Court Opinion

ID: 9545734
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:18:25.202543+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:15:26.612094
License: Public Domain

VAN DYKE, P. J.
I dissent. Unless speeiálly provided for by statute attorneys’ fees are an element of damages ancillary to a cause of action to enforce some contractual right. (Genis v. Krasne, 47 Cal.2d 241 [302 P.2d 289].) Like any other element of damages they must be pleaded when the party claiming the same first institutes court action to enforce his claims. (Genis v. Krasne, supra.) The right to recover attorneys ’ fees depends upon the contract in the particular ease and whether or not the contractual conditions antecedent to a valid claim for attorneys’ fees are present is a proper issue to be submitted when the action is brought to enforce contractual rights. For instance, in the ease before us the agreement as to attorneys’ fees made'it a condition precedent to recovery that the party claiming them had found it “necessary to bring an action at law to enforce its rights.” It might well have been a disputed issue as to whether the application for a judgment confirming the arbitrators’ award was necessary to the enforcement of the applicant’s rights. Other affirmative defenses might exist. The right to attorneys’ fees *131ought to have been pleaded and an award of attorneys’ fees ought to have been requested as a part of the relief to be granted in the proceeding. That is the usual procedure and I see nothing in the situation here which justifies any exception to the general practice. As said in Genis v. Krasne, supra, page 246:
“. . . Such fees cannot be allowed a successful litigant without pleading and proof (or admission) that there is a contract provision for them. This is so whether the successful party is plaintiff [citing eases] or defendant . . .” (See also Brooks v. Forington, 117 Cal. 219 [48 P. 1073], and Prescott v. Grady, 91 Cal. 518, 522 [27 P. 755].)
I think that in order to recover attorneys’ fees it was necessary for respondent herein to- tender the issue of its right to such fees as a part of the relief it claimed upon making its application to the court for a judgment confirming the-arbitrators’ award. Not having done so it relinquished its right.
The failure of respondent to plead its right to attorneys’ fees and demand appropriate relief in the trial court brings into play another well-settled rule of law, that of estoppel by judgment. A judgment concludes the parties as to all issues that are settled thereby and also as to those issues which might have been settled by the judgment had they been pleaded and presented to the court. (Sutphin v. Speik, 15 Cal.2d 195, 202 [99 P.2d 652, 101 P.2d 497]; Dobbins v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 22 Cal.2d 64, 70 [136 P.2d 572]; Brunswig Drug Co. v. Springer, 55 Cal.App.2d 444, 449-450 [130 P.2d 758]; De Hart v. Allen, 26 Cal.2d 829, 830-831 [161 P.2d 453].) The doctrines of res judicata and estoppel by judgment apply to proceedings in court in respect to arbitration. Section 1292 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides with respect to the judgment confirming the- award:
“The judgment so entered lias the same force and effect, in all respects, as, and is subject to all the provisions of law relating to, a judgment in an action; and it may be enforced, as if it had been rendered in an action in the court in which it is entered.”
The doctrine of res' judicata was applied in respect of a judgment rendered in connection with arbitration in Goldkette v. Daniel, 70 Cal.App.2d 96, pages 98-99 [160 P.2d 145]. In this case, since the right to attorneys’ fees could have, and as I have said ought to have, been tendered as an issue in the *132main action when application was made for a confirmatory-judgment, the right to attorneys’ fees stands as adjudicated against respondent. In that proceeding respondent could not withhold any proper issue nor split its deniands so as to retain the right to litigate in later proceedings. Akin to the foregoing are these further considerations. There was but one “action at law” begun and prosecuted by respondent. The fact that an appeal was taken did not and could not constitute a new action. Section 1049 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that:
“An action is deemed to be pending from the time of its commencement until its final determination upon appeal, or until the time for appeal has passed ...”
As said in Sharon v. Hill, 26 P. 337, 346 [11 Sawy. 290] :
“The effect of this provision appears to be that the judgment in the court below is only a step in the proceeding to a final judgment in the appellate court in cáse of an appeal, . . .” (To the same effect see Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nakano, 12 Cal.2d 711, 714 [87 P.2d 700, 121 A.L.R. 417].)
Any suggestion that because a plaintiff does not lmow an appeal will be taken he need not make or cannot make claim thereto until an appeal is in fact taken was rejected by the Supreme Court in Genis v. Krasne, supra, at page 248, as follows:
“. . . It is lessor’s position that when the litigation concluded in their favor in the trial court they could only present evidence of services which had been rendered up to that time; they could not anticipate whether there would be an appeal and what attorneys ’ services would be required if there were. There is no such practical difficulty, for when costs are awarded on appeal, the memorandum of costs on appeal is fixed and taxed in the trial court . . . , and if a party is entitled to attorneys’ fees on appeal, they can be determined by trial court when it determines the costs on appeal.”
I would reverse the judgment for attorneys’ fees with directions to the trial court to enter judgment that respondent is not entitled to recover such fees.
Appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied September 11, 1959.