Court Opinion

ID: 9965851
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-03 16:03:47.439295+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:46.577401
License: Public Domain

2024 IL App (1st) 240154
                                                                               SIXTH DIVISION

                                                                                      May 3, 2024

                                         No. 1-24-0154B

 ______________________________________________________________________________

                                             IN THE
                                APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                                        FIRST DISTRICT
 ______________________________________________________________________________
 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                         )   Appeal from the Circuit Court
                                                              )   of Cook County.
          Plaintiff-Appellee,                                 )
                                                              )
                                                              )
     v.                                                       )   No. 241104752
                                                              )
 EMMANUEL JOHNSON,                                            )   Honorable
                                                              )   Ankur Srivastava,
          Defendant-Appellant.                                )   Judge, presiding.

          JUSTICE C.A. WALKER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
          Justices Hyman and Tailor concurred in the judgment and opinion.

                                            OPINION

¶1    Defendant Emmanuel Johnson appeals from the circuit court’s grant of the State’s pretrial

detention petition per article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS

5/art. 110 (West 2022)), as amended by Public Act 101-652, § 10-255 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023) and Public

Act 102-1104, § 70 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023), claiming the State failed to proffer clear and convincing
No. 1-24-0154B

evidence that he posed a threat to a person, persons, or the community. Because the court’s finding

that Johnson posed a real and present threat to the community was not against the manifest weight

of the evidence and its decision to detain him pending trial was not an abuse of discretion, we

affirm.

¶2                                        BACKGROUND

¶3    Johnson was arrested on January 7, 2024, and charged by criminal complaint with unlawful

use or possession of a weapon by a felon (UUWF) (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2022)). On

January 8, 2024, the State filed its pretrial detention petition, in which it alleged Johnson was on

parole when arrested for UUWF and “clearly” posed a real and present threat.

¶4    At the pretrial detention hearing, the State proffered that on January 7, 2024, Chicago police

officers stopped a vehicle due to an expired license plate. As the officers approached, they detected

a “strong odor of cannabis emitting” from the vehicle, and the driver showed the officers a bag of

marijuana. Hence, they asked the occupants of the vehicle to exit for a “narcotics search.” Johnson

was the front seat passenger. He told the officers “hold on” and “[l]et me call my mom” while

holding his cell phone. Officers took Johnson’s phone, and he “began crouching in the seat,” at

which point the officers removed Johnson from the vehicle, searched him, and recovered a loaded

firearm from his waistband.

¶5    The State further proffered that Johnson could not legally possess a firearm because he was

on parole at the time of his arrest for a 2014 conviction of armed robbery with a firearm. He had

been out on parole for only “a little under six months” before the January 7, 2024, incident. Given

these circumstances, the State argued, it was “clear” Johnson posed a real and present threat

because “he received a 20 year sentence for this armed robbery with a firearm and [then] was in

possession of a firearm.”

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¶6     Defense counsel proffered, in relevant part, that Johnson did not pose a threat because the

State made no “allegations of violence” in connection with the UUWF charge. Counsel

emphasized the State did not allege that Johnson engaged in any illegal conduct besides the

possession of the firearm and that the record showed Johnson made no “dangerous maneuvers,”

cooperated with the officers, and did not resist arrest. Moreover, Johnson had connections with the

community, including employment through the “CTA second chance” program. He lived with his

family and served as a caretaker for his grandfather, who suffered from lung disease and

Alzheimer’s disease. Counsel proposed electronic monitoring as a potential mitigating condition

of pretrial release.

¶7     The circuit court granted the State’s petition. Regarding whether Johnson posed a real and

present threat, the court stated, “the bottom line is, you are on parole for a very serious offense ***

another firearm offense. You have been on parole for about six months here and you picked up

another gun case. *** In my view, it does show you pose a danger.”

¶8     Also on January 8, 2024, the circuit court entered its pretrial detention order. Regarding the

real and present threat Johnson posed, the court wrote, “Defendant was just placed on parole 6

months ago after serving a 20 year sentence for armed robbery with a firearm. Defendant

possessing a loaded firearm on his person while on parole for a serious and violent offense suggests

that his release poses a danger to the community.”

¶9     On January 19, 2024, Johnson filed a notice of appeal from the circuit court’s January 8,

2024, detention order. Johnson raised a single claim on appeal—the State failed to prove by clear

and convincing evidence that he posed a real and present threat—and attached a “supplemental

document” in support. Therein, Johnson argued he did not pose a threat because he only “possessed

the firearm”; did not use, brandish, or threaten anyone with it; and did not engage in any “violent

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behavior.” Additionally, Johnson cooperated with police officers after they removed him from the

vehicle. Johnson concluded that “[m]ere possession of a firearm, without any other allegations of

violent or dangerous behavior, is not sufficient to find a real and present threat to safety.”

¶ 10                                       JURISDICTION

¶ 11 The circuit court entered its order detaining Johnson pending trial on January 8, 2024, and

he filed his notice of appeal on January 19, 2024. Accordingly, the notice was timely, and this

court has jurisdiction per the Code. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(j) (West 2022); Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)

(eff. Dec. 7, 2023).

¶ 12                                       ANALYSIS

¶ 13    Johnson’s lone claim on appeal is that the State did not demonstrate through clear and

convincing evidence that he posed a real and present threat to a person, persons, or the community.

¶ 14    A criminal defendant is presumed eligible for pretrial release and cannot be detained

pending trial unless the State files a pretrial detention petition. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1)-(8), (e)

(West 2022). After the State files the petition, the circuit court must conduct a pretrial detention

hearing, during which the parties can proceed by way of proffer to present the anticipated evidence

of the case. Id. § 110-6.1(c)(2), (e), (f)(2). At the hearing, the State bears the burden to establish

certain elements by clear and convincing evidence, including, as relevant here, that the defendant

poses a “real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on

the specific articulable facts of the case.” Id. § 110-6.1(e)(2). In determining whether a defendant

poses a real and present threat, the Code provides that a circuit court may consider certain factors,

including whether the defendant (1) has a criminal history that is “indicative of violent” conduct,

(2) has access to weapons, or (3) was on parole at the time of the alleged offense. Id. § 110-

6.1(g)(2)(A), (7), (8).

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¶ 15    If the circuit court grants the State’s petition, it must issue a written detention order

        “summarizing the court’s reasons for concluding that the defendant should be denied

        pretrial release, including why less restrictive conditions would not avoid a real and present

        threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific

        articulable facts of the case, or prevent the defendant’s willful flight from

        prosecution.” Id. § 110-6.1(h)(1).

¶ 16    The appropriate standard of review for pretrial detention claims arising under the Code is

still a matter of debate. See People v. Pitts, 2024 IL App (1st) 232336, ¶ 14. We agree with those

panels that have found a two-tiered standard of review appropriate, where, generally, the circuit

court’s findings of fact are reviewed under the manifest weight of the evidence standard, while the

ultimate decision regarding pretrial detention is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See id. ¶¶ 14-29;

People v. Castillo, 2024 IL App (1st) 232315, ¶ 18. Johnson’s claim arises from the court’s factual

findings as to the second requirement the State must prove under section 110-6.1(e) of the Code

(725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(2) (West 2022)), and therefore, we will review his claim using the

manifest weight standard. Pitts, 2024 IL App (1st) 232336, ¶¶ 14-29. We may consider both the

oral and written findings of the circuit court. Castillo, 2024 IL App (1st) 232315, ¶ 30.

¶ 17 The State proffered that Johnson, while on parole for a firearm offense, was arrested while

in possession of a loaded firearm. During the pretrial detention hearing, in finding Johnson posed

a real and present threat, the circuit court cited the fact that Johnson’s arrest occurred less than six

months after his release on parole for armed robbery with a firearm. The court further explained

in its written order that “[d]efendant possessing a loaded firearm on his person while on parole for

a serious and violent offense suggests that his release poses a danger to the community.”

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No. 1-24-0154B

¶ 18 We hold the circuit court’s finding that the State presented clear and convincing evidence

that Johnson posed a real and present threat was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

As the court noted during the hearing and in its order, Johnson was currently on parole for a

conviction involving the use of a firearm when police recovered a loaded firearm from his

waistband. Possession of the firearm disregards the conditions of his release. A person who acts

with such disregard could reasonably be found to place the public at risk, even where, as here, that

person was not arrested while actively using the firearm. See People v. Lee, 2024 IL App (1st)

232137, ¶ 29 (noting the public policy in Illinois that the public health and welfare is furthered by

identifying individuals who should not have firearms (citing 430 ILCS 65/1 (West 2022))); see

also People v. Parker, 2024 IL App (1st) 232164, ¶¶ 74-77 (circuit court did not err in finding a

defendant with a criminal history posed a danger due to possession of a firearm where, in part, the

defendant was already barred from possessing a firearm and demonstrated noncompliance with

court orders).

¶ 19 We are further guided by the factors listed in the Code that courts may consider when

deciding whether a defendant poses a real and present threat. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(g) (West

2022). The State’s proffer showed that Johnson, at the time of his arrest, was on parole after an

armed robbery with a firearm conviction and currently had access to firearms. Each aspect of

Johnson’s conduct—his parole status, his access to firearms, and his violent criminal history—are

relevant factors to a court’s detention determination. Id. § 110-6.1(g)(2)(A), (7), (8).

¶ 20 Johnson contends the State did not demonstrate he posed a real and present threat because

(1) he was not charged with using the firearm he possessed in a violent or threatening manner,

(2) Pretrial Services did not assign him a “New Violent Criminal Activity Flag,” and (3) his

conviction, while violent, occurred almost a decade before the current arrest. These arguments fail

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because they ignore the guidance from cases like Lee and Parker, where those courts

acknowledged the danger of firearm possession under any circumstances by an individual legally

barred from doing so. See Lee, 2024 IL App (1st) 232137, ¶ 29 (citing 430 ILCS 65/1 (West

2022)); Parker, 2024 IL App (1st) 232164, ¶¶ 74-77. Johnson’s willingness to use a firearm in the

commission of a violent crime, coupled with his subsequent inability to refrain from committing a

new firearm violation following his conditional release for that violent crime, provides more than

a sufficient record to sustain the circuit court’s pretrial detention finding.

¶ 21                                        CONCLUSION

¶ 22 The circuit court’s finding that Johnson posed a real and present threat was not against the

manifest weight of the evidence, and the court’s order for pretrial detention was not an abuse of

discretion. Hence, we affirm.

¶ 23 Affirmed.

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No. 1-24-0154B

                    People v. Johnson, 2024 IL App (1st) 240154

Decision Under Review:    Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 241104752;
                          the Hon. Ankur Srivastava, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys                 Sharone R. Mitchell Jr., Public Defender, of Chicago (Emily
for                       Motin, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.
Appellant:

Attorneys                 Kimberly M. Foxx, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Noah
for                       Montague, Assistant State’s Attorney, of counsel), for the
Appellee:                 People.

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