Court Opinion

ID: 9699681
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:46:18.653001+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:55.677203
License: Public Domain

Arthur H. Healey, J.
(dissenting). I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court properly considered the statutory requirements of General Statutes §§ 46b-81 and 46b-821 *746in its disposition of the defendant’s claim of error arguing that the trial court failed to consider the statutory criteria laid down by these two statutes.
Under date of October 30, 1980, the defendant filed her “Motion for Rectification of Appeal,” pursuant to Practice Book § 3082, moving the trial court to rectify the appeal. In relevant part this motion sought rectification: “1) By preparing a written Memorandum of Decision setting forth the Referee’s decision on the factual and legal issues raised by the ease including, but not limited to, the factual and legal questions raised by Connecticut General Statutes Sections 46b-81 and 46b-82, and the conclusions as to claims of law raised by the parties together with factual basis of such conclusions. . . .”2 The trial court thereafter filed its “Memorandum on Motion for Rectification of Appeal” which in part recited the following: *747“The Court in making the awards (see Memorandum of Decision) took into consideration the following evidence: 1. The length of the marriage. 2. The causes of the separation; ‘a finding is made that the parties were equally at fault for the irretrievable breakdown.’ 3. The ages, the health, occupations and income of the parties, and the future employability and needs of the parties. . . .”
The defendant maintains that the memorandum on her motion for rectification discloses that several criteria required by General Statutes §§ 46b-81 and 46b-82 were not considered. Placing these statutes next to the referee’s memorandum reveals, she says, the absence of his consideration of the following criteria laid down by these statutes: “Station, vocational skills, estate of the parties, the desirability of the defendant as a custodial parent securing employment, the opportunity of each party for further acquisition of capital assets and income, and the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation or appreciation of their estates.” The majority explicitly points out that the defendant admits that evidence concerning each statutory criterion was submitted to the court. They also point out that while the defendant makes “a broadside attack based upon the statutory elements not specifically noted by the court, consideration of occupation, income, future employability and needs of the party implicitly requires consideration of vocational skills and the future ability to acquire capital assets, the two principal items which the defendant claims were ignored by the court.”3 *748This position of “implicit consideration” is seri-ionsly undercut by reading those criteria the referee himself expressly stated that he considered. There is no need to answer the implication that some of the criteria may overlap or even be the same. I call attention, however, to the tenet that “[i]t is a commonplace that ‘[n]o word in a statute should be treated as superfluous, void or insignificant unless there are impelling reasons . . . why this principle cannot be followed.’ General Motors Corporation v. Mulquin, 134 Conn. 118, 126, 55 A.2d 732 [1947].” Levin-Townsend Computer Corporation v. Hartford, 166 Conn. 405, 409, 349 A.2d 853 (1974); see McPhee v. McPhee, 186 Conn. 167, 178, 440 A.2d 274 (1982) (Healey, J., concurring). In construing a statute, the court seeks to ascertain the intent of the legislature “as it is expressed through the words actually used.” State v. Grant, 176 Conn. 17, 20, 404 A.2d 873 (1978); Schwab v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 154 Conn. 479, 482, 226 A.2d 506 (1967). “[W]ords seldom have precise and unvarying meanings.” Jacques v. H. O. Penn Machinery Co., 166 Conn. 352, 359n, 349 A.2d 847 (1974); see Doe v. Institute of Living, Inc., 175 Conn. 49, 57, 392 A.2d 491 (1978). The legislature, in both § 46b-81 and § 46b-82, did determine to include a number of criteria and I prefer to rest on the presumption that “the legislature had a purpose for every sentence, clause or phrase in a legislative enactment.” McAdams v. Barbieri, 143 Conn. 405, 419, 123 A.2d 182 (1956). In short, all the criteria in each statute must be considered.
I agree that the trial court is not required to make express findings on each of the statutory criteria as we recently pointed out in Weiman v. *749Weiman, 188 Conn. 232, 234, 449 A.2d 151 (1982).4 The court, however, must consider all the statutory criteria; Weiman v. Weiman, supra, 234; although no single criterion is preferred over all the others. Tutalo v. Tutalo, 187 Conn. 249, 252, 445 A.2d 598 (1982); Robinson v. Robinson, 187 Conn. 70, 72, 444 A.2d 234 (1982); McPhee v. McPhee, supra, 172; Valante v. Valante, 180 Conn. 528, 530-31, 429 A.2d 964 (1980). In Weiman, in referring to § 46b-82 we quoted that statute including “vocational skills” as a factor that must be considered. Weiman v. Weiman, supra. We went on to say that with respect to property assignment under § 46b-81 a trial court, “in addition to the criteria listed in § 46b-82, must consider ... ‘the opportunity of each [of the parties] for future acquisition of capital assets and income.’ ” Weiman v. Weiman, supra. We did the same in McPhee. McPhee v. McPhee, supra, 171.
I realize that a trial court enjoys wide discretion in allocating property and making alimony awards; Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 177 Conn. 259, 262-63, 413 A.2d 854 (1979); Pasquariello v. Pasquariello, 168 Conn. 579, 583, 362 A.2d 835 (1975); and that we properly recognize that trial courts have a distinct advantage over appellate courts in dealing with domestic relations matters. See, e.g., Fucci v. Fucci, 179 Conn. 174, 180-81, 425 A.2d 592 (1979). In declaring that dissolution, though statutory, is *750essentially equitable in nature we have said that “[t]he power to act equitably is the keystone to the court’s ability to fashion relief in the infinite variety of circumstances which arise out of the dissolution of a marriage.” Pasquariello v. Pasquariello, supra, 585; see Robinson v. Robinson, supra, 72. Accordingly, our review is limited in these cases. In order to conclude that a trial court abused its discretion, we must find that the court either incorrectly applied the law or could not reasonably conclude as it did. See, e.g., Weiman v. Weiman, supra, 234-35; Beede v. Beede, 186 Conn. 191, 194, 440 A.2d 283 (1982); Koizim v. Koizim, 181 Conn. 492, 498, 435 A.2d 1030 (1980).
For the reasons given, I conclude that the trial court incorrectly applied the law and, thus, committed error.
Therefore, I dissent.

 General Statutes § 46b-81 entitled “Assignment of property and transfer of title” provides in relevant part: “(c) In fixing the nature and value of the property, if any, to be assigned, the court, after hearing the witnesses, if any, of each party, except as provided in subsection (a) of section 46b-51, shall consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the annulment, dissolution of the marriage or legal separation, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties and the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income. *746The court shall also consider the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of their respective estates.”
General Statutes § 46b-82 entitled “Alimony” provides: “At the time of entering the decree, the superior court may order either of the parties to pay alimony to the other, in addition to or in lieu of an award pursuant to section 46b-81. The order may direct that security be given therefor on such terms as the court may deem desirable. In determining whether alimony shall be awarded, and the duration and amount of the award, the court shall hear the witnesses, if any, of each party, except as provided in subsection (a) of section 46b-51, shall consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the annulment, dissolution of the marriage or legal separation, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate and needs of each of the parties and the award, if any, which the court may make pursuant to section 46b-81, and, in the case of a parent to whom the custody of minor children has been awarded, the desirability of such parent’s securing employment.”

 The motion also asked the referee to state whether he considered the case before him as a “limited contested dissolution” or “contested dissolution.” In his memorandum on the motion for rectification he stated that he considered it a “contested dissolution.”

 While it is true that the defendant’s brief does spend some time discussing the “two principal items” of “vocational skills and the future ability to acquire capital assets,” I do not read her brief or understand her oral argument to retreat from her claim as set out earlier in this dissent.

 In Posada v. Posada, 179 Conn. 568, 572-73, 427 A.2d 406 (1980), we found that the trial court’s detailed findings of faet amply supported its conclusion that it had “considered” the statutory criteria. In Posada, the trial court’s memorandum of decision stated in part: “I have taken into consideration the factors enumerated in §§ 46-51 and 52 [now General Statutes §§ 46b-81 and 46b-82] . . . .” A-270 Rec. and Briefs, R. 17. The memorandum on the motion for rectification in the case now before us expressly excludes any such conclusion.