Court Opinion

ID: 9792225
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:25:21.225727+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:41.212519
License: Public Domain

WILLIAMS, Justice
(dissenting).
I do not agree that plaintiff’s cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations and that the trial court erred in overruling defendant’s demurrer to plaintiff’s amended petition.
The majority opinion correctly states that fraud is deemed to be discovered, within the statute of limitation, when in the exercise of reasonable diligence it could have been discovered, citing Yoder v. Weston, 122 Okl. 51, 250 P. 522; Widger v. Union Oil Co. of Oklahoma, 205 Okl. 614, 239 P.2d 789, 793. But the majority opinion goes further and says that a defrauded party must allege and prove that he has made a diligent effort to ascertain whether someone has perpetrated a fraud upon him without his knowledge before he can obtain judicial relief. Such holding completely misinterprets the rule above stated and the basis for the rule. The basis for the rule is well stated in the quotation from Smith v. Kimsey, 192 Okl. 618, 138 P.2d 94, set out in Widger v. Union Oil Co. of Oklahoma, supra, as follows:
“Where the means of discovering fraud are in the hands of the party defrauded and the defrauding party has not covered up his fraud to the extent that it would be difficult or impossible to discover, the party de*764frauded will be deemed to have had notice of the fraud from the date the means of discovering’ such fraud came into his hands, and the fraud will be deemed to have been discovered upon that date.”
Upon what date did the means of discovering the fraud come into the hands of plaintiff in this case? The majority opinion does not say. Indeed, it cannot say, because there is no evidence in the record or allegation in the amended petition indicating that the means of discovering the fraud came into plaintiff’s hands more than two years prior to the bringing of this action. Although the amended petition alleges and the proof shows that plaintiff made diligent effort to locate her husband and to determine if he were still living, without success, the majority opinion says she should have gone even further and made diligent effort to ascertain if he had fraudulently procured a divorce decree without notice to her in some unknown place. I cannot agree that such is the law in this or any other jurisdiction.
The majority opinion is erroneous in still another respect. It holds that plaintiff’s contention that the decree of divorce was void and a fraud on the court will not be considered by this court because not presented to the trial court. The record shows that the affidavit for service by publication in the divorce action was not only false but was defective in form and did not contain the necessary jurisdictional allegations; that no affidavit of mailing or non-mailing was filed and that the judgment or decree made no finding as to the sufficiency of the service and did not approve the service as being good. The trial court specifically found these things to be true and found the divorce decree to be void as well as fraudulently obtained. I therefore cannot agree that such issue was not presented to the trial court.
In my opinion the case at bar is strikingly similar to that of Rodgers v. Nichols, 15 Okl. 579, 83 P. 923, 926, in which the court concluded its opinion with the following:
“The evidence in this case clearly discloses that no evidence was adduced by the defendants to show that the statute was, in any respect, complied with. Hence there is no evidence in this case to support the finding of the trial court in respect to service, either by publication or otherwise, upon the defendant. On the contrary, the evidence in this case clearly and conclusively establishes, the fact that no service, actual or constructive, was had upon the defendant, and that a gross fraud and imposition was not only practiced upon the court, but upon the plaintiff in error, and therefore the decree of divorce should not be permitted to stand. The doctrine that, subsequent to the death of the party who obtained a decree of divorce by fraud, an action will lie to annul the same, is sustained by all the authorities. 14 Cye, 719; Cent.Dig. vol. 17, § 535; Bishop, Marriage & Divorce, § 1554; Johnson v. Coleman, 23 Wis. 452, 99 Am.Dec. 193; Brown v. Grove, 116 Ind. 84, 18 N.E. 387, 9 Am.St.Rep. 823; Boyd’s Appeal, 38 Pa. 241; Bomsta v. Johnson, 38 Minn. 230, 36 N.W. 341.
“The judgment of the district court is therefore reversed, and the cause remanded, with directions to vacate and annul the decree of divorce in accordance with the prayer of the petition.”
I therefore respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice HALLEY concurs in the views herein, expressed.