Court Opinion

ID: 9906990
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-05 17:25:28.81373+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:57:55.895603
License: Public Domain

J-S37041-23

 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                         :
              v.                         :
                                         :
                                         :
 EDWARD FRANCIS GOSNER                   :
                                         :
                   Appellant             :   No. 625 EDA 2023

          Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 7, 2023
             In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
              Criminal Division at CP-09-CR-0000187-2020

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., MURRAY, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                       FILED DECEMBER 5, 2023

     Edward Francis Gosner (Appellant) appeals from the order denying his

first petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

           On July 14, 2021, after a [non-jury] trial, [the trial] court
     found Appellant guilty of aggravated assault, assault by prisoner,
     simple assault, and harassment. Appellant was represented by
     Daniel Schatz, Esquire (hereinafter “Trial Counsel”).

            The facts underlying Appellant’s convictions stem from an
     attack that occurred on October 13, 2019[,] at the Bucks County
     Correctional Facility (hereinafter “BCCF”). Appellant was in the
     restricted housing unit of BCCF when he assaulted another
     inmate, Michael Dozon (hereinafter “Victim”), after Appellant took
     issue with Victim’s sexuality. N.T., 7/14/21, p. 69. Appellant
     threatened to “fuck [Victim] up,” told him that “faggots shouldn’t
     live” and “it’s not right to be gay,” and called [Victim] homophobic
     slurs. Id. at 70-72. Appellant followed Victim as he retreated
     into a closet, forcing Victim to spray Appellant with a water hose
     so he could escape. Id. at 70. As Victim fled to the unit’s exit,
     Appellant attacked him from behind. Id. at 74, 24. As Victim laid
     curled up in a ball on the floor, Appellant punched and kneed
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      Victim fifteen times and kicked him in the head. Id. at 25. Victim
      never returned the attack on Appellant. Over five correctional
      officers had to respond to the assault. Id. at 26. Correctional
      officers attempted to obtain medical treatment for Victim, but he
      refused. Id. at 79. However, Victim testified that his cheek was
      swollen, he had bruises all over his body, and the pain in his head,
      chest, and back areas was so severe that he had to take pain
      medication “all of the time.” Id.

             Shortly after the attack, Appellant discovered that charges
      were filed against him for the assault. He threatened Victim to
      “drop the charges … or [Appellant] would make [Victim’s] life a
      living hell.” N.T., 7/14/21, p. 83. Victim received so many threats
      that he became suicidal. Ultimately, Appellant asked Victim to
      write a letter on Appellant’s behalf that Appellant’s girlfriend could
      bring to the district court[,] to have the charges dismissed. Id.
      at 89. Victim complied, had his cellmate write the letter with
      Appellant’s requested false statements, and then Victim signed
      the letter. Id. at 92-95. On November 8, 2019, Appellant wrote
      a letter to his girlfriend with Victim’s letter attached. At the
      preliminary hearing, Appellant also told Victim “please make the
      right decision,” implying Victim should lie on the stand so that the
      case would be dismissed. Id. at 97, 96.

            After this court found Appellant guilty of the charges, it
      deferred sentencing for 60 days. On September 10, 2021, this
      court imposed sentence of no less than seven years to no more
      than fifteen years of incarceration in a state correctional facility
      on count 1, aggravated assault[. The court imposed] a sentence
      of no less than five years to no more than ten years in a state
      correctional facility on [Appellant’s conviction of] … assault by
      prisoner, to run concurrently to the sentence imposed on count 1.
      [With respect to Appellant’s remaining convictions, the trial court
      imposed no further punishment.]          This court also ordered
      Appellant to pay the costs of prosecution as well as to undergo
      mental hea[l]th and drug and alcohol treatment and complete an
      anger management program.

PCRA Court Opinion, 4/18/23, at 1-3 (footnotes omitted, some capitalization

and citations modified).

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       On September 20, 2021, Trial Counsel filed a post-sentence motion

(PSM) on Appellant’s behalf.         Appellant claimed the trial court abused its

discretion in imposing an excessive sentence.              PSM, 9/20/21, ¶¶ 6, 7

(asserting the sentence was “well beyond the top of the aggravated range”

and “greater than necessary to meet the rehabilitative needs of [Appellant,]

as well as the need to protect the public.”). Pertinently, Appellant requested

the appointment of new counsel to file a PCRA petition raising Trial Counsel’s

ineffectiveness. Id. ¶¶ 8-11. The trial court denied Appellant’s PSM without

a hearing on September 29, 2021. Appellant did not appeal.

       On July 11, 2022, Appellant timely filed a pro se PCRA petition.

Appellant claimed, inter alia, that Trial Counsel rendered ineffective assistance

when he ignored Appellant’s repeated requests to file an appeal.            PCRA

Petition, 7/11/22, at 4. The PCRA court appointed Eric Alcon, Esquire (PCRA

Counsel) to represent Appellant.1              PCRA Counsel filed an amended PCRA

petition on December 7, 2022.           In the amended petition, Appellant raised

several claims of Trial Counsel’s ineffectiveness. See Amended PCRA Petition,

12/7/22, ¶¶ 5, 10-28. Relevant to this appeal, Appellant claimed Trial Counsel

“failed to properly preserve in [the PSM, Appellant’s] challenge to the

discretionary aspects of the sentence.” Id. ¶ 10(b). Appellant further argued

Trial Counsel

____________________________________________

1 PCRA Counsel continues to represent Appellant on appeal.

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       failed to properly preserve, and to file, [a direct] appeal to the
       Superior Court, challenging the discretionary aspects of the
       sentence and the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to the
       charge of [a]ggravated [a]ssault.

Id. ¶ 10(c).     In addition, Appellant asked the PCRA court to schedule an

evidentiary hearing to develop the record.2 Id. ¶¶ 29-30.

       On January 10, 2023, the Commonwealth filed an answer asserting that

each of Appellant’s claims of Trial Counsel’s ineffectiveness lacked merit. See

Answer, 1/10/23, at 4-18.             Seven days later, the PCRA court issued

Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of intent to dismiss Appellant’s PCRA petition without

a hearing. The PCRA court stated it “is satisfied that the claims raised in [the

petition] are without merit and do not warrant an evidentiary hearing.” Notice

of Intent to Dismiss, 1/17/23. Appellant did not respond.

       The PCRA court denied Appellant’s PCRA petition on February 7, 2023.

This timely appeal followed. Appellant and the PCRA court have complied with

Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

       Appellant presents three issues for review:

     I.    Did [the] lower court err in denying []Appellant’s claim, without
           a hearing, that Trial Counsel was ineffective in that he failed to
           properly preserve in a post-sentence motion [Appellant’s]
           challenge to the discretionary aspects of the sentence[?]

     II.   Did the lower court err in denying []Appellant’s claim, without
           a hearing, that Trial Counsel failed to properly preserve, and to
           file an appeal to the Superior Court, challenging the
           discretionary aspects of the sentence[?]
____________________________________________

2 Appellant did not attach any affidavits to either his pro se PCRA petition or

amended petition.

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    III. Did the lower court err in denying []Appellant’s claim, without
         a hearing, that Trial Counsel failed to properly preserve, and to
         file an appeal to the Superior Court, challenging the sufficiency
         of the evidence with respect to the charge of aggravated
         assault-attempt to cause serious bodily injury[?]

Appellant’s Brief at vi (some capitalization modified).

      Preliminarily, we discuss a defect in Appellant’s brief. In compliance

with our Rules of Appellate Procedure, Appellant sets forth separate

arguments for each of the issues presented in his statement of questions

involved. See id. at 15-21; see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119 (argument section of

appellate briefs).   However, Appellant also argues an issue that does not

correspond with his statement. See Appellant’s Brief at 9-14 (claiming the

PCRA court erred in denying relief without an evidentiary hearing and

determining Appellant’s PCRA petition was defective for failure to include an

affidavit from Trial Counsel).

      “This Court will address only those issues properly presented and

developed in an appellant’s brief as required by our Rules of Appellate

Procedure, Pa.R.A.P. 2101-2119.”     Commonwealth v. Phillips, 141 A.3d

512, 522 (Pa. Super. 2016).       Issues not presented in the statement of

questions involved are generally deemed waived.           Commonwealth v.

Garland, 63 A.3d 339, 342 (Pa. Super. 2013) (finding waiver of appellant’s

issue) (citing Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) (“No questions will be considered unless they

are stated in the statement of questions involved or are fairly suggested

thereby.”)).   Accordingly, Appellant waived this issue.        Id.; see also

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Commonwealth v. Briggs, 12 A.3d 291, 343 (Pa. 2011) (“The briefing

requirements scrupulously delineated in our appellate rules are not mere

trifling matters of stylistic preference; rather, they represent a studied

determination by [the Supreme] Court and its rules committee of the most

efficacious manner by which appellate review may be conducted”). We thus

proceed to the merits of Appellant’s preserved issues.

     Our standard of review of a PCRA court’s denial of relief is “limited to

whether the court’s findings of fact are supported by the record, and whether

its conclusions of law are free from legal error.” Commonwealth v. Small,

238 A.3d 1267, 1280 (Pa. 2020). The scope of our review is limited to the

findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of record, which we view in the

light most favorable to the party who prevailed in the PCRA court.

Commonwealth v. Hanible, 30 A.3d 426, 438 (Pa. 2011).

     With respect to evidentiary hearings, this Court has explained:

     A PCRA petitioner is not automatically entitled to an evidentiary
     hearing. We review the PCRA court’s decision dismissing a
     petition without a hearing for an abuse of discretion. The right to
     an evidentiary hearing on a post-conviction petition is not
     absolute. It is within the PCRA court’s discretion to decline to hold
     a hearing if the petitioner’s claim is patently frivolous and has no
     support either in the record or other evidence.            It is the
     responsibility of the reviewing court on appeal to examine each
     issue raised in the PCRA petition in light of the record … to
     determine if the PCRA court erred in its determination that there
     were no genuine issues of material fact in controversy and in
     denying relief without conducting an evidentiary hearing.

Commonwealth v. Williams, 244 A.3d 1281, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2021)

(citations, brackets, and paragraph break omitted).

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      All of Appellant’s issues assail the effectiveness of Trial Counsel.

Notably, counsel is presumed to be effective; a PCRA petitioner bears the

burden of proving otherwise. Commonwealth v. Brown, 196 A.3d 130, 150

(Pa. 2018); see also Commonwealth v. Lesko, 15 A.3d 345, 380 (Pa. 2011)

(“When evaluating ineffectiveness claims, judicial scrutiny of counsel’s

performance must be highly deferential.” (citation and quotation marks

omitted)).

      [A] PCRA petitioner will be granted relief only when he proves, by
      a preponderance of the evidence, that his conviction or sentence
      resulted from[, inter alia,] the “ineffective assistance of counsel
      which, in the circumstances of the particular case, so undermined
      the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt
      or innocence could have taken place.”

Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 294, 311 (Pa. 2014) (quoting 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii)).

      To establish a claim of ineffectiveness, a PCRA petitioner must plead and

prove:

      (1) the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) no reasonable
      basis existed for counsel’s action or failure to act; and (3) he
      suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s error, with prejudice
      measured by whether there is a reasonable probability the result
      of the proceeding would have been different. Commonwealth v.
      Chmiel, 30 A.3d 1111, 1127 (Pa. 2011) (employing ineffective
      assistance of counsel test from Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527
      A.2d 973, 975-76 (Pa. 1987)). … Additionally, counsel cannot be
      deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim. Finally,
      because a PCRA petitioner must establish all the Pierce prongs to
      be entitled to relief, we are not required to analyze the elements
      of an ineffectiveness claim in any specific order; thus, if a claim
      fails under any required element, we may dismiss the claim on
      that basis.

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Commonwealth v. Treiber, 121 A.3d 435, 445 (Pa. 2015) (citations

modified).

      In his first issue, Appellant claims the PCRA court erred in denying relief

without an evidentiary hearing because Trial Counsel “was ineffective in that

he failed to properly preserve in a [PSM, Appellant’s] challenge to the

discretionary aspects of the sentence.” Appellant’s Brief at 15 (capitalization

modified); see also Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 981 A.2d 274, 282-83 (Pa.

Super. 2009) (“Issues challenging the discretionary aspects of a sentence

must be raised in a post-sentence motion or by presenting the claim to the

trial court during the sentencing proceedings.        Absent such efforts, an

objection to a discretionary aspect of a sentence is waived.”).

      Appellant concedes Trial Counsel “did ask for a reconsideration of

sentence” in the PSM. Appellant’s Brief at 15; see also PSM, 9/20/21, ¶¶ 6,

7 (claiming Appellant’s sentence was “well beyond the top of the aggravated

range” and “greater than necessary to meet the rehabilitative needs of

[Appellant,] as well as the need to protect the public.”).         Nonetheless,

Appellant asserts that the discretionary sentencing claim in the PSM

      does not raise a colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s
      actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of
      the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms
      which underlie the sentencing process. As such, even had [a
      direct] appeal been filed, as Appellant requested, [the Superior]
      Court would have likely found the [PSM] insufficient and
      determined that Appellant had waived his right to challenge the
      discretionary aspects of the sentence by failing to properly
      preserve same in the post-sentence motion.

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Appellant’s Brief at 16.

       The Commonwealth counters that the PCRA court properly rejected this

claim because the PSM preserved Appellant’s discretionary sentencing

challenge:

       The [PSM] argued Appellant was sentenced beyond the
       aggravated range of the sentencing guidelines and that he
       believed his sentence to be “excessive and greater than necessary
       to meet the rehabilitative needs of Appellant as well as the need
       to protect the community.” [PSM, 9/20/21,] ¶¶ 6-7. Absent
       Appellant identifying some additional discretionary aspects of
       sentencing claim that he believed trial counsel should have raised
       in his post-sentence motion, trial counsel surely did preserve a
       reviewable sentencing claim for purposes of direct appeal, and the
       underlying claim here has no arguable merit.

Commonwealth Brief at 13 (italics in original; some capitalization modified).

       The PCRA court also opined that Appellant’s discretionary sentencing

claim was “properly preserved” in the PSM. PCRA Court Opinion, 4/18/23, at

8. We agree. As there is no arguable merit to Appellant’s underlying claim of

Trial Counsel’s ineffectiveness, the PCRA court did not err in denying relief.

       In the alternative, the PCRA court stated

       even if Trial Counsel’s [PSM] was insufficient, Appellant has not
       established all three required prongs of the Pierce test for
       ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Appellant has not,
       and cannot, establish prejudice because there is no reason to
       believe that a challenge to the discretionary aspects of sentence
       would have had merit on appeal.

PCRA Court Opinion, 4/18/23, at 8.3 Again, we agree.

____________________________________________

3 The PCRA court also cited law applicable to discretionary aspects of
sentencing claims. See PCRA Court Opinion, 4/18/23, at 8-10.

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     The PCRA court, which also presided at Appellant’s sentencing,

explained:

            [T]his court set forth its reasons for the sentence on the
     record. First, this court considered Appellant’s prior criminal
     history and noted he had six prior convictions for assault-related
     behavior. N.T. 9/10/2021, p. 11. Second, this court considered
     the facts of the case—that Appellant began his attack from behind,
     leaving Victim unable to defend himself; that Appellant kneed and
     kicked Victim over a dozen times in the head despite Victim never
     attempting to fight back—and determined that it was a “very
     violent and unprovoked and vicious assault.” Id. at 12. Third,
     this court considered Appellant’s lack of remorse and failure to
     accept responsibility for his actions. At sentencing, Appellant
     claimed to feel apologetic for his actions, yet interrupted this court
     in the middle of the imposition of sentence to blame Victim for the
     assault and to again lie and state a debunked assertion that the
     hose Victim used [in self-defense] was filled with anything other
     than water. Id. at 12[]; N.T. 7/14/2021, p. 41.

             Fourth, this court considered Appellant’s inability to abide to
     authority as shown by his numerous misconducts in the [BCCF]
     and his violations of this court’s orders to not contact victims. N.T.
     9/10/2021, p. 13. Fifth, this court considered the need to protect
     the community and noted that Appellant has repeatedly
     demonstrated that he cannot control his anger and that he has
     even acknowledged this himself at times. Id. at 14. Lastly, this
     court considered Appellant’s need for rehabilitation. Although
     Appellant completed a few classes on anger management and
     decision-making, this court found that those classes did not meet
     Appellant’s needs. Id. Appellant, time after time, chose not to
     take advantage of and follow the programs and treatment
     available to him in the community, in the county correctional
     facility, or in the state correctional facility. For these reasons, this
     court found that anything other than total confinement was
     inappropriate. Id.

            As such, it is clear that this court did not err when imposing
     sentence and properly exercised its discretion and, as such, any
     challenge on direct appeal would be meritless. Appellant’s claim
     to the contrary is wholly without merit and Appellant’s claim that
     Trial Counsel was ineffective must fail.

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PCRA Court Opinion, 4/18/23, at 10-11 (some capitalization modified). For

the above reasons, Appellant’s first issue lacks merit.

      In his second and third issues, Appellant presents related claims.

Appellant asserts the PCRA court erred in rejecting his contention that Trial

Counsel was ineffective for failing to file a requested direct appeal challenging

the sufficiency of the evidence and the discretionary aspects of his sentence.

See Appellant’s Brief at 16-18, 19-21. According to Appellant, he

      pled in both the pro se [PCRA] petition and the amended petition
      that he directed Trial Counsel to pursue an appeal challenging the
      sentence. There is nothing in the record that belies this claim.

            Trial Counsel contends, through the Commonwealth’s answer
      [to Appellant’s amended PCRA petition], that [Trial Counsel] was
      not told to pursue an appeal of the sentence.         Without a[n
      evidentiary hearing,] it is impossible for the PCRA court to make
      any determination as to whether Appellant’s claim, or Trial
      Counsel’s response, is credible.

Id. at 17 (some capitalization modified).

      The Commonwealth counters that Appellant failed to meet his burden of

proving he asked Trial Counsel to file a direct appeal. See Commonwealth

Brief at 14-18. The Commonwealth argues:

      Appellant makes passing references to alleged verbal and written
      directives to [Trial Counsel to] file an appeal on [Appellant’s]
      behalf. However, … [Appellant] failed to attach any exhibits to his
      petition demonstrating such written instructions.          Moreover,
      before [the Commonwealth filed] its answer [to the amended
      PCRA petition, PCRA Counsel] spoke with [T]rial [C]ounsel[,] who
      contested that Appellant ever instructed him to file a direct appeal.
      The Commonwealth relayed the same in its answer.

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Id. at 16; but see also id. at 18 (Commonwealth acknowledging “the

averments in its answer … did not constitute ‘testimony’ or ‘evidence.’”).

        According to the Commonwealth, the

        record – even absent any additional testimony at [a PCRA
        evidentiary] hearing – undermines any claim that Appellant asked
        [T]rial [C]ounsel to file and represent him on direct appeal while
        simultaneously expressing [Appellant’s] steadfast desire to
        immediately pursue PCRA claims alleging [Trial Counsel’s]
        ineffectiveness.

Id. at 17. Upon review, we agree.

        The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that where there is an

“unjustified failure to file a requested direct appeal,” counsel is per se

ineffective.   Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 736 A.2d 564, 572 (Pa. 1999)

(footnote omitted). However, while “counsel may be ineffective for failing to

file a direct appeal on his client’s behalf, a PCRA petitioner must prove that he

asked     counsel   to   file   an   appeal    in   order   to   be   entitled   to

relief.” Commonwealth v. Maynard, 900 A.2d 395, 397-98 (Pa. Super.

2006) (citation omitted). “Mere allegations will not suffice.” Commonwealth

v. Harmon, 738 A.2d 1023, 1024 (Pa. Super. 1999). Where a petitioner has

met his burden of proving he asked for a direct appeal, “no discussion of the

potential merit of any claims is necessary or warranted.” Commonwealth v.

Markowitz, 32 A.3d 706, 715 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citing Lantzy, 736 A.2d at

572).

        Instantly, at the beginning of Appellant’s sentencing hearing, Trial

Counsel stated that Appellant had presented “one issue I think ought to be

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addressed prior to any argument.” N.T., 9/10/21, at 3. Trial Counsel then

questioned Appellant as follows:

      [TRIAL COUNSEL]: I received a letter [from Appellant] … written
      by [Appellant] by way of the Public Defender’s Office[,] expressing
      your desire to pursue certain matters on PCRA; is that correct?

      [APPELLANT]: Yes, sir, it is.

      [TRIAL COUNSEL]: I’m nonetheless prepared to move forward
      with sentencing today. Would you like to move forward for
      sentencing today with my representation?

      [APPELLANT]: Yes, I would.

Id. at 3-4.

      After the trial court sentenced Appellant, Trial Counsel asked the trial

court: “Would you be inclined to vacate my appointment [as Appellant’s

counsel] at this time so [Appellant] can pursue other relief?” Id. at 16. The

trial court responded:

      THE COURT: I think what I’m inclined to do is, if [Appellant]
      wishes to appeal, [the trial court will] have [Trial Counsel]
      file the notice of appeal so that [Appellant’s] rights are
      protected. Then I will permit [Trial Counsel’s] withdrawal since
      [Appellant has] raised post conviction issues or ineffective [sic]
      issues.

Id. (emphasis added). The trial court advised Appellant he had “30 days to

file an appeal” from the date of his sentence. Id. at 15. The trial court further

informed Appellant: “If you can’t afford an attorney for that purpose, we’ll

appoint one for you free of charge….” Id. at 15-16.

      As discussed, Trial Counsel averred in the PSM that Appellant sought

appointment of new counsel to file a PCRA petition claiming Trial Counsel’s

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ineffectiveness.   PSM, 9/20/21, ¶¶ 10-11; id. ¶ 8 (stating Appellant “has

indicated, through a July 27, 2021 letter to the Public Defender’s Office, that

he wishes to file for [PCRA] relief”); accord Lesko, 15 A.3d at 359

(recognizing an attorney cannot raise a claim of his own ineffectiveness).

Thus, the record belies Appellant’s unsupported claim that he asked Trial

Counsel to file a direct appeal.      Harmon, 738 A.2d at 1024 (a PCRA

petitioner’s “[m]ere allegations” that petitioner asked counsel to file an appeal

“will not suffice” to satisfy petitioner’s burden of proving the claim).

Appellant’s second and third issues fail because there is no arguable merit to

his claim of Trial Counsel’s ineffectiveness.

      Our review reveals no abuse of discretion by the PCRA court in

determining that Appellant raised no genuine issues of material fact and

denying Appellant’s PCRA petition without an evidentiary hearing.

      Order affirmed.

Date: 12/5/2023

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