Court Opinion

ID: 9927186
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-26 15:05:34.218036+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:03.894174
License: Public Domain

FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE                                                      NEWS RELEASE #006

FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

The Opinions handed down on the 26th day of January, 2024 are as follows:

BY Griffin, J.::

 2023-CQ-00257              RANDALL KLING VS. TROY HEBERT; ERNEST P. LEGIER, JR., IN HIS
                            OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE COMMISSIONER OF THE OFFICE OF
                            ALCOHOL AND TOBACCO CONTROL OF THE LOUISIANA
                            DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE

                            CERTIFIED QUESTION ANSWERED. SEE OPINION.

                            Crichton, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
                            Crain, J., concurs and assigns reasons.
                            McCallum, J., additionally concurs for the reasons assigned by Justice Griffin.
                            Griffin, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons.
                           SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

                                       No. 2023-CQ-00257

                                       RANDALL KLING

                                                 VS.

TROY HEBERT; ERNEST P. LEGIER, JR., IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY
   AS THE COMMISSIONER OF THE OFFICE OF ALCOHOL AND
   TOBACCO CONTROL OF THE LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF
                        REVENUE

On Certified Question from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

GRIFFIN, J.

         Invoking Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XII,1 the United States Court of

Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (“United States Fifth Circuit”) certified to this Court

the following question: “In Louisiana, under what circumstances, if any, does the

commencement of a suit in a court of competent jurisdiction and venue interrupt

prescription as to causes of action, understood as legal claims rather than the facts

giving rise to them, not asserted in that suit?” Kling v. Hebert, 60 F.4th 281, 288

(5th Cir. 2023). We answer the certified question as follows: Prescription is

interrupted when notice is sufficient to fully apprise the defendant of the nature of

the claim of the plaintiff, and what is demanded of the defendant.

1
    Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XII provides, in relevant part:

         When it appears to the Supreme Court of the United States, to any circuit court of
         appeal of the United States, or to any district court of the United States, that there
         are involved in any proceedings before it questions or propositions of law of this
         state which are determinative of said cause independently of any other questions
         involved in said case and that there are no clear controlling precedents in the
         decisions of the supreme court of this state, such federal court before rendering a
         decision may certify such questions or propositions of law of this state to the
         Supreme Court of Louisiana for rendition of a judgment or opinion concerning such
         questions or propositions of Louisiana law. This court may, in its discretion,
         decline to answer the questions certified to it or reformulate the question certified.
                       FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       Certified questions are decided on the facts presented to us by the federal

court. See, e.g., Menard v. Targa Resources, L.L.C., 23-0246, p. 2 (La. 6/27/23),

366 So.3d 1238, 1240. Randall Kling filed suit in state court alleging his firing from

the Licensing and Certification Division of the Louisiana Office of Alcohol and

Tobacco Control (“ATC”) was in retaliation for submitting written complaints

describing workplace and ethics violations committed by then-Assistant Secretary

of the ATC, Troy Hebert.              Mr. Kling’s state petition named the Louisiana

Department of Revenue (“LDR”), which includes the ATC, as the sole defendant

and asserted a single claim of violation of Louisiana’s constitutional right to free

expression. He did not allege any federal claims. A jury awarded him compensatory

damages and lost wages, the latter of which was reversed on appeal. Mr. Kling’s

subsequent writ application to this Court on the issue of lost wages was denied.

Kling v. Louisiana Department of Revenue, 18-1480 (La.App. 1 Cir. 7/18/19), r’hg

denied (La.App. 1 Cir. 8/7/19), 281 So.3d 696, writ denied, 19-1434 (La. 11/5/19),

281 So.3d 671.

       Prior to this Court’s disposition of Mr. Kling’s writ application, he filed a

complaint in federal district court asserting substantially similar facts and sought

declaratory relief, damages (including lost wages), and reinstatement for violations

of his federal First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Mr. Kling named then-

Commissioner of the ATC, Juana-Marine Lombard, in her official capacity, and

Troy Hebert, in his individual capacity, as defendants. Mr. Hebert filed a Rule

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss arguing Mr. Kling’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims, not pleaded

in his state court suit, were prescribed.2 The federal district court granted Mr.

2
  The prescriptive period for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims in Louisiana borrows from the one-year
liberative prescriptive period for delictual actions set forth in La. C.C. art. 3492. See SS v. State
ex rel. Dept. of Social Services, 02-0831, p. 7 (La. 12/4/02), 831 So.2d 926, 931.
                                                 2
Hebert’s motion and dismissed Mr. Kling’s federal suit against Mr. Hebert with

prejudice. Mr. Kling appealed.

       The United States Fifth Circuit, observing a lack of clarity in Louisiana

jurisprudence, certified the foregoing question of law to this Court which we granted.

Kling v. Hebert, 23-0257 (La. 4/18/23), 359 So.3d 499.

                                        DISCUSSION

       The certified question asks whether there are any circumstances in which

commencement of a suit interrupts prescription as to legal claims not asserted in that

suit.3 “Prescription is interrupted … when the oblige commences action against the

obligor, in a court of competent jurisdiction and venue.” La. C.C. art. 3462.

Interruption of prescription continues as long as the suit is pending and runs anew

from the last day of interruption. La. C.C. arts. 3463 and 3466.

       Mr. Kling argues in favor of a broad interpretation wherein interruption is

effective as to all causes arising out of the same operative facts identifying the same

right/duty and the same violation of the legal theory pleaded irrespective of the

source of the legal obligation.4 Mr. Hebert advocates a narrower approach such that

the actions in the two suits must be the same to provide notice to a defendant. We

find a more balanced methodology is warranted.

       The starting point for the interpretation of a statute is the language of the

statute itself. Menard, 23-0246, p. 3, 366 So.3d at 1241. As noted by the United

States Fifth Circuit, La. C.C. art. 3462 “is silent as to this particular aspect of

interruption’s scope.” Kling, 60 F.4th at 287. We therefore turn to related provisions

3
 Although this court has the authority to reformulate the certified question, for the sake of comity
with the federal court that posed the question, we choose not to utilize the dissent’s approach to
address the issue before us in the context of res judicata, which requires a completely different
analysis.
4
  We decline to address Mr. Kling’s arguments as to solidary obligors as it is beyond the scope of
the certified question and was not addressed by the United States Fifth Circuit.

                                                 3
of the positive law to discern its meaning and context. See Menard, 23-0246, p. 4,

366 So.3d at 1242. “An obligation is a legal relationship whereby a person, called

the obligor, is bound to render performance in favor of another, called the obligee.”

La. C.C. art. 1756. “A civil action is a demand for the enforcement of a legal right.

It is commenced by the filing of a pleading presenting the demand to a court of

competent jurisdiction.” La. C.C.P. art. 421. Article 3462 may thus be rephrased as

stating prescription is interrupted when the obligee files a pleading presenting the

demand for the enforcement of a legal right/duty to a court of competent jurisdiction

and venue, against the obligor.

         The essence of interruption of prescription by suit is notice to the defendant

of the legal proceedings based on the claim involved.5 Nini v. Sanford Bros., Inc.,

276 So.2d 262, 264-65 (La. 1973). The underlying reason why prescription does

not bar a subsequent claim is that a defendant has adequate and timely notice by

legal demand that liability arising out of the factual occurrence pleaded is sought to

be enforced against him. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Theriot, 376 So.2d 950, 954 (La. 1979);

see also Tate, Amendment of Pleadings in Louisiana, 43 Tul. L. Rev. 211, 233 (1969)

(“fundamental purpose of prescription statutes is only to afford a defendant security

of mind and affairs if no claim is made timely, and to protect him from stale claims

and from the loss or non-preservation of relevant proof”). Prescription is interrupted

when a defendant knows or should know, prior to the expiration of the prescriptive

5
    As early as Flower v. O’Connor, 17 La. 213 (1841), this Court observed:

         It is clear from this doctrine of Pothier, that in order to determine the effect and
         extent of a legal interruption, we must enquire more particularly into the object and
         cause of the action, than the right of the plaintiff, the manner in which it is
         prosecuted and the competency of the court in which it is instituted; and endeavor
         to ascertain how far the knowledge of the titles on which the action is founded, has
         been brought home to the defendant by the judicial demand; and we do not hesitate
         to conclude that, if it be established that the defendant has been judicially notified
         of the titles which are the foundation of the demand for the whole of the property
         or of the debt, so as to acquire sufficient knowledge of the rights which are sought
         to be enforced against him by a suit, there results from said suit a legal interruption
         in favor of those to whom such rights may belong.
                                                   4
period, that legal demands are made upon him from the occurrence described in the

petition. Nini, 276 So.2d at 264; Parker v. Southern American Ins. Co., 590 So.2d

55, 56 (La. 1991). Notice is therefore sufficient when it fully apprises the defendant

of the nature of the claim of the plaintiff, and what is demanded of the defendant.

See Theriot, 376 So.2d at 953 (citing Callendar v. Marks, 185 La. 948, 952, 171 So.

86, 87 (1936)). “[I]f what is filed can be classified as a ‘pleading presenting the

demand,’ prescription will be interrupted whether or not the original pleading sets

forth a cause of action.” Batson v. Cherokee Beach and Campgrounds, Inc., 530

So.2d 1128, 1130 (La. 1988) (quoting La. C.C.P. art. 421); Theriot, 376 So.2d at

953; Findley v. City of Baton Rouge, 570 So.2d 1168, 1170 (La. 1990) (“[w]hile

designed to protect a defendant against prejudice from lack of notification of a claim

within the period of limitation, prescriptive statutes are not designed to protect a

defendant against non-prejudicial pleading mistakes”); Tate, supra, at 233. This

correctly places the emphasis on notice to the defendant, addressed on a case-by-

case basis, rather than quixotic attempts at offering a precise definition of a cause of

action. Examining the spectrum of jurisprudence is illustrative.

      In Theriot, this Court found a prior suit by plaintiff’s workers’ compensation

insurer against the defendant fully apprised the defendant that judicial claim was

being made to enforce his liability for personal injuries to the plaintiff thus defendant

received notice that plaintiff himself might intervene in the suit. 376 So.2d at 953-

54. Theriot affirmatively cited to National Sur. Corp. v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 247

La. 905, 918, 175 So.2d 263, 268 (1965), wherein this Court similarly found a prior

negligence suit by the workers’ compensation insurer of plaintiff’s employer against

defendant tortfeasors put the latter on notice of subsequent intervention by the

plaintiff reasoning that “one principal cause of action resulting from a single tort

                                           5
exists herein.” Notwithstanding the problematic use of the phrase “cause of action”6

in National Sur. Corp., combined with Theriot it stands for the proposition that

notice is sufficient to interrupt prescription where there is one underlying obligation

owed by the same obligor to ostensibly the same obligee. See Louviere v. Shell Oil

Co., 440 So.2d 93, 95 (observing that because the compensation insurer has paid

part of the employee plaintiff’s damages, it is entitled to recover to the extent of

those payments as partial subrogee).

       In Parker, this Court found that a prior workers’ compensation suit against an

employer – despite ultimately being dismissed on an exception of no cause of action

– gave sufficient notice to a defendant liability insurer in a subsequent tort suit

observing there “is factual connexity and the parties are closely related.” 590 So.2d

at 56. The Parker Court reasoned both suits were based on the occurrence of the

employee’s death and the monetary liability of the employer. Id. (further observing

a lack of prejudice in the liability insurer’s ability to prepare and conduct a defense);

Findley, 570 So.2d at 1171-72; Tate, supra, at 234. Thus, this Court implicitly found

that in addition to the two suits being instituted by the same obligee, they dealt with

the same underlying obligation and presented the same demand for monetary

damages. See Thompson v. Town of Jonesboro, 16-1224, p. 6 (La.App. 1 Cir.

6/2/17), 222 So.3d 770, 774 (discussing Parker).

       Conversely, in Trahan v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 314 So.2d 350, 354 (La. 1975),

this Court found no interruption of prescription as the first suit gave defendant

insurers no notice that plaintiffs were claiming damages resulting from the

negligence of a co-plaintiff/employee – the first suit being based solely on the

alleged negligence of six named executive officers. The Court additionally observed

that “[a] cause of action in tort has no identity independent from the defendant upon

6
 Theriot applied the reasoning of National Sur. Corp. despite the fact the first suit in Theriot was
dismissed for a failure to state a cause of action. 376 So.2d at 953-54.
                                                 6
whose fault it is based.” Id., 314 So.2d at 353. Thus, the obligation or duty owed in

the first suit (relating to negligence from the executive officers) was distinct from

the obligation in the second suit (relating to negligence from co-plaintiff/employee.

See also Thompson, 16-1224, pp. 6-7, 222 So.3d at 774 (while first suit for

mandamus notified defendant of a dispute concerning plaintiff’s entitlement to

office, it did not put defendant on notice of a possible claim for monetary damages);

Illes v. State ex. rel. Div. of Admin., 14-0689, p. 5 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/23/14), 168

So.3d 646, 649 (observing a claim for loss of consortium is separate from any claim

of the primary victim).

       Mr. Kling’s interpretation risks undermining the purpose of prescription

statutes and invites the potential for abuse. See Tate, supra, at 233 (“a party’s

assertion of one claim or defense should not, by mere reason of the original filing,

preserve indefinitely all other claims or defenses by him against his opponent”). “[I]t

must not be overlooked that intended ill-pleading could sometimes be used to obtain

the procedural advantage of delay desired by an ill-pleader.” Id. at 240. A plaintiff’s

conscious choice or strategic decision to withhold potential claims to circumvent

prescription statutes or avoid res judicata should not be countenanced. See La.

C.C.P. art. 425 (“party shall assert all causes of action arising out of the transaction

or occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation”); Tate, supra, at 240

(observing ill-pleading could lead to “increased judicial traffic caused by unused

trial days and further hearings so resulting [that] may prejudicially delay other

litigants and may decrease the efficiency of the judicial system as a whole”). Mr.

Hebert’s interpretation risks penalizing pleading mistakes and inartful phraseology.7

7
  It is well-settled that pro se litigants are accorded greater leeway in the interpretation of their
pleadings. See State ex rel. Johnson v. Maggio, 440 So.2d 1336, 1337 (La. 1983) (pro se petitioner
“is not to be denied access to the courts for review of his case on the merits by the overzealous
application of form and pleading requirements or hyper-technical interpretation of court rules”);
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 596, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972) (pro se filings are
held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings by lawyers”).
                                                 7
See Theriot, 376 So.2d at 954; Parker, 590 So.2d at 56 (“law strictly construes

statutes of liberative prescription”). Framing the relevant inquiry around notice

strikes a balance between these competing policy concerns.

                                      DECREE

      We have answered the certified question as set forth in this opinion. Pursuant

to Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XII, the judgment rendered by this Court upon the

question certified shall be sent by the clerk of this Court under its seal to the United

States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and to the parties.

CERTIFIED QUESTION ANSWERED

                                           8
                      SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

                                No. 2023-CQ-00257

                               RANDALL KLING

                                        vs.
TROY HEBERT; ERNEST P. LEGIER, JR., IN ms OFFICIAL CAPACITY
   AS THE COMMISSIONER OF THE OFFICE OF ALCOHOL AND
   TOBACCO CONTROL OF THE LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF
                        REVENUE

On Certified Question from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

CRICHTON, J., dissents and assigns reasons:

      Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XII, Section 1, setting forth the provisions

permitting this Court to certify questions from the Supreme Court of the United

States, any circuit court of appeal or any district court of the United States, also

allows this Court, in its discretion, to "reformulate the question certified." In my

view, the circumstances giving rise to this certified question require such a

reformulation.

      The Fifth Circuit presented the following certified question: "In Louisiana,

under what circumstances, if any, does the commencement of a suit in a court of

competent jurisdiction and venue interrupt prescription as to causes of action,

understood as legal claims rather than the facts giving rise to them, not asserted in

that suit?" Randall Kling v. Troy Hebert, et al., 60 F.4th 281, 288 (5 th Cir. 2023).

However, this Court need not reach the issue of prescription, as plaintiffs

subsequent claim in federal court is barred by res judicata principles. Accordingly,

I would reformulate the certified question as follows: "In Louisiana, can a party

demand a judicial remedy which existed at the time of a prior judgment, arising out

of the same facts, which he failed to assert in a prior suit which has now been

                                          1
concluded           by a final        judgment              that did not grant                that remedy?"                 For the reasons             that

follow,      that question               would      be answered                in the negative.

           Louisiana's            primary          res judicata          principles               are found         in La. R.S. 13:4231,                 the

current      version        of which         was enacted               in 1991.             The statute            provides:

           Except         as otherwise              provided           by      law,        a valid        and      final     judgment          is
           conclusive             between         the same parties,                      except     on appeal              or other       direct
           review,        to the following                  extent:
           (l)     If   the judgment               is in       favor        of the         plaintiff,        all    causes        of   action
           existing        at the time            of final      judgment                 arising     out of the transaction                    or
           occurrence             that    is the subject              matter         of the litigation               are extinguished
           and merged              in the judgment.
           (2)     If the judgment                 is in favor           of the defendant,                   all     causes       of action
           existing        at the time            of final      judgment                 arising     out of the transaction                    or
           occurrence             that    is the subject              matter         of the litigation               are extinguished
           and the judgment                 bars a subsequent                      action      on those           causes      of action.
           (3)     A judgment               in     favor       of     either         the    plaintiff        or the          defendant         is
           conclusive,            in any subsequent                   action         between        them,       with       respect     to any
           issue actually            litigated        and determined                     if its determination               was essential
           to that judgment.

The comments               to the statute            note that the 1990                    revisions        made       a "substantial              change

in the law.             The       new     statute      broadened               Louisiana            res judicata             principles        and thus

concomitantly              narrowed              the possibility               for       a party        to re-litigate          an issue           already

fairly     and fully        litigated       by claiming               he or she is asserting                       a "new"       cause of action.

"The      central       inquiry         is not whether              the second             action        is based      on the same cause or

cause of action            (a concept            which        is difficult           to define)         but whether            the second            action

asserts      a cause       of action         which           arises     out of the transaction                      or occurrence             which          is

the      subject        matter      of     the      first     action."             La.     R.S.     13:4231,           Cmt.        (a).       See      also

Terrebonne Fuel & Lube, Inc. v. Placid Refining Co., 95-654 (La. 1/16/96), 666 So.

2d 624,       632 (quoting               same).        The purpose                 of the amendments                       was clearly         stated     as

promoting          "judicial        economy            and fairness                by requiring            the plaintiff         to seek all relief

and to assert            all rights       which        arise        out of the same transaction                            or occurrence."              La.

R.S. 13:4231, Cmt. (a). See, e.g., Lafreniere Park Foundation v. Broussard 221

F.3d      804,      810     (5'h Cir.       2000)           (Dennis,         J., wrxting            for     the     court,      finding        La.     R.S.

13:4231       "provides            a broad        application           of res judicata              to foster judicial              efficiency         and

                                                                               2
protect         litigants          from duplicative                      litigation.").                "Res       judicata             is a concept             by      which

the defendant                may defeat an action by declaring                                              the claim             extinguished                 because it

has already been litigated."                                  Walton v. Burns,                     47,388, p. 9 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/16/13),

151 So. 3d 616, 621, citing                               La. R.S. 13:4231.

               Furthermore,               La. R.S. 13:4231(2)                           provides           that    if a judgment                  is in favor           of the

defendant,              then "all             causes of action                   existing              at the time of final judgment                                   arising

out of the transaction                          or occurrence                   that is the subject                       matter          of     the      litigation          are

extinguished                and the judgment                         bars a subsequent                      action on those causes                            of action."

In other words, "causes                           of action"              or "claims"                  that existed based on the facts which

were brought                 or could            have been brought                             are barred.            Notably,             the statute does not

state "causes               of action asserted"                        in the first litigation,                          but rather existing                     based on

the    facts.

            Relatedly,              La. C.C.P. art. 425(A)                              states that "[a]                 party shall assert all causes

of action          arising         out        of the     transaction              or occurrence                   that        is the     subject          matter        of the

litigation."              The        1990         comment                 to     this        article        explains             that     "[t]his           amendment

expands           the     scope          of    this     Article          to reflect             the     changes           made           in the        defense          of    res

judicata          and      puts      the       parties          on    notice            that     all     causes          of     action         arising         out     of     the

transaction             or occurrence                  that     is the      subject            matter       of the litigation                  must       be raised."i2

' There is also an analogous                          provision          in La.        c.c.p. art. 5, which                    states that "[w]hen               a plaintiff
reduces        his claim          on a single            cause of action                to bring         it within         the jurisdiction               of a court          and
judgment          is rendered            thereon,        he remits          the portion               of his claim            for which         he did not pray                for
judgment,         and is precluded               thereafter          from       demanding              it judicially."

2 This Court recently                addressed           the relationship                between         La. R.S. 13:4231                 and La.         c.c.p. art. 425
in Carlo Carollo, Jr., et al., v. State of Louisiana, DOTD, 21-1670 (La. 9/9/22), 346 So. 3d 751.
The Court's decision resolved     a circuit split in Louisiana regarding whether La. c.c.p. art. 425
should      be read in pari           materia          with     La. R.S. 13 :4231 or whether                         art. 425 should                be an independent
preclusion         device.         The Court            examined            the 1990            amendments               to the res judicata                principles,          as
discussed         herein,        and ultimately               concluded         that because             the amendments                  broadened            the scope of
res   judicata,         it follows        that art. 425 serves as a "rule                         for parties        to follow           during        litigation;      i.e., as
a warning         or    notice     that all causes of action                    arising        out of the same transaction                       or occurrence               must
b e asserted           in the same suit."              Id. at 763.             Thus,      a majority          of the Court              found,      art. 425 is not an
independent            preclusion         provision,           but rather        is enforced            through          the exception            of res judicata.

                                                                                         3
With        these        principles              in mind,        we tum         to the reformulated                       question           under      the facts

of this matter.

             Plaintiff            was          terminated          from         his      job     in     the       Licensing            and      Certification

Division            of      the      Louisiana               Alcohol         and        Tobacco            Control             ("ATC"),            which         is a

division           of the Louisiana                    Department            of Revenue,                on March             30, 2011.           On May           26,

2011,       he filed          suit against               the Louisiana             Department                 of Revenue             in the      Igth Judicial

District        Court,           asserting            a claim        of violation              of Louisiana's                  constitutional            right       to

free expression                   pursuant            to Art.     1, § 7.3 Following                    a jury      trial,     plaintiff       was awarded

compensatory                 damages               and lost wages.               Plaintiff        filed       a motion          for new trial,           seeking

the additional               remedy              of reinstatement,              but it was denied.                       The First         Circuit      Court        of

Appeal         reversed              the       lost      wages       award         but      affirmed           the       general        damages            award.

Plaintiff          thereafter            filed     a writ       application             in this Court            and prior           to our dispensation

of that       matter,            also     filed       suit    in federal         district        court        on October              3, 2019,          asserting

the same set of facts                      and seeking             declaratory              relief,      damages             (including          lost wages),

and reinstatement                       for      alleged        violations            of his First            and Fourteenth                  rights.       In his

federal        court         suit,       plaintiff           named        the    Commissioner                     of the        ATC          in her       official

capacity           and the then-Assistant                        Secretary            of the ATC           (Troy          Hebert)       in his individual

capacity.            On November                      5, 2019,         approximately                   one month             after     plaintiff        filed     his

federal       court         suit,       this     Court       denied       plaintiff"s           writ      application.               Kling      v. Louisiana

Department ofRevenue, 19-1441 (La. 11/5/19), 281 So. 3d 671. The record makes

clear       that     all     of this           litigation        arises      out        of plaintif:f's            termination               as "Captain             in

Charge"            of      the      Licensing             and     Certification                Division           of     the    Louisiana            Office          of

Alcohol            and Tobacco                   Control.

            Based           on the language                     of La.       R.S.       13:4231,           this      Court       has established                 that

each       of the          following              five      elements         must        be satisfied              for    a finding           that      a second

3 Section 7 of Article I of the Louisiana Constitution provides that "[n]o law shall curtail or restrain
the freedom of speech or of the press. Every person may speak, write, and publish his sentiments
on any subject, but is responsible for abuse of that fireedom."

                                                                                    4
actton       is precluded             by res judicata:              "(l)     the judgment                 is valid;         (2) the judgment              is

final; (3) the parties                 are the same;                (4) the cause or causes of action                              asserted         in the

second suit existed at the time of final judgment                                                in the first litigation;                 and (5) the

cause       or causes      of action            asserted           in the second             suit arose              out of the transaction              or

occurrence            that was the subject                   matter        of the first          litigation."            Chewon           U.S.A.,     Inc.

v. State,       07-2469,             p. 10      (La.     9/8/08),          993       So. 2d 187,                 194,      citingBurguieres               v.

Pollingue,        02-1385,             p. 7 (La.        2/25/03),            843     So.2d         1049,         1053.         There      is no doubt

that in this instance,                 the first      two      requirements                of La. R.S. 13:4231,                   the existence          of

a valid      and final         judgment,            are met.         For purposes                 of res judicata,              a valid     judgment

is one       rendered          by     a court        with      jurisdiction               over    both         the    subject      matter       and the

parties,      disposing          of the merits               in whole            or in part,           after      proper       notice     was    given.

Burguieres,            02-1385,          843        So. 2d at 1049,               citing         La.     R.S.        13:4231      cmt.     d (1990).4

The court        of appeal's            judgment            in this matter            became             final       and definitive         following

this Court's          denial        ofplaintiff"s           writ    application             on November                 5, 2019,        and therefore

satisfies      this    requirement.                 See La.          c.c.p.        art 2166(E)                 ("When          an application           for

certiorari      to the         supreme          court        is timely           filed,     a judgment                 of the     court     of appeal

becomes        final     and definitive                after       a delay       of five         days,     exclusive           of legal     holidays,

commencing              to run on the day after                      the clerk            has mailed             the denial       by the supreme

court      of the application               for certiorari.")

4 Comment        (d), "Valid          and Final"       provides:

            To have any preclusive effect a judgment must be valid, that is, it must have been
            rendered by a court with jurisdiction    over subject matter and over parties, and
            proper notice must have been given. The judgment must also be a final judgment,
            that is, a judgment that disposes of the merits in whole or in part. The use of the
            phrase "final judgment" also means that the preclusive effect of a judgment attaches
            once a final judgment has been signed by the trial court and would bar any action
            filed thereafter unless the judgment is reversed on appeal. Having the res judicata
            effect of a judgment attach at the time of final judgment is rendered by the trial
            court is in accord with our present law on lis pendens, see Code of Civil Procedure
            Articles 531, 532.

                                                                             5
             The     third     requirement            of res judicata                under        the statute           is that     the parties         in

both     suits     are "the         same.         This      Court     has stated        that "[b]oth              the civilian           law    and the

common             law    mandate        that there          must        be 'identity         of parties'          before         the doctrine          of

res judicata             can be used to preclude                      a subsequent                suit.   This         requirement             does not

mean         that the parties          must       have the same physical                      identity,          but that the parties             must

appear        in the         same     capacities            in both       suits."       Burguieres,               843     at 1054.             In other

words,         "[t]here        exists        an     identity        of     parties      whenever                 the     same       parties,       their

successors,              or others      appear        so long         as they        share         the    same "quality"                 as parties.

Welch        v. Crown         Zellerbach            Corp.,      359 So. 2d 154, 156 (La. 1978).                                  Thus,    under       this

analysis,          the    defendants,          including            the    agency        and         subdepartment                that    employed

plaintiff,        as well      as the commissioners                       or secretaries             of the ATC            in their       individual

capacities          all share        the same "quality"                    as parttes        for purposes                of res judicata              and

their interests are closely aligned.5 See Forum for Equality PAC v. McKeithen, 04-

2551      (La.     1/19/05),         893 So. 2d 738.                Under       the facts          of this case, there                is no amount

of     creative          pleading       or    naming           as defendants                 of      different          levels      of    plaintiff's

employers            or supervisors               (either      as agencies           or in their           individual            capacities)          that

will    defeat      this requirement.                 To do so would                 allow        an aggrieved            plaintiff        to merely

file    suit up and down                the chain            of command              of employers                in perpetuity.                Such     an

abuse        of the system            is precisely           what        the principles              outlined          herein      seek to avoid,

and"[tlhe interests ofjustice are not served when a concerned party is excluded from

the litigation."              Walton        v. Burns,        47,388,        p. 12 (La.        App.        2 Cir. 1/16/13),               151 So. 3d

616,     622.

5 There are exceptions to the res judicata principles as set forth in La. R.S. 13:4232.                                                        Although
none  are present in this matter, those exceptions are:

              (1) When exceptional circumstances justify relief from the res judicata effect of the
             judgment;
              (2) When the judgment dismissed the first action without prejudice; or,
              (3) When the judgment reserved the right of the plaintiff to bring another action.

                                                                            6
           Regarding               the fourth      requirement            that the cause             or causes         of action         asserted

in the        second        suit     existed      at the time          of the     final     judgment           in the         first    litigation,

plaintiff's        first     suit set forth        violations          of his freedom          of expression             or speech             under

the Louisiana              Constitution           when      he was allegedly               fired     in retaliation           for submitting

written        complaints            against      Troy      Hebert        (the    previous          secretary       of the ATC).                 For

those     alleged          violations,         he sought        damages          and reinstatement.                 In his federal             court

stnt,     plaintiff         alleged       the     same        facts,     seeking          declaratory          relief,        damages,           and

reinstatement               for     alleged      violations        of     his    First6      and       Fourteenth7            Amendments.

Given         the duplicative            nature        of plaintiff"      s causes        of action        in both       suits,       I find     this

requirement            has been met.             Moreover,         because         the cause of action                 asserted        in federal

court     also arose out of the same occurrence                              in the first          suit (plaintiff's          termination            in

alleged        retaliation),         the fifth     requirement            for res judicata             is also met.

           Accordingly,               in my       view,      regardless          of whether            plaintiffs         state       court      suit

intertupted           prescription        on the federal           court     suit, plaintiff          is now barred             from      seeking

the same relief             in federal         court    that he unsuccessfully                sought        in state court.             Pursuant

to La. R.S. 13:4231                  and La.      c.c.p.       art. 425, plaintiff           was required              to raise       all claims

arising       out of the same transaction                     or occurrence:              his termination              from      employment

as "Captain           in Charge"         of the Licensing               and Certification              Division        of ATC.          Because

he failed       to do so, under               Louisiana       res judicata         principles,           he cannot        now         seek relief

in another         court       or jurisdiction.8

6 The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. Const. amend. I.

7 Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent
part, that no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const.
amend. XIV, § 1.

8 Importantly, an appellate court, such as the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in this instance, may
recognize   the exception of res judicata on its own motion pursuant to La. c.c.p. art. 927(A)(3).

                                                                         7
        Thus,   as set forth   herein,   I would   answer   the reformulated   question   in the

negative.

                                                   8
                      SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

                                No. 2023-CQ-00257

                                RANDALL KLING

                                         VS.

TROY HEBERT; ERNEST P. LEGIER, JR., IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY
   AS THE COMMISSIONER OF THE OFFICE OF ALCOHOL AND
   TOBACCO CONTROL OF THE LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF
                        REVENUE

On Certified Question from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

CRAIN, J., concurs with reasons.

      I agree that interruption requires notice sufficient to fully apprise the

defendant of the nature of the claim and what is demanded. However, I write to

emphasize that the defendant is only on notice of those causes of action specifically

alleged. Separate causes of action that are later brought are not interrupted by the

initial suit because the defendant does not have notice from the petition.

      A petition must contain “a short, clear, and concise statement of all causes of

action arising out of . . . the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of

the litigation” as well as “the material facts of[] the transaction or occurrence.” La.

Code of Civ. Proc. art. 891. (Emphasis added). Article 891 draws a distinction

between material facts and causes of action arising from them. Both must be pled.

      Louisiana Civil Code article 3462 provides that “[p]rescription is interrupted

when the . . . obligee commences action against the obligor[] in a court of competent

jurisdiction and venue.” Addressing what is actually interrupted, La. Civ. Code art.

3462 cmt. (b) explains: “[t]he filing of suit in a court of competent jurisdiction and

venue interrupts any kind of prescription as to the causes of action therein sued upon

. . ..” (Emphasis added). Consequently, the express language of the statute requires

that prescription continue to run against causes of action not pled.

                                          1
      While Article 3462 uses the word “action,” and the comment uses “causes of

action,” neither of which are defined, a “civil action” is defined as “a demand for the

enforcement of a legal right.” La. Code Civ. Proc. art. 421. I discern no difference

between the terms. Therefore, applying the definition of “civil action,” prescription

is only interrupted for specific claims pled, as those are demands made for the

enforcement of a legal right.

      Similarly, La. Code of Civ. Proc. art. 425, which addresses preclusion by

judgment, requires a party to “assert all causes of action arising out of the transaction

or occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation.” (Emphasis added). Again,

a party must do more than allege material facts. They are required to allege all causes

of action arising from those facts. Requiring the petition to articulate both the facts

and, more specifically, all causes of action furthers the fundamental purpose of both

prescription and res judicata, which is to offer a defendant finality. See Giroir v.

South Louisiana Medical Center, 475 So.2d 1040, 1045 (La. 1985) (An important

purpose of prescription is to provide a defendant psychological and economic

security if no timely claim is made, and to protect a defendant from stale claims and

loss of relevant proof.).

       I concur.

                                           2
                        SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

                                   No. 2023-CQ-00257

                                   RANDALL KLING

                                             VS.

TROY HEBERT; ERNEST P. LEGIER, JR., IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY
   AS THE COMMISSIONER OF THE OFFICE OF ALCOHOL AND
   TOBACCO CONTROL OF THE LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF
                        REVENUE

On Certified Question from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

GRIFFIN, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons.

       Respectfully, it is unclear whether the “same parties” requirement of res

judicata is met where a governmental entity is sued in one suit and an employee is

sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in his individual capacity in a second suit.1 As observed

by the United States Supreme Court:

       [I]t is clear that a suit against a government official in his or her personal
       capacity cannot lead to imposition of fee liability upon the
       governmental entity. A victory in a personal-capacity action is a
       victory against the individual defendant, rather than against the entity
       that employs him. Indeed, unless a distinct cause of action is asserted
       against the entity itself, the entity is not even a party to a personal-
       capacity lawsuit and has no opportunity to present a defense. That a
       plaintiff has prevailed against one party does not entitle him to fees
       from another party, let alone from a nonparty.

Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167-68, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 3106, 87 L.Ed.2d 114.

I would therefore leave it to the federal courts to determine the applicability of res

judicata under the facts presented. The irony is Mr. Kling’s contention that his initial

suit against the LDR constitutes notice to Mr. Hebert for liability in his individual

capacity simultaneously supports the dissent’s position that the party defendants are

the same thus triggering res judicata.

1
  Notwithstanding my position on the applicability of res judicata, I stand by the concerns over
the potential for abuse as articulated in the opinion of the Court.