Court Opinion

ID: 9825835
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 14:07:34.027179+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:23:47.278822
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: AUGUST 25, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                 Commonwealth of Kentucky
                           Court of Appeals
                              NO. 2022-CA-0179-MR

ANU WHITE                                                               APPELLANT

               APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.               HONORABLE MARY M. SHAW, JUDGE
             ACTION NOS. 14-CR-003257 AND 14-CR-003257-004

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                                  APPELLEE

                                     OPINION
                                    AFFIRMING

                                   ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: COMBS, MCNEILL, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

MCNEILL, JUDGE: In 2017, Appellant, Anu White (White), was convicted of

first-degree robbery (complicity). He was found not guilty of murder. Prior to his

sentencing phase of trial, White entered a conditional plea, wherein he agreed to

waive his right to a jury-sentencing phase, and his right to appeal any trial issues.

The Commonwealth recommended a sentence of twelve years’ imprisonment,

which was imposed by the trial court. Nearly three years later, White filed a pro se
Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence pursuant to RCr1 11.42. The

primary allegation here is that he pleaded guilty because of ineffective assistance

of counsel. The court denied White’s request for RCr 11.42 relief. He appeals to

this Court as a matter of right. For the following reasons, we affirm.

                A successful petition for relief under RCr 11.42 for ineffective

assistance of counsel must survive the twin prongs of “performance” and

“prejudice” provided in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984);

accord Gall v. Commonwealth, 702 S.W.2d 37, 39-40 (Ky. 1985). As to the

second Strickland prong, the defendant has the duty to “affirmatively prove

prejudice.” Id. at 693. In the context of a guilty plea:

                A conclusory allegation to the effect that absent the error
                the movant would have insisted upon a trial is not
                enough. The movant must allege facts that, if proven,
                would support a conclusion that the decision to reject the
                plea bargain and go to trial would have been rational,
                e.g., valid defenses, a pending suppression motion that
                could undermine the prosecution’s case, or the realistic
                potential for a lower sentence.

Stiger v. Commonwealth, 381 S.W.3d 230, 237 (Ky. 2012) (citations and footnote

omitted).

                [W]hen reviewing a trial court’s findings of fact
                following an RCr 11.42 evidentiary hearing, an appellate
                court utilizes the clearly erroneous standard set forth in
                Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 52.01. Findings
                of fact are not clearly erroneous if supported by

1
    Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.

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             substantial evidence. Even though claims of ineffective
             assistance of counsel are subject to de novo review, a
             reviewing court should defer to the determination of facts
             made by the trial judge.

Saylor v. Commonwealth, 357 S.W.3d 567, 570-71 (Ky. App. 2012) (citations

omitted). With these standards in mind, we now return to the record and

arguments at issue here.

             White contends that the jury was presented with an erroneous

facilitation to robbery instruction. The Commonwealth does not dispute this. But

for this erroneous instruction, White claims that he would not have accepted the

sentencing plea agreement. However, in denying White’s RCr 11.42 petition, the

circuit court correctly concluded that the jury did not consider the tendered

facilitation instruction, because it found White guilty under the preceding

complicity instruction. White does not take issue with the complicity instruction,

which concluded with the admonition, “[I]f you do not find Anu White guilty

under this instruction, proceed to Instruction 2a [facilitation].” Therefore, because

White cannot “affirmatively prove prejudice” pursuant to Strickland, we need not

address trial counsel’s “performance.” Accordingly, we AFFIRM.

             ALL CONCUR.

                                         -3-
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:          BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Jacquelyn Bryant-Hayes        Daniel Cameron
LaGrange, Kentucky            Attorney General of Kentucky

REPLY BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:    Thomas A. Van De Rostyne
                              Assistant Attorney General
Kara Stinson Lewis            Frankfort, Kentucky
LaGrange, Kentucky

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