Court Opinion

ID: 6239697
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-02-17 20:41:24.483743+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:58:09.703669
License: Public Domain

Opinion,
Mr. Justice Mitchell:
The right of railroad companies to make reasonable regulations, not only as to the amounts of fares, but as to the time, place, and mode of payment, is unquestionable. This right includes the right to refuse altogether to carry without the previous procurement of a ticket: Lake Shore etc. Ry. Co. v. Greenwood, 79 Pa. 373. That case arose upon a special regulation as to the carriage of passengers upon freight trains; but there is no appreciable distinction between it and a general regulation as to all passengers. Both rest on the common law principle that requires payment or tender as an indispensable preliminary to holding a carrier liable for refusal to carry, and on the manifest and necessary convenience of business, where the number of passengers is liable to be large and the time for serving them short.
So, too, the authorities are uniform that companies may *434charge an additional or higher rate of fare to those who do not purchase tickets before entering the cars: Crocker v. Railroad Co., 24 Conn. 249; Swan v. Railroad Co., 132 Mass. 116; Hilliard v. Goold, 34 N. H. 241; Stephen v. Smith, 29 Vt. 160; State v. Goold, 53 Me. 279; State v. Chovin, 7 Iowa 208; Du Laurans v. Railroad Co., 15 Minn. 49; State v. Hungerford, 39 Minn. 6 (34 Amer. & Eng. R. Cas. 265), and note; Chicago etc. R. Co. v. Parks, 18 Ill. 460; Pullman Co. v. Reed, 75 Ill. 130; Railroad Co. v. Skillman, 39 Ohio 451; Forsee v. Railroad Co., 63 Miss. 67. And it may be noted, in response to one of the most urgently pressed arguments of the defendant in error, that the reasons almost uniformly given in support of this long line of decisions include the furthering of the honest, orderly, and convenient conduct by the railroad company of its own business.
The regulation in question in the present case, is not in itself unreasonable or oppressive. In regard to the traveler, it is scarcely just ground of complaint that he has to present his refunding ticket at the end of his journey, instead of getting an ordinary ticket at the start. The inconvenience, if any, is the result of his own default. With reference to the other passengers, and still more to the railroad company, the regulation is conducive to the rapid, orderly, and convenient dispatch of the conductor’s part in the collection of fares, and thus to leaving him free for the performance of his other duties in connection with the stops at stations, the entrance and exit of passengers, and the general supervision of the safety and comfort of those under his care.
If, therefore, the company may refuse to carry at all without a ticket, it may fairly refuse under the far less inconvenient alternative to the traveler of putting him to the trouble of going to an office to get his excess refunded. If the company may charge those failing to get a ticket an additional price, and keep it, certainly they may charge such price and refund it; and, as the regulation is not in itself unreasonable or oppressive, or needlessly inconvenient to the traveler, its validity, upon general principles and on authority, would seem to be beyond question.
These views were conceded by the learned judge below, and are not seriously questioned by counsel here. But the decision *435was based upon the view that the extra ten cents imposed by this regulation is a part of the fare, and makes it higher than the rate allowed by the act of incorporation of the company. The language of the act is, “ In the transportation of passengers no charge shall be made to exceed.....three and one half cents per mile for way passengers.” As the distance from East Liberty station to the Union station in Pittsburgh is 4-g-miles, and the regular fare fourteen cents, it is admitted that the extra ten cents is in excess of the charter rate, if it is a “ charge for transportation ” within the meaning of the act. Should it be so regarded ? “ Charge ” is a word of very general and varied use. Webster gives it thirteen different meanings, none of which, however, expresses the exact sense in which it is used in this charter. The great dictionary of the Philological Society, now in course of publication, gives it twenty separate principal definitions, besides a nearly equal number of subordinate variations of meaning. Of these definitions, one (10 6) is, “ The price required or demanded for service rendered, or (less usually) for goods supplied; ” and this expresses accurately the sense of the word in the present case. The essence of the meaning is that it is something required, exacted, or taken from the traveler as compensation for the service rendered, and, of course, something taken permanently, — not taken temporarily, and returned. The purpose of the restriction in the charter is the regulation of the amount of fares, not of the mode of collection; the protection of the traveler from excessive demands, not interference with the time, place, or mode of payment. These are mere administrative details, which depend on varying circumstances, and are therefore left to the ordinary course of business management. We fail to see anything in the present regulation which can properly be treated as an excessive charge, within the prohibition of the charter.
Nor is there any force in the objection that this regulation is unreasonable. It is said not to be general, fair, and impartial, because it provides that as to passengers getting on the train at stations where there is no ticket office, etc., or on trains where, on account of the excessive rush of business, it is impossible to issue the refunding check, the collection of the excess shall be omitted. The objection overlooks the necessary qualifications to the validity of such a regulation. All the cases are agreed *436that' the regulation would be unreasonable, and therefore void, unless the carrier should give the passenger a convenient place and opportunity to buy his ticket before entering the train, This part of the regulation merely puts in express words a necessary exception which the law would otherwise imply. So, as to the excessive rush of business. Reasonableness depends on circumstances. To collect the extra amount and issue return checks to as many passengers as the conductor could reach in time, and let all others go free entirely, would be much more unreasonable than to treat all alike and dispense with the regulation for the time being. Necessity modifies the application of all rules, and there is nothing unreasonable in requiring the conductor to exercise sufficient foresight to see whether he can perform the prescribed duty in the available time, and investing him with the discretion to omit it altogether, if, in his judgment, he cannot perform it fully.
No authorities precisely in point have been found upon either side. The cases cited by the defendant in error, from Kentucky and Ohio, are widely distinguishable, as they were cases of absolute charge beyond the charter limit, without any provision for return of the excess to the traveler. But on well-settled principles we are of opinion that the' regulation is reasonable in itself, and not in violation of the restriction in the act of incorporation. The defendant’s first point should therefore have been affirmed.
Judgment reversed.
Mr. Justice Stekrett dissented.