Court Opinion

ID: 9644594
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:00:24.833358+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:15.830108
License: Public Domain

Steele Hays, Justice, dissenting. Admittedly, it is not entirely clear the legislature did not intend the words “molds and dies” to apply to the forms produced by C.B. Form Company (Company) and used by its sole customer, Amfuel, to produce fuel cells. But neither is it clear that the legislature did so intend and, unfortunately for the Company, that is the stringent test it must surpass to prevail in this litigation. In fact, in order to qualify for the exemption the Company must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that such was the intent of the legislature. Ragland v. General Tire and Rubber Co., 297 Ark. 394, 763 S.W.2d 70 (1989); Heath v. Westark Poultry Processing Corp., 259 Ark. 141, 531 S.W.2d 953 (1976). This case, perhaps more than any other in recent memory, illustrates the maxim applicable to taxation exemption: “to doubt is to deny the exemption.” Pledger v. Baldor International, Inc., 309 Ark. 30, 827 S.W.2d 646 (1992). I respectfully suggest the majority is resolving a doubtful issue against the taxing authority — the State of Arkansas — and strictly construing the exemption in favor of the Company, exactly the reverse of settled law. In its baste to judgment the majority equates the words ‘mold’ and ‘form’ and effectively decides the case on that basis. The words may be used interchangeably in the industry, but that is not true of the Company, where the word ‘form’ is consistently used to refer to the disposable device now in dispute and the word ‘mold’ is used, in contradistinction, to refer to a reusable fiberglass structure utilized by the Company to produce the ‘form.’ I submit that the reusable device — the mold — meets the statutory test but that the nonreusable device — the form — does not. If one looks no farther than the words “molds and dies that determine the physical characteristics of the finished product. . .” the exemption might seem warranted. But to conclude that the form in this case is synonymous with ‘mold,’ as used in the statute, greatly over simplifies a complex issue. The key words of the statute are “machinery and equipment” and “molds and dies.” Certainly the ‘form’ in this case determines the physical characteristics of the finished product — the fuel cell. But is that conclusive of the issue being decided? I think not. I submit that a ‘mold,’ used in conjunction with the word ‘die,’ when strictly construed against the exemption, contemplates a device which has an ongoing function in the manufacture of a particular product, as opposed to a cardboard structure which, once used, is torn from the product piece by piece and discarded as unusable waste. Admittedly, the statute does not require that molds and dies be permanent. But the two words are linked together in the conjunctive, suggesting a correlation, rather than in the disjunctive, and the word ‘die’ plainly contemplates an industrial device which is reusable over an extended life. The word is defined as “any of various devices for cutting or forming materials in a press or a stamping or forging machine;” “a hollow device of steel,” “a steel block or plate.” In this context it is far more plausible that by using the words “molds and dies” (under the broader heading of “machinery and equipment”) the legislature was referring to devices characteristically similar and having a useful life in the manufacturing process. Indeed, we have recognized that the language used in our statute requires a “continuing utility” in order for the exemption to attach. Ragland v. Dumas, 292 Ark. 515, 732 S.W.2d 119 (1987). Other states have interpreted the language of similar tax exemption statutes accordingly: See, e.g., Midwestern Press, Inc. v. Commissioner of Taxation, 203 N.W.2d 344, 295 Minn. 59 (1972) (lithographic plates custom made for particular printing jobs, usable for only a limited number of impressions and then scrapped, were not “machinery” for the purposes of tax exemption); Hasbro Industries, Inc. v. Norbug, R.I., 487 A.2d 124 (1985) (the “machinery” tax exemption not applicable to clay models); Great Western Sugar Co. v. U.S., 452 F.2d 1394 (1972) (metal plates with a cutting edge used to cut sugar beets into thin slices not entitled to tax exemption applicable to “machinery used in the manufacture of sugar”); Morgan County Feeders, Inc. v. McCormick, 836 P.2d 1051 (Colo. App. 1992)(goods used in business are “equipment” when they have identifiable units and a relatively long period of use.) Being unable to eliminate all reasonable doubt that the legislature intended the exemption in this instance, I would reverse. Brown, J., joins in this dissent.