Court Opinion

ID: 9908759
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-11 18:07:31.4233+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:29.983828
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Feasby v. Logan, 2023-Ohio-4478.]

                      IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                          THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                              PAULDING COUNTY

TIMOTHY A. FEASBY, ET AL.,
                                                       CASE NO. 11-23-05
       PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS,

       v.

JOHN LOGAN, ET AL.,                                    OPINION

       DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.

                Appeal from Paulding County Common Pleas Court
                            Trial Court No. CI-22-072

                      Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded

                          Date of Decision: December 11, 2023

APPEARANCES:

        John E. Hatcher for Appellants

        Timothy Holtsberry for Appellees
Case No. 11-23-05

ZIMMERMAN, J.

       {¶1} Plaintiffs-appellants, Timothy A. Feasby and Rhonda D. Feasby (“the

Feasbys”), appeal the May 25, 2023 judgment entry of the Paulding County Court

of Common Pleas dismissing their complaint after granting a judgment on the

pleadings under Civ.R. 12(C) in favor of defendants-appellees, John Logan and

Jessie Logan (“the Logans”). For the reasons that follow, we reverse.

       {¶2} On May 4, 2022, the Feasbys filed a complaint in the trial court alleging

claims for invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress against

their neighbors, the Logans. Along with their complaint, the Feasbys filed a motion

requesting a temporary restraining order and a permanent injunction against the

Logans to “remove or lower their camera that is approximately fourteen (14’) feet

off of the ground and that [the] audio capability of that camera be disabled thereby

abating the ongoing invasion of [the Feasbys’] privacy.” (Doc. No. 2).

       {¶3} On May 23, 2022, the Logans filed their answer. Also that day, the

Logans filed a motion for a judgment on the pleadings under Civ.R. 12(C), arguing

that “there are no allegations on the complaint’s face that would indicate a cause of

action being brought for an invasion of privacy * * * .” (Doc. No. 9). Specifically,

the Logans argued that “[t]he complaint does not allege an unwarranted

appropriation or exploitation of the [Feasbys’] personalities, nor a publication of the

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Case No. 11-23-05

[Feasbys’] private affairs nor an allegation of outrage or mental suffering, shame or

humiliation.” (Id.).

       {¶4} In response to the Logans’ motion seeking a judgment on the pleadings,

the Feasbys filed a motion for leave to amend their complaint on July 18, 2022. On

August 11, 2022, the Logans filed a memorandum in opposition to the Feasbys

motion for leave to amend their complaint.

       {¶5} That same day, the Feasbys filed a memorandum in opposition to the

Logans’ motion for a judgment on the pleadings. In their memorandum, the Feasbys

contend that the Logans misconstrued the elements of an invasion-of-privacy claim

by asserting that a party must “prove all different types of invasion of the privacy

[sic] in every invasion of privacy case when in reality they are three distinct causes

of action.” (Doc. No. 14).

       {¶6} Before addressing the Logans’ motion for a judgment on the pleadings,

the trial court granted the Feasbys’ motion for leave to amend their complaint on

January 10, 2023. Consequently, the Feasbys filed an amended complaint on

January 11, 2023. The Logans filed their answer to the Feasbys’ amended complaint

on January 25, 2023.

       {¶7} On March 16, 2023, the trial court (without providing any analysis)

granted the Logans’ motion for a judgment on the pleadings under Civ.R. 12(C).

(Doc. No. 18).

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Case No. 11-23-05

         {¶8} The Feasbys filed a notice of appeal on April 14, 2023. However,

because the trial court’s March 16, 2023 entry granting a judgment on the pleadings

in favor of the Logans was not a final, appealable order, this court dismissed the

Feasbys’ appeal. Following the dismissal of the Feasbys’ appeal, the trial court

dismissed the Feasbys’ complaint on May 25, 2023. (Doc. No. 22). The Feasbys

filed their notice of appeal on June 15, 2023. They raise one assignment of error

for our review.

                                       Assignment of Error

         The Court erred in granting Appellee’s Motion for Judgment on
         the Pleadings.

         {¶9} In their sole assignment of error, the Feasbys argue that the trial court

erred by granting the Logans’ motion for a judgment on the pleadings under Civ.R.

12(C). Specifically, the Feasbys argue that the trial court erred by granting a

judgment on the pleadings in favor of the Logans because the trial court “was [led]

to believe that a party needed to prove all three enumerated elements * * * when

those enumerated elements are actually three different causes of action for invasion

of privacy * * * .”1 (Appellant’s Brief at 7).

                                         Standard of Review

         {¶10} “Under Civ.R. 12(C), ‘[a]fter the pleadings are closed but within such

time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings.’”

1
 Because the Feasbys do not raise any argument relative to their intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress
claim, we will not address it.

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Case No. 11-23-05

Jones v. Gilbert, 3d Dist. Auglaize No. 2-22-19, 2023-Ohio-754, ¶ 10, quoting

Civ.R. 12(C). When “considering a Civ.R. 12(C) motion for judgment on the

pleadings, the court is limited to the statements contained in the parties’ pleadings

and any ‘written instruments’ attached as exhibits to those pleadings.” Id., citing

Socha v. Weiss, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga, 2017-Ohio-7610, ¶ 9 and Civ.R. 10(C) (stating

that a “copy of any written instrument attached to a pleading is a part of the pleading

for all purposes”).

       {¶11} “‘A trial court reviews a Civ.R. 12(C) motion for judgment on the

pleadings using the same standard of review as a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion for failure

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.’” Oliver v. Marysville, 3d Dist.

Union No. 14-18-01, 2018-Ohio-1986, ¶ 18, quoting Walker v. Toledo, 6th Dist.

Lucas No. L-15-1240, 2017-Ohio-416, ¶ 18. Consequently, “‘Civ.R. 12(C) requires

a determination that no material factual issues exist and that the movant is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law.’” Jones at ¶ 11, quoting State ex rel. Midwest Pride

IV, Inc. v. Pontious, 75 Ohio St.3d 565, 570 (1996).

       {¶12} “‘An appellate court reviews a trial court’s decision on a Civ.R. 12(C)

motion for judgment on the pleadings de novo and considers all legal issues without

deference to the trial court’s decision.’” Id., quoting Wentworth v. Coldwater, 3d

Dist. Mercer No. 10-14-18, 2015-Ohio-1424, ¶ 15.

       Under Civ.R. 12(C), dismissal is appropriate where a court (1)
       construes the material allegations in the complaint, with all reasonable
       inferences to be drawn therefrom, in favor of the nonmoving party as

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Case No. 11-23-05

       true, and (2) finds beyond doubt, that the plaintiff could prove no set
       of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief.

(Emphasis sic.) Wentworth at ¶ 15. “Thus, the granting of a judgment on the

pleadings is only appropriate where the plaintiff has failed to allege a set of facts

which, if true, would establish the defendant’s liability.” Id.

                                      Analysis

       {¶13} In Ohio,

       [t]o be actionable, the invasion of privacy must involve “the
       unwarranted appropriation or exploitation of one’s personality, the
       publicizing of one’s private affairs with which the public has no
       legitimate concern, or the wrongful intrusion into one’s private
       activities in such a manner as to outrage or cause mental suffering,
       shame or humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities.”

(Emphasis added.) Lunsford v. Sterilite of Ohio, L.L.C., 162 Ohio St.3d 231, 2020-

Ohio-4193, ¶ 32, quoting Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35 (1956), paragraph two of

the syllabus. See also Hamrick v. Wellman Prods. Group, 9th Dist. Medina No.

03CA0146-M, 2004-Ohio-5170, ¶ 35 (noting that “[t]he tort of invasion of privacy

includes * * * separate torts”). Generally, “a defendant may be liable for intrusion

upon another’s seclusion if the defendant intentionally intrudes upon the ‘solitude

or seclusion’ or the private affairs or concerns of another, and if such an intrusion

would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.” Moran v. Lewis, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 106634, 2018-Ohio-4423, ¶ 4.

       {¶14} “Under Ohio law, in order to properly plead an invasion of privacy

claim premised on the invasion into another’s seclusion, at a minimum, there must

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be allegations demonstrating an intrusion, physical or otherwise, into another’s

solitude or private affairs.” Id. at ¶ 10, citing Housh at paragraph two of the syllabus.

See also Sullinger v. Sullinger, 849 Fed.Appx. 513, 522 (6th Cir.2021) (“A plaintiff

must raise facts showing that a defendant ‘wrongful[ly] intru[ded] into’ the

plaintiff’s ‘private activities.’”), quoting Welling v. Weinfeld, 113 Ohio St.3d 464,

2007-Ohio-2451, ¶ 15. A “‘“defendant is subject to liability under [this] rule * * *

only when he has intruded into a private place, or has otherwise invaded a private

seclusion that the plaintiff has thrown about his person or affairs.”’” Moran at ¶ 10,

quoting Salupo v. Fox, Inc., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 82761, 2004-Ohio-149, ¶ 23,

quoting Haynik v. Zimlich, 30 Ohio Misc.2d 16, 22 (C.P.1986).

       {¶15} “‘Intrusion upon seclusion’ is based on the ‘right to be left alone.’”

Lunsford at ¶ 33, quoting People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Bobby

Berosini, Ltd., 111 Nev. 615, 630, 895 P.2d 1269 (1995). “It is ‘akin to trespass in

that it involves intrusion or prying into the plaintiff’s private affairs.’” Id., quoting

Killilea v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 27 Ohio App.3d 163, 166 (10th Dist.1985).

Importantly, “[w]hether a plaintiff’s activities were ‘private’ depends on whether he

has a reasonable expectation of privacy based on the totality of circumstances.”

Sullinger at 522-523. See also Lunsford at ¶ 33 (noting that, “[w]hether an invasion

of privacy has occurred turns on the particular facts of the case”).

       {¶16} On appeal, the Feasbys contend that the trial court erred by granting

the Logan’s motion for a judgment on the pleadings because when “[c]onstruing all

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Case No. 11-23-05

allegations and any inference therefrom to the benefit of the non-moving party (the

[Feasbys]), it is clear that [they] have pled a cause of action for Invasion of Privacy

due to the [Logans’] wrongful intrusion into their seclusion or private activities.”

(Appellants’ Brief at 7).

       {¶17} The Logans disagree and argue that, to maintain their invasion-of-

privacy claim, the Feasbys were required to plead facts demonstrating “that the

security camera * * * is somehow capable of taking pictures inside the [Feasbys’]

home to be considered an invasion of privacy.” (Emphasis sic.) (Appellees’ Brief

at 6). In other words, the Logans contend that “pictures of the yard are not an

invasion of privacy under the law” because “all of the yard space is open to the

public and therefore is not private and not an invasion of privacy.” (Id.). The

Logans’ argument is misplaced. See Mangelluzzi v. Morley, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 102272, 2015-Ohio-3143, ¶ 17 (rejecting the defendants’ argument that

“photographing or videotaping individuals in their backyard cannot support an

invasion of privacy claim because a person’s backyard is not ‘private’ and that the

‘qualified privilege’ defense entitles them to judgment on the pleadings”).

       {¶18} “Ohio follows the ‘no set of facts’ pleading standard, recognizing that

a complaint ‘“should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears

beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which

would entitle him to relief.”’” Mangelluzzi at ¶ 12, quoting O’Brien v. Univ.

Community Tenants Union, Inc., 42 Ohio St.2d 242, 245 (1975), quoting Conley v.

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Case No. 11-23-05

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45, 78 S.Ct. 99 (1957). The Supreme Court of Ohio explained

that “a plaintiff is not required to prove his or her case at the pleading stage” because

“[v]ery often, the evidence necessary for a plaintiff to prevail is not obtained until

the plaintiff is able to discover materials in the defendant’s possession.” York v.

Ohio State Hwy. Patrol, 60 Ohio St.3d 143, 145 (1991). Importantly, the court

reasoned that, “[i]f the plaintiff were required to prove his or her case in the

complaint, many valid claims would be dismissed because of the plaintiff’s lack of

access to relevant evidence.” Id. “Consequently, as long as there is a set of facts,

consistent with the plaintiff’s complaint, which would allow the plaintiff to recover,

the court may not grant a defendant’s motion” for judgment on the pleadings under

Civ.R. 12(C). Id.

       {¶19} Because “‘Ohio is a notice-pleading state,’” “Ohio law does not

ordinarily require a plaintiff to plead operative facts with particularity.” Hall v.

Crawford Cty. Job & Family Servs., 3d Dist. Crawford No. 3-21-19, 2022-Ohio-

1358, ¶ 16, quoting Pugh v. Sloan, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2019-A-0031, 2019-

Ohio-3615, ¶ 26; Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 95 Ohio St.3d 416, 2002-Ohio-

2480, ¶ 29. Indeed, “[u]nder the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint need

only contain ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the party is

entitled to relief.’” Mangelluzzi at ¶ 13, quoting Civ.R. 8(A)(1). “‘Each averment

of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct. No technical forms of pleading

or motions are required.’” Hall at ¶ 16, quoting Civ.R. 8(E)(1). “In sum, ‘[t]he

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Case No. 11-23-05

statement of the claim must give the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim

and the grounds upon which it is based.’” Id., quoting Pugh at ¶ 27. Therefore,

when “reviewing a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a complainant’s failure

to allege specific facts to disprove possible affirmative defenses of the defendant

should not be fatal to the complaint.” Mangelluzzi at ¶ 13.

       {¶20} Construing the material allegations alleged in the Feasbys’ amended

complaint (along with all reasonable inferences which may be drawn from those

allegations), we conclude that the trial court erred by granting a judgment on the

pleadings in favor of the Logans. Accord Mangelluzzi at ¶ 22. That is, our review

of the record reveals that the Feasbys alleged a set of facts that, if true, could

establish the Logan’s liability. Therefore, it is not beyond doubt that the Feasbys

cannot prove any set of facts in support of their invasion-of-privacy claim that would

entitle them to relief. See Welling v. Weinfeld, 113 Ohio St.3d 464, 2007-Ohio-

2451, ¶ 10 (noting that the lower court concluded “that an invasion-of-privacy action

could lie based upon Weinfeld’s use of the video camera and floodlights”). See also

J.P. v. T.H., 9th Dist. Lorain No. 19CA011469, 2020-Ohio-320, ¶ 17 (suggesting

that sufficient evidence was presented demonstrating that the defendant “engaged

in actions that would constitute an invasion of privacy, such as routinely video

recording his neighbors’ activities”).

       {¶21} In this case, the Feasbys alleged that the Logans wrongfully intruded

into their private activities to outrage or cause mental suffering, shame, or

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Case No. 11-23-05

humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities as provided under the third prong

of an invasion-of-privacy claim. Importantly, the Feasbys alleged in their amended

complaint that the Logans “are wrongfully intruding into the [Feasbys’] private

activities” and that they “have suffered damages” as well as “mental and emotional

harm from the actions of the [Logans] * * * .” (Doc. No. 16).

       {¶22} In particular, the parties do not dispute that the Logans installed a

security camera on their property or that the Logans informed the Feasbys of the

camera along with its voice- and audio-recording capabilities. Rather, the parties

dispute whether the Logans’ conduct intruded into the Feasbys’ private activities.

Contrary to the Logans’ suggestion that the Feasbys are precluded (as a matter of

law) from alleging an invasion-of-privacy claim when the viewing occurs outside

of the home, such a claim can stand if the circumstances support the claim. See

Mangelluzzi at ¶ 16 (agreeing that there is “no blanket rule of law that precludes an

invasion of privacy claim when the viewing occurs outside of the home”).

       {¶23} Based on our review of the record in this case, we conclude that the

Feasbys alleged sufficient facts to suggest that they had a reasonable expectation of

privacy in their yard and that the Logans invaded their privacy by installing a

security camera “so that they could see over the embankment being built by the

[Feasbys].” (Doc. No. 16). Compare Mangelluzzi at ¶ 16 (concluding that the

Mangelluzzis pleaded sufficient facts to suggest “that the Morleys have invaded

their privacy by videotaping and photographing them on numerous occasions while

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they ‘are in their own backyard’” and that, “despite the Mangelluzzis installing ‘an

additional $10,000 worth of fencing to stop defendants from videotaping’ the

Mangelluzzis’ children, ‘[d]efendants have responded by climbing to the top of their

children’s swing sets in order to continue to videotape them’”) with Salupo, 2004-

Ohio-149, ¶ 24-25 (concluding that the plaintiff did “not allege defendants intruded

into a private place, or that they invaded his private seclusion”).

       {¶24} Importantly, the Feasbys alleged in their amended complaint that,

because the Logans “have said cameras on their property[, the Feasbys] decided to

extend their tree rows and [they built] a twelve (12) foot embankment to ensure that

they had privacy from the [Logans’] surveillance cameras while outside in their

yard.” (Doc. No. 16). Yet, according to the Feasbys, the Logans “installed a large

camera approximately fourteen (14) feet above their garage door on the front of their

residence” following the construction of their privacy embankment.             (Id.).

Critically, the Feasbys alleged “that this large camera was purchased by the

[Logans] and placed so that they could see over the embankment being built by the

[Feasbys].” (Id.). Compare Mangelluzzi at ¶ 19 (asserting that “the complaint

alleges that the Mangelluzzis erected a fence to stop the Morleys from interfering

and invading their privacy, yet the Morleys continued to do so and took such

measures as climbing on their children’s swing set to videotape the Mangelluzzis’

children”).

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       {¶25} Moreover, the Logans’ contention that their conduct was justified

since the Feasbys’ “yard space is open to the public and therefore not private, and

not an invasion of privacy,” is specious. (Appellee’s Brief at 6). Significantly, the

pleadings do not demonstrate that the Logans are unequivocally entitled to any type

of privilege defense to defeat the Feasbys’ claim. See Mangelluzzi at ¶ 20. Indeed,

the Feasbys’ amended complaint belies any such inference that the Feasbys’ front

yard is viewable to the public. Furthermore, based on the reasonable inference

established by the Feasbys’ amended complaint that they had a reasonable

expectation of privacy in their front yard, evaluating any evidentiary materials

suggesting that the Logans are entitled to such defense is inappropriate at this stage

of the proceedings. See id. at ¶ 9 (“‘Unlike a Civ.R. 56 motion for summary

judgment, which authorizes the court to evaluate evidentiary materials, Civ.R. 12(C)

imposes a structural test: whether on their face the pleadings foreclose the relief

requested.’”), quoting Steinbrink v. Greenon Local School Dist., 2d Dist. Clark No.

11CA0050, 2012-Ohio-1438, ¶ 15.

       {¶26} Thus, when construing the allegations in the Feasbys’ favor (as we are

required to do), we conclude that the Feasbys alleged a set of facts which would

allow them to recover. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court erred by granting

a judgment on the pleadings under Civ.R. 12(C) in favor of the Logans.

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       {¶27} Having found error prejudicial to the appellants herein in the

particulars assigned and argued, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and

remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                                                                 Judgment Reversed
                                                               and Cause Remanded

MILLER, P.J. and WILLAMOWSKI, J., concur.

/hls

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