Court Opinion

ID: 9791174
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:07:08.876012+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:34.619293
License: Public Domain

WILKINS, Justice
(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent. I, first of all, disagree with the majority that “a writ of habeas corpus is not an available remedy on the facts alleged in the petition.” Rule 65B(i)(l), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides in pertinent part:
Any person imprisoned in the penitentiary or county jail under a commitment of any court, whether such imprisonment be under an original commitment or under a commitment for violation of probation or parole, who asserts that in any proceedings which resulted in his commitment there was a substantial denial of his rights under the Constitution of the United States or of the State of Utah, or both, may institute a proceeding under this Rule.
In his Complaint for Writ of Habeas Corpus appellant alleges as grounds for his petition that he is “illegally and unconstitutionally detained in violation of his rights under the laws of the State of Utah [and] the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.” Further allegations as to the nature of the illegality of the detention are contained in the complaint. While I agree with the majority that “a habeas corpus proceeding is not intended as a substitute for an appeal,” there is nothing in the record here to suggest that petitioner is so using that procedure as a substitute.
The constitutional issue raised by the appellant is the alleged absence of findings of fact and conclusions of law in his revocation proceeding. The issue is whether the transcript provided a sufficient written record to meet the requirements of due process.
In Gagnon v. Scarpelli,1 the United States Supreme Court set down the minimum requirements of due process which must be met before probation can be revoked. Those requirements are:
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of [probation or] parole; (b) disclosure to the [probationer or] parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present wit*694nesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a ‘neutral and detached’ hearing body ...; and (f) a written statement by the fact finders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking [probation or] parole.2
It is undisputed here that the District Court failed to enter any findings of fact and conclusions of law at appellant’s revocation hearing. Furthermore, an examination of the transcript of that hearing fails to support the contention that sufficient findings and conclusions are found there, even though at the hearing, during which several witnesses including appellant testified, and after the Court made some observations about the crime for which appellant had originally been convicted, the District Judge stated:
It’s the finding of the Court that you violated the terms of your probation.
This simple conclusory comment cannot rise to the level of a written statement by the fact finder as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for revoking probation required by due process. I would reverse and remand for the District Court, as required by Rule 65B(i)(8), to “enter an appropriate order with respect to the judgment or sentence in the former proceedings and such further orders with respect to rearraignment, retrial, custody, bail or discharge as the Court may deem just and proper in the case.”
MAUGHAN, J., concurs with the dissenting opinion of WILKINS, J.

. 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973).

. Id., at 786, 93 S.Ct. at 1761, citing and quoting from Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2604, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972).