Court Opinion

ID: 9762060
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:09:31.385374+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:29.697987
License: Public Domain

BAIRD, Judge,
dissenting.
Believing Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 42.12, § 5(a) requires the trial judge to admonish a misdemeanor defendant of the possible consequences of violating deferred adjudication probation prior to accepting the plea, I respectfully dissent.
I.
The majority states that, in eases of misdemeanor deferred adjudication, art. 42.12, § 5(a) calls for the trial judge to take the following sequential steps:
(1) receive the defendant’s plea;
(2) hear any evidence substantiating the defendant’s guilt;
(3) determine whether the evidence substantiates the defendant’s guilt;
(4) defer further proceedings without adjudicating the defendant’s guilt; and
(5) place the defendant on probation.
Majority Opinion pg. 612. The majority, recognizing that § 5(a) requires that the defendant be admonished of the possible consequences of violating deferred adjudication probation, nevertheless holds that giving the admonition prior to the plea is not a “condi*614tion precedent to a voluntary plea.” Id., at 612. The majority, citing art. 27.14, reasons that since a misdemeanor defendant need not be present in order to enter his plea, and may be admonished in writing, the admonition required under § 5(a) is merely “pro forma” and has no bearing as to whether the plea is knowingly and voluntarily given. Id. Thus, a misdemeanor defendant need not be admonished prior to entering his plea. Id.
I believe, however, that the majority’s distinction between admonitions for felony deferred adjudication probation and misdemeanor deferred adjudication probation subverts the legislative intent behind amending art. 42.12 § 5(a). “In enacting an amendment the Legislature is presumed to have changed the law, and a construction should be adopted that gives effect to the intended change, rather than one that renders the amendment useless.” Ex parte Trahan, 591 S.W.2d 837, 842 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). The amendment of art. 42.12, § 5(a), requiring the admonition, underscores the importance placed by the Legislature on the defendant’s knowledge of the consequences of violating deferred adjudication probation, regardless of the class of the offense. Further, the majority’s distinction between felony and misdemeanor deferred adjudication probation is not supported by the text of art. 42.12, § 5(a). Moreover, insofar as incarceration may be a consequence of violating misdemeanor deferred adjudication probation, the majority’s distinction between felonies and misdemeanors is artificial. Finally, the majority erroneously relies on out-dated case law to ascertain the correct procedure for admonishing a misdemeanor defendant.
II.
In addressing the issue of plea admonishments, the United States Supreme Court has held that because a guilty plea involves simultaneously waiving several Constitutionally protected rights, the plea must be made voluntarily and knowingly, otherwise due process is violated. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243-244, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1712, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), and McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 1171, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969). In McCarthy, the Court explained the two purposes furthered by the trial judge’s admonition of a defendant prior to taking a guilty plea:
... By personally interrogating the defendant, not only will the judge be better able to ascertain the plea’s voluntariness, but he also will develop a more complete record to support his determination in a subsequent post-conviction attack.
These two purposes have their genesis in the nature of a guilty plea. A defendant who enters such a plea simultaneously waives several constitutional rights, including his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, his right to trial by jury, and his right to confront his accusers. For this waiver to be valid under the Due Process Clause, it must be “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, [1023], 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). Consequently, if a defendant’s guilty plea is not equally voluntary and knowing, it has been obtained in violation of due process and is therefore void. Moreover, because a guilty plea is an admission of all the elements of a formal criminal charge, it cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant possesses an understanding of the law in relation to the facts.1
McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 466, 89 S.Ct. at 1171. See also, Boykin, 395 U.S. at 244, 89 S.Ct. at 1712; Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1469, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970) (“Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.”). Consequently, where a defendant enters a guilty plea without knowing the punishment range of the offense, he does not enter the plea having “full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence.” Boykin, 395 U.S. at 244, 89 S.Ct. at 1712.
In Hughes v. State, 833 S.W.2d 137 (Tex.Cr.App.1992), we acknowledged that the vol-untariness of a defendant’s guilty plea under *615art. 26.13 hinges on whether the trial judge admonishes him of the punishment range prior to his entering the plea. Id., at 140. See also, Whitten v. State, 587 S.W.2d 156, 159 (Tex.Cr.App.1979) (Op. on reh’g). Where a defendant is not informed of the punishment range prior to entering his plea, the plea is not knowingly entered, hence, it is not voluntary. Hughes, 833 S.W.2d at 140. See also, Ex parte McAtee, 599 S.W.2d 335 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). Further, such admonitions must be shown in the record in order to comply with due process requirements. Whitten, 587 S.W.2d at 158.
Because the plea proceedings involved in the deferred adjudication statute, art. 42.12, § 5(a), are similar to the proceedings for a guilty plea under art. 26.13,2 the same due process principles apply to each statute.3 In Whitten, 587 S.W.2d 156, we explained that the underlying purpose of the art. 26.13 admonishments was “to insure that the defendant entered his plea with full knowledge of its consequences. An affirmative showing of such knowledge is constitutionally required as well.” Id., at 158 (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709). While art. 26.13 applies only to felony offenses, McGuire v. State, 617 S.W.2d 259, 261 (Tex.Cr.App.1981), in the context of art. 42.12 § 5(a) the due process principles upon which art. 26.13 is based are equally applicable to misdemeanor defendants who face actual incarceration. Compare, Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367-373, 99 S.Ct. 1158, 1162, 59 L.Ed.2d 383 (1979), and Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 2012, 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972). See also, Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 195-197, 92 S.Ct. 410, 415-416, 30 L.Ed.2d 372 (1971).
In Scott and Argersinger the Supreme Court extended the rule of Gideon,4 to require the appointment of counsel for indigent defendants in misdemeanor proceedings where the defendant faces actual incarceration. Scott, 440 U.S. at 373, 99 S.Ct. at 1162; Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 40, 92 S.Ct. at 2014. The basis for these holdings rested on the severe nature of incarceration as a punishment. In Argersinger, the Court stated that the due process principle of Gideon “had relevance to any criminal trial where an accused is deprived of his liberty.” Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 32, 92 S.Ct. at 2010. The Court observed that where incarceration was involved, even for a brief period of time, the distinction between felony and misdemeanor offenses blurred. Id., 407 U.S. at 33, 92 S.Ct. at 2010. Consequently, when a misdemeanor defendant faced incarceration, the due process principles involved in felony trials are equally applicable to misdemeanor trials. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 33, 92 S.Ct. at 2010; see also, Scott, 440 U.S. at 372-374, 99 S.Ct. at 1161-1162.
The reasoning in Argersinger and Scott extends to the admonitions required prior to a defendant’s guilty plea in deferred adjudication cases. Since incarceration is often a consequence of violating misdemeanor deferred adjudication probation, a defendant needs to know of that consequence before accepting a sentence of deferred adjudication probation. At least one court of appeals has *616held that due process requires the trial judge to admonish a misdemeanor defendant on the punishment range prior to accepting his plea. McMillan v. State, 703 S.W.2d 341, 343 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1985).5
III.
A.
Under art. 42.12, § 5(a), the trial judge must inform a defendant of the consequences of violating deferred adjudication probation. The issue in the instant case is when the trial judge is required to inform the defendant. In interpreting the meaning of legislation, it is our duty to “effectuate the collective intent or purpose of the legislature.” Ward v. State, 829 S.W.2d 787, 790 (Tex.Cr.App.1992); Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex.Cr.App.1991).
Prior to 1985, misdemeanor deferred adjudication was governed by former art. 42.13, § 3(d). However, in 1985, the Legislature repealed former art. 42.13, § 3(d) and merged it with the provision relating to felony deferred adjudication, art. 42.12, § 3(d). Acts 1985, 69th Leg., Ch. 427, §§ 1 and 3. Within the amended statute, the Legislature did not distinguish between the two classes of offenses.6 By merging the statutes, the Legislature intended to eliminate the distinctions between felony and misdemeanor deferred adjudication. See, Trahan, 591 S.W.2d at 842.
In 1989, the Legislature again amended art. 42.12 § 5(a) to its current version. The amendment requires the trial judge to admonish a defendant facing deferred adjudication of the possible consequences of violating that probation.
Except as provided by Subsection (d) of this section, when in its opinion the best interest of society and the defendant will be served, the court may, after receiving a plea of guilty or plea of nolo contendere, hearing the evidence, and finding that it substantiates the defendant’s guilt, defer further proceedings without entering an adjudication of guilt, and place the defendant on probation. The court shall inform the defendant orally or in writing of the possible consequences under Subsection (b) of this section of a violation of probation. If the information is provided orally, the court must record and maintain the court’s statement to the defendant. In a felony case, the period of probation may not exceed 10 years. In a misdemeanor case, the period of probation may not exceed two years.
See, Acts 1989, 71st Leg.R.S., Ch. 785, § 4.17; Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 42.12, § 5(a).
We may safely presume the Legislature added the admonition requirement to art. 42.12 knowing the constitutional due process implications of Boykin/McCarthy and Argersinger/Scott. Grunsfeld v. State, 843 S.W.2d 521, 523 (Tex.Cr.App.1992) (“[W]hen examining amendments to existing legislation, it is presumed that the legislature was aware of case law affecting or relating to the statute.”). Thus, in amending art. 42.12, § 5(a), the Legislature created a vehicle to inform the defendant of the effect of his plea and of the consequences of violating deferred adjudication probation.7 See, Boykin, 395 U.S. at *617244, 89 S.Ct. at 1713. It is further presumed that the Legislature intended the statute to comply with constitutional requirements. Tex.Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.021(1). Yet in order to be consistent with the Federal due process requirements of Boykin and McCarthy, a trial judge must admonish the defendant prior to the defendant’s entering his plea, otherwise the defendant does not “know” the consequences of his plea prior to entering it. Since this is not a “knowing” plea, it is not a voluntary one. McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 466, 89 S.Ct. at 1171; Hughes, 833 S.W.2d at 140. Therefore, knowing that due process required admonitions to be given prior to the entry of the plea, the Legislature obviously intended for the admonitions of art. 42.12 § 5(a) to be given prior to the plea.8
B.
Further, a reading of art. 42.12, § 5(a) does not support the majority’s distinction between admonishments for felony and misdemeanor deferred adjudication probation. The majority’s reading of art. 42.12, § 5(a), requiring two separate admonitions, results in an irrational rule. See, Boykin, 818 S.W.2d at 785.
The majority construes § 5(a) to result in an artificial distinction between felonies and misdemeanors: (1) a felony defendant must receive admonitions prior to entering a guilty plea, and (2) a misdemeanor defendant may receive admonitions after entering a guilty plea. This interpretation is erroneous for at least three reasons: First, the text does not distinguish between felonies and misdemeanors. As previously noted, the Legislature repealed former art. 42.18, § 3(d) and merged it with art. 42.12. Acts 1985, 69th Leg., Ch. 427, §§ 1 and 3. In merging the statutes, the Legislature sought to eliminate any distinctions between felony and misdemeanor deferred adjudication. “Where the statute is clear and unambiguous, the Legislature must be understood to mean what it has expressed and it is not for the courts to add or subtract from such a statute.” Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d at 785 (quoting Ex parte Davis, 412 S.W.2d 46, 52 (Tex.Cr.App.1967)). See also, State v. Kaiser, 822 S.W.2d 697, 700 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1991) (“[T]he existence or non-existence of the particular intent of a statute may be inferred from the fact that an act does not contain a certain provision.”), and State v. Jones, 570 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tex.App.-Austin 1978). Compare, Ex parte McIver, 586 S.W.2d 851, 856 (Tex.Cr.App.1979) (“[T]he express mention or enumeration of one person, thing, *618consequence, or class is tantamount to an express exclusion of all others.”). Since the admonishment portion of § 5(a) does not distinguish between felonies and misdemeanors, any such distinction made by the Majority is artificial.9
Second, for the purpose of admonitions, the majority’s distinction between felonies and misdemeanors is purely arbitrary in view of the punishment faced by many misdemeanor defendants for violating deferred adjudication probation. Our Penal Code prescribes incarceration as a possible punishment for both Class A and Class B misdemeanors. Tex.Penal Code Ann. §§ 12.21 and 12.22. Any attempt to distinguish between felony and misdemeanor ranges of punishment overlap. For example, under § 12.21 the punishment for a Class A misdemeanor may include “confinement in jail for a term not to exceed one year.” Similarly, an individual adjudged guilty of a third degree felony may be confined in a community correctional facility for up to one year. Tex.Penal Code Ann. § 12.34(2).
The prospect of incarceration is a real possibility for many misdemeanor defendants who violate the terms of deferred adjudication probation. As the Supreme Court acknowledged in Argersinger, “the prospect of imprisonment for however a short time will seldom be viewed by the accused as a trivial or “petty” matter and may well result in quite serious repercussions affecting his career and his reputation.” Id., 407 U.S. at 37, 92 S.Ct. at 2012 (quoting Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 73, 90 S.Ct. 1886, 1890, 26 L.Ed.2d 437 (1970)). The Court further noted that “[a]ny incarceration, over thirty days, more or less, will usually result in loss of employment, with a consequent substantial detriment to the defendant and his family.” Id., 407 U.S. at 37, 92 S.Ct. at 2012 n. 6 (quoting Marston v. Oliver, 324 F.Supp. 691, 696 (E.D.Va.1971)). Thus, it is clear that a misdemeanor defendant facing incarceration following revocation of his deferred adjudication probation may endure similar personal and economic hardships as those of a felony defendant.
In the instant case, appellant was placed on deferred adjudication probation for a Class A misdemeanor. Yet had he been placed on deferred adjudication for a third degree felony, despite facing an equivalent punishment, under the majority’s holding, he would have been entitled to an admonishment prior to entering his plea. The majority cannot justify this distinction on the class of the offense when the punishment for each can result in the same “deprivation of a person’s liberty”. See, Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 39-40, 92 S.Ct. at 2013-2014, and McMillan, 703 S.W.2d at 344. Compare, Mayer, 404 U.S. at 195-196, 92 S.Ct. at 415-416.
Third, in attempting to ascertain the correct procedure for admonishing a misdemeanor defendant under art. 42.12, § 5(a), the majority relies upon out-dated case law. The majority acknowledges there is no case precedent interpreting art. 42.12, § 5(a). Majority Op. pg. 611. However, the majority also notes that we have held that under the prior deferred adjudication statute, art. 42.-12, § 3(d), due process was not violated by failing to admonish a defendant of the possible consequences of deferred adjudication probation. Majority Op. pg. 611. Relying on McNew v. State, 608 S.W.2d 166, 172-173, 177 (Tex.Cr.App.1980), the majority observes:
[fjailure to admonish a defendant of certain post-revocation and adjudication contingencies ... does not violate rights to due process and effective assistance of counsel. While it may be “better practice” to admonish as to consequences of deferred adjudication in a felony case, Article 26.13 does not require it.
*619Majority Op. pg. 611 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). However, as the Court of Appeals correctly noted, relying on McNew and other pre-amendment case law to ascertain the due process implications of art 42.12, § 6(a) is misplaced. Price v. State, 846 S.W.2d 37, 40 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1992).
The McNew Court addressed art. 42.12, § 3(d), which did not contain an admonition requirement. By contrast, art. 42.12, § 5(a) contains such a requirement. It is undeniable that the Legislature has the authority to create new statutory rights as long as those rights do not conflict with the Federal or State Constitution. See, 67 Tex.Jur.3d Statutes §§ 7, 78 (1989). See also, Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 122, 50 S.Ct. 57, 58, 74 L.Ed. 221 (1929); Ex parte Halsted, 147 Tex.Crim. 453, 182 S.W.2d 479, 482 (1944), and McCulloch v. Fox and Jacobs, Inc., 696 S.W.2d 918, 924 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1985). By amending art. 42.12 § 5(a), the Legislature expressly created the right for a defendant receiving deferred adjudication probation be admonished; the failure to provide an admonition violates that statutory right. Consequently, McNew is inapplicable because the amendment to § 5(a) created a new right which did not exist under art. 42.12, § 3(d).
IV.
In conclusion, the Majority interpretation art. 42.12, § 5(a) creates an artificial and false distinction between misdemeanor deferred adjudication probation and felony deferred adjudication probation. It cannot be logically argued that such a distinction was ever intended by the Legislature. The statute provides that defendants receiving deferred adjudication probation must be admonished of the possible consequences of violating that probation. Due process principles require that in order for a felony defendant’s plea to be knowing and voluntary, he must be informed prior to making his plea as to the consequences, including the possible punishment. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243-244, 89 S.Ct. at 1712, and McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 466, 89 S.Ct. at 1171. Those same principles apply to a misdemeanor defendant who faces incarceration. By giving trial judges the discretion of when to admonish a misdemeanor defendant, the Majority opinion violates those due process principles and subverts the ends which the Legislature sought to achieve.
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Because the Majority does not, I respectfidly dissent.
OVERSTREET and MALONEY, JJ., join this opinion.

. All emphasis is supplied unless otherwise indicated.

. Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 26.13 reads in pertinent part:
(a) Prior to accepting a plea of guilty or a plea of nolo contendere, the court shall admonish the defendant of:
(1) the range of punishment attached to the offense ...
(c) In admonishing the defendant as herein provided, substantial compliance by the court is sufficient, unless the defendant affirmatively shows that he was not aware of the consequences of his plea and that he was misled or harmed by the admonishment of the court.
(d) The court may make the admonitions required by this article either orally or in writing. If the court makes the admonitions in writing, it must receive a statement signed by the defendant and the defendant’s attorney that he understands the admonitions and is aware of the consequences of his plea. If the defendant is unable or refuses to sign the statement, the court shall make the admonitions orally.

. Since a statute within a common scheme should be construed, if possible, to harmonize with the other statutes in that scheme, see, Cheney v. State, 755 S.W.2d 123, 126 (Tex.Cr.App.1988), and 67 Tex.Jur.3d, Statutes, § 135 (1989), art. 42.12, § 5(a) is consistent with art. 26.13 bearing in mind that art. 26.13 sets out the requirements for admonishing a defendant prior to his entering a guilty plea and art. 42.12, § 5(a) adds an element with which a defendant must be informed.

. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963).

. On petition for discretionary review, this Court expressly declined to answer the constitutional question of whether constitutional due process required a misdemeanor defendant be informed as to the maximum punishment for an offense. This Court held, however, that contrary to the Court of Appeals’ finding, the record indicated that McMillan was adequately informed of the maximum punishment so that constitutional due process requirements were satisfied. McMillan v. State, 727 S.W.2d 582, 584 (Tex.Cr.App.1987).

. The Legislature did specify the varying permissible lengths of probation for felonies and misdemeanors.

. Despite the differences in the House and Senate versions of art. 42.12, § 5(a), there is a clear intent to place the trial judge’s admonition to the defendant on the record, which is consistent with the due process requirements of Boykin, 395 U.S. at 244, 89 S.Ct. at 1712, and McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 465-466, 89 S.Ct. at 1170-1171. Compare, H.J. of Tex., 71st Leg., R.S. 1358 (1989), and, House Comm, on Corrections, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 2335, 71st Leg., R.S. (1989) ("The court shall inform the defendant orally of the possible consequences under Subsection (b) of this section of a violation of probation, and the defendant shall acknowledge the fact that he has been informed of those consequences”), with, Tex. C.S.S.B. 2335, 71st Leg., R.S. (1989), and, Senate Comm, on Criminal Justice, Bill Analysis, *617Tex.C.S.H.B. 2335, 71st Leg., R.S. (1989) ("The court shall inform the defendant orally and in writing of the possible consequences under Subsection (b) of this section of a violation of probation”).
Therefore, insofar as the history of art. 42.12, § 5(a) indicates the Legislature sought to insure the defendant’s voluntary plea would be in the record, as required by Boykin and McCarthy, it is logical to infer that the Legislature also intended that the trial judge admonish a defendant, either orally or in writing, prior to taking the defendant's guilty plea.

. In attempting to distinguish felony from misdemeanor admonishments, the majority notes that the provision relating to misdemeanor pleas, art. 27.14(a), does not require a misdemeanor defendant to be present to enter his guilty plea. Majority Op. pg. 612. The majority further notes that art. 42.12, § 5(a) permits a defendant to be admonished in writing. In reading the two statutes together, the majority reasons that since a misdemeanor defendant need not be present in court to enter a plea, he need not be present in court to receive the admonishments. Thus, the majority concludes, since a misdemeanor defendant need not be orally admonished of the consequences of violating deferred adjudication probation, he need not know of those consequences prior to entering a plea. Majority Op. pg. 612.
However, this conclusion erroneously presumes that a misdemeanor defendant may not be admonished in writing prior to entering his plea. This conclusion is questionable because the provision relating to felony pleas, art. 26.13(d), specifically permits a judge to admonish a felony defendant in writing, rather than orally, prior to accepting the defendant’s plea. Thus, I fail to see why the trial judge's written admonitions cannot be given to a misdemeanor defendant before he enters a plea, even though written admonitions may be given to a felony defendant before he enters a plea. Because the purpose of § 5(a) is to provide a defendant sufficient information concerning the possible punishment for violating deferred adjudication probation for him to understand the consequences of his plea, it does not matter whether the admonitions are written or oral so long as the defendant receives them prior to entering his plea. See, McMillan v. State, 703 S.W.2d at 344-345 (and cases cited therein).

. It is notable that immediately following the admonition requirement, § 5(a) does distinguish between felonies and misdemeanors with regard to the length of probation:
... In a felony case, the period of probation may not exceed 10 years. In a misdemeanor case, the period of probation may not exceed two years.
This expressed distinction between the probationary lengths of felony and misdemeanor offenses only highlights the absence of a legislative intent to distinguish between felony and misdemeanor admonishments in the preceding sentence of the statute. See, McIver, supra, Kaiser, supra, and Jones, supra.