Court Opinion

ID: 9945367
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-27 19:01:47.817094+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:27.658871
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-3053    Document: 010111006097   Date Filed: 02/27/2024   Page: 1
                                                              FILED
                                                  United States Court of Appeals
                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS         Tenth Circuit

                            FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                    February 27, 2024
                          _________________________________
                                                                    Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                        Clerk of Court
     IRINEO GARCIA,

          Plaintiff - Appellant,

     v.                                                 No. 23-3053
                                              (D.C. No. 5:19-CV-03108-DDC)
     DAN SCHNURR; MISTI                                  (D. Kan.)
     KROEKER; GERALD SHERIDAN;
     CHRIS SCHNEIDER; MICHAEL
     LAMB; DAVID GORGES;
     JEFFREY PETTIJOHN; NATASHA
     HAYS; APRIL RICHARDS;
     ANGELA WEST; MACY ROOT;
     JOE JACKSON; DEB LUNDRY;
     TIM MEAD; CORIZON; DOUGLAS
     W. BURRIS,

          Defendants - Appellees.
                      _________________________________

                             ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
                          _________________________________

 Before BACHARACH and KELLY, Circuit Judges, and LUCERO, Senior
 Circuit Judge.
                _________________________________

 *
      Oral argument would not help us decide the appeal, so we have
 decided the appeal based on the record and the parties’ briefs. See Fed. R.
 App. P. 34(a)(2)(C); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).

       This order and judgment does not constitute binding precedent except
 under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel.
 But the order and judgment may be cited for its persuasive value if
 otherwise appropriate. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).
Appellate Case: 23-3053   Document: 010111006097   Date Filed: 02/27/2024   Page: 2

       Mr. Irineo Garcia is an inmate who was previously housed at the

 Hutchinson Correctional Facility. Mr. Garcia had the bottom part of his

 right leg amputated, so showering could be dangerous. Given the dangers,

 Mr. Garcia asked officials at Hutchinson to provide safety accommodations

 in the showers. Dissatisfied with what they provided, Mr. Garcia sued,

 invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Americans with Disabilities Act to

 claim that Hutchinson officials had acted with deliberate indifference and

 had failed to provide adequate accommodations.

       The district court dismissed all of the claims. Mr. Garcia appeals,

 and we affirm because he has not provided a viable reason to question the

 district court’s rulings.

                      Denial of motion to appoint counsel

       In his opening brief, Mr. Garcia contends that the district court

 should have appointed counsel because “ADA law is complicated.”

 Appellant’s Opening Br. at 4 ¶ 7.

       In district court, Mr. Garcia moved for appointment of counsel based

 on the complexity of the legal issues, limited access to the law library

 during his time in segregation, and limited knowledge of the law. The

 district court denied the motion, reasoning that Mr. Garcia had been able to

 present his claims “cogently and intelligently.” R. vol. 1, at 199.

       In reviewing this ruling, we apply the abuse-of-discretion standard.

 Toevs v. Reid, 685 F.3d 903, 916 (10th Cir. 2012). To determine whether

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Appellate Case: 23-3053   Document: 010111006097   Date Filed: 02/27/2024   Page: 3

 the court abused its discretion, we consider the limitations on what the

 court could do. The court couldn’t require an attorney to take the case; the

 court could only ask an attorney to represent Mr. Garcia. Rachel v. Troutt,

 820 F.3d 390, 396–97 (10th Cir. 2016). Courts may be reluctant to ask too

 often because so many indigent parties seek help in getting legal

 representation “and only a small number of attorneys are available to

 accept these requests.” Id. at 397. In determining whether Mr. Garcia’s

 claims merited a request among this limited pool of attorneys, the court

 needed to consider not only the complexity of the issues but also

 Mr. Garcia’s ability to present the claims. Id.

       In gauging the complexity of the issues and Mr. Garcia’s ability to

 present the claims, the district court acted within its discretion. On appeal,

 Mr. Garcia says that an attorney could help him put the case in “legal

 terms the Court can understand.” Appellant’s Opening Br. at 4 ¶ 8. But the

 district court didn’t express confusion about Mr. Garcia’s allegations. He

 filed a meticulous, 22-page complaint identifying his claims, his factual

 allegations, and his demands.

       He says that “ADA law is complicated.” Appellant’s Opening Br. at 4

 ¶ 7. But the ADA claims survived initial screening, with the district court

 concluding that Mr. Garcia had stated a plausible claim under the ADA. So

 when the district court ruled on the motion to appoint counsel, Mr. Garcia

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Appellate Case: 23-3053   Document: 010111006097    Date Filed: 02/27/2024   Page: 4

 had already done everything required of him. The court thus had little

 reason to seek representation for Mr. Garcia.

       The district court denied the motion without prejudice to a future

 motion. So Mr. Garcia could seek counsel again if circumstances were to

 change. We thus conclude that the district court didn’t abuse its discretion

 in denying Mr. Garcia’s motion for appointment of counsel.

                              Dismissal of claims

       Nor did the court err in dismissing the claims.

 1.    Mr. Garcia didn’t show that the court had erred by dismissing his
       claim involving a denial of equal protection.

       In the complaint, Mr. Garcia claimed a denial of equal protection.

 The district court dismissed this claim for failure to exhaust available

 administrative remedies.

       Mr. Garcia waited until his reply brief to address the dismissal of his

 equal protection claim. The reply brief was too late because Mr. Garcia had

 needed to present his appellate argument in his opening brief. Stump v.

 Gates, 211 F.3d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 2000).

       But even in the reply brief, Mr. Garcia doesn’t address the district

 court’s reasoning. Mr. Garcia instead insists that he presented his claim

 within the applicable period of limitations. But the district court didn’t

 dismiss the claim based on the limitations period; the dismissal instead

 rested on a failure to exhaust available administrative remedies. Mr.

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Appellate Case: 23-3053   Document: 010111006097   Date Filed: 02/27/2024   Page: 5

 Garcia’s failure to address the court’s rationale prevents us from disturbing

 this ruling. See Nixon v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 784 F.3d 1364, 1366

 (10th Cir. 2015) (stating that an appellant must “explain what was wrong

 with the reasoning that the district court relied on in reaching its

 decision”). 1

 2.    The district court didn’t err in dismissing the claim of cruel and
       unusual punishment.

       Because Mr. Garcia was an amputee, prison authorities provided him

 with a bench so that he could sit while showering. But Mr. Garcia believed

 that the bench was unsafe and would create cruel and unusual punishment.

 The district court dismissed this claim, concluding that the alleged safety

 risk hadn’t amounted to cruel and unusual punishment.

       Mr. Garcia appeals this ruling, but argues only that prison authorities

 had other facilities that could have eliminated the risk of injury. This

 argument doesn’t address the district court’s reason for dismissing the

 claim. See Reynolds v. Powell, 370 F.3d 1028, 1031–32 (10th Cir. 2004)

 (concluding that prison authorities were entitled to summary judgment

 because a slippery shower floor didn’t violate the Eighth Amendment by

 1
       Mr. Carter’s pro se status doesn’t relieve him of the obligation to
 identify an error in the district court’s reasoning. See Garrett v. Selby
 Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[T]his court
 has repeatedly insisted that pro se parties follow the same rules of
 procedure that govern other litigants.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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 creating a risk that a prisoner would fall). We thus lack any basis for

 disturbing this ruling. See p. 4, above.

 3.    Mr. Garcia hasn’t preserved a claim involving substantive due
       process.

       Mr. Garcia claims that the safety risk not only constituted cruel and

 unusual punishment, but also violated his right to substantive due process.

 But Mr. Garcia didn’t present this claim in district court. So he failed to

 preserve this claim. See Richison v. Ernest Grp., Inc., 634 F.3d 1123,

 1130–31 (10th Cir. 2011).

 4.    Mr. Garcia hasn’t addressed the district court’s reasons for
       rejecting his claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act.

       Mr. Garcia also asserted a claim under the Americans with

 Disabilities Act, seeking damages and an injunction. The district court

 dismissed this claim, reasoning that (1) the defendants enjoyed sovereign

 immunity as to damages and (2) the request for an injunction was moot. In

 his opening brief, Mr. Garcia again argues that the defendants violated the

 Act, but he doesn’t address the district court’s reasons for dismissing the

 claim. So we have no basis for disturbing the ruling. See p. 4, above. 2

 2
       In his reply brief, Mr. Garcia argues that the claim for an injunction
 wasn’t moot because authorities could return him to Hutchinson. But
 Mr. Garcia needed to make this argument in the opening brief rather than
 wait until the reply brief. See Stump v. Gates, 211 F.3d 527, 533 (10th Cir.
 2000).

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Appellate Case: 23-3053   Document: 010111006097   Date Filed: 02/27/2024   Page: 7

                          Request for appellate counsel

       Mr. Garcia asks us to appoint an attorney for him to show that (1) the

claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act is not moot because he

could be returned to Hutchinson and (2) an attorney could put the case in

legal terms that we can understand.

       Like the district court, however, we cannot force an attorney to take

the case. See Part 1, above. We can only ask an attorney to represent Mr.

Garcia. See id. Without some basis to expect Mr. Garcia’s return to

Hutchinson, we doubt that Mr. Garcia would have standing to base a claim

on the possibility of a future injury. See Initiative & Referendum Inst. v.

Walker, 450 F.3d 1082, 1087 (10th Cir. 2006) (stating that allegations about

the possibility of a future injury would not create standing). We thus lack a

basis to seek representation for Mr. Garcia.

                                      ** *

       We affirm the district court’s dismissals and denial of the motion for

 appointment of counsel. We also decline to request appellate counsel for

 Mr. Garcia. But we grant Mr. Garcia’s request for leave to proceed in

 forma pauperis.

                                        Entered for the Court

                                        Robert E. Bacharach
                                        Circuit Judge

                                        7