Court Opinion

ID: 9638318
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:40:33.240126+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:05.567709
License: Public Domain

EVANS, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
My difference with the majority opinion as to appellant, Princess Pat, Ltd., arises out of the clause in paragraph 8 of the contract, which reads:
“Station reserves the right to devote part or all the time allotted to the Advertiser for the purpose of broadcasting events it deems of special importance or interest.”
Applying the rule of construction “ex-prcssio unins est exclusio altcrius” I assume the particularization of this exception excludes all other right of plaintiff to interrupt Princess Pat’s use of the time which it purchased. It follows therefore that plaintiff must justify its use of defendant’s time on the sole ground that it was broadcasting events “of special importance or interest.” Did the announcements of the outcome of “horse racing” and “betting odds” fall within that provision? The court left the question to the jury and instructed,—
“You will determine from all of the evidence in the case whether the matter that was interjected might reasonably be deemed by the plaintiff to be matters of public interest or importance. If you believe from all the evidence in the case that the plaintiff might reasonably deem these racing results to be matters of public interest and importance, then it had the right under the terms of the contract, to make announcements of the racing results during the time allotted to the defendants in this case.”
In my opinion that instruction was erroneous. The court should have said that an annouuncement of a horse race and the betting odds on horse races were not of “special importance or interest” as that term was used in this contract.
Plaintiff made a secret commercial contract with the William Armstrong Publishing Company and was regularly paid for that company’s right to broadcast such horse race, betting information. This, it seems to me, conclusively negatives the idea that the outcome of horse races and betting results could be “deemed of special importance or interest
If the company selling betting odds information on horse races had a contract to use plaintiff’s broadcasting facilities, with which to reach the gambling fraternity, hourly, every day, it could not be said to be “special.” If regularly repeated each day over the radio, whence comes the “special,” to say nothing of the words “importance or interest”? I would think only “out of the ordinary” was special. That which was daily routine, was not special. In the radio field, I would say special war news, deaths of important characters, and like matters—-were special.
A jury might even say that reports of the outcome of great athletic events—like the World Series baseball games, the account of the famous Derby races—were of special importance or interest. Whether such events were of special importance, would present a jury question, in my opinion. But it’s a far cry from such announcements to the advertisements of publishers of racing sheets which tell the gamblers of the amounts of their winnings in so-called horse races. These races are daily occurrences. Emphasis is not on the horse. It’s the outcome of a bet. The publisher of the racing sheets is broadcasting his advertisements in order to keep up interest in gambling results, that he may sell more racing sheets.
If the interruptions, here in question, were to describe horse races as they are run every day, they would not be announcements of special importance or interest. But we are here dealing with even less important matters, namely, announcements which relate to betting odds or winnings of race No. 1, 2 or 3 at Track T., etc. We are dealing with advertisements to aid in the sale of racing sheets on horse races, to a gambling fraternity, in order that interest in gambling may be maintained or heightened.
Nor, in my opinion do the interruptions present a jury question as to whether they were of special importance or interest.
If the verdict were not a general one, plaintiff might still prevail. For recovery is here possible because the jury might have found the breach was not substantial or because defendant waived the breach. That possibility, however, is not before us, because a general verdict makes it impossible for us to say upon what ground the *156jury found for plaintiff. It may have been, under the instructions, upon the ground that the interruptions were of “special interest or importance.” Reversal is necessitated because on this material issue the jury was improperly instructed, and we cannot say that it was not decisive of the case.