Court Opinion

ID: 9385874
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-10 16:07:06.535312+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:53.230175
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. McKenzie, 2023-Ohio-1178.]

                      IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                          THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                             CRAWFORD COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,

       PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,                               CASE NO. 3-22-33

       v.

JOHN MCKENZIE,
                                                         OPINION
       DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

               Appeal from Crawford County Common Pleas Court
                          Trial Court No. 22-CR-0137

                                     Judgment Affirmed

                             Date of Decision: April 10, 2023

APPEARANCES:

        Christopher Bazeley for Appellant

        Thomas Meagher V. for Appellee
Case No. 3-22-33

ZIMMERMAN, J.

       {¶1} Defendant-appellant, John McKenzie (“McKenzie”), brings this appeal

from the September 7, 2022 judgment of the Crawford County Common Pleas Court

sentencing him to six months in prison after McKenzie pled guilty to, and was

convicted of, Violating a Protection Order. On appeal, McKenzie argues that his

plea was not knowingly or intelligently given, and that the trial court failed to advise

him of his rights pursuant to Crim.R. 5 at arraignment. For the reasons that follow,

we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                     Background

       {¶2} On July 20, 2022, McKenzie entered into a written, negotiated plea

agreement wherein he agreed to plead guilty to Violating a Protection Order in

violation of R.C. 2919.27(A)(2), a fifth degree felony. In exchange for his guilty

plea, the State agreed to dismiss the Criminal Trespass charge pending against him.

The trial court conducted a Crim.R. 11 dialogue with McKenzie and determined that

he was entering a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea. McKenzie’s plea

was accepted and he was found guilty. As a result of his conviction, McKenzie was

sentenced to serve six months in prison. McKenzie now appeals the trial court’s

judgment entry of sentence, asserting the following assignments of error for our

review.

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Case No. 3-22-33

                         Assignment of Error No. 1
       McKenzie’s guilty plea was not knowingly or intelligently given.

                          Assignment of Error No. 2
       The trial court erred when it failed to advise McKenzie of his
       Crim.R. 5 rights at arraignment.

                            First Assignment of Error

       {¶3} In his first assignment of error, McKenzie argues that his plea was not

knowing or intelligent.

                                Relevant Authority

       {¶4} “All guilty pleas must be made knowingly, voluntarily, and

intelligently.” State v. Moll, 3d Dist. Defiance Nos. 4-14-17 and 4-14-18, 2015-

Ohio-926, ¶ 9, citing State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527 (1996). “Failure on any

of those points renders enforcement of the plea unconstitutional under both the

United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution.” Engle at 527.

       {¶5} Criminal Rule 11(C)(2), which governs guilty pleas for felony-level

offenses, provides:

       In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or a
       plea of no contest, and shall not accept a plea of guilty or no
       contest without first addressing the defendant personally and
       doing all of the following:

       (a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily,
       with understanding of the nature of the charges and of the
       maximum penalty involved, and if applicable, that the defendant
       is not eligible for probation or for the imposition of community
       control sanctions at the sentencing hearing.

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Case No. 3-22-33

       (b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the
       defendant understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no
       contest, and that the court, upon acceptance of the plea, may
       proceed with judgment and sentence.

       (c) Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant
       understands that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights
       to jury trial, to confront witnesses against him or her, to have
       compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in the defendant’s
       favor, and to require the state to prove the defendant’s guilt
       beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the defendant
       cannot be compelled to testify against himself or herself.

       {¶6} A trial court must strictly comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) and orally

advise a defendant before accepting a felony plea that the plea waives the

defendant’s constitutional rights. State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-

5200, ¶ 31. When a trial court fails to strictly comply with this duty, the defendant’s

plea is invalid. Id. However, a trial court is only required to substantially comply

with the non-constitutional notifications in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and (b). Id. at ¶ 14-

17.

       {¶7} An appellate court reviews the substantial-compliance standard based

upon the totality of the circumstances surrounding the defendant’s plea and

determines whether he subjectively understood the implications of his plea and the

rights he waived. State v. Sarkozy, 117 Ohio St.3d 86, 2008-Ohio-509, ¶

20. “Furthermore, a defendant who challenges his guilty plea on the basis that it was

not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made must show a prejudicial effect. *

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Case No. 3-22-33

* * The test is whether the plea would have otherwise been made.” State v. Nero,

56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108 (1990).

                                             Analysis

        {¶8} McKenzie argues that his Crim.R. 11 dialogue with the trial court, and

his written plea agreement, failed to inform him that a guilty plea was a complete

admission of guilt pursuant to Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b). After reviewing the transcript

of the Crim.R. 11 dialogue, we agree that McKenzie was not informed that his guilty

plea was a complete admission of guilt at the plea hearing.1 Nevertheless, there was

language in McKenzie’s written plea agreement regarding the effect of his plea.

However, McKenzie contends that the statement in his written plea agreement was

not sufficient to render his plea knowing and intelligent.

        {¶9} In our review of the matter, we continue to emphasize that a trial court’s

“‘[l]iteral compliance with Crim.R. 11, in all respects, remains preferable to inexact

plea hearing recitations.’” State v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-3748, ¶

29, quoting State v. Griggs, 103 Ohio St.3d 85, 2004-Ohio-4415, ¶ 19, fn. 2.

Nevertheless, “literal compliance” is not the standard; rather, the standard for

evaluating whether a defendant was informed of the effect of his plea is “substantial

compliance.” State v. Jones, 3d Dist. Crawford No. 3-19-11, 2020-Ohio-3919, ¶ 11.

1
  We note that the Crim.R. 11 hearing transcript is mislabeled in the record as “CONTINUED
SENTENCING” on September 7, 2022. According to the record, this is inaccurate, as the “continued plea
hearing” was held July 20, 2022.

                                                -5-
Case No. 3-22-33

           {¶10} Importantly, Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b)’s requirement to be notified of the

effect of a plea may be satisfied either orally or in writing. Jones at ¶ 14. Here,

McKenzie’s written plea agreement stated, “By pleading, I admit the truth of the

facts and circumstances alleged.”2 (Doc. No. 14). We have previously held that

nearly identical language in a written plea agreement constituted substantial

compliance with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b)/(B)(1). Id. (“Specifically, the written-plea

agreement reflects that Jones acknowledged that “[b]y pleading, [he] admit[s] the

truth of the facts and circumstances alleged[.]”).

           {¶11} Moreover, even if the trial court failed to substantially comply with

Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b), McKenzie has to demonstrate prejudice in this matter and he

is entirely unable to do so. See State v. Griggs, 103 Ohio St.3d 85, 2004-Ohio-4415.

McKenzie has presented no evidence that he would not have entered his plea if the

trial court had used the actual language contained in Crim.R. 11 regarding the effect

of his guilty plea. State v. Lindemayer, 5th Dist. Licking No. 08-CA-142, 2009-

Ohio-3982, ¶ 77. Furthermore, McKenzie did not assert a claim of actual innocence

at the plea hearing.

           A defendant who has entered a guilty plea without asserting
           actual innocence is presumed to understand that he has
           completely admitted his guilt. In such circumstances, a court’s
           failure to inform the defendant of the effect of his guilty plea as
           required by Crim.R. 11 is presumed not to be prejudicial.

2
    The written plea agreement was signed by McKenzie and his attorney.

                                                    -6-
Case No. 3-22-33

Griggs, 103 Ohio St.3d 85, at syllabus. McKenzie has shown us nothing in the

record that would overcome the presumption that the failure to orally inform him of

the effect of his plea was prejudicial in this instance.

       {¶12} In sum, based on the record before us, we find that McKenzie has not

demonstrated that his plea was anything less than knowing, intelligent, and

voluntary. For all of these reasons, McKenzie’s first assignment of error is

overruled.

                             Second Assignment of Error

       {¶13} In his second assignment of error, McKenzie argues that the trial court

erred by failing to advise him of his rights pursuant to Crim.R. 5 at the arraignment

hearing. However, by pleading guilty, McKenzie “waive[d] all appealable orders

except for a challenge as to whether the defendant made a knowing, intelligent, and

voluntary acceptance of the plea.” State v. Bowers, 3d Dist. Union No. 14-11-12,

2012-Ohio-1585, ¶ 12. This includes any challenges to alleged deficiencies at

arraignment. Id.

       {¶14} Given that we have determined that McKenzie’s plea was not invalid,

he has waived his challenge to any purported errors in his arraignment. Id.

Therefore, his second assignment of error is overruled.

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Case No. 3-22-33

                                Conclusion

      {¶15} Having found no error prejudicial to McKenzie in the particulars

assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the Crawford County Common

Pleas Court.

                                                         Judgment Affirmed

WILLAMOWSKI and WALDICK, J.J., concur.

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