Court Opinion

ID: 9541939
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:30:00.547197+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:05:25.244102
License: Public Domain

' Spencer, J.,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion herein for the following reasons: First. The land was not a homestead at the time of the sale. The evidence shows that the parties left the premises claimed as a homestead without any intention of returning to it for homestead purposes. An abandonment of the homestead right has been established. Phifer v. Miller (1951), 153 Neb. 748, 45 N. W. 2d 907.
Second. The deed took the contract out of the statute of frauds. Even if the property were a homestead, an unacknowledged contract for its sale would be valid where it is made simultaneously with a deed which is acknowledged. Farmers Investment Co. v. O’Brien (1922), 109 Neb. 19, 189 N. W. 291.
Third. Specific performance is not barred by the statute of frauds where there has been part performance. Section 36-106, R. R. S. 1943, provides: “Nothing contained in sections 36-101 to 36-106 shall be construed to abridge the powers of a court of equity to compel the specific performance of agreements in cases of part performance.”
Fourth. The land involved herein increased in value after the option was given, but that is no reason to *380deny specific performance. Musser v. Zurcher (1966), 180 Neb. 882, 146 N. W. 2d 559.
McCown, J., joins in this dissent.