Court Opinion

ID: 9369956
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-10 15:00:54.024246+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:18.321873
License: Public Domain

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                                                 [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                               No. 21-10614
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

        WASEEM DAKER,
                                                    Plaintiff-Appellant,
        versus
        D. VICTOR REYNOLDS,
        former District Attorney,
        DISTRICT ATTORNEY JOYETTE HOLMES,
        AMELIA G. PRAY,
        Assistant District Attorney, Cobb County,
        CHRISTINA WILLOUGHBY,
        Administrative Assistant,
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        2                       Opinion of the Court                   21-10614

                                                        Defendants-Appellees.

                              ____________________

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Northern District of Georgia
                     D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cv-02650-WMR
                            ____________________

        Before NEWSOM, BRANCH, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
                Waseem Daker, a Georgia prisoner proceeding pro se,
        appeals the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of his first amended
        civil complaint for failure to state a claim; the district court’s denial
        of his motion to alter or amend judgment, pursuant to Federal Rule
        of Civil Procedure 59(e); and the district court’s denial of his
        motion for leave to amend. He presents three main arguments on
        appeal: (1) the district court judge and magistrate judge abused
        their discretion in failing to sua sponte recuse themselves; (2) the
        district court erred in dismissing his complaint for failure to state a
        claim; and (3) the district court abused its discretion in denying his
        supplemental Rule 59(e) motion without granting his request for
        leave to amend the first amended complaint. Because Daker has
        shown no reversible error, we affirm.
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        21-10614               Opinion of the Court                        3

                                  I.     Background
                 In May 2020, Daker filed a pro se civil complaint under 42
        U.S.C. § 1983, asserting six claims against several Cobb County,
        Georgia, employees, namely, D. Victor Reynolds, a former district
        attorney; Joyette Holmes, a former district attorney; Christina
        Willoughby, an administrative specialist; and Amelia Pray, an
        assistant district attorney (collectively “Cobb defendants”). In the
        complaint, Daker asserted that he was convicted in 1996 in Cobb
        County of two counts of aggravated stalking, and then again in
        2012 of several other offenses, including malice murder, burglary,
        false imprisonment, aggravated battery, and attempted aggravated
        stalking. Daker explained that, since his convictions, he had filed
        several habeas corpus petitions in both state and federal court
        challenging his 1996 and 2012 convictions.
                Daker then alleged that between 2017 and 2019, the Cobb
        defendants denied, ignored, or failed to timely respond to multiple
        Georgia Open Records Act (“ORA”) requests that Daker submitted
        seeking a copy of files that he originally possessed and copied onto
        a USB drive for the assistant district attorney during his 2012 case.
        He maintained that by denying, ignoring, or not responding to his
        requests, the Cobb defendants violated his First Amendment right
        of access to courts, the ORA, and other Georgia statutes.
        However, he did not provide any detail as to what was on the USB
        drive, why he needed the files, or how he was injured by his
        inability to access the files. Daker sought declaratory relief,
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        4                           Opinion of the Court                        21-10614

        compensatory and punitive damages, nominal damages, as well as
        injunctive relief.
               Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A of the Prison Litigation
        Reform Act (“PLRA”), 1 a magistrate judge conducted an initial
        screening of Daker’s complaint and recommended dismissal. The
        magistrate judge determined that count one against defendant
        Willoughby, which was based on Willoughby’s February 2017
        denial of Daker’s ORA request, was time-barred because Daker
        filed the complaint in May 2020, outside the relevant two-year
        statute of limitations. The magistrate judge further concluded that
        Daker failed to state an access to court claim against any defendant
        because he failed to allege or show an actual injury that resulted
        from the defendants’ actions—such as a missed filing deadline or
        an inability to present claims because he lacked the requested files.
        Finally, the magistrate judge recommended the dismissal of
        Daker’s state law claims for lack of diversity jurisdiction.
              In response, Daker filed a first amended complaint (which
        provided some of the missing details from the original complaint
        concerning the files) along with his objections to the magistrate
        judge’s report and recommendation (“R&R”). He alleged that the

        1 The PLRA provides that when a prisoner in a civil action “seeks redress from
        a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity,” the
        district court shall review the complaint and shall “dismiss the complaint, or
        any portion” thereof, if it “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon
        which relief may be granted” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who
        is immune for such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)–(b).
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        21-10614                Opinion of the Court                         5

        police executed several search warrants on his home in connection
        with the 2012 case and seized numerous items, including his
        personal computer. During the 2012 trial, Daker, who represented
        himself pro se with standby counsel, requested permission to
        inspect his seized laptop to obtain files relevant to his defense.
        Initially, the agreement was that an assistant district attorney and
        the state’s investigator would sit with Daker while he copied the
        files and make a list of every file he copied “to make sure that he
        [did] not get the pornography, the escape books, the killing, the
        bomb books, and all the other things that [were] on there” that
        could be a threat to jail security. However, halfway through the
        copying of the files, the State suggested that instead of making a
        handwritten list of the files, it should get a copy of the files on the
        USB drive. Daker objected, arguing that giving the State a copy of
        the files would force him to “disclose trial strategy and work
        product” and “consent to a search of his computer without a
        warrant.” The trial court ruled that Daker could only access the
        files if he provided a copy to the State.
               According to Daker, in 2017, he filed a state habeas action
        that included three claims related to the copying of the files and the
        trial court’s ruling, but he was unable to support these claims
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        6                          Opinion of the Court                        21-10614

        because the Cobb defendants denied, ignored, or otherwise did not
        respond to his numerous requests for access to the copied files. 2
               The amended complaint also included three additional
        claims. Specifically, he alleged in Claims 6 and 7 that he sent two
        ORA requests for “all digital data” obtained from his property in
        the possession of the district attorney’s office, which the defendants
        either failed to timely respond to or ignored. He alleged in Claim
        8 that he requested the return of all property seized from him
        during his prior trials, but the police refused to release the property
        without authorization from the district attorney’s office, which he
        alleged violated the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause and the
        Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. Finally, Daker
        argued that all of his claims were timely.
               In his objections to the R&R, Daker alleged in relevant part
        that the magistrate judge (1) failed to construe the factual
        allegations in the light most favorable to him as required by
        § 1915A; (2) erred in finding that the complaint was filed in May
        2020, as opposed to January 2020; (3) erred in considering the

        2 Daker referred to the following claims from his 2017 state habeas petition:
        (1) “that the trial court acted as a ‘surrogate prosecutor’ . . . throughout the
        trial in general and in ruling on this matter in particular”; (2) the requirement
        that he “could only have access to the files if he also provided them to the State
        forced him to disclose trial strategy and work product” in violation of the Fifth,
        Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments; and (3) the requirement that he give the
        State access to the files violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from
        unreasonable search and seizure and his Sixth Amendment right to
        compulsory process.
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        21-10614                   Opinion of the Court                                7

        statute of limitations defense sua sponte and in holding that Count
        One (related to the February 2017 denial of his ORA request) was
        time-barred; and (4) erred in concluding that his pro se complaint,
        when construed liberally, failed to state an access to courts claim.
        He also asserted that his amended complaint set forth additional
        facts in support of his access to court claims.
                The district court overruled Daker’s objections, adopted
        the R&R, and dismissed the complaint without prejudice. In doing
        so, the district court considered the allegations in Daker’s first
        amended complaint. 3 The district court did not address the statute
        of limitations issue. Instead, the court concluded that, regardless
        of whether the claims were timely, Daker failed to state a viable
        access to courts claim. The district court explained that, even
        though Daker generally asserted that his lack of access to the files
        prevented him from supporting certain claims, he failed to describe
        what information was in those files or how that information would
        have helped him support those claims. 4 As a result, his claim that

        3 The district court noted that Daker failed to sign the first amended
        complaint, making it “a legal nullity,” but because the failure to sign was a
        curable defect, the court still considered the allegations in the first amended
        complaint.
        4 The district court noted that the files were originally Daker’s and he
        downloaded the files and gave them to the State, and, therefore, “he must have
        at least a general idea of what files the jump drive contained.” Accordingly,
        the district court determined that Daker’s “failure to provide even the slightest
        description of what information in those files would have helped him in his
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        8                         Opinion of the Court                      21-10614

        “he suffered an actual injury in the pursuit of habeas corpus relief
        because he was prevented from presenting his claims [was] entirely
        speculative.” Finally, the district court concluded that there being
        no diversity jurisdiction, it lacked jurisdiction over the state law
        claims.5
               Daker subsequently filed a motion to vacate the district
        court’s order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), arguing
        that the district court committed various errors in dismissing his
        complaint. A few weeks later, he filed a supplemental Rule 59(e)
        motion, in which he requested the opportunity to again amend his
        complaint, and he argued that the district court erred in dismissing
        his complaint without first providing him with notice and an
        opportunity to respond. He attached a copy of his proposed second
        amended complaint. The district court denied Daker’s initial Rule
        59(e) motion, concluding that Daker “failed to demonstrate that he
        [was] entitled to the relief he [sought].” It then denied the
        supplemental Rule 59(e) motion, concluding that Daker was not
        entitled to relief and that leave to amend was futile. In doing so,
        the district court considered Daker’s second amended complaint

        state habeas corpus action renders his access-to-courts claim[s] incomplete and
        unavailing”—particularly in light of Daker’s lengthy history of frivolous
        litigation.
        5 Daker states that he is not challenging the diversity jurisdiction ruling on
        appeal.
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        21-10614                  Opinion of the Court                              9

        and again concluded that he failed to state a viable access to courts
        claim. Daker appealed to this Court.
               During the pendency of his appeal, the Supreme Court of
        Georgia affirmed the grant of state habeas relief on Daker’s claim
        that the trial court erroneously denied him his constitutional right
        to appellate counsel in his initial pro se appeal. Allen v. Daker, 858
        S.E.2d 731, 735 (Ga. 2021). Thus, the Court remanded the case to
        the state habeas court with instruction to “grant relief to Daker in
        the form of a second, out-of-time direct appeal so that he may start
        the post-conviction process anew in the trial court.” Id.
                                      II.     Discussion
                   A. Whether the district court judge and magistrate
                      judge erred in failing to sua sponte recuse
                      themselves
               Daker argues that the district court judge and magistrate
        judge abused their discretion by failing to recuse themselves sua
        sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). He notes that almost a year after
        the district court’s rulings in this case, both the district court judge
        and magistrate judge recused themselves from several of Daker’s
        other cases. 6 He maintains that because of the subsequent

        6 Specifically, the district court judge granted Daker’s recusal motion in
        another case and recused himself from five of Daker’s pending actions, stating
               while the undersigned has always acted his best to make the
               correct decision on the seemingly endless motions that Daker
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        10                          Opinion of the Court                      21-10614

        recusals, the district court’s order here should be vacated and the
        case remanded and assigned to new judges.
               Although Daker argues that the judges abused their
        discretion in failing to sua sponte recused themselves, when, as
        here, a plaintiff raises a recusal issue for the first time on appeal, we
        review for plain error only. Curves, LLC v. Spalding Cnty., Ga.,
        685 F.3d 1284, 1287 n.2 (11th Cir. 2012); Hamm v. Members of Bd.
        of Regents of State of Fla., 708 F.2d 647, 651 (11th Cir. 1983). “Plain
        error review is an extremely stringent form of review,” and the
        plaintiff has the burden to show that (1) an error occurred (2) that
        the “error was plain” (3) that it affected the
        plaintiff’s substantial rights and (4) “not correcting the error would

                 files in all his cases, the undersigned acknowledges that he has
                 become fatigued by the sheer volume of Daker’s litigious and
                 vexatious case filings, as well as Daker’s tendency to cast
                 repeated aspersions on the integrity of this Court whenever an
                 adverse ruling is made. Thus, to avoid any question as to the
                 undersigned’s impartiality going forward in any of Daker’s
                 pending cases, a change seems to be prudent here.

        Daker v. Warren, No. 1:14-cv-03180-SDG, Doc. 155 at 2–3 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 30,
        2022).
        Similarly, the magistrate judge granted Daker’s motion for recusal in another
        one of his cases, stating “[o]ut of an abundance of caution and for the reasons
        stated by [the district court judge], I will also RECUSE from the three pending
        actions listed in the caption and any Daker matters that are reopened or filed
        in the future.” Daker v. Keaton, No. 1:16-cv-03745-SDG, Doc. 73 at 3 (N.D.
        Ga. Mar. 31, 2022).
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        21-10614               Opinion of the Court                        11

        seriously affect the fairness of the judicial proceeding.” Farley v.
        Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 197 F.3d 1322, 1329 (11th Cir. 1999).
                Section 455 of Title 28 of the United States Code sets forth
        two conditions for recusal. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)–(b). Subsection (a)
        provides that “[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the
        United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which
        his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Id. § 455(a). The
        question for purposes of § 455(a) “is whether an objective,
        disinterested, lay observer fully informed of the facts underlying
        the grounds on which recusal was sought would entertain a
        significant doubt about the judge’s impartiality, and any doubts
        must be resolved in favor of recusal.” United States v. Patti, 337
        F.3d 1317, 1321 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal citations and quotations
        omitted).
                Second, under subsection (b), a judge must recuse himself
        “[w]here he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a
        party . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1); see also Patti, 337 F.3d at 1321
        (explaining that recusal under subsection (b) is mandatory once it
        is established that any of the enumerated circumstances in (b)
        exist). “The bias or prejudice must be personal and extrajudicial; it
        must derive from something other than that which the judge
        learned by participating in the case.” United States v. Amedeo, 487
        F.3d 823, 828 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotations omitted). Importantly,
        “opinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or
        events occurring in the course of the current . . . [or] prior
        proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion
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        12                      Opinion of the Court                 21-10614

        unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that
        would make fair judgment impossible.” Liteky v. United States,
        510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). Absent evidence of pervasive bias and
        prejudice, “a judge’s rulings in the same or a related case may not
        serve as the basis for a recusal motion.” McWhorter v. City of
        Birmingham, 906 F.2d 674, 678 (11th Cir. 1990).
                Daker has not shown that any error—much less plain
        error—occurred when the judges failed to sua sponte recuse
        themselves in this case. Daker’s sole contention in support of
        recusal is that both the magistrate judge and the district court judge
        have since recused themselves in other cases brought by Daker.
        But “a judge’s rulings in the same or a related case may not serve
        as the basis for a recusal motion.” McWhorter, 906 F.2d at 678.
        Furthermore, we note that their subsequent recusals in other cases
        stemmed from Daker’s own recusal motions (which he did not file
        in this case), and there is no evidence of persuasive bias or prejudice
        on the part of either judge. And nothing in either judge’s recusal
        statement in those cases or their conduct in this case would cause
        an objective, disinterested lay observer to question the judges’
        impartiality in the instant case. Patti, 337 F.3d at 1321.
        Accordingly, Daker failed to show plain error and is not entitled to
        relief on this claim.
                  B. Whether the district court erred in dismissing the
                     complaint
              Daker argues that the magistrate judge and district court
        erred in construing the facts and inferences against him and
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        21-10614                   Opinion of the Court                               13

        concluding that he failed to state a viable access to courts claim. 7
        He also argues that the district court erred in dismissing the
        complaint because he did not receive the proper notice and
        opportunity to respond prior to the dismissal. 8 Finally, Daker
        argues that the district court erred in failing to consider and address
        the three new claims in his first amended complaint.
               “A district court’s decision to dismiss for failure to state a
        claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A is reviewed de novo, taking the
        allegations in the complaint as true.” Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d
        1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006). The same standards that apply to a
        dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) apply to
        dismissals under § 1915A. Leal v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 254 F.3d 1276,
        1278–79 (11th Cir. 2001).
               We construe pro se pleadings liberally, but we will not
        “serve as de facto counsel” or “rewrite an otherwise deficient
        pleading in order to sustain an action.” Campbell v. Air Jamaica
        Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168–69 (11th Cir. 2014) (quotations omitted).
        We may affirm on any ground supported by the record, regardless

        7 Daker also takes issue with the magistrate judge’s statute of limitations
        determination. Because the district court did not adopt the timeliness
        determination in dismissing the complaint, we do not address this issue.
        8 Daker argues that the district court erred in concluding that the first
        amended complaint was a legal nullity because he did not sign it. We find it
        unnecessary to reach this issue because the district court expressly stated that,
        notwithstanding this determination, it still considered the allegations in the
        first amended complaint.
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        14                     Opinion of the Court                21-10614

        of whether that ground was relied upon or even considered below.
        Kernel Records Oy v. Mosley, 694 F.3d 1294, 1309 (11th Cir. 2012).
                As an initial matter, Daker was not entitled to notice and an
        opportunity to respond prior to the dismissal of his complaint.
        Under § 1915A, the district court was authorized to sua
        sponte dismiss Daker’s amended complaint “as soon as practicable
        after docketing” based solely on the allegations in his complaint
        and without the consideration of additional arguments. See 28
        U.S.C. § 1915A(a)–(b). Additionally, we note that Daker had the
        opportunity to object to the magistrate judge’s R&R before the
        district court entered its order, which is sufficient to satisfy due
        process. See Vanderberg v. Donaldson, 259 F.3d 1321, 1324 (11th
        Cir. 2001) (holding no due process violation where district court
        sua sponte dismissed complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure
        to state a claim because plaintiff had an opportunity to file
        objections to the R&R before the district court issued its decision).
               Now we turn to the substance of Daker’s complaint. Taking
        the complaint as true and construing all reasonable inferences in
        Daker’s favor, he failed to state a viable access to courts claim
        because he failed to show an actual injury. Specifically, in order to
        assert a claim arising from the denial of access to the courts, a
        prisoner “must first establish an actual injury.” Barbour v. Haley,
        471 F.3d 1222, 1225 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S.
        343, 349–50 (1996)). “Actual injury may be established by
        demonstrating that an inmate’s efforts to pursue a nonfrivolous
        claim were frustrated or impeded by . . . an official’s action.” Id.
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        21-10614                  Opinion of the Court                             15

        Thus, “[t]o prevail, a plaintiff must provide evidence of such
        deterrence, such as a denial or dismissal of a direct appeal, habeas
        petition, or civil rights case that results from actions of prison
        officials. Wilson v. Blankenship, 163 F.3d 1284, 1290–91 (11th Cir.
        1998). Additionally, “a litigant asserting an access claim must also
        prove that he has a colorable underlying claim for which he seeks
        relief.” Barbour, 471 F.3d at 1226. “Thus, the plaintiff must identify
        within his complaint, a nonfrivolous, arguable underlying claim.”
        Id. (quotation omitted).
               Daker asserted that the files he requested from the Cobb
        defendants were necessary to support three of the allegations from
        his 2017 state habeas petition. 9 However, nowhere in his initial,
        first or second amended complaint did he describe what
        information was in those files or how that information would have
        aided in support of his three state habeas claims that: (1) “the trial
        court acted as a ‘surrogate prosecutor’ . . . throughout the trial in
        general and in ruling on this matter in particular”; (2) the
        requirement that he “could only have access to the files if he also
        provided them to the State forced him to disclose trial strategy and
        work product” in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth

        9 Daker did not explain in his initial or first amended complaint why he no
        longer had the files. However, for the first time in the second amended
        complaint that Daker included with his supplemental Rule 59(e) motion, he
        explained that he no longer has the files because his standby counsel did not
        “preserve” the USB drive that the files were on, and, therefore, he needed the
        files from the Cobb defendants.
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        16                        Opinion of the Court                      21-10614

        Amendments; and (3) the requirement that he give the state access
        to the files violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from
        unreasonable search and seizure and his Sixth Amendment right to
        compulsory process. Thus, he failed to satisfy all of the
        requirements for establishing an actual injury. Nor did he provide
        any information that tended to demonstrate that these underlying
        claims were colorable. Barbour, 471 F.3d at 1226.
               Moreover, Daker cannot show an actual injury because the
        Supreme Court of Georgia has granted him a belated direct appeal
        and instructed that the postconviction process will begin anew in
        state court. Thus, he cannot show that the Cobb defendants’
        actions have impeded or otherwise led to the denial or dismissal of
        his habeas claims because the state postconviction process is
        beginning anew. Wilson, 163 F.3d at 1290–91.
               Likewise, Daker cannot show that the district court erred in
        failing to address his three new claims in the first amended
        complaint. Claims 6 and 7 were denial of access to courts claims
        based on Daker’s requests in 2020 for copies of the files from the
        Cobb defendants. As discussed above, Daker failed to state a viable
        access to courts claim.10 Accordingly, the district court did not err
        in dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim.

        10 As for Claim 8, it does not appear that the district court addressed Daker’s
        claim that the defendants violated the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause and
        the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause when they denied his request
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        21-10614                   Opinion of the Court                                17

                    C. Whether the district court erred in denying the
                       motion to amend the first amended complaint
                Daker argues that the district court erred in denying his
        motion for leave to amend his first amended complaint because
        motions for leave to amend a complaint should be granted
        liberally. 11
             Generally, we review a district court’s decision to deny a
        motion to amend for an abuse of discretion. Marrache v. Bacardi

        to return property seized in relation to his 2012 trial. Nevertheless, we need
        not remand because it is plain from the face of his complaint that Daker failed
        to state a claim. It is not clear that the Takings Clause applies to seizures of
        property pursuant to lawful search warrants in criminal actions. See, e.g.,
        Johnson v. Manitowoc Cnty., 635 F.3d 331, 336 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he Takings
        Clause does not apply when property is retained or damaged as the result of
        the government’s exercise of its authority pursuant to some power other than
        the power of eminent domain.”); AmeriSource Corp. v. United States, 525
        F.3d 1149, 1153 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Property seized and retained pursuant to the
        police power is not taken for a ‘public use’ in the context of the Takings
        Clause.”). But in any event, Daker merely asserted that he requested return
        of all the property seized in relation to his criminal case, the defendants denied
        his request, and that this this denial violated the Fifth and Fourteenth
        Amendment. But “the pleading standard Rule 8 announces . . . demands
        more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”
        Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotation omitted). Daker’s sparse
        allegations, without more, are insufficient to state a Takings Clause or a due
        process claim.
        11 Daker also argues that the district court judge should have sua sponte
        recused himself prior to ruling on his supplemental Rule 59(e) motion and
        motion to amend. This argument fails because, as discussed above, there was
        no basis for recusal.
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        18                     Opinion of the Court                21-10614

        U.S.A., Inc., 17 F.4th 1084, 1092 (11th Cir. 2021). “But we will
        review de novo an order denying leave to amend on the grounds
        of futility, because it is a conclusion of law that an amended
        complaint would necessarily fail.” Id. (quotation omitted).
                Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 provides that “[a] party
        may amend its pleading once as a matter of course,” but any
        amendment after that requires the written consent of the other
        party “or the court’s leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)–(2). It also
        provides that “[t]he court should freely give leave when justice so
        requires.” Id. Rule 15(a)(2). However, a court may deny leave to
        amend the complaint “when such amendment would be futile.”
        Hall v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 367 F.3d 1255, 1263 (11th Cir. 2004).
        An amendment is futile when the complaint as amended would
        still be subject to dismissal. Id.
                The district court did not err in denying Daker’s motion for
        leave to amend because amendment was futile. Once again, Daker
        did not explain in his second amended complaint how the files
        related to or would otherwise help him support his three state
        habeas claims. Moreover, he cannot show actual injury because
        even though those habeas claims were initially denied, he has since
        been granted a belated direct appeal and the state habeas process is
        beginning anew. Accordingly, the second amended complaint was
        still subject to dismissal, and the district court properly concluded
        that amendment was futile. Id.
              AFFIRMED.