Court Opinion

ID: 9575015
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:10:40.933934+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:47:46.559531
License: Public Domain

THORNTON, J.,
dissenting.
The main conclusion reached in the majority opinion is that whenever any proceeding to change a comprehensive plan affects a single parcel of real property, as distinguished from numerous parcels, a judicial-type administrative hearing is required'.
It is my view that the majority has erred in accepting petitioners’ argument that Fasano v. Washington Co. Comm., 264 Or 574, 507 P2d 23 (1973), requires this. I believe that the holding of the majority represents a misapplication of Fasano for two reasons:
In the first place a proceeding to change a comprehensive plan of a city or county is not adjudicatory in nature. It is preliminary only. An examination of the authorities and the decided cases in other jurisdictions indicates that it is well settled that a public body vested with zoning powers is entitled to make appropriate changes in its comprehensive plan wherever and whenever circumstances warrant such action so long as the same is done in the manner provided by law. The true nature of a plan-change pro*674ceeding, which is what we are dealing with here, is described in 3 Anderson, American Law of Zoning 307, § 17.15 (1968), in the following terms:
“A comprehensive plan is not prepared and adopted primarily with a view to its legal impact upon the right to use land. Such a plan, whether it is adopted by a planning commission or by a municipal legislative body, is a guide to community development rather than an instrument of land-use control. * # *”
A judicial-type hearing should therefore not be required for a preliminary and nonadjudicatory proceeding.
Second, these petitioners will receive a judicial-type hearing at the next stage of the proceedings, viz., at the zone-change hearing. Due process does not require that objecting property owners be accorded two consecutive judicial-type administrative hearings on substantially the same issue. See, West v. City of Astoria, 18 Or App 212, 524 P2d 1216 (1974). The effect of the majority opinion is to burden the zoning process with an additional, duplicative judicial-type hearing.
As I view petitioners’ main contention in the light of the above analysis, it appears to me that petitioners’ challenge is premature. Petitioners are endeavoring to convert a plan-change proceeding into a zone-change proceeding, and are demanding that respondents follow zone-change procedures to accomplish any change in the comprehensive plan affecting only a single parcel.
Petitioners’ real challenge to the city’s proposed action is to the second step rather than the first. It is at the next stage of the proceedings, viz., the zone-*675change application, that the actual land-use decision will be considered and decided.
Following the rationale of our recent decisions in Mar. Fire Dist. v. Mar. Polk Bndry, 19 Or App 108, 526 P2d 1031, Sup Ct review denied (1974), and Millersburg Dev. Corp. v. Mullen, 14 Or App 614, 514 P2d 367 (1973), Sup Ct review denied (1974), I would conclude that the action of the Hillsboro City Council in undertaldng to change its comprehensive plan was quasi-legislative in character rather than quasi-judicial in the special sense that those terms are defined in Fasano.
One further issue should be mentioned.
Petitioners also alleged in their petition that respondents, in making the subject change, did not follow the amendment procedures prescribed in the “Hillsboro Comprehensive Plan” itself. For reasons which follow, I would agree with this contention, if there is evidence to support those allegations. It is of course true as a general rule that a public body is required to follow its own rules. This rule extends to planning and zoning matters. As the court held in L. F. Letts & Son, Inc. v. City of Cortland, 47 Misc2d 240, 262 NYS2d 294 (1965), a municipal'legislative body must follow the procedural requirements of its own land-use legislation; failure to comply with such requirements renders its legislation invalid. Accord: Dalton v. City & County, 51 Hawaii 400, 462 P2d 199 (1969), where ordinances purporting to amend a general plan for the city and county were held void for failure to comply with the safeguards specified by the charter for amending the plan.