Court Opinion

ID: 9665886
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:58:55.53621+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:20.079419
License: Public Domain

POPOVICH, Justice
(dissenting).
I regret I must respectfully dissent from both holdings in the majority opinion. Defendants were denied their right to a trial within 60 days under Minn.R.Crim.P. 6.06 and the conditions of their probation were unconstitutional. It is my view that Rule 6.06 establishes an independent nonconsti-tutionally based procedural right, which in this case has been violated.
1. The majority admits the defendants made a demand for a speedy trial and the state failed to meet that demand when it did not provide a trial within 60 days as mandated by Rule 6.06, Minn.R.Crim.P.1 The majority reasons, however, that the 60-day time period is not an arbitrary time limitation but, rather, merely creates a presumption that the defendant has been prejudiced by the delay.
The majority goes on to apply to this case the factors given in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-32, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2191-93, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), for determining whether the sixth amendment right to a speedy trial has been violated. The majority equates a “good cause” finding justifying a delay under the rule with the balancing test in Barker. Thus, under the majority’s reasoning, a violation of Rule 6.06 is nothing more than a triggering mechanism for a constitutional analysis of the delay in question, using the factors given in Barker. The majority reaches this conclusion despite the mandatory language in Rule 6.06.2 The majority relies on language in Barker and the commentary to Rule 11.10, Minn.R.Crim.P., which is incorporated by reference in the commentary to *518Rule 6.06, to support its conclusion that the 60-day time period is not a per se rule, whose violation has consequences independent of constitutional analysis.
The majority’s reliance on Barker is unfounded. Barker specifically recognized that the states, unlike the Supreme Court, were free to set rigid time periods in which criminal trials must be brought. Barker, 407 U.S. at 523, 92 S.Ct. at 2188. Thus, nothing in Barker can be read as limiting the effect of the 60-day time period specified in Rule 6.06.
The comments relied on by the majority provide: “The existence or absence of the demand under Rule 11.10 provides a factor that may be taken into account in determining whether the defendant has been unconstitutionally denied a speedy trial.” Comment to Rule 11.10, Minn.R.Crim.P. The constitutional question, however, does not answer whether “good cause” has been shown for a violation of the procedural time limit as required by Rule 6.06. The procedural violation is an entirely different question than the constitutional question. The commentary suggests this distinction where it states, “a defendant shall be brought to trial within 60 days after demand * * *, unless good cause is shown for a delay * * Id. Contrary to the majority’s contention that Rule 6.06 does not set an arbitrary time limit, the commentary makes clear that is precisely what the rule does: “Rule 11.10 does not attempt to set arbitrary time limits (other than those resulting from the demand) * * *.” Id. (emphasis added).
The only way to reconcile the commentary’s conflicting language is by recognizing that a violation of the procedural rule is not equivalent to a violation of a defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial. Nothing in the rule or the commentary suggests the 60-day limit is meaningless unless there is a constitutional deprivation. That the 60-day limit itself could be the source of a dismissal was implicitly recognized by this court in State v. Kasper, 411 N.W.2d 182 (Minn.1987). In Kasper, we explicitly recognized that the constitution did not require a specific time period in which the state must commence trial. Id. at 184 (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 523, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2188, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972)). We noted, however, that Barker permitted states to prescribe reasonable time periods. Id. We said Minnesota had codified such a time period in Rule 6.06. Id. No further mention of Barker, its factors, or of the constitutional right to a speedy trial was mentioned in Kasper. Indeed, our decision was quite clear: “We hold that defendant was denied a speedy trial under Rule 6.06 * * Id. at 185 (emphasis added). The majority’s reading of Kasper means that this court barred the state from pursuing a prosecution, reversed a lower court, and gave judicial gloss to Rule 6.06, all for constitutional reasons, without ever mentioning that our decision was based on the constitution. I believe Kasper stands for the proposition that violation of the procedural time limit can result in dismissal without resort to application of the Barker factors. To hold otherwise would reduce Rule 6.06 to mere surplusage. Thus, Rule 6.06 should be directly applied to this case to determine if the state showed “good cause” for violating the rule’s mandate.
2. Rule 6.06, unlike the balancing test in Barker, places the burden for explaining a delay squarely on the state; the state must show “good cause” for the delay. I conclude from the above analysis of Barker, the commentary to Rule 6.06 and Minnesota case law that there is no authority for equating “good cause” to the Barker factors. None of the cases cited by the majority even mention a “good cause” showing, much less equate such a showing to the Barker factors. Under the majority’s formula no violation of Rule 6.06 would be cognizable until such time as the right to a speedy trial had been violated. Thus, Rule 6.06 would be nothing more than a recodification of the sixth and fourteenth amendments, in my opinion an untenable position.
The majority relies on the trial judge’s personal knowledge of “crowded dockets” and the defendants’ “eleventh hour” motion to remove the trial judge, to show good cause existed for the delay. As an *519initial matter, the defendants’ motion to remove came 33 days before the expiration of the 60-day limit, hardly an eleventh-hour delaying tactic3 vis-a-vis the 60-day time limit at issue in this case. More importantly, the condition of the court dockets is not a fact which is subject to judicial notice in the manner it was done here.
Rule 201(b), MinmR.Evid., describes what type of adjudicative facts may be “noticed” by a judge:
A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.
The condition of the Ramsey County District Court calendar, based on the trial judge’s recollection, does not fall under either type of fact which may be noticed. Additionally, the trial judge’s assessment was apparently wrong, as the affidavit of Mike Calvert, criminal case manager for Ramsey County, shows.4 The comment to Rule 201 states, “Minnesota has traditionally limited judicial notice of adjudicative facts to situations incapable of serious dispute.” Obviously, here the condition of the court calendar is in dispute. Absent such facts, there is virtually no evidence on which the state can base a showing of good cause for the delay. Where the state fails to show good cause for the delay, our decision in Kasper requires dismissal.
3. While the United States Supreme Court has not had occasion to rule broadly on the constitutional rights of probationers, these questions have been answered as to prisoners. I look to these prisoner cases for guidance in analyzing the rights of the instant probationers. “Prison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates from the protections of the constitution.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2259, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987). Specifically, prisoners retain the protections of the first amendment. O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 107 S.Ct. 2400, 2404, 96 L.Ed.2d 282 (1987). It is obvious that probationers retain a broader range of rights than do prisoners. See generally, Hurwitz, House Arrest: A Critical Analysis of an Intermediate-Level Penal Sanction, 135 U.Pa.L.Rev. 771, 796 (1987). Thus, any limitation on the instant petitioners’ first amendment rights of expression and religious freedom cannot be justified by suggesting that probationers have somehow lost these rights.5
The United States Supreme Court has not articulated a test for reviewing probation conditions which infringe first amendment rights. Again, the prisoner rights cases are instructive by analogy. Limitations on prisoners’ constitutional rights are justified by the fact of incarceration and valid penological objectives, including deterrence of crime, rehabilitation, and institutional security. O’Lone, 107 S.Ct. at 2404. “There must be a ‘mutual accommodation between institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the Constitution that are of general application.’ ” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1878, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979).
In formulating a standard of review, the Court takes special cognizance of the extreme complexity and urgent problems involved in prison administration, which courts are ill-equipped to handle. Turner, 107 S.Ct. at 2259. Additionally, prison administration raises separation of powers concerns because it is within the province of the executive and legislative branches of *520government. Id. Accordingly, deference to prison authorities is required. Id.
The Court in Turner determined that a “reasonableness” test was appropriate. Id. at 2261. “[W]hen a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Id. The Court requires that there be a logical, valid and rational connection to a legitimate governmental interest which is not so remote as to make the regulation arbitrary. Id. at 2262.
The test in the prisoner rights cases is instructive because the state’s legitimate interests in a probation case are much less significant. When evaluating probation conditions, which limit constitutional rights, the state’s legitimate interest in prison security and order, and limitations incident to the fact of incarceration, are entirely absent. Moreover, the reviewing court need not defer to any special expertise possessed by the trial court. Finally, concerns over the separation of powers are also absent in the probation context. Thus, these important differences between the probation and prison cases suggest that in order to justify an infringement of a constitutional right in a probation context, more is required than the reasonableness test described in Turner; i.e., more is required than a mere logical and valid relationship between the' condition and the legitimate interest.
The majority relies on federal court of appeals decisions of similar issues in advancing its reasonableness test for probation conditions. United States v. Lowe, 654 F.2d 562, 568 (9th Cir.1981). No case, however, suggests that the “reasonableness” test as described in Turner is the same as used in Lowe. Indeed, many court of appeals decisions, while applying their reasonableness test, have made it clear that infringement of probationers’ first amendment rights requires close or special scrutiny or that such limitations must be narrowly drawn. See United States v. Terrigno, 838 F.2d 371, 374 (9th Cir.1988); United States v. Tolla, 781 F.2d 29, 34 (2nd Cir.1986); United States v. Holloway, 740 F.2d 1373, 1383 (6th Cir.1984) (special scrutiny); United States v. Lawson, 670 F.2d 923, 930 (10th Cir.1982) (special scrutiny); United States v. Pastore, 537 F.2d 675, 681 (2nd Cir.1976). Even United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259 (9th Cir.1975), cited in part by the majority, says: “Conditions that unquestionably restrict otherwise inviolable constitutional rights may properly be subject to special scrutiny to determine whether the limitation does in fact serve the dual objectives of rehabilitation and public safety.” Id. at 265.6
In view of the special scrutiny used when applying the reasonableness test, I can only conclude that the proper standard of review was not followed in evaluating the conflicting interests presented in this case. The reasonableness test used in probation cases requires probation conditions which infringe constitutional rights to be “especially fine-tuned.” Tolla, 781 F.2d at 34. Such conditions may not be presumed valid. Id. The 500-foot buffer zone in this case does not pass the heightened scrutiny suggested in the cases. The only legitimate interest served by the buffer zone in this case is the avoidance of another possible trespassing event. It cannot be explained how a buffer zone of 500 feet as opposed to a 20-foot zone, or no zone at all, enhances this goal sufficiently to justify cutting off the defendants’ first amendment rights to lawfully protest the practices of this clinic. The availability of an obvious condition, a *521smaller buffer zone, or picketing in a manner to allow ingress and egress, which would have a de minimis effect on the state’s legitimate interest, would be sufficient reason to find this limitation unconstitutional in a prison context.7 See Turner, 107 S.Ct. at 2263-64, 2266. Since probation conditions deserve more exacting scrutiny than do prison regulations, the 500-foot limitation in this case cannot survive heightened scrutiny and must be rejected.
Even assuming there was no “speedy trial” issue involved in this case, I would remand to the trial court for a reconsideration of the probation condition. The trial court should be instructed to create a condition which infringes the defendants’ first amendment rights no more than is necessary to significantly advance legitimate state interests.

. The rule provides, in pertinent part:
A defendant shall be tried as soon as possible after entry of a not guilty plea. On demand made in writing or orally on the record by the prosecuting attorney or the defendant, the defendant shall be tried within sixty (60) days from the date of the demand unless good cause is shown by the prosecution or defendant why he should not be brought to trial within that period.

. The majority’s characterization of Rule 6.06 as not mandatory is difficult to understand. The rule is clear on its face; once a demand is made, a trial must begin within 60 days unless either party can show good cause for the delay. That there is a "good cause” exception to this rule does not make the rule’s application "voluntary."

. The majority suggests other cases were scheduled during 33 days following the removal. Since the state failed to adduce any evidence on the condition of the court’s calendar, we will never know the true status of that calendar.

. The majority focuses on the procedural problems with Mr. Calvert’s affidavit. Surely, if the trial judge could take notice of erroneous information concerning the court calendar, this court could take notice of the correct information of which we have personal knowledge from reading Calvert’s affidavit.

.Similarly, the fact that the state might have constitutionally incarcerated defendants does not justify a lesser but unconstitutional intrusion of their rights. See United States v. Tolla, 781 F.2d 29, 33 (2nd Cir.1986); United States v. Pastore, 537 F.2d 675, 683 (2nd Cir.1976); Hurwitz, supra, at 796-97.

. The majority concedes that the condition restricts the defendants' first amendment rights. The United States Supreme Court has suggested that first amendment expression, even when it comes in the form of illegal acts, cannot be limited by legislative act unless the act "furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.” United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 1679, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968); see also Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, 509, 89 S.Ct. 733, 738, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969). I cannot understand why the trial court’s decision in this case should receive a lesser standard of scrutiny than the legislative acts of Congress in O’Brien or the State of Iowa in Tinker.

. In the prison context the presence of such alternatives may require finding the regulation unconstitutional. See Turner, supra. I submit in the probation context, where heightened scrutiny is appropriate, the presence of easy and obvious alternatives requires modification of the probation condition at issue.