Court Opinion

ID: 9402287
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-15 16:13:41.968983+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:58.864851
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Townsend, 2023-Ohio-1968.]

                              COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                             EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                   :

                Plaintiff-Appellee,              :
                                                            No. 111548
                v.                               :

JOSHUA TOWNSEND,                                 :

                Defendant-Appellant.             :

                               JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: June 15, 2023

         Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                  Case Nos. CR-19-646155-A and CR-20-649095-A

                                           Appearances:

                Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                Attorney, and John Kirkland, Assistant Prosecuting
                Attorney, for appellee.

                Scott J. Friedman, for appellant.

EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J.:

                Defendant-appellant Joshua Townsend (“Townsend”) appeals the

portion of his criminal sentence that requires him to pay $5,000 in restitution. For

the reasons that follow, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
Factual and Procedural History

            Townsend had two cases that were separately bound over to the general

division from the juvenile division of the common pleas court. On December 3,

2019, Townsend was indicted in Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-19-646155 for aggravated

murder (Count 1); two counts of murder (Counts 2 and 3); aggravated robbery

(Count 4); felonious assault (Count 5); discharge of a firearm on or near prohibited

premises (Count 6); and two counts of improper discharging into habitation (Counts

7 and 8). Each count included one- and three-year firearm specifications. (“Case 1”).

             Next, Townsend was indicted in Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-20-649095 on

March 3, 2020, for aggravated robbery (Count 1); robbery (Count 2); abduction

(Count 3); grand theft (Count 4); two counts of theft (Counts 5 and 6); and

obstructing official business (Count 7). Counts 1 through 5 included one- and three-

year firearm specifications. (“Case 2”).

            On April 19, 2022, Townsend entered into a negotiated plea agreement

to encompass both cases. In Case 2, Townsend pleaded guilty to Count 2, robbery a

felony of the second degree and Count 7, obstructing official business a

misdemeanor of the second degree. The state dismissed the remaining charges in

Case 2.

            In Case 1, the defense filed a motion to dismiss Counts 1 and 4 based on

State v. Smith, 167 Ohio St.3d 423, 2022-Ohio-274, 194 N.E.3d 297, because the

juvenile court found there was no probable cause for those counts. The state agreed
that dismissal was proper and moved to dismiss Counts 1 and 4. The court granted

the motion.

              Townsend pleaded guilty to Count 2 as amended to involuntary

manslaughter, a felony of the third degree, and to the associated three-year firearm

specification. The state moved to dismiss the remaining charges in Case 1.

              The parties recommended a sentence of six years globally across the two

cases and stipulated that Townsend was not amenable to the juvenile system,

preventing a reverse bindover. The parties also agreed to proceed to sentencing

immediately after the plea. Finally, the parties noted that both cases occurred prior

to the enactment of the indefinite sentencing provisions created by 2018 Am.Sub.

S.B. 201, the Reagan Tokes Law, so it would not apply. After speaking directly with

Townsend and accepting his guilty pleas, the court proceeded with sentencing.

              Bengolia Powell (“Ms. Powell”), the mother of the decedent in Case 1,

Justin Powell, spoke at sentencing. Ms. Powell expressed disappointment in the

plea agreement and the suggested sentence of six years. She felt the time was

insufficient. Her son was deceased, but Townsend would be released while still in

his 20s. She exhorted the court to ignore the recommended plea and sentence him

to a longer term and order him to pay fines and penalties. She also asked the court

to order Townsend to reimburse her for her son’s funeral expenses. When asked,

Ms. Powell testified the funeral expenses were $5,000.

              The trial court asked Townsend’s attorney whether he had any

objection to an order of restitution in the amount of funeral expenses incurred.
Townsend’s attorney asked for a moment to discuss the issue with his client. After

that discussion, Townsend’s attorney stated his client would stipulate to restitution.

              The court sentenced Townsend that day, however, inadvertently

issuing a ten-year sentence when it was the court’s intent to issue a seven-year

sentence. Prior to entering the sentencing entry, the court reconvened the case for

sentencing on April 25, 2022. The court noted the error and sentenced Townsend

as follows. In Case 1, the court issued a sentence of three years on the firearm

specification to be served consecutively to 36 months on the involuntary

manslaughter charge. In Case 2, the court issued a sentence of four years on the

robbery charge and 90 days on the obstruction of official business charge. The court

ordered the four-year sentence in Case 2 to run consecutively to the three-year

firearm specification in Case 1 for an aggregate term of seven years.

              Townsend now appeals assigning the following errors for our review.

                           Assignment of Error No. 1

      The trial court erred when it ordered the Appellant to pay $5,000 in
      restitution.

                           Assignment of Error No. 2

      The defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel, in
      derogation of his rights under the Sixth Amendment to the United
      States Constitution, and Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution.

              Townsend alleges that the trial court committed plain error when it

ordered restitution in an amount that was not supported by any evidence and that

trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to object to the

order of restitution.
Law and Analysis

               We review an order of restitution under the abuse of discretion

standard. State v. McLaurin, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103068, 2016-Ohio-933, ¶ 8,

citing State v. Marbury, 104 Ohio App.3d 179, 661 N.E.2d 271 (8th Dist.1995). “An

abuse of discretion implies that the trial court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary

or unconscionable.” McLaurin at ¶ 8, citing Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d

217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983).

               In the first assignment of error, Townsend argues that the trial court

committed plain error in ordering restitution because the amount ordered was not

supported by competent and credible evidence. Additionally, he argues that the trial

court plainly erred because it did not determine his present and future ability to pay

restitution.

               Preliminarily, we note that Townsend stipulated to the amount of

restitution. By definition, a stipulation is “a voluntary agreement entered into

between opposing parties concerning the disposition of some relevant point in order

to avoid the necessity for proof on an issue.” Wilson v. Harvey, 164 Ohio App.3d

278, 2005-Ohio-5722, 842 N.E.2d 83, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.). By stipulating to restitution,

Townsend agreed to pay Ms. Powel $5,000 for funeral expenses, effectively

removing the issue from litigation and rendering proof unnecessary. Bodrock v.

Bodrock, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104177, 2016-Ohio-5852, ¶ 19. “Once entered into

by the parties and accepted by the court, a stipulation is binding upon the parties as

‘a fact deemed adjudicated for purposes of determining the remaining issues in the
case.’” Bodrock at ¶ 19, quoting Dejoseph v. Dejoseph, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 10

MA 156, 2011-Ohio-3173, ¶ 35.

{¶ 16} When parties stipulate, they waive any error that may occur with respect to

the fact that the trial court decided the issue without hearing evidence presented by

the parties. Bodrock at ¶ 19, citing Rice v. Rice, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 78682, 2001

Ohio App. LEXIS 4983, 11 (Nov. 8, 2001). It would be fundamentally unfair for a

party to stipulate to restitution and then claim on appeal that the order of restitution

was not supported by competent and credible evidence. See Tisci v. Smith, 3d Dist.

Hancock No. 5-15-30, 2016-Ohio-635, ¶ 25, citing Havens v. Havens, 10th Dist.

Franklin No. 11AP-708, 2012-Ohio-2867, ¶ 22.

               Townsend’s stipulation to restitution waived the alleged errors.

Accordingly, his first assignment of error is overruled.

               In his second assignment of error, Townsend argues that he received

ineffective assistance of counsel when his lawyer failed to object to the order of

restitution.

               Ineffective assistance of counsel is established when a defendant

demonstrates that “(1) counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of

reasonable representation and (2) he was prejudiced by that performance.”

Morgan, 2018-Ohio-1834, at ¶ 10, citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

687-688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Courts considering whether an

attorney’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, “must

indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance.” Strickland at 689. A defendant establishes

prejudice by showing that “there exists a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s error, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” State v.

Davis, 159 Ohio St.3d 31, 2020-Ohio-309, 146 N.E.3d 560, ¶ 10.

              A party must establish both prongs of the test. Failure to prove one

prong makes consideration of the other prong unnecessary. Morgan at ¶ 11. Here,

Townsend has failed to establish that his attorney’s performance was unreasonable.

Townsend argues that his trial counsel should have objected to the amount of

$5,000 because it was not substantiated by the record.           Townsend had an

opportunity to dispute the amount of restitution but did not do so. R.C. 2929.18

only requires a hearing “if the offender * * * disputes the amount.” Furthermore,

Townsend does not argue that his counsel agreed to stipulate to restitution against

his wishes or by mistake.

              Townsend’s argument suggests it would have been prudent for his

lawyer to require Ms. Powell to prove the amount of restitution. Nevertheless, the

record reflects that Townsend agreed to pay the restitution after consultation with

his lawyer. It would be counterintuitive for this court to find that Townsend’s lawyer

provided ineffective assistance by consulting with his client and abiding by his

wishes at the time. We cannot find that Townsend received ineffective assistance of

counsel on these facts.

              Accordingly, the second assignment of error is overruled.

              Judgment affirmed.
      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.          The defendant’s

conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending is terminated. Case remanded to

the trial court for execution of sentence.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

EMANUELLA D. GROVES, JUDGE

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, P.J., and
MARY J. BOYLE, J., CONCUR