Court Opinion

ID: 9955908
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-29 18:03:34.758219+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:38.546331
License: Public Domain

2024 IL App (1st) 221134-U

                                                                           SECOND DIVISION
                                                                               March 29, 2024

                                          No. 1-22-1134

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

                                            IN THE
                                 APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                                   FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                         )   Appeal from the
                                                              )   Circuit Court of
                                                              )   Cook County.
           Plaintiff-Appellee,                                )
                                                              )
                                                              )
      v.                                                      )   No. 18 CR 962 (02)
                                                              )
                                                              )
 NATRELL JACKSON,                                             )
                                                              )   Honorable
                                                              )   James B. Linn,
           Defendant-Appellant.                               )   Judge Presiding.

       PRESIDING JUSTICE HOWSE delivered the judgment of the court.
       Justices McBride and Cobbs concurred in the judgment.

                                             ORDER

¶1     Held: We affirm the trial court’s judgment denying defendant’s motion to dismiss
       the charges against him on the basis of a speedy trial violation; defendant is not
       entitled to plain error relief based on the trial court’s refusal to offer an
       accomplice witness instruction to the jury; defendant’s sentence is not excessive.

¶2     Defendant Natrell Jackson was charged with first-degree murder for the shooting death of

Shari Graham, who was a bystander and not the intended target of the shooting. As the case was
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preparing to go to trial, the State informed the trial judge on numerous occasions that it could not

locate an essential trial witness, Semaja Weathersby. On the basis that it could not find

Weathersby, the State used its power of nolle prosequi to dismiss the charges. Defendant was

released from custody. The State subsequently filed a new indictment, and defendant was

arrested a few months later in Iowa before being brought back to Illinois to face the murder

charges in this case. Defendant moved to dismiss the charges against him arguing that the State

improperly circumvented the speedy-trial period when it dismissed the charges against him and

then refiled them. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss.

¶3     Defendant was tried by a jury. During the trial, Semaja Weathersby, one of the men who

was with defendant at the time of the shooting, identified himself, defendant and the co-

defendant in a surveillance video made during the commission of the offense. Defendant urged

the trial court to instruct the jury that the testimony was the testimony of an accomplice and was

subject to suspicion and should be considered with caution. The trial court rejected the

instruction. Defendant was convicted by the jury of first-degree murder. The jury also made a

special finding that defendant personally discharged a firearm during the commission of the

murder. The trial court sentenced defendant to 35 years in prison. Defendant now appeals both

his conviction and his sentence. We affirm.

¶4                                      BACKGROUND

¶5     On February 26, 2016, Shari Graham, her three children, and her boyfriend were visiting

her boyfriend’s mother at the Wentworth Gardens housing complex in Chicago. Graham left the

residence to go and get dinner for the family at a nearby restaurant. She planned to take a taxi.

As she was getting into the taxi, gunshots rang out. Graham got into the cab and told the taxi

driver that she had been shot. Graham also called her boyfriend to tell him she had been shot.

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¶6     The taxi driver started driving towards the hospital and, on the way there, he was able to

flag down an ambulance that was stopped at a red light. The paramedics transferred Graham into

the ambulance and assessed that she had been shot in the back. Graham was not breathing and

did not have a pulse. She was taken to the hospital and pronounced dead. An autopsy revealed

that the bullet entered Graham’s back, traveled through her lung, and then entered the left

ventricle of her heart, causing her death.

¶7     Patrick Curry was working as a security guard at Wentworth Gardens the night of

Graham’s death. He and his partner heard seven to eight gunshots, and they traveled in the

direction of the gunfire. As they traveled towards the location of the gunshots, Curry observed

defendant and another man exiting the back stairwell of 3801 S. Princeton Avenue. Curry knew

defendant by sight because of his work as a security guard at Wentworth Gardens. Curry had

also seen defendant the day before the shooting. When Curry saw defendant after the shooting,

defendant was wearing a distinctive Pelle Pelle jacket and looked directly at Curry before

running away. Curry’s partner called the police. Chicago Police officers arrived and talked to

witnesses, photographed the crime scene, and recovered a fired bullet and bullet casings.

¶8     Curry identified defendant in a photo array shortly after the shooting as the person he saw

in the distinctive jacket coming out of the stairway after the shooting. Curry also identified

defendant’s co-defendant, Michael Whitehead, in a photo array, identifying Whitehead as a

person he had seen in the area about an hour before the shooting.

¶9     Semaja Weathersby previously lived at Wentworth Gardens and grew up with defendant

and Whitehead. Weathersby was socializing with defendant and Whitehead on the day of the

shooting. Weathersby and defendant were smoking cannabis during the day, and they went to a

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gas station to get some blunts. Weathersby acknowledged that it was he and defendant captured

on the surveillance video together at the gas station around 6:30 p.m.

¶ 10   Three hours later, Weathersby, defendant, and Whitehead were hanging out in a

courtyard at Wentworth Gardens, smoking a blunt. Weathersby acknowledged that it was the

three of them captured on surveillance video together in the courtyard at that time. Weathersby

saw two vehicles driving southbound on Princeton Avenue that caught his attention and he

believed the people in the vehicles were rival gang members. Defendant and Whitehead ran

towards Princeton, and Weathersby ran behind them. The surveillance video, which Weathersby

viewed in open court and narrated, showed the subject vehicles driving southbound on Princeton

Avenue and showed three men running to the street. The men stopped running and flashes of

light appeared from where the men were standing.

¶ 11   At trial, Weathersby testified that he did not recall what defendant and Whitehead did

after they ran towards the vehicles, saying that he just saw flashes. However, when he testified

before the grand jury in this case, Weathersby testified that the three of them ran to Princeton

Avenue and that defendant and Whitehead pulled out guns and began firing at a vehicle.

¶ 12   Defendant went to the gas station again after the shooting and was captured on

surveillance video a second time. Defendant was wearing different clothes than he was in the

first surveillance video, and, in this video, he was wearing the distinctive orange and blue Pelle

Pelle jacket.

¶ 13   Twelve days after the shooting, on March 9, 2016, the police arrested Weathersby for an

unrelated trespassing charge. After his arrest, investigators talked to him about the shooting

where Shari Graham was killed. Weathersby identified defendant and Whitehead in separate

photo arrays and indicated in writing on the identification forms that he knew defendant and

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Whitehead well, that the three of them hung out on the night of the shooting, and that defendant

and Whitehead were shooting guns that night—shooting at a car that drove past. Weathersby

gave a video-recorded statement to an Assistant State’s Attorney in which he stated that, after the

two cars pulled up, defendant and Whitehead “started standing in the street, started shooting.”

¶ 14   Surveillance video obtained from the Chicago Housing Authority showed three men in

the courtyard behind 3801 S. Princeton Avenue. Another angle shows two vehicles driving

southbound on Princeton Avenue and the three individuals running to the street. Two of the

individuals go out into the street, while one of the men remains on the sidewalk. The two men

standing in the street fire numerous shots in the direction of the vehicles, and then the three men

all run back around to the rear of 3801 N. Princeton and enter the building. It was that same

building that Curry observed defendant exiting when he arrived near the scene of the shooting.

¶ 15   Detective James Carroll recovered the surveillance video from the CHA and the gas

station, and he showed still-frame photographs from the video to Officer David Carey, who was

familiar with Wentworth Gardens because it was his assigned territory. Officer Carey confirmed

to Detective Carroll the identities of defendant and Weathersby on the gas station video. Officer

Carey noticed that defendant was wearing a distinctive Pelle Pelle jacket in the photographs

taken from the video, and he took note of defendant’s attire because Carey was familiar with

Pelle Pelle jackets and had never seen two jackets with the same pattern. After confirming the

identity of the two men and knowing that they were together on the day of the shooting,

Detective Carroll spoke with Weathersby to find out more about the shooting. Detective Carroll

did not view Weathersby as a suspect at the time of speaking to him because the detective had

watched the video and seen Weathersby was not one of the shooters. Forensic analysis of the

ballistics evidence showed that the cartridges recovered at the scene were fired from only two

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weapons—seven of the cartridge cases that were recovered were from bullets fired from one

firearm, while five of the recovered cartridge cases were from bullets fired from a second

firearm.

¶ 16   Defendant and Whitehead were arrested on March 10, 2016. Defendant was 18 years old

at the time of the murder. The day after defendant’s arrest, detectives went to his home to

interview his mother, and they asked her to produce defendant’s orange and blue Pelle Pelle

jacket. Defendant’s mom gave the jacket to the detectives. On April 15, 2016, defendant was

charged by indictment with first-degree murder for killing Shari Graham. A trial date was set for

August 21, 2017. On the trial date, defendant answered ready, but the State asked for a

continuance because a witness, Weathersby, had not been served and was not present for the

trial. Defendant demanded trial. The trial court granted the State’s motion for a continuance. At

court appearances on October 10th and 13th, the State asked for further continuances. At the

October 20, 2017 court appearance, the State informed the trial court that the State had spent

“hundreds of man hours” trying to locate the witness, Semaja Weathersby. The State represented

that it had utilized both the State’s Attorney’s Office investigators as well as the Chicago Police

Department to try to locate Weathersby. The State indicated it was still unable at that time to

locate Weathersby and had not served him with a subpoena. More than three weeks remained in

the speedy-trial period as of the October 20th court appearance, but the State moved for nolle

prosequi. Defendant demanded trial again. The trial judge informed defendant that the charges

against him had been dropped by the State, but that the charges could still be reinstated.

Defendant was released from custody.

¶ 17   On the same day defendant was released from custody, a new grand jury investigation

into the murder began. The State filed a new indictment against defendant, and defendant was

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indicted again by the grand jury for Graham’s murder. A warrant was issued for defendant’s

arrest on January 11, 2018. Defendant was located and arrested in Iowa on April 12, 2018, and

was transferred back to Illinois to face these murder charges.

¶ 18   Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charges against him, arguing that the State

violated his right to a speedy trial. Defendant argued that the State misused its power of nolle

prosequi to gain a tactical advantage in the case. As evidence of the alleged gamesmanship,

defendant highlighted the fact that the State was able to serve Weathersby on October 23, 2017,

which was just three days after a grand jury issued a subpoena for Weathersby to appear.

¶ 19   The State recounted that it informed the trial court that it believed the missing witness

was aware of the court dates and was being uncooperative. The State had to move for

continuances because, despite its efforts of searching for Weathersby by contacting his family

and friends and conducting extensive searches on social media, it could not locate him. The State

represented that its investigators made numerous visits to Weathersby’s listed address and to the

addresses of family members who lived in other places. The Assistant State’s Attorney informed

the trial court that she even spent a half hour on the phone with Weathersby’s mother who stated

that she had kicked Weathersby out of the house and that he did not live with her anymore. After

the State exercised its power of nolle prosequi in defendant’s case, the State found Weathersby

outside of his mother’s house. The State concluded that it was able to locate and serve

Weathersby at that time because the charges against defendant and his co-defendant were

dismissed and Weathersby believed he no longer needed to evade the State. Weathersby told the

investigator who eventually located him, “I’m not coming to court. I don’t have to come to court.

I have a lawyer.” Weathersby made good on his word and failed to appear before the grand jury

that had summoned him. A warrant was issued for Weathersby’s arrest, and he was located and

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arrested on the outstanding warrant on January 9, 2018. The new indictment against defendant

was filed the following day, on January 10, 2018.

¶ 20   The trial court held a hearing on defendant’s motion to dismiss the case on speedy-trial

grounds. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court made certain findings and concluded

that the State had a good-faith basis for dismissing the charges against defendant thereby tolling

the speedy-trial term. The trial court found Weathersby to be a material witness. The trial court

explained that it accepted the State’s contention as logical and understandable that Weathersby

was easily served after the charges against defendant and his co-defendant were dismissed

because Weathersby decided he could go back home—when Weathersby stopped fearing the

prosecution was searching for him. The trial court explained that the State did not do anything

manipulative by dismissing the charges, and the court explained that it truly believed the State

could not find Weathersby until the time that it did find him.

¶ 21   The trial court noted its own observation that Weathersby was not happy about being

involved in the case and was being kept on electronic monitoring to ensure his appearance as a

witness. Ultimately, the trial court explained that it did not think the State was acting in bad faith,

but rather, the State was doing what it needed to do under the circumstances. The trial court

stated that the problem underlying the ability to get defendant to trial was the State having a

problem finding the necessary witness. The trial court further explained that defendant was not

prejudiced by the way the prosecution was handled.

¶ 22   The case proceeded to a jury trial where the testimony was consistent with the facts set

forth above. Following the trial testimony, the trial court held a jury instruction conference.

Defendant requested that the jury be instructed with “the accomplice-witness jury instruction.”

Defendant argued that Weathersby could have been charged with the murder in this case, so the

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jury needed to be instructed to exercise caution in analyzing Weathersby’s testimony. The trial

court denied defendant’s request for the proposed instruction but allowed defendant to argue its

accomplice theory to the jury during closing argument. The trial court explained that the

testimony showed that Weathersby was never a suspect in the murder and was only ever looked

at by the police as a witness.

¶ 23   The jury found defendant guilty of first-degree murder. The jury also found that

defendant personally discharged a firearm during the commission of the offense.

¶ 24   Before sentencing, defendant filed with the court psychiatric, psychological, and

academic evaluations, as well as other records of his social history and academic performance

totaling more than 300 pages to assert that his brain development was more like a juvenile than

an adult at the time of committing the murder. Defendant was 18 years old at the time of the

offense. Among other things, the records show that defendant had a learning disability and

consistently scored low on academic evaluations. One of the psychiatric evaluations performed

when defendant was 17 years old showed that, at that time, defendant was immature for his age.

¶ 25   The trial court decided, based on defendant’s youth and reports from a doctor who

examined defendant, that it was not appropriate to apply the firearm sentencing enhancement to

defendant’s sentence. After hearing arguments in aggravation and mitigation, the trial court

concluded a 35-year prison sentence was appropriate for defendant.

¶ 26   In reaching its sentence, the trial court specified that it was sentencing defendant without

the firearm enhancement based on defendant’s age and individual characteristics and that another

person might not obtain the same results. The court discussed that defendant and his co-

defendant, Whitehead, were different not just in their age but also in their backgrounds and their

behavior. The trial court also noted, however, that defendant murdered a woman, an innocent

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bystander, and it was a crime that never should have happened. The trial court characterized the

crime in this case as “tragic beyond belief.” The trial court explained that during its multiple

years presiding over the case it got the sense that defendant is “something of a danger to the

community,” and the trial court noted it needed to consider the safety of the public when

fashioning a sentence. Finally, the trial court explained that it had “considered all of this at great

length” before concluding that a 35-year prison sentence was appropriate for defendant.

¶ 27   Defendant now appeals both his conviction and sentence.

¶ 28                                         ANALYSIS

¶ 29   Defendant makes three primary arguments on appeal: (1) the charges against him are

subject to dismissal for violating his right to a speedy trial; (2) he was denied a fair trial when the

trial court refused to give the jury instruction for an accomplice witness; and (3) his 35-year

prison sentence is excessive.

¶ 30   Speedy Trial

¶ 31   Defendant argues that the charges against him should have been dismissed for an alleged

violation of his right to a speedy trial. In Illinois, a defendant possesses both a state and federal

constitutional right, along with a statutory right, to a speedy trial. U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV;

Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 8; 725 ILCS 5/103-5 (West 2022). Defendant bases his claim only on

the Illinois statutory right. By statute in Illinois, any person accused of a crime has the right to

stand trial in a prompt fashion.

       “Every person in custody in this State for an alleged offense shall be tried by the

       court having jurisdiction within 120 days from the date he or she was taken into

       custody unless delay is occasioned by the defendant. *** The 120-day term must

       be one continuous period of incarceration. In computing the 120-day term,

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        separate periods of incarceration may not be combined. If a defendant is taken

        into custody a second (or subsequent) time for the same offense, the term will

        begin again at day zero.” 725 ILCS 5/103-5(a) (West 2022).

¶ 32    The right to a speedy trial is designed to: (1) prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration;

(2) minimize the accused’s anxiety and concern; and (3) limit the possibility that the defense

might be impaired. People v. Decatur, 191 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 1039-40 (1989). During the pretrial

period, the State has the right to dismiss the charges and then later re-charge the defendant under

the appropriate circumstances. See People v. Klein, 393 Ill. App. 3d 536, 545 (2009). However,

the State may not use its power of nolle prosequi to unfairly circumvent a defendant’s right to a

speedy trial. People v. Van Schoyck, 232 Ill. 2d 330, 335 (2009).

¶ 33    The State has absolute power to request a nolle prosequi, so such a dismissal requires

scrutiny to determine whether the State is abusing its dismissal power and whether the refiling is

vexatious, repetitious, or employed to manipulate the proceedings in order to evade or frustrate

the purpose of the speedy-trial statute. Decatur, 191 Ill. App. 3d at 1038. Allowing a nolle

prosequi to toll the speedy-trial statute, absent a showing of bad faith, enables the State to meet

its dual obligations: (1) to prosecute the case in a timely manner so as to honor the protections

afforded to the defendant by his right to a speedy trial; and (2) to prosecute violations of law so

as to protect the citizenry. Id. at 1039.

¶ 34    The parties disagree about what standard of review we should employ to address

defendant’s claim. Defendant argues that the standard of review should be de novo because

whether the statute was violated is a question of law (citing Van Schoyck, 232 Ill. 2d at 335). The

State argues that the standard of review should be two-fold: (1) the manifest weight of the

evidence standard to review the question of whether the State exercised bad faith; and (2) the

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abuse of discretion standard to review whether the dismissal of the charges tolled the speedy-trial

term (citing People v. Weddell, 405 Ill. App. 3d 424, 437 (2010)).

¶ 35   In this case, we are not presented with a pure question of law. The issue in this case is a

determination of whether the trial court erred when it ruled that the State did not operate in bad

faith when it dismissed the charges, i.e., ruled that the State did not manipulate the proceedings

to evade defendant’s right to a speedy trial. Under such circumstances, “[w]hether the State acted

to evade the speedy-trial term or otherwise gain a tactical advantage over defendant is a factual

issue.” Weddell, 405 Ill. App. 3d at 435.

¶ 36   Both defendant and the State submitted factual matters to the trial court that required

resolution before the trial court could rule on the speedy-trial question. The trial court was in a

superior position to observe the parties during the hearing on the motion to dismiss and to apply

its sense of the veracity of the statements based on its familiarity and history with the case. Some

deference must be afforded to the trial court’s rulings under such circumstances. Thus, we follow

the line of cases which hold that “[a] trial court’s factual findings on a speedy-trial claim are

reviewed under a manifest weight of the evidence standard [and the] de novo standard of review

is applied to determine if a defendant’s statutory right to a speedy trial has been violated.” See

People v. Sykes, 2017 IL App (1st) 150023, ¶ 35; People v. McBride, 2022 IL App (4th) 220301,

¶ 28. This bifurcated standard of review has long applied to constitutional speedy-trial claims

(People v. Crane, 195 Ill. 2d 42, 51 (2001)) and we find it to be appropriate under the

circumstances in this case.

¶ 37   Moving to the merits of defendant’s claim, Illinois courts have held that the unavailability

of a witness is a valid reason to voluntarily dismiss a case, which, in turn, tolls the speedy-trial

term. See Klein, 393 Ill. App. 3d at 545 (citing, e.g., People v. Martin, 183 Ill. App. 3d 442, 444

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(1989); People v. Stinnett, 166 Ill. App. 3d 1027, 1028 (1988)). In order for the tolling effect of

the nolle prosequi to be inoperative, there must be a “clear showing” that the State dismissed the

charges to gain some tactical advantage over the defendant or to otherwise harass or prejudice

the defendant so as to avoid or frustrate the interests that the speedy-trial right was designed to

protect. Decatur, 191 Ill. App. 3d at 1039. Defendant bears the burden of affirmatively

establishing a violation of the speedy-trial statute. People v. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81, 114 (1998).

¶ 38   Defendant argues that he made a “clear showing” that the State’s use of nolle prosequi in

this case was used to circumvent his speedy-trial term. He contends that the State’s supposed

inability to locate a witness was a pretense because the record demonstrates the State could

locate the witness. Defendant points out that at a court appearance where there was three weeks

left in the speedy-trial term, the trial court asked the State if it wanted to use the remainder of the

speedy-trial period to locate the witness. The State declined and instead exercised its power of

nolle prosequi. Defendant further points out that, after a new grand jury investigation began, a

subpoena was issued on October 20, 2017 for Weathersby to appear, and Weathersby was served

within three days on October 23, 2017. Defendant argues that the ability to quickly serve the

grand jury subpoena demonstrates that Weathersby was not difficult to find, and the quick

service belies the representations the State made to the trial court. Defendant contends that the

State engaged in precisely the sort of impermissible technical maneuvering to avoid the speedy-

trial period such that we should hold the speedy-trial period was never tolled, that it lapsed, and

that his charges should have been dismissed.

¶ 39   Defendant does not suggest what benefit the State would have received by

misrepresenting Weathersby’s unavailability. For example, at three separate court appearances

when there was roughly a month remaining in the speedy-trial term, the State consistently

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asserted it could not locate Weathersby. The State represented that both the State’s Attorney’s

Office investigators and Chicago Police Department personnel had been searching for

Weathersby expending hundreds of hours in the search. We see no benefit the State would

receive by lying to the court, dismissing the charges against defendant, and setting defendant free

from custody only to start the same process again. Rather, the evidence and the trial court’s

observations demonstrate that Weathersby was an extremely reluctant witness.

¶ 40   The trial court expressly found that the State was not manipulating the proceedings by

lying about its ability to locate Weathersby in some undefined effort to prejudice defendant. The

trial court stated that defendant’s contention “makes zero sense to me at all. I don’t believe at all

that that’s what happened. I believe from everything that I have before me that they couldn’t find

the witness, until they did find him.” The trial court was entitled to credit the State’s

representations about its efforts to locate Weathersby and to reject defendant’s assertions that the

State was fabricating its efforts. At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the State submitted that

it contacted Weathersby’s family and friends, conducted extensive searches on social media,

made numerous visits to his listed address, and visited the addresses of family members who

lived in other places. The State further submitted that it spent a half hour on the phone with

Weathersby’s mother who falsely stated that she had kicked Weathersby out of the house, and he

did not live with her anymore. The trial court’s conclusion that the State was able to serve

Weathersby quickly after the charges were dropped because Weathersby felt comfortable and

stopped evading service is a reasonable one. The trial court had the opportunity to observe the

State and the defense at numerous court appearances in which the State represented it could not

locate Weathersby. The trial court was not required to accept defendant’s theory that, since

Weathersby was served fairly easily with the grand jury subpoena, “the State had apparently not

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made a good faith effort before.” Defendant has not made a clear showing that the State sought

nolle prosequi for the purpose of evading the speedy-trial requirements. None of the trial court’s

findings or credibility determinations are against the manifest weight of the evidence and we find

its conclusion that the State did not violate defendant’s right to a speedy trial is correct and

consistent with the controlling law.

¶ 41    Jury Instruction

¶ 42    Defendant argues that he was denied a fair trial when the trial court refused to instruct the

jury with the jury instruction for accomplice witnesses. The “Testimony Of An Accomplice”

instruction provides that: “[w]hen a witness says he was involved in the commission of a crime

with the defendant, the testimony of that witness is subject to suspicion and should be considered

by you with caution. It should be carefully examined in light of the other evidence in the case.”

IPI Criminal 3.17. The underlying rationale reflected in the pattern instruction “is that it is fair to

question the testimony of a witness who has admittedly participated in the crime at issue in the

proceedings.” People v. Fane, 2021 IL 126715, ¶¶ 35-36. Defendant raised this issue during the

jury instruction conference, but he concedes he did not raise the issue in a posttrial motion.

Defendant, therefore, urges us to review the issue under the plain error doctrine. If a defendant

either fails to object to an error at trial or fails to raise the issue in a posttrial motion, the issue is

forfeited for appellate review. People v. Johnson, 238 Ill. 2d 478, 484 (2010). An exception to

the forfeiture rule exists for situations in which the alleged error rises to the level of

“plain error.” People v. Roman, 2013 IL App (1st) 102853, ¶ 19. Under plain error review, we

will grant relief to a defendant on otherwise-forfeited issues in either of two circumstances: (1) if

the evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice

against the defendant; or (2) if the error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the

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defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness

of the evidence. People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 178–79 (2005). Defendant argues he is

entitled to relief under both prongs of the plain error doctrine.

¶ 43   Where a defendant alleges first-prong plain error, a court of review may first examine the

record to determine whether the evidence is closely balanced before determining whether error

occurred. People v. White, 2011 IL 109689, ¶ 148. “When it is clear that the alleged error would

not have affected the outcome of the case, a court of review need not engage in the meaningless

endeavor of determining whether error occurred.” Id.

¶ 44   In this case, the evidence against defendant was overwhelming. Even setting aside the

damning testimony from Weathersby for the moment, Patrick Curry, the security guard, saw

defendant just after the shooting exiting a stairwell in the direction from which Curry heard the

gunshots. Defendant was wearing a distinctive Pelle Pelle jacket and looked directly at Curry

before running away. Curry knew defendant well and testified clearly that it was defendant he

saw. Curry identified defendant in a photo array soon after the murder.

¶ 45   The whole shooting incident was captured on surveillance video. After the shots were

fired, the surveillance video shows that defendant and the other men ran inside the building at

3801 S. Princeton Avenue. Curry saw defendant and another man running out the back stairwell

of the building at 3801 S. Princeton Avenue when he arrived at the scene. He clearly saw

defendant’s face. Piecing together the surveillance video and Curry’s testimony provides strong

evidence against defendant.

¶ 46   After the shooting, defendant was captured on gas station surveillance video wearing the

same distinctive Pelle Pelle jacket he was seen wearing by Curry as he fled from the area of the

shooting. Officer Carey, whose territory included Wentworth Gardens, was able to identify

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defendant by sight from the gas station surveillance video. The day after defendant’s arrest,

detectives went to defendant’s home to interview his mother, and they asked her for his orange

and blue Pelle Pelle jacket. Defendant’s mom gave the jacket to the detectives. All of this

evidence strongly implicated defendant in Graham’s murder. Add Weathersby’s testimony back

into the mix and there was overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt offered at trial. The

evidence was not closely balanced, and defendant is not entitled to first-prong plain error relief.

¶ 47    Under the second prong of the plain error doctrine, we may address unpreserved errors

that undermine the integrity and reputation of the judicial process regardless of the strength of

the evidence or the effect of the error on the trial outcome. People v. Jackson, 2022 IL 127256,

¶ 24. The plain error rule itself, however, is “a narrow and limited exception” to procedural

default, and the errors that fall under the purview of the second prong of the plain error rule are

rare. Id. at ¶ 27.

¶ 48    Defendant argues that second-prong plain error relief is warranted “because the failure to

instruct the jury regarding how to evaluate [Weathersby’s] [sic] credibility deprived [defendant]

of his due process right to a fair trial.” We do not find the trial court’s discretionary decision to

decline to give an accomplice jury instruction in this case to be an error. “If the witness could not

be indicted for the offense then he is not an accomplice. An accomplice must knowingly,

voluntarily, and with common interest unite with the principal offender in the commission of the

crime.” People v. Travis, 94 Ill. App. 3d 983, 991 (1981). At the jury instruction conference,

defendant requested the “Testimony Of An Accomplice” pattern jury instruction—IPI Criminal

3.17. The first part of the instruction at issue provides that “[w]hen a witness says he was

involved in the commission of a crime with the defendant ***.” Weathersby and the State never

said Weathersby was involved in the commission of a crime along with defendant.

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¶ 49   There was no evidence or even a suggestion at trial that Weathersby committed any

crime. After hearing argument from the parties on the propriety of giving the instruction, the trial

court concluded that Weathersby was not “an accomplice.” The trial court did, however, allow

defendant to argue throughout trial that Weathersby should not be believed because he was being

granted immunity from the State and was present at the scene of the shooting. Nonetheless,

Weathersby testified consistently that he had no idea defendant and Whitehead were going to

shoot anyone. He did not even know they had guns. The surveillance video somewhat

corroborates this testimony, or at least it shows that Weathersby was standing back away from

defendant and Whitehead, and only defendant and Whitehead pulled out guns and started

shooting. The detective similarly testified that he never viewed Weathersby as a suspect in the

murder and always viewed him only as a witness. The trial court considered the arguments of the

parties on the issue and made a thoughtful determination to reject giving the instruction. “The

refusal of an accomplice instruction will not be overturned on appeal unless it represents an

abuse of discretion.” People v. Harris, 182 Ill. 2d 114, 144 (1998). Abuse of discretion is a

highly deferential standard of review, and we will find such abuse only when the trial court’s

decision is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable to such a degree that no reasonable person would

agree with it. People v. Lerma, 2016 IL 118496, ¶ 32. We cannot say that no reasonable judge

would agree with the judge’s decision or that the decision was arbitrary or fanciful. Therefore,

the trial court’s decision did not amount to an abuse of discretion, and it has support in Illinois

caselaw. See e.g., Harris, 182 Ill. 2d at 145 (“There was no probable cause in the present case to

believe that [the witness] was guilty of these offenses either as a principal or under an

accountability theory, and therefore the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to give

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the jury an accomplice instruction for [the witness’s] testimony.”). As we find no clear and

obvious error, defendant is not entitled to second-prong plain error relief.

¶ 50   Defendant argues that his trial counsel’s failure to include the jury-instruction issue in his

posttrial motion constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. However, the existence of prejudice

is a fundamental part of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To show prejudice in an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a

defendant must show a “reasonable probability” that the result of the proceeding would have

been different but for counsel’s supposed error. Id. at 693. Here, as explained above, the

evidence of defendant’s guilt was overwhelming, and he cannot show any prejudice from

counsel’s alleged error concerning the jury instruction. See supra ¶¶ 44-46.

¶ 51   Sentencing

¶ 52   Defendant argues that his 35-year prison sentence is excessive. Defendant was 18 years

old at the time he committed the murder in this case. Defendant argues that his young age and his

“demonstrated history of cognitive delays” combined with his potential for rehabilitation show

that the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced him to 15 years imprisonment above

the minimum sentence. Defendant urges us to reduce his sentence or remand the case for a new

sentencing hearing.

¶ 53   At the sentencing hearing, the State pointed out that defendant had a prior conviction for

unlawful use of a firearm wherein defendant discharged a firearm in a park. The trial court also

explained that during its multiple years presiding over the case it got the sense that defendant is

“something of a danger to the community,” and the trial court noted it needed to consider the

safety of the public when fashioning a sentence. Of course, the circumstances of this case were,

as the trial court described it, “tragic beyond belief.” Defendant killed a young mother who had

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three young children. Graham merely happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time where

she was caught on the wrong end of defendant’s violent actions.

¶ 54   The Illinois Constitution requires that all sentences “be determined both according to the

seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.”

Ill. Const. (1970) art. I, § 11; 730 ILCS 5/1-1-2 (West 2022). When the trial court sentences

defendant to a term within the range prescribed by the General Assembly, the sentence is

presumed to be proper. People v. Knox, 2014 IL App (1st) 120349, ¶ 47. A sentence is deemed

excessive and represents an abuse of discretion only where it is “greatly at variance with the

spirit and purpose of the law, or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense.” People

v. Evans, 373 Ill. App. 3d 948, 968 (2007).

¶ 55   The sentencing judge is given great discretion in determining a sentence within the limits

set by the legislature by statute. People v. Fern, 189 Ill. 2d 48, 53 (1999). A sentencing decision

by the trial court is accorded great deference and weight because the trial court is generally in a

better position than the reviewing court to determine the appropriate sentence. People v. Stacey,

193 Ill. 2d 203, 209 (2000). The trial court has the opportunity to weigh such factors as the

defendant’s credibility, demeanor, general moral character, mentality, social environment, habits,

and age. Id.

¶ 56   In arguing that the sentence was excessive, defendant points out the “overwhelming

amount of mitigating evidence presented by the defense demonstrat[ing that he had]

developmental delays which significantly reduced his age when measured by brain maturity.”

Defendant recounts the evidence of learning disabilities and developmental delays in his brief on

appeal which the trial court found to be fairly persuasive. To summarize the point, defendant

concludes that his “intellectual development shows a consistent lag behind his peers, meaning

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that at the time of the offense, at age 18, he was more immature than his peers.” Defendant also

points out though that once he was in a structured environment in jail, he earned his GED while

this case was pending. Defendant argues that the trial court gave this mitigating evidence “short

shrift.”

¶ 57       Quite to the contrary, the trial court gave significant attention to defendant’s youthful

age, his history of learning disabilities, and the disadvantages of his childhood. The trial court

considered those factors to be compelling, such that it chose not to apply the mandatory firearm

sentencing enhancement even though the jury had made a special finding that defendant

personally discharged a firearm during the commission of the murder. The trial court explained

that it had “considered all of this at great length” before concluding that a 35-year prison

sentence was appropriate for defendant.

¶ 58       The Illinois Supreme Court recently held that the statutory firearm enhancements are only

discretionary as to individuals who were juveniles at the time of the offense, but for an adult like

defendant, the statutory sentencing enhancements are mandatory. People v. Hilliard, 2023 IL

128186, ¶ 39. Nonetheless, defendant was sentenced before Hilliard was decided and the trial

court gave defendant a major benefit by not applying the sentencing enhancement. Defendant

was actually subject to a mandatory 40-year minimum sentence: 20 years for the firearm

enhancement and 20 years minimum for first-degree murder. See 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(ii)

(West 2022) (firearm enhancement); 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-20(a)(1) (West 2022) (sentencing range

for first-degree murder). The trial court chose to forego the firearm enhancement in defendant’s

favor over the State’s objection due specifically to defendant’s young age, his childhood learning

difficulties, and other unfortunate circumstances in his upbringing. Defendant, therefore, actually

ended up receiving a sentence of five years less than the minimum allowable by statute. In his

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reply brief, defendant seems to acknowledge this fact and essentially abandons his argument that

the trial court abused its discretion when fashioning his sentence. Whether defendant abandoned

the issue or not, we would hold that defendant’s sentence is not excessive and would reject his

challenge to his sentence.

¶ 59                                    CONCLUSION

¶ 60   Accordingly, we affirm.

¶ 61   Affirmed.

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