Court Opinion

ID: 9486085
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 11:37:28.539315+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:31.268886
License: Public Domain

PREGERSON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
Because the State of Oregon failed to hon- or its obligations to King under the terms of *1411a plea agreement, I dissent from the majority opinion. I believe that the district court erred in finding that King’s due process rights were not violated.
BACKGROUND
On April 19, 1983, King was indicted for the aggravated murder and murder of Julie Salter in Clackamas County, Oregon. On August 3,1983, King and the State of Oregon (“the state”) entered into a plea agreement, which was accepted by the court. Under the terms of the agreement:
1. King agreed to provide information to the state concerning the involvement of co-defendant James Salter in the murder of Salter’s ex-wife, Julie. King also agreed to testify for the state at any bail hearings, grand jury proceedings, and trials in the James Salter prosecution.
2. In exchange for King’s cooperation, the state agreed to “allow [King] to enter a plea of guilty to the charge of murder with the understanding that [King would] receive a life sentence with an order that he serve a minimum of ten years before being eligible for parole, and that said sentence will run concurrent to any sentence the defendant is now serving.”1
The plea agreement did not set a deadline for King to enter a guilty plea. The agreement further provided that if King refused to cooperate, “no evidence resulting from th[e] agreement, whether that evidence is information, persons, names, documents or physical exhibits, [would] be introduced by the state against [King] in any trial or hearing unless the state can establish that it was already aware of that information.”
On December 6, 1983, King testified at Salter’s grand jury proceedings in accordance with the plea agreement. On December 7,1983, King’s counsel told the court that King wished to enter his guilty plea in the middle of the following week. On December 14,1983, the state and King agreed to continue the entry of his plea to a future date, as long as King entered such plea before the Salter trial.2
King continued to fulfill his obligations under the plea agreement. In addition to testifying before the grand jury, King spoke with the Oregon police about Salter’s involvement in Julie Salter’s murder and testified at Salter’s bail hearing in January 1984.
In December 1983, King began receiving serious death threats from other prisoners because of his agreement to testify against Salter. As a result, Oregon State prison authorities implemented extraordinary security provisions to ensure King’s safety.3 In addition, King’s counsel undertook efforts to arrange for King’s transfer to state prison in Alabama, King’s home state.
On February 23, 1984, King filed a handwritten motion asking the court to discharge his attorneys so he could proceed pro se. In addition, he asked the court to set a trial date and accused his attorneys of placing his life in jeopardy because of their plea negotiations. Accordingly, he asked the court to *1412permit him to withdraw from “all life endangering plea agreements.”
On February 24, King asked the court to permit him to proceed pro se. King stated to the court that he no longer wished to enter a guilty plea as allowed under the plea agreement because the state refused to guarantee him a transfer, to Alabama as requested by him for security reasons.
As a result of King’s motions, one of King’s two attorneys told the court that King was not competent to represent himself and moved to withdraw. On February 27, 1984, King’s second attorney advised the court that King was not competent to stand trial because he was mentally ill and had stopped taking his medication, which included daily doses of Tegretol, Dilantin, Haldol, Lithium, and Benadryl.4 In response, the court ordered Dr. Parvaresh, a psychiatrist, to conduct an examination to determine King’s competency to stand trial.
On March 3,1984, the state also moved for a competency examination of King and requested that the examination be conducted at the Oregon State Hospital. On March 9, 1984, Dr. Parvaresh submitted his written opinion, which concluded that King “is not competent to stand trial as he is clearly mentally too impaired to assist in his own defense.” On April 9, 1984, Dr. Jerry K. Larsen, a second psychiatrist, gave a similar opinion. The court held no hearing concerning King’s mental competency'until the end of May 1984.
In April 1984, Salter’s murder trial began. At the trial, King fulfilled another part of his plea agreement obligations by testifying against Salter for three days. Despite the state’s previous assertion at the December 14,1983 hearing that it wanted King to enter his guilty plea before testifying at the Salter trial, the state did not require King to enter a guilty plea before testifying. On May 10, 1984, Salter was acquitted.
On May 17, 1984, King’s counsel reminded the court that it had not yet ruled on King’s competency to stand trial and to proceed pro se. The court had postponed the competency hearing to allow King to testify at the Salter trial.
On May 31, 1984, the court held a competency hearing. The court determined that, although King suffers from a “mental defect,” he was nonetheless able to assist in his own defense. Hence, the court determined that King was competent to stand trial. King refused to address the court but through his counsel withdrew his motion to proceed pro se. .
In addition, at the May 31 hearing, King’s counsel told the court that King had asked that a trial date be set. In response, the prosecutor took the position that, by requesting a trial date, the state assumed that King was seeking to withdraw from the plea agreement. The court told the state to file a formal motion for rescission. On June 5, 1984, the state filed a motion asking the court to find that King had rescinded the plea agreement.
On July 9, 1984, King’s counsel asked the court for additional time before ruling on the state’s request to terminate the plea agreement. In the interim, King’s counsel wished to see if he could secure a commitment from Alabama for King’s transfer to Alabama state custody. King’s counsel informed the court that he had prepared a 700-page presentation for the Alabama Parole Board, and was still trying to arrange the the transfer. King’s counsel further informed the court that a commitment from Alabama would permit King to “make an intelligent decision as to whether he wants to pursue the plea agreement or go to trial.”
In response, the prosecutor argued that the state did not want to undertake extensive trial preparations if King were ultimately going to plead guilty. The prosecutor again asserted that, by asking for a trial date, King had withdrawn from the plea agreement. King’s counsel remained silent. The trial court then issued an order terminating the plea agreement. In so ruling, the court simply stated “[t]hat the defendant has breached *1413and rescinded the plea agreement entered into between the defendant and the State of Oregon.” State v. King, 84 Or.App. 165, 175, 733 P.2d 472, rev. denied, 303 Or. 455, 737 P.2d 1248 (1987) (citing trial court transcript).
On August 8, 1984, twelve days before his trial was scheduled to begin, King filed a motion expressing his desire to plead guilty and asking the court to compel specific performance of the plea agreement. The state opposed King’s motion, alleging that it had been prejudiced because of the cost and inconvenience of having to prepare for trial.
On August 15, 1984, the court held a hearing on King’s motion to compel specific performance of the plea agreement. At the hearing, King’s counsel pointed out that King had fully complied with his duties under the plea agreement by cooperating with the state in Salter’s prosecution and by testifying against Salter for three days. In addition, King’s counsel reminded the court that, in reliance on the plea agreement, King had relinquished substantial rights, such as the right to a speedy trial, the right to remain silent, and the right not to incriminate himself. Accordingly, counsel argued that fundamental fairness as required by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause mandated that King receive the benefit of his plea bargain. King’s counsel also told the court that he did not believe King was competent to make an informed and rational decision about entering a plea when he earlier asked for a trial date.
The trial court found that King’s request for a trial date had prejudiced the state. Hence, the court denied the motion to compel specific performance of the plea agreement.
Thereafter, King was tried and convicted by a jury for aggravated murder in violation of O.R.S. 163.095(1). The trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment, with thirty years’ mandatory minimum. The court further ordered this sentence to be served consecutively to the two consecutive, twenty-year minimum sentences he was already serving in the State of Washington.
After exhausting state remedies, see State v. King, 84 Or.App. 165, 733 P.2d 472, rev. denied, 303 Or. 455, 737 P.2d 1248 (1987), King filed a habeas corpus petition in federal district court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In his petition, King alleged that the failure of state authorities to fulfill their obligations under the plea agreement violated his right to fundamental fairness as guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. In addition, King asked the district court to decide: (1) whether the state had waived its objections to King’s failure to enter a guilty plea by using his testimony at trial without insisting he enter a plea; (2) whether King was competent to enter or withdraw from a plea; (3) whether King was ever required to enter a plea before the start of his trial under the terms of the plea agreement, which was drafted by the state and did not contain a cut-off date for entry of plea; and (4) whether the state had demonstrated prejudice.
The district court did not address any of King’s substantive arguments.5 Rather, on April 23, 1992, the court dismissed King’s habeas petition on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction because King had not demonstrated a violation of a federal constitutional right. In so ruling, the court concluded that King had not relied to his detriment on the state’s promises in the plea agreement because in King’s oivn trial the state did not use anything said or done by King under the plea agreement to secure his conviction.6
ANALYSIS
King alleges a violation of his right to fundamental fairness as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and therefore raises a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Specifically, King contends that it was fundamentally unfair for the state to reap the *1414benefit of Ms substantial cooperation under the plea agreement and then turn around and rescind the agreement, which he had not breached. As support for such claim, King cites the following: (1) he disclosed relevant information to the police about Salter’s involvement in Julie Salter’s murder; (2) he testified for the state at Salter’s bail and grand jury hearings; and (3) he testified for three days for the state at Salter’s murder trial. Hence, King contends that he is entitled to specific performance of the plea agreement.
“Applying the Due Process Clause is ... an uncertain enterprise which [requires that we] discover what ‘fundamental fairness’ consists of in a particular situation by first considering any relevant precedents and then by assessing the several interests that are at stake.” Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Serv. of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 24-25, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 2158-59, 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981). As a general rule, the fundamental fairness component of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires prosecutors to honor bargains made with criminal defendants. See, e.g., Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 104 S.Ct. 2543, 81 L.Ed.2d 437 (1984); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971); United States v. Carrillo, 709 F.2d 35, 37 (9th Cir.1983). Because plea agreements implicate important due process rights, “the process must be fair.” United States v. Packwood, 848 F.2d 1009, 1011 (9th Cir.1988).
This circuit has concluded that where a defendant has fulfilled all obligations under a plea agreement, “under settled notions of fundamental fairness the government [is] bound to uphold its end of the bargain.” Carrillo, 709 F.2d at 37 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Irwin, 612 F.2d 1182, 1189-91 (9th Cir.1980) (recognition of enforceability of cooperation agreements); United States v. Garcia, 519 F.2d 1343, 1345 & n. 2 (same); United States v. Hallam, 472 F.2d 168, 169 (9th Cir.1973) (where defendants fully discharge their obligations under plea agreement government is bound to fulfill its promise to forego future criminal prosecution)) (additional citations omitted).
Here, under the plea agreement, King agreed to provide information to the state regarding the involvement of co-defendant Salter in the murder of Julie Salter. King also agreed to testify for the state at bail hearings, grand jury proceedings, and the trial in the Salter prosecution.
In return, the state agreed to allow King to plead guilty to murder instead of aggravated murder and thereby receive a more favorable sentence.
The state now contends that under the plea agreement King was obligated to enter his guilty plea, and to do so by a certain date. Hence, the majority opinion concludes that, by asking the court to set a trial date, King breached the plea agreement by failing to perform an obligation thereunder. I disagree.
In interpreting a plea agreement, we hold the state to the literal terms of the plea agreement. Packwood, 848 F.2d at 1012; United States v. Read, 778 F.2d 1437, 1441 (9th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 835, 107 S.Ct. 131, 93 L.Ed.2d 75 (1986). Here, the literal language of the plea agreement provides that the state will allow, not require, King to enter a guilty plea as a result of his cooperation in Salter’s prosecution. In addition, the language of the plea agreement does not state that King will relinquish his right to enter a guilty plea if he fails to enter such plea by a particular deadline.
Henee, I submit that one may properly assume from the literal language of the plea agreement that King was allowed to enter a guilty plea to murder at any time before the start of his own trial. Indeed, I note that the state did not hesitate to call King as a witness in Salter’s trial in April 1984, despite the fact that King had not yet entered his guilty plea and had stated to the court in February 1984 that he wanted to withdraw from the “life endangering” plea agreement.
I therefore conclude that King affirmatively complied with all of his obligations under the plea agreement by providing all of the information and testimony required of him by the state.
Moreover, other factors convince me that King did not breach the plea agreement by *1415requesting a trial date. King’s competency was seriously at issue during this period because, despite his mental illness, King had stopped taking his medication. As a result, the court ordered several psychiatric evaluations and held a hearing to determine King’s competency.7 Also, King requested withdrawal from “all life endangering plea agreements” only after he had received serious death threats that had prompted prison officials to implement extraordinary security provisions to ensure his safety. Such threats resulted directly from his agreement to turn state’s witness against Salter. In fact, King’s counsel, at the time the motion to rescind was heard, specifically requested additional time to secure a transfer to Alabama state prison to ensure King’s safety, to enable King to “make an intelligent decision as to whether he wants to pursue the plea agreement or go to trial.” The court summarily denied this request.
In light of King’s full compliance with all obligations under the plea agreement and his precarious mental state, which no doubt was exacerbated by the threats against his life resulting from his cooperation with the state, it defies reason to construe King’s request for a trial date as a rescission of the plea agreement. The Oregon courts erred in so doing.
In light of the foregoing, I find that fundamental fairness as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause mandates the specific performance of the state’s obligations under the plea agreement.8 Accordingly, I believe that this case should be remanded to the district court to issue a writ of habeas corpus directing the State of Oregon within 60 days to vacate King’s conviction on condition that King enter a guilty plea and receive a sentence in accordance with the plea agreement, or, in the alternative, to release King from the strictures of his Oregon sentence.

. King was already serving two consecutive sentences, each with a twenty year minimum, in Washington state prison.

. On this issue, the following exchange occurred:
THE COURT: What is the purpose of delaying the entry of that plea?
THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY: Your Honor, this we have been informed Mr. King wishes. We examined the relative benefits and detriments that might result in a trial of Mr. Salter and it's our opinion it is of no detriment to us as long as the plea is entered before Mr. King testifies, or probably more specifically before the Salter trial starts.
THE COURT: What if he changes his mind?
THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY: Prior to the testimony?
THE COURT: Yes.
THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY: In that sense, Your Honor, there would be a breach of the agreement and we would proceed as if the agreement was null and void. In other words, we would go ahead and prosecute Mr. King for the charge of aggravated murder.

.Affidavits from prison' officials indicated that King's cell was fitted with bullet-proof plates of armor and King was put in a bullet-proof vest and disguised whenever he was taken from his cell. Indeed, the prison authorities stated that the security precautions for King were the most extreme they had ever seen. In fact, despite such precautions, a fellow prisoner still managed to stab King in the eye with a pencil after calling him a "snitch.”

. King has suffered from mental illness since he sustained head injuries in an aircraft accident in January 1979. As a result, he experienced memory loss and has since required hospitalization and medication to control grand mal seizures.

. King's habeas petition was referred to a Magistrate who made recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law, which the district court then adopted in their entirety.

. “Detrimental reliance” is a phantom issue. The dispositive issue is “fundamental fairness” as required by the Due Process Clause.

. King's apparent instability is evidenced by the fact that, despite his alleged desire to withdraw from the "life endangering” plea agreement, he still testified against Salter for three days at Salter’s murder trial in accordance with the terms of such plea agreement. The state cannot urge this court to accept King's alleged intentions to withdraw from the plea agreement as credible when the state itself did not do so, but proceeded to call King as a witness in the Salter murder trial under the terms of the plea agreement.

. In light of this dispositive ruling, I see no need to address any other issues raised by the briefs or the district court’s dismissal of King’s habeas petition.