Court Opinion

ID: 9558327
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:07:06.950666+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:08:47.261844
License: Public Domain

MOSK, J.
I dissent. The majority are correct that McMillian v. Monroe County (1997) 520 U.S. 781 [117 S.Ct. 1734, 138 L.Ed.2d 1] (McMillian) is the case critical for deciding the present issue. But the application of the McMillian test leads me to the conclusion, contrary to the majority, that district attorneys in California are county rather than state officials for most purposes. Although it is true that a district attorney represents the state when prosecuting a criminal case, I agree with the Second Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals and with other courts that when the district attorney engages in training, supervision, and other managerial tasks, he or she is acting as a local policymaker, and the county which he or she represents may be held liable under 42 United States Code section 1983 (section 1983) for systematic civil rights violations, just as a city may be held liable for the violations committed by its police force.
Plaintiffs were convicted in 1985 of multiple counts of sexual abuse of young children and were each sentenced to hundreds of years in prison. In *3671990, after they had served several years in state prison, their convictions were overturned on appeal because of numerous instances of prosecutorial misconduct and errors on the part of the trial judge. (People v. Pitts (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 606 [273 Cal.Rptr. 757].) In 1991, the district attorney dismissed the case against plaintiffs. By 1994, all of the original child witnesses who had testified recanted and claimed to have been forced to falsely testify. After the dismissal, plaintiffs filed suit against the County of Kern, the sheriff, the district attorney and several members of the district attorney’s office. The focus of the complaint was on the alleged misconduct of some of the deputy district attorneys and an investigator with the district attorney’s office in coercing false testimony from children, as well as suppressing and failing to reveal exculpatory evidence. The district attorney, who had no direct role in prosecuting the case, was alleged to have fostered a custom or policy condoning this misconduct.
The starting points of any analysis of the county’s liability, which is in essence an inquiry into whether the district attorney is considered a county or a state official, are the two guiding principles invoked by the McMillian court. First, the question we must resolve is not whether the district attorney acted for the county “in some categorical, ‘all or nothing’ manner. Our cases on the liability of local governments under § 1983 instruct us to ask whether governmental officials are final policymakers for the local government in a particular area, or on a particular issue.” (McMillian, supra, 520 U.S. at p.__ [117 S.Ct. at p. 1737].) “Second, our inquiry is dependent on an analysis of state law. [Citations.] . . . [Ojur understanding of the actual function of a governmental official, in a particular area, will necessarily be dependent on the definition of the official’s functions under relevant state law.” (Ibid.)
In determining that a sheriff was, under Alabama state law, a state rather than a county official for law enforcement purposes, the closely divided McMillian court engaged in a weighing of a number of factors, not relying on any single one. (McMillian, supra, 520 U.S. at p._[117 S.Ct. at pp. 1738-1740].) The opinion did, however, indicate which factors it considered to be the most weighty, finding the provisions of the Alabama Constitution to be the more significant, while those of the Alabama Code “less compelling.” (Id. at p. ___ [117 S.Ct. at p. 1739].) What the court apparently considered most crucial was the state’s singular constitutional structure and history. As the opinion discusses, a 1901 state constitutional amendment changed the status of sheriffs, transforming them from local officials into members of the “executive department” of the state government. The greater role that the Alabama Constitution accorded to the state in supervising sheriffs was occasioned by the latter’s historical failure to prevent lynchings. Collusion with lynching was made an impeachable offense and authority to *368impeach the sheriff was moved from the county courts to the state supreme court. The McMillian court put great importance on the Alabama Supreme Court’s interpretation of these state constitutional provisions as “evidence of ‘the framers’ intent to ensure that sheriffs be considered executive officers of the state.’ ” (Id. at p. _ [117 S.Ct. at p. 1738].)
California, by contrast, has no similar constitutional history or provisions. District attorneys were never made a part of an executive department. There was never a historical need to circumscribe the autonomy of the district attorneys’ office for rogue behavior. In fact, in contrast to the scheme in Alabama, district attorneys in California are designated constitutionally and by statute as county officers (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 1, subd. (b); Gov. Code, § 24000). Article XI, section 1, subdivision (b) concerns the constitution of county government and states that “The Legislature shall provide for county powers, an elected county sheriff, an elected district attorney, an elected assessor, and an elected governing body in each county.” Government Code section 24000 states in pertinent part that “The officers of a county are: ft[] (a) A district attorney.” The district attorney is not a member of a state department and the office is not found among the list of state officers set forth in article V, section 14, subdivision (f) of the Constitution. These constitutional and statutory provisions, while perhaps not dispositive of the issue, weigh heavily in favor of finding district attorneys to be county officers, and distinguishes this case from McMillian.
It is true, as the majority point out, that article V, section 13 of the California Constitution provides that “[t]he Attorney General shall have direct supervision over every district attorney and sheriff and over such other law-enforcement officers as may be designated by law, in all matters pertaining to the duties of their respective offices, and may require any of said officers to make reports concerning the investigation, detection, prosecution, and punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions as to the Attorney General may deem advisable.” (Italics added.) But the fact that the Attorney General has authority over all law enforcement officers, in a general constitutional sense, does not negate the de facto and de jure autonomy of the district attorney’s office.
What the court stated in People v. Brophy (1942) 49 Cal.App.2d 15 [120 P.2d 946], commenting on the same constitutional language as quoted in the above paragraph, is still good law: “Manifestly, ‘direct supervision over every district attorney and sheriff and over such other law enforcement officers as may be designated by law’ does not contemplate absolute control and direction of such officials. Especially is this true as to sheriffs and district attorneys, as the provision plainly indicates. These officials are *369public officers, as distinguished from mere employees, with public duties delegated and entrusted to them, as agents, the performance of which is an exercise of a part of the governmental functions of the particular political unit for which they, as agents, are active. [Citation.] Moreover, sheriffs and district attorneys are officers created by the Constitution. ... [I]t is at once evident that ‘supervision’ does not contemplate control, and that sheriffs and district attorneys cannot avoid or evade the duties and responsibilities of their respective offices by permitting a substitution of judgment.” (Id. at p. 28, italics added.) Indeed, because counties are political subdivisions of the state, they are frequently subject to state supervision; this does not nullify the responsibilities they bear or the autonomy they enjoy.
The status of district attorneys as county officers finds confirmation in other constitutional and statutory provisions that further distinguish this case from McMillian. The McMillian court found it significant that the sheriff must “attend upon” the state courts in his county, and a judge, who is a state officer, may order sheriffs to take certain actions even if the judge sits in a distant county. (McMillian, supra, 520 U.S. at p._[117 S.Ct. at p. 1739].) As the court explained, many judicial circuits in Alabama contain more than one county. (Id. at p._, fn. 6 [117 S.Ct. at p. 1739].) In contrast, here in California each county has its own superior court, and these courts have no appreciable authority to command the actions of a district attorney outside of the county in which they sit. The one exception, found in Government Code section 3073, involves the appointment of the district attorney of an adjoining county for purposes of impeachment of the local district attorney. But the fact that a county officer may on very rare occasion be obliged to perform extra-local duties does not transform him or her into a state officer.
Moreover, district attorneys in California, unlike sheriffs in Alabama, have their salaries fixed for them not by state law but by the county board of supervisors (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 1, subd. (b).) Both the board of supervisors and the district attorney derive their power not from the Governor or the Attorney General but from the county electorate, which has the power not only to elect them, but, also recall them if it is unsatisfied with their performance. (Elec. Code, § 11200 et seq.) These provisions demonstrate that district attorneys’ constitutional and statutory designation as county officers is not a mere nominal reality, but reflects the fact that both their source of power and their jurisdiction are located in the county rather than the state.
The McMillian court also found significance in the fact that an Alabama sheriff is not controlled by the governing body of the county. (See McMillian, supra, 520 U.S. at p. _ [117 S.Ct. at p. 1739].) It is true that a *370California district attorney is also not controlled appreciably by the county’s governing body, the board of supervisors. But the fact that the district attorney is independent of the board does not mean he or she is not a county officer. It simply means that under article XI, section 1, subdivision (b) of the California Constitution and Government Code section 24000, political power within the county is not vested exclusively in the board of supervisors, but is diffused among various public offices. The district attorney is constitutionally and statutorily responsible for county law enforcement.
The court’s decision in Pembaur v. Cincinnati (1986) 475 U.S. 469 [106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452]supports the principle that a district attorney can be an autonomous county policymaker whose decisions can cause the county to incur section 1983 liability. In Pembaur, the court considered whether the forcible entry of sheriffs’ deputies into the plaintiff’s office could be a basis for a county’s liability under section 1983. The Court of Appeals had concluded that this single instance of alleged misconduct could not be considered a county policy and therefore the county could not be held liable. The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the deputies’ actions had been authorized by the county prosecutor, who, under Ohio law “could establish county policy under appropriate circumstances,” such actions could constitute official county policy. (Id. at p. 484 [106 S.Ct. at p. 1301].) Implicit in Pembaur is the assumption that county prosecutors and district attorneys may be viewed as independent county policymakers, and that their very autonomy from the county governing body establishes them as such.
The cases from other states cited by the majority in support of their position are readily distinguishable. For example, in Oklahoma and Mississippi the district attorney is paid directly by the state and his or her employees are classified as state employees. (See Arnold v. McClain (10th Cir. 1991) 926 F.2d 963, 965-966 [citing Laidley v. McClain (10th Cir. 1990) 914 F.2d 1386, 1390]); Chrissy F. by Medley v. Mississippi DPW (5th Cir. 1991) 925 F.2d 844, 849.) In Georgia and Colorado district attorneys generally represent a judicial district that encompasses more than one county and therefore cannot be considered simply as county policymakers. (Owens v. Fulton County (11th Cir. 1989) 877 F.2d 947, 951; Rozek v. Topolnicki (10th Cir. 1989) 865 F. 2d 1154, 1158.) In California, to the contrary, the district attorney is considered a county officer, is paid by the county, and has his or her jurisdiction limited by the county. The foregoing cases therefore do not support the majority’s position with respect to the district attorney’s position under California law.
The majority recognize that a district attorney might be liable as a county officer for “action or inaction related to hiring or firing an employee, *371workplace safety conditions, procuring office equipment, or some other administrative function . . . unrelated to the prosecution of state criminal law violations.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 363.) But the majority state that since “in California a district attorney represents the state when preparing to prosecute and when prosecuting criminal violations of state law,” so “it logically follows that [the district attorney] also represents the state, and not the county, when training and developing policy . . . .” (Id. at p. 362.)
I disagree. The distinction that confuses the majority flows from the dual nature of the district attorney as both a local officer and a representative of the state in individual cases. In fact, section 1983 is directed at “persons,” including local government entities, that act “under color of . . . State” law. A county performs numerous functions delegated to it by the state. (See, e.g., County of San Diego v. State of California (1997) 15 Cal.4th 68 [61 Cal.Rptr.2d 134, 931 P.2d 312].) In these cases, as in many others, the county is both an extension of the state and a local policymaker implementing the state’s statutes and regulations. Given the fact that section 1983 excludes the state from liability, it seems inevitable that we must parse with some precision the functions of a local government entity that serves both as an agent of the state and a local policymaker in order to determine when the entity is acting in the latter capacity.
Accordingly, there is no insurmountable analytical difficulty to concluding that a county cannot be held liable under section 1983 when the district attorney or one of his or her deputies, as an agent of the state, commits prosecutorial misconduct, but can be held liable when the district attorney’s hiring, training and supervision program, which the district attorney undertakes as a local policymaker, results in injury to a person’s civil rights. This distinction is congruent with section 1983 jurisprudence, wherein it is held that in order for a government entity to be found liable for the actions of its employees, some sort of custom or policy is required, and a single instance of misjudgment or malfeasance on an employee’s part is insufficient. (Bd. of County Com’rs of Bryan County, Okl. v. Brown (1997) 520 U.S. 397,_-_ [117 S.Ct. 1382, 1389-1390, 137 L.Ed.2d 626].) Thus, at least three courts from out-of-state jurisdictions have come to the conclusion that when district attorneys engage in training, supervision or other managerial matters over which they have local control, they act as county officers, not as a representatives of the state. (Walker v. City of New York (2d Cir. 1992) 974 F.2d 293, 301; Gobel v. Maricopa County (9th Cir. 1989) 867 F.2d 1201, 1209; Crane v. State of Tex. (5th Cir. 1985) 759 F.2d 412, 429.)
In sum, California recognizes the district attorney constitutionally and by statute as a county official who possesses considerable local autonomy. *372There is no historical parallel in California to the constitutional developments that occurred in Alabama with respect to sheriffs and that the McMillian court found so significant. Also unlike the sheriff in Alabama, the district attorney in California has his or her compensation set by the county and with rare exceptions has his or her jurisdiction limited to the county. He or she is elected and may be recalled by the county electorate. I therefore conclude on balance that when the district attorney engages in activities in which he or she acts to set local policy, such as training staff, he or she should be considered a county officer for purposes of section 1983 liability. In the present case, in which plaintiffs claim that the injuries they suffered from being falsely accused and prosecuted for sexual abuse crimes were due, in part, to the inadequate training of the district attorney’s investigators, I would allow them to proceed with their claims against the county.
I emphasize the heavy burden that plaintiffs bear in proving that their injuries resulted from a policy within the district attorney’s office; as opposed to the misfeasance, malfeasance, or negligence of individual members of that office: They must establish a pattern of action that amounts to a custom or policy of deliberate indifference to their civil rights. (See Canton v. Harris (1989) 489 U.S. 378 [109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412]; Bd. of County Com’rs of Bryan County, Okl. v. Brown, supra, 520 U.S. 397.) But if such a custom or policy did exist and caused plaintiffs’ injuries, they should be entitled to some relief under section 1983.
Kennard, J., concurred.