Court Opinion

ID: 9746954
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 14:47:09.007866+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:18.730587
License: Public Domain

KELLEY, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Preliminarily, I agree with the trial court that this action is not barred by collateral estoppel. As the trial court noted:
The [federal] court’s decision ... concluded that there was no constitutionally protected property interest in the subject contract for employment. While the underlying facts are identical, the federal § 1983 cause of action proceeded on a constitutionally protected right rather than on the contract itself. Furthermore, the application of collateral estoppel requires that the facts be “actually litigated in the first cause.” Muhammad v. Strassburger, 526 Pa. 541, 587 A.2d 1346 (1991), cert. denied, [— U.S.-] 112 S.Ct. 196 [116 L.Ed.2d 156].
Trial court opinion at 9, n. 1.
A review of Bolduc’s complaint in the federal action reveals that in addition to his federal § 1983 action, Bolduc also pled state counts in mandamus and breach of contract. The federal judge, in dismissing the § 1983 claim, noted the following:
In light of the law, plaintiffs federal cause of action must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and, lacking a basis for retaining jurisdiction *256over the state law claims, the court will dismiss those as well. Bolduc is free, of course, to institute an action on those claims in state court, inasmuch as the statute of limitations has not expired and this court makes no judgment upon their viability.
Bolduc v. Board of Supervisors of Lower Paxton Township, Civil Action No. 1:CV-91-0749, filed August 26, 1991 at 5 (emphasis added, footnote omitted), Reproduced Record at 36a.
Therefore, Bolduc’s pendent state claims were not “actually litigated” and are not now barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
The majority, relying on Scott v. Philadelphia Parking Authority, 402 Pa. 151, 166 A.2d 278 (1960), finds that the contract was ultra vires as Bolduc could point to no specific authority, conferred by statute, which would allow the township to enter into employment contracts preventing the township from terminating its employees at will. Although Scott is over thirty years old, I agree that we are still bound by its holding. I find, however, that the circumstances of Scott are distinguishable from those in the present case.
Prior to Scott, only contracts involving governmental functions and which extended beyond the terms of the elected officials entering into the contract were found to be ultra vires. See, e.g., Moore v. Luzerne County, 262 Pa. 216, 105 A. 94 (1918); McCormick v. Hanover Township, 246 Pa. 169, 92 A. 195 (1914); Western Saving Fund Society v. City of Philadelphia, 31 Pa. 185 (1858). In the present case, the contract did not purport to extend beyond the current terms of the board members.
In Scott, while the contract at issue purported to extend beyond the terms of the elected officials, our Supreme Court did not decide the case on that issue, stating that the primary issue was not “whether the instant contract is unenforceable as an attempt to bind the succeeding members of the Authority, but whether the making of the contract in the first place was beyond the power of the Authority and hence initially invalid. Scott, 402 Pa. at 154, 166 A.2d at 280.
*257The Scott court found that the broad grants of “necessary and convenient” powers to carry out the purposes of the Authority did not include the power to contract away the right of summary dismissal. The court was careful to note, however, that:
[W]e are not concerned with contracts for work on particular and specific projects being carried out by a governmental body which might necessitate the temporary services of some specialist.
Id. at 157, 166 A.2d at 282.
In stating this exception, the Scott court referred to prior cases as examples of what these “particular and specific projects” might be. An examination of the cited cases shows that they involved an attorney employed by the Attorney General for the specific purpose of pursuing an escheat case, Beloff v. Margiotti, 328 Pa. 432, 197 A. 223 (1938); employment of an attorney to assist a county solicitor in a tax assessment case, Light v. Lebanon County, 292 Pa. 494, 141 A. 291 (1928); employment of a contractor to design, supervise, inspect and report on the construction of a road project, Moore; and employment by a township of an attorney for a period of a year, McCormick,1 Although the latter two contracts were found to be ultra vires for attempting to bind future boards, the contract in Light was found to be valid despite language in the contract which purported to bind the board and its successors.
Given these examples, I believe that the contract at issue in this case was for “particular and specific projects” for which the “temporary services of some specialist” were required. The trial court found that upon Bolduc’s resignation as Township Manager on December 31, 1989, he accepted a new position as “Special Projects Administrator.” According to the trial court, Bolduc’s job consisted of “working three days per week on several specific items which had their inception *258under his tenure as township manager.” Trial court opinion at 1.
This is not a situation similar to Scott where appellant had been hired not for any “particular and specific project,” but rather had been hired on an annual basis and was responsible for the daily management and supervision of the Authority. Rather, Bolduc’s employment to work on specific items was similar to that of the attorneys in Beloff, Light and McCormick and of the contractor in Moore.
I believe that “at will” employees of a public body may be contract employees so long as the contract duration is within the term of the elected executive and/or for special projects. The remedy for any breach by the public body must distinguish between tenure for the contract, which must yield to the greater public policy of “at will” employment, and the alternative of damages, which must be available to serve -the appeal of qualified personnel in “at will” governmental positions as an equally desirable public policy.
Accordingly, I would find that the trial court erred in sustaining the board’s preliminary objections and dismissing the case and would remand for further proceedings.

. The services rendered by the attorney in McCormick consisted of "the trial of one negligence case against the township, and frequent consultations with reference to ordinary business.... ” McCormick, 246 Pa. at 177, 92 A. at 197.