Court Opinion

ID: 9730787
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:23:55.568642+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:09.294588
License: Public Domain

Handler, J.,
dissenting. I believe that the hearing on the motion to suppress evidence at the trial level was misdirected and misconceived by the court as well as the parties. I agree therefore with the recommendation set forth in the dissenting opinion of Justice Sehreiber that this matter be remanded for another hearing on the motion. I would redefine the issues and require that the matter proceed to the end that the issues, as correctly formulated, be properly resolved.
No one quarrels that the arrest of the defendant Ereolano was valid. He was known to be criminally implicated in the gambling operations being conducted at 1381 North Avenue in Elizabeth. His criminal involvement was adequately established through the investigation and surveillance of the law enforcement officers. The police timed the search of the apartment pursuant to a lawful search warrant with the anticipated arrival of defendant. When Ereolano was arrested, he had just driven up to the premises, parked his car and come into the apartment building. There is not the slightest doubt that in this total factual context, Ereolano entered this gambling den to engage in illegal gambling. The officers had abundant probable cause to believe that he was then, or on the verge of, committing a gambling crime in their presence. They quite properly and lawfully placed him under arrest. United States v. Watson, 423 U. S. 411, *7296 S. Ct. 820, 46 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1976); see United States v. Santana, 427 U. S. 38, 96 S. Ct. 2406, 49 L. Ed. 2d 300 (1976); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 95 S. Ct. 854, 43 L. Ed. 2d 54 (1975); Draper v. United States, 358 U. S. 307, 79 S. Ct. 329, 3 L. Ed. 2d 327 (1959); Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 45 S. Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed. 543 (1925); cf. Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98, 80 S. Ct. 168, 4 L. Ed. 2d 134 (1959).
The pointed inquiry at the motion to suppress hearing should have been whether the search of the automobile, which defendant used to get to the scene in order to complete his gambling business, flowed from and was connected with his lawful arrest for criminal conduct occurring in the presence of law enforcement officers.
Gambling is a peripatetic crime. State v. Snow, 77 N. J. 459 (1978). It involves on a daily, recurring time table the ceaseless movement of persons, records, paraphernalia and moneys. The automobile, only slightly less than the telephone, is as vital to the illicit commerce of organized gambling as any other device or instrumentality one can imagine. The automobile must invariably loom large as an inescapable object of police attention when it is used regularly by persons known to be engaged actively in unlawful gambling. If this be so — but unfortunately this was not developed or addressed on the motion to suppress — then it would appear entirely reasonable for the apprehending officers, on the strength of the probable cause to arrest defendant, to have undertaken a search of the automobile contemporaneous with defendant’s arrest and the search of his person. Compare United States v. Watson, supra.
Aside from whether an automobile is subject to special search and seizure rules under the Fourth Amendment, as emphasized by the dissent of Justice Schreiber, Ante at 58-60 and discussed in the recent case, Rakas v. Illinois, - U. S. -, 99 S. Ct. 421, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387 (1978); also South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1000 (1976); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 *73U. S. 583, 94 S. Ct. 2464, 41 L. Ed. 2d 325 (1974), “[a]utomobiles transporting criminals in the course of criminal activity are likely instrumentalities of crime or the repositories of the tools and fruits of crime.” Ante at 58. When so used, ears become the proper focus of police action, including seizure and search, provided this is accomplished under the factual umbrella of the criminal acts justifying the apprehension of the occupants of such vehicles. Texas v. White, 423 U. S. 67, 96 S. Ct. 304, 46 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1975); Chambers v. Maroney, 339 U. S. 42, 90 S. Ct. 1975, 26 L. Ed. 2d 419 (1970); State v. La Porte, 62 N. J. 312 (1973); cf. United States v. Watson, supra.
An automobile, which can be lawfully and reasonably searched because of its factual tie-in to the criminal conduct of a defendant subjecting him to arrest, can be removed to a more secure and convenient place by the police for the purpose of conducting such a search. Many cases have so held or strongly indicated. See e. g., Texas v. White, supra; Cardwell v. Lewis, supra; Chambers v. Maroney, supra; United States v. Pheaster, 544 F. 2d 353 (9 Cir. 1976), cert. den. 429 U. S. 1099, 97 S. Ct. 1118, 51 L. Ed. 2d 546 (1977); United States v. Vento, 533 F. 2d 838 (3 Cir. 1976). The reasonableness of searches under such circumstances has been recognized by our own courts. State v. La Porte, supra; State v. Hannah, 125 N. J. Super. 290, 295 (App. Div. 1973), certif. den. 64 N. J. 499 (1974); cf. State v. McCarthy, 130 N. J. Super. 540, 544-545 (App. Div. 1974).
This case would appear to fit within the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment as applied in the foregoing body of decisional authority. The trial court was confronted with evidence obtained from the search of an automobile which shortly before had been removed to police headquarters from a public street immediately following the arrest of the defendant-driver. That arrest was based upon criminal acts in the officers’ presence, confirming defendant’s involvement in a *74long-standing, illegal, organized gambling operation, in the course of which it had become known that he used this car to conduct his gambling business and, because of his suspected role in the gambling ring, that there was a likelihood he would have gambling contraband on his person, among his personal effects or in his automobile.
Inexplicably the motion to suppress was not tried on this basis. I think it appropriate that the matter therefore be remanded so that the parties may confront these issues and adduce and develop relevant evidence under correct legal principles governing the search of the automobile.
Pashman, J., concurring in the result.
For affirmance — Justices Sullivan, Pashman, and Clie-eobd and Judge Coneord — 4.
For reversal and remandment — Chief Justice Hughes and Justices Schreiber and Handler — 3.