Court Opinion

ID: 9897300
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:09:52.172096+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:42.375819
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                             Aug 29 2023, 9:16 am

                                                                                 CLERK
                                                                             Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                                Court of Appeals
                                                                                  and Tax Court

APPELLANT PRO SE                                           ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
James K. McConnell                                         Jeremy J. Grogg
Decatur, Indiana                                           Burt Blee Dixon Sutton & Bloom
                                                           Fort Wayne, Indiana
                                                           James J. O’Connor, Jr.
                                                           Rachel K. Steinhofer
                                                           Barrett McNagny LLP
                                                           Fort Wayne, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

James K. McConnell,                                        August 29, 2023
Appellant-Plaintiff,                                       Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                           23A-CT-145
        v.
                                                           Appeal from the Allen Superior
                                                           Court
Martha A. Doan; Marilyn S.
                                                           The Honorable Craig J. Bobay,
Hall; David Fee; Jerome Henry,                             Judge
Jr.; Thomas B. Walsh; Tim
Miller; and Nicolas Ciocca;                                Trial Court Cause No.
                                                           02D02-1901-CT-57
Appellees-Defendants.

                                Opinion by Judge Bradford
                            Judges Riley and Weissmann concur.

Bradford, Judge.

Case Summary
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-145 | August 29, 2023                           Page 1 of 16
[1]   In 2019, James McConnell filed a derivative shareholder lawsuit against

      Martha Doan, Marilyn Hall, David Fee, Jerome Henry, Jr., Thomas B. Walsh,

      Tim Miller, and Nicolas Ciocca (collectively, “Appellees”), who comprised the

      then-board of directors of F. McConnell & Sons (“FMS”). In May of 2022,

      McConnell and Appellees executed a settlement agreement (“the Agreement”),

      pursuant to which FMS would redeem shares held by McConnell and sever his

      connection with the company. McConnell, however, began refusing to perform

      according to the terms of the Agreement and was eventually held in contempt

      of court for failure to obey several court orders. In the commercial court’s

      contempt order, it, inter alia, appointed a commercial court master (“CCM”)

      pursuant to Indiana Commercial Court Rule 5 and Indiana Rule of Trial

      Procedure 70 to take the necessary steps to satisfy McConnell’s contractual

      obligations. McConnell contends that the commercial court abused its

      discretion in appointing a CCM pursuant to Commercial Court Rule 5 and

      Trial Rule 70 and that the Agreement is an unenforceable “agreement to agree”

      at a later date. Because we disagree with both contentions, we affirm.

      Facts and Procedural History
[2]   On January 28, 2019, McConnell filed a derivative shareholder lawsuit against

      Appellees. On May 20, 2022, McConnell and Appellees executed the

      Agreement. The Agreement states, in relevant part:

              1. Mechanism for Settlement.
                 a. The Parties agree to submit the most recent audited
                    financial information for F. McConnell & Sons, Inc.
                    (“FMS”) from Katz Sapper Miller to an investment firm

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-145 | August 29, 2023       Page 2 of 16
                      for purposes of providing an opinion regarding the value of
                      Jim McConnell’s shares in FMS determined from the net
                      enterprise value of FMS including the fair market value of
                      its real estate minus any real estate indebtedness (together,
                      “Per Share Value of FMS”). […]
                   b. Upon the completion of the calculation of the Per Share
                      Value of [] FMS, FMS shall redeem Jim McConnell’s
                      FMS shares at the per share value determined by the
                      investment banker, including any shares that he will
                      possess in the future upon dissolution of the Trust that
                      currently holds approximately 247 shares of FMS. The
                      intent and purpose of this agreement is to ensure that all of
                      Jim McConnell’s current or future shares in FMS are
                      redeemed.
                   c. The Per Share Value of FMS, as calculated by the
                      investment banker, is binding on FMS, Defendants, and
                      Jim McConnell.
      Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 102–03. The parties further agreed that McConnell

      would have “no further involvement with FMS, directly or indirectly[.]”

      Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 103.

[3]   After receiving notice of resolution of the claims, the commercial court held a

      conference on May 23, 2022, at which time the parties reported the intent to

      stipulate to the appointment of a CCM, specifically an investment banker, to

      “assist in performing work necessary in fulfilling the terms of the

      comprehensive settlement agreement.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 86. On

      May 26, 2022, Greenwich Capital Group (“Greenwich”), the investment

      banker chosen to perform the per-share valuation, provided the parties with an

      engagement letter outlining the scope of services and fees relating to the

      valuation to be performed.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-145 | August 29, 2023         Page 3 of 16
[4]   On June 17, 2022, FMS received correspondence from McConnell indicating

      that he had transferred eighteen of his shares in FMS to eight individuals. On

      June 21, 2022, Appellees moved to enforce the Agreement, find McConnell in

      contempt of court, order return of funds, and award them attorney’s fees.

      McConnell had also refused to engage Greenwich to perform the valuation as

      required pursuant to the Agreement and had refused to authorize his then-

      counsel to agree to file the stipulation to appoint Greenwich as a CCM to

      perform the valuation.

[5]   On August 4, 2022, the commercial court granted Appellees’ motion to enforce,

      ordering the following specific actions:

              2. Consistent with the parties’ settlement agreement, the Court
                 ORDERS the parties to file a Stipulation for Appointment of
                 [CCM] by August 12, 2022;
              3. Consistent with the settlement agreement, the Court
                 ORDERS the parties to file a joint motion to stay the relevant
                 proceedings pending in Adams County;
              4. The Court ORDERS Plaintiff James K. McConnell to
                 unwind the purported transfer of shares that occurred on or
                 about June 15, 2022;
              5. The Court ORDERS the parties to work together, along with
                 the Trustee and Trustee’s counsel, to effectuate a redemption
                 of Plaintiff James K. McConnell’s Trust Shares, and that the
                 process to effectuate the redemption of Plaintiff James K.
                 McConnell’s Trust shares shall not be a basis upon which all
                 other aspects of the parties’ settlement agreement be delayed;
                 and
              6. The Court sets this matter for a hearing on November 8, 2022
                 at 2:30 (Courthouse, Room 316), at which time the Court
                 will:

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-145 | August 29, 2023      Page 4 of 16
                 6.1 Hear evidence and require Plaintiff James K. McConnell
                     to show cause why he should not be found in contempt of
                     court failing to comply with this Court’s Orders; and
                 6.2 Determine whether to impose sanctions against Plaintiff
                     James K. McConnell, which sanctions may include:
                     reimbursement of Defendants’ reasonable attorney fees
                     associated with enforcement of the settlement agreement
                     in all respects; return of the initial consideration that
                     Defendants paid to Plaintiff James K. McConnell
                     pursuant to the settlement agreement; and any other
                     sanction the Court deems reasonable in light of the
                     demonstrated efforts and relative progress made by
                     Plaintiff to comply with the settlement agreement and this
                     Court’s Order.
              7. Plaintiff James K. McConnell and all counsel must personally
                 appear at the November 8, 2022 hearing.
      Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 169–70.

[6]   On August 12, 2022, the parties filed a stipulation to appoint a CCM. On

      August 16, 2022, the commercial court appointed Greenwich to be CCM, to

      “provide the Per Share Market Value of [FMS] in accordance with an

      engagement letter with Greenwich to be reasonably agreed to[,]” and determine

      “the information needed for the purpose of performing the calculation of the

      Per Share Market Value of FMS.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 174–75.

[7]   As it happens, McConnell failed to provide Greenwich with an appropriate and

      reasonable engagement letter because he repeatedly suggested terms that

      contradicted the terms of the Agreement. On November 3, 2022, Appellees

      filed their report to the commercial court with regard to the conduct of

      McConnell and their request for relief because of his continued refusal to

      engage Greenwich to perform a valuation of his FMS shares (“the Contempt

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-145 | August 29, 2023         Page 5 of 16
      Report”). As of the date of filing the Contempt Report, McConnell had also

      taken no action to unwind his transfer of FMS shares.

[8]   Because of McConnell’s ongoing lack of cooperation, including his refusal to

      obey the commercial court’s orders of May 23, August 4, and August 16, 2022,

      Appellees requested the appointment of a CCM pursuant to Commercial Court

      Rule 5 and Trial Rule 70 to fulfill the terms of the Agreement, including

      undertaking any action necessary to transfer McConnell’s shares in FMS and

      unwinding McConnell’s transfer of his FMS shares.

[9]   On November 8, 2022, the commercial court found McConnell in contempt of

      the commercial court’s orders of August 4 and 16, 2022, and ordered the

      following specific relief:

              3. The Court finds and concludes that James McConnell has no
                 intention of following the terms and conditions of the
                 [Agreement] reached in this matter on May 20, 2022. The
                 Court also finds and concludes that James McConnell has
                 demonstrated that he has no intention of following the above-
                 referenced August 4, 2022, and August 16, 2022 Orders of the
                 Court. James McConnell is therefore found in contempt of
                 the Court’s Orders. […]
                     3.1 The Court Orders [FMS] to engage [Greenwich], the
                         previously appointed [CCM], for purposes of
                         determining the per share market value of the shares of
                         FMS, consistent with the terms of the [Agreement] and
                         consistent with the Court’s August 16, 2022 Order
                         Appointing [CCM]. As James McConnell has
                         unreasonably failed to engage Greenwich, engagement
                         by FMS alone is sufficient to engage Greenwich, and it
                         is not required that any engagement of Greenwich
                         include James McConnell’s signature;

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-145 | August 29, 2023       Page 6 of 16
                 3.2 Consistent with Indiana Commercial Court Rule 5 and
                     Indiana Trial Rule 70, the Court permits Defendants to
                     file a Motion to Appoint a Special Master, for the
                     purpose of appointing a Special Master to execute all
                     required documentation to effectuate the redemption of
                     James McConnell’s FMS shares upon completion of
                     the valuation by Greenwich. […]
                 3.3 On or about June 15, 2022, James McConnell
                     attempted to thwart the [Agreement] and subsequently
                     failed to comply with the Court’s Orders by his actions
                     related to the purported transfer of his FMS shares.
                     Consistent with Indiana Commercial Court Rule 5 and
                     T.R. 70, the Court also permits Defendants to file a
                     Motion to Appoint a [CCM] for the purpose of
                     authorizing a Special Master to approach the Purported
                     Transferees […] to execute appropriate Waivers and/or
                     Disclaimers of Interest, prepared by FMS, relating to
                     the shares James McConnell purportedly transferred on
                     or about June 15, 2022[.] If the [CCM], for any reason,
                     is unable to obtain the appropriate Waivers and/or
                     Disclaimers of Interest from any of the Purported
                     Transferees, the [CCM], pursuant to Indiana
                     Commercial Court Rule 5 and T.R. 70, is authorized to
                     execute the appropriate Waivers and/or Disclaimers of
                     Interest. The [CCM] shall also be authorized to
                     undertake any and all other actions necessary,
                     including interpleading any of the Purported
                     Transferees into this litigation, to address the Purported
                     Transfers such that the subject shares in FMS will be
                     redeemed by FMS, as contemplated in the
                     [Agreement];
                 3.4 The Court finds and concludes that the above-
                     referenced Purported Transfers were, and are deemed,
                     void ab initio. The Court Orders that James
                     McConnell shall not undertake any actions to transfer
                     any shares in FMS other than for purposes of FMS

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-145 | August 29, 2023           Page 7 of 16
                     redeeming James McConnell’s shares in FMS as
                     required by the [Agreement];
                 3.5 The Court Orders that FMS is authorized, as
                     reasonably necessary, to issue duplicate stock
                     certificates in James McConnell’s name to facilitate
                     proper redemption of all shares of James McConnell in
                     FMS in accordance with the [Agreement] and the
                     above-referenced prior Orders of the Court. In the
                     event FMS issues such duplicate stock certificates,
                     FMS shall hold said certificates until they are redeemed
                     by FMS, and the certificates shall not be placed into the
                     possession of James McConnell; and
                 3.6 Consistent with Indiana Commercial Court Rule 5 and
                     T.R. 70, the Court permits Defendants to file a Motion
                     to Appoint a [CCM] for the purpose of authorizing the
                     [CCM] to execute all documentation necessary to
                     effectuate the redemption of any and all shares that
                     James McConnell will possess in the future upon the
                     dissolution of the Trust that currently holds
                     approximately 247 shares of FMS (the “Trust Shares”).
                     This execution is in accordance with Paragraph 1(b) of
                     the [Agreement]. […]
                     3.6.1 The [CCM] shall be authorized to execute an
                            appropriate Redemption Agreement for the Trust
                            Shares. That Redemption Agreement shall
                            become effective upon the dissolution of the Trust
                            and the distribution of the Trust Shares to James
                            McConnell. The Redemption Agreement will be
                            held in Escrow by the [CCM] until the
                            dissolution of the Trust; and
                     3.6.2 Upon completion of the valuation by Greenwich,
                            FMS shall provide funds to the [CCM] equal to
                            the per share market value of the Trust shares.
                            Those funds will be held by the [CCM] in escrow
                            for purposes of payment to James McConnell
                            upon dissolution of the Trust.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-145 | August 29, 2023          Page 8 of 16
       Appellant’s App. Vol. III pp. 60–63. On December 20, 2022, the commercial

       court issued its order appointing Edward E. Beck to be CCM to enforce the

       terms of the Agreement. McConnell contends that the commercial court

       abused its discretion in appointing CCM Beck and that the Agreement is

       unenforceable.

       Discussion and Decision
       I.      Appointment of CCM Beck
       A.      Commercial Court Rule 5
[10]   Indiana Commercial Court Rule 5 provides, in part, as follows:

               (1) […] A Commercial Court Judge may appoint a [CCM] in any
               case pending on the commercial court docket if:
                   a. All parties consent to appointment of a [CCM]; or
                   b. If all parties do not consent, the Court, after giving notice
                   to the parties and an opportunity to be heard finds it probable
                   that:
                       i. Appointment of a [CCM] will materially assist the Court
                       in resolving the case in a just and timely manner[.]
       We review a commercial court’s appointment of a CCM for an abuse of

       discretion. Ind. Comm. Ct. R. 5, cmt. (“[T]he ultimate scope of the Order is

       dictated by that which is necessary and appropriate under the circumstances,

       and is left to the sound discretion of the Court.”).

[11]   We have little hesitation in concluding that the commercial court acted within

       its discretion pursuant to Commercial Court Rule 5 when it appointed CCM

       Beck. The commercial court’s order does nothing more than grant CCM Beck

       the power to do the things that McConnell has been ordered to do but has

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-145 | August 29, 2023         Page 9 of 16
       refused—and only those things. Moreover, it is clear that CCM Beck’s

       appointment will materially assist the commercial court in resolving the case in

       a just and timely manner, as McConnell’s continuing refusal to do things he has

       been ordered to do—and, by the way, agreed to do by executing the

       Agreement—prevents the case from being resolved.1 The commercial court did

       not abuse its discretion in appointing CCM Beck pursuant to Commercial

       Court Rule 5.

       B.      Trial Rule 70
[12]   Trial Rule 70 provides, in part, as follows:

               If a judgment directs a party to execute a conveyance of land, or
               other property or to deliver deeds or other documents or to
               perform any other specific act and the party fails to comply
               within the time specified, the court may direct the act to be done
               at the cost of the disobedient party by some other person
               appointed by the court and the act when so done has like effect as
               if done by the party.
       We review a commercial court’s grant of relief under Trial Rule 70 for an abuse

       of discretion. Analytical Eng’g, Inc. v. Baldwin Filters, Inc., 425 F.3d 443, 449 (7th

       Cir. 2005). Trial Rule 70 gives a commercial court distinct and limited power

       to handle parties who refuse to comply with orders to perform specific acts.

       22B Ind. Prac., Civil Trial Rule Handbook § 70:1.

       1
         McConnell also seems to argue that CCM Beck has failed to comply with Commercial Court Rule 5 and
       cannot be held accountable. McConnell, however, points to nothing in the record to indicate that CCM Beck
       has acted outside the authority granted him or that McConnell would not be able to challenge his actions in
       the commercial court if he did.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-145 | August 29, 2023                           Page 10 of 16
[13]   We again have little hesitation in concluding that the commercial court did not

       abuse its discretion in this regard. The record indicates clearly that McConnell

       refused to act in accordance with the terms of the Agreement, stipulate to the

       appointment of Greenwich as a CCM to complete the per share valuation,

       execute the engagement letter with Greenwich, and unwind his purported

       transfers of shares. McConnell’s refusal to obey any of the commercial court’s

       specific instructions resulted in his being held in contempt of court, which had

       no effect on his recalcitrance. The commercial court appointed CCM Beck to

       step into McConnell’s shoes and perform the specific acts that McConnell

       purposely failed to complete, which is clearly within the authority granted to it

       by Trial Rule 70.2

[14]   Although there does not seem to be any Indiana caselaw directly on point,

       Indiana’s Trial Rule 70 is based on and nearly identical to its federal

       counterpart, cf. Ind. T.R. 70 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 70, and we may therefore look

       to the construction of the federal rule and legal precedent for guidance. See

       Associated Truck Lines, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Ind., 492 N.E.2d 704, 713

       (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (explaining that, where no Indiana case law is on point,

       we have looked to federal cases as persuasive authority). For example, in

       2
         In Payton v. Hadley, 819 N.E.2d 432 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), we did discuss, sua sponte, a commercial court’s
       authority pursuant to Trial Rule 70. In Payton, the parties contested ownership of several parcels of land, and
       the commercial court appointed a special master to execute a deed on behalf of the plaintiff to transfer a
       parcel of land to the defendant after the commercial court had entered default judgment against the plaintiff.
       Id. at 434–35. In subsequent litigation, a third party challenged the validity of the deed executed by the
       special master, in part questioning the special master’s authority to execute the deed. Id. at 438–39. We
       concluded that the deed signed by the special master was valid because the special master’s signature had the
       same effect as if the plaintiff had signed the deed. Id. at 439.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-145 | August 29, 2023                               Page 11 of 16
       Analytical Engineering, Analytical Engineering filed a declaratory judgment

       action against Baldwin Filters in which it sought guidance on each party’s rights

       to patents developed during a joint venture between the parties following

       Baldwin Filters’s termination of the joint venture. Id. at 447. Baldwin Filters

       moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the agreement governing the

       joint venture was unambiguous and authorized Baldwin Filters to retain all

       rights to the patents in question. Id. The district court granted Baldwin Filters’s

       motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding, however, that the unambiguous

       language of the agreement required Baldwin Filters to assign “any and all

       rights” to the patents to Analytical Engineering. Id. Baldwin Filters did not

       fully comply with the district court’s order, and Analytical Engineering moved

       to enforce the judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 70. Id. at

       448–49. The district court granted Analytical Engineering’s motion. Id. at 449.

[15]   In the appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the

       central issue was whether the district court properly granted relief to Analytical

       Engineering under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 70. Id. at 449. Examining

       the language of the rule, the Seventh Circuit stated, “Under Rule 70, […] a

       district court may direct a party to complete a specific act where the district

       court previously directed the same party to perform the same act […] and that

       party has failed to comply.” Id. at 451. The scope of the district court’s orders

       granting judgment on the pleadings and Rule 70 relief for Analytical

       Engineering was the same and, therefore, the district court had properly

       exercised its authority in granting it such specific relief. Id. The facts of this

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-145 | August 29, 2023         Page 12 of 16
       case do not significantly differ from those in Analytical Engineering, and we reach

       the same result.

       II. Enforceability of Agreement
[16]   McConnell also contends that the Agreement is unenforceable on the grounds

       that the FMS shares he holds in trust cannot be redeemed and that the

       Agreement is nothing more than an “agreement to agree.” “Indiana strongly

       favors settlement agreements.” Georgos v. Jackson, 790 N.E.2d 448, 453 (Ind.

       2003). “It is well-settled that in the absence of fraud or mistake a settlement is

       as binding and conclusive of the parties’ rights and obligations as a judgment on

       the merits.” 409 Land Tr. v. City of S. Bend, 709 N.E.2d 348, 350 (Ind. Ct. App.

       1999) (citing Burke v. Middlesworth, 92 Ind. App. 394, 399, 174 N.E. 432, 434

       (1930)), trans. denied. The parties, by counsel, negotiated the terms of the

       Agreement. The parties knowingly and voluntarily entered into the Agreement

       and, in doing so, agreed to be bound by the terms of the Agreement.

[17]   McConnell nonetheless claims that the Agreement is impossible to enforce

       because his FMS shares held in trust cannot be redeemed. The record,

       however, does not support this contention. First, the trustee’s counsel outlined

       several options that the parties could consider in redeeming McConnell’s trust

       shares. Moreover, McConnell, through former counsel, admitted to the

       commercial court that the parties had options for redeeming McConnell’s trust

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-145 | August 29, 2023       Page 13 of 16
       shares. The record simply does not support McConnell’s contention that it is

       impossible to redeem his trust shares in FMS.3

[18]   McConnell also argues that the Agreement is not binding because it is an

       agreement to agree at a future date.

                It is quite possible for parties to make an enforceable contract
                binding them to prepare and execute a subsequent final
                agreement. In order that such may be the effect, it is necessary
                that agreement shall have been expressed on all essential terms
                that are to be incorporated in the document. That document is
                understood to be a mere memorial of the agreement already
                reached. If the document or contract that the parties agree to
                make is to contain any material term that is not already agreed
                on, no contract has yet been made; the so-called “contract to
                make a contract” is not a contract at all.

       Wolvos v. Meyer, 668 N.E.2d 671, 674–75 (Ind. 1996) (citation omitted).

                The question of whether an agreement is an enforceable option
                contract or merely an agreement to agree involves two
                interrelated areas: “intent to be bound and definiteness of
                terms.” See generally 1 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN AND
                JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 2.8 at

       3
         In any event, it seems clear that the defense of impossibility does not apply to situations in which the
       condition that is causing the alleged impossibility existed at the time of agreement, which is the case here.
              We regard it as thoroughly settled that the words of a mere general covenant will not be
              construed as an undertaking to answer for a subsequent event, happening without the fault of the
              covenantor, which renders performance of the covenant itself not merely difficult or relatively
              impossible, but absolutely impossible, owing to the act of God, the act of the law, or the loss or
              destruction of the subject-matter of the contract.
       Krause v. Bd. of Trs. of Sch. Town of Crothersville, 162 Ind. 278, 283, 70 N.E. 264, 265 (1904) (emphasis added).
       In other words, whatever difficulty there may be in redeeming McConnell’s trust shares existed at the time he
       signed the Agreement. Finally, to the extent that McConnell may be arguing that performance is impossible
       due to his transfer of shares, it is no defense because that particular subsequent event did not “happen
       without the fault of the covenantor[.]” Id., 70 N.E. at 265.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-145 | August 29, 2023                                 Page 14 of 16
               131 (rev. ed. 1993). According to the Restatement (Second) of
               Contracts § 33 cmt. f (1979), “[p]romises may be indefinite....
               The more important the uncertainty, the stronger the indication
               is that the parties do not intend to be bound; minor items are
               more likely to be left to the option of one of the parties or to what
               is customary or reasonable.”

       Id. at 675.

[19]   McConnell points to the following passage in the Agreement as rendering it

       nothing more than an agreement to agree at a later date:

               3.     Greenwich Capital Group shall have the sole discretion to
               determine the appropriate procedures for resolution of all
               assigned matters and shall have the authority to take all
               appropriate measures to perform the assigned duties consistent
               with the engagement letter to be defined and reasonably agreed
               to.
                      3.1. The Parties agree that they shall have no ex parte
                      communications with the Special Master and further agree
                      that any information provided to, or communication with,
                      any Special Master shall be through counsel for the
                      Parties, and counsel for the Parties shall have the option to
                      participate in or be present at any communication with the
                      Special Master.

       Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 172.

[20]   McConnell seems to argue that leaving the particulars of the engagement letter

       up to a reasonable agreement in the future and giving the parties the option to

       participate in communications with the Special Master renders the Agreement

       nothing more than an agreement to agree. Suffice it to say that these matters

       are relatively minor and have little to do with the essentials of the Agreement,

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-145 | August 29, 2023         Page 15 of 16
       which, at its heart, is an agreement regarding the redemption and valuation of

       McConnell’s FMS shares. Read as a whole, the Agreement clearly indicates an

       intent by McConnell and Appellees to be bound by an agreement that FMS

       would redeem McConnell’s shares, severing his connection with the company.

       Because the language McConnell cites has no effect on the essentials of the

       Agreement, he has failed to establish that it is an unenforceable “agreement to

       agree.”

[21]   We affirm the judgment of the commercial court.

       Riley, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-145 | August 29, 2023     Page 16 of 16