Court Opinion

ID: 9371745
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-16 19:00:31.243629+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:29.852436
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-30038         Document: 00516648312           Page: 1      Date Filed: 02/16/2023

               United States Court of Appeals
                    for the Fifth Circuit                                    United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                      Fifth Circuit

                                                                                    FILED
                                       No. 22-30038                          February 16, 2023
                                                                               Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                    Clerk
   Esther Watson,

                                                                  Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                            versus

   School Board of Franklin Parish; Eddie Ray Bryan;
   Ronnie Hatton; Danny Davis; Richard Kelly; Louise
   Johnson; Tim Eubanks; Dorothy Brown; Lanny Johnson,

                                                                Defendants—Appellees.

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                           for Western District of Louisiana
                                USDC No. 3:20-CV-527

   Before Stewart, Dennis, and Higginson, Circuit Judges.
   Stephen A. Higginson, Circuit Judge: *
          For approximately half a century, Esther Watson worked in
   education, including as a teacher for over twenty years, an assistant principal
   for almost a decade, a principal for around seven years, and a child welfare

          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.
Case: 22-30038      Document: 00516648312           Page: 2     Date Filed: 02/16/2023

                                     No. 22-30038

   and attendance supervisor for another seven years or so. Starting in 2009,
   Watson served as the assistant principal of Winnsboro Elementary School
   (WES) in Franklin Parish, Louisiana. During the 2017-18 school year, the
   principal of WES resigned. Watson, an African American woman, applied for
   the open position. She was not selected, and the position went to Scott
   McHand, a white man who had eight years of teaching experience. Watson
   then sued the Franklin Parish School Board, alleging that she was not selected
   for the position because of her race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
   Act. The district court dismissed the claims against the School Board
   members and Johnson in their individual capacities and then, after discovery,
   granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the remaining Title
   VII claims. Watson now appeals this grant of summary judgment. Because
   we find that Watson provided evidence that she was clearly better qualified
   than the white man who was selected, we reverse the district court’s grant of
   summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.
                                           I.
          In 1973, Esther Watson, an African American woman, was hired by
   the Catahoula Parish School Board as a teacher. Over the next thirty-five
   years, Watson worked as an educator within the Catahoula Parish school
   district board. She spent the first twenty years or so as a teacher before, in
   1994, becoming principal of a junior high school. Watson spent
   approximately seven years as a school principal. Then, in 2001, she became
   the child welfare and attendance supervisor in Catahoula Parish. During her
   time in Catahoula Parish, Watson achieved ten certifications, including
   certifications to serve as a superintendent (2001), a principal (1979), a
   supervisor of student teaching (1984), a parish/city school supervisor of
   instruction (1979), and an adult education administrator and/or supervisor

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                                           No. 22-30038

   (1995). 1 In 1976, she also obtained a Master of Education plus 30 hours in
   graduate courses. Watson retired from the Catahoula Parish School district
   in 2008.
           After approximately one month of retirement, Watson applied for the
   position of assistant principal at a junior high school in Franklin Parish.
   Watson was hired for the position by Dr. Lanny Johnson, the superintendent
   for Franklin Parish. Watson spent one year at the junior high before moving
   to serve as Winnsboro Elementary School’s (WES) assistant principal.
   Ronald Lofton, WES’s principal, had served as superintendent for Catahoula
   Parish while Watson was employed there and specifically requested that
   Watson serve as his assistant principal. Lofton resigned from this position in
   the 2017-18 school year.
           Watson applied for the now-open position of principal of WES. As
   part of the selection process, the personnel director for Franklin Parish
   assembled an interview committee to conduct the initial review of
   candidates. 2 The interview committee then provided the rankings of the
   candidates to the superintendent, Johnson, who made the ultimate decision
   as to whom to hire. Watson scored higher on the interview score. 3

           1
            Watson also received certifications in other areas, including certifications to serve
   as an adult education instructor (1995) and for adapted physical education (1983).
           2
               Typically, the interview committee was comprised of administrators from the
   central office as well as, possibly, principals from the other schools in the district and a
   teacher from the school for which the position was being filled.
           3
               It is an undisputed fact, asserted by both parties, that Watson scored higher on
   the interview. Although the record does not appear to contain comparative scores, the
   parties agree that her score was slightly higher.

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                                     No. 22-30038

          Watson, however, was not selected to serve as principal of WES for
   the 2018-19 school year. Instead, Scott McHand, a white man, got the
   position. McHand had been employed as a teacher by the Franklin Parish
   School Board since 2011, including one year experience serving as a Mentor
   Teacher. He did not have any prior experience as a school administrator,
   although he had both a Master of Teaching, Elementary Education (2012)
   and a Master of Educational Leadership (2018).
          In April 2020, Watson filed suit against the Franklin Parish School
   Board, its individual members, and Johnson (collectively referred to as the
   “School Board”) in their individual and official capacities, claiming that she
   was not selected as principal of WES due to racial discrimination. While the
   suit was pending, the district court dismissed the claims against the school
   board members and Johnson in their individual capacities on grounds of
   qualified and statutory immunity. The School Board then moved for
   summary judgment on the remaining claims against the remaining
   defendants in their official capacities; the district court granted the motion
   and dismissed Watson’s suit with prejudice. Watson appeals.
                                          II.
          We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.
   Sanders v. Christwood, 970 F.3d 558, 561 (5th Cir. 2020). “Summary
   judgment is proper ‘if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as
   to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
   law.’” Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). “A genuine issue of material fact
   exists when there is evidence sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find for
   the non-moving party.” Perez v. Region 20 Educ. Serv. Ctr., 307 F.3d 318, 323
   (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
   U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986)). When reviewing an appeal from summary
   judgment, we must view the facts and evidence in the light most favorable to

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   the non-movant and draw all reasonable inferences in her favor. Hanks v.
   Rogers, 853 F.3d 738, 743-44 (5th Cir. 2017).
          A Title VII claim for employment discrimination based on
   circumstantial evidence is evaluated under the burden-shifting framework
   first established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
   Roberson-King v. La. Workforce Comm’n, Office of Workforce Dev., 904 F.3d
   377, 380-81 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-04).
          Under this this three-part framework, “a plaintiff must first establish
   a prima facie case of discrimination, which requires a showing that the
   plaintiff (1) is a member of a protected group; (2) was qualified for the
   position at issue; (3) was discharged or suffered some adverse employment
   action by the employer; and (4) was replaced by someone outside [her]
   protected group or was treated less favorably than other similarly situated
   employees outside the protected group.” McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492
   F.3d 551, 556 (5th Cir. 2007).
          Once the plaintiff has made this showing, the burden shifts to the
   employer to “articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its
   employment action.” Morris v. Town of Independence, 827 F.3d 396, 400 (5th
   Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). This burden “is one of production, not
   persuasion; it can involve no credibility assessment.” Reeves v. Sanderson
   Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000) (internal quotation marks and
   citation omitted). If the employer does so, the burden shifts back to the
   plaintiff to “rebut the employer’s purported explanation” and “to show that
   the reason given is merely pretextual.” Moss v. BMC Software, Inc., 610 F.3d
   917, 922 (5th Cir. 2010). When conducting the pretext inquiry, we do “not
   ‘engage in second-guessing of an employer’s business decisions.’” Roberson-
   King, 904 F.3d at 381 (quoting LeMaire v. La. Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., 480
   F.3d 383, 391 (5th Cir. 2007)).

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           It is undisputed that Watson has established a prima facie case of
   employment discrimination. Watson, an African American female, is a
   member of a protected class and was qualified for the principal position.
   Nonetheless, she was rejected from that position in favor of McHand, a white
   man.
           The School Board, however, contends that it provided legitimate,
   non-discriminatory reasons as to why McHand, not Watson, was selected for
   the position. According to the School Board, Johnson considered a variety of
   factors, including the educational credentials, certifications, interview
   scores, work history, and, most importantly, “anticipated length of service”
   when making his decision. Specifically, Johnson believed that Watson was
   unlikely to remain in the principalship position, or even with the Franklin
   Parish School Board, for the long term. This conclusion was based on two
   primary factors: first, that Watson was a retiree returned to work and second,
   that Watson, unlike McHand, did not live in Franklin Parish.
           Assuming that these proffered reasons are legitimate and non-
   discriminatory, the burden shifts back to Watson to show that the School
   Board’s asserted justification is pretextual. 4 Watson may “establish pretext
   ‘by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is false or unworthy
   of credence.’” Roberson-King, 904 F.3d at 381 (quoting Laxton v. Gap Inc.,
   333 F.3d 572, 578 (5th Cir. 2003)). Alternatively, she may show that a fact
   finder could infer pretext by presenting evidence that she was “‘clearly better

           4
               Watson contends that any consideration of her status as a retiree returned to work
   would constitute impermissible age discrimination under the Age Discrimination
   Employment Act. Because we find that Watson provides evidence sufficient to raise a
   triable issue of fact as to whether the reasons given by the School Board were pretextual,
   we need not resolve the issue as to whether one of the bases for Watson’s non-selection
   was itself discriminatory.

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                                    No. 22-30038

   qualified’ (as opposed to merely better or as qualified)” than the employee
   who was selected. EEOC v. La. Office of Cmty. Servs., 47 F.3d 1438, 1444 (5th
   Cir. 1995); see also McMichael v. Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc.,
   934 F.3d 447, 459 (5th Cir. 2019) (explaining that a plaintiff “must show that
   his replacement, if any, is clearly less qualified” to show pretext); see also
   Stennett v. Tupelo Pub. Sch. Dist., 619 F. App’x 310, 319 (5th Cir. 2015)
   (noting that, where the plaintiff was alleging age discrimination, “a
   reasonable jury could consider the strength of [the plaintiff’s] qualifications
   vis-à-vis the successful younger applicants as undermining the credibility of
   [the defendant’s] proffered hiring rationale”).
          “To meet her burden to show that she was clearly better qualified, the
   plaintiff ‘must present evidence from which a jury could conclude that no
   reasonable person, in the exercise of impartial judgment, could have chosen
   the candidate selected over the plaintiff for the job in question.’” Roberson-
   King, 904 F.3d at 381 (quoting Moss, 610 F.3d at 923). “Showing that two
   candidates are similarly qualified does not establish pretext under this
   standard,” Price v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 283 F.3d 715, 723 (5th Cir. 2002), and
   employers are “generally free to weigh the qualifications of prospective
   employees,” Martinez v. Tex. Workforce Comm’n-Civil Rights Div., 775 F.3d
   685, 688 (5th Cir. 2014) (noting that “an employee’s ‘better education, work
   experience, and longer tenure with the company [did] not establish that [s]he
   [was] clearly better qualified,’” where other considerations weighed in favor
   of the selected candidate (quoting Price, 283 F.3d at 723)).
          Here, Watson produced evidence from which a jury could find that
   she was clearly better qualified for the principal position and that therefore
   the School Board’s proffered reasons for selecting McHand over her were
   pretextual. Watson presented evidence showing that she had significantly
   more educational certifications than McHand. More importantly, she also
   presented evidence as to her substantial amount of relevant work experience,

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   above all almost a decade as assistant principal at WES and several years as a
   principal in Catahoula Parish. 5 In comparison, McHand, although he had
   recently received a degree in educational leadership, had less than a decade
   of teaching experience and no prior experience in any administrative
   position. Additionally, Watson scored higher in her interview with the
   interview committee. Given Watson’s long history of experience in
   administrative positions, especially as both an assistant principal and
   principal, her larger number of educational certifications of all types,
   including a certification to serve as a superintendent, and stronger
   performance before the interview committee, a jury could—not necessarily
   will—find that no reasonable person could have selected McHand over her
   in the absence of racial discrimination. Accordingly, summary judgment was
   inappropriate.
                                               III.
           For the reasons given above, we REVERSE the district court and
   REMAND the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

           5
               We reiterate that years of experience alone generally is not determinative of
   whether a candidate is “clearly better qualified.” However, we note that in Moss, upon
   which the district court relied for the proposition that an “attempt to equate years served
   with superior qualifications is unpersuasive,” Moss, 610 F.3d at 923 (cleaned up), we
   affirmed the grant of summary judgment only after confirming that the selected applicant,
   although she had less years of overall experience, had considerably more specialized
   experience than the plaintiff. Id. at 924. Here, Watson relies heavily on her years of
   experience as a school administrator, including nearly a decade as assistant principal at WES
   as well as her prior principalship in Catahoula Parish. McHand has no such specialized
   experience.

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