Court Opinion

ID: 9647126
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:24:14.691116+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:45.761435
License: Public Domain

YÁÑEZ, Justice.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. I find appellant’s point of error number three meritorious. I would sustain appellant’s due process points and reverse and remand.
Appellant filed an answer to Thomas and Nelda’s petition and also counterclaimed against Thomas Nance, Nelda Nance, and Brenda Parr for money damages. Thomas and Nelda filed an answer to the counterclaim, as did Brenda Parr. Thereafter, appellant filed a motion for appointed counsel. She also requested a bench warrant so she could represent herself at trial. After a hearing on these motions, which appellant did not attend, the trial court denied both. The cause was heard on October 29,1992, on which date appellees appeared and presented evidence. Appellant failed to appear, and the court entered a post-answer default judgment against her on appellees’ claims.1 Appellant took nothing on her counterclaim. Appellant complains that the trial court de*894nied her right to counsel, deprived her of access to the courts, and deprived her of property without due process of law. I address appellant’s due process claim because I deem it dispositive of the current appeal.
Appellant contends generally that she was denied due process because her claims were foreclosed and the judgment against her was essentially rendered ex parte, without adequate notice of the trial setting, and without the assistance of counsel. The record shows that appellant filed pretrial motions and a motion for new trial urging these contentions. I address the issues of the ex parte judgment and of the denial of access to the courts.
A small body of ease law exists in Texas on an inmate litigant’s right to personally appear at a civil trial. While prisoners have a right of access to the courts, an inmate does not have an unconditional right to attend a civil trial in which she is a litigant. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 3198, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821-22, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 1494-95, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977); Ballard v. Spradley, 557 F.2d 476, 479-81 (7th Cir.1977); Stone v. Morris, 546 F.2d 730, 735-36 (7th Cir.1976); see Pruske v. Dempsey, 821 S.W.2d 687, 689 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1992, no writ); Nichols v. Martin, 776 S.W.2d 621 (Tex.App.—Tyler 1989, no writ); Birdo v. Holbrook, 775 S.W.2d 411 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1989, writ denied); Brewer v. Taylor, 737 S.W.2d 421, 423 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1987, no writ); see generally Itel Capital v. Dennis Mining Supply, 651 F.2d 405, 407 (5th Cir.1981). The inmate’s attendance at trial is left to the trial court’s sound discretion, guided by considerations of the State’s interest in safety and incarcerating its prisoner against the inmate’s need to be present to prosecute her claim. Stone, 546 F.2d at 735-36; Pruske, 821 S.W.2d at 689; Brewer, 737 S.W.2d at 423.2 Particularly relevant to the trial court’s decision is the question of whether the denial of an appearance would completely foreclose the inmate’s opportunity to be heard. Nichols, 776 S.W.2d at 623. In this case, I would hold that the trial court’s denial did deprive appellant of all opportunity to be heard, and it violated her right to due process and her right of access to the courts.
The cases on right of access have almost uniformly come down in favor of the State’s interest in maintaining incarceration. Ballard v. Spradley, 557 F.2d 476, 479-81 (7th Cir.1977); Stone v. Morris, 546 F.2d 730, 735-36 (7th Cir.1976); Birdo v. Holbrook, 775 S.W.2d 411 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1989, writ denied); Brewer v. Taylor, 737 S.W.2d 421, 423 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1987, no writ); cf. Pruske, 821 S.W.2d at 689; Nichols, 776 S.W.2d at 621. However, none of the cases to which we have looked for guidance present the same facts as the case at bar. The inmates in the prior cases were plaintiffs or defendants who had some legal representation. See Itel Capital v. Dennis Mining Supply, 651 F.2d 405, 407 (5th Cir.1981); Armstrong v. Randle, 881 S.W.2d 53, No. (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1994 n.w.h). The only case significantly similar is Pruske. There, the appellate court vacated a post-*895answer default judgment and remanded so the trial court could conduct a Brewer-type balancing test on the inmate’s interest in personally appearing.
The case at bar goes beyond Pruske. The court below entered findings on the Brewer factors. However, I find that the findings are wholly conclusory and inadequate to satisfy due process considerations. The trial court’s findings merely parrot the Brewer factors, reciting the language, and indicating that the court found against appellant on each one. We do not know what evidence, if any, the trial court considered on those factors. Findings that recite specific facts and not mere conclusions are necessary to enable the appellate court to review the basis for the trial court’s ruling. The purpose of having the trial court prepare findings on the Brewer factors in a case such as this is so that such a review will be possible. See Nichols v. State, 810 S.W.2d 829, 881 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref'd).
Particularly disturbing are the trial court’s findings that state:
The Court further finds that Sherry A Nance’s presence is not important in judging her demeanor or credibility compared to that of any other witness’s.
The Court further finds that the prisoner will not or cannot offer any admissible noncumulative testimony that could not otherwise be offered effectively by deposition, telephone or otherwise if should [sic] choose to do so.
The trial court should not base the exercise of its discretion on the merits of the claim. Ballard v. Spradley, 557 F.2d 476, 481 (5th Cir.1977). I agree with the Ballard court that a preliminary determination of the merits of the prisoner’s case is improper. Moreover, the final judgment states that the appellees appeared at the “trial on the merits,” that appellant was absent due to the denial of the bench warrant, that “all matters of fact and things in controversy were submitted to the Court,” and that appellees were entitled to recover. The record before us does not show that appellant was accorded due process. While the trial court found that appellant could offer deposition or other evidence “if she chose,” the record does not support that finding. It does not show that any provision was made for receiving appellant’s evidence, particularly inasmuch as she was not present and had no representation. It is clear from the appellant’s pleadings and motions that she did not intend to default and that she was attempting to defend against appellee’s claims. As a practical matter in an adversarial proceeding, a party who is not present and is not represented by counsel will find it difficult indeed to offer evidence and defend a claim. The record does not show that any special provisions were made for receiving evidence in appellant’s favor. Appellant alleged contributory negligence and failure to mitigate damages in her answer. She did not have a fair opportunity to present evidence on these pleadings.
At the very least, our system of justice comprehends due process to include notice and an opportunity to be heard. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust, 389 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950); Ex parte Peterson, 444 S.W.2d 286, 289 (Tex.1969). Due process has been held to mean “notice and an opportunity to be heard and to defend in an orderly proceeding adapted to the nature of the case; and it means a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds on injury, and which renders judgment only after trial.” See Masonic Grand Chapter of Order of Eastern Star v. Sweatt, 329 S.W.2d 334, 337 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.). “An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process for any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” State v. Rumfolo, 545 S.W.2d 752, 754 (Tex.1976). This did not happen in the present case. The record shows that appel-lees filed suit on July 2, 1991. Trial “on the merits” was held on October 29, 1992, only two months after the hearing on appellant’s *896request for a bench warrant, and five months after appellant’s original answer.3 The case proceeded expeditiously and appellant, in prison, was at a distinct disadvantage. It is a fundamental principle of justice that no man may be condemned or prejudiced in his rights without an opportunity to make his defense. See Sweatt, 329 S.W.2d at 337. An opportunity to “make a defense” involves more than notice and hearing, but time in which to prepare the defense. Id. at 337.
Appellant cannot successfully challenge the default judgment because she does not meet the Craddock test. See Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 134 Tex. 388, 133 S.W.2d 124 (1939); Director, State Employees Workers’ Compensation Division v. Evans, 889 S.W.2d 266 (Tex.1994). Appellant’s absence from trial was not due to conscious indifference; neither was it due to a mistake or accident. Evans, 37 Tex.Sup.Ct.J. at 780; see also Bank One, Texas v. Moody, 830 S.W.2d 81, 83 (Tex.1992). She was incarcerated, and the case law does not address a situation where the pro se inmate civil defendant seeks but is denied a bench warrant for a personal appearance. The ordinary recitations in a trial record are inadequate in this case to reassure this court that due process considerations have been satisfied. In this instance, the burden rightly falls upon the trial court to recite sufficient facts to demonstrate to a reviewing court that evidence was presented, and that a meaningful opportunity to present some kind of objection or rebuttal was accorded a pro se inmate civil defendant. The failure of the record here and the lack of a meaningful opportunity to bring a collateral attack violates the due course of law provision of the Texas Constitution. See Tex Const, art. I, § 19.
The circumstances in this case raise serious questions about the integrity of the fact finding process. The record reveals violations of those principles of fundamental fairness and due process that are foundational to the adversarial nature of our system. Appellant has appeared pro se throughout the action below. Although obviously unlearned in legal matters, she filed pleadings and motions raising some valid contentions and requests. Despite her best efforts, appellant had a post-answer default judgment rendered against her. All of the proceedings below occurred ex parte, and appellant’s requests to attend the trial were parried by adherence to case law that was factually and legally inadequate to guide the trial court in the present situation. Due process has not been served in this instance. I would sustain appellant’s due process points. I would reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the cause for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

. A post-answer default judgment occurs when an answer is on file but the defendant fails to appear at trial. Stoner v. Thompson, 578 S.W.2d 679 (Tex.1979); Peck v. Ray, 601 S.W.2d 165, 166-67 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.). When the defendant fails to appear on the date set for trial, the plaintiff must still appear and present evidence to support the cause of action. The defendant’s failure to appear constitutes neither an abandonment of the answer nor an implied confession of any issues thus joined by defendant’s answer. Peck, 601 S.W.2d at 167.

. The court must consider the following factors:
a) the cost and inconvenience of transporting the prisoner;
b) the security risk and potential danger to the court and public of allowing the prisoner to attend court;
c) whether the prisoner’s claims are substantial;
d) whether a determination of the matter can reasonably be delayed until the prisoner is released;
e) whether the prisoner can and will offer admissible noncumulative testimony which cannot be offered effectively by deposition, telephone, or otherwise;
f) whether the prisoner’s presence is important in judging his demeanor and credibility compared with that of other witnesses;
g) whether the trial is to the court or to a jury; and
h) the prisoner’s probability of success on the merits.
Stone, 546 F.2d at 735-36; Brewer, 737 S.W.2d at 423; cf. Ballard, 557 F.2d at 481 (court should not base the exercise of its discretion on the merits of the claim so as not to focus on the ultimate result of the action rather than the need for the prisoner's testimony vis a vis the difficulty in securing it).

. The record before us shows that the case lay dormant for nine months after appellees filed suit. No action was taken from July 2, 1991, the original filing date, until April 6, 1992 when appellees amended their petition. Appellant's original answer was filed May 4, 1992. The record shows that appellant filed her counterclaim August 3, 1992 and that both sides took action on the case on almost a weekly basis. Within the two months after the court denied her motion for bench warrant, appellant filed two motions for continuance which were denied.