Court Opinion

ID: 9450001
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 16:31:52.065738+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:06.283132
License: Public Domain

BAZELON, Chief Judge
(dissenting).
If the jury believed appellant’s version of the facts and drew all the permissible inferences in his favor, it could, in my opinion, reasonably have concluded that the alleged criminal act was induced by or was “the product of the creative activity” of the police. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451, 53 S.Ct. 210, 216, 77 L.Ed. 413 (1932). See also Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 78 S.Ct. 819, 2 L.Ed.2d 848 (1958).
Concededly appellant’s testimony may have been weak. But as this court recently said, “However implausible, unreliable or incredible only the jury had the right to make the evaluation *" Young v. United States, 114 U.S.App. D.C. 42, 309 F.2d 662 (1962).
I would hold, therefore, that it was reversible error for the trial judge to decline to give the requested instruction on entrapment. See Johnson v. United States, 115 U.S.App.D.C. 63, 317 F.2d 127 (1963) (“Whenever the * * * evi*96dence * * * gives rise to a factual issue of inducement [of criminal conduct] by the Government an instruction on entrapment should be given if requested * * *_» Page 129, note 2.) See also Kinard v. United States, 68 App.D.C. 250, 96 F.2d 522 (1938).