Court Opinion

ID: 9897617
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:18:56.345984+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:35.224111
License: Public Domain

11/13/2023
                  IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                              AT NASHVILLE
                                   September 7, 2023 Session

 DIANA LYNN VAN ZANDBERGEN v. SCOTT W. VAN ZANDBERGEN

                    Appeal from the Chancery Court for Coffee County
                       No. 2020CV-198 Vanessa Jackson, Judge
                        ___________________________________

                               No. M2022-00886-COA-R3-CV
                           ___________________________________

In this divorce case, Husband/Appellant appeals the amount and duration of alimony in
futuro awarded to Wife/Appellee. Husband also appeals the trial court’s award of
attorney’s fees to Wife for Husband’s alleged failure to comply with discovery. We
conclude that the amount of alimony in futuro exceeds Wife’s need. As such, the award of
alimony in futuro is modified to $3,451.00 per month and shall terminate upon Wife’s
death or remarriage, or Husband’s death in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated
section 36-5-121(f)(3). We vacate the trial court’s award of $20,000.00 in attorney’s fees
to Wife and remand for the trial court to enter an order containing sufficient findings of
fact and conclusions of law regarding this issue pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil
Procedure 52.01.

      Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court
         Reversed in Part, Affirmed in Part as Modified, and Remanded

KENNY ARMSTRONG, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ANDY D. BENNETT
and JEFFREY USMAN, JJ., joined.

Brad William Hornsby, Murfreesboro, Tennessee, and Eric J. Burch, Manchester,
Tennessee, for the appellant, Scott W. Van Zandbergen.

C. Diane Crosier and Hannah R. Ellis, Franklin, Tennessee, for the appellee, Diana Lynn
Van Zandbergen.

                                 MEMORANDUM OPINION1

      1
          Rule 10 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee provides:

      This Court, with the concurrence of all judges participating in the case, may affirm, reverse
      or modify the actions of the trial court by memorandum opinion when a formal opinion
      would have no precedential value. When a case is decided by memorandum opinion it shall
                                     I. Background

       Appellant Scott W. Van Zandbergen (“Husband”) and Appellee Diana Lynn Van
Zandbergen (“Wife”) were married in 1983. Shortly thereafter, Husband entered the
Marine Corps and served 22 years. Husband retired as a major and took a job with the
University of Tennessee Space Institute (“UTSI”) in 2006. Husband’s gross monthly
income from UTSI is $8,078.00 per month. Husband also receives $117.00 per month in
longevity pay as well as $125.00 per month for a mobile phone allowance. In addition,
Husband receives $4,001.00 per month from his military pension, of which $522.00 per
month is tax-free disability retirement. Wife will receive $1,739.00 per month from
Husband’s military pension. Husband also receives rental income of $11,400.00 per year
from a farm he inherited. Wife is unemployed and has not worked since 2014. Wife
receives $1,073.00 per month in social security disability.

        Husband admitted to having affairs during the marriage. At the time of the divorce
hearing, Husband was 59 years old and intended to retire in about 8 years. Wife was 58.
There is no evidence that Husband has any infirmities that prevent him from working. On
the other hand, Wife claims numerous maladies, including thyroid cancer, hysterectomy,
joint issues, fibromyalgia, migraines, anxiety, depression, PTSD, and IBS. Husband claims
that there was no evidence to support these infirmities, and, indeed, other than Wife’s
testimony, there is no evidence concerning her medical conditions. Husband claims that
Wife is supported by her parents and that some of the expenses she claims are paid by
them, without any expectation of repayment. Husband asserts that, although Wife initially
claimed monthly expenses of $5,137.00 “[a]t the trial, the claims of the needs of the Wife
went through the roof and she claimed a monthly need of well over $7,000.00.”

       On July 21, 2020, Wife filed a complaint for divorce on grounds of inappropriate
marital conduct, adultery, and irreconcilable differences. Wife requested all four types of
alimony. On August 13, 2020, Husband filed an answer and counter-complaint for divorce.
Therein, he averred that Wife should not receive any alimony. On September 14, 2020,
Wife filed a motion for pendente lite support claiming a monthly need of $5,137.00.

       On October 26, 2020, the trial court heard Wife’s request for temporary support and
entered an order on October 27, 2020, awarding Wife $2,500.00 per month in pendente lite
support. We note that, at the time of the award of temporary support, Wife’s sole income
was from her Social Security disability. The trial court also ordered Husband to continue
to pay Wife’s automobile insurance, life insurance, and cell phone bill. On January 11,
2022, Husband filed a statement of his monthly income and expenses, wherein he alleged
monthly income of $10,790.67 and $9,268.46 in monthly expenses.
       Concerning discovery, the record contains a January 13, 2021 “Agreed Order,”

      be designated “MEMORANDUM OPINION”, shall not be published, and shall not be
      cited or relied on for any reason in any unrelated case.
                                           -2-
stating that the parties “agreed that the Motion to Compel Discovery and Motion for Order
is hereby set for January 19, 2021.” In a January 22, 2021 order, the trial court granted
Wife’s motion to compel discovery, finding that Husband “failed to respond fully to written
discovery propounded to him on September 14, 2020.” The trial court ordered Husband to
pay $1,505.00 in Wife’s attorney’s fees for his failure to comply with discovery. On
January 2, 2022, Wife filed a motion to continue the final hearing in the divorce. Therein,
Wife averred that she “has not received Husband’s updated discovery, nor has she received
any documents requested during Husband’s deposition and in the Subpoena Duces
Tecum.”

        On January 25 and February 8, 2022, the trial court held the final hearing. On March
30, 2022, the trial court entered a written opinion. As is relevant to this appeal, the trial
court awarded Wife $4,350.00 per month in alimony in futuro with no stated termination
date. The trial court also ordered Husband to pay $20,000.00 for Wife’s attorney’s fees
based on the court’s finding that Husband “failed to comply with the Court’s orders, failed
to appropriately and timely file responses to discovery and caused unnecessary hearings.”
The trial court’s opinion does not elaborate further concerning the specifics of Husband’s
failure to comply with discovery. On June 6, 2022, the trial court entered a final decree,
which incorporates the trial court’s March 30, 2022 opinion. Husband filed a timely
appeal.

                                         II. Issues

       Husband raises three issues for review as stated in his brief:

       1. Did the Court err in awarding Wife alimony in futuro which was in excess
       of the amount requested and includes the purchase of illegal drugs and a
       standard of living well in excess of that exercised during the marriage
       resulting in Wife receiving a net amount approximately double what husband
       receives based primarily on the fault assessed to Husband?
       2. Did the Court err in not permitting the alimony to terminate at a date in the
       future considering the age of the parties?
       3. Did the Court err in awarding Wife attorney fees for failure to answer
       discovery when there was absolutely nothing in the record to support the
       award[—]not the discovery, the motion to compel discovery, or even
       itemized time sheets setting forth the time expended?

Wife asks for her attorney’s fees and expenses on appeal.

                                 III. Standard of Review

       This case was tried without a jury. As such, “[o]ur review is de novo upon the record
of the proceedings below with a presumption of correctness as to the trial court’s factual
                                            -3-
findings unless the evidence preponderates against those findings.” Barnes v. Barnes, 193
S.W.3d 495, 498 (Tenn. 2006) (citing Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d)). However, the trial court’s
conclusions of law “are accorded no such presumption.” Id. (citing Union Carbide Corp.
v. Huddleston, 854 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993)).

       Specifically concerning awards of spousal support, the Tennessee Supreme Court
has “repeatedly . . . observ[ed] that trial courts have broad discretion to determine whether
spousal support is needed and, if so, the nature, amount, and duration of the award.”
Gonsewski v. Gonsewski, 350 S.W.3d 99, 105 (Tenn. 2011). In Gonsweski, the Court
explained:

       [A] trial court’s decision regarding spousal support is factually driven and
       involves the careful balancing of many factors. Kinard v. Kinard, 986
       S.W.2d 220, 235 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998); see also Burlew [v. Burlew], 40
       S.W.3d [465,] 470 [(Tenn. 2004)]; Robertson v. Robertson, 76 S.W.3d 337,
       340-41 (Tenn. 2002). As a result, “[a]ppellate courts are generally disinclined
       to second-guess a trial judge’s spousal support decision.” Kinard, 986
       S.W.2d at 234. Rather, “[t]he role of an appellate court in reviewing an award
       of spousal support is to determine whether the trial court applied the correct
       legal standard and reached a decision that is not clearly unreasonable.”
       Broadbent v. Broadbent, 211 S.W.3d 216, 220 (Tenn. 2006). Appellate
       courts decline to second-guess a trial court’s decision absent an abuse of
       discretion. Robertson, 76 S.W.3d at 343. An abuse of discretion occurs when
       the trial court causes an injustice by applying an incorrect legal standard,
       reaches an illogical result, resolves the case on a clearly erroneous
       assessment of the evidence, or relies on reasoning that causes an injustice.
       Wright ex rel. Wright v. Wright, 337 S.W.3d 166, 176 (Tenn. 2011);
       Henderson v. SAIA, Inc., 318 S.W.3d 328, 335 (Tenn. 2010). This standard
       does not permit an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the
       trial court, but “‘reflects an awareness that the decision being reviewed
       involved a choice among several acceptable alternatives,’ and thus ‘envisions
       a less rigorous review of the lower court's decision and a decreased likelihood
       that the decision will be reversed on appeal.’” Henderson, 318 S.W.3d at
       335 (quoting Lee Medical, Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 524 (Tenn.
       2010)). Consequently, when reviewing a discretionary decision by the trial
       court, such as an alimony determination, the appellate court should presume
       that the decision is correct and should review the evidence in the light most
       favorable to the decision. Wright, 337 S.W.3d at 176; Henderson, 318
       S.W.3d at 335.

Id. at 105-106 (footnotes omitted).

                                            -4-
                                           IV. Alimony

       Husband does not take issue with the type of alimony awarded in this case. Rather,
he appeals the amount of alimony awarded to Wife and the fact that the trial court did not
state an end date. Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-5-121 states in pertinent part:

      (d)(1) The court may award rehabilitative alimony, alimony in futuro, also
      known as periodic alimony, transitional alimony, or alimony in solido, also
      known as lump sum alimony or a combination of these, as provided in this
      subsection (d).

                                            ***

      (4) An award of alimony in futuro may be made . . . where a spouse may be
      only partially rehabilitated, or instead of an award of rehabilitative alimony,
      where rehabilitation is not feasible. . . .

                                           ***

      (f)(1) Alimony in futuro, also known as periodic alimony, is a payment of
      support and maintenance on a long term basis or until death or remarriage of
      the recipient. Such alimony may be awarded when the court finds that there
      is relative economic disadvantage and that rehabilitation is not feasible . . . .
      (2)(A) An award of alimony in futuro shall remain in the court’s control for
      the duration of such award, and may be increased, decreased, terminated,
      extended, or otherwise modified, upon a showing of substantial and material
      change in circumstances.

                                           ***

      (i) In determining whether the granting of an order for payment of support
      and maintenance to a party is appropriate, and in determining the nature,
      amount, length of term, and manner of payment, the court shall consider all
      relevant factors, including:
      (1) The relative earning capacity, obligations, needs, and financial resources
      of each party, including income from pension, profit sharing or retirement
      plans and all other sources;
      (2) The relative education and training of each party, the ability and
      opportunity of each party to secure such education and training, and the
      necessity of a party to secure further education and training to improve such
      party’s earnings capacity to a reasonable level;
      (3) The duration of the marriage;
                                            -5-
      (4) The age and mental condition of each party;
      (5) The physical condition of each party, including, but not limited to,
      physical disability or incapacity due to a chronic debilitating disease;
      (6) The extent to which it would be undesirable for a party to seek
      employment outside the home, because such party will be custodian of a
      minor child of the marriage;
      (7) The separate assets of each party, both real and personal, tangible and
      intangible;
      (8) The provisions made with regard to the marital property, as defined in §
      36-4-121;
      (9) The standard of living of the parties established during the marriage;
      (10) The extent to which each party has made such tangible and intangible
      contributions to the marriage as monetary and homemaker contributions, and
      tangible and intangible contributions by a party to the education, training or
      increased earning power of the other party;
      (11) The relative fault of the parties, in cases where the court, in its discretion,
      deems it appropriate to do so; and
      (12) Such other factors, including the tax consequences to each party, as are
      necessary to consider the equities between the parties.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121. As the Tennessee Supreme Court has explained, “[a]lthough
each of these factors must be considered when relevant to the parties’ circumstances, ‘the
two that are considered the most important are the disadvantaged spouse’s need and the
obligor spouse’s ability to pay.’” Gonsewski, 350 S.W.3d at 110 (quoting Riggs v. Riggs,
250 S.W.3d 453, 457 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007)). Furthermore, this Court has confirmed that
when “considering these two factors, the primary consideration is the disadvantaged
spouse’s need.” Murdock v. Murdock, No. W2019-00979-COA-R3-CV, 2022 WL
611024, at *14 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 2, 2022).

      As noted above, in seeking pendente lite support, Wife claimed monthly need of
$5,137.00. Following a hearing, the trial court awarded Wife $2,500.00 per month in
temporary support. Then, following the final divorce hearing, the trial court awarded Wife
$4,350.00 per month in alimony in futuro with no specified termination date. On appeal,
Husband asserts that Wife’s expenses did not increase from the time of the award of
pendente lite support so as to warrant an increase in alimony.

                                  A. Amount of Alimony

      Concerning the award of alimony in futuro, in the June 6, 2022 Final Decree of
Divorce, the trial court stated that

      [b]ased on the parties’ estimates of their income and expenses and [in]
      consideration of Tenn. Code Ann. §36-5-121(i), as well as other applicable
                                        -6-
       law, the Court finds that Wife needs the sum of $4,350.00 per month in
       alimony in futuro, and Husband has the ability to pay . . . .

In a separate March 30, 2022 “Opinion,” which was incorporated by reference into the
Final Decree of Divorce, the trial court made the following additional findings to support
its award of alimony in futuro:

               Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-121(i) sets forth the factors to be considered
       to determine whether an award of alimony is appropriate. In considering
       those, the Court finds as follows:
               Husband is fifty-nine years old. He is healthy, able-bodied and
       gainfully employed in a well-paying job. Wife is unemployed and disabled.
       She has an associates’ degree, but has not worked since 2014. Wife, who is
       fifty-eight years old, suffers from mental and medical conditions, including
       but not limited to PTSD and fibromyalgia. Given her mental and medical
       conditions and her age, it is unlikely she can obtain further education or
       training that would allow her to be gainfully employed.
               As to the factors set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(i)(8) and
       (9), the Court has previously made findings as to the separate assets of the
       parties and the division of marital property and has found that the parties each
       made tangible and intangible contributions to the marriage.
               As to factor (11), the Husband is clearly at fault in the demise of the
       marriage. He has admitted to purchasing and watching pornography and
       having extramarital affairs.
               Husband receives gross monthly income of $8,078.00 per month from
       his current employment. He receives $4,001.00 per month from his military
       pension, $117.00 per month in longevity pay and $125.00 per month for a
       mobile phone allowance. He also receives rental income from his separate
       property in Illinois in the amount of $750.00 per month.
               Wife receives $1,073.00 per month in gross social security disability.
       Wife will receive $1,739.00 from Husband’s military pension.
               Based upon the parties’ estimates of their income and expenses, the
       Court finds Wife needs the sum of $4,350.00 per month in alimony in futuro,
       and Husband has the ability to pay said alimony.

       As set out above, in setting alimony, the trial court referred to its division of marital
property and debts, i.e., “As to the factors set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(i)(8)
and (9), the Court has previously made findings as to the separate assets of the parties and
the division of marital property.” From our review, the trial court wholly adopted Wife’s
proposed division of marital property, which was admitted into evidence as trial exhibit 24.
According to the exhibit, the parties each received 50% of the marital estate, i.e.,
$303,424.00. In addition to her award of marital property, Wife testified that she has a
Merrill Lynch account that is funded by “gifts” from her parents. At the time of the divorce
                                            -7-
hearing, the funds in that account totaled approximately $48,000.00. It does not appear
that the trial court considered Wife’s Merrill Lynch account in calculating her need.
However, because the account is largely funded by “gifts” from her parents, it is not
guaranteed that the account will increase in value.

        Concerning the parties’ respective incomes and expenses, at trial, Wife called
Rosemary Frank as her financial expert. Ms. Frank prepared a report concerning the
parties’ assets and liabilities, which report was entered into evidence as trial exhibit 27.
According to this exhibit, Husband’s monthly income from all sources is $10,028.00.
Notwithstanding alimony, Wife’s monthly income is approximately $2,812.00. We now
turn to Wife’s monthly expenses.

       At trial, Wife claimed monthly expenses totaling $7,117.00. As set out in Wife’s
detailed expense report, which was admitted into evidence as trial exhibit 18, these monthly
expenses were comprised of the following:

                                           -8-
 Detailed Expenses

Wife's Expenses                                   Post-Divorce
                                         Weekly     Monthly Annual

 Household
 Rent                                                   850
 HOA / Condo Fee                                        100
 Homeowners' Insurance                                  150
 Real Estate Tax                                        240
 Cable / Internet                                       140
 Internet Access                                          50
Netflix, CBS, Prime                                       25
 Household Maintenance                                  100
 Household Supplies                                       50
 Lawn Service                                             30
 Utilities - Electricity                                130
 Utilities - Gas / Propane Heat                         -
 Utilities - Water / Sewer                               21
 Major Purchase Fund (furniture, etc.)                  167    2,000
 Other Household - Storage Unit
Moving Costs one time
LIVING EXPENSES-HOUSEHOLD                         $ 2,053.00

 Transportation
 Car Payments                                          525
 Car Insurance                                         125
 Car Gasoline / Oil                                    175
 Car Maintenance and Repair                             50
 Car License / Stickers                                  4
 Tolls                                                  10
LMNG EXPENSES-TRANSPORTATION                      $ 889.00

Personal
Cell Phone                                             110
Ciqarettes                                             150
Clothes                                                200
Charitable                                             150
Church / Synagogue                                     150
Entertainment                                          100
Food / Groceries (not restaurants)                     400
Gifts                                                  125
Hair                                                    60
Laundry                                                 20
Legal and Accountinq                                    21      250

                                         -9-
    Detafled Expenses

   Wife's Expenses                                Post-Divorce
                                           Weekly   Monthly Annual
    Liquor / Beer / Wine                                  200
    Manicure / Pedicure                                    70
    Pets                                                   60
    Restaurants                                           200
    Sports / Hobbies/Lessons                               75
    Subscriptions / Books                                  42
    Therapist / Counselor                      75         325
    Toiletrles / Grooming                                  40
    Travel (Visit Children)                               333  4,000
    Vacations                                             150
   Technology                                              25
   Massage                                                 80
   LIVING EXPENSES-PERSONAL                        $ 3,086.00

   Health and Medical
   Health insurance                                       240
  Dental/Vision Insurance                                 -
   Medical / Doctor                                        75
   Dental                                                 180
   Drug & Prescription                                    319
  Optical                                                 200
  Laboratory                                               25
  LIVING EXPENSES-HEALTH & MEDICAL                  $1,039.00

  Other
  Life Insurance                                           50
  LMNG EXPENSES-OTHER                               $   50.00

  TOTAL LIVING EXPENSES                             $7,117.00

        First, as noted by Appellant in his brief, the difference between Wife's stated need
(i.e., $7,117.00) and her income without alimony (i.e., $2,812.00) is $4,305.00 per month.
However, the trial court held that Wife needs $4,350.00 per month in alimony, which is
$45.00 more than Wife’s stated need in trial exhibit 18, supra. Accordingly, the amount
of alimony should be reduced by $45.00 to correct this miscalculation.

        Next, as to her claim for “Rent” in the amount of $850.00 per month, at the time of
trial, Wife testified that she was living in a home owned by her parents, and she paid no
rent, to-wit:
                                             - 10 -
      Q. You have rent listed as $850 per month. How did you reach this number?
      A. My parents purchased the home that I’m living in right now, and because
      I don’t have sufficient income to make a payment, they’ve postponed any
      repayment that I need to make until after the divorce. At that point, we’re
      going to sign a contract, and that is the estimated monthly payment to them
      to purchase the house.
      Q. After this divorce ends, will you be responsible for making rent or rent-
      to-own type payments?
      A Yes.

On cross-examination, Wife further explained:

      Q. Now, you’ve got $850 per month as rent; right?
      A. Yes.
      Q And you're not paying any rent.
      A. At this point, I don’t have the funds to pay a rent . . . but I’ve been covering
      the other expenses for the house.
      Q. But your parents bought this house for you to live in.
      A. Yes.
      Q. And you anticipate you’re going to continue to live there.
      A. And purchase it from them.
      Q. You don’t have a purchase agreement?
      A. Not in writing. We’ve verbally discussed it.
      Q. Well, what’s the purchase price?
      A. My dad said he was going to check what market value is at the time that
      I’m able to purchase the home, and then I’ll start making payments towards
      like a rent-to-own kind of situation.
      Q. But if you didn’t have the money for that, your parents would allow you
      to stay there, wouldn’t they?
      A. Yes.

      Likewise, Wife testified that she had a similar arrangement with her parents
concerning the vehicle she was driving at the time of the hearing, to-wit:

      Q. Do you currently own a car?
      A. I do not.
      Q. Do you have a car that you have?
      A. Yes. I’m borrowing a vehicle from my parents for the last year.
      Q. Do you intend to purchase a car? Is that the car payment you have at $525?
      A. That’s correct. I'll need a vehicle at the end of this.

On cross-examination, Wife further explained:

                                            - 11 -
       Q Now, we’ve got a car payment at $525 per month?
       A Correct.
       Q. You don't have a car payment.
       A. I will after the divorce.
       Q. Who’s the payment owed to?
       A. My parents.
       Q. They gave you a car to drive.
       A. They loaned me a car to drive.
       Q. A 2017 Toyota Camry.
       A. Correct.
       Q. Do you have any agreement with your parents that you’ll buy that car
       from them?
       A. Yes, we’ve discussed it actually between these two court dates and the
       house, and we came up with the understanding that I’ll be purchasing [the
       car]. Otherwise, I’d have to go out and get an entirely new car.
       Q. Unless they keep letting you use that one.
       A. That’s not our—they’re only helping so that I can have some
       transportation and a place to live until this is over. They’re not going to keep
       funding my life after this.
       Q. What’s the purchase price of the car?
       A. Nineteen thousand five hundred.

       As conceded by Wife, no written agreement concerning the purchase of her parents’
home or vehicle was entered into evidence. Furthermore, Wife’s parents did not testify as
to any arrangement concerning the home or the car. However, the trial court clearly gave
credence to Wife’s testimony that, following the divorce, she will be paying some amount
of mortgage (or rent) and some amount of car payment to her parents. See Mitchell v.
Archibald, 971 S.W.2d 25, 29 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998) (“[A]ppellate courts routinely decline
to second-guess a trial court’s credibility determinations unless there is concrete, clear, and
convincing evidence to the contrary.”). Regardless, Wife’s parents should not be charged
with paying for her basic necessities such as housing and transportation. To live
independently, Wife will need money for a vehicle and a house. There are, however, other
expenses in trial exhibit 18 that should be reduced.

       Under “Personal” expenses, Wife claims $150.00 per month for cigarettes and
$200.00 per month for “Liquor/Beer/Wine.” Husband argues that these are not necessary
expenses. We agree. Although Wife testified that she smoked cigarettes throughout the
marriage, she also testified that her intention was to quit. So, not only are cigarettes not a
necessity, but by her own testimony, she is going to stop using them. Likewise, alcohol is
not a necessity, and Husband should not have to pay for Wife’s use of same. Removing
these expenses reduces Wife’s “Personal” expenses by $350, i.e., from $3,086.00 per
month to $2,736.00.

                                            - 12 -
       Turning to Wife’s claim of $319.00 per month in “Drug & Prescription” expenses,
this number appears to be inflated. Wife testified that, as of January 2022, her health
insurance included prescription medication coverage. Other than Wife’s testimony, there
was no evidence concerning what drugs Wife is prescribed or how much those drugs cost.
However, Wife’s testimony is enlightening on the subject of her out-of-pocket monthly
expenses for medication, to-wit:

      Q. Since January [i.e., when Wife’s prescription drug coverage began], have
      you purchased any prescription drugs since you’ve had this coverage?
      A. I’ve picked up two prescriptions.
      Q. And how much did those cost?
      A. One of them was .50 cents—
      Q. (Interposing) Fifty cents.
      A. —and other one was $43 for one bottle.
      Q. Okay. So in over a month, you’ve spent $43.50.
      A. I currently have a little bit of a stockpile on my daily prescriptions.
      Q. Well, that’s a far cry from $319 a month, is it not?
      A. I understand that, but that is what the dollar figure comes out to be for my
      prescriptions.
      Q. That’s just not what you’ve spent since it’s been under this current plan.
      A. In January, I believe I spent just maybe $183 out-of-pocket and—
      Q. (Interposing) Well, I asked you since the beginning of January since
      you’ve been under this prescription plan, how much have you spent. You
      told me .50 cents on one and $43 on the other.
      A. I’m adding one that I forgot.
      Q. Well, what was that? What is the medication?
      A. It’s marijuana.
      Q. So you expect your husband to purchase marijuana for you as well after
      the divorce?
      A. It’s a prescription that I’ve been given for my multiple conditions.
      Q. And that’s not covered under Insurance?

                                           ***

      Q How long have you been smoking marijuana?
      A. I think since 2010-ish.
      Q. So is that a big part of this drug and prescription cost?
      A. Yes. Well, it’s a portion of it; maybe half.

The Tennessee General Assembly has not legalized marijuana for either medical or
recreational use in Tennessee, where the divorce proceedings are set. Because marijuana
use is illegal in Tennessee, we conclude that it was error for the trial court to charge
Husband with these expenses, i.e., approximately $160.00 per month. Furthermore, it
                                          - 13 -
appears that Wife’s expenses for her legal prescription drugs are largely covered by her
current insurance plan. By her own testimony, she has paid only $43.50 per month since
her insurance became effective. In the absence of any evidence to support expenses above
the $43.50 she testified to, and in the absence of any documentation concerning Wife’s
prescriptions or the costs thereof, her “Drug & Prescription” expense should be reduced by
a total of $269.00, i.e., from $319.00 to $50.00 per month.

        Wife claimed expenses for “Cable/Internet” of $140.00 per month. In a separate
line item, she claimed a monthly expense of $50.00 for “Internet”. Then, in another line
item, she claimed expenses of $25.00 per month for “Netflix, CBS, Prime.” When
questioned as to whether some of these expenses were duplicated, Wife testified, in
relevant part, as follows:

      Q. Well, we’ve got $215 between cable/internet and some of these apps,
      entertainment apps. Do you have to pay for internet access and internet?
      A. I pay for internet access, and then I pay for TV service. They don’t come
      from the same company.
      Q. Why do you need cable/internet, internet access, and all these channels . .
      . . Why do you need—you’ve got cable/internet at $140 per month. You've
      got internet access at $50 a month. Wouldn’t those be redundant?
      A. I don't recall that. I know I pay $50 a month for the internet to be brought
      to the house.
      Q Okay. Who do you pay that to?
      A That goes to Xfinity.
      Q Okay. So, Xfinity is $50 a month.

                                           ***

      Q. Well, once you’ve got the internet service, that should be all you need;
      right?
      A. If I only want to be on the internet, but I do like to watch television as
      well.
      Q. Well, there’s all sorts of TV services that stream over the internet; right?
      A. Yes, and that’s how I receive my TV, which is $80 a month for my
      channels and then
      Q. (Interposing) Who do you pay that [to]—
      A. Hulu.
      Q. So you pay Hulu $80 per month?
      A. Yes.
      Q. Okay. And what else?
      A. CBS, Netflix, Prime. I think those are the ones that I have right now.
      Q. And those are $25?
      A. Each one has its own price, but they add up—
                                           - 14 -
       Q. (Interposing) To $25.
       A. –yes.
       Q Anything else?
       A. I’m not recalling. I’m not sure. . . .
       Q. So if we add those figures up, that should come to $155 per month; right?
       A. Okay.
       Q. Instead of the $215 that you’ve got between cable/internet, internet access,
       and these special channels?
       A. (Thereupon no response from the witness.)

                                             ***

       Q. So that $140 figure [for Cable/Internet] should be $80 because that's what
       you pay for Hulu; right?
       A. Okay

From the foregoing testimony, Wife’s claim per month for cable, internet, and streaming
applications, total $155.00, not $215.00. As such, these expenses should be reduced by
$60.00, i.e., $215.00 minus $155.00.

       As to Wife’s claim of $325.00 per month for therapy, this amount supposes that
Wife will attend four therapy sessions per month at $75.00 per visit, which totals $300.00
not the $325.00 claimed. Regardless, at trial, Wife testified that she currently attends
therapy only every other week:

       Q. And how often do you go to therapy?
       A. . . . I was seeing her every week until I started to have to make more
       frequent trips and between our two schedules, it dropped back to about every
       other week.
       Q. And how much does that cost per visit?
       A. It’s $75 per visit.

Based on Wife’s testimony, the amount claimed for therapy should be reduced from
$325.00 to $150.00.

        Although there is no doubt that Wife has need of alimony in futuro, based on the
foregoing analysis, her claimed monthly expenses should be reduced by a total of $899.00,
i.e., $45.00 should be deducted to correct the trial court’s erroneous calculation; “Personal”
expenses should be reduced by $350; “Drug & Prescription” expenses should be reduced
by $269.00; Cable, Internet, and Television expenses should be reduced by $60.00; and
“Therapy” should be reduced by $175.00. As such, we modify the trial court’s award of
alimony in futuro from $4,350.00 to $3,451.00 per month. See, e.g., Nelson v. Nelson,
106 S.W.3d 20 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) (modifying the amount of alimony awarded by the
                                            - 15 -
trial court); Hiscock v. Hiscock, No. M2005-01489-COA-R3CV, 2006 WL 3007518
(Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 19, 2006) (same).

                                        B. Length of Alimony

         Turning to Husband’s second issue, wherein he argues that the trial court erred in
failing to limit the time period for the alimony in futuro award, Husband specifically asserts
that his obligation should end upon his retirement. In his brief, Husband states that he “is
only requesting that the alimony be able to cease if indeed he truly retires upon receiving
full retirement Social Security age of 67.” At this point, Husband’s retirement plans are
speculative. As we have explained, “This Court is not prescient, and speculation is not
within its purview.” Riegel v. Wilkerson, No. W2013-01391-COA-R3-CV, 2014 WL
546113, *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2014). Because Husband has not yet retired, we
decline to modify the trial court’s order to terminate his alimony in futuro obligation upon
his retirement. However, our holding does not preclude Husband from seeking
modification of alimony when he does retire. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(f)(2)(A) (“An
award of alimony in futuro shall remain in the court’s control for the duration of such
award, and may be increased, decreased, terminated, extended, or otherwise modified,
upon a showing of substantial and material change in circumstances.”). Regardless, under
Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-5-121(f)(3), “[a]n award for alimony in futuro shall
terminate automatically and unconditionally upon the death or remarriage of the recipient
[or] . . . upon the death of the payor.” Accordingly, to the extent the trial court allowed the
alimony award to continue indefinitely, it is modified to terminate on Wife’s death or
remarriage, or Husband’s death, in accordance with the statute.

                     V. Attorney’s Fees Assessed in the Trial Court

        Usually, in a divorce case, an award of attorney’s fees to a spouse constitutes
alimony in solido. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(d)(5) (“Alimony in solido may be awarded
in lieu of or in addition to any other alimony award, in order to provide support, including
attorney fees, where appropriate.”). However, in this case, the trial court’s order states
that, “The Court finds that a portion of the attorney fees incurred by Wife were incurred
due to Husband’s failure to comply with the Court’s Orders and failure to timely and
appropriately respond to discovery. The Court hereby orders that Husband pay $20,000.00
of the attorney fees incurred by Wife . . . .” Palmer v. Palmer, 562 S.W.2d 833, 837 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1977) (“No principle is better known than that which states that a Court speaks
through its orders and decrees . . . .”). The trial court’s order clearly indicates that the
award of attorney’s fees to Wife is based on Husband’s failure to comply with discovery.
As such, the $20,000.00 award does not constitute alimony in solido under Tennessee Code
Annotated § 36-5-121(d)(5); rather, we infer that the trial court made the award under
Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 37.01, which provides, in relevant part, as follows:2

       2
           The trial court made no finding that Husband was in contempt of its orders.
                                                  - 16 -
       A party, upon reasonable notice to other parties and all persons affected
       hereby, may apply for an order compelling discovery . . .

                                             ***

       (4) Award of Expenses of Motion. If the motion is granted, the court shall,
       after opportunity for hearing, require the party or deponent whose conduct
       necessitated the motion or the party or attorney advising such conduct or both
       of them to pay to the moving party the reasonable expenses incurred in
       obtaining the order, including attorney's fees, unless the court finds that the
       opposition to the motion was substantially justified or that other
       circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.

        Concerning Husband’s alleged failure to fully comply with discovery, we glean
some context from the trial court’s January 22, 2021 interim order. Therein, the trial court
indicated that the hearing giving rise to the order was held “on the 19th day of January 2021
upon Wife’s Motion to Compel Discovery Responses and Motion for Order Requiring
Husband to Restore Wife as Beneficiary to Life Insurance” (emphasis added). Neither of
Wife’s motions are contained in the appellate record. Regardless, in the January 22, 2021
order, the trial granted Wife’s motion to compel discovery, finding that: (1) “Husband
failed to respond fully to written discovery propounded to him on September 14, 2020”;
and (2) “the time period requested for documents is reasonable.” The order further stated
that, “within fifteen (15) days of the date of the hearing of the motion,” Husband shall
provide Wife with the following: (1) “Two (2) years of Navy Federal Credit Union
American Express statements prior to the filing of the divorce complaint to present”; “Two
(2) years of the statements for his military pensions, 401k and AIG prior to the filing of the
divorce complaint to present”; (3) “Two (2) years of cell phone records prior to the filing
of the divorce complaint to present”; and (4) “All documents relating to the improvements
to the real property.” In the January 22, 2021 order, the trial court awarded Wife $1,505.00
“for her attorney fees incurred in compelling Husband to respond to written discovery.”
From the foregoing, the January 22, 2021 order was sufficiently clear to put Husband on
notice of the particular discovery requests he was required to answer and the timeframe for
doing so. We can also reasonably infer that the $1,505.00 attorney fee award was
warranted because Husband failed to answer Wife’s September 14, 2020 discovery
requests. So, as of the entry of the January 22 order, Husband was on notice that he had
fifteen days from January 19, i.e., the date of the hearing, to tender the specific documents
set out in the January 22 order. By contrast, the trial court’s June 6, 2022 Final Decree of
Divorce merely states that, “The Court finds that a portion of the attorney fees incurred by
Wife were incurred due to Husband’s failure to comply with the Court’s Orders and failure
to timely and appropriately respond to discovery. The Court hereby orders that Husband
pay $20,000.00 of the attorney’s fees incurred by Wife . . . .” The trial court’s Final Decree
of Divorce wholly fails to make any findings concerning how Husband failed to comply
with discovery after the entry of the January 22, 2021 order. Furthermore, the trial court’s
                                             - 17 -
order fails to include any discussion concerning how it arrived at the $20,000.00 amount
and also fails to state that the amount awarded was reasonable.

        Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01 provides that “[i]n all actions tried upon
the facts without a jury, the court shall find the facts specially and shall state separately its
conclusions of law and direct the entry of the appropriate judgment.” “There is no bright-
line test by which to assess the sufficiency of factual findings, but the findings of fact must
include as much of the subsidiary facts as is necessary to disclose to the reviewing court
the steps by which the trial court reached its ultimate conclusion on each factual issue.”
Lovlace v. Copley, 418 S.W.3d 1, 35 (Tenn. 2013) (quotation omitted). Otherwise,
appellate courts are “left to wonder” about the basis for the trial court’s decision. In re
Houston D., 660 S.W.3d 704, 721 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2022). This Court has declined to
speculate as to a trial court’s rationale when we cannot discern the basis for the trial court’s
decision. See, e.g., Lugo v. Lugo, No. W2020-00312-COA-R3-CV, 2021 WL 507889, at
*5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 10, 2021). We have explained:

       “It is this Court's purview to review, not assume or speculate. Without any
       facts in the trial court's order, we are forced to guess at the rational[e] the
       trial court used in arriving at its decision. This we cannot do. Accordingly,
       we conclude that the trial court did not comply with Tennessee Rule of Civil
       Procedure 52.01.”

Id. (quoting Harthun v. Edens, No. W2015-00647-COA-R3-CV, 2016 WL 1056960, at
*5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 17, 2016)).

        “Generally, the appropriate remedy when a trial court fails to make appropriate
findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Rule 52.01 is to ‘vacate the trial court's
judgment and remand the cause to the trial court for written findings of fact and conclusions
of law.’” Manning v. Manning, 474 S.W.3d 252, 260 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting Lake
v. Haynes, No. W2010-00294-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 2361563, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App.
June 9, 2011)). We conclude that the trial court’s order does not include sufficient findings
and conclusions regarding its award of $20,000.00 in attorney’s fees to Wife for Husband’s
failure to comply with discovery. In the absence of sufficient findings, this Court is not in
a position to conduct a meaningful review of the trial court’s decision. As such, we vacate
the $20,000.00 award and remand for the trial court to enter an order that complies with
Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01.

                           VI. Attorney’s Fees on Appeal

       As her sole issue on appeal, Wife asserts that Husband should be ordered to pay her
attorney’s fees incurred in defending this appeal. As this Court has explained:

                                             - 18 -
      In divorce proceedings, the recovery of attorney’s fees by a litigant is
      provided for by statute which provides that a spouse seeking enforcement of
      an alimony or custody award in a decree may be granted attorney’s fees in
      the discretion of the court before whom the action is pending. Tenn. Code.
      Ann. 36-5-103(c) (2003).

      The discretion to award attorney’s fees on appeal in a proceeding of this
      nature rests within the discretion of the Court. Archer v. Archer, 907 S.W.2d
      412, 419 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). When considering a request for attorney’s
      fees on appeal, we also consider the requesting party’s ability to pay such
      fees, the requesting party’s success on appeal, whether the requesting party
      sought the appeal in good faith, and any other equitable factors relevant in a
      given case.

Darvarmanesh v. Gharacholou, No. M2004-00262-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 1684050, at
*16 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 19, 2005).

       Here, we conclude that Husband sought the appeal in good faith, and he has
prevailed on some of his arguments. We are also cognizant of the fact that Wife was
awarded sufficient assets in the divorce from which she can pay her attorney’s fees.
Therefore, we decline Wife’s request for appellate attorney’s fees.

                                    VII. Conclusion

        For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the trial court’s award of $20,000.00 in
attorney’s fees. On remand, the trial court is instructed to enter an order that makes
sufficient findings in compliance with Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01. The trial
court’s award of alimony in futuro is modified to $3,451.00 per month and shall continue
until Wife’s remarriage or death, or Husband’s death in accordance with Tennessee Code
Annotated section 36-5-121(f)(3). Wife’s request for appellate attorney’s fees is denied,
and the case is remanded for such further proceedings as may be necessary and are
consistent with this opinion. Costs of the appeal are assessed one-half to the Appellant,
Scott W. Van Zandbergen, and one-half to the Appellee, Diana Lynn Van Zandbergen, for
all of which execution may issue if necessary.

                                                   S/ Kenny Armstrong
                                                   KENNY ARMSTRONG, JUDGE

                                          - 19 -