Court Opinion

ID: 9546689
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:34:16.313435+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:16:46.854494
License: Public Domain

McQUADE, Chief Justice
(concurring and dissenting).
I agree with the majority’s resolution of the speculative damage and proper party issues. There is also considerable merit in the discussion of exemplary damages insofar as the majority extends and applies to this set of facts that analytical framework established in Cox v. Stolworthy, supra. However, I was compelled to dissent in that case from the majority’s treatment of attorney’s fees and related “out of pocket” expenses as elements of exemplary damages, when they are truly compensatory. The same problem is manifest in this case,1 and doubtlessly will reappear often in future litigation. Unlike the player-queen in Shakespeare’s “Hamlet”, I do not wish to protest too much. But I would remind my colleagues on this occasion that the Court today is sealing its commitment to a policy of broadening the scope of recoverable *712costs without the requisite legislative authority.
In Cox v. Stolworthy, supra, I noted that the United States Supreme Court has twice held that attorney’s fees should not be awarded as exemplary damages.2 These decisions recognize that such awards, in reality, compensate the successful plaintiff through reimbursement of costs. They apply the general rule, that such costs are not recoverable unless agreed by the parties or expressly authorized by statute.3 The distinction commonly employed to evade this rule, that inclusion of costs in exemplary damages punishes the defendant but does not compensate the plaintiff,4 is transparent and unconvincing.
Compensation of the successful litigant by award of costs has been a creature of statute since the practice was commenced in England by the Statute of Gloucester in the year 1275.5 The Idaho legislature has frequently addressed the issue, by authorizing the allowance of attorney’s fees in a variety of situations.6 However, it has declined to authorize the type of award made by the majority in the present case or in Cox v. Stolworthy, supra. Since there was no agreement by the parties on this question, I am forced again to conclude that the majority has usurped a firmly established legislative function by awarding attorney’s fees and related costs. The result might be favored as a matter of public policy,7 but that does not justify this Court’s invasion of the legislative domain.

. It is instructive to note that in this case the majority makes explicit a point camouflaged in Cox v. Stolworthy, supra, that attorney’s fees and related expenses are elements of what the majority terms “exemplary damages,” and are not merely measures of the maximum permissible awards.

. Oelrichs v. Spain, 15 Wall. (82 U.S.) 211, 21 L.Ed. 43 (1872); Day v. Woodworth, 13 How. (54 U.S.) 363, 14 L.Ed. 181 (1851).

. See, e. g., the cases collected in Annotation, 30 A.L.R.3d 1443.

. E. g., Brewer v. Home-Stake Production Company, 200 Kan. 96, 434 P.2d 828, 30 A.L.R.3d 1435 (1967).

. 6 Edw. I, c. 1 (1275); see generally, Goodhart, Costs, 38 Yale L.J. 849 (1929).

. I.C. § 28-35-202 (Uniform Commercial Credit Code, authorizing recovery by debtor in several types of actions against creditor who acted wrongfully); I.C. § 12-120 (authorizing award in all civil actions for injury to person or property where damages pleaded do not exceed $1500); I.C. § 54-1929 (laborer’s and materialmen’s liens against public works projects); I.C. § 30-1446 (violations of Securities Act); I.C. § 45-513 (mechanic’s lien); I.C. § 62-409 (railroad killing stock); I.C. § 45-605 (wages); I.C. § 11-402 (redemption of property from execution sale); I.C. §§ 72-611, 702 (workmen’s compensation) .

.See, e. g., McCormick on Damages, 255-259 (1935).