Court Opinion

ID: 9770908
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:24:51.974087+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:22.241790
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing
All parties hereto have filed motions for rehearing. We reversed the judgment of the trial court upon a holding that certain special exceptions had been improperly sustained. For such error, a remand of the cause rather than a rendition of judgment is deemed appropriate. We will not anticipate what may occur upon another trial and are of the opinion that no further discussion of appellant’s motion for rehearing is necessary. Said motion is overruled.
By separate arguments filed in support of their motion, Gregg and Susser urge that Article 5400a, Vernon’s Ann.Civ. Stats., does not apply to a home rule city, because a municipality when acting in a proprietory capacity can not be properly classified as a “political subdivision.”
It is well settled that a city performs both governmental and proprietory functions. As pointed out in the arguments, the case cited by us as authority for the proposition that a city is a political subdivision of the State, expressly recognized this dual capacity. Supreme Forest Woodmen Circle v. City of Belton, 5 Cir., 100 F.2d 655. We are also cited to the 1953 Act relating to oil and gas pooling agreements which refers to “Cities and towns chartered or organized under the General Laws of Texas, or by special act or charter,” and to “Political subdivisions which are bodies corporate with recognized and defined areas”, thus suggesting that the Legislature ' recognized two species of public or political subdivisions, namely, cities and towns, on the one hand, and counties, water districts and the like, ón the other. Acts 1953, 53rd Leg. p. 686, Ch. 262, Art. 5421n, Vernon’s Ann.Tex.Stats. There are in Texas various types and species of political and municipal organization and, as a general rule, such organization may be classified as belonging to two principal categories, namely, municipalities and political organizations more nearly analogous to counties. See Bennett v. Brown County Water Improvement District No. 1, Tex.Sup., 272 S.W.2d 498, particularly the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Wilson, in which the history of English and American cities and counties and kindred organizations is carefully traced.
In view of these historical distinctions, it would have been appropriate to have .referred to both cities and other political subdivisions in providing- for a general preliminary notice of an intention-to execute an oil and gas lease. An Act containing such references could probably have been more accurately indexed and catalogued with reference to the Revised Statutes as relating to “Cities, Towns and Villages,” as well as to the general subject of “Lands-Public.” The draftsmen who prepared the 1953 bill (now Art. 5421n) may-have-had these considerations in mind. But, when we return to the actual words used by the Legislature in Article 5400a, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that cities' are included within the phrase, “political subdivisions which are bodies corporate with recognized and defined areas,” particularly in view of the decision in Culver v. Miears, Tex.Civ.App., 220 S.W.2d 200. The Act does-not say, “political subdivisions which exercise governmental power. only,”- nor does it say that the notice provisions shall be inapplicable to a political subdivision when acting in a proprietory as distinguished from a governmental capacity.
A school district-,-when engaged in .'educating the children -of the 1 State, may.be said to be exercising a.-governmental function. Similarly a city, when enforcing- a health regulation, is. exercising a governmental function. Ex parte Ernest, 138 Tex.Cr.R. 441, 136 S.W.2d 595. Money is required to carry out either -function and the end purpose sought to be obtained by .the execution of an oil and gas lease is the procurement of funds necessary for the operations of the organization. Insofar as the nature of the act is concerned, it is difficult to draw a logical distinction bé-tween the exécution of an oil and gas1 lease *556by a city, on one hand, and a school district, on the other hand. It seems that there is no true distinction, and in order to raise an apparent one it must be argued that the execution of the lease by a school district is necessarily governmental in nature, because a school district has no proprietory powers. And if this distinction be forced, the doctrine of the Miears case is not avoided, for such distinction is not made by the statute therein construed. There are numerous differences between cities and school districts, but if the usual and ordinary meaning be given to the words employed by the Legislature it seems that both are comprehended by the phrase, “political subdivisions which are bodies corporate with recognized and defined areas.” If Article 5400a is applicable to a school district it is likewise applicable to a city.
In determining the intent of the Legislature our primary guide must of necessity be the wording contained in the statute. Article 5400a is admittedly a statute which is wide in its scope of operation. It has for its purpose the safeguarding of the properties of political subdivisions of the State by requiring a notice of intention to lease for oil and gas. The scope and purpose of the statute is well within the legislative authority and we may not properly restrict its operation to something less than that prescribed by its wording. Such a construction would defeat the announced legislative intent and contribute to confusion rather than lessen it.
Furthermore, in view of the Supreme Court’s refusal of the application for writ of error in Culver v. Miears, we are not at liberty to depart from the holding contained therein. Agnew v. Coleman County Electric Co-operative, Tex.Sup., 272 S.W.2d 877; Bennett v. Brown County Water Improvement District No. 1, Tex.Sup., 272 S.W.2d 498; Mitchell v. Town of Refugio, Tex.Civ.App., 265 S.W.2d 261, wr. ref.; 21 C.J.S., Courts, § 197, p. 343.
We adhere to the holdings announced in our original opinion and appellees’ motion for rehearing is accordingly overruled. •