Court Opinion

ID: 9516212
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 23:37:38.496675+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:00.890651
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE TRAPP dissenting: The conviction should be affirmed upon the authority of People v. Pardo, 47 Ill.2d 420, 265 N.E.2d 656. In Pardo there was claim of denial of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. On May 24, 1971, the United States Supreme Court dismissed Pardo’s appeal “for want of a substantial federal question”. (Pardo v. Illinois, 402 U.S. 992, 29 L.Ed.2d 158, 91 S.Ct. 2179.) There is similar constitutional history in Wark v. State, Me., 266 A.2d 62. The Supreme Court of Maine held valid a classification between males and females for the purpose of a sentence imposed for the offense of escape. (Cert. denied, 400 U.S. 952, 27 L.Ed.2d 259, 91 S.Ct. 255). Thereafter, habeas corpus based upon a claim of denial of equal protection was denied in the Federal District Court. Such denial was affirmed in Wark v. Robbins, 458 F.2d 1295. Neither Stanley v. Illinois, (U.S.), 31 L.Ed.2d 551, (92 S.Ct.), nor Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 30 L.Ed.2d 225, 92 S.Ct. 251, are persuasive authority upon this issue. In Stanley, the denial of equal protection was sustained upon the fact that an unmarried father was denied a hearing upon the issue of fitness for custody, whereas such hearing was required in order to take custody from the married father. The issue of equal protection was not essentially a matter of classification by sex. In Reed, the person contesting the appointment as administrator was of the same statutory class. The Idaho Supreme Court stated that the statutory preference of appointment of the male member of the class was a means of eliminating controversy in the Probate Court among those in the same class seeking appointment. The United States Supreme Court found a denial of equal protection because of want of valid criteria related to the objectives of probate statute. Here, however, the question of criteria is settled by Pardo. The principal opinion asserts the supremacy of Art. 1, § 18 of the Illinois Constitution of 1970. A search of the Report of Proceedings of the Convention reveals no committee examination or report upon the Section and no debate thereon. That Constitution in Art. 1, § 2, provides that no person shall be denied due process or “the equal protection of the law”. The principle of equal protection has been explored since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Section 2 appears to substantially adopt the language of the Fourteenth Amendment, and presumably its meaning. In Reed, the Supreme Court said: “In applying that clause, this Court has consistently recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment does not deny the States the power to treat different classes of persons in different ways.” The Records of Proceedings, Vol. I, pages 547 and 548, of the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention, Journal of August 6, 1970, reveals that such Art. 18 was first presented from the floor of the Convention in the language “Equality under the law * * *.” Upon motion made and adopted, the language was amended to read, “The equal protection of the law * * *.” Such action gives a reasonable basis for concluding that the “equal protection” of Art. 18 is to be applied within the perimeter of established constitutional history, rather than to create a new inflexible equality. Despite the infinite breadth in the spectrum of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the principal opinion would create a new “equal protection” which could only operate independently or at variance within the established constitutional history. Since “equal protection” can only be “equal protection”, the constitutional anamoly created is not required.