Court Opinion

ID: 9545810
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:19:54.854687+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:15:34.493077
License: Public Domain

Winsor, J.
(concurring) — I concur in the result only. State v. Miller, 103 Wn.2d 792, 698 P.2d 554 (1985) is sufficient authority for holding that the particular phrase we deal with here, "lawfully arresting," is not unconstitutionally vague. The opinion of both my colleagues that the term "lawful" is not vague if applied only to conduct other than that of the accused, is therefore unnecessary and ill advised.
Judge Scholfield relies on dictum in State v. Smith, 111 Wn.2d 1, 759 P.2d 372 (1988), as authority for analyzing the vagueness question here in terms of whether "lawfully" as used in SMC 12A.16.050, concerns police conduct or the defendant's conduct. I am uncomfortable with that dictum and analysis. Judge Pekelis relies on a similar ruling in State v. Aver, 109 Wn.2d 303, 745 P.2d 479 (1987). I hold out hope that Bellevue v. Miller, 85 Wn.2d 539, 536 P.2d 603 (1975) and Seattle v. Rice, 93 Wn.2d 728, 612 P.2d 792 (1980), remain viable authority. I do not understand how "lawful" is less vague, when applied to the conduct of others, than when it is applied to the conduct of defendants. In either case, defendants must proceed at their peril based upon their ability to ascertain whether or not certain conduct is "lawful."
I believe that we must continue to examine allegedly vague terms by focusing on the particular use of the chai-' lenged word in the context of the particular statute involved. Only by this means can the two purposes of the constitutional definiteness requirement, i.e., ensuring that citizens have fair notice of criminally proscribed conduct, *44and preventing arbitrary arrests and convictions, be achieved. E.g., Smith, 111 Wn.2d at 18; Rice, 93 Wn.2d at 731.
Review denied at 113 Wn.2d 1025 (1989).