Court Opinion

ID: 2966161
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:49:41.59736+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:32.399258
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

       [NOT FOR PUBLICATIONNOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]
                 United States Court of Appeals
                     For the First Circuit

No. 99-1607

                          UNITED STATES,

                            Appellee,

                                v.

                          CESAR CABRERA,

                      Defendant, Appellant.

           APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                 FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

             [Hon. Mary M. Lisi, U.S. District Judge]

                              Before

                      Selya, Circuit Judge,
                Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
                   and Lipez, Circuit Judge.
                                
                                
                                
                                
     
     John F. Sullivan on brief for appellant.
     Margaret E. Curran, United States Attorney, Donald C. Lockhart
and Stephanie S. Browne, Assistant United States Attorneys, on
brief for appellee.

February 18, 2000

                                
                                
            Per Curiam.   After a careful review of the record
  and the submissions of the parties, we affirm.
            Appellant Cesar Cabrera ("Cabrera") contends his
  attorney below should have argued that Cabrera was subjected to
  a de facto arrest unsupported by probable cause, so the
  evidence subsequently seized from his car should have been
  suppressed (the record shows Cabrera's attorney did in fact
  advance this argument, so we will assume he means his attorney
  should have more fully developed the argument).  He also
  contends that his attorney should have argued that a statement
  Cabrera made during a consensual search of his car, in which he
  admitted to ownership of the bag containing heroin, should have
  been suppressed because he had not yet been advised of his
  rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  Since
  the district court held an evidentiary hearing, the factual
  record is fully developed and the only question presented is
  whether counsel should have presented (or better developed)
  these alternative legal theories.  In such a case, we may
  consider ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct
  appeal.  United States v. Natanel, 938 F.2d 302, 309 (1st Cir.
  1991) (appellate court may elect to consider ineffective
  assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal "where the
  critical facts are not genuinely in dispute and the record is
  sufficiently developed to allow reasoned consideration of an
  effective assistance claim").
            Cabrera's first ineffective assistance of counsel
  claim fails because the substantive argument clearly would not
  have succeeded.  See Vieux v. Pepe, 184 F.3d 59, 64 (1st Cir.
  1999) ("Obviously, counsel's performance was not deficient if
  he declined to pursue a futile tactic.").  At the point when
  the officer removed Cabrera's keys from the ignition, he was,
  according to the lower court's supportable factual findings,
  conducting a search to which Cabrera had consented.  Cabrera
  does not directly challenge those factual findings, but even if
  he were to do so, we cannot see how he could establish clear
  error.  See United States v. Jones, 187 F.3d 210, 214 (1st Cir.
  1999) ("Where evaluations of witnesses' credibility are
  concerned, we are especially deferential to the district
  court's judgment . . . .").  Further, even if Cabrera had not
  consented to a search at that point, the officer would have
  been entitled to continue detaining Cabrera under Terry v.
  Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), given Cabrera's evasive and
  inconsistent answers to the officer's questions and his
  excessively disproportionate nervous response.
            Cabrera's contention that his attorney should have
  argued for suppression of the statement made during the search
  also fails.  Cabrera was not in custody at the time, so the
  argument would have been futile.  See Jones, 187 F.3d at 217-
  18.
            Cabrera makes other vague allegations that his
  counsel failed to communicate effectively, failed to brief
  fully the suppression motion, and failed to investigate.  To
  the extent these claims are understandable, the factual record
  does not support any of them to the extent necessary to show
  ineffective assistance.
            Affirmed.  See 1st Cir. Loc. R. 27(c).