Court Opinion

ID: 9751750
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 16:57:32.836887+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:58.624767
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
Before HOOD and QUINN, Associate Judges, and CAYTON (Chief Judge, Retired), sitting by designation under Code, § 11-776(b).
CAYTON, Acting Judge,
We ordered oral argument on appellant’s motion for rehearing, to further explore the question of the validity of the lease between the parties, under Code Section 45-401. Arguments have now been heard and the question more- thoroughly briefed. Having carefully reconsidered the ease wé have come to the conclusion that appellant’s position is correct, and that the lease did not create an estate for longer than one year.
Our statute, Code, § 45-401, provides that "No deeds of conveyance of either real or personal estate by individuals shall be executed or acknowledged, by attorney.”
Appellee now concedes that the section just quoted applies to agents as well' as attorneys. And it is clear that- in making the lease as “broker” appellee Holloway was nothing more than a réiital agent. It is true that he had the owner’s authority to execute the lease; indeed the owner signed the lease as witness. But despite any- contractual authority given - him by the - owner, Holloway could not under the statute make a conveyance of the real estate,’ because he had no interest to convey.
And yet, in executing a léase for a term longer than one year Holloway was attempting to make a conveyance. Code 1951, 45-106 provides that “No estate * * * for a longer term than 'one year, in any real property * * * shall be created or take effect, except by deed signed and sealed by the grantor, lessor, or declarant, or by will.” And since Code, § 45-401, quoted earlier in this memorandum, withholds from an attorney (or agent) the right to create such an estate, it follows that the lease between these parties was ineffectual beyond the one year period; This seems to be established law in our jurisdiction. Velati v. Dante, 39 App.D.C. 372, certiorari denied 227 U.S. 679, 33 S.Ct. 462, 57 L.Ed. 700; Kresge v. Crowley, 47 App.D.C. 13; Binder v. Jaffe, D.C.Mun.App., 101 A.2d 260. See also Schooler v. Schooler, 84 U.S.App.D.C. 147, 173 F.2d 299.
Appellee suggests that the lessee is estopped to deny the “owner and lessor relationship.” But in the record there is no suggestion that the lessee committfed any fraud, or induced the owner to make" any expenditures-or otherwise to alter his position to his disadvantage. ’ See Kresge v. Crowley, supra. The lessee was therefore entitled to invoke the statute.
From what we have said it follows that the lease was invalid during, the period for which rent was claimed, and that the defendant lessee was entitled tó'judgment in the trial court. We now amend and correct our . opinion of May. 7,' 1956 accordingly, and order that the judgmént below be reversed and that final judgment be entered for defendant.
Reversed, with instruction.