Court Opinion

ID: 9482480
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:51:43.441543+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:01.505502
License: Public Domain

CUDAHY, Circuit Judge,
concurring in the judgment.
Although I agree that Mr. Smith’s sentence should be affirmed, I do not join the majority’s discussion of section 5K1.1 of the sentencing guidelines. In any event, I think this discussion is dictum. The majority points out that the district judge did not permit Smith to introduce evidence of his cooperation, but neither has Mr. Smith made a showing of arbitrariness or bad faith in the prosecutor’s decision not to make a section 5K1.1 motion. “Arbitrariness” in this context seems to me akin to bad faith and there is no showing of improper motive on the part of the prosecutor. The majority equates “arbitrariness” with unjustified disparity in treatment, no matter what the prosecutor’s intentions. This interpretation, which I think unworkable, explains the opinion’s conclusion that traditional equal protection analysis would be enough to check the prosecutor’s decision.
I believe that “arbitrary or in bad faith" is the proper standard for review of the prosecutor’s failure to make the motion in question. See United States v. Doe, 940 F.2d 199, 206 (7th Cir.) (Cudahy, J., concurring), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 201, 116 L.Ed.2d 160 (1991). The question is of substantial moment throughout the circuits, and this position has found support in at least three other circuits. See United States v. Agu, 949 F.2d 63, 67 (2d Cir.1991); United States v. Rexach, 896 F.2d 710, 713-15 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 433, 112 L.Ed.2d 417 (1990); United States v. Smitherman, 889 F.2d 189, 191 (8th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1036, 110 S.Ct. 1493, 108 L.Ed.2d 629 (1990); United States v. Goroza, 941 F.2d 905, 908 (9th Cir.1991) (per curiam); United States v. Mena, 925 F.2d 354, 356 (9th Cir.1991). The question has been left open in at least two decisions in our circuit, United States v. Donatiu, 922 F.2d 1331, 1334-35 & n. 3 (7th Cir.1991), and United States v. Lewis, 896 F.2d 246, 249 n. 1 (7th Cir.1990). The argument for a bad faith exception has been made by distinguishing the decision to prosecute, which is subject to numerous subsequent checks (the requirement of grand jury indictment, the need for proof beyond a reasonable doubt, etc.), from the decision not to move for a downward departure (which is subject to no systemic checks).
The majority’s discussion of the current state of substantive due process and of sentencing jurisprudence is inapposite. While a guarantee of individualized treatment in sentencing may be written out of the statute books, but see 28 U.S.C. § 994(n) (sentencing commission must include departure possibility for substantial assistance), due process conditions all aspects of a criminal proceeding, including sentencing. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 1203, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977); United States v. Doe, 934 F.2d 353, 356 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 268, 116 L.Ed.2d 221 (1991). Moreover, even if the section 5K1.1 decision is analogous to other prosecutorial decisions, this does not insulate it from meaningful review. Doe, 934 F.2d at 361 (citing *1069Rexach, United States v. Bayles, 923 F.2d 70, 72 (7th Cir.1991), and Mena as having “reached similar conclusions”). I believe that section 5K1.1, if interpreted so as never to allow for a substantial-assistance departure absent a motion of the government, would potentially violate due process in cases of prosecutorial bad faith or arbitrariness. However, the relevant provisions can reasonably be construed to avoid any constitutional infirmity.
The majority seems to believe that section 5K1.1 is essentially a means by which the prosecutor may dispense lenity in exchange for assistance. As I read the guideline, it provides the court with the authority to grant a reduction, with the prosecutor as something of a “fact finder” who determines initially whether the assistance was substantial. The Commentary to section 5K1.1 supports this interpretation:
The nature, extent, and significance of assistance can involve a broad spectrum of conduct that must be evaluated by the court on an individual basis. Latitude is, therefore, afforded the sentencing judge to reduce a sentence based upon variable relevant factors, including those listed above. The sentencing judge must, however, state the reasons for reducing a sentence under this section.
U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, Comment (Background).
The majority notes that section 5K1.1 “tracks” three statutes: 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), Fed.R.Crim.P. 35(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 994(n). It discusses the first two of these statutes, neither of which applies in this case. (Section 3553(e) deals with sentences below a statutory minimum and Rule 35(b) with reduction of a sentence after its imposition.) Section 994(n), which the majority does not discuss, contains Congress’s authorization for the Sentencing Commission to adopt section 5K1.1. It provides:
The Commission shall assure that the guidelines reflect the general appropriateness of imposing a lower sentence than would otherwise be imposed, including a sentence that is lower than that established by statute as a minimum sentence, to take into account a defendant’s substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense.
28 U.S.C. § 994(n). This provision was enacted as part of the same piece of legislation as section 3553(e), which parallels the language of section 5K1.1; in fact, the two sections were immediately adjacent to each other in the legislation. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub.L. No. 99-570 §§ 1007(a), 1008(1), 100 Stat. 3207-7 (October 27, 1986). Since Congress obviously knew how to require a government motion as a strict prerequisite to sentence reduction, and did so with respect to mandatory-minimum departures (§ 3553(e)) but not with respect to guideline-range departures (§ 994(n)), Congress apparently did not want the motion requirement transposed onto section 994(n). For a more thorough presentation of this argument, see Judge Clark’s opinion in United States v. Chotas, 913 F.2d 897, 902-05 (11th Cir.1990) (Clark, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 1421, 113 L.Ed.2d 473 (1991).
Moreover, section 5K1.1 is a “policy statement,” not a guideline, and therefore may well not be binding on the sentencing judge. See United States v. Gutierrez, 908 F.2d 349, 353-54 (8th Cir.1990) (Heaney, J., dissenting), vacated on reh’g en banc, 917 F.2d 379 (8th Cir.1990). While the authoritative status of guideline policy statements is unclear, such provisions are apparently designed to give courts “greater flexibility.” United States v. Bayles, 923 F.2d 70, 71 (7th Cir.1991) (quoting U.S.S.G. ch. 7, introductory note 3(a)). The majority moves away from any flexibility, rejecting even a narrow bad faith exception to the government motion requirement.
In addition, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.4, a “General Application” guideline, provides that in determining whether departure is warranted, a court “may consider, without limitation, any information concerning the background, character and conduct of the defendant, unless otherwise prohibited by law.” The majority turns a policy statement into a vehicle for trashing not only this fundamental guideline, but also a Con-*1070gressiona] statute, and possibly due process.
In another connection I agree with the majority that the summary affirmance of criminal cases is not an appropriate sanction for violation of Circuit Rule 30(c).