Court Opinion

ID: 9734612
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:39:19.360613+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:49.407958
License: Public Domain

Kavanagh, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). These cases concern the meaning of the phrase "serious impairment of body function”, MCL 500.3135(1); MSA 24.13135(1), which is one of the bridges between the statutory scheme of no-fault insurance, MCL 500.3101 et seq.; MSA 24.13101 et seq., and traditional tort recovery in motor vehicle accidents. We granted leave to appeal and consolidated Cassidy v McGovern, 410 Mich 861 (1981), and Hermann v Haney, 410 Mich 921 (1981).
In each case, it must be determined whether certain injuries suffered by a plaintiff cross the statutory threshold for recovery of noneconomic losses in tort. The Legislature, in adopting no-fault insurance, decided that traditional tort recovery remains available if the injuries are severe enough.
In Cassidy, plaintiffs sought recovery in tort for injuries suffered when plaintiff Leo Cassidy’s car collided with one driven by defendant Terrance McGovern, owned by defendant Peter H. Seaton, and operated in the course of employment with defendant Seaton Industries, Inc. Plaintiff Ardith Cassidy claimed loss of consortium. At trial, defendants admitted liability, but disputed whether Leo Cassidy’s injuries met the threshold of § 3135(1) to *507enable recovery in tort. As a result of the accident, Leo Cassidy, a potato farmer, suffered complete fractures of both bones of his lower right leg.
At the close of their case in chief, plaintiffs moved for a directed verdict on the issue whether Leo Cassidy had suffered a serious impairment of body function. In denying the motion, the trial court indicated that it was without authority to do anything but submit the question to the jury. The jury returned a verdict in the defendants’ favor. On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court did have authority to decide the motion for directed verdict and remanded for that purpose. Cassidy v McGovern, 86 Mich App 321; 272 NW2d 644 (1978). On remand, the trial court ruled plaintiff Leo Cassidy’s injuries did not constitute serious impairment of body function as a matter of law and that the issue was properly given to the jury to decide. On a second appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. Cassidy v McGovern, 98 Mich App 100; 296 NW2d 200 (1980).
Plaintiffs in Hermann brought an action for recovery in tort claiming that plaintiff Barbara Jean Hermann suffered serious impairment of body function. Plaintiff Michael Hermann sought damages for loss of consortium. Barbara Jean Hermann, a telephone operator, suffered bruises on her legs and knees, a bump on her head, and neck and back injuries in an automobile accident. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that she, as a matter of law, had not suffered serious impairment of body function. The trial court granted defendants’ motions and later denied plaintiffs’ motion for rehearing. In a split decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed. Hermann v Haney, 98 Mich App 445; 296 NW2d 278 (1980).
Under the statute at issue:
*508"A person remains subject to tort liability for noneconomic loss caused by his or her ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle only if the injured person has suffered death, serious impairment of body function, or permanent serious disfigurement.” MCL 500.3135(1); MSA 24.13135(1) (emphasis added).
Of the three categories in the statute, perhaps the least definite is the one which is implicated in these cases. Whether particular injuries constitute serious impairment of body function is a question to be determined in the context of the no-fault act. The Legislature provided no guideline for construing the serious impairment phrase.
The plaintiffs in Cassidy argue that complete fractures of both lower bones of one leg constitute serious impairment of body function as a matter of law, especially where qualitative inferences must be made. They say that if the threshold is to be malleable and applicable to a variety of circumstances, the language of the statute must be given full latitude. Defendants warn against adopting any schedule of injuries as sufficient to meet the threshold.
In Hermann, plaintiffs argue that a genuine issue of material fact existed sufficient to preclude an order of summary judgment in defendants’ favor. The jury should decide the issue, plaintiffs say, except where interpretation breaches or approaches permissible limits. Defendants maintain, on the other hand, that Barbara Jean Hermann’s injuries are textbook examples of the kind which no-fault meant to exclude because her initial injuries were not severe, nor were the effects continuing. Any determination, they urge, must consider the legislative intent of reducing the number of lawsuits in confining personal injury claims to the no-fault system.
*509We reverse the judgments in both cases and hold that, in Cassidy, complete fractures of both lower bones of one leg constitute serious impairment of body function as a matter of law. Barbara Jean Hermann’s injuries presented a question for the trier of fact to determine.
"Serious impairment of body function” is a standard not readily amenable to judicial definition, but is nevertheless sufficiently definite for interpretation and acquires meaning from case-by-case application. Advisory Opinion re Constitutionality of 1972 PA 294, 389 Mich 441; 208 NW2d 469 (1973). The words of the statute, standing alone, are not self-evident in meaning and must be construed in reference to the goals of the no-fault act and the rules of statutory construction.
The act must be read as a whole and construed in light of its objectives. Statutory language of doubtful meaning is given a reasonable construction by looking at the purpose to be served. Spartan Asphalt Paving Co v Grand Ledge Mobile Home Park, 400 Mich 184, 190; 253 NW2d 646 (1977), reh den 400 Mich 1029 (1977). In seeking meaning, the words and clauses are not divorced from those which precede and those which follow. Sanchick v State Board of Optometry, 342 Mich 555, 559; 70 NW2d 757 (1955).
The statutory scheme of no-fault insurance resulted from dissatisfaction with traditional theories of liability founded on fault. Among the deficiencies sought to be remedied were the overcompensation of minor injuries, the undercompensation of serious injuries, long payment delays, an overburdened court system, and discrimination against those with low income and little education. Shavers v Attorney General, 402 Mich 554; 267 NW2d 72 (1978), reh den 403 Mich 958 (1978), cert *510den sub nom Allstate Ins Co v Kelley, 442 US 934; 99 S Ct 2869; 61 L Ed 2d 303 (1979). To remedy these deficiencies, liability without fault was provided to replace traditional tort recovery except where injuries met one of the thresholds of § 3135(1).
An injury need not be permanent or fatal to seriously impair body function, nor must it disfigure the injured person. Death, permanency, and disfigurement are not at issue where serious impairment of body function is asserted.
Statutes such as the no-fault act, which derogate from the common law, must be strictly construed. They will not be extended by implication to abrogate established rules of common law. Rusinek v Schultz, Snyder & Steele Lumber Co, 411 Mich 502, 508; 309 NW2d 163 (1981), reh den 412 Mich 1101 (1981). Because the Legislature chose a rather amorphous standard, we are not free to treat it as being limited only to the most serious injuries. We may not properly extend the Legislature’s endeavor to resolve the tort system’s deficiencies by limiting the available causes of action.
The question whether the threshold has been met may be decided as a matter of law where reasonable persons would not reach different conclusions on the seriousness of an injury. Harris v McVickers, 88 Mich App 508, 510-511; 276 NW2d 629 (1979), lv den 406 Mich 929 (1979). Otherwise, a question is presented for the trier of fact. Advisory Opinion, supra, 478.
We are satisfied, in light of the spirit and purpose of the no-fault act, that complete fractures of both bones of the lower right leg constitute a serious impairment of body function as a matter of law.
Thus, in Cassidy, the trial court erred in failing to direct a verdict in plaintiffs’ favor on the issue *511whether Leo Cassidy suffered a serious impairment of body function. See Armstrong v LeBlanc, 395 Mich 526, 532; 236 NW2d 419 (1975). We are persuaded that the complete fractures of Leo Cassidy’s weight-bearing bones significantly interfered with his ability to walk. He was hospitalized for 18 days. His leg was unable to bear any weight for over two months. Up to nine months after the accident, Leo Cassidy used first crutches and later a walker to move about. Testimony was adduced about his complaints of a limp. The threshold question should never have been submitted to the jury. A new trial is required.
In the Hermann case, on the other hand, we are not prepared to say that all reasonable persons would agree that Barbara Jean Hermann’s injuries constituted a serious impairment of body function. She suffered bruises on her legs and knees and a bump on her head. She was given medication at a hospital after the accident and was discharged. About two days later, she complained of neck and back pains which caused difficulty in sitting for an extended period of time. A doctor treated her neck and back on nine occasions. She did not return to work for one month following the accident, and during that time she was confined mainly to bed. Her neck and back problems cleared up about one month after returning to work, about two months after the accident. Reasonable minds might differ over whether these injuries constituted a serious impairment of body function.
Thus, in Hermann, it was error to grant defendants' motions for summary judgment. The threshold issue should have been given to the jury to decide. We reverse for trial.
Riley, J., took no part in the decision of this case.