Court Opinion

ID: 9499379
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:47:17.169194+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:59:28.605613
License: Public Domain

GREGORY, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in Part IV of the majority opinion, which concludes that Christopher *174Scott Emmett’s (“Emmett’s”) counsel was not ineffective in failing to develop evidence of Emmett’s intoxication for use during the penalty phase. I respectfully dissent from the majority’s analysis and conclusion in Part III of the opinion. Counsel failed to investigate adequately Emmett’s childhood, and counsel’s inadequate investigation prejudiced the sentencing phase of Emmett’s trial. The Supreme Court of Virginia unreasonably applied Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), in ruling otherwise.
I.
The majority opinion provides a lengthy description of the facts related to Emmett’s crime and a thorough exposition of counsel’s effort to investigate Emmett’s background. The opinion does not detail at length the facts related to Emmett’s childhood of abuse and neglect. Because these facts are essential to analyzing Emmett’s claim, I fully recount them here.
Emmett, born August 18, 1971, was the last of five children born to Barbara “Karen” McAdams (“Karen”) and Bobby Emmett (“Bobby”). His birth home was unsanitary. Emmett’s aunt, Joanne Baze-more (“Joanne”), remembered that the home was filthy and smelled of urine, a stench bad enough to make her eyes burn. She remembered dirty diapers that fell out of closet doors and urine-soaked mattresses that had to be taken outside for airing. In this home, the children were neglected. Joanne recalled that there were many times the children did not have enough to eat. While unsupervised, an older sister then two years old, Angela Emmett Wynn (“Angela”), sustained severe injury from an electrical shock after she was allowed to chew on a cord. Also while unsupervised, an infant sister died, apparently from an asthma attack.
Approximately three months after Emmett’s birth, his mother divorced his father, taking the children with her, she said, because Bobby was an alcoholic who could not keep a job. Bobby’s second wife Glenda Mills (“Glenda”) remembered that at some point thereafter, Karen left the children, dirty and underdressed, with a friend but did not return for them for over two days. When the children stayed with Bobby and Glenda for approximately one year, the couple never heard from Karen.
Karen and the children later moved to Roanoke Rapids, North Carolina, where Karen married Tommy McAdams (“Tommy”) and had three additional children. Visitors to the McAdams home described it as dilapidated. The stairs had fallen off the front porch, so the children climbed up a tree to enter the home from the front; the back of the house was also difficult to access. Emmett’s brother Bobby Emmett Jr. (“Bobby Jr.”) remembered that bugs infested the house in the summer because none of the windows had screens, bats flew inside the house, and the one oil heater in the parents’ bedroom could not keep the family warm in the winter.
The children in the McAdams home had little supervision. An older sister, Amy Walton (“Amy”), remembered that by age eight, she roamed the streets, without consequence, to avoid being in the house. Bobby Jr., who similarly roamed the streets, stated that “kids were always supposed to be watching kids” at home. J.A. 299. Another sister, Mary Emmett Floyd (“Mary”), remembered that their step-father Tommy was often working, but their mother was either idle at home or “running the streets.” J.A. 305. The lack of supervision led to injuries. Mary fell off the front porch and suffered rib injuries that persist today. When still a baby, *175Emmett fell down a flight of stairs and required emergency room care. Even though Tommy was home that night, he blamed and beat Amy for Emmett’s fall.
The McAdams home was as unsanitary as Karen’s previous home with Bobby. Glenda remembered piles of dirty clothes and dishes, the smell of urine, and dirty diapers that were left wherever a baby was changed. Emmett’s siblings remembered the same, including trash cans that were full and sometimes overturned. Amy could not recall Karen doing laundry. If the children wanted clean clothes, they had to use the washboard and cold water (as there was no running hot water) to clean the clothes themselves. Before eating, the children had to find a dish and wash it.
The children were also malnourished, therefore Emmett was very thin as a child. Karen only served dinner and sometimes a tomato soup lunch. Emmett’s siblings remembered that there was never enough food to eat, so the children regularly left the house to look for food. They occasionally had to steal food. More often, neighbors or the man working at a local ice cream shop fed them; other times, a local doughnut shop owner fed them on the way to school. Angela remembered that, strangely, her mother always had enough to eat and would not share with the children the cakes she lay in bed eating.
Fights were common. Karen and Tommy physically fought over Karen’s spending habits. The family did not have much money, and Karen went to jail a few times for writing bad checks. Mary remembered that the family lost their trailer home because, unbeknownst to Tommy, Karen spent the money intended for its payment. Infidelity also caused fights, even a knife fight. Karen in particular had a reputation for sleeping with married men, and she often fought with their wives.
The children suffered physical abuse. Karen and Tommy beat Mary and Emmett with “anything that was handy.” J.A. 306. Emmett received more beatings because he was rebellious; Mary went to school with marks from the beatings. Angela remembered not feeling safe in the home. She recalled that the children were so afraid of Tommy, especially when he was drinking, that they would climb down a tree from the second floor window to reach the bathroom behind the house without seeing him, or simply urinate on their bedroom floors. Emmett’s half-sister Lauri McAdams Johnston (“Lauri”) remembered that Tommy had a quick temper and slapped the children with little provocation. Tommy beat Emmett badly after one of his sisters threw him through a wall in the trailer. Bobby Jr. remembered that a caretaker beat Amy badly and locked Emmett and Bobby Jr. in their rooms.
Around 1974, the children’s biological father, Bobby, picked up his three eldest children at school, without permission, and took them to live with him in Chesapeake, Virginia. Mary and Emmett, however, were too young to be in school and were therefore left behind. Amy, Bobby Jr., and Angela considered it a huge relief to go live with their father. They recalled that back in North Carolina, Tommy sometimes beat Emmett badly, dumped their plates of food in the trash just for “looking at him wrong,” and locked them in a closet. J.A. 378. When Angela and Bobby Jr. returned to live with Karen and Tommy briefly, the situation had not changed.
Back in North Carolina, Karen forced the children to take the blame for her misdeeds. Mary remembered that when Karen’s marijuana was found in the home, Karen blamed Emmett even though he was only ten or eleven years old. Lauri remembered that her mother told the children to confirm the lies she had told Tom*176my. Sometimes Karen left the home for weeks or months at a time.
Around this time, Emmett began to get in trouble, mostly for stealing items like food, fishing equipment, toys, bicycles, and cigarette lighters from neighbors and schoolchildren. Emmett was first arrested for stealing at age seven. In April 1979, Karen brought him to the Halifax County (North Carolina) Mental Health Center for treatment. A psychiatric social worker there noted that, in addition to stealing, Emmett “is prone to telling outrageous lies” and his “hygiene was most inappropriate. There was a distinctive odor of urine about him.” J.A. 329, 335. The social worker recommended a battery of tests and made a note to investigate the family. Emmett’s tests later revealed neglect:
The obsession with food themes supplies support for feeling by school personnel that Scottie may not be receiving adequate care in the home. Some explicative stems include: “What worries me ... is food, when I’m going to it;” “I need ... food;” “It is hard to ... cook”.... Projective testing indicated a tendency to be highly concerned with basic survival needs, especially food.
J.A. 333. The social worker recommended that the school consider reporting the Mc-Adams home to the Halifax County Department of Social Services (“DSS”) for investigation. She also diagnosed Emmett with reactive disorder of later childhood, a developmental disorder caused by persistent disregard of a child’s basic emotional needs (e.g., comfort, stimulation, affection) or basic physical needs.
Karen and Tommy did not follow through with counseling for Emmett. Three months after his initial visit, records indicate that multiple canceled and no-show appointments interrupted his therapy and that attempts to get Karen to come for sessions failed. After a year of no contact with the center, Karen returned to report that Emmett’s behavior had worsened. She acknowledged that “she realizes his stealing is the result of lack of attention.” J.A. 339.
Accordingly, in March 1980, the family re-initiated treatment. In mother-son play therapy, the therapist noted that Karen remained aloof from her son and that Karen and Emmett seemed unaware of how to interact with each other. Despite some initial progress in Emmett’s behavior, the family eventually interrupted therapy. In August 1980, a juvenile court counselor noted that Tommy’s involvement in treatment was essential to Emmett’s progress but not forthcoming. A June 1981 report noted that Emmett’s chaotic and disorganized family setting afforded him little opportunity for attention from his parents, that his parents did not comply with counseling, and that DSS was considering eventual residential placement for Emmett. The center terminated treatment “due to repeated unsuccessful attempts to re-involve the family.” J.A. 341. In October 1981, a court order reinstated treatment one final time. Therapists saw Emmett, by then age ten, ten times, but Karen continued to miss appointments. For the second time, the center terminated Emmett’s treatment “du[e] to lack of follow-through on the part of his family.” J.A. 343.
Juvenile court reports confirm these accounts of Emmett’s childhood. In 1980, a juvenile intake counselor preparing for Emmett’s court appearance on charges of breaking and entering and larceny described the McAdams home as dilapidated and unkempt. When he visited, he wrote, the children were extremely dirty and the only furniture in good condition was a fully stocked gun cabinet.
The Chief Court Counselor filed a Child Abuse and Neglect Report against Karen *177on March 3, 1981. He recommended that Emmett be placed outside of the home if the present conditions could not be fixed. The next month, a social worker reported that Karen resisted DSS involvement. When the social worker did succeed in visiting the home, she found that rotted food and dirty dishes filled the sink in a roach-infested kitchen; the furniture was dilapidated; the steps had fallen off the front porch and entry from the back of the house was difficult; all the children were unkempt and dirty; there was a lack of bonding between mother and children and among siblings; and the mother did not nurture or show any affection toward the children. The social worker concluded that the home was dysfunctional.
Two weeks after this visit, a juvenile court counselor filed another Child Abuse and Neglect Report after finding the Mc-Adams home in total disarray during an unscheduled visit. He opined based on Emmett’s age and the nature of his thefts that his stealing was the result of neglect and his resistance to authority was the result of lack of supervision.
The counselor filed another report in 1984, after Emmett was arrested for breaking and entering a neighbor’s home and stealing a ten-dollar piggy bank. Emmett spent the money at a grocery store on soft drinks, potato chips, and ice cream. The counselor once again suggested that these acts were Emmett’s way of seeking the attention he did not receive at home. The report also noted that Emmett, who had missed multiple days of school that year, had been required to- repeat the fourth grade. The counselor recommended that Emmett be committed to the Division of Youth Services until his eighteenth birthday or placed in a residential treatment program. According to an update filed a month later, Emmett had not attended school for twelve consecutive calendar days. After being charged with three additional delinquent offenses on March 7, 1984, Emmett was finally removed from the McAdams home.
In preparing Emmett’s mitigation case, trial counsel did not uncover any of the above facts regarding Emmett’s childhood-facts habeas counsel uncovered by requesting North Carolina juvenile court and social services records, interviewing several of Emmett’s siblings and relatives, and interviewing a probation officer and social worker from Emmett’s youth. Unaware of these facts, counsel did not present them during the penalty phase of trial. Rather, counsel called just two witnesses from Emmett’s family, Emmett’s mother Karen and his half-sister Lauri, and asked them a total of three questions about Emmett’s childhood. Counsel asked Karen to name and describe Emmett’s birth father. Karen replied that Emmett’s birth father, Bobby, was an abusive alcoholic who never took care of his family. Counsel asked Lauri whether she grew up with Emmett, to which she replied yes. These three answers were all that the jury heard regarding Emmett’s childhood.
II.
Emmett argues that his counsel was ineffective because he failed to retrieve Emmett’s juvenile mental health records, review Emmett’s juvenile court file, or interview additional relatives and juvenile authorities-sources that would have yielded the information described above. Instead, counsel called only two witnesses from Emmett’s family, asked them the most cursory questions about Emmett’s childhood, and left the jury with the impression that Emmett’s life after infancy was “perfectly normal.” Appellant’s Br. at 8. Had counsel completed an adequate investigation and presented the credible evidence about Emmett’s abuse and ne-*178gleet as a child, Emmett argues, there is a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have recommended a life sentence. The majority, however, siding with the Warden, finds that the district court properly upheld the state court’s determination that counsel acted reasonably, especially given Emmett’s criminal history and Emmett’s statements to counsel, discussed below. I agree with Emmett and would grant his application for relief.
III.
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under Strickland, Emmett must show that (1) his counsel’s performance was deficient and (2). this deficient performance prejudiced the defense. 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
Under the first Strickland prong, counsel’s performance is deficient where “counsel’s representation [falls] below an objective standard of reasonableness” as measured by prevailing professional norms. Id. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052. When, as here, counsel’s performance in developing a mitigation case is at issue, the relevant inquiry “is not whether counsel should have presented a mitigation case,” but “whether the investigation supporting counsel’s decision not to introduce mitigating evidence of [the petitioner’s] background was itself reasonable.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 523, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003). That inquiry includes “a context-dependent consideration of the challenged conduct as seen from counsel’s perspective at the time,” id. (internal quotation marks omitted), and applies “a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The Supreme Court has clarified further that a strategic choice made by counsel after a thorough investigation is “virtually unchallengeable,” whereas a strategic choice made by counsel after an incomplete investigation is reasonable only to the extent that “reasonable professional judgments” support the limitations counsel put on his or her investigation. Id. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
Under the second Strickland prong, prejudice exists where “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. “When a defendant asserts prejudice with respect to his sentence, the Court must ‘reweigh the evidence in aggravation against the totality of available mitigating evidence.’ ” Hedrick v. True, 443 F.3d 342, 349 (4th Cir.2006) (quoting Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534, 123 S.Ct. 2527).
Ultimately, this Court is tasked with determining whether the state court’s adjudication of Emmett’s Strickland claim “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000), or “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceedings,” id. § 2254(d)(2).
IV.
In assessing counsel’s performance, the majority correctly states that an attorney’s conversations with a defendant can be critical in determining whether the attorney acted reasonably in limiting his or her investigation. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Nonetheless, for a host of reasons, it was not reasonable for counsel to rely on Emmett’s bland depiction of his childhood and Dr. Evan Nelson’s (“Dr.Nelson’s”) conclusion that “there is little in [Emmett’s] background *179that can mitigate the offense” in limiting his investigation. J.A. 432. While Emmett did omit (and, in some instances, misrepresent) details about his childhood, he did not indicate to counsel that further investigation would be useless or that he had identified “all relevant social history” for counsel, as the state court held. J.A. 542.1 Cf. Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 380-83, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 162 L.Ed.2d 360 (2005) (holding that defendant’s statement, among other things, that his childhood and schooling had been normal did not extinguish counsel’s duty to investigate). More importantly, however, counsel knew that Emmett had a history with the North Carolina mental health and juvenile justice authorities, but counsel did not know what that history entailed before he concluded that any details from that history did not fit within his mitigation strategy. I am more than willing to “credit [counsel’s] plausible strategic judgments,” a rule the majority faithfully invokes, so long as those strategic judgments are made after a reasonable investigation. Lovitt v. True, 403 F.3d 171, 181 (4th Cir.2005).
Counsel’s explanation as to why he did not pursue Emmett’s mental health and social services records, even though Emmett and his mother told counsel those records existed, is wanting. The majority notes that counsel investigated Emmett’s school and prison records and tried to obtain Emmett’s juvenile commitment records but was told those records had been destroyed. The majority does not offer a similar explanation as to why counsel did not seek Emmett’s juvenile social services and mental health records. Instead, the majority credits counsel’s post-hoc explanation (because, as counsel admits, his “file notes are silent” as to his inaction, J.A. 433) that he must not have pursued those records because conversations with Emmett, his mother, and his half-sister suggested there was nothing significant to uncover, much less anything that would contradict the information already provided by Emmett.
This explanation does not mollify me as it does the majority; counsel’s interviews with Karen and Lauri were wholly insufficient. During counsel’s single interview with Lauri, he asked her only about Emmett’s drug use and changes in his personality. Lauri explained: “[H]e did not ask me any questions about Scott’s childhood or about our family situation when we were growing up. [Counsel] also never tried to talk to me outside the presence of my mother.” J.A. 308. When deposed for the habeas proceedings, Karen explained that because counsel did not tell her what he would ask her on the witness stand, she felt unprepared to testify. As for her interview with the investigator from counsel’s office, Karen shared:
[I]t seemed to me like he was in a hurry to get it over with. He never asked us to show him family photographs or sign medical releases. He also never spoke to any of Scott’s brothers or sisters. The investigator told me repeatedly that there was no danger of Scott getting the death penalty. He said that he really didn’t think the prosecutor would ask for death in this case. For that reason, I was shocked when Scott was sentenced to death.
J.A. 317. A closer look at the substance of counsel’s interviews, then, calls into question the reasonableness of his decision to *180look no further than those interviews for mitigating evidence.
Furthermore, counsel did not, as the state court held in error, interview all of the witnesses whose names Emmett provided. I disagree with the majority that the state court’s mistake is harmless. The majority writes that it “cannot say that the state court operated under the mistaken belief that counsel had [interviewed every family member bought to his attention].” That proposition, however, works both ways: as much as we cannot say that the state court operated under its mistaken determination of the facts, we cannot say that the state court did not. All that is before us is the state court’s unambiguous, factually inaccurate statement that counsel did interview all of the witnesses Emmett named. In this regard alone, the state court’s adjudication of Emmett’s claim resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).2 Counsel never swore in his affidavit that he interviewed all of the witnesses whose names Emmett provided (in fact, counsel specifically stated that he “contacted and interviewed Emmett’s mother, step-father and sister and other friends,” J.A. 431), the Warden never argued as much, and both counsel’s and Dr. Nelson’s notes clearly indicate that Emmett provided the names of several siblings whom counsel did not interview. Four of Emmett’s natural siblings, an aunt, Emmett’s step-mother, a social worker, and a probation officer were available but not interviewed.
As the majority correctly observes, Strickland does not require counsel to interview these witnesses, but counsel made a decision to not use these witnesses’ testimony before he knew what that testimony was.3 This limitation on counsel’s investigation was unreasonable. Two cases that reached the outcome the majority reaches today, Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987), and Tucker v. Ozmint, 350 F.3d 433, 441 (4th Cir.2003), are helpful examples. In those cases, counsel’s actions were decidedly different from those of Emmett’s counsel. In Burger, the Supreme Court deemed counsel’s limited investigation reasonable because he interviewed all witnesses brought to his attention and discovered little that was helpful and much that was harmful. 483 U.S. at 794, 107 S.Ct. 3114. In Tucker, this Court held that counsel was not ineffective because he presented “a substantial mitigation case” based on the defendant’s childhood abuse. 350 F.3d at 441. Emmett’s counsel neither interviewed all witnesses bought to his attention nor presented a mitigation case of any *181substance based on Emmett’s childhood abuse and neglect.
Notwithstanding counsel’s failure to obtain Emmett’s mental health and social services records, the information counsel had contained important clues. Emmett and his mother told counsel that Emmett received court-ordered mental health counseling as a child; counsel knew that Emmett, who reached only the ninth grade, repeated the fourth grade because of excessive truancy due to, according to Emmett, psycho-therapy sessions; counsel had school records indicating that Emmett’s family phone was disconnected and his mother did not communicate with teachers; and counsel knew that a juvenile counselor described Emmett’s childhood home as nasty and crowded. These red flags would have led a reasonably effective attorney to investigate further. See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 527, 123 S.Ct. 2527 (“In assessing the reasonableness of an attorney’s investigation ... a court must consider not only the quantum of evidence already known to counsel, but also whether the known evidence would lead a reasonable attorney to investigate further.”).
For this reason, the majority’s complaint that Emmett has neither testified nor produced evidentiary support to explain why he could not recall the details of his childhood for trial counsel is irrelevant. It is of no moment that Emmett either intentionally misled counsel or unwittingly suppressed memories of the abuse he suffered as a child. Counsel possessed independent sources of information indicating that Emmett had a history with various state agencies and suggesting that there may be more of Emmett’s story to uncover. The law does not require Emmett to present “testimony or [an] affidavit on his behalf in [these] habeas proceedings,” as the majority writes. Rather, Strickland and Wiggins compel us to ask: What external evidence did Emmett’s counsel have that should have led him to investigate further?
V.
The majority observes that Emmett did not grapple with the intellectual challenges that the defendant did in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000), stymie his attorney’s efforts to investigate as the defendant did in Rompilla, or receive no investigation at all by counsel, as in Wiggins. Nonetheless, having engaged in the requisite “case-by-case examination” of the evidence, see Williams, 529 U.S. at 391, 120 S.Ct. 1495, I find that counsel’s limited investigation still falls short of the standards set in Wiggins, Rompilla, and Williams. Counsel “uncovered a wealth of information” about Emmett’s criminal background, as the majority emphasizes, but counsel certainly did not uncover why, according to the bevy of professionals who met the young Emmett, he had this criminal history. Indeed, a former social worker testified that the situation in the Emmett’s home was one of the “worst [she’s] seen,” a “classic, text-book case of what you hear discussed as being the environments in which adults who have serious problems were raised.” J.A. 315. At least one juror may have found this information disposi-tive.
'Counsel also fell short of the standards articulated in the American- Bar Association (“ABA”) Guidelines that the Supreme Court regularly consults to measure reasonable performance. See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524, 123 S.Ct. 2527. Those guidelines “provide that investigations into mitigating evidence ‘should comprise efforts to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence and evidence to rebut any aggravating evidence that may be introduced by the prosecutor.’” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting ABA Guidelines for the *182Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases 11.4.1(C), p. 93 (1989)). The sources of mitigating evidence that Emmett’s habeas counsel consulted, but his trial counsel did not, were “reasonably available.” Thus, neither Supreme Court precedent nor the ABA Guidelines compels the majority’s conclusion that counsel’s performance was reasonable.
I note two cases where I declined to find counsel’s performance constitutionally ineffective. The facts in both cases, Hedrick, v. True, 443 F.3d 342 (4th Cir.2006) (Gregory, J.), and Kandies v. Polk, 385 F.3d 457 (4th Cir.2004) (Gregory, J.), vacated on other grounds by 545 U.S. 1137, 125 S.Ct. 2974, 162 L.Ed.2d 884 (2005), are- distinguishable from those in Emmett’s case. In the first case, Hedrick, we concluded that counsel was not ineffective in limiting his investigation once he learned that Hedrick’s father abused alcohol, both parents used marijuana, and both parents preferred Hedrick to use .drugs and alcohol at home rather than on the street. See Hedrick, 443 F.3d at 349-52. Additional investigation would have yielded only the information that Hed-rick’s parents fought frequently and his mother committed welfare fraud. Furthermore, a significant body of evidence that Hedrick’s counsel did not pursue— the juvenile court file of Hedrick’s brother, which indicated that the family home was fragmented and dysfunctional — was not “reasonably available.” The file belonged to a minor, Hedrick’s brother, who could not sign a release granting counsel access after Hedrick’s family refused to allow counsel to involve the brother in the case. These were the circumstances under which Hedrick’s counsel reasonably decided to limit his investigation and to pursue only the strategy of persuading the jury that Hedrick was “a good kid ... led astray.” Id. at 352.4
Emmett’s case is distinguishable. Unlike Hedrick’s counsel, Emmett’s counsel failed to pursue records that were (1) related to his own client and (2) reasonably available. Further, Emmett’s counsel ignored clues from interviews and from documents he , already possessed, thereby missing evidence that Emmett had some type of agency intervention and an actual diagnosis. In short, counsel left undiscovered clear “cause and effect” evidence-cogent explanations by professionals as to why Emmett developed into a criminal. Counsel did not, as did Hedrick’s counsel, neglect mere anecdotal evidence that his client’s father drank and fought bitterly with a spouse-anecdotal evidence that likely would not have outweighed the aggravating evidence in the record.
In the second case, Kandies, the defendant was convicted for raping and murdering a four-year-old girl. Kandies argued that, in investigating his background, his *183counsel had a duty to ask Kandies whether he was sexually abused as a child because studies have found that men who commit child abuse are more likely than the general population to have been sexually abused as children. See Kandies, 385 F.3d at 470-71. We held that counsel was not ineffective in faffing to ask the question, especially when counsel otherwise, “thoroughly investigated Kandies’s background.” Id. at 471.
Again, Emmett’s case is distinguishable. Kandies’s counsel failed to ask a single question when no other evidence in the record would suggest the importance of asking that question. He otherwise thoroughly investigated Kandies’s background. By contrast, Emmett’s counsel did not thoroughly investigate Emmett’s background: he failed to pursue substantial leads (from information already in his possession) that would have opened to him the true story of Emmett’s childhood.
Emmett’s case also differs from that of Kandies’s because, in Kandies, we refused to deem counsel’s actions unreasonable when counsel failed to pursue a general, sociological observation that sexual offenders tend to have been victims as children. Here, Emmett’s counsel did not fail to pursue a statistical probability; he failed to pursue Emmett’s documented history of receiving social and mental health services. Counsel’s actions left undiscovered powerful mitigating evidence developed years before Emmett committed a crime as an adult. The conclusion drawn by a social worker in 1981, for example, that the young Emmett’s home was precisely the kind of home in which adults with “serious problems” have been raised, has an undeniable credibility. J.A. 315. Stated otherwise, that 1981 conclusion very likely would have changed the vote of at least one juror deciding a sentence of life or death for Emmett twenty years later.
VI.
The majority makes much of the fact that counsel was respecting Emmett by not assuming that Emmett was being less than forthcoming in describing his childhood. As support, the majority cites Lov-itt for the proposition that counsel is always an agent of the defendant. Even the attorneys in Lovitt, however, obtained all of Lovitt’s jaü records, all of his juvenile records, and .all of his medical records. See 403 F.3d at 179. The attorneys knew the extensive criminal history of Lovitt’s family and the family’s reputation in the community. See id. at 180. Armed with this information, they heeded Lovitt’s request not to interview his family members, lest they “be accused of being ineffective for ignoring their client’s wishes.” Id. at 181. Counsel in the instant case was not similarly barred from speaking to Emmett’s family, and counsel did not have the vast information about Emmett’s past that the attorneys in Lovitt had before making a decision about the type of mitigation case to present.5 The question is not, then, as the majority phrases it, whether the Constitution requires counsel to presume that a cooperative client or cooperative family *184member is being misleading. The question is whether a reasonable attorney, presented with the red flags apparent here, would have investigated further by looking to the readily available sources — e.g., Emmett’s other siblings, Emmett’s social services records — he knew existed. See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 523, 123 S.Ct. 2527 (“[W] e focus on whether the investigation supporting counsel’s decision not to introduce mitigating evidence of [the petitioner’s] background was itself reasonable.”).
VII.
The majority concludes that, after indications from Emmett that his childhood was unremarkable, counsel conducted a reasonable investigation and put on a mitigation case that artfully avoided, as the majority writes, “bolstering] the prosecutor’s argument that Emmett was a calculating, ruthless, lifelong criminal.” I note that the lengthy criminal history counsel sought to minimize is largely one of stealing toys and food that began when Emmett was seven. Emmett’s mental health records and juvenile court files, which counsel knew existed but did not seek and therefore did not know the content of, consistently attribute Emmett’s theft to his parents’ neglect. Counsel did not have the full picture of this neglect before concluding that this mitigating evidence could not outweigh the state’s evidence that Emmett would be a future danger because he had been a criminal since age seven. Counsel’s conclusion, which today becomes the majority’s conclusion, might have been reasonable had it been reached after a thorough assessment of the voluminous mitigating evidence available for Emmett. Cf. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (holding that “strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable”).6
The majority holds that counsel was understandably reluctant to introduce mitigating evidence that would unwittingly become aggravating evidence. Yet counsel swore in his affidavit that “[t]he prosecution was either unaware of or chose not to detail my client’s extensive criminal behavior from as early as age 7 or 8.”
J.A. 423 (emphasis added). Since counsel was not certain that the prosecution did not know the extent of Emmett’s criminal history, he had a duty to investigate that history in the event that the prosecution did know of that history and planned to use it in aggravation.7 See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524, 123 S.Ct. 2527; see also Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 377, 125 S.Ct. 2456 (“[E]ven when a capital defendant’s family members and the defendant himself have suggested that no mitigating evidence is available, his lawyer is bound to make reasonable efforts to obtain and review material that counsel knows the prosecution will probably rely on as evidence of aggravation at the sentencing phase of trial.”). Indeed, as the majority notes, the prosecutor had attempted to investigate Emmett’s juvenile records for use in aggravation.
The conclusion in Wiggins, then, is equally appropriate here:
*185Given both the nature and the extent of the abuse petitioner suffered, we find there to be a reasonable probability that a competent attorney, aware of this history, would have introduced it at sentencing in an admissible form.... [CJounsel were not in a position to make a reasonable strategic choice as to [what] to focus on ... because the investigation supporting their choice was unreasonable.
539 U.S. at 535-36, 123 S.Ct. 2527. The Wiggins Court continued: “[H]ad the jury been confronted with this considerable mitigating evidence, there is a reasonable probability that it would have returned with a different sentence.” Id. at 536, 123 S.Ct. 2527; cf. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 393, 125 S.Ct. 2456 (“It goes without saying that the undiscovered mitigating evidence, taken as a whole, might well have influenced the jury’s appraisal of [Rompilla’s] culpability, and the likelihood of a different result if the evidence had gone in is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome actually reached at sentencing.” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). The majority is persuaded that the social history Emmett has presented during these habe-as proceedings is “more than offset by” the “compelling” aggravating evidence presented at trial. I, in contrast, am persuaded that at least one juror, see Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 536, 123 S.Ct. 2527, might disagree.
In sum, Emmett’s is “a case where counsel’s failure to thoroughly investigate kept the jury completely in the dark as to” Emmett’s childhood. McWee v. Weldon, 283 F.3d 179, 189 (4th Cir.2002). Because counsel made a “strategic” decision not to develop additional mitigating evidence after an investigation that was unreasonable by the standards set forth in Supreme Court precedent, and because at least one juror might have voted against death had the jury heard the extent of the abuse and neglect Emmett suffered as a child, I would grant Emmett relief.
VIII.
For these reasons, I find that the Supreme Court of Virginia’s determination of at least one of Emmett’s claims was an unreasonable application of Strickland. Accordingly, I dissent from Part III of the majority’s opinion.

. In addition, I find merit in Emmett's argument that because Dr. Nelson did not conduct an independent investigation and relied only on information supplied by counsel, counsel was especially ineffective for relying on Dr. Nelson’s conclusions in lieu of completing a thorough investigation.

. Likewise, the Supreme Court of Virginia unreasonably applied Strickland in holding that counsel's performance was also not deficient because "evidence that petitioner's father was an alcoholic and abusive was admitted at trial and heard by the jury through petitioner's mother.” J.A. 541. Emmett’s birth father, Bobby, about whom Karen testified, had no role in Emmett's upbringing beyond Emmett's infancy. Emmett's step-father, Tommy, was the abusive and neglectful paternal figure who colored Emmett's path toward juvenile delinquency. The jury never heard from Karen or anyone else about Emmett's life under Tommy's roof.

. Counsel's attempting to use one juvenile probation officer, Molly Bergwyn ("Berg-wyn''), as a mitigation witness, and then coming to the conclusion that her testimony could hurt more than help, does not relieve him of his duty to develop other, readily available sources of information. Moreover, counsel's abandonment of a portion of Emmett’s mitigation case just nine days before trial because one probation officer (again Bergwyn) had potentially harmful testimony and another juvenile officer was retired and could not be found demonstrates how unsatisfactory counsel’s investigation was to begin with.

. In fact, Hedrick could show neither deficient performance, as explained above, nor prejudice. The evidence of Hedrick’s "less than idyllic upbringing” uncovered by habeas counsel would have been contradicted at sentencing by the testimony of Hedrick’s family members and other witnesses. Hedrick, 443 F.3d at 351. In interviews with habeas counsel, an aunt and uncle decried Hedrick's childhood home. But witnesses at Hedrick's sentencing testified that Hedrick grew up in a normal family with wonderful parents and only recently became involved with a bad crowd. Id. at 352. We concluded that "[g]iv-en the contradictory evidence on this point, it is not at all clear that [the] additional [mitigating] information outweighs the aggravating evidence supporting the jury’s findings.” Id. By contrast, in the instant case, the undeveloped evidence of Emmett’s poor upbringing would have been coiroborated, not only by the multiple family members counsel did not interview, but also by those family members counsel did interview, had he asked the correct questions. Emmett, therefore, can show prejudice where Hedrick could not.

. The type of mitigating evidence Lovitt claimed should have been presented to the jury also distinguishes Lovitt's case from that of Emmett. Lovitt's mitigating evidence was described as "occasionally contradictory.” Lovitt, 403 F.3d at 182. Testimony described Lovitt’s step-father as alcoholic and abusive, but Lovitt's juvenile records describe his childhood home life as clean, nicely furnished, stable, and loving. See id. There is no such contradiction or ambiguity in the mitigating evidence that Emmett argues the jury should have heard. While Emmett’s description of his childhood to counsel and Dr. Nelson was misleading, all of the testimony and records habeas counsel has uncovered indicate that Emmett’s childhood was beset by abuse and neglect.

. Indeed, after assessing Emmett's mental health and social services files, and the testimony of additional juvenile officers and Emmett's several siblings, counsel may well have found evidence that fit within his strategy to "humanize” Emmett and "persuade the sen-tencer that he ... is not a monster.” J.A. 433.

. Counsel merely believed that the prosecution's aggravation case would rely only on Emmett's escape from a juvenile facility at age twelve, larceny conviction at age seventeen, and vehicular homicide conviction at age twenty-five-offenses that counsel had investigated.