Court Opinion

ID: 9370222
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-10 22:03:10.2903+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:20.151933
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
            in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

                                        2023 IL App (3d) 200503-U

                                 Order filed February 10, 2023
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                  IN THE

                                    APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                                             THIRD DISTRICT

                                                    2023

      THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF                      )       Appeal from the Circuit Court
      ILLINOIS,                                       )       of the 21st Judicial Circuit,
                                                      )       Kankakee County, Illinois,
             Plaintiff-Appellee,                      )
                                                      )       Appeal No. 3-20-0503
             v.                                       )       Circuit No. 17-CF-528
                                                      )
      JEAN H. SMITH,                                  )       Honorable
                                                      )       Clark E. Erickson,
             Defendant-Appellant.                     )       Judge, Presiding.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

            JUSTICE ALBRECHT delivered the judgment of the court.
            Presiding Justice Holdridge and Justice Peterson concurred in the judgment.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                 ORDER

¶1          Held: The State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed a theft.

¶2          Defendant, Jean H. Smith, appeals her conviction for theft. Defendant argues that the

     State failed to prove her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm.

¶3                                         I. BACKGROUND

¶4          A grand jury charged defendant with theft, a Class 3 felony (720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(1)(A),

     (b)(4) (West 2016)). The bill of indictment alleged that defendant “knowingly exerted
     unauthorized control over property of Rose Dotson, to wit: a purse and its contents, having a

     total value in excess of $500.00, but not in excess of $10,000.00, intending to deprive ***

     Dotson permanently of the use of the property.” The court appointed counsel and the matter

     proceeded to a bench trial.

¶5           Dotson testified that she went to the Walmart in Kankakee on May 24, 2017, at

     approximately 5:30 p.m. Dotson parked her vehicle in a handicap spot near the east side of the

     building. After exiting the store, Dotson unloaded her items from her shopping cart into her

     trunk. She left the cart in front of her car. At some point after leaving the parking lot, Dotson

     realized that her purse was not in her car. She remembered she left her purse in the front basket

     of the cart. Dotson returned to Walmart and found her purse was no longer in the cart.

¶6           Dotson’s purse was grey, large, and had handles. She purchased the purse for

     approximately $80. Dotson left her wallet, insulin, checkbook, credit cards, driver’s license,

     $400, and an iPhone 7 that she recently purchased for approximately $600 in the purse.

¶7           Police Sergeant Tim Kreissler testified that he went to Walmart on June 1, 2017, to view

     a security video relating to the theft of Dotson’s purse. From the security video, Kreissler

     identified, as a vehicle of interest, a small, white truck with a blue plastic barrel in its truck bed.

     After Kreissler left Walmart, he noticed the same truck at a gas station. Kreissler identified the

     truck based on its missing rear bumper, a dent near the right rear tire, and its missing front right

     hubcap.

¶8           Kreissler stopped at the gas station and observed an elderly woman “buying a bunch of

     Lotto tickets.” He waited for her to leave in the truck and then conducted a traffic stop. Kreissler

     identified the driver as defendant and identified her in court The court admitted into evidence

     photographs of a white truck missing a rear bumper as People’s exhibit Nos. 4, 5, and 6.

                                                        2
       Kreissler created a six-person photographic lineup that Officer Lacie Zingre administered to Josh

       Horton, the Walmart employee responsible for bringing in the shopping carts. Kreissler obtained

       an audio recorded statement from Horton.

¶9            Zingre testified that she administered the photographic lineup to Horton on June 6, 2017.

       Zingre first read the instruction page to Horton. Zingre then ensured that Horton understood the

       instructions. Horton initialed the instruction page of the lineup indicating that he understood the

       instructions. Zingre presented the lineup. Horton identified defendant. The court admitted into

       evidence the photographic lineup as People’s exhibit No. 2.

¶ 10          The instruction page of People’s exhibit No. 2 stated that “[t]he suspect may or may not

       be in this photo-line up and you are under no obligation to make an identification[,]” and “should

       not feel compelled to make an identification.” On the questionnaire page of People’s exhibit No.

       2, Horton marked that he recognized defendant and noted that “the hairstyle was different.”

¶ 11          Horton testified that he worked the midday shift on May 24, 2017. While collecting

       shopping carts, Horton found a grey purse in a shopping cart basket. Horton assumed it belonged

       to the person in the vehicle closest to the shopping cart, which was a white truck. He asked the

       passenger of the truck, an older, black woman, if the purse belonged to her. Horton testified that

       he thought the truck door was open. The woman’s husband was loading groceries into the back

       of the truck. The woman nodded affirmatively, indicating that the purse belonged to her. Horton

       gave her the purse.

¶ 12          On cross-examination, Horton testified that he generally has a bad memory. On May 24,

       2017, it was raining but light out. The woman never exited the truck. Horton stood on the right

       side of the cart and the woman was on the left side of the cart in the truck. Horton spoke to the

                                                        3
       woman for approximately 10 seconds. Defense counsel asked “[a]nd basically, is this your

       purse? Yes, it is.” And Horton answered “[y]eah, I apologize.”

¶ 13          The State rested and defense counsel moved for a directed verdict. The court denied the

       motion.

¶ 14          Kreissler testified that he made no attempts to ping Dotson’s cell phone. He did not

       obtain any search warrants to determine the location of the cell phone. He did not subpoena the

       credit card companies to determine whether Dotson’s credit cards were used. He did not follow-

       up with Dotson’s bank to determine whether any of Dotson’s checks were cashed.

¶ 15          Ernest Jones testified that defendant is his wife. Jones testified that he could have been at

       Walmart on May 24, 2017. On that date, Jones transported several passengers to different

       locations. He met a young woman at the liquor store, and she asked him to drive her to Walmart.

       He described the woman as between the ages of 30 or 35. Jones did not remember an incident

       involving a purse.

¶ 16          Defendant testified that she had visited the Walmart in Kankakee numerous times but

       was at home on May 24, 2017. She had never met Horton. She did not accept a purse from

       Horton. She did not cash any checks belonging to Dotson or use Dotson’s cell phone.

¶ 17          The court did not find defendant or Jones credible. The court stated that “[a]t the moment

       the defendant said, yes, that’s mine, knowing it was not hers, she exerted unauthorized control

       over the property.” Additionally, the court determined that defendant intended to permanently

       deprive Dotson of the purse since Dotson’s credit cards and driver’s license were in it. The court

       reasoned that “[t]here was no question that the owner could be easily identified, yet there was no

       effort to do that.” The court found defendant guilty and sentenced her to 12 months’ conditional

                                                        4
       discharge. The court also ordered defendant to pay $1215 in restitution to Dotson. Defendant

       appeals.

¶ 18                                              II. ANALYSIS

¶ 19          Defendant argues that the State failed to prove her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of

       theft. Defendant makes the following arguments in support: (1) the evidence failed to show that

       defendant intended to commit theft, (2) Horton’s identification was unreliable, and (3) the State

       failed to prove that the value in stolen property exceeded $500.

¶ 20          When a defendant makes a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, “ ‘the relevant

       question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,

       any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

       reasonable doubt.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985)

       (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). “Under this standard, a reviewing court

       will not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact on issues of the weight of evidence or

       the credibility of witnesses.” People v. Cooper, 194 Ill. 2d 419, 431 (2000). “This same standard

       of review applies regardless of whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial [citation], and

       regardless of whether the defendant receives a bench or jury trial.” Id.

¶ 21          “[I]n weighing evidence, the trier of fact is not required to disregard inferences which

       flow normally from the evidence before it, nor need it search out all possible explanations

       consistent with innocence and raise them to a level of reasonable doubt.” People v. Jackson, 232

       Ill. 2d 246, 281 (2009). “[I]t is not the function of this court to retry the defendant.” Collins, 106

       Ill. 2d at 261. Thus, “the reviewing court must allow all reasonable inferences from the record in

       favor of the prosecution.” People v. Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 280 (2004). “A conviction will

                                                         5
       be reversed only where the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory that it

       justifies a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt.” People v. Belknap, 2014 IL 117094, ¶ 67.

¶ 22          Defendant first argues that the State failed to prove the “knowledge” and “intent”

       elements of theft. A person commits a theft when she knowingly obtains or exerts unauthorized

       control over property of the owner and intends to deprive the owner permanently of the use of

       the property. 720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(1)(A) (West 2016). A person acts knowingly when she is

       consciously aware that her conduct is practically certain to cause the offense defined in the

       statute. Id. § 4-5. “A defendant’s knowledge is generally established by circumstantial evidence

       rather than direct proof.” People v. Castillo, 2018 IL App (1st) 153147, ¶ 26. “Circumstantial

       evidence is proof of facts or circumstances that give rise to reasonable inferences of other facts

       that tend to establish guilt or innocence of the defendant.” People v. Saxon, 374 Ill. App. 3d 409,

       417 (2007). “Knowledge, as an element of a criminal offense, is a question of fact for the trier of

       fact to decide.” People v. Monteleone, 2018 IL App (2d) 170150, ¶ 26.

¶ 23          The record establishes that defendant knowingly exerted unauthorized control over the

       purse when she accepted the purse from Horton, knowing it did not belong to her. Horton’s

       testimony clearly showed that he handed the purse he found in a cart in the parking lot to

       defendant. Defendant then indicated to Horton that the purse belonged to her. From this

       evidence, the court correctly reasoned that “[a]t the moment the defendant said, yes, that’s mine,

       knowing it was not hers, she exerted unauthorized control over the property.” Assuming,

       arguendo, that defendant initially thought the purse belonged to her, it is reasonable to infer that

       defendant would have quickly realized that the purse did not belong to her. The record further

       established that the purse belonged to Dotson, not defendant, as it contained Dotson’s driver’s

       license and credit cards. Kreissler testified that he identified a vehicle of interest by watching a

                                                         6
       security video. It is reasonable to infer from Kreissler’s testimony that no other vehicles or

       persons approached the cart containing the purse during the time frame when Dotson left it in the

       cart and when she returned for it. Thus, it is also reasonable to infer that the purse still contained

       Dotson’s driver’s license, credit cards, and other belongings when Horton found it. Accordingly,

       defendant knew the purse did not belong to her and there is no evidence that Dotson authorized

       her to possess it.

¶ 24           A person intends to accomplish a result when her conscious purpose is to accomplish that

       result. 720 ILCS 5/4-4 (West 2016). “ ‘[G]enerally[,] ***[the] intent to permanently deprive the

       owner of his property may ordinarily be inferred when a person takes the property of another.’ ”

       People v. Haissig, 2012 IL App (2d) 110726, ¶ 31 (quoting People v. Veasey, 251 Ill. App. 3d

       589, 592 (1993)). “ ‘This is particularly true when the owner of the property is a stranger to the

       accused.’ ” Id. (quoting Veasey, 251 Ill. App. 3d at 592). Additionally, “[t]he question of intent is

       one for the trier of fact.” In re Weigler, 37 Ill. App. 3d 478, 482 (1976).

¶ 25           Defendant’s failure to return the purse indicated that she intended to permanently deprive

       Dotson of the purse. Again, Dotson’s driver’s license and credit cards were in the purse. Thus,

       defendant could have easily identified the owner and attempted to return it to them or returned it

       to Walmart. The court recognized this when it noted that “[t]here was no question that the owner

       could be easily identified, yet there was no effort to do that.”

¶ 26           Defendant next argues that Horton’s identification of defendant was not reliable. “The

       State bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the identity of the person who

       committed the charged offense.” People v. Lewis, 165 Ill. 2d 305, 356 (1995). “[A] single

       witness’ identification of the accused is sufficient to sustain a conviction if the witness viewed

       the accused under circumstances permitting a positive identification.” Id. Six factors are relevant

                                                         7
       in evaluating the reliability of identification testimony: (1) the witness’s opportunity to view the

       offender; (2) the witness’s degree of attention; (3) the accuracy of the witness’s prior

       descriptions; (4) the witness’s level of certainty; (5) the length of time between the crime and

       confrontation; and (6) the witness’s prior acquaintance with the suspect. Neil v. Biggers, 409

       U.S. 188, 199-200 (1972); People v. McTush, 81 Ill. 2d 513, 521 (1980).

¶ 27           Regarding the first factor, the witness’s opportunity to view the offender, the question is

       “whether the witness was close enough to the accused for a sufficient period of time under

       conditions adequate for observation.” People v. Carlton, 78 Ill. App. 3d 1098, 1105 (1979).

       Here, Horton testified that he was on one side of a shopping cart and defendant was on the other

       side sitting in the front passenger seat of the truck with the door open. Although it was raining,

       Horton testified that it was light out. While Horton only spoke with defendant for approximately

       10 seconds, he had a close, unobstructed view of defendant. Thus, the first factor weighs in favor

       of the State.

¶ 28           Regarding the second factor, the witness’s degree of attention, reviewing courts generally

       focus on whether the witness provided detailed and descriptive testimony. See People v.

       Blankenship, 2019 IL App (1st) 171494, ¶ 29; In re J.J., 2016 IL App (1st) 160379, ¶ 30; People

       v. Manion, 67 Ill. 2d 564, 572 (1977). Here, Horton provided a detailed account of the theft and

       descriptions of defendant, the purse, the truck, and his proximity from defendant. Additionally,

       on the photographic lineup form, Horton noted that defendant’s hair was different at the time of

       the theft. This indicates that Horton directed his attention toward defendant during the encounter.

       See Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d at 280 (all reasonable inferences in favor of the State). The second

       factor favors the State.

                                                         8
¶ 29          As to the third factor, the accuracy of the witness’s prior descriptions, the record does not

       contain Horton’s prior descriptions of defendant. Regardless, “no general right exists to an

       inference that potential evidence would help a defendant based on the State’s failure to present

       that evidence.” People v. Majka, 365 Ill. App. 3d 362, 371 (2006). Accordingly, the third factor

       favors neither the State nor defendant.

¶ 30          Regarding the fourth factor, the witness’s level of certainty, Horton did not testify

       regarding his level of certainty. Additionally, the State did not ask Horton to identify defendant

       in court. Still, the court admitted People’s exhibit No. 2, the photographic lineup. Zingre testified

       that she read the instructions to Horton. The instructions stated that the suspect may not be in the

       lineup, and that the witness was under no obligation and should not feel compelled to make an

       identification. Horton accurately identified defendant. Accordingly, we can reasonably infer that

       Horton was certain regarding his identification of defendant. See Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d at 280.

¶ 31          Defendant concedes that the fifth factor, the length of time between the crime and

       confrontation, favors the State. We agree. Here, the length of time between the crime and

       identification was only 13 days. Cf. People v. Rodgers, 53 Ill. 2d 207, 214 (1972) (identification

       made two years after the crime).

¶ 32          Regarding the sixth factor, the witness’s prior acquaintance with the suspect, nothing in

       the record indicates that Horton previously knew defendant. Since the identification of a stranger

       is generally considered unreliable (United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967)), this factor

       weighs in favor of defendant. Regardless, based on the totality of the circumstances, Horton’s

       identification of defendant was reliable.

¶ 33          Finally, defendant argues that the State failed to prove that the value of the stolen

       property exceeded $500. “[T]heft of property exceeding $500 and not exceeding $10,000 in

                                                         9
       value, is a Class 3 felony.” 720 ILCS 5/16-1(b)(4) (West 2016). Additionally, “[w]hen a charge

       of theft of property exceeding a specified value is brought, the value of the property involved is

       an element of the offense to be resolved by the trier of fact as either exceeding or not exceeding

       the specified value.” Id. § 16-1(c). “[T]he State carries the burden of proving each element of a

       charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v. Murray, 2019 IL 123289, ¶ 28. Still, the

       State does not need to prove the exact value of the stolen property, it only needs to prove that

       value exceed $500 at the time of the theft. See People v. Davis, 132 Ill. App. 3d 199, 203 (1985).

       “[T]he owner of personal property [can] testify to its value, where [she] has some familiarity

       with the property.” People v. Newton, 117 Ill. App. 2d 232, 235 (1969). “In the absence of

       contrary evidence, testimony as to the value of property alleged to be stolen is proper proof of

       value.” People v. DePaolo, 317 Ill. App. 3d 301, 308 (2000).

¶ 34          Here, Dotson testified that she recently purchased an iPhone 7 for approximately $600

       and that the iPhone was in her purse at the time of the theft. Additionally, Dotson testified that

       the purse contained $400 in cash. We previously established that it is reasonable to infer that the

       purse still contained Dotson’s belongings, including the iPhone 7 and cash, when Horton found

       it. Supra ¶ 23. Accordingly, allowing all reasonable inferences from the record in favor of the

       State (Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d at 280), we find that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt

       that the value of the items in the purse plus the cost of the purse exceeded $500. Overall, the

       evidence was sufficient to prove defendant’s guilt of theft beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶ 35                                           III. CONCLUSION

¶ 36          The judgment of the circuit court of Kankakee County is affirmed.

¶ 37          Affirmed.

                                                        10