Court Opinion

ID: 9585184
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:57:19.048248+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:32:56.156386
License: Public Domain

Rose, C. J.,
dissenting:
Just a year ago, in State, Department of Transportation v. Hill, 114 Nev. 810, 963 P.2d 480 (1998), we drafted a less rigid and more equitable framework for deciding negligent infliction of emotional distress issues. The majority’s departure from the framework set forth in Hill prevents that procedure from being tested in our district courts to determine its validity. I believe we are discarding this precedent prematurely.
Legal precedents of this Court should be respected until they are shown to be unsound in principle. As stated by the United States Supreme Court:
The doctrine of stare decisis imposes a severe burden on the litigant who asks us to disavow one of our precedents. For the doctrine not only plays an important role in orderly adjudication; it also serves the broader societal interests in evenhanded, consistent, and predictable application of legal rules.
Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 272 (1980). And as stated by the Supreme Court of Illinois:
[Wjhen a rule of law has once been settled, contravening no statute or constitutional principle, such rule ought to be followed unless it can be shown that serious detriment is thereby likely to arise prejudicial to public interests. [Citations omitted.] The rule of stare decisis is founded upon sound principles in the administration of justice, and rules long recognized as the law should not be departed from merely because the court is of the opinion that it might decide otherwise were the question a new one.
Maki v. Frelk, 239 N.E.2d 445, 447 (Ill. 1968).
*343The rule adopted by the majority requires a relationship by blood or marriage before one can claim to have a close relationship for purposes of pursuing damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress. While this rule will be predictable, it will permit some people to pursue this claim who have no close relationship, and yet prohibit others who have a loving, close relationship with someone injured or killed from pursuing these claims merely because they are not related by blood or marriage.
The case at issue provides a good example. Kellie Grotts and John Colwell were very much in love and expected to marry in the near future. They were at the zenith of love and commitment. Numerous plays and novels have been written about the great loss suffered when this type of relationship ends with the death of one party. Yet the majority denies Kellie Grotts’ claim for emotional distress caused as a result of witnessing the death of the love of her life and constant companion simply because their wedding date was a few months off. This same scenario could happen to an older man and woman who, for a variety of reasons, had lived together for years but were not formally married.
And the unfairness of the rule adopted today does not stop there. Anyone living in a non-traditional relationship will be denied the chance to recover emotional distress damages, while those living together with benefit of marriage will not suffer such prejudice. It is a fact of life that many gay men and lesbian women have partners with whom they have lived for decades and shared a close, loving relationship. These individuals will be denied the right to even claim damages for emotional distress for witnessing injury or death to their partner for no other reason than that they are not legally married, a status they cannot prevent. The closeness of two people should be judged by the quality and intimacy of the relationship, not by whether there is a blood relationship or whether a document has been filed at the court house. A segment of our population should not be denied legal redress simply because of their lifestyle.
The rule we adopted in Hill permits a judge to first scrutinize the claim of emotional distress to determine if the relationship is sufficiently close to create an issue of fact to present to a jury. State, Dep’t of Transp. v. Hill, 114 Nev. at 816, 963 P.2d at 484 (1998). If it is, the jury will then hear all the facts of the case, including the nature of the relationship existing between the plaintiff and the party injured or killed. We ask juries to make all sorts of difficult determinations and deciding the closeness of a relationship is a judgment juries are uniquely qualified to make. Leaving this factual determination to the jury would give Nevada a reasonably flexible rule that does not arbitrarily bar those who *344would otherwise be able to establish a close relationship. The majority of this court once saw the wisdom of this rule.
Accordingly, I dissent.