Court Opinion

ID: 9755315
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:34:50.029077+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:06.181367
License: Public Domain

CATHERINE STONE, Justice,
dissenting.
George Rabago, like all individuals accused of criminal conduct, is entitled to a trial which preserves the presumption of innocence and the impartiality of the presiding judge. Because these basic rights were not safeguarded in the trial court, I respectfully dissent.
In the challenged portion of the court’s comments, the trial judge did not urge the jury to listen to the evidence carefully. Rather, the court indicated that Rabago was currently housed in the county jail, made an obscure reference to someone — • perhaps Rabago — being on “some form of misdemeanor punishment,” and provided information about Rabago’s repeat offender status and the effect that status had on the applicable range of punishment. The court also added an air of mystery by telling the jury about Rabago’s prior felony conviction, a matter which “the jury and no one else knows about except those of us involved in the case.” If anything, this information served to forewarn the jury they were dealing with an experienced criminal. Under these facts, I would conclude the presumption of innocence was seriously undermined in this case.
Likewise, the impartiality of the trial court is called into question by these comments. Because the jury was to determine guilt or innocence, and not assess punishment, the court’s comments about Rabago’s prior criminal history and the possible range of punishment were totally unnecessary. Accordingly, I would hold that the court’s comments constitute fundamental error that was not waived by Rabago’s failure to object.