Court Opinion

ID: 9786978
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:07:06.962618+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:50.700678
License: Public Domain

WILKINS, Associate Chief Justice,
dissenting:
1 19 I respectfully dissent.
120 This case is factually different in a major way from Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 121 S.Ct. 946 (2001). In McArthur, the Supreme Court addressed a cireumstance where the defendant and the "evidence" were physically separated, and remained so (through police action) for the two hours necessary for police to obtain a warrant to enter and search the residence. In this matter, however, Ms. Duran and her companions were in a small trailer with the "evidence" and the police were on the outside. There was no way for the police to separate the defendant and her companions from the illegal drugs for the time necessary to obtain a warrant without first alerting them to the presence of the police. Alerting the defendant to the presence of the police would certainly have increased the risk of destruction of the evidence, as well as increasing the danger of a violent confrontation.
121 Additionally, the officers had no way of knowing that the defendant and her companions were unaware of the presence of law enforcement prior to the time of entry, nor that they would have remained unaware during the time necessary to secure a warrant. We also know nothing of the time actually necessary to obtain a warrant. The fact that officers did not seek a warrant does not answer questions regarding how long it would have taken under these cireumstances, or whether or not the presence of law en-foreement would have been observed or discovered by the occupants of the trailer during that period.
122 We do know that when officers arrived they were reliably informed that there was illegal drug use going on in the trailer, there were guns in the trailer, and that in addition to Ms. Duran there were other adults in the trailer. We also know that the officers were informed that the tenant to whom the trailer had been rented was not then present, but that he owned the guns, was known to be violent, and could return at any time.
123 Under these cireumstances the officers did not seek a warrant. Much of the discussion focuses on the reasons given after the fact for why the officers sought no warrant in this instance. I fail to see the relevance of the reasons given. What should matter in our review is the sum total of objectively observable facts presented to the officers at the time and upon which they could act.
124 In addition to the initial report from the on-the-scene witnesses, the officers testified that they smelled the unmistakable odor of burning marijuana. The officers testified that they believed the defendant and her colleagues were "smokin' up the evidence" since they smelled marijuana smoke and saw smoke "leakin' out of the cracks of the trailer." What quantity of marijuana was in the process of being burned, by whom, and with what end in mind, was unknown to the officers. Without being able to observe the burning first hand, they had only the odor, the smoke, and the report made by the informant. The officers had no other data upon which to rely in making their decision about whether or not to delay their enforcement action while a warrant was obtained.
"I 25 Supposition does not replace fact. We simply do not know now, nor did the officers at the time know, what Ms. Duran and her colleagues were doing, thinking, or most concerned with, when the police made their decision to enter. Moreover, regardless of explanations given later by the officers, if the facts at the time justified warrantless entry, the trial court was correct in denying the motion to suppress evidence found in the trailer when police did finally enter. If not, it was not.
126 On certiorari we have agreed to address the limited question of whether or not the detectable odor of burning marijuana alone is enough to justify an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. My colleagues say that it is not, as *801did the court of appeals. I say that it may be, and that in this particular case it is.
T27 As we said in State v. Ashe, warrant-less entries may be sustained "where the cireumstances indicated that evidence might be destroyed or removed if entry was delayed until a warrant could be obtained." 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987) (emphasis added). The cireumstances must be viewed from the perspective of law enforcement officers at the time the decision to seek or not seek a warrant is made, not in the clear reflected light of appellate review after the fact.
{28 What matters in our review is the factual circumstances of the entry. In a case where illegal drugs are being burned out of sight but not out of smell, and where the quantity of drugs is unknown to the officers, a presumption that the drugs are being destroyed rather than merely consumed is not unreasonable. Adding knowledge of firearms on the premises, a violent tenant whose whereabouts and time of return are unknown, and multiple parties engaged in the illegal activity, I would uphold the law enforcement decision to proceed without a warrant. In addition, we must consider the passage of time already noted between the observation of the activity by the informant and the arrival of the officers, and the additional time required to secure the warrant. With the drugs, the guns, and the defendants inside, and the officers outside, passing time increases the likelihood that the officers will be discovered, the absent tenant may return, or the drugs may be disposed of by means other than mere recreational use.
129 Any close call must go to securing a warrant. The Fourth Amendment requires no less. However, this was not a close call. Given facts like those presented to the officers in this case, and where, as here, probable cause to secure the warrant is unquestionably present, I believe the Fourth Amendment permits the entry without a warrant. I do not find such police action to be unreasonable. To the contrary, I find it reasonable, and consequently not proscribed by the Fourth Amendment's ban on unreasonable searches. Protecting the rights of citizens does not necessarily require the handeuffing of police. I would allow law enforcement agents to consider the cireum-stances and act as objective reasonableness dictates.
30 I would reverse the court of appeals, affirm the trial court, and answer the question presented on certiorari with "perhaps."