Court Opinion

ID: 9858104
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 16:14:37.439601+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:02:28.088337
License: Public Domain

MESCHKE, Justice,
dissenting.
In Kuntz v. State Highway Commissioner, 405 N.W.2d 285 (N.D.1987), Kuntz’s license to drive was revoked after he refused to take a chemical test. Because Kuntz was not allowed a reasonable opportunity to try to consult with his attorney, when he asked to do so after his arrest, we reversed the Commissioner’s decision to revoke Kuntz’s license. In Bickler v. North Dakota State Highway Commissioner, 423 N.W.2d 146 (N.D.1988), we again recognized an arrestee's qualified right to con-*253suit with counsel before taking a chemical test. We explained that we did so to erase the contradiction between the post-arrest Miranda assurance of a right to counsel and the subsequent denial of reasonable access to an attorney’s advice.
A highway patrolman arrested Arden Holte for driving under the influence of alcohol. Presumably, though not depicted in this record, the patrolman gave Holte the usual advisory about his constitutional rights, including “that he had the right to an attorney; [and] if he could not afford one, one would be "appointed for him.”
Before the chemical test, Holte repeatedly asked to call a lawyer. At his first request early in the customary observation period, the officer told him: “Well, we’ll get all processed here and see about calls.” Responding to Holte’s next request, the patrolman told him:
“You can make all the calls you need to when we get done. You can call your lawyer, your doctor, anybody you want.”
During the 20-minute observation period and an equal extension of it when the patrolman discovered peanuts in * Holte’s mouth, three more requests to call an attorney were similarly answered.
At the administrative hearing on suspension of Holte’s license to drive, the results of the test were put in evidence. Holte’s attorney objected that “the test should [not] be admissible because of the violation of the statute” about calling his attorney. The hearing officer ruled that “[o]n the issue of the right to an attorney, ... the officer did perform his duties in a proper manner,” that Holte was properly arrested and properly tested, and that the test results showed an unlawful blood-alcohol concentration. The hearing officer suspended Holte’s license to drive for 364 days.
Holte appealed. Holte argued that the violation of his statutory right to call an attorney, as interpreted in Kuntz v. State Highway Commissioner, supra, called for reversal. Suggesting that the “context” of Holte’s request for an attorney was about bail, not about taking the test, the Highway Commissioner argued that denial of Holte’s request for an attorney did not “trigger” the Kuntz analysis.
The district court overruled the hearing officer and reinstated Holte’s license to drive. The district court reasoned that the right to an attorney after arrest, under NDCC 29-06-20,1 “does not rest on any type of ‘context.’ ” The district court ruled that “the petitioner had a right to counsel, whatever his motivation, so long as the exercise of that right did not unreasonably interfere with the intoxilyzer testing procedures.” The district court ruled that, “given the taint of the denial of [Holte’s] right to counsel, ... the results could [not] possibly be considered as ‘properly obtained’ ” under NDCC 39-20-07(5).2
*254The Commissioner appealed the district ctiurt decision, arguing, strangely, that our Kuntz decision is authority “that an exclusionary rule should not be applied in civil administrative proceedings.” Holte responded that Kuntz applied to his situation where access to an attorney was unreasonably refused before taking a chemical test. Holte cited Whisenhunt v. Department of Public Safety, 746 P.2d 1298 (Alaska 1987) where the Alaska Supreme Court held that the result of a test secured in violation of the right to counsel should be excluded in a civil license revocation proceeding.
Holte also suggested mootness, declaring “this appeal is of no consequence to Holte” and questioning “the necessity of this appeal and whether the Commissioner is seeking an advisory opinion.” Holte disclosed that on the day after the Commissioner appealed this district court decision, Holte negotiated a plea bargain on the criminal charge, pled guilty to a second offense DUI, and was sentenced.3 As a result of his criminal conviction, Holte’s license to drive was later suspended for 364 days!
The Commissioner did not reply to this suggestion of mootness. At oral argument, counsel for the Commissioner conceded that no additional suspension could be applied to Holte through this administrative proceeding. See NDCC 39-06.1-10, particularly at subsection 4. Nevertheless, counsel for the Commissioner urged that we address the “very important issue” here.
Whatever importance the issue may have, I believe that it is not a matter of such great public interest that it demands our immediate attention absent an actual controversy. I believe that our opinion in this case would be purely advisory.
In Rolette Education Association v. Rolette Public School District, 427 N.W.2d 812 (N.D.1988), we recently studied our mootness decisions and applied our mootness doctrine. There, mootness was suggested at oral argument because the school district and the association representing the teachers had changed a contract clause to resolve their dispute after the appeal had been taken. We concluded that the dispute was not a matter of such great public interest that it demanded our attention absent an actual controversy. We dismissed that appeal. We should also dismiss this case where the dispute has been resolved and mooted by events during the appeal.
If a law enforcement officer should again deny an arrested person reasonable access to counsel, I am confident that the denial would be reviewable through an administrative proceeding. As in Rolette, I do not believe this issue is capable of being repeated in a manner that will escape review.
Accordingly, I would dismiss this appeal.
LEVINE, J., concurs.

. NDCC 29-05-20 says:
"Delay after arrest prohibited — Attorney.— The accused in all cases must be taken before a magistrate without unnecessary delay, and any attorney at law entitled to practice in the courts of record of this state, at his request, may visit such person after his arrest.”

. NDCC 39-20-07(5) says:
“39-20-07. Interpretation of chemical tests. Upon the trial of any civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have been committed by any person while driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, drugs, or a combination thereof, evidence of the amount of alcohol, drugs, or a combination thereof in the person’s blood at the time of the act alleged as shown by a chemical analysis of the blood, breath, saliva, or urine is admissible. For the purpose of this section:
[[Image here]]
“5. The results of the chemical analysis must be received in evidence when it is shown that the sample was properly obtained and the test was fairly administered, and if the test is shown to have been performed according to methods and with devices approved by the state toxicologist, and by an individual possessing a certificate of qualification to administer the test issued by the state toxicologist. The state toxicologist is authorized to approve satisfactory devices and methods of chemical analysis and determine the qualifications of individuals to conduct such analysis, and shall issue a certificate to all qualified operators who exhibit the certificate upon demand of the person requested to take the chemical test.
[[Image here]]

. Holte also told us that the State's Attorney for Stutsman County had not resisted his motion to suppress the test results in the criminal case and had not intended to offer the results in the trial scheduled to take place on the day of his plea bargain. See State v. Dressler, 433 N.W.2d 549 (N.D.App.1988); Patterson v. Illinois, — U.S. —, 108 S.Ct. 2389, 101 L.Ed.2d 261 (1988); and Annot., Denial of Accused's Request for Initial Contact with Attorney — Drunk Driving Cases, 18 A.L.R. 4th 705 (1982).