Court Opinion

ID: 9778971
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:29:59.387762+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:17.779733
License: Public Domain

BAIRD, Judge,
dissenting.
This is a post-conviction application for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.07. Applicant contends the cumulation order in the instant case is void. His claim is meritorious in light of established statutory and case law. Nevertheless, the majority overrules established precedent and excogitates a new rule of law in order to deny relief. To this conduct, I dissent.
The Legislature has determined what information is necessary in order to cumulate sentences. Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.08 (Cumulative or Concurrent Sentences) provides in relevant part:
(a) When the same defendant has been convicted in two or more cases, judgment and sentence shall be pronounced in each case in the same manner as if there had been but one conviction. Except as provided by Sections (b) and (c) of this article, in the discretion of the court, the judgment in the second and subsequent convictions may either be that the sentence imposed or suspended shall begin when the judgment and the sentence imposed or suspended in the preceding conviction has ceased to operate, or that the sentence imposed or suspended shall run concurrently with the other case or cases, and sentence and execution shall be accordingly ... 1
The Code further provides the requirements for a valid judgment in Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.01:
*312Sec. 1. A judgment is the written declaration of the court signed by the trial judge and entered of record showing the conviction or acquittal of the defendant. The sentence served shall be based on the information contained in the judgment. The judgment should reflect, [inter alia ]:
1. The title and number of the case;
12. The county and court in which the case was tried ...;
13. The offense or offenses for which the defendant was convicted;
14. The date of the offense or offenses and degree of offense for which the defendant was convicted;
15. The term of sentence;
It is the duty of the judiciary to interpret the laws enacted by the Legislature. Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex.Cr.App.1991).2 Consistent with that duty, in Ex parte Ashe, 641 S.W.2d 243 (Tex.Cr.App.1982), we held a cumulation order which only recites the cause number and county of the prior conviction is invalid where the prior conviction is from a different county. This Court held in Ex parte Lewis, 414 S.W.2d 682, 683 (Tex.Cr.App.1967), “[a] sentence is a final judgment and should be sufficient on its face to effect its purpose without resort to evidence in aid thereof.” Additionally, in Ward v. State, 523 S.W.2d 681, 682 (Tex.Cr. App.1975), this Court recommended that cu-mulation orders contain:
(1) the trial court number of the prior conviction;
(2) the correct name of the court where the prior conviction was taken;
(3) the date of the prior conviction;
(4) the term of years of the prior conviction; and
(5) the nature of the prior conviction.
The cumulation order in the ease sub judi-ce recites only the name of the county of the prior conviction. The majority’s holding that the cumulation order was sufficiently specific is contrary to established law and contrary to the statutory requirements of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Today’s additional burden of requiring applicant show TDCJ-ID is not properly cumulating his sentences is without authority. Accordingly, I dissent.
OVERSTREET and MEYERS, JJ., join.

. All emphasis supplied unless otherwise indicated.

. When interpreting a statute we seek to effectuate the intent or purpose of the Legislature; focusing our attention on the literal text of the statute in question and attempting to discern the fair, objective meaning of that text at the time of its enactment. Where the statute is clear and unambiguous, the Legislature must be understood to mean what it has expressed, and it is not for the courts to add or subtract from such a statute. Coit v. State, 808 S.W.2d 473, 475 (Tex.Cr.App.1991). Only where the application of a statute’s plain language would lead to an absurd result, which the Legislature could not possibly have intended, should we depart from the literal text of the statute. Ibid. We further presume the Legislature intended for all the statutory language to have meaning and effect.