Court Opinion

ID: 9607855
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:02:30.108453+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:40.963765
License: Public Domain

HATHAWAY, Judge,
dissenting.
The juvenile court forthrightly and explicitly found it in the children’s best interests that parental rights be terminated. That finding discloses:
The children are residing in a very positive foster home. Both children are bonded to the foster parents and the foster parents are bonded to both children. The foster parents have been able to meet the special needs of these children in an effective way. The foster parents want to adopt these children and it would be in the best interests of the children for them to do so. It is in the best interests of the children that they remain with their foster parents. It is against the children’s best interests for them to be placed with their parents. It is in the best interests of the children that their parents’ rights be terminated.
I agree with DES’s contention that the trial court erred in ruling that the children could not have been abused or neglected by their mother’s prenatal use of alcohol or their father’s failure to protect. Of importance is whether the abuse occurred and not when. The fact of the abuse and the damage to the children should be the issues.
Abuse requires “the infliction of or allowing physical injury, impairment of bodily function or disfigurement____” AR.S. § 8-531(2). Of importance is that the impact of the abuse affects a person meeting the definition of a child in AR.S. § 8-531(4). The timing of the parental misconduct is unimportant in the instant case and is immaterial to the injury inflicted. One requirement that is essential to fulfill the statutory definition of “child” for purposes of parental termination, is, of course, the existence of a child *550for whom a termination action is sought. Here, the victim children are living persons, meeting the definition of “child” at the time, the severance action was filed. The appropriate focus of the trial court should be whether the child is suffering from an injury or damage culpably caused or allowed to be caused by the parent.
I disagree with the majority’s reliance on two criminal cases, Vo v. Superior Court, 172 Ariz. 195, 836 P.2d 408 (App.1992), and Reinesto v. Superior Court, 182 Ariz. 190, 894 P.2d 733 (App.1995) (criminal prosecution not permitted for heroin abuse by mother during pregnancy). Rather, I find Summerfield v. Superior Court, 144 Ariz. 467, 698 P.2d 712 (1985), more apposite. If a wrongful death action can be brought where a viable infant dies before birth for harm done in útero, as held in Summerfield, it follows that responsibility for such harm is not eradicated where the child survives. Cf. Matter of Stefanel Tyesha C, 157 A.D.2d 322, 556 N.Y.S.2d 280 (1st Dept.1990) (even a single incident of cocaine usage during infancy can sustain a finding of “actual impairment” to a child if the child is born with positive toxicology for cocaine); In re Solomon L., 190 Cal.App.3d 1106, 236 Cal.Rptr. 2 (1987) (use of drugs during pregnancy was neglect for purpose of termination action); In re Ruiz, 27 Ohio Misc.2d 31, 27 OBR 350, 500 N.E.2d 935 (Com.Pl.1986) (the protection of an unborn child’s interest in life is bestowed at viability and injury to the fetus after that point is abuse); Matter of Baby X, 97 Mich.App. 111, 293 N.W.2d 736 (1980) (child has a legal right to begin life with a sound mind and body). I believe the trial court erred in discounting the children’s injuries knowingly inflicted by the parents during pregnancy and in not giving weight to the best interests of the children who, at the time of the court’s ruling, had been in their foster placements, one for 41 months and the other for more than 2$ years. The record shows that enough experimentation has occurred with the biological parents; the children should not be exposed to further experimental risk and are entitled to the stability of their current home, which the trial court specifically found would be in their best interests.
It is further worthy of note that in the 1994 amendment to AR.S. § 8-533(B), in the introductory paragraph to the grounds for severance, the legislature changed the phrase “the court may also consider the needs of the child” (emphasis added) to “the court shall also consider the best interests of the child.” (emphasis added) I believe that neither the trial court nor this court have factored into the decision-making equation the best interests of the children. When that is done, taking into account the pathetic long-term history of the parents, I believe termination of parental rights is strongly indicated.