Court Opinion

ID: 9896288
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-09 21:05:22.340205+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:45.393059
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/9/23 Ross v. Monempour CA2/7
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

 DAVID ROSS et al.,                                            B317614

           Plaintiffs and Appellants,                          (Los Angeles County
                                                               Super. Ct. No.
           v.                                                  20STCV29427)

 JUSTIN MONEMPOUR,
 Individually and as Trustee, etc.,

           Defendant and Respondent.

      APPEAL from an order of dismissal of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County, Jon Takasugi, Judge. Reversed with
directions.
      Law Offices of Michael L. Tusken and Michael L. Tusken
for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
      Gusdorff Law, Janet Gusdorff; Marquee Law Group and
Poya Ghasri for Defendant and Respondent.
                        _________________
                       INTRODUCTION

      David and Leah Ross filed this action against Justin
Monempour, alleging he breached a series of oral agreements
that they claim gave them an option to purchase real property
they previously owned before their lender foreclosed on it. The
Rosses appeal from an order of dismissal after the trial court
sustained a demurrer by Monempour without leave to amend.
The trial court ruled that the Rosses’ action was barred by the
statute of limitations and that the Rosses had not complied with
an alleged contract condition requiring them to demonstrate
proof of loan approval for the property’s purchase price of
$1,800,000.
      We agree with the Rosses that, because of tolling provided
by an emergency rule the Judicial Council of California adopted
in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, California Rules of
Court, appendix I, emergency rule 9 (Emergency rule 9), their
action is timely. We also agree they sufficiently alleged they
complied with the $1.8 million loan approval condition. Finally,
we conclude the Rosses have sufficiently pleaded equitable
estoppel to assert the statute of frauds, another ground for
demurrer that Monempour asserted and continues to press.
Therefore, we reverse.

                                2
      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       A.    The Rosses File This Action
       On August 4, 2020 the Rosses filed this action against
Monempour for breach of contract and related causes of action.
The Rosses alleged that in 2004 David purchased and moved into
a residential property in Los Angeles, having executed a deed of
trust for the property to secure a $780,000 loan. Leah moved into
the property in 2006. In 2008 the property “changed hands” (in
some unexplained manner), but David and Leah continued to live
there. On December 5, 2017, the lender foreclosed on the
property, under the deed of trust David had executed, and sold
the property to Monempour, as trustee of the Martel Trust.
       “Immediately after the trustee’s sale,” the Rosses alleged,
they met with Monempour to discuss (re)purchasing the property.
In this discussion Monempour allegedly gave the Rosses an
option to buy the property for $1.8 million, with Monempour
“carrying $600,000 for one year at 10% interest only,” on the
condition the Rosses “present proof of loan approval for the
purchase amount of $1,800,000” (the December 2017 Agreement).
The Rosses did not allege a specific period for the option.
Instead, they alleged the Rosses and Monempour agreed that,
“upon [the Rosses] presenting [Monempour] with proof of a loan,”
Monempour “would grant [the Rosses] sufficient time to purchase
the Subject Property.”
       The Rosses alleged they “subsequently presented
[Monempour] with proof of the loan approval.” Specifically, they
presented a letter from RanLife Home Loans—dated
December 29, 2017 and attached to the Rosses’ complaint as
exhibit 1—stating that David had “applied for a purchase money

                                3
mortgage” and that RanLife, “[h]aving reviewed his income and
credit,” had “issued a preliminary approval for a purchase price of
$1,800,000.” RanLife explained in the letter that it would issue
“a full and final approval” only upon “the satisfactory completion
and review” of certain conditions: evidence of homeowners
insurance, clear title, a satisfactory appraisal, and an
underwriter review.
       The Rosses alleged that meanwhile, and unbeknownst to
them, Monempour had filed an unlawful detainer action against
them. And that in mid-January 2018—after the Rosses allegedly
“complied with [Monempour’s] terms and conditions and
performed exactly as the parties had agreed” regarding the
Rosses purchasing the property—Monempour served the Rosses
with notice of the unlawful detainer action. In that action the
parties entered into an April 2018 stipulated judgment that
required the Rosses to vacate the property by July 11, 2018. The
parties also allegedly agreed that, “because of [the Rosses’] option
to purchase the Subject Property,” the Rosses “would not be
required to make any payments for use of the property from
December of 2017 through July 11, 2018.” Thus, the Rosses
alleged, they “continued to believe that they had an option to
purchase the Subject Property.”
       The Rosses alleged that in “late May of 2018” they “sought
to exercise their option to purchase the Subject Property, subject
to the terms and conditions that the parties had agreed upon.”
Monempour, however, “reneged on the agreement and was not
willing to carry any amount.” In “an attempt to salvage the
option to purchase,” the Rosses allegedly told Monempour they
“could secure a $500,000 loan on a property they owned in
Norwalk.” Monempour allegedly responded that, if the Rosses

                                 4
“would bring at least $300,000 cash from that loan into the
purchase transaction, he would carry the other $300,000” (the
May 2018 Agreement). The Rosses applied for and (we
reasonably construe their complaint to allege they) obtained the
loan on their Norwalk property. But in June 2018 Monempour
again “refused to sell [them] the Subject Property, citing his lack
of confidence in the deal because,” among other reasons, David
was “‘too old and sick.’”
       In July 2018, “shell-shocked” by Monempour’s “duplicitous
behavior,” the Rosses asked to extend the July 11, 2018 deadline
for vacating the property “so that the purchase could be
consummated.” Monempour allegedly agreed, but at a price: In
exchange for $10,000 he would extend the deadline “until July 19,
2018, with an additional extension to July 31, 2018, upon the
opening of escrow.” The Rosses agreed, David paid Monempour
the $10,000 in cash, and on July 10, 2018 Monempour signed a
writing memorializing the agreement (the July 10, 2018
Agreement). This document, dated July 10, 2018 and attached as
an exhibit to the Rosses’ complaint, read: “This will confirm that
per the agreement between Justin Monempour, trustee of the
Martel Trust, and David and Leah Ross, the Ross family will be
permitted to remain on the property . . . up until and including
Wednesday July 18, 2018.”
       The Rosses alleged, however, that on July 16, 2018 David
received a text message from Monempour stating that the “‘lock
out will proceed’” because the parties’ “agreement was never
fulfilled.” Because David had (nine years prior) filed for
bankruptcy protection under Chapter 7 of the United States
Bankruptcy Code and that matter was still pending, Monempour
filed a motion in the bankruptcy court for relief from the

                                5
automatic stay to allow him to evict the Rosses. The bankruptcy
court granted the motion, permitting Monempour to enforce his
“remedies to obtain possession of the Property, including
lockout.”

       B.     The Rosses File a First Amended Complaint
       Monempour demurred to the Rosses’ complaint. He
argued, among other things, they failed to allege facts sufficient
to constitute a cause of action for breach of oral contract because
the statute of frauds requires any contract for the sale of real
property to be in writing and the Rosses’ allegations “fail to
provide any evidence of a writing signed by . . . Monempour
agreeing to give [the Rosses] an option to purchase the Property
that includes [the Rosses’] alleged contractual terms.” He also
argued the two-year statute of limitations barred the breach of
oral contract cause of action. Citing the Rosses’ allegations he
“reneged” on the December 2017 Agreement in May 2018 and
“refused” again to sell the property under the May 2018
Agreement in June 2018, Monempour contended that, “no matter
which date [the Rosses] try to point to as the date of the alleged
breach,” the two-year statute of limitations barred their cause of
action because they did not file this action until August 4, 2020.
Monempour also argued the Rosses had not performed under the
alleged oral agreement because the preliminary loan approval
they obtained from RanLife did not “satisfy the terms of their
alleged contract.”
       Before the court heard Monempour’s demurrer, the Rosses
filed a first amended complaint. In it they newly alleged that on
July 27, 2018 Monempour “orally agreed that if [the Rosses]
could prove that they had access to liquid funds in the amount of

                                 6
$300,000 within 30 days after the opening of escrow,
[Monempour] would further extend the option until August 10,
2018 and open escrow by August 10th” (the July 27, 2018
Agreement). The Rosses alleged that, in reliance on this new
promise by Monempour, David spent $3,000 arranging a
commitment from a loan broker for a $300,000 “hard money
loan”1 secured by the Norwalk property and that, on August 7,
2018 (the day the bankruptcy court granted Monempour’s motion
for relief from the automatic stay), David advised Monempour the
“$300,000 would be available and requested that the parties open
escrow under the terms of the extended option.” Monempour
allegedly refused this request and “reneged” on the parties’
July 27, 2018 Agreement. The Rosses further asserted in their
first amended complaint that their cause of action for breach of
contract, based on the oral agreements for an option to purchase
the property, was “not barred by the statute of frauds under the
doctrine of equitable estoppel.”
       Monempour demurred again. He continued to argue the
Rosses’ cause of action for breach of oral contract was barred by
the statute of frauds, contending the new allegation they
expended “time and money in connection with making payments
towards the Property’s purchase price” was “insufficient to take
an oral agreement out of the statute of frauds or to allege
estoppel.” Monempour also continued to argue the breach of oral

1     “A hard money loan is a private loan secured against real
property. Unlike a mortgage, a hard money loan is usually a
short-term investment, often with a fairly compressed repayment
period and a high interest rate.” (Strasburger v. Blackburne &
Sons Realty Capital Corp. (C.D.Cal., June 25, 2020, No. CV-20-
00220-CJC(JCx))) 2020 WL 6128223, p. *1, fn. 3.)

                               7
contract cause of action was barred by the two-year statute of
limitations. He argued the court should disregard the new
allegation of a July 27, 2018 Agreement to conditionally extend
the Rosses’ purchase option to August 10, 20182 as a “sham
pleading” because it was “a transparent attempt to bypass the
statute of limitations” and “entirely inconsistent with their
previous pleading.” He argued the Rosses’ remaining causes of
action were similarly barred by the statute of frauds, the statute
of limitations, or both.

      C.      The Trial Court Sustains Monempour’s Demurrer to
              the First Amended Complaint with Leave To Amend,
              and the Rosses File a Second Amended Complaint
       The trial court sustained Monempour’s demurrer to the
first amended complaint with leave to amend. The court ruled
that, although the Rosses’ equitable estoppel theory regarding
the statute of frauds required a “factual determination not
properly decided at this stage” (a ruling in the Rosses’ favor—see
footnote 9), the two-year statute of limitations barred the Rosses’
cause of action for breach of oral contract. The court agreed with
Monempour that the Rosses’ new allegations of another,
previously unmentioned extension of their purported option
appeared to run afoul of the sham pleading doctrine, according to
which (the trial court said) a “pleader may not attempt to breathe
life into a complaint by omitting relevant facts which made his
previous complaint defective.” The court therefore sustained the
demurrer to all causes of action with leave to amend to allow the

2     Which would mean the last alleged breach of the oral
contract occurred slightly less than two years before August 4,
2020, the date the Rosses filed this action.

                                 8
Rosses to “set forth sufficient facts to explain why this third [oral]
extension, which brings this case within the statute of
limitations, was excluded from the original complaint.”
       The Rosses then filed the operative, second amended
complaint. In it they asserted causes of action for breach of oral
contract, declaratory relief, specific performance, breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and quiet title.
They also newly alleged that, when they filed their original
complaint, they “believed that they were well within any
applicable statute of limitations. Therefore, [they] did not deem
the additional facts added to the First Amended Complaint . . . as
sufficiently necessary at the time of the original complaint to
include them.” That was the extent of their explanation for not
alleging the third oral extension in their prior complaints.

      D.     The Trial Court Sustains Monempour’s Demurrer to
             the Second Amended Complaint Without Leave To
             Amend
       Monempour demurred yet again. In addition to arguing
the Rosses had not sufficiently pleaded estoppel to overcome the
statute of frauds, he continued to argue the sham pleading
doctrine applied to the Rosses’ attempt to plead around the
statute of limitations. He argued it was “incongruous” the Rosses
“saw fit to allege that Monempour purportedly committed
breaches in May 2018, June 2018, and July 2018, and yet failed
to include the date of the last alleged breach, which was only
included after [the Rosses] realized the statute of limitations bar
to recovery and now conveniently saves [them] from that same
bar to recovery.” Monempour also again argued the Rosses’
preliminary loan approval did not satisfy their “obligation to

                                  9
provide loan approval for $1,800,000” under the alleged
December 2017 Agreement.
       The trial court sustained Monempour’s demurrer to the
second amended complaint without leave to amend. Concluding
that the allegations in the second amended complaint of a
previously unmentioned extension to the Rosses’ option to
purchase the property were inconsistent with the allegations in
their prior complaints and that the Rosses had not satisfactorily
explained the inconsistency, the court (impliedly) ruled the sham
pleading doctrine applied to those allegations.
       The court also ruled there was “another fundamental
deficiency” with the second amended complaint. The court
observed the Rosses alleged “that the parties entered into an oral
contract for the sale of real property, that this contract should be
enforced on an equitable theory despite running afoul of the
statute of frauds, that [the Rosses] performed all obligations
under the contract, and [that Monempour] breached the
agreement in spite of this.” However, the court ruled, the Rosses
failed to allege they performed their obligations under the alleged
December 2017 Agreement. Specifically, the Rosses continued to
allege the agreement was conditioned on “proof of loan approval
for the purchase amount of $1,800,000,” but the document the
Rosses characterized as proof of that loan approval was only a
preliminary loan approval conditioned on four requirements. The
court stated “the express language of this document indicates
that no loan has been approved, and that there were outstanding
terms and conditions which had to be satisfied before the loan
amount was approved.” Thus, the court concluded, the Rosses’
allegations showed that they “had not yet received a loan for the
approved amount as required under the terms of the alleged oral

                                10
contract” and that “they did not perform under the agreement as
agreed.”
      The trial court entered a signed order of dismissal with
prejudice on October 26, 2021. The Rosses timely appealed.

                         DISCUSSION

       A.      Standard of Review
       On appeal from an order of dismissal after an order
sustaining a demurrer, “‘we examine the operative complaint
de novo to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a
cause of action under any legal theory.’ [Citation.] ‘“‘“We treat
the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded,
but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or
law. . . . We also consider matters which may be judicially
noticed.” . . . Further, we give the complaint a reasonable
interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their
context.’”’” (Mathews v. Becerra (2019) 8 Cal.5th 756, 768; accord,
Morris v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 279,
292; see State ex rel. Edelweiss Fund, LLC v. JPMorgan Chase &
Company (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 1119, 1134 [“We construe the
complaint in a reasonable manner and assume the truth of
properly pleaded factual allegations that are not inconsistent
with other allegations, exhibits, or judicially noticed facts.”].)

      B.    The Trial Court Erred in Sustaining Monempour’s
            Demurrer to the Second Amended Complaint
       The Rosses argue the trial court erred in ruling that the
two-year statute of limitations barred their complaint and that
they did not perform their obligations under the December 2017

                                11
Agreement to present proof of a $1.8 million loan approval.
Monempour argues that the trial court’s rulings were correct and
that (contrary to the trial court’s ruling on Monempour’s
demurrer to the Rosses’ first amended complaint) the statute of
frauds also bars the Rosses’ complaint because the Rosses did not
sufficiently allege Monempour is equitably estopped from
asserting the statute of frauds. We agree with the Rosses down
the line.

            1.      Because Emergency Rule 9 Tolled the Statute of
                    Limitations, the Rosses’ Action Was Timely
       In their second amended complaint the Rosses alleged
Monempour committed four breaches of an oral contract giving
them an option to purchase the property. These occurred (1) in
“late May 2018,” when Monempour “reneged” on the original
December 2017 Agreement; (2) in June 2018, when Monempour
refused to sell the property to the Rosses under the May 2018
Agreement, which required them to contribute $300,000 from a
loan they acquired on their Norwalk property; (3) in mid-July
2018, when Monempour did not honor the July 10, 2018
Agreement that allowed the Rosses to remain on the property
until July 19, 2018 “so that the purchase could be consummated”
(“with an additional extension to July 31, 2018, upon the opening
of escrow”) in exchange for $8,000;3 and (4) on August 7, 2018,
when Monempour refused to sell the property to the Rosses under
the terms of the July 27, 2018 Agreement.

3      In their initial complaint, the Rosses alleged this number
was $10,000; in the first and second amended complaints, they
said it was $8,000.

                                12
       The limitations period on a cause of action for breach of an
oral contract is two years (see Code Civ. Proc., § 339), and it runs
from the occurrence of the alleged breach (Piedmont Capital
Management, L.L.C. v. McElfish (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 961, 964).
Thus, absent tolling of the limitations period, the breaches
alleged by the Rosses in their cause of action for breach of oral
contract would have resulted in four statutory filing deadlines:
(1) “late May” 2020, (2) June 2020, (3) mid-July 2020, and
(4) August 7, 2020. The first three of these, of course, were before
the Rosses filed this action on August 4, 2020, and the fourth is
the result of allegations disregarded by the trial court under the
sham pleading doctrine.
       But there was tolling of the limitations period under
Emergency rule 9. “Emergency rule 9 was adopted by the
Judicial Council and became effective on April 6, 2020. As
initially adopted, Emergency rule 9 tolled ‘the statutes of
limitations on all civil causes of action from April 6, 2020, . . .
until 90 days after the Governor declares that the state of
emergency related to the COVID-19 pandemic is lifted.’ As
amended on May 29, 2020, and as pertinent here, Emergency
rule 9 reads: ‘ . . . Notwithstanding any other law, the statutes of
limitations and repose for civil causes of action that exceed
180 days are tolled from April 6, 2020, until October 1, 2020.’”
(People v. Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. (2022)
78 Cal.App.5th 879, 885; accord, LaCour v. Marshalls of
California, LLC (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 1172, 1186.) Emergency
rule 9 thus tolled the statute of limitations on the Rosses’ cause of
action for breach of oral contract for nearly six months. As a
result, the Rosses’ breach of contract action was timely, even

                                 13
when calculating their filing deadline from the earliest alleged
breach.4
        Monempour argues the Rosses forfeited the tolling benefits
of Emergency rule 9 because they did not mention Emergency
rule 9 in the trial court. It is true the Rosses did not invoke
Emergency rule 9 in opposing Monempour’s demurrers. And it is
true that, as a general rule, “‘“a party is not permitted to change
its position on appeal and raise new issues not presented in the
trial court. [Citation.] . . . However, ‘a litigant may raise for the
first time on appeal a pure question of law which is presented by
undisputed facts.’ [Citation.] A demurrer is directed to the face
of a complaint [citation] and it raises only questions of law
[citations]. Thus an appellant challenging the sustaining of a
general demurrer may change his or her theory on appeal
[citation], and an appellate court can affirm or reverse the ruling
on new grounds.”’” (Bocanegra v. Jakubowski (2015)
241 Cal.App.4th 848, 857; see Bank of New York Mellon v.
Citibank, N.A. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 935, 942-943 [in reviewing a
ruling on a demurrer, “we are not bound by the trial court’s
reasoning and may consider new legal theories or pure questions
of law presented by undisputed facts for the first time on
appeal”]; Orcilla v. Big Sur, Inc. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 982, 994
[“We do not review the validity of the trial court’s reasoning.
[Citation.] For that reason, and because demurrers raise only
questions of law, we may also consider new theories on appeal to
challenge or justify the trial court’s rulings.”].)

4     Two years from “late May 2018” plus 178 days (“April 6,
2020, until October 1, 2020”) gives a filing deadline in late
November 2020.

                                 14
       Monempour also contends Emergency rule 9 does not help
the Rosses because the statute of limitations on their cause of
action for breach of contract expired prior to the Emergency rule’s
effective date of April 6, 2020. He argues that the relevant
breach for determining the statutory filing deadline occurred “in
mid-January 2018,” when the Rosses allegedly learned he had
filed an unlawful detainer action against them, and that
therefore the Rosses “had to bring their lawsuit for breach of
contract by no later than mid-January 2020.” But Monempour
does not explain how his filing an unlawful detainer action
against the Rosses (or their learning of it) constituted a breach of
the December 2017 Agreement that gave the Rosses an option to
purchase the property, which was the only contract alleged to
have existed between the parties as of January 2018.5
       Finally, Monempour suggests another reason the Rosses’
breach of contract cause of action is “untimely”: Because the
Rosses did not allege a period for their option under the
December 2017 Agreement (or any consideration for it) and allege
they first attempted to exercise that option in May 2018,

5     In fact, the Rosses alleged that, when they confronted
Monempour about the unlawful detainer action in January 2018,
he “claimed that it was his partners and principals who had done
this and that he would not do anything to harm the agreement
between himself and [the Rosses]” and “explained that the UD
was filed only ‘to give [Defendants] leverage in any future
negotiation if necessary.’” These allegations suggest the alleged
December 2017 Agreement, which gave the Rosses an option to
purchase the property, was separate from any (unalleged)
agreement Monempour may have breached by filing or serving
notice of the lawful detainer action. Ownership and possession
are very different things.

                                15
Monempour “revoked whatever option he may have initially
offered” by serving the Rosses with the unlawful detainer action
in January 2018.6 But again, Monempour does not explain how
serving the Rosses with the unlawful detainer action was related
to the alleged December 2017 Agreement, let alone amounted to
revoking the option allegedly extended to the Rosses under that
agreement. Moreover, even assuming that in January 2018
Monempour revoked his offer of a purchase option (by serving the
unlawful detainer action), that fact would relate to whether the
contract on which the Rosses are suing existed, not to the date of
an alleged breach of that contract, and thus is irrelevant to
determining the statutory period for filing the action. (See Oasis
West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 821 [“the
elements of a cause of action for breach of contract are (1) the
existence of the contract, (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for
nonperformance, (3) defendant’s breach, and (4) the resulting
damages to the plaintiff”].)7

6     “‘[A]n option based on consideration contemplates two
separate [contracts], i.e., the option contract itself, which for
something of value gives to the optionee the irrevocable right to
buy under specified terms and conditions, and the mutually
enforceable agreement to buy and sell into which the option
ripens after it is exercised. Manifestly, then, an irrevocable
option based on consideration is a contract . . . .’ [Citation.]
Conversely, an option without consideration is not binding on
either party until exercised [citation]; until then, the option ‘“is
simply a continuing offer which may be revoked at any time.”’”
(Steiner v. Thexton (2010) 48 Cal.4th 411, 420.)

7     Because the Rosses filed their cause of action for breach of
oral contract within the statutory period, as measured from even

                                  16
            2.     The Rosses Sufficiently Alleged They Provided
                   Proof of an Approval for a $1.8 Million Loan
       The Rosses allege the December 2017 Agreement gave
them an option to purchase the property “on condition that [they]
present proof of loan approval for the purchase amount of
$1,800,000.” The Rosses allege they satisfied this condition by
presenting Monempour “with proof of the loan approval.”8
Monempour, however, contends Exhibit 1 to the operative
complaint, a copy of the RanLife letter the Rosses gave
Monempour as proof of their loan approval, established they did
not satisfy the condition because it evinces only “a preliminary
approval” of a loan for the purchase price, with “full and final
approval” subject to several (as yet unfulfilled) conditions. This
argument falls short.
       Monempour construes the Rosses’ description of the alleged
condition too narrowly. The Rosses did not allege the condition
required them to present proof of “final” loan approval, merely
“loan approval.” And, importantly, they do not purport to be
quoting the terms of a written contract, or even the exact
language allegedly exchanged orally between the parties. Thus,
particularly when liberally construed with a view to substantial
justice between the parties, the Rosses’ description of the
condition was general enough to permit a reasonable inference
that providing preliminary loan approval satisfied the condition.

the earliest breach they alleged, we do not reach the issue
whether the sham pleading doctrine applies.

8      The parties appear to assume—and the operative complaint
reasonably suggests—this condition continued to apply to the
later agreements Monempour allegedly breached.

                                17
(See Liapes v. Facebook, Inc. (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 910, 919 [in
reviewing an order sustaining a demurrer, we “liberally construe
the complaint ‘with a view to substantial justice between the
parties,’ drawing ‘all reasonable inferences in favor of the
asserted claims’”]; Candelore v. Tinder, Inc. (2018)
19 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1143 [same].) Determining more precisely
the sort of loan approval the parties intended as a condition to
the December 2017 Agreement, as Monempour urges us to do,
would raise factual questions inappropriate for resolving on
demurrer. (See Treadwell v. Nickel (1924) 194 Cal. 243, 261
[“When the contract relied on is oral, its interpretation in the first
instance is a question of fact to be determined by the jury.”],
disapproved on another ground in Conservatorship of O.B. (2020)
9 Cal.5th 989, 1010; Esbensen v. Userware Internat., Inc. (1992)
11 Cal.App.4th 631, 640 [determining an oral agreement’s terms
is a question for the jury]; Southern Christian Leadership
Conference v. Al Malaikah Auditorium Co. (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d
207, 220 [“Where the lack of a written instrument reflecting
every term of the agreement creates the dispute, the trier of fact
must rely on extrinsic evidence to determine whether a contract
existed and if so what it covered.”]; Smyth v. Tennison (1914)
24 Cal.App. 519, 521 [“since the contract was oral, its
interpretation in the first instance was a question of fact to be
determined by the jury”].)

            3.      The Rosses Sufficiently Alleged Estoppel To
                    Raise the Statute of Frauds
      Because the contracts Monempour allegedly breached were
for the sale of real property, they come within the statute of
frauds, which ordinarily would make them invalid if not in
writing. (Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. (a)(3); see Reeder v. Specialized

                                 18
Loan Servicing LLC (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 795, 801 [an
“‘agreement for the sale of real property or an interest in real
property comes within the statute of frauds,’” and an “‘agreement
to modify a contract that is subject to the statute of frauds is also
subject to the statute of frauds’”].) The Rosses, however, alleged
the statute does not bar their cause of action for breach of oral
contract under the doctrine of equitable estoppel.9 Monempour
contends the Rosses did not allege facts sufficient to justify
applying that doctrine. But they did.
       “To estop a defendant from asserting the statute of frauds,
a plaintiff must show unconscionable injury or unjust enrichment
if the promise is not enforced. [Citation.] ‘“The doctrine of
estoppel has been applied where an unconscionable injury would
result from denying enforcement after one party has been
induced to make a serious change of position in reliance on the

9      Monempour incorrectly asserts the Rosses forfeited this
argument by not raising it in their opening brief. It is true an
“appellant is required to raise and support claims of error in its
opening brief or they will be forfeited.” (Orange County Water
Dist. v. Sabic Innovative Plastics US, LLC (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th
343, 380, fn. 13.) But because the trial court did not sustain
Monempour’s demurrer on this ground (and indeed ruled in the
Rosses’ favor on this point in the prior demurrer), the Rosses did
not have to raise the issue in their opening brief; it was up to
Monempour to raise the issue as an alternative ground for
affirming the court’s order. Which Monempour did in his
respondent’s brief, which in turn is why the Rosses appropriately
discussed the issue in their reply brief. (See ibid. [“the trial
court’s failure to adopt grounds for summary judgment or
summary adjudication urged by the respondent does not
constitute an error from an appellant’s point of view,” and the
“appellant therefore need not address them in its opening brief”].)

                                 19
contract or where unjust enrichment would result if a party who
has received the benefits of the other’s performance were allowed
to invoke the statute.”’” (Jones v. Wachovia Bank (2014)
230 Cal.App.4th 935, 944; accord, Day v. Greene (1963) 59 Cal.2d
404, 410; see Tukes v. Richard (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 1, 25 [“‘[t]he
doctrine of estoppel to plead the statute of frauds may be applied
where necessary to prevent either unconscionable injury or
unjust enrichment’”].) “Whether the doctrine of equitable
estoppel should be applied in a given case is generally a question
of fact.” (Byrne v. Laura (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1054, 1068;
accord, Chavez v. Indymac Mortgage Services (2013)
219 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1058.)
       The Rosses alleged that, (1) relying on the December 2017
Agreement, they spent “time and money” applying for and
obtaining preliminary approval for the $1.8 million purchase
loan; (2) relying on the May 2018 Agreement, they spent
additional time and money, including “paying appraisal fees and
service fees,” in securing the $500,000 loan on their Norwalk
property; (3) under the July 10, 2018 Agreement they paid
Monempour $8,000 in exchange for permission to continue living
on the property until July 19, 2018 so they could consummate
purchase of the property (with an extension to July 31 upon
opening of escrow); and (4) relying on Monempour’s promise,
under the July 27, 2018 Agreement, to extend their purchase
option to August 10, 2018 if they could prove they had access to
$300,000 in liquid funds, they paid $3,000 to arrange a hard
money loan for that amount against their Norwalk property.
These allegations of detrimental reliance on Monempour’s
promises raise questions of fact, unsuitable for resolving on
demurrer, regarding whether estoppel is warranted to avoid

                                20
unconscionable injury to the Rosses. (See Tukes v. Richard,
supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 26 [cases “reflect that allegations of
substantial investment made by the plaintiff in reliance on the
defendant’s promise—whether in time, effort, or money—may
permit the trier of fact to consider a claim of estoppel”]; see id. at
pp. 25-26 [plaintiff sufficiently pleaded estoppel by alleging that,
in reliance on defendant’s promise, she spent considerable time
and effort, to the exclusion of her continuing education, trying to
find a buyer for a property].)
       Monempour insists a promisee’s “payment of money . . . is
insufficient to take a contract out of the statute of frauds.” The
cases he cites, however, do not support that general proposition.
Rather, they illustrate the narrower principle that paying money
toward the purchase price, in partial performance of a promisee’s
obligation under a contract, is not sufficient detrimental reliance
to warrant equitable estoppel to assert the statute of frauds. (See
Secrest v. Security National Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-2 (2008)
167 Cal.App.4th 544, 557 [plaintiffs failed to establish estoppel to
assert the statue of frauds because (“[w]e emphasize”) the only
action undertaken by them in reliance on the alleged agreement
“was making the downpayment”]; Oren Realty & Development Co.
v. Superior Court (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 229, 235 [promisees’ “part
performance through their transmittal of checks in down
payment” was insufficient to warrant estoppel]; Cordano v.
Ferretti (1911) 15 Cal.App. 670, 673 [“it is the generally accepted
rule that the payment of the purchase price . . . is not such a part
performance of a parol agreement as will relieve the contract
from the operation of the statute”].) This is because “‘the party
paying money “under an invalid contract . . . has an adequate

                                 21
remedy at law.”’” (Secrest, at p. 555; see Anderson v. Stansbury
(1952) 38 Cal.2d 707, 716.)
       None of the Rosses’ alleged expenditures of money appears
to have been a payment toward the property’s purchase price.
Indeed, most were payments to third parties for services
connected with applying for and obtaining loans. In any event, as
mentioned, the Rosses alleged they invested substantial time and
effort, in addition to money, in reliance on their alleged oral
agreements with Monempour. That was enough, at the pleading
stage, to allege Monempour is estopped from raising the statute
of frauds.

                        DISPOSITION

      The judgment is reversed. The trial court is directed to
vacate its order sustaining Monempour’s demurrer without leave
to amend and enter a new order overruling it. The parties are to
bear their costs on appeal.

                                    SEGAL, Acting P. J.

           We concur:

                 FEUER, J.

                 MARTINEZ, J.

                               22