Court Opinion

ID: 9796324
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:55:18.067296+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:50:00.902057
License: Public Domain

LUMPKIN, J.,
dissent.
{1 Because this opinion disregards case law which has been consistent since the early *155days of statehood, and seeks to give an expansive interpretation to a U.S. Supreme Court decision that violates the Rules of Evidence, I must respectfully dissent to the decision rendered.
T2 While I agree that Cleon Johnson should have been allowed to testify as to what he said and who he told, the exclusion of his testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as it did not have a substantial influence on the outcome. See Simpson v. State, 1994 OK CR 40, ¶ 37, 876 P.2d 690, 702.
T8 Further, I cannot agree to the majority's attempt to make the Oklahoma Evidence Code1 irrelevant to the trial of a criminal case. This Court has already interpreted and applied the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 126 S.Ct. 1727, 164 L.Ed.2d 503 (2006) in Pavatt v. State, 2007 OK CR 19, 159 P.3d 272, where we stated:
Appellant refers us to Gore v. State, 2005 OK CR 14, 119 P.3d 1268, and Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 126 S.Ct. 1727, 164 L.Ed.2d 503 (2006), to support his claim that he was entitled, as a matter of due process, to present evidence of a possible third-party perpetrator. In Hoimes, the Supreme Court found that a state evidentiary rule governing admissibility of third-party perpetrator evidence ran afoul of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a fair trial The defendant in Holmes, charged with rape, burglary, robbery, and capital murder, proffered testimony suggesting that the forensic evidence against him had been contaminated and/or planted, and that another man, White, had admitted to the crime to several other people. White denied making any incriminating statements to others, and offered an alibi. The trial court excluded this evidence. The state appellate court affirmed, holding that third-party perpetrator evidence should be excluded any time the evidence against the defendant is "strong," particularly when there is "strong forensic evidence" of the defendant's guilt.
The United States Supreme Court found the rule applied by the state appellate court in Hoimes to be too rigid. The Court pointed to several of its past cases, striking down similar rules that "serve[d] no legitimate purpose" or were "so disproportionate to the ends that they [were] asserted to promote." Yet the Court recognized the authority of legislatures, and courts, to impose reasonable evidentiary rules in criminal trials, and noted that such authority-even regarding the admission of third-party perpetrator evidence-was not directly at issue. The only issue in Holmes was the South Carolina Supreme Court's recent expansion of its decades-old, judge-made rule, to make the admissibility of third-party perpetrator evidence entirely dependent upon the strength of the prosecution's evidence, considered in isolation. The Supreme Court found such a rule unconstitutional, in effect because it irrationally presumed that any evidence presented by the state was necessarily more credible than any evidence proffered by the defense.
2007 OK CR 19, ¶¶ 49-50, 159 P.3d at 288-289 (internal citations and footnotes omitted).
14 The Supreme Court in Holmes was dealing with a judge made rule that had no historical legal basis. In this case, the trial judge appropriately applied the Oklahoma Evidence Code, and prior case law, to determine that the proffered hearsay statements were not admissible as they did not fall under any recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule. There was no independent evidence to corroborate the statements and Johnson has no independent knowledge of what happened after he put out his alleged hit on the Vanus. In other words, he does not know who was at the Vann's house on the night of the murders. This opinion seeks to disregard the Rules of Evidence based on the sentence fragment "the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants 'a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense'" that was contained in Holmes, 547 U.S. at 324, 126 S.Ct. at 1731.
15 The Evidence Code, both federal and state, have been developed through the cen*156turies and emanate from the English common law to ensure only competent evidence is presented in a court of law. Without regard to its validity or competency this opinion basically says that when it comes to what a defendant in a criminal case wants to present as part of his/her defense it must be admitted even though it violates our Eivi-dence Code. Other than what he testifies he said, Johnson cannot under these rules testify to what other people told him when those statements do not qualify as exceptions to the hearsay rule. See 12 0.8.2001, § 2801 et seq. As Section 2802 sets out "[hlearsay is not admissible except as otherwise provided by an act of the Legislature." The U.S. Supreme Court decision in Holmes did nothing to dilute the application of the Rules of Evidence. The current decision seeks to do exactly what the U.S. Supreme Court condemned in Holmes, i.e. create an "arbitrary" rule. Regardless of whether an arbitrary rule benefits a defendant rather than the state, it is still arbitrary and inconsistent with the concept of the Rule of Law.
T6 As the Supreme Court said in Holmes: While the Constitution thus prohibits the exclusion of defense evidence under rules that serve no legitimate purpose or that are disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted to promote, well-established rules of evidence permit trial judges to exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by certain other factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead the jury. Plainly referring to rules of this type, we have stated that the Constitution permits judges "to exclude evidence that is 'repetitive ..., only marginally relevant' or poses an undue risk of 'harassment, prejudice, [or] confusion of the issues." "
547 U.S. at 326-27, 126 S.Ct. at 1732-33 (internal citations omitted).
I 7 The Supreme Court went on to say:
A specific application of this principle is found in rules regulating the admission of evidence proffered by criminal defendants to show that someone else committed the crime with which they are charged... ["I[Such evidence] may be excluded where it does not sufficiently connect the other person to the crime, as, for example, where the evidence is speculative or remote, or does not tend to prove or disprove a material fact in issue at the defendant's trial". Such rules are widely accepted, and neither petitioner nor his amici challenge them here.
547 U.S. at 827, 126 S.Ct. at 1733 (internal citations omitted).
[ 8 In a footnote listing jurisdictions which fall under this statement of acceptance of such rules the Supreme Court cited Gore v. State, 2005 OK CR 14, ¶¶ 13-24, 119 P.3d 1268, 1272-1276. Id.
T9 The interesting thing about the cite to the particular pages of Gore is that those pages set out the lineage since the early days of statehood that Oklahoma has had those rules and consistently applied them. The opinion in the present case seeks to do what the precedent of this Court has not done, and that is nullify the requirement since statehood that "evidence must tend to connect such other person with the commission of the crime charged" and "[elvidence, which can have no further effect than to cast a bare suspicion upon another is incompetent and inadmissible." Gore, 2005 OK CR 14, ¶ 13, 119 P.3d at 1273.
T10 One year after Gore, Judge Lewis authored Stouffer v. State, 2006 OK CR 46, 147 P.3d 245. Addressing third party perpetrator evidence, and specifically the overt act requirement, this Court rejected Stouffer's claim of error in part because "(hle had no evidence of an overt act by any particular person pointing to an alternative suspect". Id., 2006 OK CR 46, ¶ 50, 147 P.3d at 262.
11 A year after Stouffer, Judge Charles Johnson authored Pavatt v. State, 2007 OK CR 19, 159 P.3d 272. In its discussion of third party perpetrator evidence, the overt act requirement simply is not mentioned. 2007 OK CR 19, ¶ 49, 159 P.3d at 288. Based on the votes in each of these cases, contrary to the statement in the current opinion, together with the long historical precedence of this Court on the issue, the overt act requirement is still a viable legal principle. Wishing something does not make it true.
*157{12 Based on the principles set out in Gore, Stouffer, and Povatt the trial court properly excluded Johnson's statements regarding what Campbell told him. There is no evidence of an overt act, and the evidence was not corroborated or trustworthy. While Johnson's testimony of what he himself had said or directed would not be barred by the Evidence Code as hearsay, the trial judge was confronted with an admitted perjurer. While I may have allowed that testimony, together with the collateral evidence regarding its untrustworthiness, I cannot say the trial court abused his discretion based on our case law and the Evidence Code. I would affirm the judgment and sentence.

. 12 0.$.2001,§ 2101 et seq.