Court Opinion

ID: 9729708
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:47:07.544016+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:00.663129
License: Public Domain

Nelson, Justice
(concurring specially).
I respectfully disagree with that portion of the majority opinion which states that the Senate Journal reveals that the senate did not discharge its constitutional and statutory right either to consent to the appointment or to reject it. The question of whether or not there was a confirmation of the appointment of respondent to the Board of Tax Appeals in the instant case is clearly before this court upon the record submitted. The problem is therefore before us and should be decided. It is clear, and the majority opinion so admits, that the appointment of respondent by Governor Andersen was complete and beyond his pleasure to revoke when reported to the senate. It is equally clear that the removal of respondent was beyond the power of Governor Rolvaag, Andersen’s successor, and his appointment is irrevocable unless it was rejected by the senate.
Minnesota’s procedure in filling a vacancy on the Board of Tax Appeals is one of appointment by the governor, in the first instance, and not of nomination; the appointee is not a mere nominee awaiting confirmation, but an officer duly appointed pursuant to statute and in*165vested with the powers, privileges, and responsibilities of the office to which he has been appointed, subject only to senate confirmation.
81 C. J. S., States, § 39, reads in part:
“Under provisions of the constitutions of the several states, each house generally has power to determine its rules of procedure, and in such case proceedings in conformity with the legislative rules are valid where not in conflict with the constitution; but the power of legislative houses to make their own rules is for the purpose of orderly procedure and expedition and disposition of their business, and the failure to comply with such rules does not invalidate resolutions or legislative acts.” (Italics supplied.)
Respondent contends that his appointment was confirmed by the state senate at the 1963 session and that the Senate Journal so indicates. He contends that the requirements of Minn. St. 271.01 with respect to confirmation were fully complied with — first, by the action taken by the senate tax committee on February 28, 1963, when it voted to recommend confirmation and, second, by the action taken by the senate as a whole when the motion to adopt the committee’s report prevailed by a vote of 40 to 21.
Relator disputes this conclusion and contends that the senate failed to comply with the provisions of its own Rule 4, Permanent Rules of the Senate, which reads in part:
“When nominations or appointments made by the Governor which require confirmation by the Senate have been transmitted to the Senate, the final question on every nomination shall be, ‘Will the senate advise and consent to this nomination?’ which question shall not be put on the same day on which the nomination is received, nor on the day on which it may be reported by a committee unless by unanimous consent.”
It is also contended by relator that since the Senate Journal fails to show the putting of the final question to the senate pursuant to Rule A — “Will the Senate advise and consent to this nomination?” — respondent was not legally and in fact confirmed.
It has been held repeatedly by the courts of this country that the mere failure to conform to some defined parliamentary usage’ will *166not invalidate the action when the requisite number of members have agreed on the particular measure.
The important inquiry is whether the number required by law have agreed to the particular measure. If this be so, and it is expressed in a way not inconsistent with the statutory provisions, the fact that the niceties of every parliamentary rule have not been followed does not render the act illegal. See, 4 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3 ed.) § 13.42; Commonwealth ex rel. Fox v. Chace, 403 Pa. 117, 168 A. (2d) 569.
Relator also contends that the word “adopt” as employed by the senate in the present context can in no way connote senate approval or ratification of the committee recommendation because confirmation in that manner bypasses the procedure envisioned in Rule 4. Nevertheless, a reading of the Senate Journal, as well as the proceedings before the senate tax committee, indicates that the words “confirm” and “adopt” were used interchangeably throughout the proceedings.
It is a well-accepted principle of law that legislative bodies are not bound by their own rules of procedure. Cases on the point are collected in 67 C. J. S., Parliamentary Law, § 3b. Such rules are created by the legislative body to insure the orderly conduct of business and the same body which makes them can also waive or simply disregard them at pleasure. See State ex rel. Fox v. Alt, 26 Mo. App. 673, and City of Sedalia v. Montgomery, 109 Mo. App. 197, 88 S. W. 1014, where the court held that legislative action is not rendered invalid because it is violative of the legislative body’s own rules of procedure.
Robert’s Rules of Order Revised (SF) § 54, pp. 223, 229, as well as Mason’s Manual of Legislative Procedure, § 685, states that the adoption of a committee report has the effect of endorsing the statements therein and making the assembly assume responsibility for it.
In Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1961) p. 29, we find that to adopt, when used in reference to a deliberative body, means “to endorse and assume official responsibility (for a resolution of a committee).”
In Black, Law Dictionary (4 ed.) p. 70, the word “adopt” is defined as follows: “To accept, consent to, and put into effective opera*167tion; as in the case of a constitution, constitutional amendment, ordinance, or by-law,” citing Real v. People, 42 N. Y. 270, 282; People ex rel. Clark v. Norton, 59 Barb. (N. Y.) 169; City of Albany v. Nix, 21 Ala. App. 164, 106 So. 199, 200. See, also, Martin v. State, 75 Ga. App. 807, 810, 44 S. E. (2d) 562, 565; and Baugh v. City of LaGrange, 161 Ga. 80, 84, 130 S. E. 69, 71.
Jefferson’s Manual which, pursuant to Rule 51, Permanent Rules of the Senate, governs the procedure of the senate when applicable and not inconsistent with its rules and orders is silent as to the effect of the procedural rules of the senate on the adoption of a committee report.
Robert’s Rules of Order Revised (SF) § 54, pp. 223, 229, states that the adoption or acceptance of a committee report—
“* * * has the effect of endorsing the statement and making the assembly assume the responsibility for it.
*****
“* * * motions to adopt, to accept, etc., are often used indiscriminately, and the adoption of any one of them has the effect of endorsing or adopting the opinions, actions, recommendations or resolutions submitted by the committee * *
In Commonwealth ex rel. Tarner v. Bitner, 294 Pa. 549, 144 A. 733, the court held that there is no difference between a motion and a resolution, and that it is the substance of the corporative act, and not the form, that governs.
In 1 Sutherland, Statutory Construction (3 ed.) § 604, the author has this to say with regard to the effect of a violation or disregard of rules of procedure:
“The decisions are nearly unanimous in holding that an act cannot be declared invalid for failure of a house to observe its own rales. Courts will not inquire whether such rules have been observed in the passage of the act.” (Italics supplied.)
In State ex rel. Lindsey v. Tollison, 100 S. C. 165, 174, 84 S. E. 819, 821, the court held:
*168“* * * [I]n determining what was or was not done by the Senate, the Journal must be considered as a whole, as any other record would be.”
In Gray v. Childs, 115 Fla. 816, 156 So. 274, the court held:
“[The] Legislature is empowered while it is in session to make its records speak truth and to record in its journal true history of proceedings, and proceedings as written and approved by Legislature while in session are controlling data as to session’s proceedings.”
It is the uniform rule that parliamentary rules, such as Rule 4, are merely procedural and not substantive. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body, and courts have no concern with their observance.
Neither will courts invalidate an ordinance enacted in disregard of parliamentary usage if complying with statute. See, South Georgia Power Co. v. Baumann, 169 Ga. 649, 151 S. E. 513; Kerr v. Trego, 47 Pa. 292; 67 C. J. S., Parliamentary Law, §§ 3b and 6.
State ex rel. Fox v. Alt, 26 Mo. App. 673, 676, involved quo warranto proceedings to determine who was the rightful speaker of the St. Louis House of Delegates. The court said:
“The rules [of the House of Delegates] have not, in any proper sense, the force of a public law. They are merely in the nature of by-laws, prescribed for a deliberative body for the ordinary and convenient conduct of its own proceedings. The power that made them can unmake them, or disregard them.” (Italics supplied.)
Commonwealth ex rel. Fox v. Chace, 403 Pa. 117, 168 A. (2d) 569, was a quo warranto proceeding to determine the rightful holder of the office of councilman and the important question involved concerned the noncompliance of a legislative body with its own rules of procedure. In holding that there was substantial compliance with an applicable statute and that the appointment was valid, reflecting the will of the majority, the court said (403 Pa. 122, 168 A. [2d] 572):
“Nor is the appointment invalid because a formal resolution was not enacted. It is the substance of the act of a governing body that is all important, not the form thereof.”
*169In the Chace case the court also pointed out that it is the members of the legislative body alone who have the right to object to the violation of its parliamentary rules and said (403 Pa. 122, 168 A. [2d] 572):
“* * * No one voiced objection to the procedure followed. Under such circumstances, the procedure may not be declared illegal by a court.”
The court further made it clear that mere failure to conform to some defined parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action taken by the legislative body when the requisite number of members have agreed on the particular measure, saying (403 Pa. 119, 168 A. [2d] 571):
“The important inquiry in a matter of this nature is whether the number, as required by law, have agreed to the particular measure. If this be so, and it is expressed in a way not inconsistent with the statutory provisions, the fact that the niceties of every parliamentary rule have not been followed does not render the act illegal.”
See, 4 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3 ed.) § 13.42; Commonwealth ex rel. v. Mayor of Lancaster, 5 Watts (Pa.) 152; and United States v. Ballin, 144 U. S. 1, 5, 12 S. Ct. 507, 509, 36 L. ed. 321, 324.
In Larsen v. City of St. Paul, 83 Minn. 473, 86 N. W. 459, it appears that the charter of the city provided that all appointments to the police force were to be made by the mayor with advice and consent of the council. This court held that no particular form of expressing the council’s advice or consent was required and that it was competent for the council to express its advice and consent to plaintiff’s appointment ■without direct action and to recognize his title to the office so that it could not thereafter be questioned. See, Madden v. Smeltz, 2 Ohio Cir. Q. 168,173.
In Ex parte Mayor, etc. of Albany, 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 277, the court said:
“It is no objection that in conducting the proceeding they [the city council] do not conform to by laws established by themselves to carry into effect the powers conferred upon them.”
In McGraw v. Whitson, 69 Iowa 348, 28 N. W. 632, a new mayor *170and some new aldermen took office between the second and third readings of an ordinance, and it was contended that the ordinance had not been properly enacted. The council had adopted for its parliamentary government Robert’s Rules of Order, one of which provided that unfinished business fell to the ground when the term of service of outgoing aldermen expired. The court said (69 Iowa 350, 28 N. W. 633) that if it should concede that the rule in question became applicable, “the most that could be said is that the council violated one of its own parliamentary rules,” (italics supplied) and held that the violation of such a rule does not invalidate an ordinance which was passed in compliance with the statute. See, also, Mann v. City of LeMars, 109 Iowa 251, 80 N. W. 327.
In City of Sedalia ex rel. v. Scott, 104 Mo. App. 595, 609, 78 S. W. 276, 280, where it had been shown that the council had adopted Cushing’s Manual to govern its parliamentary action and had not complied with its provisions in the proceedings being challenged, the court held:
“* * * [E]ven if it should be conceded that according to the sections of the Manual introduced in evidence, the council did not act on the report, the whole record shows that beyond any doubt the council did take it as a basis of its action. But even if the council had acted out of harmony, or in contradiction of the rules of the Manual, it did no more than it legally might do, since such body is not bound to act in accordance with its rules or by-laws. Such bodies may, and perhaps do, oftener than otherwise, waive them. [Citations omitted.]” (Italics supplied.)
Relator apparently takes the view that there was no action taken by the senate on the confirmation in the instant case. The only possible discrepancy observable is the failure of the Senate Journal to reflect compliance with Senate Rule 4 which the senate might waive or disregard so long as it complied with statutory requirements.
In Heiskell v. Mayor, etc. of Baltimore, 65 Md. 125, 4 A. 116, 57 Am. R. 308, it was held that a municipal corporation cannot, by a rule made by itself, either enlarge or diminish its own powers. Preliminary to making that decision the court said (65 Md. 149, 4 A. 118, 57 Am. R.311):
*171“But these rules of procedure never contravene the statute or common law of the land. When the Constitution of the United States gave to each house of Congress, and the Constitution of the State of Maryland to each house of the General Assembly, the right to determine its rules of proceeding, it was never held for a moment that such a right included the power to change any existing statute or common law; much less can a municipal corporation claim the right under the guise of permission to frame their rules of procedure, such unlimited power. This surely must be conceded by every one; and being so conceded, the next question for us to consider is whether the right to fix a quorum, does contravene any existing law of the land.”
It is therefore clear that a “rule,” as distinguished from a statute or ordinance, is defined as a regulation adopted by a deliberative body for the conduct of its business and its own proceedings. Armatage v. Fisher, 74 Hun (N. Y.) 167, 172, 26 N. Y. S. 364, 367.
On the distinction between directory and mandatory requirements in statutes, and the effect of compliance or noncompliance with such requirements, see 12A Wd. & Phr. (Perm, ed.) p. 164, et seq. See, also, State, by Lord, v. Frisby, 260 Minn. 70, 108 N. W. (2d) 769.
In answering certain questions submitted by the governor about the state’s election laws, the Maine Supreme Court said that requirements which are of the very essence of the thing to be done, and the ignoring of which would practically nullify the vital purpose of the statute itself, are regarded as mandatory and imperative, while those directions or details which are not of the essence of the thing to be done, but are prescribed with a view to orderly conduct, the omission of which would not prejudice the rights of interested parties, are directory unless followed by words of positive prohibition. Questions and Answers, 124 Me. 453, 468, In re Opinion of the Justices, 126 A. 354, 363.
In an early Minnesota case, State ex rel. Parker v. Smith, 22 Minn. 218, 223, this court held that, where a meeting of the council of the city of Duluth was held at which business was transacted which it only had a right to do at a legal meeting, it would be presumed, if necessary, and nothing to the contrary was shown, that all its members were present and acted. The court said:
*172“* * * illegality will not be presumed, but the contrary. The maxim of law in such case is, omnia rite acta presumuntur.”
The following cases reflect the general attitude of the courts where violations of parliamentary or procedural rules have occurred in state legislative assemblies:
In Loper v. State, 82 Minn. 71, 84 N. W. 650, we construed L. 1897, c. 144, amending G. S. 1894, § 7869, with reference to its title in connection with the rules of the legislature in force at the time of its enactment. The amendment was held valid, this court stating (82 Minn. 74, 84N. W. 651):
“Legislative enactments are not to be defeated on account of mistakes, errors, or omissions, provided the intention of the legislature can be collected from the whole statute, and the title and its history may be referred to for that purpose.”
In State v. Savings Bank of New London, 79 Conn. 141, 64 A. 5, the court held that under a constitutional provision declaring that each house of the legislature shall determine the rules of its own proceedings and shall have all powers necessary for a branch of the legislature of a free and independent state, the fact that the house of representatives acted in violation of its own rules or of parliamentary law in a matter clearly within its power in the passage of a statute cannot be reviewed by the courts.
In Goodwin v. State Bd. of Administration, 212 Ala. 453, 102 So. 718, It was claimed that a statute had not been legally passed because the house when acting on it had violated one of its rules. The court, however, said (102 So. 719):
“* * * counsel candidly concede that the authorities are against his contention. The rule not being required by the Constitution, but adopted by the House for its own convenience, the fact that it may have been overlooked or violated in the passage of the act did not impair its validity. [Citation omitted1.]”
In Sweitzer v. Territory, 5 Okla. 297, 299, 47 P. 1094, where the defendant, convicted under a gambling law, claimed that it had not been properly passed by the legislature, the court said:
*173“* * * We have no constitutional provision requiring that the legislature should read a bill in any particular manner. It may, then, read or deliberate upon a bill as it sees fit, either in accordance with its own rules, or in violation thereof, or without making any rules. * * *
“The courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself to govern its deliberations.” (Italics supplied.)
The court in support of its position cited McDonald v. State, 80 Wis. 407, 50 N. W. 185; In re Ryan, 80 Wis. 414, 50 N. W. 187; State v. Brown, 33 S. C. 151, 11 S. E. 641; and Railway Co. v. Gill, 54 Ark. 101, 15 S. W. 18, 11 L. R. A. 452.
In Keenan v. Price, 68 Idaho 423, 195 P. (2d) 662, plaintiff contended 'that because of an error in engrossing a resolution, it had never legally passed the senate. The Idaho Constitution provided that each house when assembled should determine its own rules of proceeding, and certain rules of the senate relative to engrossing and passage of joint resolutions had not been complied with. Plaintiff contended that because of the constitutional provision, these rules had the force of law. The Supreme Court of Idaho said (68 Idaho 437, 195 P. [2d] 669):
“Plaintiff cites no authorities to support such proposition, and we do not accept it. The power of the legislative houses to make their own rules is for orderly procedure and the expedition and disposition of their business. A failure to comply with such rules does not jeopardize or invalidate resolutions or legislative acts. 59 C. J. 575. All that is required as to this constitutional amendment is contained in Article XX, Secs. 1 and 2, and a substantial compliance therewith is sufficient. [Citation omitted.]”
In State v. Cumberland Club, 136 Tenn. 84, 91, 188 S. W. 583, 585, the court said:
“So far as concerns the violation of its own rules by the Senate, this cannot furnish a basis for the court’s annulment of an act. The Senate has the right, under the constitution to make its own rules (Cbnst. art. 2, section 12), and it must be the judge of those rules. All the oourt can do is to ascertain whether the constitution has been complied *174with. If this has been done, we cannot look further. The same question has arisen in other states, and has been decided in the same way.”
In Railway Co. v. Gill, 54 Ark. 101, 105, 15 S. W. 18, 19, 11 L. R. A. 452, affirmed, 156 U. S. 649, 15 S. Ct. 484, 39 L. ed. 567, the court held that:
“* * * -jjje joint rules of the general assembly were creatures of its own, to be maintained and enforced, rescinded, suspended, or amended, as it might deem proper. Their observance was a matter entirely subject to legislative control and discretion, not subject to be reviewed by the courts.”
In McDonald v. State, 80 Wis. 407, 50 N. W. 185, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the courts will take judicial notice of the contents of the journals of the two houses of the legislature far enough to determine whether an act published as a law was actually passed in accordance with constitutional requirements but will not inquire whether the two houses have or have not complied strictly with their own rules in their procedure upon the bill between its introduce tion and final passage. The court said (80 Wis. 412, 50 N. W. 186):
«* * * Further than this the courts will not go. When it appears that an act was so passed, no inquiry will be permitted to ascertain whether the two houses have or have not complied strictly with their own rules in their procedure upon the bill, intermediate its introduction and final passage. The presumption is conclusive that they have done so. We think no court has ever declared an act of the legislature void for noncompliance with the rules of procedure made by itself, or the respective branches thereof, and which it or they may change or suspend at will. If there are any such adjudications, we decline to follow them.” (Italics supplied.)
The fact that Rule 4 was not, in so far as the Senate Journal records, observed by the senate will not of itself invalidate a confirmation made by the senate if it is demonstrated that, although disregarding its own rule, the senate nevertheless agreed in adopting the report of the tax committee recommending the confirmation of respondent’s appointment.
*175As has been suggested by the court in Commonwealth ex rel. v. Mayor of Lancaster, 5 Watts (Pa.) 152, the rule in the instant case was virtually repealed for the occasion when its authority was disregarded by those who had the power to control it, and the act of breaking through it, if not an abrogation, was at least a suspension of it. There is nothing in the Journal of the Senate indicating that anyone voiced objection to the procedure followed.
When, as stated in 62 C. J. S., Municipal Corporations, § 403, the mode of voting is not prescribed by statutory or charter provisions, any reasonable mode may be adopted which is not forbidden by law, which insures to each member the right to vote, and by which the will of the majority can be fairly ascertained. All who voted in the tax committee and all who later voted on the motion put to the senate to adopt the report were legally constituted officials and the action taken by them ought not now, under the circumstances, be ruled out because there is nothing to indicate a compliance with the senate procedural, parliamentary rule which is without force of law, statutory sanction, or invalidating power under any rational view of the applicable law of this state.
I am therefore of the opinion that the senate, as a whole, agreed to the committee report recommending confirmation of respondent’s appointment to the Board of Tax Appeals when the motion to adopt the report prevailed, as indicated by the journal. There is no merit in relator’s contention that the senate failed to confirm simply because its journal does not show compliance with one of its own procedural rules. The clear manifestation of consent shown by the action taken is conduct from which in the light of the circumstances it is reasonable for others to infer consent. The present proceedings to confirm, as shown by the journal, must, without regard to Rule 4, stand as proof conclusive of confirmation according to all constitutional and statutory legal requirements. See, McDonald v. State, supra.
It should therefore be ordered that the writ of quo warranto shnpld be discharged on the ground that respondent’s, appointment has been confirmed by the senate and is beyond the pleasure of the governor to revoke.
*176Knutson, Chief Justice (concurring specially).
I agree with the opinion of Mr. Justice Nelson.
Mr. Justice Sheran took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.