Court Opinion

ID: 9797491
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:22:08.750568+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:56:23.828399
License: Public Domain

EDMONDS, P. J.,
dissenting.
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the administrative law judge’s (ALJ) findings adopted by the board are not supported by substantial evidence. Consequently, I would affirm the board’s decision.
In relevant part, the ALT found:
“After reviewing the medical evidence, I do not believe that Dr. Mason’s opinion is sufficient to establish compens-ability of the stenosis at L4-5 as a combined condition. Although Dr. Mason indicated that the injury was the major cause of the nerve injury, his opinion in this regard is based solely on the temporal relationship between the injury and the occurrence of symptoms. In this regard, Dr. Mason specifically based his belief that the work injury damaged the nerve solely on the fact that the onset of claimant’s symptoms occurred after his injury. (Ex. 6[8A]-14,15). Medical opinions based solely on a ‘temporal relationship’ between the claimant’s work injury and the onset of disability and need for treatment generally do not satisfy the claimant’s burden of proof. Under such circumstances, I conclude that Dr. Mason’s opinion is not sufficient to establish compensability of the stenosis condition.”
(Citations omitted.)
ORS 183.482(8)(c) provides:
“The court shall set aside or remand the order if it finds that the order is not supported by substantial evidence in the record. Substantial evidence exists to support a finding *61when the record viewed, as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.”
Could a reasonable person find on the evidentiary record before the board and the ALJ that Mason specifically based his belief that the work injury damaged the nerve solely on the fact that the onset of symptoms occurred after his injury? The ALJ made the above finding based on testimony of Mason in exhibit 68A, pages 14 and 15. Mason testified, in part, that claimant suffered from a stenosis (narrowing of the spinal canal) before the work injury occurred (exhibit 68A, page 9) and that trauma changed something in the canal to produce symptoms and the need for treatment, (exhibit 68A, page 10). Then, Mason gave the following answers at pages 13-15:
“Q. And we know that he didn’t have this sort of compression prior to the work accident because he would have had symptoms and the need for treatment, correct?
“A. He was essentially symptom-free before.
“Q. Right. So that’s a big part of your analysis?
“A. Yes. That’s right. * * *
* * * *
“Q. And workers — the work injury caused the damage to the nerve?
“A. Yes.
“Q. Okay.
“A. Because he had the onset of symptoms after his injury.”
I am aware of no cognizable legal impediment to a reasonable person inferring from the above testimony that Mason’s opinion about causation was based solely on a temporal relationship between the injury and the symptoms. However, the majority concludes otherwise. First, it points out that Mason
“took a history from claimant, reviewed the other physicians’ opinions and earlier tests, which were inconclusive, reviewed the myelogram and CT scan, and considered the disease process.”
*62187 Or App at 58. Then it describes how Mason reasoned that the symptoms could have occurred as a result of a sudden injury or jerking movement to the stenosis. Based on those factors, the majority concludes that Mason’s “opinion does not rely ‘solely5 on the proposition that, because claimant’s symptoms occurred after the injury, the injury must have caused them.” Id. (footnote omitted).
While the history, the tests, and the opinions of the other doctors all could have been a basis for an opinion regarding causation, Mason did not testify that those factors formed, in fact, the basis of his opinion. Rather, he said that he reached his opinion regarding causation “[b]ecause [claimant] had the onset of symptoms after his injury.” It may be that Mason relied on the factors pointed to by the majority and that a reasonable person could have inferred from all of his testimony that he was relying on more than the temporal relationship between the symptoms and the injury, but the factfinders in this case, the ALJ and the board, were not required to draw that inference, contrary to the majority’s holding.
Because the evidence entitled the ALJ and the board to draw the inference from the evidence that Mason’s opinion was based solely on a temporal relationship, I perceive no proper basis on which to reverse the board,1 and I therefore dissent.

 Claimant presents only one question on appeal: “Does substantial evidence support the Board’s conclusion that Dr. Mason based his opinion supporting com-pensability ‘solely on the temporal relationship between the injury and the occurrence of symptoms!?]’ ”