Court Opinion

ID: 9556012
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-15 20:00:55.147464+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:36:33.973859
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-10910    Document: 37-1      Date Filed: 08/15/2023   Page: 1 of 14

                                                [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-10910
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        VICTOR RICARDO GRANT,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Middle District of Florida
                   D.C. Docket No. 8:20-cr-00050-WFJ-CPT-1
                           ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                  22-10910

        Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Victor Ricardo Grant appeals his conviction for one count of
        possessing ammunition as a felon and his corresponding 262-
        month sentence of imprisonment. On appeal, Grant makes two
        arguments. First, he argues that the district court erred in denying
        his motion for judgment of acquittal because there was insufficient
        evidence for a jury to find that he possessed the ammunition. Sec-
        ond, he contends, for the first time on appeal, that the district court
        erred at sentencing when it found that his prior state drug convic-
        tions constituted “serious drug offense[s]” under the Armed Career
        Criminal Act (“ACCA”), because federal drug schedules did not
        prohibit the conduct underlying those convictions at the time of
        his federal ammunition offense. After careful review, we affirm.
                                          I.
               A federal grand jury indicted Grant for knowingly pos-
        sessing ammunition after having been convicted of a felony in vio-
        lation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e).
               Grant proceeded to trial, and the parties stipulated that
        Grant had been convicted of felonies and had no right to possess a
        ﬁrearm or ammunition. At trial, FBI special agent Sarah Andre-
        asen testiﬁed about a SWAT team’s lawful search of Grant’s family
        residence. Andreasen testiﬁed that the residence’s master bedroom
        had two closets, with the closet to the left containing female cloth-
        ing and a closet to the right containing male clothing. The right-
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        22-10910              Opinion of the Court                        3

        side closet with male clothing contained a black backpack, which
        itself contained four orange traﬃc vests, ﬁfteen boxes of 7.62-mil-
        limeter ammunition, a plastic bag with additional ammunition, and
        earplugs. Law enforcement discovered a laundry receipt with
        Grant’s name on it near the backpack. The residence’s attic, the
        master bedroom’s left-side closet, and a purse in the living room
        that belonged to Grant’s wife all also contained ammunition.
               Another law enforcement oﬃcer testiﬁed that he observed
        Grant take a black backpack out of his car and wear it at least four
        or ﬁve times when returning to his residence. Other detectives ob-
        served the same pattern of Grant taking the backpack out of his
        car and wearing it. An employee of the Hillsborough County Sher-
        iﬀ’s Oﬃce testiﬁed that her unit did not ﬁnd ﬁngerprints on the
        ammunition uncovered by law enforcement. And a forensic analyst
        for the FBI testiﬁed that the agency did not recover DNA from the
        ammunition.
              After the government rested, Grant moved for a judgment
        of acquittal, arguing that no reasonable juror could ﬁnd that he
        possessed the ammunition seized by law enforcement. The district
        court denied the motion.
               Grant then called his wife, Melissa Grant, as a witness. She
        testiﬁed that she moved her husband’s black backpack from the liv-
        ing room to his closet before the search. She conﬁrmed that the
        master bedroom’s right-side closet containing male clothes was ex-
        clusively her husband’s.
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                  22-10910

               Grant also testiﬁed in his own defense. He testiﬁed that he
        knew nothing about and never possessed the ammunition seized
        by law enforcement. He acknowledged that the right-side closet
        was his, but he testiﬁed that he did not recall ever seeing or know-
        ing about the black backpack found in the closet. Grant also admit-
        ted, however, that he used a black backpack to take spare clothes to
        work.
               Grant renewed his motion for judgment of acquittal after
        the defense rested and again at the end of trial. The district court
        denied the motion both times. The jury returned a verdict ﬁnding
        Grant guilty.
                The presentence investigation report (“PSI”) described
        Grant’s oﬀense conduct by reference to the evidence presented at
        trial. Based on these facts, the PSI initially calculated a base oﬀense
        level of 20, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1and added two points for
        obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 based on Grant’s false
        statements under oath about his oﬀense. The PSI also applied an
        armed career criminal oﬀense level enhancement under U.S.S.G.
        § 4B1.4 because Grant had at least three prior convictions for a vi-
        olent felony or serious drug oﬀense and was thus subject to an en-
        hanced sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). The PSI applied the en-
        hancement based on the following convictions: three in December
        2001 for the sale of cocaine, and one for aggravated assault in 2005.
        Grant committed the three drug oﬀenses on separate occasions in
        February and May of 2001. After this enhancement was applied,
        the PSI calculated a total oﬀense level of 33 for Grant.
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        22-10910               Opinion of the Court                        5

               The PSI further calculated that Grant had a criminal history
        score of 10, establishing a criminal history category of V under
        U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4(c)(1). Based on Grant’s total oﬀense level of 33 and
        criminal history category of V, the PSA calculated that Grant’s
        guideline range was 210 to 262 months’ imprisonment, subject to
        a statutory minimum of 15 years imprisonment. Before sentenc-
        ing, Grant objected to the PSI’s obstruction-of-justice enhance-
        ment. But Grant did not object to the PSI’s ﬁnding that his state
        drug convictions qualiﬁed as “serious drug oﬀense[s]” under the
        ACCA.
               At the sentencing hearing, the district court found that the
        PSI properly calculated Grant’s guideline range and therefore over-
        ruled Grant’s objection to the obstruction-of-justice enhancement.
        Grant sought a downward variance and a sentence of only 185
        months’ imprisonment or, alternatively, a sentence at the low end
        of his guidelines range. Grant, again, did not object to the PSI’s
        determination that his state drug convictions were “serious drug
        oﬀense[s]” under the ACCA. The government argued that Grant
        should be sentenced at the high end of his guidelines range given
        the totality of the circumstances of the case. The district court
        then sentenced Grant to 262 months’ imprisonment, followed by
        ﬁve years of supervised release. After sentencing Grant, the district
        court asked if Grant had any further objections, and Grant’s coun-
        sel answered that he did not.
              This timely appeal ensued.
                                         II.
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        6                       Opinion of the Court                  22-10910

                We review de novo the denial of a defendant’s properly pre-
        served motion for judgment of acquittal, “viewing the evidence in
        the light most favorable to the government and drawing all reason-
        able factual inferences in favor of the jury’s verdict.” United States
        v. Jiminez, 564 F.3d 1280, 1284 (11th Cir. 2009). We will uphold the
        district court’s denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal “if a
        reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the evidence establishes
        the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v.
        Rodriguez, 218 F.3d 1243, 1244 (11th Cir. 2000). “It is not necessary
        that the evidence exclude every reasonable hypothesis of inno-
        cence or be wholly inconsistent with every conclusion except that
        of guilt, provided a reasonable trier of fact could ﬁnd that the evi-
        dence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v.
        Vera, 701 F.2d 1349, 1357 (11th Cir. 1983) (alteration omitted) (quot-
        ing United States v. Bell, 678 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (en
        banc)). This is so because “[a] jury is free to choose among reason-
        able constructions of the evidence.” Id. (quoting Bell, 678 F.2d at
        549). Thus, “we must sustain the verdict where there is a reasona-
        ble basis in the record for it.” United States v. Farley, 607 F.3d 1294,
        1333 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Brown, 415 F.3d 1257,
        1270 (11th Cir. 2005)).
                “The test for suﬃciency of evidence is identical regardless
        of whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial, and ‘no distinc-
        tion is to be made between the weight given to either direct or cir-
        cumstantial evidence.’” United States v. Mieres-Borges, 919 F.2d 652,
        656–57 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting United States v. Gonzalez, 719 F.2d
        1516, 1521 (11th Cir. 1983)). But when “the government relies on
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        22-10910                 Opinion of the Court                             7

        circumstantial evidence, reasonable inferences, not mere specula-
        tion, must support the conviction.” United States v. Mendez, 528 F.3d
        811, 814 (11th Cir. 2008).
                 We generally review de novo challenges to an enhancement
        under the ACCA. United States v. Smith, 983 F.3d 1213, 1222 (11th
        Cir. 2020). When a defendant does not state the grounds for an
        objection in the district court, however, we review for plain error.
        United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1087 (11th Cir. 2003). To prevail
        under plain-error review, a defendant must demonstrate “that there
        is: ‘(1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that aﬀects substantial rights.’”
        United States v. Jones, 743 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting
        United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1298 (11th Cir. 2005)).
        Once the defendant makes that showing, we have discretion to no-
        tice the forfeited error “only if (4) the error seriously aﬀects the
        fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id.
        (quoting Rodriguez, 398 F.3d at 1298).
                                            III.
               To convict a defendant of being a felon in possession of am-
        munition under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the government must prove
        beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the defendant knowingly pos-
        sessed a ﬁrearm or ammunition, (2) the defendant was a felon, and
        (3) the ﬁrearm or ammunition was in or aﬀecting interstate com-
        merce. United States v. Green, 873 F.3d 846, 852 (11th Cir. 2017).
              Possession can be actual or constructive. See United States v.
        Ochoa, 941 F.3d 1074, 1104–05 (11th Cir. 2019) (concluding that the
        jury had suﬃcient evidence to ﬁnd that the defendant
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        8                       Opinion of the Court                    22-10910

        constructively possessed ammunition after tying him to the bed-
        room where it was found through his phones, personal identiﬁca-
        tion cards, and travel papers in the room, along with a driver’s li-
        cense that bore the address of the residence in question). Construc-
        tive possession may be exclusive or shared with others. See United
        States v. Flanders, 752 F.3d 1317, 1332 (11th Cir. 2014). To establish
        constructive possession, whether exclusive or joint, the govern-
        ment must oﬀer evidence showing that the “defendant has owner-
        ship, dominion, or control over an object or the premises where the
        object is found.” Id. “[A] defendant’s mere presence in the area of
        [an object] or awareness of its location is not suﬃcient to establish
        possession.” Green, 873 F.3d at 852–53 (second alteration in origi-
        nal) (quoting United States v. Beckles, 565 F.3d 832, 841 (11th Cir.
        2009)). A defendant has constructive possession of ammunition or
        a ﬁrearm if the government proves, either through direct or cir-
        cumstantial evidence, that he “(1) was aware or knew of [its] pres-
        ence and (2) had the ability and intent to later exercise dominion
        and control over [it].” United States v. Perez, 661 F.3d 568, 576 (11th
        Cir. 2011); see also United States v. Molina, 443 F.3d 824, 830 (11th Cir.
        2006) (reversing a grant of judgment of acquittal where a reasona-
        ble jury could have found that the defendant exerted dominion or
        control over a ﬁrearm because it was in her bedroom nightstand
        that also contained her passport).
                We have also held that if a defendant takes the stand and tes-
        tiﬁes, the factﬁnder not only does not have to believe his testimony,
        but it can also take the opposite position and consider his testimony
        as evidence of his guilt. See United States v. Hughes, 840 F.3d 1368,
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        22-10910               Opinion of the Court                         9

        1385 (11th Cir. 2016) (“[A] statement by a defendant, if disbelieved
        by the jury, may be considered as substantive evidence of the de-
        fendant’s guilt.” (quoting United States v. McDowell, 250 F.3d 1354,
        1367 (11th Cir. 2001))).
                Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the gov-
        ernment, we conclude that the district court properly denied
        Grant’s motion for judgment of acquittal because the evidence was
        suﬃcient for a reasonable jury to ﬁnd beyond a reasonable doubt
        that he constructively possessed the ammunition. See Jiminez,
        564 F.3d at 1284. The evidence elicited at trial showed that law en-
        forcement found the ammunition in Grant’s closet, inside his black
        backpack, and near a laundry receipt with his name on it. That
        evidence permitted a reasonable inference that Grant construc-
        tively possessed the ammunition. See, e.g., Ochoa, 941 F.3d at 1105;
        Molina, 443 F.3d at 829–830; see also United States v. Brown, 587 F.3d
        1082, 1091–92 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding that suﬃcient evidence sup-
        ported jury’s ﬁnding that the defendant possessed a ﬁrearm when
        law enforcement found seven ﬁrearms in a bedroom closet and the
        defendant’s identiﬁcation cards in the bedroom).
               And despite Grant’s testimony that he did not know about
        the ammunition in the closet and that his wife put the backpack in
        his closet, the jury was entitled to disbelieve him. See Hughes, 840
        F.3d at 1385. The jury likewise was entitled to view his testimony
        as substantive evidence of his guilt. See id. Indeed, Grant’s testi-
        mony that he wore a black backpack to work, viewed in the light
        most favorable to the jury’s verdict, supported the government’s
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                  22-10910

        argument that Grant possessed the ammunition in the backpack
        found in his closet.
               We thus aﬃrm the district court’s denial of Grant’s motion
        for judgment of acquittal.
                                         IV.
                Grant also appeals his sentence on the ground that his prior
        state drug convictions were not “serious drug oﬀense[s]” within the
        meaning of the ACCA. The ACCA requires that any person who
        violates 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) serve a mandatory minimum sentence
        of ﬁfteen years when the defendant has three prior convictions for
        violent felonies or serious drug oﬀenses committed on occasions
        diﬀerent from one another. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The ACCA de-
        ﬁnes a “serious drug oﬀense,” in relevant part, as “an oﬀense under
        State law, involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with
        intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance (as de-
        ﬁned in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C.
        § 802)).” Id. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). We have held that federal law gov-
        erns the meaning of terms in the ACCA and state law governs the
        elements of state law crimes. Jackson v. United States (Jackson II), 55
        F.4th 846, 850 (11th Cir. 2022), cert. granted, 143 S. Ct. 2457 (2023).
               Section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act deﬁnes a “con-
        trolled substance” as any substance on the federal controlled sub-
        stances schedules. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(6), 812. The current version
        of the federal drug schedules expressly excludes ioﬂupane. 21
        C.F.R. § 1308.12(b)(4)(ii). But the federal drug schedules included
        ioﬂupane until 2015. Jackson II, 55 F.4th at 851 & n.4.
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        22-10910               Opinion of the Court                        11

               At the time of Grant’s drug oﬀenses in February and May
        2001, the list of “controlled substances” in Florida included
        “[c]ocaine or ecgonine, including any of their stereoisomers, and
        any salt, compound, derivative, or preparation of cocaine or ecgon-
        ine.” Fla. Stat. § 893.03(2)(a)(4) (amendments eﬀective from Octo-
        ber 1, 2000, to June 30, 2001). It did not speciﬁcally include or ex-
        clude ioﬂupane. Id.
               We apply the categorical approach to determine whether a
        defendant’s state conviction is a serious drug oﬀense under the
        ACCA. Jackson II, 55 F.4th at 850. Under the categorical approach,
        we consider the statutory deﬁnition of the state oﬀense rather than
        the facts of the crime itself. Id. A state conviction qualiﬁes only if
        the state statute under which the conviction occurred deﬁnes the
        oﬀense in the same way as, or more narrowly than, the ACCA’s
        deﬁnition of a serious drug oﬀense. Id.
               In Jackson I, decided in June 2022 after Grant’s sentencing,
        we vacated a defendant’s ACCA-enhanced sentence, holding that
        his Florida cocaine-related oﬀenses did not qualify as serious drug
        oﬀenses under the ACCA. United States v. Jackson (Jackson I), 36
        F.4th 1294, 1306 (11th Cir. 2022). We determined that the federal
        controlled substances schedules that deﬁned a serious drug oﬀense
        under the ACCA were those in eﬀect when the defendant commit-
        ted his federal oﬀense and that those schedules did not cover io-
        ﬂupane at the time he committed his federal oﬀense. See id. at
        1299–302. Since the relevant Florida statute covered ioﬂupane
        when he was convicted of his prior cocaine-related oﬀenses, we
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        12                      Opinion of the Court                  22-10910

        held that the state statute was broader than the relevant version of
        the federal controlled substances schedules, and the defendant’s
        prior cocaine-related convictions thus did not qualify as serious
        drug oﬀenses. Id. at 1303–04.
                In December 2022, however, we vacated our decision in Jack-
        son I and held, in Jackson II, that the defendant’s Florida cocaine-re-
        lated convictions qualiﬁed as serious drug oﬀenses. Jackson II,
        55 F.4th at 861–62. We held that the ACCA’s deﬁnition of a serious
        drug oﬀense incorporates the version of the federal controlled sub-
        stances schedules in eﬀect when the defendant was convicted of
        the prior state drug oﬀense. Id. at 854. We then concluded that the
        defendant’s 1998 and 2004 Florida cocaine-related convictions qual-
        iﬁed because Florida’s controlled substances schedules included io-
        ﬂupane until 2017 and the federal controlled substance schedules
        also included ioﬂupane until 2015. Id. at 851 & nn.3–4. We deter-
        mined that the Florida controlled substances schedules included io-
        ﬂupane because Florida later amended its schedules to exclude io-
        ﬂupane. Id. at 851 n.3. Jackson then sought certiorari, which the
        Supreme Court granted in May 2023. The Supreme Court also
        consolidated Jackson II with another case, see United States v. Brown,
        47 F. 4th 147 (3d Cir. 2022), cert. granted, 143 S. Ct. 2458 (2023), and
        the cases remain pending.
                Again, because Grant did not object to the PSI’s ﬁnding that
        his state drug convictions qualiﬁed as “serious drug oﬀense[s]” un-
        der the ACCA, we review his ACCA enhancement for plain error.
        Zinn, 321 F.3d at 1087.
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        22-10910                Opinion of the Court                          13

                  Grant concedes that, under our current precedent, the dis-
        trict court committed no error in applying an ACCA enhancement
        to his sentence. Grant acknowledges that our decision in Jackson II
        forecloses his argument that his prior state drug convictions were
        not serious drug oﬀenses because the federal and Florida drug
        schedules in eﬀect at the time of those convictions included io-
        ﬂupane. That concession fully resolves Grant’s appeal because we,
        as a panel, are bound by Jackson II’s holding. Under our prior prec-
        edent rule, we must follow a prior panel precedent “unless and un-
        til it is overruled by this court en banc or by the Supreme Court.”
        United States v. Brown, 342 F.3d 1245, 1246 (11th Cir. 2003). Alt-
        hough the Supreme Court will soon review Jackson II, a grant of
        certiorari by the Supreme Court does not in itself change the law.
        See Rutherford v. McDonough, 466 F.3d 970, 977 (11th Cir. 2006).
                In addition, the error that Grant asserts the district court
        committed was not plain. We have made clear that “[w]here the
        explicit language of a statute or rule does not speciﬁcally resolve an
        issue, there can be no plain error where there is no precedent from
        the Supreme Court or this Court directly resolving it.” United
        States v. Verdeza, 69 F.4th 780, 791 (11th Cir. 2023) (quoting United
        States v. Chau, 426 F.3d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 2005)). Indeed, an error
        qualiﬁes as plain only if it is “‘obvious’ or ‘clear under current law.’”
        United States v. Laines, 69 F.4th 1221, 1233 (11th Cir. 2023) (quoting
        United States v. Candelario, 240 F.3d 1300, 1309 (11th Cir. 2001)).
        Here, we have directly resolved the relevant issue against Grant’s
        position. See Jackson II, 55 F.4th at 854, 861–62. And because the
        district court’s decision to enhance Grant’s sentence under the
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        14                     Opinion of the Court                22-10910

        ACCA is consistent with our current law, the alleged error is, by
        deﬁnition, not plain. See, e.g., Laines, 69 F.4th at 1233–34 (holding
        that the defendant did not carry his burden of showing plain error
        because our precedents expressly rejected his argument that an er-
        ror occurred, and he did not identify any decision abrogating or
        overruling these precedents).
               In short, we conclude that the district court did not plainly
        err when it enhanced Grant’s sentence under the ACCA. Accord-
        ingly, we aﬃrm Grant’s sentence.
              AFFIRMED.