Court Opinion

ID: 9644049
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:47:33.618669+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:08.089232
License: Public Domain

CERCONE, Judge,
concurring:
While I agree with the result reached by the majority in the instant case, I do not find the law concerning revival “judgments” in Pennsylvania to be nearly so muddled as the majority does.
The linchpin of appellant’s argument, and the rationale of the court below, is succinctly stated in appellee’s brief: “In the instant case, the appellant had a reasonable opportunity in the revival proceeding to litigate the claim that the *241original judgment was void.” However, revival proceedings, in the nature of scire facias to revive, are not presently designed to inquire into the validity of the judgment sought to be revived. The purposes of revival are to maintain the lien of a judgment, revive the lien of a dormant judgment, maintain a judgment as ripe for execution, or ripen a dormant judgment for execution.1 Since presumptions of payment, albeit rebuttable presumptions ordinarily, arise with the lapse of time,2 it is readily apparent that scire facias, or revival, is necessary principally to avoid such presumptions which would otherwise deny a judgment creditor the benefit of the record and, in some cases, permit other lien creditors from gaining priority should the lien of the judgment creditor lapse.3 In short, revival is nothing more than a procedural device to refresh a stale record, and the inquiry at such proceedings should be limited to whether anything has transpired since the judgment was entered which affects its revival.
In light of the foregoing it is not surprising to find numerous cases which have reached the conclusion the majority reaches today. In Smith v. Bald Hill Coal Co., 343 Pa. 399, 401, 23 A.2d 466, 467 (1942) our Supreme Court stated:
“It is a firmly established rule that there may be no inquiry, in scire facias proceedings to revive a judgment, into the validity of the original judgment. ‘As long as the original judgment stands unimpeached, defenses on a scire facias to revive are limited to those arising after entry of the judgment, such as payment or other discharge.’ . . ” Quoting Eiffert v. Giessen, 339 Pa. 60, 61, 14 A.2d 130 (1940). See also Moll v. Lafferty, 302 Pa. 354, 153 A. 557 (1931).
Even more conclusive language may be found in First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Laubach, 333 Pa. 344, 346, 5 A.2d 139, *242141 (1939): “On a scire facias sur judgment no defense is available unless it arose subsequently to the entry of the judgment, as, for example payment.” [Emphasis added.] See also Cardessa v. Humes, 5 S. & R. 65 (1819); 6A Standard Pa. Practice 659 (1960).
Since no defense which speaks to the validity of the original judgment may be raised in revival proceedings, it follows that such defenses are not waived solely because the judgment debtor suffered the judgment to be revived by default.4 Therefore, laches aside, a judgment which has been revived is nonetheless subject to being successfully attacked by a motion to strike, if there are defects which render the judgment either void or voidable.
Unfortunately, this rule works a substantial hardship on a judgment creditor who, through a relatively innocuous mistake, has caused a void judgment to be confessed against the debtor. Because revival does not cure the kind of defect raised in the instant case, the judgment creditor has no truly satisfactory remedy. Although judgments may be amended if they contain technical or clerical errors, void judgments cannot be amended. See W. H. Keech Co. v. O’Herron, 41 Pa.Super. 108, 111 (1909). See also 6A Standard Pa. Practice 460-61 (1960); 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 258 (1947). Furthermore, the law is clear that once a judgment is confessed by warrant of attorney, the power of the warrant is exhausted, and the warrant may not be used again even if the first judgment was void and has been stricken. See 6A Standard Pa. Practice 416-19 (1960), and the cases cited therein. Thus, although a judgment creditor may limit the damage he might suffer, such as loss of priority of his lien, by moving to strike his own judgment and reinstituting *243proceedings on the debt,5 he will not have the expedient of reusing the warrant of attorney to confess judgment. Hence, the penalty for not taking care to file the necessary papers with the prothonotary initially is loss of priority of the judgment lien to intervening liens, and loss of the expedient of confessing judgment. Although I am certain that in many cases, practically speaking, this is tantamount to leaving the creditor without an adequate remedy, the law currently compels this result.
I, therefore, agree that the order of the lower court must be reversed.

. See 6A Standard Pa. Practice 631-33 (1960).

. See 12 P.S. § 878 et seq. (1953); 12 P.S. § 2091 et seq. (1967).

. See, e. g., Swope v. Turner, 193 Pa.Super. 217, 163 A.2d 714 (1960).

. The majority speaks too broadly when it states that “one who petitions to have a judgment stricken is required to show purely formal defects; given such defects, the petitioner prevails without regard to whether his conduct has been equitable.” 247 Pa.Super. at 238, 372 A.2d at 26. Actually, in many circumstances a motion to strike off a judgment may be barred by laches. See 7 Standard Pa. Practice 222-24 (1961).

. Herdic v. Woodward, 75 Pa. 479 (1874), 7 Standard Pa. Practice 226-27 (1961).