Court Opinion

ID: 9491212
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:07:13.537732+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:54:35.394872
License: Public Domain

McKAY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I agree fully with the majority opinion that no probable cause existed to believe that the video tapes would be located at the named place to be searched, i.e., Defendant’s residence, when the magistrate issued the warrant for the search of the residence. The affidavit supporting the warrant provided insufficient facts to support a nexus between the contraband or illegal activity and the place to be searched. See United States v. Dennis, 115 F.3d 524, 529-30 (7th Cir.1997); United States v. Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d 8, 11 (1st Cir.1993); United States v. Hendricks, 743 F.2d 653, 654-55 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1006, 105 S.Ct. 1362, 84 L.Ed.2d 382 (1985).
In this case, Postal Service Inspector Carr led the investigation of Defendant, the sting operation, and the execution of the warrant. Subsequent to correspondence with Defendant concerning the purchase of child pornography materials, Inspector Carr targeted Defendant for a sting operation whereby a package of child pornography video tapes would be delivered to Defendant’s private post office box. In his understandable zeal, the Inspector, as procuring and executing officer, applied for and received a search warrant to search for the video tapes in Defendant’s home. In every observation made and reported to the magistrate judge, Defendant would pick up his mail at the private mailbox and take it to his place of employment. Nothing that the Inspector knew or reported to the magistrate judge pointed to Defendant’s residence. Further, the Inspector did not report anything to the magistrate judge that would suggest that viewers of child pornography are more likely to view it at their homes. What we know about people viewing pornography on their computers at work suggests a high probability that Defendant might observe pornography at work.1 See David Kane, High-Tech Measures Can Thwart Office Internet Misuse, Dallas Bus. J., Jan. 24, 1997, available in 1997 WL 7887838 (discussing the problem of employees’ frequent visits to pornography web sites). As I have noted, nothing that the Inspector knew or reported to the magistrate judge created any nexus between the video tapes and Defendant’s home.
To help cure this obvious deficiency of probable cause, the Inspector applied for and received an order authorizing the use of an electronic monitoring device [beeper] to track the package in the hope that Defendant would take the package to his home. The Inspector reported to the magistrate judge that the beeper would permit him, accompanied by his team of law enforcement officers, *1211to track the package. If the package were opened, an accelerated alarm would notify the officers.
The officers knew that the beeper stopped functioning at Defendant’s place of employment before he left work for the day. When the beeper failed and the officers could not visually observe the package, no means represented to the magistrate judge could cure the failure to maintain surveillance over the package until it was received at Defendant’s home. Despite the Inspector’s full knowledge that he and his team had failed to keep the package under surveillance, a requirement that the magistrate judge’s probable cause determination rested on, the Inspector was bent on executing the warrant as he saw fit. In applying Leon to these facts, the majority sanctions the following scenario: Officers approach a magistrate judge for a warrant to search a suspect’s home for a package of contraband after a controlled delivery to a post office box. They declare that the suspect usually takes his mail from his post office box to his place of employment. But, the officers say, if they find evidence during the operation which shows that the suspect has this particular package in his home, they will execute the warrant. This scenario represents just the type of unchecked discretion that the Fourth Amendment was intended to prevent and destroys the notion that we analyze Fourth Amendment violations under a standard of objective reasonableness. Therefore, I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the good-faith exception set out in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922-24, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), applies in this case to prevent the suppression of evidence.
I. Anticipatory Search Warrants
In all so-called “anticipatory search warrants,” where the officers who procure and execute the warrant are part of a pre-ar-ranged plan, sting, or controlled delivery, the magistrate judge’s determination of probable cause hinges on the expected occurrence of some future event or condition which was represented to him. As the majority notes, see ante, at 1201, the magistrate judge issuing an anticipatory search warrant must determine that probable cause will exist to believe, at some point in the future, that the items to be seized will be at the designated place to be searched when the search occurs. See United States v. Garcia, 882 F.2d 699, 702 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied sub nom. Grant v. United States, 493 U.S. 943, 110 S.Ct. 348, 107 L.Ed.2d 336 (1989); State v. Smith, 124 N.C.App. 565, 478 S.E.2d 237, 241 (1996). Anticipatory search warrants are inherently problematic because, unlike other warrants, they depend for their validity on events which have yet to transpire and which are often uniquely in the control of the executing officers. See Dennis, 115 F.3d at 528; United States v. Leidner, 99 F.3d 1423, 1430-31 (7th Cir.1996) (Wood, J., concurring), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 117 S.Ct. 1434, 137 L.Ed.2d 542 (1997); Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d at 20-21 (Torruella, J., concurring). Unlike normal warrants, an anticipatory warrant is not justified by past observations or events sufficient to establish probable cause but rather by conditions or events the executing officers have sworn they will either observe or cause to occur. See Dennis, 115 F.3d at 527 (controlled delivery); United States v. Hugoboom, 112 F.3d 1081, 1083-84 (10th Cir.1997) (controlled delivery); Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d at 9-10, 16 (sting operation).
The purpose of. the condition precedent is to ensure against premature or unlawful execution of the warrant by maintaining judicial control over the probable cause determination and over the circumstances of the warrant’s execution. See Dennis, 115 F.3d at 528; Hugoboom, 112 F.3d at 1085-86; Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d at 12-13; Garcia, 882 F.2d at 703-04. When the condition precedent is not satisfied, the magistrate judge’s probable cause determination is undermined and execution of the warrant is illegal. “If the party seeking the search ... create[s] the circumstances which [provide] the probable cause, which then justify the warrant itself, the magistrate is removed ... from his constitutionally mandated role.” Smith, 478 S.E.2d at 241; see Hendricks, 743 F.2d at 654 n. 1. This is exactly the course of events in this case.
*1212The anticipatory warrant is based on facts which the procuring officer, the executing officer, and the issuing magistrate judge know full well have not yet occurred. Thus any claim of good faith by the executing officers is inextricably bound up with their conduct after the warrant is issued. To compound this doubtful2 notion of an anticipatory warrant by suggesting that the executing officer is acting in good faith when he or she executes the warrant knowing that the conditions failed, i.e., they did not occur as represented, is to totally ignore the magistrate judge’s role of determining “probable” cause and to distort notions of good faith by authorizing the officer to substitute other facts for the ones the magistrate judge relied on. This case illustrates the cancerous role that these so-called “anticipatory search warrants” play in undermining the integrity of the judicial function in issuing warrants mandated by the Fourth Amendment.
II. The Applicability of Leon
In Leon, the Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule would not apply when an officer acted “in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant.” 468 U.S. at 922, 104 S.Ct. 3405. The Court emphasized that the exclusionary rule is aimed at deterring police rather than judicial misconduct, and the rule should be invoked only in cases in which it would deter police misconduct. See id. at 918-21, 104 S.Ct. 3405. The applicability of Leon is a question of law which we review de novo. See United States v. Corral-Corral, 899 F.2d 927, 929 (10th Cir.1990).
It is well settled in this circuit that the Leon good-faith exception does not apply to an improperly executed warrant. See United States v. Moland, 996 F.2d 259, 261 (10th Cir.1993) (citing United States v. Medlin, 798 F.2d 407, 410 (10th Cir.1986)), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1057, 114 S.Ct. 722, 126 L.Ed.2d 686 (1994). “Unlike cases in which the police properly execute an invalid warrant that they reasonably thought was valid, in cases of improper execution there is police conduct that must be deterred.” Medlin, 798 F.2d at 410. The question then is whether the execution in this case was in accordance with the terms of the warrant. See Moland, 996 F.2d at 261.
Because this warrant was an anticipatory one, my analysis differs slightly from other cases analyzing the execution of the warrant. I do not address the traditional questions relating to the execution of a warrant.3 Instead, I am confronted with the essence of the dubiousness of anticipatory search warrants: The occurrence of future events or conditions which are often in the exclusive control of the executing officers and which are relied upon, but not observed, by the magistrate judge in his probable cause determination. The Inspector’s fidelity in the execution of those future conditions is the only thing that even arguably can support the claim that this warrant was either validly issued or validly executed. I cannot see how the majority can conclude that “the officers complied with the conditions in executing the warrant,” ante, at 1207, when the essential sworn conditions failed. The execution of the warrant was invalid and prevents the application of Leon.
In analyzing the conditions to the warrant, courts read the descriptions in warrants and their supporting documents “in a ‘commonsense’ fashion.” United States v. Gendron, 18 F.3d 955, 966 (1st Cir.) (quoting United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965)), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1051, 115 S.Ct. 654, 130 L.Ed.2d 558 (1994); see United States v. Bianco, 998 F.2d 1112, 1116-17 (2d Cir.1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1069, 114 S.Ct. 1644, *1213128 L.Ed.2d 364 (1994); see also United States v. Tagbering, 985 F.2d 946, 950 (8th Cir.1993) (construing warrant and supporting affidavit “fairly” and in “ ‘commonsense’ ” manner) (citation omitted). Courts also recognize that the “conditions governing an anticipatory warrant [should be] ‘explicit, clear, and narrowly drawn’ ” to preserve the magistrate judge’s role in determining probable cause. Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d at 12 (quoting Garcia, 882 F.2d at 703-04); see Gendron, 18 F.3d at 965. The conditions in this case were stated in the affidavit supporting the warrant. See Hugoboom, 112 F.3d at 1087 (holding valid conditions for execution of the warrant which are “constitutionally satisfactory,” “stated in the affidavit that solicits the warrant,” and “accepted by the issuing magistrate”). I therefore look at the context in which the warrant was issued to determine the nature of these conditions and whether they communicated a clear, simple directive to the executing officers. See Gendron, 18 F.3d at 966-67 (reviewing affidavit’s description of where future triggering event would occur).
In this case, Inspector Carr’s affidavit supporting the warrant stated two essential conditions which must occur before the anticipatory warrant is executed. The first condition required that the “package [would] be kept under surveillance by [Inspector Carr] and/or other law enforcement officers until it [was] received at the residence located” at the named address. Appellant’s App. at 95. The second condition pledged that the search warrant would be executed only when the package was “received by an individual at the residence described and only when brought into the residence.” Id. These two conditions are inextricably linked; both had to be satisfied for the warrant to be properly executed.
Several factors surrounding the procurement of the search warrant and the beeper order support the inescapable conclusion that the beeper surveillance was necessary to the proper execution of the warrant. The Inspector testified at the suppression hearing that his applications for the search warrant and beeper order were presented and issued on the same day, see id. at 67, and the warrant and order indicate that they were both valid for the same duration. See id. at 78, 97. It is more than likely that the same magistrate judge issued both the order and the warrant. The reasonable inference is that both the Inspector and the magistrate judge knew that the beeper would be used to maintain surveillance of the package.
More importantly, in light of what was represented to the magistrate judge and the sting operation as implemented, see Gen-dron, 18 F.3d at 966-67, the only reasonable meaning of maintaining “surveillance” of the package, Appellant’s App. at 95, is that the officers would, until the package was received at Defendant’s residence, either maintain visual watch over the package or observe and ascertain the package’s whereabouts by using the electronic monitoring device. See Bianco, 998 F.2d at 1117-24 (analyzing surveillance of oral communications by a roving electronic bug). Continuous surveillance was necessary to determine when the package was actually brought to the place to be searched, Defendant’s residence. See Gen-dron, 18 F.3d at 967 (discussing importance of surveillance to execution of warrant). This common-sense interpretation is supported by the facts alleged in the warrant and beeper order affidavits. See id. at 966-67. The Inspector represented to the magistrate judge that he had visually observed Defendant on three prior occasions picking up his mail and returning to his place of employment. The Inspector also pledged to the magistrate judge that the beeper was “required to ensure that the material in the package [was] not lost and to assist in identifying the perpetrator.” Appellant’s App. at 81-82.
It is irrelevant that the method of surveillance was not explicitly mentioned on the face of the warrant, or in its supporting affidavit, because the only means of maintaining surveillance of the package that were reasonably foreseeable to the magistrate judge when he issued the search warrant and the only means employed during the sting operation were through the use of the beeper or by visual observation. See id. at 46, 51. Although the officers could keep the package within their sight when Defendant carried the package from the post office box to his *1214place of employment, it was impossible to maintain surveillance during the sting operation as executed without the benefit of the beeper once Defendant entered the building in which he worked. The beeper was, therefore, essential to the execution of the warrant because it provided the sole means of tracking the package after the officers lost sight of it. The officers obviously anticipated losing the ability to maintain visual surveillance over the package because they planned for that contingency as evidenced by their seeking an order authorizing the use of the beeper.
The necessity of the beeper to the proper execution of the warrant is corroborated by the manner in which the sting operation occurred. Inspector Carr delivered the package with two video tapes and the hidden beeper to Defendant’s private post office box. The Inspector and his team of law enforcement officers then watched the post office box from the moment the package was delivered until Defendant picked it up fifteen minutes later, at about 10:30 a.m. The officers followed Defendant by visual observation and by tracking the package with the beeper as he walked back to his place of employment. On his way back to work, Defendant opened the package which triggered the accelerated alarm in the beeper. See id. at 49. When Defendant left during lunch time, the beeper indicated that he had left the package in his place of employment.
We know from the Inspector’s testimony at the suppression hearing that before Defendant left his place of employment for the day the beeper had stopped functioning because the batteries had died. See id. at 50. From that moment until Inspector Carr asked Defendant the location of the package, the officers had no idea where the package and its contents were. The condition that the “package [would] be kept under surveillance by [Inspector Carr] and/or other law enforcement officers until it [was] received at [Defendant’s] residence” had irreparably failed.4 See id. at 95 (emphasis added). Before the officers ever entered Defendant’s home, they knew that they had not satisfied the surveillance condition represented to the magistrate judge, which was the only means by which the magistrate judge could determine that, at some point in the future, there would be probable cause to believe that the tapes would be transferred to Defendant’s home. When Defendant left work at about 4:30 p.m., carrying a backpack and a white plastic grocery sack,5 the officers saw neither the package which had previously contained the video ■ tapes nor the tapes themselves. Although the officers could neither see nor electronically track the package, they followed Defendant to his residence. It is undisputed that the officers did not observe Defendant carrying the video tapes or package into his residence. They did not know whether he had the video tapes. In fact, the only thing the officers knew was that, just before the beeper failed, the probable location of the tapes was Defendant’s place of employment, if indeed any probability existed in the affidavits reviewed by the magistrate judge.6
When the first condition, surveillance of the package, failed, the warrant could no longer be validly executed. When the beeper died and the officers could no longer see the package, the magistrate judge’s determination that probable cause would arise in the future, based upon the satisfaction of the conditions represented to him, was null and void. The officers’ continued surveillance of the package until they determined that it was received at the place to be searched was a condition essential to the execution of the warrant. See Gendron, 18 F.3d at 967. This condition was unfulfilled, and the procuring *1215and executing officers had full knowledge of this deficiency when they executed the warrant.
The majority’s contention that the officers had satisfied the conditions of the warrant by entering Defendant’s residence and asking whether the tapes were located in the residence ignores the fact that a condition represented to the magistrate judge and necessary to the warrant’s proper execution had already been violated. The Inspector knew that the warrant had no vitality even before he went to Defendant’s residence because the surveillance condition had not been met; nothing could breath life into the search warrant or revive the absence of probable cause to support that warrant. The only means of satisfying the first condition to the warrant had failed, and any new information obtained or observations made by the officers during the sting operation misappropriated the magistrate judge’s probable cause determination. The majority’s ratification of this improper execution of the warrant authorizes the transfer of the probable cause determination to the executing officers based on information not represented to the magistrate judge. Inspector Carr proceeded with the absolute discretion that the Fourth Amendment and the magistrate judge’s probable cause determination are intended to prevent. See Ric-ciardelli, 998 F.2d at 20-21 (Torruella, J., concurring). Because the execution was not in accordance with the conditions of the warrant, see Moland, 996 F.2d at 261, Leon should not be applied to prevent the suppression of illegally seized evidence.
III. The Application of Leon
The more fundamental problem here lies in the inappropriate application of Leon’s good-faith exception to this anticipatory search warrant. As stated above, the problem begins with an anticipatory search warrant in which the magistrate judge must rest his probable cause determination on the expectation that a condition or conditions in the control of the executing officer will be satisfied. The officer’s sworn undertaking that he will only execute the warrant when he has caused or observed the essential conditions to occur totally vitiates any possibility that the execution is in good faith when the officer knows that the conditions did not occur. The majority’s application of Leon to these facts compounds the constitutionally objectionable nature of these activities by sanctioning improper police conduct.
Under Leon, the proper test of an officer’s good faith is “whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate’s authorization.” 468 U.S. at 922 n. 23, 104 S.Ct. 3405 n. 23. In determining whether an officer has acted in good faith in accordance with this objective test, a court should evaluate all attendant circumstances, see id., and assume that the executing officers have “a reasonable knowledge of what the law prohibits.” Id. at 919 n. 20,104 S.Ct. 3405 n. 20. When “a government agent asserts good faith reliance on a magistrate’s decision to issue a warrant, the court must focus upon the existence vel non of objective good faith at the time of the warrant application.” Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d at 15-16 (citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344-45, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986)). This means that in this case, where Inspector Carr was both procuring and executing officer, the preplanned scheme and the application for, the issuance of, and the execution of the search warrant are not a series of self-sustaining independent events but must be analyzed in context, examining the totality of the circumstances. See Leidner, 99 F.3d at 1424, 1429-30.
The Leon good-faith exception does not apply and suppression remains an appropriate remedy in four situations: (1) the magistrate judge issuing the warrant was misled by a deliberately or recklessly false affidavit; (2) the magistrate judge wholly abandoned his or her detached and neutral judicial role; (3) the warrant was based on an affidavit “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable,” Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-11, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part); or (4) the warrant was “so facially deficient ... that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 923, 104 S.Ct. 3405 (citations omitted). In all *1216of these circumstances, no reasonably well trained officer should rely on the warrant. Several of these limitations on the good-faith exception occurred in this case.
This is not the typical Leon situation where an officer who did not procure the warrant is told to go execute it. That officer is not charged with the antecedent knowledge resulting from the procurement of the warrant. Nor is this a situation where the magistrate judge merely misjudged probable cause and the executing officer is innocently unaware of that misjudgment. By definition, in this anticipatory search warrant case, everyone, including the procuring and executing officer and the magistrate judge, was fully and consciously aware that when the warrant was signed, probable cause did not exist. They all knew that the magistrate judge’s probable cause determination was contingent upon the occurrence of future events, which were known by and in the control of Inspector Carr. The officers cannot reasonably and in good faith represent that they innocently relied on the magistrate judge’s probable cause determination to believe that the tapes would be found in Defendant’s residence when in fact they knew only that the tapes had at one time been located at Defendant’s place of employment and that the condition designed to ensure that the tapes would be found at Defendant’s residence had failed. Because Inspector Carr was fully aware that the beeper had died and the conditions represented to the magistrate judge could not be met, any argument that he proceeded in good faith is absurd and incredible.
In applying for a search warrant, whether anticipatory or contemporaneous, every affi-ant-officer worth his or her salt knows that he or she must present facts or allegations which make a probable connection, a nexus, between the contraband or illegal activity and the place to be searched. This is not a new or unsettled complexity of the law peculiar to anticipatory search warrants. Probable cause for anticipatory warrants, like all search warrants, “undoubtably requires a nexus between [the contraband to be seized or] suspected criminal activity and the place to be searched.” Corral-Corral, 899 F.2d at 937; see Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983); Leidner, 99 F.3d at 1430-31 (Wood, J., concurring); Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d at 12-14. Defendant correctly argues that the good-faith exception does not apply because the affidavit’s failure to establish a sufficient nexus between the contraband and the location to be searched was a “readily observable, ... non-technieal defect [that] ... should have been easily detected by an experienced postal inspector.” Appellant’s Opening Br. at 12. Inspector Carr not only should have easily detected the absence of a nexus during the execution of the warrant, but he knew, or should have known, that no such nexus existed when he applied for the search warrant.
Because Inspector Carr was the chief investigative officer or case agent, the procurer of the warrant, and the executing officer, he and his team of law enforcement officers are charged with the knowledge that he did not present facts or allegations to the magistrate judge showing a connection between the place to be searched and the package containing the video tapes. Inspector Carr’s affidavit stated only that Defendant had been observed on three occasions picking up mail at a post office box in downtown Denver and walking back to his place of employment. The majority recognizes that the Inspector’s affidavit only obliquely mentions Defendant’s residence, stating that “it is anticipated that defendant, after picking up the tapes from the post office box, will go to his place of employment and after work to his residence.” Appellant’s App. at 95. Nothing in the affidavit traced any mail or package previously picked up by Defendant at the post office box to his residence. Nor did the affidavit show that Defendant stored other contraband in his home. Inspector Carr did not present facts, based on his experience or training, describing the nature of the crime or circumstances inherent in viewing pornography that link the crime or contraband to the suspect’s residence. See United States v. Wylie, 919 F.2d 969, 975 (5th Cir.1990); Hendricks, 743 F.2d at 655. In light of recent publicity concerning the fact that employees are viewing Internet pornography at work on their *1217company computers,7 there is nothing probable about the suggestion that this working man would take child pornography to his home rather than his place of employment. The Inspector’s application for the beeper stated “that probable cause exists to believe that the package containing the mobile tracking device will be picked up at [Defendant’s post office box] and transported to other premises for viewing and use.” Appellant’s App. at 83 (emphasis added). He simply did not connect the video tapes to the residence in any way. Everything in the Inspector’s affidavit pointed to the fact that the package could be found at Defendant’s place of employment; nothing indicates that it could be at his residence.
The government’s assertion that the affi-ant’s experience and expertise was relevant to the magistrate judge’s probable cause determination also supports my conclusion that Inspector Carr should be held accountable for his knowledge. See Appellee’s Br. at 11. The Inspector testified that he had previously executed some ten to twenty anticipatory search warrants. See Appellant’s App. at 59-60. The Inspector’s expertise and experience in child pornography cases and in obtaining and executing search warrants in general shoulders him with the knowledge that a nexus is required between the place to be searched and the contraband. It is clearly and objectively iro reasonable to suggest that an officer acted in good faith when he subjectively knew, or should have known, that he presented no facts or observations to the magistrate judge to support the requisite nexus. See Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d at 16; Smith, 478 S.E.2d at 244. This is exactly the type of misconduct that the exclusionary rule was intended to prevent.
Although the Inspector knew that surveillance over the package was essential to the proper execution of the warrant and was elearly aware that Defendant could pick up the package at any time, he did not present facts in the affidavit establishing the reliability of the beeper, how long the beeper was expected to function, or what time Defendant was likely to pick up the package. The majority points out that the record does not state that Inspector Carr intentionally misled the magistrate judge. No precise statement is necessary to show how Inspector Carr failed to disclose all relevant facts to the magistrate judge; the affidavits and the sting operation demonstrate this deficiency.
Contrary to the government’s assertion and the majority’s opinion, it is not more logical to infer that Defendant would pick up the package “during his lunch break, thus allowing the beeper enough time to continue functioning until [he] got off work and proceeded to his residence.” Ante, at 1208 n. 9. The affidavit does not mention what time Defendant was previously observed picking up his mail and walking back to work. According to the record, the Inspector’s team of law enforcement officers began visually observing the post office box not just prior to the lunch hour but as soon as the Inspector delivered the package to the mailbox in the morning. See Appellant’s App. at 47-48. Therefore, not only is it entirely reasonable for the Inspector to anticipate that the package could be picked up at any time after delivery, but nothing in the record supports the notion that Defendant would pick up the package during his lunch break. It is also common sense to expect that someone might open a package when he receives it, thus triggering the beeper’s accelerated alarm mode which would wear out the batteries more rapidly. The Inspector should have informed the magistrate judge of the likelihood that Defendant could pick up and open the package at any time, thereby triggering the accelerated alarm of the beeper which *1218would make its batteries run out more quickly. Because the record reflects no evidence that the beeper malfunctioned in any way, Inspector Carr should have informed the magistrate judge of the possibility that the beeper could stop functioning before it tracked the package to Defendant’s home. These reasonable scenarios would affect the ability of the officers to maintain surveillance of the package, a condition necessary to the execution of the warrant. The Inspector may not proceed on “good faith” because his affidavit in support of the warrant was plainly submitted without full disclosure of all the relevant and reasonably foreseeable facts. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 923, 104 S.Ct. 3405; Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d at 16-17.
The record reflects additional recklessness in the preparation of the search warrant affidavit. As previously discussed, Inspector Carr applied for the search warrant and the beeper order on the same day. Appellant’s App. at 78-85. In reviewing the record, it becomes apparent that the affidavit in support of the beeper order is virtually identical to the search warrant application.8 The only significant difference between the two affidavits is as follows: The warrant affidavit pledges that the package will be kept under surveillance and the warrant will not be executed until the package is “received by an individual at [Defendant’s] residence” and “brought into the residence,” id. at 95, while the beeper order affidavit states, more specifically, that “[the] device is required to ensure the material in the package is not lost and to assist in identifying the perpetrator.” Id. at 81-82. Neither of the affidavits disclosed to the magistrate judge any facts showing the nexus between the video tapes and Defendant’s residence. It is facially evident from this comparison that the affiant utilized one set of facts for both affidavits without providing the additional facts necessary to demonstrate to the magistrate judge that there is a fair probability that the video tapes would be found at Defendant’s residence.9
Based on the foregoing analysis, I believe not only that the good-faith exception of Leon should not be applied to the improperly executed anticipatory search warrant but also that the officers in the ease could not rely in good faith on the warrant and its supporting affidavit. Inspector Carr, admittedly a well-trained officer, knew or should have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate judge’s authorization. I therefore respectfully dissent and would order the evidence suppressed.

. I acknowledge that viewing pornography on the Internet is perhaps less intrusive and obvious than viewing a pornography video on a television screen. The two situations, however, are sufficiently analogous to point out that there is no more of a reasonable inference that Defendant would view the child pornography at home rather than at work. The Inspector's failure to represent to the magistrate judge facts that might support an inference that Defendant would view the child pornography at home reinforces my conclusion.

. The Supreme Court has never ratified anticipatory search warrants and has not addressed the Leon good-faith exception in this context.

. Generally, challenges to warrant execution ask whether the scope, intensity, and duration of the warrant execution were excessive; whether certain items not named in the warrant were properly seized; whether certain persons were properly detained or searched incident to execution of the warrant; whether the warrant was executed in an untimely fashion; or whether officers' entry without prior notice of authority and purpose was permissible. See Medlin, 798 F.2d at 410 (citing Wayne R. LaFave, "The Seductive Call of Expediency United States v. Leon, It’s Rationale and Ramifications, 1984 U. ILL. L. Rev. 895, 915-16).

.Because courts should interpret descriptions in warrants and their supporting documents in a " 'commonsense' fashion,” see Gendron, 18 F.3d at 966 (citation omitted), I need not decide whether a momentary lapse of surveillance would mean the failure of the surveillance condition. In this case there was a significant period of time when the package was not under surveillance as promised to the magistrate judge.

. The record does not indicate whether Defendant had brought the backpack and white plastic sack to his place of employment earlier that day.

. I emphasize that nothing reported to the magistrate judge indicates that the Inspector observed Defendant going from his mailbox to his home or taking his mail to his home at the end of the day.

. With the advent of the "information superhighway,” companies are faced with the dilemma created by Internet access for their employees: Companies must balance the beneficial access to data with the detrimental and suspect access to pornography or other inappropriate personal uses. The Wall Street Journal reported that employees of IBM, Apple Computer, and AT & T were among the most frequent visitors to Penthouse magazine’s Web site, spending the equivalent of over 347 8-hour days in a single month. See Kane, supra at 3; Suspended Principal Will Have Other Duties, Wis St. J., Oct. 2, 1997 (Local), available in 1997 WL 12263311; Wayne Tompkins, Caught on the Web More Companies Monitor On-the-Job Internet Abuse, Fla. Today, May 3, 1998 (Business), available in 1998 WL 11931216; Bruce Westfall, Clark College Fires Head of Security After Complaints, Columbian, Apr. 18, 1997, available in 1997 WL 6520467.

. The search warrant affidavit offers a professional description of the affiant and an explanation of the crime Mr. Rowland was suspected of violating. The electronic beeper affidavit states that the mobile tracking device will be attached to a package that is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation to identify persons suspected of trafficking in materials containing sexual exploitation of children. Using identical language and organization, both affidavits then describe the background facts of the sting operation and Defendant’s activities. See Appellant’s App. at 79-82, 88-96.

. I have considered the possibility that similar affidavits may be viewed as the methodology of an experienced, efficient law enforcement officer, and that the application for the beeper contained more than it needed to because it was really intended to satisfy the search warrant application. I have discounted this theory in light of the Inspector’s failure to present facts to the magistrate judge supporting a nexus between the video tapes and Defendant’s home. The Inspector, perhaps relying on his expertise and reputation, presented a sparse affidavit that could not objectively and reasonably be relied upon.