Court Opinion

ID: 9894383
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-01 17:03:25.626524+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:08:30.850065
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/31/23 P. v. Gonzalez CA4/1
                   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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                 COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                       DIVISION ONE

                                              STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                  D080153

            Plaintiff and Respondent,

            v.                                                                (Super. Ct. No. SCE400143)

 JULIA GONZALEZ,

            Defendant and Appellant.

          APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Daniel G. Lamborn, Judge. Affirmed.
          John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
          Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, and
Robin Urbanski and Juliet W. Park, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
          A jury convicted Julia Gonzalez of voluntary manslaughter (Pen. Code,
§ 192, subd. (a)) for, and found true the allegation that she personally used a
deadly and dangerous weapon in, killing Justyn Preston. The trial court
sentenced her to a prison term of seven years.
        Gonzalez raises two issues on appeal. First, she contends the trial
court abused its discretion and prejudicially erred by excluding certain
evidence of Justyn’s prior acts of, and character trait for, violence. Second,
Gonzalez argues the trial court prejudicially erred in giving allegedly
misleading and incomplete jury instructions about the use of the admitted
evidence of Justyn’s prior violent acts.
        We conclude the trial court did not err. The trial court appropriately
exercised its discretion in allowing some evidence of Justyn’s prior acts of
violence but excluding the remainder under Evidence Code section 352.
Further, the jury instructions properly instructed the jury on justified and
voluntary manslaughter, including how to use the evidence of Justyn’s prior
violent acts. We accordingly affirm.
                                           I.
                                        A.
        In May 2020, Gonzalez, her brother G.G., G.G.’s girlfriend, the
girlfriend’s mother, and a roommate lived in the front unit of a duplex in
Lakeside, California. Justyn’s two sisters and his mother lived in the back
unit. The neighbors generally had a civil relationship. Justyn visited his
family regularly but never interacted with Gonzalez or G.G. before May 7,
2020.
        Gonzalez’s friend K.H. dated Justyn in the past. K.H. had told
Gonzalez they got into violent physical altercations and she had a restraining
order against him.
                                        B.
        Gonzalez stabbed Justyn in the early morning hours of May 8, 2020.

                                           2
      Throughout May 7, 2020, Gonzalez, her friend J.C., G.G., and G.G.’s
girlfriend hung out in a tent in the yard. In the evening, Justyn visited, and
he and his sister T.P. had a bonfire and drank alcoholic beverages in a
different part of the yard. At some point, Justyn drove his truck to the store
with T.P. The tires squealed as Justyn drove up the driveway afterward, and
Gonzalez said something to them about the noise. Justyn apologized, and he
and T.P. returned to their bonfire.
      Justyn and T.P. talked and drank for several hours. He said Gonzalez
was “pretty.” The siblings then reentered Justyn’s truck to go back to the
store. The windows were down and they were playing music as Justyn drove
past the tent. Gonzalez yelled something, but Justyn and T.P. could not
hear. Justyn asked T.P. who Gonzalez was, and T.P. said she thought
Gonzalez’s name was Julie or Julia. G.G. heard Justyn repeat Gonzalez’s
name in a “spooky,” “soft and slow” tone. Gonzalez also heard a male voice
call her name in a “creepy” way, so she left the tent.
      Gonzalez got close to the truck and asked why they said her name, and
T.P. said Justyn “‘thinks you’re pretty.’” Gonzalez recognized Justyn because
she had seen his social media profile after K.H. told her about him. Gonzalez
called him “weird” and walked away. Justyn drove the truck a bit and
stopped.
      Accounts diverge from this point. G.G. claimed T.P. threatened
Gonzalez, while T.P. claimed Gonzalez and G.G.’s girlfriend were “yelling
back and forth.” Justyn remained in the truck. T.P. and Gonzalez
approached each other and ended up fighting on the ground for several
minutes, although T.P. and J.C. said Gonzalez was the aggressor and
Gonzalez and her brother claimed T.P. was. T.P. hit Gonzalez in the face at
least once.

                                       3
      G.G. ran toward the fight to break it up and told T.P. to “‘[g]et off my
sister.’” Justyn opened the truck door, got out, and approached the fight.
G.G. tackled Justyn. G.G. said he was afraid of Justyn because of a “smirk”
on his face and the way he spoke to Gonzalez. The men fell to the ground and
fought each other while T.P. and Gonzalez continued fighting about eight feet
away. G.G. put Justyn in a bear hug, and Justyn reached back and hit G.G.
in the face and told him he was “going to fucking die.” Justyn then put his
hands around G.G.’s neck, and G.G. feared for his life. No one saw either
with a weapon.
      It is unclear when a tire iron entered the fight. Gonzalez testified that
once T.P. let her go and she began to crawl toward Justyn and G.G.’s fight,
T.P. hit her from behind with something hard. According to Gonzalez, T.P.
stood with a tire iron by Justyn before Justyn was stabbed. T.P. testified
that she “panicked” and grabbed the tire iron for protection only after she
saw Justyn was bleeding.
      At some point during the fighting, Gonzalez stabbed Justyn. According
to Gonzalez, she heard Justyn tell G.G. several times he would “‘kill [him].’”
In fear of her brother’s life, Gonzalez ran to the tent, grabbed a knife, and
returned to the fight. She told Justyn she had a knife and told him to get off
G.G., but he just looked at her and continued fighting G.G. Gonzalez told
Justyn at least once to get off her brother; when he did not, she stabbed
Justyn twice in his side and once in his lower back to save G.G. J.C. testified
that Gonzalez walked toward the fighting men and said to “let go of her
brother” three times before J.C. “saw what looked like [Gonzalez] punching
[Justyn] in his side twice. But then the guy yelled, ‘Oh, she stabbed me.’
. . . [A]nd then she stabbed him two more times in the back.” J.C. never saw
the knife. G.G. testified that at some point during his fight with Justyn he

                                        4
heard Justyn ask about being stabbed, but G.G. did not see anyone walk up
to Justyn or stab him. T.P. saw Gonzalez with the knife, but did not witness
her stabbing Justyn.
      T.P. testified that Gonzalez threatened her while holding the knife and
said, “I’ll stab you, too,” as she advanced. T.P. hit Gonzalez in the torso or
face with the tire iron. T.P. dropped or threw the tire iron, told her brother to
let G.G. go, and then grabbed Justyn and helped him walk up the driveway to
a chair.
      The physical altercation ended at this point. T.P. called 9-1-1 while
walking her brother up the driveway and exchanging threats with Gonzalez.
She told the operator that both “a guy and a girl” stabbed Justyn. Both J.C.
and Gonzalez heard T.P. or Justyn yelling that they had “fucked with a
skinhead” and they were going to come for her family. G.G. picked up the
tire iron and brought it inside. Gonzalez at some point exited the duplex and
threw the knife over the fence because she was scared.
                                       C.
      Law enforcement arrived at around 12:30 a.m. The first deputy
observed “pools of blood” and Justyn seated in a chair, “bleeding profusely.”
The deputy rendered medical aid, but Justyn was not responsive to his
questions, stating only that “it hurt” and he could not breathe.
      A detective found the knife used in the stabbing under a barbecue grill
by the fence. A forensic evidence technician impounded the knife; the tire
iron, found inside the duplex; and Gonzalez’s cell phone, found at the scene.
A report of the phone’s contents revealed that within the same week
Gonzalez exchanged text messages in which she claimed to have “almost
stuck someone,” grabbing him “by the throat” and putting a “blade to his
stomach.” She sent a similar message to someone else, adding that she was

                                        5
“going to end up in jail.” She texted someone else that she had “pulled a
knife” on a former friend. She also claimed to be “like a crack head on
steroids when I fight.” At trial, Gonzalez testified these messages were
“lie[s]” or “sarcastic joke[s].”
      According to a paramedic who responded to the scene, Justyn was in a
confused state and could not tell him what happened. On the way to the
hospital, Justyn “bec[a]me pulseless” and did not respond to CPR. He was
pronounced dead at the hospital. An autopsy revealed the stab wounds to his
torso were the cause of death. A toxicologist testified Justyn had a blood
alcohol level of 0.16 percent and metabolites for cocaine and cannabinoids in
his blood at the time of his death.
                                      D.
      During a police interview the following day, Gonzalez initially said
neither she nor her companions had a knife and that she did not know how
Justyn got stabbed. She later admitted, however, that the knife was hers and
that she had stabbed Justyn when she panicked. She was arrested and taken
into custody.
                                      E.
      The People charged Gonzalez with one count of murder and
additionally alleged use of a deadly and dangerous weapon in the commission
of the offense.
      Trial began in October 2021. The case was submitted to the jury the
afternoon of November 17, 2021. The following morning, the jury requested
and received a readback of J.C.’s testimony. The morning of November 19,
2021, the jury returned a unanimous verdict of not guilty of first or second
degree murder and guilty of voluntary manslaughter, with a true finding as
to the weapon allegation.

                                       6
      On March 11, 2022, the court sentenced Gonzalez to a term of six years
in prison for voluntary manslaughter with a one-year consecutive term for
the weapon enhancement.
                                          II.
                                          A.
      Gonzalez first contends on appeal that the trial court prejudicially
erred in excluding some of the evidence she sought to admit to show Justyn’s
character trait of violence. The People counter that this argument is waived
as to some evidence and nonetheless fails on the merits, as the trial court
properly exercised its discretion and any error was harmless.
      We review a trial court’s exclusion of evidence for abuse of discretion.
(People v. Gutierrez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 789, 827-828.) “Under this standard, a
trial court’s ruling will not be disturbed, and reversal of the judgment is not
required, unless the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary,
capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest
miscarriage of justice.” (People v. Wilson (2021) 11 Cal.5th 259, 304
(Wilson).)
      For the reasons provided below, we conclude the trial court
appropriately exercised its discretion.
                                          1.
      Generally, “evidence [of specific instances] of a person’s character or a
trait of his or her character (whether in the form of an opinion, evidence of
reputation, or evidence of specific instances of his or her conduct) is
inadmissible when offered to prove his or her conduct on a specified occasion.”
(Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (a).) However, such evidence is admissible in a
criminal action when “[o]ffered by the defendant to prove conduct of the
victim in conformity with the character or trait of character.” (Evid. Code,

                                          7
§ 1103, subd. (a)(1).) Thus, “[i]t has long been recognized that where self-
defense is raised in a homicide case, evidence of the aggressive and violent
character of the victim is admissible.” (People v. Rowland (1968)
262 Cal.App.2d 790, 797.)
      “The admission of such character evidence, however, is not without
bounds[.]” (People v. Wright (1985) 39 Cal.3d 576, 587.) A trial court may
exclude evidence admissible under section 1103, subdivision (a)(1), if the
court decides its probative value is “substantially outweighed” by the
likelihood it will unduly consume trial time or creates a “substantial danger
of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.” (Evid.
Code, § 352.)
                                        2.
                                        a.
      Prior to trial, Gonzalez moved in limine to introduce evidence of
Justyn’s history of violence. The requested evidence pertained to:
(1) domestic violence against B.P.; (2) assault against K.P.; (3) assault with a
deadly weapon against K.L.; (4) uncharged 2017 property damage involving
T.P.’s car; and (5) uncharged 2017 property damage involving his mother’s
fence and door. On appeal, Gonzalez concedes waiver of two other assaults
that we do not address here.
      The People, meanwhile, moved to exclude evidence of Justyn’s prior
violent acts. These instances included: (1) a January 2005 juvenile true
finding for a violation of Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1); (2) a
September 2005 juvenile true finding for a violation of Penal Code
section 211; (3) March 2007 felony convictions for violations of Penal Code
sections 211 and 12022, subdivision (b)(1), arising from Justyn taking
videogames from a store and pointing a knife at a salesperson; (4) a March

                                        8
2009 felony conviction for violations of Penal Code sections 245,
subdivision (a)(1), and 1192.7, subdivision (c)(8), for punching K.P. in the jaw
in 2008; (5) a September 2018 detention for a potential violation of Penal
Code section 243, subdivision (e)(1), involving B.P., in which Justyn verbally
argued with her, broke her phone, and spat on her; (6) an unsolved January
2019 assault case in which one of three unknown suspects had a tattoo
similar to one of Justyn’s, but the victim did not identify Justyn; and (7) a
July 2019 felony conviction for a violation of Penal Code section 245,
subdivision (a)(1), for hitting K.L. with a metal bat.
      Later, defense counsel also raised an additional domestic violence
incident from 2014 involving Gonzalez’s friend K.H., in which a restraining
order issued after Justyn verbally abused her, threw her phone in the street,
and pushed her against a wall multiple times.
      The court agreed to allow evidence concerning the July 2019 felony
conviction. As for the other incidents, the court was “loath to spend a lot of
time” on priors consisting of “detentions, unsolved cases, [and] restraining
orders” that are “not attached to any convictions,” because “we’re going to end
up having literally a trial within a trial.” The court, however, “ha[d] an open
mind.”
      The defense acknowledged the trial court “has to engage in some sort of
line drawing” and thus proceeded to “chisel down to what I really want.” As a
result, Gonzalez dropped the request for the juvenile incidents. But defense
counsel argued to “just talk about the[ ] most recent” offenses was “not
[Justyn’s] true character.” The 2009 and 2019 convictions were defense
counsel’s “top two” events that “I really want.” In addition, defense counsel
also thought “the domestic violence incidents are relevant and should be
allowed[.]” Those four incidents “at a minimum should come in under 1103.”

                                        9
And the defense also wanted to introduce the fact of the 2007 robbery
conviction as a “violent felony,” without any testimony. But counsel was
willing to “give up” everything else.
      The court, after “exercis[ing] 352” and “look[ing] at all the factors that
are relevant,” ruled that evidence of the 2008 and 2019 assaults resulting in
convictions would be allowed. However, “in [the court’s] balancing act,” it
tentatively decided not to allow evidence concerning the two domestic
violence incidents. It further tentatively declined to allow the defense to
introduce a copy of Justyn’s 2007 felony conviction. It did not address the
juvenile incidents.
      During trial, the defense additionally wanted to call G.G.’s girlfriend’s
mother (Neighbor) to testify about Justyn’s character. During her police
interview, Neighbor said “she ha[d] seen [Justyn] be violent in the past” and
that “he[ was] scary as hell when he’[d] been drinking.” The People objected
on the ground that further character testimony would be “cumulative and
352 barred,” but the defense contended Neighbor’s firsthand knowledge made
her testimony noncumulative. The court denied Gonzalez’s request on the
ground that “the convictions speak louder than” the proposed testimony.
      During trial, Gonzalez testified that, before the stabbing, she heard
about Justyn from her friend K.H. K.H. had been in a relationship with
Justyn and “told [Gonzalez] of previous fights that they had that turned
physical.” After the People objected, the defense argued at sidebar that the
evidence of the 2014 domestic violence incident “goes to [Gonzalez’s] state of
mind.” Because “[t]he cat is somewhat out of the bag at this time,” the court
permitted the defense to “finish this with a question or two,” which it did.
      Body-worn camera footage of an officer’s interview of K.L. following the
2019 incident was played for the jury. K.L.’s statements about Justyn having

                                        10
spent four years in prison and being “‘known for breaking into cars’” were not
redacted, which made the court “[v]ery unhappy.” The People noted that
“now they have this in, they have other evidence as it related to what Ms.
Gonzalez testified to. And then tomorrow, now they’re going to hear from
[K.P.] about an incident that happened in 2008. It just seems like one thing
after another that keeps slipping in as it relates to [Justyn]’s character.”
      The court considered “not letting [K.P.] testify,” as “[w]e’ve gone way
beyond what this [c]ourt had intended . . . at the beginning as far as
character evidence against [Justyn].” However, the court tentatively decided
to “let [K.P.] testify, but . . . bare bones, what happened and what injuries
happened.” The court ultimately permitted the defense 10 minutes of limited
testimony from K.P.
                                        b.
      The People additionally moved in limine to exclude evidence of white
supremacy tattoos on Justyn’s body, as any minimal probative value was
substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice.
      Defense counsel conceded that this issue was “a little squishy” and
said, “I don’t specifically want in the tattoos.” “I certainly don’t intend as
part of my case in chief to be putting up photos of them.” However, defense
counsel argued Justyn’s threats after the stabbing were “relevant to
[Gonzalez’s] state of mind.” The court tentatively granted the People’s
motion.
      While defense counsel was cross-examining the deputy medical
examiner who autopsied Justyn, however, he asked her about a tattoo on
Justyn’s lower back, prompting a sustained objection from the People. At
sidebar, defense counsel argued that “[J.C.] testified that when this
altercation was over, there was mention of retribution by so-called

                                        11
skinheads,” and since some of Justyn’s tattoos “are characterized as
skinhead,” they “go[ ] to the state of mind of [Gonzalez.]” The People argued
Gonzalez’s state of mind afterward was irrelevant and this was “just . . . to
muddy up” Justyn.
      Ultimately, the court permitted “limit[ed]” testimony about two of the
tattoos—a pair of “skinhead boots” and the words “Scandinavian pride”—but
“exercise[d] 352” to exclude any reference to a swastika tattoo. The deputy
medical examiner then testified about the two tattoos.
                                        3.
      We discern no abuse of discretion in the court’s exclusion of some of the
proposed evidence of Justyn’s character for violence, even overlooking the
People’s meritorious waiver argument and considering the entirety of
Gonzalez’s claim on the merits.
      We disagree with Gonzalez’s contention that the admitted evidence,
“separated by a decade, gave the erroneous appearance that Justyn
infrequently resorted to actual violence.” The court allowed evidence of the
2008 and 2019 violent felonies that resulted in convictions. It also allowed
additional evidence it initially disallowed, including the 2014 domestic
violence incident, Justyn’s skinhead-affiliated tattoos, Justyn’s reputation for
vandalism, and Justyn’s time in prison. There was sufficient evidence
admitted for the jury to reasonably infer that Justyn had a violent character
over a span of more than a decade that increased the likelihood that he was
the initial aggressor. To reject the remainder of the proffered evidence under
Evidence Code section 352 was not an arbitrary decision “result[ing] in a
manifest miscarriage of justice.” (Wilson, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 304.)
      The trial court explicitly stated on the record that it “looked at all the
factors that are relevant in deciding the admissibility of these prior acts,” and

                                       12
our deferential review concludes that the court’s decision was supported and
reasonable. As the People argued, the two juvenile incidents were “incredibly
old” and lacked detail. The defense conceded that the victims from the 2007
incident were “long gone” and “having a difficult time even remembering that
incident.” As the People contended, this incident also was remote from and
factually dissimilar to the charged conduct, risking confusion. The 2017
vandalism incidents did not involve physical violence against people and did
not result in any arrest, much less conviction, so they would have been
unduly distracting and time-consuming. The 2018 domestic violence incident
also was factually dissimilar, and presenting that evidence would have
required significant trial time given the lack of any conviction. Justyn was
not a confirmed suspect in the unsolved 2019 incident, so any limited
probative value would be far outweighed by the need for “a trial within a
trial” on the matter. Nor did the court abuse its discretion in finding that
Neighbor’s generic testimony about Justyn’s character was less probative
than the evidence of Justyn’s prior felony convictions. Any probative value
was outweighed by the further consumption of trial time on an issue
adequately evidenced. On this record, we cannot conclude that excluding this
evidence was an abuse of discretion.
      As to the swastika tattoo, we agree with the People that it is not
“opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific instances of conduct”
and thus does not even fall within the categories of evidence admissible
under Evidence Code section 1103, subdivision (a). Defense counsel
recognized as much at the motions in limine hearing, stating, “I don’t want
the tattoos per se because they may represent white supremacy,” but rather
because the “skinhead” threats were “relevant to [Gonzalez’s] state of mind.”
Besides, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the

                                       13
evidence inadmissible under Evidence Code section 352. Given the admitted
lack of gang allegations here, the prejudice from such an inflammatory
symbol far outweighed any minimal probative value.
      We are unconvinced by Gonzalez’s claim that this case “shares
parallels” with People v. DelRio (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 47 (DelRio). In DelRio,
the prosecution conceded the trial court erred in excluding wholesale
evidence of the victim’s character for violence because the defendant was
unaware of the victim’s prior acts, but argued the court reasonably could
have excluded the evidence under Evidence Code section 352. (Id. at p. 56.)
The court of appeal disagreed, noting the issue of the identity of the aggressor
was “key” and it would have been an abuse of discretion “simply to exclude
everything.” (Id. at p. 57.) Here, however, the trial court did not “exclude
everything.” (Ibid.) Rather, as DelRio recognized is “traditional and proper
under section 352,” the trial court balanced the “proof of high value” against
“other less vital material” and “tailor[ed] the presentation in a discretionary
way.” (Ibid.)
      As we find no error in the court’s exclusion of portions of the defense’s
evidence of Justyn’s violent character, we need not address the parties’
prejudice arguments.
                                       B.
      Second, Gonzalez argues the trial court prejudicially erred by
instructing the jury with pattern instructions that included purportedly
conflicting statements about whether Gonzalez had to know of Justyn’s prior
acts of violence for them to be relevant to the jury’s determinations as to self-
and third-party defense and heat-of-passion voluntary manslaughter.
Reviewing de novo Gonzalez’s claim of instructional error, we conclude the
trial court did not err. (People v. Guiuan (1998) 18 Cal.4th 558, 569.)

                                       14
                                       1.
      Relevant here, the trial court instructed with: (1) CALCRIM No. 200
(duties of judge and jury), which informed the jurors that “[s]ome of these
instructions may not apply, depending on your findings about the facts”; and
(2) CALCRIM No. 220 (reasonable doubt), instructing the jury that a
defendant is presumed innocent unless and until the People prove otherwise
beyond a reasonable doubt.
      The trial court also instructed the jury on the general legal principles of
homicide using CALCRIM No. 500, which noted Gonzalez was charged with
murder and that manslaughter is a lesser offense. The instruction provided a
homicide can be lawful “[i]f a person kills with a legally valid excuse or
justification,” in which case the defendant commits no crime. Otherwise, a
killing is unlawful.
      The court further instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 505
(justifiable homicide), both on the theory of self-defense and defense of
another. These instructions noted that a defendant is not guilty of murder if:
(1) they reasonably believed either they or someone else “was in imminent
danger of being killed or suffering great bodily injury”; (2) they reasonably
believed that, to defend against that danger, “immediate use of deadly force
was necessary”; and (3) they “used no more force than was reasonably
necessary to defend against that danger.”
      As relevant to Gonzalez’s claim, these instructions provided that the
jury, in assessing reasonableness, should “consider all the circumstances as
they were known to and appeared to [Gonzalez] and consider what a
reasonable person in a similar situation with similar knowledge would have
believed.” They further informed the jury that, should it find Justyn
“threatened or harmed” either Gonzalez or others “in the past,” it “may

                                       15
consider that information in deciding whether [Gonzalez]’s conduct and
beliefs were reasonable.” Immediately thereafter, the instructions stated: “If
you find that the defendant knew that Justyn Preston threatened or harmed
others in the past, you may consider that information in deciding whether the
defendant’s conduct and beliefs were reasonable.” When giving these
instructions, the trial court reminded the jury that “[t]he People have the
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was not
justified. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the
defendant not guilty of murder.”
      The trial court next instructed the jury using CALCRIM No. 520 (first
or second degree murder with malice aforethought), which noted a finding of
guilty of murder requires a defendant to act with “malice aforethought.”
CALCRIM No. 521 (first degree murder) immediately followed, which
informed the jury that a finding of guilty of first degree murder requires the
People to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant “acted
willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation.” CALCRIM No. 522 informed
the jury that provocation can reduce murder from first to second degree.
      The trial court also instructed the jury on several variations of
voluntary manslaughter: (1) heat of passion (CALCRIM No. 570),
(2) imperfect self-defense (CALCRIM No. 571), and (3) imperfect defense of
another (CALCRIM No. 571). The court noted that heat of passion requires
provocation, rash action due to intense emotion that obscured the defendant’s
reasoning or judgment, and a determination that a person of average
disposition would have also acted “rashly and without due deliberation.” It
also informed the jury that the People bore the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that Gonzalez did not kill in the heat of passion.

                                       16
      With the two instructions on imperfect defense, the trial court
reminded the jury that completely justified self-defense or defense of others
requires a finding of “not guilty of any crime,” but imperfect defense requires
one or both of Gonzalez’s beliefs in (1) imminent danger and/or (2) the
necessity of immediate use of deadly force to defend against that danger to be
unreasonable. The jury was instructed that it should “consider all the
circumstances as they were known and appeared to [Gonzalez]” in assessing
her beliefs. The imperfect self-defense instruction further provided that if the
jury found that Justyn had “threatened or harmed others in the past,” it
could “consider that information in evaluating the defendant’s beliefs,” and if
it found Gonzalez knew that Justyn “had threatened or harmed others in the
past, [it] may consider that information in evaluating [her] beliefs.” Both
instructions concluded with the admonition that proving beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant was not acting in imperfect defense was the
People’s burden, and should they fail to meet that burden, the jury “must find
the defendant not guilty of murder.”
                                        2.
      We agree with the People that the jury instructions Gonzalez
challenges correctly stated the law and were not erroneous.
      As an initial matter, the People argue Gonzalez forfeited this issue by
failing to object to the instructions at trial. However, failure to object below
does not forfeit an alleged instructional error affecting a defendant’s
“substantial rights.” (People v. Christopher (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 418, 426;
Pen. Code § 1259.) We must, therefore, determine whether the error violated
Gonzalez’s substantial rights, which “necessarily requires an examination of
the merits of the claim.” (People v. Andersen (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1241,
1249; People v. Rojas (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1298, 1304.)

                                       17
      We thus turn to the merits. In assessing whether a jury instruction
was erroneous, we first determine “what the relevant law provides,” and
second “what meaning the charge conveys in this regard.” (People v. Warren
(1988) 45 Cal.3d 471, 487.) We then decide “whether there is a reasonable
likelihood that the jury understood the instruction in a manner that violated
the defendant’s rights,” considering the specific language challenged and the
instructions as a whole. (People v. Andrade (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 579, 585.)
      In a criminal case, the trial court must instruct the jury on relevant
general principles of law, even when not requested. (People v. Garvin (2003)
110 Cal.App.4th 484, 488 (Garvin).) That duty extends to defenses supported
by substantial evidence that are not inconsistent with the defendant’s case.
(Ibid.) “Yet this duty is limited.” (Ibid.) A trial court has no duty to provide
a pinpoint instruction “relating particular facts to the elements of the offense
charged” not requested by either party. (People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th
186, 197.)
      We agree with the People that the trial court correctly instructed the
jury with “proper” instructions and reject Gonzalez’s claim that the
instructions erroneously failed to include express language allowing the jury
to use evidence of Justyn’s violence to determine the instigator.
      Here, the trial court was not obligated to specifically instruct the jury
as to how it could use the prior acts evidence. The trial court was required to,
and did, instruct the jury on the general principles of justifiable homicide and
voluntary manslaughter. These instructions correctly stated the applicable
law, and we thus perceive no likelihood that the jury misunderstood the
general legal principles of justifiable homicide and voluntary manslaughter.
      The issue of whether Justyn was the initial aggressor “highlights a
particular aspect of this defense and relates it to a particular piece of

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evidence,” and any instruction on it would be “analogous to a clarifying
instruction.” (Garvin, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 489.) Had Gonzalez
requested an instruction on this issue, it may have been error for the court to
deny it; but the court was under no obligation to provide additional
instruction on its own, and we thus conclude the given instructions were not
erroneous.
      Further, the instructions were consistent—rather than “contradictory,”
as Gonzalez contends—as to the jury’s ability to consider the prior acts
evidence. (Garvin, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 489.) While the instructions
did not explicitly tell the jury they could consider the evidence of Justyn’s
former violent acts to infer that he was more likely to have been the
aggressor, portions permitted the jury to consider Justyn’s past threats and
harms to others in deciding the reasonableness of Gonzalez’s conduct and
beliefs. These instructions do not, as Gonzalez contends, limit consideration
of this evidence to its effect on Gonzalez’s perceptions, which would
necessarily not include prior acts unknown to her. Rather, the language
allowed the jury to consider evidence of Justyn’s prior conduct to determine
whether he acted similarly on this occasion, thus justifying, fully or partially,
Gonzalez’s actions and beliefs. The instructions about considering Gonzalez’s
knowledge of Justyn’s past threats or harms to others when deciding the
reasonableness of her conduct and beliefs did not contradict this permissible
use, but rather provided an additional use—the effect of that knowledge on
Gonzalez’s state of mind—for some, but not all, of the character evidence
introduced by the defense.
      We reject Gonzalez’s argument that the jury would be likely to
misunderstand the portions of the charge concerning Gonzalez’s knowledge
as qualifying or limiting the preceding statements about Justyn’s prior

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violence more generally. Such a reading would render the instruction about
past acts about which Gonzalez need not have had knowledge superfluous.
We presume jurors are intelligent and able to understand and apply a court’s
instructions. (People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335,
433.) A reasonable jury would have read the two statements in a way that
harmonized them rather than eviscerating one. (People v. Harper (2020)
44 Cal.App.5th 172, 195 [no reasonable likelihood jury applied allegedly
“‘nonsensical’” instruction in impermissible manner].) We conclude there was
no reasonable likelihood the jurors would have misunderstood that they could
consider Justyn’s prior acts regardless of Gonzalez’s knowledge; thus, the
instructions were not erroneous.
      As we perceive no error, we need not address any resulting prejudice.
                                     III.
      We affirm.

                                                                CASTILLO, J.

WE CONCUR:

KELETY, Acting P. J.

RUBIN, J.

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