Court Opinion

ID: 9775050
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:42:14.091254+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:50:32.495965
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
In their first point of error in their motion for rehearing, appellants contend that they complied with the requisites delineated in Hallett v. Houston Northwest Medical Center, 689 S.W.2d 888, 890 (Tex.1985), and thus properly preserved error regarding the trial court’s failure to strike two jurors for cause.
The record shows that subsequent to the completion of the voir dire examination of the jury panel, the panel was excused while the trial jury was selected. At that time, appellants objected to potential jurors Reese and Stafford, both of which objections were overruled. They also requested additional peremptory strikes for the purpose of striking those jurors. That request was denied. Appellee’s counsel then requested an additional five-minute delay “to consider this list.”
Next, the recitation by the trial court addressed each of the parties’ counsel and received from each an affirmative reply. Apparently, this was for the purpose of the delivery by counsel of their strike lists. The record then shows the trial judge’s *681comment that appellee’s counsel had an additional objection “he’d like to make for the record.” At that time, appellants' trial counsel informed the court with regard to juror Reese, “we have used peremptory-challenge on him,” and “As a result, we have been forced to leave on the jury and not strike” juror Stafford. He went on to say Stafford was objectionable to them and asked for an additional peremptory strike to use against Stafford, which was refused. Counsel then asked the court to note that appellants had not stricken Stafford, but “with regard to Mr. Stafford and our objection to him in our request for the peremptory challenge made before and for additional peremptory strike,” they had been forced to take juror Rossi, who was objectionable to them.
Reiterated, the Hallett Court instructs that it is incumbent upon an objecting party, prior to making its peremptory challenges, to advise the trial court (1) it would exhaust its peremptory challenges, and (2) that after exercising those peremptory challenges, specific objectionable jurors would be left on the jury list. En route to that explication, the Court had noted that a prior challenge for cause to a juror was not sufficient to preserve asserted error. Id. at 889-90.
Peremptory strikes are exercised by a party’s actions and not by the actions of the trial court in determining which juror remains and seating the jury. See Hallett v. Houston Northwest Medical Center, 689 S.W.2d 888 (Tex.1985). By delivering the list of peremptory challenges to the court, a party “exercises” its peremptory challenges.
The record indicates that appellants exercised their strikes prior to attempting to preserve error. The only request by the court for the lists occurred prior to appellants’ attempt at preserving error. The parties verbally responded in the affirmative. From the record, it appears that this occurred when the lists were delivered and the peremptory strikes were exercised. This is also indicated by the fact that during appellants’ attempt at preserving error, appellants repeatedly referred to their peremptory strikes in the past tense. Furthermore, after appellants’ attempt at preserving error, the record reveals no request by the court for the lists or anything else to indicate the lists were delivered after appellants’ attempt at preserving error.
Appellants also contend that the record does not reveal when appellants’ list of peremptory challenges were delivered to the court. Even if the record could not be construed to indicate when the list was delivered, no error has been preserved. After describing the requirements for preservation of error in this situation, including the time requirement that the court be notified prior to the exercise of a party’s peremptory strikes, the Court in Hallett stated that “absent such notice” a party waives any error. Id. at 890. It is the burden of appellants to present a sufficient record to show error requiring reversal. Tex.R.App.P. 50(d). Thus, if the record does not reveal that notice was given timely, no error is preserved for appellate review.
Additionally, Tex.R.App.P. 81(b)(1) provides no judgment shall be reversed unless “the error complained of amounted to such a denial of the rights of appellant as was reasonably calculated to cause and probably did cause rendition of an improper judgment in the case.” Tex.R.Civ.P. 292 allows the rendition of a verdict in a civil case by ten members of the trial jury.
The two trial jurors about whom appellant complains are Mr. Stafford and Mr. Rossi. The record shows the verdict in this case was an eleven-to-one verdict. Rossi did not join in that verdict. Thus, even assuming, arguendo, that both Rossi and Stafford were not qualified, the verdict was returned by a sufficient number of qualified jurors and no reversible error is shown. See Palmer Well Serv. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 776 S.W.2d 575, 577 (Tex.1989).
Appellants’ first point of error is overruled. Appellants’ remaining points of error have been adequately addressed in our original opinion and we remain convinced *682that our prior disposition was correct. Accordingly, all of appellants’ points of error contained in their motion for rehearing are overruled.