Court Opinion

ID: 9620315
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:40:55.14984+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:49.289165
License: Public Domain

Wendell L. Griffen, Judge, dissenting. The Arkansas Board of Review (Board) awarded unemployment benefits pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated § ll-10-514(a) (Supp. 2007) because it found that claimant Jennifer Fraze’s separation from her last work was due to a layoff caused by the unavailability of work, rather than misconduct in connection with the work. I would affirm the Board’s decision, which is supported by substantial evidence. See Ark. Code Ann. § ll-10-529(c)(l) (Supp. 2007). In reversing and remanding for the Board to determine under a separate statute, Arkansas Code Annotated § 11-10-513 (Supp. 2007), whether Fraze voluntarily left her employment without good cause, the majority opinion ignores the dispositive finding that the Board made under § ll-10-514(a), and seeks to require the Board to make an unnecessary finding. Through A Team, a temporary employment agency, Fraze accepted a long-term assignment as a manager with Wing Stop. Fraze was unhappy with her assignment for various reasons and threatened to quit several times before she finally quit. She ultimately left that assignment before she completed it. Fraze explained that she resigned because she could not satisfy Wing Stop’s owners with her job performance; thus, she felt it would be best if she quit. Wing Stop’s owners accepted Fraze’s resignation and another A Team employee was hired to fill the vacancy. As the terms of Fraze’s employment with A Team dictated, she reported to A Team within five days of ending her assignment with Wing Stop, at which time, the employer did not have any available suitable work. Although we review only the Board’s findings, the procedural history of this case demonstrates the majority’s error in requiring the Board to make separate findings under § 11-10-513. The Department of Workforce Services (Department) initially denied Fraze unemployment benefits based on § 11 — 10—513. That statute denies unemployment benefits to a claimant who voluntarily leaves work. See Ark. Code Ann. § ll-10-513(a)(l). The same statute also disqualifies a temporary employee who, without good cause, fails to contact the temporary help firm for reassignment upon conclusion of his or her latest assignment. See Ark. Code Ann. § ll-10-513(a)(2). The Arkansas Appeal Tribunal reversed the Department’s denial of benefits under § 11-10-513, and modified the Department’s determination to specifically awardbenefits under § ll-10-514(a), which disqualifies a claimant who is discharged from his or her last work due to misconduct in connection with the work. The Board affirmed the Appeal Tribunal’s decision, awarding benefits under § ll-10-514(a). In so doing, the Board rejected the employer’s claim that Fraze “quit the employment when she quit the assignment” to Wing Stop. The Board determined that Wing Stop’s acceptance of Fraze’s resignation resulted in the conclusion of Fraze's temporary assignment with Wing Stop but did not end her employment with A Team. The Board found that Fraze’s employment with A Team continued because A Team considered Fraze eligible for reassignment when her assignment with Wing Stop ended. Accordingly, the Board concluded that Fraze’s separation from her last work was due to lack of work, rather than due to misconduct connected with work within the meaning of Ark. Code Ann. § ll-10-514(a). I would affirm the Board’s decision. While Fraze did not complete her assignment with Wing Stop, § 11-10-513 does not define a temporary employee as one who completes a temporary assignment. A temporary employee is an employee assigned to work for the clients of a temporary help firm. Ark. Code Ann. § ll-10-513(a)(2)(C) (Repl. 2003). A temporary help firm means a firm that hires its own employees and assigns them to clients to support or supplement the client’s work force in work situations such as employees’ absences, temporary skill shortages, seasonal workloads, and special assignments and projects. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-513(a)(2)(B)(i) (emphasis added). Providing that the temporary employee has heen so informed, he will be deemed to have voluntarily quit employment and will be disqualified for benefits if, upon conclusion of his latest assignment, the temporary employee without good cause failed to contact the temporary help firm for reassignment. Ark. Code Ann. § ll-10-513(a)(2)(A) (emphasis added). The Board here specifically found that Fraze’s assignment was concluded; upon conclusion of her temporary assignment to Wing Stop, she contacted her employer as required, and no suitable work was available. That is all that § 11-10-513(a)(2)(A) requires. The majority opinion fails to explain why Wing Stop’s acceptance of Fraze’s resignation did not result in the conclusion of her assignment; it also sweeps aside the fact that Fraze’s employment with A Team thereafter continued because A Team considered Fraze eligible for reassignment when her assignment with Wing Stop ended. Obviously, Fraze did not “quit” her employment with the temporary agency when she “quit” Wing Stop because her employer thereafter attempted to find her another temporary job. Accordingly, because the requirements of§ 11-10-513 were satisfied, that statute cannot be used as a basis for denying Fraze unemployment benefits. Moreover, because the Board’s decision to award benefits under § 11-10-514 is supported by substantial evidence, there is no need to reverse and remand for it to determine whether Fraze voluntarily quit or had good cause to quit under § 11-10-513. To do so would require the Board to engage in an exercise that is both futile and improper given our standard of review and the plain meaning of the Board’s finding and the pertinent statute. The practical effect of the holding set forth in the majority opinion is to judicially nullify the very real distinction between temporary employees assigned by temporary-help firms, and other employees. It is one thing for the Arkansas General Assembly to rescind that distinction; after all, the General Assembly created it. It is judicial legislation for our court to do so. I am authorized to state that Judgé Robbins joins in this opinion.