Court Opinion

ID: 9917346
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-12 05:04:26.125772+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:02:24.918156
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

                                                                   UNPUBLISHED
In re Z. L. SMITH, Minor.                                          January 11, 2024

                                                                   No. 366512
                                                                   Wayne Circuit Court
                                                                   Family Division
                                                                   LC No. 2020-001085-NA

Before: GLEICHER, C.J., and BORRELLO and SHAPIRO, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

       The trial court terminated the parental rights of respondent-father, Darnell Demetrius
Smith, to his minor child, ZLS, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(h) (parent imprisoned for a period
exceeding two years, such that the child will be deprived of a normal home). Because the record
adequately supports that termination was in ZLS’s best interests, we affirm.

                                      I. BACKGROUND

        Smith and Kellyn Layne Beasley are the parents of ZLS. In May or June 2022, shortly
before ZLS’s birth, Smith was convicted in the United States District Court of possessing child
pornography, 18 USC 2252. Smith will remain incarcerated for this conviction until at least June
2025. Beasley has another minor child, DAB, who is unrelated to Smith. In November 2020,
DAB was removed from Beasley’s care because she abused drugs during her pregnancy, and DAB
tested positive for cocaine and marijuana. ZLS similarly tested positive for marijuana at birth.

         Petitioner requested the trial court take jurisdiction over ZLS and terminate Smith’s and
Beasley’s parental rights to the child. During the preliminary hearing, Yyvonne Collier, Beasley’s
third cousin who was caring for ZLS and DAB, expressed a desire to adopt ZLS. Smith’s counsel
requested that “the Court order the Department to investigate and provide, if available, at least
some Zoom contact for the father in terms of visitation,” and investigate ZLS’s paternal relatives
to determine whether she could be placed in their care. The trial court authorized the petition,
provided Smith and Beasley supervised visitation, and directed petitioner to continue reasonable
efforts toward reunification. The court also authorized a permanency plan of adoption and placed
ZLS with Collier.

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        On the same day in May 2023, the trial court held DAB’s best-interests hearing and ZLS’s
joint adjudication and dispositional hearing, in two separate proceedings. As relevant here, the
trial court entered an order taking jurisdiction over ZLS and finding statutory grounds to terminate
Smith’s parental rights only under MCL 712A.19b(3)(h). Further, the trial court found that
termination of Smith’s parental rights was in ZLS’s best interests based on Smith’s lack of bond
with ZLS, ZLS’s placement and relationship with Collier and DAB, and Smith’s conviction for
possessing child pornography. The trial court also found that aggravated circumstances existed
because Smith must register as a sex offender after his release. This appeal followed.

                                  II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

        Whether termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests must be established
by a preponderance of evidence. In re MOTA, 334 Mich App 300, 320; 964 NW2d 881 (2020).
The trial court’s findings and ruling that termination is in the child’s best interests are reviewed
for clear error. Id. “A finding . . . is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court has a definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted;
omission in original). Furthermore, “regard [must] be given to the special opportunity of the trial
court to judge the credibility of the witnesses who appeared before it.” Id. (citation and quotation
marks omitted).

                                         III. ANALYSIS

       Smith argues the trial court improperly terminated his parental rights because termination
was not in ZLS’s best interests. Because the record adequately supports the court’s best-interest
finding, we affirm.

       “If the court finds that there are grounds for termination of parental rights and that
termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests, the court shall order termination of
parental rights. . . .” In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App 35, 42; 823 NW2d 144 (2012), citing MCL
712A.19b(5).

       [T]he focus at the best-interest stage has always been on the child, not the parent.
       In assessing whether termination of parental rights is in a child’s best interests, the
       trial court should weigh all evidence available to it. Courts may consider such
       factors as the child’s bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s
       need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home
       over the parent’s home. Other considerations include the length of time the child
       was in care, the likelihood that the child could be returned to her parents’ home
       within the foreseeable future, if at all, and compliance with the case service plan.
       [In re Payne/Pumphrey/Fortson, 311 Mich App 49, 63-64; 874 NW2d 205 (2015)
       (quotation marks and citations omitted; alteration in original).]

“The trial court may also consider a parent’s history of domestic violence, . . . the parent’s
visitation history with the child, the children’s well-being while in care, and the possibility of
adoption.” In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 714; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). The trial court should also
consider the risk of harm a child might face if returned to the parent’s care. See In re VanDalen,
293 Mich App 120, 142; 809 NW2d 412 (2011). “[B]ecause a child’s placement with relatives

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weighs against termination under MCL 712A.19a(6)(a), the fact that a child is living with relatives
when the case proceeds to termination is a factor to be considered in determining whether
termination is in the child’s best interests.” In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 43 (quotation
marks and citation omitted). Additionally, under MCL 712A.13a(14)(a), reasonable efforts must
be made to “[p]lace siblings removed from their home in the same foster care, kinship
guardianship, or adoptive placement, unless the supervising agency documents that a joint
placement would be contrary to the safety or well-being of any of the siblings.”

         The record shows Smith had appropriate housing before his incarceration; successfully
completed drug screens, complied with a curfew, maintained employment, and participated in
therapy during three years of a pretrial release program1; did not receive any tickets or citations
while incarcerated, and had family willing to care for ZLS. Additionally, there was no evidence
that Smith ever committed domestic violence against Beasley or harmed ZLS. However, the
record also shows ZLS was never in Smith’s care or custody because his sentence for possessing
child pornography began shortly after her birth in August 2022. Smith never supported ZLS
financially before he was incarcerated and testified that he would not be able to do so while in
prison. By the time Smith would be released, at the earliest in June 2025, ZLS will have been
without Smith’s care for the first three years of her life. Additionally, Smith must register as a sex
offender and enter transitional housing upon release, so ZLS could not even then be returned to
Smith’s care. Further, a Child Protective Services (CPS) investigator and a foster care worker both
testified that ZLS had no bond with Smith. And though Smith had some limited contact with ZLS
shortly after the child’s birth while she was in the hospital and “some parenting time” at an agency
location, he failed to attend his scheduled virtual visit in April 2023 and never saw ZLS following
his incarceration.2

1
 Although Smith was indicted in 2018, he was not convicted until 2022 because the COVID-19
pandemic delayed his case.
2
  We acknowledge that petitioner arguably did not exert much effort to ensure Smith could have
supervised, virtual visitation with ZLS, particularly where the trial court ordered supervised visits
in October 2022 but nothing was actually scheduled until April 2023. And though a caseworker
reached out to Smith via letter in December 2022, this was still well after the court’s order, with
nothing in the record showing Smith ever received this communication. However, to the extent
that Smith argues on appeal that “the state failed to follow court orders directing that he be
provided some sort of opportunity to establish a bond with [ZLS],” i.e., that petitioner failed to
make sufficient efforts at reunification, this issue is absent from Smith’s statement of questions
presented. See Mich Ed Ass’n v Secretary of State, 280 Mich App 477, 488; 761 NW2d 234
(2008), aff’d 489 Mich 194 (2011) (“[W]e generally do not consider any issues not set forth in the
statement of questions presented.”). In any event, reasonable efforts to reunify the child and family
must generally be made, except when cases involve aggravated circumstances under MCL
712A.19a(2). In re Mason, 486 Mich 142, 152; 782 NW2d 747 (2010). Under MCL
712A.19a(2)(d), reasonable efforts to reunify the child need not be made if “the parent is required
by court order to register under the sex offenders registration act.” Here, Smith must register as a
sex offender upon his release, and the trial court found aggravating circumstances present.
Petitioner, therefore, was not required to make reasonable efforts towards reunification.

                                                 -3-
        Further, Smith testified that (1) he still intended to plan for ZLS’s care with Beasley and
reunify with her after his release, (2) he was only “somewhat aware” of Beasley’s case concerning
DAB, and (3) he never knew Beasley was abusing cocaine and marijuana despite living with her
for 10 months before ZLS’s birth. While Smith acknowledged that he would not permit Beasley
around ZLS if she was not mentally healthy, these facts nonetheless call into question, at least
somewhat, Smith’s parenting ability, particularly his judgment and ability to provide a safe, drug-
free environment for ZLS.

        In contrast, the record shows Collier cared for ZLS since birth and was able to meet all her
basic needs, they shared a strong bond, and ZLS was resistant to being in the care of anyone but
Collier. ZLS viewed Collier as her caregiver, and Collier expressed a desire to adopt ZLS and
provide her with long-term care. Collier also acted as the foster parent for ZLS’s sibling, DAB,
and ZLS and DAB were “very attached.” In fact, ZLS and DAB attended the same daycare and
“have to be placed in the same room. They have to have snack and lunch and nap time together.
She will not leave his side.”

        Based on this evidence, the trial court did not clearly err by finding that termination was in
ZLS’s best interests. ZLS had a stable, permanent, and loving home with Collier and DAB. The
trial court expressly considered ZLS’s placement with Collier when making its best-interests
determination and found that ZLS’s best interests warranted termination. ZLS had never been in
the care of Smith or Smith’s relatives at any point in her short life, and she demonstrated resistance
to being in the care of anyone but Collier. Although Smith had no history of violence and there
was no evidence suggesting he ever harmed ZLS, he was unable to financially provide for her and
failed to take meaningful steps to plan for her care before his incarceration. By the time Smith is
released and completes his stay in transitional housing, ZLS would have spent over three years
with the only family she has ever known. To allow ZLS to be removed from Collier’s home and
placed in the care of Smith or his relatives, with whom she had no bond, would not be in her best
interests.

        To the extent Smith argued below that termination was not is ZLS’s best interests because
(1) there was no basis for ZLS to be placed with Collier and (2) his sister, Aresena Smith-Hughes,
was willing and able to provide proper care and custody for ZLS while Smith was incarcerated,
this argument lacks merit. Under MCL 712A.13a(14)(a), reasonable efforts must be made to
“[p]lace siblings removed from their home in the same foster care, kinship guardianship, or
adoptive placement, unless the supervising agency documents that a joint placement would be
contrary to the safety or well-being of any of the siblings.” Collier was already caring for DAB
when ZLS was born, and the evidence suggests placement with Collier created safety, stability,
and permanency for both children. Further, before the birth of ZLS, Smith knew he would be
going to prison. Despite this, Smith did not give caseworkers information to ensure Smith-Hughes
would care for ZLS during his incarceration. He only advocated for ZLS’s placement with Smith-
Hughes once termination proceedings commenced.3

3
 Smith testified that he gave a caseworker Smith-Hughes’s contact information and informed this
caseworker “[p]robably within a few days of [ZLS’s] birth” of his desire that ZLS be placed with

                                                 -4-
        Smith also asserts the trial court improperly based its best-interests determination on DAB
“moreso [sic] than” ZLS. However, there is no evidence supporting this contention. In fact, the
trial court’s only reference to DAB when discussing ZLS’s best interests was that “[ZLS is] very
attached to her brother, whose [sic] also in that relative placement [with Collier].” Otherwise, the
court focused on Smith’s incarceration, the bond between Smith and ZLS, Smith’s general lack of
contact with ZLS during the case, the length of time ZLS had been with Collier, and Collier’s
willingness to adopt.

       Affirmed.

                                                             /s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
                                                             /s/ Stephen L. Borrello
                                                             /s/ Douglas B. Shapiro

Smith-Hughes, and Smith-Hughes testified that she spoke with Smith about caring for ZLS as soon
as the child was born. However, the caseworker testified that Smith never mentioned Smith-
Hughes as a possible placement until a February 2023 pretrial hearing, well after ZLS’s birth and
when this case commenced. We defer to the trial court’s apparent credibility determination on this
matter that despite Smith-Hughes’s willingness to care for ZLS, “no actions other than
conversation [were taken].”

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