Court Opinion

ID: 9402225
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-15 15:14:45.498378+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:58.482110
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

                                             2023 WY 63

                                                                    APRIL TERM, A.D. 2023

                                                                             June 15, 2023

  LIZABETH MORENO HURTADO,

  Appellant
  (Defendant),

  v.                                                                 S-22-0309

  THE STATE OF WYOMING,

  Appellee
  (Plaintiff).

                       Appeal from the District Court of Albany County
                          The Honorable Misha E. Westby, Judge

Representing Appellant:
      Lauren McLane, Faculty Director, Defender Aid Clinic, University of Wyoming
      College of Law; Luke Dainty, Student Director; Sarah Kelley, Assistant Student
      Director.

Representing Appellee:
      Bridget Hill, Wyoming Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, Deputy Attorney
      General; Kristen R. Jones, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

Before FOX, C.J., and KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, GRAY, and FENN, JJ.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are
requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of
any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the
permanent volume.
GRAY, Justice.

[¶1] Lizabeth Moreno Hurtado pled guilty to possession and delivery of
methamphetamine. She filed a timely motion for sentence reduction pursuant to W.R.Cr.P.
35(b), which the district court denied. Ms. Hurtado appeals. We affirm.

                                          ISSUE

[¶2] Was the district court required to elaborate on its reasons for denying Ms. Hurtado’s
motion for sentence reduction?

                                          FACTS

[¶3] The State of Wyoming charged Ms. Hurtado with five felony offenses related to
possession and delivery of a controlled substance. Pursuant to a plea agreement, she pled
guilty to one count of possession and one count of delivery of methamphetamine. The
State dismissed the other charges. At sentencing, the district court imposed a five- to
seven-year sentence on the possession charge, and a consecutive sentence of ten to fifteen
years on the delivery charge. The sentence on the delivery charge was suspended in favor
of two years probation.

[¶4] One year later, Ms. Hurtado filed a Rule 35(b) motion for sentence reduction.
Eleven days after the motion was filed, the district court entered an order denying the
motion. The order states, in its entirety:

                    THIS MATTER came before the Court pursuant to
              Ms. Hurtado’s Motion for Sentence Reduction filed on
              November 18, 2022 and the State of Wyoming’s State’s
              Response to Defendant’s Motion for Sentence Reduction filed
              on November 28, 2022. Being fully advised in the matter, this
              Court CONCLUDES as follows:

                     FINDING NO GOOD CAUSE, Defendant’s request
              for sentence reduction shall be and hereby is DENIED.

Ms. Hurtado appeals.

                                        ANALYSIS

[¶5] Ms. Hurtado makes three arguments in support of her request that the district court’s
denial of her motion for sentence reduction be reversed. First, the order did not set out the
basis for the denial. Next, the order did not demonstrate “due consideration of [her]
motion.” Third, the order did not specify that alternative treatments were considered.

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[¶6] We begin by addressing Ms. Hurtado’s contention that the district court abused its
discretion because the order did not set forth its rationale for denying her motion.
W.R.Cr.P. 35(b) governs motions for sentence reduction. It states:

             A motion to reduce a sentence may be made, or the court may
             reduce a sentence without motion, within one year after the
             sentence is imposed or probation is revoked, or within one year
             after receipt by the court of a mandate issued upon affirmance
             of the judgment or dismissal of the appeal, or within one year
             after entry of any order or judgment of the Wyoming Supreme
             Court denying review of, or having the effect of upholding, a
             judgment of conviction or probation revocation. The court
             shall determine the motion within a reasonable time. Changing
             a sentence from a sentence of incarceration to a grant of
             probation shall constitute a permissible reduction of sentence
             under this subdivision. The court may determine the motion
             with or without a hearing.

W.R.Cr.P. 35(b).

[¶7]   We review the denial of a motion for sentence reduction for abuse of discretion.

             The district court has broad discretion in determining whether
             to reduce a defendant’s sentence, and we will not disturb its
             determination absent an abuse of discretion. The sentencing
             judge is in the best position to decide if a sentence modification
             is appropriate, and is free to accept or reject information
             submitted in support of a sentence reduction at its discretion.
             Our objective on review is not to weigh the propriety of the
             sentence if it falls within the sentencing range; we simply
             consult the information in front of the court and consider
             whether there was a rational basis from which the district court
             could reasonably draw its conclusion. Because of the broad
             discretion given to the district court in sentencing, and our
             significant deference on appeal, this Court has demonstrated
             many times in recent years that it is a very difficult bar for an
             appellant to leap seeking to overturn a sentencing decision on
             an abuse of discretion argument.

Leners v. State, 2022 WY 127, ¶ 24, 518 P.3d 686, 695 (Wyo. 2022) (quoting Coffey v.
State, 2021 WY 21, ¶¶ 8–14, 479 P.3d 1263, 1265–66 (Wyo. 2021) (quoting Mitchell v.

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State, 2020 WY 131, ¶ 7, 473 P.3d 1255, 1257 (Wyo. 2020) (quoting Barrowes v. State,
2019 WY 8, ¶ 12, 432 P.3d 1261, 1266 (Wyo. 2019)))).

[¶8] The order denying Ms. Hurtado’s motion for sentence reduction provides that the
district court was “fully advised in the matter” but did not expound on the court’s reasons.
Rule 35(b) does not require the district court to elaborate on its rationale in deciding a
motion for sentence reduction. See W.R.Cr.P. 35(b). All that is required is that the
sentencing court consider the motion and supporting materials. Coffey, ¶ 11, 479 P.3d at
1266 (“[T]he court’s order indicates that it did consider [the] motion and the supporting
materials, and we do not require more than that.”). See Hart v. State, 2016 WY 28, ¶ 11,
368 P.3d 877, 879 (Wyo. 2016) (affirmed an order denying a Rule 35(b) motion that did
not detail the district court’s considerations but indicated that it was “fully advised”);
Chapman v. State, 2015 WY 15, ¶ 12, 342 P.3d 388, 392 (Wyo. 2015) (“There is no
authority in Wyoming requiring a sentencing court to demonstrate good cause in denying
a Rule 35(b) motion.” (citing Hodgins v. State, 1 P.3d 1259, 1262 (Wyo. 2000))); Boucher
v. State, 2012 WY 145, ¶ 12, 288 P.3d 427, 430 (Wyo. 2012) (“The fact that the order does
not describe the specific information . . . provided in support of [the] motion does not
establish an abuse of discretion.”). The district court did not abuse its discretion when it
did not elaborate on its reasons for denying Ms. Hurtado’s motion for sentence reduction.

[¶9] We turn next to Ms. Hurtado’s argument that the district court’s order “fail[ed] to
demonstrate due consideration of [her] motion” depriving her of due process.

[¶10] The question of whether an individual was afforded constitutional due process is
one of law, which we review de novo. Booth v. Booth, 2019 WY 5, ¶ 11, 432 P.3d 902,
907 (Wyo. 2019); see also KC v. State, 2015 WY 73, ¶ 16, 351 P.3d 236, 241 (Wyo. 2015);
In interest of DT, 2017 WY 36, ¶ 23, 391 P.3d 1136, 1143 (Wyo. 2017). “The party
claiming an infringement of his right to due process has the burden of demonstrating both
that he has a protected interest and that such interest has been affected in an impermissible
way. The question is whether there has been a denial of fundamental fairness.” Leners,
¶ 12, 518 P.3d at 692 (quoting Matter of NRAE, 2020 WY 121, ¶ 12, 472 P.3d 374, 377
(Wyo. 2020) (quoting In re MC, 2013 WY 43, ¶ 29, 299 P.3d 75, 81 (Wyo. 2013) (quoting
In re KMO, 2012 WY 100, ¶ 30, 280 P.3d 1216, 1224 (Wyo. 2012)))).

[¶11] Ms. Hurtado contends that she has a right to know what evidence the district court
relied on in making its decision. In support of her argument, she relies on Holm v. State.
In Holm we explained that “[o]ne of the most basic elements of due process is the right of
each party to be apprised of all the evidence upon which an issue is to be decided[.]” Holm
v. State, 404 P.2d 740, 744 (Wyo. 1965) (citations omitted). We held that the appellant’s
due process rights were violated because the jury relied on improperly submitted
evidence—a court file that included a report from a doctor prejudicial to the appellant. The
appellant had no opportunity to cross-examine the doctor or to contravene the effect of the
evidence. Id. at 744–45. Holm is inapposite.

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[¶12] Ms. Hurtado filed her motion for sentence reduction and the State filed a response,
which was served upon Ms. Hurtado. Ms. Hurtado does not argue that the district court
considered improper evidence or that she had no opportunity to respond. She submits that
due process requires an explanation for the court’s denial of her motion. As previously
discussed, Rule 35(b) does not require the court to detail its reasons for denial of a motion
for sentence reduction. Ms. Hurtado has failed to show that she was denied due process.

[¶13] Finally, Ms. Hurtado argues that because she was found to be a “qualified addicted
offender” under the Addicted Offender Accountability Act (the Act), 1 the district court was
required to explain that alternative treatments were considered. We disagree. The Act is
not directed at sentence reductions. See generally Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-13-1301 through
-1304; Gomez v. State, 2013 WY 134, ¶¶ 7–8, 311 P.3d 621, 623–24 (Wyo. 2013). The
Act authorizes the court to “order treatment for substance abuse while the defendant is
incarcerated or to sentence him to probation or a suspended sentence and require treatment
as a condition of release.” Marshall v. State, 2014 WY 168, ¶ 8, 340 P.3d 283, 286 (Wyo.
2014). The process for sentence reduction of a qualified addicted offender is governed by
Rule 35(b). Gomez, ¶¶ 7–8, 311 P.3d at 623–24. Neither the Act nor Rule 35(b) requires
the district court to explain that alternative treatments were considered.

[¶14] Affirmed.

1
 The Act provides:
               Suspended sentence for qualified offenders.
               (a)     Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section,
               notwithstanding any other provision of law, qualified offenders may be
               placed on probation under W.S. 7-13-301, receive a suspended sentence
               under W.S. 7-13-302(a) or placed on probation under W.S. 35-7-1037.
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-1303(a) (LexisNexis 2021).

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