Court Opinion

ID: 9398423
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-31 13:05:13.072483+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:33.255118
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
  Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
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  official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

                                                   Decided: May 31, 2023

                          S23A0166. DAVIS v. THE STATE.

       LAGRUA, Justice.

       Appellant Garrett Davis was convicted of felony murder in

connection with the shooting death of Eugene Stinchcomb. 1 On

appeal, Davis contends that (1) the evidence was legally insufficient

to support his convictions, (2) his trial counsel provided

constitutionally ineffective assistance, (3) the trial court erred by

failing to instruct the jury on confession corroboration, and (4) the

       1Stinchcomb died on May 10, 2012. On August 7, 2012, a Fulton County
grand jury indicted Davis for malice murder, felony murder, aggravated
assault with a deadly weapon, and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony. At a trial from December 16 to 18, 2013, the jury found
Davis not guilty of malice murder, but guilty of the remaining counts. The trial
court merged the aggravated assault count into the felony murder count and
sentenced Davis to serve life in prison with the possibility of parole, plus five
years. Davis filed a timely motion for new trial, which was amended through
new counsel. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion for new
trial on September 2, 2022. Davis filed a timely notice of appeal, and his case
was docketed to this Court’s term beginning in December 2022 and submitted
for a decision on the briefs.
trial court erred by failing to grant a new trial based on prosecutorial

misconduct. These claims fail, and we affirm.

      Background. The evidence presented at Davis’s trial showed

that, on May 9, 2012, law enforcement officers responded to a 911

call reporting a shooting at an apartment complex located at 635

Jett Street. Upon arrival, officers discovered a man bleeding from

his left leg, who refused to provide his name or any information

about the shooting. A 9mm shell casing was recovered near the

injured man, and he was transported to Grady Hospital. Police

officers spoke to several bystanders, including a man who had

applied a tourniquet to the injured man’s leg, but each person

refused to provide any information about the shooting. The injured

man died the next day, and he was eventually identified as Eugene

Stinchcomb. The medical examiner determined that Stinchcomb’s

cause of death was probable sepsis due to a gunshot wound to the

left leg.

      Two days after the shooting, Rory Session called 911 and stated

he was “turning in his nephew” because Davis had “confessed” to “a

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shooting, a murder” on “Jett Street” of “Eugene Stony,” who “died in

Grady [Hospital] the other day.” Session stated he was going to pick

up Davis and then drive to a relative’s house and police should meet

them there.

     When Session and Davis arrived at the relative’s house, officers

were waiting. Davis and Session were separated, and a police officer

conducted a pat-down of Davis and recovered a 9mm magazine,

containing a single bullet, from Davis’s pocket. A 9mm handgun was

also recovered from underneath the front passenger seat where

Davis had been sitting. When the gun was pulled out of the car,

Session stated, “[T]hat’s not mine.” Session told a detective that he

called 911 and “told them that [Davis] had confessed to . . . a murder,

to a shooting . . . over the phone today[.]”

     Ballistics testing revealed that the 9mm shell casing recovered

near Stinchomb’s body was fired from the 9mm handgun recovered

from Session’s car. Crime scene technicians were unable to find any

fingerprints on the shell casing, handgun, or bullet.

     Several of the bystanders, who initially refused to speak to

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police on the day of shooting, testified at trial. Rollo Gregory testified

that he saw Davis walk to Jeremy Douglas’s apartment, speak with

Douglas for a minute, and then stand around in the parking lot.

According to Gregory, Stinchcomb arrived at the apartment complex

during this time frame and asked Gregory, “Who has the good dope?”

Gregory responded that he did not know, and Stinchcomb would

“have to check and see.” Stinchcomb then went to speak to Douglas

at his apartment. After Stinchcomb left Douglas’s apartment,

Stinchcomb     encountered     Davis,    and    they   began    arguing.

Stinchcomb said: “I don’t screw with you . . . I don’t want nothing

you got . . . Just leave me alone.” Stinchcomb then asked, “Man, you

going to shoot me?” Gregory then witnessed Davis shoot Stinchcomb,

put the gun into his pants, and say, “[H]e won’t talk back to nobody

else like that.” Gregory went over to Stinchcomb, took off his shirt,

and used it to tie a tourniquet around Stinchcomb’s leg.

     Sir James Woods testified that on the day of the shooting, he

was standing in the doorway of a friend’s apartment when he heard

Davis and Stinchcomb arguing, and he witnessed Davis shoot

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Stinchcomb. And Melvin Croom testified that on the day of the

shooting, he was sitting outside of his apartment, heard Davis and

Stinchcomb arguing, heard a gunshot, and then saw Davis walk

away from Stinchcomb.

     1. Davis contends the trial court erred in denying the motion

for new trial because the evidence was insufficient. We disagree.

     Evidence is constitutionally sufficient to support a conviction

if, “‘after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Jackson v. State,

315 Ga. 543, 549 (1) (883 SE2d 815) (2023) (quoting Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560)

(1979)). “This Court does not reweigh evidence or resolve conflicts in

testimony but rather defers to the jury’s assessment of the weight

and credibility of the evidence.” Jones v. State, 314 Ga. 692, 695 (878

SE2d 502) (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted).

     Here, the evidence showed that Davis shot and killed

Stinchcomb in front of multiple eyewitnesses, admitted to his uncle

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that he shot Stinchcomb, and was in possession of the murder

weapon two days after the shooting. Accordingly, we conclude that

the evidence was sufficient to support Davis’s convictions, and this

claim is without merit.

     2.   Davis   contends    that    his   trial   counsel   provided

constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to investigate alibi

evidence and by failing to request a jury instruction on confession

corroboration. We conclude these claims fail.

     To prevail on these claims, Davis must demonstrate both that

his trial counsel’s performance was professionally deficient and that

he was prejudiced by this deficient performance. See Bates v. State,

313 Ga. 57, 62 (2) (867 SE2d 140) (2022) (citing Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (III) (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674)

(1984)). To establish deficient performance, Davis must show that

trial counsel performed his duties in an objectively unreasonable

way, considering all the circumstances and in the light of prevailing

professional norms. See id. Establishing deficient performance

     is no easy showing, as the law recognizes a strong

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     presumption that counsel performed reasonably, and [the
     appellant] bears the burden of overcoming this
     presumption. To carry this burden, he must show that no
     reasonable lawyer would have done what his lawyer did,
     or would have failed to do what his lawyer did not. In
     particular, decisions regarding trial tactics and strategy
     may form the basis for an ineffectiveness claim only if
     they were so patently unreasonable that no competent
     attorney would have followed such a course.

Park v. State, 314 Ga. 733, 740-741 (879 SE2d 400) (2022) (citation

and punctuation omitted). To establish prejudice, Davis must prove

that there is a reasonable probability that, but for his trial counsel’s

deficiency, the result of the trial would have been different. See

Bates, 313 Ga. at 62 (2). “A reasonable probability is a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. (citation and

punctuation omitted). “And, this burden is a heavy one.” Id. at 62-

63 (2) (citation and punctuation omitted). “If an appellant fails to

meet his or her burden of proving either prong of the Strickland test,

the reviewing court does not have to examine the other prong.”

Taylor v. State, 315 Ga. 630, 647 (5) (b) (884 SE2d 346) (2023)

(citation and punctuation omitted). “This Court accepts a trial

court’s factual findings and credibility determinations on an

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ineffectiveness claim unless they are clearly erroneous, but we apply

legal principles to the facts de novo.” Bonner v. State, 314 Ga. 472,

474 (1) (877 SE2d 588) (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted).

     (a) Davis contends that his trial counsel performed deficiently

by failing to investigate evidence of alibi. But, in his appellate brief,

Davis also “concedes that this enumeration of error is without merit

based on trial counsel’s testimony at the motion[-]for[-]new[-]trial

hearing and applicable case law,” and we agree.

     At the motion-for-new-trial hearing, Davis’s trial counsel

testified that he was informed of a potential alibi, i.e., that Davis

was babysitting a child at a nearby apartment complex. Trial

counsel went to the apartment complex to locate the parent(s) and

child for whom Davis was babysitting, but trial counsel was unable

to locate them after speaking with residents and a property

manager. After obtaining additional details from Davis, trial counsel

went back to the apartment complex, but was still unsuccessful in

locating any potential alibi witnesses.

     It is hardly unreasonable, or outside the scope of prevailing

                                   8
professional norms, to diligently investigate an alibi and simply fail

to discover any such evidence of alibi. See Henderson v. State, 310

Ga. 231, 244 (3) (b) (850 SE2d 152) (2020) (the appellant failed to

show that trial counsel performed deficiently when the evidence

showed that trial counsel attempted to locate alibi witnesses but

they could not be found). Accordingly, Davis has failed to show that

his trial counsel performed deficiently, and this enumeration of

error fails.

     (b) Davis contends that his trial counsel performed deficiently

by failing to request a jury instruction on confession corroboration.

See OCGA § 24-8-823 (“A confession alone, uncorroborated by any

other evidence, shall not justify a conviction.”). But see Thomas v.

State, 308 Ga. 26, 30 (838 SE2d 801) (2020) (“Incriminating

statements, unlike confessions, do not require corroborating

evidence.”). Assuming, without deciding, that Davis’s statement to

Session was a confession, see English v. State, 300 Ga. 471, 474 (2)

(796 SE2d 258) (2017) (distinguishing admissions, where “only one

or more facts entering into the criminal act are admitted,” and

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confessions, where “the entire criminal act is confessed,” (citation

and punctuation omitted)), and pretermitting whether Davis’s trial

counsel was deficient, we conclude that Davis has not established

prejudice.

     Here, there was ample evidence at trial to corroborate Davis’s

statement to Session, including the testimony of Gregory and

Woods, who testified that they witnessed Davis shoot Stinchcomb,

and the testimony of Croom, who testified that he witnessed Davis

and Stinchcomb arguing immediately before Stinchcomb was shot.

Additionally, the 9mm shell casing recovered near Stinchcomb’s

body was fired from the 9mm handgun recovered from underneath

Davis’s seat in Session’s car. This other evidence was strongly

inculpatory.

     Thus, even if Davis’s counsel was deficient for failing to request

a confession-corroboration instruction, Davis has failed to show that

there is a reasonable probability that the result of his trial would

have been different if the trial court had given the instruction. See

Hooper v. State, 313 Ga. 451, 456 (1) (870 SE2d 391) (2022) (the

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appellant failed to show a reasonable probability of a different

outcome where there was evidence sufficient to corroborate the

confession and there was other strongly inculpatory evidence).

     3. In a related claim, Davis contends that the trial court plainly

erred by not instructing the jury on confession corroboration.

Because Davis failed to request such a jury instruction, we review

only for plain error. See Simmons v. State, 314 Ga. 883, 888 (2) (880

SE2d 125) (2022).

     To establish plain error, Davis “must demonstrate that the

instructional error was not affirmatively waived, was obvious

beyond reasonable dispute, likely affected the outcome of the

proceedings, and seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public

reputation of judicial proceedings. Satisfying all four prongs of this

standard is difficult, as it should be.” Clarke v. State, 308 Ga. 630,

637 (5) (842 SE2d 863) (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted).

“The Court need not analyze all of the elements of the plain error

test when the appellant fails to establish one of them.” Hood v. State,

311 Ga. 855, 866 (2) (860 SE2d 432) (2021) (citation and punctuation

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omitted).

     As explained in Division 2 (b), there was ample, strongly

inculpatory corroborating evidence at trial. Thus, Davis cannot

satisfy the third prong of the plain-error test by showing that the

trial court’s failure to give the jury instruction sua sponte on

confession corroboration likely affected the outcome of the trial court

proceedings. See Hood, 311 Ga. at 866-867 (2) (concluding there was

no plain error where the appellant failed to demonstrate that the

failure to give the confession-corroboration jury instruction likely

affected outcome of the trial in light of “ample evidence

corroborating the confessions”). See also Simmons, 314 Ga. at 892

(3) (b) (equating the prejudice prong of the plain-error test with the

prejudice prong for an ineffective assistance claim).4. Davis

contends the trial court erred by failing to grant a new trial based

on prosecutorial misconduct. We disagree.

     (a) Background. At trial, Laneka Bristow, a crime scene

technician, testified that she documented and collected the shell

casing at the crime scene and sealed it in a bag for transport to the

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GBI. On cross-examination, Bristow was asked whether she

attempted to find a fingerprint on the shell casing, and she

responded that she processed the shell casing for fingerprints, but

no print was located. Bristow was asked whether her attempt to

locate a fingerprint was in any of her reports, and Bristow responded

that it “should be.” But after reviewing both of her reports, Bristow

admitted the processing of the shell casing was not in her reports.

     Also at trial, Antoinette Otey, a crime scene technician,

testified that she processed the handgun and bullet for fingerprints,

but she was unable to recover any. Otey was asked when she tested

for fingerprints, and she responded that it was “a day or two later,”

but that the actual date would be in her reports. Davis’s trial counsel

then presented Otey with her reports, and Otey testified that she

processed the items for fingerprints on May 12, 2012, which was the

day after the items were recovered. Davis’s trial counsel then asked

Otey why her reports were updated on December 5, 2013,

approximately 11 days before trial. Otey responded that she “forgot”

to indicate in her initial reports that she tested for fingerprints and

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that she updated her reports when she reviewed them closer to trial.

     Prior to the motion-for-new-trial hearing, Davis filed the

affidavit of the Atlanta Police Department’s records custodian, who

averred that she searched for any records indicating that fingerprint

testing was done in this case, but she was unable to locate any such

documents. She further averred that “[a]ll records of fingerprint

analysis on any evidence would have been documented in the

provided Crime Scene Reports from Crime Scene Tech[nicians]

Bristow or Otey,” and “[t]hey have informed me that there is no

fingerprint documentation” regarding this case.

     (b) Davis contends that Otey and Bristow falsely testified that

they processed the shell casing and handgun for fingerprints, and

the State’s failure to correct the testimony of these witnesses denied

Davis due process of law. See Harris v. State, 309 Ga. 599, 607 (2)

(c) (847 SE2d 563) (2020) (“The knowing use of material, false

evidence by the State in a criminal prosecution violates due process,

even where the falsehood bears upon the witness’s credibility rather

than directly upon the defendant’s guilt.” (citation and punctuation

                                 14
omitted)). To prevail on this claim, Davis must show that

     (1) the prosecutor knowingly used perjured testimony or
     failed to correct what he subsequently learned was false
     testimony; and (2) such use was material[,] i.e., that there
     is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could
     have affected the judgment.

Id. (citation and punctuation omitted).

     Although we have serious doubts that Davis has made the

threshold showing that the prosecutor knowingly used perjured

testimony or failed to correct what the prosecutor subsequently

learned was false testimony, we need not reach these questions

because we conclude that Davis’s claim was not preserved since it

was not raised at trial. See Horton v. State, 310 Ga. 310, 325 (4) (849

SE2d 382) (2020) (concluding that the appellant’s claim of

prosecutorial misconduct by the State in allegedly allowing the

medical examiner to testify falsely and therefore violate his due

process right to a fair trial was not preserved because it was not

raised at trial). Accordingly, this claimfails.

     (c) Davis contends in the alternative that the State’s failure to

disclose evidence of fingerprint processing denied Davis due process

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of law. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (83 SCt 1194, 10

LE2d 215) (1963) (“[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence

favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the

evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of

the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”). To prevail on his

Brady claim, Davis must show that

     (1) the State possessed evidence favorable to his defense;
     (2) he did not possess the favorable evidence and could not
     obtain it himself with any reasonable diligence; (3) the
     State suppressed the favorable evidence; and (4) had the
     evidence been disclosed to the defense, a reasonable
     probability exists that the outcome of the trial would have
     been different.

Harris v. State, 313 Ga. 653, 664 (5) (872 SE2d 732) (2022) (citation

and punctuation omitted).

      (i) Regarding the processing of fingerprints on the handgun

recovered from Session’s car and the bullet recovered from the

magazine in Davis’s pocket, we conclude that Davis has failed to

show that the State possessed evidence favorable to Davis which

Davis did not also possess. We know Davis possessed the evidence

because his trial counsel introduced Otey’s reports at trial, showing

                                 16
that the items were processed for fingerprints, and he cross-

examined Otey on the reports. Accordingly, this claim has no merit

because Davis has failed to meet the second prong of the Brady test.

     (ii) Regarding the processing of fingerprints on the shell casing

recovered near Stinchcomb’s body, we conclude that Davis has failed

to show that favorable evidence was not disclosed to him.

     At trial, Bristow testified that she processed the shell casing

for fingerprints, and she did not find any fingerprints. Davis’s trial

counsel questioned Bristow on the fact that her reports omitted any

mention of fingerprint analysis, and Bristow admitted that her

reports failed to include this information.

     Davis has not shown that earlier disclosure of the fact that his

fingerprints were not discovered on the shell casing would have

benefited him, and he has not shown that the delayed disclosure

deprived him of a fair trial or materially prejudiced his case. Indeed,

even if this evidence was turned over to defense counsel prior to

trial, it is not material in a case where multiple people witnessed

Davis shoot Stinchcomb, Davis “confessed” to his uncle, and the

                                  17
murder weapon was recovered underneath Davis’s car seat. See

Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280 (II) (119 SCt 1936, 144 LE2d

286) (1999) (In the context of Brady, “evidence is material if there is

a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the

defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”

(citation and punctuation omitted)).

     Accordingly, this claim has no merit because Davis has failed

to show a violation of Brady. See Burgan v. State, 258 Ga. 512, 514

(1) (371 SE2d 854) (1988) (concluding “Brady was not violated by the

nondisclosure of such inconsistent statements before trial where the

witness was extensively cross-examined about the inconsistencies,

earlier disclosure would not have benefited the defense, and the

delayed disclosure did not deprive him of a fair trial or materially

prejudice his case”).

     Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

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