Court Opinion

ID: 9750787
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 15:32:32.525581+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:22.024330
License: Public Domain

FARRELL, Senior Judge,
concurring:
I join the court’s opinion because the court has no occasion to consider an available argument that, had it been made by Counterpart, would give me serious pause about reversing summary judgment on one of Propp’s two claims of retaliation. As the court explains, Propp alleged that, after he complained of discrimination, Counterpart “changed its tune” by demanding a release of claims it had not earlier required as a condition of talks between the two about a possible consulting agreement. In moving for summary judgment on this point, Counterpart argued only that its conduct had not changed after receiving the letter from Propp’s counsel asserting discrimination, because Propp had always known that a release of claims against the former employer was necessary before Counterpart would discuss such a contractual arrangement with him. On appeal, Counterpart continues to argue that “it is undisputed [that] Counterpart required a release of claims as a condition of entering into a consulting agreement before Propp complained of discrimination” (Br. for Ap-pellees at 9), an argument the court properly rejects as a basis for summary judgment.
What Counterpart does not argue, surprisingly to me, is that Propp’s letter through counsel dramatically changed the parties’ relationship such that, even if Counterpart hadn’t earlier conditioned discussions on an up-front release of claims, it now inarguably had a valid reason to do so. For, what Propp’s letter through counsel said was that (a) he believed he had been discriminated against in Counterpart’s conduct leading to his firing; (b) the discrimination was unlawful under federal and local law; and (c) this matter had to be resolved satisfactorily to Propp by some further arrangement. In short, while “Propp’s preference,” as counsel’s letter said, was “to focus on the future rather than litigate the history of the past few years,” Propp was threatening legal action unless the parties came to some formal agreement1 including, among other options, relinquishment to Propp of “any” right, title and interest in the [Counterpart Communities] program.”
What else than prudent business judgment, one may fairly ask, would cause Counterpart — or any company — to refuse further talks with a former employee about a consulting relationship once he asserts, and insists on maintaining, the right to sue the company if the discussions do not end to his liking? Otherwise put, what is pretextual — a mere disguise for spite or vindictiveness — in a refusal to consider contracting with a person who will not give up the threat of suit except as part of a final “agreement”?2 Had the *873issue been framed to the trial court or us in this way, I would have serious difficulty finding a triable issue of pretext in Counterpart’s reaction to Propp’s threat of legal action. It is not, however, our job to make a party’s case for it.

. As Propp testified in deposition, "[T]hey [Counterpart] knew that I was seeking legal counsel and contemplating an action if we couldn't resolve it.”

. As Propp stated in deposition, he had made *873it clear to Counterpart “that there needs to be one agreement ... that encompassed everything,” including a release of claims against it.