Court Opinion

ID: 9528080
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:36:53.054474+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:28.039893
License: Public Domain

COMPTON, Justice,
with whom, BURKE, Justice, joins, dissenting in part.
While declining to comprehensively define the elements of the tort of bad faith, the court has actually eliminated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in insurance contracts. The court concludes that summary judgment is appropriate if the insurer has a reasonable (color-able) contractual basis for denying liability. In other words, the insurer may enforce a contractual basis for denying liability regardless of any subjective bad faith. Because the court’s analysis is contrary to law and not supported by policy, and because a reasonable jury could find that Nationwide acted with subjective bad faith, I dissent.
The court concludes that the tort of bad faith in the context of first party insurance claims necessarily includes a requirement that the insurer’s refusal to honor the claim be made without a reasonable basis. It should be noted that the Hillmans do not accept this proposition, because contrary to the court’s conclusion, the Hillmans do. not accept that a reasonable basis can exist if actions are motivated by improper purposes. The Hillmans argue that because evidence was presented that shows Nationwide’s denial was motivated by self serving, dishonest and improper purposes, summary judgment was inappropriate. “Where the record supports plaintiff’s contention that acts or omissions by the carrier were for a bad-faith purpose or motive, the matter should be submitted to a jury for its determination.” Thus the issue is properly before us.
Until today the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which we have implied in every contract including insurance contracts, has imposed duties above and beyond express contractual duties. Guin v. Ha, 591 P.2d 1281, 1291 (Alaska 1979). The additional duties imposed by the covenant of good faith and fair dealing were not eliminated when this court accepted the argument that in insurance contracts, a breach of the covenant sounds in tort. “That responsibility is not the requirement mandated by the terms of the policy itself — to defend, settle, or pay. It is the obligation, deemed to be imposed by the law, under which the insurer must act fairly and in good faith in discharging its contractual responsibilities.” Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Company, 9 Cal.3d 566, 108 Cal.Rptr. 480, 485, 510 P.2d 1032, 1037 (1973).
The covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires that the party act with both subjective good faith and objective fairness. Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 834 P.2d 1220, 1225 (Alaska 1992). It is objectively reasonable to rely on contractual rights. Contractual rights, therefore, provide a reasonable basis for a position. But this does not end our inquiry. The covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires that contractual rights be pursued with subjective good faith. In Mitford v. de Lasala, 666 P.2d 1000, 1007 (Alaska 1983), even though the employment at will contract allowed the firing of Mitford for no reason at all, “the circumstances surrounding Mitford’s termination give rise to an inference that he was fired ... for the purpose of preventing him from sharing in future profits,” thereby violating the duty of good faith and fair dealing. In Loyal Order of Moose v. International Fidelity Insurance Co., 797 P.2d 622, 629 (Alaska 1990), we noted that while the surety had a contractual right to demand arbitration, “the demand for arbitration may not itself be made in bad faith, or serve to defeat an otherwise timely and sufficient bad-faith claim.”
We have declined to hold that a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing sounds in tort in the context of employment contracts. However, because of the special nature of insurance contracts, a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in first party insurance claims does sound in tort. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. *1330Nicholson, 777 P.2d 1152, 1156-57 (Alaska 1989).
The adhesionary aspects of the insurance contract, including the lack of bargaining strength of the insured, the contract’s standardized terms, the motivation of the insured for entering into the transaction and the nature of the service for which the contract is executed, distinguish this contract from most other non-insurance commercial contracts. These features characteristic of the insurance contract make it particularly susceptible to public policy considerations.
Id., quoting Louderback & Jurika, Standards for Limiting the Tort of Bad Faith Breach of Contract, 16 U.S.F.L.Rev. 187, 200-01 (1982). The reason for holding that such claims sound in tort is because “an action in tort provides a remedy for harm done to insureds though no breach of an express contractual covenant has occurred and where contract damages fail to adequately compensate insureds.” Id., quoting White v. Unigard Mutual Insurance Co., 112 Idaho 94, 730 P.2d 1014, 1017-18 (1986).
Nicholson is consistent with our policy that because of the special nature of insurance contracts, they are particularly susceptible to public policy considerations. Hillman v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 758 P.2d 1248, 1250 (Alaska 1988) (invalidating uninsured motor vehicle exclusion on the basis of public policy); CHI of Alaska, Inc. v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 844 P.2d 1113 (Alaska 1993) (granting an insured the unilateral right to select independent counsel in cases where an insurer has reserved its rights, despite the insurer’s express contractual right to select counsel); Estes v. Alaska Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 774 P.2d 1315 (Alaska 1989) (concluding that a time limitation on commencement of suit will only be enforced on a showing of prejudice); Alaska Energy Authority v. Fairmont Insurance Co., 845 P.2d 420 (Alaska 1993) (concluding that the failure to file suit within the time limitation of the contract does not bar a claim without a showing of prejudice).
In spite of these cases, this court now concludes that as long as there exists a reasonable contractual basis for a denial of liability, a bad faith claim sounding in tort will fail regardless of any evidence of subjective bad faith. The court interprets our adoption of Gruenberg as “seem[ing]” to require proof of both objectively unfair conduct and subjective bad faith. Gruen-berg was the first case to hold that a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing sounds in tort, giving the plaintiff broader remedies than those in contract. While in Gruenberg there may have been evidence of both unfair conduct and bad faith, the court clearly articulated “the obligation, deemed to be imposed by the law, under which the insurer must act fairly and in good faith in discharging its contractual responsibilities.” 510 P.2d at 1037 (emphasis added).
Instead of providing more protection for an insured by adopting the proposition that a bad faith claim may sound in tort, in fact we are providing less protection. In the context of first party insurance claims, the court has actually limited the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by imposing a twofold requirement which it has not required in any other contract. The covenant of good faith and fair dealing is meaningless if existence of a reasonable contractual basis for denial of liability is alone sufficient to defeat a bad faith claim.1
*1331This is contrary to our previous holdings. For example, in State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Weiford, 831 P.2d 1264, 1266 (Alaska 1992), we reaffirmed that “bad faith claims brought by insured persons against their insurance companies may be brought in tort as well as in contract.” We vacated the award of punitive damages because “the $20,000 offer clearly was reasonable. While the suspect note to the file might be reflective of bad motive, since the offer in question was reasonable, the note cannot independently form the basis for a punitive damages award.” Id. at 1268. However, we noted that “the crux of Weiford’s bad faith case was the testimony of her expert, George Broatch. Broatch testified that no single act of State Farm amounted to bad faith, but that cumulatively State Farm’s actions did: ‘It — to me it was a matter of the company philosophy. I don’t really have any quarrel with the day to day handling of the file particularly.’ ” Id. at 1267. We concluded “that there was sufficient evidence to support a jury finding that State Farm acted in bad faith.” Id. at 1269. The court is correct in rejecting the Hillmans’ assertion that reasonableness is always a question of fact for the jury. But the proper question is whether a reasonable jury could conclude that Nationwide acted unreasonably, i.e. either objectively unfairly or with subjective bad faith.
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment we view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-prevailing party. Loyal Order of Moose, 797 P.2d at 628. The Hillmans presented evidence that Nationwide denied coverage before making an investigation of the facts or law. Nationwide violated its internal guidelines and policies which guarantee fair, honest and reasonable claims handling. Specifically, Nationwide: (1) failed to follow internal procedures when local adjustors failed to consult with higher echelons in the company before denying the death claim; (2) failed to resolve all reasonable doubts about coverage in favor of the policy holder; (3) failed to explain why a nonwaiver agreement was required; (4) obtained a legal opinion in order to justify denying the claim; (5) failed to provide the Hillmans with previously promised information from its attorney; (6) lied about whether a letter from its attorney was available; (7) stonewalled for four years because of alleged vindictiveness toward the Hillmans’ attorneys; and, (8) even after authority to concede “coverage and settle the case was granted, the Regional Claims Attorney unilaterally decided not to settle.
Taking these assertions as true,2 a reasonable jury could conclude that by failing to investigate, lying to the policy holder and stonewalling for four years, Nationwide acted with subjective bad faith. The grant of summary judgment was improper. Yet this court concludes that as long as Nationwide had a reasonable contractual basis for denying liability, evidence of bad faith and unfair dealings “have little or no relevance.”
The court applies this same standard to the question of arbitration. Again, on summary judgment we view the facts in a light most favorable to the non-prevailing party. Loyal Order of Moose, 797 P.2d at 628. The Hillmans claim Nationwide insisted on arbitration in order to discourage the Hillmans from proceeding with their legitimate claims, and because of vindictiveness and aggravation with Hillmans’ attorneys. Again, a reasonable jury could conclude that Nationwide acted with subjective bad faith. Yet because Nationwide’s insurance policy contained an arbitration provision, “Nationwide’s decision to demand arbitration was reasonable and therefore not in bad faith.” This conclusion ignores Loyal Order of Moose, 797 P.2d at 629, which specifically states that even though a surety may have a right to arbitration, “the demand for arbitration may not itself be *1332made in bad faith, or serve to defeat an otherwise timely and sufficient bad-faith claim.” The court’s conclusion again effectively eliminates the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
The Hillmans presented evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude Nationwide acted with subjective bad faith. There are genuine issues of material fact which preclude summary judgment.

. This court stated in State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Weiford, 831 P.2d 1264, 1266 (Alaska 1992), that an insured may bring a bad faith claim "in tort as well as in contract.” The duty of good faith and fair dealing implied in every contract requires the insurer to act with subjective good faith and objective fairness, unlike the tort of bad faith which, as now defined, permits the insurer to act with subjective bad faith. If Weiford is still a correct statement of the law, then the proper disposition of this case would be to remand it to the superior court for further proceedings. The Hillmans should be permitted to proceed on a claim based on a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing arising out of the contractual relationship, distinct from a claim based on the tort of bad faith. They have set forth specific facts which, viewed in a light most favorable to them, raise genuine issues of material fact. Contractual damages based on a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing may be narrower in scope than tort damages, yet some relief may be available to the Hill-*1331mans. However, the correctness of the statement in Weiford is now doubtful, despite this court's assertion that it is declining to “comprehensively” define the elements of the tort of bad faith.

. While the Hillmans have not at this point presented, convincing evidence of their assertions, they have set forth specific facts which, viewed in the light most favorable to the Hill-mans, raise a genuine issue of fact.