Court Opinion

ID: 9844549
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:04:33.639465+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:37.198603
License: Public Domain

Brachtenbach, J.
(concurring) — For reasons stated hereafter, I concur in the result reached by the majority. I cannot agree that California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 34 L. Ed. 2d 342, 93 S. Ct. 390 (1972), is as sweeping in its holding as it is characterized by the majority. Neither can I find the clarity of guidelines suggested by Justice Utter in his dissent.
I find the holding of LaRue somewhat difficult to rationalize in the context of a traditional First Amendment analysis. Apparently the court recognized that some of the prohibited acts of conduct involved in that case would enjoy First Amendment protection other than in the context of state regulated liquor establishments. The court’s treatment of the First Amendment issue has been criticized. See 6 Akron L. Rev. 247 (1973); 61 Georgetown L.J. 1577 (1973); 68 Nw. U.L. Rev. 130 (1973); and 40 Tenn. L. Rev.465 (1973).
Nonetheless the court clearly stops short of requiring a showing of obscenity as the Utter dissent would require. It specifically said at page 116:
[W]e do not believe that the state regulatory authority in this case was limited to either dealing with the problem it confronted within the limits of our decisions as to obscenity, or in accordance with the limits prescribed for dealing with some forms of communicative conduct in *210O’Brien, supra. [United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 20 L. Ed. 2d 672, 88 S. Ct. 1673 (1968).]
While the court did, in a footnote, draw attention to the possible distinction between the constitutionality of a law on its face and in application, I do not believe that distinction is controlling here in view of the conduct involved. I believe the court’s decision means that the activity proscribed must contain a recognizable communicative element before First Amendment rights are to be considered, again whether on the face of the prohibiting law or in the application thereof.
In this case I can ascertain no communicative element, as required by LaRue, to barebreasted dancing when the dancer admitted that her dance was no different whether she performed fully clothed or “topless.” It is not the dance per se which is prohibited, but rather its performance in a state of almost total nudity. While LaRue may not go so far as to prohibit the dance per se, indeed it should not go that far, it does permit the ban, in a state licensed liquor establishment, against the nudity aspect of the dance. See Paladino v. Omaha, 471 F.2d 812 (8th Cir. 1972), which upheld a prohibition against topless entertainment even though it was not found to be obscene.