Court Opinion

ID: 9900923
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-20 19:03:29.797028+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:22.592943
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/20/23
                 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                 SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                           DIVISION SIX

 THE PEOPLE,                           2d Crim. No.B312618
                                    (Super. Ct. No. 18F-09531)
      Plaintiff and Respondent,      (San Luis Obispo County)

 v.

 LUCION LEE EDWARD
 BANKS,

      Defendant and Appellant.

       The Chelsea King Child Predator Prevention Act of 2010
penalizes human trafficking of a minor. It targets a person who
preys upon, and forces, a minor to engage in commercial sex acts
for the person’s financial benefit. The penalty for this crime is
fifteen years to life imprisonment. That was the sentence
imposed here.
       Lucion Lee Edward Banks appeals from the judgment after
a jury convicted him of human trafficking of a minor (“Doe”) for a
commercial sex act and found true the allegation that the offense
involved force, fear, fraud, deceit, coercion, violence, duress,
menace, or threat of unlawful injury. (Pen. Code, § 236.1, subd.
(c)(2).) 1
        Appellant contends: (1) the trial court erred in denying his
motion to suppress evidence obtained during a warrantless
search of his vehicle, (2) he has standing to challenge the search
of Doe’s cell phone, (3) the evidence is insufficient that he used
force or fear to induce Doe to engage in commercial sex, (4) the
prosecutor committed misconduct during argument, (5) the trial
court erred in failing to instruct on the lesser included offense of
attempted pandering, and (6) the cumulative impact of the
“errors” requires reversal. We affirm.
                Factual and Procedural Background
        Doe was born in 2003. She lived with her mother in
Oakland. Doe’s mother was abusive toward her and when Doe
was 10 years old, her mother “kicked her out of the house.” When
Doe was 11 years old, she became a prostitute. The Sacramento
Sheriff’s Department arrested Doe and returned her to her
mother. She was not welcome there and Doe returned to a life on
the streets.
        Doe continued to work as a prostitute. She worked for her
first pimp at the age of 12. She left him when he became violent.
She worked for a second pimp but left him after he too, became
violent.
        In September 2018, Doe met appellant. At that time, she
had been working by herself as a “renegade,” that is, a prostitute
who works without a pimp. Doe was 14 years old. Appellant was
35 years old. Doe trusted appellant and gave him her telephone
number. Later that same day, appellant picked Doe up in his
Jaguar and took her shopping for boots. As they were driving,

      1   All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                  2
Doe received a telephone call from a police officer. Appellant
immediately changed Doe’s phone number without her consent.
       Doe began working as a prostitute for appellant that same
day. Appellant set the rules that Doe was required to follow. He
expected her to hold a door open for him. When she did not,
appellant got mad and raised his hand like he was going to hit
her. He also had rules regarding how Doe was to dress and wear
her hair. He told Doe to wear different colored wigs every night,
as well as revealing clothing, and high heel shoes. He told her to
call him “Daddy.” He controlled what she could and could not do,
who she could speak to, when she worked, when she slept, and
when she ate. He physically battered her on three occasions.
       Appellant took Doe from city to city, using known areas of
prostitution called “blades.” He drove her to San Jose, Salinas,
Oakland, San Francisco, Fairfield, Fresno, and Vallejo.
Appellant did not tell Doe where they were going and she was not
allowed to ask. She was also not allowed to take any pictures or
post her location. Appellant dictated these rules to prevent any
proof of prostitution and to avoid detection by police.
       Doe worked as a prostitute every day for appellant. When
they were not together, they communicated by cell phone and
text messages. Many of their text messages referenced street
locations and prices for “dates.” One message from appellant’s
cell phone to Doe’s cell phone stated, “Have faith in my pimpin
bitch.” There were also text messages that referred to appellant
physically abusing Doe.
       In early October 2018, appellant was driving through San
Luis Obispo at approximately 1:40 a.m. Doe was also in the car.
Officer Quenten Rouse of the San Luis Obispo Police Department
conducted a traffic stop because appellant’s vehicle did not have

                                3
proper license plates, and he was not wearing his seatbelt.
Officer Rouse did not see any temporary DMV registration sticker
on the front passenger window. Officer Rouse contacted
appellant. Appellant explained that he did not have a driver’s
license, and instead, provided his I.D. card.
      Officer Rouse observed an open container of marijuana in
the center console of the front driver’s seat and front passenger
seat. This was a concern because marijuana must be stored in a
sealed container inside a vehicle. Officer Rouse ran a records
check on appellant. He was advised that appellant’s license was
suspended and there was a misdemeanor traffic warrant for his
arrest.
      Officer Rouse then contacted Doe, who was sitting in the
front passenger seat. She appeared to be under the age of 18.
Officer Rouse attempted to identify Doe because of her youth and
the time of the night. Doe did not have any identification and
twice provided a false name and date of birth. Officer Rouse
suspected Doe may be a runaway or a reported missing person.
He removed Doe from the vehicle and had her sit on the curb next
to appellant. Officer Rouse continued to try to identify Doe.
When Doe started to give him a different name, appellant said
something to Doe under his breath that Officer Rouse could not
hear. Doe provided a third name and date of birth that did not
return a match.
      Doe was wearing a “puffer-type” jacket. Officer Rouse
asked Doe to open her jacket to check for weapons. He noticed
that she was wearing a halter top that exposed her bare midriff
and tight pants. Officer Rouse believed the clothing was
inappropriate for the cold weather and was very revealing for
someone of Doe’s age. He searched the car and found wigs,

                               4
revealing clothing, approximately 25 condoms, feminine hygiene
products, and receipts for a motel room in Tracy. When Officer
Rouse searched Doe’s purse, he found a condom that matched the
brand of the condoms in the car. He also found an identification
card that did not belong to Doe.
       When Officer Rouse questioned appellant and Doe
separately, their stories were drastically different. Appellant
claimed to have only known Doe for a few days, but Doe said she
had just met appellant. Appellant said he was headed to Los
Angeles to sell his car, but later said he was headed to the Bay
area to sell the car. Doe said they had come from Salinas and
were heading back to the Bay area, which did not make sense
because San Luis Obispo is to the south of Salinas.
       Officer Rouse placed appellant under arrest for the
outstanding warrant and driving with a suspended license. After
appellant was removed from Doe’s presence, she provided her
true name and stated that she was 14 years old.
       Officer Rouse believed appellant was engaging in human
trafficking. He contacted his supervisor and requested Child
Welfare Services to meet him at the police station. He secured
both appellant’s and Doe’s cell phones, locked appellant’s vehicle
in the parking lot, took custody of Doe, and transported her to the
police station.
       At the police station, Officer Rouse continued to interview
Doe. Based on his reasonable suspicion of trafficking a minor, he
asked if there was going to be any messages on her cell phone
about human trafficking or sex for money. Doe said there might
be because “she let bitches use her phone.” Doe consented to the
search of her cell phone and signed a consent form. Officer Rouse
searched Doe’s cell phone and saw information that confirmed his

                                5
belief that appellant was involved in human trafficking or sex for
money.
       Officer Rouse identified appellant’s phone number based on
the phone number written on a “for sale” sign placed in the
window of appellant’s Jaguar, as well as the phone number he
provided on the booking form to the county jail. Officer Rouse
used Doe’s cell phone to call the number and appellant’s phone
rang. Appellant’s phone number was listed in Doe’s contacts as
“My Chocolate King.” Based on his training and experience,
Officer Rouse knew the term “king” was a street term for a pimp.
Doe also repeatedly referred to appellant as “Daddy,” a term
commonly used by victims to their traffickers to establish an
authoritative figure or a person of strength.
       The text messages included comments from appellant
about going “upside [Doe’s] head” when she was “outta pocket,”
which Officer Rouse believed to be physical violence for not
following appellant’s rules.
       The text messages also showed that appellant and Doe got
into a fight when they were in San Francisco. Appellant was
angry because he thought Doe had interfered with another
prostitute who worked for him. He beat Doe as they were
driving, then stopped at a gas station and told her to get out. She
refused because she had no money, no identification, and had
nowhere to go.
       When Officer Rouse asked Doe if appellant was trafficking
her or pimping her, she denied it. Doe provided Officer Rouse
with the password to appellant’s cell phone, which was “Pimp n
asss.” When Officer Rouse typed the password into appellant’s
cell phone, the phone unlocked. Officer Rouse did not search

                                6
appellant’s phone at that time. It was subsequently searched
pursuant to a warrant.
                Lawful Search of Appellant’s Vehicle
       Appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his
motion to suppress the “fruits of the warrantless search” of the
vehicle.
       Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is well known. (See, e.g.,
Katz v. United States (1967) 389 U.S. 347, 357; Arizona v. Gant
(2009) 556 U.S. 332, 338.) Well-settled rules govern our review.
(People v. Quick (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1006, 1010; People v. Sims
(2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 943, 950.) We will affirm the trial court’s
ruling if correct on any theory of law applicable to the case, even
if the reasons differ from those given by the trial court. (People v.
McDonald (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 521, 529.)
       Appellant contends the decision to tow and then search the
vehicle was “obviously ‘motivated by an investigatory purpose.’”
The evidence demonstrates otherwise. Because we conclude the
search was justified by the inevitable discovery doctrine, we need
not address the other exceptions to the warrant requirement.
       The inevitable discovery doctrine acts as an exception to
the exclusionary rule and permits the admission of otherwise
excluded evidence if the prosecution can establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that the information would have
been inevitably discovered by lawful means, such as routine
police procedures. (Nix v. Williams (1984) 467 U.S. 431, 444;
People v. Hughston (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1062, 1071-1072.)
       Officer Rouse lawfully stopped appellant’s car. Appellant
pulled into a private parking lot. He did not have a valid driver’s
license. The San Luis Obispo Police Department has a policy
regarding inventory searches “[t]o protect the department as well

                                 7
as the defendant or owner of the vehicle in the event that there’s
property – highly valuable property inside the vehicle, large
amounts of cash, things of that nature. In addition, the inventory
search will document any damage to the vehicle to protect the
tow company in the event of civil litigation . . . [a]s well as
document everything inside the vehicle.”
       Officer Rouse suspected the vehicle may have been stolen
because it was an older vehicle with paper plates, there was no
vehicle registration in the window, and appellant failed to
produce proof of ownership. “Police officers may exercise
discretion in determining whether impounding a vehicle serves
their community caretaking function, ‘so long as that discretion is
exercised according to standard criteria and on the basis of
something other than suspicion of evidence of criminal activity.’
[Citation].” (People v. Torres (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 775, 787;
People v. Williams (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 756, 759-763.) Based
on these facts, the trial court correctly concluded the evidence
would have been inevitably discovered pursuant to a lawful
inventory search.
              Consensual Search of Victim’s Cell Phone
       Appellant contends he has standing to challenge the search
of Doe’s cell phone, which he claims was accomplished through
coercion. He concedes that the trial court “correctly applied
third-party standing law in ruling on the suppression motion.”
Nevertheless, he urges this court to reconsider the doctrine and
conclude that he has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
data transmitted to a third party because of the “complex,
detailed and private nature of smartphone communication.”
       The answer is, no. We decline the invitation to depart from
this well-settled doctrine. (See, e.g., People v. Satz (1998) 61

                                8
Cal.App.4th 322, 325.) We also observe that the trial court
factually found that “there was no coercion of any sort.”
                      Sufficiency of the Evidence
       Appellant contends the evidence was insufficient that he
used force or fear to induce Doe to engage in commercial sex, or
that there was “any link” between his use of force or fear and
Doe’s engaging in commercial sex.
       “In reviewing a claim for sufficiency of the evidence, we
must determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime or special
circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. We review the entire
record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to
determine whether it discloses sufficient evidence – that is,
evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value –
supporting the decision, and not whether the evidence proves
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] We neither reweigh
the evidence nor reevaluate the credibility of witnesses.
[Citation.] We presume in support of the judgment the existence
of every fact the jury reasonably could deduce from the evidence.
[Citation.] If the circumstances reasonably justify the findings
made by the trier of fact, reversal of the judgment is not
warranted simply because the circumstances might also
reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding. [Citation.]”
(People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 638-639.)
       Appellant contends the evidence is insufficient as to the
“forcible” trafficking conviction. He argues that it only shows
“that a prostitute experiences a climate or a relationship in which
violence sometimes occurs.” He adds that the evidence shows
that Doe was a prostitute “long before she ever met” him.

                                 9
Sometimes she used a pimp, sometimes she acted as a
“‘renegade.’” She left prior pimps who treated her poorly. And
although there was evidence that appellant used force against
Doe “on certain occasions,” he argues that the evidence is
insufficient to prove that the use of force or fear “was a factor
that ‘caused’ or ‘induced’ or ‘persuaded’ Doe to engage in any act
of commercial sex.”
       The People correctly contend this was a “textbook case of a
perpetrator using both force and fear to induce a 14-year-old
victim to engage in commercial sex.”
       The prosecution presented expert testimony describing the
nature of human trafficking. Timothy Bergquist of the Alameda
County District Attorney’s Office explained that even if a victim
enters the lifestyle willingly, they can still be a victim of
trafficking if they are kept in the lifestyle through violence, force,
or fear, and other such factors. This is especially true for younger
victims who are initially “seduced” by the trafficker, but the
relationship quickly becomes violent or there are threats or
manipulation to keep the victim in prostitution. Bergquist
explained that the pimp will use common techniques to break
down the victim, such as physical violence, threats, psychological
manipulation, physical, mental, and economic abuse, in essence,
stripping the victim of everything down to their clothing. In so
doing, the pimp steps into the role of being the person “in total
control” of the victim emotionally, physically, economically so
that the victim is “absolutle[ly] dependent on the trafficker.”
       Bergquist also testified that another way in which a
trafficker exerts control over the victim is through constant
communication on cell phones. The trafficker will also use social
media to set up “dates” for the victim and will travel from city to

                                 10
city with the victim to avoid police detection and to keep the
victim disoriented and dependent upon the trafficker. There is
also the added benefit of being the “new face” in the area.
       Doe testified that after appellant became her pimp, he
controlled what she wore, who she talked to, how long she
worked, and when she slept. She even communicated to him
when she had to use the bathroom. He demanded all of the
money she earned on her “dates.”
       Appellant kept Doe isolated and completely dependent
upon him. He changed her cell phone number without her
knowledge or consent, drove her from city to city, where he would
put her on the “blade” to work. He did not tell her where he was
taking her. When they arrived, she felt “lost” and had to rely on
appellant to figure out where she was going. This is consistent
with the trafficker’s efforts to exert “total control” over the victim.
       There was also evidence that appellant used psychological
manipulation, as well as physical violence to maintain control
over Doe. For example, she testified that appellant would get
mad at her and say things to hurt her feelings, but then he would
be nice to her and make her feel special. Doe testified that
appellant would beat her if she broke the rules, or if she made
him mad, or “just because.”
       The prosecution also relied on the text messages between
appellant and Doe to establish that he trafficked Doe and did so
through force or fear. In one message, Doe told appellant, “Why
daddy. u the one that had took me off of international and
showed me that it was more places then just international and
that I am worth way more then just 40 dollars . . . .” In another
text Doe sent to appellant, she said, “Daddy on date for 50,” to
which appellant replied, “Bring me my money when u done.” The

                                  11
text messages also demonstrate that appellant used physical
violence when Doe did not abide by his rules. For example, Doe
wrote, “Mmmmm at least I dont gotta worry about nobody hitting
me tonight.” Appellant replied, “Bitch lmpao [laughing my pimp
ass off] bitch u act like I jus wanna hit u.” Doe responded, “U do.”
“That is really what u wanna do.” Appellant replied, “Bitch I
don’t until u get outta pocket.”
       Sufficient evidence supports the jury’s finding that
appellant used force, fear, fraud, deceit, coercion, violence,
duress, menace, or threat of unlawful injury as set forth in
section 236.1, subdivision (c)(2).
                  Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct
       Appellant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct
by repeatedly suggesting that sexual trafficking merely requires
“encouraging” prostitution, that the crime of trafficking is already
“done” if a pimp recruits an active prostitute to work for him, and
that encouragement and persuasion are “interchangeable.” We
conclude the claims are both forfeited and without merit.
       The standard governing review of prosecutorial misconduct
claims is well-settled. It requires reversal only when a
prosecutor uses “‘deceptive or reprehensible methods [to attempt]
to persuade either the [trial] court or the jury’ [citation] and ‘“it is
reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the defendant
would have been reached without the misconduct’” [citation].”
(People v. Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 612.)
       “To preserve for appeal a claim of prosecutorial misconduct,
the defense must make a timely objection at trial and request and
admonition; otherwise, the point is reviewable only if an
admonition would not have cured the harm caused by the
misconduct.” (People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 447.)

                                  12
        Here, appellant’s trial counsel objected to the prosecutor’s
misstatement of the law when he, on more than one occasion,
used the word “encourage” to describe the legal standard to
establish trafficking. The objections were sustained but counsel
did not ask that the jury be admonished to disregard the
prosecutor’s misstatement of the law. Even if this claim had been
properly preserved for review, we would nevertheless reject it on
the merits.
       “‘[I]t is improper for the prosecutor to misstate the law
generally [citation], and particularly to attempt to absolve the
prosecution from its prima facie obligation to overcome
reasonable doubt on all elements. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People
v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 829-830.) But those misstatements
must be evaluated “‘[i]n the context of the whole argument and
the instructions’ [citation], [and the appellant must show] there
was a ‘reasonable likelihood the jury understood or applied the
complained-of comments in an improper or erroneous manner.
[Citations.] In conducting this inquiry, we “do not lightly infer”
that the jury drew the most damaging rather than the least
damaging meaning from the prosecutor’s statements. [Citation.]’”
(People v. Centeno (2014) 60 Cal.4th 659, 667 (Centeno).)
       Section 236.1, subdivision (c) provides, “A person who
causes, induces, or persuades, or attempts to cause, induce, or
persuade, a person who is a minor at the time of commission of
the offense to engage in a commercial sex act, with the intent to
effect or maintain a violation of [certain enumerated crimes] is
guilty of human trafficking.”
       The prosecutor repeatedly used the word “encourage” to
describe appellant’s conduct as sufficient for a violation of section
236.1, subdivision (c)(2). This was erroneous but trial counsel did

                                 13
not request an admonition. The trial court sustained these
objections and the prosecutor corrected himself each time. It is
not likely that the jury applied the prosecutor’s misstatements in
an objectionable fashion because the trial court instructed the
jury to “follow the law as I explain it to you, even if you disagree
with it. If you believe that the attorneys’ comments on the law
conflict with my instructions, you must follow my instructions.”
We presume the jury followed the trial court’s instructions,
rather than any conflicting statements by counsel. (Centeno,
supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 676; People v. Meneses (2019) 41
Cal.App.5th 63, 75.)
                 Lesser Included Offense Instruction
       Appellant contends the trial court erred in “failing” to sua
sponte instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of
attempted pandering of a minor in violation of section 266i,
subdivision (b). We disagree. There was no “failure” here.
       The trial court was not required to instruct sua sponte on
this lesser included offense. “[T]he existence of ‘any evidence, no
matter how weak,’ will not justify instructions on a lesser
included offense, but such instructions are required whenever
evidence that the defendant is guilty only of the lesser offense is
‘substantial enough to merit consideration’ by the jury.
[Citations.] ‘Substantial evidence’ in this context is ‘“evidence
from which a jury composed of reasonable [persons] could . . .
conclude[]’” that the lesser offense, but not the greater, was
committed.” (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 162,
disapproved of on other grounds by People v. Schuller (2023) 15
Cal.5th 237; People v. DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 50.)
       We independently review the substantiality of evidence for
these purposes and do so by viewing it in the light most favorable

                                 14
to the defendant. (People v. Millbrook (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th
1122, 1137.)
       CALCRIM No. 1151, sets forth the elements of the offense
of pandering (§ 266i). The pattern instruction provides, in
relevant part: To prove that the defendant is guilty of pandering,
the People must prove that the defendant successfully (1)
(persuaded/procured) a person to become a prostitute, (2)
intended to influence the person to be a prostitute, and (3) the
person was a minor (16 years old or older/under the age of 16) at
the time the defendant acted. Appellant was charged with
trafficking a minor in violation of section 236.1, subdivision (c)(2).
The jury was instructed pursuant to CALCRIM No. 1244, which
provides in relevant part: To prove the defendant is guilty of this
crime, the People must prove (1) the defendant caused or induced
or persuaded or attempted to cause or induce or persuade
another person to engage in a commercial sex act, (2) when the
defendant acted, he intended to commit pimping (§ 266h), and (3)
when the defendant did so, the other person was under 18 years
of age.
       Here, there is no substantial evidence that appellant was
guilty of the lesser offense of attempted pandering but not the
greater offense of trafficking of a minor. (See People v. Campbell
(2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 463, 495-496, 500-502.) The evidence,
which was credited by the jury, is overwhelming as to the
charged offense.
                          Cumulative Error
       Appellant contends the cumulative impact of the alleged
errors requires reversal. Because there was no error, “there is
nothing to cumulate and hence there can be no cumulative
prejudice.” (People v. Grimes (2016) 1 Cal.5th 698, 737.)

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                          Disposition
     The judgment is affirmed.
     CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

                                        YEGAN, J.

We concur:

             GILBERT, P. J.

             BALTODANO, J.

                              16
                  Barry T. LaBarbera, Judge
           Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo
                _____________________________

     Alex Coolman, for Defendant and Appellant.

      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and David F. Glassman, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.