Court Opinion

ID: 9569264
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:12:10.855616+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:51:44.944427
License: Public Domain

*559Thompson, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissented in State v. Evans, 265 Ga. 332, 334 (454 SE2d 468) (1995), to express the opinion that strict compliance with USCR 33.9 and 33.11 (C) should be required. Today, the court greatly expands our ruling in Evans, by permitting the reviewing court to consider material not of record in the sentencing court, but subsequently placed in evidence.2 I strongly disagree with this procedure because it is contrary to the Uniform Superior Court Rules and it eliminates the incentive for adherence to those rules. Furthermore, the procedure permits reliance on stale recollections which, as is apparent in the present case, may be faulty. Because I conclude that the documentary evidence of record in the sentencing court demands withdrawal of Henry’s guilty plea to correct what I perceive as a manifest injustice, I see no necessity to expand the inquiry permitted by Evans, and I respectfully dissent.
The plea hearing was neither recorded nor transcribed. Henry was arrested on April 13, 1989 in Lanier County, Georgia, on a warrant allegedly charging him with “possession and distribution of cocaine.” When it became apparent that Henry was interested in pleading guilty to the charges, he was transported to Cook County for that purpose. In the meantime, an ADA in Cook County drafted an accusation charging Henry with “trafficking in cocaine.” When the ADA received the warrant, he apparently realized the charging error and partially corrected the accusation to show “distribution of cocaine.” But the accusation was only corrected in part; it continued to specify a violation of the trafficking statute, OCGA § 16-13-31 (a), and accused the defendant “with the offense of trafficking in cocaine.” Henry was presented with a pre-printed “acknowledgment and waiver of rights” form. All of the responses had been handwritten prior to presenting the form to the defendant. At some unspecified time, certain corrections were made; e.g., trafficking was crossed out by hand and changed to distribution, as were the affirmative answers relating to discussion of the case with counsel, the explanation of rights and the nature of the charges. It is not clear whether the defendant was even aware of these uninitiated changes. Henry signed the form and the trial court accepted his plea.3
*560In Evans the court acknowledged that a case by case analysis must be conducted to determine whether withdrawal of a guilty plea should be permitted after sentencing to correct a manifest injustice. Guidance was offered as follows:
[I]t has been said that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice if, for instance, a defendant is denied effective assistance of counsel, or the guilty plea was entered involuntarily or without an understanding of the nature of the charges.
Evans, supra at 336.
Given the confusion surrounding the uncounseled and unrecorded guilty plea, I would hold that withdrawal of Henry’s guilty plea is mandated to correct a manifest injustice under Evans. I see no need to remand, as the majority proposes, for the habeas court to conduct a manifest injustice analysis. The record speaks for itself. The plea was entered without the benefit of counsel, without a showing that the trial court satisfied itself regarding the factual basis for the plea, and without a clear understanding on the part of the defendant as to what the charges actually were. Evans acknowledges that the reviewing court may make the determination as to whether withdrawal of the plea is necessary to correct a manifest injustice. I conclude that it is, and I would affirm the ruling of the habeas court.
This case presents a clear example of why USCR 33 was promulgated and why adherence to that rule is necessary. At that critical point in the proceedings when an accused waives his constitutional rights and is transformed into a convicted felon, a verbatim record is necessary to determine whether those rights were knowingly and voluntarily relinquished. Indeed, Evans, supra at 334 held, “that the provisions of USCR 33, including 33.9, are mandatory.” “[B]y making a record of the guilty plea hearing, the state will be better able to show that the plea was voluntarily and intelligently entered. Additionally, the reviewing court can determine that the rights of the accused have been protected. ... ‘A comprehensive on-the-record inquiry . . . “forestalls the spin-off of collateral proceedings” . . ,’ [cit.].” State v. Germany, 245 Ga. 326, 328 (265 SE2d 13) (1980).4 I again impress upon the bench and bar the need to adhere to USCR 33 in entertaining and accepting guilty pleas.
*561Decided April 11, 1996.
Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Susan V. Boleyn, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Paige R. Whitaker, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.
Charles Henry, pro se.

 Evans limited the inquiry to evidence of record at the time the plea was entered. That is, the
trial court [could] learn the factual basis from material contained in parts of the record other than the guilty plea hearing so long as the trial court makes clear on the plea hearing record that he is relying on those parts of the record and so long as those parts of the record are made a part of the record for appeal.
Id. at 335.

 The court’s pre-printed order is inconsistent with the facts of the case as it refers to “questioning of the defendant (and his counsel).”

 While the federal courts require “nearly literal compliance with their Rule 11 [FRCrP] procedure,” this Court has declined to do so. Germany, supra at 327. See also Ford v. State, 248 Ga. 241 (282 SE2d 308) (1981). But USCR 33.9, adopted following Germany and Ford, and in response thereto, “corresponds, almost verbatim, with Rule 11 (f) of the FRCrP.” Evans, supra at 333.