Court Opinion

ID: 9710751
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:16:51.567603+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:59.731599
License: Public Domain

*479Dissenting Opinion
DeBruler, C. J.
:I dissent from the majority opinion in this case and would grant the appellant a new trial. The majority is in error in my opinion when they conclude that there was circumstantial evidence presented to the trier of fact in this case from which the trier of fact could find that the fire was of incendiary origin. In my opinion there is no evidence either circumstantial or direct which would permit this inference. There must be some proof either direct or circumstantial presented at the trial to support the element of this offense that the fire was set deliberately by some person. Simmons v. State (1955), 234 Ind. 489, 129 N. E. 2d 121.
The following evidence outlined in the majority opinion was deemed by the majority to be sufficient to support this element:
“The evidence presented in the trial court showed that a man dressed like the appellant broke into the church at approximately 1:30 a.m., left the church and entered the appellant’s car and lingered in the vicinity of the fire. A very short time lapsed between the man’s departure from the church and the discovery of the fire. The fire inspector testified that the fire started at three locations on two different floors.”
The appellant aptly cites several cases which demonstrate the proper methods by which the incendiary origin of a fire may be proved. In Smock v. State (1966), 247 Ind. 184, 213 N. E. 2d 896, the outline of the evidence contained the following:
“There was testimony from the chief director of the Indianapolis Fire Bureau that in his opinion both fires were deliberately set by a human being.”
In the case for decision before us the State’s expert witness, a fire inspector, only testified that the fires started in the church in three different locations. However, there is no *480evidence of how they were started, what the three locations were, what type of materials were involved, or that the fires were not naturally caused. The fire inspector did not testify as to the significance of the one fact he did relate nor did he state that in his opinion this fire was set by a human being. The following case analyses appear in appellant’s brief indicating the type, of evidence that would be relevant:
“In State v. Marchand, 31 N. J. 223, 156 A. 2d 245, pieces of burnt towel found at the scene of the fire and saturated with lighter fluid were sufficient to prove that the fire was of incendiary origin.
“In State v. Ruckman, 253 Mo. 487, 161 S. W. 705, testimony that there was the odor of coal oil in the burning premises and that kindling was arranged around a pool table, was evidence to show that the fire was caused criminally rather than by accidental or natural means.
“In State v. Watson, 47 Oregon 543, 85 P. 336, a coal oil can, burlap sacks and excelsior saturated with oil tended to show the origin of the fire.”
I, therefore, conclude that there is a total lack of evidence in this case to support the court’s determination that this fire was of incendiary origin.
Note.—Reported in 250 N. E. 2d 364.