Court Opinion

ID: 9686786
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:06:28.439469+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:22.030419
License: Public Domain

Boyle, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur in the majority’s result and analysis of part ii, finding that the plaintiff was partially dependent on her deceased husband, and part iv, holding that the statutory minimum and maximum limitations on dependent benefits are indirectly incorporated into a proper formula for partial dependent benefits calculation. I write separately because I do not agree with the formula adopted by either the majority or Justice Cavanagh for calculation of partial dependent benefits.
I agree with Justice Cavanagh that the deter*719mination of "the amount contributed by the employee to such partial dependents” to be used in calculating a partial dependent’s weekly benefits pursuant to MCL 418.321; MSA 17.237(321), requires a factual determination by the trier of fact. I would hold that the present case should be remanded to the magistrate for such a determination. Neither of my colleagues’ opinions, however, account for the amendment of MCL 418.321; MSA 17.237(321), adding the phrase "80% of.” 1985 PA 103.
In order to remain faithful to the statutory formula for partial dependent benefits calculation, I would adopt Justice Cavanagh’s formula, ante at 710, except I would find that the statute expressly requires that the fraction derived from taking eighty percent times the amount contributed by the employee to the partial dependent over the annual earnings of the deceased employee at the time of injury be multiplied by the "weekly payments for the benefit of persons wholly dependent,” MCL 418.321; MSA 17.237(321). Although Justice Cavanagh’s formula more accurately reflects the language of the statute than does the majority’s,* by finding that the amendment adding "80% of” "simply dictates that death benefits for partially dependent persons shall be determined by the same procedure that death benefits for wholly dependent persons are determined,” id., Justice Cavanagh effectively reads this portion of the 1985 amendment out of the statute._

 I agree with Justice Cavanagh that the majority ignores the statutory formula set forth in § 321.