Court Opinion

ID: 9950942
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-15 07:17:00.02125+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:37:31.307099
License: Public Domain

In The

                            Court of Appeals

                Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

                           __________________

                          NO. 09-22-00202-CV
                          __________________

             IN THE INTEREST OF C.B.W. & C.B.W.
__________________________________________________________________

            On Appeal from the 418th District Court
                  Montgomery County, Texas
                 Trial Cause No. 18-06-08110-CV
__________________________________________________________________

                     MEMORANDUM OPINION

     In this appeal, one of C.B.W.’s parents, Frank, argues in one issue

that the trial court erred when, in April 2022, it granted Mother’s Petition

to Modify Parent-Child Relationship with C.B.W., a child we will refer to

as David. 1 According to Frank, despite a finding in an “Agreed Final

     1We have used pseudonyms for the names of the children and all

adults referred to in the opinion to avoid confusion. See Tex. Fam. Code
Ann. § 109.002(d) (authorizing appellate courts in Title 5 appeals to
identify the parties by fictitious names or by their initials). Mother and
Frank also have a daughter, and their daughter shares David’s initials.
Frank’s and Mother’s daughter, whom we will call Demi, is also named
in trial court’s order granting Mother’s Petition to Modify Parent-Child
Relationship with Frank. Frank doesn’t challenge the validity of the trial
                                     1
Decree of Divorce” (the Agreed Decree)—which was signed by the 418th

District Court of Montgomery County, Texas in December 2018, and that

states that he is David’s parent—the Agreed Decree as to David is void

because the Chancery Court in Mississippi made a child custody

determination naming Stan as David’s father in 2008, giving Stan the

right to custody, possession, and access to David under Mississippi’s

version of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act

(the UCCJEA). 2

     On appeal, Frank argues that during the hearing conducted in the

418th District Court on Mother’s Petition to Modify Parent-Child

Relationship (Motion to Modify the Agreed Decree), Mother failed to meet

her burden to prove that the Mississippi Chancery Court lost its exclusive

continuing jurisdiction over David’s child custody determination, a case

decided in 20018 in which that court awarded joint custody of David to

Mother and Stan, David’s father. In 2008 and after Mother and Stan

divorced, Frank and Mother married. In 2018, the 418th District Court

court’s order to the extent it modifies the requirements of the custodial
provisions in the Agreed Decree of Divorce tied to his daughter, Demi.
      2See Miss. Code Ann. §§ 93-27-101 — 93-27-402 (Lexis Advance

through February 30, 2024). In Texas, the UCCJEA is codified in Chapter
152 of the Family Code. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 152.002-.317 (Supp).
                                    2
of Montgomery County, Texas signed Mother’s and Frank’s Agreed

Decree, an agreement they reached after signing an irrevocable mediated

settlement agreement. According to Frank, because the record fails to

show that the 418th District Court conducted the jurisdictional analysis

required to show that the 418th District Court acquired subject-matter

jurisdiction over David’s case, both the Agreed Decree and Order

modifying the terms of David’s parent-child relationship should be

declared void. Frank concludes that because the evidence does not show

the 418th District Court acquired subject-matter jurisdiction to make an

initial custody determination in David’s case or to modify the Mississippi

Chancery Court’s determination before the 418th District signed the

Agreed Decree, that court could not have created a valid parent-child

relationship adjudicating him as David’s parent, could not have created

a duty that required him to support David financially, or could not have

acquired the jurisdiction necessary to have awarded him rights of

custody, access, or possession to David. 3

     3Compare Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 152.202 (Exclusive Continuing

Jurisdiction) and id. § 152.203 (Jurisdiction to Modify Determination),
with Miss. Code Ann. § 93-27-202 (Exclusive Continuing Jurisdiction)
and 93-207-203 (Jurisdiction to Modify Determination).
                                   3
     Mother didn’t file a brief in response to Father’s appeal. We

overrule Frank’s issue. First, we conclude the record doesn’t support

Frank’s argument that Mother didn’t meet her burden of proof. Instead,

the record shows that when Mother and Frank divorced in December

2018, the trial court found that “after receiving evidence, . . . it has

jurisdiction of this case and of all the parties and that at least sixty days

have elapsed since the date the suit was filed.” Thus, even were we to

assume that Mississippi remained David’s home state as of the date

Mother and Frank divorced in 2018, the finding in the Agreed Decree

constitutes some evidence that the 418th District Court either complied

with the provisions in Texas Family Code sections 152.201 or 152.202

before signing the Agreed Decree, that the trial court determined that

one of the exceptions in section 152.203 to the continuing exclusive

jurisdiction requirements of UCCJEA existed before it signed the Agreed

Decree, or that before the 418th District granted the divorce, the court in

Mississippi determined that it was an inconvenient forum in which to

                                     4
proceed in David’s case under one of the provisions in Mississippi Code

section 93-27-207. 4

       Second, we note that Frank’s signature is on the Agreed Decree. “A

party cannot complain on appeal that the trial court took a specific action

that the complaining party requested, a doctrine commonly referred to as

the invited error doctrine.” 5 Simply put, Frank asked the 418th District

Court to grant his divorce on the terms in the Agreed Decree, and in the

Agreed Decree he agreed to pay $1,200 in child support toward the

support of two children regardless of whether they were his. He also

made that obligation a contractual obligation under the Agreed Decree.

When the 418th District Court modified the Agreed Decree in 2022, it

didn’t increase the terms of any of the financial obligations Frank made

to Mother in 2018 in the Agreed Decree, the court simply enforced the

agreement that Frank made. Finally, to the extent Frank complains

about the Order modifying the custodial requirements of the Agreed

       4Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 152.201-.203; Miss. Code Ann. § 93-27-

207.
       5Tittizer   v. Union Gas Corp., 171 S.W.3d 856, 862 (Tex. 2005)
(cleaned up).
                                     5
Decree, those requirements have all become moot because David became

an adult in May 2023 when he turned eighteen.

                             Background

     Frank appeals from an order that the trial court signed following a

trial to the bench. The order is titled “Order in Suit to Modify Parent-

Child Relationship,” but we will refer to it as the Order or the Order

modifying the Agreed Decree. The Order addresses and modifies

Mother’s and Frank’s custodial rights under an Agreed Decree that

addressed Mother’s and Frank’s duties, obligations, and their rights to

two children, David (born in 2005) and Demi (born in 2010).

     The trial court conducted the hearing on Mother’s motion to modify

the Agreed Decree in February 2022. Following the hearing, Frank asked

the trial court to provide the parties with written findings of fact and

conclusions of law. In its written findings, the trial court found that

David’s and Demi’s circumstances had substantially changed since

Mother and Frank divorced in December 2018. The trial court also

modified the Agreed Decree by granting Mother exclusive rights

regarding David’s and Demi’s custody. The Order gave Mother the

exclusive right (a) to consent to David’s and Demi’s medical, dental and

                                   6
surgical treatment, should their treatment involve an invasive

procedure; (b) to consent to their psychiatric and psychological treatment;

(c) to make decisions concerning their educations; and (d) to apply for,

renew, and maintain possession of their passports. Under the Order,

Frank and Mother were required to communicate through a computer

system the trial court called Our Family Wizard when communicating

with each other about David’s and Demi’s school, extracurricular

activities, medical, dental, psychological, and psychiatric needs. The

Order also permanently enjoined Frank and Mother from disparaging

one another’s family members, from making derogatory remarks or

belittling the children, from using corporal punishment as a form of

discipline, from hiding or secreting David or Demi from each other, from

using illegal drugs or medications without a valid prescription within

twelve hours before or during their periods of possession, and from

blocking the opposing party’s cell phone number from their phone. The

Order also modified when Frank was allowed to communicate

electronically with David and Demi, authorizing those communications

to occur electronically on Mondays and Thursdays between 8:00 and 8:30

                                    7
p.m. The changes described above were all based on an agreement the

parties reached before the hearing.

     The amount Frank was paying Mother in monthly child support

was one of the main issues that the parties litigated during the hearing.

Simply put, Mother wanted Frank to pay more in child support. Under

the 2018 Agreed Decree, Frank had agreed to pay $1,200 per month for

the joint support of both David and Demi until David turned eighteen, at

which time the support would then be reduced to $1,120 per month for

Demi’s support alone. 6 After the hearing, The Order the trial court signed

modifying the Agreed Decree didn’t increase Frank’s support obligation

above the $1,200 per month, the amount he had been paying under the

Agreed Decree. The Order also didn’t extend the $1,200 payment term

beyond David’s eighteenth birthday. To be sure, the Order confirmed an

arrearage that Frank owed under the Agreed Decree of $1,741. 7 The

Order also requires Frank to pay the arrearage in $100 monthly

     6There  are additional conditions in the Agreed Decree tied to
Frank’s support obligation that could have resulted in his child support
obligation ending earlier, but none of them are relevant to the appeal.
     7For simplicity, we have rounded all monetary figures to whole

numbers.
                                   8
installments until the arrearage (with interest at 6% per year) is paid in

full.

        Except as described above, the trial court denied Mother’s requests

for any additional relief. Although the appellate record includes a few

documents in the Clerk’s Record from Mother’s and Frank’s divorce—the

Original Petition For Divorce, Frank’s answer, the Mediated Settlement

Agreement, the Agreed Final Decree of Divorce, and some Qualified

Domestic Relations Orders—it doesn’t include the information

mentioned in the Agreed Decree, specifically “the record of testimony”

that the trial court noted “was duly reported by the Court reporter for

[the] 418th Judicial District Court.” Additionally, the docket sheet in the

Clerk’s Record includes docket entries relevant to the proceedings in

Mother’s and Frank’s divorce. The docket entry on the day the trial court

conducted the final hearing in Mother’s and Frank’s divorce states:

“UCCJEA affidavits filed; agreed final decree of divorce granted and

signed[.]” The Clerk’s Record in the appeal that Frank filed doesn’t

include the UCCJEA affidavits that are referenced in the docket sheet.

        Based on the positions the parties took in the hearing that occurred

in the trial court in February 2022, most of the remaining facts that we

                                      9
need to resolve Frank’s appeal are undisputed. For instance, in the

February 2022 hearing, the parties didn’t dispute that (1) Mother was

married to Stan before marrying Frank; (2) Mother and Stan divorced in

March 2008; and (3) Mother married Frank after Mother and Stan

divorced. At the beginning of the hearing, Mother and Frank stipulated

that David isn’t Frank’s child. That said, Frank never denied signing the

Agreed Final Decree of Divorce, he never claimed that he didn’t sign the

UCCJEA affidavit that is referred to in the docket sheet (which isn’t in

the record before us in the appeal), and he never argued that the Agreed

Decree (which he signed) isn’t enforceable as a contract.

     There was also no dispute that when he and Mother married in

2008, he knew that he wasn’t David’s father. During the February 2022

hearing, Frank’s attorney introduced an exhibit that shows that in 2013,

David’s Mother and Stan obtained a court order in Mississippi changing

David’s last name so that his last name would be same as Frank’s. The

exhibit was admitted into evidence without objection. Finally, during the

hearing, Frank established that Stan (David’s biological father) died in

September 2020.

                                   10
     As for the Chancery Court’s judgment, we agree that it establishes

as a matter of law that the Chancery Court in Mississippi made the

initial custody determination in 2008 naming Stan as David’s father

when Mother and Stan divorced. A Final Judgment and Property

Settlement from Mother’s and Stan’s 2008 divorce was admitted into

evidence without objection during the November 2022 hearing. Both the

Final Judgment granting the divorce and the Property Settlement name

Stan and Mother as David’s parents. They also both state that David was

“born to this union.” The Mississippi Court’s 2008 Judgment gave Mother

and Stan joint “legal custody of [David] with [Mother] having primary

physical custody.” 8

     Turning to the pleadings, we note that the pleadings on file before

the November 2022 hearing don’t show that Frank ever filed a pleading

alleging that he was not David’s parent. And after examining the

testimony the trial court heard in the hearing that it conducted in

November 2022, we note that no one ever asked Frank whether, after he

     8The proceeding in Mississippi was in the Chancery Court of the

First Judicial District of Hinds County, Mississippi, Cause number 2005-
1166 W/4.
                                    11
and Mother married in 2008, if he’d adopted David or if Stan had ever

signed a document relinquishing his parental rights.

     At the beginning of the February 2022 hearing, the trial court noted

that in response to Mother’s motion to modify the Agreed Decree, Frank

had not filed pleadings contesting Mother’s allegation or the statement

in the Agreed Decree that he is David’s “parent.” When Frank’s attorney

brought up his theory during the hearing for the first time that the trial

court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Mother’s request to modify

the custodial provision in the Agreed Decree because Mother hadn’t

shown the Mississippi Chancery’s Court no longer possessed exclusive

continuing jurisdiction over David’s case, the trial court noted that it

viewed its role as limited to

      modifying the order that is in place. That order has two
      children of the marriage, so I’m taking that into account.
      You’re not challenging any of the paternity that was found
      underneath that order. I have no pleadings to challenge that.

      After the trial court signed the Order modifying the Agreed Decree,

Frank filed a Motion for Partial New Trial. In his Motion, Frank asked

the trial court to grant a new trial as to the parts of the order that applied

to David but not those applicable to Demi. In that same motion, Frank

argued that as to David, the trial court didn’t have subject-matter
                                     12
jurisdiction over the case for the reasons already discussed. Frank’s

motion was overruled by operation of law. In June 2022, Frank filed a

timely notice of appeal. Eleven months later, in May 2023, David turned

eighteen.

                          Standard of Review

     On appeal, Frank raises one issue claiming the 418th District Court

of Montgomery County, Texas lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to

adjudicate any issues addressing David’s parent-child relationship

because Mother failed to meet her burden to show the Chancery Court in

Mississippi no longer had exclusive continuing jurisdiction over the

issues of David’s custody, possession and access. Frank concludes that

because the record doesn’t show the trial court had subject-matter

jurisdiction of those issues when, in 2018, it signed the Agreed Decree or

when, in 2022, it signed the Order modifying the custody provisions in

the Agreed Decree, both the Agreed Decree and the Order modifying the

Agreed Decree are void.

                                   13
      Whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law

that we review de novo. 9 “[S]ubject-matter jurisdiction is essential to a

court’s authority to decide a case.” 10 “[A] court cannot render a binding

judgment concerning matters over which it lacks subject-matter

jurisdiction.” 11 Thus, a judgment rendered by a court acting without

subject-matter jurisdiction is vulnerable to collateral attack on the basis

that it is void. 12

      A question of statutory construction presents a question of law that

we review on appeal using a de novo standard. 13 When construing a

statute, “our objective is to determine and give effect to the Legislature’s

intent.” 14 We start with the plain and common meaning of the statute’s

      9See Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226

(Tex. 2004).
      10Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 553 (Tex. 2000).
      11In re City of Dallas, 501 S.W.3d 71, 73 (Tex. 2016) (orig.

proceeding) (per curiam).
      12In re D.S., 602 S.W.3d 504, 520 (Tex. 2020) (noting that “a

judgment rendered without subject-matter jurisdiction is void and thus
subject to collateral attack”).
      13Id. at 514.
      14In re D.T., 625 S.W.3d 62, 71 (Tex. 2021).

                                    14
words. 15 “If the meaning of the statutory language is unambiguous, we

adopt the interpretation supported by the plain meaning of the statute.”16

     The UCCJEA, codified as Chapter 152 of the Texas Family Code,

governs child custody issues between Texas, Mississippi, and other states

that have adopted the UCCJEA. 17 “The UCCJEA . . . helps ensure

custody determinations are rendered in the State which can best decide

the case in the interest of the child.” 18 The UCCJEA “encourages national

uniformity in child custody disputes and addresses the increasing

mobility of American families.” 19

     While district courts in Texas have general jurisdiction over child-

custody matters, sections 152.203 and 152.207 of the Texas Family Code

provide several circumstances under which a court in Texas may proceed

to modify an initial child-custody determination made by a court in

     15See State v. Shumake, 199 S.W.3d 279, 284 (Tex. 2006).
     16See D.T., 625 S.W.3d at 71.
     17Compare Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 152.001-.317 (Uniform Child

Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act), with Miss. Code Ann. §§ 93-
27-101—93-27-402 (Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act).
     18In re D.S., 602 S.W.3d at 513 (cleaned up).
     19In re Dean, 393 S.W.3d 741, 743 (Tex. 2012).

                                  15
another state. 20 In 2020, the Texas Supreme Court noted that “some refer

to the UCCJEA as a subject-matter-jurisdiction statute, while others do

not. The issue is not settled.” 21 Yet in that case, our Supreme Court

declined to resolve the issue, holding that father’s collateral attack of an

order terminating his parental rights was barred by the plain language

of Family Code section 162.211(c), a statute that prohibits “a direct or

collateral attack on an order terminating parental rights based on an

unrevoked affidavit of relinquishment[.]” 22

     Section 152.201(a) of the UCCJEA is the exclusive jurisdictional

basis for a court to make a child custody determination. 23 Under Chapter

152, a child custody determination is “a judgment, decree, or other order

of a court providing for legal custody, physical custody, or visitation with

respect to a child,” and the term “includes permanent, temporary, initial,

and modification orders.” Even so, a child custody determination doesn’t

     20Tex.  Fam. Code Ann. §§ 152.203 (Jurisdiction to Modify
Determination), 152.207 (Inconvenient Forum).
     21In re D.S., 602 S.W.3d at 517.
     22Id. at 518 (citing the plain language of Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §

161.211(c)).
     23See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 152.201(b); D.S., 602 S.W.3d at 513.

                                   16
include “an order relating to child support or other monetary

obligations.” 24

      As defined by statute, an initial determination means “the first

child custody determination concerning a particular child.” 25 The record

shows that as to David, the Chancery Court in Mississippi made an

initial child custody determination as to David in 2008. Under

Mississippi Code Section 93-27-202 of the UCCJEA, the Mississippi

Chancery Court in Hinds County as of 2008 had exclusive continuing

jurisdiction over child-custody disputes involving David subject to other

provisions in the UCCJEA authorizing courts of other states to modify an

initial custody determination or to modify a custody determination made

by a court of another state. 26 Stated another way, the UCCJEA provides

how the court in the initial state where the child custody determination

was made may lose its original exclusive continuing jurisdiction over the

issues of custody, access, and possession of the child or choose not to

exercise its jurisdiction and defer to the forum of another state. 27

      24Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 152.102(3).
      25Id. § 152.102(8).
      26See Miss. Code Ann. § 93-27-202; Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 152.203,

152.207.
     27See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 152.202, 152.203, 152.207.

                                17
                                Analysis

     Frank argues that in the November 2022 hearing, Mother failed to

meet her burden of proof to establish that the judge of the 418th District

Court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the initial child custody

determination that was made by that same court in 2018 when Frank

and Mother divorced, and failed to meet her burden of proof in the

February 2022 hearing to demonstrate the trial court could exercise

subject-matter jurisdiction over Mother’s motion to modify the Agreed

Decree, with respect to the provisions that apply to David. Because the

trial court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the dispute,

Frank argues, he has a right to have this Court reverse the trial court’s

Order and have that Order and the Agreed Decree declared void.

     We turn first to Frank’s complaint about the finding in the Agreed

Decree in which the trial court found that Mother and Frank are David’s

and Demi’s “parents.” As to the finding of parentage, we conclude that it

was Frank rather than Mother who failed to meet his burden of proving

that the 418th District Court acted without subject-matter jurisdiction

when, in 2018, the 418th District Court made or modified the custody

                                   18
determination that was made first in David’s case in 2008 by the

Mississippi Chancery Court.

     Before the hearing in February 2022 on Mother’s Motion seeking to

modify the Agreed Decree, Frank filed no pleadings that collaterally

attacked the jurisdiction of the 418th District Court or that asserted he

wasn’t David’s parent, despite the finding to the contrary in the Agreed

Decree. When the trial court heard Mother’s motion, Mother introduced

a copy of the Agreed Decree, which was admitted into evidence without

objection. As mentioned above, the Agreed Decree includes a finding that

after receiving evidence, the trial court found it had jurisdiction of the

case and the parties. Thus, the evidence Mother presented during the

February 2022 hearing shows that before the trial court signed the

Agreed Decree, it determined that based on the evidence it heard it had

jurisdiction over the parties and the case. On appeal, Frank argues the

418th District Court didn’t have jurisdiction over David’s part of the case

because the Chancery Court in Mississippi continued to retain exclusive

continuing jurisdiction over David’s case when, in 2018 and 2022, the

418th District Court signed the Agreed Decree and the Order modifying

the Agreed Decree.

                                    19
     As with other final judgments that are regular on their face and

that a party did not appeal, a final judgment in a case that arose from a

divorce is not vulnerable to collateral attack if the trial court had

jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the suit. 28 Frank

did not appeal from the judgment in the parties’ divorce. He also did not

file a bill of review. Because Frank did not file pleadings collaterally

attacking the judgment before the trial court conducted the hearing on

the Order modifying the Agreed Decree—the Order from which he filed

this appeal—the relief he could have obtained from the trial court in the

February 2022 hearing would at most have been a ruling denying

Mother’s request seeking to modify the Agreed Decree. 29

     On appeal, Frank attacks the jurisdictional finding in the Agreed

Decree by pointing to the evidence he presented in the hearing the trial

court conducted in February 2022. To be fair, Frank did argue in the

hearing that the trial court didn’t have jurisdiction as to David’s part of

the case to enforce the Agreed Decree because the Chancery Court in

     28Berry v. Berry, 786 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. 1990).
     29Stoner v. Thompson, 578 S.W.2d 679, 683 (noting that a
“judgment must be based upon pleadings” and that unless an issue is
tried by consent, a party may not sustain a favorable judgment on
unpleaded claims).
                               20
Mississippi in 2008 had issued orders that constitute an initial custody

determination under Mississippi’s version of the UCCJEA. Yet the

UCCJEA has exceptions that allow courts in other states to modify initial

custody determinations made in another state or to make an initial

custody determination when the child’s parents do not presently reside

in this state. 30 As mentioned before, Frank and Mother were never

questioned about whether Stan relinquished his rights to David after he

married Mother in 2018. And no one asked Mother or Frank whether

David was ever adopted by Frank. Moreover, without pleadings

collaterally attacking the Agreed Decree, the only question the trial court

could have considered based on the evidence Frank introduced in the

February 2022 hearing proving that the Chancery Court made an initial

custody determination in David’s case in 2008 was that the 2008

judgment evidenced an         initial   determination that     a   custody

determination in another state in David’s case had been made. Thus,

given the UCCJEA provisions that allows for the initial court that has

exclusive continuing jurisdiction to change, the fact that the Mississippi

     30See Miss. Code Ann. §§ 93-27-202(1)(b), 93-27-203, 93-27-207; Tex.

Fam. Code Ann. §§ 152.202(a)(2), 152.203, 152.207.
                                 21
Chancery Court had exclusive jurisdiction in 2008 doesn’t exclude the

presumption created by the trial court’s finding of jurisdiction in the

Agreed Decree. That finding is based on evidence presented to the 418th

District Court in 2018 that Frank failed to include in the record he filed

to support his appeal. Without it, he cannot demonstrate that the 418th

District Court violated any jurisdictional restrictions in the UCCJEA. 31

     For instance, after Frank introduced the Mississippi judgment, he

failed to establish what evidence the 418th District Court heard in 2018

when he and Mother divorced when it determined that it had jurisdiction

of the case and the parties. He didn’t include the Reporter’s Record from

the 2018 hearing, so we don’t know whether the trial court heard

evidence that the Chancery Court in Mississippi held a hearing and

complied with the procedures in the UCCJEA and found the 418th

District Court would be a more appropriate forum in which to modify the

initial custody determination that the Chancery Court made in 2008. 32

     To the extent Frank complains the parentage findings in the Agreed

Decree are void, we hold that Frank failed to file pleadings collaterally

     31Id.
     32Miss. Code Ann. § 93-27-207.

                                   22
attacking the parentage findings in the Agreed Decree. We also hold that

Frank failed to meet his burden of proof in the hearing the trial court

conducted in February 2022 to establish that the 418th District Court

didn’t have the jurisdiction it needed to sign the Order modifying the

Agreed Decree when the trial court relied on the parentage finding in the

2018 Agreed Decree.

     We turn next to Frank’s argument that the trial court’s order is void

to the extent that it modifies the financial aspects of his obligations to

David. We overrule this part of Franks argument, as we conclude the

trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction to enforce the financial aspects

of the Mediated Settlement Agreement the parties signed when they

divorced.

     The provisions of the UCCJEA in Mississippi and Texas provide

courts in those states with exclusive continuing jurisdiction that have

“made a child custody determination[.]”33 By statutory definition under

the versions of the UCCJEA in both states, a child custody determination

“does not include an order relating to child support or another monetary

     33Miss. Code Ann. § 93-27-202(1); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 152.202(a).

                                    23
obligation of an individual.” 34 Under the UCCJEA, the exclusive

continuing jurisdiction provisions do not apply to the parts of the trial

court’s order addressing “an order relating to child support or other

monetary obligation[s,]” so the UCCJEA doesn’t apply to Frank’s

agreement to pay Mother $1,200 a month toward David’s and Demi’s

support until David turned eighteen.

     The other financial obligations Frank agreed to pay in the

irrevocable Mediated Settlement Agreement on David’s behalf, such as

premiums for health insurance and half of David’s out-of-pocket,

unreimbursed, and uninsured medical costs, are other monetary

obligations that Frank agreed to pay under the UCCJEA. Since other

monetary obligations are not subject to the exclusive continuing

jurisdiction provisions under the UCCJEA, the UCCJEA did not deprive

the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction over Mother’s claim that

Frank breached his agreement to pay child support and breached his

agreement to pay David’s medical expenses and insurance premiums

under the terms of the Agreed Decree. As a district court, the 418th

District Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over disputes that involve

     34Miss. Code Ann. § 93-27-102(c); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 152.102(3).

                                   24
an amount in controversy exceeding $500. 35 The amount in controversy

here exceeded that amount.

     Last, we turn to Frank’s argument that the trial court didn’t have

subject-matter jurisdiction to sign an order awarding him any rights or

burdening him with any obligations over David’s possession, custody, or

access because Mother didn’t meet her burden to show the Chancery

Court in Mississippi lost its exclusive continuing jurisdiction over David’s

case. As mentioned, David turned eighteen in May 2023. The trial court’s

orders addressing Frank’s duties and obligations of possession, custody,

and access as they relate to David expired under the trial court’s order

when David turned eighteen. Because Frank is no longer subject to the

possession, custody, and access provisions in the Order modifying the

Decree, the possession, custody, and access provisions in the Order to the

extent it applies to David are moot.

     The mootness doctrine is a constitutional limitation that prohibits

courts from issuing advisory opinions. 36 A controversy between parties

     35Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 24.007(b) (providing that “[a] district court

has original jurisdiction of a civil matter in which the amount in
controversy is more than $500, exclusive of interest”)
     36Elec. Reliability Council of Tex., Inc. v. Panda Power Generation

Infrastructure Fund, LLC, 619 S.W.3d 628, 634 (Tex. 2021).
                                    25
becomes moot “when events make it impossible for the court to grant the

relief requested or otherwise affect the parties rights or interests.” 37 A

controversy may become moot at any time, including on appeal, and the

court may sua sponte consider mootness. 38 If a case becomes moot, we

must dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. 39

       When a child becomes an adult by turning eighteen, issues of

conservatorship, possession, and access become moot. 40 Both the Texas

and Mississippi versions of the UCCJEA define a child as “an individual

       37State ex rel. Best v. Harper, 562 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. 2018) (cleaned

up).
       38See Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 184 (Tex. 2001).
       39Heckman v. Williamson Cnty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 162 (Tex. 2012).
       40In re Marriage of Comstock, 639 S.W.3d 118, 127 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, no pet.) (“A controversy can become moot at any
time, including on appeal, and courts have an obligation to take into
account intervening events that may render the controversy moot.”)
(cleaned up); Overturf v. Garcia, No. 03-18-00777-CV, 2019 Tex. App.
LEXIS 10588, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 6, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.)
(“Because [the child] recently reached the age of majority, there is no
longer a live controversy, rendering [the] appeal moot.”); In re D.S.H., No.
09-16-00109-CV, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 3525, at *14 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont Apr. 20, 2017, no pet.) (finding that the Father’s argument
that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s findings on the
conservatorship issue became moot because the child, who was seventeen
when the trial occurred turned eighteen before the case was decided on
appeal).
                                     26
who has not attained 18 years of age.” 41 So to the extent Frank complains

that the 418th District court exercised jurisdiction over issues that

addressed David’s possession, custody, and access, those complaints are

moot. 42

                               Conclusion

      For the reasons explained above, we dismiss Frank’s complaints

addressing David’s possession, conservatorship, and access as moot. We

overrule Frank’s sole issue challenging the trial court’s subject-matter

jurisdiction to sign the Order modifying the remaining provisions in the

Agreed Decree.

      AFFIRMED IN PART AND DISMISSED AS MOOT IN PART.

                                                   HOLLIS HORTON
                                                       Justice

Submitted on February 2, 2024
Opinion Delivered March 14, 2024

Before Golemon, C.J., Horton and Johnson, JJ.

      41Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 152.102(2); see Miss. Code Ann. § 93-27-

102(b).
      42Harper, 562 S.W.3d at 6.

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