Court Opinion

ID: 9391241
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-01 17:00:56.901595+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:41.069061
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        MAY 1 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                            FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LINDA CONDELLO, an individual,                  No.    22-35322

                Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 3:19-cv-01985-SI

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
COLUMBIA COUNTY, an Oregon
municipality,

                Defendant-Appellee.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                            for the District of Oregon
                   Michael H. Simon, District Judge, Presiding

                       Argued and Submitted April 17, 2023
                                Portland, Oregon

Before: RAWLINSON, BEA, and SUNG, Circuit Judges.

      Linda Condello (“Plaintiff”) appeals the denial of a motion for new trial after

the jury rendered a defense verdict for Columbia County (“Defendant”). The jury

found that Defendant was not negligent in its maintenance of the courthouse chair

in which Plaintiff sat, and which broke under her. We have jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      The parties are familiar with the facts of the case, so we do not recite them

here. A district court’s denial of a motion for new trial is reviewed for an abuse of

discretion. Janes v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 279 F.3d 883, 886 (9th Cir. 2002). Under

that standard, we first assess “whether the trial court identified and applied the

correct legal rule to the relief requested” and then “whether the trial court’s

resolution of the motion resulted from a factual finding that was illogical, implausible,

or without support in inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the record.”

United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1262, 1263 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).

      The district court applied the correct legal rule. Under Oregon law, res ipsa

loquitur “specifies certain facts or circumstances which, when found in combination,

raise an inference of negligence.” Gow v. Multnomah Hotel, 224 P.2d 552, 555 (Or.

1950) (emphasis added) (citing Ritchie v. Thomas, 224 P.2d 543 (Or. 1950)).

Namely, the tort doctrine creates

      an inference [that] is enough to satisfy, in the first instance, the
      plaintiff’s burden of introducing evidence from which reasonable
      men may find in his favor. It is enough to avoid a nonsuit or a
      dismissal. It is not enough to entitle the plaintiff to a directed verdict,
      even though the defendant offers no evidence. It shifts no ‘burden’ to
      the defendant, except in the sense that unless he produces evidence he
      runs the risk that the jury may find against him. The jury may accept
      the inference, but it is not compulsory, and if they see fit to find for the
      defendant they are free to do so. In other words, the inference makes
      enough of a case to get to the jury and no more.

Ritchie, 224 P.2d at 550 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)

(quoting William L. Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitur in California, 37 Cal. L. Rev. 183,

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217 (1949)). This is precisely the rule of decision the district court applied.

        Even were we to assume the district court misunderstood Oregon law1 and

that defendants must present evidence to defeat a tort plaintiff’s prima facie case

based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the error would be harmless because

Defendant did present exculpatory evidence. Without objection or a motion to strike

from Plaintiff, Defendant called two witnesses in its defense. Those witnesses

detailed the visual inspections of the facilities and furniture that the maintenance

crew conducted every morning. The facilities manager testified that the courthouse

staff conduct more thorough, quarterly safety inspections. And the jury heard

unchallenged testimony that no previous incidents involving broken chairs or loose

screws or fasteners at the courthouse were ever reported to the courthouse staff. That

evidence admitted at trial strongly supports the jury’s verdict: that the accident that

befell Plaintiff was unusual and that Defendant had otherwise taken reasonable care

to maintain its furniture. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied

Plaintiff’s motion for new trial; it found that the weight of the evidence supported the

jury’s verdict that Defendant was not negligent, because the court relied on reasonable

inferences drawn from the evidence admitted at trial. Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1263.

        AFFIRMED.

1
    It did not. See the above citation and language from Gow and Ritchie.

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