Court Opinion

ID: 9477561
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:26:18.61527+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:56.492253
License: Public Domain

BISSELL, Circuit Judge,
concurring in result.
The majority decision turns on the proposition that “upon” means “shortly afterward,” and that we must so interpret it throughout the contract. Examining the Title and Risk of Loss clause belies this position. That clause states that title to supplies “shall pass to the Government upon formal acceptance” (emphasis added). In this clause, it is obvious that “upon” means “at the time of acceptance,” and not “shortly afterward.”
In my view, a better basis for decision begins with the recognition that the government is widely known to accept contract performance through the execution of the DD250. As the majority acknowledges, ASPR 14-306(b) states that “[acceptance shall ordinarily be evidenced by execution” of a DD250. The Title and Risk of Loss clause just noted reveals why such a bright line event is particularly important: the government owns the goods and bears the risk of loss for them once it has accepted them. In light of the normal practice of government acceptance through execution of the DD250, and the policy reasons underlying such a bright line event, I would hold that acceptance occurs only through the execution of the DD250, or similar document, unless the contract clearly states otherwise. Although the parties may agree to acceptance by some other means, the subject contract is too loosely worded to hold that Sperry and the government did so here.
I must add that this conclusion does not reflect insensitivity to Sperry’s right, as optionor, to protect itself against attempts by the government to enlarge a fixed option period. This case, however, is not about strictly construing the terms of an option agreement: It is about the separate question of how to interpret what this contract means by the term “final acceptance.”