Court Opinion

ID: 9682410
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 08:11:02.043771+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:39.159486
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
PER CURIAM.
Dr. Pat M. Allen, the original appellee in this proceeding, has filed a motion for rehearing. In that motion, he attacks our judgment in five points of error. In his first three points he asserts that this Court erred in its rendition of a take-nothing judgment against him because: (1) five un-attacked claims of Dr. Allen provide separate and independent bases on which we must affirm in the absence of complaint by the original appellant Virginia Allen; (2) if the other five claims were not adjudicated, then the order appealed from is interlocutory and this Court has no jurisdiction; or (3)if this Court has jurisdiction, the cause should be remanded in the interest of justice.
As Dr. Allen points out in his motion for rehearing, in the instrument denominated “Third Amended Petition for Enforcement of Decree and Alternative Relief,” he pleaded the following six claims:
(1) Claim for clarification and enforcement of the Decree of Divorce and the Agreement Incident to Divorce;
(2) Claim for a declaratory judgment to construe the Agreement Incident to Divorce;
(3) Claim for bill of review, based on fraud and mutual mistake;
(4) Claim for reformation of the Agreement Incident to Divorce based on mutual mistake;
(5) Claim for entry of a nunc pro tunc judgment, pursuant to TEX.R.CIV.P. 316, 317; and
(6) Claim for a constructive trust.
However, each one of these claims was related to the same question: the status of the real property here in controversy. The order giving rise to this appeal expressly recites that the parties “announced ready for trial, and the Court proceeded to hear the issues presented by the parties concerning ... the real property at 7801 University, legally described as Lot 1, Novella Addition, City of Lubbock, Lubbock County, Texas.... ”
The language of the order compels the conclusion that it must be viewed as one considering and disposing of all issues made by the pleadings in the case. North East Independent School District v. Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d 893, 896 (Tex.1966).
Dr. Allen also argues that the “non-jury hearing which occurred here, particularly in face of the request of Mrs. Allen for a jury trial,” could not be a “case regularly set for a conventional trial on the *117merits,” necessary to invoke the Aldridge rule. We disagree. As noted above, the order expressly recites that both parties were present and announced ready for trial. Even assuming, arguendo, that Mrs. Allen’s request for a jury trial would have been an obstacle to the instant hearing, as appellee pointed out in his brief on original proceeding, by “proceeding to trial without objection, Mrs. Allen waived any right to jury trial.” We think appellee, was correct and the authorities he cited mandate that Mrs. Allen waived any right she might have had to a jury. We are also convinced that the hearing was, in this instance, a “trial” within the purview of the Aldridge rule. Under this record, Dr. Allen’s first three points must be, and are hereby, overruled.
In his fourth and fifth points, Dr. Allen contends that we erred in reversing the trial court’s order and in holding that the trial court had no authority to resolve “substantive disputes.” We remain convinced that our original disposition of this cause was correct. Appellee’s fourth and fifth points are overruled.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.