Court Opinion

ID: 9533519
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:32:27.005341+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:29:04.603336
License: Public Domain

BELL, C.J.,
dissents.
Dissenting Opinion by BELL, C.J.
Misappropriation of entrusted funds, we have admonished, “is an act infected with deceit and dishonesty, and, in the absence of compelling extenuating circumstances justifying a lesser sanction, will result in disbarment.” Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Bakas, 323 Md. 395, 403, 593 A.2d 1087, 1091 (1991). See Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Spery, 371 Md. 560, 568, 810 A.2d 487, 491-92 (2002); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Sullivan, 369 Md. 650, 655-56, 801 A.2d 1077, 1080 (2002); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376, 410, 773 A.2d 463, 483 (2001). That same admonition has been given, and thus applies, in the case of conduct involving misrepresentation, see Vanderlinde, 364 Md. at 380, 773 A.2d at 465. See also Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Levitt, 286 Md. 231, 238, 406 A.2d 1296, 1299 (1979); Fellner v. Bar Ass’n of Balt. City, 213 Md. 243, 247, 131 A.2d 729, 732 (1957), especially when the attorney has a history of such conduct. Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Myers, 333 Md. 440, 449, 635 A.2d 1315-1319 (1994).
Whether the misconduct occurred is a question to be determined by the hearing court, whose findings in that regard are important and entitled to deference. See Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Parker, 306 Md. 36, 46, 506 A.2d 1183, 1188 (1986). The intent with which the misconduct was committed also is entrusted to the determination of the hearing court. That determination is of further importance in that it speaks directly to the quality and degree of misconduct for sanction purposes. Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Tomaino, 362 Md. 483, 498, 765 A.2d 653, 661 (2001) (reasoning that “the state of mind of the attorney at the time of the violation [is] important *600in the context of mitigation”); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Sheridan, 357 Md. 1, 29, 741 A.2d 1143, 1158 (1999) (“We agree with Respondent that his state of mind at the time he violated the ethical rules is important in the context of mitigation.”); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Awuah, 346 Md. 420, 435, 697 A.2d 446, 454 (1997). (“Although ignorance does not excuse a violation of disciplinary rules, a finding with respect to the intent with which a violation was committed is relevant on the issue of the appropriate sanction.”).
The hearing court found that the respondent violated Rules 8.4(c) and (d), and thus engaged in conduct involving misrepresentation. It also concluded that she did so intentionally, that the intent with which she acted was not a defense:
“The Respondent contends that her actions were not intentional or willful and thus could not been viewed to violate Rule 8.4(c) and (d). This Court simply does not believe that Respondent did not intend the natural consequences of her action and nonaction, especially when the Respondent testified that she never wanted the Butlers to become aware of the source of the funds or the status of their claims. Intentional fraud can be sustained by means of concealment. Attorney Grievance Commission v. Clements, 319 Md. 289, 572 A.2d 174 (1990); See also Attorney Grievance Commission v. Pinkney, 311 Md. 137, 532 A.2d 1367 (1987) (Respondent prepared fictitious pleadings to give her client the impression that her case was filed in court, when in fact, she had failed to do so.) The act of concealment is exactly the conduct of the Respondent in this matter.”
The court also rejected the “independent defense of reliance of counsel,” which the respondent argued answered both the allegations with respect to Rule 8.4 and Rule 1.7. That defense was based on the respondent’s having consulted with Mr. Wiggins concerning the appropriateness of proceeding to reimburse her client for a loss necessitated by her inaction, without fully disclosing to that client the circumstances and that it was her money, rather than that of an insurance company, that was being used to make the reimbursement. After conducting the analysis and reviewing the pertinent *601cases, the hearing court concluded, “the Respondent ... cannot rely on the good faith reliance on the defense of counsel as this is not the rule in Maryland.” Nevertheless, it offered mitigating factors to be used when fashioning a sanction. Specifically, the hearing court made a “finding that the Respondent in good faith relied on the incorrect advice provided to her by Mr. Wiggins and, because of that reliance, did not impart to the Butlers information about the status of their claims or the source of the funds that they received.” In addition, the hearing court noted that, “during the hearing, Respondent displayed a high degree of remorse for her actions. These actions should therefore be considered as mitigating factors when fashioning any sanction.”
Despite the Hearing court’s mitigation findings and, notwithstanding its recognition of the purpose of attorney discipline, the majority orders the respondent disbarred.
The goal of attorney discipline in this state is well settled and has been stated often: “The primary purpose in imposing discipline on an attorney for violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct is not to punish the lawyer but rather to protect the public and the public’s confidence in the legal profession.” Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Stein, 373 Md. 531, 533, 819 A.2d 372, 375 (2003); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Powell, 369 Md. 462, 474, 800 A.2d 782, 789 (2002). When sanctions that are commensurate with the nature and gravity of the violations and the intent with which they were committed are imposed, the public is protected. Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Awuah, 346 Md. 420, 435, 697 A.2d 446, 454 (1997). See Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Sheinbein, 372 Md. 224, 255, 812 A.2d 981, 999 (2002); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Hess, 352 Md. 438, 453, 722 A.2d 905, 913 (1999); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Webster, 348 Md. 662, 678, 705 A.2d 1135, 1143 (1998). In determining the appropriate sanction, the Court is required to consider the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including consideration of any mitigating factors. See Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Atkinson, 357 Md. 646, 656, 745 A.2d 1086, 1092 (2000); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Gavin, 350 Md. 176, 197-98, 711 A.2d 193, 204 (1998).
*602The absence of a dishonest or selfish motive is a factor that this Court has determined to be a mitigating factor, entitled to some weight. Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Thompson, 367 Md. 315, 330, 786 A.2d 763, 772-73 (2001); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Jaseb, 364 Md. 464, 481-82, 773 A.2d 516, 526 (2001); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Glenn, 341 Md. 448, 488-89, 671 A.2d 463, 483 (1996). We have also recognized “remorse” as a mitigating factor. Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Post, 379 Md. 60, 71, 839 A.2d 718, 725 (2003); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Wyatt, 323 Md. 36, 38, 591 A.2d 467, 468 (1991). Accordingly, I believe that an indefinite suspension, rather than disbarment, is the appropriate sanction.
That advice of counsel is not a defense or that the hearing court found that the respondent “intend[ed] the natural consequences of her action and nonaction,” does not mean that, as a matter of law, the respondent acted with a dishonest or selfish motive. As we have seen, the hearing court concluded that the respondent had no intent to harm her client.
It necessarily follows, therefore, that she acted without a dishonest or selfish motive. That finding and conclusion is entitled to weight. That is true notwithstanding the facts that the hearing court could have reached the opposite conclusion and, more to the point, that that opposite conclusion is the one that this Court prefers and, as factfinder, would have reached. Nor can it be ignored that the hearing court concluded that the respondent expressed a high degree of remorse. Here again, that finding is entitled to weight. That the majority’s review of the record leads it to the opposite finding does not undermine the finding and certainly is not a basis for its vitiation. When the hearing court’s motive finding is considered with its finding of a high degree of remorse, disbarment simply is not warranted. There really is no good reason, and the public is not protected, when an attorney, acting, as found by the hearing court, without a selfish or dishonest motive is disbarred. Imposition of such a sanction under those circumstances, amounts to nothing more than punishment. Perhaps recognizing the logic of this position, the majority totally *603disregards the hearing court’s motive findings 1 and trivializes the remorse finding; in that way, the majority justifies its punishment — the exaction of the pound of flesh it believes required — of the respondent.

. It is interesting to me, given the fact that the holding is that reliance on advice of counsel is not a defense, the emphasis that the majority places on where Mr. Wiggins is barred, going so far as to suggest that seeking advice from someone not barred in Maryland and, therefore, presumably, not familiar with Maryland procedure, somehow is more reprehensible, that her fault may have been less had she sought the advice of a Maryland attorney. Quaere: why do we refer frequently to commentators, experts, in many fields of endeavor, without regard to where they are barred? Curiously, sometimes, quite frequently, in fact, the opinion of the commentator finds its way into appellate opinions, even those of this Court. It is perhaps obvious, but I want to be clear, I do not share the majority’s view.