Court Opinion

ID: 9669365
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:53:58.292709+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:55.949394
License: Public Domain

O’Hara, J.
(concurring in reversal). I am obligated to vote to reverse with instructions *508to enter an order dismissing the declarations for failure to state a cause of action of which the court had jurisdiction. This is for the reason that the legislature abolished the cause of action here sought to be asserted. Fairly read, it seems to me the whole thrust of the declarations is that the boys entered upon the property of the defendant to trap; that defendant had knowledge that many people did so and that defendant was ordinarily negligent in the maintenance of the premises.1 Altering the order of the paragraphs merely for clarity, the pleadings read:
“27. That David Heider is the minor son of the plaintiff, Donald Heider, and on the 21st day of December, 1958 said son with his brother, James Donald Heider and their dog set out muskrat trapping.
“28. That David Heider with his brother and dog entered the defendant’s premises and walked onto one of the defendant chemical ponds.
“5. That the defendant knew persons came on their land where their artificial storage ponds are located to trap for muskrats, mink, et cetera.
“21. That the defendant failed to have any warning signs and failed to maintain the property to protect children.” (Emphasis this Court’s.)
The wording is identical in the companion case.
The statute2 involved is herewith set out in its entirety:
“An act restricting suits by persons coming upon the property of another for the purpose of hunting, fishing or trapping; and to declare the limited liability of owners of property within this State.

*509
“The People of the State of Michigan enact:

“300.201 Prohibiting tort actions against landowners for recovery of damages, unless caused by negligence, etc., of owner, tenant or lessee. [M.S.A. ■13.1485]
“Sec. 1. No cause of action shall arise for injuries to any person ivho is on the lands of another without paying to such other a valuable consideration for the purpose of fishing, hunting or trapping, with or without permission, against the owner, tenant or lessee of said premises unless the injuries were caused by the gross negligence or wilful and wanton misconduct of the owner, tenant or lessee.
“Approved June 10,1953.” (Emphasis supplied.)
At the time of these unfortunate deaths the Constitution limited the original jurisdiction of our .circuit courts to “all matters civil and criminal not ■excepted in this constitution and not prohibited by law.” (Const 1908, art 7, §10.)3
No right or rights of action as pleaded here could have accrued, to the personal representatives of either decedent, the declared acts of defendant not being “such as would (if death had not ensued) have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages, in respect thereof” (CL 1948, § 691.581 [Stat Ann 1959 Cum Supp §27.711]).
With or without raising of the question below, the circuit court was possessed of no jurisdiction to hear and determine the merits of plaintiffs’ allegations. See the long list of authorities cited in In re Fraser’s Estate, 288 Mich 392, 394, as supporting this settled principle:
“Courts are bound to take notice of the limits of their authority, and a court may, and "should, on its own motion, though the question is not raised by the pleadings or by counsel, recognize its lack *510of jurisdiction and act accordingly by staying proceedings, dismissing the action, or otherwise disposing thereof, at any stage of the proceedings.”
The principle quoted was applied in Lehman v. Lehman, 312 Mich 102, 105 and Second National Bank & Trust Co. v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 321 Mich 28, 45. It is controlling here; hence my vote as indicated. The situation here is the same as if plaintiff had declared for alienation of affections.  Defendant, having failed to raise the jurisdictional question in due time, should not have costs.
Black and Smith, JJ., concurred with O’Hara, J.

 In view of the statute, it matters not whether the hoys were licensees, invitees, or trespassers.

 PA 1953, No 201 (CLS 1961, § 300.201; Stat Ann 1958 Kev § 13.1485).

 For the corresponding present provision, see Const 1963, art 6, §13.