Court Opinion

ID: 9960324
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-15 21:17:55.072412+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:22.371465
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

 STATE OF WASHINGTON,
                                                         DIVISION ONE
                         Respondent,
                                                         No. 86165-4-I
                 v.
                                                         UNPUBLISHED OPINION
 JULIO JOLÓN-PUAC,

                         Appellant.

        DWYER, J. — Julio Francisco Jolón Puac1 appeals from the judgment

entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of one count of child molestation in the

first degree. On appeal, Jolón contends that the trial court erred when it denied

his request for a voluntary intoxication instruction. Jolón also alleges that one of

the community custody provisions imposed at sentencing was unconstitutionally

overbroad and vague. Finally, he contends that a victim penalty assessment

(VPA) and a DNA collection fee were also improperly imposed at sentencing.

        Finding no error regarding the decision to not issue a voluntary

intoxication instruction, we affirm Jolón’s conviction. Regarding the claim of an

overbroad and vague community custody provision, the State concedes error

and requests that we remand the matter to the trial court to either modify or strike

the provision. We accept the concession and further authorize and direct the trial

        1 Jolón Puac’s surname is spelled with a hyphen—“Jolón-Puac”—in the information, in

the State’s motions, and in the respondent’s brief. However, the appellant spells his surname in
the conventional Latin American form, which does not include a hyphen between family (maternal
and paternal) names. Throughout this opinion, we simplify and refer to the defendant as “Jolón.”
No. 86165-4-I/2

court, on remand, to reconsider the imposition of the VPA and the DNA fee in

light of now existing statutory and case law and in light of the defendant’s

indigency, if that is established at the remand hearing.

                                                 I

          In April 2022, E.C. was living in Vancouver with her older sister, Hailey

Patino, her brother, A.D., and Hailey’s boyfriend, Jolón. E.C. had lived in the

apartment with Hailey for approximately one year. Prior to moving in with Hailey,

E.C. had lived with her grandparents in Oregon City. E.C.’s sister, W.D., had

also lived with Hailey during this time, but she moved out in February or March of

2022 and returned to live at their grandparents’ residence. According to E.C.’s

grandfather, Arturo Covarrubias, E.C.’s mother was “in and out” of the children’s

lives due to an alcohol problem. The family did not know the identity of E.C.’s

father.

          Jolón worked in a construction job. He worked in the morning and

afternoon and was usually home by 4:00 p.m. Hailey was a nurse and usually

left for her shifts at the hospital shortly before 6:00 p.m.

          On April 15, 2022, Hailey left for work at approximately 5:30 p.m. A.D.

was staying at a friend’s house for the night. One or two neighbors were in the

apartment with Jolón. They were all smoking marijuana and drinking alcohol in

the living room. The visitors left after an hour or so, leaving only E.C. and Jolón

therein.2

          2The testimony on this was conflicting. E.C. testified that two neighbors were there and
that they left the apartment for a period of time. However, Jolón testified that only one neighbor,
Omar, had been there and that Omar stayed the entire evening.

                                                 2
No. 86165-4-I/3

       After the neighbors left, Jolón and E.C. were sitting in the living room

watching television. Jolón told E.C. that he liked her and repeatedly said that he

“wanted to eat [her].” E.C. testified:

       He was telling me that I was so beautiful and that Hailey was too
       big for him and that he needed a smaller body to -- for him. And
       that he just liked -- that he liked me and that he wanted to eat me
       again. He said that again.

Again, according to E.C.’s testimony, Jolón told her that “it was going to be okay”

and that he was not going “to do intercourse.”

       E.C. then began to get up from the couch in order to leave the room, but

Jolón pushed her back on the couch and held her down, unbuckling her belt.

E.C. testified that Jolón then put his hand inside her pants and underwear and

touched her, skin to skin, over the clitoral region of her vagina.

       As further elicited at trial from E.C.:

                [Prosecutor] Q. How was he holding you down? Where was
       he holding on your body?
                A. He was holding my left hand down because I was trying
       to push his hands to stop. And then he, like, grabbed both of my
       hands like this, and he, like, locked -- put them in a lock. But then
       I got -- I got out of the lock, and then I kind of just tried to, like,
       stop it from happening.
                And then I got off. And then I went into my -- and then I was
       going to my bedroom. But then he started following me. And then
       he was just, like, telling -- he was just calling my name and, like,
       stuff like that. And he was like, [E.C.]. [E.C.]. Like, come over
       here, please.

       When E.C. reached the door to her bedroom, she tried to close it, but

Jolón prevented her from doing so. Eventually Jolón relented. E.C. entered her

bedroom and sent a Snapchat message to her sister, W.D., informing her of what

had happened and that Jolón had touched her improperly.

                                            3
No. 86165-4-I/4

       E.C. testified that Jolón appeared to be intoxicated that evening, but she

could not explain how she could determine this. E.C. had also been smoking

marijuana that evening and was “kind of high,” although not the “highest” she had

ever been. She further testified that her marijuana use did not affect her ability to

see or hear or her sense of touch. However, it “[m]aybe a little bit, if anything,”

affected her ability to remember what had happened that night. E.C. had gotten

the marijuana from Jolón. E.C. testified that sometimes she got marijuana from

Jolón, but usually she “just stole [her] sister’s weed.”

       E.C. remained in her room for about one hour. She then left the room

because she had to use the bathroom. When she walked out into the hallway

and walked toward the kitchen, Jolón was there. At first, he was wearing his

boxers but then he took them off and, fully naked, followed her to the kitchen.

Jolón told E.C. that he wanted to talk. E.C. then moved to the living room. Jolón

said to her, “can I do this?” E.C. interpreted the comment to mean that he

wanted to touch her more and that he was not going to stop even if she told him

to stop. E.C. then began to back up. Jolón moved toward her. E.C. testified

that, at this time, Jolón’s penis was “standing up” and he began to masturbate.

       E.C. went into the kitchen and got a knife, returned to the living room, and

told Jolón to put on his clothes. There, she saw Jolón sitting on the couch, still

masturbating. At this moment, one of the neighbors came upstairs and knocked

on the door. Jolón put on his boxers and answered the door. E.C. left the room

and went back to her bedroom.

                                          4
No. 86165-4-I/5

       E.C.’s sister, W.D., testified that E.C. had sent her a message via

Snapchat and that W.D. had also called and talked to E.C. In the Snapchat

message, E.C. asked W.D. if they were going to pick her up because she did not

want to be at the house by herself. W.D. said that E.C. was crying during the

call. While talking with E.C., W.D. had the phone on speaker, and when their

grandfather and uncle heard what E.C. was saying, they decided to drive to the

Vancouver apartment to help her.

       Hailey was the first one to arrive at the apartment. She found E.C. in her

bedroom. E.C. told Hailey that Jolón had been touching her.

       E.C.’s grandfather, uncle, and sister W.D. arrived approximately 30

minutes later, having driven up to Vancouver from Oregon City. As they were

walking up the stairs to the Vancouver apartment, 911 was called. The call to the

911 dispatcher reported that “the boyfriend of the reporting party’s older sister

touched a younger sister, 12 years old, in a sexual way.” This information was

provided to the police officers who responded to the call.

       Upon entry to the apartment, E.C.’s grandfather and uncle proceeded to

hit Jolón and pinned him to the ground. Officers from the Vancouver Police

Department arrived soon afterward and were able to break up the physical

altercation. Officer Christian Stromme testified that Jolón’s demeanor was

initially grateful, but that he became confrontational when he was being taken

into custody. Nine or ten officers were present at the scene, including four

officers who testified at trial. Several of the officers interviewed E.C., Jolón, and

                                          5
No. 86165-4-I/6

Hailey. The officers took photographs of the living room, including the empty

beer cans.

       At approximately 1:00 a.m., E.C. went to the hospital with her grandfather

and W.D. They went to the hospital in order for E.C. to be examined, but they

left before she saw a doctor because it was very late and they were all tired.

E.C. testified that she also felt too uncomfortable to remain.

       At trial, E.C. testified about what happened on April 15. She also testified

that there had been two previous incidents when Jolón had expressed his

interest in touching or “eating” her.

       Jolón had moved into Hailey’s apartment in March of 2022. At trial, E.C.

did not remember the exact date of the first time Jolón improperly touched her,

but she knew she was then 11 years old.3 E.C. testified that she had been sitting

on a couch in the living room watching television. Jolón was also watching

television, sitting on a different couch. On this particular occasion, her sister and

brother were in the apartment, but they were in their respective bedrooms and

not in the room with E.C. and Jolón. Jolón told E.C. that he wanted her, and he

moved so as to be able to touch her legs with his hands, rubbing against her

ankles and then moving further up to her thighs. “He told me he that he wanted

to eat me and that -- yeah, he just wanted to eat me and that he liked me,”

according to E.C. Jolón then got up from the couch where he was sitting and

started to crawl toward E.C. E.C. felt uncomfortable and left the room.

       When the State asked E.C. if she knew what “eat” meant, she answered:

       3 E.C. also described the previous interactions with Jolón in detail during a pretrial

interview on August 1, 2022.

                                                 6
No. 86165-4-I/7

             A. Like, I don’t know. I don’t know -- I don’t -- well, I do know
       how to explain it. Like, when you’re giving somebody head.
             Q. Okay. So something sexual in nature?
             A. Yeah.
             Q. Can you describe what that is in your own words the best
       you can.
             A. When you lick someone’s private part.

       E.C. further testified that the second incident with Jolón occurred two or

three days later, before school, while Hailey was in the kitchen and W.D. and

A.D. were upstairs in their bedrooms. E.C. was sitting on the couch waiting for

Hailey to finish making breakfast. Jolón sat down next to her. He took her arm

and kissed it, and told her not to tell anybody. E.C. left and went up to her

bedroom. The encounter made her feel uncomfortable and frightened.

       E.C. told her sister, W.D., about both of these incidents. She did not

directly tell her older sister, Hailey, but a week after the second incident, Hailey

asked E.C. about it and inquired if E.C. was “okay.” E.C. testified about this

conversation with Hailey:

       And then [Hailey] told me that Francisco had told her that he
       touched me. And then she just wanted to make sure that I was
       okay, and she wanted to know what happened. And then I didn’t --
       I -- she changed the subject after -- before I even got to tell her
       so --

In response to the prosecutor’s questions, E.C. continued:

               A. I told her that I was okay and just like -- you know, like,
       when is he [Jolón] going to move out and stuff. And we were just
       talking about things like that. And then after we went home. That
       was it.
               Q. Did you think he was going to be moving out?
               A. Maybe. I was -- I thought that maybe, if anything, he’d
       move out in, like, a couple weeks but --

                                          7
No. 86165-4-I/8

      At trial, Officers Chylah Bass, Christian Stromme, Nicholas Giolingham,

and Gunnar Skollingsberg testified about the presence of alcohol and marijuana

at the scene, Jolón’s apparent level of intoxication, E.C.’s demeanor during her

interview, and her statement to an officer that she had been sexually abused.

      Officer Skollingsberg interviewed E.C. at the apartment. He testified that

“[E.C.’s] responses were rather short and very to the point and very quick, and

she appeared to be uncomfortable and slightly defensive.” Officer Giolingham

testified that E.C. disclosed to him that she believed she had been sexually

abused. The officer described E.C.’s demeanor as calm, “not a lot of emotion.”

      On direct examination, Officer Stromme was asked about Jolón: “[D]uring

your interaction with the defendant, did he appear to be intoxicated?” Officer

Stromme answered “Yes, ma’am.” The officer stated that Jolón’s intoxication

level was “obvious” because of Jolón’s slurred speech, difficulty maintaining

balance, and the officer smelled an odor of intoxicants on his breath. The

prosecutor then asked if Officer Stromme could determine whether Jolón was

coherent and understood his instructions, to which the officer answered, yes, that

Jolón was coherent and able to understand his instructions “with the assistance

of an interpreter sometimes.”

      Officer Skollingsberg also testified about Jolón’s level of intoxication and

coherence.

             A. When I saw and spoke with him, there were several
      things. His eyes were watery. They were red, bloodshot. There
      was a very, very strong odor of intoxicants coming from his person
      specifically when he would speak. His responses were appropriate,
      he was alert; however, they were delayed and repetitive
      sometimes. And his speech was slurred.

                                         8
No. 86165-4-I/9

               Q. At what level did you believe the defendant was
        intoxicated?
               A. Beyond the level I would be comfortable with him driving.
        Well beyond that.
               Q. Was the defendant coherent?
               A. Yes.
               Q. Did he understand instructions?
               A. Yes, he did.
               Q. Was he able to respond appropriately?
               A. Yes.

        Jolón testified, speaking in Spanish, but with the aid of an interpreter.

Jolón testified that there had been a misunderstanding and that E.C. had not

correctly understood what he was saying to her in Spanish. Jolón stated that he

had actually asked E.C. if she was hungry and wanted some food to eat, but E.C.

did not speak Spanish well and, therefore, she wrongly thought Jolón had said “I

want to eat you.”4

        Jolón denied touching E.C.’s legs. He denied walking naked inside the

apartment in front of E.C. He denied that he had been masturbating in front of

her.

        Jolón testified that he and his friend, Omar, had been smoking marijuana

and drinking beer the entire evening, and that Omar had not left the apartment.

Jolón claimed that he had only consumed about three beers and that Omar had

also consumed three or four beers. The prosecutor pointed out that there were

fifteen beer cans in the photograph of the living room in the apartment. In

response, Jolón testified that there had already been empty beer cans in the box

that Omar brought over to share with Jolón. Jolón testified that they had

        4 At trial, E.C. testified that she spoke and understood Spanish and that people in her

family spoke Spanish to her, although she was not a fluent speaker herself. She also testified
that during the April 15 incident, Jolón was speaking to her in English.

                                                9
No. 86165-4-I/10

consumed the beer and smoked over a period of three hours while they were

watching television and listening to music. Jolón claimed that although he had

been drinking, he was not intoxicated:

              Q. Okay. So would you say that you were intoxicated or not
       intoxicated when Hailey came home?
              A. No, I don’t think anybody was intoxicated.
              ....
              Q. And would you say you were intoxicated, or were you not
       intoxicated when the police officers arrived that evening and spoke
       with you and had contact with you?
              A. I did feel the effects of the marijuana and that I had been
       drinking, but I was more like in pain because of the beating -- for
       the fight in the apartment.
              Q. Okay. But that’s not my question. My question was do
       you feel you were intoxicated or not intoxicated when the police
       arrived later that evening, contact you, and talk to you?
              A. I did not consider I was intoxicated, but I had been
       drinking.

       W.D. testified that she had told Hailey about Jolón touching E.C. two and

a half weeks before the April 15, 2022 incident. W.D. confirmed that E.C. sent

her Snapchat messages on April 15 and had also told her about similar

interactions with Jolón on previous dates.

       After both parties rested and the jury departed the courtroom, the trial

court met with the attorneys to discuss the court’s proposed jury instructions.

Regarding the defense’s proposed instruction on sexual contact and voluntary

intoxication, the court stated:

       Instruction No. 7 is the definition of sexual contact.
               Originally the Court was going to insert the defendant’s
       proposed instruction as instruction No. 8 after the definition of
       sexual contact on voluntary intoxication, and we can talk about that,
       but it did not appear to me that the defendant through his testimony
       or the presentation of evidence was asserting voluntary
       intoxication, so I left that out of the final packet that I have here.

                                         10
No. 86165-4-I/11

(Emphasis added.)

        Defense counsel then repeated the request he initially made during

motions in limine for the court to include the proposed voluntary intoxication

instruction in its instructions to the jury.

                MR. SOWDER: I would still request the voluntary instruction
        -- the voluntary intoxication instruction. I think there’s sufficient
        evidence to indicate from what the officer is saying he was
        obviously intoxicated, the alleged victim saying he was super high,
        super drunk despite his -- the pictures of the beer cans despite his
        statements that he didn’t drink that much. It’s something the jury
        can consider -- should consider.

               THE COURT: All right. So I guess you’re indicating that
        there’s evidence sufficient that the defendant at the time that he
        committed an act, which he says he did not commit, was so
        intoxicated that he would be unable to form the intent. What
        specific information would allow a jury to make that finding -- or to
        consider that?

               MR. SOWDER: Because I think even if defendants say
        they’re not intoxicated, there’s other evidence that they are
        intoxicated that could be something that the jury could consider.

               THE COURT: Well, the test isn’t whether you’re intoxicated.
        It’s whether you’re intoxicated to the point that you can’t form the
        specific intent that goes with the act that you’re supposed to be
        committing. So what witness testified that he was in that mental
        state?

               MR. SOWDER: All we have is the two witnesses that he
        was obviously intoxicated, and he was super high or super drunk.
        And the instruction I believe from WPIC 18.10[5] – I’ll just read the
        one I’m requesting. No act committed by a person while in a state
        of voluntary intoxication is less criminal by the reason of that
        condition; however, in determining if the defendant acted for the
        purpose of gratify the sexual desire of either party, evidence of
        intoxication may be considered. And I cited State versus Stevens
        127 Wn. App 269 (2005).

                  THE COURT: Did you wish to be heard on this point?

        5 11 W ASHINGTON PRACTICE: W ASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL 18.10

(5th ed. 2021).

                                               11
No. 86165-4-I/12

              MS. MEYER: Your Honor, the State does not believe there’s
       substantial evidence based on any of the testimony that the
       defendant was [a]ffected to the point necessary to get this
       instruction. The defendant himself based on his testimony was not.
       The officers also testified that the defendant was coherent,
       understood them, and was able to respond appropriately.

               THE COURT: Well, it’s an interesting position because it’s
       technically correct that it’s – it’s not illegal -- usually isn’t found to be
       very smart, but it’s not illegal to argue inconsistent defenses. In
       other words, you get up in front of the jury and argue I didn’t -- for
       example, I didn’t hit the guy, but if I hit him, it was in self-defense.
       That almost universally guarantees that the jury isn’t going to buy
       either one of your arguments. But it’s permissible to make that
       argument when the evidence supports it.
               However I find here that the evidence does not support it.
       Although there was evidence that the defendant was intoxicated,
       the State’s witnesses indicate that while he was intoxicated, he was
       coherent and able to follow instructions. That he while exhibiting
       signs of intoxication that were obvious; however, there was no
       indication that he was at the point where he couldn’t have formed
       the intent necessary for sexual desires.
               Certainly none of the lay witnesses testified to that. And the
       defendant in his testimony not only denied the act but denied that
       he was intoxicated. So there’s simply no basis for me to throw in
       this instruction that no witness testified to allow the jury to speculate
       on it. So your section -- your objection is noted -- exception is
       noted.

       Accordingly, the trial court instructed the jury without including an

instruction on voluntary intoxication. Three instructions are particularly pertinent

to our analysis.

              A person commits the crime of Child Molestation in the First
       Degree when the person has sexual contact with a child who is less
       than twelve years old and who is at least thirty-six months younger
       than the person.

Instruction 5.

              To convict the defendant of the crime of Child Molestation in
       the First Degree, each of the following elements of the crime must
       be proved beyond a reasonable doubt:

                                            12
No. 86165-4-I/13

               (1) That on or about or between January 1, 2022 and April
       16, 2022, the defendant had sexual contact with E.C.;
               (2) That E.C. was less than twelve years old at the time of
       the sexual contact;
               (3) That E.C. was at least thirty-six months younger than the
       defendant; and,
               (4) That this act occurred in the state of Washington.
               If you find from the evidence that each of these elements
       has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then it will be your
       duty to return a verdict of guilty.
               On the other hand, if, after weighing all the evidence, you
       have a reasonable doubt as to any one of these elements, then it
       will be your duty to return a verdict of not guilty.

Instruction 6.

              Sexual contact means any touching of the sexual or other
       intimate parts of a person done for the purpose of gratifying sexual
       desires of either party.

Instruction 7.

       Upon concluding its deliberations, the jury found Jolón guilty of the crime

of child molestation in the first degree.

       Jolón subsequently moved for a new trial or, in the alternative, for an

arrested judgment. Defense counsel argued that the trial court erred by not

instructing the jury as to the defense of voluntary intoxication. Defense counsel

also asserted that insufficient evidence of child molestation in the first degree

was adduced at trial, based on the assertion that E.C. had testified that the illegal

act was just a “two second touch.”

       The State responded that the trial court had property denied Jolón’s oral

motion to dismiss after the close of the State’s case, and that the jury had been

presented with sufficient evidence to warrant the conviction. The State further

                                            13
No. 86165-4-I/14

argued that the necessary proof to establish sexual contact did not contain a

duration requirement.

       The trial court denied Jolón’s motion for a new trial or an arrested

judgment.

       On September 30, 2022, Jolón was sentenced to a minimum term of 60

months of incarceration with a maximum of life. He appeals.

                                          II

       Jolón first contends that he was improperly prevented from presenting his

theory of the case to the jury. This is so, he asserts, because the trial court

wrongly refused to give the jury an instruction on the defense of voluntary

intoxication. We disagree.

                                         A

       Our standard of review is dependent on whether the trial court’s refusal to

give the requested instruction was based on the evidence presented or on a

ruling of law.

       A trial court’s refusal to give a requested instruction, when based
       on the facts of the case, is a matter of discretion and will not be
       disturbed on review except upon a clear showing of abuse of
       discretion. State ex rel. Carroll v. Junker, 79 Wn.2d 12, 26, 482
       P.2d 775 (1971). See Grant v. Huschke, 70 Wash. 174, 177, 126
       P. 416 (1912), overruled on other grounds by Larson v. City of
       Seattle, 25 Wn.2d 291, 171 P.2d 212 (1946). When . . . a trial
       court’s decision regarding a jury instruction is “predicated upon
       rulings as to the law,” however, it is reviewed de novo for error of
       law. Braden v. Rees, 5 Wn. App. 106, 110, 485 P.2d 995 (quoting
       Johnson v. Howard, 45 Wn.2d 433, 436, 275 P.2d 736 (1954)
       (citing Huschke, 70 Wash. 174, 126 P. 416)), review denied, 79
       Wn.2d 1009 (1971).

                                         14
No. 86165-4-I/15

State v. Lucky, 128 Wn.2d 727, 731, 912 P.2d 483 (1996), overruled on other

grounds by State v. Berlin, 133 Wn.2d 541, 544, 947 P.2d 700 (1997).

       Here, the proposed instruction contained language consistent with the

pertinent statute, which provided:

              No act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary
       intoxication shall be deemed less criminal by reason of his or her
       condition, but whenever the actual existence of any particular
       mental state is a necessary element to constitute a particular
       species or degree of crime, the fact of his or her intoxication may
       be taken into consideration in determining such mental state.

RCW 9A.16.090. The trial court’s decision was not based on a rule of law.

Instead, as set forth previously, the trial court’s ruling was based on its analysis

of the evidence presented. Accordingly, our review is for abuse of discretion.

                                          B

       Before reviewing the appropriateness of a voluntary intoxication

instruction, we must first outline the elements of the crime of child molestation,

specifically the required mental state of the charged offense.

       To convict a person of child molestation in the first degree, as charged

herein, a jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that a person of a certain age

had “sexual contact” with a child of a certain age. RCW 9A.44.083 (which

prohibits a person from having “sexual contact with another [person] who is less

than twelve years old” when the first person is at least 36 months older). “Sexual

contact” is defined as “any touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of a

person done for the purpose of gratifying sexual desire of either party or a third

party.” RCW 9A.44.010(13) (emphasis added). Thus, the State had the burden

                                         15
No. 86165-4-I/16

of proving that Jolón acted with the purpose of gratifying his sexual desire when

he touched E.C. This was the mental state at issue.

        The “purpose of sexual gratification” is not an essential element of first

degree child molestation. However, it is a definitional term used to clarify the

essential element of “sexual contact.” State v. Stevens, 158 Wn.2d 304, 309,

143 P.3d 817 (2006).6

        Here, E.C. was less than 12 years old and Jolón was more than 36

months older than E.C. on the date of the alleged offense. Sexual contact

occurred when Jolón pushed his hand under E.C.’s pants and touched E.C.’s

vagina with his fingers. The question that remains, therefore, is whether Jolón

touched her vagina with his fingers for the purpose of gratifying his sexual desire.

        The record provides sufficient evidence to prove that Jolón approached

E.C. on a least three separate occasions, between March and April 2022, with

the purpose of satisfying his sexual desires. At trial, E.C. testified about these

three incidents and described Jolón’s verbal and physical invitations to E.C. to

engage sexually with him. Jolón told E.C. repeatedly that he liked her and

wanted to “eat” her. Jolón touched her leg and thigh and kissed her arm while

telling her these things. The first two incidents occurred during the daytime,

when there was no testimony that Jolón was intoxicated or that he had been

        6  Stevens cites to an earlier opinion, State v. Lorenz, 152 Wn.2d 22, 93 P.3d 133 (2004),
which explains: “Had the legislature intended a term to serve as an element of the crime, it would
have placed ‘for the purposes of sexual gratification’ in RCW 9A.44.083. Rather the definition of
‘sexual contact’ clarifies the meaning such that it excludes inadvertent touching or contact from
being a crime. A plain reading of the statute favors a holding that ‘sexual gratification’ is not an
essential element to the crime of first degree child molestation but a definition clarifying the
meaning of the essential element ‘sexual contact.’” Lorenz, 152 Wn.2d at 34-35 (citations
omitted).

                                                16
No. 86165-4-I/17

drinking. Then, on the evening of April 15, Jolón presented himself to E.C. while

naked, his penis was erect, and he proceeded to masturbate in front of her,

tending to demonstrate that the prior contact (that formed the basis for the

charge) was not accidental and that his intoxication did not affect his ability to

purposely act to satisfy his sexual desires. The record provides sufficient

evidence that Jolón appeared to have the required mental state to be guilty of the

crime of child molestation.

       Accordingly, we next proceed to examine if evidence was produced that

tended to demonstrate that Jolón was intoxicated to such an extent that he was

likely not able to form this mental state. If not, the trial court properly declined to

issue a voluntary intoxication instruction to the jury.

                                           C

       A defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on the defendant’s

theory of the case only when the proposed instruction is a correct statement of

the law, the theory of the defense has support in the evidence admitted, and the

instruction does not mislead the jury. Stevens, 158 Wn.2d at 308, 310 (citing

State v. Barnes, 153 Wn.2d 378, 382, 103 P.3d 1219 (2005)).

       Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to a crime. State v. Coates, 107

Wn.2d 882, 891, 735 P.2d 64 (1987). Rather, the defense of voluntary

intoxication asks the jury to consider evidence of the defendant’s intoxication in

determining whether the defendant acted with the mental state required to

commit the crime charged. State v. Thomas, 123 Wn. App. 771, 781, 98 P.3d

                                          17
No. 86165-4-I/18

1258 (2004). For the trial court to be required to issue a voluntary intoxication

instruction, the defendant must establish that

       (1) the crime charged has as an element a particular mental state,
       (2) there is substantial evidence of drinking, and (3) evidence that
       the drinking affected the defendant’s ability to acquire the required
       mental state. E.g., State v. Gallegos, 65 Wn. App. 230, 238, 828
       P.2d 37, review denied, 119 Wn.2d 1024, 838 P.2d 690 (1992).
       Put another way, the evidence must reasonably and logically
       connect the defendant’s intoxication with the asserted inability to
       form the required level of culpability to commit the crime charged.
       State v. Griffin, 100 Wn.2d 417, 418-19, 670 P.2d 265 (1983).
       Evidence of drinking alone is insufficient to warrant the instruction;
       instead, there must be “substantial evidence of the effects of the
       alcohol on the defendant’s mind or body.” Safeco Ins. Co. v.
       McGrath, 63 Wn. App. 170, 179, 817 P.2d 861 (1991), review
       denied, 118 Wn.2d 1010, 824 P.2d 490 (1992).

State v. Gabryschak, 83 Wn. App. 249, 252-53, 921 P.2d 549 (1996).

       Herein, the trial court refused to issue Jolón's proposed voluntary

intoxication instruction.

       The record supports the conclusion that while the evidence satisfied the

first two criteria set forth in Gabryschak (crime charged has element of particular

mental state and there was substantial evidence of drinking), the evidence did

not satisfy the third part of the test (intoxication affected defendant’s ability to

attain the mental state for the crime). There was no evidence presented at trial

“that he otherwise exhibited sufficient effects of the alcohol from which a rational

juror could logically and reasonably conclude that his intoxication affected his

ability to think and act in accord with the requisite mental states.” Gabryschak,

83 Wn. App. at 255. Indeed, the only evidence admitted on the question, as set

forth above, was evidence in support of the proposition that Jolón had the ability

to form the required mental state at the time of the offense.

                                           18
No. 86165-4-I/19

       During the September 30, 2022 sentencing hearing, and in response to

Jolón’s September 6, 2022 motion for new trial, the trial court was consistent

when explaining its reasoning, once again, for denying the voluntary intoxication

instruction. When ruling on Jolón’s posttrial motion, the court explained, in

pertinent part:

               On the question of the voluntary intoxication instruction,
       while it’s true that the defendant can present inconsistent defenses
       and argue or not argue them to the jury in their closing, the test for
       the introduction of a voluntary intoxication instruction is it’s not
       sufficient simply that the person voluntary consumed something
       which might intoxicate them or that they were intoxicated. There
       has to be evidence from which a jury might be able to find that the
       defendant at the time was so affected by intoxication that they were
       unable to form a mental state that had something to do with the
       case.
               There was simply no evidence from which the jury could
       have made that finding, and no party expressly testified to that -- or
       no witness, excuse me, expressly testified that the defendant was
       in such a state or that they believed he was in such a state.

(Emphasis added.)

       The trial court’s reasoning is supported by case law and the evidentiary

record. While the evidence was undisputed that Jolón had been drinking and

smoking marijuana on the night that he had physical contact with E.C., other

evidence indicated that he did not consider himself intoxicated, that he interacted

coherently with police officers at the time, and that he understood and responded

to their questions. Jolón also directly testified that he was not intoxicated. As

Gabryschak notes, “[i]ntoxication is not an all-or-nothing proposition. A person

can be intoxicated and still be able to form the requisite mental state, or he can

be so intoxicated as to be unconscious.” 83 Wn. App. at 254. As the trial judge

                                         19
No. 86165-4-I/20

noted, the evidentiary record herein is devoid of evidence or testimony that Jolón

was intoxicated to a degree that he could not form the requisite mental state.

       The trial judge properly reserved the request for the voluntary intoxication

instruction at the beginning of the trial. Then, after hearing the evidence and

after the parties rested, the court cogently provided its reasoning for denying the

instruction. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its

discretion.

                                         III

       Next, Jolón contends that a community custody condition imposed on him

is unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. The State concedes that this is so,

confesses error, and requests a remand to the trial court for it to either modify or

strike the provision. We accept the State’s concession.

       The condition at issue is:

       You shall not possess, use, access, or view any sexually explicit
       material as defined by RCW 9.68.130(2) or erotic materials as
       defined by RCW 9.68.050(2) or any material depicting any person
       engaged in sexually explicit conduct as defined by RCW
       9.68A.011(4) unless given prior approval by [Department of
       Corrections] and your sexual deviancy treatment provider.

(Emphasis added.)

       In its concession, the State cites to an unpublished opinion, State v.

Soungpanya, No. 54455-5-II (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2021) (unpublished),

https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/D2%2054455-5-

II%20Unpublished%20Opinion.pdf, in which it previously conceded error on the

same issue. In its holding, regarding the “prohibition on accessing any material

depicting sexually explicit conduct,” the Soungpanya opinion cites to State v.

                                         20
No. 86165-4-I/21

Padilla, 190 Wn.2d 672, 682, 416 P.3d 712 (2018). Our Supreme Court in

Padilla concluded that a prohibition on viewing “pornographic materials” was

unconstitutionally vague because it would “unnecessarily encompass movies and

television shows not created for the sole purpose of sexual gratification.” Padilla,

190 Wn.2d at 681.

       We remand to the trial court to conduct a hearing after which it may either

modify or strike the provision.

                                         IV

       Finally, Jolón brings a motion outside his briefing, seeking to have us

strike the VPA and DNA fees imposed on him. He cites to Engrossed Substitute

House Bill (ESHB) 1169 (adopted as LAWS OF 2023, ch. 449) and State v. Ellis,

27 Wn. App. 2d 1, 530 P.3d 1048 (2023). The trial court ordered Jolón to pay a

$500 victim assessment pursuant to RCW 7.68.035 and a $100 DNA collection

fee pursuant to RCW 43.43.7541.

       Because we are remanding this matter for a hearing on the condition of

community custody addressed previously, we authorize and direct the trial court

to address the questions of fee obligations and indigency at the same hearing.

                                         V

       We affirm the conviction.

       We remand for hearing and determination of the questions concerning the

community custody condition, the VPA, and the DNA collection fee.

                                        21
No. 86165-4-I/22

      Affirmed in part and remanded.

WE CONCUR:

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