Court Opinion

ID: 9563797
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:47:24.408555+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:04.795866
License: Public Domain

BIRD, C. J.
J.—  I concur in the majority opinion with one significant caveat. I do not agree that a suspect’s right to communicate with his lawyer should depend on whether that lawyer arrives at the police station before the police questioning of the client begins. I cannot believe that a suspect’s right to counsel (Cal. Const., art. I, § 15) was intended to depend on the vagaries of traffic jams, road or weather conditions, or an attorney’s busy schedule.
The majority adhere correctly, I believe, to the reasoning of Justice Stevens’ dissenting opinion in Moran v. Burbine (1986) 475 U.S. 412 [89 L.Ed.2d 410, 106 S.Ct. 1135] in interpreting our state Constitution. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 610.) They hold that if the suspect’s attorney is physically present at the police station, the police have an absolute duty to inform the suspect that his attorney wishes to speak with him. However, the majority also hold that the police may conceal from a suspect the critical fact that his attorney is trying to reach him if the attorney is not physically present at the station. I find this latter position logically inconsistent, fundamentally unfair, and unjustified by any legal or practical considerations. The dissenters in Moran wisely rejected it, and so do I.
The majority opinion properly recognizes the importance of the right to assistance of counsel under the California Constitution. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 600, 602-605, 610.) The majority also recognize that to allow law enforcement agents “to prevent [a suspect] from having contact with his own lawyer . . . would be ‘bad policy’ of the most basic kind.” (Id., at p. 612.) Given these premises, I cannot understand how my colleagues condone police interference with attorney-client communications when such communications are attempted by means other than personal and physical contact.
*615My colleagues offer no basis for distinguishing between an attorney’s on-the-scene efforts to contact his client and efforts pursued through other means. A suspect has a right to know that his attorney wishes to see him whether that request comes over the police station counter, over the telephone, or via messenger.
In Moran, Justice Stevens found “interference with communications between an attorney and [her] client . . .” to be unconstitutional when the defendant “was not told that his attorney had phoned and that she had been informed that he would not be questioned.” (475 U.S. at p. — [89 L.Ed.2d at p. 451, 106 S.Ct. at p. 1166], italics added; see maj. opn., ante, at p. 606.) “[T]he concealment by the police of the critical fact that an attorney retained by the accused or his family has offered assistance, either by telephone or in person,” Justice Stevens reasoned, renders a suspect’s waiver of his right to counsel invalid and “violates the due process requirement of fundamental fairness.” (Moran, supra, 475 U.S. at pp. —, — [89 L.Ed.2d at pp. 441, 443-444, 451, 106 S.Ct. at pp. 1158, 1160, 1166], italics added.) I agree.
If, indeed, the majority’s goal is to discourage police “interfere[nee] with the attorney-client relationship” and to deter “conduct . . . which is calculated to . . . delay . . . counsel in his efforts to reach his client” (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 604, 605) a message from an attorney to a client in police custody should be relayed.
Yet, the majority’s “physical presence” limitation will permit the police to thwart such communications. A call from a lawyer that he is “on the way” or will be there in a few hours may motivate police to hasten questioning of the suspect so that they will complete it before the attorney arrives. In similar contexts, this court has found the prevention of such abuses to be a legitimate basis for judicially created rules. (See People v. Bustamante (1981) 30 Cal.3d 88, 101 [177 Cal.Rptr. 576, 634 P.2d 927]; People v. Fowler (1969) 1 Cal.3d 335, 344 [82 Cal.Rptr. 363, 461 P.2d 643].)
The majority’s holding is also fundamentally unfair. Under their rule, a suspect’s right to know that his lawyer wants to speak with him will turn upon such irrelevant factors as the attorney’s schedule, distance from the police station, or entanglement in traffic jams or battles with foul weather. Furthermore, as Justice Lucas’s dissent points out, the majority’s rule will favor wealthy or sophisticated suspects whose retained counsel happen to arrive at the station before their clients make incriminating statements. (Dis. opn., post, at pp. 621-622.)1
*616The majority do not deny that their rule will yield these unfair results. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 612.) Yet, they offer no explanation to justify their solution.2
It is commendable that my colleagues attempt to create a “bright line” rule to ensure that a suspect’s attorney has taken “diligent steps” to come to his aid. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 610.) However, an attorney’s diligence can manifest itself in ways other than showing up at the police station. In many situations, a phone call or messenger may well be the most efficient, effective—and most diligent—means of transmitting a message to a client. This is true, for example, when an attorney is (1) engaged in trial, (2) handling an urgent matter for another client, (3) located far from where the suspect is being detained, or (4) delayed by traffic or weather conditions. It is unreasonable to suggest that failing to appear in person indicates a lack of diligence on the attorney’s part.
Practical considerations similarly do not require the adoption of a “physical-presence” requirement. The majority apparently believe that requiring the attorney’s physical presence is the only method of verifying that the request emanates from an attorney. (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 611.) Admittedly, such verification will not be immediately possible if the attorney does not come to the station. However, this minor problem is not sufficient to justify the distinction which my colleagues have created between on-the-scene efforts and other forms of attempted communication with a client.
The state constitutional right to counsel requires that police relay a message—however received—that the suspect’s attorney wishes to speak with him. If upon receiving that message the suspect indicates his desire to speak with counsel, questioning must cease. The police may still insist that the attorney come to the station before the attorney may speak with the suspect. When the attorney arrives, his or her status may be verified.3
*617Finally, many of the authorities the majority rely on for their duty-to-inform rule (see maj. opn., ante, at pp. 604-605) plainly reject a “physical-presence” requirement. In People v. Smith (1982) 93 Ill.2d 179 [442 N.E.2d 1325, 1329], certiorari denied (1983) 461 U.S. 937 [77 L.Ed.2d 312, 103 S.Ct. 2107], the court required police to transmit a message written by an attorney on her business card to a suspect. In Commonwealth v. McKenna (1969) 355 Mass. 313 [244 N.E.2d 560, 563, 566] and State v. Haynes (1979) 288 Ore. 59 [602 P.2d 272, 273-274, 278-279], certiorari denied (1980) 446 U.S. 945 [64 L.Ed.2d 802, 100 S.Ct. 2175], the courts announced a broad rule requiring police to relay an attorney’s desire to communicate with the suspect—regardless of the medium through which the request was received. Finally, in Burbine v. Moran (1st Cir. 1984) 753 F.2d 178, 180, 187, reversed, Moran v. Burbine, supra, 475 U.S. 412 [89 L.Ed.2d 410, 106 S.Ct. 1135], an attorney’s telephonic request to speak to his client was found to trigger a duty on the part of the police to communicate that desire to the suspect.
None of these cases ever suggested that physical presence—or lack thereof—had any bearing on a police officer’s duty to relay an attorney’s message that he wishes to speak with his client. Indeed, this underscores the fact that my colleagues have created an unsupportable rule which serves no apparent purpose other than to penalize suspects whose attorneys’ absence from the station is due wholly to extraneous circumstances.
In sum, the majority is correct in requiring that police refrain from interfering with attorney-client communications. In so holding, this court furthers the state constitutional guarantee to the right to counsel. However, to limit that holding to cases where the attorney is physically present at the police station defies logic, ignores reality and renders that important guarantee a hollow one. This judicially created rule is arbitrary at best. The majority’s “physical-presence” rule is a quantum leap beyond acceptable limits. Since that leap is unwarranted, I cannot join my brethren’s opinion.
Broussard, J., concurred.

Despite the soundness of Justice Lucas’s reasoning, I do not concur in his ultimate conclusion that police may grant all suspects only such rights as the least fortunate suspects may enjoy.

The majority refute Justice Lucas’s argument (fn. 1, ante) by noting simply that the state cannot use equal protection principles as a “sword” to deny all persons certain rights simply because others cannot enjoy them. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 612.) I agree.
My colleagues assert that “[t]he doctrine of equal protection is society’s shield against discriminatory treatment by the authorities.” (Ibid., italics added.) Yet, ironically, they find that their “physical-presence” rule does not violate this principle, even though it permits the authorities to deny constitutional protections to some suspects—but not others—solely on the basis of arbitrary distinctions. Thus, the majority’s rule does not conform to the very principle they espouse.

Obviously, I differ with my colleagues as to the soundness of the reasoning in People v. Saidi-Tabatabai (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 981, 984-985 [86 Cal.Rptr. 866]. (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 610, fn. 16.) It is true that the court there declined to hold that the police, armed with a telephonic expression of interest from a suspect’s alleged attorney, should either discontinue interrogation or inform the suspect of the attorney’s call. (Id., at pp. 984-985.) However, the court did not need to reach that question, since “[c]ounsel did not ask that *617the interrogation cease until he had a chance to confer with his client, nor did he request that defendant be advised that he was representing her.” (Id., at p. 984.) All that counsel did was telephone and obtain information as to whether he could bail his client out and whether he would be able to see her if he drove across town to the station. (Ibid.)