Court Opinion

ID: 9680588
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:34:33.967379+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:29.468396
License: Public Domain

DON WITTIG, Senior Justice, (Assigned).
dissenting
“Is it not possible that an individual may be right and a government wrong? Are laws to be enforced simply because they are made? Or declared by any number of men to be good, if they are not good?.”

Henry David Thoreau, “A Plea for Captain John Brown” 1859

Texas law too often converts the crime of possession of drug paraphernalia into possession of drugs; the stamp is the letter. Today our court turns possession of a glass tube with burn marks on it into a five year tour of the Texas penitentiary. Disingenuous or not, we Texans would hold that an invisible, unweighable substance with a probable mass of .OOOOx grams, i.e. hundredths or even thousandths of a single grain, can be knowingly possessed. The laboratory of the law can see what no man can see.
The corpus of law relied upon in the majority opinion, like Pinoechio’s nose, grows. That law, such as it is, confounds and confuses, but refuses to quantify. That law ever expands, but is justly scrutinized on many fronts, a quantum of which I have already noted.1 Today, let us examine the measure of proof necessary under Texas law to show knowing possession of a controlled substance.
A. The facts are legally insufficient to prove knowing possession beyond a reasonable doubt even under current Texas law.
The majority correctly notes that visibility is no longer an element of the offense of possession of a controlled substance. Cantu v. State, 546 S.W.2d 621, 622 (Tex.Crim.App.1977), overruling Coleman v. State, 545 S.W.2d 831, 835 (Tex.Crim.App.1977). Rather, in order to show intent to possess, a court may rely on a defendant’s “affirmative links” to the substance. See generally King v. State, 895 S.W.2d 701 (Tex.Crim.App.1995). There is no requisite number of “affirmative links.” Rather, it is the “logical force the factors have in establishing the elements of the offense” that is important. See, e.g., Gilbert v. State, 874 S.W.2d 290, 298 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref’d).
*834The attached chart identifies and summarizes prior affirmative links decisions.2 In the chart, those cases that are most similar to the case at bar are shaded. My review of some of the relevant case law shows that courts have relied upon almost anything to affirm a conviction by finding an affirmative link.
The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the “affirmative links” analysis is not actually a legal rule, having no methodology, but is instead shorthand for determining whether knowing possession is proven. Brown v. State, 911 S.W.2d 744, 747 (Tex.Crim.App.1995). The majority opinion today is a good example of the manner in which appellate courts recite from a list of approved affirmative links, thereby giving the affirmative links analysis defacto legal-rule status.3 Links relied upon in prior decisions, taken out of context, may or may not be probative in any given case. Here for example, the majority opinion relies on links emanating predominantly from Chavez. 769 S.W.2d 284 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, writ ref’d). Chavez is distinguishable on at least two fundamental grounds: First, the drugs in Chavez were both visible and of a measurable quantity. Second, the drugs were found in a baggie in Chavez’s pocket. There is no better assurance of knowing possession than finding visible drugs on the defendant’s person.4
The majority opinion cites Villegas for the additional proposition that, presumably, knowing possession derives from the defendant’s control over the car at the time the drugs were found. Again, the problem with reliance on Villegas is contextual. Control of an automobile, whether as occupant, driver or owner, has oftentimes been used by our courts as an affirmative link. Yet it has never been used where the drugs were invisible and immeasurable. In Villegas, for example, the defendant was caught with 90 pounds of cocaine and 150 pounds of pot. The typical car scenarios have been: (1) a single person driving a car he “borrowed” claiming no knowledge of the big stash of drugs in the secret compartment, who is then affirmatively linked as the “sole occupant” or “driver”; or (2) two or more people in a drug-loaded car, the non-car-drivers and non-car-owners of which are then affirmatively linked because the drugs were “on their side of the car” and “easily accessible.”
Diligent research has found no case in which a possession conviction was affirmed where the drugs were: invisible5, unmeas*835urable, and not found on the defendant himself. Accordingly, the result reached in the majority opinion is one more improper extension of existing law.6
B. The cases relied upon in King v. State do not support the rule of law pronounced.
Justice Maloney’s dissent in King v. State properly noted the illegitimate provenance of the law that a substance too small to be measured may form the basis of a conviction for possession. 895 S.W.2d at 706-708. Justice Maloney wrote:
In my view we erroneously relied on Cantu and Reyes in Daniels v. State, 574 S.W.2d 127 (Tex.Crim.App.1978), in holding for the first time that other evidence might be used to prove knowledge for purposes of possession where the quantity of the substance was too small to be measured.
In Cantu, the defendant’s plea admitted that he knowingly possessed heroin. 546 S.W.2d 621, 622 (Tex.Crim.App.1977). In Reyes, the defendant was caught trying to sell drugs, i.e. he represented that the substance at issue was drugs. 480 S.W.2d 873, 374-75 (Tex.Crim.App.1972). The pertinent fact is that in both Reyes and Cantu the defendant affirmatively stated that he knew he possessed drugs, even though the sample turned out to be invisibly small. In Daniels, by contrast, the defendant did not admit the substance existed, yet the conviction for possession of the invisible and unmeasurable was nevertheless (summarily) affirmed.7 Under the facts of this case, I would agree with Justice Maloney that Pelham and Greer should control. Pelham v. State, 164 Tex.Crim. 226, 298 S.W.2d 171 (1957) (acquittal); Greer v. State, 163 Tex.Crim. 377, 292 S.W.2d 122 (1956) (acquittal; trace of narcotic on cotton used to wipe of needle after injection); see also Coleman v. State, 545 S.W.2d 831 (Tex.Crim.App.1977) (acquittal; vial containing unweighable amount of cocaine estimated at 1/28000 of an ounce of cocaine).8
*836The notion that drug possession may be validly proved via nothing more than a liquid rinse of some surface offends common sense. The rule of law accepted in our court today is an abuse of hard science — a rinse analysis like the one performed in this case of virtually any surface is almost certain to yield surprising results. For example, that a rinse of the headliner in any car where people smoked will test positive for the chemicals in the smoke. If the smoke is from a marijuana cigarette and the owner is pulled over, should the driver face prison for drug possession?
The idea that something can be legally “identified” merely through ultra-violet9 or molecular chemical analysis is at odds with our shared human experience and with the ethic that should inform our jurisprudence. When such strained notions become a rational basis for incarceration, the result must be both unconscionable and unconstitutional.
The entire affirmative link doctrine, as too often applied, is the reddest of herrings. It focuses 'our attention away from the reality that drug paraphernalia is drug paraphernalia, not drug possession. Non est factum. The instrument of torture is not torture. A used car not a new car. Truth not fiction. In short, how can one know the unknowable?10 How can the state prove a man knows what a scientist cannot even see or accurately measure? Because I believe our laws should be first and foremost human, rational, and fearlessly true, I respectfully dissent, again.11
*837[[Image here]]

. For failure under Daubert, see Victor v. State, 995 S.W.2d 216, 225 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999) (Wittig dissenting). Consider as well whether five years in prison for possession of something that is invisible, unweighable, and unusable constitutes cruel and unusual punishment? Under similar but not identical circumstances, the court in Cantu held that two years was not cruel and unusual. Are due process concerns implicated where the sample is so small that it cannot even be reliably tested or weighed? Is a substance that has been chemically altered by fire still the same substance? To say possession of a crack pipe, even one that has been used, is knowing possession of drugs is simply false. Has the law come to fictitious convictions, or "is 'is' really is?”

. Every now and then various courts endeav- or to list affirmative links noted in past decisions. These litanies are then recited and relied upon in future decisions in conjunction with whatever new putative links are deemed probative. For this reason, the chart cannot be exhaustive.

. Note the majority opinion announces: "In this case, no less than seven of the suggested links are met.”

. The majority opinion also cites Linton v. State, 15 S.W.3d 615, 619 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet refd). In Linton, the contraband was visible, therefore probably also of a measurable quantity, and the defendant admitted he possessed drugs.

.The majority opinion notes that the arresting officer testified that no white powder was visible on the pipe. The officer said he could only see "blackened burnt spots.” However, the majority elects to place greater emphasis upon the testimony from the chemist that she saw "beige powdery residue” on the pipe. Regardless of whose testimony is correct, the crux of the issue is that "residue” is not cocaine. Burning anything produces “residue." The color of residue produced by fire is usually a combination of brown and black; and, indeed, the residue will be "powdery.” Should we not hold these facts to be self evident? In any event, the obvious truth is that where cocaine is of a measurable quantity, it is usually visible. Where the quantity is not measurable, the cocaine cannot be visible. *835Here the quantity was immeasurable. To this extent, the majority opinion’s assertion that cocaine itself was visible in this case is against the great weight of the evidence, as well as human experience.

. For the state of the law regarding whether visibility of cocaine (as opposed to mere residue), is required, see footnote 8 below. Also note that the included chart specifically distinguishes "residue cases” from cases where the controlled substance (or something looking substantially like it) was actually visible.

. It is extremely noteworthy that white powder “cocaine” was in fact visible in Daniels. The problem for the prosecution was that the cocaine was of such low quality, i.e. so impure, that the amount of cocaine was immeasurable. The presence in the powder of ingredients used to cut cocaine formed the principal affirmative link in the court’s analysis.

. It is unclear from the decision in King whether visibility of cocaine itself, as opposed to mere residue, will suffice, absent the affirmative links present in that case. In King, the pipe was found in the defendant’s pocket, it was still wet with saliva, and the defendant was obviously intoxicated. Justice Clinton's concurrence seemed to accept that cocaine itself had been visible in the pipe. Justices McCormick and Mansfield concurred with the explicit recognition that visibility of the cocaine itself should not be required. Justice Maloney dissented. Because none of the exceptionally probative affirmative links relied upon in King are present in this case, it is possible that the King court would have acquitted this defendant.
In any event, the proper question is not residue. Residue is but a burn mark, like a burnt pipe or a burnt house. The question is minimally what burnt, not whether a match lit some unknown or unknowable substance. A substance burned beyond recognition cannot be visible, especially if it cannot be weighed or measured. In our case modern technology opined contraband less than 10 mg — equivalent to less than 0.0003 ounces. 0.0003 ounces, as a matter of fact and a matter of law cannot be visible. And how *836could such minuscule molecular particles be knowingly possessed? So the law meanders, like a muddled stream or a polluted well. Cf. Pro. 26:26

. The wavelength of UV light is about 2 x 10 7 meters, or two ten-millionths of a meter. Generally speaking, a UV analysis should be capable of resolving objects nearly as small as a single wavelength, i.e. many orders of magnitude smaller than possible with the human eye.

. I refer to the physical world. Again, affirmative links, are used in the sense of circumstantial proof of knowledge. No problem, when there is sixty pounds of pot in the trunk, or perhaps even a syringe in hand and drugs at his feet. But remove the measurable drugs, then such a conviction is not based on science or fact — only affirmative conjecture. Under affirmative conjecture, no one needs to be dead for a murder, and nothing needs to be stolen for theft.

.Since the state and the courts seem unwilling to cease their cecity, I strongly urge the legislature give this area of law a long, logical look.