Court Opinion

ID: 9534608
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:41:21.983172+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:31:57.996605
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE GREIMAN, dissenting: This case is not a matter of great moment to our system of justice. Some might say that it is a trivial matter and that the parties ought to consider the best interests of the child and accept the equitable decision of the trial court. However, in many ways this case is a crucible for appellate court judges. The child’s father has supported him, has a close relationship with him and understandably desires him to bear his name. The mother, who has never been married to the father, bore this child, has been the primary person responsible for his development and education, desires the child to bear her name and have no part of the father’s name introduced into his cognomen. The trial court, seeking to do equity, resolves the matter in a most reasonable manner by ordering that the father’s name be designated as a middle name. The majority cites In re Marriage of Presson (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 303, 309, 465 N.E.2d 85, 88, which acknowledges that a name change must be in the best interest of the child and sets out seven criteria for a court to consider. At best, only two of the factors in Presson would be applicable to the facts of this case. In any event, Presson was decided in 1984 and in 1985 the General Assembly amended the Name Change Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 96, par. 1) to require that any changes be effected only “if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the change is necessary to serve the best interest of the child.”1 Therefore, the standard that might obtain under Presson has been superseded by the Act of the General Assembly in the year following its decision. The statute has been construed to acknowledge as a basis for name change the expanded standard of clear and convincing evidence necessary to the best interests of the child. (In re Marriage of Schaefer (1987), 161 Ill. App. 3d 841, 515 N.E.2d 710.) It is clear that use of the term “clear and convincing” imposes upon the petitioner an extraordinary burden, under law and that the court must employ the standard imposed upon it by statute. Often appellate judges must only speculate as to what was in the mind of the trial court. Unfortunately, in the case at bar, the trial court leaves no room for speculation as to what was in his mind. He lays on the record his entire mental processes for all to examine. The trial court tells us: “The petition indicates that it would be *** in the child’s best interests that his name be changed. There has not been a great deal of evidence along those lines. * * * Therefore, I have not heard evidence to warrant that it would be in the best interest of the child and in the best welfare for the child that the name be changed. •i* % I decided that the facts *** in this case did not warrant the relief that was requested by [the father].” The trial court’s offerings and conclusion, therefore, are at serious odds with the language and intent of section 1 of the Name Change Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 96, par. 1). He advised the parties: “In the United States of America normally children, except in some unusual circumstances, bear the name of their father. * * * I would venture to say 99% of the children in the United States bear the name of their father * * * I still feel that in our country the child takes the father’s name. In our country the wife takes the husband’s name, although that is not as common nowadays. It is something that is done.” The court seems to ignore the fact that the parents have never been married. Additionally, the court appears to shift the burden of coming forward with evidence to the respondent mother in contravention of the statute. Again, the court has afforded us an opportunity to examine his thinking process. Again, he has strayed from the standard provided by the legislature. The trial court states that he has “chancery powers” which allow him to insert the father’s name as the middle name of the child. While such action is intelligent, wise and thoughtful on the part of the trial judge, it is without authority. The issue is not whether the burden on the youngster to bear the father’s name is difficult or unnecessary since many of us bear the burden of a name we might not have selected for ourselves.2  I noted this case was a crucible for appellate judges because the trial court has done the fair, the equitable, the thoughtful thing, but has ignored the statute governing such action, imposed an improper burden upon one of the parties and looked to matters outside of the record for direction. I believe that appellate decisions should stand as signposts for future trial judges and would return this to the trial court for a new hearing. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.   Amendment to the Name Change Act was initiated by the 1984 Supreme Court Recommendations to the General Assembly. Moreover, the issue of “clear and convincing evidence” was considered separately by the House, which imposed this standard by Amendment 2 to House Bill 197 of the 84th General Assembly. Originally the standard was only a rebuttable presumption that favored the use of the family name of the natural father. 84th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Bill 197, Amendment 2, 1985 Sess.; Amendment adopted April 24,1985.    2This writer is none too pleased with his middle name “Joel” and similar dissatisfaction may someday be voiced by people currently being named Amber, Brittani, Ashley, Brandi, Blaine, Chelsea, Kelsee, Courtney, Krista, Sierra, Shawna, Chantel, Shayla, Tiffany, Moira, Katlynn, Maya, Shira, Joshua, Justin, Cody, Jared, Cameron, Chad, Kyle, Zachary, Corey, Bryce or Trevor. It is because of this dissatisfaction that we affect “Buddy,” “Bunny,” “Spike,” “Honey” and a variety of other nicknames to take the place of these unloved monikers.