Court Opinion

ID: 9898717
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-15 00:03:12.063035+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:13.078950
License: Public Domain

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                             303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501
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            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA

ALEXIE N. WALTERS JR.,
                                                         Court of Appeals No. A-13871
                            Appellant,                 Trial Court No. 4SM-17-00081 CR

                     v.
                                                                  OPINION
STATE OF ALASKA,

                            Appellee.                   No. 2758 — September 15, 2023

             Appeal from the Superior Court, Fourth Judicial District,
             Bethel, Michael A. MacDonald, Judge.

             Appearances: Paul Malin, Attorney at Law, under contract
             with the Public Defender Agency, and Samantha Cherot,
             Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Madison M.
             Mitchell, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal
             Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General,
             Juneau, for the Appellee.

             Before: Wollenberg, Harbison, and Terrell, Judges.

             Judge HARBISON.

             Alexie N. Walters Jr. pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and third-
degree assault for killing his girlfriend and then shooting a gun at two village police
officers.1 As part of the plea agreement, Walters would receive a 35-year active term of
imprisonment for the murder conviction and a 5-year term of imprisonment for the
assault conviction. The agreement left open the question of whether the sentences would
be consecutive or concurrent, as well as the amount of suspended jail time and the length
of probation for the murder conviction.
              The superior court accepted the parties’ plea agreement. For the murder
conviction, the court imposed a sentence of 99 years with 64 years suspended (35 years
to serve), and a 15-year term of probation. For the assault conviction, the court imposed
a sentence of 5 years to serve. The court chose to impose entirely consecutive sentences,
resulting in a composite sentence of 40 years to serve. The court also ordered that
Walters could not be released on discretionary parole for the duration of his sentence.
The court then entered a written judgment designating both offenses as crimes of
domestic violence. Walters now appeals.
              Walters first claims that the imposition of entirely consecutive sentences
resulted in an excessive composite sentence. For the reasons explained in this opinion,
we conclude that we do not have jurisdiction to consider this claim, and we accordingly
transfer it to the Alaska Supreme Court for discretionary review.
              Walters next challenges the court’s order restricting his eligibility for
discretionary parole. We conclude that we do have jurisdiction to consider this claim
and issue this opinion to explain our reasoning. Ultimately, however, having reviewed
the record, we conclude that the restriction on Walters’s parole eligibility is not clearly
mistaken.
              Finally, Walters contends that the court erred in designating the third-
degree assault offense as a crime of domestic violence in the judgment. We agree.
Because there was no evidence that the assault (which was committed against two
village police officers) was a crime of domestic violence, this matter must be remanded

   1
       AS 11.41.110(a)(1) and AS 11.41.220(a)(1)(A), respectively.

                                           –2–                                        2758
to the superior court so that it may issue a corrected judgment vacating the domestic
violence designation for that conviction.

      Background facts and proceedings
             This case arose after Walters and his girlfriend, Gertrude Queenie, got into
an altercation at Walters’s house in Mountain Village. Walters locked the front door
and began beating Queenie in the living room in front of his mother and twelve-year-
old daughter, A.W. Queenie was crying and asking him to stop hitting her.
             Walters’s mother later reported that Walters then grabbed A.W. by the
hair and threw her into the back bedroom. After threatening to kill A.W. and telling his
mother and A.W. not to call the police, Walters continued to beat Queenie. His mother
and A.W. then ran out of the house and went to Walters’s sister’s house, where the sister
contacted Village Police Officers Blaise Long and John Tikiun.
             Long and Tikiun went to investigate, knocking on Walters’s door and
announcing themselves as police officers. They heard footsteps and the sound of a gun
being loaded. Concerned that they would be shot, Long and Tikiun ran out to the
driveway. As they were running away, Walters fired a gun at them.
             Queenie was later found beaten to death inside the house. Her head, face,
arms, chest, abdomen, hips, and legs were covered in lacerations and bruising. Initially,
the house appeared to be free of blood, but during the investigation, law enforcement
officers conducted chemical testing that revealed the presence of blood throughout the
house, suggesting that Walters had attempted to clean up after the incident.
             Walters was indicted for first-degree murder, two counts of second-degree
murder, two counts of third-degree assault, and tampering with physical evidence.2 He

      2
            AS        11.41.100(a)(1)(A),       AS          11.41.110(a)(1)-(2),
      AS 11.41.220(a)(1)(A), and AS 11.56.610(a)(1), respectively.
                                            –3–                                     2758
later pleaded guilty to one count of second-degree murder for killing Queenie and to
one consolidated count of third-degree assault for firing the gun at Long and Tikiun.
              Walters faced a sentencing range of 15 to 99 years for the second-degree
murder charge, and a presumptive sentencing range of 2 to 5 years for the third-degree
assault charge.3 Walters’s pleas were entered as part of an agreement with the State
which prescribed a 35-year active term of imprisonment for the murder conviction and
a 5-year term of imprisonment for the assault conviction, but left open the question of
whether the sentences would be consecutive or concurrent.
              During the sentencing hearing, the superior court found that Walters was
a worst offender. The court based this finding on Walters’s lengthy criminal history,
which included sixteen prior convictions (three of which were felonies and five of
which were assaults), as well as several juvenile adjudications for assault. The court
also based this finding on the severity of the offenses in this case, finding that thirteen
aggravating factors applied by analogy to Walters’s conviction for second-degree
murder.4 The court noted the pervasiveness of violence associated with Walters’s drug
and alcohol use and the many opportunities Walters had been given to participate in
rehabilitative programs.5 For these reasons, the court found that, in order to protect the

   3
      AS 12.55.125(b); former AS 12.55.125(e)(3) (2017). Walters had three prior felony
convictions.
   4
       See Allen v. State, 56 P.3d 683, 684 (Alaska App. 2002) (explaining that statutory
aggravating and mitigating factors may be employed “by analogy in murder sentencings as
points of reference when the parties argue how a particular defendant’s crime should be
viewed in comparison to a typical murder”).
   5
      See Leopold v. State, 278 P.3d 286, 295 (Alaska App. 2012), as corrected on reh’g
(May 25, 2012) (upholding a worst offender finding where the defendant had a lengthy
criminal history, his alcohol addiction was a strong influence on many of his prior
convictions, and he had multiple prior opportunities to participate in rehabilitation).

                                           –4–                                        2758
public, imposition of the maximum period of isolation permitted under the agreement
was warranted, and it accordingly imposed entirely consecutive sentences.6
              In its sentencing remarks, the superior court specifically considered all of
the Chaney criteria, and then found that the statutorily prescribed parole eligibility
period was insufficient to meet the sentencing goals.7 The court stated that eliminating
Walters’s eligibility for discretionary parole was needed in order to isolate him for as
long as possible “to protect society from his malice and his rage.” In making this
determination, the court considered the extremely serious nature of the offense,
Walters’s lengthy criminal history, and his history of repeatedly violating probation.
              This appeal followed.

       Why we conclude that we do not have jurisdiction over Walters’s
       challenge to the imposition of entirely consecutive sentences
              Walters first contends that the superior court’s imposition of entirely
consecutive sentences resulted in an excessive composite sentence.
              Under AS 22.07.020(b), this Court has the authority to review a sentence
exceeding 2 years of active incarceration for a felony offense on the ground that the
sentence is excessive, but this grant of jurisdiction is subject to certain limitations. One
of these limitations is that this Court may not review an excessive sentence claim if the

   6
      The superior court was required to impose “at least some additional term” of
consecutive time for the assault conviction, but the exact amount was within its discretion.
AS 12.55.127(c)(2)(F).
   7
        See State v. Korkow, 314 P.3d 560, 565 (Alaska 2013) (providing that, when
restricting a defendant’s parole eligibility, a sentencing court must explain its reasons for
concluding that the statutorily prescribed parole eligibility period is insufficient after
specifically considering all of the Chaney criteria); Hinson v. State, 199 P.3d 1166, 1173
(Alaska App. 2008).

                                            –5–                                         2758
sentence was imposed in accordance with a plea agreement that provided for a sentence
equal to or less than a specified maximum sentence.8
              In the present case, neither party has suggested that this Court lacks
authority to consider Walters’s arguments on appeal. But if we identify a potential flaw
in our jurisdiction, we have an independent duty to decide the jurisdictional question as
a threshold matter.9
              Walters’s pleas were entered pursuant to an agreement under which he
would receive a sentence of 35 years of active incarceration for the murder conviction
and 5 years of active incarceration for the assault conviction, leaving open the question
of whether the sentences would be consecutive or concurrent. In other words, the
parties’ agreement permitted the superior court to impose a maximum composite
sentence of 40 years of active imprisonment. The superior court accepted the agreement
and exercised its discretion to impose entirely consecutive terms of active imprisonment
— i.e., the maximum possible sentence permitted by the parties’ agreement.
              Because the superior court imposed a sentence in accordance with an
agreement that contained a cap on the maximum sentence that could be imposed, we do
not have jurisdiction to consider Walters’s excessive sentence claim.10 However,
Walters is authorized to petition the Alaska Supreme Court for discretionary sentence
review.11 Accordingly, we refer this claim to the supreme court for discretionary review
pursuant to Alaska Appellate Rule 215(k).

   8
        AS 22.07.020(b); AS 12.55.120(a).
   9
       See Robertson v. Riplett, 194 P.3d 382, 386 (Alaska 2008) (explaining that subject
matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, and if noticed by the court, but not identified
by the parties, it must be raised by the court).
   10
       AS 12.55.120(a); Alaska R. App. P. 215(a)(5); see also Stone v. State, 255 P.3d 979,
980-83 (Alaska 2011) (treating defendant’s sentence as within the plea agreement’s
maximum range, and therefore only subject to a petition for review, where the active term
of imprisonment was under the agreement’s cap but the suspended time exceeded that cap).
   11
        See Alaska R. App. P. 215(k); Stone, 255 P.3d at 983.

                                            –6–                                          2758
        Why we affirm the restriction on Walters’s parole eligibility
              We next consider Walters’s challenge to the superior court’s order
restricting his eligibility for discretionary parole. As we have explained, neither party
challenges our jurisdiction to consider Walters’s claims. But, given our conclusion that
we lack jurisdiction over Walters’s excessive sentence claim, the question naturally
arises as to whether the limitations on our jurisdiction set out by AS 22.07.020(b) apply
to Walters’s challenge to the restriction on his parole eligibility. We conclude that they
do not and that we have jurisdiction to consider this claim.
              We have previously held that appeals that do not challenge the length of a
defendant’s term of imprisonment (such as appeals challenging probation conditions,
fines, forfeitures, and license revocations) do not implicate the jurisdictional restrictions
set out in AS 22.07.020(b) (which incorporates AS 12.55.120) and Alaska Appellate
Rule 215(a)(1).12
              And in Jackson v. State, the Alaska Supreme Court made clear that a
sentencing court cannot consider a defendant’s discretionary parole eligibility when
determining the appropriate length of a defendant’s sentence.13 Rather, the correct

   12
        Allen v. Anchorage, 168 P.3d 890, 893-95 (Alaska App. 2007) (holding that this
Court had jurisdiction to consider non-term-of-imprisonment sentence appeals regardless
of the term of imprisonment imposed by the sentencing court); see e.g., Maguire v. State,
390 P.3d 1175, 1177-78 (Alaska App. 2017) (declining to overrule Allen and concluding
that this Court had jurisdiction over defendant’s challenge to the length of his probationary
term, explaining that “this Court is uniquely well-situated to handle these types of
appeals”); Parson v. State, 404 P.3d 227, 228-29 (Alaska App. 2017) (concluding that this
Court had jurisdiction over sentencing court’s denial of a suspended imposition of
sentence, regardless of the length of the imprisonment imposed); Johnson v. State, 421
P.3d 134, 138 (Alaska App. 2018) (concluding that this Court had jurisdiction to consider
appeal from a defendant, who was sentenced to a term of imprisonment in accordance with
a plea agreement, challenging certain probation conditions imposed by the court); see also
Hillman v. Anchorage, 941 P.2d 211, 212-15 (Alaska App. 1997) (explaining that this
Court “retains the right to review an illegal sentence, regardless of how much (or how little)
imprisonment is imposed on the defendant”).
   13
      Jackson v. State, 616 P.2d 23, 24-25 (Alaska 1980) (recognizing that “the
assumption that an offender will be paroled on a particular date is, at best, speculative” and

                                            –7–                                          2758
approach is for the sentencing court to impose an appropriate term of incarceration on
the assumption that the entire term will be served. A restriction on discretionary parole
eligibility therefore does not alter the term of imprisonment imposed by the superior
court, and a challenge to such a restriction does not challenge the length of a defendant’s
term of imprisonment.
              In light of these principles, we conclude that an appeal challenging a
restriction on a defendant’s eligibility for discretionary parole is not an excessive
sentence appeal within the meaning of AS 12.55.120(a) and Appellate Rule 215(a)(1)
— and that we have jurisdiction to decide Walters’s challenge to such a restriction.
              We therefore turn to the merits of Walters’s claim regarding the restriction
on his discretionary parole eligibility.
              This Court reviews a sentencing court’s restriction on discretionary parole
under the clearly mistaken standard.14 Here, the superior court found that Walters had
“no realistic rehabilitative potential” and that, given his lengthy criminal history, he
“would likely re-offend as soon as he’s released, just as he’s re-offended every time
he’s been released.” The superior court rejected the notion that Walters’s fetal alcohol
spectrum disorder had substantially impaired his judgment, noting that Walters’s expert
witness had determined that his cognitive functioning was in the low-average range.
The court emphasized that Walters had consistently rejected attempts at rehabilitative
services and that “incalculable resources” had been devoted to Walters “to no avail.” It
then found that the current offense “shows that there is no boundary to Mr. Walters’s

instructing sentencing judges to assume that the defendant will serve the entire term of their
imprisonment without release on discretionary parole when determining the proper length
of a defendant’s sentence); see also Thomas v. State, 413 P.3d 1207, 1212 (Alaska App.
2018) (“Because release on discretionary parole is so difficult to obtain, a sentencing judge
is not permitted to consider a defendant’s eligibility for discretionary parole as a factor that
is likely to reduce the jail time that the defendant will actually serve.”).
   14
      State v. Korkow, 314 P.3d 560, 562 (Alaska 2013); see also McClain v. State, 519
P.2d 811, 813 (Alaska 1974).

                                             –8–                                           2758
willingness and ability to lash out and rage at the world around him and the people who
love him.”
              The record supports the superior court’s findings. Walters beat his
girlfriend in front of his mother and child, inflicting injuries that were later fatal, and
then shot at two responding police officers. And as we previously noted, at the time of
the offenses in this case, Walters had a significant criminal history — sixteen prior
convictions, three of which were felonies and five of which were assaults, as well as
several juvenile adjudications for assault. Under the circumstances of this case, and
given Walters’s repeated failed attempts at rehabilitation, we conclude that the superior
court’s restriction on Walters’s discretionary parole eligibility was not clearly
mistaken.15

        Why we vacate the domestic violence designation for Walters’s assault
        conviction
              Lastly, Walters asserts that the superior court erred by designating the
third-degree assault conviction as a crime of domestic violence when it issued the
written judgment. The State agrees with Walters that this designation was error, and we
conclude that this concession is well-taken.16
              The third-degree assault was committed against Village Police Officers
Long and Tikiun. Under Alaska law, certain enumerated offenses are crimes involving
domestic violence if they are committed against a “household member” as that term is

   15
        See Stern v. State, 827 P.2d 442, 453 (Alaska App. 1992) (upholding a parole
restriction for a “heinous crime[]” committed as “the culmination of an escalating series of
violent acts,” where the defendant had “shown repeatedly that he is not amenable to
probationary supervision”); Marcy v. State, 823 P.2d 660, 669-70 (Alaska App. 1991)
(upholding a parole restriction where the defendant “repeatedly committed crimes and
violated probation and parole conditions” and “[h]is offenses continually increased in
severity”).
   16
       See Marks v. State, 496 P.2d 66, 67-68 (Alaska 1972) (requiring an appellate court
to independently assess any concession of error by the State in a criminal case).

                                           –9–                                         2758
defined in AS 18.66.990(5).17 In the present matter, the State never claimed that the
third-degree assault charge was a crime of domestic violence, and the superior court did
not make such a finding during the sentencing hearing. Moreover, the record is devoid
of any indication that Walters was a household member of, or even personally knew,
either Long or Tikiun.
              We accordingly remand this matter to the superior court for correction of
the judgment.

        Conclusion
              We TRANSFER Walters’s excessive sentence claim, challenging the
imposition of consecutive sentences, to the Alaska Supreme Court for discretionary
review pursuant to Appellate Rule 215(k). We VACATE the domestic violence
designation with regard to the assault conviction and direct the superior court to correct
the judgment on remand. With those exceptions, we AFFIRM the judgment of the
superior court.

   17
        AS 18.66.990(3).

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