Court Opinion

ID: 9584478
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:48:46.674026+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:07:57.398741
License: Public Domain

LATIMER, Justice
(concurring).
*190I concur.
For convenience in following my discussion I divide the first part of Section 103 — 51—8, U. C. A. 1943, into three clauses:
(1) “Any person who procures a female inmate for a house of prostitution”
(2) “or induces, persuades, encourages, inveigles, or entices a female to become a prostitute”
(3) “or who by promises, threats, violence, ,or by any device or scheme, causes, induces, persuades, encourages, takes, places, harbors, inveigles, or entices a female to become an inmate of a house of prostitution, or assignation place, or any place where prostitution is practiced, encouraged, or allowed.” Emphasis added).
Appellant’s principal contention is that he was convicted under subsection (2) and that the state failed to prove the offense because a successful inducement is an element of the offense, and there was no evidence that the complaining witness became a prostitute. His interpretation would require that we add to the language of subsection (2) the words “so as to cause her to become a prostiute.” Such an interpretation seems to be precluded by the context of the act and by the wording of subsections (1) and (3). The offense as defined in subsection (1) could not be committed without a successful enticement. To procure a female inmate for a house of prostitution requires an actual procurement and the placing of the woman in the house of assignation. Subsection (3), which by transposition can be read “or by promises, induces or encourages a female person to become an inmate of a house of prostitution” sets out an offense which can be committed without the woman becoming an inmate. Mere encouragement or solicitation to become an inmate, even though unsuccessful, is being prohibited. To construe subsection (3) *191to require a procurement would result in that subsection restating identical elements with those prescribed in subsection (1). Two rules of construction of statutes are that the legislature intended the entire statute to be effective and certain; and, that the act shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all of its provisions. Unless we construe subsection (1) to require actual procurement and subsection (3) only mere solicitation, the legislature is guilty of doing a useless act by repeating itself in enumerating the elements necessary to constitute the offense.
If the legislature intended the words “encourage to become an inmate” in subsection (3) not to require a successful enticement, then when the words “encourage to become a prostitute” were used in subsection (2) they should be given the same effect. If the meaning of a word or phrase is clear in one part of an act, it should be construed to mean the same in other portions.
Viewed in the light of the foregoing rules, the legislature must have intended that the word “become” merely referred to the subject matter of the encouragement.