Court Opinion

ID: 9388617
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-21 05:04:52.883873+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:21.410649
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                           COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                   UNPUBLISHED
                                                                   April 20, 2023
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

V                                                                  No. 357608
                                                                   Allegan Circuit Court
DEVON JOHN SCHNYDERS,                                              LC No. 20-023654-FH

               Defendant-Appellant.

Before: GLEICHER, C.J., and MARKEY and RICK, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

       A jury convicted Devon Schnyders of possession of methamphetamine, MCL
333.7403(2)(b)(i), arising from the discovery of residue in two glass pipes found in his vehicle.
Schnyders challenged the validity of the inventory search of his truck and claimed that Allegan
County Sheriff Sergeant Brandon Berens improperly elicited inculpatory statements from him after
he requested an attorney. We affirm.

                                      I. BACKGROUND

        On February 1, 2019, Sergeant Berens stopped a vehicle because the driver, Schnyders,
was not wearing a seatbelt and the tab on the truck’s license plate was expired. Schnyders
presented a state-issued identification card instead of a driver’s license. Sergeant Berens
conducted a Law Enforcement Information Network search and discovered that Schnyders’s
license had been suspended and that the license plate affixed to the vehicle was not registered to
the truck. And Sergeant Berens stated that Schnyders did not have no-fault insurance.

        Sergeant Berens asked for permission to search the vehicle, but Schnyder refused consent.
The sergeant decided to impound the vehicle because it was not properly registered or insured.
Moreover, neither Schnyders nor his passenger had a valid license, precluding either from driving
the vehicle away. The sergeant ordered Schnyders to exit the vehicle so he could perform an
inventory search before the vehicle was towed. He inquired whether there was anything illegal
inside the truck and Schnyders indicated that there was not. During his search, Sergeant Berens

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found two glass smoking pipes under a blanket next to the driver’s seat. The residue inside the
pipes later tested positive for meth.

        Sergeant Berens described that Schnyders became belligerent when the sergeant stated his
intent to conduct an inventory search. Sergeant Berens handcuffed Schnyders and escorted him to
his patrol vehicle. While seated in the patrol car, Schnyders answered questions posed by the
sergeant. Schnyders indicated that he took the pipes from a friend who was struggling with
addiction, but admitted that he had smoked meth in the previous two or three days. At the
conclusion of this stop, Sergeant Berens drove Schnyders five to eight miles to his brother’s house.
The sergeant permitted Schnyders to remove his tools from the truck and bring them with him.

        Charges were not brought against Schnyders immediately. Before trial and nearly two
years after his stop, Schnyders moved to exclude the evidence seized from his truck. Schnyders
contended that the inventory search was a pretext for an illegal search. Specifically, Schnyders
asserted that the vehicle was safely parked and that someone could have taken control of the
vehicle, and so impoundment was unnecessary. Schnyders also presented photographs taken
nearly two years after the search depicting damage to the truck’s interior. Within the body of the
motion, Schnyders also sought to suppress the incriminating statement he made to Sergeant Berens
inside the patrol car. He asserted that Sergeant Berens continued questioning him after he
requested an attorney.

       The trial court denied the motion to suppress the evidence from inside the truck. The court
determined that the sergeant identified a proper purpose for impounding the vehicle: without a
proper registration and license plate, the vehicle could not legally be driven on the road.
Accordingly, it was irrelevant if there was a licensed driver that could have driven the truck from
the scene. The court concluded that the sergeant had not damaged the truck during the inventory
search. As the truck “ha[d] been sitting for nearly two years, there [were] all kinds of things that
could have happened to” it. The court declined to consider Schnyders’s motion to suppress his
statement, however, as it was not properly presented.

        Schnyders subsequently filed a motion to suppress his statement to Sergeant Berens and
sought reconsideration of the denial of his motion to suppress the evidence from his truck. With
his motion for reconsideration, Schnyders included the sheriff department’s policy on
impoundment and inventory searches. At the hearing on these motions, Sergeant Berens testified
that he could not recall Schnyders requesting an attorney. However, had Schnyders requested an
attorney, Sergeant Berens indicated that he would have noted that in the police report and would
have ceased his questioning. Moreover, Sergeant Berens testified that once Schnyders was placed
in the patrol vehicle, he advised Schnyders of his Miranda rights. He again could not recall what
Schnyders’s response was when asked if he waived his rights. But if Schnyders had not waived
his rights, the sergeant stated that he would have stopped his questioning and indicated this in his
report. Schnyders, on the other hand, insisted that he repeatedly requested an attorney, beginning
when he was first removed from his truck and before the inventory search was conducted. To
prove the strength of his memory, Schnyders testified that he remembered eating Cheerios for
breakfast on the morning before the traffic stop.

        The court acknowledged the conflicting evidence about whether Schnyders waived his
rights or requested an attorney. However, the court opined “that answering questions can be

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construed as an implicit waiver of” one’s rights. The court took the matter under advisement and
ultimately noted that this was a pure credibility contest: “[I]t’s a question of weighing credibility,
in this case, to decide which version is more credible because they are so diametrically opposed in
this case.” The court opined that both Schnyders and Sergeant Berens “seemed credible,” but
found it “a little unusual . . . that Mr. Schnyders could recall what he had for breakfast that
morning,” two years later. But had Schnyders not waived his rights and had requested an attorney,
the court accepted that such details would have been included in the police report. The court also
denied Schnyders’s motion for reconsideration of the motion to suppress the evidence from his
truck.

      The matter proceeded to trial and a jury convicted Schnyders of possession of meth.
Schnyders now appeals the denial of his pretrial motions.

                                    II. INVENTORY SEARCH

        We review de novo a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, but review the
underlying factual findings for clear error. People v Williams, 472 Mich 308, 313; 696 NW2d 636
(2005). A factual finding is clearly erroneous if it leaves this Court with a firm and definite
conviction that a mistake was made. People v Gingrich, 307 Mich App 656, 661; 862 NW2d 432
(2014).

        Both the United States and Michigan Constitutions protect individuals from unreasonable
searches and seizures. US Const, Ams IV and XIV; Const 1963, art 1, § 11; People v Slaughter,
489 Mich 302, 310-311; 803 NW2d 171 (2011). The exclusionary rule generally bars the
introduction of evidence obtained during an unconstitutional search. People v Hawkins, 468 Mich
488, 498-499; 668 NW2d 602 (2003). “In order to show that a search was legal, the police must
show either that they had a warrant or that their conduct fell under one of the narrow, specific
exceptions to the warrant requirement.” People v Eaton, 241 Mich App 459, 461; 617 NW2d 363
(2000).

        One such exception to the warrant requirement is “[t]he performance of an inventory search
by the police in accordance with departmental regulations.” People v Toohey, 438 Mich 265, 271;
475 NW2d 16 (1991). This is because an inventory search is “an administrative function
performed by the police, rather than part of a criminal investigation which the Fourth Amendment
was intended to circumscribe.” Id. at 272. For impounded vehicles, “An inventory search that is
conducted pursuant to standardized police procedure is considered reasonable because the
resulting intrusion will be limited to the extent it is necessary to fulfill the caretaking function.”
Id. at 275-276. The purpose of the inventory search is to secure and list the property within an
impounded vehicle to protect both the owner and law enforcement officer. Id. at 275.

       The United States Supreme Court described in Florida v Wells, 495 US 1, 4; 110 S Ct
1632; 109 L Ed 2d 1 (1990):

       [A]n inventory search must not be a ruse for a general rummaging in order to
       discover incriminating evidence. The policy or practice governing inventory
       searches should be designed to produce an inventory. The individual police officer
       must not be allowed so much latitude that inventory searches are turned into a

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       purposeful and general means of discovering evidence of crime[.] [Quotation
       marks and citation omitted.]

        The Allegan County Sheriff’s Office “vehicle impound, abandoned vehicle and inventory”
policy provides that “[v]ehicles may be impounded” under a list of circumstances. Relevant to
this matter, a vehicle may be impounded when it “is found to be without a registration, improperly
registered or titled, or operated without insurance[.]” When an officer impounds a vehicle, he or
she must “make a reasonable attempt to provide for the security of the vehicle and its contents by:
1) turning custody of the vehicle over to a responsible person of the owner and/or operator’s
choosing or; 2) placing the vehicle and its contents in impound with an approved towing service.”

         The truck driven by Schnyders was not properly registered and bore a license plate that
belonged to a different vehicle. Moreover, Schnyders did not have no-fault insurance coverage.
Sergeant Berens had a right under the department policy to impound the vehicle. Sergeant Berens
then had two options: turn custody of the vehicle over to a properly licensed individual or have the
vehicle towed. Neither Schnyders nor his passenger had a valid driver’s license. Although
Schnyders contended in his motion that his brother could have taken the vehicle, Sergeant Berens
testified that Schnyders could identify no one available to take custody of the vehicle at the time.1
The trial court observed the witnesses first hand and credited the sergeant’s account over
Schnyders’s. We must defer to the trial court’s “superior opportunity to evaluate these matters”
of credibility. People v Sexton, 461 Mich 746, 752; 609 NW2d 822 (2000). In any event, as the
vehicle did not have mandatory insurance, or a proper registration or license plate, the vehicle
could not be operated legally on a public road.

        Schnyders challenges the validity of the inventory search because Sergeant Berens did not
create a comprehensive list of every item inside the truck. An inventory search may be
procedurally defective when it is not shown “that standard inventory forms were completed and
kept for future reference (showing presence or absence of valuables), [or] that a place of
safekeeping for valuables so secured was maintained.” People v Long (On Remand), 419 Mich
636, 647-648; 359 NW2d 194 (1984) (quotation marks and citations deleted). The police report
indicated that Sergeant Berens found two glass pipes under a blanket and a cooler with two cans
of beer inside the truck. Schnyders indicated that he also had clothing and tools in the vehicle.
Sergeant Berens permitted Schnyders to remove the tools from the truck before it was impounded.
Accordingly, those items would not be included on any inventory. The omission of mention of
Schnyders’s articles of clothing from the police report’s recitation of the inventory had no real
impact on this case.

        Schnyders also asserts that the photographic evidence supports that Sergeant Schnyders
“ransacked” his truck and pulled the speakers from the dashboard looking for evidence. The trial
court correctly determined, however, that the photographs taken nearly two years after the search

1
  Even though his brother lived only five to eight miles away from the site of the stop and the
sergeant drove Schnyders there after impounding the truck, Schnyders presented no evidence that
his brother had a valid driver’s license.

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and Schnyders could not establish that the damage depicted was caused by the sheriff’s department
or within the impoundment lot.

                               III. RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT

        Schnyders also challenges the admission of his statement in the patrol car. Generally,
before engaging in custodial interrogation, police must inform a suspect of his or her rights to
remain silent and to have an attorney present for questioning. Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436,
469-473; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966). Once the right to counsel is invoked, all
interrogation must cease until counsel is made available, or unless the accused initiates further
communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. Edwards v Arizona, 451 US 477,
484-485; 101 S Ct 1880; 68 L Ed 2d 378 (1981). “The right to have counsel present during
custodial interrogation is a corollary of the right against compelled self-incrimination,” because
the availability of counsel at a custodial interrogation helps to ensure that statements offered are
not coerced. People v Elliott, 494 Mich 292, 301; 833 NW2d 284 (2013), citing Miranda, 384 US
at 466.

        As aptly noted by the trial court, whether Schnyders invoked his right to counsel was a
pure credibility contest. Although Sergeant Berens could not specifically recall the details of the
evening in question, he testified that had Schnyders requested an attorney, he would have ceased
all questioning and stated in his report that Schnyders had invoked his right. Schnyders’s attempts
to make his memory look more reliable were purely self-serving. Again, it is not the role of this
Court to interfere with the lower court’s assessment of the testifying witnesses’ credibility.

        The trial court’s conclusion that Schnyders implicitly waived his rights is more
complicated. However, we need not dwell on that issue. Even if Schnyders’s statement was
improperly admitted, any error was harmless. “A constitutional error is harmless if it is clear
beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the
error.” People v Henry (On Remand), 305 Mich App 127, 144; 854 NW2d 114 (2014) (cleaned
up). Sergeant Berens found the meth pipes in the truck during a valid inventory search. Those
pipes were within easy reach of the driver’s seat, hidden only under a blanket. This evidence was
more than adequate to establish Schnyders’s possession of the contraband. See People v Cohen,
294 Mich App 70, 77; 816 NW2d 474 (2011) (holding that at a minimum, joint constructive
possession can be established by the discovery of drug paraphernalia in plain view on a vehicle’s
center console).

       We affirm.

                                                             /s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
                                                             /s/ Jane E. Markey
                                                             /s/ Michelle M. Rick

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