Court Opinion

ID: 9901560
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-22 01:00:32.781019+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:35.172322
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-40518         Document: 00516976320             Page: 1      Date Filed: 11/21/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                                United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                         Fifth Circuit

                                             FILED
                                      ____________
                                                                               November 21, 2023
                                       No. 22-40518                               Lyle W. Cayce
                                      ____________                                     Clerk

   Olivia Sligh,

                                                                     Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                             versus

   City of Conroe, Texas; Tyson Sutton; Alexis Alias
   Montes; Montgomery County, Texas,

                                               Defendants—Appellees.
                      ______________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Southern District of Texas
                               USDC No. 4:20-CV-1417
                      ______________________________

   Before King, Smith, and Elrod, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
          Olivia Sligh appeals the dismissal of (1) an excessive force claim under
   42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) a § 1983 failure-to-intervene/bystander liability claim;
   (3) a § 1983 municipal liability claim; and (4) various failure-to-accommodate
   claims under Title II of the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. We
   AFFIRM.

          _____________________
          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-40518      Document: 00516976320           Page: 2    Date Filed: 11/21/2023

                                     No. 22-40518

                                          I.
          This case involves a plaintiff who was bitten and injured by a police
   dog. The below facts are mainly taken from the operative complaint. At 1:39
   a.m. on July 5, 2018, Plaintiff-Appellant Olivia Sligh’s partner called 911 to
   report that Sligh was suicidal, had hurt herself, and had left her house on foot.
   Sligh’s partner requested an ambulance, and he indicated that Sligh was
   unarmed and not a violent person. The Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office
   notified the City of Conroe of the emergency medical call and requested a
   canine officer if available. Tyson Sutton, a police officer employed by the City
   of Conroe, and Alexis Alias Montes, a deputy employed by the Montgomery
   County Sheriff’s Office, responded to the call. Sutton brought along Thor, a
   trained K9 police dog. These two officers, the City of Conroe, and
   Montgomery County are the Defendants-Appellees in this action.
          The complaint alleges that when the officers located Sligh, Sutton
   shined a flashlight in Sligh’s face as Thor barked and lunged at her. Montes
   grabbed Sligh, who pulled away. Sutton then sicced Thor on Sligh, and Thor
   initially bit Sligh in the upper thigh. Sligh sat down, and Sutton continued to
   direct Thor to bite Sligh on the rear of her upper leg and her ankle. Sligh
   alleges that “Sutton used the dog to purposively attack and bite” her; that
   “Montes did not intervene in the multiple dog bites by words or actions even
   though the attack lasted one minute and some seconds”; and that she never
   resisted seizure, tried to escape, or assaulted Montes.
          Sligh’s complaint is not the only account of what happened that night.
   Sligh’s complaint also repeatedly references Sutton’s bodycam footage (the
   “Video”), which was attached to Montgomery County and Montes’s motion
   to dismiss. In the Video, Sutton encounters Sligh and shines a flashlight at
   her. Sligh begins to approach Sutton, who loudly says: “Wait, wait, wait,
   don’t! Do not walk towards me! Do not walk towards me! The dog will bite

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   you!” Sligh acknowledges Sutton before shouting a profanity at the officers.
   Montes commands Sligh to place her hands behind her back. Sligh responds
   with more profanities and, contrary to the complaint’s assertions that she
   never resisted, slaps at Montes’s arms while attempting to pull away. Sligh
   and Montes physically struggle for about 11 seconds, at which point Sligh
   breaks free from Montes’s grip. Sutton then releases Thor with a bite
   command, and Thor bites Sligh as Sutton commands her to get on the
   ground. Sligh falls to a seated position on the ground and cries out in pain.
   Beginning eight seconds after the bite command, Sutton repeatedly
   commands Thor to release Sligh, but Thor does not immediately comply.
   Sligh begins lying on her side. 36 seconds after giving the first bite command,
   Sutton grabs and pulls Thor’s collar. Thor releases Sligh around 64 seconds
   following the first bite command. 1 While Thor was biting Sligh, Montes
   reaches to control Sligh’s hands and commands her to put her hands behind
   her back. Montes handcuffs Sligh after Thor’s release.
           On April 21, 2020, Sligh filed a complaint against the City of Conroe
   and John Doe Conroe Police Officers alleging various constitutional,
   Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and Rehabilitation Act claims.
   Sligh subsequently amended her complaint three times and added the present
   Defendants-Appellees. In the operative third amended complaint filed on
   June 23, 2021, Sligh asserted various claims against Sutton and Montes in
   their individual capacities as well as claims against the City of Conroe and
   Montgomery County. Specifically, as relevant to this appeal, she asserted
   (1) a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 excessive force claim against Sutton; (2) a § 1983
   failure-to-intervene/bystander liability claim against Montes; (3) a § 1983

           _____________________
           1
             The time of the release is unclear from the footage. But given that Thor began and
   continued barking from this point, we can infer that the attack lasted 64 seconds at most
   from first bite to release.

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   municipal/Monell liability claim against the City of Conroe; and (4) various
   failure-to-accommodate claims under Title II of the ADA and § 504 of the
   Rehabilitation Act against both the City of Conroe and Montgomery County.
          Montgomery County and Montes jointly moved to dismiss the
   complaint for failure to state a claim, raising, inter alia, a qualified immunity
   defense as to Montes. The City of Conroe and Sutton also moved to dismiss,
   with Sutton raising a qualified immunity defense. The district court granted
   all three motions. It held that (1) Sutton was entitled to qualified immunity
   on Sligh’s excessive force claim; (2) Montes was entitled to qualified
   immunity on Sligh’s failure-to-intervene/bystander liability claim; (3) Sligh
   had failed to state a § 1983 municipal liability claim against the City of
   Conroe; and that (4) Sligh’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims against the
   City of Conroe and Montgomery County failed because they fell into the
   exigent circumstances exception to the ADA. Sligh timely appealed.
                                          II.
          This court reviews de novo a district court’s grant of a motion to
   dismiss. Whitley v. BP, P.L.C., 838 F.3d 523, 526 (5th Cir. 2016). In
   considering a motion to dismiss, we may “also consider ‘[d]ocuments that a
   defendant attaches to a motion to dismiss . . . if they are referred to in the
   plaintiff’s complaint and are central to her claim.’” Villarreal v. Wells Fargo
   Bank, N.A., 814 F.3d 763, 766 (5th Cir. 2016) (alteration in original) (quoting
   Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498–99 (5th Cir. 2000)).
   If an allegation is qualified by the contents of an exhibit attached to the
   pleadings, but the exhibit instead contradicts the allegation, “the exhibit and
   not the allegation controls.” United States ex rel. Riley v. St. Luke’s Episcopal
   Hosp., 355 F.3d 370, 377 (5th Cir. 2004). Here, the Video was attached to
   Montgomery County and Montes’s joint motion to dismiss and referenced

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                                    No. 22-40518

   by Sligh in her operative complaint. Accordingly, to the extent that the Video
   contradicts Sligh’s allegations, the Video controls.
                                         III.
                            A. Excessive Force Claim
          We begin with Sligh’s excessive force claim against Officer Sutton. To
   overcome Sutton’s qualified immunity defense, Sligh must show (1) that
   Sutton violated a constitutional right; and (2) that the right at issue was
   “clearly established” at the time of the alleged misconduct. See Pearson v.
   Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). We can address these inquiries in any
   order. See id. at 236.
          To succeed on a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim, Sligh must
   demonstrate an “(1) injury, (2) which resulted directly and only from a use
   of force that was clearly excessive, and (3) the excessiveness of which was
   clearly unreasonable.” See Trammell v. Fruge, 868 F.3d 332, 340 (5th Cir.
   2017) (quoting Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 167 (5th Cir. 2009)). “In
   excessive-force claims, the reasonableness of an officer’s conduct depends
   on the ‘facts and circumstances of each particular case . . . .’” Cooper v.
   Brown, 844 F.3d 517, 522 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490
   U.S. 386, 396 (1989)). Such a determination is based on “the perspective of
   a reasonable officer on the scene.” Id. (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396).
   The Supreme Court in Graham v. Connor outlined three factors that inform
   the reasonableness of an officer’s use of force: “(1) the severity of the crime
   at issue, (2) whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of
   officers or others, and (3) whether the suspect was actively resisting arrest or
   attempting to evade arrest by flight.” See Joseph ex rel. Est. of Joseph v.
   Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 332 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396).

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          The first Graham factor, the severity of the crime, weighs in Sligh’s
   favor. The officers were called based on concerns about Sligh’s mental
   health, not a crime she was suspected of committing.
          The second Graham factor, whether the suspect posed an immediate
   threat to the safety of officers or others, also weighs in Sligh’s favor. Sligh
   may have posed a safety threat to herself, as she had cut herself and was
   potentially suicidal, but the officers received no indication that Sligh was
   violent, armed, or otherwise posed a threat to others. Defendants-Appellees’
   contention that the employment of a dog bite was justified due to Sligh’s
   immediate safety threat to herself is unpersuasive in this case. Sligh did not
   appear to be engaging in self-harm during her interactions with the officers,
   which undermines Defendants-Appellees’ argument that Sligh posed an
   “immediate” safety threat to herself that warranted such a dangerous use of
   force. It is also difficult to see how Sligh’s self-harm justifies the employment
   of a dog bite, which will inevitably lead to more punctures or lacerations.
          Defendants-Appellees contend that Sutton could not determine
   whether Sligh had a weapon in her clothing, which weighs in favor of
   employing the dog bite. But it is difficult to imagine that Sutton would have
   believed that Sligh, who was wearing a tank top and women’s athletic shorts,
   was armed when no weapon was produced during the physical struggle
   between Sligh and Montes. Furthermore, because the officers did not suspect
   that Sligh was violent or had committed a crime, the fact that she was
   unsearched is not enough to permit a reasonable officer to assume that she
   posed an immediate threat. See Cooper, 844 F.3d at 523 n.2.
          The third Graham factor, whether the suspect was actively resisting
   arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight, appears to weigh against Sligh.
   The Video shows that Sligh actively resisted seizure, did not follow verbal
   commands, and engaged in a physical struggle with Montes. Once Sligh

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                                       No. 22-40518

   broke free from Montes’s efforts to physically apprehend her, a reasonable
   officer could conclude that a heightened use of force would be necessary to
   detain her for her own safety. However, even where force is authorized,
   officers must employ an appropriate degree of force to stay within
   constitutional bounds. An officer must use force “with measured and
   ascending actions that correspond[] to [a suspect’s] escalating verbal and
   physical resistance.” Joseph, 981 F.3d at 332–33 (alterations in original)
   (quoting Poole v. City of Shreveport, 691 F.3d 624, 629 (5th Cir. 2012)).
          We find that under these circumstances, the decision to sic Thor on
   Sligh constituted an excessive use of force in violation of the Fourth
   Amendment. When Sligh slipped free from Montes’s attempt to seize her,
   there was a break in the action. At that point, the officers could have
   attempted to escalate their use of physical force in a more measured manner,
   or they could have provided a clear warning that they would employ a dog
   bite if Sligh did not comply. Instead, Sutton sicced Thor on Sligh without
   warning.
          Without any further attempts to subdue Sligh without the use of a dog
   bite, and without providing Sligh any warning that she may be subjected to a
   dog bite if she did not comply, Sutton sicced a dog on a woman who (1) was
   not suspected of any crime; (2) did not pose an immediate safety threat to
   officers or others; and (3) was in need of emergency medical intervention due
   to self-harm. Furthermore, Sligh—surrounded by a fence and thick foliage—
   was not attempting to flee the officers. Employing a dog bite under these
   circumstances arguably constituted an unreasonable seizure in violation of
   Sligh’s Fourth Amendment rights. 2

          _____________________
          2
             We need not and do not address the issue of whether the prolonged duration of
   Thor’s bite also constituted excessive force. Because Thor disobeyed Sutton’s commands
   to release Sligh, the extension of the application of force in this case was arguably

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            Because we find that Sligh has alleged a violation of a constitutional
   right, we turn to the question of whether that right was clearly established at
   the time of the violation. “To answer that question in the affirmative, we
   must be able to point to controlling authority—or a robust consensus of
   persuasive authority—that defines the contours of the right in question with
   a high degree of particularity.” Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 371–72 (5th
   Cir. 2011) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
   Although this does not mean that “a case directly on point” is required,
   “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional
   question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011).
            “‘[I]n an obvious case,’ the Graham excessive-force factors
   themselves ‘can clearly establish’” the law without a body of relevant
   precedent. Cooper, 844 F.3d at 524 (quoting Newman v. Guedry, 703 F.3d 757,
   764 (5th Cir. 2012)). We find that the facts here do not present such an
   “obvious case.” Because Sligh actively resisted seizure, the third Graham
   factor weighs against her and justified a use of heightened force. While the
   method of heightened force employed may have been unconstitutionally
   excessive, the Graham analysis in this case is not so obvious as to clearly
   establish the law without a body of relevant authority. Sligh therefore bears
   the burden of identifying precedent that clearly establishes her constitutional
   right.

            _____________________
   unintentional. Sligh has offered no evidence that Thor, nor police dogs more generally,
   frequently ignore such commands to release. Neither has she offered any clearly established
   law indicating that an officer violates the Fourth Amendment when he or she loses control
   of a canine engaged in a dog bite. We therefore find that the unintended use of canine force
   that occurred after Sutton ordered Thor to release did not violate Sligh’s clearly established
   right. Because we find that there was not a clearly established violation of a constitutional
   right, we need not address “whether in fact there is such a right.” See Pearson, 555 U.S. at
   236–37.

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          In arguing that Officer Sutton violated her clearly established right,
   Sligh relies primarily on the case Cooper v. Brown, 844 F.3d 517 (5th Cir.
   2016). In Cooper, the namesake plaintiff fled on foot after being pulled over
   on suspicion of driving under the influence (“DUI”). Id. at 521. An officer
   radioed for backup and explained that Cooper was a DUI suspect. Id.
   Defendant Officer Brown answered the call with his police dog, Sunny, who
   discovered Cooper in a small wood-fenced “cubbyhole.” Id. The parties
   disputed whether Sunny initiated the attack or if Brown ordered it, but they
   agreed on the following sequence of events following the initial bite:
          Sunny continued biting Cooper for one to two minutes. During
          that time, Cooper did not attempt to flee or to strike Sunny.
          Brown instructed Cooper to show his hands and to submit to
          him. At the time of that order, Cooper’s hands were on
          Sunny’s head. Brown testified that he could see Cooper’s
          hands and could appreciate that he had no weapon. Brown then
          ordered Cooper to roll onto his stomach. He complied, and
          Brown handcuffed him. But he did not order Sunny to release
          the bite until after he had finished handcuffing Cooper.
   Id. This court affirmed the district court’s denial of Brown’s motion for
   summary judgment based on qualified immunity. Id. at 524–26. On the
   question of whether there was a constitutional violation, we held that all the
   Graham factors except for the severity of the crime “push[ed] heavily for
   Cooper.” Id. at 522. Cooper did not pose an immediate threat because he was
   not suspected of committing a violent offense, Brown had not been warned
   that Cooper may be violent, and Brown could see that Cooper was unarmed.
   Id. at 522–23. Furthermore, Cooper was “not actively resisting arrest or
   attempting to flee or to strike Sunny.” Id. at 523. The only act of resistance
   Brown identified was Cooper’s understandable failure to raise his hands
   while being bit by Sunny. Id. And, in any case, Cooper complied with
   Brown’s order to roll onto his stomach. Id. Also relevant to our analysis was

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   Brown’s failure to immediately command Sunny to release the bite; instead,
   he waited until after Cooper had been handcuffed. Id. at 521, 523. In sum,
   while explicitly noting that we were not creating a per se rule on
   reasonableness, we concluded that “[u]nder the facts in this record,
   permitting a dog to continue biting a compliant and non-threatening arrestee
   is objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 524.
          The present case is distinguishable from Cooper in at least two material
   aspects. First, Sligh actively resisted seizure. See id. (“Our caselaw makes
   certain that once an arrestee stops resisting, the degree of force an officer can
   employ is reduced.” (emphasis added)). Second, Cooper involved a dog bite
   that was intentionally prolonged. Sunny bit Cooper for one to two minutes
   before the officer finally ordered Sunny to release. Id. at 521. Here, Sutton
   repeatedly ordered Thor to release Sligh beginning about eight seconds after
   the initial bite command. And when Thor failed to obey his repeated
   commands, Sutton made affirmative efforts to release Thor by pulling his
   collar about 36 seconds following the first release command. Such conduct
   on Sutton’s part suggests that the amount of force intentionally used here
   differs from Cooper, where the dog bit the plaintiff for one to two minutes and
   the officer did not order the dog to release the plaintiff until after the suspect
   was handcuffed. See id. at 524 (noting that “permitting a dog to continue
   biting a compliant and non-threatening arrestee is objectively unreasonable”
   (emphasis added)).
          We find that Cooper’s precedent does not sufficiently “place[] the . . .
   constitutional question beyond debate.” See Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 741. Cooper
   involved a nonresisting plaintiff and an intentionally prolonged application of
   force. Because the present case involves an application of unintentionally
   prolonged force against an actively resisting plaintiff, we do not find that
   Sutton’s violation of Sligh’s constitutional right was clearly established.
   Sutton is therefore entitled to qualified immunity.

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                           B. Bystander Liability Claim
          We next consider Sligh’s failure-to-intervene/bystander liability
   claim against Montes. To overcome Montes’s qualified immunity defense,
   Sligh must identify law clearly establishing that Montes’s actions violated her
   constitutional rights, i.e., she must show that “any reasonable officer would
   have known that the Constitution required them to intervene.” Joseph, 981
   F.3d at 345. She has not done so. We accordingly need not and do not reach
   the question of whether Montes violated Sligh’s constitutional rights. See
   Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236–37.
          Sligh relies entirely on Cooper as clearly establishing the law relating
   to Montes’s actions. But this reliance on Cooper is misplaced because Cooper
   is wholly inapplicable to a bystander liability theory. The facts and analysis in
   Cooper concerned only the conduct of the specific officer who controlled the
   dog. There was consequently no discussion in Cooper of whether another
   officer on site would be required to intervene as a bystander. Thus, Cooper
   cannot clearly establish that Montes—a bystander—violated Sligh’s
   constitutional rights by failing to intervene. Sligh points to no other case
   clearly establishing the law on this issue. Accordingly, Montes is entitled to
   qualified immunity on Sligh’s bystander liability claim.
                           C. Municipal Liability Claim
          We next consider Sligh’s municipal liability claim against the City of
   Conroe. For such a claim, Sligh must identify “(1) an official policy (or
   custom), of which (2) a policymaker can be charged with actual or
   constructive knowledge, and (3) a constitutional violation whose ‘moving
   force’ is that policy or custom.” See Valle v. City of Houston, 613 F.3d 536,
   541–42 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Pineda v. City of Houston, 291 F.3d 325, 328
   (5th Cir. 2002)).

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           Sligh asserts three separate theories of municipal liability. First, Sligh
   argues that the City of Conroe had inadequate written policies concerning
   police dogs. Second, Sligh contends that the City of Conroe failed to
   adequately train Officer Sutton on the use of his police dog. Third, Sligh
   asserts that the City of Conroe ratified Sutton’s actions by failing to punish
   him or change their policies. We address each theory of municipal liability in
   turn.
                            1. Inadequate Policies Claim
           For an inadequate policies claim, “[a] plaintiff must show that (1) an
   official policy (2) promulgated by the municipal policymaker (3) was the
   moving force behind the violation of a constitutional right.” Peña v. City of
   Rio Grande City, 879 F.3d 613, 621 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Hicks-Fields v.
   Harris County, 860 F.3d 803, 808 (5th Cir. 2017)). A plaintiff must also show
   that the policy was implemented with “deliberate indifference” to the
   “known or obvious consequences” that constitutional violations would
   result. Alvarez v. City of Brownsville, 904 F.3d 382, 390 (5th Cir. 2018)
   (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407
   (1997)). Usually, a plaintiff must show “a pattern of similar violations” to
   establish deliberate indifference. Valle, 613 F.3d at 547. “To show deliberate
   indifference based on a single incident, there must be evidence that shows
   that it should have been apparent or obvious to the policymaker that a
   constitutional violation was the ‘highly predictable consequence’ of the
   particular policy.” Alvarez, 904 F.3d at 391 (quoting Burge v. St. Tammany
   Parish, 336 F.3d 363, 373 (5th Cir. 2003)).
           Sligh’s policy-based claim fails because she has not adequately alleged
   that an official policy was a moving force behind Officer Sutton’s violation of
   her constitutional right. Sligh alleges that “the only policy that the City has
   on the use of attack dogs is that they may be used on anyone: evading arrest;

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   known to be armed; that has demonstrated violence; that has the potential
   for violence; or has committed a felony.” Sligh mischaracterizes the policy
   in question. Her quotations are misrepresentations of the relevant policy
   language, which states that police dogs can be “released off leash to
   apprehend any suspect evading arrest that is known to be armed, has
   demonstrated violence, or the potential for violence, or has committed a
   felony offense.”
          Sligh cannot establish a “moving force” causal relationship between
   this policy and Officer Sutton’s constitutional violation. The policy limits the
   offensive employment of canines to a subset of suspects evading arrest, which
   does not apply to Sligh. Because Sutton was not following this policy when
   he sicced Thor on Sligh, we find that the policy cited by Sligh was not a
   moving force behind Sutton’s constitutional violation.
          Sligh also fails to adequately allege that the City’s canine policies were
   deficient. She relies on Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1445 (9th Cir. 1994), an
   out-of-circuit authority, to support her proposition that a failure to adopt a
   departmental policy governing the use of police dogs constitutes deliberate
   indifference. But in Chew, the court held that municipal liability could be
   found “[w]here the city equips its police officers with potentially dangerous
   animals, and evidence is adduced that those animals inflict injury in a
   significant percentage of the cases in which they are used,” provided that the
   city “fail[s] to engage in any oversight whatsoever of an important
   departmental practice involving the use of force.” Id.
          Sligh’s reference to the City’s policy, which limits the offensive use
   of canines to apprehending a subset of suspects evading arrest, undermines
   her assertion that the City’s canine policies were deficient. Additionally,
   unlike the plaintiff in Chew, Sligh fails to allege a widespread pattern of
   canine-related injury that would provide the City with “[a]ctual or

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   constructive knowledge” that its canine policies were constitutionally
   inadequate. See Burge, 336 F.3d at 370 (alteration in original) (quoting Bennett
   v. City of Slidell, 735 F.2d 861, 862 (5th Cir. 1984)). She does not convincingly
   argue why she need not show a pattern of violations here, arguing only that
   this court should “infer” that such problems were “reoccurring.” Sligh’s
   speculation is insufficient to establish deliberate indifference as necessary for
   an inadequate policies claim.
          Because the City’s actual canine policy was not a “moving force”
   behind Officer Sutton’s constitutional violation, and because Sligh has not
   alleged facts indicating that the City was deliberately indifferent to a known
   or obvious risk that its canine policies would result in constitutional
   violations, we find that the district court did not err in holding that Sligh
   failed to adequately allege an inadequate policies claim against the City of
   Conroe.
                             2. Failure-to-Train Claim
          A failure-to-train theory of municipal liability requires Sligh to show
   that “1) the [city] failed to train or supervise the officers involved; 2) there is
   a causal connection between the alleged failure to supervise or train and the
   alleged violation of the plaintiff’s rights; and 3) the failure to train or
   supervise constituted deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional
   rights.” See Peña, 879 F.3d at 623 (alteration in original) (quoting Thompson
   v. Upshur County, 245 F.3d 447, 459 (5th Cir. 2001)).
          Sligh’s failure-to-train claim fails because, as described above, she
   cannot show deliberate indifference on the City of Conroe’s part. Sligh
   argues that the need for more or different training here is so obvious that the
   policymakers can reasonably be said to be deliberately indifferent. But she
   rests the entirety of her conclusory argument on the single present incident
   and pleads no pattern of prior incidents sufficient to place the City of Conroe

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   on “actual or constructive notice that a particular omission in their training
   program causes city employees to violate citizens’ constitutional rights.”
   Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011); cf. id. at 62 (“A pattern of similar
   constitutional violations by untrained employees is ‘ordinarily necessary’ to
   demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train.” (quoting
   Brown, 520 U.S. at 409)). Because Sligh has failed to allege specific and non-
   conclusory facts that would show that the City was deliberately indifferent in
   adopting its training policy, we find that the district court did not err in
   dismissing Sligh’s failure-to-train claim against the City of Conroe.
                                3. Ratification Claim
          Concerning ratification, if “authorized policymakers approve a
   subordinate’s decision and the basis for it, their ratification [is] chargeable to
   the municipality because their decision is final.” World Wide Street Preachers
   Fellowship v. Town of Columbia, 591 F.3d 747, 755 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting
   City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988)). “The theory of
   ratification, however, has been limited to ‘extreme factual situations.’” Id.
   (quoting Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 848 (5th Cir. 2009)).
   “Therefore, unless the subordinate’s actions are sufficiently extreme—for
   instance, an obvious violation of clearly established law—a policymaker’s
   ratification or defense of his subordinate’s actions is insufficient to establish
   an official policy or custom.” Id.
          Sligh’s ratification theory fares no better than her other theories of
   municipal liability. Ratification is a limited theory of liability, and, for the
   reasons stated above, the present circumstances are neither an obvious
   violation of clearly established law nor an extreme factual circumstance
   sufficient to support a municipal liability claim. Thus, Sligh’s ratification
   theory fails.

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Case: 22-40518        Document: 00516976320              Page: 16       Date Filed: 11/21/2023

                                          No. 22-40518

                        D. ADA and Rehabilitation Act Claims
           Finally, we consider Sligh’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims
   against the municipalities. 3 “Title II of the ADA provides that ‘no qualified
   individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded
   from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or
   activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such
   entity.’” Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 799 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting 42
   U.S.C. § 12132). Although her briefing is not particularly clear, Sligh appears
   to be pursuing a failure-to-accommodate claim. 4
           “To succeed on a failure-to-accommodate claim, a plaintiff must
   prove: (1) he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) the disability and
   its consequential limitations were known by the covered entity; and (3) the
   entity failed to make reasonable accommodations.” Ball v. LeBlanc, 792 F.3d
   584, 596 n.9 (5th Cir. 2015). “Plaintiffs ordinarily satisfy the knowledge
   element by showing that they identified their disabilities as well as the
   resulting limitations to a public entity or its employees and requested an
   accommodation in direct and specific terms.” Smith v. Harris County, 956
   F.3d 311, 317 (5th Cir. 2020). “When a plaintiff fails to request an
           _____________________
           3
             We adjudicate and refer to the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims collectively as
   the “ADA claims” below. See D.A. ex rel. Latasha A. v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 629 F.3d
   450, 453 (5th Cir. 2010) (“Because this court has equated liability standards under § 504
   [of the Rehabilitation Act] and the ADA, we evaluate [Plaintiff’s] claims under the statutes
   together.”).
           4
              Specifically, Sligh argues that the municipal Defendants-Appellees failed to
   accommodate her mental disabilities by (1) using a police attack dog; (2) not educating and
   training officers in caring for mentally disabled persons; (3) not using verbal de-escalation
   techniques; (4) not protecting Sligh from further harm; (5) not allowing Sligh an
   opportunity to account for her being surrounded; (6) not adopting a policy to protect the
   mentally disabled; (7) not conducting self-evaluation plans under the ADA or
   Rehabilitation Act; and (8) not modifying their programs and services to accommodate the
   mentally disabled.

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Case: 22-40518     Document: 00516976320           Page: 17   Date Filed: 11/21/2023

                                    No. 22-40518

   accommodation in this manner, he can prevail only by showing that ‘the
   disability, resulting limitation, and necessary reasonable accommodation’
   were ‘open, obvious, and apparent’ to the entity’s relevant agents.” Id. at
   317–18 (quoting Windham v. Harris County, 875 F.3d 229, 237 (5th Cir.
   2017)).
          Sligh does not meet this standard. Assuming arguendo that she is a
   qualified individual with a disability under the ADA, Sligh pleads no facts
   showing that she requested an accommodation or that her disability and
   limitations were known by the covered entity. At this stage, we must take as
   true her allegations that “Officer Sutton and Deputy Montes learned that
   Olivia had cut herself, was suicidal, [and] that she was a mental health
   patient.” But Sligh does not allege that she identified her disabilities or
   resulting limitations; nor does she allege that she requested any of her
   accommodations “in direct and specific terms” to the officers. See id. at 317.
   The Video further corroborates that she did not request the accommodations
   that she now alleges were denied.
          Having failed to make such requests, Sligh can “prevail only by
   showing that ‘the disability, resulting limitation, and necessary reasonable
   accommodation’ were ‘open, obvious, and apparent’ to the entity’s relevant
   agents.” See id. at 317–18 (quoting Windham, 875 F.3d at 237). But she does
   not attempt to make this showing. Nor could she. Neither her limitations nor
   her highly specific desired accommodations were open, obvious, and
   apparent under the given facts, where a police dog was used to track a missing
   person who then immediately began physically struggling with one of the
   officers. Because Sligh has not shown that her disability and limitations were
   known by the municipalities, her failure-to-accommodate claims under the

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Case: 22-40518       Document: 00516976320             Page: 18      Date Filed: 11/21/2023

                                        No. 22-40518

   ADA and Rehabilitation Act are inadequate and were appropriately
   dismissed. 5
                                             IV.
           For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is
   AFFIRMED.

           _____________________
           5
             Because we can “affirm on any ground supported by the record, including one
   not reached by the district court,” we do not and need not consider the district court’s
   invocation of the exigency exception to the ADA. See Ballew v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 668
   F.3d 777, 781 (5th Cir. 2012).

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