Court Opinion

ID: 9840655
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-19 17:09:11.186716+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:38:51.542552
License: Public Domain

J-S25044-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  LUIS ALAMO                                   :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 2973 EDA 2022

               Appeal from the Order Entered October 6, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-51-CR-0634511-1988

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.:                       FILED SEPTEMBER 19, 2023

       Luis Alamo (Appellant) appeals, pro se, from the October 6, 2022, order

entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, denying his third

petition filed pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA).1 He seeks

relief from the 1990 judgment of sentence imposed following his jury

convictions of first-degree murder, conspiracy, corrupt organizations, and

possession of an instrument of a crime (PIC).2         Appellant claims the PCRA

court erred by finding his petition was untimely because he properly invoked

the newly-discovered fact exception to the timeliness requirement pursuant

to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii). For the reasons below, we affirm.

____________________________________________

1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9545.

2 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2502, 903, 911, and 907, respectively.
J-S25044-23

     The relevant facts of this case were summarized by a prior panel of this

Court on direct appeal:

     Appellant and Henry “Apples” Marbet1 were members of a drug
     organization which operated at the intersection of 7th and Butler
     Streets in North Philadelphia, and which was managed by
     Fernando “Flocko” Hernandez. . . . In 1987, the 7th and Butler
     drug organization was expanding its business to South
     Philadelphia. Robert “Moon” Pigford, the victim, attempted to
     move in on the South Philadelphia territory. Appellant and Marbet
     agreed that Pigford had to be killed. . . .

     _____________________

        1 Marbet was tried with [A]ppellant and was convicted of[,

        inter alia, first-degree murder and sentenced to life
        imprisonment at Criminal Docket No. CP-51-CR-0403461-
        1988].

     _____________________

           In the early morning hours of November 29, 1987, Marbet,
     accompanied by [A]ppellant, gunned down Pigford on the streets
     of South Philadelphia. Pigford was shot twice with a .38 calib[er]
     special ammunition: one shot entered the right side of Pigford’s
     neck and exited through the left side; the other shot hit Pigford in
     the lower lip, fractured his two front lower teeth, tore the major
     artery on the left side of his spine, causing a massive internal
     hemorrhage into his head and neck, and lodged in the first
     vertebrae of his neck. The police were called and responded
     immediately, but Pigford had already expired. Subsequently,
     Marbet and [A]ppellant were arrested and charged with the
     shooting death of Robert “Moon” Pigford and other charges.

            On May 23, 1989, after a lengthy jury trial, [A]ppellant was
     convicted of murder of the first degree, criminal conspiracy,
     corrupt organizations, and [PIC]. After a penalty hearing, the
     jury, finding one aggravating and three mitigating circumstances,
     directed that [A]ppellant serve a term of life imprisonment for the
     conviction of murder in the first degree. Post-verdict motions
     were subsequently filed, argued and denied. [On May 16, 1990,
     t]he trial court, thereafter, sentenced [A]ppellant as follows: life
     imprisonment for the murder conviction, a consecutive term of

                                    -2-
J-S25044-23

       imprisonment of not less than five years nor more than ten years
       for the criminal conspiracy conviction, a concurrent term of
       imprisonment of not less than two and a half years nor more than
       five years for the possession of an instrument of crime conviction,
       and a concurrent term of imprisonment of not less than five years
       nor more than ten years for the conviction of corrupt
       organizations.

Commonwealth v. Alamo, 1736 PHL 1990 (unpub. memo. at 1-3) (Pa.

Super. June 17, 1991), appeal denied, 600 A.2d 532 (Pa. Nov. 1, 1991).

Following his jury conviction and sentencing, Appellant filed a timely direct

appeal in June 1991, which was affirmed by this Court on June 17, 1991. The

Pennsylvania Supreme Court declined to grant allocatur on November 1, 1991.

See id.

       At this juncture, we note that the trial court docket omits all case activity

between May 16, 1990, and August 21, 2012.3 Our research reveals Alamo

filed his first PCRA petition, pro se, in December 1992, followed by a

counseled, amended petition.4 The PCRA court denied his petition in an order

____________________________________________

3 These omissions were not explained in the certified record and the record

had to be reconstructed. The certified docket indicates the reconstructed
record was filed on December 6, 2022.

4 Appellant raised a myriad of ineffective assistance of counsel claims,
including: (1) failing to object to improper jury instructions regarding
accomplice liability; (2) failing to object to improper jury instructions
regarding accomplice intent and PIC; (3) failing to raise an issue concerning
Appellant’s waiver of his right to testify; (4) failing to challenge the sufficiency
of the evidence; (5) failing to object to the admission of a co-conspirator’s
statement; and (6) failing to object to “other act” evidence outside the
conspiracy. See Commonwealth v. Alamo, 677 PHL 1995 (unpub. memo.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                           -3-
J-S25044-23

on February 7, 1995. A panel of this Court affirmed his petition on November

30, 1995, and Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied his request to grant

allocatur on September 4, 1996.5

       Appellant filed a second, pro se PCRA petition on August 21, 2012. The

matter went dormant until February 29, 2016, when Appellant filed an

amended, pro se petition. Appellant challenged the constitutionality of his

mandatory life sentence without the possibility of parole, invoking Miller v.

Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S.

190 (2012).6 Appellant claimed that his sentence violated both the Eighth

Amendment, Article V of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section

____________________________________________

at 2) (Pa. Super. Nov. 30, 1995), appeal denied, 683 A.2d 886 (Pa. Sept. 4,
1996).

5 The panel determined Appellant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim
failed because his argument concerned Commonwealth v. Huffman, 638
A.2d 961 (Pa. 1994), which was not decided until 1994, well after the
conclusion of Appellant’s trial. The panel concluded counsel could not be
deemed ineffective for failing to foresee future developments in the law. See
Alamo, 677 PHL 1995 (unpub. memo. at 5). The panel also held that
Appellant’s remaining claims were meritless, based on the record, the
applicable law, and the PCRA court’s extensive 40-page opinion. Id. at 5-6.

6 Briefly, we note in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), the United
States Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits life
imprisonment without parole (LWOP) for juvenile offenders who did not
commit homicide. Then, in Miller, supra, the Supreme Court concluded that
a mandatory sentence of LWOP for those under the age of 18 at the time of
their crimes violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishments. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 465. In Montgomery, supra, the
Supreme Court held that Miller applies retroactively. See Montgomery, 577
U.S. at 212.

                                           -4-
J-S25044-23

13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. See Appellant’s Amendment to PCRA,

8/21/12, at 3-5 (unpaginated). Appellant further asserted that his age at the

time of the shooting (he was 27 years old) was “of no moment [because] state

and federal case law involving equal protection support a conclusion that the

circumstances shared between petitioner and his juvenile counterparts require

that he be treated similarly.” Id. at 3.

      On February 2, 2018, the PCRA court filed a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice,

finding: (1) Appellant’s petition was untimely; and (2) he was “over the age

of [18] at the time of the offense, placing [his] sentence outside the reach of

the Supreme Court’s Miller decision.” Notice Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule

of Criminal Procedure 907, 2/2/18. Appellant did not file a response. The

PCRA court dismissed the petition on February 28, 2018. Appellant did not

file an appeal from the PCRA court’s February 28th order.

      Rather, Appellant filed a third, pro se PCRA petition on March 6, 2020,

followed by an amended, pro se petition on July 28, 2021. In his amended

petition, Appellant requested the PCRA court grant a new trial based on

substantive after-discovered evidence, namely two declarations from his co-

defendant, Marbet, which “exonerate[ed Appellant] of the murder of Robert

‘Moon’ Pigford [and proclaimed] that [Marbet] was the sole perpetrator of the

shooting on November 29, 1987.” Amended Petition to PCRA Petition Filed on

March 6, 2020, 7/28/21, at 4. The first declaration from Marbet was undated

and stated, in relevant part:

                                     -5-
J-S25044-23

       On 03/23/2018, I wrote to the Conviction [I]ntegrity Unit to open
       an investigation into a claim of actual innocence/wrongful
       conviction. I . . . would like to withdraw that [a]pplication and I’m
       pleading guilty of my own free will without any pressure, I don’t
       want your office to waste your time with this case[,] like my co-
       defendant [Appellant,] many more like him.

             I . . . take all the responsibility for death of Robert
       Pigford. . . . But there is one person that is innocent of Pigford’s
       death. His name is [Appellant]. . . .

             He was not there when I shot Pigford. . . . It was not like
       the witness Beaurfort testified in the trial. It didn’t happen like he
       said, but now it does not matter anymore.

Appellant’s Motion for Post Conviction Relief, 3/7/20, at Exhibit A (Declaration

of Marbet, undated) (grammatical errors in original).            Marbet’s second

declaration was dated November 25, 2019, and stated, in pertinent part:

Appellant “didn’t have [anything] to do with Pigford’s death, he is innocent of

Pigford’s death. . . .    I am sorry [i]t took me this many years to get the

courage to plead guilty for the death of Pigford.” Id. at Exhibit B (Declaration

of Marbet, 11/25/19).7

       On June 7, 2022, the PCRA court filed a Rule 907 notice, declining to

review the merits of Appellant’s claim due to his failure to plead and prove an

exception to the PCRA’s one-year time bar. In the notice, the court stated:

____________________________________________

7 Marbet refers to both documents as “sworn” declarations but there is no
stamp or an indication that they were sworn before an officer authorized to
administer an oath. Nevertheless, we note that an appellant is not required
to attach sworn affidavits to his PCRA petition in support of his request for an
evidentiary hearing regarding a witness’s proposed testimony. See
Commonwealth v. Pander, 100 A.3d 626, 641 (Pa. Super. 2014).

                                           -6-
J-S25044-23

“The fact that [Appellant] did not aid Marbet in the commission of the murder,

if true, was not previously unknown.             Thus, Marbet’s acknowledgment of

information known to [Appellant] for decades did not constitute new

facts. . . .” Notice Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 907,

6/7/22 (internal quotation marks omitted). Appellant responded on June 27,

2022, alleging that Marbet’s new admissions about the shooting were indeed

new information, as he previously had been unaware of Marbet’s appellate

activity.     See    Petitioner’s    Response     to   Court’s   Notice   Pursuant   to

Pa.R.Crim.Proc. 907, 6/27/22, at 1-2. The PCRA court subsequently dismissed

Appellant’s petition on October 6, 2022. Appellant filed a notice of appeal on

October 14, 2022.8

       Appellant poses the following questions for appellate review:

       1[.] Whether [the] PCRA court erred in denying Appellant’s post-
       conviction petition as untimely filed when Appellant established
       that his “[newly]-discovered facts” claim was within the plain
       language of the timeliness exception set forth at 42 Pa.C.S.[ §]
       9545(b)(1)(ii) and 42 Pa.C.S.[ §] 9545(b)(2)?

       2[.] Whether Appellant is entitled to a new trial or remand for an
       evidentiary hearing based upon the personal documents of co-
       defendant Henry Marbet, admitting that Appellant did not
       participate in the murder of Robert “Moon” Pigford, which
       “[newly]-discovered facts” were provided by Marbet through
       Appellant’s aunt Maria Sanchez, who then made it possible for
       Appellant to receive these exculpatory statements that triggered
       the 60 days filing period?
____________________________________________

8 The PCRA court did not order Appellant to file a concise statement of errors

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). However, it did issue
a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion on October 14, 2022.

                                           -7-
J-S25044-23

Appellant’s Brief at 3.9

       When reviewing the dismissal of a PCRA petition, we consider “whether

the PCRA court’s determination is supported by the record and free from legal

error.” Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 141 A.3d 1277, 1283-84 (Pa. 2016)

(internal quotation marks & citation omitted). “[O]ur scope of review is limited

to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of record, viewed in the

light most favorable to the prevailing party[.]” Commonwealth v. Howard,

285 A.3d 652, 657 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citations omitted). We apply a de novo

standard of review with respect to legal conclusions. Id.

       Appellant raises two challenges to the PCRA court’s denial of his petition:

(1) his newly-discovered evidence claim satisfied the requirements for the

PCRA’s timeliness exception, and (2) he exercised due diligence and could not

have obtained Marbet’s declarations at an earlier date. See Appellant’s Brief

at 9-30. Based on the nature of his claims, we will address them together.

____________________________________________

9 We note that at times in his brief, Appellant appears to conflate the concept

of a newly-discovered evidence claim with an after-discovered evidence
argument. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 244 A.3d 1281, 1289 n.20
(Pa. Super. 2021) (stating that a newly-discovered evidence issue — defined
under Section 9545(b)(1)(iii) of the PCRA — is a jurisdictional threshold
challenge and does not require a merits analysis, whereas an after-discovered
evidence argument — set forth in Section 9543(a)(2)(vi) of the PCRA — is a
substantive claim alleging the unavailability of exculpatory evidence at the
time of trial that would have changed the outcome at trial if introduced). Here,
we must first address the jurisdictional question because the PCRA court found
Appellant’s petition was untimely filed before we can reach the merits of the
substantive claim.

                                           -8-
J-S25044-23

      Appellant first states that because he and Marbet did not testify at their

trial, “the only testimony submitted was [his] statement to the Philadelphia

Homicide detectives that was read to the jury in its entirety, and Marbet’s

statement to the detectives relating [that] he was [in] South Philly [on] the

morning of November 29, 1987[, because] he went there looking for

Appellant[.]” Appellant’s Brief at 10. Appellant contends: Marbet’s “admission

has more weight and it is exculpatory in nature because he [was] the sole

perpetrator of the murder. [Marbert’s] two sworn declaration[s amount to] a

confession of guilt that was never brought up before trial, during and after the

trial.” Id. at 12 (emphasis omitted).

      Moreover, Appellant alleges that because he “gave a[n] exculpatory

statement to the homicide detectives that was read in its entirety to the jury

at trial[,]” Marbert’s statements reinforce the notion that he was not involved

in the shooting.   Appellant’s Brief at 12.   Appellant states the PCRA court

should have held an evidentiary hearing to properly determine the credibility

of Marbet’s declarations and should not have dismissed his petition as

untimely “because Marbet’s admission brought to light a material fact that was

already in evidence before, during and after Appellant’s trial [—] his

innocence!” Id. at 18 (emphasis omitted).

      Appellant next argues that he satisfied the due diligence prong of the

PCRA time-bar exception.      See Appellant’s Brief at 18.     In his brief, he

recounts the events that led to the shooting — he drove Marbet to meet

                                     -9-
J-S25044-23

Pigford after Pigford stole drugs from Appellant, but he did not know Marbet

had a gun. Id. at 19-23. Appellant stated that following his arrest, he initially

entered into an agreement with Marbet, whereby Marbet would tell the

authorities that Appellant was not involved in the shooting, but Marbet later

changed his mind and implicated both in the murder. Id. at 25-27. Appellant

alleged that he then distanced himself from Marbet as they became “enemies”

and requested a transfer to a different prison facility. Id. at 27-28. He stated

the ex-husband of his aunt met Marbet in prison and they discussed the case;

thereafter, Marbet decided to write the two declarations.        Id. at 28-29.

Appellant avers that “until [M]arbet decided to write these [declarations,]” any

effort by Appellant to procure this kind of admission from his co-defendant at

earlier point was an “impossibility.” Id. at 29-30.

      Preliminarily, we note “[a]lthough this Court is willing to liberally

construe materials filed by a pro se litigant, pro se status confers no special

benefit upon the appellant. To the contrary, any person choosing to represent

himself in a legal proceeding must, to a reasonable extent, assume that his

lack of expertise and legal training will be his undoing.” Commonwealth v.

Adams, 882 A.2d 496, 498 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citations omitted).

      As mentioned above, Appellant’s arguments touch upon this Court’s

jurisdiction to review the matter. Therefore, before reaching the merits of

Appellant’s claim, we must determine whether this appeal is properly before

us.

                                     - 10 -
J-S25044-23

       The timeliness of a PCRA petition is a jurisdictional requisite.
       [T]he PCRA time limitations implicate our jurisdiction and may not
       be altered or disregarded in order to address the merits of the
       petition. In other words, Pennsylvania law makes clear no court
       has jurisdiction to hear an untimely PCRA petition. The PCRA
       requires a petition, including a second or subsequent petition, to
       be filed within one year of the date the underlying judgment
       becomes final. A judgment of sentence is final at the conclusion
       of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme
       Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of
       Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking review.

Commonwealth v. Ballance, 203 A.3d 1027, 1031 (Pa. Super. 2019)

(citations, quotation marks, & emphasis omitted); see also 42 Pa.C.S. §

9545(b)(1), (3).

       Here, Appellant’s judgment of sentence was imposed on May 16, 1990,

his direct appeal was denied by this Court on June 17, 1991, and the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court declined to grant allocatur on November 1, 1991.

Therefore, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final for PCRA purposes

on Thursday, January 30, 1992, 90 days after the Pennsylvania Supreme

Court denied his petition for allowance of his appeal and the time for filing a

writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court expired. See U.S.

Sup. Ct. R. 13. Accordingly, Appellant had one year from that date — or until

February 1, 199310 — to file a timely PCRA petition.        See 42 Pa.C.S. §

____________________________________________

10 The one year mark, January 30, 1993, fell on a Saturday; therefore,
Appellant had until Monday, February 1st, to file a PCRA petition. See 1
Pa.C.S. § 1908 (for purposes of computing time, when last day of period falls
on a weekend or legal holiday, such day is omitted from computation).

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                          - 11 -
J-S25044-23

9545(b)(1).       Because Appellant filed his petition on March 7, 2020,

approximately 27 years after his judgment of sentence became final, the

petition is facially untimely.

       The PCRA, however, allows a defendant to file a petition after this period

when they plead and prove the following relevant timeliness exception:

             (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
       unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by
       the exercise of due diligence[.]

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii). Furthermore, a petitioner pleading one of the

timeliness exceptions must be filed within one year of the date the claim could

have been presented.11 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2). “It is the petitioner’s burden

to allege and prove that one of the timeliness exceptions applies.”

Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d 1263, 1268 (Pa. 2008).

____________________________________________

       We also recognize the 1995 amendments to the PCRA provided that a
petitioner whose judgment of sentence became final on or before January 16,
1996, had a one-year grace period from the effective date of the 1995
amendments to file a first-time PCRA petition. See Commonwealth v.
Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091, 1093 n.2 (Pa. 2010). The present petition,
however, was Appellant’s third, and, in any event, was filed more than 20
years after the amendments went into effect.

11 Until 2018, Section 9545(b)(2) required a petitioner to invoke a timeliness

exception within 60 days. However, in 2018, the time period was extended
to one year. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2); Act of October 24, 2018, P.L. 894,
No. 146, § 3. The Act amending Section 9545(b)(2) provides that the one-
year period applies only to timeliness exception claims arising on or after
December 24, 2017. See Act of October 24, 2018, P.L. 894, No. 146, § 3.
Appellant alleges his claim arose in 2019, when Marbet wrote the declarations.
Therefore, the amendment to Section 9545(b)(2) governs the present matter.

                                          - 12 -
J-S25044-23

      “Due diligence demands that the petitioner take reasonable steps to

protect his own interests. A petitioner must explain why he could not have

learned the new fact(s) earlier with the exercise of due diligence. This rule is

strictly enforced.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 111 A.3d 171, 176 (Pa. Super.

2015) (citations omitted).

      Additionally, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court previously explained that

“[t]he focus of the [Section 9545(b)(1)(ii)] exception is on [the] newly

discovered facts, not on a newly discovered or newly willing source for

previously known facts.” Commonwealth v. Marshall, 947 A.2d 714, 720

(Pa. 2008) (citation, quotation marks, & emphasis omitted). “The law does

not require a ‘nexus’ between the newly-discovered facts and the conviction

or sentence for purposes of satisfying the timeliness exception requirements

of the PCRA.” Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 193 A.3d 350, 366 (Pa. 2018).

The exception “does not require any merits analysis of the underlying claim[.]”

Commonwealth v. Small, 238 A.3d 1267, 1286 (Pa. 2020) (citation

omitted).

      Here, Appellant attempts to satisfy the newly-discovered fact exception

by relying on Marbet’s two declarations. In denying relief, the PCRA court

explained its reasons for rejecting his “newly discovered facts” claim:

      [Appellant] claimed he recently discovered the “fact” that he did
      not act as an accomplice to the 1987 murder of Robert Pigford.
      In support of this new fact, he appended two letters from his
      convicted co-defendant, Henry Marbet, which aver that
      [Appellant] had nothing to do with the murder.

                                     - 13 -
J-S25044-23

          First, the fact that [Appellant] did not aid Marbet in the
     commission of the murder, if true, was not previously unknown.
     Thus, Marbet’s acknowledgment of information known to
     [Appellant] for decades did not constitute new ‘facts’ satisfying
     subsection 9545(b)(1)(ii). . . .

           Second, even if [Appellant] was unaware of his non-
     involvement, he failed to even acknowledge, much less satisfy,
     the due diligence prong of subsection 9545(b)(1)(ii). [Appellant]
     stated that he and Marbet were associates in a drug-selling
     enterprise. Despite their collaborative history, [Appellant] failed
     to even attempt to demonstrate that he could not, with the
     exercise of due diligence, have obtained a statement from Marbet
     for over three decades. Specifically, [Appellant] neither detailed
     any efforts made to contact Marbet nor explained why such efforts
     would have been unsuccessful. This omission was also fatal to
     [Appellant]’s attempt to meet his burden of proof under
     subsection 9545(b)(1)(ii).4

     _____________________

        4   Even if [Appellant] made the requisite showing for
        purposes of subsection 9545(b)(1)(ii), no relief would be
        due. Specifically, [Appellant] failed to demonstrate that his
        co-defendant’s post-sentence admission would have
        changed the outcome at trial. Pennsylvania courts have
        long held that affidavits by co-defendants subsequent to the
        co-defendant’s conviction and sentencing are unreliable.
        Commonwealth v. Frey, 517 A.2d 1265, 1268-69 (Pa.
        1986) (“We have long recognized that post-verdict
        accomplice testimony must be viewed with a jaundiced
        eye.”). Like the alleged exculpatory witness in Frey, Marbet
        had nothing to lose by implicating himself to aid
        [Appellant]’s cause. Marbet had already been convicted and
        sentenced. See Commonwealth v. Marbet, 593 A.2d 913
        (Pa. Super. 1991)[, appeal denied, 602 A.2d 857 (Pa.
        1992)].

PCRA Ct. Op., 10/6/22, at 1-2 (unpaginated; record citations & some

footnotes omitted).

                                   - 14 -
J-S25044-23

     We disagree with the PCRA court’s determination that Appellant failed

to satisfy the “newly-discovered fact” exception.    As alleged in his PCRA

petition, Appellant’s “new fact” is Marbet’s willingness to admit that he was

the sole perpetrator, and that Appellant was not involved Pigford’s murder.

Moreover, Appellant alleges he could not have presented Marbet’s “new”

admission before 2019 because Marbet had never made these statements

before.   Appellant promptly presented the claim once he received the

declarations and timely filed his 2020 PCRA petition.       Based on these

allegations, Appellant arguably has invoked the newly-discovered fact

exception as the facts, upon which his claim is predicated, were unknown to

him and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence.

See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii). We reiterate that the newly-discovered fact

timeliness exception “does not require any merits analysis of the underlying

claim[.]” Small, 238 A.3d at 1286 (citation omitted).

     We now proceed to Appellant’s substantive PCRA claim concerning after-

discovered evidence — Appellant maintains Marbert’s recent statements

demonstrate Appellant was not involved in Pigford’s death and should be given

greater weight as they are exculpatory in nature because Marbet declared he

was the sole perpetrator of the murder. See Appellant’s Brief at 12.

           After-discovered evidence is a recognized ground for relief
     under the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(vi). Relief is due
     when the proponent can “demonstrate that the evidence: (1)
     could not have been obtained prior to the conclusion of the trial
     by the exercise of reasonable diligence; (2) is not merely
     corroborative or cumulative; (3) will not be used solely to impeach

                                   - 15 -
J-S25044-23

      the credibility of a witness; and (4) would likely result in a different
      verdict if a new trial were granted.” Commonwealth v. Pagan,
      950 A.2d 270, 292 (Pa. 2008). Failure to satisfy any one prong is
      fatal to the claim. See Commonwealth v. Solano, 129 A.3d
      1156, 1180 (Pa. 2015) (“As this test is conjunctive, failure to
      establish one prong obviates the need to analyze the remaining
      ones.”).

Commonwealth v. Crumbley, 270 A.3d 1171, 1178 (Pa. Super. 2022),

appeal denied, 284 A.3d 884 (Pa. 2022).

      Here, Appellant’s claim fails for several reasons. First, Appellant has not

met his burden regarding the first prong — that he could not have obtained

the underlying evidence prior to the conclusion of the trial by the exercise of

reasonable diligence.      Indeed, the substantive information provided in

Marbet’s declarations was known by both Marbet and Appellant at the time of

their trial. Therefore, one cannot reasonably conclude that Appellant could

not have obtained this evidence until after the conclusion of the trial. Indeed,

in his brief, Appellant acknowledged he and Marbet entered into a pact, in

which Marbet initially agreed to state Appellant was not involved in the matter.

See Appellant’s Brief at 25-27. Appellant would have known on the day of

the shooting and at trial that he did not fire the gun that killed Pigford or was

involved in the incident. See Commonwealth v. McClucas, 548 A.2d 573,

576 (Pa. Super. 1988) (concluding victim’s recantation statement did not

qualify as after-discovered evidence because defendant would have known

that victim committed perjury at trial).          Therefore, Appellant has not

                                      - 16 -
J-S25044-23

demonstrated that he exercised “reasonable diligence” in obtaining this

information. See Crumbley, 270 A.3d at 1178 (citation omitted).

       Moreover, Appellant failed to establish the fourth prong — the after-

discovered evidence would likely result in a different verdict if a new trial were

granted. As mentioned by the PCRA court,12 courts of this Commonwealth

have previously held that affidavits submitted by co-defendants following their

convictions and sentencings are unreliable.               See Commonwealth v.

Washington, 927 A.2d 586, 597 (Pa. 2007) (concluding PCRA court properly

rejected co-defendant’s confession based on lack of credibility when co-

defendant had previously been convicted and “had nothing to lose in

contradicting his pre-trial statement”); Commonwealth v. Frey, 517 A.2d

1265, 1269 (Pa. 1986) (“We have long recognized that post-verdict

accomplice     testimony      must     be      viewed   with   a   jaundiced   eye.”);

Commonwealth v. Scott, 470 A.2d 91, 94 (Pa. 1983) (“[P]ost-verdict

accomplice testimony should be considered with caution.”).               Marbet had

already been convicted, sentenced, and denied appellate relief when he

provided the two declarations. See Marbet, supra. Thirty years later, he

had nothing to lose by backpedaling and now declaring solitary culpability.

Based on these circumstances, it was reasonable for the PCRA court to

question the legitimacy and source of Marbet’s declarations.

____________________________________________

12 PCRA Ct. Op. at 2 n.4 (unpaginated).

                                            - 17 -
J-S25044-23

       It also merits mention that in one of Marbet’s declarations, he indicated

that he had previously written to the Conviction Integrity Unit in 2018 about

investigating his own innocence. See Appellant’s Motion for Post Conviction

Relief, 3/7/20, at Exhibit A (Declaration of Marbet, undated). The unreliability

of Marbet’s declarations in establishing Appellant’s innocence when he,

himself, proclaimed innocence two years earlier leads us to conclude that the

PCRA court did not err in finding this admission of evidence likely would not

have resulted in a different verdict. See Crumbley, 270 A.3d at 1178; see

also PCRA Ct. at 1 n.4.

       Accordingly, because Appellant failed to demonstrate two prongs of the

“after-discovered evidence” test, we find the PCRA court did not err or abuse

its discretion by dismissing his petition without an evidentiary hearing.13

       Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 9/19/2023

____________________________________________

13 It is well-settled that we may affirm on any basis.   See Commonwealth
v. Doty, 48 A.3d 451, 456 (Pa. Super. 2012).

                                          - 18 -