Court Opinion

ID: 9693349
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:38:14.038922+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:44.757901
License: Public Domain

D. C. Riley, P.J.
The facts of this case are adequately set forth in Judge Walsh’s opinion.
We are in agreement with Judge Walsh’s analysis of defendant’s challenge to the adequacy of the court’s jury instructions and therefore adopt it as our own. However, we find that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of defendant’s prior convictions for attempted breaking and entering.
Under proper circumstances, MRE 609 allows the introduction of evidence of prior convictions for impeachment purposes. MRE 609(a) provides as follows:
"(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from *174him or established by public record during cross-examination but only if
"(1) the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was convicted, or the crime involved theft, dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment, and
"(2) the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence on the issue of credibility outweighs its prejudicial effect and articulates on the record the factors considered in making the determination. ” (Emphasis added.)
The record reveals that the trial court failed to comply with MRE 609(a)(2) in that it made no mention of the factors it considered in determining that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect. The trial court’s fleeting reference to People v Crawford, 83 Mich App 35, 39; 268 NW2d 275 (1978), does not compel a different result. When ruling on defendant’s motion in limine, the trial court stated:
"The motion is denied. It is a matter within my discretion and based on the factors mentioned in People v Crawford, I will allow the prosecutor to inquire as to those felonies that we have mentioned.”
This conclusory statement is insufficient to satisfy the dictates of Crawford, supra. When ruling on such a motion, the trial court should note its discretion and the Crawford factors, as well as the factual circumstances supporting its decision. People v Barker, 97 Mich App 253, 256, fn 1; 293 NW2d 787 (1980); People v Joyner, 93 Mich App 554, 560-561; 287 NW2d 286 (1979).
Furthermore, the trial court’s statement,
"I believe that the jury knows that Mr. Johnson has *175committed so [sic] similar offenses on more than one occasion that he certainly might have the propensity for this type of crime and it would be more likely that he committed this one than he did not”,
leads us to believe that it erroneously weighed the second Crawford factor, i.e., similarity, in favor of admission and, therefore, defendant’s conviction is reversed.
Reversed.
N. J. Kaufman, J., concurred.