Court Opinion

ID: 9907885
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-07 16:01:26.929859+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:17:31.364815
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-14267    Document: 31-1      Date Filed: 12/07/2023   Page: 1 of 10

                                                [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-14267
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        DANIEL SCOTT CROW,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Florida
                     D.C. Docket No. 2:22-cr-14035-JEM-1
                           ____________________
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        2                          Opinion of the Court                       22-14267

        Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
              Daniel Crow appeals his sentence of 360 months’ imprison-
        ment for enticement of a minor to engage in sexual activity and
        production of child pornography. Crow asserts several issues on
        appeal, which we address in turn. After review, 1 we affirm in part,
        and vacate and remand for resentencing in part.
                                     I. DISCUSSION
        A. Grouping of Counts
              Crow contends the district court erred in failing to group his
        counts together when calculating his guideline range, because his
        counts involved substantially the same harm under U.S.S.G.
        § 3D1.2. The Government concedes error on this issue.
               Oﬀenses “shall be grouped” for guideline oﬀense level calcu-
        lation purposes when they “involve substantially the same harm.”
        U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2. The Guidelines list four circumstances where
        counts involve “substantially the same harm”:

        1 When reviewing the district court’s findings with respect to Guidelines is-

        sues, we consider legal issues de novo, factual findings for clear error, and the
        court’s application of the Guidelines to the facts with due deference, which is
        akin to clear error review. United States v. Rothenberg, 610 F.3d 621, 624 (11th
        Cir. 2010). In order to be clearly erroneous, the finding of the district court
        must leave us with a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
        committed.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
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        22-14267               Opinion of the Court                        3

              (a) When counts involve the same victim and the
              same act or transaction.
              (b) When counts involve the same victim and two or
              more acts or transactions connected by a common
              criminal objective or constituting part of a common
              scheme or plan.
              (c) When one of the counts embodies conduct that is
              treated as a speciﬁc oﬀense characteristic in, or other
              adjustment to, the guideline applicable to another of
              the counts.
              (d) When the oﬀense level is determined largely on
              the basis of the total amount of harm or loss, the
              quantity of a substance involved, or some other meas-
              ure of aggregate harm, or if the oﬀense behavior is
              ongoing or continuous in nature and the oﬀense
              guideline is written to cover such behavior.
        Id. Subsection (d) specifically precludes the grouping of a “produc-
        tion of child pornography” offense under that subsection. Id.
        However, offenses need only meet the criteria of one subsection of
        § 3D1.2 to qualify for grouping as “substantially the same harm.”
        See id. § 3D1.2(d) (“Exclusion of an offense from grouping under
        this subsection does not necessarily preclude grouping under an-
        other subsection”).
              The district court erred in failing to group Crow’s counts.
        See United States v. Nagel, 835 F.3d 1371, 1374 (11th Cir. 2016) (re-
        viewing the district court’s decisions regarding grouping de novo).
        The conduct embodying Crow’s enticement offense was used to
        apply a specific offense characteristic enhancement to his
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        4                         Opinion of the Court                     22-14267

        production offense. Namely, Crow’s production of child pornog-
        raphy “involved the use of a computer [to] persuade, induce, en-
        tice, coerce, or facilitate the travel of, a minor to engage in sexually
        explicit conduct, or to otherwise solicit participation by a minor in
        such conduct.” This enhancement placed Crow’s counts squarely
        within § 3D1.2(c), which requires grouping “[w]hen one of the
        counts embodies conduct that is treated as a specific offense char-
        acteristic in . . . another of the counts.” U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(c). Thus,
        the court erred in failing to group Crow’s offenses, and we vacate
        and remand for resentencing as to this issue.
        B. Pattern of Activity Enhancement
               Crow asserts the court erred in applying a ﬁve-level enhance-
        ment for a “pattern of activity involving prohibited sexual con-
        duct” under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5, because the court sustained the pat-
        tern enhancement on facts that were not suﬃciently proven at the
        sentencing hearing.
               Under § 4B1.5, the district court applies a ﬁve-level enhance-
        ment when the defendant engaged in a “pattern of activity involv-
        ing prohibited sexual conduct.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5(b)(1). For pur-
        poses of § 4B1.5, “prohibited sexual conduct” includes, among
        other things, “any oﬀense described in 18 U.S.C. § 2426(b)(1)(A) or
        (B)” and “the production of child pornography.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5,
        comment. (n.4(A)). 2 It does not include receipt or possession of

        2Deferral to the Guidelines commentary is necessary only if the text of the

        Guidelines is ambiguous. United States v. Dupree, 57 F.4th 1269, 1275-77 (11th
        Cir. 2023) (en banc).
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        22-14267               Opinion of the Court                        5

        child pornography. Id. Section 2426(b)(1)(A) cross-references to
        oﬀenses contained in chapter 117, which includes enticement of a
        minor under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). 18 U.S.C. § 2426(b)(1)(A).
                A defendant engaged in a “pattern” under § 4B1.5 if he en-
        gaged in such conduct “on at least two separate occasions.” Id.
        § 4B1.5, comment. (n.4(B)(i)). “[R]epeated prohibited sexual con-
        duct with a single victim may qualify as a ‘pattern of activity’ for
        purposes of § 4B1.5(b)(1).” United States v. Fox, 926 F.3d 1275, 1279
        (11th Cir. 2019). But “separate occasions” requires events that are
        “independent and distinguishable” from one another. Id. at 1280.
        Noncontinuous instances of prohibited sexual conduct that occur
        on different days constitute “separate occasions.” United States v.
        Isaac, 987 F.3d 980, 994 (11th Cir. 2021).
               The Government did not put forth “sufficient and reliable”
        evidence at the sentencing hearing in support of any facts sustain-
        ing the pattern enhancement. See United States v. Washington, 714
        F.3d 1358, 1361 (11th Cir. 2013) (“When the government seeks to
        apply an enhancement under the Sentencing Guidelines over a de-
        fendant’s factual objection, it has the burden of introducing ‘suffi-
        cient and reliable’ evidence to prove the necessary facts by a pre-
        ponderance of the evidence.”). Because Crow made a factual ob-
        jection to the enhancement, the record to be considered was lim-
        ited to Crow’s factual proffer, which admitted to only a single sex-
        ual encounter involving oral sex with Victim 1 on May 22, 2020.
        The Government’s assertion of facts at the sentencing hearing be-
        yond those contained in the factual proffer, absent additional
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                22-14267

        supporting evidence, could not be relied upon by the district court.
        See id. (“[A]bsent a stipulation or agreement between the parties,
        an attorney’s factual assertions at a sentencing hearing do not con-
        stitute evidence that a district court can rely on.”). The district
        court stated the support for the enhancement was provided “based
        on what [Victim 1] said,” suggesting that it relied upon every state-
        ment by or about Victim 1 contained in the PSI when imposing the
        enhancement, despite Crow’s factual objections. The court relied
        upon insufficiently proven evidence when it sustained Crow’s pat-
        tern enhancement based upon the “separation in time of the vari-
        ous relationships with Victim 1.”
                However, the facts contained in Crow’s factual proffer are
        sufficient to sustain his pattern enhancement. See United States v.
        Gill, 864 F.3d 1279, 1280 (11th Cir. 2017) (explaining we may affirm
        on any ground supported by the record, regardless of whether the
        district court considered or relied upon that ground below). Crow
        concedes in his factual proffer that he engaged in oral sex with Vic-
        tim 1 on May 22, 2020, and that he produced child pornography
        when he filmed that sexual encounter. He further concedes that at
        unidentified points prior to his May 22 meeting with Victim 1,
        Crow requested naked photos and videos from Victim 1 and made
        plans with Victim 1 to meet and engage in sexual acts. Between his
        requests for illicit images from Victim 1 and his formulation of
        plans to meet up with Victim 1 for sex, Crow engaged in entice-
        ment prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), which qualifies as “prohib-
        ited sexual conduct” under the commentary to § 4B1.5. This con-
        duct occurred on a different day than his production of child
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        22-14267               Opinion of the Court                         7

        pornography on May 22, constituting distinct, “separate occasions”
        sufficient to establish a pattern under § 4B1.5. See Fox, 926 F.3d at
        1279; Isaac, 987 F.3d at 994. Thus, while the district court sustained
        Crow’s enhancement on insufficiently proven factual allegations,
        the existing and undisputed record supports the enhancement on
        alternative grounds. Thus, we affirm as to this issue.
        C. Distribution Enhancement
              Crow also argues the court erred in applying a two-level en-
        hancement for “distribution” of child pornography under U.S.S.G.
        § 2G2.1(b)(3), because his sending of a video from his phone to
        Victim 1’s phone did not constitute “distribution.”
               The Sentencing Guidelines provide for a two-level enhance-
        ment when a defendant “knowingly engaged in distribution” of
        child pornography. U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(3). The commentary to the
        Guidelines provides that:
              “Distribution” means any act, including possession
              with intent to distribute, production, transmission,
              advertisement, and transportation, related to the
              transfer of material involving the sexual exploitation
              of a minor. Accordingly, distribution includes posting
              material involving the sexual exploitation of a minor
              on a website for public viewing but does not include
              the mere solicitation of such material by a defendant.
        Id. § 2G2.1, comment. (n.1(A)). We have stated “distribute” ordi-
        narily means “to deliver, give out, dispense, or disperse to others.”
        United States v. Grzybowicz, 747 F.3d 1296, 1307 (11th Cir. 2014)
        (holding a defendant did not engage in a “distribution” of child
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                 22-14267

        pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a) when he sent four images
        of child pornography from his cellphone to his personal email ac-
        count, because the images were not transferred “to others”). More-
        over, distribution impliedly involves “deliver[y] to someone other
        than the person who does the delivering.” Id. at 1307-08.
                The district court did not clearly err in imposing the distri-
        bution enhancement under § 2G2.1. By airdropping a video from
        his cell phone to Victim 1’s cell phone, Crow delivered, gave out,
        dispersed, or dispensed that video to another. See id. at 1307. While
        Crow asserts Victim 1, presumably by virtue of her inclusion in the
        video, does not constitute another person to whom Crow could
        “distribute” the video, Crow provides no argument or legal author-
        ity as to why Victim 1 should not constitute an “other” for purposes
        of determining whether he engaged in a distribution. Thus, be-
        cause airdropping a video to another’s cell phone is a “deliver[y]”
        to another, the court did not clearly err in applying a two-level en-
        hancement for Crow’s distribution. Accordingly, we aﬃrm as to
        this issue.
        D. Use of Computer Enhancement
              Crow asserts the court erred in applying a two-level en-
        hancement for “use of a computer” pursuant to U.S.S.G.
        § 2G2.1(b)(6)(B), because an iPhone is not a “computer” as in-
        tended in the Guidelines.
               Section 2G2.1 provides for a two-level enhancement when,
        as part of a defendant’s production of child pornography, the of-
        fense involved:
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        22-14267                Opinion of the Court                          9

               the use of a computer or an interactive computer ser-
               vice to (i) persuade, induce, entice, coerce, or facili-
               tate the travel of, a minor to engage in sexually ex-
               plicit conduct, or to otherwise solicit participation by
               a minor in such conduct; or (ii) solicit participation
               with a minor in sexually explicit conduct . . . .
        U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(6). The Guidelines Commentary cross-refer-
        ences to 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1), which deﬁnes “computer” as “an
        electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other high speed
        data processing device performing logical, arithmetic, or storage
        functions.” 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1) (cited in U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1, com-
        ment. (n.1)). We have previously held a defendant’s use of a cell
        phone constitutes the use of a computer as deﬁned by 18 U.S.C.
        § 1030(e)(1). United States v. Mathis, 767 F.3d 1264, 1283 (11th Cir.
        2014), abrogated on other grounds by Lockhart v. United States, 577 U.S.
        347 (2016)).
                The court did not clearly err in applying a two-level enhance-
        ment for “use of a computer.” Crow’s iPhone possessed much of
        the functionality of a typical computer, and he used it as such: send-
        ing and receiving messages over the internet, booking a hotel
        room, and ﬁlming and distributing a video. Thus, Crow’s use of an
        iPhone falls within the unambiguous, plain reading of “use of a
        computer” as it appears in § 2G2.1(b)(6). Accordingly, we aﬃrm as
        to this issue.
        E. Downward variance
             Crow lastly argues the court abused its discretion in denying
        a downward variance, because the facts and circumstances of his
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                22-14267

        case place it outside the heartland of cases for which the Sentencing
        Guidelines were intended to apply. Because our vacatur and re-
        mand of Crow’s sentence under Issue I will result in a new sentenc-
        ing hearing under a new Guidelines range, we do not address the
        merits of the district court’s denial of a downward variance.
                                II. CONCLUSION
                We aﬃrm the district court’s imposition of enhancements
        for pattern of activity, distribution, and use of a computer. We va-
        cate and remand for resentencing because the district court erred
        in failing to group Crow’s counts, and decline to address the denial
        of a downward variance.
                AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED AND REMANDED IN
        PART.