Court Opinion

ID: 9634757
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:22:42.516032+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:43:52.339748
License: Public Domain

WIEAND, Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. The majority, in my judgment, paints with too broad a brush. By taking the decision of the Supreme Court in Muhammad v. Strassburger, McKenna, Messer, Shilobod and Gutnick, 526 Pa. 541, 587 A.2d 1346 (1991), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 196, 116 L.Ed.2d 156 (1991), and applying it to facts to which that decision can *411have no reasonable application, the majority has unnecessarily and unwisely expanded the Supreme Court’s holding. It has fashioned a rule of law which blindly protects the careless and does a disservice alike to those members of the lay public who must rely upon their lawyers for legal advice and the conscientious, careful practitioners who willingly accept the responsibility for providing such advice.
The issue in this appeal is the liability of a lawyer who negligently failed to advise his client correctly about the state of the law before the client entered a marital settlement agreement. The trial court held that there could be no such liability and entered summary judgment for the defendant-lawyer. A majority of this Court agrees and affirms. I disagree and would reverse.
The plaintiff, Richard E. Miller, was represented in a divorce action by Jerold Berschler, Esquire, a partner in the law firm of Solomon and Berschler. During the course of the divorce action, Miller entered a property settlement agreement by the terms of which he agreed, inter alia, to pay alimony to his wife until Miller’s retirement, his wife’s remarriage, or the death of either party. The agreement said nothing about the wife’s possible cohabitation with an adult male. Miller has alleged that his lawyer negligently failed to advise him that the wife’s continued habitation with an adult male, in the absence of agreement to the contrary, was a basis for terminating alimony under the provisions of the Divorce Code at 23 Pa.C.S. § 3706. It was solely because he lacked this infoxmation, he suggests, that he agreed to the terms of a written contract which did not expressly terminate the payments of alimony in the event of his wife’s cohabitation with an adult male.
After a decree in divorce had been entered, Miller’s wife, in November, 1986, began cohabiting with an adult male. Miller thereupon applied to the court to terminate his payments of alimony. The court, finding an agreement to pay alimony despite his foimer wife’s cohabitation, denied his application. Miller then commenced an action against his lawyer, alleging negligence in failing to advise him correctly of the applicable *412law and his rights regarding the payment of alimony. A motion for summary judgment was denied. Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Muhammad v. Strassburger, McKenna, Messer, Shilobod and Gutnick, supra, however, the lawyer-defendant renewed his motion for summary judgment, and this time the court granted it. Miller appealed.
A motion for summary judgment may be granted only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In passing upon a motion for summary judgment, a court must examine the record in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party and must resolve all doubt against the moving party. Mariscotti v. Tinari, 335 Pa.Super. 599, 601, 485 A.2d 56, 57 (1984); Thorsen v. Iron and Glass Bank, 328 Pa.Super. 135, 140, 476 A.2d 928, 930 (1984).
“The essential elements which must be demonstrated to state a cause of action for attorney malpractice are: the employment of the attorney or other basis for duty; the failure of the attorney to exercise ordinary skill and knowledge; and that such negligence was the proximate cause of damage to the plaintiff.” Liberty Bank v. Ruder, 402 Pa.Super. 561, 567, 587 A.2d 761, 764-765, allocatur denied, 528 Pa. 637, 598 A.2d 994 (1991). See also: McHugh v. Litvin, Blumberg, et al., 525 Pa. 1, 5, 574 A.2d 1040, 1042 (1990); Rizzo v. Haines, 520 Pa. 484, 499, 555 A.2d 58, 65 (1989); Schenkel v. Monheit, 266 Pa.Super. 396, 398, 405 A.2d 493, 494 (1979). A lawyer will be found negligent if he or she fails to possess and exercise that degree of skill, knowledge and care that would normally be exercised by members of the profession under the same or similar circumstances. McPeake v. Cannon, Esquire, P.C., 381 Pa.Super. 227, 232, 553 A.2d 439, 441 (1989). The duty to exercise ordinary care extends also to the conduct of settlement negotiations. Rizzo v. Haines, supra, 520 Pa. at 499, 555 A.2d at 65. A lawyer has a duty to inform himself of the facts as to how a proposed settlement affects his or her client, and to inform the client as to the consequences thereof. 7A C.J.S., Attorney & Client, § 261, citing Wade v. Clemmons, 377 N.Y.S.2d 415, 84 Misc.2d 822 *413(1975). See also: In re Snitoff, 53 Ill.2d 50, 289 N.E.2d 428 (1972), cert. denied, Snitoff v. Board of Managers of Chicago Bar Ass’n., 412 U.S. 906, 93 S.Ct. 2292, 36 L.Ed.2d 971 (1973); Joos v. Drillock, 127 Mich.App. 99, 338 N.W.2d 736 (1983). As the Court observed in Lang v. Anton, 40 Pa.D. & C.3d 47 (Pa.Com.Pl.1983),
A lawyer should exert his best efforts to insure that decisions of his client are made only after the client has been informed of relevant considerations.
Id. at 48. In order to advise a client properly, a lawyer must be familiar with the well settled principles of law and rules of practice which are of frequent application in the ordinary business of the profession; must observe the utmost good faith toward his client; and must give such attention to his duties, and to the interests of his clients, as ordinary prudence demands, or members of the profession bestow.
George v. Caton, 93 N.M. 370, 377, 600 P.2d 822, 829 (1979). “A lawyer has an obligation to his or her clients to scrutinize any contract which [he or she] advise[s] [a] client to execute and [is] required to disclose the full import of the instrument and the possible consequences that may arise upon execution of it____ The duty imposed on a fiduciary embraces the obligation to render a full and fair disclosure to the [client] of all facts which materially affect his rights.” Soderquist v. Kramer, 595 So.2d 825, 830 (La.App.1992). See also: Bush v. O’Connor, 58 Wash.App. 138, 791 P.2d 915 (1990) (“Under common law, an attorney unquestionably has a duty to investigate the applicable law and to disclose the results to his clients”).
The provision of the Divorce Code which provides for termination of alimony in the event the receiving spouse cohabits with another is a principle of law which is known to practitioners of marital law and one which the defendant-lawyer should have been aware of in the instant case. Even if he were unfamiliar with the applicable provision of the statute, moreover, he should have familiarized himself with it before advising the client regarding his duty to pay alimony. It *414seems readily apparent to me, therefore, that appellant has stated a cause of action for legal malpractice and that judgment should not be entered summarily in favor of the defendant.
The decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Muhammad v. Strassburger, et al., supra, does not require a different result. In Muhammad, the lawyers had represented parents who had a medical malpractice claim for the death of their son. As a result of negotiations, the parents agreed to settle their claim for the sum of twenty-six thousand, five hundred ($26,500.00) dollars. Although the parents subsequently expressed dissatisfaction with the amount of the settlement, the court in which their action had been pending ruled that the settlement agreement would be enforced.1 Thereafter, the parents brought suit against their lawyers for legal malpractice, contending that the lawyers had been negligent in recommending settlement. The trial court sustained preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer to the complaint and dismissed the action. The Superior Court reversed, and the Supreme Court granted allocatur. After argument, the Court held that the parents had failed to state a cause of action on which relief could be granted. The Court said:
This case must be resolved in light of our longstanding public policy which encourages settlements. Simply stated, we will not permit a suit to'be filed by a dissatisfied plaintiff against his attorney following a settlement to which that plaintiff agreed, unless that plaintiff can show he was fraudulently induced to settle the original action. An action should not lie against an attorney for malpractice based on negligence and/or contract principles when that client has agreed to a settlement. Rather, only cases of fraud should be actionable.
Id., 526 Pa. at 546, 587 A.2d at 1348. The Court reasoned as follows:
Mindful of these principles [which encourage and support settlements in our court system], we foreclose the ability *415of dissatisfied litigants to agree to a settlement and then file suit against their attorneys in the hope that they will recover additional monies. To permit otherwise results in unfairness to the attorneys who relied on their client’s assent and unfairness to the litigants whose cases have not yet been tried.... (emphasis added).
We do believe, however, there must be redress for the plaintiff who has been fraudulently induced into agreeing to settle. It is not enough that the lawyer who negotiated the original settlement may have been negligent; rather, the party seeking to pursue a case against his lawyer after a settlement must plead, with specificity, fraud in the inducement. (emphasis in original).
Id. at 552, 587 A.2d at 1351.
The salutary policy which undergirded the Supreme Court’s decision in Muhammad has no application to the facts of the instant case. In Muhammad, the only issue necessary to the client’s decision to accept or reject the settlement was the amount of money being offered. In the instant case, the defendant-lawyer’s alleged negligence does not lie in the amount agreed to be paid in settlement. The settlement agreement in this case involved a great deal more than offering and accepting an amount in settlement of appellant’s rights and obligations. The intelligent entry of an agreement settling marital property rights depended upon appellant’s knowing and understanding all relevant considerations. This required that his lawyer investigate the applicable law and disclose the effect thereof upon a settlement of the marital property rights. Without such information, the client could not make an intelligent decision regarding the terms of the agreement. In this respect the plaintiff in the instant case was in the same position as any other client who relies upon the advice of a lawyer before entering a complex, legal agreement. His position was not altered merely because the legal agreement had the effect of settling amicably a pending divorce action. As such, the client was entitled to be told about the law pertaining to his obligation to pay alimony, the *416duration thereof, and the nature of those events which would effect a termination of his obligation.
In my best judgment, therefore, Muhammad is not dispositive of the instant appeal. The policy which encourages settlements of law suits does not operate to relieve a lawyer from a duty to inform his or her client of all relevant considerations before the client enters and signs a complex legal agreement. In such cases, the client must be told of the impact of the agreement and the possible consequences that may arise therefrom. There must be a fair disclosure to the client of all facts which may materially affect the client’s rights.
The record in the instant case suggests that there is a factual dispute as to whether the defendant-lawyer fulfilled this obligation to the client. In such a case, the entry of summary judgment is inappropriate.
I would reverse and remand for further proceedings.

. The decision of the trial court was affirmed on appeal.