Court Opinion

ID: 9406392
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-30 20:04:07.680665+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:30.477328
License: Public Domain

Filed 6/30/23 P. v. Behnke CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 THE PEOPLE,                                                          D080808

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.                                                         (Super. Ct. No. SCD183245)

 SCOTT RAYMOND BEHNKE,

           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Peter C. Deddeh, Judge. Reversed; remanded with directions.
         Theresa Osterman Stevenson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A.
Sevidal and Christopher P. Beesley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
      In 2006, a jury convicted Scott Raymond Behnke of first degree murder

(Pen. Code,1 § 187, subd. (a)) and found true that he used a knife in the
commission of that crime (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). The court sentenced Behnke
to prison for 25 years to life for the murder conviction plus an additional year
for the knife enhancement.
      We affirmed the judgment in an unpublished opinion. (See People v.
Behnke (Mar. 14, 2008, D049282).)
      In 2019, the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (CDCR) sent the superior court a letter noting Behnke’s
commendable behavior and accomplishments in prison. The Secretary
recommended that the court recall Behnke’s sentence and resentence Behnke
to a lesser term under section 1172.1.
      Following briefing from the parties, the superior court declined to
resentence Behnke, explaining that absent the prosecution’s assent, it lacked
discretion to reduce the first degree murder conviction and impose a lesser
sentence.
      Behnke appeals, arguing the superior court erred (1) in determining
that a “blanket exclusion” exists under section 1172.1 prohibiting a court
from resentencing a person convicted of murder upon receiving a CDCR
recommendation for resentencing and (2) failing to consider whether the
enhancement could be stricken. We agree that the court had the discretion to
strike the enhancement and resentence Behnke accordingly. Further, it does
not appear on the record that the court properly considered this option. As
such, we remand this matter to allow the superior court to consider the
CDCR’s recommendation and whether the enhancement should be stricken.
Further, we agree with the parties that the superior court was correct that it

1     Statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
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could not change Behnke’s first degree murder conviction to a lesser included
offense without the prosecution’s consent. As such, on remand, the superior
court is only to consider striking the enhancement and then resentencing
Behnke if necessary.
              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      The underlying facts of Behnke’s murder conviction are not relevant to
the issues before us. Suffice it to say, Behnke strangled and stabbed the
victim with a knife.
      On August 22, 2019, the Secretary of the CDCR sent the superior court
a recommendation to recall Behnke’s sentence pursuant to section 1172.1.
The recommendation enclosed a cumulative case summary and evaluation
report, identifying factors that supported the CDCR’s recommendation for
recall of Behnke’s commitment and resentencing. Specifically, the
recommendation detailed that Behnke had not received any serious
disciplinaries since February 2007, completed Masonry Level I through III,
and was active in Artis in Corrections. Behnke also provided assistance to
at-risk youth and participated in multiple self-help classes.
      The superior court appointed counsel to represent Behnke and set the
matter for hearing. Behnke thereafter retained counsel, who filed a
memorandum of points and authorities in support of resentencing as well as
numerous documents in support thereof. Behnke requested his judgment be
modified to second degree murder or voluntary manslaughter.
      The prosecution opposed both the Secretary’s recommendation and
Behnke’s request for modification of the jury verdict. In addition to arguing
that Behnke’s rehabilitation and circumstances did not warrant recall and
resentencing, the prosecution maintained that the superior court had no

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authority to reduce Behnke’s conviction and that the knife enhancement
should not be stricken.
      On July 28, 2022, the superior court denied Behnke’s request for
modification of his conviction. To this end, the court determined it did not
have authority to reduce Behnke’s conviction for first degree murder without
the prosecution’s consent. It does not appear in the record that the court
considered its discretion to strike the enhancement.
      Behnke timely appealed the order.
                                 DISCUSSION

      Section 1172.1 (formerly section 1170.03)2 provides a procedure by
which a court may “at any time upon the recommendation of the secretary or
the Board of Parole Hearings in the case of a defendant incarcerated in state
prison . . . recall the sentence and commitment previously ordered and
resentence the defendant in the same manner as if they had not previously
been sentenced, whether or not the defendant is still in custody, and provided
the new sentence, if any, is no greater than the initial sentence.” (§ 1172.1,
subd. (a)(1).) “The CDCR recommendation furnishes the court with
jurisdiction it would not otherwise have to recall and resentence and is ‘an

2      Assembly Bill No. 1540 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) moved the recall and
resentencing provisions of former section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) to
section 1170.03, effective January 1, 2022. (Stats. 2021, ch. 719, § 2.) It also
clarified many of the required procedures under this section. (See People v.
McMurray (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1035, 1041 (McMurray) [“[T]he Legislature
repeatedly indicated that Assembly Bill No. 1540 was intended to ‘make
clarifying changes’ to former section 1170(d)(1), including specifying the
required procedure and guidelines when the CDCR recommends recall and
resentencing”].) Assembly Bill No. 200 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) then
renumbered section 1170.03 to section 1172.1, effective June 30, 2022, but
made no substantive changes. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 9.) For the sake of
clarity and consistency, we refer to section 1172.1 when addressing the
statute governing the petition for resentencing.
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invitation to the court to exercise its equitable jurisdiction.’ ” (McMurray,
supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 1040.)
      This section provides, where a resentencing request is made, there is
now a presumption in favor of recall and resentencing of the defendant,
“ ‘which may only be overcome if a court finds the defendant is an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety,’ ” as defined in subdivision (c) of
section 1170.18. (McMurray, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 1040; accord
§ 1172.1, subd. (b)(2).) Additionally, “[w]here, as here, the CDCR
recommends recall and resentencing, the court is also now required to hold a
hearing (unless the parties otherwise stipulate), state on the record its
reasons for its decision, provide notice to the defendant, and appoint counsel
for the defendant.” (McMurray, at p. 1040; accord § 1172.1,
subds. (a)(6)-(8), (b)(1).) Furthermore, when recalling and resentencing
pursuant to its provisions, the court “shall . . . apply any changes in law that
reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(2);
McMurray, at p. 1040; People v. Pierce (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1074, 1078.)
      The jury convicted Behnke of first degree murder. Below, per
section 1172.1, Behnke requested that the superior court vacate the judgment
against him and impose judgment on either second degree murder or
voluntary manslaughter, either of which would have reduced Behnke’s
sentence. The court had the discretion to take such action only if the
prosecution agreed. (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(3)(B).) However, it is undisputed
that the prosecution did not concur with Behnke’s request. Thus, the court
could not alter Behnke’s first degree murder conviction. (Ibid.) And Behnke
makes clear that he is not challenging the superior court’s denial to vacate
his judgment and impose judgment on a lesser included offense here.

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      Rather, Behnke argues the superior court erred in failing to consider
the CDCR’s recall and resentencing recommendation regarding the
enhancement under section 12022, subdivision (b)(1). The People concede
that the superior court could have done so but argue Behnke forfeited this
claim because he did not ask the trial court to strike the enhancement or
draw the court’s attention to it during the hearing. (See People v.
McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, 593.)
      On the record before us, we do not find forfeiture. During the hearing,
it was clear that the superior court believed it could not resentence Behnke.
The court noted:
         “In this particular case, the jury rendered a verdict. The
         verdict was first degree murder. It was supported by the
         evidence. And there’s—I don’t think this statute authorizes
         me to adjust the jury’s verdict. I think the statute really
         speaks more to if he had been convicted of a gang allegation
         or convicted of some other—some drug allegation, a drug
         case or something that this statute is trying to address that
         and not address the situation where we have here where he
         got convicted of first degree murder.”

In addition, the parties focused on this issue during the hearing.
      Considering the focus of the hearing and the court’s conclusion that it
lacked authority to resentence Behnke absent the prosecution’s consent, we
agree with Behnke that it would have been futile for his counsel to argue that
the enhancement should be stricken. (See People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th
228, 237 [failure to raise issue at trial excused where it would be futile to do
so]; People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 92 [same].) Moreover, the issue of
striking the enhancement was clearly before the court. Indeed, in its
opposition, the prosecution explicitly argued that the court should not strike
the enhancement.

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      In short, the parties agree that the court had discretion, under
section 1172.1, to consider striking the knife enhancement. There is no
indication in the record that the superior court realized that it had such
discretion. “A failure to exercise discretion also may constitute an abuse of
discretion.” (People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 847-848.)
Accordingly, this matter must be remanded to allow the court to exercise its
discretion and determine whether the enhancement under section 12022,
subdivision (b)(1) should be stricken and Behnke resentenced accordingly.
                                DISPOSITION
      The order is reversed. We remand this matter to the superior court to
consider whether it should strike the knife enhancement and resentence
Behnke accordingly.

                                                                 HUFFMAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

IRION, J.

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