Court Opinion

ID: 9564409
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:59:54.822903+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:23.573208
License: Public Domain

Barnes, Judge,
dissenting.
The record shows that the police had no reasonable suspicion which would warrant the stop of the vehicles of Flores and Renteria, but even if reasonable suspicion existed, that would not be sufficient to authorize the stop in this case because the evidence clearly shows that this was not a Terry stop. Today, the majority expands the concept of a Terry stop far beyond what our law has previously recognized. After this decision, the police will be authorized to stop and search anyone who leaves a location that has been under police surveillance solely because another person who left the location was found to have drugs in her possession, and not because of anything the person stopped may have done. As I cannot agree with this result, I must respectfully dissent.
The evidence shows that Flores and Renteria were stopped by the police, even though they were not observed violating the law, because the police decided to stop all people leaving the apartment. In my opinion, this decision removes this case from the typical Terry stop category of cases.
The motions to suppress the evidence seized as a result of these stops asserted that the traffic stops of Flores and Renteria were not based on reasonable articulable suspicion because no evidence showed that Flores carried any boxes, and that the traffic stops were unreasonable because the decision to make the stops was based on events that occurred three hours and twenty minutes earlier: “As soon as [two police officers] advised what was found in the first vehicle, the decision was made [that] anybody leaving was going to be stopped based on the fact that there were narcotics in the apartment.”7
The officer who testified at the motion to suppress hearing admitted that he saw no criminal activity, saw no exchange of money, had no wiretap information, heard no conversations, and had conducted no controlled buy. The State contends, however, that the stops of Flores and Renteria were lawful because they were based on the collective knowledge of the law enforcement officers. Even so, this information would not warrant stopping Flores and Renteria.
Based upon the totality of the circumstances, a detaining officer with a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity may detain the person for investigation. *397Postell v. State of Ga., 264 Ga. 249 (443 SE2d 628) (1994). Consequently,
[a]n authorized officer may stop an automobile and conduct a limited investigative inquiry of its occupants, without probable cause, if he has reasonable grounds for such action — a founded suspicion is all that is necessary, some basis from which the court can determine that the detention was not arbitrary or harassing. A Terry stop must be justified by specific, articulable facts sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct.
(Punctuation omitted.) Buffington v. State, 228 Ga. App. 810, 811 (492 SE2d 762) (1997). “ ‘(T)he existence of an articulable suspicion can be based on the collective knowledge of law enforcement officials’; a detaining officer is ‘entitled to rely on the information given him by a fellow officer in the formation of an articulable suspicion.’ [Cit.]” Id. at 811. Here, of course, the decision to stop these men was not based upon anything Flores and Renteria were doing, but, was instead based upon something someone else had done miles away and hours earlier. The collective knowledge of the law enforcement officers in this case did not encompass any activities of Flores and Renteria; instead, it concerned the activities of others.
Our Supreme Court has recognized that
the essence of the elusive concept was to take the totality of the circumstances into account and determine whether the detaining officer has a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.
(Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Vansant v. State, 264 Ga. 319, 320 (2) (443 SE2d 474) (1994).
Thus,
a law enforcement officer may conduct a constitutional investigatory stop of an individual when the officer is able to point to specific and articulable facts which, when taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion. Over a decade later, the Court restated the standard when it held that an investigatory stop must be justified by some objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity. United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 417 (101 SC 690, 66 LE2d 621) (1981). The Cortez [C]ourt went on to elaborate: based upon the totality of the circumstances, the detaining officers must have a particularized and objective *398basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity. Thus, the inferences and deductions of a trained officer, drawn from objective observation, must raise a suspicion that the particular individual being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing. This demand for specificity in the information upon which police action is predicated is the central teaching of the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
(Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Postell v. State of Ga., supra, 264 Ga. at 249. Here, the police do not even contend that Flores and Renteria were engaged in any such conduct. The decision to stop them was entirely based on the fact that others had been found in possession of methamphetamine and activities that had occurred much earlier.
Further, the majority has ignored earlier cases in which this court, under similar circumstances, has found that the stops were not authorized under Terry. In State v. Mallard, 246 Ga. App. 357, 364-365 (541 SE2d 46) (2000), in a well-reasoned opinion, this court held that, even though the police were ready to execute a search warrant at a home, the police had no authority to stop a vehicle just because it left a residence where the warrant was about to be executed. We held that we would
follow our Supreme Court’s approach in Garmon [v. State, 271 Ga. 673 (524 SE2d 211) (1999)], and apply a Terry analysis. In Garmon, [supra], our Supreme Court held, inter alia: under the totality of the circumstances, the investigatory stop must be justified by some objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity. Postell v. State, citing United States v. Cortez. Such articulable suspicion that the law has been or is about to be violated is less than probable cause, but greater than mere caprice. What is necessary is a founded suspicion, some basis from which the court can determine that the detention was not arbitrary or harassing. Thus, in cases where there are some reasonable articulable grounds for suspicion, the state’s interest in the maintenance of community peace and security outweighs the momentary inconvenience and indignity of investigatory detention. Here, the police had no specific articulable facts sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct by these defendants and thus could not meet the requirements of Terry, supra.
(Citations, punctuation and footnotes omitted; emphasis supplied.) *399Id. Accord Emery v. State, 249 Ga. App. 114, 115 (548 SE2d 23) (2001) (State adduced no evidence supporting a founded suspicion that driver of vehicle stopped was engaged in or was about to be engaged in criminal activity). Therefore, following the analysis in Mallard and Emery, I cannot agree that the police had a reasonable suspicion to stop Flores and Renteria.
The majority’s focus on whether the conduct of Flores and Renteria was sufficient to create a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity warranting further investigation is misplaced. The facts demonstrate clearly that the traffic stop was not based on any such determination. The evidence shows that they were stopped because they departed from the apartment under surveillance, and that the decision to stop them was based on the fact that two other men were apprehended in possession of methamphetamine some three hours earlier. They were stopped because, even though no officer had been in the apartment, the police believed that narcotics were in the apartment. The police had no information from a confidential informant about any drugs and no wiretap saying the suspects were moving the drugs, and had made no controlled buys from the apartment; all they had was their surveillance of the apartment.
Although I agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the police lacked a particularized and objective basis for suspecting that Flores and Renteria were engaged in criminal activity when they were stopped, I also believe that under the evidence in this case, the police were required to meet the higher standard of probable cause.
This was not a Terry stop to determine whether Flores and Renteria were engaged in criminal conduct. “A Terry stop is a brief detention by an officer who suspects an offense is being committed or has been committed, for the purpose of clarifying or investigating the facts that gave rise to that suspicion. [Cits.]” McKenzie v. State, 208 Ga. App. 683, 684 (1) (431 SE2d 715) (1993). Instead, Flores and Renteria were stopped so the police could search their vehicles for narcotics.
They were not the subjects of a valid Terry stop; they were arrested. “[A] person is under arrest whenever his liberty to come and go as he pleases is restrained, no matter how slight such restraint may be.” Collier v. State, 244 Ga. 553, 561 (3) (261 SE2d 364) (1979). “Detention beyond that authorized by Terry is an arrest, and, to be constitutional, such an arrest must be supported by probable cause. Probable cause to arrest exists where, based on objective facts and circumstances, a man of reasonable caution would believe that a crime has been or is being committed.” (Citation omitted.) Williams v. State, 251 Ga. 749, 792 (8) (a) (ii) (312 SE2d 40) (1983). “ ‘Probable cause need not be defined in relation to any one particular element, but may exist because of the totality of circumstances sur*400rounding a transaction.’ ” Norman v. State, 214 Ga. App. 408, 409 (448 SE2d 219) (1994).
Decided July 16, 2003
J Tom Morgan, District Attorney, Alison T Burleson, Shawn E. LagGrua, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellant.
Even considering the collective knowledge of the officers, see Maxwell v. State, 249 Ga. App. 747, 748 (549 SE2d 534) (2001), and the totality of the circumstances, I cannot find that the stop of Flores and Renteria was. based on probable cause to warrant a stop of their vehicles. No officer testified that they were stopped because of anything they were doing or not doing at the time of the stop, or that the officers had any reason to believe that drugs were in the cars. Indeed, the State conceded that the men had not committed a traffic violation. Instead, the men were stopped because they had departed from the apartment that was under surveillance and because some other men, who also had departed that apartment, were found some three hours earlier to be in possession of illegal drugs. Even if the police suspected that Flores and Renteria were carrying drugs because of their previous actions or the actions of others, in the absence of a particularized and objective manifestation at the time of the stop that Flores and Renteria were then or were about to be engaged in criminal activity, the police could not legitimately stop them under Terry. Garmon v. State, supra; Emery v. State, supra; State v. Mallard, supra.
If the majority’s theory is correct, the authorities may now, with impunity, stop and search anyone they suspect might be engaged in criminal activity even though there was no present objective manifestation that the person stopped was then or was about to be engaged in criminal activity. I do not believe this to be our law.
The officer who directed the stop of Flores and Renteria testified, “We knew a crime had been committed and drugs were found.” No information the State provided concerned the activities of Flores and Renteria.
At best the decision to stop them was based on a mere hunch that anyone leaving the apartment might have drugs. A hunch, however, is not a valid reason to authorize a traffic stop, State v. White, 197 Ga. App. 426, 427 (398 SE2d 778) (1990), much less an arrest. And this is not a situation where the men were fleeing. Compare State v. Billoups, 191 Ga. App. 834, 835 (383 SE2d 198) (1989).
In these circumstances, I believe that the trial court did not err by granting the motions to suppress, and, therefore, the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent.
*401Cromwell & Hibbert, William G. Cromwell, Henry A. Hibbert, Corinne Mull-Milsteen, for appellees.

 Although an application for a search warrant for the apartment was prepared, the warrant was not signed, and the warrant was not executed until later that evening.