Court Opinion

ID: 9898836
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-15 15:04:03.271743+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:26.659144
License: Public Domain

Cite as 2023 Ark. App. 528
                   ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
                                      DIVISION IV
                                      No. E-22-463

 DONNA HIGGINS                                Opinion Delivered November 15, 2023
                              APPELLANT
                                              APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS
 V.                                           BOARD OF REVIEW
                                              [NO. 2022-BR-00870]
 DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF
 WORKFORCE SERVICES
                                APPELLEE REMANDED

                          N. MARK KLAPPENBACH, JUDGE
       Donna Higgins appeals the Arkansas Board of Review’s decision affirming the

nonfraud overpayment determination issued by the Division of Workforce Services under

Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-532(b) (Supp. 2021) and holding Higgins liable to repay $20,944.

We remand for additional findings.

       Higgins filed claims for unemployment benefits and was paid a total of $20,944

covering the weeks ending July 19 through October 26, 2019 and March 28 through

September 25, 2020. Higgins received regular state unemployment benefits, lost wage

assistance, federal emergency unemployment compensation, and federal pandemic

unemployment compensation. It was later determined that Higgins was ineligible for

benefits during those weeks due to nonfraudulent reasons. The Board of Review considered

whether, applying the dictates of Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-532(b), Higgins would be liable to

repay those benefits. The statute provides that overpayment is required to be repaid by the
recipient unless (1) the overpayment was the result of agency error, and (2) it would be against

equity and good conscience to require repayment. The Board found that because Higgins

was disqualified from receiving benefits, the overpayment was not caused by agency error,

rendering it unnecessary to consider whether it would be against equity and good conscience

to require repayment. Higgins now appeals to this court. The sole issue in this appeal is the

repayment requirement.

       Board decisions are upheld if they are supported by substantial evidence. Blanton v.

Dir., 2019 Ark. App. 205, 575 S.W.3d 186. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence

that reasonable minds might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id. In appeals of

unemployment-compensation cases, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences

deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Board’s findings. Id. Importantly,

however, the Board must make adequate findings of fact for this court to review. Rush v.

Dir., 2023 Ark. App. 276, 668 S.W.3d 520. If adequate findings of fact are not made on the

issue presented, we remand to the Board for findings of fact and conclusions of law upon

which to perform proper appellate review. Pillow v. Dir., 2022 Ark. App. 341.

       When a claimant receives both state and federal unemployment benefits and the

State attempts to recover nonfraud overpayments, the Board must conduct two different

waiver analyses for the state unemployment benefits and the federal unemployment benefits.

Hill v. Dir., 2023 Ark. App. 418, 675 S.W.3d 889. The Board addressed the waiver analysis

for state-law purposes, although the total amount ordered to be repaid obviously includes

federal as well as state benefits. See Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-532(b)(2). The Board conducted

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no federal waiver analysis whatsoever. The federal analysis requires findings on whether the

federal payments were made without fault on the part of the claimant and whether requiring

repayment would be contrary to equity and good conscience. See 15 U.S.C. § 9023(f)(2).

       Where sufficient findings of fact are lacking, we must remand to the Board for it to

provide findings of fact on which to perform appellate review. See Rush, supra. Further

findings are necessary as to whether appellant was at fault and whether repayment would be

contrary to equity and good conscience before requiring her to repay the federal benefits. 1

       Accordingly, we remand for further findings regarding whether Higgins is required

to repay the federal benefits.

       Remanded.

       HARRISON, C.J., and BARRETT, J., agree.

       Donna Higgins, pro se appellant.

       Cynthia L. Uhrynowycz, Associate General Counsel, for appellee.

       1
        The Board failed to specify the amounts in unemployment benefits paid to Higgins
that were attributable to state funds versus federal funds, which must be clarified on remand.

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