Court Opinion

ID: 9465337
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 00:43:36.178704+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:07.558861
License: Public Domain

MERRILL, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I dissent. I agree with the district court that Jackson’s testimony as to her rape by appellant was properly admitted as part of the sequence of events during which the charged offense was committed. The witness was asked to describe what had occurred that evening; testimony respecting her rape served to put the charged offense in its factual setting. It was not proof that the accused had misbehaved on another occasion, from which the jury was invited to infer that he had misbehaved on this occasion. It was proof of what he actually did on this occasion. The evidence thus is clearly admissible under Rule 404(b), Federal Rules of.Evidence, being offered for a purpose other than proof of character. It was relevant because it bore directly on the charged offense.
With relevance thus established the question is whether under Rule 403, Federal Rules of Evidence, the prejudice to the accused outweighed the probative value attendant on presenting a clear picture of the circumstances under which the charged offense was committed. On that question I do not find this case distinguishable from United States v. Sangrey, 586 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir.) Under the standards set in Sangrey, the balance struck here by the trial judge did not amount to abuse of discretion.
As to cautionary instructions, in neither this case nor Sangrey was such an instruction requested. In our case one was given when the testimony was admitted. It may not have been the clearest of cautions, but if the failure to caution in Sangrey was not *1288plain error, a fortiori the failure to caution further here was not.