Court Opinion

ID: 9692338
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 15:52:00.82441+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:34.149982
License: Public Domain

ALDISERT, Circuit Judge
(concurring) .
In Ace Doran Hauling & Rigging Co., Investigation of Operations, 108 M.C.C. 717 (1969), the Interstate Commerce Commission issued an order interpreting as outside the scope of a heavy hauler’s certificate the transportation of commodities the “inherent nature” of which does not “require” that they be bundled or aggregated for loading. In so doing, the Commission again relied upon the “inherent nature” test as the standard for determining whether a commodity re*762quires aggregation or loading on a unit basis.
Thus, the “reasoned” rule for dividing the traffic between the general carriers and the heavy haulers now promulgated by the Commission is this:
1. General haulers may haul any commodity, except certain specialized commodities not pertinent here, including those which are tendered by shippers in aggregated packages or bundles which require the use of special equipment so long as the carrier itself does not own the special equipment.
2. Heavy haulers may transport only those commodities which, by reason of their inherent or intrinsic characteristics, require special equipment whether the equipment is owned by the carrier or shipper.
Because I view the “inherent nature” standard as outmoded and unrealistic, and stripped by technological advancement of whatever validity it may have once possessed, I am put to strain by the majority’s endorsement of its vitality.
This court offered an explanation of the workings of this test in W. J. Dillner Transfer Co. v. I.C.C., 193 F.Supp. 823, 827 (W.D.Pa.), aff’d., 368 U.S. 6, 82 S.Ct. 16, 7 L.Ed.2d 16 (1961):
[T]he test is what is the inherent nature of the commodity itself. If the commodity required aggregation not for the mere purpose of economy and efficiency, but because of the inherent nature of the commodity, and after bundling they would become too heavy to handle without the use of special equipment, special bundled commodities would be within the purview of an article requiring special equipment; otherwise it would not.
Thus, if a commodity can be loaded on a unit basis, it must be carried by a general hauler. Now, after witnessing one modification of this approach (Aero Trucking, Inc. v. United States, 1966 F.C.C. ¶ 53,036 (W.D.Pa.1966)), and fashioning a second (Moss Trucking Co., Inc., Investigation of Operations, 103 M.C.C. 91 (1966)), the Commission, in Ace Doran, has reasserted its previous statement of the “inherent nature” test, as contained in Dillner.
In an era where the mechanized loading of aggregated commodities has become virtually a universal practice, the obvious purpose behind the formulation of the “inherent nature” test is to create protection for general haulers lest they suffer invasion at the hands of the heavy haulers. To insulate the general haulers, the Commission, in Ace Doran, sought to “preserve the historically recognized limits of heavy hauler service,” thereby seeking to prevent heavy hauler encroachment upon general hauler business.
In my view, the Commission has utterly failed to perceive that the hauling industry has undergone drastic technological change, rendering the limits envisioned by the Commission an anomaly. Indeed, history itself, as reflected in the realities of the hauling industry, has bypassed the Commission. The majority properly observe:
It is conceivable that investigation might disclose the existence of a well-nigh universal practice of mechanical loading utilizing equipment belonging to the shipper. In such event, it could perhaps be concluded that there is no practical difference between the services performed by the heavy haulers and the general commodities haulers, and that there is no purpose to be served by continuing to preserve and enforce the distinction between the two types of carriers. In that ease the Commission could reclassify the carriers, and perhaps permit present heavy haulers to convert their operations into general commodities operations. . . .
It may also be noted that there is no prohibition against a single carrier’s holding both heavy hauling and general commodities authority (such as the prohibition in 49 U.S.C. § 310 against dual operation as a common and contract carrier).
Slip Opinion, at 755.
*763In the face of this, the preservation of “historically recognized limits” represents blind administrative endorsement of obsolescent industry practices. By ruling that bundled, aggregated, or palletized commodities are presumed to be outside the scope of heavy hauler authority, the Commission, simply stated, has all but lost sight of the realities of economical and efficient hauling requisite in an accelerating industrialized society. Indeed, a determination that industry practice, economy, and efficiency are not relevant to the inquiry whether a commodity must be shipped in bundles or individually, reflects a total lack of appreciation for the state of hauling today. As urged by the United States, which found it necessary to assume a position opposite to the I.C.C. in this case, this protectionism policy for general carriers freezes the industry in an outmoded technology. By severely restraining competition, the Commission convincingly eschews the promotion of an efficient hauling system operating on a sound economic basis.
In its brief urging that this court enjoin the enforcement of the Commission’s order, the United States has delineated with specificity the scope of judicial review it believes applicable to the instant proceeding:
The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 706, requires a court, on judicial review of agency action, to “decide all relevant questions of law . . . and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action.” It must set aside agency action which fails to meet the six criteria set forth in Section 706.1 This scope of review
to assure that agencies faithfully carry out the responsibility for deciding issues of public policy entrusted them by Congress. While reviewing courts cannot overrule an agency’s decision “merely because they disagree with its wisdom” (Radio Corporation v. United States, 341
is intended to assure that agencies
faithfully carry out the responsibility for deciding issues of public policy entrusted them by Congress. While reviewing courts cannot overrule an agency’s decision “merely because they disagree with its wisdom”
(Radio Corporation v. United States, 341 U.S. 412, 420, 71 S.Ct. 806, 810, 95 L.Ed. 760 (1951)), they must subject its action to “thorough, probing, in-depth review.” Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415, 91 S.Ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d 136. This is necessary because it is the administrative agency, not the court, which is charged with exercise of the expertise necessary to regulate an industry. Thus when an agency has properly explained and supported its action in accordance with law,
“its judgment is entitled to ‘ great deference because of its familiarity with the conditions in the industry which it regulates.” East Texas Motor Freight Lines v. Frozen Food Express, 351 U.S. 49, 54, 76 S.Ct. 574, 577, 100 L.Ed. 917 (1956). See also United States v. Pierce Auto *764Freight Lines, 327 U.S. 515, 535-536, 66 S.Ct. 687, 90 L.Ed. 821 (1946).
Nevertheless, reviewing courts cannot simply “stand aside and rubber-stamp their affirmance of administrative decisions.” NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 291, 85 S.Ct. 980, 988, 13 L.Ed.2d 839 (1965). Courts and agencies are “ ‘collaborative instrumentalities of justice,’ ” Greater Boston Television Corp. v. Federal Communications Commission, 143 U.S.App.D.C. 383, 444 F.2d 841, 851-852 (1971); the courts cannot slight their responsibility to properly supervise agency action. Agency action cannot be upheld merely “with a nod in the direction of the ‘substantial evidence’ test, and a bow to the mysteries of administrative expertise.” Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 142 U.S.App.D.C. 74, 439 F.2d 584, 597 (1971) (footnotes omitted). For if the exercise of administrative “expertise” were left thus unexamined, it would then “ ‘become a monster which rules with no practical limits on its discretion.’ ” Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 167, 83 S.Ct. 239, 245, 9 L.Ed.2d 207 (1962).
The cornerstone of judicial review of agency action is court insistence on “reasoned decision making.” Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, 454 F.2d 1018, 1025 (D.C.Cir. 1971). As the Supreme Court has recently noted, the reviewing court “must consider whether the [agency’s] decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment.” Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416, 91 S.Ct. 814, 823-824, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971). Courts must be satisfied that the agency “has exercised a reasoned discretion, with reasons that do not deviate from or ignore the ascertainable legislative intent.” Greater Boston Television Corp., supra, 444 F.2d at 850. By this insistence courts do not substitute their concepts of public policy for those of the agency. Rather, courts simply insure that the agency has adequately carried out its duty to determine the public interest, and has fully “focus[ed] on the values served by its decision.” Greater Boston Television Corp., supra, 444 F.2d at 852.2
In its brief, the United States has urged:
In this case, however, the Commission’s opinion gives this Court no assurance that it has indeed focused on the “values served by its decision.” It is not an example of the requisite “reasoned decision making.” The Commission has decided to protect from competition one class of carriers, without bothering to explore the impact of this policy on shippers, other carriers, or the consumer public. It has not explained to this Court how the policy of protectionism — unsupported by considerations of varying transportation services or shipper needs — can possibly comport with the mandate of the National Transportation Policy to promote an efficient and economical transportation system. Nor has it even arrived at a reasoned rule for dividing the traffic between the different types of carriers.
One example is illustrative of the arbitrariness of the guidelines articulated in Ace Doran. The Commission has *765determined that merely because it is theoretically possible to load individually a series of 30 foot rails, each weighing 150 pounds, these rails are outside the scope of a heavy hauler’s authority because they do not require bundling. The realities of the hauling industry apparently escape the Commission. That it is possible to load articles such as these rails individually does not produce the conclusion that general haulers will employ this method of loading these rails, one at a time. Indeed, for reasons of safety, economy, and efficiency, shippers will continue to require that general haulers load such articles in heavy aggregates.
Clearly, in this case, the Commission should adhere to its own suggestion that “it would seem unreasonable to deny a heavy hauler the authority to transport commodities because it is physically possible to handle them without special equipment, leaving the field of service open to general commodity carriers which will never handle the commodities any other way than with special equipment.” Moss Trucking Co., Inc., Investigation of Operations, 103 M.C.C. 91,107 (1966).
This having been said, however, in the final analysis, I must be guided by the Supreme Court’s most recent interpretation of the standard of court review of I.C.C. orders. In United States v. Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742, 92 S.Ct. 1941, 32 L.Ed.2d 453 (June 7, 1972), the Court stated, in reversing the judgment of a three-judge court which held invalid a Commission order enforcing two “car service rules”:
The standard of judicial review for actions of the Interstate Commerce Commission ... is well established by prior decisions of this Court. We do not weigh the evidence introduced before the Commission; we do not inquire into the wisdom of the regulations which the Commission promulgates, and we inquire into the soundness of the reasoning by which the Commission reaches its conclusions only to ascertain that the latter are rationally supported.
92 S.Ct. at 1946.
It remains only for me to observe that although I agree completely with the position taken by the government in this action, that position is totally irreconcilable with that apparently taken by the government before the Supreme Court in Allegheny Ludlum.3 Nor will I attempt to distinguish this action from Allegheny *766Ludlum. There the Supreme Court “conceded that the immediate effect of the Commission’s order will be to disrupt some established practices with respect to the handling and routing of freight cars, and on occasion cause serious inconvenience to shippers and railroads alike,” 92 S.Ct. at 1948, but that this inconvenience was of less than great moment because, of the disorganization and inefficiency already rampant in the railroad industry. Indeed, the Court specifically provided that “[i]f the Commission were thrusting these regulations upon an admittedly smoothly functioning transportation industry . . . the rationality of its action might well be open to question.” 92 S.Ct. at 1948. Rather than expound, however, upon the structure, prosperity, efficiency, and stability of the carrier trucking industry, I will state merely that this is an area of delicate concern, and note that any guidelines specifically required for the trucking industry at variance with those promulgated by the I.C.C. must emanate from an authority endowed with more power than this court.
Regretfully, and with an absolute minimum of enthusiasm, I concur in the result reached by the majority.

. The relevant portions of § 706 are:
“The reviewing courts shall—
(2) hold unlawful anil set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be—
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity ;
(0) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute ; or
(P) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to a trial de novo by the reviewing court.”

. These considerations apply whether the proceedings involve rule making or adjudication. In both instances the whole record must be canvassed in a searching and careful inquiry to determine whether the agency has reached a reasoned oonclusion, based on a factual predicate supported by the record, within the applicable statutory authority. See City of Chicago, Illinois et al. v. Federal Power Commission et al., D.C. Cir., 458 F.2d 731, decided December 2, 1971.

. The inconsistency of the government’s position in the case at bar with that taken in Allegheny Ludlum is dramatically illustrated by its argument urged upon, and readily accepted by, the Supreme Court, that the economic effect upon carrier's and shippers of I.C.C. rules is a factor of relative insignificance. As I have heretofore observed, the Commission’s rules here have all but lost sight of the reality of economical and efficient hauling in today's industrialized society. Moreover, in this case the government apparently agrees. Yet, in the railroad case, at the apparent urging of the government, the Court suggested : “If, as a result of [an inadequate supply of freight cars! such roads are placed under economic and competitive pressure to acquire additional freight cars, there is certainly no principle of law we know of which would require the Commission to permit them to avoid this economic pressure by continuing to borrow freight cars acquired and owned by other lines.” 92 S.Ct. at 1949.
The inconsistency in the government’s position in Allegheny Ludlum fairly leaps from this statement. The reference to the “principle of law,” refers not to law in its jurisprudential, but in its economic, sense. In the geographic confines represented by this judicial circuit, 7,209 miles out of the total trackage of 10,422 miles, or 09.2%, is now in bankruptcy — the Penn Central, Central of New Jersey, Lehigh Valley, Reading Railroad, and Lehigh and Hudson River Railroad. Sec, 1972 Rail Facts, Economic and Financial Division of Association of American Railroads. To suggest that these roads possess financial resources to purchase additional freight cars flaunts the realities evidenced by a score of district court and appellate cases morosely demonstrating the acute, financial distress of the railroad industry. To suggest, alternatively, that these roads “continue to borrow” freight cars owned by other lines is the very practice discouraged by the mandated service rules which now require that borrowed cars immediately be returned to the owning lines.