Court Opinion

ID: 9525697
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:06:31.400739+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:16:36.704313
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge,
dissenting in part and concurring in part.
I concur in the second portion of the majority opinion which reverses the summary judgment with respect to Crystal Oil’s possible liability for failing to plug the Egli # 1 well during Crystal Oil’s possession and control of the well.
I dissent with respect to the majority’s holding that, as a matter of law, Jarvis Drilling did not rely upon various misrepresentations made by Midwest Oil. This conclusion was reached upon grounds that information was available to Jarvis Drilling which would have shown that Egli # 1 existed and was not capped.
The reasonableness of reliance under circumstances such as those before us is a question of fact, not a question of law determinable upon summary judgment. Scott v. Bodor, Inc. (1991) 5th Dist. Ind. App., 571 N.E.2d 313; Medtech Corp. v. Indiana Insurance Co. (1990) 1st Dist. Ind.App., 555 N.E.2d 844; Captain & Company, Inc. v. Stenberg (1987) 4th Dist. Ind.App., 505 N.E.2d 88; Plumley v. Stanelle (1974) 2d Dist. Ind.App., 311 N.E.2d 626.
It is not entirely clear that, as stated by the majority, examination of the Egli # 1 well file would have disclosed that the well was not capped. Thus even if Jarvis Drilling had examined the file, it may not have learned that the well was not plugged. Additionally, in light of the prior representations and documents provided by Midwest Oil, it would be unreasonable to impose upon Jarvis Drilling a duty to check all sources of information, remote or otherwise, in order to see if Midwest had misrepresented the actual situation. To hold that Jarvis Drilling, in the exercise of due diligence, was obligated to make sure the well was plugged, is to hold that all purchasers must assume that all sellers misrepresent all aspects of the transaction.
*829A reasonable trier of fact might well conclude that the transfer form for Egli # 1, included as it was with some seventy-eight other such permit transfer forms, would not necessarily trigger a duty of inquiry on the part of Jarvis Drilling. A reasonable trier of fact could find that Jarvis Drilling was entitled to credit previous information that the well was plugged and was not required to assume that the existence of a transfer form for Egli # 1 necessarily meant that the well was unplugged.
Similarly, there are factual issues or differing inferences permissible with reference to whether an agency relationship existed between Midwest Oil and some or all of the other defendants.
In essence then, there are sufficient factual issues requiring submission of the fraud allegations to the trier of fact. I would in all respects reverse the summary judgments entered for the various defendants.