Court Opinion

ID: 9729918
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:52:44.110775+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:02.294126
License: Public Domain

RATTIGAN, J.
I dissent. It having been shown that police officers entered private premises without a search warrant, the burden rested upon the prosecution to show justification. (Badillo v. Superior Court (1956) 46 Cal.2d 269, 272 [294 P.2d 23].) As the justification claimed here was the parole officer’s presence and participation, the prosecution was required to *193show that the entry was “actually necessitated by the legitimate demands of the operation of the parole process.” (In re Martinez (1970) 1 Cal.3d 641, 647, fn. 6 [83 Cal.Rptr. 382, 463 P.2d 734] [quoted in full in the majority opinion].)
As I read the record, the police conceived the idea of searching the premises where appellant lived, the parole officer was “requested to assist” them, and he did. That he acted as a functionary of the parole system, however, can only be based upon speculation as to what he knew, suspected, or intended. Such speculation operates to relieve the prosecution of its obligation to show, by real evidence, that the entry of the garage was “actually necessitated by the legitimate demands of the operation of the parole process.” Absent such real evidence, I conclude that the property seized in the garage was inadmissible for lack of a constitutionally requisite foundation. As it was indispensable to the prosecution’s case against appellant, I would reverse the judgment.
A petition for rehearing was denied on April 30, 1970, and the following opinion was then rendered:
THE COURT.
On petition for rehearing, appellant makes a new contention, which was not presented in his original brief; that is, that appellant confessed at the police station, that the confession was coerced, and that the search was therefore fruit of the poisonous tree. Not only was the point not made on appeal; it was not made in the trial court. Appellant’s statement was excluded from evidence despite testimony that a full Miranda warning was given, because appellant had said he would make a statement but would not sign it without an attorney. But there was no contention that the statement was a confession and when the court inquired of the district attorney as to its contents, the reply was that the statement contained just denials and an alibi.
Rattigan, J., is of the opinion the petition should be granted.
Appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied June 10,1970.