Court Opinion

ID: 9728317
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:04:48.744651+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:47.074625
License: Public Domain

ALLPORT, J.
I dissent.
Following a valid arrest for being under the influence of intoxicating liquor in a public place, defendant was taken to the J. J. Newberry store security office by an off-duty Los Angeles city police officer who was working part time for that company as a security guard. At the office a cursory search was made for weapons. No weapons or contraband were found at that time. During this pat-down the guard did feel the presence of a wallet in defendant’s pocket. When asked his name defendant replied “Millard.” Thereafter defendant was asked for some identification. He stated that he did not have any. The officer next removed the wallet, a brown paper bag and two or three other articles from defendant’s pocket. The wallet contained no identification. A check was then made of the contents of the paper bag for identification, at which time the contraband was discovered and defendant arrested for possession of marijuana. The initial search was legal as incidental to a valid arrest for being intoxicated in a public place and was expressly limited to weapons. The second search of the wallet and paper bag, which is condemned by the majority, was in my opinion legal, being not only contemporaneous with a valid arrest, but being made solely for the purpose of endeavoring to make personal identification of the arrestee. Identification is an essential part of the detention or arrest procedure. The search as made was clearly reasonable. The arresting guard first asked for identification. Obtaining only a partial name in response to that verbal inquiry and a negative response to the request for identification, it was logical to extract the wallet in an effort to learn and verify the individual’s identity. Finding no assistance from the contents of the wallet, the inquiry was then pursued by looking into the bag. The bag may well have contained a sales slip, medical prescription, or other personal paper or effect from which identification could have been made. Identification by some means becomes inevitably necessary in the course of processing one detained or arrested. In fact, proper and immediate identification could, in cases such as this, result in release from custody without prosecution of charges. (Pen. Code, § 849.) Identification of one subject to arrest and who is unable to cooperate may also be desirable for the benefit of the person involved in case he should be suffering from an illness or injury not readily apparent. Certainly an on-the-scene search of one’s wallet and *765other personal effects for identification under the circumstances of this case should not be deemed offensive by the individual or an unreasonable exercise of authority. I see no requirement in law or logic for holding that an on-the-scene reasonably conducted search of one clearly under the influence of intoxicating liquor or of anyone' otherwise unable to cooperate voluntarily in the production of personal identification is constitutionally illegal or otherwise violative of individual rights.
Further, assuming that an on-the-scene search for identification of one otherwise unable to identify himself should be deemed violative of the Fourth Amendment provision against unreasonable search and seizure, the protection afforded thereby has been held inapplicable to searches by private individuals not acting in concert with or as agents of the governmental authorities. (Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 [65 L.Ed. 1048, 41 S.Ct. 574, 13 A.L.R. 1159]; Stapleton v. Superior Court, 70 Cal.2d 97, 100 [73 Cal.Rptr. 575, 447 P.2d 967].) I would conclude that an off-duty police officer acting as a security guard should be classed as a private citizen for the purpose of application of the exclusionary rule. Here there is nothing in the record that establishes that these individuals were acting other than as private security guards. While they did identify themselves as “police officers” and one showed his “badge,” the testimony fails to indicate that the words “police officers” or the “badge” referred to was indicative of other than reference to themselves as private police. Their action did not establish them to be, or acting as, agents of governmental authority at the time of these events. See also People v. Houle, 13 Cal.App.3d 892, 895 [91 Cal.Rptr. 874], where it is said: “The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures does not apply to searches by private individuals not acting in concert with or as agents of governmental authorities. (Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 [65 L.Ed. 1048, 41 S.Ct. 574, 13 A.L.R. 1159]; Stapleton v. Superior Court, 70 Cal.2d 97, 100 [73 Cal.Rptr. 575, 447 P.2d 967].) . *".
I would affirm the judgment for both of the reasons stated herein.
Respondent’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied April 29, 1971. McComb, J., and Burke, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

 “We are aware of footnote 3 in Stapleton v. Superior Court, supra, 70 Cal.2d 97, 100, which indicates a possible disposition of our Supreme Court to consider whether the controlling United States Supreme Court decision in Burdeau v. McDowell, supra, 256 U.S. 465, correctly interprets the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution where the private person conducting a search is a private investigator or private policeman. As an intermediate appellate court we deem ourselves bound by Burdeau.”