Court Opinion

ID: 9729482
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:37:44.688062+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:58.900028
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Ciiiep Justice Jones :
For a variety of reasons, I believe the PCHA judge properly refused appellant’s amendments and that a further evidentiary hearing on the prejudiced-juror claim is unnecessary. While repeated requests for post-conviction relief do not, standing alone, have any legal significance, it should be noted that appellant is no stranger to the judicial process. United States ex rel. Cornitcher v. Rundle, 315 F. Supp. 1300 (E.D. Pa. 1970); United States ex rel. Cornitcher v. Rundle, 285 F. Supp. 625 (E.D. Pa. 1968), aff'd, 406 F. 2d 773 (3d Cir. 1969); United States ex rel. Cornitcher v. Myers, 253 F. Supp. 763 (E.D. Pa. 1966); Com. v. Cornitcher, 211 Pa. Superior Ct. 710, 234 A. 2d 223 (1967); Com. ex rel. Cornitcher v. Myers, 206 Pa. Superior Ct. 725, *555212 A. 2d 455 (1965). In addition to these reported opinions, this Court denied allocatur once before, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania considered and dismissed a civil rights action brought by appellant against his trial attorney, United States ex rel. Cornitcher v. Dwyer, Civ. No. 68-2102, and the record reveals four unreported opinions by the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas.
I. The Prejudiced-Juror Claim
It would appear to me that this claim is not cognizable under the Post Conviction Hearing Act. The appellant in Com. v. Newsome, 444 Pa. 586, 281 A. 2d 904 (1971), had knowingly and intelligently waived his right to a direct appeal, Com. ex rel. Newsome v. Myers, 428 Pa. 141, 236 A. 2d 763 (1968), and sought post-conviction relief by alleging, inter alia, that he was convicted by a prejudiced jury. Speaking for a unanimous Court, Mr. Justice Eagen stated: “These complaints are not cognizable in a collateral attack on the conviction and judgment. They pertain to trial error which may be challenged only in a direct appeal.” 444 Pa. at 588, 281 A. 2d at 905. Although there is no prior opinion by this Court dealing with appellant’s failure to prosecute a direct appeal, this argument was previously presented by appellant in a counselled PCHA petition and rejected by the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas and appellant never appealed that denial. Thus, it appears to me that appellant’s position is identical to Newsome’s and the results in these cases should be identical.
A second, and perhaps more fatal, defect in the majority opinion is the assumption that the PCHA judge denied relief on the prejudiced-juror claim due to either a Section 4 waiver or appellant’s failure to ask ques*556tions on voir dire which may have indicated the alleged juror’s alleged bias. Although we do not have the benefit of an opinion from the PCHA judge due to appellant’s failure to comply with Supreme Court Rule 63, it appears to me that the decision of the PCHA judge to deny relief rests not on either waiver theory but rather on the merits. Of course, if this prejudiced-juror claim has been fully considered and rejected, it would be unnecessary to remand for a further evidentiary hearing.
If the PCHA judge relied on a Section 4 waiver, the hearing afforded appellant was unnecessary since we have held that a PCHA hearing is not required when the issues raised in the petition have been waived under Section 4 of the Act. E.g., Com. v. Williams, 437 Pa. 526, 263 A. 2d 127 (1970). The mere fact that a hearing was conducted, indeed ordered by the Administrative Judge of the Trial Division of the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, leads me to the inescapable conclusion that the decision of the PCHA judge was not bottomed on a Section 4 waiver. Nor do I believe that relief was denied due to a failure to question the jurors on voir dire. Nowhere in the transcript of the PCHA hearing is there any mention of the fact that defense counsel failed to adequately question the jurors on voir dire. Since this point was never discussed at the hearing, I do not believe the PCHA judge relied on this “waiver” theory.
In support of my position that the PCHA judge ruled on the merits of the prejudiced-juror claim, it should be noted that the PCHA judge, after hearing argument concerning a Section 4 waiver, stated, “[l]et us go on and see what he has to say.” Moreover, the PCHA judge made no decision on appellant’s petition until after appellant completed his testimony. Lastly, two interruptions of appellant’s testimony by the PCHA *557judge indicate a total rejection of appellant’s claim. Accordingly, I am of the opinion that the PCHA judge ruled on the merits and that a further evidentiary hearing would be both futile and unnecessary.
II. The Eejected Amendments
Although I recognize the general principle that amendments should be freely allowed, I do not believe that we should permit amendments raising claims that have been finally litigated or are patently frivolous.
Turning first to the claim under Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), it should be noted that this claim was raised in appellant’s first petition and rejected by the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas; the decision of the Common Pleas Court was subsequently affirmed by the Superior Court, 211 Pa. Superior Ct. 710, 234 A. 2d 223 (1967).
Since appellant was represented by counsel in his first petition, that issue would be finally litigated, Com. v. Wilson, 444 Pa. 433, 283 A. 2d 78 (1971), except for the fact that the dismissal of the first petition predates Bruton which is fully retroactive, Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293 (1968), and we have held the “finally litigated” concept to be inapplicable when dealing with retroactive rulings. Com. v. Gates, 429 Pa. 453, 240 A. 2d 815 (1968). However, contrary to footnote five of the majority opinion, I believe the Bruton claim is finally litigated due to the presence of this argument in appellant’s second PCHA petition. The majority’s initial contention-—a dismissal of this third petition as finally litigated is improper since the second petition was not denied on the merits—ignores the fact that appellant could have appealed the denial of the second petition. See, Com. v. Black, 433 Pa. 150, 249 A. 2d 561 (1969). Acceptance of the majority’s argument *558violates the overriding philosophy of section 4: avoidance of multiple petitions raising the same issue and piecemeal litigation. The majority’s second argument that the second petition was uncounselled is only a matter of perspective: while there is no indication that counsel was appointed, there is also no indication that counsel was not appointed. Since the record does demonstrate that appellant had counsel* in all of the other actions cited in the first paragraph of this dissent, I tend to think that the second PCHA petition was counselled. To allow an amendment under these circumstances is most unwise.
In a similar manner, I do not believe a “tacit admission” amendment should be allowed. Notwithstanding our prohibition of tacit admissions in Com. v. Dravecz, 424 Pa. 582, 227 A. 2d 904 (1967), we have indicated that the rationale of Bravees is inapplicable to cases where the judgment of sentence was finalized before Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). E.g., Com. v. Little, 432 Pa. 256, 248 A. 2d 32 (1968). Since this is a collateral attack on a 1963 conviction and not a direct appeal, this claim is patently frivolous. I am of the opinion that an amendment under these circumstances should not be granted.

 In several instances, the petitions and opinions do not note the presence of counsel but I can ascertain the presence of counsel due to motions and stipulations.