Court Opinion

ID: 9740851
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:42:48.770119+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:20.668213
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Davis, dissenting: I must dissent from the broad sweep of the opinion of the court which, if taken literally, would strike down all Sunday-closing ordinances. I believe the court has reached an erroneous conclusion by misconceiving the constitutional basis for such enactments. This opinion would uphold a Sunday closing ordinance only if the prohibited activity actually tended to disturb others in their observance of a religious holiday. Such an attitude runs counter to the almost universal view that a city may, under the police power, act to preserve the deep-rooted, nation-wide custom, of Sunday observance. It is clearly a proper legislative function to set aside a day of rest each week, and it is natural and proper that lawmakers should set aside Sunday, as the day of rest traditionally observed by the great majority of the public. (Humphrey Chevrolet, Inc. v. City of Evanston, 7 Ill.2d 402; McPherson v. Village of Chebanse, 114 Ill. 46; Richmond v. Moore, 107 Ill. 429; 50 Am. Jur., sec. 9, page 808; 83 C.J.S., sec. 3, page 800; McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, sec. 24.188.) I find no expression in the law, prior to this opinion, which would base such power on the disturbance of the public. To be sure, we have struck down Sunday closing ordinances which singled out specific nondisturbing activities. (City of Mt. Vernon v. Julian, 369 Ill. 447; Eden v. People, 161 Ill. 296.) But these decisions do not buttress the reasoning of this opinion. The ordinances involved in City of Mount Vernon and in Eden had the vice of arbitrarily closing certain nondisturbing businesses and permitting others to remain open. We were mindful of these cases in Humphrey Chevrolet, Inc. v. City of Evanston, 7 Ill.2d 402, where we upheld a “commodity type” of comprehensive Sunday-closing ordinance similar to the ordinance now before us. . Generally speaking, Humphrey teaches us that a city is authorized, under the general grant of police power, to adopt a comprehensive Sunday-closing ordinance, but such ordinance must not be unreasonably discriminatory in its application. It may exempt certain activities and the sale of certain commodities from its scope, but such exemptions must rest on a reasonable classification. The actual disturbance caused by the proscribed activities was not considered in Humphrey. Believing as I do, that we adopted the correct rationale in deciding Humphrey, I conclude that we are wrong today.