Court Opinion

ID: 9840271
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-15 18:05:52.556714+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:11:56.975813
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/15/23 Russell v. Walsh CA1/4
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                  DIVISION FOUR

 STEPHEN RUSSELL,

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                    A165356
 v.
                                                                        (City & County of San Francisco
 TARA WALSH,                                                            Super. Ct. No. CGC-18-570137)
           Defendant and Appellant.

         Stephen Russell sued Tara Walsh for battery, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and domestic violence (Civ. Code, § 1708.6, subd. (a)), and
a jury found her liable for all three torts. Walsh, who represented herself at
trial and does so again on appeal, argues that the evidence is insufficient to
support the jury’s verdict. She also contends that the trial court erred in
declining to continue the trial when she told the court about her mental
health issues. Finding none of these arguments persuasive, we affirm the
judgment.
         The parties are familiar with the facts and our opinion does not meet
the criteria for publication. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c).) We confine
our discussion to the information that is relevant to our conclusions and to
our statement of the reasons that have led us to them. (See Cal. Const.,
art. VI, § 14; Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1262.)
                                 DISCUSSION

      1. The Trial Court Acted Within Its Discretion in Electing Not to
      Continue the Trial

      Walsh argues that the trial court “erred in refusing to continue the trial
when . . . Walsh expressed that she was having mental health issues.” We
disagree.
      “The court may grant a continuance only on an affirmative showing of
good cause requiring the continuance.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(c).)
“A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on a motion for a continuance.
[Citation]. It is the duty of the trial court to vigorously insist upon cases
being heard and decided in the most timely manner possible, unless there are
compelling reasons to the contrary.” (Midwest Television, Inc. v. Scott,
Lancaster, Mills & Atha, Inc. (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 442, 456.) “Unnecessary
continuances are wasteful, nonproductive, time-consuming and a fertile
ground for criticism by the public of the courts.” (County of San Bernardino
v. Doria Mining & Engineering Corp. (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 776, 781.) “A trial
court has great discretion in the disposition of an application for a
continuance. Absent a clear abuse of discretion, the court’s determination
will not be disturbed.” (Estate of Smith (1973) 9 Cal.3d 74, 81.)
      According to Walsh, there was good cause to continue her trial because
she told the court that she was “not mentally fit to go through the trial” and
offered to “obtain[] a letter from her psychiatrist” to the same effect.
However, when Walsh first made the request for a continuance, the jury had
been sworn and she had just delivered an opening statement in propria
persona. Having observed that opening statement, the trial court could
reasonably conclude that Walsh was able to proceed despite any difficulties.

                                         2
      The trial court buttressed that conclusion after Walsh faced direct
examination: “[T]he Court is not precluding you from [presenting] the
[psychiatrist’s] note, but I will also tell you that if you wish to continue this
case in some form or fashion, that I will require under the law good cause. So
far I've not seen a good cause basis.” As the trial court observed, Walsh had
“been able to withstand the examination by” opposing counsel, and “seem[ed]
to have the ability to understand the nature of the proceedings, what’s going
on, and to proceed with the case.” Moreover, even though the court made
clear that Walsh could present a note from a psychiatrist to support her
request and emphasized that she had not yet established good cause, Walsh
never did so.
      Under these circumstances, we cannot find an abuse of discretion in the
trial court’s conclusion that Walsh’s oral statements concerning her mental
health problems did not establish good cause to continue the trial and
thereby override the courts’ vital interest in avoiding costly delays.
      2. Walsh’s Challenges to the Sufficiency of the Evidence Are
      Waived
      Walsh argues that no substantial evidence supports a finding that she
committed battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, or domestic
violence against Russell. Because she has not made the requisite showing in
any of those respects, we disagree.
      In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we presume that the
“ ‘ record contains evidence to sustain every finding of fact.’ ” (Foreman &
Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881 (Foreman).) It is the
appellant’s burden to demonstrate that it does not. (Ibid.) “In furtherance of
this burden, the appellant must fairly summarize all the facts in the light
most favorable to the judgment.” (Burch v. CertainTeed Corp. (2019)
34 Cal.App.5th 341, 349.) “Accordingly, if . . . ‘some particular issue of fact is

                                         3
not sustained, they are required to set forth in their brief all the material
evidence on the point and not merely their own evidence. Unless this is done
the error assigned is deemed to be waived.’ ” (Foreman, at p. 881.)
      Here, Walsh’s opening brief summarizes only her own testimony, not
Russell’s. By neglecting Russell’s testimony—which described symptoms he
experienced, how those symptoms would abate in Walsh’s absence, a blood
test that revealed high levels of lithium in his body, and the statements of a
nanny who had witnessed Walsh drugging his wine—Walsh failed “to set
forth . . . all the material evidence” pertaining to the sufficiency of the
evidence for battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and domestic
violence. (Foreman, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 881.) Accordingly, her claims in
those respects are waived. (Ibid.)
      3. Even if Those Claims Were Not Waived, Substantial Evidence
      Supports the Jury’s Verdict to All Three Torts
      Walsh’s challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence fail on the merits,
as well. We explain below.
            a. Standard of Review
      In evaluating the record for substantial evidence, we determine
whether the evidence, “contradicted or uncontradicted,” will support the
judgment. (Bowers v. Bernards (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 870, 873–874.)
“ ‘Substantial evidence’ is evidence of ponderable legal significance, evidence
that is reasonable, credible and of solid value.” (Roddenberry v. Roddenberry
(1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 634, 651.) “ ‘ “The testimony of a [single] witness . . .
may be sufficient” [to support a judgment].’ ” (In re Marriage of Slivka (1986)
183 Cal.App.3d 159, 163.) “It is not our role as a reviewing court to reweigh
the evidence or to assess witness credibility.” (Thompson v. Asimos (2016)
6 Cal.App.5th 970, 981 (Thompson).)

                                         4
             b. Battery
      First, Walsh challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for battery. “ ‘A
battery is any intentional, unlawful and harmful contact by one person with
the person of another. . . . A harmful contact, intentionally done is the
essence of a battery. . . . A contact is “unlawful” if it is unconsented to. . . .’
[Citation.] The elements of a civil battery are: ‘ “1. Defendant intentionally
did an act which resulted in a harmful or offensive contact with the plaintiff’s
person; [¶] 2. Plaintiff did not consent to the contact; [and][¶] 3. The harmful
or offensive contact caused injury, damage, loss or harm to the plaintiff.” ’ ”
(Fluharty v. Fluharty (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 484, 497 (Fluharty).)
      Here, Walsh and Russell resided in New York City and San Francisco,
respectively. They met in New York in 2015 and began a dating relationship.
Russell testified that in 2016, after a visit from Walsh, he became “severely
ill . . . to the point [he] was unable to get out of bed.” Soon after giving birth
to their daughter in early 2017, Walsh came to San Francisco to stay with
Russell. From that time through the middle of the next year, there were “at
least a dozen times” when Russell suspected he had been drugged. During
some of those times, he went “to the emergency room to get toxicology
reports . . . .” According to Russell, “it felt like being knocked out,” like
“you’re going to lose consciousness.” Such episodes would occur when Walsh
was staying in the same city as Russell, but abate once the two had parted.
      In her own testimony, Walsh admitted that on at least two occasions
during the same time period, she put the prescription drug Seroquel into
Russell’s wine without asking his permission or telling him she was doing so.
She then “put it on the coffee table” near him, intending that Russell ingest
the drug. When a nanny later told Russell about Walsh drugging the wine,
the revelation “[e]xplained . . . 90 percent of what [he] had been experiencing

                                          5
that month”: “a very confusing set of symptoms” related to the drug’s onset,
“the panic [he] would experience upon noticing [he] was drugged, and the
subsequent “withdrawal and neuropathy.”
       A jury hearing that testimony could reasonably find by a
preponderance of the evidence that Walsh had battered Russell. Walsh
admitted to drugging Russell’s wine and placing it near him, intending for
him to drink it. And Russell explained the abnormal and unpleasant
sensations he experienced around that time. On that basis, it is reasonable
to infer that Walsh “ ‘ “intentionally did an act which resulted in a harmful or
offensive contact with [Russell’s] person.” ’ ” (Fluharty, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th
at p. 497.) That Russell “ ‘ “did not consent to the contact” ’ ” follows from the
testimony showing that he was ignorant of Walsh’s conduct and panicked
upon feeling the drug’s effects. (Ibid.) And Russell’s testimony regarding his
symptoms supports a finding that Walsh’s actions “ ‘ “caused . . .
harm . . . .” ’ ” (Ibid.)
       As for Walsh’s contention that she drugged Russell in self-defense, it
cannot survive the standard of review operative here. That affirmative
defense requires the defendant to have “reasonably believed, in view of all the
circumstances of the case, that the plaintiff was going to harm him or
her. . . .” (J.J. v. M.F. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 968, 976.) Here, Russell
testified that he never physically harmed Walsh or threatened her with
physical harm. If that testimony is credited, then Walsh could not have
reasonably believed Russell was going to harm her. As we have already
observed, “[i]t is not our role as a reviewing court to reweigh the evidence or
to assess witness credibility.” (Thompson, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 981.)
Accordingly, we defer to the jury in Walsh’s case, which apparently resolved
this question of credibility against her.

                                        6
      Finally, in arguing that Russell consented to being drugged, Walsh
relies on two cases: Piedra v. Dugan (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1483 and
Saxena v. Goffney (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 316. However, neither case is
relevant to her argument. In both Piedra and Saxena, the defendants were
medical doctors and the legal analysis in those cases related to signed
consent forms by which the plaintiffs or their guardians expressly consented
to medical treatment. (Piedra at p. 1496; Saxena at p. 321.) In contrast,
Walsh argues only that Russell rendered implied consent.
      Unaided by Piedra and Saxena, Walsh’s argument challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence for battery comprises a series of assertions
unsupported by any legal authority or citations to the record. For that
reason, it does nothing to undermine our analysis supporting the verdict.
(See Foreman, supra, at p. 881 [it is appellant’s burden to demonstrate the
insufficiency of the evidence].)
            c. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
      Second, Walsh challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. “The elements of the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress are: ‘ “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by
the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the
probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe
or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the
emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct. . . .” Conduct to be
outrageous must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually
tolerated in a civilized community.’ [Citation.] The defendant must have
engaged in ‘conduct intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the
realization that injury will result.’ ” (Christensen v. Superior Court (1991)
54 Cal.3d 868, 903; see also Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050.)

                                        7
      Here, Walsh’s extreme and outrageous conduct consisted of her
drugging Russell’s wine without his knowledge or consent. Her reckless
disregard for the probability of causing emotional distress can be inferred
from the fact that she accompanied Russell on one of his trips to the
emergency room for a toxicology report when he suspected he had been
drugged. Walsh therefore had reason to know that Russell believed he was
being drugged and that this belief was causing him distress, and she acted
with that knowledge when, later, she admittedly drugged him herself. And
Russell’s testimony regarding his feelings of panic upon feeling the effects of
being drugged support the jury’s finding that Walsh’s conduct caused
Russell’s emotional distress.
            d. Domestic Violence
      Third, Walsh challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for domestic
violence. Civil Code section 1708.6, subdivision (a) provides: “A person is
liable for the tort of domestic violence if the plaintiff proves both of the
following elements: [¶] (1) The infliction of injury upon the plaintiff resulting
from abuse, as defined in subdivision (a) of Section 13700 of the Penal Code.
[¶] (2) The abuse was committed by the defendant, a person having a
relationship with the plaintiff as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 13700 of
the Penal Code.” “ ‘Abuse’ means intentionally or recklessly causing or
attempting to cause bodily injury, or placing another person in reasonable
apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury to himself or herself, or
another.” (Pen. Code, § 13700, subd. (a).)
      Here, Walsh does not contest the jury’s finding that she and Russell
had the requisite relationship for the tort of domestic violence; only the
“injury” finding is contested. But Walsh committed abuse because she placed
Russell “in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury to

                                         8
himself” (Pen. Code, § 13700, subd. (a)) by inducing the panic Russell
experienced upon noticing he had been drugged. That abusive conduct
resulted in injuries that included Russell’s symptoms of “withdrawal and
neuropathy.” Walsh offers another explanation for those symptoms—
Russell’s pre-existing “mental health issues”—but “[u]nder the substantial
evidence standard of review, ‘where two or more different inferences can
reasonably be drawn from the evidence, this court is without power to
substitute its own inferences for those of the [trier of fact] and decide the case
accordingly.’ ” (Escobar v. Flores (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 737, 752.)
                                DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed. Russell is entitled to recover his costs on
appeal.
                                            GOLDMAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

STREETER, Acting P. J.
HIRAMOTO, J. *

* Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of Contra Costa, assigned

by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

                                        9