Court Opinion

ID: 9957989
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-05 22:04:01.804182+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:38.921750
License: Public Domain

2024 IL App (5th) 220627-U
            NOTICE
                                                                                        NOTICE
 Decision filed 04/04/24. The
                                                                             This order was filed under
 text of this decision may be               NO. 5-22-0627
                                                                             Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
 changed or corrected prior to
 the filing of a Petition for                                                not precedent except in the
                                               IN THE                        limited circumstances allowed
 Rehearing or the disposition of
 the same.                                                                   under Rule 23(e)(1).
                                   APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                               FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,            )     Appeal from the
                                                )     Circuit Court of
      Plaintiff-Appellee,                       )     Pulaski County.
                                                )
v.                                              )     No. 21-CF-21
                                                )
JARED WADE HINMAN SR.,                          )     Honorable
                                                )     Jeffery B. Farris,
      Defendant-Appellant.                      )     Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

         JUSTICE CATES delivered the judgment of the court.
         Presiding Justice Vaughan and Justice Welch concurred in the judgment.

                                            ORDER

¶1       Held: The State presented sufficient evidence for the jury to make reasonable inferences
               to convict the defendant of predatory criminal sexual assault. The circuit court did
               not abuse its discretion in allowing testimony of other crimes or bad acts to show
               the defendant’s propensity to commit sex offenses. The circuit court did not err in
               sentencing the defendant where it considered factors in mitigation for an individual
               under the age of 18.

¶2       A jury found the defendant, Jared Wade Hinman Sr., guilty of two counts of predatory

criminal sexual assault of a child and one count of criminal sexual assault. The defendant was

sentenced to a total of 55 years in the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) and 3 years to

life of mandatory supervised release (MSR). On appeal, the defendant claims insufficient proof to

find that the defendant was over 17 years old when the incidents of predatory criminal sexual

assault occurred; the trial court erred by allowing several witnesses to provide testimony of overly

prejudicial sexual offenses that were unrelated to the charges; and the defendant claims that the
                                                  1
circuit court failed to consider mandatory mitigating sentencing factors as required by section 5-

4.5-105(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(a) (West 2020)). For the

following reasons, we affirm.

¶3                                   I. BACKGROUND

¶4      The defendant was born on December 27, 1982. His parents divorced when he was a child,

and the defendant’s mother had additional children after she remarried. The defendant had multiple

half-sisters, including J.J., born on October 20, 1989, P.R., born on June 11, 1991, and J.H., born

on January 25, 1995. The defendant additionally had older brothers from his mother’s first

marriage and younger half-brothers, who were J.J., P.R., and J.H.’s siblings. The defendant spent

a portion of his childhood in a household with his mother and younger half-siblings. In August of

2002, the defendant married and had multiple children from that marriage, including A.H., born

on April 12, 2002.

¶5      A.H. was removed from the defendant’s care when she was approximately eight years old

due to allegations of sexual abuse by the defendant. The defendant was charged with predatory

criminal sexual assault pursuant to section 12-14.1(a)(1) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS

5/12-14.1(a)(1) (West 2010)) in People v. Hinman, No. 13-CF-94 (Cir. Ct. Pulaski County), for

allegations involving sexual acts with his daughter, A.H. The defendant’s half-siblings were

interviewed regarding sexual abuse by the defendant after A.H. was removed from the defendant’s

care.

¶6                                       A. Pretrial

¶7      The defendant was subsequently charged by information on March 31, 2021, in this case,

based on allegations of sexual activity against his half-sister, J.J. The information was

subsequently amended, and the defendant was charged with two counts of predatory criminal

                                                2
sexual assault pursuant to section 11-1.40 of the Criminal Code of 2012 (720 ILCS 5/11-1.40

(West 2020)) and one count of criminal sexual assault pursuant to section 11-1.20(a)(2) of the

Criminal Code of 2012 (720 ILCS 5/11-1.20(a)(2) (West 2020)). Count I alleged that the defendant

knowingly committed an act of sexual penetration by making contact with his penis and the sex

organ of J.J. when she was under 13 years of age and the defendant was over 17 years of age.

Count II alleged that the defendant put his penis in the mouth of J.J. when she was under 13 years

of age and the defendant was over 17 years of age. Count III alleged that the defendant knowingly

committed an act of sexual penetration by putting his penis into the sex organ of J.J. when she was

a minor, and the defendant did so with knowledge that J.J. was intoxicated.

¶8     The State filed a motion to allow other crimes evidence pursuant to section 115-7.3 of the

Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/115-7.3 (West 2020)). The State sought to

present testimony from the victim, J.J., of approximately six incidents of uncharged sexual acts

involving the defendant to show the nature of their relationship. One of the incidents involved the

defendant forcing J.J. and her siblings to engage in sexual acts with each other and together with

him. The State additionally sought to present evidence of other crimes or bad acts involving the

defendant’s half-sisters, P.R. and J.H., as well as testimony by the defendant’s daughter, A.H., to

show the defendant’s propensity to commit sex offenses. The State provided descriptions of the

allegations of the victim and the corroborating witnesses. The allegations included the defendant

forcing his relatives to jointly perform acts of oral sex on him and with each other, as well as

incidents of inappropriate touching, forced anal sex, and vaginal sex. The State argued that the

probative value of their testimony outweighed the prejudice to the defendant when considering the

proximity in time of the allegations and the degree of factual similarity of the allegations to the

charged offense, as well as other relevant facts and circumstances.

                                                3
¶9      The defendant filed a response to the State’s proffered evidence of other crimes evidence.

The defendant requested an opportunity to cross-examine the proposed witnesses regarding the

time, content, and circumstances related to their statements.

¶ 10    The circuit court held a hearing on the State’s motion to allow other crimes evidence. The

State argued that the victim in this case, J.J., was allowed to testify to the entirety of her relationship

with the defendant. The defense argued that testimony of J.J. was required before the circuit court

could make its determination, and requested a hearing where the State would make a formal offer

of proof. The defense additionally argued that the State should not be allowed to present more

evidence of other events than the events which were charged. The circuit court found that the

State’s motion appeared to provide a “very specific” framework of events involving J.J. that would

be presented in testimony. The circuit court granted the portion of the motion regarding testimony

by J.J. over the defendant’s objection. The circuit court additionally stated that the defense may

object during the trial, outside of the presence of the jury, if the testimony of uncharged events

became excessive. Defense counsel conceded that if the State presented evidence regarding when

the sexual abuse started and the frequency of the abuse, she did not anticipate a problem with J.J.’s

testimony.

¶ 11    The circuit court addressed the second part of the State’s motion regarding other crimes

evidence by the three additional victims. The State argued that the incidents involving the

additional victims occurred within 15 years. The witnesses were all female family members that

were significantly younger than the defendant. The witnesses were in situations where the

defendant was a caretaker, either as a father or an older sibling that was babysitting. The incidents

involved group sex. The witnesses additionally observed violence and had received threats from

the defendant.

                                                    4
¶ 12   The defense argued that the circuit court was required to hear the testimony of the potential

witnesses to determine whether they would testify as expected. The defense additionally argued

that the similarities were not sufficient to justify the admission of the testimony. The allegations

raised by each witness were not similar where some of the allegations involve drugs and alcohol.

The defense raised the issue of P.R. potentially testifying that the defendant would have his half-

siblings “smoke something on foil.” The defense also did not specifically address the potential

testimony regarding group sex with the defendant and his siblings. Also, some allegations mention

anal sex, but not by all, and that allegation would not relate to the victim’s testimony. The defense

claimed that the witness testimony would be overwhelmingly more prejudicial than probative.

¶ 13   The circuit court found that there was no requirement for the State to provide live testimony

as an offer of proof. The circuit court additionally found that the proposed testimony was not

substantially more prejudicial than probative, and the testimony was subject to cross-examination.

The circuit court, however, believed that “something wrapped in foil” may provide the wrong

impression and admonished the State to “take consideration of things of that nature that are purely

inflammatory” or “may be seen as purely inflammatory.” The circuit court reserved its ruling on

the issue regarding “smoking something in foil” and allowed testimony regarding alcohol.

¶ 14                                        B. Trial

¶ 15   The jury trial began on May 23, 2022. The State presented its opening argument, while the

defendant reserved opening argument for the beginning of his case. The defendant’s birth

certificate showing that his birth date was December 27, 1982, was admitted into evidence without

objection after opening argument.

¶ 16   J.J. testified that her date of birth was October 20, 1989, and she grew up in a house with

her siblings and her half-brother, the defendant. J.J. testified that their mother worked often, and

                                                 5
the defendant would babysit daily. J.J. recalled an incident that occurred when she was 5 years old,

and the defendant was 12 years old. She was dancing in the kitchen and the defendant asked if she

wanted to learn how to dance. J.J. agreed and the defendant took her into his bedroom. J.J. testified

that the defendant put her on a bed, fully clothed, and “he was pushing himself onto me like dry

humping.” The defendant then “stopped and walked off.”

¶ 17   J.J. testified to another incident that occurred when she was that same age. The defendant

was babysitting, and he gave J.J. and her sister, P.R., a bath together. The defendant took J.J. out

of the bathtub and into a bedroom where the defendant made J.J. perform oral sex. J.J. testified

that their mother returned home during the incident. The defendant shoved J.J. into a closet but

their mother found the defendant with his pants undone and J.J. was not wearing clothes. J.J.

testified that she remembered their mother spanking the defendant with a belt. Their mother also

spanked J.J. for not telling her what had happened. J.J. testified, “It made me feel like I had done

something wrong, and I didn’t want to tell her about any of that in the future because I thought I

would get in trouble.”

¶ 18   J.J. testified that their mother allowed the defendant to continue to babysit after that

incident and the abuse continued. J.J. testified that the abuse seemed to occur “all the time” and

she lived with “an overall sense of dread and doom.” J.J. testified that she avoided being alone

with the defendant. The defendant would take J.J. places such as a skating rink or an abandoned

building, and “make [her] perform oral on him.” J.J. testified that they would visit their

grandmother’s house on the weekends and the defendant would take her down to the basement.

He would also wake J.J. up to make her perform oral sex when they stayed at their grandmother’s

house. When J.J. was approximately 11 years old, the defendant gave her alcohol for the first time.

                                                 6
J.J. testified that the defendant would have their siblings “take turns doing oral on him,” and the

defendant would perform oral on J.J. J.J. could not recall specific details of those events.

¶ 19   J.J. then testified to the incidents alleged in count I and count II, which occurred when she

was 10 years old and living in Kentucky. Their mother had asked the defendant to pick up dresses

from their grandmother’s house in Mound City, Illinois, for J.J. and her sisters to wear to a church.

J.J. went with the defendant to pick up the dresses because she wanted to visit her grandmother.

The defendant made J.J. “perform oral on him for the entire ride from Lovelaceville, Kentucky,

all the way to Mound City.” J.J. testified that it started when they left the house and then near the

halfway point of the drive, the defendant stopped his truck in a wooded area on a back road. J.J.

testified that he wanted her to continue when the truck was stopped. She testified that she “had an

idea that maybe if I said I had to use the bathroom, I could get out of the truck.” The defendant

allowed her to use the bathroom and J.J. tried to escape. The defendant chased J.J., “dragged” her

back, and “threw” her into the truck. The defendant then said, “if you ever run away from me like

that again, I’ll kill you.” The defendant then put on a flavored condom. J.J. recalled the taste of

“fruity rubber.” He made her continue until they reached their grandmother’s house. J.J. testified

that the defendant had shoved and held her face down and she was “gagging and crying and snot.”

¶ 20   J.J. then described the incident that occurred after they arrived at their grandmother’s

house. J.J. ran inside, but their grandmother was not home. The defendant followed J.J. into the

house. J.J. testified that “since [J.J.] didn’t do what he had asked [her] to do that he was going to

put it inside of [her]. And he said that he was either going to put it in my butt or in my vagina.”

J.J. told the defendant, “please don’t put it in my butt” because she remembered something that

her brother had told her. J.J. screamed and the defendant put his hand over J.J.’s mouth to quiet

her. J.J. was undressed from the waist down. She testified that she “remember[ed] the weight of

                                                 7
his body on top of [her] and him shoving his penis onto my vagina” and that it “felt like a fist just

like punching me in the vagina.” The defendant stopped after J.J.’s older half-brother arrived, and

the defendant had heard a car door closing.

¶ 21   J.J. testified to her age at the time of the incidents described in count I and count II, and the

following testimony was provided:

              “Q. I think you initially said that you were ten and he was—do you know how old
       he was?
              A. He is seven years older than me.
              Q. Okay. So do you believe he was 17?
              A. I believe so.
                                                   ***
              Q. [J.J.], I’m sorry to ask again. Your date of birth is?
              A. 10-20-89.
              Q. And so you said this happened when you were ten years old?
              A. Yes.
              Q. So that would have been 10-20 of ’99. That was when you turned ten years old,
       right?
              A. Right.
              Q. Okay. And then your eleventh birthday would have been October 19th [sic] of
       2000. You believe it happened at some point in that year?
              A. Yes.
              Q. Do you know what grade you were in at that time?
              A. When it happened?
              Q. Yes.
              A. May have been in the fourth grade.
              Q. And do you know where you attended fourth grade?
              A. Lone Oak Elementary.
              Q. So that was still at Lone Oak. Do you recall—well, did you continue at Lone
       Oak? Or at some point, did you leave Lone Oak school?
              A. We left Lone Oak sometime in my fifth-grade year. It was October of 2000.
              Q. Okay. Was that right around your eleventh birthday?
              A. Correct.
              Q. Do you remember what the dresses were for?
              A. I don’t remember exactly.
              Q. Okay. Were there different occasions that you would get dresses?
              A. It could have been around Easter.
              Q. Okay.
              A. But I’m not certain.”

                                                  8
J.J. also testified that she was not wearing a winter coat when the incident occurred on the drive to

and at her grandmother’s house.

¶ 22   J.J. additionally testified that the abuse was “still pretty constant” after that incident until

she was 12 years old. J.J. believed that the defendant stopped after she started menstruating, and

the defendant had married. J.J. testified that the defendant was inappropriate towards her again

when she was alone in a vehicle with the defendant when she was 14 years old. The defendant had

offered her “$400.00 for a blow job.” J.J. told him “no,” and he did not do anything further.

¶ 23   J.J. testified to the incident alleged in count III, which occurred at her grandmother’s house

when she was 16 years old. J.J. was drinking alcohol with the defendant, his wife, and her sister,

P.R., after their grandmother went to sleep. J.J. remembered vomiting in her grandmother’s

backyard and the defendant had offered to help. The defendant then put J.J. in a vehicle and drove

her to a place near an electrical substation. J.J. testified that when they stopped, she opened the car

door to vomit. While she was vomiting, she felt the defendant’s hands undoing her pants. The

defendant removed one of J.J.’s legs from her pants and pulled her on top of him in the driver’s

seat. J.J. testified that “he put his penis inside of me.” She “flung” herself to the car door and

vomited again. J.J. testified that when she woke up the following morning, she had remembered

what had happened to her and cried. J.J. additionally testified that she had confronted the defendant

about that incident approximately a year later. The defendant had told her that “he thought it was

mutual, and that he was in love with [J.J.] and he thought that [J.J.] was in love with him.” J.J.

additionally told the defendant’s wife what had happened. She had wanted the defendant’s wife to

end her relationship with the defendant because of the defendant’s violent behavior and he had hit

his wife on several occasions.

                                                  9
¶ 24   J.J. testified that she had not spoken to the defendant in years and felt no connection to him.

She believed that he was a danger to society. J.J. testified that she did not want to talk to the police

about what had happened. She also did not want the defendant to continue to hurt her niece, A.H.,

or anyone else.

¶ 25   P.R. testified that she lived with the defendant until he turned 18 years old. After that time,

the defendant lived with their grandmother. P.R. testified that she was molested by the defendant

when she was four or five years old. The abuse occurred in several places, including their

grandmother’s house and in vehicles. P.R. explained that the defendant would “put our mouth

down there,” “touch private parts,” and “try to put his mouth down there.” P.R. additionally

testified that the defendant would give his half-siblings alcohol.

¶ 26   The defendant would take P.R. and her siblings to the basement of her grandmother’s house

in Mound City. P.R. testified to an incident that occurred at their grandmother’s house that

involved J.J. and the defendant. The defendant gave J.J. and P.R. vodka and orange juice. Then he

stripped off their clothing and had “sexual relations” with his sisters and made them interact with

each other. P.R. testified that the defendant had threatened to kill them, and they were afraid of the

defendant.

¶ 27   P.R. testified that the abuse stopped when she was approximately eight years old. P.R.

believed that the defendant stopped molesting her because she had threatened to tell someone about

the defendant.

¶ 28   P.R. additionally testified that when she was 18 years old, the Department of Children and

Family Services (DCFS) investigated the defendant’s family. The defendant had called P.R. for

help, and P.R. went to the defendant’s home to speak to his daughter, A.H., while the caseworker

was present. P.R. promised A.H. that the defendant would never hurt her again if she told her story.

                                                  10
P.R. told the DCFS caseworker about the defendant’s history of sexual abuse. DCFS removed the

defendant’s children from his care.

¶ 29   On cross-examination, the defense counsel questioned P.R. on whether she had reported

abuse by the defendant before DCFS involvement. P.R. responded that she was suspicious of

sexual abuse to A.H. P.R. had witnessed the defendant pick up A.H. by her neck and throw her

across a room. P.R. explained that she was fearful of the defendant when she was a child because

he had threatened to kill her. She reported the defendant when she became an adult.

¶ 30   A.H. testified that the defendant was her father and J.J. was her aunt. A.H. testified that the

earliest memory of sexual abuse by the defendant was when he touched her in the bathtub. When

A.H. was six or seven years old, the defendant penetrated her anally at his grandmother’s house in

Mound City, Illinois. She described an incident where the defendant gave A.H. a choice of putting

his penis in “your butt” or “your front” and proceeded to penetrate her anally. A.H. yelled because

it hurt, and the defendant flipped her over and penetrated her vaginally. After that incident, the

defendant would penetrate A.H. vaginally.

¶ 31   A.H. testified to an incident where A.H. was asleep at the grandmother’s house. A.H.’s

mother woke her to join the defendant and her mother in their bedroom. The defendant was naked,

and he directed A.H.’s mother to perform oral sex on A.H. A.H. testified that her mother was upset

and had been crying. A.H. was directed to perform oral sex on her mother and to assist her mother

perform oral sex on the defendant.

¶ 32   When A.H. was eight years old, DCFS investigated her family because her mother had

attempted to kill herself. P.R. was present at the house when the DCFS caseworker was

investigating. P.R. was the first person that A.H. had spoken to about the sexual abuse by

defendant. A.H. was removed from her parents’ care at that time.

                                                 11
¶ 33   J.H. testified that the defendant was 12 years older than her and her half-brother. The

defendant moved from their household when she was five years old, but he would babysit J.H. at

their grandmother’s house in Mound City, Illinois. J.H. testified to an incident where the defendant

sexually violated her in a car when she was approximately six years old. J.H. additionally testified

that the defendant would wake her up in the night to perform sexual acts. He would force her to

perform sexual acts in their grandmother’s basement and in her bathroom. J.H. testified to a

specific incident that occurred when she was 10 to 12 years old. The defendant forced anal sex in

their grandmother’s bathroom. She testified that the defendant continued to sexually abuse her

until she was approximately 13 or 14 years old.

¶ 34   J.H. testified that during a sexual altercation, the defendant “had some form of realization”

and he said that “he had to ask himself what the hell is wrong with me.” The defendant then

admitted to J.H. that he had abused all his half-siblings, except their youngest brother. J.H.

additionally testified that the defendant called her when she was 18 years old and asked her for

forgiveness. J.H. reported the defendant to the police in 2016, near the time of her twenty-first

birthday at the direction of her counselor.

¶ 35   After J.H. testified, the State rested its case. The defense made a motion for a directed

verdict and argued that the State was unable to establish that the defendant was over 17 years old

for two of the counts. The State responded that the defendant’s age was an issue of fact and there

was sufficient evidence presented for the jury to find that the defendant was 17 years old. The

circuit court denied the motion for directed verdict.

¶ 36   The defendant did not testify or present any evidence. The parties presented closing

arguments. The State discussed the charges in its closing argument and explained that they must

determine whether the defendant was 17 years old at the time of the incidents for count I and count

                                                 12
II. The State argued that J.J. identified the defendant as being 17 years old at the time of the

incidents and his birthday was in December. J.J. testified to the grade school she was attending at

that time, it was warm out, and she did not wear a coat on the date of the incidents alleged in count

I and count II.

¶ 37    The defendant’s closing argument included an argument that the State had not proved

beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was 17 years old during the time of the incidents

alleged in count I and count II. The defense stated that when J.J. turned 10 years old, the defendant

was 16 years old. The age of the defendant mattered, and defense counsel questioned J.J.’s

credibility.

¶ 38    The jury found the defendant guilty of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child where

he touched his penis to J.J.’s sex organ, guilty of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child with

regard to the defendant’s penis in mouth of J.J., and guilty of criminal sexual assault of J.J.

¶ 39                              C. Posttrial and Sentencing

¶ 40    The defendant filed a motion for a new trial and argued that the State did not prove

predatory criminal sexual assault beyond a reasonable doubt where it did not prove that the

defendant was 17 years old at the time of the incidents charged. The defense claimed that the State

did not prove sexual assault beyond a reasonable doubt where the victim could not remember

details of the incident and there was no corroborating or physical evidence presented. The

defendant additionally claimed that he was denied a fair trial where J.J., A.H., P.R., and J.H. were

allowed to testify to other crimes allegedly committed by the defendant where the prejudicial

testimony outweighed the probative value of the evidence presented. Additionally, the defendant

argued that there was not a substantial degree of similarity between the allegations and the

testimony presented.

                                                 13
¶ 41   The circuit court heard the defendant’s motion for a new trial prior to the sentencing

hearing. The defendant argued the issues raised in his written motion for a new trial. The State

responded that the issues regarding the defendant’s age and testimony of specific details of sexual

assault were issues of fact that the jury decided. The State argued that the issue of other crimes

evidence was raised in a pretrial motion and relied on those same arguments. The State additionally

argued that the other crimes evidence was not a focal point of the trial. The circuit court found that

the probative value of the other crimes evidence outweighed the prejudicial effect and denied the

motion for a new trial.

¶ 42   During the sentencing hearing, J.J. and J.H. made victim’s impact statements and the State

requested that the circuit court consider the testimony presented by the other witnesses at trial. The

State requested the maximum sentence of 30 years on count I, consecutive 30 years on count II,

and a consecutive 15 years on count III, for a total of 75 years in the IDOC served at 85%. The

State additionally requested protective orders for J.J. and J.H., and that the defendant should

receive a $12,000 fine.

¶ 43   The defendant argued that the minimum sentence was 6 years on count I, 6 years on count

II, and 4 years on count III, for a total of 16 years, and requested a sentence of no more than 20

years in the IDOC. Three letters of support were submitted. The defendant argued that the

defendant’s conduct did not cause or threaten serious physical harm and he did not contemplate

that his criminal conduct would have caused or threatened serious physical harm. The defendant

additionally argued that according to the jury, the defendant was 17 years old for two of the charges

and a young adult for the third charge and the circuit court should consider his young age when

the incidents occurred. The defendant did not have a history of prior delinquency or criminal

                                                 14
activity when the crimes were committed. He also argued that his character and attitude indicated

that he was unlikely to commit another crime.

¶ 44   The defendant made a statement in allocution and addressed his siblings. The defendant

stated that his siblings’ memories were different from his own, and that he did not hold anything

against them. He stated that he loved his family.

¶ 45   The circuit court considered the evidence presented at trial, the contents of the presentence

investigation (PSI), victim impact statements, the defendant’s allocution statement, letters of

support, and arguments by counsel. The circuit court additionally referenced Miller v. Alabama,

567 U.S. 460 (2012), and considered that the defendant was 17 years old at the time of the

incidents. The circuit court sentenced the defendant to 20 years in the IDOC at 85% time with a

MSR of 3 years to life on count I. On count II, the circuit court sentenced the defendant to 25 years

in the IDOC at 85% time, to run consecutive to count I. On count III, the defendant was sentenced

to 10 years in the IDOC at 85% time, followed by MSR of 3 years to life, to be served

consecutively. The circuit court additionally imposed a $12,000 fine and entered a protective order.

¶ 46   The defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence and argued that the circuit court failed

to fully consider the defendant’s age at the time of the offenses and his sentence was excessive

where he lacked a criminal history. The circuit court was required to consider five factors when

sentencing a juvenile offender, including age and accompanying immaturity, home environment,

degree of participation, incompetence in dealing with the justice system, and any prospects for

rehabilitation. The defendant argued that the circuit court did not give enough weight to the

defendant’s age or his family or home environment when it imposed a 55-year sentence to IDOC.

¶ 47   The circuit court found that during the sentencing hearing that it had sentenced the

defendant to a lesser sentence due to the defendant’s lack of criminal history. The circuit court

                                                 15
discussed the Miller factors and referred to People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655. The circuit court

considered that sentencing courts must consider factors associated with youth, including the

defendant’s age at the time of the offense; evidence that the defendant was particularly immature

or unable to appreciate the risks and consequences; the defendant’s home environment; the

defendant’s degree of participation in the offense and any peer pressure; whether the defendant

was able to deal with prosecutors, the police, and his capacity to assist his attorneys, and the

defendant’s potential for rehabilitation.

¶ 48   The circuit court found that the defendant was 17 years old when the offenses occurred.

The circuit court considered that it did not have evidence that the defendant was particularly

immature and that some people would consider his sexual activity as a sign of maturity while

others would consider that sexual activity with younger children as a sign of immaturity or that the

defendant was unable to appreciate the risks and consequences of his behavior. The circuit court

found that because the defendant acted in secret and attempted to hide his behavior that he was

able to appreciate the risks and consequences of his actions. The circuit court considered the

defendant’s home environment and found that the case was about the defendant’s proclivities. No

evidence was presented that the defendant was subject to peer pressure and the circuit court found

that the defendant had acted on “his own impulses.” The defendant was 39 years old at the time of

sentencing and the circuit court found that there were no limitations on his ability to interact with

police or attorneys based on his age. The circuit court additionally considered the defendant’s

potential for rehabilitation and found that the defendant demonstrated “zero evidence of remorse.”

¶ 49   The defendant’s motion to reconsider his sentence was denied. This appeal followed.

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¶ 50                                     II. ANALYSIS

¶ 51    On appeal, the defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to prove that the

defendant was at least 17 years old when the incidents occurred; the circuit court erred in allowing

several witnesses to testify to overly prejudicial sexual offenses that were unrelated to the

defendant’s charges; and the circuit court failed to consider mitigating sentencing factors.

¶ 52                             A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶ 53    We first address the defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. “When

considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, courts of review must consider whether,

when viewing all the evidence adduced at trial in a light most favorable to the State, any rational

trier of fact could find proof of the essential elements of the charged offense beyond a reasonable

doubt.” People v. Edward, 402 Ill. App. 3d 555, 564 (2010). The State is not required to disprove

all possible factual scenarios. People v. Newton, 2018 IL 122958, ¶ 27.

¶ 54    “The trier of fact is responsible for determining witness credibility, the weight to be given

to their testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.” People v.

Harmon, 2012 IL App (3d) 110297, ¶ 11. Factual disputes are resolved by the trier of fact where

evidence can produce conflicting inferences. Harmon, 2012 IL App (3d) 110297, ¶ 12. We do not

substitute our judgment for the determination made by the trier of fact. Newton, 2018 IL 122958,

¶ 26.

¶ 55    The defendant was charged with two counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child

(720 ILCS 5/12-14.1 (West 2000)) and one count of criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12-

13(a)(2) (West 2000)). The defendant claims that the State failed to prove, beyond a reasonable

doubt, the elements to sustain a conviction for predatory criminal sexual assault of a child based

on the version of the statute in effect at the time of the offense.

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¶ 56   In order to be convicted of predatory criminal sexual assault, the accused must be 17 years

old or older, and must commit an act of sexual penetration with a victim under 13 years old. 720

ILCS 5/12-14.1 (West 2000). The defendant does not dispute that the State proved that he had

committing acts of sexual penetration alleged in both counts of predatory criminal sexual assault

of a child under 13 years of age. The defendant, however, disputes his age at the time of the offense.

J.J. had testified that the incident occurred when she was 10 years old, and the defendant argues

that he was 16 years old for a period after J.J.’s tenth birthday. Specifically, he was 16 years old

on October 20, 1999, when J.J. turned 10 years old, until his seventeenth birthday on December

27, 1999.

¶ 57   In both counts of predatory criminal sexual assault, the State alleged that the defendant

committed the charged acts in April of 2000, in Pulaski County, Illinois, after the defendant’s

seventeenth birthday. J.J. testified that the defendant forced her to perform oral sex on the drive to

her grandmother’s house and a separate event that occurred on the same day at her grandmother’s

house where he attempted to insert his penis into her vagina.

¶ 58   J.J. could not provide the specific date of the events, but she testified that she went to her

grandmother’s house to pick up dresses for a church holiday, such as Easter. J.J. testified that she

was not wearing a winter coat. She recalled the grade school that she was attending at that time

and that she had transferred schools the following October. J.J. additionally testified that the

defendant continued to sexually abuse her after the date of those incidents until she was

approximately 12 years old.

¶ 59   The jury determined the essential element that the defendant was 17 years old at the time

of the incidents alleged in count I and count II based on the testimony that was presented. We will

not substitute our judgment for reasonable inferences made by the jury. Substantial evidence was

                                                 18
presented for the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed two

counts of predatory criminal sexual assault.

¶ 60                               B. Other Crimes Evidence

¶ 61   In general, evidence of other crimes for the purpose of demonstrating the propensity of the

defendant to commit the charged crime is inadmissible. People v. Manning, 182 Ill. 2d 193, 213

(1998). The defendant’s prior sexual activity with the same child in a sexual offense case is

admissible “to show the defendant’s intent, design or course of conduct and to corroborate the

victim’s testimony concerning the charged offense.” People v. Anderson, 225 Ill. App. 3d 636, 647

(1992). The victim’s credibility could face an unfair strain if testimony is limited to make an

incident appear isolated. Anderson, 225 Ill. App. 3d at 647-48.

¶ 62   Section 115-7.3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) provides an exception

for the evidentiary use of the defendant’s prior convictions in sexual offense cases, including the

crimes of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child and criminal sexual assault. 725 ILCS 5/115-

7.3 (West 2020). “Where the other-crimes evidence meets the preliminary statutory requirements,

it is admissible if (1) it is relevant; and (2) its probative value is not outweighed by its prejudicial

effect.” People v. Cardamone, 381 Ill. App. 3d 462, 489 (2008).

¶ 63   Section 115-7.3 of the Code specifies that the following factors should be weighed in

determining whether the prejudicial effect of admitting other crimes evidence outweighs the

probative value:

       “(1) the proximity in time to the charged or predicate offense;

       (2) the degree of factual similarity to the charged or predicate offense; or

       (3) other relevant facts and circumstances.” 725 ILCS 5/115-7.3(c) (West 2020).

                                                  19
Thus, section 115-7.3 “enable[s] courts to admit evidence of other crimes to show defendant’s

propensity to commit sex offenses” despite the general rule against other-crimes evidence. People

v. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d 159, 176 (2003). Relevant other-crime evidence, however, must not become

the focal point of a trial. People v. Boyd, 366 Ill. App. 3d 84, 94 (2006).

¶ 64   The circuit court’s decision to admit other-crimes evidence is reviewed for an abuse of

discretion. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d at 182. An abuse of discretion will be found only where the circuit

court’s decision is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or where no reasonable person would take

the view adopted by the circuit court. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d at 182. “The actual limits on the trial

court’s decisions on the quantity of propensity evidence to be admitted under section 115-7.3 are

relatively modest, especially when combined with the highly deferential abuse-of-discretion

standard that governs review of such trial court decisions.” People v. Walston, 386 Ill. App. 3d

598, 621 (2008).

¶ 65   There is no bright-line rule regarding the proximity in time between the prior offense and

the crime charged. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d at 184. Courts should consider the issue of proximity in

time on a case-by-case basis and the reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of

the circuit court. People v. Braddy, 2015 IL App (5th) 130354, ¶ 32. In Donoho, the other crime

occurred 12 to 15 years prior to the conduct at issue in that case. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d at 184. Our

supreme court in Donoho considered that the appellate court in People v. Davis, 260 Ill. App. 3d

176, 192 (1994), affirmed the admission of other-crimes evidence over 20 years old to be

“sufficiently credible and probative.” Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d at 184.

¶ 66   The allegations charged against the defendant were based on incidents that occurred when

J.J. was 10 years old, in 2000, and for an act that occurred when she was 16 years old, on or

between October 20, 2005, and October 19, 2006. The defendant began sexually abusing J.J. when

                                                 20
she was approximately five years old, in 1995. A.H., the defendant’s daughter, testified to the last

incident of the defendant’s sexual abuse. The defendant began sexually assaulting A.H. in

November of 2009, when she was approximately seven years old, and the abuse continued until

she was taken into DCFS custody on September 8, 2010. The allegations of sexual abuse by the

defendant spanned approximately 15 years from 1995 through 2010. Witness testimony should not

be excluded based on the proximity of time of uncharged testimony to the charged allegations.

¶ 67   Evidence of other crimes must have “some threshold similarity to the crime charged.”

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Braddy, 2015 IL App (5th) 130354, ¶ 39. Some factual

differences will not defeat admissibility. Braddy, 2015 IL App (5th) 130354, ¶ 39. General areas

of similarities are sufficient to support admissibility. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d at 184. Where the

defendant does not have continued access to the victims, the progression of abuse may be different.

Braddy, 2015 IL App (5th) 130354, ¶ 41.

¶ 68   The charged acts included forcing J.J. to perform oral sex in a vehicle. The defendant also

made contact with J.J.’s vaginal area with his penis. During that incident, although it did not

include anal penetration, the defendant gave J.J. the option to “put it in [her] butt or in [her]

vagina.” The defendant additionally was charged with criminal sexual assault where the defendant

penetrated the sex organ of J.J. with his penis while she was intoxicated.

¶ 69   The defendant relied on Cardamone, 381 Ill. App. 3d 462, to claim that the volume of

other-crimes evidence presented made the probative other-crimes evidence overly prejudicial. In

Cardamone, the circuit court had allowed testimony of 158 to 257 incidents of uncharged conduct.

Cardamone, 381 Ill. App. 3d at 491. Cardamone found that the circuit court did not address the

“other relevant facts and circumstances” prong of section 115-7.3 of the Code and stated,

       “We believe that there are several facts and circumstances that weighed against admission.
       For example, unlike a case where the trial court might admit other-crimes evidence as it

                                                21
       pertains to 1 or even 2 victims, the court here found admissible numerous acts alleged by
       15 victims. In the face of so many allegations of misconduct, there was a great risk that the
       jury could find that defendant must have done something, or that it could find defendant
       guilty beyond a reasonable doubt not of the charges but, instead, of uncharged acts.”
       (Emphasis in original.) Cardamone, 381 Ill. App. 3d at 493-94.

¶ 70   Walston considered the Cardamone case, and found that,

       “Cardamone gives us a start in assessing the limits imposed on section 115-7.3 propensity
       evidence by the requirement from section 115-7.3(c) that the undue prejudicial effect of
       such evidence not outweigh its probative value. However, due to the extreme facts in
       Cardamone, the case instructs us only on the outer bounds of the rule; it reveals nothing of
       the rule’s more subtle inner striations.” Walston, 386 Ill. App. 3d at 619.

“Simply put, Cardamone was an extreme case.” People v. Perez, 2012 IL App (2d) 100865, ¶ 49.

¶ 71   The defendant claims that the jury’s decision was based on the testimony of six uncharged

acts of sexual misconduct by J.J. where there was an absence of evidence establishing that the

defendant was 17 at the time of committing count I and count II. The defendant claims that the

circuit court erred by allowing testimony by J.J. of the defendant’s conduct including that the

defendant “dry hump[ed]” J.J. when she was five years; forced J.J. to perform oral sex on him after

giving J.J. and P.R. a bath; forced J.J. to perform oral sex on him at a skating rink and in abandoned

building; directed J.J. to participate in acts of oral sex with him and her siblings; and after J.J. had

turned 16 years old, the defendant had offered her $400 to perform oral sex on him.

¶ 72   As discussed above, sufficient evidence was presented for the jury to determine the

essential element that the defendant was 17 years old at the time of the incidents alleged in count

I and count II. J.J.’s testimony referenced six uncharged incidents demonstrating the progression

of abuse and history of her relationship with the defendant that led to the charges against the

defendant. J.J.’s testimony referencing other events showed the defendant’s intent to engage in a

variety of sexual acts with his younger half-sibling, and corroborated J.J.’s testimony concerning

the charged offenses. J.J.’s testimony focused on the details of the specific charged incidents. The

                                                  22
circuit court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the victim, J.J., to testify to additional acts of

sexual misconduct by the defendant that were not charged by the State.

¶ 73    The defendant’s behavior towards each victim who testified had general similarities. J.J.

testified that she was between the ages of 5 and 12 years old when most of the abuse occurred, and

that the defendant committed criminal sexual assault when she was 16 years old. The abuse

occurred at their grandmother’s house in Mound City, Illinois, when adults were sleeping, or when

she was alone with the defendant. J.J. had been intoxicated at times. The defendant had also

physically threatened J.J., and she was fearful of the defendant.

¶ 74    P.R. testified that the defendant began to molest her when she was four or five years old.

The defendant stopped abusing her when she was eight years old after she threatened to report the

defendant. The abuse occurred at their grandmother’s house and in vehicles. She testified that the

defendant would force oral sex. P.R. testified to a specific event that involved J.J. where the

defendant forced J.J. and P.R. to sexually interact with each other after he gave them alcohol. P.R.

was afraid of the defendant because he had threatened to kill her.

¶ 75    J.H. was also a half-sibling of the defendant. The defendant moved away when J.H. was

five years old. The defendant still had contact with J.H. when he would babysit her at their

grandmother’s house in Mound City, Illinois. J.H. testified that the defendant sexually violated her

in a car when she was approximately six years old. He would wake J.H. in the night and force her

to perform sexual acts when she stayed at her grandmother’s house. When J.H. was 10 to 12 years

old, the defendant forced anal sex. The defendant continued to abuse J.H. until she was 13 or 14

years old.

¶ 76    A.H. was the defendant’s daughter. The defendant began to sexually abuse A.H. when she

was six or seven years old. The sexual abuse ended when she was eight years old because of DCFS

                                                   23
intervention. The defendant would penetrate her anally when they were staying at his

grandmother’s house in Mound City, Illinois. A.H. testified to an incident where the defendant

gave her an option of penetrating her anally or vaginally. A.H. additionally testified that the

defendant directed group oral sex with a relative.

¶ 77    The defendant specifically argued that testimony involving the defendant’s sexual

misconduct with multiple victims was overly prejudicial where the defendant had not been charged

with a similar offense. The State argues that the defendant forfeited this issue for appeal and the

defendant did not seek plain error review. The defendant, however, sought plain error review in

his reply brief.

¶ 78    To preserve an issue for review in a criminal case, the defendant must raise it in either a

motion in limine or an objection at trial, and in a posttrial motion. People v. Denson, 2014 IL

116231, ¶ 18. “A claim of forfeiture raises a question of law, which we review de novo.” People

v. Sophanavong, 2020 IL 124337, ¶ 21.

¶ 79    We may review forfeited errors under the plain error doctrine where (1) the evidence “is

so closely balanced that the jury’s guilty verdict may have resulted from the error” or (2) “the error

is so serious that the defendant was denied a substantial right.” People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167,

178-79 (2005). The defendant “argued plain error in his reply brief, which is sufficient to allow us

to review the issue for plain error.” People v. Ramsey, 239 Ill. 2d 342, 412 (2010). Before

addressing the defendant’s plain-error argument, we must first determine whether error occurred.

People v. Lovejoy, 235 Ill. 2d 97, 148 (2009).

¶ 80    Testimony regarding sexual misconduct with multiple victims was properly admitted. J.J.

testified to incidents where the defendant had forced her to perform oral sex including an incident

that involved her sibling, P.R. P.R. additionally testified to this conduct with her siblings while

                                                 24
intoxicated. Although, the charged allegation did not involve multiple victims, the defendant’s

behavior was generally similar. The charged incidents occurred when the defendant was alone with

a half-sibling and forced her to perform oral sex. The defendant additionally committed criminal

sexual assault when J.J. was intoxicated. Consequently, we conclude that there was no error in

allowing testimony of sexual misconduct by the defendant that involved multiple victims, thus, no

plain error can exist.

¶ 81    Overall, the victims who testified were young females and biologically related to the

defendant. The defendant sexually abused the children in secret while the defendant had a

supervisory role. Most of the abuse occurred at a house in Mound City, Illinois, or in a vehicle.

The defendant additionally would force his victims to perform oral sex acts alone with him or at

times included oral sex acts with relatives and jointly with him. Although the allegations did not

involve anal penetration, J.J. testified that the defendant gave her that option, but penetrated her

vaginally. A.H. testified to a similar situation where she was provided with a choice and the

defendant began to penetrate her anally before penetrating her vaginally. P.R. and J.J. both testified

that the defendant provided them with alcohol before his sexual assaults. The sexual acts described

by the corroborating witness were also not identical; however, there were sufficient general

similarities for admission of the other crimes evidence.

¶ 82                                     C. Sentencing

¶ 83    At the sentencing hearing, the circuit court must balance the “retributive and rehabilitative

purposes of punishment.” People v. Center, 198 Ill. App. 3d 1025, 1033 (1990). All factors in

aggravation and mitigation must be considered. People v. Quintana, 332 Ill. App. 3d 96, 109

(2002). “The seriousness of the crime is the most important factor in determining an appropriate

sentence, not the presence of mitigating factors such as the lack of a prior record, and the statute

                                                 25
does not mandate that the absence of aggravating factors requires the minimum sentence be

imposed.” Quintana, 332 Ill. App. 3d at 109. The circuit court is not required to articulate its

process or its consideration of mitigating factors regarding its sentencing decision. Quintana, 332

Ill. App. 3d at 109.

¶ 84   We will not reverse a sentence unless the circuit court abused its discretion. People v.

Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d 203, 209-10 (2000). “However, when the issue is whether a sentencing court

misapprehended applicable law, our review is de novo.” People v. Cavazos, 2023 IL App (2d)

220066, ¶ 33.

¶ 85   The eighth amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits the infliction of “cruel

and unusual punishments” (U.S. Const., amend. VIII) and applies to the states through the

fourteenth amendment (U.S. Const., amend. XIV). People v. Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 37. “[T]he

Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of

parole for juvenile offenders.” Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012). A prison sentence of

more than 40 years imposed on a juvenile offender constitutes a de facto life sentence. Dorsey,

2021 IL 123010, ¶ 47.

¶ 86   Miller did not foreclose the imposition of a life sentence in prison for juvenile offenders,

rather it required sentencing courts to “ ‘take into account how children are different, and how

those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.’ ” Dorsey,

2021 IL 123010, ¶ 24 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 480). “Neither a finding of permanent

incorrigibility nor an on-the-record sentencing explanation is constitutionally required before a

juvenile may be sentenced to life without parole.” People v. Wilson, 2023 IL 127666, ¶ 38.

¶ 87   In 2016, Illinois codified the factors set forth in Miller in section 5-4.5-105(a) of the

Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(a) (West 2016)). People v. Buffer, 2019 IL

                                                26
122327, ¶ 36. Pursuant to section 5-4.5-105(a), the circuit court is required to consider the

following factors in mitigation before imposing a sentence on an individual under the age of 18:

              “(1) the person’s age, impetuosity, and level of maturity at the time of the offense,
       including the ability to consider risks and consequences of behavior, and the presence of
       cognitive or developmental disability, or both, if any;

               (2) whether the person was subjected to outside pressure, including peer pressure,
       familial pressure, or negative influences;

              (3) the person’s family, home environment, educational and social background,
       including any history of parental neglect, physical abuse, or other childhood trauma;

               (4) the person’s potential for rehabilitation or evidence of rehabilitation, or both;

               (5) the circumstances of the offense;

               (6) the person’s degree of participation and specific role in the offense, including
       the level of planning by the defendant before the offense;

               (7) whether the person was able to meaningfully participate in his or her defense;

               (8) the person’s prior juvenile or criminal history; and

               (9) any other information the court finds relevant and reliable, including an
       expression of remorse, if appropriate. However, if the person, on advice of counsel chooses
       not to make a statement, the court shall not consider a lack of an expression of remorse as
       an aggravating factor.” 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(a) (West 2020).

¶ 88   At the sentencing hearing, the circuit court stated that it considered the evidence presented

at trial, the defendant’s PSI, the victim impact statements, arguments of counsel, the defendant’s

statement in allocution and letters of support, and possible sentencing alternatives. The circuit

court considered the defendant’s childhood and stated, “There’s just nothing about it that’s normal

or has ever been normal or continues to be normal.” The circuit court additionally addressed that

defense counsel referred to Miller in her sentencing recommendation, and the court believed that

defendant’s sentence “would pass the Miller test.” The State requested the maximum sentence on

each count for a total of 75 years in the IDOC. The defendant requested a sentence closer to the

                                                 27
total minimum sentence of 16 years in the IDOC. The defendant was sentenced to 20 years for

count I, 25 years for count II, and 10 years for count III. The sentences were to be served

consecutively for a total of 55 years in the IDOC.

¶ 89   The defendant filed a motion to reconsider his sentence and alleged that the circuit court

failed to fully consider his age at the time of the offenses and failed to consider the defendant’s

criminal history at the time the offenses occurred. Although the circuit court considered the

defendant’s age at the time of the sentencing hearing, the circuit court specifically addressed each

of the sentencing factors for individuals under 18 years of age at the time the offenses occurred

during the motion to reconsider the defendant’s sentence.

¶ 90   The circuit court found that the defendant was 17 years old when the offenses occurred.

The circuit court did not believe that the defendant was particularly immature. The defendant acted

in secret and attempted to hide his behavior that he was able to appreciate the risks and

consequences of his actions and had acted on “his own impulses.” The circuit court considered the

defendant’s home environment and found that the case was about the defendant and his own

proclivities. The circuit court additionally considered the defendant’s potential for rehabilitation

and found that the defendant demonstrated “zero evidence of remorse.” The circuit court noted

that it had considered the defendant’s lack of a criminal history and sentenced the defendant to a

lesser sentence based on that factor. The defendant was 39 years old at the time of sentencing and

the circuit court found that there were no limitations on his ability to interact with police or

attorneys based on his age.

¶ 91   The circuit court considered the defendant’s youth and attendant circumstances when

making its determination and the defendant received a sentence within the sentencing range. The

circuit court did not err when sentencing the defendant.

                                                28
¶ 92                                III. CONCLUSION

¶ 93   For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Pulaski County.

¶ 94   Affirmed.

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