Court Opinion

ID: 9569272
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:12:15.069116+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:51:50.176043
License: Public Domain

Carley, Justice,
dissenting.
In my opinion, the Court of Appeals correctly reversed the trial court’s grant of appellant’s motion to suppress. I must, therefore, respectfully dissent to the majority’s reversal of the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
The only witnesses who testified at the motion to suppress hearing were Officer Shields who made the initial stop of appellant’s vehicle and another officer who subsequently arrived on the scene in response to Officer Shields’ radioed request for assistance. Accordingly, it is undisputed that appellant was committing at least two traffic offenses in the presence of Officer Shields. Appellant was weaving and he had no tag light on his vehicle. It is also undisputed that, based upon appellant’s erratic driving, he was possibly committing the offense of driving under the influence. Under these undisputed circumstances, it would have been a dereliction of Officer Shields’ duty to have failed to stop appellant to conduct a brief investigation and the Court of Appeals correctly so held: “ ‘[T]he patrol officers of Georgia are charged with enforcing Georgia’s traffic laws, and this court can presume no less than that a patrol officer would obey this mandate.’ ” State v. Tate, 208 Ga. App. 117, 121 (430 SE2d 9) (1993).
Despite the undisputed testimony that appellant was committing at least two and possibly three traffic offenses in the presence of Officer Shields, the trial court nevertheless granted the motion to suppress based upon
substantial evidence that both officers have been trained in identifying the characteristics of a drug courier and that a conscious decision to focus on a relatively short strip of 1-75 in Cherokee County had been made by the officers’ superiors:
This “substantial evidence” was wholly irrelevant and the Court of Appeals correctly so held:
The finding of an improper or even illegitimate motivation does not render the stop an unreasonable one. The validity of the stop depends on what the driver was doing and what that reasonably conveyed to the officer, not on what else the officer thought might be occurring.
State v. Tate, supra at 121.
The proper focus for the trial court was upon the specifics of what had prompted Officer Shields’ initial stop of appellant, not upon Officer Shields’ drug training or the prevalence of drug activity in the *59area where he had been ordered by his superiors to patrol for traffic violations. There is no evidence that appellant even fit a drug courier profile and nothing which contradicts or is inconsistent with Officer Shields’ testimony that appellant was stopped only for investigation of the minor traffic offenses that he had committed and the serious traffic offense that he was possibly committing.
The direct and positive testimony of an unimpeached witness which is not inherently improbable, incredible or unreasonable and which is not contradicted, cannot be arbitrarily disregarded by the trier of fact. [Cits.]
Nesbit v. Nesbit, 241 Ga. 351, 352 (2) (245 SE2d 303) (1978). The majority’s reliance upon State v. Betsill, 144 Ga. App. 267, 268 (2) (240 SE2d 781) (1977) as authority for the proposition that the trial court was authorized to disregard Officer Shields’ testimony is misplaced. In Betsill, the evidence was in dispute. In what was, therefore, clearly dicta, Betsill erroneously cited Chaffin v. Community Loan &c. Co., 67 Ga. App. 410 (1) (20 SE2d 435) (1942) for the proposition that the trier of fact “is not obligated to believe a witness, even if not contradicted by other witnesses.” In fact, Chaffin does not stand for that proposition. Chaffin, supra at 410 (1), holds that
“where there are circumstances inconsistent with the truth of [a witness’] testimony, the [trier of fact is] not obliged to believe him, even though he is not contradicted by any other witness.” [Cit.]
Here, not only is Officer Shields’ testimony that his initial stop of appellant was prompted by the observed and suspected traffic violations uncontradicted by any other witness, there are no “circumstances” regarding the initial stop of appellant’s vehicle which are in any way inconsistent with that testimony. Accordingly, the erroneous dicta in Chaffin is certainly not controlling here and Officer Shields’ testimony “cannot be arbitrarily disregarded by the trier of fact. [Cits.]” Nesbit v. Nesbit, supra at 352 (2).
The Court of Appeals correctly resolved the issue presented on appeal by holding:
“A rule requiring a law enforcement officer to forego making a traffic stop which he would otherwise be authorized to make merely because he suspects that the vehicle might be engaged in the transport of illicit drugs would have little to commend it. . . .”
(Emphasis in original.) State v. Tate, supra at 121.
*60Decided February 28, 1994 —
Reconsideration denied March 25, 1994.
John R. Hesmer, Jane P. Manning, for appellant.
Garry T. Moss, District Attorney, Gregory A. Hicks, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
A majority of this Court reverses the Court of Appeals because the decision of that court “is predicated upon the conclusion that the trial court ‘found’ that [appellant] committed traffic violations in the presence of [Officer Shields].” (Majority opinion, page 53.) The trial court did make such a finding and, indeed, was compelled to do so because Officer Shields’ testimony was uncontradicted. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals correctly relied upon that finding of the trial court and reversed because the trial court reached an erroneous conclusion of law notwithstanding that finding. The trial court’s erroneous conclusion of law was that Officer Shields’ uncontradicted testimony that his initial stop of appellant had been for the purpose of investigating actual and possible traffic violations was somehow vitiated by the irrelevant evidence regarding the nature of Officer Shields’ drug training and the orders of his superiors that he patrol for traffic violations in an area where drug activity was prevalent. In reversing the Court of Appeals, this Court now sanctions the trial court’s erroneous conclusion of law and, by so doing, sets a dangerous precedent which allows evidence to be suppressed based upon the subjective beliefs of a trial judge as to an officer’s motivations, rather than upon such uncontradicted testimony as demands the contrary finding.
As did the Court of Appeals, I “make no judgment about the validity of [Officer Shields’] actions after the warning ticket was issued, as that subsequent part of the encounter was not challenged, ruled on, or raised on appeal.” State v. Tate, supra at 122. With regard to the trial court’s erroneous conclusion of law concerning Officer Shields’ initial stop of appellant’s vehicle, however, I would affirm the Court of Appeals’ reversal of the grant of the motion to suppress.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Hunt joins in this dissent.