Court Opinion

ID: 9894310
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-01 14:10:35.848894+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:34.144855
License: Public Domain

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
                         In The Court of Appeals

             The State, Respondent,

             v.

             Terriel Leshawn Mack, Appellant.

             Appellate Case No. 2019-000521

                           Appeal from Florence County
                     William H. Seals, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

                               Opinion No. 6031
                   Heard March 16, 2022 – Filed July 12, 2023
                  Withdrawn, Substituted and Refiled November 1, 2023

                        REVERSED AND REMANDED

             Kathrine Haggard Hudgins, of Columbia, for Appellant.

             Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Deputy
             Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, Senior Assistant
             Deputy Attorney General Melody Jane Brown, Senior
             Assistant Attorney General W. Edgar Salter, III, all of
             Columbia, and Solicitor Edgar Lewis Clements, III, of
             Florence, for Respondent.

GEATHERS, J.: Terriel Leshawn Mack appeals the result of a resentencing
hearing required by our supreme court's decision in Aiken v. Byars, 410 S.C. 534,
765 S.E.2d 572 (2014). Mack argues that the circuit court (1) erred by sentencing
Mack to life without parole without finding that he was irreparably corrupt; (2) did
not properly consider the "hallmark features of youth" in its decision; (3) improperly
rejected Mack's argument that he could be rehabilitated because of his relative youth
at the time of the crime; (4) faulted Mack for not overcoming the circumstances of
his upbringing; and (5) erred in finding that Mack's youth did not hinder his ability
to present a defense in his original trial. We reverse and remand for reconsideration
under the standards laid out by our supreme court.

                       FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

      In 2003, Terriel Lashawn Mack and two co-defendants, Islam Horn and
Gregory Johnson, were indicted for the murder of Joseph Todd Wilson (the victim)
and for conspiracy. Mack was seventeen years old at the time of the victim's death.

       At trial, Horn and Johnson testified that on the day of the victim's death, they
drove to North Florence with Mack. At some point, Mack saw the victim and
"wanted to holler at" him. Mack and Johnson got out of the car. Not long after,
Horn "heard the first gunshot." Moving his car slightly, Horn saw Mack "stand over
[the victim] and shoot him three more times in the back."

       According to Johnson, when Mack first saw the victim, "he ask[ed] me was
that [the victim] who snitched on somebody else[,] a guy by the name of White
Boy[.]"1 Johnson testified that he and Mack exited the car, and, a few moments later,
Mack shot the victim in the head. Johnson said he was running away by the time
Mack fired the last three bullets.

      At trial, Horn also read and helped decode an incriminating letter he said Mack
wrote to Horn while the two of them were in jail following the crime. The contents
included:

             I got out the car me and [Johnson] and I call [the victim]
             like, Yo, that my n** Tellie. Then he started walking back
             towards me. [Johnson] was like, Yo, the jakes is over
             there.[2] I was like f*** that n**. I ain't got no time to
             waste. Plus, I don't give a f*** about no jakes anyway.
             Son, I had hollows in the chamber and I blew that b****
             n** brains out . . . . That n** s*** splattered everywhere

1
  Investigator Ron Smith testified about a previous violent crime in Florence.
According to Investigator Smith, two men were shot: Antonio McCall, who died,
and the victim. Shortly after the incident, the victim blamed the shooting on "White
Boy."
2
  According to Horn, "jakes" is a term for law enforcement.
             and he drop like a rag doll, like he had spaghetti legs or
             some s***, put three in his back.

The letter also suggested that Mack killed the victim "for WB and my n** BG rest
in peace . . . ." Mack also allegedly wrote: "I told myself the only thing I was coming
back to jail for was either bricks or bodies and I stuck to my word."3 During a
hearing on his post-conviction relief application, Mack denied being the author of
the letter.

      The jury found Mack guilty of murder. The court sentenced Mack to life in
prison without parole (LWOP). This court affirmed in an Anders appeal.

       In 2014, Mack and fourteen other individuals challenged the legality of their
LWOP sentences in Aiken v. Byars, 410 S.C. 534, 765 S.E.2d 572 (2014). A divided
South Carolina Supreme Court found that they were entitled to new sentencing
hearings under either the U.S. Supreme Court's recent interpretations of the Eighth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution or under a similar provision of the South
Carolina Constitution.4 Id. at 545–46, 765 S.E.2d at 578. The plurality held that
circuit courts must consider the following factors (Aiken factors) when sentencing a
juvenile to LWOP:

             (1) the chronological age of the offender and the hallmark
             features of youth, including "immaturity, impetuosity, and
             failure to appreciate [] risks and consequence[s]"; (2) the
             "family and home environment" that surrounded the
             offender; (3) the circumstances of the homicide offense,
             including the extent of the offender's participation in the
             conduct and how familial and peer pressures may have
             affected him; (4) the "incompetencies associated with
             youth—for example, [the offender's] inability to deal with
             police officers or prosecutors (including on a plea
             agreement) or [the offender's] incapacity to assist his own
             attorneys"; and (5) the "possibility of rehabilitation."

3
  We are unable to locate an actual copy of the note in the record. What is reproduced
is based on testimony at Mack's trial.
4
  "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. Const. amend. VIII; see also S.C. Const. art. I,
§ 15 ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor shall excessive fines be imposed, nor
shall cruel, nor corporal, nor unusual punishment be inflicted, nor shall witnesses be
unreasonably detained.").
Id. at 544, 765 S.E.2d at 577 (first and second alterations added) (quoting Miller v.
Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 477–78 (2012)).5 Following our supreme court's decision,
Mack filed a motion for resentencing that was granted.

        At Mack's resentencing hearing, the State attempted to portray Mack as a
remorseless killer. Mack presented an array of evidence about aspects of his first
trial, the offense, and his life both before and after the murder.

       Testifying for the State, Detective Melvin Godwin said Mack had confessed
to the murder in a statement to police and that Mack said he murdered the victim to
prevent him from testifying against "White Boy," whose real name was Marcus
Martin.6 However, under cross-examination, Godwin was forced to concede that
Mack had asked for a lawyer, but law enforcement had continued questioning him
anyway.

       The State also introduced Mack's disciplinary record in prison, which included
charges and allegations of weapons and drug possession, fights with guards, threats
to guards, property damage, being part of a "security threat group," and eight
instances of public masturbation. He once allegedly attempted to bribe a prison
guard to bring money into the prison for him. In all, Mack had twenty-seven reports
over more than twelve years. Mack was also investigated for homicide in an
investigation related to a riot at Lee Correctional Institute. At his resentencing
hearing, Mack said that "some [of the incidents were] entirely my fault"; additional
incidents were caused by "misunderstandings"; and other disciplinary actions
included times he was "falsely accused and unable to prove my innocence."

       Mack presented the testimony of Dr. Geoffrey McKee, a forensic
psychologist. Dr. McKee testified about Mack's complicated relationship with the
father figures in his life. Mack's biological father denied paternity even after testing
confirmed he was Mack's father. A romantic partner of his mother, a man named
Nathaniel, acted as a "father figure" to Mack and was abusive to his mother. A
subsequent romantic partner of his mother insisted on removing any trace of

5
  Justice Pleicones concurred in the result that the petitioners were entitled to "seek
resentencing in a proceeding that complies with the standards announced" in Miller
but noted the result was under the South Carolina Constitution, not the U.S.
Constitution. Id. at 545–46, 765 S.E.2d at 578.
6
  Mack's statement does not appear to have been admitted into evidence at Mack's
murder trial.
Nathaniel, forcing Mack to deny the existence of the man he viewed as a "father
figure" and "role model."

       Dr. McKee also testified about the abuse Mack experienced and witnessed.
Mack once defended his mother from an abuser. Mack was also abused by his
mother on at least one occasion. At the age of twelve, Mack was sexually assaulted
by a seventeen-year-old female.7 Around the same time, Mack began using alcohol
and marijuana. Dr. McKee testified that he believed Mack could be rehabilitated.

      After the end of testimony and evidence, Mack addressed the court.

             I would like to sincerely apologize for my involvement in
             the death of Mr. Wilson . . . . At the time of my arrest, I
             was a 17-year-old child that was under the false
             impression that I was a grown man because at least since
             the age of 13[,] I have been running around town with
             people I thought were my friends doing what we thought
             grownups did[:] alcohol, doing drugs[,] and living every
             day like life was a game people press restart—press a
             restart button on.

Mack also discussed his involvement in the prison ministry and his efforts to tutor
fellow inmates.

      Both sides also introduced dozens of pages of documentary evidence. A
Department of Juvenile Justice report prepared when Mack was fifteen and had been
charged with petit larceny stated that he was "cool and indifferent to the feelings and
welfare of others." The report also said Mack "does not appear interested in
developing close relationships with others, and [his] ties to others are generally
based on sharing similar antisocial or unempathetic attitudes." The report indicated
that Mack had been charged with multiple counts of damaging or tampering with a
vehicle and larceny in a December 2001 incident. There were also assorted assault
charges listed.8

      The defense introduced a psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Matthew Gaskins
noting an incident in which Mack told a nurse practitioner that "'he was found

7
 The seventeen-year-old was a "former babysitter" of Mack's.
8
 At Mack's murder trial, counsel for the State and the court referred to three counts
of assault and battery with intent to kill that were "pending." It is not clear what
became of those charges.
hanging in the shower' and had to be cut down." Dr. Gaskins also noted Mack had
an array of diagnoses—including posttraumatic stress disorder, psychosis, antisocial
personality disorder, and malingering—and prescriptions for Mack. Gaskins's report
also noted Mack said he once kept a sharpened stick at prison because "he had
shoulder surgery and 'was a one-armed man' making him feel 'like a sitting duck.'"
Gaskins added: "His experiences have led him to knowingly push boundaries and
break rules in order to 'survive' while incarcerated (i.e.[,] have a potential weapon
when limited physically, fight an officer/inmate who disrespects him publicly)."
Gaskins also wrote: "the most common form of malingering is exaggeration and
should not be dismissed." As to the personality disorder diagnosis, Gaskins
emphasized Mack's incarceration and prior experience. "[T]hese traits seem to have
been adaptively beneficial for Mr. Mack to survive 'street life' and while in prison.
It is not clear that he would continue this pattern of behavior as an adult in a non-
correctional setting."

       The resentencing court sentenced Mack to LWOP again. The court stated that
it was "extremely concerned by the cold-blooded nature of the killing[] and the fact
that [Mack] has shown little to no signs of rehabilitation." The court also said that
it had "carefully and deliberately considered all the factors as outlined in Aiken v.
Byars" before reaching its decision.

      This appeal followed. This court issued an unpublished opinion affirming
Mack's sentence on February 23, 2023. Mack subsequently filed a petition for
rehearing. Following a review of the petition and the issues raised, we reverse and
remand.

                               ISSUES ON APPEAL

  I.   Did the circuit court err by sentencing Mack to LWOP without a specific
       finding that he was irreparably corrupt?

 II.   Did the circuit court inadequately consider the "hallmark features of youth"
       in its decision to sentence Mack to LWOP?

III.   Did the circuit court err in failing to adequately consider the impact of Mack's
       upbringing?

IV.    Did the circuit court err in rejecting Mack's argument that he could be
       rehabilitated because of his relative youth at the time of the crime?
V.    Did the circuit court err in finding that Mack's youth did not hinder his ability
      to present a defense in his original trial?

                            STANDARD OF REVIEW

       Mack argues that the standard of review in this case is a novel issue in our
state because it concerns juvenile LWOP sentencing. This framing distorts the issue;
South Carolina courts have frequently dealt with sentencing decisions in the context
of the Eighth Amendment, which is the proper background for reviewing Mack's
claim.

             When considering whether a sentence violates the Eighth
             Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual
             punishments, the appellate court's standard of review
             extends only to the correction of errors of law. Therefore,
             this court will not disturb the circuit court's findings absent
             a manifest abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion
             occurs when the circuit court's finding is based on an error
             of law or grounded in factual conclusions without
             evidentiary support.

State v. Finley, 427 S.C. 419, 423, 831 S.E.2d 158, 160 (Ct. App. 2019) (emphasis
added) (citations omitted).

                                 LAW/ANALYSIS

      We will begin our discussion of Mack's case by addressing the state of the
law, then turn to which of Mack's issues on appeal survive the most recent U.S.
Supreme Court decision, and then analyze the issues that remain.9

I.    STATUS OF LAW ON JUVENILES AND LWOP

       In 2012, the United States Supreme Court issued a landmark decision in Miller
v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). There, the Court held "that mandatory life without

9
  The State argues that Mack failed to preserve some arguments based on particular
cases because he did not cite those cases to the resentencing court. Suffice it to say
that we believe it would come as a shock to our state's appellate bar if we were to
find that each and every example of case law—or even a line of cases—used to
support an argument on appeal and clearly relevant to the issues argued before the
resentencing court must be recited at that level if a party wished to rely on those
cases on appeal.
parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition on 'cruel and unusual punishments.'" Id. at 465 (quoting
U.S. Const. amend. VIII). The Court explained this conclusion rested on the nature
of human development and the recognition in constitutional law that "children are
different." Id. at 479–81.

             Mandatory life without parole for a juvenile precludes
             consideration of his chronological age and its hallmark
             features—among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and
             failure to appreciate risks and consequences. It prevents
             taking into account the family and home environment that
             surrounds him—and from which he cannot usually
             extricate himself—no matter how brutal or dysfunctional.
             It neglects the circumstances of the homicide offense,
             including the extent of his participation in the conduct and
             the way familial and peer pressures may have affected
             him. Indeed, it ignores that he might have been charged
             and convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies
             associated with youth—for example, his inability to deal
             with police officers or prosecutors (including on a plea
             agreement) or his incapacity to assist his own attorneys.

Id. at 477–78.

       The South Carolina Supreme Court considered the impact of Miller on South
Carolina law in Aiken v. Byars. There, a plurality of the court found Miller affected
South Carolina's discretionary sentencing regime because "Miller does more than
ban mandatory life sentencing schemes for juveniles; it establishes an affirmative
requirement that courts fully explore the impact of the defendant's juvenility on the
sentence rendered." 410 S.C. 534, 543, 765 S.E.2d 572, 576–77 (2014). The
plurality laid out the Aiken factors to guide courts in carrying out their duties under
the Eighth Amendment.10 Id. at 544, 765 S.E.2d at 577.

      After Aiken, the U.S. Supreme Court elaborated further on the dimensions of
Miller in Montgomery v. Louisiana:

10
  Despite holding "Miller does not require that we grant relief to juveniles who
received discretionary life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) sentences,"
Justice Pleicones concurred, saying he "would reach the same result under S.C.
Const. art. I, § 15." Id. at 545–46, 765 S.E.2d at 578.
             Miller, then, did more than require a sentencer to consider
             a juvenile offender's youth before imposing life without
             parole; it established that the penological justifications for
             life without parole collapse in light of "the distinctive
             attributes of youth." Even if a court considers a child's age
             before sentencing him or her to a lifetime in prison, that
             sentence still violates the Eighth Amendment for a child
             whose crime reflects "unfortunate yet transient
             immaturity."

577 U.S. 190, 208 (2016) (citation omitted) (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 472, 479).
The Court added: "A hearing where 'youth and its attendant characteristics' are
considered as sentencing factors is necessary to separate those juveniles who may
be sentenced to life without parole from those who may not." Id. at 210 (quoting
Miller, 567 U.S. at 465).

       In 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court again addressed the issue in an effort to
clarify the meaning of Miller and Montgomery. In Jones v. Mississippi, the Court
held: "Miller did not require the sentencer to make a separate finding of permanent
incorrigibility before imposing such a sentence." 141 S.Ct. 1307, 1316 (2021).
Instead, the majority found that "[t]he Court's precedents require a discretionary
sentencing procedure in a case of this kind." Id. at 1322.

       The Jones opinion was issued well after Mack and the State submitted their
briefs in this case, but it affects our considerations here. The first question we
confront is whether Mack's issues survive.

II.   SURVIVAL OF MACK'S ISSUES

       As an initial matter, Mack's first issue on appeal—whether the circuit court
should have made a finding that Mack was irreparably corrupt—is without merit in
light of recent U.S. Supreme Court and South Carolina decisions, most significantly
the Jones opinion. "[T]he Court has already ruled that a separate factual finding of
permanent incorrigibility is not required . . . . In a case involving an individual who
was under 18 when he or she committed a homicide, a State's discretionary
sentencing system is both constitutionally necessary and constitutionally sufficient."
Jones, 141 S.Ct. at 1313 (footnote omitted).

       South Carolina courts have followed suit in finding that there is no need for a
circuit court to rule that a juvenile is "permanently incorrigible" before sentencing
that juvenile to LWOP. See State v. Miller, 433 S.C. 613, 627, 861 S.E.2d 373, 380
(Ct. App. 2021) ("As to [the appellant's] argument that a trial court must specifically
find a juvenile is 'irreparably corrupt' before sentencing him or her to a life sentence,
pursuant to Jones v. Mississippi, such a finding is not required under the Eighth
Amendment."), cert. granted (Oct. 7, 2022); see also State v. Slocumb, 426 S.C. 297,
299, 827 S.E.2d 148, 149 (2019) ("Once the Supreme Court has drawn a line in the
sand, the authority to redraw that line and broaden federal constitutional protections
is limited to our nation's highest court."); State v. Finley, 427 S.C. 419, 427, 831
S.E.2d 158, 162 (Ct. App. 2019) (noting that the Slocumb court "declined to extend
the holdings of Graham and Miller, stating 'a long line of Supreme Court precedent
prohibits us from extending federal constitutional protections beyond the boundaries
the Supreme Court itself has set'" (quoting Slocumb, 426 S.C. at 306, 827 S.E.2d at
153)).

        Even so, we find that Mack's issues related to the Aiken factors must still be
resolved. The U.S. Supreme Court's precedents through Montgomery require that a
court "have the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances before imposing
the harshest possible penalty for juveniles." Miller, 567 U.S. at 489; see also
Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 208 ("Miller requires that before sentencing a juvenile to
life without parole, the sentencing judge take into account 'how children are
different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to
a lifetime in prison.'" (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 480)). The plain language of Jones
provides that the decision is not intended to remove state-level safeguards for
juvenile sentencing. See Jones, 141 S.Ct. at 1323 ("[O]ur holding today does not
preclude the States from imposing additional sentencing limits in cases involving
defendants under 18 convicted of murder."). The court noted that Miller and
Montgomery declined to mandate how the states complied with their Eighth
Amendment obligations in juvenile sentencing—as long as they did so. See Jones,
141 S.Ct. at 1314 ("Miller mandated 'only that a sentencer follow a certain process—
considering an offender's youth and attendant characteristics—before imposing' a
life-without-parole sentence." (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 483)); see also Malvo v.
State, 281 A.3d 758, 765 (Md. 2022) (holding that "the Court's opinion in Jones
focused almost exclusively on Miller's procedural component," but that "Miller's
substantive holding, as articulated in Montgomery, remains good law").

       Our supreme court has decided that, in South Carolina, compliance should
take the shape of a review of the Aiken factors. The holdings in our supreme court's
most recent cases have reaffirmed that decision. See State v. Smart, 439 S.C. 641,
889 S.E.2d 573 (2023); Jones v. State, 440 S.C. 14, 889 S.E.2d 590 (2023).

     In sum, we may not consider Mack's contention that his resentencing court
was required to find him "irreparably corrupt." However, we will review the
resentencing court's process in considering the Aiken factors. As we explain, this is
where the resentencing court missed the mark.

III.   AIKEN FACTORS

       There are, essentially, four ways in which Mack argues that the resentencing
court misinterpreted Miller and Aiken. We will address two that we find particularly
troubling and will not address the other two because they are not essential to our
holding. Our conclusion, though, is that we agree with Mack.

      First, Mack argues that the resentencing court did not adequately consider
whether his crimes were affected by "the chronological age of the offender and the
hallmark features of youth, including 'immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to
appreciate [] risks and consequence[s.]'" Aiken, 410 S.C. at 544, 765 S.E.2d at 577
(quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 477). We agree.

       The resentencing court's order addresses Mack's age only as a chronological
fact and does not seem to consider the "hallmark features of youth" at all. It found
that:

             In regards to the age of the offender, [Mack] was 17 years
             old at the time of the murder, and was 18 years old when
             he was convicted. The court considered that at the time of
             the murder, [Mack] was within one year of being able to
             serve in the military to possibly fight and die for this
             country and had a driver's license. [Mack] was within one
             year of an age whereby he would have immense
             responsibilities and be considered an adult by law.

While all of this is true, it could also be said about any seventeen-year-old facing a
potential LWOP sentence. Miller requires more; it requires "factors of youth [be]
carefully and thoughtfully considered" in the individualized sentencing proceeding.
Aiken, 410 S.C. at 543, 765 S.E.2d at 577 (noting that in some of the sentencing
hearings at issue, "[m]any of the attorneys mention[ed] age as nothing more than a
chronological fact in a vague plea for mercy. Miller holds the Constitution requires
more.").

       We acknowledge that the fact that an offender is seventeen rather than a
younger age is relevant to the inquiry. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 476–77 (criticizing
mandatory LWOP because "every juvenile will receive the same sentence as every
other—the 17–year–old and the 14–year–old, the shooter and the accomplice, the
child from a stable household and the child from a chaotic and abusive one"); see
also Malvo, 281 A.3d at 816 (Hotten, J., dissenting) ("In determining whether
Petitioner's crimes were representative of 'transient immaturity,' it is relevant that
Petitioner was nearly an adult."). But, it does not remove a juvenile from the
protection of Miller and Aiken. Under Aiken, Miller, and the entire line of authority
about juvenile sentencing, the courts have made clear that seventeen-year-olds are
not kind-of juveniles, or sort-of juveniles. They are juveniles. Montgomery, 577
U.S. at 212 ("The opportunity for release will be afforded to those who demonstrate
the truth of Miller's central intuition—that children who commit even heinous crimes
are capable of change."); Miller, 567 U.S. at 474 ("[I]mposition of a State's most
severe penalties on juvenile offenders cannot proceed as though they were not
children."); see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005) ("The qualities
that distinguish juveniles from adults do not disappear when an individual turns 18.
By the same token, some under 18 have already attained a level of maturity some
adults will never reach . . . . The age of 18 is the point where society draws the line
for many purposes between childhood and adulthood." (emphases added)); Aiken,
410 S.C. at 537 n.1, 765 S.E.2d at 573 n.1 ("However, Miller extends to defendants
under eighteen years of age and therefore for the purposes of this opinion[,] we
consider juveniles to be individuals under eighteen."). As the Iowa Supreme Court
held:

             [A]ge is not a sliding scale that necessarily weighs against
             mitigation the closer the offender is to turning eighteen
             years old at the time of the crime. When the Miller Court
             referred to "chronological age" in identifying the need to
             distinguish the criminal sentencing of children from
             adults, it did not suggest that a seventeen-year-old child is
             more deserving of adult punishment than a sixteen-year-
             old child, or a fifteen-year-old child more deserving than
             a fourteen-year-old child. It referred to "chronological
             age" as a unit of age that distinguishes children from
             adults. The Court recognized that children within this unit
             have "signature qualities" of "immaturity, irresponsibility,
             'impetuousness[,] and recklessness.'" . . . This is not to say
             judges cannot and should not be alert to circumstances that
             might suggest the age of a particular offender might not
             support mitigation. Yet, categorical age groups do not
             exist for children to justify using age alone as a factor
             against granting eligibility for parole.
State v. Roby, 897 N.W.2d 127, 145–46 (Iowa 2017) (citations omitted) (first
alteration added) (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 476).11

       To be sure, our courts need not write peer-reviewed papers about human
development to follow Aiken. See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 279–80
(2011) ("In short, officers and judges need no imaginative powers, knowledge of
developmental psychology, training in cognitive science, or expertise in social and
cultural anthropology to account for a child's age. They simply need the common
sense to know that a 7-year-old is not a 13-year-old and neither is an adult."). Our
courts do, though, need to appreciate that "[a] child's age is far 'more than a
chronological fact.'" Id. at 272 (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115
(1982)); see also id. ("It is a fact that 'generates commonsense conclusions about
behavior and perception.'" (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 674
(2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting))).

       Simply finding that Mack was almost eighteen—as emphasized by the
resentencing court—does not account for the careful and thoughtful consideration
the U.S. Supreme Court considers vital. Nor does it change the fact that Mack was
not yet eighteen when the crime occurred. The resentencing court's order only
considered Mack's age a chronological fact; Miller requires more. See Aiken, 410
S.C. at 543, 765 S.E.2d at 577 (noting that in some of the sentencing hearings at
issue, "[m]any of the attorneys mention[ed] age as nothing more than a chronological
fact in a vague plea for mercy. Miller holds the Constitution requires more.").
Further, other than stating it had considered all the Aiken factors, the resentencing
court order makes no reference to "the hallmark features of youth, including
'immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate [] risks and consequence[s.]'"
Aiken, 410 S.C. at 544, 765 S.E.2d at 577 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 477). As a
result, the court erred by failing to adequately consider whether Mack's crimes were
affected by his chronological age and the hallmark features of youth.

      Second, Mack argues that the resentencing court erred in its interpretation of
the Aiken factor concerning a defendant's home life. Again, we agree.

      The second Aiken factor requires "the 'family and home environment' that
surrounded the offender" be accounted for in a court's decision on whether to
sentence a juvenile to LWOP. Aiken, 410 S.C. at 544, 765 S.E.2d at 577.

11
   Roby dealt with a non-homicide crime. 897 N.W.2d at 132. However, it
references Miller and similar precedent and draws on Iowa's version of the Aiken
factors.
      We are unable to locate any South Carolina authority elaborating on what
aspects of a juvenile's upbringing should carry weight in considering whether to
impose a sentence of LWOP. However, we find the approach of the Roby court
persuasive:

            This factor seeks to identify any familial dependency and
            negative influences of family circumstances that can be
            ingrained on children . . . . [E]xpert testimony will best
            assess how the family and home environment may have
            affected the functioning of the juvenile offender. This
            factor does not rely on general perceptions, but specific
            measures of the degree of functioning. Furthermore, it is
            not limited to extremely brutal or dysfunctional home
            environments, but considers the impact of all
            circumstances and all income and social backgrounds.

897 N.W.2d at 146 (citations omitted).

      Here, we need not decide whether Mack's home life could arguably qualify as
evidence of an "extremely brutal or dysfunctional home environment[]." We are
concerned only with whether the resentencing court's order shows a meaningful
consideration of the evidence about Mack's home life. We find that it does not. The
resentencing court found:

            [Mack] grew up in a bad home environment, whereby he
            witnessed several traumatic events in his childhood[] and
            was affected by these events as well as many other things
            in his life. However, the court recognizes that many
            successful people grew up in chaotic and violent
            environments[] and were able to adhere to the law and
            become productive members of society. Additionally, the
            State highlighted the childhoods of Elie Wiesel, Oprah
            Winfrey, and Tyler Perry[] and how they all were able to
            overcome traumatic experiences in their childhoods and
            home life and become good, law-abiding[] citizens in the
            community.

      The court misapprehended the nature of the question this Aiken factor seeks
to answer. The inquiry does not ask the court to use the success of others in
overcoming their circumstances as the yardstick when considering the defendant's
circumstances. Certainly, there are untold numbers of individuals—both public and
private—who have been successful in overcoming abject poverty and a myriad of
hardships and traumatic childhoods. And, others have failed. Nonetheless, this is
not the appropriate rubric to be applied under the Aiken factors. The inquiry requires
the court to consider the impact of the defendant's family and home environment on
his crimes. It is a specific and individualized inquiry.

       Even if we were to interpret the resentencing court's use of the examples of
celebrities with harsh childhoods as rhetorical flourish, the resentencing court did
not make findings as to how Mack's childhood affected him. The order did provide,
"[Mack] grew up in a bad home environment"; however, this finding does not reflect
the consideration required by Aiken. See Aiken, 410 S.C. at 545, 765 S.E.2d at 578
(holding a juvenile defendant facing a LWOP sentence must receive "an
individualized hearing where the mitigating hallmark features of youth are fully
explored" (emphasis added)). Applying the Aiken factors involves more than
repeating the words; it requires applying the substantive content of those factors.

      Finally, we note our supreme court issued two holdings in Smart and Jones
during the time this case was in the appeals process. Our conclusion does not ignore
or conflict with those holdings.

       In Smart, our supreme court found that neither the State nor the defendant
bore the burden in a resentencing hearing pursuant to Aiken. Smart v. State, 439 S.C.
641, 645, 889 S.E.2d 573, 575 (2023). While affirming the resentencing court in
that case, our supreme court noted that "there is language in the resentencing court's
oral ruling that could be understood to support [the defendant]'s claim that the court
placed an improper burden on him." Id. at 646, 889 S.E.2d at 576. "After a careful
review of the entire record, however, we are convinced the resentencing court
thoroughly considered Smart's background and history in light of the Aiken factors."
Id.

       In Jones, the majority held juvenile offenders can constitutionally be
subjected to mandatory minimum sentencing, but circuit courts must nonetheless
consider the "mitigating factors of youth in sentencing juveniles" who are subject to
the circuit court's jurisdiction because of the charges against them. 440 S.C. 14, 29,
889 S.E.2d 590, 598 (2023). The defendant in Jones was asked about (1) his age,
(2) his criminal record, (3) his employment history, (4) medication he was on, and
(5) his understanding of the consequences of pleading guilty. Id. at 30, 889 S.E.2d
at 599. The majority found the plea colloquy satisfied the requirements of Aiken in
that context. Id.
       Unlike Smart and Jones, the resentencing court's order does not reflect a
careful and thorough consideration of the Aiken factors. To be sure, the resentencing
court stated that although Mack "presented some mitigating evidence including his
immaturity at the time of the murder, some mental health diagnoses, and growing up
in a difficult environment, this [c]ourt believes these limited mitigating factors are
substantially outweighed by the areas mentioned above pursuant to Aiken v. Byars."
However, as discussed above, the resentencing court's order does not adequately
consider the Aiken factors and "how children are different, and how those differences
counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison." Montgomery,
577 U.S. at 208 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 480). Rather, Mack's age being near
the age of majority was used against him without affording him full consideration of
juvenility; and, he was faulted for not overcoming his circumstances. See Aiken,
410 S.C. at 545, 765 S.E.2d at 578 ("Miller requires that before a life without parole
sentence is imposed upon a juvenile offender, he must receive an individualized
hearing where the mitigating hallmark features of youth are fully explored."
(emphasis added)).

       Because we reverse based on the inadequate consideration of the hallmark
features of youth and Mack's upbringing, we do not need to address Mack's
remaining challenges to the resentencing court's order. We remand for the
resentencing court to consider all of the Aiken factors. See Futch v. McAllister
Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (stating
that the "appellate court need not address remaining issues when disposition of prior
issue is dispositive" (citing Whiteside v. Cherokee Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. One, 311 S.C.
335, 340, 428 S.E.2d 886, 889 (1993))).

                                  CONCLUSION

      We believe this is a rare instance in which issuing a new opinion on rehearing
is appropriate. An individual's rights under the Eighth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution and the similar safeguard under the South Carolina Constitution are
implicated. As Mack highlights in his petition for rehearing, we expressed concerns
about the resentencing court's order in our initial opinion. It is imperative for us to
thoughtfully reconsider the issues rather than mechanically insist we were correct on
a close question. We hold that Mack is entitled to have the determination of his
sentence made after a faithful application of the Aiken factors.

      Based on the foregoing, the resentencing court's order is reversed, and the case
is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.
HILL, A.J., AND LOCKEMY, A.J., concur.