Court Opinion

ID: 9704134
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:23:58.251737+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:57.637786
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
BELL, C.J.,
which RAKER, J. joins.
I disagree with the majority’s holding that (1) the “plain language of § 643B(c)[1] does not require intervening terms of *562confinement between the predicate convictions.” McGlone v. State, 406 Md. 545, 558, 959 A.2d 1191, 1198 (2008), and that (2) there is no requirement under the statute that, for the purposes of sentence enhancement, the predicate convictions must be imposed sequentially. 406 Md. at 559-61, 959 A.2d at 1199-1200. As this Court noted in Jones v. State, 336 Md. 255, 264, 647 A.2d 1204, 1208 (1994):
“the penological objectives of statutes such as § 643B(c) which mandate the extended incarceration of recidivist criminals [are] to provide warning to those persons who have previously been convicted of criminal offenses that the commission of future offenses will be more harshly punished, and to impose the extended period of incarceration upon those who fail to heed that warning so as to protect society from violent recidivist offenders.”
See also, Gargliano v. State, 334 Md. 428, 442-45, 639 A.2d 675, 682-83 (1994); Jones v. State, 324 Md. 32, 38, 595 A.2d 463, 466 (1991); Minor v. State, 313 Md. 573, 576, 546 A.2d 1028, 1029 (1988); Hawkins v. State, 302 Md. 143, 148, 486 A.2d 179, 182 (1985); Garrett v. State, 59 Md.App. 97, 118, 474 A.2d 931, 941, cert. denied, 300 Md. 483, 479 A.2d 372 (1984).
By interpreting § 643B(c) as requiring only that the defendant have served a term of confinement without regard to when, in relation to the other predicate conviction, the conviction as to which the confinement was imposed occurred, the majority disregards those objectives. And those purposes will not be, and, indeed, can not be, served unless the term of *563confinement was imposed as a result of a conviction that occurred after the offender had been given the opportunity to “heed” the warning the prior conviction represented and reform him or herself before the imposition of the mandatory minimum sentences the statute prescribes. In other words, for the sentence enhancement prescribed by § 643B(c) to be triggered, there must be not only separate convictions, but also sequentiality of those convictions and the one required term of confinement. Without these requirements, the rehabilitative purpose of the statute is in no way served.
L
In the case sub judice, McGlone was indicted for an armed robbery that occurred in May 1977 in New Jersey (offense # 1). While awaiting trial for offense # 1, McGlone was arrested in Prince George’s County and charged with committing a robbery that occurred in January 1978 (offense # 2). McGlone was convicted of offense #2 in June 1980 and sentenced to ten years incarceration. While serving his sentence for offense # 2, McGlone pled guilty to offense # 1, was convicted of that offense, and was sentenced to a ten year sentence, to be served concurrently with his sentence for offense # 2. Subsequently, in 1989, McGlone was sentenced in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County to twenty-five years incarceration without the possibility of parole, pursuant to § 643B (c) for use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence. The two robbery convictions, both occurring in the same year, but in a sequence different from that in which they were committed, are the predicate convictions that are the subject of the appeal before this Court.
When McGlone was sentenced in 1989, Article 27, § 643B(c) provided:2
*564“Third conviction of crime of violence. — Any person who (1) has been convicted on two separate occasions of a crime of violence[3] where the convictions do not arise from a single incident, and (2) has served at least one term of confinement in a correctional institution as a result of a conviction of a crime of violence, shall be sentenced, on being convicted a third time of a crime of violence, to imprisonment for the term allowed by law, but, in any event, not less than 25 years. Neither the sentence nor any part of it may be suspended, and the person shall not be eligible for parole except in accordance with the provisions of Article 31B, §§ 11. A separate occasion shall be considered one in which the second or succeeding offense is committed after there has been a charging document filed for the preceding occasion.”
McGlone argues that § 643B(c) should be interpreted to require that each predicate conviction be separated by intervening terms of confinement. He also argues that, since his convictions were not sequential, i.e. he committed offense number one, committed offense number two, was convicted for offense number two, and then convicted for offense number one, he, therefore, was improperly sentenced under § 643B(c). To test these premises, we must determine the meaning of *565§ 643B(c), which implicates the “cannons of statutory interpretation.” Chow v. State, 393 Md. 431, 443, 903 A.2d 388, 394 (2006).
The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the legislative intention. Id.; Kushell v. Dep’t of Natural Res., 385 Md. 563, 576, 870 A.2d 186, 193 (2005). See also Collins v. State, 383 Md. 684, 688, 861 A.2d 727, 730 (2004). “Statutory construction begins with the plain language of the statute ..Chow, 393 Md. at 443, 903 A.2d at 395 (citation omitted), and may, indeed, end there.
The plain language of the statute is not interpreted in isolation, however. Kushell, 385 Md. at 577, 870 A.2d at 193. Rather, the statutory scheme of which it is a part must be analyzed, “as a whole and [the Court must] attempt to harmonize provisions dealing with the same subject so that each may be given effect.” Id.; Deville v. State, 383 Md. 217, 223, 858 A.2d 484, 487 (2004); Navarro-Monzo v. Washington Adventist, 380 Md. 195, 204, 844 A.2d 406, 411 (2004).
If an examination of the plain language of the statute reveals that it is clear and unambiguous, the court, “will give effect to the statute as it is written.” Jones, supra, 336 Md. at 261, 647 A.2d at 1207 (citations omitted); Kushell, 385 Md. at 577, 870 A.2d at 193. In that event, the “inquiry as to [the] legislative intent ends; we do not need to resort to the various and sometimes inconsistent, external rules of construction, for ‘the Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said and said what it meant.’ ” Chow, 393 Md. at 444, 903 A.2d at 395 (quoting Arundel Corp. v. Marie, 383 Md. 489, 502, 860 A.2d 886, 894 (2004)) (citations omitted). On the other hand, “ ‘[w]here a statute is plainly susceptible of more than one meaning and thus contains an ambiguity, courts consider not only the literal or usual meaning of the words, but their meaning and effect in light of the setting, the objectives and purpose of that enactment.’ ” Fraternal Order of Police v. Mehrling, 343 Md. 155, 174, 680 A.2d 1052, 1062 (1996) (quoting Tucker v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md. 69, 75, 517 A.2d 730, 732 (1986)).
*566In determining whether, or not, § 643B (c) is ambiguous, that section must not be viewed in isolation. It is necessary, rather, to consider the entire habitual offender statute. That means that § 643B(b), the so-called ■ “four-time loser” provision, and § 643B(c), the so-called “three-time loser” provision, must be construed together and analyzed in relation to one another.
When McGlone was sentenced in 1989, Article 27 § 643B(b) provided, in pertinent part:
“Mandatory life sentence — Any person who has served three separate terms of confinement in a correctional institution as a result of three separate convictions of any crime of violence shall be sentenced, on being convicted a fourth time of a crime of violence, to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.”
This Court, in Montone v. State, 308 Md. 599, 521 A.2d 720 (1987), considered and construed § 643B(b). In Montone, this Court held that the “three separate convictions of any crime of violence” requirement contemplated and required sequentiality of the predicate convictions4. We explained:
*567“Section 643B(b) is unlike any other habitual offender statute in the country. The Maryland statute requires more than merely ‘previous’ convictions; it requires separate convictions. Moreover, the statute’s scope is narrowed by the fact that it requires not only that an individual shall have received separate convictions, but that he shall have been sentenced to, and shall have actually served, three separate terms of confinement under the jurisdiction of the correctional system. Thus, the picture that emerges is one of a statute specifically designed to identify and target a unique class of people so that they may be permanently exiled from our free society. These are the violent criminals who have been exposed to the correctional system three distinct times, who have refused to conform their conduct to societal standards, and who, instead, have demonstrated violent criminal behavior after each encounter with the correctional system, thus evidencing the futility of any hope for their rehabilitation.”
Id. at 606, 521 A.2d at 723. We further elucidated:
“Two convictions must be separated by an intervening term of confinement before they may each serve as a predicate *568conviction for purposes of § 643B(b). This is so for two reasons. First, we would be thwarting the purpose of § 643B(b) if we allowed two convictions to count as two predicate convictions notwithstanding the fact that the individual was deprived of an intervening exposure to the correctional system. The purpose of § 643 B(b) is to identify individuals incapable of rehabilitation and lock them up forever. The statute identifies these individuals by requiring that they have served ‘three separate terms’ within the correctional system, followed by three separate opportunities to prove that they have reformed. When an individual receives two convictions without any intervening term of confinement, he has had no opportunity to reform between his first and second convictions. Thus, the second conviction says nothing about that individual’s capacity for rehabilitation. Accordingly, this second conviction cannot serve as a predicate conviction under § 643B(b).”
Id. at 613, 521 A.2d at 727.
Unlike section 643B(b), the plain language of which requires separate terms of confinement for each predicate conviction, § 643B(c), on the other hand, is silent on that point. McGlone argues nevertheless that, as held in Montone with regard to § 643B (b), it should be construed to require a separate and sequential term of confinement. He relies on Minor v. State, 313 Md. 573, 546 A.2d 1028 (1988). In Minor, this Court acknowledged that its analysis of § 643B(b) in Montone was equally applicable to § 643B(c), stating:
“We discussed the unique qualities of the Maryland habitual offender statute in Montone v. State, 308 Md. 599, 521 A.2d 720 (1987). Although in that case we were commenting on the operation of § 643B (b), our remarks are equally applicable to § 643B(c). We said:
‘The Maryland statute requires more than merely ‘previous’ convictions; it requires separate convictions. Moreover, the statute’s scope is narrowed by the fact that it requires not only that an individual shall have received separate convictions, but that he shall have been sentenced to, and shall have actually served, [a term] of *569confinement under the jurisdiction of the correctional system.’
Id. at 606, 521 A.2d at 723 (Emphasis supplied).
“Section 643B(c) is designed to allow the prosecutor to seek an enhanced punishment against individuals who have demonstrated violent propensities on three distinct occasions. The penological objectives behind the extended incarceration of these individuals are to protect our citizens from violent crime and to expose these criminals to a prolonged rehabilitative process. See Hawkins v. State, 302 Md. 143, 148, 486 A.2d 179, 182 (1985).”
Minor, 313 Md. at 576, 546 A.2d at 1029.
McGlone argues, and I agree, that § 643B(b) and § 643B(c), should be construed together, the result of which, for internal consistency of the statutory scheme, would be that separate terms of confinement for each predicate conviction or, at the least, that the separate term of confinement follow a conviction that provides the offender with the opportunity for rehabilitation, is a requirement of § 643B(c).
The State argues that McGlone was sentenced properly pursuant to § 643B(c). In support of that argument, it relies on the clarity of the provision. Characterizing the language of the statute as plain and unambiguous, it notes that McGlone served a term of confinement and that his two prior convictions were separately incurred.
To be sure, § 643B(c) does provide that, “[a]ny person who (1) has been convicted on two separate occasions of a crime of violence where the convictions do not arise from a single incident, and (2) has served at least one term of confinement in a correctional institution as a result of a conviction of a crime of violence,” is eligible for the mandatory minimum sentence of 25 years without suspension or parole, but the statute does not address the scenario where the predicate convictions are served concurrently, as in the case sub judice. Thus, § 643B(c), viewed by itself, clearly and unambiguously prescribes the number, and timing, of predicate convictions, as well as the requirement that a term of confinement be served *570as a prerequisite to triggering the imposition of the mandatory minimum sentence. So viewed, however, the statute does not define, clearly or otherwise, the interplay, if any, there is between the predicate convictions and the mandated term of confinement. Although it is clear from an isolated reading of § 643B(c), that the predicate convictions must be separate, § 643B(c) does not address whether those convictions also must be sequential. But, as we have seen, § 643B(c) does not exist in isolation; rather, it is a part of a statutory scheme that addresses the habitual offender. Accordingly, it must be interpreted in that context. So doing, given the purpose of the habitual offender statutory scheme and the interpretation given one of the related provisions by this Court, I think it clear beyond cavil that § 643B (c), far from being clear, is quite ambiguous.
This Court has recognized that, “[v]ery often, a statute may be unambiguous in certain contexts but ambiguous in other contexts”. Price v. State, 405 Md. 10, 30, 949 A.2d 619, 631 (2008); See, e.g., BAA v. Acacia, 400 Md. 136, 151, 929 A.2d 1, 9-10 (2007); Bank of America v. Stine, 379 Md. 76, 85, 839 A.2d 727, 733 (2003)(“[a]n ambiguity may ... exist even when the words of the statute are crystal clear. That occurs when its application in a given situation is not clear.” (quoting Blind Indus. & Servs. of Md. v. Md. Dep’t of Gen. Servs., 371 Md. 221, 231, 808 A.2d 782, 788 (2002))). If the terms of a statute, “are ambiguous when [the statute] is part of a larger statutory scheme, [the statute] is ambiguous and we endeavor to resolve that ambiguity by looking to the statute’s legislative history, case law, statutory purpose as well as the structure of the statute.” Md. Central Collection v. Jordan, 405 Md. 420, 426, 952 A.2d 266, 270 (2008); Barbre v. Pope, 402 Md. 157, 173, 935 A.2d 699, 709 (2007); Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene v. Kelly, 397 Md. 399, 419-20, 918 A.2d 470, 482 (2007); Smack v. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 378 Md. 298, 305, 835 A.2d 1175, 1179 (2003). This Court noted in Jordan that,
“[w]hen a statute is part of a larger statutory scheme, it is axiomatic that the language of a provision is not interpreted in isolation; rather we analyze the statutory scheme as a *571whole considering the ‘purpose, aim, or policy of the enacting body,’ Serio v. Baltimore County, 384 Md. 373, 390, 863 A.2d at 952, 962 (2004); Drew v. First Guar. Mortgage Corp., 379 Md. 318, 327, 842 A.2d 1, 6 (2003), and attempt to harmonize provisions dealing with the same subject so that each may be given effect. Bowen v. City of Annapolis, 402 Md. 587, 613-14, 937 A.2d 242, 258 (2007); Magnetti v. Univ. of Md., 402 Md. 548, 565, 937 A.2d 219, 229 (2007); Clipper Windpower, Inc. v. Sprenger, 399 Md. 539, 554, 924 A.2d 1160, 1168 (2007).”
Id. at 426, 952 A.2d at 270.
Noting the ambiguity oí § 643B(c), we must therefore, look at other avenues to interpret the statute, starting with the purpose of the statute5 and including the analysis of the larger statutory scheme. I argue, and the State conceded at oral argument, that the purpose of the habitual offender statute, including § 643B(b) and § 643B(c), is two-fold: the first objective is to punish the offender, while the second purpose is to attempt to rehabilitate him or her. It is clear from the lengthy sentence that McGlone received that the first purpose of § 643B(c), i.e. punishment6, is served. The second purpose of the statute, rehabilitation, under these facts, simply has not been engaged, never mind served. McGlone never had the opportunity to attempt to rehabilitate himself between convic*572tions one and two because these convictions were not separated by an intervening term of confinement.
As mentioned earlier, this Court has previously addressed and interpreted the habitual offender statute in Montone. Despite the fact that Montone discusses a different subsection than the case sub judice, the two subsections are both part of a larger statutory scheme which has the same dual purposes of punishment and rehabilitation. Indeed, as we have seen, Minor says, “[although in that case we were commenting on the operation of § 643B(b), our remarks are equally applicable to § 643B(e).” Minor, 313 Md. at 576, 546 A.2d at 1029. Montone notes that, “when an individual receives two convictions without any intervening term of confinement, he has had no opportunity to reform between his first and second convictions. Thus, the second conviction says nothing about that individual’s capacity for rehabilitation.” Montone, 308 Md. at 613, 521 A.2d at 727. In an attempt to harmonize the provisions of the habitual offender statute and following the analysis of this statute in Montone, § 643B(c) should be interpreted to require that each predicate conviction be separated by separate terms of confinement for the purpose of sentence enhancement. It makes no sense, in my opinion, to require otherwise.
McGlone also argues that because § 643B(c) is ambiguous, the rule of lenity7 must apply to his case. This Court has stated that, “[f]undamental fairness dictates that the defendant understand clearly what debt he must pay to society for his transgressions. If there is doubt as to the penalty, then the law directs that his punishment must be construed to favor the milder penalty over a harsher one.” Robinson v. Lee, 317 Md. 371, 379-80, 564 A.2d 395, 399 (1989) (citation omitted). *573A proper application of § 643B(c) is consistent with the rule of lenity. Strictly construing it in favor of McGlone, therefore, each predicate conviction should have been separated by intervening terms of confinement and sequential, just as is the standard pursuant to § 643B(b) and this Court’s holding in Montone.
II.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent with the majority’s holding. Article 27, § 643B(c) has the umbrella of serving the dual purpose of punishment and rehabilitation of the offender, but in actuality, it is only a punishment tool as it is currently interpreted.
RAKER, J. has authorized me to state that she joins in this dissent.

. Md.Code. (1957, 1982 Repl.Vol., 1987 Cum.Supp.) Art. 27., § 643B, which was in effect when this case was decided and, therefore, is referenced in this opinion, has been repealed and re-codified as Md. Code (2002, 2007 Supp. Vol.), § 14-101 of the Criminal Law Article. See 2002 Md. Laws of Md., Chapter 26, § 1. The Revisor’s Note to that section states: "This section is new language derived without substantive change from former Art. 27, § 643 B(b) through (g) and the first sentence of (a).” Section 14-101 now provides:
"(d)(1) ... on conviction for a third time of a crime of violence, a person shall be sentenced to imprisonment for the term allowed by law but not less than 25 years, if the person:
*562(1) has been convicted of a crime of violence on two prior separate occasions:
1. in which the second or succeeding crime is committed after there has been a charging document filed for the proceeding occasion; and
2. for which the convictions do not arise from a single incident; and (ii) has served at least one term of confinement in a correctional facility as a result of a conviction of a crime of violence.
(2) The court may not suspend all or part of the mandatory 25-year sentence required under this subsection.
(3) A person sentenced under this subsection is not eligible for parole except in accordance with the provisions of § 4-305 of the Correctional Services Article.”

. Section 643B(c) provided in 1977, when McGlone committed his initial crime of violence:
"(c) Any person who (1) has been convicted on two separate occasions of a crime of violence where the convictions do not arise from a single incident, and (2) has served at least one term of confinement in *564a correctional institution as a result of a conviction of a crime of violence, shall be sentenced, on being convicted a third time of a crime of violence, to imprisonment for the term allowed by law, but, in any event, not less 25 years. Neither the sentence nor any part of it may be suspended, and the person shall not be eligible for parole except in accordance with the provisions of Article 31B, § 11.”

. "Crime of Violence” was defined in § 643B(a) as:
"... abduction; arson; burglary; daytime housebreaking under § 30(b) of this article; kidnapping; manslaughter, except involuntary manslaughter; mayhem and maiming under §§ 384, 385, and 386 of this article; murder; rape; robbery with a deadly weapon; sexual offense in the first degree; sexual offense in the second degree; use of a handgun in the commission of a felony or other crime of violence; an attempt to commit any of the aforesaid offenses; assault with intent to murder; assault with intent to rape; assault with intent to rob; assault with intent to commit a sexual offense in the first degree; and assault with intent to commit a sexual offense in the second degree....”

. In so concluding, this Court accepted the construction that a number of states around the country gave their respective habitual offender statutes, noting:
“Most of those courts holding that the sequentiality of the predicate crimes is irrelevant do so after construing their statute as being intended as a punishment vehicle only. See Watson v. State, 392 So.2d 1274, 1279 (Ala.Crim.App.1980) (purpose of Alabama habitual offender statute is to 'prevent repetition and increase of crimes by imposing increased penalties upon repeat offenders’); Washington v. State, 273 Ark. 482, 621 S.W.2d 216, 218 (1981) (‘Arkansas’s ... statute was not designed to act as a deterrent ... but is simply a punitive statute....’); Gimmy v. People, 645 P.2d 262, 264 (Colo.1982)(purpose of Colorado statute is 'to punish more severely those who show a propensity toward repeated criminal conduct without regard to an opportunity between convictions for the defendant to reform’); State v. Montague, 671 P.2d 187, 190 (Utah 1983) (the fair import of the statutory language suggests that its purpose is to do exactly what it does-make persistent offenders subject to greater sanctions’).”
Montone v. State, 308 Md. at 611-12, 521 A.2d at 726.
The Court of Special Appeals discussed § 643B(c) in the context of the rehabilitative purpose of the statute in Garrett v. State, 59 Md.App. *56797, 474 A.2d 931, cert. denied, 300 Md. 483, 479 A.2d 372 (1984). The court stated:
“We therefore align ourselves with the great majority of States and conclude that in order for a defendant to be sentenced under § 643B(c), the two convictions serving as the predicate for the enhanced sentence must precede in time the commission of the offense upon which the instant conviction is based. Deterrence, rather than retribution, is the legislative intent we shall infer; and that ... requires that the instant offense-the one for which the enhanced punishment is imposed-be committed after the two predicate convictions.”
Id. at 118, 474 A.2d at 941.
In light of our holding in Montone, albeit construing a different provision of this statutory scheme, the Court of Special Appeals’ construction of the statute does not go far enough to serve its rehabilitative purpose. There should be a requirement in the imposition of § 643B(c) that the each predicate conviction occur in sequential order, meaning the offender commits offense # 1 and then is convicted and sentenced for offense # 1, the offender then commits offense # 2 and then is convicted and sentenced for offense # 2, finally the offender commits offense # 3 and becomes eligible for sentencing under § 643B(c).

. The "bill enacting § 643B(c) (1977 Md. Laws, ch. 678), was directed primarily at a wholesale rewriting of the 'defective delinquency’ law (Md.Code Ann. art. 3 IB) and the restructuring of [the] Patuxent Institution." Garrett, 59 Md.App. at 115, 474 A.2d at 939. While the legislative history in the enactment of the statute is less than extensive, its purpose was to, " 'provid[e] new and different alternatives for dealing with aggressive and violent offenders.’ ” Jones, 336 Md. at 264, 647 A.2d at 1208 (quoting Ch. 678, 1977 Laws of Maryland).

. Under § 643B(c), once the predicate requirements for imposition of the sentence are met, the sentencing judge has no choice but to impose on the defendant the mandatory minimum sentence prescribed. Taylor v. State, 333 Md. 229, 232-33, 634 A.2d 1322, 1323 (1993); State v. Taylor, 329 Md. 671, 675, 621 A.2d 424, 426 (1993); Loveday v. State, 296 Md. 226, 236-37, 462 A.2d 58, 63 (1983).

. This rule was, “originally formulated by the United States Supreme Court as a principle of statutory construction." Monoker v. State, 321 Md. 214, 222, 582 A.2d 525, 529 (1990). When a statute is construed under the rule of lenity, it "means that the Court will not interpret a ... criminal statute so as to increase the penalty it places on a defendant ‘when such an interpretation can be based on no more than a guess as to what [the legislature] intended.' " Id. (citation omitted).