Court Opinion

ID: 9759790
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:28:11.463415+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:04.656498
License: Public Domain

HOFFMAN, Judge,
dissenting:
This Court is once again faced with a problem arising under Rule 1100, Pa.R.Crim.P., 19 P.S.Appendix. I believe *154that the Commonwealth did not bring appellant to trial within the 270 day period, see Rule 1100(a)(1); therefore, I would reverse and order appellant discharged.
On February 6, 1974, the owner of P. & J. Enterprises, 4458 North Fifth Street, Philadelphia, was the victim of a robbery. The owner, Patrick Jurado, and his associate, Edgar Hidalgo, also on the scene at that time, gave the police a complete description of the two robbers. Two days later, Lt. Benson of the Philadelphia Police Department went to Jurado’s establishment and displayed a photo array to the two witnesses, who identified appellant and his co-defendant. The record indicates that a criminal complaint was issued on February 8, 1974.
The police arrested the appellant on February 13, 1974. The record does not indicate why appellant was not arrested prior to that date. Apparently, there was some confusion concerning the subsequent court dates. During a December 9, 1974 hearing before Judge Bonavitacola, the parties reconstructed a procedural history from the Quarter Sessions files. Thereafter, the trial court developed the following chronology, which has been accepted by both the District Attorney and the appellant:
"2/6/74 Date of Incident.
2/13/74 Arrest.
2/22/74 Prelim. Hearing.
3/11/74 Indictment.
3/22/74 Arraignment.
4/22/74 Motion to Suppress — held under advisement. S. Smith, J. Case Listed for trial 5/21/74
5/10/74 Motion Denied
5/21/74 Both sides ready; assigned to trial 6/25/74; Latrone, J.
6/25/74 Com. witness not present. Returned for reassignment
7/25/74 Witness on vacation. Continued to 9/3/74.
8/28/74 Assigned for trial on 9/4/74: Bonavitacola, J.
9/4/74 Def. Attorney on trial. Continued to 9/30/74: Bonavitacola, J.
9/25/74 Def. Atty.. req. continuance for personal reasons. Cont. to 10/28/74: Bonavitacola, J.
10/23/74 Co-counsel not available (re Rivera). Cont. to 11/6/74: Bonavitacola, J.
11/6/74 Assigned to Room 296 to be heard by Judge assigned after completion of case now being tried: Bonavitacola, J.
11/13/74 Sent back to 625; Judge Porter will be in chambers next week.
11/14/74 Assigned to Room 426 for 11/18/74; both sides ready.
12/4/74 Returned to Room 625 for reassignment: Julian King, J.
12/5/74 For trial 12/9/74
12/9/74 Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 1100, denied: Bonavitacola, J.
12/13/74 12/17/74 Jury selected and sworn — Takiff, J. Motion to Suppress in Court identification denied: Takiff, J.
12/18/74 Demurrer. Overruled.
12/20/74 Verdict — guilty."
*155The record contains a Copy of Docket Entries which is less complete than the lower court’s procedural history but which includes one additional event worth noting:
“May 20, 1974 — Commonwealth’s Petition for an Extension of time under Rule 1100 of the Pa Rules of Crimina! Procedure filed ”1
As the cited history indicates, appellant filed a motion to dismiss which was denied on December 9, 1974, trial began on December 13, 1974, and a jury found appellant guilty of robbery on December 20, 1974. Appellant raised the Rule 1100 violation post-trial; relief was denied on May 16, 1975. At that time, appellant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of five to ten years. This appeal followed.
Appellant contends that his right to a speedy trial under Rule 1100 was violated, and that, therefore, he should be discharged. Rule 1100(f) Pa.R.Crim.P. Appellant calculates the time period as follows: the period commenced on February 13, 1974, so that trial should have begun on November 10, 1974. He concedes that counsel requested two continuances, one on September 4, until September 25, and another on September 25, until October 28. The two continuances consumed 54 days. As stated by appellant, “[i]f all of the 54 days were chargeable to the appellant, his trial, as the lower court ruled, would have commenced in accordance with Rule 1100. However, the lower court completely ignored the mandate of 1100(d)(1) and (2) which in effect gives the appellant a thirty (30) day period which is not chargeable to him if he falls within the terms of this provision.” Cf. *156Commonwealth v. Lewis, 237 Pa.Super. 357, 352 A.2d 99 (1975).2
The Commonwealth argues that the 270th day after arrest was November 12, and that trial, therefore, began 31 days after the period ran. Therefore, unless the period was extended automatically by operation of Rule 1100(f), cf. Commonwealth v. Shelton, 469 Pa. 8, 364 A.2d 694 (1976); Commonwealth v. Cutillo, 235 Pa.Super. 131, 339 A.2d 123 (1975), the appellant is entitled to be discharged. The Commonwealth makes the following computation: “Appellant concedes that the twenty-two (22) days continuance from 9/4/74 to 9/25/74 can validly be charged against the defense .. B.ut appellant contends that the lower court erred in charging the twenty-nine (29) day continuance from 9/25 to 10/23/74 against the defense since it violated Rule 1100(d)(2) .... Such a contention, standing alone, would have merit .... But appellant overlooks the defense-requested continuance of 10/23/74 to 11/6/74, a period of fourteen (14) days. At the hearing for the Motion to Dismiss Indictments under Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100 before Judge Bonavitacola, defense counsel . . . admitted that he requested the continuance on 10/23/74 . . .. Unfortunately, the Quarter Sessions file indicated that appellant’s co-defendant requested the continuance and the lower court did not charge this period against appellant. Therefore, it is clear that appellant requested a twenty-nine (29) day continuance from 9/25/74 to 10/23/74 and a fourteen (14) day continuance from 10/23/74 *157to 11/6/74 for a total of forty-two (42) days. Under Rule 1100(d)(2) twelve (12) of these days can be excluded from the ‘running of the Rule.’ These twelve (12) days, coupled with the twenty-two (22) days appellant concedes are excluded from the period make it obvious that the November 12, 1974 date should be extended by thirty-four (34) days bringing the mandatory trial date to December 15, 1974. Appellant’s trial commenced on December 13, 1974, clearly within the period . . .3
The transcript of the hearing on appellant’s motion to dismiss supports the Commonwealth’s position that on October 23, 1974 continuance was requested by appellant’s counsel:
“[Counsel for appellant]: ... By the way, what I could find in my file is, number one, on September 25th for personal reasons — I have about 36 days of my responsibility. *158Under Rule 1100, 30 days of that 36 cannot be held chargeable to my client.
“THE COURT: Did you make two requests for continuances:
“[Counsel for appellant]: Yes, sir. I made two requests on my file. September 25th—
“THE COURT: That was continued to what date?
“[Counsel for appellant]: October 23rd.
“THE COURT: Then you made another request?
“[Counsel for appellant]: Yes, sir. Continued till November 6, I believe .
“[Counsel for the co-defendant]: Judge, according to our records, we have never asked for a continuance in the case
Even if we assume that the Commonwealth is correct in all of its calculations, we should reverse appellant’s conviction. Both the Commonwealth and the appellant have treated February 13, the date of the arrest, rather than the date on which the complaint was filed, as the first day of the 270 day period. Rule 1100(a)(1) is explicit that the date of the, complaint customarily controls: “Trial in a court case in which a written complaint is filed against the defendant after June 30, 1973 but before July 1, 1974 shall commence no later than two hundred seventy (270) days from the date on which the complaint is filed.” See also, Commonwealth v. Silver, 238 Pa.Super. 221, 357 A.2d 612 (1975). The period can be extended if any delay results from the unavailability of the accused. Rule 1100(d)(1). Further, the police’s inability to find an accused can amount to unavailability. The Comment provides that “the defendant should be deemed unavailable for any period of time during which he could not be apprehended because his whereabouts were unknown and could not be determined by due diligence . . ..” (Emphasis added). My examination of the record, however, indicates that the Commonwealth failed to make a showing of due diligence. Thus, the period commenced on February 8, the date on which the complaint was issued, and trial *159should have begun on November 5. Trial was commenced 38 days thereafter. Even assuming the period was extended by 34 days as the Commonwealth argues, Rule 1100 was nonetheless violated.
Therefore, judgment of sentence should be reversed and the appellant should be discharged.
PRICE, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.

. Appellant’s brief states that the Commonwealth never filed a petition to extend. The motion does appear in the record but does not have the date received stamped thereon. No action was ever taken on the motion, the Commonwealth choosing instead to rely on its arguments under Rule 1100(f). The Commonwealth has not raised the issue at any stage of the proceeding. Further, failure by the lower court to decide a properly filed Rule 1100(c) petition until after trial constitutes a violation of the rule. Commonwealth v. Ray, 240 Pa.Super. 33, 360 A.2d 925 (filed April 22, 1976).

. Cf. Commonwealth v. Lewis, supra at 360, 352 A.2d at 101: “A preliminary hearing scheduled for July 22, 1974, was continued until August 19, 1974, at the request of appellant’s attorney due to his being out of town. But, because the continuance was not in excess of 30 days, it is not excluded in determining the period for commencement of trial., See Rule 1100(d)(2).”
Rule 1100(d)(2) provides: “In determining the period for commencement of trial, there shall be excluded therefrom such period of delay at any stage of the proceedings as results from: . .
“(2) any continuance in excess of thirty (30) days granted at the request of the defendant or his attorney, provided that only the period beyond the thirtieth (30th) day shall be so excluded.”

. The case raises some serious questions which I need not resolve; at the same time, I note the issues because I do not endorse the Commonwealth’s computations. First, at the hearing on the petition, the parties discussed an initial “continuance” granted because counsel was on trial in another matter. However, had counsel’s appearance in another courtroom been mandated by court rules, see e. g., Rules 800-810, Philadelphia Court Rules (governing continuances and priorities if an attorney is scheduled to appear in more than one courtroom), he would have been “unavailable”. See the Comment to Rule 1100, which indicates that unavailability relates to the impossibility of the court proceeding against the accused. Obviously, whether counsel was “unavailable” or whether the case was continued will often produce a different result given the distinct methods of computing time under Rules 1100(d)(1) and 1100(d)(2). See also, Commonwealth v. Coleman, 241 Pa.Super. 450, 361 A.2d 870 (filed June 25, 1976). Second, the parties have assumed that if counsel were unavailable at that time, the entire 21 days was chargeable against the appellant. It does not appear in the record for how many of those 21 days appellant’s attorney was unavailable. The rule provides that delay must result from counsel’s unavailability. The Comment provides that only that time during which an accused is unavailable may be used to extend the period. If an accused is unavailable for, let us assume, 5 days because he is on-trial on another charge, but the court cannot reschedule the case for 20 days because of a lack of resources, it would appear that the accused could be charged with only 5 of those days. See Commonwealth v. Shelton, supra; cf. Commonwealth v. Coleman, supra, (holding that delay was not caused by appellant’s request for a continuance, but resulted from scheduling practices then in effect).