Court Opinion

ID: 9388505
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-20 18:02:31.436715+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:20.681080
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/20/23 In re K.T.M. CA2/6
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION SIX

 In re K.T.M., a Person Coming                                2d Juv. No. B322343
 Under the Juvenile Court                                 (Super. Ct. No. 20JV00467)
 Law.                                                       (Santa Barbara County)

 SANTA BARBARA COUNTY
 DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL
 SERVICES,

      Plaintiff and Respondent,

 v.

 B.G., et al.,

      Defendants and Appellants.

      B.G. (father) and K.M. (mother) separately appeal the
juvenile court’s order terminating their parental rights to two-
year-old K.T.M. and selecting adoption as the permanent plan.
(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.)1 Father and mother’s sole
contention on appeal is that the Santa Barbara County Child
Welfare Services (CWS) and the juvenile court did not comply
with the inquiry and notice requirements pursuant to the Indian
Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C., § 1901 et seq.) and
related California law.2 We affirm.
                    Facts and Procedural History
       In December 2020, CWS petitioned the juvenile court to
detain six-month-old K.T.M. after mother became overwhelmed
with the care of the baby and had thoughts of harming herself
and K.T.M. The petition alleged that mother had been homeless
throughout K.T.M.’s life, suffered from mental illness, was
subject to several restraining orders. CWS had investigated four
referrals in six months concerning mother’s mental health. The
petition also alleged father was abusing methamphetamine and
heroin, was arrested for the forced rape of mother in the presence
of K.T.M., and understood K.T.M. was unsafe with mother but
continued to allow mother to provide care for the baby.
        At the detention hearing, father denied having any Indian
ancestry when asked by the juvenile court. Mother stated that
she had Indian ancestry through maternal grandfather, who she
believed was affiliated with the “Kurok” tribe of Northern
California. Father completed the ICWA-020, “Parental

      1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.

      2  “[B]ecause ICWA uses the term ‘Indian,’ we do the same
for consistency, even though we recognize that other terms, such
as ‘Native American’ or ‘indigenous,’ are preferred by many.” (In
re Benjamin M. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 735, 739, fn. 1 (Benjamin
M.).)

                                2
Notification of Indian Status” form, and declared, under penalty
of perjury, that none of the criteria indicating Indian ancestry
applied to him. Mother also completed the ICWA-020 form and
checked the boxes indicating that she and K.T.M. are or may be a
member of, or are eligible for membership in, a federally
recognized Indian tribe, and that one or more of her parents,
grandparents, or lineal ancestors is or was a member of the
Kurok tribe located in Happy Camp, California. She listed
maternal grandfather and maternal great grandfather as the
relatives through whom she claimed Indian ancestry.
       CWS filed an amended petition, which included an Indian
Child Inquiry Attachment. The attachment indicated that CWS
had asked parents about K.T.M.’s Indian status and there was
reason to believe K.T.M. is or may be an Indian child.
       CWS mailed mother an ICWA Questionnaire, obtained
ancestry information regarding K.T.M.’s relatives from three
different databases, and spoke with mother who provided
additional ancestry information. CWS included this information
in the ICWA matrix, which also indicated that maternal
grandfather was in the process of obtaining membership in the
Kurok tribe and all of his siblings were receiving benefits through
the tribe.
       CWS met with both parents to conduct a social
study/family assessment for the jurisdiction and disposition
report. Mother indicated she was raised by maternal
grandmother but remained in contact with maternal grandfather.
During CWS’s interview with father, paternal grandfather was
present and participated in the interview. There was no
indication that either parent was adopted.
       In February and July 2021, CWS mailed the ICWA-030
forms, “Notice of Child Custody Proceeding for Indian Child,” to
father and mother, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Secretary of the

                                3
Interior, and various other tribes including the Karuk Tribe of
California, Quartz Valley Indian Reservation, Bear River
Band/Rohnerville Rancheria, Big Lagoon Rancheria, Blue Lake
Rancheria, Cher-Ae Heights/Trinidad Rancheria, Elk Valley
Rancheria, Resighini Rancheria, and the Yurok tribe. The
notices included ancestry information for father and mother,
maternal grandparents, paternal grandparents, maternal great
grandparents, and paternal great grandparents.
       CWS also included a cover letter with the notices that
requested the Tribal ICWA representative to search its census
roll to determine if K.T.M. is eligible for enrollment or is enrolled
with the tribe. The letter stated that CWS had “conducted a
diligent search to obtain as much family ancestry information as
possible,” and that it had “contacted all family members known to
[the] agency and ha[d] obtained all ancestry information known
to them.” (Italics omitted.) Prior to sending the second set of
ICWA notices in July 2021, CWS spoke with mother and
confirmed the correct spelling of the “Kurok” tribe as it did not
match a tribe listed in the Bureau of Indian Affairs registry.
None of the responding tribes claimed K.T.M. as an Indian child.
       In February 2022, CWS emailed an ICWA inquiry with the
family tree to the following tribes: Yurok Tribe of the Yurok
Reservation, the Karuk Tribe, Resighini Rancheria, Big Lagoon
Rancheria, and Blue Lake Rancheria. The Yurok Tribe
responded that none of the individuals listed in the family tree
are enrolled with the Yurok Tribe. Big Lagoon Rancheria also
responded that none of the individuals listed were members or
eligible for membership in its tribe.
       At the contested 12-month review hearing, the juvenile
court found there is no reason to believe that ICWA applies in
this case.

                                 4
       In August 2022, following a contested section 366.26
hearing, the juvenile court terminated the parental rights of
father and mother, and found by clear and convincing evidence,
that K.T.M. is likely to be adopted.
                          Motion to Augment
       On December 13, 2022, prior to filing its respondent’s brief,
CWS filed a motion to augment the record on appeal to include
evidence of an updated ICWA matrix for K.T.M. that CWS filed
in the juvenile court on December 12, 2022. The document
reveals that between August 2022 and December 2022, CWS
contacted several members of mother’s extended family to inquire
about K.T.M.’s possible Indian ancestry.
       For example, CWS contacted Jessica S., who is mother’s
half sister. She “recall[ed] that there could be [Indian] ancestry
in maternal grandfather’s family,” but did not provide any
further information. CWS also contacted maternal cousin, Diane
E., with whom K.T.M. was placed. She stated that “there is no
Native American ancestry in the family as far as she knows.”
CWS attempted to contact maternal grandfather on at least two
occasions and left voicemails with call back instructions on his
cell phone. He did not return their calls. CWS contacted
maternal aunt, Mallory M., who stated “there is [Indian] ancestry
with [maternal grandfather’s] family,” but was not sure which
tribe. She also explained that it can be difficult to reach
maternal grandfather because his phone is “always broken.” She
stated she would try to get in touch with him and would contact
CWS with any tribal information maternal grandfather knows.
No further information was provided.
       After CWS moved to augment the record with the updated
ICWA matrix, father filed an opposition. He contends this court
should reject the motion “because it contains a post-judgment
filing in violation of the long-held standard that such [a]

                                 5
document is inappropriate for appellate review.” We deferred
resolution of CWS’s motion to augment pending completion of
briefing.
       Currently, there is a split of authority as to whether an
appellate court should consider additional evidence outside the
lower court record concerning a child services agency’s
investigatory efforts pursuant to ICWA. This issue is pending
review before our state Supreme Court. (In re Kenneth D. (2022)
82 Cal.App.5th 1027, review granted Nov. 30, 2022, S276649.)
We conclude that additional evidence may be considered in
certain circumstances, where as here, the evidence is beneficial to
resolving appellant’s ICWA claim of error on appeal.
       Code of Civil Procedure section 909 permits appellate
courts to make independent factual findings and take additional
evidence on appeal. Our Supreme Court cautions that this
authority should be exercised sparingly. (In re Zeth S. (2003) 31
Cal.4th 396, 405.) But Code of Civil Procedure section 909 “also
mandates it shall be liberally construed where a cause may be
disposed of in a single appeal.” (In re E.L. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th
597, 600 (E.L.), review granted Nov. 30, 2022, S276508.) “When,
however, postjudgment evidence is offered to an appellate court
in support of a motion to dismiss a juvenile dependency appeal, it
is ‘routinely conder[ed]’ because, if the motion is granted, it will
have ‘the beneficial consequence’ of ‘“expedit[ing] the proceedings
and promot[ing] the finality of the juvenile court’s orders and
judgment.”’” (In re Allison B. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 214, 219; In
re Dezi C. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 769, 779, fn. 4 (Dezi C.), review
granted Sept. 21, 2022, S275578.)
       Accordingly, we grant CWS’s motion to augment the record
with the updated ICWA matrix.

                                 6
                      ICWA Inquiry and Notice
       Father and mother contend the judgment terminating their
parental rights should be conditionally reversed and the matter
remanded to the juvenile court because CWS and the juvenile
court failed to conduct an adequate inquiry and therefore, notice
was incomplete.
       We review claims of inadequate inquiry and notice for
substantial evidence. (In re Rebecca R. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th
1426, 1430; In re J.T. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 986, 991.)
       ICWA defines an “‘Indian child’” as “any unmarried person
who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an
Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe
and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.” (25
U.S.C. § 1903(4) & (8); § 224.1, subd. (a).) The juvenile court and
the county child welfare department have an affirmative and
continuing duty to inquire whether a child subject to dependency
proceedings is or may be an Indian child. (§ 224.2, subd. (a); Cal.
Rules of Court, rules 5.481(a) & 5.668(c).)
       “‘The continuing duty to inquire whether a child is or may
be an Indian child “can be divided into three phases: the initial
duty to inquire, the duty of further inquiry, and the duty to
provide formal ICWA notice.”’” (In re Antonio R. (2022) 76
Cal.App.5th 421, 429.)
       The duty to inquire begins with the initial contact and
obligates the juvenile court and the child services agency to ask
the child, parents, extended family members, and others who
have an interest in the child, whether the child is, or may be, an
Indian child. (§ 224.2, subds. (a)-(c); E.L., supra, 82 Cal.App.5th
at p. 607.)
       The duty of further inquiry is triggered if the child services
agency or the juvenile court has “reason to believe that an Indian
child is involved in a proceeding.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e).) There is

                                  7
“reason to believe” a child is an Indian child “whenever the court
[or] social worker . . . has information suggesting that either the
parent of the child or the child is a member or may be eligible for
membership in an Indian tribe.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(1).) Further
inquiry includes interviewing the parents, extended family
members, contacting the Bureau of Indian Affairs and State
Department of Social Services for assistance in identifying the
tribes in which the child may be a member or eligible for
membership, contacting the tribes and any other person that may
reasonably be expected to have information regarding the child’s
membership status or eligibility. (§ 224.2, subds. (e)(1), (e)(2)(A)-
(C).)
       The duty to notify the relevant tribes is triggered if there is
“reason to know that an Indian child is involved.” (§ 224.3, subd.
(a); 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a).) A “reason to know” exists in any of the
following circumstances: (1) a person having an interest in the
child informs the court that the child is an Indian child; (2) the
residence or domicile of the child or the child’s parents is on a
reservation or in an Alaska Native village; (3) any participant in
the proceeding informs the court that it has discovered
information indicating the child is an Indian child; (4) the child
who is the subject of the proceeding gives the court reason to
know he or she is an Indian child; (5) the court is informed that
the child is or has been a ward of a tribal court; and (6) the court
is informed that either parent or child possess an identification
card indicating membership in an Indian tribe. (§ 224.2, subd.
(d).)
       Here, based on mother’s statements that she and K.T.M.
had Indian ancestry and may be eligible for membership with the
Kurok tribe, CWS elected to conduct further inquiry by sending
ICWA-030 notices to the various tribes, the Bureau of Indian
Affairs, and the Secretary of the Interior. But neither CWS nor

                                  8
the juvenile court inquired of father and mother’s extended
family members about K.T.M.’s possible Indian ancestry, despite
having contact with several family members throughout the
proceedings.
       The question becomes whether the error is harmless.
(People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)
       Appellate courts are presently divided as to what standard
to apply when assessing whether a defective inquiry is harmless.
As one appellate court aptly explained, “[t]his diversity of rules is
understandable . . . because courts are grappling with . . . how
the absence of information (that is, answers to the questions
about American Indian heritage that the agency never asked)
might affect the juvenile court’s ICWA finding.” (Dezi C., supra,
79 Cal.App.5th at p. 778.)
       Here, father and mother suggest the correct approach is the
“rule of automatic reversal.” That rule requires reversal when
the initial inquiry is deficient “no matter how ‘slim’ the odds are
that further inquiry on remand might lead to a different ICWA
finding by the juvenile court.” (Dezi C., supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at
p. 777.) In the alternative, father and mother suggest application
of the “readily obtainable information rule,” set forth in Benjamin
M., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 744. That rule provides that “a
court must reverse where the record demonstrates that the
agency has not only failed in its duty of initial inquiry, but where
the record indicates that there was readily obtainable
information that was likely to bear meaningfully upon whether
the child is an Indian child.” (Ibid.)
       Respondent contends father and mother have not carried
their burden to demonstrate prejudicial error because “there was
no readily available information that would bear meaningfully on
the issue of Native American heritage,” (Benjamin M., supra, 70
Cal.App.5th at p. 744) and “the record contains no information

                                 9
suggesting a reason to believe [K.T.M.] may be an Indian child.”
(Dezi C., supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 779 (noting a “fourth rule,”
the “reason to believe” rule).)
       We reject appellants’ invitation to apply the “automatic
reversal rule” because error on the part of the juvenile court is
never presumed. We will not “set aside” the juvenile court’s
judgment unless it “has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.”
(Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; Benjamin M., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at
p. 742.) Here, it has not.
        As reflected in the augmented record on appeal, CWS
contacted several of mother’s extended family members and
inquired about possible Indian ancestry, but none of these
inquiries provided any information about a specific tribal
affiliation. They merely confirmed that there was a suggestion of
Indian ancestry through maternal grandfather. CWS attempted
to contact maternal grandfather, who presumably would have
information that would bear meaningfully on the issue of Indian
ancestry, but he has not returned any of CWS’s calls. The law
requires a child services agency to make a “meaningful effort” to
locate and interview extended family members. It is not required
to cast about for information or pursue unproductive
investigative leads, particularly when a potential source of
information is either unavailable or unresponsive. (See In re
K.R. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 701, 709; In re Levi U. (2000) 78
Cal.App.4th 191, 199.)
        Father and mother next contend, and respondent concedes,
that CWS did not ask father’s extended family members about
K.T.M.’s possible Indian ancestry. We conclude the error was not
prejudicial. This is not a case where father was adopted or
estranged from his biological family such that his “self-reporting
of ‘no [Indian] heritage’ may not be fully informed . . . .” (Dezi C.,
supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 779, citing In re A.C. (2022) 75

                                 10
Cal.App.5th 1009, 1015-1017.) To the contrary, he was raised by
his parents, “speaks to them all the time,” has consistently
denied having any Indian ancestry, and neither father nor
mother point to anything in the record that suggests otherwise.
Given these facts, it is unlikely paternal grandfather would have
information that would bear meaningfully on the issue of
K.T.M.’s possible Indian ancestry even if CWS had asked him.
Accordingly, CWS’s failure to comply with its initial duty of
inquiry is harmless error. (Benjamin M., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th
at p. 744; In re Y.M. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 901, 917.)
       Father and mother next contend the notices were
inaccurate and incomplete. This contention is meritless.
“[S]haring of information with tribes at [the further] inquiry
stage is distinct from formal ICWA notice, which requires a
‘reason to know’ – rather than a ‘reason to believe’ – that the
child is an Indian child.” (In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041,
1049.)
       Here, mother’s claim of Indian ancestry did not rise to the
level of information indicating that K.T.M. is an Indian child
within the meaning of section 224.2, subdivision (d). A
suggestion of Indian ancestry is not sufficient under ICWA or
related California law to trigger the notice requirement. (In re
Austin J. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 870, 886-887; In re M.W. (2020)
49 Cal.App.5th 1034, 1047 [“‘reason to believe’ the minor is an
Indian child triggers requirements less rigorous than does a
‘reason to know’”].) Accordingly, any omission in the ICWA
notices is of no consequence.
       We conclude remand is not warranted here because there is
no evidence that K.T.M. is an Indian child or that remand for
further inquiry would lead to a different ICWA finding.

                               11
                            Disposition
       The judgment (order terminating parental rights and
selecting adoption as the permanent plan) is affirmed.
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                              YEGAN, J.
I concur:

            GILBERT, P. J.

                               12
BALTODANO, J., Dissenting:
       I respectfully dissent. The Santa Barbara County Child
Welfare Services and juvenile court’s failure to ask Father’s
extended family whether K.T.M. may be an Indian child was not
harmless.
       The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C.
§ 1901 et seq.) serves “to protect the best interests of Indian
children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes
and families by the establishment of minimum Federal standards
for the removal of Indian children from their families.” (25
U.S.C. § 1902; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.1) Thus, the juvenile
court and agency “have an affirmative and continuing duty to
inquire whether a child . . . is or may be an Indian child.”
(§ 224.2, subd. (a).)
       Initial inquiry requires a child services agency “ask[ ] the
child, parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family
members, [and any] others who have an interest in the child . . .
whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd.
(b).) Extended family includes, among others, the child’s
grandparents. (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); § 224.1, subd. (c).)
       Here, Father was the only person on the paternal side of
the family the agency asked regarding K.T.M.’s possible Indian
ancestry. After Father said he did not have Indian ancestry,
CWS’s inquiry of paternal relatives ended there. But the
agency’s duty of inquiry was not met simply because Father
denied Indian ancestry. (In re Y.W. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 542,
554.) The agency interviewed the paternal grandfather but did
not inquire about K.T.M.’s Indian ancestry. Father said he spoke
to paternal grandmother “all the time,” but CWS did not attempt

      1All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.

                                 1
to contact her. On this record, there is no substantial evidence
(§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2); In re A.M. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 303, 314)
that the agency and the juvenile court fulfilled their duty of
initial inquiry as to Father’s family members who were available
to the agency.
       While the law does not require the agency to contact every
extended family member (see In re Ezequiel G. (2022) 81
Cal.App.5th 984, 1006-1007), there must be a reasonable inquiry.
(In re J.K. (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 498, 508, fn. 7.) Based on the
facts here, the agency’s initial inquiry was not reasonable. “The
duty to develop information concerning whether a child is an
Indian child rests with the court and the [child services agency],
not the parents or members of the parents’ families.” (In re
Antonio R. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 421, 430.) I would conditionally
affirm the order terminating parental rights but remand this
case to the juvenile court for the limited purpose of allowing the
agency and the juvenile court to comply with the inquiry
requirements of ICWA and related California law as to Father’s
extended family. (In re J.K., at p. 511; In re Antonio R., at pp.
436-437.)
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                        BALTODANO, J.

                                2
                 Gustavo E. Lavayen, Judge
           Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
               ______________________________

     Michelle D. Peña, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant, B.G.

      Linda Rehm, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant, K.M.

     Rachel Van Mullem, County Counsel, Jennifer J. Lee,
Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.