Court Opinion

ID: 9565442
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:21:16.561866+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:38.895844
License: Public Domain

SENIOR JUSTICE POFF, with whom JUSTICE RUSSELL and JUSTICE HASSELL join,
dissenting.
*291Because I cannot agree that the trial court abused its discretion, I must dissent.
The resolution of the issue raised in this case requires a thorough comparison of the facts as alleged in the motion for judgment, as revealed in pretrial proceedings, and as developed in sworn testimony at trial. The motion for judgment alleged that Montecalvo “rented out rooms to boarders.” Johnson, “a licensing inspector for the Virginia Department of Social Services, presented herself at the plaintiffs residence . . . and requested permission to enter and inspect the premises.” Montecalvo refused permission unless “the defendant present [ed] a valid search warrant”. A magistrate, “[a]t the initiative of the defendant ... issued a search warrant. . . and an arrest warrant for the plaintiff for interfering with the defendant in the performance of her duties.”1 The arrest warrant “was so totally lacking in probable cause as to infer a spirit of malice.” After hearing evidence at the criminal trial “consisting entirely of the testimony of the defendant”, the judge “struck the Commonwealth’s evidence and dismissed the criminal charges”. The motion for judgment demanded compensatory and punitive damages “[d]ue to the malicious prosecution ... set on foot by the defendant”.
The record of the pretrial proceedings shows that Johnson, in a memorandum of law filed in support of her demurrer and motion for summary judgment, stated that she “did not ask for the issuance of the arrest warrant”, that she “assumed they had simply gotten a search warrant”, and that she “was surprised when Officer Stachura executed the arrest warrant.” In that memorandum, Johnson averred that Oliver Norrell, an assistant Commonwealth’s Attorney, “will testify that the inspectors sought his assistance in securing a search warrant, and that they never mentioned the need for an arrest warrant”. The affidavit in support of the search warrant, attached as an exhibit to Johnson’s memorandum of law, stated that Montecalvo had “acknowledged . . . that he was operating a home for Adults without the required license”. Although Johnson, Gestwick, and William Davidson, a zoning officer, were named (in that order) as those who had heard the con*292fession, the affidavit was executed, not by Johnson but by Barbara Gestwick.
Martha Parrish, the assistant Attorney General who represented Johnson in pre-trial proceedings, filed an affidavit declaring that “[o]n at least two occasions during the motions stage of this case, I advised counsel for the plaintiff that Ms. Johnson had no role in instigating the prosecution of the plaintiff. One of these occasions was immediately following our oral argument on the defendant’s demurrer or in the alternative motion for summary judgment.”
On March 6, 1989, Oxenham filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the demurrer and motion. Reaffirming allegations made in the motion for judgment filed four months earlier, Oxenham insisted that it was Johnson who “obtained a search warrant”; that Johnson “had no reasonable grounds to institute these criminal proceedings”; and that “[t]he facts before the Court clearly show that the . . . prosecution for interfering with [Johnson] was ‘set on foot’ by [Johnson].”
On May 3, 1989, Oxenham signed “Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Plea of Sovereign Immunity and Motion to Strike Punitive Damages”. Consistent with the allegations made in the Motion for Judgment, the memorandum asserted that Johnson had “committed the intentional tort of malicious prosecution” and had “acted without regard to the plaintiffs legal rights”.
In answers signed May 15, 1989 to interrogatories posed by Johnson, the plaintiff said that Johnson “acted without regard for the plaintiffs constitutional rights.” Explaining his allegation that Johnson was the person who initiated the arrest warrant, he said that “[t]he arrest warrant was issued by the magistrate after the defendant complained to the magistrate” and “[t]he defendant’s name appears on the warrant as the complainant.”
In her grounds of defense, filed May 18, 1989, Johnson repeated her statement that “she did not in any way initiate the arrest warrant . . . and had no knowledge of the obstruction of justice charge”. In answer to an interrogatory propounded by Montecalvo whether “anyone from the Office of the Richmond Commonwealth’s Attorney or the Richmond Bureau of Police contacted [her] prior to the plaintiffs [criminal] hearing and discussed [her] testimony”, Johnson replied that no one had con*293tacted her and that she had testified because she was “under subpoena.”
In a pretrial deposition taken by Johnson, Montecalvo testified that he had never held any conversation with Johnson; that it was Barbara Gestwick, Johnson’s superior in the department, with whom he had talked about the search; and that he had not felt “harassed” by Johnson and had no reason to believe she bore him any ill will.
The trial court overruled Johnson’s demurrer, special pleas, and motion for summary judgment and seated a jury for trial of the malicious-prosecution suit. The evidence adduced at that trial is relevant to the sanctions issue before this Court.
The plaintiffs evidence consisted of Montecalvo’s testimony, that of Johnson, and the two warrants admitted as exhibits. Montecalvo testified that Gestwick, in company with Johnson and Davidson, came to his residence on June 8, 1988. Gestwick requested permission to inspect his home. After conferring by telephone with Oxenham, his attorney, Montecalvo told Gestwick that they could not enter his home without a search warrant. The three inspectors left and returned later with two police officers. Officer Stachura served both a search warrant and an arrest warrant, and the inspectors searched the home. At the criminal trial, Montecalvo pled guilty to the charge of operating a home for adults without a license. The charge of interfering with the discharge of official duties was dismissed. Asked on cross-examination if he had been “harassed in any way by Virginia Johnson” and if he had “exchanged any words with her at all”, Montecalvo replied, “No, sir; just Ms. Gestwick.”
Johnson, called by Montecalvo as an adverse witness, testified that she had accompanied Gestwick and Davidson on the visit to Montecalvo’s residence; that “Ms. Gestwick and Mr. Montecalvo had the conversation” about the request to search; that she attended the meeting at the magistrate’s office when Gestwick executed the affidavit for the search warrant; that she, Johnson, “had no correspondence or conversation with the magistrate whatsoever”; and that she did not know that an arrest warrant had been issued until it was served. Explaining why her name appeared on the face of the arrest warrant as the complaining witness, Johnson said she assumed that the magistrate “took my name from the search warrant affidavit because it was first in a series of names.”
*294Montecalvo rested, and Johnson moved to strike his evidence. Commenting for the record, the trial judge said, “I can’t comprehend how the jury can come back with a plaintiffs verdict, but let’s see what they do.” Accordingly, pursuant to the “the court’s policy against striking the evidence in order to preserve a full record on appeal”, the court took Johnson’s motion under advisement.
Johnson then called Gestwick to the stand. Gestwick testified that it was she, and not Johnson, who had talked with Montecalvo; that she had contacted the magistrate and consulted with an assistant Commonwealth’s Attorney and an assistant Attorney General about a search warrant; that she had executed the affidavit for the search warrant; and that she had never requested or discussed an arrest warrant and was unaware that one had been issued until Officer Stachura served it. Joi Jeter, the assistant Attorney General mentioned by Gestwick, confirmed her testimony that their conversation concerned only the need for a search warrant and that no mention had been made of an arrest warrant.
At the conclusion of all the evidence, Johnson renewed her motion to strike, and the trial court, reaffirming its previous ruling, submitted the case to the jury. As the court noted for the record, the jury “required just ten minutes to return a verdict for the defendant.” Invoking Code § 8.01-271.1, Johnson filed a motion for sanctions against Oxenham and Montecalvo. In a letter opinion, the court approved the motion as to Oxenham.
The court rested its decision upon two findings of violations of the duty imposed upon an attorney by the statute: (1) that Oxenham failed to make “reasonable inquiry” to determine whether the civil suit against Johnson was “well-grounded in fact”; and (2) that the suit was brought and maintained “for an improper purpose”.
The court explained the reason for its first finding. Although the court believed that, initially, Oxenham “was entitled to rely on the information contained in the warrant. . . as a basis for the preparation and filing of the motion for judgment”, the court concluded that Oxenham violated his duty under the statute when he failed to conduct an investigation which would have disclosed that none of the prospective witnesses would testify at trial in support of the facts alleged in the pleading. Specifically, the court found:
*295Plaintiff conducted no investigation nor discovery after the filing of the motion for judgment, notwithstanding being repeatedly told by defense counsel that the defendant was not the source of the issuance of the arrest warrant, that she merely accompanied her supervisor to the magistrate’s office .... At trial there was no evidence to the contrary. In fact, all the evidence was that defendant had nothing to do with the issuance of either warrant.
In explanation of its second finding, the court said:
To file a motion for judgment and do nothing that was reasonably calculated to produce a favorable result leads the court to the inevitable conclusion that the purpose of filing the motion for judgment was not to prevail on the merits but to harass the defendant.
Basing its decision upon these findings, the court entered final judgment confirming the jury’s verdict and imposing a monetary sanction upon Oxenham.
I agree with the majority that, contrary to Oxenham’s theory, the abuse of discretion standard is the appropriate standard of appellate review in a sanctions case. Oxenham’s chief complaint in this Court is that the trial court erred in construing Code § 8.01-271.1 to impose a “continuing duty” upon an attorney or a litigant who signs the initial pleading. As he points out, courts in the federal jurisdiction appear to be deeply divided over the question whether Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure2 contemplates a continuing duty. See, e.g., Blue v. Marsh, 914 F.2d 525 (4th Cir. 1990) (finding continuing duty); Thomas v. Capital Sec. Services, 836 F.2d 866 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (finding no continuing duty); Herron v. Jupiter Transportation Co., 858 F.2d 332 (6th Cir. 1988) (finding continuing duty); Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp. 801 F.2d 1531, 1536 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding no continuing duty); see also Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978) (fees assessed against plaintiff under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 when “claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or . . . the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so.”).
*296As I read these opinions, the appearance of diversity is largely a matter of semantics, resulting primarily from the disparate use of the term “continuing duty”. I do not disagree with the statement Oxenham quotes from Pantry Queen Foods v. Lifeschultz Fast Freight, 809 F.2d 451, 454 (7th Cir. 1987) (finding no continuing duty) that nothing in Rule 11 “requires a lawyer to . . . update his pleading in light of any new findings.” Our statute imposes no “continuing duty” as the term is used in that sense; nothing in Code § 8.01-271.1 requires an attorney to “update” the initial pleading. That is not to say, however, that a lawyer has no duty extending beyond the filing of the initial pleading.
Although his duty to list his address applies only to “the first pleading filed”, his duty to make a “reasonable inquiry” does not stop at that point. In the express language of the statute, that duty continues to the signing and filing of “[e]very pleading, written motion, and other paper” and to the making of “[a]n oral motion”, to the end that the lawyer certify, advisedly and creditably, that each such pleading, paper, or motion is “well-grounded in fact”. See Thomas, 836 F.2d at 875 (“Rule 11 . . . requires that each filing reflect a reasonable inquiry.”).
Even if Oxenham’s examination of the arrest warrant bearing Johnson’s name as the complainant constituted an inquiry sufficiently reasonable to avoid sanctions for the signing and filing of the motion for judgment3 , the record of the proceedings conducted thereafter reflects no such inquiry before the signing of the several “papers” Oxenham drafted and filed with the court. During the course of those proceedings, Oxenham was advised, verbally and in writing, unequivocally and repeatedly, that Johnson was not the person who obtained the search warrant and instigated the criminal prosecution. While, as the majority says, he was not required *297to accept as truth what opposing counsel, Gestwick, and Johnson had told him, the statute required him, before each new filing, to conduct a reasonable inquiry to determine whether the facts basic to the cause of action asserted were well-grounded. Yet, failing for six months awaiting trial to depose, or simply to interview, any of the several persons present in the magistrate’s office when the arrest warrant was issued, Oxenham persisted in signing and filing papers for the record, reaffirming allegations made in the original pleading. I cannot endorse the majority’s conclusion that this constituted a “reasonable inquiry”.
Because it was not clearly erroneous, we should uphold the trial court’s first finding of fact. The question then occurs whether the record supports the court’s finding that Oxenham filed and persisted in litigating the malicious-prosecution suit “for an improper purpose”, that is, “not to prevail on the merits but to harass the defendant.”
The majority overrules that finding because the record “contains no evidence of threats or expressions of ill will on Oxenham’s part.” However, ill will is not the only reason a person might have to harass a defendant. It is an unfortunate fact of life that many defendants, wanting to escape the inherently vexatious nature of litigation, will settle frivolous claims for their “nuisance value”, i.e., an amount approximating the costs necessary to defend against the claim. Although the filing and litigation of such claims once may have been acceptable practice, that practice now is sanctionable under Code § 8.01-271.1.
The statute authorizes courts to impose sanctions whenever a “pleading, motion, or other paper” is “interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.” “If a complaint is not filed to vindicate rights in court, its purpose must be improper.” In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 518 (4th Cir. 1990). As the trial court said, the only proper purpose of filing papers and making motions in court “would be to have the trier of fact vindicate [the party’s] position; to support his assertion of rights. How could any reasonable person assume to accomplish this purpose without some investigation into the facts?”
Applying the same standard of review, this Court should affirm the trial court’s second finding of fact.
Finally, Oxenham contends that “[e]ven if sanctions were appropriate, the trial judge failed to consider alternatives to mone*298tary sanctions.” Pursuing the point, he says that “the public rebuke which he has received [on account of news reports] is more than adequate to deter him from such conduct in the future”. And, he continues, even if monetary sanctions were justified, they were excessive in this case. I find no merit in these arguments.
Manifestly, the public policy goal of sanctions statutes is to expedite final adjudication of legitimate causes of actions by eliminating frivolous litigation from the overburdened dockets of nisi prius and appellate courts. The secondary goal, rooted in equity, is to compensate victims of frivolous claims and spurious defenses for the time, trouble, trauma, and expense suffered on account of such vexatious practices. These goals can be achieved only by the imposition of sanctions sufficient to deter such practices. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. _, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 2454 (1990).
Code § 8.01-271.1 provides that, in the event of a “violation of this rule, the court . . . shall impose ... an appropriate sanction, which may include . . . the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper or making of the motion, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.” Thus, our statute vests a trial court with broad discretion; what kind and what quantity of sanctions may be appropriate depends upon the circumstances in each case.
The trial judge made a balanced analysis of the sanctions issue. With measured restraint, he remarked that sanctions are “not favored by this court [and] are never to be imposed lightly.” Although the evidence showed that $10,383 was a “reasonable estimate of the economic losses caused by the filing and prosecution of this frivolous suit”, the trial judge, noting that Oxenham “enjoys a good reputation for professional competence” and that he had not “previously engaged in practices such as found here”, concluded that “a sanction of $4,500 would meet the purposes of the law in serving as a deterrent to [Oxenham] and others from filing frivolous suits.”
Considering the facts and circumstances disclosed by the record of the pretrial proceedings and confirmed by the evidence at trial, and applying the standard of review applicable here, I would hold *299that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in.imposing this sanction upon Oxenham and affirm the judgment.4

 Code § 63.1-182 provides in part:
Any person who interferes with any authorized agent of the Commissioner in the discharge of his duties under this [licensing] article, or . . . any person who engages in the conduct of a home for adults without first obtaining a license . . . shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.

 Rule 11 is substantially identical to Code § 8.01-271.1.

 It is difficult to see, however, how any inference of malice, one of the essential elements of a malicious prosecution suit, could be gleaned from the face of the arrest warrant, especially when Oxenham knew, or should have learned, that his own client did not believe that Johnson bore him any ill will.
The majority holds that Oxenham was relieved of his duty to conduct a reasonable inquiry on the issue of legal malice by our decision in Giant of Virginia, Inc. v. Pigg, 207 Va. 679, 685, 152 S.E.2d 271, 276 (1967), where we said that malice “may be inferred from the want of probable cause.” Giant went on to say that the existence of malice must be determined under “all the circumstances of the case. The circumstances must warrant the inference . . . .” Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Oxenham conducted no investigation into “the circumstances of the case” and, hence, the inference of malice is not warranted.

 While I concur fully with the majority’s determination that the punitive-damage claim was frivolous from its inception, I can find no precedent for the refusal to remand this case for further proceedings on that issue. Although the majority’s concern for the “unnecessary burdens upon Johnson and the trial court” is commendable, I believe any additional burdens would be gladly borne by both. Furthermore, even if the trial court found the task of apportioning attorney’s fees between frivolous and non-frivolous claims to be unworkable, a public censure or other “appropriate sanction” could be imposed to “give effect to the [statute’s] central goal of deterrence.” Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at_, 110 S.Ct. at 2454.