Court Opinion

ID: 9562485
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:30:06.925898+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:22.609787
License: Public Domain

CLARK, J.
I dissent.
When this court created a theory of partial equitable indemnity in American Motorcycle Assn. v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 578 [146 Cal.Rptr. 182, 578 P.2d 899], it held that sound legislative policy, not traditional indemnity principles, would shape the new doctrine. In order to effect fundamental and sound legislative policies reflected in the Tort Claims Act and statutes of limitation, we should hold that the period for filing both claims and actions commences on the date of plaintiffs injury, not years after recovery of judgment.
Prior to American Motorcycle, an injured plaintiff could bring his action against one or more alleged contributing or concurrent tortfeasors as he chose, leaving defendant tortfeasors and their insurers no right to seek contribution by either joining additional defendants or proceeding against them in separate actions. (Code Civ. Proc., § 875 et seq.; 4 Wit-kin, Summary of Cal. Law (8th ed. 1974) pp. 2346-2347.)
By leaving the plaintiff free to select his defendants, the system avoided “the controversial procedure of third party impleader and litigation of the contribution issue in the main action.” (4 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, supra, p. 2346.) Additionally, the contribution statutes reflect a legislative determination that a plaintiffs interest in speedy and effective recovery takes priority over the pocketbook concerns of wrongdoers and their insurers.
In some cases, a defendant could seek indemnity from another tortfeasor if he claims a special relationship to that tortfeasor. Indemnity, which placed the entire loss upon one of two or more tortfeasors, differed from contribution which distributed the loss equally among them. (4 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, supra, pp. 2348-2349.)
*765Dissatisfied with the narrow scope of traditional indemnity and legislative policy reflected by the contribution statutes, this court in American Motorcycle created a new label: “partial equitable indemnity.” Under it wrongdoers who previously had no recovery right were allowed to bring actions against other tortfeasors based on comparative fault; additionally, the requirement of special relationships was eliminated. By repudiating contribution in favor of a modified indemnity principle, this court allowed the pocketbook concerns of wrongdoers and their insurers to take priority over the concerns of innocent plaintiffs seeking speedy, effective relief.
Despite adoption of the new label, the court clearly indicated that traditional indemnity principles would not be applied to the new partial indemnity doctrine. Indeed, American Motorcycle itself departed from traditional indemnity principles in holding that the settlement procedures of the contribution statutes (Code Civ. Proc., § 877) are to be “preserved as an integral part of the partial indemnity doctrine.” (20 Cal.3d at pp. 603-604; Gehman v. Superior Court (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 257 [158 Cal.Rptr. 62].) Under those procedures, a tortfeasor may not recover partial indemnity from another tortfeasor who has settled. Under traditional indemnity principles, by way of contrast, an agent who settles with the plaintiff can be held liable to indemnify the principal. (Code Civ. Proc., § 875, subd. (f); Ritter v. Technicolor Corp. (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 152, 155 [103 Cal.Rptr. 686].)
Similarly in American Motorcycle this court stated that in accordance with Labor Code section 3864 a concurrently negligent employer will not be liable for partial indemnity to a tortfeasor liable to an injured employee. (20 Cal.3d 578, 607, fn. 9.)
Most importantly, American Motorcycle held on the basis of Code of Civil Procedure section 428.10 that a defendant “is generally authorized to file a cross-complaint against a concurrent tortfeasor for partial indemnity on a comparative fault basis.” (20 Cal.3d at p. 607.) Under traditional indemnity doctrine, the defendant would be limited to seeking declaratory relief by cross-complaint—the cause of action for direct recovery does not arise until after the indemnitee has suffered actual loss through payment. (E. L. White, Inc. v. City of Huntington Beach (1978) 21 Cal.3d 497, 506 [146 Cal.Rptr. 614, 579 P.2d 505].)
American Motorcycle thus shows that we will not attempt to apply traditional indemnity doctrine to the cause of action for partial indem*766nity when to do so would significantly impair or defeat sound legislative policy.
Today the label of comparative or partial equitable indemnity is sought to be used to repudiate fundamental legislative policy. Concern for the pocketbook of the admitted wrongdoer does not justify violation of the legislative policies reflected by claims statutes and statutes of limitation. By adopting those statutes, the Legislature has shown that limitation periods are of sufficient importance to warrant barring meritorious but untimely actions by injured persons. There is no justification for elevating the pocketbook interest of a wrongdoer above that of the injured plaintiff or above that of the policy reflected by the claims and limitations statutes.
“The policy underlying the claims statutes is to afford prompt notice of claims to governmental entities. (Myers v. County of Orange (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 626 [86 Cal.Rptr. 198]; Rowan v. City etc. of San Francisco (1966) 244 Cal.App.2d 308 [53 Cal.Rptr. 88].) The courts and commentators have considered prompt notice important for several reasons: To allow (1) early investigation of the facts, (2) informed fiscal planning in light of prospective liabilities, (3) settlement of claims before initiation of costly civil litigation, and (4) avoidance of similarly caused future injuries and liabilities. (2 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1959) p. A-73; Fredrichsen v. City of Lakewood (1971) 6 Cal.3d 353, 359-360. . ..)” (Minsky v. City of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 113, 123-124 [113 Cal.Rptr. 102, 520 P.2d 726].)
It must be apparent that should a concurrent tortfeasor be permitted to delay filing claim against a public entity until he has been compelled to respond in a lawsuit, the policy underlying the claims statute will surely be frustrated. Not receiving the requisite statutory notice, the public entity has no reason to commence investigation of the facts surrounding the accident; it is unable to engage in informed fiscal planning to meet prospective liabilities—a matter of increasing importance due to recent unprecedented fiscal reforms (see Amador Valley Joint Union High School District v. State Board of Equalization (1978) 22 Cal.3d 208 [149 Cal.Rptr. 239, 583 P.2d 1281]); it has no notice of a possibly dangerous condition for months or years after the accident—in this case the state was not put on formal notice of its potential liability until nearly five years had passed—and it is not afforded opportunity to effect early settlement of claims, thus avoiding costly litigation.
*767Attempts to relate the commencement of the running of the 100-day period to some other event occurring later than the cause of action giving rise to a plaintiff’s injuries are counter to the policy purposes of the Tort Claims Act. The public entity’s liability, if any, is to be determined in its entirety by factual matters relating to the accident itself—not to procedural steps thereafter taken by an injured party in seeking redress. It is the accident which the entity must be afforded an early opportunity to investigate, and it is the dangerous condition of its property, if any, at the site of the accident which the entity must be afforded an early opportunity to correct, if the policy of the Tort Claims Act is to be served. If we were to hold that a public entity may be inter-pleaded without the filing of a timely claim when measured against the time of the accident, the net effect would be to permit a plaintiff to recover a proportionate share of his loss from the entity, thus permitting to be done by indirection what the statute expressly forbids.
The clear public policy embodied in the Tort Claims Act should not be frustrated and ignored in favor of a tortfeasor who traditionally could not complain because the victim of the tortious conduct elects to pursue less than all concurrent tortfeasors. Civil Code section 1714 declares “that ‘[e]very one is responsible.. .for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill.. .. ’ A tortfeasor may not escape this responsibility simply because another act-—either an ‘innocent’ occurrence such as an ‘act of God’ or other negligent conduct—may also have been a cause of the injury.” (American Motorcycle Assn. v. Superior Court, supra, 20 Cal.3d 578, 586.) “[A] defendant has no equitable claim vis-a-vis an injured plaintiff to be relieved of liability for damage which he has proximately caused simply because some other tortfeasor’s negligence may also have caused the same harm.” (Id., at p. 589.)
Although this court in American Motorcycle modified traditional rules to provide for partial indemnity based on comparative fault among concurrent tortfeasors, it did not purport either to create a cause of action where none otherwise existed, or to modify statutory claims procedures when a public entity is one of the tortfeasors. The relief judicially announced in American Motorcycle was thus deemed to be permissible in that case only because it was consistent with controlling statutory provisions. (See id., at pp. 599-603.) We should hold that any judicially announced rule which would allow the presentation of a cause of action for damages against a public entity absent the filing of an administrative claim against the entity within the statutorily prescribed *768period is impermissibly inconsistent with the Tort Claims Act. Whether a defendant should be afforded relief in these circumstances is clearly a legislative matter. In the words of Justice Feinberg, “In sum, we can find no reason in logic or in the statute to exempt an action for partial indemnity against a public entity from the claims procedure.” (Gehman v. Superior Court, supra, 96 Cal.App.3d 257, 263.)
Similarly the policies underlying statutes of limitation will be substantially subverted by holding that the cause of action for partial indemnity arises not upon injury but upon payment. “‘Statutes of limitation, like the equitable doctrine of laches, in their conclusive effects are designed to promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared. The theory is that even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend within the period of limitation and that the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them.’ [Citations.]” (Wood v. Elling Corp. (1977) 20 Cal.3d 353, 362 [142 Cal.Rptr. 696, 572 P.2d 755]; Bollinger v. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co. (1944) 25 Cal.2d 399, 406-407 [154 P.2d 399].)
Permitting deferred accrual of the indemnity action will allow tortfeasors to avoid asserting causes of action against both public and private parties until after “evidence is lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.” (Id.) It certainly is not unjust to require a defendant to assert his claims for partial indemnity within the statutory period after plaintiff’s cause of action or injury occurs. The cross-defendants will then have the same opportunity to defend or to settle as does the defendant.
Given the substantial policies served by claims and limitation statutes, I must reject the majority’s mechanical application of traditional indemnity principles. Those principles are based in part on a voluntary relationship between the tortfeasors—a relationship ordinarily absent in partial indemnity cases. As pointed out above, this court in American Motorcycle departed from traditional indemnity principles in three respects—settlement rules, workers’ compensation and accrual of the cause of action for direct recovery—in order to give effect to legislative policy. Similarly, giving effect to legislative policy rather than labels requires that the cause of action for partial indemnity accrue for claims and statute of limitations purposes at the time of injury to plaintiff.
*769It is true that in a few cases, like the instant one, a defendant will not learn of the action against him until it is too late under claims and limitation statutes to proceed against another alleged tortfeasor who was not joined by plaintiff. However, this hardship should be viewed in the light of additional factors. If the plaintiff is free from negligence, the defendant is in the same position that he would have been under the contribution statutes prior to Li v. Yellow Cab Co. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 804 [119 Cal.Rptr. 858, 532 P.2d 1226, 78 A.L.R.3d 393], and American Motorcycle. If, on the other hand, plaintiff is contributorily negligent, he will recover less against a single defendant than he would have recovered had he prevailed against all defendants. Since plaintiffs recovery is determined by the relationship of his fault to that of all defendants, failure to join a defendant will always reduce his recovery. Defendants who are sued thus obtain a benefit from the negligent plaintiffs omission.
I would issue a peremptory writ of mandate directing respondent court (1) to vacate its orders overruling department’s demurrer to "Frost’s cross-complaint and granting Hunter’s motion for leave to cross-complain against department, (2) to sustain department’s demurrer to Frost’s cross-complaint, (3) to deny Hunter’s motion for leave to cross-complain against department, and (4) to proceed in accordance with the views herein expressed.
Manuel, J., concurred.
Petitioner’s application for a rehearing was denied May 14, 1980. Clark, J., and Manuel, J., were of the opinion that the application should be granted.