Court Opinion

ID: 9846815
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:48:52.894304+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:50.493626
License: Public Domain

Harwell, Justice
(dissenting):
Respondent was awarded $1750 actual and punitive damages in an action against the appellant for fraud and deceit. Appellant alleges the denial of his motions for nonsuit, directed verdict and judgment N.O.V. was error. The sole issue here is whether there was any evidence of fraud and deceit upon which the jury could base a verdict in favor of the re*375spondent, I believe there is no evidence in this record supporting an action for fraud and deceit and that the trial judge should have so held as a matter of law.
On January 1, 1979, respondent, a laundry business owner, and his twenty-two (22) year old son approached several automobile dealerships to consider purchasing a new pickup truck for use in his business. At appellant’s place of business, respondent test drove a new 1978 Chevrolet Luv pickup truck. A Chevrolet Luv is a Japanese compact truck manufactured for General Motors and sold under the tradename of Chevrolet. Although the truck was a 1978 model, a 1979 sticker was inadvertently placed in the truck’s back window when some options were added to it by appellant. (No 1979 compact trucks were on appellant’s lot or on any other lots in the United States in January 1979 because the Japanese made trucks did not arrive until March 1979). Respondent contends he bought the 1978 truck in reliance upon appellant’s alleged representation that it was a 1979 model. However, respondent signed a sales agreement which clearly stated the truck was a 1978 model. In addition, a temporary bill of sale for a 1978 truck was given to the respondent on the purchase date. The glove compartment contained a 1978 Chevrolet Luv owner’s manual, and an EPA sticker on the window listed the estimated gas mileage for a 1978 truck. Later, the respondent received a South Carolina registration card for a 1978 model.
Despite the abundance of evidence indicating the truck was a 1978 model, respondent alleged that he relied upon the 1979 sticker in the back window and a representation by one of appellant’s salesmen. The salesman, however, denies he represented the truck as a 1979 model; he merely represented it as a “new” truck, which it was. Respondent alleged that he first learned the truck was a 1978 model when, three months after purchase, he tried to sell it as a 1979 model. The prospective buyer immediately pointed out to the respondent a door sticker indicating the year as 1978. This suit for fraud and deceit followed.
In order to recover in an action for fraud and deceit based upon a representation, a plaintiff must prove all nine of the following elements. (1) a representation; (2) its falsity; (3) *376its materiality; (4) either knoweldge of its falsity or reckless disregard of its truth or falsity; (5) intent that the representation be acted upon; (6) the hearer’s ignorance of its falsity; (7) the hearer’s reliance on its truth; (8) the hearer’s right to rely thereon; (9) the hearer’s consequent and proximate injury. M. B. Kahn Const. Co., Inc. v. S. C. Nat. Bank, 275 S. C. 381, 271 S. E. (2d) (1980); O’Shields v. Southern Fountain Mobile Homes, Inc., 262 S. C. 276, S. E. (2d) 50 (1974); Moye v. Wilson Motors, Inc., 254 S. C. 471, 176 S. E. (2d) 147 (1970); Jones v. Cooper, 234 S. C. 477, 109 S. E. (2d) (1959). Failure to prove any one element is fatal to recovery. Fraud is never presumed, and the plaintiff assumes the heavy burden of proving it by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. Watson v. Wall, 239 S. C. 109, 121 S. E. (2d) 427 (1961). Because respondent did not offer clear, cogent and convincing evidence that he had a right to rely upon the alleged representation that the truck was a 1979 model, I believe he did not meet the heavy burden, and therefore, appellant was entitled to a directed verdict.
I believe that respondent offered no evidence to prove that appellant falsely represented the truck to be a 1979 model. Nevertheless, assuming appellant did fraudulently misrepresent the truck’s model, respondent’s reckless disregard of his duty to avail himself of the opportunity and means at hand to protect his own interest precludes recovery. One who has signed a written instrument cannot complain of fraud in the misrepretation of the contents when the truth could have been ascertained by reading it. Moye v. Wilson, supra; Jones v. Cooper, supra. Respondent argued that he did not sign the temporary bill of sale; however, it was undisputed that he signed the sales agreement which clearly indicated the truck was a 1978 model. If only he had read the sales agreement, he would have ascertained the truck’s model.
Besides the signed sales agreement, there was an abundance of other opportunities from which the respondent could have ascertained the truck’s model. Even though the sticker in the truck’s window misstated the model, the respondent cannot rely on that because the truth was easily within his reach. O’Shields v. Southern Fountain Mobile Homes, Inc., supra; *377Whitman v. S.A.L. Ry., 107 S. C. 200, 92 S. E. 861 (1917). The EPA sticker, the owners manual, and the S. C. Registration card all correctly indicated the year as 1978.
The majority analogizes the present case with Carroll Ho-tors, Inc. v. Purcell, 273 S. C. 745, 259 S. E. (2d) 604 (1979). However, Carroll is in no way dispositive here. Carroll was an action brought for claim and delivery of an automobile sold to appellant. Appellant asserted as an affirmative defense and counterclaim a cause of action for fraud and deceit based on misrepresentation of the automobile’s actual mileage. The element of fraud at issue in Carroll was the automobile seller’s knowledge of the representation’s falsity. The appellant’s right to rely on the federally mandated odometer disclosure form was not seriously questioned. In the present case, the element of fraud at issue is respondent’s right to rely on the representation on the window sticker when the sales agreement he signed, the EPA sticker, the owner’s manual and the S. C. Registration card all indicated the truck was a 1978 model.
Under the facts of this case, I believe the respondent has no right to rely upon any alleged misrepresentation. The trial judge should have granted appellant’s motion for a directed verdict. I would reverse.
Gregory, J., concurs.