Court Opinion

ID: 9478868
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:01:21.265666+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:40.556803
License: Public Domain

*597KRUPANSKY, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I write briefly to express my concurrence in the result articulated by the majority opinion. Under 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a), the PTO’s registration creates only a “prima facie” presumption that the mark is valid. The registration “shall not preclude an opposing party from proving any legal or equitable defense or defect which might have been asserted if such mark had not been registered.” Id. It is well-settled that “under the Lanham Act, registration by itself does not enlarge a registrant’s substantive rights in a mark.” Amer. Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Heritage Life Ins. Co., 494 F.2d 3, 10 (5th Cir.1974) (citing Turner v. HMH Publishing Co., 380 F.2d 224, 228 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1006, 88 S.Ct. 566, 19 L.Ed.2d 601 (1967)). Indeed, Lanham Act registration does not shift the ultimate burden of proof, but merely imposes on a challenger of a trademark “the burden of going forward with evidence to meet or rebut the presumption; it does not shift the ultimate burden of proof.” Silverman v. CBS, Inc., 666 F.Supp. 575, 578 (S.D.N.Y.1987). See also House of Westmore, Inc. v. Denney, 151 F.2d 261, 265 (3d Cir.1945) (ultimate burden of proving claimed validity of registered trademark rests with registrant); Sylvania Elec. Products, Inc. v. Dura Elec. Lamp Co., 144 F.Supp. 112 (D.N.J.1956) (same), aff'd, 247 F.2d 730 (3d Cir.1957).
In the case at bar, the ultimate burden of proof rested upon the plaintiff. Once the defendant had rebutted the plaintiff’s pri-ma facie presumption anchored in plaintiff’s registration of the mark by evidence that the mark was merely geographically descriptive and that it had not been used for an extended period of time, defendant had satisfied its burden of going forward. When the presumption arising from registration was rebutted, the ultimate burden of proof including proof of secondary meaning reverted to the plaintiff. On rebuttal, plaintiff failed to satisfy its ultimate burden of proof by introducing sufficient secondary meaning of the mark. See Bank of Tex. v. Commerce Southwest, Inc., 741 F.2d 785, 787 (5th Cir.1984) (evi-dentiary burden necessary to establish secondary meaning for a geographically descriptive term is substantial); Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 794 (5th Cir.1983) (if term descriptive, rather than inherently distinctive, burden necessary to establish secondary meaning is substantial); Telemed Corp. v. Tel Med Corp., 588 F.2d 213, 220 (7th Cir.1978) (same).
It was not “clearly erroneous” for the district court to conclude that plaintiff had failed to meet this substantial burden. Plaintiff’s advertising was in itself insufficient to prove secondary meaning. Application of Andes Candies, Inc., 478 F.2d 1264, 1267 (C.C.P.A.1973); Amer. Footwear Corp. v. Gen’l Footwear Corp., 609 F.2d 655, 663 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 951, 100 S.Ct. 1601, 63 L.Ed.2d 787 (1980). Nor was evidence concerning the volume of sales persuasive. Twentieth Century Wear, Inc. v. Sanmark-Stardust, Inc., 747 F.2d 81, 90 (2d Cir.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052, 105 S.Ct. 1755, 84 L.Ed.2d 818 (1985); Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar Well Foods, Ltd., 568 F.2d 1342, 1345 (C.C.P.A.1977).
Because of the very limited period during which the mark had been used, and given the absence of any direct evidence of consumer testimony as to secondary meaning, I conclude that plaintiff has not met its burden of proving secondary meaning and accordingly concur in the result of the majority opinion.