Court Opinion

ID: 9602462
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:55:21.998885+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:03.841585
License: Public Domain

Pannell, Judge,
dissenting. I dissent from Divisions 1 and 2 of this opinion for the same reasons given in State Hwy. Dept. v. Rutland, ante. So that proper comparisons to the charges and exceptions may be made, I think it appropriate that the charges and the exceptions thereto in this case be set forth herewith. The following charges were excepted to as a whole in ground 4 of the motion for new trial:
“I charge you that in estimating the value of land when taken for public uses inquiry may be made as to all legitimate purposes to which the property could be appropriated or used, or to which it had been appropriated and used. The jury shall assess the value of the property taken and used and the damages done.
“In estimating its value the capabilities of the property and the use to which it is applied, and to which it had been applied are to be considered, and not the mere condition it is in at the time and the use to which it is then applied by the owner.
*804“All the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings and improvements and capabilities may be shown, and, if shown, be considered by the jury in estimating its value.”
The exceptions were as follows:
“1. It is error to charge the jury that they can consider all uses to which the property may be put where, as here, there is no evidence that the property is suitable for any other use than the one to which it was being put at the time of the taking, or that it has ever been put to any other use, or that it has any possibility or capability of any other use.
“2. The charge is misleading in that it leads the jury to believe that they may disregard the present condition of the property and base the valuation of the property on possible improvements that may be put on it, rather than its condition at the time of the taking.
“3. There is no evidence that the property has any use or capability other than agriculture and it was error to charge the jury that they could consider all legitimate purposes to which the property could be appropriated other than the purpose for which it was used at the time of the taking.”
There was evidence in the case that the property involved was used for farming; that a tenant house had been rented for the past four or five years at a stated rental; that about three acres of the land taken had been planted in pine trees under a Federal program for which the owner was paid $10 per year; that there were two tobacco barns, a stock barn and fencing on the property taken, and that part of property taken was in the city limits of Sparks, Ga.
It is my opinion that the judgment should be affirmed.
I am authorized to state that Nichols, P. J., joins me in this dissent.