Court Opinion

ID: 9678636
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:26:09.859005+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:06.370597
License: Public Domain

Irwin, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
I agree with the majority’s opinion finding that there was a duty on the part of DOTT because Hovorka had actual knowledge that there was a risk of stroke from rinsing procedures and that she responded to that knowledge by instructing DOTT employees about the risk before Golden rinsed Bates’ hair. DOTT had a legally recognized duty to ensure its employees performed the rinsing procedure in a manner that would avoid negligently injuring a client. I further agree that Cooper’s expert testimony was sufficient to establish that the positioning of Bates’ head caused injury to the right vertebral artery and that the occlusion of that artery caused her stroke.
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that a reasonably prudent cosmetologist, as a matter of law, should not be expected to conclude that Bates’ actions indicated discomfort. It must be kept in mind that it was DOTT, not Bates, who had the superior knowledge that positioning a person’s head in a laid back posture over the sink could lead to a stroke. It was Golden who was instructed by her employer of the danger of the rinsing process and that if a client “complained about it, they were to be rinsed forward.”
It must also be remembered that when Bates’ head had been over the sink for 1 to 2 minutes, she lifted her head, and that Golden pushed Bates’ head back over the sink and told her, “You’re okay.” Golden made no inquiry of Bates at that time. Subsequently, when Bates lifted her head a second time, she was met with the remark, “What are you doing?” being leveled at her by Golden. While understanding that the second time she lifted her head from over the sink she stated she was doing so in order to allow Golden to rinse the nape of her neck, this does not eliminate all probative value of the first movement of the head, or the second movement from over the sink, or their combined probative value.
*270It does not seem out of the realm of reasonableness that Bates, although experiencing discomfort, decided to endure this uncomfortable process, rather than complain to Golden who had already told her that she was “okay” or to have her head pushed over the sink once again. After all, it was DOTT, not Bates, who knew that discomfort while positioned over the sink in this fashion could be indicative of vertebral occlusion and the onset of a stroke.
It has been repeatedly stated that summary judgment is an extreme remedy. It should be awarded only when the issue is clear beyond all doubt. Any reasonable doubt touching the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party. Mayer v. Howard, 220 Neb. 328, 370 N.W.2d 93 (1985).
On a motion for summary judgment, the question is whether there is any genuine issue of material fact and not how that issue should be decided. In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court should view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom it is directed. Piper v. Hill, 185 Neb. 568, 177 N.W.2d 509 (1970).
There exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Bates’ action would put a reasonable cosmetologist on notice that a customer was experiencing pain or that appropriate and reasonable inquiry was called for given these facts.