Court Opinion

ID: 9771787
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:53:28.036272+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:41:22.549845
License: Public Domain

HOYT, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent because appellant’s contention that his conviction is void because his indictment was barred by the three-year statute of limitations set out in Tex.Code Crim.P.Ann. art. 12.01(4) (Vernon Supp.1987) is in my opinion, incorrect.
The evidence shows: that the offense occurred on or about July 15, 1981; that the appellant was indicted on September 12, 1985, for the offenses of aggravated rape and rape of a child; and that he was convicted of rape of a child.
The applicable law at the time that appellant committed the offense of rape of a child provided for a three-year period of limitations. In 1983, the legislature extended the limitations period from three to five years. After amending art. 12.01, the legislature stated: “This Act does not apply to an offense, the prosecution of which became barred by limitations on or before August 31, 1983.” Ch. 85, § 2(b), 1983 Tex.Gen.Laws 413.
Two points are noteworthy: first, the offense that appellant was ultimately convicted of was not barred by limitations on August 31, 1983, because limitation would have run in July 1984, since the offense occurred in 1981; second, the limitation period for rape of a child was extended to five years in 1983, and because prosecution was not barred by limitation when the amendment occurred, the amended act would extend the period for appellant’s prosecution to July 1986.
However, in 1985 the legislature repealed the statute making rape of a child an offense and included that conduct under “sexual assault, indecency with a child.” Tex.Penal Code Ann. § 22.011(a)(2) (Vernon Supp.1987). Appellant argues, and the majority found, that because § 22.011 no longer listed rape as an offense, the statute of limitations governing rape would fall under § 12.01(4) that provides for a three-year statute for all other felonies. I disagree. Legislative intent is essential when construing statutes of this nature. See Barbee v. State, 432 S.W.2d 78, 82 (Tex.Crim.App.1968) (op. on reh’g); Summerford v. State, 627 S.W.2d 468, 471 (Tex.App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, no pet.). A construction that ignores the legislative objective is to be avoided. Tex.Gov’t.Code Ann. §§ 311.021, 311.023 (Vernon 1987).
It is apparent that the legislature intended that the period of limitations for sexual offenses involving children be five years. The legislature had increased the limitations period for rape of a child from three to five years prior to its repeal. Article 12.011 This intent becomes clear when we consider that the offenses of “sexual assault, indecency with a child,” enacted in 1985, also carry a five-year period of limitations. Recognizing that a void could occur in the law in repealing rape as an offense, the legislature in its bill provided: “An offense committed before the effective date of this Act is covered by the law in effect at the time the offense was committed, and the former law is continued in effect for *20this purpose.” Ch. 577, § 2(b), 1985 Tex. Gen.Laws 4356.
I interpret “the law in effect at the time that the offense was committed” to relate only to the substantive law in effect as found in the Penal Code. Changes found in the Code of Criminal Procedure, i.e., limitations, do not affect the accused’s right to notice and a fair trial. The appellant was charged in September 1985, with the offense of rape of a child; the State was well within the limitation period.
I would therefore overrule this point of error, and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

. Ch. 85, § 1, 1983 Tex.Gen.Laws 413.