Court Opinion

ID: 9482759
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:59:41.930133+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:11.312382
License: Public Domain

ROSENN, Circuit Judge,
concurring and dissenting.
I join in parts I, II, and III of the majority’s opinion, but respectfully dissent from part IV affirming Phillips’ sentence. I cannot agree with the majority that there is sufficient record evidence from which the district court could conclude that Phillips acted in the role of a leader or an organizer.
The majority concludes that an independent review of the record supports the district court's finding that Phillips acted as a “leader” or an “organizer” of criminal activity. There is evidence that Phillips recruited one or two persons to accompany him when he picked up drugs in Philadelphia and that Phillips was a principal source of cocaine to Jarmon. However, in my mind, this limited evidence alone is insufficient to support the severe four-level enhancement for leadership or organizational activity under United States v. Ortiz, 878 F.2d 125, 127 (3rd Cir.1989). See Maj. Opinion at 1191.
One of the principal considerations determining leadership or organizational characteristics under Ortiz is “the degree of control and authority exercised over others.” Ortiz, 878 F.2d at 127. Here, there is no evidence that Phillips exercised any control over Jarmon or the other members of Jar-mon’s drug distribution ring. Similarly, his role as one of several suppliers to Jarmon makes Phillips nothing more than a conduit of drugs, but is not evidence of control *1193over Jarmon or Jarmon’s drug ring. Nor does Phillips’ supply of drugs to Jarmon constitute “the exercise of decisionmaking authority” within the drug ring. See Ortiz, 878 F.2d at 127.
The majority relies on Derrick Powell’s testimony that he saw cocaine in Phillips’ possession on two separate occasions. I am unable to see how possession of cocaine on two occasions renders one a “leader” or an “organizer” of criminal activity under Ortiz. The majority also relies on Powell’s testimony that if Phillips did not travel to Philadelphia, there would not be any cocaine to sell. Certainly, this evidence supports the district court’s finding that Phillips provided a flow of cocaine into the distribution scheme; however, the indirect effect on the organization’s drug distribution caused by Phillips’ inability to obtain supplies is not the exercise of “control” or decision making authority enunciated in Ortiz. If Jarmon chose to rely primarily on Phillips to supply cocaine for distribution and Phillips could not always produce, this reveals only that Phillips was an unreliable supplier; not necessarily a leader in the organization.
The majority points to an occasion when Jarmon placed more than ten calls to Phillips’ house in an attempt “to contact his source” and that several people called in the interim to check on the status of the cocaine. (Maj. Opinion at 1192) This lends nothing to the conclusion that Phillips was a leader; it merely reveals that Jarmon was in dire need of cocaine for distribution on that particular occasion. In addition, the majority asserts that Phillips was a leader or an organizer because on the previous evening, Jarmon had inquired about Phillips’ trip to Philadelphia to get a supply of cocaine but was unable to demand that Phillips go. Even if, as the majority states, this evidence suggests that Phillips was able to set his own timetable and manner of purchasing cocaine, this does not ipso facto transform Phillips into a “leader” or an “organizer” in Jarmon’s drug organization. It only supports Phillips’ contention that he was merely an independent drug supplier.
Moreover and significantly, there is no evidence that Phillips claimed the right of a larger share of the profits than others in the organization. The majority concludes that Phillips “was able to receive a larger share of the profits than others in the organization” because the police found $3,410 in cash in his pocket on the day of his arrest. I disagree with this conclusion for two reasons. First, there was no testimony linking the cash found on Phillips to the drug activities of the organization. Second, there is no evidence in the record regarding the extent of Phillips’ share of the profits. I am unwilling to construe Ortiz in a manner that renders the mere possession of $3,410 in cash, without evidence of its source, proof that the defendant received a larger share of the profits.
Finally, the district court found that Phillips acted as an organizer because on various occasions he stored cocaine at two different locations until it was needed for distribution. A finding that storing drugs in the woods until a kingpin is ready to distribute them is a far cry from the type of “organization” of criminal activity required for the § 3B1.1 sentencing enhancement.
In sum, I believe that the evidence of Phillips’ alleged leadership activity relied on by the majority supports nothing more than the finding that Phillips was an independent drug supplier to the Jarmon organization. Although I agree with the majority that more than one individual may function in a leadership capacity within a criminal organization, the Government has not established by the preponderance of the evidence that Phillips was a leader or an organizer of Jarmon’s drug ring.
The court sentenced Phillips to the maximum term of confinement for his offenses and his alleged leadership role, 188 months or nearly 16 years. The enhancement, resting on slender reeds indeed, represents an additional five years and seven months of incarceration on top of an already severe sentence for offenses unaccompanied by violence, firearms, or other exacerbating circumstances.
The majority aptly observes that “we consider a finding to be clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, we are left, after reviewing all the evi*1194dence, with a firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” (Maj. Opinion at 1191) Here, there is insufficient evidence to support the district court’s finding of Phillips’ leadership or organizational role and I am left with a firm conviction that the district court erred. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from part IV of the majority’s opinion.