Court Opinion

ID: 9739909
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:23:25.073792+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:14.704223
License: Public Domain

CADY, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
I would affirm the district court and the court of appeals. The Heers’ claim arose independent of the trustee’s deed and the statute of limitations under section 614.14(5) does not apply.
Under section 614.14(5), “an adverse claim arising ... by reason of a transfer of an interest in real estate by a trustee” must be brought within a year after the date of the recording of the deed “from which such claim may arise.” I agree with the majority that the claim of boundary by acquiescence falls within the legislative definition of an “adverse claim” under section 614.14(3). However, it fails to satisfy the further requirement of “arising ... by reason of a transfer” by a trustee. A claim of acquiescence does not arise by reason of a transfer of land by a trustee’s deed, but by conduct and consent of two adjoining property owners or their predecessors in interest. See Egli v. Troy, 602 N.W.2d 329, 332 (Iowa 1999). The nature of the underlying recorded title to the land is totally unrelated to a claim of acquiescence, and it cannot be said that the acquisition of land by a trustee’s deed gives rise to a claim of boundary by acquiescence. Acquiescence and title by deed are totally unrelated legal concepts.
Nevertheless, the majority maintains the claim of acquiescence in this case arose by reason of the trustee’s deed because the dispute between the parties would not have occurred if it had not been for the trustee’s deed. This may be true, but this type of factual analysis is contrary to the basic operation of a statute of limitations and has dangerous consequences.
A statute of limitations limits the filing of a legal claim to a period of time beginning with the act which gives rise to the claim. See 51 Am.Jur.2d Limitation of Actions § 107, at 679 (1970); see also Estate of Montag v. T.H. Agric. & Nutrition Co., 509 N.W.2d 469, 470 (Iowa 1993) (statute of limitations is the outer time limit to investigate claim and bring action which begins upon notice of potential action). The act is a form of notice. The majority, however, has interpreted the statute of limitations of section 614.14(5) to apply to a cause of action based on acts which do not give rise to the legal elements of the action. This is not only contrary to the basic operation of a statute of limitations, but has due process implications. A statute of limitations must only apply to the particular actions it recites, and no others. 51 Am.Jur.2d Limitation of Actions § 61, at 640.
The language “arising by reason of’ imparts not only a factual connection but a legal connection as well. It refers to the causal connection between the act and liability. See 2800 Corp. v. Fernandez, 528 N.W.2d 124, 128 (Iowa 1995) (the phrase “arising out of’ in our workers’ compensation law refers to the causal connection between injury and employment). The majority, however, has discarded the legal connection and would include any claim factually traced to the trustee’s deed. This broad interpretation could not have been intended by our legislature. Courts cannot, under the guise of construction, apply a statute of limitations to actions not *664within the provisions. 51 Am. Jur.2d Limitation of Actions § 61, at 640.
We are obligated to give statutes a reasonable interpretation. State ex rel. Schuder v. Schuder, 578 N.W.2d 685, 687 (Iowa 1998). Moreover, statute of limitations are not preferred and when faced with two possible interpretations, the preferred interpretation is the one which permits the action. In re Estate of Renwanz, 561 N.W.2d 43, 45 (Iowa 1997). I understand why our legislature would place a one-year statute of limitations on legal claims which are adverse to and arise from a trustee’s deed, but I cannot conceive of any reason our legislature would include claims with no legal connection to a deed, such as a claim for boundary by acquiescence. The statute should be interpreted to permit the Heers to pursue their claim.
McGIVERIN, C.J., joins this dissent.