Court Opinion

ID: 9563214
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:37:47.722849+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:46.534251
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Justice.
This is a driving under the influence (DUI) case. The primary issues presented concern whether the state should have been allowed to use two prior misdemeanor DUI convictions as the basis for the felony DUI charge in this case. We conclude that the state was not precluded from relying on the two prior convictions.
I.
THE BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS.
In June 1990, a Lewiston police officer arrested Gary D. Maxey for DUI (the 1990 ease). The state charged Maxey with felony DUI on the basis of two prior DUI convictions.
In 1987, Maxey pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor DUI (the 1987 case). In 1988, Maxey pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor DUI (the 1988 case). In 1989, Maxey was again arrested for DUI (the 1989 case). In the 1989 case, the state originally charged Maxey with felony DUI based on convictions in the 1987 and the 1988 cases. As the result of a plea agreement, Maxey resolved the 1989 case by pleading guilty to another misdemeanor DUI.
In the 1990 case, the state originally charged Maxey with felony DUI based upon his prior convictions in the 1987 case and the 1988 case. Maxey challenged the use of these convictions for enhancement purposes, and the trial court granted Maxey’s motion to dismiss the 1988 conviction as an enhance*507ment. The state then dismissed the felony charge against Maxey, but later refiled, charging Maxey with felony DUI based on the convictions in the 1987 and the 1989 cases.
Maxey filed motions in limine and to dismiss challenging the use of the convictions in the 1987 and the 1989 cases as a basis for charging him with a felony in the 1990 case. Maxey asserted that in the 1987 case the guilty plea was taken in violation of Maxey’s right to counsel and in violation of the state and federal constitutions and I.C.R. 11. Therefore, Maxey argued, the state may not use the 1987 conviction for enhancement purposes in the 1990 case. Maxey asserted that, in the 1989 case, the guilty plea was also taken in violation of the state and federal constitutions and I.C.R. 11, and, therefore, may not be used for enhancement purposes in the 1990 ease. The trial court denied Maxey’s motions.
Maxey entered a Rule 11 conditional plea of guilty, reserving the right to appeal the use of the convictions in the 1987 and 1989 cases as enhancements. The trial court withheld judgment and ordered that Maxey be placed on probation for five years. The trial court also ordered that Maxey serve nine months in jail, that he pay $1,500.00 restitution to the county, and that his driving privileges be suspended for one year. Maxey appealed to this Court the trial court’s denial of his motions in limine and to dismiss and the trial court’s order withholding judgment and order of probation. This Court assigned the case to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial court’s denial of Maxey’s motions in limine and to dismiss. This Court granted the state’s petition for review.
II.
MAXEY WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN THE 1987 CASE.
Maxey asserts that the state may not use the 1987 conviction to charge him with a felony in the 1990 case because he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel in the 1987 case. We disagree.
A. MAXEY HAD THE RIGHT TO APPOINTED COUNSEL, IF HE WAS INDIGENT.
We first note that pursuant to M.C.R. 6(c) Maxey had a right to appointed counsel in the 1987 case, if he was indigent:
If the offense has a permissible penalty of imprisonment which will be considered as possible punishment by the court, or if the conviction of the offense could cause a subsequent conviction to be enhanced from a misdemeanor to a felony, then or in either of such events the defendant shall be advised that he has the right to court appointed counsel at public expense if [the defendant] is indigent. If the defendant is found by the court to be entitled to court appointed counsel, the court shall appoint such counsel unless the defendant voluntarily waives [the defendant’s] right to counsel.
M.C.R. 6(c).
When Maxey pleaded guilty in the 1987 case, I.C. § 18-8005(3) provided that a person who pleaded guilty to or was found guilty of three or more DUI violations within five years was guilty of a felony. Because of this enhancement Maxey had a right to appointed counsel pursuant to M.C.R. 6(c), if he was indigent. Therefore, we do not address the more intricate questions concerning Maxey’s right to counsel in the 1987 case under the United States Constitution and the Idaho Constitution. Cf. Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 100 S.Ct. 1585, 64 L.Ed.2d 169 (1980); and U.S. v. Lee, 995 F.2d 887 (9th Cir.1993).
B. MAXEY WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO APPOINTED COUNSEL.
Maxey contends that he never validly waived his right to counsel under I.C. § 19-857, which provides:
A person who has been appropriately informed of [the person’s] right to counsel may waive in writing, or by other record, any right provided by this act, if the court concerned, at the time of or after waiver, finds of record that [the person] has acted with full awareness of [the person’s] rights and of the consequences of a waiver and if *508the waiver is otherwise according to law. The court shall consider such factors as the person’s age, education, and familiarity with the English language and the complexity of the crime involved.
In distinction, I.C.R. 11(e) provides:
Before a plea of guilty is accepted, the record of the entire proceedings, including reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, must show:
(1) The voluntariness of the plea.
(2) The defendant was informed of the consequences of the plea, including minimum and maximum punishments, and other direct consequences which may apply.
(3) The defendant was advised that by pleading guilty the defendant would waive the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront witnesses against the defendant.
(4) The defendant was informed of the nature of the charge against the defendant.
(5) Whether any promises have been made to the defendant, or whether the plea is a result of any plea bargaining agreement, and if so, the nature of the agreement and that the defendant was informed that the court is not bound by any promises or recommendation from either party as to punishment.
If I.C. § 19-857 is substantive, it takes precedence over I.C.R. 11(e). If the statute is procedural, I.C.R. 11(c) takes precedence over it. State v. Harbaugh, 123 Idaho 835, 837 n. 3, 853 P.2d 580, 582 n. 3 (1993).
In State v. Currington, 108 Idaho 539, 540-41, 700 P.2d 942, 943-44 (1985), the Court ruled that the authority of a trial court to allow post-conviction bail to a convicted •criminal made ineligible for bail by a statutory enactment is a matter of procedure rather than substantive law. See also State v. Yoder, 96 Idaho 651, 654, 534 P.2d 771, 774 (1975) (I.C.R. 41(c) concerning issuance of search warrants is a rule of procedure and I.C. § 19-4404 is of no further force or effect.). In its analysis in Currington, the Court incorporated the following statement of the distinction between substantive law and procedure:
“Substantive law prescribes norms for societal conduct and punishments for violations thereof. It thus creates, defines, and regulates primary rights. In contrast, practice and procedure pertain to the essentially mechanical operations of the courts by which substantive law, rights, and remedies are effectuated.”
108 Idaho at 541, 700 P.2d at 944 (quoting from State v. Smith, 84 Wash.2d 498, 527 P.2d 674, 677 (1974) (en banc)).
Applying this distinction to I.C. § 19-857 and I.C.R. 11(c), we conclude that I.C. § 19-857 is procedural and not substantive law. The subject of the statute is how a trial court will consider and rule on the waiver of the right to counsel. The statute does not create, define, or regulate any primary rights. Therefore, I.C.R. 11(c) takes precedence over I.C. § 19-857.
We reject Maxey’s argument that the conviction in the 1987 ease was defective because the trial court failed to comply with I.C. § 19-857 by not considering the factors mentioned in the last sentence of the statute and by not finding on the record that Maxey made a knowing or intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. The acceptance of the plea was in compliance with I.C.R. 11(c) because the record of the entire proceeding, including reasonable inferences from the record, show that the requirements of the rule were met.
At the time of Maxey’s arraignment in the 1987 ease, and before Maxey pleaded guilty, the trial court asked Maxey if he wished to fill out an application for a court appointed lawyer to represent him. Maxey said “no.” The trial court then asked Maxey if he gave up his right to have a public defender. Maxey said “yes.” The trial court accepted this as a waiver of Maxey’s right to have counsel appointed.
Maxey contends that the trial court should have advised Maxey not only of his right to counsel, but also of the dangers and disadvantages of representing himself. In State v. Clayton, 100 Idaho 896, 606 P.2d 1000 (1980), the Court stated that, where the defendant wanted to represent himself at trial, the decision amounted to a waiver of the right to counsel, and “the defendant should be made *509aware of the problems inherent in self-representation so that such waiver is knowingly and intelligently made.” Id. at 897, 606 P.2d at 1001. See also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2541, 45 L.Ed.2d 562, 581-82 (1975) (A defendant who chooses self-representation at trial should be made aware of the dangers of doing so.).
The dangers of self-representation at trial are obvious. The intricacies of the procedures, the rules of evidence, and the law are sufficient to justify extra care in making sure the defendant appreciates the difficulties in conducting a trial without the assistance of a lawyer. Certainly a guilty plea is an important part of a criminal proceeding. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 769, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 1448, 25 L.Ed.2d 763, 772 (1970) (“to plead guilty ... frequently involves the making of difficult judgments”). We are not convinced, however, that the judgments that confront a defendant who pleads guilty in a misdemeanor ease are sufficiently difficult to warrant a requirement that the trial court must advise the defendant of the problems inherent in entering a plea without counsel.
III.
MAXEY’S GUILTY PLEAS IN THE 1987 AND THE 1989 CASES WERE NOT ENTERED IN VIOLATION OF THE STATE OR FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS, OR I.C.R. 11.
Maxey asserts that in the 1987 and 1989 cases he did not plead guilty knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, as required by the United States Constitution, the Idaho Constitution, and I.C.R. 11. We disagree.
We first note that this Court has distinguished between the requirements for accepting guilty pleas in felony cases and those in misdemeanor cases. In State v. Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295, 297-98, 787 P.2d 281, 283-84 (1990), the Court determined that the defendant’s guilty pleas to two felonies were not entered knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently. In Carrasco, the Court referred to the constitutional rights waived by a guilty plea stated in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969) and the requirements of I.C.R. 11(c). 117 Idaho at 297, 787 P.2d at 283. In a footnote, the Court stated: “The requirements set forth herein apply only to accepting pleas of guilty in felony cases. The provisions of I.C. § 19-1502 and Rule 6(d) of the Misdemeanor Criminal Rules continue to be applicable in accepting guilty pleas in misdemeanor cases.” 117 Idaho at 297-98 n. 1, 787 P.2d at 283-84 n. 1.
I.C. § 19-1502 provides: “If the indictment is for a felony the defendant must be personally present; but if for a misdemean- or, [the defendant] may appear upon the arraignment by counsel.” M.C.R. 6(d) provides:
A defendant may also appear, answer and have judgment entered through an attorney, who shall either appear in person or shall file, at or before the time for appearance, a written appearance and answer on behalf of the defendant. The court may, in its discretion, require the presence of the defendant at any stage of the proceeding not otherwise required by these rules.
The procedures for advising a defendant in a misdemeanor case of the defendant’s rights are contained in M.C.R. 6(c):
At the first appearance of the defendant before the court on a uniform citation or sworn complaint, the court shall inform the defendant of [the defendant’s] constitutional rights and the rights provided in the Idaho Criminal Rules, and these rules. Such advice of rights may be announced to all defendants at each session of court at the commencement of the court hearing, rather than advising each of the defendants individually when they come before the court.
M.C.R. 1 provides that the Idaho Criminal Rules “shall apply to the processing of misdemeanor complaints and citations to the extent they are not in conflict with these specific rules regarding the processing of misdemeanor charges.” Therefore, except for the procedures contained in M.C.R. 6(c) and (d), I.C.R. 11(c) applies to the acceptance of misdemeanor pleas of guilty.
*510A. THE 1987 CASE.
In the 1987 case, the transcript of the session of court where Maxey was arraigned indicates that pursuant to M.C.R. 6(c) the trial court advised all defendants present of the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront witnesses, as required by I.C.R. 11(c)(3). Before Maxey pleaded guilty, the trial court asked Maxey if he understood the rights which the trial court at the beginning of the session had advised all defendants they had. Maxey said he did. The trial court asked Maxey if he understood that by pleading guilty he would give up all his rights except his right to appeal his sentence. After a dialogue about other matters, the trial court asked Maxey if he still wished to plead guilty. Maxey said he did, and the trial court, accepted Maxey’s plea.
In Maxey’s sentencing in the 1987 case, which took place in a separate proceeding seven days after Maxey’s guilty plea, the trial court informed Maxey:
Let me advise you of something else, though so you can beware of it. You get a second [DUI] now in the State of Idaho and you’re looking at — I mean if it’s within five years of the date of this one, you’re looking at least ten days in jail, you could go for a year. You’re looking at a fine of up to two thousand dollars, your driving privileges would have to be suspended for at least six months and could be for up to a year and a third such offense within five years is a felony and you could actually go to prison for it.
The day after this hearing, the clerk of court sent a “Quicki-Note” to Maxey indicating that Maxey had not signed a “Notification of Penalties Form” in court. The “Quicki-Note” asked for acknowledgement that the magistrate judge had notified Maxey of future penalties if he were convicted of DUI within five years. Maxey admits that he signed three copies of the notification of penalties form and sent them back to the court.
In 1987, I.C. § 18-8005(l)(e) provided that a person who pleaded guilty to or was found guilty of a DUI violation for the first time:
Shall be advised by the court in writing at the time of sentencing of the penalties that will be imposed for second or subsequent [DUI] violations ..., which advice shall be signed by the defendant,----
M.C.R. 9.1(c) also requires:
[T]he court shall at or before the time of sentencing or granting a withheld judgment deliver to the defendant a written notice advising the defendant as to the penalties that may be imposed for subsequent [DUI] violations____ The notice shall be signed by the defendant and retained by the court,____
Neither the statute nor the rule require this advice to be given before the court accepts a plea of guilty. Although the trial court did not strictly comply with the requirement for written notice of subsequent penalties signed by Maxey at or before sentencing, Maxey admitted he received, signed, and returned the written advice shortly after his sentencing, and certainly before any of his subsequent DUI violations that are at issue in this case. Therefore, we conclude that the error, defect, irregularity, or variance did not affect Maxey’s substantial rights and should be disregarded as harmless. I.C.R. 52. As evidence of this, we note that at the sentencing hearing in the 1988 case, the following colloquy occurred:
THE COURT: When you appeared here last year, 1987 on your last DWI and that was in what, in October?
A: Yes, your Honor.
THE COURT: The judge explained to you what the penalties were for future [DUI’s], didn’t they?
A: Yeah.
THE COURT: Do I need to go over it again?
A: No.
We decline Maxey’s invitation that we address the significance of the trial court’s failure in the 1987 case to use a form in compliance with M.C.R. 5(f) because Maxey did not preserve this question for appeal in his conditional plea agreement.
We conclude that the record of the entire proceedings of the 1987 case, including *511reasonable inferences drawn from this record, show that Maxey’s guilty plea was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily and that the trial court complied with the requirements of I.C.R. 11(c).
B. THE 1989 CASE.
In the 1989 case, Maxey was awaiting a jury trial on a felony DUI, when the prosecutor and Maxey’s attorney approached the trial court with a plea bargain by which Maxey would plead guilty to a misdemeanor DUI. Before accepting Maxey’s plea, the trial court advised Maxey of his rights and asked Maxey if he was prepared to enter a plea to the misdemeanor charge. Maxey pleaded guilty.
In addition to Maxey’s general assertions that his 1989 guilty plea was not knowing and intelligent, Maxey asserts that the trial court specifically did not inform him of: (1) his right to a jury trial, and (2) the consequences of his guilty plea with regard to future DUIs.
Concerning the lack of advice of the right to a jury trial, we acknowledge that at the plea hearing, the trial court informed Maxey: ‘You have a right to go to trial.” Although the trial court did not inform Maxey of a right to a “jury trial,” we cannot ignore that this advice came at a time when Maxey was scheduled for a jury trial on the felony DUI charge that was reduced to a misdemeanor by the plea bargain. In this context, it is disingenuous for Maxey to contend that he did not understand that he had a right to a jury trial when he pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor DUI.
At the sentencing hearing in the 1989 case the trial court informed Maxey as follows:
THE COURT: Do we have those advice— advice of future penalties forms?
Well, I suppose I can go ahead before those forms come back. I’ll accept this plea agreement.
Thanks. Thank you.
Sign it.
Mr. Maxey, it’s my duty to inform you that you have been — you have just pled guilty to an enhanced DUI, that you did previously—
MR. CLARK: Judge. That’s unenhanced.
THE COURT: Unenhanced DUI, and the maximum possible penalty for that you know.
A second DUI violation within five years including withheld judgments is a misdemeanor, and for a second DUI within five years you can be sentenced to jail for at least — you will be sentenced to jail for at least ten days and can be sentenced for up to one year in jail. You could be fined up to two thousand dollars for an enhanced DUI and you shall have your driving privileges suspended for at least six months but not more than one year following your release from jail.
A third DUI violation within five years including withheld judgments is a felony and you shall in that situation be sentenced to the custody of the Idaho State Board of Corrections for not more than five years, but if the court imposes a jail sentence instead of the state penitentiary it shall be for a minimum period of not less than thirty days, and also you may be fined up to five thousand dollars and you shall have your driving privileges suspended for at least one year and not more than five years after release from imprisonment.
So you should be aware of those future penalties. And I’m going to ask you to sign this form which contains those penalties that I’ve just read to you.
We’ll just leave those at the clerk’s desk and perhaps if you’d step over there after sentencing and sign that form, we’ll take care of it in that way.
This satisfied the requirements for written advice of subsequent DUI penalties as specified in M.C.R. 9.1(c).
We conclude that the record of the entire proceedings of the 1989 case, including reasonable inferences drawn from this record, show that Maxey’s guilty plea was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily and that the trial court complied with the requirements of I.C.R. 11(c).
*512IV.
CONCLUSION.
We affirm the trial court’s denial of Maxey’s motions in limine and to dismiss.
McDEVITT, C.J. and HART, J. Pro Tern concur.