Court Opinion

ID: 9834020
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 23:13:55.533137+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:10.870732
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
[6] Appellee contends that in our former opinion we failed to view the failure to keep lights on the end of the tender from the standpoint of the effect such lights would have produced in warning Fred of the approach of the train. Viewed from this standpoint, the failure to have lights is not shown to have been the proximate cause of Fred’s death for the same reason that the failure to give signals -was not proved to be the proximate cause. There is not a circumstance in the record from which it can be inferred that Fred was ignorant of the approach of the train. It is too well established to need citation of authorities that it cannot be inferred from the fact that he was killed. If he knew of the approach of the train in ample time to have left the track, if he was on it, the signals and lights could not have assisted him as alleged by plaintiff, and their absence could not be the proximate cause of his death. It is a mere matter of conjecture whether he knew the train was approaching. He may have known it and had ample time to leave the track, if standing on it or walking along it, but may have delayed too long, may have stumbled in trying to step therefrom and fallen, or may have tried to cross in front of the train, stumbled and fallen across the rail. When we examine the evidence from the viewpoint of the result of the failure to have lights which rendered ineffective such lookout as was maintained, we find that proximate cause is not shown because there is no evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which it can legitimately be inferred that Fred was on the track for such length of time that the operatives by maintaining a proper lookout, aided by lights, would have seen him in time to avoid injuring him. It is altogether a matter of conjecture whether he stepped suddenly on the track or whether he had been standing thereon for some time or walking along in the path between the rails. Proximate cause can be proved by circumstances, but we think there are no circumstances in this case from which it can legitimately be inferred. The uncertainty is disclosed by appellee’s own argument, for therein it is contended that Fred was either standing on the track or checking up cars or was walking along the path leading from the passenger depot to the freight depot. To these theories of what he may have been doing just before his death others could be added. Appellee apparently believes that if Fred was upon the track when struck by the train, enough has been proven, that it should then be assumed that he was there long enough for the operatives of the engine to have seen him in time to save him, or assumed that he was ignorant of the approach of the train. These matters cannot be assumed ; they must be proven.
[7, 8] Appellee confuses the issues of contributory negligence and proximate cause, and views our conclusion as one to the effect that Fred was guilty of contributory negligence, and therefore should not recover. We did not view the case from any such standpoint for Fred cannot be presumed to have been guilty of negligence, and the absence of evidence as to the circumstances surrounding his death as hereinbefore pointed out precludes any finding that he was negligent. The question whether he was guilty of negligence which proximately contributed to cause his death could not arise or be considered until it was first determined that the proven negligence of the company was a *900proximate cause of the accident. The case cannot go to the jury upon the assumption that, where deceased is presumed to have been free from negligence, it must follow that defendant’s negligence caused the accident. Such a theory does not take into consideration the fact that a 'man may be killed without being negligent himself, and without the defendant being negligent, or where being negligent, such negligence was in no way the cause of the accident. Plaintiff cannot, by reason of the presumption that deceased used due care, be relieved of the burden of proving not only negligence on the part of defendant, but that such negligence caused the death of her husband.
In the case of M., K. & T. Ry. v. Greenwood, cited in our former opinion, the defect in the evidence relied on to show causal connection was similar to that in this case, although the grounds of negligence relied upon differed from those in this case. The decision of this court was approved by the Supreme Court. Chief Justice Ely, then Associate Justice, said:
“Do those facts show that Charles Greenwood was killed through the negligence of appellant? In answering that question it must he kept in mind that the burden rested upon the plaintiffs in the court below to prove thal the death of Charles Greenwood was caused through the negligence of appellant. We cannot go out into the field of speculation and theorize as to what may have thrown the deceased from the train and under the wheels of a ear, but it must reasonably appear that his death occurred through the negligence of appellant. An analysis of the evidence does not meet the demands of that rule. All that the facts establish is that the boy was a brakeman on a train belonging to appellant, it was his duty at a certain place to make a coupling in front of the engine, and he was seen a few minutes before his death going towards the pilot of the engine and a short time afterwards was lying on the track in a mutilated condition. One step of the pilot was a little lower than the other, there was a slight defect in the coupler, the coupler had been up before the accident, afterwards it was down, and the road was rough and uneven at that point. There was no blood on the pilot or the step or wheels of the engine at the time, and no blood was found anywhere except on the wheels of a car eight or ten cars back from the engine. What caused the accident? Was it the coupler, the step, or the rough road, or all of them? Would it not be speculation of the purest type to hold that one, two, or all of the matters alluded to caused the accident? No one saw the accident; no one knows how it occurred. Theories may be constructed as to how the accident occurred and as to what caused it, but they are the filmy creations of the imagination, by which the rights of litigants should never be determined. The burden rested upon appellees to show how the catastrophe was caused, and, failing to do so, courts and juries cannot construct a caso for them upon hypothesis and presumptions.”
In the Kentucky case of Sutton’s Adm’r v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 168 Ky. 81, 181 S. W. 938, it was contended that an employs was killed while in the performance of his duties on the track. The negligence consisted in failure to keep a lookout and give signals, and such negligence was proven. The circumstantial evidence tended, we think, more strongly than that in this case to show what the deceased was doing, at the time death overtook him, but the court held the evidence insufficient to go to the jury, and said in part:
“It is the well-established rule in this and other jurisdictions that, in the case of an action for damages for death, it is not sufficient merely to show that the decedent was killed by the defendant and that the defendant was guilty of negligence. It must further appear that his death was caused by the proven negligence. (Citing cases.) Following this rule, it is held that conjecture affords no sound basis for a verdict. It is not sufficient, therefore, to present a number of circumstances about which one might theorize as to the cause of the accident. Where it is sought to base an inference on a certain alleged fact, the fact itself must be clearly established. If the existence of such a fact depend on a prior inference, no subsequent inference can legitimately be based upon it. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. De Sedillo, 219 Fed. 686, 135 C. C. A. 358; Chamberlayne’s Modem Law of Evidence, 1029.”
We are not authorized to presume, from the fact that Fred left his house at about 5:30 p. m. for the purpose of checking up some cars, that he was engaged in that occupation at 6:08 p. m., or later, nor to infer that, if he was engaged in that occupation when he was run over, he had stood on the track such length of time that a proper lookout, with the aid of lights, would have enabled those in charge of the engine to save him, or to infer that in performing such work he stepped upon or remained upon the track in ignorance of the approach of the train.
[9] We attempted to state the facts bearing upon the issue of proximate cause in our former opinion, and no exception has been taken to such statement. It may be proper to add that Fred’s wife testified at first that his hours of work ended at 5 p. m., and later fixed the time at 6 p. m. No witness testified to seeing Fred after he left home at 5:30 p. m. until his dead body was discovered. We cannot agree with appellee in her contention that the circumstances in evidence will support a finding that the acts of negligence proven proximately caused Fred’s death. Were we to so find, it would in our opinion be contrary to the well-established rule that a finding must rest upon something more substantial than conjecture or surmise.
We coneludé, however, that we erred in holding that special charge No. 9 should have been given, and therefore overrule the assignment of error.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.