Court Opinion

ID: 9420425
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 22:54:27.1619+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:46:18.888840
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
whom
Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Jackson join, dissenting.
In light of the attitude with which the doom of deportation has heretofore been viewed by this Court, in the case of those whose lives have been intimately tied to this country, I deem it my duty not to squeeze the Act of May 10, 1920, 41 Stat. 593, as amended, 8 U. S. C. § 157, so as to yield every possible hardship of which its words are susceptible. See Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U. S. 276, 284-85; Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U. S. 388, 391; Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U. S. 6, 10; Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U. S. 135, 147; Fiswick v. United States, 329 U. S. 211, 222, n. 8; Klapprott v. United States, 335 U. S. 601, 612, modified, 336 U. S. 942. Because we have been mindful of the fact that such deportation may result “in loss of both property and life; or of all that makes life worth living,” this Court concluded *534that due process of law requires judicial determination when a claim of citizenship is made in a deportation proceeding, while upon entry or reentry the same claim may be determined administratively. It took into account the great difference “in security of judicial over administrative action.” Ng Fung Ho v. White, supra, at 284, 285. I am aware of the fact that we are dealing here with a person whose citizenship has been taken from him. I maintain, however, that the rigorous statute permitting deportation of an “alien” should be read to apply only to one who was an alien when convicted and should not be made to apply to persons in the position of these petitioners.
Since such construction is not unreasonable, due regard for consequences demands that the statute be so read. Where, as here, a statute permits either of two constructions without violence to language, the construction which leads to hardship should be rejected in favor of the permissible construction consonant with humane considerations. The Act of May 10, 1920, provides that “All aliens who since August 1, 1914, have been or may hereafter be convicted” of certain offenses shall be deported upon a finding that they are “undesirable residents of the United States.” Since neither of the petitioners herein was found to “have been” convicted of any offense before passage of the Act, they come, it is urged, within the alternative prerequisite. But the statute, in terms, refers to aliens “who . . . may hereafter be convicted,” not persons who are citizens when convicted and later transformed into aliens by the process of denaturalization. And this view of the statute is reinforced by the legislative history as well as by considerations relating to the impact of the Court’s decision upon various other congressional enactments not now before us.
*535The Committee reports1 and congressional debate2 make plain that Congress was principally concerned with the status of about 500 persons who had been interned by the President during the First World War as dangerous alien enemies and about 150 aliens who had been convicted under various so-called war statutes. Congress could not have been unaware that naturalized citizens may lose their citizenship; yet nowhere in the legislative history do we find the remotest hint that Congress had also such denaturalized citizens in mind. On the contrary, the debates contain ample evidence that Congress had in mind only persons convicted when aliens.3
The Court’s decision has serious implications with respect to citizens denaturalized for reasons not involving moral blame,4 and who have, while citizens, committed one of a variety of acts not involving moral obliquity and *536certainly not endangering the security of the country but which nevertheless are covered by other statutory provisions in language similar to that before us.5 Thus, discriminations would as a matter of policy have to be drawn if this general problem were consciously faced by policy-makers. They are not within the power of this Court to draw. If and when Congress gives the matter *537thought, it may well draw distinctions between one who was an alien and one who was naturalized at the time of conviction, based on the manner in which citizenship was lost, the type of offense committed, and the lapse of time between conviction and denaturalization. These serious differentiations should not be disregarded by giving a ruthlessly undiscriminating construction to the statute before us not required by what Congress has written.

 H. R. Rep. No. 143, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. (1919); S. Rep. No. 283, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. (1919).

 58 Cong. Rec. 3361-3377.

 Representative Gard: “I assume that everybody will agree with that, that if an alien is tried, is afforded a fair trial and is convicted, then he is a proper subject for deportation.” 58 Cong. Rec. 3371.
Representative Robsion, discussing wealthy aliens: “We permitted .them to live here and granted them practically all of the rights of the American citizen. They reward our hospitality by joining with our enemies in an effort to destroy us. As they were not citizens, they were not required to. take up arms in defense of the country in which they had grown rich.” 58 Cong. Rec. 3374.

 Citizenship is lost by any person “Voting in a political election in a foreign state.” 8 U. S. C. § 801 (e). Bills are now before Congress to restore citizenship to the approximately 4,000 Americans who voted in recent Italian elections. See H. R. 6616 and 6617, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950); H. R. Rep. No. 1469, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950); 96 Cong. Rec. App. 117 (January 9, 1950). See also 8 U. S. C. §§ 801 (c) and (d), 804; Battaglino v. Marshall, 172 F. 2d 979. As to denaturalization based on fraud in the procurement of citizenship, see Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U. S. 665.

 E. g., 8 U. S. C. § 156a provides for the deportation of any alien, with exceptions not here pertinent, “who, after February 18, 1931, shall be convicted for violation of or conspiracy to violate” any federal or State narcotics law. In United States v. Balint, 258 U. S. 250, this Court held that conviction under the federal Anti-Narcotic Act can be had without the usual requirement of scienter.
Even convictions under laws related to the national security involve varying degrees of culpability. This is demonstrated by the remarks of the prosecuting attorney to the District Court concerning Dr. Willumeit, the relator in No. 82, when his sentence was being considered:
“It has been our belief, after having gone into this thing pretty thoroughly with him [the relator], that he was more or less caught in it without perhaps intending to go as far as the others went.
. . . . .
“. . . I have a feeling, your Honor, that Dr. Willumeit can be restored to decent citizenship in this country. I think he has something that he can give to America.
. . . . .
“. . . I would say that the Government would view a lenient sentence as a just sentence under all the circumstances. We think something can be done with this man. We do not think he is a bad man at heart, your Honor. We think he is probably a good man who got in with bad company and got in with this trouble.
. . . . .
“I say to your Honor I am not his lawyer. I am supposed to be hard with him, I guess, if I believe in it. But in this case I do not feel that this man is a bad actor. I think there is a place for Dr. Willumeit in America in time, and he may become a most useful citizen.”