Court Opinion

ID: 9597941
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:04:08.843022+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:27:42.780617
License: Public Domain

Callow, C.J.
(dissenting) — I disagree with the majority's determination that Const. art. 1, § 21 affords a tort litigant an absolute right to have a jury determine noneconomic damages in a tort action. This constitutional provision should be interpreted to require only that a jury determine such facts as the Legislature may choose to incorporate into a cause of action.
The majority's right-to-jury argument can be stated as two propositions. First, the majority asserts that a litigant has a constitutional right to trial by jury with respect to all actions in which a jury was available at the time the constitution was adopted. See, e.g., State ex rel. Goodner v. Speed, 96 Wn.2d 838, 840, 640 P.2d 13, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 863 (1982). A jury was available in negligence actions at the time the constitution was adopted. See, e.g., Say-ward v. Carlson, 1 Wash. 29, 23 P. 830 (1890). Because the plaintiff’s action sounds primarily in negligence, plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial. I agree.
Second, the majority asserts that in such cases a litigant has the constitutional right to have the jury determine the same issues which were determined by juries in 1889. Majority, at 645. Because juries determined the measure of damages, including noneconomic damages, in all civil actions in 1889, the majority concludes that a contemporary litigant has the constitutional right to have a jury determine the measure of noneconomic damages. Majority, at 646.1 disagree.
The majority offers no authority and no sound policy reasons in support of the premise that our constitution requires contemporary juries to determine all issues which juries determined in 1889. In fact, this court has never adopted a historical standard to determine the "scope" of the right to a jury trial, and there are good reasons why we should not do so now.
*671Most of the majority's cited authority and discussion focuses on the minor premise — that the amount of damages have historically been determined by a jury.9 Thus, Baker v. Prewitt, 3 Wash. Terr. 595, 19 P. 149 (1888), does show that in 1889 "the jury's fact-finding function included the determination of damages." Majority, at 646. Similarly, the court in James v. Robeck, 79 Wn.2d 864, 869, 490 P.2d 878 (1971) spoke historical truth when it said that "the amount of damages in a particular case is an ultimate fact." Majority, at 646. In Bingaman v. Grays Harbor Comm'ty Hosp., 103 Wn.2d 831, 835, 699 P.2d 1230 (1985), we held that an appellate court could not alter the jury's determination of noneconomic damages, because the determination of noneconomic damages had been left to the discretion of the jury. See also Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 79 L. Ed. 603, 55 S. Ct. 296, 95 A.L.R. 1150 (1935).
These cases prove that juries historically have determined the amount of damages, including noneconomic damages, in civil actions. But they only prove that juries historically have determined noneconomic damages, not that juries constitutionally must do so. The majority errs by equating historical fact with constitutional necessity.
No case cited by the majority shows that this court has ever used a strict historical standard for determining the scope of the right to a jury trial. For example, the majority states that State ex rel. Mullen v. Doherty, 16 Wash. 382, 384-85, 47 P. 58 (1897) provides "contemporary insight on the scope issue." Majority opinion, at 645. In Mullen, the court cited section 248 of the Code of 1881 to show that at the time the constitution was adopted, the right to a jury trial extended only to "actions at law." Because a quo warranto proceeding is not an action at law, the court determined that the defendant had no right to a jury trial. Mullen, at 385. Mullen is merely an early example in which *672the court used a historical standard to determine whether the right to a jury trial attached at all. It simply does not address the "scope" issue. Similarly, the court in In re Ellern, 23 Wn.2d 219, 160 P.2d 639 (1945) held that the right to a jury trial attached to insanity commitment proceedings because a jury heard such proceedings in 1889. Ellern does not address the "scope" issue.
The only case the majority cites which directly addresses the "scope” issue is State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 110 P. 1020 (1910). In Strasburg, six judges held that a criminal defendant had a due process right to bring the question of his sanity before a jury. Because this right antedated the adoption of the constitution, three judges found that a statute which purported to deny the jury the opportunity to consider this issue also violated Const. art. 1, § 21. The plurality in Strasburg thus determined that the right to a jury trial included the right to have the jury determine the issue of the defendant's sanity.
Strasburg is distinguishable from the case before us. In Strasburg, the defendant had an independent constitutional right to have his sanity made a factual issue. Const. art. 1, § 21 therefore required that the factual issue be determined by the jury. In the present case, however, the plaintiff has no independent constitutional right to have the determination of noneconomic damages be a factual issue. Accordingly, the plaintiff has no Const. art. 1, § 21 right to have the amount of noneconomic damages determined by a jury.
The majority errs by summarily dismissing Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 95 L. Ed. 2d 365, 107 S. Ct. 1831 (1987). The majority dismisses Tull on the grounds that the Seventh Amendment does not apply to the states. Majority, at 648. I agree that the federal supremacy clause does not compel us to apply Tull to this case. However, "[t]he opinions of the Supreme Court, while not controlling on state courts construing their own constitutions, are nevertheless important guides on the subjects which they squarely address." State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 60-61, *673720 P.2d 808 (1986), quoting State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 363, 450 A.2d 952 (1982) (Handler, J., concurring).
Before this court will determine whether our State constitution affords wider protection than the United States Constitution, a litigant must adequately present and argue the issues to us, using at a minimum the criteria set out in Gunwall. State v. Wethered, 110 Wn.2d 466, 472-73, 755 P.2d 797 (1988). However, the majority today interprets Const. art. 1, § 21 to afford wider protection than the Seventh Amendment without presenting any reasons for doing so. Majority, at 644-45; footnote 4. We articulated Gun-wall's interpretive criteria precisely in order to avoid this "all sail, no anchor" approach to state constitutional law. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d at 60.
In Tull, the Court concluded that the common law right of trial by jury did not include the right to have a jury determine the amount of the remedy. Therefore, the Court held that the Seventh Amendment permitted Congress to assign the determination of the amount of a civil penalty to the trial judge. Tull, 481 U.S. at 426-27. The analysis set forth in Tull bears directly on the "scope" issue.10 We should not ignore Tull, and we cannot legitimately do so.
Because the majority chooses to disregard Tull, the applicability of the tort reform act may now depend upon the forum, federal or state, in which an action is heard. The Seventh Amendment controls federal courts sitting in diversity cases. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., *674356 U.S. 525, 2 L. Ed. 2d 953, 78 S. Ct. 893 (1958). Because the Seventh Amendment does not require that a jury determine the amount of the remedy, Tull, the tort reform act does not violate federal right-to-jury guaranties and therefore may still apply to tort litigation in federal court. Compare Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781, 788 (W.D. Va. 1986) , reconsideration denied, 672 F. Supp. 915 (W.D. Va. 1987) ; Etheridge v. Medical Ctr. Hosps., _Va._, 376 S.E.2d 525 (1989). Even in our state courts, the act will still apply to litigants who waive their right to a jury trial, intentionally or otherwise. See CR 38(d).
Other absurd results will necessarily follow from the adoption of a historical standard for determining the "scope" of the right to a jury trial. For example, the majority cites Baker v. Prewitt, 3 Wash. Terr. 595, 19 P. 149 (1888), to establish the fact that juries in 1889 determined the amount of damages in all civil actions. Majority opinion, at 645-46. However, Baker also holds that a jury must determine the amount of damages before a court can enter a default judgment. 3 Wash. Terr, at 598. Baker's holding was in effect overruled by Johansen v. United Truck Lines, 62 Wn.2d 437, 383 P.2d 512 (1963). However, because the majority holds that a jury must determine all issues which juries determined in 1889, a default judgment entered at variance with this obsolete procedure logically violates a defendant's Const. art. 1, § 21 right to a jury trial.
The majority's analysis also inexorably results in a Const. art. 1, § 21 right to have the jury assess punitive damages in wrongful death actions. The Territorial Code of 1881, § 8, provides in part that: "In every [wrongful death] action the jury may give such damages, pecuniary or exemplary, as, under all the circumstances of the case may to them seem just." (Italics mine.) See also Graetz v. McKenzie, 3 Wash. 194, 28 P. 331 (1891). Because juries had the right to award punitive damages in wrongful death actions in 1889, Const. art. 1, § 21 will now require that juries be permitted to determine appropriate punitive damage awards in wrongful death actions today.
*675Indeed, this court did not generally prohibit punitive damage awards until 1891. Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 2 Wash. 45, 25 P. 1072 (1891). In Spokane Truck, the court clearly indicated that it was rejecting the majority common law rule which permitted the jury to award such damages.11 2 Wash. at 50-51. If the drafters of our state constitution intended Const. art. 1, § 21 to perpetuate a litigant's common law right to have a jury determine the amount of noneconomic damages, surely they also intended to perpetuate a litigant's common law right to have the jury determine appropriate punitive damages.
While the majority's holding resurrects much obsolete remedy law (which I submit is ill advised), the holding (if consistent) should also eliminate other more recent provisions. For example, the majority asserts that the Consumer Protection Act's damages provisions are not affected by its analysis because they are part of "a cause of action specifically created by the Legislature to fulfill a public policy." Footnote 6. However, the Legislature also specifically created the tort reform act's damage provisions to further a public policy. Laws of 1986, ch. 305, § 100. Under the majority's "flexible historical approach" (majority, at 649), the right to a jury trial would presumably attach to Consumer Protection Act actions because they are analogous to actions heard by a jury at common law, such as fraud, misrepresentation, or deceit. Therefore, if consistently applied, the majority's analysis renders the CPA's treble damages provisions unconstitutional.
For these reasons, I believe the majority errs by adopting a historical standard for determining the "scope" of the right to a jury trial. As the majority acknowledges at page 649, the constitution is not a static document and constitutional analysis should not be completely frozen in time. *676Hunter v. North Mason High Sch. & Sch. Dist. 403, 85 Wn.2d 810, 539 P.2d 845 (1975). This is exactly what the majority's historical standard does.
I would apply a more flexible standard to determine the scope of the right to trial by jury. I would hold that Const. art. 1, § 21 does not restrict the power of the Legislature to alter or amend the elements of a common law cause of action. Tull; see also Shea v. Olson, 185 Wash. 143, 53 P.2d 615, 111 A.L.R. 998 (1936). Rather, this provision serves to check the power of the judiciary, by preventing a judge from substituting his or her judgment for that of the jury. Bingaman; James. Compare Const. art. 4, § 16. Accordingly, I would hold that the challenged provisions of the tort reform act do not violate Const. art. 1, § 21.
Dolliver, J., concurs with Callow, C.J.

I note that even in 1889, juries did not have unlimited discretion to award economic damages. Section 717 of the Territorial Code of 1881 limited to $5,000 the damages a jury could award in a wrongful death action.

The majority cites Boyd v. Bulala, 672 F.2d 915 (W.D. Va. 1987) for the proposition that "Tull does not even apply to civil damages actions" (majority, at 663), as if the opinion of a single federal district judge were dispositive of the issue. Compare Franklin v. Mazda Motor Corp., 704 F. Supp. 1325 (D. Md. 1989) (Maryland cap on economic damages does not violate the Seventh Amendment).
In fact, the court in Boyd acknowledged that Tull “provides some guidance." 672 F. Supp. at 920. The court ultimately determined that the Seventh Amendment required juries to determine that the right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Virginia Constitution is stronger than the right secured by the Seventh Amendment. 672 F. Supp. at 922. The Virginia Supreme Court subsequently held that the Virginia Constitution does not require juries to determine the amount of damages. Etheridge v. Medical Ctr. Hosps.,__ Va._, 376 S.E.2d 525 (1989). Boyd's predictive value is weak.

The majority attempts to distinguish the punitive damage issue by asserting that "the nonconstitutional status of punitive damages may have been intimately understood by the judges on the court [in 1891], three of whom had served as drafters at the constitutional convention 2 years earlier." Majority, at 665. I submit that this is speculation.