Court Opinion

ID: 9517438
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:17:11.087514+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:49:57.698047
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE KAPALA, specially concurring: I agree with the majority’s conclusion that respondent may not successfully challenge the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction. However, I believe that we need not reach the issue of estoppel to so conclude because I find that respondent cannot collaterally attack subject matter jurisdiction in this case. Therefore, I specially concur. The majority states that “[a] judgment entered by a court that lacked subject matter jurisdiction is void and may be attacked at any time and in any proceeding. [Citation.]” 349 Ill. App. 3d at 897. However, the rule is different when, as in this case, a party is attempting to collaterally attack the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction. In re Marriage of Hulstrom, 342 Ill. App. 3d 262, 271 (2003). In Hulstrom, this court, in discussing our supreme court’s decision in In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d 169 (1998), held: “ ‘When a court has rendered a judgment in a contested action, the judgment precludes the parties from litigating the question of the court’s subject matter jurisdiction in subsequent litigation except if: (1) The subject matter of the action was so plainly beyond the court’s jurisdiction that its entertaining the action was a manifest abuse of authority; or (2) Allowing the judgment to stand would substantially infringe the authority of another tribunal or agency of government; or (3) The judgment was rendered by a court lacking the capability to make an adequately informed determination of a question concerning its own jurisdiction and as a matter of procedural fairness the party seeking to avoid the judgment should have opportunity belatedly to attack the court’s subject matter jurisdiction.’ ” (Emphasis omitted.) In re Marriage of Hulstrom, 342 Ill. App. 3d at 271, quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 12 (1982). In this case, respondent is attempting to attack the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction five years after the petition for legal separation was granted. Respondent’s attack was a petition brought under section 2 — 1401(f) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2— 1401(f) (West 2002)). A petition brought under section 2 — 1401 is considered a separate legal proceeding, not a continuation of the old proceeding. Sarkissian v. Chicago Board of Education, 201 Ill. 2d 95, 102 (2002). As such, respondent is attempting to collaterally attack the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction. See In re Marriage of Hulstrom, 342 Ill. App. 3d at 270. Thus, our holding in Hulstrom would prohibit such a collateral attack unless one of the three exceptions is met. I do not believe that any of the exceptions is applicable in this case. As to the first exception, I do not believe that the subject matter of this case was plainly beyond the jurisdiction of the trial court. The Canadian divorce decree could be acknowledged under principles of comity and the decision to recognize the decree would be in the discretion of the trial court. See In re Marriage of Kohl, 334 Ill. App. 3d 867, 881 (2002). Thus, absent an abuse of discretion, the trial court need not have recognized the Canadian decree, and jurisdiction would have been proper in the trial court. As such, I cannot say that the subject matter of this case was plainly beyond the jurisdiction of the trial court or that the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction was a manifest abuse of authority. Next, I do not find that the second exception is met. The trial court’s judgment did not overrule or reverse the Canadian divorce. In fact, the trial court’s decision incorporating the marital settlement agreement merely supplemented the Canadian divorce decree by deciding the unresolved issues. I do not find that such a supplementation amounts to infringing upon the authority of the Canadian court. Finally, the trial court had all facts before it that were necessary to determine whether it had jurisdiction. Petitioner testified in the trial court proceedings and acknowledged the Canadian divorce decree. Therefore, the trial court was well aware of the decree and chose to exercise jurisdiction. There is no other lack of knowledge alleged by respondent and, thus, the third exception is inapplicable. Accordingly, as our holding in Hulstrom is controlling and none of the exceptions are applicable, I would hold that respondent cannot collaterally attack subject matter jurisdiction in this case. Therefore, I would not rely on estoppel to resolve this case. I note that the majority contends that in Mitchell our supreme court elected not to adopt the Restatement rule enunciated in Hulstrom. I disagree. The court in Mitchell simply stated that “[t]he parties do not ask us to adopt the rule expressed in the Restatement, however, and therefore we need not decide in this case whether to take that step.” In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d at 177. Thus, I find that Mitchell gives no insight regarding our supreme court’s opinion as to whether the Restatement rule should be adopted. I believe that this court’s application of the Restatement rule in Hulstrom makes the rule the law in this district. The majority provides no reasoning why we should not follow our own precedent as established in Hulstrom, but instead simply chooses to follow the traditional rule. Absent some reasoning for doing so, I decline to diverge from our precedent. Moreover, were I to address the estoppel issue, I would find that its application is inappropriate here. It is true that courts have used the doctrine of estoppel by remarriage to bar parties from challenging the subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Yelton, 286 Ill. App. 3d 436, 442-43 (1997). The majority cites several cases and concludes that acceptance of benefits alone is sufficient to estop respondent from raising subject matter jurisdiction. However, all of the cases cited by the majority, except one, involved situations in which at least one party had remarried or the doctrine was found to be inapplicable. In re Marriage of Schlam, 271 Ill. App. 3d 788, 793-94 (1995); In re Marriage of Paulius, 131 Ill. App. 3d 343, 345 (1985); In re Marriage of Gryka, 90 Ill. App. 3d 443, 445 (1980); Henley v. Houck, 49 Ill. App. 2d 472, 475 (1964); McDonald v. Neale, 35 Ill. App. 2d 140, 150-51 (1962); Guelzo v. Guelzo, 292 Ill. App. 151, 155-56 (1937). But see In re Marriage of Yelton, 286 Ill. App. 3d at 442-43 (finding that estoppel was applicable in the absence of a remarriage because dissolution decree allowed petitioner to avoid responsibility for respondent’s ongoing medical expenses and, thus, petitioner had accepted the benefits of the dissolution decree). I believe that the doctrine of estoppel by remarriage should be limited only to those situations where at least one party has remarried. In my opinion, the policy grounds behind the estoppel by remarriage doctrine support my conclusion. It has long been recognized that the rule of estoppel in marriage cases is “founded upon the public policy of protecting the marital status and good character of innocent third persons, the legitimacy of children, and the rights and position of persons whose status has been finalized by decree of divorce.” McDonald, 35 Ill. App. 2d at 151; see also Henley, 49 Ill. App. 2d at 475-76. Furthermore, in Schlam, this court discussed the policy reasons for this doctrine. Schlam, 271 Ill. App. 3d at 793-94. This court stated: “Estoppel by remarriage serves several purposes. It protects the marital status and character of third parties who marry believing their spouse has been granted a valid and final divorce. [Citation.] Estoppel by remarriage also ensures a child, one or both of whose parents divorced before remarrying, has the benefit of a lawfully married mother and father. [Citation.] Finally, estoppel by remarriage protects the rights of other persons whose rights have been finalized by the dissolution judgment. [Citation.] Two policies underlie these considerations. First, the rights and position of a third party dependent on the validity of a dissolution judgment should not be put in jeopardy by a motion to vacate. Second, it is fundamentally and legally inconsistent for divorced parties to accept benefits of a dissolution judgment, while later asserting the judgment granting them those benefits never existed as a matter of law.” Schlam, 271 Ill. App. 3d at 793-94. In other words, the importance of the institution of marriage, and all the rights and responsibilities concomitant with the institution, outweigh the importance of ensuring the integrity of judgments. I simply do not believe that there are similar policy concerns in this case where the benefits accepted did not involve remarriage but were simply financial. The jurisdiction of a court is fundamental to the court’s ability to render a decision. Du Page County Election Comm’n v. State Board of Elections, 345 Ill. App. 3d 200, 205 (2003). I do not believe that we should foreclose attacks upon void judgments simply because financial benefits of a transaction were accepted. The majority comments that the precedent for applying estoppel when financial benefits are present is long established. I once again reiterate that in all but one of the cases cited by the majority there was a remarriage and, thus, the facts of those cases differ in a material sense from this case. Furthermore, an award of financial benefits can easily be undone through repayment, whereas the ramifications when a remarriage is involved cannot be so easily resolved. Moreover, to the extent that the cases cited by the majority do stand for the proposition that financial benefits alone are sufficient to evoke estoppel, I disagree with such a holding for the reasons I have outlined above. Furthermore, while I recognize that my analysis forecloses a collateral attack in this case, the majority’s reasoning forecloses collateral attacks in marriage dissolution cases where such a foreclosure is not warranted. For example, in a case where the trial court adjudicated issues plainly beyond its jurisdiction, the reasoning I employed would allow the collateral attack, as the first exception enunciated in Hulstrom would be applicable. However, under the majority’s approach, if a party accepted the financial benefits flowing from such a judgment, he would be estopped from challenging the judgment. In a nutshell, the majority’s approach would let stand the judgment of a court, which was plainly without jurisdiction to enter the judgment, simply because money had changed hands. I believe that such a result is antithetical to the principle that the power of a court to render a decision is fundamental. Accordingly, I would not extend the concept of estoppel by remarriage to encompass the facts of this case, where the only benefit accepted is financial.