Court Opinion

ID: 9738165
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:43:42.740086+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:04.080419
License: Public Domain

KELLEY, Justice
(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent. I would reverse the court of appeals and affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on the grounds that as a matter of law there existed here a common enterprise exempting the appellants from common law liability. As the majority opinion demonstrates, resolution of the “common enterprise” issue is usually on an ad hoc basis depending upon relevant facts. In this case no factual dispute exists relative to the paving enterprises. While examination of our prior cases in this area clearly indicates that they are largely irreconcilable on principle, nevertheless, it occurs to me that if this continuous, unified paving operation, demanding the closest coordination of work activity among these three concerns and their employees, does not constitute in law a common enterprise, it will, indeed, be an extremely rare combination of facts and circumstances that will give rise to such a finding. I concur with the trial court’s finding that Cemstone’s connection with this closely integrated paving project consisted of much more than merely delivering concrete to the job site at the time of the injury. So far as the actual paving process was concerned, the employees of the *315three contractors shared closely coordinated activities at the job site and equally shared similar risks of injury resulting therefrom.