Court Opinion

ID: 9929325
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-02 15:05:01.878957+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:06:48.268241
License: Public Domain

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                  STATE OF FLORIDA
                  _____________________________

                       Case No. 5D23-0594
                   LT Case No. 2018-CA-00353
                  _____________________________

PHILLIP C. DOZIER and
JENNIFER E. DOZIER,

    Appellants,

    v.

DAVID R. SCRUGGS and
JANNA P. SCRUGGS,

    Appellees.
                  _____________________________

Nonfinal appeal from the Circuit Court for Sumter County.
Jason J. Nimeth, Judge.

Scott A. Smothers and Mitchell L. Davis, of Smothers Law Firm,
P.A., Apopka, for Appellants.

Lindsay C. T. Holt, of Crawford, Modica & Holt, Chartered
Attorneys at Law, Tavares, for Appellees.

                         February 2, 2024

SOUD, J.

     Appellants Phillip and Jennifer Dozier appeal the trial court’s
denial of their motion seeking enforcement of a mediated
settlement agreement entered into with Appellees David and
Janna Scruggs (collectively, “Scruggs”). We have jurisdiction. See
Art. V, § 4(b)(1), Fla. Const.; Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(b); Fla. R.
App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(ix). We reverse and remand.

                                  I.

     The Doziers, as husband and wife, own noncontiguous pieces
of real property in Sumter County, Florida. Situated between these
two Dozier properties are numerous parcels, one of which was
owned by Scruggs. The Doziers filed suit against the several
property owners, including Scruggs, seeking a prescriptive
easement (or the like) across each of their respective properties. 1
Ultimately, after more than a year of litigation, in November 2019
the Doziers and Scruggs attended mediation and entered into a
written mediated settlement agreement.

    In the agreement, Scruggs agreed to:

        convey an easement to be prepared by [the Doziers’]
        counsel over [described land]. In the event legal and
        marketable and insureable [sic] access from C.R.
        719 to Slemons Easement such that legal and
        insureable [sic] access is obtained for the benefit of
        [the Doziers] and their parcels . . . , this easement
        shall terminate.

The agreement further provides that if access is not obtained from
C.R. 719, then Scruggs could replace the granted easement with
one at a different location on their property (at Scruggs’ expense
and with certain requirements). The agreement contained no
provision setting forth the timeframe in which the easement was
to be prepared by the Doziers’ counsel or executed by Scruggs.
Similarly, the agreement contained no provision concerning any

    1 Originally, the Doziers sued six defendant owners of parcels

that separated the Doziers’ properties. To access their property to
the south, the Doziers would use an existing roadway across the
original six defendants’ properties. A portion of the roadway runs
through Scruggs’ property. Prior to this appeal, all defendants
except for Scruggs were dismissed from the underlying action.

                                  2
obligation required of the Doziers in obtaining the access from C.R.
719.

     The Doziers’ counsel prepared the form of the easement. After
Scruggs had failed to sign the easement, the Doziers filed a motion
for sanctions in June 2020, 2 which was denied by the trial court.
Thereafter, the Doziers again filed a motion—this time seeking
enforcement of the mediated settlement agreement and entry of
judgment against Scruggs. The trial court denied the motion in
December 2022, more than three years after the mediated
settlement agreement was signed. This appeal followed.

                                 II.

    We are called upon to decide a relatively narrow issue:
whether the mediated settlement agreement is enforceable. It is. 3

     As mediated settlement agreements are contracts, they are
governed by contract law, see Postma v. Baker, 276 So. 3d 828, 829
(Fla. 4th DCA 2019), and “construed in accordance with the rules
for interpretation of contracts.” Patrick v. Christian Radio, 745 So.
2d 578, 580 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). Thus, our review is de novo. See
Mid-Continent Cas. Co. v. R.W. Jones Constr., Inc., 227 So. 3d 785,
788 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017).

     Under Florida law, settlement agreements are “highly
favored.” See Robbie v. City of Miami, 469 So. 2d 1384, 1385 (Fla.
1985). This “strong policy in Florida . . . is especially fitting when
settlement results from formal mediation.” Lentz v. Cmty. Bank of
Fla., Inc., 189 So. 3d 882, 887 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016). Mediated

    2 This motion alleges that the easement document was
prepared by the Doziers’ counsel in collaboration with Scruggs’
counsel and that no further requests for changes or additions were
made by Scruggs.
    3 The issue before us is not whether the Doziers are entitled

to a prescriptive, statutory, or other easement across Scruggs’ land
and the locations and requirements related thereto. As we discuss
more fully infra, the parties have, with the full benefit of counsel
during mediation, resolved that issue for themselves.

                                  3
settlement agreements will be enforced whenever possible because
the settlement of cases conserves the taxpayers’ resources invested
in the judicial branch. See Robbie, 469 So 2d at 1385; see also
Patrick, 745 So. 2d at 580. Further, settlement allows the parties
to steward their own affairs—that is, to broker for themselves an
acceptable outcome rather than invite into their lives the
unwelcome involvement of the machinery of government and the
risk of an adverse determination at trial.

     As with other types of contracts, for mediated settlement
agreements to be legally enforceable, the essential terms of the
parties’ agreement must be “firm or definite.” De Cespedes v.
Bolanos, 711 So. 2d 216, 217 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998). “Even though all
the details are not definitely fixed, an agreement may be binding
if the parties agree on the essential terms and seriously
understand and intend the agreement to be binding on them.” Id.
at 217–18 (quoting Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co., Inc. v.
Data Lease Fin. Corp., 302 So. 2d 404, 408 (Fla. 1974)). What
constitutes an “essential term” in an agreement may vary
depending upon the nature of the contemplated transaction or
agreement and is evaluated on a case-by-case basis. See Acosta v.
Dist. Bd. of Trs. of Miami-Dade Cmty. Coll., 905 So. 2d 226, 228
(Fla. 3d DCA 2005).

     Scruggs seek to avoid enforcement of the agreement by
arguing that (i) the agreement contained no timeframe for their
performance and (ii) Scruggs’ obligation to grant the easement to
the Doziers was intertwined with the Doziers’ obligation to
cooperatively seek an appropriate access from C.R. 719, which they
have not done. Both arguments fail.

      First, time of performance is not an essential term of the
mediated settlement agreement before us. Generally, in Florida,
“when a contract does not expressly fix the time for performance of
its terms, the law will imply a reasonable time.” De Cespedes, 711
So. 2d at 218 (quoting Denson v. Stack, 997 F.2d 1356, 1361 (11th
Cir. 1993)); see also Doolittle v. Fruehauf Corp., 332 So. 2d 107,
109–10 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). Therefore, the absence of a provision
requiring a time for Scruggs to execute the easement is not fatal to
the agreement’s enforceability.

                                 4
     The plain language of the mediated settlement agreement
requires Scruggs to grant the Doziers the described easement. As
contemplated by the agreement, the Doziers’ counsel prepared the
form of the easement, in consultation with counsel for Scruggs. The
record reflects there was no continued dispute as to the form of the
easement; only its execution (and subsequent filing) remained.
Whatever would be implied by Florida law to be the reasonable
time for Scruggs’ performance under the agreement, that time has
long since passed in the now four-plus years since the mediated
settlement agreement was signed by the parties.

     Finally, Scruggs’ contention that their obligation to sign the
easement is intertwined with the Doziers’ purported obligation to
obtain an access from C.R. 719 is contrary to the express terms of
the agreement. 4 The agreement provides, “Scruggs shall convey an
easement to be prepared by [Doziers’] counsel over [described
lands]. In the event legal and marketable and insureable [sic]
access from C.R. 719 . . . is obtained for the benefit of [the Doziers]
and their parcels . . . , this easement shall terminate.” Thus, the
plain language of the mediated settlement agreement makes clear
Scruggs’ obligation to provide the described easement. By the
agreement’s express terms, this requirement is unconditional—
there is no provision that conditions their performance on the
occurrence of any event.

    4  In support of this argument, Scruggs suggest that other
agreements with other owners contain language contemplating the
Doziers’ efforts to obtain access from C.R. 719. However, the trial
court was not permitted to consider parol evidence. “A court may
look beyond the language of a contract only when the document’s
terms are ambiguous.” Ivester v. Parkway Reg’l, 996 So. 2d 909,
911 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008); see generally Thompson o/b/o R.O.B. v.
Johnson, 308 So. 3d 250, 253 (Fla. 5th DCA 2020) (“‘Where a
contract is clear and unambiguous, it must be enforced pursuant
to its plain language’ without resort to parol evidence.” (quoting
Hahamovitch v. Hahamovitch, 174 So. 3d 983, 986 (Fla. 2015))).
No ambiguity exists in this mediated settlement agreement. Thus,
its express terms control.

                                  5
     The benefit obtained by the Doziers in the agreement is the
described easement across Scruggs’ land. Two corresponding
benefits obtained by Scruggs are the right to terminate the
easement if access from C.R. 719 is obtained, or to relocate the
easement if such access if not obtained. The agreement simply does
not tie the Doziers’ right to the mediated easement to their efforts
to obtain access from C.R. 719. When, as here, “the language of a
settlement agreement is clear and unambiguous, ‘courts may not
indulge in construction or modification and the express terms of
the settlement agreement control.’” Postma, 276 So. 3d at 829
(quoting Com. Cap. Res., LLC v. Giovannetti, 955 So. 2d 1151, 1153
(Fla. 3d DCA 2007)).

                                III.

     The mediated settlement agreement is enforceable and must
be given its full legal force and effect. Therefore, we REVERSE
AND REMAND to the trial court for enforcement of the agreement
and to set a reasonable time for David and Janna Scruggs to sign
the easement contemplated thereby.

    It is so ordered.

EDWARDS, C.J., and LAMBERT, J., concur.

                 _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
               _____________________________

                                 6