Court Opinion

ID: 9460700
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:58:01.380518+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:44.517655
License: Public Domain

GOLDBERG, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
Because my opinion on the proper scope of federal jurisdiction in this case —both original and appellate — differs significantly from the majority’s view, I must respectfully dissent. The concepts of nonappealability and abstention are here combined to quarantine appellants’ judicial movement. However, the majority’s melding of these doctrines does not forge a chain any stronger than its individual links; and neither principle, properly applied, renders any of the actions complained of in the district court immune to Article III nisi prius consideration and thereafter appellate scrutiny.
The majority correctly notes that appellants’ complaint stated two separate, though related, causes of action. In its order of September 21, 1973, the district court granted judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) F.R.C.P. on the claim of harassment by airport and police officials so severe as to constitute a burden on interstate commerce, and stayed proceedings on the permissibility of the 15% use charge on gross receipts “until the state courts have had an opportunity to determine its legality under state law.” My brothers do not reach the action of the district court in disposing of appellants’ claim of operational interference, finding it to be a “partial” judgment unaccompanied by district court certification.1 To my mind, how*300ever, that ruling is subject to review by this Court on its merits as one part of an order that was in all respects final.
There is, of course, no question but that the judgment on the pleadings entered below represents a complete determination by the district court on the merits of the harassment claim. Hence, had appellants raised only that issue in their complaint of July 5, 1973, the judgment would be appealable under the terms of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.2 Consequently, the majority’s conclusion that, in the language of Rule 54(b) F.R.C.P., the September 21 order “adjudicates fewer than all the claims,” must rest on its belief that the stay of federal proceedings on the use charge did not amount to a final determination on that claim for the purposes of appeal. On the basis of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 1962, 370 U.S. 713, 82 S.Ct. 1294, 8 L.Ed.2d 794, however it seems clear that the bells had indeed tolled for Toye Brothers on this point and that the stay, standing alone, would also have constituted a final decision from which an appeal would lie as of right.
In Idlewild, plaintiff had brought suit challenging certain aspects of the New York Alcoholic Beverage Control Law as violative of the Commerce, Import-Export, and Supremacy Clauses of the United States Constitution. The district court stayed the federal action in order to give the New York state courts an opportunity to rule on certain aspects of the litigation. In response to the State’s attack on its jurisdiction to hear the appeal, the Second Circuit held that:
Appellees’ argument that this order was not final and hence unappealable under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1292 is not well taken. No parallel state actions were pending and there was no state adjudication to await. There was nothing to be done in federal court because the action there had for all intents and purposes concluded. Appellant was effectively out of court—
Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Rohan, 2 Cir. 1961, 289 F.2d 426, 428, modified on other grounds sub nom., Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, supra. In its own consideration of the merits, the Supreme Court explicitly approved this holding, noting that “[t]he Court of Appeals properly rejected the argument that the order of the District Court [was not final].” 370 U.S. at 715 n. 2, 82 S.Ct. at 1296. Idle-wild’s teaching, gleaned by both courts and commentators, instructs us that where, as in the present case,3 no state court action is pending at the time of a federal court’s determination to abstain, the abstention order is a final decision appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Druker v. Sullivan, 1 Cir. 1972, 458 F.2d 1272; 9 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 110.20 [4.2] at 251.
We are faced here with a single order which disposes of two claims in different ways. Either method taken in isolation amounts to a final decision subject to appellate scrutiny at this time. I know of nothing in law or logic which would make the whole order any less than the sum of its parts.
My brothers’ view on the appealability of the judgment on the pleadings makes *301extended discussion of the merits of that ruling on my part premature.4 I cannot forbear from commenting, however, that given the stringent requirements for granting such a dismissal5 and the necessary focus of this litigation on the actual impact of the city’s policies on appellants’ operations, greater inquiry into the facts — as through a hearing on the merits — seems the better course.
With regard to that portion of the order reviewed on its merits, I am unable to agree that the teaching of Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 1941, 312 U.S. 496, 61 S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971, was properly applied by the district court in staying consideration of the 15% charge. I cannot concur in a conclusion that the merits of this controversy are too delicate for the federal touch and that abstention is therefore wise and compelled. Just as state courts are assumed to be open and competent to adjudicate questions of federal law in cases properly before them, see Younger v. Harris, 1971, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669, so the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, see United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 1966, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218; the Article III diversity grant, see Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 1938, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188, and the myriad federal question litigation involving rights and relationships created by the states presuppose the ability of federal courts to interpret and apply state law. Pullman and its progeny do not dispute that general commingling of judicial authority; rather they call upon a federal court to question the propriety of determining matters of state law and the wisdom of proceeding with related issues of federal law only under certain “special circumstances.” Lake Carriers’ Association v. MacMullan, 1972, 406 U.S. 498, 510, 92 S.Ct. 1749, 32 L.Ed.2d 257. Hence, where resolution of a difficult and unsettled issue of state law vitally affecting an area of local concern is preliminary to consideration of a perplexing federal constitutional question, and where authoritative construction of the state statute may well eliminate the need for or limit the constitutional issues.
abstention may be proper in order to avoid unnecessary friction in federal-state relations, interference with important state functions, tentative decisions on questions of state law, and premature constitutional adjudication.
Harman v. Forssenius, 1965, 380 U.S. 528, 534, 85 S.Ct. 1177, 1182, 14 L.Ed.2d 50.
It is true that in the present case the issue of state law — whether the use charge can be properly imposed by the Aviation Board pursuant to blanket City Council approval — has never been directly addressed by the courts of Louisiana; but the mere absence of definitive state judicial construction does not automatically trigger abstention, Doud v. Hodge, 1956, 350 U.S. 485, 487, 76 S.Ct. 491, 100 L.Ed. 577. Neither perceptible complexities in the state provisions under consideration here nor possibly serious implications of this decision in the overall Louisiana scheme for governing the New Orleans airport have surfaced to justify the timidity of the court below. Moreover, a state court determination that the 15% charge has not received adequate approval by the New Orleans *302City Council would doubtless bring only a temporary alleviation of the controversy, given the insistence of the city on collection of the fee. Appellants face the prospect of “the delay and expense to which application of the abstention doctrine inevitably gives rise,” England v. Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 418, 84 S.Ct. 461, 466, 11 L.Ed.2d 440, only to be met at the end of the state road with an affirmance of the Board’s authority or formal adoption by the city of what it has already endorsed.
When inquiry shifts to the federal questions, the cause of abstention is not materially advanced by an examination of the issues thus avoided. Appellants challenge the gross receipts charge as violative of both the Airport Development Acceleration Act of 1973 and the Commerce Clause. Though involving the constitutional principle of federal supremacy, the former argument is exclusively an issue of statutory construction ; and the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the Pullman doctrine as a method of postponing the interpretation of federal statutes, Propper v. Clark, 1949, 337 U.S. 472, 490, 69 S.Ct. 1333, 93 L.Ed. 1480. Nor has this Circuit’s prior approach to attacks on airport use charges as unduly burdensome of interstate commerce indicated that such challenges pose difficult constitutional questions. See Toye Brothers Yellow Cab Company v. Irby, 5 Cir. 1971, 437 F.2d 806, 811. Pullman does not provide a means for delaying decision whenever a case raises related state and federal questions. Its purpose is to avoid untutored federal interference in complex state regulatory schemes, while permitting the resolution of controversies without resort to “substantial constitutional issue [s] . . . [touching] sensitive area[s] of social policy upon which the federal courts ought not to enter unless no alternative to [their] adjudication is open.” Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., supra, 312 U.S. at 498, 61 S.Ct. at 644. Its application to this case serves neither interest.

. Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in relevant part that: When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action . . . the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims . . . only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims . . . shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims and the order or other form of *300decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims ....

. The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States . except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

. There is no reference in the record to any state court action over the legality of the 15% use charge on gross receipts; and both the answer filed by appellees in August of 1973 and the September 21 memorandum of the district court indicate that no such proceeding had been instituted prior to the order. The only reference to a state proceeding concerning the use charge comes in the briefs, where appellees state that on December 21, 1973, three months after the abstention order was entered, the City of New Orleans filed suit to collect sums alleged as due from appellants’ airport operations.

. Conversely, my own view on the finality of the September 21 order makes it unnecessary for me to reach the question of whether the judgment also operated as the denial of a preliminary injunction. I must confess, however, that a reading of the majority opinion has left me considerably perplexed on this point. All of the arguments advanced in support of review of the stay order under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) seem equally applicable to the dismissal of the harassment claim, for which injunctive relief was also sought.

. A claim may be dismissed on the pleadings only where it appears “beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 1957, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80. See also Continental Motors Corp. v. Continental Aviation Corp., 5 Cir. 1967, 375 F.2d 857.