Court Opinion

ID: 9495167
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:56:22.638643+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:51.685196
License: Public Domain

COLE, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I write separately to briefly set forth my thinking on this interesting question of law. While I join Judge Ryan’s opinion based on the force of the plain language of the ADEA, I also entertain serious doubts as to whether Congress specifically intended that the ADEA allow persons ages forty and over to recover for so-called reverse age discrimination. Ultimately, from the text and structure of the ADEA, I conclude that in enacting the ADEA, Congress was most concerned with prohibiting age discrimination that favors younger over older employees, but that Congress’s choice of language, whether specifically intended or not, also prohibits age discrimination that favors older over younger protected employees. With that perspective in mind, I emphasize three points: (1) sections 623 and 631 of Chapter 29 of the United States Code have clear meaning— they prohibit any form of age discrimination against persons ages forty and over; (2) no legally acceptable reason exists for looking beyond the language of the statute here; and (3) allowing reverse age discrimination suits is reconcilable with the “substantially younger” requirement announced in O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 116 S.Ct. 1307, 134 L.Ed.2d 433 (1996).
First, the text of the ADEA compels the conclusion that members in the pro*473tected class can sue for age discrimination that favors older over younger workers. Section 623 makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). Section 631 limits that age discrimination prohibition to “individuals who are at least 40 years of age.” 29 U.S.C. § 631(a). Thus, taken together, §§ 623 and 631 unambiguously prohibit using age as a basis for employment decisions involving persons ages forty and over.
Second, this Court is bound to apply the plain language of the ADEA here. The law of the Circuit is well-established; in its efforts to interpret a statute, a court may look beyond the text only in four limited instances: (1) where the text is ambiguous; (2) where a literal reading is inconsistent with other statutory provisions; (3) where a plain-language reading is inconsistent with congressional intent; (4) where the plain statutory meaning leads to absurd results. See Vergos v. Gregg’s Enters., Inc., 159 F.3d 989, 990 (6th Cir.1998); Appleton v. First Nat’l Bank of Ohio, 62 F.3d 791, 801 (6th Cir.1995); see also Limited, Inc. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 286 F.3d 324, 332 (6th Cir.2002) (“Resort to legislative history is not appropriate, however, if the text of the statute may be read unambiguously and reasonably.”). Not one of those limited situations is present here. And, for that reason, there is no basis for looking beyond the plain statutory language.
As discussed above, the texts of §§ 623 and 631 are not ambiguous. Rather, they suggest an unequivocal result — age discrimination in employment is generally unlawful and persons ages forty and over may sue an employer for such discrimination. Therefore, there is no ambiguity-based reason to look beyond the plain text of §§ 623 and 631.
Also, a literal reading of §§ 623 and 631 is not inconsistent with other statutory provisions. The Seventh Circuit in Hamilton v. Caterpillar Inc., 966 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir.1992), concluded that § 621(a)’s reference to “older workers” suggests that the ADEA’s age discrimination prohibition applies only to workers who are older vis-a-vis preferably treated workers. Id. at 1228. But, § 621(a)’s use of the phrase “older workers” is at most ambiguous because “older workers” could also refer to that population of workers ages forty and over. Thus, at worst, there still is no definite inconsistency between our interpretation of §§ 623 and 631 and the language of § 621(a). However, in contrast to the Seventh Circuit’s holding, our reading of §§ 623 and 631 does not render § 623(i)(1)(A) meaningless. Section 623(i)(1)(A) allows an employer to set a minimum age as a condition for eligibility in a pension plan. 29 U.S.C. § 623(1 )(1)(A). If younger protected employees could not sue their employers for the preferable pension treatment of older employees, then the minimum age exception in § 623(i)(1)(A) would not be necessary (because only younger employees could sue based on a minimum retirement age). In sum, because our reading of §§ 623 and 631 is not manifestly inconsistent with § 621(a) and because § 623(l)(1)(A) has significance only if §§ 623 and 631 permit reverse age discrimination suits, there is no statutory conflict to justify looking beyond the text of the statutes.
In addition, this Court should not look beyond the statutory text because interpreting §§ 623 and 631 as allowing reverse age discrimination suits is consistent *474with Congress’s statutorily stated intent for enacting the ADEA. See 29 U.S.C. § 621(b). In § 621(b), Congress declared that the purposes of the ADEA were “to promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; [and] to help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on employment.” Id. Allowing younger employees to sue older employees for age discrimination is consistent with those purposes. For example, when a forty-two year-old employee loses her job or benefits in favor of a fifty-two year-old employee due to her age, that termination is not based on her ability. Moreover, that loss of job or benefits furthers, instead of prohibits, arbitrary age discrimination in employment. Finally, permitting that type of age discrimination to continue without a remedy hardly amounts to a solution to the problems arising out of the impact of age on employment. In short, because a plain language reading of §§ 623 and 631 is consistent with the ADEA’s purpose, there is no conflict between the specific intent of Congress and the statutory text to justify considering sources beyond the statutes themselves.
Finally, this Court is confined to reviewing only statutory text because allowing reverse discrimination suits by persons in the protected class is not absurd as either a matter of reason or of policy. Allowing persons in the protected class to sue for reverse discrimination is a reasonable means of redressing two of the findings that prompted Congress to enact the ADEA. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 621. Congress declared in § 621(a)(1) that “in the face of rising productivity and affluence, older workers find themselves disadvantaged in their efforts to retain employment, and especially to regain employment when displaced from jobs.” 29 U.S.C. § 621(a)(1). Permitting younger members of the protected class to sue employers for age discrimination in favor of older workers is consistent with that finding. For example, a fifty year-old employee is equally disadvantaged in retaining and regaining employment if he is age discriminated against in favor of a thirty year-old as if he is age discriminated against in favor of a sixty year-old. In another of its findings, Congress declared that “the existence in industries affecting commerce, of arbitrary discrimination in employment because of age, burdens commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce.” 29 U.S.C. § 621(a)(4). Thus, Congress concluded that all age discrimination burdens commerce. Consequently, even the so-called reverse discrimination suits would alleviate the congressionally identified burden on commerce.
Likewise, as a matter of policy, allowing reverse age discrimination suits is not absurd. Such an interpretation hardly “open[s] the floodgates to attacks on every retirement plan,” as the Seventh Circuit feared. Hamilton, 966 F.2d at 1228. Rather, courts have already begun to interpret state discrimination laws as allowing reverse age discrimination suits. See, e.g., Bergen Commercial Bank v. Sisler, 157 N.J. 188, 723 A.2d 944, 957 (N.J.1999) (7-0 decision) (concluding that New Jersey’s Law Against Discrimination was “broad enough to accommodate [plaintiffs] claim of age discrimination based on youth”); Ogden v. Bureau of Labor, 299 Or. 98, 699 P.2d 189, 192 (Or.1985) (en banc) (interpreting Oregon age discrimination law as allowing claims by younger workers); Zanni v. Medaphis Physician Servs. Corp., 240 Mich.App. 472, 612 N.W.2d 845, 847 (Mich.Ct.App.) (holding that the Michigan Civil Rights Act “protects workers who are discriminated against on the basis of youth”), appeal *475denied, 463 Mich. 879, 618 N.W.2d 596 (Mich.2000); see also Graffam v. Scott Paper Co., 870 F.Supp. 389, 405 n. 27 (D.Me.1994) (noting that the Maine Human Rights Act does not limit age discrimination claims to a certain range of ages). Thus, based on the congressional statements of purpose and similar state-law provisions, it is not absurd to allow members of the protected class to sue for reverse discrimination.
The third reason for my separate concurrence is to reconcile the implicit tension between our conclusion today and the Supreme Court’s holding in O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 116 S.Ct. 1307, 134 L.Ed.2d 433 (1996). In Consolidated Coin, the Supreme Court considered whether to satisfy the prima facie test- for indirectly proving age discrimination, an ADEA plaintiff had to be replaced by a person outside the protected class. Id. at 312, 116 S.Ct. 1307. More concretely, the Court had before it the issue of whether a fifty-six year-old employee who was replaced by a forty year-old satisfied the fourth element of the prima facie test even though both employees belonged to the protected class. Id. The Court’s analysis hinged on the logical connection between the elements of the prima facie test and illegal age discrimination. Id. at 311-12, 116 S.Ct. 1307. After looking first at the text of the ADEA, the Supreme Court concluded that the fourth element of the prima facie test should include a “substantially younger” requirement instead of a “membership in the protected class” requirement. Id. at 313, 116 S.Ct. 1307. Thus, Consolidated Coin instructs that to indirectly prove age discrimination, an ADEA plaintiff must demonstrate age discrimination that favors a substantially younger person.
Although this is a direct evidence age discrimination ease and consequently does not rely on the prima facie test, the impact of the substantially younger requirement is significant. The substantially younger requirement implies that reverse age discrimination claims are not permitted under the ADEA because when discriminated against in favor of older workers, younger protected workers cannot prove that substantially younger persons were favored. As a result, those younger workers could not satisfy the substantially younger requirement, and thus could not state a prima facie claim under the ADEA. In short, Consolidated Coin, by limiting the prima facie test to persons injured by discrimination that favors someone substantially younger, suggests that reverse age discrimination claims are not permitted under the ADEA.
Despite that implication, three reasons give me confidence that the Supreme Court would approve of our result today. First, the Supreme Court was not considering reverse age discrimination in Consolidated Coin. Second, the Consolidated Coin holding acknowledged that members within the protected class may sue one another. Third, we follow the same recipe as the Supreme Court did-we look to the plain text of §§ 623(a)(1) and 631(a) to determine whether so-called reverse age discrimination is actionable under the ADEA. Based upon the combined effect of these three reasons, I do not believe that Supreme Court precedent dictates a result different than what we reach today. Moreover, had the Supreme Court also considered the question of reverse age discrimination in Consolidated Coin, I believe it would have expressed the fourth part of the prima facie test as requiring proof of “substantial difference in age” as opposed to “substantially younger.” And, notably, based on our holding, the fourth prong of the prima facie test in this Circuit requires proof of substantial difference in *476age, not necessarily substantially younger proof.
In short, the result we reach today strikes me as counterintuitive. But, the clarity with which Congress spoke convinces me that the ADEA permits younger workers in the protected class to sue their employers for age discrimination that favors older employees. Also, although a close call, I do not believe that our result violates Supreme Court precedent. For those reasons, I agree to reverse the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ ADEA claims.