Court Opinion

ID: 9390599
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-27 21:00:40.240679+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:35.654649
License: Public Domain

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                                             UNPUBLISHED

                                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                       FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 22-1032

        ANTHONY KEMMOY WHYTE,

                       Petitioner,

        v.

        MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,

                       Respondent.

        ------------------------------

        LAMBDA LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, INCORPORATED;
        IMMIGRATION EQUALITY; IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CENTER; BRONX
        DEFENDERS; IMMIGRANT LEGAL DEFENSE; SAN FRANCISCO PUBLIC
        DEFENDER’S OFFICE; CAPITAL AREA IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS
        COALITION,

                       Amici Supporting Petitioner.

        On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals.

        Argued: March 9, 2023                                          Decided: April 26, 2023

        Before WILKINSON, AGEE, and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges.

        Petition denied by unpublished opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote the opinion, in which
        Judge Agee and Judge Heytens joined.
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        ARGUED:          Amber Nasir Qureshi, Victoria Frances Neilson, NATIONAL
        IMMIGRATION PROJECT OF THE NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, Washington,
        D.C., for Petitioner. Jeffrey Michael Hartman, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
        JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. ON BRIEF: Joseph Meyers, NATIONAL
        IMMIGRATION PROJECT OF THE NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, Washington,
        D.C.; David C. Drake, DRAKE IMMIGRATION LAW, PLLC, Alexandria, Virginia;
        Joseph Alexander Brophy, BROPHY LENAHAN LAW GROUP, P.C., Havertown,
        Pennsylvania, for Petitioner. Brian Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
        Melissa Neiman-Kelting, Assistant Director, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil
        Division, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for
        Respondent. Jennifer C. Pizer, LAMBDA LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION
        FUND, INC., Los Angeles, California; Bridget A. Crawford, IMMIGRATION
        EQUALITY, Brooklyn, New York; Michael J. Mestitz, WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY LLP,
        Washington, D.C., for Amici Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. and
        Immigration Equality. Elizabeth Schmelzel, Eleni R. Bakst, Lorna Julien, CAPITAL
        AREA IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS (CAIR) COALITION, Washington, D.C., for Amicus
        Capital Area Immigrants’ Rights (CAIR) Coalition. Tania Linares Garcia, Mary
        Georgevich, NATIONAL IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CENTER, Chicago, Illinois, for Amici
        National Immigrant Justice Center, Bronx Defenders, Immigrant Legal Defense, and the
        San Francisco Public Defender’s Office.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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        WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:

               Anthony Whyte, a citizen of Jamaica, was accused of molesting a young boy while

        he was a pastor in Jamaica. Whyte denies these allegations and claims that reports of the

        accusations made him fear for his life, so he fled to the United States. Jamaican law

        enforcement authorities issued two arrest warrants for Whyte, claiming he committed the

        crimes of “buggery” and “indecent assault” on an under-age boy. The International

        Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) also circulated a Red Notice to locate Whyte

        and return him to Jamaica. Whyte was then detained in the United States.

               During his removal proceedings, Whyte argued that he should not be returned to

        Jamaica for two reasons: First, he should be permitted to pursue his application for asylum

        and withholding of removal because he did not commit a serious nonpolitical crime, and

        second, the Convention Against Torture (CAT) barred his removal because he would be

        tortured in Jamaica given the country’s pervasive hostility toward gay individuals like

        himself. The Immigration Judge (IJ) ruled against him on both counts. The Board of

        Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s findings. Whyte now petitions this court for

        review, seeking to reverse the BIA’s determinations on whether he committed a serious

        nonpolitical crime and whether the CAT bars his removal. Finding no error in the BIA’s

        decision, we deny the petition.

                                                    I.

                                                    A.

               Anthony Whyte, a Jamaican citizen, previously served as a pastor for a Seventh-

        Day Adventist church in Jamaica. Whyte is a gay man who kept his sexuality secret for

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        fear of anti-gay hostility in Jamaica. In January 2020, a young boy named J.R. came

        forward with allegations of sexual assault against Whyte. The boy and his family were

        parishioners at the church where Whyte had served as a pastor. J.R. told his mother, Marie

        Richards, that Whyte had kissed him in 2017 and sexually assaulted him in 2018.

               Whyte tells a different story. He claims that “he did not know that [J.R.] was a minor

        when he first met him.” Administrative Record (A.R.) 116. Whyte met J.R. through his

        church, and they grew close as Whyte formed a relationship with the Richards family.

        Whyte claims that J.R. and his brother would spend nights at Whyte’s home, and Whyte

        began to suspect that J.R. was also gay. During one of those visits, Whyte asserts that J.R.

        made advances on him, which Whyte rejected. Whyte believed J.R. was 18 at the time.

               After J.R. told his mother Marie about the sexual assault, Whyte met with Marie in

        January 2020 to deny the allegations. Whyte claims Marie and the Richards family then

        attempted to extort him, demanding money or else they would make public the accusations

        against him. The Richards family then ostensibly began to threaten his life. Whyte claims

        that J.R.’s father, Morris, sent men to Whyte’s home to kill him. According to Whyte, his

        neighbor informed him that a group of men had gathered outside Whyte’s home. Later that

        day, Whyte fled to a hotel room and booked a flight to Baltimore, Maryland. He came to

        the United States on a nonimmigrant visa on January 11, 2020. He eventually resigned

        from the church.

               A Jamaican newspaper, the Jamaica Observer, published four articles in March

        2020 describing the accusations against Whyte. One article, entitled “Pervert Pastor!,”

        accused an unnamed pastor of sexually assaulting a 13-year-old boy. The other articles

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        repeated this allegation. Though the articles did not identify Whyte by name, he claims he

        began receiving hundreds of death threats on social media and messaging apps.

               On March 9, 2020, the Jamaican police obtained two arrest warrants for Whyte, one

        for “bugger[y],” the crime of engaging in anal sex, and one for “indecent[] assault.”

        A.R. 365–66. This led INTERPOL to issue a Red Notice on March 16, 2020. The

        INTERPOL Red Notice, which is a request to law enforcement worldwide to help locate a

        wanted person, sought Whyte’s “provisional arrest” and extradition back to Jamaica. A.R.

        587–88. Whyte was already in the United States by this time. In response to the Red Notice

        and arrest warrants, Whyte’s visa was revoked, and immigration authorities detained

        Whyte on March 25, 2021.

                                                     B.

               The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against

        Whyte. In response, Whyte applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and deferral of

        removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). In support of removal, DHS

        submitted two Jamaican arrest warrants against Whyte, a Form I-213 documenting the

        chain of custody for the arrest warrants, and an investigative report prepared by a detective

        of the Jamaican Constabulary Force, which functions as Jamaica’s police department.

        Whyte objected to including this evidence, arguing that it was unreliable and untimely. The

        record also included the Red Notice and the Jamaican Observer articles.

               The IJ held a hearing on the merits of Whyte’s claims in June 2021. Though Whyte

        testified in a “generally credible manner,” the IJ was not convinced that Whyte was “being

        truthful.” A.R. 121–23. Specifically, the IJ found that Whyte’s story that he was falsely

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        accused of molesting J.R. was not persuasive against the countervailing evidence

        “contained in the Red Notice which is corroborated by articles and by an arrest warrant.”

        A.R. 123. The IJ found there were reasons to believe that Whyte committed a serious

        nonpolitical crime, namely sexual assault against a minor, thereby barring asylum and

        withholding of removal. The IJ also denied Whyte’s deferral of removal under the CAT

        because Whyte had failed to show that he would likely be tortured in Jamaica. The IJ

        reasoned that Whyte “cannot establish eligibility for CAT protection by relying on mere

        speculation or stringing together a series of suppositions unless each step in the

        hypothetical chain of events would lead to his torture to be more likely than not to occur.”

        A.R. 128.

               Whyte appealed the IJ’s ruling to the Board of Immigration Appeals. In January

        2022, the BIA denied Whyte’s appeal and affirmed the IJ’s decision. Whyte filed a timely

        petition for review of the BIA’s decision on January 8, 2022. On March 31, 2022, Whyte’s

        final order of removal was executed, so Whyte has since been returned to Jamaica.

               Whyte now challenges the BIA’s decision, arguing that the BIA erred in concluding

        (1) that there were reasons to believe Whyte committed a serious nonpolitical crime, and

        (2) that Whyte was not entitled to deferral of removal under the CAT.

               When the BIA “affirms and adopts an IJ’s decision and includes its own reasons for

        affirming,” then we review both the BIA and IJ decisions. Cabrera v. Garland, 21 F.4th

        878, 883 (4th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). We review the BIA’s factual

        findings under the “substantial evidence standard,” Quintero v. Garland, 998 F.3d 612,

        621 (4th Cir. 2021), and treat them as “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would

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        be compelled to conclude to the contrary,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). We review the BIA’s

        “legal conclusions de novo.” Quintero, 998 F.3d at 621. Ultimately, “we are bound to

        uphold the BIA’s determinations unless they are manifestly contrary to the law and an

        abuse of discretion.” Tassi v. Holder, 660 F.3d 710, 719 (4th Cir. 2011).

                                                    II.

               We first address the BIA’s finding that Whyte committed a serious nonpolitical

        crime (SNPC), barring him from asylum and withholding of removal. The Immigration

        and Nationality Act (INA) renders an alien ineligible for asylum and withholding of

        removal if “there are serious reasons for believing that the alien has committed a serious

        nonpolitical crime outside the United States prior to the arrival of the alien in the United

        States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(iii) (asylum); id. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(iii) (withholding of

        removal).

               Once the government offers evidence showing serious reasons to believe Whyte

        committed a serious nonpolitical crime, the burden is on Whyte to show that the SNPC bar

        does not apply to him. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(A)(i). In a similar

        context, the Supreme Court has instructed that “any lingering uncertainty” about whether

        the alien has met his burden is “enough to defeat his application for relief.” Pereida v.

        Wilkinson, 141 S. Ct. 754, 761 (2021).

               We first consider whether the agency proffered sufficient evidence establishing

        serious reasons to believe that Whyte committed a serious nonpolitical crime. We then

        address whether Whyte successfully showed the SNPC bar does not apply.

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                                                     A.

              Our sister circuits and the BIA have interpreted the INA’s “serious reasons for

        believing” standard to be equivalent to probable cause. See, e.g., Gonzalez-Castillo v.

        Garland, 47 F.4th 971, 977 (9th Cir. 2022); Barahona v. Garland, 993 F.3d 1024, 1027

        (8th Cir. 2021); Guo Qi Wang v. Holder, 583 F.3d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 2009); Matter of E-A-,

        26 I. & N. Dec. 1, 3 (BIA 2012). Under this standard, a court need not find proof that the

        alien actually committed the alleged crime; it must only find that there is probable cause

        “for believing that the alien has committed a serious nonpolitical crime.” 8 U.S.C.

        § 1158(b)(2)(A)(iii). Courts have found probable cause where the record contains such

        evidence as indictments, arrest warrants, Red Notices, and testimony from the parties

        involved. See, e.g., Villalobos Sura v. Garland, 8 F.4th 1161, 1167 (9th Cir. 2021).

               The IJ and BIA here found probable cause to believe, based on the record before

        them, that Whyte committed a serious nonpolitical crime when he allegedly sexually

        assaulted a young boy. We hold that there was ample evidence in the record to support this

        conclusion, namely arrest warrants, an investigation letter, contemporaneous newspaper

        articles, and an INTERPOL Red Notice.

               First, the agency relied on two arrest warrants, one asserting that Whyte did “bugger

        [J.R.] contrary to common law,” A.R. 353, and another stating that Whyte “indecently

        assaulted [J.R.] contrary to Sec. 13 of the Sexual Offences Act.” A.R. 354. The Form I-213

        introduced by DHS traced the chain of custody of these arrest warrants and confirmed they

        were “certified copies.” A.R. 360.

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               Second, the agency considered the investigatory letter written by a detective within

        Jamaica’s constabulary force, which is responsible for “community policing, special

        response, intelligence gathering, and internal affairs.” A.R. 551. This letter recounted that

        “whilst the suspect was the Pastor of an Adventist Church,” he “buggered [a] twelve year[]

        old boy.” A.R. 352.

               Third, the record contained four articles from the Jamaica Observer that described

        the alleged crimes. Each article accused a pastor within Whyte’s parish of sexually

        assaulting a teenage boy. See A.R. 667–73. These articles did not name Whyte, but he

        conceded that individuals “were able to easily deduce that [he] was the one being referred

        to just based on the descriptions of the places [] and the timeframe.” A.R. 614.

               Last, the agency relied on the INTERPOL Red Notice alleging that Whyte

        committed “Buggery” and “Indecent Assault” against a “12 year old boy” “while the

        suspect was the Pastor of an Adventist Church” in Jamaica. A.R. 587–88. The Red Notice

        included INTERPOL’s official seal, Whyte’s photograph, biographical information, and a

        summary of the facts leading to the charge. Other circuits have noted that a Red Notice on

        its own is not dispositive. See Barahona, 993 F.3d at 1028; Gonzalez-Castillo, 47 F.4th at

        977. When a Red Notice is accompanied by other evidence, however, the agency does not

        err in relying on it alongside corroborating documents. See Villalobos Sura, 8 F.4th at 1168

        (finding Red Notice, arrest warrant, and testimony sufficient).

               The record shows there was no error here. We have held that evidence relied on by

        the IJ and BIA must contain “sufficient indicia of reliability and trustworthiness to support

        its use.” Anim v. Mukasey, 535 F.3d 243, 256 (4th Cir. 2008). Though Whyte contests the

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        accuracy of the evidence against him because it clashes with his story, each piece of

        evidence contained sufficient indicia of reliability for the IJ and BIA to trust its use. Both

        the IJ and BIA found the evidence in its totality established a consistent story: Whyte

        sexually assaulted a young boy while he was a pastor in Jamaica. Taken as a whole,

        therefore, the evidence establishes probable cause that Whyte committed a serious

        nonpolitical crime.

                                                     B.

               Because “the evidence indicates that one or more of the grounds for mandatory

        denial of the application for relief may apply,” Whyte has “the burden of proving by a

        preponderance of the evidence that such grounds do not apply.” 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d).

        Whyte attempts to meet his burden by essentially challenging the sufficiency of the

        evidence against him. While Whyte asserts he was extorted and falsely accused by the

        Richards family, the IJ found that there was probable cause to believe Whyte sexually

        assaulted a young boy.

               The IJ’s resolution of these conflicting versions of events is not a determination we

        can upset on review. Our “task at this juncture is not to reweigh the evidence and determine

        which of the competing views is more compelling.” Mulyani v. Holder, 771 F.3d 190, 200

        (4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). If “the record contains contrary

        evidence of a kind and quality that a reasonable factfinder could find sufficient, a reviewing

        court may not overturn the agency’s factual determination.” Garland v. Ming Dai, 141 S.

        Ct. 1669, 1677 (2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). In weighing the competing

        narratives, the IJ considered Whyte’s credibility against the strength of the surrounding

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        evidence. “[W]here the record plausibly could support two results: the one the IJ chose and

        the one the petitioner advances, reversal is only appropriate where the court finds that the

        evidence not only supports the opposite conclusion, but compels it.” Niang v. Gonzales,

        492 F.3d 505, 511 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).

               Given the evidence discussed above and that Whyte’s chief objection to that

        evidence is that his side of the story should be believed, we find nothing that compels us

        to overturn the ruling below. As we see no merit in any of the remaining assignments of

        error on this issue, we shall uphold the BIA’s ruling.

                                                    III.

               We turn to Whyte’s final claim that the agency erred in its determination that he was

        ineligible for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).

                                                    A.

               Article 3 of the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,

        Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment provides that parties agree not to deport

        “a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would

        be in danger of being subjected to torture.” Turkson v. Holder, 667 F.3d 523, 525 (4th Cir.

        2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). Torture is defined as (1) “any act by which severe

        pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person” in a

        manner that is (2) by, or “with the consent or acquiescence of, a public official.” 8 C.F.R.

        § 1208.18(a)(1) (2012); Herrera-Martinez v. Garland, 22 F.4th 173, 185 (4th Cir. 2022).

               An alien seeking relief under the Convention therefore has the burden to show that

        first “it is more likely than not that he will be tortured if removed” and second that “this

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        torture will occur at the hands of government or with the consent or acquiescence of

        government.” Moreno-Osorio v. Garland, 2 F.4th 245, 256 (4th Cir. 2021) (internal

        quotation marks omitted). Importantly, “judicial review of factual challenges to CAT

        orders . . . is highly deferential.” Nasrallah v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1683, 1692 (2020).

                                                      B.

               The Board determined that Whyte failed to offer evidence that the Jamaican

        government will torture him. We agree for the following reasons. First, Whyte neglects to

        name any public officials who will likely torture him. Instead, he testifies generally that he

        was extorted by police in 2016 when they found him kissing another man. A.R. 276–79.

        This falls short of a showing that the police, much less any specific officers, will torture

        him. Whyte further contends that Jamaica uses its “buggery” laws to sanction violence

        against homosexual men, but this too falls short. Reports from the Department of State

        show that Jamaica enforces its buggery laws only “in cases of sexual assault and child

        molestation,” A.R. 125–26, which is consistent with the charges here. See 8 C.F.R.

        § 1208.16(c)(3)(iv) (allowing for consideration of “[o]ther relevant information regarding

        conditions in the country of removal”). In short, Whyte offers no non-speculative evidence

        that he will be tortured by government officials.

               Whyte must therefore rely on an acquiescence theory to demonstrate likely torture.

        Public officials acquiesce to torture when, “prior to the activity constituting torture, [they]

        have awareness of such activity and thereafter breach [their] legal responsibility to

        intervene to prevent such activity.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(7). “Such awareness requires a

        finding of either actual knowledge or willful blindness,” which “means that the public

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        official acting in an official capacity . . . was aware of a high probability of activity

        constituting torture and deliberately avoided learning the truth.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(7);

        see also Moreno-Osorio, 2 F.4th at 256.

               Whyte fails to offer sufficient evidence here. He claims that he witnessed two gay

        men in his community beaten and stabbed when he was a child, that his life is in danger

        from people on social media and the mob that gathered at his home, and that Jamaican

        officials will turn a blind eye to any harm that results from these threats because of

        pervasive anti-gay sentiment in Jamaica. Yet Whyte’s testimony neither rises to the level

        of a likelihood of torture at the hands of private individuals nor to the level of showing that

        the government will acquiesce.

               Despite the alleged threats on social media and messaging apps from unknown

        individuals and the purported mob outside his home, Whyte could not point to any specific

        instances of harm that he may face, nor could he name any particular individuals or groups

        who might harm him. See Lukunku-Tshibangu v. Lynch, 652 F. App’x 180, 185 (4th Cir.

        2016) (explaining that failure to “specifically identify” those “who would want to harm

        him” weighs against contention that he would be tortured); see also Valle v. Garland, No.

        20-1753, 2022 WL 621784, at *4 (4th Cir. Mar. 3, 2022).

               Whyte also does not present any evidence that he was tortured in the past. 8 C.F.R.

        § 1208.16(c)(3)(i) (“Evidence of past torture inflicted upon the applicant” is relevant to

        whether applicant will be tortured in the future). His claims of likely torture thus amount

        to “predictions” about what will happen in the future, which we have held are factual

        determinations that we leave undisturbed absent clear error. Turkson, 667 F.3d at 529; see

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        also Cruz-Quintanilla v. Whitaker, 914 F.3d 884, 890 (4th Cir. 2019) (holding that “a

        prediction as to ‘what would likely happen’ to the noncitizen if removed” is “a purely

        factual determination”). The IJ and BIA did not commit clear error in its findings here.

               Last, though Whyte presents disturbing evidence of gay people being mistreated in

        Jamaica, he fails to link this general assertion to his individual circumstances. The data

        about Jamaica’s regrettable hostility toward homosexuals is certainly relevant background

        information, see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3)(iii), but it does not show that Whyte “would be

        singled out for torture,” Kerr v. Garland, No. 21-2074, slip op. at 16 (4th Cir. April 24,

        2023). Information about the overall atmosphere in Jamaica, moreover, falls short of

        revealing “actual knowledge or willful blindness” on behalf of Jamaican officials who

        would allegedly acquiesce in Whyte’s torture. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(7). Actual knowledge

        or willful blindness requires a level of specificity about the sources of torture and the

        reaction of those in authority in response to them that is simply lacking in this record. In

        sum, the BIA did not err in finding that Whyte failed to show it was more likely than not

        that he would be tortured if returned to Jamaica.

                                                    IV.

               For the foregoing reasons, the petition is denied.

                                                                                          DENIED

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