Court Opinion

ID: 9586734
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:14:23.901143+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:49.031580
License: Public Domain

Carlisle, Judge,
dissenting. I dissent from the judgment and decision of this court affirming the judgment of the trial court and holding that the general demurrer to the petition was properly overruled. The Supreme Court, and this court, have in a line of decisions going back to the case of McWhorter v. Beavers, 8 Ga. 300, held that where property is sold by a sheriff pursuant to the levy of an execution, there is no warranty of title on the part of the sheriff or of the defendant in execution. In such cases, the maxim of caveat emptor applies as to the purchaser of the property, and after the money has been paid to the sheriff and by him distributed pursuant to the rules of law, in the absence of allegations of fact in the petition showing fraud on the part of the defendant in fi. fa., or collusion between him and the plaintiff in fi. fa., or some other equitable reason therefor, the purchaser cannot recover either from the sheriff, the plaintiff in fi. fa. or from the defendant in fi. fa. the amount so paid on account of the failure of the title to the property thus conveyed, or because of any defect therein. Methvin v. Bexley, 18 Ga. 551; Lowe v. Rawlings, 83 Ga. 320 (10 S. E. 204, 6 L. R. A. 73) ; Pinkston v. Harrell, 106 Ga. 102 (31 S. E. 808); Keen v. McAfee, 116 Ga. 728 (42 S. E. 1022); Pittman Construction Co. v. City of Marietta, 177 Ga. 573 (170 S. E. 669); Brady v. Smotherman, 51 Ga. App. *886480 (180 S. E. 862). I do not think that cases exemplified by Corley v. Jarrell, 36 Ga. App. 225 (136 S. E. 117), holding that, where the holder of a deed to secure debt fails to reconvey to the defendant in foreclosure prior to foreclosing the same, the sale under the foreclosure is void and the buyer is not compellable to pay the amount of his bid thereon, relied upon by the defendant in error, are pertinent to the question here. Such cases are distinguishable from the instant case in that in those cases the act of foreclosure and the acceptance of the benefits thereunder are the voluntary acts of the party foreclosing on the property, and he cannot take advantage of his own failure to do the thing which the law requires of him as a condition precedent to foreclosing on and selling the property.
There is nothing in the decision of Todd v. Morgan, 215 Ga. 220 (109 S. E. 2d 803) which authorizes the conclusion alleged in the petition that the Supreme Court held that the levy was null and void. This allegation, therefore, being unsupported by any facts alleged is not sufficient even as against a mere general demurrer to bring into operation the principle that the rule of caveat emptor does not apply to void sales. Henderson v. Swift Fertilizer Works, 16 Ga. App. 448 (1a) (85 S. E. 613); Daniel v. Burson, 18 Ga. App. 25 (2) (88 S. E. 745); Gibbs v. Bank of Tifton, 21 Ga. App. 653 (1a) (94 S. E. 827). The petition does not allege any other facts warranting the conclusion that the sale in this case was void.
Neither do I think that the present case can be construed as an action for money had and received or for unjust enrichment. Such an action does not lie for money voluntarily paid where the facts are known to the party and where there is no misplaced confidence and no artifice, deception or fraudulent practice used by the other party. Stein Steel & Supply Co. v. K. & L. Enterprises, Inc., 97 Ga. App. 71 (102 S. E. 2d 99). The rule of caveat emptor, as stated above, applying to the sale in this case, the purchaser was charged with constructive knowledge of the facts respecting the title to the property.