Court Opinion

ID: 9949174
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-08 23:01:42.938495+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:28:39.279448
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/8/24 P. v. Spaugy CA4/2

                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
                                     or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                   FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION TWO

 THE PEOPLE,

          Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      E080906

 v.                                                                      (Super. Ct. No. FVI22002321)

 JEVERION WADE SPAUGY,                                                   OPINION

          Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Miriam I. Morton,

Judge. Affirmed.

         Robert L. Hernandez, by appointment of the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney

General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Collette C. Cavalier, Deputy

Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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                                     INTRODUCTION

       Defendant and appellant Jeverion Spaugy was convicted of forcible rape of his

adopted 17-year-old sister and sentenced to 14 years in state prison. He now appeals the

trial court’s denial of his Romero1 motion to vacate his prior felony conviction allegation.

       Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to afford

“great weight” to the mitigating circumstances articulated in the recent amendment to

Penal Code2 section 1385 and by denying the Romero motion despite an absence of

evidence of endangerment to public safety. The People argue that the amendment does

not apply to sentences, such as defendant’s, that were increased by the “Three Strikes”

law.

       We conclude that the amended law’s references to “enhancements” do not include

Three Strikes punishments, such that defendant’s argument fails. We therefore affirm the

trial court’s ruling on defendant’s Romero motion.

                      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       On January 4, 2023, a jury found defendant guilty of forcible rape under section

261. Defendant subsequently waived his right to a jury trial on the existence of

aggravating factors and his previous felony conviction, and instead proceeded by court

trial. At the court trial, the court found the aggravating factors to be true; and a prior

       1 People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero).

       2 All further statutory citations are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.

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conviction for attempted robbery with misdemeanor gang participation to be true beyond

a reasonable doubt.

       At the sentencing hearing on March 14, 2023, the court considered defendant’s

request to strike the prior conviction (his Romero motion) for which defendant had been

convicted as an adult despite having committed the offense when he was 17 years old.

Defendant argued that the conviction allegation should be stricken in the interests of

justice because the conviction was eight years old and its dismissal would not endanger

public safety. The court denied the Romero motion and sentenced defendant to the low

term of seven years. Because the court found a strike within the meaning of the Three

Strikes law, defendant’s sentence was then doubled to 14 years.

       The trial court relied on that same conviction to also find a five-year enhancement

under section 667, subdivision (a)(1), for a prior conviction on a serious felony.

However, the trial court then stayed the enhancement, such that it was not applied to

defendant’s prison term.

       On March 14, 2023, defendant timely filed a notice of appeal.

                                      DISCUSSION

       A.     STANDARD OF REVIEW

       Defendant made his Romero motion pursuant to section 1385, subdivision (a),

which refers to the trial court’s power to dismiss a criminal action “in furtherance of

justice.” The Supreme Court has held that this statute also provides “the lesser power to

strike factual allegations relevant to sentencing, such as the allegation that a defendant

has prior felony convictions.” (Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 504.)

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       “It is well established that a defendant may appeal from the denial of relief under

section 1385 on the ground that the trial court failed to properly exercise its discretion.”

(People v. Gillispie (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 429, 434.) “A court’s discretion to strike prior

felony conviction allegations in furtherance of justice is limited. Its exercise must

proceed in strict compliance with section 1385(a), and is subject to review for abuse.”

(Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 530.) Likewise, “a court’s failure to dismiss or strike a

prior conviction allegation is subject to review under the deferential abuse of discretion

standard.” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 374 (Carmony).)

       “[A] trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so irrational or

arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.” (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at

p. 377.) It “is not required to state reasons for declining to exercise its discretion under

section 1385. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] [I]f error affirmatively appears on the record, the defendant

may seek remand for resentencing through an appeal. We stress, however, the

requirement that error must affirmatively appear on the record. On a silent record in a

post-Romero case, the presumption that a trial court ordinarily is presumed to have

correctly applied the law should be applicable.” (People v. Gillispie, supra, 60

Cal.App.4th at pp. 433-434.)

       Thus, “an appellate court will not disturb the trial court’s ruling denying

defendant’s request to dismiss his strike conviction absent an affirmative showing of an

abuse of discretion.” (People v. Uecker (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 583, 599.) “In the

absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume that the trial court considered all of the

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relevant factors and properly applied the law.” (People v. Brugman (2021) 62

Cal.App.5th 608, 638.)

        B.    A TRIAL COURT’S DENIAL OF A ROMERO MOTION

        The Three Strikes law was codified in subdivisions (b) through (i) of section 667.

The statute provides, in relevant part, that when a criminal defendant is being sentenced

for a felony and “has one prior serious or violent felony conviction . . . the determinate

term or minimum term for an indeterminate term shall be twice the term otherwise

provided as punishment for the current felony conviction.” (§ 667, subd. (e)(1).) The

provisions of the Three Strikes law are mandatory. (§ 667, subd. (f)(1).) “[T]he Three

Strikes law does not offer a discretionary sentencing choice, as do other sentencing laws,

but establishes a sentencing requirement to be applied in every case where the defendant

has at least one qualifying strike.” (People v. Strong (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 328, 337.)

The law “not only establishes a sentencing norm, it carefully circumscribes the trial

court’s power to depart from this norm and requires the court to explicitly justify its

decision to do so . . . the law creates a strong presumption that any sentence that

conforms to these sentencing norms is both rational and proper. [¶] In light of this

presumption, a trial court will only abuse its discretion in failing to strike a prior felony

conviction allegation in limited circumstances.” (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 377-

378.)

        “In reviewing this decision [to strike a prior] we follow the Supreme Court’s

direction to consider the nature and circumstances of the present crimes; the defendant’s

prior convictions; his background, character and prospects.” (People v. McGlothin

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(1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 468, 474-475.) “[N]o weight whatsoever may be given to factors

extrinsic to the scheme.” (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161.) Dismissing

the strike is appropriate when, after weighing the permissible factors, the defendant is

“deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as

though he had not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent

felonies.” (Ibid.)

       Here, defendant’s sentence conformed with the Three Strikes law: the low term of

seven years was doubled to 14 years because of his prior felony conviction. We therefore

undertake our review with the initial presumption that the trial court’s denial of the

Romero motion and the resulting sentencing order were “rational and proper.”

(Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378.)

       The crux of defendant’s argument is that the trial court’s denial of his Romero

motion was an abuse of discretion because the court failed to “afford great weight” to

certain mitigating circumstances. He derives this requirement from subdivision (c) of

section 1385, which was added to the statute, effective January 1, 2022, by Senate Bill

No. 81 (2021-2022 Reg. Session). (Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2022.)

Defendant argues that subdivision (c), refers to the dismissal of sentencing

“enhancements”; and that such enhancements include the provision of the Three Strikes

law that doubled his term of imprisonment. The People argue that this doubling was not

an enhancement; that subdivision (c) only applies to enhancements; and that because the

Three Strikes doubling was not an enhancement, subdivision (c) did not apply. The

People contend that the trial court properly denied defendant’s Romero request.

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       C.       SECTION 1385, SUBDIVISION (C), IS INAPPLICABLE TO THREE

                STRIKES PUNISHMENTS

       Pursuant to the new subdivision (c) of section 1385, the trial court “shall dismiss

an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so” and must “consider and

afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any of the

mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present. Proof of the presence of

one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the

enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger

public safety. ‘Endanger public safety’ means there is a likelihood that the dismissal of

the enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious danger to others.”

(§ 1385, subds. (c)(1) & (c)(2).)

       The mitigating circumstances that are allegedly relevant to this appeal are

defendant’s age when he committed the offense supporting the enhancement, i.e.,

whether he was a juvenile; and the age of the prior conviction. (§ 1385, subds. (c)(2)(G)

& (c)(2)(H).)

       As the People have noted, the Third District addressed in People v. Burke (2023)

89 Cal.App.5th 237 (Burke) whether a punishment imposed by the Three Strikes law is

an “enhancement for purposes of section 1385” or whether, as the People contend here,

“a prior strike conviction is part of an alternative sentencing scheme” and is therefore not

subject to section 1385, subdivision (c). (Burke, at p. 241.) The Third District held that a

Three Strikes punishment is not an enhancement. Specifically, it cited language from

Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th 497 at page 527, which stated that the Three Strikes law was

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“an alternative sentencing scheme for the current offense” rather than an enhancement.

(Burke, at p. 243.) It also cited the Second District’s opinion in People v. Williams

(2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 733, which held that the Three Strikes law was “not an

enhancement because it does not add an additional term of imprisonment to the base

term.” (Id. at p. 744.)

       “Whether the amendments to section 1385 apply to prior strike convictions is a

question of statutory interpretation which we review de novo.” (Burke, supra, 89

Cal.App.5th at p. 242.) “The statute’s plain language controls unless its words are

ambiguous.” (People v. Maultsby (2012) 53 Cal.4th 296, 299.) “When, however, a term

has developed a particular meaning in the law, we generally presume the legislative body

used the term in that sense rather than relying on ordinary usage.” (In re Friend (2021)

11 Cal.5th 720, 730.)

       Here, defendant urges this court to diverge from the Third District’s holding. We

decline to do so. As the Third District succinctly reasoned, the Three Strikes law has

traditionally been distinguished from enhancements and is understood to instead create an

alternative sentencing scheme. This is because, while an enhancement adds time to a

sentence that has been imposed by a specific statute, a Three Strikes law sentence is

imposed under the Three Strikes law itself. We presume the Legislature was aware of

this distinction and, in the absence of explicitly contrary language, presume that it

intended the distinction to apply to section 1385.

       In an opinion published after the parties filed their briefs in this matter, the First

District Court of Appeal expanded on the analysis in Burke by highlighting the legislative

                                               8
history of the bill, which “confirms the Legislature had no such intent” to extend the

amendments to the Three Strikes law. (People v. Olay (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 60, 67,

petn. for review pending, petn. filed Jan. 30, 2024.) A June 2021 bill analysis explicitly

distinguished between enhancements and alternative penalty schemes. (Ibid., citing

Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 81 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) as

amended Apr. 27, 2021, pp. 5-6.) The analysis stated that the Three Strikes law was an

alternative penalty scheme and that this bill did not encompass alternative penalty

schemes. (Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 81, supra, as

amended Apr. 27, 2021, p. 6.) As the First District wrote, “A more unambiguous

statement of the Legislature’s intent to adopt the legal meaning of enhancement for

section 1385, subdivision (c) can hardly be imagined.” (Olay, at p. 68.)

       Given these principles of statutory interpretation and the supportive legislative

materials, we must reject defendant’s reading of section 1385. We are instead in

agreement with our sister courts of appeal that the amendments to section 1385 apply

only to punishment enhancements; and by limiting the application of section 1385 to

enhancements, the Legislature excluded Three Strikes punishments. It follows that the

trial court was not required to give great weight to the mitigating circumstances provided

by section 1385. Its alleged failure to do so does not constitute error.

       D.     DEFENDANT’S CHALLENGE TO THE FIVE-YEAR ENHANCEMENT

              FAILS

       Section 667, subdivision (a)(1), imposes a five-year enhancement on a sentence

when the defendant has already been convicted of a serious felony at least once before.

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In his reply brief, defendant argues for the first time that section 1385 applies to his

sentence, even if the statute does not apply to Three Strikes punishments, because his

prior conviction was also used to support a five-year enhancement. However, we

generally disregard new claims that are raised in a reply brief. (Varjabedian v. City of

Madera (1977) 20 Cal.3d 285, 295, fn. 11.)

       Irrespective of whether defendant timely presented this issue, the record reflects

that the enhancement had been stayed, such that even if the trial court had dismissed the

prior conviction for enhancement purposes, the dismissal would not have lessened

defendant’s sentence—he still would have been sentenced to 14 years in prison. Thus,

defendant cannot show prejudice.

       Because the five-year enhancement argument was waived and because defendant

was not prejudiced by the error he alleges, we decline to address the issue any further.

                                        DISPOSITION

       The judgment is affirmed.

       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                          MILLER
                                                                                  Acting P. J.

We concur:

RAPHAEL
                                   J.

MENETREZ
                                   J.

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