Court Opinion

ID: 9941297
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-16 15:14:23.486608+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:30.842906
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: FEBRUARY 9, 2024; 10:00 A.M.
                             TO BE PUBLISHED

                   Commonwealth of Kentucky
                               Court of Appeals
                                  NO. 2022-CA-1371-MR

KEVIN MEIER                                                                      APPELLANT

                    APPEAL FROM BOONE CIRCUIT COURT
v.                 HONORABLE JAMES R. SCHRAND, II, JUDGE
                          ACTION NO. 21-CI-00710

JEFF WYLER ALEXANDRIA, INC.
AND JEFF WYLER AUTOMOTIVE
FAMILY, INC.                                                                      APPELLEES

                                          OPINION
                                         AFFIRMING

                                        ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CALDWELL, JONES, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

CALDWELL, JUDGE: Kevin Meier (Meier) appeals from a summary judgment

dismissing his claims of illegal wage deductions. We affirm.

                                            FACTS

               Meier worked as a car salesman at a Jeff Wyler1 dealership for a few

1
  Meier worked at the Jeff Wyler dealership in Florence before filing suit against Appellees Jeff
Wyler Alexandria, Inc. and Jeff Wyler Automotive Family, Inc. The Appellees argued to the
trial court that Jeff Wyler Automotive Family, Inc. was not Meier’s employer. The trial court
years. Meier was paid a set amount twice monthly as a “draw” against anticipated

commissions.

              Meier could also earn additional amounts in commissions and bonuses

under a written pay plan.2 However, the additional payments for commissions and

bonuses could be reduced in certain situations – such as for imperfect customer

service surveys or an unsatisfactory mystery shopper assessment. For example, a

salesperson could earn a $100 bonus for a perfect customer service survey or a

$200 deduction for an imperfect customer survey. A salesperson could also incur

bonuses or deductions based on the percentage of potential trade-in sales which

actually occurred.

              Each month, Meier and a manager signed a sheet with calculations of

the total additional payment amount due after adding up commissions and bonuses

and subtracting amounts for negative factors. Meier later stated it was unclear

from the sheets how the net total for a customer service or mystery shopper bonus

noted the argument but did not resolve any dispute on this issue. Instead, it granted summary
judgment on other grounds. As the parties did not substantively argue whether either Appellee
was Meier’s employer in their appellate briefs, we need not address this issue. We collectively
refer to the Appellees as Jeff Wyler for brevity.
2
  Relevant to the present case, Meier worked for Jeff Wyler from late 2016 until June 2020. He
signed a written pay plan, which had taken effect in 2013. A new written pay plan with some
additional provisions became effective in 2018. And Meier also participated in a mystery
shopper assessment program which was not described in either written pay plan. Meier does not
claim that he did not agree to any pay plan provisions or the terms of the mystery shopper
assessment program.

                                               -2-
was calculated – such as whether a certain bonus due reflected just a bonus for a

singular event or multiple bonuses reduced by negative factors. Meier admitted

that as far as he knew, he received the payments for amounts calculated on these

sheets signed by him and a manager. But he later perceived that reductions in his

earnings for factors such as imperfect customer service surveys or failing mystery

shopper assessments violated Kentucky law.

                 Meier filed suit, claiming that Jeff Wyler assessed deductions which

were fines prohibited by law. Meier filed a motion for partial summary judgment,

requesting that the trial court hold that “pay deductions” for imperfect customer

service surveys, failed mystery shopper assessments, and “low conversion rates on

potential trade-in deals” were unlawful fines violating KRS3 337.060(2).

                Jeff Wyler filed a response to Meier’s partial summary judgment

along with its own motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of Meier’s

claims. Following briefing and a hearing, the trial court denied Meier’s motion for

partial summary judgment, granted summary judgment in Jeff Wyler’s favor, and

dismissed Meier’s lawsuit. Meier appealed.4

                Further facts will be discussed as needed.

3
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.
4
 Although Meier filed the trial court action along with co-plaintiff Brandon Niehaus, Niehaus
did not appeal from the trial court’s granting summary judgment in favor of Jeff Wyler.

                                              -3-
                                         ANALYSIS

                                     Standard of Review

                An appellate court must review a trial court’s interpretation of statutes

and its grant of summary judgment de novo (without deference) on appeal. Dolt,

Thompson, Shepherd & Conway, P.S.C. v. Commonwealth ex rel. Landrum, 607

S.W.3d 683, 686-87 (Ky. 2020).

                In reviewing the grant of summary judgment, we also consider

whether the trial court correctly determined that no genuine issues of material fact

exist and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See id.

at 686; CR5 56.03. We also keep in mind the trial court’s obligation to view the

evidence in the light most favorable to the opposing party and to determine if

genuine issues of material fact exist – but not to decide issues of fact – when faced

with a motion for summary judgment. See Shelton v. Kentucky Easter Seals Soc.,

Inc., 413 S.W.3d 901, 905 (Ky. 2013).

                Although determining if genuine issues of material fact exist is clearly

a key part of ruling on a motion for summary judgment, Meier’s appellate briefs do

not clearly identify any particular factual disputes. However, Meier states in his

reply brief: “Contrary to Jeff Wyler’s assertion, Mr. Meier does indeed dispute

Jeff Wyler’s interpretations of when and how wages are earned.”

5
    Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.

                                            -4-
             In sum, there appear to be no direct disputes about specific facts.

However, despite the lack of dispute about specific facts, the parties disagree about

whether bonuses were earned at the end of the month upon performing all

calculations or whether bonuses were earned immediately upon the occurrence of

certain events such as a perfect customer service survey. The parties also disagree

about the proper construction and application of Kentucky wage and hour statutes.

                         Overview of Applicable Statutes

             This case hinges on application and interpretation of Kentucky wage

and hour statutes, which are set forth in KRS Chapter 337. We quote those

provisions argued by the parties regarding Meier’s illegal wage deduction claims.

             KRS 337.010(1)(c)1. states:

             “Wages” includes any compensation due to an employee
             by reason of his or her employment, including salaries,
             commissions, vested vacation pay, overtime pay,
             severance or dismissal pay, earned bonuses, and any
             other similar advantages agreed upon by the employer
             and the employee or provided to employees as an
             established policy.

             KRS 337.060(1) states: “No employer shall withhold from any

employee any part of the wage agreed upon” except for certain enumerated

exceptions, such as authorized deductions to cover insurance premiums, which are

inapplicable here.

                                         -5-
              KRS 337.060(2)(a) provides: “Notwithstanding the provisions of

subsection (1) of this section, no employer shall deduct the following from the

wages of employees: (a) Fines[.]”6

          Trial Court Resolved Legal Arguments in Jeff Wyler’s Favor

              In granting summary judgment dismissing Meier’s claims, the trial

court accepted Jeff Wyler’s argument that no illegal deductions occurred. Like

Jeff Wyler, the trial court construed KRS 337.060(1) and (2) together to only

prohibit deductions from “wages agreed upon” rather than from all wages.

              In addition to arguing there was no deduction from an agreed-upon

wage, Jeff Wyler alternatively argued there was no fine. Jeff Wyler contended that

deductions incurred for negative factors as part of an agreed-upon method for

calculating wages were not fines. Meier disagreed, arguing that deductions for

negative factors were fines violating KRS 337.060(2)(a) even if a written pay

policy provided for these deductions. The trial court did not address whether any

subtractions for various factors in Jeff Wyler’s bonus calculations amounted to

fines.

6
  In addition to prohibitions against deductions for fines in KRS 337.060(2)(a), KRS
337.060(2)(b)-(e) also forbids, notwithstanding subsection 1 of this statute, making deductions
from employees’ wages for matters such as cash shortages in a cash register used by two or more
people, breakage, and losses due to customers’ dishonored checks, faulty workmanship, or stolen
property. It is undisputed that there were no deductions from Meier’s wages for the matters
mentioned in KRS 337.060(2)(b)-(e).

                                             -6-
            Instead, the trial court determined that KRS 337.060 only prohibited

deductions from agreed-upon wages and that, under the largely undisputed facts,

there was no deduction from the wages agreed upon here. First, the trial court

quoted both KRS 337.060(1) and KRS 337.060(2)(a). It noted: “Subsection (1)

begins with the prohibition of withholding wages agreed upon from employees,

and subsequently addresses exceptions to this prohibition.” And it interpreted the

word “notwithstanding” in KRS 337.060(2) “as applying to the exceptions listed in

subsection (1).” It concluded there was no conflict between these first two

subsections of KRS 337.060 and that KRS 337.060 simply did not apply to wages

which were not agreed upon by the employee and employer, stating:

            Both the first sentence of subsection (1) and subsection
            (2) prohibit an employer from withholding/deducting an
            employee’s wages, and thus they are not in conflict or
            contradiction. In order for compensation to be due to an
            employee, the statute requires that there must have been
            an agreement between the employee and the employer as
            to what that compensation will be. Thus, the statute
            cannot be interpreted as to be inclusive of wages not
            agreed upon.

            The trial court also stated:

                   The Court finds that the parties did not have an
            agreed upon wage, but rather a calculation as to what
            their wage would be. This calculation factored in the
            employees’ commissions, as well as categories for unit
            and miscellaneous bonuses that included both additions
            and deductions pursuant to their payment plan
            agreement, which resulted in the final calculation of the
            employees’ wages. See Exhibit A to Defendants’

                                           -7-
               Response and Motion.[7] The Court finds that the
               bonuses were not considered earned until after the
               calculation produced the Plaintiffs’ wages after
               considering the factors agreed upon by the parties, and
               therefore there were no deductions from either of the
               Plaintiffs’ calculated wages.

The trial court determined there was no agreed-upon wage but simply an agreed-

upon method for calculating wages which took into consideration additions and

deductions for positive and negative factors. It also determined that bonuses were

not earned until after wages were calculated after considering both positive and

negative factors agreed to by the parties. It concluded that no deductions from

wages had occurred.

               On appeal, Meier argues the trial court misinterpreted legal authority

and erred in concluding Jeff Wyler was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.8

7
 The trial court appears to be referring to the deposition of co-plaintiff Brandon Niehaus here.
The supporting memorandum to Jeff Wyler’s response in opposition to plaintiff’s motion for
partial summary judgment and Jeff Wyler’s motion for summary judgment states that Niehaus’
deposition was attached as Exhibit A. (Record (R.), p. 47).
8
  Despite the trial court’s repeated use of the word “find” in discussing its resolution of the issues
before it, Meier has not claimed on appeal that the trial court improperly made factual findings
rather than simply determining whether genuine issues of material fact existed. See Shelton, 413
S.W.3d at 905. Instead, Meier’s appellate briefs argue the circuit court misconstrued legal
authority in concluding that Jeff Wyler was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

                                                 -8-
Trial Court Possibly Erred in Presuming KRS 337.060(2)’s Enumerated
Prohibited Deductions Only Applied to Agreed-Upon Wages, but Any Such
Error is Harmless Under the Undisputed Facts Here

             Meier argues the trial court erred in holding that KRS 337.060(2) only

prohibits deductions from agreed-upon wages. Meier asserts that KRS 337.060(1)

provides protection for agreed-upon wages, but that KRS 337.060(2) provides

protection for all wages. Meier argues that even if the parties agreed to reduce

earnings for certain factors under the pay plan, such reductions were forbidden

under KRS 337.060(2).

             Meier contends the legislature defined wages more broadly than

agreed-upon wages. He points to KRS 337.010(1)(c)1., which defines wages as

including “any compensation due to an employee by reason of his or her

employment” such as salaries, commissions, “earned bonuses[,]” and “other

similar advantages agreed upon by the employer and the employee or provided to

employees as an established policy.”

             Meier argues KRS 337.060(2) must be interpreted as written, without

adding any other language, to prohibit certain deductions from wages. So, he

asserts the trial court erred in construing KRS 337.060(2) to prohibit only

deductions from agreed-upon wages.

             Meier asserts there is no conflict between KRS 337.060(1) and (2).

He argues the use of “notwithstanding subsection (1)” in KRS 337.060(2) means

                                         -9-
that certain deductions from wages are prohibited regardless of whether there is an

agreement about wages. He points to case law interpreting notwithstanding as

meaning “in spite of” or “without prevention or obstruction from or by.” See

Landrum v. Commonwealth ex rel. Beshear, 599 S.W.3d 781, 791 (Ky. 2019). He

also directs our attention to a quote from Bloyer v. Commonwealth, 647 S.W.3d

219 (Ky. 2022): “[N]otwithstanding is a fail-safe way of ensuring that the clause it

introduces will absolutely, positively prevail.” Id. at 225 (quoting ANTHONY

SCALIA & BRYAN GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS

127 (2012)).

               In response to Meier’s argument that “notwithstanding subsection (1)”

in KRS 337.060(2) means that KRS 337.060(1)’s limitation to agreed-upon wages

does not apply, Jeff Wyler argues that notwithstanding simply shows which

provision prevails in the event of a clash. But Jeff Wyler asserts there is no clash

between KRS 337.060(1) and KRS 337.060(2) because KRS 337.060 as a whole

only applies to agreed-upon wages.

               Jeff Wyler also points out that despite the mention of “wages” without

the qualifier “agreed upon” in KRS 337.060(2), for purposes of KRS Chapter 337,

wages are defined in KRS 337.010(1)(c)1. as “any compensation due to an

employee” for his/her employment “agreed upon by the employer and the

employee or provided to employees as an established policy.” Jeff Wyler argues

                                         -10-
that KRS 337.060(2) implicitly refers to wages agreed upon or provided as an

established policy. And it asserts that the evidence shows that Meier received all

wages agreed upon or provided under an established policy.

              Meier suggests employers and employees are free to negotiate

agreements about compensation, but that employers may not make certain

deductions such as fines from an employee’s wages – even if the employee has

supposedly agreed to a pay plan permitting such deductions.9 He contends the trial

court’s holding that KRS 337.060(2) only prohibits deductions from agreed-upon

wages clearly contradicts the language of the statute.

              Whether KRS 337.060(2)’s prohibition against certain enumerated

deductions such as fines applies to all wages or simply to all wages agreed upon is

an issue unresolved by binding precedent from Kentucky appellate courts.

However, a published opinion from this Court suggests that KRS 337.060 as a

whole applies only to agreed-upon wages, since we stated: “The statute makes it

unlawful for the employer to withhold ‘any part of the wage agreed upon.’”

9
 Meier cites for our consideration an unpublished federal district court opinion which he
characterizes as construing KRS 337.060(2) as prohibiting deductions from wages for breakage
or other property damages despite any employer/employee compensation agreement supposedly
authorizing such deductions. See Henderson v. Pieratt’s, Inc., No. 5:17-CV-377-JMH, 2019 WL
1903398, at *8 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 29, 2019) (unpublished). However, this is not binding authority.
See Unifund CCR Partners v. Harrell, 509 S.W.3d 25, 28 (Ky. 2017) (federal court opinions
construing state law in diversity actions are not binding on Kentucky courts although Kentucky
courts may consider them as persuasive authority). See also Kentucky Rule of Appellate
Procedure (RAP) 41(B) (“Unpublished opinions from other jurisdictions are not binding
precedent and citation of these opinions is disfavored.”).

                                            -11-
Grossl v. Scott Cnty. Fiscal Court, 566 S.W.3d 221, 224 (Ky. App. 2018)10

(quoting with added emphasis KRS 337.060(1)). But this Court did not

specifically consider whether KRS 337.060(2) applied only to agreed-upon wages

in Grossl.

               Similarly, there was no alleged KRS 337.060(2) violation in two

unpublished opinions which were cited for this Court’s consideration in both

parties’ briefs.11 Perhaps the language of these unpublished opinions suggests that

KRS 337.060 as a whole only applies to agreed-upon wages,12 though such

unpublished opinions are not binding authority. And in any event, neither of these

two unpublished opinions specifically addressed KRS 337.060(2) at all.

10
  Our Supreme Court denied discretionary review of our opinion in Grossl, 566 S.W.3d at 221,
on February 7, 2019.
11
   RAP 41(A) clearly states that Kentucky state appellate opinions not designated for publication
are not binding authority and that citation of such unpublished opinions is disfavored. RAP
41(A) also sets forth certain requirements for citing such unpublished opinions for consideration
in appellate briefs. Though some of these requirements appear to be met by the parties’ briefs,
both parties failed to comply with RAP 41(A)(4)’s requirement that one clearly state that the
opinion is not binding authority when citing an unpublished opinion for this Court’s
consideration. We leniently elect to impose no sanctions for the parties’ failure to comply fully
with RAP 41(A)(4).
12
  See Bahil v. Flexsteel Industries, Inc., No. 2019-CA-000064-MR, 2019 WL 6998646, at *2-3
(Ky. App. Dec. 20, 2019), discretionary review denied (Apr. 22, 2020) (unpublished) (agreeing
with trial court’s conclusion that KRS 337.060 did not apply to bona fide disputes about wages
but only to agreed-upon wages, and affirming summary judgment granted due to lack of
agreement about wages where parties had different understandings of whether an old pay system
or a new pay system applied); Kimmel v. Progress Paint Mfg. Co., No. 2002-CA-000273-MR,
2003 WL 1226837, at *3 (Ky. App. Jan. 10, 2003) (unpublished) (“Here, the agreed wage is in
dispute; thus, we do not think KRS 337.060(1) applicable. Simply put, we do not believe the
legislature intended KRS 337.060 to apply where there exists a bona fide dispute concerning
wages.”).

                                              -12-
                 In contrast, another unpublished opinion from this Court reviewed a

trial court’s determination that a violation of KRS 337.060(2)(e) occurred.13 We

reversed, noting that KRS 337.060(1) only prohibited deductions from agreed-

upon wages and that the reductions in wages at issue had been agreed to by both

parties under a compensation plan.14

                 As Meier points out, we did not discuss the effect of “notwithstanding

the provisions of subsection (1) of this section” language in KRS 337.060(2) in

that unpublished case. Meier suggests this may have been one of the reasons the

Kentucky Supreme Court granted discretionary review in that case. However,

since the Supreme Court case was dismissed on motion following the grant of

13
  See AT&T Corp. v. Fowler, Nos. 2006-CA-000402-MR & 2006-CA-000535-MR (Ky. App.
Oct. 19, 2007), discretionary review granted (Oct. 15, 2008) (unpublished), page 5 of slip
opinion available as a searchable opinion on the Kentucky Court of Justice website, kycourts.net.
See Kentucky Supreme Court Opinions (kycourts.net) and click search under case number No.
2006-CA-00535 (Last accessed Jan. 5, 2024). Unfortunately, the text of Fowler is not available
on Westlaw. According to court records, the Fowler Kentucky Supreme Court case was later
dismissed upon motion.
14
   Fowler slip opinion at page 7. After noting that employees agreed to deductions in certain
circumstances under the terms of a compensation plan, we held:

        The purpose of the statute is to prevent employers from recouping their
        losses from wages that they have agreed to pay their employees. By
        signing and acknowledging their acceptance of the Compensation Plan,
        the appellees agreed upon a particular wage which included a fixed salary
        plus commissions subject to certain conditions. This arrangement does
        not violate the letter or the spirit of the statute, since AT&T was not
        withholding any amounts that had not been agreed upon under the terms of
        the Compensation Plan.

Id. at page 7.

                                              -13-
discretionary review, our Supreme Court did not construe the “notwithstanding”

clause in KRS 337.060(2) or determine whether KRS 337.060(2) only applied to

agreed-upon wages.

             Though clarification from our Supreme Court on these matters would

certainly be welcome, we cannot say that we entirely agree with the trial court’s

construction of KRS 337.060 upon de novo review. Notably, the trial court

interpreted the term notwithstanding in KRS 337.060(2) as referring to the

exceptions stated in KRS 337.060(1). But the word exceptions does not follow

notwithstanding in KRS 337.060(2); instead, KRS 337.060(2) begins with the

clause “notwithstanding the provisions” (emphasis added) of KRS 337.060(1)

before forbidding certain deductions from wages including fines. But KRS

337.060(1) does not just contain one provision identifying exceptions to a rule.

Instead, it also contains provisions generally prohibiting employers from

withholding any part of an employee’s agreed-upon wages and specifically

prohibiting, after a certain date, collective bargaining agreement provisions calling

for deductions from wages without employees’ written consent.

             Although we do not share the trial court’s view of the term

notwithstanding in KRS 337.060(2) as only referring to the exceptions in KRS

337.060(1), we ultimately conclude that the trial court reached the proper result

albeit based on different grounds supported by the record. See Mark D. Dean,

                                        -14-
P.S.C. v. Commonwealth Bank & Tr. Co., 434 S.W.3d 489, 496 (Ky. 2014) (“If an

appellate court is aware of a reason to affirm the lower court’s decision, it must do

so, even if on different grounds.”). Since the trial court ultimately reached the

proper result, any error in its interpretation of the statutory language of KRS

337.060(2) is harmless. See CR 61.01.

Trial Court Reached Proper Result as There Was No Fine Under These Facts

             Assuming arguendo that KRS 337.060(2) prohibits an employer’s

taking the types of deductions specified therein even though the employee agreed

to such deductions being taken, the deductions here were not fines. Meier cites

KRS 446.015 for the proposition that words in statutes must be interpreted

according to common usage and suggests that people commonly use the word fine

to refer to any requirement that someone pay an amount as a punishment.

             We note that KRS 446.015 states that any statute enacted after mid-

June 1978 must not use technical terms and will be construed according to

common usage. KRS 337.060 has been amended several times but was originally

enacted in 1942.

             Meier argued to the trial court that the common meaning of a fine is a

“sum imposed as a punishment” according to https://merriam-webster.com

/dictionary/fine (last accessed Feb. 5, 2024). Though Meier cites KRS 446.015 to

argue that fine should be construed according to a common meaning, Meier does

                                         -15-
not address KRS 446.080(4), which states: “All words and phrases shall be

construed according to the common and approved usage of language, but technical

words and phrases, and such others as may have acquired a peculiar and

appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed according to such meaning.”

               Unfortunately, the word fine is not defined in KRS Chapter 337 nor

elsewhere in the Kentucky Revised Statutes. Perhaps some people may

colloquially use the term fine to refer to any sort of pecuniary punishment. But

fine has developed a particular meaning under the law, connoting not just any

payment but a payment to a public authority as a type of punishment for criminal

activity or as a remedy for a civil wrong. For example, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY

(11th ed. 2019) defines a fine as a: “pecuniary criminal punishment or civil

penalty payable to the public treasury.” And based on our recent review, the

Merriam-Webster website defines a fine as: “a sum imposed as punishment for an

offense” or “a forfeiture or penalty paid to an injured party in a civil action” in

addition to noting some more obscure definitions of the noun fine. See

https://merriam-webster.com/dictionary/fine (last accessed Jan. 5, 2024).15 And

long-standing Kentucky precedent essentially defined a fine as a court-imposed

sum to be paid for a criminal offense. Commonwealth v. French, 130 Ky. 744, 114

15
  Both BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY and Merriam-Webster also mention other obsolete
definitions of a fine which are obviously not applicable here such as a settlement of a type of
lawsuit to determine the true owner of a parcel of land.

                                               -16-
S.W. 255, 256 (1908) (discussing legal definitions of a fine as pecuniary

punishment for a criminal offense which essentially puts an end to the offense).

             In sum, the word fine has a particular meaning in the law which does

not encompass deductions from bonus earnings from one’s private employer

pursuant to a pay plan to which the employee agreed. Instead, a fine is an amount

to be paid to the public treasury as a civil or criminal penalty or an amount to be

paid as a penalty to an injured party in a civil action. Thus, the deductions here

under a pay plan to which Meier agreed are not fines prohibited by KRS

337.060(2) so the trial court properly granted summary judgment – albeit on

different grounds.

             Other arguments raised by the parties in their appellate briefs which

are not discussed in this opinion have been determined to be lacking in merit or not

relevant to our resolution of this appeal. And we decline to discuss any further

non-binding authority including unpublished Kentucky appellate court opinions

and precedent from our sister state courts and from federal courts construing

Kentucky state law in diversity cases.

                                  CONCLUSION

             For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the Boone

Circuit Court.

             ALL CONCUR.

                                         -17-
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:     BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:

David C. Harman           Patricia Anderson Pryor
Jessica L. Powell         Trevor M. Nichols
Cincinnati, Ohio          Cincinnati, Ohio

                        -18-