Court Opinion

ID: 9749241
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:29:16.928182+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:04:27.359774
License: Public Domain

THOMPSON, Judge,
Dissenting:
Respectfully, I dissent. I believe that the majority’s strict enforcement of a technical rule usurps the public policy that the court is to decide cases on their merits with a fair opportunity for the litigants to be heard.
I disagree that the unpublished case, Coleman v. El-Mallakh, 2008 WL 899805 (Ky.App.2008), is persuasive. To the extent that the case stands for the proposition that our court clerks cannot personally ensure that every attorney of record receives actual notice of a CR 77.02(2) dismissal hearing, I agree. However, in Coleman, the motion was presented pursuant to CR 60.02(f) and filed more than one year after the judgment. The Court emphasized the case may have been resolved differently “under CR 60.02(a) had the matter been brought to the circuit court’s attention within one year of entry of the order of dismissal.” Id. at *5.
In contrast, Honeycutt filed his CR 60.02 motion within one year after the order of dismissal without prejudice was entered and, therefore, was timely under CR 60.02(a). Although the Court set aside a default judgment rather than a CR 77.02 order, I believe Bargo v. Lewis, 305 S.W.2d 757 (Ky.1957), is controlling. In Bargo, a Lexington attorney requested a Barbourville attorney to secure an extension of time to answer a complaint. After the Barbourville attorney mistakenly failed to file an answer, a default judgment was entered. The Court held that the default judgment was properly set aside under CR. 60.02(a) on the basis of inadvertence or excusable neglect. Id. at 758. Under the circumstances now presented, I believe justice requires the same result.
I also believe that this case presents an opportunity to establish a reasonable and *137just standard when CR 77.02(2) is invoked. Although CR 77.02(2) is a dismissal without prejudice that theoretically permits the complaint to be refiled, minimally, a year has elapsed since the first complaint was filed and most probably the statute of limitations has expired. Therefore, a dismissal without prejudice has the identical consequences as a dismissal with prejudice pursuant to CR 41.02.
Our Supreme Court has reexamined the applicable standard when determining whether to dismiss for lack of prosecution pursuant to CR 41.02. In Jaroszewski v. Flege, 297 S.W.3d 24 (Ky.2009), the Court held that the trial court is required to consider all relevant factors which may include those listed in Ward v. Housman, 809 S.W.2d 717 (Ky.App.1991). Id. at 34.
Trial courts must make explicit findings on the record so that the parties and appellate courts will be properly apprised of the basis for the trial court’s rulings; and the appellate courts can assess whether the trial court properly considered the totality of the circumstances in dismissing the case.
Id. at 36.
I am aware that in Jaroszewski, the Court noted a distinction between CR 41.02 dismissals and CR 77.02(2) dismissals; specifically, that the latter is a dismissal without prejudice. I reiterate that while a legally correct distinction, as a practical matter, CR 77.02(2) dismissals result in the deprivation of the litigant’s right to be heard on the merits and because of the applicable statute of limitations, the right to file a second complaint is frequently illusory.
I am perplexed that a CR 41.02 dismissal is subject to a totality of the circumstances standard but that a CR 77.02(2) dismissal is not subject to the same standard. Indeed, a complex case such as the current often sits idle for a year as a result of negotiations and preliminary investigations; yet, the case can be dismissed to serve the purpose of managing the court’s docket. Although the courts certainly have such power inherently and by virtue of CR 77.02(2), this power must be secondary to the primary purpose of our judicial system to provide meaningful dispute resolution on the merits. Therefore, I urge our Supreme Court to espouse standards applicable to CR 77.02(2) dismissals similar to those applied to CR 41.02 dismissals.
In this case, the circuit court abused its discretion when it refused to set aside the CR 77.02(2) motion. Although the attorney failed to notify the court that he changed his address, after learning of the dismissal, he promptly filed a CR 60.02 motion. There was absolutely no evidence that Norfolk Southern was prejudiced by the inactivity in the case, no evidence as to the reason for the inactivity, the merits of the claim, or any other circumstances that would justify the dismissal of this complex litigation. The passage of time alone should not be the sole factor when deciding to terminate a litigant’s right to seek redress in the courts. Rather than imposing such a harsh result on the litigant, it would be more appropriate to sanction the attorney.
For the reasons expressed, I would reverse the circuit court’s order and remand the case for further proceedings so that this litigant can receive the justice to which he is entitled.