Court Opinion

ID: 9384676
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-04 17:07:34.516552+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:55.531125
License: Public Domain

J-S44019-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    GREGORIO ROBLES                            :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 650 MDA 2022

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 20, 2021
    In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s):
                           CP-67-CR-0004346-2020

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.:                  FILED: APRIL 4, 2023

        Gregorio Robles appeals from the judgment of sentence entered

following his jury convictions for recklessly endangering another person

(“REAP”), simple assault, and disorderly conduct.1 Robles argues the

convictions were against the weight of the evidence and that his conviction for

simple assault should have merged for sentencing purposes with his REAP

conviction. We affirm.

        The trial court recounted the evidence as follows.

        [Robles] and the victim, Guillermo Murillo (“Murillo”), were
        neighbors who both lived in the same townhouse complex. On
        June 11, 2020, [Robles] and Murillo were hanging out around
        [Robles’] girlfriend’s car to smoke weed while parked in front of
        their townhouses. Specifically, [Robles] was seated “in the driver’s

____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1   See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2705, 2701(a)(1), and 5503(a)(1).
J-S44019-22

     seat with the door open” with music playing and Murillo was
     standing in front of him.

     A verbal altercation quickly turned physical. Murillo stated the
     argument was initially over music, but also involved a
     disagreement about Murillo’s girlfriend. On cross examination,
     Murillo then said the argument was over a jail saying where
     [Robles] replied, “[Y]o homie, don’t talk to me like that.” [Robles]
     testified Murillo didn’t want him to say anything to his girlfriend
     about Murillo “taking mushrooms.” Sergeant Jack Asper (“Asper”)
     testified that [Robles] stated the argument was because [Robles]
     told Murillo he was going to tell his girlfriend that Murillo was
     smoking weed and cheating on her.

     Murillo said the attack was “out of the blue.” Murillo blocked the
     first hit with his shoulder. Murillo then saw a box cutter in [Robles’]
     hand which caused him to run. [Robles] testified that Murillo
     grabbed the box cutter that was on the car door. [Robles] says
     Murillo cut [his] finger with the box cutter and then swiped at him.
     Asper testified that [Robles] said Murillo originally had the box
     cutter and came at [Robles] first, but then [Robles] was able to
     get the box cutter away from him. [Murillo testified that w]hile
     [he] was trying to escape, [Robles] slashed Murillo three times
     with the box cutter. Murillo tripped over his sandals, but neighbors
     were able to step in and briefly break the two apart. [Robles]
     testified that he kicked Murillo, which made Murillo fall and drop
     the box cutter, which is where [Robles] claims Murillo’s injuries
     came from.

     After neighbors separated the two, [Robles] continued to chase
     Murillo. Murillo testified that [Robles] stated “I'm going to kill you”
     while standing in front of Murillo’s door. [Robles] testified that
     Murillo was threatening to kill him, so [Robles] did not want to let
     Murillo get inside his townhouse to get a gun. At some point,
     Murillo was able to get to into his townhouse when [Robles] went
     back to his car. [Robles] stated he went directly to the police
     precinct when we got in his car and left the townhouse parking
     lot. Murillo saw [Robles] driving away so he emptied the magazine
     of his gun as a “distress call.” Murillo claimed he did not point the
     gun at [Robles].

     Initially, Murillo refused medical attention because he wanted to
     give his statement to police first. While Murillo was giving police a
     statement at the scene, [Robles] was waiting at the police station.

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         Murillo was later treated at the hospital. Pictures of Murillo’s
         wounds were provided as exhibits and shown to the jury.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/21/22, 2-4 (citations to trial transcript omitted).

         The jury convicted Robles on all counts. For the REAP conviction, the

trial court sentenced him to two years of restrictive probation, with the first

six months on house arrest. For simple assault and disorderly conduct, the

court entered sentences of one year of probation to be served concurrently

with the REAP sentence. Robles filed a post-sentence motion raising a weight

claim. The court denied the motion, and Robles appealed.

   Robles raises the following issues:

   I.      Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Robles’
           post-sentence motion challenging his convictions for recklessly
           endangering another person, simple assault, and disorderly
           conduct where the greater weight of the evidence established
           he acted in self-defense?

   II.     Whether Robles’ convictions for recklessly endangering another
           person and simple assault should have merged for sentencing
           purposes?

Robles’ Br. at 5 (suggested answers omitted).

                         I.    Weight of the Evidence

         Robles challenges the trial court’s rejection of his weight claim. He

argues that he was acting from fear that Murillo would retrieve his gun from

his house and shoot him, and that this fear was valid and corroborated by the

undisputed testimony “that Murillo discharged his firearm as soon as he

retrieved it from his house, despite the fact that Murillo saw Robles fleeing the

scene.” Robles’ Br. at 20. He further argues that he did not violate his duty to

retreat by continuing the fight once he had control of the boxcutter, as Murillo

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was threatening to kill him and moving towards his home — a mere 40 feet

away — where his firearm was located. Id. at 22-23. Robles claims he did

retreat and flee in his car once he realized he could not stop Murillo from

reaching his house. Id. at 23.

      He argues that Murillo’s explanation of how the attack began was not

credible, as he did not explain what the “jail saying” was, or why Robles would

have taken offense to it, or why Robles would have reacted violently to a

conversation about Murillo’s girlfriend. Id. at 20. Robles claims his version of

events – that Murillo grew angry when Robles threatened to tell his girlfriend

that he took mushrooms – was “far more coherent.” Id. at 21. Robles argues

the version Sergeant Asper testified Robles told him — that Robles had

threatened to tell Murillo’s girlfriend that he was smoking marijuana and

cheating on her — is also more believable than Murillo’s version of the events.

Id. at 22. He further argues that the fact he went immediately to the police

station should weigh in his favor as evidence that he lacked consciousness of

guilt. Id. at 23-24.

      We review a challenge to the weight of evidence for an abuse of

discretion. Commonwealth v. Fallon, 275 A.3d 1099, 1107 (Pa.Super.

2022). Because the task of assigning weight to the evidence belongs to the

fact finder, which may believe all, some, or none of the evidence, “[a] trial

court may sustain a weight challenge only if the verdict is so contrary to the

evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice.” Commonwealth v. Clemens,

242 A.3d 659, 667 (Pa.Super. 2020) (internal quotation marks and citation

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omitted). That high standard is met “[w]hen the figure of Justice totters on

her pedestal, or when the jury’s verdict, at the time of its rendition, causes

the trial judge to lose his breath, temporarily, and causes him to almost fall

from the bench[.]” Commonwealth v. Davidson, 860 A.2d 575, 581

(Pa.Super. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

       Self-defense is a complete defense to each of the crimes for which

Robles was convicted. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 502, 505.2 A person may use force

against another if he “believes that such force is immediately necessary for

the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force[.]” 18

Pa.C.S.A. § 505(a). However, a person may not use deadly force to protect

himself against deadly force he provoked in the same encounter, or if he

knows he can retreat with complete safety. Id. at § 505(b)(2).3 Once there is

some evidence of record, from whatever source, to support a claim of self-

defense, the Commonwealth bears the burden of disproving the defense

beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Smith, 97 A.3d 782, 787

____________________________________________

2 To prove REAP, the Commonwealth must establish Robles “recklessly
engage[d] in conduct which places or may place another person in danger of
death or serious bodily injury.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705. To prove simple assault,
the Commonwealth must show Robles “attempt[ed] to cause or intentionally,
knowingly, or recklessly cause[d] bodily injury to another[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
2701(a)(1). To prove disorderly conduct, the Commonwealth must
demonstrate Robles, “with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or
alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof . . . engage[d] in fighting or
threatening, or in violent or tumultuous behavior.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5503(a)(1).

3 If the defendant uses only non-deadly force, there is no duty to retreat, but
the defendant may only use enough force to repel the attack.
Commonwealth v. Pollino, 467 A.2d 1298, 1300 (Pa. 1983).

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(Pa.Super. 2014). It may do so by establishing either: “1) the accused did not

reasonably believe that he was in danger of death or serious bodily injury; or

2) the accused provoked or continued the use of force; or 3) the accused had

a duty to retreat and the retreat was possible with complete safety.” Id.

(citation omitted).

      In rejecting the weight claim, the court stated it found Murillo’s version

of events more credible than Robles’. See Trial Ct. Op. at 13. It believed

Murillo’s testimony that Robles had begun the physical confrontation, and that

Robles had slashed him with the box cutter three times as he was trying to

escape. Id. at 12. The court also pointed out that “[b]ox cutters can be deadly

weapons because they are very sharp and can easily cause major bleeding,”

Murillo required treatment at a hospital, and one of Murillo’s injuries was a

puncture wound near his lung. Id. The court also noted that even if Murillo

had initially had the box cutter, Robles could have retreated to his home or

car once he had control of the box cutter, rather than continue to chase

Murillo. Id. at 10.

      This issue is meritless. The jury was free to believe that Robles had

provoked the attack with deadly force, had continued to use such force

unnecessarily, or had violated a duty to retreat; any of these would disprove

his self-defense claim, despite Murillo’s proceeding to retrieve and discharge

his firearm. Smith, 97 A.3d at 787. On this record, we find no abuse of

discretion in the trial court’s denial of the weight claim.

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                                  II.   Merger

      Robles argues that his conviction for simple assault should have merged

with his conviction for REAP for purposes of sentencing. See Robles’ Br. at 27.

He asserts the convictions arose from a single act — attacking Murillo with a

box cutter — and that the elements of simple assault are included in the

elements of REAP. Id. at 28 (citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9765). He argues

Commonwealth v. Calhoun, 52 A.3d 281 (Pa.Super. 2012), which held the

two offenses do not merge, was decided incorrectly, because it disregarded

that the definition of “bodily injury” includes serious bodily injury. See Robles’

Reply Br. at 2-4. He therefore asserts simple assault, which requires the

infliction of bodily injury or its attempt, includes the attempt to inflict serious

bodily injuries. He posits his use of the box cutter both comprised an attempt

to cause serious bodily injury (even though it caused non-serious bodily

injury) (simple assault) and recklessly created the danger of serious bodily

injury (REAP), and that these elements are equivalent. See id. at 4-5.

      Pursuant to Section 9765 of the Judicial Code, crimes may only merge

for sentencing purposes if they “arise from a single criminal act and all of the

statutory elements of one offense are included in the statutory elements of

the other offense.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9756. Whether convictions qualify for

merger under Section 9765 is a question going to the legality of the sentence.

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Calhoun, 52 A.3d at 284.4 Thus, “our standard of review is de novo and the

scope of our review is plenary.” Id. (citation omitted).

       Simple assault, as charged, occurs when a person “attempts to cause or

intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another[.]” 18

Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a)(1).5 A person is guilty of REAP when he “recklessly

engages in conduct which places or may place another person in danger of

death or serious bodily injury.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705.6 The Commonwealth

alleged Robles committed both crimes by “slicing [Murillo] with a box cutter.”

Information, 10/26/20, at 1.7

       In Calhoun, a panel of this court considered whether simple assault

merged with REAP, to resolve “demonstrably inconsistent” precedent. 52 A.3d

at 285. We observed that the simple assault and REAP charges in that case

arose from a single criminal act — a car accident — because the accident

“simultaneously caused bodily injury, which indisputably occurred, and placed

the victim in danger of death or serious bodily injury, which fortunately did

____________________________________________

4This issue is not subject to waiver. Commonwealth v. Green, 149 A.3d 43,
52 (Pa.Super. 2016).

5 “Bodily injury” is defined as “[i]mpairment of physical condition or
substantial pain.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2301.

6 “Serious bodily injury” is defined as “[b]odily injury which creates a
substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement,
or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or
organ.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2301.

7The Commonwealth charged simple assault as a third-degree misdemeanor
and REAP as a second-degree misdemeanor.

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not occur.” Id. at 286. However, we found that the offenses were not subject

to merger, because the element of “placing another individual in danger of

death or serious bodily injury,” was included in REAP but not simple assault.

Id. We noted the difference between simple assault, which requires bodily

injury or the attempt to cause it, and aggravated assault,8 which requires

seriously bodily injury or the attempt to cause it. Id. We stated,

        Plainly, an offender could place a victim in danger of serious bodily
        injury or death without causing, or attempting to cause, “non-
        serious” bodily injury. Conversely, causing “non-serious” bodily
        injury (or the attempt) is neither the same as, nor a necessary
        step in the course of, creating the danger of serious bodily injury
        or death. Both crimes require at least one element not included in
        the other.

Id. at 286-87.9

        We find Calhoun binding. Furthermore, “if the crimes themselves can

result in committing one without committing the other, the elements in

general are different, and the legislature has said merger cannot apply.”

Commonwealth v. Green, 149 A.3d 43, 53 (Pa.Super. 2016) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Coppedge, 984 A.2d 562, 564 (Pa.Super. 2009)).10 The

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8   See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1).

9 We further observed that, “[t]he plain language of the statutes establishes
that the mischiefs to be remedied are readily distinguishable and independent
of each other.” Calhoun, 52 A.3d at 287.

10See also Coppedge, 984 A.2d at 563-64 (discussing that when Section
9765 took effect in 2003 it rendered previous common-law merger test
obsolete).

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convictions do not merge, and the court did not err in imposing a sentence for

each.11

       Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 4/4/2023

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11 See also Commonwealth v. Cianci, 130 A.3d 780, 783 (Pa.Super. 2015)
(holding REAP does not merge with aggravated assault); accord
Commonwealth v. Edwards, 229 A.3d 298, 315 (Pa.Super. 2020), aff’d,
256 A.3d 1130 (Pa. 2021) (“As Cianci holds, because there are ways an
individual could commit aggravated assault under Section 2702(a)(1) without
committing REAP and vice versa, the elements of the two offenses are
different and do not merge. That Appellant committed aggravated assault
causing serious bodily injury while also committing REAP is inapposite to the
merger analysis”).

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