Court Opinion

ID: 9791673
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:15:53.233945+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:37.849676
License: Public Domain

Thompson, J.,
dissenting:
The responsibility placed upon a trial court to decide which parent shall have the privilege of child custody is awesome in nature and exceedingly difficult to discharge. The difficulty multiplies when we are asked to review a custody order since we are removed from the atmosphere of the trial and must rest our decision upon a cold record. It is for this reason that a wide discretion is accorded to the trial court, with an attendant reluctance on our part to interfere with the trial court’s point of view. Realizing our inadequacy in these matters, we have, nonetheless, proclaimed certain guidelines within which trial court discretion is to be exercised, and beyond which an abuse of discretion will be declared. This is our appellate function in this troublesome area.
These guidelines have been announced mainly in those custody cases in which the party denied custody has been found to be fit. For example, in McGlone v. McGlone, 86 Nev. 14, 464 P.2d 27 (1970), we ruled that a fit parent is to be preferred over nonparents with respect to child custody and reversed an order of the trial court granting the custody of two children to their maternal grandparents. In Peavey v. Peavey, 85 Nev. 571, 460 P.2d 110 (1969), we held that, as between fit parents, the mother should have custody of children of tender years, and reversed an order of the trial court granting such custody to the father. And in Sisson v. Sisson, 77 Nev. 478, 367 P.2d 98 (1961), we held that a mother who had lived in adultery with her paramour before her children of discerning years could not be granted the privilege of custody over a fit father; see also, Toth v. Toth, 80 Nev. 33, 389 P.2d 73 (1964), a modification proceeding. None of these guidelines are rigid and inflexible in application, but are generally to be followed unless solid reasons exist for not doing *224so. In most cases, each of the mentioned guides to the exercise of discretion is wholly compatible with the best interests of the child or children involved.
In the case at hand I find no true basis upon which to distinguish Sisson v. Sisson, supra. The guideline established by that decision is, in my view, sound and should not be overturned.
Respectfully, I dissent.
Collins, C. J., concurs.