Court Opinion

ID: 9775732
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:08:13.431003+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:30.745784
License: Public Domain

COOK, Justice,
dissenting.
By holding that unemancipated minor children may pursue a cause of action against their parents for negligent operation of motor vehicles, the court has removed one more thread from our already degenerating social weave. Reverence for one’s parents is one of the most basic tenets of our society.1 Yet the court today *677approves of litigation that pits children against their parents.
The court has read Felderhoff v. Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928 (Tex.1971), too broadly. The majority construes that case to abrogate the doctrine of parental immunity except in areas of parental authority and parental discretion. The issue in Felderhoff was “whether parental immunity should be extended to acts arising outside of the normal family relationship of parent and child and occurring in the parent’s business activity in which the child is engaged as an employee.” 473 S.W.2d at 930 (emphasis added). The majority’s reading of Felderhoff would make the entire second phrase superfluous. The majority of courts construing Felderhoff have likewise concluded that the holding was not this broad.2
In fact, this broad interpretation of Felderhoff conflicts with a previous interpretation by this court. In Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661 (Tex.1983), this court, relying on Felderhoff, reasoned that the doctrine of parent-child immunity would preclude children from suing their parents when the parents negligently fail to assert a cause of action on behalf of the children. Id. at 667.
Further, assuming arguendo that the court has correctly interpreted the scope of Felderhoffs abrogation of the immunity, the court has misapplied the test established. Felderhoff specifically enumerated “the provision of a home, food, schooling, family chores, medical care, and recreation” as within the scope of parental discretion. Id. at 933. The Jilanis were on a recreational trip when the accident occurred. The decision in this case overrules the test established in Felderhoff.
Further, the court does not discuss the fact that allowing this litigation will disrupt the harmony and tranquillity of the family unit. The relationship between a parent and child is unique. It involves elements of love, trust, confidence, and independence that must be exercised continuously by parents in carrying out their demanding and burdensome duties. Parents are the primary role models for children. Children learn from what they see their parents do; a holding such as this can only encourage and breed a more litigious society.
The need to preserve this relationship remains even stronger in today’s troubled society. At a time when the deterioration of the family unit is a matter of concern and alarm, the court should preserve — and not further destroy — what is left of this basic unit of our nation’s strength.3 A number of other states still bar a cause of action such as the one in this case. Ward v. Rhodes, Hammonds & Beck, Inc., 511 So.2d 159, 163 (Ala.1987); Carpenter v. Bishop, 290 Ark. 424, 426, 720 S.W.2d 299, 300 (1986); Horton v. Reaves, 186 Colo. 149, 156, 526 P.2d 304, 308 (1974); Brown v. Phillips, 178 Ga.App. 316, 316-17, 342 S.E.2d 786, 787-88 (1986); Buffalo v. Buffalo, 441 N.E.2d 711, 712-14 (Ind.Ct.App.1982); Bondurant v. Bondurant, 386 So. 2d 705, 706 (La.Ct.App.1980); Frye v. Frye, 305 Md. 542, 567, 505 A.2d 826, 839 (1986); McNeal v. Administrator of Estate of McNeal, 254 So.2d 521, 523-24 (Miss.1971); Pullen v. Novak, 169 Neb. 211, 224, 99 N.W.2d 16, 25 (1959); Barranco v. Jackson, 690 S.W.2d 221, 222 (Tenn.1985). See also Hogan v. Hogan, 106 Ill.App.3d 104, 107, 61 Ill.Dec. 929, 931, 435 N.E.2d 770, 772 (1982) (operation of motor vehicle to accomplish a family purpose covered by *678parental immunity doctrine); Kendall v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 634 S.W.2d 176, 178 (Mo.1982) (parental immunity doctrine retained and applied on a case-by-case basis).
Several states have relied on the presence of liability insurance in abrogating the parental immunity doctrine with respect to motor vehicle accidents. E.g., Williams v. Williams, 369 A.2d 669, 672 (Del.1976); Ard v. Ard, 414 So.2d 1066, 1067-68 (Fla.1982); Sorensen v. Sorensen, 369 Mass. 350, 362-63, 339 N.E.2d 907, 914 (1975). This reliance is misplaced. The reasoning that a “nominal defendant” parent will not usually suffer loss because of liability insurance is flawed. First, the minimum coverage required in Texas is only $20,000 for personal injury to a person in an accident. TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 6701h, § 1(10) (Vernon Supp.1988). The “nominal defendant” parent would then be personally liable for any excess recovery. As a result, there remains a very real chance of depletion or exhaustion of family funds. Are children to thus conduct post judgment discovery on their parents and thereafter have the sheriff's department levy on the assets of the family?
Second, the State Board of Insurance has amended the Standard Provisions for Automobile Policies and added an endorsement to the Texas Automobile Manual that eliminates coverage if the claimant is the spouse or other family member of the insured. State Bd. of Insurance, 12 Tex.Reg. 1126 (1987). Texas personal automobile policies written after May 1, 1987 do not provide liability coverage to situations such as the one presented in the instant case.
In our society where many commitments are no longer taken with meaning, family values are eroding. Evidence of this is the divorce rate in our country, which is among the highest in the world. With this decision the court has further weakened a cherished cornerstone of our society.

. E.g., Exodus 20:12 (“Honour thy father and thy mother: that thy days may be long upon the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee").

. See Attwood v. Estate of Attwood, 276 Ark. 230, 235, 633 S.W.2d 366, 369 (1982); Dzenutis v. Dzenutis, 200 Conn. 290, 297, 512 A.2d 130, 134 (1986); Ard v. Ard, 414 So.2d 1066, 1067 & n. 3 (Fla.1982); Nocktonick v. Nocktonick, 227 Kan. 758, 771-72, 611 P.2d 135, 143-44 (1980); Stamboulis v. Stamboulis, 401 Mass. 762, 765, 519 N.E.2d 1299, 1301 n. 6 (1988); Sorensen v. Sorensen, 369 Mass. 350, 357 n. 8, 339 N.E.2d 907, 911 n. 8 (1975); Hooper v. Clements Food Co., 694 P.2d 943, 944-45, 945 n. 2 (Okla.1985); Winn v. Gilroy, 61 Or.App. 243, 250 n. 2, 656 P.2d 386, 390 n. 2 (1983); Barranco v. Jackson, 690 S.W.2d 221, 227 (Tenn.1985); Langley v. National Lead Co., 666 S.W.2d 343, 345 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1984, no writ); Chase v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 156 W.Va. 444, 453, 195 S.E.2d 810, 815 (1973).

. See Turner v. Turner, 304 N.W.2d 786, 789-90 (Iowa 1981) (LeGrand, J., dissenting). Accord Rousey v. Rousey, 528 A.2d 416, 421-24 (D.C.1987) (Nebeker, J., dissenting).