Court Opinion

ID: 9842782
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 02:18:10.335034+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:45.640539
License: Public Domain

BAZELON, Circuit Judge
(concurring).
Appellant labor union sued for a judgment declaring that appellee company had breached a collective bargaining agreement between the parties by refusing to arbitrate an issue concerning the employees’ pension plan. The complaint also sought a mandatory injunction to compel the company to proceed to arbitration. The District Court denied appellant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, or, in the alternative, for summary judgment.1
*20Ordinarily orders denying such motions are not final for purposes of appealability because they indicate that a “genuine issue as .to any material fact” remains to be tried.2 But finality is asserted here on two grounds: first, because the judge indicated that, in his view, “the action does not lie,” and second, because the order, by- necessary implication, includes the refusal of an injunction as that term is used in 28 U.S. C. § 1292(1).3
The defendant below did not seek, and the court did not order, dismissal or summary judgment in defendant’s favor. Nor, of course, was there a final disposition in favor of the plaintiff. On this state of the record, I think denial of plaintiff’s motion, viewed in the light of Rule 56,4 reflects no more than a ruling that a genuine issue of material fáct remains to be tried.5 This unresolved issue is. whether the parties intended by their contract to make, pension disputes arbitrable. I therefore construe tile order we are asked to review as not final and appealable.
In considering whether the order is ap- . pealable as a denial of injunctive relief, within the meaning of § 1292(1), I note, that there is nothing in the record to indicate that the equity powers of the District Court were invoked on the motion for summary judgment.. Such a motion is not an application for injunctive relief, and there is no basis for inferring that the court considered it so merely because a prayer for injunction was included in the complaint. At least without a clear showing that the court considered the merits of a plea to its equitable jurisdiction, the denial of summary judgment cannot be deemed an “interlocutory order * * * refusing” an injunction within § 1292(1). Morganstern Chemical Co. v. Schering Corp., 3 Cir., 1950, 181 F.2d 160, 162.6

. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c), 56, 28 U.S.C.A.

. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). See Morganstern Chemical Co. v. Schering Corp., 3 Cir., 1950, 181 F.2d 160, 161; Hook v. Hook & Ackerman, Inc., 3 Cir., 1954, 213 F.2d 122, 128.

. “The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from:' (1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts of the United States * * * granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions * * 62 Stat. 929 (1948).

.. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56.

. This case does not, to quote Judge Clark, “signalize any departure from the ordinary tentative and merely postponing nature of a denial of summary judgment.” Federal Glass Co. v. Loshin, 2 Cir., 1954, 217 F.2d 936, 940, dissenting opinion.

. To the extent that Federal Glass Co. v. Loshin, supra, is to the contrary, I would not follow it. See 6 Moore, Federal Practice 2321 (2d ed. 1953).