Court Opinion

ID: 9856694
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:55:36.815013+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:40:22.674016
License: Public Domain

WOOD, J., Concurring.
I concur in the judgment of reversal but I cannot agree that the reversal should be based upon the giving of the instruction referred to in the majority opinion. The instruction is open to the criticism that the rule on the subject should have been more completely *493stated and the jury told that there is a presumption that Howard Campbell used ordinary care for his own safety unless the presumption be overcome by evidence. In view of all the instructions given I am of the opinion that the judgment should not be reversed for the sole reason that the instruction is subject to this criticism.
I cannot agree with the statement in the majority opinion concerning the circumstances under which the presumption may not be invoked. In Smellie v. Southern Pac. Co., 212 Cal. 540 [299 Pac. 529], it was held that an instruction on the subject of the presumption under consideration may be given unless the plaintiff’s witnesses establish facts which are “wholly irreconcilable with the presumption sought to be invoked”. In the late ease of Engstrom v. Auburn Auto Sales Corp., 11 Cal. (2d) 64 [77 Pac. (2d) 1059], the Smellie case is referred to with approval and the rule again set forth in the following language: “Generally speaking, however, it may be said that a presumption is dispelled when a fact which is wholly irreconcilable with it is proved by the uncontradicted testimony of the party relying on it or of such party (s own witness, -when such testimony was not the product of mistake or inadvertence.” In the ease before us plaintiff did not present any evidence which was irreconcilable with the presumption covered by the instruction in question.
In my opinion the judgment should be reversed for the reason that plaintiff did not present evidence showing facts upon which the liability of the city can be predicated. The accident did not occur while the decedent was using the recreational facilities of the park which had been provided for the public. The question of the dangerous character of a defective condition depends largely on the intended lawful use of the premises. (Howard v. City of Fresno, 22 Cal. App. (2d) 41 [70 Pac. (2d) 502].) The liability of the city under the Public Liability Act is limited to damages suffered in the ordinary, usual and customary use of defective streets, grounds or property. (Beeson v. City of Los Angeles, 115 Cal. App. 122 [300 Pac. 993].) The city had no notice that children were in the habit of playing about the embankment. Regardless of any other question involved, it cannot be held that the city had knowledge or notice that the premises in question were in a dangerous condition.
*494A petition by respondent to have the canse heard in the Supreme Court, after judgment in the District Court of Appeal, was denied by the Supreme Court on November 17, 1938.