Court Opinion

ID: 9836305
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 03:09:05.673825+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:15.685935
License: Public Domain

Saxe, J.
(dissenting). The trial court properly (1) denied plaintiffs’ in limine motion, and (2) granted a directed verdict in favor of the remaining defendants at the close of evidence, finding that plaintiffs had failed to establish that the warrant was not properly obtained. The law of the case doctrine does *55not preclude a trial court from making a necessary finding of fact based upon the evidence before it after a denial of summary judgment by a prior bench of this Court, where that bench in its denial of summary judgment exceeded the scope of its assignment by finding facts beyond those necessary to reach its determination.
In the prior appeal in this case, this Court affirmed the denial of defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Delgado v City of New York, 86 AD3d 502 [1st Dept 2011] [Delgado 2]). In doing so, it necessarily determined one of two things: either that, based on the record before it, defendants had failed to conclusively establish, as a matter of law, that the “no-knock” search warrant was validly issued and executed, or, that plaintiffs had offered proof in opposition that created a question of fact (see Friends of Animals v Associated Fur Mfrs., 46 NY2d 1065, 1067 [1979]). As the Practice Commentary cited by the majority clearly and categorically states, “A denial of a motion for summary judgment is res judicata of nothing except that summary judgment was not warranted” (Siegel, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, C3212:21). In view of the axiom that the court’s function on a motion for summary judgment is issue finding, not issue determination (see Sillman v Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 3 NY2d 395, 404 [1957]), the purported “finding” included in this Court’s decision in Delgado I, that “the police did not have sufficient independent verification to satisfy the veracity component of Aguilar-Spinelli, nor did they possess the requisite knowledge . . . component of the test” (86 AD3d at 508), constituted obiter dictum, in that it was unnecessary for the denial of summary judgment, and therefore is not binding as precedent (see Black’s Law Dictionary 1240 [10th ed 2014]).1 As such, it did not constitute the law of the case (see Friedman v Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 30 AD3d 349, 350 [1st Dept 2006], mod 9 NY3d 105 [2007]). The trial court was not precluded from considering and resolving, after the presentation of evidence at trial, the issues regarding the issuance and execution of the warrant, since those issues had not yet been finally determined (see Holmes v Bronx-Lebanon Hosp. Ctr., 128 AD3d 596 [1st Dept 2015]; Rodriguez v Ford Motor Co., 106 AD3d 525, 525-526 [1st Dept 2013]).
Nothing in the cases cited by the majority requires or justifies holding that this Court’s purported finding when denying *56summary judgment should be treated as the law of the case. In Brownrigg v New York City Hous. Auth. (29 AD3d 721, 722 [2d Dept 2006]), a previous denial of summary judgment precluded a subsequent pretrial grant of summary judgment; it did not preclude a decision on the issue at trial.
Nor does the case of Carmona v Mathisson (92 AD3d 492 [1st Dept 2012] [Carmona II]) support precluding the trial court here from making its own findings regarding the evidence before it. In Carmona, this Court had previously granted summary judgment in favor of one of the defendants, the manufacturer of the Alcon machine that had been used in the cataract surgery performed on the plaintiff, finding no evidence of defective design or manufacture (see Carmona v Mathisson, 54 AD3d 633 [1st Dept 2008]). Yet, “the trial court permitted defendants to elicit testimony that the Alcon machine malfunctioned or contained a design defect [,] [and] . . . the court included Alcon on the verdict sheet for the purpose of apportioning liability” (92 AD3d at 492). This Court in Carmona II held that giving those issues to the jury constituted reversible error, since they had already been determined on the earlier grant of summary judgment; accordingly, this Court set aside the verdict and remanded for a new trial (id. at 492-494). In the case now before us, because this Court affirmed the denial of defendant’s motion for summary judgment, there is no viable finding of fact to which the law of the case doctrine can apply.
Moreover, the trial court, hearing live testimony rather than merely reading transcribed depositions, affidavits, or other documents, is in the unique position of being able to assess and interpret testimony (cf. Cioffi-Petrakis v Petrakis, 103 AD3d 766 [2d Dept 2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 860 [2013]). Therefore, although the live testimony before the trial court largely paralleled the content of the submissions on the summary judgment motion, the trial judge as factfinder had greater leeway than the motion court in assessing credibility and drawing inferences from the testimony. So, for example, with regard to whether the warrant court interviewed the informant before signing the warrant, although the submissions on defendants’ motion failed to establish as a fact that the warrant judge had interviewed the informant, the trial testimony of Police Officer Brian Washington2 could properly have formed the basis for a finding by the trial court that the warrant judge did, in fact, *57interview the confidential informant before signing the warrant. That finding would render the Aquilar-Spinelli test inapplicable (see People v Kaplan, 174 AD2d 489 [1st Dept 1991]).
In any event, even if the Aguilar-Spinelli test was applicable, it was satisfied. The reliability of the information was established by the informant’s admission, against penal interest, that he had purchased drugs from the apartment, and by his implication in the more serious crime of selling drugs (see Kaplan, 174 AD2d at 490). The basis of the informant’s knowledge was established by the informant’s detailed description of the apartment, and the drugs and weapons alleged to be contained in the apartment, based upon his personal knowledge (see id.). At trial, not only did plaintiffs fail to rebut the presumption of validity that attaches to a warrant (see People v Ortiz, 234 AD2d 74, 75 [1st Dept 1996], lv denied 89 NY2d 941 [1997]), but the trial court had the authority to make findings as to the warrant’s validity based on the evidence placed before it.
While no drugs or weapons were recovered from the apartment, which was alleged to be a drug distribution center, it is undisputed that the apartment was the one identified in the warrant, that police found several hidden trap compartments there, and that the drug sniffing dogs reacted positively to two areas in the apartment. Plaintiffs’ expert conceded that, even if the officer in charge of the execution of the warrant believed that the apartment was the wrong one, he or she could have reasonably decided to perform a controlled search. Further, defendant Nicholas Witkowich, a retired police captain who was in charge of the NYCHA Police Department narcotics unit at the time of the search, testified that the search for drugs and firearms needed to be performed methodically and that, for the safety of all concerned, the occupants of the premises needed to be secured during the search. Under these circumstances, plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of showing that the execution of the search was objectively unreasonable (see Liu v New York City Police Dept., 216 AD2d 67, 68 [1st Dept 1995], lv denied 87 NY2d 802 [1995], cert denied 517 US 1167 [1996]; Simpkin v City of Troy, 224 AD2d 897, 898 [3d Dept 1996]). Further, since there was no showing at trial that the officers who presented the information to the court for a warrant know*58ingly misled or provided false information to the judge, individual defendants Nicholas Witkowich and Brian Washington were entitled to the protection of qualified immunity (id.).
While the preferred procedure would have been for the trial court to leave the issues of fact for determination by the jury, there was no material issue that required the submission of the case to a jury. Accordingly, the court had the authority to direct a verdict at the close of evidence under CPLR 4401, and its decision should stand.
Gische and Webber, JJ., concur with Acosta, J.; Saxe, J., dissents in a separate opinion in which Friedman, J.P., concurs.
Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County, entered December 9, 2014, reversed, on the law, without costs, and the matter remanded for a new trial.

. Notably, this Court did not search the record to grant plaintiff summary judgment on the issue of liability.

. After testifying that in his experience the judge would have interviewed the confidential informant as well, and only then would the judge sign off on *57the warrant or decline to sign it, Washington was asked, “But this time the affidavit was submitted, the interview was done and the judge signed the warrant, correct?” and he answered, “Correct.”