Court Opinion

ID: 9722989
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:59:23.073241+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:43.544508
License: Public Domain

*236Holbrook, Jr., P.J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur with the majority in holding that all except one of plaintiffs allegations are not actionable on the basis of the tort invasion of privacy. My dissent is limited to the issue of whether plaintiffs factual allegation of surveillance accomplished by observations of defendants’ agents made through the windows of plaintiffs home, at times using a high-powered camera lens, was properly dismissed by summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10).
All members of this panel agree that the starting point for an analysis of plaintiffs claim requires a showing of (1) an intrusion by the defendant (2) into a matter in which plaintiff has a right of privacy (3) by a means or method that is objectionable to a reasonable person. With regard to the specific allegations of this case, we all agree that the scope of plaintiffs right of privacy was subject to limitations derived from defendants’ legitimate interest as an employer in investigating suspicions that plaintiffs work-related disability was a pretext. The point of departure in this analysis is the majority’s conclusion that the employer’s legitimate investigatory purpose underlying surveillance of the windows of a dwelling renders plaintiff unable to meet the second requirement for an actionable intrusion upon seclusion.
In my view, this does not end the inquiry. Even if the purpose for conducting an investigation into private matters is legitimate, the defendant is not entitled to carte blanche investigate without regard to the degree and nature of intrusion. "It is clear that this area of the right to privacy is concerned with the manner of procuring informa*237tion as well as the nature of the information obtained.” Beaumont v Brown, 65 Mich App 455, 462; 237 NW2d 501 (1975), rev’d on other grounds 401 Mich 80; 257 NW2d 522 (1977). Although the question of whether an unwarranted intrusion into privacy ultimately occurred requires factual determinations beyond the purview of this Court, it is difficult for me to imagine circumstances where the use of nonconsensual access to something as essentially private as a personal dwelling does not amount to such an intrusion. Some means of intrusion are so objectionable that even a legitimate purpose should not be permitted to undermine the right of privacy. The means of intrusion and the nature of the privacy interest should be considered cumulatively in order to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists.
In dicta, this Court has previously suggested that window-peeping is actionable. See Lewis v Dayton-Hudson Corp, 128 Mich App 165, 168-169; 339 NW2d 857 (1983); Bradshaw v Michigan Nat'l Bank, 39 Mich App 354, 356; 197 NW2d 531 (1972).
In Harkey v Abate, 131 Mich App 177, 182; 346 NW2d 74 (1983), lv den 419 Mich 912 (1984), this Court, in deciding that the defendant’s conduct was an unwarranted intrusion into privacy, found significant that the conduct in question had been criminalized by statute as a felony. The fact of a criminal prohibition was understood to evince "a legislative expression of public policy opposed to such conduct.” Similarly, being a "window peeper” is a misdemeanor under the disorderly persons statute. MCL 750.167(1)(c); MSA 28.364(1)(c). The existence of this provision could only serve to enhance a plaintiffs expectation of privacy.
I concur that an allegation of pervasive surveillance of the investigatory target through the windows of his own home, particularly when accom*238plished by means of a camera lens, at a minimum creates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the intrusion was unwarranted. I would reverse summary disposition with respect to that allegation.