Court Opinion

ID: 9849070
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:34:16.054224+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:59.743012
License: Public Domain

REYNOLDSON, Chief Justice
(concurring specially).
I join the majority opinion, and write further only to express my deep philosophical concern for the future of state *648courts if the Zauderer1 holding is to be extended to the uncontrollable and inevitable machinations of television advertising, absent the safeguards provided by our rules challenged here.
I. Surely no one will dispute there is a compelling state interest that state courts be, and should be perceived to be, forums in which controversies will be seriously and dispassionately resolved, and justice administered, in a structured, disciplined, and dignified environment. It is more than an axiom that “[jjustice must satisfy the appearance of justice.” 2
From the early history of the common law to this day, lawyers have been inextricably linked in the minds of persons generally, as well as in fact, to the functions of the courts and the adjudication process. Blackstone in the middle of the 18th century wrote that attorneys were “admitted to the execution of their office by the superior courts of Westminster hall, and are in all points officers of the respective courts of which they are admitted.” 3 The observation from Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792, 95 S.Ct. 2004, 2016, 44 L.Ed.2d 572, 588 (1975), that “[t]he interest of the States in regulating lawyers is especially great since lawyers are essential to the primary governmental function of administering justice, and have historically been ‘officers of the courts,’ ” has been underscored by repeated quotation in subsequent Supreme Court decisions.4 Smáll wonder, then, that “[sjince the founding of the Republic, the licensing andWegulation of lawyers has been left exclusively to the States and the District of Columbia within their respective jurisdictions,”5 and that the legal profession is the only profession so intimately related to the judicial branch as to be separately regulated by it.6
The nexus that lay persons observe between lawyers and the courts was noted by the Iowa court in Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct v. Bromwell, 221 N.W.2d 777 (Iowa 1974):
Lay persons recognize that the bench and bar each have a grave and heavy responsibility in the administration of justice. The practicing lawyer assumes an important role both in and out of court. He or she is the first to pass on the 'merit, or lack of merit, of potential litigation as- a client unfolds facts across a desk. ...
In the courtroom a lawyer is still more conspicuous as a vital force in our justice system. The importance of his function was well described more than 20 years ago by Dean Roscoe Pound:
“The average controversy is likely to have two sides, each believed in, in good faith by honest men. In order to decide such controversies satisfactorily the case of each party must be presented thoroughly and skillfully, so that things are put in their proper setting and the tribunal may review the whole case intelligently and come to a conclusion with assurance that nothing has *649been overlooked, nothing misapprehended, and nothing wrongly valued.

... [P]roper presentation of a case by a skilled advocate saves the time of courts and so public time and expense. It helps the court by sifting out the relevant facts in advance, putting them in logical order, working out their possible legal consequences, and narrowing the questions which the court must decide to the really crucial points. ... Experience has shown abundantly the waste involved in inexpert presentation of cases by laymen or by inexperienced or inept practitioners.” — The Lawyer from Antiquity to Modern Times, pp. 25-26 (West Publishing Company, 1953).
It is in these ways that lawyers are inextricably and logically connected, in the public view, with the application of law and the protection of constitutional rights.
Id. at 779.
The state courts cannot be disassociated, in the minds of lay persons, from the conduct of their officers, either in or out of court. These courts, struggling in the face of financial constraints to fulfill their most basic functions, have not been supplied with sufficient resources to expand their regulatory responsibility in order to police even the ingenious activity of the minority of lawyers who have utilized print advertising to promote dishonest scams. Such a lawyer defrauded many Iowa clients without the knowledge of the court before his license could be revoked.7 One need not conduct a formal poll of the nation’s chief justices to determine that a number of states, faced with the massive task of regulating lawyer print advertising under the after-the-fact, case-by-case scrutiny applied in the commercial setting, are abandoning the field with mild rule admonitions to do nothing undignified or misleading, words subject to constitutional challenge.8 The task would loom even larger if the sights, color, sounds, subliminal messages, and not-so-hidden persuaders of commercial television advertising were added to the burden.
Many of the more flagrant advertisements by court officers, generated by greed, do more than diminish state courts in the eyes of the public. The total legal advertising movement, coupled with the climate created by words taken out of context in implementing Supreme Court decisions (for example, the Bates statement that “the belief that lawyers are somehow ‘above’ trade has become an anachronism”),9 has resulted in increased unsavory solicitation. The horde of lawyers that descended on the disaster at Bhopal, India, brought the American judicial system into worldwide disrepute.
II. The record before us demonstrates some of the problems inherent in policing television advertising without the safe*650guards of our rules, and the damage to the justice system occasioned by those officers who utilize the manipulative television techniques of the marketplace.
Norton Frickey, president of Network Affiliates, the lawyer and advertising salesman who produced defendants’ television advertisements, volunteered that he failed miserably when he attempted to do his own soliciting via television. The secret, he discovered, was to use “authoritarian figures” like the fake doctor in the advertisement run by the defendants, or, continuing down the series, the fixture-breaking ex-coach John Madden, famous for his Miller beer advertisements. The intent of Frickey’s advertisements is to have the advertised lawyers be seen by the public as “skillful and competent,” “trustworthy and honest,” and the product is specifically “designed ... to have people call you.” A casual scrutiny of the “doctor” television advertisement run by these defendants discloses the bottom-line message: A thinking injured person10 would telephone the defendants.11 Under this record, however, the defendants had no demonstrated expertise in personal injury litigation.
The disturbing future progress of lawyer television advertising surfaced throughout this litigation. Defendants’ alleged advertising expert, Lori B. Andrews, defended with slight amusement a Wisconsin court officer’s advertisement, which she described in the following language:
In the particular ad at issue, he does his ads in a humorous way and they’re all take-offs of existing ads by major advertisers. The particular ad you’re talking about was a take-off on a jewelry ad, and in the ad he comes out of water in a scuba suit and tells people that [if] they’re in over their head with bankruptcy problems, they can call the legal clinic....
Further, in a recorded colloquy during the submission of this case, counsel for defendants expressed no reservations about the “award winning” lawyer television advertising, itself the subject of a long-running advertisement in a national lawyer’s magazine. -A copy of this advertisement is attached as an addendum to this concurrence.12 Here is the robed judge, on the bench flanked by flags with his gavel before him, listening with intense and respectful concentration to a one-on-one dissertation by the lawyer, who rests his elbow casually on the bench. The message conveyed to the viewer is obvious: Here is a lawyer who has the private ear of the judge in the courtroom. The message about the court is equally, and unfortunately, very clear.
Although such advertisements may propose a “commercial transaction,” Zauderer, 471 U.S. at -, 105 S.Ct. at 2275, 85 L.Ed.2d at 663, most are transactions designed to be consummated in the trial courtrooms of the states, where ninety-six percent of the litigation in this country occurs. These solicitations are tailored further to establish firm linkage between the advertising lawyers and the courts. It is not surprising that the logos most repeatedly usurped by advertising lawyers are the scales of justice, which historically, in one form or another, have graced thousands of state courtrooms.
Solemn forums for the litigation of cases whose lawyer-officers resemble carnival barkers at the doors scarcely can avoid being viewed as carnivals, or at least, places where justice is bought and sold as in any marketplace. Judicial systems are not equipped, nor do they have the time, to police Madison Avenue.
*651III. Neither can merit be perceived in the implied suggestion that the necessary regulation be accomplished through the Federal Trade Commission, which appears here as amicus on behalf of defendants.13 The FTC’s ability to insure that advertising “flows both freely and cleanly” 14 in the commercial arena may be tested with John Madden’s beer advertisements which teach youths watching televised sports that drinking Miller’s is macho and interests attractive women; or with the subtle messages to millions of adolescent girls that they can become both slim and daring by smoking Virginia Slims 15; or with the televised demonstrations, watched by impressionable children, that baseball players and cowboys get real pleasure by placing another carcinogen, Skoal, between cheek and gum, utilizing the thumb and finger.
Iowa long has been in the forefront with protective measures for persons involved in its legal processes, all with the support of its organized, voluntary bar association. The Iowa Supreme Court was the second in the nation to mandate continuing legal education for lawyers and judges.16 It was the first in the United States to mandate compulsory audits of lawyer trust accounts.17 This step was ancillary to court rules which created a client security fund, now totaling over $1,400,000,18 to reimburse embezzled clients.19 As of July 1, 1985, through supreme court order,20 Iowa became one of a handful of states21 mandating that interest on lawyer trust accounts be combined through a commission and used primarily to provide legal services to the poor in civil cases. Further, lay persons appointed by the court serve on its Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct, Grievance Commission, Client Security and Attorney Disciplinary Commission, Commission on Continuing Legal Education, Board of Law Examiners, Lawyer Trust Account Commission, and Specialization Committee.
The Iowa Supreme Court continued this movement after Bates, following the procedures outlined in its first opinion, Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct v. Humphrey, 355 N.W.2d 565, 568 (Iowa 1984), to bring its rules into conformance. We were then only concerned, of course, with amending those rules so that they did not “prevent the publication in a newspaper of [lawyers’] truthful advertisement concerning the availability and terms of routine legal services.” Bates, 433 U.S. at 384, 97 S.Ct. at 2709, 53 L.Ed.2d at 836. Following the federal district court decision in Bishop, 521 F.Supp. 1219, we again amended our rules in the few respects they there were found constitutionally deficient. *652After Zauderer was filed, we have amended our rules to permit advertising other than words and numbers, and to assure that our itemization of objective information would be viewed merely as a “safe harbor” approach.22 We thought we had provided the means by which all objective information concerning a lawyer’s education, experience, skills, fees, and availability could be conveyed to a potential client making a reasoned selection among advertising lawyers. The resulting rules do not constitute the bright line we might have drawn to protect the stature of the courts against the excesses of unprofessional court officers, but at least it was not obliterated.
Zauderer, which narrows any remaining gap between state court officers and tradespeople with respect to the puffing that may be permissibly printed, further endangers the capability of the courts to identify and dislodge lawyer print advertising that is false, deceptive, or misleading. The line is blurred further if Zauderer is to be applied without restriction to the television media and solicitation for services in state courts is to be delegated to “authoritarian” pitchmen utilizing all the slick imagery, promotion, and aggressive overreaching of Madison Avenue in the invasion of lay persons’ living rooms.
The effectiveness of state courts, which have only moral suasion and public respect for the ultimate vindication of their judicial power,23 is enhanced by the perception that courts are served by a cadre of professional court officers.24 These professionals in turn should be perceived in the light described by Justice Frankfurter:
From a profession charged with such responsibilities there must be exacted those qualities of truth-speaking, of a high sense of honor, of granite discretion, of the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility, that have, throughout the centuries, been compendiously described as “moral character.”
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 247, 77 S.Ct. 752, 761, 1 L.Ed.2d 796, 806 (1957) (concurring opinion). The television advertising exposed in the record before us hardly projects the above-described qualities. I am unwilling to believe the Supreme Court would extend Zauderer to the undefinable parameters of commercial television. Nor should we. Our rules are designed to permit television advertising while avoiding the excesses and dangers otherwise so inherent and accepted in that media. These rules reasonably protect defendants’ first amendment rights. At the same time, they protect the integrity of Iowa’s courts in “the primary governmental function of administering justice.” 25
SCHULTZ and WOLLE, JJ., join this special concurrence.

*653

. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 2265, 85 L.Ed.2d 652 (1985).

. Friendly, On Judging the Judges, in State Courts: A Blueprint for the Future 72 (T. Fetter ed. 1978) (quoting Justice Felix Frankfurter).

. 2 Sharswood’s Blackstone’s Commentaries 25 . (1864).

. See, e.g., Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, - n.18, 104 S.Ct. 1989, 1996 n.18, 80 L.Ed.2d 590, 600 n.18 (1984); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 484 n.16, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 1316 n.16, 75 L.Ed.2d 206, 223-24 n. 16 (1983); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 422, 98 S.Ct. 1893, 1899, 56 L.Ed.2d 417, 428 (1978).

. Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 442, 99 S.Ct. 698, 700, 58 L.Ed.2d 717, 722 (1979).

. This inherent regulatory authority is claimed under the judicial power constitutionally allocated to the courts. See, e.g., Conway-Bogue Realty Investment Co. v. Denver Bar Association, 135 Colo. 398, 409, 312 P.2d 998, 1002 (1957); People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Association v. People’s Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 470; 176 N.E. 901, 905 (1931); Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct v. Bromwell, 221 N.W.2d 777, 780 (Iowa 1974); In re Integration of Nebraska State Bar Association, 133 Neb. 283, 287, 275 N.W. 265, 267 (1937); Danforth v. Egan, 236 S.D. 43, 47, 119 N.W. 1021, 1022-23 (1909).

.See Bishop v. Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct, 521 F.Supp. 1219 (S.D.Iowa 1981) (attack by Bishop on Iowa’s advertising rules that were drafted with the intent to conform with the holding in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 97 S.Ct. 2691, 53 L.Ed.2d 810 (1977)), vacated and remanded, 686 F.2d 1278 (8th Cir.1982) (on ground lawyer’s license had been revoked, rendering case moot; attorney not adequate representative at time class was certified); In re Bishop, 320 N.W.2d 47 (Iowa 1982) (license revoked for converting funds). This lawyer, who advertised extensively and testified that 80% of his clients came to his office as a result of his advertisements, 521 F.Supp. at 1221, collected fees and costs in his legal clinics located in three Iowa cities, then left the state. Thus far 82 claims totaling $17,564.50 have been processed and paid by the Client Security and Attorney Disciplinary Commission, out of funds provided by Iowa lawyers and judges. See 1984 Client Sec. & Att’y Disciplinary Comm’n Ann. Rep. 3; 1983 Client Sec. & Att’y Disciplinary Comm’n Ann. Rep. 3; 1982 Client Sec. & Att’y Disciplinary Comm’n Ann. Rep. 4.

. But see Spencer v. Honorable Justices of the Supreme Court, 579 F.Supp. 880, 892 (E.D.Pa.1984), aff’d, 760 F.2d 261 (3d Cir.1985); Bishop, 521 F.Supp. at 1232 (“dignified,” as used in advertising, held not unconstitutionally vague).

. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 371-72, 97 S.Ct. 2691, 2703, 53 L.Ed.2d 810, 828 (1977).

.The description of the television advertisement contained in the minority opinion omits the declaration of the fake doctor that "[t]he choice of a lawyer could be important. That’s something to think about.” (Emphasis added,) This, of course, is followed at once by the name of the defendant firm.

. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 383-84, 97 S.Ct. at 2709, 53 L.Ed.2d at 835-36 ("[A]dvertising claims as to the quality of services ... are not susceptible of measurement or verification; accordingly, such claims may be so likely to be misleading as to warrant restriction.’’).

. See, e.g., Trial, Jan. 1984, at 7; Trial, Mar. 1984, at 9.

. There is no reason to believe that the Federal Trade Commission would take a position opposing that of another United States agency, the antitrust division of the United States Department of Justice. On September 21, 1984, the antitrust division sent a letter to the highest judicial courts of forty states, including Iowa, criticizing the American Bar Association’s new model rules concerning fees, solicitation, and advertising because they would curtail “face-to-face conversations ... that focus on the prospective client’s particular legal problem." Letter from J. Paul McGrath, Assistant Attorney General, AntiTrust Division, to W.W. Reynoldson, Chief Justice of the Iowa Supreme Court, at 5 (Sept. 21, 1984); see ABA President Answers Justice Dept. Attack, Bar Leader, Jan.-Feb. 1985, at 11-12.

. Bates, 433 U.S. at 384, 97 S.Ct. at 2709, 53 L.Ed.2d at 836.

. Over 350,000 Americans each year, or almost 1000 every day, die of cigarette smoking. Most became addicted to nicotine as adolescents. Between 1968 and 1979, smoking among all teenaged girls increased from 8.4% to 12.7%. Among 17 to 18-year-old girls, 26.2% smoke. American Heart Association, American Lung Association, American Cancer Society, Smoking or Health 4, 9-12 (Mar. 1985).

. Order filed April 9, 1975.

. Order filed December 5, 1973.

. 1984 Client Sec. & Att’y Disciplinary Comm’n Ann. Rep. 1.

. Order filed December 5, 1973.

. Order filed December 28, 1984, establishing the trust account as of July 1, 1985, pursuant to an application filed by The Iowa State Bar Association.

. As of June 1, 1985, only four states had mandatory systems. 3 IOLTA Update 11 (Summer 1985).

. Order filed November 8, 1985.

. See 1 A. de Tocqueville, Democracy In America 145 (P. Bradley ed. 1945):
It is a strange thing, the authority that is accorded to the intervention of a court of justice by the general opinion of mankind! It clings even to the mere formalities of justice, and gives a bodily influence to the mere shadow of the law. The moral force which courts of justice possess renders the use of physical force very rare....

. See Address by Simon H. Rifkind to the National Conference of Bar Presidents, Detroit (Feb. 15, 1985) adapted and printed in Professionalism Under Siege, Bar Leader, Sept.-Oct. 1985, at 13-14.

. Bates, 433 U.S. at 361-62, 97 S.Ct. at 2698, 53 L.Ed.2d at 822.