Court Opinion

ID: 9713895
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:25:19.501608+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:21.361713
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
Lewis, C. J.
I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion of this Court on the Petition for Rehearing. The order book of the respondent court directed the appraisers to file their report on the 27th of November at 1:00 P.M. The appraisal was duly submitted in open court on November 22, 1967. There is no question that the appraisal was accepted and duly filed by the court on the same day. It is also clear that both parties were required by statute to file any exceptions to the report within 10 days of the filing. The state here filed on December 4, 1967, within ten (10) days of the date set by the court for the filing. However, the Court today holds that the 10-day limitation is to be computed from the actual date of filing rather than from the date ordered for filing by the court.
It is recognized that Burns’ Indiana Statutes, Anno., (1968 Repl.), § 3-1707 (a) was not complied with by the court in this case and that petitioner did not object to this non-compliance. However, the rationale of that statute is very much in point on this procedural matter. The statute says:
. . And the court or judge in vacation shall on the return day fixed at the time of the filing of the complaint appoint appraisers as provided by law and fix a day certain within 10 days thereof for said appraisers to appear qualify and file their report of appraisal.” (emphasis supplied)
It is too obvious for recitation to state the merits of “certainty” in matters where time limits may, and do as here, shape substantive rights. The legislature called for a day *684certain from which the parties to the litigation may ascertain in advance and with certainty the tolling of the 10-day limit. Without advance notice and clarity, only constant and wasteful surveilance at the court house steps would assure parties and counsel that their filing of exceptions will fall within the 10-day limitation.
It is not disputed that the court speaks by its order book. Cook v. State (1941), 219 Ind. 234, 37 N. E. 2d 63; O’Malia v. State (1934), 207 Ind. 308, 192 N. E. 435. The order book here called for the filing of the appraiser’s report on November 27, 1967, at 1:00 P.M. While the order should have read “on or before” November 27, 1967, correction could have easily been made by petition to amend. The report was tendered five (5) days before that date set by the order book, which as a result of the decision today, moved up by five (5) days the deadline for filing exceptions to the report. As a consequence, a trap for the unwary, rather than certainty designed to expedite trial matters and as designated in Burns’ §3-1707(a), has been created.
In light of the mass litigation flooding our courts today, and the progressive revisions in both federal and state procedural rules, procedural devices which may shackle substantive rights are not to be desired. Reasonableness in this area of the law calls for certainty and predictability wherever it is possible. In this matter, with a court order clearly calling for the appraisal to be filed on November 27, 1967, I believe the better solution is to compute the 10-day time limitation from that date which stands as official public notice as called for in Burns’ § 3-1707(a).
I would grant rehearing and vacate the memorandum previously rendered on the petition, and enter an order dissolving the alternative writ issued by this Court on February 5, 1968.
Jackson, J., concurs in this dissenting opinion. Mote, J., not participating.
Note. — Reported in 238 N. E. 2d 446.