Court Opinion

ID: 9739629
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:18:48.310205+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:12.228131
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE QUINN, dissenting: I concur with the reversal of the trial court’s denial of the motion to dismiss on the retaliatory discharge count. As I would affirm the trial court’s granting of the motion to dismiss plaintiffs intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, I dissent from that portion of the opinion. I believe that this court’s holding in Welsh v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 306 Ill. App. 3d 148, 713 N.E.2d 679 (1999), is controlling. I do agree with the majority that the complaint in the instant case, unlike that in Welsh, pled sufficient facts from which the level of severity of the emotional distress could be inferred and that ComEd either intended or knew its conduct would inflict such emotional distress. I do not agree with the majority that the facts alleged in the complaint before us could support a finding that ComEd’s conduct was extreme and outrageous. The majority finds that the complaint’s allegations regarding the “sham investigation” conducted by ComEd distinguish our facts from those alleged in the complaints reviewed in Welsh. I do not agree. The complaints in Welsh also relied heavily upon allegations that ComEd acted with a retaliatory purpose in taking actions against the plaintiffs in that case. As here, the plaintiffs in Welsh alleged that ComEd reassigned and demoted them in retaliation for their complaining about conditions and procedures at a ComEd nuclear power plant. Welsh, 306 Ill. App. 3d at 150. The plaintiffs complaint does contain an allegation that Rob Marsh of the NRC told plaintiff that at the time ComEd became involved in the investigation, ComEd was aware plaintiff was not involved in the vandalism and harassment (see paragraph 23 of the third amended complaint). However, when this allegation is later fleshed out, this allegation can be seen to be conclusory and not supported by a reasonable inference. Under the heading “Defendant’s Knowledge of the Falsity of its Allegations Against Plaintiff and Defendant’s Continual Retaliation Against Plaintiff,” the complaint states in pertinent part: “33) *** Marsh told Plaintiff that he had no knowledge of any allegations against Plaintiff and that the NRC’s investigation did not result in any allegations against Plaintiff. Indeed, Marsh told Plaintiff that he had never even heard Plaintiffs name before, from either the NRC’s investigation or from Defendant. 34) Marsh further explained to Plaintiff, that when Defendant decided to join the investigation, that the NRC required that Defendant share all information with the NRC and that Defendant failed to inform the NRC either that Plaintiff and Phillips were the subject of investigation or that Plaintiff and Phillips had been suspended. Marsh concluded the meeting by informing Plaintiff that Plaintiff was not a suspect in the NRC’s investigation and that the NRC had named their suspects even prior to the time that Defendant joined the investigation and had already informed Defendant of those suspects.” The above allegations do not support plaintiff’s assertion that prior to beginning its investigation ComEd was aware plaintiff was not involved in the targeted activity. Nor do the above allegations support plaintiffs assertion that ComEd continued its investigation into plaintiff after it became aware plaintiff was not involved. It should also be noted that the plaintiffs allegations regarding the “extreme and outrageous conduct” of ComEd are significantly less compelling than those in the Welsh case. In Welsh, some of the plaintiffs were assigned to manually cleaning manholes “ ‘infested with bacteria, human waste, and other disgusting matter’ and denied permission to use equipment specifically designed for such purposes.” Welsh, 306 Ill. App. 3d at 150. While the plaintiff in the instant case was assigned to work in a facility that was not operating, there is no allegation that he was compelled to engage in any activity more demeaning than filling out crossword puzzles in an office. It is incongruous to hold that plaintiff has sufficiently pled that ComEd’s conduct was extreme and outrageous and the plaintiffs in Welsh did not. The majority’s holding that plaintiffs complaint for intentional infliction of emotional distress properly stated a cause of action based on the facts alleged here will certainly have a far-reaching effect on other cases. I understand, as does the majority, that it is easy for an employee to allege in a complaint that his employer “knew he didn’t do it” but investigated the employee anyway. It is, of course, much harder to prove such allegations sufficiently to avoid summary judgment. I disagree with the majority that the facts alleged in the complaint before us are sufficient to avoid dismissal. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.