Court Opinion

ID: 9649390
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:51:35.082511+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:10.454862
License: Public Domain

FICKLING, Associate Judge
(dissenting) :
In my view the issue is whether appellant’s inculpatory statement should have been ruled inadmissible since the statement was in response to a question asked by the arresting officer after an arrest had been effected but before Miranda1 warnings were given.
The record supports the trial judge’s finding that appellant was under arrest when the officer asked, “What are you doing here ?” and appellant answered, “Just getting tires, man.” Moreover, at the time the question was asked, the officer was handcuffing appellant in order to secure the arrest which had previously been accomplished when the officer, with drawn gun, had ordered the appellant to “hold it right there.”
The majority are of the opinion that the question asked by the officer after appellant was under arrest and while being handcuffed did not constitute a “custodial interrogation” within the meaning of Miranda. I disagree.
The Supreme Court in Miranda stated:
By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. . . . [Miranda, supra at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612; footnote omitted.]
The meaning of the above language is crystal clear and I am compelled to conclude that the officer’s question constituted a custodial interrogation. In the instant case, the officer asked “What are you doing here?” We said in Brewster2 that the crucial factor is not the type or number of questions asked, but rather whether the questions were asked during a custodial *826interrogation. Here the appellant had not only been arrested and taken into custody at the time of the question, hut had been further deprived of his freedom in a significant way when the officer began handcuffing him. Therefore, this questioning in this context of almost total deprivation of freedom was clearly “custodial interrogation” within the meaning of Miranda. Brown v. United States, D.C.App., 278 A. 2d 462, 466 (1971).
The majority state that they “shy away from an easy, mechanical application of the black-letter words” of Miranda. I know of no reason (other than mere disagreement with the rule) why black-letter words which are clear and unambiguous should not apply to the facts of this case. The nature of our judicial system requires no less, even in the face of disagreement.
.The majority emphasize the fact that the appellant “was caught in the very commission of a crime and it was during the contemporaneous securing of his hands that the officer asked the question.” I fail to find the relevance of this observation. Miranda does not except from its coverage questions asked at the. time of arrest. Such an exception, in fact, would completely nullify the Miranda rule. For instance, if a person is caught while committing a criminal act, a police officer prior to giving the Miranda warnings would be permitted to ask an arrestee, “Why did you do it?” and thereby secure a confession. There is no doubt that such a confession would be suppressed under Miranda, notwithstanding the fact that the question was asked contemporaneously with the arrest.
It also appears that the majority are engaged in fact-finding which is beyond the scope of our review power. D.C. Code 1973, § 17-305. They use such phrases as “the officer’s question . may be construed as one of wonderment rather than accusation”; “question asked ref lexively”; and “appellant’s instantaneous response . . . more akin to a volunteered statement.” Having thus characterized the officer's question as other than a question and appellant’s response as other than a response, they conclude that “custodial interrogation” did not begin until additional officers arrived on the scene. However, the trial judge found and the record is clear that the officer asked a question and appellant responded to that question while in custody.
Further, the majority attempt to soften the impact of their opinion by stating that “the single inquiry was a part of the apprehension rather than an event separately orchestrated by the police to obtain evidence.” I respond by saying that a rose by another name is a rose just the same. The “inquiry” was a question and the “apprehension” was an arrest.
The majority imply that Miranda was only intended to apply when one is held for interrogation, not when a person has been arrested during the commission of a crime or arrested on probable cause. Of course, such implication is clearly contrary to Miranda.3
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.

. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

. Brewster v. United States, D.C.App., 271 A.2d 409, 412 (1970).

. The majority’s reliance on Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 446-47, 94 S.Ct. 2357, 41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974), is misplaced. There the issue was whether the testimony of a witness should have been suppressed because the identity of the witness was discovered during the custodial interrogation of the defendant, who was not given the complete Miranda warnings. The only missing element was that defendant was not told that counsel would be appointed if he was indigent. The Supreme Court held that the statements of the defendant were properly suppressed and the testimony of the witness was properly admitted into evidence. We have no such factual situation in the instant case.