Court Opinion

ID: 9746958
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 14:47:43.3886+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:18.818680
License: Public Domain

NICHOLSON, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I concur with and join part II of the majority opinion but respectfully dissent as to part I. In my view, the sentence imposed on this defendant did not violate the federal proscription on cruel and unusual punishment or the state proscription on cruel or unusual punishment.

United States Constitution

An indeterminate 25-years-to-life sentence under the “Three Strikes” law does not violate the United States Constitution. (Ewing v. California (2003) *1090538 U.S. 11, 29-31 [155 L.Ed.2d 108, 122-123, 123 S.Ct. 1179].) This court has already rejected, in People v. Meeks (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 695 [20 Cal.Rptr.3d 445], the proposition the majority now embraces. “[A] sentence of 25 years to life in prison for failing to register cannot be considered a sentence that is grossly disproportionate to his crime in light of his long and serious criminal history.” (Id. at p. 708.) The majority’s weak rationalization for departing from precedent, offered in a footnote, is that “Meeks failed to register after changing his residence and therefore, unlike in the present case, law enforcement authorities did not have Meeks’s correct address and information.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1082, fn. 11.) Meeks was living with his sister-in-law after being evicted from his prior residence. He had frequent contact with law enforcement officers, who knew about his duty to register. He was not hiding. Defendant violated the same law the defendant in Meeks violated. I see no reason to turn precedent on its ear.

California Constitution

Neither does the sentence imposed here violate the California Constitution’s proscription on cruel or unusual punishment. (People v. Meeks, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at pp. 709-710.)

Majority Analysis

The majority goes astray, I believe, because it begins with several unsupported and unsupportable assumptions.
1. “If the constitutional prohibition is to have a meaningful application it must prohibit the imposition of a recidivist penalty based on an offense that is no more than a harmless technical violation of a regulatory law.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1072.)
The majority’s opinion concerning the importance of sex offender registration is inconsistent with California public policy. “California has recognized, and reasonably so, that sex offenders present a serious danger to society because of their tendency to repeat their sexual offenses. Sexual offenses not only invade the deepest privacies of a human being, and thereby may cause permanent emotional scarring, but they frequently result in serious physical harm to, or death of, the victim. Hence, 1 “it is necessary to provide for continued registration” to effectuate the statutory purpose of protecting the safety and general welfare of the public.’ [Citation.] Defendant’s willingness to ignore his duty to register and thus ignore society’s right to maintain some *1091control over sexual offenders may seem ‘de minimis’ to him but oes not seem so to a society seeking to protect itself from sexual predators.” (People v. Meeks, supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at p. 709.)
In this case, the authorities found defendant where he had last registered. The majority calls this “a harmless technical violation of a regulatory law.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1072.) Once we catch a person who has failed to register, we know where he is. That is fortunate, but it does not justify the violation of an important public safety statute. We rightly place strict requirements on sex offenders so we can keep tabs on them.
2. “[T]he current offense must bear the weight of the recidivist penalty imposed.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1072.)
In Ewing v. California, the defendant made the same argument. The lead opinion responded: “The gravity of his offense was not merely ‘shoplifting three golf clubs.’ Rather, Ewing was convicted of felony grand theft for stealing nearly $1,200 worth of merchandise after previously having been convicted of at least two ‘violent’ or ‘serious’ felonies. ” (Ewing v. California, supra, 538 U.S. at p. 28.) Here, defendant committed the felony of failing to register after having been convicted of two violent or serious felonies. That is the relevant set of circumstances that must bear the weight of the penalty imposed.
3. “[T]he requirement that defendant reregister within five days of his birthday served no stated or rational purpose of the registration law and posed no danger or harm to anyone.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1073.)
Under this rationale, the sex offender registration statute serves no rational purpose unless the sex offender has moved since the last time he registered. I disagree. While it was fortuitous that defendant was found where he had last registered, the requirement to register at continuing intervals is rational and supported by the policy discussed above.
4. While acknowledging that only in a rare case will a punishment be deemed cruel and unusual under the federal Constitution or cruel or unusual under the state Constitution, the majority declares, “there must be a bottom to that well.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1072.) This case does not present a bottom-of-the-well scenario. It would be cruel and unusual to torture a third-striker or to give a life term to a petty thief with no prior record. Those are bottom-of-the-well scenarios.

*1092
Conclusion ■

These are my points of departure from the majority’s analysis. Since this court has already spoken on this issue, I would follow that holding and uphold defendant’s sentence against the challenge that it is cruel and unusual under the federal Constitution or cruel or unusual under the state Constitution.
Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied June 29, 2005. Brown, J., did not participate therein. Kennard, J., and Baxter, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.