Court Opinion

ID: 9363788
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-17 18:01:03.56877+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:34.278320
License: Public Domain

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                                ______________

                                       No. 21-2671

                                     ______________

                                   SHEILA JACKSON,
                                            Appellant

                                             v.

      SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY
                         ______________

             APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
               FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
                      (D.C. Civ. Action No. 2-19-cv-00760)
                    District Judge: Honorable John M. Younge
                                 ______________

                      Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
                                  October 21, 2022
                                  ______________

           Before: GREENAWAY, JR., MATEY and ROTH, Circuit Judges.

                            (Opinion Filed: January 17, 2023)

                                     ______________

                                        OPINION *
                                     ______________

       *
        This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7
does not constitute binding precedent.
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge.

       Sheila Jackson, an employee of the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation

Authority (“SEPTA”), claimed that SEPTA violated her rights under the Americans with

Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”). 1

Concluding that no genuine disputes of material fact existed, 2 the District Court granted

SEPTA’s motion for summary judgment. Integral to that decision was the District

Court’s conclusion that Jackson’s declaration submitted in support of her opposition to

the motion for summary judgment was self-serving and not supported by any facts. On

appeal, Jackson challenges only that conclusion, asserting it is the lynchpin upon which

the District Court’s decision rests. 3 For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm the

order of the District Court.

       As an initial matter, we note that, during argument before the District Court,

Jackson’s counsel admitted that he had not engaged in any discovery and that he did not

       Jackson also brought claims pursuant to the Philadelphia Fair Practices
       1

Ordinance, but she agreed to dismissal of all of these claims.
       2
         Both the District Court and the parties stated that summary judgment is
appropriate when there is no issue of material fact. However, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 was
amended and now uses the phrase “genuine dispute as to any material fact.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a).
       3
         Jackson only challenges the District Court’s conclusion that her declaration was
self-serving. Since we agree with the District Court on that issue, we need not reach the
substance of the District Court’s thorough opinion analyzing the ADA and PHRA claims.
Specifically, since we find the declaration to be self-serving, Jackson has failed to
establish a prima facie case under the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
framework. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973).
                                              2
have any evidence to support Jackson’s declaration. Although these admissions seriously

undermine counsel’s arguments on appeal, we do not rely solely on them in reaching our

decision to affirm.

A. Facts/Background

       Jackson began working as a bus driver for SEPTA on April 25, 2011. As a bus

driver, Jackson was a member of the Transport Workers Union of Philadelphia Local 234

(“Union”). The Union had a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) with SEPTA that

governed many of the terms and conditions of its members’ employment.

       On October 1, 2015, Jackson left work to go to the hospital due to a severe

headache. She was diagnosed with three cerebral aneurysms. Surgery during the month

of October eliminated two of the three aneurysms.

       On December 7, 2015, SEPTA concluded Jackson was medically disqualified

from operating a bus due to the remaining, untreated aneurysm. At that time, Jackson

requested a reasonable accommodation in the form of an alternate duty position.

       The CBA governed how SEPTA could handle this request. Pursuant to the CBA,

alternate duty positions were available for medically disqualified employees. A

medically disqualified employee is someone who “cannot return to his or her former

permanently budgeted position with [SEPTA], as determined by [SEPTA’s] Medical

Director.” App. 191. “Employees who become Medically Disqualified will be placed on

                                            3
the MD List[4] while awaiting assignment to an Alternate Duty Position.” App. 192.

“When Alternate Duty Positions are to be filled from the MD List, three (3) IOD[5]

employees will be placed for every one (1) sick employee who is placed. Subject to the

foregoing, the most senior IOD or sick employee on the MD List who possesses the

requisite skills and is medically capable of performing the job will be offered the vacant

position.” Id.

       As required by the CBA, Jackson was placed on the MD List on December 7,

2015. Christopher Terranova, SEPTA’s Manager of Vocational Rehabilitation, met with

Jackson on December 7, 2015, to discuss alternate duty positions and to inform her of her

placement on the MD List. SEPTA provided the District Court with multiple copies of

the MD List, showing Jackson’s name in order of seniority. The MD Lists covered the

period from December 18, 2015, through December 1, 2016.

       Jackson’s third aneurysm was removed in April 2016. Although Jackson obtained

a note from her treating physician stating she was cleared for work on May 12, 2016,

SEPTA did not allow her to return as a bus driver based on a decision by SEPTA’s

Medical Director. The Medical Director based his decision on “federal law, safety

       The MD List is “[t]he list of Medically Disqualified employees awaiting
       4

assignment to a permanently budgeted Alternate Duty Position.” App. 191.
       5
        While IOD is not defined in the part of the CBA provided to the Court, other
CBAs define IOD as injury-on-duty. See also App. 184 (referring to “injuries which one
received while on duty”).

                                             4
recommendations from the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, and advisory

literature.” App. 169. These sources required a six-month waiting period in order “to

ensure that she did not experience symptoms that would adversely affect her driving and

thereby imperil the safety of Ms. Jackson and members of the public.” App. 169.

Instead, SEPTA extended her sick leave to October 15, 2016. By letter dated June 13,

2016, Jacqueline Hopkins, SEPTA’s Director of Equal Employment Opportunity,

Affirmative Action, and Employee Relations, notified Jackson of the extension of her

sick leave. The letter also instructed Jackson to “contact SEPTA Medical to schedule an

appointment with them one week prior to [October 15, 2016] and have updated records

from your treating physician.” App. 220.

      Jackson did not provide updated medical information by October 15, 2016. At

some point after the October 15, 2016, deadline, she submitted a note from her treating

physician, dated October 27, 2016. Since she had failed to submit the updated medical

information in a timely manner, she was dropped from SEPTA’s employment rolls, in

accordance with the terms of the CBA. As also required by the CBA, she was added to

the priority recall list. On December 13, 2016, Jackson’s seniority and an available

position aligned. She was assigned to an alternate duty cashier position. She began work

in this new position in January 2017.

      Dissatisfied with this outcome, Jackson filed a complaint against SEPTA, raising

claims of discrimination and retaliation under the ADA, the PHRA, and the Philadelphia

Fair Practices Ordinance. The District Court initially denied SEPTA’s motion for
                                            5
summary judgment, finding that disputes of material fact existed. SEPTA moved for

reconsideration. After oral argument, the District Court granted the motion for

reconsideration and entered summary judgment in SEPTA’s favor. Integral to the

District Court’s decision was its conclusion that Jackson’s declaration, submitted in

opposition to the motion for summary judgment, was self-serving and did not create a

genuine dispute as to a material fact.

       On appeal, Jackson argues that her “declaration does not contain self-serving,

conclusory allegations, but is replete with facts and dates, and identifies the same

individuals who submitted declarations in their own right on behalf of SEPTA.”

Appellant’s Br. 11. She further argues that even if her declaration is self-serving, it

suffices to defeat summary judgment because it is “based on [her] personal knowledge

and directed at a material issue” and “is supported by the evidence.” Id. at 22-23

(quoting Cappuccio v. Prime Capital Funding LLC, 649 F.3d 180, 189 (3d Cir. 2011)).

 B. Discussion 6

       “We exercise plenary review over a district court’s order granting summary

judgment.” Lupyan v. Corinthian Colleges Inc., 761 F.3d 314, 317 (3d Cir. 2014).

       We are faced with one question—whether the District Court erred in finding

Jackson’s declaration was self-serving and thus insufficient to create a genuine dispute as

       6
        The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and § 1367. We
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

                                              6
to a material fact. “It is true that ‘conclusory, self-serving affidavits are insufficient to

withstand a motion for summary judgment.’” Kirleis v. Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote,

P.C., 560 F.3d 156, 161 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Blair v. Scott Specialty Glass, 283 F.3d

595, 608 (3d Cir. 2002)). On the other hand, “a single, non-conclusory affidavit or

witness’s testimony, when based on personal knowledge and directed at a material issue,

is sufficient to defeat summary judgment.” Lupyan, 761 F.3d at 320.

       All of the statements from her declaration upon which Jackson relies in her effort

to create a factual dispute are either conclusory, contrary to the facts, or not material to

the issues presented. For example, Jackson insists she was never placed on the MD List,

but instead was included in the sick book. Not only are SEPTA’s business practices

beyond Jackson’s personal knowledge, but the numerous copies of the MD List

submitted by SEPTA clearly demonstrate she was placed on that list as required by the

CBA. Similarly, Jackson’s efforts to create a factual dispute based on her claim of

repeatedly contacting various SEPTA officials during her sick leave also fall short. Since

SEPTA had, pursuant to the CBA, taken all necessary steps to ensure she was placed in

an alternate duty position, the number of phone calls she made is not material or relevant.

       In addition, Jackson, relying on her declaration, argues that people with less

seniority were assigned alternate duty positions ahead of her. As we stated at the outset

of this opinion, counsel admitted that he did not have any evidence to support the

statements in Jackson’s declaration. Specifically, he stated that “we did not present

evidence that someone, who, with less seniority, was placed ahead of her other that my
                                               7
client --- other than my client’s declaration which does say that.” App. 444. That

admission, when considered in light of SEPTA’s submission of the MD Lists showing

seniority of the employees seeking alternate duty positions, eviscerates Jackson’s

argument.

C. Conclusion

       Since Jackson’s declaration does not satisfy any of the exceptions for use of a self-

serving affidavit in opposition to summary judgment, we will affirm the order of the

District Court.

                                             8