Court Opinion

ID: 9650291
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 15:28:31.006274+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:19.500737
License: Public Domain

*409POMEROY, Justice,
concurring.
I agree with Mr. Justice Larsen’s conclusion that the lower court correctly refused to suppress appellant’s statement. I write separately, however, because the opinion of my brother Roberts may introduce some uncertainty in the area of the law that I had thought to be settled.
Mr. Justice Roberts would hold appellant’s Futch claim waived for want of compliance with the requirements of Pa.R.Crim.P. 1123(a) and our decision in Commonwealth v. Blair, 460 Pa. 81, 33 n.1, 331 A.2d 213, 214 n.1 (1975). In my view, however, we must reach the merits of appellant’s claim. As Mr. Justice O’Brien points out in part I of his dissenting opinion, we have engrafted a limited exception to the rule of Blair, namely that where, as here, an issue is not raised in post-trial motions or a supplement thereto, but is raised in a defendant’s post-trial brief in the trial court, and that court considers the issue on the merits, an appellate court also will consider the merits of the claim. Commonwealth v. Pugh, 476 Pa. 445, 383 A.2d 183 (1978); Commonwealth v. Smith, 474 Pa. 559, 561 n.8, 379 A.2d 96 (1977); Commonwealth v. Perillo, 474 Pa. 63, 65-66 & n.2, 376 A.2d 635 (1977); Commonwealth v. Grace, 473 Pa. 542, 375 A.2d 721 (1977). When, however, the trial court follows the requirements of Blair and refuses to consider issues raised in the post-trial briefs because not set forth in post-trial motions, its action will not be disturbed on appeal; we will hold the issue waived. Commonwealth v. Carrillo, 483 Pa.-at -, 395 A.2d 570 at 571 (1978); Commonwealth v. Kozek, 479 Pa. 171, 387 A.2d 1278 (1978) (disapproving dicta to the contrary in Commonwealth v. Marrero, 478 Pa. 97, 385 A.2d 1331 (1978)); Commonwealth v. McClain, 478 Pa. 10, 385 A.2d 970 (1978).*
*410One may agree that it is rather incongruous for this Court to make its finding of waiver vel non turn on the action taken by the lower court on an issue that, strictly speaking, should be deemed waived. Nonetheless, if we were now to overrule the exception to Blair allowed in Grace and followed in Perillo, Smith, and Pugh, such action should be prospective only. I can see no reason to deny this particular appellant a consideration of the merits of his claims when other appellants, similarly situated, have been granted consideration, and sometimes relief. See Pugh, supra; Smith, supra; Perillo, supra (new trial granted in each case).
In light of the exception to the Blair rule which our decisions, wisely or not, have carved out and which appear to reflect the views of a majority of this Court, I think that Mr. Justice Larsen and Mr. Justice O’Brien are correct in considering the merits of appellee’s Futch claim. Having also followed this approach, I agree that the judgments of sentence should be affirmed.

 Also to be noted is our rule that an appellate court will consider waived any ground for relief which is only orally raised before the trial court in post-trial proceedings, even if the lower court reached the merits. E. g., Commonwealth v. Waters, All Pa. 430, 384 A.2d 234 (1978); Commonwealth v. Roach, 477 Pa. 379, 383 A.2d 1257 (1978).