Court Opinion

ID: 9667880
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:57:01.848241+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:41.261116
License: Public Domain

GAMMAGE, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent. The Blomdahls seek to recover under Tex.Water Code Ann. § 11.086 (Supp.1987), which provides:
(a) No person may divert or impound the natural flow of surface waters in this state, or permit a diversion or impounding by him to continue, in a manner that damages the property of another by the overflow of the water diverted or impounded. (emphasis added).
Originally, surface water drained to the southeast over the property later developed into a subdivision by Mitchell and his partners. It is undisputed that Mitchell and his partners constructed the ditches and culverts which increased and diverted the flow of water and made it unnatural. No one objected to this primary diversion so long as the water was permitted to drain unobstructed across the Blomdahls’ property. *796But when the same 'person (Mitchell) who diverted the surface water into these channels and culverts then erected obstructions which impounded and further diverted the same water causing it to overflow and damage the property of another (the Blom-dahls) objections were clearly and repeatedly raised and a cause of action arose under § 11.086.
To allow Mitchell to escape liability for the damages he has inflicted upon the Blomdahls on the specious ground that it was permissible for him to dam up water flowing onto his “lower estate” because the waters were channelized and diverted by “the hands of man” on the “upper estate” ignores the fact, obviously apparent to the jury, that the “hands” involved were his.
Bunch v. Thomas, 49 S.W.2d 421 (Tex.1932) is distinguishable in that neither the owner of the upper estate nor the owner of the lower estate in that case diverted the surface water. The county did; and the lower estate owner was entitled to protect his property from water unnaturally diverted onto it by a third party — the county.
In Bishop v. Harris, 669 S.W.2d 859 (Tex.App.1984, writ dism’d), it was the owner of the upper estate who, by constructing buildings and parking lots, unnaturally accelerated and concentrated the flow of water onto the lower estate, endowing the lower estate’s owner with the right to protect his property from the water so diverted by another.
The majority acknowledge the Blom-dahls’ argument that lower estate owners have a right to protect their property only from water diverted by “others,” but reason that the right of the lower estate owner exists “regardless of who altered the water flow.” The majority further reason that the flooding water, once initially diverted into bar ditches and culverts by Mitchell, ceased to be “surface waters,” and invested Mitchell with the right to protect his own lower estate property against the water he diverted there regardless of what injury might result to innocent property owners in the diverted water’s path. Such reasoning is contrary to the purpose of the statute and in this case produces an inequitable and unjust result.
I believe the jury properly adopted the common sense reasoning that Mitchell was responsible for his actions as a single transaction — that when he impounded water with the fill on his lower estate he was impounding surface water over which he had taken initial control and diverted as owner and developer of the original upper estate. Viewed from this perspective, there is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding. I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.