Court Opinion

ID: 9945364
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-27 19:01:42.173263+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:28.236602
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         FEB 27 2024
                                                                       MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                        U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                            FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DANNY JACOBS,                                    No.    22-16822

                Petitioner-Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:18-cv-01628-JGZ

 v.
                                                 MEMORANDUM*
RYAN THORNELL, Arizona Department of
Corrections; ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR
THE STATE OF ARIZONA,

                Respondents-Appellees.

                    Appeal from the United States District Court
                             for the District of Arizona
                    Jennifer G. Zipps, District Judge, Presiding

                      Argued and Submitted February 9, 2024
                                Phoenix, Arizona

Before: BERZON, HURWITZ, and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges.

      In 2014, Danny Jacobs was convicted in Arizona state court of kidnapping.

The district court dismissed his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition and denied a

Certificate of Appealability (“COA”); this Court then also denied a COA. On the

last day on which a petition for certiorari could have been filed, Jacobs instead filed

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
a motion in the district court to amend his habeas petition.

      The district court held that it had no jurisdiction to consider the amended

petition, citing Ninth Circuit cases holding that motions to amend filed in the district

court while the denial of a habeas petition is being challenged in this Court are

second or successive petitions subject to the constraints of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2).

See Balbuena v. Sullivan, 980 F.3d 619, 636–42 (9th Cir. 2020); Beaty v. Schriro,

554 F.3d 780, 783 n.1 (9th Cir. 2009).1 But it granted a COA to allow Jacobs to seek

en banc reconsideration of those precedents. Jacobs then filed this appeal and a

petition seeking an initial en banc hearing. See Fed. R. App. P. 35(c); Ninth Cir.

Gen. Order 5.2. We deny the petition for initial hearing en banc on behalf of the

Court and affirm.

      Jacobs concedes that the district court was compelled by Balbuena to treat his

motion to amend as a second or successive petition. But he urges the Court to go en

banc to overrule that case and instead to follow the approach taken by the Second

and Third Circuits, under which a motion to amend filed when the appeal of the

dismissal of a habeas petition is pending may not be a second or successive petition.

1
        The Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have the same rule. See Moreland v.
Robinson, 813 F.3d 315 (6th Cir. 2016); Phillips v. United States, 668 F.3d 433 (7th
Cir. 2012); Williams v. Norris, 461 F.3d 999 (8th Cir. 2006). The Tenth Circuit
initially adopted the same rule but has since carved out some exceptions. See Ochoa
v. Sirmons, 485 F.3d 538 (10th Cir. 2007) (per curiam); Douglas v. Workman, 560
F.3d 1156 (10th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).

                                           2
See Ching v. United States, 298 F.3d 174, 178 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v.

Santarelli, 929 F.3d 95, 106 (3d Cir. 2019); see also Balbuena, 980 F.3d at 642–45

(Fletcher, J., concurring in the judgment) (urging the Supreme Court to resolve the

Circuit split and adopt the approach of the Second and Third Circuits).

      In Ching, the Second Circuit held that a petitioner’s 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition,

which it construed as a motion to amend his original § 2255 motion, was not a second

or successive petition because an appeal of the denial of the § 2255 motion was

pending when the second petition was filed. 298 F.3d at 177–78. Ordinarily, Ching

noted, the district court would not have jurisdiction to consider a motion to amend

while the appeal was pending. Id. at 180 n.5 (citing Griggs v. Provident Consumer

Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982) (per curiam)). Ching held, however, that the

district court had jurisdiction because the Second Circuit had already remanded the

initial § 2255 motion to the district court for further consideration. Id. at 175, 180

n.5. Critically for present purposes, the Court noted that, “had we affirmed the

district court’s denial of his initial § 2255 motion, Ching would have been foreclosed

from bringing these additional claims unless he satisfied the requirements applicable

to second or successive motions.” Id. at 180 n.5.

      In Santarelli, the Third Circuit reached an identical conclusion. Like the

Second Circuit, it held that a motion to amend a habeas petition is not second or

successive if filed after appeal of the denial of the initial petition but before all

                                          3
appellate remedies are exhausted.      929 F.3d at 105.      The Third Circuit also

recognized the general rule that the district court lacks the power to address the

motion, even if not second or successive, after a plaintiff appeals the initial denial.

Id. at 106. And, like the Second Circuit, the Third Circuit stated that a motion to

amend, even if potentially not second or successive when filed, becomes second or

successive once “a petitioner exhausts her appellate remedies to no avail.” Id.

      Jacobs’ motion to amend would be treated as a second or successive petition

under the approach articulated by the Second and Third Circuits. Jacobs never

sought review in the Supreme Court, or reconsideration by this Court, of our denial

of a COA. He therefore plainly “exhaust[ed his] appellate remedies to no avail.” Id.

Because the appellate proceedings did not result in a remand to the district court,

Jacobs’ motion to amend—even if potentially not second or successive when filed

under the approach taken by the Second and Third Circuits—would now be treated

as such by those Courts.2 Thus, we leave for another day whether to reconsider our

existing jurisprudence on the topic.

2
      Whab v. United States, 408 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2005), on which Jacobs relies,
does not support a different outcome. Although Whab emphasized that “the proper
reference point for determining whether a petition is ‘second or successive’ is the
moment of filing,” it also acknowledged that a subsequent petition would be second
or successive once the “petitioner’s opportunity to seek review in the Supreme Court
has expired.” Id. at 120.

                                          4
      We DENY the petition for initial hearing en banc on behalf of the Court and

AFFIRM.3

3
      The motions to become amici curiae submitted by the Ninth Circuit Federal
Public and Community Defenders, Dkt. 31, and the Innocence Network and
Montana Innocence Project, Dkt. 32, are GRANTED.

                                       5