Court Opinion

ID: 9889708
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-11 13:04:08.932988+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:20.328855
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
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official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia

                                                   Decided: October 11, 2023

                         S23A0429. RIVERA v. THE STATE.

        LAGRUA, Justice.

        On May 19, 1996, the body of Bridgett Parker was discovered

near an abandoned mobile home in Ben Hill County. Parker’s throat

had been cut, and she had been raped. Soon after, law enforcement

officers identified Appellant Octavious Rivera as a possible suspect

in the crimes against Parker, and over the next few weeks, they

interviewed Rivera regarding Parker’s death, executed a search

warrant for his car and residence, and obtained a sample of his DNA;

however, they did not arrest Rivera at that time. In February 2018,

following the GBI’s reexamination of Parker’s sexual assault kit

using new DNA testing methods and technology, Rivera’s DNA was

identified as a match for DNA found inside Parker’s vaginal area,

and he was arrested. Rivera was later convicted of felony murder
predicated on aggravated assault, as well as rape.1                On appeal,

Rivera contends that the trial court erred in the following respects:

(1) by denying Rivera’s motion for directed verdict on the ground

that the State failed to allege the applicable tolling provision or

exception to the statute of limitation with respect to Count 3

(aggravated assault) and Count 4 (rape) in the indictment, and on

the ground that the statute of limitation on those counts was not

tolled; and (2) by permitting the State to admit other-acts evidence

under OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) and OCGA § 24-4-413 at trial. For the

reasons that follow, we affirm Rivera’s felony murder conviction and

reverse his rape conviction.

      1 In April 2018, Rivera was indicted by a Ben Hill County grand jury on

charges of malice murder (Count 1), felony murder predicated on aggravated
assault (Count 2), aggravated assault (Count 3), and rape (Count 4). In June
2019, a jury found Rivera guilty of all counts except malice murder. The trial
court sentenced Rivera to serve life in prison with the possibility of parole on
the felony murder count and a consecutive sentence of life in prison with the
possibility of parole on the rape count. The aggravated assault count merged
with the felony murder count for sentencing purposes. On July 25, 2019,
Rivera filed a timely motion for new trial. After Rivera waived a hearing on
the motion for new trial, the trial court summarily denied Rivera’s motion for
new trial on April 18, 2022. Rivera filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court
on April 28, 2022, and the case was docketed to the April 2023 term of this
Court and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
                                       2
     The evidence presented at Rivera’s 2019 trial showed that, in

the early morning hours of May 19, 1996, Gloria Edmonson and Lee

Colson discovered Parker’s body outside an abandoned mobile home

on property owned by Edmondson’s father in Ben Hill County. After

Edmonson and Colson reported Parker’s death, law enforcement

officers with the Ben Hill County Sheriff’s Department and the GBI

responded to the scene.

     One of the responding officers, GBI Special Agent Bruce Willis,

located Parker’s body about 30 feet from the abandoned mobile home

and noted she had a significant wound in her neck. According to

Agent Willis, between the mobile home and Parker’s body, there

were four large bloodstains on the ground, as well as “[a] very

significant amount of blood” on and around the body, including blood

spatter on Parker’s shoes. Agent Willis also noted that Parker’s

body had post-mortem injuries caused by animal and insect activity

and a loss of pigment coloration. Agent Willis concluded that, given

the animal and insect activity and the decomposition to the body,

Parker’s body had been in that location about “24 to 36 hours.”

                                 3
     The medical examiner determined that Parker’s cause of death

was “sharp force injuries to the neck.” According to the medical

examiner, Parker had a “stab slash type of wound,” where a “sharp

instrument” was “stabbed in th[e neck] area” and then “drawn back

down.” The medical examiner explained that, because Parker was

very petite—with a height of 5’ 3” and weight of 98 pounds—the

wound was “deep enough to cause injury to some of the arteries that

go to the right side of the face,” including the “external carotid

artery, the right lingual artery, and the right facial artery.” The

medical examiner observed that all three of these arteries were

“incised, causing massive amounts of bleeding.”

     The medical examiner also observed “deep bruising” on

Parker’s “anterior vaginal wall” and “significant hemorrhage or

bleeding” to the “neck of the bladder” and “right peripelvic tissues”

from blunt force trauma caused by a “very forceful penetration.” The

medical examiner did not see any lacerations in the vaginal area,

which suggested to him that Parker was penetrated with a penis, as

opposed to another device or object. The medical examiner also

                                 4
conducted a rape kit and collected vaginal swabs and smears from

Parker. The medical examiner found no spermatozoa on the vaginal

swabs and smears, which was not unusual given the position of the

body and the amount of decomposition caused by the exposure to

heat, humidity, and animal and insect activity over the course of

about two days.

     Over the next few days, law enforcement officers interviewed

several witnesses who established that the last time anyone saw

Parker before her death was on the night of Friday, May 17, 1996,

two days prior to the date her body was found. Edmonson, who was

close friends with Parker, told law enforcement officers that she and

Parker attended a viewing at a funeral home together between 7:30

and 8:00 p.m. on May 17, and that they then went their separate

ways. According to Earnestine Balom, she gave Parker a ride to a

nightclub in downtown Fitzgerald later that same evening, and

Ethel Wilcox said that she saw Parker leaving this nightclub alone

and “on foot” around 9:30 p.m. Balom also told law enforcement

officers that, after she dropped Parker off at the nightclub, she had

                                 5
difficulty exiting the nightclub’s parking lot because a “long and old

car” had parked in front of the nightclub and was blocking part of

the driveway. Each woman stated that she did not see Parker alive

again.

     While investigating Parker’s death, law enforcement officers in

Ben Hill County received information from law enforcement officers

in neighboring Irwin County about a man—later identified as

Rivera—who had been involved in two incidents in Irwin County on

May 8, 1996 (the “Irwin County incidents”), a little more than a week

before the crimes against Parker were committed.          One of the

victims in the Irwin County incidents told law enforcement officers

that the man involved in those incidents was driving a beige

Mercury Grand Marquis, and another victim reported to law

enforcement officers that the man was driving a “tan-brown looking

car” with four doors. During the investigation of the crimes against

Parker, Ben Hill County law enforcement officers learned that

Rivera, who lived in Ben Hill County, owned a beige 1985 Mercury

Grand Marquis. Law enforcement officers then spoke to Balom

                                  6
again—the woman who dropped Parker off at the nightclub on the

night of May 17—and showed her a picture of Rivera’s Mercury

Grand Marquis. According to Balom, the car in the photograph

“looked like” the car that was partially blocking her exit from the

nightclub’s parking lot on the night of May 17.

     GBI Special Agent Cary Hames interviewed Rivera on May 23,

1996 at the Ben Hill County Sheriff’s Department. After advising

Rivera of his Miranda rights,2 which Rivera agreed to waive, Agent

Hames asked Rivera to provide some personal details, including

whether he knew the victim, Parker. Rivera told Agent Hames that

he had moved to the area about one year before from New York City

and that he had met Edmonson about one month prior, but that he

had never met and did not know Parker. When asked about his

activities and whereabouts between May 17 and 19, Rivera told

Agent Hames that the only time he left his residence during that

period was on Saturday, May 18, between 12:00 p.m. and 1:00 p.m.,

to go to the grocery store to “buy supplies for a cookout.”

     2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966).

                                    7
     On June 3, GBI Special Agent Stephen Tinsley, the primary

case agent assigned to this case, interviewed Rivera at the

Fitzgerald Police Department. During this interview, Rivera also

told Agent Tinsely that he had moved from New York about one year

before “because he wanted a better life for his children.” Rivera

indicated that he had held several jobs over the past year, including

working for Edmonson Logging Company—a company owned by

Edmonson’s father, Johnny Edmonson. When Agent Tinsley asked

Rivera if he knew Parker, Rivera changed his earlier statement and

said that he had “met [Parker] a short time earlier through

Edmonson,” who was “their mutual friend.” Rivera said he heard

Parker had been killed and that he was familiar with the area where

her body was discovered because he had previously “collect[ed] a

paycheck” from Johnny Edmonson at the mobile home located on

that property. Rivera stated that he did not have any relationship

with Parker and that he had only been around her at a nightclub or

bar when Edmonson was also present. Agent Tinsley inquired about

Rivera’s whereabouts during the timeframe leading up to Parker’s

                                  8
death, and Rivera told Agent Tinsley that he stayed home all day

Friday, May 17, and Saturday, May 18, except for leaving briefly on

May 18 to pick up charcoal at the grocery store for a barbecue.

     On June 5, Agent Tinsley obtained a search warrant3 for

Rivera’s Mercury Grand Marquis, his residence, and his person

based on Balom’s statement that Rivera’s car looked similar to the

one she saw parked at the nightclub where Parker was last seen on

May 17.     Agent Tinsley and Agent Willis executed the search

warrant at Rivera’s residence on June 6. The agents seized a pair

of boots from the residence because Agent Tinsley observed “what

appeared to be [] some kind on fluid on [them] such as possible blood

or semen;” however, subsequent testing of the boots by the GBI was

negative for the presence of blood or spermatozoa. Agent Willis also

collected fingerprints from the interior and exterior of Rivera’s car

and removed the floor mats for testing. The testing revealed that all

of the fingerprints in the car belonged to Rivera, and the floor mats

were negative for the presence of any blood, saliva, or spermatozoa.

     3 The search warrants do not appear in the record of this case.

                                     9
When Agent Willis searched the trunk of Rivera’s car, he found

“cleaning supplies”—specifically, laundry detergent and Clorox—as

well as a laundry bag full of clothes, wire, and duct tape. However,

law enforcement officers did not find any evidence demonstrating

that wire or duct tape had been utilized in the commission of the

crimes against Parker. Agent Willis also compared plaster tire casts

he had taken of tire tracks located at the crime scene with the tires

on Rivera’s car, and he noted that the tire impressions from Rivera’s

car “were visibly consistent with what he saw at the scene.” At the

conclusion of the search, Agent Tinsley transported Rivera to the

hospital, where Rivera consented to having his blood drawn and

samples taken of his hair and saliva. These samples were then

collected and sent to the GBI crime lab for analysis.

     Lynn Langford, a scientist who worked in the Division of

Forensic Sciences for the GBI and testified as an expert in forensic

DNA analysis at trial, ran tests on Rivera’s blood sample, Parker’s

fingernail clippings, and grass collected from the crime scene, among

other items.   According to Langford, based on the DNA testing

                                 10
available at that time, no DNA—other than Parker’s—was

discovered on any evidence collected from Parker’s person or from

the crime scene.

     At this point, law enforcement lacked probable cause to arrest

anyone for the crimes against Parker or any further leads to pursue,

and the investigation went into inactive status. All of the evidence

collected in this case, including Parker’s vaginal swabs and Rivera’s

bloodstain card, were then sealed and maintained in the GBI crime

lab or in lockers at the Ben Hill County Sheriff’s Department.

     18 years later, in December 2014, GBI Agent Logan Holland

was assigned to Parker’s murder case to reopen the investigation.

As part of the investigation, Agent Holland resubmitted Parker’s

sexual assault kit to the GBI crime lab for testing, and he

interviewed several witnesses again, including Edmonson, who told

Agent Holland that she knew Rivera in 1996 because they used to

work together at a packing company, but she did not know anything

about his potential involvement in the crimes against Parker.

     Erin Norris, a forensic biologist with the GBI who testified as

                                 11
an expert in forensic DNA analysis at trial, received the sexual

assault kit collected from Parker and Rivera’s “bloodstain card” from

Agent Holland for testing. Norris explained that DNA testing had

advanced significantly since 1996, and she was able to use the

vaginal swabs from Parker to obtain a DNA profile for comparison

to the DNA profile she obtained from Rivera’s bloodstain card.

Based on her testing and analysis, Norris concluded that the DNA

profile on Parker’s vaginal swabs was a match to Rivera.

     Based on the results of the DNA testing, Agent Holland started

searching for Rivera. After Agent Holland was able to locate a

contact number for Rivera, he called Rivera on February 1, 2018,

and arranged to meet with him in Tifton. Prior to meeting with

Rivera, Agent Holland obtained an arrest warrant for Rivera. On

the afternoon of February 1, Agent Holland met with Rivera at

Rivera’s workplace. Prior to interviewing Rivera, Agent Holland

advised Rivera of his Miranda rights, which Rivera agreed to waive.

During the interview, which was audio-recorded, Rivera initially

told Agent Holland that Parker’s name did “not sound familiar at

                                 12
all.” A few minutes later, Rivera said that he remembered getting a

phone call from law enforcement officers about a week after Parker’s

death, advising that Parker was dead and that they wanted to talk

to him. Rivera said he went to “the station,” but he told the officers

that he “didn’t know anything else about it.” Agent Holland showed

Rivera a picture of Parker, and Rivera said that he did not recognize

her and that, if he knew her, he did not remember her or think he

ever had a sexual relationship with her. Rivera recalled that Parker

had been murdered, but stated that he did not know how she was

killed or any of the details about her murder. Rivera was arrested

at the conclusion of this interview.

     At trial, the State was permitted to present evidence from

several witnesses regarding the Irwin County incidents addressed

above under OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) (“Rule 404 (b)”).4              The State

presented this evidence for purposes of showing Rivera’s intent to

     4   The admission of this other-acts evidence forms the basis of one of
Rivera’s enumerations of error on appeal, which will be discussed in more
detail in Division 3 below.

                                    13
commit an aggravated assault against Parker with an unknown

object resulting in serious bodily injury; preparation for committing

the charged offenses; plan to commit a series of similar crimes; and

motive.

     The first Irwin County incident was presented through the

testimony of the victim, Deidre Gamble. Gamble testified that, on

May 8, 1996, when she was 13 years old, she was walking to her

grandmother’s house when a “tan-brown looking car” with four doors

passed her and pulled over on the side of the road. According to

Gamble, a man got out of the car holding a hammer and told her to

“come here.” Gamble testified that she was terrified, and she “took

off running” up the street. The man chased her, but Gamble was

able to get away and ran to her grandmother’s house. A short time

later, Gamble’s grandmother took Gamble to the police station to

report the incident, and she described the vehicle that stopped and

the man who approached her that afternoon. At trial, Gamble

identified Rivera as the man who chased her on May 8, 1996.

     The second Irwin County incident was presented through the

                                 14
testimony of the victims, Tammy Bargaineer and Shamia Tucker,

and an eyewitness, Halique Jordan. Bargaineer testified that, on

the evening of May 8, 1996, she and Tucker were walking to an

arcade in Ocilla when they observed a beige Mercury Grand Marquis

drive down the street and stop in the middle of the road. According

to Bargaineer, a man jumped out of the Grand Marquis and grabbed

Bargaineer’s arm with one of his hands, while he was holding an

object in his other hand. Bargaineer did not see the object well, but

she remembered it had a silver top on it. Bargaineer snatched her

arm away and started running. Tucker, who was 16 years old at the

time, testified that the man then grabbed her and “tried to take [her]

to the car.” She said that she was “fighting him off,” and he “hit

[her] across the head” and “busted [her] head open.” According to

Tucker, a woman who was driving by stopped her car and offered to

help. Tucker testified that, while she was trying to get into the

woman’s car, the man was trying to prevent her from doing so, and

she wrestled out of her shirt to get away from him. Tucker was able

to get into the woman’s car, but the man reached in and started

                                 15
choking the woman. Tucker then noticed that her friend, Jordan,

had stopped his car nearby. Jordan testified that, as he was driving

down the street, he saw a man pulling on Tucker and “beating her,”

so Jordan stopped to help. Tucker got into the back seat of Jordan’s

car, and Jordan drove Tucker to the police station, where she

described the person who attacked her and the vehicle he was

driving. Tucker was later transported to the hospital, where she

received treatment and stitches for her head injury.         At trial,

Bargaineer, Tucker, and Jordan identified Rivera as the man who

assaulted Tucker on May 8, 1996.

     1. On appeal, Rivera contends that the trial court erred in

denying his motion for directed verdict because the State failed to

assert an applicable tolling provision or exception to the statute of

limitation in the aggravated assault and rape counts of the

indictment to show that these offenses were not time-barred. We

conclude that, with respect to the rape count, the trial court erred in

denying Rivera’s motion for directed verdict, and with respect to the

aggravated assault count, the statute of limitation is not at issue

                                  16
because that count merged for sentencing purposes with the felony

murder count, for which there is no statute of limitation. See Lewis

v. State, 306 Ga. 455, 462 (4) (831 SE2d 771) (2019) (concluding that

the appellant’s “challenge to the aggravated assault conviction [wa]s

moot because that count” had merged with the felony murder count).

     (a) The State argues on appeal that, because Rivera raised his

challenge to the indictment for the first time in a motion for directed

verdict of acquittal—as opposed to a demurrer or plea in bar prior to

trial—this enumeration of error was not properly preserved for

appellate review by this Court. While we agree with the State that

challenges to the form of an indictment must be raised before trial

or they are waived, challenges to the substance of an indictment can

be raised at any time before, during, or after trial. See Gilmore v.

State, 118 Ga. 299, 299 (1) (45 SE 226) (1903) (holding that a

challenge to the substance of an indictment, where the “indictment

or accusation is so defective that judgment upon it would be

arrested,” can be raised at any time during trial). Thus, as explained

in more detail below, Rivera has not waived this claim on appeal.

                                  17
     “An indictment may be challenged by general or special

demurrer.” Kimbrough v. State, 300 Ga. 878, 880 (2) (799 SE2d 229)

(2017) (citation and punctuation omitted.) “A general demurrer

challenges the sufficiency of the substance of the indictment,

whereas a special demurrer challenges the sufficiency of the form of

the indictment.” Green v. State, 292 Ga. 451, 452 (738 SE2d 583)

(2013) (citing Bramblett v. State, 238 Ga. 336, 337-338 (1) (236 SE2d

580) (1977)). “[A] plea in bar is [also] [a] proper procedural vehicle

through which to assert” a challenge to the form or substance of an

indictment. State v. Barker, 277 Ga. App. 84, 87 (3) (625 SE2d 500)

(2005).

     “Special demurrers,” which challenge the form of the

indictment, must be “made at or before arraignment” or before trial

or they “are waived.” Bramblett, 238 Ga. at 337 (1). See also Taylor

v. State, 303 Ga. 583, 587 (4) (814 SE2d 302) (2018). Similarly,

general demurrers, which challenge the substance of the indictment,

can be made before trial, but they are not required to be raised at

that time. “A challenge to the sufficiency of the substance of the

                                 18
indictment can be made after trial by means of a motion in arrest of

judgment,” Bramblett, 238 Ga. at 338 (1), or “attention may be called

to [such a] defect at any time during trial.” Gilmore, 118 Ga. at 299

(1) (emphasis supplied). See also, e.g., Scandrett v. State, 124 Ga.

141, 141 (2) (52 SE 160) (1905) (holding that challenges to the

substance of the indictment can be made “by motion in arrest of

judgment”); McKay v. State, 234 Ga. App. 556, 559 (2) (507 SE2d

484) (1998) (holding that “because a general demurrer attacks the

legality of an indictment, it is permissible to raise this ground”

before or during trial or “after verdict by a motion in arrest of

judgment even if there was no earlier objection”).

     Where, as here, a defendant challenges an indictment based on

the State’s failure to assert a tolling provision or exception to the

statute of limitation therein, this is a challenge to the substance of

the indictment. See Lynch v. State, 346 Ga. App. 849, 866-867 (815

SE2d 340) (2018) (McMillian, J., concurring specially). Thus, Rivera

was permitted to raise this challenge to the substance of the

indictment for the first time in a motion for directed verdict at

                                 19
trial—a motion which, under these circumstances, substantively

amounts to a general demurrer that can be raised at any time. See,

e.g., Gilmore, 118 Ga. at 299 (1); State v. Mondor, 306 Ga. 338, 340

(830 SE2d 206) (2019) (“Magic words are not required to file a

demurrer, and the substance and function of a motion or pleading

generally controls our review.”); Gulledge v. State, 276 Ga. 740, 741

(583 SE2d 862) (2003) (“[T]here is no magic in nomenclature and . .

. substance controls our consideration of pleadings.”); Moss v. State,

220 Ga. App. 150, 151 (469 SE2d 325) (1996) (holding that the trial

court erred in denying the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict

when no exception to the statute of limitation was alleged in the

indictment). Therefore, Rivera did not waive this argument, and we

may address it on appeal.

     (b) “In criminal cases, the statute of limitation runs from the

time of the criminal act to the time of the indictment.” Taylor v.

State, 306 Ga. 277, 286 (3) (b) (830 SE2d 90) (2019) (citation and

punctuation omitted). “Where an exception is relied upon to prevent

the bar of the statute of limitation, it must be alleged and proved.”

                                 20
Id. (citing Hollingsworth v. State, 7 Ga. App. 16, 16 (1) (65 SE 1077)

(1909) (punctuation omitted)). To that end, “[t]his Court has held

that an exception to the statute of limitation is a ‘material allegation’

which must be alleged in the indictment.” Id. (quoting McLane v.

State, 4 Ga. 335, 342 (2) (45 SE 226) (1848) (holding that the State

is required to allege in the indictment “the particular exception”

which the State “intended to [] prove[] at trial”)). See also, e.g.,

Jenkins v. State, 278 Ga. 598, 604 (1) (B) (604 SE2d 789) (2004) (“[I]t

is true that an exception to the statute of limitations must be pled

in the indictment if the State is relying on one.”); Hansford v. State,

54 Ga. 55, 58 (3) (1875) (holding that “if the offense appears on the

face of the indictment to be barred by the statute of limitation in

reference thereto, and some exception in the statute is relied upon

to prevent its bar, such exception should be alleged in the

indictment”).

     More than a century ago, this Court explained that

     [o]n the score of principle, we think it was incumbent on
     the prosecuting officer, to have alleged in the indictment
     the particular exception on which he relied to prevent the

                                   21
     operation of the Statute, so that it might affirmatively
     appear that the defendant was liable under the law, to be
     arrested, tried and convicted for the offence; and for the
     further reason, that he might be prepared at the trial, to
     traverse all the material allegations made by the State
     against him.

McLane, 4 Ga. at 342 (2). And, since that time, the Court of Appeals

     has made it clear that fundamental principles of due
     process require indictments or other charging
     instruments to not only show that a public law of the
     State has been violated, but also that the defendant has
     been indicted therefor, in the manner, and within the
     time, prescribed by the laws of the land.

Lynch, 346 Ga. App. at 866 (McMillian, J., concurring specially)

(citing McLane, 4 Ga. at 340 (2); punctuation omitted). “Thus, if an

accused is tried on an indictment that is untimely on its face and no

exception or tolling provision is alleged, the State cannot introduce

evidence of the exception at trial, and any prosecution under that

indictment will not be sustained, even if an accused has been tried

and convicted thereon.”   Id. See also, e.g., Moss, 220 Ga. App. at

151 (holding that, because “no exception was alleged in the

indictment, the State was incapable of proving an exception to toll

the applicable four-year statute of limitation, as such proof was

                                 22
inadmissible”); Hollingsworth, 7 Ga. App. at 16 (1) (holding that “the

evidence that the offense was not barred by the statute of limitations

was inadmissible, unless it was pleaded in the indictment”).

     Here, it is undisputed that the State did not allege an

applicable tolling provision or exception to the statute of limitation

in the rape count of the indictment as the law required it to do. And,

“because the indictment did not include the required language to

show that the statute of limitation period[] had been tolled, the

indictment was fatally defective as a matter of law” as to the rape

count, and Rivera’s “conviction[] on th[at] count[] must be reversed.”

Lynch, 346 Ga. App. at 348 (3) (a) (i).

     2. Rivera next contends that the trial court erred in denying

his motion for directed verdict because his aggravated assault and

rape charges were indicted outside the applicable four and fifteen-

year statutes of limitation, and the State failed to prove at trial that

the statutes of limitation were tolled by the person-unknown

exception in OCGA § 17-3-2 (2)5 or the DNA exception in OCGA §

     5   OCGA § 17-3-2 (2) provides that “[t]he period within which a
                                  23
17-3-1 (d) (3).6 However, given our conclusion that the rape count

must be reversed because the State failed to allege the applicable

tolling provision or exception to the statute of limitation in the

indictment and because the challenge to the aggravated assault

count is moot, we need not reach the merits of this argument on

appeal.

     3.   Finally, Rivera contends that the trial court erred in

permitting the State to admit evidence of the Irwin County incidents

under Rule 404 (b) because these incidents were irrelevant to any

issue other than Rivera’s character and because the probative value

of this other-acts evidence was substantially outweighed by the

prosecution must be commenced under Code Section 17-3-1 or other applicable
statute does not include any period in which: . . . The person committing the
crime is unknown or the crime is unknown[.]”
      6 OCGA § 17-3-1 (d) provides that

      [a] prosecution for the following offenses may be commenced at any
      time when deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) evidence is used to
      establish the identity of the accused: . . . Rape, as defined in [OCGA
      §] 16-6-1; . . . provided, however, that a sufficient portion of the
      physical evidence tested for DNA is preserved and available for
      testing by the accused and provided, further, that if the DNA
      evidence does not establish the identity of the accused, the
      limitation on prosecution shall be as provided in subsections (b)
      and (c) of this Code section.
                                     24
danger of unfair prejudice. Rivera also contends that the trial court

erroneously admitted this evidence under OCGA § 24-4-4137 (“Rule

413”) because there was no evidence of sexual assault in either of

the Irwin County incidents.8 We conclude that, even if the trial court

      7 Rule 413 provides:

      (a) In a criminal proceeding in which the accused is accused of an
      offense of sexual assault, evidence of the accused’s commission of
      another offense of sexual assault shall be admissible and may be
      considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.
      (b) In a proceeding in which the prosecution intends to offer
      evidence under this Code section, the prosecutor shall disclose
      such evidence to the accused, including statements of witnesses or
      a summary of the substance of any testimony that is expected to
      be offered, at least ten days in advance of trial, unless the time is
      shortened or lengthened or pretrial notice is excused by the judge
      upon good cause shown.
      (c) This Code section shall not be the exclusive means to admit or
      consider evidence described in this Code section.
      (d) As used in this Code section, the term “offense of sexual
      assault” means any conduct or attempt or conspiracy to engage in:
      (1) Conduct that would be a violation of [OCGA §§] 16-6-1, 16-6-
      2, 16-6-3, 16-6-5.1, 16-6-22, 16-6-22.1, or 16-6-22.2;
      (2) Any crime that involves contact, without consent, between any
      part of the accused’s body or an object and the genitals or anus of
      another person;
      (3) Any crime that involves contact, without consent, between the
      genitals or anus of the accused and any part of another person’s
      body; or
      (4) Any crime that involves deriving sexual pleasure or
      gratification from the infliction of death, bodily injury, or physical
      pain on another person.
      8 We note that, while the trial court initially ruled that one of the Irwin

County incidents was also admissible under Rule 413 because the court was
under the impression that a sexual assault had occurred during the incident
since the victim came out of her shirt, the trial court later revised its ruling
                                       25
abused its discretion in admitting this other-acts evidence at trial,

the admission of this evidence was harmless error. See Tiraboschi

v. State, 312 Ga. 198, 200 (2) (862 SE2d 276) (2021) (“We need not

decide whether this evidence was erroneously admitted, because any

such error was harmless.”).

      At trial, the State presented evidence of the Irwin County

incidents through several witnesses.              Prior to the witnesses’

testimony and in the trial court’s final charge to the jury, the trial

court gave the jury an instruction limiting the jury’s use of this

evidence. The limiting instruction and final charge instructed the

jury that evidence of these two incidents was being “admitted for a

limited purpose” and “may be considered by the jury for the sole

issue or purposes for which the evidence [was] limited and not for

any other purpose.”       The trial court further instructed that the

limited purposes for which this evidence was being admitted by the

State was to show “intent,” “plan and preparation of the defendant

after testimony was admitted about this incident at trial, stating on the record
that Rule 413 did not apply.
                                      26
in committing the offenses,” and “motive of the defendant in

committing the offenses.” The trial court directed the jury that it

was “permitted to consider that evidence only in so far as it may

relate to those issues and not for any other purpose.”

     Assuming without deciding that the trial court erroneously

admitted the Irwin County incidents for the stated purposes under

Rule 404 (b), “evidentiary errors require reversal only if they harm

a defendant’s substantial rights.” Pritchett v. State, 314 Ga. 767,

778 (2) (c) (879 SE2d 436) (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted).

“The test for determining whether a nonconstitutional evidentiary

error was harmless is whether it is highly probable that the error

did not contribute to the verdict.” Tiraboschi, 312 Ga. at 200 (2). In

reaching that determination, “we review the record de novo, and we

weigh the evidence as we would expect reasonable jurors to have

done,” as opposed to “viewing it all in the light most favorable to the

jury’s verdict.” Edwards v. State, 308 Ga. 176, 184 (3) (839 SE2d

599) (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted).

     “[A]s to the central issue at trial,” the evidence of Rivera’s guilt

                                   27
was strong. Tiraboschi, 312 Ga. at 200 (2). See also Edwards, 308

Ga. at 184 (3). First, there was physical evidence supporting the

State’s theory that Rivera was the perpetrator of the crimes against

Parker. At trial, the medical examiner testified that Parker was

raped shortly before her death, and subsequent DNA testing

revealed that Rivera’s DNA was a match for the DNA found on the

vaginal swabs in Parker’s rape kit. Additionally, a witness testified

at trial that she saw a car that looked like Rivera’s car parked at the

same nightclub where she dropped Parker off on the evening of May

17, 1996—the night Parker was last seen alive.                And law

enforcement discovered tire tracks consistent with the tire

impressions from Rivera’s car at the crime scene—a location with

which Rivera admitted he was familiar, having previously picked up

paychecks at this location from his former employer, Johnny

Edmonson.

     “We recognize that the admission of this other-acts evidence

carried a risk of prejudice” to Rivera, particularly since the State did

not demonstrate that he was charged with any crimes arising from

                                  28
the Irwin County incidents and “because the State chose to

emphasize” the Irwin County incidents again during closing

arguments. Pritchett, 314 Ga. at 780 (2) (c). See also Hood v. State,

299 Ga. 95, 105 (786 SE2d 648) (noting that the danger of admitting

extrinsic offense evidence is greater where “the extrinsic activity

was not the subject of a prior conviction” because “the jury may feel

that the defendant should be punished for that activity even if he is

not guilty of the offense charged”).     However, “in light of the

substantial evidence” of Rivera’s guilt in this case and “after

conducting a de novo review and weighing the evidence as

reasonable jurors would, we conclude that it is highly probable that

[any] error in admitting the other-acts evidence” was harmless and

“did not contribute to” the jury’s guilty verdicts against Rivera.

Pritchett, 314 Ga. at 780 (2) (c). See also Tiraboschi, 312 Ga. at 201

(2) (“In sum, the jury heard compelling evidence of Appellant’s guilt,

and it is highly probable that the admission of the evidence relating

to his prior convictions did not contribute to the jury’s guilty

verdict.”).

                                 29
     4.   Therefore, we affirm Rivera’s felony murder conviction,

reverse his rape conviction, and remand this case to the trial court

for resentencing in accordance with this opinion.

    Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part, and case
remanded. All the Justices concur.

                                 30