Court Opinion

ID: 9773357
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:42:59.81072+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:52.756553
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION ON STATE’S SECOND MOTION FOR REHEARING
DOUGLAS, Judge.
The majority overrules the State’s motion for rehearing without written opinion. The indictment alleges, in substance, that appellant did “then and there knowingly and intentionally engage in the sexual contact of _, a child younger than seventeen years of age, not being the spouse of the defendant, by touching the genitals of the said_”
This alleges an offense under V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 21.11(a)(1), which provides:
“(a) A person commits an offense if, with a child younger than 17 years and not his spouse, whether the child is of the same or opposite sex, he:
(1) engages in sexual contact with the child; ...”
The definition of “sexual contact”, that it should be done with intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, is merely a definition. The allegation that he intentionally and knowingly engaged in sexual contact with a child under seventeen years by touching the genitals connotes that it was done with the intent to gratify sexual desire. It rules out an accidental touching. It should not be required by this Court that the obvious be alleged.
The requirement that with intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person is necessary after alleging that one knowingly engaged in sexual contact with a child under seventeen years of age is requiring, in effect, to inform him of something that he is already aware of as alleged in the indictment.
There is no showing that appellant was any way misled or did not know what he was charged with.
Article 21.17, V.A.C.C.P., provides:
“Words used in a statute to define an offense need not be strictly pursued in the indictment; it is sufficient to use other words conveying the same meaning, or which include the sense of the statutory words.”
Article 21.12, V.A.C.C.P., provides:
“When a statute defining any offense uses special or particular terms, indictment on it may use the general term which, in common language, embraces the special term. To charge an unlawful sale, it is necessary to name the purchaser.”
See Baldwin v. State, 538 S.W.2d 109 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), and the authorities there cited. In Reynolds v. State, 547 S.W.2d 590 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), and in Ex parte Cannon, 546 S.W.2d 266 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), the majority and this writer disagree on what has to be alleged in indictments. It would serve no useful purpose to repeat the arguments. See also Jones v. State, 545 *6S.W.2d 771 (Tex.Cr.App.1975, motion for rehearing, January 26, 1977), including the concurring and dissenting opinions.
The State’s motion for rehearing should be granted and the judgment should be affirmed.