Court Opinion

ID: 9753077
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 18:56:18.826131+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:29.336469
License: Public Domain

NEBEKER, Associate Judge,
dissenting:
This decision ought to alarm everyone concerned with litigation delay and concomitant costs. In remanding this case to the trial court for the second time, we are both wresting power from the calendar control court and failing in our obligation to improve the efficiency of judicial administration. When reviewing a case such as this one, this court should consider not only the interests of the respective parties but also those of witnesses and other litigants awaiting their day in court. The American Bar Association’s Action Commission to Reduce Court Costs and Delay reports that the average delay in civil litigation, for example, is five years but that this could be reduced to one year if the bench and bar were willing to work together. Hufstedler & Nejelski, A.B.A. Action Commission Challenges Litigation Cost and Delay, 1980 A.B.A.J. 966.
When a case is set for trial, all parties are notified and expected to be present at the appointed hour, in this case 9:30 a.m. Here, appellant did not appear until after 11:00 a.m., at which time he informed the court for the first time that his lawyer was in trial elsewhere. Super.Ct.Civ.R. 39-I(b), which is applicable in the Landlord and Tenant Branch1, and upon which Judge Wolf predicated his subsequent dismissal, states that: “When an action is called for trial and the party seeking affirmative relief fails to respond, an adversary may have the claim dismissed with or without prejudice as the court may decide....” Further, Super.Ct. L & T R. 12(a)(2) provides that: “If in any case the plaintiff shall fail to appear without prior notice, the action may be dismissed for want of prosecution. ...”
Despite the language in these rules, the majority holds that the trial court’s dismissal was improper, reasoning that the case was never “called for trial” as it had not yet been certified from the assignment office to a trial judge. The majority also concludes that the “party seeking affirmative relief,” the landlord, did not “fail[ ] to respond” under Rule 39-I(b). I cannot agree with such a narrow, literal reading of this rule. Indeed, this court recently emphasized that the “thrust of Rule 39-1 is that parties and their counsel are strictly obliged to appear in timely fashion on the day of trial. A weighty and convincing justification is required to excuse failure to do so.” Milton Properties, Inc. v. Newby, 456 A.2d 349, 353 (D.C.1983). Here, appellant’s justification for arriving late without counsel was neither weighty nor convincing. He, a long-standing member of the bar, had represented himself until one week prior to the scheduled trial date, at which time he retained counsel. However, *1157his lawyer failed to either enter his appearance or request a continuance until after 11:00 a.m. on the trial date, a maneuver which could have only delayed the trial. Super.Ct.Civ.R. 104 requires that an attorney with a scheduling conflict notify the court immediately upon becoming aware of the conflict and attempt to resolve it as quickly as possible. Appellant’s counsel did neither, and a trial judge “understandably need not look kindly upon last-minute maneuvers which would wreak havoc on the court’s trial calendar.” Taylor v. Washington Hospital Center, 407 A.2d 585, 591 (D.C.1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 921, 100 S.Ct. 1857, 64 L.Ed.2d 275 (1980). Therefore Judge Wolf was acting within his discretion when he dismissed the action.

. Super.Ct. L & T R. 2.