Court Opinion

ID: 9754866
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:17:03.594554+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:00.034645
License: Public Domain

*501PRICE, Judge,
concurring:
In Part I of its opinion, the majority determines that the period of time prescribed by Rule 1100 for trial commencement must be measured from the filing date of the first complaint against the appellant. In Part II of its opinion, the majority determines that if the mandatory period is measured from the filing date of the first complaint, then appellant’s right to a speedy trial was violated and he must be discharged. Although I agree with Part II in its entirety and the conclusion of Part I, I cannot accede to the rationale employed by the majority in Part I.
In Commonwealth v. Braithwaite, 258 Pa.Super. 447, 385 A.2d 423 (1978), this court, citing Commonwealth v. Mumich, 239 Pa.Super. 209, 361 A.2d 359 (1976), enunciated a standard by which we would examine Rule 1100 claims in cases, such as the instant case, where all of the charges arising from a criminal transaction have been dismissed and then later revived in whole or in part.1 See also Commonwealth v. Lowe, 255 Pa.Super. 78, 386 A.2d 144 (1978). We stated that “. . . the prompt trial period would attach from the date of [a] second complaint only if (1) the first complaint was properly dismissed and (2) the record fails to reflect an improper prosecutorial design to circumvent the mandate of Rule 1100.” Commonwealth v. Braithwaite, supra 253 Pa.Super. at 450, 385 A.2d at 424. Despite our holdings in Braithwaite and Mumich, the majority asserts that “. . . the Commonwealth’s motive is immaterial” to an analysis of the appellant’s claim. I see no reason to *502eschew the standard pronounced by this court in Braithwaite and would use that standard to resolve appellant’s claim.
When the appellant’s claim is analyzed in light of the guidelines established in Braithwaite, it is apparent, under the circumstances of this case, that the period of time for trial must be measured from the date of the first complaint. Although the record does not demonstrate a prosecutorial intent to evade the mandate of the Rule, the record does indicate that the hearing judge improperly dismissed the first complaint against the appellant.
At the appellant’s first preliminary hearing, the hearing judge dismissed the charges against the appellant because the preliminary hearing had been scheduled on the second day after the preliminary arraignment.2 Under Pa.R. Crim.P. 140(f)(1), a preliminary hearing shall not be less than three days nor more than ten days after the preliminary arraignment.3 Although a technical violation of Rule 140(f)(1) did occur in the instant case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Commonwealth v. Hailey, 470 Pa. 488, 509, 368 A.2d 1261, 1272 (1977), has ruled that unless an accused is able “. . .to demonstrate a causal connection between any prejudicial event and the alleged irregularity” then the remedy of dismissal is inappropriate if the hearing substantially complied with the requirements of Rule 140(f). In the instant case, the appellant’s preliminary hearing was scheduled one day too soon under Rule 140(f). Certainly, despite such an irregularity, the appellant’s hearing substantially complied with Rule 140(f), particularly since “Rule 140(f) was primarily designed to prevent pro*503longed custody of an accused prior to an independent judicial finding of the existence of probable cause.” Commonwealth v. Hailey, supra at 506, 368 A.2d at 1270. Moreover, neither party indicates that the defense was prejudiced in any way by the irregularity. Under these circumstances, it is clear that the hearing judge improperly dismissed the first complaint against the appellant. Since the complaint against the appellant was improperly dismissed, the proceedings on the charges contained in that complaint were never terminated for the purpose of Rule 1100. Therefore, because I agree with the majority that the appellant’s Rule 1100 right to a speedy trial was violated if the mandatory period is measured from the filing date of the first complaint, I would reverse the judgment of sentence and discharge the appellant.
VAN der VOORT, J., joins in this opinion.

. The present case is therefore distinguishable from Commonwealth v. Earp, 476 Pa. 369, 382 A.2d 1215 (1978), in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that an accused not timely tried under Rule 1100 on charges arising from a criminal transaction may not, under Rule 1100, be later brought to trial on other charges arising out of the same transaction. The limited applicability of the supreme court’s holding in Earp was highlighted by the court when it specifically refused to determine “. . . the effect of a complete dismissal on all charges arising out of a criminal transaction upon the speedy trial rule.” Commonwealth v. Earp, supra at 374, 382 A.2d at 1217. I am therefore unable to understand how Judge Cercone, in his concurring opinion, can conclude that Earp, in any way, provides support for the majority’s decision.

. The preliminary arraignment was held on July 26, 1975, and the preliminary hearing was scheduled for July 28, 1975.

. Rule 140(f) reads in pertinent part as follows:
“(f) When a preliminary hearing is not waived, the issuing authority shall:
(1) fix a day and hour for a preliminary hearing which shall not be less than three nor more than ten days after preliminary arraignment unless extended for cause shown, unless the issuing authority fixes an earlier date upon request of the defendant or his attorney with the consent of the complainant and the attorney for the Commonwealth.”