Court Opinion

ID: 9558906
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:18:43.795314+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:39.531725
License: Public Domain

ROONEY, Justice,
dissenting in part and concurring in part, with whom RAPER, Chief Justice, joins.
I concur with the result of the majority opinion on all issues except the reversal and remand for determination of costs. On that issue, I dissent.
My concurrence with the result, however, is only because evidence was here submitted making an issue of fact as to the existence of “actual knowledge of the danger” and the “ability to discover it by use of reasona*556ble care.” Evidence of the size of the puddle, its visibility from the checkout stand and the actual knowledge of it by a “sack-er” employee was sufficient to establish a question of fact for determination by the fact finder.
I do not agree that negligence on the part of the storekeeper can be presumed from “a reasonable probability because of the weather conditions” as expounded by the majority opinion. In spite of its denial, such holding does make the storekeeper an insurer. It not only approaches res ipsa loquitur, it is res ipsa loquitur. The holding will engender legal action by charlatans who deliberately fall in a store during wet weather to recover payment for injuries previously inflicted at other locations. It will cause the storekeeper to have an employee precede the path of each shopper, mopping the way.
As later developed herein, the proper and long-established rule in slip and fall cases involving water, snow, etc., tracked into a store in inclement weather is that the storekeeper is not negligent absent a showing of actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition and failure to correct it. Once evidence pertaining to such knowledge is presented, a question of fact exists and a motion for summary judgment will not lie. The determination of the fact finder will then control; and, if such knowledge is found to exist, the negligence can be apportioned by the fact finder between the storekeeper and the plaintiff, with the 100 percent total for comparative negligence purposes being apportioned to each between 0 percent to 100 percent in any proper ratio. But the threshold of actual or constructive knowledge of the specific danger is mandated.
The majority opinion quotes from Jasko v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 177 Colo. 418, 494 P.2d 839 (1972) and it refers to other cases which are not slip and fall cases resulting from accumulations of snow, water, etc., from natural weather conditions. Jasko involved wax paper and debris from a pizza counter in the store. The element of constructive knowledge was, thus, present. Constructive knowledge is that knowledge which can be acquired by the exercise of ordinary care, i. e., notice of circumstances which would put a prudent man on inquiry as to the specific fact in question, Luck v. Buffalo Lakes, Tex.Civ.App., 144 S.W.2d 672 (1940); Hayward Lumber & Investment Co. v. Orondo Mines, 34 Cal.App.2d 697, 94 P.2d 380 (1939); Brophy v. Clisaris, Mo.App., 368 S.W.2d 553 (1963); First National Bank in Albuquerque v. Nor-Am Agricultural Products, Inc., 88 N.M. 74, 537 P.2d 682 (1975). Denver Dry Goods Company v. Gettman, 167 Colo. 539, 448 P.2d 954 (1969), cited in the majority opinion, improperly relied on Jasko in a slip occasioned by tracking of slush into the store. The other case cited in the majority opinion for its position, F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Stokes, Miss., 191 So.2d 411 (1966), recognized the majority of jurisdictions were not in accord with its holding.
In slip and fall cases, the presence of inclement weather does not establish constructive knowledge of the existence of specific deposits of snow, water, etc., from inclement weather on the storekeeper’s premises. Such cases differ from those in which the deposit is from other than natural causes. The spraying of water from produce sprinklers and the presence of lettuce prunings made by an employee are examples of the latter in which constructive knowledge has been held to exist. See cases cited in the majority opinion.
With reference to the remand for determination of costs, I believe the record is adequate to reflect the reasonableness thereof.
On August 1,1980,1 presented a suggested opinion to other members of the court. The majority did not agree with the suggested opinion. The suggested opinion was substantially as follows, and I believe it reflects the proper disposition to have been made of this case:
Appellee-plaintiff brought an action against appellant-defendant for damages resulting from injuries sustained in a fall on appellant’s business premises in Gillette. The action was founded on alleged negli*557gence in allowing water to collect on the floor of the premises near its entrance. Judgment for $10,207.29 plus $690.50 costs was entered against appellant after a trial to the court. The court found 100 percent negligence on the part of appellant and 0 percent negligence on the part of appellee.
Appellant alleges error:
1. In that there was insufficient evidence to support the finding of 100 percent negligence on the part of appellant and 0 percent negligence on the part of appellee.
2. In that there was insufficient medical evidence to support a finding of permanent injury resulting from the fall.
3. In that the amount of the judgment was excessive.
4. In that the amount allowed for the cost of the expert witness was excessive, and
5. In the failure of appellee to allege in her complaint or in her answers to interrogatories the amount of damages sought by her.
INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
In gauging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings made by a fact finder in arriving at its decision, we treat the findings as presumptively correct and do not set them aside unless clearly erroneous or contrary to the great weight of the evidence. Diamond Management Corporation v. Empire Gas Corporation, Wyo., 594 P.2d 964 (1979); Whitefoot v. Hanover Insurance Company, Wyo., 561 P.2d 717 (1977).1
Appellant contends that in applying this standard, there was insufficient evidence to support the finding that appellant violated the duty owed by it to appellee, and that there was insufficient medical evidence to support a finding of permanent injury to appellee.
With reference to ⅛⅞⅜ contention concerning negligence, appellant recognizes the elements of negligence to be (1) a duty, (2) a violation of the duty, (3) proximately causing (4) damages. Danculovich v. Brown, Wyo., 593 P.2d 187, 195 (1979). It argues that there was no evidence of the violation of the duty or that such evidence was “so weak in fact as to be non-existent.” I cannot agree.
The duty itself has been well established in law. The proprietor of a place of business is not an insurer of the safety of those coming upon his premises for business purposes, but he must use ordinary care to keep the premises in a safe condition; that is, h'e must accept an affirmative duty to protect them against dangers known to him and against dangers which he might discover by use of reasonable care. 62 Am. Jur.2d Premises Liability §§ 39 and 62; 65 C.J.S. Negligence §§ 63(121) and 63(124); Bluejacket v. Carney, Wyo., 550 P.2d 494 (1976); McKee v. Pacific Power and Light Company, Wyo., 417 P.2d 426 (1966); Watts v. Holmes, Wyo., 386 P.2d 718 (1963). See Wheatland Irrigation District v. McGuire, Wyo., 537 P.2d 1128 (1975), rehearing granted in part (on another issue) 552 P.2d 1115 (1976), rehearing 562 P.2d 287 (1977). This law is properly applied to “slip and fall” cases occasioned by water, mud or snow from inclement weather on the floor. 62 Am.Jur.2d Premises Liability § 219; 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 81(9); Annotation, “Liability of proprietor of store, office, or similar business premises for injury from fall on floor made slippery by tracked-in or spilled water, oil, mud, snow, and the like,” 62 A.L.R.2d 6.
The evidence in this case was ample to support the finding that appellant did not satisfy the duty owed by it to exercise ordinary care and prudence in rendering its premises safe to visit.
At the time of the fall, appellee was 63 years of age. She and a friend entered appellant’s store at about 1:00 or 1:30 p. m., January 20, 1979 to make a purchase. There was snow and ice on the ground. *558They entered the outside door, the threshold of which was spanned by a rubber mat. They then crossed a 3' X 6' mat between the outside door and the inside door. The threshold of the inside door was also spanned by a rubber mat. After entering it, they passed over another 3' X 6' mat. Appellee was preceding her friend, and as she stepped off this last mat, she stepped into a pool of water which caused her to slip and fall to the floor. A “sacker” employee of appellant testified that the pool of water was visible from the checkout stand about 20 feet distant. Appellee testified that the water made the right shoulder, right sleeve, right leg and hip area of her clothes wet. Her friend testified:
“Q. Approximately, what was the size of the water puddle?
“A. Oh, probably three feet, three feet one way and five feet another way.
“Q. How did you come to notice the size of the wet spot?
“A. By the fact that Mrs. Coulson was laying in the water, and I wanted to get her out of it.
“Q. Were her clothes wet?
“A. Yes.
“Q. What portion of her clothes were wet?
“A. All down the side that she was laying on.
“Q. Was she wet on the shoulders?
“A. Yes, she was.
“Q. On the sleeve?
“A. The sleeve.
“Q. And, the hip area?
“A. And the hip area.
“Q. And the leg?
“A. And the leg.”
A puddle of water of a size 3' X 6', not only noticeable from the checkout stand but noticed by a “sacker” employee, is a danger which the fact finder could find was known to appellant (through the sacker) or at least one which the fact finder could find that appellant should discover through use of reasonable care. Such findings were here made by the trial court, and it cannot be said that the findings were clearly erroneous or contrary to the great weight of the evidence.
Negligence cannot-be presumed from the mere happening of an accident. Mellor v. Ten Sleep Cattle Company, Wyo., 550 P.2d 500 (1976); Jivelekas v. City of Worland, Wyo., 546 P.2d 419 (1976). Nor are the facts that water is on the floor and that such occasioned a fall sufficient to establish negligence. Dudley v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 64 Wyo. 357, 192 P.2d 617 (1948); Annot., 62 A.L.R.2d 6, supra.
However, “slip and fall” cases cannot command a special place in the law of negligence. “Slip and fall” cases must meet the same relative standards as other negligence cases-no more, no less. The duty owed by a proprietor of a place of business to one coming on the premises for a business purpose is set forth supra. The violation of this duty is that action or inaction which is other than that which a reasonable man of ordinary prudence would take under the same or similar circumstances. Whether or not such a man would have removed or alleviated the danger resulting from snow, water, etc., on the floor is a question of fact to be determined by the fact finder. The volume of the water, snow, etc., the length of time it has been on the floor, the location of the deposit within the store, the cause of the deposit, actual or constructive knowledge of the deposit by the proprietor or his agent, and similar factors will enter into the determination of whether or not an issue of fact exists, and, if so, whether or not the standard of reasonable care has been met. Of course, the other two elements of negligence, i. e., proximate cause 2 and resulting damages must be established. If an issue as to the existence of such factors is properly indicated, summary judgment will not lie-insofar as the element of violation of duty is concerned. If such issue is presented, a directed verdict will not lie-insofar as the same element is concerned.
*559Appellant also questions the percentage of negligence attributed to the parties by the trial court. Appellant contends that appellee was not wearing the proper shoes and did not take proper precautions for her own safety in view of the snowy weather. Although appellee was not wearing overshoes or boots, her shoes had soft rubber, corrugated “ground-gripper” soles. There was evidence that she entered the store in the regular and usual fashion. The finding of 100 percent negligence on the part of appellant and 0 percent on the part of ap-pellee is not ipso facto suspect. Prior to the enactment in 1973 of our comparative negligence statute, § 1-1-109, W.S.1977, such a finding was necessary for any recovery by a plaintiff. The evidence here was such that the trial court could find that appellee was not negligent.
With reference to the contention that there was insufficient medical evidence to support a finding of permanent injury resulting from the fall, it should be noted that the court did not allocate the damage award to specific items, i. e., to permanent injury or otherwise. That there was evidence upon which to base the award is indicated in the next section of this opinion. Causal connection between the accident and the medical expenses and loss of wages was established. Medical testimony is not necessary to establish a causal link between a violent occurrence and soreness and pain which began immediately thereafter. Mariner v. Marsden, Wyo., 610 P.2d 6 (1980). Appellee’s testimony concerning her pain and the resulting impairment of activities was supported by testimony of two other witnesses. The lack of medical testimony in this respect is not fatal to the award.
EXCESSIVE AWARD
Evidence was presented reflecting an expense of $138.72 for past medical expense, $960.00 for future medical expense, $600.00 for lost wages. There was evidence that appellee was bedridden for two and one-half weeks; that her leg would not bear her weight for two months; that she could not move about after the accident in the same fashion as before the accident; that she could no longer drive an automobile for long periods of time; and that she could not attend functions where she had to ascend stairs. Pain and suffering were indicated. See Mariner v. Marsden, supra. All in all, there was substantial evidence upon which the award here made ($10,207.29) could be predicated. When there is substantial evidence or a conflict therein, we do not disturb the findings made by the fact finder. Jelly v. Dabney, Wyo., 581 P.2d 622 (1978); Zitterkopf v. Roussalis, supra, 546 P.2d 436. The award here made is not such as to shock the judicial conscience, and there is no indication-or inference of passion, prejudice or other improper cause in connection therewith. Such indication or inference is necessary to warrant modifying or reversing action on appeal. Brittain v. Booth, Wyo., 601 P.2d 532 (1979).
EXCESSIVE COSTS
Although the record does not contain a bill of costs, the judgment awards appellee costs in the amount of $690.50. On the same day that the judgment was entered, appellant filed an “Objection to Taxation of Costs” in which he objects to the payment of “any expert witness fee in excess of the statutory fee of Twenty-five dollars ($25.00) per day as provided by § 1-14-102, Wyoming Statutes, 1977.” The record does not contain an order on the objection, but I consider the judgment as rejecting the objection. For the purposes of appellant’s contention that an excessive amount was allowed for the cost of the expert witness, I will assume that the full amount of $690.50 awarded for costs was the cost of the expert witness. Even so, I cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing such cost.
Section l-14-102(b), W.S.1977 provides in pertinent part:
“(b) In any civil or criminal case, * * * the expert witness shall be allowed witness fees of twenty-five dollars ($25.00) per day or such other amount as the court allows according to the circumstances of the case. * * *” (Emphasis supplied.)
*560Discretion as to the amount of the fee for an expert witness in excess of the $25.00 minimum is thereby placed in the trial court.
Appellee’s expert witness was an ortho-paedic surgeon practicing medicine in Sheridan. He testified in this matter on October 17, 1979 in Gillette. He obviously lost a day’s income for October 17, 1979 in traveling from Sheridan and in testifying. He also gave a 40-page deposition which was taken at his office in Sheridan beginning at 2:30 p. m. on October 10, 1979. He therefore lost a few hours income on that day. While loss of income to the witness is not a standard by which witness fees are to be paid, such factor enters into the willingness arid cooperation of witnesses in assisting the court and the ends of justice through the sharing of their expertise on the matters at hand.
In view of the nature of the expert testimony, the distance traveled and the time involved, I do not find an abuse of discretion by the trial court in the allowance of the costs for this witness in the amount of $690.50. As said in Martinez v. State, Wyo., 611 P.2d 831, 838 (1980):
“A court does not abuse its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances. In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could reasonably conclude as it did. An abuse of discretion has been said to mean an error of law committed by the court under the circumstances. * * *”
FAILURE TO ALLEGE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES
In contending for error in the failure of appellee to allege in her complaint or in her answers to interrogatories the amount of damages sought by her, appellant argues that it was improperly and “totally in the dark and subject to surprise on the specific amount” of damages sought by appellee in the action until the time of trial.
In her complaint, appellee stated that her claim “exceeds One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) and is sufficient to establish jurisdiction of this court.” In the prayer of the complaint, appellee demanded judgment “in an amount sufficient to compensate her for her all [sic] injuries suffered as a result of defendant’s negligence as indicated by the facts and the law and for such other and further relief as the court deems proper.” 3
Among interrogatories directed to appel-lee by appellant was a request to “itemize your alleged damages.” Appellee’s response was: “Special damages known at this time are these: Medicals, $122.72 and Lost Wages, $625.00.” Appellant did not take appellee’s deposition; it did not make further inquiry concerning “general” damages; it did not object to the testimony by appellee and two other witnesses relative to the inability of appellee to perform tasks after the incident in the same fashion as such were performed by her prior to the incident; it did not object to testimony concerning pain and suffering; and a pretrial conference was not held. Generally, the record is barren of any effort to present this issue to the trial court.
Normally, we do not consider matters raised for the first time on appeal unless they go to jurisdiction or are otherwise of such fundamental nature that we must take cognizance of them. Schaefer v. Lampert Lumber Company, Wyo., 591 P.2d 1225 (1979); Scherling v. Kilgore, Wyo., 599 P.2d *5611352 (1979). I will not here further consider this issue except to note that appellant has not set forth in what manner it is prejudiced by the lack of knowledge as to the extent of general damages claimed by appellee. If the exact amount of general damages were known to appellant, there is no suggestion that such would have enabled appellant to have obtained and presented counter evidence. Absent the showing of actual prejudice, the error, if any would be harmless.
“Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.” Rule 7.04, W.R.A.P.
I would affirm, but not for the reasons stated in the majority opinion.

. Special findings of fact were not requested or made in this case. In the absence thereof, the judgment carries with it every finding of fact supported by the evidence. Hendrickson v. Heinze, Wyo., 541 P.2d 1133 (1975); Zitterkopf v. Roussalis, Wyo., 546 P.2d 436 (1976).

. In this case, appellee testified that the fall resulted from stepping in the water.

. The omission from the complaint of a dollar amount claimed for damages is a result of § 1-1-114, W.S.1977 which provides:
“The ad damnum clause or prayer for damages incorporated in a pleading which sets forth a claim for relief based upon personal injury or wrongful death shall not state any dollar amount as alleged damages or demand a sum as judgment other than an allegation that the damages are of an amount necessary to establish jurisdiction of the court. Nothing herein shall be construed to prevent any party from arguing to the court or jury the amount of his claim in money. In all cases the court shall inform the jury of the consequences of its verdict.”
The constitutionality of this statute is not here contested. This court has not yet caused this statute to be superseded by rule.