Court Opinion

ID: 9724668
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:07:26.812953+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:04.073976
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. The Commission adopted the decision of the arbitrator that claimant sustained accidental injuries arising out of and in the scope of her employment. Specifically, in determining the etiology of claimant’s fall, the arbitrator determined that the bathroom tiles had not been cleaned and gave less probative value to testimony of the tiles being free of any foreign substance. My colleagues have concluded that the decision of the Commission should be reversed based upon grounds with which I disagree. The majority states that if facts are undisputed and susceptible to only a single reasonable inference, our review is de novo rather than the usual manifest weight of the evidence standard. Under the latter standard, we are obligated not to disturb the Commission’s decision unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence, citing Brady v. Louis Ruffolo & Sons Construction Co., 143 Ill. 2d 542, 578 N.E.2d 921 (1991). I disagree regarding the issue of whether claimant’s injuries arose out of and in the course of her employment. The area where the bathroom is located is not an area generally open to the public, and the record substantiates sufficient evidence on which a reasonable trier of fact could infer that the bathroom floor was dirty on the date in question, August 8, 2003, and that this condition resulted in claimant’s fall. This inference is not only possible, but reasonably probable such that a trier of fact, the Commission, could reasonably make such a determination. While I agree that the arbitrator seems to have improperly shifted the burden of proof as to the condition of the floor to the employer rather than claimant, there is sufficient basis in the record for the Commission to reach the conclusion that it did. The record references photographs and testimony of fellow employees as to the condition of the bathroom floor. The majority argues that this testimony and photographs together are too speculative to support the Commission’s determination. But, to reach that conclusion, the majority is reweighing the evidence; that is the province of the Commission. It is well settled in workers’ compensation cases that the reviewing courts, either the circuit court or our court, cannot substitute our judgment for that of the Commission as trier of fact. I would, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the circuit court which confirmed the decision of the Commission. On the above basis, I respectfully dissent.