Court Opinion

ID: 9925303
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-19 15:00:35.258761+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:03.032277
License: Public Domain

22-1372-cr
United States v. Lespier

                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                               FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
                                      SUMMARY ORDER
Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order
filed on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 32.1 and this court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a
document filed with this court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an
electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order
must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel.

          At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the
City of New York, on the 19th day of January, two thousand twenty-four.

          PRESENT:         Steven J. Menashi,
                           Alison J. Nathan,
                           Maria Araújo Khan,
                                    Circuit Judges.
____________________________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                   Appellee,

             v.                                                       No. 22-1372-cr

RICHARD LESPIER, AKA RICKY,

                   Defendant-Appellant. *

____________________________________________

*   The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the caption as set forth above.
For Appellee:                                  KATHERINE E. BOYLES, Assistant
                                               United States Attorney (Sandra S.
                                               Glover, Assistant United States
                                               Attorney, on the brief), for Vanessa
                                               Roberts    Avery,   United    States
                                               Attorney    for   the   District   of
                                               Connecticut, New Haven, CT.

For Defendant-Appellant:                       CARLY      LEVENSON,      Assistant
                                               Federal Defender, for Terence S.
                                               Ward, Federal Defender for the
                                               District of Connecticut, Hartford,
                                               CT.

      Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District
of Connecticut (Bryant, J.).

      Upon due consideration, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and
DECREED that the order of the district court of June 21, 2022, is REMANDED for
further proceedings consistent with this order.

      Defendant-Appellant Richard Lespier appeals the denial of his request for
compassionate release pursuant to the First Step Act of 2018, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Lespier is serving a mandatory minimum life sentence for
murder in aid of racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(1). “We review the
denial of a motion for compassionate release for abuse of discretion.” United States
v. Halvon, 26 F.4th 566, 569 (2d Cir. 2022). Because “[a] district court has broad
discretion when considering a motion for compassionate release,” a district court
abuses its discretion only when it “bases its ruling ‘on an erroneous view of the
law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or renders a decision
that cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.’” Id. (quoting

                                         2
United States v. Borden, 564 F.3d 100, 104 (2d Cir. 2009)). We assume the parties’
familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues on
appeal.

                                             I

        The First Step Act effectively establishes “three requirements that must be
satisfied before a court can grant” a motion for compassionate release:
(1) exhaustion of administrative remedies, “absent waiver or forfeiture by the
government,” (2) a balancing of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors that favors release,
and (3) a determination that the defendant’s “circumstances are indeed
‘extraordinary and compelling.’” United States v. Keitt, 21 F.4th 67, 71 (2d Cir. 2021)
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)). “[I]f a district court determines that one of
these conditions is lacking, it need not address the remaining ones.” Id. at 73.

        In this case, the district court’s order denying compassionate release read in
full:

        Noting the Defendant’s laudable conduct while incarcerated the court
        for the reasons stated in the Government’s cogent objection, most
        notably the fact that the Defendant is subject to a mandatory
        minimum life sentence, denies the motion.

J. App’x 18. An order denying compassionate relief may be “brief” so long as “it
communicates ‘some indication of the rationale for the ruling.’” United States v.
Chen, No. 21-2595, 2023 WL 3589894, at *2 (2d Cir. May 23, 2023) (quoting United
States v. Christie, 736 F.3d 191, 196 (2d Cir. 2013)); see also Concepcion v. United States,
597 U.S. 481, 501 (2022) (“[A] district court is not required to be persuaded by every
argument parties make, and it may, in its discretion, dismiss arguments that it
does not find compelling without a detailed explanation.”). And a district court
may incorporate by reference a party’s arguments—as the district court did here—
without abusing its discretion. See Chavez-Meza v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1959,
1965 (2018) (“In some cases, it may be sufficient for purposes of appellate review
that the judge simply relied upon the record.”). On appeal, this court will read
                                             3
such orders “in context with the government’s submissions and the district court’s
prior compassionate-release orders,” United States v. Goodman, No. 22-527, 2023
WL 3513573, at *2 (2d Cir. May 18, 2023), and will “discern the court’s reasons for
denying relief from the ‘history of the case,’” United States v. Foskey, No. 21-149,
2022 WL 92043, at *1 (2d Cir. Jan. 10, 2022) (quoting Christie, 736 F.3d at 196). In
this way, “[t]he context and the record may render a district court’s explanation
adequate even where the judge might have said more.” United States v. Rosa, 957
F.3d 113, 119 (2d Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, a district
court need not always expressly address the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) because “[a] district court is presumed to have ‘considered all relevant
§ 3553(a) factors and arguments’ unless the record suggests otherwise.” Halvon, 26
F.4th at 570 (quoting Rosa, 957 F.3d at 118).

       For these reasons, the brevity of the order does not itself indicate an abuse
of discretion. 1

                                               II

       The only potential deficiency in the district court’s order was its treatment
of the mandatory minimum sentence. We explained in United States v. Brooker that
“the First Step Act freed district courts to consider the full slate of extraordinary
and compelling reasons that an imprisoned person might bring before them in
motions for compassionate release.” 976 F.3d 228, 237 (2020). Following Brooker,
we “explicitly h[e]ld that a mandatory minimum sentence does not preclude a
district court from reducing a term of imprisonment on a motion for
compassionate release.” Halvon, 26 F.4th at 570.

       Thus, per Halvon, if the district court denied Lespier’s motion for
compassionate release on the ground that his mandatory minimum sentence
categorically precluded the court from granting the motion, it erred. However, if

1Although a brief order may suffice, we note that the better practice typically would be for the
district court to provide litigants with a thorough explanation of its decision.

                                                4
the district court treated the mandatory minimum sentence as one relevant
consideration, that decision would fall within the district court’s “broad
discretion.” Id. at 569. The district court’s order is not entirely clear as to whether
it viewed the mandatory minimum sentence as a categorical bar.

      On the one hand, there are reasons to think that the district court did not
treat the mandatory minimum as a categorical bar to compassionate release. First,
the district court’s order weighs the government’s arguments against “the
Defendant’s laudable conduct while incarcerated,” suggesting it did not believe
that the mandatory minimum sentence categorically settled the issue. J. App’x 18.
Second, the district court referred to “the reasons stated in the Government’s
cogent objection, most notably the fact that the Defendant is subject to a mandatory
minimum life sentence,” id., and the government’s objection generally does not
treat the mandatory minimum sentence as a categorical bar. The government’s
objection cites several cases in which compassionate release was granted despite
mandatory minimum sentences, and it distinguishes those cases from this one. Id.
at 121-23. The government’s opposition acknowledges that district courts in our
circuit have previously “been willing to reduce lengthy sentences, including
sentences imposed pursuant to mandatory minimums,” but it argues that those
cases involved “some special factor impacting the defendant” that is not present
here. Id. at 122. The government’s opposition argues that “Lespier’s punishment
… provides no basis for reducing his sentence,” given the lack of special factors
such as the defendant’s youth. Id. at 123. Moreover, the government’s opposition
emphasizes that the mandatory minimum sentence means that the length of
Lespier’s sentence is “no outlier” and that “[a]n identical defendant sentenced for
the first time in 2022 would still face the same mandatory minimum of life in
prison.” Id. at 121. If the district court intended to adopt these “reasons stated in
the Government’s … objection,” it did not abuse its discretion.

      On the other hand, one passage in the government’s objection seems to
contradict Halvon—and indeed the government was unaware of Halvon because it
was decided the same day the objection was filed. That passage argues that “‘the

                                          5
length of the sentence cannot be an extraordinary and compelling reason to grant
compassionate release because this would infringe on the legislature’s province to
fix penalties. This is especially true’ in cases involving statutory mandatory
minimums.” Id. at 122 (alteration omitted) (quoting United States v. Andrews, 480
F. Supp. 3d 669, 678-79 (E.D. Pa. 2020), aff’d, 12 F.4th 255 (3d Cir. 2021)). The
passage continues to say that “[i]n seeking a modification of a mandatory
minimum sentence, the defendant essentially ‘asks the Court to reevaluate his
sentence and fashion its own brand of justice. But to do so in this manner would
intrude on legislative prerogatives.’” Id. (quoting Andrews, 480 F. Supp. 3d at 679).
These statements might suggest that the district court understood itself to be
categorically barred from granting compassionate release in cases involving a
mandatory minimum sentence. If the district court believed that it was
categorically barred, contra Halvon, its order would have reflected a legal error. We
therefore cannot say for certain whether the district court abused its discretion in
denying compassionate release.

      The practice of affirming a judgment but “remand[ing] partial jurisdiction
to the district court to supplement the record on a discrete factual or legal issue
while retaining jurisdiction over the original appeal” is known in this circuit as a
Jacobson remand. Rosa, 957 F.3d at 121 n.29 (quoting Corporación Mexicana De
Mantenimiento Integral, S. De R.L. De C.V. v. Pemex-Exploración Y Producción, 832
F.3d 92, 115 (2d Cir. 2016) (Winter, J., concurring)); see United States v. Jacobson, 15
F.3d 19, 22 (2d Cir. 1994).

      Given the ambiguity in the district court’s order, we believe that a Jacobson
remand is appropriate for the district court to supplement its order to clarify
whether its decision was consistent with Halvon. Although we remand for
clarification as to the basis for the denial of compassionate release, on remand the
district court may consider Lespier’s arguments and determine that it would
instead grant the motion for compassionate release. See United States v. Nosov,
No. 21-187, 2022 WL 803985, at *2 (2d Cir. Mar. 17, 2022).

                                           6
                                   *      *      *

      We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments, which we conclude
are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we remand the case to the district
court pursuant to Jacobson to clarify the reasons for its denial of Lespier’s
compassionate release motion or, in the alternative, to conclude that it should
grant the motion. Upon the district court’s issuance of a new order, either party
may restore the matter to the active docket of this court by letter without filing a
new notice of appeal. If either party seeks further action from this court, the matter
will be referred to this panel.

                                        FOR THE COURT:
                                        Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

                                          7