Court Opinion

ID: 9701727
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 22:34:36.509324+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:08:56.032857
License: Public Domain

Opinion by
Mr. Chief Justice Horace Stern,
The court below correctly decided that plaintiff had no legal standing to institute these proceedings.
The action is one of mandamus. Plaintiff, Dr. John L. Dorris, filed a complaint in his capacity as County Chairman of the Democratic Party, but averred that he was proceeding also on behalf of the Democratic candidates who ran for office on the Democratic ticket *476in 1952, State and National, and by and on behalf of the Democratic candidates who will aspire for office on the Democratic ticket in 1953, State and Local, and by and on behalf of the Democratic party of Luzerne County. The defendants are the County Commissioners of Luzerne County acting as the Registration Commission and as the Board of Elections of Luzerne County.
In substance the complaint avers that defendants have neglected and wilfully refused to perform the duties imposed upon them by law, more especially those provided in the Act of June 3, 1937, P.L. 1333, Art. Ill, Sec. 302 (g) as follows: “To instruct election officers in their duties, calling them together in meeting whenever deemed advisable, and to inspect systematically and thoroughly the conduct of primaries and elections in the several election districts of the county to the end that primaries and elections may be honestly, efficiently, and uniformly conducted.” And (i): “To investigate election frauds, irregularities and violations of this act, and to report all suspicious circumstances to the district attorney.”
The complaint detailed some alleged instances in which defendants did not perform these duties, and it prayed that they be commanded to abide by and comply with the laws of the State of Pennsylvania and to carry out the duties of inspection, investigation and report set forth in the portions of the act above quoted. Defendants moved to strike off the complaint, and the court, treating this motion as in the nature of preliminary objections, entered judgment in favor of the defendants, from which order plaintiff now appeals.
The Mandamus Act of June 8, 1893, P.L. 345, Section 3, provides that “The writ of mandamus may issue upon the application of any person beneficially *477interested.” Section 4 provides that “When the writ is sought to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the proceeding shall be prosecuted in the name of the Commonwealth on the relation of the Attorney General: Provided however, That said proceeding in proper cases shall be on the relation of the district attorney of the proper county: . . .”
Even before the passage of the act it had been uniformly held that when public rights are to be sub-served only public officers may, ordinarily, apply for the writ, and that a private individual cannot do so unless he can show some particular right or privilege of his own independent of that held in common with the public at large: Heffner v. The Commomoealth ex rel. Kline, 28 Pa. 108; Commonwealth ex rel. Snyder v. Mitchell, 82 Pa. 343. Since the passage of the act there have been numerous authorities holding to the same effect, namely that, where the duty of an officer under a statute is a public one, it can be enforced only at the suit of the attorney general or the district attorney of the proper county or by a private citizen who has a specific and independent legal right or interest in himself different from that of the public at large or who has suffered an injury special and peculiar to himself: Stegmaier v. Jones, 203 Pa. 47, 52 A. 56; Davidson v. Beaver Falls Council, 348 Pa. 207, 34 A. 2d 505; Kulp v. Board of Inspectors of Berks County Prison, 102 Pa. Superior Ct. 310, 156 A. 547; Butcher v. Philadelphia Civil Service Commission, 163 Pa. Superior Ct. 343, 61 A. 2d 367. It is necessary too, in order to entitle a private citizen to enforce a public duty, that his interest or his injury be different not merely in degree but also in kind and nature from that of the general public: Commonwealth ex rel. The Attorney General v. Mathues, 210 Pa. 372, 376, 59 A. 961, 963.
*478It does not here appear that plaintiff as an individual or in his representative capacity had any grievance to be redressed or any right to assert that would not be common to the public at large in Luzerne County. The alleged failure of defendants to inspect systematically and thoroughly the conduct of primaries and elections and to investigate election frauds is something that affects the good government of the county and the welfare of all the citizenry. There is nothing to show that plaintiff is more peculiarly affected thereby than others or that he has suffered any injury different in kind from that of the general public.
There are other reasons why the complaint in these proceedings must fail. Mandamus lies only to compel the performance by a public officer of a ministerial duty and, while there undoubtedly are some duties imposed by law upon county boards of election that are purely ministerial, it is gravely doubtful whether the inspection of the conduct of primaries and elections and the investigation of election frauds do not involve the exercise of a broad range of discretion in the manner and extent of their performance. Moreover, a fatal objection to the granting of the relief here sought is the fact that, as stated in 55 C.J.S., 109, 110, §66: “The ordinary office of the writ of mandamus is to coerce the performance of single acts of specific and imperative duty, . . .; and ordinarily it is not an appropriate remedy to compel a general course of official conduct or a long series of continuous acts, to be performed under varying conditions, . . .”. To this there is added in 34 Am. Jur. 864, §74: “It is plain that where the court is asked to require the defendant to adopt a course of official action, although it is a course required by statute and imposed upon the official by law, it would be necessary for the court to supervise, generally, his official conduct, and to *479determine in numerous instances whether he has, to the extent of his power, carried out the mandate of the court. It would in effect render the court a supervising and managerial body as to the operation and conduct of the activity to which the writ pertains, and so keep the case open for an indefinite time to superintend the continuous performance of the duties by the respondent. Accordingly, the writ will not issue to compel the performance of a series of acts by a judicial officer;. . . nor to compel performance of other acts of a continuous nature.” That mandamus will not lie to compel the pursuance of a general course of official conduct and the performance of continuous duties has been generally held: Murphey v. Brock, 206 Ga. 9, 55 S.E. 2d 564; Diamond Match Co. v. Powers, 51 Mich, 145, 16 N.W. 314; State ex rel. Hawes v. Brewer, Sheriff, 39 Wash. 65, 80 P. 1001; People ex rel. Bartlett v. Dunne, Mayor, 219 Ill. 346, 76 N.E. 570. It is obvious that to mandamus these defendants to perform the duties of their office which are set forth in the complaint would be to make the court a continuing supervisor of not only the good faith but also the ability with Avhich they Avill hereafter perform the duties of their office, for it is to be noted that the complaint does not contemplate an order upon them to act with reference to some past event, but rather to behave themselves in the future. That, of course, is not the proper function of a mandamus.
The judgment is affirmed.