Court Opinion

ID: 9439248
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 06:27:19.488448+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:26:15.329465
License: Public Domain

HARRY T. EDWARDS, Chief Judge,
dissenting:
Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) because, “historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms of discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a)(2)(1994). The ADA was enacted “to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities,” and “to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) & (2)(1994).
The ADA generally provides that
*1121no covered [employer] shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.
42 U.S.C. § 12112 (a)(1994). A “qualified individual with a disability” includes persons “with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8X1994). And “reasonable accommodation[s]” include “job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, [and] reassignment to a vacant position.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9X1994).
In light of the general purposes and standards enunciated in the ADA, appellate review of this case should have been a simple matter. The plaintiff/appellee, Jimmy Duncan, was in a job that everyone— including his attending physician, doctors retained by WMATA, and his supervisors — knew that he could not perform because of his physical disability. He presented medical evidence of his physical disability to WMATA. When a WMATA job opened up that he could perform, parts runner in Automated Fare Collection, he applied to be transferred to the position. He had held the parts runner job previously; he was indisputably qualified to perform the job; and the work required was within his current physical ability. He also had seniority among the competing candidates. He was denied the job, however, for no reason. Under the ADA, WMATA should have offered the parts runner job to Duncan, as a reasonable accommodation to his existing disability.
During oral argument before the court, WMATA’s counsel was asked to address the following hypothetical:
Assume an employee is disabled because, due to a freak accident, one of his legs is amputated. As a result of this disability, the employee is unable to perform his job with WMATA. Subsequently, there is a job opening at WMATA in a position that the disabled employee previously has held and is currently capable of performing (because it requires no appreciable standing or walking). The amputee requests a transfer to the job. Is WMATA required to accommodate the disabled employee?
WMATA’s counsel conceded that, under the ADA, the employer would be obliged to accommodate the disabled employee by offering him the job. Duncan’s request merited an equivalent response.
The problem in this case is that, under the ADA, a disability is defined as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of [an] individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994) (emphasis added). Congress has delegated to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) the responsibility for issuing regulations to enforce the proscription against discrimination in employment under the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (1994). In assuming this responsibility, the EEOC has promulgated regulations providing that “major life activities” include
caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1999)*. It is fairly easy to determine whether a person is disabled due to a physical impairment that substantially limits his ability to walk. The same cannot be said about physical impairments (beyond, say, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, and breathing) that substantially limit a person’s ability to work. Thus, the EEOC has explained that the substantial limitation inquiry with respect to “working” entails an inability to work in a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable train*1122ing, skills, and abilities. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i).
The disabled employee in the aforecited hypothetical is covered by the major life activity of “walking,” so he need only show that his walking is substantially impaired in order to pursue a claim under the ADA. Duncan’s ADA claim, however, rests on the major life activity of “working,” so he faces a tougher burden. This disparate burden is hard to fathom. Both men are physically impaired and their impairments limit their abilities to work; and both men easily can be accommodated. Nonetheless, Duncan is forced to show that he is unable to work in a broad class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes in order to claim relief, whereas the hypothetical employee need only show an inability to perform a single job. Given the purposes of the ADA and the similarities in the two situations, it is difficult to find a meaningful difference between the hypothetical employee and Duncan. Both the hypothetical employee and Duncan should be accommodated because of their disabilities.
As the majority and separate opinions make clear, however, “working” is a disfavored basis upon which to rest a definition of major life activities. Indeed, even the Supreme Court, albeit in dicta, has questioned whether “working” should be considered a major life activity. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 492, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999). There are undoubtedly some conceptual difficulties in viewing work as a major life activity. For example, an expansive view of work as a major life activity might allow a person to claim a disability and discrimination under the ADA if he/she is allegedly denied work for a physical impairment, such as cosmetic disfigurement, which does not rise to the level of an underlying handicap. In this sense, “work” is arguably over-inclusive when viewed as a major life activity, at least when considered in conjunction with the principal purposes of the ADA. Nevertheless, it is hard to believe that Congress intended to deny a claimant like Duncan — a truly disabled person, who has undisputed job limitations due to his physical impairment and can easily be accommodated (much the same as with the hypothetical employee) — redress under the ADA because his claim rests on “work” as a “major life activity.”
The result reached by the majority in this case invariably will make “work” im-permissibly under-inclusive when viewed as a major life activity, in a way that appears to defy Congress’ mandate in enacting the ADA. The Supreme Court may have some doubts about work as a major life activity, but the Court has not declared the EEOC’s regulation unlawful. Unless and until this happens, claimants like Duncan are entitled to full protection of the statute. In short, as long as working is a major life activity, an employer’s responsibility to offer a reasonable accommodation to a disabled employee like Duncan should be taken seriously.
I. Analysis
Quite apart from the foregoing analytical problems raised by this case, I respectfully dissent from the judgment of the majority because this is a case that no judge should take from a jury. The jury considered the evidence presented by Duncan and WMATA; there were no erroneous instructions given to the jury; and the jury weighed the evidence and found in favor of the plaintiff. In nullifying the jury verdict, the majority has impermissi-bly encroached on the jury’s important fact-finding function, which is something that neither a trial judge, see Tri County Industries, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 200 F.3d 836, 840, 842-43 (D.C.Cir.2000), cert. granted, — U.S.-, 121 S.Ct. 29, 147 L.Ed.2d 1051 (2000) (No. 99-1953), nor an appellate panel, see Boodoo v. Cary, 21 F.3d 1157, 1161 (D.C.Cir.1994), is permitted to do.
The majority opinion is especially suspect, because the judgment is based on a re-weighing of the evidence that was be*1123fore the jury. The case that Duncan presented to the jury was adequate to survive a judgment as a matter of law, so there is no basis for this court to second-guess the jury. And it is somewhat unnerving to notice that this court showed unbridled solicitude for the jury’s role when considering a highly debatable claim in Tri County Industries (in which the city of Washington, D.C., was required to pay $5 million on a jury verdict) and now see that same solicitude missing here in a case involving a claim under the ADA.
A. Standard of Review
In considering whether to take a verdict away from a jury and grant a judgment as a matter of law, a court may not substitute its judgment for the jury’s judgment in factual determinations. See Boodoo, 21 F.3d at 1161 (D.C.Cir.1994). As the Court recently reiterated, “[credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2110, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)).
Whether a judge is inclined in favor of one possible interpretation of the evidence, over another plausible interpretation of the evidence, is of no moment. This court may enter a judgment as a matter of law only when the evidence presented at trial admits of a single inevitable interpretation. “It is long settled that ‘the jury’s verdict will withstand challenge unless the evidence and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are so one-sided that reasonable men and women could not disagree on the verdict.’ ” Swanks v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 179 F.3d 929, 933 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1061, 120 S.Ct. 614, 145 L.Ed.2d 509 (1999) (quoting Scott v. District of Columbia, 101 F.3d 748, 753 (D.C.Cir.1996)). This high threshold has not been met in this case. Based on the evidence presented at trial, the jury reasonably determined that Duncan’s physical impairment substantially limited him in the major life activity of working. Despite the clear prohibition that a court must not replace a jury as trier of fact, WMATA’s case turns on asking this court to re-weigh the evidence. At the very opening of his oral argument, WMATA’s counsel urged this court to weigh the medical reports and physicians’ testimony offered at trial so as to find that Duncan was able to perform medium lifting. The argument was one that simply asked this court to make findings of fact against the plaintiff, something that we have no authority to do. Indeed, much of WMATA’s argument to this court was presented as if the judges on the appellate bench were in a jury box. As the following analysis indicates, there is no basis here to take this case from the jury.
B. Disability under the ADA
As noted above, under the ADA, a disability is “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of [an] individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2)(A) (1994). And EEOC regulations provide that “work” is a major life activity. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1999). Unless and until the Supreme Court decides otherwise, working remains a major life activity under the ADA. See Mullins v. Crowell, 228 F.3d 1305, 1313 (11th Cir.2000); Sinkler v. Midwest Property Management, Ltd., 209 F.3d 678, 684 n. 1 (7th Cir.2000); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. R.J. Gallagher Co., 181 F.3d 645, 654-55 (5th Cir.1999).
EEOC regulations explain that a physical impairment substantially limits an individual’s ability to work when the individual is
significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities. The inability to perform a single, partic*1124ular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i). In addition, the following factors may be considered in assessing whether a physical impairment substantially limits a person’s ability to work:
(A) The geographical area to which the individual has reasonable access;
(B) The job from which the individual has been disqualified because of an impairment, and the number and types of jobs utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within that geographical area, from which the individual is also disqualified because of the impairment (class of jobs); and/or
(C) The job from which the individual has been disqualified because of an impairment, and the number and types of other jobs not utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within that geographical area, from which the individual is also disqualified because of the impairment (broad range of jobs in various classes).
Id. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii).
There is no magical legal standard for measuring substantial limitation. Clearly, the inability to perform lifting does not automatically constitute an impairment that substantially limits a person’s ability to work. See, e.g., Thompson v. Holy Family Hosp., 121 F.3d 537, 539 (9th Cir.1997) (holding nurse who was restricted in her ability to lift but was able to work in other nursing jobs was not substantially limited). However, the inability to participate in significant lifting, taken in the context of an individualized analysis, may substantially limit an individual’s ability to work. In evaluating substantial limitation, a jury must engage in a context-dependent assessment of the plaintiffs personal characteristics, education, work history, and the available job market in order to assess whether the plaintiff is excluded from a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs across classes. See, e.g., Wellington v. Lyon County Sch. Dist., 187 F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir.1999) (finding issue of material fact exists regarding disability where plaintiffs education was limited to a high school degree and some trade school training, his work experience was limited to manufacturing, construction, heavy maintenance and plumbing, and no evidence was presented that jobs were available in the job market for a person with comparable abilities); Quint v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 172 F.3d 1, 11-12 (1st Cir.1999) (rejecting judgment as a matter of law against plaintiff where plaintiff had only a high school education and a work history of heavy physical labor, and physician testified plaintiff was precluded from a lot of jobs); Mondzelewski v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 162 F.3d 778, 784 (3d Cir.1998) (explaining that “an individual’s training, skills, and abilities are taken into account in determining whether the individual is substantially limited in the major life activity of working”); Webb v. Garelick Mfg. Co., 94 F.3d 484, 487 (8th Cir.1996) (explaining “[a] person’s expertise, background, and job expectations are relevant factors in defining the class of jobs used to determine whether an individual is disabled”); Cochrum v. Old Ben Coal Co., 102 F.3d 908, 911 (7th Cir.1996) (noting “[t]he physical restrictions Cochrum’s physician placed upon him- — no overhead work, heavy lifting, or pulling and pushing out from his body — might apply to a broad range of jobs, and are more than job specific”).
In this case, the jury was presented with evidence of Duncan’s personal characteristics, education, work history, and the available job market in order to assess whether he was excluded from a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs across classes. It does not matter that WMATA disputed some of what Duncan offered; what matters is that there was evidence in the record supporting Duncan’s claim. I agree with my colleagues that Duncan did not present the strongest case possible. However, I believe that there was enough *1125before the jury to justify its verdict in his favor.
C. The jury reasonably determined that Duncan was substantially limited in the major life activity of working
There is no serious doubt that Duncan was physically impaired. Dr. Harvey N. Mininberg, an orthopedic surgeon, diagnosed Duncan with degenerative disc disease. See Trial Transcript at 18 (May 20, 1997). After he was injured while worldng for WMATA, Dr. Mininberg authorized Duncan to return to work, with the restriction that Duncan not lift more than approximately 20 pounds. See id. at 25. Dr. Najmaldin O. Karim, a neurosurgeon, confirmed both the diagnosis and the lifting restriction. See id. at 122, 127. Duncan alleged that this physical impairment substantially limited him in the major life activity of working. Specifically, Duncan claimed that as a result of his physical impairment, he was precluded from the classes of jobs that included medium, heavy, and very heavy lifting.
There was sufficient evidence in the record for a reasonable jury to determine that, based on Duncan’s education, training, work history, and efforts to find another job, Duncan’s physical impairment substantially limited his ability to work. Duncan never received a high school diploma or completed his GED. He went to trade school for a year and a half, but never finished the training. He had no other formal training or education. He had no computer training. He had no clerical or office skills. He could barely type. See Trial Transcript at 127-28 (May 19,1997).
Duncan was employed in heavy labor jobs throughout his working life. Before working for WMATA, he worked in furniture factories, in a box company, in a glass company, in construction, and in a company that provided the physical settings for functions and meetings. He was a physical laborer. Every one of his jobs involved significant lifting.
After Duncan injured his back while working for WMATA and WMATA terminated him, Duncan sought jobs that were of a light duty nature. Duncan testified that during the nine months he was receiving unemployment compensation, he looked for jobs that were not strenuous. See id. at 129. With his back injury, Duncan knew he could not perform the kinds of work he had performed previously. He testified that he could not go back and work as a laborer in construction, or as a packer at a glass company or furniture company, as he had before. See id. at 186.
Duncan testified that, in order to receive unemployment compensation, he was required to submit applications in search of other employment. See id. at 129. Although he could not recall the specific jobs for which he applied, Duncan testified that during his nine months on unemployment he would check the unemployment listings, and call jobs he thought he could do. He would ask prospective employers what the jobs entailed. If the description of a job included significant lifting that he knew he could not do, he would not inquire further. See id. at 130.
Although he wanted to work full time, Duncan was not able to find full-time employment. He ended up accepting a part-time job with Hertz, moving cars after customers dropped them off. He accepted the job even though it paid $5.75 an hour, approximately one-third what he earned working for WMATA. See id. at 135.
As noted above, Duncan should have been offered the parts runner job when it became available. He had performed the job in the past; he was fully qualified and physically able to perform the work; and he had seniority among the competing candidates. WMATA never offered an adequate explanation for its failure to accommodate Duncan, despite knowing of his disability and having a position available for him to perform. Indeed, the only excuses offered by WMATA were that Duncan never furnished medical evidence to *1126support his disability and that Duncan never really sought an accommodation. The jury obviously rejected each of these claims; and, based on the record before us, it is easy to understand this, for WMA-TA’s claims are patently specious.
II. Conclusion
Based on the evidence presented at trial, the jury reasonably determined that Duncan’s physical disability substantially limited him in the major life activity of working. The jury verdict should stand and the judgment of the District Court should be affirmed.