Court Opinion

ID: 9704568
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:40:15.871746+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:03.455183
License: Public Domain

HOFFMAN, Judge,
concurring and dissenting.
I concur in part and dissent in part. A court reviewing the disposition of marital assets will consider only that evidence most favorable to the trial court's determination. Berger v. Berger (1995), Ind.App., 648 N.E.2d 378, 381. The trial court's disposition of property is viewed as a whole, not item by item. Id. Further, a party challenging the trial court's division of the marital assets must overcome a presumption that the trial court considered all evidence and properly applied the statutory factors. Livingston v. Livingston (1992), Ind.App., 583 N.E.2d 1225, 1227-1228.
Further, when valuing the marital assets, the trial court has discretion to set any date between the date of filing the dissolution petition and the date of the hearing. Eyler v. Eyler (1986), Ind., 492 N.E.2d 1071, 1074. The majority notes that this Court has upheld valuations which consider changes in circumstances between the filing date and the hearing date. It does not follow that had the changes not been considered, the valuations would have been reversed.
On review, this Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court and can consider only the evidence most favorable to the trial court's disposition. Castaneda v. Castaneda (1998), Ind.App., 615 N.E.2d 467, 470. The trial court acted within its discretion, and the evidence adduced supports the valuation. Thus, I reject the qualifying language the majority appended to the *580standard. Because the standard currently allows the trial court to choose a date which recognizes changes in the value of assets between the date of final separation and the final hearing, the modification serves only to limit the discretion of the trier of fact. The majority reweighed the evidence in remanding for a new valuation of the construction business.7
Additionally, the remand for further findings and any necessary disposition of the accounts is unnecessary when review of the record revealed that no testimony or documentation was entered into evidence concerning the balance of the accounts. Where the parties fail to present evidence as to the value of assets, it will be presumed that the trial court's decision is proper. Cf. Livingston, 583 N.E.2d at 1228. This is especially true in that the parties cannot present new or additional evidence through the appellate process. As noted above, the disposition is considered as a whole, not item by item. Id. I would vote to affirm the valuation of the marital assets.
Further, I disagree that the trial court did not find that the children were incapacitated. Relying upon expert evidence, the trial court specifically found:
"©29.... Both daughters have on-going counseling needs related to victim abuse (Stipulated letter from Dr. Campbell) and post traumatic stress syndrome (Testimony of Hanna Cohen]."
Accordingly, I would vote to affirm the trial court's determination as to counseling expenses.
Finally, I disagree that the trial court erred in awarding Jean's attorney fees and litigation expenses. IND.CODE § 31-1-11.5-16 (1992 Supp.) provides, in pertinent part:
"(a) The court from time to time may order a party to pay a reasonable amount for the cost to the other party of maintaining or defending any proceeding under this chapter and for attorneys' fees, including sums for legal services rendered and costs incurred prior to the commencement of the proceedings or after entry of judgment. The court may order the amount to be paid directly to the attorney, who may enforce the order in his name."
A trial court enjoys broad discretion in assessing attorney's fees in dissolution cases. In re Marriage of Lewis (1994), Ind.App., 638 N.E.2d 859, 861. In considering whether to make such an award and the appropriate amount, the trial court may consider factors including: the resources of the parties, the relative earning ability of the parties, the superiority and availability of funds, the result achieved, the size of the estate, and the difficulty of the issues. See Riddle v. Riddle (1991), Ind.App., 566 N.E.2d 78, 83; Canaday v. Canaday (1984), Ind.App., 467 N.E.2d 783, 785.
Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney's fees and litigation expenses. Evidence was presented as to the amount of attorney's fees and the relative resources of the parties. As in most dissolution proceedings, the parties each were required to expend funds for personal maintenance. That Philip spent a substantial amount on his defense in pending criminal matters does not alter the evidence that Jean bore the main financial burden in sustaining the welfare of the children and maintaining the tangible property after the sale of their residences. That the marital estate was size-able and that the complexity of the issues required substantial litigation expenses is clear. The award of attorney's fees should be affirmed.
Therefore, I disagree as set out herein, and I coneur as to the remaining issues.

. The majority reweighed the evidence to find the trial court improperly determined that Naples 38, Inc. is a successor in interest to Quillen Construction; however, the determination does not appear to alter the valuation of the marital estate.