Court Opinion

ID: 9773098
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:36:44.531893+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:50.040638
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
In determining an application for writ of habeas corpus, it must be kept in mind that the duty of the Court of Civil Appeals is limited to determining whether the trial court’s contempt order was void. If the contempt order was void, the relator shall be discharged. If the order of the trial court was only erroneous, then the relator shall be remanded to the custody of the sheriff or other law enforcement official and be jailed pursuant to the orders of the court imposing the commitment. The Court of Civil Appeals has no authority in a habeas corpus proceeding to reform a trial court’s judgment. That may be done by the applicable remedy of appeal or writ of error to the Court of Civil Appeals.
The matter of attorney’s fees in this case cannot be reformed. The court awarded respondent’s attorney the sum of $2,750.00 *321as attorney’s fees. A portion of that was probably attributable to the work done in behalf of respondent in pursuing the contempt matter under Rule 308-A, Tex.R. Civ.P. The other portion of the fee was probably attributable to work done in behalf of respondent in getting the amount of child support changed. Pursuant to Tex. Family Code Ann. § 11.18, the trial court could award attorney’s fees for respondent’s attorney. It is impossible for us to determine from the record which part of the fee, if any, was related to the Rule 308-A proceeding and which part, if any, was related to the application to change the amount of child support. Whatever portion was attributable to the Rule 308-A proceeding is unenforceable because relator was found by this Court not to be in contempt. Ex Parte Myrick, supra. Whatever portion of the fee that was attributable to Section 11.18, would now be final because no appeal was taken from that award. If the trial court lumped all of the fee together and did not initially make a determination as to how much of the fee was related to the Rule 308-A proceeding and how much was attributable to the child support proceeding, then the trial court’s order would be vague and uncertain, thus requiring a new determination. However, we point out that such issue is not before this Court for the resolution, except to say that if any portion of the attorney’s fee was awarded pursuant to the Rule 308-A proceeding, such portion of the fee is unenforceable as stated in Ex Parte Myrick, supra.
Whether the $4,353.57 paid by relator during the period from May 13, 1978, through April 4, 1979, was to be applied to the oldest amount due for child support or the most recent amount due, is a fact question to be determined by the trial court because it involves the intent of the relator since he voluntarily made the payments. Had the payments been made pursuant to a coercive order of the court, then, if not specifically stated in the order, such payments would be presumed to have been applied to the oldest amounts due, not barred by limitations, if that defense had been urged by the relator. Certainly, one who has been required to make child support payments, some of which may have become barred by limitations, may yet voluntarily pay the support payments to which the limitation statute would be applicable.
Relator’s motion for rehearing is overruled.