Court Opinion

ID: 9467221
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:41:59.026118+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:13.990409
License: Public Domain

NATHANIEL R. JONES, Circuit Judge,
dissenting from denial of rehearing.
Because the panel’s opinion in Hocken-bury v. Sowders, 620 F.2d 111 (6th Cir. 1980) conflicts with several prior decisions of this Court, I heartily join in Parts I, II and III of my Brother Keith’s dissenting opinion. I write separately only to express my chagrin that the full court has failed to review en banc the panel’s treatment of exceptionally important issues of the construction of 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
The opinion in Hockenbury distinguishes this Court’s decisions in Berrier v. Egeler, 583 F.2d 515 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955, 99 S.Ct. 354, 58 L.Ed.2d 347 (1978), Rachel v. Bordenkircher, 590 F.2d 200 (6th Cir. 1978), and Cook v. Bordenkircher, 602 F.2d 117 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 936, 100 S.Ct. 286, 62 L.Ed.2d 196 (1979), but the distinctions, as Judge Keith has carefully explained, are illusory. The rule in this Circuit before Hockenbury was that a federal court could make an independent determination of the substantiality of federal constitutional questions raised in habeas corpus petitions where the state contemporaneous objection rule contained an exception in the case of manifest injustice. The decision in Cook v. Bordenkircher, 602 F.2d at 119 plainly establishes this rule by its reference to Miller v. North Carolina, 583 F.2d 701, 705-06 (4th Cir. 1978). This case raises two exceptionally important questions with respect to the construction of 28 U.S.C. § 2254:
1) If the state contemporaneous objection rule provides an exception in the case of “manifest injustice” or “plain error,” may the federal court in reviewing a petition for habeas corpus make its own determination of the substan-tiality of the federal constitutional question raised in the petition?
2) If the state court addresses a federal constitutional question on the merits *449and also indicates that an alternative ground for denying the criminal defendant’s appeal is the application of the contemporaneous objection rule, may a federal court review that federal constitutional question in a habeas corpus petition?
Hockenbury provides a negative answer to both questions.
The Supreme Court in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977), did not answer either question. In Wainwright, the Florida procedural rule stood as an absolute bar to review by the state appellate courts of the issues raised. Justice White, concurring, believed that the majority opinion did not affect a “plain error” rule. 433 U.S. at 99,97 S.Ct. at 2512. Wainwright does suggest the factors which this Court should consider, such as achieving comity in the relations between the federal and state courts. 433 U.S. at 88, 97 S.Ct. at 2507. The substance and strength of these factors, addressed in the context of Kentucky’s contemporaneous objection rule, which allows an exception for “manifest injustice,” may differ significantly from the Supreme Court’s evaluation of the Florida rule in Wainwright.
I am mindful of the concerns often expressed by my more senior colleagues about en banc hearings. Yet, I am convinced that such displeasure must not outweigh the fundamental need to resolve a clear conflict. Neither should it be a reason for perpetuating a potential narrowing of the channel through which aggrieved parties must pass to obtain relief for intrusions on their federal constitutional rights. In my view, the questions have great importance and require further study and resolution by this Court.