Court Opinion

ID: 9486524
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 11:51:09.748386+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:46.422714
License: Public Domain

NIES, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
On procedural and substantive grounds, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s remand for a determination of whether the United States must pay compensation under the Fifth Amendment to the extent that the 98 acres in issue lost a substantial part, but not essentially all, of its economic use or value. The majority’s theory is contrary to Fifth Amendment “takings” jurisprudence as delineated by the Supreme Court and this court. Labelling its lost use/value theory a “partial taking” (ipse dixit) does not give it any legitimacy.
Inverse condemnation of land, like the affirmative exercise of the power of eminent domain, requires the transfer of the property found to be taken to the United States. Value is not a transferable interest. Thus, a claim for loss of value does not constitute a takings claim within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.
In response to the dissent, the majority opines that any loss in value due to a regulatory restriction on land use can be easily transmuted into a taking of a property right in the land (Op. p. 1570, n. 26) and that such right will belong to the government (p. 1570). The majority’s recognition that a successful claim of inverse condemnation of land transfers property rights is salutary. However, the majority’s throw-in line on the transfer of a property right to the United States does not change the thrust of its opinion that damages must be paid to the extent of loss of value in the fee to the 98 acres.
The majority’s partial taking theory, now vaguely tied to property rights, appears to borrow from the views of then Justice Rehnquist in his dissent in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138-153, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 2666-2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978), and restated in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 506-521, 107 S.Ct. 1232, 1252-1261, 94 L.Ed.2d 472 (1986) that the taking of an identifiable property right should be compen-sable. However, the Supreme Court, in Penn Central (and in Keystone) rejected the division of the fee owner’s bundle of property rights into separate takable rights. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-31, 98 S.Ct. at 2662; Keystone, 480 U.S. at 470-501, 107 S.Ct. at 1232-1250. These decisions and all others require one to focus on the effect of a regulatory restriction on the totality of an owner’s rights in the property. See also Concrete Pipe & Prod. v. Const. Laborers Pen. Tr., - U.S. -, -, 113 S.Ct. 2264, 2291, 124 L.Ed.2d 539 (1993) (citing Keystone). A diminution in value from denial of an economic use (even if the loss can be expressed in property right terms) is insufficient to effect a taking under all Supreme Court precedent so long as substantial other uses are left to the owner. While the Supreme Court may rethink and change its rulings, this court is not free to adopt positions in conflict with decisions of the Court, anticipating that the Court will be persuaded to adopt a dissenting Justice’s view. In any event, the majority espouses compensation for a partial taking of the fee, which is not the same as the total taking of a severable interest. No support for the partial taking theory can be found even in dissents.
With respect to procedural error after the first remand, the issue in this case was limited to whether the entire fee had been taken, which turned on whether the property had a *1574substantial value after the denial of the permit. As this court specifically instructed in Florida Rock II,
[I]f there is found to exist a solid and adequate fair market value (for the 98 acres) which Florida Rock could have obtained from others for that property, that would be a sufficient remaining use of the property to forestall a determination that a taking had occurred or that any just compensation had to be paid by the government.
791 F.2d 893, 903 (Fed.Cir.1986). This court in Florida Rock II remanded for a determination of whether substantial value remained. If it did, no taking occurred. The majority sides with the government on that issue and holds that the entire fee was not taken, which should have ended this litigation under principles of law of the case. Instead, the majority remands to allow Florida Rock to prove a different claim, indeed, a claim once raised and now subsumed in the judgment.1 Therefore, the issue of a “partial taking,” had it been argued on appeal by Florida Rock, would be outside the scope of appellate review because that party filed no cross appeal,2 and it is not an argument in support of the judgment. United States v. American Ry. Exp. Co., 265 U.S. 425, 435, 44 S.Ct. 560, 563, 68 L.Ed. 1087 (1923).
This court has no license to shape a case more to its liking by not only ignoring the law of the case but also effectively taking an appeal for Florida Rock. The trial court ordered the government to pay $1+ million for the 98 acres and ordered Florida Rock to tender a deed to the property. Florida Rock tied its fate to upholding that judgment. Under the majority’s ruling that the entirety of the fee was not taken, Florida Rock loses.
While the procedural issue is dispositive, I will also address the merits of the majority theory of a “partial” taking which conflicts with current Supreme Court precedent and the precedent of this court.
I
No legal subject has received the attention of scholars more than “takings” jurisprudence in recent years. A flood of literature has been produced advocating various theories of property and social responsibilities.3 *1575Some espouse the view that property is held subject to complete control as to its use by the state and federal governments.4 Others, at the opposite extreme, start from a premise that owners have a right to use their property in any manner, virtually without restriction, and, damages must be paid for any governmental interference with their use.5 The more often the government must pay for exercising control over private property, the less control there will be. That is the reality.
The majority decision discusses “takings” law in a conventional manner through sections A and B of its analysis. But then it leads us into the camp of those who advocate damage awards for regulatory restriction (Op. p. 1568). Its economic justification that the government will now pay less for regulatory interference with private property is specious. In the absence of governmental restrictions rising to the very high level of a total “taking” of the property in issue required by Supreme Court precedent, Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 225-228, 106 S.Ct. 1018, 1026-1027, 89 L.Ed.2d 166 (1985); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31, 136-38, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 2662, 2665-2666, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978), the government does not now pay. It may pay more in the few cases where a claimant can satisfy those high standards, but it requires little imagination to envision the vast sums required for lost value/use claims if the government must pay for mere impairment of rights. Indeed, the objective of the theory is to preclude government regulation6 precisely because regulation will entail too great a cost. Only in this respect will the theory save the public fisc.
The majority does not analyze loss of value and transfer of a property right separately under its partial taking theory. Essentially it sees no distinction in a property right, an economic use and a loss of value. However, I will address lost value separately from property rights because the concepts, which may be the same under “law-and-economics” theories, are not interchangeable in established takings jurisprudence.
A.

Loss of Value

The majority view that lost value of land in itself is compensable is not-the course set by the Supreme Court. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 66 S.Ct. 1062, 90 L.Ed. 1206 (1945), provides perhaps the clearest statement that an inverse condemnation claim respecting land rights requires an identification of the specific property interest to be transferred to the government. Causby involved a takings claim by reason of low military aircraft flights over the plaintiff’s chicken farm which destroyed its use for that purpose. As held therein:
[T]he Court of Claims held, as we have noted, that an easement was taken. But the findings of fact contain no precise description as to its nature. It is not described in terms of frequency of flight, permissible altitude, or type of airplane. Nor is there a finding as to whether the easement taken was temporary or permanent. Yet an accurate description of the property taken is essential, since that interest vests in the United States. United States v. Cress, supra [243 U.S. 316], 328-329 [37 S.Ct. 380, 385, 61 L.Ed. 746 (1917)], and eases cited.
Id. at 267, 66 S.Ct. at 1069 (emphasis added).
“Value” is not a property right under Florida law or any state law that I can uncover. While much of takings law is unclear, one principle is not. Rights in land depend on the law of the particular state. Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 16 n. 9, 20-25, 110 S.Ct. 914, 924 n. 9, 108 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990) (majority and concurring opinions); Ruckelshaus v. Mon*1576santo Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001, 104 S.Ct. 2862, 2871, 81 L.Ed.2d 815 (1984) (“Property interests ... are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law.”). Use of generalities respecting “property” law disserves the development of coherent takings jurisprudence. The right taken must be identified not only because, when transferred, it becomes the property of the United States. Id.; Deltona Corp. v. United States, 228 Ct.Cl. 476, 657 F.2d 1184, 1190 (1981), but also because compensation is fixed at the fair market value of the transferred property right. Yuba Natural Resources, Inc. v. United States, 904 F.2d 1577, 1580 (Fed.Cir.1990).7 This bedrock requirement means that, the United States having purchased the fee or a property right, no second claim that the government took that specific property is possible.
In contrast, a lost value damage claim would impose not even an easement on the land. Successive claims are not only possible but likely. If loss of value alone created a claim, Florida Rock not only would receive the damage award, but also would keep its land. In effect, takings jurisprudence would become a novel type of Fifth Amendment tort claim for regulatory injury to the landowner under which the United States must pay damages while receiving no quid pro quo. This is not the law.
Inverse condemnation jurisprudence, like the direct exercise of eminent domain power, is based to a large extent on in rem concepts.8 Thus, the theory of compensation simply for a loss in the land’s value, not for the taking of a property right founded on Florida law, is untenable.
The Supreme Court has long rejected the position that a diminution in economic value of private lands caused by government regulation of its use requires compensation. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 131, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 2662, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978); Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91, 29 S.Ct. 567, 53 L.Ed. 923 (1909). As stated in Penn Central, “[Supreme Court precedent] uniformly reject[s] the proposition that diminution in property value, standing alone, can establish a taking.” Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 131, 98 S.Ct. at 2663 (citing Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926) (75 percent diminution in value caused by zoning law); Hadachek v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 36 S.Ct. 143, 60 L.Ed. 348 (1915) (87fc percent diminution in value)). The taking issue “is resolved by focusing on the uses the regulations permit.” Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 131, 98 S.Ct. at 2663.
Appellants in Penn Central argued that the NYC landmark law effected a taking because its operation had significantly diminished the value of the Penn Central Terminal site. Appellants further argued that any restriction imposed on individual landmarks pursuant to the Landmark Law constituted a taking requiring just compensation. The Court found “no merit” in the argument. Id.
Thus, it is clear that no claim under the Fifth Amendment for a taking is stated by allegations that the property in issue simply lost value.
B.

The Property Rights in Issue

In the instant case, while there is no allegation that the government took a property right from the fee owned by Florida Rock, the majority suggests throughout its opinion that mining rights are the property rights in issue whose loss require prorata compensation. Florida Rock’s position in contrast is *1577that the denial of the permit for mining effectively took the entire fee by reason of the denial of all economically viable use. This latter position tracks precedent that government actions, which leave some property rights in the owner may, nevertheless, so severely interfere with private land use that they are deemed equivalent to outright condemnation of the land for public use. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166, 177-180, 20 L.Ed. 557 (1871) (“taking” by flooding land by dam construction).
Lucas v. South Carolina, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992), is the latest in a series of “takings” eases issued since this ease was previously on appeal. The plaintiff pleaded the taking of the “fee simple interest” to certain lands. Id. at - n. 7, 112 S.Ct. at 2894 n. 7. Lucas is instructive that a taking of the fee may be found even though the owner was left with some property rights after the governmental action. The state regulations at issue in Lucas prohibited any building on Lucas’ two oceanfront privately-owned lots. The regulations did not strip the owner of all property rights, e.g., the right to sell or devise the land. Nevertheless, the court held that the denial of all economically viable use by state regulation effected a categorical and total taking of the land unless, under state law, the action amounted to abatement of a “nuisance.”9
The Lucas opinion begins with the recognition that a claim that a governmental regulation took private property for public use has generally required ad hoc factual inquiries into the circumstances of each case, there being no set formula for deciding that the action effected an inverse condemnation. Id. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2893. In Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 224-25, 106 S.Ct. 1018, 1026, 89 L.Ed.2d 166 (1986) (citing Penn Central Transportation Co., 438 U.S. at 124, 98 S.Ct. at 2659), the Court had provided the following guidance:
To aid in this determination, however, we have identified three factors which have “particular significance”: (1) “the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant”; (2) “the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations”; and (3) “the character of the governmental action.”
In Lucas, two discrete categories of regulatory action were delineated as compensable without case-specific inquiry namely, (1) regulation allowing physical “invasion” of private property and (2) regulation denying all economically beneficial or productive use of land. — U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2893. Thus, where less than all economically beneficial or productive use of land is lost by reason of governmental regulation, one reverts to an ad hoc inquiry to determine whether the property in issue, here the fee, was taken.
In contrast, the majority divides the “ad hoe” inquiry into two types of takings, total and partial. After finding there is no categorical taking by physical invasion or prevention of all economic use of land, the two situations recognized in Lucas, the majority concludes that, under the ad hoc inquiry, the claimant may recover proportional compensation for the impairment of economic use if it passes a threshold beyond “diminution in value.”10 Contrary to the majority, in an ad *1578hoc inquiry, the reduction in value resulting from use restriction pertains to whether a “taking” occurred. In making the “taking” determination, such loss is a factor. Id., at - n. 8, 112 S.Ct. at 2895 n. 8 (95 percent loss may not get “benefit of categorical formulation” but “keenly relevant to takings analysis”). The loss in value, however, is not the property taken (as discussed supra) nor the measure of compensation. Yuba, 904 F.2d at 1580.
Under Supreme Court precedent, a Fifth Amendment claim that specific property has been taken is an all or nothing proposition. Either the property in issue has been taken and the fair market value at the time of the taking must be paid, or the property is not taken and no compensation is due. Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States, 10 F.3d 796, 800-803 (Fed.Cir.1993). The answer is “yes” or “no,” not “partially.” See Lucas, — U.S. at - n. 8, 112 S.Ct. at 2895 n. 8 (“Takings law is full of those ‘all-or-nothing’ situations.”). Thus, under an ad hoc analysis, a 95 percent loss of value in the land, for example, may be sufficient, when considered with other factors, to require the government to purchase 100 percent of the interest in the land, i.e. the fee. Conversely, the landowner asserting the taking of the fee receives nothing, despite the loss in value caused by the regulatory action, if the factors weighed together do not mandate that the government must become an “involuntary purchaser” of the fee. Florida Rock II, 791 F.2d at 905.
The majority states that in Lucas, the Supreme Court touched upon but did not have to decide “the partial taking question.” (op. p. 1568) The Supreme Court did note that precedent did not make it clear, even in a categorical taking, how to determine “the property interest against which the loss of value is to be measured.” The court noted that “this uncertainty regarding the denominator in our ‘deprivation’ fraction has produced inconsistent pronouncements by the Court [citations omitted].” Lucas, — U.S. at - n. 7, 112 S.Ct. at 2894 n. 7. The majority seeks to shoehorn its “partial taking” theory into this open question. It does not fit. The Lucas court left open the question of how to determine the property interest in issue, the denominator. One would still determine whether there is a total taking of that property interest. The “partial taking” theory does not change the denominator or even the numerator. The majority’s denominator remains the fee and if an ad hoc inquiry negates that the fee is taken, one simply would go on, (under the majority’s view) to consider proportional compensation if a threshold of injury, more than “mere diminution”, is passed.11
There can be no question that the “partial” taking theory of the majority does not change the property in issue (the denominator) from the fee to mining rights. If the taking of mining rights were the issue, one would simply evaluate the mining rights at the time the permit was denied. And there would be no need to remand to determine if a taking of such rights occurred. One would merely remand for their evaluation. Cf. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 152, 98 S.Ct. at 2673 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting). Mining is clearly precluded and such right has zero value to Florida Rock after the action on the permit. The majority, instead, engages in a complicated before and after taking evaluation of the fee. But the loss in value of the fee does not reflect the value of mining rights on the date of permit denial. One must also take into account that the land is zoned for five-acre residential development as well. It is pure speculation whether the substantial residual value found by the majority reflects investment value for future mining use or for future residential use.12 What the majority’s *1579evaluation analysis makes clear is that its discussion of mining rights merely serves to obfuscate its theory that a substantially less than total loss of value in the fee must be compensated.
The majority’s partial taking theory finds no home in an ad hoc analysis. As reaffirmed most recently in Concrete Pipe & Proc., — U.S. at —, 113 S.Ct. at 2290:
[A] claimant’s parcel of property could not first be divided into what was taken and what was left for the purpose of demonstrating the taking of the former to be complete and hence compensable. To the extent that any portion of property is taken, that portion is always taken in its entirety; the relevant question, however, is whether the property taken is all, or only a portion of the parcel in question. Accord, Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497, 107 S.Ct. 1232, 1248, 94 L.Ed.2d 472 (1987) (“[0]ur test for regulatory taking requires us to compare the value that has been taken from the property with the value that remains in the property, [and] one of the critical questions is determining how to define the unit of property ‘whose value is to furnish the denominator of the fraction’ ”) (citation omitted).
The ad hoc analysis answers the question whether the entirety of the property in issue should be deemed confiscated even where the owner retains some rights. It gives no guidance on how to determine what is the property in issue, i.e., the denominator. It is simply the formula to apply after the denominator is properly defined. That “complex question” is not facilely answered by giving the restricted interest a name.
The law has been and continues to mandate that a court may not look only to the part of the entirety of property rights of a fee owner which a regulation restricts, whether called a property right, an economic use, or .simply value. As Concrete Pipe informs us, there is always a total taking of that interest and conversely, a partial taking of the fee. This is, indeed, the precise rationale for requiring an ad hoc analysis. One must weigh the rights (and value) of the property in issue before regulatory action against the rights (and value) therein after regulatory restriction and find confiscatory disparity between the two values for a taking to be found. Thus, where only a portion of the acreage of a tract is affected by denial of a wetlands permit, we have held under an ad hoc analysis that no taking of the tract occurred and no compensation was due. Deltona Corp. v. United States, 228 Ct.Cl. 476, 657 F.2d 1184, 1192 (1981).13
The difficult issue of what is the property in issue (the denominator) was avoidable in Lucas because the plaintiff claimed the fee was taken. Here as well. Respecting the denominator, as indicated, we do not have a question of the taking of a severable interest, i.e., mineral rights from the bundle of rights in the land.14 Indeed, Florida Rock abandoned any issue other than the taking of the fee in its entirety prior to the first appeal. Florida Rock III, 21 Cl.Ct. 161, 169 n. 5 (1990). At this stage of proceedings, nothing less is at stake than the entire fee interest in the 98 acres. The majority’s ruling 'that the fee was not taken under an ad hoc analysis mandates reversal.
II
Inasmuch as the majority remands for determination of the difference in value of the fee, before and after permit denial, it is appropriate to point out the legal error in the $10,500 valuation figure as the value of the *1580fee prior to denial of the permit. One must focus on the fair market value on the date of the denial, namely on October 2, 1982, because that is the date of the alleged taking. First Lutheran, 482 U.S. at 321 n. 10, 107 S.Ct. at 2389 n. 10 (the valuation of property taken must be calculated at time of taking); Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 10, 104 S.Ct. 2187, 2194, 81 L.Ed.2d 1 (1983) (just compensation determined on the date property is taken); Tabb Lakes v. United States, 10 F.3d 796, 803 (Fed.Cir.1993) (compensation is measured from the time the taking occurs).
The pre-denial value ascribed to the fee by the trial court of $10,500 is the value of the wetlands acreage with no regulations. The trial court based the $10,500 figure on the acquisition cost with upward adjustments. Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl.Ct. 161, 169 n. 5 (1990) (Florida Rock III).
On the evidence of record, the $10,500 per acre figure does not reflect the fair market value of the fee immediately prior to the denial of the permit on Florida Rock’s property. The value of these lands prior to permit denial had previously been diminished by the state and federal regulations applicable to all wetlands. However, the regulations in themselves constitute no taking. As specifically held in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.:
A requirement that a person obtain a permit before engaging in a certain use of his or her property does not itself “take” the property in any sense: after all, the very existence of a permit system implies that permission may be granted, leaving the landowner free to use the property as desired. Moreover, even if the permit is denied, there may be other viable uses available to the owner. Only when a permit is denied and the effect of the denial is to prevent “economically viable” use of the land in question can it be said that a taking has occurred.
474 U.S. 121, 127, 106 S.Ct. 455, 459, 88 L.Ed.2d 419 (1985).
Thus, any loss attributable to the regulations is noncompensable. As evidenced by enactment of the FWPCA, the nation has come to recognize that wetlands are necessary resources which require special protection from unbridled development. Contrary to the majority, the limitations of development only under permit may be imposed on this type of property without compensation. Id.
Owners of such property have no right from ownership to use lands with this natural resource unfettered. Ownership of property carries responsibilities to the community as a whole as well as privileges. Like height limitations or five-acre zoning laws or other similar restrictions on use, the government’s assertion of control generally over use of wetlands, which devalues all such property to some extent, is not itself compensable. “Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law.” Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413, 43 S.Ct. 158, 159, 67 L.Ed. 322 (1922). Thus, the fair market value of the fee must be determined with these general restrictions on land use in place, not as if no regulations of wetlands existed at all. Only with this adjustment is the pre-taking value of the property properly determined. Indeed, the evidence of sales of “comparable” lands in the 1980’s, discussed by the majority in connection with post-taking valuation, appears in fact to reflect the pre-taking impact of general wetlands regulations on neighboring property values.
The majority treats sales of wetland property on which no permit was denied as evidence of the value of wetland property on which a permit was denied. Under the majority’s rationale, the denial of the permit has no effect on valuation. Actually, the majority is suggesting a partial taking occurred based on a comparison between the original value of the subject land and the later lower value of other property, lower because depressed by general regulations, but for which no permit was denied. That would mean the existence of general regulations respecting wetlands effected the taking, which is contrary to the Supreme Court’s decision in Riverside Bayview, supra. Moreover, the actual alleged act of taking under the majority’s view *1581can be simply ignored. Muddled though land takings law may be, it is not so muddled that these concepts can pass muster.

. Florida Rock's complaint in the Court of Federal Claims originally sought, inter alia, damages for ihe diminution in value of its land but, during the course of litigation, that issue dropped out in the first trial, and no appeal of the viability of that type of claim was taken. Rather, the issue litigated was whether the United States had taken the entirety of the fee to the 98 acres. The majority brings a closed issue back into the entirety of the case by its partial taking theory.

. An appellee must file a cross appeal when issues it seeks to raise constitute an attack on the judgment below but not when the issues are merely alternative arguments in support on the judgment. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 254.11 [3] at 4-46 (1993).

. Jed Rubenfeld, "Usings," 102 Yale L.J. 1077 (1993); Glenn Sugameli, "Takings Issues in Light of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Decision Full of Sound and Fury Signifying Nothing,” 12 Virginia Env.L.J. 439 (1993); Erika Jones et al., "The Fifth Amendments Just Compensation Clause: Implications to Regulatory Policy," 6 Adm.L.J. of American U. 674 (1993); Hon. John M. Walker, "Common Law Rules and Land Use Regulations: Lucas and Future Takings Jurisprudence,” 3 Const.L.J. 3 (1993); Richard Epstein, "Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Tangled Web of Expectations," 45 Stan.L.Rev. 1369 (1992); William W. Fisher III, "The Trouble with Lucas," 45 Stan.L.Rev. 1393 (1992); Joseph L. Sax, "Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council," 45 Stan.L.Rev. 1433 (1992); Richard J. Lazarus, “Putting the Correct Spin in Lucas," 45 Stan.L.Rev. 1411 (1992); Andrea L. Peterson, "The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles Part I — A Critique of Current Takings Clause Doctrine," 77 Cal.L.Rev. 1299 (1989); Douglas W. Kmiec, "The Original Understanding of the Taking Clause Is Neither Weak Nor Obtuse," 88 Colum.L.Rev. 1630 (1988); William A. Fischel, "Introductions: Utilitarian Balancing and Formalism in Takings,” 88 Colum.L.Rev. 1581 (1988); Frank Michelman, "Takings, 1987", 88 Colum.L.Rev. 1600 (1988); Margaret Jane Radin, "The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings," 88 Colum.L.Rev. 1667 (1988); Susan Rose Ackerman, "Against Ad Hocery: A Comment on Michelman," 88 Colum.L.Rev. 1697 (1988); Richard A. Epstein, " Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain" (1985); Margaret Jane Radin, "Property and Personhood," 34 Stan.L.Rev. 957 (1982); Frank Michelman, “Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comment on the Ethical Foundations of Just Compensation Law," 80 Harv.L.Rev. 1165 (1967).

.Sax, supra, “Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council," 45 Stan.L.Rev. 1433 (1992). Although not so stated, such theorists would, in effect, superimpose the constitutional powers of Congress on land rights much as the constitutional powers may negate state immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.

. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain, (1985).

. Id.

. In a temporary taking, the proper measure of compensation is the value of the use of the property interest during the taking, since the government returns the property interest to the owner when the taking ends. Yuba, 904 F.2d at 1580-81.

. "While the typical taking occurs when the government acts to condemn property in the exercise of its power of eminent domain, the entire doctrine of inverse condemnation is predicated on the proposition that a taking may occur without such formal proceeding." First English Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304, 316, 107 S.Ct. 2378, 2386, 96 L.Ed.2d 250 (1986).

. This exception appears inapt as applied to federal regulation. The source of federal action is constitutional, as is the requirement for compensation. Precedent respecting takings by state action must be carefully parsed to determine whether the principles are equally applicable to federal regulation. The authority of Congress to impose use restrictions in this case rests on the commerce clause which, it is true, may be exercised to achieve purposes akin to a state’s police power. Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432, 436-37, 45 S.Ct. 345, 346, 69 L.Ed. 699 (1925). But it is not at all clear or logical that a state's nuisance law, which the Lucas court recognized as the basis for no compensation respecting a state’s exercise of police powers, is also the limit of the federal power to take property without compensation. The noncompensable seizure of houses, cars, boats, airplanes, or other private property in connection with drug crimes seems to belie the majority’s assumption (Op. p. 1577 n. 10) that state nuisance law alone defines the interrelation of commerce and the Fifth Amendment.

. The majority supports its theory with citation to Loretto and Hendler. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982); Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364 (Fed.Cir.1991). Both are physical occupation cases decided under a categorical analysis, whereas the majority’s taking theory is analyzed under an ad hoc analysis. In *1578a permanent physical occupation case, the size of the property interest taken is irrelevant. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 434-35, 102 S.Ct. at 3175. Had Loretto been analyzed under an ad hoc inquiry, the result may well have been different. See id. at 452-53, 102 S.Ct. at 3185 (Blackmun, J. dissenting) ("[A]ny intelligible takings inquiry must also ask whether the extent of the state's interference is so severe as to constitute a compensable taking in light of the owner’s alternative uses for the property.”).

. Anomalously the majority remands for advice on the legal standard of what .percentage must be taken to rise to the level of a partial taking.

. Once mining rights are transferred to the government, the majority’s theory of post-takings *1579value based on offers to buy the land because of possible change in regulations is thrown entirely askew. There could be no change in regulations which would give a subsequent owner the right to mine the mineral estate which the majority agrees becomes government property.

. Indeed, in this case, it is far from clear in my mind that the 98 acres should be treated as a severed tract rather than part of the 1500+ total acreage.

. It may also be noted that there is no issue involving frustration of Florida Rock's mining business. This court in Florida Rock II concluded that the trial court's finding of a taking based on the fact that Florida Rock was prevented from conducting a profitable mining business made the case "improperly one to recover for frustration of business purposes.” Id.