Court Opinion

ID: 9463322
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 23:02:52.109941+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:01.529194
License: Public Domain

TIMBERS, Circuit Judge
(dissenting):
Sentence review is none of our appellate business.
Today’s majority decision is the most unwarranted interference with a conscientious district judge’s imposition of sentence within the limits prescribed by Congress that I have seen in more than sixteen years on the federal bench.
Raymond Robin — whose underworld code name is “Railroad” or “RR” — was caught red-handed selling one-half kilograms of heroin on two occasions during a six day period in March 1974. A retired New York City police officer and bail bondsman, he pleaded guilty to three counts of violation of the federal narcotics laws. He has never said or suggested that he did not commit the offenses. He has never indicated a scintilla of remorse. After a day-long sentence hearing,1 he was sentenced by Judge Motley to two-thirds of the maximum prison penalty provided by Congress; was ordered to pay a $75,000 committed fine — the maximum; and was ordered to serve a three year special parole term upon his release from prison.
The majority candidly concedes that it does not like “the particular severity of the sentence which was imposed in this case.” 545 F.2d at 782. Reaching deep down into its bag for a rationalization to justify its vacating a sentence imposed within statutory limits,2 the majority comes up with the assertion, as the basis for its decision, that *783the defense was not given sufficient time to examine the presentence report.
The record is squarely to the contrary.
In the first place, no objection was made before Judge Motley of insufficient time to examine the presentence report and no request for an adjournment of sentencing was made for the purpose of examining it.3 Second, the presentence report was made available in its entirety to Robin’s attorney.4 Third, the presentence report was used extensively by Robin’s attorney in his plea to Judge Motley on behalf of his client during the lengthy sentence hearing.5 Fourth, Judge Motley made it crystal clear at the outset of the hearing and throughout that in imposing sentence she would confine herself to the charges in the indictment to which Robin had pleaded guilty; specifically, the judge repeatedly stated that she would not take into consideration other matters set forth in the presentence report, including “other crimes which may have been committed by the defendant .... If he is guilty of some other crimes, they are not before me.”6 To this, defense counsel responded, “I’m glad to hear your *784Honor say that because your Honor has articulated the rule on sentencing. ...” Finally, the claim that the defense was not given sufficient time to examine the presentence report — the ground for the majority’s decision vacating sentence — aside from never having been raised in the district court, likewise has not been raised by appellant on appeal either in his briefs or in oral argument.
In short, the ground upon which the majority’s decision is based must be viewed precisely for what it is: a ground never claimed by appellant or his counsel in the district court or on appeal; a ground totally devoid of any support in the record; but a ground nevertheless relied on by the majority as a vehicle not only for expressing its “concern” for “the particular severity of the sentence” but for vacating it.
If this were not enough to compel me to dissent, there is one other matter. Without the slightest basis in the record to justify it, the majority has directed that “resentencing will be before a different judge”. 545 F.2d at 782. The majority characterizes this as “the preferred practice in such cases”. Id. What is “preferred” of course is a subjective judgment. I had supposed that the extraordinary remedy of directing that proceedings on remand take place before another judge should be reserved for the extraordinary case. In my view, this is not such a case. In the context of imposition of sentence, one would expect, before ordering the extraordinary remedy of re-sentencing before a different judge, that such order be based upon a showing in the record of such bias or prejudice against the defendant as to render it difficult or impossible for the judge fairly and impartially to perform the duty which she took the oath more than ten years ago to perform. There is not a scintilla of a showing in this record of any such bias or prejudice, and the majority points to none.
The conclusion therefore is inescapable that the direction that appellant be resentenced before a different judge further confirms my belief stated above that the true reason for the majority's decision vacating this sentence is that the majority simply does not like “the particular severity of the sentence which was imposed”. With deference, that strikes me as precisely the sort of sentence review which is none of our appellate business.
I therefore respectfully but most emphatically dissent.

. The sentence hearing began at 10 A.M. on January 9, 1976. It continued until the noon recess. It resumed at 2 P.M. and continued until sentence was imposed later in the afternoon.
Both sides were given a full opportunity to be heard. There was no curtailment of the presentation by either side. Both Robin and his attorney were heard at length. On the government side, in addition to the Assistant United States Attorney, the judge briefly heard from David F. Cunningham, Esq. and Sterling Johnson, Esq., the two prosecutors who had been in charge of the New York State prosecution of Robin for the same narcotics offenses for which he was indicted in the federal court.

. The majority, although giving lip service to it, then proceeds totally to ignore the rule which is deeply rooted in public policy and has been uniformly adhered to by the Supreme Court and ours that “a sentence imposed by a federal district judge, if within statutory limits, is generally not subject to review.” United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972); accord, Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 441 (1974); Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, *783397 (1958); United States v. Wiley, 519 F.2d 1348, 1351 (2 Cir. 1975); United States v. Tramunti, 513 F.2d 1087, 1120 (2 Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 832 (1975); McGee v. United States, 462 F.2d 243, 248 (2 Cir. 1972).

. Indeed the majority states only that “defense counsel unsuccessfully sought an adjournment of sentencing in order to prepare a rebuttal” to the Cunningham letter.
Even this request for an adjournment does not appear in the 'record certified to this Court. It appears only in an affidavit by Robin’s district court counsel attached to Robin’s reply brief in which he states that “My purpose is to make clear herein that I did not have enough time and opportunity to adequately meet the many conclusiory (sic) and hearsay statements contained in Mr. Cunningham’s letter." (emphasis added). Counsel never complained of insufficient time to examine the presentence report.
As for the Cunningham letter, Robin’s counsel concedes that it was received in his office two weeks before the date of sentencing.
And of course Cunningham himself appeared at the sentence hearing where he was available for questioning by defense counsel who chose not to question him.

. The repeated references in the majority opinion to the fact that the presentence report was given to defense counsel but not “to his client”, 545 F,2d at 777, 781, appear to suggest that there was something wrong with that procedure. Amended Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(c)(3), however, which governs disclosure of the presentence report and which became effective on December 1, 1975, just one month before the instant sentence was imposed, expressly states no less than five times that the presentence report shall be made available to “the defendant or his counsel”, (emphasis added).

. With respect to defense counsel’s use of the presentence report at the sentence hearing, the record shows the following:
“MR. COHEN [Robin’s attorney]: If your Honor please, to begin with I would like to address myself to some of the matters in the presentence report. I had an opportunity to see that this morning (Tr. 2-3).
* * *
On an individual basis the presentence report has shown you this man at the age of seventeen and not under any compulsion but voluntarily enlisted in the United States Navy. On his eighteenth birthday he was in the fields of the Philippines, and served his country throughout that time with honor, and received an honorable discharge.
Thereafter, as the probation report shows, your Honor, the man was a policeman and worked for the city and state of New York. Despite various suggestions again in the presentence memorandum, your Honor will note that the probation officer from the official record has indicated and tells your Honor and informs your Honor that during his years of service not once but twice he performed meritoriously enough for commendation. We are dealing with that kind of man in public service. I am not going to detail the family background. Your Honor has all of that, but that is the kind of man we are talking about. A man who has never been convicted of anything, not even getting a traffic ticket.” (Tr. 11).
Of course defense counsel understandably made selective use of the presentence report. But that itself belies the assertion of the majority that “the time allotted to appellant’s counsel was insufficient to permit adequate study of the presentence report . . 545 F.2d 781. Appellant’s counsel never, at any time, in any court, made any such claim.

. Judge Motley’s ruling that in imposing sentence she would confine herself to the charges *784in the indictment to which Robin had pleaded guilty was a ruling which of course was more favorable to him than that to which he was entitled. We have held that “[a] sentencing judge’s access to information should be almost completely unfettered in order that he may ‘acquire a thorough acquaintance with the character and history of the man before [him].’ United States v. Doyle, 348 F.2d 715, 721 (2 Cir.) (Friendly, X), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 843 (1965).” United States v. Schipani, 435 F.2d 26, 27 (2 Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983 (1971). A sentencing court “may and should consider matters that would not be admissible at a trial,” United States v. Sweig, 454 F.2d 181, 183-84 (2 Cir. 1972), including hearsay, Wiliiams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576 (1959); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949); prior crimes of which the defendant has not been convicted, United States v. Cifarelli, 401 F.2d 512, 514 (2 Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 987 (1968); and charges dismissed without a determination on the merits, United States v. Doyle, supra. See generally United States v. Hendrix, 505 F.2d 1233, 1235-36 (2 Cir. 197"), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897 (1975). See Judge Hays’ summary of some of these authorities and the rationale for the rule that such matters may and should be considered by the sentencing judge in the exercise of his “very broad discretion in imposing any sentence within the statutory limits.” United States v. Sweig, supra, 454 F.2d at 183-84.