Court Opinion

ID: 9616869
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:50:36.816364+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:45.429013
License: Public Domain

Benham, Judge,
dissenting.
While I agree with the majority in Divisions 1, 3, and 4, I must depart from the fold on Division 2 and plot a new course. The majority’s position on Division 2 represents a shortfall on a very significant issue — testimony of children in abuse cases.
I differ from the dissent of Presiding Judge McMurray because it would admit the testimony as being relevant to the proper diagnosis. However, appellant’s enumeration goes deeper than this analysis. While the ultimate issue is one of child molestation, the evidence was offered by the State on the issue of truthfulness, and I choose not to sidestep the issue but to face it head-on as it is presented in the appeal.
This court is presented with the problem of determining the admissibility of expert testimony on the interpretation to be given to the testimony of a young child as to sexual abuse. Our Supreme Court dealt with the issue of expert testimony in Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 612 (277 SE2d 678) (1981), where expert testimony was admitted on the novel “battered wife syndrome.” While identification of the problem is new, it, like so many other problems, has been with us for ages. Here, we deal not with a novel concept but with an age-old problem, alleged sexual abuse of a child. However, the rule of Smith, at 619, is equally applicable: “Expert opinion testimony on issues to be decided by the jury, even the ultimate issue, is admissible where the conclusion of the expert is one which jurors would not ordinarily be able to draw for themselves.” The traditional objection to expert testimony is that it invades the province of the jury. Mitchell v. State, 154 Ga. App. 399 (3) (268 SE2d 360) (1980).
The analytical undergirding of Smith is Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Saul, 189 Ga. 1, 9 (5 SE2d 214) (1939), which states: “[W]e think it is . . . true that if the nature of the question is such that the factors leading to a conclusion are not known to the common or average man, but are among those things shrouded in the mystery of professional skill or knowledge, then the light of that knowledge should not be withheld from the jury because of such a fine distinction in the ordinary rules of evidence.” The basis for allowing expert testimony is to aid the jury in understanding a subject or issue not usüally within the knowledge of lay persons. In Smith, expert testimony was allowed to shed light on the phenomenon known as the “battered wife syndrome.” The court there found that it was error to exclude such testimony because it would have supplied an interpretation of the facts *115that differed from the ordinary lay perception.
Decided February 13, 1986
Rehearing denied March 5, 1986
Thomas C. Sanders, for appellant.
William A. Foster III, District Attorney, Penny J. Udolf, Christine C. Daniel, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.
After reviewing the major cases on the topic, Smith v. State, supra; Sinns v. State, 248 Ga. 385, 387 (283 SE2d 479) (1981); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Saul, supra; Fordham v. State, 254 Ga. 59, 60 (325 SE2d 755) (1985); and Williams v. State, 254 Ga. 508 (330 SE2d 353) (1985), I am of the opinion that the rule of Smith needs some further refinement which will encompass the meaning of these other cases. In deciding the issues upon which jurors may not be able to make independent assessments and upon which the testimony of an expert is needed, the court should determine if (1) the issue is so complex as to be beyond the ordinary knowledge of lay persons; or (2) so phenomenal in nature as to lend itself to gross misconceptions without the benefit of expert testimony.
In the case-in-chief, the lay perception is that children have vivid imaginations and conjure up weird tales. See Personality in the Making: The Fact-Finding Report of the Mid-Century White House Conference on Children and Youth, Helen Leland Witmer and Ruth Kotinsky, eds., Harper & Row, 1952, pp. 15-16. The expert testimony of Dr. Fleming was offered to show a phenomenon not normally within law perceptions, i.e., children of tender years do not fantasize about sexual encounters. Therefore, the offered testimony fits squarely within the Smith rule, and the weight to be given such opinion should remain within the province of the jury with proper instructions from the court.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Deen joins in this dissent.