Court Opinion

ID: 9658823
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:16:39.146625+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:00.172372
License: Public Domain

*262aThe following opinion was filed June 26, 1959:
Per Curiam
(on motion for rehearing). The brief in support of the plaintiffs motion for rehearing asserts that our original opinion was grounded on a material mistake of fact. The original opinion stated that (p. 262), “no renewed claim was made or has been made” to the defendant insurance company after the second heart attack of February 16, 1954. It is this statement which is claimed to be erroneous.
This contention has necessitated that we review the record before the trial court on the motion for summary judgment as to this particular point.
We start with the pleadings. The complaint did not separate the two heart attacks, or state the date of occurrence of either, but merely alleged that the plaintiff became wholly disabled by bodily disease prior to or on June 1, 1954. This was followed by this allegation:
“That plaintiff did prior to or on June 1, 1954, furnish said defendant with due proof before having attained the age of sixty that he had become wholly disabled by bodily disease and that he would be permanently, continuously, and wholly prevented thereby for life from engaging in any occupation or employment for wages or profit.”
The answer of the defendant denied “that plaintiff on or before June 1, 1954, furnished defendant with any proof of total permanent disability.” We interpret such denial to mean that the plaintiffs allegation, that proofs of claim were filed with the defendant after June 1, 1954, which was subsequent to the second heart attack, is not disputed, but what is denied is the sufficiency of the proofs filed to establish permanent disability.
The plaintiff’s affidavit in opposition to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment states that the plaintiff did *262brenew his application for benefits following the lapse of the six-month period that defendant’s agent had advised was necessary before the second application for benefits could be filed. The affidavits filed by the plaintiff presented no facts on the issue raised by the pleadings that the proofs filed with the company of permanent disability were insufficient.
It may well be that plaintiff still may have the right to now file sufficient proofs of such permanent disability and commence a new action to collect the benefits due. We express no opinion with respect to this.
The motion for rehearing is denied.