Court Opinion

ID: 9721193
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:50:45.273179+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:23.869216
License: Public Domain

SCHEINEMAN, P. J., dissenting. I am unable to concur in the result of this case. It seems to me there is a complete lack of evidence tending to show negligence, and that the testimony points strongly to the probable cause, which cannot be charged to the garage company. A mechanic was called by plaintiffs to explain the operation of hydraulic brakes. He described the position of the cylinders at each wheel, and stated: “If a brake catches or pulls to one side it is usually due to either brake fluid or some sticky substance like coal or grease, or something like that on the brake lining.” Another mechanic testified that a sudden grab of brakes such as is asserted in this case, is not due to the adjustment of the hydraulic brakes, but to the intrusion of some foreign substance into the mechanism. Surely brake-grabbing is not circumstantial evidence of negligence for it could happen to anyone that a drop of brake fluid might fall so as to work into the brake lining. It is probably not unusual, although it is likely that the driver holding the wheel would not ordinarily lose control. There is nothing in the evidence to justify rejection of this possibility, and nothing to support any other conjecture. It is undisputed that Nadeau had his brakes attended to three weeks before the accident. He was notified one drum was cracked. He drove the car for the ensuing three weeks and testified the brakes were all right. On the day of the accident he brought the car in for the sole purpose of having the cracked drum replaced, not for another brake overhaul. The mechanic who made the change testified how he cleaned the drum, that he inspected the band as well as the drum and both were clean when he put them together. Nadeau testified that he drove slowly in traffic, and used the brakes lightly at four stops, and they worked all right. Between the last two stops he says he traveled a quarter of a mile in second gear. Then he got on the highway and attained a speed of 30 miles per hour, when he again applied the brakes and the jerk occurred, with the resultant collision. I fail to discover anything in this record of events pointing to a conclusion that a foreign substance got into the brake while in the garage, rather than while on the road. Besides this there is other testimony more pointed. Plaintiff’s attorney had caused another mechanic, who owned an independent garage, to visit the Mixon place after the accident, for the express purpose of looking for a mechanical defect that might have caused it. He testified to removing the left front wheel, finding a new brake drum, that he observed a glazed place on the brake lining, and that there was leakage at the left wheel cylinder. He further stated his opinion that this condition was not caused by the head-on-collision. This is the only direct evidence of cause produced. None of the testimony of any of the mechanics on this subject was contradicted in any way. The plain import of the whole evidence indicates that the replacement of the brake drum was not the cause of the accident, and logically indicates a drop of brake fluid caused the grabbing. No evidence supports the charges of negligence. Of course, counsel are able to conjecture other possible causes of the brake condition found after the accident, but there is not a scintilla of evidence to sustain these guesses. • Appellees cite Lindroth v. Walgreen Co., 407 Ill. 121, 134, and other cases to the effect the choice between conflicting versions of the occurrence is for the jury. But this rule is always expressly limited by the statement that “Where there is a reasonable basis in the record for concluding that there was negligence that caused the injury, it is irrelevant that fair minded men might reach a different conclusion.” None of the cited Illinois cases departs from the sound principle that the evidence must show a reasonable basis for concluding that there was negligence. The provision in the Illinois constitution preserving the right to a jury trial as it existed at common law, does not limit its application to plaintiffs. The defendant is also entitled to a fair trial as it existed at common law, under which the court would not permit a jury to fasten liability on a defendant, based only on conjecture suggested by counsel, without evidentiary support; I have full confidence in the honesty of jurors, and have observed that they eagerly seek to do justice, as a normal condition. But there will necessarily be ■ari occasional mistake, and when that occurs, the courts ought to follow the fundamental principle of the common law, that an obviously erroneous verdict will not be permitted to stand. To depart from that principle. serves only to encourage groundless and vexatious litigation. I fear the present case is a departure, and for that reason I dissent.