Court Opinion

ID: 9770133
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 15:47:15.346198+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:14.724159
License: Public Domain

MURPHY, J., dissenting, in which BATTAGLIA and ADKINS, JJ., join.
I agree with the majority’s reaffirmation of the “ ‘totality of the circumstances’ approach to determining the voluntariness of guilty pleas.” I also agree with the majority that, when a defendant who has entered a guilty plea claims that the judge who accepted that plea failed to comply with the requirements of Md. Rule 4-242, the court reviewing this claim must determine “whether, considering the record as a whole, the trial judge could fairly determine that[, at the proceeding during which the plea at issue was entered,] the defendant understood the nature of the charge to which he [or she] pleaded guilty.” (Emphasis supplied). In my opinion, however, “the record as a whole” includes everything shown to have occurred (1) before, (2) during, and (3) after the defendant pleaded guilty. While the dispositive issue is whether the defendant understood the nature of the charge at the moment the guilty plea was entered, the reviewing court should resolve that issue by examining everything in the record that has probative value.
In the case at bar, the record clearly shows that the Respondent (1) gave a detailed confession to the investigating officers, in which he confessed to his role in the armed robbery that resulted in the murder of the robbery victim, (2) *82aided in the investigation of that crime, which resulted in the arrest of his co-defendant, (3) entered into a plea agreement in which he promised to testify against his co-defendant, and during which he answered “Yes” when asked by the Court whether the facts stated by the prosecutor were “what happened in this case?,” (4) breached his plea agreement when called to testify during the trial of his codefendant, and (5) at sentencing, requested “mercy” on the ground that, “but for” his cooperation, the State’s case against his co-defendant would not have been likely to “come to trial.” I therefore dissent from the holding that the Respondent’s plea of guilty did not pass the Priet test.
The transcript of the Respondent’s guilty plea proceeding includes the following statements:
THE COURT: What’s the State’s recommendation on the Court’s acceptance of such a plea?
[THE PROSECUTOR]: The State’s recommendation as to Count I would be life suspend all but 30 years. As to Count 2, would be, I guess, 20 years concurrent, the first five without parole.
[RESPONDENT’S COUNSEL]: That’s acceptable.
[THE PROSECUTOR]: For a total of life suspend all but 30 years.
[RESPONDENT’S COUNSEL]: Not free to allocute. Life suspend all but 30.
THE COURT: All right. The Court is willing to bind itself to that recommendation.
[RESPONDENT’S COUNSEL]: Of course, Your Honor, in exchange for that, the Defendant would be cooperating with the State and would be testifying in any and all proceedings against Mr. Ashton.
THE COURT: Okay. Is a condition of his plea that he testify truthfully?
[THE PROSECUTOR]: Yes.
*83[RESPONDENT’S COUNSEL]: Yes.
[THE COURT] All right. I want you to have a seat. The Prosecutor is about to describe to me the facts that they’re relying upon to support your plea.
[PROSECUTOR] If this matter had gone to trial, the State would have produced witnesses who would testify that on December 14, 2005, at approximately 12:49 p.m., uniformed officers from the Prince George’s County Police Department were dispatched to 1132 Kennebec Street, Apartment 204, Oxon Hill, Prince George’s County, Maryland for the report of a shooting.
While responding to that location, officers saw a vehicle leaving the scene at a high rate of speed and in that vehicle were occupants who matched a lookout given by a witness to 911. The officers followed the vehicle—it was a Mercury Grand Marquis—into the District of Columbia to Yuma Street, Southeast. Two occupants got out and fled the scene. This Defendant, Demetrius Daughtry, was apprehended by officers and transported to the Metropolitan Police Department Violent Crime Branch where he gave a statement regarding his involvement in this matter.
Furthermore, if there was further testimony by Mr. Daughtry, he would testify that he had met up with Adrian Ashton earlier that morning, that the two of them decided to go to 1132 Kennebec Street, Apartment 204 to see Anthony Brown and to rob him of some marijuana. That both Mr. Daughtry and Adrian Ashton had handguns. They both went to that location. That both Adrian Ashton and Demetrius Daughtry went inside of that location. That there was a struggle between Adrian Ashton and Anthony Brown at time Mr. Daughtry fired in the direction of Anthony Brown and then grabbed some marijuana and fled out of the apartment.
Mr. Brown, when he was located at the scene by other officers, was pronounced dead at the scene. An autopsy was performed at which time the results of the autopsy *84were that the cause of death was multiple gunshot wounds and the manner of death was a homicide.
Further, the Prince George’s County police technician who was there—, well the doctor recovered two bullets which she gave to the technician. The technician marked those bullets as RM-12 and RM-13, the first being a .45 caliber bullet, the second being a .40 caliber bullet.
There would be further testimony that between Mr. Daughtry, the Defendant here, and Adrian Ashton, there was a .40 and a .45 caliber handgun. Court’s indulgence. All events occurring in Prince George’s County.
[THE COURT]: Mr. Daughtry, did you hear what the Prosecutor just described to me?
[THE DEFENDANT]: Yes.
[THE COURT]: Is that what happened in this case?
[THE DEFENDANT]: Yes.
In my opinion, the nature of the charges to which the Respondent pleaded guilty are “readily understandable” to any defendant who has (1) confessed to a classic “felony murder,” (2) aided in the arrest of his co-defendant, (3) agreed to enter a guilty plea pursuant to a plea agreement that calls for him to testify as a State’s witness, and (4) during his guilty plea proceeding, expressed agreement with the Statement of Facts that describe his role in the death of the robbery victim.1 Under these circumstances, even if subsequent events were inadmissible as a matter of law on the issue of whether the Respondent understood the nature of the charges when he entered his pleas of guilty, “the record as a whole” at that point in time clearly shows that he did.
The record also shows that (1) when called as a State’s witness in the trial of his codefendant, the Respondent asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege, and (2) as a result of the Respondent’s breach of the plea agreement, the State filed a *85MEMORANDUM IN AID OF SENTENCING that included the following assertions:
On September 7, 2006, the defendant withdrew his previously entered plea of not guilty and plead guilty to count-1, murder 1st degree and count-4, use of a handgun in the commission of a felony, before the Honorable Dwight D Jackson. As part of the plea agreement the defendant agreed to testify truthfully against his co-defendant, Adrian Ashton.
On May 3, 2007, Daughtry was called as a witness in the trial of State of Maryland v. Adrian Ashton and refused to testify.
Defendant’s Version of The Events
Upon his arrest in the District of Columbia, the defendant gave a videotaped statement to the police admitting his involvement in the murder of Anthony Brown. He later had further conversations with law enforcement personnel. In sum and substance he stated that on December 14, 2005, at approximately 12:29 pm, he and Adrian Ashton went to Anthony Brown’s apartment at 1132 Kenebec Street, Apt 204, Oxon Hill, Prince George’s County, Maryland, to rob Brown of some marihuana. Daughtry and Ashton drove to Brown’s apartment. Daughtry was in the driver’s seat and Ashton was in the front passenger seat. Both Daughtry and Ashton had handguns. Ashton had a .40 caliber handgun and Daughtry had a .45 caliber handgun. Ashton went into the apartment first. Daughtry entered into the apartment after he heard gunshots. Daughtry saw Ashton and Brown struggling on the couch. Daughtry fired once or twice in the direction of the victim. Daughtry then grabbed a bag of marihuana, ran out of the apartment and back to his car. Ashton followed him out of the apartment, but returned to the apartment to retrieve his handgun magazine. Ashton took Daughtry’s handgun with him when he returned to Brown’s apartment. Ashton returned to the car *86and both men fled the scene. Daughtry was apprehended in DC shortly after fleeing Brown’s apartment.
In his interview with parole and probation, the defendant again admitted his involvement and apologized to the victim’s family and to the State of Maryland, but denied having a gun at the time of the offense.
While this may be the defendant’s first serious criminal conviction, it is not the first time the defendant has been involved in assaultive behavior. The defendant was found guilty of second degree assault in 2003. The safety of society requires that he be sentenced to a significant period of incarceration. Furthermore, pursuant to the defendant’s agreement with the State, the defendant agreed to testify truthfully against his codefendant. At the co-defendant’s trial, the defendant refused to testify. Therefore, the State asserts that it is not bound by any prior agreement as to sentence recommendation.
For all the reasons stated above, the State respectfully requests that this Court sentence the defendant to life plus 20 years.
The transcript of the Respondent’s sentencing proceeding includes the following statements:
[RESPONDENT’S COUNSEL]: Mr. Daughtry has accepted his responsibility in Mr. Brown’s death. As you do know, he aided the investigation in this matter. He understands what he’s been charged with. He understands what he’s admitted to.... He did not want to go to trial. He wanted to save the victim’s family from any further pain. He wanted to save the State the cost of prosecution of him. And thus, he’s placing his future upon the mercy of the Court
[THE PROSECUTOR]: ... As Your Honor is aware in this case, Mr. Daughtry entered into an agreement. Part of the terms of the agreement was that he was to testify truthfully in any grand juries and any trial and other court proceeding *87with respect to the matters about which this may require his testimony, specifically, as to the trial of State v. Adrian Ashton.
At the trial of State v. Adrian Ashton, Mr. Daughtry was called as a witness.
THE COURT: I remember. He took the Fifth.
[THE PROSECUTOR]: Yes. So with that understanding, the State would submit that, basically, there is a violation of the agreement and[ ] therefore, the state is free to ask for what it feels would be the appropriate sentence.
[RESPONDENT’S COUNSEL]: ... Madam State’s Attorney is seeking to ask the Court to punish Mr. Daughtry for violating the terms of the agreement. Mr. Daughtry is not asking the Court to honor the terms of the agreement. We understand. He understands that the agreement is null and void at this juncture.
He knows that once an agreement is breached, there is no agreement any more. He understands that, but he is asking the Court to take into account the fact that he did aid in the investigation. But for Mr. Daughtry, it’s not likely that Mr. Ashton would have come to trial.
Your Honor, again, he’s going to be asking for life suspend all but 40 and a concurrent 20 on the handgun.
Mr. Daughtry wants the Court to know that he made—as he says, he made a stupid mistake. He wasn’t thinking in his right mind, so he has to accept his consequences, accept it and keep moving on. He wants to apologize to the victim’s family and to the State of Maryland for being involved in a senseless act of malice.
THE DEFENDANT: I’d just say that I truly, truly do apologize to Mr. Brown’s family.
*88From my review of the record as a whole, I am persuaded beyond the shadow of a doubt that when the Respondent entered the guilty pleas at issue, he fully understood the nature of the charges to which he pleaded guilty. I would therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and direct that Court to deny Petitioner’s Application for Leave to Appeal.
Judges BATTAGLIA and ADKINS have authorized me to state that they join this dissenting opinion.

. The offenses to which the Respondent pleaded guilty are simply not “complex,” and they do not involve the "fine and often difficult distinction” between degrees of homicide.