Court Opinion

ID: 9684536
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:00:04.6323+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:56.897949
License: Public Domain

Dissenting opinion by
Justice ROACH.
The Workers’ Compensation Board was correct and properly construed KRS 342.0011(ll)(a) and KRS 342.140(5) in light of Central Kentucky Steel v. Wise, 19 S.W.3d 657, 659 (Ky.2000), and Robertson v. United Parcel Service, 64 S.W.3d 284 (Ky.2001). Therefore, I would reverse.
Workers’ compensation is statutory. KRS 342.0011(ll)(a) provides that:
“Temporary total disability” means the condition of an employee who has not reached maximum medical improvement from an injury and has not reached a level of improvement that would permit a return to employment.
KRS 342.140(5) is mandatory and makes no exceptions. It provides:
When the employee is working under concurrent contracts with two (2) or *516more employers and the defendant employer has knowledge of the employment prior to the injury, his wages from all the employers shall be considered as if earned from the employer liable for compensation.
Nothing in either statute implies a legislative intent to authorize temporary total disability (TTD) benefits based on a worker’s inability to perform one of two concurrent jobs. An individual who continues to perform one of two concurrent jobs after an injury clearly is able to “return to employment.” The majority opinion is simply awarding benefits for temporary partial disability, which are not available under KRS Chapter 342. Robertson, 64 S.W.3d at 287.
The majority relies upon Wise for the principle that if a worker has not reached maximum medical improvement, TTD is not precluded by a release to return to something less than the individual’s customary work or the work performed at the time of the injury. What the majority overlooks is that Wise did not involve concurrent employments and that the injured worker did not work during the disputed period. In the present ease, as in Robertson, the claimant’s injury did not prevent him from continuing to perform one of his concurrent jobs. Therefore, Appellee Mitchell was not entitled to TTD because his post-injury condition permitted a return to employment. The majority has chosen to ignore the clear language of KRS 342.140(5) and, in doing so, has effectively amended the statute without a vote of the General Assembly. I respectfully dissent.