Court Opinion

ID: 9470501
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:07:41.329979+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:56.106477
License: Public Domain

HAYNSWORTH, Senior Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The word “proceeding” as used in 49 U.S. C.A. § 10321(c)(1) should not be construed by reference to the Commission’s definition of a “proceeding” in its Rules of General Practice. 49 C.F.R. § 1100.5(b) (1980). The word, as used in the statute, is one of art, clearly defined in the reviser’s note and by the Congress itself to include the kind of informal investigation during which earlier statutes authorized the Commission’s exercise of its subpoena power.
Prior to the revised Interstate Commerce Act of October 13, 1978, the Commission’s subpoena power was derived primarily from 49 U.S.C.A. § 12(1), which, in its last clause, authorized the Commission to “require, by subpoena, the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of all books, papers, tariffs, contracts, agreements, and documents relating to any matter under investigation.” The revised Interstate Commerce Act of 1978, however, was a combination and rearrangement of many different sections relating to different classes of businesses within the regulatory jurisdiction of the Commission. In the reviser’s note, the intention was clearly expressed. Instead of the words “books, papers, tariffs, contracts, agreements, and documents,” the reviser substituted the word “records” as encompassing all of those things previously enumerated. They had found the words “proceeding,” “matter” and “investigation," as previously used in the statutes, redundant; and they substituted the single word “proceeding” with the intention that it be construed as encompassing the other two words. More importantly, the Congress itself expressed its legislative purpose and prescribed the construction required of its revision. It stated in § 3(a) of the Act:
“Sections 1 and 2 of this Act restate, without substantive change, laws enacted before May 16, 1978, that were replaced by those sections. Those sections may not be construed as making a substantive change in the laws replaced. Laws enacted after May 15, 1978, that are inconsistent with this Act are considered as superseding it to the extent of the inconsistency.”
92 Stat. 1466, 1 U.S.Code Congressional and Administrative News, 95th Cong., 2d Session, 1978, 1466.
Among the provisions for enforcement of the act and the commencement of formal proceedings for that purpose, § 11701(a) authorizes the Commission to initiate an investigation on its own initiative or on complaint. Section 10321, however, is one of the general administrative provisions of the statute that is not exclusively concerned *537with formal enforcement procedures. A section prescribing how a formal proceeding may be commenced should not be held to limit administrative powers of the Commission that are conferred by a separate section relating specifically to those administrative powers.
In the administration of the act, informal procedures have great utility when hard evidence of a violation of the act is lacking. Piggy Back professes to be an exempt shippers’ association. But it is not exempt if, in part, it has been conducting the business of a freight forwarder. The Commission simply seeks information which will enable it to answer the question whether Piggy Back is, in part, a freight forwarder or an exempt non-profit association serving exclusively its own members. The answer will determine whether or not the Commission has jurisdiction to regulate and enforce, and, of course, the Commission has jurisdiction to inquire into its own jurisdiction.
That kind of inquiry preferably should be informal. So far as appears on this record, the Commission presently has no hard information that would warrant the filing of a formal complaint charging Piggy Back with any violation of the law. An inquiry to determine jurisdiction should not be required to proceed in the straitjacket of formal complaint and investigatory proceedings containing an explicit or implicit charge of a violation of the law.
The course of judicial decision would support this view. In holding that the Commission may issue an investigative subpoena before the initiation of any formal proceeding, the court in United States v. City National Bank, 403 F.Supp. 345 (C.D.Cal.1975), put it well:
As early as Smith v. ICC, 245 U.S. 33, 38 S.Ct. 30, 62 L.Ed. 135 (1917), the Supreme Court emphasized the investigative as well as the adjudicative role of the agency, and refused to limit the agency’s subpoena authority under 49 U.S.C. § 12 to situations where a specific complaint or charge had been filed.
More recently in Hunt Foods v. Federal Trade Commission, 286 F.2d 803 (9th Cir.1961), the Ninth Circuit specifically rejected the argument that a subpoena by the Federal Trade Commission is unenforceable prior to the issuance of a complaint. The court interpreted Section 9 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which is substantially identical to Section 12 of the Interstate Commerce Act (49 U.S.C. § 12), as authorizing subpoenas in aid of investigations with respect to matters that might have been made the object of a complaint, e.g., pre-complaint investigations. This decision is in harmony with United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 70 S.Ct. 357, 94 L.Ed. 401 (1950), wherein the Court held that the Federal Trade Commission’s authority was not limited to investigating only actual charges, but, like a grand jury’s, extended to violations. .
In ICC v. James R. Gould, 629 F.2d 847 (3d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077, 101 S.Ct. 856, 66 L.Ed.2d 800 (1981), the Third Circuit noted that § 10321 extends the Commission’s investigative power to anyone who has information relevant to a transportation-related inquiry.1 The question before the court in Gould was whether the Commission has statutory jurisdiction under § 11144(b) to determine its own jurisdiction. Gould, who claimed his business was exempt from Commission regulation, argued that the § 11144(b) inspection power applies only where a business has consented to Commission regulation or has been adjudicated to be subject to Commission jurisdiction, and that the Commission might investigate to determine its jurisdiction only “by resorting to the more cumbersome procedures of ICA §§ 204, 205, 49 U.S.C.A. § 10321 (West Supp.1980).” Id. at 850.
The court disagreed, holding that the § 11144(b) inspection power and the § 10321 general investigatory power are equally available alternatives where the person or entity the Commission seeks to *538inspect arguably falls within Commission jurisdiction. The court apparently deemed the § 10321 procedure “more cumbersome” because the section contains no provision for summary enforcement and only certain Commission officials may authorize the issuance of subpoenas. Id. at 850 n. 7. In light of the court’s conclusion that the Commission may use the summary procedures of § 11144(b) to determine its jurisdiction, it would appear to follow a fortiori that the Commission may seek to determine its jurisdiction by means of a subpoena issued pursuant to § 10321, which provides greater procedural safeguards for the individual or company that is the focus of the Commission’s attention.
“When I use a word,” Humpty-Dumpty said, “it means just what I choose it to mean — neither more nor less.”2 Congress has expressed the intention with which it used the word “proceeding” in § 10321(c)(1), and that expression should govern our decision.
I respectfully dissent.

. See also Comet Electronics, Inc. v. United States, 381 F.Supp. 1233, 1237-40 (W.D.Mo.1974), aff'd mem., 420 U.S. 999, 95 S.Ct. 1439, 43 L.Ed.2d 758 (1975).

. Lewis Carroll, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, Chap. 6.