Court Opinion

ID: 9453869
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 18:26:40.28743+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:50.544561
License: Public Domain

KIRKPATRICK, Judge
(dissenting).
I agree that the appeal is moot and should be dismissed. That, however, is ’ all that I feel that the court should do in this ease.
I am aware that a number of appellate courts, including the Supreme Court, have in cases in which the cause has become moot,1 reversed or vacated lower court judgments pursuant to a stipulation or at request of the losing party, but I cannot join with the majority in following that practice in the present case. I think that the judgments of trial and lower appellate courts and the final decisions of administrative tribunals rendered after a full hearing on the merits of an actual controversy should not be altered, reversed or vacated by a judgment of the Court for the sole reason that the parties have agreed that the court should take such action.
In the present case, although court approval is really unnecessary, there is no reason why, if the parties desire it, this court should not approve the part of their agreement which provides for the withdrawal of the application for registration of the trademark. However, the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board after full hearing and in the exercise of its authority dismissed the appellant’s opposition and under the majority’s order the court now vacates that decision. The net practical effect between these parties of that action is that the opposition is sustained by a judicial act of this court for no other reason than that the attorneys desire that it should be.
Any review of the decisions of the Trademark, Trial and Appeal Board resulting in nullifying a decision of the Board is properly taken only on the merits. As the cause is now moot, this court should not hear the appeal on the merits and has not done so.
It seems to me that the proper practice, as has been stated, is to dismiss the appeal leaving the parties as the court has found them. I therefore dissent.

. See Brenner v. Hofstetter, 389 U.S. 5, 88 S.Ct. 29, 19 L.Ed.2d 5 (1967); United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 71 S.Ct. 104, 95 L.Ed. 36 (1950).