Court Opinion

ID: 9401549
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-13 16:09:34.749532+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:53.274296
License: Public Domain

J-A03034-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

    WILLIAM E. HUTCHESON, III                  :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellee                :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
    NICOLE A. SUISSA                           :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :      No. 2368 EDA 2022

                Appeal from the Order Entered August 12, 2022
             In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County
                  Civil Division at No(s): C-48-CV-2020-2557

BEFORE:      KING, J., SULLIVAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                                  FILED JUNE 13, 2023

        Appellant, Nicole A. Suissa (“Mother”), appeals from the order entered

in the Northampton County Court of Common Pleas, which awarded Appellee,

William E. Hutcheson, III (“Father”) primary physical custody and shared legal

custody of the parties’ minor child, S.H. (“Child”). We affirm.

        The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.

Mother and Father met in 2013 when Father was working in Carlisle,

Pennsylvania and Mother was attending Penn State Law School. They began

dating in 2014 and Mother became pregnant with Child while she was in her

third year of law school. Mother graduated law school in May 2015 and moved

in with Father in June 2015. Shortly thereafter, Child was born in July 2015.

____________________________________________

*   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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Both parents lived together and cared for Child until Mother got a job in

Albany, New York in March 2016. Mother and Child moved to Albany while

Father remained in Carlisle until May 2016, when he moved to North Carolina

to begin law school.

      During this period, the parties were not romantically involved but

cooperated with one another regarding which parent would be Child’s primary

caregiver depending on the changing circumstances and demands in each

parent’s life. Additionally, they coordinated visits on weekends so that both

parents could spend time with Child. When Father moved to North Carolina,

Child lived with Father from May 2016 to October 2016.       After that, Child

moved back to Albany to live with Mother.      Child primarily remained with

Mother while Father was in law school. Father transferred to a law school in

Syracuse, New York in 2017 so that he was closer to Mother and Child. Mother

moved with Child to Brooklyn, New York in November 2018 when she got a

new job.   After Father graduated from law school, he moved to Bangor,

Pennsylvania, which was close to his family. After Father’s graduation, the

parties agreed to allow Child to stay with Father’s mother, Michelle Hutcheson

(“Paternal Grandmother”), for the summer of 2019 to attend a local camp. In

August 2019, Child began living with Father in Bangor due to Mother’s

demanding work schedule. Since then, Child has primarily been living with

Father during the week and living with Mother on most weekends.

      In March of 2020, Child was staying at Paternal Grandmother’s house.

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While Child was there, all parties agreed on a weekend for Mother to visit Child

at Paternal Grandmother’s house. Mother’s boyfriend at the time, Thomas

Pielli, came with Mother to visit Child. They visited with Child on a Saturday

and all parties had dinner together at Paternal Grandmother’s house. Mother

and Mr. Pielli stayed in a hotel Saturday night and returned to visit with Child

on Sunday morning. Father and Paternal Grandmother testified that Mother

did not inform them that Mr. Pielli would be joining Mother on the trip, and

they were uncomfortable with Mr. Pielli’s presence at Paternal Grandmother’s

house. They further stated that Mr. Pielli overconsumed alcohol during dinner.

Mother and Mr. Pielli testified that they all had a pleasant dinner and Father

commented to Mother about the positive impression he had of Mr. Pielli after

they left.

      The parties agreed that Mother would return in two weeks to spend time

with Child. Father and Paternal Grandmother testified that a few days prior

to the planned trip, Mother asked if she and Mr. Pielli could sleep at Paternal

Grandmother’s house. Paternal Grandmother told Mother that Mother was

welcome to stay the night by herself, but she was uncomfortable with allowing

Mr. Pielli to stay in her house. Upon hearing this, Mother became extremely

upset and accused Father and Paternal Grandmother of keeping her from

seeing Child. Although they assured Mother that she was welcome to come

see the Child, Mother remained irate. A few days later, local police showed

up at Paternal Grandmother’s house to conduct a wellness check because

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Mother had called them. Mother testified that a few days before the planned

trip, Paternal Grandmother called Mother and told her that she should not

come for the weekend.      Mother became upset that Paternal Grandmother

cancelled their plans without reason and called Father to inquire why she did

so. Father stated that he did not know and hung up the phone. The next day,

Mother received a text message from Father stating that he was filing for

custody of Child.     Mother tried repeatedly calling Father and Paternal

Grandmother, but the calls went straight to voicemail. Because she could not

get in touch with Father or Paternal Grandmother, and was unaware of Child’s

whereabouts, Mother claimed she called the police to conduct a wellness check

to ensure that Child was safe. All parties agree that after this incident, their

relationship became increasingly strained.

      Father filed for custody on April 7, 2020. The court entered a temporary

custody order on April 9, 2020, which awarded Father primary physical

custody of Child from Monday to Friday and awarded Mother partial physical

custody of Child three weekends per month. In the fall of 2020, Child began

attending school in Bangor, Pennsylvania. Mother and Father agree that Child

is academically gifted and could benefit from an advanced or gifted program

at school. When they inquired at Child’s current school, they learned that the

advanced program is not offered for Child’s grade but would be available to

Child when she advances to a higher grade. Mother testified that she inquired

into a charter school that is near Mother’s current residence in New Jersey

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that offers an advanced program that starts at first grade.

      Mother and Mr. Pielli married in June 2020. Mr. Pielli admitted that he

began drinking alcohol excessively during their marriage but hid it from

Mother. Mr. Pielli was hospitalized in July 2021 due to serious gastrointestinal

issues as a result of his drinking, and he required care for over a month at a

vocational rehabilitation facility to recover. Mr. Pielli did not disclose to the

medical professionals or anyone in his personal life that he was abusing

alcohol at this time. Mr. Pielli was hospitalized again in November 2021. At

this point, Mr. Pielli told Mother about his alcohol addiction, and they

separated.   Mother testified that she initiated divorce proceedings prior to

learning about Mr. Pielli’s alcohol abuse because she wanted Mr. Pielli to

qualify for assistance programs to cover his medical expenses.          Mother’s

income was too high for Mr. Pielli to qualify for these programs if they

remained married. When she learned that Mr. Pielli had lied to her and that

his medical issues stemmed from alcohol abuse, Mother followed through with

the divorce in earnest. Mother and Mr. Pielli’s divorce was finalized in February

of 2022 and they no longer maintain contact. Father testified that Mr. Pielli

was an active part of Child’s life while he was married to Mother and Child was

upset when she learned that she would no longer see Mr. Pielli.

      Mother testified that she has concerns about Father’s methods of

disciplining Child. Mother stated that Father often yells at Child and hits her

on occasion. Mother noted one occasion where Father yanked Child’s arm so

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hard that it left a bruise. Mother reported her concerns to Children and Youth

Services (“CYS”) and an investigation was initiated against Father. Mother

testified about another occasion when she went to pick up Child, where Father

became upset about things that Child wrote in her journal and threw it down

the stairs. Father was yelling at Mother and throwing items down the stairs

while Child was present and visibly upset.     Father then ordered Mother to

leave his house. Mother stated that she was scared by Father’s aggressive

behavior in front of Child and reported the incident to Bangor police.

      Father testified that both the CYS investigation and the police report

happened immediately preceding his admittance to the New Jersey Bar. When

he received notice of the open investigations, Father self-reported it to the

New Jersey Board of Bar examiners. As a result, Father had still not been

admitted into the New Jersey Bar at the time of the custody hearing. Father

testified CYS ultimately determined that the report was unfounded.

Additionally, no charges have been filed against Father as a result of the police

report. Father further testified that James Baron, Mother’s close friend from

law school, left a review on Google for the law firm which currently employs

Father. The review mentioned Father by name and stated that he was an

unlicensed attorney who was working on clients’ cases. Mr. Baron also left a

one-star review of Father’s attorney’s firm even though the firm has not

represented Mr. Baron in any capacity. Mother testified that she was unaware

that Mr. Baron took these actions and did not ask him to do so.

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      On May 7, 2020, the parties were ordered to begin seeing Dr. Ronald

Esteve for co-parenting counseling sessions. Dr. Esteve testified that he had

approximately 38 sessions with the parties.        One issue that they regularly

discussed was Mother’s interest in placing Child in individual therapy. Father

was initially resistant to the idea but became more open to the idea towards

their later sessions. Mother also expressed interest in conducting a custody

evaluation.   Dr. Esteve explained that he was not conducting a custody

evaluation for litigation purposes but was building a therapeutic relationship

with the parties in the hopes of helping them resolve their differences to co-

parent Child without further court intervention.

      On January 4, 2021, Mother filed a petition seeking a court ordered

custody evaluation. After conducting a hearing, at which Dr. Esteve and a

psychologist of Mother’s choosing testified, the Honorable Paula Roscioli of the

Northampton County Court of Common Pleas denied Mother’s petition on

February 22, 2021. In the same order, the court instructed the parties to

arrange for Child to meet with Dr. Esteve so that he could gain insight into

Child’s outlook on the present custodial arrangement and author a report for

the court. Additionally, the court ordered the parties to make arrangements

for Child to engage in confidential counseling sessions with another provider

and share the costs of the counseling equally. On March 31, 2021, Judge

Roscioli and the entire bench of Northampton County recused themselves from

this matter to avoid any actual or appearance of a conflict of interest due to

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the fact that Father’s aunt is a judicial secretary to one of the county’s sitting

judges.

      In April 2021, Dr. Esteve terminated his therapeutic relationship with

the parties because Mother accused him of having unprofessional and

unethical ex parte communication with Father’s attorney and took issue with

Dr. Esteve’s fees for testifying in court. Dr. Esteve determined that he could

not continue counseling the parties because it was clear that Mother did not

believe him when he denied her allegations. On April 16, 2021, Mother filed

a petition for contempt, claiming that Father did not enroll Child in individual

counseling in a timely manner. Father testified that Child began individual

counseling, but the counselor left the practice shortly thereafter. Mother and

Father had a disagreement about whether Child should continue counseling

virtually with the same counselor or continue with a different counselor in

person. Father further testified that Mother did not pay her half of the costs

for the counseling sessions that took place. Mother testified that she did not

believe that Father took Child to the counseling sessions due to a letter she

received assessing costs for unattended sessions.

      The custody matter and the contempt issue were assigned to a visiting

judge, the Honorable Emanuel Bertin. Following a custody trial consisting of

ten days of testimony, spanning several months, Judge Bertin issued a

custody order on August 12, 2022, awarding Father shared legal custody and

primary physical custody and awarding Mother shared legal custody and

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partial physical custody on alternating weekends and eight weeks in the

summer. On Monday, September 12, 2022, Mother filed a timely notice of

appeal and contemporaneous Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) concise statement of

errors complained of on appeal.

     Mother raises the following issues for our review:

        Did the trial court abuse its discretion, thereby depriving
        Mother of a full and fair custody proceeding, by acting as an
        advocate for Father during the hearings, including engaging
        in extensive questioning of witnesses and providing ongoing
        and biased commentary pertaining to the evidence and
        witnesses and other critical matters as the custody hearings
        progressed?

        Did the trial court err in refusing to order a Child Custody
        Evaluation by a qualified mental health professional, which,
        under the antagonistic relationship present between the
        parents would have been in the best interests of the Child
        for there to have been a fully objective custody
        determination based on a complete record, including but not
        limited to psychological testing, rather than on the
        subjective and idiosyncratic views of the trial court, as
        evidenced by the trial court’s conduct during the extended
        hearings ordered?

        Should the Custody Order be vacated, this case be
        remanded, back to the trial court with directions to order a
        Child Custody Evaluation and, ultimately, to hold a new trial
        de novo on the issue of custody?

        Did the trial court err by failing to include a specific and
        detailed schedule for the Jewish holidays which Mother and
        the Child observe, especially when contrasted with the more
        particular schedule for Christian holidays which the trial
        court provided for Father’s benefit?

        Did the trial court err by failing to rule on Mother’s petition
        for contempt with respect to Father’s failure/refusal to
        obtain a counselor for the Child?

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(Mother’s Brief at 8-9).

      In reviewing a child custody order:

         [O]ur scope is of the broadest type and our standard is
         abuse of discretion. This Court must accept findings of the
         trial court that are supported by competent evidence of
         record, as our role does not include making independent
         factual determinations. In addition, with regard to issues of
         credibility and weight of the evidence, this Court must defer
         to the trial judge who presided over the proceedings and
         thus viewed the witnesses first hand. However, we are not
         bound by the trial court’s deductions or inferences from its
         factual findings. Ultimately, the test is whether the trial
         court’s conclusions are unreasonable as shown by the
         evidence of record. We may reject the conclusions of the
         trial court only if they involve an error of law, or are
         unreasonable in light of the sustainable findings of the trial
         court.

S.J.S. v. M.J.S., 76 A.3d 541, 547-48 (Pa.Super. 2013) (internal citation

omitted).

         With any child custody case, the paramount concern is the
         best interests of the child. This standard requires a case-
         by-case assessment of all the factors that may legitimately
         affect the physical, intellectual, moral and spiritual well-
         being of the child.

M.J.M. v. M.L.G., 63 A.3d 331, 334 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal denied, 620 Pa.

710, 68 A.3d 909 (2013) (quoting J.R.M. v. J.E.A., 33 A.3d 647, 650

(Pa.Super. 2011)).

      In her first issue, Mother argues that the trial judge engaged in improper

and extensive questioning of the witnesses during Father’s case-in-chief and

acted as co-counsel for Father.    Mother asserts that the court intervened

during Father’s direct testimony, asking leading questions and inviting Father

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to speculate about Mother’s background.          Mother further argues that the

court’s extensive questioning during Father’s case-in-chief truncated Mother’s

ability to present her case-in-chief. Mother contends that the court also asked

inappropriate questions about her sexual history with an individual who she

dated prior to meeting Father, with Father, and Mr. Peilli. Further, Mother

alleges that the court made personal and judgmental commentary throughout

the case, indicating prejudgment and bias. Mother concludes that the court’s

conduct throughout the case demonstrates bias and prejudgment such that

the trial did not adequately evaluate Child’s best interests, and this Court

should vacate the custody order and remand for a new trial. We disagree.

      Preliminarily, we observe that although Mother alleges that the court’s

prejudicial and biased questioning and commentary began on the first day of

testimony, Mother did not at any point prior to entry of the custody order

request that the trial court recuse itself. Accordingly, Mother has waived this

claim.   See Lomas v. Kravitz, 642 Pa. 181, 192-93, 170 A.3d 380, 387

(2017) (stating: “party must seek recusal of a jurist at the earliest possible

moment, i.e., when the party knows of the facts that form the basis for a

motion to recuse. If the party fails to present a motion to recuse at that time,

then the party’s recusal issue is time-barred and waived”); Reilly by Reilly

v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 507 Pa. 204, 220, 489 A.2d 1291, 1299

(1985) (stating: “When circumstances arise during the course of a trial raising

questions of a trial judge’s bias or impartiality, it is still the duty of the party,

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who asserts that a judge should be disqualified, to allege by petition the bias,

prejudice or unfairness necessitating recusal”).

       Even if Mother had properly preserved the issue by filing a timely recusal

motion, Mother’s issue would merit no relief. This Court has previously held

that due to the paramount importance of determining the best interests of the

child in a custody matter, “a trial judge has the right if not the duty to

interrogate witnesses in order to clarify a disputed issue or vague evidence.”

Jordan v. Jackson, 876 A.2d 443, 453 (Pa.Super. 2005) (internal citation

omitted). “Unless the complaining party can establish the judge’s questioning

constituted an abuse of discretion, resulting in discernible prejudice,

capricious disbelief, or prejudgment, a new trial will not be granted.” Id. at

454.

       Additionally:

          [O]pinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts
          introduced or events occurring in the course of the current
          proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a
          basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a
          deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair
          judgment impossible. Thus, judicial remarks during the
          course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even
          hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do
          not support a bias or partiality challenge. They may do so
          if they reveal an opinion that derives from an extrajudicial
          source; and they will do so if they reveal such a high degree
          of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment
          impossible[.] Not establishing bias or partiality, however,
          are expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance,
          and even anger, that are within the bounds of what
          imperfect men and women, even after having been
          confirmed as judges, sometimes display. A judge’s ordinary
          efforts at courtroom administration—even a stern and short-

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         tempered     judge’s ordinary efforts        at    courtroom
         administration—remain immune.

Commonwealth v. Kearney, 92 A.3d 51, 61 (Pa.Super. 2014).

      Here, the trial court did ask many questions during Father’s direct

testimony. However, Father was the first witness to testify in this case and

the court’s questions were aimed to gain a basic understanding of Mother and

Father’s backgrounds and history with Child, much of which was uncontested

by Mother. The court inquired into the parties’ educational and work history,

the history of their relationship, the details of when and where Child resided

with each parent and the extent to which each parent was involved in Child’s

care prior to the custody filing. The court did not invite Father to speculate

about Mother’s background but merely to testify to the details of her

background of which he was aware.

      Additionally, the court did not limit its questioning to Father’s case-in-

chief but asked questions of nearly all the witnesses. Again, the questions

were not aimed to advance Father’s case but largely for the purpose of gaining

background information about the witness or to clarify a point of confusion for

the court.   Regarding questions about Mother’s sexual history, the court’s

questions were for the purpose of understanding the nature and/or

seriousness of Mother’s relationship with individuals who were relevant to the

custody case. The individual who Mother dated prior to meeting Father that

the court inquired about was Mr. Baron. The court had reason to inquire into

the nature of Mother’s relationship with Mr. Baron based on the evidence that

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Mr. Baron left negative reviews about Father online.         As to the court’s

questions about Mother’s relationships with Father and Mr. Pielli, the court

asked questions to understand and clarify the timeline and nature of Mother’s

relationship with these individuals at various points in her life.     Upon our

review of the record, we see no indication that Mother’s case-in-chief was

truncated due to the court’s actions. The court allowed Mother much latitude

in cross-examining Father’s witnesses and did not restrict Mother from

presenting any witnesses. Although the extent of the trial court’s questioning

in this case may have been more than typical, we conclude that the court’s

inquiries were largely to gain a good understanding of the parties involved in

Child’s life in order to fashion a custody order that would be in Child’s best

interest. See Jordan, supra.

      Regarding Mother’s claims of improper commentary by the court, we

acknowledge that there were multiple instances during the pendency of the

trial where the judge recited the evidence as it had been presented to him by

Father, prior to hearing Mother’s testimony.        However, we note that the

judge’s actions must be taken in the context of the fact that this custody trial

consisted of ten days of testimony spanning several months.          There were

multiple instances where the examination of one witness was interrupted to

permit   the   testimony   of   another   witness   to   accommodate    witness

availabilities. There were also several instances where the examination of a

witness began on one date and concluded on another date several weeks later.

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Thus, the record demonstrates that the judge’s recitation of the facts as it had

been presented to date was often for the purpose of discerning whether the

topic had already been testified to by the witness at a prior occasion or to limit

the scope of cross-examination to the contents of the witness’ direct

testimony.

      Further, the court allowed Mother the full opportunity to testify and

present evidence about any topic where she disagreed with Father’s or

Father’s witnesses’ testimony. In fact, it is clear from the court’s questions

seeking clarification during Mother’s testimony that the court carefully

considered Mother’s testimony prior to making its custody determination.

Many issues in this case required a credibility determination, which is an area

fully within the sound discretion of the trial court as the factfinder. See S.J.S.,

supra. The fact that the court ultimately did not find Mother to be credible

and made comments to that effect does not demonstrate bias against Mother

or an abuse of discretion. See Kearney, supra; Jordan, supra. Therefore,

Mother’s first issue on appeal is waived and would merit no relief in any event.

      In her second and third issues combined, Mother contends that due to

the adversarial nature of the relationship between Mother and Father, a

custody evaluation by a licensed and experienced mental health professional

was necessary to ensure that the court was fully informed prior to making its

decision. Mother avers that a custody evaluation was necessary to create a

full and complete record that focuses on the best interests of Child. Mother

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asserts that a child custody evaluation “would have placed objective bounds

on the presiding judge, whose idiosyncratic questioning and personal and

judgmental comments from the bench cast significant doubt on whether an

unbiased evaluation of the facts was undertaken.”      (Mother’s Brief at 32).

Mother argues that a custody evaluation would have “flushed out” the material

facts and disputes underlying the proceedings and made the trial court’s

determinations more objectively reliable. Mother concludes that the lack of a

custody evaluation renders the court’s analysis of the custody factors

unreliable, and this Court should vacate the custody order and remand for a

new trial after the preparation of a custody evaluation. We disagree.

      In a custody matter, “the court may order the child(ren) and/or any

party to submit to and fully participate in an evaluation by an appropriate

expert or experts … upon the court’s own motion, upon the motion of a party

with reasonable notice to the person to be examined, or by agreement of the

parties.”   Pa.R.C.P. 1915.8(a).   “[A] court is not mandated to order a full

custody evaluation but may do so at its discretion.” T.M. v. H.M., 210 A.3d

283, 289 (Pa.Super. 2019) (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion

by declining to order custody evaluation where trial court concluded that

custody evaluation was not necessary in light of information elicited at full

custody trial).

      Instantly, Judge Roscioli explained the decision to deny Mother’s petition

for a custody evaluation as follows:

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         [O]ur reason for denying [Mother]’s petition was our
         conclusion that the appointment of a mental health
         professional to interview the child and opine as to an
         appropriate custody arrangement was not warranted under
         the circumstances of this case. On March 30, 2021, we
         received testimony from Dr. Roy Lubit, the evaluator
         proposed by [Mother]. After hearing the testimony of Dr.
         Lubit, the court was not convinced that an evaluation of the
         nature proposed was necessary or in the best interests of
         the child. Dr. Lubit proposed to interview the parents and
         the child, and to observe the child over the course of one to
         two months, after which he would opine as to which parent
         should be the primary custodian. Hearing the testimony of
         the parents and the child and making a determination as to
         what custody order should be entered in the best interest of
         the child is fully within the purview of the court, and the
         court is tasked with making such a determination in custody
         cases.     No unique circumstances were presented that
         caused the court to believe that putting the child through an
         intense evaluation in addition to litigation would be
         necessary or in her best interest.

(Trial Court Opinion, filed 9/21/22, at 2-3).

      We agree with the trial court that there were no unique circumstances

in this case such that a custody evaluation was required. In support of her

argument, Mother cites Johns v. Cioci, 865 A.2d 931, 944 (Pa.Super. 2004),

where this Court concluded that the trial court did not have sufficient

information to award custody without a custody evaluation. That is simply not

the case here.   The court held many days of evidentiary hearings, heard

testimony from nearly every significant adult in Child’s life, and conducted an

interview of Child. The court elicited extensive testimony about Mother and

Father’s childhood, family background, educational background, employment

history, and current circumstances. The court further heard testimony about

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Child’s education, hobbies, friendships, accommodations at each parent’s

residence, relationships with family members, and the status of Child’s

physical and mental health. The court also had the benefit of Dr. Esteve’s

report and testimony summarizing his interactions with Child and the parents

during the pendency of this custody matter.

      Mother does not specify what information the court lacked in making its

determination that a custody evaluation would have remedied.              Rather,

Mother essentially seems to suggest that a custody evaluation was required

to supply a second opinion as to the credibility determinations in this case.

There is no basis for this assertion as the trial court is the ultimate arbiter of

credibility in a custody matter, and a custody evaluation exists only for the

purpose of helping the court make such determinations, if needed.            See

S.J.S., supra; Pa.R.C.P. 1915.8(a).      The court determined that a custody

evaluation was neither required nor in Child’s best interests in this matter and

we discern no abuse of discretion in the court’s decision. See T.M., supra.

      In her fourth issue, Mother argues that the current custody order is not

specific enough about custody of Child during major Jewish holidays. Mother

argues that by failing to specify the names and dates of the Jewish holiday for

which Mother is entitled to custody of Child, the current custody order

“virtually guarantee[s] future controversy.” (Mother’s Brief at 22). Mother

concludes that the trial court erred by failing to delineate dates for major

Jewish holidays and this Court should remand with instructions for the court

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to cure the ambiguity with a clarifying or supplemental custody order. We

disagree.

      Here, the custody order states that holidays shall be shared as the

parties may agree. It further delineates a schedule for custody of Child during

major holidays to be observed in the event that the parties cannot agree. By

order of September 20, 2022, the court amended the custody schedule to add

that Mother shall have custody of Child in New Jersey for all major Jewish

holidays. Mother takes issue with the fact that the custody schedule does not

specifically delineate the days of custody for the Jewish holidays in anticipation

that the parties will have disagreements as to the dates when such holidays

are observed.     However, there is no evidence to substantiate Mother’s

concerns. Father has historically been supportive of Child’s exposure to Jewish

customs and religious practices.        There is no evidence of record to

demonstrate that Father has prevented or attempted to prevent Child from

participating in her Jewish heritage. If such an issue is to arise in the future,

Mother is free to petition the court for further instructions. Accordingly, we

do not find that the court erred or abused its discretion in failing to specify

dates of custody for Jewish holidays. See S.J.S., supra.

      In her final issue, Mother argues that the court erred by declining to

hold Father in contempt for failing to comply with the order entered on

February 22, 2021, which directed the parties to obtain an individual counselor

for Child.   Mother avers that Father failed to enlist Child in individual

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counseling and falsely charged Mother for counseling fees. Mother concludes

that the court erred in failing to hold Father in contempt and this Court should

remand the matter with instructions to enter a contempt order. We disagree.

      When we review a trial court’s finding of contempt:

         [W]e are limited to determining whether the trial court
         committed a clear abuse of discretion. This Court must
         place great reliance on the sound discretion of the trial judge
         when reviewing an order of contempt. This [C]ourt also has
         stated that each court is the exclusive judge of contempts
         against its process.

G.A. v. D.L., 72 A.3d 264, 269 (Pa.Super. 2013) (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted).

      Instantly, the court explained that a contempt order was unwarranted

given the conflicting testimony from both parties about Child’s individual

counseling. Father maintained that he took Child to the counselor that the

parties agreed upon and only stopped when the counselor left the practice.

Father also stated that Mother did not pay her half of the counseling fees as

required by the same February 22, 2021 order which instructed the parties to

share the costs of the counseling. Conversely, Mother testified that she did

not pay Father the money because she believed that he charged her for

counseling sessions that Child did not attend.     Father maintained that any

notice Mother received about unpaid fees was due to a clerical error. Given

the confusion and conflicting reports surrounding this situation, we see no

abuse of discretion in the court’s decision not to hold Father in contempt on

this ground.   See G.A., supra.      Accordingly, we find no merit to any of

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J-A03034-23

Mother’s issues on appeal and affirm the trial court’s custody order.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 6/13/2023

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