Court Opinion

ID: 9460244
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:45:32.567838+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:32.485672
License: Public Domain

THORNBERRY, Circuit Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part):
I concur fully in the opinion of the Court except insofar as it concludes that there is no merit to appellant’s contention that testimony, inadmissible for any purpose, was admitted against him to his clear detriment.
Before the trial, appellant’s trial counsel filed a motion in limine with the court requesting that the government not be permitted to introduce evidence or testimony indicating that mail had been reported missing from the post office on occasions prior to those charged in the indictment. The motion suggested that postal inspectors involved in this case had testified before a civil service board hearing to the effect that mail had been reported missing from the post office for more than a year. In response to the motion, the government stated that it had no objection to the request.
Nevertheless at the trial the government introduced precisely that evidence which the motion in limine sought to suppress.1 Appellant’s trial counsel *77properly objected, but the objection was overruled. Appellant’s counsel on appeal contended, as trial counsel did below, that this testimony indicated that Trevino might be guilty of similar offenses unrelated to the offense charged and thus that this testimony was both irrelevant and highly prejudicial. The government’s response is that the testimony was not prejudicial and that it was relevant to “explain the reason for the investigation and the method used by the postal inspectors . . .,” citing United States v. Rosse, 2nd Cir. 1969, 418 F.2d 38, 41, cert. denied, 1970, 397 U.S. 998, 90 S.Ct. 1143, 25 L.Ed.2d 408.
In my opinion, the government is reading Rosse through a mirror. For in my opinion, Rosse states that evidence relevant only to explain the reason for the investigation and the method used by the postal inspectors is precisely the kind of evidence which has no place before the jury. Rosse, a postman, was found guilty by a jury of stealing $8" from the mails in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1709. During the trial, postal inspectors testified that nineteen previous thefts had occurred at Rosse’s post office and that these thefts prompted the investigation which led to Rosse’s arrest and prosecution. To Rosse’s contention that the admission of this testimony constituted reversible error, the court responded:
. We find this argument to have considerable merit, for it is difficult to imagine any theory of evidence under which this testimony would be admissible. The prior investigations and attendant thefts may have a place at a probable cause hearing, not at a trial for a completely distinct substantive offense. Evidence of such prior crimes is highly prejudicial as it created a suspicion about the defendant although there were many other employees in the . . . post office who may have been responsible for the prior thefts. In short such evidence is not sufficiently connected with the defendant to justify its admission on the question of guilt, although it is relevant to explain the reason for the investigation and the method used by the postal inspectors to find who was guilty.
418 F.2d at 41.
Thus Rosse stands for the proposition that while such testimony may be relevant at a preliminary or probable cause hearing, it is not relevant and is highly prejudicial at a trial on the merits. In spite of the fact that Rosse’s counsel did not object to the introduction of the testimony at trial, the Second Circuit went so far as to suggest that it would have found plain error if Rosse had not taken the stand to testify that he was being “framed” by postal inspectors, thus making relevant the basis of the postal inspectors’ actions in focussing attention on the defendant,2 and rendering the ad*78mission of the testimony proper. No such defense testimony is present here, and Trevino’s counsel properly asserted his objection at the trial.
To contend, as the government does, that the objeeted-to testimony did not prejudice the defendant’s case is, I think, to ignore reality. The postal inspector testified not that he was involved in the investigation of missing mail, but that he was involved in the investigation of internal theft. And the inspector went on to refer to “letters which fail to reach their destination” or “ a problem area.” I do not believe that the use of such euphemisms distinguishes away the thrust of Rosse. In my opinion, only the most naive juror could have failed to see their true and intended meaning.
In deciding the question of admissibility of evidence, the district judge’s task is to strike a proper balance between relevancy and prejudice. The appropriate appellate test is one of abuse of discretion. United States v. Bell, 5th Cir. 1972, 457 F.2d 1231, 1237. Since this testimony was inadmissible at trial for any purpose, the district court abused its discretion in admitting it. With deference to the majority, I dissent from the suggestion in the majority opinion that this testimony may be admitted against Trevino at a new trial.

. Q . . . What are your duties with the Postal Department?
A I am involved in the investigation of internal theft.
Q Briefly, briefly describe how you conduct these investigations.
A Well, we have a, a form of complaints that patrons give us when they mail a letter that fails to reach its destination. They file a— [defense counsel] :—May it please the Court, I believe there is a Motion in Limine which covers this testimony and I must object to its introduction.
[prosecutor] : We are not in the area of his motion in limine.
THE COURT: I dont believe he is.
[defense counsel]: AVell, I believe he is about to—
[prosecutor] :—When we get into it, we will-—
THE COURT:—He is not there and I am going to let him go ahead.
[By prosecutor] :
Q Excuse me, go ahead.
A A patron who mails letters which fail to reach their destination notifies the Post Office which makes a tracer form. Prom the *77traeer form we try to locate the letter, and a copy of the tracer form is sent to me after it lias been determined that the letter can’t be located. I analyze these forms, and on a continuing basis, and when it looks like there is a problem area, I go into the office to investigate it.
Q All right, by the office, you mean the Post Office?
A Well, a specific unit.whei’e there seems to, there appears to be a problem.
Q All right, now did you have the occasion to make such an investigation in Alice, Texas, at the Post Office, in January of 1972?
A Yes, I did.
Transcript of Trial Proceedings at 35-36.

. “The introduction of this evidence, however, was so irregular and its potential effect so damaging to Rosse that we might be inclined to order a new trial if later events at trial had not largely nullified the prejudice . . ” U. S. v. Rosse, supra, 418 F.2d at 41.
Judge Lumbard, writing for the Court, further noted that in the normal case, “[t]he government cannot use the defendant’s rebuttal testimony as grounds for claiming independent vitality for its inadmissible evidence.” But the Chief Judge concluded that Rosse’s was not the normal case :
“ . . . Rosse’s claim of a frame-up in no way was a defensive' parry, or an attempt to repair the damage done by the inspectors’ testimony; if anything, it pro*78vided a favorable context for that evidence by rendering it directly relevant. Also, defendant was not “forced” to testify to repair his character here, since his counsel in opening statement referred to the prior investigation and announced that Rosse would take the stand.”
418 F.2d at 42. Judge Waterman, concurring in the result, concluded that in view of the overwhelming evidence of Rosse’s guilt and the failure of Rosse’s attorney to object, the “highly improper admission” was harmless error. But he disapproved of the “bootstrap” procedure by which the government’s introduction of the evidence was sanctioned:
“the Government ought not to be permitted to cure a wrongful admission of prejudicial evidence placed before the jury as part of the Government’s direct case by pointing to its accidental relevancy to some part of the defendant’s direct case.”
418 F.2d at 42. There is no question of “order of proof” or of any defense testimony making the postal inspector’s testimony relevant in the present case. I have noted Judge Lumbard’s and Judge Waterman’s comments only to demonstrate that in only unusual circumstances can such testimony ever be admitted.