Court Opinion

ID: 9759565
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:19:55.83695+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:02.816519
License: Public Domain

REYNOLDS, Chief Justice,
concurring.
Concurring in the affirmance of the summary judgment rendered in these irregular proceedings, I add these observations. Hartsfield did not present his second-point complaint made here to the trial court so as to preserve error in Wisdom’s attacking his bill of review proceedings by motion for summary judgment instead of by special exceptions. Therefore, we may not reverse the trial court’s judgment on that procedural ground raised for the first time in this Court. San Jacinto River Authority v. Duke, 783 S.W.2d 209, 210 (Tex.1990).
To invoke the equitable powers, of the trial court, Hartsfield had a burden to allege, with particularity, sworn facts sufficient to constitute a defense to the divorce judgment rendered. Baker v. Goldsmith, 582 S.W.2d 404, 408 (Tex.1979). Thus, even accepting that Hartsfield was incompetent at all times material to the rendition of the divorce judgment, he was not relieved from the burden of pleading a good defense to the divorce judgment, Lissner v. State Mortgage Corporation, 29 S.W.2d 849, 852 (Tex.Civ.App. — San Antonio 1930, writ dism’d), i.e., of showing by proper pleading that he was entitled to other and additional relief, which he was deprived of by the alleged fraud of Wisdom. Dallas Coffee & Tea Co. v. Williams, 45 S.W.2d 724, 728 (Tex.Civ.App. — Dallas 1931, writ dism’d). Hartsfield did not so plead, and there being no defense shown to the divorce judgment rendered, he may not set *225the judgment aside on the fraud alleged. Id.
Accordingly, I concur in the overruling of Hartsfield’s two points of error and the affirmance of the judgment.