Court Opinion

ID: 9830491
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 20:14:52.055376+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:23.457433
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
Defendants in error insist:
“That if your opinion shall stand as against a rehearing, it is in conflict with the principle laid down in Ruling Case Law, p. 860, reading: ‘So far as third persons are concerned, the principal, as a rule, may revoke the authority of his agent at any time; but it is settled that the acts Of an agent after his authority has been revoked bind a principal as against third persons, who, in the absence of notice of the revocation of.the agent’s authority, rely upon its continued existence.’ ”
The -eases are practically unamimous on this general concept. It is often stated as if it were an axiom. It means that, in the case of mere revocation, it is the fault, as constituting the element of fraud, of the principal, if notice is not given to third persons, and that therefore the principal is bound by the agent’s act, upon the doctrine of estoppel. It further means that the doctrine of estop-pel furnishes the basis upon which one person may be bound by acquiescence, as constituting the element of admission, in the acts or conduct of a discharged agent who had dealt with a third person in such manner as to create the appearance of agency. The rule quoted is therefore controlling, according to the proof of particular facts of each case, with the distinction mentioned constantly recognized.
In the present case upon the conclusive proof that J. B. Rowland’s agency had terminated, the presumption no longer could be indulged of continuity of agency. This rule of presumption peculiarly concerns burden of proof or duty of producing evidence, where-ever from one fact another is presumed. 1 Greenleaf on Evidence, § 42; 10 R. C. L. p. 872, § 15; 1 Jones on Evid. p. 293. And the evidence is conclusive that the company did not merely revoke the agency without notice. Reasonable notice was given in ways une*717quivocal and of sufficiency to afford knowledge of revocation to the public at large in the locality. A reasonably prudent person, in the exercise of ordinary caution, upon mere inquiry would have been led to a knowledge of the revocation. In such facts it was unnecessary that personal information be brought home to the defendants in error, the company having reasonably done what it could to make the revocation as notorious in the locality as was the fact of previous agency. Defendants in error admitted that they “made no inquiry from any one in an effort to determine whether or not J. B. Rowland was' still the agent of defendant company.”
As appears, they had had no dealings with J. B. Rowland, as agent, since June 10, 1924, to date of sale of property in February, 1926. It is further conclusively proven that there was no holding out in any way by the company of J. B. Rowland as its agent, or adopting or acquiescing in any acts done by him. The company never knew of the purported agreement of J. B. Rowland. In no wise does the element of admission of agency appear by acquiescence of acts done by Rowland with third parties. In these facts, the rule must be applied, in denial of liability. It is the general principle of elemental and substantial justice that estoppel does not arise without fault.
In the original opinion the disposition of the case was made to turn upon the single point, quoting:
“We believe the evidence is entirely insufficient to meet the requirements of an estoppel. J. B. Rowland was not authorized to make the ‘agreement’; the company gave timely and reasonable public notice of cessation of his authority; the company never ratified or adopted the agreement, or even knew of it at all; the insured was not justified by an act of the company in believing that Rowland was still the authorized agent.”
The facts are agreed and without conflict.
The motion is overruled.