Court Opinion

ID: 9576398
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:24:04.573233+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:07:00.884617
License: Public Domain

Judge KAPELKE
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the analysis and conclusions of the majority as to Parts I and VII of its opinion. However, because Kriho has not challenged the admissibility of the evidence regarding jury deliberations in the underlying case, and because I believe the trial court’s contempt order is supported by the record, even excluding that evidence, I would affirm. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that reversal and remand are required.
This punitive contempt proceeding arises from a 1996 criminal proceeding in which Kriho served as a juror. That case (the underlying case) involved charges of unlawful possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), criminal impersonation, and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia.
At the beginning of the trial in the underlying case, the court informed Kriho and the other prospective jurors of the criminal charges involved. The court then told them of the importance of their listening to all the questions it asked, as well as those asked by the attorneys, and explained the need to obtain a fair and impartial jury. Kriho and the other jurors took an oath in which they agreed to answer truthfully the questions asked by the court or counsel concerning their service as jurors on the case.
After some of the prospective jurors had been called into the jury box, the court asked numerous additional questions, including the following: “Has anybody in the panel been accused of a crime other than traffic stuff? Had to go to court for something?”
In response to the question, one potential juror indicated that he had been accused of vandalism and that his case had gone to trial. Another prospective juror indicated that his son had had a problem with drugs and, as a result, had become involved in the justice system in connection with his use of marijuana.
The prosecutor in his voir dire asked the jurors in the jury box the following questions: “[D]oes anyone have any particular strong feelings, either pro or con, about the laws we have including the law that will apply here that you will get from his Honor ... about the control of dangerous drugs or controlled substances? In other words, it is against the law to possess methamphetamine and that is why we’re here. Does anybody have any particular views about these laws including specifically this one?”
Thereafter, the prosecutor went on to ask individual members of the panel whether they had “any particular views one way or another about the laws in this area?”
After she was called into the jury box, Kriho stated that she had heard all the questions asked by the court and counsel. She was then asked whether any of the questions raised in her mind an answer that might be different from those given by others. She mentioned that she had been involved in a court proceeding in Boulder District Court involving a suit against a developer. Finally, the court asked if she could think of anything that would interfere with her sitting as a fair and impartial juror. She replied in the negative.
The trial in the underlying case resulted in a mistrial after some of the jurors sent the following note to the court:
Can a juror be disqualified for:
Looking up the sentence on the internet for the possession charge. IE (4-6 years)
Juror stated The court criminal system is no place to decide drug charges that they should be decided by family and community. Many of my friends aquan (sic) have used illegal drugs.
*179In July 1996, the People filed a motion for contempt against Kriho which included allegations that in the underlying criminal action: 1) she had not disclosed that she had been arrested in 1984 for possession of a controlled substance (LSD) and had pled guilty and received a deferred judgment and sentence for that offense; and 2) she had not disclosed that she had views in opposition to existing drug laws.
At Kriho’s trial on the contempt motion, the People placed in evidence, among other things, the transcript of the voir dire questions at the trial of the underlying case and documents relating to Kriho’s deferred judgment on the controlled substance possession charge. In addition, they introduced evidence showing that Kriho was active in the Boulder Hemp Initiative Project, an association advocating the legalization of marijuana use.
The People called as witnesses six of the jurors in the underlying trial. Kriho did not object to the testimony of those jurors concerning and revealing what had transpired in the jury deliberations. Kriho herself called one of the jurors in the underlying trial as a witness, and that juror also described what had taken place in deliberations. In addition, in her own testimony, Kriho discussed the deliberations and even indicated how she had voted on the charges and for what reasons.
I.
In my view, the admissibility of the evidence concerning jury deliberations is not before us, nor is the propriety of the trial court’s having considered that evidence. As noted, Kriho did not challenge the testimony in the trial court on that subject and even presented her own evidence detailing what occurred during the deliberations. Also, before trial she had listed all the jurors in the underlying trial as prospective witnesses.
To the extent that Kriho failed to object to the admission of the evidence presented by the People, our review would generally be for plain error. People v. Kruse, 839 P.2d 1 (Colo.1992). Under that standard, reversal is not required unless the error casts serious doubt upon the basic fairness of the trial itself. Wilson v. People, 743 P.2d 415 (Colo.1987).
Here, however, because Kriho not only failed to object but also submitted substantial evidence of her own as to what happened in the deliberations, an analysis based on waiver or even invited error would seem more appropriate. Under the invited error doctrine, a party may not complain on appeal of an error that he or she has invited or injected into the case. See People v. Zapata, 779 P.2d 1307 (Colo.1989); People v. Shackelford, 182 Colo. 48, 511 P.2d 19 (1973).
Notably, in Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 53 S.Ct. 465, 77 L.Ed. 993 (1933), the leading case on contempt based on juror misconduct, Justice Cardozo pointed out that, to the extent the alleged contemnor there had voluntarily disclosed what occurred in deliberations, she had waived any privilege to protect the confidentiality of that information.
In its opinion the majority suggests that Kriho adequately challenged the admissibility of the evidence of juror deliberations in a pre-trial motion. However, none of the pretrial motions addressed the admissibility of such evidence. Accordingly, I cannot share the view that the issue of admissibility has been preserved.
Finally, and significantly, even in this appeal Kriho did not contend either in the briefs or at argument that the evidence regarding the juror deliberations should not have been admitted by the trial court. While she identified admissibility of the evidence as an issue in her notice of appeal, by having failed to address it in the briefs she is deemed to have abandoned it, and we cannot properly rule on the issue. See Sanchez v. State, 730 P.2d 328 (Colo.1986).
Under these circumstances, I can find no basis for reversal based on either the admission of the evidence or the court’s having considered it in determining whether Kriho deliberately failed to disclose pertinent information in the voir dire, whether she did so with the purpose of gaming acceptance upon the jury, and whether she obstructed the administration of justice.
*180I appreciate the vital importance of safeguarding the secrecy of jury deliberations and the critical policy concerns expressed in United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606 (2d Cir.1997). Indeed, in Clark v. United States, supra, 289 U.S. at 13, 53 S.Ct. at 469, 77 L.Ed. at 999, the Supreme Court emphasized that “freedom of debate might be stifled and independence of thought checked if jurors were made to feel that their arguments and ballots were to be freely published to the world.”
Nevertheless, under Clark and its progeny, there is no absolute bar to admission or consideration of evidence of juror deliberations in a later proceeding concerning alleged juror contempt. Rather, the Court stated in Clark that there first has to be a prima facie presentation sufficient to show the court “that the light should be let in.” Clark v. United States, supra, 289 U.S. at 14, 53 S.Ct. at 469, 77 L.Ed. at 1000. See also Bays v. Petan Co., 94 F.R.D. 587 (D.Nev.1982) (allowing evidence of juror deliberations but ultimately finding that juror had not acted willfully); 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2354 (McNaughton rev.1961); 3 J. Weinstein, M. Berger & J. McLaughlin, Weinstein’s Evidence § 606[4] (1966).
Here, the trial court in its written findings determined that such a prima facie showing had been made. It is evident, however, that such a showing was not made before the first of the jurors began testifying about the deliberations. At that point, the court had before it the transcript of the voir dire but had not yet received evidence as to the information withheld by Kriho, such as that regarding her prior deferred judgment on a drug possession charge.
Nevertheless, given the failure of Kriho to challenge the testimony about juror deliberations, either in the trial court or here, I conclude that the admission of that evidence and the court’s consideration of it as corroborative evidence do not provide a basis for reversal.
Finally, because, as discussed below, I believe the court’s contempt order was sufficiently supported by evidence unrelated to the juror deliberations, I conclude that the court’s reception and consideration of such evidence at a bench trial did not so undermine the fundamental fairness of the trial itself as to cast serious doubt upon the reliability of the court’s order. See Wilson v. People, supra. Thus, in my view, there was no plain error.
II.
As noted above, even if I were to assume that the trial court should not have considered the evidence of what occurred in juror deliberations in the underlying case, in my view- the other evidence presented at trial sufficiently supports the trial court’s contempt order.
In considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we must review the evidence and all reasonable inferences which could be drawn from that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. People v. Rodriguez, 914 P.2d 230 (Colo.1996).
An assertion that the evidence is insufficient will not result in reversal of a judgment by a trial court sitting as trier of fact where there is competent evidence in the record to support that court’s findings of fact. People v. Storey, 191 Colo. 546, 554 P.2d 694 (1976).
We must give deference to the trial court’s findings and may not overturn them provided they have record support. “This is true even though a contrary position may find support in the record and even though we might have reached a different result had we been acting as the trier of fact.” People v. Thomas, 853 P.2d 1147, 1149 (Colo.1993).
Further, the determination of the credibility of the witnesses is solely within the province of the factfinder. Kogan v. People, 756 P.2d 945 (Colo.1988); People v. Drake, 841 P.2d 364 (Colo.App.1992).
Pursuant to C.R.C.P. 107, the definition of “contempt” includes “conduct that obstructs the administration of justice.”
In Clark v. United States, supra, the Supreme Court recognized that concealment or misstatement by a juror upon voir dire examination can constitute contempt if its tendency and design are to obstruct the administration of justice. See also In re Mossie, 768 *181F.2d 985 (8th Cir.1985); In re Brogdon, 625 F.Supp. 422 (W.D.Ark.1985); United States v. Lampkin, 66 F.Supp. 821 (S.D.Fla.1946); Witherspoon v. Arkansas, 322 Ark. 376, 909 S.W.2d 314 (1995).
As Justice Cardozo pointed out in Clark v. United States, supra, 289 U.S. at 11, 53 S.Ct. at 468, 77 L.Ed. at 998, a prospective juror whose answers are willfully evasive or knowingly untrue is, when accepted, a juror in name only, whose relation to the court “is tainted in its origin” and is “a mere pretense and sham.”
As our own supreme court has recognized, where a juror conceals or misstates important biographical information relevant to a challenge for cause or a peremptory challenge, “the juror’s deliberate misrepresentation or knowing concealment is itself evidence that the juror was likely incapable of rendering a fair and impartial verdict on the matter.” People v. Dunoyair, 660 P.2d 890, 895 (Colo.1983).
A juror who thus misrepresents or conceals relevant information is guilty of misconduct which may be prejudicial to either or both parties because it impairs the right to challenge for cause or peremptorily. People v. Rael, 40 Colo.App. 374, 578 P.2d 1067 (1978).
Here, the trial court made the following findings of fact, among others, with respect to Kriho’s conduct or omissions as a prospective juror in the trial of the underlying criminal case:
Several times during voir dire the judge, [the prosecutor], and [defense counsel] discussed issues related to drugs with several different jurors. This Court finds that Ms. Kriho was aware that any experiences, or strong opinions she had concerning the drug laws were important issues in selecting the jury. The evidence shows that on 1983, in Boulder County District Court, Ms. Kriho had pled guilty to the felony crime of Possession of a Schedule I controlled substance and was granted a deferred judgment and sentence. The evidence further shows that Ms. Kriho holds strong opinions about the propriety of certain drug laws. She is a founder and activist in an organization called the Boulder Hemp Initiative Project, which has the goal of legalizing marijuana in Colorado. She failed to reveal any of this highly relevant information during the jury selection process.
The court went on to conclude that Kriho had deliberately withheld the pertinent information from the trial court and the parties during the jury selection process and had done so in order that she could be selected to serve on the jury and obstruct the judicial process. In addition, the court concluded that, by deliberately withholding the information, Kriho had in fact obstructed the process of selecting a fair and impartial jury.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence unrelated to deliberations adequately supports the trial court’s findings and its contempt order. It was within the trial court’s province to find, based on such evidence, that Kriho deliberately concealed both the pertinent fact that she had been accused of and received a deferred judgment for unlawful possession of drugs, and the fact that she harbored strong views regarding certain of the drug laws. From that evidence, and permissible inferences that can be drawn from it, the court could also conclude that she had concealed such information for the purpose of getting on the jury and obstructing justice.
III.
Rather than targeting either the admission of the evidence of juror deliberations or the sufficiency of the other evidence to sustain the contempt finding, Kriho’s actual contention on appeal is that: “A juror cannot be charged with criminal contempt of court, and convicted, for actions taking place within the jury room, actions which comprise jury deliberations.”
In other words, Kriho is urging that she was improperly convicted for her conduct in deliberations. As discussed above, however, the evidence that she intentionally concealed pertinent information regarding her previous drug charge and deferred judgment was not derived in any way from the juror-witnesses’ testimony about deliberations. Similarly, the court’s findings concerning Kriho’s conceal*182ment of her views about drug laws are supported by the evidence unrelated to the deliberations.
The trial court in its findings emphasized that Kriho was not being sanctioned for her vote in deciding the underlying case but rather for deliberately misleading the court and counsel during jury selection with the intent to obstruct the legal process.
The court stated in its order:
This case is not now and never has been about how Ms. Kriho voted during jury deliberations. This case is about whether Ms. Kriho misled the trial court and the trial attorneys about important matters during the trial selection process with the intent to remain on the jury and obstruct the legal process. The Court admitted evidence of Ms. Kriho’s conduct during jury deliberations only as it was relevant to the issue of Ms. Kriho’s conduct during the jury selection process.
In my view, the following observation by the Supreme Court in Clark v. United States, supra, 289 U.S. at 17-18, 53 S.Ct. at 470, 77 L.Ed. at 1001-02, applies with equal force to Kriho here:
She has been held to answer for the deceit whereby she made herself a juror, and was thereby placed in a position to vote upon the case at all. What was said and done in the jury room is no more than confirmatory evidence of her state of mind before.
In Clark, the Court concluded that the juror would have been found in contempt even in the absence of any evidence concerning the jury deliberations, based on the showing that she had concealed pertinent information during voir dire. Essentially, the Court concluded that even if it were assumed that the evidence concerning deliberations should not have been allowed, its admission would have been harmless error. In my view, the same analysis would apply here if the harmless error standard were applicable.
While Kriho could not be punished for her statements in deliberations or for how she voted as a juror, she could be found in contempt — as she was — for obstruction of justice stemming from her deliberate failure to disclose critically pertinent information on voir dire.
Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court’s contempt order.