Court Opinion

ID: 9580549
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:06:05.006479+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:21.505751
License: Public Domain

*601KENNARD, J.
I dissent.
In this case, the trial court discharged the jury immediately after it returned a verdict of guilty but before the prosecution had presented evidence that defendant had suffered prior felony convictions, as alleged by the prosecution for purposes of sentence enhancement. The trial court excused the prosecution’s failure to offer this evidence by convening another jury, over defendant’s objection, and giving the prosecution a second chance to prove the enhancement. The majority approves this procedure on the ground that defendant “waived” the right to object by not raising the issue when the first jury was discharged.
By this holding, the majority turns an important rule of trial procedure on its head. Generally, each party is responsible for presenting its evidence at the appropriate time. If the defense forgets to call a witness to testily, and the prosecutor knows that the witness has been subpoenaed, the prosecutor is under no obligation to remind the defense about the witness, or to object before the defense rests its case. Yet the majority holds that when the prosecutor has neglected to present evidence in support of a prior conviction allegation that may result in a substantial increase in the defendant’s sentence, the defendant must bring this neglect to the attention of the trial court.
As I shall explain, our statutory scheme imposes on the trial court the task of ensuring that the jury is not discharged before the prosecutor has an opportunity to offer evidence that the defendant has a prior conviction. It is the responsibility of the prosecution to see to it that the trial court gives it an opportunity to present this evidence. Never before has this court placed upon the defense the burden of curing the omissions of the court and the prosecutor, and we should not do so in this case. In addition, because the obligation imposed by the majority could not have been anticipated by the defense and is wholly unsupported by prior law, the majority’s holding should be applied, if at all, prospectively only.
I.
A party forfeits a legal right by silence only when the law allocates to that party the legal duty or obligation to speak.1 Our law expressly allocates to the trial court, not the defendant, the obligation to ensure that the jury is not *602discharged before it has decided the truth of a prior conviction allegation. (Pen. Code, § 1164, subd. (b).) Because the obligation is placed on the trial court, defendant did not forfeit any legal right by failing to object when the trial court erred.2
Contrary to the sweeping assertions of the majority (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 589-590), a party’s failure to object does not necessarily result in the forfeiture of a legal right, as the following examples illustrate.
For instance, when a trial court accepts a plea of guilty without first advising the defendant of the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to a jury trial, and the right to confront one’s accusers, as required by decisional law (see, e.g., In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122, 130-133 [81 Cal.Rptr. 577, 460 P.2d 449]; People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1174-1175 [5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268, 824 P.2d 1315]), the Court of Appeal may reverse the judgment of conviction even if the defendant had not objected to the trial court’s error at the time of the plea. A reversal may also be appropriate when the trial court fails to instruct on its own motion on the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence. (See, e.g., People v. Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 307, 323 [185 Cal.Rptr. 436, 650 P.2d 311].) In either instance, the defendant’s silence has not resulted in the forfeiture of any right because the duty to ensure proper advisement of rights and to instruct on the applicable principles of law is placed on the court, not the defendant.
Similarly, appellate review is not precluded, nor is a defendant’s right to have the charges against him or her proved beyond a reasonable doubt forfeited, by the defendant’s failure to object when the prosecution does not introduce sufficient evidence of an element of the offense charged. (See Patterson v. New York (1977) 432 U.S. 197, 210 [53 L.Ed.2d 281, 292, 97 S.Ct. 2319]; People v. Kunkin (1973) 9 Cal.3d 245, 249-250 [107 Cal.Rptr. 184, 507 P.2d 1392, 57 A.L.R.3d 1199].) Forfeiture does not occur in this situation because it is the prosecution, not the defendant, that bears the burden of proof.
And, as the majority acknowledges in this case, appellate review of a double jeopardy claim is not barred by defendant’s failure to object on this *603ground at trial. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 591.) The double jeopardy claim is not barred by the failure to object because “the defendant is under no duty to object in order to claim the protection of the constitutional guarantee, and his mere silence in the face of an ensuing discharge cannot be deemed a waiver.” (Curry v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 707, 713 [87 Cal.Rptr. 361, 470 P.2d 345]; accord, People v. Superior Court (Marks) (1991) 1 Cal.4th 56, 77 & fn. 20 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 389, 820 P.2d 613].)3
As these examples illustrate, defendant’s failure to act results in a forfeiture only if the law imposes on the defendant an obligation to act.4
Accordingly, to determine whether a party’s failure to object results in the forfeiture of a right, the threshold inquiry is whether the law has allocated to that party the duty to object.
II.
Penal Code section 1164, subdivision (b) expressly and unambiguously places on the trial court the obligations pertaining to the discharge of the jury in a case involving prior conviction allegations: “No jury shall be discharged until the court has verified on the record that the jury has either reached a verdict or has formally declared its inability to reach a verdict on all issues before it, including, but not limited to, the degree of the crime or crimes charged, and the truth of any alleged prior conviction whether in the same proceeding or in a bifurcated proceeding.” (Italics added; see People v. Bonillas (1989) 48 Cal.3d 757, 772 [257 Cal.Rptr. 895, 771 P.2d 844] [duty of the trial court to review the form and substance of a jury verdict to ensure its propriety before discharging the jury]; People v. Superior Court (Marks), supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 73, fn. 15 [emphasizing the importance of subdivision (b) of section 1164 as a safeguard against nonconforming verdicts, and urging strict compliance with statute].) Thus, the Legislature has specifically *604allocated to the trial court, not the defendant, the responsibility for ensuring that the jury is not discharged before it has determined the truth of prior conviction allegations.
In holding that, by not objecting to the trial court’s erroneous premature discharge of the jury, the defendant has forfeited the right to have the truth of the prior convictions determined by the same jury, the majority circumvents the statutory language imposing on the trial court the obligation not to prematurely discharge the jury.
III.
In support of its conclusion that the defendant must object when, after the jury’s verdict of guilt, the trial court erroneously discharges the jury before the prosecution has presented evidence of defendant’s prior convictions, the majority gives three reasons. According to the majority, the Legislature did not intend to create a “procedural trap” allowing defense counsel to “ambush” the trial court. Also, in the majority’s view, placing on the defendant the burden to object would protect the prosecution’s statutory right to prove the prior convictions. Additionally, it would avoid placing a defense attorney “in the untenable position of having to choose between honoring counsel’s commitment to the court (that jury trial on the prior conviction allegation would be waived) and counsel’s duty to his or her client (to offer all available defenses to the charges and allegations contained in the accusatory pleading).” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 591.) These assertions do not withstand analytical scrutiny.
For more than a century, California law has required that the same jury that determines a defendant’s guilt or innocence on the charged offense make a special finding of the truth of any prior conviction alleged by the prosecutor. (Pen. Code, §§ 1025, 1158.) For nearly as long, it has been the law that when the jury fails to return a special verdict as to the truth of the prior conviction, the court must treat this as a finding “in favor of the defendant upon the question of [the] prior conviction[s].” (People v. Eppinger (1895) 109 Cal. 294, 298 [41 P. 1037]; accord, In re McVickers (1946) 29 Cal.2d 264, 271 [176 P.2d 40]; People v. Morton (1953) 41 Cal.2d 536, 543-544 [261 P.2d 523].) Here, the trial court was neither “procedurally trapped” nor “ambushed” by the defense. The trial court simply violated a clear and well-established legal rule that the court should not discharge the jury until it has determined the truth of any prior conviction allegations.
I now turn to the majority’s assertion that placing on the defendant the burden to object would safeguard the prosecution’s statutory right to prove a *605prior felony conviction. Because it is the prosecution that seeks the imposition of the prior felony conviction enhancement and has the burden of proving the truth of the prior conviction allegation, the prosecution, not the defense, is at least partially responsible for the erroneous premature discharge of the jury by its failure to bring the error to the trial court’s attention. Our recent decision in People v. Superior Court (Marks), supra, 1 Cal.4th 56, 77, is instructive. In Marks, the jury’s verdict failed to specify the degree of murder, contrary to the mandate of Penal Code section 1157. By operation of law, the verdict became fixed at second degree murder. (Pen. Code, § 1157.) We rejected the prosecution’s contention that the application of Penal Code section 1157 deprived the prosecution of its one complete opportunity to convict. We said: “We perceive no unfairness to the People in our holding. The prosecution is not deprived of its ‘one complete opportunity to convict those who have violated [the] laws.’ [Citations.] When the verdict is ‘deemed of the lesser degree’ by operation of law, the prosecution bears at least partial responsibility. The consequences of an irregular verdict are well settled, and nothing precludes the prosecution from calling the deficiency to the court’s attention before it discharges the panel. (See §§ 1161-1164.) Since any failure to do so results from neglect rather than lack of notice and opportunity to be heard, the People’s right to due process is accordingly not offended. [Citations.] [1] The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly counseled against subjecting a defendant to further proceedings to allow the prosecution the opportunity to ameliorate trial deficiencies, evidentiary or procedural, that could have been otherwise timely corrected. [Citations.]” (People v. Superior Court (Marks), supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 77, fns. omitted.) This court’s reasoning in Marks applies with equal force here.
Here, as in People v. Superior Court (Marks), supra, 1 Cal.4th at page 77, the failure of the defense to object to the trial court’s premature discharge of the jury did not deprive the prosecution of its one complete opportunity to prove one or more alleged prior convictions. As in Marks, there was nothing to prevent the prosecution in this case from “calling the problem to the court’s attention before the court discharge[d] the panel,” and the prosecution’s failure to do so “result[ed] from neglect rather than lack of notice and opportunity to be heard.” As in Marks, defendant should not have been subjected “to further proceedings to allow the prosecution the opportunity to ameliorate trial deficiencies . . . that could have been timely corrected.” I perceive no reason not to follow Marks in this case.
Finally, the majority asserts that not allocating to the defendant the burden of making a timely objection would place the defense attorney in the untenable position of having to choose between counsel’s “commitment to the court” that jury trial on the prior conviction allegation may subsequently *606be waived and counsel’s duty to zealously represent the defendant. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 591.) This assertion confuses the roles of the respective parties in a judicial proceeding.
The error in this case—the trial court’s discharge of the jury before the prosecution presented evidence of defendant’s prior convictions—was committed by the trial court and was abetted by the neglect of the prosecution when it failed to bring the error to the trial court’s attention. In a criminal trial, the defense attorney’s obligation is to diligently and conscientiously act as an advocate for the defendant (see, e.g., In re Cordero (1988) 46 Cal.3d 161, 180 [249 Cal.Rptr. 342, 756 P.2d 1370]), not to perform any obligations incumbent on the trial court or to ameliorate the prosecution’s deficiencies at trial. It is the task of the prosecution to allege the prior conviction in the accusatory pleading (Pen. Code, § 969) and to prove its truth beyond a reasonable doubt (People v. Morton, supra, 41 Cal.2d at p. 539). Thus, in this case, any duty to object should be imposed on the prosecution, not the defense. To hold, as the majority does, that defense counsel must interpose an objection that could result in substantial detriment to the client, and that could not advance the client’s interests, is inconsistent with counsel’s responsibilities, is anathema to our adversarial system, and is contrary to the allocation of the duties and obligations of the participants in our judicial system.
As we have seen, the majority reallocates the obligations of the respective participants at trial contrary to well-established law. It also applies its ruling retroactively without any discussion of the propriety of doing so. If this court is going to impose a new duty on the defense, it should do so prospectively only.
IV.
In addition to disagreeing with the majority on the objection issue, I disagree that its holding should be given retroactive application.
An objection and waiver rule such as the new rule promulgated by the majority may not be applied retroactively when existing law did not require an objection. In a decision filed only a few weeks ago, this court held that a defendant’s failure to challenge the reasonableness of a probation condition constituted a waiver of the claim on appeal. As we pointed out: “Reviewing courts have traditionally excused parties for failing to raise an issue at trial where an objection would have been futile or wholly unsupported by substantive law then in existence. (People v. Turner (1990) 50 Cal.3d 668, 703 [268 Cal.Rptr. 706, 789 P.2d 887]; People v. Ogunmola (1985) 39 Cal.3d 120, *607123, fn. 4 [215 Cal.Rptr. 855, 701 P.2d 1173]; In re Gladys R. (1970) 1 Cal.3d 855, 861 [83 Cal.Rptr. 671, 464 P.2d 127].) By the same token, defendant should not be penalized for failing to object where existing law overwhelmingly said no such objection was required.” (People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 237-238 [19 Cal.Rptr.2d 520, 851 P.2d 802], italics added, fn. omitted)
To say that the objection requirement imposed by the majority in this case was “wholly unsupported by substantive law then in existence” is an understatement. Our law, underscored by a consistent pattern of actions by this court, did not previously impose such an obligation.
In 1984, the Court of Appeal’s decision in People v. Wojahn (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 1024 [198 Cal.Rptr. 277] addressed a trial court’s premature discharge of a jury. In Wojahn, the jury was mistakenly discharged, without an objection, before any evidence of the truth of the prior conviction was offered. (Id. at p. 1032.) Three weeks later, on a motion of the prosecution and over the objection of the defense, a new proceeding was instituted and the prior conviction allegation was found to be true. (Ibid.) On appeal, the Wojahn court held that the constitutional protection against being twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense required the striking of the prior conviction allegation. (Id. at pp. 1032-1035.) This court denied review of the Wojahn decision on March 21, 1984. Thereafter, this court consistently endorsed the Wojahn holding by denying review of Courts of Appeal decisions that followed Wojahn, while ordering the depublication of those decisions that were contrary to Wojahn.
For example, in 1989, the Courts of Appeal issued decisions contrary to Wojahn in People v. Laury (Cal.App.) A043042 and People v. Casillas (Cal.App.) A043679. This court denied review in Laury in July 1989; as to Casillas, a petition for review was never filed with this court. Then, in 1990, a Court of Appeal decided People v. Hockersmith (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 968 [266 Cal.Rptr. 380]. The decision in Hockersmith adhered to the Wojahn holding and criticized the decisions in both Laury and Casillas. (217 Cal.App.3d at pp. 973-975.) On April 26,1990, this court denied the petition for review in Hockersmith, but ordered the decisions in both Laury and Casillas depublished.
As the First District Court of Appeal in People v. Dee (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 760 [272 Cal.Rptr. 208] observed: “The Supreme Court denied a petition for review in Laury on July 20, 1989. There was no petition for review in Casillas, which therefore became final on January 16, 1990. A petition for review in Hockersmith was filed on March 6, 1990. Then, at one *608fell swoop on April 26, 1990, the Supreme Court denied review in Hockersmith and depublished both Casillas and Laury, which had long since become final and were not even before the court. This leaves Hockersmith as the only published post -Wojahn opinion. [1] The message from the Supreme Court is obvious: Hockersmith and Wojahn were correct, and Laury and the plurality in Casillas were wrong. There is no other fathomable reason for the Supreme Court’s action.” (222 Cal.App.3d at p. 763.) Thus, by its actions, this court affirmed the continued viability of Wojahn, including the absence of any requirement of a defense objection.
The majority seeks to evade the import of the Courts of Appeal’s decisions and this court’s actions on two grounds. First, the majority asserts that this court’s denial of review in some cases and depublication of other cases do not express this court’s view on the merits of those decisions. Second, the majority claims that because no case has expressly stated that a defendant may argue on appeal that the trial court violated Penal Code section 1025 after failing to object when the jury was discharged, it is justified in imposing a previously nonexistent obligation retroactively. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 592, fn. 8.) The majority is wrong.
This court’s denials of review and orders of depublication in numerous cases following the decision in People v. Wojahn, supra, 150 Cal.App.3d 1024, cannot simply be dismissed as meaningless. As the court stated in People v. Dee, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at pages 764-765: “We also recognize that, effective July 1, 1990, new rule 979(e) of the California Rules of Court provides that a depublication order ‘shall not be deemed an expression of opinion of the Supreme Court of the correctness of the result reached by the decision or of any of the law set forth in the opinion.’ Because the depublication orders in Laury and Casillas predate rule 979(e), we conclude the new rule does not apply to those orders. We note, however, that given the manner in which the Supreme Court has dealt with the three post -Wojahn cases, to insist that those depublication orders are without significance would be to perpetuate a myth.”
The majority’s second claim—that full retroactivity of its decision is justified because no case has expressly stated that the defendant does not have a duty to object to preserve the Penal Code section 1025 right—is also incorrect. Only a defense attorney with extrasensory powers could have predicted that this court would impose an obligation to object to the trial court’s premature discharge of the jury. Such an objection is directly contrary to the interest of counsel’s client, the defendant. In addition, it is unreasonable to expect defense counsel to understand our prior law as requiring, based on identical facts, an objection on statutory grounds but not *609double jeopardy grounds. A conscientious attorney researching the issue or carefully tracking the development of the law in this area would have concluded, based on the overwhelming authority, not only that an objection was not required, but also that the making of such an objection could constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. If, as it has done here, this court is going to ignore the statutes and prior decisional law, it should at least follow the rules of prospectivity it has established.
V.
In this case the majority imposes a forfeiture of defendant’s statutory right to a determination of the truth of prior conviction allegations by the same jury that determined guilt or innocence on the charged offense even though defendant had no legal duty or obligation to speak. In doing so, the majority places on defendant an obligation that the Legislature has expressly placed on the trial court, and relieves the prosecution from the consequences of its neglect. The majority’s conclusion is contrary to both statutory and decisional law, and the retroactive application of its holding is fundamentally unfair.
I would amend the judgment by striking the prior conviction sentence enhancements and affirm the judgment as so amended.
Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied September 16, 1993. Mosk, J., and Kennard, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

This case, as analyzed by the majority, does not involve the forfeiture of a right by express consent (see e.g., Redevelopment Agency v. City of Berkeley (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 158, 166 [143 Cal.Rptr. 633]) or by the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right (see e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U.S. 458, 464 [82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 146 A.L.R. 357]). (See generally, United States v. Olano (1993)_U.S. _-_ [123 L.Ed.2d 508, 518-521, 113 S.Ct. 1770] [distinguishing waiver and forfeiture]; Freytag v. Commis*602sioner (1991) 501 U.S. _, _, fn. 2 [115 L.Ed.2d 764, 789-790, 111 S.Ct. 2631, 2647] (conc. opn. of Scalia, J.) [same].)

In my view, this court need not now resolve the constitutional double jeopardy issue because the decision in this case is governed by existing state statutory and decisional law. Therefore, I do not express an opinion on the appropriate final resolution of the double jeopardy issue. I do note, however, that if one accepts the majority’s assumption that jeopardy attached to the alleged prior conviction allegation at the time the jury was sworn (maj. opn., ante, at p. 592), the majority’s theory of “unterminated jeopardy” is, as Justice Mosk has shown in his dissenting opinion, clearly wrong.

To support its position, the majority quotes this statement from Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge etc. Dist. (1979) 23 Cal.3d 180, 184-185, fn. 1 [151 Cal.Rptr. 837, 588 P.2d 1261]: “ ‘ “An appellate court will ordinarily not consider procedural defects or erroneous rulings in connection with relief sought or defenses asserted, where an objection could have been, but was not, presented . . . ” (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 589-590, italics added.) But the majority apparently fails to appreciate the significance of the qualifying italicized language. The party seeking relief or asserting a defense may by failing to object forfeit the right because the law allocates to that party the burden or obligation to act. (See Leland v. Oregon (1952) 343 U.S. 790, 795-796 [96 L.Ed. 1302, 1307-1308, 72 S.Ct. 1002].)

The majority concedes that there are circumstances in which claims may be raised on appeal in the absence of a timely objection in the trial court. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 591, fn. 7.) The majority, however, fails to state a principled legal basis for identifying the “circumstances” that may or may not require an objection. As I have shown, the relevant “circumstance” is whether the law has allocated the duty to speak to the party against whom the forfeiture is asserted.