Court Opinion

ID: 9561546
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:11:37.155136+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:54.508870
License: Public Domain

*533ShaRP, J.,
dissenting:
The majority opinion makes it quite clear that defendant’s arrest upon the charge of occupying a room for immoral purposes and the search of his motel room were illegal. During the unlawful search the officers found the coins which had been stolen in Virginia from the home of Mr. Hill. These coins were not offered in evidence. The record clearly shows, however, that defendant’s confession was obtained by Mr. Hill’s identification of his coins in defendant’s presence.
Evidence obtained by unlawful search and seizure is not excluded because it is inherently unreliable but because its exclusion is deemed the most effective means of enforcing constitutional guarantees against unreasonable searches and seizures. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 4 L. Ed. 2d 697, 80 S. Ct. 725. Had the coins been offered in evidence they would have been excluded because illegally obtained. G.S. 15-27; G.S. 15-27.1; State v. Mills, 246 N.C. 237, 98 S.E. 2d 329; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643; 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081, 81 S. Ct. 1684. It follows, therefore, that a confession obtained by their use is equally inadmissible. To hold otherwise would emasculate the rule of exclusion. In Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 64 L. Ed. 319, 40 S. Ct. 182, 24 A.L.R. 1426, Mr. Justice Holmes, with reference to information obtained during an unlawful search, said: “The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the court, but that it shall not be used at all.”
We hold that incriminating articles obtained in consequence of an illegally obtained confession are inadmissible in evidence. State v. Mitchell, 270 N.C. 753, 155 S.E. 2d 96. The reverse of the rule is equally true. State v. Hall, 264 N.C. 559, 142 S.E. 2d 177; People v. Stoner, 55 Cal. Rptr. 897, 422 P. 2d 585; Commonwealth v. Spofford, 343 Mass. 703, 180 N.E. 2d 673; People v. Rodriguez, 11 N.Y. 2d 279, 183 N.E. 2d 651. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 83 S. Ct. 407.
In People v. Rodriguez, supra, defendant confessed after being confronted with articles obtained in an illegal search. In granting defendant a new trial because his motion to suppress the confession had been denied, the Court of Appeals of New York said: “[T]he exclusionary rule covers not only the evidence illegally obtained, but the product of the unlawful search as well. The underlying rationale is that government may not violate the constitutional guarantee (U. S. Const., 4th Arndt.) and ‘use the fruits of such unlawful conduct to secure a conviction.’ . . . And, obviously, it matters *534not that these ‘fruits’ happen to be confessions rather than some other type of evidence.” (Citations omitted.)
As the majority opinion points out, evidence “concerning the involuntariness of the confession” was not introduced until after the confession was admitted into evidence, and “defendant did not offer the evidence upon which he relies to invalidate the confession until the third day of the trial.” The orderly administration of justice is not furthered by such procedure. Counsel for defendant was remiss in not offering upon the voir dire the evidence he offered on the third day of the trial. However, the original remissness was that of the State. Upon defendant’s objection to the confession testimony the burden devolved upon the State to show, inter alia, that the search by which the officers obtained the coins which triggered the confession was legal. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 20 L. Ed. 2d 797, 88 S. Ct. 1788; State v. Little, 270 N.C. 234, 154 S.E. 2d 61. This it could not do. Indeed, the State offered no evidence attempting to establish the legality of the search. In view of this omission, the judge committed error in admitting the evidence of. defendant’s confession.
It is no longer the rule that a confession is presumed to be voluntary and the burden is on a defendant to show the contrary. The burden of showing the voluntariness of a confession is now upon the State. State v. Thorpe, 274 N.C. 457, 164 S.E. 2d 171; State v. Vickers, 274 N.C. 311, 163 S.E. 2d 481; State v. Pike, 273 N.C. 102, 159 S.E. 2d 334; State v. Ross, 269 N.C. 739, 153 S.E. 2d 469. Now, in order to be admissible, a confession must be voluntary in two aspects: (1) It must be made of a defendant’s own free will, without coercion induced by fear, threat of harm, promise of reward or leniency; and (2) it must not be influenced by methods which violate the constitutional rights of the accused. See 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence §§ 526, 542, 555, 557, where the cases are collected. Thus, a confession obtained in consequence of a violation of a defendant’s constitutional rights is deemed involuntary.
It appears from the State’s evidence that defendant’s confession was obtained by the exhibition and identification of the coins which the officers had seized while unlawfully arresting him and unlawfully searching his motel room. His confession therefore cannot be held voluntary. In my view defendant is also entitled to a new trial on the charges of safecracking, breaking and entering, and larceny.
Bobbitt, C.J., joins in this dissenting opinion.