Court Opinion

ID: 9738755
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:02:03.453233+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:08.269659
License: Public Domain

Fairchild and Gordon, JJ.
(dissenting). We must respectfully dissent from the conclusion that the complaint states no cause of action for negligence with respect to lighting. The commandeering of the Nead vehicle did not relieve Nead from the duty of using due care in the operation of his vehicle, except insofar as the officer may specifically have ordered a particular course of conduct. For example, if the officer ordered Nead to speed, Nead would not be subject *10to liability for complying. So too, if the officer ordered Nead to park his tractor-trailer without lights, Nead would be free of negligence in obeying this order.
There must be some limitation on the scope of the exemption from ordinary rules when one acts at the request of an officer. One who operates a vehicle in an- emergency in the necessary performance of public duties is exempted from certain rules, but the exemption shall not protect the operator from the consequence of a reckless disregard for the safety of others.1
“. . . whoever, in good faith,- renders assistance and obeys the orders and directions of a known public officer in response to a call for assistance is protected in making an arrest, although the officer may be acting wrongfully and may be personally liable for a false arrest.” (Emphasis supplied.) 2
Upon demurrer we cannot look beyond the complaint for our facts. This complaint is wholly devoid of allegations which would show that the officer had directed that the lighting provisions of sec. 85.06 (18), Stats. 1955, be ignored. Upon the face of the complaint, one cannot determine that the alleged negligence on the part of Nead with respect to inadequate lighting was committed in compliance with the commandeering officer’s mandate. Nor does the complaint reasonably suggest that by complying with sec. 85.06 (18) Nead would have thereby contradicted any express, or implied direction of the officers. The failure to comply with the statute may have been the result of Nead’s own negligence, and he should then be liable therefor. Accordingly, we would affirm the trial court’s order which overruled- the demurrer.
There is some question whether any liability , of the officers and assisting citizens under these circumstances would be *11governed by the law of intentional torts (including the scope of privilege) or by the law of negligence.3
We have made our comments in terms of negligence because the complaint and the opinion of the majority speak in those terms. Our view would be similar, however, in terms of the extent of the privilege intentionally to obstruct the highway.

 Sec. 85.12 (5), Stats. 1955.

 4 Am. Jur., Arrest, p. 80, sec. 129.

 See Schulze v. Kleeber (1960), 10 Wis. (2d) S40, 545, 103 N. W. (2d) 560.