Court Opinion

ID: 9384016
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-31 16:08:38.006438+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:49.831730
License: Public Domain

J-S44011-22

                                   2023 PA SUPER 53

    SARA D'ARCY CROCKER-FASULO                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    GREGG JOSEPH FASULO                        :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 990 MDA 2022

                  Appeal from the Order Entered June 17, 2022
               In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
                      Civil Division at No(s): CI-09-10259

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

OPINION BY PANELLA, P.J.:                              FILED: MARCH 31, 2023

        Gregg Joseph Fasulo (“Husband”) appeals from the order which granted

his petition to terminate or modify his alimony to Sara D’arcy Crocker-Fasulo

(“Wife”), and reduced his alimony owed to Wife to $2,500 per month. Husband

contends the trial court should have terminated his alimony payments due to

his deteriorating health condition; the trial court erred in failing to modify the

alimony amount retroactively to the date he filed the petition; and the trial

court should have terminated his $1 million life insurance obligation to Wife.

We affirm.

        The trial court set forth the relevant factual and procedural history as

follows:

              The parties were married October 2, 1982, while Husband
        was in medical school. Following the marriage, Husband continued
____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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     his medical training and Wife continued to work until the birth of
     the parties’ first child in May of 1987. After the birth of their child,
     Wife remained a full-time mother and homemaker. Wife also
     contributed a $40,000.00 inheritance to the marriage. Husband
     graduated medical school in 1985 and completed his residency in
     general orthopedic surgery in 1992.

           The parties separated October 10, 1998, when Husband left
     the marital home. Wife continued in her role as mother and
     homemaker while Husband provided voluntary payments to
     ensure that the household needs and the needs of the minor
     children were met. At the time of separation, marital assets
     included the house equity and contents, cars, a checking account,
     a small pension Husband had with his employer, Lancaster
     Orthopedic Associates, and Husband’s interest in an airplane. At
     the time of separation, Husband was negotiating to become a
     shareholder in Lancaster Orthopedic Group. The vast majority of
     his assets have been accumulated since separation after he
     became a shareholder in his new medical practice.

           Wife filed for divorce in July of 2009, and, following a
     hearing in October of 2010, a final divorce decree was entered on
     January 20, 2012. As part of the divorce decree, the [trial c]ourt
     determined that Wife had no earned income and ordered
     permanent alimony in the amount of $8,500.00/month, transfer
     of the marital home to Wife, and for Husband to maintain a
     $1,000,000.00 life insurance policy with Wife as the beneficiary.
     The decree also contemplated that Wife would sell or refinance the
     marital home within three years. Wife received no cash,
     retirement or other form of investment asset in the divorce.

            Wife began working part-time for [Court Appointed Special
     Advocates for Children] in 2013, when she was already 57 years
     of age. She began full-time employment approximately a year
     later, and, in 2015, became the organization’s program director
     with [an] annual salary of approximately $62,000.00. [Wife]
     stated her intent to retire at age 68 in April[] 2023. She does not
     have a pension through her employment[,] and she began to
     receive health insurance through Medicare when she reached age
     65. Wife sold the marital residence in 2016, realizing $265,000.00
     net [profit] and from that amount she purchased two $100,000.00
     annuities and put $20,000.00 toward the purchase of a
     condominium with her sister. She and her sister continue to reside

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     in the condominium, which has a mortgage until 2030, and share
     some expenses.

           Wife estimates that her total pay is approximately
     $3,500.00/month       and   her    total  expenses   are    about
     $5,300.00/month. She indicated she has three potential income
     streams for retirement—her two annuities, Social Security, and an
     investment/IRA account—which she projected to provide
     $3,800.00 to $4,000/month. … [T]he total value of her accounts
     [is] $467,533.00 as of December 31, 2021. Although she would
     be eligible to collect Social Security upon retirement, she
     indicate[d] a desire to defer doing so until age 70.

            Following separation, Husband made a substantial income
     as an orthopedic surgeon. However, beginning in 2012, he began
     to experience symptoms of Parkinson’s Disease. Although he
     shifted to a non-surgical practice, he was eventually unable to see
     patients. He was diagnosed with Parkinson’s Disease in 2015 and
     resigned as a partner in Lancaster Orthopedic Group in June of
     that year. He was declared incapable of performing surgery
     effective July 1, 2015. Husband was able to collect benefits from
     five private disability policies which provided him with an income
     of approximately $27,000.00/month initially. These policies have
     begun to expire, and only one is still paying benefits of
     $2,159.00/month. This last policy [expired] at the end of 2022.
     Husband has also done medical consulting and has performed
     independent medical examinations. He stated that he did only two
     [examinations] in the last year due to Covid, and acknowledged
     that, while he is still able to do such examinations, he actually lost
     money doing them. Husband indicated he had no earned income
     in 2021, although he had investment income, and he had to tap
     into savings and his IRA to meet expenses.

           Husband, 65 years of age, owns a home which was built in
     2005 and has a 30[-]year mortgage with a balance of
     approximately $108,000.00. The monthly mortgage payment is
     $2,670.40, for principal and interest, and does not include taxes.
     Husband agreed that he is paying some extra on principal each
     month. He lives with his wife, his wife’s two children (14 and 19
     years of age), and his mother-in-law. His wife is self-employed as
     an accountant and earns … $25,000.00 per year. Other [than] his
     house, Husband indicated that most of his expenses are medical—
     drugs and therapies—related to his disease. Husband stated that
     there is no cure for his condition. He testified that he has difficulty

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     with activities of daily living, but there is no prediction that he
     would have to go into residential care within the next eighteen
     months. He stated that he pays approximately $16,000.00 per
     year for health insurance.

            Husband testified that he had approximately $275,000.00
     in cash on hand at the end of 2021, which is designated for his
     care. He also has a Schwab rollover IRA and a Schwab non-
     qualified investment account with a total balance of about
     $2,800,000.00, an annuity with approximately $400,000.00. He
     will also receive an additional $277,209.00 by the end of 2022 for
     the sale of his interest in medical practice real estate.

           Following his diagnosis, [Husband and Wife agreed to
     multiple modifications to the alimony payment and on January 1,
     2020, Husband was paying $3,750.00 per month in alimony.]
     Husband filed his most recent petition for modification or
     termination of alimony on August 30, 2021, asking the [trial c]ourt
     to substantially reduce and then terminate his alimony obligation.
     Husband proposed a schedule whereby payments to [W]ife would
     be reduced to $2,550.00 per month as of September 17, 2021,
     then reduced again to $1,128.00 per month as of January 20,
     2022, then reduced to $303.00 per month effective February 1,
     2022, and finally terminated as of the end of 2022. Husband
     further requested that the condition that he maintain a life
     insurance policy with Wife as beneficiary be terminated at the
     same time as his alimony.

            Wife filed a response and new matter on November 9,
     2021…. Husband filed his response to new matter on January 20,
     2022. Husband acknowledged that, at the time of the divorce
     decree, there was a significant income disparity between the
     parties. He noted, however, that, in addition to alimony, Wife was
     awarded 53.10% of the total marital assets …. Husband also
     denied that he would have substantial income from his assets
     which were non-marital assets and asserted that any order
     directing him to liquidate non-marital assets would be an award
     of non-marital property and a violation of Pennsylvania law.

           A hearing was held on February 14, 2022, at which the
     parties entered into a stipulation of facts and submitted as well as
     a number of joint exhibits.

Trial Court Opinion and Order, 6/17/22, at 1-6 (footnotes omitted).

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      On June 17, 2022, the trial court entered an order reducing the alimony

award to $2,500 per month, effective the month after the order was entered.

The trial court stated Husband could seek further reduction of alimony when

Wife begins to collect Social Security or if the progress of his disease resulted

in an increase in the amount required for his care each month. Finally, the

trial court found that Husband must continue to maintain a life insurance policy

in the amount of $1 million with Wife as beneficiary. Husband filed a timely

appeal and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement.

      On appeal, Husband raises the following questions for our review:

      1. Did the lower Court abuse its discretion and commit an error of
         law in failing to terminate [Husband’s] alimony obligation in
         light of his Parkinson’s Disease disability, his involuntary
         retirement with a significant reduction in income, and the result
         that the Court Order, in effect, results in a transfer of non-
         marital assets from [Husband] to [Wife] by a forced liquidation
         of his non-marital assets to pay [Wife]?

      2. Did the lower Court abuse its discretion and commit an error of
         law in failing to make its alimony modification order effective
         retroactive to the date of the filing of the Petition by [Husband]
         which was August 30, 2021?

      3. Did the lower Court abuse its discretion and commit an error of
         law in ordering [Husband] to continue providing a one-million-
         dollar life insurance policy payable to [Wife] as beneficiary?

Appellant’s Brief at 6-7.

      In his first claim, Husband contends that the trial court abused its

discretion in failing to terminate his alimony obligation in light of his disability

and subsequent retirement, which resulted in a significant reduction in

income. See id. at 15, 27-32. Husband argues that although alimony is a

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transfer of income from one spouse to another, it should not constitute a post-

divorce transfer of non-marital assets. See id. at 18, 19-20. According to

Husband, the trial court’s order forces him to liquidate non-marital assets and

transfer them to Wife. See id. at 15-17, 19, 21-22. Husband claims the trial

court improperly focused on the asset imbalance between the parties and

Wife’s budget, which showed her need for financial assistance to meet her

expenses. See id. at 30, 32. Husband asserts that the circumstances in this

case have changed from the time alimony was first awarded to Wife,

highlighting his and Wife’s substantially altered incomes and his deteriorating

health, which prevented him from working. See id. at 21-22, 27-29; see also

id. at 20 (noting that support guidelines can be used in determining an

alimony award). Husband maintains that this is a backdoor division of non-

marital property that he had accumulated after the parties’ separation and

divorce. See id. at 30.

      “An award of alimony may be reversed where there is an apparent abuse

of discretion or there is insufficient evidence to support the award.” Cook v.

Cook, 186 A.3d 1015, 1020 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted).

             [T]he purpose of alimony is not to reward one party and to
      punish the other, but rather to ensure that the reasonable needs
      of the person who is unable to support himself or herself through
      appropriate employment, are met. Alimony is based upon
      reasonable needs in accordance with the lifestyle and standard of
      living established by the parties during the marriage, as well as
      the payor’s ability to pay. Moreover, alimony following a divorce
      is a secondary remedy and is available only where economic
      justice and the reasonable needs of the parties cannot be achieved

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      by way of an equitable distribution award and development of an
      appropriate employable skill.

            In determining whether alimony is necessary, and in
      determining the nature, amount, duration and manner of payment
      of alimony, the court must consider numerous factors including
      the parties’ earnings and earning capacities, income sources,
      mental and physical conditions, contributions to the earning power
      of the other, educations, standard of living during the marriage,
      the contribution of a spouse as homemaker and the duration of
      the marriage.

Leicht v. Leicht, 164 A.3d 1246, 1248 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).

In deciding “whether alimony is necessary and to establish the appropriate

nature, amount, and duration of any alimony payments, the court is required

to consider all relevant factors, including the 17 factors that are expressly

mandated by [23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(b)].” Cook, 186 A.3d at 1020 (citation

omitted)). Notably, “the factors in Section 3701(b) do not create an

exhaustive list.” Conner v. Conner, 217 A.3d 301, 316 (Pa. Super. 2019)

(citation omitted).

      The trial court addressed Husband’s claim as follows:

            While the [trial c]ourt is aware that alimony is premised not
      solely on the relative prosperity of the payor, but upon the
      reasonable needs of the recipient, Nemoto v. Nemoto, 620 A.2d
      1216, 1221 (Pa. Super. 1993), the evidence presented
      demonstrated that Wife is, and will continue to be, unable to meet
      her reasonable monthly expenses without the financial assistance
      she receives from Husband.

            In determining [the] amount that Husband should pay going
      forward, the [trial court] took into account the assets available to
      him despite his changed circumstances. The Divorce Code does
      not define what constitutes income for purposes of assessing
      alimony, but case law indicates that retirement income is properly
      considered in calculating alimony even where the payor was

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     previously granted absolute entitlement to the pension income.
     McFadden v. McFadden, 563 A.2d 180, 184 (Pa. Super. 1989).
     In the present case, Husband’s retirement income was not subject
     to equitable distribution at the time of the divorce, but it should
     be taken into account at this point.

            A review of the alimony factors and the facts of the case
     shows that there was, and remains, a significant economic
     imbalance between the parties that cannot be overcome other
     than through the imposition of what the [c]ourt at the time of its
     Order of August 31, 2011, deemed “permanent alimony.” That
     imbalance is well illustrated by the fact that Husband, at the peak
     of his surgical career, made over $800,000 in a single year. This
     one year of earnings is more than Wife has earned in her entire
     career. Further, because of his income as an orthopedic surgeon,
     Husband has been able to set aside significant assets which
     continue to generate income, which Wife has not been able to do.
     Although more [than] $200,000 of Husband’s income for 2021
     was derived from his disability insurance policies, his total income
     for 2021 exceeded $500,000. That amount is more [than] eight
     times Wife’s annual income and the amount he received from
     sources other than his disability insurance policies was still more
     than four times Wife’s total income for the year. Additionally,
     Husband testified that he had approximately $275,000 in cash on
     hand at the end of 2021, which is designated for his care, and he
     is set to receive an additional sum of $277,209 by the end of 2022
     for the sale of his interest in medical practice real estate. Husband
     also stated that his personal expenses for food, gas, clothing and
     the like was $5,000 per month, which the [trial c]ourt thought at
     the time to be somewhat excessive and which is still twice the
     amount the [trial c]ourt awarded in alimony. Thus, he has funds
     in hand to provide for his own medical care and the amount he is
     expected to receive by the end of this year, if annualized, would
     offset to some extent the loss of his disability policies. Wife even
     suggested that Husband could use part of the money he will
     receive for the sale of medical practice real estate to pay off the
     mortgage on his home and free up money currently directed to
     that expense. Regardless, there is a clear and substantial income
     imbalance in this case which is heavily in Husband’s favor.

            Further, despite Husband’s assertion to the contrary, the
     [trial c]ourt absolutely considered his retirement and disability in
     making its decision. The [trial c]ourt specifically acknowledged
     that Husband had experienced changed circumstances, and these

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      circumstances were taken into effect, both through the voluntary
      reductions in alimony negotiated between the parties prior to this
      litigation and by the [trial c]ourt in its decision which significantly
      reduced Husband’s monthly obligation by 33%, from $3,750 to
      $2,500. The [trial c]ourt determined that this amount represented
      what was needed to satisfy Wife’s reasonable monthly expenses,
      and that Husband’s physical and financial condition had not
      changed to the extent that he would be unable to pay this amount.
      In fact, given Husband’s high income and expected additional sum
      of more [than] $277,000 at the end of the year, the $2,500 per
      month amount set by the [trial c]ourt is far from unreasonable
      and is consistent with appropriate alimony. Further, the [trial
      c]ourt explicitly kept the door open for future adjustments and
      stated in its order that Husband could petition for further reduction
      or termination of alimony in the event his physical condition
      deteriorated or if Wife’s retirement income was greater than
      anticipated. In the end, the [trial c]ourt is of the opinion that the
      proper course in this case would be for Husband to seek further
      relief in the future as circumstances dictate, as he is permitted to
      do, rather than to terminate alimony at this time.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/22/22, at 5-7.

      Here, the trial court properly considered the 17 factors articulated in

Section 3701(b) and found that the alimony should not be terminated, but

instead be modified to a monthly payment of $2,500 to Wife. See Trial Court

Opinion and Order, 6/17/22, at 7-12. Moreover, while Husband argues that

the trial court could not examine his non-marital assets obtained after divorce

in determining alimony, under the factors set forth at Section 3701(b), the

trial court was required to consider “[t]he sources of income of both parties,

including, but not limited to, medical, retirement, insurance or other benefits”

and “[t]he relative assets and liabilities of the parties.” 23 Pa.C.S.A.

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§ 3701(b)(3), (10); see also Cook, 186 A.3d at 1020.1 Husband does not

dispute the value of his assets and liabilities. Furthermore, the trial court fully

considered Wife’s assets, the fact she could collect Social Security soon, and

Husband’s disease. To that end, the trial court explicitly affirmed that Husband

could seek a reduction of the alimony when Wife begins to collect Social

Security or if the progress of his disease results in an increase in the amount

required for his care. In effect, the trial court simply viewed the relevant

factors differently than Husband contends it should have. See Lawson v.

Lawson, 940 A.2d 444, 449 (Pa. Super. 2007) (noting that the trial court

must consider and weigh the statutory factors before granting alimony).

Therefore, because the trial court considered the totality of the circumstances

and found that Wife requires alimony to sustain her standard of living and

Husband still has the ability to pay, we find the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in modifying the alimony to the reduced amount of $2,500 per

month. See Llaurado v. Garcia-Zapata, 223 A.3d 247, 259 (Pa. Super.

2019) (concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in fashioning

the alimony award where it adequately addressed the Section 3701(b)

____________________________________________

1 We note that Husband also references a “double dip” in his argument. See
Appellant’s Brief at 24. It is well-settled that “[w]e do not condone ‘double
dipping’, i.e., using the same revenue as a source for ‘support’ and ‘equitable
distribution.’” Rohrer v. Rohrer, 715 A.2d 463, 466 (Pa. Super. 1998)
(citation omitted). However, Husband failed to raise this issue in his Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b) concise statement or articulate any analysis to establish the trial court
double dipped in awarding alimony; therefore, any such claim is waived on
appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii); Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a).

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factors); Isralsky v. Isralsky, 824 A.2d 1178, 1188 (Pa. Super. 2003)

(“Alimony is based upon reasonable needs in accordance with the lifestyle and

standard of living established by the parties during the marriage, as well as

the payor’s ability to pay.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)).

      In his second claim, Husband contends the trial court erred in failing to

make the alimony modification order retroactive to August 30, 2021, the date

of the filing of the modification petition. See Appellant’s Brief at 32. Husband

argues that, in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court admitted the

modification should have been retroactive to the filing of his petition. See id.

at 32-33.

      Pertinently, Section 3701(e) of the Divorce Code states the following:

      (e) Modification and termination.--An order entered pursuant
      to this section is subject to further order of the court upon changed
      circumstances of either party of a substantial and continuing
      nature whereupon the order may be modified, suspended,
      terminated or reinstituted or a new order made. Any further
      order shall apply only to payments accruing subsequent to
      the petition for the requested relief. Remarriage of the party
      receiving alimony shall terminate the award of alimony.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(e) (emphasis added).

      The relevant portion of the statute states that any order modifying

alimony must be awarded for payments accruing after the filing of the petition

for modification, not before. To that end, we interpret the use of the word

“shall” in section 3701(e) as indicating the legislature’s intent to make the

filing date of the petition to modify the earliest date a modification could take

effect. However, the statutory language does not explicitly require that the

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modification order be applied to all payments accruing after the filing of the

petition. Accordingly, the statute does not mandate any retroactive payments

to the date of filing, and only permits the trial court, in its discretion, to apply

the modification order to any date subsequent to the date of filing.2

       Here, in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, without conducting any analysis, the

trial court interpreted the relevant language of Section 3701(e) as intending

any modification of an alimony award to automatically apply retroactively to

the date of filing of the petition to modify alimony. See Trial Court Opinion,

8/22/22, at 3-4. However, as noted above, the trial court’s interpretation is

not supported by the plain language of the statute. Moreover, Husband does

not provide his own analysis regarding the interpretation of the statutory

language, and instead merely cites to the trial court’s ultimate conclusion. See

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (noting that the argument must contain “such discussion

and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent.”). In doing so, Husband

ignores that Rule 1925(a) opinions are merely advisory and cannot alter the

previously entered order. See Youst v. Keck’s Food Serv., Inc., 94 A.3d

1057, 1075 (Pa. Super. 2014); see also Commonwealth v. Lobiondo, 462

____________________________________________

2 A previous panel of this Court came to the same conclusion in an unpublished
memorandum. See Hawk v. Hawk, 1749 WDA 2017 (Pa. Super. filed June
25, 2019) (unpublished memorandum at 17-18) (stating that in interpreting
Section 3701(e), courts are constrained to award alimony “after the petition’s
filing and not before” and there is “no language in [Section] 3701(e) that
mandates retroactivity” to the date that the petition was filed (citation
omitted)). We may cite to unpublished memorandum decisions filed after May
2, 2019, for their persuasive value. See 210 Pa. Code § 65.37(B).

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A.2d 662, 665 n.4 (Pa. 1983) (noting that a trial court’s Rule 1925(a) opinion

“is intended as an aid to the reviewing appellate court and cannot alter a

previously entered verdict”). As the trial court’s order modifying the alimony

award was proper based upon the statutory language of Section 3701(e), we

cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion in not retroactively

modifying the award to the date Husband filed the modification petition.

      In his final claim, Husband contends the trial court abused its discretion

in ordering him to maintain a $1 million life insurance policy payable to Wife

as the sole beneficiary. See Appellant’s Brief at 33. According to Husband, the

life insurance policy payout is the equivalent of 400 months of alimony, which

would provide Wife a significant windfall upon his death. See id. at 33-34.

Husband argues that his life insurance requirement should be a reducing scale

payment based on his life expectancy. See id. Husband further claims the

trial court acknowledged that the amount of the policy may not be appropriate

under the circumstances. See id. at 34.

      “Upon the death of the payor party, the obligation to pay alimony shall

cease unless otherwise indicated in an agreement between the parties or an

order of court.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3707. Further, “[w]here it is necessary to

protect the interests of a party, the court may also direct the purchase of, and

beneficiary designations on, a policy insuring the life or health of either party.”

Id. § 3502(d).

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      Here, as part of the equitable distribution of marital assets and

determination of alimony in 2011, the trial court directed Husband to obtain a

life insurance policy of $1 million to provide for Wife’s permanent alimony in

the event of Husband’s death. See Trial Court Opinion, 9/12/11, at 11. As

noted above, the trial court found that Wife is “still unable to [meet] her

reasonable monthly expenses without the additional money provided as

alimony. It is, therefore, appropriate that Husband still maintain insurance.”

Trial Court Opinion, 8/22/22, at 4.

      In this case, the trial court had determined that Husband’s obligation to

make alimony payments should not terminate upon his death. See 23

Pa.C.S.A. § 3707. Therefore, the trial court was authorized to require Husband

to maintain the life insurance policy to secure the alimony obligations. See id.

§ 3502(d). Furthermore, while the trial court found there was “some question”

about the amount of the policy, Trial Court Opinion, 8/22/22, at 4, Husband

fails to raise any substantive argument in his brief regarding the amount of

the policy and instead merely complains about the length of time Wife would

be receiving alimony. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Notably, Husband is free to file

a new petition to reduce the amount of the life insurance policy and further

develop the record on this issue. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(e). Nevertheless,

based upon this record, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion

in ordering Husband to continue to maintain a life insurance policy of $1 million

with Wife as the beneficiary.

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     Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/31/2023

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