Court Opinion

ID: 9647578
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:41:21.483502+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:50.906142
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION

Justice SAYLOR.
This matter falls into a particularly problematic set of criminal cases handled by then-Assistant District Attorney Jack McMahon within a short time after he gave his 1987 jury-selection training session as recorded on the tape at issue. As with Commonwealth v. Basemore, 560 Pa. 258, 744 *640A.2d 717 (2000), Mr. McMahon prosecuted this case in 1988, within approximately one year of the training session. Excerpts of McMahon’s comments on the tape are provided in Basemore. See Basemore, 560 Pa. at 280-88, 744 A.2d at 730-31. In substance, Mr. McMahon’s remarks indicate, among other things, that he does not feel bound by the Constitution as interpreted by appellate courts, and that obtaining a conviction is the highest value that a prosecutor can achieve. The following excerpt is illustrative:
The case law says that the object of getting a jury is to get — I wrote it down. I looked in the cases. I had to look this up because I didn’t know this was the purpose of a jury. “Voir dire is to get a competent, fair, and impartial jury.” Well, that’s ridiculous. You’re not trying to get that. You’re — both sides are trying to get the jury most likely to do whatever they want them to do.
And if you go in there and any one of you think you’re going to be some noble civil libertarian and try to get jurors, “well, he says he can be fair; I’ll go with him,” that’s ridiculous. You’ll lose and you’ll be out of the office; you’ll be doing corporate law. Because that’s what will happen. You’re there to win[.]
Jury Selection with Jack McMahon, transcript at 45-46. Consistent with the above, in the training class McMahon indicates, among other things, that: he attempts to obtain a jury that is as “unfair” as possible; in his efforts to secure a conviction-friendly jury, he adheres to a set of jury-selection principles that are, in large part, based on race and gender;1 *641in light of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), he asks African American prospective jurors various questions designed to provide him with a pretextual, race-neutral basis for exercising a race-based peremptory strike in the event defense counsel challenges the strike; and he never deviates from these tactics, which he likens to basic rules for playing blackjack in that they should always be followed. Again, the tape also reflects contempt toward appellate decisions interpreting the Constitution and a similar disrespect articulated toward the integrity of the trial process, as manifested in a studied lack of candor toward the trial court.2
In my view, this evidence, through McMahon’s own words, strongly implicates that he carried his impermissible attitudes, and applied his unconstitutional practices, in trials within a reasonable temporal proximity before and after the making of the tape. While I have no difficulty with the notion that a Batson claimant maintains the burden of persuasion, here, I believe that Appellant met and exceeded his burden in this regard, and it therefore fell to the Commonwealth to rebut that case with evidence carrying at least equal strength. Cf. Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 631-32, 92 S.Ct. 1221, 1226, 31 L.Ed.2d 536 (1972) (“Once a prima facie case of invidious discrimination is established [in the selection of a grand jury], the burden of proof shifts to the State to rebut the presumption of unconstitutional action by showing that permissible racially neutral selection criteria and procedures have produced the monochromatic result. The State has not carried this burden in this case; it has not adequately explained the elimination of Negroes during the process of selecting the grand jury that indicted petitioner.” (citations omitted)).
*642In this regard, the present case does not present the more typical scenario in which a defendant has merely met the fairly low threshold of a Batson-type prima facie case, thus requiring the prosecutor to articulate his race-neutral explanation for preemptory strikes. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723. Rather, this is a more unusual instance in which the PCRA petitioner has advanced the kind of direct evidence of actual, purposeful discrimination envisioned in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965), and Commonwealth v. Uderra, 580 Pa. 492, 862 A.2d 74 (2004). In Swain, the United States Supreme Court indicated that a systematic practice of excluding blacks from jury service violates the Equal Protection Clause.3 In this regard, the Basemore Court observed that, although Swain violations are difficult to prove, “where such violations have been found admissions by the prosecuting attorney have frequently played a prominent role.” Basemore, 560 Pa. at 284, 744 A.2d at 732 (citing Jackson v. Herring, 42 F.3d 1350, 1357 (11th Cir.1995), and State v. Washington, 375 So.2d 1162, 1164 (La.1979)).
Indeed, the approach of channeling temporally proximate, McMahon-prosecuted cases through the typical Batson framework is yielding inconsistent results in our courts, as some PCRA judges find it significant that there are some peremptory challenges that McMahon simply cannot explain, and some do not; likewise, some judges attach a high degree of relevance to the fact that McMahon arguably engaged in disparate treatment of African American and Caucasian prospective jurors in a specific case, and some do not.
In Commonwealth v. Spence, 561 Pa. 344, 750 A.2d 303 (2000) (per curiam), for example, after this Court vacated the denial of PCRA relief and remanded for further proceedings, *643McMahon offered race-neutral explanations for all of the challenged peremptory strikes. In view of the comments made during the training session, the common pleas judge granted a new trial, as he simply did not believe that a particular African American juror would have been peremptorily stricken if she had had all the same characteristics but had been white. See Commonwealth v. Spence, Sept. Term 1986, No. 3311, PCRA Hearing at 2-3 (C.P. Phila. March 22, 2004) (“I don’t think Mr. McMahon is a racist, but, of course, when striking people the way he struck in particular one prospective juror, who was a black lady, whose son was on the police force, he was an FBI agent, he was in DEA and all that, no way do I believe that if this prospective juror was Caucasian, would she have been struck by the District Attorney’s Office.”). Similarly, in the Basemore case, the PCRA court (on remand) granted Batson relief after finding the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations “insufficient” and observing that he was unable to explain some of the peremptory challenges. In that matter, the court recognized that disparate treatment of similarly situated jurors may indicate that the explanations offered are pretextual, and referenced examples in which McMahon had explained that he used a peremptory challenge against a black prospective juror because the individual was uneducated, or was living with his or her parents, or had been the victim of a crime, but had accepted white jurors with similar characteristics. See Commonwealth v. Basemore, March Term 1987 Nos. 1762-65, 2001 WL 36125302 (C.P. Phila. December 19, 2001) (Opinion by Savitt, J., after remand, granting new trial). Here, by contrast, the PCRA judge concluded that no Batson violation was proved although McMahon could not articulate a race-neutral reason for three peremptory strikes against African Americans and engaged in disparate treatment of black and white unemployed individuals, as described in more detail infra. In my view, these types of inconsistent results tend to undermine the appearance of fairness and consistency that forms a necessary foundation to the proper functioning of the criminal justice system, particularly as Batson violations are an especially damaging form of defect in criminal proceedings. See Basemore, 560 Pa. at 287-*64488, 744 A.2d at 734 (explaining that Batson violations are fundamental deficiencies that undermine the judicial function at its core and, hence, they are not subject to conventional harmless error or prejudice analysis, particularly in a capital case).
Centrally, I believe that McMahon’s recorded admissions concerning consistently applied unconstitutional practices and impermissible attitudes toward jury selection raise the question of whether there is any basis to believe that he experienced some change of heart that could have caused him to alter his approach to jury selection between the time he made the tape and the trial in the present case. In his recorded comments, McMahon simply went too far for his remarks to be merely recast or explained away.
In his testimony in the PCRA proceedings, McMahon did not reference any basis to believe that he fundamentally altered his approach to jury selection in the months following the making of the tape; nor did he expressly disavow the policies expressed in the tape. Rather, when confronted with portions of the tape in which he advocated using a racially-based method of demographic profiling, he sought to justify such methodologies — in view of the overarching goal of obtaining a Commonwealth-friendly jury — based on the person’s demographic (as opposed to racial) classification and what that classification could indicate regarding his or her attitude toward the police, or in terms of eliminating any possible empathy that a female juror might feel toward a male defendant of the same race. See N.T. December 11, 2002 at 88-99. To me, his comments were more in the nature of an attempt to recast or explain away, and there simply is no evidence of the necessary watershed change.
Even under the ordinary Batson regime as applied by the majority, I believe that the Swain-type backdrop described above is relevant to the Batson analysis in the present case. As the United States Supreme Court explained in Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 162 L.Ed.2d 196 (2005) (“Miller-El II ”):
*645Although the move from Swain to Batson left a defendant free to challenge the prosecution without having to cast Swain’s wide net, the net was not entirely consigned to history, for Batson’s individualized focus came with a weakness of its own owing to its very emphasis on the particular reasons a prosecutor might give. If any facially neutral reason sufficed to answer a Batson challenge, then Batson would not amount to much more than Swain. Some stated reasons are false, and although some false reasons are shown up within the four corners of a given case, sometimes a court may not be sure unless it looks beyond the case at hand. Hence Batson’s explanation that a defendant may rely on “all relevant circumstances” to raise an inference of purposeful discrimination.
Id. at 239-40, 125 S.Ct. at 2325 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723).
As the majority sets forth, when defense counsel challenges a peremptory strike, the Batson procedure calls for the prosecutor to advance a race-neutral explanation, which the trial court then assesses for persuasiveness. See Majority Opinion, at 602 (quoting Commonwealth v. Harris, 572 Pa. 489, 505-07, 817 A.2d 1033, 1042-43 (2002)). The McMahon tape, especially the admission by McMahon that it is his practice to use pretextual race-neutral explanations, tends to undermine the persuasiveness of any race-neutral explanation he provided at the PCRA hearing. Although, as the majority explains, the trial court’s determinations concerning persuasiveness are reviewed deferentially, this standard is grounded on that tribunal’s ability to view the prosecutor’s demeanor first-hand. See id. at 603. In this respect, the present case is unusual: it does not fit into the normal Batson framework because no contemporaneous justifications were given inasmuch as the Batson procedure was invoked many years after trial.4 Thus, as was *646evident at the PCRA hearing, McMahon had to rely upon the voir dire transcript to formulate his race-neutral explanations. See N.T. December 11, 2002 at 17. While this in itself is not unique, the point is that the prosecutor’s demeanor in responding to a Batson challenge is plainly of less significance in such a context than when he provides his reasons at the time of trial while they are still fresh in his mind. Cf. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 343, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 1042-43, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003) (“Miller-El I ”) (recognizing that explanations offered by a prosecutor at a hearing years after trial are “subject to the usual risks of imprecision and distortion from the passage of time”). Accordingly — and in light of McMahon’s admission that it was his regular practice to question African Americans in a manner calculated to develop pretextual race-neutral explanations for a race-based peremptory strike5 — I believe that this Court is entitled to scrutinize the facial plausibility of McMahon’s explanations in a less deferential mode than usual.
As applied presently, I find McMahon’s rationale for striking two black jurors who were unemployed, but accepting one white juror who was also unemployed, exceptionally weak. He indicates that he struck prospective juror 328, a black female, because she was a 24-year-old student living with her unemployed mother, it was unclear where the “money [was] coming from,” and that these circumstances “rose [sic] the stability factor.” See N.T. December 11, 2002 at 44. It is not evident, however, why a 24-year-old student may be considered in any respect unusual or unstable. As to prospective juror 203, a black male, McMahon states that he exercised a peremptory strike because the individual had apparently been fired from his job, a circumstance that, again, “goes to the stability factor.” However, there is nothing in the voir dire *647transcript to indicate that he was fired.6 On the other hand, McMahon accepted, after minimal questioning, a white venirewoman who was unemployed, whose husband had been laid off, and whose daughter was a full-time student, see N.T. October 19,1988 at 135-37 (voir dire of prospective juror 357), notwithstanding any “stability” concerns that these circumstances may have given rise to. Moreover, in the training tape McMahon specifically recommends using lack of employment as a pretextual basis for exercising a race-based peremptory strike. See Jury Selection with Jack McMahon, transcript at 70-71. Finally, as discussed, McMahon was unable to explain several peremptory strikes on race-neutral grounds. See Majority Opinion, at 606-07.
Presently, as the majority observes, the record shows that McMahon peremptorily struck 58 percent of blacks whom he had an opportunity to strike, versus only 18 percent of whites whom he had an opportunity to strike. See Majority Opinion, at 605 n. 8 (noting that the PCRA court defined a venireperson whom the prosecutor had an opportunity to strike as one who was not excused or stricken for cause, and not stricken by the defense when it was the defense’s turn to go first). Additionally, of the nineteen peremptory challenges that McMahon exercised, fourteen (73 percent) were against African Americans. Cf. Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 342, 123 S.Ct. at 1042 (observing that, where the prosecutor used ten of his fourteen strikes (71 percent) against African Americans, such a result was not likely due to “happenstance”). It is not a convincing answer to say that African Americans served on Appellant’s jury and that McMahon did not exhaust all his peremptories: in the videotape, he tailors his racially based jury selection theory to advocate allowing some blacks onto the jury where, as here, the defendant and the eyewitnesses are black. McMahon hypothesizes in this respect that, unless there are a few African Americans in the jury room, the white jurors might be inclined to adopt an apathetic attitude toward *648the crime during deliberations. See Jury Selection with Jack McMahon, transcript at 58-59; see also id. at 59 (“I’ve always felt that a jury of like eight whites and four blacks is a great jury, or nine and three, because then you’re not going to get any of that [apathy] in there.”).
In light of all of these circumstances, I would conclude that the PCRA court’s decision to credit McMahon’s explanations was clear error and would, accordingly, find that Appellant carried his burden under either Swain or Batson.
Justice BAER joins this dissenting opinion.

. For example, he states that "in my experience, black women, young black women are very bad,” id. at 57; prosecutors should avoid having “older black women” on the jury when the defendant is a young black male because of a possible “maternal instinct” that would cause leniency, whereas men are more "demanding” and "law and order,” id. at 56; district attorneys should also exclude individuals from an area of Philadelphia near the intersection of 33rd and Diamond Streets, an area known to be predominantly black, see id. at 21; N.T. December 11, 2002 at 65 (reflecting McMahon's knowledge of the racial composition of the neighborhood around 33rd and Diamond); and if a district attorney is "sitting down and you’re going to take blacks, you want older blacks ... particularly men. Older black men are very good.” Jury Selection with Jack McMahon, transcript at 55.

. In the training tape McMahon advocates dealing less than truthfully with the trial court in multiple ways. In addition to inventing pretextual justifications for race-based peremptory strikes, he counsels attorneys to make false excuses to avoid afternoon jury panels, see Jury Selection with Jack McMahon, transcript at 65, and to invent pretextual reasons to leave the courtroom in order to view the racial composition of the remaining venire panel, see id. at 67-68.

. Although Swain referenced a scenario in which all African Americans were excluded from juries, total exclusion is not necessary for a successful Swain challenge; rather, systematic discrimination that substantially reduces the number of African Americans on juries will suffice. See Commonwealth v. Futch, 492 Pa. 359, 367 n. 7, 424 A.2d 1231, 1234 n. 7 (1981); accord Jackson v. Herring, 42 F.3d 1350, 1357 (11th Cir.1995) (emphasizing that Swain "describes an 'extreme' example of illegal conduct, rather than a ‘litmus test.' " (quoting Horton v. Zant, 941 F.2d 1449, 1454 (11th Cir.1991))).

. Perhaps because the McMahon tape had not yet become public, defense counsel did not forward any Batson challenges contemporaneously with the challenged peremptory strikes, but reluctantly raised the issue at the conclusion of jury selection upon Appellant's insistence. The trial court rejected the claim in toto without requesting any race-neutral explanations from McMahon.

. See Jury Selection with Jack McMahon, transcript at 70; Basemore, 560 Pa. at 283, 744 A.2d at 731; cf. Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 255-63, 125 S.Ct. at 2333-38 (disapproving prosecutorial questioning of black potential jurors undertaken in an effort to create a pretextual challenge for cause, where the same questioning techniques were not used relative to white venirepersons).

. The transcript only reveals prospective juror 203 had worked for an employer and no longer worked for that same employer, but that he had not retired.