Court Opinion

ID: 9454764
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 18:58:34.854417+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:34:17.933129
License: Public Domain

GODBOLD, Circuit Judge
(specially concurring):
This case demonstrates the difficulty created by the language of the majority opinion in Riley-Stabler Construction Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 396 F.2d 274 (5th Cir. 1968). In another summary judgment ease the courts are urged by the surety that they must delve into the recesses of the supplier’s mind and explore a penumbra of unknown limits beyond the requirements of the Miller Act, to ascertain not only whether the supplier knew the materials were “in the prosecution of the work” but what the supplier reasonably should have known as well.
The majority do not decide whether the supplier, in order to secure a summary judgment in a Miller Act case, must bear the burden of affirmatively showing that he was acting in “good faith.” I would lay that issue to rest here and now. In a summary judgment case once the supplier presents in the form required for factual matter under Rule 56 objective evidence that he supplied materials for the prosecution of the work he is entitled to summary judgment unless the surety comes forward with facts indicating he did not do so. Neither the Act, nor summary judgment procedures, requires the supplier affirmatively show he is honest, reliable, pure-héarted and very careful as well. Until the implications to the contrary are dissipated summary judgment is drained of its usefulness in an area in which it is peculiarly valuable, and the alert surety can force cases to trial on issues that are not embraced in the Act.