Court Opinion

ID: 9538147
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:31:18.994553+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:57:34.556508
License: Public Domain

RICHARDSON, J.
I respectfully dissent. My disagreement with the majority focuses principally on part VIII of their opinion wherein they consider the application of article XIII of the California Constitution to the present school financing program, concluding that the system is invalid as violative of the equal protection provisions of that Constitution. As I develop more fully below, I have serious reservations about the constitutional analysis indulged by the majority as it affects article XIII. My principal problem with the majority’s thesis is that the same Constitution expressly authorizes the essential elements of the challenged system.
The majority’s learned and comprehensive review of the asserted faults and failings of the present scheme and their holding that another, more equitable, one must be devised to replace it, may well be consistent with sound public policy. Doubtless, it represents a well-intended effort to assure equal educational opportunity for California’s school children. Nonetheless, it is not our function to formulate public policy. Under our time-honored, constitutionally founded system of separation of governmental powers, we are not entrusted with such difficult tasks as devising or choosing between alternative educational financing policies. That responsibility is vested in the Legislature, alone, acting within the confines expressed in our state Constitution. So long as the Legislature has performed its work in a manner consistent with overriding constitu: tional principles, we must uphold its efforts regardless of our personal views as to the fairness or wisdom of those legislative results. Accordingly, it becomes vital to analyze with great precision those constitutional limits on legislative action before we invalidate a system as important and accepted as the existing California school financing plan.
The majority do not now rely upon the equal protection clause of the federal Constitution. Contrary to our holding in Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584 [96 Cal.Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241] (Serrano I), it is now established by the highest authority that school district financing systems such as ours do not offend federal equal protection principles. (San *778Antonio School District v. Rodríguez (1973) 411 U.S. 1 [36 L.Ed.2d 16, 93 S.Ct. 1278].) Indeed, the majority herein candidly admit that the Rodriguez decision clearly “undercuts” Serrano Fs reliance upon the national charter. (Ante, p. 762.) Among other things, the high court in Rodriguez held that the “strict scrutiny” standard of review was inapplicable, since no “fundamental interest” or “suspect classification” was involved; that the present traditional method of local district financing, though perhaps unfair in some respects, nevertheless operates in a rational fashion, without invidious discrimination; and that the courts should defer to the state legislatures in these matters of policy, since these bodies alone have the necessary expertise and familiarity with local problems. One may differ, as I do, with the high court’s conclusion that education is not a fundamental interest. Yet, the question of whether the school financing plan here at issue violates federal equal protection has been laid to rest in Rodriguez.
The majority herein, disagreeing with Rodriguez’ analysis of the equal protection issue, point to the fact that Serrano I, in a footnote, stated that its analysis of plaintiffs’ federal equal protection contention “is also applicable to their claim under . . . state constitutional provisions.” (5 Cal.3d at p. 596, fn. 11.) The majority then hold, as we have noted, that California’s school financing system is invalid under the only remaining constitutional refuge—the state equal protection provisions. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 7, art. IV, § 16.)
In broad, general language the Constitution guarantees both equal protection of the laws and uniform operation of the laws, and forbids irrevocable special privileges or immunities. Since, as we have previously observed, these provisions are “substantially the equivalent” of the federal equal protection clause (Serrano I, 5 Cal.3d at p. 596, fn. 11), although not required to do so, we might defer to the Rodriguez equal protection analysis rather than create our own different interpretation of substantially identical constitutional language. (See People v. Disbrow (1976) 16 Cal.3d 101, 119, dis. opn. [127 Cal.Rptr. 360, 545 P.2d 272].) Indeed, a number of state courts in post-Rodriguez cases have done just that—namely, declined to invalidate comparable school financing systems in reliance upon state constitutional provisions. (See Northshore School District No. 417 v. Kinnear (1974) 84 Wn.2d 685 [530 P.2d 178,. 200-202]; Shofstall v. Hollins (1973) 110 Ariz. 88 [515 P.2d 590]; Thompson v. Engelking (1975) 96 Idaho 793 [537 P.2d 635]; cf. Hootch v. Alaska State-Operated School System (Alaska 1975) 536 P.2d 793, 804; *779but see Robinson v. Cahill (1973) 62 N.J. 473 [303 A.2d 273].) The present majority are, for reasons which I fully respect but do not accept, unwilling to follow the lead of Rodriguez and the foregoing cited cases.
My dissent, however, does not rely upon the foregoing principle of deference, for in my view the majority’s analysis contains a serious, indeed fatal, flaw: the same California Constitution which generally extends equal protection also specifically authorizes the essential elements of California’s present system of school financing. As a matter of interpretive principle, the authority which the Constitution specifically extends with one hand cannot be generally withdrawn with the other.
The majority thoroughly explain that our public schools are financed from two major sources, the state school fund and local district taxes. As to the former, state aid to education is authorized by article IX, section 6, of the state Constitution, which directs the Legislature to provide a state school fund for apportionment each year in an amount not less than $180 per pupil in average daily attendance; that the fund shall be apportioned annually as the Legislature may provide, through the school districts; and that the Legislature must apportion at least $120 per pupil in the district during the next preceding fiscal year, and at least $2,400 to each school district in each fiscal year.
As to the latter, assistance to schools from local district taxation, the subject of plaintiffs’ challenge herein, is authorized by article XIII, section 21, of the Constitution which provides: “Within such limits as may be provided under Section 20 of this Article [allowing the Legislature to provide maximum local property tax rates and bonding limits], the Legislature shall provide for an annual levy by county governing bodies of school district taxes sufficient to provide annual revenues for each district that the district’s board determines are required for its schools and district functions.”
Paraphrased, section 21 requires the Legislature to adopt a school financing system in which each county may levy annually a school district tax in an amount sufficient to provide the revenues deemed necessary by each district board. Since under our Constitution property must be assessed in, and taxed only by, the county, city and district in which it is situated (art. XIII, § 14; see San Francisco etc. Ry. Co. v. Scott (1904) 142 Cal. 222, 229 [75 P. 575]; Smith-Rice Heavy Lifts, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles (1967) 256 Cal.App.2d 190, 200 [63 Cal.Rptr. 841]; *780Ehrman & Flavin, Taxing Cal. Property (1967) § 162, at. pp. 145-146), it necessarily follows that article XIII of the Constitution, section 21 in conjunction with section 14, contemplates a school financing system in which each individual district’s needs are satisfied from the taxable wealth of that district, namely, the present system which the majority find unconstitutional. The majority describe the foregoing reasoning as a “non sequitur.” If, however, section 21 empowers the Legislature to provide for district tax levies to assure adequate school revenues, and if under section 14 the property subject to tax by the district to generate those revenues must repose within the district, wherein lies the “non sequitur”? Do not sections 14 and 21, in combination, authorize, constitutionally, a system wheréby levy of taxes on local property within the district, supplemented by state aid, shall constitute the source of school financing?
The majority assert that the constitutional provision at issue was intended to authorize a different, more equitable, system not based upon disparities in district wealth. They concede that the state Constitution “allows variation in school district expenditures” (ante, p. 770, italics added). One would presume that expenditures are more closely related to the quality of education than generalized equality in the value of properties subject to district school taxes. However, we emphasized in Serrano I that the state Constitution did not require an equality of spending between various school districts. Our words were “. . . we have never interpreted the constitutional provision to require equal school spending; . . .” (5 Cal.3d at p. 596.) Nonetheless, the majority insist that since the Constitution does not expressly authorize district wealth disparities as to the source of district revenues, the present system cannot be deemed protected by its shield. In the majority’s view, “Such disparities . . . are the result of legislative action, not constitutional mandate.” (Ante, p. 772, italics in original.) (In this connection, I do not contend, of course, that the California Constitution mandates the present system of school financing, but only that it permits or authorizes that system.)
The central theme of the majority is that the Legislature has somehow abused its constitutional authority by drawing school district boundary lines in a manner permitting variations in district wealth. As the majority put it, “It is that action [drawing district boundary lines], which we reiterate is the product of legislative determinations, that we today hold to be in violation of our state provisions guaranteeing equal protection of *781the laws.” (Ante, p. 772, italics in original.) Yet, again it is manifest that the Legislature derives its power to create and classify school districts from the same Constitution (art. IX, § 14). Furthermore, we ourselves have long held that “The power of the legislature over school districts is plenary. [Citations.] It may divide, change, or abolish such districts at pleasure .... [Citation.]” (Worthington S. Dist. v. Eureka S. Dist. (1916) 173 Cal. 154, 156 [159 P. 437], italics added; see Hughes v. Ewing (1892) 93 Cal. 414, 417 [28 P. 1067].) It seems to me self-evident that if the framers of our Constitution had intended to impose substantial restrictions upon the plenary power of the Legislature over school district boundaries, they would have expressly so provided. They did not do so. I suggest that it is highly unlikely that such a drastic and dramatic restriction on plenary power as the majority now impose would have been intended to occur wholly by implication. With due deference, I suggest that, to the contrary, we must presume that those who adopted section 21 (and its predecessor sections) were fully aware of the fact that there existed for years disparities in district wealth and that the effect of the continued exercise of such plenaiy legislative power would result in continued disparities, which permitted wealthier districts to allocate more funds for educational purposes. (Undoubtedly, the existence of such disparities was a motivating factor in creating the state school fund to supplement local revenues. (Art. IX, § 6.)) The inequitable result of district wealth disparities is forcefully and eloquently demonstrated by the majority. Nevertheless, once we determine that the action in question is constitutionally authorized, the sociologically unsatisfactory or, indeed unacceptable, consequences are matters for legislative correction.
We have often insisted that a constitutional enactment be viewed in the “light of its historical context and the conditions existing prior to its enactment.” (Mulkey v. Reitman (1966) 64 Cal.2d 529, 534 [50 Cal.Rptr. 881,. 413 P.2d 825], and cases cited.) Section 21 of article XIII, was adopted as recently as 1974. We have been told that its purpose was to restate “without change in meaning” the provisions of former article IX, section 6, adopted in 1946. (See Cal. Const. Revision Com., Proposed Revision of the Cal. Constitution (1971) pt. 6, p. 36.) Section 6 provided: “The Legislature shall provide for the levying annually by the governing body of each county, and city and county, of such school district taxes,____ as will produce in each fiscal year such revenue for each school district as the governing board thereof shall determine is required in such fiscal year for the support of all schools and functions of said district authorized or required by law.”
*782Thus, as early as 1946, the California Constitution expressly authorized a system of local school district financing. Indeed, the original 1849 Constitution provided that any local school district which neglected to “keep and support” its school might lose its proportion of the interest from the public school fund. (Art. IX, § 3.) Local school district financing systems in various forms, but all of them based upon individual district wealth, have been in operation from this state’s inception surviving numerous amendments to the constitutional provisions authorizing local support of public schools. (See Sweet, History of the Public School System in Cal. (1876) at pp. 60-62, 66.)
The foregoing review of constitutional history is not new. A close examination of our own previous analysis of the problem demonstrates that the same conclusions I have reached were also necessarily implicit in our opinion in Serrano I. Respectfully, I find unconvincing the majority’s attempt to explain away our definitive disposition in Serrano I of the state constitutional issue whether district wealth disparities can survive equal protection analysis.
First, in describing the present school financing system, Serrano I acknowledged that wealth-produced variations in district spending are a necessary by-product of the system authorized by the state Constitution. We said: “Pursuant to article IX, section 6 [the predecessor to art. XIII, § 21] of the California Constitution, the Legislature has authorized the governing body of each county, and city and county, to levy taxes on the real property within a school district at a rate necessary to meet the district’s annual education budget. (Ed. Code, § 20701 et seq.) The amount of revenue which a district can raise in this manner thus depends largely on its tax base—i.e., the assessed valuation of real property within its borders.” (5 Cal.3d at p. 592, italics added.) The foregoing, contrary to the majority view (ante, p. 771, fn. 50), is founded upon constitutional (art. IX, § 6 (the predecessor to art. XIII, § 21)), not legislative, authority.
Second, in Serrano I, plaintiffs had argued that the present system was invalid under article IX, section 5, of the state Constitution, which section requires the Legislature to provide for a system of common schools. In rejecting the argument we said that, “While article IX, section 5 makes no reference to school financing, section 6 of that same article [the predecessor to art. XIII, § 21] specifically authorizes the very element of the fiscal system of which plaintiffs complain.” (5 Cal.3d at p. 596, italics *783added.) What was the “element of the fiscal system of which plaintiffs complain”? The majority insist that this phrase related to “variations in expenditures per ADA.” I think it arguable, however, that this “element” in question had broader implications and included not only expenditure inequalities but district wealth disparities as well. For, on the page previous to the above quotation, we had described plaintiffs’ preliminary contention as follows: “Plaintiffs’ argument is that the present financing method produces separate and distinct systems, each offering an educational program which varies with the relative wealth of the district’s residents.” (Id., at p. 595, italics added.) I think that it is this element which section 6 of article IX authorizes, and not merely the existence of “variations in expenditures per ADA” (as suggested by the majority herein).
Third, in Serrano I, we stated that “it is clear that such [locally raised] revenue iá a part of the overall educational financing system. As we pointed out, supra, article IX, section 6, of the state Constitution specifically authorizes local districts to levy school taxes.” (Id., at p. 598, fn. 12.) Once again the question must be put: If under article IX local district taxes are specifically authorized for school support, and if, under article XIII, of that same Constitution, such taxes necessarily must be assessed upon local wealth, then how is the system rendered unconstitutional under article I?
Finally, in Serrano I defendants had argued that any discriminatory effects arising from the present system were “de facto” in origin and accordingly not invidious in nature. We flatly, and in my opinion wisely, rejected the argument, noting that “Indeed, we find the case unusual in the extent to which governmental action is [italics in orig.] the cause of the wealth classifications. The school funding scheme is mandated in every detail by the California Constitution and statutes.” (Id., at p. 603, italics added.) The majority insist that the constitutional provision mandates “only that there be a system allowing for local decision as to the level of school expenditures,’’ (ante, pp. 771-772). I fail, however, to see how such local decision making, necessarily based upon available local wealth as supplemented by state aid, differs in any material respect from the financing system under scrutiny herein.
In summary, we must reconcile two separate provisions of the state Constitution, first, a general expression guaranteeing our citizens “equal protection of the laws,” and second, a specific constitutional provision *784authorizing the Legislature to adopt a school financing system whereby each district finances its own educational needs. The majority, purporting to follow the well established rule that conflicts between constitutional or statutory provisions should be avoided, construe article XIII, section 21, I respectfully suggest, in a manner which contradicts its plain meaning, ignores the “historical context” of the section, and conflicts with our own recent construction of that section in Serrano I. The irreconcilable conflict arising from the majority’s rejection of the Rodriguez analysis necessarily leads to a result which is not palatable to them—namely, in accordance with Serrano I, the conflict can be resolved in only one manner: the more specific provision of the Constitution must prevail. (5 Cal.3d at p. 596.) I am unable to accept the majority’s conclusion that the present system of school financing in this state, whose essential elements are expressly authorized by specific provisions of the state Constitution, is at the same time in violation of the general equal protection clause of the same Constitution.
Few constitutional principles are more firmly established and accepted than the rule that all presumptions and intendments favor the validity of legislation. The case for invalidity of statutes must reach beyond mere doubt to the level at which we fairly can say that “ ‘ “. . . their unconstitutionality clearly, positively, and unmistakeably [j/c] appears.” ’ ” (In re Ricky H. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 513, 519 [86 Cal.Rptr. 76, 468 P.2d 204].) Similarly, it is equally well settled that there exists a strong presumption in favor of the Legislature’s interpretation of a provision of the Constitution. (Methodist Hosp. of Sacramento v. Saylor (1971) 5 Cal.3d 685, 692 [97 Cal.Rptr. 1, 488 P.2d 161].) Thus, we must presume that the Legislature properly construed the scope of its authority under article XIII, section 21, of the Constitution, and we must further presume that the resulting school financing legislation is constitutional. The foregoing principles must be accorded great weight in determining the constitutional validity of the present school financing scheme.
I am wholly sympathetic toward the majority’s efforts to achieve a more fair and equitable result in this case. I also fully acknowledge the vital role which education must play in our modern society, and the absolute necessity of assuring an adequate education for all of our citizens. There could be no more worthy goal. Yet, and I say this with the utmost deference, as I conceive our role we are not free to roam in search of administratively acceptable answers, but must work within the confines of constitutional limitations, leaving to the Legislature the selection of those particular responses which are most appropriate to a *785developing need. (Cal. Const., art. III, § 3.) So long as the Legislature has operated under its constitutional authority we should withhold intervention. It is this principle, I believe, which prompted the wise and pertinent admonition of the United States Supreme Court in the closing sentences of its Rodriguez decision: “These matters merit the continued attention of the scholars who already have contributed much by their challenges. But the ultimate solutions must come from the lawmakers and from the democratic pressures of those who elect them.” (San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, supra, 411 U.S. at pp. 58-59 [36 L.Ed.2d at p. 58], italics added.)
I would reverse the judgment.