Court Opinion

ID: 9489340
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:13:06.067577+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:53:28.438508
License: Public Domain

ESCHBACH, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I write separately only because I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Murray was not “in custody” when the' police questioned him at the scene.
Concluding that Murray was “verbally combative,” Officer Davison placed Murray in the back of the squad car and closed the door, while Officer Shepardson searched Murray’s vehicle. The record reveals that the back seat of the squad ear, when the doors are closed, is analogous to a prison cell. The rear doors cannot be opened from the inside of the car, and a partition divides the front and rear seats. Not only was Murray’s freedom “restrained,” it was impossible for *464him to escape. That, of course, is the very reason that Davison placed him in the back of the squad car in the first place. After Shepardson found drugs and a gun in Murray’s ear, Davison opened the car door and asked Murray: who owned the gun; who owned the car; whether Murray had loaned the car to anyone that day; and, whether anyone else had access to the car. While questioning Murray, Davison stood by the door of the car. Although it is true that Murray was not handcuffed, the use of handcuffs is not a prerequisite to a finding of custody. I also do not believe that the custodial nature of the questioning changed just because the car door was open when Davison questioned Murray. Unless Murray was prepared to tackle Davison, he was unable to leave the car. In my opinion, no reasonable person in Murray’s shoes would have felt free to leave the back seat of the squad car; Murray was “in custody.”
The majority cites our holding in United States v. Kelly, 991 F.2d 1308 (7th Cir.1993). The majority’s reliance on Kelly in this case is misplaced. The defendant in Kelly was never forcibly locked in a car, he was merely detained and questioned during a roadside stop. Id. at 1313. Further, unlike Kelly, the public-safety exception to Miranda’s requirements is inapplicable in this case. The theory was never raised by the government. And, even if it had been, it would be unavailing because the police already had located Murray’s gun when they questioned him.
Murray’s responses to Davison’s questions were not, however, what convicted him. The evidence found in Murray’s car secured his conviction. I entirely agree with the majority that the evidence in the car was obtained legally. The admission of Murray’s responses to Davison was harmless error. Killebrew v. Endicott, 992 F.2d 660, 663 (7th Cir.1993). Therefore, I concur.