Court Opinion

ID: 9965734
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-03 14:05:01.954846+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:38.842803
License: Public Domain

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                STATE OF FLORIDA
                  _____________________________

                      Case No. 5D2023-1060
                 LT Case No. H-27-2021-CC-001454
                  _____________________________

HERNANDO COUNTY, FLORIDA,

    Appellant,

    v.

HERNANDO COUNTY FAIR
ASSOCIATION, INC.,

    Appellee.
                  _____________________________

On Appeal from the County Court for Hernando County.
Barbara-Jo Bell, Judge.

Jon A. Jouben and Kyle J. Benda, Brooksville, for Appellant.

Joseph M. Mason, Jr., of McGee & Mason, P.A., Brooksville, for
Appellee.

                           May 3, 2024

PER CURIAM.

    Hernando County, Florida (the “County”) appeals the trial
court’s final order dismissing with prejudice its single-count
breach of contract first amended complaint that it filed against the
Hernando County Fair Association, Inc. (“HCFA”). The trial court
concluded that the five-year statute of limitations for bringing an
action on a written contract had expired prior to suit being filed. 1
We reverse.
                                  I.

      According to its first amended complaint, in 1964, the County
began leasing to HCFA certain real property that it described as
the “Fairgrounds Parcel,” upon which HCFA would hold the
annual county fair. The parties later entered into the written
contract at issue, 2 where the County agreed to convey the
Fairgrounds Parcel to HCFA and, in consideration, HCFA agreed
to redevelop this property pursuant to a Master Plan that had to
be approved by the County. The contract did not provide a date by
which the Fairgrounds Property was to be redeveloped, although
it did contain a specific date for the submission of the Master Plan.
The County alleged in its amended complaint that it conveyed the
subject property to HCFA, but HCFA had breached the contract by
its failure to substantially redevelop the property.

      HCFA moved to dismiss the first amended complaint,
arguing that its alleged breach in failing to submit the Master Plan
to the County by the date described in the contract began the
running of the five-year statute of limitations for the County to
have brought the instant breach of contract action. HCFA asserted
that because this limitations period had, in fact, expired before the
County filed its original complaint, the action was time-barred.
The trial court agreed and, after also concluding that further leave
to amend the complaint would be futile, dismissed the action with
prejudice.
                                 II.

      A trial court’s final order dismissing a complaint with
prejudice, such as was done here, is reviewed de novo. Real Est.
Sols. Home Sellers, LLC v. Viera E. Golf Course Dist. Ass’n, 288 So.

    1 See § 95.11(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2007).

    2 The parties’ contract consists of two separate documents
titled “Performance Agreement” and “Memorandum of
Understanding.”

                                  2
3d 1228, 1230 n.2 (Fla. 5th DCA 2020) (citing Chimera Servs., Inc.
v. Prevatt, 267 So. 3d 556, 557 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019)).

                                III.

       The purpose of a motion to dismiss is to test the legal
sufficiency of a complaint. Grove Isle Ass’n v. Grove Isle Assocs.,
LLLP, 137 So. 3d 1081, 1089 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (citing Fla. Bar
v. Greene, 926 So. 2d 1195, 1199 (Fla. 2006)). To that end, when
evaluating whether a complaint is legally sufficient, a trial court
must (1) limit itself to examining the four corners of the complaint,
including any attached or incorporated exhibits, (2) assume the
factual allegations in the complaint to be true, and (3) construe all
reasonable inferences from the complaint in favor of the non-
moving party. Id. (citing Greene, 926 So. 2d at 1199; Minor v.
Brunetti, 43 So. 3d 178, 179 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010)).

       Also pertinent to our analysis is that the statute of
limitations is an affirmative defense that should generally be
raised by answer rather than a motion to dismiss the complaint.
Rigby v. Liles, 505 So. 2d 598, 601 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).
Nevertheless, in extraordinary circumstances, a motion to dismiss
is appropriate if the facts constituting the defense affirmatively
appear on the face of the complaint and establish conclusively that
the statute of limitations bars the action as a matter of law. Id.
This principle comes with the caveat that “[b]ecause affirmative
defenses may be avoided by facts pled in a reply, the allegations of
the complaint must also conclusively negate the plaintiff’s ability
to allege facts in avoidance of the defense by way of reply or
dismissal is inappropriate.” Grove Isle, 137 So. 3d at 1089 (citing
Rigby, 505 So. 2d at 601; Saltponds Condo. Ass’n v. McCoy, 972 So.
2d 230, 231 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007)). Therefore, the issue before us is
whether, as a matter of law, the statute of limitations defense is
conclusively established on the face of the County’s first amended
complaint and that the County’s ability to allege facts in avoidance
of this defense is also conclusively negated.

                                IV.

    Our review shows that the County alleged in its first
amended complaint various breaches of the contract regarding

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HCFA’s failure to complete the redevelopment of the Fairgrounds
Parcel that related not only to HCFA’s single act of failing to
submit the Master Plan by the designated date, but also in failing
to comply with numerous other intertwined, ongoing, and
continuing contractual duties and obligations that postdated the
date that the Master Plan was due. As such, under the “continuing
breach” doctrine, see Allapattah Servs., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 188
F.R.D. 667, 680 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (“Where the nature of the contract
is continuous, statutes of limitations do not typically begin to run
until termination of the entire contract.”), aff’d, 333 F.3d 1248
(11th Cir. 2003), aff’d sub. nom., Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Allapattah
Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005), we conclude that the trial court
erred in dismissing the action with prejudice because the
complaint does not conclusively show that the statute of
limitations bars this action. 3

     Accordingly, the final order of dismissal with prejudice is
reversed; and we remand for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.

    REVERSED and REMANDED.

WALLIS, LAMBERT, and HARRIS, JJ., concur.

                 _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
               _____________________________

    3  The County also argues that the trial court abused its
discretion in not also granting it leave to file a second amended
complaint to allege additional facts in avoidance of the statute of
limitations defense. Based upon our disposition, we find it
unnecessary to address the merits of this argument.

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