Court Opinion

ID: 9730543
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:15:11.071828+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:07.320861
License: Public Domain

CROSBY, J., Concurring.
I agree the appeal is untimely, but find my colleagues’ analysis of the problem needlessly complicated and their discussion of Code of Civil Procedure section 660 unnecessary to the resolution of this matter.
*229The September 22, 1976 order dismissing this action constituted a judgment and was “effective for all purposes.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 581d.) Miller was served with notice of entry of that order the following day. At that point, rule 2 of the California Rules of Court required Miller to file a notice of appeal within 60 days, or no later than November 22, 1986.
But Miller instead sought to vacate the dismissal. Despite his characterization of the motion as one for reconsideration under Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, I agree with my colleagues in Division Two who held that provision “is not available to a party against whom a final order has been made and who is not in possession of newly discovered evidence .... [Instead, a] motion for new trial may be used to challenge an appealable order on a motion as well as a decision or verdict in a conventional civil action [citation] and a motion for new trial may be based on a number of different grounds . . . .” (Blue Mountain Development Co. v. Carville (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 1005, 1014 [183 Cal.Rptr. 594], italics added.) In my view, Miller’s motion for reconsideration of the judgment in favor of defendants was more in the nature of one for new trial (see Code Civ. Proc., § 657).
In any event, no matter how Miller’s motion was characterized, its filing rendered the time constraints of rule 2 inapplicable; in its place, the deadline set forth in California Rules of Court, rule 3(a) should govern. (132 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1009-1010.) Rule 3(a) provides that the “time for filing the notice of appeal from the judgment is extended for all parties until 30 days after [] entry of the order denying the motion \for reconsideration] . . . .” (Italics added.) The significant difference between rule 2 and rule 3(a) is that the latter is pegged to the entry of an order while the former is linked to notice of the entry of a judgment. This distinction may appear to be without reason, but it has been ordained by the Judicial Council. We are not free to ignore it.
In this case, the minute order denying the motion for reconsideration was entered on October 31, 1986, within 60 days after notice of entry of the judgment. The notice of appeal was required to be filed no later than December 1, 1986.
But Miller argued the order denying the motion for reconsideration was not truly entered until January 21, 1987, when the formal order prepared by his counsel and signed by the judge was filed. He cites rule 2(b)(2) of the California Rules of Court, which provides, “The date of entry of an appeal-able order which is entered in the minutes shall be the date of its entry in the permanent minutes, unless such minute order as entered expressly directs that a written order be prepared, signed and filed, in which case the *230date of entry shall be the date of filing of the signed order.” (Italics added.) I have several problems with this contention. First, the minute order here technically did not satisfy the requisites of the rule; it stated only that “Moving party [was] to prepare the order.” Second, Miller was the moving party; and he delayed almost three months before causing the written order to be filed. Should we interpret the law to permit him to take advantage of his own delay to extend the period for filing a notice of appeal? I do not believe so.
In any event, even if the order was deemed filed on January 21, 1987, per rule 2(b)(2), Miller’s notice of appeal from the denial of the motion for reconsideration was still untimely. Rule 3(b) of the California Rules of Court provides, “When a valid notice of intention to move ... to vacate a judgment and enter another and different judgment is served and filed by any party on any ground within the time in which, under rule 2, a notice of appeal may be filed, . . . the time for filing the notice of appeal from the judgment is extended for all parties until the earliest of 30 days after entry of the order denying the motion to vacate; or 90 days after filing the first notice of intention to move to vacate the judgment; or 180 days after entry of the judgment.” Here, Miller’s motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing the action was filed September 29, 1986. The 90-day limit expired December 28, 1986, a month before the notice of appeal was filed; it was untimely even under his own version of the facts.
Although I find no fault with my colleagues’ handling of the issue, I add a final thought concerning Miller’s appeal from the denial of his motion for relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473. The inadequacy of the briefing on the subject was tantamount to a waiver. Also, it has long been the rule in California that “[a]n order denying a motion to vacate an appeal-able judgment is generally not appealable if such appeal raises only matters that could be reviewed on appeal from the judgment itself.” (Rooney v. Vermont Investment Corp. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 351, 358-359 [110 Cal.Rptr. 353, 515 P.2d 297].) That is precisely the case here.
A petition for a rehearing was denied September 11, 1989, and appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied November 2, 1989.