Court Opinion

ID: 9725843
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:15:13.582353+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:20.568769
License: Public Domain

SCOTT, J.
I dissent.
I do not read Fioritto and Pettingill as establishing an absolute ban against further interrogation where the right to remain silent has once been asserted. This case is factually similar to People v. Lopez (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 711 [153 Cal.Rptr. 541] (hg. den. May 17, 1979). To reach its conclusion, the majority must disagree with Lopez. In my view Lopez was correctly decided, and for the correct reasons. The Fioritto! Pettingill rule was thoroughly examined and the court concluded “that in Pettingill the Supreme Court has attempted to establish reasonable and flexible guidelines in order to accommodate the right of the individual to exercise his privilege against self-incrimination and society’s interest in protecting itself through reasonably effective law enforcement procedures.” (90 Cal.App.3d at p. 713.)
Justice Gardner points out in Lopez that there is a long line of Court of Appeal decisions limiting the broad rule of Fioritto to “situations in which on balance the court could conclude that, given the combination of circumstances existing, the defendant had freely, knowingly and intentionally elected to speak without counsel at the second interrogation.” (90 Cal.App.3d at p. 718; see People v. Miller (1974) 40 *999Cal.App.3d 228 [114 Cal.Rptr. 779]; People v. Chambers (1969) 276 Cal.App.2d 89 [80 Cal.Rptr. 672]; People v. Duran (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 112 [74 Cal.Rptr. 459]; People v. Brockman (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 1002 [83 Cal.Rptr. 70]; People v. Smith (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 715 [76 Cal.Rptr. 53]; People v. Lyons (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 760 [96 Cal.Rptr. 76].) The Supreme Court in Pettingill, and later in People v. Mack (1980) 27 Cal.3d 145 [165 Cal.Rptr. 113, 611 P.2d 454], did not disapprove of these cases. Indeed, in Pettingill, the court explicitly recognized that the Fioritto rule allows for contrary conclusions on closely similar fact situations. The court wrote: “Even in applying the comparatively inflexible Fioritto rule under present law, the courts have sometimes reached contrary conclusions on admissibility that are difficult to justify in terms of the factual differences between the cases. (Compare, e.g., People v. Miller (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 228 [114 Cal.Rptr. 779] (per Thompson, J.), with People v. Parker (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 24 [119 Cal.Rptr. 49] (same).) We have no doubt that such discrepancies would be far more frequent under Mosley.” (21 Cal.3d at p. 251, fn. 12.)
The facts of each case must be examined to determine if there is substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding that there was no violation of the defendant’s right against self-incrimination in his statement to a police officer.
The majority asserts that the only meaningful distinction between Pettingill and the present case is that here the detective who obtained the incriminatory statement had no knowledge that the appellant had previously invoked his Miranda rights. However, it should be noted that in Pettingill, two hours after the defendant informed the arresting officer that he wished to exercise his right to remain silent, the same arresting officer renewed interrogation of the defendant regarding the crime for which he was arrested. The defendant again refused to talk. After the defendant had been in custody for three days, a detective, who was aware of the defendant’s two refusals, confronted him with evidence of his guilt in a different crime, readvised him of his rights, and obtained a waiver and confession. As Justice Gardner writes in Lopez,. “Obviously, police harassment existed. The officers were going to interrogate Mr. Pettingill come hell or high water.” (90 Cal.App.3d at pp. 717-718.)
In the instant case, the arresting officer advised appellant of his rights and then asked him if he wanted to talk with him about the *1000drunk driving. When appellant refused, the officer immediately ceased the interrogation. In the morning, the detective, ignorant of the appellant’s earlier refusal to discuss the drunk driving charge, readvised appellant of his rights and began asking him questions about the burglary. Unlike Pettingill, there were no coercive police tactics here; there was no deliberate attempt to circumvent Fioritto. The facts of this case clearly demonstrate that a rigid, inflexible application of the Fiorittoj Pettingill rule irrationally obstructs legitimate police investigation activity.
I would affirm.
A petition for a rehearing was denied November 6, 1980. Scott, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted. Respondent’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied December 4, 1980. Clark, J., and Richardson, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.