Court Opinion

ID: 9718518
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:26:26.419042+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:59.964761
License: Public Domain

N. J. Kaufman, J.
(concurring in result). Historically, debate over issues of constitutional law has largely been a matter of perspective. This case provides a good example of that maxim. The majority ' opinion has chosen to cast the Fourth Amendment in a narrow context and in static terms. In so doing, it ignores the reality of a law enforcement realm that encompasses not only sovereign peace-keeping forces but other instrumentalities whose activities may, at times, straddle that rather ephemeral public-private boundary which delineates the limits of the Constitution’s scope. The majority’s perspective ignores the potential for tacit abuse of power on the part of the state. It is a perspective, therefore, I cannot share.
The majority opinion is grounded in two major premises: (1) Michigan law clearly holds that security guards are not subject to the Fourth Amendment, and (2) certain decisions of the United States Supreme Court do not render that law inoperative. I cannot agree with either premise. Further, assuming arguendo the validity of the majority’s interpretation of its citations to support *635its contentions, I nonetheless would not come to the same conclusion.
The majority opinion cites only People v Harry James Smith, 31 Mich App 366; 188 NW2d 16 (1971), in support of its major proposition, that security guards are not subject to the Fourth Amendment.1 That case held that despite the fact that the security guard "was a private policeman licensed in the state of Michigan, and that he had a Detroit license to be a private patrol watchman under a Detroit ordinance”,2 he was nonetheless a private person in terms of the Fourth Amendment. However, this Court further explained:
"To hold a private individual to the same standard of conduct as that required of a police officer who acts with, for, and on behalf of the authority of the state, would create a chaotic situation. We recognize that Mr. Gunn was a private policeman but unless, and until, the Legislature or the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan or the Supreme Court of the United States places upon private policemen the same standard of care as is placed on police officers they are acting in an individual and private capacity.” 31 Mich App at 375.
I believe that the Legislature has placed "upon private policemen the same standard of care as is placed on police officers”. MCLA 338.1080; MSA 18.185(30) states:
"Sec. 30. Any private security police officer, as defined in section 29, who is properly licensed under this act shall have the authority to arrest a person without a warrant as set forth for public peace officers in section 15 of chapter 4 of Act No. 175 of the Public Acts of 1927, being section 764.15 of the Compiled Laws of 1948 *636when such security police officer is on his employer’s premises. Such authority shall be limited to his hours of employment as a private police officer and shall not extend beyond the boundaries of the property of his employer, and while such officer is in the full uniform of his employer.” (Footnote omitted.)
Thus, at least some security guards have the same powers as police officers. Ostensibly, the provision is limited by MCLA 338.1079; MSA 18.185(29):
"Sec. 29. This act shall not require licensing of any private security police employed for the purpose of guarding the property and employees of their employer and generally maintaining plant security for their employer, provided however, that any person, firm or corporation maintaining a private security police organization may voluntarily apply for licensing under this act. When a private security police employer described and defined in this section provides the employee with a pistol for the purpose of protecting the property of the employer, such pistol shall be considered the property of the employer and the employer shall retain custody thereof except during the actual working hours of the employee. All such private security people shall be subject to the provisions of section 19, subsection (1) of this act.”
Certainly the argument can be made that MCLA 338.1080; MSA 18.185(30) refers to, and is applicable to, only proprietary security guards who work in-house for a parent company who has voluntarily become licensed and supplies the training requirements of MCLA 338.1079; MSA 18.185(29).
However, such a construction would ignore the legislative intent of the Private Security Guard Act of 1968:
"[T]o license and regulate private security guards, *637private police, special police, security technicians, watchmen, patrol service, * * * to provide penalties for violations; * * * establish minimum qualifications for individuals as well as private agencies engaged in private security work.”
It would also ignore the rather pervasive licensing requirements embodied in MCLA 338.1053; MSA 18.185(3),3 and MCLA 338.1056; MSA 18.185(6).4
*638A more expansive reading of MCLA 338.1080; MSA 18.185(30) would satisfy the Smith condition and would bring security guards within the ambit of the Fourth Amendment.
Significantly, this viewpoint has already been expressed by this Court in People v Eastway, 67 Mich App 464; 241 NW2d 249 (1976),5 specifically disapproved of by the majority. Thus, I would dispute their contention that Michigan law is clear on this subject.
As Michigan law is not clear, it remains for this panel to decide in which direction to turn at the crossroads. Do private security guards act in such a manner so that their activities may be classified as "public” or "governmental”? If the answer is "yes”, then the Fourth Amendment is applicable. *639As noted in Berger v New York, 388 US 41, 53; 87 S Ct 1873; 18 L Ed 2d 1040 (1967):
" 'The basic purpose of this Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of this Court, is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.’ ” [Camara v Municipal Court of the City and County of San Francisco, 387 US 523, 528; 87 S Ct 1727; 18 L Ed 2d 930 (1967)].”
It is too simplistic to divide the world into public and private sectors and presume security guards to be on the private side. Security guards are hired to provide security for persons and property, cf. People v Smith, 82 Misc 2d 204; 368 NYS2d 954 (1975), precisely the function given to other governmentally constituted peace-keeping forces. A more detailed and practical examination should be undertaken.
Underlying the Fourth Amendment’s prohibitions against unwarranted governmental searches is the fact that people have a right of privacy which ought not be abridged by such activities. In Boyd v United States, 116 US 616; 6 S Ct 524; 29 L Ed 746 (1886), the United States Supreme Court discussed the intent of the framers and then declared:
"The principles laid down in this opinion affect the very essence of constitutional liberty and security. They reach farther than the concrete form of the case * * * they apply to all invasions on the part of the government and its employes of the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life.” 116 US at 630. (Emphasis added.)
Private security guards, as noted earlier, fall into a "gray” area astride the public-private dis*640tinction. To err on the side of a restrictive interpretation of the Fourth Amendment would be to sanction the possibility of widespread abuse of the privacy rights of individuals by private security guards. We live in an era where citizens’ fears for personal security lead to the formation of private law-enforcement groups. We may acknowledge the fact that public law-enforcement agencies try to discourage such groups; but must we stand ostrich-like to the destruction of basic constitutional rights merely because the police did not encourage the lawless behavior which attends this process? Respect for the law is not furthered by telling the citizenry at large that they may conduct illegal searches and turn the evidence over to the police to circumvent the Constitution. Illegal searches would still be undertaken even if officially "discouraged”. The Court in People v Williams, 53 Misc 2d 1086, 1091; 281 NYS2d 251, 256 (1967), expressed it best:
"It seems ludicrous to say that a District Attorney in prosecuting a defendant cannot use evidence obtained by a policeman in derogation of a defendant’s constitutional rights, but can use this same evidence obtained by a private person in derogation of a defendant’s constitutional rights, which in turn is handed over to a policeman who then hands it over to a District Attorney.”
This is not to suggest that publication of the majority opinion will lead to widespread illegal searches by private individuals. Clearly, most people have neither the opportunity nor the means to do so. But there is one group who has both— private security guards.
Ill-trained in the subtleties of the law of search and seizure, private security guards are more *641likely than public law-enforcement officials to conduct illegal searches and seizures. In addition, private security guards have accoutrements of office that tend to radiate an air of authority not possessed by other private individuals. Of particular importance are the uniform and the badge, both regulated by the state. 6
Therefore, it seems truly myopic to suggest that although the tasks of private security guards and police officers are similar,7 although at least some security guards have the same arrest powers as do police officers, and although security guards’ practical authority derives from trappings akin to those of public law-enforcement officials, private security guards are nonetheless to be treated as any other private individual in terms of the Fourth Amendment.8
In reality, private security guards do act under "color of state law”. It may be admitted that this case is not so compelling as Griffin v Maryland, 378 US 130; 84 S Ct 1770; 12 L Ed 2d 754 (1964), or Williams v United States, 341 US 97; 71 S Ct 576; 95 L Ed 774 (1951). However, despite the majority’s summary treatment of those cases, I cannot — as does the majority — fault the trial court for failing to see that one state intermediate appellate opinion renders the conclusion of the United States Supreme Court in the two cases cited supra inapposite here.
*642Having thus concluded that the conduct of private guards is subject to the limitations of the Fourth Amendment it is still necessary to determine if the search and seizure of the weapon in this case was reasonable under Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1; 88 S Ct 1868; 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968). I would hold that it was.
The inquiry demanded by Terry is a dual one:
"whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” 392 US at 20.
Terry itself provides guidelines to determine whether the security guard’s action in the instant case was justified at its inception. The Terry majority opinion recognized a variety of "street encounters” between police officers and citizens ranging from friendly exchanges of pleasantries to hostile confrontations of armed men involving arrest, or injuries, or loss of life. Terry, supra, 392 US at 13. The majority opinion in Terry referred to the need to balance the interests involved — the neutralization of danger to the policeman in the investigative circumstances and the sanctity of the individual. Terry, supra, 392 US at 26. Thus,
"[T]here must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime. The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger. * * * And in determining whether the officer acted reasonably in *643such circumstances, due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch,’ but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.” (Citations omitted.) 392 US at 27.
In this case, defendant’s suspicious behavior, combined with the fact the guard noticed a bulge in defendant’s pocket, justified a limited pat-down condoned by Terry and conducted here.9
Therefore, although I disagree with the reasoning of the majority opinion, I join in the result.

 The citation to People v Langley, 63 Mich App 339; 234 NW2d 513 (1975), is factually distinguishable as the private individual involved was the brother of the victim. Its inclusion merely begs the question.

 31 Mich App at 369.

 "Sec. 3. (1) A person, firm, company, partnership, or corporation shall not engage in the business of alarm system contractor, alarm system agent, private security guard, private police, special police, patrol service, or an agency furnishing those services, notwithstanding the name or title used in describing the agency and notwithstandihg that other functions and services may also be performed for fee, hire, or reward. Nor shall a person, firm, company, partnership, or corporation advertise the business to be that of alarm system contractor, alarm system agent, private security guard agency, or an agency furnishing those services without having first obtained from the department a license to do so, as hereinafter provided, for each bureau, agency, subagency, office, and branch office to be owned, conducted, managed, or maintained for the conduct of that business. Violation of this section is a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than 90 days, or by a fine of not more than $1,000.00, or both.”

 "Sec. 6. (1) The department shall issue a license to conduct business as an alarm system contractor or a private security guard or agency, if it is satisfied that the applicant is a person, or if a firm, partnership, company, or corporation, the sole or principal license holder is a person who meets all of the following qualifications:
"(a) Is a citizen of the United States.
"(b) Is not less than 25 years of age.
"(c) Has a high school education or its equivalent.
“(d) Is currently, and has been for not less than 1 year, a resident of this state.
"(e) Has not been under any sentence for the commission of a felony within 5 years prior to application, including parole, probation, or actual incarceration.
"(f) Has not been dishonorably discharged from a branch of the United States military service.
"(g) In the case of an applicant for a private security guard or agency license, has been lawfully engaged in 1 of the following:
"(i) In the private security guard or agency business on his own account for a period of not less than 3 years.
"(ii) In the private security guard or agency business for a period of not less than 3 years as an employee of the holder of a certificate of authority to conduct a private security guard or agency business, and has had experience reasonably equivalent to not less than 4 years of *638full-time guard work in a supervisory capacity with rank above that of patrolman.
"(iii) In law enforcement employment on a full-time basis for not less than 4 years for a city, county, or state government, or for the United States government.
"(iv) In the private security guard or agency business as an employee or on his own account, or as a security administrator in private business for not less than 2 years on a full-time basis, and is a graduate or its equivalent in the field of police administration or industrial security from an accredited college or university.
"(j) Has posted with the department a bond provided for in this act.
"(k) Has not been adjudged insane, unless restored to sanity by court order.
"(2) In the case of a person, firm, partnership, company, or corporation now doing or seeking to do business in this state, the resident manager shall comply with the applicable qualifications of this section.”

 it is noteworthy that the Eastway holding is characterized as dictum. It is true that this Court states, "We need not reach that question, however, as the search and seizure complained of in this case was not unreasonable.” 67 Mich App at 467. However, had this Court strictly followed Smith, that analysis would be superfluous as the reasonableness of a private person’s actions need not be assessed. This Court clearly analyzed the private security guard’s actions as it would any other peace officer. It did not apply the exclusionary rule to the evidence seized, because the search was not unreasonable.

 See MCLA 338.1069; MSA 18.185(19).

 Private security guards, of course, being limited to the scope of their employment.

 Surely it will be argued that the mere fact of licensing alone does not a public official make. It is true that recitation of a familiar "talismanic formula”, People v Beard, 78 Mich App 636, 639; 261 NW2d 27 (1977), has a soothing effect on those who invoke it. But even fervent incantation cannot dispel the reality of what function is being licensed here — that of protection of person and property by an organized peace-keeping force.

 In so concluding, I acknowledge this Court’s holding in People v Terrell, 77 Mich App 676; 259 NW2d 187 (1977). I have no quarrel with the disposition of that case and agree with its reasoning. However, there are two salient features which distinguish Terrell from this case. Terrell took place out-of-doors and no "bulge” was readily apparent. That differs from the factual situation here where the chances of innocent people being injured were greater because the incident took place in the drugstore of the bus station. It was prudent for the security guard to make a Terry stop here even if it would not have been proper on the street.