Court Opinion

ID: 9465466
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 00:47:15.666465+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:11.777513
License: Public Domain

WILKEY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
This is quite plainly a case in which my Brothers have voted their “druthers”, rather than construed a statute. I can sympathize with their “druthers”,1 but we are sitting in a court and not in a legislature. Whatever the wiser policy may be in regard to exempting from disclosure the Guidelines at issue here, the law Congress passed in 1966 did not, as Congress itself has most recently reaffirmed,2 and I must respectfully dissent from my colleagues’ well-intentioned effort to repair Congress’ faulty handiwork.
I. ORIGIN OF CONTROVERSY
In discharging its duty of enforcing federal pricing regulations implementing the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 19733 the FEA periodically reviews the records of oil refiners and others for indications of possible violations. Of necessity the FEA is not a complete audit, but a system of spot checks, random samplings, and analysis of significant indicators. The “Guidelines” for FEA audit personnel deal *738with the methods to be used, the areas in which inquiries are to be made, and the degree of intensity to which each area is to be subject to review.4 The FEA contended that disclosure of the Guidelines “would allow refiners with access to the Guidelines to impede FEA’s law enforcement activities by developing strategies to avoid detection of violations.”5 Plaintiff asserted that the information sought was necessary to curb allegedly improper actions by FEA auditors, making improper demands on the refiners, j. e., to make sure that the auditors kept within their own guidelines.6
The District Court agreed with the defendant FEA, finding that “the public may have an interest in the Guidelines, but it is not a legitimate interest, since the document is useful only for the purpose of evading regulation.”7
II. PURPOSE AND STRUCTURE OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
A. Purpose Guiding Construction
Whether the trial court was correct in its conclusion that the documents would be “useful only for the purpose of evading regulation” is immaterial under the FOIA. Indeed, the above-quoted conclusion of the trial court illustrates the basic error in sustaining the refusal of the FEA to produce the requested Guidelines. Although the District Court’s conclusion, and the agency’s refusal to disclose its Guidelines for investigation, is a position with much common sense logic to commend it as a policy matter, the agency position is not sustainable under the FOIA.
The history, language, and structure of the Freedom of Information Act shows clearly that its purpose is that all Government documents must be disclosed on request, unless such documents fall within one of the nine enumerated exemptions from disclosure contained in the Act. “Disclosure, not secrecy, is the dominant objective of the Act.” Accordingly, the exceptions particularized in the Act are “exclusive.”8 There is no requirement whatsoever that the seeker of information from Government files state the purpose of his obtaining the documents; the theory of the Act is that the public has a right to know and the procedures of the Act are to provide the enforcement mechanism, subject to the enumerated exemptions, which are to be narrowly construed.9 Since no motive or purpose is required to be stated by the requester, it is immaterial what the requester’s motive or purpose is, or to what extent or for what purpose the documents sought would be useful to the requester when he obtains them. This may be a serious flaw in the FOIA, but it is inherent in the purpose and structure of the Act, and has been recognized since its inception.10
*739So when the trial court concluded that “the public may have an interest in the Guidelines, but it is not a legitimate interest,” the trial court thus was evaluating the merits of the purpose or use to which the plaintiff would put the documents once he obtained them. Under the FOIA this is an erroneous approach, for the trial judge was in effect balancing the public’s right to know against the public good to be obtained by permitting the Government agency to keep confidential its instructions for its audit agents. This balancing between the public interest in disclosure and Government confidentiality had already been done by Congress when it passed the Act. Those matters in the Government files in which the public’s interest in maintaining confidentiality outweighs the public’s right to know have already been the subject of a policy judgment made by Congress; they are enumerated in the nine exemptions to the Act, nowhere else.
It will not do to argue that the exemption should be broadly construed to protect the public interest, because we have been told (and we have said) precisely the contrary.11 The Freedom of Information Act is to be viewed as a remedial statute and is to be construed liberally, and it is the exemptions that are to be construed narrowly. This, too, may not be ultimately in accord with the best interest of this country, but that is what the law says and the courts have largely followed it.
B. Structure of Compelled Disclosure and Exemptions
Turning to the structure of the Freedom of Information Act itself, the statute begins:
§ 552 Public information; agency rules, opinions, orders, records and proceedings,
(a) Each agency shall make available to the public information as follows:
There then are enumerated three categories or methods of making information available to the public. The first requires certain matter to be published in the Federal Register; the second requires certain matter to be made available for public inspection and copying; and the third requires certain matter to be available upon request to the agency.
The second method or category affirmatively requiring disclosure of certain matter under Section 552(a) states:
(2) Each agency, in accordance with published rules, shall make available for public inspection and copying—
(C) administrative staff manuals and instructions to staff that affect a member of the public.
The third category is most pertinent here:
(3) Except with respect to the records made available under paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection, each agency, upon any request for records which (A) reasonably describe such records and (B) is made in accordance with published rules stating the time, place, fees (if any) and procedures to be followed, shall make the records promptly available to any person.
It has been argued by the FEA that the manuals issued to staff only here do not properly fall within Section 552(a)(2) because they are designed for internal use only; they guide the conduct only of staff personnel, and therefore do not “affect a member of the public.” In the District Court plaintiff replied that no such staff manuals or instructions could affect a member of the public more than these do, because they determine what the auditors look for and what the auditors do in regard to the members of the public with whom they have contact.
The majority asserts that appellant’s “first and principal contention” is that the Guidelines are “administrative staff manuals]” required to be disclosed under 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(C). Actually, this argument seems to have been largely abandoned *740by appellant. The District Court did not deal with this issue in its memorandum opinion. Appellant has not raised the issue on appeal, either in briefs or at oral argument.12
Indeed, appellant stated the issue on appeal as being solely the trial court’s holding on Exemption 2. Thus, far from being appellant’s “first and principal contention”, from the time of the District Court’s memorandum, the applicability of 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(C) simply no longer has been a significant issue in the case.
Whether these staff manuals and instructions fall under (a)(2) or not, it is clear that, if they do not, they do fall within the catch-all description of the third category, Section 552(a)(3), calling for records to be made available to the public on request, “reasonably describing] such records . in accordance with published rules,” which no one denies that the plaintiff has done here.
The above is the affirmative part of the FOIA which unquestionably covers the request for disclosure made by plaintiff. Under the law, that request must be honored unless the matter sought falls within one of the nine exemptions, which are listed in Section 552(b), immediately following the affirmative disclosure requirements of subsection (a). The nondisclosure part of the FOIA provides:
(b) This section does not apply to matters that are—
(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency.
As my discussion of the purpose and structure of the Act above shows, it is on the wording of this exemption and this exemption only that the authority of the FEA to withhold the requested documents rests. If the Guidelines are not described by this specific language of the statute, they are not exempt and must be disclosed.
This conclusion rests on the specific language of the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Company:
As the Act is structured, virtually every document generated by an agency is available to the public in one form or another, unless it falls within one of the Act’s nine exemptions. . . . “[T]he disclosure obligation ‘does not apply’ to those documents described in the nine enumerated exempt categories listed in § 552(b).”13
III. EXEMPTION 2 AS APPLIED TO THE FEA GUIDELINES SOUGHT
The FEA argues on three grounds that its “Refinery Audit Review Guidelines” and supplement “Guidelines for Audit Modules” were intended to be protected from disclosure by Exemption 2: First, the specific language of Exemption 2; second, the legislative history of Exemption 2; third, the balancing of the public interest in disclosure or nondisclosure of these Guidelines.
A. Specific Language of Exemption 2
There are three key words in the short description of the matter specifically covered by this single exemption: The three key words are “solely,” “internal,” and “personnel.”
“Internal,” as modifying or limiting “personnel rules and practices of an agency,” would seem to refer to those rules and practices which concern relations among the employees of that agency, as distinct from rules and practices which might relate to, or have an impact upon, members of the public. How an agency orders its own affairs among its own personnel would seem to invite little public interest in disclosure.14 On the contrary, rules and practices which have a definite impact on the public would seem a fit subject for disclosure to the public. The first might properly be described as internal, the second as external. On *741this basis the Guidelines should be more properly described as external rather than internal, although this is not a decisive division.
“Personnel” is the real problem for the Government agency here seeking to avoid disclosure. It is almost impossible to look at this short, simple exemption on its face, “related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency,” and say that this description was intended to cover the Guidelines and instruction manuals here. “Personnel rules and practices” would normally have to do with rules such as pay, pensions, vacations, hours of work, lunch hours, parking, etc. — precisely the kind of trivia that was indeed described by the Senate’s comment on the coverage of this particular exemption.15 Just why the statute should go to the trouble to include a special subsection exempting this trivia is not certain.16 But this is what the plain language of the statute points to, and it is confirmed by the Senate’s comment, as will be seen below. An instruction manual of this guideline type is simply not a “personnel” rule or practice.
It is argued that the Guidelines are instructions limited to the personnel of this particular agency, and are thus personnel rules and practices. This argument is somewhat circular reasoning, however, because the question at issue here is whether these Guidelines can be limited to the knowledge of the personnel of the agency. Furthermore, it is apparent that if these Guidelines, instructions for agency personnel as to how they shall conduct themselves with the public to which their official duties relate, can be termed “personnel” rules and practices because they are directed to agency personnel, there is very little that the agency produces, except what it deliberately wants to make public, which could not be so limited.
The word “solely” emphasizes the limited scope of Exemption 2, whatever the other words are deciphered to mean.
It can only be concluded from the face of the statute that the Guidelines at issue here are not within the specific language of Exemption 2.
In an attempt to circumvent the plain meaning of Exemption 2, my two colleagues have come up with a novel reading of the provision. It is claimed that the phrases “internal personnel rules” and “practices of an agency” are to be read disjunctively, with the former phrase referring to relations between the agency and its employees and with the latter phrase referring to operational conduct of the employees. This interpretation cannot be sustained. It is violative of basic rules of English grammar, contrary to the legislative history of the exemption, and incompatible with the general purpose of the Act. Indeed, every court which has considered the specific language of Exemption 2 has concluded, for good and sufficient reasons, that the phrase “internal personnel” modifies both “rules” and “practices”.17
Grammatically, it is clear that “internal” modifies “practices”. “Internal” is an adjective which requires completion by the prepositional clause “of an agency”. Whatever is modified by “internal” must be in*742ternal to something. “Internal” is orphaned unless it is related to the clause “of an agency”. It is basic grammar that both nouns bracketed by the word “internal” and the phrase “of an agency” are modified by “internal”. Moreover, while it is conceivable that “personnel” applies only to “rules”, the preferred construction is that it modifies both nouns in the dyad “rules and practices”. If Congress intended to sever “practices” from “internal personnel rules”, it would have preserved parallel construction by inserting the article “the” before the word “practices”.
We need not rely solely on the rules of grammar to determine that Congress had no intention of exempting a general category of information relating to “practices of an agency”. It is clear from the legislative history of this particular clause, with direct reference to its grammatical construction, that Congress intended the exemption to be read as a composite clause, covering only internal personnel matters.
The phrasing of Exemption 2 is traceable to Congressional dissatisfaction with the exemption from disclosure under former Section 3 of the Administrative Procedures Act of “any matter relating solely to the internal management of an agency.”18 Agencies had relied on this broad language in refusing to disclose matters “rangpng] from the important to the insignificant.”19 The language “internal personnel rules and practices” was first used in a bill specifically designed to narrow the “internal management” exemption in former Section 3 of the APA. S. 1666, introduced in the 88th Congress, proposed an exemption for “internal management” only in the subsection of the bill requiring certain matters to be published in the Federal Register. In the subsection requiring agency rules, orders and records to be made available for public inspection, an exemption was proposed only for information related “solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency.” This distinction was highlighted in the Senate Report on S. 1666 by reference to the latter as “more tightly drawn” language.20 The Freedom of Information bills introduced in the 89th Congress, including S. 1160 which became the law in 1966, dropped the “internal management” exemption altogether and carried over the “more tightly drawn” language of S. 1666 as a single exemption. Thus, as the Supreme Court concluded in Department of Air Force v. Rose,21 “the legislative history plainly evidences the Congressional conclusion that the wording of Exemption 2, ‘internal personnel rules and practices’, was to have a narrower reach than the Administrative Procedure Act exemption for ‘internal management’ ”. My colleagues’ interpretation of Exemption 2 which sets apart “practices of an agency” as an independent category of exempt information would be contrary to Congress’ clear intention that this exemption be interpreted specifically and narrowly.
Even more convincingly, it is clear from both the House and Senate hearings on Freedom of Information legislation in the 89th Congress that everyone concerned in both the legislative and executive branches understood that the words “internal personnel” applied to all of Exemption 2. For example, on the first day of House hearings on H.R. 5012, Congressman John E. Moss, Chairman of the Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcommittee of the House Government Operations Committee, Benny L. Kass, counsel to the subcommittee, and Norbert A. Schlei, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, discussed the scope of the phrase “internal personnel rules and practices”:22
*743Mr. Kass. Mr. Schlei, what is your interpretation of exemption No. 2? What information would fall under those records relating solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency? How does your agency interpret that?
Mr. Schlei. Well, we were inclined to be critical of that exception because it did not seem to us actually that the personnel rules and practices of an agency, many of them, ought to be exempt. They ought to be public. How you handle various personnel problems and where somebody goes to complain if he is treated wrongly by his superior, and so on. All those things I would suppose should be public. They should be published somewhere. They should be up on a bulletin board.
And there are some personnel rules and practices that ought to be exempt, and I think that — let’s see—
Mr. Kass. It is No. 2.
Mr. Schlei. And so that exception, it seemed to us, protected from disclosure things that did not need protection, as well as perhaps not going far enough as to some aspects of information that the Government gets about its employees.
Mr. Kass. Where an individual is, let’s assume, fired from the agency — for cause we hope — would the facts and circumstances surrounding this discharge fall within the personnel practices of an agency as you read it?
Mr. Schlei. I should not think so, although you are talking here about records that are related to the “practices” of an agency, and conceivably a record, although it contained only a summary of some facts, say, might be related to the “practices, personnel practices,” of the agency, part of a file, part of a series of documents.
I am just talking off the top of my head about that problem, but I would say that you could get a situation where a factual statement or document came within that exception.
Mr. Kass. We are all talking, as you say, off the top of our heads. We are trying to create legislative history to determine what we intend.
Mr. Moss. What this was intended to cover was instances such as the manuals of procedure that are handed to an examiner — a bank examiner, or a savings and loan examiner, or the guidelines given to an FBI agent.
Mr. Schlei. Ah! Then the word “personnel” should be stricken. Because “personnel” I think connoted certainly to use the employee relations, employee management rules and practices of an agency. What you meant was material related solely to the internal rules and practices of any agency for the guidance of its employees — something like that.
I do agree that there should be protection for the instructions given to FBI agents and bank examiners; people who, if they are going to operate in expectable ways, cannot do their jobs. Their instructions have to be withheld.
But I think that word “personnel” does not do the job well enough, Mr. Chairman. I am sure it can be done.
Mr. Moss. We will hope to seek a way of doing the job without exempting internal rules and practices.
Mr. Schlei. I suppose that could cover quite a lot of ground, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Moss. Because I am afraid that we would there open the barn door to everything.
Mr. Schlei. Well, it is one of those things, Mr. Chairman, that just shows how hard it is to cover the whole Government with a few words. There are a number of problems.
Mr. Moss. Oh, we recognize the difficulty and the complexity, but we are perfectly willing to work at it.
It is clear from this exchange that Congressman Moss, author of H.R. 5012, had intended the words “internal personnel” to apply to both “rules” and “practices”. He apparently wanted investigative manuals covered by the exemption, but he was told flatly that the word “personnel” precluded such interpretation. He acknowledged this, but stated his concern that excising “personnel” would “open the barn door” by *744leaving a broad exemption for all “internal rules and practices”. The Senate was also told by several witnesses (at its hearings on the FOIA) that the proposed legislation did not protect investigative manuals and that if the Senate wanted to protect this material it would either have to expand Exemption 2,23 Exemption 7,24 or some other provision of the Act.25 However, at no time did the Senate Committee or any individual Senator express a desire to cover investigative manuals and, accordingly, no change in the bill was made.
Finally, it is clear in reading Exemption 2 in the context of the Act as a whole that Congress intended to limit the word “practices” to “internal personnel” matters. The recognized purpose of the Act is to assure the broadest possible access to governmental records. Accordingly, the disclosure requirements are to be construed broadly, the exemptions narrowly. If the majority’s reading of Exemption 2 were accepted, the Act would not apply to “matters that are related solely to the . . . practices of an agency.” This would be an unlimited exemption, so broad that it would effectively swallow the rest of the Act. What is not an agency practice? What agency documents are there which do not relate to agency practices? And if one were to use the majority’s constructional canon against superfluous language, one would ask why Congress has bothered to enumerate the other eight exemptions — “practices” covers it all.
In short, a survey of every intrinsic and extrinsic aid relevant to interpretation of Exemption 2 supports my reading of the provision’s specific language. My colleagues’ attempt to carve out a tenth exemption for “practices of an agency” has nothing to recommend it but wishful thinking.26
B. Legislative History
On the legislative history of this particular exemption, the Government agency is in an even weaker position than on its argument on the face of the statute, because the Supreme Court in Department of Air Force et al. v. Rose, et al.27 and this court in Vaughn v. Rosen (Vaughn II)28 have construed and discussed at length the legislative history of this exemption.
The perils of reliance on legislative history are nowhere better illustrated than with regard to Exemption 2, for rarely can there be found two such contradictory explanations of a statute’s meaning than in the Senate and House Reports. The Senate Report on the Freedom of Information Act stated:
Exemption 2 relates only to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency. Examples of these may be rules as to personnel’s use of parking facilities or regulations of lunch hours, statements of policy as to sick leave, and the like.29
Diametrically opposite was the House Report:
2. Matters related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of any agency: Operating rules, guidelines, and manuals of procedure for Government investigators or examiners would be exempt from disclosure, but this exemption would not cover all “matters of internal management” such as employee relations and working conditions in routine admin*745istrative procedures which are withheld under the present law.30
Thus, the Senate Report interprets Exemption 2 as exempting only trivial “housekeeping” matters in which it can be presumed the public lacks any substantial interest. The language of the House Report however, “carries the potential of exempting a wide swath of information under the category of ‘operating rules, guidelines and manuals of procedure.’ ”31 As a threshold matter, it must be remembered that committee reports are not the law; they are only aids in interpreting statutory language and are useful only to the extent they fairly reflect Congressional intent.32 Sometimes committee reports are not reliable guides to legislative intent as, for example, where they contain statements that contradict the plain meaning of the statutory language33 or that conflict with the expressed purpose of the statute.34
We first confronted the amazing discrepancy between the Senate and House Reports to the Freedom of Information Act in Vaughn v. Rosen (Vaughn II).35 In that case we rejected the House Report as a reliable guide in construing Exemption 2 and chose to rely instead upon the Senate Report as being a truer indication of legislative intent. Every court which has considered the difference between the reports has done the same.36
In an attempt to validate the House interpretation of Exemption 2, and thus evade this court’s decision in Vaughn II, the majority make the novel argument that there is no contradiction between the House and Senate Reports, and that both can be given effect. Every court and commentator dealing with this Exemption up until now has treated the two interpretations as contradictory37 And, of course, this is plainly so. Judge MacKinnon’s opinion emphasizes the first half of the sentence from the House Report relating to operational rules, claiming that the House was here referring to something different from what the Senate had covered in its report, namely “practices” instead of “rules”. I have already shown that this is a false distinction. Be that as it may, the contradiction is present in the second half of the House statement beginning with the words “but this exemption would not cover . . . .” This last part does not deal with anything the Senate overlooked; this last part deals with precisely those things the Senate mentioned, and puts a directly opposite interpretation on Exemption 2 as to whether routine internal management matters are covered or not. The Senate Report says they are; the House Report says they are not. What could be more contradictory? But the mere fact that the House Report directly contradicts the Senate Report is not the only basis for our determination in Vaughn II that “a court viewing the legislative history must be wary of relying upon the House Report.”
In Vaughn II we expressed several reasons for preferring the Senate Report. First, we noted that the Senate Report language was more consistent with the actual wording of the statute, whereas the House Report appeared in several areas to depart *746from and indeed contradict the statutory language of the Act. This is an important factor in determining the relative reliability of committee reports.38 Second, we observed that the House Report potentially exempted “a wide swath of information” but gave no guidance as to which matters are covered by the exemption and which are not, whereas the Senate Report provided a standard which agencies and courts could apply with certainty, consistency and clarity. The extent to which a committee report actually clarifies statutory language is also a relevant factor in determining its reliability, for reports are to be used to resolve ambiguities, not to create new ones.39 Third, we noted that the sweeping interpretation of Exemption 2 favored by the House Report was incompatible with Congress’ expressed intent to cut back on the previous exemption for “internal management.” Fourth, we observed that the language of the House Report seemed less consonant with the overall scheme and general purpose of the Act than did the Senate Report:40
Reinforcing this interpretation is “the clear legislative intent [of FOIA] to assure public access to all governmental records whose disclosure would not significantly harm specific governmental interests.” As a result, we have repeatedly stated that “[t]he policy of the Act requires that the disclosure requirement be construed broadly, the exemptions narrowly.” Thus, faced with a conflict in the legislative history, the recognized principal purpose of the FOIA requires us to choose that interpretation most favoring disclosure.
Finally, we addressed in Vaughn II what one commentator has called the “abuse of legislative history” which was involved in adoption of the House Report.41 This refers to the fact that the expansive gloss placed on Exemption 2 and other sections of the Act by the House Report was the product of last minute chicanery by interested members of the House after the Senate had passed the bill and just as the full Committee in the House was about to report out the bill. The details of this episode have been placed on the public record by Benny L. Kass, who was counsel to the Foreign Operations and Government Operations Committee from 1962 to 1965, and who was later assistant counsel to the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Judiciary Committee. Testifying in 1973 at Senate hearings on proposed amendments to the Freedom of Information Act, Mr. Kass explained “why the House report is so different from the rest of the bill”:42
The basic reason that the House bill is different was after the Senate passed the Freedom of Information Act and it was about to be reported out of the House Government Operations Committee, the Justice Department — Mr. Katzenbach, Mr. Wozencraft — came up and talked to Congressman Moss and said, look, we cannot support the bill. There are a number of changes that have to be made.
I kind of appeared as an emissary on behalf of the former chairman of this subcommittee to Congressman Moss and I said it is our reading from the Senate *747that the Senate has already passed this bill twice, that there should be no amendments. We wanted to move forward with it. We have played with it long enough.
So basically what was done under really almost an implied veto — I don’t think they ever specifically said they would veto it but there was an implied threat— we tried to compromise a number of the specific objections into the House report. I don’t think time permits going into these details. I have a very brief analysis which I was going to submit. I have to type it and I will submit it for the record, pointing out where the House kind of gave in to what the Justice Department wanted, (emphasis added).
Mr. Kass then pointed out eight sections in the House Report in which the Justice Department was able to get the language it wanted. Not surprisingly, the seventh area was the Report’s description of Exemption 2. Mr. Kass concluded:43
I don’t think it was a sellout but in any event it was really the price of getting the bill. It was my legal advice to both the chairman of this committee and the chairman, Congressman Moss, that the legislative history only interprets and does not vitiate in any way the legislation and that the legislation was strong and was there.
I think this is important just for the record to point out why the House report is different. Fortunately, as Mr. Dobrovir said, there have been a number of cases all of which have said that the House report is so different that we have to look to the statute and that the House report should not in any way undermine the basic statute that was passed by Congress in 1966. (Emphasis added.)
This background is relevant to the weight that the House Report should be accorded as an item of legislative history. Statements in the report of a single House are not reliable guides to Congressional intent where, as here, they have been inserted in an effort to change the meaning of the statutory language already adopted by the House which initiated the legislation. As Professor Davis said:44
The basic principle is quite elementary: The content of the law must depend upon the intent of both Houses, not of just one. In this instance, only the bill, not the House committee’s statements at variance with the bill, reflects the intent of both Houses. Indeed, no one will ever know whether the Senate Committee or the Senate would have concurred in the restrictions written into the House committee report.
The reasons why the courts will reject the House committee’s abuse of legislative history, even though the Attorney General supports it, are overwhelming. Allowing the meaning of clear statutory words to be drastically changed by the House committee report would have many unsound consequences. Three major ones are: (1) The House that acts first would be deprived of any voice in the final meaning of the enactment, for the House that acts second could always adopt the same bill but alter its meaning through committee reports. (2) The sound system of the conference committee would be defeated, for the House that acts second, even when it knows the other House disagrees, could always make law as it chooses through the committee reports. (3) Statutes which are clear on their face would become unreliable indicia of the effective law.
The position of this Court in Vaughn II has recently been vindicated by the action of the House of Representatives itself in passing the “Government in the Sunshine Act of 1976.”45 Professor Davis has recently suggested the relevance of the Sunshine *748Act to interpretation of the Freedom of Information Act:46
The Freedom of Information Act, Advisory Committee Act, Privacy Act, and Government in the Sunshine Act all deal with the subject matter of openness of records and of meetings. Each of the four statutes has its own function. Each provision of each statute may be interrelated to one or more provisions of the other statutes. Furthermore, the various statutes often use language that is identical with the language of another statute. The meaning of that language may depend not only on legislative history and interpretations with respect to the language of the one statute, but it may depend upon legislative history and interpretations with respect to the identical language that is used in one of the other statutes.
Of course, Professor Davis is correct, for it is a well established principle that courts may look to subsequent legislation as an aid in the interpretation of prior legislation dealing with the same or similar subject matter.47 Indeed, Chief Justice Marshall stated the principle that, if it can be gathered from a subsequent statute in pari materia what meaning the legislature attached to the words of a former statute, this will amount to a legislative declaration of its meaning, and will govern the construction of the first statute.48
Applying this principle, it is highly significant that the Government in the Sunshine Act, enacted in 1976, carries over verbatim most of the exemptions in the Freedom of Information Act, including the specific language of Exemption 2. Thus, 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c)(2) exempts from the Act’s open meeting requirement portions of meetings likely to “relate solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency.” The House Report to the Sunshine Act gives the same narrow interpretation to this exemption as the Senate did in 1965:49
(2) This exemption includes meetings relating solely to an agency’s internal personnel rules and practices. It is intended to protect the privacy of staff members and to cover the handling of strictly internal matters. It does not include discussions or information dealing with agency policies governing employees’ dealings with the public, such as manuals or directives setting forth job functions or procedures. As is the case with all of the exemptions, a closing or withholding permitted by this paragraph should not be made if the public interest requires otherwise, (emphasis added).
It thus appears that by 1976 the House of Representatives had repudiated the sweeping language concerning Exemption 2 contained in its 1966 report on the Freedom of Information, thus leaving my colleagues out of date on the House’s own interpretation. Chief Justice Marshall would thus have repudiated Judge MacKinnon’s position.
This Court’s rejection of the House Report has recently been vindicated by the Supreme Court. Five months after our decision in Vaughn II, the Supreme Court in *749Department of Air Force, et al. v. Rose50 specifically considered the legislative history of Exemption 2, quoted at some length from our opinion in Vaughn II, and approved our reasoning therein, and likewise concluded, “[A]nd because we think the primary focus of the House Report was on exemption of disclosures that might , enable the regulated to circumvent agency regulation, we, too, ‘choose to rely upon the Senate Report’ in this regard.”51
In concluding its discussion of Exemption 2, the Supreme Court stated: “In sum, we think that, at least where the situation is not one where disclosure may risk circumvention of agency regulation, Exemption 2 is not applicable to matters subject to such a genuine and significant public interest. . Rather, the general thrust of the exemption is simply to relieve agencies of the burden of assembling and maintaining for public inspection matter in which the public could not reasonably be expected to have an interest.”52
From the words “at least where the situation is not one where disclosure may risk circumvention of agency regulation,” the FEA argues that the Supreme Court implied that Exemption 2 should be stretched to cover such a situation. I cannot agree; this language of the Supreme Court means no more than that the Court cautiously left open the question of what to do about any exemption “where disclosure may risk circumvention of agency regulation.” With the question left open, we have confronted the problem here, and, as my analysis of the statutory language of Exemption 2 and its legislative history demonstrates, Exemption 2 was not designed to protect documents whose disclosure might risk circumvention of agency regulation, whatever would be the merits of such a provision. Exemption 2 is much more limited, as I have described. And, it is evident from the reasoning of the Supreme Court in adopting the meaning of Exemption 2 as described in the Senate Report, and in the Supreme Court’s citation with approval of our reasoning in Vaughn II, that a stretching of Exemption 2 to protect the Guidelines would be inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Rose and our court’s analysis in Vaughn II.
C. Balancing of the Public Interest in Protecting These Guidelines Against Disclosure
The Government agency urges that this Court should balance the public interest in protecting these particular Guidelines against disclosure versus any legitimate interest these plaintiffs or other members of the public may have in utilizing these Guidelines. This is an exhortation to balance disclosure of the individual documents involved in this particular case against the public interest in confidentiality. This the Court cannot do. The Freedom of Information Act certainly does not permit a court to balance the public good or harm involved in a disclosure or confidential retention of any individual document. The balancing of the public interest in disclosure or nondisclosure has been done by Congress, as discussed above. And it was done by Congress in terms of categories of documents which were to be exempt from disclosure. All of the cases which to my knowledge have touched on this question, beginning with our own decision in Soucie v. David,53 have discussed the balancing of the public interest in terms of categories of documents, not in terms of the individual documents concerned.54
On reflection, it becomes clear that for a court to balance the public interest in disclosure or nondisclosure, with reference to the particular documents involved in a case, would destroy completely the effectiveness of the Freedom of Information Act. This procedure was what occurred before the passage of the Act in 1966. The whole *750scheme of the Act, as analyzed above, is to decree: first, in Section 552(a) the particular methods by which all records are to be made available to the public, whether (1) published in the Federal Register, or (2) made available for inspection and copying, or (3) to be made available upon request; second, following the mandate of disclosure, in Section 552(b) are listed the nine specific enumerated exemptions.55
The whole question of whether any Governmental document should be disclosed or protected against disclosure is a matter of public policy for legislative determination in the first instance56 There is no constitutional question involved here on which a court might feel free to express itself. The whole question of what is to be disclosed is one on which the Congress has spoken in precise, enumerated detail. If Congress has erred, Congress has erred, and it is not for this or any other court to rewrite a statute, in which we might consider to have been omitted necessary items in a list of exemptions against disclosure. On the face of the statute, on its legislative history, the Guidelines here at issue do not fall within the specific language of Exemption 2. This Court cannot write in an exemption to protect these Guidelines without rewriting the statute.57 Rewriting, especially to add a separate and distinct item to a carefully limited list, is for Congress.
One can easily see the public interest to be served by keeping confidential these Guidelines designed, as plaintiff contends, to prevent FEA auditors from exceeding their instructions and authority, and from unduly harassing the business enterprises inspected, for if revealed no doubt they will serve as useful guidelines somewhere for those bent on evasion of the law by concealing accounting data in those areas in which the auditors are instructed not to look or to look lightly. Furthermore, these FEA Guidelines for its auditors are but examples of similar instructions found in many other Government agencies, and their revelation to the public must be accompanied by a diminution in the effectiveness of law enforcement. It may be thought strange that Congress did not provide for their exemption from disclosure; certain it is that Congress did not protect such Guidelines by Exemption 2.58
IV. THE MAJORITY’S IMPROPER RELIANCE ON EXEMPTIONS 7 AND 5
The majority supports its interpretation of Exemption 2 by reference to Exemption 7, concluding “We thus refuse to interpret Exemption 2 as requiring the disclosure of matter that it is the objective of Exemption 7 to protect.” However, Exemption 7 was not designed to protect the Guidelines in question. That exemption applies only to “investigatory records.” A document is an “investigatory record” if its purpose for creation was part of an agency inquiry into specific conduct which might be found to have violated a statute or regulation admin*751istered by that agency.59 The Guidelines here are clearly not such records, and the District Court properly so held. No appeal has been taken by the Government from this ruling.
The majority argues further that because Exemption 7 protects against disclosure of investigatory records which would reveal investigatory techniques and procedures, this court should construe Exemption 2 expansively to protect against disclosure of other kinds of information besides investigatory records which could likewise reveal such techniques and procedures. This argument might be appropriate if the language of Exemption 2 and its legislative history admitted of such an expansive interpretation. However, as I have demonstrated above, such a construction would amount to blatant judicial legislation. Section 552(e) provides that the Act cannot be invoked as a basis for withholding information “except as specifically stated” in one of the nine exemptions. The narrowness of the phrase, “specifically stated,” forbids the expansion of the exemptions beyond their terms both by the agencies and by the courts. Although I would agree that Congress should have written in an exemption covering the documents here sought, it is my firm belief that Congress did not, and therefore I cannot accept a spurious construction of an exemption in order to cover the documents.
Astonishingly, as an “additional basis” for its holding, the majority finds that the Guidelines in question are exempt from disclosure as “intra-agency memoranda” under Exemption 5. However, the only exemptions asserted by the Government as grounds for withholding the Guidelines have been Exemptions 2 and 7. The District Court held Exemption 7 inapplicable, and, having taken no appeal from this ruling, the Government has relied solely on Exemption 2 before this court.60 At no time has the Government raised Exemption 5 as a ground for withholding the Guidelines. It was not raised in the Agency’s initial denial; it was not raised in the Government’s pleadings in the District Court. In its motion for summary judgment and supporting affidavit in the District Court, the Government neither asserted Exemption 5 nor provided any factual basis for concluding that it applied. It was not mentioned in the District Court’s opinion, nor was it raised in any way by the Government on this appeal, either in its briefs or at oral argument.
It is basic that the FOIA establishes a statutory presumption that all federal records are available to “any person.” The presumption is rebutted only by evidence presented by an agency that the item sought is exempt from disclosure under one of the nine enumerated exemptions. The agency bears the full burden of proof when an exemption is claimed to apply61 To meet this burden the agency must specifically identify the exemption relied upon and demonstrate that the exemption applies to the documents in question. If an agency neither asserts an exemption nor adduces evidence demonstrating its applicability, a court may not step in sua sponte on behalf of the Government' and assert as grounds for withholding information from disclosure an exemption which the Government itself has not asserted.62
This principle derives not only from the basic requirements of the FOIA itself, but also from the fundamental precept that issues on appeal are to be confined to those duly presented to the trial court — a precept which Judge MacKinnon recalled and applied recently in Doe v. McMillan.63 This *752principle reflects, in part, due process considerations, for if the Government does not raise a particular exemption as a defense in the district court or on appeal, the appellant will have no opportunity to present arguments or evidence against the applicability of the exemption. Thus, in view of the fact that in this case the Government has at no time asserted or presented evidence on the applicability of Exemption 5, the majority’s resort to the exemption is gratuitous and improper.
Furthermore, even if the argument for applying Exemption 5 to the Guidelines is considered on its merits, there is clearly no basis for holding Exemption 5 applicable. The basic purpose for Exemption 5 is to exempt from disclosure the predecisional, deliberative internal communications of an agency in order to protect its decisional processes. An agency asserting this exemption must show that disclosure of the memoranda sought would harm one of several policies: (1) the policy to protect creative debate and discussion within an agency,64 (2) the policy to avoid misleading the public as to the grounds for a particular agency action or to avoid premature publication of novel and unadopted concepts under consideration,65 and (3) the policy to protect the integrity of the decision-making process.66 The Guidelines sought in this case are not pre-decisional documents. They discuss and instruct agency personnel concerning decisions already made and policies already set. The Government has adduced no evidence whatsoever that disclosure of the Guidelines would have a “chilling effect” on creative discussion within the FEA, precipitously disclose novel and unadopted concepts still under consideration, or interfere with the decision-making process in the FEA. Thus, there is no basis for applying Exemption 5 in the instant case.67
The position taken by the majority here regarding Exemptions 7 and 5 is based on claims not asserted by the Government. If this litigation progresses farther, either to an en banc in this court or to the Supreme Court, I strongly suggest that it is incumbent upon the Government to advise the court in its first papers filed whether it will now attempt to rely upon either Exemption 7 or 5, and if so, to justify such reliance.
Before BAZELON, Chief Judge and WRIGHT, McGOWAN, TAMM, ROBINSON, MacKINNON, ROBB and WILKEY, Circuit Judges.

. See note 58, infra.

. See pp. ----- ------- of 192 U.S.App.D.C., pp. 747-748 of 591 F.2d, infra.

. 15 U.S.C. § 751 et seq., as amended.

. See Brief of Appellee at 6-11.

. Affidavit of James Newman, Deputy Assistant Administrator for Compliance, J.A. 35.

. J.A. 12.

. J.A. 44. The District Court held that the documents were not protected by Exemption 7, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7), relating to investigatory records, but were in substantial part protected by Exemption 2. No appeal was taken from the ruling on Exemption 7 and this therefore is not before us. See Part IV, infra.

. Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361, 96 S.Ct. 1592, 1599, 48 L.Ed.2d 11 (1976); EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79, 93 S.Ct. 827, 35 L.Ed.2d 119 (1973); Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Train, 160 U.S.App.D.C. 270, 273, 491 F.2d 63, 66 (1974).

. Department of Air Force v. Rose, supra, 425 U.S. at 361, 96 S.Ct. 1592; Vaughn v. Rosen (Vaughn II), 173 U.S.App.D.C. 187, 193, 523 F.2d 1136, 1142 (1975); Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Train, supra, 160 U.S.App.D.C. at 203, 491 F.2d at 66.

. See, e. g., EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 86, 93 S.Ct. 827, 835, 35 L.Ed.2d 119 (1973):
“[T]he Act, by its terms, [does not] permit inquiry into [the] particularized need of the individual seeking the information . ..”
In this regard, it is noted that the Act provides that each agency “shall make the records promptly available to any person.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (emphasis added). This statutory language supports the notion that the requesting party’s purpose is irrelevant.

. See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 86, 93 S.Ct. 827, 35 L.Ed.2d 119 (1973). See also cases cited at notes 8, 9, supra.

. See Brief for Appellant at 8, 9, 11 and 15.

. 421 U.S. 132, 136-37, 95 S.Ct. 1504, 1509, 44 L.Ed.2d 29 (1975).

. See Supreme Court’s comment in Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 96 S.Ct. 1592, 48 L.Ed.2d 11 (1976), quoted in text at note 27.

. See Part III.B, infra, at note 19.

. The Supreme Court offered one explanation, see text at note 27, infra.

. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Veterans Administration, 301 F.Supp. 796, 800 (S.D.N.Y.1969) appeal dismissed as moot, 436 F.2d 1363 (2d Cir. 1971); Benson v. General Services Administration, 289 F.Supp. 590, 594 (W.D.Wash.1968), aff’d on other grounds, 415 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1969). See Vaughn v. Rosen (Vaughn II), 173 U.S.App.D.C. 187, 523 F.2d 1136 (1975); Stokes v. Brennan, 476 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1973); Hawkes v. Internal Revenue Service, 467 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1972); Stern v. Richardson, 367 F.Supp. 1316 (D.D.C.1973).
Cases which have given a broad interpretation to Exemption 2 have not set “practices of an agency” apart from “internal personnel rules”. See Tietze v. Richardson, 342 F.Supp. 610 (S.D.Tex.1972); Cuneo v. Laird, 338 F.Supp. 504 (D.D.C.1972), rev’d on other grounds, sub nom. Cuneo v. Schlesinger, 157 U.S.App.D.C. 368, 484 F.2d 1086 (1973), cert. denied, sub nom. Rosen v. Vaughn, 415 U.S. 977, 94 S.Ct. 1564, 39 L.Ed.2d 873 (1974); City of Concord v. Ambrose, 333 F.Supp. 958 (N.D.Cal.1971).

. 5 U.S.C. § 1002 (1964). (emphasis added)

. H.R.Rept. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., at 5 (1966), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News 1966, p. 2422.

. S.Rept. No. 1219, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 12 (1964).

. 425 U.S. at 363, 96 S.Ct. at 1600 (1976).

. Federal Public Records Law Part I: Hearings on H.R. 5012, et al., before the Foreign Operations and Government Information Sub-comm. of the House Comm, on Government Operations, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 29-30 (30 March-5 April 1965) (emphasis added).

. Administrative Procedure Act: Hearings on S. 1160 et at, before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practices and Procedure of the Senate Comm, on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (12, 14, 21 May 1965) (statement of Mr. Rains).

. Id. at 112 (remarks by Mr. Benjamin).

. Id. at 149 (statement of Professor Davis).

. Cf.: This court’s language in Lubrizol Corp. v. EPA, 183 U.S.App.D.C. 288, 299-300, 562 F.2d 807, 818-819 (1977) re an agency’s attempt to rewrite the statute by its regulations and this court’s duty to resist such and thus place the issue squarely before Congress.

. Note 8, supra.

. Note 9, supra.

. S.Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1965).

. H.Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1966), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News 1966, p. 2427.

. Vaughn v. Rosen (Vaughn II), 173 U.S.App.D.C. at 193, 523 F.2d at 1142.

. E. g., In re Evans, 146 U.S.App.D.C. 310, 452 F.2d 1239, cert. denied, sub nom. U. S. v. Evans, 408 U.S. 930, 92 S.Ct. 2479, 33 L.Ed.2d 342 (1971).

. Id. 146 U.S.App.D.C. at 316, 452 F.2d at 1245 (“[W]e would have difficulty accepting the report as, in effect, an amendment to the clear — and contrary — language of the statute.”); Abell v. Spencer, 96 U.S.App.D.C. 268, 270, 225 F.2d 568, 570 (1955) (“One sentence in a Senate Report is not controlling where both houses of Congress have passed a bill containing unambiguous language to the contrary.”)

. See United States v. General Motors, 171 U.S.App.D.C. 27, 45, 518 F.2d 420, 438 (1975).

. Note 9 supra.

. See cases cited at note 17, supra.

. See cases cited at note 17, supra. See generally K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, Chapter 3A (1970 Supp.).

. See Montgomery Charter Service, Inc. v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Co., 117 U.S.App.D.C. 34, 325 F.2d 230 (1963); Peoples Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 75 U.S.App.D.C. 235, 127 F.2d 153, cert. denied, 316 U.S. 700, 62 S.Ct. 1298, 86 L.Ed. 1769 (1942); Hoover v. Intercity Radio Co., 52 App.D.C. 339, 286 F. 1003 (1923).

. E. g., FTC v. Manager, Retail Credit Co., 169 U.S.App.D.C. 271, 278, 515 F.2d 988, 995 (1975) (“The proper function of legislative history is to resolve ambiguity, not to create it.”) (MacKinnon, J.).

. 173 U.S.App.D.C. at 193, 523 F.2d at 1142.

. See generally, K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, § 3A.31 (1970 Supp.) at 174-76.

. Freedom of Information, Executive Privilege, Secrecy in Government: Hearings on S. 1142 et al. before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure and the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm, on Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations of the Senate Comm, on Government Operations, (Volume 2), 93rd Congress, 1st Sess., 122-6 (7, 8, 11, 26 June 1973) (testimony of Benny L. Kass).

. Id. at 126.

. K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, § 3A.31 (1970 Supp.) at 175-76.

. P.L. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241.

. K. Davis, Administrative Law in the Seventies, § 3A.00-1 (Cumulative Supp.1977) at 23.

. E. g., W. A. Sheaffer Pen Co. v. Lucas, 59 App.D.C. 323, 41 F.2d 117 (1930); Apfel v. Mellon, 59 App.D.C. 94, 33 F.2d 805, cert. denied, 280 U.S. 585, 50 S.Ct. 35, 74 L.Ed. 634 (1929); Joy Floral Co. v. C.I.R., 58 App.D.C. 277, 29 F.2d 865 (1929). See District of Columbia v. Orleans, 132 U.S.App.D.C. 139, 406 F.2d 957 (1968).

. “It is to be observed that acts in pari materia are to be construed together as forming one act. If, in a subsequent clause of the same act, provisions are introduced, which show the sense in which the Legislature employed doubtful phrases previously used, that sense is to be adopted in construing those phrases. Consequently, if a subsequent act on the same subject affords complete demonstration of the legislative sense of its own language, the rule which has been stated, requiring that the subsequent should be incorporated into the foregoing act, is a direction to courts in expounding the provisions of the law.” Chief Justice Marshall, in Alexander v. Alexandria, 5 Cranch 7, 3 L.Ed. 19.

. H.R. Rept. No. 94-880 (Part I), 94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 9 (1976), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News 1976, p. 2191.

. Note 8, supra.

. Id., 425 U.S. at 366-67, 96 S.Ct. at 1601.

. Id. at 369-70, 96 S.Ct. at 1603.

. 145 U.S.App.D.C. 144, 153-154, 448 F.2d 1067, 1076-77 (1971).

. E. g. Ditlow v. Brinegar, 161 U.S.App.D.C. 154, 494 F.2d 1073 (1974) (Exemption 7).

. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck, text at note 12, supra.

. Aside from any constitutional question, reserved for judicial decision.

. Soucie v. David, 145 U.S.App.D.C. 144, 153-154, 448 F.2d 1067, 1076-77 (1971).

. The disclosure of thése Guidelines would be especially regrettable because the FEA and other agencies have spent a great deal of effort in compiling guidelines for their investigators, not only to increase the efficient use of their time, but also to prevent dangerous freelancing and extemporizing by agents, to give them common directives within recognized legal limits. Agencies would instinctively tend to eliminate written guidelines which they would be obliged to disclose, to direct their operatives by word of mouth, variations in procedure would set in, agents would exceed reasonable limits, all to the public harm.
Such harm could be prevented, however, by an exemption in the Freedom of Information Act forbidding the disclosure of such guidelines prescribing rules for auditors or investigators. As the dialogue between Congressman Moss and Assistent Attorney General Schlei showed (p. — of 192 U.S.App.D.C., p. 743 of 591 F.2d, supra), some members of the House wanted such an exemption, but they were told that the language of Exemption 2 did not cover this, and the parliamentary situation (the Senate having already passed the FOIA) prevented any change in the text of the bill which was subsequently enacted.

. See Rural Housing Alliance v. U. S. Dept. of Agriculture, 162 U.S.App.D.C. 122, 498 F.2d 73 (1974).

. See Brief for Appellee at 4, 17-21.

. See 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(B).

. Cf. Vaughn v. Rosen (Vaughn II), 173 U.S.App.D.C. at 194, 523 F.2d at 1143 (Court of Appeals would not consider rationale for applying exemption not raised in District Court).

. 148 U.S.App.D.C. 280, 287, 459 F.2d 1304, 1311 n.10 (1972), rev’d on other grounds, 412 U.S. 306, 93 S.Ct. 2018, 36 L.Ed.2d 912 (1973). See also Miller v. Avirom, 127 U.S.App.D.C. 367, 384 F.2d 319 (1968); Calhoun v. Freeman, 114 U.S.App.D.C. 385, 316 F.2d 386 (1963); *752American Lease Plans, Inc. v. Houghton Const. Co., Inc., 492 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1974).

. See International Paper Co. v. FPC, 438 F.2d 1349 (2nd Cir. 1971); Tax Reform Research Group v. IRS, 419 F.Supp. 415 (D.C.D.C.1976).

. See Renegotiation Bd. v. Grumman Aircraft Eng. Corp., 421 U.S. 168, 95 S.Ct. 1491, 44 L.Ed.2d 57 (1975).

. See Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 146 U.S.App.D.C. 237, 450 F.2d 698 (1971).

. See Merrill v. Federal Open Market Committee of Federal Reserve System, 184 U.S.App.D.C. 259, 565 F.2d 778 (1977).