Court Opinion

ID: 2965533
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:41:32.524161+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:01:03.947163
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

      [NOT FOR PUBLICATION--NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]
                 United States Court of Appeals
                     For the First Circuit

No. 98-1245

                         FRANCISCA COLON,

                      Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                v.

                 SHIRLEY S. CHATER, COMMISSIONER,
                 SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,

                       Defendant, Appellee.

           APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                 FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

        [Hon. Robert W. Lovegreen, U.S. Magistrate Judge]

                              Before

                     Torruella, Chief Judge,
                 Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge,
                   and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
                                
                                

     Donna M. Nesselbush and Green, Greenberg & Nesselbush on brief
for appellant.
     Sheldon Whitehouse, United States Attorney, Mary E. Rodgers,
Assistant U.S. Attorney, and Wayne G. Lewis, Assistant Regional
Counsel, on brief for appellee.

September 30, 1998

                                
                                
            Per Curiam.   Appellant Francisca Colon appeals from
    the district court's decision affirming the final decision of
    the Commissioner of Social Security which denied her disability
    insurance benefits under the Social Security Act.  After
    reviewing the administrative record, we conclude that
    substantial evidence supported the denial of benefits,
    essentially for the reasons given by the district court in its
    decision.  In particular, we note that the district court
    correctly construed the medical record, which showed that both
    of appellant's treating physicians, rheumatologist Dr. Edward
    Lally and orthopedist Dr. Howard Hirsch, ultimately viewed her
    pain to be muscular in origin and that both rejected the view
    that it was due to her clavicular non-union.  We make only the
    following additional comments which relate to claims of error
    not directly addressed by the district court.
                   1.  We do not think that Social Security Ruling
    96-5p required the administrative law judge ("ALJ") to
    recontact Dr. Hirsch to clarify the basis for his opinion that
    the appellant was disabled from December 1993 to December 1994. 
    Under the Ruling, the ALJ was required to do so only if he
    could not "ascertain the basis of the opinion from the case
    record."  The record contained a questionnaire, filled out by
    Dr. Hirsch in July 1995, which stated the basis for his opinion
    that the appellant was disabled.
                   2.  We see no error in the ALJ's failure to
    explain in detail why he discredited the appellant's testimony
    as to her pain.  He does not appear to have discredited the
    specific facts to which she testified, since he determined that
    she had a severe impairment which prevented her from performing
    her past work.  Rather, he apparently declined only to draw the
    ultimate conclusion that her pain left her totally disabled,
    offering legitimate reasons for doing so.  Nor do we agree that
    he mischaracterized her testimony regarding her daily
    activities.  Based on her testimony, the ALJ could reasonably
    infer that, as the only adult regularly present, she cared for
    her two young children who lived with her; that she could drive
    (she stated only that she was not driving at the time of the
    hearing because she did not have a car); that she could shop
    (she testified only that her son lifted the "heavier" things);
    and that she could do some household cleaning (she stated only
    that she had "difficulty" cleaning, that she asked her younger
    son to sweep the floor, and that her adult son, who lived in a
    different state, did general cleaning when he was there). 
    While she did not testify that she visited with friends
    regularly, she did report that fact in her disability
    applications.  Finally, the appellant has not shown that the
    ALJ failed to make the inquiries required by Avery v. Sec'y of
    Health & Human Serv., 797 F.2d 19 (1st Cir. 1986).
                   3.  The ALJ had no need to consult a medical
    expert because the record contained several medical opinions on
    appellant's functional capacity.  Both Dr. Lally and Dr. Hirsch
    offered opinions, and the Commissioner's consulting, non-
    examining physician, Dr. Richard Mignacci, filled out a
    residual capacity assessment form.  While appellant's treating
    physicians differed in their opinions on her functional
    capacity, the ALJ reasonably explained why Dr. Lally's opinion
    should be preferred.
                   4.  The hypothetical, which appellant's counsel
    posed to the vocational expert at the disability hearing, was
    premised in part on the assumption that appellant's ability to
    grasp with her dominant right hand was limited.  Because this
    restriction was not supported by the medical evidence, the ALJ
    did not err in ignoring the expert's response to counsel's
    hypothetical.
                   The decision of the district court is affirmed.