Court Opinion

ID: 9865230
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 16:27:55.607125+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:37:58.524816
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Bakke,
dissenting.
With due respect to my associates, I think the court in its opinion misconceives defendant’s position in this case. He does not base his defense upon the theory that the 1926 deed was not given as security, but grounds it upon the oral agreement made in 1928, by which the deed was to become absolute, i.e., what it is on its face. The fact of the recording of the 1926 deed at that time, viz., 1928, is strong evidence in support of that defense.
In my opinion, the proper rule to be applied in this case is that, “By an independent parol agreement the mortgagor may waive his rights under a deed which *581was originally in effect a mortgage, and if this agreement is supported by a consideration, or is partially acted upon by the parties or fully performed, the mortgagor is estopped to deny the grantee’s absolute title. The grantee has the legal title already, and the grantor may cut off all right to redeem by a receipt of an adequate consideration therefor and an informal release of all his interest in the property. But the new agreement must not only be founded upon adequate consideration, but must be fair and reasonable in its terms and free from fraud and undue influence.” 1 Jones on Mortgages (7th ed.) §338. See, also, 41 C.J. 344, §111, and Murphy v. Booker, 139 Ark. 469, 214 S.W. 63.
The 1928 oral agreement was pleaded as a special defense. It was met by a plea of confession and avoidance based upon alleged prior indebtedness, some of it over twenty-five years old. Is it any wonder the trial court refused to place any credence in testimony of that sort?
We are confronted time and again in the opinion with reference to evidence that is conflicting. Why is there not in this case an adherence to the well-established rule, that findings based upon conflicting testimony will not be disturbed on review?
We recently celebrated the One Hundred Fiftieth anniversary of the bill of rights. Article VII of that declaration provides, inter alia: “No fact tried by a jury [the rule is the same where the trial court is the trier of facts] shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of the United States than according to the rules of the common law.”
The opinion here contains the statement, “we cannot concur” in the finding that the 1926 deed was absolute. On its face it is absolute as definitely as any instrument could be. Emmett admits there was an oral agreement in 1928, which agreement was the principal issue in this case, and, under the rule hereinabove quoted, the lower court was amply justified in its findings.
*582Emmett alleged that the 1926 deed was a mortgage and that the debt which it was given to secure had been paid. This allegation was the basis of the suit. In the light of his contentions, why, pray, did his mother relinquish all claim to the property, as is indicated by her letter to Georgia offered in evidence, wherein she asks for just a place in which to sleep and eat; and by the fact that the. mother made application for an old age pension, in which she declared under oath that she neither owned nor had an interest in any real estate. By allowing recovery in this case, the stamp of approval is placed on possible fraud in old age pension cases.
There is nothing in the record to indicate that Emmett may be able to produce any better evidence than he did at the hearing. Since both mother and daughter are now deceased, further attempts to establish the agreements between them would be futile without violating statutory provisions bearing on the admission of testimony, since both parties appear now in a representative capacity.
Georgia’s good faith in this whole matter was amply demonstrated by the naming of her mother as a beneficiary in a substantial life insurance contract, the proceeds of which the mother admittedly received, in addition to which the improvements Georgia and her husband placed upon the property, more than offset any possible equity that Emmett may have. This would be true even assuming that the $600 which Emmett admittedly received as part consideration for the 1928 oral agreement was in payment of an old debt which he alleged in his reply was the fact. I do not think it was in payment of this old debt.
There is ample testimony to sustain the findings of the trial court and which would clearly support an affirmance of the judgment here.
For the reasons mentioned, I dissent.