Court Opinion

ID: 9677824
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:01:19.280505+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:58.785811
License: Public Domain

EVELYN V. KEYES, Justice,
concurring.
I respectfully concur in the judgment only. The language in the jury charge complained of by appellant states:
Now, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 13th day of May, 2005, in Harris County, Texas, the defendant, Wayne O’Hara Campbell, did then and there unlawfully, intentionally or knowingly threaten Demetra Ariran with imminent bodily injury by using or exhibiting a deadly weapon, namely, a knife, then you will find the defendant guilty of aggravated assault, as charged in the indictment.

Unless you so find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, or if you have a reasonable doubt thereof, you will acquit the defendant of aggravated assault, and next consider whether the defendant is guilty of terroristic threat

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[I]f you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that in Harris County, Texas, on or about the 13th day of May, 2005, the defendant, Wayne O’Hara Campbell, did then and there unlawfully, threaten violence to Demetra Ariran or place Demetra Ariran in fear of imminent serious bodily injury, then *333you will find the defendant guilty of terroristic threat.
Unless you so find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, or if you have a reasonable doubt thereof, you will acquit the defendant of terroristic threat and next consider whether the defendant is guilty of assault....
If you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of either aggravated assault or terroristic threat, but you have a reasonable doubt as to which of said offenses he is guilty, then you must resolve that doubt in the defendant’s favor and find him guilty of the lesser offense of terroristic threat.
If you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of either terroristic threat or assault, but you have a reasonable doubt as to which of said offenses he is guilty, then you must resolve that doubt in the defendant’s favor and find him guilty of the lesser offense of assault.

If you have a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant is guilty of any offense defined in this charge, you will acquit the defendant and say by your verdict “Not Guilty.”

(Emphasis added.)
Appellant contends the charge is erroneous in that the jury was required to acquit appellant of aggravated assault unanimously before it could move on to consider the lesser-included offenses. That contention misreads the charge. The charge says that (a) unless the jurors as a whole, or unanimously, find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the greater offense of aggravated assault or (b) if, as a whole, or unanimously, they do not agree that the defendant is guilty of the greater offense of aggravated assault and, therefore, have a reasonable doubt as to his guilt of the greater offense, they must acquit him of the greater offense and then consider the lesser offense of terror-istic threat — and so on down the chain of lesser included offenses. The necessary implication is that a lack of unanimity as to guilt — and not unanimity as to acquittal — must produce a verdict of acquittal on any offense charged.
The instruction given to the jurors, while hardly a model of clarity, is not erroneous. It adequately instructs the jury that if any of them has a reasonable doubt about the defendant’s guilt on the greater charge the defendant must be acquitted of that charge; therefore, they should consider the defendant acquitted of that charge and so consider the next offense. There is nothing in the charge that instructs the jurors that they cannot change their minds during deliberations prior to rendition of the verdict and agree that whatever doubts any of them had about the greater offense that prevented a guilty verdict on that offense have been assuaged. Indeed, the charge expressly recognizes that the jurors may change their minds as they deliberate. It, therefore, instructs them, “If you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of either aggravated assault or terroristic threat, but you have a reasonable doubt as to which of said offenses he is guilty, then you must resolve that doubt in the defendant’s favor and find him guilty of the lesser offense.”
The exact opposite of appellant’s complaint was made previously by the appellant in Boyett v. State, namely, that the jury should have been instructed to acquit the defendant of the greater offense before addressing the lesser. 692 S.W.2d 512 (Tex.Crim.App.1985). The instruction complained of in Boyett stated, in relevant part, “Unless you so find [i.e., that the defendant is guilty of the greater offense], or if you have a reasonable doubt thereof, *334you should consider whether or not the defendant is guilty of the lesser included offense of [offense named].” Id. at 515 (emphasis added). The appellant complained that the instruction should have advised the jurors — as it does here — that “if you do not so believe, [the defendant is guilty of the greater offense] or if you have reasonable doubt thereof, you will acquit the defendant of [the greater offense] and proceed to consider whether the defendant is guilty of the [lesser offense].” Id. (emphasis added). The Court of Criminal Appeals stated:
We agree with appellant that the charge given in the instant case should have more explicitly instructed the jurors that if they did not believe, or if they had reasonable doubt of appellant’s guilt of the greater offense, they should acquit appellant and proceed to consider whether appellant was guilty of the lesser included offense. ... However, the instruction given, although not a model charge, essentially instructed the jurors to acquit, without specifically using the word “acquit”, by stating that if the jurors had a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of appellant to the greater offense, they should next consider the lesser included offense. This instruction properly informed the jurors to consider appellant’s requested instructions on lesser included offenses.... The charge read as a whole adequately instructed the jurors about acquitting appellant and about considering the lesser included offenses requested by appellant.
Id. at 516 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
In this case, appellant complains that the instruction to acquit of the greater charge before addressing the lesser — the instruction sought by the appellant in Boy-ett and held to be correct by the Court of Criminal Appeals — is the error and, therefore, implicitly seeks a return to the instruction complained of in Boyett. I would not engage in this round robin. The majority, however, indulges appellant — at least sufficiently to assume error and conduct a harmless error analysis — only to conclude that appellant suffered no harm from the instruction.
Because I think appellant’s reasoning is faulty and the law is clear, I do not agree that the instruction is erroneous.1 Because I otherwise agree with the majority, I concur in the judgment affirming appellant’s conviction.

. As the majority states, a long line of cases holds that any error in the submission of a lesser-included offense is not reversible when the jury has found the accused guilty of the greater offense. See O’Pry v. State, 642 S.W.2d 748, 765 (Tex.Crim.App.1982); Thomas v. State, 587 S.W.2d 707, 708-09 (Tex. Crim.App.1979); DeRusse v. State, 579 S.W.2d 224, 233 (Tex.Crim.App.1979); see also Parson v. State, 193 S.W.3d 116, 127 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2006, pet. ref'd). The rationale for this line of cases is that, once the jury convicts an accused of the greater offense charged, having been properly charged as to that offense, it has no occasion to consider whether appellant might be guilty of the lesser-included offense. See O’Pry, 642 S.W.2d at 765. Here, the jury, having found appellant guilty of the greater offense of aggravated assault, had no occasion to consider lesser included offenses. Therefore, I agree that, had the instructions regarding consideration of lesser included offenses been erroneous, appellant still would not have been harmed by the failure of the jury to consider those offenses because there was no occasion to reach them in his case.