Court Opinion

ID: 9392881
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-08 16:07:01.241276+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:49.663000
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. McCoy, 2023-Ohio-1539.]

                 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                           ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                PORTAGE COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,                                    CASE NO. 2022-P-0059

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,
                                                  Criminal Appeal from the
        - vs -                                    Court of Common Pleas

TAIJH R. MCCOY,
                                                  Trial Court No. 2022 CR 00632
                 Defendant-Appellant.

                                            OPINION

                                        Decided: May 8, 2023
                                         Judgment: Affirmed

Victor V. Vigluicci, Portage County Prosecutor, 241 South Chestnut Street, Ravenna,
OH 44266 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).

Wesley C. Buchanan, 50 South Main Street, Suite 625, Akron, OH 44308; and
Anna K. Ley, 803 East Washington Street, Suite 110, Medina, OH 44256 (For
Defendant-Appellant).

EUGENE A. LUCCI, J.

        {¶1}     Appellant, Taijh R. McCoy, appeals the judgment of the Portage County

Court of Common Pleas convicting him on one count of cruelty to a companion animal, in

violation of R.C. 959.131(C), a felony of the fifth degree. We affirm.

        {¶2}     In April 2022, appellant was at home with Jewel McFarland. Ms. McFarland

had a dog, Ginger, a two-year-old Yorkie. At some point, a glass of juice was spilled on

the dog. Appellant took the dog into the bathroom to wash the animal. In the course of
“bathing” the animal, appellant subjected the dog to significant second and third degree

burns from scalding water. The animal had to be euthanized.

       {¶3}   Appellant was indicted by the Portage County Grand Jury on one count of

knowingly causing serious physical harm to a companion animal, in violation of R.C.

959.131(C), a felony of the fifth degree. Appellant ultimately entered into a plea of guilty

to the charge. After conducting a thorough Crim.R. 11 colloquy, the court found appellant

guilty. Appellant was sentenced to an 11-month term of imprisonment. This appeal

follows.

       {¶4}   After reviewing the record, counsel filed a merit brief pursuant to Anders v.

California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), asserting four potential

errors for this court’s consideration.

       {¶5}   In Anders, the United States Supreme Court held that if appellate counsel,

after a conscientious examination of the record, finds an appeal to be wholly frivolous, he

or she should advise the court and request permission to withdraw. Id. at 744. This

request to withdraw must be accompanied by a brief citing anything in the record that

could arguably support an appeal. Id. Further, counsel must furnish his or her client with

a copy of the brief and request to withdraw and give the client an opportunity to raise any

additional items. Id. Once these requirements have been met, the appellate court shall

review the entire record and determine whether the appeal is wholly frivolous. Id. If the

court finds the appeal is wholly frivolous, the court may grant counsel’s motion to withdraw

and proceed to a decision on the merits. Id. If, however, the court concludes the appeal

is not frivolous, it must appoint new counsel for the client. Id.; see also Penson v.

Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988).

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Case No. 2022-P-0059
       {¶6}   Pursuant     to   Anders, counsel’s      brief   was    properly    served     on

appellant. Appellant, however, did not file a supplemental brief.

       {¶7}   Counsel’s first and second proposed assignments of error are related. They

provide, respectively:

       {¶8}   “[1.] The trial court failed to conform to the Crim.R. 11 requirements.

       {¶9}   “[2.] Taijh’s plea was not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily entered into.”

       {¶10} In a felony case, “the court * * * shall not accept a plea of guilty * * * without

first addressing the defendant personally” and complying with the requirements of Crim.R.

11 to determine the voluntary nature of the plea. Crim.R. 11(C)(2). To this end, the trial

court must ensure the defendant understands the charges and maximum penalty; the

court must also inform the defendant of the effect of his plea and that the court may

proceed to judgment and sentencing; and the court must advise the defendant of rights

waived by entering the plea. Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a)-(c). These constitutional rights include

“the rights to jury trial, to confront witnesses against him or her, to have compulsory

process for obtaining witnesses in the defendant’s favor, and to require the state to prove

the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the defendant cannot

be compelled to testify against himself or herself.” Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c).

       {¶11} A trial court must “strictly comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) and orally advise

a defendant” of the constitutional rights contained therein or his plea is rendered

invalid. State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d 621, ¶ 31. For

the nonconstitutional portions of Rule 11, the applicable standard is “substantial

compliance” which means that “under the totality of the circumstances the defendant

subjectively understands the implications of his plea and the rights he is waiving.”

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(Citations omitted.) State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108, 564 N.E.2d 474 (1990). “[A]

defendant who challenges his guilty plea on the basis that it was not knowingly,

intelligently, and voluntarily made must show a prejudicial effect.” (Citations omitted.) Id.

The test for prejudice is “whether the plea would have otherwise been made.” (Citation

omitted.) Id.

       {¶12} At the plea hearing, the trial court advised appellant of the maximum penalty

he was facing by pleading guilty. The trial court also advised appellant that, upon

accepting the plea, it could proceed to sentencing. Regarding the waiver of appellant’s

constitutional rights, the court specifically stated, by entering his plea, appellant was:

                     giving up your right to a trial by jury. At that trial, the
                     prosecutor would have to prove, beyond a reasonable
                     doubt, each and every element of the charges against
                     you. Your attorney could cross-examine and confront
                     the witnesses who come in and testify for the State of
                     Ohio. You could subpoena or compel witnesses, have
                     them come in and testify for you, and you can take the
                     stand at your trial, if you chose to do so. You have a
                     constitutional right not to testify, but if you wanted to,
                     you could.

       {¶13} The trial court then confirmed that appellant understood he was giving up

the various constitutional rights. And, finally, the trial court asked appellant if he

understood that his plea of guilty was an admission of each and every element of the

charges. Appellant stated he understood.

       {¶14} In light of the foregoing, we conclude the trial court fully conformed to the

requirements of Crim.R. 11. We further hold the record supports the conclusion that

appellant’s plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered. Appellant did not

express any misgivings or concerns about entering the plea and he expressly stated he

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Case No. 2022-P-0059
understood the ramifications of doing so and was entering the same of his own free will.

Counsel’s first two potential assignments of error lack merit.

       {¶15} The next potential assigned error provides:

       {¶16} “Taijh received ineffective assistance of counsel when entering his plea.”

       {¶17} To establish his claim that his counsel provided ineffective assistance, an

appellant must demonstrate (1) his counsel was deficient in some aspect of his

representation, and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, were it not for counsel’s

errors, the result of the trial would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

       {¶18} One of the inquiries in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is whether

there was actual error on the part of appellant’s trial counsel. State v. McCaleb, 11th Dist.

Lake No. 2002-L-157, 2004-Ohio-5940, ¶ 92. In Ohio, every properly licensed attorney is

presumed to be competent, and therefore a defendant bears the burden of proof. State

v. Smith, 17 Ohio St.3d 98, 100, 477 N.E.2d 1128 (1985). Counsel’s performance will not

be deemed ineffective unless and until the performance falls below an objective standard

of reasonable representation and, in addition, prejudice arises from counsel’s

performance. See generally Strickland.

       {¶19} Here, there is nothing to indicate appellant could satisfy the first prong of

deficient performance. During the plea hearing the trial court asked appellant if his

attorney reviewed the written plea of guilty with him. Appellant stated counsel did so.

And the trial court asked appellant if he was satisfied with counsel’s performance. He

again responded he was satisfied. Appellant did not hesitate or dither when the court

asked about his attorney’s performance. And, at no point, did appellant take issue with

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Case No. 2022-P-0059
any aspect of the plea negotiations or the manner in which counsel managed his interests

during the negotiations. We therefore conclude that, because appellant’s plea was

entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, and there is no evidence of deficient

performance on counsel’s behalf, appellant cannot establish ineffective assistance.

Counsel’s third proposed assignment of error lacks merit.

       {¶20} Counsel’s final proposed assignment of error provides:

       {¶21} “Taijh was sentenced contrary to law.”

       {¶22} Pursuant to R.C. 2929.11(A), “[a] court that sentences an offender for a

felony shall be guided by the overriding purposes of felony sentencing,” and it “shall

consider the factors * * * relating to the seriousness of the conduct” and “to the likelihood

of the offender’s recidivism.” R.C. 2929.12(A).

       {¶23} R.C. 2953.08(G) governs our review of felony sentences, and provides, in

relevant part, that after an appellate court’s review of the record, and it “may increase,

reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence that is appealed under this section or may vacate

the sentence and remand * * * if it clearly and convincingly finds * * * [t]hat the sentence

is * * * contrary to law.” R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b); State v. Meeks, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No.

2022-A-0060, 2023-Ohio-988, ¶ 11.

       {¶24} “A sentence is contrary to law when it is ‘in violation of statute or legal

regulations’ * * *.” Meeks at ¶ 11, quoting State v. Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 242, 2020-Ohio-

6729, 169 N.E.3d 649, ¶ 34. Thus, “‘[a] sentence is contrary to law when it does not fall

within the statutory range for the offense or if the trial court fails to consider the purposes

and principles of felony sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and the sentencing factors

set forth in R.C. 2929.12.’” State v. Shannon, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2020-T-0020, 2021-

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Ohio-789, ¶ 11, quoting State v. Brown, 2d Dist. Montgomery Nos. 24520, 24705, 2012-

Ohio-199, ¶ 74; see also State v. Wilson, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2017-L-028, 2017-Ohio-

7127, ¶ 18. The Supreme Court has further held that a sentence is contrary to law if “it is

imposed ‘based on factors or considerations that are extraneous to those [seriousness

and recidivism factors] that are permitted by R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.’” Meeks at ¶ 11,

quoting State v. Bryant, 168 Ohio St.3d 250, 2022-Ohio-1878, 198 N.E.3d 68, ¶ 22. “But

an appellate court’s determination that the record does not support a sentence does not

equate to a determination that the sentence is ‘otherwise contrary to law’ as that term is

used in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b).” Jones at ¶ 32.

       {¶25} Further, this court has frequently noted that “even though a trial court is

required to consider the R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12 factors, it is not required to make

specific findings on the record to comport with its statutory obligations.” Shannon at ¶ 17,

citing State v. Parke, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2011-A-0062, 2012-Ohio-2003, ¶ 24; State

v. Blake, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2003-L-196, 2005-Ohio-686, ¶ 16.

       {¶26} Here, appellant was found guilty of a fifth-degree felony, punishable by up

to 12 months in prison. R.C. 2929.14(A)(5). After considering the relevant statutory

factors and making various findings on record, the trial court sentenced appellant to a

term of 11-months imprisonment, a term within the statutory range. Further, the trial court

pointed out that R.C. 2929.13(B)(1) creates a presumption for community control; the

court observed, however, that the presumption was overcome because appellant had

been previously sent to prison. See R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(b)(ix). We discern no error or

irregularity in the trial court’s imposition of sentence. Therefore, counsel’s final proposed

assigned error lacks merit.

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       {¶27} After a thorough and independent review of the record, we hold the trial

court did not err in accepting appellant’s plea of guilty nor did it err in imposing sentence.

Further, there is no indication that counsel was ineffective such that appellant’s plea

would be rendered invalid. Finally, we discern no colorable issue(s) on the current record

that would merit the appointment of new counsel. Thus, there are no arguable legal points

on the merits of this matter. Appellant’s appeal is without merit and is wholly frivolous.

       {¶28} Because there are no arguable issues in this appeal, the request to

withdraw filed by appellate counsel is well-taken and is hereby granted. The judgment of

the Portage County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

JOHN J. EKLUND, P.J.,

MARY JANE TRAPP, J.,

concur.

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