Court Opinion

ID: 9625782
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:51:09.360345+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:15.318917
License: Public Domain

PRATT, Chief Justice
(concurring in part).
I believe it unnecessary to make any statements concerning the University of Utah; and for that reason I confine my remarks to the Agricultural College. Furthermore, I express no opinion as to the relative merit of legislative control of the college as compared with its control were it held to be constitutionally independent.
I am not satisfied that to hold that the college is not a corporate entity, necessarily decides completely the issue of the status of the trustees. I am impressed with the thought that it is possible to have a public institution governed by a constitutional body, and this without delving into the question of the corporate character of the institution. Is the office of trustee for this college a constitutional office?
When the college was established in 1888, certain definite office holders were designated as ex officio trustees. There were seven of them, though not mentioned by number. Sec. 3, Laws of 1888, quoted in prevailing opinion. Obviously, though terms for their office were not fixed, their terms expired with the expiration of their terms in the office they held as Governor, Secretary and Assessors. In 1892 the Governor and Legislative Council determined that this form of selection of trustees was invalid, McCornick case (McCornick v. Thatcher) 8 Utah 294, 30 P. 1091, 17 *127L. R. A. 243; and the legislature provided that the Governor should appoint seven trustees. Nothing was said, however, as to terms of office. Presumably then, their service was subject to the will of the appointing authority or at least during good behavior. Although terms of other offices under the Organic Act were fixed, there is nothing either in the act or the laws of 1892 that fixes a term of the trustees.
This is the picture we had when our constitution • was adopted. These trusteeships are not mentioned in the constitution as offices of any kind. The prevailing opinion quotes the wording of Sec. 4, Article X of our constitution which refers to the college. If it is proper to infer from such wording that the trustees became fixed in number, as seven, it would seem to follow that their terms of office, should also be inferred; and thus the.constitution fixed not only the office but its term; and neither could be changed by legislative enactment. I don’t think anyone will contend that such is the case; and yet, if we are to consider the constitution as establishing these offices as constitutional, by inference only, it would seem that we should carry the inferences to their logical conclusion and include the term of office. There was a term of office of some kind contemplated by the laws existent prior to the Constitution. Presumably, the Constitution was adopting what the Territorial Legislature had provided.
I am not convinced that there is any justifiable inference that the offices of the trustees were frozen either in number or term by the constitution. Apparently the legislature of 1898 did not think so, at least as to terms of office. Sec. 2075, Rev. Stat. 1898. In that year they fixed terms. Again in 1907 they did the same thing. Sec. 2075, Comp. L. 1907. In 1909 Chap. 108, Laws of Utah 1909, they certainly thought that the number was not frozen as they provided for 9 trustees and fixed their terms of office. In *1281911 they changed to 18 members, one of whom was the Secretary of State, Chap. 35, Laws of Utah 1911, and in 1929 this same number was carried on, with their terms fixed, except as to the Secretary of State. Chap. 41, Laws of Utah, 1929.
Considering what has happened over the years as to the number and terms of office of the trustees, and that no one, up to the present time evidenced any thought that the inferences found in Sec. 4 of Article X in any way froze either the number of trustees or their terms of office, to now hold that the offices were frozen in number, seems to me to overstress rather weak inferences, and to make a selection of favorable inferences and reject unfavorable.
I agree that the bonds in this case are not a charge upon state indebtedness. I think the principles of contract as discussed by Mr. Justice WOLFE clearly support that conclusion.
I agree, also, that as the vote for the bonds was unanimous, it makes little difference whether or not all trustees were de jure.