Court Opinion

ID: 9392086
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-04 07:00:18.137326+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:17.579686
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     GEORGE DUGGAN,                                  DOCKET NUMBER
                 Appellant,                          SF-1221-16-0150-W-2

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,                          DATE: May 3, 2023
                 Agency.

                       THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           George Duggan, Newman, California, pro se.

           David Gallagher, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                     REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initia l decision, which
     dismissed his individual right of action (IRA) appeal as untimely refiled without
     good cause for the delay in filing. For the reasons discussed below, we GRANT
     the appellant’s petition for review, VACATE the initial decision and REMAND

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                            2

     the case to the regional office for further adjudication in accordance with this
     Order.
¶2         The appellant is a Senior Auditor, GS-0511-12, with the Defense Contract
     Audit Agency. Duggan v. Department of Defense, MSPB Docket No. SF-1221-
     16-0150-W-1, Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 1. On December 5, 2016, he
     filed this appeal alleging that he made protected disclosures of a violat ion of law,
     rule, or regulation; gross waste of funds; abuse of authority; and gross
     mismanagement, which were contributing factors in a series of agency actions
     taken against him between 2007 and 2012. IAF, Tabs 1-4. The appellant later
     moved for dismissal of the appeal without prejudice pending the Board’s ruling
     on his petition for review in a prior IRA appeal, Duggan v. Department of
     Defense, MSPB Docket No. SF-1221-14-0544-W-2, Final Order (Sept. 13, 2016)
     [hereinafter Duggan I]. IAF, Tab 6. The agency did not object. 2 IAF, Tab 9.
     The administrative judge dismissed the appeal without prejudice on February 3,
     2016. IAF, Tab 10, Initial Decision.        In the order dismissing the appeal, the
     administrative judge advised the appellant that he might “refile his appeal within
     30 days of the issuance of the Board’s final decision in SF -1221-14-0544-W-2, or
     one year from today’s date, whichever is earlier.” Id. at 2 (emphasis in original).
     The Board issued its Final Order in Duggan I on September 13, 2016.                 The
     deadline for refiling the instant appeal thus became October 13, 2016. Id. at 1.
¶3         The appellant refiled this appeal on November 11, 2016.                Duggan v.
     Department of Defense, MSPB Docket No. SF-1221-16-0150-W-2, Refiled
     Appeal File (RAF), Tab 1.        In the acknowledgment order, the administrative
     judge advised the appellant that his refiling notice appeared to be untimely by
     29 days, and he ordered the appellant to file evidence and argument showing good

     2
       The agency did, however, object to the appellant’s proposed refiling deadl ine, which
     was 1 year from the date of his motion to dismiss. IAF, Tabs 6, 9. The agency
     proposed instead that the administrative judge set the refiling deadline to fall 6 months
     from the date of the appellant’s motion or 30 days from the date of the Board’s final
     decision in Duggan I, whichever was later. IAF, Tab 9.
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     cause for the delay in refiling. RAF, Tab 2 at 1-4. In his response, the appellant
     stated that he mistakenly believed he had 60 days in which to refile his appeal.
     RAF, Tab 3 at 5. He explained that he confused the time limit for refiling the
     instant appeal with the time limit for filing a court appeal of the Board’s Final
     Order in Duggan I. Id. He stated that, because he had confused the length of the
     two filing periods, he failed to request an extension of time in which to refile this
     appeal.   Id.   He further stated that his confusion was caused by two medical
     conditions, knee surgery on September 23, 2016, during the refiling period, and
     the symptoms of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), a condition with which
     he was diagnosed on November 2, 2016. Id. He attached to his response progress
     notes from his surgeon stating that he had a pre- and post-surgical diagnosis of a
     medial meniscus tear, which was repaired by arthroscopic surgery to the left knee
     on September 23, 2016.      Id. at 6.   The appellant also attached a brief email
     message dated November 6, 2016, from a psychologist, indicating that the
     appellant’s test results showed that he suffered from PTSD.        Id. at 6-7; RAF,
     Tab 1 at 6-7.
¶4         The administrative judge acknowledged that the initial appeal was timely
     filed and that the agency neither objected to the dismissal without prejudice nor
     alleged that it would be prejudiced if the refiling deadline was waived. RAF,
     Tab 10, Initial Decision (ID) at 5.     He explained, however, that the refiling
     deadline was clearly set forth in the decision dismissing the appeal without
     prejudice, the deadline fell within the parameters requested by the appellant, and
     the 29-day delay was not a minimal one. Id. He noted that the appellant, though
     pro se, “has had numerous previous Board appeals in which he has represented
     himself effectively, and is very familiar with Board case law and procedures.” Id.
     He further noted that nothing in the progress notes indicated that the appellant
     was mentally impaired either before or after the surgery, and the email message
     from his psychologist, which came 24 days after the refiling deadline, did not
     state how, when, or if the diagnosis adversely affected the appellant’s capacity to
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     refile, or to request an extension to do so. ID at 4. The administrative judge thus
     dismissed the appeal as untimely refiled without good cause shown for the delay.
     ID at 5.
¶5         On review, the appellant argues that he did not know that his medical
     evidence would be deemed inadequate based on the guidance he received from the
     administrative judge.    Had he known, he explains, he would have submitted
     additional evidence. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 5-6 (citing Lacy v.
     Department of the Navy, 78 M.S.P.R. 434 (1998) (“When, as here, an appellant
     states that the reason for a filing delay is physical or mental illness, he must
     receive explicit information regarding the legal standard for establishing good
     cause on that basis, and he must be afforded a fair opportunity to submit evidence
     and argument to show that he met that standard.”) (emphasis in original)).
     Nevertheless, the appellant argues, a reasonable person would conclude that his
     knee injury caused pain and distraction before the surgery, which occurred
     10 days into the refiling period, as well as pain during recovery. PFR File, Tab 1
     at 6. He asserts that he was thus impaired for the entire 30-day filing period. Id.
     at 6-7. As for the administrative judge’s dismissal of the PTSD diagnosis because
     it occurred after the refiling deadline, the appellant explains that PTSD develops
     from exposure to a traumatic event, and a reasonable person would expect there to
     be a lag in time between the triggering event and presentation of symptoms and
     the diagnosis. Id. at 7-8. The appellant also objects to the administrative judge’s
     characterization of him as a pro se appellant “who represented himself
     effectively, and is very familiar with Board case law and procedures,” namely
     because he has not prevailed in most of his Board litigation . Id. at 8.
¶6         The administrative judge correctly found that the refiled appeal was
     untimely by 29 days. ID at 2; RAF, Tab 2 at 2. As for whether the appellant has
     shown good cause for waiving the refiling deadline , the Board has held that its
     dismissal without prejudice policy should not become a trap that would deny the
     unwary pro se appellant of the opportunity to have his case decided on the merits.
                                                                                            5

     Brown v. Office of Personnel Management, 86 M.S.P.R. 417, ¶ 8 (2000). The
     Board has identified the following factors as supporting a finding of good cause
     for waiving a refiling deadline: an appellant’s pro se status; timely filing of the
     initial appeal; intent throughout the proceedings to file an appeal; minimal delay
     in refiling, and any confusion; the small number of dismissals without prejudice;
     an arbitrary refiling deadline; the agency’s failure to object to the dismissal
     without prejudice; and the lack of prejudice to the agency in allowing the refiled
     appeal to go forward. Gaddy v. Department of the Navy, 100 M.S.P.R. 485, ¶ 13
     (2005).    On the issue of timeliness, the appellant bears the burden of p roof.
     5 C.F.R. § 1201.57(c)(2).
¶7         In weighing the Gaddy factors here, several factors work in the appellant’s
     favor. 3   They include the appellant’s timely filing of his initial appeal , his
     articulated intent throughout the proceedings to refile his appeal, only a single
     dismissal without prejudice, and the agency’s failure to object to the dismissal
     without prejudice and the apparent lack of prejudice to the agency in allowing the
     refiled appeal to proceed. IAF, Tabs 1-4, 6, 9; RAF, Tab 6. However, the clarity
     of the order language dismissing the appeal without prejudice works against the
     appellant. IAF, Tab 10 at 2. We also do not consider the deadline to have been
     arbitrary. In fact, when he set the deadline, the administrative judge seems to
     have been influenced by the appellant’s preferences to the same extent that he
     was influenced by those of the agency. IAF, Tab 6 at 4, Tab 9 at 4, Tab 10 at 2.
     However, the order language includes an alternative deadline, which might have
     contributed to the confusion the appellant alleges. Brown, 86 M.S.P.R. 417, ¶ 8.
     A 29-day delay is not a minimal one, but the Board has remanded cases with
     similarly lengthy delays in refiling for consideration on the merits. See Jaramillo

     3
       In 2017, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, in an unpublished decision,
     cited Gaddy to vacate a Board decision in which the court held that the Board abused its
     discretion by concluding that Mr. Schnell’s petitions for appeal were untimely filed
     under circumstances less sympathetic than those presented here. Schnell v. Merit
     Systems Protection Board, 673 F. App’x 1011 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
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     v. Department of the Air Force, 106 M.S.P.R. 244, ¶ 5 (2007) (finding that the
     waiver of the refiling deadline was warranted even though the appellant’s
     representative miscalculated the deadline and refiled the appeal 29 days late).
¶8        Even if the appellant is, as the administrative judge characterized him, an
     effective self-representative before the Board and “very familiar with Board case
     law and procedures,” ID at 5, we cannot disregard his pro se status.              The
     administrative judge cited a nonprecedential order for the proposition that the
     Board now avoids distinctions between pro se and represented ap pellants. ID at 5
     (citing Snowden v. Department of the Interior, MSPB Docket No. DC-0752-11-
     0988-I-2, Final Order (June 28, 2013)). In Snowden, however, the Board did not
     invalidate the distinction between pro se and represented appellants . Instead, the
     Board simply offered examples of cases in which the other Gaddy factors
     outweighed the fact that the appellant had been represented.
¶9        Further, here, the appellant presented evidence of two medical conditions,
     outpatient surgery on his left knee, which occurred on the tenth day of the refiling
     period, and PTSD, which was diagnosed 24 days after the refiling period ended.
     RAF, Tab 1 at 6-7, Tab 3 at 6-7. His medical documentation is slim. As the
     administrative judge pointed out, it does not address how his conditions prevented
     him from refiling the appeal on time. ID at 4. We also reject the appellant’s
     contention that the administrative judge failed to inform him of the legal standard
     for establishing good cause. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5-6; RAF, Tab 2 at 3 n.2. Yet,
     the date that the appellant refiled—59 days after the Board issued its Final Order
     in Duggan I—is consistent with his assertion that he believed he had 60 days in
     which to refile his appeal. RAF, Tab 3 at 5. Although the agency argued that the
     appellant had adequate time in which to manage his affairs because he was on
     leave during the refiling period, RAF, Tab 6 at 6, we cannot simply ignore his
     claims regarding stress and confusion. The appellant has averred under penalty
     of perjury that he was diagnosed with PTSD on November 2, 2016, and that he
     was suffering from symptoms of that illness beforehand.         RAF, Tab 1 at 5.
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Persons who are diagnosed with PTSD have presented with various symptoms
related to reactivity, cognition, and mood regulation for at least a month before
diagnosis.   See National Institute of Mental Health, Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder, https:// www.nimh.nih.gov/health/topics/post-traumatic-stress-disorder-
ptsd. The symptoms of PTSD may continue for months after the triggering event
and significantly affect the patient’s ability to manage daily tasks. 4 Id. Although
a more detailed statement of the appellant’s condition would have been
preferable, when we weigh all of the Gaddy factors, we find that the appellant
met his burden of proof. We do not absolve the appellant of his obligation to
carefully read and comply with the Board’s orders and decisions, but we find that
it is in the interest of justice to waive the refiling deadline and remand the appeal
for adjudication.

                                      ORDER
      For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the regional office
for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

FOR THE BOARD:                                     /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.

4
  The Board takes official notice of this information about PTSD pursuant to 5 C.F.R.
§ 1201.64.