Court Opinion

ID: 9666604
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:22:04.644777+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:31.058505
License: Public Domain

RICKHOFF, Justice,
dissenting.
Because “the scriveners of indemnity agreements have devised novel ways of writing provisions which fail to expressly state the true intent of those provisions,” we must adhere ever so closely to the express negligence doctrine. Ethyl Corp. v. Daniel Constr. Co., 725 S.W.2d 705, 707 (Tex.1987). If Ethyl requires an express statement of ordinary negligence before supporting indemnification, we should similarly require an unambiguous statement that gross negligence is covered.
The majority cites our opinion in Newman v. Tropical Visions, Inc., 891 S.W.2d 713, 721 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1994, writ denied), which I authored, to support the proposition that no exact line can be drawn between negligence and gross negligence. In Newman, the express negligence doctrine was not raised. Id. at 720. Furthermore, there are distinct differences between negligence and gross negligence, as illustrated by Transportation Insurance Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 21 (Tex.1994), and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Alexander, 868 S.W.2d 322, 326 (Tex.1993). If an indemnity contract does not mention “gross negligence” specifically, we should not hold, as a matter of law, that the contract covers it.
Respectfully, I dissent.