Court Opinion

ID: 9635851
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 14:08:03.253292+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:37.717075
License: Public Domain

CADENA, Chief Justice,
dissenting in part.
I do not uphold the award of $20,000.00 for future medical expenses.
The jury awarded $4,143.25 for past medical expenses which include treatment for all of the complaints listed in the majority opinion. The medical testimony conclusively establishes that the laceration of the right eyelid has healed and that no further treatment will be required. The same is true of the abrasions and contusions on his face and other parts of his body, including the bruised chest wall and bruised hip. The bruised kidney has completely healed. No further treatment or hospitalization will be required for these injuries. The various x-rays and clinical tests which were required in order to determine the extent of his injuries will not have to be repeated.
Even if we accept plaintiffs self-diagnosis concerning the recurrence of the growths on his chest, there is no evidence indicating that further surgery will be required; that such surgery will require hospitalization; that the cost of such surgery and hospitalization will be $20,000.00; and that such anticipated charges represent the reasonable cost of such medical attention, surgery and hospitalization. The only other medical attention which may be required consists of possible replacement of the plastic appliance, commonly called a “night guard”, should such device be lost or broken.
The total charge for the services rendered by Dr. Maniatis, the dentist who treated plaintiff and fitted him with the night guard, was $792.00. This sum included the charge for the plastic appliance ($395.00) and the cost of replacing it after, according to plaintiff, it had broken. The bill submitted by the dentist indicated that the cost of replacing the appliance was $160.00. The dentist testified that, “basically”, patients require only one night guard unless it breaks. The record shows that the device was given to plaintiff on February 16, 1984, and replaced on March 10, 1986.
As far as the chest “tumors” are concerned, plaintiff testified that following the accident he experienced pain and swelling in the arm and chest and that, after treatment with pain-relieving and anti-inflammatory drugs produced no relief, he received steroid injections. Subsequently, growths appeared on his chest where the injections had been administered. According to plaintiff, these growths were surgically removed, but, at the time of trial, had returned.
There is no evidence concerning the cost of the surgical removal of the growths from plaintiffs chest. The only evidence that such surgery took place is found in plaintiff’s testimony. There is no testimony identifying the surgeon. The only evidence relating to treatment of the chest problems suggests that plaintiff was treated by Dr. Reyna, whose charges totalled $130.00.
The evidence contained in the record furnishes no basis for an award of $20,000.00 for future medical expenses.
It is true that in Hughett v. Dwyre, 624 S.W.2d 401, 405 (Tex.App.— Amarillo 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.), the Court said that “[n]o precise evidence” concerning future medical expenses “is required”, and “to maintain a finding on future medical expenses the plaintiff is not required to establish the future medical consequences of his injury by expert medical testimony grounded on reasonable medical probability.”
Statements that no precise evidence is required and that plaintiff need produce no expert testimony based on reasonable probability concerning the “future medical consequences of his injury” cannot be stretched to justify the conclusion that no evidence concerning future medical expenses is required.
There can be no disagreement with the statement that the award of future medical *323expenses is primarily for the jury to determine. The Hughett opinion was breaking no new ground when it made this announcement concerning the functions of a jury. The statement that the award may be based on “the nature of the injuries, the medical care rendered before trial, and the condition of the injured party at the time of trial” should not, in an unseemly rush to judgment, be considered entirely without regard to the circumstances in the case in which such statement was made.
The Hughett language relied on by the majority was uttered in a case in which the court addressed the issue of whether a plaintiff must establish future medical expenses according to a standard of reasonable probability or possibility. The specific point of error which was addressed in Hughett was based on the argument that the testifying physician’s “ballpark figures” were insufficient. Id. at 405. The Court was merely making the obvious point that testimony regarding future medical expenses cannot be exact and absolute. Stated differently, such testimony cannot be “precise” any more than any attempt to predict the future can be precise.
The majority completely loses sight of the fact that in Hughett plaintiff presented testimony by a physician concerning the amount of future medical expenses anticipated. Id. at at 408. There is no such testimony in this case, either from a doctor or from any other person. It is significant that in the three cases quoting the language which the majority relies on, plaintiff presented testimony concerning the reasonableness of the anticipated future medical expenses. Gladewater Municipal Hospital v. Daniel, 694 S.W.2d 619, 621 (Tex.App.— Texarkana 1985, no writ); Thrailkill v. Montgomery Ward and Company, 670 S.W.2d 382, 384 (Tex.App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, writ ref d n.r.e.); Keller Industries v. Reeves, 656 S.W.2d 221, 227 (Tex.App.— Austin 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.)
The truth is that in no case, not even in Hughett, has a Texas court upheld an award of future medical expenses where there is no evidence whatsoever concerning the need for future medical attention nor the reasonable cost of such attention.
According to Hughett the award of future damages may be based upon the nature of the injuries, the medical care rendered before trial, and the condition of plaintiff at the time of trial. Insofar as the nature of the injuries is concerned, all injuries, with the possible exception of the chest tumors and the injury to the jaw which required the night guard, had completely healed at the time of trial. Treatment of these injuries required medical and hospital attention totaling only $4,143.25 as of the date of trial. This sum included the cost of two appliances or night guards. It is simply not true that the evidence shows that the night guard would have to be “continuously replaced.” The only evidence which can possibly be related to the treatment of plaintiffs chest condition consists of Dr. Keyna’s charge of $130.00.
As already pointed out, there is no evidence of the cost of surgery for the removal of the chest tumors. This fact was admitted by plaintiffs attorney when, in his argument to the jury when he said, “We have not submitted any medical bills to you for “the removal of the masses from the chest” because we don’t want there to be any question ... ”.
The argument that an award of $20,-000.00 for future treatment finds support in a past dental bill for $792.00 and a bill for $130.00 for, perhaps, past treatment of chest pains, will support an award of $20,-000.00 is totally unpersuasive.
As the Amarillo Court recognized in Hughett, Texas has always followed the rule that recovery for future damages must be limited to damages which will reasonably and probably result from the injury sustained. See Fisher v. Coastal Transport Co., 149 Tex. 224, 230 S.W.2d 522 (1950).
In Dallas Railway & Terminal Company v. Gossett, 294 S.W.2d 377 (Tex.1956), the plaintiff argued that evidence showing the nature of the injuries, the character of the treatment received and the amounts charged for such treatment permitted an inference that such charges were reason*324able. In rejecting this argument the Texas Supreme Court said:
In some jurisdictions proof of the expenses incurred or paid for the treatment of personal injuries is regarded as presumptive evidence of the reasonable value of the services, provided the unreasonableness of the charges does not appear from other evidence. This rule has never been followed in Texas, and it is now well-settled that proof of amounts charged or paid does not raise an issue of reasonableness, and recovery of such expenses will be denied in the absence of evidence showing that the charges are reasonable.
Id. at 382-83. The court reversed a judgment. See Gerland’s Food Fair, Inc. v. Hare, 611 S.W.2d 113, 117 (Tex.App.— Houston [1st Dist] 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.), (reversing a judgment for past and future medical expenses in the absence of evidence that the charges paid were reasonable). “Without such a showing the expenses are not recoverable.” Id. at 117.
I would reform the judgment by deleting the award for future medical expenses.