Court Opinion

ID: 9763242
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:39:37.228394+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:40.145521
License: Public Domain

DAUGHTREY, Judge,
dissenting.
I cannot agree that the trial court properly overruled the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal, and I therefore dissent. After hearing the state’s case, the judge remarked on more than one occasion that the case was a “very close” one and that the prosecution’s evidence was “very weak” as to Hall. But he decided to send Hall’s case to the jury because there was “some evidence of his participation” in the robbery.
After a review of the prosecution’s case, I am unable to find any evidence of participation. More importantly, the standard, contemplated by Rule 29(a) is not “some evidence” of guilt, but evidence “[sjufficient to sustain a conviction.” There clearly was insufficient proof to meet this standard, and for that reason the motion for acquittal should have been granted.
The defendant argued at trial and contends on appeal that there is no evidence of his presence at the scene of the crime. In this insistence, he is essentially correct. The record does reveal sufficient circumstances from which one may reasonably infer that Hall was in defendant Raiford’s car while the robbery was being committed. Hall was seated somewhere in the car (the evidence was conflicting as to whether he was in the front passenger’s seat or back seat) when the car was stopped two miles from the scene shortly after the offense was committed. According to the testimony of the police officer who interrogated Hall after his arrest, the defendant made three statements, as evidenced by the following colloquy between the State's attorney and the police officer:
Q. ... Did you ask him, “Whose idea was it to rob the Stop N Go?” And was his answer, “I am not quite sure.”?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you additionally ask him, “Why didn’t you go inside the grocery during the robbery?” And did he answer, “Because I received a severe gunshot wound to the right chest about two years ago. As a result, I have a bullet in my spine, physically unable to overexert myself.”
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you additionally ask him, “If not for that injury, would you have went inside and participated in the robbery?” And did he answer, “I don’t know.”?
*63A. Yes, sir.
But although the defendant’s equivocal responses to police interrogation and his presence in the car shortly after the robbery may be sufficient circumstances from which to infer that he was in the car while the robbery was committed, his mere presence in the car is not sufficient evidence to convict, even on the theory of aiding and abetting.
There is, for example, no evidence whatsoever concerning the actual location of the automobile during the commission of the offense. The robbery victim testified that he never saw the two robbers’ vehicle and could not say in what direction they went when they left the store. The record thus establishes the distinct possibility that the car was not in the immediate vicinity of the market. As the trial judge noted at the close of the state’s proof, “I don’t think they’ve got any proof in the record where the car was.... I don’t recall any and it looks to me like that would be a factor to consider as to whether or not [Hall] was the lookout.”
Moreover, Tennessee law recognizes that mere presence and opportunity are not sufficient to support a conviction for aiding and abetting. See Anglin v. State, 553 S.W.2d 616, 619 (Tenn.Cr.App.1977); Essary v. State, 210 Tenn. 220, 357 S.W.2d 342, 347 (1962). The majority in their opinion conclude that “where a defendant knowing that a robbery was planned, voluntarily accompanied the perpetrators to the scene of the crime, and waited outside while the crime was being committed,” the facts would “support the finding that the defendant acted as a ‘lookout.’ ” As a general principle, this observation may be sound. The problem in this case is that the evidence presented by the State not only fails to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Hall was at the scene, but also fails to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew a robbery was planned.
But even if there were evidence here to support prior knowledge by Hall, it would still be incumbent upon the state to prove that the defendant was actually engaged in acting as a “lookout,” that is, that he had placed himself in a position to give a warning. Contrast and compare Richard Brent Taylor, et al. v. State of Tennessee, Court of Criminal Appeals at Knoxville (August 19,1977) (defendant arrested in the car; his location inside the car indicated that he was the “wheelman” and the position of the car itself with an unobstructed view of the burglary scene indicated that he was also a “lookout”). Otherwise, the defendant cannot be shown to have been aiding and abetting or present and willing to aid and abet, and his conviction would make him subject to punishment for mere presence alone.
Although I am willing to concede that it is not unreasonable to infer from the circumstances in the record that Hall was present in the car during the commission of the crime, the majority builds another inference on that inference — that the car was actually located at the scene of the crime— and a third inference on the first two — that Hall knew what was occurring and was in a position to participate as a lookout. Only by building inference upon inference upon inference can it be concluded that the defendant is guilty in this case. But the law is clear that a verdict of guilt may not be based upon such conjecture, speculation, or mere possibility. Mathis v. State, 590 S.W.2d 449 (Tenn.1979); Rucker v. State, 174 Tenn. 569, 129 S.W.2d 208 (1939).
Moreover, as the majority notes, when the only evidence against the defendant is circumstantial in nature, it must be consistent with guilt and inconsistent with every reasonable hypothesis other than that of guilt. In many (if not most) cases in which three people drive to the scene of a crime and one of them stays in the car, the only reasonable hypothesis is that the person who remained in the car was acting as the “lookout” or the “getaway driver.” In this instance, however, there was another reasonable hypothesis for the defendant’s non-participation in the offense and thus for his presence in the car, for it is undisputed in record that his physical condition prevented him from participating in the robbery.
*64It may be that Hall was acting as lookout. But the state wholly failed to prove this point, and thus such a conclusion must be based on nothing more than a mere hunch. Yet, as previously noted, conjecture is not a sufficient basis on which to convict; the trial judge implicitly recognized this principle of law, saying that the case was “very weak, very close” and that his “instinct” was to grant the acquittal. Because the trial judge was admittedly confused about what standard of review to apply in ruling on the motion to acquit, he apparently accepted the state’s argument that there was a “modicum” of proof as to Hall’s guilt and announced that he would decline to “substitute myself right now at this point for the jury.” Had the trial judge reviewed the language of Rule 29(a), it would have been obvious that a “modicum” of evidence was not sufficient and that the motion for acquittal should have been granted.
Because the defendant “stood on his motion,” as required by Mathis, supra, he is entitled to have us grant that relief which the trial court should have granted. I would therefore reverse the judgment and dismiss the charges against Hall.