Court Opinion

ID: 9603544
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:07:34.112634+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:12.973461
License: Public Domain

URBIGKIT, Justice,
dissenting.*
I would not concur with the majority’s conclusion to approve the decision of the trial court in setting aside what was probably the most significant and factually justified finding in the special verdict, nor with the action of this court in approving a clearly discriminatory application of peremptory challenges. Consequently, I dissent.
Implicit in the trial jury’s findings as then reversed by the trial court, issue number three demonstrates the pre-existing error in allocation of peremptory challenges.
*672ISSUE NO. 3. Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that there is such a unity of interest and ownership between Defendant Meadowrivers Corp. and Plaintiff Zwaanshoek that they should be treated as a single entity? Yes X No ' 1
This finding is persuasive, if not manda-torily dictated, by the evidence provided by the trial record. However, this unity, to be considered as a single entity under the evidence adduced (in Jackson, Wyoming as considering the general community acquaintanceship with the project, persons and participating lawyers) received six peremptory challenges. Conversely, defendants, with two more clearly defined separate entities, received only three. I would find in this result a clear trial error in denial to appellants of equal protection and due process as constitutionally required, as well as a clear violation of W.S. 1-11-202.
By the action taken, the trial court and this court, by approval, rejects the validity of the jury verdict. Cf. Clarke v. Vandermeer, 740 P.2d 921 (Wyo.1987); Jones v. Sheridan County School Dist. No. 2, 731 P.2d 29 (Wyo.1987); DeJulio v. Foster, 715 P.2d 182 (Wyo.1986).
In a finding, which is sustained by the clear substance of trial evidence, it is those trial facts, and not Distad v. Cubin, 633 P.2d 167 (Wyo.1981), from which our conclusions should be made as contrary to what is decided in majority decision.
In Distad, 633 P.2d at 171, this court determined:
We hold that in determining whether multiple defendants constitute one side, consideration must be given the nature of the claim against them and whether the defendants’ interests are or may be antagonistic.
* * * * * *
Our use of the term “antagonistic” does not mean that parties must express as between them dislike, hatred, unfriendliness, ill-will, or spite; it should be read in accord with our adversary system.
Since a parent corporation with ownership of what was essentially a minimal asset affiliate is involved, unpersuasive justification for the doubled assignment of peremptory challenges is presented.
The fallacy of trial court action in setting aside a factual, well justified finding to support an earlier decision of denied peremptory challenges, is equally objectionable in evaluation of the complete jury verdict. Meadowrivers, as buyer, was newly created for the transaction without meaningful capital. It was only a conduit for the real party in interest, Zwaanshoek, and associated companies of many diverse names and character, to be generally called the Arab Group, as controlling functionary. In result, the majority, by reversal of the jury finding, exonerates acquisition of the lands by the Arab Group without purchase price payment by charging the seller for improvement costs on land which they did not own and for which they will not be paid. It is doubly unfortunate that the erroneous decision in allocation of peremptory challenges was then followed by setting aside a portion of the jury verdict in order to justify the error earlier made and thus eliminating the invalidating relationship between correlative trial issues.
Negotiative gamesmanship and consequent judicial approval has its condonation limitations which were here crossed by this affirmed judgment. The fairness normally sought in judicial inquest should at least require equality in utilization of the specific factual findings in the jury verdict as well as approval of unequal allocation of preemptory challenges.
Consequently, I respectfully dissent.

 Dissent circulated December 22,. 1987.

. In a detailed analysis of the entire transcript and litigative record, I would conclude that if a portion of the verdict was to be set aside and a portion retained, I would have retained issue number three and perhaps set aside most of the remaining findings.