Court Opinion

ID: 9792498
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:30:11.85076+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:43.106807
License: Public Domain

GOLDEN, Justice.
Thomas Heggen, convicted of one count of submitting a false claim with intent to defraud, raises issues identical to those raised in Hudson v. State, No. 89-83 [800 P.2d 471] (Wyo. Oct. 5, 1990) and Billis v. State, No. 88-250 [800 P.2d 401] (Wyo. Oct. 5,1990), concerning the constitutionality of W.S. 7-13-301 (June 1987 Repl.) (“new 301”).
We affirm.
From March through May, 1987, Mr. Heggen, while employed, filed a series of false unemployment claims with the Employment Security Commission which netted him $1,584 in benefits he was not entitled to receive. Under a plea agreement, in return for Mr. Heggen’s plea of guilty to one count of submitting a false claim with intent to defraud in violation of W.S. 6-5-303(b)(June 1983 Repl), the state agreed not to pursue seven other counts of the same crime, and a charge of obtaining property by false pretenses in violation of W.S. 6-3-407(a)(i)(Cum.Supp.l984), and to recommend a sentence of a two-year probation plus restitution. Being apprised of the plea bargain, the district court judge accepted the guilty plea and ordered a pre-sentence investigation report. Before the *477sentencing proceeding, Mr. Heggen filed a motion for “new 301” treatment. At the sentencing proceeding, Mr. Heggen requested that the court make a record concerning whether the court would have handled Mr. Heggen under “new 301” but for the state’s refusal to consent to that treatment. The court declined to say what it would do were the statute different and found that “new 301” requires the consent of both parties. The court sentenced Mr. Heggen to two years supervised probation. This appeal followed.
Mr. Heggen raises issues identical to those raised in Billis and Hudson, namely:
1. Whether W.S. 7-13-301 (June 1987 Repl.), requiring the state’s consent to the court’s deferring further proceedings and placing a defendant on probation without entry of a judgment of conviction, infringes on the judicial department’s sentencing power in violation of the principle of separation of powers explicitly stated in Wyo. Const. art. 2, § 1.
2. Whether 1987 Wyo.Sess.Laws, ch. 157, § 3, enacting W.S. 7-13-301 (June 1987 Repl.), was enacted in violation of Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 20, which proscribes altering or amending a bill during its passage through the legislature so as to change the bill’s original purpose.
3. Whether 1987 Wyo.Sess.Laws, ch. 157, § 3, enacting W.S. 7-13-301 (June 1987 Repl.), was enacted in violation of Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 24, which mandates the passage of a bill containing only one subject which must be clearly expressed in the bill’s title.
4. Whether the prosecutor’s refusal to consent to sentencing under § 7-13-301 was arbitrary and an abuse of discretion and therefore violated Wyo. Const, art. 1, §§ 2 and 7.
Although the state asserts that Mr. Heg-gen has not preserved these issues since he failed properly to raise them below, we have chosen to consider them as explained in Hudson.
Our decisions in Billis and Hudson, in particular, and in Mollman v. State, No. 89-21, 800 P.2d 466 (Wyo. Oct. 5, 1990), and Lowry v. State, No. 88-312, 800 P.2d 401 (Wyo. Oct. 5, 1990), are dispositive here. See also companion cases, Vigil v. State, No. 88-310 (Wyo. Oct. 5, 1990); McIver v. State, No. 88-311 (Wyo. Oct. 5, 1990); Moon v. State, No. 88-304 (Wyo. Oct. 5,1990); and Magarahan v. State, No. 89-4 (Wyo. Oct. 5, 1990) [800 P.2d 401], Applying those decisions in this case, we hold that “new 301” is constitutional in terms of the issues raised here and that the prosecutor’s refusal to consent to “new 301” treatment in Mr. Heggen’s case was neither arbitrary nor an abuse of discretion in violation of Wyo. Const. art. 1, §§ 2 and 7. Accordingly, we affirm.
URBIGKIT, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion in which MACY, J., joins.
MACY, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which URBIGKIT, C.J., joins.