Court Opinion

ID: 9957086
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-03 17:01:11.089027+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:06.180430
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-13499   Document: 45-1    Date Filed: 04/03/2024   Page: 1 of 5

                                                [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                              No. 23-13499
                         Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

       JUDY A. JOHNSON,
                                                   Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
       versus
       SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
       U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
       U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
       U.S. ATTORNEY,

                                                Defendants-Appellees.

                         ____________________
USCA11 Case: 23-13499         Document: 45-1         Date Filed: 04/03/2024          Page: 2 of 5

       2                          Opinion of the Court                        23-13499

                    Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Southern District of Florida
                       D.C. Docket No. 0:23-cv-60918-RLR
                             ____________________

       Before ROSENBAUM, NEWSOM, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               Judy Johnson, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s
       dismissal of her complaint seeking review of, and mandamus relief
       from, the Securities and Exchange Commission’s decision to per-
       manently bar her from the whistleblower program. On appeal,
       Johnson argues that the district court erred in dismissing her com-
       plaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. In response, the SEC
       moves for summary aﬃrmance, defending the district court’s rea-
       soning. After careful review, we GRANT the SEC’s motion for
       summary aﬃrmance because the district court correctly concluded
       that it lacked subject-matter over Johnson’s complaint. 1

       1 While the specific allegations in Johnson’s complaint focus on the SEC, she

       also named the Department of Justice, Attorney General, and U.S. Attorney
       as defendants. On appeal, these non-SEC defendants also move for summary
       affirmance. In effect, that motion is unopposed because Johnson concedes
       that she has no objection to dismissing the non-SEC defendants. Even if that
       weren’t the case, Johnson abandoned any potential arguments against them
       by failing to raise them in her initial brief. United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th
       860, 873 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc). Accordingly, we GRANT the non-SEC
       defendants’ request for summary affirmance.
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       23-13499                   Opinion of the Court                           3

                                               I.
               Summary disposition is appropriate in two contexts. First,
       when time is of the essence, such as “situations where important
       public policy issues are involved or those where rights delayed are
       rights denied.” Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162
       (5th Cir. 1969). 2 Second, when “the position of one of the parties
       is clearly right as a matter of law so that there can be no substantial
       question as to the outcome of the case, or where, as is more fre-
       quently the case, the appeal is frivolous.” Id.
              We review a district court’s dismissal for lack of subject-mat-
       ter jurisdiction de novo. Stone v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
       86 F.4th 1320, 1324 (11th Cir. 2023). We may aﬃrm the district
       court’s judgment on any ground supported by the record, whether
       or not the district court relied on it. Id.
               The statutory framework underlying the SEC’s whistle-
       blower program gives it “the authority to issue such rules and reg-
       ulations as may be necessary or appropriate to implement the pro-
       visions of this section consistent with the purposes of this section.”
       15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(j). The SEC has utilized this authority to prom-
       ulgate regulations governing the whistleblower program, includ-
       ing, as relevant here, 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-8(e)(1). That regulation
       grants the SEC the authority to impose a permanent bar on a claim-
       ant if she makes three or more award applications found to be (1)

       2 Decisions of the former Fifth Circuit are binding precedent on this court.

       Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981).
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                 23-13499

       frivolous or (2) lacking a colorable connection between the tip and
       the SEC’s actions for which the claimant is seeking awards. 17
       C.F.R. § 240.21F-8(e)(1).
              Importantly here, the relevant statutory framework also
       outlines how whistleblowers may challenge the SEC’s determina-
       tion about “whether” and “to whom” it will award whistleblower
       awards. 15 U.S.C. § 78u‑6(f ). Speciﬁcally, such challenges “may be
       appealed to the appropriate court of appeals of the United States
       not more than 30 days after the determination.” Id. The SEC’s
       whistleblower regulations further clarify that the appropriate
       courts of appeal for seeking review are the “United States Court of
       Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, or to the circuit where
       the aggrieved person resides.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F‑13(a).
                                        II.
              We agree with the SEC that the district court lacked subject-
       matter jurisdiction over Johnson’s complaint. To be sure, we have
       not speciﬁcally addressed whether § 78u-6(f ) grants the courts of
       appeals exclusive jurisdiction. But we have held that where Con-
       gress speciﬁcally designates a forum for judicial review of adminis-
       trative actions that forum is exclusive, even where Congress does
       not use the word “exclusive” in the statute. Drummond Coal Co. v.
       Watt, 735 F.2d 469, 475 (11th Cir. 1984). Signiﬁcantly, that exclusive
       jurisdiction also extends to petitions for mandamus relief. George
       Kabeller, Inc. v. Busey, 999 F.2d 1417, 1423 (11th Cir. 1993). Because
       Congress has speciﬁcally designated the “court of appeals” as the
       appropriate forum for judicial review of SEC whistleblower
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       23-13499              Opinion of the Court                        5

       determinations, the district court lacked jurisdiction to review the
       SEC’s decision to permanently bar Johnson from the whistleblower
       program. It likewise lacked jurisdiction over Johnson’s request for
       mandamus relief.
              In sum, the SEC’s position is clearly correct as a matter of
       law, no substantial question exists as to the outcome of the case,
       and thus summary aﬃrmance is appropriate here. Groendyke
       Transp., Inc., 406 F.2d at 1162. Accordingly, the SEC’s motion for
       summary aﬃrmance is GRANTED.
       AFFIRMED.