Court Opinion

ID: 9379637
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-15 21:02:47.291965+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:56.718323
License: Public Domain

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                                                         Electronically Filed
                                                         Supreme Court
                                                         SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX
                                                         15-MAR-2023
                                                         10:02 AM
                                                         Dkt. 20 OP

           IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI

                              ---o0o---

                         STATE OF HAWAIʻI,
                  Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee,

                                 vs.

                         JONATHAN S. VADEN,
                  Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant.

                          SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX

         CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
           (CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX; CASE NO. 2CPC-XX-XXXXXXX)

                           MARCH 15, 2023

        RECKTENWALD, C.J., NAKAYAMA, AND EDDINS, JJ.; AND
      WILSON, J., DISSENTING, WITH WHOM McKENNA, J., JOINS

                OPINION OF THE COURT BY EDDINS, J.

                                 I.

     This case is about whether Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes (HRS)

§ 706-671 (2014) ever entitles a defendant to “double count”

concurrently-earned detention or incarceration credit against

later-imposed consecutive sentences.
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        We hold that under HRS § 706-671(1) presentence detention

time must be counted only once against the aggregate of a

defendant’s consecutive sentences.         This is true even if those

consecutive sentences are spread across multiple cases.

        Likewise, we hold that under HRS § 706-671(2) time served

against concurrently running probation sentences that are later

revoked and converted to consecutive terms of imprisonment must

be counted only once against the aggregate of a defendant’s

consecutive sentences in one or more cases.

        We also hold that when detention or prison time is accrued

before sentencing, or pursuant to a later-revoked probationary

sentence, the double jeopardy clause’s prohibition on multiple

punishments is not violated so long as the defendant’s total

period of detention and imprisonment does not exceed the

statutory maximum term for the offenses at issue.

                                     II.

        In 2018, the State charged Jonathan Vaden with drug and

property crimes.       There were five unrelated cases, including the

one at issue here, Case No. 2CPC-XX-XXXXXXX (2CPC-18-844 or this

case).

        In May 2019, after spending several months in jail for all

five cases, Vaden pled no contest to all but one charge 1.            The

1     The parties agreed to dismiss count 1 (attempted promoting a dangerous
drug in the first degree) in 2CPC-XX-XXXXXXX.

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court accepted Vaden’s pleas.        The parties waived a presentence

report. 2     The court sentenced Vaden to four years of probation in

each case.      All terms ran concurrently.     And in all five cases,

the court sentenced Vaden to terms of imprisonment as

discretionary conditions of probation.         Vaden got six months

(for the misdemeanors) and twelve and eighteen months (for the

felonies).

        In June 2019, Vaden petitioned for admission into the Maui

Drug Court Program.       The Maui Drug Court approved the petition.

It “re-sentenced” him to new probation terms, with the

discretionary condition that he complete the drug court program.

The court ordered that all previous probation terms and

conditions that were “not inconsistent” with the new probation

terms remain as probation conditions.

        A month later, in July 2019, Vaden was released from

custody.      Vaden remained in the drug court program for a full

five months before he violated its rules.          Vaden was detained

2     The presentence report (PSR) has “many uses in the criminal justice
process.” See State v. Carlton, 146 Hawaiʻi 16, 27, 455 P.3d 356, 367 (2019).
It affords victims, or their families, an opportunity to be heard. See HRS
§ 706-604(3) (Supp. 2016). It is used by the Hawaiʻi Paroling Authority in
determining defendants’ minimum term of imprisonment. HRS § 706-669(2)
(2014). A copy is provided to defendants’ probation officers. HRS § 806-
73(b)(3)(F) (2014 & Supp. 2017). And to mental health professionals
conducting court-ordered assessments of defendants. HRS § 806-73(b)(3)(C).
In some instances — for example where there is a recent pre-existing PSR –
waiver of the PSR may be appropriate. But these reports play an important
role in our criminal justice system and trial courts should not consent to
their waiver as a matter of course. See HRS § 706-601(3) (Supp. 2016) (“With
the consent of the court, the requirement of a pre-sentence diagnosis may be
waived by agreement of both the defendant and the prosecuting attorney.”).

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again in December 2019.    The circuit court terminated him from

the Maui Drug Court Program and revoked his probation.

     In February 2020, the circuit court resentenced Vaden as

follows.

          Case             Counts              New Sentences
    2CPC-XX-XXXXXXX    Ct. 1-11         5 years in each count
                       Ct. 12,13        1 year in each count
                       Ct. 14           30 days
    2CPC-XX-XXXXXXX                     5 years
    2CPC-XX-XXXXXXX    Ct. 1            5 years
                       Ct. 3            30 days
    2CPC-XX-XXXXXXX                     5 years
    2CPC-XX-XXXXXXX    Ct. 2 (PDD2)     10 years
    (This case)        Ct. 3,4          5 years in each count
                       Ct. 5            1 year

     The court ordered the sentences in the first four cases to

run concurrently with each other; the aggregate term was 5 years

(the 5-year sentence).    The court also ran the sentences in

2CPC-18-844 (this case) concurrently with each other; the

aggregate term was 10 years (the 10-year sentence).       The court

ran Vaden’s 10-year sentence consecutively to his 5-year

sentence.

     The Resentencing Order stated: “Credit given for time

served.”

     The Department of Public Safety (DPS) did not give the

court the required certificates of detention detailing the days

Vaden was detained prior to sentencing and in connection with

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his probation sentence. 3      But it credited him 340 days against

the 5-year sentence and one day against the 10-year sentence.

        Vaden moved the court to correct the credit he received: he

wanted 340 days of credit against both the 5-year sentence and

the 10-year sentence.       (DPS explained in an email to defense

counsel that it declined to credit the 340 days against the 10-

year sentence in order to avoid “double dipping”; Vaden

submitted the email to the court.)         Vaden invoked HRS § 706-

671(1) and (2), as well as the double jeopardy clause.

        The court denied Vaden’s motion.      It relied on State v.

Tauiliili, 96 Hawaiʻi 195, 29 P.3d 914 (2001).           There, the trial

court had sentenced Tauiliili to two concurrent 10-year terms

and one consecutive 5-year term within a single case; we held

that under HRS § 706-671(1), “presentence” credit should be

3     HRS § 706-671(1) requires that when a defendant has previously been
detained, the officer who has custody of the defendant furnish the court with
a certificate showing how long the defendant spent in detention before
sentencing. HRS § 706-671(2) similarly requires that when a defendant who
has been detained or imprisoned pursuant to an earlier sentence is re-
sentenced, “[t]he officer having custody of the defendant” shall furnish a
certificate to the court at sentencing showing “the period of imprisonment
served under the original sentence.” Both subsections also instruct that the
certificate be annexed to the “official records” of the defendant’s
commitment.

      Here, the record contains no certificates of detention; Vaden was
resentenced by the circuit court, but the court was not furnished with any
certificates of detention by the Department of Public Safety. And there are
no certificates of detention attached to the court’s judgment. The absence
of a detention certificate is particularly problematic here because it
appears that the DPS’s informal credit calculations may have been wrong to
the extent they gave Vaden only 472 days’ credit for time served in 2CPC-18-
0000315 when it appears that he was actually imprisoned for 532 days in that
case.

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applied only once to the aggregate of consecutive sentences.

Id. at 197, 199, 29 P.3d at 916, 918.     Citing Tauiliili, the

circuit court ruled that Vaden could not get a “double credit”

for his 340 days of imprisonment before the resentencing.

     The ICA affirmed.    It observed that Vaden’s claim

implicated two different credit categories: “presentence” credit

under HRS § 706-671(1) and “probation incarceration” credit

under HRS § 706-671(2).    But, the ICA noted, neither Vaden nor

the State addressed this distinction.     So the record was unclear

as to “what portion of the 340 days constitutes presentence days

and probation sentence days.”    The distinction between

presentence detention and probation incarceration played no

further role in the ICA’s analysis; the ICA concluded that

Tauiliili was “dispositive”: Vaden could not get “double” credit

for any of the 340 days.

     Now, Vaden asks this court to consider whether the ICA

gravely erred and violated his rights under HRS § 706-671 or the

double jeopardy clause by “erasing” his incarceration credit and

effectively adding 340 days to his 10-year sentence.

                                III.

A.   Vaden’s incarceration credit implicates both HRS § 706-
     671(1) and (2)

     Under HRS § 706-671(1) and (2), convicted defendants are

entitled to credit for time served as follows:

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              (1)   When a defendant who is sentenced to imprisonment has
              previously been detained in any State or local correctional
              or other institution following the defendant’s arrest for
              the crime for which sentence is imposed, such period of
              detention following the defendant’s arrest shall be
              deducted from the minimum and maximum terms of such
              sentence. . . .

              (2)   When a judgment of conviction or a sentence is
              vacated and a new sentence is thereafter imposed upon the
              defendant for the same crime, the period of detention and
              imprisonment theretofore served shall be deducted from the
              minimum and maximum terms of the new sentence. . . .

        These two subsections concern distinct types of credit.

        HRS § 706-671(1) controls credit for detention time between

arrest and the initial sentence.

        HRS § 706-671(2), in contrast, deals with credit for time

served as part of a sentence. 4         Though HRS § 706-671(2) refers to

time served under a “vacated” sentence, our holding in State v.

Delima confirms that HRS § 706-671(2) also applies to situations

like Vaden’s where a defendant serves time pursuant to probation

that is later revoked.        See 78 Hawaiʻi 343, 348, 893 P.2d 194,

199 (1995) (holding that six months imprisonment served by a

defendant as a condition of a later-revoked, probation was “time

spent imprisoned for the purposes of HRS § 706-671(2)” that must

be deducted from the new sentence imposed on resentencing).

        The 340 days at issue here consist of three distinct time

4     The Model Penal Code and Commentaries’ (MPC) discussion of a parallel
section – MPC § 7.09 – also makes clear that subsection (1) applies to “time
served prior to sentencing” while subsection (2) addresses “time served under
a conviction[.]” MPC § 7.09 at 310 (emphasis added). Though MPC § 7.09 uses
the word “conviction” in subsection (2), the commentary confirms that its
principle “also extend[s] to a situation in which a court vacates a sentence
and imposes a new one without vacating the conviction.” Id.

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periods:

     (1)   time served from his initial arrest to the initial

           sentencing;

     (2)   time served under probation; and

     (3)   time served between his (re)arrest in connection with

           his termination from the Maui Drug Court Program and

           resentencing.

     Category (1) is “presentence” time under HRS § 706-671(1).

     Under Delima, category (2) corresponds to “probation

incarceration” time under HRS § 706-671(2).

     Regarding category (3), though it happened after the

imposition of the initial sentences, it is comparable to

“presentence” detention time since Vaden was not serving any

“sentence” during that period.    Because HRS § 706-671(2) only

governs time served under vacated or revoked sentences, we treat

category (3) as “presentence” time under HRS § 706-671(1).

B.   Under HRS § 706-671(1) Vaden is entitled to credit his
     presentence detention time once against the aggregate of
     his consecutive sentence terms

     In Tauiliili, we held that under HRS § 706-671(1), “when

consecutive sentences are imposed, credit for presentence

imprisonment is properly granted against only the aggregate of

the consecutive sentence terms.”       96 Hawaiʻi at 199, 29 P.3d at

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918. 5    This holding is consistent with other courts that have

interpreted laws concerning defendants’ entitlement to “credit”

for presentence detention time as allowing for credit once

against the aggregate of consecutive sentences.           See, e.g,

Wilson v. State, 264 N.W.2d 234, 235 (Wis. 1978) (concluding

that “where consecutive sentences are imposed, pretrial

incarceration time should be credited as time served on only one

of such sentences”). 6

         Vaden’s argument that Tauiliili is inapplicable because it

concerns consecutive sentences within a single case as opposed

to multiple cases lacks merit.        Vaden cites no authority

allowing “double dipping” in the “presentence” credit context

5     In Tauiliili we noted that the commentary to HRS § 706-671 states that
the statute “provides for some equalization . . . between those defendants
who obtain pre-sentence release and those who do not.” Allowing those who
are detained prior to sentencing to get repeat credit, we said, would
undermine the legislature’s equalization rationale. 96 Hawaiʻi at 199, 29
P.3d at 918.

6     See also State v. Price, 50 P.3d 530, 535 (Mont. 2002) (holding that
Montana statute governing credit for incarceration prior to conviction
“entitles defendants to credit for presentence incarceration only once
against the aggregate of all terms imposed when multiple sentences are
imposed consecutively”); Schubert v. People, 698 P.2d 788, 795 (Colo. 1985)
(“When consecutive sentences are imposed, crediting the period of presentence
confinement against one of the sentences will assure the defendant full
credit against the total term of imprisonment.”); Cox v. State, 522 P.2d 173,
176 (Kan. 1974) (holding that defendant was not entitled to credit
presentence detention time against his state sentence where he had already
received credit for that time against federal sentence he was serving
consecutively to his state sentence); Nissel v. Pearce, 764 P.2d 224, 228
(Or. 1988) (“In light of the underlying purposes of statutes giving credit
for presentence time served and the absence of any indication that the
legislature intended (or even contemplated) duplicate credit for consecutive
sentences, we hold that the plaintiff was not entitled to receive credit on
each of his consecutive sentences.”).

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where the sentences at issue run consecutively to those in

unrelated cases. 7,8

        Tauiliili remains good law and is dispositive of our

analysis of Vaden’s arguments to the extent they concern

presentence credit time: under Tauiliili, Vaden is entitled to

credit his presentence HRS § 706-671(1) time once against the

aggregate of any later imposed consecutive sentences.

C.      Under HRS § 706-671(2) Vaden is entitled to credit for time
        served as a condition of probation once against the
        aggregate of his consecutive sentences

        Vaden also argues that HRS § 706-671(2) entitles him to

credit time served as a discretionary condition of probation

against each of the consecutive sentences imposed following the

revocation of that probation.        We disagree for three reasons.

        First, nothing in the plain text of HRS § 706-671(2)

suggests that the legislature intended that time earned under

HRS § 706-671(2) should be credited against multiple consecutive

sentences.      The statute’s use of the singular “sentence”

reflects the fact that the word may refer not only to a

7     At least one state court of appeals has held that such “double dipping”
is not allowed. See Ransone v. State, 20 So.3d 445, 447, 449 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2009) (refusing to double credit presentence jail time against
consecutive sentences in two separate cases when the defendant was held in
custody for both).

8     Vaden correctly argued that transferring credit to an unrelated case is
prohibited. See State v. March, 94 Hawaiʻi 250, 255, 11 P.3d 1094, 1099
(2000) (holding that a sentence that credits Defendant with the time served
for an unrelated offense is illegal). But no such transfer happened here.
The 340 days were simultaneously accrued in all five cases.

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particular term of incarceration imposed for a conviction on a

single criminal count, but also to the sum of the terms of

incarceration and other penalties imposed on a defendant for

their crimes.   Multiple consecutive sentences are really just

one sentence.   The order of resentencing in Vaden’s case

describes the ten terms of incarceration (imposed for ten

different counts across five different cases) as a single

“sentence” imposed “with this order.”     Cf. State v. Percy, 612

A.2d 1119, 1127 (Vt. 1992) (“When all is said and done, a number

of consecutive sentences becomes one sentence, and it is against

this sentence, as ‘imposed,’ that pretrial detention is

credited.”).

     Second, though Tauiliili does not control our analysis, its

implicit interpretation of the word “sentence” in HRS § 706-

671(1) is persuasive.   Tauiliili treats HRS § 706-671(1)’s

“sentence” as referring to the aggregate of consecutive

sentences imposed in connection with the defendant’s crimes, not

a particular term of imprisonment imposed in connection with a

specific crime.   It makes sense to use the same definition of

“sentence” in HRS § 706-671(2).    Adopting a more atomistic

approach and reading “the new sentence” in HRS § 706-671(2) as

referring to each consecutive term of incarceration imposed

following the revocation or vacatur of probation would

effectively require holding that the word “sentence” as used in

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HRS § 706-671(2) has a different meaning from that of the same

word in HRS § 706-671(1).

     Third, reading HRS § 706-671(2) as requiring that probation

incarceration time be applied against each consecutive sentence

imposed after the revocation of probation would lead to unfair

and arbitrary results.   The defendant who served a year of

probation incarceration time and then, following probation

revocation, was sentenced to two consecutive five-year terms

would, in total, spend a year less in prison than a defendant

who served the same year as a condition of probation but was

sentenced to a single ten-year term.     Cf. Tauiliili, 96 Hawaiʻi

at 199, 29 P.3d at 918 (explaining that allowing repeat credit

for presentence detention time against consecutive sentences

would “defeat the legislative purpose underlying consecutive

sentencing” since if multiple credit were allowed, “the more

consecutive sentences a criminal defendant received, the more

credit [they] would accrue for presentence imprisonment”).

     Further, this reading of HRS § 706-671(2) would curb

courts’ ability to impose consecutive sentences.      For instance,

if a defendant commits five misdemeanors in five separate cases

and serves one year before sentencing, they would receive five

years of credit if the court imposes consecutive statutory

maximum terms (one year for each misdemeanor).      In that

situation, the defendant would ultimately serve no additional

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jail time, and the court’s decision to impose consecutive

sentences would be pointless.         Id.    Indeed, any consecutive

sentence would be meaningless.

        For these reasons, we hold that HRS § 706-671(2) entitles

Vaden to incarceration credit earned pursuant to a later-revoked

probationary sentence once against the aggregate of his later-

imposed consecutive sentences.         As in the HRS § 706-671(1)

context, this holding applies irrespective of whether the

sentences are in one case or spread across multiple cases.

D.      The double jeopardy clause does not require that Vaden be
        awarded incarceration credit against each of his
        consecutive sentences

        Along with his statutory arguments, Vaden advances a

constitutional claim: he says the court’s refusal to deduct 340

days from his 10-year consec sentence violates his double

jeopardy rights.       We disagree.

        The constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy 9

“protects against multiple punishments for the same offense.”

North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969).            This

guarantee “absolutely requires that punishment already exacted

must be fully ‘credited’ in imposing sentence upon a new

conviction for the same offense.”           Id. at 718-19 (emphases

9     See U.S. Const. amend. V (guaranteeing that a person “subject for the
same offence” shall not be “twice put in jeopardy of life or limb”); Haw.
Const. art I, § 10 (same except that article I, section 10 omits “life or
limb”).

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added) (footnote omitted).

      If Vaden’s incarceration time was earned pursuant to a

probationary sentence that was later vacated, a trial court’s

refusal to credit that time against a sentence imposed in

connection with a “new conviction for the same offense” would

implicate Vaden’s double jeopardy clause rights. 10          But that’s

not what happened here.       Vaden’s 340 days were served either

before sentencing 11 or pursuant to a sentence of probation that

was later revoked, not vacated. 12        So his double jeopardy rights

would only come into play if his total punishment in this case

10    See State v. Thompson, No. SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX, 2020 WL 2846618, *3 (Haw.
June 1, 2020) (SDO) (acknowledging that applying time served on vacated
sentences only once against the aggregate of new consecutive sentences for
the same crimes “would raise very serious double jeopardy issues” and result
in “unconstitutional ‘multiple punishments’ for the same offense.” (Citation
omitted)).

11    Several courts have held that the denial of prison credit for
presentence detention time generally does not raise constitutional issues
unless it operates to extend the defendant’s total incarceration beyond the
statutory maximum term. See, e.g., Faye v. Gray, 541 F.2d 665, 667 (7th Cir.
1976); State v. Warde, 570 P.2d 766, 768–69 (Ariz. 1977) (“[A] number of
state and federal appellate courts . . . have held that a defendant, as a
matter of equal protection, must be credited with presentence jail time when
such time, if added to the maximum sentence imposed, will exceed the maximum
statutory sentence.” (Emphasis added.)).

12    “[T]he imposition of confinement when an offender violates his term
of probation has never been considered to raise a serious double jeopardy
problem.” Ralston v. Robinson, 454 U.S. 201, 220 n.14 (1981). This is
because the revocation of a defendant’s probation and the imposition of a new
sentence is a modification of the defendant’s original sentence, not a
“second” or “multiple” punishment for double jeopardy purposes. So, as the
Supreme Court explained in Ralston, there is no “double jeopardy” problem
when the offender “by his own actions, trigger[s] the condition that permits
appropriate modification of the terms of confinement.” Id. Cf. United
States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 137 (1980) (stating that the double
jeopardy clause “does not provide the defendant with the right to know at any
specific moment in time what the exact limit of his punishment will turn out
to be” and observing that “there is no double jeopardy protection against
revocation of probation and the imposition of imprisonment”).

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exceeded the maximum statutory penalty for the crimes at issue. 13

Cf. Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 381 (1989) (“[I]n the

multiple punishments context, [the interest that the double

jeopardy clause seeks to protect] is ‘limited to ensuring that

the total punishment did not exceed that authorized by the

legislature.’”).     The sum of Vaden’s 10-year sentence and the

340 days of presentence and probation incarceration 14 at issue in

this case is just shy of 11 years, far below the 21 years of

incarceration Vaden could have received in this case if the

court ran his terms of imprisonment consecutively. 15

      Since Vaden’s punishment in this case does not exceed the

13    In Faye, the Seventh Circuit explained that in the context of
presentence incarceration, unconstitutional “double punishment” happens only
“when the [uncredited] pre-sentence time together with the sentence imposed
is greater than the statutory maximum penalty for the offense.” 541 F.2d at
667. It stands to reason that the double jeopardy clause would also prohibit
a court from imposing terms of imprisonment following the revocation of
probation that, if combined with time already served pursuant to the
probation, would exceed the maximum statutory total punishment for the crimes
at issue in the case.

14    The record is unclear as to how many of the 340 days were accrued
before sentencing and how many were accrued in connection with Vaden’s
probation sentence.

15    The Faye court viewed “the statutory maximum penalty” as the maximum
consecutive terms a court can impose for the offenses at issue. 541 F.2d at
666-67. There, the court sentenced the defendant to two concurrent seven-
year terms for two counts of rape; the statutory maximum for each was 30
years. Id. at 666. Because the presentence time plus the two concurrent
sentences was less than “the maximum punishment of 60 years which he could
have received [if the trial court ran the two 30-year terms consecutively],”
the court concluded that uncredited presentence time did not violate the
guarantee against double jeopardy. Id. at 667. Here, the maximum
consecutive terms the court could have imposed for the offenses at issue is
21 years: ten years for Count 2, five years each for Counts 3 and 4, and one
year for Count 5.

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statutory maximum total punishment for the crimes at issue, and

since his probation incarceration credit was not accrued under a

vacated sentence, the trial court did not violate Vaden’s double

jeopardy clause rights by declining to credit the 340 days

against Vaden’s 10-year sentence.

                                 IV.

     As described above, we affirm the ICA’s Judgment on Appeal.

We remand this case to the circuit court so that the court may:

(1) order the Department of Public Safety to furnish the court

with certificates of detention that comply with HRS § 706-671(1)

and (2); and (2) file an amended judgment that affixes those

certificates of detention.

Benjamin E. Lowenthal                  /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald
for petitioner
                                       /s/ Paula A. Nakayama
Richard B. Rost                        /s/ Todd W. Eddins
for respondent

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