Court Opinion

ID: 9633339
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:43:46.988782+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:33.357300
License: Public Domain

DEITS, P. J.,
concurring.
I agree with the holding and most of the reasoning in the lead opinion. However, I am unable to agree with its dicta stating that the meaning of ambiguous language in standard (i.e., “non-negotiated”) insurance policy provisions can never be a question for the trier of fact. 145 Or App at 519-20. Although there is considerable logic to the lead opinion’s proposition and the rule it espouses would promote consistency in the way that standard policy provisions are applied, there are controlling decisions by the Supreme Court that are to the contrary.
Over the years, the Supreme Court has articulated a number of ways by which the meaning of ambiguous provisions in insurance contracts may be resolved. Whether those methods are consistent with one another or have been applied in a consistent manner is a question I will discuss briefly later in this opinion. However, if there are problems in that regard, this court can do little about them. For purposes of discussion, I will note only two examples of the various methods the Supreme Court has endorsed. One is to construe *534ambiguous policy language against the insurer. A second is to submit the question to the trier of fact, to determine the meaning of the ambiguous language by reference to the parties’ intent.1 Under the lead opinion’s analysis, that second method could never be employed. Yet the Supreme Court has held on numerous occasions that it may be.
The court stated in Timberline Equip. v. St. Paul Fire and Mar. Ins., 281 Or 639, 643, 576 P2d 1244 (1978):
“As a general rule the construction of a contract, including an insurance contract, is a question of law. May v. Chicago Insurance Co., 260 Or 285, 292-94, 490 P2d 150 (1971). The exception to this rule is that if the language of the contract is ambiguous, or if technical words, phrases or terms of art are used and evidence is properly admitted showing meaning, the question becomes one of fact. Libby Creek Logging, Inc. v. Johnson, 225 Or 336, 339, 358 P2d 491 (1960).” (Emphasis supplied.)
Similarly, the court stated in Zingani v. Frost, 273 Or 774, 776, 543 P2d 674 (1975), that, “[i]f the language of the binder is considered uncertain * * *, interpretation of the coverage of the binder becomes a question for the trier of fact.” See also, e.g., Western Fire Insurance Co. v. Wallis, 289 Or 303, 313, 613 P2d 36 (1980) (Tongue, J., dissenting); May v. Chicago Insurance Co., 260 Or 285, 292-94, 490 P2d 150 (1971).
To the extent it acknowledges that the Supreme Court has ever stated the rule I have described, the lead opinion suggests implicitly that all of that changed with the court’s opinion in Hoffman Construction Co. v. Fred S. James & Co., 313 Or 464, 836 P2d 703 (1992). The plaintiff insureds in that case argued that the court should adopt their proffered interpretation of certain policy language “under the rule that ambiguous terms contained within an insurance policy are to be construed against the insurer, who drafted *535the policy.” Id. at 469-70. The court then turned to the question of whether the policy was ambiguous and, after fashioning an elaborate analytical method for determining if an ambiguity exists, concluded that the language in question was unambiguous. Hence, the principle of construing ambiguous language against the insurer, which the plaintiffs had urged the court to apply, could not come into play.
The lead opinion appears to understand Hoffman as meaning that, when there is an ambiguity, the principle of construing it against the insurer is the only device for resolving it that remains extant, and that principle is one for the court rather than a factfinder to apply. Under the lead opinion’s reading of Hoffman, whatever other means for resolving ambiguities that might have existed before that decision, e.g., a jury’s determination of the parties’intent, did not survive.
I do not read Hoffman as cutting that deeply or broadly. The opinion in no way suggests that it is meant to overrule the cases that I have discussed regarding the fact-finder’s potential role in resolving ambiguities. The insureds’ argument in Hoffman was that they should prevail under the principle of construing ambiguities against the insurer. The court rejected the argument, because it concluded that there was no ambiguity. However, in my view, the court did not intend by that conclusion to hold that, whenever an ambiguity exists, the only method for resolving it is for the court to apply that principle. Stated another way, the court rejected the insureds’ premise that there was an ambiguity and, therefore, it rejected the only argument that the insureds advanced for resolving the putative ambiguity in their favor. I simply do not believe that the court held or implied that all the other means for resolving ambiguities that had been recognized in its cases had ceased to exist.
It is unnecessary, however, for us to debate whether the lead opinion’s or my reading of Hoffman is the “right” one, because the Supreme Court itself provided the answer in its later opinion in Interstate Fire v. Archdiocese of Portland, 318 Or 110, 864 P2d 346 (1993). It stated:
“The method by which an insurance policy is to be construed has been discussed thoroughly by this court in the *536court’s recent decision of Hoffman Construction Co. v. Fred S. James & Co., [313 Or 464, 836 P2d 703 (1992)]. We see no need to repeat that discussion here. We add to that discussion two points. First, we note that reference to precepts of Oregon tort law as a means of defining policy terms is appropriate only if the policy expressly or by clear inference implicates those precepts. Second, we note that, if the first six steps of the Hoffman methodology, id. at 474-75, fail to resolve an ambiguity in the meaning of the policy, what remains could be a factual issue — the parties’ intent — as to which an award of summary judgment might be inappropriate.” 318 Or at 117-18. (Emphasis supplied.)
Clearly, if Hoffman was meant to hold that the principle of construction against the insurer becomes automatically and exclusively dispositive whenever there is an ambiguity, the question of the parties’ intent could not be a material factual issue. Further, summary judgment would not be “inappropriate” if the final determination of the meaning of the ambiguous language could only be made by the court and could only be adverse to the insurer. In my view, Interstate Fire makes it plain that, by referring to the particular method for resolving ambiguities that was argued to it in Hoffman, the court did not suggest that the other historical methods for doing so— such as the one contemplated in Interstate Fire and in the pre-Hoffman cases I have discussed — were nullified by Hoffman.
The lead opinion appears to draw a distinction between “generic” standard policy language and “customized” or negotiated terms and suggests that questions of intent and meaning might be jury questions only in connection with the latter but cannot be in connection with the former. That suggestion, too, is contrary to the Supreme Court’s holdings. In May and Interstate Fire, among other cases where the court has held that questions of intent and/or meaning were or could be for the factfinder, the language in question was standard policy language.
The lead opinion also relies on Botts v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 284 Or 95, 585 P2d 657 (1978), for the thesis that the jury may be charged with finding “historical facts,” i.e., those pertaining to whether events occurred that come within the meaning assigned to ambiguous policy provisions *537by the court, but may not be charged with the task of identifying the intended meaning of the provisions. Accepting for argument the proposition that Botts refers only to questions of the former kind, I do not agree with the lead opinion’s conclusion that it thereby negates the possibility that questions of the latter kind can also be for the jury — as other decisions by the court, both before Botts and after, plainly indicate they can be. In my view, Botts does not state that only questions of the kind described in the lead opinion’s quotation from it can be for the jury; rather, it simply states that those questions are jury questions. My disagreement with the lead opinion’s understanding of Botts is quite similar to my disagreement with the way in which it reads Hoffman: in both instances, the lead opinion understands the court to have said that, because one thing is, everything else is not.
As indicated earlier in this opinion, it is not entirely clear to me when or why, in particular cases, the Supreme Court has chosen one method for resolving ambiguities instead of the other. With little or no explanation, in some instances it has chosen to apply the principle of construction against the insurer while, in others, the meaning of ambiguities has been treated as a question of intent for the fact-finder. It may be that the best indication of where the line should be drawn is to be found in our statement in First Far West Transp. v. Carolina Casualty Ins., 47 Or App 339, 343, 614 P2d 1187 (1980) (citing, inter alia, I-L Logging Co. v. Mfgrs. & Whlse. Ind. Exc., 202 Or 277, 273 P2d 212, 275 P2d 226 (1954)):
“[T]he rule of liberal construction in favor of the insured is subordinate to the rule that with insurance contracts, as with other contracts, the primary and governing consideration is to ascertain the intent of the parties.”
Wherever the line might be, however, it is clear that the court has said that questions regarding the meaning of ambiguous standard policy provisions are at least sometimes factual ones for the trier of fact, and it has reiterated those statements often and recently. I cannot agree with the lead opinion’s conclusion that we may say the opposite.

 By using the word “meaning,” I do not imply that the factfinder could ever be called upon to articulate in its findings or verdict what the ambiguous term is to be understood as saying. Rather, where there is evidence of intent and of other critical facts, it could become the factfinder’s role to decide whether there is coverage, and that decision could entail a determination of which of two or more arguable meanings of the ambiguous provision is the one to which the parties agreed.