Court Opinion

ID: 9400774
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-09 14:07:06.881015+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:47.743423
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: JUNE 2, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

             Commonwealth of Kentucky
                   Court of Appeals
                     NO. 2022-CA-1056-MR

JAMES LANG                                         APPELLANT

             APPEAL FROM OLDHAM CIRCUIT COURT
v.            HONORABLE JERRY CROSBY, II, JUDGE
                    ACTION NO. 21-CI-00595

ANDREW GRAHAM BESHEAR,
GOVERNOR; CHARLES WARD,
INSPECTOR, OLDHAM COUNTY
HEALTH DEPARTMENT;
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY;
ERIC FREIDLANDER, SECRETARY
OF THE CABINET FOR HEALTH
AND FAMILY SERVICES;
JOHN/JANE DOE, BRANCH
MANAGER, ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT BRANCH;
JOHN/JANE DOE, DIRECTOR OF
THE DIVISION OF PUBLIC HEALTH
AND SAFETY; JOHN/JANE DOES,
MEMBERS OF THE OLDHAM
COUNTY BOARD OF HEALTH;
STEVEN STACK, COMMISSIONER
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
HEALTH; AND TERESA GAMSKY,
DIRECTOR, OLDHAM COUNTY
HEALTH DEPARTMENT
                                                   APPELLEES
                                     OPINION
                                    AFFIRMING

                                    ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: ACREE, CALDWELL, AND CETRULO, JUDGES.

CETRULO, JUDGE: This is an appeal by an inmate at the Roederer Correctional

Complex (“RCC”) from an Order dismissing numerous claims against various

individuals employed by the Commonwealth of Kentucky. While the complaints

are extensive, in a nutshell, the Appellant, James Lang (“Lang”) alleges that the

conditions at the prison did not meet legal requirements and that these conditions

resulted in him contracting COVID-19; that all named defendants are negligent per

se, as well as criminally liable for “official misconduct”; and that he is entitled to

monetary damages. For reasons set forth below, we affirm the Order of the

Oldham Circuit Court.

             While it is difficult to discern exactly what Mr. Lang is arguing in his

brief, his complaint was focused on a claim of overcrowding at RCC, which he

alleged resulted in him contracting COVID-19. He alleged in the complaint that

authorities charged with inspecting confinement facilities in Kentucky had failed in

their duty to ensure compliance with various statutes and regulations. He further

alleged that certain defendants falsified official documents and/or failed to inspect

the conditions of his confinement and did not accurately compute the square

footage within the prison to determine the number of prisoners that could be

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legally housed therein. Finally, Lang further alleged that he had exhausted all

administrative remedies available to him, a statement which all defendants below

have contested. All defendants below moved for dismissal on the pleadings, on

several grounds, many of which were applicable.1 However, the Oldham Circuit

Court clearly considered all of the pleadings and briefs, and outlined the statutes

relied upon by Lang, before writing a detailed Opinion and Order dismissing all

claims on the basis that Lang had failed to exhaust administrative remedies.

               Our review of an Order dismissing a claim under Kentucky Rule of

Civil Procedure (“CR”) 12.02 is de novo. “Since a motion to dismiss for failure to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted is a pure question of law, a

reviewing court owes no deference to a trial court’s determination . . . .” Fox v.

Grayson, 317 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Ky. 2010). The problem for Lang is that Kentucky law

is clear that inmates can only bring lawsuits regarding the “conditions of their

confinement” once they have exhausted their administrative remedies. Kentucky

Revised Statute (“KRS”) 454.415(1). In reviewing the complaint itself, it is

equally clear that this suit was over a healthcare concern and, as such, a “condition

of his confinement.” We thus incorporate a section of the trial court’s well-

1
  Many of the claims herein would also be barred as a matter of law by sovereign or qualified
immunity. See Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510 (Ky. 2001). However, the trial court did not
proceed to those defenses, finding that Lang had failed to exhaust administrative remedies
depriving it of jurisdiction to hear the claims. Thus, we do not address those defenses herein
either.

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reasoned opinion for a discussion of this statute and the law on exhaustion of

remedies:

                    The Kentucky Department of Corrections Policies
             and Procedures 14.6 governs grievances within the prison
             system in Kentucky. Specifically, 14.6(II)(B) outlines
             what is considered to be a grievable issue within DOC.
             Further, KRS 454.415(1)(d) supra specifically states that
             an inmate may not bring a civil action on a conditions of
             confinement issue without first exhausting his
             administrative remedies. See Houston v. Fletcher,
             Ky.App., 193 S.W.3d 276, 278 (2006) (finding no
             entitlement to appellate review of claims where inmate did
             not establish exhaustion of administrative remedies under
             the same language in a previous version of KRS 454.415).
             See also Hensley v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 355
             S.W.3d 473, 475 (2011) (“KRS 454.415 sets forth proper
             procedure for inmates who raise sentence calculation
             questions.     Subsections (1) and (2) state that all
             administrative remedies must be exhausted. Nothing in
             Hensley’s brief or the record indicates that he has filed an
             administrative complaint or appeal.         KRS 454.415
             specifically forbids inmates from bringing civil actions
             before exhausting the administrative remedies.”) . . . .

                    There is no denying that this case involves a
             conditions of confinement issue. Plaintiff is asserting that
             due to the prison overcrowding and the state’s failure to
             comply with the requirements of adequate spacing, he was
             infected with the COVID virus. He may couch it in other
             terms but at its core, this is the issue. Plaintiff contends he
             exhausted his administrative remedies by writing to
             various individuals in the state addressing this issue.
             Plaintiff asserts he couldn’t file a grievance as there was
             no mechanism in place to challenge the inspector’s report.
             However, KRS 454.415(2) notes that an inmate must still
             exhaust his administrative remedies even if the remedy the
             inmate seeks is unavailable.

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       During the course of the COVID pandemic, many
inmates filed CR 60.02 motions requesting relief from
their sentence. Many of these inmates were at higher risk
than the average individual due to underlying health
concerns. However, these requests were denied as the
Courts agreed this was not an issue that could be addressed
through an inmate’s underlying criminal case. Instead, the
Courts noted this was a condition of confinement issue that
should be addressed through a civil proceeding. See
Merriweather v. Commonwealth, No. 2020-CA-1182-
MR, 2021 WL 5977912, at *2 (Ky.App. Dec. 17, 2021)
(“When conditions of confinement are at issue, like they
are here, the proper venue is for the prisoner to pursue his
claims through the grievance system. See KRS 454.415.
If the prisoner still has concerns after fully exhausting his
administrative remedies, he may file a civil action against
the warden pursuant to KRS 418.040. A civil, conditions-
of-confinement suit is the appropriate way for
Merriweather to raise his constitutional challenges”);
Williams v. Commonwealth, Nos. 2019-CA-0964-MR
and 2020-CA-0638-MR, 2021 WL 943753, at *3 (Ky.
App. Mar. 12, 2021) (“Conditions of confinement claims
are civil in nature; as such, the sentencing court is not the
proper forum to address them.”).

      In addition, it does not matter that the grievance
process could not result in monetary damages, as pursuant
to KRS 454.415(2) “[a]dministrative remedies shall be
exhausted even if the remedy the inmate seeks is
unavailable.” See Pearson v. Correct Care Solutions, NO.
2019-CA-1565-MR, 2022 WL 2080253 at *2 (Ky. App.
June 10, 2022).

        When conditions of confinement are at issue, like
they are here, the proper avenue is for the prisoner to
pursue his claims through the prison grievance system.
See KRS 1 454.415. If the prisoner still has concerns after
fully exhausting his administrative remedies, he may file
a civil action against the warden pursuant to KRS 418.040.

                            -5-
                    Where an administrative remedy is provided by the
             statute, relief must be sought from the administrative body
             and this remedy exhausted before the courts will take hold.
             Ordinarily the exhaustion of that remedy is a jurisdictional
             prerequisite to resort to the courts. Goodwin v. City of
             Louisville, 309 Ky. 11, 14, 215 S.W.2d 557, 559 (1948)
             citing Martin v. Board of Council of City of Danville, 275
             Ky. 142, 120 S.W.2d 761, 762 (1938).

                    As noted above, exhaustion of administrative
             remedies is a condition precedent to this Court obtaining
             jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s civil claim. As Plaintiff failed
             to exhaust his administrative remedies, this Court has no
             jurisdiction. . . .

(Footnote omitted.)

             Lang argues on appeal that one is not required to exhaust

administrative remedies when to do so would be an “exercise in futility.” He relies

upon Harrison’s Sanitarium, Inc. v Commonwealth, Department of Health, 417

S.W.2d 137 (Ky. 1967), for his position that it would be futile to require him to

pursue remedies against the agencies and employees who all (with the exception of

Governor Beshear) essentially are required to answer to the Cabinet for Health and

Family Services.

             We have reviewed Harrison’s Sanitarium. Lang has simply misstated

the holding of that case, and it is not applicable to the case at bar. As the trial court

noted, exhaustion of administrative remedies is generally required prior to turning

to the courts for relief. Kentucky State Police v. Scott, 529 S.W.3d 711, 716 (Ky.

2017). Popplewell’s Alligator Dock No. 1, Inc. v. Revenue Cabinet, 133 S.W.3d

                                           -6-
456, 471 (Ky. 2004). Compliance with KRS 454.415 is mandatory. Thrasher v.

Commonwealth, 386 S.W.3d 132, 134 (Ky. App. 2012). While there are limited

exceptions to that requirement, the purpose of exhaustion requirements is to

prevent inappropriate judicial oversight into administrative agencies charged with

applying and enforcing regulations and statutes. Id.

             In Harrison’s Sanitarium, a party challenged the validity and

constitutionality of a particular statute on undisputed facts. Here, Lang was

actually seeking “enforcement” of statutes and regulations related to the conditions

of his confinement, and the allegations and relief he sought were very much in

dispute. Lang sought monetary damages, as well as injunctive relief to require “re-

inspection” of all Kentucky prisons. None of these issues can be reviewed

judicially without exhaustion of administrative remedies. He cannot sidestep the

requirement of pursuit of administrative remedies simply because he believes he

would not prevail in that forum. When none of the limited exceptions apply, then

the courts are deprived of subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court properly

followed the law of this Commonwealth and dismissed the claims in their entirety.

The ruling is hereby affirmed.

             ALL CONCUR.

                                         -7-
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:    BRIEF FOR APPELLEE
                        GOVERNOR BESHEAR:
James Lang, pro se
LaGrange, Kentucky      S. Travis Mayo
                        Laura C. Tipton
                        Frankfort, Kentucky

                        BRIEF FOR APPELLEES
                        OLDHAM COUNTY BOARD OF
                        HEALTH; OLDHAM COUNTY
                        HEALTH DEPARTMENT; MATT
                        RHOADES; CHARLES WARD;
                        AND JOHN/JANE DOE MEMBERS
                        OF THE OLDHAM COUNTY
                        BOARD OF HEALTH:

                        Carol S. Petitt
                        Matthew R. Bastin
                        Pewee Valley, Kentucky

                        BRIEF FOR APPELLEE
                        COMMONWEALTH OF
                        KENTUCKY:

                        Matthew F. Kuhn
                        Michael R. Wajda
                        Assistant Attorneys General
                        Frankfort, Kentucky

                        BRIEF FOR APPELLEE
                        CABINET FOR HEALTH AND
                        FAMILY SERVICES:

                        Marian B. Hogan
                        Frankfort, Kentucky

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