Court Opinion

ID: 9454643
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 18:53:16.91128+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:34:13.001330
License: Public Domain

DANAHER, Circuit Judge
(dissenting):
My colleagues here have ordered the pretrial release of this appellant notwithstanding that she stands charged with an offense punishable by death. I dissent. They assert that in their view— contrary to the position taken by the District Judge — the “appellant is presumptively releasable.” I disagree, and, out of deference, I submit the following.
It has seemed to me that an element of confusion has crept into various of these bail-release situations due in part perhaps to an ad hoc approach, and alternatively to the way the statutes have been written. If I fail to convince my colleagues, I can at the very least clarify my own position.
I
The Bail Reform Act of 19661 was intended to revise practices relating to bail. An accused is not “needlessly” to be *148detained when detention will serve “neither the ends of justice nor the public interest.” Sections 3146 and 3147 detail the provisions applicable to release in non-capital cases prior to trial. Persons coming within these sections may properly be regarded as “presumptively releasable.” To illustrate, Allen v. United States2 demonstrates respecting a pretrial situation that an accused “presumptively releasable” under section 3146, may nevertheless be denied release and, under section 3147, an appeal from such an order “shall be affirmed if it is supported by the proceedings below.” Thus, if the statement3 of evidence in the release order and the order of the trial court on the accused’s motion to amend will support the action denying release, that ends it. Often, the District Judge or the United States Commissioner may fail to state in writing the reasons for the action he has taken, and we have remanded in accordance with the provisions of section 3147(b).
II
On the other hand, section 3148 deals with a completely different situation. It speaks of release in capital cases or after conviction. An excellent illustration of the problem presented where release is sought after conviction in a noncapital case may be found in Russell v. United States.4 There, Judge Leventhal pointed out that a District Judge may order that the convict be detained, but he is authorized to enter that order on the ground that release of the accused would present a danger to the community. The District Judge could not in lieu of such a conclusion, enter an order requiring the posting of financial security which the accused is unable to provide. In short, the fixing of high money bail is no substitute for the statutorily authorized grounds for detention.
In addition to dealing with post-conviction situations, section 3148 makes specific provision respecting an accused “who is charged with an offense punishable by death.” The section authorizes the detention of the accused if the judge believes any one or more of four grounds may exist: risk of flight, risk of danger, that the appeal is frivolous or the appeal has been taken for delay.
While the accused under section 3146 may be presumptively releasable, we look to the words of the statute, section 3148, for our guidance in capital cases. No such accused charged with an offense punishable by death is automatically brought within the provisions of section 3146. The judge must exercise a judgment. That j udgment depends upon what the judge “has reason to believe.” So it is that section 3148 provides that an accused in a capital case shall be treated in accordance with the provisions of section 3146
“unless the court or judge has reason to believe that no one or more conditions of release will reasonably assure that the person will not flee or pose a danger to any other person or to the community.” (Emphasis added.)
Ill
When this appellant here sought release, we directed a remand that the District Judge might comply with the requirements of Fed.R.App.P. 9(a). Of course we knew that a person arrested for an offense punishable by death may be admitted to bail by a judge “in the exercise of discretion, giving due weight to the evidence and to the nature and circumstances of the offense.” 5 The judge thereupon exhibited to us the basis upon which he rested his “reason to believe” that this accused should be detained. He concluded that in the light of the circumstances made known to him and the possibility of the death penalty, there is a substantial risk of non-appearance nr *149flight and that the appellant presents a danger to the community.
The respective parties have filed mem-oranda with us. It appears that on July 2, 1968, officers were investigating a robbery. In due course they attempted to place under arrest for that robbery one Johnnie White, Jr., with whom this appellant was then cohabiting, although she had a family in South Carolina. White had been pointed out by the robbery victim who lived in the same neighborhood as did the Whites. White fought the officers when they tried to take him into custody. As they were struggling the appellant ran up and tried to get the police away from White who was lying on the ground holding a police officer by the collar. This appellant apparently pulled on the shoulder of the officer who was over Johnnie White.
Thereupon, Dwayne White, son of Johnnie White, Jr., came along and entered the fray. The two male Whites managed to secure the service revolvers of the police and shot both officers as they lay on the ground. One officer then unarmed was slain and another was seriously wounded. This appellant had apparently made no effort to prevent the slaughter.
The Government contended: “It is clear that but for the intervening assault by Ethel the two police would easily have subdued Johnnie and that Dwayne would thus not have had an opportunity to make an offguard entrance into a police struggle with his father.”
In my appraisal, the judge was justified in believing there existed grounds upon which to order that the accused be detained. It was a reasonable judgment which gave due weight to the evidence and to the nature and circumstances of the offense. Unless the judge had clearly abused his discretion or had erroneously arrived at his determination as a matter of law, his order should be supported. Both the Rule and the applicable statutes so contemplate.
Since I find no error in Judge Smith’s determination, I think the District Court’s order should be affirmed.

. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146-3152 (Supp. III, 1965-67).

. 128 U.S.App.D.C. 207, 386 F.2d 634 (1967); compare Wood v. United States, 129 U.S.App.D.C. 143, 391 F.2d 981 (1988), which also treats of a pretrial order under § 3146.

. See Fed.R.App.P. 9(a) (1968).

. 131 U.S.App.D.C. 44, 402 F.2d 185 (1968).

. Fed.R.Crim.P. 46(a).