Court Opinion

ID: 9788882
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:21:35.864334+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:17.156947
License: Public Domain

KIDWELL, Justice.
Steve Neibaur appeals the Industrial Commission’s award of attorney fees to Jesus Medrano. He argues that the Industrial Commission abused its discretion by awarding the fees almost six months after the deadline for submitting a memorandum of costs and supporting affidavit had passed.
I.
PACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On July 21, 2000, the Industrial Commission (Commission) entered an order awarding Jesus Medrano (Medrano) total temporary disability benefits, payment of medical expenses, and payment of prescription medication as the result of a farming accident. Medrano had injured his left little finger while changing a tractor tire while employed at Steve Neibaur’s (Neibaur) farm. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-804,1 the Commission determined that Medrano was entitled to attorney fees. The order stated that Medrano’s counsel, David Peña, had to submit a memorandum of costs and attorney fees with an affidavit in support thereof within ten days from the order dated July 21, 2000.
On January 17, 2001, Peña, on behalf of Medrano, submitted a motion for costs and attorney fees pursuant to Industrial Commission order, with an affidavit of support. He requested $1210.00 in attorney fees. On February 12, 2001, Neibaur moved to dismiss the motion as untimely and improper for being incomplete, eonclusory, and lacking in detail. On that same day, without knowledge of Neibaur’s motion, the referee ordered Peña to submit a more specific affidavit as well as a copy of his attorney fees agreement no later than ten days from February 12, 2001. On February 22, 2001, at 5:18 p.m., the fee agreement was faxed to the Commission with a notation from “Sandy” stating an affidavit would be forwarded on February 26, 2001, because Peña was unavailable until then. No affidavit was ever filed.
In her findings, the referee found that based on the fee agreement, the amount of time Peña spent on the case, and the amount awarded to Medrano, attorney fees in the amount of $250.00 were reasonable. The Commission entered an order on March 14, 2001, awarding Medrano $250.00 in attorney fees under I.C. § 72-210.
On April 25, 2001, Neibaur filed a timely notice of appeal, arguing that the Commission had abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees more than six months after the established deadline for filing a memorandum of costs and attorney fees had passed. He also argued that the memorandum for costs and attorney fees lacked the necessary specificity.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing Industrial Commission decisions, this Court exercises free review of the Commission’s legal conclusions, but will not disturb findings of fact if they are supported by substantial and competent evidence. Jensen v. City of Pocatello, 135 Idaho 406, 409, 18 P.3d 211, 214 (2000).
III.
ANALYSIS
The appellant argues that the Commission erred by allowing Medrano, through Peña, to file a motion for costs and attorney fees past the deadline stated by the Commission in its order dated July 21, 2000. The *769order stated that Medrano had ten days in which to submit his motion for costs and attorney fees and supporting affidavit. Medrano’s incomplete information was submitted five days shy of six months past the deadline. Neibaur cites Harney v. Weatherly, 116 Idaho 904, 781 P.2d 241 (Ct.App.1989), to support his position. In Harney, the Court of Appeals held that a prevailing party had waived the right to recover attorney fees awarded because he submitted his memorandum of costs and attorney fees fifty-five days after the court’s deadline. Neibaur argues that he should be able to rely on the validity of the Commission’s order. He asserts that by disregarding its own deadline, the Commission abused its discretion.
The Commission’s order of July 21, 2000, required that a memorandum of costs and attorney fees be submitted within ten days of that order. Medrano submitted nothing until January 17, 2001. The motion submitted was so lacking in specificity that the referee required that additional information be submitted within ten days. After the close of business, on the last day of the ten-day period, only part of the information requested was submitted. Procedurally, Neibaur’s objection to the motion for costs and attorney fees was never ruled upon. Instead, the referee, on incomplete information, determined that an award of $250.00 in attorney fees was reasonable. The Commission then ordered the award of attorney fees based upon the referee’s recommendation.
A three-part test is used when reviewing whether a court abused its discretion. This Court determines “(1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.” Sun Valley Shopping Ctr. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991) (quoting State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989)). This Court applies this three-part test to decisions of the Industrial Commission. Cantu v. J.R. Simplot Co., 121 Idaho 585, 588, 826 P.2d 1297, 1300 (1992).
This Court has not addressed an abuse of discretion by the Commission in reference to attorney fees awarded under I.C. § 72-210. Harney, cited by Neibaur, is on point regarding the denial of attorney fees for the untimely submission of the memorandum on costs and attorney fees, although Harney addresses attorney fees awarded under I.C. § 32-704(2). However, the underlying issues are the same — a prevailing party was awarded attorney fees, but waited until the deadline had long passed before submitting a memorandum of costs and attorney fees.
The facts of this case reveal an abuse of discretion by the Commission. It established a ten-day deadline in its July 21, 2000 order. Medrano missed that deadline by six months with no explanation for the delay. Even after being given an extended deadline, he did not submit all of the requested information. The information submitted lacked the detail needed to make an accurate determination. For six months, Neibaur believed this case was resolved because the deadline in the Commission’s order had expired. Yet, notwithstanding all of the above facts, the Commission adopted the referee’s recommendation to award attorney fees.
Using the three-part test discussed above, the Commission abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees. The decision to disregard its own deadline by allowing the untimely submission of the memorandum was unfair to the parties and exceeded the boundaries of its discretion. The referee requested documentation from Medrano, did not receive it, and yet made an award of attorney fees. Ten days within which to submit a memorandum of costs and attorney fees on a simple matter such as this was reasonable. Reliance on the Commission’s deadline by Neibaur was reasonable. Although unfortunate that Medrano will not receive attorney fees, it would be equally unfair to Neibaur to allow Medrano multiple attempts to obtain those fees. This Court holds that the Commission abused its discretion by awarding attorney fees to a claimant who had waived his right to recover attorney fees awarded because he *770submitted his . memorandum of costs and attorney fees months after the deadline.
IV.
CONCLUSION
The Industrial Commission established a ten-day deadline in which Medrano was to submit a memorandum of costs and attorney fees.. Medrano missed that deadline by six months. The Commission abused its discretion by disregarding its own deadline, upon which Neibaur relied. The order awarding attorney fees to Medrano is reversed.
Chief Justice TROUT, Justices SCHROEDER and WALTERS concur.

. The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendation Regarding Attorney Fees clarified that attorney fees in this case were actually awarded under I.C. § 72-210 because Neibaur was an uninsured employer. As such, penalty for attorney fees and costs was imposed under I.C. § 72-210, not I.C. § 72-804 as stated in the original order.