Court Opinion

ID: 9697201
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:08:34.328734+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:29.940698
License: Public Domain

CAPPY, Justice,
concurring.
I join in the decision of the majority. I write separately only to disassociate myself from the majority’s use of the terms “so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place” when enunciating the standard for PCRA relief under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)®. (See Majority opinion at p. 575-76).
As I noted in my dissent in Commonwealth v. Buehl, 540 Pa. 493, 658 A.2d 771 (1995), wherein I questioned the meaning of this precise language, albeit with respect to § 9543(a)(2)(h) and not (a)(2)®, the only meaning that the terms “so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken *577place” could have is that an “actual innocence” test must now be applied. Our system of justice requires, however, that there be articulable standards for determining guilt and for determining when a trial comports with due process and other constitutional guarantees. Guilt is to be determined by the Commonwealth proving beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements of the crime charged, in a trial that is deemed to comply with the requisite constitutional guarantees, not by the defendant having to prove his innocence. Accordingly, if the Commonwealth proves all the elements of the crime charged, but there was a constitutional violation, perhaps because the Commonwealth, in proving those elements, admitted evidence which was unconstitutionally seized, can we say that the defendant has no recourse because he cannot prove his innocence?
However, since I agree with the majority’s conclusion in the case sub judice that Appellant’s claim of a constitutional violation is without merit, the recitation of the “truth-determining process” standard, in this instance, is of no moment. Thus, I join the majority’s decision.1

. I also note my disagreement with the majority’s statement at page 564 of its opinion that “[t]he accused has a constitutional right to counsel on direct appeal but not in state collateral proceedings.” Although this is a correct statement as a matter of federal constitutional law, as we noted in Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 541 Pa. 108, 661 A.2d 352 (1995), this issue has not been resolved as a matter of Pennsylvania constitutional law.