Court Opinion

ID: 9847848
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:08:44.464304+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:38.688272
License: Public Domain

Moon, J.,
dissenting
I respectfully dissent from the majority because I do not believe that the Commonwealth excluded as a reasonable hypothesis that Ricky Fortune was attempting to force the victim to perform oral sodomy on him, instead of attempting to force the victim to have sexual intercourse with him against her will. Under most circumstances, I believe it would be permissible to infer that a person who attempted to commit a forcible sexual act intended to commit the sexual act deemed more serious by the law and social mores. In this respect, rape, I believe, would be deemed more serious than the crimes defined as sodomy. However, in this case, all the Commonwealth’s evidence showed was that Fortune demanded that the victim perform oral sodomy on him. Only by ignoring that evidence could one conclude that Fortune was attempting to have intercourse with her. Thus, under this evidence, I do not believe that any rational finder of fact could believe beyond a reasonable doubt that Fortune intended to have forcible intercourse with the victim, as opposed to intending that she perform oral sex on him.
Furthermore, I do not believe this case is controlled by Ingram v. Commonwealth, 192 Va. 794, 66 S.E.2d 846 (1951). There, as the majority points out, the Supreme Court upheld a conviction of attempted rape based on evidence that the defendant, under a false pretense, gained entry to the home of a woman whose husband he knew to be away, grabbed her by the neck and choked *231her. Even though no direct evidence showed a sexual assault occurring before the accused fled, the Court pointed out that the evidence negated any attempt by the accused to commit murder, arson, robbery or mere assault and battery. After a careful process of elimination, the Court concluded that rape was the only possible motive for the attack and choking. Id. at 802-03, 66 S.E.2d at 851. Thus, the fact finder could infer an attempted rape.
Here, we cannot, through a process of elimination, negate appellant’s attempt to commit at least one other crime than rape, that of oral sodomy. The Commonwealth’s uncontradicted evidence established Fortune’s persistent demands that she perform oral sodomy on him and at one point he offered the defendant money for the requested act.
Furthermore, I do not believe that the distinction between attempted rape and attempted sodomy is without significance. In order to prove an attempted rape,' the Commonwealth must prove “a direct, ineffectual act, done toward commission of the offense.” Barrett v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 153, 156, 169 S.E.2d 449, 451 (1969). I, for one, cannot conclude as a matter of law that the “direct,” though “ineffectual,” act to commit rape would necessarily be the same “direct,” though “ineffectual,” act to force another person to commit oral sodomy or vice versa.
As a matter of public policy — which the legislature alone may address — it may well be that the Commonwealth should not have to prove the specific sexual act that the person intends to commit. If a person commits an overt act toward the commission of either rape or forcible sodomy, the person should be deemed guilty of a crime, notwithstanding that the person’s specific intent to commit rape or commit sodomy is in question. Here, the overt acts the majority points to — defendant’s removal of his own pants, exposing himself, asking the victim to lie on the bed, grabbing her and pulling her back into the room twice, grabbing her when she tried to leave and struggling with her, and touching her breast — are not inconsistent with proof that he intended to have her commit oral sodomy as opposed to his attempting to rape her. The uncertain nature of this evidence is even more inconclusive since Fortune neither touched her or her clothing in order to effectuate a rape and repeatedly demanded oral sex from her.
*232Thus, I do not believe that any rational finder of fact on this evidence could be free of a reasonable doubt, Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), not of Fortune’s guilt of some crime, but of guilt of the crime of attempted rape as opposed to guilt of attempted oral sodomy.
Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case.