Court Opinion

ID: 9615466
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:37:07.465741+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:03:13.251016
License: Public Domain

ROSSMAN, J.,
dissenting.
I dissent from the majority’s holding on appeal that, because defendants did not object to the verdict before the jury was dismissed, they waived their right to object to entry of a judgment based on that verdict. The majority apparently bases its holding on the assumption that a verdict awarding punitive damages without actual damages isper se defective. I *98do not agree. As defendants correctly point out, the jury returned a “facially sufficient verdict which, as a matter of law, awarded no damages.”
Neither party disputes that punitive damages cannot be awarded without an award of actual damages. That is another way of stating the rule that punitive damages are not recoverable in the absence of proof of actual damages. Crouter v. United Adjuster, Inc., 259 Or 348, 364, 485 P2d 1208 (1971). A proven (¿serete, discernible harm must underlie any punitive damages award. Klinicki v. Lundgren, 298 Or 662, 686, 695 P2d 906 (1985). Under that rule, the verdict here, which awarded BSI only punitive damages, means that the jury did not find that BSI proved a discrete, discernible harm on its claim for fraud. Thus, insofar as defendants were concerned, the verdict was not defective; it was a verdict for them.1 In other words, defendants were not “aggrieved” by the verdict. If BSI did not agree that that was what the jury intended, it was incumbent on BSI — not defendants — to ask the jury to correct any alleged defect.
The effect of the majority’s opinion is that a defendant now will be required to ask the judge to resubmit a verdict which is in the defendant’s favor. That result is illogical to me and, I submit, will also be illogical to trial attorneys. That result is also not dictated by the cases relied on by the majority, none of which involved a verdict awarding punitive damages.
Closer to the question before us, and supporting the conclusion opposite to the majority’s, is Klinicki v. Lundgren, supra. There, inter alia, the plaintiff brought a personal claim for breach of fiduciary duty against the defendant Lundgren. The plaintiff sought actual and punitive damages. The trial court tried the actual damages issue and found that Lundgren had breached his duty. However, the trial court made no award of actual damages against Lundgren. A jury then tried the punitive damages issue and found against Lundgren, but the court never made an award of actual damages. Four months after the verdict, Lundgren moved to *99dismiss the plaintiffs claim under ORCP 21A, asserting mainly that the plaintiff was not entitled to general damages and therefore could not recover punitive damages. 298 Or at 685. The trial court set aside the punitive damages verdict and sua sponte entered a judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of Lundgren on the punitive damages issue. Both we and the Supreme Court affirmed.
As we noted in our opinion, Klinicki v. Lundgren, 67 Or App 160, 167 n 2, 678 P2d 1250 (1984), the record did not show that any party brought the absence of an award of actual damages to the trial court’s attention. Despite that failure to object before the verdict was received, neither we nor the Supreme Court held that Lundgren had waived the right to challenge the punitive damages four months after the jury was discharged.2
Klinicki v. Lundgren, supra, is analagous to the circumstances here. ORCP 64B(5) allows a new trial if the verdict is “against law.” The verdict here was legally erroneous. I would hold that the trial court did not err in granting a new trial.
Deits, De Muniz and Leeson, JJ., join in this dissent.

 See Robin v. Knuth, 108 Or App 207, 815 P2d 704 (1991) (trial court erred in refusing to accept jury’s verdict finding for plaintiff on breach of contract claim but awarding plaintiff “$ 0” in damages; under ORCP 61A(2), the verdict was legally sufficient).

 Rhodes v. Harwood, 273 Or 903, 544 P2d 147 (1975), did involve an issue of a timely objection to a verdict which awarded punitive damages but only nominal general damages. The plaintiff argued that the defendant had not objected to the verdict before the jury was discharged. The Supreme Court held that the defendant had. The trial court understood that the defendant had a continuing objection because he had objected to the initial verdict which awarded punitive damages but no general damages, and had objected to resubmitting the case to the juiy. There was no error, however, because the punitive damages were awarded on a claim for trespass, in which proof of actual damages is not required. Actual damages are presumed to exist.
It does not appear from the opinion that the defendant’s assignment of error was grounded on a post-trial motion, as is the issue here. In the light of Klinicki v. Lundgren, I cannot read Rhodes to dictate the result reached by the majority.