Court Opinion

ID: 9783723
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 20:04:43.138649+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:34.188331
License: Public Domain

MICHAEL A. WOLFF, Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the principal opinion but write separately to point out that the findings of fact and conclusions of law to be made in the circuit court on remand should include findings as to whether defense counsel or the prosecutor went beyond the limits set forth in Formal Opinion 126 of the Advisory Committee of this Court. Specifically, the factual record should address these questions:
1) Whether defense counsel advised his client, Clarence Burgess, to waive the client’s right to seek post-conviction relief based on ineffective assistance of defense counsel; and
2) Whether the prosecuting attorney required that Burgess waive all rights under Rule 24.035 when entering into this plea agreement.
Formal Opinion 126, interpreting Rules 4-1.7, 4-3.8 and 4-8.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, reads as follows:
WAIVER OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
We have been asked whether it is permissible for defense counsel in a criminal case to advise the defendant regarding waiver of the right to seek post-conviction relief under Rule 24.035, including claims of ineffective assistance by defense counsel. We understand that some prosecuting attorneys have expressed intent to require such a waiver as part of a plea agreement.
It is not permissible for defense counsel to advise the defendant regarding *330waiver of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel by defense counsel. Providing such advice would violate Rule 4-1.7(a)(2) because there is a significant risk that the representation of the client would be materially limited by the personal interest of defense counsel. Defense counsel is not a party to the post-conviction relief proceeding but' defense counsel certainly has a personal interest related to the potential for a claim that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance to the defendant. It is not reasonable to believe that defense counsel will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to the defendant regarding the effectiveness of defense counsel’s representation of the defendant. Therefore, under Rule 4 — 1.7(b)(1), this conflict is not waivable.
We have also been asked whether it is permissible for a prosecuting attorney to require waiver of all rights under Rule 24.085 when entering into a plea agreement. We believe that it is inconsistent with the prosecutor’s duties as a minister of justice and the duty to refrain from conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice for a prosecutor to seek a waiver of post-conviction rights based on ineffective assistance of counsel or prosecutorial misconduct. See, Rules 4-3.8 and 8.4(d).
We note that at least three other states have issued opinions consistent with our view.1
We do not believe the Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit a defense counsel and prosecutor from entering into a plea agreement that involves waiver of other post-conviction rights, unless such a waiver violates the Constitution or other laws. Analysis of whether it would violate the Constitution or other laws is beyond the scope of this opinion.
Rule 5.30 authorizes the Advisory Committee to issue formal opinions and regulations about matters related to Rules 4, 5 and 6. Formal opinions are binding on attorneys. Rule 5.30(b) provides that “any member of the bar who is substantially and individually aggrieved by any formal opinion of the advisory committee may petition this Court for review of the opinion.” When a review is requested, “This Court in its discretion may direct that the petition be briefed and argued as though a petition for an original remedial writ has been sustained, may sustain, modify or vacate the opinion, or may dismiss the petition.” Informal opinions, by contrast, “are not binding.” Rule 5.30(c).
The question of whether the ethical standards set forth in Formal Opinion 126 have been violated may go to the merits of Burgess’ post-conviction motion.

. The North Carolina State Bar, RPC 129, January 15, 1993; Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee Advisory Ethics Opinion 94-A-549, November 30, 1994; Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court of Ohio, Opinion 2001-6, December 7, 2001.