Court Opinion

ID: 9809703
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:22:17.64187+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:51:34.652592
License: Public Domain

DeGrasse, J.,
dissents in part in a memorandum as follows: I dissent because I disagree with the part of the majority’s opinion that affirms the trial court’s grant of plaintiff’s CPLR 4401 motion for judgment as a matter of law with respect to his Labor Law § 240 (1) cause of action. Plaintiff, a welder, was injured when he fell to the ground as he descended a closed *543A-frame ladder that was leaning against an eight foot tall water tank. Plaintiff was welding seams on the water tank at the time of the accident. According to testimony at trial, the ladder was sturdy, equipped with rubber feet and had no defects. The water tank sat atop a platform that was three feet wide on the side where plaintiff had leaned the ladder. The ladder was two feet wide at the bottom. Therefore, the platform was wide enough to enable plaintiff to use the ladder in a secure open position.
In granting plaintiff’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, the court found the ladder to be unsuitable for the work plaintiff was performing. The court’s reasoning, which the majority adopts, is based on plaintiff’s testimony that use of the ladder on the platform in an open position would have exhausted plaintiff by requiring him to twist his body into uncomfortable positions. The majority’s reasoning misconstrues the purpose underlying Labor Law § 240 (1). The statute “was designed to prevent those types of accidents in which the scaffold, hoist, stay, ladder or other protective device proved inadequate to shield the injured worker from harm directly flowing from the application of the force of gravity to an object or person” (Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 NY2d 494, 501 [1993]). The key phrase is “directly flowing.” Based upon the trial evidence and the parties’ arguments, there is at least a factual issue as to whether Labor Law § 240 (1) was violated because the claimed inadequacy of the ladder does not implicate the effects of gravity. Instead, it relates to plaintiff’s ability to weld the water tank without discomfort. Although not completely analogous, Ross illustrates the distinction. Ross involved a plaintiff who injured his back while welding a seam at the top of a shaft that was 40 to 50 feet deep (id. at 498). The injury occurred because the plaintiff in Ross had to strain and contort his upper torso “ [i]n order to complete his welding job without falling from his perch” (id.). The Court in Ross found Labor Law § 240 (1) inapplicable because the injuries in that case “allegedly flowed from a deficiency in the [safety] device that was wholly unrelated to the hazard which brought about its need in the first instance” (id. at 501 [internal quotation marks omitted]). In keeping with the holding in Ross, the record before us warrants a factual determination as to whether the claimed defect in the ladder was related or unrelated to plaintiff’s protection “from the application of the force of gravity” (id. at 501 [emphasis omitted]).
Plaintiffs burden was to show that a violation of Labor Law § 240 (1) was a contributing cause of the accident (see Zimmer *544v Chemung County Performing Arts, 65 NY2d 513, 524 [1985]). The only evidence regarding causation came in the form of plaintiff’s testimony. In his trial testimony, plaintiff stated that the accident was caused by the ladder’s placement on debris that was on the platform. Plaintiff was impeached however by his General Municipal Law § 50-h hearing testimony that he did not know what caused the ladder to move. In light of the impeachment, it would have been within the jury’s province to reject plaintiff’s trial testimony and find that the cause of the accident was undetermined. The resulting evidentiary gap would have been consequential because, as noted above, the ladder had no defects. “ ‘Where a plaintiff is injured in a fall from a ladder, which is not otherwise shown to be defective, the issue of whether the ladder provided the plaintiff with the “proper protection” required under [Labor Law § 240 (1)] is a question of fact for the jury’ ” (Weber v 1111 Park Ave. Realty Corp., 253 AD2d 376, 377 [1st Dept 1998], quoting Rice v PCM Dev. Agency Co., 230 AD2d 898, 899 [2d Dept 1996]).
There is also an issue as to whether plaintiff’s actions were the sole proximate cause of the accident. If that had been the case, liability under Labor Law § 240 (1) would not attach (Robinson v East Med. Ctr., LP, 6 NY3d 550, 554 [2006]). A plaintiff’s misuse of a safety device can constitute the sole proximate cause of an injury otherwise actionable under Labor Law § 240 (1) (see Blake v Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of N.Y. City, 1 NY3d 280, 290-291 [2003]). The issue of sole proximate cause should have also been submitted to the jury based upon the undisputed testimony that plaintiff fell from a closed, unsecured A-frame ladder that he himself had leaned against the water tank. Such placement of an A-frame ladder can constitute misuse of a safety device (see Nalepa v South Hill Bus. Campus, LLC, 123 AD3d 1190 [3d Dept 2014], lv denied 25 NY3d 909 [2015]; Santiago v Fred-Doug 117, L.L.C., 68 AD3d 555 [1st Dept 2009]). The majority concedes this principle but unconvincingly attempts to distinguish Nalepa and Santiago on the ground that plaintiff “gave a specific reason why he used the ladder in the closed position,” that reason being the alleged discomfort that working with the ladder in an open position would have caused him. I disagree with the majority’s reasoning on this point because plaintiff’s proffered excuse is insufficient to support the necessary finding that “there is no rational process by which the fact trier could base a finding [on the issue] in favor of the nonmoving party” (Szczerbiak v Pilat, 90 NY2d 553, 556 [1997]). Moreover, plaintiff’s excuse is simply one factor that the jury should have been allowed to consider along with the other trial evidence in order to determine *545whether plaintiffs actions were the sole proximate cause of the accident.
The majority correctly cites Rico-Castro v Do & Co N.Y. Catering, Inc. (60 AD3d 749 [2d Dept 2009]) for the proposition that “[a] worker’s decision to use an A-frame ladder in the closed position is not a per se reason to declare him the sole proximate cause of an accident.” I do not take a contrary position because it is not my argument that defendants should necessarily be granted judgment as a matter of law. Significantly, defendants did not move below for judgment pursuant to CPLR 4401. Accordingly, Rico-Castro is distinguishable because it involved an appeal from the denial of a defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment dismissing a Labor Law § 240 (1) cause of action (id. at 749). Consistent with Nalepa and Santiago, my position is simply that the issue should have been submitted to the jury.
I also note that the trial court granted plaintiff’s CPLR 4401 motion for judgment although the subject Labor Law § 240 (1) cause of action was never considered by the jury. The better practice would have been to submit the claim to the jury from the standpoint of judicial economy. If the jury is prevented from passing on the issues, an appellate court that disagrees with a verdict directed by the trial court under CPLR 4401 has no jury verdict to reinstate, wasting the time spent on trial (see Matter of Austin v Consilvio, 295 AD2d 244, 246 [1st Dept 2002]). Nonetheless, I agree that a new trial on damages is required for the reasons stated by the majority. I would reverse the order entered below and direct a new trial on the Labor Law § 240 (1) cause of action as well.