Court Opinion

ID: 9540130
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:13:00.432491+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:13:48.060190
License: Public Domain

J-S24041-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :  IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  LANDON WILEY THOMAS                          :
                                               :
                       Appellant               : No. 353 MDA 2023

            Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 9, 2023
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-22-CR-0000135-2014

BEFORE:      BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                 FILED: AUGUST 7, 2023

       Appellant Landon Wiley Thomas files this pro se appeal from the order

of the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County dismissing his fourth petition

pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA).1 We affirm.

       The factual background of this case was summarized in this Court’s

decision denying Appellant’s third PCRA petition:

       The Commonwealth charged [Appellant] with 13 counts of
       Robbery arising out of a spree of hold-ups of gas stations,
       convenience stores and banks during which [Appellant] used his
       pointed finger or a piece of plastic under his sweatshirt to simulate
       a weapon. [The Commonwealth withdrew Counts 12 and 13
       (Robbery—Threat Immediate Serious Injury, (18 Pa.C.S. § 3701
       A1(ii)).]

       On May 11, 2015, [Appellant] entered a negotiated guilty plea to
       9 counts of Robbery—Threat of Immediate Serious Injury, 18
       Pa.C.S. 3701(a)(1)(ii), a felony of the first degree and 2 counts of
____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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     Robbery—Taking Property From Another by Force, 18 Pa.C.S. §
     3701(a)(1)(v), a felony of the third degree. The Court sentenced
     [Appellant pursuant to the negotiated plea agreement to an
     aggregate sentence of 121//2 to 25 years' imprisonment, with a
     consecutive 5–year term of probation.]

                                  ****

     [Appellant] filed no post sentence motion or appeal.

     On August 26, 2015, [Appellant] filed a pro se Motion for Post
     Conviction Collateral Relief in which he asserted that the Court
     imposed a constitutionally infirm sentence, citing, Alleyne v.
     United States,133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013) and Commonwealth v.
     Hopkins, 117 A.3d 247 (2015). [Appellant] further alleged that
     the Court imposed an impermissible sentence under 42 Pa.C.S. §
     9714, Sentence for Second and Subsequent Offenses. On
     September 14, 2015, prior to the appointment of PCRA counsel,
     [Appellant] filed a pro se Amendment to the PCRA Motion.

     On October 22, 2015, the Court appointed Jennifer Tobias, Esq.,
     as PCRA Counsel. Appointed Counsel filed a Motion to Withdraw
     on November 20, 2015. On March 25, 2016, [Appellant] filed
     Defendant's Addendum to Counsel's No Merit Letter.

     On March 30, 2016, the Court ordered the Commonwealth to file
     a Response and Memorandum in Support Thereof to [Appellant's]
     claims as to the asserted applicability of Alleyne v. United
     States,133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013) and Commonwealth v. Hopkins,
     117 A.3d 247 (2015).

     Thereafter, [Appellant] filed a series of pro se pleadings each of
     which opposed Appointed Counsel's Motion to Withdraw and
     sought to raise new claims.

                                  ****

     On December 23, 2016, [the] Court ordered that [Appellant] shall
     file no further pleadings pending disposition of the filings of
     record.

Commonwealth v. Thomas, 624 MDA 2021 (Pa.Super. October 29, 2021)

(unpublished memorandum) (quoting PCRA court opinion, 6/15/17, at 1-5).

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       On June 15, 2015, the PCRA court issued notice of its intent to dismiss

Appellant's first PCRA petition without a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907.

On July 13, 2017, the PCRA dismissed the petition. On May 2, 2018, this Court

affirmed the dismissal of Appellant’s petition and on January 2, 2019, our

Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal.

       On July 28, 2020, Appellant filed a second PCRA petition, which the

PCRA court dismissed on October 30, 2020. Appellant did not appeal this

dismissal.2 On January 13, 2021, Appellant filed his third PCRA petition. The

PCRA court issued a Rule 907 notice on April 19, 2021 and dismissed the

petition on May 12, 2021. Thereafter, on October 29, 2021, this Court affirmed

the dismissal of Appellant’s third PCRA petition as untimely filed.

       On December 23, 2022, Appellant filed his fourth PCRA petition which is

the subject of this appeal. On January 23, 2023, the PCRA court issued an

opinion and order providing Rule 907 notice, indicating that Appellant’s

petition was facially untimely and failed to state an exception to the PCRA’s

timeliness requirements. The PCRA court also noted that all of Appellant’s

claims were waived and fully litigated.

       On February 6, 2023, Appellant filed objections to the PCRA court’s Rule

907 notice. On February 9, 2023, the PCRA court issued final notice of the

dismissal of the instant petition. This timely appeal followed. Appellant

____________________________________________

2 Appellant also filed petitions for federal habeas corpus relief, which were
ultimately denied.

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complied with the PCRA court’s direction to file a concise statement of matters

complained of on appeal.

      As an initial matter, we must determine whether the instant petition was

timely filed. We acknowledge that “the PCRA's timeliness requirements are

jurisdictional in nature and must be strictly construed; courts may not address

the merits of the issues raised in a petition if it is not timely filed.”

Commonwealth v. Walters, 135 A.3d 589, 591 (Pa.Super. 2016) (citations

omitted).

      Generally, a PCRA petition “including a second or subsequent petition,

shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment of sentence becomes

final.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment of sentence becomes final at

the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking the

review. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3).

      However, Pennsylvania courts may consider an untimely PCRA petition

if the petitioner explicitly pleads and proves one of the three exceptions

enumerated in Section 9545(b)(1), which include: (1) the petitioner's inability

to raise a claim as a result of governmental interference; (2) the discovery of

previously unknown facts or evidence that would have supported a claim; or

(3) a newly-recognized constitutional right that has been held to apply

retroactively by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court

of Pennsylvania. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).

                                     -4-
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      In this case, Appellant was sentenced on May 11, 2015. As Appellant

did not file a direct appeal, the judgment of sentence became final on June

10, 2015, after the expiration of the time period to file an appeal to this Court.

See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). Thus, Appellant had to file a PCRA petition by June 10,

2016. As Appellant did not file this petition until December 23, 2022, over

seven years after his judgment of sentence became final, the instant petition

is facially untimely.

      In this petition (Appellant’s fourth PCRA filing), Appellant claims PCRA

counsel was ineffective in failing to argue that Appellant was forced to proceed

with his plea counsel in violation of Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806

(1975) after Appellant unequivocally indicated at his February 5, 2015 plea

hearing that he wished to represent himself.

      Nevertheless, Appellant claims that his fourth petition should be deemed

to be timely pursuant to Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381 (Pa.

2021), in which our Supreme Court held that “a PCRA petitioner may, after a

PCRA court denies relief, and after obtaining new counsel or acting pro se,

raise claims of PCRA counsel's ineffectiveness at the first opportunity to do so,

even if on appeal.” Id. at 401.

      However, this Court has also found that the Bradley decision does not

provide an exception to the PCRA time bar, specifically noting that “[n]othing

in Bradley creates a right to file a [serial] PCRA petition outside the PCRA's

one-year time limit as a method of raising ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel or

                                      -5-
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permits recognition of such a right.” Commonwealth v. Stahl, 292 A.3d

1130, 1136 (Pa.Super. 2023).

      As Appellant has not pled or proven that any of the statutory exceptions

to the PCRA time bar applies to the claims raised in this petition, the PCRA

court correctly determined that this petition was untimely.    Therefore, we

affirm the dismissal of Appellant’s fourth PCRA petition.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 8/7/2023

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