Court Opinion

ID: 9946011
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-28 21:03:34.362983+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:24:34.455452
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/28/24 Valadez v. In-N-Out Burgers CA2/3
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                      SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                  DIVISION THREE
 ERIKA VALADEZ et al.,                                      B318125

          Plaintiffs and Appellants,                        (Los Angeles County
                                                            Super. Ct. No. BC675696)
          v.

 IN-N-OUT BURGERS,

          Defendant and Respondent.

     APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Malcolm Mackey, Judge. Affirmed.
     Mallison & Martinez, Stan S. Mallison, Hector R. Martinez,
and Gonzalo Quezada for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
     Littler Mendelson, Fermin H. Llaguno, and Michael L.
Kibbe for Defendant and Respondent.
                 ‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
       Plaintiffs Erika Valadez and Efren Lara appeal from the
trial court’s judgment affirming an arbitration award in favor of
defendant In-N-Out Burgers (INO). Plaintiffs contend the court
erred in concluding their employment-related claims were subject
to arbitration. Valadez argues that INO failed to prove she
signed the arbitration agreement, and both plaintiffs assert that
even if they signed it, they timely opted out of the agreement.
Plaintiffs also argue the arbitration agreement was
unconscionable. We affirm.
       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       Lara and Valadez began working for INO in 1987 and 2008,
respectively. Lara was Valadez’s direct supervisor at INO’s meat
processing facility. In September 2017, Valadez, Lara, and five
others1 filed a complaint against INO, alleging sexual and
national origin discrimination, sexual harassment, hostile work
environment, and other employment-related claims.
I.     Motion to Compel Arbitration
       In February 2018, INO filed a motion to compel arbitration
of plaintiffs’ claims. In support of the motion, INO’s Regional
Human Resources Manager, Deborah Marianno, attested that in
2013, plaintiffs received and electronically signed INO’s dispute
resolution agreement (DRA) through an online training module.
The training module provided the associate a copy of the four-
page DRA in both English and Spanish. The DRA stated the
agreement was governed by the Federal Arbitration Act. It
explained:

1     We do not discuss the five other plaintiffs any further. We
use “plaintiffs” to refer solely to Valadez and Lara.

                                2
      Except as it otherwise provides, this Agreement is
      intended to apply to the resolution of disputes that
      otherwise would be resolved in a court of law, and
      therefore this Agreement requires all such disputes
      to be resolved only by an arbitrator through final and
      binding arbitration and not by way of court or jury
      trial. Such disputes include without limitation
      disputes arising out of or relating to interpretation or
      application of this Agreement, but not as to the
      enforceability, revocability or validity of the
      Agreement or any portion of the Agreement.

      The Agreement also applies, without limitation, to
      disputes regarding the employment relationship,
      trade secrets, unfair competition, compensation,
      breaks and rest periods, termination, or harassment
      and claims arising under the Uniform Trade Secrets
      Act, Civil Rights Act of 1964, Americans With
      Disabilities Act, Age Discrimination in Employment
      Act, Family Medical Leave Act, Fair Labor Standards
      Act, Employee Retirement Income Security Act,
      Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act, and
      state statutes, if any, addressing the same or similar
      subject matters, and all other state statutory and
      common law claims (excluding worker[’]s
      compensation state disability insurance and
      unemployment insurance claims).

       The DRA further stated the arbitrator “shall be selected by
mutual agreement of [INO and the employee]” and that “the
parties will have the right to conduct adequate civil discovery,
bring dispositive motions, and present witnesses and evidence as
needed to present their cases and defenses, and any disputes in
this regard shall be resolved by the Arbitrator.” As to paying for
arbitration, the DRA stated: “Each party will pay the fees for his,

                                 3
her or its own attorneys, subject to any remedies to which that
party may later be entitled under applicable law. However, in all
cases where required by law, the Company will pay the
Arbitrator’s and arbitration fees. If under applicable law the
Company is not required to pay all of the Arbitrator’s and for
arbitration fees, such fee(s) will be apportioned between the
parties in accordance with said applicable law, and any disputes
in that regard will be resolved by the Arbitrator.”
      Although the DRA waived the employee’s right to “bring
any dispute in arbitration on . . . a class, collective, or private
attorney general basis,” it provided that the waiver “shall be
severable in any case in which the dispute is filed as an
individual action and severance is necessary to ensure that the
individual action proceeds in arbitration.”
      Paragraph 10 of the DRA, titled “An Associate’s Right to
Opt Out of this Agreement” stated:
      An Associate may submit a form stating that the
      Associate wishes to opt out and not be subject to this
      Agreement. The Associate must submit a signed and
      dated statement on a “Dispute Resolution Agreement
      Opt Out Form” (“Form”) that can be obtained from
      the Company’s website, www.in-n-out.com, under the
      Associate Events/Associate Portal tab at the bottom
      of the home page. In order to be effective, the signed
      and dated Form must be returned to the Human
      Resources Department within 30 days of the
      Associate’s receipt of this Agreement. For Associates
      under 18 years old choosing to opt out, the signed and
      dated Form must be returned to the Human
      Resources Department within 30 days of the receipt
      of the Agreement by the Associate’s parent or
      guardian. An Associate who timely opts out as
      provided in this paragraph will not be subject to any

                                 4
      adverse employment action as a consequence of that
      decision and may pursue available legal remedies
      without regard to this Agreement. Should an
      Associate not opt out of this Agreement within 30
      days of the Associate’s (or minor Associate’s parent or
      guardian’s) receipt of this Agreement, continuing the
      Associate’s employment constitutes mutual
      acceptance of the terms of this Agreement by
      Associate and the Company. An Associate has the
      right to consult with counsel of the Associate’s choice
      concerning this Agreement.

       To access the DRA training module which presented the
agreement quoted in part above, associates were required to
input their unique associate number and their personal
identification number (PIN), which they were prohibited from
sharing with others. Marianno stated: “Toward the conclusion of
the module [informing the associate of her rights and obligations
under the DRA], a dialog box asks the Associate to acknowledge
her receipt of the DRA as well as her understanding that, among
other things, she may voluntarily opt out of the DRA and, if she
does not timely do so, ‘it constitutes mutual acceptance’ of the
DRA. The Associate acknowledges this by clicking a button
stating, ‘I acknowledge,’ at the bottom of the dialog box. After the
completion of the module, after the Associate’s acknowledgment
of the DRA, the signature and date line of the DRA become
populated with the Associate’s printed name and the date and
time of the Associate’s assent, respectively. A record of this
activity gets saved in INO’s electronic databases in the ordinary
course of business.” In addition, the training module explained
“the process an Associate should undertake should they have
wished to opt out from the DRA. Further, the module explained

                                 5
that any associate questions or concerns could be addressed to
either the Legal or Human Resources Departments and provides
a phone number to contact.” Marianno stated that since the
implementation of the DRA in 2012, more than 260 associates
have opted out.
       Marianno attested INO’s records showed that in February
2013, Valadez and Lara completed the DRA training module, and
received and acknowledged the DRA. Marianno attached as
exhibits to her declaration records of Valadez’s and Lara’s
electronically-signed and time-stamped agreements, which state
above their signatures: “I acknowledge receipt of and agree to
this Dispute Resolution Agreement.” Marianno reported that
INO did not receive opt out forms from Valadez or Lara.
II.    Opposition to the Motion to Compel Arbitration
       In March 2018, Valadez and Lara filed their opposition to
INO’s motion to compel arbitration, attacking the DRA’s
formation and fairness. They first argued their “ ‘electronic
acknowledgments’ [on the DRAs were] not valid signatures and
[did] not create a contract.” Valadez denied ever seeing the DRA
module and insinuated another employee electronically forged it
with her employee identification number. Lara asserted he
signed it under threat of termination.
       In her declaration, Valadez attested her primary language
is Spanish but she can read and speak English on a basic level.
Valadez averred that while working for INO, she never used a
computer and did not know how to use a computer. Valadez
stated that on two occasions she was assisted by bilingual INO
coworker Ana Rodriguez in completing surveys on the computer.
However, Valadez attested these two occasions did not involve
the DRA. She stated the first time she saw the DRA was when

                               6
INO produced it to her attorneys in response to a request for her
personnel file. She said that she never participated in any online
modules and never clicked on any acknowledge button to sign the
DRA. She attested that not only Rodriguez, but other
supervisors, managers, and assistants knew how to log into her
employee account using her associate number. Valadez denied
having a PIN. In 2017, Valadez completed the opt out form and
submitted it to INO’s human resources department.
      Lara (Valadez’s supervisor) also attested: “Valadez did not
personally use a computer at the times indicated [by Marianno].
Instead, another employee logged in under [Valadez’s account]
and input information for [her]. This was a common practice for
employees who did not speak English or know how to use
computers.” Counsel argued someone else from INO signed
Valadez’s name to the DRA without her consent.
      In his declaration, Lara admitted to electronically signing
the DRA in February 2014 but only because his supervisor told
him he would need to “get a lawyer” if he did not sign it. Lara
attested he felt that he would be fired if he did not sign
immediately and he did not read the DRA when he signed it.
Lara subsequently submitted the DRA opt out form in 2017 with
assistance from his lawyers.
      Plaintiffs also asserted the DRA was unenforceable because
it was unconscionable. They argued that the DRA was
procedurally unconscionable since it was “clearly [a contract] of
adhesion,” failed to state the method for selecting an arbitrator,
and provided no rules for arbitration. Plaintiffs contended the
DRA was substantively unconscionable since it lacked mutuality
with regard to a confidentiality agreement. If plaintiffs violated

                                7
their confidentiality agreement with INO, INO could apply to a
court for injunctive relief.
III. INO’s Reply
       In May 2018, INO filed its reply, attacking plaintiffs’
credibility. INO pointed out that Valadez (who had attested she
never had a PIN and thus could not electronically sign the DRA)
needed a PIN to clock in and out of work, complete and receive
evaluations, and do other necessary work functions. Valadez’s
performance evaluations from 2011 through 2013 showed her
electronic signatures with date stamps, all made by using her
unique PIN. INO also produced a copy of INO’s “Personal
Identification Number (PIN) Policy,” which Valadez signed by
hand. In the signed policy, Valadez acknowledged that she must
(1) “take all steps necessary to protect the confidentiality of [her]
PIN”; (2) “not under any circumstances share [her] PIN with
anyone”; (3) “establish a new PIN in a confidential manner” if she
forgets it or if someone learns her PIN; and (4) “not use another
person’s PIN under any circumstances.” Several other INO
employees from the meat packing facility also attested that
associates’ PINs were confidential and were not shared with
others.
       In support of the reply, Rodriguez declared that when she
was an associate in the meat department, at the request of her
supervisors, she occasionally helped associates, whose primary
language was Spanish, complete INO’s web-based performance
evaluations. Her assistance was limited to translating words or
sentences associates did not understand. Rodriguez stated she
did not know Valadez’s or any other employee’s PIN. Rodriguez
had observed Valadez log herself into the computer during
training modules and Valadez had no trouble using the computer.

                                 8
Rodriguez only minimally assisted Valadez with translation.
According to INO’s attendance records, Rodriguez was not at
work on the date Valadez electronically signed the DRA.
       INO also asserted Lara’s failure to read the DRA and to opt
out as permitted in the DRA were a result of Lara’s own lack of
diligence and not any procedural unconscionability on the part of
INO. Lara’s supervisor contradicted Lara’s statements and
attested that he did not compel Lara to sign anything, he was
never pressured by his superiors to obtain anybody’s agreement
to the DRA, and he always understood that associates could opt
out of the DRA at their choosing without any negative
repercussions. INO additionally pointed out that a section of the
DRA contained the rules for arbitration.
IV. The Court’s Ruling and Subsequent Entry of
       Judgment
       In June 2018, after hearing argument, the court found
“plaintiffs expressly [agreed] to resolve any dispute they have
with the defendant [INO] arising from their employment through
binding arbitration. The agreements were entered electronically
after each employee accessed the document online.” The court
granted INO’s motion to compel arbitration, stayed the matter,
and ordered the parties into binding arbitration.
       Three years later, after successfully defending against
plaintiffs’ claims, INO filed its petition to confirm the contractual
arbitration award. In January 2022, the trial court entered
judgment in favor of INO, stating plaintiffs take nothing by their
complaint. Plaintiffs timely appealed.
                            DISCUSSION
       Plaintiffs assert: (1) INO failed to prove Valadez assented
to the arbitration agreements, (2) both plaintiffs opted out of the

                                  9
agreement, and (3) the DRA was procedurally and substantively
unconscionable.
I.     General Principles
       “Although the arbitration agreement in the present case
provides that the arbitration is to be governed by the [Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA)] and not California law, generally the
California Arbitration Act [(CAA, Code Civ. Proc.,2 §§ 1280–
1294.2)] governs arbitral procedures brought in California
courts.” (Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC (2015) 61 Cal.4th
899, 922.) Under the CAA, “when a petition to compel arbitration
is filed and accompanied by prima facie evidence of a written
agreement to arbitrate the controversy, the court itself must
determine whether the agreement exists and, if any defense to its
enforcement is raised, whether it is enforceable. Because the
existence of the agreement is a statutory prerequisite to granting
the petition, the petitioner bears the burden of proving its
existence by a preponderance of the evidence. If the party
opposing the petition raises a defense to enforcement . . . that
party bears the burden of producing evidence of, and proving by a
preponderance of the evidence, any fact necessary to the defense.”
(Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14
Cal.4th 394, 413 (Rosenthal); §§ 1281.2, 1290.2.) “In these
summary proceedings, the trial court sits as a trier of fact,
weighing all the affidavits, declarations, and other documentary
evidence, as well as oral testimony received at the court’s
discretion, to reach a final determination. [Citation.]” (Engalla
v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 972.)

2    All subsequent statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.

                               10
      Where, as in this case, the order granting a motion to
compel arbitration depends on resolution of disputed facts, we
review the decision for substantial evidence. (Ahern v. Asset
Management Consultants, Inc. (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 675, 687
(Ahern).) In doing so, we must “ ‘ “ ‘accept the trial court’s
resolution of disputed facts when supported by substantial
evidence; we must presume the court found every fact and drew
every permissible inference necessary to support its judgment,
and defer to its determination of the credibility of witnesses and
the weight of the evidence.’ ” ’ ” (Hotels Nevada, LLC v. L.A.
Pacific Center, Inc. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 336, 348.)
II.   Substantial Evidence Supported the Court’s Finding
      that Valadez Agreed to the DRA3
      Valadez argues INO failed to prove that she agreed to the
DRA. “Every contract requires mutual assent or consent (Civ.
Code, §§ 1550, 1565), and ordinarily one who signs an instrument
which on its face is a contract is deemed to assent to all its terms.
A party cannot avoid the terms of a contract on the ground that
he or she failed to read it before signing.” (Marin Storage &
Trucking, Inc. v. Benco Contracting & Engineering, Inc. (2001) 89
Cal.App.4th 1042, 1049 (Marin Storage).)
      Under Civil Code section 1633.7, “an electronic signature
has the same legal effect as a handwritten signature.” (Ruiz v.
Moss Bros. Auto Group, Inc. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836, 843
(Ruiz).) “Civil Code section 1633.9 addresses how a proponent of
an electronic signature may authenticate the signature—that is,
show the signature is, in fact, the signature of the person the

3      Lara did not deny signing the DRA; on appeal, he argues
that it is unenforceable for other reasons discussed below.

                                 11
proponent claims it is. The statute states: ‘(a) An electronic
record or electronic signature is attributable to a person if it was
the act of the person. The act of the person may be shown in any
manner, including a showing of the efficacy of any security
procedure applied to determine the person to which the electronic
record or electronic signature was attributable.’ (Civ. Code,
§ 1633.9, subd. (a), italics added.)” (Ruiz, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th
at p. 843.)
       Valadez cites her own declaration and argues “the record
clearly reflects that someone other than Valadez accessed the
online training module and affixed her signature without her
authorization, knowledge, or consent.” She contends that INO
summarily asserted that Valadez signed the DRA and that
Regional Human Resources Manager Marriano’s declaration was
insufficient to authenticate Valadez’s signature. We disagree.
       Marianno attested INO’s records showed that on February
27, 2013, Valadez completed the DRA training module and
electronically signed the DRA by entering her employee
identification number and her PIN. Upon entry of these
numbers, Valadez’s printed name and the date and time of her
assent populated the signature and date line of the DRA; a record
of the agreement was saved to INO’s electronic database. Entry
of the employee identification number and PIN was the only way
to create this electronic record. Declarations from Marianno and
other employees, and the copy of INO’s PIN Policy, hand-signed
by Valadez, supported the court’s implicit conclusion that despite
Valadez’s assertion otherwise, Valadez had a PIN, which she was
prohibited from sharing with others, and that she regularly used
for routine work functions. The court could reasonably conclude
that the electronic signature on the DRA was attributable to

                                12
Valadez since INO’s evidence indicated the PIN was known solely
to her.
      The court was not required to believe Valadez’s statements
to the contrary. And, “[i]t is not the function of this court to
reweigh the evidence and substitute its judgment for the
judgment of the trial court.” (Berman v. Health Net (2000) 80
Cal.App.4th 1359, 1373 [affirming trial court’s denial of a motion
to compel arbitration].) Valadez’s assertion that the
authentication was invalid because INO’s security measures
lacked integrity fails for the same reason. The court was entitled
to disbelieve Valadez’s statements about how others logged her
into computers, particularly in light of INO’s employee
declarations that they did not do so.
      Valadez likens the facts here to Ruiz, supra, 232
Cal.App.4th at pages 842–844, asserting INO’s evidence was
insufficient to prove her consent. In Ruiz, the Court of Appeal
concluded the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that
an electronic signature on the arbitration agreement was the act
of Ruiz because the business manager authenticating the
arbitration agreement “summarily asserted . . . that Ruiz was the
person who electronically signed the [arbitration] agreement.”
(Ruiz, at p. 843.) The fatal flaw of the business manager’s
declaration was that she “did not explain that an electronic
signature . . . could only have been placed on the [arbitration]
agreement . . . by a person using Ruiz’s ‘unique login ID and
password’; that the date and time printed next to the electronic
signature indicated the date and time the electronic signature
was made; that all . . . employees were required to use their
unique login ID and password when they . . . signed electronic
forms and agreements; and the electronic signature . . . was,

                               13
therefore, apparently made by Ruiz on September 21, 2011, at
11:47 a.m.” (Ibid.)
       In contrast, Marianno’s declarations provided these critical
facts. INO’s evidence more closely tracks the declaration
proffered by the employer in Espejo v. Southern California
Permanente Medical Group (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1047 (Espejo).
Distinguishing its facts from the facts in Ruiz, the Espejo court
found sufficient evidence that the employee signed the
arbitration agreement where the employer’s declarant detailed
the “security precautions regarding transmission and use of an
applicant’s unique username and password, as well as the steps
an applicant would have to take to place his or her name on the
signature line of the employment agreement and the
[agreement]” by using that unique username and password. (Id.
at 1062.) Like in Espejo, the details provided by Marianno satisfy
the requirements articulated in Ruiz and establish that the
electronic signature on the document was an act of Valadez.
       Without citation to authority, Valadez asserts that INO
failed to prove she signed the DRA because INO did not offer a
“percipient witness who . . . personally witnessed Valadez click
the button acknowledging her consent to affix her electronic
signature [or] who could attest that they at least heard Valadez
verbally agree to allow another employee to affix her electronic
signature to the document.” However, INO needed only to
demonstrate that the electronic signature was Valadez’s act,
which could be shown “in any manner,” including by
demonstrating that the DRA could only be signed by Valadez
using her unique employee identification number and private

                                14
PIN. (Civ. Code, § 1633.9, subd. (a); Ruiz, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th
at p. 843.)4
III. Plaintiffs Did Not Timely Opt Out of the DRA
       Plaintiffs argue that even if they signed the DRA, they
timely opted out within 30 days of receiving a physical copy of the
DRA after their attorneys requested their employment records.
Although plaintiffs made factual assertions in their declarations
about opting out, in their opposition brief before the trial court,
they did not argue that the DRA was inapplicable to their claims
due to their belated opt outs. (See Blankenship v. Allstate Ins.
Co. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 87, 105 [“We do not consider factual
arguments raised for the first time on appeal, and this argument
is forfeited.”].) Although we generally do not consider such a
factual argument for the first time on appeal, we nonetheless
exercise our discretion to address this purely legal question
because of the undisputed factual record. (DD Hair Lounge, LLC
v. State Farm General Ins. Co. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1238, 1243.)
       According to paragraph 10 of the DRA, “In order [for the
opt out] to be effective, the signed and dated Form must be
returned to the Human Resources Department within 30 days of
the Associate’s receipt of this Agreement.” Plaintiffs assert
“receipt” means when they obtained a copy of the agreement in
2017.

4     In their reply brief, plaintiffs argue the court abused its
discretion in declining to hold an evidentiary hearing on the issue
of consent. We disagree. “There is simply no authority for the
proposition that a trial court necessarily abuses its discretion, in
a motion proceeding, by resolving evidentiary conflicts without
hearing live testimony.” (Rosenthal, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 414.)
The court had adequate evidence before it to make its decision.

                                15
       In making this argument, plaintiffs ignore the plain
language of the agreement. “We interpret words in a contract in
accordance with their ordinary and popular sense, unless the
words are used in a technical sense or a special meaning is given
to them by usage. [Citation.] If contractual language is clear and
explicit and does not involve an absurdity, the plain meaning
governs.” (Westrec Marina Management, Inc. v. Arrowood
Indemnity Co. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1392.)
       The final page of the DRA, above plaintiffs’ time-stamped
signatures, states, “I acknowledge receipt of and agree to this
Dispute Resolution Agreement.” Thus, Valadez and Lara
received the DRA on February 27 and 28, 2013, respectively, as
reflected on the signature lines of their electronically-signed
DRAs. Since plaintiffs submitted their opt out forms years after
receiving the DRA, they failed to timely opt out within 30 days of
receipt.
IV. Despite Some Procedural Unconscionability, the
       Agreement Was Enforceable
       Plaintiffs also argue the DRA was unenforceable because it
is unconscionable. “ ‘[G]enerally applicable contract defenses,
such as . . . unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate
arbitration agreements without contravening’ the FAA.
[Citations.] Unconscionability consists of both procedural and
substantive elements. The procedural element addresses the
circumstances of contract negotiation and formation, focusing on
oppression or surprise due to unequal bargaining power.
[Citations.] Substantive unconscionability pertains to the
fairness of an agreement’s actual terms and to assessments of
whether they are overly harsh or one-sided. [Citations.] A
contract term is not substantively unconscionable when it merely

                               16
gives one side a greater benefit; rather, the term must be ‘so one-
sided as to “shock the conscience.” ’ ” (Pinnacle Museum Tower
Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55
Cal.4th 223, 246 (Pinnacle).)
      “The party resisting arbitration bears the burden of proving
unconscionability. [Citations.] Both procedural
unconscionability and substantive unconscionability must be
shown, but ‘they need not be present in the same degree’ and are
evaluated on ‘ “a sliding scale.” ’ [Citation.] ‘[T]he more
substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of
procedural unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion
that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa.’ ” (Pinnacle,
supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 247.)
      “[U]nconscionability is a question of law we review de novo.
[Citation.] To the extent the trial court’s determination on the
issue turned on the resolution of contested facts, we would review
the court’s factual determinations for substantial evidence.”
(Carmona v. Lincoln Millennium Car Wash, Inc. (2014) 226
Cal.App.4th 74, 82.)
      a.     Procedural Unconscionability
      Procedural unconscionability requires oppression or
surprise. (Pinnacle, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 247.) “ ‘Oppression
occurs where a contract involves lack of negotiation and
meaningful choice, surprise where the allegedly unconscionable
provision is hidden within a prolix printed form.’ ” (Morris v.
Redwood Empire Bancorp (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1305, 1317.)
“A procedural unconscionability analysis ‘begins with an inquiry
into whether the contract is one of adhesion.’ [Citation.] An
adhesive contract is standardized, generally on a preprinted
form, and offered by the party with superior bargaining power ‘on

                                17
a take-it-or-leave-it basis.’ ” (OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th
111, 126; see Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare
Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 113 (Armendariz).) Under
California law, “an opt-out provision does not insulate an
arbitration agreement from a finding of procedural
unconscionability.” (Swain v. LaserAway Medical Group, Inc.
(2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 59, 69.)
       In Gentry v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443, 470
(Gentry), abrogated on other grounds by Iskanian v. CLS
Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348, 360
(Iskanian), our Supreme Court held that a 30-day opt out
provision, like the one at issue in this case, did not automatically
eliminate procedural unconscionability and must be considered in
light of the rest of the circumstances of the contract. The court
explained, “It is true that freedom to choose whether or not to
enter a contract of adhesion is a factor weighing against a finding
of procedural unconscionability.” (Gentry, at p. 470.)
       Despite the opt out provision, the Supreme Court concluded
there was no authentic informed choice made by Gentry based on
the one-sided information provided by his employer, Circuit City.
(Gentry, supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 470–472.) At the time of hiring,
Circuit City gave Gentry “a packet that included an ‘Associate
Issue Resolution Package’ and Circuit City’s ‘Dispute Resolution
Rules and Procedures.’ ” (Id. at p. 451.) Although the package
“alluded to some of the shortcomings of arbitration in the general
sense, it did not mention any of the additional significant
disadvantages that this particular arbitration agreement had
compared to litigation.” (Id. at p. 470.) The Circuit City
arbitration agreement significantly curtailed the employee’s legal
remedies and rights by reducing the statute of limitations for

                                18
overtime wages and the recovery period for backpay, imposing a
maximum of $5,000 in punitive damages, and eliminating the
employee’s ability to recover attorney fees if successful in
arbitration. (Id. at pp. 470–471.) The court explained that
although an employee who read the dispute resolution rules and
procedures “would have encountered the above provisions, only a
legally sophisticated party would have understood that these
rules and procedures are considerably less favorable to an
employee than those operating in a judicial forum.” (Id. at
p. 471.)
       The Supreme Court further stated, “it is not clear that
someone in Gentry’s position would have felt free to opt out. The
materials provided to Gentry made unmistakably clear that
Circuit City preferred that the employee participate in the
arbitration program. The ‘Associate Issue Resolution Handbook’
distributed with the opt[]out form touted the virtues of
arbitration, including use of the all-capitalized subheading—
WHY ARBITRATION IS RIGHT FOR YOU AND CIRCUIT
CITY—that left no doubt about Circuit City’s preference. The
fact that the arbitration agreement was structured so that
arbitration was the default dispute resolution procedure from
which the employee had to opt out underscored Circuit City’s
proarbitration stance. Given the inequality between employer
and employee and the economic power that the former wields
over the latter [citation], it is likely that Circuit City employees
felt at least some pressure not to opt out of the arbitration
agreement. The lack of material information about the
disadvantageous terms of the arbitration agreement, combined
with the likelihood that employees felt at least some pressure not
to opt out of the arbitration agreement, leads to the conclusion

                                 19
that the present agreement was, at the very least, not entirely
free from procedural unconscionability.” (Gentry, supra, 42
Cal.4th at pp. 471–472.)
       As there was some procedural unconscionability, the
Supreme Court remanded for the Court of Appeal to analyze the
existence of substantive unconscionability, which it had not
addressed on appeal. (Gentry, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 472.) The
Court stated: “To reiterate, the fact that some degree of
procedural unconscionability is present does not mean
necessarily that the arbitration agreement is unenforceable. But
it does mean that the agreement is not immune from judicial
scrutiny to determine whether or not its terms are so one-sided or
oppressive as to be substantively unconscionable.” (Id. at p. 472.)
       Similarly here, the DRA suffers from some of the flaws
exhibited by the Gentry agreement. First and foremost, INO
required plaintiffs to sign and acknowledge the DRA; plaintiffs
had no choice but to do this to complete the training module. To
opt out, INO employees had to go through two extra steps:
seeking out an opt out form online and submitting it to INO’s
human resources department within 30 days. As in Gentry,
arbitration was the default option for the employees and opting
out was additional work.
       The training module also made clear that arbitration was
INO’s preferred method for resolving conflicts with employees.
As plaintiffs point out, the module states that arbitration
furthers employees’ “ ‘[r]ight to be heard and to have their
concerns addressed,’ and ‘respects and protects the rights of the
Associate.’ ” We agree these aspects of the DRA and training
module introducing the DRA were somewhat oppressive. Like in
Gentry, it is not clear that non-executive employees in INO’s

                                20
meat packing plant would have felt free to opt out given the
pressure from INO’s pro-arbitration messaging in the training
module and INO’s implicit discouragement of the opt out
provision.
      However, unlike Gentry, the DRA did not curtail the
employee’s rights to recover individual damages, which was
perhaps the most egregious aspect of the Gentry agreement.
Instead, the DRA, which was provided in both English and
Spanish, informed employees that they were giving up their right
to bring a lawsuit against INO in court and that the agreement
was not mandatory. In sections 4 through 6, the DRA provided
the applicable arbitration rules, e.g. rules for commencing
arbitration, selecting the arbitrator, discovery, presentation of
evidence, and effect of the arbitrator’s decision. INO’s training
module also “explained that any associate questions or concerns
could be addressed to either the Legal or Human Resources
Departments and provide[d] a phone number to contact.”5 The
existence of a clear opt out provision and INO’s disclosure of the
arbitration rules and procedures show that the contract was not
really offered on a “ ‘take it or leave it basis,’ ” as plaintiffs assert.
As such, the procedural unconscionability is not great.

5     Lara asserts that the DRA was procedurally
unconscionable because he “was not provided with a copy of the
agreement nor never given any of the rules that would govern if
he voluntarily agreed to arbitration.” As stated above, the rules
were provided. Had Lara wanted a copy of the agreement after
he signed it, he could have requested it from either the human
resources or legal departments; he does not state that he asked
for such a copy.

                                   21
       As to Lara in particular, he asserts his agreement was
infected with oppression because his supervisor stated if he did
not sign the agreement, he would have to “get a lawyer.” Lara
interpreted this to mean he would be terminated if he did not
sign the DRA. Had Lara read through the training module and
DRA, he would have learned he could opt out of the agreement.
(See Marin Storage, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 1049 [“A party
cannot avoid the terms of a contract on the ground that he or she
failed to read it before signing.”].) The plain language of the
agreement made it clear that Lara’s inference about termination
was incorrect and the agreement was not oppressive on this
basis. (Cf. OTO L.L.C. v. Kho, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 127
[arbitration agreement unconscionable where the agreement’s
contents and significance were unexplained by employer, and
employee was required to sign the agreement to keep the job he
had held for three years].)
       Based on the foregoing, we conclude the DRA was infected
with some procedural unconscionability.
       b. Substantive Unconscionability
       The court’s inquiry into whether a contract is substantively
unconscionable “focus[es] on . . . ‘ “overly harsh” ’ or ‘ “one-sided” ’
results.” (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 114.) “[T]he
paramount consideration in assessing [substantive]
conscionability is mutuality.” (Abramson v. Juniper Networks,
Inc. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 638, 657.)
       Plaintiffs argue the DRA is substantively unconscionable
because it primarily requires arbitration of the type of claims
employees bring against employers. We disagree with this
characterization of the agreement. The DRA states it applies to
not only disputes about compensation, breaks and rest periods,

                                  22
termination, and harassment, but also to claims INO could bring
against an employee regarding trade secrets and unfair
competition. The DRA does not exclude any of INO’s claims
against its employees. (Cf. Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc. (1997) 51
Cal.App.4th 1519, 1528 [the arbitration agreement was
substantively unconscionable where it excluded the employer’s
claims relating to the protection of the employer’s intellectual
and other property and the enforcement of a postemployment
covenant not to compete, which were to be litigated in state or
federal court].)
       Plaintiffs assert that the DRA’s lack of mutuality is
illustrated by the fact that despite the DRA, INO can still seek
injunctive relief from a court when the employee violates “ ‘In-N-
Out Burgers’ Associate Confidentiality and At-Will Employment
Agreement’ ” (an agreement separate from the DRA at issue on
appeal). In the event of breach, the confidentiality agreement
states that INO “ ‘may apply to any court of law or equity having
jurisdiction for injunctive relief’ ” because monetary damages
would not effectively remedy the violation.
       The injunctive relief provision that plaintiffs take issue
with is not even part of the DRA. Rather, it is found in INO’s “At
Will Employment Agreement,” which Valadez signed in 2007,
years before she signed the DRA in 2013. (The record does not
contain such an agreement signed by Lara.) As it was not
contemporaneously executed, we do not construe the DRA and At
Will Employment Agreement together, and the latter is not a
consideration in our unconscionability analysis of the DRA. (See
Alberto v. Cambrian Homecare (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 482, 491
[construing an arbitration agreement and confidentiality

                                23
agreement together pursuant to Civil Code section 1642 because
they were contemporaneously executed].)
      Citing Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 596
U.S. __, __, 142 S.Ct. 1906 (Viking River), plaintiffs also argue
the arbitration agreement is substantively unconscionable
because it requires plaintiffs “ ‘to bring any dispute in arbitration
on an individual basis only, and not on a . . . private attorney
general basis.’ . . . Employers may not force employees to waive
their right to bring a Private Attorney General Act [PAGA]
claim.”
       In Viking River, the United States Supreme Court reviewed
an unconscionability challenge to an employment contract with
an arbitration provision specifying that “in any arbitral
proceeding, the parties could not bring any dispute as a class,
collective, or representative PAGA action. It also contained a
severability clause specifying that if the waiver was found
invalid, any class, collective, representative, or PAGA action
would presumptively be litigated in court. But under that
severability clause, if any ‘portion’ of the waiver remained valid,
it would be ‘enforced in arbitration.’ ” (Viking River, supra, 596
U.S. at p. __, 142 S.Ct. at p. 1916.) Considering our state law
rule articulated in Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th 348, which
prohibited the wholesale waiver of PAGA claims, the Viking
River court held that the contract’s severability clause applied
and the FAA compelled enforcement of the arbitration agreement
as to the plaintiff’s individual Labor Code claims. (Id. at pp. __,
142 S.Ct. at pp. 1922–1925; see Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc.
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104, 1113–1114.)
       Like in Viking River, the DRA contains a severability
clause, which states: “The Class Action Waiver and Private

                                 24
Attorney General Waiver, and any other provision of this
Agreement, shall be severable in any case in which the dispute is
filed as an individual action and severance is necessary to ensure
that the individual action proceeds in arbitration.” Thus, as in
Viking River, the DRA’s PAGA waiver is severable from the
arbitration agreement, which remains enforceable against
plaintiffs’ individual claims.
       Based on the foregoing, we conclude plaintiffs failed to
show the DRA was substantively unconscionable, which is
necessary to find it unenforceable.
                           DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed. Defendant In-N-Out Burgers is
awarded its costs on appeal.

                                          EDMON, P. J.

We concur:

                  LAVIN, J.

                  EGERTON, J.

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