Court Opinion

ID: 9563649
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:44:11.073577+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:59.472285
License: Public Domain

*920Beasley, Judge,
dissenting.
I agree with every aspect of the decision except Division 1, regarding the non-consensual and warrantless search. An application of Michigan v. Clifford, _ U. S _ (104 SC 641, 78 LE2d 477) (1984) construing the federal constitution,1 requires that the evidence obtained by the state arson investigator and the observation of the assistant fire chief that the refrigerator was empty, must be excluded.
The assistant fire chief was the first to arrive on the scene when the fire was reported after 3:00 a.m. He became suspicious as to the cause of the fire because of the heavy fire and smoke present and because extinguishment required about double the amount of water and more than twice the amount of time normally needed for accidental fires. The fire was brought under control in 30-40 minutes and the water was cut off about 5:00 a.m. However, a hose was left connected for several hours in the event of a rekindling and a few firemen remained for this purpose and to assure security of the premises, which had been taped off, to prevent anyone from entering. The assistant fire chief determined to call in the investigator from the state fire marshal’s office, who arrived a little after 8:00 a.m. By this time, the pumper had left and only two fire department cars and a pick-up truck were on the premises. The assistant fire chief had left after 6:00 a.m. for dry clothes and returned to await the investigator, to whom he turned over the determination of the fire’s cause.
The latter had stopped at the fire department, where he talked to the resident, but he did not seek her permission to search her home. She testified at trial, without contradiction, that she went to the scene after learning of the fire from the early morning radio newscast but the firemen would not talk with her and just asked where she could be found, which information she gave. She also testified that she went to the fire “hall” that day, which is apparently when the inspector saw her on his way to the scene.
When he arrived, the fire was out and he began examining the house to find the origin of the fire. He concluded, after going all through, under, and around the house, that it had occurred in the basement under the badly burned kitchen. He also concluded that it did not stem from the furnace, hot water heater, or electric breaker box or any electrical wiring but rather, based on his sight and smell, from a substance. Consequently, he took two containers full (one five-gallon can and one one-gallon can) of debris samples, including papers, from the basement. These he sent to the State Crime Lab, which found them to contain kerosene. He had taken what he be*921lieved had the strongest odor.
The assistant fire chief did not assist in this collecting endeavor but was still on the premises when the samples were taken between 10:00-11:00 a.m. The investigator was there four hours or more altogether. At some point the assistant fire chief looked in the nearly empty refrigerator because, as he testified, an empty refrigerator is an indication when arson is suspected. A number of photographs of the interior were taken, at the direction of the investigator, by someone from the fire department.
The three factors set out in Michigan v. Clifford must be inquired into. The first is whether the appellant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in her fire-damaged private dwelling. Since, thanks to the good work of the fire department, the premises were not wholly destroyed and the fire was confined to one part of the house, and since she had personal effects in this her private residence, there is little doubt that, subjectively, reasonable privacy interests remained. In fact, appellant testified that she stayed in the garage apartment the next night to protect things in the house.
All of that being the case, the warrant requirement applies, absent consent or exigent circumstances. There was no effort to obtain the resident’s consent although she apparently was available. Nor were the circumstances exigent when the investigator began his work. The fire was out. The assistant fire chief had left once, the pumping apparatus had departed, and a separate function began. It was focused into determining the cause of the fire so as to make a judgment whether it was incendiary or merely accidental; it was not undertaken to prevent or eliminate flare-ups and was unconnected to the standby status of the firemen. In fact, by the time the investigator took the debris samples, the period during which the assistant fire chief said a rekindle might occur had nearly expired. The premises were secure and there was no reason to fear tampering with the conditions then existing, nor did the investigator voice any concern that a rekindling would destroy evidence. It simply did not occur to him, or apparently to the assistant fire chief either, that a warrant should be obtained despite the fact that the investigation would require a thorough search of the entire house.
The evidence fails to describe exigent circumstances which waive the warrant requirement. It was not shown that the investigation by the expert as to the cause and origin of the fire would have been hampered in any way by the obtaining of a warrant. The result was that the decision to authorize the search and thus invade the home was made by the assistant fire chief, not by an independent and impartial magistrate.
The examination of the refrigerator brings up the third factor which, according to Michigan v. Clifford, must be considered. “If the *922privacy object [of the search] is to determine the cause and origin of a recent fire, an administrative warrant will suffice. To obtain such a warrant, fire officials need show only that a fire of undetermined origin has occurred on the premises, that the scope of the proposed search is reasonable and will not intrude unnecessarily on the fire victim’s privacy, and that the search will be executed at a reasonable and convenient time.2 If [on the other hand] the primary object of the search is to gather evidence of criminal activity, a criminal search warrant may be obtained only on a showing of probable cause to believe that relevant evidence will be found in the place to be searched.” Michigan, supra, 52 LW at 4058.
Decided May 1, 1985
Rehearing denied May 31, 1985
M. Gene Gouge, Robert A. Whitlow, for appellant.
J. O. Partain, District Attorney, Steven M. Harrison, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
The investigator needed at least an administrative warrant although it appears from the evidence, and particularly the testimony of the assistant fire chief and the investigator, that the purpose and nature of the latter’s activity was a criminal investigation. However, whether taking samples and photos required a criminal warrant need not be decided. As relates to the refrigerator, however, the assistant chiefs testimony establishes that its examination was for the latter purpose. The refrigerator’s opening had nothing to do with trying to find the origin of the fire.
Thus, the admission of evidence gathered without proper legal authority was constitutionally erroneous. Although the other evidence against appellant was rather overwhelming, I cannot say that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; it “might have contributed to the conviction.” Foster v. State, 156 Ga. App. 672, 674 (275 SE2d 745) (1980); Tarpkin v. State, 236 Ga. 67, 68 (1) (222 SE2d 364) (1976).

 Appellant raises no state constitution argument; although the Constitution of Georgia was cited in the motion to suppress, no specific portion was enumerated nor was its protections pursued.

 Even “[an] administrative search into the cause of a recent fire does not give fire officials license to roam freely through the victim’s private residence.” Michigan v. Clifford, 52 LW at 4059.