Court Opinion

ID: 2963656
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Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:13:34.74805+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:21:31.917207
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USCA1 Opinion

	

          November 14, 1995 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                              _________________________

          No. 94-1958

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                                 JEFFREY W. SPINNEY,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                              _________________________

                                     ERRATA SHEET
                                     ERRATA SHEET

               The opinion of this  court issued on September 19,  1995, is
          corrected as follows:

          On page 2, line 3   change "(count 1)" to "(count 2)".

          On page 2, line 4   change "(count 2)" to "(count 3)".

          On page  2, line 6 (footnote  1)   change "All  references are to
          the superseding indictment." to "Count 1, which charged appellant
          with conspiring to commit bank robbery,  see 18 U.S.C.   371, was
                                                   ___
          dismissed on the government's motion."

          On  page 5, line 10   insert  the following text before the words
          "aiding  and abetting":   "counts  of conspiracy  to commit  bank
          robbery, see 18 U.S.C.    371 (which count was  later dismissed),
                   ___
          ".

          On  page 5,  line 14    change "each  count." to  "each remaining
          count."

          On page 5, line 20   change "count 1" to "count 2".

          On page 7, line 10   change "count 1" to "count 2".

          On page 11, lines 24-25 (footnote 5)   change "The grand jury did
          not lodge  a conspiracy charge against Spinney and the government
          has  not tried"  to  "Having  moved  for  the  dismissal  of  the
          conspiracy count against appellant, the government did not try ".

          On page 16, line 24   change "(11th Cir. 1986)" to (11th Cir.)".

          On page 21, line 12   change "count 1" to "count 2".

          On page 21, line 13   change "count 2" to "count 3".

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                              _________________________

          No. 94-1958

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                                 JEFFREY W. SPINNEY,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                              _________________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                   [Hon. Douglas P. Woodlock, U.S. District Judge]
                                              ___________________

                              _________________________

                                        Before

                          Selya and Boudin, Circuit Judges,
                                            ______________

                              and Lisi,* District Judge.
                                         ______________

                              _________________________

               Diana L. Maldonado, Federal Defender Office, for appellant.
               __________________
               Timothy Q.  Feeley, Assistant United  States Attorney,  with
               __________________
          whom Donald K. Stern,  United States Attorney, was on  brief, for
               _______________
          appellee.

                              _________________________

                                  September 19, 1995

                              _________________________

          ____________________
          *Of the District of Rhode Island, sitting by designation.

                    SELYA,  Circuit  Judge. Defendant-appellant  Jeffrey W.
                    SELYA,  Circuit  Judge.
                            ______________

          Spinney  challenges his  convictions for  aiding and  abetting an

          armed bank robbery (count 2) and aiding and abetting the use of a

          firearm  during and  in relation  to a  crime of  violence (count

          3).1    In  our  view,   the  two  crimes,  despite   superficial
                              
          ____________________

               1Count 1, which charged  appellant with conspiring to commit
          bank  robbery,  see  18  U.S.C.     371,  was  dismissed  on  the
                          ___
          government's motion.   The implicated portions  of the applicable
          statutes are as follows:

                    Whoever,  by   force  and  violence,   or  by
                    intimidation,  takes,  or  attempts to  take,
                    from the person or presence of another . .  .
                    any property  or money or any  other thing of
                    value belonging to, or in the  care, custody,
                    control,  management,  or possession  of, any
                    [federally  insured] bank  .  . .  [shall  be
                    punished as provided by law].

          18 U.S.C.   2113(a) (1988).

                    Whoever, in committing,  or in attempting  to
                    commit, any  offense defined in  [  2113(a)],
                    puts in  jeopardy the  life of any  person by
                    the  use of  a  dangerous  weapon or  device,
                    shall be . . . [punished as provided by law].

          18 U.S.C.   2113(d) (1988).

                    Whoever, during and in  relation to any crime
                    of  violence  .  .  .  for  which  he  may be
                    prosecuted in  a court of the  United States,
                    uses or  carries a  firearm, shall  . .  . be
                    [subjected to additional punishment].

          18 U.S.C.   924(c)(1) (1988).

                    Whoever commits an offense against the United
                    States  or  aids, abets,  counsels, commands,
                    induces  or  procures   its  commission,   is
                    punishable as a principal.

          18 U.S.C.   2(a) (1988).

                    As  the text  indicates,  a conviction  for armed  bank
          robbery,  18 U.S.C.     2113(d), necessarily  signifies that  the

                                          4

          similarities,  require  the   application  of  dissimilar   legal

          standards.  Because the evidence  amassed by the government falls

          between these stools, we affirm the first conviction  but reverse

          the second.

          I.  BACKGROUND
          I.  BACKGROUND

                    We limn the pertinent facts in the light most favorable

          to the government, see United States v. Ortiz, 966 F.2d 707, 710-
                             ___ _____________    _____

          11 (1st Cir. 1992), cert. denied,  113 S. Ct. 1005 (1993), paying
                              _____ ______

          particular  heed  to those  details  that  arguably reflect  what

          appellant knew and when he knew it.

                    On August 20, 1991, at  around 3:00 p.m., Gerald Mohan,

          a conscientious FBI agent, noticed appellant (a person previously

          known to him)  sitting on  the steps of  the Federal Building  in

          Lowell,  Massachusetts.   Mohan  decided  to  mount an  impromptu

          surveillance.    As  he  was  positioning  his  vehicle,  a  blue

          Oldsmobile arrived at  the scene.   After  appellant entered  the

          Oldsmobile,  it made several quick  turns and then  pulled to the

          curb.  The driver (subsequently  identified as Paul Kirvan) moved

          into  the  front passenger  seat  and appellant  took  the wheel.

          Kirvan and appellant proceeded  to criss-cross the streets around

          the  Lowell Institution for Savings (the  Bank).  Mohan testified

          that the pair's driving pattern appeared to  be part of a process

          of careful scrutiny.

                    Roughly fifteen minutes  after beginning  surveillance,

                              
          ____________________

          government has proved the elements of the lesser included offense
          of unarmed bank robbery, 18 U.S.C.   2113(a).

                                          5

          Mohan  followed  the  Oldsmobile  to  Academy  Drive.    There he

          observed  a  classic   getaway  "switch  site"  on   a  dead  end

          approximately 0.3 miles from the Bank.  Appellant and Kirvan next

          returned to the  vicinity of  the Federal Building.   On  Fayette

          Street,  Kirvan alighted  from the  Oldsmobile (which  he owned),

          entered a parked Chevrolet Monte Carlo (later ascertained to have

          been stolen some  distance away),  and began  driving toward  the

          Bank.    Appellant followed  him  in  the  Oldsmobile, and  Mohan

          followed both of them,  caravan-style, in his own vehicle.   When

          the two  drivers veered in separate directions,  Mohan lost sight

          of both  cars.  He circled in the general vicinity and, some four

          minutes  later, glimpsed  the  Chevrolet at  a standstill  in the

          Bank's parking lot.

                    Mohan made a U-turn and  headed back to the Bank.   His

          efforts were  unavailing; at  that precise moment,  the Chevrolet

          accelerated  rapidly out of the parking lot and passed him (going

          in the  opposite direction).  Kirvan was alone in the car.  Mohan

          made yet another U-turn and unsuccessfully gave chase.

                    At approximately 3:25 p.m., ostensibly during the brief

          interval in which Mohan lost track of his quarry, a masked Kirvan

          entered the  Bank, instructed those  present not to  move, jumped

          over  the tellers' counter, stuffed  the contents of several cash

          drawers  into a  garbage bag,  leapt back  over the  counter, and

          fled.  Although Kirvan  brandished a handgun at the height of the

          robbery,  a teller testified that the weapon was not visible when

          he entered the Bank.

                                          6

                    Other percipient witnesses reported that, mid-afternoon

          of the  same day,  they saw  a Chevrolet  Monte Carlo speed  down

          Academy  Drive.  Two  men, one  holding a  bag, emerged  from the

          vehicle, crossed through two  gates, and drove away in  a waiting

          blue car.  The  witnesses were unable to identify  either suspect

          positively, although one of the men "looked like" appellant.  The

          Lowell police recovered the Chevrolet that afternoon.  They found

          Kirvan's blue Oldsmobile the next morning, abandoned not far from

          the switch site.

                    The  government established  that appellant  and Kirvan

          had been close friends for many years.  Telephone   toll  records

          reflected seventy-three calls between the men's residences in the

          nineteen days  preceding the  robbery, including eleven  calls on

          August 19.

                    A federal  grand jury  indicted appellant on  counts of

          counts of conspiracy to commit bank  robbery, see 18 U.S.C.   371
                                                        ___

          (which count was  later dismissed), aiding and abetting  an armed

          bank  robbery, see 18 U.S.C.    2113(d), and  aiding and abetting
                         ___

          the  use  of a  firearm  during and  in  relation to  a  crime of

          violence,  see  18 U.S.C.    924(c).    A jury  trial eventuated.
                     ___

          After appellant unsuccessfully moved  for judgment of  acquittal,

          the jurors returned  a guilty verdict  on each remaining  count.2
                              
          ____________________

               2In a separate proceeding before a different judge and jury,
          Kirvan  was convicted of armed bank robbery  and use of a firearm
          during and in relation  to a crime of violence.   Notwithstanding
          the  verdict, the judge ordered an acquittal on the latter count.
          We affirmed the armed bank robbery conviction and  reinstated the
          firearms conviction.  See  United States v. Kirvan, 997  F.2d 963
                                ___  _____________    ______
          (1st Cir. 1993).

                                          7

          The court sentenced appellant  to serve 262 months in  prison for

          armed  robbery and  imposed a  mandatory sixty-month  consecutive

          sentence  in  respect  to  the  firearms  charge.    This  appeal

          followed.

          II.  ARMED BANK ROBBERY
          II.  ARMED BANK ROBBERY

                    Appellant  challenges the  sufficiency of  the evidence

          supporting   his   conviction  on   count   2.     Our   task  is

          straightforward.  We must  ascertain whether, "after assaying all

          the evidence in  the light  most amiable to  the government,  and

          taking  all  reasonable  inferences  in  its  favor,  a  rational

          factfinder  could  find,  beyond  a reasonable  doubt,  that  the

          prosecution  successfully proved  the  essential elements  of the

          crime."  United  States v.  O'Brien, 14 F.3d  703, 706 (1st  Cir.
                   ______________     _______

          1994).    In  performing  this task,  we  do  not  pass  upon the

          credibility  of witnesses,  see id.,  nor do  we demand  that the
                                      ___ ___

          government   disprove  every   hypothesis  consistent   with  the

          defendant's innocence,  see United States v.  Echeverri, 982 F.2d
                                  ___ _____________     _________

          675, 677 (1st Cir. 1993).

                    The  jury reached its verdict in this case on the basis

          of circumstantial evidence.  Reliance  on indirect, as opposed to

          direct,  evidence in  a  criminal case  is  both permissible  and

          commonplace.   See O'Brien, 14  F.3d at 706  (observing that "the
                         ___ _______

          criminal  law  does  not  place  a  special   premium  on  direct

          evidence").  In making  such judgments, "juries are not  required

          to examine the evidence  in isolation, for `individual  pieces of

          evidence, insufficient  in themselves  to prove a  point, may  in

                                          8

          cumulation prove it.'"  Ortiz, 966 F.2d at 711 (quoting Bourjaily
                                  _____                           _________

          v. United States,  483 U.S.  171, 179-80 (1987)).   Thus, when  a
             _____________

          jury draws inferences  from circumstantial evidence, a  reviewing

          court should refrain from second-guessing the ensuing conclusions

          as long as  (1) the  inferences derive support  from a  plausible

          rendition of  the record, and (2) the conclusions flow rationally

          from those inferences.  See id.
                                  ___ ___

                    We add a  cautionary note.  Despite the  deference that

          characterizes appellate  review of  jury verdicts, juries  do not

          have carte blanche.  The appellate function, properly understood,
               _____ _______

          requires the reviewing  court to take a  hard look at the  record

          and  to reject  those  evidentiary interpretations  and illations

          that  are unreasonable,  insupportable,  or  overly  speculative.

          See,  e.g., United States  v. Valerio, 48  F.3d 58,  64 (1st Cir.
          ___   ____  _____________     _______

          1995);  United States  v. Loder,  23 F.3d  586, 589-92  (1st Cir.
                  _____________     _____

          1994).  This function is especially  important in criminal cases,

          given the prosecution's  obligation to prove every element  of an

          offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

                    In this  instance, the jury convicted  the appellant on

          count 2  as an aider and abettor.   See 18 U.S.C.    2(a).  Under
                                              ___

          this theory of accomplice liability, Spinney would be guilty only

          if  the  government  proved   (1)  that  Kirvan  (the  principal)

          committed the  substantive offense (armed bank  robbery), and (2)

          that Spinney (the accomplice) became associated with the endeavor

          and took part in it, intending to ensure its success.   See Nye &
                                                                  ___ _____

          Nissen v. United  States, 336  U.S. 613, 619  (1949); Ortiz,  966
          ______    ______________                              _____

                                          9

          F.2d at 711 n.1.  Because the jury heard plethoric evidence  from

          which it  rationally could  conclude that Kirvan  committed armed

          bank robbery, we direct our  analysis to the second of these  two

          elements.

                    The  central requirement  of the  second element  is "a

          showing that  the defendant  consciously  shared the  principal's

          knowledge of the  underlying criminal act,  and intended to  help

          the principal."   United States v. Taylor, 54 F.3d  967, 975 (1st
                            _____________    ______

          Cir. 1995).  In a prosecution for armed bank robbery, this shared

          knowledge requirement is binary; it extends both to awareness  of

          the  robbery and to comprehension  that a weapon  would likely be

          used.   See United States v.  Jones, 678 F.2d 102,  106 (9th Cir.
                  ___ _____________     _____

          1982)  (explaining   that,  to  convict  under      2113(d),  the

          prosecution must "show that the  defendant aided and abetted  the

          principal  both in the act of bank robbery and in the principal's

          use  of `a dangerous weapon  or device' during  the act") (citing

          other  cases).    Appellant  maintains that  neither  finding  is

          justified here.   In the first place, he claims that the evidence

          does not adequately  show that he knew Kirvan aspired  to rob the

          Bank  and  nonetheless endeavored  to help  him.   In  the second

          place, he claims  that the record is devoid of  any proof that he
                                                          ___

          knew about the actual or intended use of a gun.3
                              
          ____________________

               3If  both arguments  succeed,  then the  conviction must  be
          reversed.     Conversely,  if  both  arguments   fail,  then  the
          conviction  must be  affirmed.   However, if  the first  argument
          fails, but the second succeeds, then,  since the jury necessarily
          found  all  the elements  of unarmed  bank  robbery, 18  U.S.C.  
                                       _______
          2113(a), and since the  trial court charged on that  statute as a
          lesser  included offense  under    2113(d), we  would  remand for

                                          10

                    1.    Shared  Knowledge  of  the  Robbery.    The first
                    1.    Shared  Knowledge  of  the  Robbery.
                          ___________________________________

          challenge need not occupy us for long.  Appellant does not assert

          that he was  "merely present" at the scene.   See Ortiz, 966 F.2d
                                                        ___ _____

          at 711 ("Mere association between the principal and those accused

          of aiding and abetting is not  sufficient to establish guilt; . .

          .  nor is mere  presence at the scene and knowledge that  a crime

          was  to   be  committed   sufficient  to  establish   aiding  and

          abetting.")  (internal  quotation  marks omitted).    Rather,  he

          focuses on the lack of direct evidence placing him at  the switch

          site, in or  near the Bank,  or in Kirvan's  company at any  time

          except immediately prior to the  commission of the crime, thereby

          attempting  to raise  doubts  about whether  he had  any specific

          intent to assist in the enterprise.

                    This  argument  is flawed  in  its  presumption that  a

          dearth of  direct evidence somehow precludes  jurors from drawing

          logical  inferences based  on available  circumstantial evidence.

          Contrary to  the burden  of appellant's thesis,  it is  precisely

          those situations  that involve an  absence of direct  evidence in

          which circumstantial evidence must be most closely analyzed.  See
                                                                        ___

          O'Brien,  14  F.3d  at 706  (explaining  that  a  lack of  direct
          _______

          evidence spurs  examination of indirect  evidence).  In  the last

          analysis,  the persuasive  power  of  circumstantial evidence  is

          attributable  more to its  relevance and probative  force than to

          the presence of complementary direct evidence.

                              
          ____________________

          resentencing on that basis.  See, e.g., United States v. Dinkane,
                                       ___  ____  _____________    _______
          17 F.3d 1192, 1198 (9th Cir. 1994).

                                          11

                    Having in  mind Mohan's  observations, the  events that

          transpired  on Academy  Drive,  the vehicles  abandoned in  close

          proximity  to the  Bank,  and the  telephone  logs, a  completely

          rational juror need  make only modest inferential leaps to arrive

          at  a founded conclusion  that the two  long-time friends planned

          the crime, the flight, and the  car switch.  See United States v.
                                                       ___ _____________

          Olbres, ___  F.3d ___, ___ (1st Cir. 1995) [No. 94-2123, slip op.
          ______

          at   10]  (finding   a  "sturdy   infrastructure,"  provided   by

          "circumstantial  and  suggestive"   evidence,  for  making  sound

          rational inferences); Taylor, 57 F.3d at 975 (similar); see  also
                                ______                            ___  ____

          Ortiz,  966  F.2d  at  711  (remarking  that  "[t]he  sum  of  an
          _____

          evidentiary  presentation may  be  greater than  its  constituent

          parts") (quoting  Bourjaily,  483  U.S. at  180).    Since  every
                            _________

          necessary inference is adequately rooted in the record, we reject

          as meritless  appellant's assignment of error based on a supposed

          lack of  proof that he knew  of, and helped to  further, Kirvan's

          desire to rob the Bank.4

                    2.    Shared  Knowledge  of the  Weapon.    Appellant's
                    2.    Shared  Knowledge  of the  Weapon.
                          _________________________________

          stronger challenge is  directed at the  jury's finding of  shared

          knowledge,  prior to  the commission  of the  crime, that  Kirvan

          would use a firearm.  See United States v. Dinkane, 17 F.3d 1192,
                                ___ _____________    _______

          1197  (9th Cir. 1994) (holding  that, for purposes  of   2113(d),

          aiding  and abetting  requires  prior knowledge  of weapon);  see
                                          _____                         ___
                              
          ____________________

               4To  the extent  that  appellant also  seeks  to impugn  the
          jury's  decision about  who and  what to  believe, we  decline to
          "usurp  the  jury's  province,"  O'Brien,  14  F.3d  at  707,  by
                                           _______
          superseding either  its rational factfinding  or its  credibility
          choices.

                                          12

          generally  United States v. de la Cruz-Paulino, ___ F.3d ___, ___
          _________  _____________    __________________

          (1st Cir. 1995)  [No. 94-1985,  slip op. at  28-30] (stating,  in

          aiding and  abetting case, that  shared knowledge  must be  prior

          knowledge).

                    A participant in the holdup of  a bank will be found to

          be  an  aider  and  abettor  of  an  armed  robbery only  if  the
                                               _____

          government  can provide an additional piece of the puzzle:  proof

          that  the accomplice "knew a  dangerous weapon would  be used [in

          the robbery] or at least . . . was on notice of the likelihood of

          its use," United States v. Sanborn,  563 F.2d 488, 491 (1st  Cir.
                    _____________    _______

          1977); accord United States v. Ferreira, 625 F.2d 1030, 1032 (1st
                 ______ _____________    ________

          Cir. 1980).  Refined to bare essence, appellant's asseveration on

          this  point is that the evidence, taken  as a whole, is so sparse

          that it does not  satisfy the Sanborn standard; there  are simply
                                        _______

          no  facts, he  tells  us, from  which  a reasonable  juror  could

          extrapolate to a finding of shared knowledge.5  We do not agree.

                    In  terms, the  Sanborn rubric  requires only  proof of
                                    _______

          "notice of . . . likelihood"  to satisfy this prong of the shared

          knowledge  element  in connection  with  a charge  of  aiding and

          abetting  an  armed  bank robbery.    This  phrase  is not  self-

          defining.  Hence, it is important to search out its meaning.

                    We  start from  the  premise that  the Sanborn  court's
                                                           _______

          formulation of the shared knowledge requirement is  not merely an
                              
          ____________________

               5Having  Moved for  the  dismissal of  the conspiracy  count
          against  appellant,  the  government  did  not try  to  hang  his
          criminal  liability  on  the  reasonably  foreseeable  act  of  a
          coconspirator.  Compare Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640,
                                  _________    _____________
          647-48 (1946).

                                          13

          awkward  locution.   Other  courts  have adopted  it,  see, e.g.,
                                                                 ___  ____

          United States v. McCaskill,  676 F.2d 995, 998 (4th  Cir.), cert.
          _____________    _________                                  _____

          denied, 459 U.S. 1018  (1982); United States v. Ingram,  592 A.2d
          ______                         _____________    ______

          992, 1003 (D.C. App.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1017 (1991), and it
                                 _____ ______

          stands in marked contrast   almost as point and counterpoint   to

          the  "practical certainty" formulation that courts have developed

          for  assessing  the  shared knowledge  requirement  applicable to

          aiding  and abetting firearms  charges brought under  18 U.S.C.  

          924(c).  See infra  Part III.  The glaring  linguistic difference
                       _____

          between the two formulations guides our inquiry.

                    Knowledge is a concept,  not an absolute.  In  the law,

          as  in  life, "knowledge"  means  different  things in  different

          contexts.    Accordingly, we  believe it  is  useful to  view the

          concept as a continuum.

                    At  one end of the  continuum is what  the law commonly

          calls "constructive  knowledge."   Constructive knowledge  is the

          law's  way of  recognizing that,  given  an awareness  of certain

          subsidiary  facts, a  person  is quite  likely  to know,  can  be

          expected to  know, or at  least should  know that a  further fact

          exists.   See Black's Law Dictionary 314  (6th ed. 1990) ("If one
                    ___

          by exercise  of reasonable  care would have  known a fact,  he is

          deemed to have had constructive knowledge of said fact . . . .").

          By way of illustration, if an easily visible foreign object is on

          a  staircase for an appreciable  length of time,  the law accepts

          the  reasonableness  of a  conclusion  that the  occupier  of the

          premises "knew" of its presence (even though there is no evidence

                                          14

          that the occupier actually knew, by observation or report, of the
                            ________

          object's whereabouts).

                    At  the  other end  of the  continuum  is what  the law

          commonly calls "actual knowledge."  Actual knowledge, as the term

          implies, reduces the need for inference; it suggests the presence

          of   particular   evidence   which,  if   credited,   establishes

          conclusively that the person in question knew of the existence of

          the fact in question.  See  id. at 873 (defining actual knowledge
                                 ___  ___

          as  "positive, in contrast to imputed or inferred, knowledge of a

          fact").   To carry our example forward, if witnesses testify that

          the occupier himself placed  the foreign object on the  stair, or

          remarked its  location, that testimony,  if believed, establishes

          that the occupier actually knew of its presence.

                    The concepts  of constructive  and actual knowledge  do

          not occupy the entire span of the continuum.  Knowledge varies in

          origin, degree, and an array of other respects.  These gradations

          are best  visualized as way  stations that dot the  length of the

          hypothetical knowledge continuum.  Notice of likelihood fits into

          the poorly charted area  that stretches between the poles  of the

          continuum.   While  we  believe that,  in  a criminal  case,  the

          reasonable  doubt  standard  requires that  notice  of likelihood

          comprise   more  than  constructive  knowledge  simpliciter,  its
                                                          ___________

          articulation evokes  echoes of constructive knowledge  and places

          the  proof  requirement  closer to  that  end  of  the continuum.

          Actual knowledge, after all,  is certain knowledge, see  id., and
                                                              ___  ___

          likelihood is not the stuff of certainty.

                                          15

                    Logically,  then,  the  Sanborn rubric  implies,  in  a
                                            _______

          section 2113(d) case, that  the defendant's shared knowledge need

          not amount to actual knowledge that his cohort  intended to use a
                        ______

          gun or  other  dangerous  weapon in  robbing  the  bank;  indeed,

          Sanborn's disjunctive phraseology, 563  F.2d at 491 ("knew .  . .
          _______

          or at  least . . .  was on notice of the  likelihood"), leaves no

          doubt  that a conviction can  be grounded on  something less than

          actual  knowledge.   We  conclude  that  an  enhanced showing  of

          constructive  knowledge  will  suffice.   See  United  States  v.
                                                    ___  ______________

          Grubczak, 793 F.2d 458, 463 (2d Cir. 1986).
          ________

                    While  this is  a very  close case,  we think  that the

          evidence clears  the notice of  likelihood hurdle.   Our analysis

          builds  on  the human  condition.   Jurors  are "not  expected to

          ignore  what is perfectly  obvious," Echeverri, 982  F.2d at 679,
                                               _________

          but,   rather,  "to  take  full  advantage  of  their  collective

          experience and common sense."  O'Brien, 14 F.3d at 708.   In this
                                         _______

          case, the  scheme called for a lone robber to enter a bank during

          business hours with the intent  of looting it.  One  would expect

          tellers, guards, customers, and other persons unsympathetic to an

          unauthorized  withdrawal of funds to  be on the  premises.  Under

          those circumstances,  not even  the most sanguine  criminal would

          expect clear sailing without some menace in  the wind.  In short,

          the circumstances gave rise  to constructive knowledge beforehand

          that the intruder would need a gun or some other dangerous device

          to  accomplish the  felons' agreed  goal.   See United  States v.
                                                      ___ ______________

          Powell, 929 F.2d 724,  727 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (stating,  in dictum,
          ______

                                          16

          that  "possession  of  a gun  .  . .  is  virtually  essential in

          [perpetrating a bank robbery]").

                    Here,  moreover, Spinney  was not  merely a  bit player

          (say, a lookout or a getaway driver), but  a leading man.  A jury

          could  reasonably  infer  from  the  totality  of  the  attendant

          circumstances,  particularly  from the  host  of telephone  calls

          between Spinney  and Kirvan  and from Spinney's  participation in

          the elaborate reconnaissance mission, that he had a major role in

          planning the heist.   Even  assuming that there  was no  specific

          discussion  of  the  use of  a  gun,  evidence  of a  defendant's

          substantial  involvement  over  the  course of  several  days  in

          planning and  orchestrating a  robbery, when coupled  with actual

          participation in carrying it  out, permits a compelling inference

          that  the defendant knew the  salient details of  the plot (e.g.,

          the  timing of the robbery, the bank's identity and location, the

          planned entry by a lone robber).   These circumstances seem to us

          to  sustain  a finding  that Spinney  was  on notice  that Kirvan

          likely would  tote a gun in  the course of  the upcoming robbery.

          See  Grubczak,  793  F.2d  at  464  (relying  on  evidence  of  a
          ___  ________

          defendant's  substantial  involvement  as  a  planner  of  and  a

          "principal player[] in the robbery" to help ground "the inference

          that he had to have been aware of the likely use of a  gun"); see
                                                                        ___

          also United States v. DeMasi, 40 F.3d 1306, 1316 (1st Cir.  1994)
          ____ _____________    ______

          (inferring  knowledge  that   weapons  would  be  employed   from

          accomplice's awareness of the conspirators' overall  plan), cert.
                                                                      _____

          denied, 115 S. Ct. 947 (1995).
          ______

                                          17

                    Appellant  decries  this  approach,  claiming  that  it

          necessitates the  stacking of inference  upon inference.   In one

          sense,  at least, this may be so   but "[t]he rule is not that an

          inference,  no matter how reasonable, is to be rejected if it, in

          turn,  depends upon  another  reasonable inference;  rather,  the

          question  is  merely   whether  the  total   evidence,  including

          reasonable inferences, when put together is sufficient to warrant

          a jury to conclude  that defendant is guilty beyond  a reasonable

          doubt."  Dirring v. United States, 328 F.2d 512, 515  (1st Cir.),
                   _______    _____________

          cert. denied, 377  U.S. 1003 (1964).   Chains of inference  are a
          _____ ______

          familiar,  widely   accepted   ingredient  of   any  process   of

          ratiocination.  This method  of reasoning, commonly called logic,

          is  regularly relied  upon in  the realm  of human  endeavor, and

          should not be forbidden to a criminal jury.

                    Of course,  the inferential chain must be strong6   but

          here,  the  hypothesis  upon   which  Spinney's  section  2113(d)

          conviction rests is not at all dubious.  On  this record, despite

          the lack of direct evidence and the uncertainties associated with

          that lack, the jury rationally could find Spinney to have been an

          architect of, and an  active participant in, the robbery.   Given

          these  available findings, and the persuasive  force of the other

          permissible inferences supported by the overall circumstances, we
                              
          ____________________

               6As  we recently  wrote:  "Guilt  beyond a  reasonable doubt
          cannot  be  premised  on  pure  conjecture.    But  a  conjecture
          consistent with the evidence becomes  less and less a conjecture,
          and  moves  gradually  toward  proof,  as   alternative  innocent
          explanations  are discarded  or  made less  likely."   Stewart v.
                                                                 _______
          Coalter,  48 F.3d 610, 615-16 (1st Cir. 1995), petition for cert.
          _______                                        ________ ___ _____
          filed (U.S. June 19, 1995) (No. 94-9742).
          _____

                                          18

          cannot  say  that  the  jury  exceeded  its  proper  province  in

          concluding  that Spinney  was on  notice of  the likelihood  that

          Kirvan would use a gun.7  See Sanborn, 563 F.2d at 490.
                                    ___ _______

          III.  THE FIREARMS CHARGE
          III.  THE FIREARMS CHARGE

                    Appellant  also  challenges  the  sufficiency   of  the

          evidence  in regard to his  conviction under 18  U.S.C.   924(c).

          Although here, too, appellant is charged as an aider and abettor,

          his assignment of error raises a somewhat different question.  To

          prove that a defendant  aided and abetted a violation  of section

          924(c), the government must establish that the defendant knew "to

          a practical certainty that the principal would be [using] a gun."

          United States  v. Torres-Maldonado, 14  F.3d 95,  103 (1st  Cir.)
          _____________     ________________

          (quoting  Powell, 929 F.2d at 728), cert.  denied, 115 S. Ct. 193
                    ______                    _____  ______

          (1994); accord DeMasi, 40 F.3d at 1316.
                  ______ ______

                    The government  strives to collapse  the linguistically

          different standards  for aiding  and abetting liability  under 18
                              
          ____________________

               7We acknowledge that two other courts, on somewhat analogous
          facts, have  found that  a defendant's participation  in planning
          will not support  a conviction  for aiding and  abetting under   
          2113(d).   See  Dinkane,  17  F.3d  at  1197;  United  States  v.
                     ___  _______                        ______________
          Pendergraph, 791  F.2d 1462, 1466 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
          ___________                                         _____ ______
          479  U.S. 869 (1986).   But every  case is different  and must be
          judged on its particular array of facts.  Moreover, in this case,
          unlike in Dinkane, 17  F.3d at 1195, the district  court properly
                    _______
          instructed  the jury as to  the elements of  aiding and abetting,
          and unlike in Pendergraph, 791 F.2d at 1464-65, the court did not
                        ___________
          erroneously  admit  evidence that  would  have  allowed the  jury
          improperly to convict.   At any rate,  to the extent our  holding
          today  contradicts  Dinkane  and/or  Pendergraph,  we  stand  our
                              _______          ___________
          ground.   In the final  analysis, we cannot  reject as irrational
          the jury's "conclu[sion] that an accomplice so closely associated
          with the venture could not fail to know what would be the central
          question in  any robbery:    how the  robbers were  to force  the
          bank's employees to part  with the money."  Sanborn,  563 F.2d at
                                                      _______
          490.

                                          19

          U.S.C.    2113(d)  and 924(c), respectively,  at the less  taxing

          end of the knowledge  continuum.  We are uncomfortable  with this

          esemplastic approach.  Particularly when  juxtaposed with "notice

          of  . . . likelihood," we believe that "practical certainty" is a

          rubric that  calls  for proof  verging on  actual knowledge,  see
                                                                        ___

          Model Penal  Code   2.02  at 236  n.13 (1985)  ("With respect  to

          result elements, one  cannot of course  `know' infallibly that  a

          certain  result will follow from engaging in conduct, and thus to

          some  extent  `knowledge,'  when   applied  to  result  elements,

          includes  a  contingency  factor  as  well.    This  is expressed

          definitionally  in terms  of  whether the  actor is  `practically

          certain' that  the result will  follow."), and, thus,  presents a

          considerably higher hurdle  for the prosecution to overcome.  Nor

          do  we think that  we are free  to cut  this hurdle down  to size

          either  by  reading  significantly  dissimilar  articulations  to

          denote  a  single  meaning  or  by treating  one  of  them  as  a

          linguistic  accident.  Courts invite error when they try to weigh

          meaning only after placing a thumb on the scale, or when they too

          freely write  off as  malapropos  words carefully  chosen in  the

          past.   If principle  is to prevail,  we must give  effect to the

          obvious difference in standards of knowledge.8
                              
          ____________________

               8There are,  moreover, policy reasons why  courts might wish
          to adopt divergent standards  for an accomplice's knowledge under
          the  two statutes. While possession  of a gun  or other dangerous
          instrumentality will  likely facilitate  a bank robbery,  many of
          the felonies  that underlie    924(c) can  be   and  often are   
          completed   unarmed.     Furthermore,  defendants   convicted  of
          violating    924(c), unlike  defendants convicted of  violating  
          2113(d),  must be given an  additional sentence of  at least five
                                      __________
          years, to run  consecutively to the term of incarceration imposed

                                          20

                    In  this  case, the  difference  is  dispositive.   The

          government's argument  boils down to  an assertion that  the jury

          could  infer that  Spinney  was practically  certain of  Kirvan's

          anticipated use  of a  gun based  on  the evidence  we have  just

          reviewed,  principally  the  confederates'  joint  design  of the

          robbery.  Yet, the government adduced no evidence suggesting that

          firearms were  actually contemplated  in the planning  stages, or

          that Spinney had any actual knowledge that Kirvan would be armed.

          Under the  circumstances, we conclude that  the government's best

          evidence (that  Spinney helped to mastermind  the robbery), taken

          in the light  most favorable  to the verdict,  even when  coupled

          with  the   jury's  ability  to  make   intuitive  judgments,  is

          insufficient  to  support the  requisite  inference of  practical

          certainty.9   See, e.g., Powell,  929 F.2d at  729; United States
                        ___  ____  ______                     _____________

          v. Hamblin, 911 F.2d  551, 558-59 (11th Cir.), cert.  denied, 500
             _______                                     _____  ______

          U.S. 943 (1991).

                    In  a last-ditch effort to save the day, the government

          directs  our attention  to  a  series  of  drug  cases  in  which
                              
          ____________________

          for the  underlying crime.  See  18 U.S.C.   924(c)(1).   Both of
                                      ___
          these considerations suggest that a higher threshold of knowledge
          may well be appropriate in the   924(c) milieu.

               9Although  courts  sometimes   have  distinguished   between
          prosecutions under the  two statutes with which we are concerned,
          see, e.g., United States v. Medina, 32 F.3d 40, 47 (2d Cir. 1994)
          ___  ____  _____________    ______
          (narrowly directing its holding to cases brought  under   924(c),
          and distinguishing  cases brought under    2113(d)), our research
          has  revealed no  reported case  in which  the evidence  has been
          found sufficient to sustain an aiding and abetting conviction for
          armed  bank  robbery, but  insufficient  to sustain  a  charge of
          aiding and abetting the commission of a firearms offense based on
          the same incident.  To that extent, our decision today breaks new
          ground.

                                          21

          knowledge of a vessel's cargo was imputed to crew members.   See,
                                                                       ___

          e.g., United States v. Guerrero-Guerrero, 776 F.2d 1071 (1st Cir.
          ____  _____________    _________________

          1985),  cert. denied,  475  U.S. 1029  (1986);  United States  v.
                  _____ ______                            _____________

          Quejada-Zurique, 708 F.2d  857 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
          _______________                            _____ ______

          885 (1983).  But these scenarios are readily distinguishable from

          the  case at bar.  In  those cases, guilty knowledge was inferred

          from the  crew members' close proximity  to detectable quantities

          of  drugs over  an  extended period  of  time.10   See  Guerrero-
                                                             ___  _________

          Guerrero, 776 F.2d at 1074-75;  Quejada-Zurique, 708 F.2d at 859-
          ________                        _______________

          60.  Here,  Spinney did not even enter the bank, and there was no

          evidence  that Kirvan had the  weapon in his  possession while he

          and Spinney were together  before the robbery, let alone  that it

          was visible  or  otherwise  detectable at  that  juncture.    Put

          bluntly, even though Spinney may have spent much time with Kirvan

          devising the plan, and was on notice of the likelihood that a gun

          would be  used in the course  of the robbery, there  is simply no

          evidence  to  support  a  reasoned conclusion  that  Spinney  was

          practically certain that Kirvan would be armed.

                    In sum, "likelihood" and "practical certainty" are  not

          equivalent terms.   Applying  the practical certainty  rubric, we

                              
          ____________________

               10These  situations involve  what we  have termed  "culpable
          presence."   Ortiz, 966 F.2d at  712.  They must be distinguished
                       _____
          from ones  in which  a defendant is  "merely present"  on a  drug
          vessel.  Such presence, without more (i.e., absent "circumstances
          where   presence   itself   implies  participation,"   id.),   is
                                                                 ___
          insufficient  to ground  criminal liability.   See,  e.g., United
                                                         ___   ____  ______
          States v. Hyson, 721 F.2d 856, 863 (1st Cir. 1983); United States
          ______    _____                                     _____________
          v. Mehtala,  578 F.2d 6, 9 (1st  Cir. 1978).  Spinney's situation
             _______
          does not fit within the integument of the genuine "mere presence"
          cases.

                                          22

          hold  that the  jury reached  its verdict  on the  section 924(c)

          count without an adequate evidentiary foundation.

          IV.  CONCLUSION
          IV.  CONCLUSION

                    This is  the rare  case in  which the evidence,  viewed

          most  congenially  to the  government,  passes  muster under  the

          notice   of  likelihood   test  and,  therefore,   justifies  the

          appellant's  conviction for  aiding  and abetting  an armed  bank

          robbery,  18  U.S.C.     2113(d), but,  nevertheless,  fails  the

          practical  certainty test  and, therefore,  does not  justify the

          appellant's conviction for  aiding and  abetting the  principal's

          use of a firearm during  and in relation to a crime  of violence,

          18 U.S.C.   924(c).  This  result, though it is unusual, does not

          strike us as strange.  See, e.g., Model Penal Code   2.02 at 236-
                                 ___  ____

          37  n.13 (suggesting  that, where  knowledge is  in issue,  it is

          sometimes "meaningful to draw  a line between practical certainty

          and awareness  of substantial  risk").   So it  is here:   though

          notice  of likelihood must  be proven beyond  a reasonable doubt,

          the government  can meet  this burden  by an  evidentiary showing

          less  than is  required to  prove that  the defendant  knew to  a

          practical certainty that a gun would be used.

                    We   need  go  no  further.     The  law   is  full  of

          complexities,  and language is, at  best, an imperfect device for

          capturing the energy of ideas.  Here, interpreting the words used

          by the Sanborn  court ("notice of . . .  likelihood"), on the one
                 _______

          hand, and by  the Powell  court ("practical  certainty"), on  the
                            ______

          other  hand, "in the light of the tacit assumptions upon which it

                                          23

          is reasonable to  suppose that  the language was  used," Ohio  v.
                                                                   ____

          Agler,  280 U.S. 379, 383 (1930) (Holmes, J.), it is unsurprising
          _____

          to discover a fork in the road.

                    The appellant's  conviction on count 2  is affirmed and
                    The appellant's  conviction on count 2  is affirmed and
                    _______________________________________________________

          the appellant's conviction on count 3 is reversed.
          the appellant's conviction on count 3 is reversed.
          _________________________________________________

                                          24