Court Opinion

ID: 9403774
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-21 17:04:38.410375+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:09.185217
License: Public Domain

Filed 6/21/23 P. v. Martin CA2/4
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF
                        CALIFORNIA

                          SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                            DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,                                                                B325379

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                       (Los Angeles County
                                                                           Super. Ct. No. KA078144)
           v.

JOSE LUIS MARTIN,

           Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Juan C. Dominguez, Judge. Dismissed.
     Richard B. Lennon, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
     No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
      Appellant Jose Luis Martin appeals the trial court’s
denial of his postjudgment petition for resentencing
pursuant to Penal Code1 section 1172.75, which invalidates
sentence enhancements for prior prison terms. The trial
court concluded Martin lacked standing to bring such a
petition because remedial proceedings under section 1172.75
must be initiated by the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation.
      On appeal, Martin’s appointed counsel filed a brief
raising no issues and invoking People v. Serrano (2012) 211
Cal.App.4th 496 (Serrano). Because the trial court correctly
concluded it lacked jurisdiction to entertain Martin’s
petition, we similarly lack jurisdiction over this appeal. The
appeal is therefore dismissed.

    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      In 2007, Martin was convicted of several crimes,
including robbery and various firearms-related charges. A
prior robbery conviction was found to qualify as a prior
serious felony conviction, prior “strike” offense, and prior
prison term under section 667.5, subdivision (b). (§§ 667,
667.5, subd. (b).) An additional prior conviction for grand
theft was found true as a prior prison term under section
667.5, subdivision (b). The trial court imposed an aggregate

1       All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.

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sentence of 33 years. With regard to the two prior prison
term enhancements, the trial court imposed one-year terms
for each enhancement, but stayed imposition of sentence.
       On direct appeal, this court affirmed Martin’s
conviction and sentence. (People v. Martin (Dec. 15, 2009
B207123) [nonpub. opn.].)
       On September 1, 2022, Martin filed a petition seeking
resentencing pursuant to Senate Bill No. 483 (2021-2022
Reg. Sess.) (S.B. 483) which, effective January 1, 2022,
added former section 1171.1 (now section 1172.75)2 and
retroactively eliminated enhancements for certain prior
prison terms. (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3; Stats. 2022, ch. 58,
§ 12; Burgess, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at pp. 379–381.)
       On November 3, 2022, the trial court summarily denied
Martin’s petition, concluding Martin lacked standing to seek
resentencing under S.B. 483. The court noted that such
relief must be initiated by the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) on behalf of a
prisoner.
       Martin timely appealed.

2      Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered section
1171.1 to section 1172.75, with no substantive changes. (Stats. 2022,
ch. 58, § 12; People v. Burgess (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 375, 378, fn. 2
(Burgess).)

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                         DISCUSSION
A.    Serrano/Delgadillo Review
      Martin’s appointed counsel filed a brief raising no
issues and invoking Serrano, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th 469.
Counsel sent the record and a copy of the appellate brief to
Martin, and this court notified Martin of his right to file a
supplemental brief and the consequences of failing to do so.
We received no response. Under Serrano, when appointed
counsel raises no issue in an appeal from a postjudgment
proceeding, an appellate court need not independently
review the record. (Id. at pp. 498, 503; see also People v.
Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 231–232 (Delgadillo).)
Moreover, if the appellant fails to file a supplemental brief,
we may dismiss the appeal as abandoned. (Serrano, supra,
211 Cal.App.4th at pp. 498, 503; see Delgadillo, supra, 14
Cal.5th at p. 232.) In this case, however, Martin has filed an
appeal from a non-appealable order thereby depriving this
court of jurisdiction in the first instance.

B.     Principles of Jurisdiction
       Generally, once a judgment is rendered and execution
of the sentence has begun, the trial court does not have
jurisdiction to vacate or modify the sentence. (People v. King
(2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 629, 634 (King).) There are several
exceptions to this rule. For example, section 1172.1 gives a
trial court the authority to recall a sentence on its own
motion within 120 days of the defendant’s remand or at any
time upon request by various law enforcement officials.

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(King, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 637, citing former
§ 1170.03, subd. (a); Stats 2022 ch 58 § 9 (Assem. Bill No.
200) [renumbering 1170.03 to 1172.1].) The Legislature has
also created other specific statutory avenues for incarcerated
defendants to seek resentencing in particular cases. (See,
e.g., §§ 1172.6, 1170.126, 1170.18.) If, however, the trial
court does not have jurisdiction to entertain a motion to
vacate or modify a sentence, an order denying such a motion
is nonappealable and any appeal from such an order must be
dismissed. (King, supra, at p. 634.)

C.    Analysis
      Here, Martin filed a petition seeking to invoke section
1171.1 (now section 1172.75) added to the Penal Code by
Senate Bill No. 483.
      Section 1172.75 states that “[a]ny sentence
enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020,
pursuant to subdivision (b) of [s]ection 667.5, except for any
enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually
violent offense … is legally invalid.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).)
The statute further establishes a mechanism to provide
affected defendants a remedy by directing the Secretary of
the CDCR to “identify those persons in their custody
currently serving a term for a judgment that includes an
enhancement described in subdivision (a)” and further
instructs the CDCR on how, and when, to bring these
persons to the attention of the sentencing court. (§ 1172.75,
subd. (b); Burgess, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at pp. 380–381

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[discussing procedures under section 1172.75].) The trial
court is, thereafter, instructed to review the information
and, where warranted, “recall the sentence and resentence
the defendant.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (c).) However, as the trial
court correctly noted, that section does not allow a prisoner,
like Martin, to file his own request for relief. (Burgess,
supra, at pp. 381–382.) Accordingly, the trial court correctly
concluded that Martin lacked standing to bring his petition.
(Id. at pp. 379, 381.) This, in turn, leaves us without
jurisdiction to entertain Martin’s appeal.3 (Id. at p. 382;
King, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 639; People v. Fuimaono
(2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 132, 135.)

3      In its order denying Martin’s petition, the trial court further
noted that Martin was not sentenced with the now-invalid
enhancements. Martin had argued that although the original
sentencing court stayed the prior prison term enhancements, the
enhancements are nevertheless “legally invalid” under S.B. 483, now
codified at section 1172.75. To the extent any of Martin’s arguments
implicate the “unauthorized sentence” rule, they must be raised via a
writ of habeas corpus. Section 1172.75 is not an appropriate vehicle
for prisoner-initiated relief. (Burgess, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at pp. 379,
382; King, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at pp. 639-640.)

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                       DISPOSITION
      The appeal is dismissed.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                              MORI, J.

We concur:

COLLINS, Acting P. J.

ZUKIN, J. *

*     Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief
Justice pursuant to Article VI, section 6, of the California Constitution.

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