Court Opinion

ID: 9767443
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:19:52.600449+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:03.768987
License: Public Domain

Tom Glaze, Justice, dissenting. The majority opinion properly adopts a standard by which an attorney’s conduct or actions can be measured to determine if the attorney, who has a conflict of interest with a client, has violated Disciplinary Rule 5-104(a). In this connection, the majority adopts the rule set out in In re Neville, 147 Ariz. 106, 708 P.2d 1297 (1985), and I agree with this part of the majority’s decision. However, I cannot agree with the court’s decision that this court is constitutionally empowered to establish a committee which may serve in a judicial capacity with the authority to suspend attorneys for their professional misconduct. In my view, the majority court assumes more authority and power than it is given by the Arkansas Constitution. The majority court assumes for itself this power to regulate and suspend attorneys by virtue of amendment 28 to the Arkansas Constitution, which was passed by the vote of the people in 1938 and which provides as follows: The Supreme Court shall make rules regulating the practice of law and the professional conduct of attorneys at law. Clearly, this court has the authority under amendment 28, directly or impliedly, to provide all necessary and reasonable means by which attorneys’ conduct may be regulated. Such authority does not, and should not, include the authority to appoint or establish a committee with authority that conflicts with existing powers already given by the constitution to other courts. In the case of In re Dodrill, 260 Ark. 223, 538 S.W.2d 549 (1976), this court, quoting from Feldman v. State Board of Law Examiners, 438 F.2d 699 (8th Cir. 1971), stated the following: The principle is firmly established that the judicial branch of government, acting through the courts, has exclusive jurisdiction to admit, control and disbar attorneys. (Emphasis added.) The Arkansas Constitution provided that the circuit courts shall have jurisdiction in all civil and criminal cases the exclusive jurisdiction of which may not be vested by the constitution in some other court, see Ark. Const. art. 7, § 11, and our court repeatedly has held the proceedings involving the disbarment of an attorney are civil in nature. In Re: Dodrill, 260 Ark. 223, 538 S.W.2d 549 (1976); Weems v. Sup. Ct. Comm. on Prof. Conduct, 257 Ark. 673, 523 S.W.2d 900 (1975); Hurst v. Bar Rules Comm. of the State of Arkansas, 202 Ark. 1101, 155 S.W.2d 697 (1941). In Dodrill, the court held that, in a disbarment proceeding, the trial court [circuit court] had jurisdiction with the power and authority to impose the lesser penalty, i.e., to conditionally suspend the petitioner’s [attorney’s] license. The majority would quibble that the supreme court committee would have authority to suspend an attorney’s license but must defer to the circuit (or chancery) court when disbarment proceedings are involved.1 Such a distinction runs a very fine line and has little in the way of rationale to support it. For example, no rule or authority exists that I can find which would prevent the committee from suspending an attorney indefinitely, that is, if the committee decided to impose such a sanction. However, even if the committee chose only to suspend an attorney for one or two years, the practical result is the same as a disbarment — the attorney cannot practice law. When comparing suspension and disbarment proceedings, it is also noteworthy that Ark. R. Prof. Conduct 16 treats attorneys who are disbarred or suspended in other states in the same manner when taking action against them in Arkansas. In sum, amendment 28 contains no terms or language that endow this court with the power to appoint a committee to act in a judicial function so as to enforce the rules this court promulgates to regulate attorneys. Amendment 28 was passed in 1938, and no one even suggested this court had such power, at least until the court, by per curiam order dated March 11, 1985, adopted its present rules to regulate the conduct of attorneys. The reason for the nearly fifty-year delay between the passage of amendment 28 and the court’s 1985 per curiam order was, I submit, because our constitution’s mandates harmoniously provide for the supreme court to regulate the professional conduct of attorneys and for the circuit court to provide the mechanism for trying such matters. In construing and applying amendment 28 and the judicial article (particularly Ark. Const, art. 7, § 11) in this manner, an attorney is also availed the panoply of civil rules of procedure which are normally allowed in civil proceedings. Under the majority’s decision, such procedures are not available. For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the committee’s decision with directions for it to file this matter in circuit court.   In view of Ark. Const, art. 7, § 11,1 would take issue with this court’s rules which allow the committee to file its complaint in chancery court.