Court Opinion

ID: 9581329
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:13:51.360221+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:51.814896
License: Public Domain

Fontron, J.,
dissenting: I am unable to comprehend the court’s conclusion that it would be inequitable to enforce the restrictive covenant against this defendant. The evidence is undisputed that defendant’s sister and his mother were both informed by the plaintiffs some months previously that the trailer house they planned to *566move onto defendant’s lot would violate the restrictive covenant against trailer houses and that the plaintiffs would file an injunction if the trailer was placed there.
Notwithstanding this advance warning, the sister and her husband, Mr. and Mrs. Thompson, proceeded to purchase and install the trailer on the defendant’s lot. In so doing they knowingly violated a restriction of long standing and bought themselves a lawsuit. Under these circumstances I see no inequity resulting to the defendant or to the Thompsons from the enforcement of the covenant. To the contrary, as I view the matter, the refusal to enforce the restriction results in injustice to the plaintiffs.
Restrictive covenants of the nature involved here, are not strangers to this court, nor has their enforcement been lightly refused. In N. P. Dodge Corp. v. Calderwood, 151 Kan. 978, 101 P. 2d 883, cited in the majority opinion, we spoke on the subject as follows:
“Restrictions on the use of real property are recognized in this state. (Hartman v. Wolverton, 126 Kan. 613, 270 Pac. 584; Clark v. Vaughan, 131 Kan. 438, 292 Pac. 783; Welsh v. Flo, 146 Kan. 807, 73 P. 2d 1084.)
“These restrictions or equitable servitudes are based on the equitable principle of notice—that the person who takes land with notice of a restriction upon it will not in equity and good conscience be permitted to act in violation of these restrictions. (2 Tiffany, Real Property, 2d ed., 1425 et seq., §§ 394-401; Clark, Covenants and Interests Running with Land, p. 148.)” (p. 979.)
While it is true that the right to enforce a restrictive covenant may be lost through laches or waiver (N. P. Dodge Corp. v. Calderwood, supra) no circumstances have been shown here which would justify application of either doctrine. The Thompsons were warned of the consequences some three months before they bought and installed the trailer, and the present suit was filed within 60 days from the time plaintiffs became aware of the violation. The present case presents an entirely different picture from that depicted in the Dodge case where the plaintiff stood by for nearly three years with full knowledge of the violation before taking legal action.
Furthermore, Clark v. Vaughan, 131 Kan. 438, 292 Pac. 783, from a factual standpoint, provides small support for the majority opinion. In that case there was testimony to the effect that enforcement of the restriction against the Vaughan lots would unduly burden them, while sale of their property, freed of the limitation, would not further depreciate the value of the plaintiffs’ premises. I find no evidence of similar import in this case.
*567The numerous “violations” to which the court refers as being so substantial as to indicate a purpose on the part of area residents to abandon or to destroy the restrictive covenants turn out to be somewhat puny when subjected to close scrutiny. One small uninhabited trailer is located on part of a lot three blocks from plaintiff’s residence; four prefabricated houses are mentioned; four businesses are said to have been started, the nature of which are not shown. There are no used car lots in the addition but some used cars are there—but what residential area is without them?
But violations, alone, do not constitute sufficient reason to refuse enforcement of a restrictive covenant. In Hartman v. Wolverton, 126 Kan. 613, 270 Pac. 584, an $800 dwelling had been erected on the defendant’s lot in violation of a restrictive covenant which prohibited the construction of any residence costing less than $2,500. It was claimed by the defendant that the house was only a temporary residence for use until he could get around to building a better one and that other temporary residences had been permitted in the restricted area. In granting relief to the plaintiff, this court said:
“. . . and the fact that other lot owners heretofore have been permitted to build temporary residences on their lots in disregard of the restrictive clause is of no consequence.” (p. 614.)
In my judgment the plaintiffs are entitled to a decree enforcing the plain and unambiguous restriction against trailer houses even though this court opines that enforcement would not benefit the plaintiffs. Manifestly the Hechts believe otherwise. While the restriction has but two more years to run (although it had six years to go when this lawsuit begun its tortuous trip through the courts) who may say with certainty that plaintiffs will reap no benefit from the removal of the trailer house just three short lots away?
In a dissenting opinion in Clark v. Vaughan, supra, Mr. Justice Jochems employed the following language which to me appears pertinent to the circumstances here present:
“In the development of the modern city restrictive covenants are becoming a matter of great moment. Their enforcement becomes important to progressive town building. Courts should not hesitate to extend the strong arm of equity to safeguard and enforce valid covenants where the parties entitled to the benefit thereof have not waived them or permitted their breach under such circumstances as to create an estoppel.” (p. 447.)
This is language which I can understand and approve. Accordingly, with due respect to my colleagues, I am obliged to dissent.