Court Opinion

ID: 9925707
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-22 20:02:50.586728+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:27.626901
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/22/24 P. v. Porter CA2/3

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 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                     DIVISION THREE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                 B314917

        Plaintiff and Respondent,                            Los Angeles County
                                                             Super. Ct. No. BA463024
        v.

 BRUCE WICKLAND PORTER,

        Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Deborah S. Brazil, Judge. Affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded with directions.
      Robert A. Werth, under appointment by the Court, for
Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Heidi Salerno, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                       INTRODUCTION

       A jury convicted defendant Bruce Wickland Porter of one
count of felony criminal threats and one count of misdemeanor
disobeying a criminal protective order. The court sentenced
Porter to 11 years in prison, including the high term of three
years for the criminal threats conviction, doubled to six years
under the Three Strikes Law, plus five years for the prior strike
conviction.
       On appeal, Porter contends: (1) the court erred by denying
his requests to subpoena a witness and various phone and
business records and by excluding or limiting other items of
evidence that he claims were relevant to his defense; (2) the
abstract of judgment must be corrected to reflect the court did not
impose any fines and fees; and (3) the matter must be remanded
for resentencing because the court improperly relied on one of his
prior convictions to impose the upper term for his current
criminal threats conviction and to impose a five-year prior strike
enhancement.
       We agree the matter must be remanded for resentencing
and that the inclusion of fines and fees must be struck from the
abstract of judgment. On remand, the court shall reconsider
Porter’s sentence in light of Senate Bill No. 567 (S.B. 567), which
amended Penal Code section 1170, former subdivision (b) by
making the middle term the presumptive sentence for a term of
punishment. (Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3, adding § 1170, subd.
(b)(1) & (2).) We otherwise affirm.

                                2
                 FACTUAL BACKGROUND

1.    Porter’s Relationship with Peggy F.
       Porter and Peggy F. met each other online around April
2013, and they soon started dating. At the time, Peggy lived
alone with her four-year-old son.
       Porter and Peggy went on their first date at a restaurant
near Peggy’s home in Silverlake, and they took trips to Santa
Barbara and Ojai during their relationship. Peggy eventually
introduced Porter to several of her friends, her father, and her
sister, Clarissa J.
       In late December 2013, Porter broke up with Peggy. They
saw each other again sporadically in the spring of 2014.
2.    Porter’s Harassment
       Around May 2014, Porter began behaving erratically
toward Peggy. He sent her several “cryptic” messages and would
repeatedly call her over short periods of time. Peggy told Porter
he was “scaring” her and that she didn’t want to see him again,
and she asked him to stop calling her. They didn’t speak again for
over a month.
       In early July 2014, Peggy was working from home when
she heard the front door slam shut. She found Porter standing in
her living room. He was sweating and smelled like alcohol, and
his eyes were glassy. Porter yelled at Peggy and accused her of
recording them having sex. Porter claimed he watched a “sex
tape” that depicted a woman who looked like Peggy having sex
with a man whose wrists resembled Porter’s wrists in a house
that looked like Peggy’s house. Peggy told Porter she didn’t know
what he was talking about, but she agreed to watch the video,
hoping it would convince him to leave.

                                3
       Later that day, Porter sent Peggy an email with a
pornographic video attached, which he claimed showed two
people who resembled him and Peggy having sex. Peggy watched
several minutes of the video, but she didn’t think either of the
actors resembled her or Porter. She replied to Porter’s email,
stating, “I looked at the videos briefly, and aside from her being a
curvy girl with natural boobs and him being tall, they look
nothing like us, nor does the room they are in look anything like
my place. That is just crazy that you could even think that. I
don’t know what to say, but it’s just way out there.” Porter
replied, “I don’t feel crazy. Really not drinking that much. But
this morning was totally crazy. I’m sorry. Here’s the thing. My
bony, broken wrists stand out [in the video]. Isn’t my
imagination. It’s me.”
       A couple of days later, Porter sent Peggy a series of text
messages. He told Peggy that she was “in some trouble” and that
he would “get [her] out of that” if she let him “put down
whomever needs to get put down.” Porter later texted Peggy,
“[w]ake up. Tell me I’m totally fucking crazy and I’ll check myself
into a lollipop factory. … [¶] Otherwise, I’ve got to fix this. See
you in a bit. Okay. 45 minutes.” Porter continued to text Peggy,
“You know, I don’t give a shit about sex tapes, but I think you
need help. … [¶] If you need saving, then I’ve got to save you. Can
you tell me what’s going on? Sometime this weekend you must
tell me again that I’m off my rocker. Otherwise, we’ll do this
again Monday morning.” Worried that Porter might return to her
house, Peggy replied, “[y]ou scare me to death, and I don’t want
any part of it. You are stalking me, and if you come here again, I
will call the police.”

                                 4
       Around mid-July 2014, Peggy woke up early in the morning
to Porter banging on her bedroom window and saying, “It’s me.
It’s me. You need to let me in.” As Peggy locked her son in his
bedroom, Porter said, “If you don’t come out, I need to see you’re
okay. You need to come to the front door.” Peggy then opened her
front door and spoke to Porter through a security screen. When
she told Porter he needed to leave, he responded, “I’m not
leaving. You need to come out. I’m not leaving.” After Peggy
closed her door, Porter went to the back of her house and
continued to bang on her windows. When Peggy threatened to
call the police, he called her a “stupid cunt” or a “bitch” and left
the house.
       Between July and September 2014, Porter sent Peggy
around 50 emails. In many of them, Porter attached links to
pornographic videos and claimed Peggy and several other people
produced and sold hundreds of videos depicting digitally altered
versions of him having sex with Peggy or other women.1 Porter
often demanded that Peggy acknowledge she was involved in the
production of the videos, and he repeatedly threatened to ruin
her reputation and career. In several emails sent between August
and September 2014, Porter threatened to kill Peggy, her friends,
and the other people he claimed were involved in the supposed
video production scheme. Peggy sent several of Porter’s emails to
the police.

1 Peggy testified that she never filmed or published, or agreed to have

others film or publish, videos of herself or anyone else having sex with
Porter.

                                   5
       Porter also sent Peggy at least 14 voicemails between July
and September 2014. Porter repeatedly threatened to ruin
Peggy’s, her son’s, and her friends’ lives; accused Peggy of being
involved in a conspiracy to produce and sell videotapes of Porter
having sex with her and other women; and demanded that Peggy
share with him the proceeds she made from selling the sex tapes.
       Porter vandalized Peggy’s home on multiple occasions. One
day in early August 2014, Porter told Peggy that he was “coming
over.” Peggy and her son stayed with Peggy’s sister that night.
When Peggy returned home the next morning, she saw that
Porter had burned the letters “WHORE” into her front lawn. A
couple of weeks later, Porter threw around 100 pornographic
printouts on Peggy’s lawn. And in September 2014, after Peggy
obtained a permanent restraining order against him, Porter
covered Peggy’s and one of her friend’s cars in red paint and
threw two cans of paint through Peggy’s living room windows.
       In late September 2014, Porter started a text message
group with Peggy and several other women he previously dated.
In his messages to the group, Porter threatened to kill Peggy
several times and accused the women of being involved in a
scheme to produce pornographic videos of him. Although Peggy
had never spoken to any of the other women before Porter sent
text messages to the group, she discovered that he had also been
harassing the other women and vandalizing some of their homes.
       Porter was arrested around September 2014. He pled guilty
to three counts of felony stalking (Pen. Code,2 § 646.9), one count
of felony criminal threats (§ 422), and three counts of felony
vandalism (§ 594). The court sentenced Porter to 5 years in

2 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                   6
prison and issued a criminal protective order precluding him
from contacting Peggy for 10 years.
      Porter was released from custody in early 2017.
3.    Porter’s Screenplay
       In November 2017, Porter sent Peggy an email that stated:
“You feel like talking? Off record. I sorta do. [¶] Otherwise, we’ll
just leave it to the gods[.]” Porter attached to his email a copy of a
screenplay he recently wrote entitled “Amateur Porn.”
       The screenplay’s two main characters, Rob McKenzie and
Patsy Greinke, were based on Porter and Peggy, respectively.
Most of the scenes mirrored events from Porter and Peggy’s
relationship, including: their first date at an Italian restaurant
near Peggy’s house; their trips to Santa Barbara and Ojai; the
night Porter met Peggy’s friends; and Porter’s repeated claims
that Peggy, her friends, and other women were involved in a
scheme to produce pornographic videos featuring Porter.
       Although the final scene of the screenplay was fictionalized,
Peggy construed it as a threat of violence against her. In that
scene, Rob drives to the desert, where he digs a “grave.” Later, he
drives a van to Patsy’s neighborhood and parks it near her house.
Rob, who is in disguise, waits inside the van with a semi-
automatic pistol, a roll of duct tape, a box cutter, and a taser.
When Patsy and her son return home, Rob parks the van in front
of the house, grabs the pistol and taser, and walks toward them.
Rob tells Patsy to send her son inside her house.
       After Patsy’s son walks away, Rob asks Patsy whether they
had a “deal,” to which she replies, “yes.” Rob states, “Okay, here’s
the new deal. I’d planned on burying you in the desert. Not too
far from where I now live. But I’m not really cut out for a killer.
But you girls have pushed me right to the edge. … [¶] I’m going

                                  7
to give you the option. The new deal is that we can still take that
ride out to the desert or I can give you something to remember
this by.” Rob then brandishes a gun and tells Patsy that he “can
remove [her] pinkie toe. Like [she] always wanted.”3 When Patsy
asks Rob if he’s serious, he “jams the gun in her ribs” and says, “I
couldn’t [be] more serious.”
       Rob then leads Patsy to her neighbor’s lawn, where he
forces her to sit down. Rob places the muzzle of the pistol to
Patsy’s toe, but before he pulls the trigger, he moves the pistol
and the bullet misses her foot. Before leaving, Rob tells Patsy, “If
I hear one word from the police. If I’m handcuffed over a traffic
ticket … I’m gonna kill you, I’m gonna kill your sister. I’m gonna
kill Britt, then computer dude, and I’m gonna go down the line
until SWAT takes me out. Do you understand?”4
       Porter was arrested after Peggy forwarded his email and a
copy of the attached script to the police.
4.    Porter’s Testimony
       Porter testified at trial. The first act of the screenplay he
sent Peggy was based on real events that occurred during their
relationship and throughout his life. He based the character
Patsy on Peggy and the character Rob on himself. Other
characters in the play were based on Peggy’s friends and family
as well as other women he previously dated. In the first draft of

3 According to Peggy, she once told Porter that she wanted to have a

doctor amputate her smallest toe because it caused her pain.
4 Peggy testified that “computer dude” was based on one of her male

friends and that Britt was based on another woman who Porter
accused of being involved in the supposed pornographic video-
production scheme.

                                   8
the screenplay, which Porter did not send to Peggy, the final
scene did not include any violence. He changed the screenplay’s
ending shortly before sending it to Peggy because he received
feedback from an online review service, which found the original
ending he wrote was too “weak.”
      Porter continued to believe Peggy, some of her friends, and
several other women were involved in a conspiracy to produce
pornographic videos featuring him. Porter introduced several
screenshots from videos he found on the internet, which he
claimed included digitally altered versions of him engaging in
sexual acts, including having sex with digitally altered versions
of Peggy and the other women.
       Porter admitted he sent numerous threatening emails, text
messages, and voicemails to Peggy and vandalized her home on
several occasions in 2014 because he wanted to “scare” her.
According to Porter, he violated the first restraining order Peggy
obtained against him “dozens of times.”
      Porter also admitted he violated the 2015 criminal
protective order when he sent Peggy the November 2017 email
with the screenplay attached. When he sent Peggy a copy of the
screenplay, he knew she would recognize the character Patsy was
based on her and the character Rob was based on him. Although
Porter didn’t intend the screenplay to serve as a threat, he
wanted Peggy to read the entire thing, including the final scene
in which Rob threatened to kill Patsy.

               PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      The People charged Porter with one count of felony
criminal threats (§ 422) and one count of misdemeanor
disobeying a court order (§ 166, subd. (a)(4)). The People further
alleged that Porter suffered a prior strike and prior serious or

                                 9
violent felony conviction—i.e., the 2015 criminal threats
conviction—under the Three Strikes Law.
       Before trial, the court granted Porter’s request to represent
himself under Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806. The jury
found Porter guilty of both charges, and the court found true the
prior conviction allegations concerning Porter’s 2015 criminal
threats conviction.
       At sentencing, the court denied the People’s request to
strike Porter’s prior strike conviction. The court sentenced Porter
to 11 years in prison, consisting of the high term of three years
for the criminal threats conviction, doubled to six years under the
Three Strikes Law, plus five years for the prior strike conviction.
       Porter appeals.

                            DISCUSSION

1.    Denial of the Subpoena Requests
       Porter contends the court erred when it denied his requests
to issue subpoenas duces tecum to obtain various phone and
business records and to subpoena Clarissa, Peggy’s sister, to
testify at trial. We disagree.
      1.1.   Relevant Background
      Prior to trial, Porter asked the court to issue a subpoena
duces tecum to obtain Peggy’s and Bette F.’s5 cell phone records
from 2014 (Phone Records). Porter argued the records could
impeach Peggy’s and Bette’s credibility, as well as the credibility
of two other women he accused of being involved in the alleged

5 Porter also accused Bette of being involved in the alleged

pornographic video production scheme. She testified at trial.

                                   10
pornographic video production scheme—Elda M. and Lisa P.,6 if
the records showed those women lied when they claimed they did
not meet each other until after Porter was arrested in September
2014. If the Phone Records showed the women lied about when
they met each other, Porter argued, the jury could also infer the
women were involved in the alleged video production scheme and
had lied when they claimed otherwise. If the Phone Records
showed Peggy lied about those facts, Porter argued, the jury
could also find she lied when she claimed she feared for her
safety after he sent her a copy of his screenplay in November
2017.
       Porter also asked the court to issue a subpoena duces
tecum to obtain business records, including “financial and
personnel” information, from Redtube.com, a pornography
website (Business Records). Specifically, Porter sought records
associated with nine pornographic videos he found on the website
that he sent to Peggy in 2014. Porter argued the records could
show Peggy and the other women he accused of being involved in
the alleged video production scheme produced the videos at issue
in his request. The records could also show, Porter claimed, that
Peggy and the other women lied about when they first contacted
each other. According to Porter, if the Business Records showed
Peggy lied about those facts, the jury could infer she also lied
when she claimed she feared for her safety after he sent her a
copy of his screenplay.
       The court denied Porter’s request to subpoena the Phone
Records “for lack of materiality and lack of a showing of good
cause.” The court did “not see the relevance of the telephone

6 Elda testified at trial. Lisa did not testify.

                                      11
records [from] 2014 as having bearing on an event that is alleged
to have occurred in this case on or about November 9th, 2017.”
Alternatively, the court explained, it would exclude the evidence
under Evidence Code section 352 because it would likely confuse
the jury to “go[] back to phone records [from] 2014 based on a
charge that occurred in November of 2017.”
      The court also denied Porter’s request to subpoena the
Business Records for lack of “relevance” and “materiality.” Even
assuming the records proved Peggy and the other women were in
contact with each other and participating in a scheme to produce
pornographic videos featuring Porter, the court explained, there
was a “temporal disconnect” between that evidence and the
conduct giving rise to the charges in this case. Specifically, the
court found evidence of Peggy’s and the other women’s conduct in
2014 was not relevant to whether Peggy was in sustained fear
after Porter sent her a copy of his screenplay in November 2017.
      Porter also moved to subpoena Clarissa to testify at trial.
Porter wanted to question her about why she was named as a
protected person on the restraining order Peggy obtained around
August 2014. According to Porter, Clarissa could testify she was
named in Peggy’s restraining order because she also was part of
the alleged scheme to produce pornographic videos featuring
Porter. Porter also wanted to question Clarissa about her income.
He claimed Clarissa purchased an expensive car and rented a
“luxury apartment,” which he believed she could not afford while
“working as an admin assistant.” Porter opined that Clarissa
could testify she made additional money through her role in the
alleged video production scheme. Finally, Porter claimed Clarissa
could testify Peggy was involved in the alleged pornographic
video production scheme, which would show Peggy lied when she

                               12
claimed otherwise. Like the Phone Records and Business
Records, Porter argued, Clarissa’s testimony could impeach
Peggy’s claim that she feared for her safety after he sent her a
copy of his screenplay.
       The court denied Porter’s request to subpoena Clarissa to
testify at trial. The court found Clarissa’s testimony would not be
relevant to any issue at trial. The court also noted that even if
Clarissa’s testimony was relevant, it would nevertheless exclude
that testimony under Evidence Code section 352 because its
probative value would be substantially outweighed by the
probability it would confuse the jury.
      1.2.   The court did not err in denying Porter’s
             subpoena requests.
      Porter argues the court abused its discretion and violated
his state and federal due process rights when it denied his
subpoena requests. Porter claims the Phone Records, the
Business Records, and Clarissa’s testimony were relevant for the
same purpose—i.e., they could have impeached the credibility of
Peggy, Bette, and the other women he accused of being involved
in the alleged scheme to produce pornographic videos.
Specifically, Porter argues, that evidence would have undermined
the witnesses’ credibility had it shown they lied about their
involvement in the alleged video production scheme and about
when they first met each other. Had he been able to use the
sought-after evidence to impeach the witnesses’ credibility on
those issues, Porter contends, he could have materially
undermined the People’s evidence supporting his criminal threats
conviction, especially Peggy’s testimony that she feared for her
safety after he sent her a copy of his screenplay.

                                13
       As we explain, the court did not err when it denied Porter’s
subpoena requests. Even assuming the court issued the
requested subpoenas and determined the Phone Records,
Business Records, and Clarissa’s testimony were relevant to show
Peggy and the other women lied when they denied involvement
in the alleged video production scheme and claimed they first met
each other after Porter was arrested in 2014, those facts are
collateral to the material, disputed issues in this case, and the
court had broad discretion to exclude collateral evidence offered
for impeachment purposes.7 (See People v. Contreras (2013) 58
Cal.4th 123, 152 (Contreras) [trial courts have broad discretion to
exclude evidence offered for impeachment that is collateral to and
has no relevance to the action].)
       Evidence is relevant if it has some “tendency in reason to
prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action.” (Evid. Code, § 210.) Relevant
evidence includes evidence “relevant to the credibility of a
witness.” (Ibid.) Conversely, evidence is “collateral” if it “ ‘has no
relevancy to prove or disprove any issue in the action.’ ” (People v.
Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 9.) A fact may bear on a witness’s
credibility and still be collateral to the case. (Contreras, supra, 58
Cal.4th at p. 152; see, e.g., People v. Dement (2011) 53 Cal.4th 1,
50–52 (Dement) [inmate who testified for the prosecution about
witnessing a prison murder could not be impeached with

7 Because we assume the records and testimony Porter sought to

obtain through his subpoena requests would have established the facts
Porter claims they were relevant to prove, and because Porter doesn’t
argue that evidence was relevant for any other purposes, we focus our
analysis on whether the court properly excluded the evidence targeted
by Porter’s requests.

                                 14
collateral evidence that he had lied in court about his prior
murder conviction], disapproved on other grounds in People v.
Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1216.)
       The trial court has “wide latitude” under state law to
exclude impeachment evidence that is collateral and otherwise
has no relevance to the action. (Contreras, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p.
152.) “This exercise of discretion necessarily encompasses a
determination that the probative value of such evidence is
‘substantially outweighed’ by its prejudicial, ‘confusing,’ or time-
consuming nature.” (Ibid.) Additionally, the exclusion of
collateral impeachment evidence does not implicate federal
constitutional rights so long “as the excluded evidence would not
have produced a ‘ “ ‘significantly different impression’ ” ’ of the
witness’s credibility.” (Ibid.)
       The court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded the
Phone Records, the Business Records, and Clarissa’s testimony
as collateral impeachment evidence. At trial, Porter admitted he
wrote the screenplay and sent it to Peggy. Porter also admitted
he violated the 2015 criminal protective order when he contacted
Peggy in 2017. Thus, as Porter acknowledges, the primary
disputed issues in this case were whether: (1) he intended to
threaten Peggy when he sent her the screenplay; and (2) whether
sending Peggy the screenplay caused her to be in sustained fear
for her safety. (See People v. Toledo (2001) 26 Cal.4th 221, 227–
228 [describing elements of criminal threats].) Evidence that
Peggy, Bette, and other women participated in a scheme to
produce pornographic videos featuring Porter several years
before Porter sent Peggy the screenplay has little tendency to
directly prove these disputed issues. If anything, such evidence
would support a negative inference about Porter’s motive to

                                 15
threaten Peggy when he sent her the screenplay—i.e., he wanted
to retaliate for her participation in the video production scheme.
As for evidence that Peggy and the other women met each other
before Porter was arrested around September 2014, more than
three years before the events giving rise to this case, it is not
directly relevant to either disputed issue.
       To be sure, evidence that Peggy, Bette, or Elda lied about
when they met each other or whether they participated in the
alleged video production scheme was relevant to assessing their
credibility. (See People v. Lavergne (1971) 4 Cal.3d 735, 742
(Lavergne) [evidence that contradicts a witness’s testimony is
relevant for impeachment purposes].) But a defendant is not
entitled to engage in an unlimited inquiry into collateral matters
(People v. Homick (2012) 55 Cal.4th 816, 865) or to attack a
witness’s credibility with “time-consuming and remote evidence
that was not obviously probative on the question” at issue
(Dement, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 52). Here, it was more than
reasonable for the court to conclude the probative value of the
Phone Records, the Business Records, and Clarissa’s testimony
was substantially outweighed by the probability that introducing
such evidence would confuse the jury or consume too much time.
       As for the probative value of the evidence, it was slight.
(See Lavergne, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 742 [“the collateral character
of the [impeachment] evidence reduces its probative value”].)
There are obvious reasons why Peggy and the other women
would lie about their participation in a pornographic video
production scheme centered around Porter. They could have
wanted to avoid criminal prosecution and protect their
professional or social reputations. And, for reasons made clear by
Porter’s conduct since 2014, they could have wanted to avoid

                                16
Porter’s retaliation. But evidence that Peggy and the other
women lied about their participation in the video production
scheme has little, if any, tendency to show Peggy lied about
fearing for her safety after Porter sent her a copy of his
screenplay, especially considering Porter’s self-admitted history
of threatening and harassing Peggy. (See id. at p. 742 [“A witness
may have a strong reason to lie about the collateral fact which
reason would furnish no motive to lie in [her] other testimony.”].)
       Additionally, the probative value of the Phone Records, the
Business Records, and Clarissa’s testimony was substantially
outweighed by the likelihood that introducing such evidence
would consume too much time and confuse the jury.8 As for the
records, Porter would have needed to introduce numerous
documents along with testimony from multiple witnesses
qualified to explain the contents of those documents. Such
evidence also likely would have confused the jury, as it concerned
communications and transactions involving multiple individuals
that took place several years before the incident giving rise to
this case. While Clarissa’s testimony may not have consumed an
inordinate amount of time, it was still likely to confuse the jury
for the same reasons—i.e., it concerned events significantly
predating the incident in this case.
       For the same reasons, introducing the Phone Records,
Business Records, and Clarissa’s testimony would not have
caused the jury to have a “ ‘ “ ‘significantly different
impression’ ” ’ ” of the credibility of Peggy, Bette, or the other
women Porter accused of being involved in the pornographic

8 As discussed more fully below, the court has broad discretion to limit

or exclude evidence under Evidence Code section 352.

                                   17
video production scheme. (Contreras, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 152.)
That is, the women may have had strong motives to lie about
their roles in the scheme which do not reflect they also had a
motive to lie about their reactions to Porter’s harassing conduct.
(See Lavergne, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 742.) Thus, excluding the
Phone Records, Business Records, and Clarissa’s testimony did
not violate Porter’s due process rights.
2.    Other Evidentiary Rulings
      Porter next contends the court erred when it excluded
copies of the first draft of his screenplay and a review of the
screenplay’s first draft from an online review service. Porter also
contends the court abused its discretion when it allowed him to
introduce only 10 of around 100 pornographic photographs. We
disagree with both contentions.
      2.1.   Applicable Law
      Under Evidence Code section 352, a court has discretion to
exclude or limit otherwise relevant evidence “if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its
admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b)
create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the
issues, or of misleading the jury.” We review a ruling excluding
evidence under Evidence Code section 352 for abuse of discretion.
(People v. Olguin (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1373.) We will
reverse a court’s ruling under Evidence Code section 352 when no
reasonable judge would have made the same determination as
the one on review. (People v. Clark (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 270,
292.)

                                18
      2.2.   First Screenplay Draft and Review
       Before trial, Porter sought to introduce a copy of the first
draft of his screenplay, which included a nonviolent ending.
Porter also wanted to introduce a copy of a 10-page review of the
first draft of his screenplay, which he obtained from an online
review service. The review recommended Porter change the
draft’s nonviolent ending because it was too “weak.” Porter
claimed the first draft of his screenplay and the review showed he
added a violent ending to the screenplay to increase its appeal,
not to threaten Peggy. Thus, Porter argued, the evidence was
relevant to prove he lacked the intent necessary to support a
criminal threats conviction.
       The court ruled Porter could not introduce a copy of the
first draft of his screenplay or a copy of the first draft’s review,
but it allowed him to testify about his “intentions” when he wrote
the screenplay because such evidence would “certainly be
relevant on [his] state of mind and [his] intent or lack thereof.”
The court explained that it excluded a copy of the screenplay
review because it was not relevant whether “Hollywood people
from a website think [Porter’s] screenplay was good, poor, needs
work or a blockbuster in the making.” The court also noted that
Porter did not need to introduce a “170-page document [i.e., the
first draft of his screenplay] as an exhibit for the jurors to
consider … [because his] testimony will be enough.”
       The court did not abuse its discretion when it precluded
Porter from introducing a copy of the first draft of his screenplay
or a copy of the draft’s review. The court allowed Porter to testify
to the same facts he sought to establish by introducing the first
draft of his screenplay and its review—i.e., that he originally
drafted the screenplay without a violent ending and added a

                                19
violent ending in response to a reviewer’s criticism. (See People v.
Trujeque (2015) 61 Cal.4th 227, 269 [Evidence Code section 352
allows a court to exclude evidence on the ground that it is
cumulative].) In any event, Porter fails to explain how he was
prejudiced by the court’s decision to exclude copies of the first
draft and the draft’s review while still allowing him to testify
about why he changed the ending of the screenplay’s first draft.
Thus, any error in precluding Porter from introducing copies of
the first draft of his screenplay and the first draft’s review was
harmless. (See Trujeque, at p. 269.)
      2.3.   Pornographic Photographs
       Before trial, Porter filed a motion to introduce around 100
screenshots from pornographic videos he found on the internet,
which he claimed depicted digitally altered versions of him
having sex with Peggy and other women. Porter argued the
photographs were relevant to impeach Peggy’s and Bette’s
credibility because they refuted the witnesses’ statements
denying they were involved in the alleged scheme to produce
pornographic videos featuring Porter.
       Initially, the court ruled Porter could not introduce the
photographs, finding they were not probative of a material issue
in the case. In any event, the court explained, it would not permit
Porter “to have a mini-trial on the issue of pornography and
whether or not [he is] depicted in the[] photographs.” The court
later changed its ruling, however, allowing Porter to introduce 10
of the proposed photographs at trial.
       Like the Phone Records, the Business Records, and
Clarissa’s testimony, Porter wanted to introduce the
pornographic photographs to impeach the credibility of Peggy,
Bette, and the other women he accused of being involved in the

                                 20
alleged scheme to produce pornographic videos. Thus, the
photographs were collateral impeachment evidence, and the court
had broad discretion to limit such evidence. (Contreras, supra, 58
Cal.4th at p. 152.)
      It was more than appropriate for the court to limit Porter to
introducing only 10 of the nearly 100 proposed photographs. As
we explained above, the probative value of collateral
impeachment evidence focused on the alleged pornographic video
production scheme was slight. And that probative value was
substantially outweighed by the risk that introducing nearly 100
photographs taken from pornographic videos, none of which
directly related to the incident giving rise to the charges in this
case, would consume too much time and confuse the jury.
3.    The abstract of judgment must be corrected.
      Porter argues the abstract of judgment erroneously reflects
the court imposed more than $800 in fines and fees. The People
agree, and so do we, that the abstract of judgment must be
corrected because it does not accurately reflect the court’s oral
pronouncement of sentence.
      In a criminal case, the oral pronouncement of a sentence is
the judgment. (People v. Mesa (1975) 14 Cal.3d 466, 471.) An
abstract of judgment, on the other hand, is not the judgment, and
it does not control if different from the court’s oral
pronouncement. (People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185
(Mitchell).) Thus, the abstract of judgment “may not add to or
modify the judgment it purports to digest or summarize.” (Ibid.)
To the extent a minute order diverges from the oral record of the
sentencing proceedings it purports to memorialize, the deviation
is presumed to be the product of clerical error. (Mesa, at p. 471.)
We may order correction of an abstract of judgment that does not

                                21
accurately reflect the oral pronouncement of sentence. (Mitchell,
at pp. 185–188.)
       At sentencing, the court did not impose any fines or fees,
finding “good cause to waive [them] in this matter.” Porter’s
abstract of judgment, however, states that the court imposed the
following fines and fees: (1) a $400 restitution fine; (2) a $400
parole revocation fine; (3) a $40 court operations assessment; and
(4) a $30 conviction assessment. Because the abstract of
judgment lists $870 in fines and fees the court did not impose, it
must be corrected to remove them. (See Mitchell, supra, 26
Cal.4th at pp. 185–188.) The court is directed to do so on remand.
4.    Dual Use of Facts at Sentencing
       Porter next argues the matter must be remanded for
resentencing because the court violated section 1170, subdivision
(b)(5) when it used his 2015 criminal threats conviction to impose
an upper term for his current criminal threats conviction and to
impose a five-year prior strike enhancement. The People do not
respond to this argument in their respondent’s brief. We agree
with Porter that the matter must be remanded for resentencing.
       At sentencing, the court selected the upper term of three
years for Porter’s criminal threats conviction. It explained its
decision to do so as follows: “The court selects the high term
based on [Porter’s] prior criminal record, specifically, [he] was
convicted by plea of making criminal threats and felony stalking
of the same victim in the current case, Peggy [F.]. The contact
and current case with Peggy [F.] occurred less than a year …
after [Porter] was paroled after his five-year prison sentence for
acts of violence and threats against Peggy [F.] in 2014. [¶] The
court rejects that low term would be appropriate and rejects that
midterm would be appropriate based on the fact that [Porter]

                                22
engaged in the same conduct, placing [Peggy F.] in no doubt a
terrorized state of mind thinking the defendant may have been
rehabilitated from his five-year imprisonment and thinking she’d
be protected by the criminal order, i.e., that Mr. Porter would
follow the orders of the court. None of that occurred as we have
evidence of the fact that the defendant was convicted by a jury
with all due process rights attached, and the jury found that he,
in fact, committed a violation of Penal Code section 422 and a
violation of the court order in count 2.” The court also used
Porter’s 2015 criminal threats conviction to double the upper
term for his current criminal threats conviction and to impose a
five-year prior strike enhancement.
       Section 1170, subdivision (b)(5) states that the trial court
“may not impose an upper term by using the fact of any
enhancement upon which sentence is imposed under any
provision of law.” Former section 1170, subdivision (b), which was
in effect when the court sentenced Porter, included the same
prohibition on the dual use of facts to impose a sentence
enhancement and an upper term. (See former § 1170, subd. (b).)
       As we just noted, the court explicitly relied on Porter’s 2015
criminal threats conviction when it imposed the upper term for
his current criminal threats conviction. The court also imposed a
five-year prior strike enhancement for the same prior conviction.
This was error. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(5); see People v. McFearson
(2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 388, 395 (McFearson) [trial court erred
when it used defendant’s prior conviction to impose an
aggravated sentence and a prior prison term enhancement].)
       Porter argues the court’s error requires us to remand the
matter for resentencing. As we noted above, the People do not
address this issue. We conclude remand is appropriate. In

                                 23
imposing the upper term, the court relied on similarities between
Porter’s 2015 criminal threats conviction and his current criminal
threats conviction. Thus, although the court noted it also was
relying on Porter’s 2015 stalking conviction when it selected the
upper term for his current criminal threats conviction, we cannot
determine whether the court would still have imposed an
aggravated sentence had it not considered the 2015 criminal
threats conviction. (See McFearson, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p.
395 [remanding for resentencing because reviewing court could
not determine whether trial court would have imposed
aggravated sentence without considering improper prior
conviction].)
      This is especially true considering S.B. 567 went into effect
while Porter’s appeal was pending. Although the court had broad
discretion to select the upper term when it sentenced Porter, S.B.
567’s presumption in favor of applying the middle term, which
applies retroactively to nonfinal cases like Porter’s (see In re
Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 744–745; People v. Flores (2022) 73
Cal.App.5th 1032, 1039), can only be overcome by certain
aggravating factors that generally have to be “stipulated to by the
defendant, or ... found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by
the jury or by the judge in a court trial.” (Stats. 2021, ch. 731, §
1.3, amending § 1170, subd. (b); People v. Flores (2022) 75
Cal.App.5th 495, 500.) As Porter points out, when it imposed the
upper term for his current criminal threats conviction, the court
relied on some factors, including the nature and circumstances of
that crime and Peggy’s vulnerability, that the jury did not find
true beyond a reasonable doubt and to which Porter did not
stipulate. (See People v. Boyce (2014) 59 Cal.4th 672, 728–729
[cautioning that it may be difficult for a reviewing court to

                                24
conclude with confidence that the same sentencing decision
would have been made had the aggravating factors been
submitted to the jury].)
      In short, we conclude Porter’s sentence must be vacated
and the matter must be remanded for a new sentencing hearing,
at which the court shall reconsider Porter’s sentence in light of
S.B. 567. (See People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 459, 465
[S.B. 567’s “ameliorative amendments to section 1170,
subdivision (b) apply retroactively to all cases not yet final as of
January 1, 2022”].)

                          DISPOSITION

      The sentence is vacated, and the matter is remanded for
resentencing consistent with the views expressed in this opinion.
The judgment is otherwise affirmed. Upon resentencing, the
court shall strike from the abstract of judgment the $870 in fines
and fees that the court did not impose, prepare an amended
abstract of judgment, and send a certified copy to the Department
of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                       LAVIN, J.
WE CONCUR:

      EDMON, P. J.

      ADAMS, J.

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