Court Opinion

ID: 9678759
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:31:18.123677+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:07.709394
License: Public Domain

Per Curiam.
This case was heard previously in Kullbom v. Kullbom, 209 Neb. 145, 306 N.W.2d 844 (1981).
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 45-103 (Cum. Supp. 1982) provides that interest on all decrees and judgments for the payment of money shall be from the date of the rendition thereof at the rate provided for in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 45-104.01 (Cum. Supp. 1982), which, at the present time, is 14 percent per annum.
In the decree in the instant case appellee was ordered to pay $37,566.75 of his pension and profit-sharing trusts to appellant as part of the property division. The appellee was not required to make any part of the $37,566.75 payment until he received a distribution from the trusts and the trial court did not award any interest on the appellant’s share of the trusts.
In the case of Cumming v. Cumming, 193 Neb. 601, 228 N.W.2d 296 (1975), the respondent was awarded $37,000 from the petitioner’s share of her father’s estate. The $37,000 payment was necessary to bring the property division to the level determined by the trial court. The payment was to be made “not later than such time as petitioner received $60,000 or more from her father’s estate.” Cumming at 604, 228 N.W.2d at 298. In ordering interest at 8 percent on the payment, this court stated: “In the decree here, although any part or all of the $37,000 may be paid at any time, none of it is required to be paid until the petitioner receives the distribution of her share from her father’s estate. A court of equity *150has a reasonable discretion to allow or withhold interest as is reasonable and just, except in cases where interest is recoverable as a matter of right.” Cumming at 605, 228 N.W.2d at 299.
We therefore hold that interest on the $37,566.75, or any unpaid balance thereof, from appellee to appellant shall accrue from the date of the December 14, 1979, divorce decree, which was when the District Court should have assigned to appellant her share of appellee’s pension and profit-sharing trusts.
Reversed and remanded with directions.