Court Opinion

ID: 9697373
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:15:04.890908+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:32.135178
License: Public Domain

McEWEN, Judge,
dissenting:
The majority opinion provides a most perceptive expression of view, but I am obliged, nonetheless, to dissent, for I am of the mind that the claim of the parents for intentional infliction of emotional distress cannot properly be dismissed without affording the parents an opportunity to amend their complaint. See: Pittsburgh Coal and Coke Inc. v. Cuteri, 404 Pa.Super. 298, 590 A.2d 790 (1991). Moreover, I am convinced that this is THE case to which the caveat to Comment L of Section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts is addressed, thus obviating, in view of the outrageous and despicable conduct of defendant Caparelli, the requirement of presence.1
*417The vile depravity which the complaint asserts defendant Caparelli practiced upon young Mark has, to be sure, subjected young Mark to a lifetime of tortured existence, and — it is alleged in the amended complaint soon to be filed in the trial court — has hurled young Mark into the devil’s abyss of AIDS.2 When defendant Caparelli imposed his perversion upon the child, and thereby summoned the angel of living death, no one will doubt that he scorched the mind and seared the soul of each of the parents. As the majority opines, “the facts of this case fall squarely within [Restatement] 646(2)” and its requirement of extreme and outrageous conduct.3
The issue is, however, whether the parents meet all of the prerequisites to a recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress. These prerequisites, as quite aptly delineated by the majority, are:
That defendant Caparelli has engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct,
That the extreme and outrageous conduct has caused the parents severe emotional distress which resulted in bodily harm, and
That the parents have been present at the time of the commission of the extreme and outrageous conduct.
The majority has determined that the parents have met two of the three prerequisites, namely, the conduct of defendant Caparelli toward their son was extreme and outrageous, and the emotional distress they have suffered includes bodily harm. The majority concludes, however, that the parents *418have not stated a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress due to the absence of an allegation that the outrageous acts were committed in their presence. It is my disagreement with this determination that causes my departure from the company of the majority and the conclusion that the preliminary objections in the form of a demurrer should have been denied and the parents enabled to proceed with their cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
I so conclude since the loathsome degeneracy which defendant Caparelli practiced upon the body of young Mark was but the culmination of his depravity since he commenced the pursuit of young Mark long before the culmination, specifically, when by word and deed over a period of time he deceived the parents into believing that he was a man of Holy Orders, a trustworthy confidant, and a kindly confessor. When young Mark, too terrified to tell of his fear of the pervert, expressed a reluctance to accompany defendant Caparelli, the parents— their faith defiled, their trust betrayed, because they too had been seduced and victimized — admonished him into continuing with the companionship of Father Caparelli. As a result, I am of the mind that the parents were more than present since defendant had made of the parents not simply witness but had impelled them into the role of accomplice.4
The assertion will be made that it should not be presumed that, once defendant Caparelli met the parents, his interaction with them was solely to entice young Mark, for certainly some time elapsed between his first contact with them and the physical onset of his perversion with young Mark. Even if the validity of this contention is accepted, arguendo, once the loathsome perversion began, encounters and interaction with the parents had a sole, single despised purpose — the preserva*419tion of the trust of the parents so as to enable him to consume the body of the son he coveted. Surely, the parents thereby were more than witnesses. Certainly the man of God, who became the disciple of the devil, made the parents his accessories for, when the parents forced Mark to associate with defendant Caparelli, they aided him in his repugnant errands, they abetted him in his repulsive mission, they served to defile their son and to infect and destroy his body. No punishment can be sufficiently barbarous for defendant Caparelli, nor can the wealth of ancient kings be sufficient recompense for the child and each parent.5 The law is clearly inadequate to the task of either retribution or recompense, but the law must not be so inept as to deny that the hell defendant Caparelli has brought to earth for these parents affords to them a cause of action.

. The Comment recites:
Conduct directed at a third person. Where the extreme and outrageous conduct is directed at a third person, as where, for example, a husband is murdered in the presence of his wife, the actor may know that it is substantially certain, or at least highly probable, that it will cause severe emotional distress to the plaintiff. In such cases the rule of this Section applies. The cases thus far decided, however, have limited such liability to plaintiffs who were present at the time, as distinguished from those who discover later what has occurred. The limitation may be justified by the practical necessity of drawing the line somewhere, since the number of persons who may suffer emotional distress at the news of an assassination of the President is virtually unlimited, and the distress of a woman who is informed of her husband's murder ten years afterward may lack the guarantee of genuineness which her presence on the spot would afford. The Caveat is intended, however, to leave open the possibility of situations in which presence at the time may not be required, (emphasis supplied).

. Since discovery has not commenced, there is no evidence to enable argument that officials of the defendant Archdiocese were aware of and concealed earlier such conduct by defendant Caparelli thereby enabling him to maintain pursuit of the perversion by which he consumed young Mark as prey.

. Even an abandoned sinner is unable to urge mitigation of the sentence pronounced by the New Testament:
It were better for him that a millstone were hanged about his neck, and he be cast into the sea, than that he should offend one of these little ones.
Luke XVIL2.

. It might even be argued that a clergyman who, for so vile and despicable a purpose, enters upon a course of deceit of members of his flock — in this instance, the parents — engages in conduct so extreme and outrageous that the deceit of the parents itself affords basis for an action by the parents for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

. Since social commentary may distract from proposal of jurisprudential revision, particularly when submitted from the intermediate rank and especially when in dissent, expression of personal conviction must be but terse. So mindful, we observe that while the crimes of defendant Caparelli have thrust the victim's family into an existence of torture which cries for vengeance, defendant Caparelli has, as well, impugned the legions of women and men who presently labor selflessly to serve mankind, as did, through the centuries, their dedicated, even saintly, predecessors. Defendant Caparelli has, moreover, provided the bigots through the land with cause for celebration, as well as abundant feast to the creedless members of the media who condemn the institutions and traditions and beliefs of the people of the land.