Court Opinion

ID: 9725641
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:57:20.733823+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:17.413539
License: Public Domain

Jansen, P.J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur with the majority that the trial court properly revoked defendant’s probation in this case. *417However, I respectfully dissent from the decision to remand for resentencing. I would affirm defendant’s sentence of life without parole for the conviction of possession with intent to deliver 650 grams or more of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(i); MSA 14.15(7401)(2)(a)(i).
I do not agree that MCL 771.7(1); MSA 28.1137(1) and MCR 6.933(B)(1) require that defendant be sentenced to a term of years in the face of the Legislature’s mandate that a conviction of possession with intent to deliver 650 grams or more of a controlled substance is punishable by a term of life imprisonment. Such a conviction requires a term of imprisonment for life and there is no other available prison term under the statute. See MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(i); MSA 14.15(7401)(2)(a)(i).
MCL 771.7(1); MSA 28.1137(1) does state that a juvenile must be “committed to the department of corrections for a term of years that shall not exceed the penalty that could have been imposed for the offense for which the juvenile was originally convicted and placed on probation.” (Emphasis added.) MCR 6.933(B)(1) similarly provides that the juvenile must be “committed to the department of corrections for a term of years not to exceed the penalty that could have been imposed for the offense that led to the probation.” (Emphasis added.) I emphasize these provisions because I do not believe that the “term of years” provision should be read in an overly legalistic manner or in a manner that could not have been what the Legislature intended.
The primary rule of statutory construction is to determine and effectuate the intent of the Legislature through reasonable construction in consideration of *418the purpose of the statute and the object sought to be accomplished. Gross v General Motors Corp, 448 Mich 147, 158-159; 528 NW2d 707 (1995). Where a statute is clear and unambiguous, judicial construction is precluded. Mino v McCarthy, 209 Mich App 302, 304; 530 NW2d 779 (1995). If judicial interpretation is necessary, the meaning of the Legislature is to be found in the terms and arrangement of the statute without straining or refinement, and the expressions used are to be taken in their natural and ordinary sense. Gross, supra, p 160. Statutes must be construed to prevent absurd or illogical results and to give effect to their purposes. Id., p 164.
By adopting defendant’s argument that he must be sentenced to a term of years, as opposed to a term of life imprisonment, the majority is nullifying the Legislature’s mandated sentence as set forth in MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(i); MSA 14.15(7401)(2)(a)(i). Moreover, such an interpretation, that only a sentence of a term of years can be imposed, leads to an illogical or unreasonable result. In other words, had defendant in this case been originally sentenced to the adult term, the trial court would have been required to sentence him to the mandatory term of life imprisonment. However, that option was not exercised and defendant was instead sentenced to probation. While on probation, defendant again committed another felony offense. His probation was revoked, and the majority now holds that he must be resentenced to a term of years. Such a result cannot be what the Legislature intended.
Rather, I believe that MCL 771.7(1); MSA 28.1137(1) requires that a defendant be sentenced to a term of years that cannot exceed the penalty that could have *419originally been imposed, but that “term of years” does not preclude a sentence of life imprisonment where such penalty is mandated by the statute governing the original offense. Otherwise, it is anomalous that a juvenile defendant who is sentenced as an adult must be imprisoned for life, while a juvenile who is sentenced to probation and commits a felony while on probation could only be sentenced to a term of years. Not only could the Legislature not have intended such an anomaly, but such a result could well have equal protection implications.
Accordingly, I would affirm defendant’s sentence of life without the possibility of parole because that sentence is required under MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(i); MSA 14.15(7401)(2)(a)(i). I do not agree that MCL 771.7(1); MSA 28.1137(1) and MCR 6.933(B)(1) preclude the imposition of a life sentence where that sentence is mandatory (and the only sentence permissible) under the pertinent statute. Rather, I would find that MCL 771.7(1); MSA 28.1137(1) and MCR 6.933(B)(1) simply require that the juvenile defendant be sentenced to a term of years that cannot exceed the penalty that could have been imposed for the offense for which the defendant was placed on probation. If the statute requires a sentence of life imprisonment, then the defendant should be sentenced to that term.
I would affirm the decision of the trial court in all respects.