Court Opinion

ID: 9881930
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-04 18:00:37.297575+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:26.833571
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-30360         Document: 00516919828               Page: 1      Date Filed: 10/04/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                                     United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                              Fifth Circuit

                                      ____________                                          FILED
                                                                                      October 4, 2023
                                       No. 22-30360                                    Lyle W. Cayce
                                      ____________                                          Clerk

   Sonder USA, Incorporated,

                                                                         Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                              versus

   635 N. Scott Street, L.L.C.,

                                               Defendant—Appellant.
                      ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Eastern District of Louisiana
                              USDC No. 2:18-CV-13891
                     ______________________________

   Before Clement, Haynes, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
   Edith Brown Clement, Circuit Judge: *
         This is an appeal concerning a jury verdict rendered against
   Defendant-Appellant 635 N. Scott Street, L.L.C. (“635”). 635 makes two
   core arguments on appeal: (A) the district court erred in denying 635’s
   motion for judgment as a matter of law; and (B) the district court erred in
   denying 635’s motion for a new trial. For the reasons explained below, we
   reject these arguments and AFFIRM.

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-30360         Document: 00516919828             Page: 2   Date Filed: 10/04/2023

                                          No. 22-30360

                                                I.
                                               A.
          Sonder USA Incorporated (“Sonder”) is a hospitality company that
   operates residential-style hotels. To that end, in 2017, Sonder entered into
   lease agreements with 635 N. Scott Street, L.L.C. in New Orleans, Louisiana,
   with the intent to lease the apartment complex and operate it as a residential
   hotel. Each of Sonder’s lease agreements with 635 requires 635 to “promptly
   provide” repair and maintenance to keep the apartments in “good working
   order, suitable for residential use.” Prior to taking possession, Sonder
   conducted its own inspections of the apartments, including the filters on the
   air-conditioning units. Sonder located visible mold in at least one unit, which
   Sonder ostensibly remediated prior to taking possession of the apartment.
   Eventually, Sonder took possession of twenty-five of the twenty-six units
   located at 635 North Scott Street. 1
          Soon after taking possession of the units at 635, Sonder began to
   observe water leakages in units throughout the building. In March 2018,
   Sonder started documenting and reporting to 635 the water leakages. These
   leaks continued through at least August 2018. In some units, water leaked
   from the air-conditioning units into the walls and flooring. In another
   apartment, water seeped through the ceiling, causing “substantial []
   damage.”
          By July 2018, Sonder reported the appearance of mold in multiple
   apartments. In September 2018, an air-conditioning serviceman apprised
   Sonder that mold had spread inside the air-conditioning units in three

          _____________________
          1
              Sonder never took possession of unit 18.

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   separate apartments. Shortly thereafter, Sonder reported to 635 the
   emergence of mold in several additional apartments.
          In response to Sonder’s many reports of mold, 635 would either deny
   the existence of mold, deny responsibility for the mold, or inspect and
   supposedly remediate the issue. 635 often dismissed complaints of mold as
   mere “discoloration.” And, in response to the first reports from Sonder that
   air-conditioner units had developed mold, the owner of 635 referred to the
   damage as “[s]elf inflicted” and noted the absence of mold tests. Upon
   hearing that the air-conditioning serviceman had discovered mold in the air-
   conditioning units of three separate apartments, the owner of 635 responded:
   “send me tests showing mold.”
          Sonder obliged, engaging Dan Paradela of All American Home
   Inspections to collect and test samples based on inspections of certain 635
   units on October 15 and 16, 2018. Sonder shared with 635 the Paradela report,
   which found visible mold in most units, elevated levels of mold in certain
   units, the probability of hidden mold in improperly installed air conditioners,
   and extensive water damage in most apartments and recommended further
   testing. 635 rejected Paradela’s report, denying responsibility and refusing to
   remediate. Instead, 635 threatened litigation and engaged its own mold
   examiner, Dan Driskill, to inspect the property and conduct testing, which
   Driskill completed on November 8 through 13, 2018.
          But before Driskill could conduct his own mold testing, and after 635
   refused to accept the Paradela report, Sonder terminated all twenty-five
   leases with 635 on November 7, 2018, because of its policy against renting out
   units that contain potential health hazards.
                                         B.
          In December 2018, Sonder filed suit against 635 in Louisiana’s
   Orleans Parish Civil District Court, seeking declaratory judgment that the

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   twenty-five leases between Sonder and 635 were terminated. On December
   17, 2018, 635 removed the action to the United States District Court for the
   Eastern District of Louisiana. On January 17, 2019, 635 answered and filed a
   counterclaim for breach of contract and violation of the Louisiana Unfair
   Trade Practices Act (“LUTPA”). Sonder filed an amended and restated
   complaint, asserting three causes of action: (1) declaratory judgment that the
   leases were dissolved because their use as short-term rentals was
   “substantially impaired” due to 635’s failure to maintain, repair, and
   remediate the issues; (2) breach of warranty that the units were in good
   condition at the time of entry into the leases; (3) breach of contract relating
   to 635’s failure to maintain the roof and HVAC systems and to remediate the
   mold issues. Sonder also sought as damages the resulting lost profits. On
   September 30, 2019, 635 amended its pleadings to add a request for damages
   for breach of contract and violation of LUTPA.
            After the district court denied cross-motions for summary judgment,
   the case went before a jury in March 2022. At trial, Sonder introduced
   evidence to show the existence of mold in the units, including the Paradela
   testimony concerning his inspection and report and the expert testimony of
   William Feaheny, whom Sonder engaged in July 2019 to conduct his own
   mold inspection and to review Paradela’s findings. Among this evidence were
   email reports and photograph attachments that an air-conditioning
   serviceman, Basil Lohaza, sent to Sonder, which stated that certain air-
   conditioning units at 635 contained mold. Although Sonder subpoenaed
   Lohaza to testify, Lohaza notified the company that he would not honor the
   subpoena because he intended to travel to Ukraine to volunteer in the
   Ukraine-Russia conflict. The district court admitted the emails and
   photographs as business records. 635 never objected to their authenticity at
   trial.

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                                    No. 22-30360

          At the close of Sonder’s case in chief, 635 moved orally for judgment
   as a matter of law. In support of its Rule 50(a) motion, Sonder made three
   arguments: (1) Sonder failed to present expert evidence on the presence of
   mold, which is required to show that lease cancelation was warranted; (2)
   Sonder failed to show that 635 breached its warranty because Sonder
   presented no admissible evidence of prior defects at the property; and (3) 635
   did not breach its lease agreements because it delivered the units in good
   condition. The district court denied the Rule 50(a) motion. After the defense
   rested, 635 renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of law on 635’s
   breach-of-contract claims, which motion the district court again denied. All
   told, the trial lasted four days, during which nine witnesses testified and
   eighty-seven exhibits came into evidence.
          At the close of trial, the district court administered the jury
   instructions, which included thirty-eight charges, and issued the verdict
   form. After approximately six hours of deliberation, the jury returned a
   verdict in Sonder’s favor as to each of Sonder’s claims but left the remainder
   of the verdict form, containing 635’s counterclaims, blank at the verdict
   form’s instruction. The district judge advised the jury that the verdict form’s
   admonition to stop completing the form after the Sonder-claims section was
   mistaken and instructed the jury to complete the remainder of the form.
   Approximately five minutes later, the jury returned a verdict against 635 for
   each of its counterclaims. The jury concluded that Sonder was entitled to
   terminate all twenty-five leases and awarded Sonder $222,489.00 in
   damages. 635 once again orally renewed its Rule 50(a) motion, which the
   court denied.
          On April 7, 2022, 635 filed a Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a
   matter of law on all claims and on 635’s counterclaim for wrongful
   abandonment. 635’s Rule 50(b) motion, unlike any of its three previous Rule
   50(a) motions, specifically argued that Sonder’s failure to present expert

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                                      No. 22-30360

   evidence as to causation of mold is fatal to Sonder’s claims and entitles 635 to
   judgment as a matter of law on all the claims and counterclaims asserted. In
   its opposition to 635’s Rule 50(b) motion, Sonder did not argue that 635 had
   waived or forfeited this new argument by raising it for the first time in a Rule
   50(b) motion. Also in its April 7 filing, 635 made a Rule 59 motion for a new
   trial, citing a lack of evidence supporting the verdict as well as prejudicial jury
   instructions and evidentiary rulings. The court denied both motions. 635
   appealed.
                                           II.
          We review the district court’s denial of a motion for judgment as a
   matter of law de novo, applying the same standard as the district court. Cowart
   v. Erwin, 837 F.3d 444, 450 (5th Cir. 2016). A party is entitled to judgment as
   a matter of law only where no reasonable jury would have had a legally
   sufficient evidentiary basis to find otherwise. Apache Deepwater, L.L.C. v.
   W&T Offshore, Inc., 930 F.3d 647, 653 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing Fed. R. Civ.
   P. 50(a)). But, although our review is de novo, we recognize that “our
   standard of review with respect to a jury verdict is especially
   deferential.” Wantou v. Wal-Mart Stores Texas, L.L.C., 23 F.4th 422, 431
   (5th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation omitted). Thus, “a Rule 50 motion must
   be denied unless the facts and inferences point so strongly and
   overwhelmingly in the movant’s favor that reasonable jurors could not reach
   a contrary conclusion.” Id.
          “We review the denial of a motion for a new trial for abuse of
   discretion.” Williams v. Manitowoc Cranes, L.L.C., 898 F.3d 607, 614 (5th
   Cir. 2018) (internal quotation omitted). “[R]eview of the denial of a new trial
   motion is more limited than when one is granted.” Whitehead v. Food Max of
   Miss., Inc., 163 F.3d 265, 269 (5th Cir. 1998). In reviewing such a denial, “all
   the factors that govern our review of the trial court’s decision favor

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                                          No. 22-30360

   affirmance.” Alaniz v. Zamora–Quezada, 591 F.3d 761, 770 (5th Cir. 2009)
   (alterations adopted).
                                               III.
                                                A.
           635 first argues that the district court erred in denying 635’s motion
   for judgment as a matter of law because Sonder failed to carry its evidentiary
   burden with respect to its claims. 635 also argues that it is entitled to
   judgment as a matter of law with respect to its counterclaim of wrongful
   abandonment. We disagree on both counts, as explained below.
                                                1.
           635 first argues that Sonder’s claims fail as a matter of law because
   Sonder failed to present any expert evidence on the cause of mold. Causation,
   635 argues, can be proven only through expert evidence and is necessary to
   establish fault—an essential element under the relevant Louisiana statute for
   either remedy that Sonder seeks, dissolution or damages. 2 But because 635
   has not presented, and we have not located, binding or persuasive authority
   for the proposition that expert evidence is necessary to establish mold
   causation, and because Sonder presented unopposed lay evidence going to
   causation, 635’s argument fails.

           _____________________
           2
               Specifically, under Louisiana Civil Code Article 2715, which the parties agree
   governs whether Sonder was entitled to cancel the leases, a party (i) may dissolve a lease if
   its use of the property is “substantially impaired” “without the fault of the lessee” and (ii)
   may demand damages if the lessor was at fault. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2715. Sonder does
   not appear to dispute that it failed to present any expert evidence going to the issue of mold
   causation. And, as for the sole expert that Sonder called at trial—Feaheny—the district
   court ordered that Feaheny could not testify at trial on causation because Feaheny failed to
   include such opinion in his expert report. But, as we discuss herein, Sonder did present lay
   evidence going to mold causation.

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           When a nonmovant fails in district court to object to a new issue being
   raised in a Rule 50(b) motion, the new issue receives de novo appellate review.
   Montano v. Orange Cnty., Tex., 842 F.3d 865, 877 (5th Cir. 2016) (collecting
   cases). Here, none of 635’s three oral motions for judgment as a matter of law
   argued that the law requires expert evidence of mold causation or that Sonder
   had failed to offer it; instead, 635 argued merely that Sonder had failed to
   present expert evidence of the existence of mold. 3 635 did raise the issue of
   expert evidence and causation in its April 7, 2022, motion for judgment as a
   matter of law under Rule 50(b), however. And now, 635 argues that, without
   expert evidence on mold causation, Sonder cannot obtain lease cancelation
   or damages under Article 2715, thus entitling 635 to judgment as a matter of
   law on Sonder’s breach-of-contract claims and 635’s wrongful-abandonment
   counterclaim. Sonder did not argue in its opposition to the Rule 50(b) motion
   that 635 had waived or forfeited the causation issue by failing to raise it in the
   Rule 50(a) motion.
           But 635 has not presented, and we have not located, any binding or
   even persuasive authority for the proposition that expert evidence is
   necessary to prove mold causation. We have not located a Fifth Circuit or
   Louisiana decision holding this, and the cases that 635 cites are either
   completely inapposite (Shed, Allen, Hooks, and Hill involve expert evidence
   being necessary to show that a mold caused illness, not the source of mold)

           _____________________
           3
            At trial, Sonder did offer expert evidence of the presence of mold through Feaheny.
   635 has not argued on appeal that the trial court erred in admitting such testimony—either
   by deciding a Daubert motion in Sonder’s favor or otherwise. And 635 did not object to
   Feaheny’s testimony that he agreed with Paradela’s conclusions set forth in the October
   2018 report. Thus, the issue of whether Feaheny’s report and testimony established the
   presence of mold at the time Sonder terminated the leases properly went before the jury.
   In any event, 635 has not presented binding or persuasive case law showing that expert
   evidence is necessary to prove the presence of mold, and, as explained herein, Sonder offered
   lay evidence on the presence of mold through Paradela.

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   or are unpublished, lower-court opinions that do not apply Louisiana law
   (Qualls, Kemmerer, and Cagle). 4 Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate
   only when “there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable
   jury to find for that party on that issue,” FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)(1), and, here,
   Sonder offered at trial lay evidence from Paradela going to mold causation, to
   which 635 did not object. Accordingly, 635 has not established that the jury
   lacked a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for Sonder on the question
   of mold causation.
                                               2.
           The remainder of 635’s arguments as to its Rule 50 motion attempts
   to rebut or undermine evidence that Sonder presented at trial. That approach
   is unavailing, however, in light of the evidence adduced at trial and the highly
   deferential standard of review.
           The parties agree that each of Sonder’s claims, as well as 635’s
   wrongful-abandonment counterclaim, turns on whether Sonder’s use of the
   units was “substantially impaired” such that Sonder was entitled to cancel
   the leases.
           At trial, Sonder introduced evidence concerning (1) the water leakages
   and mold that Sonder observed throughout 2018 in every unit that 635 leased
   Sonder—identified and documented by a combination of Sonder and third-
   party inspectors—(2) Sonder’s reporting these issues to 635, and (3) 635’s

           _____________________
           4
             See Shed v. Johnny Coleman Builders, Inc., 761 F. App’x 404 (5th Cir. 2019); Allen
   v. Pa. Eng’g Corp., 102 F.3d 194 (5th Cir. 1996); Hooks v. Nationwide Hous. Sys. LLC, No.
   15-729, 2016 WL 3667134 (E.D. La. July 11, 2016); Hill v. GEO Grp., Inc., No. 1:18-cv-
   01363, 2021 WL 6053783 (W.D. La. Dec. 21, 2021); Qualls v. State Farm Lloyds, 226 F.R.D.
   551 (N.D. Tex. 2005); Kemmerer v. State Farm Ins. Co., No. 01-5445, 2004 WL 87017 (E.D.
   Pa. Jan. 19, 2004); Cagle v. Allstate Tex. Lloyds, No. 4:04-cv-02953, 2005 WL 2076145 (S.D.
   Tex. Aug. 25, 2005).

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                                         No. 22-30360

   failure to remediate the same. 5 In addition to offering documentary evidence
   of the water leakages and mold, Sonder called as a witness Paradela, who
   performed the 2018 inspection and testing. Paradela testified about, inter alia,
   his firsthand observations of visible mold, the presence of toxic black mold,
   as well as elevated moisture levels and structural defects in multiple units.
   Sonder also presented expert evidence from Feaheny, which purported to
   substantiate the Paradela report. The jury weighed this evidence and more,
   deliberated for nearly six hours, and returned a verdict in Sonder’s favor with
   respect to all claims and counterclaims. 6
           In view of the evidence presented at trial and the highly deferential
   standard of review, we cannot conclude that no reasonable jury would have
   reached this verdict. And because we conclude that a reasonable jury could
   have found Sonder was entitled to cancel the leases, 635’s attempt to
   resurrect its wrongful-abandonment counterclaim—which likewise turns on
   whether Sonder was empowered to dissolve the leases—also fails.

           _____________________
           5
             635 argues on several occasions that the jury mistakenly viewed the 635-Sonder
   lease agreements as a singular contract governing the whole building and that this mistaken
   view infects the verdict. But the jury itself acknowledged in its verdict-form answers that,
   in resolving the case, it was charged with individually reviewing each unit leased. 635 does
   not dispute, moreover, that Sonder introduced at trial evidence going to the condition of
   every unit leased; rather, 635 argues that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to
   meet Sonder’s evidentiary burden as to Sonder’s claims.
           6
             The Jury Verdict Form consists of two main sections—“Plaintiff Sonder USA,
   Inc.’s Breach of Contract Claim” and “Defendant 635 N. Scott St., LLC’s Counterclaim.”
   Question three of the first section states as follows: “[D]id Defendant 635 N. Scott St.,
   LLC breach its obligations under ANY of the individual leases justifying Plaintiff Sonder
   USA, Inc.’s termination of those leases?” Because breach of warranty is a breach-of-
   contract claim, section one of the verdict form appears to encompass each of Sonder’s
   claims for breach of the lease agreements, notwithstanding the singular “Claim” in the title
   of section one.

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                                          B.
          635 next argues that, in the alternative, it is entitled to a new trial
   because (1) the district court erroneously admitted certain emails and
   photograph attachments that 635 claims are inadmissible hearsay or were not
   properly authenticated and (2) the jury charge and verdict form contained
   prejudicial defects. We conclude that 635 is not entitled to a new trial.
                                           1.
          A trial judge’s ruling on evidentiary matters will not be grounds for a
   new trial unless a substantial right of a party is adversely affected. Echeverry
   v. Jazz Casino Co., L.L.C., 988 F.3d 221, 235 (5th Cir. 2021). A party’s
   substantial rights are affected if, for example, erroneously admitted evidence
   is the only evidence admitted to prove an element. Anderson v. Siemens Corp.,
   335 F.3d 466, 473–75 (5th Cir. 2021). “When a party fails to show that
   excluding the evidence would have altered the outcome of the case, the party
   has not met its burden for a new trial.” Echeverry, 988 F.3d at 235.
          The evidence about which 635 complains are two emails with
   photograph attachments sent by Basil Lohaza, the air-conditioning repairman
   that first identified the water leakages and mold, to Sonder. 635 complains
   that the emails constituted inadmissible hearsay and that the photographs
   contained therein were never authenticated. We need not reach either issue,
   however, because the complained-of emails and photographs would not have
   altered the outcome of the case.
          Here, the two emails offer no information that was not already
   provided by other evidence adduced at trial. Specifically, numerous other
   pieces of evidence, which 635 does not dispute were properly admitted, go to
   the same issue—the existence of water leakages and mold related to air-
   conditioning units throughout the building during the relevant time period.
   635 does not argue that Lohaza’s evidence uniquely addressed any issues

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   otherwise absent from the record developed at trial. Therefore, in light of the
   ample evidenced adduced at trial, we are persuaded that, even absent the
   admission of these two emails and photograph attachments, substantial
   evidence supported the jury’s verdict.
                                                2.
           We apply a two-part test to review challenges to jury instructions.
   Navigant Consulting, 508 F.3d at 293. First, an appellant must “demonstrate
   that the charge as a whole creates substantial and ineradicable doubt whether
   the jury has been properly guided in its deliberations.” Id. (internal quotation
   omitted). Second, even where a jury instruction was erroneous, we will not
   reverse the district court if we find that, in light of the entire record, “the
   challenged instruction could not have affected the outcome of the case.” Id.
   (internal quotation omitted).
           635 argues, in essence: (i) jury charge number 31 failed to include that
   the lessee must be free from fault to obtain lease dissolution; (ii) jury charge
   number 23 reflects Louisiana Civil Code Article 1993 instead of Article 2715,
   which controls; and (iii) the language of charge number 23, coupled with the
   verdict form’s admonition to stop completing the form if the jury found for
   Sonder on its claims, resulted in the jury’s failure to properly consider 635’s
   counterclaim.
           As an initial matter, 635 forfeited its objection to charge number 23 by
   failing to raise it at the charge conference. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(d); see
   also Jimenez v. Wood Cnty., 660 F.3d 841, 845 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc). 7 At

           _____________________
           7
              We have also held that a party’s failure to adequately object to a jury instruction
   means that the party has waived that objection on appeal. Eastman Chem. Co. v. Plastipure,
   Inc., 775 F.3d 230, 240 (5th Cir. 2014); Thompson v. Gaar, 59 F.3d 1240 (5th Cir. 1995). But
   regardless of whether 635 waived or forfeited its objection to charge number 23, 635’s
   challenge to this jury instruction fails: if the former applies, we need not even review the

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   the charge conference, 635’s counsel stated that it agreed with the inclusion
   of charge number 23. As the district court recognized, 635 “acknowledge[d]
   that it did not object to jury charge Number 23 during the charge
   conference.” Under the plain text of Rule 51, 635 cannot “assign as error the
   giving or the failure to give an instruction” without “object[ing] thereto
   before the jury retires to consider its verdict . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 51. In
   cases of failure to preserve an objection to a jury instruction, the instruction
   is subject to plain-error review. See Baisden v. I’m Ready Prods., Inc., 693 F.3d
   491, 506 (5th Cir. 2012). In that context, plain error exists only when the
   charge as a whole is “so erroneous as to cause a grave miscarriage of justice
   or seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
   proceedings.” United States v. Crawford, 52 F.3d 1303, 1310 (5th Cir. 1995).
          On plain-error review, 635’s argument as to the jury instructions fails
   because the jury charge and verdict form, when read together, set forth the
   exact legal principles on which 635 wanted the jury instructed. As to point
   (i), 635 complains that it was “plain and obvious error” for the jury
   instructions to omit the requirement that “Sonder be free from fault to obtain
   dissolution.” But the instructions did advise the jury in charge number 23
   that, for Sonder to obtain dissolution of the leases, Sonder must be faultless,
   stating “a party cannot assert a claim for breach of contract unless that party
   has performed its own obligations under the contract.”
          635’s point (ii) fails for similar reasons: regardless of the particular
   provision of the Louisiana code from which the instructions draw their
   language, the parties agreed on the substantive rule that needed to be
   included—and in fact was included—in the jury charge, namely that, for

          _____________________
   objection on appeal; if the latter applies, 635 fails on plain-error review for reasons
   explained herein.

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   Sonder to obtain dissolution for the lessor’s breach, the lessee must be free
   of fault.
           Relatedly, 635 argues that “all of the questions about Sonder’s claim
   on the Verdict Form were tethered to a breach of the lease, not to dissolution
   separate and apart from a breach of lease,” that there “was not one question
   asking the jury whether Sonder was entitled to ‘dissolution’ of the leases or
   even asking whether the units were ‘substantially impaired,” and that
   “[n]either ‘dissolution’ nor ‘substantially impaired’ appear in the Verdict
   Form.” But the precise language that 635 complains was omitted from the
   verdict form appears in the jury charge, specifically charge number 31, which
   states that, “[u]nder Louisiana law, a tenant may obtain dissolution of a lease
   when its use of the leased property is substantially impaired and may obtain
   damages if the landlord was at fault.” “Verdict forms are considered part of
   the jury instruction, and we evaluate the combined effect on the jury.” United
   States v. Fairley, 880 F.3d 198, 208 (5th Cir. 2018); see also Jones v. United
   States, 527 U.S. 373, 393 (1999) (“[A]lthough the verdict forms standing
   alone could have [confused the jury], any confusion created by the verdict
   forms was clarified when considered in light of the entire jury instruction.”)
   (internal quotation omitted).
           Here, because the legal principle that 635 complains was omitted from
   the verdict form was in fact contained in the form, and because charge
   number 31 instructs the jury on this same point, 635 has failed to show plain
   error in how the jury was instructed. In any event, 635 had the opportunity to
   object to the verdict form and failed to do so.
           Finally, as for 635’s point (iii), 635 itself implicitly concedes that the
   district judge cured the erroneous verdict-form language at trial by correcting
   the complained-of instruction and specifically re-instructing the jury to
   resolve 635’s counterclaim. As established above, the parties agree that

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   whether Sonder was entitled to cancel the leases determines both Sonder’s
   claims       and   635’s    wrongful-abandonment           counterclaim.       The      jury
   instructions, read alongside the verdict form, reflect that the jury was
   instructed to consider and resolve this issue, that the jury weighed the
   evidence going to this issue, and that the jury, after six hours of deliberation,
   rendered a verdict in Sonder’s favor as to all claims and counterclaims. 8
                                               IV.
            For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.

            _____________________
            8
             635 also argues that prejudice resulted from the fact the jury deliberated for only
   five minutes after the trial judge instructed them to return to the deliberation room to
   resolve the counterclaims. But that fact is immaterial here. The jury deliberated for six
   hours prior to the judge’s instruction to resolve 635’s counterclaims, during which time the
   jury—per their instructions—undoubtedly discussed 635’s conduct as compared to
   Sonder’s with respect to fault and substantial impairment.

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