Court Opinion

ID: 9727945
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:53:25.925537+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:44.512797
License: Public Domain

*366POCHÉ, J.
I respectfully dissent from the decision of this court to set aside, as an abuse of discretion, a trial court’s carefully crafted and balanced discovery order the issuance of which was not only required by law but was encouraged by the concession that the matters sought to be discovered were relevant.
Additionally, in my view, review by prerogative writ of this routine discovery order violates the directions given appellate courts of this state by the California Supreme Court. I begin with the latter proposition.
“The prerogative writs have been used frequently to review interim orders in discovery cases [citations]. But this does not mean that these discretionary writs will or should issue as of course in all cases where this court may be of the opinion that the interim order of the trial court was erroneous. In most such cases, as is true of most other interim orders, the parties must be relegated to a review of the order on appeal from the final judgment. As inadequate as such review may be in some cases, the prerogative writs should only be used in discovery matters to review questions of first impression that are of general importance to the trial courts and to the profession, and where general guidelines can be laid down for future cases.” (Oceanside Union School Dist. v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 180, 185-186, fn. 4 [23 Cal.Rptr. 375, 373 P.2d 439], italics added.)
Inapplicable here is the sole exception spelled out in Oceanside—the review of questions of first impression that are of general importance to the trial courts and to the profession where general guidelines can be laid down for future cases. There is nothing at all unusual about this or any other request for documents which identify those persons who may have relevant information concerning the subject matter of the action. As this court put it so very bluntly in Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Superior Court (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 840 [176 Cal.Rptr. 874]: “A party to litigation is entitled to unimpeded access to persons who may have relevant information . . . .” (Id., at p. 849.) In short, this is not a discovery matter raising questions of first impression of general importance to the trial courts and to the profession. Nor does the majority attempt to fashion general guidelines for future cases. Accordingly, I fail to see how this case falls within the Oceanside exception warranting review by prerogative writ.
The merits of the matter weigh no better for petitioner.
Under Code of Civil Procedure section 2031, subdivision (a),1 any party may request another party to produce documents “which are relevant to the *367subject matter of the action, or are reasonably calculated to discover admissible evidence . . . .” Production of such information may be compelled upon a showing of good cause (§ 2034, subd. (a)), i.e., a showing of “specific facts justifying discovery and that the matter is relevant to the subject matter of the action or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (§ 2036, subd. (a).)
Real parties in interest filed documents spelling out in detail why the requested documents were directly relevant to the issues of design defect, negligence and punitive damages. There certainly is no question but that real parties amply met their burden of showing need. But even if some problem with that showing could be imagined, petitioner conceded relevance: “. . . there’s just no question but that the matter they’re seeking is relevant. We don’t contest that at all. ...”
Perhaps that blanket concession reflected a reading of Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 161 [84 Cal.Rptr. 718, 465 P.2d 854], where the California Supreme Court put this all to rest by explaining “the relevance of the subject matter standard, must be reasonably applied; in accordance with the liberal policies underlying the discovery procedures, doubts as to relevance should generally be resolved in favor of permitting discovery [citations] .... An appellate court cannot reverse a trial court’s grant of discovery under a ‘relevancy’ attack unless it concludes that the answers sought by a given line of questioning cannot as a reasonable possibility lead to the discovery of admissible evidence or be helpful in preparation for trial.” (Id., at p. 173, fns. omitted; accord Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 785, 790 [183 Cal.Rptr. 810, 647 P.2d 86].)
Somehow however the majority finds an abuse of discretion based upon what it determines to be an incorrect balancing by the trial court of “the damage to petitioner’s business from informing all its customers of the fact that the safety of its equipment has been questioned in litigation, ...” (Majority opn., ante, p. 364.)
Assuming for purposes of argument that the discovery request required the trial court to balance something, I find no evidence that the trial court engaged in improper balancing. Even the majority dubs as speculative petitioner’s claim of the damage arising from the discovered material. What bounces out from the record is that the trial court was duly—if not unduly— solicitous of such possible damage and gave more than adequate consideration to that especially in light of the unsatisfactory responses plaintiff had previously been given to its discovery request. That balancing and consideration is typified in the court’s order that petitioner be allowed to see in *368advance all proposed correspondence addressed to any of its customers. Thus all the balancing was in favor of petitioner.
What we are left with is a routine discovery order reviewed by prerogative writ and set aside because the majority dislikes discovery of customer lists. Not only is the ruling of this court unfair to both real parties in interest and the trial judge, it will encourage an unnecessary blizzard of petitions for extraordinary relief from routine discovery orders.
For these reasons, I would deny the petition for writ of mandate and discharge the alternative writ.
A petition for a rehearing was denied October 23, 1985. Poché, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted. The petition of real party in interest Smaystrla for review by the Supreme Court was denied December 5, 1985. Bird, C. J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

All statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.