Court Opinion

ID: 9529025
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:46:35.337694+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:35.127497
License: Public Domain

CARTER, J.
I dissent.
I believe that the life insurance policy in the instant case covered the death of the insured. It is conceded that, while the death occurred when the insured was in military service outside the states of the United States, it was in no way connected with, caused by or the result of that military service or war. The caption of the rider which requires interpretation states that the rider is a war risk exclusion rider. In the body of the rider it is provided, accepting the construction placed thereon by the majority opinion, that a death is not covered when it occurs outside the states of the United States while the insured is serving in the military forces. The caption and the clause in the body are diametrically opposed to each other-, they cannot be harmonized. The words “wár risk” are not ambiguous. They can mean only one thing, a risk or hazard incident to or the consequence of war—the proximate result of war. Such risks and those only are excluded by the express wording of the caption. It may be that in the application of those words to a particular set of facts it will be difficult to ascertain whether the case is or is not within the definition of those words, but that problem, even if it be considered as making the words ambiguous, is not an ambiguity in language. Certainly there is no ambiguity in a clear case such as we have here where there can be no claim that there was any connection between the war and the insured’s death. Where no relation exists between the death and the war, the death cannot under any definition of “war risk” be considered as embraced therein. Turning then to the clause in the body of the rider we find it makes no reference to any war risk. It purports to exclude risks which occur (1) at a certain place, and (2) when the insured has a certain status—is in the military service. Neither of those factors necessarily has the remotest connection with the risks connected with or are inherent in war. Hence it purports to make an exclusion which is totally foreign to the caption. *13Thus we have two contradictory clauses in an insurance policy. In that situation the clause most favorable to the insured must be held applicable to the case. It is true that some of the other parts of the body of the rider do pertain to war risks, but how can that validate a clause which is clearly outside the scope of a war risk? It is also of importance that the caption is in large type as contrasted with the small type in the body. The insured in taking the policy would naturally assume that the words “war risk” in the caption meant what they plainly import, a risk caused by and the result of war. He could assume that risks having no connection with war are not excluded. So to permit him to be misled is contrary to justice and the principles applicable to the interpretation of insurance policies.
The foregoing is to me the turning point of the case, yet the majority opinion devotes only one paragraph to it, stating: “It is true, as plaintiff contends, that the policy of insurance is to be read and construed as a whole and, more particularly, that the caption of the rider is to be read and construed with the language of the rider itself. (Citations.) But this argument makes obvious the antistrophe which defeats it; the language of the rider is explicit and clear; reading that language with the caption effectually resolves any ambiguity in the latter. The words ‘Aviation and War Risk Exclusion Rider’ are only the caption of the rider; they are not in themselves an operative provision of the policy; standing alone they do not exclude any risk whatsoever. Thus, unless the operative language in the body of the rider is to be considered the rider will be wholly ineffectual. But if any of the operative language is to be considered it would seem that we must consider all of it. If such operative language were ambiguous the insured would be entitled to a favorable construction of the ambiguity but, as previously observed, such operative language is explicit and clear.” It is assumed without discussion that the caption is ambiguous. It is clearly not ambiguous. Neither is the body of the rider. They are squarely antagonistic. So we have two opposing and conflicting provisions, which create an uncertainty or ambiguity as to the nature of the risk excluded. The problem is one of interpretation. Moreover the majority opinion states that the caption is not an operative part of the policy although in the previous sentence it recognizes the rule that it must be construed as part of the policy. (Ogburn v. Travelers Ins. Co., *14207 Cal. 50, 52 [276 P. 1004] ; Narver v. California State Life Ins. Co., 211 Cal. 176 [294 P. 393].) When so used it clearly limits the exclusion to only such risks as are war connected.
There are many cases in which provisions closely analogous to the one in the case at bar have been interpreted in favor of extending coverage to the insured. In Arendt v. North American Life Ins. Co., 107 Neb. 716 [187 N.W. 65], the insured was covered for death from any cause “except military or naval service in time of war.” Yet a nonmilitary service connected death in time of war was held not to be excluded. The policy in Atkinson v. Indiana Nat. Life Ins. Co., 194 Ind. 563 [143 N.E. 629], read: “After one year from the date of issue this policy shall become incontestable . . . except that military or naval service in time of war without a permit from the company, is a risk not assumed under this policy at any time; but the legal reserve hereunder will be due and payable in case of death while in such service.” The court stated: “Appellant contends that the plain meaning of the military clause is that the insurance company does not assume the risks of or incident to military service. Appellee contends that the limitation intended by the military clause is one of the status of the insured at the time of death, and not a limitation as to the cause of death. In support of its contention appellee argues that the words ‘military service,’ or ‘in the military service, ’ if not modified by some other words, such as the words ‘engaged in military service,’ or ‘in active military service ’ have uniformly been held to refer to the status of being in the military service, . . . The language of the first part of the sentence of the military limitation before the court has to do with a military service risk, or a risk of military service, or a risk incident to military service, or a risk occasioned by military service. The second part of 'that part of the sentence relating to military limitation is incompatible with the first part, and, if the position taken by appellee is to be confirmed, it is sufficient in its strength to control the other part of the sentence, thereby defining the first part of the sentence to mean status only, which carried out logically would mean to say, ‘ The risk of death while in military or naval service in time of war without a permit reduces the liability of the company to the payment to the beneficiary of the legal reserve only under this policy. ’
“The possibility of such a construction of the meaning of the military service clause, in the face of a denial of such *15construction by the appellee, declares its ambiguity. This very state of conjecture suggests the rule of law, long adhered to, that in construing an insurance contract, which by ambiguities is capable of two reasonable interpretations, that interpretation will be adopted which is most favorable to the insured, and against the insurer. ’ ’ Likewise in the case at bar the caption of the rider refers to war risk, that is, a risk peculiar to war rather than merely the status of the insured. In Illinois Bankers’ Life Ass’n v. Davaney, 102 Okla. 302 [226 P. 101], the exclusion clause read: “It is expressly provided that death while in the service in the army or navy of any government in time of war is not a risk covered at any time during the continuance or reinstatement of this policy of any greater sum that the amounts actually paid to the company herein.” (Emphasis added.) The insured died of influenza while in the service in time of war. The court in holding the insured was covered relied upon a prior case (Barnett v. Merchants’ Life Ins. Co., 87 Okla. 42 [208 P. 271]) where the clause excluded those engaged in military service stating: “It is contended that in the Barnett Case, supra, this court was dealing with a policy which provided that it was unrestricted as to ‘travel, residence, or occupation, except that if at any time the insured shall engage in army or naval service in time of war,’ etc.
“It is pointed out that the term ‘engage’ is not used in the policy in the instant case-, that the exemption here applied when and wherever the insured is in the service of the army or navy. It is true that in the Barnett Case the provision of the policy is ‘that if at any time the insured shall engage in army or naval service' and that in the instant case the provision of the policy is, in that respect, ‘that death while in the service of the army or navy of any government in time of war is not a risk covered’ by the policy, but we are unable to agree with counsel for defendants that the decisions of this court referred to differentiated the provision before the court in those cases from the provision in the case at bar. ’ ’
Smith v. Sovereign Camp, W. O. W., 204 S.C. 193 [28 S.E. 2d 808], considered a policy reading “The double indemnity benefits hereby provided shall not be payable—while the member is in the military or naval service in time of war.” The insured, a member of the military forces, was injured while on a furlough. His beneficiary recovered. In Young v. Life & Casualty Ins. Co. of Tennessee, 204 S.C. 386 [29 S.E. *162d 482], the exclusion clause stated: “No Accidental Death Benefit will be paid ... if death results from bodily injuries sustained while . . . the insured is in military or naval service in time of war. ’ ’ The death of the insured, a member of the military forces, unconnected with his services therein, was held not to be excluded. The court said: “In the ease before us, we think it clear that although the policy contains the word ‘enroll’ and not ‘engage,’ it was intended by the parties, insured and insurer, that the failure of the insured to obtain the permit and pay the extra premium would reduce the company’s liability only in ease his death should result from a risk peculiar to the military service. This view is strengthened by the requirement that an extra premium be paid in the event of military service in time of war. It is evident that an extra hazard was in contemplation of the parties as a possible cause of death, and that for this added risk the Company should be compensated. This added risk, in our view, cannot reasonably be referred to status; it relates to the death of the insured caused by or connected with his military duties as a member of the nation’s armed forces. This seems to us to be the natural and obvious reading of the clauses quoted.”
It has been held in many cases that where the exclusion clause extends to those “engaged” in military service, a death is not excluded unless it is service connected or the consequence of service. (Long v. St. Joseph Life Ins. Co. (Mo. App.), 225 S.W. 106; Nutt v. Security Life Ins. Co. of America, 142 Ark. 29 [218 S.W. 675]; Benham v. American Central Life Ins. Co., 140 Ark. 612 [217 S.W. 462]; Stephan v. Prairie Life Ins. Co., 113 Neb. 469 [203 N.W. 626]; Boawright v. American Life Ins. Co., 191 Iowa 253 [180 N.W. 321, 11 A.L.R. 1085]; Myli v. American Life Ins. Co., 43 N.D. 495 [175 N.W. 631, 11 A.L.R. 1097]; Farmers’ Nat. Life Ins. Co. of America v. Carman, 76 Ind.App. 700 [132 N.E. 697]; Rex Health & Accident Ins. Co. v. Pettiford, 74 Ind.App. 507 [129 N.E. 248]; Illinois Bankers’ Life Assn. v. Jackson, 88 Okla. 133 [211 P. 508]; Barnett v. Merchants’ Life Ins. Co., 87 Okla. 42 [208 P. 271].) There are some cases to the contrary but the very fact of the conflict shows the necessity of interpreting the clause favorable to the insured. There is no distinction between “engaged” in military service and “in” military service, the words used in the instant case. A person is occupied or employed (engaged) in military service when he is in the service.
*17It should be noted that none of the policies in any of the cited eases, which hold the exclusion clause applicable have a war risk caption comparable to the one in the ease at bar, that is, “AVIATION AND WAR RISK EXCLUSION RIDER.”
It is conceded by respondent that under the interpretation contended for by it, which has been adopted by the majority of this court in the case at bar, the insured was not covered during any of the time he was serving with the armed forces of the United States in Alaska; that is, had he met his death even while on furlough as the result of an accident or cause wholly unconnected with his military service, no recovery could be had under the provisions of the policy here involved. This conclusion must necessarily follow from the interpretation placed upon the war risk exclusion provision by the majority opinion.
Many cases involving the interpretation of war risk exclusion clauses in insurance policies have been reported in the American Law Beports, and reference to the annotations to these cases discloses a great diversity of judicial opinion in the interpretation of clauses of this character. (See, 157 A.L.R. 1448; 156 A.L.R. 1447; 155 A.L.R. 1449; 154 A.L.R. 1446; 153 A.L.R. 1418; 152 A.L.R. 1449; 151 A.L.R. 1452; 150 A.L.R. 1414; 147 A.L.R. 1294; 141 A.L.R. 1510; 140 A.L.R. 1533; 137 A.L.R. 1263; 15 A.L.R. 1280; 11 A.L.R. 1103; 7 A.L.R. 382; 4 A.L.R. 848.) Those courts expressing the more liberal view have allowed recovery in cases like the one now before us where there is a conflict between provisions of the policy which create an uncertainly or ambiguity as to the risks excluded by the policy. Under the interpretation placed on such clauses by the decisions of the courts following the more liberal trend, plaintiff would be entitled to recover in the case at bar. The majority opinion, however, adopts the more conservative view and interprets the conflicting provisions of the policy most strongly against the insured. In my opinion considerations of justice and fairness should compel an interpretation of conflicting provisions of this character most strongly in favor of the insured, and that this court should adopt the liberal view expressed by the courts of other jurisdictions which have allowed recovery in cases of this character. A basic reason in support of this conclusion is that many persons holding policies containing war risk exclusion clauses did not contemplate entering military service at the time such policies were issued to them but were thereafter re*18quired to enter such service as the result of the operation of the National Selective Service Act. Obviously such persons would not scrutinize the war risk clauses upon receipt of their policies, because of the assumption, after reading the caption “AVIATION AND WAR RISK EXCLUSION RIDER” in large black-faced type, that such rider limited the liability of the insurance company in cases only where death resulted solely from some risk incidental to or connected with war or military service, and for this reason did not read the provisions of the rider which were printed in very small type. In other words, such insured had the right to assume that the only risks excluded by the rider were those connected with or incidental to aviation and war. If the rider in the small type had provided that the company would not be liable if the insured’s death resulted from an injury received by reason of coming in contact with an aeroplane while engaged in any pursuit connected with aviation or otherwise, could it be said that the insured would not be covered if he was killed as a result of a collision between an automobile in which he was riding and an aeroplane operated by a third person? Obviously any one reading the caption to the rider who was not interested in aviation, and who never intended to have anything to do with aeroplanes, would have the right to assume that the clauses contained in the small type below the caption did not exclude risks which had no connection with aviation; yet, the interpretation placed upon the rider in the case at bar would per vent recovery by the beneficiary of the person killed while riding in the automobile as the result of being struck by an aeroplane. In my opinion the beneficiaries of those who were thus misled should be protected against such an obvious means of deception.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment should be reversed.
Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied May 6, 1946. Carter, J., voted for a rehearing.