Court Opinion

ID: 9811408
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:19:23.930711+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:13:27.577557
License: Public Domain

Furches, C. J.,
concurring in the opinion of Justice Cook. I state the following reasons for my concurrence:
If the plaintiff is entitled to recover it is by reason of the fraud committed upon her marital rights. The Statute of Frauds has nothing to do with the case for the reason that the deed has been executed, and tire Statute of Frauds does not apply to executed contracts. Hall v. Fisher, and other cases cited in .the opinion. Nor does the Statute of Frauds prevent a party from carrying out his contract, unless ilt affects cred*509itors or purchasers for a full price, and without notice. Triplett v. Witherspoon, 70 N. C., 589. In tbis case there are no creditors of the grantor, unless the plaintiff be treated as such, and tibe defendant children are noit purchasers for a full price. Indeed it 'appears that they paid nothing for their deed.
If the plaintiff was not strictly a creditor, her claim was in the nature of that of ;a creditor. After her contract with the grantor (W. H. Brinkley), in June, 1884, it was a fraud upon her marital rights for her intended husband to give away his property, and in this case it seems to hare been all the property he had. In Poston v. Gillespie, 58 N. C. 258, 75 Am. Dec., 427, it is said: “After the courtship or negotiations about and concerning the marriage, is concluded and the parties bind themselves by a contract to marry, neither can give away his or her property, without the consent of the other, 'and the matter does not then rest upon a mere question of deceit, which may be repelled by proof of notice, but involve® a question of fraud on a right vested by force of a contract, for 'a breach of which an action will lie at laiw.” So if this case states the law, the action is given to either party; it rests on contract and vested rights, >amd is not to be defeated by notice. If this be the law, it is claimed that plaintiff’s right of action was not defeated by the registration of defendant’s deed 'and that contention of defendants must fail.
But defendants claim that since the Constitution of 1868 the wife has nio miarital rights, except 'the inchoate right of dower, which is not due until his death, and that the husband has no marital rights in the wife’s estate. If these contentions are true there ceases to be such a thing as fraud on n. aritdl rights in North Carolina. While the husband may not have the same rights over the estate of the wife that he had before the Constitution of 1868, I do not admit that the wife has not now the same rights in her husband’s estate that *510she bad before the Constitution of 1868, and the same she bad in 1859, when the case of Poston v. Gillespie, was decided by this Court — in which it is held “that after the engagement to marry, neither party has the right to give awiay Ms or her property.” Rut this very question. — fraud ov marital rights since the Constitution of 1868 — has been before the Court and it was held that the Constitution of 1868 worked no such wonders, 'and that the doctrine of fraud upon marital rights still exists in North Carolina. Brinkley v. Jordan, 13 N. C., 145.
Upon these authorities I must hold that the ¿Doctrine of fraud on marital rights still exists in this State; that the defendant, W. IT. Brinkley, having disposed of his land by gift 'to the other' defendants after he and the plaintiff were engaged to be married, was a fraud upon her marital rights, and the deed must be set asida My opinion is put upon the fraud, and not upon Ms promise to convey. Bult when defendant’s deed -is set aside for fraud, there is nothing to prevent the plaintiff’s deed of 1900 from becoming effective, and the plaintiff is entitled to be admitted to the possession of one undivided half of said land, as tenant in common with her husband.
We have had it impressed upon us that the first wife’s father gave this land to the defendant, W. IT. Brinkley, and his first wife. This may be a reason for making the deed of July, 1884, to the defendant children; but it could not constitute a legal consideration, and wo rue trying to dispose of the ease according to the law. Under the laws of this tate,upon 'the death of the wife, the land becomes the property of die husband, and-as such was- liable to' his contracts and creditors to 'the same extent as if he had bought the same with dollars. I must, therefore, concur in the opinion that there was
Error.