Court Opinion

ID: 9646949
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:17:57.511253+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:44.185241
License: Public Domain

John A. Fogleman, Justice, concurring in part, dissenting in part. I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court erred in tripling the jury’s verdict of $1,000 for timber damage. I certainly do not agree that the verdict amounted to a double recovery, and I thoroughly disagree with the statement that it was based on the same incident. The recovery of triple damages under Ark. Stat. Ann. § 50-105 (Repl. 1971) is for damages to the value of the thing damaged, broken, destroyed, or carried away, with costs. The things covered by the statute are trees, timber, rails, wood, stone, ground, clay, turf, mold, fruit, plants, grass, grain, corn, cotton, tobacco, hemp, or flax. The statute also covers glass in a building broken by the trespasser. It does not cover any other damages resulting from a trespass. This statute covers a particular kind of damage to a particular kind of property. It does not cover other trespasses. The appellees sought to recover for appellant’s trespass committed by entering their land and using a bulldozer to scrape the earth. It takes a stretch of the imagination to say that Ark. Stat. Ann. § 50-105 covers that kind of trespass. As appellees point out, the trespass by cutting the trees lay in the act of cutting apd destroying them, not in the entry on the land and the scraping with the bulldozer blade. There was testimony that Mrs. Stoner had used a bulldozer to widen the road through appellees’ property, in the course of which a portion of appellees’ yard had been cut out. The soil was disturbed elsewhere, according to this testimony. Mr. Houston also testified that, before the bulldozing, the property was beautiful and scenic, but that it is now scarred with two ugly gashes across it. If the jury accepted this testimony, appellees were entitled to common law damages for this damage in addition to the treble damages for destruction of trees. It is quite clear that the jury arrived at damages on the two items separately. The interrogatories submitted separated the damage to the trees and the damage for the trespass on the land. In my opinion this was proper. I agree with my brother Hickman that the rule that nominal damages will not support a punitive award is improper and subversive of the very purposes for which punitive damages are awarded. I would point out that in Manhattan Credit Company, Inc. v. Skirvin, 228 Ark. 913, 311 S.W. 2d 168, relied upon by the majority, we were treating Texas law, not Arkansas law. In that same case we pointed out that the authorities are hopelessly in conflict on this question, but said that Texas law applied because the conversion took place in Texas. Not only does the majority fail to cite any other case to support its position, appellant cited no other case supporting that position. Other cases cited by the appellant were cases where no actual damages were found. I do not think that we should follow our neighbor Texas in the application of an unsound and inappropriate rule. I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice Hickman joins in this opinion. Darrell Hickman, Justice. My main disagreement with the majority is regarding its statement that punitive damages will not be awarded if only nominal damages are awarded. Quite often punitive damages are the only remedy available to an individual to stop impermissible conduct. 1 would not like to preclude any litigant from being able to go to court and punish another person for outrageous conduct such as a willful trespass that might result in only nominal damages. For a more detailed explanation of the reasons lor punitive damages see Ray Dodge, Inc. v. Moore, 251 Ark. 1036, 479 S.W. 2d 518 (1972).