Court Opinion

ID: 9399549
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-05 16:12:46.966771+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:30.664816
License: Public Domain

J-A11036-23

    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    CHAD ROBERT GOLDSTROM                      :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 776 WDA 2022

         Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 24, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Armstrong County Criminal Division at
                        No(s): CP-03-CR-0001034-2020

BEFORE:      BENDER, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.:                             FILED: JUNE 5, 2023

        Chad Robert Goldstrom (Goldstrom) appeals from the judgment of

sentence imposed in the Court of Common Pleas of Armstrong County (trial

court) following his jury conviction of one count each of carrying a firearm

without a license, aggravated assault (causing bodily injury with deadly

weapon), and the lesser included offenses of simple assault and recklessly

endangering another person (REAP).1 On appeal, Goldstrom contends that

the trial court erred in omitting from its jury instructions a mens rea culpability

requirement with respect to the non-licensure of his firearm. Applying this

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*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

118 Pa.C.S. §§ 6106(a)(1), 2702(a)(4), 2701(a)(1) and 2705. The jury found
Goldstrom not guilty of several additional charges brought against him in
connection with this incident.
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Court’s decisions in Commonwealth v. Scott, 176 A.3d 283 (Pa. Super.

2017) and Commonwealth v. Arnold, 284 A.3d 1262 (Pa. Super. 2022),2

we vacate the judgment of sentence and remand for a new trial with respect

to the firearms and aggravated assault charges. We affirm with regard to his

conviction for simple assault and REAP.

                                               I.

       This case arises from a November 29, 2020 incident where Goldstrom,

who is a member of the Pagan Motorcycle Club, shot two members of the rival

Outlaws Motorcycle Club, Brian Oss and Justin Shook.      The incident was

captured by video surveillance cameras. Goldstrom shot Shook in the arm

and shot Oss, permanently paralyzing him. Goldstrom claimed he acted in

self-defense in shooting the men because they intended to cause him serious

bodily injury or death because he left the Outlaws and joined the Pagans.

Goldstrom once had a valid license to carry the weapon he used in the

shooting, which purportedly, unbeknownst to him, had been revoked.

       As a result of this incident, the Commonwealth charged Goldstrom with

two counts of Attempted Homicide; two counts of Aggravated Assault with

____________________________________________

2Although Arnold was issued while the instant matter was pending on appeal,
we apply the legal principles in effect at the time of our decision. See
Commonwealth v. Hummel, 2023 WL 2764443, at *2 (Pa. Super. filed April
4, 2023) (explaining that appellate courts apply law in effect at time of
decision and parties are entitled to benefit of any changes in law occurring
before judgment of sentence is final).

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intent to cause serious bodily injury; two counts of Aggravated Assault with

intent to cause bodily injury with a deadly weapon; one count of Carrying a

Firearm Without a License (CFWOL); two counts of Simple Assault; and two

counts of Recklessly Endangering Another Person (REAP).

      Shook testified at Goldstrom’s December 2021 trial that he was standing

on the sidewalk outside of a tattoo shop with his friends Oss and Nathan

Batistig when “I heard a shot go off. I seen by best friend [Oss] fall on the

ground. My first instinct was to run for cover then I got shot.” (N.T. Trial,

12/07/21, at 54-55).    Shook indicated that neither he nor his friends had

weapons in their hands before the shooting. Shook recounted that as he ran

across the street to his truck for cover, a bullet struck him in the arm and

went completely through his bicep. Shook then checked on Oss, who was

lying on the ground screaming for help and sat with him until an ambulance

arrived.

      Batistig similarly testified that he was not holding a weapon in his hand

when he was standing with Shook and Oss outside of the tattoo shop, and he

saw no weapons in their hands. Batistig relayed that the incident “happened

so fast . . . I was standing there talking with my friends and I heard gunshots

and I ran and ducked and that is what I remember.” (Id. at 88). Batistig

then ran over to Oss who was lying on the ground bleeding from his throat.

Batistig acknowledged that he was carrying a knife during the incident and

explained that he usually wears this knife at his side.

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       Oss testified that he is a quadriplegic as a result of the shooting and

recounted that while he was waiting outside of the tattoo shop, “Chad

[Goldstrom] shows up and we have been kind of waiting to go rounds for

awhile because he ducked out on me a couple of times. Basically he had been

selling meth and I don’t like it and I was going to beat him up over it.” (Id.

at 112). They were also at odds because “Goldstrom was a member of our

club and he left our club and went out bad . . . you can leave for certain things

but he joined the Pagans. That is not one of the things you can leave to go

do.”   (Id. at 112-13).    Oss recounted that a verbal argument broke out

between the men as Goldstrom approached, that he never had a weapon in

his hand, and that the knife that he carried remained in a sheath on his hip.

Oss testified that he anticipated “we were going to fist fight . . . and do hand-

to-hand battle that way.” (Id. at 116). Instead, Goldstrom pointed a gun

“right at my face . . . the bullet went right into my jaw, hit me in the spine

and it came out my back.” (Id.).

       On cross-examination, Oss explained that “it became well known that

[Goldstrom] had been moving in and the Pagans were taking over and selling

meth.” (Id. at 119). Oss admitted that leading up to this incident, Goldstrom

avoided him because he was afraid, and that Oss lurched at Goldstrom outside

of the tattoo shop “to beat the hell out of him.” (Id. at 130).

       Goldstrom’s wife, Casey Scalzott, testified that she and Goldstrom

scheduled appointments at the tattoo shop on Sundays to avoid confrontation

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with the Outlaws. As they approached the shop on the day of the incident,

Scalzott realized there was a problem when Goldstrom saw Oss and looked at

her with “terrified, black eyes, just the intention was not good.” (N.T. Trial,

12/09/21, at 27). Goldstrom directed her to go inside the shop and when she

looked outside of its window, she saw Oss lunge at Goldstrom with a silver

blade in his hand. Goldstrom stepped backwards then “pulled out a firearm

and shot,” and they left the scene in a panic. (Id. at 30). Goldstrom threw

his gun out of the car window as they crossed a bridge.

       The testimony pertinent to whether Goldstrom had knowledge that his

gun permit had been revoked is the testimony of Sergeant John Dixon of the

Westmoreland County Sheriff’s Office. He testified that the records check he

conducted showed that Goldstrom’s permit to carry a firearm had been

revoked when a temporary Protection From Abuse (PFA) order was issued

against him. A certified letter was sent to Goldstrom informing him of the

revocation on May 11, 2020.3 The Sherriff’s Office received a receipt from the

postal service indicating that the letter had been delivered to Goldstrom’s

address, and the signature block was signed by “M.S.” (Id. at 65; see also

Defendant’s Exhibit MM, USPS Certified Mail Receipt for Goldstrom dated

5/13/20, marked “Delivered, Left with Individual”). Sergeant Dixon learned

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3  This is consistent with the prescribed notice provision stating that when a
license to carry a firearm is revoked, notice of revocation “shall be sent by
certified mail to the individual whose license is revoked.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 6109(i).

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through speaking with the postmaster that at the height of the COVID-19

pandemic, the postal service changed their practice to mark certified mail as

delivered themselves instead of having the actual person served sign for it,

and that when a letter is marked as delivered to a particular address, it means

that it was given to an individual at the residence.         The Sergeant also

explained that when an individual’s license to carry a firearm is revoked, the

permit holder would need to contact his office to seek reinstatement,

triggering a thorough review before a final decision on reinstatement is made.

Sergeant Dixon testified that he is not aware of any documentation indicating

that Goldstrom sought reinstatement of his license.

      Regarding the firearms offense, Goldstrom maintained he had no

knowledge that his license to carry a firearm had been revoked as part of a

prior PFA proceeding. During opening statements at trial, defense counsel

argued:

            When the PFA hit, part of the order — you will see it — was
      to turn all handguns either to the sheriff or to a third person, which
      he did. He gave it to his parents along with his license. The PFA
      was totally frivolous. A week or two, two and a half weeks later
      the PFA was fully dismissed. There was supposedly a notice from
      the sheriff from Westmoreland County telling him that his license
      was revoked based on the PFA that was dismissed. He never got
      it. He never signed for it. He had no idea about that. He carried
      his gun. After the PFA was dismissed he started carrying it again
      everyday, not special for this incident.

(N.T. Trial, 12/07/21, at 39-40).

      At the charging conference before closing arguments, defense counsel

requested the trial court instruct the jury with regard to the carrying a firearm

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without a license offense that, “[Goldstrom] has to have knowledge it was

revoked. He has to. You can’t find culpability without that.” (Id. at 106).

Although the trial court acknowledged that it could “instruct them regarding

knowingly” and that a scienter requirement “is logical,” 4 the Commonwealth

objected to any modification of the standard instruction. (Id. at 106, 109).

The trial court ruled that defense counsel could argue to the jury that

Goldstrom had to have knowledge of the license revocation and noted that

this mens rea requirement “makes perfect common sense,” but nonetheless

declined to adjust or supplement the standard instruction. (Id. at 109).

       During closing argument, defense counsel again emphasized to the jury

that Goldstrom lacked knowledge of the license revocation:

              Getting back to mens rea, Ladies and Gentlemen, you have
       to know you are committing a crime. It has to be intentional.
       That also applies for here. [Goldstrom] had to know his permit
       was revoked. . . . The only way he would know is to receive this
       letter and he didn’t receive it. Look at it. That is not him. What
       MS whatever. There is no proof here beyond a reasonable doubt
       that he was served with a revocation letter from the sheriffs; knew
       or should have known that his license was revoked because he
       didn’t.

(Id. at 138-139).

____________________________________________

4 See 18 Pa.C.S. § 302(c), infra (setting forth minimum culpability required
in absence of specific mens rea, i.e., that a person acts “intentionally,
knowingly or recklessly.”).

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      The trial court then charged the jury in relevant part as follows on the

carrying a firearm without a license and aggravated assault charges

respectively, in accordance with the standard instructions:

             The defendant has been charged at Count 7 with carrying a
      firearm without a license. To find the defendant guilty of this
      offense, you must find that each of the following three elements
      has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt; first, that the
      defendant carried a firearm concealed on or about his person. The
      definition of firearm includes any pistol or revolver with a barrel
      less than 15 inches. To be a firearm the specific object charged
      must be operable. It is not disputed in this case that the object
      in this case was operable. Obviously it fired bullets. Next, the
      defendant was not in his place of abode, that is his home, or his
      fixed place of business. Third, that the defendant did not have a
      valid and lawfully issued license for carrying the firearm.

(Id. at 172-73).
                                  *    *    *

            If you find that the defendant used a firearm in committing
      or attempting to commit the acts constituting these violations of
      attempted murder or the aggravated assault and that the
      defendant did not have a license to carry that firearm as
      required by law, you may regard that as one item of
      circumstantial evidence on the issue of whether the
      defendant intended to commit those crimes as otherwise
      charged. It is for you to determine what weight — and remember
      by weight I mean the importance — what weight, if any, you will
      give to that item of circumstantial evidence. Evidence of non
      licensure alone is not sufficient to prove that the defendant
      intended to commit those offenses.

(Id. at 170).

      After the court’s closing instructions, defense counsel renewed his

objection to the charge on the firearms offense and noted that while the

standard instruction is typically appropriate, in this case, Goldstrom did have

a license and that in order to find him guilty, “he had to have known it was

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revoked . . .   When the Jury reads the instructions, it is almost like strict

liability . . . [Goldstrom] had to have mens rea in this case . . . he did have a

permit and it was revoked, however, he had no knowledge of the same is

something for [the jury] to decide.” (Id. at 188-189). The Commonwealth

again opposed any change and the trial court found, “your statement is logical

but for some reason it is not contained in the standard instructions” and

declined to modify them. (Id. at 189).

      The jury acquitted Mr. Goldstrom of all charges relating to the shooting

of Oss. As to Shook, the jury convicted Mr. Goldstrom of aggravated assault

(causes bodily injury with a deadly weapon) and the lesser included offenses

of simple assault and REAP. The jury additionally found Mr. Goldstrom guilty

of CFWOL. On March 24, 2022, the trial court sentenced Goldstrom to 18 to

60 months of incarceration for aggravated assault, followed by 24 to 60

months for the firearms offense.      Goldstrom filed post-sentence motions,

which the trial court denied following oral argument.

      Goldstrom timely complied with Rule 1925. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)-(b).

In its 1925(a) Opinion, the trial court addressed Goldstrom’s contention that

a mens rea instruction should have been given. It noted that 18 Pa.C.S. §

6109 had been complied with, in that notice was sent by certified mail to

Goldstrom’s address, and though he did not sign for the certified mail, which

was not a requirement.      It explained that it declined to depart from the

standard jury instruction to include a provision requiring actual receipt or

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knowledge of the revocation because it was for the jury to decide whether he

had actual notice, given that the statutory notice had been provided;

Goldstrom had given his firearm and his license to his parents per the PFA

order; and he never sought to reinstate his license. (See Trial Court Opinion,

8/30/22, at 3-4).

       The court also noted that while it did not depart from the standard jury

instruction, it did give free rein to Goldstrom to argue non-receipt of notice to

the jury which defense counsel did by arguing in both his opening and closing

statements that Goldstrom was unaware that he receive the notice. It then

concluded because Goldstrom never sought to reinstate his license, and

because the notice of revocation was sent as the statute required, there was

sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that Goldstrom knew that

his license had been revoked. (See id.).

                                               II.

                                               A.

       We begin by addressing Goldstrom’s challenges to the sufficiency of the

evidence, as a successful disposition would result in discharge on the pertinent

crime. See Commonwealth v. Spence, 290 A.3d 301, 308 n.4 (Pa. Super.

2023).5 Goldstrom first argues the evidence was insufficient to support the

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5

       In determining whether the evidence was sufficient to support a
       defendant’s conviction, we must review the evidence admitted
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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carrying a firearm without a license offense, based on the Commonwealth’s

failure to prove that he acted intentionally, knowingly or recklessly with

respect to the element of non-licensure, where the evidence showed he had

no notice or knowledge that his once valid license had been revoked.

Goldstrom also maintains that his CFWOL conviction must be reversed where

no notice of revocation was ever served on him and the Commonwealth’s

evidence on this point is speculative.

       “In order to convict a defendant for carrying a firearm without a license,

the Commonwealth must prove that the weapon was a firearm; that the

firearm was unlicensed; and that where the firearm was concealed on or about

the person, it was outside his home or place of business.” Commonwealth

v. Muhammad, 289 A.3d 1078, 1090 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation omitted);

see also 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106(a)(1). As will be discussed in detail infra, the

____________________________________________

       during the trial along with any reasonable inferences that may be
       drawn from that evidence in the light most favorable to the
       Commonwealth as the verdict winner. If we find, based on that
       review, that the jury could have found every element of the crime
       beyond a reasonable doubt, we must sustain the defendant’s
       conviction. Further, a conviction may be sustained wholly on
       circumstantial evidence, and the trier of fact—while passing on the
       credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence—is free
       to believe all, part, or none of the evidence. In conducting this
       review, the appellate court may not weigh the evidence and
       substitute its judgment for the fact-finder.

Commonwealth v. Hummel, 283 A.3d 839, 846 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citations
omitted).

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Commonwealth must establish that a defendant acted intentionally, knowingly

or recklessly with respect to each element of Section 6106, including non-

licensure. See Scott, supra at 291.

      In this case, the evidence reflects through the testimony of Sergeant

Dixon that notice of the license revocation was delivered to Goldstrom’s

residence by certified mail in accordance with the statutory mandate, and that

an individual at that address accepted the letter.        Although Goldstrom’s

signature itself was not on the mail receipt, the jury could reasonably infer

that he was aware that his license to carry had been revoked since there is no

dispute that the notice of revocation had been delivered to his residence, and

that as part of the PFA proceeding, he was aware that he needed to seek

reinstatement of his license to carry. Viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, see Hummel, supra at

846, the evidence was sufficient to establish that Goldstrom was aware of the

license revocation. Accordingly, his first sufficiency challenge merits no relief.

                                       B.

      Goldstrom also disputes the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his

aggravated assault, simple assault and REAP offenses.         (See Goldstrom’s

Brief, at 55-64).    Goldstrom contends that the Commonwealth failed to

disprove that he acted in self-defense when he shot Shook once in the arm

after he was confronted by multiple members of the Outlaws who had a

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vendetta against him because he had left their motorcycle club to join the rival

Pagan club.

      A person is guilty of aggravated assault under 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(4)

when he “attempts to cause or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury

to another with a deadly weapon.” A defendant is guilty of simple assault if

he “attempts to cause or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily

injury to another.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2701(a)(1). The Crimes Code defines bodily

injury as “impairment of physical condition or substantial pain.” 18 Pa.C.S. §

2301. Lastly, if found guilty of REAP, the Commonwealth must prove that the

defendant “recklessly engage[d] in conduct which place[d] or may [have]

place[d] another person in danger of death or serious bodily injury.”        18

Pa.C.S. § 2705.

      Goldstrom maintains that he is not guilty of these offenses because he

acted in self-defense, which is addressed in Section 505 of the Crimes Code:

      § 505. Use of force in self-protection

      (a) Use of force justifiable for protection of the person.─The
      use of force upon or toward another person is justifiable when the
      actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for the
      purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by
      such other person on the present occasion.

      (b) Limitations on justifying necessity for use of force.

                                  *     *      *

            (2) The use of deadly force is not justifiable under this
      section unless the actor believes that such force is necessary to
      protect himself against death, serious bodily injury, kidnapping or

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      sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat; nor is it justifiable
      if:

                  (i) the actor, with the intent of causing death or
      serious bodily injury, provoked the use of force against himself in
      the same encounter; or

                   (ii) the actor knows that he can avoid the necessity of
      using such force with complete safety by retreating, except the
      actor is not obliged to retreat from his dwelling or place of work,
      unless he was the initial aggressor or is assailed in his place of
      work by another person whose place of work the actor knows it to
      be.

18 Pa.C.S. § 505(a)-(b)(2)(i)-(ii).

      “If a defendant introduces evidence of self-defense, the Commonwealth

bears the burden of disproving the self-defense claim beyond a reasonable

doubt.” Commonwealth v. Steele, 234 A.3d 840, 846 (Pa. Super. 2020)

(citation omitted). The use of force against a person is justified “when the

actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of

protecting himself against the use of unlawful force” by the other person. 18

Pa.C.S. § 505(a). A self-defense claim is composed of three elements: “(1)

the defendant reasonably believed that he was in imminent danger of death

or serious bodily injury and that it was necessary to use deadly force against

the victim to prevent such harm; (2) the defendant was free from fault in

provoking the difficulty which culminated in his use of deadly force; and (3)

the defendant did not violate any duty to retreat.”       Steele, supra at 846

(citation omitted).

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       In this case, the evidence was sufficient to disprove Goldstrom’s claim

of self-defense with regard to Shook, who he shot while he was running away.

The jury considered the testimony of the witnesses and weighed it in

conjunction with the video surveillance footage of incident, and was free to

believe Shook’s version of events instead of the defense theory of the case.

Because Shook posed no threat to Goldstrom when Goldstrom shot him, the

evidence does not support Goldstrom’s claim of self-defense with regard to

the charges and he was not justified in shooting Shook to protect himself.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence was

sufficient to sustain Goldstrom’s convictions for aggravated assault, simple

assault and REAP.

                                           III.

                                               A.

       We next turn to Goldstrom’s issues concerning the trial court’s jury

instructions. Goldstrom first contends that the trial court erred in failing to

issue any mens rea instruction to the jury with respect to the non-licensure

element of the carrying a firearm without a license offense.6 Goldstrom points

to this Court’s decisions in Scott and Arnold, supra, in support of his position

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6 “Our standard of review when considering the denial of jury instructions is
one of deference – an appellate court will reverse a court’s decision only when
it abused its discretion or committed an error of law.” Commonwealth v.
Sebolka, 205 A.3d 329, 342 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted).

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that the standard instruction was inadequate and should have been modified

or supplemented given his defense of lack of knowledge of his license

revocation. (See Goldstrom’s Brief, at 28-43). We agree.

      In reviewing a challenge to jury instructions, we do not “rigidly inspect

a jury charge, finding reversible error for every technical inaccuracy, but

rather evaluate whether the charge sufficiently and accurately apprises a lay

jury of the law it must consider in rendering its decision.” Commonwealth

v. Johnson, 289 A.3d 959, 1002 (Pa. 2023) (citation omitted). Additionally,

the trial court “may use its own expressions of the law, so long as the concepts

at issue are accurately presented.” Id. (citation omitted). The Suggested

Standard Jury Instructions are not binding and are guides only for courts to

use in crafting appropriate jury instructions.      See Commonwealth v.

Simpson, 66 A.3d 253, 274 n.24 (Pa. 2013).

      In this case, Goldstrom maintains that the element of non-licensure

requires a culpable mental state and that the jury should have been instructed

accordingly.   In Scott, this Court considered whether the Commonwealth

must establish mens rea for the element of concealment in order to obtain a

carrying a firearm without a license conviction under Section 6106, although

the statutory language does not include an express scienter requirement with

respect to any of its elements. The Court observed that our Supreme Court

has held that “[section] 302 provides the default level of culpability where a

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criminal statute does not include an express mens rea.” Scott, supra at 290

(citing Commonwealth v. Moran, 104 A.3d 1136, 1149 (Pa. 2014)).

       Section 302(c) of the Crimes Code states:

       (c) Culpability required unless otherwise provided.—When
       the culpability sufficient to establish a material element of an
       offense is not prescribed by law, such element is established if a
       person acts intentionally, knowingly or recklessly with respect
       thereto.

18 Pa.C.S. § 302(c).

       The Scott Court explained that strict liability offenses are generally

disfavored, and a statute will not be interpreted to dispense with a mens rea

requirement absent indicia of legislative intent to do so. See Scott, supra at

291. It held with regard to Section 6106 that because there is no indication

the legislature intended to impose strict liability for the crime, “the

Commonwealth must establish that a defendant acted intentionally, knowingly

or recklessly with respect to each element” of Section 6106. Id. (citation

omitted; emphasis added).

       This Court’s more recent decision in Arnold, supra, is also instructive.

In that case, we examined the offense of Contraband,7 which does not include

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7 Section 5123 of the Crimes Code defines the offense of Contraband as
follows:

       A person commits a felony of the second degree if he sells, gives,
       transmits or furnishes to any convict in a prison, or inmate in a
       mental hospital, or gives away in or brings into any prison, mental
       hospital, or any building appurtenant thereto, or on the land
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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an express scienter requirement, and the constitutionality of the court’s use

of the standard instruction defining the offense to the jury. After noting that

the concept of due process includes a degree of protection against the

imposition of criminal liability without criminal intent on the part of the

defendant, the Arnold Court determined that the offense contains a default

mens rea of recklessness provided by Section 302(c) in the absence of an

express scienter requirement. See Arnold, supra at 1275. The Court then

addressed the trial court’s issuance of only the standard jury instruction for

the offense without any supplemental mens rea guidance for the jury, over

the objection of defense counsel.          The Court ascertained no defect in the

standard instruction itself, but nonetheless found reversible error and held:

             The constitutional defect in this case stemmed not from the
       court’s reading the standard instruction for the offense to the jury
       but, instead, from the trial court’s omission of an
____________________________________________

       granted to or owned or leased by the Commonwealth or county
       for the use and benefit of the prisoners or inmates, or puts in any
       place where it may be secured by a convict of a prison, inmate of
       a mental hospital, or employee thereof, any controlled substance
       included in Schedules I through V of the act of April 14, 1972 (P.L.
       233, No. 64), known as The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device
       and Cosmetic Act, (except the ordinary hospital supply of the
       prison or mental hospital) without a written permit signed by the
       physician of such institution, specifying the quantity and quality
       of the substance which may be furnished to any convict, inmate,
       or employee in the prison or mental hospital, the name of the
       prisoner, inmate, or employee for whom, and the time when the
       same may be furnished, which permit shall be delivered to and
       kept by the warden or superintendent of the prison or mental
       hospital.

18 Pa.C.S. § 5123(a).

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      accompanying instruction relaying the default mens rea
      from Section 302(c) and/or from the trial court’s failure to
      issue a [supplemental] instruction given the nature of
      Appellant’s testimony. Because of the trial court’s error in
      issuing a jury instruction for Section 5123(a) without also defining
      the default mens rea provided by Section 302(c), Appellant is
      entitled to a new trial for that offense.

Id. at 1276 (case citation omitted).

      In this case, the Commonwealth was required to establish that

Goldstrom had actual notice that his license to carry a firearm had been

revoked, which may be proven by a collection of facts and circumstances that

allow the fact finder to infer that a defendant has knowledge of suspension.

See Commonwealth v. Kane, 333 A.2d 925 (Pa. 1975); Commonwealth

v. Crockford, 660 A.2d 1326, 1330-31 (Pa. Super. 1995). While Goldstrom’s

counsel was permitted to argue to the jury that Goldstrom did not have actual

knowledge that his license had been revoked, that was not a substitute for the

trial court giving a mens rea jury instruction.

      As in Arnold, we conclude the trial court’s lack of instruction on men

rea sufficiently tainted its jury charge to a degree that a new trial is warranted

on the firearms offense. The defense presented a clear theory that Goldstrom

was never served with notice that his once-valid concealed carry license had

been revoked. Consistent with this defense, counsel repeatedly asked the

trial court to instruct the jury on a scienter element, but the court declined to

do so in spite of its acknowledgment that this request was logical and made

common     sense.     In   reading   the   standard   instruction   without   any

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accompanying guidance on a minimum culpability requirement as provided by

Section 302(c), the court relieved the Commonwealth of its obligation to

establish mens rea and removed from the jury’s consideration Goldstrom’s

only defense to the offense. We, therefore, vacate Goldstrom’s judgment of

sentence for the carrying a firearm without a license conviction.

                                       B.

      In a related issue, Goldstrom contends the trial court’s use of the

standard jury instruction for the aggravated assault charge, which included a

permissive inference arising from his use of a firearm without a license to

carry, was also legally deficient. Goldstrom argues that while the instruction

is correct on its face, its use in this case was tainted by the trial court’s

erroneous omission of a mens rea requirement from the jury charge on the

firearms offense. (See Goldstrom’s Brief, at 43-48; see also supra at *8

(trial court’s instruction permitting jury to regard Goldstrom’s use of a firearm

without a license to carry as circumstantial evidence of his intent to commit

aggravated assault)). We agree.

      We first note that “[i]nferences and presumptions are staples of our

adversary system of factfinding” and can be either mandatory or permissive

in nature. Commonwealth v. Hall, 830 A.2d 537, 544 (Pa. 2003) (citation

omitted). A mandatory presumption “tells the trier of fact that he must find

the elemental fact upon proof of the basic fact.” Id. (citation omitted). In

contrast, a permissive inference allows but does not require the factfinder to

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infer the elemental fact from proof of the basic fact, and the basic fact may

constitute prima facie evidence of the elemental fact. See id.

      In Commonwealth v. Sattazahn, 631 A.2d 597 (Pa. Super. 1993),

this Court explained the reasoning for use of a permissive inference in the

context of a defendant’s carrying of an unlicensed firearm in the commission

of another crime:

             We [] find a rational connection between the licensing or
      failure to license a firearm and the intent with which a person acts
      in using that firearm. The legislature has recognized a distinction
      between prohibited offensive weapons which have no peaceful
      purpose and shall not be allowed to exist in our society, and those
      which have peaceful as well as lethal possibilities. The former are
      banned absolutely because criminal usage is conclusively
      presumed, while the latter are allowed, if licensed. The obtaining
      of a license is tantamount to an acknowledgment that the
      possession is for lawful purposes; the failure to obtain a license
      suggests the opposite. One who envisions no criminal purpose for
      the firearm is unlikely to refuse, if required, to declare his
      ownership of that weapon to the proper authorities, while one who
      harbors criminal intentions will. This is not to say that in every
      instance the lack of a license suggests criminal intent, but rather
      that a lack of required license is simply another piece of
      circumstantial evidence from which the true intent of the user of
      a firearm might be ascertained in a given situation.

            Although this case involves whether Appellant had a license
      to carry the firearm, rather than a license merely to own the
      firearm, the same reasoning is sound in reaching the result that
      there is a rational connection between the licensing and the intent
      to commit criminal acts with that firearm.

Id. at 606, n.6 (citation omitted).

      In this case, because the trial court did not instruct the jury to evaluate

whether Goldstrom acted intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly with respect

to non-licensure, the jury was deprived of the opportunity to meaningfully

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consider whether his use of a firearm without a license to carry as

circumstantial evidence of his intent to commit aggravated assault and, if so,

what weight to assign it as circumstantial evidence. Because the trial court’s

legally deficient instruction to the jury concerning the firearms offense tainted

the jury’s deliberation and determination of Goldstrom’s guilt as to aggravated

assault, he is entitled to a new trial for this offense.

      Judgment of sentence vacated. Simple Assault and REAP convictions

affirmed.   Case remanded for a new trial on the aggravated assault and

carrying a firearm without a license offenses. Jurisdiction relinquished.

      PJE Bender joins the memorandum.

      Judge Stabile concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 6/5/2023

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