Court Opinion

ID: 9778220
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:56:24.339446+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:05.260743
License: Public Domain

ON REHEARING
Ford argues, among other things, in its motion for rehearing that we cannot properly order a retrial on the issues of gross negligence and malice as a basis for punitive damages. It argues that such a partial remand would (1) violate the Texas rule against remand on damages only when liability is contested, Tex.R.App.P. 81(b)(1); and (2) would violate its due process rights because such a partial remand and retrial cannot be held without unfairness. We disagree with these contentions for the following reasons.
We first point out that we are not reversing the punitive damage award itself for insufficient evidence or for excessiveness. Rather, we are reversing the underlying liability findings that authorize an award of punitive damages. Consequently, the partial remand will not violate the rule against a partial remand on damages apart from liability; it will rather be a remand on the issues of gross negligence and malice as bases for punitive damages, apart from the issue of ordinary negligence as a basis for compensatory damages. That kind of partial remand has been approved by Texas courts because gross negligence and malice are based on different standards of conduct from those of ordinary negligence, and are clearly distinct. See, e.g., McElroy v. Fitts, 876 S.W.2d 190 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1994, writ dism’d by agr.); Alm v. Aluminum Co. of America, 753 S.W.2d 478, 485-86 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1988), rev’d on other grounds, 785 S.W.2d 137 (Tex.1990); Olin Corp. v. Dyson,. 678 S.W.2d 650, 659 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1984), rev’d on other grounds, 692 S.W.2d 456 (Tex.1985).
Ford relies on Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 283 U.S. 494, 500, 51 S.Ct. 513, 515, 75 L.Ed. 1188, 1191 (1931). In that case, the Supreme Court held that an appellate court cannot remand a case for a partial new trial unless the issue to be retried is so distinct and separable from the others that the trial of it alone may be had without injustice. The court found that the question of damages on a counterclaim was so interwoven with that of liability that the jurors could not consider the damage claim without confusion and uncertainty and that this would amount to a denial of a fair trial. The Court said, however, “Here we hold that where the requirement of a jury trial has been satisfied by a verdict according to law upon one issue of fact, that requirement does not compel a new trial of that issue even though another and separable issue must be tried again.” Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 283 U.S. at 499, 51 S.Ct. at 515.
All of the cases Ford cites involve the impropriety of remanding damages alone for partial retrial, not remanding gross negligence or malice issues, or they involve other facts that distinguish them from the situation here.15
*600In fact, Ford cites McDonald v. Johnson & Johnson, 722 F.2d 1370 (8th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 870, 105 S.Ct. 219, 83 L.Ed.2d 149 (1984), which supports a partial remand in our situation. There, the trial court gave the jurors improper instructions involving malicious or oppressive conduct, which would support punitive damages. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s judgment on the fraud verdict and remanded for a new trial on what the court called “punitive damages,” but what was really the issue of liability supporting punitive damages. Courts sometimes confuse the issue by referring to punitive damage issues when they actually are discussing gross negligence, malice, or other egregious conduct justifying punitive damages.
Ford relies on three cases involving the remand of underlying liability issues: Burke v. Deere & Co., 6 F.3d 497, 513 (8th Cir.1993), Western Fireproofing Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 896 F.2d 286 (8th Cir.1990), and Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Bennett, 251 F.2d 934, 938-39 (4th Cir.1958).
In Burke v. Deere & Co., supra, the appeals court, applying Iowa law, found “no evidence of any conduct so egregious as to support an award of punitive damages.” The majority said that remand of the punitive damage issue would violate Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., supra. Among the court’s considerations was Iowa’s practice of admitting evidence of the defendant’s net worth in connection with exemplary damages when jurors also are considering compensatory damages. Texas, however, uses a bifurcated system in which exemplary damages, but not liability, are determined in a separate trial. Moreover, a dissenting judge in that case noted that Champlin specifically would permit retrial of the issue of whether Deere had acted with “willful and wanton disregard of the rights or safety of another.” Burke v. Deere & Co., 6 F.3d at 514 n. 2 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
In Western Fireproofing Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co., supra, the appeals court remanded for trial on all issues after the trial court gave the jurors an improper malice instruction. The court noted, however, that the evidence was legally sufficient to submit the punitive damage issue to the jurors.
In Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Bennett, supra, the court found that the evidence of willful misconduct was inextricably intertwined with that relating to primary negligence, and remanded both the willful misconduct and the negligence claims for retrial. The court relied on Smyth Sales v. Petroleum Heat & Power Co., supra, in which the court found the amount of punitive damages excessive. There the court said Champlin barred a trial on the amount of damages alone. The amount of damages, not the question of liability supporting the damages, was at issue.
Ford also cites Redman Homes, Inc. v. Ivy, 920 S.W.2d 664 (1996). That case involved a partial remand on actual damages alone, apart from any liability issue. As the Supreme Court noted, that clearly violated Tex.R.App.P. 81(b)(1). That is not what we have in this case.
Ford also has cited us to Hyman Farm Service, Inc. v. Earth Oil & Gas Co., 920 S.W.2d 452 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1996, n.w.h.), in which the court holds that, even in separate or bifurcated trials of different issues, the same ten jurors must agree and sign the verdict on the same issues. Tex. R.Civ.P. 292. The holding in that ease is not in point on the issue we consider. In that case there was no severance—only separate *601trials of issues in the same case. When there is a severance, the suit is divided into separate and independent causes. Hall v. City of Austin, 450 S.W.2d 836 (Tex.1970). The Hyman case applies to jury answers in one cause, even though it is tried piecemeal. Our severance and remand of the gross negligence and malice issues as a basis for punitive damages will make those issues a separate cause, and Rule 292 will not require that the same ten jurors who heard the original case hear and concur in the verdict on retrial.
We cannot agree that the partial remand will cause unfairness to Ford. As noted, the elements of ordinary negligence are entirely different from the elements of gross negligence and malice. Although the concepts are similar, the evidence of ordinary negligence cannot satisfy the burden of proof for either gross negligence or malice, Tex.Civ. PRAC. & Rem.Code Ann. § 41.003(b), and the issues are not inextricably intertwined.
We find the other points in Ford’s motion for rehearing to be without merit. For the reasons stated, the motion for rehearing is overruled.

. Costilla v. Aluminum Co. of America, 835 F.2d 578 (5th Cir.1988) (remanded for new trials on negligence, products liability, and reckless failure to warn because recently-decided Texas case changed “failure to warn” rules); Malandris v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 703 F.2d 1152, 1178 (10th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 824, 104 S.Ct. 92, 78 L.Ed.2d 99 (1983) (excessive punitive damage award overturned; if plaintiff rejects remittitur, retrial must be had on all *600issues; Champlin bars new trial on damage issue alone, and evidence sufficient to support liability for punitive damages); C.W. Regan, Inc. v. Parsons, Brinckerhoff, Quade & Douglas, 411 F.2d 1379, 1388 (4th Cir.1969) (separate trials not allowed on issues of damages and liability); Smyth Sales v. Petroleum Heat & Power Co., 141 F.2d 41, 45 (3d Cir.1944) (amount of punitive damages, not liability for punitive damages, at issue); George Grubbs Enterprises, Inc. v. Bien, 900 S.W.2d 337 (Tex.1995) (trial court gave incorrect jury instruction on setting exemplaiy damages); Iley v. Hughes, 158 Tex. 362, 311 S.W.2d 648 (1958) (civil procedure rules do not authorize separate trials for damages and liability in personal injury suit); Hoechst Cetanese Corp. v. Arthur Bros., 882 S.W.2d 917 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1994, no writ) (although sufficient evidence supports jury’s fraud finding, punitive damages excessive; if plaintiff does not accept remittitur, entire case remanded).