Court Opinion

ID: 9775740
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:08:22.425692+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:30.774507
License: Public Domain

RENDLEN, Judge.
This is a disciplinary proceeding instituted by the Bar Committee of the Twenty-Second Judicial Circuit of Missouri against respondent, Randall B. Kopf. The Committee filed an information charging respondent with neglect in the handling of the step-parent adoption of Jessica Clair Smith *21for Steven and Bette Richardson and with failure to provide the Richardsons with competent representation in violation of Missouri Supreme Court Disciplinary Rules 6-101(A)(3), 7-101(A)(l) and 7-101(A)(2), effective January 1, 1971; and of Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, and 3.2 of the Missouri Rules of Professional Conduct, effective January 1, 1986.
Appointed Special Master, the Honorable Jean C. Hamilton after a plenary hearing found respondent had not failed to provide competent representation or violated Rule 1.1, but was guilty of neglect and failure to keep his clients reasonably informed, and recommended a public reprimand. Though the Master’s findings, conclusions and recommendation are “necessary to this Court’s orderly supervision of the bar,” they are essentially advisory and this Court must examine the evidence and make all necessary factual determinations. In re Staab, 719 S.W.2d 780, 781 (Mo. banc 1986). On review of the record we find ourselves in agreement with the Master’s recommendation and accordingly issue this public reprimand.
The essential facts are undisputed, and respondent candidly concedes they establish unnecessary delay of the legal matter entrusted to him by the Richardsons. During the summer of 1982 Steven and Bette Richardson consulted respondent, who had represented each of them in matters connected with their divorces, regarding Mr. Richardson’s desire to adopt Mrs. Richardson’s daughter from a previous marriage, Jessica Clair Smith. In January 1983, the Richardsons requested that respondent proceed with the adoption, paying him half of his $200 fee, and in March paid the remainder. Respondent prepared a petition for adoption and consent of parent/petitioner to adoption form which he sent to the Rich-ardsons, who in turn promptly signed and sent them back.
On numerous occasions between March 1983 and November 1985, Bette Richardson contacted respondent by telephone to inquire about the status of the adoption. Each inquiry resulted in assurances that the necessary steps had been or would soon be taken. On November 17, 1985, Mrs. Richardson filed a complaint with the Bar Committee for the Twenty-Second Judicial Circuit regarding the apparent lack of progress on the adoption, and a special representative of the Committee wrote to respondent requesting that he answer the Richardsons’ complaint. Failing to receive a reply, the special representative sent a second letter February 5,1986, and on February 21, 1986, respondent wrote to the special representative, admitting that he had failed to keep his clients advised of the matter and explaining that legislation to correct deficiencies in the new adoption statute was being considered by the legislature which would necessitate filing an amended petition. He promised to monitor the legislative activity and draft the amended petition as soon as the new statute became effective.
In April 1986, respondent sent the Rich-ardsons an amended petition reflecting the new legislation which the Richardsons signed and returned to respondent, who promised to file it immediately. Respondent also told Mrs. Richardson that he would obtain a court date in June; however, he failed to do so and in July the special representative informed respondent he was proceeding to file his report with the Committee. On October 16, the day before the informal hearing, respondent filed the amended petition. The Richard-sons wrote respondent a letter on May 11, 1987, terminating his representation and requesting a refund of the fees that had been paid. Respondent returned the Rich-ardsons’ money on June 15; on June 19 a formal hearing was held before the Committee and the Information was filed November 18 of that year. Respondent subsequently learned that the adoption proceeding had been placed on the dismissal docket and immediately contacted the Rich-ardsons to ascertain whether they had obtained new counsel. Learning they had not, respondent offered to complete the adoption at no charge. They accepted his offer and on December 18, 1987, respondent successfully brought the matter to a conclusion by obtaining a decree declaring the adoption final.
*22At the hearing before the Master, Mrs. Richardson testified that she had no complaint concerning respondent’s performance other than the length of time it took to complete the adoption and stated that she was not aware of any substantial harm or real prejudice from the delay. Although her daughter indicated on a couple of occasions that she was anxious to know when the adoption would be final, any potential embarrassment to the child was minimized by registering Jessica in school under the name “Richardson,” which was also the name by which her friends knew her.
Respondent testified at the hearing that he agreed there was an inordinate delay. He stated that he had personal problems beginning with his initial separation from his wife in the Fall of 1982, when the Richardsons first approached him regarding the adoption. Respondent and his wife reconciled for a period of about six months before finally separating in September of 1983. During this period respondent experienced anxiety and depression and had difficulty concentrating and remembering things. He obtained psychiatric help and began a treatment program that included medication and counseling; however, in 1984 and for most of 1985 respondent discontinued the treatment. He resumed treatment in late 1985 or early 1986 and his medication dosage was increased at that time. Respondent adduced a letter from his psychiatrist which in large measure corroborates respondent’s description of his condition and treatment and which indicates that respondent has continued to improve. Respondent also told of his recent remarriage and expressed a belief that his personal life is now under control.
During the time in question, respondent maintained approximately 100-150 active case files at a time, many of which were minor civil matters involving small fees. In September 1986 respondent found it necessary to take over, in addition to his normal case load, a number of files that had been assigned to an associate who left the firm. He testified that since those days office conditions have improved substantially and he is now able to keep abreast his workload. One of his partners testified at the hearing and corroborated respondent’s account of the law practice and office improvements.
We agree with the Master’s conclusion that there was no evidence to indicate that respondent failed to provide competent representation to his clients, and accordingly dismiss the Count charging violation of Rule 1.1. However, the record clearly establishes respondent’s neglect of his duty to the Richardsons, which is sufficient for disciplinary action. Matter of Maloney, 620 S.W.2d 362 (Mo. banc 1981); Matter of Alpers, 574 S.W.2d 427 (Mo. banc 1978). Hence we must decide the appropriate discipline to be administered; however, before determining the sanction, we address respondent’s contention that a prior letter of admonition which was adduced at the hearing before the Master should not be considered.
The letter of admonition was issued by the Bar Committee on March 12, 1985, eight months before Mrs. Richardson filed the complaint against respondent. The subject of the letter was three complaints against respondent for neglecting either to file suit or take action requested by clients. In the letter respondent was informed that “this admonition will become part of your record to be considered in connection with any future disciplinary proceedings and [the Committee] wishes to emphasize that it will not be so lenient in the future if a pattern of misconduct persists.” The letter of admonition was not offered or considered for the purpose of determining guilt or innocence of the charges involved here, but was offered solely for consideration in determining an appropriate sanction. In re Murphy, 732 S.W.2d 895, 901 (Mo. banc 1987). The letter informed respondent it would be utilized in the future for that purpose. We find no merit to respondent’s contention that he was denied his right to confrontation regarding the conduct in the letter by its admission at the hearing before the Master in this case for consideration as an aggravating factor in arriving at the discipline to be imposed.
*23Turning to consideration of the appropriate sanction, we are mindful that “[t]he purpose of discipline is not to punish the attorney, but to protect the public and maintain the integrity of the legal profession.” In re Littleton, 719 S.W.2d 772, 777 (Mo. banc 1986). “This Court has held that disbarment should be reserved for those cases in which it is clear that respondent is one who should not be at Bar.” Id. We have also stated that “[f]or isolated instances of misconduct or clearly inappropriate acts with minimal harm to the client, a reprimand may be more appropriate." In re Staab, 719 S.W.2d at 784 (emphasis ours). Although respondent’s breach of duty should not be trivialized, it is apparent from the record that the harm to the clients was minimal. Furthermore, while the evidence concerning respondent’s personal difficulties does not justify his misconduct, his mental state is properly to be considered a mitigating factor. In re Mentrup, 665 S.W.2d 324 (Mo. banc 1984). The evidence suggests that respondent’s personal situation has improved substantially and that he continues to make progress through his treatment program. While the prior letter of admonition for neglect is troubling, we nonetheless conclude, as did the Master, that public reprimand is the appropriate sanction to be employed in this case.
Respondent’s misconduct is similar to that disciplined by public reprimand in a number of recent cases. See, e.g., In re Staab, 719 S.W.2d at 780; In re Hardge, 713 S.W.2d 503 (Mo. banc 1986); and In re Elliott, 694 S.W.2d 262 (Mo. banc 1985). The Staab case is particularly pertinent. There the respondent was found to have neglected the affairs of two clients and to have failed to cooperate with the Bar Committee in the subsequent disciplinary proceeding. Both instances of neglect resulted in dismissal of actions, one because of failure to prosecute and the other for failure to respond to a show cause order. In determining that public reprimand was the appropriate disciplinary measure, we noted that the respondent “did not seek personal gain by his actions" and that “there was no irreparable harm to the clients.” Id. at 784.
The respondent here neither sought nor obtained personal gain by his actions and the harm to his clients was minimal. He eventually performed the service to his client competently and without fee and appears to have resolved in large measure the personal difficulties he encountered during the time of the misconduct. He has also taken measures to prevent caseload burden and careless management from affecting him in the future.
It is ordered that respondent be and he is hereby publicly reprimanded. Costs of this proceeding are assessed against respondent.
BILLINGS, C.J., and ROBERTSON and HIGGINS, JJ., concur.
BLACKMAR, J., concurs in separate opinion filed.
WELLIYER, J., dissents in separate opinion filed.
DONNELLY, J., retired January 1, 1989.
COVINGTON, J., not participating because not a member of the Court when cause was submitted.
BLACKMAR, J., withdraws separate concurring opinion filed February 14, 1989, and concurs in separate opinion filed March 8, 1989.