Court Opinion

ID: 9637236
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:00:58.653502+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:40.843708
License: Public Domain

21-6104
    Padron Rincon v. Garland
                                                                                   BIA
                                                                             Hoover, IJ
                                                                           A201 451 529

                         UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                             FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                               SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.

          At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
    Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
    Square, in the City of New York, on the 22nd day of August, two thousand
    twenty-three.

    PRESENT:
                    JON O. NEWMAN,
                    DENNY CHIN,
                    MICHAEL H. PARK,
                     Circuit Judges.
    _____________________________________

    NESTOR ALBERTO PADRON RINCON,
            Petitioner,

                    v.                                           21-6104
                                                                 NAC
    MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
    STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
               Respondent.
    _____________________________________

    FOR PETITIONER:                    Kenneth A. Mayeaux, Baton Rouge, LA.
FOR RESPONDENT:                          Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant Attorney
                                         General; Anthony P. Nicastro, Assistant
                                         Director; Yanal H. Yousef, Trial Attorney,
                                         Office of Immigration Litigation, United
                                         States Department of Justice, Washington,
                                         DC.

       UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

       Petitioner Nestor Alberto Padron Rincon, a native and citizen of Venezuela,

seeks review of a July 23, 2020, decision of the BIA affirming a November 21, 2019,

decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum,

withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture

(“CAT”). In re Nestor Alberto Padron Rincon, No. A 201 451 529 (B.I.A. July 23,

2020), aff’g No. A 201 451 529 (Immig. Ct. Richwood, LA Nov. 21, 2019). 1 We

assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.

       We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as supplemented by the BIA. See Yan

Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005). The applicable standards of

1
 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is the proper venue for this case because the
proceedings were docketed and completed in Louisiana. See Sarr v. Garland, 50 F.4th 326, 329–
35 (2d Cir. 2022). We have retained the case because venue is not jurisdictional, and the Fifth
Circuit transferred the case here.
                                              2
review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (“[T]he administrative

findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be

compelled to conclude to the contrary.”); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513

(2d Cir. 2009) (reviewing factual findings for substantial evidence and questions

of law and application of law to fact de novo); Gjolaj v. Bureau of Citizenship &

Immigr. Servs., 468 F.3d 140, 143 (2d Cir. 2006) (reviewing a nexus determination

for substantial evidence); see also Thuri v. Ashcroft, 380 F.3d 788, 792 (5th Cir. 2004)

(“For us to reject the IJ’s conclusion that [petitioner] was not persecuted on account

of political opinion, the evidence presented by [petitioner] must have been so

compelling that a reasonable factfinder could not fail to find that her persecutors

were motivated, at least in part, by a political opinion held by her or imputed to

her.”).

      To establish eligibility for asylum and withholding of removal, an applicant

has the burden to “establish that race, religion, nationality, membership in a

particular social group, or political opinion was or will be at least one central

reason for persecuting the applicant.”         8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); see also id.

§ 1231(b)(3)(A); Quituizaca v. Garland, 52 F.4th 103, 108–14 (2d Cir. 2022). Padron

Rincon asserted past persecution on account of his and his father’s opposition to

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the Venezuelan government.       The agency did not err in finding that Padron

Rincon failed to establish that he was or would be targeted on account of his

political opinion (actual or imputed from his father) because the evidence reflects

that his harm was linked to a land dispute between his father and a communal

council. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 157–58 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[W]hen

a petitioner bears the burden of proof, his failure to adduce evidence can itself

constitute the ‘substantial evidence’ necessary to support the agency’s challenged

decision.”).

      To demonstrate that persecution (past or prospective) bears a nexus to an

applicant’s political opinion, “[t]he applicant must . . . show, through direct or

circumstantial evidence, that the persecutor’s motive to persecute arises from the

applicant’s political beliefs,” rather than merely from the persecutor’s own

opinion.   Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 545 (2d Cir. 2005).       “The

persecution may also be on account of an opinion imputed to the applicant by the

persecutor, regardless of whether or not this imputation is accurate.” Hernandez-

Chacon v. Barr, 948 F.3d 94, 102 (2d Cir. 2020). “Where the dispute is such that the

asylum seeker did not merely seek economic advantage but mounted a challenge

to the legitimacy and authority of the ruling regime itself, and where the applicant

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can show that this ‘political threat’ is the motive for the persecution perpetrated

or feared, the applicant can meet the definition of a ‘refugee.’” Yueqing Zhang,

426 F.3d at 547 (citing Osorio v. INS, 18 F.3d 1017, 1029 (2d Cir. 1994)); see also

Ontunez-Tursios v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 341, 352 (5th Cir. 2002) (distinguishing

between Osorio where “the direct government connection cast a political shadow

over an otherwise largely economic claim,” from a case where the facts

“suggest[ed] that the landlords neither hated [the petitioner] for his general

political opposition to the moneyed elites nor wished to silence his impassioned

speeches; they just wanted him off the land so they could develop it”).

      Padron Rincon asserts that the agency overlooked evidence that his family

was involved in longstanding political opposition in Venezuela. But there was

little specific evidence of sustained opposition.          Apart from his father’s

participation in strikes and firing in 2002 or 2003 (in protest of a prior regime), the

evidence consisted of general assertions that his father joined political

organizations and demanded justice following his other son’s murder, and that

Padron Rincon started to “participate in the opposition” when he was “more of an

adult” in 2017. Padron Rincon’s father asserted that he was a member of activist

groups and collaborated with communal councils, but did not specify what actions he

                                          5
took between 2002 and 2013 other than the strike. Certified Admin. Record at 229

(Affidavit). Instead, he stated that a communal council demanded 50% of his

property in 2013 because his contributions had not been sufficient and because he

was a political activist, and Padron Rincon testified that the council wanted the

land to build housing adjacent to the town for “political benefits.” Id. at 143

(Transcript), 229.   When the council refused to negotiate a lower percentage,

Padron Rincon’s father sold to a third party. Id. at 140–45 (Transcript), 229.

      While there is a government element to the land dispute, the failed

negotiation with the community council and subsequent selling of the land does

not compel the conclusion that Padron Rincon’s father’s actions amounted to more

than “merely seek[ing] economic advantage.” Yueqing Zhang, 426 F.3d at 546.

The record does not establish that Padron Rincon’s father’s decision about the land

was more than economic. Id. at 548. Moreover, neither Padron Rincon nor his

father provided details about his father’s alleged political activities leading up to

the demand for the land in 2013, and his father indicated that he had collaborated

with the council previously.     Cf. id.; see also Ontunez-Tursios, 303 F.3d at 352

(affirming agency finding of no past persecution where “. . . landlords neither

hated [the petitioner] for his general political opposition to the moneyed elites nor

                                         6
wished to silence his impassioned speeches; they just wanted him off the land so

they could develop it.”).

      Padron Rincon also requests remand for the agency to consider whether he

can state a claim based on membership in his family as a particular social group.

He asserts that remand is warranted because Matter of L-E-A-, 28 I. & N. Dec. 304

(A.G. 2021), vacated a prior Attorney General’s holding (vacating an earlier BIA

decision) that a family generally will not qualify as a particular social group, Matter

of L-E-A-, 27 I & N. Dec. 581 (A.G. 2019). The Government asserts that he did not

exhaust a family-based claim before the agency and that his recourse is to move to

reopen with the BIA.

       “A court may review a final order of removal only if . . . the alien has

exhausted all administrative remedies available to the alien as of right.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(d)(1).   This provision is meant “to promote the orderly progress of

litigation by requiring that the parties take certain procedural steps at certain

specified times.” Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 143 S. Ct. 1103, 1112 (2023) (quotation

marks omitted). Because the Government has raised exhaustion as a defense, we

decline to consider the claim. See Lin Zhong v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 480 F.3d 104, 117–

25 (2d Cir. 2007) (explaining that our review is limited to the reasons given by the

                                          7
agency), abrogated on other grounds by Santos-Zacaria, 143 S. Ct. at 1112.

      Because the nexus determination is dispositive of asylum and withholding

of removal, see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i), 1231(b)(3)(A), we do not reach the

agency’s conclusion that Padron Rincon’s past harm did not rise to the level of

persecution, see INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (“As a general rule courts

and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which is

unnecessary to the results they reach.”). Padron Rincon has not challenged the

agency’s denial of his CAT claim. See Norton v. Sam’s Club, 145 F.3d 114, 117 (2d

Cir. 1998) (“Issues not sufficiently argued in the briefs are considered waived and

normally will not be addressed on appeal.”); see also Yueqing Zhang, 426 F.3d at 541

n.1 (same).

      For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending

motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

                                        FOR THE COURT:
                                        Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
                                        Clerk of Court

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