Court Opinion

ID: 9629912
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:52:27.499613+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:26.737906
License: Public Domain

THORNTON, J.,
dissenting.
I am unable to agree that this is a proper case for allowing a writ of prohibition.
The majority opinion places chief reliance on Southern Pacific Co. v. Heltzel, 201 Or 1, 268 P2d 605 (1954). In Heltzel the Supreme Court carefully pointed out the general rule: A writ of prohibition lies only to restrain a clear excess of jurisdiction where there is no other adequate remedy; that it does not issue to correct or restrict errors or irregularities of a regulatory agency which is acting within its jurisdiction although proceeding improperly in the exercise of that jurisdiction.
As I read the charges involved here, I fail to see where the Attorney General is about to cause the Labor Commissioner to exceed his statutory jurisdiction. The fact that the school district may, as claimed by the Attorney General, have pursued a general policy of racial discrimination against other teachers of Negro ancestry over a long period in the past may be reasonably related to, or have some bearing on, the Attorney General’s charge that Mrs. Spencer was discriminated against. See, Dobbins v. Local 212, International Bro. of Elec. Wkrs., 292 F Supp 413 (SD Ohio 1968); United States v. H. K. Porter Company, 296 F Supp 40 (ND Ala 1968). Yet this is what the *412lower court says constituted an attempt to exercise jurisdiction which, the Labor Commissioner does not possess and therefore must be enjoined. This decision appears to be out of step with the tenor of recent federal court decisions cited in appellants’ brief interpreting parallel federal fair employment practices statutes.
Additionally, the rule is well established that a writ of prohibition does not lie where the legal processes provide an adequate remedy. See Willamette Val. Lbr. Co. v. Tax Com., 226 Or 543, 359 P2d 98, 360 P2d 926 (1961). Here the remedy is provided by OES 659.080, which provides:
“Any party aggrieved by an order of the commissioner issued after hearing under OES 659.060, may appeal from such order to the circuit court in accordance with the provisions of OES chapter 183.
This is exactly what the aggrieved party did in Williams v. Joyce, 4 Or App 482, 479 P2d 513, Sup Ct review denied (1971), another case involving the Oregon Civil Eights Law. Moreover, even if the Commissioner should decide, after a full public hearing, to issue a cease and desist order against the school district, the order is not self-enforcing. It can only be enforced by filing a court suit. ORS 659.070.
As the Supreme Court said in Willamette Val. Lbr. Co. v. Tax Com., supra at 548:
“The fact that direct access to the courts might be more speedy and less burdensome than the route provided by statute does not necessarily justify judicial intervention in the executive or legislative process when the legislature has provided an exclusive remedy which is adequate. Powell v. State Bd. of Pilot Com’rs, 224 Or 122, 355 P2d 224; P. U. *413Com. v. Portland Traction Co., 222 Or 614, 331 P2d 344.”
As to petitioner’s claim of undue breadth and lack of relevancy of the subpoena duces tecum, under the liberal rule for testing administrative agency subpoenas announced in Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Tax Com., 216 Or 605, 340 P2d 960 (1959), and approved in several recent United States Supreme Court cases cited in that opinion, I believe that the subpoena in this case meets the modern test of relevancy. In any event, as the majority opinion here properly points out, the school district has an adequate remedy at law by refusing to obey the subpoena and requiring the Commissioner to justify his position in a separate proceeding in a court of law as specifically provided in OES 183.440.① An evidentiary hearing is the proper and usual procedure to thresh out disputes as to the permissible scope of a subpoena duces tecum. OES 183.440; Okla. Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 US 186, 66 S Ct 494, 90 L Ed 614, 166 ALR 531 (1946). This certainly does not call for the granting of a writ of prohibition.
The school district says that to assemble the information requested by the Attorney General will *414cause it great inconvenience, expense and irreparable harm. It is also inconvenient, expensive and harmful to be denied employment or promotion because of race or color.
We are dealing with a remedial statute designed to eliminate job discrimination “because of race, religion, color, sex or national origin * * This is the declared public policy of Oregon. ORS 659.020. A remedial statute is construed liberally to effectuate its purposes. Myers/Sherwood v. Tualatin RFD, 5 Or App 142, 483 P2d 95 (1971) (firemen’s civil service act); Boling v. Nork, 232 Or 461, 375 P2d 548 (1962) (Workmen’s Compensation Act); Sunshine Dairy v. Peterson et al, 183 Or 305, 193 P2d 543 (1948) (Milk Control Act); Puget Sound B. & D. Co. v. S. U. C. C., 168 Or 614, 126 P2d 37 (1942) (Unemployment Compensation Act).
It is my conclusion that to allow the writ in this ease is a premature and an unwarranted intervention by the judicial branch of government into the operations of a specialized administrative agency of the executive branch to which the legislature has given the sensitive and difficult task of enforcing the state’s fair employment practices laws.
For these reasons I respectfully dissent.

 ORS 183.440 provides:
“Agency subpenas authorized by law shall be issued to any party to a contested case upon request and, to the extent required by agency rule, upon a statement or showing of general relevance and reasonable scope of the evidence sought. If any person fails to comply with any subpena so issued or any party or witness refuses to testify on any matters on which he may be lawfully interrogated, the judge of the circuit court of any county, on the application of the agency or of a designated representative of the agency, shall compel obedience by proceedings for contempt as in the case of disobedience of the requirements of a subpena issued from such court or a refusal to testify therein.”