Court Opinion

ID: 1083556
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-10-09 21:18:07.768864+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:37:02.312773
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

                                     AT NASHVILLE                  FILED
                                  JUNE 1996 SESSION
                                                                      July 23, 1997

                                                                  Cecil W. Crowson
                                                                 Appellate Court Clerk
STATE OF TENNESSEE,                        )
                                           )      C.C.A. NO. 01C01-9509-CR-00317
              Appellee,                    )
                                           )      DAVIDSON COUNTY
VS.                                        )
                                           )      HON. WALTER C. KURTZ,
WILLIAM HENRY BARNEY,                      )      JUDGE
                                           )
              Appellant.                   )      (Rape of a Child, Aggravated
                                           )       Sexual Battery, and Sentencing)

                                      DISSENT

              I respectfully disagree with the majority’s holding that the counts of the

indictment alleging rape of a child are constitutionally adequate. The indictment does not

meet constitutional muster because it fails to allege the defendant’s mens rea, an

essential element of the crime. The author of the lead opinion states, “Upon only a

cursory reading of the indictment, any person of normal intelligence would realize that the

only sound implication of the factual allegations is that these acts were at least reckless,

if not knowing or intentional.” I contend that the only sound implication of the factual

allegations is that these acts were perpetrated without the victim’s consent and that they

say nothing about the defendant’s mens rea.

              To begin, I remind my brethren on the Court that one of the stated

objectives of our criminal code is to “Give fair warning of what conduct is prohibited, and

guide the exercise of official discretion in law enforcement, by defining the act and the

culpable mental state which together constitute an offense.” T.C.A. § 39-11-101(2) (1991
Repl.) (emphasis added). See also T.C.A. § 39-11-301(b) (1991 Repl.) (“A culpable

mental state is required within this title unless the definition of an offense plainly

dispenses with a mental element.”) The act which is prohibited by the rape of a child

statute is unlawful sexual penetration. T.C.A. § 39-13-522(a)(Supp. 1996). The culpable

mental state which must have been possessed by the defendant at the time he

committed the unlawful sexual penetration is intent, knowledge or recklessness. T.C.A.

§ 39-11-301(c) (1991 Repl). Thus, the factual allegations which must be set forth in an

indictment charging rape of a child are that the defendant committed unlawful sexual

penetration with intent, knowledge or recklessness.

              As noted by the majority, the term “sexual penetration” is legislatively

defined as including “any . . . intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person’s body or

of any object into the genital or anal openings of the victim’s, the defendant’s, or any

other person’s body . . . ” T.C.A. § 39-13-501(7) (1991 Repl). Unlike the term “sexual

contact,” T.C.A. § 39-13-501(6), the definition of sexual penetration contains no

requirement that the intrusion be intentional. Nor does it require that the penetration be

for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification as does the definition of sexual contact.

Id. Thus, as further noted by the majority, the definition of sexual penetration does not

include any description of the necessary mens rea. Indeed, one panel of this Court has

previously held, “a reference to sexual penetration, as statutorily defined, does not imply

the mens rea.” State v. Milton S. Jones, Jr, No. 02C01-9503-CR-00061, Shelby County

(Tenn. Crim. App. filed Mar. 7, 1997, at Jackson). Rather, the definition of sexual

penetration is aimed at describing particular acts, and is broad enough to include

completely accidental and totally innocent intrusions: for instance, a mother bathing her

infant may find one of her fingers accidentally intruding into the baby’s anal opening as

she lifts him from the bathwater. Such an intrusion, “however slight,” would meet the

                                             2
statutory definition of sexual penetration.      The definition also includes intentional

intrusions that are clearly lawful. For example, a nurse taking a child’s temperature

rectally would satisfy the statutory definition of sexual penetration. While there is no

question that our legislature did not intend these acts to constitute rape of a child, the

plain meaning of the defining statute does encompass them within the rubric of “sexual

penetration.”

                How, then, are we to distinguish between innocent and criminal acts of

sexual penetration? The child rape statute proscribes “unlawful” sexual penetration.

T.C.A. § 39-13-522(a) (Supp. 1996). Clearly, then, our legislature intended this word to

differentiate between child molestation and, for instance, legitimate medical treatment.

The differentiation is not based, however, on the defendant’s mental state: as seen in

the examples above, sexual penetration can occur intentionally, knowingly or recklessly

and still be perfectly innocent. Thus, construing the term “unlawful” to imply the requisite

state of mind held by the defendant does nothing to distinguish innocent from criminal

activity.

                I suggest the term “unlawful” should be construed to mean “without

consent.” Cf. State v. Jones, 889 S.W.2d 225, 227 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) (“the term