Court Opinion

ID: 9825829
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 14:07:28.528864+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:24:54.102122
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: AUGUST 25, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                 Commonwealth of Kentucky
                              Court of Appeals
                               NO. 2022-CA-1100-MR

MARCELLA CORNETT                                                       APPELLANT

                   APPEAL FROM PERRY CIRCUIT COURT
v.                 HONORABLE ALISON C. WELLS, JUDGE
                         ACTION NO. 20-CI-00282

TERRI CORNETT, AS
ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE
OF JEFFERY CORNETT                                                       APPELLEE

                                     OPINION
                                    AFFIRMING

                                   ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: DIXON, GOODWINE, AND KAREM, JUDGES.

DIXON, JUDGE: Marcella Cornett appeals the order granting summary judgment

to Terri Cornett, as Administratrix of the Estate of Jeffery Cornett, entered by the

Perry Circuit Court on August 23, 2022. Following a careful review of the record,

briefs, and law, we affirm.
            BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

                Marcella Cornett and her son Jeffery Cornett, now deceased, were

neighbors, and both were employed by the Perry County Fiscal Court to work at

the Perry County Senior Citizens Center (the Center). Jeffery drove a van1 daily to

and from the Center, providing transportation for his mother and others. On

December 18, 2018, Jeffery picked up Marcella, and on their way to pick up

another passenger, Jeffery had a coughing attack, lost consciousness, and the van

careened off an embankment. Both Jeffery and Marcella were injured in the

accident and paid workers’ compensation benefits; neither returned to work.

                Marcella sued her employer, the van’s owner, and her son’s estate.

An agreed order was eventually entered dismissing Marcella’s complaint, without

prejudice, against all defendants except her son’s estate. The estate moved the trial

court for summary judgment, asserting Marcella’s sole remedies are through

workers’ compensation. After the matter was fully briefed, the trial court granted

summary judgment in favor of the estate. This appeal followed.

                               STANDARD OF REVIEW

                Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, stipulations, and admissions on file, together with the

1
    The van was owned by the Leslie Knott Letcher Perry County Action Council.

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affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” CR2 56.03.

“[T]he proper function of summary judgment is to terminate litigation when, as a

matter of law, it appears that it would be impossible for the respondent to produce

evidence at the trial warranting a judgment in his favor.” Steelvest, Inc. v.

Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 1991).

                An appellate court’s role in reviewing an award of summary judgment

is to determine whether the trial court erred in finding no genuine issue of material

fact exists, and the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky. App. 1996). A grant of summary

judgment is reviewed de novo because factual findings are not at issue. Pinkston v.

Audubon Area Cmty. Servs., Inc., 210 S.W.3d 188, 189 (Ky. App. 2006) (citing

Blevins v. Moran, 12 S.W.3d 698 (Ky. App. 2000)).

                Here, because the trial court granted summary judgment to the estate,

we review the facts in a light most favorable to Marcella and resolve all doubts in

her favor. Applying the Steelvest standard, and based on the record, we agree with

the trial court that there was no genuine issue of material fact. Therefore, we

conclude that summary judgment was proper.

2
    Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.

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                                     LEGAL ANALYSIS

                On appeal, Marcella argues that summary judgment was improper

because she was not in the course of employment at the time of the accident.

Marcella was not obligated to ride in the van and occasionally rode to work with

her husband instead.3 She contends that, unlike her son, her workday did not begin

until she arrived at the Center each day, and she was not paid for her time spent

commuting. She further asserts that although she assisted seniors boarding the van

and during the commute, these gestures were not part of her employment but,

rather, simply acts of compassion and kindness.

                It is well-established that “[t]he general rule is that injuries sustained

by workers when they are going to or returning from the place where they

regularly perform the duties connected with their employment are not deemed to

arise out of and in the course of the employment as the hazards ordinarily

encountered in such journeys are not incident to the employer’s business.”

Receveur Const. Co./Realm, Inc. v. Rogers, 958 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Ky. 1997). This

rule is often labeled the “coming and going rule.”

                “However, this general rule is subject to several exceptions. For

example, transitory activities of employees are covered if they are providing some

service to the employer, i.e., service to the employer exception.” Id. “Thus, work-

3
    According to her deposition testimony, Marcella does not drive.

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related travel has come to mean travel which is for the convenience of the

employer as opposed to travel for the convenience of the employee.” Id. See

Farris v. Huston Barger Masonry, Inc., 780 S.W.2d 611 (Ky. 1989) (since the

employer had knowledge of, supported the practice of, and benefitted from its

employees carpooling, and as the co-workers were running an errand and, thus,

providing a service for the employer during the time in question, their injuries were

work-related); State Highway Comm’n v. Saylor, 252 Ky. 743, 68 S.W.2d 26

(1933) (notwithstanding the fact that the employer was not obliged to furnish the

worker transportation and that the pay of the worker started only when he began

his work at the actual jobsite, the practice of the employer to convey its employees

to the jobsite was clearly in the interest of the employer as it enabled the workers

to begin work sooner without being hindered by the distances between the jobsites

and their residences; hence, there was an implied contract that the employer would

transport this worker, and it would be considered part of the employment contract).

             Another exception to the coming and going rule is the “employer

operating premises/conveyance” exception that “an employer is responsible for

work-related injuries that occur on its entire ‘operating premises’ and not just at the

injured worker’s worksite. . . . Of particular concern in making that determination

is the extent to which the employer could control the risks associated with the area

where the injury occurred.” Pierson v. Lexington Public Library, 987 S.W.2d 316,

                                          -5-
318 (Ky. 1999). The trial court found this case fits within that exception, but even

if it did not, Marcella’s employer decided to provide coverage and pay her

workers’ compensation benefits.

               The interpretation and scope of exceptions to the coming and going

rule are questions of law this Court reviews de novo. We find it unnecessary under

the circumstances, however, to determine if, or which, coming and going rule

exceptions apply to the case herein as the outcome remains the same.

               It is well-settled that:

               Workers’ compensation is a creature of statute, and the
               remedies and procedures described therein are exclusive.
               [Morrison v. Carbide & Carbon Chems. Corp., 278 Ky.
               746, 129 S.W.2d 547, 549 (1939).] When an employer
               and employee submit themselves to the provisions of the
               act, their rights and liabilities are henceforth to be
               measured by the terms of the act. Id. at 550. A right
               created by statute cannot be defeated by the application
               of a common law principle. Eversole v. Eversole, 169
               Ky. 793, 185 S.W. 487, 488 (1916). Thus, any analysis
               of a workers’ compensation issue is necessarily an
               exercise in statutory interpretation.

Williams v. Eastern Coal Corp., 952 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Ky. 1997).

               Marcella was paid and accepted workers’ compensation benefits;

therefore, her remedies lie under the Workers’ Compensation Act (the Act).4 KRS

342.690 provides in pertinent part, “If an employer secures payment of

4
    Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) Chapter 342.

                                             -6-
compensation as required by this chapter, the liability of such employer under this

chapter shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employer to the

employee[.]” (Emphasis added.) It further provides that this exemption from

liability extends to employees. Id. Since Jeffery was an employee acting within

the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident, as evidenced

by his receipt of workers’ compensation benefits, the employer’s exemption from

liability extends to him and, by further extension, to his estate.

             Even so, Marcella contends that the Act does not apply because her

injury did not arise out of and in the course of her employment. This discounts the

language of the statute which merely requires the employer to secure payment of

compensation to trigger the Act’s exclusive remedies. Id. It also ignores the fact

that she accepted those benefits. It further disregards the fact that Marcella was

sent at least one letter from the Commissioner of Kentucky’s Department of

Workers’ Claims about benefits which were paid to her “as a result of a work-

related injury[,]” explaining how she could receive additional benefits. “It seems

clear to us that in the event of an accident arising out of and in the course of

employment, where the employer and the employee have elected to operate under

[the Act], compensation may only be obtained in a proceeding before the

Workmen’s Compensation Board (except for an intentional injury[).]” Davis v.

                                          -7-
Solomon, 276 S.W.2d 674, 676 (Ky. 1955). Thus, the trial court did not err in

dismissing Marcella’s claim against Jeffery’s estate.

             Marcella’s final argument concerns KRS 342.650(7) and KRS

342.660. KRS 342.650(7) exempts employees participating “in a voluntary

vanpool or carpool program while that person is on the way to or from his or her

place of employment” from the coverage and defines “carpool or vanpool” as “any

method by which two (2) or more employees are transported from their residences

to their places of employment[.]” KRS 342.660 allows an employer with an

employee who is exempt under KRS 342.650 to elect coverage, if it so chooses.

Due to our resolution of the previous issue(s), we find it unnecessary to determine

if these provisions apply to the case herein as the outcome remains the same.

                                 CONCLUSION

             Therefore, and for the foregoing reasons, the order of the Perry Circuit

Court is AFFIRMED.

             ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                     BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Michael E. Lovins                         Jonathan C. Shaw
Austin, Texas                             Paintsville, Kentucky

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