Court Opinion

ID: 9692078
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 15:40:23.467203+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:30.717393
License: Public Domain

JACKSON B. SMITH, Jr.,
Justice (Retired), concurring and dissenting.
I concur with the majority opinion in all respects, except for its reversal of the $1,000,000 damage award to James Ward for intentional infliction of emotional distress. I would affirm the entire trial court judgment.
The majority opinion holds that Rescar’s actions toward Ward were neither extreme and outrageous nor Ward’s emotional distress sufficient to be classified as “severe.” I disagree.
To recover damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must prove: (1) the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly; (2) the defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) the defendant’s actions caused the plaintiff emotional distress; and (4) the emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff was severe. Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 621 (Tex.1993).
It is manifest from the evidence that Rescar’s actions toward Ward were intentional and that Ward suffered emotional distress as a result of those actions. These two matters appear to be uncontested. However, Rescar vehemently contests Ward’s claim that Rescar’s actions were extreme and outrageous and that the emotional distress Ward suffered was sufficient to be classified as “severe.”
*185The Texas Supreme Court has held that whether a defendant’s conduct may reasonably be regarded as extreme and outrageous is a question of law. Womick v. Casas, 856 S.W.2d 732, 734 (Tex.1993). The supreme court also has held that, for a defendant’s conduct to be considered extreme and outrageous, the conduct must be “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Twyman, 855 S.W.2d at 621. That court has further held that bad faith and rudeness cannot reasonably be regarded as so extreme as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency. Natividad v. Alexsis, Inc., 875 S.W.2d 695, 699 (Tex.1994).
FACTS
The evidence shows that Ward was hired in 1992 by Rescar as a plant manager. Rescar contracted to clean and repair railroad cars. Although Ward was responsible for the entire plant, the cleaning portion of the plant was under the authority of Mitchem and Keil. Mitchem was a Res-ear vice-president.
In December 1992, a Texas Water Commission investigator and Ward discovered that Rescar Cleaning (RC) was disposing of hazardous chemical waste in a sewer system. Ward had the pipe plugged through which the chemical was flowing. Mitchem, Rescar’s vice-president, asked Ward what he was doing plugging Mit-chem’s pipe. Shortly thereafter, Ward showed McDermott, Rescar’s highest official responsible for environmental issues, a number of chemical drums lying in a field near the RC cleaning area. Some of the drums were unmarked, some mislabeled, and some were leaking. McDermott told Ward that RC would clean up the drums as well as some chemical hoses that had been dumped in the field. The hoses had spilled chemicals, leaving burned spots on the field. No action was taken by RC to clean up the field.
In March 1993, another pipe was discovered leaking liquid flowing from a sludge separation in the RC area. More hoses and areas of ground contamination also were observed in the same field. Tests revealed that the leaking liquid, black sludge, was highly acidic.
Ward was becoming increasingly concerned about the environmental hazard being created and its potential effect on the public. He also was well aware of his own responsibilities and, as plant manager, he was the person who could be found guilty of violating federal and state environmental laws. To protect himself, Ward wrote letters to the owner, the president of Res-car, as well as the vice-president of RC. In those letters, Ward outlined the various violations taking place in the RC area. He recommended immediate remedial action, and disclaimed any responsibility for any misconduct resulting from RC’s illegal activities.
Upon hearing of Ward’s letter, Dan Loyd, Ward’s immediate supervisor, wanted to fire Ward. However, Loyd was told, “he could not fire him immediately and to take care of it.”
On April 10, Loyd sent Ward a memorandum stating that, effective January 1, 1993, Ward had been given authority over RC’s cleaning area.
Loyd did not know if anyone had told Ward about his changed responsibilities before he sent the memo to Ward on April 10. Ward was upset when he received the memo, because he was the one who had reported to Rescar’s officers the various violations that had occurred between January 1, 1993 and April 10, 1993, and now, the company was trying to place the re*186sponsibility on him by giving him an organizational chart that had been back-dated by approximately four months. Ward and others had never seen or heard of the chart prior to April 10.
Shortly thereafter, in May 1993, Ward was transferred to another Rescar plant that was not operational at that time. Ward was responsible for hiring new employees. During the balance of 1993, Ward and his supervisor, Loyd, had several confrontations concerning the hiring of employees and, on December 30, 1993, Loyd terminated Ward’s employment. Meryl Whitmeyer, a Rescar supervisory employee, told Ward that morning that he was going to be fired because he had hired too many minorities. Loyd had accomplished what his supervisors had told him to do in March 1993, “he could not fire him [Ward] immediately and to take care of it.”
Less than a month after Ward’s termination, Pat Everett, a sales person, informed Ward of a conversation she had had with Rescar’s executive vice-president, Myron Hawkins. She said Hawkins told her that Rescar officials were very upset by Ward’s letter which informed them of the company’s various violations. She said that Hawkins then told her to tell Ward that: (1) Ward and Geri (Ward’s wife) would find it difficult to run with the big boys; (2) that he would not win if he tried and pursued; (3) he would not work in the industry anymore; and (4) it could adversely affect Ward’s wife’s business.
Hawkins’s threat and caveat sent to Ward was not an idle threat. Notwithstanding his qualifications and extensive experience in the specialized cleaning and repairing rail car industry, Ward was unable to obtain and retain employment. Resear formulated a plan that, when Ward obtained employment with Shell Oil, a Rescar vice-president would request Shell not to send Ward to inspect Shell’s own railcars that Rescar worked on for Shell. When Ward was employed by GE, Rescar contacted GE and told it that employing Ward would hurt Rescar’s relationship with GE. Ward finally went to work for his wife’s company at a much lower salary than he would have made in the cleaning and repairing railcar industry.
It is not unusual for an employer to terminate an at-will employee when disputes arise. In fact, it is well established that an employer does not need a reason to terminate an at-will employee. See Montgomery County Hosp. Dist. v. Brown, 965 S.W.2d 501, 503 (Tex.1998). It is not even unusual when heated disputes arise between two parties that threats may be made. However, when an employer terminates an employee, threatens to ruin that employee’s ability to ever obtain employment, and then carries through on the threats by exerting pressure and leverage on the former employee’s new employers to such an extent that the former employee cannot keep employment, all of which Rescar did, the employer’s actions exceed common decency and become extreme and outrageous.
To add insult to injury, Rescar’s executive vice president also threatened to take action that would affect the business of Ward’s wife. The continuity of Rescar’s actions to remonstrate and even harm Ward make it readily apparent that Res-car intended to inflict as much emotional distress upon Ward, and his family, as it possibly could. This evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s verdict that Rescar’s actions toward Ward were intentional and its conduct was extreme and outrageous.
Rescar also asserts that Ward is not entitled to recover damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress because Ward did not introduce sufficient proof to demonstrate “severe” emotional distress.
*187The question of whether evidence is sufficient to classify emotional distress as severe is a two-step process. First, the trial court must determine as a matter of law whether the evidence is such that severe emotional distress can be found. Second, if the trial court answers the first question affirmatively, whether severe emotional distress in fact exists becomes a question for the finder of fact to determine from the evidence. Restatement (Second) of ToRts § 46 cmt. d (1965); Behringer v. Behringer, 884 S.W.2d 889, 844 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1994, writ denied); Tidelands Auto. Club v. Walters, 699 S.W.2d 939, 945 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
In this case, because the trial court submitted the question of severe emotional distress to the jury, it, of necessity, found as a matter of law that the evidence was such that the jury, if it chose to do so, could find that there had been intentional infliction of severe emotional distress on Ward by Rescar.
At what point emotional distress becomes severe emotional distress is a matter of degree and depends upon the specific facts of each case. Other than enumerating specific factual situations that do or do not constitute severe emotional distress, case law has not established firm or specific standards to determine what constitutes sufficient emotional distress to classify it as severe.
In a case factually similar to the instant case, a former employer phoned the ex-employee and told her that she would ruin her, would call any employer she worked for and get her fired, would get her for setting her up, and that the ex-employee had better watch her back always, and watch her children always. For approximately two years “hang-ups” were made by the employer to the ex-employee’s business. The employer’s actions caused the ex-employee debilitating headaches and severe emotional distress. The former employer sent a black floral arrangement to the ex-employee, which was interpreted as a death threat and caused the ex-employee to become paranoid. The jury found severe emotional distress. The appellate court held that there was some evidence to show that the findings of fact by the jury were not clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. Qualicare of East Texas, Inc. v. Runnels, 868 S.W.2d 220, 223 (Tex.App.—Eastland 1993, no writ).
More recently, the Texas supreme court affirmed a judgment awarding damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress where employees suffered illness as a result of a supervisor’s continued verbal abuse and threatening gestures. GTE Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605, 618 (Tex.1999).
In Bruce, the court held that severe emotional distress is distress that is so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it. Id. The evidence in Bruce showed that three employees experienced a variety of symptoms, including crying spells, emotional outbursts, nausea, stomach disorders, difficulty sleeping and eating, stress, anxiety, depression, and fear. This evidence was held to be legally sufficient to support the jury’s findings that the three employees suffered severe emotional distress. Id.
In the instant case, Rescar attempted, by backdating an organizational chart, to shift the responsibility to Ward for its own unlawful activities in disposing of waste. Rescar used a false pretext to dismiss Ward, made threats to keep Ward from ever working in the industry, and threatened to harm Ward’s wife’s business. These combined actions apparently made Ward ill.
The evidence shows that Ward became upset and depressed when Rescar termi*188nated his employment. When Everett informed Ward of Rescar’s threats toward Ward’s wife, Ward’s condition worsened. The evidence describing Ward’s lifestyle before and after Rescar’s actions makes it apparent that Ward changed from being a happy person to being a very depressed person. He developed eating disorders, would not leave his home, and developed stomach problems. His problems with Rescar weighed on his mind continuously, resulting in loss of sleep. This in turn caused Ward to be nervous, edgy, irritable, moody, and diminished his ability to think clearly or concentrate. During this time, Ward lost interest in doing things that he had enjoyed previously. He became defensive and lacked motivation. His condition deteriorated to the point where he refused to drive a car. During this period of depression his weight dropped from 190 to 160 pounds.
Ward’s expert witness, Dr. Pesikoff, testified that Ward’s condition was major depression. Pesikoff explained that, according to the Diagnositc and Statistical Manual, 4th Edition, there are nine criterion for making a diagnosis of major depression. Pesikoff testified that Ward’s condition met six of the nine criterion and only five were necessary to characterize the condition as major depression.
Rescar contends that Ward’s emotional distress could not have been severe because he did not seek medical attention. Dr. Pesikoff explained that it is not unusual for a person experiencing depression for the first time not to recognize the symptoms and not to seek medical attention. Pesikoffs testimony was not rebutted, and, although he did not classify Ward’s depression as severe, the facts appear to justify the jury’s finding that Ward suffered severe emotional distress.
In this case, based on the evidence, the trial court found as a matter of law that severe emotional distress can be found. The court then submitted the proper issue to the jury inquiring whether severe emotional distress in fact existed. The jury answered that it did.
The question of whether severe emotional distress exists is a question of fact. The Texas Supreme Court has admonished courts of appeals that they are never permitted to substitute their opinion for that of the trier of fact merely because they might have reached a different fact conclusion. Herbert v. Herbert, 754 S.W.2d 141, 144 (Tex.1988). It is my view of the majority opinion that they are doing what the caveat of the Supreme Court told us not to do; that is, substitute their opinion for that of the fact finder.
I would hold- that there is some evidence; that is, legally and factually sufficient evidence, to support the jury’s verdict against Rescar on Ward’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Accordingly, I dissent from the majority opinion reversing the award of $1,000,000.00 to Ward for intentional infliction of emotional distress.