Court Opinion

ID: 9648797
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:35:17.712045+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:05.483209
License: Public Domain

VAN der VOORT, Judge,
dissenting:
The majority finds that appellant’s trial counsel and first PCHA counsel were ineffective in failing to challenge certain purported defects in the guilty plea colloquy. I respectfully dissent.
According to the majority, in order for appellant to enter a valid guilty plea, under Pa.R.Crim.P. 319 appellant had to first be informed that if he chose to stand trial before a jury, 1) the jury verdict would have to be unanimous, and, 2) he would be presumed innocent until found guilty. Rule 319(a) provided that a trial judge could not accept a plea of *580guilty unless he determined after inquiry of the defendant that the plea was voluntarily and understanding^ entered. The comment to the rule at the time appellant entered his plea (March 5, 1975) stated:
Comment: The purpose of paragraph (a) is to codify the requirement that the judge, on the record, ascertain from the defendant that the guilty plea is voluntarily and understanding^ tendered. Recent court decisions have indicated that this is the preferred practice but have not made the requirement mandatory. See Commonwealth ex rel. West v. Rundle, 428 Pa. 102, 237 A.2d 196 (1968); Commonwealth v. Belgrave, 445 Pa. 311, 285 A.2d 448 (1971).
It is difficult to formulate a comprehensive list of questions a judge must ask of a defendant in determining whether the judge should accept the plea of guilty. Court decisions constantly add areas to be encompassed in determining whether the defendant understands the full impact and consequences of his plea, but is nevertheless willing to enter that plea. It is recommended, however, that at a minimum the judge ask questions to elicit the following information:
(3) Does the defendant understand that he has the right to trial by jury?
(4) Does the defendant understand that he is presumed innocent until he is found guilty?
It is advisable that the judge should conduct the examination of the defendant. However, paragraph (a) does not prevent defense counsel or the attorney for the Commonwealth from conducting part or all of the examination of the defendant, as permitted by the judge. (Emphasis added).
Unlike the majority, I would not find in the Rule and Comment a requirement that appellant be advised on the record of the presumption of innocence and of the fact that a jury verdict had to be unanimous. On the contrary, the *581comment would have led trial counsel in 1975 to believe that it was not necessary that appellant be so advised on the record. I am aware of no cases decided prior to 1975 which would have alerted appellant’s counsel to the necessity of advising appellant on the record of these two aspects of our jury system. I would not find trial counsel ineffective for failing to ascertain that appellant was so advised on the record, and I would not find appellant’s first PCHA counsel ineffective for failing to raise the issue.
Appellant was advised on the record that the Commonwealth had the burden of proving his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant was also advised that he had the right to a trial before a jury composed of twelve members of the community, and that he would be permitted to assist in selecting them. There is no allegation that appellant was unaware that he would be presumed innocent or that a jury verdict had to be unanimous, or that appellant would not have pleaded guilty had he possessed such knowledge. I would affirm the order of the lower court denying PCHA relief.