Court Opinion

ID: 9533775
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:34:30.156612+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:29:10.080074
License: Public Domain

BUTTLER, J.,
concurring in part; dissenting in part.
Although I concur in the majority’s disposition of defendant’s first conviction (CA A27008), I disagree with its affirmance of his second conviction (CA A28773) and therefore dissent from the disposition of that case.
The appeal from the second conviction calls upon us to determine the permissible scope and intensity of a “frisk” of a person following a stop pursuant to ORS 131.615.1 Under that statute, the officers were entitled to stop defendant for a reasonable time and to make reasonable inquiry regarding the immediate circumstances that aroused their suspicion. Under ORS 131.625(1), they were permitted to frisk defendant for weapons if they reasonably suspected that he was armed and presently dangerous to them or others present. A “frisk,” however, is limited by definition to “an external patting of a person’s outer clothing.” ORS 131.605(2). The officers testified that they had satisfied themselves that defendant had no weapon on his person after they frisked him. Having done so, their right to make reasonable inquiry into the immediate and very limited circumstances which aroused their suspicion had ended, and they had no right to detain defendant further.
The only basis for their suspicion was an anonymous call advising that the caller had heard a clicking noise in *181defendant’s pocket, by virtue of which the caller had concluded that defendant must have had a gun in his pocket. Once the officers had determined that defendant did not have a gun on his person, “the immediate circumstances that aroused the officer’s suspicion,” ORS 131.615(3), had dissipated, and any further inquiry, by definition, was unreasonable. The officers should have gone on their way and let defendant go on his.
The “stop” statute was enacted in Oregon following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Terry v. Ohio, 372 US 1, 88 S Ct 1868, 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968), but is more limited in its application than is the Terry rule. At best, permitting the temporary seizure of a person without probable cause is an accommodation between a person’s right to be secure in his or her person, papers and effects (Or Const, Art I, § 9; US Const, Amend IV) and the government’s right to investigate crimes. That accommodation involves a delicate balance, and the courts should insist on strict adherence to the statutory circumscriptions in fulfilling their duty to act as arbiters between private citizens and the police. We have held, in very limited circumstances when the police had good cause to believe that a stopped person was armed and dangerous, that a more extensive intrusion into otherwise protected areas may be permitted for the protection of the officers. See State v. Goodman, 63 Or App 102, 663 P2d 422, rev den 296 Or 56 (1983); State v. Bowcutt, 62 Or App 591, 661 P2d 565, rev den 295 Or 773 (1983); State v. McGregor, 57 Or App 78, 634 P2d 1315 (1982). In those cases, the “immediate circumstances” giving rise to the officers’ suspicion were substantially more significant than here. It cannot be said that the officers reasonably believed that defendant was armed and dangerous just because someone had said that he had heard a clicking noise emanating from defendant’s pocket.
The majority would hold that, even though the officers did not have authority to arrest defendant at the time he was stopped, their authority to search incident to the stop exceeded the authority they would have had incident to an arrest. We have consistently held that when a search incident to arrest reaches a logical stopping point, the police must seek a warrant before proceeding further. State v. Ridderbush, 71 Or App 418, 692 P2d 667 (1984); State v. Kirsch, 69 Or App 418, 686 P2d 446, rev den 298 Or 151 (1984); State v. Flores, 68 Or App 617, 685 P2d 999, rev den 298 Or 151 (1984). The *182logical stopping place here was when the officers had satisfied themselves that the clicking noise in defendant’s pocket was not a gun. Had they permitted defendant to leave at that point, he would not have attempted to assert his right to be free of the officers’ unauthorized attempt to search his duffel bag, and the inquiry would have ended, see State v. Gressel, 276 Or 333, 554 P2d 1014 (1976), as it should have.
The evidence should have been suppressed. Accordingly, I dissent.
Warden and Newman, JJ., join in this opinion.

 There are separate, timely notices of appeal from the two judgments of conviction and from the order revoking probation. The three appeals were consolidated.