Court Opinion

ID: 9468612
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:19:04.95415+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:57.313712
License: Public Domain

HILL, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur fully in the affirmance of the contempt conviction of Mr. Hermann on the ground of the adequacy of the government’s response to his claim of illegal surveillance. I would reverse, however, Mrs. Vannier’s conviction and uphold her claim of a privilege against adverse spousal testimony.
My disagreement centers on the court’s analysis of the privilege against adverse spousal testimony. The majority fails to appreciate the peculiar effect that the probable conspiracy indictment has upon any invocation of that privilege. It is under the peculiar circumstances of a conspiracy involving both husband and wife that I would agree with appellant Vannier that the privileges against adverse spousal testimony and against self-incrimination are coextensive.
Subject to sharp criticism for its basis in outdated notions which regarded the woman as a chattel and denied her a separate legal existence, the privilege against adverse spousal testimony has had a checkered history.1 Recently the United States Supreme Court modified the privilege “so that the witness spouse alone has a privilege to refuse to testify adversely” and “may be neither compelled to nor foreclosed from testifying.” Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 53, 100 S.Ct. 906, 914, 63 L.Ed.2d 186 (1980). See also Fed.R.Evid. 501 (applicable to grand juries under Fed.R.Evid. 1101(d)). As an unwilling witness, Mrs. Vannier may not be compelled to testify if in fact the testimony would be adverse to her husband’s interest. Thus the issue becomes whether Mrs. Vannier’s answers to the questions posed 2 would tend to incriminate her husband.
In Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159, 71 S.Ct. 223, 95 L.Ed. 170 (1950), a case involving the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the Supreme Court noted that the danger of incrimination must not be viewed narrowly. Such a danger may exist, said the Court, even if the answer to a question would not by itself support a conviction. It suffices if the “[ajnswers to the questions asked by the grand jury would have furnished a link in the chain of evidence needed in a prosecution of the petitioner.” Id. at 161, 71 S.Ct. at 224. In Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 71 S.Ct. 814, 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1951), the Supreme Court further elaborated on the standard governing incriminating statements:
The privilege afforded not only extends to answers that would in themselves support a conviction under a federal criminal statute but likewise embraces those which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant for a federal crime .... To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result.
Id. at 486, 71 S.Ct. at 818 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Therefore a claim of incrimination must be upheld unless it is perfectly clear that the answers to the questions could not possibly incriminate. Id. at 488, 71 S.Ct. at 819. The setting in which the questions here were asked — a grand jury investigation of, inter alia, a conspiracy charge 3 involving Vannier’s husband — becomes crucial to a proper resolu*432tion of a claim of privilege against self-incrimination and against adverse spousal testimony.
The government does not dispute that Mrs. Vannier’s husband, Merrill Vannier, is one of the subjects or targets of the federal grand jury’s investigation. Allegations concerning Mr. Vannier include claims that he is a member of the Church of Scientology who participated in the unlawful campaign to harass, discredit and silence organizations critical of the church. More specifically, the government believes that Merrill Vannier was the attorney who, as an undercover operative for the church, sought to and did represent Gabriel Cazares in his litigation with the church and breached the attorney-client relationship with Cazares by disclosing confidential communications to the church and its attorneys. Along with witnesses Hermann and Mrs. Vannier, Mr. Vannier was subpoenaed to appear before the federal grand jury in the Middle District of Florida on June 10, 1981. Mr. Vannier asserted his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination in response to the questions posed to him.4 Significantly, the government did not offer Mr. Vannier use immunity in order to compel his testimony. This omission reinforces any suspicion that the government plans to indict Mr. Vannier.
With this setting in mind, it becomes clear that the questions posed to Mrs. Vannier were not “innocuous,” as the government contends and the majority agrees, but contain potential for providing a link in a chain of evidence which might be used to convict Mr. Vannier. Under the law of conspiracy, the acts of one co-conspirator in furtherance of the unlawful agreement are admissible against all, even in the absence of the other’s approval of these overt acts. United States v. Netterville, 553 F.2d 903, 912 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009, 98 S.Ct. 719, 54 L.Ed.2d 752 (1978). The overt act itself need not be criminal if it is in furtherance of the unlawful agreement, United States v. Enstam, 622 F.2d 857, 867 (5th Cir. 1980), and it may occur before or after the others join the conspiracy. United States v. Netterville, 573 F.2d at 912. If, for example, Mrs. Vannier were to testify that she moved from California to Pinellas County, Florida with her husband in 1975, and the government proves that the purpose of the move was to engage in, as a field service member of the Church of Scientology, any of the alleged unlawful activities recited in footnote 1, this overt act would provide evidence admissible against Mr. Vannier as an alleged co-conspirator. Likewise, an affirmative answer by Mrs. Vannier that she infiltrated the election campaign of Gabriel Cazares would prove an act attributable to Mr. Vannier. This brief discussion suffices to show that, given the scope of the grand jury’s investigation into activities of members and employees of the Church of Scientology, it is not perfectly clear that the answers to the questions could not possibly incriminate Mr. Vannier. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. at 488, 71 S.Ct. at 819.
This possibility of incrimination, which arises by virtue of the fact that a conspiracy is at issue, convinces me that Mrs. Vannier’s claim of privilege should be upheld. The majority apparently concedes that Mr. Vannier’s guilt might be indicated and the Vannier marriage jeopardized by Mrs. Vannier’s answers to at least two of the questions. This is sufficient to persuade the court to uphold the privilege as to these questions. But the other apparently lawful *433acts which were the subject of the other “objective” questions can also incriminate when performed in the context of a conspiracy, an unlawful agreement to accomplish lawful objectives by unlawful means or to accomplish unlawful objectives. For this reason, I view it imperative that the privilege against adverse spousal testimony be honored where the government seeks to indict one spouse for a conspiracy involving both and attempts to procure that indictment through incriminatory testimony of the remaining spouse.

. See generally Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 43-50, 100 S.Ct. 906, 909-12, 63 L.Ed.2d 186 (1980).

. See note 7 supra.

. See note 1 of the majority opinion supra.

. These questions included the following:
“Are you now or have you ever been a member of the Church of Scientology?”
“Have you ever held an office in the Church of Scientology?”
“In fall 1975, 1976, and 1977 did you ever reside in Pinellas County?”
“Have you ever attended or graduated from any law school in the United States?”
“What state bars are you a member of? Aren’t you a member of the Florida Bar?”
“In 1975, when you flew to Florida, did you come with your wife?”
“Do you know Gabriel Cazares?”
“Did you ever have an attorney-client relationship with Gabe Cazares?”
“Were you ever employed in Pinellas or Hills-borough Counties as an attorney?”
“Did you ever obtain or seek a job with James Russell of the State Attorney’s Office?”
“Do you know Mitch Hermann?”