Court Opinion

ID: 9536657
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:04:22.184362+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:54:55.288798
License: Public Domain

CARTER, J.
— I dissent.
I am in full accord with the views expressed by Mr. Justice Traynor in his dissenting opinion, and I do not believe it is possible for anyone to say with any degree of sincerity or conviction that the conceded error in the admission of material evidence unlawfully obtained does not permeate the entire record and equally affect the determination of the jury as to Count 2 as well as to the other counts. This must be apparent when we consider the effect of the instruction given by the court to the jury relative to the evidence offered of other similar offenses which the prosecution claims the defendant had committed.* In view of *605this instruction it must be assumed that the jury considered all of the illegally obtained evidence for whatever bearing “it might have on the question of whether defendants are innocent or guilty of any crime charged against them in this action” and if such illegally obtained evidence tended to show that defendant had a motive for the offense charged against him in Count 2, or that he entertained the intent which is a necessary element of said offense, or that he possessed knowledge that might have been useful in the commission of said offense, or that there existed in his mind a plan, scheme, system or design which fitted into the commission of said offense, or that there existed in his mind a consciousness of guilt, it would be relied upon to establish his guilt of the offense charged in Count 2. Certainly it cannot be said that the tremendous volume of illegally obtained evidence which was offered by the prosecution in this case did not tend to establish some or all of the above mentioned elements of the offense charged in Count 2, and therefore I think it is only fair to assume that the illegally obtained evidence admitted over the objection of defendant weighed heavily with the jury in determining the guilt of the defendant Tarantino of the crime charged in Count 2. In view of this clear and obvious situation I do not think it can fairly be said that the admission of this evidence did not result in a miscarriage of justice as to Count 2 but did result in a miscarriage of justice as to Counts 1, 3 and 4.
Without considering the effect of the above quoted instruction relating to the applicability of the illegally obtained evidence to Count 2, the majority opinion states: “The sixty excerpts of illegally obtained recordings were played re*606peatedly to the court and jury. They contained the names of the complaining witnesses and defendant’s recorded remarks connected these names, insofar as Counts 1, 3 and 4 are concerned, with threats and demands for money. Since the recordings clearly constituted a substantial and important part of the evidence pertinent to the last mentioned counts, it cannot be said that the verdicts as to those counts rested on evidence independent of them. (See Stevens v. Snow (1923), 191 Cal. 58, 67 [214 P. 968].) Accordingly their admission in evidence deprived the defendant of a fair trial and resulted in a miscarriage of justice which necessitates a new trial as to such counts.” As justification for its holding that the admission of the illegally obtained evidence deprived the defendant of a fair trial and resulted in a miscarriage of justice which necessitates a new trial as to Counts 1, 3 and 4, but not as toi Count 2, the majority opinion states: “Independently of the recordings, the effect of Vlasoff’s testimony describing the commission of the offense against him is impressively strengthened by the testimony of other witnesses, the victims of Counts 3 and 4 and the victims of extortions not charged against the defendants, showing the pattern of defendant’s criminal operations. This admissible evidence of other offenses is of such probative, corroborative effect that the record as a whole, notwithstanding its further content of illegally obtained evidence, falls short of leading us to the opinion that as to this count of the indictment (Count 2), defendant’s conviction can be said to constitute a miscarriage of justice. (Cal. Const., art. VI, §4%.)” The majority opinion then discusses the effect of the instructions given by the court to the jury with respect to the weighing of the evidence as to each count in the indictment and the determination of the sufficiency of the evidence as to each count independent of the other, and concludes that it must be presumed that the jury followed these instructions. But the majority makes no mention of the instruction hereinabove quoted and the effect such instruction might have in causing the jury to give consideration to the illegally obtained evidence in arriving at their verdict as to Count 2. I am disposed to agree with the majority that it must be presumed that the jury followed the instructions of the court, but in so doing they would be required to give consideration to much if not all of the illegally obtained evidence in their determination of the guilt or innocence of the defendant of the offense charged in Count 2, and therefore if, as the majority hold, *607such illegally obtained evidence deprived defendant of a fair trial and resulted in a miscarriage of justice as to Counts 1, 3 and 4, it is inescapable that a fair and honest consideration of the record points unerringly to the same conclusion as to Count 2.
Since the majority here invokes section 4% of article VI of the Constitution of California as the basis for its holding that the judgment as to Count 2 should be affirmed, I think it might be well to give consideration to the applicability of this provision to the case at bar. In my opinion section 4% of article VI of the Constitution of California postulates a wise and salutary concept of appellate review in both criminal and civil cases. Its adoption marked a departure from the rigid application of technical rules which had been previously invoked by this court and which had resulted in the reversal of judgments in criminal cases where there was scarcely any doubt as to the guilt of the defendant and it was obvious that form rather than substance was playing too dominant a role in the decisions of our courts. Hence the people saw fit in the adoption of this provision to write into the Constitution the concept that a reviewing court should not reverse a judgment because of a mere technical error which did not go to the merits of the case or could not possibly affect the result and thereby enjoined upon the reviewing court the duty to examine the entire record and determine therefrom whether or not the error complained of had resulted in a miscarriage of justice before ordering a reversal of the judgment. This amendment was adopted about the time that I began the practice of law, and I believed at the time of its adoption and still believe that it constituted a major salutary step in the administration of justice in this state. While this constitutional provision has not been applied with uniformity by our courts, I think the best reasoned cases have uniformly held that it cannot be invoked to cure an error which affects the substantial rights of the litigant, or, in other words, an error which might affect the determination of a material issue in a case. As early as 1913 this court speaking through Mr. Justice Sloss in the case of People v. O’Bryan, 165 Cal. 55, at pages 65-66 [130 P. 1042], made the following illuminating observations with reference to the application of this section to the review of a judgment of conviction in a criminal case: “This much, however, we think may be safely said. Section 4% of article VI of our constitution must be given at least the effect of abrogating *608the old rule that prejudice is presumed from any error of law. Where error is shown it is the duty of the court to examine the evidence and ascertain from such examination whether the error did or did not in fact work any injury. The mere fact of error does not make out a prima facie case for reversal which must be overcome by a clear showing that no injury could have resulted. . .
‘ ‘ On the other hand, we do not understand that the amendment in question was designed to repeal or abrogate the guaranties accorded persons accused of crime by other parts of the same constitution or to overthrow all statutory rules of procedure and evidence in criminal cases. When we speak of administering ‘justice’ in criminal cases, under the English or American system of procedure, we mean something more than merely ascertaining whether an accused is or is not guilty. It is an essential part of justice that the question of guilt or innocence shall be determined by an orderly legal procedure, in which the substantial rights belonging to defendants shall be respected. For example, if a court should undertake to deny to a defendant charged with a felony the right of trial by jury, and after a hearing of the evidence render a judgment of conviction, it cannot be doubted that such judgment should be set aside even though there had been the clearest proof of guilt. Or, if a defendant, after having been once acquitted, should be again bronght to trial and thereupon convicted, in disregard of his plea that he had been once in jeopardy, it would hardly be suggested that because he was in fact guilty, no ‘miscarriage of justice’ had occurred.”
In People v. Sarazzawski, 27 Cal.2d 7, 11 [161 P.2d 934], decided in 1945, this court declared: “When a defendant has been denied any essential element of a fair trial or due process, even the broad saving provisions of section 4V2 of article VI of our state Constitution cannot remedy the vice and the judgment cannot stand. (People v. Mahoney, 201 Cal. 618, 627 [258 P. 607] ; People v. Adams, 76 Cal.App. 178,186-187 [244 P. 106] ; People v. Gilliland, 39 Cal.App.2d 250, 264 [103 P.2d 179]; People v. Duvernay, 43 Cal.App.2d 823, 829 [111 P.2d 659].) That section was not designed to ‘ abrogate the guaranties accorded persons accused of crime by other parts of the same constitution or to- overthrow all statutory rules of procedure and evidence in criminal cases. When we speak of administering “justice” in criminal eases, under the English or American system of • procedure, *609we mean, something more than merely ascertaining whether an accused is or is not guilty. It is an essential part of justice that the question of guilt or innocence shall be determined by an orderly legal procedure, in which the substantial rights belonging to defendants shall be respected. ’ (People v. O’Bryan, 165 Cal. 55, 65 [130 P. 1042], opinion of Mr. Justice Sloss; People v. Wilson, 23 Cal.App. 513, 524 [138 P. 971].)”
In People v. Hall, 199 Cal. 451, 458 [249 P. 859], Mr. Justice Shenk, speaking for a unanimous court, said: “The amendment by which said section 4% was added to the constitution was not ‘ designed to repeal or abrogate the guaranties accorded persons accused of crime by other parts of the same constitution, or to overthrow all statutory rules of procedure and evidence in criminal cases. ’ (People v. O ’Bryan, 165 Cal. 55 [130 P. 1042]; People v. Frey, 165 Cal. 140 [131 P. 127]; People v. Wilson, 23 Cal.App. 513 [138 P. 971] ; People v. Ho Kim You, 24 Cal.App. 451 [141 P. 950].)” (Emphasis added.)
In People v. Carmichael, 198 Cal. 534, 547 [246 P. 62], Mr. Justice Curtis speaking for this court, said: “No authority has been called to our attention which can be construed as holding that section 4% of article VI of the constitution can be relied upon to sustain the judgment herein. As we have already said, in our opinion it was prejudicial error for the court to refuse the appellant the right to examine the jurors as to the effect on their minds of the standing of the former jury. The ruling of the court in thus limiting the appellant in his examination of the jurors was, in our opinion, the deprival of the appellant .of a fundamental right, —a right to be tried by an impartial jury. It was never intended by this provision of the constitution to take from the defendant in a criminal action his fundamental right to a jury trial or in any substantial manner to abridge this right (People v. Wismer, 58 Cal.App. 679, 688 [209 P. 259]).”
In People v. Bomar, 73 Cal.App. 372, 378 [238 P. 758], the court said: “Neither do we think that section 4% of article VI of the constitution is applicable in the present ease. Before any accused person can be called upon to defend himself on any charge prosecuted by information, he is entitled to a preliminary examination upon said charge, and the judgment of the magistrate before whom such examination is held as to whether the crime for which it is sought to prosecute him has been committed, and whether there is suffi*610cient cause to believe him guilty thereof. These proceedings are essential to confer jurisdiction upon the court before whom he is placed on trial. To say that he was accorded a fair trial upon an information filed against him without a substantial compliance with these jurisdictional requirements, and, therefore, that there had been no miscarriage of justice, hardly meets the situation. Such an argument would apply with equal force to the validity of the conviction upon an information filed by the district attorney in a case where no preliminary examination at all had been held. Such practice would result, in legal effect, in wiping out all provisions of the constitution and the Penal Code providing for preliminary examination, and in clothing the district attorney with unlimited authority to file information against whomsoever in his judgment he might consider guilty of crime. We do not believe that it was ever the intention to extend the scope of section 4% of article VI of the constitution to any such limits.”
In People v. Salaz, 66 Cal.App. 173, 185 [225 P. 777], the court said: “While it is true that section 4% of article VI of the constitution confers upon this court the power to weigh, to a limited extent, the entire evidence upon which a conviction was had, still ‘we are not substituted for the jury. We are not to determine, as an original inquiry, the question of defendant’s guilt or innocence.’ We are to ‘decide whether, in our judgment, any error committed has led to the verdict which was reached.’ (People v. O’Bryan, 165 Cal. 55 [130 P. 1042].) (Italics ours.) And whenever we are unable to determine whether the defendant would have been convicted had erroneously admitted testimony been withheld from the jury’s consideration, this section of the constitution cannot be applied to uphold the judgment. (People v. MacPhee, 26 Cal.App. 218 [146 P. 522], See, also, People v. Columbus, 49 Cal.App. 763 [194 P. 288], Freeman v. Adams, 63 Cal.App. 225 [218 P. 600] , and People v. Roe, 189 Cal. 548 [209 P. 560].) After a most careful consideration of the entire cause, including the evidence, we are unable to determine whether the jury would or would not have convicted appellant had Dr. Wagner’s opinion as to the position of the parties been withheld from them. This being so, we do not think that the judgment can be upheld by reason of this provision of the constitution.” (Emphasis added.)
In People v. Abbott, 132 Cal.App. 109, 114 [22 P.2d 566], the court said: “Appellant, however, argues that even if *611this be true, section 4% of article VI of the Constitution should rescue the case from the fate of a new trial. .We do not think this constitutional section permits us to consider the evidence of the whole case as a trial tribunal and sustain or reverse every judgment that reaches us upon our own ‘verdictIt does not intend to repeal the fundamental rights of trial by judge and jury where witnesses appear and their testimony may be given such weight as their words, conduct and appearance would seem to justify. There is certainly great doubt that the jury disregarded the court and found defendant guilty of one of the offenses excluded by the terms of the court’s instructions. It is almost certain it did not. The defendant is entitled to a jury trial on all offenses charged against him before being punished for them and we should not take the chance of depriving him of such right upon unreasonable and strained constructions and presumptions.” (Emphasis added.)
The foregoing review of the authorities in this state relating to the application of section 4%, article VI, of the Constitution makes it crystal clear that an error such as the one here under review cannot be cured by the application of this section.
While a majority of this court has recently invoked this section for the purpose of affirming a judgment in a case where the appealing party had been denied the right to a peremptory challenge of a juror, its decision is clearly contrary to all the authorities (see my dissenting opinion in Buckley v. Chadwick filed November 8, 1955, ante, p. 183 at p. 208 [288 P.2d 12]), and it is obvious that this provision was only relied on in that case as some slight justification for the conclusion reached by the majority. In other words the majority desired to affirm the judgment and section 4% of article VI was invoked even though the error there committed may have deprived the appellant of his right to a fair and impartial jury. No other case has gone this far or even approached it. The effect of such a decision is to permit the majority to resort to section 4% of article VI as a device which may be used for the affirmance of any judgment regardless of the seriousness of the error committed. In my opinion this is the situation which exists in the case at bar. To state the matter pointedly, it simply amounts to this: A majority of this court desires to affirm the judgment in this case, and section. 4% of article VI of the Constitution is relied upon *612to cure any error which may have occurred so far as Count 2 is concerned.
Í also agree with appellant that it was prejudicial error to admit in evidence some 200 weekly issues of Hollywood Life, a magazine published by defendant, and to permit these magazines to be examined by the jury during their deliberations. While these issues may have contained material evidence in support of the charges against the defendant, they also contained many articles which had no bearing whatsoever upon any of the offenses charged, but may have had the effect of prejudicing the jury against the defendant. These issues contained many articles attacking members of the police department of San Francisco including high officials in said department. They also contained many articles attacking officials and employees of one of the most powerful newspaper syndicates in California. They also contained articles attacking many public officials of San Francisco and California including the present attorney general. None of these articles had any. bearing whatsoever upon any of the offenses charged against the defendant. It was therefore error of the most prejudicial character to admit in evidence the complete issues of these magazines and permit the jury to peruse the same.
Defendant may be an undesirable character. His conduct as disclosed by the record is such that it could not help but create resentment, animosity and ill will on behalf of many prominent, influential people. His attacks upon most if not all of these people appear to be wholly unjustified and deserving of condemnation, but the problem before this court in reviewing his conviction of the offenses charged is to determine whether or not he was accorded that fair and impartial trial guaranteed by the Constitution and laws of this state. Even a wicked, disreputable scandalmonger is entitled to a fair trial before he is convicted and punished. In my opinion the admission of the illegally obtained evidence and the issues of the Hollywood Life magazine constituted error of such magnitude that a fair and impartial trial was not had. Had this evidence been excluded it is not beyond the realm of probability that a different result may have been reached by the jury. The jury deliberated for five days before arriving at its verdict. This fact makes it obvious that at least some of the jurors were not convinced as to the guilt of the defendant on all of the counts, and it may be that Count 2 was the one regarding which the doubt existed. In this state of the record I am convinced that the only solution which can *613be reached by this court which will be consonant with the quality of justice which should be administered by a court of justice, is that the judgment as to all counts should be reversed and the defendant should be granted a new trial.
Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied December 28, 1955. Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Traynor, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

“ Evidence was offered in this case for the purpose of showing that the defendants committed other crimes than the ones of which they are accused, and for which they are on trial in this action. Such evidence was received for a limited purpose only, not to prove distinct offenses *605or continued criminality, but for such bearing, if any, as it might have on the question whether defendants are innocent or guilty of any crime charged against them in this action.
“You are not permitted to consider that evidence for any other purpose, and as to that purpose, you must weigh such evidence as you do all other in the case. You are not permitted to consider that evidence for any other purpose. The value, if any, of such evidence, depends on whether it tends to show, first, that the defendants had a motive for the commission of the offense charged against them in this action, or, second, that the defendants entertained the intent which is a necessary element of the alleged crime for which they are now on trial, as pointed out in these instructions, or, third, that the defendants possessed knowledge that might have been useful in the commission of any crime for which they are now on trial; or, fourth, that there existed in the minds of the defendants a plan, scheme, system or design, into which fitted the commission of the offense for which they are now on trial; or, fifth, that there existed in the minds of the defendants a consciousness of guilt.”