Court Opinion

ID: 9748901
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:17:18.89463+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:40.621695
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion by
HARRELL, Judge.
I concur in the Majority opinion’s reasoning and result, except as to sustaining Respondent’s exception to the hearing court’s disposition of his motion in limine. Maj. op. at 631-36, 929 A.2d at 584-87. Consequently, I also disagree with the ripple effect that the Majority opinion sees as flowing from sustaining this exception, i.e., sustaining Respondent’s exception to the finding of a violation of MRPC 1.4(a). Maj. op. at 639, 929 A.2d at 589.
The Majority opinion spies merit in Respondent’s exception to the denial of his motion in limine seeking to restrict Bar *644Counsel from adducing testimony or other evidence of the Complainant’s claim that Respondent failed to advise her that another attorney would be handling her case or to introduce her to the other attorney. The basis for the motion in limine was Bar Counsel’s tardy denial of one of Respondent’s Requests for Admissions claiming to the contrary of Complainant’s assertion. The hearing judge granted relief to Bar Counsel and allowed the conflicting evidence of Complainant on this score. The Majority opinion finds fault with the hearing judge’s exercise of discretion under Md. Rule 2-M24(d) because the hearing judge, in her oral ruling, did not address in so many words that she considered whether allowing withdrawal of the default admission “would assist the presentation of the merits of the action” and whether prejudice would accrue to Respondent “in maintaining the ... defense on the merits” if relief from the default admission were granted. Maj. op. at 635, 929 A.2d at 586.
While it may be said, in the abstract and in certain circumstances, that Justice is blind, my vision has been corrected to 20-20 for a long time. To me, it is clearly implicit in the hearing judge’s remarks that she considered both factors that the Majority opinion perceives as lacking. First, it is patent that the potential for prejudice was argued to her. Compare Maj. op at 632-33, n. 15, 929 A.2d at 584-85, n. 15 with op. at 634-35, 929 A.2d at 585-86. From the competing presentations, it is abundantly clear that Respondent offered no specific indicia of how he would be prejudiced, choosing instead to mouth only generalities and conclusory arguments. Not once did Respondent argue the unavailability, because of Bar Counsel’s late response, of a specific and refutatory item of physical evidence or a specific witness who would corroborate his version of what transpired between himself and Ms. BelleTrottman on whatever day in the Spring of 2005 the pertinent meeting in Respondent’s office occurred, at which her deposition in the wrongful death case was to be taken. To the contrary, Bar Counsel argued essentially the situation was a “he said, she said” one where only Respondent and Complainant were present. The only surprise to Respondent in the *645hearing judge’s ruling should have been that he was going to have to put his veracity to the test instead of enjoy the “walkover” that he anticipated.
Implicit in the hearing judge’s verbal explanation for denying Respondent’s motion in limine is consideration of both assistance in presenting the merits of the allegations and whether Respondent would be prejudiced in a cognizable way that the law might recognize as unfair. She spoke to Respondent’s awareness of what the Complainant contended occurred in her statements to Bar Counsel’s investigator, a copy of which Respondent received before the tardy response to the Request for Admissions (putting aside the fact that Respondent was present on that fine Spring 2005 day when the relevant interaction with his client occurred). It was just as obvious to the hearing judge, as it apparently is to this Court, that the contradictory versions of that encounter were critical to the determination of some of the alleged MRPC violations; hence, the evidence sought to be excluded would be of assistance in resolving the merits. Moreover, because Respondent could not muster any specific replies to Bar Counsel’s argument that he would suffer no prejudice to the preparation of his defense because he was his only witness on this matter, the hearing judge was entirely within the proper range of her discretion to deny the motion in limine.
In accord with my view of the propriety of the hearing judge’s ruling (and the resultant error in the Majority opinion sustaining Respondent’s exception thereto), I would hold that Respondent violated MRPC 1.4(a), in addition to the violations otherwise held by the Majority opinion.