Court Opinion

ID: 9770340
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 15:59:00.402511+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:16.539503
License: Public Domain

MEYERS, J.,

delivered this dissenting opinion.

In point of error one appellant argues the evidence is legally insufficient to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the testimony of the accomplice wit*467ness “tended to connect” appellant to the commission of the offense. The majority says a legal sufficiency review is inappropriate when considering such claim because the accomplice witness rule is a creature of statute alone:
We decline appellant’s invitation to impose legal and factual sufficiency standards upon a review of accomplice witness testimony under Article 38.14. The accomplice witness rule is a statutorily imposed sufficiency review and is not derived from federal or state constitutional principles that define the legal and factual sufficiency standards. See Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 n. 6 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). The burden established by the Legislature is that there be other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the offense.
Majority opinion at 462-63. But this Court has always superimposed on the accomplice witness rule elements derived from federal constitutional principles defining legal sufficiency review. For instance, this Court reviews an accomplice witness/insufficiency claim “in the light most favorable to the verdict.” See, e.g., Hernandez v. State, 939 S.W.2d 173, 176 (Tex.Crim.App.1997); Knox v. State, 934 S.W.2d 678, 683-87 (Tex.Crim.App.1996); Colella v. State, 915 S.W.2d 834, 836 (Tex.Crim.App.1995); Gill v. State, 873 S.W.2d 45, 48 (Tex.Crim.App.1994). This is not a statutory requirement.1 This is derived from Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). We also ask whether “reasonable” or “rational” jurors could find the evidence to be sufficiently corroborative. See, e.g., Hernandez v. State, 939 S.W.2d 173 (Tex.Crim.App.1997)(“rational jurors could conclude that this evidence sufficiently tended to connect ... ”); Gill v. State, 873 S.W.2d 45, 48 (Tex.Crim.App.l994)(“the issue before us is whether a reasonable jury could conclude that this non-accomplice evidence, taken as a whole, tended to connect ... ”). This cannot be found in the accomplice witness provision. See n. 2, supra. It is an application of Jackson, supra. Farris v. State, 819 S.W.2d 490, 493-95 (Tex.Crim.App.1990)(in reviewing accomplice witness/insufficiency claim, we observed “our analysis of evidentiary sufficiency is guided, as always by the standard set out in Jackson v. Virginia”). In addition, as the majority notes, when the evidence is insufficient under an accomplice witness/insufficiency of the evidence claim, an acquittal rather than a retrial is in order. This is required by Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1977), and Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19, 98 S.Ct. 2151, 57 L.Ed.2d 15 (1977), pursuant to federal constitutional principles.2
*468A claim of insufficiency under the accomplice witness rule is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the defendant’s conviction, and thus ultimately governed by federal constitutional principles set forth in Burks and Greene:
If the non-accomplice evidence fails to connect appellant to the offense, the evidence is insufficient to support appellant’s conviction and an acquittal results, [citing Reynolds, supra, Burks and Greene, supra].... However, a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s verdict on guilt or innocence.
Munoz v. State, 853 S.W.2d 558, 560 (Tex.Crim.App.1993); see also Moron v. State, 779 S.W.2d 399, 403 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (holding State failed to present sufficient non-accomplice testimony that tended to connect defendant with offense and thereby corroborate accomplice witnesses, thus defendant entitled to acquittal and stating “Under Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978), also see Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19, 98 S.Ct. 2151, 57 L.Ed.2d 15 (1978), a determination by this Court that the evidence, as a matter of law, is insufficient to sustain the trier of fact’s verdict bars any retrial of [the defendant] for the same offense”).
The majority suggests there is no connection between the accomplice witness rule and federal constitutional law because the rule is purely statutory.3 Granted the rule is statutory, but it is a legislative recognition that there is “reasonable doubt” (a federal constitutional principle) to support a finding of guilt when the circumstances described in the rule exist (i.e., when there is only uncorroborated accomplice testimony to support the conviction):
[The accomplice witness rule] essentially constitutes a legislative judgement that a reasonable doubt exists if the only evidence the State presents in satisfaction of its burden of proof is the testimony of an uncorroborated accomplice witness. In other words, as a matter of statutory law, an uncorroborated accomplice witness cannot by itself persuade us beyond a reasonable doubt — or, at least, even if it persuades a particular jury to that level of confidence, a conviction will not be permitted.
Castillo v. State, 913 S.W.2d 529, n. 3 (Tex.Crim.App.1995) (plurality opinion); see also Munoz, supra. By ignoring the caselaw discussed in this opinion, it seems the majority intends to overrule it sub silentio.4
*469I cannot guess at the majority’s motivation to today render an insufficiency of the evidence claim under the accomplice witness rule divorced from any federal constitutional principles. Without more explanation as to why this is now necessary in contrast to former caselaw, I decline to join the majority in revising the law on this issue.5 With these remarks, I dissent.

. The statute provides:
A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice witness unless corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the offense committed; and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense.
Tex.Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.14.

. In Ex parte Reynolds, 588 S.W.2d 900 (Tex. Crim.App.1979), cert, denied, 445 U.S. 920, 100 S.Ct. 1284, 63 L.Ed.2d 605 (1980), the petitioner contended her second trial violated double jeopardy, after her first conviction was reversed for insufficient evidence to corroborate an accomplice witness. The State argued such finding under the accomplice witness rule is trial error and does not constitute insufficient evidence to support the conviction under Burks and Greene. We noted acquittal was required under article 38.17, but further held such result was mandated in these circumstances under Burks and Greene:
In this jurisdiction, when the evidence is insufficient to corroborate an accomplice witness, the jury cannot properly return any verdict except an acquittal. We therefore hold that the Burks-Greene rule does apply to cases in which the evidence is insufficient to corroborate the testimony of the accomplice witness.
588 S.W.2d at 902 (emphasis added). The emphasis remained on Burks and Greene, as the State continued to argue those decisions should not be given retrospective application. We disagreed, ultimately holding the petitioner was entitled to relief under Burks and Greene. Id. at 904; see also Munoz v. State, 853 S.W.2d 558, 560 (1993) ("If the non-accomplice evidence fails to connect appel*468lant to the offense, the evidence is insufficient to support appellant’s conviction and an acquittal results” citing Ex parte Reynolds, supra, Buries, supra, and Greene, supra); Cruz v. State, 690 S.W.2d 246 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (setting aside judgment and reforming to reflect acquittal for insufficient evidence to corroborate accomplice witness testimony, citing Burks and Greene); Castaneda v. State, 682 S.W.2d 535, 538 (Tex.Crim.App. 1984) (reversing judgments and remanding to trial court for entry of acquittal under Reynolds, Burks and Greene); Walker v. State, 615 S.W.2d 728, 733 (Tex.Crim.App.1981) (holding evidence insufficient to corroborate accomplice witness testimony and ordering judgment reformed to acquittal, stating, "This court is bound by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978), and Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19, 98 S.Ct. 2151, 57 L.Ed.2d 15 (1978), which applied Burks to the states. These decisions require that a defendant having once been placed in jeopardy and the evidence having been found insufficient, no further prosecution may be had.”).

. Most matters that are subject to or connected to a legal sufficiency review are statutorily imposed, such as culpable mental state, elements of an offense, statute of limitations, law of the parties, and the accomplice witness rule. This is because everything the State has to prove is decided by the legislature. And we have held that everything the State is required to prove (and therefore bears a burden of proof) must be in the jury charge so that it can be passed upon by a jury.

. It’s not really clear what the majority intends to do by its holding or how its holding *469will impact “review” of accomplice witness/insufficiency claims. And how will removing of accomplice witness/insufficiency claims from the purview of Jackson impact charge error regarding accomplice witness instructions? As the law stands, failure to include an accomplice witness instruction may be egregious error. See Saunders v. State, 817 S.W.2d 688 (Tex.Crim.App.1991)(holding defendant egregiously harmed where no charge given on accomplice testimony and evidence taken as whole did not have “strong tendency” to connect defendant with commission of offense).

. As we have recognized, a claim of insufficiency of the evidence based on the accomplice witness rule is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to convict. Munoz, 853 S.W.2d at 560. This is because a finding of sufficient corroborating evidence in a case involving an accomplice witness is a precondition to finding the evidence legally sufficient to convict. If the corroborating evidence is insufficient, then the evidence to convict is automatically legally insufficient. In other words, if the corroborating evidence does not "tend to connect,” then a rational jury would have a reasonable doubt as to whether appellant committed the offense. Conversely, if the corroborating evidence is sufficient, then the legal sufficiency of the evidence to convict must still be measured by the appropriate standard.
The test for measuring the corroborative evidence goes like this:
The test for weighing the sufficiency of the corroborative evidence is to eliminate from consideration the testimony of the accomplice witness and then examine the testimony of other witnesses to ascertain if there is evidence which tends to connect the accused with the commission of the offense. The non-accomplice evidence need not be sufficient in itself to establish the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Nor is it necessary for the non-accomplice evidence to directly link the accused to the commission of the offense. The accomplice witness rule is satisfied if there is some non-accomplice evidence which tends to connect the accused to the commission of the offense alleged in the indictment.
Hernandez, 939 S.W.2d at 176 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Appellant confuses these concepts by superimposing on the accomplice witness rule a burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. He argues "When the evidence regarding appellant’s statements and connection to the weapon is considered standing alone, as it must be, such evidence is simply inadequate to support a finding that appellant was connected to the commission of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” This is wrong. The standard is "tend to connect” as shown above. This is not to say that satisfaction of the accomplice witness rule means the evidence is otherwise legally sufficient beyond a reasonable doubt. Just like sufficient proof of one element of the offense does not mean there is sufficient proof of the others. Appellant does not argue, however, the evidence is legally insufficient in any other respect.