Court Opinion

ID: 9377629
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-08 16:01:31.05425+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:15.330072
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-2001   Document: 50     Page: 1   Filed: 03/07/2023

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                 ______________________

                  MARK EDENFIELD,
                      Petitioner

                            v.

      DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
                   Respondent
             ______________________

                       2021-2001
                 ______________________

    Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
 Board in No. AT-1221-19-0440-W-2.
                 ______________________

                  ON APPLICATION
                 ______________________

    NATHANIEL M. EDENFIELD, Sodhi Spoont PLLC, West
 Palm Beach, FL, for petitioner. Also represented by ERIC
 SODHI, Miami, FL.

     DOMENIQUE GRACE KIRCHNER, Commercial Litigation
 Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Jus-
 tice, Washington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by
 BRIAN M. BOYNTON, CLAUDIA BURKE, PATRICIA M. MCCAR-
 THY.
                  ______________________

    Before CHEN, BRYSON, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.
Case: 21-2001    Document: 50      Page: 2   Filed: 03/07/2023

 2                      EDENFIELD V. DEP’T VETERANS AFFAIRS

 PER CURIAM.
                         ORDER
      Dr. Mark Edenfield seeks an award of appellate attor-
 ney fees and costs under the Whistleblower Protection Act
 following this Court’s opinion reversing and remanding a
 judgment from the Merit Systems Protection Board. Be-
 cause this Court is not authorized to award attorney fees
 under this statute, we deny the application.
                              I
      On June 3, 2021, Dr. Edenfield appealed a decision of
 the Board dismissing his request for corrective action, ar-
 guing that the Board erred in finding that certain disclo-
 sures he made during his employment were not protected
 under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). We agreed and reversed the
 Board’s determination that the disclosures were not pro-
 tected and remanded the case for further proceedings. 1 Fol-
 lowing that decision, Dr. Edenfield submitted the current
 application asking this Court to award attorney fees and
 costs under the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA), spe-
 cifically 5 U.S.C § 1221(g)(3).
                              II
     Traditionally, “[u]nder the doctrine of sovereign im-
 munity, the federal government . . . is immune to an award
 of money damages, except to the extent that the govern-
 ment has explicitly waived such immunity.” M.A. Morten-
 son Co. v. United States, 996 F.2d 1177, 1180 (Fed. Cir.
 1993) (citation omitted). Such waivers of sovereign immun-
 ity must be strictly construed in favor of the federal

     1   A full description of the factual and procedural
 background of this case, as well as this Court’s reasoning
 for reversing and remanding, can be found at Edenfield v.
 Department of Veterans Affairs, 54 F.4th 1357 (Fed. Cir.
 2022).
Case: 21-2001     Document: 50      Page: 3   Filed: 03/07/2023

 EDENFIELD   v. DEP’T VETERANS AFFAIRS                        3

 government. United States v. Nordic Vill. Inc., 503 U.S. 30,
 33–34 (1992). Allowing an award of attorney fees under the
 WPA is a waiver of sovereign immunity, and therefore the
 language of § 1221(g) must be strictly construed.
      Furthermore, Federal Circuit Rule 47.7 limits this
 Court’s ability to award attorney fees and reasonable ex-
 penses to situations where we are authorized by law to do
 so. In the absence of such statutory authorization, we lack
 the ability to award attorney fees. Indeed, “[u]nder Rule
 47.7, this Court must itself be authorized by law to award
 attorney fees.” Gallo v. Dep’t of Transp., 725 F.3d 1306,
 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (emphasis added). This Court cannot
 “derive its authority to award attorney fees from the
 Board’s authority to do so and must have its own statutory
 authorization to award attorney fees.” Id. at 1309.
                              III
     Dr. Edenfield seeks an award of attorney fees only un-
 der § 1221(g), which outlines the types of correction action
 available to the Board in an individual right of action case
 under the WPA. It provides in relevant part that:
    (g)(1)(A) If the Board orders corrective action under
    this section, such corrective action may include—
     ...
    (ii) back pay and related benefits, medical costs in-
    curred, travel expenses, any other reasonable and
    foreseeable consequential damages, and compensa-
    tory damages (including interest, reasonable ex-
    pert witness fees, and costs).
    (B) Corrective action shall include attorney’s fees
    and costs as provided for under paragraphs (2) and
    (3).
    (2) If an employee . . . is the prevailing party before
    the Merit Systems Protection Board, . . . the
    agency involved shall be liable to the employee . . .
Case: 21-2001     Document: 50     Page: 4    Filed: 03/07/2023

 4                       EDENFIELD V. DEP’T VETERANS AFFAIRS

     for reasonable attorney’s fees and any other rea-
     sonable costs incurred.
     (3) If an employee . . . is the prevailing party in an
     appeal from the Merit Systems Protection Board,
     the agency involved shall be liable to the em-
     ployee . . . for reasonable attorney’s fees and any
     other reasonable costs incurred, regardless of the
     basis of the decision.
 5 U.S.C. § 1221(g).
      This statute clearly lays out the conditions and proce-
 dure for awarding attorney fees in an individual right of
 action case under the WPA. First, § 1221(g)(1)(A) explicitly
 gives the Board the authority to “order corrective action.”
 Next, § 1221(g)(1)(B) states that “corrective action shall in-
 clude attorney’s fees and costs” in the two scenarios pro-
 vided for in paragraphs (2) and (3). Section 1221(g)(2)
 provides for an award of attorney fees in proceedings “be-
 fore the Merit Systems Protection Board,” and § 1221(g)(3)
 provides for an award of attorney fees incurred “in an ap-
 peal from the Merit Systems Protection Board.” When
 tracking the language of this statute, two things are clear:
 first, the Board, and only the Board, has the authority to
 order corrective action, including attorney fees; and second,
 the authority to award attorney fees extends to proceedings
 where an employee appeals a decision from the Board to
 this Court, because this Court has jurisdiction over appeals
 of individual right of action decisions under the WPA.
     However, no part of § 1221(g) grants this Court the au-
 thority to award attorney fees in an action brought under
 the WPA. When construed narrowly as required by prece-
 dent, the plain language of § 1221(g) only allows the Board
 to award attorney fees in appeals from the Board.
     Dr. Edenfield first argues that this Court is the proper
 forum to grant attorney fees because “[t]he Federal Circuit
 is in a better position than the [B]oard to determine the
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 EDENFIELD   v. DEP’T VETERANS AFFAIRS                        5

 amount of fees and expenses to be awarded in connection
 with the appeal,” quoting our decision in Gavette v. Office
 of Personnel Management, 808 F.2d 1456, 1468 (Fed. Cir.
 1986). Mot. at 8–9. But in Gavette, the employee sought at-
 torney fees and expenses under the Equal Access to Justice
 Act (EAJA). The EAJA is an entirely different statute that
 does, in fact, allow this Court to award attorney fees. Id. at
 1460–61 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (allowing an award
 of attorney fees and reasonable costs by “any court having
 jurisdiction [over such] action”)). Unlike the EAJA, the
 WPA does not contain any language that would allow us to
 grant an award of attorney fees. Strictly construed, the
 statute only allows the Board to grant an award of attorney
 fees, and that authority cannot be extended to this Court.
 Gallo, 725 F.3d at 1309.
     Dr. Edenfield also argues that § 1221(g) and 5 C.F.R.
 § 1201.202, which lists various statutes that authorize the
 Board to award fees, are silent as to the Board’s authority
 to award fees for appeals to this Court, and therefore the
 authority lies with this Court. We disagree. As discussed
 above, § 1221(g)(3) specifically allows the Board to order
 attorney fees in an appeal from the Board. And we have
 previously recognized that the Board has the authority to
 award attorney fees under § 1221(g). See Hickey v. Dep’t of
 Homeland Sec., 766 F. App’x 970, 974 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (rec-
 ognizing that the Board may require a payment of attorney
 fees under § 1221(g)); Carson v. Dep’t of Energy, 64 F. App’x
 234, 237 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (reviewing a grant of attorney fees
 by the Board in a case brought under the WPA). As to the
 regulation, Dr. Edenfield is correct that it does not refer to
 § 1221(g)(3) but explicitly recites other provisions of § 1221.
 The regulation, however, also explains that the recited list
 of statutes is not exclusive, and thus the regulation does
 not preclude the Board from awarding fees under
 § 1221(g)(3). See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.202(a) (“These statutory
 authorities include, but are not limited to, the following
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 6                      EDENFIELD V. DEP’T VETERANS AFFAIRS

 authorities . . . .” (emphasis added)). And even if both the
 statute and regulation were silent on the Board’s authority
 to award attorney fees, that would not change the fact that
 § 1221(g) does not grant this Court the authority to award
 attorney fees in an action brought under the WPA. See Er-
 ickson v. U.S. Postal Serv., 759 F.3d 1341, 1345 (Fed. Cir.
 2014) (“[T]here must be an independent statutory authori-
 zation for the court to award fees.”). Because this Court
 does not have independent statutory authority to grant an
 award of attorney fees under the WPA, and Dr. Edenfield
 has not argued for a grant of attorney fees under any other
 statute, we cannot grant Dr. Edenfield’s application. 2

     Accordingly,
     IT IS ORDERED THAT:
     Dr. Edenfield’s application for an award of appellate
 attorney fees and costs is denied.

                                    FOR THE COURT

 March 7, 2023                      /s/ Peter R. Marksteiner
     Date                           Peter R. Marksteiner
                                    Clerk of Court

     2    We express no opinion as to whether Dr. Edenfield
 is entitled to an award of attorney fees from the Board for
 this appeal.