Court Opinion

ID: 9571701
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:34:22.521614+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:30:49.476596
License: Public Domain

Fritz, C. J.
{dissenting). Although the policy in question was written in Massachusetts which sustains the validity of a no-action clause, it was, so far as it pertains to the named assured, John E. Sexmith, to be performed in Wisconsin where he resided, and there the automobile in question was garaged and licensed and principally used; and was being used by Sexmith when his alleged negligent operation thereof caused injuries to the plaintiffs for which they seek to recover in this action. In view of those circumstances the contract is to be treated, — as stated in the court’s opinion for the purpose of its decision, — “as though made in Massachusetts directly between the Insurance Company and Sexmith, the assured.” Consequently, in so far as the policy pertains to Sexmith and his negligent operation of the automobile in Wisconsin, the insurer’s obligation to Sexmith to investigate for and on his behalf the nature, cause, and resulting consequences of the collision must be performed by the insurer in Wisconsin. Therefore, the following statements and decisions are applicable and controlling in this action, to writ:
“The supreme court of the United States has laid down the following rules in reference to the law governing contracts *517in cases in which the place of making and the place of performance are not the same: (1) Matters bearing upon the execution, interpretation, and validity are determined by the law of the place where the contract is made; (2) matters connected with the performance are regulated by the law of the place where the contract by its terms is to be performed; and (3) matters relating to procedure depend upon the law of the forum. These three general rules have been adopted and applied by many jurisdictions in a long list of cases involving almost every conceivable kind of contract.” 11 Am. Jur., Conflict of Laws, p. 403, sec. 118.
“When an action is brought upon a contract of property insurance in the state in which the property is situated, the court will, of course, apply a statute of the state which either expressly, or by construction, extends to all contracts of insurance upon property within the state, although the contract may have been made, and the loss may be payable, in another state.” 63 L. R. A. 855. See Rose v. Kimberly & Clark Co. (1895), 89 Wis. 545, 62 N. W. 526.
“As a general rule the construction and validity of a purely personal contract depend on the law of the place where made. Story, Conflict of Laws, sec. 272. If, however, the contract is made in one place, to be performed in another, then, as a general rule, the place of payment or performance is the place of the contract. 2 Parsons, Cont. (8th ed.), 583; Newman v. Kershaw, 10 Wis. *333. This rule is founded on the idea that, in making a personal contract to be fully performed in another state, the parties must have had the law of that other state in view. Shores L. Co. v. Stitt, 102 Wis. 450.” Bartlett v. Collins (1901), 109 Wis. 477, 481, 85 N. W. 703; Seyk v. Millers’ Nat. Ins. Co. (1889), 74 Wis. 67, 72, 41 N. W. 443; Brown v. Gates (1904), 120 Wis. 349, 97 N. W. 221, 98 N. W. 205.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice Gehl concurs in this dissent.