Court Opinion

ID: 9776373
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:32:01.000666+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:37.481852
License: Public Domain

HARDBERGER, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
The majority concludes that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on mitigation. To be entitled to such an instruction, however, Hygeia was required to prove the amount by which Gonzalez’s damages were increased by his alleged failure to mitigate.1 See, e.g., Austin Hill *227Country Realty, Inc. v. Palisades Plaza, Inc., 948 S.W.2d 293, 299 (Tex.1997); Harris County v. Smoker, 934 S.W.2d 714, 721 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, writ denied); Regency Advantage Ltd. Partnership v. Bingo Idea-Watauga, Inc., 928 S.W.2d 56, 62 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1995), aff’d in parí and rev’d in part on other grounds, 936 S.W.2d 275 (Tex.1996); Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc. v. Great Southwest Savings, F.A., 923 S.W.2d 112, 117 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no writ); Lester v. Logan, 893 S.W.2d 570, 577 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1994), writ denied per curiam, 907 S.W.2d 452 (Tex.1995); Texas Dept. of Human Services v. Green, 855 S.W.2d 136, 151 (Tex.App.—Austin 1993, writ denied); City of San Antonio v. Guidry, 801 S.W.2d 142, 150 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1990, no writ); Lakeway Land Co. v. Kizer, 796 S.W.2d 820, 824 (Tex.App.—Austin 1990, writ denied); Cocke v. White, 697 S.W.2d 739, 744 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.); R.A. Corbett Transport, Inc. v. Oden, 678 S.W.2d 172, 176-77 (Tex.App.—Tyler 1984, no writ); United Furniture & Appliance Co. v. Johnson, 456 S.W.2d 455, 459 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1970, no writ); Tom Brown Drilling Co. v. Nieman, 418 S.W.2d 337, 340-41 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland 1967, writ refd n.r.e.). Because I believe Hygeia failed to meet this burden, I respectfully dissent.
Two diseases were present in Hygeia’s herd — bovine leukosis and Johne’s disease. Hygeia introduced evidence that the diseases could have been managed through a herd management program, which would require the culling of cattle that displayed symptoms of the disease for testing and the performance of autopsies. The very nature of the management program recognizes that some cattle will be lost during its course.
Hygeia contends that Gonzalez could have mitigated his damages by the entire value placed on his herd. However, the evidence showed that Johne’s disease is terminal and only some cattle are able to recover from bovine leukosis. Furthermore, the value of a cow that does recover from bovine leukosis is lost or decreased during the recovery period after clinical symptoms of the disease develop.
The majority asserts that the burden of showing the amount by which damages can be mitigated is lessened in cases in which damages are unliquidated. The majority relies on Alamo Ambulance to support this assertion, contending a mitigation instruction was required in that case even though “there was no testimony as to how much of Moulton’s injury was due solely to his failure to follow his doctor’s advice.” However, the Texas Supreme Court’s opinion actually notes: “The doctor’s testimony would also support a reasonable conclusion that Moulton’s knee injury would probably have healed within a brief period of time if he had followed his doctor’s advice.” Moulton v. Alamo Ambulance Service, Inc., 414 S.W.2d 444 (Tex.1967). The doctor’s testimony, therefore, was evidence of an amount by which the damages could be mitigated in that case, i.e, the damages could have been totally mitigated after a brief period of time, which period of time is presumably described by the doctor in his testimony.
As previously explained, the evidence presented in this case could not support a total mitigation finding. Since some cattle are necessarily lost even during a successful herd management program and the value of the diseased cattle that survive is lost or decreased during the recovery period, a jury could not determine the amount by which damages could be mitigated absent evidence of the percentage of the herd that would be unavoidably lost under *228a successful herd management program and the percentage of those that would survive with reduced values.
For this same reason, the decision in Alexander & Alexander of Texas, Inc. v. Bacchus Indus., Inc., 754 S.W.2d 252 (Tex.App. — El Paso 1988, writ denied), cited by the majority, is distinguishable. The evidence in that case disclosed that the plaintiff could have mitigated its entire damages by purchasing a compatible replacement computer. Id. Unlike the Alexander case, Gonzalez could not have mitigated his entire damages because he could not identify the diseased cattle until clinical symptoms were displayed, and once clinical symptoms were displayed, the value of the cow displaying those symptoms was already lost or decreased.
Not only does Alamo Ambulance not support the majority’s attempted unliqui-dated damages distinction, but other cases involving unliquidated damages also undermine the majority’s reasoning.
In Harris County v. Smoker, the jury assessed damages for the defendant’s negligence which caused the plaintiff to suffer a fractured ankle, resulting in 20% impairment. 934 S.W.2d at 722. Although the plaintiff failed to attend the physical therapy prescribed by her physician to increase the strength and range of motion of her ankle, no testimony was introduced to specify any amount of increase in ankle strength or range of motion that would have been gained from the therapy, or any amount lost from not following such therapy. Id. Similarly, in the instant case, Hyg-eia introduced evidence that Gonzalez’s damages could have been decreased by a proper herd management program; however, there was no evidence of the amount of the herd that could have been saved in light of the evidence that some cattle would necessarily be lost. Harris County v. Smoker involved a claim for unliquidat-ed damages, yet, a mitigation instruction was not required because proof of the amount by which the damages could be mitigated was absent.
Similarly, in City of San Antonio v. Guidry, the plaintiff sued the City for inverse condemnation, and the jury found that the City unduly delayed a drainage and street project which caused a temporary limited restriction of access to the plaintiffs restaurant. 801 S.W.2d at 144. The plaintiff sought and recovered damages for lost profits. Id. at 150. The City suggested that the plaintiff could have mitigated his damages by closing the existing restaurant location and moving elsewhere. The court of appeals held that the trial court properly refused a mitigation instruction because there was no evidence to show “how long it would have taken [the plaintiff] to relocate, what the move would have cost, or how successful he might have been at another location.” In the instant case, Hygeia failed to present evidence to show how long the herd management program would take to prevent the loss of additional cattle to the disease after some cattle began displaying symptoms or how successful the program would have been by showing the percentage or value of the cattle that would necessarily have been lost. City of San Antonio v. Guidry involved a jury award for unliquidated damages, but this court still held that the denial of a mitigation instruction was proper because the defendant failed to introduce evidence of a specific amount of damages that could have been avoided.2
Hygeia was required to prove the amount by which Gonzalez’s damages were increased by his alleged failure to mitigate *229through the use of a herd management program. Hygeia failed to introduce evidence of the amount of damages Gonzalez could have mitigated through the use of such a program because there was no evidence of the value of the cattle that necessarily would be lost or whose value would be decreased as a result of the presence of the two diseases. Absent evidence of the unavoidable loss caused by the diseases even in the presence of a successful herd management program, a jury could not arrive at a “reasoned” calculation of the amount by which the damages could be mitigated. Therefore, Hygeia was not entitled to a mitigation instruction. Because the majority holds otherwise, I dissent.

. This proof requirement is similar to the proof a defendant insurer must offer in workers’ compensation cases to be entitled to a reduction in recovery based on a previous injury. See Klein Independent School Dist. v. *227Wilson, 834 S.W.2d 3, 4 (Tex.1992); Transport Ins. Co. v. Mabra, 487 S.W.2d 704, 707 (Tex.1972). In those cases, the defendant insurer must present evidence of an amount or percentage by which a prior injury contributes to a subsequent injury. See Klein Independent School Dist. v. Wilson, 834 S.W.2d at 4; Transport Ins. Co. v. Mabra, 487 S.W.2d at 707.

. I also believe the questions posed in Gonzales's motion for rehearing en banc are well taken. “If the evidentiary predicate needed to submit a mitigation instruction will depend on the liquidated/unliquidated distinction, what happens in a multi-element case where some elements are liquidated and some are not? ... Does the defendant, who fails to prove a specific amount, receive a mitigation instruction as to some elements but not others? If there's a broad-form multi-element damage question, will the jury be directed to apply the mitigation instruction to only the liquidated’ elements?”