Court Opinion

ID: 9853365
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:47:17.605127+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:46.264173
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
On motion to have this appeal reinstated, appellants Newton and Kaplan assert in essence that the July 2,1982 summary judgment in this case was appealable 75 days later because the trial court omitted to issue an order of appealability (OCGA § 9-11-54 (b) (Code *903Ann. § 81A-154); Cleveland v. Watkins, 159 Ga. App. 885 (285 SE2d 546)). Appellants contend that until the trial court had done so, the appellants could not or did not have to appeal the summary judgment. But it is well established that the trial court did not have to issue a certificate of appealability in this case. Where a summary judgment is granted in a case as to one or more but fewer than all the claims or parties, the losing party may without certification directly appeal within 30 days of the judgment (OCGA § 9-11-56 (h) (Code Ann. § 81A-156); Ins. Co. of North America v. Fowler, 148 Ga. App. 509, 512 (251 SE2d 594); Anderson v. Automatic Sprinkler Corp., 147 Ga. App. 236, 237 (248 SE2d 507)); or he may appeal after rendition of final judgment in the case (Culwell v. Lomas &c. Co., 242 Ga. 242 (248 SE2d 641)).
Appellants do not contend, and the record does not any where show, that they had no notice of the July 2 summary judgment (see, e. g., Cambron v. Canal Ins. Co., 246 Ga. 147 (269 SE2d 426)). Instead, they contend they should be allowed to appeal the July 2 judgment 45 days late because they had no notice of the writ of fieri facias which was issued upon it. Upon issuance of the fi. fa. on August 12, the trial court stated there was “no reason for further delay in ordering a writ of Fieri Facias.” But without an express direction for entry of the judgment as final, it was not final and lacked res judicata effect (Culwell, supra); and the execution of the fi. fa. upon it would be at the appellees’ peril so long as the appellants could appeal the judgment at the end of the proceedings. Culwell, supra. A fi. fa. is not an order of final judgment tolling the time for appeal in any case. See OCGA §§ 9-11-54 (b), 5-6-34 (b) (Code Ann. §§ 81A-154, 6-701). Moreover, as regards a grant of summary judgment, the later issuance of a fi. fa., with or without notice, cannot possibly act as a “quasi” certificate of finality so as to extend the time for appeal.
Moreover, on motion for rehearing, the parties continue to insist that our jurisdiction can be conferred by consent or waiver of the parties. This cannot be done.

Motion for rehearing denied.