Court Opinion

ID: 9514685
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:51:08.83262+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:20.089333
License: Public Domain

MILLER, Chief Justice
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
[¶ 55.] I concur with the majority opinion on issues 1, 2, and 4, but respectively dissent as to the majority’s opinion on issue 3. I disagree with the majority’s holding that Johnston waived his privilege to any conversations he had with Fulda regarding Karlen, and that Karlen is entitled to an in camera review by the trial court of Fulda’s records.
[¶ 56.] Generally, “unless there is a privilege, all relevant information is discoverable.” Maynard v. Heeren, 1997 SD 60, f 12, 563 N.W.2d 830, 835; see generally SDCL 15-6-26. South Dakota specifically recognizes the need for privileged communications between university and college students and their institution-provided counselors. SDCL 19-13-21.2 provides in pertinent part:
No counselor, regularly employed on a full-time basis as a counselor for a private or public college or university in the State of South Dakota, may divulge to any other person, or be examined concerning any information or communication given to the counselor in his official capacity by a client unless:
(1) This privilege is waived in writing by the student; or
(2) The information or communication was made to the counselor for the express purpose of being communicated or of being made public.
[¶ 57.] When interpreting this statute to determine the extent of the privilege, the “ ‘words and phrases in [the] statute must be given their plain meaning and effect. When the language in a statute is clear, certain and unambiguous, there is no reason for construction, and the Court’s only function is to declare the meaning of the statute as clearly expressed.’ ” Dahn v. Trownsell, 1998 SD 36, ¶ 14, 576 N.W.2d 535, 539 (quoting Moss v. Guttormson, 1996 SD 76, ¶ 10, 551 N.W.2d 14, 17). “This court assumes that statutes mean what they say and that legislators have said what they meant.” Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Lyon, 1997 SD 50, ¶ 9, 562 N.W.2d 888, 891 (citing In re Famous Brands, Inc., 347 N.W.2d 882, 885 (S.D.1984)).
[¶ 58.] I find the language of SDCL 19-13-21.2 to be clear and unambiguous. The legislature certainly intended that the information revealed to a full-time counselor at a South Dakota university or college be privileged. In addition, it is clear the legislature intended to prohibit the counselor from being examined about the communication. Further, the student is the holder of the privilege and it can only be waived in one of two ways. The student can waive the privilege in writing or by disclosing the information to the counselor for the express purpose of allowing the counselor to communicate the information to others. These are the sole exceptions provided for in the statute.
[¶ 59.] Neither of those exceptions was present in this case. Johnston elected to seek the services of Dr. Fulda, a full-time *607counselor at SDSU. He did not give Fulda written permission to disclose any information, nor did he provide him with information so that he could publicly communicate it. Therefore, Johnston did not waive the privilege provided for in SDCL 19-13-21.2.
[¶ 60.] However, the majority argues that Johnston waived his privilege because he discussed the incidents with third parties as well as Fulda. While I agree that a privilege can be waived by disclosure to a third party, that waiver did not occur here. Mere conversation regarding the same incident does not constitute a privilege waiver. It requires much more than that. It requires a specific disclosure of the information the privilege holder shared with the coünselor. See John W. Larson, South Dakota Evidence § 510.0 (1991) (citing FedREvid 511 (proposed) advisory committee’s note) (stating that a privilege, such as the attorney-client privilege, covers the communication, not the subject matter,' and that for waiver to occur, the client would have to make a disclosure of the communication itself).
[¶ 61.] Also, the majority cites Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987), as holding that “due process principles required an in camera review of privileged material.” However, Ritchie can easily be distinguished from the instant case. The record sought in Ritchie was not of a confidential communication between a university student and his counselor but, rather, was an investigative file compiled by a state agency investigating suspected child abuse. In addition, the relevant Pennsylvania statute allowed the file to be available “to a court of competent jurisdiction pursuant to a court order.” See PaStatAnn, Tit 11, § 2215(a)(5) (Purdon Supp 1986). The privilege at issue in Ritchie was qualified, unlike the privilege here, which is absolute. Further, the Ritchie court expressly stated it would offer no opinion as to whether the result would have been different with a statute that forbid anyone from accessing the files, as SDCL 19-13-21.2 does here. 480 U.S. at 58 n. 14, 107 S.Ct. at 1001 n. 14, 94 L.Ed.2d at 57 n. 14.
[¶ 62.] In addition, no review of Fulda’s records is required because Karlen has failed to establish that the records are relevant and contain material information. Karlen argued, without supporting his position, that the records contained statements that are “relevant, exculpatory and important to the defense,” and are needed to establish Johnston gave contradictory statements. This general assertion of relevance is not enough to require an in camera review of confidential records. See People v. Dist. Court, City and County of Denver, 719 P.2d 722, 726 (Colo. 1986) (stating “[t]he vague assertion that the victim may have made statements to her therapist that might possibly differ from the victim’s anticipated trial testimony does not provide a sufficient basis to justify ignoring the victim’s right to rely upon her statutory privilege”); People v. Stanaway, 446 Mich. 643, 521 N.W.2d 557, 576 (1994) (stating Stanaway’s general assertion that the records were needed to attack an accuser’s testimony “falls short of the specific justification necessary to overcome the privilege” and “without a more specific request, defendant is fishing”).
[¶ 63.] Moreover, SDCL 19-13-21.2 does not prevent all cross-examination of Johnston. In fact, Karlen had ample opportunity to fully cross-examine Johnston about his allegations and any inconsistent statements he may have made. Fulda’s records were not needed to serve that purpose.
[¶ 64.] For the above reasons, I respectfully dissent on issue 3.
[¶ 65.] I am authorized to state that Justice KONENKAMP joins in this special writing.