Court Opinion

ID: 9723500
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:18:08.562609+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:49.232618
License: Public Domain

BUCHANAN, Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent.
For reasons discussed below, I cannot agree that final instructions 11 and 12, when considered in conjunction with the evidence presented at trial, warrant a reversal of Hahn’s conviction. While Justice v. State (1988), Ind., 530 N.E.2d 295, suggests that a criminal conviction cannot be affirmed if there is merely evidence of breaking and entering, and flight, it is clear that so long as there is some other evidence which strongly corroborates intent and provides a solid basis to support a reasonable inference of intent to commit the charged felony, the conviction should be affirmed. See id.; see also Gebhart v. State (1988), Ind., 531 N.E.2d 211; Gilliam v. State (1987), Ind., 508 N.E.2d 1270. The Justice court recognized that although there was evidence of breaking and entering and evidence of flight, there was no evidence of record demonstrating “that Justice touched, disturbed or even approached any valuable property." Justice, supra, at 297 (emphasis supplied).
As the majority aptly observes, the evidence at trial permits a conclusion that Hahn moved the bicycle and placed it in front of the broken window. Although the evidence is inconclusive as to whether the bicycle could actually have fit through the broken window, see record at 176-77, the jury could have reasonably inferred that the placement of the bicycle in front of the window was corrobative of Hahn’s intent to commit theft.
In Blackmon v. State (1983), Ind., 455 N.E.2d 586, our supreme court affirmed a burglary conviction when the evidence demonstrated that the defendant entered *623the victim’s garage through an unlocked window, opened a tool box, moved various articles, and unlocked a door between the garage and the victim’s condominium. The Blackmon court recognized that the State was not required to prove a completed theft, and the jury could reasonably infer that Blackmon entered the garage with the intent to commit theft. Id.; see also Slaton v. State (1987), Ind., 510 N.E.2d 1343 (defendant’s conduct of rummaging about in an automobile prior to breaking and entering and fleeing a nearby residence provided the additional measure of evidence necessary to prove the intent to steal); Cooper v. State (1984), Ind., 461 N.E.2d 1119 (a jury reasonably could infer that the defendant had the requisite intent to commit theft inside the dwelling he had broken into and entered when the evidence reflected that some of the victim’s personal property was not in its customary place in the middle of one room and there was a broken window indicating entry by force); but see Gilliam, supra (conviction for burglary reversed when the State did not present any evidence from which the jury could have inferred the nature of the felony that the defendant intended to commit when he broke and entered the premises).
In light of the evidence presented here, and Hahn’s attempt to evade the police, I conclude the record reflects sufficient evidence of probative value which would support a conclusion that Hahn did not merely intend to commit “some undetermined sort of wrongdoing, mischief, misdeed, ... or illegal act.” See Gebhart, supra, at .212 (emphasis supplied). Rather, the evidence presented strongly corroborates Hahn’s intent, thereby providing the jury with a solid basis for a reasonable inference that Hahn intended to commit theft. See Justice, supra. I therefore must disagree that final instructions 11 and 12 as given were misleading so as to warrant the reversal of Hahn’s conviction. The conviction should be affirmed.