Court Opinion

ID: 9371443
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-16 15:00:46.649292+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:28.033805
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-1900    Document: 83     Page: 1   Filed: 02/16/2023

        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                  ______________________

                    VR OPTICS, LLC,
                    Plaintiff-Appellant

          VILLENCY DESIGN GROUP, LLC,
            Third-Party Defendant-Appellant

         ERIC VILLENCY, JOSEPH COFFEY,
           Third-Party Defendants-Appellees

                             v.

          PELOTON INTERACTIVE, INC.,
     Defendant-Third-Party Plaintiff-Cross-Appellant
                ______________________

             2021-1900, 2021-1901, 2021-1918
                 ______________________

    Appeals from the United States District Court for the
 Southern District of New York in No. 1:16-cv-06392-JPO,
 Judge J. Paul Oetken.
                  ______________________

                Decided: February 16, 2023
                 ______________________

     MICHAEL DAVID GANNON, Baker & Hostetler LLP, Chi-
 cago, IL, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented
 by LEIF R. SIGMOND, JR.; CHARLES C. CARSON, Washington,
 DC.
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 2                VR OPTICS, LLC   v. PELOTON INTERACTIVE, INC.

     MARK A. BERMAN, Hartmann Doherty Rosa Berman &
 Bulbulia, LLC, Hackensack, NJ, argued for third-party de-
 fendant-appellant, third-party defendants-appellees. Also
 represented by PAUL S. DOHERTY, III, JEREMY B. STEIN.

     STEVEN SCHORTGEN, Sheppard, Mullin, Richter &
 Hampton LLP, Dallas, TX, argued for defendant-cross-ap-
 pellant. Also represented by JENNIFER AYERS; MATTHEW
 G. HALGREN, KARIN DOUGAN VOGEL, San Diego, CA.
                 ______________________

     Before LOURIE, REYNA, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.
 STOLL, Circuit Judge.
      In 2012, Peloton Interactive, Inc. (Peloton) entered a
 contract with Villency Design Group, LLC (VDG) under
 which VDG would design, develop, and manufacture what
 would become Peloton’s stationary exercise bike. The par-
 ties agreed to another, similar contract in 2014. Before the
 2014 contract expired, Eric Villency and Joseph Coffey (the
 sole owners and members of VDG) learned of a patent that
 the Peloton bike might infringe. They formed a new com-
 pany, VR Optics, LLC, which acquired that patent. About
 six weeks after the 2014 agreement expired, VR Optics
 sued Peloton for patent infringement. Peloton counter-
 sued, bringing various contract and tort claims against VR
 Optics, VDG, and Mr. Villency and Mr. Coffey. Among
 these was Peloton’s claim that VDG had breached a clause
 in the 2014 agreement that obligated VDG to defend Pelo-
 ton against patent infringement actions.
      The district court granted summary judgment of inva-
 lidity of VR Optics’ patent and that VDG breached its duty
 to defend Peloton. The district court granted summary
 judgment denying Peloton’s remaining claims—for breach
 of warranty, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
 dealing, fraudulent concealment, and tortious interference
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 VR OPTICS, LLC   v. PELOTON INTERACTIVE, INC.                 3

 with contract. Ultimately, the district court entered judg-
 ment in Peloton’s favor and ordered VDG to pay Peloton’s
 attorney’s fees.
    Peloton, VR Optics, and VDG each appeal. For the rea-
 sons below, we affirm.
                          BACKGROUND
                                 I
     The business relationship between Peloton and VDG
 began in 2012, when the parties signed an agreement un-
 der which VDG would design a proprietary indoor cycling
 bike for Peloton. J.A. 4132–45. Among other things, the
 2012 agreement provided that the design work done by
 VDG would “not infringe upon the rights of any third
 party.” J.A. 4137 § 2.7(c).
      Two years later, the parties executed another, more
 comprehensive agreement, titled “Bike Development and
 Services Agreement.” J.A. 4362–75. This agreement sim-
 ilarly provided that the work done by VDG would not in-
 fringe the intellectual property rights of any third party.
 J.A. 4370–71 § 8.2(a)(3). This 2014 agreement also con-
 tained a provision obligating VDG to “indemnify, defend
 and hold harmless Peloton” against claims “arising out of,
 or relating to, any violation or alleged violation of any in-
 tellectual property rights regarding any of the Bike Intel-
 lectual Property 1.” J.A. 4369–70 § 7.1(b).
     The 2014 agreement also provided that certain obliga-
 tions of the 2014 agreement would survive termination.
 Specifically, the contract states that the “termination or ex-
 piration of this Agreement shall be without prejudice . . .
 [to the] rights under any other provision . . . which

     1   “Bike Intellectual Property” was separately defined
 in the agreement. As discussed further below, the parties
 dispute this term on appeal.
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 4                 VR OPTICS, LLC   v. PELOTON INTERACTIVE, INC.

 expressly and necessarily calls for performance after expi-
 ration or termination.” J.A. 4368 § 5.6(c). One such provi-
 sion is § 8.3(b), which states that “[a]ll representations and
 warranties of Villency and Peloton contained in this Agree-
 ment will survive the termination of this Agreement.”
 J.A. 4371. The 2014 agreement expired two years after it
 was signed, on June 24, 2016. J.A. 4367 § 5.1.
                               II
     During the term of the 2014 agreement, VDG’s princi-
 pals and sole members, Mr. Coffey and Mr. Villency, dis-
 covered the existence of U.S. Patent No. 6,902,513, titled
 “Interactive Fitness Equipment.” The ’513 patent is “gen-
 erally directed to computerized fitness equipment,” e.g., a
 stationary bike, that simulates “actual race conditions with
 other users.” ’513 patent col. 2 ll. 57–59. Claim 1 is repre-
 sentative:
     A system for interactive fitness comprising:
     a server;
     a plurality of geographically-separated fitness
     equipment configured for communication with the
     server via a wide-area network, each of the fitness
     equipment comprising:
         at least one operating component;
         logic configured to obtain first performance
         parameters from the at least one operating
         component;
         logic configured to communicate the first
         performance parameters to a remote fit-
         ness equipment via the wide-area network
         and the server;
         logic configured to receive second perfor-
         mance parameters communicated from at
         least one remote fitness equipment;
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         a communication interface through which
         data may be communicated to and from the
         fitness equipment;
         a display associated with the fitness equip-
         ment; and
         logic configured to drive the display in re-
         sponse to both the first and second perfor-
         mance      parameters,    such     that    a
         performance comparison between the fit-
         ness equipment and at least one remote fit-
         ness equipment is visually displayed; and
     a computer program executed by the server to con-
     figure the server for coordinating the communica-
     tion among the plurality of fitness equipment, such
     that a plurality of the geographically-separated fit-
     ness equipment may simulate interactive exercise
     events.
 Id. at col. 23 ll. 12–40 (emphasis added to highlight dis-
 puted limitation). The specification explains that the bikes
 “may include displays . . . to provide visual, audible, or
 other information to the users.” Id. at col. 10 ll. 55–57. For
 example, Figure 2 illustrates one embodiment of such a
 display:
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 Id. at Fig. 2; see also id. at col. 11 ll. 24–28. The display
 shown in Figure 2 depicts a “graphic image of a track 202”
 that includes “relatively simplistic circles or dots 204 and
 206 [that] may be provided to illustrate the respective com-
 petitors.” Id. at col. 11 ll. 28–32. According to the specifi-
 cation, this display also includes “more detailed data on the
 individual competitors and their comparative performance
 information,” including “information 208 [which] may re-
 late to the performance of the person viewing the display”
 and “information 210,” which “may include an instantane-
 ous readout of the speed [at which] the competitor is trav-
 elling.” Id. at col. 11 ll. 32–47.
       The ’513 patent’s specification describes additional
 ways competitive performance data can be displayed. For
 example, the specification explains that performance data
 could be displayed on “a headset of a virtual-reality dis-
 play,” allowing a user to “look[] rearwardly over his or her
 . . . shoulder.” Id. at col. 11 l. 63–col. 12 l. 21, Figs. 3–4.
    In January 2016, Mr. Coffey and Mr. Villency began
 negotiating with Microsoft Technology Licensing, LLC, the
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 VR OPTICS, LLC   v. PELOTON INTERACTIVE, INC.                 7

 ’513 patent’s then-owner, to purchase the patent. In June
 2016, Mr. Coffey and Mr. Villency formed a new company,
 VR Optics. Like VDG, VR Optics is wholly owned by
 Mr. Coffey and Mr. Villency. About three weeks after the
 2014 agreement expired, Microsoft transferred ownership
 of the patent to VR Optics.
      On August 11, 2016, about seven weeks after the 2014
 agreement expired, VR Optics sued Peloton for infringe-
 ment of the ’513 patent. Peloton counterclaimed, seeking
 a declaratory judgment that its bikes did not infringe and
 that the patent was invalid because it was anticipated by
 U.S. Patent No. 6,997,852 (Watterson). Peloton also as-
 serted third-party claims against VDG, the company
 owned by Mr. Coffey and Mr. Villency and hired by Peloton
 to make its stationary bike, including: (1) a claim for
 breach of the warranty in the 2012 and 2014 agreements
 that VDG’s work would not infringe third-party rights;
 (2) a claim for breach of the 2014 agreement’s duty to de-
 fend; and (3) a claim for breach of the implied covenant of
 good faith and fair dealing. Peloton also asserted claims of
 fraudulent concealment and tortious interference against
 Mr. Coffey and Mr. Villency in their individual capacities.
      VR Optics, VDG, and Mr. Coffey and Mr. Villency each
 filed motions to dismiss the claims against them, which the
 district court denied. See VR Optics, LLC v. Peloton Inter-
 active, Inc., No. 16-CV-6392 (JPO), 2017 WL 3600427
 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2017) (Motion to Dismiss Op.). The
 court then held a Markman hearing to construe the dis-
 puted claim terms in the ’513 patent claims. See VR Optics,
 LLC v. Peloton Interactive, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 3d 394, 411
 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (Claim Construction Op.). Among these
 terms was the performance comparison limitation, present
 in all of the asserted claims, requiring “logic configured to
 drive the display in response to both the first and second
 performance parameters, such that a performance compar-
 ison between the fitness equipment and at least one remote
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 8                 VR OPTICS, LLC   v. PELOTON INTERACTIVE, INC.

 fitness equipment is visually displayed.” 2 ’513 patent
 col. 23 ll. 30–34, col. 24 ll. 2–6. In its Markman order, the
 district court construed this performance comparison limi-
 tation exactly as VR Optics requested. The parties then
 each moved for summary judgment.
                              III
                               A
     In its summary judgment order, the district court be-
 gan with Peloton’s claim that Watterson anticipated the as-
 serted claims of the ’513 patent. See VR Optics, LLC
 v. Peloton Interactive, Inc., No. 16-CV-6392 (JPO), 2020
 WL 1644204, at *3–5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2020) (Summary
 Judgment Op.).
      Watterson’s specification describes an exercise pro-
 gram that can run simultaneously on multiple, geograph-
 ically separate exercise machines.         See Watterson,
 Abstract, col. 1 ll. 31–35. Among other things, Watterson
 discloses a “personalized race” between “two or more indi-
 viduals . . . where they may race one against the other,
 while viewing graphical representations of the distan[ce],
 time, and speed of the other competitors.” Id. at col. 44
 ll. 32–37. Watterson’s specification explains that the pro-
 gram “tracks the exercising activities of competing users,”
 allowing “[e]ach competitor [to] compare the total distance
 traveled against other competitors.” Id. at col. 43 ll. 29–37.
 This comparison can be presented by a “display [that] may
 include a racing track that shows a relative position of each

     2   In claim 6, the word “drive” is replaced by the word
 “control.” ’513 patent, col. 24 l. 2. The court determined
 there was no material difference between these words.
 Claim Construction Op., 345 F. Supp. 3d at 401–02. The
 parties do not dispute this finding on appeal.
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 competitor one with another, or a trail that each competitor
 races along.” Id. at col. 44 ll. 59–62.
     At summary judgment, the parties agreed “that the
 Watterson patent discloses all” claim limitations in the
 claims—save one. Summary Judgment Op., 2020 WL
 1644204, at *3. The parties disputed only whether Watter-
 son disclosed the performance comparison limitation re-
 quiring “logic configured to drive the display . . . such that
 a performance comparison . . . is visually displayed.” Id.
 As discussed above, the court had previously construed this
 limitation, just as VR Optics had asked, to require “logic
 configured to drive the display to visually display a differ-
 ence in performance between the fitness equipment and at
 least one remote fitness equipment based on a difference
 between the first and second performance parameters.”
 Claim Construction Op., 345 F. Supp. 3d at 411–12.
     The district court determined that there was no genu-
 ine dispute of fact that Watterson disclosed the disputed
 performance comparison limitation. Summary Judgment
 Op., 2020 WL 1644204, at *3–5. In particular, the court
 explained that Watterson displays a “difference in perfor-
 mance” as required by the claim construction “because it
 contemplates a ‘personalized race’ between ‘two or more in-
 dividuals . . . where they may race one against the other,
 while viewing graphical representations of the distan[ce],
 time, and speed of other competitors,’ and a ‘display [that]
 may include a racing track that shows a relative position of
 each competitor one with another, or a trail that each com-
 petitor races along.’” Id. at *4 (emphasis in original) (quot-
 ing Watterson, col. 44 ll. 32–37, 60–62). To emphasize its
 point, the court noted that in its claim construction opinion,
 it had “cited as an exemplar of the ‘performance difference’
 limitation an embodiment” in the ’513 patent’s specifica-
 tion: “a visual read indication [that] show[s] where the
 particular user is in relation to the user or users that are
 operating the coupled fitness equipment.” Id. (quoting ’513
 patent, col. 5 ll. 29–33). This embodiment, the court
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 explained, “is materially indistinguishable from that de-
 scribed in” Watterson. Id.
     VR Optics asserted that the report of its technical ex-
 pert, Steven Lenz, created a genuine issue of material fact
 that precluded summary judgment. Mr. Lenz opined that
 Watterson did not display a difference in performance be-
 cause Watterson required “users to make their own com-
 parisons.”    J.A. 6642–43 (Lenz Decl. ¶¶ 87–88).        He
 explained that Watterson’s display of the relative distance,
 time and speed of the user and the competitor requires the
 user to make a mental comparison to understand the dif-
 ference in performance, and thus Watterson does not actu-
 ally display a “difference in performance.” Id.
     The court disagreed, explaining that “[Mr.] Lenz’s
 opinion rests on an unduly cramped reading” of its claim
 construction. Summary Judgment Op., 2020 WL 1644204,
 at *4. Specifically, the court explained that the “difference
 in performance” requirement in its construction does not
 require that the user not make a mental comparison, as VR
 Optics and Mr. Lenz urged. Id. Instead, the court ex-
 plained that the display disclosed in Watterson—showing
 the relative position of each competitor on a simulated
 track—is “a performance comparison, just as an ordinal
 ranking is a numerical representation of the competitors’
 relative performance.” Id. The court reasoned that the
 “embodiment described in” Watterson “no more requires a
 user to manually execute the comparison than any other
 conceivable display of relative performance.” Id.
      Because Mr. Lenz’s opinion was inconsistent with the
 court’s construction of the disputed limitation, the court ex-
 cluded that portion of Mr. Lenz’s testimony. Id. (citing
 Plew v. Ltd. Brands, Inc., No. 08-cv-3741, 2012 WL 379933,
 at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2012) (expert witnesses may not “of-
 fer testimony that conflicts with the Court’s construction of
 the claim”)). The court thus entered summary judgment
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 VR OPTICS, LLC   v. PELOTON INTERACTIVE, INC.               11

 that the asserted claims of the ’513 patent are invalid as
 anticipated by Watterson. 3
                                B
       The court then considered Peloton’s various contract
 and tort claims against third parties VDG, Mr. Coffey, and
 Mr. Villency. First, the court determined that the “success
 of Peloton’s argument for invalidity dooms its claim for
 breach of the warranties in the 2012 and 2014 Agreements”
 that the bike developed by VDG would not infringe any
 third-party intellectual property rights. Id. at *5. Specifi-
 cally, because the “alleged violation of those provisions is
 . . . premised on the infringement of a valid patent,” the
 court’s finding of invalidity rendered those claims for
 breach effectively moot. Id. The court thus entered sum-
 mary judgment on those claims in VDG’s favor.
     The court similarly entered summary judgment in
 VDG’s favor on Peloton’s claim for breach of the covenant
 of good faith and fair dealing. Id. This claim required Pel-
 oton to show that it was “deprive[d] . . . of the right to re-
 ceive the benefits under” the agreement. Id. (quoting Don
 King Prods., Inc. v. Douglas, 742 F. Supp. 741, 767
 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)). But because the court had determined
 that Peloton’s bike did not infringe the ’513 patent because
 the patent claims are invalid, the court found Peloton had
 thus not been “deprived . . . of the fruits of the 2012 and
 2014 Agreements: . . . a non-infringing, proprietary indoor
 bike.” Id.
     Peloton’s claim for fraudulent concealment was simi-
 larly unsuccessful. Although this claim survived VDG’s
 motion to dismiss, see Motion to Dismiss Op., 2017 WL

     3   In its summary judgment briefing, Peloton made
 other arguments for invalidity and noninfringement that
 the district court did not address in view of this determina-
 tion. Summary Judgment Op., 2020 WL 1644204, at *5.
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 12                VR OPTICS, LLC   v. PELOTON INTERACTIVE, INC.

 3600427, at *4–5, the court found it could not survive sum-
 mary judgment, Summary Judgment Op., 2020 WL
 1644204, at *5–6. Specifically, Peloton had only presented
 evidence showing that “VDG knew of the existence of the
 ’513 patent before entering [into] the 2014 Agreement.” Id.
 at *6 (emphasis in original). But Peloton had not presented
 evidence that VDG knew about the “threat of an imminent
 lawsuit” before entering that agreement. Id. Peloton ar-
 gued that, had it known of the impending litigation, it
 would have taken alternative actions, like acquiring the
 patent itself or ceasing payments to VDG. But the court
 found that Peloton had “identified no evidence—let alone
 clear and convincing evidence, as New York law requires—
 that it ‘actually relied’ on VDG’s omission in forgoing these
 potential routes.” Id. The court thus again entered sum-
 mary judgment in VDG’s favor on this claim. Id.
      The court ruled in Peloton’s favor, however, on its claim
 that VDG breached the 2014 agreement by failing to defend
 it against VR Optics’ infringement suit. In the court’s view,
 “[t]he contract’s unambiguous terms . . . obligate[] VDG to
 defend Peloton against [VR Optics’] patent action.” Id.
     Lastly, the court addressed Peloton’s claim that
 Mr. Coffey and Mr. Villency tortiously interfered with the
 contract between Peloton and VDG by inducing VDG to
 breach the contract. Because the court had found that Pel-
 oton did not infringe the ’513 patent (because its claims are
 invalid), the only remaining breach was VDG’s breach of
 the duty to defend. The court explained that Mr. Coffey
 and Mr. Villency were employees of a corporate party to the
 contract (VDG), so establishing tortious interference under
 New York law required Peloton to show that they “ex-
 ceeded the bounds of” their authority in allegedly causing
 the breach of contract. Id. at *8 (quoting In re MF Glob.
 Holdings Ltd. Inv. Litig., 998 F. Supp. 2d 157, 186
 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)). The court determined that “Peloton ha[d]
 produced no evidence that [Mr.] Villency and [Mr.] Coffey
 were acting outside the bounds of their authority or in their
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 VR OPTICS, LLC   v. PELOTON INTERACTIVE, INC.               13

 own interest, as distinguished from VDG’s, when they in-
 duced VDG to refuse to defend Peloton in this action.” Id.
 Thus, the court entered summary judgment in favor of
 Mr. Coffey and Mr. Villency.
     VR Optics, VDG, and Peloton each appealed. We have
 jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1). For the below
 reasons, we affirm.
                           DISCUSSION
     VR Optics appeals the district court’s summary judg-
 ment that the ’513 patent is invalid as anticipated by Wat-
 terson, arguing that the court “apparent[ly] re-
 interpret[ed]” its prior claim construction. VR Optics’
 Br. 1–2. VDG appeals the court’s summary judgment that
 VDG had a contractual duty to defend Peloton against VR
 Optics’ patent infringement claims. In VDG’s view, the
 duty to defend did not survive the termination of the agree-
 ment and, in any event, was not triggered by VR Optics’
 infringement suit. And Peloton appeals the court’s sum-
 mary judgment denying its claims for breach of the cove-
 nant of good faith and fair dealing; fraudulent
 concealment; and tortious interference.
     We review a district court’s summary judgment under
 the law of the regional circuit, here the Second Circuit.
 Convolve, Inc. v. Compaq Comp. Corp., 812 F.3d 1313, 1317
 (Fed. Cir. 2016). “The Second Circuit reviews the grant or
 denial of summary judgment de novo.” Id. (citing Major
 League Baseball Props., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290,
 309 (2d Cir. 2008)). Summary judgment is appropriate
 when there is no genuine issue of material fact and may be
 granted when no “reasonable jury could return a verdict for
 the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. We also
 apply regional circuit law when interpreting a contract if
 the question “is neither unique to patent law nor intimately
 involved in the substance of the patent rights.” Deprenyl
 Animal Health, Inc. v. Univ. of Toronto Innovations
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 14                VR OPTICS, LLC   v. PELOTON INTERACTIVE, INC.

 Found., 297 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002). In the Sec-
 ond Circuit, “the interpretation of a contract . . . presents a
 legal question . . . reviewed de novo.” Kelly v. Honeywell
 Int’l, Inc., 933 F.3d 173, 178 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Cap.
 Ventures Int’l v. Republic of Argentina, 552 F.3d 289, 293
 (2d Cir. 2009)).
                               I
     We begin with VR Optics’ argument that the district
 court erred in entering summary judgment of anticipation
 in view of Watterson. VR Optics’ Br. 23–29. The parties
 agree that Watterson discloses all limitations of the as-
 serted claims except displaying a “performance comparison
 between the fitness equipment and at least one remote fit-
 ness equipment.” See Summary Judgment Op., 2020 WL
 1644204, at *3. Further, no party challenges the district
 court’s construction of the performance comparison limita-
 tion to mean “logic configured to drive the display to visu-
 ally display a difference in performance between the fitness
 equipment and at least one remote fitness equipment
 based on a difference between the first and second perfor-
 mance parameters.” See Claim Construction Op., 345
 F. Supp. 3d at 411–12 (emphasis added). Rather, the par-
 ties challenge the meaning of district court’s claim con-
 struction.
      We affirm the district court’s summary judgment of an-
 ticipation. Contrary to VR Optics’ assertion, the court’s
 construction merely requires “visually display[ing] a differ-
 ence in performance between the fitness equipment and at
 least one remote fitness equipment,” Claim Construction
 Op., 345 F. Supp. 3d at 411–12; it does not specify how that
 difference may be displayed to the user. Accordingly,
 Mr. Lenz’s testimony cannot preclude summary judgment
 because it is based on an unduly narrow reading of the dis-
 trict court’s claim construction and therefore does not
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 VR OPTICS, LLC   v. PELOTON INTERACTIVE, INC.                 15

 demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact. 4 See Duncan
 Parking Techs., Inc. v. IPS Grp., Inc., 914 F.3d 1347, 1363
 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (where the expert’s opinion contradicts the
 court’s construction, “the district court is not obligated to
 credit [that] expert’s testimony” at summary judgment).
      As it did below, VR Optics argues that the district
 court’s claim construction, although not explicitly stated,
 nevertheless requires a display “that does not require a
 mental comparison by the user” to determine “who leads
 and who trails.” VR Optics’ Br. 22. We reject VR Optics’
 attempt to reinterpret the claim. First, the court adopted
 VR Optics’ proposed construction verbatim, id., so VR Op-
 tics cannot seek to change that construction on appeal. See,
 e.g., N. Telecom Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 215 F.3d
 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“[W]e look with ‘extreme dis-
 favor’ on appeals that allege error in claim constructions

     4    The parties’ briefing phrases this issue as one of
 exclusion of expert testimony. See VR Optics’ Br. 29–30;
 Peloton’s Br. 55–57; see also Summary Judgment Op., 2020
 WL 1644204, at *4 (stating that because Mr. “Lenz’s opin-
 ion is therefore inconsistent with the . . . [c]ourt’s prior con-
 struction[,] [i]t is thus excluded”). A district court’s
 exclusion of expert testimony is an issue both we and the
 Second Circuit review for abuse of discretion. Suffolk
 Techs., LLC v. AOL Inc., 752 F.3d 1358, 1366 (Fed. Cir.
 2014); Sarkees v. E. I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 15 F.4th
 584, 588 (2d Cir. 2021). But the effect of such exclusion on
 summary judgment is equivalent to the court determining
 that Mr. Lenz’s testimony is based on an incorrect claim
 construction and thus cannot create a genuine dispute of
 fact to preclude summary judgment. See Clare v. Chrysler
 Grp. LLC, 819 F.3d 1323, 1332–33 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (expert
 testimony “based on an incorrect understanding of the dis-
 trict court’s claim construction” will not preclude summary
 judgment).
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 that were advocated below by the very party now challeng-
 ing them.”). In any event, the district court’s reading of its
 construction is consistent not only with the language of its
 construction, but also the specification, which similarly
 does not limit how the difference in performance must be
 displayed. ’513 patent col. 11 ll. 20–22 (“It should be ap-
 preciated from the discussion herein that various types and
 configurations of displays may be provided for the user.”).
 Indeed, the specification consistently refers to a variety of
 possible displays of competitive performance data. See,
 e.g., id. at col. 5 ll. 29–33 (“The displays . . . on the various
 fitness equipment may provide a visual read indication
 show[ing] where the particular user is in relation to the
 user or users that are operating the coupled fitness equip-
 ment.”); col. 6 l. 55–col. 7 l. 9 (stating that “the display pro-
 vided on the fitness equipment may be relatively simple in
 nature,” then describing a more complex display of racing
 along a virtual track); col. 7 ll. 10–11 (“[V]irtual-reality
 technology may be implemented.”); col. 8 ll. 16–17 (“[per-
 formance] information could be displayed graphically”).
      VR Optics relies on Figure 2, supra p. 6, and its accom-
 panying description in the specification for its narrow in-
 terpretation of the district court’s claim construction. In
 VR Optics’ view, only some portions of Figure 2 show a “dif-
 ference in performance.” Specifically, according to VR Op-
 tics, the “trail by” and “lead by” lines of “additional textual
 information 208 and 210” satisfy the “difference in perfor-
 mance” limitation, but the first three lines of 208 and 210
 listing the user’s and the competitor’s speed and distance
 traveled do not. VR Optics’ Br. 20–21.
     The specification wholly undermines VR Optics’ argu-
 ment. Contrary to VR Optics’ suggestion, the specification
 does not indicate that only the “trail by” and “lead by” lines
 in Figure 2 show a difference in performance. Rather, the
 specification uses the phrase “detailed data on the individ-
 ual competitors and their comparative performance infor-
 mation” to refer to all of the textual information 208 and
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 VR OPTICS, LLC   v. PELOTON INTERACTIVE, INC.               17

 210, which includes the user’s speed and distance and the
 competitor’s speed and distance, as well as the graphic im-
 age 202 with “circles or dots 204 and 206 . . . to illustrate
 the respective competitors.” ’513 patent col. 11 ll. 26–35.
     Because we reject VR Optics’ attempt to reconstrue the
 claims, we affirm the district court’s summary judgment
 that the asserted claims of the ’513 patent are invalid as
 anticipated by Watterson.
                                II
      We next address whether VDG had a duty to defend
 Peloton in this action. We agree with the district court that
 it did. VDG makes three arguments on appeal: (1) that
 the duty to defend did not survive the agreement’s termi-
 nation; (2) that under New York law, its defense obligation
 can be no greater than its indemnification obligation; and
 (3) that the duty to defend was not implicated by this case
 because the asserted patent does not accuse “Bike Intellec-
 tual Property” as defined in the agreement. We take each
 argument in turn.
                                A
     VDG asserts that its duty to defend Peloton did not sur-
 vive termination of the 2014 agreement. Accordingly, be-
 cause VR Optics filed its complaint after the agreement
 expired, VDG argues it had no duty to defend Peloton. We
 disagree.
     As an initial matter, we agree with Peloton that VDG
 waived this argument. It is undisputed that VDG did not
 make this argument before the district court in opposing
 summary judgment. VDG’s Reply Br. 13–16; Peloton’s
 Br. 58. “Preservation of appeal rights is a procedural is-
 sue[] for which this court looks to the law of the regional
 circuit.” Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343,
 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2000). In the Second Circuit, if a party
 raises an argument in a motion to dismiss but does “not
 renew the argument in [its] motion for summary
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 18                VR OPTICS, LLC   v. PELOTON INTERACTIVE, INC.

 judgment,” that argument is “not preserved for review and
 [is] deemed waived.” Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17,
 38 n.17 (2d Cir. 2017); see also Allianz Ins. Co. v. Lerner,
 416 F.3d 109, 114 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding arguments that
 were available to a party below, but not raised by that
 party at summary judgment, were waived on appeal).
     VDG reasons that it need not have raised this argu-
 ment at summary judgment because it had already unsuc-
 cessfully presented this argument in its motion to dismiss.
 See VDG’s Reply Br. 14. It argues that because the court
 concluded at the motion to dismiss stage that the duty to
 defend survived the agreement’s termination, that became
 the law of the case; thus, in VDG’s view, it would have been
 futile to raise it again at summary judgment. Id. at 14–15.
     But the district court did not address whether the duty
 to defend survived the agreement’s termination in its de-
 nial of VDG’s motion to dismiss. See Motion to Dismiss Op.,
 2017 WL 3600427, at *2. It only held that “VDG’s obliga-
 tion to provide ‘Bike Intellectual Property’ that does not in-
 fringe a third-party patent unambiguously survived the
 contract’s termination in June 2016.” Id. The court did not
 expressly say that the duty to defend survived termination
 of the contract; nor did it provide any rationale for why it
 would have survived termination. Put simply, the district
 court did not address this issue, and VDG undisputedly did
 not raise it in its summary judgment briefing. Accordingly,
 VDG has waived this argument. See Darnell, 849 F.3d at
 38 n.17; Allianz, 416 F.3d at 114.
     In any event, this argument also fails on the merits.
 The unambiguous language of the agreement makes clear
 that the duty to defend survived termination. Resolving
 this issue requires consideration of several terms of the
 2014 agreement.
     The duty to defend is in Section 7.1 of the agreement.
 J.A. 4369–70. In that section, VDG “agree[d] to indemnify,
 defend[,] and hold harmless Peloton . . . against any claim
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 VR OPTICS, LLC   v. PELOTON INTERACTIVE, INC.               19

 . . . arising out of, or relating to, any violation or alleged
 violation of any intellectual property rights regarding any
 of the Bike Intellectual Property.” Id. § 7.1(b).
     Section 5.6 governs the survival of rights after termi-
 nation. This section states that the “termination or expi-
 ration of this Agreement shall be without prejudice” to the
 “rights under any other provision of this agreement which
 expressly and necessarily calls for performance after expi-
 ration or termination.” J.A. 4368 § 5.6(c). One provision
 that expressly calls for such post-expiration performance is
 Section 8.3(b), which states that “[a]ll representations and
 warranties of Villency [Design Group] and Peloton con-
 tained in this Agreement will survive the termination of
 this Agreement.” J.A. 4371 § 8.3(b).
     The agreement is thus clear: “[a]ll representations and
 warranties” made by VDG survived termination. Id. One
 such representation and warranty is to “indemnify, de-
 fend[,] and hold harmless Peloton” against claims “regard-
 ing any of the Bike Intellectual Property.” J.A. 4369–70
 § 7.1(b). Accordingly, the unambiguous terms of the con-
 tract clarify that VDG’s duty to defend Peloton survived the
 termination of the agreement.
     VDG argues that the duty to defend clause is not a rep-
 resentation or warranty. According to VDG, Section
 8.3(b)’s reference to “representations and warranties” in-
 cludes only those provisions contained in Section 8.2., titled
 “Representations and Warranties.” We disagree. Section
 8.3(b) refers to “[a]ll representations and warranties of
 Villency [Design Group] . . . contained in this Agreement”—
 not, for example, those “contained in this Article” or “con-
 tained in Section 8.2.” This suggests that the “representa-
 tions and warranties” described by Section 8.3(b) are not
 limited to those enumerated in Section 8.2. If, as VDG ar-
 gues, the parties intended for Section 8.3(b)’s survival pro-
 vision to apply only to certain representations and
 warranties, they could have said so. But as it stands, that
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 20                VR OPTICS, LLC   v. PELOTON INTERACTIVE, INC.

 provision unambiguously states that it applies broadly to
 all representations and warranties “in this Agreement.”
 See Spinelli v. Nat’l Football League, 903 F.3d 185, 200 (2d
 Cir. 2018) (“We must give effect and meaning to every term
 of a contract.” (cleaned up)).
      This conclusion is further supported by the fact that
 Section 8.3(b) does not capitalize the terms “representa-
 tions” or “warranties.” J.A. 4371 § 8.3(b). Contrast this,
 for example, with the agreement’s use of the capitalized
 term “Bike Intellectual Property” to refer back to the term
 previously defined in Section 1.7(a), see J.A. 4369–70
 § 7.1(b), and the use of the capitalized term “Bikes” to refer
 back to the term previously defined in the preamble, see
 J.A. 4364 § 1.7(a). The agreement’s use of defined terms by
 using capitalization demonstrates that the parties “were
 perfectly capable of using such terms when they wished to
 do so.” Sonterra Cap. Master Fund, Ltd. v. Barclays Bank
 PLC, 403 F. Supp. 3d 257, 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). Their de-
 cision not to capitalize the terms “representations” and
 “warranties” “should not be ignored and the term should
 therefore be accorded its ordinary meaning.” Id. (citing
 Sunbelt Rentals, Inc. v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 839
 F. Supp. 2d 680, 688–89 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (faulting party’s
 failure “to draw a distinction between the use of the term
 ‘equipment’ generically and its use as a (capitalized) de-
 fined term”)). Thus, VDG’s duty to defend survived the
 agreement’s termination.
                               B
     Citing several New York state law cases, VDG next ar-
 gues that, under New York law, its duty to defend can be
 no broader than its duty to indemnify. Because Peloton
 was not found liable for patent infringement—a prerequi-
 site for indemnification—VDG argues that it did not
 breach any duty to defend. VDG’s Br. 26–29. VDG’s argu-
 ment, however, is based on a misunderstanding of the prec-
 edent it cites.
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 VR OPTICS, LLC   v. PELOTON INTERACTIVE, INC.                    21

      In New York, “the ‘duty to defend’ is presumed only in
 insurance policies, [and] the common law imposes no such
 duty on contractual indemnitors more generally. Accord-
 ingly, an indemnitor’s obligation to defend must emanate
 (if at all) from the language of the contract.” Dresser-Rand
 Co. v. Ingersoll Rand Co., No. 14-cv-7222, 2015 WL
 4254033, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). Dresser-Rand clarified
 that this presumption is not meant to undermine unambig-
 uous contract language. “If a contractual defense obliga-
 tion is, by its own terms, exceedingly broad, a court will not
 artificially circumscribe it simply because the indemnitor
 is not an insurer.” Id.; see also McCleary v. City of Glens
 Falls, 819 N.Y.S.2d 607, 609 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (“Alt-
 hough [Defendant] contends that its duty to defend is no
 broader than its duty to indemnify because it is not an in-
 surer . . . , that distinction has no significance here, where
 the [plaintiff] is due the full benefit of the bargain it
 reached . . . under the clear and unambiguous terms of the
 contract.”).
       The contracts at issue in Dresser-Rand and McCleary
 are instructive. In Dresser-Rand, the court determined
 that a contract provision requiring Ingersoll Rand (a non-
 insurer) to “indemnify [and] defend” Dresser-Rand “from
 . . . any and all . . . claims . . . relating to . . . Products Lia-
 bilities Losses” “could be broad enough to trigger a defense
 obligation.” 2015 WL 4254033, at *8. There, however, the
 court declined to adjudicate the precise bounds of Ingersoll
 Rand’s defense obligations because the case was not yet
 ripe. Id. at *8–9. In McCleary, the contract provided that
 the South Warren Snowmobile Club would “defend, indem-
 nify and hold harmless [Warren] County . . . from any and
 all claims . . . which the County . . . may suffer as a result
 of . . . the Club’s activities.” 819 N.Y.S.2d at 609. The court
 determined that this broad contractual provision obligated
 the Club to defend the County even in the absence of a find-
 ing of liability. Id.
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 22                VR OPTICS, LLC   v. PELOTON INTERACTIVE, INC.

     In this case, VDG agreed to “indemnify, defend and
 hold harmless Peloton” against certain intellectual prop-
 erty claims. J.A. 4369–70 § 7.1(b) (emphasis added). VDG
 characterizes this provision as a “garden variety defense
 and indemnity clause,” VDG Br. 28, asking us to interpret
 it as nothing more than an agreement to indemnify Pelo-
 ton. But as the district court explained, the language of
 this provision “admits of no limiting construction.” Sum-
 mary Judgment Op., 2020 WL 1644204, at *7. Here, VDG
 agreed to “indemnify, defend and hold harmless Peloton”—
 not just “indemnify.” Just as in McCleary—where the court
 interpreted an almost identical contract provision obligat-
 ing one party to “defend, indemnify and hold harmless” the
 other—the agreement here shows that the parties under-
 stood the duty to defend was distinct from the duty to in-
 demnify. 819 N.Y.S.2d at 609. VDG thus cannot escape
 the express language of the contract. Accordingly, VDG
 also had a duty to defend Peloton that was separate and
 distinct from its duty to indemnify.
                               C
      Finally, VDG argues that its duty to defend was not
 triggered by VR Optics’ suit because VR Optics does not
 accuse “Bike Intellectual Property,” as defined in the agree-
 ment, of infringing the ’513 patent. VDG’s Br. 29–35. The
 duty to defend clause obligates VDG to “indemnify, defend
 and hold harmless Peloton . . . against any claim . . . aris-
 ing out of, or relating to, any violation or alleged violation
 of any intellectual property rights regarding any of the
 Bike Intellectual Property.” J.A. 4369–70 § 7.1(b). VDG
 argues that “Bike Intellectual Property” is “limited to in-
 tellectual property that VDG created,” VDG’s Br. 32, which
 it asserts is only the bike’s physical frame. Because VR
 Optics’ suit targeted the interactive fitness technology, not
 the bike’s physical frame, VDG argues that it was not obli-
 gated to defend Peloton against that suit. Id. at 29–35.
 Peloton argues that the plain language of the contract con-
 firms that the term “Bike Intellectual Property” is not
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 VR OPTICS, LLC   v. PELOTON INTERACTIVE, INC.                23

 limited only to that intellectual property contributed by
 VDG. Peloton’s Br. 64–68.
       In its summary judgment order, the district court did
 not resolve the parties’ dispute about the definition of “Bike
 Intellectual Property.” Instead, the court considered the
 language of the duty to defend clause and observed that the
 clause was drafted broadly. Summary Judgment Op., 2020
 WL 1644204, at *6–8. The district court concluded that VR
 Optics’ “claims rest in part on the assertion that the bike
 frame itself satisfies some limitations of the ’513 patent.”
 Id. at *7. For example, the limitations of the asserted
 claims include: “geographically-separated fitness equip-
 ment” comprising “at least one operating component,”
 ’513 patent col. 23 ll. 14, 18 (claim 1); “fitness equipment
 . . . selected from the group . . . [including] an exercise
 bike,” id. col. 23 ll. 41–43 (claim 2); the system defined in
 claim 1 wherein the operating component “is one selected
 from the group consisting of . . . a flywheel,” id. col. 23
 ll. 52–53 (claim 4); and “fitness equipment” comprising “at
 least one operating component configured to provide an as-
 pect of exercise for the user of the fitness equipment,” id.
 col. 23 ll. 59–61 (claim 6). The court thus determined it
 was unnecessary to resolve the parties’ dispute about the
 meaning of the term “Bike Intellectual Property,” because,
 even under VDG’s restrictive view of that term, VR Optics’
 suit still “regard[s] Bike Intellectual Property” and thus
 triggered the duty to defend. Summary Judgment Op.,
 2020 WL 1644204, at *7.
     We agree with the district court that the duty to defend
 clause is broad. VDG’s duty to defend explicitly extends to
 “any claim,” “arising out of . . . any violation or alleged vio-
 lation . . . regarding any of the Bike Intellectual Property.”
 J.A. 4369–70 § 7.1(b) (emphasis added); see Cook v. Wilkie,
 908 F.3d 813, 818 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“As the Supreme Court
 has recently observed, ‘the word “any” naturally carries “an
 expansive meaning.”’” (quoting SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu,
 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1354 (2018))). But we are inclined to
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 24                VR OPTICS, LLC   v. PELOTON INTERACTIVE, INC.

 instead resolve this issue by considering the meaning of
 “Bike Intellectual Property.” The agreement defines “Bike
 Intellectual Property” as:
      all intellectual property relating to the Bikes, 5 in-
      cluding, without limitation, all designs (including,
      without limitation, those created by Villency prior
      to or during the Term of this Agreement), inven-
      tions, improvements, discoveries, data, concepts,
      ideas, processes, methods, techniques, know-how,
      and information respecting the Bikes conceived,
      made, or produced by Villency prior to and/or dur-
      ing the course of performing the Product Develop-
      ment Services and/or Manufacturing Services
      under this Agreement, or made or produced as the
      result of the joint efforts of Peloton and Villency
      prior to or during the Term of this Agreement.
 J.A. 4364 § 1.7(a) (emphasis added).
     This language broadly defines “Bike Intellectual Prop-
 erty” to include “all intellectual property relating to the
 bikes, including, without limitation,” the intellectual prop-
 erty contributed by VDG. This provision expressly includes
 VDG’s contributions, but does so “without limitation,” thus
 clearly contemplating intellectual property beyond those
 contributions. See, e.g., In re Enron Creditors Recovery
 Corp., 370 B.R. 64, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d in part, rev’d
 in part, 380 B.R. 307 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (the word “includes”
 “operates as a nonrestrictive modifier”); Willow Wood Rifle
 & Pistol Club, Inc. v. Town of Carmel Zoning Bd. of Ap-
 peals, 496 N.Y.S.2d 548, 551 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (the
 words “include” and “including” are terms of enlargement,
 not of limitation, and their use indicates there are other
 items that can be included even if they are not specifically

      5  “Bikes” was defined as Peloton’s “proprietary in-
 door cycling bikes.” J.A. 4362.
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 VR OPTICS, LLC   v. PELOTON INTERACTIVE, INC.               25

 enumerated). We do not see a basis to read out the lan-
 guage “all” or “without limitation,” as VDG would have us
 do; indeed, it would be inappropriate for us to do so. See
 Spinelli, 903 F.3d at 200 (“We must give effect and mean-
 ing to every term of a contract.” (cleaned up)); 150 Broad-
 way N.Y. Assocs., L.P. v. Bodner, 14 A.D.3d 1, 6 (N.Y. App.
 Div. 2004) (courts must “interpret a contract so as to give
 meaning to all of its terms”). We thus agree with Peloton
 that this provision’s broad, clear language extends beyond
 the intellectual property contributed by VDG to include “all
 intellectual property relating to the Bikes.” J.A. 4364
 § 1.7(a).
      This conclusion is bolstered by consideration of how the
 term is used throughout the contract. For example, VDG
 agreed that “[a]ll Bike Intellectual Property provided by
 [VDG] will be originally created exclusively by” VDG.
 J.A. 4370–71 § 8.2(a)(3) (emphasis added). If the term
 “Bike Intellectual Property” were already limited to that
 provided by VDG, this provision’s use of the qualifier “pro-
 vided by [VDG]” would be redundant. But we must assume
 that every term of the contract has meaning, Spinelli, 903
 F.3d at 200, and thus that the qualifier was required in this
 provision to narrow the broad term. Later in that same
 section, VDG represented and warranted “that the Bike In-
 tellectual Property does not and will not infringe upon the
 rights of any third party.” J.A. 4370–71 § 8.2(a)(3). In this
 case, the defined term is used without a qualifier, indicat-
 ing the parties intended this portion of the provision to be
 broader. See U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Annunziata, 67
 N.Y.2d 229, 233 (1986) (omission of term in one provision
 of contract but inclusion in another “must be assumed to
 have been intentional”).
     Where the language of the contract is clear, our inquiry
 begins and ends with that language. See, e.g., 150 Broad-
 way, 14 A.D.3d at 6. Here, the term “Bike Intellectual
 Property” is defined broadly and is not limited to the intel-
 lectual property provided by VDG. VDG’s duty to defend
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 26                VR OPTICS, LLC    v. PELOTON INTERACTIVE, INC.

 was thus triggered by VR Optics’ infringement suit against
 Peloton, which asserted a “violation of [] intellectual prop-
 erty rights regarding any of the Bike Intellectual Prop-
 erty.” J.A. 4369–70 § 7.1(b).
                           *   *      *
     In sum, we conclude that VDG had a duty to defend
 Peloton; that the duty to defend survived termination of
 the agreement; and that VDG was obligated to defend Pel-
 oton in this action. We thus affirm the district court’s sum-
 mary judgment on this issue.
                               III
     We now address the remaining contract and tort claims
 at issue in this appeal: Peloton’s claims against VDG for
 fraudulent concealment, breach of the implied covenant of
 good faith and fair dealing, and breach of warranty, and
 Peloton’s claim against Mr. Coffey and Mr. Villency for tor-
 tious interference with contract. The district court entered
 summary judgment against Peloton for each of these
 claims. We affirm.
     We turn first to the fraudulent concealment claim
 against VDG. “The elements of a fraudulent concealment
 claim under New York law are: (1) a duty to disclose ma-
 terial facts; (2) knowledge of material facts by a party
 bound to make such disclosures; (3) failure to discharge a
 duty to disclose; (4) scienter; (5) reliance; and (6) damages.”
 DeSole v. Knoedler Gallery, LLC, 974 F. Supp. 2d 274, 314
 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (cleaned up). Each of these elements “must
 be shown by clear and convincing evidence.” Banque Arabe
 et Internationale D’Investissement v. Md. Nat’l Bank, 57
 F.3d 146, 153 (2d Cir. 1995). Peloton asserts that VDG
 knew of the threat of impending infringement litigation but
 did not disclose that threat to Peloton. Peloton’s Br. 76–77.
 Peloton argues that, had it known that the ’513 patent
 would soon be asserted against it, it would have “immedi-
 ately terminated the 2014 Agreement” or “negotiated with
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 VR OPTICS, LLC   v. PELOTON INTERACTIVE, INC.               27

 Microsoft to purchase the ’513 patent itself.” Id. at 77. In
 its summary judgment order, the district court found that
 “conjecture notwithstanding, Peloton has identified no evi-
 dence—let alone clear and convincing evidence, as New
 York law requires—that it ‘actually relied’ on VDG’s omis-
 sion in forgoing these potential routes.” Summary Judg-
 ment Op., 2020 WL 1644204, at *6.
     We agree with the district court. Peloton presents only
 attorney argument that it would have taken action to ter-
 minate the agreement or purchase the ’513 patent had
 VDG informed it of the impending litigation. See Peloton’s
 Br. 76–77. Regarding Peloton’s claim that it would have
 “immediately terminated the 2014 Agreement,” not only
 does Peloton not cite to any evidence supporting this claim,
 but the contract itself also suggests that Peloton did not
 actually have the right to terminate the contract unilater-
 ally. See J.A. 4367 § 5.2 (allowing termination by Peloton
 if VDG “fails to perform,” if Mr. “Villency ceases to be em-
 ployed by or otherwise associated with” VDG, or for force
 majeure); § 5.3 (allowing partial termination by Peloton for
 any reason after a set period of performance). And regard-
 ing Peloton’s assertion that it would have “purchase[d] the
 ’513 patent itself,” Peloton’s Br. 77, Peloton again cites no
 evidence. As the district court put it, “[m]erely hypothesiz-
 ing a road not taken is not enough . . . . Peloton has failed
 to create a genuine dispute.” Summary Judgment Op.,
 2020 WL 1644204, at *6. We thus affirm the district court’s
 summary judgment on this issue.
      Next, we consider Peloton’s claim against VDG for
 breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
 ing. To succeed on that claim, Peloton must show that VDG
 has acted “in a manner that, although not expressly forbid-
 den by any contractual provision,” has deprived Peloton “of
 the right to receive the benefits under their agreement.”
 Don King Prods., 742 F. Supp. at 767. The district court
 correctly observed that, because of the summary judgment
 of invalidity, Peloton has not been deprived “of the fruits of
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 28                VR OPTICS, LLC   v. PELOTON INTERACTIVE, INC.

 the 2012 and 2014 Agreements”: “a non-infringing, propri-
 etary indoor bike.” Summary Judgment Op., 2020 WL
 1644204, at *5. Because it has not been deprived of the
 right to receive its contracted-for benefits, Peloton thus
 cannot bring a claim for breach of the implied covenant of
 good faith and fair dealing. We affirm the district court’s
 granting of summary judgment on this claim.
      We now turn to Peloton’s claim for breach of warranty
 against VDG. The district court determined that because
 the ’513 patent is invalid—and thus Peloton is not liable
 for infringing that patent—VDG did not breach its war-
 ranty that its bikes would not infringe the intellectual
 property rights of third parties. Id. (citing J.A. 4370–71
 § 8.2(a)(3)). Because we affirm the district court’s invalid-
 ity finding, we also affirm the court’s granting of summary
 judgment that VDG did not breach its warranty.
     Finally, we consider Peloton’s claim for tortious inter-
 ference with contract against Mr. Coffey and Mr. Villency.
 Under New York law, a claim for tortious interference re-
 quires that (1) a valid contract exists; (2) a third party had
 knowledge of the contract’s existence; (3) that third party
 intentionally and improperly procured the breach of the
 contract; and (4) the breach resulted in harm. See TVT
 Records v. The Island Def Jam Music Grp., 412 F.3d 82, 88
 (2d Cir. 2005). If a tortious interference claim is brought
 against an employee or agent of a corporate party to the
 contract, that individual is only considered a third party if
 he “exceeded the bounds of his [] authority” in inducing the
 breach or if his actions were motivated only by his personal
 gain. Finley v. Giacobbe, 79 F.3d 1285, 1295 (2d Cir. 1996);
 In re MF Glob. Holdings, 998 F. Supp. 2d at 186.
     Here, like with its claim for fraudulent concealment,
 Peloton has failed to support its arguments with relevant
 record evidence. Because, as discussed above, VDG has not
 breached any warranty, the only breach Peloton may rely
 on for this claim is the breach of the duty to defend. But
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 VR OPTICS, LLC   v. PELOTON INTERACTIVE, INC.               29

 Peloton’s cited evidence relates exclusively to the actions
 taken by Mr. Coffey and Mr. Villency in purchasing the
 ’513 patent—evidence that is unrelated to VDG’s breach of
 the duty to defend. See Peloton’s Br. 78–81. As the district
 court correctly observed, “Peloton has produced no evi-
 dence that [Mr.] Villency and [Mr.] Coffey were acting out-
 side the bounds of their authority or in their own interest,
 as distinguished from VDG’s, when they induced VDG to
 refuse to defend Peloton in this action.” Summary Judg-
 ment Op., 2020 WL 1644204, at *8. We similarly affirm the
 district court’s granting of summary judgment on this
 claim.
                           CONCLUSION
     We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments
 and are unpersuaded. For the above reasons, we affirm the
 district court’s summary judgments.
                          AFFIRMED
                              COSTS

 No costs.