Court Opinion

ID: 9850554
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:59:11.73393+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:39.140234
License: Public Domain

FELDMAN, Justice,
concurring.
I write separately because I continue to disagree with the court’s position on the procedure to be followed in considering lesser included offenses.
In the present case, the jury had difficulty in reaching a verdict. On the second day of trial they sent seven messages to the trial judge. Two of them indicated their inability to reach a unanimous verdict on the first degree murder charge. The last note asked the judge if the jury could consider count two (second degree murder) before unanimously acquitting on count one. On the third day of deliberations, the judge answered the jury by instructing them that they must “unanimously find the defendant ‘not guilty’ of first degree murder [before they could] proceed to determine guilt or innocence of the defendant as to second degree murder.” This instruction was correct under the decision in State v. Wussler, 139 Ariz. 428, 429-30, 679 P.2d 74, 75-76 (1984). Wussler changed the practice previously followed in Arizona, which permitted the jury to consider lesser included offenses whenever they were unable to agree on guilt or innocence of the primary offense charged. Id. at 430, 679 P.2d at 76.
The vices of the procedure mandated by Wussler are described in my concurrence in that case. Id. at 432, 679 P.2d at 78. Part of the problems caused by the Wussler instruction are illustrated by this case. Some jurors evidently believed that defendant did not have the state of mind—premeditation—necessary for conviction of first degree murder. The facts certainly could support that verdict. The same jurors might well have believed that defendant did have the intent necessary for conviction of second degree murder. Jurors in that position would have been coerced because the only option available under the Wussler rule was to either turn an obviously dangerous person loose or find him guilty of the primary charge, even though they might not believe the evidence warranted such a result. Both alternatives, acquittal of the guilty or conviction of a higher degree than the jurors felt is warranted by the evidence, are unacceptable.
We should not erect procedural barriers that prevent jurors from voting their minds. I continue to believe that the Wussier procedure is bad law. It has not been raised as a separate claim of error in this case, so I concur in the result reached by the majority.
GORDON, Y.C.J., agrees with Justice FELDMAN’s concurrence.