Court Opinion

ID: 9777425
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:10:54.896413+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:53.992445
License: Public Domain

DOUGLAS, Judge
(concurring).
When an indictment and a capias ordering an arrest are in the hands of a district clerk but were unknown to the officer as they were in Hamrick v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 495 S.W.2d 256, are sufficient for an arrest, the valid orders for arrest in warrants in possession of an officer are sufficient for an arrest.
A case from another jurisdiction where a like contention by a defendant was made is by the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine in State v. Brochu, 237 A.2d 418 (1967). The police had a valid search warrant. The officers believed that the defendant or *405his daughter consented to the search. That court logically reasoned and wrote:
“The validity of the search was not discredited by the seeming uncertainty of the officers as to the source of their authority. The entry was after a statement that the officer or officers had a search warrant. The warrant, however, was marked ‘not executed.’ There is no record for a receipt for property taken or return of the warrant with inventory as provided in Rule 41.
“The receipt for property taken and the return of the warrant with inventory are ministerial acts. Failure to perform acts of this nature do not void a search warrant or the search conducted under its protection. (Citations omitted).
“The officers, whether they considered were acting by consent or under the warrant, acted in fact within the safe conduct of the warrant. Mistaken belief (or it may be uncertainty) on their part as to the source of their authority does not negate the legality of a search reasonably conducted under the warrant.”
The Illinois appellate court in People v. Foster, 72 Ill.App.2d 337, 219 N.E.2d 683 (1966), where the warrant was returned with the notation “not executed,” wrote:
“[T]he failure of the police officers to make a proper return of the warrant does not render void either the search warrant or the search made under its authority.”
See also McMillon v. State, 95 Okl.Cr. 409, 247 P.2d 295 (1952), and Klingler v. United States, 409 F.2d 299 (8th Cir. 1969).
Here, as in some of the other cases cited, the officer was mistaken and relied upon the wrong reason for making the arrest which is shown by the return and his testimony.
The dissent would place a more onerous burden upon and require more of a peace officer than it does a trial judge. When a trial judge gives a wrong reason, but his ruling is correct, this Court will not reverse the conviction. In the recent case of Miles v. State, 488 S.W.2d 790 (Tex.Cr.App.1973), the trial court gave the wrong reason for admitting certain evidence. This Court wrote:
“The mere fact that a correct ruling is given for the wrong reason will not result in a reversal. If the decision is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case, it will not be disturbed. Smith v. State, 475 S.W.2d 238 (Tex.Cr.App.1971); Moreno v. State, 170 Tex.Cr.R. 410, 341 S.W.2d 455 (1960) ; Venable v. State, 397 S.W.2d 231 (Tex.Cr.App.1966), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 266, 86 S. Ct. 1477, 16 L.Ed.2d 525 (1966).”
Why should a different rule apply where an officer has the warrant to arrest on his person but does not claim to have made the arrest by virtue of the warrant?
The dissent would hold that an officer must give the correct legal and technical reasons for his action for legal evidence he obtains to be admissible. This it would do even though we have the rule that when a trained lawyer acting as a trial judge may give an illegal reason for admitting lawfully obtained evidence. This has never been the ruling of this Court before and should not be now.
For the reasons set out above and in the maj ority opinion, I concur.