Court Opinion

ID: 9583956
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:43:19.52891+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:06:04.686481
License: Public Domain

MlKELL, Judge,
concurring specially.
Although I fully concur in Divisions 2 and 3,1 concur specially as to Division 1 because I believe that plaintiffs counsel exceeded the permissible parameters of closing argument by urging the jurors to “deal with” the defendants — the “bad” corporations like “Enron and Adelphia” — in the only language they understood: money. However, I concur in the judgment because I believe that the trial judge exercised sound discretion in the way he handled the situation.
*7401. In his “flight of oratory” disparaging corporations, counsel said: “But the bad ones need to be dealt with. And they do not get dealt with anywhere____This is the only way you handle... companies like this. You have got to speak in their language.... It’s the language of money. You can’t throw them in jail.... Anybody from Enron in jail? It’s not even worth trying.”
As noted in the majority opinion, counsel “may make use of well-known historical facts and illustrations, so long as he [sic] does not make extrinsic or prejudicial statements that have no basis in the evidence.”12 Counsel’s mention of the Enron debacle was a prejudicial and extrinsic reference which had no basis in the evidence. Moreover, even though counsel never used the word “punish,” the argument was intended to urge the jury to punish the defendants for the sins of Enron. As punitive damages were not at issue, it was inappropriate for counsel to implore the jury to “deal with” the defendants by awarding a dollar amount large enough for them to understand.13 The arguments concerned retribution, not compensation. The fact that plaintiffs’ counsel later “backtracked” from his comments, after an unreported bench conference, does not mean that the extrinsic, prejudicial statements were permissible when they were made.
2. Despite the impropriety of plaintiffs’ counsel’s remarks in final argument, reversal is not required, because the trial court acted within the exercise of its sound discretion in denying the defendants’ motion for mistrial. The record shows that after plaintiffs’ counsel made the objectionable remarks, defense counsel asked for a bench conference. When plaintiffs’ counsel resumed his argument, he told the jury to “be clear” that the case was against only the named defendants; that those were “the only defendants you are to consider in this case ... and against which you will be ... rendering a verdict. And the case is not against Enron. I use Enron as an example. But it is not against Enron . . . because this case can only deal with what happened in this particular situation.” In denying the motion for a mistrial, the judge pointed out that after the bench conference, plaintiffs’ counsel had “backtracked a bit” from his remarks and had clearly stated to the jury that he was only asking for compensatory damages. “Even where the conduct of counsel exceeds the bounds of propriety, the trial judge is vested with a broad discretion in determining whether to grant a mistrial, and his ruling will not be disturbed unless it appears that his discretion was manifestly abused.”14 *741I find no abuse of the court’s broad discretion in denying the motion for mistrial. It is for the trial court to decide whether counsel’s remarks are likely to be discounted by the jury as hyperbole, or whether the jury is likely to be inflamed.
Decided September 27, 2004
Gray & Gilliland, Robert W. Browning, for appellants.
Slappey & Sadd, E. Scott Slappey, James N. Sadd, Seacrest, Karesh, Tate & Bicknese, Karsten Bicknese, Daniel S. Wright, for appellees.
I concur in the judgment and concur fully in Divisions 2 and 3.

 Head v. State, 276 Ga. 131, 135 (6) (575 SE2d 883) (2003).

 See Gielow v. Strickland, 185 Ga. App. 85, 86 (363 SE2d 278) (1987) (“A suggestion to the jury that it increase its award for the purpose of punishing the defendant is, therefore, a suggestion that the jury use some other measure of damages than that prescribed by statute”).

 Walker v. Bishop, 169 Ga. App. 236, 241 (8) (312 SE2d 349) (1983).