Court Opinion

ID: 9575842
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:17:47.929843+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:47:59.298714
License: Public Domain

Cakley, Judge,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent. The trial court ordered that appellant respond to appellee’s requests for discovery by June 29, 1990. Appellant did file a response by that date. “All decisions of the Supreme Court and this court approving imposition of the drastic sanction of dismissal or default involve a total failure to respond to an order compelling discovery. . . .” (Emphasis in original.) Thornton v. Burson, 151 Ga. App. 456, 461 (260 SE2d 388) (1979). It is true that appellant’s response contained objections and that the time had already passed within which objections could be raised as viable responses. However, “[ajbsent any showing that the trial court [had] previously specified] . . . that the raising of objections would not be [an] acceptable response to its order [compelling discovery], [I am] constrained to [opine] that the record before us indicates only that the timely [response of June 29, 1990] was served pursuant to [appellant’s] ignorance of the technical inadequacy evidenced by [the] inclusion [therein] of the several untimely objections. OCGA § 9-11-37 (b) (2) is not designed to punish parties when their otherwise timely but partially inadequate response to discovery orders is the result of their counsel’s erroneous misunderstanding of the full mandate thereof. [Cit.]” Brunswick Mfg. Co. v. Sizemore, 176 Ga. App. 838, 841-842 (1) (338 SE2d 288) (1985). Accordingly, in my opinion, the trial court did abuse its discretion in the instant case and I must, therefore, respectfully dissent to the majority’s affirmance of the order striking appellant’s defensive pleadings and entering a default judgment in favor of appellee.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Sognier and Judge Cooper join in this dissent.