Court Opinion

ID: 8037305
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-09 03:22:24.301722+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:37:11.079501
License: Public Domain

Paine, J.,
dissenting.
With due regard for the opinion of the majority of the members of this court, I respectfully dissent from the opinion which has been adopted.
It is very evident that it is a close case, for many decisions can be cited from other states to support either theory. Hopper was sent by his employer to a tavern in Stuart to repair and adjust a cooling system which was out of order. This work required hours to correctly adjust the system so it would properly cool the beer and produce the proper foam content. He was a skilled workman at his place of employment. He had not completed the j ob assigned to him. He had made an examination of the cooling system and the guage within a few minutes of the time he was killed. He had not replaced the caps; his tools were ready for use.
All admit that his death occurred in the course of his employment. The only doubt in any one’s mind is whether it arose out of his employment. His employer knew just the kind of a place to which he was sending him. There were very few stools in front of the bar. It was perfectly proper for him to occupy one of these stools, and it brought him in close contact with the man who killed him.
I will refer to a very few cases from other courts, which strike me as somewhat in point, and where recovery was allowed.
In State v. District Court, 134 Minn. 16, 158 N. W. 713, a bartender was accidentally struck in the right eye by a drinking glass thrown by a patron who was so drunk that he did not know what he was doing. The court here considered the question, did the accident arise out of the bartender’s employment, and did such employment in such a place result in the accident? The court answers the questions in the affirmative.
*847In Shaw, Ltd., v. Macfarlane, 52 Scottish Law Rep. 236, a helper in a foundry was struck by an intoxicated stranger and injured, and the court held that he suffered the injury by an accident arising out of, and in the course of, his employment.
In a Texas case, an oil pumper was lured at night from the shack where he was required to sleep, and was shot and robbed. It was held that the heirs could recover. It is said that, if a fireman is playing cards at a fire station and is injured, no one would contend he was not at his employment. Southern Surety Co. v. Shook (1931) 44 S. W. (2d) (Tex. Civ. App.) 425.
In Ivory v. Philpot Construction Co., 145 So. (La. App.) 784, a negro was asleep in a tent provided for highway employees, and was injured by a shot from a passing truck at about 10 p. m. A judgment for defendant was reversed, as the injury was held by the court of appeals for Louisiana to “arise out of and in the course of the employment.”
In an opinion by Martin, C. J., of the court of appeals for the District of Columbia in 1936, he held that the injury of a cook in a restaurant, when he was suddenly stabbed by a drunk-crazed stranger, arose out of and in the course of his employment. The court said: “It was suffered by the claimant when at his place of duty, when upon the industrial premises of his employer, and while he was engaged at the work for which he was employed.” Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Hoage, 85 Fed. (2d) 417. Many cases holding to the contrary can be found in the reports from states where a liberal interpretation is not followed, as in Nebraska.
I now submit a very few decisions from our own court, which should be carefully considered.
' In Ridenour v. Lewis, 121 Neb. 823, 238 N. W. 745, it was held that, when a radio repair man in passing along the street in Omaha was assaulted by hold-up men, robbed of his own money, and killed, his death arose out of, and in the course of, his employment. Many cases are cited in this opinion, one from the House of Lords, the famous case *848of Dennis v. White & Co. (1917) A. C. 479, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 325, which says that, where a workman meets with an accident by reason of a risk of the streets to which his employment exposes him, the accident arises out of, as well as in the course of, his employment. See 15 Neb. Law Bulletin, 202.
In Miller v. Reisch Co., 132 Neb. 338, 271 N. W. 853, an employee was sitting at a table and eating dinner. The foreman got up from the table and knocked him down, and this court held that recovery could be had, and that his injuries arose out of his employment.
In Boyce v. Burleigh, 112 Neb. 509, 199 N. W. 785, an employee of a chicken hatchery, aged 19, with several other boys, was handling a gun, contrary to the orders of his employer, and this court held that there could be a recovery, for while the employee was not engaged in doing any work for the master at the time of the accident, still the accident arose out of the employment.
In Urak v. Morris & Co., 107 Neb. 411, 186 N. W. 345, the plaintiff was struck on the hip by a shovel by a fellow workman, the blow being given just for fun, and this court held that the injury occurred during a personal altercation between the two, and that it did not arise out of the performance of any duty or service to the employer. This decision would be authority for denying compensation to the widow in the case at bar if the drunken ex-convict and the deceased had engaged in a quarrel, fight, or altercation, but the evidence does not sustain that conclusion.
In the case of Goodwin v. Omaha Printing Co., 131 Neb. 212, 267 N. W. 419, a traveling man for the Omaha Printing Company, using his own automobile, picked up a “hitchhiker,” who shot and killed the traveling man four miles west of Schuyler in robbing him of his car, and in a careful review of many authorities it was held that the duties of the deceased required him to travel, and that highway robbery was a hazard of the highway, and of an employee who was required to travel the highway in the service of his employer. It was claimed in the Goodwin case that the de*849ceased, by inviting the “hitchhiker” to ride, brought the injuries upon himself, but the decision rejects this claim, and says that he did not disobey any directions or instructions of his employer in picking up a “hitchhiker.” Can it be said in the case at bar that Hopper, by being in the tavern, as required by his employer, or in “jollying” the one who struck him, to keep him good-natured if possible, disobeyed any directions or instructions of his employer? Was he in any way responsible for his own death? Again, in the Goodwin-case it is said that the traveling man did not step aside from his employment and act for himself on business or pleasure of his own in picking up a “hitchhiker” to visit with him. He was still within the scope of his employment, and the accident therefore arose out of and in the course of his employment, and that recovery was proper.
I do not think this court made a mistake in allowing the widow of the slain traveling man to recover for his death under the workmen’s compensation law of Nebraska, but the cases are so closely in point that, if the decision is to stand in the case at bar, we should be consistent and set aside the opinion in the case of Goodwin v. Omaha Printing Co., supra, for there was no evidence there that the assault was directed against Goodwin because he was an employee, or because of his employment by the Omaha Printing Company.
In the case at bar, Hopper had not completed his work, but was engaged in it at the time he was killed. He was not loitering there for his own entertainment, but was required to be exactly where he was to properly adjust and test out the cooling machine, which it was his business to repair. In my opinion, considering the liberality with which the compensation law should be construed, these former Nebraska opinions are abundant authority upon which to justify a recovery in the case at bar.