Court Opinion

ID: 9557797
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 16:57:44.47631+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:07:02.302703
License: Public Domain

Fromme, J.,
concurring. K.S.A. 60-456 provides:
“(a) If the witness is not testifying as an expert his or her testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to such opinions or inferences as the judge finds (a) may be rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) are helpful to a clearer understanding of his or her testimony.
“(b) If the witness is testifying as an expert, testimony of the witness in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to such opinions as the judge finds are (1) based on facts or data perceived by or personally known or made known to the witness at the hearing and (2) within the scope of the special knowledge, skill, experience or training possessed by the witness.
“(c) Unless the judge excludes the testimony he or she shall be deemed to have made the finding requisite to its admission.
“(d) Testimony in the form of opinions or inferences otherwise admissible under this article is not objectionable because it embraces the ultimate issue or issues to be decided by the trier of the fact.”
*265When Officer Gibson testified at the trial no proper foundation had been laid for the officer’s conclusions and it was reversible error to admit his speculative conclusions as to the circumstances which contributed to the accident.
However, as I interpret the provisions of the above statute subsection (a) authorizes any witness, after a proper foundation has been laid, to give opinions if such opinions are rationally based on the perception of the witness and helpful to a clearer understanding of his or her testimony. An expert when qualified may give an opinion based on both perception and facts otherwise made known to him at the hearing. Subsection (d) specifically says that if such opinions are otherwise admissible they are not objectionable because they embrace the ultimate issues to be decided by the trier of the fact.
I disagree with that part of the majority opinion which has the effect of nullifying subsection (d) of the statute.
McFarland, J., joins the foregoing concurring opinion.