Court Opinion

ID: 9928441
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-31 19:03:11.861079+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:52:45.506660
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/31/24 P. v. Dawes CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,                                                          D081586

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.                                                          (Super. Ct. No. SCS287189)

WILLIAM ORREN DAWES,

         Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Laura H. Parsky, Judge. Affirmed; remanded with directions.
         Laura Arnold, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A.
Sevidal, and Jon S. Tangonan, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
         Appellant William Orren Dawes faces multiple criminal charges for
allegedly attacking two correctional officers in 2016. On June 4, 2021, the
trial court found him incompetent to stand trial and ordered that he be
committed to a state hospital and involuntarily administered antipsychotic
medication. Dawes appealed and, on January 10, 2022, we reversed the trial
court’s order and instructed the court to vacate the incompetency
determination and corresponding involuntary medication order. (People v.

Dawes (Jan. 10, 2022, D079189) [nonpub. opn] (Dawes).)1 We further
ordered that “the trial court shall obtain an updated forensic psychiatry clinic
report on mental competency to stand trial and shall appoint a second mental
health expert to conduct an additional evaluation. ([Penal Code] §§ 1368,
1369.)” (Ibid.)
      On remand later that month, the trial court ordered another mental
health evaluation by an independent expert but did not order an updated
competency report. Following additional proceedings, the trial court issued
an order in December 2022, confirming the commitment order and ordering
involuntary administration of psychotropic medication.
      In the present appeal, Dawes contends the trial court did not fully
comply with the remand order because it only appointed a second mental
health evaluator without also ordering preparation of an updated report from
the forensic psychiatry unit. He further argues the trial court erred by
failing to indicate in its December 2022 commitment order the number of
days he was committed due to the June 4, 2021 commitment order and
deduct that time from the two-year maximum. The People insist the trial

1      We take judicial notice of this prior appeal. (Evid. Code, §§ 452,
subd. (a), 459, subd. (a); see also People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 958,
fn. 2 (Lewis) [relying on brief summary of facts drawn from appellate court’s
prior opinion].)
                                       2
court fully complied with our prior opinion but concede that the
December 2021 commitment order should reflect custody credits owed to
Dawes.
      We conclude that, although the trial court did not order an updated
forensic report, reversal is not required because Dawes has not demonstrated
any prejudice resulting from the error. However, we agree the commitment
order must be amended to reflect Dawes’s prior period of commitment.
Accordingly, we affirm the December 2021 commitment order, but remand
with directions that the trial court calculate the number of days of custody
credits Dawes is entitled to for the time he was committed following the
June 4, 2021 hearing.
              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      Dawes is serving a life sentence for murdering his niece. (People v.

Dawes (Feb. 25, 2010, G041340) [nonpub. opn], review den. May 12, 2010.)2

In June 2016, Dawes was charged with attempted murder (Pen. Code,3
§§ 187, subd. (a), 664; Count 1), assault by a life prisoner (§ 4500; Counts 2
and 3), assault with a deadly weapon by a prisoner (§ 4501, subd. (a);
Counts 4 and 5), and various enhancements after allegedly attacking two
correctional officers. A month later, a public defender declared a doubt as to
Dawes’s competency and the court suspended the proceedings on these

2     We also take judicial notice of this prior appeal. (Evid. Code, §§ 452,
subd. (a), 459, subd. (a); see also Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 958, fn. 2.)

3     All statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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charges so Dawes could be evaluated pursuant to section 1368.4 He
subsequently was found competent to stand trial.
      In 2017, a second public defender declared a doubt as to Dawes’s
competency and the court again suspended proceedings under section 1368.
The court reinstated proceedings in January 2018 after finding Dawes
competent.
      In April 2018, a public defender declared a doubt for a third time. This
time, the medical expert declared him incompetent. Dawes contested the
finding, and the court ordered a second opinion, which determined he was
competent. In September 2018, the court found Dawes competent and
reinstated the proceedings.
      In January 2019, the trial court again suspended the proceedings after
defense counsel reported concerns. (Dawes, supra, D079189). Due to various
delays, Dawes was evaluated in March 2019, December 2019, and May 2021,
and found competent in 2019 but not in 2021. (Ibid.) Dr. Nicolas Badre, the
staff forensic psychiatrist who evaluated Dawes in May 2021, had assessed
him as competent three times before but concluded Dawes was displaying
active signs of mental illness, including delusions, and that, as a result, he
was unable to understand the charges against him or assist legal counsel.
On June 4, 2021, the trial court declared him incompetent to stand trial and
authorized the hospital to administer medication involuntarily. (Ibid.)
      Dawes appealed and, on January 10, 2022, we reversed the trial court’s
order and instructed the trial court to vacate the competency determination

4     Section 1368, subdivision (b) provides: “If counsel informs the court
that he or she believes the defendant is or may be mentally incompetent, the
court shall order that the question of the defendant’s mental competence is to
be determined in a hearing which is held pursuant to Sections 1368.1
and 1369. . . .”
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and corresponding involuntary medication order. (Dawes, supra, D079189.)
We further ordered on remand that “the trial court shall obtain an updated
forensic psychiatry clinic report on mental competency to stand trial and
shall appoint a second mental health expert to conduct an additional
evaluation. (§§ 1368, 1369.)” (Ibid.)
      On January 31, 2022, the trial court held a hearing to address the
remittitur and ordered “another evaluation by an independent expert on
March 9.” During a hearing at the end of March, defense counsel was
surprised to learn that Dawes had been transferred to Patton State Hospital
(Patton) after the last hearing, despite his understanding that the court had
vacated the commitment and medication orders. Counsel represented that he
learned from court staff that a clerical error likely resulted in the orders not
being vacated properly. Because the second mental health assessment had
not occurred due to Dawes’s transfer to Patton, the trial court issued an order
on March 28, 2022, vacating the June 4, 2021 commitment to Patton and the
involuntary medication order and again ordering a second forensic mental
health evaluation. It also ordered that Dawes be transported back to jail.
      On May 5, 2022, Dr. David Naimark, a forensic psychiatrist appointed
by the court, evaluated Dawes and prepared a report finding him competent
to stand trial. Separately, Dr. Cynthia Boyd, a neuropsychologist with an
emphasis in forensic psychology who was retained as a defense expert,
examined Dawes for a total of nine hours—twice in 2019, once in 2021, and
again on July 24, 2023—and concluded he was not legally competent. On
August 19, 2022, following a hearing at which both Drs. Naimark and Boyd
testified and commented upon the prior report by Dr. Badre, the trial court
found Dawes incompetent and referred him to court forensics for an expert
opinion as to whether he lacked the capacity to make decisions regarding the

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administration of antipsychotic medication pursuant to section 1370. Dr.
Naimark submitted a subsequent report finding Dawes lacked capacity in
this regard. At a hearing on December 9, 2022, the court agreed, confirmed
the commitment order, and ordered involuntary administration of
psychotropic medication.
                                 DISCUSSION
                                        I.
        Dawes Has Not Demonstrated Prejudice Warranting Reversal
      Dawes contends the December 2022 incompetency order, and
associated commitment and medication orders, must be reversed because the
trial court did not comply with our instructions on remand and obtain an
updated forensic psychiatry clinic report on mental competency to stand

trial.5 We disagree.
      When an appellate court remands a matter to a trial court, the question
of whether the trial court correctly interpreted the prior opinion is an issue of
law reviewed de novo. (Ayyad v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P. (2012) 210
Cal.App.4th 851, 859.)
      Our decision in Dawes turned on the fact that Dawes himself, contrary
to arguments made by his appointed counsel, had made clear that he did not
want to be found incompetent. Section 1369, subdivision (a)(1) requires that
“[i]f the defendant or the defendant’s counsel informs the court that the
defendant is not seeking a finding of mental incompetence, the court shall
appoint two psychiatrists, licensed psychologists, or a combination thereof.”

5     In his opening brief, Dawes had also raised an additional argument
regarding the trial court’s failure to vacate the commitment and medication
orders as directed by the remand order. However, in light of the belated
March 28, 2022 order, Dawes indicated in his reply brief that he was no
longer pursuing that claim, so we do not address it except to the extent it
impacts Dawes’s custody credits as discussed post.
                                        6
Given Dawes’s insistence that he wanted to proceed to trial on the merits, we
concluded that section 1369 required the trial court to obtain two competency
determinations. We, therefore, ordered the trial court to “obtain an updated
forensic psychiatry clinic report on mental competency to stand trial” and
“appoint a second mental health expert to conduct an additional evaluation.”
(Dawes, supra, D079189.) It is clear from the record that the trial court did
only the latter in appointing Dr. Naimark.
      Our task then is to determine the significance of this omission. “When
there has been a decision upon appeal, the trial court is reinvested with
jurisdiction of the cause, but only such jurisdiction as is defined by the terms
of the remittitur. The trial court is empowered to act only in accordance with
the direction of the reviewing court; action which does not conform to those
directions is void.” (Hampton v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1952)
38 Cal.2d 652, 655.) An action generally becomes void when the trial court
acts outside of the limited jurisdiction afforded to it upon remand. (See, e.g.,
Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 688, 701 [finding
superior court judgment void where the reviewing court issued an unqualified
affirmance and the superior court nonetheless reopened the case and
redetermined the merits]; Butler v. Superior Court (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th
979, 982 [finding order void where the trial court exceeded the scope of
remand by effectively reopening the case on the facts and allowing for a new
trial].) We do not conclude the trial court’s decision is void here because the
trial court did not exceed its jurisdiction on remand. Instead, it complied
with the general requirement of the Dawes opinion by conducting further
competency proceedings after reviewing two mental health experts’ opinions.
It just relied upon Dr. Badre’s May 2021 opinion versus ordering an updated
report.

                                        7
      We do not find this problematic for two reasons. First, defense counsel
did not object at the January 31, 2022 remand hearing or otherwise request
that the trial court also order an updated report from Dr. Badre. Even in
recounting the January 2022 proceedings at a subsequent hearing in
August 2022, defense counsel did not take issue with the trial court only
having set a second evaluation. “[A] reviewing court ordinarily will not
consider a challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been but was not
made in the trial court.” (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293.) “The
purpose of this rule is to encourage parties to bring errors to the attention of
the trial court, so that they may be corrected.” (Ibid.) While we decline to
rely solely on a finding of forfeiture in this unusual context, we do not find it
appropriate to reverse yet again when the issue could easily have been
brought to the trial court’s attention and resolved during the hearings in
January, March, or August of 2022 prior to the trial court’s subsequent
finding of incompetency.
      Second, on appeal, Dawes does not identify any prejudice whatsoever
stemming from the trial court’s failure to order an updated report. “It is a
fundamental principle of appellate jurisprudence in this state that a
judgment will not be reversed unless it can be shown that a trial court error
in the case affected the result.” (In re Sophia B. (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1436,
1439; Cal. Const., Art. VI, § 13; 6 Witkin, Cal. Crim. Law (4th ed. 2012)
Reversible Error, § 1.) The burden of demonstrating not only error but injury
from the error falls on the appellant. (Robbins v. Los Angeles Unified School
Dist. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 313, 318.) “Only when an error has resulted in a
miscarriage of justice will it be deemed to be prejudicial so as to require
reversal.” (Osborn v. Mission Ready Mix (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 104, 114.)
A miscarriage of justice occurs when “ ‘it is reasonably probable that a result

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more favorable to [the defendant] would have been reached in the absence of
the error.’ ” (People v. Blackburn (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1113, 1132.)
      Dawes directs us to no authority suggesting that a showing of prejudice
is not also required in this context. (Cf. Martinez v. Rite Aid Corp. (2021) 63
Cal.App.5th 958, 969–970 [concluding trial court’s decision not to follow
reviewing court’s advice regarding special verdict form did not require
reversal of the judgment because it did not prejudice Rite Aid].) Nonetheless,
Dawes only alleges a violation of section 1369 without arguing there is a
reasonable probability he would have obtained a more favorable result in the
absence of the error. (People v. Leelu (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1023, 1031–1032
[concluding this state law test of prejudice is applicable to “section 1369(a)’s
requirement that the trial court appoint a second mental health evaluator
when the defendant contests competency”].) This is not sufficient to satisfy

his burden.6 Accordingly, we conclude Dawes has not demonstrated that
reversal is warranted.
                                       II.
         Remand is Required for Calculation of Commitment Credits
      Dawes next contends the trial court erred by failing to note in its
December 2022 commitment order the number of days he had been
committed due to the June 4, 2021 commitment order and by failing to deduct

6     Nor would such an argument likely have been successful given that
Dr. Badre previously found Dawes incompetent in a report the defense
expert, Dr. Boyd, described as “very thorough”; that Dr. Boyd found him
incompetent and did not even consider it a “close call”; and that after hearing
testimony and observing Dawes at the hearing, Dr. Naimark modified his
competency opinion stating, “if I had had all of this information . . . I probably
would have asked to see him again . . . I think it’s very close.” Notably, after
his second examination of Dawes, Dr. Naimark found him incompetent to
make decisions regarding administration of psychotropic medication.

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that time from the two-year maximum commitment term. The People agree
the commitment order should accurately reflect custody credits owed to
Dawes.
      When a court issues a commitment order under section 1370, the order
must include a statement of the maximum term of commitment and “[a]
computation or statement setting forth the amount of credit for time served,
if any, to be deducted from the maximum term of commitment.” (§ 1370,

subd. (a)(3)(B)–(C)(i).)7 Here, the minute order from the December 9, 2022
mental competency hearing reflects the maximum commitment term of two
years but does not include a calculation of the time Dawes was committed at
Patton after the June 4, 2021 hearing. It also is not clear from the record
when Dawes was returned to jail. Although it appears counsel for both sides
thought the trial court vacated the commitment order at the January 2022
hearing, Dawes appeared by video conference from Patton at the March 28,
2022 hearing. At that hearing, the trial court ordered that Dawes be
returned “forthwith,” but the record does not reflect Dawes’s actual transfer
date. Accordingly, we remand the matter to the trial court for calculation of
the appropriate number of days served to be deducted pursuant to
section 1370, subdivision (a)(3)(C)(i).
                                 DISPOSITION
      The December 9, 2022 order is affirmed, but the matter is remanded
with directions for the trial court to calculate the number of days Dawes
previously was committed and deduct that amount from the two-year

7      Section 1370 has been amended twice since the trial court issued its
initial commitment order in August 2022, but the substance of
subdivision (a)(3)(B) and (C) has not changed. (Compare Stats. 2022, ch. 735,
§ 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2023; Stats. 2022, ch. 738, § 11, eff. Sept. 29, 2022; and
Stats. 2023, ch. 42, § 57, eff. July 10, 2023.)
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maximum. The trial court shall amend the December 9, 2022 competency
and commitment order to reflect said credits.

                                                 HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

DATO, J.

KELETY, J.

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