Court Opinion

ID: 9853266
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:45:21.735623+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:43.752134
License: Public Domain

DYK, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
This ease concerns the scope of the point of novelty requirement in design patents. The majority decides this case on a ground that was not addressed in briefs or at oral argument by either party. In my view, the majority opinion departs from our precedent in fashioning a new rule — that a combination of elements cannot constitute a point of novelty in design patent cases unless the combination constitutes a “nontrivial advance” over the prior art. The majority equates its newly-fashioned nontrivial advance test with the requirement that a design patent be nonobvious over the prior art.1 It then appears to limit the application of that test to cases in which the point of novelty involves a combination of prior art elements.
It seems to me that there are multiple flaws in the majority’s approach. First, by conflating the criteria for infringement and obviousness, the test eviscerates the statutory presumption of validity by requiring the patentee to affirmatively prove nonob-viousness. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (“The burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity.”). The burden of proof on obviousness rests with the accused infringer and must be established by clear and convincing evidence. Under the majority’s test, however, the patentee would have to prove nonobviousness in order to establish infringement.
Second, the majority’s approach is at the same time too narrow and too broad. It is too narrow because it applies a special test only to designs which involve a combination of design elements. It is clear to me that a single point of novelty test must apply to all points of novelty, not just those involving combinations. That has invariably been the approach of our past cases. The majority’s approach is also too broad because it extends an obviousness-like test to each point of novelty, not merely the overall design (which is presently the sole focus of the obviousness analysis).
Third, determining whether each combination point of novelty represents a “nontrivial advance” over the prior art requires a difficult and restrictive inquiry in design patent cases. As we have previously noted, “[djesign patents have almost no scope.” In re Mann, 861 F.2d 1581, 1582 (Fed.Cir.1988). Points of novelty in design patents are often not dramatically different from the prior art. It is difficult enough to assess whether an overall design would have been obvious; it is almost impossible to determine whether a particular design feature represents a trivial or substantial advance over the prior art. The majority appears willing to have this issue resolved on summary judgment without factfinding by a jury, thus relegating to the court the determination whether there is a non-trivial advance over the prior art, a determination which a court is ill suited to make and which it did not in fact make in this case.
Fourth, the majority’s test is devoid of support in the case law. The most that any of the cases cited by the majority can establish is that we have, in certain instances, used the results of our obviousness analysis to determine the point of *1360novelty under the point of novelty test. But no case has come close to requiring a showing of nonobviousness as part of the point of novelty test.2 In Bernhardt, L.L.C. v. Collezione Europa USA, Inc., 386 F.3d 1371 (Fed.Cir.2004), we considered only the question whether expert testimony was required for a party to establish infringement under the point of novelty test. In holding that such testimony was not required, the court merely observed that “[a] determination of the differences between the patented design and the prior art is not especially different from the factual determinations that district courts routinely undertake on other issues, such as obviousness.” Id. (emphasis added). This statement in no way suggests — as the majority appears to believe, see Maj. Op. at 1357- — that the substantive inquiries on obviousness and infringement should be merged. Our decisions in Litton and Goodyear do not support the majority’s test either. Litton Sys., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423 (Fed.Cir.1984), was a case in which, having determined that the differences between the patented design and the prior art rendered the overall design nonobvious, see Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17, 86 S.Ct. 684, 15 L.Ed.2d 545 (1966), we then considered those differences to be the points of novelty. Litton, 728 F.2d at 1442, 1444. In Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Hercules Tire & Rubber Co., 162 F.3d 1113 (Fed.Cir.1998), we held that the use of a similar approach by the district court was not clearly erroneous. Id. at 1119, 1121. It is one thing to suggest that a feature that renders a design nonobvious is also a point of novelty. It is quite another to hold that a point of novelty cannot exist unless it would also render the design nonobvious. Again, neither case establishes that there must be a showing of a non-trivial advance to find an asserted combination point of novelty.
Finally, the majority’s test is in fact contrary to several of our cases. In Lawman Armor Corp. v. Winner International, LLC, 437 F.3d 1383 (Fed.Cir.2006), we rejected applying an obviousness analysis to the determination of infringement. Id. at 1385. We stated explicitly that “[wjhether there is any suggestion to combine prior art references may be relevant in a validity inquiry to determine obviousness ... but has no place in the infringement issue in this case.” Id. Other cases have treated the questions of novelty and obviousness in design cases as separate inquiries. Thus in In re Leslie, 547 F.2d 116 (CCPA 1977), our predecessor court distinguished situations “where the novelty of the design is at issue” from situations “where, as here, the issue is one of obviousness.” Id. at 120; see also In re Blum, 54 C.C.P.A. 1231, 374 F.2d 904, 908 (1967) (although design had “an appearance which is novel in the strictest sense of the word, the rejection here is not for want of novelty but for obviousness”).
I would address this case without reliance on the majority’s incorrect “non-trivial advance” standard. I respectfully dissent.

. The majority’s approach is in fact more restrictive than a nonobviousness test since it takes no account of secondary considerations.

. Smith v. Whitman Saddle Co., 148 U.S. 674, 13 S.Ct. 768, 37 L.Ed. 606 (1893), long predated the statutory obviousness requirement.