Court Opinion

ID: 9530530
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:00:37.517352+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:08.476564
License: Public Domain

Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE TRAPP dissenting: It is oft repeated that in matters of child custody the “guiding star” is and must be at all times the best interests of the child. (Nye v. Nye, 411 Ill. 408, 105 N.E.2d 300.) This case suggests and illustrates that the unconsidered application of a rule of res judicata that requires a showing of altered or changed circumstances since the date of decree fixing custody may greatly erode, if not completely nullify, the ability of the court to make an advised determination of the best interests of the children. This dissent is directed to the proposition that the neglect or failure of the parties to a divorce, ill-advised or otherwise, to initially present to the court relevant facts concerning the “best interests” of the child or children should not bar the court from considering such interests when relevant and significant facts are actually presented to it subsequently. While the stated purpose of the rule is to prevent “groundless attempts” to change custody (People ex rel. Bukovich v. Bukovich, 39 Ill.2d 76, 233 N.E.2d 382), the thesis here is that the court should recognize that in certain cases the rule may subordinate the real interests of the child or children to a judicial discipline of the parents and make the court ineffectual where the circumstances call for a genuine determination of the welfare of the children concerned. The opinion in Nye makes apparent that “fitness” of a parent and the “best interests” of children are distinct and separable factors in determining custody. In Nye, the pleadings raised the sole issue of “fitness” in a moral context. The court said: “Therefore, compelling evidence must be presented, proving the mother to be a unfit person, to cause the custody of her minor daughter to be denied her, or there must be a positive showing that to deny custody to the mother would be for the best interests of the child.” (Emphasis supplied.) 408 Ill. at 414. A court may find that each parent is “fit” but determine that the best interests of the child requires that custody be in one parent. (People ex rel. Morris v. Morris, 44 Ill.2d 66, 254 N.E.2d 478.) It is not necessary to find a wife unfit before custody may be changed or denied to her. Osborn v. Hufsey, 44 Ill.App.2d 157, 194 N.E.2d 556; Kline v. Kline, 57 Ill.App.2d 244, 205 N.E.2d 775. Upon this record, it is apparent that in entering the decree initially fixing custody in the wife, the court was prevented from ascertaining the best interests of the children. Only the wife testified stating that she had custody and that she would “like to retain custody,” and that a satisfactory arrangement for visitation had been worked out. Such arrangement was not stated to the court and it does not appear in the decree. Despite the record of prior treatment for mental or emotional problems, she advised the court that she was “in good health.” There was neither a written stipulation concerning custody as in Nye, nor testimony concerning the best interests of the children as in Girolamo v. Girolamo, 5 Ill.App.3d 627, 283 N.E.2d 713. Here, the decree fixing the custody found the wife a “fit” person but made no finding as to the best interests of the children. The question was presented to the court only in the light of the allegation of the complaint that the wife was a “fit and proper person.” Such allegation was admitted in the answer, albeit it appears in the record that defendant desired to protest custody but desisted when counsel advised that such course would make the divorce difficult. In Girolamo, the court reviewed proceedings for change of custody in which it was alleged that there were material facts affecting the welfare of the children not known to the court at the time of the initial decree. The court said: “While the evidence in a proceeding of this nature is generally limited to matters which tend to show a change in circumstances since the last award of custody, parties may be permitted to show that there were material facts existing at the time of the previous decree, but unknown to the court, if such material facts tend to show that such a change in custody would be in the best interests of the child.” (Emphasis supplied.) 5 Ill.App.3d at 629-630. In Harms v. Harms, 323 Ill.App. 154, 55 N.E.2d 301, each parent under an agreement received custody of one child. Thereafter, the wife sought a change of custody so that both children would be with her. The husband contended that there was no showing of a change of circumstance. That opinion discussed Thomas v. Thomas, 233 Ill.App. 488, noting that in Thomas the court considered that: “[T]he original decree would be deemed res judicata as between the parties unless it is made to appear that it would be for the best interests of the child to give it to another. Apparently the court had in mind that the children were not parties to the divorce case, and that the rule of res judicata, while applicable between the parties, would not be allowed to interfere with the duty of the court to enter an order in accordance with the best interests of the children. The court would not be justified in altering the original decree as to the custody of the children unless there was a change in the situation, or unless facts or circumstances which should have been called to the attention of the court at the time the decree was entered, were overlooked.” (Emphasis supplied.) 323 Ill.App. at 159. In Peraza v. Tovar, 13 Ill.App.2d 405, 142 N.E.2d 165, a habeas corpus proceeding, the respondent contended that relief should not be granted without a showing of changed circumstances since a prior decree fixing custody. Citing Thomas and the quotation from Harms, the court said: “The welfare of the child should not be affected by the negligence, if any, of petitioner or his attorney in failing to appear in the first habeas corpus proceeding.” 13 Ill.App.2d at 412. On this record, the wife’s testimony that she was in good health may be considered subject to challenge. Assuming that her answer was not fraudulent, it would mislead the court even if not so intended. It is clear that no facts concerning the mental or emotional condition of the wife were brought to the attention of the court, or that he had occasion to consider such in the light of the interests of the chffdren. The principal opinion suggests that it follows the rule of Nye. The latter opinion notes and reiterates that the testimony shows that the child there concerned received excellent care in a desirable home. The emphasis of the opinion was upon the issue of whether there was a want of moral fitness which affected the best interests of the child. It seems fair to say that the court, in Nye, had no occasion to consider the child’s best interest in the light of factors such as the nervous or emotional problems of the parent having custody. As is argued in behalf of the husband, this record does include facts showing a change of circumstances in that more acute manifestations of the wife’s phobic reactions appeared subsequently to the divorce. The parties had been separated for some 2 years prior to the divorce, and there is evidence that at the time of the decree the husband had been advised that the wife was recovering. The court here did find upon substantial evidence that the best interests of the children required a change of custody. Upon the facts, the rule that the welfare of the children is the test of custody is subordinated to the doctrine that res judicata under a decree arising from the acts of the parents controls the disposition of the best interests of the children. The issues here should be reviewed upon the merits without remand.