Court Opinion

ID: 9673842
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:19:12.757544+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:46:25.622586
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION
HYDE, Judge.
I respectfully dissent from the opinion of Welborn, C., herein because it would in effect overrule City of Hannibal v. Winchester, Mo.Sup., 391 S.W.2d 279; McConnell v. City of Kansas City, Mo.Sup., 282 S.W.2d 518; as well as the other cases on which these decisions are based. We said in the Hannibal case (391 S.W.2d l. c. 286): “Section 20 also fixes, irrevocably, the mode by which charter cities may annex territory, and the legislature has no authority to eliminate the constitutional requirement or to fix any method inconsistent with it.” As hereinafter shown, the Legislature by its 1963 Act (Laws 1963, p. 126; now Secs. 71.860-71.920, RSMo, V.A.M.S.) has fixed a method inconsistent with Section 20, Art. VI of the Constitution.
It is my view that the Legislature has no authority to apply the procedure provided by Secs. 71.860-71.920 to a constitutional charter city. As stated in the Hannibal case, I agree that the Legislature has authority to require a favorable vote in an area to be annexed as a condition to annexation of territory by a constitutional charter city. Although the Legislature may do that it cannot change the method of how the charter of a constitutional charter city may be amended because the constitution provides how it may be done. In matters of more than purely municipal interest, the Legislature can provide restrictions on what may be done solely by charter amendment. See Kansas City v. J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co., 337 Mo. 913, 87 S.W.2d 195, for discussion of matters of municipal and state interest. As we recognized in McDonnell Aircraft Corporation v. City of Berkeley, Mo.Sup., 367 S.W.2d 498, 502: “Certainly bringing additional territory into cities without the consent of the inhabitants and owners of property therein is an important governmental function in which the whole state has an interest.” Therefore, providing an additional requirement for annexation of additional territory of a favorable vote of the voters. of such territory is certainly within the authority of the Legislature. This is exactly what the Legislature did when it adopted in 1887 what is now Sec. 82.090 providing for annexing other cities, towns or villages by constitutional charter cities. Such provisions do not change the method by which a charter city may amend its charter but instead provide restrictions on what such cities may do by charter amendments.
However, instead of following proper procedure such as that provided in Sec. 82.090, it adopted, in its 1963 Act, by Secs. 71.860, 71.870, 71.880, 71.890 and 71.900 procedure which directly conflicts with the procedure provided by Sec. 20, Art. VI of the Constitution as to how an amendment to the charter of a constitutional charter city shall be made, which is the only authorized method of annexing territory by a constitutional charter city. As we said in City of Hannibal v. Winchester, Mo.Sup., 391 S.W.2d 279, 288: “Section 20 of Art. 6 of the Constitution sets out the exclusive mode of annexation tor constitutional charter cities. Our cases have so stated for many years. Counsel for the city seek here to distinguish the Taylor [State ex inf. Taylor ex rel. Kansas City v. North Kansas City, 360 Mo. 374, 228 S.W.2d 762] and McConnell cases on the ground that the Court was not there discussing the constitutionality of a mode of annexation by ordinance alone, but only the method of amendment specifically provided in the *292Kansas City Charter. That is true, but this Court, both in those cases and in the prior and subsequent cases already discussed, has clearly indicated the view that any annexation by a constitutional charter city is a charter amendment and that the method provided therefor shall be followed.”
The direct conflict with the procedure required by the constitution clearly appears from a comparison of the method provided by Sec. 82.090 with that provided by Secs. 71.860-71.900. The Sec. 82.090 procedure, applicable only to annexing incorporated territory, is that the mayor of the constitutional charter city first notifies the mayor of the city, town or village proposed to be annexed of its intention to annex and an election then is required to be held in such municipality on the proposition. If four-sevenths of the qualified voters of that city, town or village vote in favor of the extension, the constitutional charter city may then extend its limits by an amendment of its charter adopted by a majority of its voters. Thus the extension of the limits of the constitutional charter city is made by the method authorized by the Constitution. Not so in the procedure established by Secs. 71.870-71.900! That procedure completely ignores the required method of a charter amendment by which a constitutional charter city is authorized to annex territory. Instead it requires simultaneous elections “submitting the proposition of annexation to the two groups of voters,” Sec. 71.870. Then Sec. 71.880 requires a copy of an order, resolution or ordinance ordering an election to be certified to the board of election commissioners and the election commissioners (not the annexing city) shall give the notice of the election, Sec. 71.890. The requirements of Sec. 71.890 for notice of the election are different from those stated in the Constitution, Secs. 19-20, Art. VI, both as to kind of newspapers, number of publications and length of time of the last publication before the election. Then Sec. 71.900 provides for a ballot that does not submit any charter amendment at all; but instead requires a vote in the city on the same proposition as submitted to the voters outside the city. Therefore, the procedure for annexation provided by these statutes cannot be applicable to a constitutional charter city unless we take back everything we have said about the method by which a constitutional charter city can annex additional territory.
Sec. 71.870-71.900 clearly conflict with Secs. 19 and 20 of Art. VI of the Constitution by attempting to establish a method of annexation that is not a charter amendment and directly conflict with the procedure required by the Constitution for the adoption of a charter amendment. Therefore, it must be held that these statutes are inapplicable to constitutional charter cities or we must overrule the Hannibal and McConnell cases and the whole line of cases on which they are based. In McConnell, we held Sec. 71.015 (Sawyers Act) inapplicable to constitutional charter cities because it provided timing of procedural steps which conflicted with the procedure required by the Constitution for the adoption of a charter amendment. The 1963 St. Louis County Act, like the Hannibal case, is a greater violation of the Constitution because it provides for annexation without any charter amendment. This issue was not discussed in the Divisional opinion because it was not adequately briefed or argued in Division. For these reasons, I would hold that the City of Florissant, being a constitutional charter city, was not affected in any way by or required to follow the procedure provided by Secs. 71.870-71.900, and that its annexation of the unincorporated territory involved, by the method provided by Secs. 19 and 20, Art. VI of the Constitution is valid.
Other sections of the 1963 Act such as 71.860 making Sec. 71.015 (Sawyers Act) applicable and Sec. 71.910 prohibiting resubmission of annexation proposition for two years need not be considered, because if they were held unconstitutional as to constitutional charter cities, the rest of *293the Act might be held constitutional if it provided constitutional procedure. Since it does not, it would serve no useful purpose to discuss these sections now. Likewise, I do not discuss the contention of appellants that the “annexation was illegal, unconstitutional and void because it was unreasonable under the traditional or classic tests of reasonableness of annexations” because this was not considered in the Division No. 1 opinion. Assuming reasonableness I would affirm.
My view of concurring opinion of Henley, J., is that it recognizes that the 1963 St. Louis County Act (Laws 1963, p. 126) nowhere requires or provides for the adoption of a charter amendment to accomplish annexation of territory by a constitutional charter city and so it deems it necessary to provide an amendment to this Act to make it conform to the Constitution. It does this by authorizing a ballot that is completely different from the ballot required by Sec. 71.900, and which would require a vote on a different proposition from that provided for by the Legislature. The whole trouble with the 1963 Act, as affecting constitutional charter cities, is that it entirely disregards the procedure we have held to be the exclusive method of annexation by such cities, namely by charter amendment. Instead this Act authorizes annexation by an entirely different method, that is, a vote in an annexation election, not a charter amendment election, on the propositions “For the annexation” and “Against the annexation.” This method is proper for other cities, towns and villages but it is in conflict with the method required by the Constitution for constitutional charter cities as we held in the Hannibal case and all the others on which it is based. This concurring opinion also overlooks the fact that the voters in the city and the voters in the area to be annexed are required to vote on the same proposition. There is no reference whatever anywhere in the Act to the adoption of a charter amendment, and of course the Legislature could not authorize voters outside the city to vote on an amendment to the city charter. If it is necessary to amend the Act to provide a different kind of election from the one it has authorized, it must be done by the Legislature and cannot be done by this Court.