Court Opinion

ID: 9962522
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-23 20:09:48.458018+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:00.164894
License: Public Domain

Schwarzer v Young Men's Christian Assn. of Greater
                          N.Y.
               2024 NY Slip Op 31363(U)
                     April 18, 2024
           Supreme Court, New York County
        Docket Number: Index No. 156838/2018
                 Judge: Richard G. Latin
Cases posted with a "30000" identifier, i.e., 2013 NY Slip
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                       publication.
                                                                                                                        INDEX NO. 156838/2018
  NYSCEF DOC. NO. 66                                                                                              RECEIVED NYSCEF: 04/18/2024

                                   SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
                                             NEW YORK COUNTY
            PRESENT:             HON. RICHARD G. LATIN                                              PART   46M
                                                                                      Justice
            ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------X      INDEX NO.          156838/2018
             ALEXANDRA SCHWARZER and EDWARD EASTON,
                                                                                                    MOTION DATE          3/2/2023
                                                         Plaintiffs,
                                                                                                    MOTION SEQ. NO.         001
                                                 -v-
             YOUNG MEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION OF GREATER
                                                                                                      DECISION + ORDER ON
             NEW YORK and ARMORY PLACE LLC,
                                                                                                            MOTION
                                                         Defendants.
            ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------X

            The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 001) 37, 38, 39, 40, 41,
            42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65
            were read on this motion to/for                                                      JUDGMENT - SUMMARY                   .

                      In this premises liability action, plaintiff Alexandra Schwarzer (“Schwarzer”) asserts that
            on March 24, 2017, she slipped and fell on accumulated liquid on the floor at the Young Men’s
            Christian Association of Greater New York (“defendant”) located at 125 West 14th St, New York,
            New York (NY St Cts Elec Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 39, Complaint). Defendant moves for an
            order pursuant to CPLR 3212 seeking summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Plaintiffs
            opposed, and defendant submitted a reply. For the following reasons, defendant’s motion is denied
            in its entirety.
            Factual Background
            Schwarzer’s EBT
                      The alleged incident occurred approximately between 8:00 a.m. to 8:15 a.m. (NYSCEF
            Doc No. 42, tr at 106). On the day of the alleged accident, Schwarzer went to the women’s locker
            room prior to swimming (id. at 63). She changed into her bathing suit and flip flops and rinsed off
            in the shower area before entering the pool (id. at 64). She swam for an hour and went to the
            shower area after she got out of the pool (id. at 68). After taking a shower, she dried herself and
            the rubber flip-flops she was wearing (id.). She placed her caddy by the sink that was six to eight
            feet from the shower (id. at 72). She slipped right after she put the caddy down (id. at 77). She
            placed the caddy down because she was waiting to get on the line to extract the water from her

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            swimsuit (id. at 78). There was water on the floor about a foot-and-a-half long and a foot wide (id.
            at 83-84). She saw the water on the floor prior to her accident (id. at 86). She was unaware where
            the water came from (id. at 84). She slipped and fell backwards, and her rear end made contact
            with the floor (id. at 99). She felt wetness underneath her (id. at 100).
                    Prior to the date of the incident, she saw water in the area several times (id. at 46). She
            believed the water came from people leaving the shower area wet or people using the sink (id. at
            47). She reported the wet floor to the locker room attendants twice a week (id. at 49). They would
            mop the area (id. at 48-49). Additionally, she made verbal complaints to the receptionist (id. at
            51). She reported the March 24, 2017 incident to defendant verbally and in writing (id. at 108-
            109).
            Abreu EBT
                    Guillermo Abreu (“Abreu”), the property manager for defendant, testified that if a
            complaint regarding excessive water inside the women’s locker room was made, an attendant
            would be notified immediately to rectify the issue by a two-way radio (NYSCEF Doc No. 43, tr at
            61). Abreu inspects the women’s locker room once a month (id. at 70). He did not recall whether
            he received any complaints about the water condition in the women’s locker room prior to March
            2017 (id. at 106). He was not aware whether the locker room attendant kept notes or track when
            she used the mop inside of the women’s locker room (id. at 43). He did not remember whether a
            log or record was kept of any scheduled inspection of the women’s locker room (id. at 44).
            Mohar Affidavit
                    Pawatie Mohar (“Mohar”) was the women’s locker room attendant for defendant. Mohar
            worked on the day of the incident for her entire shift from 6:00 am to 1:00 pm, and made regular
            rounds throughout the locker room, including the dry area (NYSCEF Doc No. 46 ¶¶ 2, 5). She
            claimed there was no water accumulation or slickness on the floor that day (id. ¶ 6). She further
            asserted that there were regular meetings with the property manager, and there were never
            complaints about water accumulations (id. ¶ 9). On the date of the incident there were no plumbing
            problems and no leaks in the women’s locker room (id.). On the date of the incident, she personally
            walked over the dry area many times and there was no water accumulation (id. ¶ 10).
            Patel Affidavit
                    Madhur Patel (“Patel”) was the aquatics director and membership director of defendant.
            Patel stated that on March 24, 2017, Schwarzer called and reported the incident to her (NYSCEF

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            Doc No. 48 ¶ 3). Patel checked with Mohar, who stated that the floor was dry, that no one reported
            any water on the floor, and that she did not have to dry the floor that morning (id. ¶¶ 5-6). Patel
            asserted that no prior complaints of the women’s locker room floor were made (id. ¶ 7).
            Parties’ Contentions
            Defendant’s Motion
                    It is undisputed that plaintiff slipped on water on the floor of the portion of the locker room
            in front of the sinks (NYSCEF Doc No. 52, Memorandum of Law in Support, Andrew B. Kaufman,
            Esq. (memo), at 1). However, defendant argues that the wet condition described by Schwarzer is
            not actionable as the wetness was incidental to the operation of a locker room (id.). Defendant
            asserts that mere presence of water on a tiled floor adjacent to the gym’s shower cannot impart
            liability, since the water was necessarily incidental to the use of the area (id. at 5).
                    Second, defendant contends that there was no duty to place mats on the floor, and plaintiffs
            did not allege a claim of negligence in failing to put mats down in their bill of particulars (id. at
            6). Regardless, defendant contends that its policy was to not put mats in the open area of the locker
            room where women dressed before leaving the facility as that area has always been referred to by
            staff as the “dry area” (id.). In support, defendant submitted the affidavit of Stan A. Pietra, a
            professional engineer (“Pietra Affidavit”) (NYSCEF Doc No. 51). Pietra opined that the tile floors
            in the locker room were slip resistant in compliance with code requirements and practice for
            walking surfaces, and there is no code or statutory requirement that matting be placed on these
            floors (id. ¶¶ 11-12).
                    Third, defendant claims that it was not on notice of the water as plaintiff did not complain
            about the floor on the day of the incident (id. at 8). Furthermore, defendant denies that plaintiff
            made prior complaints (id.). Defendant argues that there was no constructive notice of the
            condition under the doctrine of recurrent condition (id. at 11). Plaintiffs did not submit any proof
            besides generalities that there was “always” water on the locker room floor (id.).
            Plaintiffs’ Opposition
                    In opposition, plaintiffs contend that water is an actionable condition pursuant to Grossman
            v TCR, 142 AD3d 854 [1st Dept 2016], appeal dismissed 28 NY2d 1110 [2016] (NYSCEF Doc
            No. 58, Memorandum of Law in Opposition, Glen P. Ahlers, Esq. (opp memo), at 16). They claim
            the facts are similar to Grossman, as plaintiff in Grossman slipped and fell on water on the tile
            floor of a women’s locker room, and the location of the fall was accessible to the showers, sinks,

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            sauna, and steam room (id.). Plaintiffs take issue with the cases cited by defendant, as those cases
            held wetness on the side of a pool is incidental to the function of the pool, and water inside of a
            shower stall is incidental to the use (id. at 20). Schwarzer was neither in the shower, nor inside of
            a shower area, but was six to eight feet from the shower area (id.).
                   Second, plaintiffs argue there is an issue of fact as the opinions of two expert engineers
            regarding the locker room floor are contradictory (id. ¶ 31). Plaintiffs submitted the affidavit of
            Nicholas Bellizzi, a licensed professional engineer (“Bellizzi Affidavit”) (NYSCEF Doc No. 60).
            Bellizzi notes that there in the Pietro affidavit there is no description of the type of testing machine
            used to measure the wet coefficient of friction (id. ¶ 13). The locker room’s floor did not have a
            nonskid surface when wet, which made the subject ceramic tile floor slippery and is “a well-
            recognized slipping hazard” (id. ¶ 15). The locker room’s ceramic tile floor surface did not comply
            with the New York City Building Code as the code requires floor to have a nonslip surface
            impervious to moisture, free of cracks or open joints and sloped to drains (id. ¶ 18). The locker
            room’s floor did not have any mats to ensure that it was kept dry, and not wet and slippery when
            wet, and section 5 of the American Society of Testing Materials (ASTM) Standard Practice for
            Safe Walking Surfaces states that walking surfaces shall be slip resistant under expected
            environmental conditions and use (id. ¶ 22). The locker room’s hard ceramic tile floor surface was
            not slip resistant as it was not crosscut, grooved, or ribbed, and had no treatment to cause the floor
            surface to be slip resistant when wet, which was in violation of nationally-accepted ASTM
            standards for Safe Walking Surfaces (id. ¶ 23).
                   Third, plaintiffs argue that to establish notice of a recurring condition, they are not required
            to prove that defendant knew or should have known about the existence of accumulated water in
            the dry area or its precise source (NYSCEF Doc No. 58 ¶ 13). Defendant had constructive notice
            of recurrence of the condition if it has actual knowledge of the dangerous condition’s likelihood(?)
            to reoccur (id.). Defendant had made personal complaints to defendant, and other patrons of
            defendant were injured as a result of slip and falls in the “dry area” (id. ¶ 15). Lastly, defendant
            had actual notice that a hazardous condition might exist because its employee responsible for
            cleaning the area had a “spaghetti mop” with which she would soak up excess water in the dry
            areas of the locker room when a member dripped or spilled water on the floor of the dry area (id.
            ¶ 16). Defendant had notice of the dangerous condition from Schwarzer’s multiple reports to
            management on many occasions (id. ¶ 19). Defendant did not have a written policy as to the

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            frequency of inspecting the “dry area” in the locker room (id. ¶ 20). Defendant did not produce
            any written records concerning how often the subject floors were cleaned, dried, or inspected prior
            to the accident in question, nor the last time they were cleaned prior to the incident (id.).
            Defendant’s Reply
                   In reply, defendant contends that it proved that clear water on the locker room floor in an
            aquatic’s facility is incidental to the operation of the facility and is not actionable (NYSCEF Doc
            No. 64, Memorandum of Law in Reply, Laura Alto, Esq. (reply memo), ¶ 6). As the water was
            incidental to the operation of the locker room, defendant had no duty to take any additional
            measures (id. ¶ 13). Schwarzer’s testimony establishes that the water accumulations she observed
            was produced by people in their bathing suits (id. ¶ 15). She further testified as to the number of
            attendants in the locker room, and details of the mops they used which indicate there is no recurrent
            condition that was “routinely unaddressed” (id.). Abreu, the property manager for the defendant
            inspected the premises every morning, and there is no evidence or claim that there was any
            plumbing issue or leaking ceiling (id. ¶ 19). Plaintiff has offered no emails to the defendant or any
            witnesses to support her claim of the alleged constant defective condition, and has presented only
            inconsistent, vague, and accusatory testimony (id. ¶ 20). Lastly, the Bellizzi affidavit is
            unpersuasive as he does not have firsthand knowledge of the flooring (id. ¶ 24). Additionally, his
            claim of insufficient testing is meritless as ANSI or ASTM standards are simply standards and not
            the law (id.). He also did not cite to any building code violations (id.).
            Discussion

                   “ʻ[T]he proponent of a summary judgment motion must make prima facie showing of
            entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, tendering sufficient evidence to demonstrate the
            absence of any material issues of fact’” (Ayotte v Gervasio, 81 NY2d 1062, 1063 [1993], quoting
            Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]). “[F]ailure to make such a showing requires
            a denial of the motion, regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing papers” (Ayotte, 81 NY2d at
            1063 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). “Once this showing has been made,
            however, the burden shifts to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment to produce
            evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to establish the existence of material issues of act
            which require a trial of the action” (Alvarez, 68 NY2d at 324; see also Zuckerman v City of New

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            York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]). “[M]ere conclusions, expressions of hope or unsubstantiated
            allegations or assertions are insufficient” (Zuckerman, 49 NY2d at 562).

                   “Summary judgment should not be granted where there is any doubt as to the existence of
            a factual issue or where the existence of a factual issue is arguable” (Forrest v Jewish Guild for
            the Blind, 3 NY3d 295, 315 [2004]; see also American Home Assur. Co. v Amerford Intl. Corp.,
            200 AD2d 472, 473 [1st Dept 1994]). On a summary judgment motion, “facts must be viewed in
            the light most favorable to the non-moving party” (Vega v Restani Constr. Corp., 18 NY3d 499,
            503 [2012] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).

                    “In a slip-and-fall case, a defendant property owner moving for summary judgment has
            the burden of making a prima facie showing that it neither (1) affirmatively created the hazardous
            condition nor (2) had actual or constructive notice of the condition and a reasonable time to correct
            or warn about its existence” (Rodriguez v Kwik Realty, LLC, 216 AD3d 477, 478 [1st Dept 2023],
            quoting Parietti v Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 29 NY3d 1136, 1137 [2017]).

                   “[A] landowner must act as a reasonable person in maintaining his or her property in a
            reasonably safe condition in view of all the circumstances, including the likelihood of injury to
            others, the seriousness of the injury, and the burden of avoiding the risk” (Peralta v Henriquez,
            100 NY2d 139, 144 [2003] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). “Even if a hazard
            qualifies as open and obvious as a matter of law, that characteristic merely eliminates the property
            owner’s duty to warn of the hazard but does not eliminate the broader duty to maintain the premises
            in a reasonably safe condition” (Matos v Azure Holdings II, L.P., 181 AD3d 406, 407 [1st Dept
            2020] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). “Whether a condition is not inherently
            dangerous usually depends on the totality of the specific facts of each case” (id. [internal quotation
            marks and citation omitted]).

                   Defendant cannot obtain summary judgment on the reasoning that “water was necessarily
            incidental to the use of the area” (see Grossman, 142 AD3d at 855, quoting Noboa-Jaquez v Town
            Sports Intl., LLC, 138 AD3d 493, 493 [1st Dept 2016] [plaintiff slipped and fell on water located
            on the tile floor in the area of the gym showers as such the presence of such water was necessarily
            incidental to the use]; Dove v Manhattan Plaza Health Club, 113 AD3d 455, 456 [1st Dept 2014],
            lv denied 24 NY3d 901 [2014] [plaintiff slipped and fell on water located on the tile floor around

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            the indoor pool as such the presence of such water was necessarily incidental to the use of the
            pool]). “Neither of [the] holdings [in Dove and Noboa-Jaquez] stands for the broader proposition
            that any water on a tiled floor anywhere in a locker room must preclude a claim for negligence
            because water is ‘necessarily incidental’ to the entire lock room’s intended use” (Grossman, 142
            AD3d at 855). Schwarzer testified that she had left the shower area and was six to eight feet away
            from that shower area when she slipped (see NYSCEF Doc No. 43, tr at 72). She specifically
            identified slipping in the sink area that is away from the shower area (id.). Regardless of whether
            any alleged water in the accident location is incidental to the use of the shower room, the record
            presents issues of fact as to whether defendant maintained the accident area in a reasonably safe
            condition. As pointed out in the depositions, there is a dispute as to whether there was standing
            water in the accident location. The mere fact that water may be incidental to the use of the shower
            does not necessarily indicate that there can be no negligence where there is notice that a dangerous
            condition exists (see Grossman, 142 AD3d at 855).

                   Defendant failed to submit sufficient evidence to show, as a matter of law, that it lacked
            constructive notice of the condition. “To constitute constructive notice, a defect must be visible
            and apparent, and it must exist for a sufficient length of time prior to the accident to permit
            defendant’s employee to discovery and remedy it” (Gordon v American Museum of Natural
            History, 67 NY2d 836, 837 [1986] [citations omitted]). “To demonstrate lack of constructive
            notice, a defendant must produce evidence of its maintenance activities on the day of the accident,
            and specifically that the dangerous condition did not exist when the area was last inspected or
            cleaned” (Barrett v Aero Snow Removal Corp., 167 AD3d 519, 520 [1st Dept 2018] [internal
            quotation marks and citations omitted]). “Should defendant fail to meet its initial burden to show
            that it did not cause, create, or have actual or constructive notice of the alleged condition, the
            burden never shifts to plaintiff to raise a triable issue of fact” (Velocci v Stop & Shop, 188 AD3d
            436, 439 [1st Dept 2020] [citations omitted]). Here, there is an inference of constructive notice
            because plaintiff was swimming for an hour before returning to the locker room and slipping (see
            Grossman, 142 AD3d at 856 [There was an inference of constructive notice because there was no
            written schedule or written confirmation of floors mopped, and plaintiff was gone from locker
            room for 40 minutes and the water could have accumulated at the spot and remained there]; see
            also NYSCEF Doc No. 42, tr at 64). Mohar attested that on the day of the incident, she was on

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            duty for her usual shift from 6:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. and she made rounds in the locker room,
            including the dry area (see NYSCEF Doc No. 46). A showing of general cleaning procedures is
            insufficient to satisfy the burden of demonstrating the lack of constructive notice of the condition
            prior to the accident (Smith v Montefiore Med. Ctr., 192 AD3d 609, 610 [1st Dept 2021]). Mohar’s
            affidavit is insufficient as it fails to offer any evidence as to “when the area in question was last
            cleaned or inspected relative to the time when the plaintiff fell” (see Merchant v New York City
            Tr. Auth., 183 AD3d 647, 648 [2d Dept 2020][internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).
            Furthermore, Abreu’s testimony that he was not aware of cleaning protocols and he used “common
            sense” to resolve any water complaints is insufficient to establish lack of constructive notice (see
            Polanco v 756 Jomo Food Corp., 212 AD3d 540, 540 [1st Dept 2023] [“A vice president testified
            that the cleaning protocols were verbal and were based on ‘common sense,’ but did not offer any
            information as to what steps were taken during the last cleaning cycle prior to plaintiff's accident,
            which also was not sufficient to establish lack of constructive notice on behalf of defendant”]; see
            also NYSCEF Doc No. 43, tr at 63).

                    Since defendant did not meet its prima facie burden of proof, its motion for summary
            judgment dismissing the complaint is denied without the need to consider the adequacy of
            plaintiffs’ opposition (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]
            [citations omitted]).
                    Accordingly, it is
                    ORDERED that defendant's motion for summary judgment is denied in its entirety.

                    4/18/2024
                      DATE
                                                                                  ,2-{~     $SIG$
                                                                                    RICHARD G. LATIN, J.S.C.
             CHECK ONE:                   CASE DISPOSED                  X   NON-FINAL DISPOSITION

                                                                                                      □
                                          GRANTED          X    DENIED       GRANTED IN PART              OTHER

             APPLICATION:                 SETTLE ORDER                       SUBMIT ORDER

                                                                                                      □
             CHECK IF APPROPRIATE:        INCLUDES TRANSFER/REASSIGN         FIDUCIARY APPOINTMENT        REFERENCE

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