Court Opinion

ID: 9739933
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:23:48.647678+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:14.825804
License: Public Domain

Bandstra, C.J.,
(concurring). I agree with the majority that this matter must be reversed under the core holding of In re Snyder, 223 Mich App 85; 566 NW2d 18 (1997), that legally admissible evidence is required in termination proceedings brought on the basis of new or different circumstances unrelated to the offense that led the court to take jurisdiction. I write separately to question the scope of language found within Snyder concerning matters that were not critical to its outcome.
Snyder says that whenever the basis for the court taking jurisdiction is related to the basis for seeking termination, legally admissible evidence need not be introduced to establish the basis for termination. Sny*139der, supra at 90. However, the rules require legally admissible evidence to support termination if it is sought at the initial dispositional hearing, without regard to whether the bases for jurisdiction and for termination are related to one another. MCR 5.974(D)(3). Similarly, it is at least arguable that all forms of termination proceedings require legally admissible evidence to establish the statutory basis for termination. 5 Martin, Dean & Webster, Michigan Court Rules Practice, pp 759-760 (legally admissible evidence must be introduced to support the grounds for termination in cases brought under MCR 5.974[D], MCR 5.974[E], and MCR 5.974[F]). On the other hand, there is commentary that would lead to the conclusion that legally admissible evidence is not required in termination proceedings under MCR 5.974(F). Note following MCR 5.993, Mich Ct R, p R 5.9-61; Staff Comment relative to order entered March 27, 1989, Mich Ct R, p R 5.9-65; see also 5 Martin, Dean & Webster, Michigan Court Rules Practice, pp 813, 819 (when the basis for termination of rights is provided in a supplemental petition, and does not allege a new or different circumstance, the basis for termination may be proved by material and relevant evidence; when new or different circumstances are alleged, bases for termination must be proved by legally admissible evidence); Newman, Evidentiary Rules and Standards of Proof in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 75 Mich B J 1165, 1167 (1996) (when a supplemental petition is filed under MCR 5.974[F], the evidentiary standard is relaxed to allow all relevant and material evidence to the extent of its probative value.)
*140In my view, although any relevant and material evidence may be used in determining whether it is in the best interests of the child to terminate parental rights, only legally admissible evidence may be used when determining whether the statutory basis for termination has been established. In other words, I find the evidentiary standards found in subsections 1 and 2 of MCR 5.974(E) to be applicable in all termination contexts. I would not limit those standards as applying only where circumstances “new or different” from those supporting jurisdiction are alleged in support of termination. To the extent that MCR 5.974(F)(2) permits the court to consider “evidence . . . not . . . admissible at trial,” that evidence may only be considered on the “best interests” question.
In a similar vein, I question the statement in Snyder that “termination . . . solely on the basis of evidence not admissible in ordinary civil proceedings would be improper.” Snyder, supra at 91. This implies that termination would be proper even if some legally inadmissible evidence was also considered by the court, as long as some legally admissible evidence was considered. As I see it, termination may or may not be proper if supported by such a combination of evidence, depending on whether the legally admissible evidence was itself sufficient to establish a statutory basis for the termination. It is possible that Snyder concluded only that termination is improper as a matter of law whenever it is based exclusively on legally inadmissible evidence. Under this reading of Snyder, impropriety might or might not be found in cases where both legally admissible and inadmissible evidence formed the basis for a decision that the statute was satisfied. In those cases, a harmless error *141analysis could be employed to determine the effect the legally inadmissible evidence had on that decision.
My interpretation of the rules derives in part from the need for procedural protections against the drastic sanction that termination of parental rights represents. Parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of their children. Santosky v Kramer, 455 US 745, 753; 102 S Ct 1388; 71 L Ed 2d 599 (1982). “If anything, persons faced with forced dissolution of their parental rights have a more critical need for procedural protections than do those resisting state intervention into ongoing family affairs.” Id., see Lassiter v Dep’t of Social Services, 452 US 18, 27; 101 S Ct 2153; 68 L Ed 2d 640 (1981). Interpreting the rules to require that a statutory basis for termination must be shown by evidence that is legally admissible is particularly warranted in consideration of the fact that, once this hurdle is overcome, termination is mandated absent a finding that it is not in the best interests of a child. MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(5). The statute itself requires “clear and convincing evidence” before a court is empowered to terminate rights. It seems inconsistent for the statute to require that petitioner show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is justified, while the rules allow the use of legally inadmissible and, thus, potentially unreliable evidence to satisfy this standard. The evidentiary rules should not undermine the procedural protections afforded by the statute.
In any event, parental rights are important, and the rules regarding the type of evidence that must be used before a court is authorized to terminate those *142rights should be clear. The provisions of MCR 5.974 are, at best, confusing; at worst, they establish admissibility standards that are irrationally inconsistent from one parental termination context to another. I encourage the Supreme Court to consider amendments to address this problem.