Court Opinion

ID: 9759703
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:25:50.576063+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:05:59.003991
License: Public Domain

KELLER, J.,
concurring.
I write separately to address how an appellate court should review a factfinder’s determination concerning whether an appellant’s subjective expectation of privacy is one that society is willing to recognize as reasonable. I strongly disagree with Judge Meyers’ claim that the reasonableness of a defendant’s expectation of privacy should be resolved by the factfinder as an “empirical matter.”
Appellate courts generally review two types of questions: questions of fact and questions of law. Questions of fact are subject to a deferential sufficiency review: an appellate court merely attempts to determine whether the evidence contained in the record supports (sufficiently) the factual conclusions determined by the trier of fact. On the other hand, questions of law are reviewed de novo by the appellate tribunal. But most issues submitted to a factfinder contain both factual and legal elements. These issues are commonly referred to as questions regarding the “application of law to fact” or “mixed questions of law and fact.” When a jury is called upon to decide one of these mixed questions (e.g. guilt-innocence), the trial judge has the responsibility to instruct the jury on all of the legal issues contained in it. The jury then determines the facts and applies the instructions given by the trial judge. In a motion to suppress context the trial judge occupies the roles of both factfinder and lawgiver. While issues of fact and law may be imbedded within a singularly phrased question, appellate courts must nevertheless separate the legal and factual elements contained in that mixed question and review each according to the appropriate standards. Thompson v. Keohane, — U.S.-,- -, 116 S.Ct. 457, 465-466, 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995). Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 117, 106 S.Ct. 445, 453, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985).
The second prong of the Fourth Amendment standing test for searches — whether a defendant’s subjective expectation of privacy is one that society is willing to recognize as reasonable — is one of these “mixed” questions. Imbedded in this mixed question are two subsidiary questions: (1) what are the circumstances giving rise to the defendant’s subjective expectation of privacy, and (2) is society willing to recognize those circumstances as giving rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy? The first is a question of fact; the second is a question of law. Accord Chapa v. State, 729 S.W.2d 723, 728 n. 3 (Tex.Crim.App.1987). See also Thompson, — U.S. at-, 116 S.Ct. at 465.
The majority cites six factors from Callo-way v. State, 743 S.W.2d 645, 651 (Tex.Crim.App.1988) as relevant to “proof’ of a legitimate expectation of privacy. While the first five factors involve circumstances that give *146rise to a defendant’s subjective expectation of privacy, and hence, may be characterized as factual in nature, the sixth factor relates solely to society’s viewpoint, a legal question. A defendant does not have a burden to prove the legitimacy of his expectations. His burden is to prove that he had a subjective expectation of privacy and to prove the facts upon which he based that expectation. It is up to the courts to say whether those facts create a legitimate expectation of privacy, and thus confer standing. Calloway does not hold otherwise — the opinion lists the six factors as “factors which should be considered in making the determination whether an accused has ‘standing.’ ” Id. at 651. Callo-way did not hold that it was the defendant’s burden to prove those factors. Although Calloway does say the defendant “bears the burden of proving that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy,” id. at 650, citing Wilson v. State, 692 S.W.2d 661, 667 (Tex. Crim.App.1984), it is clear from the paragraphs following that statement that the opinion refers to the circumstances upon which the expectation of privacy is based (i.e. the first subsidiary question). 743 S.W.2d at 650.
I cannot agree with Judge Meyers when he says that in reviewing the factfinder’s determination of standing or lack of standing, “[Ajppellate courts should [not] engage in a dynamic application of ... any ... legal rule to the facts of [a] case.” Judge Meyers says that we should review such determinations by “a different and more deferential standard.” Villarreal v. State, 935 S.W.2d at 154 (Meyers, J., dissenting). We should not.
Whatever degree of deference we give with regard to the determination of a question of fact, we will, up to a point, necessarily give to a legal conclusion based upon that fact question. It cannot be otherwise because the legal conclusion has as one component that fact determination. But, Judge Meyers’ dissent ignores the second component that circumscribes the factfinder’s discretion — the law. Judge Meyers would allow the factfin-der to determine standing as an empirical matter similar to the approach taken to defining “contemporary community standards” in an obscenity prosecution. As in obscenity prosecutions, Judge Meyers presumably would permit the defendant to introduce evidence of society’s attitudes and expectations. See Kaplan v. Calif., 413 U.S. 115, 121, 93 S.Ct. 2680, 2685, 37 L.Ed.2d 492 (1973)(de-fense should be permitted to introduce expert testimony concerning contemporary community standards in obscenity prosecution). Berg v. State, 599 S.W.2d 802, 805 (Tex.Crim.App.1980)(defense should be permitted to introduce material evidencing society’s standards, such as other publications circulated within the community, in obscenity prosecution).
This empirical approach is misguided. Whether society is willing to recognize a particular set of circumstances as involving a reasonable expectation of privacy has always been treated as a question of law by the United States Supreme Court. There are numerous examples where the Supreme Court has conducted a de novo review of whether a particular set of factual circumstances gave rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 96-100, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 1687-1690, 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990)(ovemight guest has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the home in which he stays). Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec. Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 616-617, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 1412-1413, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989)(a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to tests of his blood and urine). Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449-452, 109 S.Ct. 693, 696-698, 102 L.Ed.2d 835 (1989)(no reasonable expectation of privacy from aerial surveillance of areas open to view from the air). Calif. v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-43, 108 S.Ct. 1625, 1628-1630, 100 L.Ed.2d 30 (1988)(no reasonable expectation of privacy in discarded garbage). O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 716-719, 107 S.Ct. 1492, 1497-1498, 94 L.Ed.2d 714 (1987)(whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in the government workplace and the extent of that privacy must be determined on a case-by-case basis; the Court determined that there was a reasonable expectation of privacy under the circumstances presented). Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525-528, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 3199-3201, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984)(no reasonable expectation *147of privacy in prison cell). Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178-181, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 1741-1743, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984)(no reasonable expectation of privacy in open fields, but there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in curtilage surrounding the home). Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 292 & 295, 104 S.Ct. 641, 646 & 647-648, 78 L.Ed.2d 477 (1984)(whether a reasonable expectation of privacy remains in a home damaged by fire depends upon the extent of damage; the Court found that there was a reasonable expectation of privacy under the circumstances presented). Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-361, 88 S.Ct. 507, 516-517, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)(Harlan, J. concur-ringXreasonable expectation of privacy in telephone conversations from telephone booth).
While most of these cases announced bright-line rules, Ortega and Clifford recognized that some situations require a case-by-case approach. Nevertheless, in all of the above-cited cases, the Supreme Court decided on a de novo basis whether the fact situation presented gave rise to an expectation of privacy that society is willing to recognize as reasonable. Once the Supreme Court holds that a particular factual circumstance does or does not give rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy, that determination is not subject to re-evaluation by a factfinder on the basis of evidence presented in the case before the factfinder. For example, a factfinder is not at liberty to decide that society now recognizes a reasonable expectation of privacy in aerial surveillance, discarded garbage, prison cells, or open fields. Nor may a factfinder decide that society now refuses to recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy for overnight guests, with regard to blood and urine tests, or in telephone conversations. These issues have been decided as questions of law. Even in the case-by-ease opinions, the Supreme Court decided as a question of law whether the particular case involved a reasonable expectation of privacy. Once decided, other cases involving the same circumstances must be decided the same way — the factfinder has no discretion to decide otherwise. The Supreme Court has merely decided not to formulate a general, bright-line rule for the category of circumstances involved but to permit the later development of legal precedent to address factual variations that may occur. See also Thompson, — U.S. at-, 116 S.Ct. at 467 (“case-by-case elaboration when a constitutional right is implicated may more accurately be described as law declaration than as law application”). Recently, the Supreme Court has expressly recognized that, on petition for certiorari, it has engaged in de novo review of state court determinations concerning whether a particular set of circumstances gave rise to reasonable suspicion. Ornelas v. United States, — U.S.-,-, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 1662, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996), citing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990). The Court held that federal appellate courts must conduct a de novo review of probable cause and reasonable suspicion determinations even though the questions involved are “fluid concepts” that “are not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.” Ornelas, — U.S. at-, 116 S.Ct. at 1661 (internal quotation marks omitted). The probable eause/reasonable suspicion issue is analytically similar to the question about society’s reasonable expectation of privacy. Both are Fourth Amendment questions that turn upon objective determinations.
Where the fact situation is one of first impression — either because the case is one which may be susceptible to a bright-line rule where no rule has yet been formulated or because a ease-by-case category is involved where the specific fact-situation has not been addressed — then evidence of society’s attitudes and expectations may be helpful to the court in determining, as a legal matter, whether the case involves a reasonable expectation of privacy. Whether a case of first impression involves a reasonable expectation of privacy, and whether a bright-line rule or a case-by-case approach should be applied, must necessarily be determined on a case-by-case basis:
We have no talisman that determines in all cases those privacy expectations that society is prepared to accept as reasonable. . Instead, “the Court has given weight to *148such factors as the intention of the Framers of the Fourth Amendment, the uses to which the individual has put a location, and our societal understanding that certain areas deserve the most scrupulous protection from government invasion.” [Citation omitted].
Ortega, 480 U.S. at 715, 107 S.Ct. at 1496 (Emphasis added). But, as the Supreme Court authorities show, once a legal rule has been fashioned, that rule controls all future cases involving the facts covered by the rule, and the only question for the factfinder is whether the facts fit the legal rule established.
Moreover, the question in this case— whether the circumstances give rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy — is very similar to other questions which the Supreme Court has expressly held to be questions of law subject to independent review: (1) the “in custody” determination under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and (2) the voluntariness of a confession, (3) the effectiveness of counsel, (4) the potential conflict of interest arising out of an attorney’s representation of multiple defendants, and (5) determinations of probable cause and reasonable suspicion. See Thompson, — U.S. at-, 116 S.Ct. at 465 (issues 1-4). Ornelas, generally (issue 5). In all of these situations, the Supreme Court held that the “what happened” issues were factual and subject to deference but that the “ultimate question” was subject to independent review because of its “uniquely legal dimension.” Thompson, — U.S. at -, 116 S.Ct. at 465, citing Miller, 474 U.S. at 116, 106 S.Ct. at 452—453. See also Orne-las, — U.S. at-, 116 S.Ct. at 1661-1662.
Further, as Judge McCormick says in his concurring opinion, DuBose v. State, 915 S.W.2d 493 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) and State v. Carter, 915 S.W.2d 501 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) were not intended to change the manner in which appellate courts review trial courts’ decisions. Those eases just restate what has always been the rule regarding an appellate court’s deference to a trial court’s decision. They simply say that the appellate court gives deference to the trial court, reversing a decision only if the lower court applied an erroneous legal standard or if the facts cannot support the legal conclusion. This is not new. Carter and DuBose were not intended to and did not undermine older decisions.1
I also agree with Judge McCormick’s discussion and argument, based upon Miller, that the reasonable expectation of privacy question must be treated as one of law to avoid “subjecting our constitutional rights too closely to majoritarian political processes and temporary passions of the moment” and because trial courts are not in a better position than appellate courts to determine this matter. I would add that treating the question as one of law would also serve to “guide police, unify precedent, and stabilize the law.” Thompson, -— U.S. at-, 116 S.Ct. at 467. Even a case-by-case approach of de novo review permits judges to “identif[y] recurrent patterns” and “advane[e] uniform outcomes. If they cannot supply a ‘definite rule,’ they nonetheless can reduce the area of uncertainty.” Id. at-n. 13, 116 S.Ct. at 466 n. 13.
In his concurring opinion, Judge Clinton argues that appellate courts need only employ de novo review on an occasional basis, to set up “guideposts” to follow. He contends that we can achieve uniformity of application by limiting de novo review to “novel-but-likely-to-reeur” fact patterns. Whatever the merits of this view as a general proposition, it seems ill-suited to questions concerning reasonable expectations of privacy. Like the *149reasonable suspicion/probable cause determination, whether society recognizes an expectation of privacy as reasonable is a legal rule that acquires content only through application. See Ornelas, — U.S. at-, 116 S.Ct. at 1661-1662. Judge Clinton’s proposed standard would be adequate if appellate courts wished only to craft bright-line rules. But, as the previous discussion in this opinion shows, bright-line rules are not always appropriate. Where a case-by-case approach is warranted, it seems odd to attempt to ascertain whether one particular fact situation deserves special treatment while another deserves only deferential review. Such an attempt would likely cause the search for a standard of review to degenerate into a mere ad hoc determination. Moreover, in an area of law subject to a case-by-case approach, minor differences may change the outcome. De novo review is-therefore “necessary if appellate courts are to maintain control of, and to clarify the legal principles.” Id.
The present case is a good example of the hazards of a policy of engaging in “occasional” de novo review. While Judge Clinton believes that this case is not important enough to analyze de novo, I would point out that there is a large degree of uncertainty in the law concerning the treatment of non-overnight guests. The present situation, analyzed from a de novo perspective, would help reduce uncertainty in this area. While my criticism might be characterized as a mere disagreement on whether the present case is important enough to warrant de novo review, I think the disagreement itself illustrates the difficulty inherent in attempting to apply Judge Clinton’s “guidepost” principle. More importantly, though, all cases that involve minor variations are useful in narrowing the area of uncertainty, and if two cases are identical, there is no reason to decide them differently. Ornelas, — U.S. at -, 116 S.Ct. at 1661-1662.
Further, it is clear from Miller, Thompson, Ornelas, and other Supreme Court cases, that de novo review of whether certain circumstances give rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy is mandated at every point in the federal system whether the ease comes by way direct appeal, by certiorari from a state or federal court judgment, or by habeas corpus from a state or federal conviction. Although the standard of review in a Fourth Amendment context may be characterized as a mere procedural requirement, and therefore not mandated upon the states, see Goeke v. Branch, 514 U.S.-,-, 115 S.Ct. 1275, 1277, 131 L.Ed.2d 152, 158 (1995) and Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977), Supreme Court authority should at least be given serious consideration when formulating rules relating to federal constitutional provisions. I see no persuasive reason to deviate from the federal standard of de novo review as it relates to the issues before us.
The question remains: what rule do we formulate in the present situation? While the Supreme Court has drawn a bright-line rule holding that an overnight guest has a reasonable expectation of privacy, the Court has not drawn such a bright-line rule with respect to a non-overnight guest. The majority acknowledges that a non-overnight guest may have standing, depending on the circumstances, majority op. at footnote 4, but, without establishing a bright-line rule, holds that the facts in this case do not establish standing. I agree with the majority’s approach and with its conclusion. The present situation seems to be similar to the government employee scenario in Ortega, in that it does not appear to lend itself readily to bright-line rules. Given the wide variety of circumstances that might involve non-overnight guests who arrange and conduct business transactions, I am unwilling to hold that such a non-overnight guest could never have an expectation of privacy. Instead, I would hold that whether a non-overnight guest has a reasonable expectation of privacy is a question of law to be decided on a case-by-case basis, using appropriate factors such as those recognized in Calloway. Applying those factors, I agree with the majority that the non-overnight guest in the present case did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy under the circumstances shown.2 The “circum*150stances shown,” being a subsidiary factual inquiry, are those supported by the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling.
With these comments, I join the Court’s opinion.

. There is some language in both opinions which suggests that appellate courts should defer to a trial court's determination of the legal significance of the facts presented. DuBose, 915 S.W.2d at 496. Carter, 915 S.W.2d at 504. But it is clear to this writer that, in both cases, the courts of appeals erred by conducting a de novo review of the facts and/or the inferences obtained from those facts and not merely of the law. See DuBose, 915 S.W.2d at 497 & 497 n. 6. Carter, 915 S.W.2d at 503-504. A de novo review of the facts is typically reserved for claims involving First Amendment freedoms. See City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 458 n. 6, 107 S.Ct. 2502, 2507 n. 6, 96 L.Ed.2d 398 (1987). Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 506-511, 104 S.Ct. 1949, 1962-1965, 80 L.Ed.2d 502 (1984). Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 282, 94 S.Ct. 2770, 2780, 41 L.Ed.2d 745 (1974).

. I agree with the majority, that “society” in this context means American society. See Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 43-44, 108 S.Ct. at 1630-1631. Appellant makes an interesting argument that the *150Texas Constitution confers broader protection. He suggests that the proper focus of the Texas constitutional provision is Texas society, as opposed to American society, and that Texas society recognizes a more expansive tradition of hospitality than the country as a whole (“Mi casa es su casa”). However, even if appellant's contention were true (and I express no opinion in that regard), the circumstances of the business transaction present in this case do not implicate the notions of hospitality referred to by appellant.