Court Opinion

ID: 9762994
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:35:06.29859+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:55:10.118673
License: Public Domain

FERREN, Associate Judge,
dissenting and concurring in part:
This case presents important “instructional” and “sufficiency” issues.
I
The majority opinion implicitly acknowledges that appellant was entitled to an instruction that the jury should acquit if there were “ ‘reasonable grounds’ for appellant to believe that the complainant had consented.” 1 Ante at 909; see id. at 909-910, 911. The majority also concedes that the “language about express and implied conduct” contained in the trial court’s instructions “cannot be viewed ... as stating in alternative language the instruction that the jury could find consent based on a defendant’s reasonable perception of the complainant’s actions or inactions.” Id. at 910. Later, however, in finding insufficient prejudice for an abuse of discretion, the majority concludes that “the trial *914judge’s instruction that ‘consent may be express or implied, and it may be evidenced by words or actions,’ is equally appropriate on these facts.” Id. at 911. I cannot agree.
The question whether the complainant gave express or implied consent focuses on whether the complainant in fact consented to the acts constituting the kidnapping; the question whether there were reasonable grounds to believe the complainant had consented focuses on the defendant’s perception. Appellant’s theory of the case— that the complainant consented — was based on what he was reasonably entitled to believe from the evidence of the complainant’s actions and words, requiring the jury to make an objective assessment of the evidence in determining the reasonableness of appellant’s perception. That is quite different from a jury’s assessment of whether appellant established consent in fact, an inquiry necessarily focusing on the complainant’s perspective derived from the complainant’s express or implied conduct. In short, appellant’s theory focuses on his own reasonable perception of the complainant’s consent; the trial court’s jury instruction focuses on the actuality of the complainant’s consent. The difference is substantial and not merely a difference in wording, as the majority believes.
This fundamental distinction has led the majority of the division to agree — at least implicitly — that the trial court erred in omitting the first sentence of standard instruction 5.19.2 See ante at 910 (“Thus, the question is whether, in view of the factual dispute and credibility contest regarding the complainant’s actions in the instant ease, the instructional omission is significant.”). I believe this error was of a magnitude requiring reversal and thus, on this record, was an abuse of discretion. See Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 366-67 (D.C.1979). Specifically, appellant presented evidence to support a defense that he had “reasonable grounds to believe” the complainant had consented. He then requested the instruction. A fundamental principle in the criminal law is that “[a] defendant in a criminal case is entitled to a jury instruction on any issue fairly raised by the evidence ... however weak that evidence may be.” Carter v. United States, 531 A.2d 956, 959 (D.C.1987) (citing cases; quotation omitted). Moreover, our decision in Bush v. United States, 516 A.2d 186, 193-95 (D.C.1986), in effect told the trial court to give this requested consent instruction where there is a consent defense to the charge of kidnapping while armed. On the facts here, the consent issue was a close one, and the jury could well have come out differently if instructed to focus on the reasonableness of the defendant-appellant’s perception that the complainant had consented, not exclusively on whether the complainant had in fact expressly or impliedly consented. Accordingly, I would reverse and remand for a new trial.
II
I agree with the majority’s conclusion about the sufficiency of the evidence of kidnapping and thus would not reverse outright on that claim. But the issue is not an easy one.
Because the trial court ruled (and the government does not contest) that the period during which appellant inveigled the complainant into his house could not be counted as part of the period of the alleged kidnapping, see ante at note 9, we consider a situation in which the period of the alleged kidnapping is coextensive with the period of the alleged assault with intent to rape. If the jury had convicted on both, then under our caselaw there would have been a merger and we would have vacated the sentence for kidnapping. See Vines v. United States, 540 A.2d 1107, 1109 (D.C.1988) (where detention constituting kidnapping was coextensive with crime of armed robbery, conviction for kidnapping merged); (Thomas) Robinson v. United States, 388 A.2d 1210, 1212-13 (D.C.1978) (where seizure and asportation constituting kidnapping were coextensive with assault with intent to rape, conviction for kidnap*915ping merged). Compare (Julius) Robinson v. United States, 501 A.2d 1273, 1277 (D.C.1985) (where act of kidnapping was completed before attempted sexual assault, no merger); Sinclair v. United States, 388 A.2d 1201, 1207-08 (D.C.1978) (where act of kidnapping began before and continued after robbery, no merger). Indeed, this court has stated that “the legislature [did not intend] the [kidnapping] statute to encompass and to punish as two separate crimes” a defendant’s actions constituting a kidnapping that are coextensive with his or her acts which constitute a second offense such as robbery or rape. (Thomas) Robinson, 388 A.2d at 1213. In such cases, “the trial judge err[s] in submitting the kidnaping issue to the jury.” Id.
This case, however, does not present a merger problem because the jury acquitted as to assault with intent to rape. This leaves the interesting question whether the kidnapping conviction alone can stand when it would not have survived if coupled with a conviction on the assault charge.
There is a paradox here, to say the least, because the consequence of acquittal on the assault charge left room for the trial court to impose a much lengthier sentence for kidnapping than would have been available in the event of convictions as to both, followed by merger of kidnapping into assault. Compare D.C.Code § 22-501 (1989) (“Every person convicted of any assault with intent ... to commit rape ... shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than 2 years or more than 15 years.”) with id. at § 22-2101 (“Whoever shall be guilty of [kidnapping] shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment for life or for such term as the court in its discretion may determine.”). Nonetheless, as I read the kidnapping statute,3 the government could have properly charged kidnapping alone on these facts, and the evidence would have been sufficient to convict. The statutory language defining the elements of kidnapping covers seizing and detaining for any unlawful purpose; the statute is not limited to the traditional ransom situation.
One could argue that, on facts such as these, a legislature would not have intended to permit a kidnapping prosecution in a predominantly assault with intent to rape situation. See (Thomas) Robinson, 388 A.2d at 1213. But, given the plain language of the statute, I find no basis for ascribing that limiting intention to the legislature when, as here, the kidnapping did not merge into the coextensive offense because the jury acquitted on the latter charge. Indeed, on the facts of this case, given the serious question whether the complainant consented to the encounter, one can understand why a jury — instructed as to both charged offenses — may have simply decided to convict on one without realizing that its choice of kidnapping could have resulted in more severe punishment than if it had convicted on the assault with intent to rape charge.4

. See Standard Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia No. 5.19 (3d ed. 1978), ante note 3.

. See supra note 1; ante note 3.

. The kidnapping statute, D.C.Code § 22-2101 (1989), provides in full:
Whoever shall be guilty of, or of aiding or abetting in, seizing, confining, inveigling, enticing, decoying, kidnaping, abducting, concealing, or carrying away any individual by any means whatsoever, and holding or detaining, or with the intent to hold or detain, such individual for ransom or reward or otherwise, except, in the case of a minor, by a parent thereof, shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment for life or for such term as the court in its discretion may determine. This section shall be held to have been violated if either the seizing, confining, inveigling, enticing, decoying, kidnaping, abducting, concealing, carrying away, holding, or detaining occurs in the District of Columbia. If 2 or more individuals enter into any agreement or conspiracy to do any act or acts which would constitute a violation of the provisions of this section, and 1 or more of such individuals do any act to effect the object of such agreement or conspiracy, each such individual shall be deemed to have violated the provisions of this section.

. In this case, appellant was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of three to fifteen years, less than the life sentence the kidnapping statute allows.