Court Opinion

ID: 9901431
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-21 19:04:58.37787+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:32.650320
License: Public Domain

FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE                                                       NEWS RELEASE #046

FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

The Opinions handed down on the 20th day of October, 2023 are as follows:

PER CURIAM:

 2022-CK-01654            STATE OF LOUISIANA IN THE INTEREST OF D.W. (Parish of St.
                          Tammany)

                          REVERSED AND REINSTATED. SEE PER CURIAM.

                          Genovese, J., dissents for the reasons assigned by the court of appeal.
                          Griffin, J., dissents for the reasons assigned by the court of appeal.
                        SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

                                   No. 2022-CK-01654

             STATE OF LOUISIANA IN THE INTEREST OF D.W.

On Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Parish of St. Tammany

PER CURIAM:

       We granted the State’s application to review the court of appeal’s

determination that the State failed to prove that 16-year-old D.W. was the person

who entered a sheriff’s vehicle and stole firearms from inside it, and therefore that

the evidence was insufficient to support the delinquency adjudication for burglary

involving a firearm, La. R.S. 14:62, and theft of a firearm, La. R.S. 14:67.15. After

reviewing the record, we find the State presented sufficient evidence that D.W. was

a principal, in accordance with La. R.S. 14:24, to these felony-grade delinquent acts

regardless of whether he personally entered the vehicle and took the firearms that

were inside it himself. Therefore, we reverse the ruling of the court of appeal and we

reinstate the delinquency adjudication and dispositions imposed by the juvenile

court, which are hereby affirmed.

       In the early morning on April 23, 2021, a marked St. Tammany Parish

Sheriff’s Office vehicle that was parked by a deputy at 617 Bellingrath Lane in

Slidell was burglarized. Several items were taken from the unit, including a police

radio and tourniquet, handcuffs, a pistol, a patrol rifle, extra magazines for the pistol

and rifle, an outer tactical vest, and a bullet proof vest. Police found a tourniquet and

the police radio in a wooded lot adjacent to D.W.’s residence. In a search of D.W.’s

residence pursuant to a warrant, police found the tactical vest.1 In a search of D.W.’s

1
  The radio and vest had serial numbers, which allowed them to be identified as the ones taken
from the deputy’s vehicle.
phone pursuant to a warrant, police found photographs of various firearms and

ammunition,2 including a photograph of a weapon with distinctive characteristics

that the deputy was able to identify as the rifle stolen from his vehicle.

         The juvenile court adjudicated D.W. delinquent and imposed dispositions of

30 months in the custody of the Office of Juvenile Justice on each count. The court

of appeal reversed the delinquency adjudication and vacated the dispositions. State

in the Interest of D.W., 2022-0188 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/23/22), 353 So.3d 786. On

appeal, D.W. contended that the State offered no direct evidence that he had entered

the deputy’s vehicle and taken anything from it, and the court of appeal agreed:

         While the evidence overwhelmingly showed that D.W. was in
         possession of some of the stolen items at issue in this case, the record
         is devoid of any evidence that D.W. was even at the scene of the crime
         to commit the unauthorized entry of [the deputy’s] unit or to otherwise
         show that D.W. took or misappropriated items from the unit. Thus, the
         hypotheses of innocence, specifically, that D.W. was not at the scene
         of the unauthorized entry, that D.W. did not enter the unit, and that
         D.W. did not take anything from the unit, were not rebutted by any
         evidence presented at the hearing.

Id., 2022-0188, p. 14, 353 So.3d at 795–96. The court of appeal also found that the

State’s case failed to rebut the reasonable hypothesis that someone else simply gave

the stolen items to D.W., as D.W.’s younger brother had testified.

         While the court of appeal is correct with regard to the direct evidence,

appellate review does not necessarily stop there. The State’s burden of proof in a

juvenile delinquency proceeding is the same as in a criminal proceeding against an

adult—to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the offense alleged in

the petition. See La. Ch.C. art. 883; see also State in the Interest of Batiste, 367 So.2d

784, 788 (La. 1979).3 As the court of appeal found, the evidence that D.W. had

2
    Some of the ammunition was in boxes that were stamped as for law enforcement use only.
3
  Appellate courts have observed that a child adjudicated a delinquent in Louisiana is entitled to a
broader scope and standard of review than the minimum required by the Due Process clause, and
therefore review of a delinquency adjudication is subject not only to the “rational fact-finder”
standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), but also the
                                                 2
possessed the stolen items was overwhelming. Furthermore, a person found in

possession of stolen property close in place and time to a burglary constitutes

circumstantial evidence that, while not creating a presumption,4 can be sufficient to

prove guilt of burglary. 5

       When circumstantial evidence forms the basis of the conviction, the evidence,

“assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to prove, in order to

convict, [the circumstantial evidence] must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of

innocence.” La. R.S. 15:438; State v. Toups, 2001-1875, p. 3 (La. 10/15/02), 833

So.2d 910, 912 (La. R.S. 15:438 does not establish a stricter standard of review than

the more general rational juror’s reasonable doubt formula; rather it serves as a

helpful evidentiary guide for jurors). Here, the State’s evidence included the fact that

the tactical vest stolen from the deputy’s vehicle was found in the attic in D.W.’s

residence, which attic was accessible from D.W.’s bedroom. However, the vest was

“clearly wrong/manifest error” standard applied in civil proceedings. See State in the Interest of
C.D., 2011-1701, pp. 5–6 (La. 7/2/12), 93 So.3d 1272, 1275–76.
4
  In State v. Searle, 339 So.2d 1194, 1202 (La. 1976) (on reh’g), this Court found it clear that “the
due process requirement of the federal constitution obliges the prosecution to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged[,] . . . and that, accordingly,
a state may not shift the burden of ultimate persuasion of an essential element of the crime charged
to the defendant in a criminal case.” Thus, the court in Searle found that it would violate due
process if La. R.S. 15:432, which established a legal presumption that “the person in the
unexplained possession of property recently stolen is the thief,” is applied to convict a defendant
“upon the basis of a presumed fact which could not beyond a reasonable doubt be inferred from
proven facts.” Searle, 339 So.2d at 1205. However, possession of recently stolen property may
give rise to a rational inference—but not a presumption—that a defendant committed the burglary
in which the items were taken. See State v. Johnson, 406 So.2d 153, 155–56 (La. 1981).
5
  See, e.g., Williams v. Cain, 408 F.App’x. 817, 821 (5th Cir. 2011) (evidence was sufficient to
support conviction for burglary where defendant was found in possession of stolen goods within
hours of and a few hundred yards away from burglary); State v. Thompson, 46,473 (La. App. 2
Cir. 9/21/11), 72 So.3d 978, 981, writ denied, 2011-2159 (La. 3/23/12) (evidence was sufficient to
support conviction for burglary where defendant found in possession of stolen goods within 24
hours of burglary in area close to burglary); State v. Williams, 96-1276 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/9/97),
693 So.2d 204, writ denied, 97-1212 (La. 10/31/97), 703 So.2d 18 (evidence was sufficient to
support conviction for burglary where defendant was found in possession of stolen goods within
minutes of and three blocks away from burglary); State v. Causey, 533 So.2d 1050 (La. App. 4
Cir. 1988) (evidence was sufficient to support conviction for burglary where defendant was found
in possession of stolen goods within minutes of and 15 feet away from burglary); State v. Johnson,
530 So.2d 641, 643 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1988), writ denied, 538 So.2d 608 (La. 1989) (evidence was
sufficient to support conviction for burglary where defendant was found in possession of stolen
goods within three to five minutes of burglary and was in vehicle that met description of burglars’
vehicle).
                                                 3
found in a search conducted about three weeks after it was stolen. 6 The police also

obtained screenshots from D.W.’s phone of several photographs, including of the

rifle stolen from the deputy’s vehicle. However, the State did not present evidence

of any technical analysis of this data that might show when and where the

photographs were taken.

       The State’s evidence also included texts found on D.W.’s phone, some of

which included photographs of weapons (including the stolen rifle). The texts

include a message in which D.W. indicated that he wanted to trade the rifle now that

his brother had removed the scope from it earlier. It was sent by D.W. approximately

12 hours after the burglary. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the

State, it shows D.W. possessed the stolen rifle approximately 12 hours after the

burglary (and likely earlier when the scope was removed). However, we need not

decide if D.W.’s possession of at least one firearm stolen from the vehicle within 12

hours of the burglary was sufficiently close in time to support (in conjunction with

the remainder of the evidence) a reasonable inference that D.W. was the burglar

because the State also presented evidence from which it could reasonably be inferred

that D.W. was a principal to crimes.

       “Simple burglary is the unauthorized entering of any dwelling, vehicle,

watercraft, or other structure, movable or immovable, or any cemetery, with the

intent to commit a felony or any theft therein, other than as set forth in R.S. 14:60.”

La. R.S. 14:62(A). “Theft of a firearm is the misappropriation or taking of a firearm

which belongs to another, either without the consent of the other to the

misappropriation or taking or by means of fraudulent conduct, practices, or

representations.” La. R.S. 14:67.15(A). “All persons concerned in the commission

of a crime, whether present or absent, and whether they directly commit the act

6
  The same is true of the items found outside D.W.’s residence in the wooded lot. While the wooded
lot contains a path connecting D.W.’s neighborhood to that in which the deputy’s vehicle was
parked, the items were not found there until three weeks after the burglary.
                                                4
constituting the offense, aid and abet in its commission, or directly or indirectly

counsel or procure another to commit the crime, are principals.” La. R.S. 14:24

(emphasis added).

        Even if we agree with the court of appeal that the State’s evidence failed to

rebut the reasonable hypothesis that someone else burglarized the vehicle and gave

the stolen items to D.W., 7 there is other evidence that can transform this from a

theory of innocence to one of guilt as a principal. Text messages were exchanged

between D.W. and another person between 12:58 and 4:24 a.m. during the likely

timeframe of the burglary. Those messages reflect D.W.’s awareness that this other

person was out looking for a target. They also reflect that D.W. directed this other

person to bring him whatever he was able to obtain. Taken as a whole, the State’s

evidence is sufficient to permit a reasonable inference that D.W., at the least, was a

principal in the commission of the delinquent acts, and, thus, even if he did not

himself burglarize the vehicle, he provided some direction to the person who did and

then received the stolen proceeds from that person and disposed of them. Under

Louisiana law neither direct commission of the crime nor presence at the scene of

the crime is necessary for conviction as a principal. See generally Whitemore v.

Maggio, 742 F.2d 230, 232 (5th Cir. 1984).

        While the court of appeal here included La. R.S. 14:24 in its recitation of the

law, it did not apply it to the evidence in the record. That evidence, when viewed

through the due process lens of Jackson v. Virginia, supports the delinquency

adjudications here. Accordingly, we reverse the ruling of the court of appeal and we

reinstate the delinquency adjudication and dispositions imposed by the juvenile

court, which are hereby affirmed.

REVERSED AND REINSTATED

7 However, the trial court specifically rejected the testimony of D.W.’s brother in this regard as not

credible.
                                                  5
                    SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

                              No. 2022-CK-01654

           STATE OF LOUISIANA IN THE INTEREST OF D.W.

On Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, Parish of St. Tammany

GRIFFIN, J., dissents and would affirm for the reasons given by the court of
appeal.