Court Opinion

ID: 9906629
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-04 19:23:30.923516+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:25:18.961364
License: Public Domain

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    IN THE INTEREST OF: K.D., A                :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    MINOR                                      :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
    APPEAL OF: J. G., MOTHER                   :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 1442 WDA 2022

              Appeal from the Order Entered November 7, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans’ Court at
                       No(s): CP-02-AP-0000053-2022

    IN THE INTEREST OF: A.D., A                :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    MINOR                                      :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
    APPEAL OF: J.G., MOTHER                    :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 1443 WDA 2022

               Appeal from the Order Entered November 7, 2022
       In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans’ Court
                       at No(s): CP-02-AP-0000054-2022

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                             FILED: December 4, 2023

       J.G. (“Mother”) appeals the November 7, 2022 orders involuntarily

terminating her parental rights to her biological son, K.D., Jr., born December

2012, and her daughter, A.D., born January 2014 (collectively, “the

Children”).1 After careful review, we affirm.

____________________________________________

1 In the same orders, the orphans’ court also involuntarily terminated the
parental rights of K.D. (“Father”) as to the Children. He did not appeal.
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      We gather the relevant factual and procedural history of this matter

from the certified record. The Allegheny County Office of Children, Youth and

Families (“CYF”) first became involved with Mother in January 2015, when CYF

provided services to assist her and the Children in obtaining housing and,

thereafter, closed their case.   See N.T., 10/28/22, at 115.     CYF became

involved with the family again in May 2020, however, after receiving reports

of troubling activities occurring within the home. Specifically, CYF became

aware of allegations of sexual and physical abuse perpetrated against the

Children by Mother and her paramour, R.K., as well as heroin use and related

criminal behavior by Mother.     See Shelter Care Order, 6/3/20, at 2; N.T.,

10/28/22, at 116.     Contemporaneously, multiple complaints concerning

Mother’s and R.K.’s alleged abuse of the Children were submitted to ChildLine.

See N.T., 10/28/22, at 118.

      On May 29, 2020, the trial court awarded CYF emergency protective

custody of the Children, who were initially placed with their paternal

grandmother.    At the June 3, 2020 shelter care hearing, the trial court

determined that the Children’s placement should continue. In June 2020, the

Children were committed to the physical care of A.H. and J.H. (“Foster

Parents”), who are considered to be an adoptive resource for the Children.

See id. at 25, 146. The Children were adjudicated dependent in August 2020.

      Mother’s initial permanency goals were to undergo drug and alcohol

assessments, submit to random narcotics’ screens, resolve her pending

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criminal charges, participate in parenting classes, undergo a mental health

evaluation, and participate in visitations with the Children. See Shelter Care

Order, 6/3/20, at 2; N.T., 10/28/22, at 119, 122. Additionally, we note that

R.K. was ordered to have no contact with the Children, which order has

remained in place for the entirety of these proceedings.          See Order of

Adjudication and Disposition, 8/26/20, at 2; Order, 10/24/22, at 4.

      The Children began to undergo individualized therapy beginning in

August 2020 with Michael Van Ness.       See N.T., 10/28/22, at 68-69.       The

Children also participated in multiple, individual sessions with licensed

psychologist Terry O’Hara, Ph.D., who prepared three separate reports of his

observations between February 2021 and October 2022. See id. at 9. From

his observations during therapy, Mr. Van Ness concluded that the Children had

suffered “trauma” in Mother’s home and still harbored significant fear of

reprisals from both Mother and R.K. See id. at 72-73, 77. Dr. O’Hara similarly

reported that A.D. made specific and “detailed allegations” of physical and

sexual abuse perpetrated by both Mother and R.K.          See id. at 13.    K.D.

disclosed to Dr. O’Hara that Mother had physically abused him on multiple

occasions. See id. at 11-12.

      On March 25, 2021, one of the ChildLine complaints was found to be

indicated against both Mother and R.K. for “causing sexual abuse or

exploitation of a child through any act or failure to act.”    See id. at 133.

Despite the no contact order entered by the trial court, the record reflects that

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R.K. and Mother are still living together. We also note that R.K. and Mother

are now married and became parents after Mother gave birth to another

daughter in September 2022, who was removed from Mother’s care

immediately after her birth. See id. at 8, 104-05, 216.

      In the permanency review orders entered between November 2020 and

October 2022, Mother was deemed to be in moderate compliance with the trial

court’s directives, in that she completed parenting classes, resolved her

criminal charges, submitted to most of her random drug screens, and

generally maintained her sobriety aside from methadone management.

During this same time period, Mother also participated in regular, supervised

visits with the Children. Initially, Mother had three supervised visits per week.

See Shelter Care Order, 6/3/20, at 3.       These supervised visitations were

decreased to twice per week in November 2020, and further decreased to once

per week in March 2021.         Ultimately, visits were ceased altogether in

approximately July 2022 based upon additional disclosures of abuse made by

A.D. to Mr. Van Ness. See Permanency Review Order, 10/13/22, at 3; Order

Granting Motion to Suspend Visits, 7/19/22, at 1 (unpaginated).

      Although Mother was largely successful in addressing her substance

abuse and parenting concerns, she did not undergo a mental health evaluation

until she met with Dr. O’Hara in 2021.          See N.T., 10/28/22, at 123.

Thereafter, she failed to follow-through with the resulting therapeutic

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recommendations until she enrolled in treatment with South Western

Pennsylvania Human Services on April 5, 2022. See id. at 123-24.

       On April 13, 2022, CYF filed petitions in the orphans’ court seeking to

involuntarily terminate Mother’s parental rights to the Children.2 The orphans’

court held a consolidated hearing on the petitions on October 28, 2022,

wherein CYF adduced testimony from, inter alia, Dr. O’Hara, Mr. Van Ness,

and the CYF caseworker assigned to Mother’s case, Erin Burzynski. Mother,

R.K., and Father also appeared and testified.     On November 7, 2022, the

orphans’ court filed orders involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights

to the Children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b).

       On December 7, 2022, Mother filed timely notices of appeal to this Court

along with concise statements of errors pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i)

and (b). Thereafter, the orphans’ court filed a responsive opinion pursuant to

Rule 1925(a)(2)(ii) explaining its rationale. This Court has consolidated these

cases sua sponte pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 513.

       Mother has raised the following issue for our consideration: “Did the

trial court err in terminating [Mother’s] parental rights?” Mother’s Brief at 4.

A review of Mother’s brief reveals that she has essentially challenged the

____________________________________________

2  On June 15, 2022, the orphans’ court appointed counsel to represent the
legal interests of the Children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2313(a). See Order
Appointing Legal Counsel, 6/15/22, at 1. The same order also made a finding
that “no conflict exists” with respect to the Children’s interests. Id.

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holdings pursuant to Section 2511(a) and (b). See id. at 19, 29. We will

address Mother’s arguments, in turn.

      Our standard of review in this context is well-settled:

      In cases concerning the involuntary termination of parental rights,
      appellate review is limited to a determination of whether the
      decree of the termination court is supported by competent
      evidence. When applying this standard, the appellate court must
      accept the orphans’ court’s findings of fact and credibility
      determinations if they are supported by the record. Where the
      orphans’ court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence,
      an appellate court may not disturb the orphans’ court’s ruling
      unless it has discerned an error of law or abuse of discretion.

      An abuse of discretion does not result merely because the
      reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion or the
      facts could support an opposite result. Instead, an appellate court
      may reverse for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration
      of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-
      will. This standard of review reflects the deference we pay to trial
      courts, who often observe the parties first-hand across multiple
      hearings.

      In considering a petition to terminate parental rights, the orphans’
      court must balance the parent’s fundamental right to make
      decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of his or her
      child with the child’s essential needs for a parent’s care,
      protection, and support. Termination of parental rights has
      significant and permanent consequences for both the parent and
      child. As such, the law of this Commonwealth requires the moving
      party to establish the statutory grounds by clear and convincing
      evidence, which is evidence that is so clear, direct, weighty, and
      convincing as to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear conviction,
      without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.

Interest of M.E., 283 A.3d 820, 829-30 (Pa. Super. 2022) (internal citations

and quotation marks omitted).

      The involuntary termination of parental rights is governed by Section

2511 of the Adoption Act, which calls for a bifurcated analysis that first focuses

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upon the “eleven enumerated grounds” of parental conduct that may warrant

termination. Id. at 830; see also 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1)-(11). If the

orphans’ court determines the petitioner has established grounds for

termination under at least one of these subsections by “clear and convincing

evidence,” the court then assesses the petition pursuant to Section 2511(b),

which focuses upon the child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs

and welfare. In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). This Court need

only agree with the orphans’ court’s determination as to “any one subsection

of [Section] 2511(a), in addition to [Section] 2511(b), in order to affirm the

termination of parental rights.” T.S.M., supra at 267.

      Since we need only agree with the orphans’ court findings as to one of

these subsections in addition to Section 2511(b), our analysis will focus upon

Section 2511(a)(8) and (b), which provides as follows:

      (a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child
      may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
      grounds:

                                    ....

         (8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent
         by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an
         agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of
         removal or placement, the conditions which led to the
         removal or placement of the child continue to exist and
         termination of parental rights would best serve the needs
         and welfare of the child.

                                    ....

      (b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights
      of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,

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      physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
      of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
      environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
      income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
      control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
      to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
      efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
      which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
      filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8), (b).

      In order to satisfy Section 2511(a)(8), the petitioner must prove that:

(1) the child has been removed from the parent’s care for at least 12 months;

(2) the conditions which led to the removal or placement still exist; and (3)

termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the

child. See In re Adoption of J.N.M., 177 A.3d 937, 943 (Pa. Super. 2018).

Section 2511(a)(8) does not necessitate an evaluation of a parent’s

willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that led to the removal of the

child. See In re M.A.B., 166 A.3d 434, 446 (Pa. Super. 2017).

      Rather, our inquiry is focused upon whether the at-issue “conditions”

have been “remedied” such that “reunification of parent and child is imminent

at the time of the hearing.” In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5, 11 (Pa. Super. 2009).

Thus, the statute recognizes “that a child’s life cannot be held in abeyance

while the parent is unable to perform the actions necessary to assume

parenting responsibilities.   This Court cannot and will not subordinate

indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stability to a parent’s claims of

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progress and hope for the future.”      Id. at 11-12 (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted). Finally, this Court has also explained that,

      while both Section 2511(a)(8) and Section 2511(b) direct us to
      evaluate the “needs and welfare of the child,” we are required to
      resolve the analysis relative to Section 2511(a)(8), prior to
      addressing the “needs and welfare” of [the child], as proscribed
      by Section 2511(b); as such, they are distinct in that we must
      address Section 2511(a) before reaching Section 2511(b).

In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1009 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc).

      If a petitioner establishes adequate grounds for termination pursuant to

Section 2511(a), we then turn to Section 2511(b), which requires that the

court “give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and

emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). “Notably,

courts should consider the matter from the child’s perspective, placing

[his/her] developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare above

concerns for the parent.” In the Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085, 1105 (Pa.

2023). This determination “should not be applied mechanically,” but “must

be made on a case-by-case basis,” wherein “the court must determine each

child’s specific needs.” Id. at 1106. Accordingly, there is no “exhaustive list”

of factors that must be considered in this context. Id. at 1113 n.28.

      Nonetheless, our Supreme Court has mandated that a court’s Section

2511(b) analysis must include “consideration of the emotional bonds between

the parent and child.” T.S.M., supra at 267. Thus, the court must determine

whether the “trauma” caused by sundering the parent-child bond is

“outweighed by the benefit of moving the child toward a permanent home.”

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Id. at 253 (cleaned up). The recognized threshold for this finding is that the

court must determine whether termination will sever a “necessary and

beneficial relationship,” such that the child “could suffer extreme emotional

consequences.” K.T., supra at 1110. Our Supreme Court has emphasized,

however, that such consequences must constitute more than mere proof of

“an adverse or detrimental impact from severance of the parental bond” in

order to preclude termination. Id. at 1113.

      Our case law reflects that a court’s analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b)

is not narrow but must include consideration of “intangibles such as love,

comfort, security, and stability.” T.S.M., supra at 267. Indeed, our Supreme

Court has affirmed that “the parental bond is but one part of the overall

subsection (b) analysis.” K.T., supra at 1113. Thus, “courts must not only

consider the child’s bond with the biological parent, but also examine the . . .

love, comfort, security, and stability the child might have with the foster

parent.”   K.T., supra at 1111 (emphasis in original; internal citations and

quotation marks omitted).     Thus, courts should also consider factors that

naturally arise due to the particular facts of a case, such as: (1) the child’s

need for permanency and length of time in foster care; (2) whether the child

is in a pre-adoptive home and bonded with foster parents; and (3) whether

the foster home meets the child’s needs. Id. at 1113.

      With these overarching legal principles in mind, we turn to Mother’s first

claim for relief, which challenges the orphans’ court’s findings pursuant to

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Section 2511(a)(8) on sufficiency grounds.      See Mother’s Brief at 19-28.

Instantly, the orphans’ court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to

involuntarily terminate Mother’s parental rights. We agree.

      Mother concedes that the first aspect of Section 2511(a)(8) is satisfied

in this case, since the Children had both been removed from her care since

May 2020, or more than two years, at the time of the filing of the termination

petition. See id. at 28. However, she argues that “not all of the conditions

which led to the removal or placement of [the Children] continue to exist,”

referring to her successful completion of parenting classes and similar efforts

to address her other permanency goals. See id. at 28-29.

      Respectfully, however, we find that Mother’s arguments entirely fail to

discuss the most serious aspect of the Children’s removal, i.e., the physical

and indicated sexual abuse perpetrated by Mother and R.K. against the

Children. As detailed above and testified to at the termination hearing, the

Children disclosed multiple instances of such abuse to both Dr. O’Hara and Mr.

Van Ness. See N.T., 10/28/22, at 11-13, 72-73, 77; see also Permanency

Review Order, 10/13/22, at 3; Order Granting Motion to Suspend Visits,

7/19/22, at 1 (unpaginated).     Furthermore, the ChildLine report alleging

sexual abuse was indicated as to Mother. See N.T., 10/28/22, at 133.

      Despite this overwhelming evidence, Mother’s testimony at the

termination hearing continued to flatly deny that any such abuse occurred.

See N.T., 10/28/22, at 199 (“I mean, I do believe they suffered from trauma

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with their father not being around but other than that, I took very good care

of my children. I’m pretty much all they had.”). Indeed, she testified to her

belief that the Children are lying. See id. at 203 (“Well, that’s all I’ve been

trying to prove is that, you know, my children are fabricating stories.”). It is

abundantly clear from the certified record that Mother is unable to even

acknowledge her role in the abuse perpetrated against the Children, as

testified to by Dr. O’Hara, Mr. Van Ness, and Ms. Burzynski. See id. at 14,

55, 77-78, 138.     Furthermore, Mother has deepened and solidified her

domestic ties to the Children’s co-abuser, R.K., with whom she now shares

both a child and a home. See id. at 8, 104-05, 216.

      Overall, we readily conclude that the record supports the orphans’

court’s finding that the conditions which led to the Children’s removal from

Mother’s care still exist. As Ms. Burzynski stated in her testimony, despite

Mother’s compliance with certain aspects of her permanency goals, she has

“not actually addressed the issues” that led to the Children’s removal. See

id. at 167. Accordingly, while Mother may have completed some aspects of

her permanency goals, the abusive environment that initially precipitated the

Children’s removal is unabated. Thus, the second prong of Section 2511(a)(8)

is also satisfied in the above-captioned cases.

      Finally, we consider whether termination of parental rights would best

serve the needs and welfare of the Children. As detailed above, the abuse

that the Children endured in Mother’s care is not reasonably in dispute. At

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the termination hearing, Dr. O’Hara testified that such abuse significantly

impedes the development of children like A.D. and K.D., as follows:

      [W]hen children do not experience a caregiver as a safe and stable
      placement, I think it can place children at a lot of risk for a lot of
      things. From my perspective, in order for children to focus on
      developmental things that are appropriate for them, they need the
      building blocks of safety, security, trust, and stability. If these
      things are lacking, it’s very difficult for a child to focus on
      maintaining relationships, focus on building competency at school
      because the child is not in a situation of safety which can allow
      the child to explore and expand one’s developmental trajectory.

See N.T., 10/28/22, at 56-57. These concerns were echoed by Mr. Van Ness,

who also expressed “significant concern” about the Children’s safety in

Mother’s care. See id. at 96. Similarly, Ms. Burzynski described the abuse

of the Children as “a huge safety issue” which outweighs any arguable need

to continue the Children’s relationship with Mother. See id. at 138, 148. This

testimony provides more-than-adequate support for the orphans’ court’s

conclusion that termination would serve the Children’s needs and welfare

pursuant to the third and final prong of Section 2511(a)(8).

      Based upon the foregoing, we observe no abuse of discretion or error of

law in the orphans’ court’s finding that sufficient grounds existed to

involuntarily   terminate   Mother’s    parental   rights   pursuant   to   Section

2511(a)(8). Since the record supports the orphans’ court’s conclusion and

credibility determinations, we may not disturb them.

      We now turn to Section 2511(b), which requires us to consider whether

termination of Mother’s parental rights would be appropriate in view of the

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developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the Children.

See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). We note that while no formal bond analysis was

conducted by CYF in this case, such an evaluation is not necessary under

Pennsylvania law. See In re D.L.B., 166 A.3d 322, 328 (Pa. Super. 2017)

(“[W]hen evaluating a parental bond, the court is not required to use expert

testimony.    Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as well.

Additionally, Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding analysis.”)

(internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

       Assuming, arguendo, that Mother and the Children share some manner

of bond, the record does not necessarily reflect that any such connection is

parental in nature. See N.T., 10/28/22, at 75-76 (Mr. Van Ness reporting

that the Children would act “nervous” in Mother’s presence during therapeutic

visits).   Indeed, Dr. O’Hara noted that both A.D. and K.D. described their

relationship with Mother in uniformly negative and fearful terms. See id. at

11-13. Concomitantly, Mr. Van Ness reported that the Children are “strongly

bonded” with Foster Parents. Id. at 95-96. Dr. O’Hara similarly testified that

both A.D. and K.D. expressed that Foster Parents were “nice,” and that they

were better cared for by Foster Parents. See id. at 9-14. Finally, Mr. Van

Ness and Ms. Burzynski each individually averred that termination of Mother’s

parental rights would not cause any severe detriment to the Children and

would also serve their needs and welfare. See id. at 95, 148.

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      Based upon the foregoing, we find no abuse of discretion or error of law

in   the   trial   court’s   finding   that   termination   would   best   serve   the

developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the Children

pursuant to Section 2511(b).

      Accordingly, we affirm the orders involuntarily terminating Mother’s

parental rights to the Children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8) and (b).

      Orders affirmed.

DATE: 12/4/2023

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