Court Opinion

ID: 9484137
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:41:44.161347+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:50:02.659194
License: Public Domain

GODBOLD, Senior Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I would reverse this case. The defendants did not have the kind of trial to which they were entitled. Plaintiff counsel’s egregiously improper arguments to the jury would, by themselves, require reversal, but other events added to the unfairness of the trial.
Few matters in modern times have rubbed raw the emotions of individual citizens, and of American institutions, as have the Rodney King events. King was beaten by Los Angeles police on March '3, 1991. The videotape of the incident, fortuitously made by a citizen observer, was released to the public on March 5,1992 and shown over and over again on television for weeks. Steven S. Lucas and Eric W. Rose, The Jury Saw All of the Evidence, L.A. Times, Apr. 30, 1992, at B7. The matter swept across our country like a prairie fire, arousing cries of outrage from television and radio commentators and the print media, from public officials at all levels, and from pulpits across the country. See, e.g., Seth Mydans, The Police Verdict, N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 1992, at A1 (stating that Pres. Bush said he was “sickened” by the video). The U.S. Justice department began a nation-wide review of all police brutality complaints. Mayor Bradley launched an investigation of the Los Angeles Police Department headed by the Christopher Commission, which recommended that L.A. Police *1215Chief Darryl Gates retire. Id.1
The trial in this case began January 21, 1992, and continued on January 23 and 24, then on January 27 and 28. On the 28th, with the first breath of his closing argument to the jury, plaintiffs counsel threw the skunk in the jury box.
MR. DEAN (Counsel for plaintiff): If there is anything good or positive that came out of the horrible Rodney King beating that most of you witnessed on television, is that the issue of police brutality was brought to the forefront of the news across the country and it gave a lot of people the opportunity to realize that police brutality does occur.
MR. DAVIS (Counsel for defendants): Excuse me, Your Honor, I’m going to object at this point.
THE COURT: I’ll sustain your objection.
MR. DAVIS: That has nothing to do—
THE COURT: What happened in California, and even though he didn’t mention it was California, that’s where it happened, really doesn’t have anything to do with this case. This case has to be tried upon the evidence in this case. So go ahead.
Rec. 14, p. 500. Counsel’s remarks were not accidental. They were not inadvertently uttered in the heat of mid-argument. They were not reply in kind. They were deliberate. This was a naked, outrageous, and unprofessional appeal to what was then — and is now — a matter of deep concern and high emotion for millions of Americans.2
The similarity of the cases is obvious: a criminal suspect in custody, allegedly drunk or under drugs, allegedly raging out of control and impossible for arresting officers to handle, plus evidence that the suspect is beaten and seriously injured through excessive force against which he is unable to defend himself. Twice counsel worked into his statement the catch phrase “police brutality.”
The trial court should have stopped the proceedings instantaneously, declared a mistrial, and sanctioned counsel. Instead, presumably caught by surprise, the court gave a mild corrective instruction to the effect that what happened in California has nothing to do with this case, and that the case was to be tried on the evidence in the case. This was not enough. It was too mild. And it did not address the real problem. Of course the case was to be tried on the evidence. But the judge’s comment did not address the crucial concern, which was the impact of counsel’s statement upon the minds of jurors in considering the evidence. At a minimum the court should have carefully explored with jurors whether they could consider the evidence and reach a fair verdict free of the effect upon their minds of what plaintiff counsel had said, of the matter to which counsel referred, and of the national concerns that had arisen from it. Moreover, the corrective instruction was directed to California matters. But the problem was not merely *1216what happened in California. The Rodney King case had inflamed a country and had become a national issue.
Defense counsel objected and moved for a mistrial. This court points out that he did not state a ground for his objection. But the court sustained the objection as soon as it was uttered. Counsel then began to state a ground, and the court terminated the dialogue with its remark about matters in California. In any event, if ever there was a case where everyone knew the ground of the objection, this was it.
The above is not all. Plaintiff’s counsel did not stop after the corrective instruction. He drew the second arrow from his quiver, “there was no video tape in this case,” a backhand way of reminding jurors again of the alleged brutalization of Rodney King, which had been brought to light, and then memorialized, by a videotape.
I do not share the confidence of the trial court, stated in denying a post-trial motion, and of my colleagues, that, bearing in mind the court’s instructions, counsel’s improper remarks really did not make a difference. This case could not be cured with a Band-aid.
Later counsel made another inappropriate argument on a different subject, this time with respect to punishing the politicians of the county by awarding punitive damages. The argument and the court’s response are set out in the opinion of this court. Perhaps this statement by itself was not ground for mistrial. But defense counsel pointed to the cumulative prejudice created by the Rodney King statement and the “punish the politicians” statement.
Plaintiff should not be rewarded in this case by judgments totalling $195,000, an amount that the trial court recognized, in ruling on pre-trial motions, was “at the outer limits of an acceptable verdict.”3
While it is not necessary that I address the matter in full detail, I would reverse on the sole ground that the court abused its discretion in allowing testimony by deposition of Johnnie Jones Allison. Ms. Allison was plaintiff’s key witness. By her deposition she testified at length to plaintiff’s being beaten and otherwise mistreated at the hospital. The evidence of what occurred there, as this court notes, was hotly disputed. Ms. Allison is the source of substantial parts of the recital of evidence in plaintiff’s favor set out by this court.4
Briefly summarizing a series of events, here is what happened about the deposition. After trial proceedings had begun plaintiff’s counsel notified the court that he would offer the deposition of Ms. Allison on the ground she was unable to attend because of illness. See F.R.Civ.P. 32(a)(3)(C), FRE 802, 804(a)(4), (b)(1). Defendant objected and a couple days later, after inquiry, produced evidence tending to show Ms. Allison was not unable to come to court. Plaintiff was never able to prove that Ms. Allison was physically unable to appear. Indeed, after several submissions to the court extending over several days, the court found that plaintiff had only succeeding in buttressing that Ms. Allison was not physically unable to come. Plaintiff’s counsel knew, from talking to Ms. Allison about trying to get a doctor’s excuse for her, that she did not want to come to court. When unavailability because of illness began to abort as a ground, plaintiff’s counsel engaged in a belated whirlwind of activity trying to serve a subpoena on Ms. Allison at her home, through a private detective, a relative of Ms. Allison, and by counsel himself. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 32(a)(3)(D). But she had departed ahead of the process servers. Defense counsel tried to find her with a subpoena but could not.
Faced with this situation, the court recognized that the issue before it had changed from alleged unavailability because of illness to inability to procure testimony of the witness by subpoena. As the court phrased it, the question was “diligence in trying to get her as it might *1217impact on unavailability. Rec. 13, p. 359. The court orally discussed the events that tended to show inability to serve a subpoena and held that, since Ms. Allison could not be reached by subpoena and adversary counsel had been present at her deposition with adequate opportunity to cross examine, the deposition would be allowed as testimony. But a critical finding was missing. The court had recognized that diligence by the plaintiff was an issue, but it never addressed that question.
Establishing a predicate for using a deposition over objection is not a mere nicety. Under FRE 801(c) the deposition is hearsay. U.S. v. Salerno, — U.S. -,-- -, 112 S.Ct. 2503, 2506-07, 120 L.Ed.2d 255 (1992). Fed.R.Civ.P. 32(a)(3) simply acts as an exception permitting admission .of deposition testimony when the witness is unavailable to testify at trial. See Michael H. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure § 6793, at 776 n. 2 (interim ed. 1992); 11 James W. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 804.04[1], at VIII-262 (2d ed. 1993). Deposition testimony may also be offered as a hearsay exception under FRE 804(b)(1), but that too requires unavailability. In considering unavailability under Rule 32(c)(3) and under FRE 804 plaintiff must show appropriate diligence. Moore, supra, § 804.03[5], VII-255-58. The court did not address this point. It was error to permit use of the deposition without proof of, or even consideration of, diligence.
This case should be tried properly with restraint on the part of plaintiffs counsel and with Ms. Allison present or proper predicate laid for her deposition. Defendants are entitled to no less.

. Subsequent events shed additional light on public feelings. State criminal charges against the Los Angeles police officers went to trial on March 4, 1992, six weeks after the instant case began. On April 29, 1992 the jury issued its verdict acquitting the defendants of all offenses except for one count against one defendant, on which the jury was hung and a mistrial declared. Whether rightly or wrongly the verdict was denounced by commentators across America and around the world. See, From the Nation's Newspapers, L.A. Times, May 4, 1992, at A9 (quoting American newspapers): The Whole World Watches — and Reacts — to L.A. Riots, L.A. Times, May 5, 1992, World Report, at 2 (quoting international newspapers). Los Angeles suffered two days of rioting resulting in 58 dead, 4,000 injured, 12,000 arrested, and $1 billion of damage. Pulling Together?, The Economist, May 9, 1992 (U.K. ed.), at 55. Less severe rioting occurred in such widespread cities as Seattle, Atlanta, New York, San Francisco, Las Vegas, and Tampa. Edith Stanley and David Treadwell, Violence Continues for Second Day, L.A. Times, May 2, 1992, at A7. Now, when this dissent is written, two officers have been convicted on federal criminal charges.

. The opinion of this court, n. 5, points out that there were discussions at the pre-trial about the inappropriateness of mentioning other cases of alleged police misconduct. The court did not forbid mention of the Rodney King incident; that did not specifically come up. The implication by plaintiff that the remarks of counsel were excusable because not forbidden ahead of time by court order is disingenuous.

. Plaintiff claims attorneys fees in the amount of approximately $130,000. The record reflects that the parties resolved this claim without the necessity of any action by the court. It does not reveal an amount, but it is fair to assume that the amount was not nominal.

. See note 1 of this court’s opinion.