanation ludicrous. The section contemplates the implication of the district attorney’s services in cases of need or when aid to families with dependent children (AFDC) is involved. In fact, the section specifically directs that the district attorney institute the action. That is not the case in this proceeding; the husband instituted the action upon the representation of the district attorney. The district attorney services are available to establish paternity and enforce prior orders or secure a temporary order in the first instance when prior proceedings relative to the spouses or child and parents have not been undertaken. It is patently clear the underlying proceeding is not one without prior court action. In 1982, a dissolution decree was entered providing for joint legal custody of the child with both parents and physical custody with the father. By stipulation of the parties, an order compelling the mother to contribute to the child’s support was not entered at that time. Four years later, husband with the assistance of the district attorney caused an order to show cause to be filed seeking modification of the decree pursuant to the provisions of Civil Code section 4720 et seq.
The district attorney as counsel for appellant husband also suggested, as a basis of authority for his representation, the provisions of Civil Code section 4801.7. Again, he has totally misread or ignored the clear meaning of the statute and the intent of the Legislature relative to that section as well as the prior section.
I assume the District Attorney of San Joaquin County has recognized that the California Supreme Court has previously stated that district attorneys are not to prosecute civil actions in the absence of specific legislative authority. (See People v. McKale (1979) 25 Cal.3d 626, 632 [159 Cal.Rptr. 811, 602 P.2d 731]; Safer v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 230, 236 [124 Cal.Rptr. 174, 540 P.2d 14].)
In this case, counsel has proceeded into what he alleges to have been a perceived authority of either Welfare and Institutions Code section 11475.1 or Civil Code section 4801.7. Only a strained construction of either section would authorize the actions here taken. Moreover, under the factual background relative to all of the parties involved, either directly or indirectly, it is difficult to ascribe the proper motives of the activities undertaken by the district attorney’s office. Civil Code section 4801.7 authorizes district attorney services in the representation of a parent entitled to support when payments have not been made and enforcement proceedings are needed. That need relates to the assistance of the district attorney to avoid institution of public support resulting from nonenforcement of the prior support orders. The clear language of that section limits the district attorney’s *513involvement to “the matter of enforcement of the spousal support order” (ibid.). Clearly the instant action is not one for enforcement nor was it for the procuring of a temporary order in the absence of any prior order or proceeding for support; nor was public support of the child imminent or remotely implicated. The obvious legislative intent as expressed in Welfare and Institutions Code section 11475.1 and Civil Code section 4801.7 is .to provide publicly funded legal assistance through the district attorney’s office in instances where it is necessary to incur payment and collection of court-ordered support in those cases in which AFDC is involved or that such enforcement is needed to preclude the possibility that public support would be needed unless such action is undertaken.
In this instance, neither scenario was present. Had the respondent mother had custody and a support order was absent, her level of income may have been sufficiently minimal to require such public services.
It is also important to note that in this instance, the action was not instituted by the district attorney as required in Welfare and Institutions Code section 11475.1, but rather by the husband, seeking in effect to modify the dissolution decree with the assistance of publicly funded counsel. (See In re Marriage of Brown (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 491, 496 [234 Cal.Rptr. 535].)
Under the circumstances, I would in affirming the judgment (order) also remand the matter to the trial court for a determination of the value of the services rendered by the district attorney’s office on behalf of appellant husband, both in the trial court and on appeal, and direct that an order be entered requiring husband to repay the amount determined to be reasonable attorney fees to the proper county fund. (See Stanson v. Mott (1976) 17 Cal.3d 206 [130 Cal.Rptr. 697, 551 P.2d 1]; Stevens v. Geduldig (1986) 42 Cal.3d 24, 35 [227 Cal.Rptr. 405, 719 P.2d 1001].)