Court Opinion

ID: 9594974
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:34:25.212825+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:25.432666
License: Public Domain

Per Curiam
(on rehearing). In our original opinion herein we held that a stipulation of facts for the purpose of enabling the Industrial Commission to enter an award thereon, in lieu of testimony taken at a formal hearing, which stipulation embodied no element of compromise, was not a “stipulation of settlement” within the meaning of sec. 102.16 (1), Stats.. Therefore, an award made thereon became final and conclusive under sec. 102.18 (3), Stats., upon twenty days having elapsed thereafter, in the absence of the filing of a petition for review within such period.
In reaching such result, we interpreted the words “stipulation of settlement” of the statute to mean one wherein there was present some element of' compromise. The attorney general strenuously objects to this interpretation and stresses the fact that the commission for many years, by practical interpretation, has held that an award upon a stipulation of facts could be opened up any time within six years from the date of the last payment of compensation. In other words, the commission interpreted the words “stipulation of settlement” to be broad enough to embrace a stipulation of facts which embodied no element of compromise as well as stipulations' of settlement which did embody an element of com.promise.
The present wording of sec. 102.16(1), Stats., is the result of an amendment made by the legislature to the Workmen’s Compensation Act in 1943. Continuously since the adoption of such amendment the commission has made use of a form letter to accompany the mailing by it of all awards for compensation entered,upon stipulations of facts. Such form letter has been mailed to the employee, the employer, *537band the insurance carrier (in those cases in which the employer is not a self-insurer).. One paragraph of such letter contained the following statement:
“A stipulation of facts leaves a case open for further claim if additional liability can be shown, provided application is filed in the office of the Industrial Commission within six years from the date of the last payment of compensation.”
This court has held that where there is any obscurity in the meaning of a statute, practical construction given by the administrative agency charged with administering such law is entitled to great weight. State ex rel. State Asso. of Y.M.C.A. v. Richardson (1928), 197 Wis. 390, 222 N. W. 222; A. D. Thomson Co. v. Industrial Comm. (1936), 222 Wis. 445, 451, 452, 268 N. W. 113, 269 N. W. 253; and Smith v. Department of Taxation (1953), 264 Wis. 389, 392, 59 N. W. (2d) 479.
While we are still of the opinion that the more commonly accepted meaning of “stipulation of settlement” is one which embodies a compromise, there is sufficient obscurity in the meaning of such phrase to justify resort to the practical interpretation of such phrase made by the Industrial Commission. We are fearful that, if we do not resort to such practical interpretation, a grave injustice might be done to many injured employees who have acted in reliance upon such interpretation by the commission.
The mandate of the previous opinion is vacated, and the judgment is affirmed.