Court Opinion

ID: 9397492
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-25 16:08:48.023105+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:25.117701
License: Public Domain

[Cite as In re M.A.P., 2023-Ohio-1755.]

                                       COURT OF APPEALS
                                   COSHOCTON COUNTY, OHIO
                                   FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                      JUDGES:
IN RE:                                        :       Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.
M.A.P                                         :       Hon. William B. Hoffman, J.
A.B.S.                                        :       Hon. Andrew J. King, J.
T.E.S.                                        :
A.E.S                                         :       Case No.      22CA0024
                                              :                     22CA0025
                                              :                     22CA0026
                                              :                     22CA0027

                                                      OPINION

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                          Appeal from the Coshocton Court of
                                                  Common Pleas, Case Nos.20203027,
                                                  20203028, 20203029, & 20203029

JUDGMENT:                                         Affirmed

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:                           May 24, 2023

APPEARANCES:

For- Appellee                                     For-Mother

ASHLET JOHNS                                      DEBORAH FRIES
Coshocton JFS                                     2760 Oxford Drive
725 Pine Street                                   Nashport, OH 43830
Coshocton, OH 3812
Coshocton County, Case No. 22CA0024                                                              2

Gwin, P.J.

       {¶1}      Appellant-mother [“Mother”] appeals the August 8, 2022 Judgment Entry of

the Coshocton County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division that terminated her

parental rights with respect to her minor children M.A.P. and A.B.S. and granted

permanent custody of the children to appellee, Coshocton County Department of Jobs

and Family Services [“CCJFS”], and, which granted legal custody of her minor children

T.E.S. and A.E.S. to T. K.1

                                        Facts and Procedural History

       {¶2}      Mother to all children is A.S. Father to M.A.P. is M. P. Father to A.B.S. is

listed on the birth certificate as J.C.; however, the biological father is believed to be J. D.

The juvenile court found J.C. to be the legal father of A.B.S. according to the State of

Ohio, Office of Vital Statistics, State File Number 2018133498, filed December 21, 2018.

A.S. is the father of the twins, T.E.S. and A.E.S.

       {¶3}      On March 16, 2020, CCJFS received a report with allegations of substance

abuse, lack of stable housing, and physical aggression as it relates to Mother. Before

this report could be investigated, CCJFS received a report that Mother, while attempting

to flee from a domestic violence situation, improperly secured the children in her car. This

resulted in A.B.S. falling out of the vehicle and being run over by a vehicle traveling behind

Mother’s car. A.B.S. was life-flighted to the hospital with severe injuries. Three siblings

were also in the vehicle, M.A.P., A.E.S. and T.E.S. They were also taken to a hospital,

evaluated, and released.           They were found to have respiratory illnesses.            Mother

       1   See, OH ST Supp. R. 44(H) and 45(D) concerning the use of personal identifiers.
Coshocton County, Case No. 22CA0024                                                      3

(passenger) and F. C. (driver and alleged paternal uncle to one of the children) were

arrested upon felony charges of Child Endangerment.

       {¶4}   The trial Court noted in the entry filed March 18, 2020, that Mother, at the

Shelter Care Hearing, stated that J. C. was not the biological father of A.B.S. She further

stated that J. D., residing in Houston Texas, is the biological father of the child.

       {¶5}   On June 4, 5, and 11, 2020, the court held adjudicatory and dispositional

hearings. M.A.P. was found to be dependent and neglected; A.B.S. was found to be

abused, neglected and dependent; T.E.S. and A.E.S. were determined to be dependent

based upon evidence of their improper restraint in a vehicle.

       {¶6}   On August 5, 2020, Mother and J. C. applied and received a marriage

license at Coshocton County Probate Court (Void after 60 days), which license was not

returned to the Court.

       {¶7}   On September 17, 2020, CCJFS filed a Motion to Change Custody of T.E.S.

and A.E.S. to T. K., a non-relative kinship placement. A Motion to Submit Sensitive

Material Under Seal, Home Study for T. K. was filed on the same date. The juvenile court

granted the motion pertaining to sensitive material on September 18, 2020.

       {¶8}   On October 5, 2020, the court granted temporary custody of T.E.S. and

A.E.S. to non-relative kinship provider T.K., and protective supervision to CCJFS.

       {¶9}   On December 16, 2020, CCJFS filed a Motion to Submit Mother's

Psychological Evaluation under seal which was granted on the same date.

       {¶10} On December 29, 2020, Mother and A.C. applied and received a marriage

license at Coshocton County Juvenile Court. Mother and A.C. married on the same date

based on Information on the returned license. See, GAL Exhibit 11.
Coshocton County, Case No. 22CA0024                                                     4

      {¶11} On February 17, 2021, CCJFS filed a Motion for a Six-Month Extension.

      {¶12} On April 5, 2021 the Annual Court Review was held. The juvenile court

found Mother was charged and convicted of Child Endangering, a felony of the third

degree due to injuries suffered by A.B.S. She served forty-six days at the Coshocton

County Justice Center and had been sentenced to three years community control

sanctions. She is currently in compliance with probation. Mother is residing at Chestnut

Crossing where she has secured a three-bedroom apartment since December 2020.

      {¶13} On July 7, 2021 Mother filed a motion to join J. D. as a party to the case

regarding the child A.B.S., which was denied by the court.

      {¶14} On September 3, 2021, CCJFS filed a Motion for Permanent Custody of

M.A.P. and A.B.S., as well as a Motion to Change Custody of T.E.S. and A.E.S. to T.K.

      {¶15} On November 2, 2021, Mother filed a motion to clarify the motion to join

J.D. as the Father of A.B.S.

      {¶16} The permanent custody and legal custody motions were heard by the

juvenile court on the following dates: January 4, 2022; January 5, 2022; February 24,

2022; March 3, 2022; March 9, 2022; March 16, 2022; March 23, 2022; March 24, 2022;

March 25, 2022; March 28, 2022; April 11, 2022; and, April 21, 2022.

      {¶17} On January 5, 2022, Mother filed a motion to Appoint a Separate Guardian

ad Litem. A Motion for In-Camera Interview of M.A.P. was filed by the GAL on January

5, 20222.

      2   The GAL subsequently withdrew the motion.
Coshocton County, Case No. 22CA0024                                                       5

       {¶18} On March 22, 2022, Mother filed a Renewed Motion for Independent

Observation of Mother's Supervised Visits and Motion to Continue the Final Hearing Date

for Mother's Case Until Six Weeks of Independent Observation Have Taken Place.

                                  Permanent Custody Hearings

       {¶19} Kaylee Shalosky, former CCJFS caseworker testified concerning the

accident and injuries to A.B.S. Ms. Shalosky further testified that Mother did not provide

contact information for J.D. 1T. at 108. Ms. Shalosky investigated relative placement for

the children; however, none were either willing or deemed suitable to care for the children.

1T. at 41-47.

       {¶20} Trooper Tyler McKee, Ohio State Highway Patrol, testified regarding a

traffic stop of the Mother on April 26, 2019 at approximately 10:30 pm, for a marked lane

violation and excessive speed. 1T. at 129. The two older boys were not properly belted

in, Mother was not properly belted in, and Mother appeared impaired base on her

bloodshot eyes and dilated pupils. Id. at 129-130. Mother admitted smoking marijuana

earlier. Mother denied any marijuana was in the vehicle; however, when asked if any was

in the diaper bag, she retrieved a small quantity from the bag. 1T. at 130. Trooper McKee

performed field sobriety tests on Mother. Mother was charged with Operating a Vehicle

While Impaired, not having a valid operator's license, a marked lanes violation, child

endangering and marijuana possession. Id. at 133-135.

       {¶21} Deputy Hannah LaBorde, Ruston Police Department, Ruston, Louisiana,

testified regarding an incident involving the Mother and Father A.S. occurring December

28, 2019. 1T. at 172. She responded to an incident in a standby capacity, observed

Mother to be pregnant, and observed a bruise to Mother's abdominal area. Id. at 173.
Coshocton County, Case No. 22CA0024                                                      6

Mother reported that Father A.S. was intoxicated, struck her several times in the

abdominal area, held a knife to her stomach, that she was in fear, and that there were

children present for the incident. 1T. at 175. Officer LaBorde reported other incidents

with the couple to which she responded and offered victim services to the Mother, which

were not followed through with by Mother. 1T. at 181-182; 187; CCJFS Exhibit 8.

       {¶22} Deanna Lanham, CCJFS Caseworker, testified that she assumed the case

in October 2020. 2T. at 216. The twins were placed with T.K. Id. at 217. Mother was

required to receive an assessment at Coshocton Behavioral Health Choices and follow

all recommendations. 2T. at 221-222. Mother was to submit to random announced and

unannounced drug screens and to develop sober supports. Mother was to engage at

First Step in regard to past violent relationships, maintain housing and employment. 2T.

at 222. Mother was further required to demonstrate the ability to manage all four children,

and follow all the terms of her community control. Id. Mother was required to follow the

recommendations of Dr. Wolfgang.

       {¶23} Mother was employed at that time. 2T. at 224-225. She completed her

assessment at Coshocton Behavioral Health Choices. Id. at 225. Mother received

counseling services from Jane Engott and was utilizing Coshocton Behavioral Health

Choices for sober support. Id. at 226. Mother completed an assessment with Dr.

Wolfgang. Id. Mother was seeing all four of her children twice per week. Id. at 227.

       {¶24} During a home visit on February 24, 2021, Mother expressed her frustration

with CCJFS. 2T. at 243. She refused to sign an amended case plan at that time. Id. at

244. Mother further indicated that because she is paying child support, she should not

be required to provide any items for the children. Id. at 243.
Coshocton County, Case No. 22CA0024                                                      7

        {¶25} In July 2021, Mother tested positive for THC. 2T. at 253. Mother admitted

to smoking marijuana at a birthday party. 2T. at 254. Mother’s visitation with the children

was suspended for three months. Id. at 255. Visitation resumed in October, 2021. 2T.

at 256. The children were much more resistant to Mother. 2T. at 258-261. She needed

assistance to manage the twins. Ms. Lanham testified that she has never observed

Mother being able to manage all four children. Id. at 261.

        {¶26} Ms. Lanham testified that Mother was not required to complete or provided

with parenting classes. 2T. at 262; 329-330. Rather, she received “coaching through her

visits.” Id.

        {¶27} On cross-examination, Ms. Lanham testified that the foster parents had

difficulty with M.A.P. and A.E.S. 3T. at 346. In fact, those two children had been in seven

different placements. Id. at 351. It was not alleged that Mother had used marijuana in

the presence of any of the children. It was further not alleged that Mother had been under

the influence of non-prescribed medication or drugs during any of her visits with the

children. Mother completed eleven of the fourteen case plan objectives. 4T. at 513.

Mother continually engaged in the services recommended by CCJFS. Id. at 515. Mother

utilized the medical providers, psychiatric providers and the rehabilitative services

provided to her. Id. at 516. Mother continually attended visitations with the children. Id.

at 518.

        {¶28} Sara   Jacobs    Lusk, visitation supervisor with Coshocton County Family

and Children's First Council (FCFC) testified regarding Mother's supervised visits with

the children from November 23, 2020 to November 2021. Ms. Lusk’s notes concerning
Coshocton County, Case No. 22CA0024                                                       8

her observations at Mother’s visitations were admitted into evidence during the hearing.

See, CCJFS Exhibits 11, 12, 15, 19-23; 26; 28; 30-33; 35-37; 40 & 41.

       {¶29} As designed, the supervised visitation program consisted of a pre-visit

advice session, the supervised visit with coaching, and a post-visit session. The services

were reduced to only a supervised visitation program due to the Mother's unwillingness

to accept suggestions or advice and unwillingness to engage with Ms. Lusk. 4T. at 530-

531. Coaching services were stopped June 24, 2021 due to Mother’s refusal to engage

with FCFC employees. Id. at 530. Ms. Lusk testified that she has not observed any

improvement in Mother’s ability to supervise the children. 4T. at 555. She further testified

that supervised visitation and coaching have not improved Mother’s parenting abilities.

Id. Ms. Lusk did note that Mother changes the children, feeds them, tells them she loves

them and plays with them during her visits. 4T. at 562-563. Overall, Ms. Lusk found

Mother to be distracted during the visits, unwilling to accept suggestions or advice

during the period such services were part of Mother's program, unable to provide for the

children's basic needs, lacking in attachment or bonding with the children, unable to

maintain the children safely, and difficult to supervise.

       {¶30} Ms. Lusk was recalled as a witness to testify regarding more recent visits of

the Mother, and in particular, the visit of March 21, 2022. This visit had been

terminated early by FCFC due to difficulties of the Mother supervising the children, who

were behaving poorly, which difficulties were escalated by the Mother's reaction and

conduct, and culminated in the Mother yelling profanities at the FCFC staff in the presence

of the children, who were visibly shaken by the outburst. 11T. at 1612-1614; 1614-1619.
Coshocton County, Case No. 22CA0024                                                       9

       {¶31} T.K. testified regarding kinship placement for T.E.S. and A.E.S. T.K.

testified to her experiences with the children. T.K. testified that she became aware of

Mother because T.K.’s ex-boyfriend and his sister knew Mother. 7T. at 990.             She

contacted CCJFS and told them she had watched the boys before and she would help

out if needed.

       {¶32} Gary Wolfgang, PhD, testified that he is retired. 8T. at 1108. Dr. Wolfgang

testified that he does not use psychological tests as a diagnostic tool. 7T. at 1058; 8T. at

1139-1140; 1154-1155; 1199. Instead, he relies on a psychosocial history interview, a

clinical interview, and a mental health status exam. Id. He spoke to the Mother, the

caseworker, and the two foster parents in drawing his conclusions. 8T. at 1160. Dr.

Wolfgang did not consult any medical or psychological providers of the children. Id. Dr.

Wolfgang has not reevaluated Mother since August, 2020. 8T. at 1189. Dr. Wolfgang

formed his opinions on the basis of,

              [A] very thorough four-part interview that included a very thorough

       and detailed psychosocial history. During the entire period, I observed her

       behaviors for the presence of psychological symptoms. I also reviewed all

       materials forwarded to me and quite recently observed interactions of the

       various parties of the children.

8T. at 1199. Dr. Wolfgang testified regarding Mother's evaluation, providing information

on his process, records reviewed, observations made during the four interviews and his

summary and recommendations as documented in his report dated December 4, 2020.

CCJFS Exhibit 7. He found Mother's difficulties to be chronic and confirmed a diagnosis

of Post-traumatic stress disorder. Dr. Wolfgang did not agree with a diagnosis of bipolar
Coshocton County, Case No. 22CA0024                                                      10

disorder preferring generalized mood dysregulation disorder.               Dr. Wolfgang,

acknowledged Mother’s cannabis dependence that may be in remission, and a

personality disorder with antisocial and narcissistic features due to issues with authority,

adherence to social norm and similar features. Ultimately, he opined that the Mother

needed psychotherapy with a psychodynamic element as well as psychotropic

medications to manage moods and behaviors; however, the prognosis for her showing

significant long-term benefit from mental health treatment was guarded if not poor; years

of various forms of treatment had not ameliorated her many issues to any appreciable

extent.

       {¶33} Dr. Wolfgang completed a second assessment to include observing the

Mother with the children as well as observing the children in the two placements with their

caregivers. CCJFS Exhibit 45. He noted that eye contact was shorter with the Mother

and there was less connection or bonding than with the caregivers. Physical contact with

the Mother was forced, strained, and not spontaneous which was markedly different than

with the caregivers. Physical contact was freely done with the caregivers, not the Mother.

The children were prone to seek out the visitation supervisor rather than the Mother for

comfort at visitations. Dr. Wolfgang testified about his observations on January 26, 2022

when A.B.S. acted out angrily. His report notes that A.B.S. refused physical contact with

the Mother and "angrily misbehaved as though to express his underlying feelings." Dr.

Wolfgang stated A.B.S. appeared to be "seeking revenge for past wrongs against him."

The twins also behaved in an equally challenging manner due to their energy and

mischievous behavior.     Mother responded in an inconsistent manner with no follow

through. Dr. Wolfgang noted that Mother was not intervening and failed to provide
Coshocton County, Case No. 22CA0024                                                      11

structure. His reports states that the children displayed "insecure avoidance pattern of

attachment" with the Mother. He noted the presence of maladaptive parental behaviors.

       {¶34} Mother presented the testimony of Ja n e E n g o t t , LPCC (Licensed

Professional   Clinical Counselor)     and   LICDC     (License   Independent     Chemical

Dependency Counselor) with Coshocton Behavioral Health Choices (CBHC). 8T. at

1285-1286. She began seeing Mother July 1, 2020. 9T. at 1314. Her last session with

Mother was a few days before Ms. Engott testified. Id. at 1315. Ms. Engott described the

improvement Mother has made completing twenty-three sessions of anger management

and fifty-two individual sessions with Ms. Engott. 9T. at 1317. Mother further completed

twenty-three sessions of the Phase II addiction and recovery group, graduating on

October 21, 2021. 9T. at 1358. This occurred after Mother had tested positive for

marijuana in July-August 2021. Id. at 1357-1358.

       {¶35} Ms. Engott's opinion was that Mother had been committed to the process,

had done all requested, and had made progress. Ms. Engott found no evidence of PTSD.

Id. at 1347. She disagreed with Dr. Wolfgang that generalized mood disorder is even a

diagnosis. Id. 1347-1348. Ms. Engott found no evidence to support a diagnosis of

personality disorder or narcissistic personality disorder. Id. at 1349. Ms. Engott testified

based upon the factors set forth in the DSM-5. Id.

       {¶36} Marissa McCleary a nurse practitioner with CBHC testified on Mother’s

behalf. Ms. McCleary specializes in both family medicine and psychiatric mental health.

9T. at 1381. Ms. McCleary is permitted to diagnose and treat mental health conditions.

Id. at 1384. She is also permitted to prescribe medication. Id. at 1385. Ms. McCleary

was qualified as an expert witness. Id.
Coshocton County, Case No. 22CA0024                                                   12

      {¶37} Ms. McCleary began seeing Mother June 1, 2020. 9T. at 1386; 1388.

Mother was diagnosed with Bipolar disorder, adjustment disorder and anxiety. Id. at

1388. She has seen Mother fourteen times. Ms. McCleary testified that Mother seemed

to be doing great as of her last appointment on March 8, 2022. 9T. at 1390. Ms. McCleary

was surprised to learn that Mother had not picked-up her medication and would have

been out of medication for nearly a month and a half. Id. at 1391. Mother presently was

taking Seroquel, Trazodone and BuSpar. Id. at 1395. Mother was not up to date with her

Seroquel and BuSpar. Id. Ms. McCleary agreed that Mother does not suffer from PTSD.

9T. at 1406. She further agreed that the DSM-5 does not list a generalized mood disorder.

Id. at 1406. She would question whether the person making such a diagnosis was using

the most current techniques and models. Id. at 1406-1407. She further disagreed that

Mother met the diagnosis for personality disorder, antisocial personality disorder or

narcissistic personality disorder. 9T. at 1406-1408; 1411. Ms. McCleary was aware that

Mother had several positive drug screens for THC in July, 2021. 9T. at 1430.

      {¶38} Mother also called her probation officer, Ross Nelson, to testify.        He

regarded Mother as being successful on her community control program, and she had

been released early on December 9, 2021, after approximately sixteen months of a three-

year sentence. On cross examination, he acknowledged Mother's failed drug screens

during the months of February, March, July, and August 2021, and she admitted use in

June 2021. He testified that many of the drug screens were strung back to back to the

same use. 9T. at 1456. He was waiting on the THC to clear her system on some of

those. Id.
Coshocton County, Case No. 22CA0024                                                  13

      {¶39} The Mother's final witness was Crystal Smucker, a counselor with First Step

Family Violence Intervention Services, Inc. CCJFS referred Mother in September 2020

for healthy relations educational program.       Mother attended as scheduled, was

cooperative, willing to participate, open, and completed the program on December 16,

2020. Ms. Smucker had limited information regarding Mother's past history of domestic

violence incidents, and her agency was not further involved in the case.

      {¶40} Permanent Custody of M.A.P. and A.B.S. to CCJFS and Legal Custody of

T.E.S. and A.E.S. to a non-relative kinship were granted by Entry Filed August 8, 2022.

                                     Assignments of Error

      {¶41} Mother raises five Assignments of Error:

      {¶42} “I. THE JUVENILE COURT ERRED IN AND DENIED APPELLANT HER

DUE PROCESS RIGHTS UNDER THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS BY

DENYING HER THE FUNDS NEEDED TO OBTAIN THE SERVICES OF A

PSYCHOLOGIST OF HER OWN CHOOSING TO ASSIST HER IN MEETING AND

REBUTTING THE TESTIMONY OF THE PSYCHOLOGISTS SELECTED AND PAID

FOR BY THE STATE.

      {¶43} “II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONTINUING THE TRIAL IN

ORDER FOR APPELLANT TO HAVE INDEPENDENT OBSERVATION OF HER

PARENTING TIME WITH THE CHILDREN AND TO HAVE PARENTING TIME HELD AT

A DIFFERENT LOCATION THAN FCFC.

      {¶44} “III.   THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING BY CLEAR AND

CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT THE CHILDREN COULD NOT BE [sic.] REASONABLY

BE PLACED WITH APPELLANT PURSUANT TO R.C. 2151.414 WHEN IT HELD THAT
Coshocton County, Case No. 22CA0024                                                    14

THE AGENCY USED REASONABLE AND DILIGENT EFFORTS TO REUNIFY THE

CHILDREN WITH APPELLANT.

       {¶45} “IV.   THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPOINTING SEPARATE

COUNSEL FOR THE CHILDREN AFTER IT CAME TO THE COURT'S ATTENTION

THAT THERE WAS A POSSIBLE CONFLICT OF INTEREST BETWEEN THE

CHILDREN’S WISHES AND THE GUARDIAN AD LITEM'S RECOMMENDATION.

       {¶46} “V. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE AND PLAIN ERROR

WHEN IT TERMINATED THE PARENTAL RIGHTS OF THE NATURAL FATHER OF

A.B.S. ALTHOUGH FATHER (J.D.) WAS NEVER PROPERLY SERVED A COPY OF

THE PERMANENT CUSTODY MOTION AND SUMMONS NOR WAS HE ADDED TO

CASE PLAN.”

                                                I.

       {¶47} In her First Assignment of Error, Mother contends that the trial court denied

her due process of law because the trial judge did not appoint an independent

psychologist to assist her in the preparation of her case.

       {¶48} Juv.R. 32 provides, in relevant part,

              (A) Social History and Physical or Mental Examination: Availability

       Before Adjudication. The court may order and utilize a social history or

       physical or mental examination at any time after the filing of a complaint

       under any of the following circumstances:

              (1) Upon the request of the party concerning whom the history or

       examination is to be made;
Coshocton County, Case No. 22CA0024                                                    15

            (2) Where transfer of a child for adult prosecution is an issue in the

     proceeding;

            (3) Where a material allegation of a neglect, dependency, or abused

     child complaint relates to matters that a history or examination may clarify;

            (4) Where a party’s legal responsibility for the party’s acts or the

     party’s competence to participate in the proceedings is an issue;

            (5) Where a physical or mental examination is required to determine

     the need for emergency medical care under Juv. R. 13; or

            (6) Where authorized under Juv. R. 7(I).

     {¶49} In In re Stanley, the Court of Appeals noted,

            It is well-settled that the care, custody, and management of one’s

     own children are fundamental rights. Santosky v. Kramer (1982), 455 U.S.

     745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1394, 71 L.Ed.2d 599. To adequately protect

     these rights, due process requires “fundamentally fair procedures” when a

     state moves to destroy already weakened familial bonds. Id. at 754. A

     parent has a paramount right to the custody of his or her child over a non-

     parent. This interest is subordinate only to the best interest of the child. In

     re Angelo Brown (Nov. 26, 1986), Hamilton App. No. C-850878, unreported,

     citing In re Perales (1977), 52 Ohio St.2d 89.

            Where the juvenile court grants the state’s request for a

     psychological examination of an indigent parent to be performed by an

     examiner selected and paid by the state [FCCS], the parent is entitled to an

     expert of his or her own. Funds to employ her own psychologist should
Coshocton County, Case No. 22CA0024                                                      16

      have been awarded appellant in order to afford her a meaningful opportunity

      to rebut the allegations of FCCS’s expert.

10th Dist. Franklin No. 93AP-972, 1993 WL 512502 (Dec. 7, 1993), at *3.

      {¶50} We note that constitutional errors are subject to a harmless error analysis.

In the context of a criminal trial, the Ohio Supreme Court addressed the “harmless error”

standard of review,

             In general, “‘a constitutional error does not automatically require

      reversal of a conviction.’” Weaver v. Massachusetts, ––– U.S. ––––, 137

      S.Ct. 1899, 1907, 198 L.Ed.2d 420 (2017), quoting Fulminante at 306, 499

      U.S. 279, 310, 111 S.Ct. 1246. For purposes of determining whether a

      conviction should be reversed, the Supreme Court has divided

      constitutional errors into two classes: “trial errors,” which are reviewable for

      harmless error, and “structural errors,” which are per se cause for reversal.

      State v. Fisher, 99 Ohio St.3d 127, 2003-Ohio-2761, 789 N.E.2d 222, ¶ 9,

      citing Fulminante at 306-312, 111 S.Ct. 1246, and State v. Esparza, 74 Ohio

      St.3d 660, 661, 660 N.E.2d 1194 (1996). Most constitutional errors are trial

      errors. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 148, 126 S.Ct.

      2557, 165 L.Ed.2d 409 (2006). Trial errors occur during “‘presentation of

      the case to the jury’ and their effect may ‘be quantitatively assessed in the

      context of other evidence presented in order to determine whether [they

      were] harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’” (Brackets sic.) Id., quoting

      Fulminante at 307-308, 499 U.S. 279, 310, 111 S.Ct. 1246. A constitutional

      trial error is harmless when the state demonstrates “‘beyond a reasonable
Coshocton County, Case No. 22CA0024                                                      17

       doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict

       obtained.’”   Weaver at ––––, 137 S.Ct. at 1907, quoting Chapman v.

       California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967).

State v. Montgomery, 169 Ohio St.3d 84, 2022-Ohio-2211, 202 N.E.3d 616, ¶25.

       {¶51} Although not appointed by the juvenile court judge, we note that Mother had

the assistance of two expert witnesses, Jane Engott, and nurse practioner Marissa

McCleary. As noted in our discussion of the Facts and Procedural History, both witnesses

criticized Dr. Wolfgang’s methodology and conclusions. Each witness also presented her

own diagnosis of Mother’s psychological make-up, Mother’s compliance with treatment

and her compliance with aspects of her case plan. Mother does not elucidate how having

a third opinion would have change the outcome of the proceedings.

       {¶52} We find any error in the juvenile judge’s failure to appoint a psychological

expert for Mother to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and did not affect the

Mother’s substantial rights.

       {¶53} Mother’s First Assignment of Error is overruled.

                                                II.

       {¶54} In her Second Assignment of Error, Mother argues the trial court erred in

denying her a continuance. Specifically, Mother contends she filed a Motion for an

Independent Observation of Mother's Supervised Visits on March 14, 2022, which was

denied by Judgment Entry filed March 23, 2022. As refiled on March 22, 2022, with the

addition of a motion to continue the trial to allow for six weeks of independent observation

of Mother with the children, the motion was eventually partly granted for the independent

observation; however, this was already during the final hearing which did not leave time
Coshocton County, Case No. 22CA0024                                                        18

for Mother to establish a new parenting center. The motion to continue the trial for six

weeks was denied.

        {¶55} The permanent custody hearing took place on the following dates: January

4, 2022; January 5, 2022; February 24, 2022; March 3, 2022; March 9, 2022; March 16,

2022; March 23, 2022; March 24, 2022; March 25, 2022; March 28, 2022; April 11, 2022;

and, April 21, 2022. In other words, from start to finish the hearing spanned over three

months. The trial court’s Judgment Entry granting the independent observation and

denying the continuance was filed April 5, 2022, some seventeen days before the

conclusion of the hearing.

        {¶56} In Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 84 S.Ct. 841, 11 L.Ed.2d 921 (1964), the

Court considered the matter of granting a continuance under a due process analysis. It

said:

               The matter of continuance is traditionally within the discretion of the

        trial judge, and it is not every denial of a request for more time that violates

        due process even if the party fails to offer evidence.... Contrariwise, a

        myopic insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request

        for delay can render the right to defend with counsel an empty formality....

        There are no mechanical tests for deciding when a denial of a continuance

        is so arbitrary as to violate due process. The answer must be found in the

        circumstances present in every case, particularly in the reasons presented

        to the trial judge at the time the request is denied....”

Id. at 589, 84 S.Ct. at 849.
Coshocton County, Case No. 22CA0024                                                     19

      {¶57} As detailed in the juvenile court’s Judgment Entry filed August 8, 2022,

Mother’s cross-examination of the witnesses presented lasted in some instances over

four hours. The court further noted over forty-one motions had been filed, the majority of

which were filed during the months long permanent custody hearings.

      {¶58} As the Ohio Supreme Court has recently explained,

             The term “abuse of discretion” connotes that “‘the court’s attitude is

      unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.’” [State v. Gondor, 112 Ohio

      St.3d 377, 2006-Ohio-6679, 860 N.E.2d 77] at ¶ 60, quoting State v. Adams,

      62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157, 404 N.E.2d 144 (1980). Stated differently, an

      abuse of discretion involves more than a difference in opinion: the “‘term

      discretion itself involves the idea of choice, of an exercise of the will, of a

      determination made between competing considerations.’” State v. Jenkins,

      15 Ohio St.3d 164, 222, 473 N.E.2d 264 (1984), quoting Spalding v.

      Spalding, 355 Mich. 382, 384, 94 N.W.2d 810 (1959). For a court of appeals

      to reach an abuse-of-discretion determination, the trial court’s judgment

      must be so profoundly and wholly violative of fact and reason that “‘it

      evidences not the exercise of will but perversity of will, not the exercise of

      judgment but defiance thereof, not the exercise of reason but rather of

      passion or bias.’” Id., quoting Spalding at 384-385, 94 N.W.2d 810.

State v. Weaver, Slip Op. 2022-Ohio-4371, ¶24 (Dec. 8, 2022).

      {¶59} Mother’s reasons for asking for the continuance were entirely speculative.

Whether the testimony would have been favorable or unfavorable is a matter of

conjecture. The trial court had an interest in controlling its own docket and ensuring the
Coshocton County, Case No. 22CA0024                                                      20

prompt and efficient administration of justice. See Unger, 67 Ohio St.2d at 67, 423 N.E.2d

1078. The trial court clearly felt that Mother was adequately represented by competent

counsel and that there was no reason to delay the hearings any further. Unquestionably,

the rescheduling of the trial six weeks in a case where the hearings had stretched three

months would have involved some degree of inconvenience for the court and the

witnesses. Balanced against this is Mother’s speculative desire to have a third party

observe her interact with her children.

       {¶60} Mother has not demonstrated prejudice from the court's denial of her motion

to continue, and the court did not abuse its discretion in overruling the motion.

       {¶61} Mother’s Second Assignment of Error is overruled.

                                                 III.

       {¶62} In her Third Assignment of Error, Mother contends the trial court erred in

finding by clear and convincing evidence that the children could not reasonably be placed

with Mother pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 when it held that the agency used reasonable and

diligent efforts to reunify the children with Mother.

                                 Standard of Appellate Review

       {¶63} “[T]he right to raise a child is an ‘essential’ and ‘basic’ civil right.” In re

Murray, 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 157, 556 N.E.2d 1169(1990), quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405

U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551(1972). A parent's interest in the care, custody,

and management of his or her child is “fundamental.” Id.; Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S.

745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599(1982). The permanent termination of a parent's

rights has been described as, “* * * the family law equivalent to the death penalty in a

criminal case.” In re Smith, 77 Ohio App.3d 1, 16, 601 N.E.2d 45(6th Dist. 1991).
Coshocton County, Case No. 22CA0024                                                         21

Therefore, parents “must be afforded every procedural and substantive protection the law

allows.” Id. An award of permanent custody must be based upon clear and convincing

evidence. R.C. 2151.414(B)(1).

       {¶64} The Ohio Supreme Court has delineated our standard of review as follows,

“clear and convincing evidence” is “[t]he measures or degree of proof that will produce in

the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the allegations sought to be

established. It is intermediate, being more than a mere preponderance, but not to the

extent of such certainty as required beyond a reasonable doubt as in criminal cases. It

does not mean clear and unequivocal.” In re Estate of Haynes, 25 Ohio St.3d 101, 103-

104, 495 N.E.2d 23 (1986). In Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 477, 120 N.E.2d 118

(1954), the Supreme Court further cautioned,

              The mere number of witnesses, who may support a claim of one or

       the other of the parties to an action, is not to be taken as a basis for resolving

       disputed facts.     The degree of proof required is determined by the

       impression which the testimony of the witnesses makes upon the trier of

       facts, and the character of the testimony itself. Credibility, intelligence,

       freedom from bias or prejudice, opportunity to be informed, the disposition

       to tell the truth or otherwise, and the probability or improbability of the

       statements made, are all tests of testimonial value. Where the evidence is

       in conflict, the trier of facts may determine what should be accepted as the

       truth and what should be rejected as false. See Rice v. City of Cleveland,

       114 Ohio St. 299, 58 N.E.2d 768.
Coshocton County, Case No. 22CA0024                                                        22

161 Ohio St. at 477-478. (Emphasis added). A court of appeals will affirm the trial court's

findings “if the record contains competent, credible evidence by which the court could

have formed a firm belief or conviction that the essential statutory elements for a

termination of parental rights have been established.”        In re Adkins, 5th Dist. Nos.

2005AP06–0044 and 2005AP07–0049, 2006-Ohio-431, 2006 WL 242557, ¶17.

                        Requirements for Permanent Custody Awards

       {¶65} R.C. 2151.414 sets forth the guidelines a trial court must follow when

deciding a motion for permanent custody. R.C. 2151.414(A)(1) mandates the trial court

schedule a hearing and provide notice upon filing of a motion for permanent custody of a

child by a public children services agency or private child placing agency that has

temporary custody of the child or has placed the child in long-term foster care.

       {¶66} Following the hearing, R.C. 2151.414(B) authorizes the juvenile court to

grant permanent custody of the child to the public or private agency if the court

determines, by clear and convincing evidence, it is in the best interest of the child to grant

permanent custody to the agency, and that any of the following apply:

              (a) The child is not abandoned or orphaned, has not been in the

       temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or

       private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive

       twenty-two-month period, or has not been in the temporary custody of one

       or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies

       for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period if, as

       described in division (D)(1) of section 2151.413 of the Revised Code, the

       child was previously in the temporary custody of an equivalent agency in
Coshocton County, Case No. 22CA0024                                                   23

       another state, and the child cannot be placed with either of the child's

       parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child's

       parents;

              (b) the child is abandoned;

              (c) the child is orphaned and there are no relatives of the child who

       are able to take permanent custody; or

              (d) The child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public

       children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or

       more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, or the child has

       been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services

       agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a

       consecutive twenty-two-month period and, as described in division (D)(1) of

       section 2151.413 of the Revised Code, the child was previously in the

       temporary custody of an equivalent agency in another state.

       {¶67} Therefore, R.C. 2151.414(B) establishes a two-pronged analysis the trial

court must apply when ruling on a motion for permanent custody. In practice, the trial

court will usually determine whether one of the four circumstances delineated in R.C.

2151.414(B)(1)(a) through (d) is present before proceeding to a determination regarding

the best interest of the child.

         Temporary Custody for at least 12 out of a consecutive 22-month period-

                                  R.C. 2151.414(B) (1) (d).

       {¶68} The “12 of 22” provisions set forth in R.C. 2151.413(D)(1) and R.C.

2151.414(B)(1)(d) balance the importance of reuniting a child with the child’s parents
Coshocton County, Case No. 22CA0024                                                      24

against the importance of a speedy resolution of the custody of a child. In re C.W., 104

Ohio St.3d 163, 2004–Ohio–6411, 818 N.E.2d 1176, ¶22.             Through the “12 of 22”

provisions in the permanent-custody statutes, the legislature provides parents with 12

months to work toward reunification before an agency can institute a permanent-custody

action asserting R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) grounds. Id.

       {¶69} The children were removed from Mother’s care on March 16, 2020. The

motion for permanent custody was filed September 3, 2021, some 1 year and 5 months

after CCJFS assumed custody.       Accordingly, the trial court correctly found M.A.P. and

A.B.S. had been in the temporary custody of the CCJFS for over twelve months of a

consecutive 22-month period.

       {¶70} As findings under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) and R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) are

alternative findings, each is independently sufficient to use as a basis to grant the motion

for permanent custody. In re Daltoni, 5th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 2007 AP 0041, 2007-

Ohio-5805. This finding alone, in conjunction with a best interest finding, is sufficient to

support the grant of permanent custody. In re Calhoun, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2008CA00118,

2008-Ohio-5458.

       {¶71} Because Mother has not challenged the twelve of twenty-two-month finding

as to M.A.P. and A.B.S., we would not need to address the merits of Mother’s assignment

of error. However, even if we consider Mother’s arguments the trial court did not err in

determining the children cannot be placed with Mother at this time or within a reasonable

period of time.

          Parental Placement within a Reasonable Time– R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)
Coshocton County, Case No. 22CA0024                                                       25

       {¶72} The court must consider all relevant evidence before determining the child

cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with

the parents. R.C. 2151.414(E). The statute also indicates that if the court makes a finding

under R.C. 2151.414(E)(1)-(15), the court shall determine the children cannot or should

not be placed with the parent. A trial court may base its decision that a child cannot be

placed with a parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with a parent upon

the existence of any one of the R.C. 2151.414(E) factors. The existence of one factor

alone will support a finding that the child cannot be placed with the parent within a

reasonable time. See In re William S., 75 Ohio St.3d 95, 1996–Ohio–182, 661 N.E.2d

738; In re Hurlow, 4th Dist. Gallia No. 98 CA 6, 1997 WL 701328 (Sept. 21, 1998); In re

Butcher, 4th Dist. Athens No. 1470, 1991 WL 62145(Apr. 10, 1991).

       {¶73} R.C. 2151.414(E) sets forth factors a trial court is to consider in determining

whether a child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable period of time or

should not be placed with the parents. Specifically, Section (E) provides, in pertinent part,

as follows:

              (E) In determining at a hearing held pursuant to division (A) of this

       section or for the purposes of division (A)(4) of section 2151.353 of the

       Revised Code whether a child cannot be placed with either parent within a

       reasonable period of time or should not be placed with the parents, the court

       shall consider all relevant evidence. If the court determines, by clear and

       convincing evidence, at a hearing held pursuant to division (A) of this

       section or for the purposes of division (A)(4) of section 2151.353 of the

       Revised Code that one or more of the following exist as to each of the child’s
Coshocton County, Case No. 22CA0024                                                    26

       parents, the court shall enter a finding that the child cannot be placed with

       either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either

       parent:

              (1) Following the placement of the child outside the child’s home and

       notwithstanding reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by the agency

       to assist the parents to remedy the problems that initially caused the child

       to be placed outside the home, the parent has failed continuously and

       repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions causing the child to be

       placed outside the child’s home. In determining whether the parents have

       substantially remedied those conditions, the court shall consider parental

       utilization of medical, psychiatric, psychological, and other social and

       rehabilitative services and material resources that were made available to

       the parents for changing parental conduct to allow them to resume and

       maintain parental duties.

                                               ***

              (16) Any other factor the court considers relevant.

       {¶74} As set forth above, the trial court’s findings are based upon competent

credible evidence. The record includes the recommendation of the guardian ad litem for

the children, and the testimony of the witnesses at trial. The trial judge was in the best

position to determine the credibility of the witnesses.

       {¶75} The juvenile court found that CCJFS had made reasonable efforts to

prevent the removal, to eliminate the continued removal, or to make it possible for M.A.P.

and A.B.S. to return home safely to Mother’s home.
Coshocton County, Case No. 22CA0024                                                    27

      {¶76} The record supports the juvenile court’s finding that Mother has not shown

consistent sustained progress to have the children returned to her custody. She has not

consistently taken her prescribed medications.   It does not appear that Mother has been

able to apply any behavioral changes that she has attempted to learn. Despite offering

numerous services, Mother was unable or unwilling to mitigate the concerns that led to

the children’s removal. As set forth in our Facts and Procedural History, supra, we find

there was sufficient and substantial competent evidence Mother failed to remedy the

problems which initially caused the removal of M.A.P. and A.B.S. from her home.

      {¶77} A parent’s successful completion of the terms of a case plan is not

dispositive on the issue of reunification. The ultimate question under R.C. 2151.414(A)(1)

is whether the parent has substantially remedied the conditions that caused the child’s

removal. In re Shchigelski, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 99–G–2241, 2000 WL 1568388 (Oct.

20, 2000); In re McKenzie, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 95CA0015, 1995 WL 608285(Oct. 18,

1995). A parent can successfully complete the terms of a case plan yet not substantially

remedy the conditions that caused the children to be removed—the case plan is simply a

means to a goal, but not the goal itself. Hence, the courts have held that the successful

completion of case plan requirements does not preclude a grant of permanent custody to

a social services agency. In re J.L., 8th Dist. No. 84368, 2004–Ohio–6024, ¶ 20; In re

Mraz, 12th Dist. Nos. CA2002–05–011, CA2002–07–014, 2002–Ohio–7278. In the case

of in re: Summerfield, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2005CA00139, 2005-Ohio-5523, this Court

found where, despite marginal compliance with some aspects of the case plan, the exact

problems that led to the initial removal remained in existence, a court does not err in

finding the child cannot be placed with the parent within a reasonable time.
Coshocton County, Case No. 22CA0024                                                      28

       {¶78} The evidence demonstrated the very little successful efforts Mother had

made on the case plan. On that point, the evidence demonstrates that any improvement

that Mother has made in her life is tentative and, perhaps, temporary, and that she is at

risk of relapse. The trial court found that Mother is not able to be a successful parent to

the children.

       {¶79} We find there is competent and credible evidence to support the trial court’s

determination that M.A.P. and A.B.S. cannot be placed with Mother within a reasonable

time or should not be placed with Mother.

                                       Reasonable Efforts

       {¶80} Mother further contends the finding that CCJFS made reasonable efforts to

reunify the children with Mother is against the manifest weight of the evidence.

       {¶81} The Supreme Court of Ohio in in re C.F., 113 Ohio St.3d 73, 78, 862 N.E.2d

816, 821(2007) noted,

                [N]o one section of the Revised Code addresses the concept of

       reasonable efforts. Overall, Ohio’s child-welfare laws are designed to care

       for and protect children, ‘whenever possible, in a family environment,

       separating the child from the child’s parents only when necessary for the

       child’s welfare or in the interests of public safety.’ R.C. 2151.01(A). To that

       end, various sections of the Revised Code refer to the agency’s duty to

       make reasonable efforts to preserve or reunify the family unit. For example,

       R.C. 2151.412 requires the agency to prepare and maintain a case plan for

       children in temporary custody with the goal ‘to eliminate with all due speed

       the need for the out-of-home placement so that the child can safely return
Coshocton County, Case No. 22CA0024                                                        29

       home.’    Under R.C. 2151.413(D)(3)(b), an agency may not file for

       permanent custody under R.C. 2151.413(D) - the ‘12 months out of 22 rule’-

       ‘[i]f reasonable efforts to return the child to the child’s home are required

       under section 2151.419’ and the agency has not provided the services

       required by the case plan.

       {¶82} A “reasonable effort” is “* * * an honest, purposeful effort, free of malice and

the design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage.” In re Weaver, 79 Ohio

App.3d 59, 63, 606 N.E.2d 1011(12th Dist. 1992). The issue is not whether there was

anything more the agency could have done, but whether the agency’s case planning and

efforts were reasonable and diligent under the circumstances of the case. In re J.D., 3rd

Dist. Hancock Nos. 5-10-34, 2011-Ohio-1458. The child’s health and safety is paramount

in determining whether reasonable efforts were made. In re R.P., 5th Dist. Tuscarawas

No. 2011-Ohio-5378.

       {¶83} R.C. 2151.419 requires the trial court to determine whether the agency filing

the complaint for custody “has made reasonable efforts * * * to eliminate the continued

removal of the child from his home, or to make it possible for the child to return home.”

Subsection (B)(1) mandates the trial court to issue written findings of fact setting forth the

reasonable efforts made by the agency, including a brief description of “the relevant

services provided by the agency to the family of the child and why those services did not

prevent the removal of the child from his home or enable the child to return home.”

       {¶84} However, even where a trial court has failed to include in its judgment entry,

the findings contemplated by R.C. 2151.419(B)(1) we have found that the ultimate issue

is the reasonableness of the Department’s efforts, and have concluded those efforts may
Coshocton County, Case No. 22CA0024                                                         30

be determined from the record.        In the matter of Kell/Bess Children, 5th Dist. No.

97CA0278, 1998 WL 401767(Mar. 23, 1998); Hunt v. Ickes, 5th Dist. Tuscarawas No.

2014 AP 08 0032, 2015-Ohio-309, ¶19.

       {¶85} We find there is competent and credible evidence to support the trial court’s

determination that CCJFS efforts were reasonable and diligent under the circumstances

of the case. We find that the record supports that CCJFS was working toward the goal

of reunification. We find no evidence of dishonest purpose, conscious wrongdoing, or

breach of duty on the part of CCJFS.

       {¶86} Having reviewed the record, we find that CCJFS made a good faith effort

to reunify Mother and her children. Furthermore, the record contains clear and convincing

evidence to support the court’s determination that the children could not be placed with

Mother.

                                The Best Interest of the Children

       {¶87} An agency that seeks permanent custody of a child bears the burden of

proving by clear and convincing evidence that the grant of permanent custody is in the

child’s best interest. In re B.C., 141 Ohio St.3d 55, 2014-Ohio-4558, 21 N.E.3d 308, ¶

26.

       {¶88} R.C. 2151.414(D) requires the trial court to consider all relevant factors in

determining whether the child’s best interests would be served by granting the permanent

custody motion. These factors include but are not limited to: (1) the interrelationship of

the child with others; (2) the wishes of the child; (3) the custodial history of the child; (4)

the child’s need for a legally secure placement and whether such a placement can be
Coshocton County, Case No. 22CA0024                                                       31

achieved without permanent custody; and (5) whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7)

to (11) apply.

       {¶89} The factors in R.C. 2151.414(E)(7) through (11), which are referred to in

R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(e), involve a parent’s having been convicted of or pleaded guilty to

specific criminal offenses against the child, the child’s sibling or another child who lived

in the parent’s household; a parent’s withholding medical treatment or food from the child;

a parent’s repeatedly placing the child at substantial risk of harm because of alcohol or

drug abuse; a parent’s abandoning the child; and a parent’s having had parental rights

as to the child’s sibling involuntarily terminated.

       {¶90} No one element is given greater weight or heightened significance. In re

C.F., 113 Ohio St.3d 73, 2007-Ohio-1104, 862 N.E.2d 816. R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) does

not require a juvenile court to make specific findings regarding each best-interest factor

listed in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) or to include in its decision or judgment entry a written

discussion of each of those factors. In re: A.M., 166 Ohio St.3d 127, 2020-Ohio-5102,

184 N.E.3d 1, ¶33.

       {¶91}     A child’s best interests are served by the child being placed in a permanent

situation that fosters growth, stability, and security. We have frequently noted, “[t]he

discretion which the juvenile court enjoys in determining whether an order of permanent

custody is in the best interest of a child should be accorded the utmost respect, given the

nature of the proceeding and the impact the court’s determination will have on the lives

of the parties concerned.” In re Mauzy Children, 5th Dist. No. 2000CA00244, 2000 WL

1700073 (Nov. 13, 2000), citing In re Awkal, 85 Ohio App.3d 309, 316, 642 N.E.2d 424

(8th Dist. 1994).
Coshocton County, Case No. 22CA0024                                                      32

       {¶92} In the case at bar, CCJFS attempted to find relative placement for each

child; however, their efforts were not successful.

       {¶93} The witnesses testified as to the minor children avoiding physical contact

with the Mother and showing anxiety and getting clingy relating to visitations. Both M.A.P.

and A.B.S. are in counseling due to trauma relating to the Mother.          A.B.S. started

counseling following the GAL recommending the same due to emotional damage caused

at visitation with the Mother. The minor children herein are more attached to their

placements than to any of the biological parents, their behavior indicates they wish to stay

in their placements, and they have been in the care of the agency (M.A.P. and A.B.S.) or

placement (A.E.S. and T.E.S.) for the majority of their lives.

       {¶94} Finally, the Guardian ad Litem recommended that the permanent custody

of the children be granted to the Agency.

       {¶95} In short, the juvenile court’s judgment entry demonstrates that the court

satisfied its statutory duty to consider the best interest factors set out in R.C.

2151.414(D)(1)(a) through (e).

                                            Conclusion

       {¶96} Having reviewed the record, we find that CCJFS made a good faith effort to

reunify Mother and her children. Furthermore, the record contains clear and convincing

evidence to support the court’s determination that M.A.P. and A.B.S. could not be placed

with Mother.

       {¶97} We find that the trial court’s determination that Mother had failed to remedy

the issues that caused the initial removal and therefore the children could not be placed

with her within a reasonable time or should not be placed with her was based upon
Coshocton County, Case No. 22CA0024                                                      33

competent credible evidence and is not against the manifest weight or sufficiency of the

evidence.

       {¶98} We further find the trial court correctly found that the children had been in

the temporary custody of the CCJFS for over twelve months of a consecutive 22-month

period.

            Legal Custody and the Best Interest of the Children – T.E.S. & A.E.S.

       {¶99} The award of legal custody is “not as drastic a remedy as permanent

custody.” In re L.D., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 12AP-985, 2013-Ohio-3214. This is because

the award of legal custody does not divest parents of their residual rights, privileges, and

responsibilities. In re C.R., 108 Ohio St.3d 369, 2006-Ohio-1191, 843 N.E.2d 1188.

       {¶100} Before awarding legal custody to a non-parent, a trial court must ordinarily

make a finding that each parent is unsuitable. In re L.P., 5th Dist. Muskingum No.

CT2016-0045, 2017-Ohio-52, citing In re Hockstock, 98 Ohio St.3d 238, 2002-Ohio-7208.

This requirement does not apply, however, in cases involving abuse, neglect, or

dependency. Id. The Ohio Supreme Court has held that, “[a] juvenile court adjudication

of abuse, neglect, or dependency is a determination about the care and condition of a

child and implicitly involves a determination of the unsuitability of the child’s custodial

and/or noncustodial parents.” In re C.R., 108 Ohio St.3d 369, 2006-Ohio-1191, 843

N.E.2d 1188. Thus, “[w]hen a juvenile court adjudicates a child to be abused, neglected,

or dependent, it has no duty to make a separate finding at the dispositional hearing that

a noncustodial parent is unsuitable before awarding legal custody to a nonparent.” Id. In

this case, the child was adjudicated abused. R.C. 2151.353(A) states, in pertinent part,
Coshocton County, Case No. 22CA0024                                                     34

             If a child is adjudicated an abused, neglected, or dependent child,

      the court may make any of the following orders of disposition:

                                           ***

             (3) Award legal custody of the child to either parent or to any other

      person who, prior to the dispositional hearing, files a motion requesting legal

      custody of the child or is identified as a proposed legal custodian in a

      complaint or motion filed prior to the dispositional hearing by any party to

      the proceedings * * *.

      {¶101} A trial court “must have wide latitude in considering all the evidence” and a

custody decision will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Davis v. Flickinger,

77 Ohio St.3d 415, 674 N.E.2d 1159, citing Miller v. Miller, 37 Ohio St.3d 71, 523 N.E.2d

846 (1988). As an appellate court, we neither weigh the evidence nor judge the credibility

of the witnesses. Our role is to determine whether there is relevant, competent, and

credible evidence upon which the finder of fact could base its judgment. Cross Truck

Equip. Co. v. The Joseph A. Jeffries Co., 5th Dist. Stark No. CA5758, 1982 WL 2911

(Feb. 10, 1982). Accordingly, judgments supported by some competent and credible

evidence going to all the essential elements of the case will not be reversed as being

against the manifest weight of the evidence. C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Constr., 54 Ohio

St.2d 279, 376 N.E.2d 578 (1978).

      {¶102} Unlike in a permanent custody proceeding where a juvenile court’s standard

of review is by clear and convincing evidence, the standard of review in legal custody

proceedings is a preponderance of the evidence.         In re S.D., 5th Dist. Stark Nos.

2013CA0081, 2013CA0082, 2013-Ohio-5752.
Coshocton County, Case No. 22CA0024                                                           35

       {¶103} Issues relating to the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given

to the evidence are primarily for the trier of fact. Seasons Coal v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio

St.3d 77, 461 N.E.2d 1273 (1984). Deferring to the trial court on matters of credibility “is

crucial in a child custody case, where there may be as much evidence in the parties’

demeanor and attitude that does not translate to the record well.” Davis v. Flickinger, 77

Ohio St.3d 415, 674 N.E.2d 1159.

       {¶104} The statutory scheme regarding an award of legal custody does not include

a specific test or set of criteria, and a trial court must base its decision on the best interest

of the child. In re C.R., 108 Ohio St.3d 369, 2006-Ohio-1191, 843 N.E.2d 1188; In re

P.S., 5th Dist. Stark No. 2012CA00007, 2012-Ohio-3431. When determining the issue of

legal custody, the trial court should consider the totality of the circumstances. In re D.T.,

5th Dist. Stark No. 2013CA00252, 2014-Ohio-2495. Trial courts should consider all

factors relevant to the best interest of the child. Id. This may include the best interest

factors contained in R.C. 2151.414(D) and/or R.C. 3109.4(F), including: the wishes of

the child (expressed to the court or through the GAL) and the child’s parents; the child’s

interactions and interrelationship with the child’s parents, siblings, and any other person

who may significantly affect the child; the custodial history of the child; the child’s need

for a legally secure placement; the child’s adjustment to their home, school, and

community; the mental and physical health of all persons involved in the situation; and

the person more likely to facilitate court-approved parenting time rights or visitation.

       {¶105} The factors in R.C. 2151.414(E)(7) through (11), which are referred to in

R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(e), involve a parent’s having been convicted of or pleaded guilty to

specific criminal offenses against the child, the child’s sibling or another child who lived
Coshocton County, Case No. 22CA0024                                                             36

in the parent’s household; a parent’s withholding medical treatment or food from the child;

a parent’s repeatedly placing the child at substantial risk of harm because of alcohol or

drug abuse; a parent’s abandoning the child; and a parent’s having had parental rights

as to the child’s sibling involuntarily terminated.

       {¶106} No one element is given greater weight or heightened significance. In re

C.F., 113 Ohio St.3d 73, 2007-Ohio-1104, 862 N.E.2d 816. R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) does

not require a juvenile court to make specific findings regarding each best-interest factor

listed in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) or to include in its decision or judgment entry a written

discussion of each of those factors. In re: A.M., 166 Ohio St.3d 127, 2020-Ohio-5102,

184 N.E.3d 1, ¶33.

       {¶107} In the case sub judice, Mother made minimal progress toward completion of

portions of her case plan, but the primary goal is not to simply complete the case plan. In

re T.H., 5th Dist. Muskingum No. CT2016-0009, 2016-Ohio-7312, ¶ 42.                     Even the

successful completion of a case plan is not dispositive on the issue of reunification. In re

W.A.J., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99813, 2014-Ohio-604. Where a parent has participated

in his or her case plan and completed most or all the plan requirements, a trial court

may still properly determine that such parent has not substantially remedied the problems

leading to agency involvement. In the Matter of A.L. and J.L., 5th Dist. Guernsey No.

11 CA 23, 2012-Ohio-481. While it may be in Mother's best interest to complete the

case plan, this is only one factor for a trial court to consider in the best interest of the child,

and, “in legal custody cases, trial courts should consider all factors relevant to the best

interest of the child.” In the Matter of D.P. and G.P., 5th Dist. Stark No. 2010CA00348,

2011-Ohio-1907.
Coshocton County, Case No. 22CA0024                                                      37

       {¶108} The issue in this case is whether the preponderance of the evidence

demonstrated it was in the best interest of T.E.S. and A.E.S. to grant legal custody to T.K.

       {¶109} In the case at bar, T.K. testified that T.E.S. and A.E.S. moved into her home

on October 7, 2020 and have resided there continuously since that time. She noted that

the children are more emotional and agitated following visitations with Mother. She

confirmed that she and the foster parents for M.A.P. and A.B.S. both now and in the

future will work to maintain the relationship between all four boys. T.K. testified that she

and T.E.S. and A.E.S. are family, bonded, and love each other. She is willing to comply

with court orders relating to the parents' visitation/parenting time schedule.

       {¶110} Based on the foregoing, we find the trial court did not commit error in

awarding legal custody of T.E.S. and A.E.S. to T.K.

       {¶111} Mother’s Third Assignment of Error is overruled.

                                                IV.

       {¶112} In her Fourth Assignment of Error, Mother contends the juvenile court erred

in not appointing separate counsel for the children after it came to the court's attention

that there was a possible conflict of interest between the children’s wishes and the

guardian ad litem's recommendation.

                                 Standard of Appellate Review

       {¶113} A guardian ad litem [GAL] can, in some situations, serve a dual role as both

the guardian ad litem and the child’s attorney, see Juv.R. 4(C) and R.C. 2151.281(H),

and thereby fulfill the child’s right to counsel, provided there has been an express dual

appointment by the juvenile court. In re Williams, 101 Ohio St.3d 398, 2004-Ohio-1500,
Coshocton County, Case No. 22CA0024                                                     38

805 N.E.2d 1110, ¶18, citing In re Duncan/Walker Children, 109 Ohio App.3d 841, 844–

845, 673 N.E.2d 217(5th Dist. 1996).

       {¶114} Sup.R. 48.02(D)(1) and Juv. R. 4(C) require a trial court to appoint a

separate attorney to represent a child in cases where the wishes of the child differ from

the recommendation of the GAL.

       {¶115} The determination of whether a conflict of interest exists between the GAL

and the child is a legal issue that we review de novo. In re Qu. W., 11th Dist. Ashtabula

No. 2015-A-0016, 2015-Ohio-2202, ¶61, citing, In re McLean, 11th Dist. Trumbull No.

2005–T–0018, 2005–Ohio–2576, ¶ 54.

       Issue for Appellate Review: Whether the juvenile court erred as a matter of law

                   in failing to appoint separate counsel for the children

       {¶116} In the case at bar, in over 1700 pages of transcripts, and 41 motions and

rulings thereon, Mother is only able to point to the following exchange in support of her

argument that a conflict existed,

              [GAL]: The last preliminary issue I would like to address is the one

       regarding [M.A.P.] having a potential conflict of interest. Your Honor, I have

       been in correspondence with Sarah at FCFC this morning. The information

       I have is that [M.A.P.] is seeking to go with his placement [K.Y.] who he is

       referring to as Mom, and seeking to leave the room, getting his coat, and

       [A.B.S.]'s coat and, in fact, leaving the visit early for that purpose.

1T. at 25. [Appellant’s brief at 15]. Mother herself notes that the child’s statement is

ambiguous, “The record is not clear as to his wishes. Other interpretations include him
Coshocton County, Case No. 22CA0024                                                      39

wanting to leave with appellant and go somewhere other than the one room visitation

center.” Appellant’s brief at 15.

       {¶117} Generally, the appointment of independent counsel is warranted when a

child has “repeatedly expressed a desire” to remain or be reunited with a parent but the

child’s guardian ad litem believes it is in the child’s best interest that permanent custody

of the child be granted to the state. In re Williams, 101 Ohio St.3d 398, 2004-Ohio-1500,

805 N.E.2d 1110, ¶¶ 5-6

       {¶118} Courts have recognized,

              [T]he desire by a child to see his or her parent does not equate to a

       desire to live in that parent’s household. In re A.T., 2006-Ohio-3919, at ¶

       61, citing In re G.C. 8th Dist. No. 83994, 2004-Ohio-5607, ¶ 9. We have

       similarly recognized that “the presence of parent/child bonding is not the

       same thing as making a knowing choice to remain with one parent.” In re A.

       T., 2006-Ohio-3919, at ¶ 61, quoting In re M.W., 8th Dist. No. 83390, 2005-

       Ohio-1302, at ¶ 12. The mere fact that a child enjoys seeing his or her

       parent at visitation is not, therefore, in conflict with a recommendation for

       permanent custody by a guardian ad litem. See In re A. T., 2006-Ohio-

       3919, at ¶ 61.

In re J.B., 9th Dist. Summit No. 23436, 2007-Ohio-620, ¶23.

       {¶119} Clearly, this is not a case where the children have consistently and

repeatedly expressed a desire to be with Mother. We find that the comments cited by the

Mother do not present a conflict of interest for the GAL. Instead we find that these

comments are the consequence of the immaturity, mental health issues and trauma
Coshocton County, Case No. 22CA0024                                                        40

suffered by the child and cannot be interpreted as a consistent or repeated desire for a

result that conflicts with the GAL’s recommendation regarding the children’s best interest.

       {¶120} Mother’s Fourth Assignment of Error is overruled.

                                               V.

       {¶121} In her Fifth Assignment of Error, Mother argues the trial court erred in

terminating the parental rights of "the natural father of A.B.S." without proper notice.

       {¶122} In Iden v. Zumbro, 5th Dist. Licking No. 18-CA-56, 2019-Ohio-1051, this

Court held,

              Our Brethren in the Third, Fourth, Sixth and Ninth Districts have held

       a judgment entered by a juvenile court against a mother is not rendered

       void due to the alleged lack of service on the non-party father. See In re

       Cook, 3d Dist. No. 5–98–16, 1998 WL 719524 (Oct. 8, 1998) (mother does

       not have standing to raise issue of father’s service on appeal); In re Kincaid,

       4th Dist. No. 00CA3, 2000 WL 1683456 (Oct. 27, 2000); (mother had no

       standing to raise the issue of the trial court’s personal jurisdiction over the

       father when there is no evidence that her defense was prejudiced by the

       absence of the father from the proceedings); In re I.J., 6th Dist. Lucas No.

       L-12-1306, 2013-Ohio-1083, 2013 WL 1190822 (lack of service on father

       did not render the lower court’s ruling relative to mother void for lack of

       jurisdiction); In re Jordan, 9th Dist. Nos. 20773, 20786, 2002 WL 121211

       (Jan. 30, 2002) (mother lacks standing to raise service issue unless she

       demonstrates she was “actually prejudiced” by the error). In the absence of

       a showing of prejudice to her case, an appellant mother cannot raise the
Coshocton County, Case No. 22CA0024                                                      41

       claimed lack of service on the putative father as error on appeal. In re: I.J.,

       supra at ¶ 11.

              Appellant must demonstrate the alleged failure to perfect timely

       service upon Father resulted in actual prejudice to her. In re A.M., 9th Dist.

       No. 26141, 2012-Ohio-1024, 2012 WL 849641, ¶ 18. As we noted supra,

       Father was served by publication although Appellant asserts such service

       was defective because an affidavit confirming service by publication was

       not filed with the court prior to the hearing and the newspaper never filed an

       affidavit. Assuming, arguendo, Father was not served, we find Appellant

       has offered no evidence of actual prejudice to her as a result. Accordingly,

       we find Mother lacks standing to assert error in regard to service upon

       Zumbro.

2019-Ohio-1051, ¶10-11. Accord, In re D.R. & T.R., 5th Dist. Licking Nos. 2020 CA000

24, 2020 CA 00025, 2020-Ohio-4025, ¶23-24.

       {¶123} J.C. who is listed as “Father” on A.B.S.’s birth certificate testified that he

was present for the birth of the child. 10T. at 1531. He further testified that J.D. never

called or contacted the Mother at any time. Id. at 1556. No evidence was presented that

J.D. was made aware that he has a child, or that he has ever taken any interest in the

child. Mother does not even know of J.D.’s present whereabouts.

       {¶124} Mother has neither alleged nor demonstrated she was “actually prejudiced”

by the failure to join J.D. as a party or to perfect service upon him.

       {¶125} Mother’s Fifth Assignment of Error is overruled.
Coshocton County, Case No. 22CA0024                                              42

       {¶126} The judgment of the Coshocton County Juvenile Court is affirmed.

By Gwin, P.J.,

Hoffman, J., and

King, J., concur.