Court Opinion

ID: 9653244
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:41:49.125745+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:57.282395
License: Public Domain

BARRON, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
I am fully aware of the burden of proof assumed by appellee on motion for summary judgment, and that all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue as to a material fact are resolved against the movant. Great American Reserve Ins. Co. v. San Antonio Plumbing Supply Co., 391 S.W.2d 41, 47 (Tex.Sup.).
In this case, however, the appellants-plaintiffs offered the depositions of Mrs. Scott, the plaintiff, and Mrs. Harrison, the store manager. Mrs. Scott could testify to nothing in her depositions as to the length of time the water (or urine) had been on the floor, who put it there, or appellee’s knowledge that the water was on the floor. On the other hand, Mrs.Harrison, the store manager, clearly and positively denied any knowledge of the water’s presence or who placed it there, though she was in a position to know the true facts. Mrs. Harrison also testified that she and the other *793two ladies who were working in the store at the time were “all over the store, and if we saw anything that was on the floor that shouldn’t have been there, we clean that up.” Mrs. Harrison’s testimony was definite, and there is nothing to show that she was evasive or that she attempted to withhold facts. I believe that Mrs. Harrison’s and Mrs. Scott’s testimony was sufficient to warrant summary judgment by the trial court.
Though appellants had ample opportunity to offer testimony which might have raised material issues of fact, nothing appears in the record which might or could, within reason, create such issues.
On the other hand, appellants attempt to create issues of fact by reason of other occurrences, known to appellee, when children in the toy department had wet the floor. If any of the independent occurrences were admissible in evidence, it cannot be inferred that appellee’s employees were thereby placed on notice of this particular water on the floor, or that it was through fault of the appellee or its employees that the water on which Mrs. Scott stepped was on the floor. See O’Neal v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 328 S.W.2d 793 (Tex.Civ.App.), writ ref., n. r. e.; H. E. Butt Grocery Co. v. Russell, 391 S.W.2d 571 (Tex.Civ.App.), writ ref., n. r. e.
I recognize that the question here is close in view of the burden of proof assumed by appellee, the movant. Further, I am familiar with the reluctance of courts generally to render and affirm summary judgments in negligence actions. But I believe the only inferences establish that the water had been on the floor only a short period of time, in view of the fact that three employees were working all over the store; that appellee’s employees had no knowledge of the water’s presence; and that appellee’s employees did not put it there.
Moreover, appellants’ points of error state generally that the proof did not support the allegations contained in appellee’s motion for summary judgment, and that fact issues were raised showing the various elements of proof. There are no fact issues raised, and the first point above is too general.
I see no reason for a futile reversal of this case for another trial on the record before us, and I would consequently affirm the judgment of the trial court. Appellee’s proof of no liability is as definite and clear as is possible under the circumstances.