Court Opinion

ID: 9564917
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:11:19.916012+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:15.018582
License: Public Domain

VOLLACK, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with Part IV of the majority opinion, which upholds the sufficiency of the information. I also concur in the result reached by the majority on the constitutionality of the accessory statute in Part III, but I would use a different analysis to reach that result. I dissent to Part II because I do not believe that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the prosecution’s cross-examination of three witnesses for the defense.
I.
The majority holds that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing certain cross-examination of Bishop, at 682, and that the prosecution “compounded its wrongful action with its cross-examination *689of two other [character] witnesses,” at 682, requiring reversal of the convictions. At 684. I disagree with these conclusions.1
A.
Cross-Examination of Bishop
The trial court permitted the prosecution to cross-examine witness Bishop about an audit conducted by a state agency that revealed possible misappropriation of $15,-000 in funds. Bishop was the nursing home’s business manager and assistant administrator, and was also ten percent owner of the business; he testified that he was solely responsible for the financial affairs of the nursing home. The trial court specifically ruled that this cross-examination, which it held to be relevant to Bishop’s credibility, would be permitted under CRE 608. That Rule states:
Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in 13-90-101, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning his character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, ...
CRE 608(b), 7B C.R.S. (1984) (emphasis added). CRE 611 also provides:
(b) Scope of cross-examination. Cross-examination should be limited to the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the credibility of the witness. The court may, in the exercise of discretion, permit inquiry into additional matters as if on direct examination.
7B C.R.S. (1984) (emphasis added).
‘“The rule is that for the purpose of impeaching the credibility of a witness he may be questioned as to misconduct, even as to collateral matters, which has a tendency to show his lack of honesty or truthfulness; the qualification of the rule being that the party questioning him is bound by his answers and may not contradict him with regard thereto.’ ” Simon v. United States, 123 F.2d 80, 85 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 694, 62 S.Ct. 412, 86 L.Ed. 555 (1941) (quoting Pullman Co. v. Hall, 55 F.2d 139, 141 (4th Cir.1932)). The questioning party is not permitted to introduce extrinsic evidence in order to contradict the witness. CRE 608(b) (“Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility, ... may not be proved by extrinsic evidence.”).
Rule 608(b) therefore “authorizes inquiry into specific instances of misconduct on cross-examination but requires that they must be ‘clearly probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness.’ ” 3 J. Weinstein ¶ 608[05], at 608-43 (1987) (footnotes omitted) (hereinafter Weinstein). Misconduct is not limited to criminal convictions. Some courts permit “inquiry into non-conviction misconduct” and generally limit that inquiry “to conduct relevant to veracity or relevant to veracity and honesty.” Weinstein if 608[05J, at 608-42 (footnotes omitted). “The rule is that for the purpose of impeaching the credibility of a witness he may be questioned as to misconduct, even as to collateral matters, which has a tendency to show his lack of honesty or truthfulness.” Pullman Co. v. Hall, 55 F.2d 139, 141 (4th Cir.1932).
The decision as to the scope and limits of cross-examination, even in a criminal case, is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Denbow v. Williams, 672 P.2d 1011, 1014 (Colo.1983). Absent a showing of an abuse of discretion, the trial court’s rulings will not be disturbed on review. People v. Crawford, 191 Colo. 504, 507, 553 P.2d 827, 829 (1976). The question before the trial judge was whether the cross-examination of Bishop about the audit was a *690matter “affecting the credibility of the witness” and whether this questioning involved specific instances of Bishop’s conduct, going to his “character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.” CRE 608(b); 611(b). The question on appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in permitting this cross-examination.
A number of jurisdictions have ruled that such questioning is permissible. In United States v. Holt, 817 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir.1987), the prosecution was permitted to cross-examine a defense witness — the defendant’s wife — regarding an incident of her prior misconduct. The cross-examination, which focused on whether she had used checks that she later reported as stolen, was held to be “probative of [her] credibility as a witness,” therefore admissible under FRE 608(b). 817 F.2d at 1273.
This situation often arises when a defendant takes the witness stand. An “accused in a criminal proceeding who takes the stand is subject to the same kind of cross-examination as any other witness,” and can therefore be cross-examined about non-conviction misconduct. Hug v. United States, 329 F.2d 475, 484 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 818, 85 S.Ct. 37, 13 L.Ed. 2d 30 (1964); Simon, 123 F.2d at 85 (“It is well settled ... that where a defendant elects to make himself a witness he may be cross-examined as such.”). See United States v. Sullivan, 803 F.2d 87, 90-91 (3d Cir.1986), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 889, 93 L.Ed.2d 841 (1987) (Because the defendant’s credibility was an issue in the case, it was not error for the trial court to permit cross-examination of Sullivan regarding his fraudulent replies on his income tax forms and financial disclosure forms.); United States v. Sperling, 726 F.2d 69 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1243, 104 S.Ct. 3516, 82 L.Ed.2d 824 (1984) (“It was ... proper for the government to cross-examine Sperling regarding his false credit card applications to show a general lack of credibility. This is acceptable cross-examination under Fed.R.Evid. 608(b)(1).” Id. at 75.); Kitchen v. United States, 221 F.2d 832 (D.C.Cir.1955), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 928, 78 S.Ct. 1378, 2 L.Ed.2d 1374 (1958) (“Questions upon collateral issues for impeachment purposes on cross-examination are permissible if the subject matter of the question bears directly upon the veracity of the witness in respect to the issue involved in the trial.” 221 F.2d at 834 (footnote omitted)); see also Pullman Co. v. Hall, 55 F.2d 139, 141 (4th Cir.1932).
The first question is whether the trial court abused its discretion in permitting this cross-examination. Based on the rulings in other jurisdictions, I would conclude that the trial court here did not abuse its discretion. While another judge may have arrived at a different conclusion, the judge here heard all of the evidence, observed the demeanor of the witnesses, and made his decision in that context. His conclusion that this cross-examination was relevant, and that its probative value outweighed the possible prejudice, was within his discretion.
Even if the trial court abused its discretion, that determination is unnecessary unless the defendant has made a showing that reversible error occurred. To be reversible, the error must substantially influence the verdict or affect the fairness of the trial proceedings. People v. Quintana, 665 P.2d 605, 612 (Colo.1983). See United States v. Clemente, 640 F.2d 1069 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 820,102 S.Ct. 102, 70 L.Ed.2d 91 (1981) (Questioning of the defendant about his filing of false loan applications is permitted under FRE 608, but the admission of fraudulent loan applications into evidence was erroneous because specific instances of conduct cannot be proved by extrinsic evidence. However, the error in admitting extrinsic evidence was held to be harmless. Id. at 1083.).
Bishop’s testimony was that he was solely responsible for the bookkeeping errors discovered in the audit, and that Pratt was not responsible for financial matters. He was rehabilitated on redirect examination with the letter from Department of Social Services. This issue related to Bishop, not Pratt. At trial, Bishop took complete responsibility for all aspects of Norton’s finances.
*691This misappropriation and the resulting audit in May and June of 1983 was presented as a specific instance of Bishop’s conduct, which is permissible in this context, but extrinsic evidence was not presented, thus complying with CRE 608. The questioning party is bound by the answers and may not present evidence in contradiction; that limitation was followed here.2 On redirect examination,. defense counsel was given an opportunity to rehabilitate Bishop, Part of that rehabilitation consisted of Bishop reading into the record the letter he received from the Department of Social Services Audit Settlement Office indicating resolution of the audit and thanking Bishop for his cooperation.3
Based on the record, it is clear that the defendant has not established that this cross-examination substantially influenced the verdict or affected the fairness of her trial. For these reasons, I would conclude that no reversible error occurred in the cross-examination of Bishop.4
*692B.
Cross-Examination of Character Witnesses
When a character witness testifies as to a defendant’s good character or reputation in the community, the state can cross-examine the witness as to the witness’ familiarity with and knowledge of the defendant who has put his character into issue. Cross-examination should be limited to “those specific acts of the accused demonstrably probative of veracity.” Weinstein 11608[06], at 608-54. Such an inquiry is permitted “not because it is relevant to defendant’s character ... but because it is relevant to the credibility of the [character] witness, as a means of testing his familiarity with the defendant and his qualifications to express an opinion about the accused or attest to his reputation.” Weinstein 11608[06], at 608-54 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted); see Shimon v. United States, 352 F.2d 449, 453-54 (D.C.Cir.1965); see also People v. Couch, 179 Colo. 324, 329, 500 P.2d 967, 969 (1972) (impeachment must be directed to a witness’ credibility, not character). “Once the defendant has opened the door to a discussion of his character by calling character witnesses.... on cross-examination, the prosecution may ask defendant’s character witnesses whether they have heard about or know about specific acts committed by defendant in order to test this knowledge and standards for good reputation.” 2 J. Weinstein ¶ 405[02], at 405-22 to -23 (footnotes omitted); see Brindisi v. People, 76 Colo. 244, 253, 230 P. 797, 801 (1924) (“When a witness has testified to reputation, no cross-examination can be effective which precludes an inquiry into what the witness has heard and upon which his conclusions must be based.”). CRE 405 provides:
(a) Reputation or opinion. In all cases in which evidence of character or a trait of character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On cross-examination, inquiry is allowable into relevant specific instances of conduct.
7B C.R.S. (1984).5
This cross-examination is, of course, subject to the general limitations of CRE 403, which requires the exclusion of evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the chance of resulting confusion or prejudice. Weinstein ¶ 405[02], at 405-31. There are other limitations: the prosecutor must ask impeachment questions in good faith, but the determination of whether good faith exists is discretionary with the trial judge. People v. Thompson, 182 Colo. 198, 200, 511 P.2d 909, 910 (1973); People v. Lewis, 180 Colo. 423, 426-27, 506 P.2d 125, 126 (1973); State v. Sample, 673 S.W.2d 61, 67 (Mo.App.1984) (“[CJross-examination of character witnesses ought to be done in good faith, and the crimes inquired about ought not to be apocryphal, existing along [sic] in the fertile fancy of a public prosecutor.”). Also, the proper form for such questioning must be used. Romero v. People, 181 Colo. 305, 309, 509 P.2d 301, 303 (1973). In People v. Futamata, 140 Colo. 233, 343 P.2d 1058 *693(1959), this court described the standards and proper form for this type of cross-examination.
[T]he trial court should conduct a preliminary inquiry out of the presence of the jury so as to insure (a) that the alleged misconduct is actual; (b) that it is reasonably likely that it was the subject of the rumor in the community; (c) that it is not too remote and that it was of the same character as the act on trial. The trial judge should also ... see to it that the question is properly formed, that is, “Have you heard?” and that the jury is instructed at the time as to the limited purpose of the inquiry.
Id. at 236-37, 343 P.2d at 1060 (citing State v. Steensen, 35 N.J.Super. 103, 113 A.2d 203 (1955)).
The prosecution may, in good faith, ask whether a defense character witness, — who testified that he had known the defendant for fifteen years and that the defendant had a good reputation for truth and veracity — has heard rumors that the defendant bought or received stolen property. Sample, 673 S.W.2d at 67 (applying plain error standard). Knowledge of such rumors was held to be relevant because that knowledge would be inconsistent with the witness’ assertion of the defendant’s good reputation. Arizona v. Lehman, 126 Ariz. 388, 616 P.2d 63 (1980) (The prosecutor cross-examined the character witness “about specific instances of [the defendant’s] violent conduct or violent behavior.” The Arizona Supreme Court upheld this cross-examination because “a character witness may be asked on cross-examination about specific instances of conduct, provided they are relevant.” Id. at 391, 616 P.2d at 66.)
The prosecution can cross-examine character witnesses “about whether they had considered allegations of misconduct” by the accused that relate to his character for truth and veracity. Hohman v. State, 669 P.2d 1316, 1327 (Alaska App.1983). As the Alaska court noted, the state “does not have to prove that the allegations are true, since the purpose of the inquiry is to ascertain whether the witness considered the allegations in forming his or her opinion about [the accused’s] truth and veracity.” Id. at 1327 n. 10.
The cross-examination at issue here fully complied with the limits and requirements of such questioning. The defendant called these character witnesses and brought her own character into issue.6 The questions were presented in the proper form.7 The prosecution did not attempt to impermissi-bly enter extrinsic evidence to challenge *694the character witness’ answers. This cross-examination by the prosecution “does not appear ... to have been unnecessarily emphasized or drawn out.” Hohman, 669 P.2d at 1328. Because I believe the record shows that the cross-examination at issue was correctly permitted and conducted, I do not find an abuse of discretion.8 For this reason, I would hold that no error occurred during the cross-examination of the character witnesses.9
II.
Turning to the issue of the constitutionality of section 18-8-105, 8B C.R.S. (1986), *695the accessory statute, I agree with the majority that its disposition is not controlled by our holdings in People v. Young, 192 Colo. 65, 555 P.2d 1160 (1976), and Self v. People, 167 Colo. 292, 448 P.2d 619 (1968).10 The accessory statute has been altered significantly since Self was decided, and the language examined in Young is not at issue in this case. I disagree with the majority that “might” can be construed as “a reasonable probability.” Nevertheless, I believe that the statute can be given a constitutional interpretation, and therefore concur in the result reached by the majority-
In addition to those principles correctly recited by the majority, a statute enjoys a presumption of constitutionality, and the party challenging it has the burden of proving its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. Orsinger Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Department of Highways, 752 P.2d 55, 61 (Colo.1988); People v. McBurney, 750 P.2d 916, 920 (Colo.1988). If a statute is capable of alternative constructions, one of which is constitutional, then the constitutional interpretation must be adopted. People v. Randall, 711 P.2d 689, 692 (Colo.1985).
Section 18-8-105 provides in pertinent part:
(1) A person is an accessory to crime if, with intent to hinder, delay, or prevent the discovery, detection, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of another for the commission of a crime, he renders assistance to such person.
(2) “Renders assistance” means to:
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(d) By force, intimidation, or deception, obstruct anyone in the performance of any act which might aid in the discovery, detection, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of such person. ...
8B C.R.S. (1986) (emphasis added).11
Sections (1) and (2)(d) contemplate the interaction of at least three persons: a principal perpetrator, an accessory, and a third person. An accessory renders assistance to the principal perpetrator under section (2)(d) when, by force, intimidation, or *696deception, she obstructs a third person in performing any act which has some tendency to aid in the discovery, detection, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of the principal perpetrator.
It is sheer speculation to guess what effect information that was never transmitted would have had on the listener. An accessory cannot escape criminal culpability because the information that a third party attempted to provide to the authorities or other third parties would not, to a reasonable probability, have aided in the discovery, detection, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of the principal perpetrator. This interpretation of section (2)(d) recognizes that fact. More importantly, this interpretation recognizes the legislative determination that information which has some tendency to aid in the discovery, detection, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of the principal perpetrator is so valuable that proof beyond a reasonable doubt of its obstruction by force, intimidation, or deception, made with the requisite specific intent, subjects the defendant to criminal culpability as an accessory to crime and obstructor of justice. See, e.g., W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law § 6.9, at 597, 599-600 (2d ed. 1986); 4 C. Torcia, Wharton’s Criminal Law §§ 35, 594 (14th ed. 1981). Thus, a defendant can be guilty of rendering assistance to a principal perpetrator under section 18 — 8—105(2)(d) by obstructing the transmission of information to the police, regulatory authorities, prosecutors, or other third persons, even if these persons would have disregarded or refused to respond to the information, with the result that the information would not have aided in the discovery, detection, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of the principal perpetrator.
This interpretation avoids the problem created by the child abuse statute in People v. Hoehl, 193 Colo. 557, 568 P.2d 484 (1977). Under that statute, a defendant would have been guilty of child abuse if, with the requisite specific intent, he “causes or permits a child to be: (a) [pjlaced in a situation that may endanger the child’s life or health....” § 18-6-401(l)(a), 8 C.R.S. (1973) (emphasis added). The child abuse statute imposed criminal culpability upon the defendant not as an accessory but as the perpetrator of the crime. We recognized that, when the word “may” was given its normal meaning as to “be in some degree likely,” the child abuse statute would probably not provide a fair description of the prohibited conduct, “since virtually any conduct directed toward a child has the possibility, however slim, of endangering the child’s life or health.” Hoehl, 193 Colo, at 560, 568 P.2d at 486 (citations omitted). In this case, however, the prohibited conduct is the act of obstructing another from transmitting any information which might aid in the discovery, detection, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of the principal perpetrator. The prosecution in both cases still bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed a particular act with a specific intent.
In my view, a defendant “renders assistance” to a principal perpetrator and becomes an accessory to crime when she (1) commits the act of obstructing a third person from providing information about the principal perpetrator by force, intimidation, or deception (2) with the specific intent to hinder, delay, or prevent the discovery, detection, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of the principal perpetrator. Although the statute does not place an affirmative duty on persons to apprise third parties such as the police of information which might aid in the capture of criminals, it does treat someone who obstructs another from apprising them of this information as an accessory to crime. As such, I believe that section 18-8-105(2)(d) gives a fair description of the conduct prohibited by the statute, and is not unconstitutionally vague.12
*697For these reasons, I would affirm the trial court.
I am authorized to say that Justice ERICKSON joins in this concurrence and dissent, and Justice ROVIRA joins in Part I of this concurrence and dissent.

. The majority does not make clear whether reversible error was committed by the cross-examination of Bishop alone, by the cross-examination of character witnesses Harlan and Linton alone, or by cumulative error. I would hold that no reversible error occurred with respect to the cross-examination of witness Bishop, that no error occurred with respect to cross-examination of character witnesses Harlan and Linton, and that no cumulative error occurred.

. The following exchange took place during the cross-examination of Bishop:
Q [district attorney] I’m going to direct your attention back to 1983, specifically to May and June of 1983 — and the months after that and before, but specifically in June of 1983. Is it not true that the monies on my first example — the monies that should have been paid back to the application for Medicaid were not paid back to Medicaid. In fact, Norton’s — Or did not pay it back to the families. Norton’s kept the money from the families and Norton’s kept the money from Medicaid.
A Let’s make a clarification here.
Q I’m asking a yes or no question.
A No.
Q That was not done?
A No.
Q Okay. Is it not true during that time period—
[defense counsel]: Your Honor, I think he’s asked the question now, and it’s been answered.
[district attorney]: I’m going through the three examples.
THE COURT: Objection is overruled.
Q [district attorney] In May and June of 1983, money that should have been — If a patient was deceased or moved out, that money that should have been paid back to Medicaid was not paid back to Medicaid for the remainder of the month. Norton’s kept that money.
A I would say no.
Q Is it not true that the money that should have been offset against social security was kept by Norton’s again?
A No.
Q You said you had an explanation.
A All right. I have a letter.
Q I don’t want to know about a letter.
[defense counsel]: I think that he’s asked the question; he’s answered it. We went over it in chambers.
THE COURT: Objection is overruled. The question is whether or not it’s extrinsic evidence. He’s allowed to cross examine him. You may proceed.
Q [district attorney] I’m not interested in any letters received in December of ’83. I’m interested in your explanation of why you say no, that that did not occur.
A Because in view of the facts that — The rules are that if they apply for Medicaid and they’re approved, that first they must apply all of their income toward their care. And they receive $29 personal funds. And all of the monies and everything was substantiated and accounted for. And that proportion that was due the State or due the patient was refunded. It might have been after the fact, but it was refunded. And we certainly have not kept it in Norton’s.

. The following testimony was heard by the jury:
Q [defense counsel] And these — Did the state of Colorado send you a letter?
A [Bishop] Yes, sir.
Q And how was it finally resolved according to the letter?
A It says, "Dear Mr. Bishop: This is to acknowledge the closure of the above-referenced Audit on December 6, 1983, and receipt of your due to the state amount of $4,991.61. Your personal needs cash shortage of $15,-684.71 has been resolved with your payment to all adjustments as confirmed by my on-site inspection of December 6.
"Remember that any returned personal needs disbursements may be forwardfed] and monies turned over to this money for disbursement regarding in-the-home patients.
“The proper posting of all prospective ledger cards will assure that your next audit begins with a clear slate. I thank you for your cooperation in settling the audit, and I trust that your next audit will be much easier to resolve following the new accounting practices.
"Sincerely, Mike Bryan, Audit Settlement Office, Investigations and Audits.”
That was dated December the 9th, 1983. So considering that that was a ten-year audit, that’s less than one half of one percent deficiency, so I can’t see where anybody felt that anybody had anything to gain from it.

. United States v. Dennis, 625 F.2d 782 (8th Cir.1980), and Shafer v. American Employers’ Insurance Co., 535 F.Supp. 1067 (W.D.Ark.1982), the cases relied upon by the majority, do not *692stand for the proposition that questioning a witness about his civil tax problems under Rule 608(b) creates a reversible error. In Dennis the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a trial court properly excluded evidence of a tax-related arrest that did not result in a conviction, but was silent on the issue of whether admission would create a reversible error. 625 F.2d at 798. In Shafer, the trial court refused to order the plaintiff in a personal injury case to produce evidence of income tax returns. The plaintiff had never been convicted, arrested, or even investigated in this regard. The court not only was silent on the issue of whether admission of such evidence would create a reversible error, it stated that the evidence could be inquired into if the plaintiff made loss of income an issue at trial. 535 F.Supp. at 1069.

. CRE 405 is substantially identical to the Federal Rule, except for the language in subsection (b): “except as limited by 16-10-301.”
One commentator has stated:
The same tests for determining when a particular person is qualified to speak of the witness' reputation should be applied under Rule 608 as when reputation is being used to prove character pursuant to Rule 405, except that the Rule 608 testimony must relate to the witness’ reputation at the time of trial — rather than at the time he committed the acts charged — and must be relevant to truthfulness — rather than to any other character trait.
3 J. Weinstein ¶ 608[03], at 608-21 to -22 (footnotes omitted).

. Character witness Linton testified as to Pratt’s reputation:
Q [defense counsel] Now, in'your dealings with all the state agencies in the state of Colorado, have you discussed with members of those agencies the reputation of Mrs. Pratt and Norton Nursing Home?
A [Linton] Yes, I have.
Q And will you tell us what that reputation is in the state of Colorado?
A In the state of Colorado, through the state agencies, the legislative body, Olga holds — has a great amount of respect from all of the individuals who deal routinely with nursing homes in Colorado.
Q And from your knowledge of Mrs. Pratt, what is your opinion of her truth and veracity?
A I have no reason to ever question it. Character witness Harlan testified:
Q [defense counsel] And have you talked with people who know Mrs. Pratt as well as yourself? In other words, have you talked to other people about Mrs. Pratt?
A [Harlan] I have known Mrs. Pratt’s fine reputation for many, many years.
Q All right. And will you tell the Court and the jury what that reputation is?
A Excellent. Excellent nursing home, very professional. And it was my experience to have an elderly aunt in the nursing home for 11 months, so I experienced it firsthand.
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Q All right. Do you know the reputation of Mrs. Pratt for truth and veracity?
A To my best knowledge, there’s just no question about it, I feel. Complete integrity.

. Harlan was questioned on cross-examination in the following manner:
Q [district attorney] You were talking about the way Norton’s was run and the way Mrs. Pratt handled things. Were you aware that in 1976, Mrs. Pratt had a patient by the name of Carolyn Gray who liked to go out at night to bars and drink, so that Mrs. Pratt ordered that she be tied in an upright chair every evening? Were you aware of that?
[defense counsel]: Your Honor, I’m going to object to this.
THE COURT: Objection is overruled.
THE WITNESS: I did not know about this. My aunt had to be tied to a chair at times.
*694Q [district attorney] All night long?
A Not to my knowledge, no. But when she became difficult to handle, that was the only way was restraint.
Q Does that give you a different opinion about her reputation?
A None.
Q Were you aware that in 1983, Norton's Nursing Home in May and June of that year kept approximately $15,000 from patients that they shouldn’t have kept?
A I know nothing about that.
Q Involving about 35 patients? Would that change your opinion of Norton Nursing Home’s reputation?
A I don't know how true it is.
Q If it was true?
A I don’t think it would. I don’t think that—
[district attorney]: I have no further questions of this witness.
Cross-examination of Linton was as follows:
Q [district attorney] You talked about Mrs. Pratt’s reputation. Were you aware that in 1976, there was a patient staying at Norton’s by the name of Carolyn Gray and that Carolyn Gray was someone who liked to go out and drink at night so that upon Mrs. Pratt’s orders, Carolyn Gray was tied to a sit-up type chair for the entire night on a consistent basis?
A [Linton] I would assume that she was probably posied. But no, I'm not aware of that situation.
Q Is that something you would do with a patient?
A Based on doctor’s orders. Many times you do have to restrain patients for their own protection. And that’s usually a decision that is made by a patient-care planning committee with input from the physician. And it is not tying them to a chair;' it’s poseying them to a chair and releasing them on a routine basis.
Q But not the — not for an entire night, nights on end.
A I don’t know that that situation happened.
Q Does that change your opinion—
A Does not change my opinion.
Q —of Olga Pratt’s reputation?
A No, because I don’t know that that’s true.
Q Were you aware that in 1983, it was discovered that in May and June of 1983, Norton’s Nursing Home kept about $15,000 in money that should have gone to either patients or Medicaid?
A I have been made aware that there was an audit performed and that there was a $15,-000 restitution — reimbursement made. That is, I might add, not unusual to happen in the nursing-home industry.
Q And they were required to pay back approximately 35 patients.
A I don’t know. I don’t know that. I don’t know how many patients there were.
Q $15,000 to 35 patients is significant money to them because they don’t earn much, is that correct?
A I understand it was a ten-year audit.
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Q Does that change your opinion of her reputation?
A Absolutely not.
Q Or the home’s reputation?
A Absolutely not.

. This conclusion is further supported by the objection found in the record. During the cross-examination of Harlan, defense counsel objected to questioning about the poseying incident, but did not object to questioning about the audit. See supra note 6. Defense counsel did not object when Linton was questioned about the audit or about the poseying incident, nor did he object when Harlan was questioned about the audit. It thus appears that if there was any error, it would be subject to the plain error standard, except for the questioning of Harlan about the poseying incident. See Crim.P. 52(b), 7B C.R.S. (1984).

. "Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." Crim.P. 52(a), 7B C.R.S. (1984). Impeachment of the character witnesses was for the purpose of assessing the completeness of the witness’ information about Pratt, not whether the allegations were true.
To assess reversible error, the inquiry is whether the error substantially influenced the verdict or affected the fairness of the trial proceedings, not whether there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict. People v. Quintana, 665 P.2d 605, 612 (Colo.1983). In this case, I believe the majority should have determined whether the testimony at issue had a substantial effect or influence on the verdict before reversing the defendant's convictions. People v. Hanson, 189 Colo. 101, 102, 537 P.2d 739, 741 (1975). I would conclude that the cross-examination of the character witnesses neither substantially influenced the verdict, nor affected the fairness of the trial proceedings.

. Because the majority decides this case on grounds of improper questioning of witnesses on cross-examination, it has no need to discuss the constitutionality of the accessory statute. See, e.g., Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 108, 89 S.Ct. 956, 959, 22 L.Ed.2d 113 (1969); Hutchinson v. People, 742 P.2d 875, 887 (Colo.1987) (Vollack, J., dissenting); People v. Bossert, 722 P.2d 998, 1004 (Colo.1986); People v. Lybarger, 700 P.2d 910, 915 (Colo.1985); Ricci v. Davis, 627 P.2d 1111, 1121 (Colo.1981); Board of County Comm’rs v. City & County of Denver, 194 Colo. 252, 256, 571 P.2d 1094, 1096 (1977); Friedman v. Motor Vehicle Div., 194 Colo. 228, 229, 571 P.2d 1086, 1087 (1977); Tyler v. School Dist. No. 1, 177 Colo. 188, 189-90, 493 P.2d 22, 23 (1972). Consequently its interpretation of section 18 — 8—105(2)(d) must be viewed as mere dictum.
By contrast, I must reach this issue because I conclude that the prosecution’s cross-examination of three defense witnesses created no reversible error.

. The definition of "render assistance” in section 18-8-105(2)(d) represents a modification of the Model Penal Code definition of “hindering apprehension or prosecution.” This modification, which represents a statutory expansion of common law accessory liability, originated in New York. New York Penal Law section 205.50 (McKinney 1975) provides:
(A] person “renders criminal assistance” when, with intent to prevent, hinder or delay the discovery or apprehension of ... a person who he knows or believes has committed a crime, ... he:
4. Prevents or obstructs, by means of force, intimidation or deception, anyone from performing an act which might aid in the discovery or apprehension of such person or in the lodging of a criminal charge against him....
(Emphasis added). The practice commentaries to section 205.50 provide that “divulging information to a prosecutor" is an example of conduct that subsection four was designed to criminalize.
Several states in addition to Colorado have adopted the New York modification of the Model Penal Code by including the word "might” in their formulation of what constitutes "rendering assistance." See Model Penal Code § 242.3, comment 4 at 235-36 & n. 53 (1980); Ark.Stat. Ann. § 5-54-105(a)(3) (1987); Conn.Gen.Stat. § 53a-165 (1987); Del.Code Ann. tit. 11, § 1244 (1987); Ky.Rev.Stat.Ann. 520.110 (Michie 1985); Me.Rev.Stat.Ann. tit. 17-A, § 753.1.E (1983); Mont.Code Ann. § 45-7-303(2)(d) (1987); N.H. Rev.Stat.Ann. § 642.3(I)(d) (1986); N.J.Rev.Stat. § 2C: 29-3(a)(5) (1982); Or.Rev.Stat. § 162.325(l)(d) (1987). Whether the word “might” renders these statutes unconstitutional, however, has never been decided.

. The majority states that, under the dictum of Rubanowitz, a special jury instruction would be required to explain the full meaning that the word "might" has acquired through case law. At 685 (citing People v. Rubanowitz, 688 P.2d 231, 239 (Colo.1984) (“may” means "reasonably *697probable")). Because I do not interpret the word “might” in the fashion construed by the majority, I would not require a special jury instruction to be given.