Court Opinion

ID: 7821812
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-07 17:57:08.922762+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:30:45.395789
License: Public Domain

John I. Purtle, Justice, dissenting. I think this record should be sent back to the trial court for the purpose of incorporating the will into the record on appeal. Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 6(e) states: ... If anything material to either party is omitted from the record by error or accident or is misstated therein, the parties may by stipulation, or the trial court, either before or after the record is transmitted to the appellate court, or the appellate court on proper suggestion, or on its own initiative, may direct that the omission or misstatement shall be corrected, and if necessary, that a supplemental record be certified and transmitted. (Emphasis added) It is evidence from reading the above rule that this court has the expressed authority to require that the will, which is the subject matter of this controversy, be included in the record before us. It is even more obvious that we will be unsure we are reaching a correct result unless we have the decedent’s will before us for review. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 62-2903 (b) (Repl. 1971) (Abatement Statute) states: If the provisions of the will or the testamentary plan or the express or implied purpose of the devise would be defeated by the order of abatement stated in subsection (a) hereof, the shares of distributees shall abate in such other manner as may be found necessary to give effect to the intention of the testator. From the fragments of the will which are included in the abstract and briefs, I feel I can state that the late senator intended thát his bounty be divided as follows: one third to his widow and the balance of the property to be split in four equal portions. These portions were: one portion to his daughter, Doris; one portion to his daughter, Mary Alice; the third part to be divided equally between his four grandchildren; and one portion to his stepdaughter, Norma LeFevers, on specific condition which if such condition failed this devise would revert to the remaining three devisees. The decedent further had a provision that the inheritance or estate tax should not be paid from the widow’s portion. Additionally, it appears to me that the devise to the widow is more in the nature of a general than specific devise. It is obvious the trial court was greatly disturbed by the problems presented in the probate of this will. It cannot be more clearly expressed when he stated: ... A great deal of law on this problem is cited by both parties, but because I have determined that the answer is the abatement statute, I leave the issue unresolved. I conclude that it would be pure speculation to imply this intent in either direction. Certainly, it cannot be argued that either side prevailed in the court below because of a preponderance of the evidence or the weight of the evidence or anything other than a decision similar to a flip of the coin. We should not leave the trial court and the parties with a situation such as this. The only way we can confidently render an opinion in this case is that we have the will before us in order to determine the intention of the testator. In the case of Fish v.Bush, 253 Ark. 27, 484 S.W. 2d 525 (1972), we stated: ... Occasionally we do send an equity case back for additional proof when there is justification for a deficient record. For instance, we followed that course in Hutchison v. Sheppard, 225 Ark. 14, 279 S.W. 2d 33 (1955), because an important question of fact had been overlooked by all the parties both in the trial court and here. ... We followed the same rule in Ferguson v. Green, 266 Ark. 556, 587 S.W. 2d 18 (1979), wherein we stated: ... Where the case has been once heard upon the evidence or there has been a fair opportunity to present it, this court will not usually remand a case solely to give either party an opportunity to produce other evidence; the rule, however, is not imperative and this court has the power, in furtherance of justice, to remand any case in equity for further proceedings, including hearing additional evidence. ... Ark. Stat. Ann. § 62-2004 (b) (Repl. 1971) provides that the probate court shall have the same power to execute its jurisdiction, carry out its orders and judgment as exist in courts of general jurisdiction. Although the trial court is not primarily involved in the matter at this point, I refer to the foregoing statute to show that probate courts should come under the same rule as chancery courts in the cases cited above. At this time the matter is solely up to this court and if it would truly like to determine the intent of the testator, it could return the record to the trial court for completion or could issue certiorari and order it sent up. Although I have no particular authority to support my opinion, 1 feel tnat the intent oí the testator is visible in this case. It appears to me that he intended his debts and taxes to be paid first and then the legacies therein enumerated be awarded. I cannot make the bold statement that I have determined this to be so from looking at the four corners of the instrument because we do not have that instrument before us. Therefore, I would remand the case for the purpose of completing the record to include the will of the decedent or in the alternative issue certiorari for the instrument to be forwarded to this court. Hays, J., joins in this dissent.