Court Opinion

ID: 9602409
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:54:28.813614+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:47:55.530210
License: Public Domain

Gordon, J.,
dissenting.
The plaintiff was unable to state why he fell out of the automobile; he refused even to speculate as to the reason. Yet the jury was permitted to determine that his falling out was caused by the defendant’s gross negligence. Since the evidence affords no basis for that determination, it was necessarily based upon speculation.
Although there are many conflicts in the testimony, one proposition is uncontroverted: There was no evidence to support a finding that the plaintiff’s injuries were caused by the automobile’s striking the telephone pole. This was conceded at bar by plaintiff’s counsel.
The plaintiff was obviously in a better position than the jury to determine why he fell out of the car. When asked why, he said: “I can’t say for sure but, it seems to me like the door flew open and his wife come over against me. I don’t know. I can’t say for sure.”
The majority resorts to judicial notice to fill the void in the plaintiff’s evidence. It is not clear whether the majority takes judicial notice of the fact that the “scooting” could have caused the plaintiff to be thrown against the automobile door with sufficient force to cause it to open, or that the “scooting” alone could have caused the automobile door to open. But to conclude that the force of the defendant’s body caused the door to open necessitates the supplying of evidence that the plaintiff himself refused to supply. The plaintiff *703did not say that his body was even touching the door when it “flew open.” And in the absence of any evidence showing why the door opened, only speculation can lead to the conclusion that the movements of the automobile caused it to open.
The cases relied upon by the majority — Fagg v. Carney, 159 Va. 118, 165 S. E. 419 (1932), and Kent v. Miller, 167 Va. 422, 189 S. E. 332 (1937) — do not support the judicial notice taken by the majority in this case.
It is difficult to perceive the relevance of Fagg v. Carney, which involved an injury to a boy on skates when he was struck by an automobile. We reversed the judgment for the plaintiff-boy because there was no proof of primary negligence. The observation of the Court — that, if the plaintiff’s evidence were believed, the defendant’s automobile “would have turned over or skidded in making such a turn” — cannot fairly be taken to support judicial notice of the cause of the opening of the door in this case.
Similarly, Kent v. Miller does not support the judicial notice taken in this case. There, the court noticed only that “It is impossible to drive an automobile around a 95 degree curve going at 45 or 50 miles an hour without turning over or going off the road or skidding or such untoward thing.”
In fact, Kent v. Miller, which also involved a guest-passenger who fell out of an automobile, is authority for this dissent, not authority for the conclusion reached by the majority. This is demonstrated by excerpts from that opinion:
“The case of Williams v. Lumpkin, 169 Miss. 146, 152 So. 842, is enlightening here. Indeed the case presents a set of facts which are strikingly similar to those in the present case. We quote briefly from it as follows:
“ ‘The only evidence to sustain the contention that the rate of speed caused the door to come open was that, when the car suddenly swerved, the door came open. But any such swerve as shown in this record, even at the highest speed any witness testified to, would not cause a latched door of a modern automobile of the sedan type to come open. Such a swerve, however, would cause an unlatched door to come open.’
“So we think the plaintiff, Miss Miller, has utterly failed to establish the necessary fact that Kent was guilty of gross negligence.
“Concede that the door of the car came open as described by Miss Miller, still it is not an incident or event which could have been *704foreseen by a reasonably prudent person as likely to happen if the door were latched. If it were not latched it was the omission or fault of Miss Miller, who got in the car on that side after Kent and Miss Wright had taken their seats. Fowlkes v. Southern Ry. Co., 96 Va. 742,, 32 S.E. 464.”*
There are several possible reasons why the door opened and the plaintiff fell out. One possible reason is suggested in Kent v. Miller: The plaintiff in the present case may not have closed the door securely. Also, it is possible that the plaintiff, who admittedly had been drinking, inadvertently grasped the handle and unlatched the door.
There is no evidence to support the conclusion that the movements of the automobile could have caused the door to open. Contrary to the finding of the majority, I believe it is not within the realm of common knowledge that this could have occurred. According to the uncontradicted evidence, there was nothing wrong with the car door. In Kent v. Miller an expert, who had examined the automobile there involved, testified that it would have been impossible for the door to have come open unless the latch had been opened. In the absence of expert testimony, we cannot know whether it was possible for the door of defendant’s automobile to have opened, unless the plaintiff failed to close it securely or unless he unlatched it just before he fell out.
Even if it be assumed that the movements of the automobile could have caused the door to open, the jury must have engaged in speculation in accepting this reason and rejecting other possible reasons — e.g. improper closing or inadvertent opening from the inside. The plaintiff failed to carry his burden of showing why his injuries occurred. To permit the jury to indulge in speculation is contrary to the settled law of this Commonwealth. Barnes v. Barnes, Adm'r, 199 Va. 903, 103 S.E. 2d 199 (1958).
For these reasons, I find the evidence insufficient to support a finding that the plaintiff’s injuries were caused by the defendant’s conduct. Therefore, I would reverse and enter final judgment for the defendant.

 167 Va. 422, 426-427, 189 S.E. 332, 334-335.