Court Opinion

ID: 9403468
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-21 13:08:30.818929+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:35.270148
License: Public Domain

[Cite as In re I.J., 2023-Ohio-2024.]

                      IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                  FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
                       HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

 IN RE: I.J.                                :     APPEAL NO. C-220553
                                                  TRIAL NO. 10-9269Z
                                            :

                                            :       O P I N I O N.

Appeal From: Hamilton County Juvenile Court

Judgment Appealed From Is: Reversed and Cause Remanded

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: June 21, 2023

Melissa A. Powers, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Keith Sauter,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,

Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Jessica R. Moss, Assistant
Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellant.
                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

BERGERON, Presiding Judge.

       {¶1}   In 2021, defendant-appellant I.J. sought to seal and expunge 46 cases

from his juvenile record. Ultimately, the juvenile court sealed and expunged 45 of the

46 cases. I.J. presently appeals the denial of his application for the remaining case,

arguing that the juvenile court abused its discretion. We agree, reverse the juvenile

court’s judgment, and remand this cause with instructions for the juvenile court to seal

and expunge the record of the remaining case.

                                           I.

       {¶2}   In December 2021, 28-year-old I.J. filed applications to seal and

expunge his juvenile record, which contained 46 cases. The following month, a

magistrate denied I.J.’s applications without a hearing, based on “the interests of

society or in the interests of justice.” At this point, the procedural history becomes

somewhat messy.

       {¶3}   One juvenile court judge handled the cases ending in “X” (the “X cases”)

and a second judge addressed the remaining cases—those ending in “Z” (the “Z cases”).

The first judge rejected the magistrate’s decision and granted sealing and

expungement of the record of the X cases after finding that I.J. had been rehabilitated.

With respect to the Z cases, I.J. filed an objection to the magistrate’s decision in

February 2022. In July 2022, the juvenile court granted I.J.’s objection in part and

ordered the magistrate to conduct a hearing on the Z cases to determine whether I.J.

had been sufficiently rehabilitated. The matter was then returned to the magistrate

for the hearing.

       {¶4}   Later in July, at the hearing, the magistrate indicated that I.J. owed

outstanding restitution in the case numbered 10-9269Z, which reflected a charge for

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

what would be breaking and entering if committed by an adult. Although I.J. did not

appear for the hearing, counsel informed the magistrate that I.J. had stayed out of

trouble and had not been convicted of a felony since 2015. Counsel also explained that

the first judge had sealed and expunged the records of the X cases after finding I.J.

rehabilitated. In arguing against sealing and expungement, the state raised I.J.’s adult

record, including a 2018 misdemeanor drug charge and various traffic offenses.

       {¶5}    Following the hearing, the magistrate granted sealing and expungement

in all I.J.’s remaining cases except for the case numbered 10-9269Z, the case in which

he failed to pay restitution. In sum, 45 of I.J.’s 46 juvenile cases were sealed and

expunged from his record upon sufficient findings of his rehabilitation.

       {¶6}    In August 2022, I.J. filed an objection to the magistrate’s decision

regarding the case numbered 10-9269Z, and he supplemented the objection in

September. In October, following a hearing on the matter, the juvenile court denied

I.J.’s objection. The court noted that the magistrate erred in basing her denial of I.J.’s

application on the “interests of society or in the interests of justice,” but from its own

independent review of the record, the court determined that the magistrate reached

the appropriate legal conclusion.      The court reviewed various factors, including

continued criminal behavior, failure to pay restitution, and lack of affirmative

evidence of rehabilitation due to I.J.’s failure to appear in court, in concluding that the

magistrate had properly denied I.J.’s request for sealing and expungement of his

record in the case numbered 10-9269Z. I.J. now appeals this decision.

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

                                            II.

       {¶7}    In his sole assignment of error, I.J. maintains that the juvenile court

erred by refusing to seal and expunge his juvenile record in the case numbered 10-

9269Z. He insists that the court abused its discretion when it denied his request

because he had demonstrated sufficient rehabilitation, and that the court’s decision

was contrary to the purposes and principles of the juvenile justice system. I.J. also

argues that the court erred in considering his failure to pay restitution in this case as

a factor indicating a lack of rehabilitation.

       {¶8}    “The sealing of a record of a criminal conviction is a privilege, not a

right.” State v. D.K., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106539, 2018-Ohio-2522, ¶ 13. But

sealing and expungement provisions are remedial in nature and are to be liberally

construed. See State v. A.S., 2022-Ohio-3833, 199 N.E.3d 994, ¶ 7 (1st Dist.); D.K. at

¶ 13, quoting State v. M.D., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92534, 2009-Ohio-5694, ¶ 9.

Moreover, statutory provisions “ ‘regarding the sealing of juvenile delinquency records

promote [the] goals of rehabilitation and reintegration into society by permitting

rehabilitated offenders to have their records sealed so that they can leave their

youthful offenses in the past.’ ” In re C.T., 5th Dist. Licking No. 11 CA 19, 2011-Ohio-

4275, ¶ 11, quoting State v. Bloomer, 122 Ohio St.3d 200, 2009-Ohio-2462, 909

N.E.2d 1254, ¶ 54; see In re H.S., 2020-Ohio-4530, 159 N.E.3d 344, ¶ 24 (11th Dist.).

Sealing and expungement provisions provide persons “who have demonstrated

rehabilitation with a second chance, so that they can avoid [the] collateral

consequences of a criminal record and the associated obstacles to becoming a thriving

and productive member of society.” A.S. at ¶ 10, citing State v. R.S., 1st Dist. Hamilton

Nos. C-210169, C-210170, C-210171, C-210172 and C-210173, 2022-Ohio-1108, ¶ 10.

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶9}   We review the trial court’s decision for an abuse of discretion. See In re

A.J., 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-210111, 2021-Ohio-3917, ¶ 6 (“Generally, appellate

courts review a trial court’s decision whether to seal records under an abuse-of-

discretion standard.”). We will thus not reverse the trial court’s judgment unless the

court has exercised its discretionary judgment over the matter in an unwarranted way

or committed legal error. See Johnson v. Abdullah, 166 Ohio St.3d 427, 2021-Ohio-

3304, 187 N.E.3d 463, ¶ 35.

       {¶10} The juvenile record sealing statute provides, in relevant part, that “the

court may order the records of the person that are the subject of the motion or

application to be sealed if it finds that the person has been rehabilitated to a

satisfactory degree.” R.C. 2151.356(C)(2)(e). In determining whether the person has

been satisfactorily rehabilitated, the court may consider all of the following:

       (i) The age of the person;

       (ii) The nature of the case;

       (iii) The cessation or continuation of delinquent, unruly, or criminal

       behavior;

       (iv) The education and employment history of the person;

       (v) The granting of a new tier classification or declassification from the

       juvenile offender registry * * *;

       (vi) Any other circumstances that may relate to the rehabilitation of the

       person who is the subject of the records under consideration.

Id.

       {¶11} Here, the juvenile court weighed these statutory factors and made

various findings. The court concluded that the magistrate properly denied I.J.’s

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

application for sealing and expungement of the case numbered 10-9269Z, after

considering I.J.’s age (29 years old), the nature of the offense (if he were an adult at

the time of the offense, breaking and entering—a felony of the fifth degree), the

continuation of delinquent or criminal behavior (a 2015 traffic-related felony

conviction, 2018 misdemeanor drug charge, and various traffic offenses), education

and employment history (noting that there is no evidence in the record regarding I.J.’s

employment and education), and other circumstances that may relate to rehabilitation

(the failure to pay restitution in this case).

       {¶12} In light of the findings of rehabilitation in 45 of the 46 cases on his

juvenile record, for the juvenile court’s denial of the application to seal and expunge

the record of the final case to constitute a proper exercise of its discretion, there would

need to exist a compelling rationale for reaching a different outcome in the remaining

case. Because I.J.’s age, adult record, and education and employment history are

consistent factors across all 46 cases, they cannot justify the different conclusion

reached by the juvenile court in this case. And from our review of the record, we

conclude that the remaining factors weighed by the court—the nature of the offense

and the “other circumstances” factor (here, nonpayment of restitution)—fail to provide

a sufficient basis for the denial of I.J.’s application to seal and expunge the record of

the case numbered 10-9269Z where the courts found him to have been satisfactorily

rehabilitated in the other 45 cases on his juvenile record.

       {¶13} Turning first to the nature of the case—the offense in this case was for

breaking and entering, a felony of the fifth degree if committed by an adult. I.J.

committed the offense when he was just 17 years old, 12 years prior to the juvenile

court’s decision. The crime was nonviolent, and in light of I.J.’s sparse adult record,

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

the nature of the case cannot, on its own, support the juvenile court’s decision adopting

the magistrate’s denial of the application to seal and expunge the record of this case.

Additionally, the nature of the offense is the only legitimate factor weighed by the court

differentiating the case at hand from the cases in which I.J. was found to have been

rehabilitated, and “the nature of the offense ‘cannot provide the sole basis to deny an

application.’ ” A.S., 2022-Ohio-3833, 199 N.E.3d 994, at ¶ 15, quoting R.S., 1st Dist.

Hamilton Nos. C-210169, C-210170, C-210171, C-210172 and C-210173, 2022-Ohio-

1108, at ¶ 29.

       {¶14} We turn next to a review of the “other circumstances” factor, under

which the juvenile court considered I.J.’s failure to pay restitution. The juvenile court

relies on this court’s decision in State v. Ushery, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-120515,

2013-Ohio-2509, in weighing I.J.’s nonpayment of restitution as a factor bearing on

his rehabilitation. However, Ushery addresses the consideration of nonpayment of

court costs in determining whether to seal adult cases. Ushery at ¶ 15 (“[Defendant’s]

failure to pay the court costs is a factor that the trial court can consider when

determining, in the exercise of its discretion, whether [defendant] has been

rehabilitated such that expungement of her [adult] conviction is appropriate.”).

Juvenile cases are distinguishable, because a juvenile court may no longer exercise its

jurisdiction over a person once that person reaches the age of 21. Accordingly, “when

a juvenile has been adjudicated delinquent prior to his 18th birthday, any dispositional

order that the juvenile court makes, including an order of restitution, terminates by

operation of law on the juvenile’s 21st birthday.” (Emphasis added.) In re J.Z., 6th

Dist. Huron No. H-11-003, 2012-Ohio-1105, ¶ 11; R.C. 2151.38; R.C. 2152.22(A)

(“[D]ispositional orders made by the court under this chapter shall be temporary and

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

shall continue for a period that is designated by the court in its order, until terminated

or modified by the court or until the child attains twenty-one years of age.”); R.C.

2152.o2(C)(6); In re R.K., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 84948, 2004-Ohio-6918, ¶ 6, 15-16

(holding that the juvenile court’s jurisdiction to collect court costs, fines, and to impose

other sanctions ends when the person reaches the age of 21). As such, an adult

applicant’s failure to pay restitution in a juvenile case is probative only of that person

at 21 years old, not whether he or she is rehabilitated at the time of applying for sealing

and expungement. Here, the juvenile court issued its decision when I.J. was 29 years

old—over 8 years after the juvenile court lost jurisdiction over him and the order of

restitution terminated.

       {¶15} Therefore, in light of the record at hand and the fact that 45 of I.J.’s 46

juvenile cases were sealed and expunged upon findings of rehabilitation, we conclude

that the juvenile court’s findings in the case numbered 10-9269Z were not so

dissimilar to the findings in the 45 sealed and expunged cases to warrant the different

outcome in this case. The court’s decision to the contrary represents an abuse of

discretion, see Johnson, 166 Ohio St.3d 427, 2021-Ohio-3304, 187 N.E.3d 463, at ¶ 35,

so we sustain I.J.’s assignment of error.

                                     *       *       *

       {¶16} In light of the foregoing analysis, we sustain I.J.’s sole assignment of

error. We reverse the judgment of the juvenile court and remand this matter to the

court with instructions to seal and expunge the record of I.J.’s juvenile adjudication in

the case numbered 10-9269Z.

                                                 Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

BOCK and KINSLEY, JJ., concur.

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                   OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

Please note:

       The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.

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