Court Opinion

ID: 9753491
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:15:41.491357+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:00:35.941328
License: Public Domain

BATTAGLIA, Judge,
concurring.
While I concur with the majority’s holding — that the prosecutor’s comment impinged on the defendant’s constitutional right against self-incrimination, and further, that such error was not harmless — I write separately because I believe that the degree of authority with which the majority cloaks the 1936 case of Smith v. State, 169 Md. 474, 182 A. 287 (1936), is unsubstantiated by subsequent case law in this Court. Likewise, the case at hand presented this Court with the opportunity to definitively articulate a standard under which prosecutors are confined to operating, and to which courts may look in effectively determining whether a defendant’s constitutional rights have been infringed; an opportunity upon which, I believe, the majority has failed to capitalize.
The privilege against self-incrimination has historically ensured the integrity of the fundamental premise of our criminal *362justice system, i.e. that one is “innocent until proven guilty.” As the Supreme Court eloquently stated, this privilege:
reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble aspirations: ... our preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates a fair state-individual balance by requiring the government to leave the individual alone until good cause is shown for disturbing him and by requiring the government in its contest with the individual to shoulder the entire load; our respect for the inviolability of the human personality and of the right of each individual to a private enclave where he may lead a private life; our distrust of self-deprecatory statements; and our realization that the privilege, while sometimes “a shelter to the guilty,” is often “a protection to the innocent.”
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of New York Harbor; 378 U.S. 52, 55, 84 S.Ct. 1594, 1596-97, 12 L.Ed.2d 678, 681-82 (1964) (internal citations and some quotations omitted).
In the same year the Supreme Court held the Fifth Amendment command that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,” applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, see Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 1492, 12 L.Ed.2d 653, 658, the Court also addressed the scope of this constitutional guarantee in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965). The Court held that the Fifth Amendment “forbids either comment by the prosecution on the accused’s silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt.” Id. at 615, 85 S.Ct. at 1233-34, 14 L.Ed.2d at 110. The Court condemned this practice as reminiscent of the “inquisitorial system of criminal justice,” reasoning that adverse comments diminished the privilege by making the assertion of such privilege carry with it a penalty. Id. at 614, 85 S.Ct. at 1232, 14 L.Ed.2d at 109-10 (quoting Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55, 84 S.Ct. at 1596-97, 12 L.Ed.2d at 681).
*363The Griffin rule squarely covers direct commentary on a defendant’s silence. The facts of Griffin, however, were unique in that the constitution of the State of California permitted prosecutors and judges to comment on the adverse inferences that may be drawn from a defendant’s silence. See 380 U.S. at 610 n. 2, 85 S.Ct. at 1230 n. 2, 14 L.Ed.2d at 107 n. 2. At the time Griffin was decided, this practice was unusual; in fact, forty-four states had already declared such commentary forbidden. Id. at 611 n. 3, 85 S.Ct. at 1231 n. 3, 14 L.Ed.2d at 108 n. 3. Therefore, while the principles that were developed in Griffin are both significant and timeless, Griffin responded only to the most egregious and obvious violations of the federal Fifth Amendment rights, leaving federal circuits and states to apply the Griffin rule to commentary, the constitutional infringement of which was less definite.
The standard, unanimously adopted in all federal circuits, for ascertaining when a prosecutor’s argument constitutes improper comment on a defendant’s exercise of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent is whether the language used manifestly intended to be a comment on the failure of the accused to testify, or whether the language was of such character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be such a comment. See e.g., United States v. Roberts, 119 F.3d 1006, 1015 (1st Cir.1997); United States v. Pitre, 960 F.2d 1112, 1124 (2nd Cir.1992); Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1544 (3rd Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 898, 112 S.Ct. 273, 116 L.Ed.2d 226 (1991); United States v. Francis, 82 F.3d 77, 78 (4th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1250, 116 S.Ct. 2513, 135 L.Ed.2d 202 (1996); United States v. Lampton, 158 F.3d 251, 260 (5th Cir.1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1183, 119 S.Ct. 1124, 143 L.Ed.2d 119 (1999); United States v. Bond, 22 F.3d 662, 669 (6th Cir.1994); United States v. Cotnam, 88 F.3d 487, 497 (7th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 942, 117 S.Ct. 326, 136 L.Ed.2d 240 (1996); United States v. Jackson, 64 F.3d 1213, 1218 (8th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1137, 116 S.Ct. 966, 133 L.Ed.2d 887 (1996); United States v. Atcheson, 94 F.3d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1156, 117 S.Ct. 1096, 137 L.Ed.2d 229 (1997); United *364States v. McIntyre, 997 F.2d 687, 707 (10th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1063, 114 S.Ct. 736, 126 L.Ed.2d 699 (1994); United States v. Calderon, 127 F.3d 1314, 1338 (11th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1033, 118 S.Ct. 1328, 140 L.Ed.2d 490 (1998); United States v. Catlett, 97 F.3d 565, 573 (D.C.Cir. 1996).
This test is also used by nearly every state court in resolving claims of improper prosecutorial comment on the defendant’s failure to testify.1 See e.g. Ex Parte Kenneth Loggins, *365771 So.2d 1093, 1101 (Ala.2000); State v. Bracy, 145 Ariz. 520, 703 P.2d 464, 479 (1985) cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1110, 106 S.Ct. 898, 88 L.Ed.2d 932 (1986); State v. Lemon, 248 Conn. 652, 731 A.2d 271, 277 (1999); Shelton v. State, 744 A.2d 465, 502 (Del.1999) cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1218, 120 S.Ct. 2225, 147 L.Ed.2d 256 (2000); Bowman v. United States, 652 A.2d 64, 72 (D.C.1994); LeMay v. State, 265 Ga. 73, 453 S.E.2d 737, 739-40 (1995); State v. Melear, 63 Haw. 488, 630 P.2d 619, 626 *366(1981); People v. Neal, 111 Ill.2d 180, 95 Ill.Dec. 283, 489 N.E.2d 845, 857 (1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1165, 106 S.Ct. 2292, 90 L.Ed.2d 733 (1986); Schertz v. State, 380 N.W.2d 404, 410 (Iowa 1985); State v. Ninci, 262 Kan. 21, 936 P.2d 1364, 1384 (1997); Bowling v. Commonwealth, 873 S.W.2d 175, 178 (Ky.1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 862, 115 S.Ct. 176, 130 L.Ed.2d 112 (1994); State v. Lindsey, 578 S.W.2d 903, 904 (Mo.1979); State v. Wiman, 236 Mont. 180, 769 P.2d 1200, 1203 (1989); Barron v. State, 105 Nev. 767, 783 P.2d 444, 451-52 (1989); State v. Merrill, 125 N.H. 479, 484 A.2d 1065 (1984); State v. Isiah, 109 N.M. 21, 781 P.2d 293, 296 (1989); State v. Skeels, 346 N.C. 147, 484 S.E.2d 390, 393 (1997); State v. Nordquist, 309 N.W.2d 109, 119 (N.D.1981); State v. Conway, 2 Or.App. 49, 465 P.2d 722, 723 (1970); Short v. State, 671 S.W.2d 888, 890 (Tex.Crim.App.1984); State v. Tucker, 709 P.2d 313, 315 (Utah 1985); State v. Zele, 168 Vt. 154, 716 A.2d 833, 838 (1998); Johnson v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 48, 372 S.E.2d 134, 136 (1988); State v. Lindvig, 205 Wis.2d 100, 555 N.W.2d 197, 200 (Wis.App.1996); Stanton v. State, 692 P.2d 947, 950 (Wyo.1984).
The Supreme Court has never expressly approved the test. Nevertheless, Justice Stevens, concurring in United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 103 S.Ct. 1974, 76 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983), alluded to the test approvingly, stating “[rjeference to uncon-tradicted portions of the Government’s evidence is improper only when the statement will naturally and necessarily be construed by the jury to be an allusion to the defendant’s failure to testify.” Id. at 515 n. 6, 103 S.Ct. at 1983 n. 6, 76 L.Ed.2d at 110 n. 6 (Stevens, J. concurring).
I believe this test, employed overwhelmingly in courtrooms across the nation, is consistent with our unwavering protection of a defendant’s rights as guaranteed by Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In fact, this Court recently *367employed standards strikingly similar to the test articulated in nearly all other jurisdictions. In Oken v. State, 343 Md. 256, 681 A.2d 30 (1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1079, 117 S.Ct. 742, 136 L.Ed.2d 681 (1997), our Court was tasked with determining the viability of a defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a primary source of which was his counsel’s failure to object to an allegedly improper comment by the prosecutor in summation.2 In considering whether a prosecutor’s comments infringed on the defendant’s failure to testify, Judge Raker, writing for this Court, stated, “[rjeading the prosecutor’s closing argument in context, however, we do not believe the statements were comments on Petitioner’s right to remain silent ..: [n]or do we find that the jury would naturally interpret the State’s argument as a comment on Petitioner’s failure to testify,” which is essentially the same analysis used in all federal and nearly every state court. Id. at 295, 681 A.2d at 49 (internal citations omitted).
Despite this Court’s recent application of the nearly universal test in Oken, the majority prefers to resurrect a 1936 case, Smith v. State, 169 Md. 474, 182 A. 287 (1936), as the authoritative case in self-incrimination jurisprudence; unfortunately, such reliance lacks substantiation by subsequent case law in this Court. In the sixty-five years of its existence, Smith has been cited infrequently: rarely, in relation to self-incrimination issues as a whole, and never, until today, as the authoritative case or standard by which all self-incrimination questions should be measured. In Woodson v. State, 325 Md. 251, 265, 600 A.2d 420, 426 (1992), Booth v. State, 306 Md. 172, 227, 507 A.2d 1098, 1126 (1986)(Eldridge, J., dissenting), cert. granted, in part, 479 U.S. 882, 107 S.Ct. 269, 93 L.Ed.2d 246 (1986), and vacated, in part, 482 U.S. 496, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 96 L.Ed.2d 440 (1987), and Littreal v. Redwine, 252 Md. 662, 666, 250 A.2d 894, 896 (1969), this Court only cited Smith to support the assertion that prior to the Supreme Court’s *368holding in Griffin v. California that the constitutional right against compelled self-incrimination forbids prosecutorial comment on a defendant’s failure to testify, our State had prohibited such practice.3 Not only has our Court declined to employ the Smith “test,” but the Court of Special Appeals, which reviews a far greater number of claims by defendants that their constitutional right to remain silent has been infringed, has only employed Smith once, see Grace v. State, 6 Md.App. 520, 522, 252 A.2d 297, 298 (1969), and ostensibly, practitioners have not utilized the Smith “test” either, as may be evident from the fact that neither of the parties in the present case proffer the “test” from Smith as the standard by which courts should measure a constitutional violation.
While our State can certainly take pride in its longstanding tradition of protecting a defendant’s constitutional right against self-incrimination, I do not believe that this Court should now claim that our decision sixty-five years ago also provided a test by which courts have in the past, can in the present, and should in the future, determine whether a defendant’s constitutional right was infringed. I find the fact that this Court neglected to apply Smith when determining whether the prosecutor’s comments infringed on the defendant’s constitutional right against self-incrimination in Oken v. State to be a valuable insight into the proper weight that should be *369afforded the Smith opinion, particularly when Oken was one of the few times this Court had been asked to consider the propriety of a prosecutor’s comments.4 If Smith had truly been the pinnacle of self-incrimination jurisprudence, then Smith should have been the standard by which the prosecutor’s comments were measured in Oken; instead this Court in Oken chose to measure the prosecutor’s comments by a standard nearly identical to that adopted in almost every jurisdiction in this country. It seems peculiar that the Smith “test” would not have unmasked itself until today.
Again, while it is true that this Court has resolutely and consistently forbidden comment upon a defendant’s failure to testify in a state criminal trial, see Veney, 251 Md. at 179, 246 A.2d at 620 (stating, “[i]t is clear that in Maryland comment upon a defendant’s failure to testify in a state criminal trial was forbidden long prior to Griffin v. California ... ”) (internal citations omitted); Woodson, 325 Md. at 265, 600 A.2d at 426-427 (demonstrating that both the cases prior to and subsequent to Griffin in this State prohibited comments by prosecutors on a defendant’s failure to testify); Oken, 343 Md. at 295, 681 A.2d at 49 (stating, “[t]o be sure, comments on a defendant’s failure to testify violate the defendant’s constitu*370tional rights”), this Court has not explicitly outlined a test by which comments may be measured to determine whether a constitutional violation has occurred. Our historical protections of a defendant’s right against self-incrimination are noble indeed, yet I believe that these rights would be better safeguarded if prosecutors and trial courts were guided by a “bright line” standard articulated by this Court. A defendant’s constitutional rights are often best protected when prosecutors are provided an inexorable framework under which they must operate. If left with no framework, or if left to operate under the guise of a framework that, in reality, is so fallible as to render the framework ineffectual, a court’s protection of constitutional rights is left to a reactionary stance summarized by case after case of harmless error analysis. If we were to allow the government to freely comment on a defendant’s silence — in the absence of a definitive framework — by resorting to “he’s clearly guilty anyway,” our protection of this constitutional right would amount to little more than a technicality, and the right itself would become little more than a “catch 22” — the defendant would be damned if he does testify and damned if he does not.
It is particularly noteworthy that the “test” which this Court employs today is neither the “fairly susceptible” test, nor the “reasonably susceptible” test,5 but rather, simply the “susceptible” test. A “test” that encompasses everything “susceptible” is not, in my experience, the type of standard under which prosecutors and courts can effectively operate. Relegating self-incrimination jurisprudence to countless exercises of harmless error analysis is not an effective way to protect the rights of defendants.
The constitutional right against self-incrimination is a perennial guarantee assiduously guarded by the courts against violation. As articulated by the Supreme Court in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886):
*371“It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can only be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for the security of person and property should be liberally construed. A close and literal construction deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted more in sound than in substance. It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon. Their motto should be obsta principiis. We have no doubt that the legislative body is actuated by the same motives; but the vast accumulation of public business brought before it sometimes prevents it, on a first presentation, from noticing objections which become developed by time and the practical application of the objectionable law.”
Id. at 635, 6 S.Ct. at 535, 29 L.Ed at 752 (emphasis added). A prosecutor’s comments on a defendant’s failure to testify are precisely the “stealthy encroachments” against which this Court is obligated to guard. In light of our legislature’s explicit statutory guarantee to be free from adverse inferences, this Court’s protection of a defendant’s right to remain silent should be particularly vigorous. See Md.Code (1957, 1998 Repl.Vol., 2000 Supp.) § 9-107 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. I believe that the standard recently employed in Oleen incorporates our consistent and steadfast protection of a defendant’s rights and gives prosecutors a consistent “bright line” standard under which to operate. The facts of this case provided our Court with the opportunity to explicitly adopt the standard which we employed in Oken, and which other jurisdictions around the country have utilized, successfully, for decades. Because I believe this Court should have seized upon this opportunity, I concur in judgment only.

. A minority of states have adopted something akin to a "fairly susceptible” test, finding a violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege when a prosecutor makes a statement that is subject to reasonable interpretation by a jury as an invitation to draw an adverse inference from a defendant’s silence. See Moore v. State, 669 N.E.2d 733, 739 (Ind. 1996). Interestingly, when applying the "fairly susceptible" test, some of those states have used the second prong of the nearly universal test to articulate the standard by which to determine a constitutional violation. See e.g. Rodriguez v. State, 753 So.2d 29, 37 (Fla.2000) cert. denied, 531 U.S. 859, 121 S.Ct. 145, 148 L.Ed.2d 96 (2000) (quoting Marshall v. State, 473 So.2d 688, 689 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (stating that "[a] constitutional violation occurs ... if either the defendant alone has the information to contradict the government evidence referred to or the jury ‘naturally and necessarily’ would interpret the summation as a comment on the failure to testify”)(internal quotations omitted)); Commonwealth v. Grant, 418 Mass. 76, 634 N.E.2d 565, 570 (1994) (finding that because the prosecutor’s rhetorical questions were not "of such a nature that a jury would naturally and necessarily construe them to be directed to the failure of the defendant to testify,” there was no error). That the few courts which have deviated from the majority test have subsequently employed the standard used by most state and federal jurisdictions is an indication of the more workable nature of the majority test.
The minority states’ basis for rejecting the majority test, as articulated by Indiana’s Supreme Court in Moore v. State, supra, and by this Court in the case sub judice, see maj. op. at note 6, appears to be rooted in fears which, upon closer review, are unwarranted. The Indiana court claimed that "[tjhere may be an understandable impulse to deem intentional comments improper and inadvertent ones valid” because the first prong considers whether the prosecutor manifestly intended the comment to be a reference to the defendant’s silence. Moore, 669 N.E.2d at 738. I agree with the Indiana court that whether the prosecutor actually or subjectively intended to produce an inference of guilt is irrelevant. Contrary to the assertions by the Indiana court and our Court today, the nearly universal test does not suggest or require an inquiry into the prosecutor’s actual intent.
*365Rather, the first prong requires a court to objectively consider whether the prosecutor manifested such intent; meaning, the prosecutor's comments, taken in the context of the argument, must outwardly convey or clearly evince the intent to reference the defendant's silence. To ‘manifestly intend’ such comment is to make a statement that is readily seen, perceived or understood to be a comment on the failure to testify; it is one that is obvious and direct. See e.g. United States v. Wagner, 884 F.2d 1090, 1099 (8th Cir.1989) (finding the prosecutor’s reference to the defendant to have clearly been "inadvertent confusion of the names of the three Wagner brothers made in the midst of her recap of the testimony of the two brothers who did take the stand at trial, ... [t]he reference did not manifest an intent on the part of the prosecutor to call attention to Robert’s failure to testify”)(emphasis added); United States v. Whitehead, 618 F.2d 523, 527 (4th Cir.1980) (stating that “[e]ven assuming, as appellants contend, that both the questions and answers were carefully planned by the prosecutor, we believe that their manifest intent, as well as their likely impact on the jury, was confined to a comment on Dowdy’s probable veracity while testifying under oath”).
Furthermore, while the State of Florida boasts that the "fairly susceptible” test is a "very liberal rule,” see Rodriguez, 753 So.2d at 37 (quoting State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129, 1135 (Fla.1986)), upon surveying its application, it does not appear to be significantly more prohibitive of prosecutorial comments than the test applied in the majority of jurisdictions. In fact, the Florida court admits that “despite our repeated admonitions to avoid any comment that is 'fairly susceptible’ to interpretation as a comment on silence, [we have] attempted to draw a distinction between impermissible comments on silence and permissible comments on the evidence in the case.” Id. at 37. The court also acknowledged other "narrow exceptions” to the rule against prosecutorial comments, including where the defendant has asserted a defense of alibi, self-defense, or defense of others, or where the prosecutor’s comment was an “invited response,” a proper rebuttal to a defense attorney’s statement. Id. at 38-39. That the minority test has been littered with exceptions and distinctions is arguably indicative of its unworkable nature. If the minority rule is more “liberal” at all, it is arguably not in the scope of its protections, but rather in the manipulation of its applicability.
*366I believe that a clearly articulated and practicable standard often provides more protection to a defendant than a standard which is malleable.

. The prosecutor, in summation stated that, "the defendant said some things through his attorney in opening ...” and that "[his attorney] really doesn't dispute these items.” Oken, supra, at 293, 681 A.2d at 48.

. The few other occasions where Smith was cited in relation to self-incrimination issues included: Veney v. State, 251 Md. 159, 180, 246 A.2d 608, 621 (1968) cert. denied, 394 U.S. 948, 89 S.Ct. 1284, 22 L.Ed.2d 482 (1969), where the Court, noting that the factual scenario for Veney and Smith were similar, virtually block-quoted the entire Smith opinion, without emphasizing any particular portion or principle articulated in Smith; and King v. State, 190 Md. 361, 374, 58 A.2d 663, 668 (1948), after this Court referred to the 1939 Maryland Code, Article 35, Section 4 which provided that the refusal of a defendant to testify must not create a presumption against him. Otherwise, Smith was only cited when referring to the portion of the decision discussing harmless error, see e.g. Wilson v. State, 261 Md. 551, 570, 276 A.2d 214, 224 (1971), Hill v. State, 218 Md. 120, 127, 145 A.2d 445, 449 (1958) (Henderson, J., dissenting), Lambert v. State, 197 Md. 22, 29, 78 A.2d 378, 381 (1951), or the effect of a curative instruction by the trial court. See e.g. Barber v. State, 191 Md. 555, 566, 62 A.2d 616, 621 (1948); Wilkerson v. State, 171 Md. 287, 290, 188 A. 813, 814 (1937).

. The majority attempts to side-step its failure to apply the now-presumed Smith “test” in Oken by stating that "the issue of the appropriate test was never raised” in Oken. I do not dispute the majority’s assessment of the issues before the Court in Oken, as it is clear that we were tasked with determining whether a defendant’s counsel was ineffective because of his failure to object to an allegedly improper prosecutorial comment on the defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. That the precise issue of "which test is appropriate” was not raised or addressed in Oken does not change the fact that the Oken Court did not apply the Smith “test” when determining whether the prosecutors comment was improper. The Court's failure to employ the Smith "test” then reinforces the perception of its seemingly sudden unveiling of the Smith “test” now.
That notwithstanding, if the majority’s reasoning were to stand, (i.e. Oken should somehow be less consequential because the “issue of the appropriate test was never raised”), then its reliance on Smith itself would be without merit, because the precise "issue of the appropriate test” was not before the Court in 1936 in Smith either.

. A handful of jurisdictions in this country have adopted either a "fairly susceptible" or "reasonably susceptible" test. See supra note 1.