Court Opinion

ID: 9497429
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:51:20.87269+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:11.694762
License: Public Domain

JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Bell’s statements during voir dire do not demonstrate that she was actually biased against Miller, and the majority errs in concluding otherwise. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
As an initial matter, some clarification is in order with respect to the posture of *679Miller’s ineffective assistance claim. No state court addressed the issue of whether Miller’s counsel’s performance prejudiced him. Consequently, we are not constrained under AEDPA by any state court ruling on this matter, and we confront it de novo. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2542, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003); Maples v. Stegall, 340 F.3d 433, 437 (6th Cir.2003). More specifically, no state court determined that Bell either was or was not actually biased against Miller, which is a question of fact. Fields v. Woodford, 309 F.3d 1095, 1103 (9th Cir.2002); see also Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1036, 104 S.Ct. 2885, 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984) (characterizing the question of a particular juror’s impartiality as “one of historical fact”). And while the district court found that Bell was not actually biased against Miller, it reached this conclusion solely on the basis of transcripts from state court proceedings; hence, we review the conclusion de novo rather than for clear error. Miller v. Straub, 299 F.3d 570, 579 (6th Cir.2002).
A defendant may prove that his counsel’s failure to strike a juror prejudiced him only by showing “that the juror was actually biased against him.” Miller v. Francis, 269 F.3d 609, 616 (6th Cir.2001) (emphasis added); see also Hughes v. United States, 258 F.3d 453, 458 (6th Cir.2001) (“Petitioner’s ‘claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is grounded in the claim that counsel failed to strike a biased juror. To maintain a claim that a biased juror prejudiced him, however, [Petitioner] must show that the juror was actually biased against him.’ ”) (emphasis added and alteration in original) (quoting Goeders v. Hundley, 59 F.3d 73, 75 (8th Cir.1995)). “Actual bias is ‘bias in fact’ — the existence of a state of mind that leads to an inference that the person will not act with entire impartiality.” Hughes, 258 F.3d at 463 (quotation omitted); see also Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 800, 95 S.Ct. 2031, 44 L.Ed.2d 589 (1975) (explaining that a juror is not impartial if there actually exists “an opinion in the mind of the juror as will raise the presumption of partiality”) (quotation omitted). It is distinct from implied bias, which has been described as arising only in “extreme situations where the relationship between a prospective juror and some aspect of the litigation is such that it is highly unlikely that the average person could remain impartial in his deliberations under the circumstances.” Person v. Miller, 854 F.2d 656, 664 (4th Cir.1988); see also United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 134, 57 S.Ct. 177, 81 L.Ed. 78 (1936) (defining implied bias as “a bias attributable in law to the prospective juror regardless of actual partiality”).
A juror is impartial if she can disregard her preconceptions “and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.” United States v. Angel, 355 F.3d 462, 470 (6th Cir.2004) (quoting Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961)). A juror’s express assurance that she can do so, although not necessarily conclusive, cf. Wolfe v. Brigano, 232 F.3d 499, 502 (6th Cir.2000) (“A court’s refusal to excuse a juror will not be upheld simply because the court ultimately elicits from the prospective juror a promise that he will be fair and impartial.”) (quotation omitted), indicates that she is impartial. See Angel, 355 F.3d at 470; Miller, 269 F.3d at 616; Hughes, 258 F.3d at 460 (stating that juror assurances of impartiality may be relied upon “in deciding whether a defendant has satisfied his burden of proving actual prejudice”). If a juror makes such an assurance, the defendant must demonstrate that it is not to be credited since he bears the burden of proof on actual bias. See Murphy, 421 U.S. at 800, 95 S.Ct. 2031 (“[T]he juror’s assurances that he is equal to [the] task [of deciding a *680case impartially] cannot be dispositive of the accused’s rights, and it remains open to the defendant to demonstrate the actual existence of such an opinion in the mind of the juror as will raise the presumption of partiality.”) (quotation omitted); see also Miller, 269 F.3d at 616-17 (noting that it is a defendant’s burden to show actual bias to succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on failure to strike a biased juror and finding that the defendant did not meet this burden because the juror at issue expressly indicated that she could decide the case impartially and because there was no reason given to doubt this assurance). A juror’s close and ongoing relationship with a person involved in the case may undermine the reliability of her assurance of impartiality. Wolfe, 232 F.3d at 502; see also Miller, 269 F.3d at 616-17 (crediting a juror’s assurance of impartiality despite her acquaintance with the victim’s mother because “there is no indication from the record that they shared a close personal relationship”). But merely being acquainted with someone involved in the case does- not. See McQueen v. Scroggy, 99 F.3d 1302, 1320 (6th Cir.1996) (“There is no constitutional prohibition against jurors simply knowing the parties involved.... The Constitution does not require ignorant or uninformed jurors; it requires impartial jurors.”).
Miller does not succeed in demonstrating that Bell was actually biased against him. Bell made numerous express assurances during voir dire that she could decide Miller’s case fairly. Specifically, in response to the trial court’s question as to whether she could be fair and impartial despite her familiarity with and feelings for Cline, Bell replied, “I think I could be fair. I think I could be fair.... I believe I could be fair and whether she’s guilty or not guilty. I believe I could be fair about it all.”1 These statements are not so equivocal in and of themselves as to be untenable. See Miller, 269 F.3d at 618 (crediting statements by juror that “I think I could be fair” and “I don’t really think that I would be biased”). Indeed, “venire members commonly couch their responses to questions concerning bias in terms of T think’ ” Such that “the use of such language cannot necessarily be construed as equivocation.” Id.
Furthermore, Miller provides no reason to doubt the validity of Bell’s assurances. As evidenced by the fact that Bell had not seen Cline in at least a year at the time of voir dire, the two did not share a close and ongoing relationship. Nor is there any reason to believe that Bell’s sympathy for Cline was so strong as to undermine the reliability of her assurance that she could evaluate the case fairly and impartially. Expressions of' sympathy for a victim, without more, do not demonstrate actual bias where the juror has assured the court that she may decide the case fairly. For example, in Ainsworth v. Calderon, 138 F.3d 787, 796 (9th Cir.1998), a juror indicated during voir dire that “she was unsure whether she could disregard the information she had gathered from news sources and decide the case based only on the evidence presented at trial.” The defendant sought a change of venue, which was denied. Id. at 795. On habeas review, he claimed that this denial was erroneous because the juror in question was actually 'prejudiced against him. Id. at 795-96. The court rejected this assertion, noting that there was “no indication that [the juror] had the opinion that [the defendant] was the murderer, and she repeatedly stated she could set aside her feelings of sympathy for [the victim] in order to judge *681the case fairly.” Id. at 796; see also Celestine v. Blackburn, 750 F.2d 353, 360 (5th Cir.1984) (holding that state court did not err in refusing to dismiss for cause a juror who knew the granddaughter of the victim because, even though her testimony at voir dire indicated her emotions might affect her ability to deliberate, “she consistently stated that her feelings would not so influence her as to prejudice her against [the defendant]” and “[s]he had not discussed the murder with the granddaughter, and she repeatedly denied bias”). As in Ains-worth, Bell repeatedly stated that she could decide the case fairly despite her sympathy for Cline, and she never stated that she believed Miller was the murderer. Also, as in Celestine, there is no indication that she discussed the crime at issue with Cline.
In sum, Miller fails to meet his burden of showing that Bell possessed actual bias against him, and, as a result, he also fails to meet his burden of showing that his counsel’s failure to strike Bell was prejudicial. Thus, we should affirm the district court’s denial of Miller’s ineffective assistance claim and of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus more generally.
The majority, of course, reaches a contrary conclusion. It finds that, although Bell stated “I think I could be fair,” she never made an unequivocal statement of impartiality and, in fact, made express statements of partiality. There are numerous problems with this conclusion and the manner in which the majority reaches it. First, Bell said much more than “I think I could be fair”:
I think I could be fair. I think I could be fair. I ministered in the women’s section for about four years. [Cline] was kind of in and out, but she seemed like she wanted to do better, but I believe I could be fair and whether she’s guilty or not guilty. I believe I could be fair about it all.
Far from saying so in an isolated statement, Bell reiterated again and again that — despite her familiarity with Cline— she could decide Miller’s case fairly.
Additionally, by describing them as statements of partiality, the majority ascribes significance to certain of Bell’s statements that the words do not justify. For example, the majority latches on to Bell’s initial comments that “I feel like I would kind of be partial to Linda Cline” and “I kind of have sympathy for her in this case, with her being the victim.” First of all, these “kind of’ statements are hardly unequivocal. Second, as discussed, expressions of sympathy for a victim do not necessarily demonstrate partiality. Third, the majority injects legal content into Bell’s use of the term “partial,” construing it to mean that she cannot decide the case on the evidence before her and that she is admitting bias against Miller. However, her full testimony indicates that Bell uses “partial” to indicate sympathy, or having a liking or fondness for, Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed.1989), Cline. Moreover, imputing import to Bell’s use of the word “partial” and to her initial indication of sympathy for Cline conveniently ignores the fact that, after she made these statements, the trial court, apparently concerned about Bell’s potential partiality, immediately questioned her about her ability to serve on the jury impartially, to which Bell responded repeatedly that she could be fair in deciding Miller’s case.
Ultimately, however, the linchpin of the majority’s conclusion that Bell unequivocally indicated partiality is the fact that, after stating for the last time that she could decide Miller’s case fairly, she said, “But I do have feelings about [Cline].” While this remark may constitute a statement of partiality in the sense that it *682evidences empathy for Cline, Bell is not asserting that she would not be able to decide fairly Miller’s guilt or innocence. Rather, the statement was simply, a reaffirmation of Bell’s earlier statement that “she kind of [had] sympathy for Cline, with her being the victim,” a feeling she repeatedly explained would not affect her ability to decide Miller’s case fairly. At no point did Bell ever indicate that her concern for Cline would make her more likely to accept Cline’s testimony as true, would predispose her to credit evidence offered against Miller, would lead her to discount testimony offered on Miller’s behalf, or would in any way incline her to believe that Miller was guilty. The only express statements we have from Bell regarding her ability to decide the case are: “I think I could be fair. I think I could be fair.... I believe I could be fair and whether she’s guilty or not guilty. I believe I could be fair about it all.” Because Miller has not articulated a valid reason to disregard these statements, they deserve our credence.2
In reaching its conclusion, the majority analogizes this case to Hughes. The analogy is inapt. In Hughes, the juror unequivocally stated ' during voir dire, “I don’t think I could be fair.” 258 F.3d at 456. In response, the trial court asked the juror, “You don’t think you could be fair?”, to which the juror starkly replied, “No.” Id. Most importantly, the juror never individually stated or suggested whatsoever that she could be impartial, either initially or through rehabilitation. Id. at 460 (“[The juror] never said that she would be able to render a fair and impartial verdict.”). Left only with a statement in the record that she could not be fair, this court was able to presume the juror was partial and actually biased against the defendant. Id.; see also Miller, 269 F.3d at 617 (“Because the only evidence relevant to the issue of bias [in Hughes] was the juror’s statement that she did not think she could be fair, we had no choice but to find actual bias.”) (emphasis added).
The case sub judice could not be moré different. Here, Bell never stated that she did not think she could be fair. Quite the contrary, she stated that she believed she could be fair “about it all.” And she said so again and again. In an attempt to fit this case within the bounds of Hughes, the majority posits that it is “ultimately left with a statement of partiality” without “juror assurances of impartiality,” whereas, in reality, we are left with numerous statements of impartiality without any express assertion from Bell that she could not decide the case fairly. In other words, what enabled the court in Hughes tó presume partiality- — a blatant statement of partiality and absolutely no contrary statement from the juror that he could be impartial— is glaringly absent here. Thus, to reach its conclusion, the majority contorts the holding of Hughes, which stands for the proposition that a juror may be presumed to be actually biased against a defendant when he makes no express statements of impartiality but instead expressly states that he does not believe he can be fair in determining a defendant’s innocence or guilt and no effort is made to rehabilitate that juror specifically. The court unjustifiably extends this holding to allow for a presumption of partiality even when the *683juror has made express statements of impartiality.
The majority also analogizes this case to Wolfe. In Wolfe, the court found that the trial court erred in failing to excuse four jurors for cause. 232 F.3d at 502-03. However, each of these jurors expressly doubted his or her ability to decide the case fairly. One juror “did not think he could be a fair and impartial juror.” Id. at 502. The second juror stated it was “hard to say” whether her relationship with the victim’s parents would impact her ability to deliberate fairly. Id. The third juror “expressed doubt as to whether she could put aside [news] reports and decide the case solely on the evidence presented at trial.” Id. at 502-03. Finally, the fourth juror “doubted he would require the prosecution to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 503. When asked about her partiality, Bell expressed no such doubt about her ability to decide Miller’s case fairly. Wolfe is simply inappo-site.
One final difficulty I have with the majority’s holding is that it reduces the inquiry into a juror’s actual bias to a question of chronology. If a juror swears repeatedly that she can be fair in deciding a defendant’s innocence or guilt but then indicates in her final statement that she has some degree of sympathy for the victim, the majority would have it that a court can only conclude that the juror is actually biased against the defendant. I simply cannot subscribe to this conclusion. In assessing whether a juror was actually biased against a defendant, we should consider the totality of her statements, see Hightower v. Schofield, 365 F.3d 1008, 1041 (11th Cir.2004); see also Miller, 269 F.3d at 618 (considering all the statements made by the juror during voir dire); cf. Pruett v. Norris, 153 F.3d 579, 587 (8th Cir.1998) (assessing actual prejudice under the totality of the circumstances); Stafford v. Saffle, 34 F.3d 1557, 1567 (10th Cir.1994) (“We review actual prejudice by examining the totality of the circumstances.”), not merely the statement that comes last-in-time.
I do not believe that the totality of Bell’s statements demonstrates that she was actually biased against Miller. Hence, I also believe that Miller’s counsel’s performance was not so objectively unreasonable as to be deficient under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Cf. Miller, 269 F.3d at 618-19 (“[T]he trial court. cannot be faulted for not disqualifying for cause a juror who consistently says that she thinks she can be fair.”). In conclusion, I would affirm the district court’s denial of Miller’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim and, ultimately, its denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Since the majority does otherwise, I respectfully dissent.

. Apparently, in stating that she could be fair in determining "whether she’s guilty,” Bell momentarily mistook Cline as being the defendant in the case.

. At most, the majority ' could conclude— though I would still disagree — that Bell’s statements of feelings toward Cline undermine her assertion of impartiality, see Wolfe, 232 F.3d at 502 ("[T]he second juror’s assessment that she could be fair and impartial [is] untenable [] in light of both the close relationship between the juror and the victim's family, and the fact that she knew the family's theory of the victim’s death.”), but to characterize them as statements of partiality in and of themselves is unfounded.