Court Opinion

ID: 9927537
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-28 19:56:48.936377+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:18.090460
License: Public Domain

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT                                          Reporter of Decisions
Decision:  2023 ME 72
Docket:    Aro-23-1
Argued:    October 4, 2023
Decided:   November 21, 2023

Panel:        STANFILL, C.J., and JABAR, HORTON, CONNORS, LAWRENCE, and DOUGLAS, JJ.

                                  STATE OF MAINE

                                           v.

                                ADRIAN COVINGTON

HORTON, J.

         [¶1] Adrian Covington appeals from a judgment of default and forfeiture

of $17,815 in cash bail, see 15 M.R.S. § 1094 (2023), entered after the trial court

(Aroostook County, Nelson, J.) denied his motion to set aside the forfeiture of

that portion of his deposited cash bail. He contends that the court abused its

discretion in denying his motion because the bail bond did not, on its face, warn

him of forfeiture as a possible consequence for violating the condition of his

release that he commit no criminal act. We affirm the judgment because a

publicly available statute authorized the forfeiture, see id.; the bail bond stated

that it was secured by Covington’s cash; and the bail commissioner certified

that the commissioner had explained Covington’s obligations to him.
2

                                       I. BACKGROUND

        [¶2] The facts are procedural and are drawn from the trial court record.

In January 2020, Covington was charged by criminal complaint with six crimes,

including aggravated attempted murder and assault, alleged to have occurred

on or about January 11, 2020. The court (Soucy, J.) entered an order committing

Covington to the Aroostook County Jail and setting bail at $250,000. Ultimately,

the State dismissed the charges of aggravated attempted murder and added

charges of robbery and elevated aggravated assault, resulting in a July 2020

indictment on seven charges.1                The order of commitment was amended

repeatedly, resulting in a decrease in the amount of cash required to be posted

for bail.

        [¶3] On April 7, 2021, a bail commissioner issued a bail bond, signed by

both Covington and the bail commissioner. The bail bond indicated that the

bond was “SECURED” by $20,000 in cash posted by Covington for his release

from custody:

    1 The indictment charged Covington with possession of a firearm by a prohibited person (Class C),

15 M.R.S. § 393(1)(A-1)(1) (2023); reckless conduct with a dangerous weapon (Class C), 17-A M.R.S.
§§ 211, 1604(5)(A) (2023); two counts of assault (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. § 207(1)(A) (2023); two
counts of robbery (Class A), 17-A M.R.S. §§ 651(1)(E), 1604(3) (2023); and elevated aggravated
assault (Class A), 17-A M.R.S. § 208-B(1)(A) (2023). Although the indictment mistakenly cited
statutes that had been repealed and replaced before the time of the criminal conduct alleged, we cite
the applicable statutes in this footnote. Compare 17-A M.R.S. § 1252(4), (5) (2018) with 17-A M.R.S.
§ 1604(3), (5)(A); see P.L. 2019, ch. 113, §§ A-1, A-2 (effective May 16, 2019).
                                                                                                       3

        SECURED. To be released from custody the following property is
        being posted. The property is:

                Cash in the amount of $20000—

The bond included the following provision:

        I agree to obey the following conditions of my release so long
        as this bail bond remains in effect. I understand that it is a crime
        for me to violate any of these conditions, and that if I violate these
        conditions I will be subject to arrest, jail and/or a fine.

As a standard condition required of anyone released on bail, Covington

affirmed, “I will commit no criminal act . . . .” See 15 M.R.S. § 1003(1)(A) (2023);

15 M.R.S. § 1026(1) (2020).2 The court-ordered conditions of release, with

which Covington agreed to abide, disallowed the posting of cash surety by a

third party, and the bond indicated that none of the cash had been posted by a

third party. Covington signed the bond under the affirmation, “I have read and

   2    Title 15 M.R.S. § 1003(1)(A) (2023) defines “bail,” in the preconviction context, to mean “the
obtaining of the release of the defendant upon an undertaking that the defendant shall appear at the
time and place required and that the defendant shall conform to each condition imposed in
accordance with section 1026 that is designed to ensure that the defendant shall refrain from any
new criminal conduct, to ensure the integrity of the judicial process and to ensure the safety of others
in the community.” (Emphasis added.) Title 15 M.R.S. § 1026(1) (2020)—the statute in effect when
the bail bond was issued—required that any order for pretrial release of a defendant “must include
. . . the condition[] that the defendant refrain from new criminal conduct.” We cite an earlier version
of section 1026 because that statute was amended repeatedly after the issuance of the bail bond in
this matter. See P.L. 2021, ch. 397, §§ 2-6 (effective Oct. 18, 2021) (codified as subsequently amended
at 15 M.R.S. § 1026(3)-(5) (2023)); P.L. 2021, ch. 608, §§ C-1, C-2 (effective Aug. 8, 2022) (codified at
15 M.R.S. § 1026(5), (7) (2023)); P.L. 2021, ch. 647, §§ B-9, B-10 (effective Jan. 1, 2023) (codified at
15 M.R.S. § 1026(1), (4) (2023)); P.L. 2023, ch. 299, § 2 (effective Oct. 25, 2023) (to be codified at
15 M.R.S. § 1026(3)); P.L. 2023, ch. 405, §§ E-1, E-2 (effective Oct. 25, 2023) (to be codified at
15 M.R.S. § 1026(3)).
4

I understand all my obligations under this bond.” The bail commissioner

who signed the bond affirmed, “I have explained the defendant’s . . . obligations

under this bond on this date,” and Covington initialed that he had received a

copy of the conditions of his release.

      [¶4] On April 11, 2022, the State moved to revoke Covington’s bail and

sought forfeiture of his $20,000 in cash on the ground that he had committed

new criminal conduct, including by assaulting multiple police officers. On

June 13, 2022, the court entered an agreed-upon order granting the State’s

motion to revoke Covington’s bail, and, after hearing arguments, it ordered the

forfeiture of the $20,000 as required by 15 M.R.S. § 1094 and denied Covington

release on bail. Covington appealed from that order to a single justice of the

Maine Supreme Judicial Court (Mead, J.), who affirmed the order. See 15 M.R.S.

§ 1097(3) (2023).

      [¶5] Covington timely moved to set aside the forfeiture of the cash,

see M.R.U. Crim. P. 46(g)(2)-(3), arguing that justice did not require the

forfeiture because Covington—who was incarcerated without bail—would not

be missing any court dates and because the forfeiture would cause a financial

hardship to him and the family members who loaned him money for bail, who

believed that there would be no forfeiture if Covington appeared in court. The
                                                                                5

court held a hearing on the motion on December 9, 2022. Covington presented

testimony from his wife that she had contributed $2,185 in funds to Covington’s

deposited cash bail, believing from what Covington had told her that it would

be returned if he attended all court hearings. Covington argued that it was

unjust to allow any forfeiture because the bail bond did not mention forfeiture

as a possible consequence of a violation of the condition that he not commit any

further criminal acts.

      [¶6] The court entered a judgment on December 12, 2022, determining

that justice did not require forfeiture of the $2,185 of Covington’s bail that his

wife had contributed. The court granted the motion for relief as to the $2,185,

“on the condition that those funds be returned” to Covington’s wife, but it

denied the motion as to the remaining $17,815 because there was “no evidence

that Mr. Covington was misled by a representative of the State regarding how

bail works or informed . . . that the only way there was a risk of forfeiture was

from a failure to appear.” The court reasoned that the law presumed Covington

to know that 15 M.R.S. § 1094 required forfeiture upon the violation of a bail

condition.

      [¶7]    Covington appealed to us by filing a notice of appeal on

December 27, 2022. With the appeal pending, we authorized the trial court to
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enter a final judgment on the forfeiture and accepted Covington’s appeal as an

appeal from that judgment. See State v. Williams, 1999 ME 82, ¶ 5, 730 A.2d

677; 15 M.R.S. § 2115 (2023).

                                       II. DISCUSSION

        [¶8] The Maine Bail Code provides, “When a defendant who has been

admitted to . . . preconviction . . . bail in a criminal case . . . has violated the

conditions of release, the court shall declare a forfeiture of the bail.”3 15 M.R.S.

§ 1094. Section 1094 authorizes the Supreme Judicial Court to adopt rules

governing the enforcement of a defendant’s obligations, and those rules “must

provide for notice to the defendant . . . of the consequences of failure to comply

with the conditions of bail.” Id.

        [¶9] Rule 46 of the Maine Rules of Unified Criminal Procedure, adopted

by the Supreme Judicial Court, provides that “[t]he procedure governing

preconviction . . . bail for a defendant is generally provided by statute.” M.R.U.

Crim. P. 46(a). As required by section 1094, the Rule goes on to provide notice

of the consequence of forfeiture if a defendant breaches a condition in a bond,

    3Although Covington is correct that “[i]n some states, a defendant does not forfeit bail for the
breach of a condition of release other than an appearance condition,” 8 C.J.S. Bail § 229 (Westlaw
updated Aug. 2023), Maine is not among those states.
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and it authorizes a court to set aside a forfeiture if justice does not require the

forfeiture:

              (g) Forfeiture.

            (1) Declaration. If there is a breach of condition of a bond,
      the court shall declare a forfeiture of the bail and give notice to the
      defendant and the person who has agreed to act as surety or
      deposited cash bail.

             (2) Setting Aside. The court may direct that a forfeiture be set
      aside, upon such conditions as the court may impose, if it appears
      that justice does not require the enforcement of the forfeiture.

              ....

M.R.U. Crim. P. 46.

      [¶10] Regarding the contents of the bail bond itself, the statute in effect

when the bail commissioner issued the bond provided that “[i]n a release order

. . . the judicial officer shall . . . [a]dvise the defendant of . . . [t]he penalties for

and consequences of violating a condition of release, including the immediate

issuance of a warrant for the defendant’s arrest.” 15 M.R.S. § 1026(5)(B)(2). As

defined in 15 M.R.S. § 1003(8), “judicial officer” includes a bail commissioner.

      [¶11] Covington argues that, particularly because he and those who gave

him money for bail are not professional bondspeople, the court should have set

aside the forfeiture in full in the absence of a bail bond providing explicit notice
8

of the possibility of forfeiture.4 He argues that the court should have applied

basic contract law principles to the bail bond such that the consequences for

violating conditions of release are limited to those stated in the bond.

        [¶12] We review for an abuse of discretion a ruling on a motion to set

aside a forfeiture. See State v. Ellis, 272 A.2d 357, 360 (Me. 1971). In reviewing

a decision for an abuse of discretion, we consider three issues: “(1) are factual

findings, if any, supported by the record according to the clear error standard;

(2) did the court understand the law applicable to its exercise of discretion; and

(3) given all the facts and applying the appropriate law, was the court’s

weighing of the applicable facts and choices within the bounds of

reasonableness.” Marks v. Marks, 2021 ME 55, ¶ 15, 262 A.3d 1135 (quotation

marks omitted).

        [¶13] Although we have not explicitly stated so before, the statutory

scheme and Rule 46(g) of the Maine Rules of Unified Criminal Procedure make

clear that the defendant has the burden of proof and burden of persuasion on

    4The Judicial Branch’s current form for bail bonds—updated in October 2021—does include
notice of this consequence:

    WARNING: Your cash or surety bail may be ordered forfeited if you fail to appear or if you violate
any of the conditions of release in this case. The reason(s) for requiring surety or cash bail or the
potential forfeiture of this bail are failing to appear as ordered in this case, prior history of failing to
appear, violation of any of the conditions of release on this bond, prior history of violating conditions
of release in this case or others, or failure to abide by court orders.
                                                                                 9

the motion to set aside a forfeiture. See 15 M.R.S. § 1094; M.R. Civ. P. 46(g);

see also United States v. Gil, 657 F.2d 712, 716 (5th Cir. 1981); State v. Ventura,

952 A.2d 1049, 1055 (N.J. 2008); Allegheny Mut. Cas. Co. v. State, 368 A.2d 1032,

1034 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977); People v. United Bonding Ins. Co., 77 Cal. Rptr.

310, 313 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969). Because a defendant bears the burden of proof

on a motion to set aside a forfeiture, a defendant challenging a court’s factual

findings in ruling on such a motion must show that the record compelled a

different finding. See State v. Norris, 2016 ME 37, ¶ 14, 134 A.3d 319 (stating

that, when the defendant has the burden of proof and the fact-finder decides

that the defendant did not meet that burden, we “will disturb that finding only

if the record compels a contrary conclusion” (quotation marks omitted)).

      [¶14] Covington is correct that we regard a bail bond as a contract.

See Ellis, 272 A.2d at 358 (“Upon the execution of the bail bond a contract arose

between the State of Maine and the [third parties], by the terms of which the

[third parties] undertook to guarantee the appearance of [the defendant] . . . .”);

State v. Willette, 402 A.2d 476, 478 (Me. 1979) (assessing the admissibility of

evidence that a defendant was “out of State in violation of his bail bond

contract”); State v. Burnham, 44 Me. 278, 283-84 (1857) (“A recognizance is a

contract entered into by the recognizors, on certain conditions therein
10

specified.”). Like other contracts, the contract memorialized in a bail bond is

“made with reference to and subject to existing law, and every law affecting the

contract is read into and becomes a part thereof.” State v. Hurley, 270 N.W.2d

915, 917 (Neb. 1978); see All Star Bail Bonds, Inc. v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 326 P.3d

1107, 1110 (Nev. 2014) (“The statutes governing bail bonds are . . .

incorporated into the agreement of the parties.”); Gilman v. Gilman, 956 P.2d

761, 767 (Nev. 1998) (explaining that “[p]arties are presumed to contract with

reference to existing statutes,” and thus, “[a]pplicable statutes will generally be

incorporated into the contract”); cf. State v. Spring, 176 S.W.2d 817, 817

(Tenn. 1944) (“A bond is to be construed according to its terms, unless those

terms conflict with some statutory provision as to its contents.”).

      [¶15] In State v. LeBlanc-Simpson, 2018 ME 109, ¶ 16, 190 A.3d 1015, we

interpreted a bail statute to be incorporated into a pretrial order setting forth

conditions for the defendant’s release.        There, we construed the statute

establishing that a condition of release is effective and enforceable “as of the

time the judicial officer sets the condition, unless [a] bail order expressly

excludes it from immediate applicability.”            15 M.R.S. § 1026(7); see

LeBlanc-Simpson, 2018 ME 109, ¶ 1, 190 A.3d 1015. We held that the “order

introduced in evidence contained no such exclusion and thus, by law, was
                                                                              11

effective when entered at the initial appearance hearing.” LeBlanc-Simpson,

2018 ME 109, ¶ 16, 190 A.3d 1015. Even though the effective date of the

conditions was not explicitly stated in the order, we held that the statutory

provision applied. See id. ¶¶ 6-7, 16.

      [¶16] Section 1094 conveyed to Covington the consequence of forfeiture

if he violated a condition of release. Furthermore, given the bail bond’s use of

the term “SECURED” in advance of all of the conditions of release, it is clear on

the face of the bail bond that the $20,000 was posted as security for Covington’s

compliance with all of the conditions that follow, including the second

enumerated condition, which required Covington to refrain from committing

any other criminal act. In this context, the term “secure” carries its ordinary

meaning: “to make sure or certain; guarantee; ensure, as with a pledge [to

secure a loan with collateral].” Secure, Webster’s New World College Dictionary

(5th ed. 2016).

      [¶17]    The $20,000 thus served as the collateral for Covington’s

compliance with the bail conditions; when he violated those conditions, he

forfeited the $20,000 that secured the bail bond, except to the extent that the

court decided to set the forfeiture aside under Rule 46(g). See 15 M.R.S.

§§ 1003(1)(A), 1026(1), 1094.       The collateral is precisely what secured
12

Covington’s agreement to comply with the conditions of release, and the loss of

that collateral was therefore a potential consequence for his breach of a

condition.

         [¶18] Furthermore, there is no evidence that any judicial officer failed to

advise Covington in accordance with section 1026(5)(B)(2). To the contrary,

the bail bond included a bail commissioner’s certification, “I have explained the

defendant’s . . . obligations under this bond on this date,” and there has been no

suggestion of any misrepresentation or omission in the commissioner’s

explanation of the bond to Covington.5

         [¶19] Although Covington cites LeBlanc-Simpson in arguing that all

consequences for violating bail conditions must be stated on the face of the bail

bond contract, we did not hold in LeBlanc-Simpson that every provision of law

governing conditions of release must be included on the face of the document

containing those conditions. 2018 ME 109, ¶¶ 6-7, 20-24, 190 A.3d 1015. We

held only that, when the person subject to a bail condition did not sign a bail

bond acknowledging it, the State must prove that the person had notice of the

     Covington did not offer evidence that he lacked actual notice that the sum would be forfeited if
     5

he committed a criminal act in violation of his conditions of bail. See United States v. Gil, 657 F.2d
712, 716 (5th Cir. 1981); State v. Ventura, 952 A.2d 1049, 1055 (N.J. 2008); Allegheny Mut. Cas. Co. v.
State, 368 A.2d 1032, 1034 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977); People v. United Bonding Ins. Co., 77 Cal. Rptr.
310, 313 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969).
                                                                                                   13

condition for the person to be convicted of violating it.6 Id. ¶¶ 20-24. The bail

condition at issue in LeBlanc-Simpson was a no-contact condition specific to the

defendant, not a statutory provision incorporated as a matter of law into the

bail contract. Cf. id. ¶¶ 6, 21. Further, unlike the defendant in LeBlanc-Simpson,

Covington does not contest the provision of notice of his conditions of release.

Rather, he claims that he lacked notice of a statutory consequence of violating

his conditions of release.                Finally, in contrast to the defendant in

LeBlanc-Simpson, Covington signed the bail bond and agreed to abide by all of

his conditions of release. Cf. id. ¶ 7.

       [¶20] The bail bond itself, the bail statutes, and the court rule were

adequate to support the court’s decision declining to determine that justice

does not require the enforcement of the forfeiture. See 15 M.R.S. §§ 1003(1)(A),

1026(1), 1094; M.R.U. Crim. P. 46(a), (g). We therefore conclude that, on the

record before the court, it acted within its discretion in denying Covington’s

motion as to $17,815 of his deposited cash bail.

   6 The standard of proof applicable in State v. LeBlanc-Simpson, 2018 ME 109, 190 A.3d 1015, thus

differed from the standard of proof here; that case involved a prosecution for the crime of violation
of a condition of release, see 15 M.R.S. § 1092(1)(B) (2023), which requires a finding of guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt, see LeBlanc-Simpson, 2018 ME 109, ¶¶ 15, 18, 190 A.3d 1015, whereas the court’s
decision whether to set aside Covington’s forfeiture of bail money was discretionary, see M.R.U.
Crim. P. 46(g)(2).
14

        The entry is:

                           Judgment affirmed.

Rory A. McNamara, Esq. (orally), Drake Law LLC, York, for appellant Adrian
Covington

Todd R. Collins, District Attorney, and Christiana Rein, Asst. Dist. Atty. (orally),
8th Prosecutorial District, Houlton, for appellee State of Maine

Aroostook County Unified Criminal Docket docket number CR-2020-34
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY