Court Opinion

ID: 9542612
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:36:32.945417+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:08:25.828920
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE KELLEY
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. The majority has not addressed what I regard as the real issue in this case: Whether the City in the reasonable exercise of its police power may prohibit the erection of new off-premises, outdoor billboards. It is axiomatic that the City may, in the exercise of its police power, restrict or forbid the erection of particular structures or a particular use, where such restriction or prohibition is not arbitrary and unreasonable and bears a substantial relationship to public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926).
Ambler also held that if the validity of a legislative classification for zoning purposes is fairly debatable, legislative judgment must be allowed to control. We said in Nopro v. The Town of Cherry Hills, 180 Colo. 217, 504 P.2d 344 (1973):
“As tempting as it sometimes may be, a court is without power to substitute its zoning philosophy for that of the zoning body; and this is so for practical as well as legal reasons.”
*468The City postured its case to a large extent on the proposition that off-premise billboards created “visual pollution,” and hazards to driving safety. The majority ignored this argument, as well as the assignments of error relating to the exclusion of evidence offered to establish the allegations.
The United States Supreme Court, on the matter of aesthetic considerations as a ground for the exercise of the police power, said:
“. . . The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. [Cite omitted.] The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled.” Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 75 S.Ct. 98, 99 L.Ed. 27 (1954).
Some of the state courts have recognized that aesthetic considerations alone may form the basis for the valid exercise of the police power. State v. Diamond Motors, Inc., 50 Hawaii 33, 429 P.2d 825 (1967); Oregon City v. Hartke, 240 Ore. 35, 400 P.2d 255 (1965); Jasper v. Commonwealth, 375 S.W.2d 709 (Ky. 1964); People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1963); Merritt v. Peters, 65 So.2d 861 (Fla. 1953).
In order to cope with the problems of environmental deterioration in core cities, the governing bodies of cities must be permitted to take aesthetic values into consideration.
I recognize that the problem of banning outdoor billboards completely is compounded by the existence of conflicting interests and considerations. As pointed out in the majority opinion, the prohibition of outdoor signs would have an adverse effect on the sign business. The majority conclude that it would be destroyed. It, of course, would affect the property owners who lease the sites for the signs, and, perhaps, the businesses which use outdoor signs to advertise their products and services.
Therefore, conflicting with the desire of the Council to promote the aesthetic values of the City, are the various economic interests. These competing values must be balanced in determining reasonableness. Neither the trial court nor the majority attempted to strike a balance.
I would reverse and remand to the trial court to make a determination under the tests suggested herein.
I have nothing to say as to the reasonableness of the amortization ordinance, Number 95, except that amortization has been approved by respectable courts1 as a valid method of satisfying the “just compensa*469tion” requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. The majority apparently does not reach the issue.

 National Adv. Co. v. Monterey, 1 Cal.3d 875, 83 Cal.Rptr. 577, 464 P.2d 33 (1970); Naegele Outdoor Adv. Co. v. Minnetonka, 281 Minn. 492, 162 N.W.2d 206 (1968); Markham Adv. Co. v. State, 73 Wash.2d 405, 439 P.2d 248 (1968); LaChapelle v. Goffstown, 107 N.H. 485, 225 A.2d 624 (1967);Moore v. Ward, 377 S.W.2d 881 (Ky. l964);Larchmontv. Sutton, 30 Misc.2d 245, 217 N.Y.S.2d929 (1961)-,Murphy, Inc. v. Board of Zoning App., 147 Conn. 358,161 A.2d 185 (1960);Granf v. Baltimore, 212 Md. 301, 129 A.2d 363 (1950); 2 Rathkopf, Law of Zoning and Planning 62-1, et. seq.