Court Opinion

ID: 9781952
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 17:44:31.17695+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:43.074716
License: Public Domain

MINZNER, Justice (specially concurring). {44} I concur in Sections 11(B), (C), (D),(E), and (F) of the majority opinion and in the result of Section 11(A), which concludes the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress certain statements he made while in custody. I am not persuaded, however, that Defendant lacked standing to raise violations of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR). Majority Opinion, ¶¶ 11-15. The text of Article 36(l)(b) of the VCCR seems to me to provide or create rights and suggests that those rights are personal to the foreign national. Standt v. City of New York, 153 F.Supp.2d 417, 424-25 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (discussing text of Article 36(l)(b) and the Preamble to the VCCR). I would affirm the district court’s decision denying Defendant’s motion on a different basis. {45} Article 36 of the VCCR states: 1. With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions relating to nationals of the sending State: (b) if he [or she] so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if, within its consular district, a national of that State is arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any other manner. Any communication addressed to the consular post by the person arrested, in prison, custody or detention shall also be forwarded by the said authorities without delay. The said authorities shall inform the person concerned without delay of his [or her] rights under this sub-paragraph. VCCR, Apr. 24, 1963, art. 36(l)(b), 21 U.S.T. 77, 100-01 (emphasis added). It is true that the preamble to the VCCR states that “the purpose of such privileges and immunities [set forth herein] is not to benefit individuals but to ensure the efficient performance of functions by consular posts----” It is also true that the first sentence of Article 36 contains language that suggests a limited administrative purpose. I do not believe, however, that either the preamble or the introductory language to Article 36 are necessarily inconsistent with the creation of an individual right in Article 36(l)(b). {46} As a number of courts have recognized, “when taken in the context of the treaty as a whole, the Preamble’s reference to ‘individuals’ is best understood as referring to consular officials rather than civilian foreign nationals.” Standt, 153 F.Supp.2d at 425; see also United States v. Rodrigues, 68 F.Supp.2d 178, 182 (E.D.N.Y.1999) (“Although this clause [of the Preamble] is regularly cited as proof that the Convention was not intended to create individual rights, it seems more reasonable to interpret the word ‘individuals’ here as referring to consular officials, not foreign nationals.”). When the term “individuals” is interpreted to refer to consular officials, it appears “that the purpose of this clause is not to restrict the individual notification rights of foreign nationals, but to make clear that the Convention’s purpose is to ensure the smooth functioning of consular posts in general, not to provide special treatment for individual consular officials.” Rodrigues, 68 F.Supp.2d at 182. Creating an individually enforceable right in foreign nationals to be notified of the associated rights of access to and assistance from their consul would facilitate the exercise of consular functions. {47} The records of the committee and plenary meeting debates suggest that Article 36 of the VCCR was intended to confer individual rights. See Mark J. Kadish, Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: A Search for the Right to Consul, 18 Mich. J. Int’l L. 565, 596-99 (1997). Both committee and plenary debates over Article 36 focused on consular notification as it related to ensuring “due process safeguards for the protection of [foreign] nationals” and the “free will of the affected national.” Id. at 598. The United States itself “proposed language intended to ‘protect the rights of the national concerned.’ ” Standt, 153 F.Supp.2d at 426 (citing 2 United Nations Conference on Consular Relations: Official Records, at 337, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.25/6, U.N. Sales. No. 63.X.2 (1963)). Others appear to have recognized that Article 36 conferred individual rights. For example, some nations supported a proposed amendment eliminating reference to a national’s freedom to communicate with his consul “because they believed that the Treaty was an inappropriate place to establish an individual national’s rights.” Kadish, supra, at 596. This proposed amendment was withdrawn in the face of strong opposition and replaced with language which included the freedom of the individual to communicate with his consul. Id. at 596-97. {48} Based upon the text and legislative history of Article 36(l)(b), I believe that we ought to construe the VCCR to have created individual rights. The fact that no judicial remedy is provided makes the task of defining and enforcing such rights more difficult but does not make me doubt their existence. Many of our most fundamental constitutional rights are not protected by remedies provided within the constitution itself. See, e.g., U.S. Const, amend. IV. The scope of the rights created by the VCCR and the appropriate remedy for violation of those rights seem to me to be proper subjects for judicial interpretation and construction. {49} It would certainly have been helpful to have had a definitive statement of purpose from which to begin that work. I gather from the available legislative history, however, that the rights established under the VCCR are intended to safeguard the procedural rights of foreign nationals. That is, if notified, the appropriate authorities of the sending State would help ensure that its citizen understood and claimed the process that was due. Where due process rights have been safeguarded by other means, I do not believe it is appropriate to suppress evidence obtained absent such notice. See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 377, 118 S.Ct. 1352, 140 L.Ed.2d 529 (1998) (“Even were Breard’s Vienna Convention claim properly raised and proven, it is extremely doubtful that the violation should result in the overturning of a final judgment of conviction without some showing that the violation had an effect on the trial.”); United States v. Chanthadara, 230 F.3d 1237, 1256 (10th Cir. 2000) (“Even presuming the Vienna Convention creates individually enforceable rights, Mr. Chanthadara has not demonstrated that the denial of such rights caused him prejudice.”). {50} For these reasons, I conclude the VCCR is ambiguous in important respects, but we ought to construe it as recognizing individual rights on which this Defendant may rely. As a result, at a minimum, I think Defendant was entitled to notice of his rights of access and assistance. Nevertheless, as the majority has noted, the record in this case does not support a conclusion that the lack of notice prejudiced Defendant. Majority Opinion ¶¶ 19, 20. Although Defendant was not given the requisite notice, other procedural safeguards ensured that he received a fundamentally fair trial. Under these circumstances, I am persuaded that the lack of notice was not prejudicial. I therefore do not believe that the district court erred in denying Defendant’s motion for suppression. For these reasons, and for the reasons contained in Sections 11(B), (C), (D),(E), and (F) of the majority opinion, I would reverse only Defendant’s conviction for receiving a stolen vehicle. I would affirm his remaining convictions.