Court Opinion

ID: 9762825
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:31:54.87416+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:37.791185
License: Public Domain

FEENEY, Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
I agree with the majority that the trial court erred in allowing the Commonwealth to present rebuttal evidence of a prior burglary offense by appellant inasmuch as the lower court considered only two of the five factors to be weighed pursuant to Commonwealth v. Bighum, 452 Pa. 554, 307 A.2d 255 (1973) and Commonwealth v. Roots, 482 Pa. 33, 393 A.2d 364 (1978). Accordingly, I concur that judgment of sentence must be vacated and this case remanded for a new trial.
However, I must dissent from the implied approval by the majority in its Opinion of the time at which and manner in which the trial court evaluated the Roots criteria in this case. The record discloses that after appellant had testified in his own defense and during his cross-examination by the Commonwealth, appellant’s defense counsel objected to the prosecutor’s line of questioning indicating at sidebar that it was bound to lead to disclosure of appellant’s prior record thereby unduly prejudicing the jury against appellant. At that point the Commonwealth indicated for the first time that it intended to present, as it subsequently did, rebuttal testimony regarding appellant’s prior record of crimen falsi. The sidebar discussion in response to defense counsel’s objection constituted the entire extent of the trial court’s inquiry as to the Roots factors.
In Commonwealth v. Hill, 302 Pa.Super. 377, 448 A.2d 1090 (1982), this Court stated:
When the admissibility of prior convictions is an issue, the court must conduct an in camera Bighum hearing prior to the commencement of trial. Once the court has determined the admissibility of prior convictions before trial, a defendant can more intelligently weigh his or her decision *581to testify at trial, [footnote omitted.] 302 Pa.Super at 382, 448 A.2d at 1093.
In Commonwealth v. Jennings, 335 Pa.Super. 404, 484 A.2d 409 (1984), this Court reiterated the quoted language from Hill and held that, because there had been no in camera Bighum hearing prior to trial to determine the admissibility of his prior criminal record, the defendant was effectively denied a meaningful choice as to whether or not to testify for himself. In light of these decisions, the trial court in this case clearly erred in entertaining the issue of admissibility of appellant’s prior record after appellant had taken the stand and presented his defense.
Moreover, I would hold that the Commonwealth, having failed to request a Bighum hearing at such time as not to impinge upon appellant’s right to have a meaningful choice as to whether to testify in his own defense or not, waived any right it may have had to use the impeachment material. The obligation of raising the issue of admissibility of a prior record for impeachment purposes and precipitating a Big-hum hearing properly rests solely with the prosecution for four reasons.
First, the prosecution, by virtue of its access to criminal court documents and law enforcement records, assuredly is aware of any potential impeachment by a prior record whereas defense counsel, despite due inquiry, may not have been advised or may have been incorrectly or inadequately informed by the client of any previous convictions.
Next, as was recognized in Bighum:
Although the statutory law of this jurisdiction expressly prohibits a defendant in a criminal case from being cross-examined as to other crimes he may have committed with two exceptions, our decisional law has made it clear that the Commonwealth may introduce in rebuttal evidence of prior convictions to attack the credibility of a defendant who has elected to testify in his own behalf, [footnote omitted.] Id., 452 Pa. at 562-63, 307 A.2d at 260.
*582The Commonwealth, consequently, must necessarily be the moving party in seeking to utilize the impeachment material.
Third, placing the obligation on the Commonwealth to initiate a Bighum proceeding is wholly consistent with the prosecution’s burden to show that the need for the evidence overcomes its inherent potential for prejudice. Com. v. Roots, supra.
Finally, the Commonwealth, knowing the existence, nature and extent of a defendant’s prior record, is certain, unlike the defendant, to possess all of the information that must be considered by the court in ruling on the issue of admissibility of a prior record for impeachment purposes pursuant to Roots, i.e.:
(1) the degree to which the commission of the prior offense reflects upon the veracity of the defendant-witness; (2) the likelihood, in view of the nature and extent of the prior record, that it would have a greater tendency to smear the character of the defendant and suggest a propensity to commit the crime for which he stands charged, rather than provide a legitimate reason for discrediting him as an untruthful person; (3) the age and circumstances of the defendant; (4) the strength of the prosecution’s case and the prosecution’s need to resort to the evidence as compared with the availability to the defense of other witnesses through which its version of the events surrounding the incident can be presented; and (5) the existence of alternative means of attacking the defendant’s credibility, [footnote omitted.] 482 Pa. at 39-40, 393 A.2d at 367.
In view of the information available to the Commonwealth, and the prosecutor’s burden of establishing that the probative value of a defendant’s prior record outweighs the prejudice that will inure to the defendant and the requirement that an in camera Bighum hearing be held prior to trial, the only meaningful result in any case where the Commonwealth fails to request a timely Bighum hearing is that the prosecution has waived its right to use impeach*583ment evidence of the defendant’s prior record. Without question, the Commonwealth abandoned any right it may have had to use such testimony in this case by raising the question of its admissibility only after appellant had elected to testify in his own defense.
Accordingly, I would hold that the trial court erred in considering the admissibility of, much less admitting, evidence of appellant’s record and would vacate judgment of sentence and remand the case for a new trial.