Court Opinion

ID: 9763433
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:45:00.747557+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:43.032627
License: Public Domain

Condon, C. J.,
dissenting. There is much in the court’s opinion concerning the necessity of an unprejudiced judge as an indispensable requisite for a fair and impartial trial, with which I agree. But I cannot agree with its conclusion that defendant was denied such a trial because of the observation made by the trial justice in explanation of the reason why he was impelled to revoke defendant’s bail and commit him. The trial justice was not then performing a judicial act involving the determination of defendant’s guilt. That matter had already been determined by the jury after a trial in which no ruling of the trial justice had been called in question on the ground of prejudicial error and after he had given the jury instructions in the law, to which defendant has pressed no exceptions.
In fact defendant frankly conceded before us that no ruling, order or act by the trial justice during the trial was unfair or hostile to him and in its opinion this court expressly concurs in such concession. This being so, the cogency of the court’s reasoning in finding defendant was denied a fair and impartial trial eludes me. Indeed I am quite at a loss to perceive how the trial justice’s observation, made at a time when the trial was over and done with *8and when he was exercising a function having not the remotest relation to the determination of defendant’s guilt, could transform a hitherto fair and impartial trial into one that was prejudicial.
/. Joseph Nugent, Attorney General, Corinne P. Grande, Special Counsel, for State.
Leo Patrick McGowan, Eugene F. Toro, for defendant.
However, in view of the trial justice’s observation it may well be argued that his impartiality to pass later upon the motion for a new trial was impaired to an extent that tended to create a cloud of suspicion sufficient to disqualify him from performing that function. For this reason I would hold that his decision on such motion should be set aside. But instead of remitting the case for a new trial as. the court has done, I would have this court examine the record and determine for itself whether the jury’s verdict was contrary to the great weight of the evidence. This is in accordance with our well-established practice where we find a trial justice has failed to perform his duty in passing upon such a motion. By following this practice we could ¡then decide whether the evidence supported the verdict, and if so remit the case to the superior court for entry of judgment on the verdict.
On my view of the record there is substantial support for the verdict and I would therefore favor entry of such an order. For this reason I must dissent from the court’s decision.