Court Opinion

ID: 9788089
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:30:04.462881+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:04.245793
License: Public Domain

THORNE, Judge
(dissenting):
122 I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion, as I cannot agree with its conclusion that the search of Defendant's bags pursuant to the driver's consent was permissible. Here, the trial court expressly found that, under the cireumstances, Officer Wes-terman "had no way of knowing whose bags they were." Accordingly, I disagree that Officer Westerman can be said to have had a reasonable belief as to the driver's ownership of the bags, and I would hold that the State failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that the driver had the apparent authority to consent to the search of Defendant's bags.
123 Both the trial court and, to a lesser extent, the majority opinion treat this as a case about the seope of the driver's consent. It is not. There is no dispute that, had the bags belonged to the driver, permission to search the bags would have been included within the seope of her consent to search the car. See Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) ("We think that it was objectively reasonable for the police to conclude that the general consent to search respondents' car included consent to search containers within that car which might bear drugs."). Rather, the question presented in this case involves the driver's authority to consent to the search of the bags.
124 "'If a third party rather than the defendant consents to a search, the third party must be one who possesses "common authority" over the area or has some other "sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected.""'" State v. Messer, 2007 UT App 166, T 21, 164 P.3d 421 (quoting State v. Brown, 858 P.2d 851, 855 (Utah 1992)). "Moreover, a search is valid even in instances where the third party does not possess common authority, as long as the police 'reasonably believe[ J'" that the third party possesses such authority. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Illinois v. Rodrigues, 497 U.S. 177, 189, 110 S.Ct. 2798, 111 LEd.2d 148 (1990). However, the State bears the burden of establishing that one who consents to a search has the authority to do so. See Brown, 858 P.2d at 855 ("'The State bears the burden of proving common authority, and it must do so by a preponderance of the evidence."); see also State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, 128, 164 P.3d 397 ("When challenged, the [Sitate has the burden of proving the reasonableness of the officer's actions during an investigative detention.").
1 25 It is undisputed in this case that the driver did not have actual authority to con*1155sent to the search of Defendant's bags.5 Thus, in order for the State to justify the search, it must demonstrate that the facts known to Officer Westerman would nevertheless have caused a person of reasonable caution to conclude that the driver had such authority. Cf State v. Duran, 2005 UT App 409, ¶ 14, 181 P.3d 246 ("If the facts known to the officers would not cause a person of reasonable caution to conclude that the consenting party had authority over the premises, 'then warrantless entry without further inquiry is unlawful unless authority actually exists'" (quoting Rodrigues, 497 U.S. at 188-89, 110 S.Ct. 2798)). It appears that the only indicia of ownership or control of the bags was their mere presence in the driver's vehicle, along with multiple passengers and in an area accessible to those passengers. As the trial court aptly found, this information alone gave Officer Westerman "no way of knowing whose bags they were."
T26 At best, Officer Westerman was presented with a situation where ownership and control of the bags was ambiguous. Utah law requires further inquiry before a consent search can be deemed valid in such ambiguous situations. See id. 117 ("The officers were faced with an ambiguous situation concerning the trailer. Although it was owned by Mother, it was rented to Horvath. Despite that ambiguity, the officers made no further inquiry and proceeded with the warrantless [consent] search. The search was not lawful ...." (footnote omitted)); State v. Davis, 965 P.2d 525, 583 (Utah Ct.App.1998) (stating that the State's burden to prove common authority cannot be met " 'if agents, faced with an ambiguous situation, nevertheless proceed without making further inquiry' " (quoting United States v. Whitfield, 939 F.2d 1071, 1075 (D.C.Cir.1991})).
127 Had Officer Westerman made further inquiry, he could likely have easily ascertained that the bags belonged to Defendant and sought her consent to search them. If further inquiry had resulted in the passengers, including Defendant, denying ownership of the bags, then Officer Westerman would have had some reason to believe that the bags belonged to the driver. Or, had everyone denied ownership of the bags, then perhaps an abandonment analysis would have been appropriate. See generally State v. Rynhart, 2005 UT 84, 121, 125 P.3d 988 (discussing abandonment); see also United States v. Veatch, 674 F.2d 1217, 1220-21 (Oth Cir.1981) (finding abandonment where the defendant disclaimed ownership of a wallet found on the seat of a vehicle). Here, however, Officer Westerman made no inquiry whatsoever and, thus, his search of Defendant's bags pursuant to the driver's consent cannot be deemed objectively reasonable under Utah case law governing consent searches.
28 Because I would suppress the results of the search of Defendant's bags under existing Utah case law, I see no need to rely on Defendant's primary source of authority, State v. Frank, 650 NW.2d 218 (Minn.Ct. App.2002). However, I agree with the logic and analysis of Frank and note that its common-sense holding is itself merely another way of stating Utah's law that a consent search based on apparent authority is not valid in the face of ambiguity of ownership or control. See id. at 219 ("[When a vehicle search is based only on consent, an officer has an obligation to ascertain the ownership of items not owned by or within the control of the consenter when the cireumstances do not clearly indicate that the consenter is the owner or controls the item to be searched.").
{29 When Officer Westerman searched Defendant's bags pursuant to the driver's consent, he had "no way of knowing whose bags they were." Faced with this ambiguity as to whose bags they were, Officer Wester-*1156man's search, without further inquiry, is objectively unreasonable and, therefore, unlawful. See Duran, 2005 UT App 409, 117, 131 P.3d 246; Davis, 965 P.2d at 588. For these reasons, I would suppress the results of the search and reverse Defendant's resulting convictions, and I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.

. The trial court found that Defendant had not abandoned her bags and retained a legitimate expectation of privacy in them. Further, this is not a case where Defendant left her bags in the care of a third person and thereby took the risk that the third person might not respect her privacy. See, eg., State v. Messer, 2007 UT App 166, 122, 164 P.3d 421 ("[In leaving the bags in Hasch's car on Hasch's property, [dlefendant took the risk that Hasch might not maintain [djefendant's privacy interest in the bags."); see also United States v. Austin, 66 F.3d 1115, 1119 (10th Cir.1995) ("By leaving his bag in the possession and control of [a third party], defendant assumed the risk that [the third party] would allow the authorities access to the bag.").