Court Opinion

ID: 9518511
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:54:49.851992+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:29:22.771187
License: Public Domain

Fairchild, J.
(concurring). There was conflicting testimony upon the subject of Mr. Barnes’ mental capacity, and very little testimony tending to prove the elements of undue influence. Judge Gollmar prepared a decision in which he meticulously dealt with the material issues. I think it is fair to say that except for two matters, which do not arise in most will-contest cases, the findings of the *653county court would not be against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence, and would be sustained here.
The first exceptional proposition is testator’s understanding of the document propounded as his will. In Will of Walter 1 this court said:
“In cases belonging to either class [wills of persons unable to read at all or of persons unable to read the language in which the will was written] the court should require satisfactory proof that the testator was correctly informed of the contents of the instrument he was about to execute.”
In that case, the testatrix did not understand English, the language in which the will was written, but proof that she gave directions as to its contents through an interpreter and that the interpreter explained it to her after it was drafted was considered sufficient. Testimony of a disinterested attorney-draftsman was recently held sufficient in a similar case.2
In the present case the county court was satisfied that Mr. Barnes’ eyesight was quite impaired. There is an additional reason, however, for requiring proof that the testator knew the contents of the instrument.
“There is support for the rule that an instrument cannot be admitted to probate as a valid last will and testament where it was drawn by one named a beneficiary therein to the detriment of the natural heir of the testator, in the absence of evidence, in addition to proof of formal execution, that the testator knew the contents of the instrument, at least where the beneficiary acting as scrivener is bequeathed a substantial legacy, or was in a confidential relationship with the testator. It has been said that where the draftsman of the will takes a large benefit under it, knowledge of the contents of the will by the testator must be shown either by proving that the will was read to him or by him, *654or that he gave instructions for such a will, or by proving other similar facts.” 3
Judge Gollmar indicated in his decision that he gave consideration to the rule stated in Will of Walter, supra, and concluded that the testimony of the witnesses to the execution of the will, briefly describing conversation between Mr. Horan and Mr. Barnes to the effect that Mr. Barnes said the will was the way he wanted it, coupled with the fact that the will was within the pattern of previous wills although giving an increased benefit to Mr. Horan and cutting another, was sufficient. In addition to these facts, it appeared that some of the differences between the 1958 will and the next-earlier one had become known to interested parties, possibly through Mr. Barnes. The codicil which was executed February 14, 1959, republished, ratified, and confirmed the will dated November 29, 1958, and was read to Mr. Barnes at the time of execution. Mr. Barnes had mentioned the effect of the codicil to one of the interested parties. While the record certainly does not contain evidence directly establishing that Mr. Barnes knew the contents of the will, either when the will or the codicil was executed, or that it conformed to the instructions he gave to Mr. Horan for drafting it, the circumstantial evidence just referred to was deemed sufficient by the court. With considerable reluctance, born of respect for the opportunity of the trial judge to observe the witnesses and hear the testimony, I join in the conchtsion that this evidence was not sufficient.
A second unusual proposition flows from the fact that Mr. Horan, who prepared the will, was in a confidential relationship with the testator and received a substantial bequest under the will, substantially increased indeed over the bequests made to him in previous wills. These facts *655are sufficient to raise an inference that the will was the result of undue influence by the attorney-draftsman.
“Thus, if a lawyer, in drawing a will, drafts himself a bequest, he must explain the circumstances and show that the gift was freely and willingly made; he must, in other words, show that he did not embrace the opportunity of exerting undue influence over the testator.” 4
“Attorneys for clients who intend to leave them or their families a bequest would do well to have the will drawn by some other lawyer. Any suspicion which may arise of improper influence used under the cover of the confidential relationship may thus be avoided. The law, recognizing the delicacy of the situation, requires the lawyer who drafts himself a bequest to explain the circumstances and to show in the first instance that the gift was freely and willingly made. ... In the absence of any explanation, a jury may be justified in drawing the inference of undue influence, although the burden of proving it never shifts from the contestant.” 5
The present rule in Wisconsin has been stated in Will of Fmilks: 6
“The mere existence of a confidential relation between a testator and a beneficiary under his will, such as attorney and client, physician and patient, priest and parishioner, confidential adviser and his advisee, etc., does not of itself constitute undue influence nor cast upon the beneficiary the burden of disproving undue influence. However, the existence of such a relationship may cause a court to scrutinize the evidence more closely and weigh it more carefully. When coupled with other circumstances such as the activity of the beneficiary in procuring the drafting and execution of the will or a sudden or unexplained change in the attitude *656of the testator or some other somewhat-persuasive circumstance, it gives rise to an inference of undue influence which the proponent has the burden of rebutting.”
It would appear from Judge Gollmar’s decision that he followed the first portion of the rule above quoted, and considered that it was only his duty to “scrutinize the evidence more closely and weigh it more carefully.” It is my opinion, however, that where the beneficiary involved is the draftsman of the will and arranges for its execution, as Mr. Horan did here, the latter part of the rule above quoted applies and an inference arose which Mr. Horan had to rebut in order to sustain the will.
Judge Gollmar considered a number of facts, including the lack of natural objects of bounty and other persons particularly close to Mr. Barnes, and the judge’s own reaction to Mr. Horan’s actions as indicating “an honest, but perhaps not too judicious handling of the situation.” Even if the evidence sufficiently showed Mr. Barnes’ understanding of the will at the time of execution, it could well be said that the evidence tending to disprove undue influence was not sufficient to counterbalance the inference arising from the confidential relationship. If the matter were disposed of on grounds of undue influence, the question would also arise whether the entire will would fall, or only those parts which make gifts to Horan.
As has been noted, the situation as to the codicil is somewhat different from the will, both as to execution and as to the interest of the draftsman, although the revocation of certain gifts by the codicil would tend to increase the residue of which Mr. Horan was given a share. In any event, however, the codicil simply revokes a devise and a bequest, and confers certain administrative power upon the executor and cannot stand alone as a will.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice Hallows joins in this opinion.

 (1885), 64 Wis. 487, 492, 25 N. W. 538.

 Estate of Dobrecevich, ante, p. 82, 109 N. W. (2d) 477.

 57 Am. Jur., Wills, p. 574, sec. 864.

 5 Am. Jur., Attorneys at Law, p. 290, sec. 51.

 Will of Putnam (1931), 257 N. Y. 140, 143, 177 N. E. 399, 79 A. L. R. 1423.

 (1945), 246 Wis. 319, 360, 17 N. W. (2d) 423.