Court Opinion

ID: 9578266
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:43:31.251238+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:26.034268
License: Public Domain

Williams, J.
Luis M. Lavaris was accused of first degree murder and found guilty as charged in a trial to the court with a jury. He appeals from the judgment entered on the verdict raising issues concerning the admission of his confession, references to a polygraph test and hearsay evidence. We affirm.
Luis Lavaris, Francisco Castro and the victim were at Betty Haro's apartment in Seattle on the evening of July 8, 1980. In the course of the evening, the victim and Haro fell asleep. Haro awoke to find Lavaris and Castro standing over the victim's wounded body. Lavaris had stabbed the victim several times with a large knife, causing his death. Castro was convicted of first degree murder by a jury on October 10, 1980, for his participation in the crime.
Several months after the incident, Lavaris was arrested in Oregon and extradited to Washington, being placed in the King County Jail. On February 19, 1981, at about 2 p.m., Detectives Gruber and Crawford of the Seattle Police Department met Lavaris in the reception area of the jail, their intention being to take him to their office across the street to talk about the murder if Lavaris wished to do so. According to one of the detectives, when this was explained to Lavaris, he stated right off that:
It was right at that time that Mr. Lavaris said that he was willing to talk to us. He stated right off that he didn't want somebody else getting in trouble for something he did; referring to Mr. Castro.
The two detectives and Lavaris then went to the office where they waited for almost an hour for an interpreter. Although the detectives determined that Lavaris could *771speak and understand English, they believed that the administration of rights should be done in both English and Spanish, and the interview conducted in both languages also. Miranda1 and constitutional rights were explained when the interpreter arrived about 3 p.m. Lav-aris then gave a complete account of the murder, his report being reduced to writing and acknowledged as correct 4 days later.
At a pretrial suppression hearing, the court decided that the State had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the statements Lavaris made before being advised of his rights were spontaneous and, hence, were inadmissible. The court suppressed anything Lavaris said before 3 p.m. but declared admissible everything he said thereafter.
The first issue is whether the conditions that rendered the prewarning statements inadmissible carried over to invalidate Lavaris' subsequent confession. United States v. Toral, 536 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1976).
Application of the principle that an intervening Miranda warning may not insulate a subsequent confession from the taint of prior unwarned interrogation caused reversal in State v. Erho, 77 Wn.2d 553, 463 P.2d 779 (1970). The situation and decision of the court is stated in the opinion as follows:
Here, the trial court found, and we agree, that the warning which the officer testified was given at the time of arrest was inadequate. State v. Tetzlaff, 75 Wn.2d 649, 453 P.2d 638 (1969). It failed to advise the appellant that anything he said might be used against him and that, being an indigent, he was entitled to appointed counsel if he so desired prior to any questioning. Despite these inadequacies, however, the officers in the patrol car questioned him and elicited an admission of his participation in the offense involved. This was later, within a very short time and without a break in continuity, reduced to written form. As heretofore indicated, the trial court *772excluded the oral admissions but admitted the written statement.
We are satisfied, upon the record as it stands, that the written statement is but the direct and derivative product of the oral admissions. It perforce suffers from the same infirmities the trial court found infected the oral statements. In short, by his oral admissions the appellant had "let the cat out of the bag by confessing" and was not "thereafter free of the psychological and practical disadvantages of having confessed." He could not get the cat back in the bag, for the secret was out. United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 91 L. Ed. 1654, 67 S. Ct. 1394 (1947); Westover v. United States, 384 U.S. 436, 494, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966); Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1047, 88 S. Ct. 2008 (1968). Thus, the voluntariness and admissibility of his written statement was compromised.
State v. Erho, at 560-61. In this case the evidence is that at the very outset Lavaris volunteered that he was the murderer. The account of what followed is given in the testimony of Detective Gruber:
Q [By defense counsel] Was there any reason that you could not have waited for [the interpreter] to come over before you started questioning [Lavaris] about the incident?
A Well, you would have to understand the tone of the whole meeting. Mr. Lavaris was very eager to talk about the incident.
Q And you were very eager to question him, were you not?
A Mr. Lavaris did way more talking than I did questioning.
Q Was there any reason why you could not have waited until [the interpreter] came over at three o'clock before you started taking down a statement in a case of that serious nature?
A I didn't take any notes at all during that . . . conversation. It was strictly sitting there and basically talking.
Q My question, Officer, was whether or not you could have waited for [the interpreter]. That would not have posed any hardship to you.
A No, it wouldn't have.
*773Q Now, did Mr. Lavaris indicate to you a time or two that he didn't want to talk to you any more?
A No.
Q He never indicated that to you?
A No.
Q Before [the interpreter] had a chance to advise Mr. Lavaris of his rights, Mr. Lavaris, I take it, had pretty much confessed to this murder; is that correct?
A Yes; to me. Officer Crawford wasn't present.
The detective further testified:
Q [By the prosecutor] Was it your intent to question the defendant [Lavaris] before he was advised of his constitutional rights?
A No, not before.
Q You mean in the jail, that's what you were speaking of, right before he waived his constitutional rights; apparently he made statements to you admitting certain facts about the incident, is that correct?
A That's correct.
Q Were those statements made in response to questions you had asked him about the crime?
A Initially they were not, not initially. His initial statement was that, yes, he did it and he didn't want to get anyone else in trouble for it. I asked him if he was aware of the prior trial of Mr. Castro and we discussed the newspaper clipping, and he said that he had seen it in the newspaper; and from that conversation he offered that Castro was not involved in it and he seemed very concerned that Castro got in trouble for something that he did. It was more that type of a conversation rather than a confession, and we really didn't get into the details and going over what happened until [the interpreter] arrived.
The details of the conversation were not developed, apparently neither counsel believing them to be important. Lavaris did not testify at the suppression hearing, although he could do so without jeopardizing his right to remain silent at the trial. CrR 3.5(b). From a view of the record most favorable to the defense, the strongest case that can be made out is that on the initial contact, Lavaris stated that he was the one who had committed the murder, not Castro, and that he did not want Castro to be in trouble for *774it. Thereafter, one of the detectives discussed the murder with him asking several questions, specific content unknown, which Lavaris answered presumably with incriminating statements.
Upon arrival of the interpreter, there was a meticulous respect for Lavaris' rights and sensibilities and the same was true 4 days later when he approved the written confession. There is not a breath of evidence that the conversation before the formal interrogation in any way changed Lavaris' attitude from his initial declaration that he had committed the murder. Nor is there the slightest hint of police overreaching in this record, it being evident that Lavaris cooperated with the police in describing the crime because he wanted to, not because he was somehow induced or tricked into telling about it. Lavaris gave a consistent account; there is nothing to suggest that he confessed after being told of his rights because "the cat was out of the bag."
Under these circumstances, the 3 o'clock confession was made voluntarily. As said in United States v. Toral:
[W]hen the circumstances surrounding a prior involuntary confession carry over to make a knowing and voluntary waiver impossible, a confession is inadmissible even if the accused is advised of his rights beforehand. . . . This jule is not inflexible, however. Even though a prior involuntary confession irretrievably "lets the cat out of the bag," a subsequent confession may still be made voluntarily under the proper circumstances.
(Citations omitted.) Toral, at 896.
The next issue concerns the trial court's refusal to strike, from a written statement given by Betty Haro, a reference to a polygraph test, and the court's refusal to declare a mistrial when the prosecutor stated in examining Detective Crawford that it was in evidence "Haro volunteered to take a test." Lavaris claims the references to a polygraph test require reversal because they raise the inference that Haro would have passed such a test if she had taken one. A reference to a polygraph test is not reversible *775error unless an inference is raised about the results of the test that is prejudicial to the defendant. State v. Desco-teaux, 94 Wn.2d 31, 614 P.2d 179 (1980). There were no inferences raised by the isolated references to a polygraph test that were prejudicial to Lavaris because the jury was informed that no test was conducted. See State v. Agren, 28 Wn. App. 1, 7-8, 622 P.2d 388 (1980). The trial court was correct in refusing to strike the statement and in denying the motion for a mistrial.
The third issue concerns Haro's testifying about certain statements made by Castro concerning the incident. Lav-aris claims that testimony was inadmissible hearsay, finding particularly objectionable Castro's purported statement: "If anything happens, don't ever mention that I been here."
ER 801(c) defines hearsay as
a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
None of the purported statements by Castro (the declar-ant), that Haro testified about, were offered "to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Thus, the statements were not hearsay and the trial court was correct in admitting them.
The judgment is affirmed.
Corbett, J., concurs.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 10 A.L.R.3d 974 (1966).