Court Opinion

ID: 9865758
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 20:04:05.117594+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:52:04.819184
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/25/23 Perez v. Galt Joint Union Elementary School Dist. CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                     (Sacramento)
                                                            ----

 ANEL PEREZ,                                                                             C092691

                    Plaintiff and Appellant,                                     (Super. Ct. No.
                                                                           34201600196960CUPOGDS)
           v.

 GALT JOINT UNION ELEMENTARY
 SCHOOL DISTRICT,

                    Defendant and Respondent.

                                          SUMMARY OF THE APPEAL
         Under the Workers’ Compensation Act (Lab. Code, § 3200 et seq., the Act) the
right to recover workers’ compensation benefits is the sole remedy of an employee
against an employer for an injury arising out of and in the course of employment (Lab.
Code, §§ 3600, 3602; see also Arriaga v. County of Alameda (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1055,
1058-1059). Generally, a person “performing voluntary service[s] for a public agency
. . . who does not receive remuneration for the services” is excluded from the definition

                                                             1
of “employee” under the Act. (Lab. Code, § 3352, subd. (a)(9).) However, under certain
circumstances, usually upon the governing board’s adoption of a resolution, volunteers of
statutorily identified organizations can be deemed employees under the Act. (See, e.g.,
Lab. Code, §§ 3361.5-3364.7.) One such exception to the exclusion of volunteers from
the definition is contained in Labor Code section 3364.5, and applies “upon the adoption
of a resolution of the governing board of the school district” to “person[s] authorized by
the governing board of a school district or the county superintendent of schools to
perform volunteer services for the school district” who are injured “while engaged in the
performance of any service under the direction and control of the governing board of the
school district or the county superintendent.” (Lab. Code, § 3364.5.)
       Here, plaintiff and appellant Anel Perez filed a personal injury action against the
defendant and respondent school district after she was seriously injured while
volunteering at an elementary school event. Following a bench trial, the court entered
judgment in favor of the district on the ground that a resolution passed under Labor Code
section 3364.5 in 1968 by the “Governing Board of Galt Joint Union School District of
Sacramento and San Joaquin Counties” for the “Galt Joint Union School District”
converted plaintiff’s status to that of an employee under the Act, rendering workers’
compensation the sole and exclusive remedy to compensate plaintiff for her injuries.
       On appeal, we consider what it means for a volunteer to be “authorized” and under
the “direction and control” of the governing board or county superintendent under the
statute. We also consider whether the resolution needed to be expressly made applicable
to the “Galt Joint Union Elementary District” and passed by a governing board that
specifically identified itself as the governing board of the “Galt Joint Union Elementary
School District” in order for the resolution to apply to plaintiff. In relation to the second
issue, plaintiff has asked us to decide if the defendant school district, which was sued and
filed answers under the name “Galt Joint Union Elementary School District” should be

                                              2
estopped under the doctrines of judicial admissions and from arguing the resolution
applied to volunteers of the defendant district in 2015.
       We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                 PRELIMINARY MATTERS
       Before we begin our analysis, we offer an explanation as to how we refer to the
district throughout this decision, and we rule on one undecided motion and two requests
for judicial notice filed in this appeal upon which we deferred rulings. We also offer a
brief note regarding our treatment of some of the facts and issues raised in the briefs.
       One of the issues that arose at trial was whether the defendant school district
should be referred to as the Galt Joint Union Elementary School District, or the Galt Joint
Union School District and/or whether the board of the Galt Joint Union School District
could pass a resolution that applied to the Galt Joint Union Elementary School District.
Though we conclude the trial court correctly determined that the evidence admitted at
trial supports that the two names refer to one and the same district, throughout this
decision we will refer to the defendant as “the defendant” or “the district,” and we will
avoid using the two names unless necessary in referring to the evidence regarding the
district’s name or to how the parties refer to the district in the pleadings in this matter.
       The defendant requested judicial notice of an analysis prepared by the staff of the
Senate Local Government Committee regarding Senate Bill No. 336 (1967 Reg. Sess.)
(Senate Bill 336). Defendant attached a copy of the subject report to its request. Plaintiff
did not oppose defendant’s request. Legislative committee reports and analyses are
properly subject to judicial notice. (See Kaufman & Broad Communities, Inc. v.
Performance Plastering, Inc. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 26, 32.) We grant defendant’s
request.
       The plaintiff requested judicial notice of a petition to stay proceedings that she
filed before the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) and the WCAB’s order

                                               3
staying those proceedings. These materials were offered to support an argument that
plaintiff made in reply to defendant’s argument that she should be estopped from
disputing the exclusive jurisdiction of the WCAB. Defendant opposed plaintiff’s request
and filed a motion to strike the portion of plaintiff’s reply brief that relies on the
documents. Because, when considering the merits of both parties’ arguments, we find the
trial court correctly concluded the WCAB has exclusive jurisdiction, a finding as to
whether plaintiff ought to be estopped from arguing WCAB does not have exclusive
jurisdiction would not change our final decision. Accordingly, we deny both plaintiff’s
request and defendant’s motion because they have no impact on the disposition of this
appeal. Similarly, we note that when and how a workers’ compensation claim was filed
on plaintiff’s behalf, and whether benefits have been paid under that claim does not affect
our decision here. Plaintiff did not need to have notice of the resolution nor to opt to be
treated as an employee under the Act in order to be deemed an employee subject to
workers’ compensation’s exclusive remedies once the district’s board adopted a
controlling resolution. (See Minish v. Hanuman Fellowship (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 437,
468.) Thus, we do not consider the evidence in the record regarding whether plaintiff
personally made a claim for benefits or accepted workers’ compensation payments.

                       FACTS AND HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS

       The Pleadings

       In July 2016, plaintiff filed an unverified complaint in the Superior Court in
Sacramento County alleging personal injury. Plaintiff named Galt Joint Union
Elementary School District as the defendant.
       According to the complaint, on December 4, 2015, plaintiff was acting as a
volunteer for the spelling bee held at River Oaks Elementary School, which is owned or
in the possession of the Galt Joint Union Elementary School District. The complaint
alleges that while attending the event, plaintiff fell off the school’s auditorium stage and

                                               4
down an adjacent stairway, causing catastrophic injury to her. Plaintiff alleged economic
and noneconomic damages.
       Defendant filed an answer in November 2016. In the introductory paragraph of
the answer, defendant wrote, “COMES NOW Defendant GALT JOINT UNION
ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DISTRICT, a public entity, and answering the Complaint of
Plaintiffs on file herein, admits, denies and alleges as follows.” The answer then
contained a general denial under Code of Civil Procedure section 431.30, subdivision (d),
in which the defendant generally and specifically denied each and every allegation and
cause of action contained in the complaint, and in which defendant denied plaintiff was
entitled to damages due to any wrongful act by the defendant. The answer then alleged
various affirmative defenses. The affirmative defenses in this initial answer did not
include anything regarding the availability of workers’ compensation coverage.
       In late 2018, the defendant filed a successful motion for leave to amend its answer
to the complaint which added an affirmative defense labeled “EXCLUSIVE REMEDY.”
It says, “[a]s a separate, further and affirmative defense, this answering defendant alleges
plaintiff is barred and precluded from recovery herein by Labor Code sections 3600 and
3602 in that the exclusive remedy against this answering defendant, if any, is that
provided by the California Labor Code, Division 4.”

       Bifurcation of Issues and Phase One Trial

       The defendant filed a motion to bifurcate the trial. The motion proposed phase
one would address if a resolution adopted under Labor Code section 3364.5 applied to
defendant, such that plaintiff’s sole and exclusive remedy would be the defendant’s
workers’ compensation. The trial court granted the motion. The two-day phase one
bench trial took place in January 2020.

                                             5
       Testimony and Evidence Presented by the District’s Superintendent

       The defense called Dr. Karen Schauer, who testified that she was the
superintendent of the “Galt Joint Union Elementary School District.” She had worked for
the district since 1980, in various capacities, beginning as a teacher. Schauer’s testimony
and the evidence she presented touched on three key issues: the 1968 adoption of a
resolution pursuant to Labor Code section 3364.5 by the governing board of the “Galt
Joint Union School District,” the names by which the district identifies itself, and her use
of school principals as her designees.
       Part of Schauer’s testimony with respect to the first and second key issues
involved the authentication of district records, including board minutes and the Labor
Code section 3364.5 resolution at issue here. Schauer described the process of recording
and verifying the content of board meeting minutes. She stated final minutes are kept in
the district office in a fireproof safe. The defense brought copies of minutes from district
archives dating back to 1952 to trial. Schauer stated district resolutions will also be
archived, but not necessarily stored with the minutes. When asked if the district office
where she works would “maintain the board minutes or resolutions for any other school
district other than the Galt Joint Union Elementary School District” she responded,
“[n]o.”
       Schauer’s testimony on the three key topics is summarized here.

       Evidence Regarding the Labor Code section 3364.5 Resolution

       Schauer testified about board minutes from the March 18, 1968, board meeting.
According to the header of those minutes, the name of the school district whose
governing board held a meeting that day was the “Galt Joint Union School District.” The
members of the governing board identified in the minutes included Donald F. Nottoli.
Schauer knew Nottoli from working with the district. He was on the governing board of
the district for years--until he retired in the 2000’s. As far as Schauer knew, Nottoli

                                              6
never served on the governing board of any district other than the defendant district. The
minutes reflect that at the meeting, the board unanimously voted to approve Resolution
No. 37, “which provides for compensation insurance coverage for persons authorized to
perform volunteer services for the district.”
       Schauer also testified about Resolution No. 37. According to the resolution, on
March 18, 1968, the “Governing Board of Galt Joint Union School District of
Sacramento and San Joaquin Counties” adopted the resolution. Resolution No. 37 states
the “Governing Board of the Galt Joint Union School District desire[d] to avail itself of
the opportunity to provide” the coverage outlined in Labor Code section 3364.5. It
resolved “that authorized, unsalaried volunteers are hereby deemed to be employees of
the Galt Joint Union School District for workmen’s compensation insurance purposes.”
The resolution was signed by Donald F. Nottoli, whose title was Clerk of the Board.
       It was Schauer’s understanding that Resolution No. 37 was passed on behalf of the
district for which she worked. She understood this to be true because it was signed by
Donald Nottoli, and it contained the “name of our district, Galt Joint Union School
District” within the resolution. She understands both “Galt Joint Union School District”
and “Galt Joint Union School District of Sacramento and San Joaquin Counties” to refer
to the district for which she works, the “Galt Joint Union Elementary School District.”
She agreed the governing board that identified itself as serving Galt Joint Union School
District of Sacramento and San Joaquin Counties and Galt Joint Union School District
was the same entity as the governing board of the Galt Joint Union Elementary School
District.
       Schauer stated she was not aware of the existence of Resolution No. 37 before the
date of plaintiff’s accident.

                                                7
       Evidence Regarding the Name of the District

       Schauer testified that the names “Galt Joint Union School District, Galt Joint
Union Elementary District, and Galt Joint Union School District of Sacramento and San
Joaquin Counties” all refer to the district for which she works, and the governing board of
the district would refer to itself using the various iterations of the district’s name.
       Schauer identified many documents that reflected the district sometimes being
referred to as “Galt Joint Union Elementary” or “Galt Joint Union Elementary School
District,” and at other times being referred to as “Galt Joint Union School District.” For
example, she described a 2016 W-2 form that identified the employer as “Galt Joint
Union Elementary,” a 1973 Registration for Tax-Free Identification registering the “Galt
Joint Union School District,” and a 2009 information return for tax-exempt governmental
obligations issued by the “Galt Joint Union School District” which each used the same
unique employer identification number (EIN) to identify the respective employer,
registrant, and issuer. Addresses listed on the 1973 and 2009 documents were for
buildings where Schauer had worked in her capacity as a district employee, and they
were signed by persons she recognized as former district administrators.
       Schauer also identified an indirect costs allocation plan for the “Galt Joint Union
School District” and a California Department of Education listing for the “Galt Joint
Union Elementary” school district that both identify the referenced districts using the
same county district school (CDS) number, which she recognized as being the CDS
number for the district where she works and a number she said she had never seen used
for any other district.
       Schauer reviewed copies of minutes of the governing board from district archives
going back many years including: minutes from a 1959 meeting of the governing board
of the “Galt Joint Union School District” on which she recognized one listed board
member who was a member of the governing board of the district at which she works

                                               8
when she began working for the district and another as a person who has a school in the
district named after him; meeting minutes from the April, May, June, and July meetings
in 1998, which alternatingly are labeled as the meeting minutes for the board of the “Galt
Joint Union School District” and the “Galt Joint Union Elementary District.”
       Schauer looked at board minutes from June 26, 2001. Nottoli is identified as a
board member at the meeting. The minutes identify the district as “Galt Joint Union
Elementary School District.” A resolution was passed at the meeting to acquire real
property for a middle school. She also looked at the grant deed for the property, which
was recorded on July 13, 2001. The grantee is listed as “Galt Joint Union School
District.” The deed also identifies the district requesting the recording and to which a
copy should be mailed following recording as “Galt Joint Union School District.” It is
her understanding that the “Galt Joint Union Elementary School District” owned the
property.
       Schauer also testified to a statement of facts prepared and filed with the California
Secretary of State in December 2000. Jeff Jennings, who was the superintendent of the
district for which she works in December 2000 signed the statement. It identifies the
“Galt Joint Union Elementary School District” as the legal name of the district. Donald
Nottoli is identified as a board member on the document. She understands the Donald
Nottoli listed to be the same one she worked with and the same one who executed
Resolution No. 37. On cross-examination, Schauer acknowledged that a statement of
facts, in part, serves as a means for a school district to file its name with the California
Secretary of State, in order to provide a legal way to identify the district filing the
statement.
       Schauer admitted that she represents to the general public that the name of the
district is “Galt Joint Union Elementary School District.” Schauer agreed it was
reasonable for plaintiff to believe she was volunteering for the “Galt Joint Union
Elementary School District.”

                                               9
         Schauer explained why the district has come to use both the name “Galt Joint
Union School District” and “Galt Joint Union Elementary School District” to identify
itself. She said, “in a community with two school districts,” the other of which is called
the Galt Joint Union High School District, “when it comes to communicating the name of
the school district” to identify the elementary district only “Galt Joint Union School
District is not necessarily clear that it’s an elementary district. So . . . there’s so many
different organizations or agencies that we prepare information for and what they require
in terms of the name of the school district may vary but the ID numbers are the same.”

         Testimony Regarding Using Principals as Designees

         Schauer testified that she understands the governing board grants her authority to
direct and control volunteers in the district and she, in turn, can delegate the direction and
control to school administrators. From a practical standpoint, the governing board could
not provide direct oversight of events at schools like spelling bees. They are not present
during the school day, and oversight requires being able to provide redirection and the
board is not on site at schools to do that. If an event is happening at a school where her
job duties do not include providing direct oversight, she delegates that power. At River
Oaks Elementary School, Schauer typically delegates that power to the principal, who
was Lois Yount in 2015. She delegated that power to Yount pursuant to board policies
and administrative regulations. Schauer hired Yount as the principal.
         According to Schauer, the governing board has the authority to prohibit events like
spelling bees. The governing board knows about the spelling bees for the most part,
because they have been going on for years, and she believes a board member has even
judged one at River Oaks. Monthly calendars with scheduled events are included in
board information packets, and she would expect to see school spelling bees listed on
those.

                                              10
       Schauer testified Yount had the authority to control the spelling bee set up,
including the seating of volunteers, placement of tables, and where students would stand
during the bee. In turn, Schauer could have given directives on those topics to Yount and
had Yount act on those directives, pursuant to authority given to Schauer through district
policies and administrative regulations. Furthermore, the board could vote to change the
policy to modify the direction and control Schauer has over volunteers, and Schauer and
Yount would follow that policy.
       Schauer testified about Megan’s Law clearance forms. District volunteers need to
fill out a Megan’s Law clearance form each year before working with children.
       If Schauer had any reason to prohibit plaintiff from volunteering at the spelling
bee, she could have done so. Likewise, as Schauer’s designee, Yount could have
prohibited plaintiff from volunteering if Yount had discovered plaintiff had not obtained
Megan’s Law clearance. According to a compliance report to which the district has
access, plaintiff had obtained Megan’s Law clearance on October 22, 2015, before the
spelling bee. When asked if she had any control over plaintiff’s activities, Schauer said
the control aspect would be related to what it takes to participate in a district event at the
school “and that control would mean she needed to have Megan’s Law completed and
that needed to happen for her to volunteer.”
       Schauer admitted she was not personally at the spelling bee. She did not
personally give any direction to plaintiff at the spelling bee. Schauer was not aware of
anyone from the board giving any direction to plaintiff when she volunteered for the
spelling bee.

       Testimony of Anel Perez

       The defendants called plaintiff.

                                               11
       Plaintiff testified she had two children who attended River Oaks Elementary at the
time of the accident, and she was a frequent volunteer at the school. She was vice
president of the PTA.
       Plaintiff testified that the PTA president asked her to volunteer at the bee the day
before the event. When plaintiff arrived for the bee, she connected with Yount. Yount
gave plaintiff the judge’s packet. Yount gave plaintiff insight and instruction on what she
expected from plaintiff as a judge. Yount told plaintiff to listen carefully, and if there
was a question or dispute about how a student spelled something, the judges would
confer. The judges’ table was set up on stage and Yount told plaintiff where to sit at the
table. During the bee, plaintiff’s chair went backwards off the edge of the stage and she
was injured.
       Plaintiff agreed that during the time of the spelling bee and before her fall, she
“understood that [she] w[as] under the direction and control of Ms. Yount who was in
essence running the spelling bee.”

       Testimony of Lois Yount

       The defense called Yount. Pertinent points of her testimony were as follows:
       She has worked for “Galt Joint Union Elementary School District” for 20 years.
She used to work as a school administrator at River Oaks Elementary. As a school
administrator, she would oversee every aspect of the school, including student safety and
staff safety, day-to-day happenings, and school functions. She would serve as a leader of
instruction, maintenance, and operation. Her direct supervisor, with whom she would
communicate on an on-going basis, was the district superintendent. The superintendent
works under the board to make sure employees follow its policies and administrative
regulations. The board makes policies and administrative regulations and has the
ultimate authority to implement what needs to be done.

                                             12
       There is a school calendar that she knows goes up to the board which would
include the date of the annual spelling bee at the school.
       The board makes the policies school administrators need to follow. The board
provides oversight to individual schools with their voting power. That voting power
relates to the direction and control of volunteers in the district. She understands that the
board has a policy that grants authority to the superintendent to direct and control
volunteers. Those polices and administrative regulations also allow the superintendent to
delegate direction and control over volunteers to school administrators. Regular visitors
who are not volunteering on campus--maybe who do a quick visit--have to sign in and get
a visitor’s badge, but they do not have to go through the Megan’s Law clearance.
       She was principal of River Oaks on December 4, 2015. She knew plaintiff as a
parent, and as a recognizable face on campus. Yount testified that plaintiff volunteered
regularly.
       Yount met with plaintiff the morning of the bee. The PTA president had informed
Yount she was not able to volunteer and had asked plaintiff to take her place. Yount and
plaintiff met in the multipurpose room before the bee started. She showed plaintiff where
the judging table was, gave her a packet, and showed her where some things were on the
table. The packet contained the rules of the spelling bee and had judging instructions.
She told plaintiff her job was to listen to the students spell the words and use her list to
determine if the child spelled the word correctly. She agreed her contact with plaintiff
that morning was “extremely brief.”
       Yount’s power to direct and control the spelling bee the day of the accident came
from the administrative regulations and board policies from the governing board, and
from the district superintendent. She has to approve spelling bee judges. While the PTA
president did not need to ask Yount before she asked plaintiff to judge, if the PTA
president asked someone who had not cleared Megan’s Law or who Yount thought would
not represent the school properly, Yount would not have let that person volunteer. If it

                                              13
was a parent Yount did not know or who had not cleared Megan’s Law, Yount would
have told the president to find someone else.
       The spelling bee at River Oaks goes back at least as far as 2000. It was common
for governing board members to serve as judges at the bees.
       In working for the district, Yount has heard the district referred to by different
names. Those include Galt Joint Union School District, Galt Joint Union Elementary
School District, Galt School District, and Galt Elementary School District and all those
names refer to the district for which she works. She would not be surprised if someone
referred to the district for which she works as “Galt Joint Union School District” because
over the years she has heard the district referred to in different ways.
       Plaintiff’s counsel read from a deposition transcript in which Yount, when asked if
she gave plaintiff instructions on how to conduct herself at the bee, responded, “[n]o, she
asked me what her role would be, and I said her role would be to listen to the words, that
was it. Very little direction was given.”
       When asked if plaintiff was under a particular person’s direction the day of the
bee, Yount said plaintiff was under the direction of the school, then added, “I think that
would be me as principal.” Plaintiff’s counsel then read from Yount’s deposition, where,
when asked, “[w]as [plaintiff] under any particular person’s direction that day?” Yount
responded, “[n]o.” He also read from Yount’s deposition where, when asked if anyone
gave plaintiff instructions on how to act as a judge, Yount responded, “[n]obody did that
I’m aware of.”

       Interrogatories Read into Evidence

       At the trial, plaintiff’s counsel read interrogatory responses into the record:
“Special Interrogatory No. 37 asks, identify the name, address, title, if applicable, and
telephone number of each person and/or entity under whose direction pursuant to Labor
Code Section 3364.5. Plaintiff Anel Perez was acting while she was judging the spelling

                                             14
bee that took place at River Oaks Elementary School on December 4th, 2015. The
response, as verified by Mr. Barentson is, as a judge at the spelling bee, plaintiff would
not be under the direction of a particular person or entity dependent upon the definition of
direction. The spelling bee committee, the principal and assistant principal were in
charge of running the spelling bee at River Oaks Elementary School on December 4th,
2015.
        “And then in a similar Interrogatory No. 38 was asked with regard to the question
of control. And the interrogatory reads, identify the name, address, title, if applicable,
and telephone number of each person and/or entity under whose control, pursuant to
Labor Code Section 3364.5. Plaintiff Anel Perez was acting while she was judging the
spelling bee that took place at River Oaks Elementary School on December 4th, 2015.
[¶] The Special Interrogatory No. 38 response verified by Mr. Barentson reads, as a
judge at the spelling bee, plaintiff would not be under the control of a particular person or
entity dependent upon the definition of control. The spelling bee committee, the
principal and assistant principal were in charge of running the spelling bee at River Oaks
Elementary School on December 4th, 2015.”

        Dr. Donald Nottoli Stipulation

        The parties agreed that the court could consider that if Dr. Donald Nottoli--the son
of the Mr. Donald F. Nottoli who signed Resolution No. 37--testified at trial, he would
have said he joined the district’s board in 1977, and when he joined the board there were
two school districts in Galt: one for high school and one for elementary. He would also
say that during his time the elementary district was referred to as both Galt Joint Unified
School District and Galt Joint Union Elementary School.

        Proceedings After Close of Evidence, Judgment, and Notice of Appeal

        Following the close of evidence, the parties submitted posttrial briefs. The court
issued a tentative ruling in defendant’s favor and provided the parties the opportunity to

                                             15
discuss the tentative ruling at a hearing before entering a final judgment. After the court
heard arguments, it adopted and affirmed the tentative ruling.
       Judgment in defendant’s favor was entered on June 26, 2020. Plaintiff filed and
served a timely notice of appeal on August 28, 2020.

                                       DISCUSSION

                                              I

        Authorization, Direction, and Control Under Labor Code Section 3364.5

       Plaintiff argues that because there was no evidence the district board members
were aware of their duties under Labor Code section 3364.5 when she was injured, none
of the members were present at the bee, and there is no evidence they knew about the
bee, she was not “authorized by the governing board” to act as a volunteer, and she was
not performing services under their “direction and control” at the time she was injured.
Thus, plaintiff reasons, the trial court should have rejected the defendant’s affirmative
defense that she was covered by the Act and, therefore, that workers’ compensation
provided her exclusive remedy.

       A.     Standards of Review

       To the extent evaluating this argument requires us to determine whether Labor
Code section 3364.5 only applies when (1) district board members and employees are
aware of its application when a volunteer is injured; (2) district board members know
about and authorize a specific volunteer’s involvement in a specific activity; and/or
(3) district board members directly control and supervise a volunteer’s actions, we
consider the question de novo. (Lopez v. Ledesma (2022) 12 Cal.5th 848, 857.) To the
extent it requires us to determine, given our resolution of the foregoing, whether plaintiff
was authorized to act as a volunteer and acted under the direction and control of the board
in this instance, we ask if that determination was supported by substantial evidence.

                                             16
(Winograd v. American Broadcasting Co. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 624, 632 [“When the
trial court has resolved a disputed factual issue, the appellate courts review the ruling
according to the substantial evidence rule. If the trial court’s resolution of the factual
issue is supported by substantial evidence, it must be affirmed”].)

       B.     Meaning of the Statute

       “ ‘In construing a statute, “ ‘we strive to ascertain and effectuate the Legislature’s
intent.’ [Citations.] Because statutory language ‘generally provide[s] the most reliable
indicator’ of that intent [citations], we turn to the words themselves, giving them their
‘usual and ordinary meanings’ and construing them in context. . . .” (People v.
Castenada (2000) 23 Cal.4th 743, 746-747 . . . .) “If the language contains no ambiguity,
we presume the Legislature meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the statute
governs.” (People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1106, 1111 . . . .) If, however, the
statutory language is susceptible of more than one reasonable construction, we can look
to legislative history (ibid.) and to rules or maxims of construction (Mejia v. Reed (2003)
31 Cal.4th 657, 663 . . . .) “[T]he court may [also] consider the impact of an
interpretation on public policy, for ‘[w]here uncertainty exists consideration should be
given to the consequences that will flow from a particular interpretation.’ ” (Ibid.,
quoting Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379,
1387 . . . .)’ (People v. Smith (2004) 32 Cal.4th 792, 797-798 . . . .)” (MW Erectors, Inc.
v. Niederhauser Ornamental & Metal Works Co., Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 412, 426.)
       Our Supreme Court has discussed, with respect to determining coverage under the
Act, the necessity of complying with “the Legislature’s command in [Labor Code]
section 3202 that the Act ‘be liberally construed by the courts with the purpose of
extending [its] benefits for the protection of persons injured in the course of their
employment.’ [] This command governs all aspects of workers’ compensation; it applies
to factual as well as statutory construction. [Citations.] Thus, ‘[i]f a provision in [the

                                              17
Act] may be reasonably construed to provide coverage or payments, that construction
should usually be adopted even if another reasonable construction is possible.’
[Citation.] The rule of liberal construction ‘is not altered because a plaintiff believes that
[she] can establish negligence on the part of [her] employer and brings a civil suit for
damages.’ [Citation.] It requires that we liberally construe the Act ‘in favor of awarding
work[ers’] compensation, not in permitting civil litigation. [Citation.]’ [Citations.]”
(Arriaga v. County of Alameda, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1065.)
       Applying these principles, we conclude (1) that so long as a resolution has been
passed at some point by the governing board of a district and not later rescinded, Labor
Code section 3364.5 does not require that district board members and staff be aware of
the statute at the time a volunteer is injured in order for it to apply; (2) district board
members do not need to know about and authorize a specific volunteer’s involvement in a
specific activity for the exception to apply; and (3) district board members do not need to
directly control and direct a volunteer’s actions for the exception to apply.
       As to our first conclusion, the statute says it applies to subject school district
volunteers, “upon the adoption of a resolution of the governing board of the school
district.” (Lab. Code, § 3364.5.) Interpreting the statute to require that every future
board member knows of Labor Code section 3364.5 and a resolution passed within the
meaning of that statute reads requirements into the statute that are not in the statute’s text.
This runs contrary to the rule of statutory construction that we do not add words to a
statute. (See B.B. v. County of Los Angeles (2020) 10 Cal.5th 1, 9; see also Code Civ.
Proc., § 1858 [“In the construction of a statute or instrument, the office of the Judge is
simply to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to
insert what has been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted; and where there are
several provisions or particulars, such a construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will
give effect to all”].) Moreover that interpretation of the statute potentially narrows the
scope of persons to whom the statutory exception can apply contrary to Labor Code

                                               18
section 3202’s command that we “liberally construe[]” sections of the Act to extend
“their benefits for the protection of persons injured in the course of their employment.”
       As to our second conclusion, to interpret the phrase “person[s] authorized by the
governing board of a school district or the county superintendent of schools to perform
volunteer services for the school district” to apply only to persons who have been
specifically authorized by the board to volunteer at specific events is also outside the
reach of the statute. (See Minish v. Hanuman Fellowship, supra, (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 465-466 [rejecting an argument that specific volunteers needed to be identified by
the governing board of nonprofits under a similar statute, Lab. Code, § 3363.6].) An
equally sensible reading of the term “authorized by the governing board” is to interpret it
as applying to the class of persons the board authorizes to perform volunteer services at
the type of activities it authorizes vis-à-vis its policies and regulations.
       As to our third conclusion, to interpret the phrase under the “direction and control
of the governing board of the school district or the county superintendent” to mean the
board would literally need to directly direct and control a volunteer’s activities before the
exception could apply is nowhere found in the statute. A proper reading of the language
of the statute, which is more in keeping with Labor Code section 3202’s directive, is that
it applies to a volunteer performing services under the supervision of an authorized board
or county superintendent designee who is abiding by the rules, policies, and regulations
developed by the board and exercising that supervision pursuant to authority granted by
the board.
       This interpretation of the statute is further supported by the legislative history of
Labor Code section 3364.5. This history shows that the purpose of its enactment was to
enable school districts to provide workers’ compensation coverage for the increasing
number of school volunteers. A senate staff analysis described the problem addressed by
Senate Bill 336 as follows: “Increasing use is being made of volunteer assistance by
numerous school districts--such as under the compensatory programs . . . and general

                                               19
school assistance . . . . As volunteers, they are neither compensated nor covered by
insurance.” (Sen. Local Gov. Com., staff analysis of Sen. Bill No. 336 (1967 Reg. Sess.),
as amended Apr. 13, 1967.) The staff analysis further noted that the proposed legislation
would “provide that a school district board may provide personal liability and
workmans[’] compensation insurance for a volunteer, the same as or comparable to that
provided for its regular employees.” (Ibid.) Examples of the growing class of volunteers
included, “tutors, librarian aides, playground monitors, etc.” and “aides for handicapped,
teacher aides, etc.” (Ibid.)
       The broad purpose of Labor Code section 3364.5, reflected in the legislative
history, reinforces our decision that the statute does not apply just in the narrow
circumstances and to the narrow class of volunteers to which plaintiff’s reading would
have us apply the statute. To adopt plaintiff’s proposed interpretation would thwart a
district’s ability to provide workers’ compensation coverage to the range of school
volunteers identified in the staff report, given the obvious impracticability of such a
requirement. (See Day v. City of Fontana (2001) 25 Cal.4th 268, 272 [we select statutory
construction that comports most closely with apparent intent of Legislature, “ ‘ “with a
view to promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the statute” ’ ”]; Spier v.
Peck (1918) 36 Cal.App. 4, 6 [“Statutes are to be so construed as not to give rise to an
absurdity in their attempted application and as not to destroy their efficacy as a whole or
in substantial part”].)
       Thus we reject plaintiff’s reading of the statute at issue.

       C.      Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court’s Findings

       The substantial evidence standard, “has three pillars. First, we accept all evidence
supporting the trial court’s order. Second, we completely disregard contrary evidence.
Third, we draw all reasonable inferences to affirm the trial court. These three pillars
support the lintel: we do not reweigh the evidence. (See Harley-Davidson, Inc. v.

                                              20
Franchise Tax Bd. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 193, 213-214 . . . .) Under this standard of
review, parties challenging a trial court’s factfinding bear an ‘ “enormous burden” ’
(People v. Thomas (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1063, 1071 . . . .)” (Schmidt v. Superior Court
(2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 570, 581-582, as modified on den. of rehg. (Feb. 14, 2020).)
Considering the manner in which we have interpreted Labor Code section 3364.5 here,
plaintiff cannot meet this burden.
       First, the governing board of the district adopted a Labor Code section 3364.5
resolution, Resolution No. 37, in 1968, and there is no suggestion that the resolution has
been rescinded since then. That the superintendent and possibly the current board
members were not individually aware of the resolution and its implications under Labor
Code section 3364.5 does not change this fact.
       Second, the evidence supports a finding that the plaintiff had been “authorized by
the governing board of [the] school district” to perform volunteer services when she was
serving as a volunteer at the spelling bee. As reflected in district records, she had
satisfied a central district requirement for the authorization of district volunteers: she had
obtained Megan’s Law clearance. The board’s designee, Schauer, and Schauer’s
designee pursuant to board authorization, Yount, could have prevented plaintiff from
volunteering at the event. In short, plaintiff’s authority to serve as a volunteer was given
because she satisfied the district’s policies regarding its volunteers, and the
superintendent and her designee--who had a better capacity to observe volunteers in the
day-to-day school environment--could have revoked that authorization based on variables
they might have observed. Additionally, evidence supported a conclusion that the
governing board was aware that spelling bees were held at River Oaks, likely was given a
calendar that stated when this particular spelling bee would be held, and the board could
have removed the authority for the school to host the bee.
       Finally, evidence supports a finding that the spelling bee on December 4, 2015, in
general, and plaintiff’s judging activities specifically were under the direction and control

                                              21
of Yount, who, as principal, was acting for Schauer with respect to daily operations at
River Oaks. Yount’s and plaintiff’s testimony establish that Yount told plaintiff where to
sit and provided plaintiff instructions on how to judge the spelling bee. Schauer’s
testimony established that Yount had the authority to control and direct the spelling bee
set up, including the seating of volunteers, placement of tables, and where students would
stand during the bee based on authority established by the board.
       The fact that Yount’s responses during her deposition may have suggested that
plaintiff was not under any one person’s control during the spelling bee does not require a
finding that plaintiff was not under Yount’s direction and control. As the trier of fact,
the trial judge was permitted to weigh the deposition responses against Yount’s,
plaintiff’s, and Schauer’s testimony. (See Mardirossian & Associates, Inc. v. Ersoff
(2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 257, 271 [stating that even if a witness’s deposition testimony
had been “inconsistent with his trial testimony” it was proper for the trial court to
conclude “such inconsistency was to be evaluated by the trier of fact.” “Trial testimony
may be impeached by inconsistent deposition testimony, but absent an abuse of the
discovery process, such testimony should not be precluded”].)
       Likewise, the district’s responses to interrogatories numbered 37 and 38 do not
dictate that we reach a different conclusion. As the trial court observed, “[d]efendant’s
actual responses to these interrogatories were not unequivocal denials” and reflect that a
complete response would turn on a precise definitions of “control” and “direction” which
the plaintiff never attempted to define.

                                              II

                           The Resolution Applies to the District

        A.    Scope of the Issue

       Before we address plaintiff’s argument regarding the name of the district, we offer
a note on its scope. In so doing, we consider some basic rules governing appellate

                                             22
briefing. “ ‘[E]very brief should contain a legal argument with citation of authorities on
the points made. If none is furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it as
waived, and pass it without consideration. [Citations.]’ (9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, (3d
ed. 1985) Appeal, § 479, p. 469; see also People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal. 3d 932, 985,
fn. 15 . . . ; Duncan v. Ramish (1904) 142 Cal. 686, 689-690 . . . .)” (People v. Stanley
(1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793; accord, Bettencourt v. City and County of San Francisco
(2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1090, 1102; see also Reyes v. Kosha (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 451,
466, fn. 6 [“Issues not raised in an appellant’s brief are deemed waived or abandoned.
(Tan v. California Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 800, 811 . . . .]”.)
Additionally, “[e]ach brief must: [¶] [s]tate each point under a separate heading or
subheading summarizing the point, and support each point by argument and, if possible,
by citation of authority.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).) Arguments that fail
to satisfy this rule are forfeited. (Consolidated Irrigation Dist. v. City of Selma (2012)
204 Cal.App.4th 187, 201.)
       Based on the headings contained in plaintiff’s opening brief, plaintiff’s argument
regarding the name of the district is as follows: defendant was barred by judicial
admissions from claiming that its name has ever been anything but Galt Joint Union
Elementary District. Plaintiff preserved this issue by raising it below, and she has been
prejudiced by the trial court’s rulings regarding names. One of plaintiff’s headings
regarding the question of the district’s name also suggests she has either taken the
position that the governing board that passed the resolution was not the governing board
of the defendant district or that Resolution No. 37 needs to contain the exact name of
district used today in order to apply. Though this position is not well-developed and
supported, we can dispose of it quickly on the merits.

                                             23
       B.     The Pleadings Did Not Prevent Defendant from Relying on the Resolution

       “ ‘A judicial admission is a party’s unequivocal concession of the truth of a
matter, and removes the matter as an issue in the case. [Citations.]’ (Gelfo v. Lockheed
Martin Corp. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 34, 48 . . . .) ‘Judicial admissions may be made in
a pleading . . . . [Citations.] Facts established by pleadings as judicial admissions “ ‘are
conclusive concessions of the truth of those matters, are effectively removed as issues
from the litigation, and may not be contradicted, by the party whose pleadings are used
against him or her.’ [Citations.] ‘ “[A] pleader cannot blow hot and cold as to the facts
positively stated.” ’ [Citation]” [Citation.]’ (Myers v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc. (2009)
178 Cal.App.4th 735, 746 . . . .)” (Minish v. Hanuman Fellowship, supra, 214
Cal.App.4th at p. 456.)
       Here, while the district did file answers as “Galt Joint Unified Elementary School
District” the answer and amended answer contain no express admissions of fact. The
answers do not “positively state[],” or even imply, that in the course of over 50 years the
district has never gone by any other name, or that the district even currently only operates
under one name. Thus, plaintiff has failed to persuade us that defendant must be
foreclosed from claiming it is the district whose governing board identified as the
governing board of “Galt Joint Union School District” on March 18, 1968, and passed
Resolution No. 37.

       C.     Governing Board’s Adoption of the Resolution

       The trial court concluded the evidence shows the defendant’s governing board
adopted the resolution. This is a finding of fact that we review under the substantial
evidence standard. (Winograd v. American Broadcasting Co. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 624,
632 [“When the trial court has resolved a disputed factual issue, the appellate courts
review the ruling according to the substantial evidence rule. If the trial court’s resolution
of the factual issue is supported by substantial evidence, it must be affirmed”].)

                                             24
       The record amply supports a finding that the governing board that passed
Resolution No. 37 is the governing board of the defendant district. Schauer’s testimony
regarding the use of “Galt Joint Union School District” and “Galt Joint Union Elementary
District” and her review of numerous district documents that use the two names
interchangeably--some of which also reflect how the unique EIN and CDS identifiers
have been used on documents identifying the district under both names--support the
finding that the two names refer to one and the same district. Additionally, according to
Schauer, the board representative that signed Resolution No. 37 only ever served on the
board of one district, which is the one that is sometimes called “Galt Joint Union District”
and other times called “Galt Joint Union Elementary District”; i.e., the defendant district.
       The trial court’s factual determination that the district’s governing board passed
Resolution No. 37 is sound.

       D.     The Resolution Need Not Use a Specific District Name

       The governing board was not required to refer to the district as “Galt Joint Union
Elementary School District” for the resolution to apply. Applying de novo review and
the principles of statutory construction articulated above (see section I.B., ante) we find
that Labor Code section 3364.5 does not require a resolution passed pursuant to the
statute to use the precise name of the district for the resolution to apply. The statute
contains no such language requiring the precise use of a district name, and we would
needlessly narrow the scope of the exception’s coverage if we were to read that
requirement into the statute. As this case demonstrates, it is possible that, over time, a
district’s name might change or evolve to better reflect the community it serves. To
require a new resolution be adopted with each potential name change, when the
governing body of the district and the core district remains unchanged, would create a
rule where numerous persons who would otherwise be covered by the exception would
become inadvertently excluded.

                                             25
                                         DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed. Defendant shall recover its costs on appeal. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.27(a)(1), (2).)

                                                  HULL, Acting P. J.

We concur:

ROBIE, J.

MAURO, J.

                                             26