Court Opinion

ID: 9859640
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 22:15:05.442586+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:59:43.021273
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE DOYLE, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. I am concerned that today’s interpretation of section 4 — 103(b) (625 ILCS 5/4 — 103(b) (West 1992)) may unnecessarily impair one of this State’s most essential anti-vehicle theft measures. In my view, the decision contravenes precedent and is at odds with the facts. A uniform system of vehicle identification numbers (VINs) has long been a key tool in the detection and deterrence of vehicle theft. Manufacturers are required to place a unique, original vehicle identification number on each vehicle produced, as well as on certain parts of the vehicles. (See 625 ILCS 5/4 — 107(g) (West 1992).) Strong criminal penalties are imposed under both State and Federal law for removing, tampering, defacing, or destroying the numbers. (625 ILCS 5/4 — 103(a)(2) (West 1992); 18 U.S.C.A. § 511(a) (West Supp. 1993).) It is illegal to buy, receive, possess, sell or dispose of any vehicle with knowledge of a VIN deficiency (625 ILCS 5/4 — 103(a)(4) (West 1992)), and the law explicitly provides a procedure for affixing substitute VIN plates on a vehicle found in violation of these regulations (625 ILCS 5/4 — 107(h) (West 1992)). An important element of this system is the use of VINs in titling and registration. By reference to a VIN, in conjunction with title, registration, and other documentation, the ownership history of any vehicle can be traced from the manufacturer. Computerized access to this information enables law enforcement agencies swiftly and conclusively to identify stolen vehicles. It is apparent that the usual motive for knowingly removing, altering, defacing, destroying, or falsifying a VIN is to render a particular vehicle unidentifiable for purposes of tracing ownership, and it is commonly known that such acts are almost exclusively performed by auto thieves and "chop shop” personnel. In the context of the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act (commonly known as the Dyer Act) (18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2311 through 2313 (West Supp. 1993)), the changing of numbers on a motor vehicle has been held to constitute a concealment, which is not less purposeful or effective than physically hiding the vehicle itself to prevent its discovery by the owner or the officers of the law. See Donaldson v. United States (7th Cir. 1936), 82 F.2d 680, 681; Annot., 56 A.L.R.2d 1309, 1343 (1957); 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles & Highway Traffic § 352, at 541 (1980). Because the alteration and destruction of identification numbers is so inextricably related to the enterprise of vehicle theft, and considering the magnitude of this enterprise and the inherent investigative obstacles to curtailing "chop shop” and "retag” operations, the legislature has declared such conduct to be punishable as a Class 2 felony. (See 625 ILCS 5/4 — 103(b) (West 1992); see also 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles & Highway Traffic § 353, at 542 (1980).) Without an effective VIN system, it may often be impossible to disprove a false claim of ownership by a suspected auto thief or, for that matter, to establish whether a particular vehicle has been stolen. Unlike an innocent irregularity which may be related to a vehicle’s title, registration, and even its odometer, discovering that a vehicle’s VIN plates or impressions have been removed is a clear indication of previous theft. The majority questions the validity of this law, as written, because it imposes punishment against individuals who "with no criminal purpose *** come into possession of a vehicle knowing that it has a missing or altered VIN tag.” (256 Ill. App. 3d at 212.) This is, however, precisely the knowing conduct which the legislature has plainly intended to prohibit. There can be nothing either lawful or innocent about purchasing, receiving or possessing a vehicle with knowledge that its VINs have been removed or altered. To comply with the law, persons are required to avoid any transaction involving a vehicle known by them to be without proper VINs and, if any violation is subsequently discovered, to immediately affix replacement numbers pursuant to statute. The importance of the VIN regulations has been recognized by the legislature and the courts of this State since the problems of auto theft emerged, and the constitutionality of such provisions has also been well established. (See generally 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles & Highway Traffic § 353 (1980).) Early provisions in our laws have imposed penalties against those who possess vehicles without proper VIN markings, even lacking knowledge of any violation. For example, in People v. Billardello (1925), 319 Ill. 124, Annot., 42 A.L.R. 1146 (1926), the defendant was charged with "unlawfully having the custody and possession of a motor vehicle the original engine number of which had been destroyed, removed, altered, covered and [sic\ defaced.” (Billardello, 319 Ill. at 125.) The defendant challenged the constitutionality of his conviction, arguing that he had purchased the vehicle in good faith with no knowledge that the engine number had been defaced. The court upheld the law, noting: "The legislature has deemed it necessary to the protection of the public from the evils arising from the unregulated use, sale and transfer of motor vehicles, from the crimes committed by their use, from the thefts to which they are so readily subject, to provide a system of registration and identification. This is in part based on the factory and engine numbers, which must be shown in the bill of sale which every manufacturer or dealer, on the sale of any motor vehicle, is required to give to the purchaser. The purchaser is required, within ten days, to apply to the Secretary of State for a certificate of registration, and his application must state the factory and engine numbers of the vehicle. *** Thus, if purchasers of motor vehicles will observe the plain provisions of the law, the ownership of any motor vehicle may be readily traced from the manufacturer to the owner at any time. There is no hardship in requiring every citizen to observe the provisions of the law enacted for the protection of all citizens. *** By the exercise of reasonable care when he becomes the owner of a motor vehicle, a purchaser can assure himself that the factory and engine numbers have not been changed and that the provisions of the law have been complied with, or if they have not, he can decline to purchase.” See Billardello, 319 Ill. at 127. Billardello specifically recognized that there was a statutory method available under section 35 of the Motor Vehicle Act (1921 Ill. Laws 574), which allowed for the replacement VIN plates to be obtained from the Secretary of State if a person having possession of a motor vehicle discovered that its original engine number had, without his knowledge or consent, been destroyed, removed, altered, or defaced. (Billardello, 319 Ill. at 127-28.) This provision was recognized to afford protection to one who complied with the duty imposed by law and verified the existence of a proper VIN when he came into possession of a vehicle but later discovered that some subsequent, unlawful tampering with identification numbers by a third party had rendered the vehicle violative of the law. See Billardello, 319 Ill. at 128. Prior to 1986, Elinois maintained two separate crimes related to the possession of motor vehicles with missing or altered VINs. The first, a misdemeanor, made it a violation for any person "to buy, receive, possess, sell or dispose of a vehicle *** if the manufacturer’s identification number thereon has been removed or falsified, and such person has no knowledge that the number is removed or falsified.” (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95½, par. 4 — 102(a)(3).) The second provided felony penalties if the individual did have knowledge of the tainted VIN. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 95½, par. 4 — 103(a)(4).) When section 4 — 102 was revised in 1986, the former absolute liability provision was deleted by the legislature (see Public Act 86 — 1209 § 4 — 102, eff. January 1, 1991), although its penalty provisions complied with the rule permitting the imposition of only misdemeanor sanctions for absolute liability offenses (see People v. Tolliver (1992), 147 Ill. 2d 397, 401) and its constitutionality had been clearly established (see People v. Brown (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 374). Defendant’s arguments in the present case are strikingly similar to those directly rejected by the Elinois Supreme Court in Brown. Brown analyzed the "no knowledge” misdemeanor offense formerly contained in section 4 — 102(a)(4) and recognized that the legislature’s actions were designed "to inhibit both the profitability of the illegal stolen car market and the ease with which stolen automobiles and their parts are sold.” (Brown, 98 Ill. 2d at 380.) The legislature had determined that the focus of such efforts must be placed upon the possessors of vehicles with falsified or removed VIN plates as well as those who own, sell, and buy them (Brown, 98 Ill. 2d at 380). Although the case law from Billardello to Brown would constitutionally permit the legislature to criminalize the possession of a vehicle with improper VINs, even in the absence of knowledge, the majority now holds that the present statute, which requires knowledge, can be validated only by our engrafting an additional element of "knowledge with intent to defraud or commit a crime.” In requiring this additional element the majority relies by analogy upon People v. Tolliver (1992), 147 Ill. 2d 397. I do not find a valid analogy, however, between one’s possessing an incomplete certificate of title, as discussed in Tolliver, and the possession of a vehicle without proper VINs. As Tolliver explains, there may be any number of innocent reasons why a certificate of title might be left incomplete. "Since it cannot be simultaneously signed and completely filled out instantaneously by all parties, the buyers, sellers or middlemen are at risk during the execution process. The execution process can be either stretched out or interrupted for a variety of innocent reasons.” (147 Ill. 2d at 402.) The supreme court in Tolliver understandably refused to impose criminal liability in the absence of a showing of scienter where the potential for inadvertent violation was great. In my view, however, possession of a vehicle with knowledge that the identification numbers have been removed or altered cannot reasonably be characterized as an inadvertent or innocent act. Unlike temporary omissions which may occur in the execution of certificates of title, VINs are never routinely altered, removed, or destroyed as a part of the common practice of buying and selling vehicles. Knowledge is one of the alternative mental states required by section 4 — 3 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/4 — 3 (West 1992); see also 720 ILCS 5/4 — 5 (West 1992)), and it appears to me to be an appropriate mental state applicable to the VIN statute in question. I cannot agree with the majority that an individual who discovers that his vehicle is missing identification numbers is in the "catch-22” predicament of having no alternative other than admitting the commission of a felony. Such an individual is presumably in no worse position than the unsuspecting person who discovers that someone has placed cocaine in the trunk of his car. Provided that person, without unnecessary delay, contacts authorities to report his discovery, it cannot be said that he has knowingly possessed the contraband. On the other hand, if he fails to take prompt corrective steps but, instead, continues to operate his automobile with knowledge of its unlawful contents, he risks conviction of knowing possession of a controEed substance, notwithstanding his initial lack of criminality in acquiring the substance. Defendant in the present case had a similar alternative to his continued possession of the tainted vehicle, i.e., having new VIN plates affixed pursuant to statute. (See 625 ILCS 5/4 — 107(h) (West 1992).) He elected not to comply but, instead, knowingly continued to violate the law by possessing the vehicle for more than a month after being notified by authorities of the violation. This case, therefore, does not involve an individual unwittingly trapped in an unavoidable situation, but rather a defendant who refused to comply with the requirements of the law despite being afforded ample opportunity to do so. Under the majority’s interpretation, there would apparently be no way for the State ever to compel defendant to comply with the VIN requirement. Under the same reasoning, except in the rare circumstance in which the State is able to prove "knowledge with intent to defraud or commit a crime,” any person could possess with impunity one or more vehicles, knowing them to have been stripped of identification numbers. It appears questionable that the universal vehicle identification numbering system could continue to function in a State which cannot prohibit the act of possessing a vehicle with knowledge of missing or altered VINs. In addition, the majority cites People v. Morris (1990), 136 Ill. 2d 157, as authority for concluding that the imposition of Class 2 felony penalties would be disproportionate to the seriousness of this offense in the absence of the additional element of an underlying criminal purpose. I do not read Morris as supporting that conclusion. In Morris, the defendant was convicted of possessing a temporary vehicle registration permit ("license applied for sticker”), knowing it to have been altered, a Class 2 felony. (See 625 ILCS 5/4— 104(b)(2)(West 1992).) The supreme court found that there was "no relationship between the offense of altering the temporary registration permit for a vehicle which one owns or to which one is legally entitled and the protection of 'automobile owners against theft’ or 'the general public against the commission of crimes involving stolen automobiles.’ ” (Morris, 136 Ill. 2d at 168, quoting One 1979 Pontiac Grand Prix, 89 Ill. 2d at 510.) The court declared the Class 2 felony penalty to be disproportionate to the seriousness of the offense committed. (Morris, 136 Ill. 2d at 168.) In clear contrast, there exists a strong relationship between the State’s need to require valid VINs on all vehicles and the protection of automobile owners against theft or the general public against the commission of crimes involving stolen automobiles. Although those committing such acts might incidentally use altered temporary registration permits to facilitate their crimes, other arguably less culpable motivations exist for the same conduct, e.g., to avoid paying the registration fee or outstanding parking tickets. The guiding principles enunciated by the supreme court in Morris would appear to support, rather than question, the legislature’s authority to provide the potential for strong penalties when, as here, they are reasonably designed to remedy the serious public problems resulting from vehicle-theft-related crime. In my opinion, People v. Steffens (1991), 208 Ill. App. 3d 252, is more directly instructive concerning the present proportionality issue. In Steffens, the defendant was charged with the Class 2 felony of knowingly possessing a rosette rivet (an item not available to the general public and used to attach VIN plates) which had not been attached to, or which had been removed from, the original vehicle. (See 625 ILCS 5/4 — 103(a)(5) (West 1992).) Defendant had possessed and resold such rivets as part of his Corvette restoration business, and he argued that the penalty classification violated the due process and proportionate penalty clauses of the Illinois Constitution. (See Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §§ 2, 11.) Noting that possession of such rivets was of great value to car thieves and not available to or legitimately used by the general public, the court upheld the penalty provisions, and concluded that permitting unauthorized persons to possess rosette rivets would defeat the statute’s purpose, and the Class 2 felony penalty was reasonably designed to effect the statute’s purpose. Steffens, 208 Ill. App. 3d at 261-62. The legislature has wide discretion, pursuant to the State’s police power, to prescribe penalties for defined offenses. (Morris, 136 Ill. 2d at 161; Steffens, 208 Ill. App. 3d at 260-61.) It is in the best position to investigate and ascertain the evils confronting society and is more capable than a court of law in gauging the seriousness of various offenses. (People v. Steppan (1985), 105 Ill. 2d 310, 319; Steffens, 208 Ill. App. 3d at 261.) The courts, therefore, require as a matter of due process only that the penalty prescribed for a particular crime be reasonably designed to remedy the evils which the legislature has determined to be a threat to the public health, safety, and general welfare. (Morris, 136 Ill. 2d at 162; Steppan, 105 Ill. 2d at 319; Steffens, 208 Ill. App. 3d at 261.) On the other hand, the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution requires that the legislature consider the constitutional goals of restoring an offender to useful citizenship and of providing a penalty according to the seriousness of the offense when defining crimes and penalties. (People v. Johns (1992), 153 Ill. 2d 436, 447.) A judicial determination of dis-proportionality is justified only if the punishment is cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock the moral sense of the community. People v. Gonzales (1962), 25 Ill. 2d 235, 240; Steffens, 208 Ill. App. 3d at 261. I would find no lack of constitutional proportionality in the penalties provided for the offense in question. The State has a significant interest in insuring compliance with its VIN laws, and such laws are essential to address the substantial problems associated with vehicle theft. By providing a Class 2 felony penalty range for those persons who possess a vehicle knowing it to have altered or removed identification numbers, a trial court is vested with considerable discretion in sentencing. A sentencing court may impose a substantial prison term where a defendant has significant culpability, or may consider a sentence of probation or conditional discharge where, as here, mitigating factors are present. Aggravating factors, such as numerous prior convictions of similar offenses or direct ties to the auto theft industry, might warrant the consideration of a longer sentence within the three- to seven-year range. It is not unreasonable, in my view, for the legislature to have entrusted trial courts with this latitude. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County.