Court Opinion

ID: 9493253
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:02:28.551907+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:44.191958
License: Public Domain

*981WALLACE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The majority reaches out unnecessarily when it decides this case on a constitutional issue the parties never briefed. Its alternate holding fails to follow the Supreme Court’s standard of review and erroneously faults the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (Board) decision to deny Abovi-an’s asylum petition based on his failure to present sufficient evidence. Accordingly, I dissent.
I
The majority opinion first holds in one brief paragraph that the Board violated Abovian’s due process rights. This will no doubt come as a surprise to the parties in this case, who never raised the issue. Nowhere in Abovian’s brief did he even mention the phrase “due process.” The Immigration and Naturalization Service was never alerted that we might reach out for the never-raised due process issue and thus was not able to provide us with any argument or analysis on the issue.
Federal courts have a long-standing tradition of declining to rule on disputes in “ ‘the absence of substantial aid from the briefs of either of the parties.’ ” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 122, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998) (Stevens, J., concurring), quoting Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 721, 95 S.Ct. 1893, 44 L.Ed.2d 525 (1975). Indeed, this respect for our adversarial system of justice underlies Article Ill’s case or controversy requirement. See generally Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 121-22, 118 S.Ct. 1003 (Stevens, J., concurring); Grant v. Johnson, 15 F.3d 146, 148 (9th Cir.1994).
We have also been instructed repeatedly that even when issues are fully briefed, we should “avoid constitutional issues when resolution of such issues is not necessary for disposition of a case.” In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 642, 105 S.Ct. 2874, 86 L.Ed.2d 504 (1985); see also United States v. Sandoval-Lopez, 122 F.3d 797, 802 n. 9 (9th Cir.1997) (“We avoid constitutional questions when an alternative basis for disposing of the case presents itself.”). Here, the majority violates this direction when it chooses to decide the constitutional issue before focusing on its alternative reason for granting the petition.
Reaching out for constitutional issues that the parties have not briefed is thus a doubly dangerous undertaking. There is a risk that the court, lacking the analysis ordinarily provided by adversarial parties, will reach the wrong conclusion on the merits and create poor precedent, as the majority opinion aptly demonstrates. Unfortunately, there is the additional problem that constitutionalized errors can only be undone by this court sitting en banc, or by the Supreme Court. It is lamentable that the majority rejects the specific instructions of the Supreme Court:
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They have the authority to adjudicate specific controversies between adverse litigants over which and over whom they have jurisdiction. In the exercise of that authority, they have a duty to decide constitutional questions when necessary to dispose of the litigation before them. But they have an equally strong duty to avoid constitutional issues that need not be resolved in order to determine the rights of the parties to the case under consideration.
County Court of Ulster County, New York v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 154, 99 S.Ct. 2213, 60 L.Ed.2d 777 (1979).
II
The majority correctly points out that we have held the Board to have violated a petitioner’s due process rights when it decides an asylum case “based on an independent, adverse, credibility determination, contrary to that reached by the IJ,” without giving “the petitioner an opportunity to explain any alleged inconsistencies that it raises for the first time.” Maj. Op. at 978 (emphasis added), quoting Campos-Sanchez v. INS, 164 F.3d 448, 450 (9th Cir.1999). In this case, however, the *982Board’s decision cannot possibly be “contrary” to that reached by the immigration judge (IJ) because the IJ never made any comment on Abovian’s credibility. Without commenting on Abovian’s credibility either way, the IJ stated, “The burden of proof is on the applicant for asylum to establish that he is a refugee as defined by Section 101(a)(42)(A) of the Act.... I cannot find that this gentlemen would suffer because of his political views or for any of the other five grounds.”
Because the Board’s credibility determination was not in conflict with any credibility determination made by the IJ, there could not possibly be a due process issue. The majority makes no attempt to account for this gap in its logic. There is simply no basis for the majority’s purported due process violation.
Ill
The foundation of the rest of the majority’s opinion is Abovian’s recitation of the facts, as shown in its “Factual Background.” But the Board did not believe Abovian’s story. Thus, the majority details its alternate ground for reversing the Board: even if the Board did not violate Abovian’s due process rights, there was not substantial evidence to support the Board’s adverse credibility determination based on the record before it. In light of the standard of review applicable to this issue, I cannot agree.
As the majority acknowledged, “[s]ub-stantial evidence can be found lacking only if the applicant shows that the evidence which he presented ‘was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution.’ ” Maj. Op. at 977-78, quoting INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483-84, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992). The substantial evidence standard is “highly deferential” to the Board. Marcu v. INS, 147 F.3d 1078, 1080 (9th Cir.1998). It requires the evidence in Abovian’s favor to be so strong that, were this a civil trial, he would be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300, 59 S.Ct. 501, 83 L.Ed. 660 (1939), cited in Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 481, 112 S.Ct. 812. Because minds differ as to whether Abovi-an’s story was or was not credible, we are obligated to deny Abovian’s petition and show the required deference to the Board which was charged with evaluating Abovi-an’s credibility. See Diaz-Escobar v. INS, 782 F.2d 1488, 1493 (9th Cir.1986) (“Under the deferential substantial evidence standard, we may not reverse the [Board] simply because we disagree with its evaluation of the facts.... ”).
When the Board reviewed the record, it concluded that Abovian’s testimony was “disjointed, incoherent, and implausible.” It was. At his hearing before the IJ, Abovian testified that he met face-to-face with Levon Ter-Petrosyan, the President of Armenia, at least “15 to 20 times” in 1993 and that each time they met, President Ter-Petrosyan tried to recruit him into the Armenian National Security Committee (NSC). According to Abovian (and to Armenian opposition groups, Abovian claimed), the Armenian NSC was actually run by the KGB; Armenia was not really independent; and “Levon Ter-Petrosyan [was] the KGB.” Abovian’s allegations concerning Ter-Petrosyan seem especially implausible considering that Ter-Petrosyan was not a member of the Communist party. Rather, he was the head of the Armenian National Movement party, which competes with the Communist party, and was the democratically elected President. 1996 State Department Profile of Armenia.
Abovian’s written application was quite lengthy. In it, however,- he made no mention of his allegation that at least fifteen times in one year he was taken to a hotel room and asked in person, by the president of the country, to join the KGB. The majority may view such inconsistencies between Abovian’s declaration and his testimony as ones “of less than substantial importance,” but I do not, nor must the *983Board. Like the Board, I see this as “a material omission that goes to the heart of the respondent’s claim that he was considered an important potential asset to the current Armenian regime.” That he failed to mention this in his formal written application raises an additional alert on an already suspicious story.
When the Board examined Abovian’s hard-to-believe claims, it rejected them not because it found them lacking corroboration (as asserted by the majority), but because Abovian offered no adequate explanation for his failure to obtain any corroborating evidence. It is important to remember that the rule against requiring supporting evidence in every asylum case applies only (1) when the petitioner’s story is credible in the first place, and (2) there is a good reason for the petitioner’s failure to provide corroborating evidence of any kind. Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1285 (9th Cir.1985) (pointing out that the alien’s testimony must be “unrefuted and credible”).
The majority asserts that the Board erroneously rejected Abovian’s testimony solely for failure to provide documentary proof. The Board’s decision makes clear that this is not true:
He made dramatic claims about the current president of Armenia, Mr. Ter-Petrosyan’s relationship to the KGB and personal effort to persuade the respondent to join the NSC. An asylum applicant must make an effort to offer corroborative evidence in support of his testimony or, when such evidence is unavailable, provide an explanation for its unavailability. Matter of S-M-J-, supra. The respondent did not support his claims with documentary proof or adequately explain his failure to do so.
(Emphasis added.) A review of Abovian’s testimony before the IJ is illustrative:
Q. She’s only asking if you have any document of any newspaper or any piece of paper that explains that this committee exists. That’s all. And the question is, do you?
A. Not with me right now.... If I knew, I would have brought one. $ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡
Q. Sir, do you have any proof that this organization is linked to the KGB?
A. For sure.
Q. Sir, other than your own testimony that you provided today, do you have any documentary proof that this National Security Committee is linked to the KGB?
A. No. No Proof.
$ ‡ ‡ $
Q. Sir, you stated that people claim that he [the President of Armenia] is the leader of the KGB now. Do you have any proof that he is such a leader of this organization?
A. He is the leader of Armenia.
Q. Is he connected to the KGB at all?
A. Of course.
Q. Do you have any proof of this today, sir?
A. For me, it’s like everyone knows— every Armenian you ask, they’ll say the same thing.
Despite the apparent ease which Abovian could have obtained corroboration of his dramatic claims concerning the President of Armenia (“everyone knows”), he presented no documentation and called no relevant witnesses. His only two witnesses, his wife and daughter, both failed to corroborate any of his claims concerning the KGB. In fact, his wife stated that she knew nothing of his supposed problems with the KGB until ten days before Abovi-an himself arrived in the United States. Furthermore, Abovian asserted that he would have brought documentary evidence to his May 22, 1996, hearing had he known it was important. Even looking past the fact that his counsel was obligated to prepare him properly for his hearing and that he offered no valid reason for not bringing evidence with him on that day, Abovian’s proceedings were continued twice, from May 22 to August 7, and again from August 7 to November 14. Still, there was no corroboration or explanation for the failure to present it.
*984Faced with Abovian s incredible stones and his failure to explain why he was unable to present any evidence to support his claims, the Board made a negative credibility determination as an alternate ground for denying his application. Based on the record, this determination was well within the bounds of reason and was unquestionably supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, I do not feel “compelled” to reverse it. Singh-Kaur v. INS, 183 F.3d 1147, 1152-53 (9th Cir.1999) (affirming adverse credibility determination, in part, because of implausibility of alien’s testimony).
I wish to emphasize one additional point pertaining to the majority’s reversal of the Board’s negative credibility determination. Even though we do not give “special deference” to a negative credibility determination from the Board because it does not observe the alien’s demeanor and hear his voice as the IJ does, maj. op. at 978, we still must be extremely deferential to it:
We review credibility findings of an IJ and the [Board] under a substantial evidence standard. That standard is extremely deferential. The court must uphold the [Board’s] findings unless the evidence presented would compel a reasonable finder of fact to reach a contrary result....
Singh-Kaur, 183 F.3d at 1149-50 (internal quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis added). The majority’s statement that we do not give “special deference” to the Board’s negative credibility determination should not be construed to mean that we give it no deference at all: we must give it extreme deference.
IV
As an alternative ground, the Board explicitly found that “[e]ven assuming the respondent testified credibly, he has not shown past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution from the KGB or NSC.” This finding is supported by substantial evidence. To begin with, Abo-vian clearly admitted at his hearing that he had not been harmed physically at any time after Armenia became an independent country. He also said that he was not even sure that it was the KGB that was responsible for the abuses he suffered prior to the breakup of the Soviet Union.
The only evidence of serious harassment Abovian presented was testimony that his daughter was hit by a car after he refused to join the NSC. Even assuming that the NSC committed such an act, it alone would be insufficient to constitute persecution as defined by the Supreme Court. See Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 112 S.Ct. 812 (a military or paramilitary organization’s attempts to coerce a person into performing military service does not, without more, constitute persecution). If the NSC harmed Abovian’s daughter, it was not because of his political opinion, but rather for his refusal to join their organization.
The burden was on Abovian to prove his eligibility for asylum. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42)(A); see also Singh v. INS, 134 F.3d 962, 966 (9th Cir.1998). He failed to present evidence that he was persecuted on a protected ground. The IJ rejected his claim on this additional ground and the Board agreed. Because the evidence does not compel reversal, I must dissent on this ground also.