Court Opinion

ID: 9774581
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:25:19.341962+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:10.862211
License: Public Domain

George Rose Smith, Justice, dissenting. I think the judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial. Among the instructions given was AMI 1805, which, after defining an abnormally dangerous crossing, goes on to say that if the jury finds that the crossing was abnormally dangerous then it was the duty of the railroad to use ordinary care to give a warning reasonably sufficient to permit the traveling public to use the crossing with reasonable safety. Evidently the jury found that the crossing -was unduly hazardous, for the single reason that the rising or setting sun tends to blind motorists approaching the crossing. It thus became the railroad’s duty to take extra precautions to warn travelers of the danger ahead. The railroad sought to discharge that duty by the installation of flashing red lights at the crossing. Under the court’s instructions the decisive issue for the jury was whether the installation of those lights satisfied the railroad’s obligation to give an adequate warning. The only testimony bearing on that issue consisted of statements that the crossing lights appeared to be dim and a statement that the lights on a patrol car were much brighter than the crossing lights. It seems to me that this proof was so scanty that the jury was left to speculate about whether the crossing lights were reasonably calculated to meet the railroad’s duty to warn. There is no proof that stronger or more visible lights can be bought or even that they can be manufactured. There is no proof that if brighter lights exist they would have overcome the glare of the rising sun. There is no proof that patrol ear lights are adaptable for use by the railroad. Those questions can be answered with a fair degree of certainty only by resort to skilled technical knowledge not lying within the ordinary experience of men called for jury duty. That knowledge was not made available to the jurors in the court below. Under the reasoning that we have followed in many cases, such as Glidewell v. Arkhola Sand & Gravel Co., 21 Ark. 838, 208 S. W. 2d 4 (1948), and Missouri Pac. R. R. v. Ross, 194 Ark. 877, 109 S. W. 2d 1246 (1937), I am compelled to conclude that the jury was allowed to draw an inference of fact not based upon adequate proof — in short, to speculate.