Court Opinion

ID: 9694044
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 17:19:24.361726+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:54.743953
License: Public Domain

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY
FITZGERALD, J.:
¶ 1 I concur with the learned majority to the extent it concludes Appellant is entitled to credit for time served from November 8, 2007 to January 9, 2008 (sixty-two days), which represents time served prior to imposition of the violation of probation (“VOP”) sentence. However, I believe the majority’s holding in regard to credit for the original sentence clearly contradicts the established caselaw of this Court and our Supreme Court. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that Appellant is entitled automatically to credit for his 113 days of time served prior to the imposition of his original sentence of 23 months’ probation.
¶2 We must look initially to Section 9771 of the Sentencing Code, which is contained under Subsection F, entitled, “Further Judicial Action.”
§ 9771. Modification or revocation of order of probation
(b) Revocation. — The court may revoke an order of probation upon proof of the violation of specified conditions of the probation. Upon revocation the sentencing alternatives available to the court shall be the same as were available at the time of initial sentencing, due consideration being given to the time spent serving the order of probation.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9771(b). Section 9760 addresses credit for time served and is located under Subchapter E of the Sentencing Code, entitled “Imposition of Sentence.” “The principle underlying section 9760 is that a defendant should be given credit for time spent in custody prior to sentencing for a particular offense.” Commonwealth v. Mann, 957 A.2d 746, 749 (Pa.Super.2008). “[Cjourts have long held the failure to award credit for time served prior to sentencing involves the legality of sentence.” Commonwealth v. Foster, 960 A.2d 160, 170 n. 5 (Pa.Super.2008).
*1007¶ 8 Our initial examination of Section 9760’s involvement in VOP proceedings occurred in 1995. In Commonwealth v. Williams, 443 Pa.Super. 479, 662 A.2d 658 (1995), this Court agreed with Williams that imposing the maximum sentence after a VOP hearing was illegal when he had already served some time after imposition of the original sentence. Id. at 659. Based on Section 9760(1), the Williams Court concluded that Appellant could not be incarcerated for a total amount of time surpassing the maximum sentence for the original crime. Id. In contrast, this Court in Commonwealth v. Bowser, 783 A.2d 348 (Pa.Super.2001), held that because the total sentence of incarceration was not illegal, the Williams holding did not apply, thereby negating the need to credit the VOP sentence with time served for the original sentence. Id. at 350.1 In Commonwealth v. Yakell, 876 A.2d 1040 (Pa.Super.2005), this Court reaffirmed the holdings in Williams and Bowser that the PCRA court “was within its right not to grant any credit for the time served on the original sentence” because the aggregate sentence was less than the statutory maximum. Yakell, 876 A.2d at 1043.2
¶ 4 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed a similar issue in McCray v. Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corrections, 582 Pa. 440, 872 A.2d 1127 (2005).3 In McCray, the trial court sentenced McCray to eleven-and-a-half to twenty-three months in prison “and a concurrent probation term of ten years, with credit for time served.” Id. at 443, 872 A.2d at 1129. Following a petition for reconsideration, the court “vacated the previous sentence and imposed a new sentence consisting of time served to twenty-three months, credit for time served, the immediate grant of parole, and ten years of probation to run concurrently.” Id. at 443-44, 872 A.2d at 1129 (footnote omitted). Because McCray violated his probation, his probation was revoked and he was sentenced to two to four years in prison followed by five years of probation. Id. at 444, 872 A.2d at 1129. McCray requested, and the Department of Corrections denied, credit for the twenty months of time served prior to imposition of the original sentence. Id. at 444 n. 5, 872 A.2d at 1129 n. 5.
¶ 5 McCray appealed to the Commonwealth Court, essentially requesting a writ of mandamus.
The Commonwealth Court reviewed applicable case law, particularly Commonwealth v. Bowser, 783 A.2d 348 (Pa.Super.2001) ... and Commonwealth v. Williams, 443 Pa.Super. 479, 662 A.2d 658 (1995).... The [Commonwealth C]ourt rejected the holdings in both cases, relying on Section 9760 of the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9760, which states that a defendant must be given credit for all time spent in custody under a prior sentence if that defendant is later reprosecuted and resentenced for the same offense.
Id. at 444-45, 872 A.2d at 1129-30 (footnotes omitted). The Commonwealth Court held McCray was entitled to credit, and *1008the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Id. at 442-43, 872 A.2d at 1128.
¶ 6 In resolving the appeal, the McCray Court discussed this Court’s decisions in Bowser and Williams:
In Bowser, the majority of the Superior Court panel held that Section .9760 of the Sentencing Code and Williams only apply when the maximum term of the revocation sentence combined with the time previously served on the original sentence exceed the statutory maximum penalty for the criminal charge. Such concerns are not present in the instant matter.
Id. at 449, 872 A.2d at 1132 (emphasis added). The McCray Court reversed the Commonwealth Court, reasoning:
McCray’s position echoes that of Judge Olszewski in his dissenting opinion in Bowser in which he expressed his belief that Section 9760(1) of the Sentencing Code mandates that an inmate is entitled to credit on any sentence “for all time spent in custody as a result of the criminal charge for which a prison sentence is imposed.... ” Considering the existence of the Williams and Bowser decisions, and the fact that Section 9760 appears in Subchapter E of the Sentencing Code governing “Imposition of Sentence” and not in Subchapter F governing “Further Judicial Action,” which includes Section 9771 (Modification or revocation of order of probation), it cannot be said that McCray had a clear right to relief.
Id. at 450, 872 A.2d at 1132 (emphasis added).4
¶ 7 Instantly, I cannot agree with the majority’s statement that McCray, Yakell, Bowser, and Williams offer limited guidance as to whether Appellant is entitled to credit for the 113 days he served prior to imposition of his original sentence. I believe Yakell, in fact, speaks clearly to this issue when it found that the court was “within its right not to grant any credit for the time served on the original sentence,” so long as the aggregate amount of time served does not exceed the statutory maximum. See Yakell, 876 A.2d at 1043 (emphasis added). I cannot see the logic in mandating that a court must always award credit for time served prior to the original sentence, when that court is not required to award credit for time served after the original sentence.5 See id. Similar to McCray, Appellant was sentenced to probation, violated his probation, had his probation revoked, and was sentenced to fifteen to thirty months in prison. Also like McCray, Appellant requested that he receive credit for the days he served in prison prior to his initial sentence of probation, in Appellant’s case totaling 113 days. Because the McCray Court found no substantive, clear right to relief in denying VOP-sentencing credit for the twenty months spent in prison prior to imposition of McCray’s original sentence, see id. at 450, 872 A.2d at 1132, I cannot agree with the majority’s mandate that the 113 days Appellant served prior to imposition *1009of his original sentence must be credited to his VOP sentence. See id.; Yakell, swpra.
¶ 8 Further, the majority’s reasoning seemingly mirrors the Commonwealth Court’s holding in McCray, which was reversed, and Judge Olszewski’s dissent in Bowser, which our Supreme Court rejected. In light of McCray and Yakell, and absent further clarification by our Supreme Court, I cannot conclude Section 9760(1) mandates that time spent in custody prior to imposition of the original sentence must automatically be credited toward a subsequent VOP sentence.6 For all these reasons, I must respectfully dissent from that part of the majority’s decision mandating the award of 113 days of credit for time served.
¶ 9 I note, however, that the issue of granting credit for time served prior to imposition of the VOP sentence was not at issue in Williams, Bowser, Yakell, or McCray. These cases did not address whether a defendant should receive credit for time served immediately prior to imposition of a VOP sentence, but rather whether a defendant should receive credit for time served for or prior to imposition of the original sentence. Initially, it would appear that the McCray/Yakell line of cases would also permit the trial court to deny credit for this time served, since the aggregate time of incarceration would not exceed the statutory maximum. In relation to this particular period of incarceration, however, I agree with the majority that the McCray/Yakell line of cases offer little guidance, other than that Section 9760 is a consideration for VOP sentences. See Yakell, 876 A.2d at 1043 (noting that Section 9760 requires credit for time served in certain VOP circumstances); Williams, 662 A.2d at 659 (relying on Section 9760 to find that the appellant was entitled to credit for time served when the aggregate amount of time served exceeded the statutory maximum). In applying Section 9760 to the instant facts, Appellant’s sixty-two days of incarceration from November 8, 2007, until January 9, 2008, relate directly to his VOP sentence. Because there is no disconnect between that time served and the sentence he is currently ordered to serve, I would conclude that he is entitled to credit for those sixty-two days. Accordingly, I both concur and dissent from the majority’s decision.

. The Bowser Court also reasoned that because time served was previously credited, the defendant was not entitled to double credit.

. The Yakell Court remanded for further proceedings because it could not discern the intent of the sentencing court. I also observe that Judge Olszewski, who wrote the dissent in Bowser, authored the unanimous decision in Yakell.

.I acknowledge that McCray examined whether the defendant fulfilled the procedural requirements for a writ of mandamus. One of the requirements for the writ, however, is whether the defendant has established a substantive, clear right to relief. McCray, 582 Pa. at 449, 872 A.2d at 1132.

. In his concurring opinion, then-Justice, now-Chief Justice Castille, wrote: “So long as the aggregate sentence (initial sentence plus VOP sentence) is less than the statutory maximum, I would hold here, as Justice Eakin did in Bowser, that duplicative credit for time served is inappropriate.” Id. at 456, 872 A.2d at 1136.

. It is particularly relevant to note that the statutory maximum sentence for his original conviction was ten years’ incarceration. Therefore, even if we were to add all the time for which Appellant seeks credit, his incarceration time would still fall well below the statutory maximum.

. I note the majority quotes a footnote in Justice Saylor’s concurrence in McCray regarding the language of Section 9760(1). McCray, 582 Pa. at 458 n. 2, 872 A.2d at 1137 n. 2 (Saylor, J., concurring). Justice Saylor also proposed to overrule Bowser. Five Justices, however, declined to join Justice Saylor.