Court Opinion

ID: 9456430
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 19:52:45.096312+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:34:58.592696
License: Public Domain

BALDWIN, Judge
(dissenting).
Now that it. as been settled that there is a description of the invention requirement compliance with which necessitates inquiry of a slightly different nature than that required by the statutory mandate of describing the manner and process of making and using the invention, I must respectfully dissent from the manner in which the majority here has approached this requirement.
In the Robins and Ahlbrecht opinions referred to by the majority, and now in this case, the court has indicated that the question of enablement is largely an objective determination. Enabling disclosure may be present in a specification or in material which is incorporated by reference into the specification regardless of whether such enablement is made apparent from a reading of the description contained in the specification. I would now go one step further and hold that the scope of enablement must be made apparent from the description alone. Both the Robins,.and Ahlbrecht decisions support this proposition. The majority opinion here, however, appears to suggest that such is not necessary.
The description in a patent specification is, of course, addressed to one having ordinary skill in the pertinent art. Implicit in the Robins decision and obvious from Ahlbrecht was the conclusion that the description must be such that one of ordinary skill would appreciate the scope of enablement being provided by the disclosure. In the case before us, the decision that the broad claim language is supported by the specification description appears to rest solely' on a question of semantics. If the test were so narrow I would still dissent from the result in this case since I find it more reasonable to interpret the recitation on diamines, for example, as quoted by the majority, as being narrowed through the use of “either * * * or” to the two classes specifically mentioned. I would not stop here, however. The inquiry should never be merely semantic in nature. Mere correspondence between the language used in a claim and that employed in the specification has never been held to satisfy the requirements of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112. I would hold that it doesn’t satisfy any “description” requirement either.
In the case before us, the Patent Office tribunals, and in particular, the examiner — who must be presumed by us to be skilled in the pertinent art in the absence of evidence to the contrary — have disputed the fact that the scope of ap*1407pellants’ invention would be obvious from the language of the description. Keeping in mind the well-known unpredictability of the chemical sciences, I find that the examiner’s objections were reasonable. Beyond asserting that-they are ■ entitled to the broad claims they are seeking, appellants have not contradicted this position. Feeling, as I do, that the description requirement should serve to assure that one of ordinary skill in the pertinent art will, in fact, be taught by a specification disclosure,* I conclude that the disclosure before us does not adequately describe the subject matter being claimed.

 I do not mean to imply that the disclosure must convince one of ordinary skill as to the fact of enablement. AH' ’that I would require is that the description be such as to make those skilled in the art aware of what is asserted as-being enabled. We have held that the scope of protection sought after must be commensurate with the scope of enablement provided by the disclosure. I believe that the disclosure should also contain a description of what is being enabled in such terms as to apprise the reader as to the actual scope of enablement contemplated.