Court Opinion

ID: 9488665
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:51:51.731532+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:53:01.375760
License: Public Domain

EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
Although I concur in most of the opinion of the Court, I dissent from Court’s treatment of the “Multiplicitous Counts Issue.” I am not convinced by the majority’s statement that “[i]n this case, the statute’s requirement that a defendant possess ‘three or more’ items would seem to indicate that the legislature did not intend for this statute to be used to charge multiple offenses.” I believe the majority is reading too much into the “three or more” language.
Section 2252(a)(4)(B) states a crime of possession, with three alternative grounds for asserting jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause. Any person who
(B) knowingly possesses 3 or more books, magazines, periodicals, films, video tapes, or other matter which contain any visual depiction that has been mailed, or has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce, or which was produced using materials which have been mailed or so shipped or transported, by any means including by computer, if—
such visual depictions involve child pornography, violates 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B). A conviction thus requires a showing that the defendant knowingly possessed 3 or more items depicting child pornography, and that each of these items also satisfies one of the alternative grounds for jurisdiction. The three items must each be shown to have either been “mailed,” or “shipped or transported” in interstate commerce, or “produced” from an item that was mailed or so shipped or transported. The jurisdictional requirement does not change the basic nature of the item or the crime, which is possession of child pornography. The three alternative jurisdictional grounds merely allow a federal court to decide the underlying violation of possession, they do not alter what is being possessed.
I therefore agree with the majority that the jurisdictional difference between the two sets of items in Counts 3 and 4 is insufficient by itself to support separate counts. The Government could not, for example, plead the same three items in separate counts merely because the same three had been “shipped” in interstate commerce and “produced” using materials which had been mailed or so shipped. The key, rather, is whether the items are in fact distinct and different items, regardless of whether they were “mailed,” “produced,” or “shipped.”1
*736While it may be true that “[a] single offense should normally be charged in one count rather than several, even if different means of committing the offense are alleged,” Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 66 n. 20, 98 S.Ct. 2170, 2180 n. 20, 57 L.Ed.2d 43 (1978), we have held that the act of mailing three child-pornography photographs in separate envelopes may be punishable in three separate counts, even though the three photographs were mailed at the same time. See United States v. Gallardo, 915 F.2d 149, 151 (5th Cir.1990) (“With respect to the child pornography statute, each separate use of the mail to transport or ship child pornography should constitute a separate crime because it is the act of either transporting or shipping that is the central focus of this statute.”).2 In the context of mail fraud, we have also held that “[e]aeh separate use of the mail in furtherance of [a scheme to defraud] constitutes a separate crime.” United States v. Blankenship, 746 F.2d 233, 236 (5th Cir.1984).
The first two sections of the child pornography statute and the mail fraud statute speak of “any visual depiction” and “any scheme or artifice” (or “any counterfeit or spurious coin”) respectively. “Any” is synonymous with “one or more.” And we have held that a prosecutor has discretion to bring a single count or several counts where there is more than one item. Why should we read the phrase “three or more ” in a more restrictive manner? Under the majority’s interpretation of the statute, a prosecutor could only charge a defendant with one count under § 2252(a)(4)(B) whether he possessed three books or several thousand.3 I believe that some additional authority, in the form of legislative history or analogous case law, should be required before we assume that Congress intended to distinguish this section of the statute from the other sections by limiting the prosecutor’s discretion to bring multiple counts.4
It is not obvious how Congress could have written this provision to make it clearer that multiple counts were permitted. It would have been confusing to omit the “or more” language from the “three” because this would seem to suggest that the possession of four or more items would not be a violation. The phrase “at least three” does not say anything different from “three or more.” Nor do I believe that Congress’s meaning would have been much clearer if they had stated “any three or more,” even though this would have more closely paralleled the preceding provisions.5
Therefore, it is more reasonable to assume that Congress simply wanted to heighten the evidentiary burden for convictions based on the mere possession of child pornography by requiring the Government to prove at least three items, but that Congress did not intend to eliminate the prosecutor’s discretion to bring additional counts where there were more than three items, as long as each count is supported by three different and distinct items. The “or more” language affirms the prosecutorial discretion rather than removes it, by allowing the prosecutor to charge nine different items, for example, as one count or *737as three.6 Accordingly, I do not believe that the “three or more” language indicates that Congress intended to eliminate the prosecutor’s discretion to bring one or several counts under this particular provision of the statute. Counts 3 and 4 should be held sufficient not because they assert different jurisdictional grounds, but because they are supported by at least three separate and distinct items. I would therefore affirm as to both counts.

. The visual depictions referred to in the separate Counts 3 and 4 appear to be ten different items. That is, the depictions listed in Count 3'— “CHERRYA.GIF”, “CHERRYB.GIF”, "CHER-RYC.GIF”, "WC221501.GIF”, and “LIT-SIS.GIF” — appear to be different depictions from those listed in Count 4 — "MBON006.JPG", "MBON007.JPG", “DS-X-219.GIF", "IN-*736NOCNTJPC”, or "KID013.GIF”. Accordingly, I believe the Government has not alleged the "same three items” in separate counts.

. This language is quoted with approval in United States v. Cipollone, 951 F.2d 1057, 1058 (9th Cir.1991), cited by the majority in footnote 6.

. My research has not uncovered any case that addresses the issue of multiple counts under this provision. In every case, the prosecution apparently chose to bring only one count under § 2252(a)(4)(B), even where, in one instance, the possession charge involved ten items. See United States v. Burian, 19 F.3d 188, 189-90 (5th Cir.1994) (defendant was in possession of ten video tapes received through the mails). If the prosecution has the discretion to bring a single count even where the facts would permit several counts, these cases do not tell us very much. In the present case, the Government apparently believed, mistakenly in my opinion, that it needed to rely on a jurisdictional distinction in order to bring more than one count.

. The legislative history contains no reference whatsoever to the language and purpose of § 2252(a)(4)(B). If Congress intended to remove prosecutorial discretion under this particular section of the statute, one would expect to find some reference to this limitation.

. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1) and § 2252(a)(2) with § 2252(a)(4)(B).

. Similarly, Congress would not have used the language "each three” because this might be read to remove prosecutorial discretion, requiring prosecutors to bring a separate count for each group of three items discovered in the defendant’s possession.