Court Opinion

ID: 9373088
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:02:39.626156+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:39.615510
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                     MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

RICARDO P. HOWELL,                                DOCKET NUMBER
              Appellant,                          DC-0432-13-6622-I-2

             v.

DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND                         DATE: January 18, 2023
  URBAN DEVELOPMENT,
            Agency.

             THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

      Juliette Niehuss, Esquire, and Jeremy Wright, Esquire, Washington, D.C.,
        for the appellant.

      Carl E. Hobbs II, Esquire, and Bianca Manns, Washington, D.C., for
        the agency.

                                        BEFORE

                            Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                              Raymond A. Limon, Member
                               Tristan L. Leavitt, Member
                       Vice Chairman Harris recused herself and
                  did not participate in the adjudication of this appeal.

1
   A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                       2

                                     REMAND ORDER

¶1         The agency has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     reversed the appellant’s removal for unacceptable performance. For the reasons
     discussed below, we GRANT the agency’s petition for review . We VACATE the
     initial decision and REMAND the case to the regional office for further
     adjudication    consistent   with    Santos v.    National    Aeronautics &      Space
     Administration, 990 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2021), and the guidance below.

                                    BACKGROUND
¶2         The appellant held the GS-12 Auditor position with the agency’s Office of
     Inspector General, Headquarters Audit Division, Office of Audit.             Howell v.
     Department of Housing and Urban Development, MSPB Docket No. DC-0432-13-
     6622-I-1, Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 2; Howell v. Department of Housing
     and Urban Development, MSPB Docket No. DC-0432-13-6622-I-2, Appeal File
     (I-2 AF), Tab 67, Initial Decision (ID) at 2. 2 In July 2012, the agency placed him
     on a 120-day performance improvement plan (PIP). I-2 AF, Tab 12 at 83-101.
     The agency later extended the PIP until January 2013, to account for the
     appellant’s absence due to a death in his family. Id. at 82. In April 2013, the
     agency proposed the appellant’s removal for unacceptable performance.                 Id.
     at 71-81.   After the appellant responded, the agency removed him, effective
     August 2013. Id. at 12, 14-18. This appeal followed. IAF, Tab 1.
¶3         The administrative judge held the requested hearing and issued an initial
     decision reversing the removal. ID at 1. Because she reversed the appellant’s
     removal on other grounds, the administrative judge did not address his harmful
     error claim. ID at 23 n.12. She did, however, deny the appellant’s affirmative
     defenses of retaliation for engaging in equal employment opportunity (EEO)

     2
       The administrative judge initially dismissed this appeal without prejudice pending an
     ongoing equal employment opportunity claim, the appellant filed a petition for review
     of that dismissal, and the Board forwarded the matter for refiling, resulting in the
     separate docket numbers associated with this one matter. ID at 3 n.3.
                                                                                            3

     activity and discrimination on the bases of sex, race, national origin, and
     disability. ID at 22-34. The agency has filed a petition for review. Howell v.
     Department of Housing and Urban Development, MSPB Docket No. DC-0432-13-
     6622-I-2, Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1.             The appellant has filed a
     response, PFR File, Tab 8, and the agency has replied, PFR File, Tab 11. 3

                   DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶4         At the time the initial decision was issued, the Board’s case law stated that,
     to prevail in a performance-based removal appeal under chapter 43, the agency
     must establish the following by substantial evidence: (1) the Office of Personnel
     Management (OPM) approved its performance appraisal system and any
     significant changes thereto; (2) the agency communicated to the appellant the
     performance standards and critical elements of his position; (3) the appellant’s
     performance standards were valid under 5 U.S.C. § 4302(b)(1); (4) the agency
     warned the appellant of the inadequacies of his performance during the appraisal
     period and gave him a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate acceptable
     performance; and (5) the appellant’s performance remained unacceptable in one
     or more of the critical elements for which he was provided an opportunity to
     demonstrate acceptable performance.         Lee v. Environmental Protection Agency,

     3
       In addition to the petition for review, response, and reply pleadings, PFR File, Tabs 1,
     8, 11, the record includes several additional filings. The appellant filed a separate
     motion to dismiss the agency’s petition for review because the agency had not provided
     interim relief. PFR File, Tab 5; see generally 5 C.F.R. § 1201.116(a) (requiring that an
     agency’s petition for review generally be accompanied by certification that it has
     provided interim relief, if the initial decision ordered interim relief). The agency filed a
     response, rightly noting that the administrative judge did not order interim relief. PFR
     File, Tab 7; ID at 35-41; see Cole v. Department of the Air Force, 120 M.S.P.R. 640,
     ¶ 20 n.5 (2014) (denying an appellant’s request to dismiss an agency’s petition for
     review for failing to provide interim relief because the administrative judge did not
     order interim relief). The appellant then filed a pleading requesting that the Board
     order immediate interim relief, PFR File, Tab 9, to which the agency also responded,
     PFR File, Tab 13. Because the administrative judge did not order interim relief, his
     request for such relief is denied.
                                                                                      4

     115 M.S.P.R. 533, ¶ 5 (2010). 4 Substantial evidence is the “degree of relevant
     evidence that a reasonable person, considering the record as a whole, might
     accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even though other reasonable persons
     might disagree.” 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(p).
¶5        The administrative judge found that the agency met its burden for
     criteria (1), (2), and (3). ID at 6-11. However, she found that the agency failed
     to prove that it afforded the appellant a reasonable opportunity to improve, as
     required by criterion (4), or that the appellant’s performance remained
     unacceptable, as required by criterion (5). ID at 12-22. We do not reach any
     conclusions as to criteria (4) and (5) at this time because we must remand this
     appeal for the agency to prove an additional criterion that was not addressed
     during the proceedings below. 5

     Remand is required in light of Santos.
¶6        During the pendency of the petition for review in this case, the U.S. Court
     of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held in Santos, 990 F.3d at 1360-61, 1363, that
     in addition to the five elements of the agency’s case set forth above, the agency
     must also “justify the institution of the PIP” by proving by “substantial evidence
     that the employee’s performance was unacceptable . . . before the PIP.”           The
     Federal Circuit’s decision in Santos applies to all pending cases, including this
     one, regardless of when the events took place. Lee v. Department of Veterans
     Affairs, 2022 MSPB 11, ¶ 16.      Accordingly, we remand the appeal to give the
     parties the opportunity to present argument and additional evidence on whether

     4
       Although Lee provides that performance standards must be valid under 5 U.S.C.
     § 4302(b)(1), the National Defense Authorization Act of 2018 redesignated
     subsection 4302(b) as subsection 4302(c). Pub. L. No. 115-91, § 1097(d)(1)(A),
     131 Stat. 1283, 1619 (2017). Accordingly, 5 U.S.C. § 4302(c)(1) now sets forth the
     statutory requirements for a valid performance standard.
     5
        The parties have not disputed the administrative judge’s findings concerning
     criteria (1), (2), or (3). Therefore, we have not addressed them here. See 5 C.F.R.
     § 1201.115 (reflecting that the Board normally will consider only the issues raised by
     the parties on review).
                                                                                        5

     the appellant’s performance during the period leading up to the PIP was
     unacceptable in one or more critical elements. See id., ¶¶ 15-17. On remand, the
     administrative judge shall accept argument and evidence on this issue, and shall
     hold a supplemental hearing if appropriate. Id., ¶ 17.

     On remand, the administrative judge should further develop the record and revisit
     her findings as to whether the agency gave the appellant a reasonable opportunity
     to improve and demonstrate acceptable performance.
¶7        To determine whether an agency has afforded an employee a reasonable
     opportunity to improve, relevant factors include the nature of the duties and
     responsibilities of the employee’s position, the performance deficiencies
     involved, and the amount of time which is sufficient for the employee to
     demonstrate acceptable performance. Lee, 115 M.S.P.R. 533, ¶ 32. An agency
     may fail to meet these criteria if it does not provide an appellant with the
     supervisory assistance promised in the PIP. E.g., Thompson v. Department of the
     Army,   122 M.S.P.R.    372,   ¶¶ 20,     30    (2015);   Thompson v.   Farm      Credit
     Administration, 51 M.S.P.R. 569, 579 (1991); Adorador v. Department of the
     Air Force, 38 M.S.P.R. 461, 464-66 (1988).
¶8        The administrative judge found below that the agency failed to meet its
     burden of proving that it provided a reasonable opportunity to improve, primarily
     based on her conclusion that the agency failed to fulfill its self -imposed
     obligation to meet with the appellant every 2 weeks.               ID at 13-17.     The
     administrative judge determined that the parties provided contradictory testimony
     on this point and she made credibility determinations in favor of the appellant’s
     version of events. ID at 14-15.
¶9        The    Board    must    defer   to    an    administrative   judge’s   credibility
     determinations when they are based, explicitly or implicitly, on observing the
     demeanor    of   witnesses   testifying   at a hearing and        may overturn such
     determinations only when it has “sufficiently sound” reasons for doing so.
     Haebe v. Department of Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (explaining
                                                                                     6

      the deference afforded to an administrative judge’s credibility findings); Hillen v.
      Department of the Army, 35 M.S.P.R. 453, 458 (1987) (recognizing relevant
      factors for assessing credibility). The Board may find sufficiently sound reasons
      to overturn such determinations if they are incomplete, inconsistent with the
      weight of the evidence, and do not reflect the record as a whole.        Faucher v.
      Department of the Air Force, 96 M.S.P.R. 203, ¶ 8 (2004). As further explained
      below, we find that the administrative judge must revisit her credibility findings
      on remand because she did not properly characterize some witness testimony and
      failed to account for evidence corroborating the agency’s version of events. Id.,
      ¶¶ 11-18 (overturning an administrative judge’s credibility finding regarding a
      witness who did nothing when the appellant allegedly sexually harassed h er
      because the administrative judge failed to take into account either the witness’s
      explanation for her inaction or the corroborating statements of other witnesses).
¶10        The organizational structure of the appellant’s supervisory chain and a
      timeline are particularly relevant for analyzing whether the appellant was
      provided a reasonable opportunity to improve during the               July 2012 to
      January 2013 PIP. During the PIP, the appellant was assigned to a Departmental
      Enforcement Center (DEC) review project. I-2 AF, Tab 12 at 101. As an Auditor
      on the DEC review project, the appellant worked closely with the Auditor in
      Charge (AIC) assigned to that project. I-2 AF, Hearing Transcript (HT) at 9-10
      (testimony of the AIC), I-2 AF, Tab 55, Hearing Compact Diskette (HCD)
      (testimony of the appellant, 7:53, 8:11). 6 The AIC testified that her role was not
      supervisory, but it did require that she provide first-level approval of the
      appellant’s work on the DEC review project and assess his performance.          HT
      at 14, 50-52 (testimony of the AIC). She further testified that, as the AIC, she

      6
        Although the parties provided the Board with transcripts for much of the hearing,
      some testimony, including the appellant’s, is not transcribed. Therefore, in some
      instances we have cited to the hearing transcript and in others to the hearing
      compact diskette.
                                                                                   7

      reviewed the appellant’s work at least once or twice a week. Id. at 10-11. The
      appellant’s supervisor at the beginning of his PIP was a Deputy Director;
      however, she became the Acting Director partway through the PIP, around the
      August to September 2012 timeframe.        An Assistant Director began actively
      supervising the appellant around the same August to September 2012 timeframe.
      HT at 124, 158-59 (testimony of the Deputy Director), 308-11 (testimony of the
      Assistant Director).
¶11        The Deputy Director issued the appellant’s PIP. I-2 AF, Tab 12 at 82-83.
      Among other things, the PIP indicated that she would be monitoring the
      appellant’s performance and she would be supervising the project for which he
      was responsible, the appellant was expected to advise her of any significant
      developments or problems, and she would meet with him every other week to
      discuss his progress.   Id. at 83, 100-01.    However, as previously discussed,
      organizational changes resulted in her taking on a more senior role during the PIP
      and the Assistant Director became more active in supervising the appellant. HT
      at 124, 158 (testimony of the Deputy Director), 308-11 (testimony of the
      Assistant Director). Nevertheless, the Deputy Director testified that:
            I met with—I think they were like every two weeks. The meetings
            were every two weeks to discuss the PIP and where [the appellant]
            was in terms of training, whether he needed additional resources,
            whether he needed any additional help on the assignment. But . . .
            the   meetings    sometimes   would    end    because   [of   the
            appellant’s behavior].
      HT at 160-61 (testimony of the Deputy Director).
¶12        The administrative judge discussed the Deputy Director’s testimony,
      generally. While doing so, her analysis included the following:
            [The Deputy Director] testified that she met with the appellant and
            [the Assistant Director] every 2 weeks during the PIP but that the
            meetings ended because of the appellant’s behavior. She did not
            indicate in her testimony how many meetings were held or when she
            stopped holding the meetings. Nor did she explain what it was about
                                                                                    8

            the appellant’s behavior that she found so problematic as to cause
            her to stop holding the meetings.
      ID at 14. Although the administrative judge seems to have co nstrued the Deputy
      Director’s testimony as demonstrating that the meetings completely stopped, we
      read the testimony as suggesting that the meetings were held every 2 weeks, but
      some were cut short due to the appellant’s behavior. HT at 160-61 (testimony of
      the Deputy Director).
¶13        Further, although the administrative judge faults the Deputy Director for not
      explaining what it was about the appellant’s behavior that she found so
      problematic, the transcript shows that the administrative judge did not permit
      testimony on this issue because the appellant was not charged with misconduct.
      Id. Administrative judges have broad discretion in regulating the course of the
      hearing, but we find that it was an abuse of that discretion to exclude testimony
      about the appellant’s conduct at PIP meetings and then rely, in part, on the
      absence of that testimony to find that the agency failed to meet its burden . See
      Beck v. Department of the Navy, 997 F.3d 1171, 1184-86 (Fed. Cir. 2021)
      (finding that administrative judges abused their discretion by preve nting an
      appellant from deposing witnesses relevant to his case); see generally Thomas v.
      U.S. Postal Service, 116 M.S.P.R. 453, ¶ 4 (2011) (explaining that an
      administrative judge has broad discretion to regulate the course of the hearing and
      exclude evidence that has not been shown to be relevant or material, but a party
      may establish an abuse of that discretion if the disallowed evidence could have
      affected the outcome); Fulton v. Department of the Army, 95 M.S.P.R. 79,
      ¶¶ 11-16 (2003) (recognizing that although administrative judges have broad
      discretion to exclude witnesses if a party has not shown their testimony would be
      relevant, material, and nonrepetitious, the administrative judge abused his
      discretion   by   excluding   certain   witnesses   that   would   have   provided
      relevant testimony).
                                                                                            9

¶14         At the hearing, the Assistant Director also described meeting with the
      appellant on a regular basis. HT at 337-38, 340-41 (testimony of the Assistant
      Director). The agency asked what kind of meetings he had with the appellant
      during the PIP and the Assistant Director responded, “we had informal
      meeting[s], and we had progress status – progress meeting[s].              The progress
      meeting used to be every two weeks.” HT at 340. The Assistant Director also
      stated that he talked with the appellant, informally, at least once a week.               Id.
      at 341.   In addition, the Assistant Director’s proposal to remove the appellant
      described holding PIP meetings with the appellant and the Deputy Director, and
      indicates that some were unproductive because of the appellant’s attitude.
      I-2 AF, Tab 12 at 77. Despite this testimony and evidence, the administrative
      judge found that the Assistant Director “did not mention any meetings with the
      appellant and [the Deputy Director] in his hea ring testimony.                 That seems
      particularly odd if, as [the Deputy Director] asserted, those meetings ceased
      because of the appellant’s behavior.” ID at 15.
¶15         The administrative judge found that the appellant testified that the Deputy
      Director did not give him any feedback during the PIP. ID at 14. However, this
      overlooks    or     at   least   oversimplifies   the   appellant’s   actual    testimony.
      The appellant did testify that he felt as if he did not receive sufficient feedback
      from the Assistant Director for purposes of improving, and the Deputy Director
      “was not involved at all in the PIP.” HCD (testimony of the appellant, 8:01).
      However, he later acknowledged having meetings with the Deputy Director in her
      office during the PIP period, without indicating how often t hey occurred or
      suggesting that they altogether ceased at some point.           HCD (testimony of the
      appellant, 8:55).
¶16         Aside from the appellant’s testimony on this matter, the appellant’s
      response to the proposed removal also included an assertion that the Assis tant
      Director “began attending the PIP meetings in mid-October,” which further
      evidences the existence of these meetings, generally. I-2 AF, Tab 12 at 41. The
                                                                                         10

      administrative judge appears to have overlooked that evidence. ID at 14-15. She
      also appears to have overlooked relevant language in the proposal to remove the
      appellant. Id. The administrative judge acknowledged one notation about the
      Assistant Director and the AIC meeting with the appellant to provide feedback,
      finding that it supported a conclusion that the Deputy Director did not participate
      in PIP meetings. ID at 15 (citing I-2 AF, Tab 12 at 80). However, she did not
      acknowledge other notations in the proposal, which specifically described the
      Assistant Director and the Deputy Director holding PIP progress meetings with
      the appellant. I-2 AF, Tab 12 at 72, 77.
¶17         We appreciate the administrative judge’s concern that the agency failed to
      present detailed documentary evidence of biweekly PIP meetings. ID at 15-16;
      cf. Thompson, 122 M.S.P.R. 372, ¶¶ 20-26 (crediting an appellant’s testimony
      that his supervisor provided only 2 of the 21 promised meetings during an
      improvement period, over testimony from the supervisor to the contrary, in part
      because the agency failed to present meeting notes or memoranda).               We also
      recognize the appellant’s general assertion that he did not receive adequate
      feedback. HCD (testimony of the appellant, 8:01). Nevertheless, the substantial
      evidence burden of proof is not a high one. 7 See, e.g., Towne v. Department of
      the Air Force, 120 M.S.P.R. 239, ¶ 6 (2013) (recognizing that substantial
      evidence is a lesser standard of proof than preponderance of the evidence a nd, to

      7
        The administrative judge also observed that the Assistant Director, who was actively
      serving as the appellant’s first-line supervisor by August or September 2012, was not
      aware of pertinent aspects of the PIP, including the performance defici encies that led to
      it or the specific requirements of it, until he received a copy of the PIP in
      November 2012. ID at 15-17. According to the administrative judge, the approximate
      44-day period after which the Assistant Director had a copy of the appella nt’s PIP letter
      containing the exact requirements of the PIP was insufficient to afford the appellant a
      reasonable opportunity to improve. Id. On remand, the administrative judge should
      consider whether evidence regarding the existence of performance meetings with the
      Deputy Director and the appellant’s own admission that the Assistant Director “began
      attending the PIP meetings in mid-October,” is sufficient for the agency to meet its
      burden to show that it provided the appellant with an opportunity to im prove. I-2 AF,
      Tab 12 at 41.
                                                                                 11

      meet this standard, the agency’s evidence need not be more persuasive than that
      of the appellant).
¶18         To summarize, the appellant’s PIP ran for a lengthy period, between
      July 2012 and January 2013. Among other things, the record includes testimony
      from the AIC that she reviewed the appellant’s work on the DEC review project
      throughout the PIP and provided feedback. HT at 10-11, 79, 101 (testimony of
      the AIC).    It also includes testimony from the Assistant Director and Deputy
      Director that they regularly met with the appellant and provided feedback. HT
      at 160-61 (testimony of the Deputy Director), 340-41 (testimony of the Assistant
      Director).   Their testimony is supported by the appellant’s testimony and
      documentation showing work he produced during the PIP with critiques of that
      work from both the AIC and the Assistant Director and specific instructions for
      the appellant to make revisions. I-2 AF, Tab 22 at 21-29, Tab 23 at 4-36, Tab 24
      at 4-24; HCD (testimony of the appellant, 8:55).       Additionally, the record
      includes a detailed memo memorializing an October 2012 meeting between the
      appellant, the Assistant Director, and the AIC describing the appellant’s
      deficiencies, specific areas of concern, and recommendations for moving forward.
      I-2 AF, Tab 25 at 9-10.    Subsequent messages memorialize a December 2012
      meeting between the same individuals, also talking about areas of needed
      improvement and corresponding resources. Id. at 5, 7. The record also includes
      evidence of the appellant completing a number of training courses during the
      relevant period, consistent with the agency’s promise that it would look for and
      schedule training that would help improve his performance.     Compare I-2 AF,
      Tab 12 at 100, with I-2 AF, Tab 27 at 26.
¶19         On remand, the administrative judge should allow the parties to submit
      additional argument and evidence regarding the PIP meetings, because she
      hindered the parties’ ability to do so below.    She must then issue new and
      complete findings as to whether the agency proved by substantial evidence that it
      gave the appellant a reasonable opportunity to improve and demonstrate
                                                                                     12

      acceptable performance. Among other things, those findings should consider and
      address the evidence described above.

      On remand, the administrative judge should make new findings as to whether the
      agency met its burden of showing that the appellant’s performance
      remained unacceptable.
¶20         In placing the appellant on the PIP, in July 2012, the agency explained that
      his performance had fallen below acceptable levels in seven core competencies
      across all three of his critical elements.   I-2 AF, Tab 12 at 84, 95, 99. In its
      April 2013 proposal to remove him, the agency indicated that the appellant’s
      performance remained unacceptable in three core competencies across two critical
      elements.       Id. at 71, 76-80.   Specifically, the agency determined that his
      performance remained unacceptable for the “professional knowledge” core
      competency and its parent critical element, “job knowledge and technical ski lls,”
      as well as the “technical skills” and “analytical skills” core competencies and
      their parent critical element, “application of job knowledge and technical skills.”
      Id. at 76-79.
¶21         The administrative judge did not substantively address whether the
      appellant’s performance remained unacceptable. Instead, the administrative judge
      concluded that the agency failed to meet its burden for this criterion because the
      appellant’s performance standards of record differed from the standards used for
      his removal.       ID at 18-22.     According to the administrative judge, those
      inconsistencies were fatal to the agency’s case. Id. We disagree.
¶22         The appellant’s performance plan of record, as signed by the appellant each
      year and further documented by the agency’s official performance appraisal
      manual, identifies the critical elements of his position and defines four rating
      levels.     I-2 AF, Tab 13 at 6-17, Tab 17 at 4-26, Tab 26 at 10, 30-31, Tab 27
      at 16-24. Most relevant to this appeal, the plan defines the lowest t wo ratings as:
                Fully Successful:   The employee’s performance demonstrates
                achievement of, or substantial progress toward, meeting the core
                competencies. Employees must average a “2” or higher on the core
                                                                                       13

            competencies identified within the Element in order to be rated Fully
            Successful for the Element overall.
            Unacceptable: The employee’s performance fails to demonstrate
            achievement of or progress toward achievement of any one of the
            core competencies within the Element; performance has a negative
            consequence on organizational goals. Employees must be rated
            Unacceptable for the overall Element if any of the core competencies
            are rated “1” within the Element.
      I-2 AF, Tab 13 at 6, Tab 26 at 30-31. 8 If an employee is unsuccessful in one or
      more critical elements, his summary rating will likewise be unacceptable.
      I-2 AF, Tab 13 at 6.     Based on this performance plan, if all other chapter 43
      requirements are met, a rating of “1” in any core competency would support a
      performance-based removal.        Id.; see Lee, 115 M.S.P.R. 533, ¶ 5; see also
      Wallace v. Department of the Air Force, 879 F.2d 829, 834 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
      (recognizing that an appellant’s failure to meet a single component of one
      critical    element     may      be    sufficient    to     justify    removal        for
      unacceptable performance).
¶23         As the administrative judge correctly noted, the agency’s various
      documentation and testimony contain some inconsistent or imprecise language in
      describing the appellant’s performance and performance expectations.                  ID
      at 18-22. For example, in one notation, the PIP provided the following: “[a]s
      stated in your performance plan, in order for performance to be considered as
      being at the Fully Successful level for a GS-12, you must generally and with
      consistency meet the standards identified at the Fully Successful l evel.” I-2 AF,
      Tab 12 at 85; ID at 17 n.11, 21-22. However, that is not the language used in the
      appellant’s performance plan. See supra ¶ 22. The statement is also circular,

      8
        The agency’s official performance appraisal manual provides different definitions for
      different employees. I-2 AF, Tab 26 at 29-31. Based on that manual, the performance
      of Office of Audit employees can be deemed “unacceptable” based on a single core
      competency, but employees in some other components can be deemed “unacceptable”
      only if they are deficient in a majority of core competencies. Id. The appellant has
      acknowledged that he was employed in the Office of Audit. IAF, Tab 1 at 2.
                                                                                        14

      essentially warning that the appellant would not be fully successful unless he met
      the fully successful standards.      In another example, the Assistant Director’s
      appraisal of the appellant after the PIP included a form on which he selected
      ratings for each critical element and its corresponding core competencies.
      I-2 AF, Tab 48 at 2-13; ID at 19-21. Although the Assistant Director completed
      the form consistent with the appellant’s actual performance plan, in which failure
      in a single core competency warranted an “unacceptable” rating for its parent
      critical element, the form’s instructions described a performance standard that
      did not apply. 9 Compare I-2 AF, Tab 13 at 6, with I-2 AF, Tab 48 at 3-8.
¶24         Elsewhere, in the proposal to remove the appellant, the agency introduced
      additional language.      While discussing the “professional knowledge” core
      competency, the proposal indicated that the appellant “more than occasionally
      failed to demonstrate a complete understanding and knowledge of different parts
      of a work paper.” I-2 AF, Tab 12 at 76; ID at 20. However, that language is not
      in the appellant’s performance plan.
¶25         Although we appreciate the administrative judge’s concern for these and
      other similar instances of the agency using inconsistent or imprecise language, as
      well as the Assistant Director’s mistakenly using an inapplicable form, ID
      at 18-22, we disagree that they are fatal to the agency’s case. The appellant’s
      performance standards remained the same before, during, and after the PIP. The
      agency is required to present merely substantial evidenc e that the appellant’s
      performance remained unacceptable in one or more of the critical elements for
      which he was provided an opportunity to demonstrate acceptable performance,

      9
        The form’s instructions provided that a critical element rating was based on the
      majority of its core competencies. I-2 AF, Tab 48 at 3. That standard is consistent with
      the performance standard for employees in offices other than the appellant’s. See supra
      ¶ 22 n.8. The administrative judge discussed the standard described on the form,
      without acknowledging either that the standard applied to those other employees or that
      the Assistant Director ignored those standards and properly completed the form
      consistent with the appellant’s performance plan. ID at 19-20.
                                                                                       15

      i.e., his “performance fail[ed] to demonstrate achievement of or progress towar d
      achievement of any one of the core competencies within the Element;
      performance       ha[d]   a   negative   consequence    on   organizational    goals.”
      I-2 AF, Tab 13 at 6; Lee, 115 M.S.P.R. 533, ¶ 5.
¶26            Because we are remanding this appeal, we do not make findings on whether
      the agency met its burden to show the appellant’s performance was unacceptable
      while on the PIP. As the hearing officer, the administrative judge is in the best
      position to make factual findings and detailed credibility assessments on this
      issue.      Mastrullo v. Department of Labor, 123 M.S.P.R. 110, ¶ 27 (2015).
      If, after any additional evidence presented on remand, she finds that the agency
      gave the appellant a reasonable opportunity to improve and demonstrate
      acceptable performance, she should make new findings as to whether the agency
      met its burden to prove, by substantial evidence, that the appellant’s performance
      remained unacceptable. These findings should be consistent with our analysis,
      above, of this issue.

      On remand, the administrative judge should make new findings as to the
      appellant’s EEO reprisal claim.
¶27            As noted above, the administrative judge denied the appellant’s affirmative
      defenses of retaliation for engaging in EEO activity, discrimination on the bases
      of sex, race, and national origin, and disability discrimination on the basis of a
      failure to accommodate. ID at 22-34.        The appellant does not challenge these
      findings on review. Nonetheless, we have reviewed the administrative judge’s
      findings and discern no basis to disturb her findings regarding the appellant’s
      race, sex, national origin, and disability discrimination claims. 10

      10
         As the administrative judge considered the appellant’s claims of sex discrimination,
      race discrimination, national origin discrimination, and EEO reprisal, she applied the
      burden shifting scheme set out in Savage v. Department of the Army, 122 M.S.P.R. 612,
      ¶ 51 (2015). ID at 23-24. Regarding the sex, race, and national origin discrimination
      claims, the administrative judge found that the appellant failed to prove that any of
      those considerations was a motivating factor in this removal action. ID at 31-34.
      During the period that followed the initial decision, the Board found that, in order to
                                                                                          16

¶28         Turning to the appellant’s EEO activity, the administrative judge found that
      the appellant proved that a prior discrimination claim was a motivating factor in
      his removal, ID at 24-29, but the agency proved that it would have taken the same
      removal action in the absence of that improper motive, ID at 29-31. During the
      period that followed the initial decision in this appeal, the Board recognized that
      although the motivating factor standard applies to claims of reprisal for engaging
      in activity protected under Title VII, an appellant must prove but-for causation in
      the first instance for a claim of reprisal for engaging in activity protected under
      the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008. Pridgen v. Office
      of Management & Budget, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶¶ 16, 21, 35-40; Haas v. Department
      of Homeland Security, 2022 MSPB 36, ¶ 32.              Accordingly, the nature of the
      appellant’s EEO activity is relevant, but the nature of that activity is not apparent
      to us—the initial decision and numerous pleadings submitted by the parties
      simply refer to the appellant’s EEO activity as discrimination claims, generally.
      E.g., ID at 24-28; I-2 AF, Tab 61 at 24-28.
¶29         In issuing a remand initial decision, the administrative judge should make
      new findings regarding the appellant’s EEO reprisal claim, applying the proper
      standard or standards. We recognize that her analysis is, absent new evidence,
      unlikely to alter her conclusion that the appellant’s affirmative defense of EEO
      reprisal fails. See Pridgen, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶ 21 n.4 (noting that some courts
      consider but-for standard to be more onerous).                Nonetheless, we find it
      appropriate to remand this issue to the administrative judge to make findings in
      the first instance.

      attain full relief for claims arising under Title VII, the appellant must prove that
      discrimination was a but-for cause of the action. Pridgen v. Office of Management &
      Budget, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶¶ 22, 42. Because the administrative judge found that the
      appellant failed to prove that his sex, race, or national origin was a motivating factor in
      his removal, and the parties have not disagreed on review, we do not reach the question
      of whether his sex, race, or national origin was a but-for cause of the removal action.
      Id., ¶ 22.
                                                                                     17

      On remand, if the agency meets its burden, the administrative judge should
      consider the appellant’s harmful error claim.
¶30        Because she found that the agency failed to meet its burden, the
      administrative judge found it unnecessary to address the appellant’s claim of
      harmful procedural error. ID at 22 n.12. The appellant alleged that his PIP used
      the wrong performance standards and this resulted in a harmful error.
      I-2 AF, Tab 29 at 17; see generally 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(2)(i)(C) (recognizing
      that an appellant bears the burden of proving harmful procedural error by
      preponderant evidence); Stephen v. Department of the Air Force, 47 M.S.P.R.
      672, 681, 685 (1991) (recognizing that an agency error is harmful only when the
      record shows that the procedural error was likely to have caused the agency to
      reach a conclusion different from the one it would have reached in the absence or
      cure of the error). If, on remand, the administrative judge finds the agency met
      its burden, she should make findings on the appellant’s harmful error claim.
¶31        In conclusion, we must remand the appeal in light of Santos. On remand,
      the administrative judge shall accept argument and evidence on the issue of
      whether the appellant’s performance was unacceptable prior to the agency placing
      him on a PIP. The administrative judge should also permit the parties to present
      evidence as to why some of the appellant’s PIP meetings ended early. She shall
      hold a supplemental hearing if appropriate.      See Lee, 2022 MSPB 11, ¶ 17.
      The administrative judge shall then issue a new initial decision consistent with
      Santos. See id.
¶32        If the agency makes the additional showing required under Santos on
      remand, the administrative judge may incorporate her prior findings regarding the
      agency proving that OPM approved its performance appraisal system, the agency
      communicating to the appellant his performance standards, and the validity of its
      performance standards.    See supra ¶ 5.   The administrative judge should then
      revisit her findings, consistent with our guidance above, regarding the agency’s
      burden of proving that it gave the appellant a reasonable opportunity to improve
                                                                                     18

      and demonstrate acceptable performance and that his performance remained
      unacceptable. Supra ¶¶ 7-26. If the argument or evidence on remand regarding
      the appellant’s pre-PIP performance and the reason some PIP meetings ended
      early affects the administrative judge’s analysis of the agency’s burden or the
      appellant’s affirmative defenses, she should address such argument or evidence in
      the remand initial decision, while also ensuring that the correct standards are
      applied. See Spithaler v. Office of Personnel Management, 1 M.S.P.R. 587, 589
      (1980) (explaining that an initial decision must identify all material issues of fact
      and law, summarize the evidence, resolve issues of credibility, and include the
      administrative judge’s conclusions of law and his legal reasoning, as well as the
      authorities on which that reasoning rests); supra ¶ 27 n.10, ¶ 28.

                                         ORDER
¶33         For the reasons discussed above, we REMAND this case to the regional
      office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

      FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                                Jennifer Everling
                                                Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.