Court Opinion

ID: 9374278
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 18:03:17.158834+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:46.181110
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/22/23

                   CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                              DIVISION SIX

 THE PEOPLE,                                2d. Crim. No. B322899
                                          (Super. Ct. No. F17902482)
      Plaintiff and Respondent,                (Fresno County)

 v.

 KORI MUHAMMAD,

      Defendant and Appellant.

       Here we hold that allowing a jury to deliberate during the
COVID pandemic is not coercive and does not deprive a
defendant of the due process of law.
       A jury convicted appellant Kori Muhammad of one count of
first degree murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 189),1 three counts of
second degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)), four counts of attempted
murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664), one count of shooting at an
occupied vehicle (§ 246), and one count of being a felon in
possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)). The jury found
true allegations that appellant used a firearm during each of the
crimes (§12022.53, subds. (b), (c), & (d)), committed multiple

        1   All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
murders (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)), and committed three of the four
murders because of race (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(16)). The trial court
sentenced appellant to a total determinate term of 61 years in
prison plus an indeterminate term of 145 years to life.
       Appellant contends the trial court deprived him of due
process by coercing the jury to deliberate during the COVID
pandemic. There was no jury coercion here and we affirm the
judgment.
              FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
       Appellant murdered four people during a 2017 shooting
spree in Fresno. The People charged him with first degree
murders and initially sought death penalty. Defense counsel
conceded appellant committed the crimes but claimed he did so
while suffering from symptoms of paranoid schizophrenia,
including auditory, visual, and olfactory hallucinations. His trial
took place over 31 days in February, March, and April of 2020.2
       Defense experts testified how mental illness skewed
appellant’s perception of his environment and caused him to
fixate on racial tensions. Appellant testified and described how
shooting white people was part of his divine, preordained mission
to establish “a kingdom of infinite peace and progress.”
       Appellant’s trial occurred during the COVID pandemic.
The trial court directed jurors to sit farther apart and to isolate
themselves as much as possible when they returned home each
day after trial. When the defense rested on March 17, the trial
court ordered jurors to return for closing argument on March 19
and assured them it would secure a spacious room for

      2The trial court initially suspended the criminal case
against appellant pursuant to Penal Code section 1368. It found
him competent to stand trial in January 2018.

                                 2
deliberations. Counsel and the trial court agreed to distribute an
anonymous questionnaire gauging jurors’ willingness to proceed
during the perceived health crisis. All of the jurors responded
that they preferred to finish the trial. Statewide court closures,
however, required the trial court to halt deliberations after just
one day.
       Deliberations were suspended for a month. The trial court
communicated with jurors by telephone and email during this
time. When deliberations resumed on April 20, the jury
requested read-backs of testimony from five witnesses and asked
the trial court three questions about the verdict forms. One of
these questions prompted the court to give an additional
instruction, CALCRIM No. 3515, which directed the jury to
consider each count against appellant separately.
       Jurors told the bailiff on April 20 they had reached verdicts
on some counts but could not agree on others. The trial court
directed them, through the bailiff, to send a note stating how
many of the counts remined undecided. An hour later they
reported reaching verdicts on all counts and requested a fresh set
of verdict forms to replace the ones they had “scribbled” on while
deliberating. The trial court took this opportunity to correct
typographical errors in the originals. The jury foreperson filled
out the new verdict forms. The verdicts were announced but the
trial court ordered them back to deliberations when one juror
stated during polling that the verdicts were “not what we
discussed.” A short time later they returned with corrections
noted on three of the attempted murder counts. These
corrections were favorable to appellant. The trial court polled
each juror a second time and confirmed the verdicts.
       Appellant withdrew his plea of not guilty by reason of
insanity. The People withdrew its request for the death penalty.

                                 3
                            DISCUSSION
       Appellant contends the trial court deprived him of due
process by “insisting” the jury continue deliberating during the
initial outbreak of COVID pandemic. He argues 1. the trial court
failed to consider how anxiety may have interfered with jurors’
ability to deliberate and might have justified their release from
duty altogether and 2. then compounded the problem by treating
April 30 as a hard deadline to reach verdicts. Appellant cites
jurors’ struggles with jury instructions and verdict forms as
showing they were operating under “intense pressure” amounting
to coercion. We do not agree.
       The authorities cited by appellant involve Allen charges
(Allen v. United States (1896) 164 U.S. 492 [41 L.Ed 528]) in
which the court instructs a “deadlocked” jury to work toward
unanimity and urges the minority to consider the majority’s
views. (See, e.g., Lowenfield v. Phelps (1987) 484 U.S. 231, 235
[98 L.Ed. 2d 568, 575] [polling of deadlocked jury and charging
them “to consider each other’s views . . . with the objective of
reaching a just verdict” did not coerce jury into subsequent
verdict of death]; Jiminez v. Myers (9th Cir. 1993) 40 F.3d 976,
981 [trial court “crossed the line between neutral inquiry and
coercive instruction” by polling jury three times and impliedly
approving their movement toward unanimity].) The trial court
gave no Allen charge here because the jury did not “deadlock.”
Deliberations stopped because of the COVID pandemic. After
reconvening, jurors reported difficulty reaching verdicts on some
counts but resolved their divisions quickly and without trial court
intervention.
       We are not persuaded the trial court coerced jurors by
holding an immutable deadline over their heads. It assured them
finishing trial “[did not] override your health and well-being and
concerns about your health.” The trial court responded as follows

                                4
when a juror asked whether proceedings would continue past
April 30: “I’m just about to send you back in to order you to pick
up your deliberations right where you left off. Please take your
time, whatever time you feel is necessary. We’re here. We’re
still, believe it or not, within that schedule that we talked to you
about. So, um, we’re doing fine. I don’t want you to feel you need
to rush in any way.”
        Appellant describes the proceedings below as “a shambles”
and having gone “off the rails” because of the pressure placed on
the parties and jury. We are not persuaded by this hyperbole.
There was no “hard deadline” of April 30. And the verdicts were
reached 10 days before that. Appellant’s case required verdicts
on four counts of murder, four counts of attempted murder, two
firearms-related felonies, and special allegations relating to nine
of the ten counts. A few of the jury instructions and verdict forms
contained errors that were quickly corrected. The issues
identified during jury polling were likewise addressed promptly.
These facets of the instant proceedings are not remarkable in a
case of such complexity.
        With considerable and thoughtful regard for the jurors’
well-being during the COVID pandemic, the trial court did the
best job it could. We cannot conceive of any further efforts the
trial court could have undertaken. We commend it for its
handling of this serious proceeding at a serious time.
                             DISPOSITION
        The judgment is affirmed.

                                 5
     CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

                            YEGAN, J.

We concur:

     GILBERT, P. J.

     BALTODANO, J.

                        6
                  Jonathan B. Conklin, Judge
                Superior Court County of Fresno
                ______________________________

      Kyle Gee, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant
Attorney General, Julie A. Hokans, and Jessica C. Leal, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.