Court Opinion

ID: 9889434
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-10 14:13:05.031858+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:35:33.054448
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
PUBLISHED

            Present: Judges Beales, Causey and Senior Judge Haley
            Argued at Richmond, Virginia

            HUGH CAMERON GREEN
                                                                               OPINION BY
            v.     Record No. 0643-22-2                                 JUDGE RANDOLPH A. BEALES
                                                                            OCTOBER 10, 2023
            COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                            FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SPOTSYLVANIA COUNTY
                                           Ricardo Rigual, Judge

                           (William F. Neely, on brief), for appellant. Appellant submitting on
                           brief.

                           Liam A. Curry, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares,
                           Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

                   Following a jury trial, Hugh Cameron Green (along with his co-defendants Jamal Kelvin

            Bailey and Montel Jaleek Wilson) was convicted of three counts of first-degree murder, three

            counts of abduction with the intent to extort money, three counts of child abuse or neglect, three

            counts of child endangerment or cruelty, one count of robbery, one count of conspiracy to

            commit robbery, and one count of conspiracy to commit abduction with the intent to extort

            money.1 On appeal, Green argues that the evidence was insufficient to uphold each conviction.

            Green also argues that the “trial Judge erred when he denied Green’s post-trial motion to Release

            the Restricted Dissemination Discovery Materials.”

                   1
                    Bailey and Wilson also appealed from their convictions. See Bailey v. Commonwealth,
            No. 0676-22-2 and Wilson v. Commonwealth, No. 0780-22-2, both decided this day.
                                          I. BACKGROUND

         “In accordance with familiar principles of appellate review, the facts will be stated in the

light most favorable to the Commonwealth, [as] the prevailing party at trial.” Scott v.

Commonwealth, 292 Va. 380, 381 (2016). In doing so, the Supreme Court has stated that we

must “discard the evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth, and regard

as true all the credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences to be

drawn therefrom.” Parks v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 492, 498 (1980) (quoting Wright v.

Commonwealth, 196 Va. 132, 137 (1954)).

         Hugh Green, Jamal Bailey, Montel Wilson, Durward Allen, and James Myers were all

engaged together in drug dealing in the Philadelphia area in 2019.2 Myers testified at trial that

Wilson recruited the four other men to travel from Philadelphia down to the Fredericksburg area

as a group to rob Michael Coleman for “Cash and coke.” Wilson is Coleman’s nephew, and

Wilson testified that Coleman often supplied him with cocaine. Wilson’s text messages from

March 2019 indicate a plan to rob someone in Virginia for at least two kilograms of cocaine.3

Myers stated that Wilson spoke with him in May 2019 about “trying to set him [Coleman] up

. . . to rob.” Myers testified that Wilson planned to set up a fake deal with Coleman to purchase

cocaine and the rest of the group would then rob Coleman while the supposed deal was taking

place.

         2
          Myers entered a plea agreement with the Commonwealth where he agreed to plead
guilty to second-degree felony murder and to conspiracy to commit robbery. Myers also agreed
to testify against his accomplices. Under the plea agreement, Myers was to be sentenced to
between twenty-four years and four months and thirty-two years and five months of active
imprisonment for his two convictions.
         3
          Philadelphia Police Officer Jason Seigafuse, an expert in the distribution of narcotics,
testified that half a kilogram of cocaine had a value of about $16,500 in Philadelphia in 2019.
                                                 -2-
       The group planned to drive from Philadelphia to a hotel in Fredericksburg on Saturday,

May 25, 2019, and then rob Coleman the next day. Wilson’s girlfriend rented a van in which

Myers, Wilson, and Bailey were to ride, while Allen and Green rode in the Nissan Altima owned

by Allen’s girlfriend. Allen’s text messages from the morning of May 25, 2019, show that Allen

added a “real dark” tint to the windows of the Altima that same morning.

       Cell phone data for each member of the group shows that the five men left Philadelphia at

around 9:50 a.m. on Saturday, May 25, 2019. The group arrived at a hotel in Fredericksburg

where Bailey rented two rooms under his name. Myers testified that, later that evening, the men

“[m]ade a test run . . . [t]o the Coleman house” so that they could “[s]ee how fast you can get

there.” The group then went to a Walmart to buy dark clothing.

       Myers testified that the group went back to Walmart on Sunday, May 26, 2019, to “get

some gloves.” Wilson spoke with Coleman over the phone to plan where the two would meet for

the “deal.” Coleman told Wilson that the two men could meet at Coleman’s home. All five

members of the group then drove toward Coleman’s home using both the rented van and the

Altima. Before the group arrived at Coleman’s home, both vehicles pulled off into a driveway so

that Wilson, Green, Myers, and Bailey could all get into the Altima together. Allen drove off

with the van, while the other four men went to Coleman’s home riding in the Altima. Myers

testified that the four men rode in the Altima because “you can’t see in the car” and because

Coleman “thought he [Wilson] was by himself.”

       The group’s cell phone data shows that they arrived at Coleman’s home at around

12:17 p.m. on Sunday, May 26, 2019. Myers testified that, when the group arrived at Coleman’s

home, Wilson “[w]ent in the house first, went in there, talked to him [Coleman], came back out

and told him [Coleman] he had to come outside to get the money.” Myers acknowledged that the

group did not bring any money for the supposed deal. Wilson instead grabbed a black bag and a

                                               -3-
gun from the car, and Bailey, Myers, and Green then followed Wilson into Coleman’s home.

Myers, Green, and Bailey all wore a mask to cover their faces, but Wilson did not wear a mask.

        Myers testified that when he first entered the house, he saw Wilson already holding a gun

on Coleman. Myers also saw Bailey holding a gun in front of Coleman’s girlfriend, Rachel

Ozuna, the couple’s seventeen-month-old son, and the couple’s one-month-old daughter. Myers

testified that Wilson was asking Coleman “where the money at, where the drugs at.” While

Wilson was searching for money and drugs, Green and Myers tied up Ozuna and Coleman using

a cord that they found inside the house. Wilson found some of Coleman’s money and drugs

inside the home.

        Myers testified that he then discovered Ozuna’s fourteen-year-old son K.O.4 playing

video games in his bedroom. K.O.’s friend, C.H., testified that the two friends were talking to

each other online while they were playing the video game together remotely at around

12:30 p.m. on Sunday, May 26, 2019, when C.H. heard that someone had “walked in and was

like get off, get off right now, and like yelling at him [K.O.] to get off.” C.H. testified that he

never heard from K.O. again. K.O.’s cell phone data showed that he sent his last text message at

12:49 p.m. on May 26, 2019. Myers testified that he saw K.O. playing a video game, and Myers

told K.O. “to come out, sit on the couch with his mom.” Myers then tied K.O.’s hands together.

        Myers testified that Green then pulled out a knife and grabbed hold of Coleman. After

Green took hold of Coleman, Myers and Bailey went outside to search through Coleman’s

vehicles. Myers testified that Bailey took a bag of money from one of Coleman’s vehicles.

Myers and Bailey then entered the home, and Myers testified that he saw Coleman bleeding on

the floor.

        4
            We use the initials of those people who are minors in an attempt to protect their privacy.
                                                  -4-
       Myers further testified that Green had slit Coleman’s throat and that Green also slit

Ozuna’s throat. Coleman’s body was left in the kitchen area of the home while Ozuna’s body

was left in a back bedroom. Myers also testified that, after K.O.’s mother and Coleman were

killed, Wilson then directed both Myers and Green to kill the fourteen-year-old K.O. because

K.O. had seen Wilson’s unmasked face. Both Green and Myers refused to kill K.O., and Myers

testified that he told Wilson, “I ain’t killing no kid, man.” Myers, however, stated that “Mal

[Bailey] just went to Cam [Green], snatched the knife out of his hand and went in the bathroom

and slit [K.O.’s] throat.”

       The group collected money, drugs, and a firearm that they found inside Coleman’s home.

They then exited Coleman’s home and left both the seventeen-month-old child and the

one-month-old infant alive but unattended inside the house with the bodies of their parents and

older half-brother. The group took Coleman’s cell phones with them but threw K.O.’s cell phone

and Ozuna’s cell phone into the front yard of the Coleman residence. Cell phone data showed

that the group left Coleman’s home at around 1:20 p.m. and they returned to Philadelphia at

about 5:00 p.m. Myers testified that he received a couple ounces of cocaine and ten thousand

dollars as a result of the murders and robbery.5

       Ben Jimenez, K.O.’s father, testified that he tried to contact K.O. on Tuesday, May 28,

2019, but K.O. did not respond to his father. Jimenez also tried to contact Ozuna, but she did not

respond either. On the morning of Wednesday, May 29, 2019, Jimenez drove over to Coleman’s

home to check on his son K.O. When Jimenez walked in the house through the unlocked door,

he saw Coleman lying in a pool of blood with his hands and feet tied together. Jimenez then saw

       5
          Detective Jesse Hanrahan of the Spotsylvania County Sheriff’s Office discovered that
Wilson took a photograph of a black bag full of money on May 28, 2019. Detective Hanrahan
also testified that Wilson contacted Coleman 111 times in the three days leading up to the
murders, but Wilson did not contact Coleman at all after the murders took place.
                                              -5-
K.O. on the floor of the bathroom in the same state as Coleman – with his son’s hands and feet

tied together and lying in a pool of his own blood.

       Jimenez frantically called 911, and law enforcement soon arrived. Sergeant Brian Seay

of the Spotsylvania County Sheriff’s Office first entered Coleman’s home. Sergeant Seay’s body

camera footage shows that he saw Coleman’s and K.O.’s bodies exactly as Jimenez had

described, and Sergeant Seay then also found Ozuna’s body in a child’s nursery. Ozuna’s throat

was also slit, and her hands and feet were likewise bound together with a cord. Ozuna also had a

belt wrapped around her neck. Sergeant Seay’s body camera footage shows the

seventeen-month-old child crawling around near his mother Rachel Ozuna’s deceased body.

Sergeant Seay then carried the seventeen-month-old child out of the nursery, and he went into

another room where he saw the one-month-old infant sitting in an infant’s rocking swing.

Sergeant Seay carried both children out of the home, and the children were taken to the hospital.

Forensic nurse Monika Kral-Dunning testified that she looked after the children at the hospital.

Both children were dehydrated, had “horrible diaper rash,” and had inflammation and swelling

around their genitals when they first arrived at the hospital. Kral-Dunning testified that these

symptoms indicated that the children had been unattended for multiple days.

       The police investigation of the murders eventually led them to Myers, who was

incarcerated in Pennsylvania. Detective Jesse Hanrahan of the Spotsylvania County Sheriff’s

Office testified that he spoke with Myers in February and March 2020. Myers initially denied

any involvement with the murders and robbery. However, Myers soon admitted to Detective

Hanrahan that he and the other members of the group were responsible for the murders of K.O.,

Coleman, and Ozuna. Myers also told Detective Hanrahan that he was concerned about

cooperating with law enforcement in this case, given that his cooperation could put the safety of

his own family at risk – specifically, the safety of his wife and daughter. Myers then testified at

                                                -6-
trial that his wife, who had been ill, had passed away before trial began, but Myers

acknowledged at trial that he tried to get his daughter into the witness protection program.

Furthermore, Myers acknowledged that Wilson “had connections to” Myers’s daughter.

       Green, Bailey, Wilson, Allen, and Myers were soon charged with multiple offenses

relating to the murders. Prior to Green’s trial, both counsel for Green and the Commonwealth’s

Attorney jointly moved the trial court to enter a discovery order pursuant to the newly amended

Rule 3A:11(c) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia. According to the trial court’s

order, the Commonwealth could designate a significant amount of material as “Restricted

Dissemination Material.” Any material designated as restricted dissemination material would be

sealed. As a result of this order, Green could view the restricted dissemination materials while

preparing for trial and during his trial, but Green would be prohibited from keeping a copy of any

of the restricted dissemination materials. The trial court entered the requested order, and the

Commonwealth designated a significant amount of material as restricted dissemination material.6

       Green, Bailey, and Wilson were jointly tried together as co-defendants in a jury trial and

convicted. Prior to Green’s sentencing hearing, counsel for Green filed a “Motion to Release to

Defendant Restricted Dissemination Discovery Materials,” where he argued that the trial court

should “grant him full access to all Discovery materials in this case so that counsel may then

provide him a copy of his file.” At the sentencing hearing, counsel for Green argued:

               [H]e’s [Green] asked for a copy of his entire file, which on its face
               violates the restricted dissemination rule, discovery rule which
               requires us to return all that material back to the Court within
               twenty-one days after the Court’s order is entered.

       6
           The record does not specify exactly what pieces of evidence are designated as restricted
dissemination material. However, at the sentencing hearing, the Commonwealth’s attorney
indicated that the material “comprises about of [sic] five hundred gigabytes of data” and “[i]t
includes witness information, information gleaned from confidential sources, local and federal as
well, it includes names, addresses for all those people, it includes victim information, it includes
confidential law enforcement techniques that were used, it includes ongoing federal investigation
information, and it is a mass of information.”
                                                 -7-
                       But as I point out, Rule 1:4 of the Virginia Rules of
               Professional Conduct for attorneys require defense counsel to fully
               communicate with their clients, and at least implicitly in that rule
               it’s understood that when a client asks for a copy of his file he’s
               given one.

       The trial court denied Green’s motion and reasoned that “the Court finds that no good

cause has been shown for the removal of everything that’s been designated given the voluminous

nature of it.” The trial judge went on to state, “If there comes a time during the course of these

appellate processes or other proceedings that someone has a specific request to release specific

material, then the Court will consider it.” Green now appeals to this Court.

                                           II. ANALYSIS

                              A. Restricted Dissemination Material

       In his first assignment of error, Green argues that the “trial Judge erred when he denied

Green’s post-trial motion to Release the Restricted Dissemination Discovery Materials.”

       Effective July 1, 2020, the Supreme Court amended Rule 3A:11 to allow the

Commonwealth to “designate evidence or material disclosed pursuant to this Rule as ‘Restricted

Dissemination Material’” prior to a defendant’s trial.7 Rule 3A:11(c)(2). When the accused’s

attorney agrees with the Commonwealth’s Attorney that material should be designated as

restricted dissemination material (as was done in this case), then the Commonwealth may

designate any material as restricted dissemination material “without supporting certification.”

Rule 3A:11(c)(2)(A). The Commonwealth may also designate material as restricted

dissemination material without an agreement by the accused’s attorney by:

               [S]tamping or otherwise marking it as such and providing a
               certification in writing, upon information and belief, that: (i) the
               designated material relates to the statement of a child victim or

       7
        The current version of Rule 3A:11 (effective March 1, 2021) was amended “to clarify
the meaning of the word ‘shall’ formerly appearing in th[is] Rule[] and not to change existing
law.” The March 1, 2021 version of Rule 3A:11(c)(2)(C) and Rule 3A:11(c)(2)(E) replaced the
word “shall” with the word “must.”
                                             -8-
               witness; or (ii) disclosure of the designated material may result in
               danger to the safety or security of a witness or victim, danger of a
               witness being intimidated or tampered with, or a risk of
               compromising an ongoing criminal investigation or confidential
               law enforcement technique.

Rule 3A:11(c)(2)(B).

       Once material is designated as restricted dissemination material, it “may only be

disclosed to the accused’s attorney, the agents or employees of the accused’s attorney, or to an

expert witness.” Rule 3A:11(c)(2)(C). “The accused’s attorney may orally communicate the

content of ‘Restricted Dissemination Material’ to the accused or allow the accused to view the

content of such material but must not provide the accused with copies of material so designated.”

Id. “Within 21 days of the entry of a final order by the trial court, or upon the termination of the

representation of the accused, the accused’s attorney must return to the court all originals and

copies of any ‘Restricted Dissemination Material’ disclosed pursuant to this Rule.” Rule

3A:11(c)(2)(E). Once the accused’s attorney returns the restricted dissemination material to the

trial court, “[t]he court must maintain such returned ‘Restricted Dissemination Material’ under

seal.” Id. However, “[a]ny material sealed pursuant to this subpart must remain available for

inspection by counsel of record.” Id. “For good cause shown, the court may enter an order

allowing additional access to the sealed material as the court in its discretion deems appropriate.”

Id.

       Before trial in this case, counsel for Green and the Commonwealth’s Attorney both

agreed to enter a joint restricted dissemination material order pursuant to Rule 3A:11(c)(2)(A).

After trial, Green asked the trial court to remove the restricted dissemination material designation

on the contents of the materials or documents that had been designated as restricted

dissemination materials from the trial court’s previous order. The trial court denied Green’s

motion and found that Green had failed to show good cause for removing the restricted

                                                -9-
dissemination material designation from all of the materials so designated. See Rule

3A:11(c)(2)(E). In general, “[a] lower court’s interpretation of the Rules of th[e Supreme] Court,

like its interpretation of a statute, presents a question of law that we review de novo.” LaCava v.

Commonwealth, 283 Va. 465, 469-70 (2012). However, the relevant inquiry in this case

concerns whether the trial court erred when it found that Green failed to show good cause to

have the restricted dissemination material designation removed from all of the material so

designated. The Supreme Court has previously analyzed similar language, and it has held that

“[a] good cause determination invests a trial court with discretion.” AME Fin. Corp. v. Kiritsis,

281 Va. 384, 392 (2011) (interpreting Rule 3:19(b)); Stephens v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 157,

162 (2007) (“[W]e are of opinion that the good cause requirement reflects a legislative intent to

invest circuit courts with discretion . . . .”). In addition, “the use of the word ‘may,’ as opposed

to ‘shall,’ in [Rule 3A:11(c)(2)(E)] evidences that even after a defendant shows good cause, a

trial court has discretion to grant or refuse the defendant’s motion . . . .” Kiritsis, 281 Va. at 392.

Consequently, we review the trial court’s interpretation of Rule 3A:11(c) de novo, and we review

the trial court’s “good cause determination” under Rule 3A:11(c)(2)(E) under an abuse of

discretion standard of review.

       As the moving party below, Green was required to show to the trial court good cause for

why the restricted dissemination material designation should have been lifted. Cf. Rakes v.

Fulcher, 210 Va. 542, 545-46 (1970) (moving party must show good cause to obtain documents

in pre-trial discovery request). Green alleges that the restricted dissemination material order

would force counsel for Green to violate Rule 1.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct because

counsel for Green would be unable to give Green his entire case file once the representation

terminated.

                                                - 10 -
        In general, when a lawyer terminates his representation of a client, the lawyer is required

to give to the client all documents in the lawyer’s possession that the lawyer obtained throughout

the course of the representation. See Rule 1.16(e) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

However, this general rule still has its limitations. See Comment 11 of Rule 1.16 of the Rules of

Professional Conduct. Relevant to this appeal, Rule 1.4(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct

states (in relevant part), “A lawyer shall inform the client of facts pertinent to the matter and of

communications from another party that may significantly affect settlement or resolution of the

matter.” Comment 7 of Rule 1.4 specifies, however, that “[r]ules or court orders governing

litigation may provide that information supplied to a lawyer may not be disclosed to the client.

Rule 3.4(d) directs compliance with such rules or orders.” (Emphasis added).

        Given the plain reading of Comment 7 of Rule 1.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct,

counsel for Green simply would not violate Rule 1.4 by following the direction of the trial

court’s order on restricted dissemination material that was governed by and entered pursuant to

Rule 3A:11. Notably, Rule 3A:11(c)(2)(C) expressly prohibits counsel for Green from providing

Green with any copy of the restricted dissemination material. In addition, Rule 3A:11(c)(2)(E)

states, “Within 21 days of the entry of a final order by the trial court, . . . the accused’s attorney

must return to the court all originals and copies of any ‘Restricted Dissemination Material.’”8

Given that Rule 3A:11(c)(2)(C) and Rule 3A:11(c)(2)(E) and the trial court’s order provide that

counsel for Green must not give Green any copy of the restricted dissemination materials and

that counsel for Green must return all pieces of restricted dissemination material back to the trial

court after the final order is entered, counsel for Green simply would not violate Rule 1.4 of the

Rules of Professional Conduct by withholding the material designated as “Restricted

        The trial court’s order uses the language from the July 1, 2020 version of Rule 3A:11
        8

which included the word “shall.” The March 1, 2021 version of Rule 3A:11(c)(2)(C) and Rule
3A:11(c)(2)(E) has replaced the word “shall” with the word “must.”
                                              - 11 -
Dissemination Material” from Green. Consequently, Green has simply not shown good cause

for requiring the removal of the restricted dissemination material designation on this basis.

       Furthermore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Green’s motion, given

the ongoing risk to the safety of Myers’s family – and the possibility of disrupting ongoing

investigations in other jurisdictions. Indeed, the recent amendments to Rule 3A:11(c) certainly

make clear that the Supreme Court has intended to provide the Commonwealth the opportunity

to develop evidence in a case without compromising the safety of potential witnesses or their

families or without compromising separate criminal investigations. Under Rule

3A:11(c)(2)(B)(ii), when the Commonwealth designates evidence as restricted dissemination

material without the agreement of the accused’s counsel, the Commonwealth must certify that

the “disclosure of the designated material may result in danger to the safety or security of a

witness or victim, danger of a witness being intimidated or tampered with, or a risk of

compromising an ongoing criminal investigation or confidential law enforcement technique.”

Although the Commonwealth is not required to provide such certification when the accused’s

attorney agrees to designate evidence as restricted dissemination material, the Commonwealth

and the accused’s attorney may still choose to designate the material for the same reasons that

are outlined in Rule 3A:11(c)(2)(B)(ii). In fact, the Commonwealth and the accused’s attorney

may even elect to designate evidence as restricted dissemination material for a wider range of

reasons, such as evidence involving issues of national security.

       In this case, the record clearly shows that Myers expressed significant concerns about

cooperating with law enforcement because he believed that the safety of his family (especially

his daughter) would be put at risk if he assisted in the investigation and prosecution. Indeed,

nothing in the record suggests that the safety of Myers’s daughter and family is no longer at risk

now that Green’s trial has finished. Instead, Myers’s testimony suggests that his daughter’s life

                                               - 12 -
is actually still in danger, given that Wilson “had connections to” Myers’s daughter and the fact

that protections have been put in place to provide her with safety. Consequently, given the

ongoing risk to the safety of Myers’s daughter and family and given Rule 3A:11(c)’s clear intent

to protect the safety of witnesses and their families, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

denying Green’s request to lift the designation of “Restricted Dissemination Material” for all of

those documents so designated for Green’s trial.

                                   B. Sufficiency of the Evidence

        Green also argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions for three

counts of first-degree murder, three counts of abduction with the intent to extort money, three

counts of child abuse or neglect, three counts of child endangerment or cruelty, one count of

robbery, one count of conspiracy to commit robbery, and one count of conspiracy to commit

abduction with the intent to extort money. On appeal, Green argues that

                the only solid proof that Green and his co-defendants robbed or
                harmed the Coleman family came from the testimony of
                co-defendant James Myers. Green contends that Myers’ testimony
                was wholly incredible as a matter of law and that the trial judge
                therefore erred in failing to grant Green’s motion to set aside his
                convictions.

        “When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘[t]he judgment of the trial court is

presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is “plainly wrong or without evidence to

support it.”’” Secret v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 204, 228 (2018) (quoting Pijor v.

Commonwealth, 294 Va. 502, 512 (2017)). “In such cases, ‘[t]he Court does not ask itself

whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’”

Id. (quoting Pijor, 294 Va. at 512). “Rather, the relevant question is whether ‘any rational trier

of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’”

Williams v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 190, 193 (2009) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.

307, 319 (1979)).
                                                 - 13 -
       The Supreme Court has often stated, “the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be

given to their testimony are questions exclusively for the jury.” Johnson v. Commonwealth, 224

Va. 525, 528 (1982). This Court will only disturb a jury’s credibility determination when the

witness’s “testimony is inherently incredible.” Juniper v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 362, 415

(quoting Walker v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 54, 71 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1125 (2000)),

cert. denied, 549 U.S. 960 (2006). “To be ‘incredible,’ testimony ‘must be either so manifestly

false that reasonable men ought not to believe it, or it must be shown to be false by objects or

things as to the existence and meaning of which reasonable men should not differ.’” Id. (quoting

Cardwell v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 412, 414 (1968)). In addition, the Supreme Court has also

articulated that “[i]t is well settled in Virginia that an accused may be convicted upon the

uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.” Johnson, 224 Va. at 527; see also Yates v.

Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 140, 144-45 (1987) (holding that an accomplice who testified

pursuant to a plea agreement was not inherently incredible).

       In this case, Myers testified that he participated in Wilson’s plan to drive from

Philadelphia to Fredericksburg to rob Michael Coleman for “Cash and coke” and that this plan

led to the abduction and murders of Coleman, Ozuna, and K.O. – and the abandonment of

Coleman’s and Ozuna’s toddler and infant, who were left behind with their older brother’s and

parents’ dead bodies. Myers unequivocally testified that Green was one of the five members of

the group who all took part in executing Wilson’s plan. Myers testified that he helped Green tie

up Coleman and Ozuna when the group first entered Coleman’s home. Myers also testified that

Green murdered both Coleman and Ozuna by slitting their throats.

       The record before this Court on appeal overwhelmingly supports the jury’s implicit

finding that Myers’s testimony was credible because a significant amount of evidence

corroborates Myers’s description of the murders and the group’s involvement in the conspiracy

                                               - 14 -
to rob Coleman. For example, Wilson’s text messages in the months leading up to May 2019

show that he was actively recruiting people to rob someone in Virginia of at least two kilograms

of cocaine. In addition, Green’s cell phone data confirms the sequence of events that Myers

described in his testimony, such as the fact that Green rode with the other members of the group

from Philadelphia to Fredericksburg on the morning of Saturday, May 25, 2019. That data also

confirms that the group went on a test run to Coleman’s home after arriving in Virginia on

Saturday and that the group then went to Walmart – which Myers explicitly described in his

testimony. Cell phone data also confirms that the group drove back to Walmart Sunday morning

before arriving at the Coleman residence to carry out their planned robbery. Furthermore, Myers

testified about how the group acted in concert with each other to move Coleman (and his family)

around Coleman’s home at gunpoint – while Wilson demanded money from Coleman as he,

Green, Bailey, and Myers searched Coleman’s home and vehicles for money and drugs.

       Myers also testified that he commanded K.O. to leave his bedroom and join his mother

on the living room couch. K.O.’s friend, C.H., corroborated Myers’s account when C.H.

testified that C.H. heard that someone had “walked in and was like get off, get off right now, and

like yelling at him [K.O.] to get off.” C.H. testified that this was the last time he ever heard from

his friend K.O., and Myers testified that Bailey slit K.O.’s throat at some point after the boy was

forced out of his bedroom.

       In addition, the forensic evidence amply supports Myers’s description of the murders,

given that Coleman, Ozuna, and K.O. were all discovered to have had their hands and legs tied

and their throats slit. Sergeant Seay’s harrowing body camera footage also corroborates Myers’s

testimony because the footage shows that each of the victims’ bodies was discovered in the exact

same room where Myers testified that each specific murder occurred. In addition, Sergeant

Seay’s body camera footage also shows that Coleman’s and Ozuna’s toddler and infant were

                                               - 15 -
discovered alive inside the home days after the murders took place. Forensic nurse

Kral-Dunning testified that both children were dehydrated and suffered from “horrible diaper

rash” and swelling as a result of being left unattended for multiple days.

       Although Myers testified about the murders and other crimes in which he took part,

pursuant to a plea agreement, the Commonwealth’s evidence extensively corroborated Myers’s

testimony. Consequently, we clearly cannot say that Myers’s testimony describing Green’s

active involvement in the murders, the robbery, the abductions, the conspiracy to commit

robbery, and the conspiracy to commit abduction with the intent to extort money is inherently

incredible as a matter of law. Therefore, given Myers’s credible testimony, given the significant

amount of cell phone data showing that Green was at the location of the crimes, and given the

forensic evidence showing the gruesome deaths of Coleman, Ozuna, and K.O., we certainly

cannot say that no rational factfinder could have found the evidence sufficient to convict Green

of first-degree murder, robbery, conspiracy to commit robbery, abduction with the intent to

extort money, and conspiracy to commit abduction with the intent to extort money. In addition,

given the multiple injuries that the one-month-old infant and the seventeen-month-old child

suffered after they were abandoned in their home after their parents were brutally murdered

there, we also certainly cannot say that no rational factfinder could have found the evidence

sufficient to convict Green of child abuse and neglect under Code § 18.2-371.1 and child

endangerment under Code § 40.1-103.

                                         III. CONCLUSION

       In short, highly credible evidence in the record shows that Hugh Cameron Green took

part in Wilson’s cold-blooded scheme to rob Michael Coleman for drugs and money, and Green

then tied up Coleman and Ozuna before mercilessly slitting their throats and before Green’s

co-defendant brutally murdered the fourteen-year-old K.O. Then, after every person who could

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have cared for the seventeen-month-old toddler and one-month-old infant had been murdered,

Green, Bailey, Wilson, and Myers left the toddler and the infant alone for multiple days without

anyone to attend to even their most basic needs. The abandonment of the children led to their

suffering from significant injuries and from dehydration until they were finally discovered three

days later. Consequently, given James Myers’s credible testimony, given the ample forensic

evidence, and given the highly detailed cell phone data admitted in this case, the totality of all of

this evidence is certainly sufficient to convict Green of each of the crimes for which he was

convicted. In addition, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Green’s motion

to release the restricted dissemination materials to him, especially given the serious ongoing risks

of doing so for the safety of a key witness’s family members.

        For all of these reasons, we uphold each of Green’s convictions and affirm the judgment

of the trial court.

                                                                                            Affirmed.

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