Court Opinion

ID: 9940071
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-13 17:06:12.65381+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:41:15.968107
License: Public Domain

IN THE

            Court of Appeals of Indiana
                      Joseph S. Kornman and Sirenia Kornman,
                                                                                FILED
                                               Appellants                  Feb 13 2024, 9:10 am

                                                                                CLERK
                                                    v.                      Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                               Court of Appeals
                                                                                 and Tax Court

                                          Verna Bowling,
                                           Appellee-Plaintiff

                                          February 13, 2024
                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
                                           23A-MI-1740
                           Appeal from the Hamilton Superior Court
                           The Honorable Jonathan M. Brown, Judge
                                       Trial Court Cause No.
                                       29D02-2103-MI-2211

                                  Opinion by Judge Bailey
                               Judges Brown and Foley concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1740 | February 13, 2024   Page 1 of 10
      Bailey, Judge.

      Case Summary
[1]   Joseph S. Kornman (“Father”) and Sirenia Kornman (“Adopted Mother”)

      (collectively, “Parents”) appeal the trial court order granting Vera Bowling

      (“Grandmother”) visitation with E.K. (“Child”). Parents raise two issues on

      appeal, but we address only the dispositive issue of whether Grandmother had

      standing to seek visitation with Child under the Grandparent Visitation Act

      (“GVA”). Finding that she did, we affirm.

      Facts and Procedural History
[2]   On October 12, 2015, Child was born out of wedlock to Father and Katy Lee

      Scott (“Biological Mother”), who was Grandmother’s daughter. Biological

      Mother and Child lived with Grandmother until approximately October of

      2017. In September of 2017, Father and Adopted Mother married. In

      November of 2017, in Madison Circuit Court 2, Father established his paternity

      of Child and was awarded custody of her. The court granted Biological Mother

      supervised parenting time with Child, and Grandmother was appointed as the

      supervisor of the visits. On October 8, 2018, Father filed his notice that he had

      moved his residence to Hamilton County.

[3]   Biological Mother died on April 13, 2019. Thereafter, Father allowed

      Grandmother to continue to visit with Child weekly, although he did not allow

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1740 | February 13, 2024    Page 2 of 10
      over-night visits. Grandmother regularly visited with Child each week until

      approximately February of 2020, when Father terminated all such visits.

[4]   On February 6, 2020, Adopted Mother filed in Hamilton County Superior

      Court 2 a petition to adopt Child. Adopted Mother did not serve notice of the

      adoption action on Grandmother. On May 1, 2020, Grandmother filed in

      Madison County Circuit Court 6 a petition for grandparent visitation with

      Child. On May 21, 2020, Father filed his answer to Grandmother’s petition but

      did not point out that an adoption action was pending in another county and

      did not object to the venue or Grandmother’s standing.

[5]   On May 27, Hamilton Superior Court 2 held a final hearing on Adopted

      Mother’s petition to adopt Child. At that hearing, Adopted Mother informed

      the court “that[,] despite the case in Madison County occurring with Verna

      Bowling[,] that [sic] the adoption proceeding would not affect her grandparent

      visitation request.” Tr. v. IV at 107. Hamilton Superior Court 2 granted the

      adoption petition but notice of the adoption decree was not served on

      Grandmother.

[6]   On August 10, 2020, Adopted Mother filed a motion to intervene in

      Grandmother’s Madison County action seeking grandparent visitation. That

      date was when Grandmother first learned of the adoption action and order

      involving Child. By agreement of the parties, Grandmother’s petition was set

      for a hearing on March 23, 2021. However, on that date Madison Circuit

      Court 6 transferred the grandparent visitation action to Hamilton Superior

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1740 | February 13, 2024   Page 3 of 10
      Court 2 because “Hamilton County is the child’s county of residence.” App. v.

      II at 8. On March 29, Hamilton Superior Court 2 accepted jurisdiction of the

      grandparent visitation action under a new cause number.

[7]   In July 2021, Parents filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that

      Grandmother lacked standing to bring the grandparent visitation action, and

      the court denied that motion. Parents subsequently sought permission to bring

      an interlocutory appeal, which the court also denied. On September 20, 2021,

      the court conducted a provisional hearing on Grandmother’s petition and took

      judicial notice of the adoption proceedings involving Child. On November 9,

      the court granted Grandmother temporary grandparent visitation pending a

      final order. Thereafter, Parents made various motions, including a motion

      asking the Judge to recuse himself, all of which were denied.

[8]   In December 2021 and January 2022, Grandmother filed motions for contempt

      on the grounds that Parents refused to allow her visitation with Child per the

      court’s provisional order. Following hearings at which Parents did not deny the

      allegations, the trial court twice found Parents in contempt of the provisional

      visitation order. The trial court appointed a Guardian Ad Litem (“GAL”), who

      investigated and filed a report on May 6, 2022, in which she recommended

      Grandmother have grandparent visitation with Child. Parents objected to the

      GAL appointment and moved to strike the report; the trial court denied the

      motion.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1740 | February 13, 2024    Page 4 of 10
[9]    A final hearing on Grandmother’s petition for visitation was held over the

       course of five days between September 16, 2022, and January 11, 2023. On

       July 10, 2023, the trial court issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in

       which it held that Grandmother had standing to bring her claim under the

       GVA, granted Grandmother’s petition for visitation with Child, and ordered

       Parents to pay Grandmother $20,000 in attorney fees incurred in addressing

       Parents’ “spurious and wasteful litigation tactics.” Appealed Order at 24. This

       appeal ensued.

       Discussion and Decision
       Standard of Review
[10]   Parents challenge the grandparent visitation order on the grounds of standing.

       In that order, the trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions thereon. On

       appeal of such an order, we generally review for clear error, employing a two-

       tiered standard of review. See, e.g., M.G. v. S.K., 162 N.E.3d 544, 547 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2020). However, where an appeal raises only questions of law, such as

       standing and statutory interpretation, our review is de novo. See, e.g., Ehrlich v.

       Starke Solar, LLC, 219 N.E.3d 749, 755 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (reviewing issue of

       standing), trans. denied; Mellowitz v. Ball State University, 221 N.E.3d 1214, 1220

       (Ind. 2023) (reviewing issue of statutory interpretation). “If a statute is clear

       and unambiguous, we do not apply any rules of construction other than giving

       effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of the language.” Jocham v. Sutliff, 26

       N.E.3d 82, 85 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (quotation and citation omitted).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1740 | February 13, 2024      Page 5 of 10
       Grandparent Visitation Act
[11]   Grandparents historically had no common-law right to visitation with their

       grandchildren. Matter of E.H., 121 N.E.3d 594, 596 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). The

       GVA was enacted in 1982 and provides the sole basis for grandparents to seek

       visitation with their grandchildren. H.P. v. G.F., 210 N.E.3d 1286, 1288 (Ind.

       Ct. App. 2023). Because the GVA was enacted in derogation of the common

       law, it must be strictly construed. E.H., 121 N.E.3d at 596.

[12]   Indiana Code Section 31-17-5-1 provides, in relevant part, that a child’s

       grandparent may seek visitation under the GVA if the child’s parent is deceased

       or, with some exceptions not applicable here, the child was born out of

       wedlock. The petition for grandparent visitation “must be filed prior to the date

       a decree of adoption is entered.” Ind. Code § 31-17-5-3(b). Such an action

       must be filed in “a circuit, superior or probate court of the county in which the

       child resides.…” I.C. § 31-17-5-4(1). The trial court may grant the petition if it

       finds that grandparent visitation is in the child’s best interests. I.C. § 31-17-5-2.

       Grandparent visitation rights awarded by a court “survive the adoption of the

       child … by … [a] stepparent.” I.C. § 31-17-5-9.

       Standing under the GVA
[13]   The trial court awarded visitation rights to Grandmother, finding that such

       visitation was in Child’s best interests. Parents do not challenge that decision

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1740 | February 13, 2024       Page 6 of 10
       on the merits. Instead, they contend that Grandmother did not have standing 1

       to seek visitation under the GVA, and, therefore, the trial court’s visitation

       order is “void ab initio.” Appellant’s Br. at 5.

[14]   Grandmother is the maternal grandparent of Child, whose biological mother

       died. As the grandparent of a child whose parent is deceased, Grandmother

       had standing under the terms of the GVA to file a lawsuit seeking visitation

       with Child. I.C. § 31-17-5-1(a). However, Parents contend Grandmother lost

       her standing under the GVA by filing her petition for visitation after Adopted

       Mother filed her adoption action but before the adoption decree was issued.

       We disagree. The plain language of the GVA provides that a grandparent must

       file a petition for visitation prior to the date a decree of adoption is entered, and

       that is what Grandmother did. See I.C. § 31-17-5-3(b); see also Romero v. McVey,

       167 N.E.3d 361, 366 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (noting the grandparent visitation

       action was allowed to proceed where an adoption proceeding already had

       begun but had not yet resulted in a decree). If Grandmother had filed the

       1
          In their briefs, Parents repeatedly conflate the issues of standing, subject matter jurisdiction, and venue.
       Subject matter jurisdiction is the power of a court to hear and determine a particular class of cases, and it is
       derived from statute or the constitution. E.g., DSG Lake, LLC v. Petalas, 156 N.E.3d 677, 689 (Ind. Ct. App.
       2020), trans. denied. Standing, on the other hand, “refers to the question of whether a party has an actual
       demonstrable injury for purposes of a lawsuit[,]”and it does not “implicate[] subject matter jurisdiction.” Fish
       v. 2444 Acquisitions, LLC, 46 N.E.3d 1261, 1265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. Venue “connotes the
       proper situs for trial of an action,” Cabanaw v. Cabanaw, 648 N.E.2d 694, 697 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), and “[t]he
       filing of a case in a county in which venue does not properly reside does not divest the trial court of subject
       matter jurisdiction,” In re Adoption of L.T., 9 N.E.3d 172, 177 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).
       Here, there is no question that both the Madison County and Hamilton County courts had subject matter
       jurisdiction over the grandparent visitation action, as the GVA grants “circuit, superior or probate court[s]”
       the power to hear and determine that class of cases. I.C. § 31-17-5-4(1). Below, we address the separate
       issues of standing and venue.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1740 | February 13, 2024                              Page 7 of 10
       visitation petition after the adoption decree was entered, she arguably would

       have lacked standing.2 See, e.g., Jocham, 26 N.E.3d at 86 (finding grandparent

       lacked standing to seek visitation under the GVA where she had failed to even

       pursue such rights before the time of the adoption decree). But Grandmother

       filed her visitation petition in Madison County on May 1, 2020, almost one

       month before the Hamilton County court entered the adoption decree.

       Therefore, Grandmother had standing.3

[15]   However, Parents argue that Grandmother did not file her petition before the

       adoption decree was entered because her petition was originally filed in the

       wrong county. As Parents point out, a petition seeking grandparent visitation

       must be filed in the county in which the grandchild resides. I.C. § 31-17-5-4(1).

       On May 1, Child resided in Hamilton County. Therefore, Hamilton County

       was the proper venue for Grandmother’s visitation action, and Grandmother

       filed in the wrong venue when she filed her petition in Madison County.

       2
         Although, in that case, there could have been successful equitable arguments that Parents were estopped
       from attacking Grandmother’s standing claim, such as the argument that they should not benefit from their
       own failure to give Grandmother notice of the adoption proceeding as required by law. See I.C. § 31-19-2.5-
       3(a)(3) (providing that notice of adoption proceedings must be given to grandparents who are entitled to seek
       visitation under the GVA).
       3
          We note that Walker v. Knight, 119 N.E.3d 573 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), cited by Parents, is inapplicable to the
       instant case. In Walker, the grandparents had argued that filing their visitation petition before the entry of an
       adoption decree gave them visitation rights; a panel of this Court noted that the GVA does not grant
       visitation rights but only the right to seek visitation rights by filing an action for the same. 119 N.E.3d at 577-
       78. Here, Grandmother does not argue that her petition under the GVA gave her visitation rights, only the
       right to seek visitation. And the fact that she did so before the entry of an adoption decree gave her standing.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1740 | February 13, 2024                                 Page 8 of 10
[16]   Parents assert, without supporting legal authority,4 that a grandparent visitation

       action is not “commenced” when it is filed in the wrong venue. Appellant’s Br.

       at 32. According to Parents’ theory, Grandmother never “commenced” her

       grandparent visitation action until her petition was transferred to Hamilton

       County on March 29, 2021, i.e., after the date the adoption decree was entered.

       Id. However, the trial rules specifically provide that, when an action is filed in

       an improper venue, “the court in which such action is filed shall not then

       dismiss the action but shall order the action transferred to the court in which it

       should have been filed.” Ind. Trial Rule 75(B)(1). Moreover, “the action shall

       be deemed commenced as of the date of filing the action in the original court.” T.R.

       75(B)(2) (emphasis added). Thus, Grandmother’s grandparent visitation action

       was deemed commenced when she filed it in Madison County on May 1, 2020,

       almost a month before the adoption decree was entered. See id.

       Conclusion
[17]   Because Grandmother filed her grandparent visitation action before the date of

       the adoption decree, the trial court did not err when it ruled that she had

       standing to bring the action under the GVA. 5 See I.C. § 31-17-5-3(b). The

       4
         Hammons v. Jenkins-Griffith, 764 N.E.2d 303 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), cited by Parents, is inapplicable as it
       involved an alleged grandparent visitation petition that failed to comply with the statutorily-required form of
       such a petition; it did not involve a petition filed in the wrong venue or the consequences thereof. 764 N.E.2d
       at 306.
       5
         Because we rule that Grandmother has standing, we do not address Parents’ claim that Grandmother
       should pay the attorney fees they “incurred after [Grandmother] was made aware she lacked standing.”
       Appellant’s Br. at 5.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1740 | February 13, 2024                             Page 9 of 10
       original filing in the wrong venue did not affect Grandmother’s standing under

       the GVA. We affirm.

[18]   Affirmed.

       Brown, J., and Foley, J. concur.

       ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
       Jack M. Freedman
       Michael E. Michaelis, II
       Freedman Law, P.C.
       Fishers, Indiana

       ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
       Amy O. Carson
       Massillamany Jeter & Carson LLP
       Fishers, Indiana

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1740 | February 13, 2024   Page 10 of 10