Court Opinion

ID: 9401564
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-13 16:09:40.711475+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:53.544989
License: Public Domain

J-A28036-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON TRUST            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 COMPANY, N.A., AS TRUSTEE FOR            :        PENNSYLVANIA
 FIRST ALLIANCE MORTGAGE LOAN             :
 TRUST 1997-3, MORTGAGE LOAN              :
 ASSET BACKED CERTIFICATES,               :
 SERIES 1997-3                            :
                                          :
                      Appellants          :
                                          :   No. 1538 EDA 2022
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :
 CONSTANTINA LIMBERIS AND                 :
 EFSTRATIA LIMBERIS                       :

               Appeal from the Order Entered April 28, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Civil Division at
                           No(s): 1999-10749

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.:                            FILED JUNE 13, 2023

      Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company, N.A. as Trustee for First

Alliance   Mortgage    Loan Trust 1997-3, Mortgage        Loan Asset Backed

Certificates, Series 1997-3 (“BNYM”) appeals from the order denying its

petition to reinstate an action terminated for inactivity. Following our review,

we quash.

      The trial court set forth, in relevant part, the factual and procedural

history as follows:

             This action was commenced on June 24, 1999, when First
      Alliance Mortgage Company (“First Alliance”) filed a Complaint in
      Mortgage Foreclosure against [d]efendants Constantina Limberis
      and Efstratia Limberis.

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J-A28036-22

             [I]n August [] 2018, [following: a name change by the
      plaintiff, from First Alliance Mortgage Company to BNYM; years of
      inactivity and several notices of proposed termination and
      statements of intent to proceed; and several substitutions of
      counsel from various law firms, the] law firm, Duane Morris LLP
      (“Duane Morris”), was substituted as counsel for [BNYM]. On the
      same date, Duane Morris filed a [s]tatement of [i]ntent to
      [p]roceed.

             [O]n March 29, 2021, . . . after two years of docket
      inactivity, the [p]rothonotary issued a fifth [n]otice of [p]roposed
      [t]ermination . . .. . . . The deadline for filing a statement of
      intent[] to proceed was specified as April 28, 2021. The [n]otice
      was filed of record, and the docket shows that electronic notice
      was sent by email to three email addresses at Duane Morris. No
      response was filed to the [n]otice, and on May 4, 2021, the
      [p]rothonotary marked the case as “Terminated” on the docket.
      The docket shows that electronic notice of the docket entry was
      emailed to the same three email addresses at Duane Morris. [The
      prothonotary issued no order terminating the case, and, thus, no
      order was provided to BNYM.]

            On January 10, 2022, [BNYM] filed a Motion to Reinstate
      Case to Active Status. . . . The [m]otion argued[, inter alia,] that
      the [p]rothonotary had not strictly complied with the requirements
      of [Pa.R.C.P.] 230.2 . . ..

                                    ****

            By [o]rder dated April 28, 2022, the [trial c]ourt denied the
      [m]otion to [r]einstate[, and the court subsequently denied
      BNYM’s motion for reconsideration. BNYM] filed a timely [n]otice
      of [a]ppeal [and, thereafter, a concise] [s]tatement of [e]rrors
      [c]omplained of on [a]ppeal [p]ursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) . . ..

Trial Court Opinion, 7/20/22, at 1-4.

      We initially consider whether we have jurisdiction over this appeal. See

Bailey v. RAS Auto Body, Inc., 85 A.3d 1064, 1067-68 (Pa. Super. 2014)

(noting that we may consider whether an order is appealable sua sponte).

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J-A28036-22

Generally, “an appeal may be taken as of right from any final order of a . . .

trial court.” Pa.R.A.P. 341(a).1 A final order is any order that “(1) disposes

of all claims and of all parties; or . . . (3) is entered as a final order pursuant

to paragraph (c) of this rule; or (4) is an order pursuant to paragraph (f)

[pertaining to Post Conviction Relief Act Orders].” Pa.R.A.P. 341(b). Without

a final order, or some other applicable basis on which this Court may exercise

jurisdiction, this Court must quash the appeal.         See, e.g., Massaro V.

Tincher Contracting LLC, 204 A.3d 932, 933 (Pa. Super. 2019).

       Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 230.2 provides for the termination

of inactive cases. In cases where there has been no activity for two years or

more, the court “shall serve a notice of proposed termination on counsel of

record . . .. The notice shall contain the date of the proposed termination and

the procedure to avoid termination.” Pa.R.C.P. 230.2(b)(1). Rule 230.2(c)

provides that “[i]f no statement of intention to proceed has been filed on or

before the date of the proposed termination, the prothonotary shall enter an

order as of course terminating the matter for failure to prosecute.”          Id.,

230.2(c) (emphasis added).2 Thus, “Rule 230.2 . . . provides the mechanism

____________________________________________

1  Other bases for this Court’s jurisdiction include an appeal from: an
interlocutory order as of right, see Pa.R.A.P. 311; a collateral order, see
Pa.R.A.P. 313; or an interlocutory order by permission, see Pa.R.A.P. 312,
1311, see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 702(b). However, those provisions do not
apply to the instant matter.

2 Rule 230.2(c) does not prescribe the manner in which the “ultimate notice
of termination shall be served”; accordingly, we look to Pa.R.C.P. 236. See
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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for entering the order terminating the case with prejudice for failure to

prosecute. Notice of entry of the order must be given in accordance

with Pa.R.C.P. 236 with a notation on the docket reflecting the notice

was given.”       Kane, 967 A.2d at 995 (Cleland, J., concurring) (emphasis

added). Accordingly, the termination of a case for inactivity pursuant to Rule

230.2 “requires two separate notices[:]” the first notice is of the proposed

termination, and the second notice is the order terminating the action. Id. at

990.    Lastly, a prothonotary’s failure to comply with Rule 236, governing

notice, means that the filing period for a responsive motion “was never

triggered,” and, therefore, a subsequent motion and order denying that

motion are legal nullities. See, e.g., Carr v. Michuck, 234 A.3d 797, 806

(Pa. Super. 2020).

       Here, it is uncontested that the prothonotary failed to enter an order

terminating this matter.        See, e.g., Trial Court Opinion, 7/20/22, at 7-8

(conceding that the prothonotary issued no order but instead simply marked

the case as “Terminated” on the docket and e-mailed notice of the docket

entry to counsel). The trial court, via the prothonotary, thus issued no order

____________________________________________

Kane v. Vigunas, 967 A.2d 987, 992 n.5 (Pa. Super. 2009) (noting that Rule
230.2(c) should be read in pari materia with Rule 236). Rule 236 requires the
prothonotary to give “written notice of the entry of . . . any other order or
judgment to each party’s attorney of record . . .. The notice shall include a
copy of the order or judgment.” Pa.R.C.P. 236(a)(2). Where the prothonotary
has failed to provide the requisite notice, this Court has held “[t]hat the parties
may have received actual notice of the order is of no moment.” Smithson v.
Columbia Gas of PA/NiSource, 264 A.3d 755, 760 (Pa. Super. 2021).

                                           -4-
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terminating the case, and, thereby, failed to provide the necessary notice—

including a copy of the order—to BNYM. See Pa.R.C.P. 230.2(c); see also

Pa.R.C.P. 236(a)(2); Kane, 967 A.2d at 995 (Cleland, J., concurring).

Because the prothonotary failed to comply with Rules 230.2(c) and 236(a)(2),

this matter was not terminated, and, consequently, the filing period for a

responsive petition was never triggered.     Therefore, BNYM’s petition to

reinstate, along with the trial court’s order denying the petition, are legal

nullities. See Carr, 234 A.23d at 806. Thus, there is no final order from

which BNYM may appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 341(a) (providing that an appeal of

right may be taken from any final order); Massaro, 204 A.3d at 933

(quashing an appeal from a non-final order). For these reasons, we quash

this appeal and remand for further proceedings consistent with this

memorandum.

     Appeal quashed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 6/13/2023

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