Court Opinion

ID: 9379833
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-16 16:07:11.237469+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:01.420937
License: Public Domain

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :
 ROSALIO SUCHITE                          :
                                          :
                    Appellant             :   No. 1588 EDA 2022

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 6, 2022
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
           Criminal Division at No(s): CP-09-CR-0000028-2021

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., STABILE, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.:                       FILED MARCH 16, 2023

      Rosalio Suchite brings this appeal from the judgment of sentence

following his convictions for involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with a

child. He is attempting to reverse his designation as a Sexually Violent

Predator (“SVP”) and to obtain resentencing for his judgment of sentence that

he is alleging is excessive. We affirm.

      In 2019, Suchite and his wife traveled with their two young sons from

Guatemala to the United States. In May 2020, Suchite moved into a separate

residence, where both of his sons visited him until September 2020. The boys

disclosed that during the visits Suchite repeatedly sexually abused them.

Investigators were contacted and Suchite was arrested in November 2020. He

was charged with two counts each of Rape of a Child, Involuntary Deviate

Sexual Intercourse with a Child, Aggravated Indecent Assault of a Child,
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Aggravated Indecent Assault — Complainant is less than 13 years of age, and

Indecent Assault — Complainant is less than 13 years of age.

      On August 27, 2021, Suchite entered a counseled, open guilty plea to

two counts of Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse with a Child, and the

Commonwealth nolle prossed the remaining charges as part of the plea

agreement. The trial court ordered the preparation of a presentence

investigative report (“PSI”) and an assessment by the Pennsylvania Sexual

Offenders Assessment Board (“SOAB”) for a determination of whether Suchite

fits the criteria of an SVP.

      On April 6, 2022, the trial court conducted an SVP hearing and a

sentencing hearing. At the SVP portion of the hearing the Commonwealth

presented the report and detailed testimony of Kristen F. Dudley, Psy.D. (“Dr.

Dudley”), a licensed clinical psychologist and member of the SOAB since 2016.

Suchite presented testimony from Barry Zakireh, Ph.D., a licensed clinical

psychologist and former member of the SOAB. At the conclusion of the SVP

hearing, the court determined that the Commonwealth had met its burden of

proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that Suchite should be classified

as an SVP. Immediately after the trial court reached its SVP conclusion, the

court sentenced Suchite to serve an aggregate term of incarceration of

nineteen to forty years.

      Suchite filed a timely post-sentence motion seeking reconsideration of

his sentence. The trial court held a hearing and denied relief. This timely

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appeal followed. Both Suchite and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P.

1925. Suchite now presents issues challenging whether the Commonwealth

properly established that he is an SVP and whether the trial court abused its

discretion in fashioning his judgment of sentence.

      Suchite first argues the trial court erred in finding that he is an SVP.

See Appellant’s Brief at 15-22. Suchite contends the Commonwealth failed to

present clear and convincing evidence to support the finding. Suchite claims

Dr. Dudley’s testimony did not establish “that [Suchite] has an increased

likelihood   of   reoffense.”   Id.   at   19.   He   further   alleges   that   “[t]he

Commonwealth’s own expert concedes that, with the treatment which he is

required to receive as a condition of this sentence, [Suchite] will no longer be

likely to reoffend.” Id. at 20. We disagree.

      When considering the sufficiency of the evidence to support an SVP

designation, we apply the following standard of review:

      In order to affirm an SVP designation, we, as a reviewing court,
      must be able to conclude that the fact-finder found clear and
      convincing evidence that the individual is an SVP. As with any
      sufficiency of the evidence claim, we view all evidence and
      reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the
      Commonwealth. We will reverse a trial court’s determination of
      SVP status only if the Commonwealth has not presented clear and
      convincing evidence that each element of the statute has been
      satisfied.

Commonwealth v. Hollingshead, 111 A.3d 186, 189 (Pa. Super. 2015)

(citation and brackets omitted).

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       SORNA1 defines an SVP as an individual who has been convicted of one

of the enumerated offenses, and “who is determined to be a[n SVP] under

section 9799.24 (relating to assessments) due to a mental abnormality or

personality disorder that makes the individual likely to engage in predatory

sexually violent offenses.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.12. Further, an act is

considered “predatory” under SORNA if it is “directed at a stranger or at a

person with whom a relationship has been initiated, established, maintained

or promoted, in whole or in part, in order to facilitate or support victimization.”

Id.

       Section 9799.24(a) of SORNA provides that “a court shall order an

individual convicted of a sexually violent offense to be assessed by the

[SOAB].” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.24(a); see also id. § 9799.12 (defining

sexually violent offense). Following the entry of such an order, the SOAB is

responsible for conducting an assessment to determine whether the individual

should be classified as an SVP. Id. § 9799.24(b). The assessment must

consider the following fifteen factors:

       whether the instant offense involved multiple victims; whether the
       defendant exceeded the means necessary to achieve the offense;
       the nature of the sexual contact with the victim(s); the
       defendant’s relationship with the victim(s); the victim(s)’ age(s);
       whether the instant offense included a display of unusual cruelty
       by the defendant during the commission of the offense; the
       victim(s)’ mental capacity(ies); the defendant’s prior criminal
       record; whether the defendant completed any prior sentence(s);
____________________________________________

1SORNA stands for Pennsylvania’s Sex Offender Registration and Notification
Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.10-9799.41.

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      whether the defendant participated in available programs for
      sexual offenders; the defendant’s age; the defendant’s use of
      illegal drugs; whether the defendant suffers from a mental illness,
      mental     disability,  or    mental     abnormality;    behavioral
      characteristics that contribute to the defendant’s conduct; and any
      other factor reasonably related to the defendant’s risk of
      reoffending.

Hollingshead, 111 A.3d at 190 (citation omitted); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. §

9799.24(b)(1)-(4). After the SOAB completes its assessment, the trial court

holds a hearing to “determine whether the Commonwealth has proved by clear

and convincing evidence that the individual is a[n SVP].” Id. § 9799.24(e)(3).

      Here, the trial court stated that “the Commonwealth clearly and

convincingly met its burden of establishing that [Suchite] met the statutory

criteria to be classified as an SVP pursuant to Pennsylvania statutory and

decisional law.” Trial Court Opinion, 8/5/22, at 19. Our review of the record

agrees with this observation.

      During the SVP hearing, Dr. Dudley offered detailed testimony regarding

her assessment of Suchite. Addressing the initial seven factors, Dr. Dudley

noted that this matter involved multiple victims, Suchite did not exceed the

means necessary to achieve the offenses, the nature of the sexual contact

was sodomy to the point of ejaculation, the relationship between Suchite and

the victims was significant because he is their biological father, and the age

of the victims, 7 and 4 years old, is significant because they are too young to

engage in sexual activity with anyone. See N.T., 4/6/22, at 11-13. These five

assessment factors suggest an SVP classification. See id. at 19. The remaining

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two factors offer some mitigation as Dr. Dudley observed that there was no

unusual cruelty displayed during the commission of the crimes and, aside from

their ages, the victims were of normal mental capacity. See id. at 13.

      Dr. Dudley also addressed the three factors pertaining to Suchite’s prior

offense history. She noted that Suchite has no known criminal history. See

id. at 13-14. Regarding completion of prior sentences, Dr. Dudley observed

that because Suchite lacked a known criminal history, the completion of prior

sentences was not a relevant factor. See id. at 14. Dr. Dudley further stated

that, in relation to participation in sexual offender programs, “[b]ecause

[Suchite] has no criminal history and no criminal history of sexually offending,

there was no legal reason for him to have attended treatment of any kind.”

See id.

      The next four factors concern the characteristics of the individual being

assessed. Dr. Dudley offered testimony reflecting upon Suchite’s age of 28 at

the time of the report and its relevance because “literature suggests that

defendants under the age of 30 at the time of the arrest and conviction have

a statistically greater risk of reoffense compared to older defendants.” Id.

Also, one of the victims reported that Suchite smoked marijuana, but it is

unknown whether Suchite was using any illegal drugs at the time of the

offenses. See id. at 15. Further, Dr. Dudley discussed Suchite’s mental illness,

disability, or abnormality with a detailed explanation concerning how she

reached the diagnosis of Pedophilic Disorder, incest only. See id. at 15-17.

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Dr. Dudley also noted that, based on the information that she had it was

unknown what behavioral characteristic contributed to Suchite’s conduct. See

id. at 16. In addition, Dr. Dudley explained that, in reaching the diagnosis,

factors considered to be important included the age of the victims, the three-

year span over with the abuse occurred, the fact that Suchite warned the

victims not to tell anyone. See id. at 16-17.

      Finally, Dr. Dudley offered the following to support her opinion that there

is an increased risk of Suchite reoffending: “By virtue of the diagnosis of

Pedophilic Disorder, by virtue of having acted upon it, … he is at higher risk of

reoffending. There is hope that, … if he receives treatment that he will be able

to learn to manage his impulses, … control his deviate sexual impulses, but at

present there is no known cure and he remains a risk.” Id. at 18. Dr. Dudley’s

testimony, viewed as a whole, was sufficient to support a finding that Suchite

is an SVP.

      Nevertheless, Suchite highlights Dr. Dudley’s concession that, “with

treatment …, Suchite will no longer be likely to reoffend.” Appellant’s Brief at

20. However, that is a misrepresentation of the above-cited testimony offered

by Dr. Dudley. Rather, Dr. Dudley opined that “[t]here is hope” treatment

could assist Suchite in learning to “manage his impulses” and “control his

deviate sexual impulses.” Dr. Dudley’s “hope” is not a concession that

treatment will result in Suchite being no longer likely to reoffend.

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      In addition, Dr. Dudley offered an assessment concerning whether

Suchite demonstrated predatory behavior. She stated, “[Suchite] engaged in

anal sex with both of his biological children beginning when they were 5 and

4-years old, [respectively]. He sodomized them on many different occasions

when they would visit him at his home. He engaged in sexual activity with his

children – when [Suchite] engaged in sexual activity with his children, he

exploited his relationship with them in whole or in part for the purpose of his

own sexual gratification.” Id. at 19. As the trial court opined, “[Suchite’s]

actions toward his children unquestionably meet the definition of predatory

behavior for the purposes of 42 Pa.C.S. Section 9799.12.” Trial Court Opinion,

8/5/22, at 21. Consequently, Dr. Dudley ultimately offered her opinion that

Suchite “does meet [the] criteria to be classified as a[n SVP].” Id. at 19.

      Upon review, we conclude that the evidence presented at the SVP

hearing, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, supports

the trial court’s finding that Suchite should be classified as an SVP. See

Hollingshead, 111 A.3d at 189. As the trial court observed,

            Dr. Dudley provided clear and convincing testimony as to
      not only [Suchite’s] mental abnormality, but also as to the
      presence of predatory behavior. Her conclusions were wholly
      supported not only by the evidentiary record, but by common
      sense as well. Accordingly, [the trial court] found that the
      Commonwealth clearly and convincingly met its burden of
      establishing that [Suchite] suffers from a mental abnormality, and
      that he engaged in predatory behavior. [Suchite] therefore
      undeniably meets the criteria to be classified as an SVP pursuant
      to Pennsylvania statutory and decisional law.

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Trial Court Opinion, 8/5/22, at 22. We may not disturb the trial court’s

credibility determinations on appeal. See Commonwealth v. Blackham, 909

A.2d 315, 320 (Pa. Super. 2006) (stating that “[i]t is not for this Court to

overturn the credibility determinations of the fact-finder.”). Further, our

review confirms that Dr. Dudley’s testimony, which was credited by the trial

court, was sufficient to support her conclusion. Accordingly, we cannot grant

Suchite relief on this issue.

      Suchite last argues that the trial court erred in fashioning his sentence.

See Appellant’s Brief at 23-29. Suchite claims the trial court failed to consider

his rehabilitative needs, history and character, such as his troubled

upbringing, when it imposed a sentence that was excessive and unduly harsh.

See id. at 27. Further, he alleges that the court only relied upon the nature

of the offense and other improper factors, such as family incidents involving

behavior for which Suchite had never been charged. See id. at 27-29.

Accordingly, he asserts that the trial court failed to consider pertinent factors

in forming his sentence.

      Our standard of review is one of abuse of discretion. Sentencing is a

matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing judge, and a sentence

will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. See

Commonwealth v. Shugars, 895 A.2d 1270, 1275 (Pa. Super. 2006).

      It is well settled there is no absolute right to appeal the discretionary

aspects of a sentence. See Commonwealth v. Hartle, 894 A.2d 800, 805

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(Pa. Super. 2006). Rather, where an appellant challenges the discretionary

aspects of a sentence, the appeal should be considered a petition for allowance

of appeal. See Commonwealth v. W.H.M., 932 A.2d 155, 163 (Pa. Super.

2007).

      As we observed in Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162 (Pa.

Super. 2010):

      An appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence
      must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:

            We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1)
            whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal,
            see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was
            properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to
            reconsider and modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P.
            720; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal defect,
            Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a
            substantial question that the sentence appealed from
            is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42
            Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

Moury, 992 A.2d at 170 (citation and brackets omitted).

      Here, the first three requirements of the four-part test are met. Suchite

brought an appropriate appeal, filed a post-sentence motion, and included in

his appellate brief the necessary concise statement of the reasons relied upon

for allowance of appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). We next determine

whether he has raised a substantial question requiring us to review the

discretionary aspects of the sentence imposed.

      Whether a particular issue constitutes a substantial question about the

appropriateness of sentence is a question to be evaluated on a case-by-case

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basis. See Commonwealth v. Kenner, 784 A.2d 808, 811 (Pa. Super.

2001). As to what constitutes a substantial question, this Court does not

accept bald assertions of sentencing errors. See Commonwealth v.

Malovich, 903 A.2d 1247, 1252 (Pa. Super. 2006). Rather, an appellant must

show actions by the trial court inconsistent with the Sentencing Code or

contrary to the fundamental norms underlying the sentencing process. See

Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 893 A.2d 735, 737 (Pa. Super. 2006).

       In his Rule 2119(f) statement, Suchite argues the trial court abused its

discretion by failing to consider certain mitigating factors, including Suchite’s

family history, age and rehabilitative needs, when it imposed an unduly

excessive aggregate sentence. See Appellant’s Brief at 23-24. This Court has

held that an assertion that a sentence was excessive and that the trial court

failed to properly consider the factors set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b)2

raises a substantial question. See Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117 A.3d

763, 770 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc). See also Commonwealth v. Raven,

97 A.3d 1244, 1253 (Pa. Super. 2014) (stating that “an excessive sentence

claim—in conjunction with an assertion that the court failed to consider

mitigating factors—raises a substantial question”) (internal citation omitted).

____________________________________________

2 The factors to be considered under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b) include: the
protection of the public, gravity of offense in relation to impact on victim and
community, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
9721(b).

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We therefore grant permission to appeal and proceed to review the merits of

this issue of Suchite’s sentencing claim.

      In his brief, Suchite argues that the trial court “did not give any

consideration to the [Suchite’s] character, history or condition but focused

solely on the nature of the crimes.” Appellant’s Brief at 27. Specifically,

Suchite offers the following concerning his troubled history and upbringing:

      [Suchite] grew up in Guatemala where he had no formal education
      and was forced to work as a child. N.T. 4/6/22, p. 74-75.
      Throughout his testimony, [Suchite] repeatedly expressed
      remorse for his actions. [Suchite] is a young man with no prior
      criminal record. Id. at 77. Furthermore, [Suchite] presented
      testimony regarding his traumatic upbringing. He described a long
      history of childhood abuse and indicated that his stepfather
      abused both [Suchite] and his mother and ultimately tried to kill
      [Suchite]. (N.T. 4/6/22, p. 74).

Id. at 26. To further elaborate on his traumatic past, Suchite refers to his own

testimony at the sentencing hearing pertaining to witnessing his stepfather’s

killing at the hands of a gang. See id. at 27.

      Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing

judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse

of discretion. See Fullin, 892 A.2d at 847. In this context, an abuse of

discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. See id. Rather, an

appellant must establish by reference to the record that the sentencing court

ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality,

prejudice, bias, or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

See id.

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      The sentencing judge has broad discretion in determining the proper

penalty, and this Court accords the sentencing court great deference, as it is

the sentencing court that is in the best position to view a defendant’s

character, displays of remorse, defiance, or indifference and the overall effect

and nature of the crime. See Commonwealth v. Walls, 926 A.2d 957, 961

(Pa. 2007) (quotations and citations omitted). As we have stated, “a court is

required to consider the particular circumstances of the offense and the

character of the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Griffin, 804 A.2d 1, 10 (Pa.

Super. 2002) (citation omitted). “In particular, the court should refer to the

defendant’s prior criminal record, his age, personal characteristics and his

potential for rehabilitation.” Id. (citation omitted).

      In addition, “[o]ur Supreme Court has determined that where the trial

court is informed by a pre-sentence report, it is presumed that the court is

aware of all appropriate sentencing factors and considerations, and that where

the court has been so informed, its discretion should not be disturbed.”

Commonwealth v. Ventura, 975 A.2d 1128, 1133 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citing

Commonwealth v. Devers, 546 A.2d 12 (Pa. 1988)).

      Our review of the record reflects that, and it is undisputed that, at

Suchite’s sentencing, the trial court received and reviewed a presentence

report, considered argument from defense counsel, heard Suchite’s allocution,

and received argument from the Commonwealth. Prior to announcing the

judgment of sentence, the trial court detailed its reasoning for imposing the

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sentence, which included a thorough discussion of the relevant sentencing

factors and evinced an understanding of Suchite’s history and a full grasp of

the crimes related to these convictions. See N.T., 4/6/22, at 81-88. In

addition, the trial court stated the following at the hearing addressing

Suchite’s post-sentence motion: “I certainly gave great consideration to the

sentence before I imposed it, believe me, great consideration to it. And as I

stated on April 6th, I read the PSI report a number of times, I reviewed the

facts, and I gave great thought to all the factors [that] we, as a [c]ourt, are

required to balance when imposing sentence. It’s very rare that I’ve imposed

anything close to a maximum sentence, truthfully, but it was appropriate in

this case, unfortunately.” N.T., 5/19/22, at 12.

      In its written opinion, the trial court offered the following summation to

support the sentence imposed:

            The notes of testimony from [Suchite’s] Sentencing Hearing
      and Reconsideration Hearing demonstrate that this [c]ourt
      considered all relevant factors during sentencing, and
      appropriately fashioned a balanced sentence based on those
      factors.14 While we recognize that [Suchite] arguably exhibited
      some degree of remorse for his actions and acknowledged that his
      actions affected his children, this alone failed to substantially
      ameliorate many of the other, more pertinent factors presented
      for this Court’s consideration. Simply stated, [Suchite] took
      advantage of his own young vulnerable children and violently
      sexually abused them for his own gratification while knowing it
      was wrong to do so.

            14 As described in the recent Superior Court decision
            in Commonwealth. v. Velez, 273 A.3d 6 (Pa. Super.
            2022), we did not solely consider the severity of the
            crimes. We evaluated a variety of mitigating and other

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            sentencing       factors,       including   [Suchites’s]
            rehabilitative needs.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/5/22, at 14-15.

      We conclude the reasons the trial court offered for the sentence imposed

were more than sufficient to conclude that the court properly considered all

relevant factors in fashioning Suchite’s sentence. Also, because the trial court

had been fully informed and relied upon the presentence report, we conclude

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in creating the instant sentence.

Ventura, 975 A.2d at 1133. Accordingly, Suchite’s claim that the trial court

failed to consider the appropriate factors in imposing the sentence lacks merit.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/16/2023

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