Court Opinion

ID: 9372411
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-21 16:01:07.190435+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:35.194045
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-2093    Document: 37     Page: 1   Filed: 02/21/2023

        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                  ______________________

                      LUIS PINTO,
                    Plaintiff-Appellant

                             v.

                    UNITED STATES,
                    Defendant-Appellee
                  ______________________

                        2022-2093
                  ______________________

     Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims
 in No. 1:19-cv-01791-EHM, Judge Edward H. Meyers.
                  ______________________

                Decided: February 21, 2023
                 ______________________

    LUIS PINTO, Williamston, NC, pro se.

     JOSEPH ALAN PIXLEY, Commercial Litigation Branch,
 Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Wash-
 ington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by
 BRIAN M. BOYNTON, STEVEN JOHN GILLINGHAM, PATRICIA
 M. MCCARTHY.
                   ______________________
Case: 22-2093     Document: 37     Page: 2    Filed: 02/21/2023

 2                                                 PINTO   v. US

     Before MOORE, Chief Judge, HUGHES and STOLL, Circuit
                           Judges.
 PER CURIAM.
     Luis Pinto appeals a decision from the Court of Federal
 Claims granting the government’s partial motion to
 dismiss and cross-motion for judgment on the
 administrative record and denying Mr. Pinto’s motion for
 judgment on the administrative record. The trial court
 found that Mr. Pinto’s challenge to the Army’s decision not
 to promote him was nonjusticiable and that there were no
 procedural errors that justified overturning the Army’s
 decision. We agree and therefore affirm.
                               I
     Mr. Pinto was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant in
 the United States Army in May 2012 when he began a
 seven-year active-duty service obligation. In September
 2013, Mr. Pinto was subject to an investigation for
 “fraternization and for having an improper relationship
 with a junior, female enlisted soldier in his unit.”
 Defendant-Appellee’s     Appendix      (D.A.)   1–2.      The
 investigation resulted in a “flag” in his personnel file, and
 while this flag was in place, Mr. Pinto was ineligible for a
 promotion to First Lieutenant.
     The    investigation   substantiated    the   alleged
 misconduct, and, due to this misconduct, Mr. Pinto’s
 superiors gave him an unfavorable Officer Evaluation
 Report that noted his “lack of judgment” and “strongly
 recommended” against his promotion. D.A. 2. The Army
 also issued a General Officer Letter of Reprimand
 regarding his misconduct. Mr. Pinto was required to show
 cause for his retention in the military before a Board of
 Inquiry. The Board of Inquiry concluded that the
 allegations against Mr. Pinto were supported by a
 preponderance of the evidence but recommended that,
 instead of discharging Mr. Pinto, the Army retain and
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 PINTO   v. US                                               3

 transfer him to another unit. Thereafter, the Army
 removed the flag from Mr. Pinto’s personnel file. Once the
 flag was removed, Mr. Pinto became eligible for promotion
 to First Lieutenant again. However, in April 2014 and
 again in November 2014, Mr. Pinto’s commanders
 recommended that he not be promoted to First Lieutenant.
 Mr. Pinto appealed this second denial of promotion to the
 promotion review authority, Major General Jeffrey Smith.
 Major General Smith issued a memorandum stating that
 “[Second Lieutenant] Pinto’s further service is not in the
 best interests of good order and discipline in this
 command.” D.A. 42. Mr. Pinto was then involuntarily
 separated from the Army for non-promotion, pursuant to
 Army Regulation (AR) 600–8–24 ¶ 5–11.
     Mr. Pinto appealed his involuntary separation to the
 Army Board for Correction of Military Records (Board),
 seeking reinstatement and a retroactive promotion as well
 as the correction of his records to reflect that he was
 wrongfully denied a promotion and wrongfully separated.
 The Board denied Mr. Pinto’s request and found that there
 was insufficient evidence to remove the letter of reprimand
 and evaluation report from his record and that his other
 requests for relief were without merit. Mr. Pinto appealed
 that decision to the Court of Federal Claims, which
 remanded the case to the Board to issue a new decision that
 “fully addresses Mr. Pinto’s promotion and more fully
 develops the record.” D.A. 2. The Board subsequently
 issued a new decision that reiterated its previous findings.
 Mr. Pinto appealed the second decision to the trial court,
 asking for placement in an appropriate duty status, a
 retroactive promotion to First Lieutenant, back pay for the
 rank of First Lieutenant, and a correction of all his military
 records. In addition to asking the trial court to review the
 Army’s decision not to promote him, Mr. Pinto identified
 the following procedural deficiencies that justified his
 request for relief: (1) the Army did not issue the
 recommendation not to promote him to First Lieutenant
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 4                                                 PINTO   v. US

 until after his promotion eligibility date had passed,
 meaning he was automatically promoted to First
 Lieutenant; and (2) the Army improperly discharged him
 under AR 600–8–24 ¶ 5–11 instead of ¶ 4–2.a.(2). 1
     The trial court determined that it did not have
 jurisdiction to review the merits of the Army’s decision not
 to promote him because “absent a statute or regulation
 entitling a service member to a promotion as a matter of
 law, the [trial court] has no authority to entertain” claims
 relating to promotion decisions in the military. D.A. 5.
 Next, the trial court found that the slight delay in the
 Army’s decision not to promote Mr. Pinto did not result in
 Mr. Pinto automatically being promoted to First
 Lieutenant because AR 600–8–29, which addresses officer
 promotions, makes it clear that promotions to First
 Lieutenant are not automatic. The trial court also found
 that there was no error in the Army separating Mr. Pinto
 under 600–8–24 ¶ 5–11 because that paragraph addresses
 separation due to non-selection for promotion and the other
 paragraphs in AR 600–8–24 did not shield Mr. Pinto from
 separation.
     Mr. Pinto now appeals to this court. We have
 jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).
                              II
     We review a decision of the Court of Federal Claims to
 dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo. Diaz
 v. United States, 853 F.3d 1355, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2017). We
 review the trial court’s jurisdictional findings of fact for
 clear error. Banks v. United States, 314 F.3d 1304, 1307–
 08 (Fed. Cir. 2003). We review a decision of the Court of
 Federal Claims granting or denying a motion on the
 administrative record de novo and “reapply the statutory

     1    Mr. Pinto alleged additional procedural deficien-
 cies to the trial court but does not raise those on appeal.
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 PINTO   v. US                                               5

 review standards.” Chambers v. United States, 417 F.3d
 1218, 1227 (Fed. Cir. 2005). We “will not disturb the
 decision of [a military] corrections board unless it is
 arbitrary, capricious, contrary to law, or unsupported by
 substantial evidence.” Id.
                             III
     We first address the trial court’s determination that it
 did not have jurisdiction to review the merits of the Army’s
 decision not to promote Mr. Pinto, and then address the
 trial court’s decisions regarding the remaining procedural
 issues.
                              A
      We have long held that courts cannot review military
 decisions not to promote service members. For example, in
 Fluellen v. United States, where we considered the
 propriety of the Air Force’s decision not to promote an
 officer, we stated that
    [a] claim of error in a promotion decision presents
    a nonjusticiable controversy because there are no
    statutory or regulatory standards against which a
    court can review such a decision; it relates to a mat-
    ter left to the discretion of the military.
 225 F.3d 1298, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2000). We further explained
 that “courts lack the expertise needed to review reserve
 officer’s records and make military retention decisions. To
 reverse the [Board’s] decision would be to second-guess the
 board’s determination on no more than speculation.” Id.
 (quotation marks omitted) (citing Murphy v. United States,
 993 F.2d 871, 873 (Fed. Cir. 1993) and Sargisson v. United
 States, 913 F.2d 918, 922 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
     This case is no different. This court lacks both the
 authority and the expertise to question the Army’s decision
 not to promote Mr. Pinto. This is especially the case here,
 when both parties agree that “none of the material facts
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 6                                                 PINTO   v. US

 appear to be in dispute.” Appellant’s Br. at 15. Although
 Mr. Pinto argues that the Army erred in considering his
 misconduct when deciding not to promote him, Mr. Pinto
 has not cited to any statute or authority that would allow
 this court or the trial court to review the merits of the
 Army’s decision to not promote Mr. Pinto to First
 Lieutenant. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s grant
 of the government’s partial motion to dismiss for lack of
 subject matter jurisdiction.
                               B
     Mr. Pinto also appeals the trial court’s decision on two
 procedural issues that he claims entitle him to his
 requested relief. First, Mr. Pinto argues that he was
 automatically promoted to First Lieutenant because the
 Army did not provide a recommendation of non-promotion
 before his eligibility date, and this justifies awarding him
 back pay and a retroactive promotion. Second, Mr. Pinto
 argues that the Army erred in involuntarily separating
 him under AR 600–8–24 ¶ 5–11, which justifies reinstating
 him.
                               1
      Under 10 U.S.C. § 624(a)(2), officers are promoted to
 First Lieutenant “in accordance with regulations
 prescribed by the Secretary concerned.” AR 600–8–29
 governs the promotion of officers in the Army. Promotion
 eligibility to First Lieutenant is based in part on the
 officer’s eligibility date, which occurs after approximately
 eighteen months of active-duty service as a Second
 Lieutenant. AR 600–8–29 ¶ 3–1.a.(1). Commanders in the
 grade of Lieutenant Colonel or above “are authorized to
 promote officers to the grade[] of [First Lieutenant].” Id. at
 ¶¶ 1–7, 1–16.b.(1).
     Although promotion from Second Lieutenant to First
 Lieutenant is fairly routine, it is not automatic. The
 regulations set forth specific procedures both for the
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 PINTO   v. US                                               7

 promotion of officers from Second Lieutenant to First
 Lieutenant and for failure to be selected for promotion. The
 regulations state that “[Second Lieutenants] found not
 qualified for promotion by the promotion approval
 authority . . . will be retained for six months,” and “[Second
 Lieutenants] who have not been promoted at the end of the
 six month retention period will be processed for separation
 under the provisions of AR 600–8–24, paragraph 4–2a(2).”
 AR 600–8–29 at ¶¶ 1–13.b.(1) and (3). The promotion
 approval authority may waive these requirements and
 “direct immediate processing for separation under the
 provisions of AR 600–8–24” if it “determines that the
 officer’s retention is inconsistent with good order and
 discipline.” Id. at ¶ 1–13.b.(1). Decisions not to promote
 officers to First Lieutenant are communicated using DA
 Form 78 and should be provided by the officer’s eligibility
 date. Id. at ¶ 3–5.b.
     Mr. Pinto argues that the removal of the flag from his
 record resulted in him being automatically promoted to
 First Lieutenant and that, in the alternative, he was
 automatically promoted to First Lieutenant because the
 promotion review authority did not present him with DA
 Form 78 before his eligibility date. Appellant’s Br. at 15.
 We agree with the trial court that the promotion from
 Second Lieutenant to First Lieutenant is not automatic. As
 the trial court explained, “[i]f the promotion to First
 Lieutenant is automatic, it would be nonsensical for the
 regulations to grant senior officers the authority to approve
 or deny such a promotion.” D.A. 7. Furthermore, the trial
 court correctly found that removing the flag from Mr.
 Pinto’s record merely made him eligible for a promotion,
 because there is no statutory or regulatory authority that
 automatically grants a promotion once a flag is removed.
 See AR 600–8–2 ¶ 3–1.d. We also agree with the trial court
 that giving Mr. Pinto his DA Form 78 after his eligibility
 date did not automatically promote him to First Lieutenant
 once that date had passed. Although Mr. Pinto is correct
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 8                                                 PINTO   v. US

 that the AR 600–8–29 ¶ 3–5.b. requires giving an officer
 DA Form 78 by the officer’s promotion eligibility date,
 neither this paragraph nor any other allows for automatic
 promotion if the deadline is missed. Mr. Pinto has not cited
 to any authority that allows for automatic promotions in
 the face of a missed statutory or regulatory deadline. As
 the trial court explained, this delay “was harmless and
 does not result in an automatic promotion.” D.A. 8. Thus,
 Mr. Pinto is not entitled to an automatic promotion to First
 Lieutenant or any of the relief related to promotion to First
 Lieutenant, including back pay. We affirm the trial court’s
 determination that the Board did not procedurally err in
 failing to promote Mr. Pinto to First Lieutenant.
                              2
     After Mr. Pinto was denied a promotion to First
 Lieutenant a second time, he was separated in accordance
 with AR 600–8–24 ¶ 5–11. Paragraph 5–11.a. states that
 “[a]n [active duty list] officer not recommended for
 promotion to the grade of [First Lieutenant] will be
 separated not later than 90 calendar days after the
 Promotion     Review      Authority     approves     the
 nonrecommendation for promotion.” AR 600–8–24 ¶ 5–11.
      Mr. Pinto argues that the Army erred by separating
 him under ¶ 5–11 because according to the language of AR
 600–8–29 ¶ 1–13.b.(3), he should have been processed for
 separation under AR 600–8–24 ¶ 4–2.a.(2). Appellant’s Br.
 at 15. Paragraph 4–2.a.(2) is directed to officer elimination
 (rather than separation) for “[f]ailure to keep pace or to
 progress with contemporaries, as demonstrated by a low
 record of efficiency when compared with other officers of
 the same grade and competitive category.” AR 600–8–24
 ¶ 4–2.a.(2). Mr. Pinto next argues that his separation
 would violate AR 600–8–24 ¶ 4–4.b., which states that “no
 officer will be considered for elimination for the reasons
 stated in paragraph 4–2 because of conduct that has been
 the subject of administrative elimination proceedings that
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 PINTO   v. US                                             9

 resulted in final determination that the officer should be
 retained in the Service.” Mr. Pinto argues that the Board
 of Inquiry’s conclusion that he should be retained in the
 Army constitutes an “administrative elimination
 proceeding” as specified in ¶ 4–4.b. Thus, according to Mr.
 Pinto, the Army violated AR 600–8–29 ¶ 1.13.b.(3), AR
 600–8–24 ¶ 4–2.a.(2), and AR 600–8–24 ¶ 4–4.b. by
 separating him due, in part, to the alleged misconduct.
     Mr. Pinto is correct that, ordinarily, non-promotion
 under AR 600–8–29 ¶ 1.13.b.(3) would trigger the
 elimination processes detailed in AR 600–8–24 ¶ 4–2.a.(2)
 and AR 600–8–24 ¶ 4–4.b. However, in Mr. Pinto’s case,
 the Army properly waived the requirements of AR
 600–8–29 ¶ 1.13.b. and exercised its discretion to “direct
 immediate processing for separation under the provisions
 of AR 600–8–24.” As discussed above, this waiver is
 appropriate if the promotion review authority “determines
 that the officer’s retention is inconsistent with good order
 and discipline,” and this is exactly what happened to Mr.
 Pinto. AR 600–8–29 ¶ 1–13.b.(1); D.A. 42. Major General
 Smith reviewed Mr. Pinto’s second DA Form 78 and the
 supporting documents and determined that Mr. Pinto’s
 “further service is not in the best interests of good order
 and discipline in this command.” D.A. 42. Because the
 Army properly exercised its discretion to waive the
 requirements of AR 600–8–29 ¶ 1.13.b., it was not required
 to follow the elimination procedures in AR 600–8–24
 ¶ 4–2.a.(2) and AR 600–8–24 ¶ 4–4.b. Instead, the Army
 was well within its discretion to separate Mr. Pinto under
 any provision of AR 600–8–24, including AR 600–8–24
 ¶ 5–11. Separation under AR 600–8–24 ¶ 5–11 was
 appropriate because this provision is specifically directed
 to the separation of officers for failure to be promoted to
 First Lieutenant. Therefore, we agree with the trial court
 that the Army did not procedurally err in separating Mr.
 Pinto under AR 600–8–24 ¶ 5–11 instead of AR 600–8–24
 ¶ 4–2.a.(2). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s
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 10                                              PINTO   v. US

 decisions to grant the government’s motion for judgment
 on the administrative record and deny Mr. Pinto’s motion
 for judgment on the administrative record.
                            IV
     Because the trial court did not err in granting the
 government’s partial motion to dismiss and motion for
 judgment on the administrative record or in denying Mr.
 Pinto’s motion for judgment on the administrative record,
 we affirm.
                       AFFIRMED
                          COSTS

 No costs.