Court Opinion

ID: 9927044
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-26 01:00:39.957401+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:38.653093
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-50332      Document: 00517044663          Page: 1     Date Filed: 01/25/2024

            United States Court of Appeals
                 for the Fifth Circuit                                  United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                 Fifth Circuit

                                 ____________                                  FILED
                                                                        January 25, 2024
                                  No. 22-50332                            Lyle W. Cayce
                                 ____________                                  Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                               Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                        versus

   Lucas James Tighe,

                                            Defendant—Appellant.
                   ______________________________

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Western District of Texas
                             USDC No. 6:20-CV-994
                   ______________________________

   Before Graves, Higginson, and Ho, Circuit Judges.
   James E. Graves, Jr., Circuit Judge:
          Lucas James Tighe appeals the district court’s denial of his habeas
   petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in which he asserted ineffective assistance
   of counsel based on his trial attorney’s failure to consult with him about filing
   an appeal. For the reasons stated herein, we REVERSE and REMAND.
                   FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
          Lucas James Tighe, represented by Attorney Sharon Diaz, pleaded
   guilty without a written plea agreement in 2019 to conspiracy to possess
   stolen firearms, possession of stolen firearms, and possession of a firearm by
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                                    No. 22-50332

   a convicted felon. Tighe was sentenced to serve a total of 150 months in
   prison.   Tighe’s sentence included 120 months each, concurrent, for
   possession of stolen firearms and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon,
   and 30 months, consecutive, on conspiracy to possess stolen firearms. His
   sentence was within the guidelines range of 121-151 months. Tighe was also
   charged in state court for engaging in organized criminal activity related to
   the same activity as his federal convictions.
          The judgment was entered in Tighe’s federal case on June 29, 2020.
   In August 2020, Tighe was sentenced to a total of 15 years on the state
   charges. By handwritten letter dated July 2, 2020, but postmarked October
   19, 2020, Tighe asked the district court to run his federal sentences
   concurrently with his forthcoming state sentences. He also asked the district
   court to reconsider the length of his sentences, claiming that he was misled
   by counsel and that he never saw the Presentence Investigation Report
   (PSR). The district court construed the letter as an initial habeas petition and
   ordered Tighe to respond within 30 days by either withdrawing the motion,
   stating that he wished to proceed, or amending it to include all claims under
   28 U.S.C. § 2255. After Tighe did not respond, the district court dismissed
   the petition without prejudice on November 30, 2020.
          On March 19, 2021, Tighe sent another letter to the court inquiring
   about his appeal. Tighe said that he was in state custody, his attorney had
   told him she was not able to help him anymore, and he never received a copy
   of the judgment or related sentencing paperwork. Tighe also asked the court
   to appoint counsel for his appeal. The district court appointed counsel, John
   Kuchera, and docketed the letter as a direct criminal appeal. Counsel filed a
   Motion for Leave to File an Out-of-Time Notice of Appeal, asserting that
   Tighe was denied assistance of counsel through trial counsel’s failure to
   perfect an appeal.

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          Tighe submitted an affidavit, which said that Diaz assured him prior
   to sentencing that there was no way he would get sentenced to more than ten
   years in prison. Tighe also said that he had asked Diaz prior to sentencing if
   she would ask the judge about running his federal sentence concurrently to
   any forthcoming state sentence but counsel “blew me off.” Tighe said that,
   after he was sentenced, Diaz told him she would visit him at the jail later that
   day, but she never came. Tighe said that his letter written to the court on
   July 2, 2020, was written that day and handed to the jailers to be mailed. He
   further said he had no idea why the letter was not mailed or postmarked until
   October 19, 2020. Tighe said that, if the letter had been mailed in a timely
   fashion by the jailers and had been treated as a notice of appeal, then his
   appeal would have been timely.
          The motion for leave also said that Tighe wanted to appeal the fact
   that the district court did not specifically order that his federal sentences run
   concurrently to his anticipated state sentences. He also wanted to appeal the
   fact that a 30-month federal sentence was ordered to run consecutively to his
   two concurrent federal sentences of 120-months each.
          Diaz sent Tighe a letter dated February 22, 2021, which said, “[y]ou
   got a copy of the appeal paper at the time of the plea. It tells you about your
   appellate rights.” Diaz also submitted an affidavit disputing much of what
   Tighe alleged in his motion and affidavit. Diaz said that she never assured
   Tighe that there was no way he would get a stacked sentence, and that she
   did not blow him off with regard to his state sentence. Diaz said that she had
   no recollection of telling Tighe that she would visit him at the jail after
   sentencing, and that Tighe never called or sent her any correspondence after
   sentencing saying that he wanted to appeal. Diaz said that she was prohibited
   from giving Tighe a copy of his PSR at the jail, but her customary practice
   was to hold the PSR up to the glass and go over it, page by page. Diaz
   reiterated that the guidelines range was 121 to 151 months, as reflected in the

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   PSR. Diaz said that the first time she heard anything about an appeal was in
   Tighe’s letter dated February 12, 2021. Diaz also requested that the court
   enter an order nunc pro tunc to run Tighe’s federal and state sentences
   concurrently and consider the date of his July 2, 2020, letter as the date of his
   request to appeal.
          The magistrate judge conducted an evidentiary hearing on Tighe’s
   habeas motion on November 2, 2021, and ultimately recommended denying
   the motion.1 The testimony offered by Diaz at the evidentiary hearing largely
   reasserted what was contained in her affidavit. The district court overruled
   Tighe’s objections to the recommendation, denied his petition, and denied a
   Certificate of Appealability (COA). On November 9, 2022, this court
   granted a COA on “whether counsel failed to consult with Tighe about an
   appeal and whether such failure constituted ineffective assistance. See Roe v.
   Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 478, 480-86 (2000).” The parties then filed
   supplemental briefs on the merits of the claim for which a COA was granted.
                             STANDARD OF REVIEW
          A district court’s conclusions on a petition under § 2255 based on
   ineffective assistance of counsel are reviewed de novo. United States v. Cong
   Van Pham, 722 F.3d 320, 323 (5th Cir. 2013). Factual findings are reviewed
   for clear error. Id. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant
   must show that (1) counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard
   of reasonableness, and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the
   defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984).

          _____________________
          1
           This court later granted Tighe’s motion to stay his direct criminal appeal (ECF
   21-50239) pending the district court’s ruling on his habeas petition.

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                                   DISCUSSION
          Under the first prong of Strickland, this court considers whether trial
   counsel consulted with Tighe about whether he wanted to appeal. See Pham,
   722 F.3d at 323-24. Tighe asserts that Diaz failed to consult with him after
   sentencing about whether he wanted to appeal. Tighe also asserts that
   counsel’s failure to consult with him was unreasonable because a rational
   defendant in Tighe’s situation would have wanted to appeal and because
   Tighe reasonably demonstrated that he was interested in appealing.
          The government asserts that the district court’s finding that counsel
   satisfied her duty to consult with Tighe about an appeal and that he never
   requested an appeal was supported by the record. The government also
   asserts that Tighe was provided with a written notice of his right to appeal
   that specified a notice of appeal must be filed with the clerk’s office within 14
   days. Tighe and Diaz both signed the notice.
          Tighe argued at the evidentiary hearing that, under Flores-Ortega, 528
   U.S. at 480, Diaz had a duty to ask or initiate a discussion with Tighe
   regarding an appeal without waiting for Tighe to contact her because there
   are nonfrivolous grounds for appeal. Further, the facts that both Tighe and
   Diaz were shocked that the district court stacked one of his federal sentences
   and that Tighe had asked her to ask the district court to run his federal
   sentence concurrent with his state sentence were indications that Tighe
   would be interested in appealing.
          The district court found that “Diaz’s credible and uncontroverted
   testimony supports the conclusion that, before sentencing, she consulted
   with the defendant about the possibility of appeal.” However, the record
   does not support that finding. The district court said that Tighe “essentially
   claims that Diaz provided ineffective assistance because she failed to consult
   with him both before and after sentencing to determine if he wanted to

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   appeal.” The district court then relied on Flores-Ortega for the proposition
   that the Supreme Court has rejected a bright-line rule.
          In Flores-Ortega, the Supreme Court set out the following:
                 In those cases where the defendant neither instructs
          counsel to file an appeal nor asks that an appeal not be taken,
          we believe the question whether counsel has performed
          deficiently by not filing a notice of appeal is best answered by
          first asking a separate, but antecedent, question: whether
          counsel in fact consulted with the defendant about an appeal.
          We employ the term “consult” to convey a specific meaning-
          advising the defendant about the advantages and disadvantages of
          taking an appeal, and making a reasonable effort to discover the
          defendant’s wishes. If counsel has consulted with the defendant,
          the question of deficient performance is easily answered:
          Counsel performs in a professionally unreasonable manner
          only by failing to follow the defendant’s express instructions
          with respect to an appeal. If counsel has not consulted with the
          defendant, the court must in turn ask a second, and subsidiary,
          question: whether counsel’s failure to consult with the
          defendant itself constitutes deficient performance. That
          question lies at the heart of this case: Under what
          circumstances does counsel have an obligation to consult with
          the defendant about an appeal?
   Id. at 478 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
          The specific meaning of “consult,” as quoted above, is key here. Diaz
   admitted that she had not advised Tighe about the advantages or
   disadvantages of taking an appeal. Diaz excused her failure to directly ask
   Tighe before sentencing whether he wanted to appeal by saying, “Well, at
   that point, he hadn’t been sentenced yet, so – I did not ask him at that point
   if he wanted to appeal.” Diaz also failed to ask Tighe after sentencing
   whether he wanted to appeal, relying instead on whether Tighe successfully
   reached out to her from prison. Diaz said that if Tighe had contacted her and

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   expressed his desire to appeal, then she would have advised him of the
   potential advantages or disadvantages of appealing.
          The Supreme Court also said in Flores-Ortega that:
                 We instead hold that counsel has a constitutionally
          imposed duty to consult with the defendant about an appeal
          when there is reason to think either (1) that a rational defendant
          would want to appeal (for example, because there are
          nonfrivolous grounds for appeal), or (2) that this particular
          defendant reasonably demonstrated to counsel that he was
          interested in appealing. In making this determination, courts
          must take into account all the information counsel knew or
          should have known.
   Id., 528 U.S. at 480.
          Tighe is correct that counsel’s failure to consult with him was
   unreasonable. A rational defendant in Tighe’s situation would have wanted
   to appeal, and Tighe reasonably demonstrated that he was interested in
   appealing. Tighe and Diaz were admittedly both shocked by the court’s
   sentence. Regardless of whether Diaz did or did not tell Tighe that he would
   not get a stacked sentence, she still expressed shock over it. It is reasonable
   to expect that Tighe would have that same reaction. Tighe had also asked
   Diaz, as she acknowledged, to ask the district court to run his federal
   sentence concurrent with his state sentence. But she did not do that. Those
   are all indications that Tighe would be interested in appealing. Further, Diaz
   excused her failure to directly ask Tighe whether he wanted to appeal because
   he had not yet been sentenced. Under that same reasoning, Diaz could not
   have properly consulted with Tighe about an appeal prior to sentencing when
   she gave him his notice of right to appeal because she would not yet have
   known the “advantages and disadvantages of taking an appeal.” Such a
   conclusion is consistent with the decision in Pham, 722 F.3d at 324, where
   this court said:

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          Pham’s counsel did not sufficiently consult with him about
          filing an appeal. At most, Pham’s counsel discussed an appeal
          in the abstract and even then did so only before the sentence was
          pronounced. But after sentencing, when the sentence actually
          imposed became known and the time period for filing a notice
          of appeal began to run, counsel neither mentioned the
          possibility of an appeal at all nor made any effort to discover
          Pham’s wishes in that regard.
   Id. (emphasis original). Similarly, in this case, Diaz neither sufficiently
   consulted with Tighe nor made any effort to obtain his wishes about an appeal
   after sentencing.
          Under the second prong of Strickland, Tighe must establish prejudice.
   Id., 466 U.S. at 687-88. In Flores-Ortega, the Supreme Court also said: “to
   show prejudice in these circumstances, a defendant must demonstrate that
   there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient failure to
   consult with him about an appeal, he would have timely appealed.” Flores-
   Ortega, 528 U.S. at 484. “[W]e hold that when counsel’s constitutionally
   deficient performance deprives a defendant of an appeal that he otherwise
   would have taken, the defendant has made out a successful ineffective
   assistance of counsel claim entitling him to an appeal.” Id. Importantly, the
   Court also said that there is no requirement for a defendant to demonstrate
   his hypothetical appeal has “merit before any advocate has ever reviewed the
   record in his case in search of potentially meritorious grounds for appeal.”
   Id. at 486.
          Tighe is able to demonstrate that, but for Diaz’s deficient conduct, he
   would have appealed. Thus, Tighe is able to establish prejudice by Diaz’s
   constitutionally ineffective failure to consult with him about an appeal.2 See

          _____________________
          2
              Tighe does not challenge his conviction.

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   Pham, 722 F.3d at 327 (“In the absence of any self-evident reason why Pham
   would not have filed a direct appeal, and without any regard to the potential
   merits of such an appeal, we conclude that he has established prejudice under
   Flores–Ortega.”).
         For these reasons, we REVERSE the district court’s denial of
   Tighe’s § 2255 motion and REMAND to the district court with instructions
   to grant an out-of-time appeal, and reenter Tighe’s criminal judgment. See
   id.

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