Court Opinion

ID: 9409733
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-19 14:04:24.042501+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:52.966568
License: Public Domain

Third District Court of Appeal
                               State of Florida

                          Opinion filed July 19, 2023.
       Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                            ________________

                             No. 3D21-1899
                       Lower Tribunal No. 17-29252
                          ________________

     Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company,
                                  Appellant,

                                     vs.

                      Jorge O. Gonzalez-Perez,
                                  Appellee.

     An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Barbara
Areces, Judge.

     Parafinczuk Wolf, P.A., and Jason B. Wolf, Austin Carr and Jean
Fernandez (Fort Lauderdale); Russo Appellate Firm, P.A., and Elizabeth K.
Russo and Paulo R. Lima, for appellant.

     Law Offices of Geoffrey B. Marks, and Geoffrey B. Marks, for appellee.

Before FERNANDEZ, MILLER and BOKOR, JJ.

     BOKOR, J.
      Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company appeals a final

judgment entered in favor of its insured, Jorge O. Gonzalez-Perez, following

a jury trial. Universal also appeals the trial court’s prior denial of a motion

for directed verdict. Relying on Arguelles v. Citizens Property Insurance

Corp., 278 So. 3d 108 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019), and as more thoroughly

explained below, we reverse.

                                  BACKGROUND

      Gonzalez-Perez filed a claim with his insurer, Universal, based on

damage resulting from an act of vandalism at his Miami residential property

on or around May 16, 2017. Universal didn’t pay the claim, and on December

20, 2017, Gonzalez-Perez filed a one-count petition for declaratory relief,

seeking a declaration that coverage applied for the loss. In an amended

response, Universal argued that coverage couldn’t apply because the policy

solely covered damage to the “residence premises,” as defined by the policy,

and Gonzalez-Perez did not “reside” in the Miami property at the time of the

vandalism.

      Gonzalez-Perez purchased the Miami property in June 2013, and lived

there until December 2014, when he began to rent the property to third

parties. Thereafter, Gonzalez-Perez lived at a rental home in Colorado for

a year and a half before moving into an apartment in Broward County,

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Florida, in June 2016. Gonzalez-Perez testified that he intended to return to

the Miami property after the tenants’ lease ended on May 1, 2017. However,

between May 1, 2017, and the discovery of the vandalism, Gonzalez-Perez

and his family were living in Broward County. Importantly, despite any

intention to move back into the property, at the time of the incident at issue,

Gonzalez-Perez and his family resided in Broward County, and the children

were enrolled at school in Broward County.

      The insurance policy at issue specifically covers damages caused by

“[v]andalism or malicious mischief” to the “residence premises.” So, this

case turns on whether, at the time of the loss, the property constituted

Gonzalez-Perez’s “residence premises.”        The policy defines “residence

premises” as:

      a. The one family dwelling, other structures, and grounds; or

      b. That part of any other building;

      where you reside and which is shown as the “residence
      premises” in the Declarations.

      “Residence premises” also means a two family dwelling where
      you reside in at least one of the family units and which is shown
      as the “residence premises” in the Declarations.

The policy, however, fails to define “reside.” Based on the facts elicited in

discovery, and this court’s opinion in Arguelles, Universal moved for

summary judgment, maintaining that the subject property didn’t qualify as a

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“residence premises” at the time of the loss.1 The trial court denied the

motion, and the case proceeded to a jury trial on the question of whether

1 In Arguelles, the court interpreted a policy containing the same “residence
premises” language as the one presently at issue and concluded that the
policy unambiguously limited coverage to the place where the insured was
living at the time of the loss:

      Here, the policy language is clear and unambiguous. It extends
     dwelling coverage to the “residence premises,” unequivocally
     defined within the policy as the “unit where you reside.”
     (Emphasis added). Although the term “reside” is undefined
     within the policy, “[w]hen a term in an insurance policy is
     undefined, it should be given its plain and ordinary meaning, and
     courts may look to ... dictionary definitions to determine such a
     meaning.” Botee v. S. Fid. Ins. Co., 162 So. 3d 183, 186 (Fla.
     5th DCA 2015) (citations omitted); see Penzer [v. Transp. Ins.
     Co.], 29 So. 3d [1000,] 1005 [(Fla. 2010)] (“[T]he first step
     towards discerning the plain meaning of [a term undefined by an
     insurance policy] is to ‘consult references [that are] commonly
     relied upon to supply the accepted meaning of [the] words.’”)
     (third and fourth alternations in original) (quoting Garcia [v. Fed.
     Ins. Co.], 969 So. 2d [288,] 292 [(Fla. 2007)]). “Reside” has two
     definitions, “[t]o live in a place permanently or for an extended
     period of time.” Reside, The American Heritage Dictionary (5th
     ed. 2019); see also Residence, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed.
     2019) (“The act or fact of living in a given place for some time ...
     The place where one actually lives ...”).             Because the
     uncontroverted facts adduced at the summary judgment hearing
     confirmed that at the time of the loss, Arguelles was living in his
     established abode in New York, and his Miami condominium was
     solely occupied by his two tenants, he was not entitled to
     coverage under either definition. Accordingly, we conclude that
     the lower tribunal properly granted final summary judgment.
     See Harrington v. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 54 So. 3d 999, 1002-
     03 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (finding the insureds' property did not fall
     under their homeowners insurance policy's definition of
     "residence premises," as insureds were required to reside in the

                                      4
Gonzalez-Perez resided in the property pursuant to the policy provision.

Universal moved for a directed verdict at the close of Gonzalez-Perez’s case

on the same basis as the unsuccessful motion for summary judgment, which

motion was denied. Universal sought a special jury instruction defining the

term “reside” consistent with Arguelles. The trial court denied the requested

instruction, concluding that Arguelles was distinguishable as the tenants had

moved out and Gonzalez-Perez intended to or was preparing to move back.

The jury then entered a verdict, specifically finding that the loss to the

property was not excluded under the policy because Universal didn’t prove

that “the subject property was not [Gonzalez-Perez’s] ‘residence premises.’”

     building described in the declarations); Centre Ins. Co. v. Blake,
     370 F. Supp. 2d 951 (D.N.D. 2005) (holding that a homeowners
     insurance policy's definition of covered “residence premises”
     defined as “where you reside” did not extend coverage to a
     duplex after the insured had moved out and rented the duplex to
     a third party); Heniser v. Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. Co., 449 Mich.
     155, 534 N.W.2d 502 (1995) (holding the policy's definition of
     “residence premises” was an unambiguous statement of
     coverage requiring that the insured “reside” in the premises at
     the time of loss); 4A John Alan Appleman & Jean Appleman,
     Insurance Law and Practice § 2832 (Supp. 2005) (“Actual
     residence by the insured is required ... by the ... definition of
     ‘residence premises,’ as ‘the one or two family dwelling, other
     structures, and grounds or that part of any other building where
     you reside and which is shown as the residence premises’ in the
     Declarations.’”).

278 So. 3d at 111–12 (footnote omitted).

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                                ANALYSIS

     On appeal, Universal argues that the trial court erred in denying its

motion for directed verdict and sending this question to a jury. 2 Gonzalez-

Perez, Universal claims, did not “reside” in the covered property at the time

of the loss based on the undisputed facts of the case. Applying Arguelles,

the trial court should have excluded coverage as a matter of law. We agree.

     Universal’s policy limited damage to an individual’s “residence

premises.” The issue here lies in whether Gonzalez-Perez resided in the

Miami property at the time of the vandalism based on the meaning of “reside”

in the context of the policy. When policy language is clear and unambiguous,

we construe this language “in accordance with the plain language of the

polic[y] as bargained for by the parties.” Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Anderson,

756 So. 2d 29, 34 (Fla. 2000). “[I]n construing insurance policies, courts

should read each policy as a whole, endeavoring to give each provision its

full meaning and operative effect.” Id. Moreover, “[w]hen a term in an

insurance policy is undefined, it should be given its plain and ordinary

meaning, and courts may look to legal and non-legal dictionary definitions to

2
  We review an order on a motion for directed verdict under a de novo
standard of review. See Hernandez v. Mishali, 319 So. 3d 753, 757 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2021). Further, “[t]he construction of an insurance policy is a question
of law to be determined by the court.” Allstate Ins. Co. v. Swain, 921 So. 2d
717, 719 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006).

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determine such a meaning.” Botee, 162 So. 3d at 186. Arguelles affirmed

a grant of summary judgment in favor of the insurer as to a claim under a

similar policy that defined “residence premises” as the “unit where you reside

shown as the ‘Location of Residence Premises’ in the Declarations.” 278

So. 3d at 110. Arguelles held that, based on the established definition, the

policy unambiguously required that the coverage be denied because the

insured was residing in New York at the time of the loss, rather than in his

Miami condominium, which was being occupied by his two tenants. Id. at

112.

       Under the residence definition provided by Arguelles, combined with

the facts elicited at trial, Universal was entitled to a directed verdict. The

testimony provided at the jury trial confirmed Gonzalez-Perez was still living

in Broward County at the time of the vandalism. The fact Gonzalez-Perez

was not leasing the Miami property and was soon to move back in when it

was vandalized does not, as Gonzalez-Perez argues, change the

applicability of Arguelles to the facts of this case. The Gonzalez-Perez family

didn’t live in the Miami property at the time of loss, their residence was the

Broward property. The trial court therefore erred in denying Universal’s

motion for directed verdict. We reverse the final judgment and remand for

the entry of a directed verdict in favor of Universal.

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Reversed and remanded with instructions.

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