Court Opinion

ID: 9616565
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:47:45.755998+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:58.887241
License: Public Domain

TAYLOR, Chief Justice
(concurring specially) :
The constitution gives appellant the right to have the decision adjudging him guilty of contempt reviewed by this court “upon *582appeal.” “The Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction to review, upon appeal, any decision of the district courts, or the judges thereof, * * *.” (Emphasis added) art. S, § 9. It should not be necessary to repeat that in the American political system the constitution is the fundamental organic law of the state, and that the act of any department or officer contrary to its provisions is null and void. Need we remind ourselves that any act of the legislature contrary to, or violative of, any provision of the constitution is null and void. We have repeatedly held that the legislature may not diminish the jurisdiction conferred by the constitution upon the district court. State v. Interest of Lindsey, 78 Idaho 241, 300 P.2d 491 (1956); Boise City v. Better Homes, 72 Idaho 441, 243 P.2d 303 (1952); Clemens v. Kinsley, 72 Idaho 251, 239 P.2d 266 (1951); Robinson v. Robinson, 70 Idaho 122, 212 P.2d 1031 (1949); Fox v. Flynn, 27 Idaho 580, 150 P. 44 (1915). Likewise, the legislature may not diminish, or circumscribe, the jurisdiction conferred upon this court by the constitution.
In State ex rel. State Board of Medicine v. Smith, 80 Idaho 267, 268, 269, 328 P.2d 581 (1958), we held:
“ * * * Despite dicta to that effect in some of our earlier decisions, the right of appeal to the stipreme court is not purely statutory. Art. 5, § 9, * * * constitution. * * * That section is the source of the jurisdiction of the supreme court. The jurisdiction thus conferred cannot be denied or diminished by any act of the legislature. Art. 5, § 13, Const.”
It is not sufficient to say that the constitutional provision providing the right to review upon appeal is not self-executing. If the right cannot be exercised in the absence of legislation providing procedure therefor, then it follows as a matter of logic that the legislature by failure to provide the procedure can deny the right, and prevent the exercise by this court of the jurisdiction conferred by the constitution. That would mean that the legislature, at its pleasure, could strike out or modify a provision of the constitution. That power the legislature does not possess.
“The legislature shall have no power to deprive the judicial department of any power or jurisdiction which rightly pertains to it as a coordinate department of the government; * * *.” Const., art. 5, § 13.
True, the legislature is directed by art. 5, § 13, to provide a proper system of appeals. But that directive is in mandatory terms. The duty so to provide is not left to the discretion or whim of the legislature. The framers used the word “shall” not “may.” Again it follows as a matter of logic that should the legislature fail in the performance of its duty to provide a proper system for the “review, upon appeal, [of] any decision of the district courts,” this court would be bound to exericse its constitutional jurisdiction by procedure of its own making, or by resort to an appropriate writ. It could not abdicate its constitutional authority.
However, that is not the situation which confronts us in this case. The legislature has provided a proper system of appeals by the provisions of I.C. Title 13. Section 13— 201 of that title provides that an appeal may be taken from the district court to this court “[f]rom a final judgment in an action or special proceeding.” The procedure is provided by other sections in Title 13. Proceedings in contempt is a “special proceedings” provided for by I.C., Title 7, ch. 6.
To say that the legislature has authority to determine what decisions of the district court shall be appealable, and that the right of appeal exists only as prescribed by the legislature, is to hold — contrary to our fundamental law — that the legislature has authority to deny to this court jurisdiction given to it in clear and unambiguous terms by the constitution. If I.C. § 7-614 is construed to deny the right of appeal from a final judgment of the district court in contempt proceedings, it is unconstitutional and void. In my opinion that section should be held to mean that judgments and orders in *583contempt proceedings are final and conclusive upon the parties in the district court. That is, they are final within the meaning of I.C. § 13-201, and thus appealable, though made and entered before final judgment in the action or proceeding in which the contempt arises.
Here the order of contempt was made and entered after the final decree of divorce, violation of which was charged as contempt. The contempt order was therefore made appealable by both I.C. § 7-614 and § 13-201. Cf. State ex rel. State Board of Medicine v. Smith, 80 Idaho 267, 328 P.2d 581 (1958).
In support of the contention that I.C. § 7-614 precludes review on appeal of a judgment in contempt, the decisions in Mathison v. Felton, 90 Idaho 87, 408 P.2d 457 (1965); Poff v. Scales, 36 Idaho 762, 213 P. 1019 (1923); and Levan v. Richards, 4 Idaho 667, 43 P. 574 (1896); are cited. The statement of the proposition contended for in the Mathison case was dictum, since that was an original proceeding for writ of review, not an appeal such as we have here. The same is true of the statement in the Poff case. That was an original application for a writ of prohibition, not an appeal. Levan v. Richards was also an original proceeding on writ of review. In none of those cases was the constitutional provision (art. 5, § 9) or the statute (I.C. § 13-201) considered. In the Mathison and Levan cases no authority was cited to support the dictum, except the statute (I.C. § 7-614) purporting to make judgments in contempt final and conclusive. The issue in all three cases was whether that statute prevented a review in this court by means of a writ— not whether an appeal would lie.
In Poff v. Scales, supra, this court quoted from Huerstal v. Muir, 62 Cal. 479 (1880). In that case the California court held:
“ * * * We have jurisdiction to hear appeals in all cases of contempt judgments —when the question presented by the record is simply as to the jurisdiction of the lower court — or in none; since in all such cases, when we pass upon the jurisdiction of the Court below, we pass upon the merits of the appeal.” 62 Cal. at 482.
The constitutional jurisdiction of the court was not mentioned in that case. However, the Huerstal case was later cited by the California court in Tyler v. Connolly, 65 Cal. 28, 2 P. 414 (1884). In the Tyler case the California constitutional provision defining the jurisdiction of the supreme court was quoted. That provision detailed the cases in which the court was given jurisdiction. Contempt was not among the cases listed. The appellant contended his case came within the class of cases “in which the demand, exclusive of interest, * * * amounts to three hundred dollars,” as mentioned in the constitution. The court held against that contention.
Unlike the California constitution, our constitution as originally adopted gave this court “jurisdiction to review, upon appeal, any decisions of the district courts, or the judges thereof”. Therefore, the California decisions relied upon by this court in the cases cited, were not then, and they are not now, authority for the proposition that an appeal does not lie from an order or judgment in contempt proceedings.
Furthermore, the decision in Levan v. Richards, supra, is equivocal on the issue here considered, as well as on the availability of a remedy by writ. After quoting what is now I.C. § 7-614, the court there said:
“ * * * The statute, then, indicates very clearly that when the district court, in contempt proceedings keeps within its jurisdiction, and there is no abuse of the discretion vested in said court, there is no appeal. It is clear, also, that, where the court confines its judgment to matters within its jurisdiction, its judgment cannot be reviewed by this court.” Levan v. Richards, 4 Idaho 667, at 671, 43 P. 574, 575 (1896).
Thus, the court in that case implied that a remedy by either appeal or writ was available if the lower court exceeded its jurisdiction. But if the trial court kept within its jurisdiction then the aggrieved party would be allowed no remedy at all.
*584The old maxim, “ubi jus ibi remedium”— where there is a right there is a remedy— is applicable here. The legislature recognized the principle in I.C. § 1-1622, as follows:
“When jurisdiction is, by this code, or by any other statute, conferred on a court or judicial officer all the means necessary to carry it into effect are also given; and in the exercise of the jurisdiction if the course of proceedings be not specially pointed out by this code, or the statute, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which may appear most conformable to the spirit of this code.”
In Fox v. Flynn, 27 Idaho 580, 150 P. 44 (1915), the principle was applied to give effect to the constitutionally granted jurisdiction of the district court:
“ * * * when jurisdiction is conferred upon the district court by the Constitution in all cases, both at law and in equity, there is also conferred, as an incident of such grant, the power to make the same effective by any suitable process or mode of procedure which may be adopted * * *.” 27 Idaho at 588, 150 P. at 47.
This court in that case did not consider that the constitutional provision was not self-executing.
The principle was applied to uphold the inherent power of the district court to punish for contempt, in McDougall v. Sheridan, 23 Idaho, 191, 128 P. 954 (1913), where the court also said:
“The Legislature has not the authority to restrict the inherent power of the court to punish for contempts; for, if it has the power to restrict such right, where will the line be drawn? If it could abridge the right, it could so minimize it as to make it ineffective for any purpose.” 23 Idaho at 223, 128 P. at 965.
In the early California case of Appeal of Houghton, 42 Cal. 35, 59 (1871), Chief Justice Wallace, referring to failure of the constitution to speak on the subject of procedure, said:
“ * * * It has left that subj ect wholly at large, and to be provided by the Legislature, through statutes enacted, or, in default of them, by this Court, through rules adopted for that purpose. The jurisdiction of this Court, as defined by the Constitution, it is true, is in no sense dependent upon legislative provisions for its appropriate exercise. It exists, and is capable of effective assertion, independently of legislative aid as to the procedure through which it is to be exerted.” (Emphasis added).
The California court spoke again on this subject in People v. Jordan, 65 Cal. 644, 4 P. 683 (1884):
“ * * * The legislature has prescribed no procedure for an appeal to this court in criminal actions, except 'in criminal actions amounting to felonies.’ Penal Code, 1235. But the supreme court has appellate jurisdiction ‘in all criminal cases prosecuted by indictment or information,’ etc. Const, art. 6, § 4. The same section of the constitution provides: ‘The court shall also have power to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, and habeas corpus, and all other writs necessary or proper to the complete exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.’ The power to issue the writs specified, or any other writ, in a case where it may be necessary or proper to resort to it to secure the complete exercise of the appellate jurisdiction of the court, would exist had the constitution been silent on the subject. It may be conceded, for our present purposes, that where machinery has been supplied for the employment of its jurisdiction by legislative enactment, such machinery must be adopted or accepted by the court. But when a certain jurisdiction has been conferred on this or any court it is the duty of the court to exercise it; a duty of which it is not relieved by the failure of the legislature to provide a mode for its exercise. In the absence of *585any .rules of practice enacted by the legislative authority, it is competent for the courts of this state to establish an entire code of procedure in civil cases, and an entire system of procedure in criminal cases, except that criminal actions of a certain class must be prosecuted by indictment or information. Const. art 1, § 8.” 4 P. at 684.
“ * * * The power of courts to establish a system of procedure by means of which parties may seek the exercise of their jurisdiction, at least when a system has not been established by legislative authority, is inherent. A fortiori must this be so in California, where the judicial is a separate department of the government under our written constitution.
“Applying these principles to the case in hand, the defendant here was prosecuted by indictment, and the legislature has failed to provide the machinery for taking an appeal from a judgment for or against him. We are confronted by the duty imposed by the constitution of reviewing the proceedings of the court below. We entertain no doubt that we have the power of declaring, and that it is our duty to declare, how this and like cases may be brought here for review. We may issue to the lower court a writ of mandamus or certiorari, or we may frame and issue any other appropriate writ. But our power is not limited in the exercise of our appellate jurisdiction to the employment of technical writs. We may by rule establish any appropriate practice for the bringing here a record or proceeding in the court below. [*] Still further, we possess the power, as necessarily incident to our jurisdiction, of recognizing as proper any mode of procedure already adopted for bringing a cause before us." * (Emphasis supplied). 4 P. at 686.
People v. Jordan, supra, was quoted and followed by the Utah court in Baker v. Dept. of Registration, 78 Utah 424, 3 P.2d 1082, 1086 (1931), where that court said:
“ * * * If either original or appellate jurisdiction is, by constitutional provisions, conferred upon a court, the failure of the Legislature to provide the manner in which such jurisdiction shall be exercised cannot defeat the jurisdiction so conferred.”
See also, State v. Morgan, 23 Utah 212, 64 P. 356, 361 (1901).
In Finlen v. Heinze, 27 Mont. 107, 69 P. 829 (1902), under a constitutional provision which expressly subjected the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court to limitation and regulation by the legislature, the court said:
“ * * * We cannot assent to the proposition that the legislature can thus limit and control the power vested in this court by the constitution, or that it has attempted to do so by the enactment of any of these provisions. It is manifest from the language of this instrument that it was the intention of its framers that the power of review granted should extend to all cases. The words 'the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court extends to all cases at law and in equity’ are of universal application, and must be construed to mean that the parties litigant have the right of appeal to this court for final review of the action of the trial court, whatever it is, and that this court has the power to grant such relief as this review implies.” 69 P. at 831.
The Montana court held in the absence of legislative procedure the court would supply such by rule. When the case was again before the court on motion for rehearing (27 Mont. 107, 70 P. 517) the court held that the constitutional provision, giving the legislature authority to limit and regulate its appellate jurisdiction, could not extend to a denial of the right of appeal.
The availability of review by writ is not an answer to the problem. The scope of review available under the various statutory writs is not so broad as that provided by appeal. Thus, the right of “review upon appeal” would be impinged by limiting an *586appellant to such a writ, and the constitutional jurisdiction of this court would thus be invaded.
SPEAR, J., concurs in this concurring opinion.