Court Opinion

ID: 9644357
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:53:52.974111+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:12.173338
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
concurring.
That the trial court erred in the method of reaching and in coming to its conclusion that a jury need not be impanelled to determine competency of appellant to stand further hearing, I am certain. But I do have enough doubt about the standard utilized to make that determination, albeit drawn from a majority opinion of the Court En Banc in Johnson v. State, 564 S.W.2d 707 (Tex.Cr.App.1978), presently to disassociate myself from its reiteration and application here.
Since 1975, given that it is properly triggered, Article 46.02, V.A.C.C.P., has mandated a hearing in advance of the trial on the merits, § 2(a), and during the trial, § 2(b), alike to determine whether “there is evidence to support a finding of incompetency.” That relatively new statutory standard provides “a different method” for raising the issue, certainly in the pretrial situation, as the Court has recognized in Williams v. State, 543 S.W.2d 385 (Tex.Cr.App.1976) and Ramsey v. State, 563 S.W.2d 616, 618 (Tex.Cr.App.1978), and, from the same language, I would think in the midtrial situation. Yet, a majority of the Court concluded otherwise in Johnson v. State, supra.
I am satisfied that whatever the former tests — and they have been expressed in various terms — the present standard for pretrial determination is that recognized in Williams and Ramsey rather than “a reasonable doubt” measure.1 I am not satisfied, however, with the Johnson view that, notwithstanding identical legislative language, the former “reasonable doubt” standard remains for a midtrial determination.
With the reservations thus expressed, I concur.

. In Sisco v. State, - S.W.2d - (Tex.Cr.App., No. 61,602, delivered February 6, 1980) I identified the early judicially formulated rule and traced legislative and judicial evolution of the various tests used prior to 1975.