Court Opinion

ID: 9545100
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:06:11.55507+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:14:04.946448
License: Public Domain

DENECKE, J.,
dissenting.
I consider the holding of the majority to be that a confession is admissible although it is obtained by interrogation outside the presence of counsel from a defendant represented by counsel. The majority reasons that by confessing, the defendant ipso facto *630waived his right to remain silent and his right to the assistance of counsel.
In Massiah v. United States, 377 US 201, 84 S Ct 1199, 12 L ed2d 246 (1964), the defendant had been indicted and had counsel. The government persuaded a co-indictee, Colson, to get the defendant into Colson’s car, in which the government had hidden a radio transmitter. Colson was to discuss the crime, which he did. A government man listened to the radio transmission of the conversation and testified at the trial to admissions made by the defendant. The Court reversed, holding that the testimony of defendant’s admissions was inadmissible. The Court held:
“Here we deal not with a state court conviction, but with a federal case, where the specific guarantee of the Sixth Amendment directly applies. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458. We hold that the petitioner was denied the basic protections of that guarantee when there was used against him at his trial evidence of his own incriminating words, which federal agents had deliberately elicited from him after he had been indicted and in the absence of his counsel. * * *” 377 US at 205-206.
The defendant had urged that the evidence was inadmissible because it was the product of an unreasonable search and seizure, but the Court stated it did not reach the search and seizure issue and decided the case squarely on the ground of right to counsel.
The basis of the Court’s decision is even more clearly indicated by its reference to the New York cases. The Court said:
“Ever since this Court’s decision in the Spano case, the New York courts have unequivocally followed this constitutional rule. ‘Any secret interrogation of the defendant, from and after the finding *631of the indictment, without the protection afforded by the presence of counsel, contravenes the basic dictates of fairness in the conduct of criminal causes and the fundamental rights of persons charged with crime.’ People v. Waterman, 9 N. Y. 2d 561, 565, 175 N. E. 2d 445, 448.
“This view no more than reflects a constitutional principle established as long ago as Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 * * 377 US at 204-205.
New York subsequently has gone even further. In People v. Meyer, 11 NY2d 162, 227 NYS2d 427, 182 NE2d 103, 104 (1962), the court stated:
“The question on this appeal is whether a voluntary, unsolicited statement made by an accused to a police officer after arraignment following his arrest and before indictment is admissible in evidence against him. It is undisputed that upon the arraignment this accused was informed of his rights, including his rights to counsel, and that he requested none (Code Criminal Procedure, § 188) and had no counsel at the time the challenged statement was made. * * *”
The court held:
“* * * While an accused may waive a fundamental right, he did not do so here, nor is he estopped because he had made no request when informed of his rights. We thus conclude that any statement made by an accused after arraignment not in the presence of counsel as in Spano, Di Biasi and Waterman (supra) is inadmissible.”① 182 NE2d at 104.
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 US 478, 84 S Ct 1758, 12 L ed2d 977 (1964), applied the Massiah rule to state court proceedings and eliminated the time of indictment as the time when the right to the assistance of counsel commenced.
*632The one opinion that supports the majority’s decision is People v. Garner, 57 Cal2d 135, 18 Cal Rptr 40, 367 P2d 680, 693, cert den 370 US 929, 82 S Ct 1571, 8 L ed2d 508 (1962), particularly Mr. Justice Traynor’s concurring opinion. It was decided prior to Escobedo v. Illinois, supra, and Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 US 335, 83 S Ct 792, 9 L ed2d 799, 93 ALR2d 733 (1963). Those decisions appear to have cut away much of the foundation for Mr. Justice Traynor’s reasoning.
There have been advanced two possible underlying motives for the decisions in Massiah and Escobedo. One line of reasoning is as follows: Without the presence of counsel, the only witnesses to the circumstances under which a confession is made are the defendant and the police. The trial court will usually believe the police.② This is only human and a matter of experience, and in the majority of eases is probably a correct assessment of the testimony. Nevertheless, it makes the question of voluntariness usually dependent upon the accuracy of the police testimony. Involuntary confessions are more apt to be untruthful than are voluntary confessions. All courts are now wedded to the proposition that involuntary confessions, truthful or not, are inadmissible. The requirement that counsel be present at interrogation would largely insure that confessions would not be coerced and that if there is a question of fact on coercion, the trial court will have the advantage of counsel’s testimony which *633ideally will be completely objective and, at tbe least, should be no more biased than that of the police.
The other reason is only indirectly connected with voluntariness. It is that one of the constitutional rights of individuals is to be free from secret police interrogation; or, stated differently, a right to have counsel present when being interrogated by the police. This is apart from the threat that secret police interrogation without counsel tends to be coercive.
In my opinion, the majority’s decision seems contrary to either of the above-stated purposes.
The testimony of the principal interrogator in this case seems to me to negate a conscious intelligent waiver of the right to counsel. According to the police officer’s testimony, the defendant must have been told by his attorney before his arrest not to talk without first seeing his attorney. The defendant denies he ever talked to his attorney. According to the police, after defendant was in jail for three days, on June seventh, he told the interrogating officer he had an alibi and gave his alibi. I infer from the detective’s testimony that he told the defendant on June eighth that his alibi did not check out. At this time the detective testified:
“* * * he [defendant] was upset at this time, due to the fact that he had not seen his counsel, and in talking with him, why, it eventually got around to the second subject involved, and at this time I—he identified that subject as Harry Boy Roberts.
“Shortly after that, I went to the identification bureau and obtained a photograph of Henry Lee Roberts, took it back to the jail division, and showed it to Mr. Atherton, and at this time he identified him as being the Harry Boy that he had told me of.
“Still not having seen his counsel, why, I again *634did not press him on any further implication of himself. On the 9th I again talked to him. He still hadn’t seen his counsel, and as a consequence I did question him, regardless, about his own participation, and at this time, why, he told me of the entire holdup.”③
For the above reasons, I dissent.
Sloan, J., joins in this dissent.

 I am not suggesting we go this lar.

 This is exactly what happened here:
“THE COURT: Well, it boils down to whether or not the Court believes Officer Wold or whether the Court believes this defendant. I have to believe one or the other, and between the two of them, I believe Officer Wold. * * *”

 Perhaps the decision could be 'affirmed upon the ground that the defendant was given ample time to retain counsel and he failed to do so and the police do not have to delay further investigation because the defendant or his counsel do not act with reasonable dispatch. However, this was not the ground upon which the majority bases its decision.