Court Opinion

ID: 9386565
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-12 21:00:19.779728+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:07.378908
License: Public Domain

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                                            UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 21-4630

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                            Plaintiff - Appellee,

                     v.

        TONY LEE COVINGTON,

                            Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at
        Columbia. Mary G. Lewis, District Judge. (3:19-cr-00421-MGL-1)

        Submitted: April 3, 2023                                          Decided: April 11, 2023

        Before HARRIS and RUSHING, Circuit Judges, and MOTZ, Senior Circuit Judge.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: Jeremy A. Thompson, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE
        FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Corey F.
        Ellis, United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, Amy F. Bower, Assistant United
        States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, South
        Carolina, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

                 Tony Lee Covington pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to conspiracy

        to commit wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349. The district court sentenced him

        to 51 months’ imprisonment and a three-year term of supervised release. On appeal,

        Covington asserts that one of the discretionary conditions of supervised release in his

        written judgment is inconsistent with the district court’s oral pronouncement of that

        condition at sentencing. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

                 “[A] district court must orally pronounce all non-mandatory conditions of

        supervised release at the sentencing hearing.” United States v. Singletary, 984 F.3d 341,

        344 (4th Cir. 2021). “Discretionary conditions that appear for the first time in a subsequent

        written judgment . . . are nullities; the defendant has not been sentenced to those conditions,

        and a remand for resentencing is required.” Id. (citing United States v. Rogers, 961 F.3d

        291, 300-01 (4th Cir. 2020)). To “satisfy its obligation to orally pronounce discretionary

        conditions,” a district court may do so “through incorporation—by incorporating, for

        instance, all Guidelines ‘standard’ conditions when it pronounces a supervised-release

        sentence, and then detailing those conditions in the written judgment.” Rogers, 961 F.3d

        at 299. “We review the consistency of [a defendant’s] oral sentence and the written

        judgment de novo.” Id. at 296; see United States v. Cisson, 33 F.4th 185, 192-93 (4th Cir.

        2022).

                 When imposing the conditions of supervised release at sentencing, the district court

        stated, “Within 72 hours of release from the custody of the Bureau of Prisons, the defendant

        shall report in person to the probation office in the district to which the defendant is

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        released.” (J.A. 56). * Immediately thereafter, the district court ordered Covington to

        “comply with the mandatory and standard conditions of supervision outlined in 18 U.S.C.

        [§] 3583(d) and [U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual §] 5D1.3(c).” (J.A. 56). The district

        court’s subsequent written judgment included the 13 standard conditions of supervised

        release in USSG § 5D1.3(c), p.s., including the following condition: “You must report to

        the probation office in the federal judicial district where you are authorized to reside within

        72 hours of your release from imprisonment, unless the probation officer instructs you to

        report to a different probation office or within a different time frame.” (J.A. 63).

               On appeal, Covington argues that the district court committed Rogers error because

        the description of the reporting condition in the written judgment materially differed from

        the court’s oral pronouncement of that condition at sentencing. To be sure, a material

        discrepancy between a discretionary condition as pronounced and as detailed in the written

        judgment may constitute Rogers error. See Cisson, 33 F.4th at 194 & n.6. However,

        Covington fails to demonstrate a reversible inconsistency between the oral sentence and

        the written judgment amounting to Rogers error. Although the district court at sentencing

        ordered Covington to report to the district in which he was released, the court also

        incorporated the reporting condition in USSG § 5D1.3(c), p.s., leaving ambiguous where

        Covington was required to report upon his release from prison. “[W]here the precise

        contours of an oral sentence are ambiguous, we may look to the written judgment to clarify

        the district court’s intent. Rogers, 961 F.3d at 299 (citing United States v. Osborne, 345

               *
                   “J.A.” refers to the joint appendix filed by the parties in this appeal.

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        F.3d 281, 283 n.1 (4th Cir. 2003)). We are satisfied that the written judgment’s inclusion

        of the reporting condition in USSG § 5D1.3(c)(1), p.s., dispels the ambiguity in the district

        court’s oral pronouncement and confirms the court’s intent to require Covington to report

        to the probation office in the district where he is authorized to reside.

               Accordingly, we affirm the criminal judgment. We dispense with oral argument

        because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this

        court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                        AFFIRMED

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