Court Opinion

ID: 9928759
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-31 21:11:22.469152+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:54:29.471125
License: Public Domain

01/31/2024
                IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                             AT JACKSON
                               September 12, 2023 Session

       KISHA DEAN TREZEVANT v. STANLEY H. TREZEVANT, III

                   Appeal from the Circuit Court for Shelby County
                   No. CT-003516-13         Mary L. Wagner, Judge
                       ___________________________________

                            No. W2021-01153-COA-R3-CV
                        ___________________________________

This is the second appeal concerning the trial court’s distribution of the divorcing parties’
marital property. Following a prior appeal, this matter was remanded to the trial court to,
inter alia, value and equitably divide the assets and debts contained in the parties’ marital
estate. The trial court appointed a special master to complete these tasks. At the beginning
of the special master’s hearing, the parties entered into a stipulation agreement concerning
the values of certain marital properties, including their associated debts. Upon the
conclusion of the special master’s hearing, the parties stipulated to the special master’s
findings. The trial court subsequently conducted an additional hearing and entered its own
findings, which it relied upon to formulate an equitable division of the marital estate
pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121(c). The husband has appealed the trial
court’s division of the marital estate, arguing that the court’s mathematical and other errors
rendered the division of the marital estate inequitable. Discerning no reversible error, we
affirm the trial court’s judgment as modified herein. We decline to award attorney’s fees
to the wife on appeal.

        Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court
                      Affirmed as Modified; Case Remanded

THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which J. STEVEN
STAFFORD, P.J., W.S., and CARMA DENNIS MCGEE, J., joined.

Donald Capparella, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Stanley H. Trezevant, III.

Mitchell D. Moskovitz and Adam N. Cohen, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellee, Kisha
Dean Trezevant.
                                         OPINION

                             I. Factual and Procedural History

       The plaintiff, Kisha Dean Trezevant (“Wife”), filed a complaint for divorce on
August 15, 2013, in the Shelby County Circuit Court (“trial court”), naming Stanley H.
Trezevant, III, (“Husband”) as the defendant. According to Wife, the parties had been
married since September 1, 1990, and had two children together, both of whom had reached
the age of majority by the time of the divorce proceedings. Wife requested that the trial
court award her a divorce and equitably divide the parties’ immense marital estate, in
addition to awarding her alimony and attorney’s fees and expenses.

       As this Court noted in its Opinion following the first appeal in this matter, equitably
valuing and dividing the parties’ marital property has proven to be an arduous task. See
Trezevant v. Trezevant, 568 S.W.3d 595, 603 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2018) (“Trezevant I”). The
Court explained:

              Throughout the marriage, Husband was very successful at his work,
       and the parties amassed a tremendous estate. By virtue of this success, the
       parties enjoyed an extravagant lifestyle. The marital residence consisted of
       a 10,500 square foot home containing six bedrooms, nine bathrooms, and a
       five car garage. In addition to their principal residence in Shelby County,
       Tennessee, the parties also maintained several vacation homes during their
       marriage, including properties in the Cayman Islands, an expansive lake
       home, and a home in Oxford, Mississippi. The parties took expensive
       international trips to destinations such as France, Spain, Greece, the Cayman
       Islands, and Jamaica. The family also enjoyed other trips to the U.S. Open,
       the Grammy Awards, West Palm Beach for diamond shopping, and Miami
       and New York to shop for clothing. Husband and Wife were members of
       sporting and social clubs in Memphis. The family drove luxury vehicles such
       as Range Rovers, Land Rovers, Mercedes Benz convertibles, and others.

              The material possessions amassed by the parties are the impetus for
       both the protraction of the proceedings below as well as for this appeal. As
       stated previously, Husband is in the real estate business. He established
       Trezevant Enterprises, Inc., which became a real estate management,
       development, and maintenance company and also does construction and
       leasing. The marital estate included approximately 49 commercial and
       residential properties. The procedural history of this case is littered with
       volumes upon volumes of pleadings, transcripts, and exhibits designed to
       identify, value, and/or distribute the parties’ wealth. Among other things, the
       sheer size of the parties’ estate, the complexities involved in valuing
       commercial property, including international property, and what the trial

                                                -2-
       court found to be Husband’s deliberate attempts to hide assets, contributed
       to the convoluted process of identifying, classifying, valuing, and
       distributing the parties’ marital estate in this case.

Id.

        Following the initial trial, as noted in Trezevant I, the trial court entered a final
decree on March 1, 2017, granting the parties a divorce pursuant to Tennessee Code
Annotated § 36-4-129. Id. at 604. The court valued the parties’ marital estate at
$44,339,611.00 and awarded property valued at $10,135,585.00 to Wife and property
valued at $34,204,026.00 to Husband. Id. When valuing certain marital assets, the trial
court did not rely on evidence presented by Husband’s certified appraisers; instead, the
court utilized a July 16, 2012 financial statement, created by Husband, which listed values
for the property that were higher than the appraised values. Id. According to its order, the
trial court chose to rely on the July 16, 2012 financial statement because it “was the last
financial statement submitted by Husband to a bank prior to the filing of the instant divorce
action” and because “Husband continued to disregard [the appraisals] with respect to the
values that he presented to the bank on his final financial statement.” Id. at 621. The trial
court also awarded to Wife alimony in solido of $7,500,000.00 and alimony in futuro of
$25,000.00 per month for the first six years, followed by $20,000.00 per month thereafter.
Id. at 624. On appeal, Husband argued, inter alia, that the trial court erred when valuing
the marital assets by heavily relying on Husband’s unsigned, unsworn, and unaudited
financial statement that was prepared more than four years before the time of the trial
court’s ruling. Id. at 606.

        On appeal in Trezevant I, this Court considered whether the trial court had erred in
rejecting the appraisal evidence and instead relying on the 2012 financial statement to value
the parties’ marital property. Trezevant I, 568 S.W.3d at 619. As this Court noted, “[t]he
trial court rejected the more recent certified appraisals in favor of the Financial Statement
with very little explanation.” Id. at 621. The Trezevant I Court found it particularly
problematic that the trial court had not provided its reasoning for ignoring more recent
appraisals and valuing the businesses and properties based on Husband’s 2012 financial
statement. Id. at 622.

        The Trezevant I Court ultimately affirmed the trial court’s identification and
classification of marital property as well as the trial court’s findings and sentencing related
to Husband’s criminal contempt for failing to disclose an interest in certain property. Id.
at 641. However, the Trezevant I Court vacated the trial court’s valuation and distribution
of the parties’ marital property due to the trial court’s failure to state a basis for its decision.
Id. at 623. The Trezevant I Court also vacated the trial court’s awards of alimony because
the marital property distribution had been vacated. Id. at 624. Those issues were remanded
to the trial court for further determination as well as entry of findings of fact and
conclusions of law. Id. at 641. Upon remand, the trial court (with a different judge now

                                                   -3-
presiding) referred the issue of valuing the parties’ real property and businesses to a special
master. The special master was also charged with determining Husband’s income.

        The special master conducted a hearing spanning four days, beginning on November
15, 2019, continuing on December 11, 2019, and concluding on February 19 and 20, 2020.
On the first day of the hearing, the parties entered a written “Stipulation of Values
Regarding Real Estate at Issue” (“the Stipulation Agreement”), which listed forty parcels
of real estate and the agreed value of each parcel, including any debt associated therewith.
However, the parties did not agree concerning the value of other properties, which values
remained at issue for the special master to ascertain. As a part of the Stipulation
Agreement, the parties listed three properties—North West Point property, West Bay Road
property, and the Kisha Condos (collectively, “the Cayman Islands Properties”)—as
having a combined value of $5,900,000.00 with zero debt encumbering the properties.

        During the hearing, the special master heard the testimony of Husband and three
certified public accountants: Alexander Ivy, James Dilley, and Sanford Blockman. The
special master further considered sixty-seven exhibits introduced as evidence, including
Husband’s deposition. In his recommendations and findings, the special master found that
the financial expert witnesses had opined that Husband’s net annual business cash flow,
for an approximate three- to five-year period before the parties’ divorce and before
payment of Husband’s personal expenses, ranged from $384,000.00 to $582,000.00. The
special master pointed out that Husband had received $7,075,380.00 in loans from his
various businesses in the years preceding the divorce, the average of which would equate
to an annual cash flow of $1,415,076.00. The special master concluded in relevant part:

               Although the transfers of money to [Husband] from his corporations
       or its affiliates are denominated loans, there is no evidence that they were in
       fact loans. There was no evidence presented to the Special Master of any
       promissory notes signed by [Husband], nor does [Husband] list any loans
       payable to the corporation or its affiliates on his list of “Accounts Payable
       October 31, 2019.” Based on the evidence the “loans” appear to actually be
       distributions of equity in the corporations to [Husband].

               In paragraph 11 of Mr. Dilley’s Supplemental Declaration he states:
       “[t]he total amount paid to or for the benefit of Stanley H. Trezevant for 2014
       through 2018 is as follows:

              Salary                                      $21,19[5]
              Dividends/distributions                           -
              Loans/advances                              $3,444,919.00
              (Total)                                     $3,466,114.00

                                                -4-
             The sum of $3,466,114.00 divided by five years (2014-2018) equals
       $693,222.80. However, in his calculations Mr. Dilley seems to have
       overlooked the loans reflected in the tax returns that he prepared for
       [Husband’s] various entities that are set out above.

       ***

              Despite [Husband’s] claims to the contrary, the Special Master’s
       opinion is that it is not possible for [Husband] to maintain such an
       extravagant lifestyle with the negative cash flow suggested by [Husband],
       Mr. Ivy and Mr. Blockman. Neither Mr. Ivy, Mr. Dilley or Mr. Blockman
       included the “loans to shareholders” reflected in the tax returns in calculating
       [Husband’s] cash flow. The evidence suggests, and the Special Master’s
       opinion is, that the cash flow from [Husband’s] business is at least
       $693,222.80 annually for the period 2014-2018. However, based on the
       “loans to shareholders” from the tax returns cited above, the cash flow from
       [Husband’s] businesses is more likely $1,415,076.00 annually for the period
       2014-2018.

              It is difficult for the Special Master to determine the exact current
       amount of [Husband’s] annual income, given the fact that his closely held
       corporations and affiliated partnerships made enough money from 2014-
       2018 to make what amounts to equitable distributions to him totaling more
       than $7 million in 2017 and 2018. Based on the evidence, the Special
       Master’s opinion is that [Husband’s] current annual income from his
       businesses is at least $582,000.00. This figure is based on Mr. Ivy’s opinion
       that the upper range of the net business cash flow from [Husband’s] closely
       held corporations and/or his partnerships is $582,000.00.

(Internal citations omitted.) The special master accepted the stipulated values of the
properties delineated in the Stipulation Agreement and assigned values to the remaining
parcels of real property.

       Following the special master’s hearing, Husband filed objections to the special
master’s recommendations and findings. Subsequently, on July 1, 2020, the parties entered
into an “Agreed Order Resolving Certain Issues for Final Hearing, Limiting Others, and
Addressing Other Matters” (“Agreed Order”). In this Agreed Order, Husband withdrew
his objections to the special master’s report, and “both parties stipulate[d] to this Court’s
adoption of that Report in full.” The parties also stipulated to the property values and debt
amounts contained in the Stipulation Agreement. The parties further agreed upon the
amount of Husband’s temporary alimony obligation, and Wife agreed that she would not
request alimony in futuro, transitional alimony, or rehabilitative alimony at the final
hearing. In addition, the parties agreed that all properties purchased by Husband post-

                                                -5-
divorce were his separate property, except 2108 E. Broadway (“the Broadway Property”)
and 177 Abbington, which would be classified as marital property.

        The trial court conducted a hearing concerning the remaining issues on September
30, 2020; October 1, 2020; and October 6, 2020. Following the filing of post-trial briefs
by the parties, the trial court entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law on January
5, 2021. Included in the court’s findings were (1) the length of the marriage (26 years), (2)
the lifestyle enjoyed by the parties (luxurious), (3) the parties’ ownership of numerous
business entities, and (4) the existence of forty-six pieces of real property and numerous
bank accounts and vehicles within the marital estate. The court stated:

              Throughout the pendency of the divorce, appeal and remand, Husband
       has exercised complete dominion and control over the marital businesses and
       almost all of the marital estate. Based upon the proof presented, corporate
       separateness appears to be a complete farce. This adds to and unnecessarily
       complicates the identification, valuation, and division of this estate.

      With regard to credibility, the trial court noted, “generally both parties have lost
almost all connection with reality.” However, as the trial court also explained:

       The Court finds that Wife is generally trying to tell the truth. Her version of
       the truth, however, is skewed based on her perception of reality. An example
       of this is her perception of her involvement in the marital businesses.
       Husband, on the other hand, will say whatever he needs to in order to get
       what he wants at that moment. This is regardless of whether it is supported
       by the truth or even previous testimony. Throughout these proceedings,
       Husband routinely contradicted prior testimony or assertions. He claimed
       repeatedly that this Court prohibited him from taking out loans. He went so
       far as to testify that he was under a Court Order not to develop real estate for
       seven years. Yet, the proof shows that he continued to buy, sell, develop,
       and borrow against marital and separate property. He hid assets and loans,
       failed to disclose assets and loans, and even allegedly “forgot” about some
       assets and loans (an allegation the Court does not believe). Having
       considered the proof in this matter and observed the demeanor of Husband
       when testifying, the Court finds him not to be credible.

       The trial court explained that in equitably dividing the marital estate, the court
would first need to identify and classify the parties’ assets. Although the court noted that
“issues of identification and classification were not remanded,” circumstances had
occurred following remand that affected the identification and classification of certain
marital property. For example, the court noted that Husband had disputed the classification
of 1047 June Road as marital because Wife had quitclaimed the property to him following
the divorce. The court clarified, however, that Wife had done so because this marital

                                                -6-
property was awarded to Husband in the initial marital property division, an award which
had since been vacated. The court therefore determined the property to be marital.

        With regard to the real property owned by The Shops of Milan, a marital business,
the trial court found that Husband had obtained a second mortgage associated with the
property during the initial appeal without Wife’s consent or knowledge. The court
therefore refused to classify the additional debt as marital. Respecting the real property
known as Goodman Malone East, the trial court noted that the parties’ had stipulated to the
value of the marital interest in the property of $26,666.00 with no associated debt. The
court explained that during the final hearing, Husband produced a loan statement, dated
August 2018, reflecting a loan in the amount of $1,140,221.77 to Goodman Malone East
LLC. The court found that Husband was “in charge” of the business and its property and
clearly knew about the loan at the time he entered into the stipulation regarding zero debt.
The court therefore ruled that “Husband’s behavior should not be allowed to reduce the
value of the marital interest in this business.”

       The trial court further found that the Broadway Property was purchased by Husband
during the appeal “using proceeds from the sale of marital property.” The court noted that
this purchase was made without the knowledge or permission of Wife or the court. The
parties stipulated that the property was marital and that its value was $1,011,950.00;
therefore, the only issue for the court to determine was the debt associated with the
property. The court found that by the time of the special master’s hearing, Husband had
already paid $800,000.00 for demolition and renovation costs on the property. The court
also determined that Husband had sold marital property valued at $179,400.00, taken out
a loan to cover the remaining purchase price of the property, and subsequently obtained
additional loans for construction despite an order entered on November 7, 2018, denying
his request to borrow against the marital estate.

       The trial court recited that Husband had requested the inclusion of $1,829,860.00 of
debt in the valuation of the Broadway Property and had asked the court to assign a negative
value to the property, which he desired to retain in the property division. The court found
that the loans associated with the property were taken out by 2108 E. Broadway LLC;
however, no proof had been presented about this company, “its ownership, income, assets,
or value.” As such, the trial court refused to include the debt of this LLC in the valuation
and distribution of the marital estate because the LLC itself had not been included in the
marital estate.

       With reference to the Cayman Islands Properties, the trial court noted that the
Stipulation Agreement had established that the Cayman Islands Properties were
unencumbered by debt predicated on Husband’s assertion that he was unaware of any debt.
However, at the conclusion of the trial court’s hearing, Wife produced an affidavit from
Dawn Majors, an “Articled Clerk” for a law firm in the Cayman Islands, detailing property
searches performed by her firm “to provide guidance on the procedure and cost to transfer

                                               -7-
properties in the Cayman Islands by way of a Court Order in divorce proceedings.” The
affidavit reflected a total of $7,250,000.00 in debt encumbering title to the Cayman Islands
Properties. The trial court noted, “Husband contends in his Post Trial Brief that these debts
should be included in the calculation of the marital estate.” The court therefore concluded:
“Based on the proof presented as to the existence of these liens and Husband’s contention,
the Court will include these debts in the calculation of the marital estate.” On this basis,
the trial court elected to maintain the Cayman Islands Properties’ value at $5,900,000.00
and assign the properties a debt of $7,250,000.00. The trial court ultimately awarded the
Cayman Islands Properties to Wife along with the attendant debt.

       The trial court valued Trezevant Enterprises, Inc. (“TEI”), which operated as the
property manager for all of Husband’s companies and properties, both marital and separate,
at $720,000.00. In valuing TEI, the court incorporated the earnings value method. The
court explained that during trial, Mr. Dilley, Husband’s accountant, had testified that from
2014 to 2018, TEI had distributed to Husband $3,600,000.00 in shareholder loans. In
addition, Mr. Dilley related that the shareholder loans were actually distributions of equity
to Husband but were recorded as loans specifically to avoid the “Hall Income Tax.” The
court thus considered the shareholder loans to be distributions of equity and valued TEI by
averaging the $3,600,000.00 in distributions over the years 2014 through 2018. The trial
court found that the company had an average future earnings of $720,000.00 per year based
on this calculation and assigned TEI that value.

       The trial court also found that in January 2020, Husband had purchased a number
of properties: 680 Piper Street, 719 Piper Street, 0 N. Rowlett, and 0 Poplar Avenue,
collectively referred to as the “Piper Superfund Property.” The existence of this property
and Husband’s use of two LLCs to purchase the Piper Superfund Property had been
disclosed on the last day of the special master’s hearing. The court noted that despite
forming two new LLCs to purchase the property and closing on the property “in the middle
of the special master hearing, Husband had claimed that he simply forgot he owned” the
property, a claim that the trial court found not credible.

       The trial court noted that the Shelby County Property Assessor had valued the Piper
Superfund Property at $2,100,000.00. By contrast, Husband testified that the Piper
Superfund Property should be valued at ten dollars. Husband also testified that the property
was subject to a $1,500,000.00 tax lien and $15,000,000.00 lien by the Environmental
Protection Agency (“EPA”). The trial court found that the property was purchased through
an LLC, of which Husband was the sole member. Because Husband purchased the
property through an LLC, he testified that he was not liable for any of the debt or liens on
the property and could simply give the property back if the liens could not be resolved.
Husband indicated that he believed he had the EPA liens “worked out.” In addition,
Husband testified that by transferring the property through “the Land Bank,” the property
would not be subject to the tax liens. The trial court found that based upon the likelihood

                                               -8-
that the liens would be resolved, the value of the Piper Superfund Property would be
approximately $2,100,000.00.

       Concerning other assets, the trial court found that on July 21, 2017, Husband had
purchased a new Range Rover vehicle for the benefit of the parties’ adult daughter through
Trip’s Nurseries, a marital business. The business purchased the Range Rover for
$47,553.99, and the purchase price was the only evidence provided as to the value of the
Range Rover. The trial court found the Range Rover to be an asset of Trip’s Nurseries,
which resulted in the inclusion of the Range Rover’s value in the value of that marital
business entity. Respecting debt, the court refused to include any of Husband’s additional
claimed debts of more than $3,000,000.00 in the marital estate.

       The trial court also determined that Husband’s average income was $1,400,000.00
annually. In doing so, the trial court relied on the special master’s finding that Husband
had received loans to shareholders from all his businesses in the total amount of
$7,075,380.00 from 2014 to 2018. The trial court again noted Mr. Dilley’s testimony that
the shareholder loans were more accurately described as distributions of equity. The court
thus found that Husband’s average income was $1,400,000.00 annually.

        Following its consideration of the facts in light of the factors enumerated in
Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121(c), the trial court ultimately awarded 58% of the
marital estate to Wife and 42% to Husband. The trial court provided several reasons for
this decision, including Husband’s greater ability in the future to earn high income with
little effort and Husband’s dissipation and management of the marital estate during the
pendency of the proceedings. The court also considered Husband’s “repeated inability and
simple refusal to abide by this Court’s orders” as well as Husband’s proven efforts to hide
assets. The trial court awarded to Wife the following real properties: Heron Oaks Lots 1,
2, and 3; 615 W. Poplar; the Cayman Islands Properties; 1047 June Road; and Highway
72, Collierville. The trial court also awarded to Wife alimony in solido in the amount of
$5,000,000.00 with an annual interest rate of 6%. The alimony was to be paid in
$250,000.00 increments plus interest every six months until paid in full, with a requirement
that husband obtain a life insurance policy, in favor of Wife, insuring the alimony amount
until paid in full. The trial court found that each party was able to pay his or her own
attorney’s fees and expenses from awarded marital assets and thus declined to award
attorney’s fees to either party.

       After entry of the January 2021 order, Husband filed a motion to alter or amend the
judgment, attaching records purportedly demonstrating that any debt on the Cayman
Islands Properties had been discharged such that no debt actually encumbered the
properties. Husband also argued that the trial court should reconsider its finding
concerning his income and instead adopt Mr. Ivy’s income valuation of $582,000.00 or
“$720,000 per year as noted in the Court’s analysis of Mr. Dilley’s testimony.” Wife

                                               -9-
likewise filed a motion to alter or amend, seeking clarification of the court’s January 2021
order.

       On September 1, 2021, the trial court entered an order concerning the parties’
respective motions to alter or amend. The court denied Husband’s motion in its entirety,
determining that both parties had a “full and fair opportunity to put on any proof that they
chose” regarding the debt on the Cayman Islands Properties. The court also noted that the
parties had been allowed to file post-trial briefs and that in Husband’s post-trial brief, he
“expressly took the position that the debt encumbering the Cayman Islands Properties was
‘now established as an uncontroverted fact in the record.’” The court determined that it
was only after these properties were awarded to Wife that Husband sought to put forth
“newly discovered evidence” that the debt had been paid. The court also found that the
evidence propounded by Husband was not newly discovered because it was available to
Husband prior to trial and should have been introduced during trial or prior to the court’s
ruling. The court therefore affirmed its valuation of the Cayman Islands Properties and its
overall division of the marital estate. The court denied Husband’s request to reconsider its
findings regarding his income.

       The trial court granted Wife’s motion to alter or amend in part, modifying its earlier
balance sheet to include parcel numbers associated with the real properties awarded to each
party. The court clarified other points raised by Wife but did not modify its earlier order
except for the addition of parcel numbers. The court otherwise affirmed its equitable
division of the marital estate. The court denied the parties’ requests for awards of
attorney’s fees associated with their respective motions to alter or amend. Husband timely
appealed.

                                     II. Issues Presented

       Husband presents the following issues for this Court’s review, which we have
restated slightly:

       1.     Whether the trial court erred by ignoring the Stipulation Agreement
              and including in its division of the marital estate $7,250,000.00 in
              marital debt related to the Cayman Islands Properties.

       2.     Whether the trial court erred by incorporating a mathematical error in
              its calculation of the net marital estate, which resulted in
              overvaluation of the net marital estate by $2,000,000.00.

       3.     Whether the trial court erred by including in Husband’s share of the
              net marital estate $2,145,131.00 in dissipation when such dissipation
              had allegedly been offset by an award of separate property to Wife
              prior to the first appeal in this matter and the offset of such dissipation

                                                - 10 -
             was purportedly affirmed by this Court in Trezevant I, constituting the
             law of the case.

      4.     Whether the trial court erred by incorporating a mathematical error
             worth $1,100,000.00 when calculating the value of Wife’s separate
             assets.

      5.     Whether the trial court erred by failing to include in its valuation of
             Husband’s separate estate more than $3,300,000.00 in separate debt.

      6.     Whether the trial court erred by including in its calculation of
             Husband’s separate estate the Piper Superfund Property at a value of
             $2,114,700.00 when Husband testified that he purchased it for $10.00.

      7.     Whether the trial court erred by valuing TEI at $720,000.00,
             purportedly in violation of the law of the case doctrine.

      8.     Whether the trial court erred by failing to properly consider Tennessee
             Code Annotated § 36-4-121(c)(2) when finding that Husband’s
             annual average income was $1,400,000.00.

      9.     Whether the trial court erred by failing to classify $1,829,860.00 in
             debt incurred in connection with the Broadway Property as marital
             debt.

      10.    Whether the trial court erred by including additional assets in the net
             marital estate that Husband had purchased after the parties were
             divorced.

      11.    Whether this matter should be remanded to the trial court to reconsider
             the marital property division with an instruction for the trial court to
             award all of the real marital properties to Husband and to award Wife
             an alimony in solido payment sufficient to equitably divide the marital
             estate.

Wife presents the following additional issues:

      12.    Whether the trial court erred by declining to award to Wife her
             attorney’s fees and expenses.

      13.    Whether Wife is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees on appeal.

                                                 - 11 -
                                 III. Standard of Review

       Our Supreme Court has elucidated the applicable standard of appellate review in a
case involving the proper distribution of assets incident to a divorce as follows:

              This Court gives great weight to the decisions of the trial court in
      dividing marital assets and “we are disinclined to disturb the trial court’s
      decision unless the distribution lacks proper evidentiary support or results in
      some error of law or misapplication of statutory requirements and
      procedures.” Herrera v. Herrera, 944 S.W.2d 379, 389 (Tenn. Ct. App.
      1996). As such, when dealing with the trial court’s findings of fact, we
      review the record de novo with a presumption of correctness, and we must
      honor those findings unless there is evidence which preponderates to the
      contrary. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston, 854
      S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993). Because trial courts are in a far better position
      than this Court to observe the demeanor of the witnesses, the weight, faith,
      and credit to be given witnesses’ testimony lies in the first instance with the
      trial court. Roberts v. Roberts, 827 S.W.2d 788, 795 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).
      Consequently, where issues of credibility and weight of testimony are
      involved, this Court will accord considerable deference to the trial court’s
      factual findings. In re M.L.P., 228 S.W.3d 139, 143 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007)
      (citing Seals v. England/Corsair Upholstery Mfg. Co., 984 S.W.2d 912, 915
      (Tenn. 1999)). The trial court’s conclusions of law, however, are accorded
      no presumption of correctness. Langschmidt v. Langschmidt, 81 S.W.3d
      741, 744-45 (Tenn. 2002).

Keyt v. Keyt, 244 S.W.3d 321, 327 (Tenn. 2007). Questions related to the classification of
assets as marital or separate are questions of fact. Bilyeu v. Bilyeu, 196 S.W.3d 131, 135
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).

      Furthermore, as this Court has previously held:

             Because Tennessee is a “dual property” state, a trial court must
      identify all of the assets possessed by the divorcing parties as either separate
      property or marital property before equitably dividing the marital estate.
      Separate property is not subject to division. In contrast, Tenn. Code Ann. §
      36-4-121(c) outlines the relevant factors that a court must consider when
      equitably dividing the marital property without regard to fault on the part of
      either party. An equitable division of marital property is not necessarily an
      equal division, and § 36-4-121(a)(1) only requires an equitable division.

McHugh v. McHugh, No. E2009-01391-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 1526140, at *3-4 (Tenn.
Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2010) (internal citations omitted). See also Manis v. Manis, 49 S.W.3d

                                              - 12 -
295, 306 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that appellate courts reviewing a distribution of
marital property “ordinarily defer to the trial judge’s decision unless it is inconsistent with
the factors in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c) or is not supported by a preponderance of the
evidence.”).

       As to our review of the trial court’s decision concerning attorney’s fees in a divorce
action, this Court has stated:

               Our review of an award of attorney’s fees is guided by the principle
       that “‘the allowance of attorney’s fees is largely in the discretion of the trial
       court, and the appellate court will not interfere except upon a clear showing
       of abuse of that discretion.’” Mimms v. Mimms, 234 S.W.3d 634, 641 (Tenn.
       Ct. App. 2007) (quoting Taylor v. Fezell, 158 S.W.3d 352, 359 (Tenn.
       2005)). “Reversal of the trial court’s decision [regarding] attorney fees at the
       trial level should occur ‘only when the trial court applies an incorrect legal
       standard, reaches a decision that is illogical, bases its decision on a clearly
       erroneous assessment of the evidence, or employs reasoning that causes an
       injustice to the complaining party.’” Church v. Church, 346 S.W.3d 474,
       487 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010).

Buntin v. Buntin, 673 S.W.3d 593, 603 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting Hernandez v.
Hernandez, No. E2012-02056-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 5436752, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Sept. 27, 2013)).

                        IV. Equitable Division of the Marital Estate

        Husband’s overarching argument on appeal is that the trial court’s division of the
marital estate, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121(c) (2014), was
sufficiently inequitable such that this Court should vacate the trial court’s ruling and
remand the property division for reconsideration. Husband points to several instances
where he believes the trial court erred in valuing and dividing the marital assets. We will
address each of Husband’s arguments in turn.

                        1. Valuation of Cayman Islands Properties

       Husband contends that the trial court erred by ignoring the Stipulation Agreement
and including $7,250,000.00 in marital debt related to the Cayman Islands Properties when
the parties had previously stipulated that such debt did not exist. This Court has defined a
stipulation as “an agreement between counsel regarding business before the court which is
entered into mutually and voluntarily by the parties.” Overstreet v. Shoney’s Inc., 4 S.W.3d
694, 701 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. Ford, 725 S.W.2d 689, 691 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1986); State v. Morris, 641 S.W.2d 883, 889 (Tenn. 1982)). “Stipulations bind the
parties and prevent them from asserting a contrary position to the stipulation, even on

                                                - 13 -
appeal.” Knizley v. Knizley, No. M2018-00490-COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 6358208, at *2
(Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 27, 2019) (citing Bearman v. Camatsos, 385 S.W.2d 91, 93 (Tenn.
1964)). This Court has further explained:

       [The stipulation’s] terms must be definite and certain in order to afford a
       proper basis for judicial decision. . . . Factors to consider in determining
       whether a stipulation was entered into properly are whether the party had
       competent representation of counsel, whether extensive and detailed
       negotiations occurred, whether the party agreed to the stipulation in open
       court, and whether, when questioned by the judge, the party acknowledged
       understanding the terms and that they were fair and equitable.

Stumpenhorst v. Blurton, No.W2000-02977-COA-R3-CV, 2002 WL 1751380, at *4
(Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2002) (citation omitted).

        On November 15, 2019, the first day of the special master’s hearing, the parties
entered into the Stipulation Agreement, which listed forty parcels of real estate and the
agreed value for each parcel. As a part of the Stipulation Agreement, the parties valued
the Cayman Islands Properties at a collective $5,900,000.00 value with zero debt
encumbering the properties. The special master valued the Cayman Islands Properties in
accordance with the parties’ stipulations. Although Husband initially objected to the
special master’s findings and recommendations, he subsequently withdrew his objections
to the special master’s report, and the parties stipulated to the trial court’s adoption of the
findings and recommendations.

       During the hearing before the trial court, however, Wife produced an affidavit from
Ms. Majors in the Cayman Islands, containing the results of a land register search for the
Cayman Islands Properties. The land register search revealed $7,250,000.00 in debt
encumbering title to the Cayman Islands Properties. By agreement of the parties, this
affidavit was entered into the record as Exhibit 95. When questioned at trial regarding the
contents of Exhibit 95, Husband stated that if debt existed on those properties, it would be
“news to [him].” Husband testified that he had previously sold three of the Kisha Condos
and believed that he had repaid any debt when those condos were sold.

       Following the hearing, the trial court permitted both parties to file post-trial briefs
to supplement their positions. In his post-trial brief, Husband conceded that “despite the
parties’ earlier stipulation that there was no debt on any of the three Cayman properties,
the $7.25 million debt encumbering those properties is now established as an
uncontroverted fact in the record.” Husband further stated that “it has become necessary
to account for that debt in the distribution of the marital estate.” In her post-trial brief,
Wife urged that the parties should be bound by their stipulations, pursuant to Tennessee
Rule of Civil Procedure 53.04, which states that “when the parties stipulate that a master’s
findings of fact shall be final, only questions of law arising upon the report shall thereafter

                                                - 14 -
be considered.” Husband subsequently filed a reply brief, arguing that any debts reflected
in the Stipulation Agreement were not encompassed by the special master’s report because
the special master was not tasked with evaluating the debt on the properties such that the
parties’ stipulations as to debt were not within the purview of Rule 53.04. Husband further
argued that the parties’ stipulations as to debt contained in the Stipulation Agreement
should be given effect by the court “unless the stipulated facts are ‘patently untrue in view
of other evidence in the record,’” quoting Mast Adver. & Publ’g v. Moyers, 865 S.W.2d
900, 902 (Tenn. 1993). Husband thus claimed that Wife’s argument regarding the debt
was “utterly nonsensical” and urged the trial court to include the $7,250,000 debt in the
marital estate. Husband argued that based on Wife’s statement that she was “shocked and
surprised” by the land records demonstrating debts associated with the Cayman Islands
Properties and his testimony that he was unaware that the debts had not been released,
“neither of these parties had knowledge of the $7.25 million in secured debt when they
entered the Nov. 15, 2019 stipulation that there was no debt on the Cayman properties.”

        Interestingly, following the trial court’s determination that the $7,250,000.00 debt
associated with the Cayman Islands Properties would be included in the distribution of the
marital estate and the court’s award of those properties to Wife at a negative value,
Husband filed a motion to alter or amend, arguing that he had possession of “newly
discovered evidence” that the debts on the properties had been released. In other words,
Husband did not seek to simply rely on the Stipulation Agreement as he now attempts to
do on appeal, likely because he had already disavowed the Stipulation Agreement in his
post-trial briefs. Instead, Husband attached undated “discharge” documents purportedly
demonstrating that the debts associated with the Cayman Islands Properties had been
cleared. Husband claimed that these documents constituted “newly-discovered evidence
which was not available at the time of the trial.” Despite this claim, Husband’s
memorandum in support of his motion stated that the debts had been paid following the
sale of Kisha Condos 102 and 304, which sales the trial court had permitted by entry of
consent orders in 2015.

       In its order concerning Husband’s motion to alter or amend, the trial court stated:

              The proof at issue regarding the debt on the Cayman Island properties
       was entered into evidence at trial of this matter. Both parties had a full and
       fair opportunity to put on any proof that they chose. At the conclusion of the
       proof on that same date, the parties requested and were granted sufficient
       time to tender Post-Trial Briefs. Husband tendered his Post-Trial Brief on
       November 20, 2020. Therein, Husband expressly took the position that the
       debt encumbering the Cayman Island properties was “now established as an
       uncontroverted fact in the record,” and that “it has become necessary to
       account for that debt in the distribution of the marital estate.” Only after this
       Honorable Court ruled that the Cayman Island properties and the
       accompanying debt were awarded to Wife did Husband contend that he had

                                                - 15 -
       “newly-discovered evidence” regarding the existence of the debt/liens in
       dispute. This Honorable Court rejects Husband’s contention that the
       evidence in question qualifies as “newly-discovered evidence.” Any
       evidence on the existence of the disputed debt or its non-existence would
       have been available to Husband prior to the trial of this matter. Husband
       could and should have tendered any such alleged evidence prior to receiving
       this Honorable Court’s ruling. Husband did not, in hopes that the properties
       would be awarded to him at a negative value.

Husband has not appealed the trial court’s determination that the discharge documents did
not constitute newly discovered evidence.

        Based on the procedural posture of this matter, we find Husband’s argument
regarding enforcement of the parties’ Stipulation Agreement unavailing. Husband has
previously asserted that the Stipulation Agreement concerning the debt on the Cayman
Islands Properties should not be enforced because existence of the debt had been
“established as an uncontroverted fact in the record.” Husband further argued that the
parties’ stipulation concerning zero debt had been shown to be “patently untrue in view of
other evidence in the record.” As such, Husband clearly abandoned his reliance on the
Stipulation Agreement during the trial court proceedings and cannot maintain an
inconsistent position on appeal. See Estate of Schultz v. Munford, Inc., 650 S.W.2d 37, 40
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that a party “cannot take a position on appeal inconsistent
with that taken in the trial of the case.”); Price v. Tenn. Prod. & Chem. Corp., 385 S.W.2d
301, 307 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964) (“When a cause is brought up for appellate review, a party
cannot assume an attitude inconsistent with, or different from, that taken by him at the
trial.”); Bradley Cnty. v. City of Cleveland, No. E2012-00634-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL
5333555, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2012) (“A party is not allowed to take one position
in the trial court and then take a contrary position on appeal.”).

       Upon the trial court’s determination that Husband had abandoned his reliance on
the Stipulation Agreement concerning this issue, the value of the Cayman Islands
Properties and any debt associated therewith became a question of fact for the trial court to
determine. See Kinard v. Kinard, 986 S.W.2d 220, 231 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998) (explaining
that “valuation of a marital asset is a question of fact” to be determined by considering all
relevant evidence). When valuation evidence is conflicting, the court may place a value
on the property that is within the range of the values represented by all the relevant
valuation evidence. Watters v. Watters, 959 S.W.2d 585, 589 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).
Accordingly, such decisions are entitled to great weight on appeal and will not be second-
guessed unless they are not supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Tate v. Tate,
138 S.W.3d 872, 875 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003); Wallace v. Wallace, 733 S.W.2d 102, 107
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).

                                               - 16 -
        Based on the evidence in the record regarding the debt encumbering the Cayman
Islands Properties, the trial court properly included the $7,250,000.00 debt in the marital
estate. The valuation of this real property was within the range of the evidence introduced,
and the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s decision. We therefore
affirm the trial court’s inclusion of this debt in the marital estate.

               2. Omission of Debt Relating to Cayman Islands Properties

        The parties agree that when the trial court was constructing the court’s marital
property balance sheet, attached as Exhibit A to the trial court’s order, the trial court made
either a mathematical or typographical error concerning the value of the Kisha Condos (one
of the Cayman Islands Properties) by determining the net equity of the property to be
negative $2,400,000.00. However, the court found the fair market value of the property to
be $1,900,000.00 with a debt owed on the property of $6,300,000.00. As such, the net
equity value of the Kisha Condos should have been negative $4,400,000.00, a difference
of $2,000,000.00. The evidence in the record supports the trial court’s findings concerning
fair market value and debt for the Kisha Condos, but we agree with the parties that the
appropriate net equity for the Kisha Condos would be negative $4,400,000.00.

       The effect of the trial court’s error in undervaluing the Kisha Condos debt, when
carried through the balance sheet, is that the court’s finding as to the value of the parties’
net marital estate, $13,995,484.11, was inflated by $2,000,000.00 such that the value of the
net marital estate should have been $11,995,484.11. In order to discern the overall effect
on the division of marital assets and debts, however, we must also determine the effect of
the error concerning the distributions received by the parties.

       The trial court valued Wife’s portion of the marital estate at $8,080,468.97;
however, this value failed to include an additional $2,000,000.00 in debt associated with
the Kisha Condos. If the error in the value of the Kisha Condos were corrected, however,
Wife would actually receive a portion of the net marital estate valued as follows:

 Asset                  Fair Market Value       Debt                   Net Value
 Heron Oaks             $633,000                0                      $633,000
 615 W. Poplar          $820,000                0                      $820,000
 Northwest Point        $2,000,000              ($950,000)             $1,050,000
 West Bay               $2,000,000              0                      $2,000,000
 Kisha Condos           $1,900,000              ($6,300,000)           ($4,400,000)
 1047 June Rd           $115,000                0                      $115,000
 Highway 72             $300,000                0                      $300,000
 Funds in possession    $837,383.90             0                      $837,383.90
 Seven Mile Account     $183,350.12             0                      $183,350.12
 Alimony in solido      $5,000,000              0                      $5,000,000

                                               - 17 -
 Other Debts                                     ($458,265.05)           ($458,265.05)
 Assessed to Wife
 Wife’s Distribution     $13,788,734.02          ($7,708,265.05)         $6,080,468.97

Therefore, if the total value of the parties’ net marital estate were actually $11,995,484.11,
Wife’s portion of $6,080,468.97 would constitute approximately 50.68% of the total net
marital estate.

       The trial court stated in its order that it intended for Wife to receive 58% of the net
marital estate. Accordingly, by virtue of this error, Wife has received less than the trial
court intended for her to receive. In her appellate brief, however, Wife has acknowledged
the effect of this $2,000,000.00 error and has sought no relief therefor, urging that the trial
court’s property division should be affirmed. Because Wife has waived this issue on
appeal, we will accordingly decline to adjust the trial court’s calculations.

                                  3. Husband’s Dissipation

       In Trezevant I, this Court affirmed the trial court’s finding that “Husband dissipated
[] more than $2 million dollars that he transferred to Norman Klein during the divorce
proceedings.” See 568 S.W.3d at 618. In the initial division of marital property, which
was appealed in Trezevant I, the trial court determined that Wife’s half of the total
dissipation amount would be used to “offset” the assets determined to constitute Wife’s
separate estate. However, the Trezevant I Court vacated “the trial court’s valuation and
distribution of the parties’ marital property,” directing that on remand, the trial court should
“articulate detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the analysis it
employs to value and distribute the marital estate.” Id. at 624.

       Following remand, as previously explained, the trial court utilized a special master
to determine asset values and Husband’s income stream. The trial court then conducted its
own hearing regarding the financial issues. In its resultant order, the trial court fulfilled its
assigned tasks, stating detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning its
valuation methods, the facts and factors considered regarding an equitable distribution, and
other necessary issues. In doing so, the trial court considered the amount of Husband’s
dissipation ($2,145,131.00) as affirmed by this Court in Trezevant I, but chose to allocate
the dissipation as a marital asset awarded to Husband in its overall distribution of the
parties’ marital estate.

        Husband argues that the trial court’s decision to distribute the dissipation to him as
a marital asset violates the law of the case doctrine. As this Court has previously explained
concerning the law of the case doctrine:

       This doctrine is a longstanding rule of judicial practice, rather than a
       constitutional mandate or limit on the power of the courts. Memphis Publ’g
                                                 - 18 -
       Co. v. Tenn. Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Bd., 975 S.W.2d 303,
       306 (Tenn. 1998); Orlando Residence, Ltd. v. Nashville Lodging Co., 213
       S.W.3d 855, 861 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006). It is based on the commonsense
       recognition that issues previously litigated and decided by a court of
       competent jurisdiction ordinarily need not be revisited, Ladd v. Honda Motor
       Co., 939 S.W.2d 83, 90 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996), and its purposes are to
       promote finality and efficiency in litigation, to ensure consistent results in
       the same litigation, and to assure that lower courts follow appellate decisions.
       State v. Jefferson, 31 S.W.3d 558, 561 (Tenn. 2000); Harrison v. Laursen,
       128 S.W.3d 204, 208 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).

              When the law of the case doctrine applies, the ruling of an appellate
       court becomes the law of the case and is binding in later trials and appeals of
       the same case if the facts in the second trial are substantially the same as the
       facts in the first trial or appeal. Memphis Publ’g Co. v. Tenn. Petroleum
       Underground Storage Tank Bd., 975 S.W.2d at 306; State ex rel. Sizemore v.
       United Physicians Ins. Risk Retention Group, 56 S.W.3d 557, 566 (Tenn. Ct.
       App. 2001). While the doctrine applies to issues that were actually decided
       by the appellate court and to issues that were necessarily decided by
       implication, it does not apply to dicta. Memphis Publ’g Co. v. Tenn.
       Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Bd., 975 S.W.2d at 306; Ladd v.
       Honda Motor Co., 939 S.W.2d at 90.

Sudberry v. Royal & Sun Alliance, 344 S.W.3d 904, 909-10 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008).

       Husband does not challenge the trial court’s use of the dissipation amount affirmed
by this Court in Trezevant I; rather, he challenges the trial court’s decision to include the
dissipation amount as a marital asset and credit it to Husband in the division of the marital
estate. Husband argues that in Trezevant I, this Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling
concerning dissipation such that any departure from the manner in which the trial court
originally managed the dissipation would violate the law of the case doctrine. This
argument is not compelling.

        The Trezevant I Court affirmed the trial court’s finding that Husband had dissipated
marital assets worth $2,145,131.00. See 568 S.W.3d at 618. However, the Trezevant I
Court also vacated the trial court’s distribution of the parties’ marital estate and remanded
for further hearing and determination by the trial court. As such, the trial court was free to
reconsider the distribution of the dissipation amount inasmuch as the Trezevant I Court
affirmed the finding of the amount of dissipation but vacated the trial court’s overall
distribution of property. Ergo, the trial court abided by the law of the case doctrine by not
relitigating the finding that Husband had dissipated marital funds or the amount of such
dissipation; rather, the trial court only addressed the manner in which the dissipation was
distributed as a part of the overall distribution of marital property. Appellate courts

                                               - 19 -
reviewing a distribution of marital property “ordinarily defer to the trial judge’s decision
unless it is inconsistent with the factors in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c) or is not
supported by a preponderance of the evidence.” Manis v. Manis, 49 S.W.3d 295, 306
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). Discerning that neither such condition is met in this case, we affirm
the trial court’s distribution of the dissipation as a marital asset credited to Husband.

                   4. Mathematical Error Concerning Wife’s Separate Estate

       The trial court found Wife to have the following assets in her separate estate: four
bank accounts with a total value of $749,244.96; four vehicles valued at a total of
$195,000.00; a silver collection valued at $3,500.00; household furnishings valued at
$55,000.00; jewelry valued at $35,000.00; clothing valued at $30,000.00; 601 N. Ft.
Lauderdale Beach Boulevard property with equity of $565,376.85; and 1607 Bernini Place
property with equity of $945,000.00. Thus, the total value of Wife’s separate estate should
have been $2,578,112.81. However, on the trial court’s balance sheet, the court listed a
value for Wife’s total separate estate in the amount of $1,510,376.85. In so doing, it
appears that the court only included the values of the two real properties listed and failed
to include the values of the other personalty and bank accounts in the calculation.

       Husband contends that the trial court’s error concerning the total value of Wife’s
separate estate resulted in an inequitable division of the marital estate. As Husband points
out, the version of Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121(c) (2014) in effect when the
instant action was filed enumerated eleven relevant factors that the court should consider
in making an equitable division of marital property, including “the value of the separate
property of each party.”1 Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c)(6). Husband also relies on prior
opinions of this Court in support of his argument that the case should be remanded to obtain
a more equitable division, including Ellis v. Ellis, No. E2020-00869-COA-R3-CV, 2022
WL 3724768 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2022), and Dover v. Dover, E2019-01891-COA-
R3-CV, 2020 WL 7224368 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 8, 2020). Having fully considered
Husband’s arguments and cited authority, however, we disagree with his contention that
remand is necessary.

        In Ellis, this Court ultimately concluded that two of the assets that the trial court had
classified as marital were not marital assets. See 2022 WL 3724768, at *8-9. The Ellis
Court stated that because of this misclassification, “the size of the marital estate has
changed by a significant amount.” Id. at *8. The Ellis Court therefore vacated the marital

1
  Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121(c) has since been amended to add a factor related to valuing a
closely held business or similar asset, see 2017 Tenn. Pub. Acts, Ch. 309, § 1 (H.B. 348), eff. July 1, 2017,
and a factor related to attorney’s fees and expenses paid by each party, see 2022 Tenn. Pub. Acts, Ch. 762,
§ 6 (S.B. 2385), eff. Mar. 31, 2022. Because the complaint in this case was filed prior to the effective date
of the amendments, the added subdivisions are not applicable here. See, e.g., In re Braxton M., 531 S.W.3d
708, 732 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2017).

                                                       - 20 -
property distribution and remanded for the trial court to “reconsider the distribution of the
marital estate in light of this modification.” Id. Similarly, in Dover, this Court concluded
that certain of the parties’ assets had been improperly classified. See 2020 WL 7224368,
at *10-12. As a result, the Dover Court stated:

               Here, several assets of substantial value have changed classification
       on appeal, and such significant changes to “the marital estate may change the
       manner in which the trial court would choose to divide the rest of the parties’
       assets and debts.” Hayes [v. Hayes], [No. W2010-02015-COA-R3-CV,]
       2012 WL 4936282, at *13 [(Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 18, 2012)]. Accordingly,
       we deem it prudent to remand the case to the trial court for reconsideration
       of its equitable division of the marital estate. Id.

Id. at *12.

        These cases both involved instances when the trial court had improperly classified
assets, thus mandating remand for reconsideration of the trial court’s distribution of the
marital estate due to a significant change in the value of the marital estate. Such is not the
case here. The trial court in this matter instead made a mathematical or typographical error
when totaling Wife’s separate estate despite having all of Wife’s separate assets correctly
classified, listed, and valued. As such, Dover and Ellis are inapposite.

       Moreover, the fact that the trial court recorded a potential typographical or
mathematical error in its balance sheet does not convince this Court that the trial court
failed to consider the entirety of Wife’s separate estate in evaluating Tennessee Code
Annotated § 36-4-121(c)(6), given the trial court’s clear acknowledgement of the
substantial size of Wife’s separate estate in its January 2021 order. In addition, the trial
court expressly delineated and valued each of Wife’s separate assets in the court’s balance
sheet. We therefore determine Husband’s contention that the trial court failed to properly
consider the value of Wife’s separate estate to be unavailing.

                  5. Consideration of Debt in Husband’s Separate Estate

        Husband posits that the trial court erred by failing to include in his separate estate
approximately $3,300,000.00 in debt encumbering three marital properties: Goodman
Malone East, the Broadway Property, and The Shops of Milan. Husband initially requested
that these debts be classified as marital by the trial court. However, because the trial court
declined to classify these debts as marital, Husband now urges that the trial court erred by
also declining to include these debts in Husband’s separate estate.

      Husband postulates that the trial court’s failure to include the $3,300,000.00 in debt
as a part of his separate estate resulted in an inequitable division of the marital estate
because the parties’ respective separate estates are one of the factors a court considers when

                                               - 21 -
making its equitable division of the marital estate pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated
§ 36-4-121(c). In dividing a marital estate, a trial court is afforded the authority to
“[e]quitably divide, distribute, or assign the marital property between the parties without
regard to marital fault in proportions as the court deems just based on the factors set forth
in subsection (c).” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(a)(1) (2014). Section § 36-4-121(c)(6)
provides that one factor a court may consider in making its equitable distribution of the
marital estate is the “value of the separate property of each party.” In addition, courts may
consider “[s]uch other factors as are necessary to consider the equities between the parties.”
Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c)(11) (2014).

       Husband reiterates his contention that when a significant error is made in valuing a
party’s separate estate, this Court should vacate the trial court’s property division and
remand for reconsideration. Husband again relies on Ellis, 2022 WL 3724768 at *6-8, in
support of his position. Having found Husband’s reliance on Ellis to be misplaced,
however, we need only address whether the trial court improperly weighed the value of
Husband’s separate estate in its analysis of the Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121(c)
factors when fashioning its equitable division of marital property.

       There can be no question that the trial court knew about and considered these debts
when rendering its equitable division. The trial court, in its January 2021 order, discussed
each of these debts in detail. Relative to the additional financing obtained by Husband
concerning The Shops of Milan, the court noted that Husband did so without Wife’s
“consent, permission, or even knowledge.” Respecting the debt related to Goodman
Malone East, the court found that although Husband had stipulated before the special
master that the asset had no debt, he then introduced a loan statement dated August 2018
during the final trial. The court thus found that Husband knew about the loan at the time
he stipulated there was no debt. In addition, the court found that the debt was not in either
party’s name; rather, the debt was in the name of an LLC for which Husband owned a 33%
interest.

       Concerning the Broadway Property, the trial court found that Husband had incurred
debt related to the property despite a November 2018 court order denying his request to do
so. The court also found that the debt was incurred in the name of an LLC, for which no
proof had been presented of ownership. The trial court’s findings concerning each of these
three properties specifically acknowledged these debts and concluded that Husband’s
behavior “should not be allowed to reduce the value of the marital interest.”

        For these reasons, we determine Husband’s argument concerning these debts to be
unavailing. The trial court’s findings demonstrate a clear acknowledgement of these debts
despite the trial court’s declination to include them in its valuation of the parties’ separate
or marital properties. Moreover, although the value of the parties’ respective separate
estates is one of many factors to be considered pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated §
36-4-121(c), we determine that the trial court herein properly considered this factor.

                                                - 22 -
Following our thorough review of the appellate record, we conclude that the trial court’s
consideration of this factor was supported by a preponderance of the evidence presented.

                        6. Valuation of Piper Superfund Property

       Husband contends that the trial court erred in valuing the Piper Superfund Property
at $2,114,700.00 when including it in his separate estate. As this Court has previously
elucidated regarding valuation of property pursuant to divorce proceedings:

       The parties themselves must come forward with competent valuation
       evidence. Kinard v. Kinard, 986 S.W.2d 220, 231 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998);
       Wallace v. Wallace, 733 S.W.2d 102, 107 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987). When
       valuation evidence is conflicting, the court may place a value on the property
       that is within the range of the values represented by all the relevant valuation
       evidence. See Watters v. Watters, 959 S.W.2d 585, 589 (Tenn. Ct. App.
       1997); Brock v. Brock, 941 S.W.2d 896, 902 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).

Owens v. Owens, 241 S.W.3d 478, 486 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007). Furthermore, when a trial
court has evaluated witnesses, “especially where issues of credibility and weight of oral
testimony are involved, considerable deference must be accorded to the trial court’s factual
findings.” Woodward v. Woodward, 240 S.W.3d 825, 828 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (citing
Seals v. England/Corsair Upholstery Mfg., 984 S.W.2d 912, 915 (Tenn. 1999)).

       The trial court found, inter alia, the following facts in support of its $2,114,700.00
valuation of the Piper Superfund Property:

              Husband purchased this property in January 2020. Husband
       purchased four or five parcels which the Court will collectively refer to as
       the “Piper Superfund.” . . . Despite forming two new LLC’s to purchase this
       property and closing on the property which Husband claims has over $16
       million in liens, in the middle of the Special Master hearing, Husband claims
       that he simply forgot he owned the Piper Superfund. This is simply not
       credible.

               Husband’s counsel told the Special Master that the property was
       valued at $10. Husband maintained this position through his testimony at the
       trial of this matter. The Shelby County property assessor has valued these
       parcels at over $2.1 million. Husband is currently operating a mini storage
       on this property. Another seemingly important fact that Husband failed to
       disclose.

             Husband asserts that this property has $1.5 million in tax liens and
       another $15 million in liens from the EPA. Husband during his testimony

                                               - 23 -
       explained the process in which the property could be transferred through the
       Land Bank and therefore would not be subject to the tax liens. Additionally,
       Husband testified that he thought he had the EPA liens “worked out.”
       Further, as he admitted, if the EPA liens cannot be resolved, he can simply
       give the land back and he will not be liable. Finally, the property is held by
       an LLC in which Husband is the sole member. The LLC, and not Husband,
       would be liable for any debts or liens.

       Having considered the trial court’s credibility findings as to Husband and the
evidence concerning this issue, we determine that the evidence does not preponderate
against the trial court’s finding of value. The trial court’s value was within the range of
value evidence presented. See Owens, 241 S.W.3d at 486. As such, we affirm the trial
court’s finding that the Piper Superfund Property has a value of $2,114,700.00.

                                    7. Valuation of TEI

         Husband asserts that the trial court violated the law of the case doctrine by valuing
TEI at $720,000.00 despite the initial trial court finding before the first appeal assigning
the company no value. As the trial court found on remand, TEI holds no real property
itself; instead, it operates as the property manager for Husband’s various companies and
properties. Husband argues that the trial court erred by assigning a $720,000.00 value to
TEI when no value was assigned to it following the first trial and the issue was not appealed
in Trezevant I. Husband postulates that the zero value of TEI has become the law of the
case.

       We reiterate our previous articulation of the law of the case doctrine:

               When the law of the case doctrine applies, the ruling of an appellate
       court becomes the law of the case and is binding in later trials and appeals of
       the same case if the facts in the second trial are substantially the same as the
       facts in the first trial or appeal.

Sudberry, 344 S.W.3d at 910.

        Notably, this Court expressly stated in Trezevant I: “We therefore vacate the trial
court’s valuation of the parties’ marital property.” See 568 S.W.3d at 623. TEI was
classified as marital property; therefore, it was included in the Trezevant I Court’s ruling
of vacatur. As such, the trial court on remand was in no way bound to value TEI at zero
dollars by the law of the case doctrine.

                                               - 24 -
        The trial court chose to use the earnings value method to value TEI.2 In doing so,
the trial court considered the testimony of Husband’s accountant, Mr. Dilley, who stated
that TEI had paid Husband $3,600,000.00 in loans to shareholders from 2014 to 2018.
According to Mr. Dilley, these shareholder loans were more accurately described as
distributions of equity, but the loans were recorded as shareholder loans to avoid the Hall
Income Tax. These distributions of equity averaged $720,000.00 a year, which formed the
basis for the trial court’s determination pursuant to the earnings value method.

       We also reiterate that when valuation evidence is conflicting, the court may place a
value on the property that is within the range of the values represented by all the relevant
valuation evidence. Watters, 959 S.W.2d at 589 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). Moreover,
decisions regarding the value of marital property are questions of fact. Kinard, 986 S.W.2d
at 231. Accordingly, valuations are entitled to great weight on appeal unless they are not
supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Tate, 138 S.W.3d at 875.

       We affirm the trial court’s finding that TEI has a value of $720,000.00, based on the
earnings value method, as within the range of values represented by the relevant valuation
evidence and supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Husband’s argument
concerning the law of the case doctrine as it relates to the trial court’s valuation of TEI is
unavailing.

                                   8. Husband’s Annual Income

       Husband asserts that the trial court erred by determining his annual average income
to be $1,400.000.00. Considering the evidence presented, we note that Mr. Ivy testified
before the special master on November 15, 2019, stating that Husband’s net business cash
flow for the years 2015 through 2018 ranged from $444,000.00 to $582,000.00 before taxes
and budgeted personal expenses. It was also Mr. Ivy’s opinion that after deducting federal
income tax and personal expenses, Husband’s net cash flow ranged from negative
$1,000.00 to negative $215,180.00 annually. However, Mr. Ivy also expressed that he did
not consider the $3,000,000.00 in loans Husband received from different general
partnerships when calculating Husband’s cash flow. Mr. Ivy explained that he made this
determination because the Internal Revenue Code does not consider loans to be income.
Mr. Dilley’s testimony supported that of Mr. Ivy concerning the amount of the loans,

2
 Our Supreme Court has recognized the earnings value method as an acceptable method of valuing a closely
held corporation, as outlined in Blasingame v. Am. Materials, Inc., 654 S.W. 2d 659, 666 (Tenn. 1983).
We note that a portion of the Blasingame decision was subsequently superseded by the enactment of
Tennessee Code Annotated § 47-8-102 (1992) concerning the definition of a “security” and that another
portion has been overruled by Athlon Sports Commc’ns, Inc. v. Duggan, 549 S.W.3d 107, 125 (Tenn. 2018),
concerning Blasingame’s perceived requirement of use of the Delaware Block method when valuing a
dissenting shareholder’s stock. Neither of these subsequent developments impact the validity of the trial
court’s use of the earnings value method in this case.
                                                     - 25 -
clarifying that the shareholder loans were actually distributions of equity to Husband but
were recorded as loans specifically to avoid the Hall Income Tax.

       The special master was not convinced, finding: “Based on the evidence the ‘loans’
appear to actually be distributions of equity in the corporations to [Husband].” The special
master pointed out that the tax returns presented at the hearing demonstrated that Husband
had received $7,075,380.00 in loans from general partnerships, which would then average,
over five years, to $1,415,076.00 in annual cash flow. The special master concluded:

       The evidence suggests, and the Special Master’s opinion is, that the cash flow
       from [Husband’s] business is at least $693,222.80 annually for the period
       2014-2018. However, based on the “loans to shareholders” from the tax
       returns cited above, the cash flow from [Husband’s] businesses is more likely
       $1,415,076.00 annually for the period 2014-2018.

       When evaluating the evidence in light of the factors contained in Tennessee Code
Annotated § 36-4-121(c), the trial court considered Husband’s earning capacity as it related
to the second factor, “age, physical and mental health, vocational skills, employability,
earning capacity, estate, financial liabilities and financial needs of each of the parties.” In
considering this factor, the court specifically found:

       Husband has substantial income. Here, the proof, through the testimony of
       Husband’s accountant, Mr. James Dilley, showed that [TEI] paid Husband
       $3.6 million in loans to shareholders from 2014-2018. Or on average
       $720,000 a year. These loans to shareholders were actually distributions of
       equity to Husband, according to Mr. Dilley. It was “booked” as a loan to
       avoid the Hall Income Tax. This is in addition to the income paid to Husband
       during this time period. Additionally, as found by the Special Master,
       Husband had received loans to shareholders from all his businesses in the
       total amount of $7,075,380.00 from 2014 to 2018. Or an average of $1.4
       million a year. In accordance with the testimony of Mr. Dilley, the Court
       find that Husband’s average income is $1.4 million a year.

        Inasmuch as this case was tried by the trial court sitting without a jury, we review
the trial court’s findings of fact de novo with a presumption of correctness unless the
evidence preponderates otherwise. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); Hyneman v. Hyneman, 152
S.W.3d 549, 553 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). Following our review of the record and the
evidence presented, we conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial
court’s determination that Husband had an average annual income of $1,400,000.00.

                                                - 26 -
                                    9. Debt on the Broadway Property

       Husband contends that the trial court erred by failing to classify the debt associated
with the Broadway Property as marital. Husband purchased the Broadway Property during
the pendency of the first appeal and paid for it in part by selling another parcel of marital
property despite a court order instructing him not to do so. As a part of the special master’s
hearing, the parties stipulated that the Broadway Property should be classified as marital
property. By reason of this stipulation, the trial court included the $1,011,950.00 value of
the Broadway Property in the marital estate; however, the trial court declined Husband’s
request to include $1,829,860.00 in debt encumbering the property in the marital estate.

        As our Supreme Court has clarified, “marital debts” are “all debts incurred by either
or both spouses during the course of the marriage up to the date of the final divorce
hearing.” Alford v. Alford, 120 S.W.3d 810, 813 (Tenn. 2003).3 Here, Husband incurred
the debt on the Broadway Property after the property’s purchase on February 28, 2018. By
2018, however, the parties had already been declared divorced such that the debt on the
Broadway Property was not incurred during the course of the marriage. Therefore, the
$1,829,860.00 debt on the Broadway Property does not meet the definition of marital debt
set forth in Alford. See id.

       Moreover, as the trial court found, the loans associated with the property were taken
out by 2108 E. Broadway LLC; however, Husband had presented no proof concerning this
company, “its ownership, income, assets, or value.” As such, the trial court declined to
include the debt of this LLC in the valuation and distribution of the marital estate because
the LLC itself was not included in the marital estate. In addition, the court noted that the
loans had been obtained following a court order directing that Husband would not further
encumber marital assets.

3
    Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121(b)(1) has since been amended to include the following definition:

          (1)     “Marital debt”:

                  (A)     Means all debt incurred by either or both spouses during the course of the
                          marriage through the date of the final hearing and any proceedings brought
                          pursuant to Rule 59 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure; and

                  (B)     Includes debt incurred to pay attorney fees and expenses incurred in
                          connection with the proceedings, and unpaid attorney fees and expenses
                          incurred in connection with the proceedings through the date of the final
                          hearing and any proceedings brought pursuant to Rule 59 of the Tennessee
                          Rules of Civil Procedure.

See 2022 Tenn. Pub. Acts, Ch. 762, § 4 (S.B. 2385) ), eff. Mar. 31, 2022.

                                                       - 27 -
       Following our review, we determine that the evidence presented does not
preponderate against the trial court’s declination to classify the debt associated with the
Broadway Property as marital. We therefore affirm the court’s determination concerning
this debt.

               10. Additional Assets Purchased by Husband after Divorce

        Husband asserts that the trial court erred by including assets in the marital estate
that were purchased after the parties were declared divorced. Specifically, on July 21,
2017, Husband, acting through Trip’s Nurseries, a marital business, purchased a new
Range Rover vehicle for the parties’ adult daughter to drive. The business purchased the
Range Rover for $47,553.00, and the purchase price was the only evidence presented at
trial as to the value of the vehicle. The trial court found that this Range Rover should be
included in the marital estate as an asset of Trip’s Nurseries. In addition, in June 2017,
Husband co-signed a promissory note for the purchase of improved real property located
on Nevada Avenue in Nashville (“the Nevada Avenue Property”) for the benefit of the
parties’ adult daughter. The trial court found that Husband had made mortgage payments
concerning this property in the amount of $35,063.90 from marital funds. The trial court
credited the $35,063.90 amount to Husband, as a dissipation, in the division of the marital
estate. Husband contends that these purchases occurred long after the parties were
divorced and, as such, the assets failed to meet the definition of “marital property” pursuant
to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121(b)(1)(A).

                                   A. New Range Rover

       Husband takes issue with the trial court’s decision to classify the Range Rover as
marital property and include it in the marital estate. Husband argues that the Range Rover’s
purchase occurred long after the parties divorced and that Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-
4-121(b)(1)(A) (2014) defined marital property as property “acquired by either or both
spouses during the course of the marriage up to the date of the final divorce hearing.”

        The evidence in the record demonstrated that this Range Rover was purchased by
Trip’s Nurseries, a marital business, in July 2017. The marital business acquired the Range
Rover before the trial court’s ultimate division of the marital estate. The trial court found
the Range Rover to be an asset of Trip’s Nurseries, which resulted in the inclusion of the
Range Rover’s value in the value of that marital business entity. As an asset of Trip’s
Nurseries, the Range Rover should not have been separately listed as personal property on
the trial court’s balance sheet. We accordingly modify the trial court’s award of marital
property to Husband by subtracting the $47,553.99 value of the Range Rover, determining
that it has already been accounted for as an asset of Trip’s Nurseries, which was also
awarded to Husband.

                                               - 28 -
                              B. The Nevada Avenue Property

         Husband argues that the trial court erred by awarding to him the amount of
$35,063.90 in the division of the marital estate, based on his use of marital funds to make
mortgage and tax payments on the Nevada Avenue Property for the benefit of the parties’
adult daughter. As previously explained, this Court must determine whether the trial court
abused its discretion in crediting Husband with the $35,063.90 in its division of the marital
estate. See Owens, 241 S.W.3d at 490. “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court
. . . app[lies] an incorrect legal standard, reaches an illogical result, resolves the case on a
clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or relies on reasoning that causes an
injustice.” Gonsewski v. Gonsewski, 350 S.W.3d 99, 105 (Tenn. 2011). A trial court
abuses its discretion “only when the trial court’s ruling falls outside the spectrum of rulings
that might reasonably result from an application of the correct legal standards to the
evidence found in the record.” Eldridge v. Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d 82, 88 (Tenn. 2001).

        Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121(c)(5)(A) provides that a trial court’s division
of marital property should consider “[t]he contribution of each party to the acquisition,
preservation, appreciation, depreciation or dissipation of the marital or separate property.”
As such, the trial court has the discretion, in fashioning its equitable division of the marital
estate, to consider whether a party utilized marital assets prior to the division of the marital
estate in a manner that did not benefit the marital estate. Following our review of the
evidence in the record, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
crediting Husband with $35,063.90 in dissipated funds based on the factors laid out in
Tennessee Code Annotated § 34-6-121(c).

                                    C. 2011 Range Rover

        Finally, Husband contends that the trial court erred by including a 2011 Range
Rover in both his distribution of marital property and Wife’s list of separate property. Wife
does not address this contention in her appellate brief, and we agree that including the same
asset in two separate portions of the balance sheet would be inappropriate. We therefore
remove the value of this asset from Husband’s share of the marital estate, allowing it to
remain as Wife’s separate property based on Husband’s argument on appeal that it should
not have been included in the marital estate.

       Following our modification of the trial court’s overall marital property distribution
to remove the $47,553.99 value of the Range Rover owned by Trip’s Nurseries and the
$12,000.00 value of the 2011 Range Rover from Husband’s share of the marital estate, we
conclude that no further adjustment to the marital property division is necessary. Removal
of these items of relatively insignificant value from Husband’s share of the marital estate
does not alter the fact that Husband has received a greater share of the marital estate than
the trial court originally intended due to the court’s overvaluing Wife’s share by
inadvertently omitting $2,000,000.00 in debt from Wife’s portion. We therefore conclude

                                                - 29 -
that a modification of the trial court’s judgment to exclude these items from Husband’s
share need not result in a redistribution of the marital estate.

         11. Propriety of the Trial Court’s Overall Division of Marital Property

        Husband’s overarching postulate is that an accumulation of alleged errors by the
trial court resulted in a marital property division that was inequitable and should be vacated
and remanded for reconsideration. Having found no reversible error, however, and
considering the overall property distribution in light of the statutory factors, we disagree.

       As this Court has explained, “[t]he approach to dividing a marital estate should not
be mechanical, but rather should entail carefully weighing the relevant factors in Tenn.
Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c) in light of the evidence that the parties have presented.” Owens,
241 S.W.3d at 490. A trial court has broad discretion in creating an equitable division of
marital property, and appellate courts must give great weight to the trial court’s division of
the marital estate. Jolly v. Jolly, 130 S.W.3d 783, 785 (Tenn. 2005).

        Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121(c) directs trial courts to consider certain
relevant, but not all encompassing, factors when fashioning an equitable division of marital
property. The version of the statute in effect when the instant action was initiated provided
the following factors:

       (1)    The duration of the marriage;

       (2)    The age, physical and mental health, vocational skills, employability,
              earning capacity, estate, financial liabilities and financial needs of
              each of the parties;

       (3)    The tangible or intangible contribution by one (1) party to the
              education, training or increased earning power of the other party;

       (4)    The relative ability of each party for future acquisitions of capital
              assets and income;

       (5)(A) The contribution of each party to the acquisition, preservation,
             appreciation, depreciation or dissipation of the marital or separate
             property, including the contribution of a party to the marriage as
             homemaker, wage earner or parent, with the contribution of a party as
             homemaker or wage earner to be given the same weight if each party
             has fulfilled its role;

       (B)    For purposes of this subdivision (c)(5), dissipation of assets means
              wasteful expenditures which reduce the marital property available for

                                               - 30 -
              equitable distributions and which are made for a purpose contrary to
              the marriage either before or after a complaint for divorce or legal
              separation has been filed;

       (6)    The value of the separate property of each party;

       (7)    The estate of each party at the time of the marriage;

       (8)    The economic circumstances of each party at the time the division of
              property is to become effective;

       (9)    The tax consequences to each party, costs associated with the
              reasonably foreseeable sale of the asset, and other reasonably
              foreseeable expenses associated with the asset;

       (10)   The amount of social security benefits available to each spouse; and

       (11)   Such other factors as are necessary to consider the equities between
              the parties.

       In its January 2021 order, the trial court analyzed all of the above-listed factors and
made factual findings concerning each one. Notably, the trial court placed emphasis on
other necessary factors to consider, stating:

              First, the Court considers Husband’s repeated inability and simple
       refusal to abide by this Court’s orders. Examples of this include, but are not
       limited to: (1) Husband taking out Paycheck Protection Loans against the
       marital businesses within days of this Court denying Husband’s motion
       requesting to do so; (2) Husband borrowing against the marital estate despite
       explicit orders not to do so; and (3) Husband traveling overseas without
       informing Wife despite a clear order from the Court not to do so. The Court
       does not consider this issue in an effort to punish Husband for his poor
       behavior. Instead, the Court considers it due to the Court’s concern that
       Husband will disregard this Court’s orders related to the division of property
       in an effort to defeat Wife’s receipt of marital assets.

              Second, the Court considers the proven efforts of Husband to hide
       assets. This includes efforts during the original litigation and trial, and
       continued acts in this regard during remand. It includes, but is not limited
       to, Husband’s actions with regard to the property purchased by 1871, LLC,
       the overlooked parcels in the Cayman Islands, and Husband’s forgotten
       purchase of the Piper properties. The Court does not consider this issue in
       an effort to punish Husband for his poor behavior. Instead, the Court

                                               - 31 -
       considers this factor as it relates to Husband’s potential for taking action to
       defeat this Court’s division of the marital estate.

       We determine the trial court’s factual findings concerning all relevant factors to be
supported by a preponderance of the evidence. The trial court found that as to a majority
of the pertinent § 36-4-121(c) factors, the evidence weighed in favor of awarding a greater
portion of the marital estate to Wife, and we agree. Upon review of the record, this Court
finds sufficient evidence that the trial court’s equitable distribution, as modified herein,
was consistent with the statutory factors contained in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-
121(c).

       Husband argues that this Court should vacate and remand the property division to
the trial court with an instruction that Husband should be awarded the marital real
properties and Wife should receive additional alimony in solido, purportedly because
Husband’s ability to manage the properties is much greater than Wife’s. We reiterate,
however, that an equitable division of marital property pursuant to Tennessee Code
Annotated § 36-4-121(c) is subject to the broad discretion of the trial court. Flannary v.
Flannary, 121 S.W.3d 647, 650 (Tenn. 2003). This Court will not overturn the trial court’s
decision unless it “is inconsistent with the statutory factors or lacks proper evidentiary
support.” Trezevant I, 568 S.W.3d at 607 (citing Baggett v Baggett, 422 S.W.3d 537, 543
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2013)). Neither of those conditions exists here.

       The trial court carefully and thoroughly considered the enumerated statutory factors
and other relevant factors when allocating to Wife several real properties. The trial court
stated its reasoning that allocating several real properties to Wife would provide her the
opportunity to “grow her skills and relationships so as to be somewhat profitable in this
business should she desire, as she states she does.” In addition, the trial court articulated
a desire to provide Wife with the ability to earn income and preserve her assets by awarding
her income-generating real properties. The trial court also expressed concerns about
Husband’s potential “refusal to timely and appropriately pay the alimony in solido in
exchange for marital property as ordered.”

       Predicated on our review of the evidence presented, we conclude that the trial court
articulated legitimate reasons for allocating several real properties to Wife, and we find
unpersuasive Husband’s argument that he would be more qualified to manage those
properties. Moreover, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
fashioning its equitable distribution of the marital estate, and we decline to vacate the trial
court’s distribution.

               V. Wife’s Attorney’s Fees Incurred at the Trial Court Level

       As the trial court noted, the parties in the “Agreed Order Resolving Certain Issues
for Final Hearing, Limiting Others, and Addressing Other Matters,” entered on July 1,

                                                - 32 -
2020, agreed that Wife would not seek any form of alimony. However, the parties did
reserve the issue of alimony in solido in order to adjust the distribution of the marital estate,
address any dissipation, and provide for a potential award of attorney’s fees. In its final
order, the trial court concluded that each party would be able to pay his or her own
attorney’s fees from the party’s respective portion of the marital estate, and the court
declined to award attorney’s fees to either party.

       On appeal, Wife has requested that this Court reverse the trial court’s denial of her
request for an award of attorney’s fees incurred at the trial court level. As our Supreme
Court has elucidated:

               It is well settled that an award of attorney’s fees in a divorce case
       constitutes alimony in solido. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(h)(1)
       (“alimony in solido may include attorney fees, where appropriate”); Herrera
       v. Herrera, 944 S.W.2d 379, 390 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). The decision
       whether to award attorney’s fees is within the sound discretion of the trial
       court. Crabtree v. Crabtree, 16 S.W.3d 356, 361 (Tenn. 2000); Kincaid v.
       Kincaid, 912 S.W.2d 140, 144 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). As with any alimony
       award, in deciding whether to award attorney’s fees as alimony in solido, the
       trial court should consider the factors enumerated in Tennessee Code
       Annotated section 36-5-121(i). A spouse with adequate property and income
       is not entitled to an award of alimony to pay attorney’s fees and expenses.
       Umstot v. Umstot, 968 S.W.2d 819, 824 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). Such awards
       are appropriate only when the spouse seeking them lacks sufficient funds to
       pay his or her own legal expenses, see Houghland v. Houghland, 844 S.W.2d
       619, 623 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992), or the spouse would be required to deplete
       his or her resources in order to pay them, see Harwell v. Harwell, 612 S.W.2d
       182, 185 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980). Thus, where the spouse seeking such an
       award has demonstrated that he or she is financially unable to procure
       counsel, and where the other spouse has the ability to pay, the court may
       properly grant an award of attorney’s fees as alimony. See id. at 185.

Gonsewski, 350 S.W.3d at 113.

       In Gonsewski, the Court found that an award of attorney’s fees was unwarranted,
stating:

               Wife had been steadily employed for more than 16 years with the
       same employer, was earning an annual salary of at least $72,000, and was
       working in the field of information technology. Moreover, she had a college
       education, received more of the marital estate than Husband and, as far as
       this record shows, is physically and mentally healthy. The record contains

                                                 - 33 -
       nothing to suggest that Wife was unable to secure counsel, either at trial or
       on appeal, but for an award of attorney’s fees.

Id.

        In the case at bar, Wife has a separate estate worth $2,578,112.81, and the trial court
awarded to Wife $6,080,468.97 from the marital estate, constituting roughly 51% of the
total marital estate, including an award of $5,000,000.00 in alimony in solido. In addition,
the trial court specifically awarded to Wife certain income-producing real properties,
reasoning that those properties would provide Wife with the highest possibility to earn
continuing income with minimal effort. In view of these circumstances, we conclude that
the trial court’s denial of Wife’s request for attorney’s fees was well within its discretion.

                          VI. Wife’s Attorney’s Fees on Appeal

       Wife also requests that this Court award her attorney’s fees incurred in defending
against this appeal. “Whether to award attorney’s fees on appeal is a matter within the sole
discretion of this Court.” Hill v. Hill, No. M2006-02753-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 4404097,
at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2007) (citing Archer v. Archer, 907 S.W.2d 412, 419 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1995)). To determine whether an award of fees is appropriate on appeal, we take
into consideration “the ability of the requesting party to pay the accrued fees, the requesting
party’s success in the appeal, whether the requesting party sought the appeal in good faith,
and any other equitable factor that need be considered.” Id.

       Although we acknowledge that Wife has been successful in defending against this
appeal, we also acknowledge Wife’s ability to pay attorney’s fees from her assets.
Accordingly, we decline to award attorney’s fees to Wife on appeal.

                                      VII. Conclusion

       For the reasons stated above, the decision of the trial court is affirmed with the
aforementioned modifications, with the result that Husband’s share of the marital estate, as
delineated in the trial court’s balance sheet and judgment, will be reduced by $59,553.99.
We decline to award attorney’s fees to Wife on appeal. We remand this matter to the trial
court for enforcement of its judgment equitably dividing the parties’ marital estate. Costs
on appeal are assessed to the appellant, Stanley H. Trezevant, III.

                                                   s/Thomas R. Frierson, II
                                                   _________________________________
                                                   THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, JUDGE

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