Court Opinion

ID: 9492417
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:40:58.820781+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:18.034282
License: Public Domain

KLEINFELD, Circuit Judge,
with whom Judge B. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge, partially joins, dissenting:
Mauro is a pretrial detainee. As of the time covered by the record in this case, he *1067had not been convicted of the crime for which he was being held. He evidently waited two year's in the county jail for his trial.1 This case involves his rights prior to conviction. He has some experience in various jails, and has been accustomed to reading Playboy, Penthouse, Time, Newsweek, and newspapers while in jail. There is no evidence in the record that he has used any of these publications in any of the inappropriate ways described in the majority opinion, and he testified in his deposition that he has not. He says in his deposition that he likes to read Playboy for the articles. This case arises from his being turned down on a request that he receive his Playboys.
My guess is that at the end of the day, the majority will turn out to be correct, that the jail can ban publications showing frontal nudity, in order to maintain security and discipline. But we are not yet at the end of the day. A person’s rights should not be taken away on the basis of a guess. There is a genuine issue of material fact. The case was dismissed on summary judgment, without a trial, so a genuine issue of material fact requires reversal. The issue of fact is whether the ban was imposed to preserve jail security and discipline, or for purposes of punishment. There is evidence in the record that the reason why the jail excludes publications with frontal nudity is to punish the prisoners. If so, the ban is unconstitutional. “[UJnder the Due Process Clause, a detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law.”2 There was also evidence that the jail excluded publications showing frontal nudity to maintain order, and that it was not excessive in relation to that purpose. If so, the ban is probably permissible. A trial is the way to find out.
The majority overlooks the issue of fact because it uses the wrong case as a source of the controlling rule. The majority uses the rule from Turner v. Safley, “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” 3 That rule applies to prisons, which impose punishment upon people who have been convicted of crimes. We should use the rule from Bell v. Wolfish, that a jail restriction is unconstitutional if it is imposed for purposes of punishment, but is constitutional if it is “but an incident of some other legitimate governmental purpose,” such as to assure that the individual will be present for his trial, or “to maintain security and order at the institution.” There is a genuine issue of fact under the rule in Bell,' even though there is not under Turner. That is because “legitimate penological interests” include punishment. That purpose generally validates a rule for convicted prisoners, but invalidates it for pretrial detainees.
“Prisons” and “jails” are not the same things. Jails hold people pending trial, and for short punitive sentences after conviction.4 Prisons hold people convicted and sentenced to substantial incarceration, ordinarily for felonies.5 The case before us is a jail case, not a prison case. The plaintiff was being held to await his trial, in the Madison Street Jail, one of several in the Maricopa County jail system. I have not found anything in the briefs and excerpts of record to show that any of the *1068prisoners in the Madison Street Jail have been convicted of the crimes for which they are being held, although the county jail system as a whole of course houses both pretrial detainees and persons convicted of crimes. The county can punish convicted inmates, and can restrict First Amendment rights of pretrial detainees to maintain order in the jail, but it cannot punish pretrial detainees or take away First Amendment right of pretrial detainees to maintain uniformity with punishment rules for convicted criminals in other facilities.
Although the majority concedes in footnote 1 that a prison regulation cannot be adopted for the purpose of punishing and rehabilitating pretrial detainees, its application of the “legitimate penological interest” test allows exactly that. “Penological” means relating to the “theory and practice of prison management and criminal rehabilitation.”6 The word is derived from the Greek and Latin words meaning penalty or punishment, and still means roughly the same thing.7 Turner, after formulating the test, expressly treats rehabilitation as a legitimate penological interest in its holding regarding a prohibition against inmate marriages.8
Our disagreement on which rule to apply has substantial practical significance for this case, because there is evidence that the reason why the jail prohibits Mauro from receiving Playboy is to punish him. Under Bell v. Wolfish,9 Mauro is entitled to defeat the restriction if he can show either of two propositions to be true, an express intent to punish, or a purpose of punishment that can be inferred from ex-cessiveness of the restriction in relation to the legitimate purpose assigned to it:
A court must decide whether the disability is imposed for the purpose of punishment or whether it is but an incident of some other legitimate governmental purpose. Absent a showing of an expressed intent to punish on the part of detention facility officials, that determination generally will turn on whether an alternative purpose to which [the restriction] may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned [to it].10
Thus the question for us is whether the record establishes a genuine issue of fact on either of these two questions. If it does, Mauro is entitled to try to prove his case.11
Mauro had evidence sufficient to establish an issue of fact material to both Bell questions, though he only needed evidence on one. First, he produced evidence of what Bell phrases as “an expressed intent to punish on the part of detention facility officials.” 12 Sheriff Arpaio, who runs the *1069jail, said, in one of the exhibits submitted in opposition to summary judgment, that his purpose in keeping sex magazines out of the jail was to punish the prisoners:
I don’t think you should live better in jail than on the outside.... They shouldn’t be country clubs. No Club Fed in my jails. When you go to jail you should have to give up certain things- — smoking, coffee, adult magazines, and R-rated movies. Jail means punishment. ... This is my jail and they stay here until they’re convicted and sent to state prison.... I’ve seen some of them interviewed on national television, saying they’ll sign plea agreements just to get out of my jail and be sent to prison.13
It is hard to imagine better evidence that the purpose of a restriction is punishment than the man who runs the jail saying that his pretrial detainees “should have to give up ... adult magazines” because “jail means punishment.” And the sheriff uses careful and precise phrasing to make it clear that he is talking about pretrial detainees, not convicted criminals.
Arguably this quotation is not cognizable evidence under Rule 56(c) and (e) because it may be inadmissible hearsay. I cannot tell from the excerpts of record we have whether that is so. Probably the statement is an admission so not hearsay as to the defendant’s own words.14 But the statement may be inadmissible hearsay by the reporter who purported to quote Sheriff Arpaio saying these words.15 I do not know whether Sheriff Arpaio has admitted the accuracy of the quotation,16 or whether a declaration by the reporter has been filed saying that the sheriff used these words. The district judge did not reach the question. Admissibility of this critical evidence ought to be ruled on in the district court.
Even without the sheriffs admission, Mauro has established a genuine issue of fact material to the second Bell criterion, “whether an alternative purpose to which [the restriction] may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned [to it].”17 The Supreme Court did not say “excessive in relation to the burdens of being in jail generally” — for a jail inmate, being deprived of Playboy is among the less substantial interferences with his liberty. The excessiveness is to be measured in relation to the legitimate purpose of maintaining order in the jail. If the restriction is excessive in relation to that legitimate purpose, that is evidence that it serves a punitive purpose, which is not legitimate as to people not yet convicted of the crime for which they are jailed.
The papers submitted on the summary judgment motion would enable a jury to conclude that the prohibition of publications showing frontal nudity was excessive in relation to the purpose of maintaining order, and was adopted for other purposes, including punishment and public relations. The memorandum written by the deputy chief of the custody bureau to the sheriff to justify the policy lists several purposes other than and in addition to maintaining order. Among them are that “morally we should not provide this material to those people” (referring to people charged with sex crimes), and “[f]ederal law requires that if a female employee makes a complaint regarding what she considers obscene, that we as employers must ensure this material is removed.” The memorandum also discusses the public relations aspect of presenting the ban to reporters, noting that “[t]he newspaper may bring up the fact that the Arizona State Prison sys*1070tem allows both smoking and sexually explicit material to its prisoners.” The moral rehabilitation of the prisoners must, of course, await their convictions.
As the majority opinion sets out, some prisoners did disgusting things using sexually oriented magazines as props, to harass female guards. So far as the record indicates, the plaintiff never did. The harassment by other prisoners does not establish that banning the magazines is not excessive relative to the goal of maintaining order. Every single one of the harassing actions by inmates was plainly prohibited by the jail discipline code. The jail has express rules against “engaging in sexual acts,” “making sexual proposals or threats,” “indecent exposure,” “refusing to obey direct orders from M.C.S.O. staff,” “assault on employee,” “fighting,” and “conduct which disrupts security or operation of institution,” among others. The penalties are substantial — typically disciplinary segregation, full restriction, and reclassification. Indecent exposure, engaging in sexual acts, making sexual proposals, are all subject to restriction, unit segregation and other sanctions. These sanctions can be imposed by means of a simple internal discipline procedure, without the burden of proving criminal charges.
Yet the jail banned the magazines and other materials for everyone, instead of punishing the people who used them as props with which the harass the guards. Though the inmates could not be punished for the crimes with which they were charged until they were convicted in court, they could be punished for discipline violations after relatively informal discipline proceedings in the jail. Punishment of malefactors is the traditional means of preventing people from misusing their liberties while leaving the liberties intact for those who do not misuse them. One inmate whose conduct was especially egregious was charged with a crime, but so far as the record indicates, the jail discipline system was never used to deal with the violative uses of sexual magazines by prisoners.
The reason jail personnel gave for not using the discipline system was that there were too many violations and the jail stays were too short. That reason is necessarily speculative where discipline proceedings charges were not even attempted. Even though all the drivers on an expressway may be going twenty miles an hour over the speed limit, it will probably not be necessary to ticket more than a few to get the rest to slow down. Likewise for more serious offenses such as the prisoners’ disorderly use of sexual magazines, punishment of a few may deter the rest. The liberty at issue, a First Amendment liberty to read (and of publishers to have access to readers18) is a substantial one, especially where it involves people whom the state holds as prisoner but who have not yet been convicted of crimes. Ironically, the prisoners could not read the Penthouse interview of the sheriff because it appeared in a publication that shows frontal nudity. It may be that trial would lead to a finding of fact that, without evidence that the discipline system had been tried and failed, a total ban was excessive relative to its legitimate purpose. (Or it might be that it would not — the case could go either way on the evidence in the record so far). There is enough here to allow the plaintiff to get the question to trial.
A related question on which there is a genuine issue of fact is whether the ban works. If the ban on sexual magazines is not a reasonably effective means for preventing inmates from fighting, harassing guards, and otherwise disrupting the good order of the jail, then the ban is excessive relative to that purpose. A ban on an exercise of a constitutionally protected liberty, to serve a permissible purpose, is excessive relative to that purpose if it does not effectively serve it. The depositions indicate that inmate sexual harassment of *1071female guards has continued, despite the ban on sexual magazines, though some guards say it has declined. The evidence that inmates use sexual magazines as props to harass female guards, described in the majority opinion, does not show that banning sexual magazines prevents inmates from sexually harassing female guards. Many of the people who get thrown in jail are likely to act inappropriately with or without sexually oriented magazines. And considering that most people in jail are young males, they are likely to have sexual thoughts about their guards, if the jail uses female guards. Because the jail uses female guards for male prisoners, and because inmates in jail must give up their privacy in order to facilitate security, the female guards are going to see the prisoners doing things that are ordinarily not done in front of people of the opposite sex, or in front of anyone at all. A trial could go either way on whether the ban on publications, pictures from wives and girlfriends, and other material showing frontal nudity, serves the purpose of maintaining order in the jail or is excessive relative to that purpose because of ineffectiveness.
We have not reached the question whether publications showing frontal nudity may be kept from pretrial detainees in jail because of jail administrator’s concerns that “[fjederal law requires that if a female employee makes a complaint regarding what she considers obscene, that we as employers must ensure this material is removed.” Defendants argue in their brief that preventing “hostile environment” in a workplace is a “compelling” government interest that justifies a ban on possession of sexually oriented speech. This rationale, of course, is not limited to jails.19 The argument would justify a government ban on possession of publications showing frontal nudity in any workplace, whether they are displayed to anyone or not. I am not so sure that the Supreme Court decisions allowing limitations on the rights of pretrial detainees to preserve order in the jail include this radical extension of sexual harassment law. The guards’ workplace is the inmates’ residence, and it is an unanswered question that would benefit from development of a record whether uncon-victed individuals in pretrial custody must give up their liberty to read what they like in order to accommodate the guards’ interest in the absence of sexually offensive material at their workplace. It is one thing for the jail to ban offensive sexual displays that may drive some women from the workplace, and another to ban receipt and possession even without display. The ban here is on receipt of publications, pictures of wives and girlfriends, and other materials that include frontal nudity, not on display of those items to guards or other improper use of them. The harassing displays and improper uses are prohibited by the discipline rules. That possession of these publications may offend does not justify banning them. “The States, acting as guardians of public morality” may not prohibit speech merely on the basis that it is offensive.20 The harassment, as opposed to the offense, is caused by display of the magazines in a purposely harassing manner, but the regulation at issue goes to their receipt and possession even by those who do not engage in such conduct, such as the plaintiff.
As I said earlier, my speculation, as yet unsupported by facts because there has been no trial, is that the majority will turn out to be right in its result. Jails can be rough places, and need some blunt tools to make the prisoners behave themselves while they are there. The jail may well be able to show that nearly all the items showing frontal nudity that come in are sex magazines and photographs of wives and girlfriends, and that the inmates fight and otherwise disrupt the good order of the jail if these are allowed in, no matter *1072what the jail tries to do about discipline. On the other hand, the majority may be wrong. The evidence might establish that the purpose of the ban on frontal nudity pictures is to punish the prisoners and rehabilitate them, as is proved by express declarations or excessiveness relative to the goal of preserving order in the jail. A trial is a good way to find out. Arizona has to convict these people before it is entitled to punish and rehabilitate them. We must not follow the Red Queen’s injunction, “sentence first — verdict afterward.” 21

. It may be that, were the record to disclose current circumstances, we would have to take notice that Mauro lacks standing, so there is no case or controversy. It seems doubtful that he is still a pretrial detainee in the Madison Street Jail. But the record has nothing in it to indicate the absence of standing.

. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979).

. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987).

. Black's Law Dictionary 834 (6th ed.1990) (jail is “[a] place of confinement that is more than a police station lockup and less than a prison. It is usually used to hold persons either convicted of misdemeanors (minor crimes) or persons awaiting trial or as a lockup for intoxicated and disorderly persons.”).

. Black’s Law Dictionary 1194 (6th ed.1990) ("[t]he words ‘prison’ and ‘penitentiary’ are used synonymously to designate institutions for the imprisonment of persons convicted of the more serious crimes, as distinguished from reformatories and county or city jails.”).

. Am. Heritage Dictionary 918 (2d college ed.1985).

. Id.

. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 97-99, 107 S.Ct 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987).

. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979).

. Bell, 441 U.S. at 538, 99 S.Ct. 1861 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

. The majority opinion argues that whether the policy at issue was imposed for the purpose of punishing pretrial detainees “was not raised by the parties in their briefs” so has been waived. Mauro's brief broadly challenges the constitutionality of the policy on all grounds. The parties dispute the legitimacy of the purpose of the policy. Mauro's brief discusses the Penthouse interview with Sheriff Arpaio “in which he stated that the purpose behind prohibiting sexually explicit magazines was to 'punish' jail inmates.” The brief for the sheriff and the county argues that the ban had three purposes, "eliminating workplace discrimination” against female detention officers, “rehabilitation,” and "to prevent fights among inmates.” The brief argues that "rehabilitation of inmates is clearly a legitimate penological interest.” The peno-logical interest of rehabilitation is identical to that of punishment, in that it is constitutionally limited to people who have been convicted of crimes. I therefore do not agree that the punishment aspect of the case "was not raised by the parties in their briefs.”

.Bell, 441 U.S. at 538, 99 S.Ct. 1861.

. Exhibit E to plaintiffs motion for preliminary injunction, Allan Sonnenschein, Sheriff Joe Arapaio, Penthouse, January, 1995, at 87, 134 (emphasis added).

. Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2).

. Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630 (9th Cir.1991).

. Cf. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 85 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir.1996).

. Bell, 441 U.S. at 538, 99 S.Ct. 1861.

. Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 408, 109 S.Ct. 1874, 104 L.Ed.2d 459 (1989) ("publishers ... have a legitimate First Amendment interest in access to prisoners”).

. See generally, Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Appellate Review in Workplace Harassment Cases, 90 Northwestern Univ. L.Rev. 1009 (1996).

. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 22-23, 91 S.Ct. 1780, 29 L.Ed.2d 284 (1971).

. Lewis Carroll, Alice’s Adventures' in Wonderland 146 (Random House 1946).