Court Opinion

ID: 9628040
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:05:30.257408+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:36.890768
License: Public Domain

Dore, J.
(dissenting in part, concurring in part) — The custodian of a minor may enlist the aid of the State Attorney General in securing support obligations which are due and owing. These support enforcement services are provided by the State regardless of the financial status of the custodian. RCW 74.20.040. Thus, even though a custodial parent earns a salairy sufficient to comfortably support the household or even if such custodian is a millionaire or trustee bank, the State's services are available for a nominal fee.
Const, art. 8, § 5 reads:
The credit of the state shall not, in any manner be given or loaned to, or in aid of, any individual, association, company or corporation.
The words of the constitution are clear and unambiguous. The cost to the State of providing such support enforcement service constitutes giving the State's credit. A custodial parent is a private "individual" to whom the State's *269credit may not be given.
This court has recognized an exception to the above quoted constitutional prohibition when the State's money is disbursed to needy and infirm individuals. Morgan v. Department of Social Security, 14 Wn.2d 156, 127 P.2d 686 (1942). Providing care for these individuals is a "recognized public governmental [function]". State v. Guaranty Trust Co., 20 Wn.2d 588, 592, 148 P.2d 323 (1944).
Const, art. 8, § 5 will be violated if the State's coffers are used to enforce support obligations for custodial parents other than those who receive public assistance, or who would be forced onto the welfare roles if the delinquent support payments are not collected.
I agree with the majority that the scheme need not offend the constitution. Standards must be set and regulations promulgated by the secretary2 so that custodial parents who are financially secure are not offered the State's funds. With such restriction, the enforcement services statutory scheme can be upheld as coming within the "aid to poor and infirm" exception to Const, art. 8, § 5's prohibitions.
The majority today upholds the support enforcement services statutory scheme by defining enforcement of child support obligations as a new "recognized public governmental function". Majority opinion, at 261.
I cannot agree with the majority that a recognized public governmental function is found whenever enforcement of support obligations are at issue. A closer look at the exception for the needy will clarify my position.
Const, art. 8, § 7 provides, in part:
No county, city, town or other municipal corporation shall hereafter give any money, or property, or loan its money, or credit to or in aid of any individual, associa*270tion, company or corporation, except for the necessary support of the poor and infirm . . .
Generally, section 7 prohibits local entities from doing what section 5 prohibits the State from doing. One obvious difference between these two sections, relevant here, is section 7's express exception to the constitutional prohibition when the funds are used to aid the poor and sick. Although this court has refused to create an exemption to a constitutional prohibition where none is expressed, State ex rel. O'Connell v. Port of Seattle, 65 Wn.2d 801, 806, 399 P.2d 623 (1965), judicial constitutional interpretation engrafted the "needy and infirm" exception onto section 5.
When article 8 was drafted, local governments were looked to as the appropriate source for welfare relief. In the wake of the Depression and consistent with the national trend, the state legislature shifted the responsibility for welfare relief to the State from the traditionally local arena. Shortly thereafter, this court carved out an exception to article 8, section 5, parallel to that found in the language of article 8, section 7. Morgan v. Department of Social Security, 14 Wn.2d 156, 127 P.2d 686 (1942). Although section 5 does not contain an express exception for "the necessary support of the poor and infirm", we have construed sections 5 and 7 as containing similar restrictions, similar exceptions thereto, and as implementing nearly identical policies with respect to different political entities.
Washington Health Care Facilities Auth. v. Ray, 93 Wn.2d 108, 115, 605 P.2d 1260 (1980). Relying on the holding in Morgan, that the State may lend its credit to the needy who are not sick, we held that the State may, likewise, lend its credit to the sick who are not needy. Health Care Facilities. The "poor and infirm" exception to section 5 thus became the "poor or infirm" exception. We illustrated our view of the government's role with the following example:
[I]t is only reasonable that our emergency medic units go to the aid of all persons in need of immediate medical attention without first inquiring as to their financial *271ability. To require that the infirm also be needy before they could receive any sort of assistance from the state or a municipality would be absurd in our opinion.
Health Care Facilities, at 116. The "recognized public governmental function" which established the "poor and infirm" exception to the prohibitions of section 5 in the context of the poor, was, through Health Care Facilities, extended to aid the infirm. The role of the government as provider to those in financial and medical need is not a new concept. Welfare relief is a public governmental function by definition. In some form or another, the needy must be aided by the State.
In contrast, however, is the State's interest in the support of minor children. That there is such an interest is beyond question. Heney v. Heney, 24 Wn.2d 445, 165 P.2d 864 (1946). Such interest is substantial, rising to the constitutional magnitude of "compelling". State v. Meacham, 93 Wn.2d 735, 738, 612 P.2d 795 (1980). At times, this interest has been transformed into authority for the State to become a party in actions where minor children are involved. In Fuqua v. Fuqua, 88 Wn.2d 100, 558 P.2d 801 (1977), the prosecuting attorney was found to have power to appear on behalf of the State when an attorney's lien threatened to diminish funds paid into the registry of the court which constituted, in part, child support arrearages. Although the court found such power inherent in the prosecutor's role as county attorney, Fuqua, at 102-03, certain statutory provisions also provided express authority for the State to step into cases involving support of minor children. Fuqua, at 103-04. The State's interest in the welfare of minor children was evident in Meacham where we held that the State may require, in a paternity suit, that the alleged father submit small amounts of blood for testing.
I do not question that the State has an interest in such cases. Further, this interest permits the State to intrude *272when minors are involved. However, such authority is not absolute; a constitutional limit on the State's acts is found in Const, art. 8, § 5. The primary responsibility for child support resides with the parents. The State seeks to ensure that that support is forthcoming.
When minor children are involved, the state's interest is that, in so far as is possible, provision shall be made for their support, education, and training, to the end that they may grow up to be worthy and useful citizens.
Heney, at 459; Corson v. Corson, 46 Wn.2d 611, 615, 283 P.2d 673 (1955). The majority allows the State to provide support enforcement services to custodial parents who have the means to provide for the minor child until the delinquent support payments are made. The State's interest in securing the support of minor children is satisfied when court action is taken to see that a judgment of support is enforced. The State may provide the means to effectuate such collection only when the custodial parent is "needy" as defined earlier.3 In such case, the state constitution will not be offended, and the State's interest in seeing that minor children are cared for will be satisfied.
I fear that if this court holds the State interest at stake here to be a "recognized public governmental function", for the purposes of excepting the scheme at issue from the prohibitions of Const, art. 8, § 5, a dangerous precedent will be set. There are many State concerns. The State may not lend or give monetary support to certain recipients, however, merely because of the State's interest in the subject. In Johns v. Wadsworth, 80 Wash. 352, 141 P. 892 (1914), the question was the county's power to donate money to the Western Washington Fair Association, a private corporation organized to promote and arrange for the county *273fair. By statute, the county commissioners were to be made ex officio members of the Fair Association. This court quoted from an argument of counsel as follows:
"Whitworth college is almost on the point of being removed from Tacoma to Spokane, because it needs money. The college is a great public benefit to Tacoma, probably as much as the fair is to the county. What is to hinder the legislature from authorizing the city to supply the lacking funds, giving them subject to the condition that the mayor shall be ex officio a member of the college board of trustees, and that the college treasurer shall report annually how the money was spent? Many people think that one of the greatest institutions a city can have is a theater and auditorium; why not contribute ten or fifty thousand dollars to the construction of one, put a councilman or two on the board, and have a yearly account filed?"
Johns, at 355-56. The court found that allowing the donation would unconstitutionally lend the credit of the county. Under today's holding, we will be free to uphold the donation to the fair by declaring that such fairs are "recognized public governmental functions". We have been reluctant in the past to broaden our interpretation of the lending of credit provisions and I would not do so in the instant case.
In summary, I hold that the State Attorney General can provide legal counsel at State expense to aid a custodial parent in recovering past-due child support payments without violating Const.* art. 8, § 5, provided that: (1) the custodial parent is receiving public assistance, or (2) there would be a real possibility the custodial parent would be forced onto the welfare roles if she or he would not be able to collect support payments. To ensure that the parent enjoying the support enforcement services is "needy", the secretary must establish guidelines to screen applicants as to their financial condition. I have suggested that a screening procedure may be in the form of affidavit wherein the custodial parent swears to his or her financial status. It is constitutionally impermissible to use the credit of the State to finance legal services for the financially affluent.
*274I would reverse and remand to the trial court for the purpose of determining the financial status of the custodial parent and for entry of judgment in accordance with the provisions of this opinion.
Rosellini, J., concurs with Dore, J.

 RCW 74.20.040 also provides, in part: "The secretary may establish by regulation, such reasonable standards as he deems necessary to limit applications for support enforcement services. Said standards shall take into account the income, property, or other resources already available to support said person for whom a support obligation exists."

 See footnote 2. The secretary of the Department of Social and Health Services may require, for example, that the custodial parent file an affidavit which, in effect, states that without the State's help in enforcing the judgment, the parent will be forced onto the public assistance roles. The Attorney General may go behind such affidavit, if necessary, to determine the precise financial status of such parent.