Court Opinion

ID: 9644143
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:48:50.645801+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:09.163998
License: Public Domain

KOEHLER, Justice,
concurring.
Although I concur in the majority opinion in both content and results, I would add a few comments with regard to Wal-Mart’s Point of Error No. One, in which it asserts that the trial court erred by permitting Cordova, over Wal-Mart’s timely objection, to introduce evidence of Wal-Mart’s net worth prior to the establishment of a pri-ma facie case of gross negligence. When to allow evidence of a defendant’s net worth is a recurring problem. Although a potential prejudice-causing problem exists anytime a plaintiff is permitted over objection to introduce such evidence before there has been a jury finding of ordinary negligence, it is particularly vexing when a trial judge permits introduction of such evidence at an early stage of the trial before any gross negligence has been shown. At a point in the trial where Cordova herself was still testifying on direct examination, no prima facie showing of gross negligence having been made, the trial court allowed Cordova to interrupt her own testimony and to call an economist, Dr. Everett Dillman, to testify not only on Cordova’s economic loss but also on Wal-Mart’s net worth. In doing so, the trial judge reversed her previous order granting Wal-Mart’s Motion in Limine by which she had properly prohibited the introduction of net worth evidence until after a prima facie *775showing of gross negligence.2
The rules of evidence authorize a trial judge to exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses. Tex.R.Civ.Evid. 611. However, the rules do not give the trial judge unbridled discretion. See Prezelski v. Christiansen, 775 S.W.2d 764, 766 n. 2 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1989), rev’d on other grounds, 782 S.W.2d 842 (Tex.1990). The court’s discretion is certainly tempered by the provisions of Rule 403 which require evidence to be excluded if “its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury_” Tex. R.Civ.Evid. 403. If the probative value of relevant evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, that evidence should not come in, particularly before its probative value has been established, whether under the theory of conditional relevance authorized under Tex. R.Civ.Evid. 104(b), or under any other theory with which I am familiar.
The courts in this state have long recognized that the existence or nonexistence of wealth is' irrelevant in determining a party’s tort liability and evidence of a party’s financial condition is generally regarded as an appeal to the prejudice or sympathy of the jury. Wilmoth v. Limestone Products Co., 255 S.W.2d 532 (Tex.Civ.App.-Waco 1953, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Moreover, it is reversible error to inject into the trial a party’s financial condition. Murphy v. Waldrip, 692 S.W.2d 584, 588 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1985, no writ).
There is an obvious risk that evidence of a defendant’s financial ability prior to evidence regarding liability may create a prejudice that could, in a close case, tilt the scales of justice against the defendant on the question of liability. Moreover, the jury may confuse the issues by prematurely considering evidence which goes only to the issue of exemplary damage calculations.3 Lunsford v. Morris, 746 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tex.1988)
The timing of the introduction of net worth evidence has not been directly and definitively addressed by the Supreme Court. However, in Nabours v. Longview Savings & Loan Ass’n, 700 S.W.2d 901 (Tex.1985), Justice Gonzalez in his majority opinion was concerned with the necessity of proving actual damages before awarding punitive damages when he stated that “[pjunitive damages must be contingent on a finding of actual damage since actual damage is a necessary element of the underlying tort upon which the punitive damages are based.”
In Lunsford, the Supreme Court was confronted with the question of pretrial discovery of net worth rather than the timing problem of when evidence of a defendant’s net worth should be introduced in a jury trial. However, both the majority and the dissenting justices more than touched on the timing problem and how some states were attempting to resolve it. Justice Gonzalez, in his dissenting opinion, expressed great concern on the timing issue. He advocated adopting procedural guidelines in all cases where punitive damages may be awarded in order to preserve a prejudice-free atmosphere in which the defendant’s conduct can be judged by his acts or omissions and not by his net worth. He sug*776gested utilization of some form of bifurcated trial procedure to accomplish this end. 746 S.W.2d at 474-75. Justice Gonzalez recognized the inherent prejudicial effect of untimely disclosure of a defendant’s net worth when he stated, “There is no legitimate need for a jury to be made aware of a defendant’s net worth when determining these issues.”
The Lunsford majority noted that some states, as of 1988, require a prima facie showing of entitlement to punitive damages before a defendant’s net worth may be discovered.4 746 S.W.2d at 473. The so called “Wyoming” plan requires a plaintiff to make a prima facie showing that a viable cause exists for punitive damages before pretrial discovery is permitted. Id. at 475. I would, however, agree with Chief Justice Phillips’ dissent in Lunsford, that a mandated bifurcation is not necessary in every case in which punitive damages are available.5 Id. at 477. The trial court should require, at a minimum, a prima facie showing by the plaintiff of a cause in which punitive damages are available.
Through reasonable restraints on the order in which such evidence is introduced, a defendant would be better assured that his liability, if any, would be measured in an environment free of any prejudice that could accompany the premature disclosure of his net worth. The burden on the plaintiff resulting from such restraints would be, at worst, minimal. If, as with Dr. Dillman, a conflict arises hindering his in-court testimony, other means, including video depositions or stipulations, can be utilized to secure the necessary testimony. There is evidence that Wal-Mart offered several of these alternatives but that Cor-dova and her attorney insisted on live testimony. He could have easily been permitted to give live testimony to the jury of Cordova’s economic loss and required to give punitive damages testimony in a deposition after the jury had been retired. The premature disclosure of Wal-Mart’s net worth very likely created an atmosphere where Wal-Mart could not get a fair trial even on the question of ordinary negligence, let alone on the gross negligence issues.

. The trial court did not find specifically that the evidence at that point (when she permitted the economist to testify out of turn) established a prima jade case of gross evidence. In overruling Wal-Mart’s objection, the court observed that, "Based on everything the jury has heard and seen in this courtroom already in this case, and even with some of the other rulings this Court has made, the Court is going to overrule your objections and allow Dr. Dillman to testify."

. An analogy to current criminal practice illustrates the feasibility of controlling the timing of "limited use” evidence. During the guilt/innocence phase of a criminal trial, extraneous offenses or other bad acts are as a general rule excluded from the trial. The reasoning is that a jury could be prejudiced and convict the defendant merely based on his propensity as a criminal. However, the relevance and admissibility of these same bad acts is increased while assessing punishment. The same reasoning should apply, in the civil context, to the use of evidence concerning a defendant’s net worth. To prevent a defendant from being held liable, simply because a "deep-pocket" exists, the court must regulate the timing and introduction of net worth evidence.

. See, e.g., Curtis v. Partain, 272 Ark. 400, 614 S.W.2d 671 (1981).

. Chief Justice Phillips suggested the use of protective orders and jury instructions as a more reasonable means of protecting a defendant’s legitimate interests against prejudice. Lunsford, 746 S.W.2d at 477.