Court Opinion

ID: 9738609
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:58:18.659705+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:07.276025
License: Public Domain

RUCKER, J.,
dissenting.
I dissent. With the order entered today the majority does something quite unusual and rather remarkable. Specifically it grants relief the parties themselves do not request and does not at all mention the only issue that is properly before us. In its Verified Petition for Emergency Writ of Mandamus and Writ of Prohibition Re-lators ask the Court to dismiss the lawsuit now pending before Lake Circuit Court Judge Lorenzo Arredondo. This is the only relief requested. And they seek dismissal under a Trial Rule that requires such a remedy where “the same action [is] pending in another state court of this state.” Ind. Trial Rule 12(B)(8). But this Rule applies only where the “parties, subject matter, and remedies” of the two actions -are either “precisely” or “substantially” the same. State ex rel Meade v. Marshall Superior Court II, 644 N.E.2d 87, 89 (Ind.1994). Even if one were to concede that the subject matter and remedies of the two actions at issue here are substantially the same, there can be no *1274doubt that the parties are significantly different. The captions in the two law suits demonstrate this point. Further, the parties represent very different interests.
Writs of mandamus and prohibition are extraordinary remedies, equitable in nature and viewed with disfavor. State ex rel. Woodford v. Marion Superior Court, 655 N.E.2d 63, 65 (Ind.1995). The law is well settled that mandamus does not lie unless the person seeking it has a “clear and unquestioned right to relief,” State ex rel. Gibson General Hospital v. Warrick Circuit Court, 247 Ind. 240, 214 N.E.2d 655, 657 (1966), and the respondent court failed to “perform a clear, absolute, and imperative duty imposed by law.” State ex rel. City of South Bend v. Court of Appeals 273 Ind. 551, 406 N.E.2d 244, 246 (1980). Stated only slightly differently, writs of prohibition and mandate will be issued only where the trial court has an absolute duty to act or refrain from acting. State ex rel. City of New Haven v. Allen Superior Court, 699 N.E.2d 1134, 1136 (Ind.1998).
It is apparent Relators have no “clear and unquestioned right” to a dismissal of the Circuit Court lawsuit. And as a corollary Judge Arredondo obviously has no “absolute duty” to dismiss the lawsuit. In sum Relators request for the extraordinary remedy should be denied.
It is important to note that Relators have not asked this court for an order consolidating these two cases. More precisely, no petition for writ of mandamus or prohibition has been requested on these grounds. As things now stand the trial court that the majority says should hear this matter, is the same trial court that previously entered a temporary restraining order, which was later vacated by a Federal District Court, prohibiting the Lake County Board of Elections from establishing satellite voting offices. By entering its order sua sponte, the majority has foreclosed the opportunity of proper briefing on whether Realtors are even entitled to consolidation and if so which court should assume jurisdiction. I am not at all certain that Judge Arredondo has a “clear, absolute, and imperative duty imposed by law” City of South Bend, supra, to grant a Trial Rule 42(D) motion to consolidate. The issue has not been presented to this Court.
I would simply deny the issuance of the writ thus allowing to stand Judge Arredon-do’s restraining order permitting the existence of satellite voting offices. Any issues concerning consolidation may then be presented to the appropriate court or courts for resolution.