Court Opinion

ID: 9516419
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 23:42:14.765434+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:35:42.108010
License: Public Domain

SABERS, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
Prior bad act evidence is not admissible to show that since a defendant committed a similar offense on another occasion, he has a propensity to commit the offense charged. SDCL 19-12-5; State v. Steele, 510 N.W.2d 661, 668 n. 8 (S.D.1994); 2 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence ¶ 404[04], at 404-26 (1994). Proof of “other acts” is admissible if it is relevant to some material issue in dispute in the case.1 State v. Rose, 324 N.W.2d 894, 895 (S.D.1982); SDCL 19-12-5 is a “rule of general inadmissibility with limited exceptions.” Steele, 510 N.W.2d at 667 (citation omitted). “[TJrial courts must be ‘ever vigilant’ so that the rule is not swallowed up by the exceptions.” Id.
This prior bad act testimony was offered and received under the intent and plan exceptions.
1. Intent
[U]se [under the intent exception] of other crimes is troubling because usually it involves a kind of particularized character inference. The defendant entertained the criminal intent on a prior occasion, so on the occasion of the charged offense he likely had the same intent. Very little space separates this inferential logic from the general propensity inference that FRE 404 [SDCL 19-12-5] seeks to prevent (he did it before, so he is the sort who behaves that way and probably did it this time). Hence courts are wise to take special precautions, and to exclude the evidence or defer it where such proof is not necessary because intent is readily inferred from the act itself (general intent crimes) or because there is no dispute on intent. For these reasons and others, evidence of other crimes should often be excluded when offered to prove intent.
1 C. Mueller and L. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 112, at 648 (2nd ed. 1994).
Here, the first two witnesses were prior bad act witnesses, rather than the victims of the crimes charged. The trial court should have excluded this testimony or at least deferred it until Ondricek put intent into dispute. Id.; State v. Champagne, 422 N.W.2d 840, 845 (S.D.1988) (Sabers, J. dissenting) (prior bad act evidence improper unless defendant claims the touching was accidental or innocent); see also Rose, 324 N.W.2d at 895 (intent in dispute where defendant admitted touchings occurred but denied sexual gratification intent). Intent is not in dispute if a defendant denies the touching occurred. Id.; see C. Hutton, Commentary: Prior Bad Acts Evidence in Cases of Sexual Contact with a Child, 34 S.D.L.Rev. 604, 610 (1989); U.S. v. Powell, 587 F.2d 443, 449 (9th Cir.1978) (“When a defendant denies participation in the act or acts which constitute the crime, intent is not a material issue for the purpose of applying Rule 404(b) [SDCL 19-12-5]”); U.S. v. Jenkins, 7 F.3d 803, 806-07 (8th *879Cir.1993) (“evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts cannot be admitted when the defense is that defendant did not do the act”).
The Second, Eighth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals hold that if a defendant denies the act occurred, then intent is not in dispute. Jenkins, 7 F.3d at 807; U.S. v. Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934, 942 (2nd Cir.1980); Powell, 587 F.2d at 448. Therefore, any prior bad act evidence is merely character evidence and inadmissible in these circumstances. Id. The Champagne majority incorrectly allowed prior bad act evidence to be introduced for a specific intent crime. 422 N.W.2d at 843.
[T]he [Champagne ] court’s dismissal of the requirement that intent be seriously in dispute — which it is not if the defendant denies the act completely — seems inconsistent with the purpose for which the intent requirement was originally inserted into the statute [SDCL 22-22-7].... [I]t appears to have been included as a means of describing and distinguishing noncriminal from criminal touchings, and not as a means of imposing a greater burden of proof on the government, or as a “backdoor” method of introducing prior bad acts evidence.
Hutton, supra, at 610.
In U.S. v. Has No Horse, 11 F.3d 104, 105 (8th Cir.1993), the trial court admitted prior bad act testimony from two girls who testified that the defendant made sexual advances toward them. The advances occurred about the same time as the charged offense. Id. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the evidence was inadmissible under the exceptions for intent, knowledge, and common plan and reversed for a new trial, even though the court held substantial evidence existed to support the verdict absent the prior bad act evidence. Id. at 107. The prior bad act testimony was admitted “to show a propensity to commit such aets[,]” which is not permitted. Id. at 106; SDCL 19-12-5; see Steele, 510 N.W.2d at 668 n. 8; U.S. v. Soundingsides, 820 F.2d 1232, 1237-38 (10th Cir.1987) (reversible error to admit evidence that murder defendant had beaten girlfriend regularly five years earlier and caused death of baby she was carrying; intent was not raised as a defense, and evidence of what happened to murder victim would support inference of intent without prior bad act evidence).
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that if prior bad acts are to be offered to prove intent, then the offer of the evidence “should await the conclusion of the defendant’s case and should be aimed at a specifically identified issue.” U.S. v. Colon, 880 F.2d 650, 660 (2nd Cir.1989) (citations omitted). “This enables the trial judge to determine whether the issue sought to be proved by the evidence is really in dispute and, if so, to assess the probative worth of the evidence on this issue against its prejudicial effect.” Id. After the defendant has “opened the door” to the issue, prior bad act evidence will be admissible.2 Id. at 661; see State v. Burtzlaff, 493 N.W.2d 1, 5-6 (S.D.1992) (once defendant “opened the door” to prejudicial prior bad acts, State may introduce further evidence).
It is uncertain whether Ondricek would have taken the stand if the prior bad act testimony had not been offered in the State’s ease-in-chief. Since the State had already opened the door on the issue of sexual intent with the prior bad act testimony, it appears Ondricek had little choice but to take the stand to attempt to counter that testimony. Under these circumstances, it is reversible error for the State to introduce the prior bad act testimony in its ease-in-chief unless intent is clearly in dispute. See Colon, 880 F.2d at 661-62.
We should hold that intent must be in dispute before any prior bad act evidence is admissible. The trial court must defer such evidence until the defendant places intent in dispute or intent is clearly in dispute from the outset.3 See McDonald, 500 N.W.2d at *880249 (Sabers, J. concurring specially) (since issue was whether defendant knew packet contained cocaine, prior bad acts were admissible to prove knowledge and intent); Rose, 324 N.W.2d 894 (defendant admitted touchings occurred but denied sexual gratification intent).
2. Common Plan or Scheme
The trial court also admitted the prior bad act testimony under the plan exception. SDCL 19-12-5. The ‘plan’ exception deals with acts which are done in connection with a “larger continuing plan, scheme or conspiracy of which the present crime is only a part[.]” Champagne, 422 N.W.2d at 842 (citations omitted).
State claims that Ondrieek’s actions against J.W. and E.P. and his other nieces were part of a common scheme of getting his nieces alone during family or recreational activities then preying upon them. State claims these activities come within a “larger continuing plan ... of which the present crime is only a part.” Id. I disagree. On-dricek’s activity with E.P. constituted separate, independent acts or mere repetition of similar acts, an impermissible propensity suggestion. The distinction and greater latitude given to admission of prior bad acts in sexual molestation cases should be exercised only in the context of same defendant/same victim. Champagne, 422 N.W.2d at 845-46 (Sabers, J., dissenting).
In addition, the other acts should not have been admitted under the plan exception considering their remoteness. U.S. v. Fawbush, 900 F.2d 150, 151-52 (8th Cir.1990) (testimony by adult daughters of childhood sexual abuse eight years earlier too remote and prejudicial, causing reversible error); U.S. v. Davis, 657 F.2d 637, 639-40 (prior bad act occurring six years earlier did not show intent or plan); U.S. v. Krezdorn, 639 F.2d 1327, 1331-1332 (5th Cir.1981) (prior forms showing forged signatures only showed repetition of similar acts, an impermissible propensity suggestion); U.S. v. O’Connor, 580 F.2d 38, 41-42 (2nd Cir.1978) (proof of prior bribes might prove character, but not show specific plan).
The trial court should carefully consider the remoteness of the previous events in determining their probative value for purpose of common plan or scheme. State v. Christopherson, 482 N.W.2d 298, 305-06 (S.D.1992) (Sabers and Amundson, JJ. dissenting); see C. Mueller and L. Kirkpatrick, supra § 108, at 600. Here, the prior bad act testimony concerned events that occurred almost twenty years earlier. D.P.’s testimony concerned events that happened between 1972 and 1978 and L.P.’s testimony concerned events that happened between 1969 and 1976 (except for a 1991 incident in an antique store in which Ondricek patted her pregnant stomach and stated: “my baby’s having a baby,” which may be an admission against interest). These events are very remote when considering common plan or scheme.
“[TJhese uncharged prior bad acts were too prejudicial and too remote and prevented the defendant from receiving a fair trial.” Christopherson, 482 N.W.2d at 306 (Sabers and Amundson, JJ. dissenting) (citation omitted). Prior bad act evidence should not be used to show that defendant is a “bad person.” State v. Werner, 482 N.W.2d 286, 296 (S.D.1992) (Amundson, J. concurring in part, dissenting in part). “The admission of this evidence allowed the defendant to be judged on the basis of innuendo” from uncharged acts. Id.
In Fawbush, 900 F.2d at 152, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s allowance of prior sexual abuse testimony by the defendant’s adult daughters under the exceptions for motive, plan, intent and knowledge. The court held that such testimony did not show a unique method which tended to establish defendant as the perpetrator. Id. at 151. Furthermore, the *881court held that the prior sexual abuse evidence was relevant to the exceptions listed under Rule 404(b) [SDCL 19-12-5] “only insofar as the previous sexual abuse tended to show a propensity to commit such acts.” Id. The acts which had occurred over eight years before the charged offenses provided no proof of opportunity or preparation. Id. at 151-52. The absence of mistake or accident was not at issue in the trial because defendant denied such touchings occurred. Id. The prior bad acts were not reasonably close in time to the offenses charged. Id.; see Davis, 657 F.2d at 639-40 (4th Cir.1981) (prior bad acts occurring 6 to 11 years earlier too remote in time). The evidence of incest and pregnancy was inflammatory. Fawbush, 900 F.2d at 152. Here, the evidence of a prior rape approximately 19 years before was highly inflammatory with little probative value to common plan or scheme. Id.; see Government of the Virgin Islands v. Pinney, 967 F.2d 912, 915-917 (3rd Cir.1992) (reversible error to admit proof of prior rape in rape trial; evidence was highly inflammatory and had minimal probative worth).
In Pinney, 967 F.2d at 915-917, the court held it was reversible error to admit evidence of a prior rape of victim’s sister six years earlier. The prior bad acts were only admissible under the plan exception when they are part of a “single series of events.” Id. at 916. The court noted:
[TJhere is no dispute in this case about the identity of the individual ... or about whether any sexual intercourse ... was accidental. The trial was about whether or not sexual intercourse oecurred[.] ... It was her word against his and if the jury believed her testimony that she was raped ... it is inconceivable that it would have found that he acted by mistake or that the perpetrator was someone else.... The obvious reason the government wanted the [prior rape] testimony before the jury was because of the substantial likelihood that one or more members of the jury would use this highly inflammatory evidence for exactly the purpose Rule 404(b) [SDCL 19-12-5] declared to be improper — i.e., drawing the inference that [defendant] was the kind of person who raped young girls and that, accordingly, he must have raped [victim].
Id. at 917; see also Werner, 482 N.W.2d at 295 (Amundson, J. concurring in part, dissenting in part) (use of this evidence might make jurors infer that defendant has a propensity to commit crimes and probably committed the crime charged).
In this case, the trial court did caution the jury that the testimony of D.P. and L.P. may “be used only to show intent and/or a common scheme on the part of the defendant.” Cautionary jury instructions are not likely to protect against unfair prejudice when this type of evidence is introduced. Pinney, 967 F.2d at 918; Fawbush, 900 F.2d at 152. “[T]here are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored.” Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 1627, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968). Here, the prior bad act testimony, especially L.P.’s rape allegation, is so “emotionally charged” that any jury instructions may not be sufficient to ensure a fair trial. Id.; Pinney, 967 F.2d at 918; Fawbush, 900 F.2d at 152 (jury instructions did not reduce risk that evidence would be used for an improper purpose).
Prior bad act evidence relating to prior victims should be admissible in the state’s case-in-chief under the common plan or scheme exception only when the acts are done as part of a larger continuing plan, scheme or conspiracy of which the present crime is only a part (i.e., as part of a single series of events).
Under these circumstances, it was reversible error for the trial court to allow the prior bad act testimony of D.P. and L.P. It created an impermissible propensity inference, SDCL 19-12-5, and was so inflammatory that cautionary jury instructions were insufficient to ensure a fair trial. We should reverse and remand for a new trial consistent with this writing.
AMUNDSON, J., joins this dissent.

. In State v. Means, 363 N.W.2d 565, 568 (S.D.1985), this court eliminated the "in dispute” requirement for introduction of prior bad acts evidence for specific intent crimes such as sexual contact. This position was restated in State v. Champagne, 422 N.W.2d 840, 843 (S.D.1988). It was error to do so. Id. at 845 (Sabers, J., dissenting); see State v. McDonald, 500 N.W.2d 243, 249 (Sabers, J. concurring specially) (prior bad acts are admissible to prove knowledge and intent “once it was clear that the real issue was whether [defendant] knew the packet contained cocaine.”).

. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals recognizes an exception when the issue of intent is clearly in dispute. Colon, 880 F.2d at 660 (citations omitted). The cases cited deal with crimes with "intent to defraud” as an element where the defendant placed the issue of intent into issue.

. In considering the possibility that the defendant might present no evidence, the Second Circuit has noted:
Defendants frequently do not disclose whether there will be a defense case until the prosecution has rested its case. Consequently, the safer course in offering similar act evidence *880that should normally await the prosecution’s rebuttal case, is for the prosecution to rest, reserving, out of the presence of the jury, the right to reopen to present such evidence in the event the defendants rest without introducing evidence. If that occurs and the evidence is subsequently admitted, the trial judge can inform the jury that court procedure obliged the prosecution to defer its similar act evidence, thereby avoiding any unwarranted inference that the prosecution was desperately using a last-minute tactic.
Colon, 880 F.2d at 660-61 n. 2 (citations omitted).