Court Opinion

ID: 9383567
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-30 18:01:01.370482+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:46.248692
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-13455   Document: 24-1     Date Filed: 03/30/2023   Page: 1 of 9

                                                 [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                              No. 22-13455
                         Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

       SOUTHERN-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY,
                                           Plaintiff-Counter Defendant
                                                              Appellee,
       versus
       TASMAN SERVICES LLC,
       JAMIE LYNN BAUMGARTNER,

                                         Defendants-Counter Claimants
                                                          Appellants.

                         ____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-13455     Document: 24-1     Date Filed: 03/30/2023   Page: 2 of 9

       2                     Opinion of the Court                22-13455

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Florida
                 D.C. Docket No. 8:21-cv-01510-VMC-TGW
                          ____________________

       Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and NEWSOM and GRANT, Cir-
       cuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Tasman Services LLC and Jamie Lynn Baumgartner appeal
       the summary judgment in favor of Southern-Owners Insurance
       Company. Southern-Owners obtained a declaratory judgment that
       it owed no duty to defend or indemnify Tasman in a state negli-
       gence action brought by Baumgartner. Tasman and Baumgartner
       challenge the ruling that the policy’s exclusion clause applied be-
       cause two other insurance policies provided “similar coverage,” a
       phrase that they contend is ambiguous and must be construed in
       their favor. Because our precedent holds that the “similar cover-
       age” provision at issue is unambiguous and applies when other in-
       surance covers similar types of risks, even if it does not provide
       similar policy limits, see S.-Owners Ins. Co. v. Easdon Rhodes &
       Assocs., 872 F.3d 1161, 1170 (11th Cir. 2017), we affirm.
                              I. BACKGROUND
             Tasman purchased a commercial general liability policy
       from Southern-Owners, which excluded coverage for bodily injury
       and property damage arising out of the use of an automobile. Tas-
       man also purchased a commercial general liability plus
USCA11 Case: 22-13455     Document: 24-1     Date Filed: 03/30/2023    Page: 3 of 9

       22-13455               Opinion of the Court                       3

       endorsement, which expanded coverage to include bodily injury
       and property damage arising out of the use of an automobile that
       Tasman does not own and is used in its business. The endorsement
       policy stated that coverage applied so long as Tasman “do[es] not
       have any other insurance available to [it] which affords the same or
       similar coverage.” The policy limit was $1 million.
               In August 2016, Tasman employee Kasey Mitchell collided
       head-on with Baumgartner while driving a U-Haul truck leased to
       Tasman, causing Baumgartner to sustain severe and permanent in-
       juries. At the time of the accident, Mitchell was insured under a
       GEICO insurance policy, which provided coverage for bodily in-
       jury and property damage arising out of her use of an automobile.
       The GEICO policy limit per occurrence was $20,000 for bodily in-
       jury, or $10,000 per person, and $25,000 for property damage. The
       U-Haul lease agreement also afforded Tasman and any authorized
       driver with “the minimum limits required by the . . . compulsory
       insurance law of the jurisdiction in which the accident occurs,”
       which in Florida was $20,000 for bodily injury, or $10,000 per per-
       son, and $10,000 for property damage.
              Baumgartner sued Mitchell and Tasman in a Florida court
       and alleged that Tasman was vicariously liable for Mitchell’s negli-
       gence. Tasman sought a defense and indemnity from South-
       ern-Owners, which agreed to provide a defense under reservation.
       Southern-Owners then filed a complaint in the district court for a
       declaratory judgment that it owed no duty to defend or indemnify.
       Tasman counterclaimed for an opposite declaratory judgment.
USCA11 Case: 22-13455      Document: 24-1     Date Filed: 03/30/2023     Page: 4 of 9

       4                      Opinion of the Court                 22-13455

              Southern-Owners and Tasman both moved for summary
       judgment. Southern-Owners argued that it had no duty to defend
       or indemnify because the GEICO policy and the U-Haul agreement
       constituted “other insurance . . . which afford[ed] . . . similar cov-
       erage,” so the exclusion clause applied. Southern-Owners argued
       that this case was indistinguishable from our holding in Easdon
       Rhodes that the “similar coverage” provision, within the same en-
       dorsement policy from Southern-Owners, was unambiguous and
       triggered whenever another policy was available to pay for the
       same liability claimed. See Easdon Rhodes, 872 F.3d at 1170.
              Tasman and Baumgartner argued that Easdon Rhodes was
       incorrectly decided and that, because the phrase “similar coverage”
       was ambiguous, Florida law required it to be construed in favor of
       coverage. In support, Tasman proffered expert testimony from Jef-
       frey Posner. According to Posner, interpreting whether different
       insurance policies offered “similar coverage” required analyzing
       both the specific insurable risks and the applicable coverage terms,
       including coverage limits, deductibles, and premiums. Tasman ar-
       gued that Posner’s report was evidence of one reasonable interpre-
       tation of “similar coverage” that required the policies at issue to
       also have similar policy limits. Southern-Owners moved to exclude
       Posner’s report because it provided a legal opinion that conflicted
       with our decision in Easdon Rhodes.
             The district court entered summary judgment in favor of
       Southern-Owners. The district court ruled that, under Easdon
       Rhodes, “similar coverage” unambiguously referred to “the
USCA11 Case: 22-13455      Document: 24-1     Date Filed: 03/30/2023     Page: 5 of 9

       22-13455               Opinion of the Court                         5

       inclusion of a specific risk in an insurance policy.” Id. at 1166. The
       district court ruled that because the GEICO policy, U-Haul agree-
       ment, and endorsement policy all covered the same specific insur-
       able risks of bodily injury and property damages, the GEICO policy
       and U-Haul agreement provided “similar coverage.” The district
       court granted the motion to exclude Posner’s expert testimony that
       “similar coverage” was ambiguous. The district court stated that,
       because “similar coverage” was unambiguous as a matter of law
       and there was no issue of fact in dispute that extrinsic evidence
       would help clarify, Posner’s report was unhelpful and could not be
       used to “manufacture ambiguity.”
                          II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
              We review de novo a summary judgment. Newcomb v.
       Spring Creek Cooler Inc., 926 F.3d 709, 713 (11th Cir. 2019). “We
       must view all of the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-
       moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s fa-
       vor.” Id. Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant
       shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
       the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.
       P. 56(a). We review the decision to exclude expert testimony for
       abuse of discretion. Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris USA, 346
       F.3d 1287, 1298 (11th Cir. 2003).
                                III. DISCUSSION
             Eason Rhodes controls this appeal. Tasman and Baumgart-
       ner argue, as the insureds did in Easdon Rhodes, that “similar
USCA11 Case: 22-13455      Document: 24-1      Date Filed: 03/30/2023     Page: 6 of 9

       6                       Opinion of the Court                 22-13455

       coverage” is ambiguous and must be construed in its favor. We
       considered in Easdon Rhodes the meaning of “similar coverage” in
       the context of this same endorsement policy and discerned only
       one reasonable interpretation—that “similar coverage” unambigu-
       ously referred to “another policy . . . [that] is available to pay for
       the same [or similar] liability claimed under the policy at issue.” 872
       F.3d at 1168 (alterations in original). We concluded that “the term
       ‘coverage’ [was] intended to reference particularized risks included
       within a policy rather than the entire scope of protection the policy
       offers.” Id. at 1166. We explained that, although Florida law re-
       quires that ambiguities within a policy be resolved in favor of cov-
       erage, “[t]o allow for such a construction, the insurance policy
       ‘must actually be ambiguous.’” Id. at 1164 (quoting Taurus Hold-
       ings, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. and Guar. Co., 913 So. 2d 528, 532 (Fla. 2005).
       For the reasons we articulated in Easdon Rhodes, we disagree with
       Tasman and Baumgartner that “similar coverage” is ambiguous.
       See id. at 1165-70; United States v. Martinez, 606 F.3d 1303, 1305
       (11th Cir. 2010) (“[U]nder the prior precedent rule, we are bound
       to follow a prior binding precedent unless and until it is overruled
       by this court en banc or by the Supreme Court.”).
             Moreover, a Florida intermediate appellate court has ap-
       proved our reasoning in Easdon Rhodes and held that the same en-
       dorsement policy did not extend coverage when other insurance
       was available to cover the same risk. See Walls v. S. Owners Ins.
       Co., 321 So. 3d 856, 859-60 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2021). As Tasman
       and Baumgartner acknowledge, when sitting in diversity we are
USCA11 Case: 22-13455     Document: 24-1      Date Filed: 03/30/2023    Page: 7 of 9

       22-13455               Opinion of the Court                        7

       bound to follow an intermediate Florida appellate court decision
       unless we conclude that there is persuasive evidence that the Flor-
       ida Supreme Court would rule otherwise. See Bravo v. United
       States, 577 F.3d 1324, 1326 (11th Cir. 2006). But Tasman and Baum-
       gartner have failed to identify persuasive evidence that the Florida
       Supreme Court would rule otherwise.
               Tasman and Baumgartner argue that “similar coverage”
       plainly means that the comparable policy must provide similar lim-
       its, but we have rejected this argument too. See Easdon Rhodes,
       872 F.3d at 1169-70 (“[The] argument that differences in policy lim-
       its between the [auto] policy and the Endorsement indicates the
       coverages are not similar is likewise unavailing.”). We explained
       that the term “coverage” was used throughout the endorsement in
       the context of specific types of risk for which coverage was pro-
       vided. Id. at 1166. We reasoned that interpreting “coverage” to re-
       fer to the full scope of protection provided by a policy would effec-
       tively read out the “any other insurance” phrase and render it “es-
       sentially meaningless since only a very specific type of insurance
       would ever fall within the exclusion clause’s purview.” Id. at 1167.
       We considered the “substantial discrepancy in cost and policy
       limit”—that the endorsement cost about $400 less per year than the
       auto policy, yet the endorsement provided a policy limit 40 times
       higher—and reasoned that “[s]uch a low price for such expansive
       coverage is only adequately explained by the presence of an exclu-
       sion clause which routinely applies, since the specific risks dealt
       with by the Endorsement would almost always be covered by
USCA11 Case: 22-13455      Document: 24-1      Date Filed: 03/30/2023     Page: 8 of 9

       8                       Opinion of the Court                 22-13455

       some other auto policy.” Id. at 1168. We remain “satisfied that the
       plain meaning of the Endorsement’s exclusion clause is concerned
       only with the type rather than amount of available ‘similar [insur-
       ance] coverage.’” Id. at 1170 (emphasis added, alteration in origi-
       nal); see Martinez, 606 F.3d at 1305.
              Tasman and Baumgartner erroneously argue that their prof-
       fered expert testimony distinguishes their case from Easdon
       Rhodes by establishing that “similar coverage” is subject to more
       than one reasonable interpretation, so it should not have been ex-
       cluded by the district court. Expert testimony is admissible if the
       expert is qualified to testify competently regarding the matters he
       intends to address, the methodology by which the expert reaches
       his conclusions is sufficiently reliable, and the testimony assists the
       trier of fact to determine a fact in issue. Daubert v. Merrell Dow
       Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993); Fed. R. Civ. P. 702.
       Under Florida law, construction of an insurance policy is a question
       of law, as is the issue of whether an ambiguity exists. Jones v. Utica
       Mut. Ins. Co., 463 So. 2d 1153, 1157 (Fla. 1985); Wheeler v.
       Wheeler, Erwin & Fountain, P.A., 964 So. 2d 745, 749 (Fla. Dist.
       Ct. App. 2007). The district court did not abuse its discretion in ex-
       cluding the proffered expert testimony because there was no issue
       of fact that needed to be resolved. The district court, consistent
       with our precedent and state law, Easdon Rhodes, 872 F.3d at 1165;
       Walls, 321 So. 3d at 859-60, correctly determined that “similar cov-
       erage” was unambiguous as a matter of law. Because there was no
       ambiguity to resolve, the proffered testimony would not assist the
USCA11 Case: 22-13455    Document: 24-1    Date Filed: 03/30/2023   Page: 9 of 9

       22-13455             Opinion of the Court                     9

       court in deciding the case. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593; Williamson
       Oil, 346 F.3d at 1298.
                             IV. CONCLUSION
            We affirm the summary judgment in favor of South-
       ern-Owners.