Court Opinion

ID: 9486595
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 11:53:48.0964+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:49.260321
License: Public Domain

*1350W. EUGENE DAVIS, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part, dissenting in part:
I totally agree with the majority that this case should be remanded so the district court can give further consideration to its sentence. Unlike the majority, on remand I would not foreclose the district court from considering in the upward departure calculus the prior bank robberies the defendant was charged with committing in Counts 1 and 2 of this indictment.
As the majority opinion reflects, the circuits are split over this question. The majority relies on the opinions of the Ninth and Third Circuits.1 These cases hold, as do the majority, that the defendant does not get the benefit of his plea bargain when the district court upwardly departs based on the dismissed counts of the indictment. I agree with the Second and Tenth Circuits2 that no reasonable basis exists for a defendant who enters a guilty plea to believe that the court cannot use the prior criminal conduct from the dismissed counts of the indictment to enhance his sentence. Ashburn’s plea bargain had no language that could have led him to that conclusion. It provided that the government would dismiss two of the counts and the government fully complied with that obligation.
I also find nothing in the guidelines themselves that would lead a defendant to reasonably expect that the conduct underlying the dismissed counts could not be used to enhance his sentence. The general guideline authorizing departure, § 5K2.0 does so in very broad terms. It authorizes the court to impose a sentence outside the guideline range if the court finds “that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines.... ” More specifically, 4A1.3 authorizes a court to depart “[i]f reliable information indicates that the criminal history category does not adequately reflect the seriousness of the defendant’s past criminal conduct or the likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes,.... ”
In deciding whether to depart because of the defendant’s criminal history, subsection (e) expressly authorizes the court to consider “prior similar adult criminal conduct not resulting in a criminal conviction.” Neither this guideline nor its commentary suggests that an exception exists for prior similar criminal conduct that is the subject of dismissed counts of an indictment.
Because nothing in the plea agreement or the guidelines prevents the district court from considering the criminal acts underlying the dismissed counts, I would not require the district judge to close his eyes to this conduct.
ORDER
(July 1, 1994)
BY THE COURT:
A majority of the Judges in active service, on the Court’s own motion, having determined to have this case reheard en banc,
IT IS ORDERED that this cause shall be reheard by the Court en banc with oral argument on a date hereafter to be fixed. The Clerk will specify a briefing schedule for the filing of supplemental briefs.

. United States v. Fine, 975 F.2d 596, 602 (9th Cir.1992) (en banc); United States v. Castro-Cervantes, 927 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir.1990); United States v. Thomas, 961 F.2d 1110, 1121 (3d Cir.1992).

. United States v. Kim, 896 F.2d 678 (2d Cir.1990); United States v. Zamarripa, (10th Cir.1990).