Court Opinion

ID: 9740038
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:26:25.681815+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:15.536373
License: Public Domain

DEININGER, J.
¶ 25. (dissenting). I cannot join in the disposition ordered by the majority. The result reached is not, in my view, required by existing precedent, and it replicates the unfairness the supreme *206court described and sought to avoid in Watts v. Watts, 137 Wis. 2d 506, 405 N.W.2d 303 (1987):
[A]llowing no relief at all to one party in a so-called "illicit" relationship effectively provides total relief to the other, by leaving that party owner of all the assets acquired through the efforts of both. Yet it cannot seriously be argued that the party retaining all the assets is less "guilty" than the other. Such a result is contrary to the principles of equity. Many courts have held, and we now so hold, that unmarried cohabitants may raise claims based upon unjust enrichment following the termination of their relationships where one of the parties attempts to retain an unreasonable amount of the property acquired through the efforts of both.
Id. at 532-33, 405 N.W.2d at 314 (footnote omitted).
¶ 26. I acknowledge our obligation to follow and apply the holdings of previously published opinions of this court. See Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 189-90, 560 N.W.2d 246, 256 (1997). I conclude, however, that neither Greenwald v. Greenwald, 154 Wis. 2d 767, 454 N.W.2d 34 (Ct. App. 1990), nor DeWitt v. DeWitt, 98 Wis. 2d 44, 296 N.W.2d 761 (Ct. App. 1980), upon which the majority relies, requires the result the majority reaches.
¶ 27. There is no dispute that Julia Meyer contributed mightily to her husband's attainment of his medical degree, both financially and through the contribution of her homemaking services and moral support over the ten-year span encompassing Joseph's undergraduate and medical studies and his internal medicine residency. Then, just as the couple was poised to begin reaping the rewards of their decade of mutual hard work and sacrifice, in the form of Joseph's $125,000 salary as a physician, they divorced.
*207¶ 28. The majority's reading of the prior decisions of this court creates a cruel Catch-22 for Julia.1 Because the couple did not marry until 1993, the trial court is directed to give no consideration whatsoever in its maintenance determination to the first seven years of Julia's contributions to Joseph's education and increased earning capacity. But, the relief that would ordinarily be available to an unmarried person in Julia's position, recovery for her contributions under an unjust enrichment theory, must also be denied her because the fruit of her labors was Joseph's increased earning capacity represented by his medical degree, instead of the accumulation of more tangible assets. I disagree with both propositions.
¶ 29. I conclude that the trial court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in awarding Julia maintenance in the amount of $20,400 per year for eight years, given the facts before it. The trial court's award was explicitly based on both support and fairness considerations. The award is sustainable on the basis of numerous factors under § 767.26, Stats., including the educational level of the parties at the inception and end of their marriage; the disparity in their earning capacities; the time needed for Julia to increase her earning capacity and improve her prospects for a comparable standard of living; the parties' mutual agreement, express or implied, before and during the marriage, whereby Julia made financial and service contributions to Joseph "with the expectation of reciprocation or other compensation in the future"; and Julia's contributions to Joseph's education and *208increased earning power. See § 767.26(4)-(9). In my view, the fact that the trial court considered the seven years of contributions Julia made to Joseph's education and increased earning power prior to their marriage does not so taint the maintenance award that it must be reversed.
¶ 30. Reversal of the maintenance award is required by neither statute nor case law. I note first, as did the trial court, that several of the relevant statutory factors are not explicitly limited to occurrences during the marriage. In particular, the last two factors, § 767.26(9) and (10), Stats. ("[t]he contribution by one party to education... or increased earning power of the other," and "[s]uch other factors as the court may . . . determine to be relevant"), are not limited to post-marriage events. The majority believes, however, that we are compelled by our holding in Greenwald to limit a trial court's application of the statutory factors to events occurring only during the marriage. I disagree.
¶ 31. Our discussion of the issue in Greenwald appears to be dicta. The discussion was not necessary to our disposition of the appeal — the reversal and remand of the trial court's property division ruling, with a direction to also reconsider maintenance in view of the new property division. But even if the Greenwald discussion is binding precedent, it does not require us to reverse the present maintenance determination. Our conclusion in Greenwald was that the trial court did not err when it "refused to consider [the wife]'s premarital contributions in support of her . . . maintenance ... claim[ ]." Greenwald, 154 Wis. 2d at 789, 454 N.W.2d at 42.2 But our conclusion in Greenwald that *209the trial court properly declined to consider premarital contributions when setting maintenance, does not require us to now hold that a trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, and regardless of the facts before it, may never give any consideration to one spouse's premarital contributions to the other's education and increased earning capacity.
¶ 32. The factual differences between Greenwald and the present case are substantial. There, a seventy-year-old widower engaged the housekeeping services of a "twice divorced" woman "in her late 50's." Id. at 776, 454 N.W.2d at 37. She moved into the man's home and received free room and board in exchange for part-time housekeeping services, while she continued full-time employment outside the residence for some eight years. The woman "oftentimes proposed marriage," but the man declined, wishing to preserve his estate for his own children. Id. Ultimately, however, and under the terms of a premarital agreement that served to keep each party's property separate and free from the claims of the other, the parties married when they were sixty-seven and eighty-one, respectively. Three years later, the wife filed for divorce and asked that the marital property agreement be set aside. See id. at 776-78, 454 N.W.2d at 37-38.
¶ 33. There is nothing in our recitation of the facts in Greenwald to suggest that the wife contributed in any significant way, either before or during the marriage, to the accumulation of assets or to the increased earning power of the husband. In fact, the opposite is implied, given that the husband had retired and accumulated substantial assets before the relationship began. See id. One could also infer from our discussion *210of the facts in Greenwald, and from our conclusion that the marital property agreement was substantively fair, that we considered the wife to have received fair compensation under the agreement for the contributions she made to the household, both before and during the marriage. See id. at 783-88, 454 N.W.2d at 40-42. It is not surprising, then, that we also concluded that the trial court was not required to consider the wife's claimed premarital contributions to the marital estate, as she insisted the court should have done. See id. at 789-90, 454 N.W.2d at 42-43.
¶ 34. The present facts are vastly different. During the seven years prior to their marriage, while Joseph pursued his undergraduate and medical education, Julia provided the primary, if not the sole, financial support for the household.3 And, unlike the Greenwalds, when these parties married, they made no agreement limiting either's claims against the other in the event of the dissolution of their marriage. To the contrary, the trial court found that Julia "shared her bed, home, and income with [Joseph] with the expectation that some day she would be a doctor's wife, and that is what she did become."
*211¶ 35. In short, I do not read our discussion in Greenwald to stand for the proposition that a trial court, when determining maintenance in a divorce action, may never consider the premarital contributions of one spouse to the education and increased earning capacity of the other spouse, regardless of the facts before it. Thus, I would hold that Greenwald is distinguishable on the present facts, and that the trial court did not err in giving some consideration to Julia's substantial contributions to Joseph's education and earning power during the seven years of their relationship which predated their marriage. Affirming the trial court's exercise of discretion in this case would not revolutionize family law, devalue the institution of marriage or create disincentives for persons to marry. It would simply confirm that when determining maintenance in a divorce action, a trial court may, but need not, consider the contributions by one spouse to the education and increased earning power of the other spouse, over the entire relationship of the parties.4
*212¶ 36. I also conclude that Julia's claim is sustainable under her alternative rationale — unjust enrichment. Julia pled contractual and unjust enrichment claims for compensation for her premarital contributions to Joseph's education and increased earning power. The trial court permitted her to pursue the unjust enrichment claim along with her claims under ch. 767, Stats. In its decision on maintenance following the final hearing in the divorce, the court acknowledged that it could have rested its maintenance award in part on the unjust enrichment theory, but declined to do so, concluding that the additional rationale was unnecessary. I agree with the trial court in both regards: the maintenance award is a proper exercise of discretion by the trial court in view of the factors under § 767.26, Stats., but if other or additional justification for the award is necessary, the theory of unjust enrichment, as set forth in Watts, provides it.
¶ 37. The majority again relies, inappropriately I believe, on a prior opinion of this court in denying Julia relief under a theory of unjust enrichment for the contributions she made to Joseph's education and increased earning capacity prior to the marriage. The majority's reliance on DeWitt v. DeWitt, 98 Wis. 2d 44, 296 N.W.2d 761 (Ct. App. 1980), is misplaced. The supreme court has made clear that our holding in DeWitt (that "a professional education or the increased earning capacity it confers" is not an asset of the marital estate, subject to division in a divorce action) must be limited to the facts and circumstances of that case:
*213We believe that our Divorce Reform Act, ch. 105, Laws of 1977, provides a flexible way for trial courts to compensate a spouse in cases of this kind. The DeWitt Case, on which the court of appeals relied in reversing the trial court, arose under ch. 247, STATS., 1975. However, the legislature subsequently made numerous changes in the divorce and separation statutes. This case is controlled by the amended statutes and we hold that the trial court properly applied them in awarding compensation to Judy Lundberg.
■ In amending these statutes, the legislature made clear its intent that "... a spouse who has been handicapped socially and economically by his or her contributions to a marriage shall be compensated for such contributions at the termination of the marriage. . . ." Ch. 105, sec. 1(2), Laws of 1977. Compensation for a person who supports his or her spouse while the spouse is in school can be achieved through both property division and maintenance payments.
Lundberg v. Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d 1, 9-10, 318 N.W.2d 918, 922 (1982). Moreover, the court concluded in Lundberg that fairness requires a trial court to consider and compensate a wife for "her costs and foregone opportunities resulting from her support of [her husband] while he was in school," because the husband's "medical degree is the most significant asset of the marriage." See id. at 14, 318 N.W.2d at 924.
¶ 38. Thus, DeWitt is questionable as precedent following the enactment of ch. 105, Laws of 1977. Furthermore, we did not say in DeWitt that no consideration could be given to a wife's contributions to her husband's attainment of a professional degree, only that the degree itself was not an asset that could be *214valued and divided under the existing property division statute:
While we hold that the trial court erred in valuing the [husband]'s law degree as an asset of the marital estate, it is our opinion that both the [wife]'s financial contributions to the family while he obtained it and the present disparity in the parties' income earning capacities resulting from the postponement of the [wifej's own education are appropriate factors for consideration in arriving at a property division, and in determining whether alimony (now "maintenance") is appropriate.
DeWitt, 98 Wis. 2d at 60, 296 N.W.2d at 769. Judge Dykman, in a concurrence, would have gone even further. He would have allowed the valuation of the law degree and its division as a marital asset, concluding that merely considering the wife's contribution to the attainment of the degree for purposes of property division or maintenance presents "difficulties" in certain cases. See DeWitt, 98 Wis. 2d at 63-65, 296 N.W.2d at 770-71 (Dykman, J., concurring).5
¶ 39. The circumstances which concerned Judge Dykman then are similar to those before us now:
It is common to find couples with no property or children, where one spouse is gainfully employed while the other obtains an education. If the divorce is obtained upon receipt of the degree, there are no significant assets which the court can award the supporting spouse as compensation. The supporting spouse would have a difficult time establishing need, for maintenance payments if he or she is employed *215and there are no children. Thus, the court's inability to consider the degree as a marital asset would result in a situation in which the income of one spouse is used for the benefit of the other spouse with no method of allowing compensation.
Id. at 65-66, 296 N.W.2d at 771 (Dykman, J., concurring).
¶ 40. Fortunately, in this case, the trial court was able to compensate Julia for her contributions to Joseph's medical education and increased earning capacity by awarding her maintenance. In so doing, the trial court in no way violated our holding in DeWitt — the court placed no dollar value on Joseph's medical degree, nor did it attempt to divide it as a marital asset. Awarding maintenance on the present facts is not only consistent with what the DeWitt majority cited as a proper alternative to the treatment of a professional degree as property, but it also comports with the supreme court's subsequent discussion of the issue in Lundberg. Thus, unlike the present majority, I conclude that if the trial court was precluded from considering Julia's premarital contributions to Joseph's education and increased earning capacity directly under § 767.26(9) and (10), Stats., the court could properly do so in the context of Julia's unjust enrichment claim. And, consistent with the supreme court's holdings in Watts and Lundberg, the court did not err in compensating Julia by awarding her maintenance for a limited term following the parties’ divorce, as a remedy for what would otherwise be Joseph's unjust enrichment.
¶ 41. Finally, I encourage the supreme court to accept this case for review, if Julia requests the court to do so. Whether I or other members of this court like it or not, cohabitation before marriage is no longer *216regarded by society as the rare exception to a general rule of proper behavior for young adults. Many couples today begin their lives together as the Meyers did, by establishing a household prior to formalizing their relationship through marriage. In the process, they often acquire and commingle significant assets, and they embark on arrangements such as that before us, where one party supports and assists the other in obtaining or completing an education. If such a couple chooses never to marry, the law is well-settled that the relief and remedies made available to the parties under Watts and its progeny remain separate and distinct from those set forth in ch. 767, Stats. However, when a couple chooses to marry, and in so doing becomes bound by ch. 767, the law is not quite so clear. The supreme court should clarify whether a trial court may consider the entire history of the parties' relationship when applying the factors under § 767.26, Stats., as I believe it may, or if the court must close its eyes to everything that occurred between the parties prior to their marriage, as the majority holds.

A "Catch-22" is "a frustrating situation in which one is trapped by contradictory regulations or conditions." The Random House Dictionary of the English Language 327 (2d ed. 1987).

 "[T]he trial court refused to consider Josephine's premarital contributions in support of her and [sic] maintenance and property division claims. We affirm the court's ruling." Green-*209wald v. Greenwald, 154 Wis. 2d 767, 789, 454 N.W.2d 34, 42 (Ct. App. 1990).

 The earnings histories of both parties, as compiled by the Social Security Administration, were introduced as trial exhibits. These exhibits show that from 1986 through 1993, Joseph had total earnings of $15,592, ranging from a low of zero to a high of some six thousand dollars in any one year. Julia, on the other hand, earned a total of $151,773 during those eight years, never less than eleven thousand dollars in any year, and over $24,000 in two of the years. These are the years prior to the parties' marriage in 1993 during which Joseph completed his undergraduate degree and attended medical school, and during which the trial court found that he and Julia shared a household.

 If Greenwald's legacy is indeed what the majority concludes it is, I believe that we wrongly decided the issue. We acknowledged in Greenwald that the supreme court had not addressed the issue of maintenance in Watts, and further that the holding in Watts applied only to never-married cohabitants. Greenwald v. Greenwald, 154 Wis. 2d 767, 790, 454 N.W.2d 34, 43 (Ct. App. 1990). We were nonetheless not "persuaded that the parties' later marriage requires a different result." Id. I fail to see why this is so. It is one thing to conclude, as the supreme court did in Watts, that the legislature did not intend the property division provisions of the Family Code to apply to "unmarried cohabitants." See Watts v. Watts, 137 Wis. 2d 506, 519-20, 405 N.W.2d 303, 309 (1987). It is quite another, however, to conclude that a trial court, when considering an award of maintenance for a married person who is divorcing, may never give any consideration to the premarital contributions of *212that person to his or her spouse's education and increased earning power. As I have noted, many of the factors under § 767.26, STATS., contain no "during the marriage" limitation, and Watts does not require that we insert one.

 The supreme court cited Judge Dykman's concurrence in DeWitt with approval in Lundberg v. Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d 1,7, 318 N.W.2d 918, 921 (1982).