Court Opinion

ID: 9905606
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-29 20:03:55.637203+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:46.151180
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/29/23 In re C.E. CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                         (Yuba)
                                                            ----

 In re C.E. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile                                        C097499
 Court Law.

 YUBA COUNTY HEALTH AND                                                      (Super. Ct. Nos. JVSQ2100087,
 HUMAN SERVICES DEPARTMENT,                                                          JVSQ2100088)

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 D.E.,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         Appellant D.E. (father), father of the minors, appeals from the juvenile court’s
orders denying his petitions for change of court order, terminating dependency
jurisdiction, and awarding custody of the minors to A.B. (mother). (Welf. & Inst. Code,1

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

                                                             1
§§ 364, 388, 395.) Father contends the juvenile court denied him due process when it
terminated dependency jurisdiction and denied his request for an evidentiary hearing on
the exit orders and his section 388 petitions. He further contends his appeal has not been
rendered moot by the termination of dependency jurisdiction. We will reverse and
remand for limited proceedings related to the exit orders.
                                      BACKGROUND
       Father filed a previous and related appeal from an order issued by the juvenile
court in Yuba County (In re C.E. (July 25, 2023, C096291) [nonpub. opn.]). We take
judicial notice of the record in the related appeal, as well as this court’s prior order and
opinion in that case. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).)
October 24, 2021, Incident of Abuse
       Father and mother lived in separate homes and shared joint legal and physical
custody of the two minors, C.J.E. and C.W.E. The family came to the attention of the
Yuba County Health and Human Services Department (Department) when, in October
2021, child and adult protective services received an emergency referral regarding
injuries then six-year-old minor C.J.E. received at the hand of father. Patricia Gurney, a
nurse practitioner, confirmed the injuries were the result of physical abuse while in
father’s care. Minor C.W.E., then 13 years old, reported having seen father pick up
C.J.E. by his chest in anger. (In re C.E., supra, C096291.)
Prior Incidents of Abuse
       Mother reported there had been prior incidents of child abuse by father against
C.W.E., which was corroborated by a report of the family’s prior child welfare history
that revealed multiple reports of physical abuse by father against C.W.E., all of which
father repeatedly denied. (In re C.E., supra, C096291.)
Current Dependency Proceedings
       On November 2, 2021, the Department filed dependency petitions on behalf of the
minors pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (a) and (c), alleging father inflicted serious

                                               2
physical harm on C.J.E. during the October 2021 incident and serious physical and
emotional harm on C.W.E. (In re C.E., supra, C096291.) At the November 3, 2021,
detention hearing, the court ordered the minors detained from father and placed with
mother. The court also ordered twice weekly supervised visits for father. (Ibid.)
Jurisdiction
          The jurisdiction report filed November 24, 2021, set forth the Department’s
evidence in support of the petitions. (In re C.E., supra, C096291.) In an addendum
report filed January 10, 2022, the Department reported that father was communicating
with C.W.E. in violation of the court’s orders. C.W.E. was exhibiting mental health
issues and was described as “unstable and very fragile.” It was further reported that
father “still has taken zero accountability” regarding his actions and how they affected
the minors. The Department recommended the court suspend father’s visitation until
father could “show he can follow the rules and implement the services being offered into
his life, as well as take accountability for his actions.” (Ibid.)
          The contested jurisdictional hearing spanned several days, finishing on March 3,
2022. Mother testified, corroborating the allegations in the petitions. (In re C.E., supra,
C096291.) After hearing oral argument and considering the jurisdiction and addendum
reports, the court sustained the allegations in the petitions. The court ordered twice-
weekly supervised visits between father and the minors, as well as therapeutic visits.
(Ibid.)
Disposition
          The March 2022 disposition and the April 2022 addendum reports stated the
minors remained in the care of their mother. C.W.E. indicated he was not ready to have
visits with father but was interested in therapeutic visits. Father reportedly denied any
wrongdoing and stated he believed the minors were lying. Father had been uncooperative
or unwilling to work with the Department on multiple occasions, refusing to follow
visitation rules, having unsupervised contact with one or both of the minors, and

                                               3
canceling visits without reason. On several occasions, C.W.E. refused visits with father,
and refused therapeutic visits with father and the paternal grandparents.
       At the disposition hearing on March 30, 2022, the court ordered father to submit to
a psychological examination to determine appropriate services and to participate in a 52-
week, in-person batterer’s treatment program and therapeutic visits with the minors.2
Psychological Evaluation
       Father participated in a psychological evaluation completed by Dr. Wuehler, who
opined that father “does suffer from a mental disturbance that renders him problems
caring for his children,” and noted that father suffered from “the inability or
unwillingness to recognize how his behaviors impact his children (and possibly others).”
Dr. Wuehler also opined that father could benefit from reunification services if he
decided to “participate correctly,” noting father had the intelligence and mental stability
to benefit but his attitude and willingness were in question. Dr. Wuehler recommended
that father participate in an in-person, 52-week anger management course, another
parenting course, and 30 sessions of individual counseling.
Visitation
       By May 2022, C.W.E. was reportedly willing to participate in therapeutic
telephone visits with father but remained unwilling to visit with father in person.
However, at the May 18, 2022, interim review hearing, the court suspended visits
between C.W.E. and father because C.W.E. had attempted to hurt himself following a
supervised telephonic visit with father. According to the June 2022 interim review
report, C.W.E. stated he did not want any visitation with father or the paternal
grandparents. Visits continued between father and C.J.E. and those visits were reportedly
positive and appropriate.

2 Father appealed from the juvenile court’s dispositional order. We affirmed the court’s
order on July 25, 2023. (In re C.E., supra, C096291.)

                                              4
       Between June and August 2022, visits between father and C.J.E. went well, while
C.W.E. continued to refuse any type of contact with father.
Participation in Services
       In May 2022, father began attending his 52-week anger management course given
by Manalive. On September 8, 2022, he claimed to have completed the 52-week course
even though he did not begin the class until May 2022. He could not provide any
information on the class, had no documentation to confirm his attendance, and could not
remember where he participated. He attended individual counseling with minimal
progress, and he continued to maintain that all of the allegations in the petitions were
“lies.” As of September 28, 2022, father had not completed his case plan objectives.
       While father had attended all of the child family team meetings, he was hostile and
argumentative, denied accountability, and questioned everything, such that his
participation was not meaningful. In addition, father refused to sign a release of
information allowing the Department access to the information and documentation
necessary to confirm his participation in the anger management course. Similarly, while
father claimed to have completed an eight-hour parenting course, he made no attempt to
provide certification of completion to the Department. Father’s therapist opined that,
even if father were taught the tools of how to properly engage in interactions, “very little
progress may be made until [father] can have a realization that his alleged actions have
been detrimental to his children.”
Status Review Reports
       In its September 28, 2022, status report, the Department recommended that the
court terminate father’s reunification services due to his failure to complete or make
substantial progress in the 52-week anger management course, his minimal progress in
individual counseling, and his failure to demonstrate any actual change in behavior.
       On October 6, 2022, the Department filed a memorandum to inform the court and
all parties about a recent incident involving mother and the minors, during which C.W.E.

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became angry, punched the dashboard, and then punched mother while she was driving.
In response, mother reached over and hit C.W.E. with the back of her hand and told him
to stop. C.W.E. explained the incident was a misunderstanding and admitted he became
upset and punched the dashboard and “accidentally punched” mother several times. In
response, mother slammed on the brakes, pulled the car over to avoid getting into an
accident, and grabbed both of C.W.E.’s wrists asking him, “If I let you go, will you
punch me?” Both minors reported they felt safe in mother’s care, that mother never used
physical violence, and that mother did not hit C.W.E. out of anger but rather to avoid
getting into an accident.
       Mother reported she tried to block C.W.E.’s punches but ended up hitting his
bicep with the back of her hand. She immediately pulled the car over and grabbed
C.W.E.’s wrist tightly to stop him from hitting her. After some time, C.W.E. calmed
down and they returned home, where mother contacted C.W.E.’s therapist to schedule an
emergency session. Mother felt that, in retrospect, she could have handled the situation
differently, but she reacted in the moment and her sole focus was on avoiding a car
accident.
       The Department concluded the encounter between mother and C.W.E. was an
isolated incident and offered to provide mother with trauma-based parenting classes to
help in similar situations. Mother agreed to learn different methods to deal with C.W.E.’s
trauma-based episodes.
Father’s Section 388 Petitions
       On October 10, 2022, father filed two virtually identical section 388 petitions
requesting that the court change its November 3, 2021, order appointing attorney Mark
Woods as counsel for both minors, alleging the minors’ interests were no longer aligned
and each minor required his own separate counsel. Father’s petitions also requested that
the court remove social worker April Williams and assign a new social worker, alleging
Williams was biased against him and not providing all of the relevant information to the

                                             6
court. Attachments to the petitions included the supporting declaration of father and his
attorney, medical notes from Sutter Health, the declaration of Dr. Suzanne Starling
(father’s expert in child abuse pediatrics), and certifications of father’s completion of a
52-hour anger management class and an 8-hour parenting class.
Final Review Hearing
       At the October 10, 2022, review hearing, the Department recommended the court
terminate father’s reunification services arguing, “the father has made it abundantly clear
that he does not wish to participate in the Department’s services. He would rather go
about it on his own.” The Department further recommended the court award sole
physical and legal custody of the minors to mother and terminate dependency
jurisdiction. Father argued he had engaged in all of the court-ordered services and made
progress on his case plan and requested a contested hearing on the court’s termination of
jurisdiction and exit orders, arguing that conditions still existed to warrant the court’s
continued oversight. Father also requested a ruling on his section 388 petitions.
       The court summarily denied father’s section 388 petitions, finding he did not make
the required prima facie showing to warrant an evidentiary hearing. The court then
granted mother full custody of the minors and terminated dependency jurisdiction. The
court expressly provided for supervised and therapeutic visits between father and C.J.E.
The subsequent minute order reflected the court’s visitation order, to wit, that father’s
visitation would consist of twice-monthly supervised visits with C.J.E. and no visits with
C.W.E. unless consented to by C.W.E. The order noted the right of both minors to
decline visitation with father. The reasons set forth for supervised visitation were that
father had either not completed or not made substantial progress in his domestic violence
treatment program for offenders, his anger management training, or his individual
counseling.

                                              7
       Father timely appealed the October 12, 2022, order terminating dependency
jurisdiction, setting visitation exit orders, and denying his section 388 petitions without
an evidentiary hearing.
                                        DISCUSSION
                                               I
                                          Mootness
       Father first contends that, because he appealed from the termination of jurisdiction
and the visitation exit orders, those orders are not final and, therefore, his appeal is not
moot. (In re Carrie M. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 530, 533.)
       As a general rule, an order terminating juvenile court jurisdiction renders an
appeal from a previous order in the dependency proceedings moot. (In re N.S. (2016)
245 Cal.App.4th 53, 60-63; In re Michelle M. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 326, 328-330.)
Aside from the exceptions for an “ ‘issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur’ ”
or “ ‘a likelihood of recurrence of the controversy between the same parties or others’ ”
(In re N.S. at p. 59), none of which father establishes here, an appellate court will
exercise discretion to hear an appeal from orders in a terminated dependency proceeding
only if the orders “continue to adversely affect appellant” (In re Joshua C. (1994)
24 Cal.App.4th 1544, 1548) and the appellate court can grant effective relief. Thus,
“ ‘questions of mootness must be decided on a case-by-case basis.’ ” (Id. at p. 1547; In
re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1488.)
       Here, father’s contentions regarding termination of dependency jurisdiction and
the exit orders issued at that time are not moot, as those orders about which he complains
continue to adversely affect him, as we explain in part II of the Discussion of this
opinion. However, as we further explain in part III of the Discussion of this opinion,
father’s claim regarding denial of his section 388 petitions is moot but, even if it were not
moot, the claim lacks merit.

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                                              II
                 Termination of Dependency Jurisdiction and Exit Orders
       Father contends the juvenile court erred when it denied his request for an
evidentiary hearing regarding the termination of dependency jurisdiction and the exit
orders issued therewith. He argues the court’s denial of his request to demonstrate
conditions still existed to justify the continued exercise of the court’s jurisdiction and that
the recommended exit orders were not appropriate denied him due process.
       Where, as here, the dependency was established without removing the minors
from mother’s home, the juvenile court “can order family maintenance services to
ameliorate the conditions causing the child to be subject to the court’s jurisdiction. After
the child is declared a dependent, the juvenile court must review the status of the child
every six months. [Citations.] Section 364 provides the standard when the child under
the supervision of the juvenile court is not removed from the physical custody of the
parent or guardian. [Citation.] Section 364 also applies in cases where a child has been
removed from the physical custody of a parent but is later returned.” (In re Armando L.
(2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 606, 614.)
       “At the section 364 review hearing, the juvenile court is not concerned with
reunification, but in determining whether the dependency should be terminated or
supervision is necessary. [Citations.] The juvenile court makes this determination based
on the totality of the evidence before it, including reports of the social worker who is
required to make a recommendation concerning the necessity of continued supervision.”
(In re Armando L., supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at p. 615.) “[U]nder section 364(c), the juvenile
court must terminate dependency jurisdiction unless either the parent, the guardian, the
child, or the social services agency establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that
the conditions justifying assumption of jurisdiction exist or will exist if supervision is
withdrawn. Thus, in the absence of a contrary showing at the review hearing, termination

                                               9
of dependency jurisdiction will be the ‘default result.’ ” (In re Aurora P. (2015)
241 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1155-1156; In re Armando L., at p. 615.)
Termination of Dependency Jurisdiction
       Here, although father’s counsel repeatedly requested an evidentiary hearing
regarding termination of dependency jurisdiction, he did not indicate he intended to
present any evidence regarding the need for continued court supervision. Instead, he
requested the evidentiary hearing so he could present evidence to demonstrate he engaged
in, and made progress in, court-ordered services. However, father’s engagement in
services had no bearing on whether continued supervision of the minors’ placement with
mother was necessary. At the section 364 hearing, “the juvenile court is not concerned
with reunification, but in determining whether the dependency should be terminated or
supervision is necessary.” (In re Armando L., supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at p. 615.) Section
364, subdivision (c), “does not allow the parties to present evidence on any issue, as
appellant appears to assume; rather, the court’s inquiry (and parties’ right to present
evidence) is limited to whether continued supervision is necessary.” (In re Elaine E.
(1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 809, 814.) As the juvenile court remarked, “The reason the case
was brought before the Court was the physical abuse to [the minors]” by father, not the
actions of mother. The Department asserted that continued court supervision was not
necessary and recommended that the court award mother full legal and physical custody
of the minors, reporting that mother completed all of her family maintenance services and
the minors were doing well in her care. Thus, reunification with father was no longer a
concern. (See In re Armando L., at p. 615.)
       Father also argued the October 6, 2022, incident in the car between C.W.E. and
mother, and the information father received from C.J.E. that there was “another male”
living at mother’s house, demonstrated that conditions existed in mother’s home which
required continued court involvement. But father did not request a hearing to present
evidence in this regard, nor did he proffer that he had relevant evidence relating to

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conditions in mother’s home other than that which was already attached to his section
388 petitions or provided in the Department’s reports. (In re Tamika T. (2002)
97 Cal.App.4th 1114, 1124 [while not required, a proper offer of proof gives the juvenile
court an opportunity to determine if there truly is a contested issue of fact].) Thus, the
juvenile court did not err in denying father’s request for an evidentiary hearing on
termination of dependency jurisdiction.
Exit Orders
       “When a juvenile court terminates its jurisdiction over a dependent child, it is
empowered to make exit orders regarding custody and visitation. These orders become
part of any family court proceeding concerning the same child and will remain in effect
until they are modified or terminated by the family court.” (In re Armando L., supra,
1 Cal.App.5th at p. 616.)
       Father first contends the court decreased his visitation from once weekly to twice
monthly without allowing him to present evidence as to why such decrease was not
appropriate. He argues, in passing, that if he “had an opportunity to, he would have
opposed such a dramatic reduction in his already limited time with C.J.E.” To avoid
forfeiture of his claim of error, father had the burden to support his argument with
analysis and citation to evidence in the appellate record. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.204(a)(1)(B) [each point in appellate brief must be supported by citation of authority].)
He did not do so. To the extent this observation, made in passing, is intended to
constitute an argument, it must be deemed forfeited. (Ibid.; Atchley v. City of Fresno
(1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 635, 647 [lack of authority or analysis constitutes forfeiture].)
Moreover, father had the opportunity to oppose the reduction and argue for more
extensive visitation upon termination of dependency jurisdiction -- he simply did not
avail himself of that opportunity.
       Next, father argues the court’s exit order improperly delegates to the minors the
authority to determine whether visits will occur. As we explain below, to the extent the

                                             11
order delegates to C.J.E. that authority, we agree. “The power to determine the right and
extent of visitation by a noncustodial parent in a dependency case resides with the
juvenile court and may not be delegated to nonjudicial officials or private parties,
including the parents themselves. [Citations.] The rule of nondelegation applies to exit
orders issued when the dependency jurisdiction is terminated.” (In re Armando L., supra,
1 Cal.App.5th at p. 616; see also In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 213-214; In re
A.C. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 796, 799.)
       A juvenile court can properly delegate “the ministerial tasks of overseeing the
right as defined by the court. . . . Such matters as time, place and manner of visitation do
not affect the defined right of a parent to see his or her child and thus do not infringe
upon the judicial function.” (In re Jennifer G. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 752, 757; accord,
In re Moriah T. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1374.) But, “[i]f the juvenile court orders
visitation, ‘it must also ensure that at least some visitation, at a minimum level
determined by the court itself, will in fact occur.’ [Citation.] When the court abdicates
its discretion and permits a third party, including the dependent child, to determine
whether any visitation will occur, the court impermissibly delegates its authority over
visitation and abuses its discretion.” (In re Ethan J. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 654, 661;
accord, In re Korbin Z. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 511, 519.) Neither the guardians nor the
children may be given absolute discretion to determine whether visitation will occur at
all. (In re M.R. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 269, 274; In re S.H. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 310,
317-320.) “Only when a visitation order delegates . . . the absolute discretion to
determine whether any visitation occurs does the order violate the statutory scheme and
separation of powers doctrine.” (Moriah T., at p. 1374.)
       As relevant here, the minute order contains the following language regarding
visitation: “The father shall continue supervised only visits, . . . two Sundays a month
with [C.J.E.]. The father can allow the paternal grandparents to be present if he
wishes. . . . [¶] The father shall have no type of visitation with [C.W.E.], unless

                                              12
[C.W.E.] stipulates he would like to visit. In the event [C.W.E.] would like to visit, he
can attend the supervised visitation . . . with his brother, [C.J.E.]. Both children have the
right to decline visitation.”
       For some time prior to the hearing, father’s only visitation was with C.J.E. Visits
between C.W.E. and father had been suspended since May 2022. The court’s order
properly allowed for C.W.E. to resume visits with father or continue to decline visitation
in keeping with the existing suspension. However, the order giving C.J.E. the absolute
discretion to determine whether visits would occur at all was not proper. (In re M.R.,
supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 274; In re S.H., supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at pp. 317-320.)
Given the improper delegation of authority to C.J.E., “we must remand for further
proceedings at which the juvenile court shall clarify the terms and conditions applicable
to [father’s] visitation . . . .” (In re Kyle E. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1130, 1136.)
       Finally, father argues the juvenile court’s written visitation order is not consistent
with the court’s oral pronouncement at the hearing. In particular, he argues the court
stated on the record that father would have supervised visitation with C.J.E. as well as
therapeutic visitation with C.J.E., but the written exit order provided for twice monthly
supervised visitation with C.J.E. only and did not reference therapeutic visits. Father is
correct. The minute order omits the therapeutic visitation between father and C.J.E. as
referenced in the juvenile court’s verbal order. Where, as here, there is a discrepancy
between the oral pronouncement of judgment and the minute order, the oral
pronouncement controls. (People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185-186; People v.
Mesa (1975) 14 Cal.3d 466, 471.) We will remand with directions to the juvenile court
to exercise its inherent power to correct its records so as to make those records reflect the
true facts. (People v. Schultz (1965) 238 Cal.App.2d 804, 807; People v. Flores (1960)
177 Cal.App.2d 610, 613; People v. Jack (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 913, 915-916 and cases
cited therein.)

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                                             III
                    Denial of Section 388 Petitions Without a Hearing
       Lastly, father argues the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying his
section 388 petitions without a hearing, arguing the petitions met the threshold
requirement of a prima facie showing of new evidence and changed circumstances.
Neither the minors’ appointed counsel nor the continued assignment of the social worker
on the case continue to adversely affect father after the termination of dependency
jurisdiction. Thus, his appeal challenging the denial of his section 388 petitions is moot.
Yet, even if father’s claims were not moot or we were to exercise our discretion to reach
the otherwise moot issue, his contention that the court erred in denying his petitions
without a hearing lacks merit.
       A petition to change or modify a juvenile court order under section 388 must
factually allege that there are changed circumstances or new evidence to justify the
requested order, and that the requested order would serve the minor’s best interests. (In
re Daijah T. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 666, 672.) The petitioner has the burden of proof on
both points by a preponderance of the evidence. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
5.570(h)(1)(D).) In assessing the petition, the court may consider the entire history of the
case. (In re Justice P. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 181, 189.)
       The petition must be liberally construed in favor of its sufficiency. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 5.570(a).) Nonetheless, if the juvenile court finds that even so construed the
petition fails to make a prima facie case as to either or both tests under section 388, the
court may deny the petition without an evidentiary hearing. (In re Justice P., supra,
123 Cal.App.4th at p. 189; In re Jeremy W. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1407, 1413; In re
Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 806; see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570(d).) We
review the denial of a section 388 petition for abuse of discretion. (In re S.R. (2009)
173 Cal.App.4th 864, 870; In re J.T. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 953, 965.)

                                             14
         Here, father’s petitions first requested that the court declare a conflict as to the
minors’ counsel, Mark Woods, alleging the minors’ interests were no longer aligned and
each minor required his own counsel. However, minors’ continued legal representation is
irrelevant since dependency jurisdiction has been terminated and counsel relieved. Thus,
his contention of error is moot. In any event, father can only speculate whether removing
attorney Woods and appointing new counsel for C.J.E. would have accomplished the
goals suggested by father, namely, more unsupervised time with C.J.E. While father
argued C.J.E. needed an attorney who wanted father to succeed and who would
proactively monitor C.W.E., and not minimize his needs or “constantly blame one parent
for them,” success or failure in services was no longer an issue. Moreover, father did not
make a showing that more unsupervised time was actually in C.J.E.’s best interest, but
only that the minor desired it. It is equally possible that new appointed counsel would
have determined less unsupervised time with father was in C.J.E.’s best interest.
         Father’s petitions also requested that the court remove social worker April
Williams and assign a new social worker so that father “can make progress in his case
plan and have all the evidence in front of the court.” The petitions alleged that Williams
was biased against father, had not presented all the relevant evidence to the court, failed
to obtain color photographs, and used selective reporting in her reports. Again, the issue
of which social worker is assigned to the case is irrelevant after the termination of
dependency jurisdiction. In any event, Williams was not appointed or assigned by the
juvenile court. Thus, the request was not a request to change or modify a prior court
order.
         The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying father’s section 388
petitions without a hearing.
                                         DISPOSITION
         The October 12, 2022, exit order governing father’s visitation with C.J.E. is
reversed and the matter is remanded to the juvenile court for the limited purpose of

                                                15
issuing new visitation orders specifying the frequency and duration of supervised visits
and therapeutic visits between father and C.J.E. In all other respects, the juvenile court’s
orders are affirmed.

                                                   /s/
                                                  Wiseman, J.*

We concur:

 /s/
Mauro, Acting P. J.

 /s/
Mesiwala, J.

* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

                                             16