Court Opinion

ID: 9547663
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:50:09.95593+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:17:56.037672
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, Justice,
concurring only in reversal of the summary judgment and in the award of costs:
The reader of the Court’s opinion and also that of the dissenters will surely conclude that Moss got considerably more than he bargained for when he transacted business with Mid-America. As is so with most responsible citizens, Moss sought coverage which would enable him to financially respond to any party whom or whose property might be injured in the operation of his hauling equipment. What he didn’t bargain for, but received anyway, was what is now almost five years of expensive litigation — and more to come. Having a truck for which he desired coverage, he received Mid-America’s GENERAL AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY POLICY, which concededly gave him ostensible coverage by defining “automobile” as “a land motor vehicle, trailer, or semi trailer,” and thus inclusive of Moss’s 1974 Ford 10-wheel truck and its tagalong 74 Tesco trailer — specifically itemized in the policy as such. As the Court’s opinion notes, the policy is replete with definitions. It also contains a multitude of conditions and various endorsements. One such endorsement is that which the Court’s opinion refers to as a “radius endorsement,” but which is actually in the policy called a “mileage limitation,” and reads:
“It is agreed that the insurance with respect to the automobile described above or designated in the policy as subject to this endorsement does not apply, if regular or frequent trips of the automobile exceed a 300 mile radius of the limits of the city or town where such automobile is principally garaged as stated in the policy, to any bodily injury or property damage which occurs during any such trip, or return therefrom, other than bodily injury or property damage which occurs during the use of such automobile for personal, pleasure or family purposes on a trip beyond such radius.”
As the Court’s opinion and the dissenters both agree, Moss was sold a policy which provided him with no definition of “frequent” or of “regular.” One contention made at oral argument by Mid-America was that both words are of common usage and hence not in need of definition, yet we seem to now have three legal points of view as to what falls within “frequent” and what falls into “regular” — the trial court, this Court, and the dissent all fashioning different formulae as to how Moss’s case is to be decided. I incline to join the Court’s opinion because it does reverse the summary judgment turning down Moss’s claim against his carrier, and is in that respect a well-written and precedentially substantiated analysis of the controversy. Nevertheless, I am persuaded that Moss should not be made to further undergo the rigors and expenses of further litigation. In short, I *304am brought to the conviction that Mid-America, knowing his insurance needs, should not have sold him this particular policy without its containing a provision telling him exactly what was meant by “frequent” and what was meant by “regular,” and also that the word “or” — which sometimes is judicially defined to mean “and” — in this case would be restricted to the disjunctive — as it apparently so is. Certainly not an absolute proposition by any means, but not an issue and accordingly removed from any considered discussion. (Anyone can see that one actually scheduled trip per year is “regular” enough to invoke argument that the mileage exclusion applies — but a regular one-trip affair is not “frequent.” Or is it, compared to a scheduled trip every other year?)
So long as Mid-America was content to sell its policy without definition of these terms in language capable of understanding by the average lay person, it ought not be allowed to defend against a claim on the basis of its own inadequate contract.
Moss was specifically asked if he considered his thirteen trips as being “frequent” or “regular.” His answer:
“Q. You heard Mr. Dance ask you from time to time two words that seem to be important here, regular or frequent?
A. Yes.
Q. Prior to 1977 had you ever made any trips to Arizona?
A. Made one trip in a car about three years ago, three or four years ago.
Q. Is this the first time you have ever been to Arizona?
A. Yes.
Q. So as far as the truck is concerned, had it ever made any trips prior to that time?
A. No, never dreamed about it until about a year ago.
Q. Well, so that even in 1977 did you make any trips to Arizona?
A. No.
Q. What’s your contention with respect to whether or not these trips to Arizona were regular?
A. Well, I just couldn’t consider them regular or frequent.
Q. Why? Let’s talk about regular first. A. Well, because we just went on a call basis whenever they had a need.
Q. And when, what, it didn’t interfere with your coal?
A. Coal haul, yes.
Q. You have a regular route of coal customers, do you not?
A. Yes.
Q. And so basically this is your winter’s job; isn’t it?
A. Yes.
Q. And you use the coal hauling to subsidize your farming income?
A. Yes.
Q. How many children do you have? A. Ten.
Q. Now, speaking of regular, then, it would only be when they called and when you didn’t have a coal haul?
A. Right.
Q. Now, the other term, frequent, other than these trips down there, what did you do in the interim periods?
A. Either hauled coal or grain.
Q. So that basically as considering the frequency of these trips as opposed to your other trips, what would you say would be the bulk of your trips, numbers of trips?
A. Oh, coal and grain.
Q. By a wide margin?
A. Yes.”
As given prominence in the dissent, it is true that Moss himself, obviously wanting some reassurance on his belief that he would not be transgressing a reasonable view of “frequent” or “regular” did testify that he asked the local agent’s opinion- and was told that if he called in it would be all right. That he did do so the first time and that he didn’t feel obligated to call in subsequently proves nothing other than that it corroborated Moss’s testimony as to what he thought. And, a proposition I think of extreme importance is that nothing in this record shows that Mid-America has ever ratified, or would ratify, a local agent’s *305opinion as to the applicability and interpretation of this or any other endorsement to the policy. Experience teaches otherwise. Be that as it may, ’tis a strange way of doing business where the owner of a policy is obliged to continually, or at all, seek his carrier’s oral advice as to whether his trips will be considered “frequent” or “regular.”
Just a year ago in Foremost Insurance Co. v. Putzier, 102 Idaho 138, 627 P.2d 317 (1981), the Court refined, reaffirmed, and relied on the language of Justice Donaldson’s opinion in Corgatelli v. Globe Life & Accident Co., 96 Idaho 616, 533 P.2d 737 (1975):
“ ‘[t]he doctrine of probability or reasonableness has long been a rule of construction geared toward ascertaining intent in situations of ambiguity. The standard to be applied is what a reasonable person in the position of the insured would have understood the language to mean.’ 96 Idaho at 622, 533 P.2d at 743. (Donaldson, J., dissenting.) (Emphasis added.)
Under this rule of construction, which utilizes an objective standard and which is used in the case of ambiguously written insurance policies, to effectuate the intent of the parties, the test is what a reasonable person in the position of the insured would have understood the language of the contract to mean. This test is not necessarily conclusive as to the intent of the parties, but is only one rule of construction to be considered in construing an ambiguous contract. This standard is, of course, in accord with the general rule of construing insurance contracts against those who write them.” 102 Idaho at 142, 627 P.2d at 32. (Footnotes omitted.)
With a record which fails to demonstrate either contention or proof that Moss is not a reasonable person, that statement in Foremost is controlling, should be applied, and likely would have been applied by the trial court other than for the fact that the opinion in Foremost had not been announced when the trial court had before it the cross-motions for summary judgment in this case. Other pertinent language in Foremost, although not of equal significance, militates in favor of finding merit in Moss’s arguments.
The dissenting opinion suggests that to adopt any view inconsistent with that therein expressed paves the way for conniving farmers to deceptively obtain cheap insurance. I see no merit in such argument, and even were it true in some other case, Mid-America can close the door to any such practices by providing its policyholders with policies couched in unambiguous language. In connection with that concern, in district court proceedings, Mid-America filed an affidavit showing that Moss for $1,500 more premium could have been sold a policy from which was removed all doubt and ambiguity. The suggestion, one supposes, is that this farmer, father of ten, was bent on outslickering an insurance company. The message better received, however, is from the fact that no contention is made that he was ever offered such a policy other than the one he was sold, but should not have been.
While, as I say, I am inclined to join the Court’s opinion, full justice is not being done, and by not joining, the trial court on remand will in its further disposition of the case not be fettered by a majority opinion which predetermines its approach to a final resolution. The trial court is not precluded from reconsideration of Moss’s motion for summary judgment.
For the foregoing reasons I concur with the Court’s opinion insofar as it reverses the summary judgment granted Mid-America. I concur in awarding costs to Moss, which will also include attorney fees for the appeal should Moss eventually prevail in further proceedings in the trial court, which court can include attorney fees on the appeal as part of Moss’s recoverable expenses in pursuing his claim.