Court Opinion

ID: 9776823
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:46:01.468236+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:43.092793
License: Public Domain

Steele Hays, Justice, dissenting. The majority concludes in effect that the mere mention of the word polygraph is so drastic that the trial judge’s firm instruction to the jury1 to disregard it could not remedy the incident and it was manifestly unjust for the trial to continue. Those are the words used by this court in countless cases dealing with mistrial motions because of some unpropitious occurrence during the trial. Johnson v. State, 254 Ark. 293, 493 S.W.2d 115 (1973), is typical. Moreover, the majority declares that the trial judge here abused his broad discretion by failing to recognize the egregious development and continuing the trial. I respectfully disagree for a number of reasons: it was not the state that elicited the mention of polygraph; by all indications the mention was inadvertent; it was not the defendant but a witness who had taken a polygraph; most importantly, the jurors were not told the results of the polygraph. In Scott v. State, 263 Ark. 669, 566 S.W.2d 737 (1978), defense counsel mentioned polygraph in his opening statement, prompting the prosecutor to try to introduce the results of the polygraph which brought on a mistrial motion. Because the results were never before the jury, we affirmed the denial of a mistrial. In Wicks v. State, 270 Ark. 781, 606 S.W.2d 366 (1980), a rape victim referred to a polygraph test administered to her, yet we found no abuse of discretion in the denial of a mistrial because the trial judge promptly admonished the jury to disregard the remark. The identical factors in this case favor affirmance. Noting that results of polygraphs are not ordinarily admissible, the author of Wicks, Justice George Rose Smith, wrote, “It does not follow that every reference to such a test calls for a mistrial, anymore than that is so when the court instructs the jury to disregard a statement based on hearsay.” Id., p. 784. The trial judge witnessed this incident as it occurred and was better able to determine its cause and effect. I believe his handling of the matter was within the broad discretion invested in the trial courts and we should affirm. Brewer v. State, 269 Ark. 185, 599 S.W.2d 141 (1980).   The trial court instructed as follows: Ladies and Gentlemen, whether or not this man took a polygraph test, what its results were is not admissible into evidence. It doesn’t have anything to do with this trial. You’re the searchers of the truth, here, and what you find to be the truth is what it’s going to be.