Court Opinion

ID: 9409142
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-15 19:09:55.106827+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:49.083447
License: Public Domain

NUMBER 13-22-00256-CR

                           COURT OF APPEALS

                  THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                    CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

OSCAR OSVALDO BARAJAS JR.
A/K/A OSCAR OSVALDO BARAJAS,                                             Appellant,

                                         v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                                       Appellee.

                   On appeal from the 36th District Court
                        of Aransas County, Texas.

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Silva and Peña
          Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Contreras

      Appellant Oscar Osvaldo Barajas Jr. a/k/a Oscar Osvaldo Barajas was convicted

of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, a second-degree felony, and deadly conduct

by discharge of a firearm, a third-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§§ 22.02(a)(2), 22.05(b)(2). He was sentenced to concurrent ten- and five-year prison
terms for the respective offenses. On appeal, Barajas argues: (1) a material variance

existed between the indictment and the proof at trial regarding the aggravated assault

offense, rendering the evidence legally insufficient to support conviction; and (2) the court

erred by submitting the aggravated assault charge to the jury. We affirm.

                                    I.      BACKGROUND

       An Aransas County grand jury returned an indictment alleging that Barajas, on or

about September 27, 2021: (1) “intentionally, knowingly[,] or recklessly sh[ot] Don Gaines

with a firearm, and did then and there use or exhibit a deadly weapon, namely a firearm,

during the commission of the assault” (Count 1); and (2) “discharge[d] a firearm at or in

the direction of a habitation, and . . . was then and there reckless as to whether the

habitation was occupied” (Count 2).

       At trial, Gaines testified that in the early morning of September 26, 2021, he

observed an argument between his neighbors Ace Montgomery and Leon Anderson

outside his home in Rockport. According to Gaines, Montgomery was yelling racial slurs

at Anderson and then punched him. Gaines testified that, when his son David came out

of the house, David saw Anderson’s necklace on the ground next to Montgomery’s

Mercedes and went to retrieve it; Montgomery then punched David. Gaines said he

grabbed David and Montgomery and all three men fell into a ditch. At that point, police

arrived and the parties dispersed. However, as he and his wife were trying to go back to

sleep, Gaines heard a “bunch” of gunshots and “the bullets just started running in through

the wall.” Gaines was shot in the foot and began bleeding profusely. He stated that the

injury hurt and that it required surgery.

       Fernanda Moctezuma testified she lived with Montgomery in her house across the

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street from Gaines’s residence. She observed the fight between Montgomery and

Anderson. At the time of the fight, Barajas was inside her house. Moctezuma stated that,

when Montgomery came back inside her house after the fight, he had visible injuries, and

Barajas saw those injuries. At some point, Barajas left the house and Moctezuma fell

asleep. She woke up when she heard multiple gunshots which she thought were directed

at her house. Later, police came to search the house and to ask about Montgomery’s

whereabouts. Eventually, Montgomery returned to the house in a car driven by Juan

Arguello, at which point police arrested both Montgomery and Arguello. On cross-

examination, she agreed with defense counsel that Gaines, David, and Anderson

“jumped” Montgomery.

      Phone records introduced into evidence showed that Montgomery called Barajas

at 4:30 a.m.—around eight minutes before the shooting occurred. Investigation also

revealed that Montgomery called Arguello at around 5:54 a.m. and again at around 6:08

a.m. Arguello testified that he went to pick up Montgomery at Barajas’s house at around

6:00 a.m. When he went inside Barajas’s bedroom, he saw a black “assault rifle” against

a wall. He then brought Montgomery back to Moctezuma’s house, where he and

Montgomery were arrested.

      Barajas’s roommate Clayton Lambert testified that he saw Barajas with a black

“AR” when Barajas moved in with him in around March of 2021. Lambert conceded that

he told police on September 28, 2021, that Barajas “said he was going to dip out because

things were getting hot.” Police impounded Barajas’s black BMW, which was parked

outside Lambert’s house. A search of the BMW revealed two .223-caliber shell casings,

which were consistent with having been fired from an assault rifle.

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       Barajas was interviewed by police after he was arrested. At first, Barajas claimed

not to be involved with the shooting; then, he said he was a passenger in the car and

Montgomery was the driver and the shooter. Barajas told police that Montgomery used

an “AR P”—i.e., an AR pistol, which is an AR-15-style rifle modified to have a shorter

barrel and no buttstock. No firearm was recovered by police.

       The jury was instructed on the law of parties. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 7.02(a)(2) (“A person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct

of another if[,] . . . acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense,

he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the

offense . . . .”). It found Barajas guilty on both charges and assessed punishment as set

forth above. This appeal followed.

                                     II.    DISCUSSION

A.     Material Variance

       By his first issue, Barajas contends that the evidence was legally insufficient to

support his conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon because there was a

material variance between the allegations in the indictment and the proof adduced at trial.

His complaint stems from the fact that Count 1 of the indictment failed to explicitly allege

that Gaines suffered bodily injury. See id. § 22.02(a)(2) (stating that a person commits

aggravated assault “if the person commits assault as defined in [§] 22.01 and . . . uses or

exhibits a deadly weapon during the commission of the assault”); id. § 22.01(a)(1) (stating

that a person commits assault “if the person . . . intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly

causes bodily injury to another” (emphasis added)).

       In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we consider

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the evidence “in the light most favorable to the verdict” to determine whether a rational

trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt. Stahmann v. State, 602 S.W.3d 573, 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). Sufficiency is

measured by the elements of the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury

charge. Curlee v. State, 620 S.W.3d 767, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (citing Malik v.

State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). A hypothetically correct jury charge

“accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily

increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of

liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was

tried.” Id. (citing Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240). “The law ‘authorized by the indictment’

consists of the statutory elements of the offense as modified by the indictment

allegations.” Id.

       “If a variance exists between the allegations and the proof, it may render the

evidence insufficient to sustain the conviction.” Wray v. State, 711 S.W.2d 631, 633 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1986). “In a variance situation, the State has proven the defendant guilty of a

crime, but has proven its commission in a manner that varies from the allegations in the

charging instrument.” Gollihar v. State, 46 S.W.3d 243, 246 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). A

variance requires reversal and judgment of acquittal only when it is prejudicial to a

defendant’s substantive rights. Id. at 248. In determining whether substantial rights have

been prejudiced, we ask (1) “whether the indictment, as written, informed the defendant

of the charge against him sufficiently to allow him to prepare an adequate defense at trial,”

and (2) “whether prosecution under the deficiently drafted indictment would subject the

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defendant to the risk of being prosecuted later for the same crime.” Id. 1

        In this case, Count 1 of the indictment failed to allege all of the essential elements

of aggravated assault because it did not allege that Barajas, either as a principal or as a

party, caused bodily injury. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 22.01(a)(1), 22.01(a)(1). 2

Pursuant to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision in Studer v. State, it is

“possible . . . for a defendant to be convicted on the basis of an indictment that does not

allege all of the elements of the offense.” Fisher v. State, 887 S.W.2d 49, 55 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1994) (first citing Studer v. State, 799 S.W.2d 263 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); then citing

State v. Oliver, 808 S.W.2d 492, 493–94 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (holding that an

indictment which failed to allege a culpable mental state was still an “indictment”

conferring jurisdiction, and the defect was waived); and then citing Rodriguez v. State,

799 S.W.2d 301, 302–03 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (same)), overruled on other grounds by

        1 The dissent purports to apply Gollihar and would find a material variance, but it does not apply
these factors.
        2  Barajas did not object to the indictment prior to trial; therefore, he waived any complaint as to the
lack of an essential element in the indictment, and he does not bring any complaint regarding the indictment
on appeal. See Studer v. State, 799 S.W.2d 263 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (noting that defects of substance
or form contained in an indictment must be objected to at trial or are waived, and that a defect of substance
includes the omission of a required element or elements of the offense); see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 1.14(b) (“If the defendant does not object to a defect, error, or irregularity of form or substance in
an indictment or information before the date on which the trial on the merits commences, he waives and
forfeits the right to object to the defect, error, or irregularity and he may not raise the objection on appeal or
in any other postconviction proceeding.”). Specifically, Barajas does not argue on appeal that the indictment
failed to accuse him of a crime “with enough clarity and specificity to identify the penal statute under which
the State intend[ed] to prosecute” such that it would not invoke the trial court’s jurisdiction. See Duron v.
State, 956 S.W.2d 547, 550–51 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). We nevertheless observe that Count 1 of the
indictment in this case, though failing to allege a “complete offense,” contains far more detail about
Barajas’s complained-of conduct than the example given by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals of a
charging instrument so deficient that it might fail to invoke the court’s jurisdiction. See Teal v. State, 230
S.W.3d 172, 183 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (Keller, P.J., concurring) (noting that an indictment which merely
reads “John Smith intentionally” would not contain “enough information to allege an offense” and would not
invoke the court’s jurisdiction); see also Walker v. State, 594 S.W.3d 330, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (“Had
the indictment in this case been as deficient as the one envisioned by Presiding Judge Keller [in Teal] then
we might characterize the engaging offense as the State does, as a ‘non-existent’ offense.”); Jenkins v.
State, 592 S.W.3d 894, 900 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (holding that when an indictment potentially charges a
felony but is defective, a court may refer to the indictment’s heading and other circumstances to determine
whether the charging instrument effectively invokes felony jurisdiction).

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Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 239–40; see Ex parte Edwards, 663 S.W.3d 614, 617 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2022) (citing Studer approvingly and noting that, under Article V, § 12 of the Texas

Constitution, “an indictment is still an indictment” conferring jurisdiction on the trial court

“even if it has a defect of substance”). However,

        where an indictment facially charges a complete offense, it is reasonable to
        presume the State intended to charge the offense alleged, and none other.
        Consequently, where an indictment facially charges a complete offense, the
        State is held to the offense charged in the indictment, regardless of whether
        the State intended to charge that offense.

Thomason v. State, 892 S.W.2d 8, 11 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994); see Sierra v. State, 501

S.W.3d 179, 183 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (same); see also

Kirkpatrick v. State, 279 S.W.3d 324, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (implicitly rejecting

appellant’s contention that the court of criminal appeals “retreated” from its holding in

Thomason); Guerrero-Acosta v. State, No. 13-17-00560-CR, 2018 WL 5832097, at *6

(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Nov. 8, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated

for publication). It follows that, “when the indictment facially charges a complete offense

and the State presents evidence which convicts under a different theory than that

alleged,” the defendant’s due process rights are violated “because the State has failed to

prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which

[the] defendant was charged.” Thomason, 892 S.W.2d at 11. In that situation, “we cannot

presume a defect exists and Studer is simply not applicable.” Id. n.5. 3

        3     The dissent suggests that both Studer and Thomason have been abrogated by the more recent
holding in Malik that sufficiency is measured with reference to a hypothetically correct jury charge, not the
charge actually given. See Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). But a variance
analysis calls for a comparison between the facts alleged in the charging instrument and the proof adduced
at trial; it does not involve the jury charge at all. See Gollihar v. State, 46 S.W.3d 243, 246 (Tex. Crim. App.
2001); Wray v. State, 711 S.W.2d 631, 633 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). Accordingly, the holding in Malik does
not affect the continued vitality of Studer and Thomason.

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        Barajas argues that the indictment for Count 1 “facially alleged the complete

offense of [d]eadly [c]onduct” under Texas Penal Code § 22.05(b)(1). See TEX. PENAL

CODE ANN. § 22.05(b)(1) (stating that a person commits the offense of deadly conduct “if

he knowingly discharges a firearm at or in the direction of . . . one or more individuals”);

Thomason, 892 S.W.2d at 11. He contends that “the material variance is fatal, and

therefore warrants reversal, since the evidence at trial proved an offense different than

the complete offense alleged in the indictment.”

        In response, the State notes that, though Count 1 of the indictment did not explicitly

allege that Barajas caused Gaines to suffer bodily injury, it did specifically cite penal code

§ 22.02(a)(2), defining aggravated assault, in its header. The State also argues that Count

1 did not facially allege the “complete offense” of deadly conduct under § 22.05(b)

because, though it alleged that Barajas “sh[ot] . . . Gaines,” it did not allege that Barajas

shot “at or in the direction of” Gaines. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.05(b)(1).

        We agree with the State that Count 1 of the indictment did not allege the “complete

offense” of deadly conduct as defined in § 22.05(b)(1) of the penal code. Count 1 alleged

that Barajas “intentionally, knowingly[,] or recklessly” shot Gaines with a firearm, which

would theoretically allow Barajas to be convicted even if he did not shoot “at or in the

direction of” Gaines. See id. § 6.03(c) (“A person acts recklessly, or is reckless, with

respect to . . . the result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a

substantial and unjustifiable risk that the . . . result will occur.”). 4 This is inconsistent with

        4For example, a defendant could fire a gun out of a car window aimlessly, or into the air or at the
ground, or while spinning the gun around on his finger. If a person is shot as a result of this action, the
defendant may be guilty of assault (because he recklessly caused bodily injury to another), but not deadly
conduct as defined in § 22.05(b) (because he did not knowingly discharge a firearm at or in the direction of
one or more individuals). See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 22.01, 22.05(b)(1). Moreover, under this scenario,

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the statutory definition of deadly conduct under § 22.05(b), which requires the “knowing”

discharge of a firearm. Id. § 22.05(b); see id. § 6.03(b) (“A person acts knowingly, or with

knowledge, with respect to the nature of his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his

conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or that the circumstances exist. A

person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he

is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.”); see also id. § 6.02(d)

(classifying “knowing” mental state as relatively more culpable than “reckless”). Barajas

does not suggest any other “complete offense” which Count 1 may have alleged, 5 and

we observe none.

        The dissent argues that an indictment alleging an “intentional, knowing, or

reckless” shooting suffices to allege the “complete offense” of deadly conduct under

§ 22.05(b), which requires the “knowing” discharge of a firearm. By that rationale, an

indictment alleging that a defendant “intentionally or knowingly caused the death or

discomfort of an individual” would suffice to allege the “complete offense” of murder under

§ 19.02(b)(1). See id. § 19.02(b)(1) (providing that a person commits murder if he

“intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual” (emphasis added)). With its

use of the disjunctive “or” in its description of culpable mental states, the indictment

transformed what would be an essential element of deadly conduct under § 22.05(b)—

the defendant shot the victim, but he did not necessarily shoot “at or in the direction” of the victim; thus, the
dissent is mistaken when it claims that “[b]y alleging Barajas shot Gaines, the State alleged that Barajas
discharged a firearm at or in the direction of Gaines.” In fact, the evidence established that Barajas shot at
Gaines’s house, not necessarily at or in the direction of Gaines.
        5 In particular, Barajas does not argue that the indictment alleged a “complete offense” under penal
code § 22.05(a). See id. § 22.05(a) (“A person commits an offense if he recklessly engages in conduct that
places another in imminent danger of serious bodily injury.”). Notably, under that statute, “recklessness and
danger are presumed if the actor knowingly pointed a firearm at or in the direction of another,” id. § 22.05(c),
but there was no allegation or evidence to that effect in this case.

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the “knowing” discharge of a firearm—into an optional element. The indictment therefore

did not allege a “complete offense” as argued by Barajas. 6 See Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 239

n.4 (noting an indictment is “facially complete” if “it alleges all of the essential elements of

a criminal offense”).

         Because Count 1 of the indictment did not facially allege a complete offense, its

failure to allege an essential element of aggravated assault did not result in a variance

between the indictment and the proof at trial, and it is not fatal to Barajas’s conviction. 7

See Thomason, 892 S.W.2d at 11; Studer, 799 S.W.2d at 263. We overrule Barajas’s first

issue.

B.       Jury Charge Error

         By his second issue, Barajas contends that the jury charge contained reversible

error because it “instructed the jury to return a guilty verdict for [a]ggravated [a]ssault with

a [d]eadly [w]eapon, despite the indictment facially alleging the complete offense of

         6  The dissent expresses concern that our decision “would allow the State to include any offense in
the jury charge, so long as the indictment did not include a facially complete offense.” This is misleading. If
an indictment does not facially allege a complete offense, it is incumbent upon the defendant to object to it
prior to trial. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.14(b); id. art. 21.03 (“Everything should be stated in an
indictment which is necessary to be proved.”). Similarly, the defendant may object to the indictment if he
believes it does not give him adequate notice of the charges against him. See Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d
394, 398 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (“The charging instrument must convey sufficient notice to allow the
accused to prepare a defense.”). And for an offense to be included in the jury charge, there must have been
evidence adduced at trial to support each essential element of it. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
36.14. So, it is true that, when the indictment fails to facially allege a complete offense, “any offense” may
be later included in the jury charge—as long as the defendant first declined to object to the indictment prior
to trial on any grounds, and as long as there is evidence adduced at trial to support each element of the
included offense. It is not unjust or unreasonable to allow a jury charge instruction on a particular offense
in this hypothetical scenario.
         In any event, the result in this case is compelled by Studer and Thomason, and we may not
disregard controlling precedent of the court of criminal appeals. See State ex rel. Vance v. Clawson, 465
S.W.2d 164, 168 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (“The Court of Criminal Appeals is the court of last resort in this
state in criminal matters. This being so, no other court of this state has authority to overrule or circumvent
its decisions, or disobey its mandates.”).
       7 Barajas does not argue that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s finding that he

committed aggravated assault, either as a principal or as a party to the offense.

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[d]eadly [c]onduct.” See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.14 (providing that the jury

charge must “distinctly set[] forth the law applicable to the case”); Fella v. State, 573

S.W.2d 548 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (reversing conviction because “the charge of the trial

court authorized the jury to find the appellant guilty . . . on a theory not alleged in the

indictment”). This issue is dependent on Barajas’s assertion that Count 1 of the indictment

facially alleged the “complete offense” of deadly conduct, an argument which we have

already rejected. Accordingly, we overrule Barajas’s second issue.

                                    III.   CONCLUSION

       The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

                                                              DORI CONTRERAS
                                                              Chief Justice

Dissenting Memorandum Opinion by
Justice Silva.

Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2 (b).

Delivered and filed on the
13th day of July, 2023.

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