Court Opinion

ID: 9666467
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:16:43.755673+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:29.163079
License: Public Domain

CORRIGAN, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I agree with the majority and the Court of Appeals that plaintiffs notice of intent (NOI) was sufficient as to defendant Dr. Kristyn Murry. I respectfully dissent, however, from the majority’s holding that defendant Huron Valley Radiology, EC. (Huron), was entitled to an NOI. Instead, I concur with and join part I of Justice YOUNG’s partial concurrence and partial dissent with regard to whether plaintiff was required to serve defendant Huron with an NOI to commence a medical malpractice action under MCL 600.2912b. I *430fully agree with Justice YOUNG that Huron is neither a “health professional” nor a “health facility” entitled to notice under MCL 600.2912b. Whether the Legislature, by oversight or design, excluded professional corporations such as Huron from the statutory definition of “health facility or agency” in MCL 333.20106(1), it is for the Legislature, and not this Court, to decide.
Because Huron was not entitled to an NOI, plaintiff was not entitled to tolling. I share Justice MARKMAN’s concerns as discussed in part III(C) of his partial concurrence and partial dissent regarding Justice YOUNG’s analysis of the tolling issue. Specifically, I disagree that as long as an NOI is sufficient as to one defendant, the statute of limitations is tolled as to all defendants. I agree with Justice MARKMAN’s conclusion that plaintiffs complaint here was untimely filed. Accordingly, I would hold that the action against Huron was barred by the statute of limitations. Moreover, I also concur with part III(D) of Justice MARKMAN’s opinion concerning whether plaintiff can retroactively amend an NOI.
Additionally, I dissent from the majority’s holding that plaintiffs NOI as to Huron was sufficient. As an initial matter, I would not reach the sufficiency of the notice issue at all for the reasons set forth in part III(E) of Justice MARKMAN’s partial concurrence and dissent, with which I fully concur and join. I also concur with Justice MARKMAN’s discussion of this issue, post at 455 n 1. Because the Court’s limited grant order did not instruct the parties to brief this issue and because both the litigants and the public should be able to rely on our orders, I would not resolve issues in this Queen of Hearts fashion.1

 See Lewis Carroll, Alice’s Adventures In Wonderland (New York: Signet Classic, 2000), ch 12, p 115 (“ ‘No, no!’ said the Queen. ‘Sentence first — verdict afterwards.’ ”).