Court Opinion

ID: 9857858
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 16:03:46.997205+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:46:49.135963
License: Public Domain

KILGARLIN, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. What an anomaly! Had the trial judge followed his initial decision and overruled the motion for new trial without expressing any desire for leniency, he would be affirmed. His refusal to consider an untimely response to the motion for summary judgment would be upheld, where, as here, no excuse was given at the time for the late filing. Rhodes v. City of Austin, 584 S.W.2d 917, 921-22 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1979, writ ref’d n.r. e.). In the absence of a response, summary judgment was proper. City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Authority, 589 S.W.2d 671 (Tex.1979). That would have been that. No appellate court in this state would have had a second thought about affirming the judgment. Here, however, *672because of a desire to do fairness, and give the plaintiff a second chance, the trial judge offered a condition for granting a new trial, which he was not obligated to do. So, we reward his generosity by a reversal. The only possible result of the court’s decision is that trial judges will replace compassionate justice with cold-hearted judicial edicts.
Moreover, it is a tortured reading of the Rules of Civil Procedure by which we allow this result. Regrettably, the court opinion emasculates the obvious intent of Rule 320, Tex.R.Civ.P., to confer discretion on the trial judge. That rule states in pertinent part, “New trials may be granted and judgment set aside for good cause, on motion or on the court’s own motion on such terms as the court shall direct.” (Emphasis added). In spite of this language, this court holds that the trial court in this case may not condition a new trial on payment of attorney’s fees. Does not the court opinion now require us to amend Rule 320 to delete trial court discretion in this area? Are we not professing to understand the circumstances surrounding the trial better than the judge who sat through it?
The torture extends beyond Rule 320. We now equate attorney’s fees with court costs in order to invoke the indigency provisions of Tex.R.Civ.P. 145. I readily accept the concept of indigency affidavits when an inability to pay costs exists. Otherwise, we would be guilty of violating our constitutional guarantee of open access to courts. Tex. Const, art. I, § 13. However, attorney’s fees were conditionally assessed in this case just as sanctions would be assessed for discovery violations. Costs are what clerks receive. No rule exists authorizing indigency affidavits in lieu of paying court-ordered attorney’s fees.
By this opinion, I fear that we open the door for potential violence to the trial judge’s power to assess monetary sanctions for discovery abuse. A major intent behind the adoption of Tex.R.Civ.P. 215 on April 1, 1984, was to clothe the trial judge with greater discretion to apply proper sanctions based on the degree of the abuse involved. See Tex.R.Civ.P. 215, interp. commentary (Vernon 1984).
This court recognized, in amending the rules, that administration of justice would be enhanced by empowering courts to cope with unreasonable delay tactics, meaningless responses, gamesmanship, and the other abuses which thwart the discovery process’ intended orderly search for truth. Kilgarlin & Jackson, Sanctions for Discovery Abuse Under New Rule 215, 15 St. Mary’s L.J. 767, 770 (1984). What will happen now when a trial judge imposes a monetary sanction for discovery abuse? If an indigency affidavit is filed, and not opposed, does the abuse go unpunished? If the affidavit is contested, must the trial judge expend vital court time conducting a hearing to decide if he can enforce the monetary sanction which he has determined? Are we not encouraging the trial judge, who earnestly attempts to obtain compliance with the discovery process, to levy a harsher sanction such as striking of pleadings, dismissal or default, rather than suffer through a contest of a milder ruling ordering attorney fees payment?
Finally, I note that the court approvingly cites United Beef Producers, Inc. v. Lookingbill, 532 S.W.2d 958 (Tex.1976). They do not recite, however, language from the opinion which says “[w]e agree that, as a condition to the granting of his motion for new trial, a defendant should be required to reimburse plaintiff for costs of suit incurred in obtaining the judgment.” Id. at 959. With our decision today, all I can say is sic transit United Beef Producers, Inc. v. Lookingbill and Rule 320, Tex.R.Civ.P.
I would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.
POPE, C.J., and SPEARS and GONZALEZ, JJ., join in this dissent.