Court Opinion

ID: 9694778
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 17:54:27.463138+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:09:39.194675
License: Public Domain

OPINION
FORSBERG, Judge.*
This is an appeal from a judgment denying appellants’ request for attorney fees. The underlying lawsuit, brought by appellants Minnesota Council of Dog Clubs and American Dog Owners Association, Inc:, challenged *904the constitutionality of various portions of the Minnesota Cruelty to Animals Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 343.22, 343.235, 343.29. The district court, ruling in favor of appellants, held that the challenged sections were in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the concurrent provision of the Minnesota Constitution, Article I, Section 7, and enjoined enforcement of the challenged portions within the City of Minneapolis. Appellants then moved, under ■ 42 U.S.C. § 1988, for an award of attorney fees and costs in the amount of $64,727.65. The district court denied the award. This appeal was subsequently brought pursuant to rule 103.03(a) of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure.
FACTS
Appellants, two nonprofit state and national organizations of dog owners, filed suit in October 1993, challenging the federal and state constitutionality of several provisions of the Minnesota Cruelty to Animals Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 343.22, 343.235, 343.29. Appellants sought declaratory relief pursuant to Minn. Stat. §§ 555.01-16. Among its allegations, appellants’ complaint referenced 42 U.S.C. § 1983: “Prosecution and enforcement of the Act are undertaken under color of state law within the meaning of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”
The district court initially dismissed the case on the ground that appellants lacked standing to pursue claims on behalf of their members. This court reversed in an unpublished opinion, Minnesota Council of Dog Clubs v. City of Minneapolis, No. C3-94-939, 1994 WL 593912 (Minn.App. Nov. 1, 1994), and remanded the case for further proceedings.
Appellants and respondent then brought cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court granted appellants’ motion, holding all of the challenged provisions unconstitutional and enjoining further enforcement of the law in the City of Minneapolis. Subsequently, appellants brought a motion under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for reasonable attorney fees and costs of $64,727.65. Attorney fees were calculated at $55,300.50, based upon a lodestar of 331 hours multiplied by applicable fee rates, ranging from $50 to $165, out-of-pocket costs of $4,427.15, and a requested, “enhancement” of $5,000. Respondent opposed the motion on grounds that it should not be liable for a fee award under section 1988. The district court denied the fee request by an order dated May 25, 1995.
The district court cited three reasons for its refusal to grant attorney fees: (1) respondent’s conduct had nothing to do with the constitutional infirmities alleged; (2) respondent had not violated appellants’ due process rights; and (3) appellants’ lawsuit only challenged “anticipatory enforcement” of the challenged provisions. Appellants seek reversal of the district court’s decision.
ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion by denying attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 to appellants who successfully challenged the constitutionality of Minn.Stat. §§ 343.22, 343.235, 343.29 in an action against a municipality for enforcement of state law?
ANALYSIS
1. Standard of Review
The standard of review for an appellate court examining an award of attorney fees and costs is whether the district court abused its discretion. Radloff v. First Am. Nat'l Bank, 470 N.W.2d 154, 156 (Minn.App.1991), review denied (Minn. July 24, 1991). The Minnesota Supreme Court noted, however:
Although section 1988 leaves an award of attorney fees to the discretion of the court, the United States Supreme Court requires an award of attorney fees to a prevailing party unless special circumstances would render an award unjust.
Welsh v. City of Orono, 355 N.W.2d 117, 124 (Minn.1984), (citing Newman v. Piggie Park Enter., 390 U.S. 400, 402, 88 S.Ct. 964, 966, 19 L.Ed.2d 1263 (1968)).
*905. 2. Discussion
Appellants’ claim for attorney fees was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988), amended by 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (Supp. Ill 1991), which provides:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of seetion[] * * ⅜ 1983 * * * of this title * * *, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.
Section 1983, in turn, allows a cause of action for
[e]very person who, under color of any statute,. ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes-to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
It is undisputed that appellants prevailed in the action underlying this appeal. The threshold question that we must address, therefore, is whether appellants properly asserted a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The United States Supreme Court requires two allegations to state a cause of action under section 1983. Plaintiffs must allege- (1) that they were deprived of a federal right and (2) that the person so depriving acted under color of state law. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640, 100 S.Ct. 1920, 1923, 64 L.Ed.2d 572 (1980).
Count I of appellants’ complaint states: “Prosecution and enforcement of the Act are undertaken under color of state law within the meaning of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” This contention is re-alleged in the lawsuit’s ensuing counts. Appellants’ complaint also specifically states that the challenged portions of the act der prived dog owners of due process and the right to a fair trial in violation of the United States Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution. Appellants’ complaint, therefore, explicitly alleges a section 1983.cause of action and identifies a deprivation of federal rights under color of state law.
The Minnesota Supreme Court applied the GomeZ two-part test for asserting a section 1983 claim in L.K. v. Gregg, 425 N.W.2d 813, 818 (Minn.1988). As in the case at bar, Gregg involved a request for attorney fees sought pursuant to section 1988. In Gregg, plaintiffs who had brought an action for declaratory and injunctive relief were allowed to recover attorney fees pursuant to section 1988 based on a section 1983 claim. The court never questioned whether plaintiffs were barred from seeking recovery of attorney fees under section 1988 because they had asserted an action for declaratory judgment. The Gregg case undermines respondent’s argument that appellants are not eligible for attorney fees under section 1988 simply because they asserted claims, pursuant to the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 555.01-16, to which the section 1988 fees being sought are inapplicable. We conclude that appellants properly asserted a section 1983 claim.
Our next consideration is whether municipal liability may be imposed under section 1983 in this ease. The United States Supreme Court first extended section 1983 liability to municipalities in Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2035, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).
Congress did intend municipalities and other local government units to be included among those persons to whom § 1983 applies. Local governing bodies, therefore, can be sued directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where * * * the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers.
The Court ruled that a local government could only be held liable if, “under color of some official policy,” it caused violation’ of another’s constitutional rights:
[I]t is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts *906may fairly be said to represent- official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.
Id. at 692, 694, 98 S.Ct. at 2036, 2037-38.
The establishment of a policy or custom divergent from state law is not a prerequisite for imposition of section 1983 liability upon a municipality. A municipality, however, must make a “deliberate choice to follow a course of action * * * from among various alternatives” to sustain section 1983 liability. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 1300, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986), quoted in Garner v. Memphis Police Dep’t, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir.1993), cert denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1219, 127 L.Ed.2d 565 (1994). In this case, the respondent municipality was limited to .following now invalidated state law to achieve certain enforcement objectives.
This case, therefore, is distinguishable from Gamer, a Sixth Circuit case where the court rejected a police department’s claim that it could not be held liable for a violation of the Civil Rights Act merely because the department took action consistent with state law. 8 F.3d at 364. The Gamer court found liability where a police department adopted a more restrictive policy than state law required regarding the use of force to effect an arrest, even though the police department’s policy was accordant with state law. Id. The court determined that the municipality’s enforcement of the state law at issue was a deliberate choice among a variety of alternatives. Id. Unlike Gamer, .the respondent in this case was not afforded similar discretion.
This case is also distinguishable from a Fifth Circuit case which held that a sheriff acting pursuant to a state statute was acting under color of state law for purposes of a federal civil rights action regardless of whether state law provided him any discretion in carrying out his duties. Jackson v. Golan, 868 F.2d 165, 167-68 (5th Cir.1989). The court in that case awarded attorney fees against the sheriff, rejecting the argument that he should not be liable. Id.; see also Johnson v. Mississippi, 606 F.2d 635, 637 (5th Cir.1979) (holding local officials liable for attorney fees under section 1988 for enforcing state statute). The holdings in Jackson and Johnson, unlike this case, however, address individual rather than municipal liability.
It is our conclusion that respondent is not liable for attorney fees in this case for merely following state law. See Bockes v. Fields, 999 F.2d 788, 791 (4th Cir.1993) (“Such bounded, state-conferred discretion is not the ‘policymaking’ authority for which a county may be held responsible under § 1983.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 922, 127 L.Ed.2d 216 (1994).
It is difficult to imagine a municipal policy more innocuous and constitutionally permissible, and whose causal connection to the alleged violation is more attenuated, than the “policy”'of enforcing state law.
Surplus Store & Exchange v. City of Delphi, 928 F.2d 788, 791 (7th Cir.1991). Because we find that respondent is not subject to liability, we need not reach any additional considerations.
Finally, it is important to note that if municipalities were to be held liable every time they enforced a state law, the consequences would be horrendous. Any municipality could be financially devastated by a number of such actions. Furthermore, in order to protect itself, a municipality would have to examine every statute passed by the legislature and then decide whether to enforce it. This would produce a spotty and chaotic enforcement policy throughout the state.
DECISION
We affirm the district court’s denial of attorney fees and costs sought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 to appellants who successfully challenged several provisions of the Cruelty to Animals Act, Minri.Stat. §§ 343.22, 343.235, 343.29; in an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a municipality for enforcing state law.
Affirmed.

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.