Court Opinion

ID: 9395788
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-18 16:11:36.269907+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:11.309877
License: Public Domain

J-S09012-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :
 TERRANCE FOWLER                          :
                                          :
                    Appellant             :   No. 1155 WDA 2022

           Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 31, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Criminal Division at No(s):
                         CP-25-CR-0002536-2010

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                          FILED: MAY 18, 2023

      Appellant, Terrance Fowler, appeals pro se from the August 31, 2022

order denying, as untimely, his fourth petition filed under the Post Conviction

Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

      In this Court’s decision affirming the denial of Appellant’s third PCRA

petition, we explained:

      Fowler was tried by a jury for his role in a July 7, 2010 jewelry
      store robbery. The store owner testified that two masked men
      with guns entered the store and demanded that he open the safe.
      When he refused, one of the men shot him. The two men then
      took several silver certificates and fled.      The store owner
      ultimately survived.

      Because the store owner could not identify the masked robbers,
      the Commonwealth’s case depended on a witness who lived near
      the jewelry store. He testified that he saw Fowler and another
      man park a car near his house then walk toward the store. They
      came back ten minutes later and drove away but soon returned
      and walked back toward the store. Growing suspicious, the
      witness wrote down the car’s license plate number. About 15
      minutes later, Fowler and the other man ran back to the car and
J-S09012-23

      drove away. The police traced the car to Fowler’s home and spoke
      to him. He told the police that he had been in control of the car
      all day. The police later discovered one of the stolen silver
      certificates where Fowler had parked his car near the jewelry
      store.

      The jury convicted Fowler of attempted murder, aggravated
      assault, conspiracy to commit robbery[,] and possessing
      instruments of crime. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of
      27½ to 55 years’ imprisonment[,] and we affirmed the judgment
      of sentence on direct appeal. Commonwealth v. Fowler, 53
      A.3d 923 (Pa. Super. 2012) (unpublished memorandum). In April
      2013, Fowler filed his first PCRA petition. The PCRA court denied
      the petition[,] and we affirmed. Commonwealth v. Fowler, 100
      A.3d 294 (Pa. Super. 2014) (unpublished memorandum). After
      an unsuccessful habeas petition in federal court, Fowler filed a
      second PCRA petition in March 2018 that was denied as untimely;
      we again affirmed on appeal. Commonwealth v. Fowler, No.
      1162 WDA 2018 (Pa. Super. 2019).

      On September 11, 2019, Fowler filed his third PCRA petition to
      assert an after-discovered evidence claim under 42 Pa.C.S. §
      9543(a)(2)(vi).

Commonwealth v. Fowler, No. 170 WDA 2020, unpublished memorandum

at *1-3 (Pa. Super. filed Sept. 8, 2020). Ultimately, the PCRA court denied

Fowler’s third petition, and this Court affirmed on appeal. Id.

      On July 5, 2022, Fowler filed a pro se document entitled, “Petition to

Correct Illegal Sentence Based Upon Fraud Committed on the Court,” which

the PCRA court treated as his fourth pro se PCRA petition. The Commonwealth

filed a response to Fowler’s petition, arguing that it should be dismissed as

untimely. On August 4, 2022, the PCRA court filed a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice

of its intent to dismiss Fowler’s petition without a hearing, agreeing with the

Commonwealth that it was untimely. Fowler did not respond, and on August

31, 2022, the court issued an order dismissing his petition.

                                     -2-
J-S09012-23

      Fowler filed a timely, pro se notice of appeal.     The court thereafter

ordered him to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained

of on appeal, and he timely complied. Herein, Fowler states one issue for our

review:

      1. Did the PCRA court have jurisdiction to correct an illegal
         sentence using its inherent power where … [Fowler] was never
         charged with []serious bodily injury[] as it relates to attempted
         murder, but his sentence was enhanced based upon
         misrepresentations [(]fraud[)] by the Commonwealth that [the
         charge] included serious bodily injury?

Fowler’s Brief at 5.

      We begin by recognizing that our standard of review regarding an order

denying a petition under the PCRA is whether the determination of the PCRA

court is supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal error.

Commonwealth v. Ragan, 923 A.2d 1169, 1170 (Pa. 2007). We must begin

by addressing the timeliness of Fowler’s petition, because the PCRA time

limitations implicate our jurisdiction and may not be altered or disregarded in

order to address the merits of a petition. See Commonwealth v. Bennett,

930 A.2d 1264, 1267 (Pa. 2007).       Under the PCRA, any petition for post-

conviction relief, including a second or subsequent one, must be filed within

one year of the date the judgment of sentence becomes final, unless one of

the following exceptions set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii) applies:

      (b) Time for filing petition.--

          (1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second
          or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the
          date the judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges
          and the petitioner proves that:

                                      -3-
J-S09012-23

              (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was      the
              result of interference by government officials with    the
              presentation of the claim in violation of              the
              Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or           the
              Constitution or laws of the United States;

              (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
              unknown to the petitioner and could not have been
              ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or

              (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
              recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States
              or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time
              period provided in this section and has been held by
              that court to apply retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Additionally, section 9545(b)(2) requires that

any petition attempting to invoke one of these exceptions “be filed within one

year of the date the claim could have been presented.”                42 Pa.C.S. §

9545(b)(2).

      Here, Fowler’s judgment of sentence became final in 2012, and thus,

his petition filed in 2022 is patently untimely.           For this Court to have

jurisdiction to review the merits thereof, Fowler must prove that he meets one

of the exceptions to the timeliness requirements set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. §

9545(b). For the following reasons, he fails to meet this burden.

      Fowler contends that his “judgment of sentence was procured by fraud

where the Commonwealth allowed the trial court to enhance [his] sentence

knowing that [he] was never charged with [a]ttempted [m]urder (serious

bodily injury), the element that is necessary for the court to enhance the

                                         -4-
J-S09012-23

maximum sentence.”          Fowler’s Brief at 10.1   Fowler also claims that the

Commonwealth failed to notify him that “it intended to seek a maximum

sentence as he was not charged with attempted murder as it relates to serious

bodily injury.” Id. at 13-14.

       Notably, Fowler does not explain which timeliness exception his

sentencing challenge satisfies. Instead, he suggests that the PCRA timeliness

requirements do not apply to his claim that his sentence was procured by

fraud, because a sentence premised on fraud constitutes an obvious or patent

mistake that a trial court has the inherent jurisdiction to correct at any time.

See id. at 12; see Commonwealth v. Cole, 263 A.2d 339, 341 (Pa. 1970)

(finding that a court has the inherent power “to amend its records, to correct

mistakes of the clerk or other officer of the court, inadvertencies of counsel,

or supply defects or omissions in the record, even after the lapse of” the 30

days after the entry of an order during which the court has the power to modify

or rescind it under 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505).

____________________________________________

1 “[A] person who has been convicted of attempt, solicitation or conspiracy to
commit murder, murder of an unborn child or murder of a law enforcement
officer where serious bodily injury results may be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment which shall be fixed by the court at not more than 40 years.
Where serious bodily injury does not result, the person may be sentenced to
a term of imprisonment which shall be fixed by the court at not more than 20
years.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 1102(c). “The Commonwealth must give a defendant
notice that it seeks to prove serious bodily injury in order for the 40-year
maximum sentence for attempted murder to apply.” Commonwealth v.
Bickerstaff, 204 A.3d 988, 996 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citations omitted).

                                           -5-
J-S09012-23

      Fowler’s argument is incorrect. It is well-settled that claims challenging

the legality of sentence are subject to review within PCRA, but must first

satisfy the PCRA’s time limits. Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 223

(Pa. 1999). Additionally, this Court has held that “when the one-year filing

deadline of section 9545 has expired, and no statutory exception has been

pled or proven, a PCRA court cannot invoke inherent jurisdiction to correct

orders, judgments and decrees, even if the error is patent and obvious.”

Commonwealth v. Jackson, 30 A.3d 516, 523 (Pa. Super. 2011). Thus,

even if Fowler’s sentencing claim constituted a patent and obvious error, the

PCRA court did not possess inherent jurisdiction to correct that error ten years

after his judgment of sentence became final. Instead, Fowler was required to

demonstrate that he meets a timeliness exception in order for the court to

have jurisdiction to review his underlying claim that his sentence is premised

on fraud. Fowler cannot do so. Clearly, Fowler knew about this purported

“fraud” in his sentence when it was imposed in 2012 and, therefore, he could

have raised this claim earlier – i.e., on direct appeal, or in one of his three

prior PCRA petitions. Consequently, Fowler cannot demonstrate that he acted

with due diligence in presenting this sentencing claim, or that any timeliness

exception applies. Therefore, the PCRA court did not err in dismissing Fowler’s

petition.

      Order affirmed.

                                     -6-
J-S09012-23

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 5/18/2023

                          -7-