Court Opinion

ID: 9638462
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:44:21.291058+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:06.244553
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
dissenting.
The majority performs a disservice to all concerned in its entirely summary treatment of appellant’s grounds of error one, two, and three. To simply quote at length the Supreme Court of the United States, then to drop a great mass of raw transcript into the margin and perform absolutely no analysis is to refuse to perform the appellate function of this Court. Such concluso-ry treatment is especially inappropriate in a case in which the death penalty has been assessed.
Specifically, I dissent to the majority’s disposition of ground of error three, regarding the exclusion for cause of venireman Edgar Lincoln Curry. Reverend Curry, an ordained minister, admittedly voiced strong religious and moral objections to the death penalty. When asked by the prosecutor if these objections were so strong that he “would automatically vote against the death penalty, regardless of what the facts might show in the case?” Curry responded, “Irregardless.”
This question and answer, however, are not dispositive. In Texas jurors do not “vote for” or “vote against” imposition of the death penalty. The question is not how the venireman might vote in a popular referendum concerning capital punishment, but whether he can set aside his personal feelings and truthfully answer the special issues of Art. 37.071, V.A.C.C.P., based on the law and the evidence of the particular case. Rev. Curry stated that he could do so:
Q. [by the prosecutor] Let’s assume the situation where you had been convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, what*158ever evidence is required to show you that proposition is true [the probability of appellant’s committing criminal acts of violence in the future], and, you know, there are some people in our society that continue to commit crimes day after day after day.
If you were convinced of that beyond a reasonable doubt, could you answer yes to that knowing that you have already answered yes to the first question and knowing that the two yes answers just—
A. Two yes answers would give him—
Q. —give him the death penalty?
A. —death penalty.
Q. Could you do that?
A. I would answer it truthfully if I was on the jury, yes.
Q. You could do that?
A. Yes.
The prospective juror continued to insist on his opposition to the death penalty in general, yet also continued to insist that he would truthfully answer the special issues based on the law and the evidence. He was clearly the type of juror who could not be excluded for cause, one who has scruples against the death penalty and yet will follow the law. Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980). It was only when the prosecutor suggested that the venireman could escape the troublesome duty of serving on the jury in this capital case by refusing to take the oath required of jurors, Art. 35.22, V.A.C.C.P., that Curry stated he would not take the oath. Appellant specifically objected to the State’s making this suggestion. The objection was overruled.
I dissent to this method of excluding a pefectly qualified juror, for the reasons elaborated in my dissenting opinion in Ellis v. State, 726 S.W.2d 39 (Tex.Cr.App., this day decided).
I also write to point out that there is no ambiguity to be resolved in Curry’s responses. He was not an equivocating juror. Every time he was asked the relevant questions regarding his ability to serve as a juror he responded that he would answer the special issues based on the law and the evidence. It was only when the trial court in the final round of questioning again reverted to the “vote against” questions that appellant stated he would not follow the evidence:
Q. —all I need to know at this point is how strong is that feeling, Reverend? Would you always vote against death or are there circumstances under which you could vote for it if the evidence shows you should?
A. Irregardless I will not change my position, that I will not want to be in a position to have to decide whether a man would live or die.
Q. All right.
A. And I would vote that he live irregardless to whether the evidence was presented.
Q. Every time?
A. Every time.
This was not equivocation. Every time he was asked in the abstract whether he would “vote against death” the venireman responded that he would. Nevertheless, every time he was asked whether he could answer the special issues in the affirmative if the evidence proved that they should be so answered, he responded that he would. It is true that he did not want to be placed in the position of performing this duty and so seized upon the escape offered by the State by saying he would not take the oath. But before he was given that option he stated that he could take an oath to render a true verdict based on the evidence, and would follow it. He was a classic example of the type of juror who, under Adams, supra, could set aside his personal feelings and vote based on the law and the evidence in spite of his expresed objection to the death penalty in general. He was thus qualified to serve.
I respectfully dissent.
TEAGUE, J., joins.
ONION, P.J., not participating.