Court Opinion

ID: 9756657
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 21:45:35.982334+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:57:01.984503
License: Public Domain

CIRILLO, Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
I agree with the majority to the extent that the holding in Commonwealth v. Dietz, 423 Pa.Super. 366, 621 A.2d 160 (1993) cannot be accepted; specifically, an appellant cannot be precluded from raising a lack of notice defense based on a failure to produce a valid driver’s license at the time of a stop or within fifteen days thereafter. I cannot, however, countenance a result that places on a defendant the burden of producing evidence of his innocence, for he is protected by the presumption of that innocence. Thus, for the following reasons, I dissent. Crockford’s conviction should not be permitted to stand.
During Crockford’s trial, the only witness called by the Commonwealth was Trooper Robert Halecky. Trooper Halecky testified that on March 1, 1993, Crockford was stopped for an inspection sticker violation. At that time, Crockford was unable to provide a current driver’s license upon request from Trooper Halecky. An examination of Crockford’s driving record by the trooper revealed that Crockford’s license had been suspended. Crockford denied knowledge of his suspension when he was so informed by Trooper Halecky and stated that he left his license at home in his wallet. It was further established at trial that notice of the suspension was mailed by the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation *43(PennDOT) to Crockford on October 28, 1992; however, the Commonwealth could not verify to what address the notice was sent. Crockford did not produce a current license following the incident.
The Commonwealth rested its case at the conclusion of Trooper Halecky’s testimony. Crockford then demurred, arguing that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he had actual notice of the license suspension. The Commonwealth averred that Crockford could not avail himself of the “no notice defense” because he had not produced a current license at the time of the offense or within fifteen days thereafter pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1511.
§ 1511. Carrying and exhibiting driver’s license on demand
(a) General rule. — Every licensee shall possess a driver’s license issued to the licensee at all times when driving a motor vehicle and shall exhibit the license upon demand by a police officer....
(b) Production to avoid penalty. — No person shall be convicted of violating this section or section 1501(a) (relating to drivers required to be licensed) if the person produces at the office of the issuing authority or the arresting officer within 15 days a driver’s license valid in this Commonwealth at the time of the arrest.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1511.1 On the basis of Commonwealth v. Dietz, 423 Pa.Super. 366, 621 A.2d 160 (1993), discussed infra, the trial court denied the demurrer and convicted Crockford of driving with a suspended license, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(b).
Crockford filed post-verdict motions, arguing that he had no actual notice of his suspension prior to the incident. The *44motions were denied, and Crockford was sentenced to ninety days imprisonment. This appeal followed.
The following issues were raised for our consideration:
(1) Whether the lack of actual notice of a license suspension is a defense to the offense of driving while operating privilege is suspended or revoked under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(b), and, if so, whether such a defense is waived when one fails to produce a current license pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1511?
(2) Whether, assuming the failure to produce a driver’s license does not waive the defense of lack of notice, there was sufficient evidence presented to support Crockford’s conviction under section 1543(b)?2
In examining a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, it is well settled that an appellate court must determine whether the evidence was sufficient to enable the jury to find every element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing all the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the verdict winner. Commonwealth v. Thomas, 527 Pa. 511, 594 A.2d 300 (1991).
The statute in question, 75 Pa.C.S.A. 1543(b), provides in pertinent part:
§ 1543. Driving while operating privilege is suspended or revoked
(b) Certain offenses. — Any person who drives a motor vehicle on any highway or traffic way of this Commonwealth at a time when their operating privilege is suspended or revoked as a condition of acceptance of Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition for a violation of section 3731 (relating to driving under influence of alcohol or controlled substance) or because of a violation of section 1547(b)(1) (relating to suspension of refusal) or 3731 shall, upon conviction, be guilty of a summary offense and shall be sentenced to pay a fine of $1,000 and to undergo imprisonment for a period of not less than 90 days.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(b).
*45The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Commonwealth v. Kane, 460 Pa. 582, 333 A.2d 925 (1975), held that it must be proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant had actual notice of the suspension of his operator’s license in order to establish an essential element of the crime of driving with a suspended license. Accord Commonwealth v. Zimmick, 539 Pa. 548, 653 A.2d 1217 (1995); Commonwealth v. Minor, 436 Pa.Super. 35, 647 A.2d 229 (1994); Commonwealth v. Heckman, 404 Pa.Super. 335, 590 A.2d 1261 (1991); Commonwealth v. Taylor, 390 Pa.Super. 571, 568 A.2d 1320 (1990); Commonwealth v. Gamble, 376 Pa.Super. 590, 546 A.2d 681 (1988); Commonwealth v. Horney, 365 Pa.Super. 152, 529 A.2d 18 (1987); Commonwealth v. Gray, 356 Pa.Super. 299, 514 A.2d 621 (1986); Commonwealth v. Burkett, 300 Pa.Super. 72, 445 A.2d 1304 (1982). Additionally, Kane established that the Commonwealth may not satisfy the actual notice requirement by merely introducing evidence of the fact that the Department of Transportation sent a suspension notice to the defendant via first class mail. Kane, 460 Pa. at 586, 333 A.2d at 927.3 Accord Zimmick, supra, 539 Pa. 556, 653 A.2d 221; Minor, supra, 436 Pa.Super. 35, 647 A.2d 229; Heckman, supra, 404 Pa.Super. 335, 590 A.2d 1261; Taylor, supra, 437 Pa.Super. 102, 649 A.2d 453; Horney, supra, at 365 Pa.Super. 152, 529 A.2d 18; Gray, supra, 356 Pa.Super. 299, 514 A.2d 621; Burkett, supra, 300 Pa.Super. 72, 445 A.2d 1304.
Subsequent to the Kane decision, several appellate decisions have clarified our Supreme Court’s ruling by holding that when notice is mailed to the defendant and additional evidence exists to infer that the defendant received notice of suspension, then the evidence may be sufficient to prove actual notice. See Zimmick, supra (where appellant based his challenge of lack of actual notice solely on the alleged failure to obtain written notice from PennDOT, evidence was sufficient to demonstrate that appellant had actual notice where Commonwealth proved that: appellant pleaded guilty to the under*46lying DUI offense, and at that time was informed that his license would be suspended; appellant was aware the he had not had a valid license for years; and, appellant asked the police officer not to cite him for a section 1543(b) violation because it would mean jail time for him); Horney, supra, 365 Pa.Super. 152, 529 A.2d 18 (actual notice proven when evidence established that notice was mailed and appellant admitted that he received prior notice, mailed to the same address, notifying him that he had to take an exam in order to keep his license, and he did not take the exam); Gray, supra, 356 Pa.Super. 299, 514 A.2d 621 (evidence was sufficient to prove actual notice where it was established that notice was mailed to appellant’s correct address and appellant had previously surrendered his license in response to a notice mailed to the same address); Burkett, supra, 300 Pa.Super. 72, 445 A.2d 1304 (evidence that appellant had surrendered his license and attempted to conceal the fact that he was driving by removing himself from the driver’s seat when his vehicle was pulled over by police was found probative of actual notice).
Notwithstanding the principles set forth thus far, the appellate courts of this Commonwealth have determined that a defendant cannot avail himself/herself of the defense of lack of actual notice under certain circumstances. Specifically, the question has arisen as to whether one who does not notify PennDOT of his or her change of address is precluded from asserting that the Commonwealth did not provide them with actual notice.4 In Commonwealth v. Heckman, supra, 404 Pa.Super. 335, 590 A.2d 1261, a panel of this court enunciated the following rule: “[W]e today hold that when a defendant fails to notify PennDOT of a change in address pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1515, the defendant cannot rely on this violation of the law to insulate him from more serious violations by claiming lack of actual notice.” Heckman, 404 Pa.Super. at 346, 590 A.2d at 1267. See Minor, supra, at 436 Pa.Super. 35, 647 A.2d 299 (applying Heckman, court held that appellant was precluded from presenting the defense that he lacked notice of suspension where he had not provided PennDOT *47with his current address).5 Most recently, this rule was validated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Zimmick, supra, 539 Pa. 556, 653 A.2d 221. There it was held that sufficient evidence existed to demonstrate that appellant had actual notice that his license was suspended and, additionally, that appellant was estopped from basing his lack of notice defense on PennDOT’s failure to mail his notice to his current address since he failed to provide PennDOT with his correct address as required by 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1515. See also Commonwealth v. McDonough, 533 Pa. 283, 621 A.2d 569 (1993) (evenly divided decision).
In the instant case, the Commonwealth claims that, as a “logical extension” of the Heckman holding, a defendant seeking to invoke the defense of no notice must produce a current license at the time of the offense, or within fifteen days thereafter, pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1511. The authority for the Commonwealth’s argument is derived from a decision by a panel of this court in Commonwealth v. Dietz, 423 Pa.Super. 366, 621 A.2d 160 (1993).
In that case, appellant Dietz was convicted of driving with a suspended license pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(a). Dietz was involved in an accident and fled the scene, leaving a trail of blood which led the police to his home. When questioned by investigators, Dietz initially lied to them, denying that he was driving the car involved in the accident. Additionally, Dietz’s driving record revealed other convictions for driving with a suspended license. Based on these facts, this court, adopting the reasoning of the trial court, logically held that the Commonwealth produced sufficient additional evidence that Dietz had actual notice of the suspension.
While the Commonwealth did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Dietz received actual notice through the *48mail, the Commonwealth did present sufficient additional evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the receipt of actual notice____ By fleeing the crash site and by misleading the investigators, Mr. Dietz demonstrated that he knew he was not permitted to drive. Secondly, Dietz’s driving record shows three driving under suspension ... convictions and one driving without a valid license conviction____
Dietz, 423 Pa.Super. at 368, 621 A.2d at 162. Additionally, and more relevant to the instant case, the court extended its holding to include the following:
Furthermore, we hold that in order for a person to invoke the defense that there was no notice of the suspension or revocation of the license, at a minimum, it must be established at trial, that a current driver’s license was produced at the time of the offense, or within 15 days thereafter, as provided for in 75 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 1511. When the penalties of 75 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 1532 have been applied, resulting in suspension or revocation of a driver’s license, under 75 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 1540, the driver is required to surrender the license. The operating privileges cannot then be restored until expiration of the suspension/revocation period at which time one must reapply for a new driver’s license. 75 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 1541. Therefore, it is logical to require of a driver who claims that no notice of a suspension was received, to at least prove possession of a current license at the time of the incident. Otherwise, a defendant’s failure to possess a current license is presumptive knowledge of suspension.
Id. at 370-371, 621 A.2d at 162-63 (emphasis added).
It is a basic tenant of our law that, in criminal cases, there is a continuing presumption of innocence. Commonwealth v. Bonomo, 396 Pa. 222, 151 A.2d 441 (1959).
[The] presumption of innocence ... represents the law’s humane approach to the solution of a dispute which may result in the loss of life or liberty. Because of this concern the law has ordained that any government which seeks to take from any person his life or liberty has the burden of proving justification for doing so. It is the continuing *49presumption of innocence which is the basis for the requirement that the state has a never-shifting burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. at 229, 151 A.2d at 445. See Commonwealth v. Hilbert, 476 Pa. 288, 297, 382 A.2d 724, 729 (1978) (“[A] state carries a never-shifting burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of all the elements of a crime, such elements being contained in either statutory or common-law definitions.”); Turner v. Commonwealth, 86 Pa. 54, 74 (1878) (the burden of proof never shifts but rests with the prosecution throughout); Commonwealth v. Wagaman, 426 Pa.Super. 396, 401, 627 A.2d 735, 737 (1993) (same). See also Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233, 97 S.Ct. 2339, 53 L.Ed.2d 306 (1977); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970).
In light of the Commonwealth’s burden to persuade the jury of a defendant’s guilt, the defendant is not required to present any evidence in order to prevail. Commonwealth v. Loccisano, 243 Pa.Super. 522, 535-537, 366 A.2d 276, 283 (1976). “A man charged with a crime is not required to explain anything. It is the Commonwealth’s obligation to prove guilt.” Commonwealth v. Clinton, 391 Pa. 212, 216, 137 A.2d 463, 465 (1958). “It is hornbook law that a person charged with a crime is under no duty to ... produce evidence of his innocence but may stand mute protected by the presumption of innocence and demand that the Commonwealth sustain its burden of proving his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Jacobs, 247 Pa.Super. 373, 379, 372 A.2d 873, 876 (1977). “The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution prohibits placing a burden of proof upon a criminal defendant to negate an element of the crime with which he or she is charged.” Hilbert, 476 Pa. at 294, 382 A.2d at 727 (citing Mullaney, supra, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881). There can be no burden on an accused to disprove an element of the offense. Loccisano, 243 Pa.Super. at 537-539, 366 A.2d at 284. Furthermore, “[t]he due process burden of proof applies to summary offenses as well as to other criminal *50charges.” Wagaman, 426 Pa.Super. at 401, 627 A.2d at 737 (citing Commonwealth v. Karl, 340 Pa.Super. 493, 490 A.2d 887 (1985)).
Here, the Commonwealth, by way of the rationale espoused in Dietz, essentially takes the position that the burden should be placed on defendant/appellant Crockford to negate an essential element of the offense of driving with a suspended license, namely, actual notice of the suspension. Crockford’s failure to establish at trial that a current driver’s license was produced at the time of the offense or within fifteen days thereafter, as provided in 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1511, is, the Commonwealth contends, presumptive knowledge of suspension; it avers that only after a current license is produced should the prosecution be required to prove actual notice of the suspension through additional evidence.6 Such a result shall not be *51tolerated. To place such a burden on a defendant of having to affirmatively prove compliance with section 1511, or be deemed to have had notice of suspension, runs afoul of the constitutional due process requirement that the government, with its never-shifting burden, must prove every element necessary to constitute the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Bonomo, supra, 396 Pa. 222, 151 A.2d 441.
In essence, under the Commonwealth’s view, since Crock-ford did not put forth any evidence that he was in possession of a current license pursuant to section 1511 he was, in effect, deemed to have forfeited his right to assert a lack of actual notice under section 1543. The right to actual notice required by Kane, supra, 460 Pa. 582, 333 A.2d 925, is grounded in the constitutional right to due process of law. Kane, 460 Pa. at 585, 333 A.2d at 926 (citing Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 89 S.Ct. 1532, 23 L.Ed.2d 57 (1969)). Under Dietz, Crockford’s failure to exhibit a valid/current driver’s license as evidence of actual notice would essentially subject him to a loss of liberty; proof of actual notice is not an element that can be essentially “waived” by an accused’s inaction, rather, it must be affirmatively proven by the Commonwealth. See Zimmick, supra, 539 Pa. 556, 653 A.2d 221 (Justice Zappala, concurring) (since the violation of section 1543(a) could result in imprisonment, definitely a loss of liberty, due process requires actual notice of suspension as an element of the offense); see also Commonwealth v. McDonough, 533 Pa. 283, 621 A.2d 569 (1993) (Justice Flaherty, opinion in support of reversal).
I am mindful of the potential difficulty facing prosecutors in their efforts to obtain convictions in these matters. A prosecutor who proves that a license has been suspended and notice has been mailed, may find it challenging to present the additional evidence necessary to prove the element of actual notice. These concerns, however, can never overshadow a defendant’s constitutionally protected presumption of innocence, the Commonwealth’s never-shifting burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and a defendant’s constitu*52tional right to due process via the notice requirements. Therefore, to the extent that the Dietz decision places an affirmative duty on a defendant to produce a current driver’s license before asserting a defense of no notice, I would reject the imposition of such a requirement.
Since Crockford cannot be obligated to establish that he was in possession of a valid driver’s license, I find that the Commonwealth did not sustain its burden of proving actual notice of the license suspension, an essential element under section 1543. Kane, supra, 460 Pa. 582, 333 A.2d 925. Because proof of mailing is not sufficient, in and of itself, to prove that Crockford had notice that his license was suspended, Kane, supra, and, since the Commonwealth presented no additional evidence of actual notice, Burkett, supra, 300 Pa.Super. 72, 445 A.2d 1304, his conviction must be reversed.7 Thomas, supra, 527 Pa. 511, 594 A.2d 300.

. Crockford was not told by Trooper Halecky that he had fifteen days to produce a current license. Furthermore, when asked by the court to produce a current license during trial, Crockford responded that he was not instructed to bring the license. When the court pressed the matter, asking Crockford why he did not bring the license when he knew he was facing ninety days mandatory jail time, Crockford answered that he did not see the significance of producing the license, since he was now aware that it was not current. Crockford also repeated that, had he been so instructed, he would have brought the license.

. For purposes of clarity, I have taken the liberty of rewording Crock-ford’s issues on appeal.

. In Kane, the notice of suspension was not sent to the address listed in PennDOT’s records but rather, due to a typographical error, was mailed to an address at which the defendant never resided.

. We have not been asked to rule upon this particular issue in the instant case. There was no evidence presented regarding the address to which PennDOT mailed Crockford's suspension notice.

. This court in Commonwealth v. Taylor, 390 Pa.Super. 571, 568 A.2d 1320 (1990) held that the Commonwealth did not prove actual notice of a license suspension where there was evidence that the defendant no longer resided at the address to which his license was registered. The decision, however, does not reveal whether the defendant notified PennDOT of his change of address pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1515. See also Commonwealth v. Gamble, 376 Pa.Super. 590, 546 A.2d 681 (1988).

. The Commonwealth contends that this approach would mirror the approach adopted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Yarger, 538 Pa. 329, 648 A.2d 529 (1994). There, the Court found it unnecessary to require the Commonwealth to present expert testimony in cases where the driver has failed to rebut the Commonwealth’s prima facie evidence that his blood alcohol content was 0.10% while operating a motor vehicle. By antilogy, the Commonwealth would apply the procedural framework set forth in Yarger to the instant case. Specifically, the Commonwealth’s brief suggests the following:
[T]he Commonwealth would maintain the initial burden of establishing that the defendant’s driver’s license was suspended and that notice of the suspension was mailed to thé defendant. Following such evidence, a prima facie case would be established. At this point, evidence that the defendant produced a valid driver’s license could be introduced by the defendant to rebut the Commonwealth’s prima facie evidence. If evidence rebutting the Commonwealth’s prima facie case was produced, then the Commonwealth would bear the additional burden of proving actual notice of suspension through additional evidence.
I reject this analogy, as these two statutes can be clearly distinguished. Section 3731(a)(4) of the Vehicle Code, at issue in Yarger, requires as a statutory element of the offense that the Commonwealth prove a 0.10% blood alcohol content as part of its prima facie case. The 0.10% rule, built into the statute itself, specifies a quantum of evidence which is legally sufficient to sustain proof of this element of the crime. See Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 339 Pa.Super. 32, 488 A.2d 293 (1985). Section 1543, as interpreted by the Commonwealth through Dietz, would essentially bring the requirements of another statute (section 1511) through the “back door,” thereby impeding a defendant’s right to notice and seeking an application of sections 1511 and 1543 that the legislature did not envision. I decline to accept the Commonwealth’s invitation to follow the procedural approach set forth *51in Yarger and apply it to a section 1543 case. The framework set up in Yarger does not result in hindering a defendant’s fundamental right to notice, as it would here.

. I reject the Commonwealth’s contention that actual notice of suspension in prosecutions under section 1543 should no longer be an element of the offense of driving with a suspended/revoked license. Specifically, the Commonwealth points out that Kane was decided pursuant to the Act of April 29, 1959, P.L. 58 § 624, as amended, 75 P.S. § 624. Since an offense under section 624 was a misdemeanor, the general requirements of culpability applied. Section 624 was repealed, and now 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543 establishes two separate summary offenses for driving with a suspended/revoked license. The Commonwealth contends that since violations of section 1543 are always summary offenses, there is no mens rea requirement that the Commonwealth must prove. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 305(a)(1) and (2). Since the 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543 statutory scheme has replaced that found in section 624, the Commonwealth avers that Kane and its progeny no longer has a valid statutory base. In other words, since the Commonwealth need not prove that a defendant was knowingly driving with a suspended license, it need not prove actual notice.
I reiterate what this court stated in Commonwealth v. Heckman, 404 Pa.Super. 335, 590 A.2d 1261 (1991), where a similar argument was rejected. There, we stated: "While we agree that § 1543(b) does not include a culpability requirement in its definition, we cannot agree that such a requirement is ‘patently inconsistent’ with effective enforcement of driving under suspension---- [W]e do not hold that actual notice of suspension is no longer necessary.” Id. at 347 n. 6, 590 A.2d at 1267 n. 6. I would decline the Commonwealth’s request to reexamine and reevaluate this area of the law.