Court Opinion

ID: 9754806
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:14:45.504867+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:58.396426
License: Public Domain

Jacobs, J.
(dissenting). Recognizing zoning ordinances as vital instruments in the preservation of the desirable characteristics of our local communities, our courts have generally displayed readiness in upholding them and in construing them liberally in furtherance of their proper objectives. Fischer v. Township of Bedminster, 11 N. J. 194 (1952); Lionshead Lake, Inc., v. Township of Wayne, 10 N. J. 165 (1952), appeal dismissed 344 U. S. 919, 73 S. Ct. 386, 97 L. Fd. 708 (1953). And they have displayed awareness of the need for giving due weight to the considered judgment of the municipal authorities. See Ward v. Scott, 16 N. J. 16 (1954). While Verona’s governing body was not called upon to deal directly with the instant matter, its board of adjustment did find that the proposed establishment of the beauty salon in the residential zone would be “a detriment to the public good” and would substantially impair the “intent and purpose of the zone plan and zoning ordinance.” It took the position that operation of the salon in the converted garage attached to the plaintiffs’ residence would not constitute a permissible “home occupation incidental to the use of the residence” within section 6 of the zoning ordinance.
The plaintiffs’ beauty salon business will admittedly be governed by the provisions of R. S. 45:4á-l et seq. and *336the regulations which have been issued thereunder. Those regulations require that the business be duly licensed; that it maintain at its main entrance or window a sign or other marking “which shall be clearly visible to the general public” indicating that beauty culture is being practiced on the premises; that its entrance “permit patrons to enter the shop directly from the public thorofare without passing through any portion of the home”; that no portion of the licensed premises “be used for domestic or residential purposes”; that the shop “possess adequate equipment and maintain same in a cleanly and sanitary condition so as to provide proper, and sufficient service” for its patrons; and that the premises “be subject to inspection” by the Board of Beauty Culture of the State Department of Health “or its representative.” The regulations also embody many requirements relating to sanitary facilities and practices; they are wholly appropriate to the conduct of a business enterprise which may affect the public health and well-being.
In Bonasi v. Board of Adjustment of Haverford Tp., 382 Pa. 307, 115 A. 2d 225 (Sup. 1955), the court held that the operation of a beauty shop in the basement of a residence was not permissible under an ordinance which authorized accessory professional uses. In State ex rel. Kaegel v. Holekamp, 151 S. W. 2d 685 (Mo. App. 1941), the operation of a dance studio in a converted portion of a residence was held not to come within an ordinance provision permitting home occupations; and a similar holding with respect to a photographer’s studio may be found in State ex rel. A. Hynek & Sons Co. v. Board of Appeals of City of Racine, 267 Wis. 309, 64 N. W. 2d 741, 66 N. W. 2d 623 (Sup. Ct. 1954). In City of Beverly Hills v. Brady, 34 Cal. 2d 854, 215 P. 2d 460, 461 (Sup. Ct. 1950) the distribution by a doctor of his syndicated column devoted to health problems was held not improper for, as the court found, it did not “interfere with the use or appearance of his home or premises as a residence” nor did it affect “the residential or aesthetic character of the district.” While the aforecited cases may. properly be said to have rested
*337upon particular ordinance provisions they nevertheless evidenced sympathetic judicial application of zoning requirements which, while permitting consistent incidental uses, were well calculated to preserve the residential nature of the district. See King County v. Lunn, 32 Wash. 2d 116, 200 P. 2d 981 (Sup. Ct. 1948); Village of Riverside v. Kuhne, 335 Ill. App. 547, 82 N. E. 2d 500 (App. Ct. 1948). Cf. Keller v. Town of Westfield, 39 N. J. Super. 430, 436 (App. Div. 1956).
It seems to me that the highly regulated business of operating a beauty salon — which under state requirements must be conducted as an independent commercial enterprise always separated from living quarters — may not fairly be considered as a permissible occupation within the intendment of section 6, which is merely designed to sanction incidental home work not in impairment of the basic integrity of the residential character of the neighborhood. In Dobres v. Schwartzman, 191 Md. 19, 59 A. 2d 684, 686 (1948), the Maryland Court of Appeals sustained an order which cancelled the issuance of a permit for the operation of a beauty shop in a dwelling located in a residential zone; while the decision involved an interpretation of the Baltimore zoning ordinance the following excerpt from the court’s opinion is particularly apt here:
“We need not determine the abstract question whether a ‘beautician’ is a member of a profession, or whether the operation of a beauty parlor in any circumstances may be a customary home occupation. It is sufficient to say that State law, and a regulation which appellant proposes to obey, prevent the operation of a beauty parlor as a home occupation or an accessory use. It is ‘unlawful for any person to practice beauty culture * * * in any place other than a registered beauty shop.’ Code, Art. 43, sec. 479. It is unlawful to ‘use for residential purposes any room used wholly or in part as a beauty shop.’ Section 489. A rule of the State Board of Hairdressers and Beauty Culturists requires that each beauty shop be designated by a sign, clearly visible at the entrance to the establishment. There is no provision of the Ordinance to sustain the action of the Board, and its action in issuing the permit in this ease was unlawful. Lipsitz v. Parr, 164 Md. 222, at [page] 228, 164 A. 743; Mayor & City Council [of Baltimore] v. Shapiro, [187 Md. 623] 51 A. 2d 273.”
*338I would reverse the judgment entered in the Law Division. Heher, J., joins in this dissent.
For affirmance — Chief Justice Vanderbilt, and Justices Olipiiant, Waciienbeld and Burling — 4.
For reversal — Justices Heher and Jacobs — 2.