Court Opinion

ID: 9685758
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 15:01:03.054225+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:09.982046
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(specially concurring).
I would reverse the trial court also, but not just on the grounds expressed in the majority opinion. Additionally, a reversal, in my opinion, lie based on consolidation of the two different charges at trial, plus the unlawful seizure of the television, clock, and electric toaster.
Breed was convicted of two counts of first-degree burglary and one count of second-degree petty theft (receiving stolen property valued at less than $100). SDCL 22-32-1 and SDCL 22-30A-7. See SDCL 22-30A-17. Our Legislature has directed that two or more offenses (whether felony or misdemeanors) may be charged in the same information or indictment only if the offenses “are of the same or similar character or are based on the same act or transaction or on two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan.” SDCL 23A-6-23. See State v. Closs, 366 N.W.2d 138, 139 (S.D.1985).1 Additionally, “[i]f it appears that a defendant ... is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses ... the court may order an election or separate trials of counts ... or provide whatever other relief justice requires.” SDCL 23A-11-2. See Closs, 366 N.W.2d at 139; State v. Hanson, 278 N.W.2d 198, 201 (S.D.1979); State v. Van Beek, 88 S.D. 154, 157, 216 N.W.2d 561, 563 (1974).
Burglary and receiving stolen property are separate and distinct acts. Even if the acts of burglary and receiving stolen property did root from a “common scheme or plan” (and this is highly questionable), severance is still mandated based on the obvious prejudice that would befall Breed if the felony burglaries and the misdemeanor receipt of stolen property were treated at one trial. The evidence supporting Breed’s burglary charges was totally circumstantial while the receipt of stolen property charge rests upon fruits of a dubious consensual search of Breed’s apartment.
*316Testimony of police officers who conducted the search undoubtedly affected Breed’s receipt of stolen property charge and his burglary charges. This accumulation of evidence unfairly prejudiced Breed and these counts should have been treated in separate trials. See Closs, 366 N.W.2d at 139; State v. Maves, 358 N.W.2d 805, 812 (S.D.1984) (Henderson, J., dissenting); Hanson, 278 N.W.2d at 201; Van Beek, 88 S.D. at 157, 216 N.W.2d at 563; SDCL 23A-11-2.2 An error was made when the trial court chose to treat these two counts in one proceeding. This error amounted to an abuse of discretion which requires reversal. See Closs, 366 N.W.2d at 140; Van Beek, 88 S.D. at 157, 216 N.W.2d at 563.
I would also vote to reverse based upon an improper search and resulting seizure of the television, clock, and electric toaster. The owner of the clock and electric toaster testified that she “never reported” them as being stolen. It was therefore impossible for police officers conducting the search to believe that said clock and toaster were stolen; there was no basis for this assumption. The “plain view” rule proffered by State and relied upon in the majority opinion is simply inapplicable in this case.
It is also noted that the search warrant recited “clothing,” namely, a T-shirt, a pair of maroon jogging shorts, a pair of blue jeans, and a pair of jogging shoes. These officers indicated that they were searching for clothing, while a search warrant was being prepared and gave no indication that they were searching for anything other than clothing. These officers were conducting a search which related to facts in the early morning hours of August 3, 1985, not of facts relating to an unreported petty theft (clock and toaster), which occurred three weeks earlier, nor of facts relating to a July 4, 1985 theft of a television set. Under the amorphous ruling of the majority, these officers could apparently, without warrant, search his apartment for anything and take anything which suited their fancy. For instance, had they seen a set of golf clubs or a baseball glove or a set of binoculars, they could have seized those items under the rationale of the majority. It would be indispensable for the officers to know in the first instance, before they seized anything, that there were stolen items in the apartment. They cannot grab, at their whim, items of personal property which strike their fancy as something that might have been stolen from someone at sometime at someplace. Nay, the supreme law of the land is the United States Constitution and in the Fourth Amendment thereof, it plainly states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. (Emphasis added.)
This article is one of the first ten articles to the Constitution of the United States commonly referred to as the Bill of Rights. It arose as the result of British soldiers beating upon and knocking down the doors on houses of our early American ancestors and then searching and seizing the personal effects of those besieged people. Thanks to the Revolutionaries — we are ostensibly secure in our homes today — if we will but rekindle the quest for freedom.
Therefore, I specially join the majority opinion and would include the above additional grounds for reversal.

. According to the American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice, "[i]f the offenses are not related, the defendant is entitled to a severance as of right_” Standards 13 — 3.1(b), commentary at 13.31; 13-1.3, commentary at 13.11 (2d ed. 1980) (emphasis added).
Unrelated offenses include any offenses that are not based upon the same conduct, upon a single criminal episode, or upon a common plan. Offenses committed at different times and places are not "related” merely because they are of the same or similar character. Thus, a series of burglaries or holdups would be unrelated offenses even though a distinctive mode of commission is repeatedly used.
Standard 13-1.3, commentary at 13.11. So in Breed’s case, the burglaries and the receipt of stolen property charges would likely be unrelated offenses that should have been severed "as of right.” See Standards 13-1.3 and 13-3.3.

. It may be generally stated that offenses should be severed when there is a significant risk "that the jury will convict the defendant upon the weight of the accusations or upon the accumulated effect of the evidence. The defendant can also be disadvantaged if the available defenses are inconsistent or if the defendant wants to testify as to one offense but not as to others." American Bar Association Standards, id., Standard 13-2.1, commentary at 13.13 (footnotes omitted).