Court Opinion

ID: 9854972
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:17:37.742163+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:37.758637
License: Public Domain

Eldridge, Judge,
dissenting.
Because a merger issue under OCGA § 16-1-7 involves the possible imposition of a void sentence which may be reviewed at any time, I must respectfully dissent from Division 4 in Case No. A01A2509.
As held in Kinney v. State, 234 Ga. App. 5, 7 (2) (505 SE2d 553) (1998), one crime is included in another as a matter of fact if it is established by proof of the same or less than all of the facts used to prove the other. OCGA § 16-1-6 (1). A defendant may be tried for both offenses under such circumstances, but may not be convicted of both. OCGA § 16-1-7 (a) (l).26 “This right to be free of multiple convictions for the same conduct has been referred to as the substantive bar against double jeopardy, and it is not waived either by the defendant’s entry of a guilty plea or by his failure to assert it in the trial court.”27
Accordingly, a trial court is without subject matter jurisdiction to sentence on an offense that has merged into another offense as a matter of law and/or fact. Such a sentence would be a mere nullity because the conviction on a merged offense is against the law. An appeal may be taken from such a void sentence, even if no objection was made in the court below, because “a void sentence is one which imposes punishment the law does not allow. [Cits.]”28 “A judgment which is void for any cause is a mere nullity and it may be so held in any court where it becomes material to the interest of the parties to consider it.”29
Accordingly, I cannot agree that Jackson, by failure to object at the time of sentencing, waived consideration of his claim that the aggravated assault count merged into either the rape or kidnapping counts pursuant to OCGA § 16-1-7. It is important to note that the Supreme Court of Georgia has granted certiorari on this issue in Curtis v. State, Case No. S01G1868, cert. granted February 13, 2002. Before we overrule another one of our precedents — again leaving bench and bar bewildered by inconsistency — I would address the instant claim of error, if for no other reason than such issue was pre*569served below at the motion for new trial. Cannon v. State, 250 Ga. App. 777, 782 (3) (552 SE2d 922) (2001), citing Williams v. State, 233 Ga. App. 217, 220 (4) (504 SE2d 53) (1998) (“There is no evidence in the record that Williams raised the merger issue or objected to the sentences imposed at the time of sentencing or in his motion for new trial”) (emphasis supplied).
Decided March 28, 2002
David D. Bishop, for appellant (case no. A01A2509).
Dell Jackson, for appellant (case no. A01A2524).
Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Alvera A. Wheeler, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Judge Phipps joins in this dissent.

 See generally State v. Estevez, 232 Ga. 316, 317 (1) (206 SE2d 475) (1974).

 Redding v. State, 188 Ga. App. 805 (374 SE2d 339) (1988); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U. S. 21 (94 SC 2098, 40 LE2d 628) (1974); McClure v. State, 179 Ga. App. 245 (345 SE2d 922) (1986).

 Noble v. State, 220 Ga. App. 155, 158 (469 SE2d 307) (1996). See also State v. Baldwin, 167 Ga. App. 737, 738 (2) (307 SE2d 679) (1983); Jarrett v. State, 217 Ga. App. 627, 628 (1) (458 SE2d 414) (1995).

 (Citation omitted.) State v. Sheahan, 217 Ga. App. 26, 27 (1) (456 SE2d 615) (1995).