Court Opinion

ID: 9908287
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-08 15:06:24.254792+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:05.141215
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: DECEMBER 1, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                          TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                           Court of Appeals
                              NO. 2023-CA-0113-MR

JON BUECHELE                                                          APPELLANT

                 APPEAL FROM NELSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.              HONORABLE CHARLES C. SIMMS, III, JUDGE
                       ACTION NO. 22-CR-00021

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                                APPELLEE

                                    OPINION
                                   AFFIRMING

                                   ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CETRULO, COMBS, AND EASTON, JUDGES.

EASTON, JUDGE: Jon Buechele (“Buechele”) appeals the denial of his motion to

suppress evidence gathered after an investigative stop by a police officer.

Buechele entered a conditional guilty plea. We affirm the Nelson Circuit Court.

                 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

             On the night of December 9, 2021, officer Josh Doerr (“Doerr”) of the

Bardstown Police Department was in a marked patrol car. Doerr was patrolling

local “hot spots” of criminal activity. A residence located at 406 East Halstead
Street was considered a drug house. Activities at this address had resulted in

numerous recent calls to the police about drug activity, including emergency calls

due to overdoses.

              Doerr drove southbound on Allison Avenue (“Allison”) approaching

the intersection with East Halstead Street (“East Halstead”). As Doerr reached that

four-way stop, he noticed Buechele walking toward him in the middle of East

Halstead. When Doerr first noticed him, Buechele was about twenty to thirty feet

from Doerr’s vehicle, and perhaps a few houses from 406 East Halstead.

              Doerr decided to stop Buechele for disregarding the law prohibiting

pedestrians from walking down the middle of a street. Doerr rolled down his

window and asked Buechele to approach. Buechele instead turned away and

walked southbound down Allison (in the opposite direction from Doerr’s vehicle).

Doerr exited the patrol car, put on his body camera, and told Buechele to stop.

Buechele looked back over his shoulder at Doerr, put his hands in his pockets, and

picked up his pace.

              Doerr quickly caught up with Buechele and grabbed him from behind.

Doerr put his left hand on Buechele’s left forearm and his right hand on Buechele’s

right forearm.1 Buechele’s hands were still in his pockets. Doerr testified he could

1
  If Buechele had been armed, which he was not, Doerr’s action in grabbing Buechele’s arms in
this way prevented any issue of a weapon being drawn or evidence being lost while not
prematurely frisking Buechele without cause to suspect a weapon.

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feel Buechele’s forearms and hands tense and flex as he was leading Buechele

back to the patrol car. Once they arrived at the patrol car, Doerr felt Buechele

pulling his hands out of his pockets. Doerr could feel Buechele’s forearms release.

Doerr looked down and noticed drugs scattered underneath his patrol car.

Buechele then was arrested.

             Once Buechele was placed in the patrol car, he asked Doerr if he

could smoke a cigarette. Doerr retrieved Buechele’s pack of cigarettes for him.

Doerr then discovered additional drugs in the cigarette pack.

             Buechele was indicted for first-degree trafficking in heroin, first-

degree trafficking in methamphetamine, tampering with physical evidence,

disregarding a traffic regulation by a pedestrian, and first-degree persistent felony

offender. Buechele filed a motion to suppress evidence claiming Doerr unlawfully

seized him in violation of the Fourth Amendment.2 Buechele’s motion was heard

by the circuit court in October 2022. Doerr and Buechele’s mother were the only

witnesses to testify.

             The testimony conflicted as to whether there was a sidewalk running

along East Halstead. Doerr remembered a sidewalk at the intersection of East

Halstead and Allison, whereas Buechele’s mother, who lives several blocks from

2
 Section 10 of the Kentucky Constitution provides the same protection as the Fourth
Amendment in the circumstances of this case. See Commonwealth v. Reed, 647 S.W.3d 237, 243
(Ky. 2022).

                                           -3-
the intersection, denied the existence of a sidewalk.3 As the circuit court correctly

observed, the existence of a sidewalk was not decisive in the circumstances which

we will address.

                Doerr testified his body camera did not start recording until a few

minutes into the incident. The parties, who apparently had seen what the video

showed, chose not to introduce the footage as evidence. At the close of the

hearing, the circuit court provided the parties time to file memoranda in support of

their respective positions.

                The circuit court issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and

Order denying Buechele’s motion. The court determined Doerr had the required

articulable and reasonable suspicion to stop and question Buechele because he was

walking down the middle of the street in violation of KRS4 189.570(14). The court

found it was immaterial whether there was a sidewalk running parallel to East

Halstead as it was unrefuted that Doerr observed Buechele walking in the middle

of the street. The court added, “Buechele’s walking path was obviously dangerous

3
  We decline the invitation to take judicial notice of a Google map from the internet offered by
Buechele, but which was not made part of the circuit court record. While judicial notice should
rarely be utilized to supplement a record on appeal, an appellate court could take judicial notice
of Google or similar images to confirm a location or other unarguable circumstances. United
States v. Perea-Rey, 680 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2012). But we are especially hesitant to take such
notice when an image is offered to establish a fact dependent on the condition of property on a
certain date, such as when sidewalks were present. It would be better practice to have a witness
confirm the accuracy of the image for the relevant time.
4
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.

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for himself and any motorist who may have been using this roadway, especially

with it being dark.”

             After the unsuccessful motion to suppress, Buechele entered a

conditional guilty plea to two counts of first-degree possession of a controlled

substance and one count of tampering with physical evidence. Buechele’s other

counts were dismissed, and he received a three-year sentence. This appeal

followed.

                            STANDARD OF REVIEW

             “When reviewing a ruling on a suppression motion, we defer to the

trial court’s findings of fact if they are not clearly erroneous. Findings of fact are

not clearly erroneous if they are supported by substantial evidence.”

Commonwealth v. Jennings, 490 S.W.3d 339, 346 (Ky. 2016). Buechele does not

challenge the circuit court’s findings of fact; instead, he disputes the circuit court’s

application of the law to the facts. An appellate court reviews a circuit court’s

application of the law to the facts de novo. Id.

                                     ANALYSIS

             “[T]he ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is

‘reasonableness[.]’” Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403, 126 S. Ct.

1943, 1947, 164 L. Ed. 2d 650 (2006). When an officer detains a person for an

                                          -5-
investigative or Terry stop,5 which is distinguished from an arrest, the officer

“must have a reasonable suspicion, based on objective and articulable facts, that

criminal activity has occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur.” Commonwealth

v. Morgan, 248 S.W.3d 538, 540 (Ky. 2008).

              Determining whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to stop an

individual is based upon the totality of the circumstances. Id. When an officer

observes a violation, there is more than suspicion, because criminal activity, even

if relatively minor, has occurred. Wilson v. Commonwealth, 37 S.W.3d 745, 749

(Ky. 2001). A pretext of believing drug activity is also going on does not

invalidate the stop for the observed violation. Id.

              In this case, it is likely Doerr was looking for drug activity, and the

jaywalking6 violation gave him the legal reason to stop Buechele. Proximity to a

known drug house alone would not have been sufficient justification to stop

Buechele. See Strange v. Commonwealth, 269 S.W.3d 847, 852 (Ky. 2008).

Whatever the legal reason for a stop: “an investigative detention must be

temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the

5
 An investigative stop or temporary detention is often called a “Terry stop” after Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 88 S .Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968).
6
  The word jaywalk originates in Kansas. Jay was a word for a rube or country bumpkin. A
jaywalker was considered foolish for endangering themselves by walking across or on streets
against established traffic regulations. Why Jaywalking is Called Jaywalking, MERRIAM
WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/wordplay/why-is-it-called-jaywalking (last visited
Nov. 13, 2023).

                                               -6-
stop.” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1325, 75 L. Ed. 2d

229 (1983).

              Buechele cites Commonwealth v. Wilson, 625 S.W.3d 252 (Ky. App.

2021), which he insists dictates a result in his favor. In Wilson, two police officers

were patrolling in an unmarked police vehicle when they observed the defendant

(“Wilson”) riding a bicycle on an unoccupied public sidewalk in violation of a

local ordinance. The officers followed Wilson in their vehicle. Wilson did not

stop in response to lights and sirens. Id. at 253.

              One of the officers jumped from the vehicle and began chasing

Wilson on foot. The officer yelled “stop” but did not identify himself as a police

officer. The officer eventually wrestled Wilson to the ground and put a gun to his

head. The officer searched Wilson and discovered a gun. Wilson was arrested for

misdemeanor fleeing and evading the police and a felony of possession of a

handgun by a convicted felon. Id. at 254.

              The decision in Wilson resulted from the issues presented by the

parties. Significantly, the Commonwealth had argued on appeal only that a

warrant for an arrest was not required because Wilson committed a crime in the

officers’ presence as prescribed by KRS 431.005(1)(d), specifically the

misdemeanor of fleeing and evading. 625 S.W.3d at 255. But fleeing and evading

requires proof of flight upon suspicion that a crime has been committed.

                                          -7-
             This Court determined the Commonwealth failed to show either

officer had an articulable and reasonable suspicion Wilson had committed any

level of crime as defined for that statute when he was directed to stop. Id. at 255.

This Court noted KRS 500.080(2) defines a “crime” as either a misdemeanor or a

felony, and that a violation of a city ordinance is neither. 625 S.W.3d at 255-56.

The Court concluded that the Commonwealth did not allege the officers suspected

Wilson committed any offense other than riding his bicycle on the sidewalk, and as

a result, the officers were without authority to arrest Wilson for fleeing and

evading, which is the justification they had argued. Id. at 256.

             Wilson is clearly distinguishable. Buechele is correct that Doerr did

not have the authority to arrest Buechele for the pedestrian violation. But Doerr

did have the authority to detain Buechele to issue a citation for the observed

violation. Doerr asked Buechele to approach his car, but Buechele turned from

him and walked away in the opposite direction. Doerr caught up with Buechele

and brought him back to the police car. While seized for purposes of a detention,

Buechele was not yet arrested. Doerr’s original purpose of stopping Buechele for

the pedestrian violation had not concluded when Buechele jettisoned the drugs for

Doerr to plainly see. At that point, Doerr had probable cause to arrest Buechele for

the felony offenses of drug possession and tampering, crimes which Doerr

observed.

                                         -8-
             To interpret the circumstances of Wilson to prohibit even a Terry stop

for anything less than a misdemeanor crime would render a substantial body of law

invalid. For example, observing a seatbelt violation justifies a Terry stop, even

though an individual may not be arrested and jailed for that violation. See Rhoton

v. Commonwealth, 610 S.W.3d 273, 278 (Ky. 2020).

             In this case we are not dealing with just a local ordinance about

bicycles on sidewalks. We are applying a state statute governing pedestrians.

KRS 189.570 (12)-(14). If there is a sidewalk, pedestrians must use it instead of

the street. If there is no sidewalk and there is a shoulder, they must use that. If

neither sidewalk nor shoulder is available, the pedestrian must walk as near to the

side of the road as possible. For multiple lane roads, they must walk on the left

side (thus facing oncoming traffic). A violator may be fined between $20 and

$100. KRS 189.990(1). A seatbelt violation by contrast is subject to only a $25

fine and no court costs.

             Kentucky’s appellate courts have not had occasion to address

detention of jaywalkers under our statute. Cases from across the country establish

that jaywalking is like other observed violations. A person may be detained for the

observed violation. As with other stops, the stop should not last longer than

necessary to complete the issuance of a citation. See, e.g., Oregon v. Jiminez, 353

                                          -9-
P.3d 1227 (Or. 2015); Hawaii v. Barros, 48 P.3d 584 (Haw. 2002); Ohio v. Ewing,

95 N.E.3d 1112 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017).

                                 CONCLUSION

             Doerr observed a violation and was justified in detaining Buechele.

During the brief detention and before Doerr had the time to even write a citation,

Buechele provided grounds to justify further detention and eventual arrest for

felony crimes. The discovery of the narcotics by Doerr was not the result of an

unreasonable seizure and search. The Nelson Circuit Court is AFFIRMED.

             ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                     BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Aaron Reed Baker                          Daniel Cameron
Frankfort, Kentucky                       Attorney General of Kentucky

                                          Courtney J. Hightower
                                          Assistant Attorney General
                                          Frankfort, Kentucky

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