Court Opinion

ID: 9531262
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:09:17.592351+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:23.100558
License: Public Domain

Horowitz, J.
(dissenting) — By reversing the judgment below, the court in effect and in the name of legislative intent, has read out of the Shoreline Management Act of 1971 (SMA), the unambiguous appeal provisions of RCW 90.58.140(2) (a). In doing so, I believe the court has not adhered to its own admonitions that the court is not a super-legislature; that it is not at liberty to substitute its own wisdom for that of the legislature when acting in its legislative capacity; that it must reconcile, if it reasonably can, seemingly inconsistent provisions of a statute. Reconciliation is possible. The published legislative history of the appeal provisions of SMA, later summarized, supports the view that RCW 90.58.140(2) (a) was added to SMA with the intention the statute should be fully operative as an *455exception to or modification of the general appeal provisions of RCW 90.58.180 (2).
Justice Holmes once observed “[A] page of history is worth a volume of logic.” New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349, 65 L. Ed. 963, 41 S. Ct. 506, 16 A.L.R. 660 (1921). That history is obtainable by using the familiar, established and approved technique of noting pertinent changes in successive drafts of House Bill 584 (42d Sess. 1971).3
The SMA was originally introduced as House Bill 584 (42d Sess. 1971). The sections of the bills pertinent to our inquiry in the order in which introduced were House Bill 584, §§ 11 and 16 (42d Sess. 1971); Substitute House Bill 584, §§ 15 and 17 (42d Sess. 1971); Engrossed Substitute House Bill 584 §§ 14 and 18 (42d Sess. 1971), now RCW 90.58.140 and RCW 90.58.180, respectively.
Originally, the only provisions for appeal by the department or Attorney General within a 45-day period were those contained in House Bill 584, § 16 (42d Sess. 1971). Section 11 of that house bill dealt with the issuance of substantial development permits prior to the adoption of the master plan, but made no special provision for appealing the issuance of such permits. The provisions governing appeals by the Department of Ecology within 30 days was first added in Substitute House Bill 584, § 15 (42d Sess. 1971). That provision remained substantially unchanged *456through various drafts of the house bill and is now found in RCW 90.58.140(2) (a). From the time of the introduction of House Bill 584 (42d Sess. 1971), through the successive house bills and despite some changes in language, the general appeal provisions now contained in RCW 90.58.180(2), including appeals from the denial or granting of permits and authorizing appeals by the department or the Attorney General within a 45-day period from the date the final order was filed, have remained substantially unchanged.
The legislative history thus shows House Bill 584, § 16 (42d Sess. 1971), and successive drafts of that house bill ultimately culminating in RCW 90.58.180(2), contained the only and all-encompassing provision for appeals by the department or the Attorney General within a 45-day period. This general appeal statute in effect was then modified by Substitute House Bill 584, § 15(2) (a) (42d Sess. 1971), now RCW 90.58.140(2) (a), to provide specifically for appeals by the department within a 30-day period only from the granting of permits for substantial developments prior to the adoption of the applicable master plan.
As a matter of draftsmanship, it might have been clearer if the latter more specific appeal provision had taken the form of a proviso to the section of the substitute bill now embodied in RCW 90.58.180 (2) dealing with SMA appeals generally. However, the fact that the specific appeal provision appeared in a separate section of the same act dealing with and relevant to the issuance of substantial development permits prior to the adoption of the master plan is merely a draftsman’s choice in the placement of the provision. Such a choice does not change the legislative intent that the special appeal provision should be treated as operative, i.e., as an intended exception to RCW 90.58.180(2) governing appeals by the department or the Attorney General within a 45-day period dealing with the granting or denial of development permits.
2A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 47.11, at 90 (4th ed. C. Sands 1973) states:
*457Generally an exception is considered as a limitation only upon the matter which directly precedes it, but if a contrary intent or meaning is clearly indicated it will operate as a general limitation on all provisions of the act.
(Footnotes omitted.) See State ex rel. Wilson v. King County, 7 Wn.2d 104, 109 P.2d 291 (1941); McKenzie v. Mukilteo Water Dist., 4 Wn.2d 103, 102 P.2d 251 (1940); Bayha v. PUD 1, 2 Wn.2d 85, 97 P.2d 614 (1939).
This court in In re North River Logging Co., 15 Wn.2d 204, 207, 130 P.2d 64 (1942), quoted with approval the following rule in 1 J. Lewis, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 268, at 515 (2d ed. 1904):
“Where a statute expresses first a general intent, and afterwards an inconsistent particular intent, the latter will be taken as an exception from the former and both will stand.”
The rule is a familiar one. See 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 347 (b), at 722 (1953).
The majority opinion relies on four principal arguments to support its refusal to recognize as operative RCW 90.58.140(2) (a). First, it is said the rule that all parts of the statute should be given effect is only one of many rules. The same might be said of any rule of construction including those relied on by the majority. If that were a sufficient objection it would rule out the use of any rule of construction. Reconciliation of seemingly inconsistent sections in a statute is a cardinal rule of construction to ascertain legislative meaning. To go beyond the ascertainment of the meaning of the words used by the legislature:
is to usurp a power which our democracy has lodged in its elected legislature. ... A judge must not rewrite a statute, neither to enlarge nor to contract it. Whatever temptations the statesmanship of policymaking might wisely suggest, construction must eschew interpolation and evisceration. He must not read in by way of creation.
F. Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, in 1 Benjamin N. Cardozo Memorial Lectures 215, 223 *458(1970). The legislative history of the appeal provisions of SMA reasonably permits reconciliation, namely that RCW 90.58.140(2) (a) is an exception to or modification of RCW 90.58.180(2).
It is said ignoring RCW 90.58.140(2) (a) is required by the rule of liberal construction called for by RCW 90.58.900. This argument erroneously assumes the two statutes dealing with appeals in SMA cannot be reconciled. If reconciliation is reasonably possible, the rule of liberal construction does not permit SMA to be rewritten by the excision of RCW 90.58.140(2) (a).
It is said RCW 90.58.180 is a specific statute dealing with appeals whereas RCW 90.58.140(2) (a) deals with the issuance of permits in which appeals are only incidentally mentioned. The legal significance of the asserted distinction on the issue of legislative intent is not readily apparent. If, however, the statement made is an attempt to apply the rule that a specific statute prevails over a general statute, then RCW 90.58.140 (2) (a) to the extent applicable should prevail over RCW 90.58.180 (2).
In Mercer Island v. Walker, 76 Wn.2d 607, 613, 458 P.2d 274 (1969), the court stated:
[WJhere there is a conflict between a general and a special statute, covering the subject in a more definite and minute way, the specific statute will prevail.
Accord, State ex rel. Phillips v. State Liquor Control Bd., 59 Wn.2d 565, 567, 369 P.2d 844 (1962); see 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 369, at 839 (1953); Cf. ITT Rayonier Inc. v. Hill, 78 Wn.2d 700, 708, 478 P.2d 729 (1970); Airway Heights v. Schroeder, 53 Wn.2d 625, 335 P.2d 578 (1959).
RCW 90.58.180 is a general statute dealing with appeals; RCW 90.58.140(2) (a) is a statute dealing with a specific kind of an appeal. The special statute is limited to appeals from the issuance of development permits prior to the adoption of the master plan. The general statute covers appeals both from the issuance and denial of development *459permits, without distinction between permits issued before or after the adoption of the master plan. If, therefore, the majority opinion relies on the distinction between general and special appeal provisions, that opinion fails to adhere to the settled meaning of general and special provisions in the ascertainment of legislative intent.
The fourth argument rests on administrative construction to the effect that RCW 90.58.180 prevails over RCW 90.58.140(2) (a). The difficulty is the administrative construction is intrinsically unpersuasive. It is true the Shorelines Hearings Board, on June 27, 1973, rendered a decision holding, inter alia, that a request for review of a permit issued prior to the adoption by Snohomish County of a master plan for shorelines was governed by RCW 90.58.180(2). Summaries of Decisons, Wn. Envir. Rptr. § 4.20.010A (SHB No. 38, June 27, 1973). An examination of the actual opinion rendered shows the board stated no reasons for this holding; nor was any reference made to the legislative history of RCW 90.58.140(2) (a) or RCW 90.58.180(2). Furthermore, WAC 173-14-120 and WAC 461-08-070 relied on in the majority opinion to describe administrative construction are also unpersuasive.4
Moreover, the legislature, although adopting amendments in 1973 to both RCW 90.58.140 and RCW 90.58.180, made no change in either the special or general appeal provisions here involved. Laws of 1973, 2d Ex. Sess., ch. 19, § 1, p. 48, and Laws of 1973, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 203, § 2, p. 1564. Had the legislature intended the excision of the appeal provisions in *460RCW 90.58.140 (2) (a) it would have been a simple matter to repeal them or to amend RCW 90.58.180 to accomplish the same result. The fact no such change was made at the very time when the statutes were under consideration for amendment purposes is consistent with the legislative intention to adhere to RCW 90.58.140(2) (a) as written.5
Nor can it be reasonably contended the failure of the legislature to change the result of the unreasoned administrative ruling of June 27, 1973, constitutes an acquiescence in that ruling. There is no showing the legislature was even aware of that ruling. Pringle v. State, 77 Wn.2d 569, 464 P.2d 425 (1970). Moreover, had that ruling been called to the attention of the legislature with a request for a change, the failure to make a change instead of being evidence of acquiescence could be explained on the ground the legislature might have decided to take no action in order to await the resolution of the instant litigation raising the precise question.6 Furthermore, it has been pointed out that:
Understanding the legislative process in its actual environment, it is unrealistic to attribute to legislative inaction any approval of the multitudinous facets of the law as they exist prior to judicial decision: the inaction much more often stems from a lack of time for detail-changing or from the clogging of the legislative process through pressures requiring priority attention.
Tate, The Law-Making Function of the Judge, 28 La. L. Rev. 211, 233 (1968), cited in R. Leflar, Appellate Judicial Opinions 71 (1974).
Finally, the majority opinion treats the historical approach through the examination of successive drafts of the *461SMA dealing with appeals as unreliable. It explains the appeal provisions of RCW 90.58.140(2) (a) were the result of “oversight” or “happenstance” or as “constituting inconsistent surplusage.” The characterization is not justified for reasons already noted. Furthermore, the SMA was one of the most contentious and publicized statutes in recent history. Shorelines Management: The Washington Experience, Symposium, Seattle Center, June 24, 1972, at 2; Crooks, The Washington Shoreline Management Act of 1971, 49 Wash. L. Rev. 423, 423-25 (1974). In fact, the SMA was part of Initiative Measure No. 43 and alternate measure 43B containing the text of the SMA which is set out in full in the Official Voters Pamphlet for the general election of November 7, 1972. In the speech of Representative Axel Julin during the above-mentioned symposium, he refers to numerous amendments to the SMA offered in the 1971 session. He states, at pages 123-24:
[T]here is a rather extensive legislative record of various and extended debate and discussion of a multitude of amendments. ... I know I, for one, offered some 32 amendments [in 1970] and they were discussed and debated as they went through the House. Over 50 were proposed and suggested during the deliberation in the 1971 session.
The fact the appeal provisions in RCW 90.58.140 (2) (a) were intentionally inserted after the original House Bill 584 (42d Sess. 1971) was introduced and survived successive changes in the later bills suggests the appeal provisions of RCW 90.58.140 (2) (a) were not the result of “oversight” or “happenstance” or as “constituting inconsistent surplus-age.” See State ex rel. Hagan v. Chinook Hotel, Inc., 65 Wn.2d 573, 578-80, 399 P.2d 8 (1965).
Legislative intention is best fulfilled by treating RCW 90.58.140 (2) (a) as an exception to RCW 90.58.180 (2).
I would affirm the trial court.
Utter, J., concurs with Horowitz, J.

State ex rel. Evans v. Brotherhood of Friends, 41 Wn.2d 133, 152-53, 247 P.2d 787 (1952); Ayers v. Tacoma, 6 Wn.2d 545, 557-58, 108 P.2d 348 (1940); State ex rel. Fair v. Hamilton, 92 Wash. 347, 351-52, 159 P. 379 (1916); State ex. rel. Griffin v. Superior Court, 70 Wash. 545, 127 P. 120 (1912); United States v. Pfitsch, 256 U.S. 547, 550-52, 65 L. Ed. 1084, 41 S. Ct. 569 (1921); Pennsylvania R.R. v. International Coal Mining Co., 230 U.S. 184, 198-99, 57 L. Ed. 1446, 33 S. Ct. 893 (1913). See generally Annot., 70 A.L.R. 5, 19-25 (1931). The following writers reject the view of Professor Radin’s article relied on in the majority-opinion. See de Sloovere, Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Statutes, 88 U. Pa. L. Rev. 527 (1940); Horack, In the Name of Legislative Intention, 38 W. Va. L.Q. 119 (1932); Jones, Extrinsic Aids in the Federal Courts, 25 Iowa L. Rev. 737 (1940); Landis, A Note on “Statutory Interpretation,” 43 Harv. L. Rev. 886 (1930).

WAC 461-08-070 was filed by the Shorelines Hearings Board on July 3, 1974, shortly after the trial court in the instant case on June 5, 1974, held RCW 90.58.140(2) (a) governed appeals filed prior to the effective date of the “applicable master program.” The regulation could not change the law. Allen v. Employment Security Dep’t, 83 Wn.2d 145, 151, 516 P.2d 1032 (1973); Pringle v. State, 77 Wn.2d 569, 464 P.2d 425 (1970).
WAC 173-14-120 filed by the Department of Ecology on December 16, 1971, dealt with the form of permits and embodied a construction commencement delay period set forth in RCW 90.58.140 (4). It did not deal with the issue now presented.

The majority opinion makes reference to mistaken statutory references in SMA that occurred as a result of text changes in successive drafts. The fact, however, that RCW 90.58.140(2) (a) in the original form survived into the final draft as enacted is evidence of a conscious and deliberate choice to retain that section of the statute. That fact is inconsistent with any claim of oversight.

Respondent filed a request for review with the Shorelines Hearings Board of the Mason County decision granting the permit on November 29, 1973.