Court Opinion

ID: 9581409
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:14:39.037344+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:55.887428
License: Public Domain

TODD, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. The majority opinion correctly identifies the issue: namely, “ * * * whether or not the separate no-fault coverages applicable with respect to each of the corporate vehicles are also applicable to Clyde Wakefield.” Absent the endorsement adding Clyde Wake-field as a named insured, I would agree with the majority opinion.
However, in this case, the insurer, by its policy, added more coverage than was required by the statute. The endorsement form is entitled “Named Individuals— Broadened Personal Injury Protection Coverage Endorsement” (emphasis supplied). Clyde Wakefield’s name appears in the column entitled “Name of Individual” and Minnesota appears in the column entitled “State.” Beneath these columns the following language appears: “It is agreed that an individual named in the schedule of this endorsement shall be deemed to be a named insured with respect to the personal injury protection afforded for the State shown on the schedule” (emphasis added).
Minnesota permits stacking. The insurance-policy states: “* * * the insurance afforded applies separately to each insured who is seeking coverage * * The policy by its terms allows Wakefield’s heirs to stack the coverage notwithstanding the fact that the statute would have permitted less coverage.
We should adhere in this case to our holding in Wasche v. Milbank Mutual Insurance Co., 268 N.W.2d 913 (Minn.1978), where we allowed stacking for priority level insurance coverage. The personal insurance policies of Wasche were stacked because the plaintiff was an insured on those policies. The resolution of the instant case simply follows from Wasche. Since respondent was a named insured, he is allowed to stack all those policies under which he is a named insured.
Wakefield’s situation must also be compared with the facts in Roepke v. Western National Mutual Insurance Co., 302 N.W.2d 350 (Minn.1981). In Roepke, plaintiff was not a named insured on his corpo*855rate policy. The corporation owned the vehicle Roepke was allowed to use and in which he eventually died. The insurer in Roepke had a good argument that the policies should not be stacked since Roepke was not expressly named as an insured in the policy. The insurer lost only because we applied a “reverse pierce” theory to allow Roepke’s survivors to stack six personal injury protection coverages available under the corporate policy. We found that Roepke, as a 100% shareholder, and the corporation were one insured. Roepke’s corporate insurance was, therefore, actually personal insurance.
The facts of this case are closely aligned with the Roepke situation, but one salient fact sets them apart. Respondent in this case is, by the express terms of the policy, a named insured. The analysis need proceed no further. Respondent, as named insured, is on a priority level of coverage where stacking is permitted. Arguments that respondent was only an employee of the corporation are relevant only when the employee is not a named insured. The term “named insured” imports a special status under the No-Fault Act. For example, being a named insured on one policy prevents one from being an additional insured on a policy naming relatives in the same household as named insureds. See Minn.Stat. § 65B.43, subd. 5 (1982); Wasche v. Milbank Mutual Insurance Co., 268 N.W.2d 913 (Minn.1978).
Wasche prevents stacking across priority levels. If the corporation in this case had limited itself to the status of named insured or only made respondent a named insured on a certain number of vehicles, the insurer would have limited its exposure. The majority probably would argue that if we follow Wasche the insurer could not specify the number of vehicles to which a special endorsement attaches. If, as Wasche states, coverage follows the person and not the vehicle, a corporation could not limit stacking to a specified vehicle or vehicles. Arguably, it follows that stacking would be permitted on all vehicles in the corporate fleet. This argument is without merit since a special endorsement is just that — special. The additional coverage provided by the appellant corporation to its employees is not mandatory under the No-Fault Act. The corporation, therefore, can designate to which vehicles the policy is applicable. Without such a provision in the policy limiting the coverage, the insurance company insures the named insured for all those vehicles to which the policy applies. No such limitation exists in the case presently on appeal. A strict reading of the policy reveals that respondent was a named insured on all 14 corporate vehicles. The majority glosses over this vital factual situation in its opinion.
Alternatively, the insurance company could have extracted much higher premiums from the insureds to make others named insureds under the policy. The insurance company charged $2.00 for the endorsement adding Wakefield as a named insured. That, however, is an underwriting problem, not a legal one.
The majority seems to place great reliance on the optional nature of the insurance coverage involved here. Since the coverage is not required, the argument goes, the insurance benefits. payable are governed only by the contractual obligation and not by our stacking decisions interpreting the No-Fault Act. I disagree. This court in Yeager v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 335 N.W.2d 733 (Minn.1983), faced a similar question of whether underinsured motorist coverage, as optional and not mandatory coverage, must be stacked under our decisions. The Yeager case involved a commercial policy as in this case. The same arguments made in Yeager against stacking policies in a commercial context were also made in this case. The concern is that policies on corporate fleets of 500 to 1000 vehicles or more could be stacked. We held, in Yeager, that the optional underin-sured motorist coverage could be stacked in a commercial policy.
We declined in Yeager, however, to address the same question when a large commercial fleet policy was involved. Yeager involved seven vehicles and this case involves only 14, hardly a large corporate fleet. Nonetheless, the number of vehicles does not alter the result of stacking dictated by Wasche. To avoid stacking, all a *856corporate insurer need do is avoid naming an employee as named insured on a policy covering multiple vehicles. An insurer could limit coverage to a specific vehicle or vehicles or to the vehicle in use by the insured at a given time. This would be sufficient to obviate stacking while still extending desired coverage to employees. As previously mentioned, an insurer could charge accordingly for the additional coverage in anticipation of stacking. Whatever choice an insurer makes, it must be achieved contractually and not by radically modifying Wasche as is suggested here. I would affirm the trial court.