Court Opinion

ID: 9721536
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:02:02.371621+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:27.085865
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent because I do not believe it is proper to resolve this case based on how "overwhelming" the evidence is. Rather, because I believe federal constitutional errors occurred at trial, the test we must apply is that enunciated in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), reh'g denied, 386 U.S. 987, 87 S.Ct. 1283, 18 LEd.2d 241 (1967). "'The question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.' [BJefore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless be*634yond a reasonable doubt." 386 U.S. at 23-24, 87 S.Ct. at 827-28 (quoting from Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87, 84 S.Ct. 229, 230-31, 11 LEd.2d 171 (19683)). This court explicitly adopted the Chapman standard in Rabadi v. State (1989), Ind., 541 N.E.2d 271, 276.
That there was federal constitutional error here is plain.
First,. as the majority rightly condemns, the deputy prosecutor emphasized in a highly prejudicial way to the jury during closing argument that the appellant had exercised his constitutional right to remain silent. Such prosecutorial behavior was held to be unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed2d 106 (1965), reh'g denied, 381 U.S. 957, 85 S.Ct. 1797, 14 L.Ed.2d 730 (1965), and by our court in Brooks v. State (1992), Ind., 598 N.E.2d 519, 520. See also Chapman, 386 U.S. at 25-26, 87 S.Ct. at 828-29.
Second, the prosecutor elicited testimony at trial about the appellant's pre-trial exercise of his fifth amendment rights. In response to questioning at trial by the deputy prosecutor, a police officer involved in the investigation testified over objection that the appellant refused to sign a waiver of his Miranda rights and that he advised the police officer that he did not want to give a statement. It is unconstitutional to tell an arrestee that he has the right to remain silent and then use that silence against him at trial, Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976); Jones v. State (1976), 265 Ind. 447, 451, 355 N.E.2d 402, 404. See also Lynch v. State (1994), Ind., 632 N.E.2d 341, 342; Wilson v. State (1987), Ind., 514 N.E.2d 282, 283.
By allowing the prosecution to emphasize appellant's exercise of his right to remain silent both before and during the trial, the trial court committed constitutional errors. It certainly seems to me that there is a reasonable possibility that these errors might have contributed to the conviction, particularly since the defendant was being retried on these charges following a hung jury in a previous trial. These errors were not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
For these reasons, I dissent.
DeBRULER, J., concurs.