Court Opinion

ID: 9796008
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:45:06.62714+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:43:09.289365
License: Public Domain

DAVIS, J.,
concurring: I concur in the result of the majority decision affirming the validity of the search warrant issued for the defendant’s premises but disagree with the reason for its decision. I also concur in every other respect with the remainder of the majority decision.
The majority holds that the seizure of the trash bag by Officer Jager violated the defendant’s constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and then, absent the evidence from the trash bag set forth in the affidavit for search warrant, holds that the remainder of evidence mentioned in the affidavit was sufficient to establish probable cause for the search and seizure of items from the defendant’s house and premises. According to the majority opinion, we may ignore the constitutional violation of defendant’s rights if the remaining evidence in the affidavit establishes probable cause. While this maybe the case, I think it important to examine the basis for the search warrant presented to the district court. Contrary to the majority opinion and consistent with the trial court and the Court of Appeals, I would conclude that Officer Shane Jager’s seizure of the trash bag *316based upon the plain view exception to the warrant requirement did not violate the defendant’s constitutional rights.
The ultimate issue in this case involves the validity of a search warrant issued for defendant’s residence at 12420 Highway 63, Emmett, Pottawatomie County, Kansas. There can be no argument that the information contained in the affidavit for search warrant including the contents of the trash bag is more than sufficient to provide probable cause for the search. See State v. Hicks, 282 Kan. 599, Syl. ¶¶ 1, 2, 147 P.3d 1076 (2006). However, in my opinion the evidence obtained from the trash bag seized by Officer Jager on defendant’s premises provided crucial information supporting the probable cause determination for the search in question.
Defendant moved to suppress the contents of the trash bag seized on the basis that the seizure violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. While approving the search warrant, the majority holds that the seizure of the trash bag by Officer Jager violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution and the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights, § 15. Since the district court in this case based its decision for granting a search warrant upon tire affidavit including evidence seized in die trash bag, which according to the majority amounted to an unconstitutional seizure in violation of the defendant’s rights, I believe it is important to examine the majority’s conclusion that seizure of the trash bag violated the defendant’s constitutional rights.
I respectfully disagree with the conclusion that seizure of the trash bag violated the defendant’s rights under the Fourth Amendment and would conclude that Officer Jager, in what amounted to an excellent investigation of a clandestine methamphetamine lab, had the right under the “plain view doctrine” to seize the trash bag in question, thereby providing probable cause for a search and seizure of evidence on the defendant’s premises.
The majority correctly sets forth our standard of review for a motion to suppress evidence. We review the factual underpinnings of a district court’s decision by a substantial competent evidence standard and the ultimate legal conclusion drawn from those facts by a de novo standard of review. This court will not reweigh the *317evidence. The ultimate determination of a suppression of evidence is a legal question requiring independent review. State v. Horn, 278 Kan. 24, 30, 91 P.3d 517 (2004).
In my opinion, the legal conclusion of the majority opinion is contrary to the facts as developed during the suppression hearing. Officer Jager was the only witness called at this hearing, and based on his testimony, the trial court concluded that the seizure of the bag, with its contents, was lawful.
The facts in this case are important, so I outline them here with some elaboration later in this dissent to support my conclusions. After a recitation of facts, I will set forth the precise ruling of the trial court on the conclusion of the suppression hearing.
Officer Jager had been employed with the Pottawatomie County Sheriffs Department for a little over 8-Vz years. At the time, he was assigned to the investigation division, the detectives’ division. He had experience in the field of narcotics and had also attended the federal Drug Enforcement Administration school for drug investigations. He also attended several Kansas Bureau of Investigation schools involving narcotic investigations and had completed a course in Quantico, Virginia, concerning the operation of clandestine methamphetamine labs. At the conclusion of this course, Officer Jager was certified as an officer capable of recognizing clandestine labs and how to safely dismantle them.
Prior to any investigation, Officer Jager received information from Deputy Sheriff Hoyt on information Hoyt had received from a concerned citizen. The citizen related that he noticed a strong, peculiar smell from trash being burned at defendant’s residence, 12420 Highway 63, which caused the citizen to begin watching the traffic coming and going from this residence. He related that there were numerous cars coming and going from the residence, which was located in a rural area with few homes nearby. The cars would stay for a short period of time and then leave the residence.
Based upon his experience from working drug cases and from his training and schooling, Officer Jager suspected that such activity may indicate the sale or distribution of controlled substances, for normally that land of traffic can indicate the buying and selling of *318drugs, particularly where there are short visits with a quick “in and out” of the cars frequenting the premises.
Deputy Hoyt had received further information he related to Officer Jager that a gray and silver or silver and blue van had been coming and going from the residence. Another citizen had seen a white female pull into the driveway and go to the shed on the property, empty some boxes, and then put some more boxes in the van and leave the area. The female was later identified.
After receiving the above information, Officer Jager, Sergeant Chris Schmidt, and Deputy Shane Van Meter of the sheriff s office went to the property north of 12420 Highway 63, which is a large grass field, walked within 30 yards of a west shed, located on the defendant’s property some 50 to 60 yards from the house, and smelled a strong odor of ether — enough to overcome Officer Jager. The officers then left the area. Officer Jager, through his training and experience as a law enforcement officer, knew that ether was used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. This information, together with the previous information concerning vehicles coming and going from the residence, suggested to him that the manufacture of methamphetamine and the sale of methamphetamine may have been taking place there.
The next morning, Officer Jager returned and stopped at a location south and east of the residence on Highway 63. Looking through binoculars and through plain eye sight, the officer observed a bum barrel and also saw through his binoculars that there were yellow containers in a trash bag located on the premises. He was aware that the containers looked similar to Heet bottles, which are commonly used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. He again smelled ether and decided to make contact -with the residents at 12420 Highway 63. Officer Jager testified at the suppression hearing as follows:
“In my — At that time I was driving a Ford Explorer as a patrol vehicle. I pulled my patrol vehicle in the driveway, went to the front door, knocked on tire door several times. [After no answer,] I got back in my vehicle and there’s a circle driveway that goes around the back side of the residence there, got in, drove by. When I was driving by the white trash bag I noticed Actifed blister packs, several Heet bottles, and — and that’s when I collected the white trash bag.
*319“Q. [County Attorney:] Were you outside of your vehicle when you saw the ephedrine?
“A. No, sir, I was not.”
The trash bag was taken back to the sheriff s department and examined more closely. It was determined that the bag contained information identifying the renters of the residence, as well as further evidence indicating that the manufacture of methamphetamine was taking place on the premises.
Upon the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the trial judge observed and ruled as follows:
“All right. The test that the Court must use when issuing a search warrant is the totality of the circumstances. You- don’t isolate individual things. You take all those observations, all that knowledge that law enforcement acquires and together you observe or determine whether there’s probable cause. A law enforcement officer doesn’t have to prove guilt. This is merely probable cause, suspicion to believe, reasonable suspicion.
“Here we had a report by a concerned citizen of a smell that was a strange smell to be associated with the burning of trash. Officers then went to an open field and observed from that field a trash bag that had botdes in it, yellow, that were consistent with ether Heet botdes, which is a known ingredient of the manufacturing of metiiamphetamine. And he smelled an odor consistent with ether, which is also a known substance with the manufacturing of methamphetamine. They tiien received a report that there was a lot of traffic that would come and go at night, which is consistent with drug trafficking at the residence. This is known to law enforcement. Ultimately, die officers went to the house to inquire. They had a right to be there. They have a right to go to the house and knock and talk to the occupants when they have that kind of information. They weren’t trespassing at [that] point; and even if tiiey were, this is not trespassing in die constitutional sense. It’s a common law trespass, but it doesn’t constitute an invasion of privacy when they went to tiiat residence. The contents of that plastic trash bag, which wasn’t protected from rural' — this wasn’t curtilage as I see it and under these facts. The Heet botdes that became readily apparent, as did — I don’t know what you call them.
“MR. WORKS: Pseudoephedrine.
“SHANE E. JAGER, Detective with Pottawatomie County Sheriffs Department: Blister packs, sir.
“THE COURT: Which are a known precursor for the manufacturing of methamphetamine. They had a right to take the trash, and what they found was further consistent with the process of manufacturing methamphetamine, specifically the coffee filters with the pinkish, powdeiy residue. These are consistent witii items in manufacturing methamphetamine.
*320“The Court does not believe the defendant’s rights were violated in this case, and the Motion to Suppress Witt be denied.” (Emphasis added.)
The majority opinion spends a great deal of time on the question of whether the trash bag seized was within the curtilage of the property. In addition, the majority spends a great deal of time on whether the trash bag retained Fisher’s expectation of privacy. I believe the question of curtilage could be resolved either way in this case, and I do not take issue with the majority’s resolution that the trash bag was within the curtilage. While I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the trash bag retained Fisher’s “expectation of privacy,” particularly in view of the fact that the bag could be seen from the highway and the residents choose to use a translucent bag for the contents, I do not, however, find this issue dis-positive.
I do not believe the majority’s resolution of either issue affects the ultimate resolution of this case as to whether the seizure of the trash bag violated the defendant’s constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The critical question in my mind is whether seizure of the trash bag was justified by the plain view doctrine.
The majority decision rejects the plain view doctrine as a justification for the seizure of the bag, drawing a distinction between the plain view doctrine and what other courts have denoted the “open view doctrine.” The majority defines the “open view doctrine” as referring to a law enforcement officer’s observation of incriminating evidence or unlawful activity from a nonintrusive vantage point. The majority correctly concludes that, unlike mere observations made under “open view,” the phrase “plain view” refers to seizures, not searches; it deals with “circumstances in which an officer has already justifiably intruded into a constitutionally protected area and then spots and removes incriminating evidence,” citing Wallin, Plain View Revisited, 22 Pace L. Rev. 307, 325 (2002). The majority concludes, in short, absent a justifiable intrusion onto defendant’s curtilage, the mere observation of the bag from the highway does not itself justify the bag’s seizure. Fisher, 283 Kan. at 297. I agree with this conclusion.
*321However, I believe the majority lapses into error by holding “the open observation of the bag from the highway — which led to the knock and talk — cannot also serve as a plain view’ of the bag from within the curtilage authorizing the seizure.” 283 Kan. at 294. The majority relies heavily upon Com. v. English, 839 A.2d 1136 (Pa. Super. 2003), as a case in point for its conclusion.
In English, the police received an anonymous tip that the residents of a home were growing marijuana on their back porch. After the officers received no response to their knock at the front door, which apparently was meant to be a “knock and talk,” they walked toward the back of the house through a neighbor’s yard. From there, they observed marijuana growing on English’s back porch. The officers knocked repeatedly on English’s back door and again received no response. After unsuccessfully trying the front door again, they unlatched the deck gate, entered, and seized the marijuana plants. The officers then obtained a search warrant.
On appeal, the Pennsylvania appellate court noted that the officers previously viewed the growing marijuana plants from the neighbor’s yard before they entered onto English’s property. Under those circumstances, the appellate court reversed, reasoning that “[wjhile it is clear that the plain view doctrine applied in this case to validate the officer’s initial observation of the plants [from a lawful vantage point of the neighbor’s yard and in open view from the neighbor’s yard], application of the doctrine did not authorize seizure of the plants.” 839 A.2d at 1140. The English court then observed that tire officers “pre-intrusion view” from the backyard of the neighbor’s house did not justify entry into English’s backyard or authorize a seizure of the marijuana plants. The majority here concludes that the English court impliedly held under its facts that the knock and talk would not qualify as a justified intrusion leading to proper seizure under plain view. See 839 A.2d at 1140-43.
Based upon English, the majority states:
“We specifically disapprove of any State attempt to ‘piggyback/ i.e., to observe an object in open view from off the premises, to use knock and — in these cases, unsuccessful — talk for justified entry onto the premises, and then assert plain view while on the premises as a legal basis to seize the identical object that had been observed earlier. Such piggybacking under these facts would smear the careful *322distinction drawn by the Horton Court between the right to merely observe an object (here, from off the premises) and die right to seize drat object (on the premises). From a practical standpoint, tiris piggyback practice would grant law enforcement tire right to seize virtually any object initially observed from a distance and subsequently located within plain view of a residential doorway by an officer purposely looking for that identical object.” 283 Kan. at 295-96.
I agree that English was correctly decided by the Pennsylvania court. However, I disagree that this case is in point. In light of the present facts before this court, English provides no support for the majority’s conclusion. The officers in English, from a preintrusion view from the neighbor’s backyard, saw marijuana growing. At that point, the officers had probable cause to obtain a search warrant. Instead, however, they elected to knock and talk, view the same growing marijuana again, and seize the marijuana, attempting to justify this seizure on the basis of the plain view doctrine. That is not what happened in this present case.
From Officer Jager’s preintrusion view, he saw through binoculars what appeared to be containers in which one would find Heet. Yet, as was indicated by the officer’s testimony at the suppression hearing, he could not specifically identify the bottles from that distance. In the defense counsel’s cross-examination of Officer Jager, the following exchange took place:
“Q. So you pulled in some place south of the road?
“A. Correct.
“Q. And how far down the road to the south was that?
“A. I wouldn’t be able to guess. It wasn’t very far.
“Q. I mean, fifty yards?
“A. At tire most, yes, sir.
“Q. And that’s when you said you saw tire trash bag out by the trash can, between the house and the shed?
“A. Correct sir.
“Q. And that’s when you said you could see with your binoculars the containers in the trash bag?
“A. Correct, sir.
“Q. But you couldn’t see what type of containers?
“A. Correct, sir.
“Q. And you couldn’t see any Actifed or any other indicia at that point?
“A. Not at that point, no, sir.”
*323Thus, what Officer Jager observed from the preintrusion view was merely another suspicious circumstance in the course of the investigation. All of the previous circumstances described above, together with what appeared in the binocular view to be similar to Heet containers, allowed Officer Jager to knock and talk in order that he might continue his investigation into these suspicious circumstances. Clearly, the actions and testimony of the officer indicate that he did not determine that his preintrusion view provided a basis for a plain view exception to the search warrant requirement.
We simply do not have a “piggyback” situation in this case. The officer s observation with binoculars merely increased his suspicion that containers in the trash bag were Heet bottles, but he could not tell from that distance what the bottles actually were. This case is therefore more analogous to another opinion cited by the majority-United States v. Hammett, 236 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 2001). In that case, law enforcement officers participated in a marijuana eradication mission on the Island of Hawaii. The officers acted as “ ‘spotters,’ ” searching for marijuana plants, from a government-employed helicopter. While flying at an altitude of approximately 500 feet, the officers noticed a distinct green color beneath a translucent roof of Hammett’s residence which, in their experience, indicated the presence of marijuana plants. To investigate their observations, the officers instructed the pilot to land the helicopter approximately 150 yards from Hammett’s home on the adjoining parcel of land.
In approaching Hammett’s residence, the officers did not use the dirt road leading to the house and consequently did not see a no trespassing sign posted at its entrance. Instead, the officers took a straight path to the home from where the helicopter landed, crossing an unfenced and virtually unobstructed area of land. As they approached the house on foot for purposes of contacting the occupants and possibly conducting an investigation regarding the officers’ previous observation, the officers reached the home and knocked on the door, shouting “ ‘Police.’ ” Receiving no answer, the officers looked through the window next to the door but saw no inhabitants. The officers then proceeded to circle the house, *324calling out “ ‘Police’ ” and knocking on the walls as they went. As they circled the house looking for a back entrance, approximately 10 to 15 feet away from having completed the circle, Officer Kerr observed a small crack in the overlapping pieces of corrugated steel siding forming the walls of Hammett’s residence. The crack was Vz- to 1-inch wide, and through it the officers observed at least three marijuana plants inside the residence.
Hammett contended that the exclusionary rule applied because the search warrant was improperly based on a false statement in the warrant affidavit and because Officer Correia’s observation of marijuana through the crack in the wall of Hammett’s residence was the product of an unconstitutional search without a warrant and, therefore, could not be the basis for establishing probable cause. The district court noted that while the warrant contained a misstatement that the officers had seen marijuana from the flyover, what the officers observed from above raised only suspicion as to the presence of marijuana — which is why they landed to investigate. See 236 F.3d at 1057-59.
While the case does not directly decide the issue with which we are presented in this case, it nevertheless indicates that where the observation from the preintrusion view merely provides suspicion, that suspicion may be used for further inquiry of the residents of the home. Further investigation based on such a suspicion does not necessarily invalidate the plain view exception to the search warrant requirement. See Hammett, 236 F.3d at 1159-60. In this case, the State does not contend that the officer’s observation of the bottles in the trash bag through his binoculars gave rise to probable cause, particularly when Officer Jager testified that he was unable to identify the contents of the bag from his viewpoint on the highway.
The critical issue that caused the majority to conclude that the seizure of the trash bag was unlawful, which is expressed by the majority as “[a]n additional reason for us to reject the State’s request to apply the plain view doctrine for justification of the seizure,” is that Officer Jager exceeded the scope of his lawful intrusion on defendant’s property in seizing the trash bag. 283 Kan. at 296. It is important to note that the majority acknowledges that *325the knock and talk allowed the officers to come within the curtilage to ask questions. The majority also acknowledges that “as here, while driving to and from the parking spot on the driveway, while walking to and from the front door, and while at the front door, the officers may make lawful observations. [Citations omitted.]” 283 Kan. at 296.
The majority noted that Officer Jager did not have the run of the entire Fisher property or the right to make a general investigation in the curtilage based on reasonable suspicion. Quoting State v. Seagull, 95 Wash. 2d 898, 902-03, 632 P.2d 44 (1981), the majority states:
“ ‘It is clear that police with legitimate business may enter areas of the curtilage which are impliedly open, such as access routes to the house. In so doing they are free to keep their eyes open. [Citation omitted.] An officer is permitted the same license to intrude as a reasonably respectful citizen. [Citation omitted.] However, a substantial and unreasonable departure from such an area, or a particularly intrusive method of viewing, will exceed the scope of the implied invitation and intrude upon a constitutionally protected expectation of privacy.’ (Emphasis added.)” Fisher, 283 Kan. at 297.
The majority then concludes:
“There is little evidence in the record indicating that at the time Jager observed the bag while on the premises he was performing any legitimate functions, i.e., observing while moving around the house exterior to look for another door of observing while on his way back to his vehicle after no one answered the knock. Admittedly, he testified at one point that he was ‘circling around to leave the property’ when he observed the bag’s contents. On this record, however, we find the evidence insufficient for the State to meet its burden that Jager did not exceed his lawful intrusion, i.e., the knock and talk. As noted, we may make a factual determination from the record when neither lower court has addressed the issue, e.g., in the absence of findings by the district court.” (Emphasis added.) 283 Kan. at 298.
Perhaps the majority is right that it is able to make factual determinations from the record when neither of the lower courts has addressed tins issue. However, those findings of fact cannot ignore the only evidence in the record as to Officer Jager s activities while leaving the premises. Officer Jager stated more than once:
“A. In my — At the time I was driving a Ford Explorer as a patrol vehicle. I pulled my patrol vehicle in the driveway, went to the front door, knocked on the door *326several times. I got back in my vehicle and there’s a circle driveway that goes around the back side of the residence there, got in, drove by. When I was driving by the white trash bag I noticed Actifed blister packs, several Heet bottles, and— and that’s when I collected the white trash bag.
“A. Well, I was circling around to leave the property. I had taken this, if you want to say southwest part of the circle drive and started back around when I — approximately right here when I saw the white trash bag, and I could see that there were Heet bottles, Actifed blister packs and pseudoephedrine.
“Q. [County Attorney:] The white trash bag where it was located, could that trash bag been [sic] observed from the highway?
“A. Yes, sir, that’s where I first observed it from.
“Q. And which highway would that be?
“A. Highway 63.
“Q. Which side of the house does 63 run on?
“A. It ran on the east side, north and south.”
Contrary to the majority’s conclusions, there certainly is evidence in the record to support a finding that at the time Officer Jager observed the trash bag, he was performing a legitimate function — that is, he was leaving the premises by the only reasonable and safe route offered by the residents of the premises.
The residence faces Highway 63. The lane leading into the premises is a single lane. The officer parked in front of the house and approached the front door. When he knocked and found no one in the house, he got in his vehicle and used the circular drive to exit the property. As he was doing so, he observed in plain view the contents of the trash bag, which were immediately recognizable as possible evidence of a crime. He was within his rights at the time while exiting the property to seize the bag in question.
The very reason for the turnaround is so that people can exit the property without having to back onto Highway 63. Naturally, it provides an invitation to those coming onto the property to leave in a safe and reasonable manner, and that was exactly what Officer Jager was doing. Photographs entered into evidence establish that fact. To back out of the residence onto a highway would have been unreasonable for the officer. Thus, the majority’s factual determination that the evidence was insufficient for the State to meet its burden that Officer Jager did not exceed his lawful intrusion is *327without support in die record and is contrary to the facts of the case.
The majority next states that
“[t]he weight of the evidence reveals that once Jager s knock and talk was complete, instead of driving away from the house to the highway, he simply drove deeper into the property on the driveway — according to the photographs, perhaps as much as 50 yards — directly to the previously observed bag. Once there, from his vehicle he noticed that it contained Actifed blister packs and, in confirmation of his earlier opinion, Heet botdes. He got out of the vehicle and seized the bag.
“Indeed, the evidence in the record reveals that the county attorney had advised Jager before he ever entered the property that the bag was outside the curtilage and, as a result, he ‘could obtain the bag’ without more. The record evidence reveals that instead of going directly to seize the bag, Jager wished to first conduct a knock and talk. Once that mission was unsuccessful, the only obstacle apparent to Jager before he seized the bag per the county attorney’s advice had been eliminated. He drove on the driveway directly to the bag and seized it.” Fisher, 283 Kan. at 298.
The above conclusions are contrary to the only testimony of record. It is important to note again that Officer Jager did not go directly to the bag and seize it. It must also be noted that the officer rejected the county attorney s advice and instead elected to knock and talk with the residents in furtherance of his investigation and suspicions. The majority seems to assume that the officer’s knock and talk was a pretext for his intention to enter the property and seize the bag, due to his preintrusion binocular observation. That assumption is belied by the record. Instead of following the county attorney’s advice and seizing the bag immediately, the officer did knock on the door and received no answer. He then exited the premises via the only reasonable way to do so. During his exit, he observed the translucent trash bag. His opinion about the Heet bottles was confirmed, and he also observed additional evidence of blister packs. Here, Officer Jager utilized appropriate investigatory techniques running counter to the county attorney’s suggestions.
It must further be noted that die officer did not engage in an exploratory search; he did not investigate the shed from where a pungent ether smell was emanating. He lawfully entered the premises, knocked on the door, and as he was leaving the premises by the invited and safe route, observed from his patrol vehicle in plain *328view what was immediately recognized as possible evidence of a crime. At that time, he was lawfully leaving the premises and had probable cause to seize the trash bag containing the incriminating evidence. The above characterization of the facts by the majority assumes that the motives of the officer in his knock and talk was merely a subterfuge to get him on the premises so he could seize the bag. There is no evidence to support such an assumption.
There was a sound basis in the evidence for the plain view exception to the warrant requirement. As stated by the United States Supreme Court in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564, 91 S. Ct. 2022, reh. denied 404 U.S. 874 (1971):
“What the plain view’ cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification — whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected ivith a search directed against the accused — and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the ‘plain view’ doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges.” (Emphasis added.)
It is important to note that the United States Supreme Court has never embraced the second element of Coolidge that the plain view must be “inadvertent.” See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 130, 110 L. Ed. 2d 112, 110 S. Ct. 2301 (1990); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 329-30, 94 L. Ed. 2d 347, 107 S. Ct. 1149 (1987) (White, J. concurring); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 744, 75 L. Ed. 2d 502, 103 S. Ct. 1535 (1983) (White, J., concurring). Rather, “[t]he plain view doctrine is grounded on the proposition that once police are lawfully in a position to observe an item firsthand, its owner s privacy interest in that item is lost; the owner may retain the incidents of title and possession but not privacy.” Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1003, 103 S. Ct. 3319 (1983). Finally, the seizure must be supported by probable cause. Hicks, 480 U.S. at 326-27.
Here Officer Jager was lawfully on the defendant’s property for a knock and talk. As he was leaving the property by the way offered *329by the resident, the circle drive, he observed in plain view the contents of the trash bag, which were immediately known by the officer to contain evidence of a crime. This observation provided probable cause to seize the bag.
Notwithstanding the advice of the county attorney, Officer Jager did not seize the bag immediately and did not engage in an exploratory search of the premises (such as the shed from where the ether smell emanated) but observed from his patrol vehicle incriminating evidence in the translucent bag as he was leaving the premises. I would therefore concur with the opinion of the district court and the decision of the Court of Appeals that the officer’s seizure of the bag from defendant’s premises was justified by the plain view doctrine, thereby validating the search warrant based upon the contents of the trash bag lawfully seized and other evidence contained in the affidavit. In every other respect I agree with the majority opinion.
McFarland, C.J., and Luckert, J., join the foregoing concurring opinion.