Court Opinion

ID: 9742394
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:12:54.96583+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:32.116286
License: Public Domain

RUCKER, Judge,
concurring in result.
I agree the trial court did not abuse its discretion in setting aside the default judgment. However, I do so for reasons different than those discussed by the majority. First, I am not persuaded McGee's attorney engaged in either fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct contemplated by Ind. Trial Rule 60(B)(8) which would afford relief to Reynolds. On the other hand, Ind. Trial Rule 60(B)(4), the alternative ground upon which Reynolds' motion was based, permits the court to set aside a default judgment where judgment was entered against a party served only by publication and without actual knowledge of the action.
The record here reveals the two attempts to personally serve Reynolds with the summons and complaint failed and thus she was served only by publication. The ree-ord also reveals Reynolds had no actual knowledge of the lawsuit nor the subsequent default judgment until several months after judgment had been entered. Under these circumstances the default judgment was properly set aside. See Duncan v. Binford (1972), 151 Ind.App. 199, 278 N.E.2d 591; Keiling v. McIntire (1980), Ind.App., 408 N.E.2d 565. Further, contrary to McGee's assertion, where a default judgment is set aside because it was entered without notice or proper service, a meritorious defense need not be shown. Shotwell v. Cliff Hagan Ribeye Franchise, Inc. (1991), Ind. 572 N.E.2d 487, 490.