Court Opinion

ID: 9682172
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 08:06:36.488327+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:37.923805
License: Public Domain

LIMBAUGH, Justice,
dissenting.
I agree with the majority opinion insofar as it concludes that MAI-CR3d is not controlling when in conflict with the substantive law, and that some culpable mental state is required to find a violation of § 195.223, RSMo 1994, drug trafficking in the second degree. Because the legislature has not clearly indicated a purpose to dispense with a culpable mental state for this statute, §§ 562.016 and 562.026, RSMo 1994, work in combination to require one. See also State v. Hatton, 918 S.W.2d 790, 794 n. 1 (Mo. banc 1996). I must disagree, however, with the majority’s choice of “knowingly” as the culpable mental state required of someone who “brings [cocaine] into this state” under § 195.223, a choice that is unsupported either by principles of statutory construction or by Missouri’s past treatment of drug offenses.
I do not dispute that “knowingly” is the required culpable mental state for possessing controlled substances. § 195.010(33), RSMo 1994. However, the majority unjustifiably imposes this standard upon all of the other actions that violate § 195.223 — including the offense of which Carson is convicted here, “bring[ing] into this state” cocaine:
A person commits the crime of trafficking drugs in the second degree if ... he possesses or has under his control, purchases or attempts to purchase, or brings into this state more than one hundred fifty grams of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of ... [cocaine]_
§ 195.223, RSMo 1994.
Contrary to the majority’s position, the legislature proscribed separate activities in § 195.223, each of which must necessarily mean something different from the others. If this were not so, then possession would suffice to cover the activity of bringing into this state and make that part of the statute superfluous. Meaning should be given to each word in a legislative enactment, and one word of a statute should not be considered a needless repetition of another. Lora v. Dir. of Revenue, 618 S.W.2d 630, 633 (Mo.1981). In short, possessing cocaine must mean something different from bringing it into this state, and the knowledge requirement for the offense of possessing cocaine cannot logically be applied to the offense of bringing it into this state.
We should determine, therefore, the specific culpable mental state for trafficking in the second degree by “bringing into the state” cocaine. With the repeal of § 562.021.2, RSMo 1986, the default culpable mental state provision, our best guide is § 562.016, which states that “a person is not guilty of an offense unless he acts with a culpable mental state, that is, unless he acts purposely or knowingly or recklessly or with criminal negligence, as the statute defining the offense may require ....” (emphasis added). Because this statute lists the four culpable mental states in the disjunctive, and *525without the statutory direction of § 562.021.2, RSMo 1986, there is no compulsion to prefer any one of the mental states to any other. Indeed, any choice as to which of the four mental states is required would be an arbitrary one, as is the majority's choice in this case. Therefore, we should not choose, and the State should be allowed to sustain a conviction based upon a showing of any of the four. Here, the verdict director used “recklessly,” but the jury's finding of purposefulness, or knowledge, or even criminal negligence would have supported the verdict just as well. However, the only mental state on which the trial court should be required to instruct is the minimum, criminal negligence, since a finding of any higher mental state necessarily establishes the lower mental states. § 562.021.2, RSMo 1994.
This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that § 562.021.2, RSMo 1986, before its repeal, excepted criminal negligence from the other three mental states that were to be read into the criminal offenses that had no mental state. An obvious inference from the repeal of § 562.021.2 is that the legislature intended to eliminate the exception for criminal negligence, thus allowing the State to rest a conviction upon a showing of any of the four culpable mental states from § 562.016.
In this case, under Instruction No. 8, the jury found that Carson “knew or consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the mixture or substance he brought into the state contained cocaine salts, a controlled substance,” an instruction that used the language of “recklessness” as the requisite mental state (emphasis added). The jury declined to find, under Instruction No. 6, that Carson had “knowledge of the presence and illegal nature of the controlled substance” (emphasis added). These two verdict directors were approved by this Court before the repeal of § 562.021.2, RSMo 1986. See MAI-CRSd 325.14, 325.16. By approving these instructions, we tacitly acknowledged that the default provision from § 562.021.2, RSMo 1986, applied to a “brings into this state” offense. If, as the majority claims, any violation of § 195.223 must be “knowing,” § 562.021.2 would not have applied. I am unwilling to state that these MAI-CR3D verdict directors, as approved, were incorrect, and indeed, I believe that they were not. The fact that the subsequent repeal of § 562.021.2, RSMo 1986, has altered the substantive law, making the “reckless” verdict director obsolete and in conflict with the substantive law, as the majority duly notes, is not relevant to whether the MAI-CR3d verdict directors accurately reflected the substantive law before the repeal.
Further support for the conclusion that different culpable mental states can apply to the different actions proscribed by § 195.223 comes from our past treatment of drug offenses. Before the enactment of either the default provisions of Chapter 562 or the Comprehensive Drug Control Act of 1989, Chapter 195 regulated drug offenses, and none of its provisions specifically provided a necessary mental state. Section 195.240, RSMo 1959, regulated the possession and sale of stimulants. Even though this Court held that the necessary mental state for possession of controlled substances was “knowing,” State v. Burns, 457 S.W.2d 721, 725 (Mo.1970), the sale of a stimulant under § 195.240 was merely a strict liability crime. State v. Napolis, 436 S.W.2d 645, 647-48 (Mo.1969); see also State v. Sledge, 471 S.W.2d 256, 259 (Mo.1971), State v. Gordon, 536 S.W.2d 811, 817-18 (Mo.App.1976).1 Napolis and its progeny indicate that “knowledge” need not be an element of a Missouri drug offense if the offense is not one of possession, as indeed it is not here.
In sum, I would allow the State to prosecute the charge using any of the culpable mental states in § 562.016, and the fact that the jury was instructed on the culpable mental state of recklessly is therefore sufficient. The conviction should be affirmed.

. Napolis and Gordon were overruled by State v. Green, 629 S.W.2d 326, 329 (Mo. banc 1982). However, Green based its overruling upon the enactment of § 562.021.2 — the very provision whose repeal engendered the instant case.