Court Opinion

ID: 9539864
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:11:12.346563+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:59:25.842887
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, Justice,
specially concurring.
My initial impulse is to dissent on the basis that establishment of the fireman’s rule is a matter for the legislature. However, if a majority sees fit to adopt a rule that “neither a fireman nor a policeman may recover in tort when his injuries are caused by the same conduct that required his official presence,” maj. op., at p. 501, 777 P.2d at p. 723, I suggest that meat be added to this bare bones statement of the rule.
Fortunately, at least some of the desired flesh is supplied by the same Michigan Supreme Court opinion cited and relied upon by the majority, Kreski v. Modern Wholesale Electric Supply, 429 Mich. 347, 415 N.W.2d 178 (1987):
As a result of examining the policy rationales supporting the fireman’s rule, we are persuaded that considerations .of fairness and public policy compel us to adopt the rule for Michigan. However, we must clarify that we are not attempting to delineate the precise parameters of the rule in this opinion. Several exceptions involving factual situations not presented here have developed in the states employing a fireman’s rule.
For example, the alleged acts and omissions in the instant cases all occurred prior to plaintiffs’ arrivals. There are no allegations of wrongdoing or negligence after plaintiffs were on the scene. Further, neither plaintiff has alleged negligence rising to the level of wilful, wanton, or intentional misconduct. In both cases, the incidents took place when the premises were closed. Therefore, we are not presented with a situation in which the injuries occurred when the buildings were open to the public for business.
Next, the building owners or occupiers were not on the premises at the time of the incidents, or even alleged to have known of plaintiffs’ presence. Thus, there are no allegations that the owners misled plaintiffs regarding the condition of the buildings or the nature of the activities carried on inside. Similarly, there is no allegation that defendants had a present ability to warn of danger on the premises. Neither are there allegations that the fire in Kreski was intentionally set or was the product of illegal activities.

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Thus, as a matter of public policy, we hold that fire fighters or police officers may not recover for injuries occasioned by the negligence which caused their presence on the premises in their professional capacities. This includes injuries arising from the normal, inherent, and foreseeable risks of the chosen profession.
Kreski, 415 N.W.2d at 188-89.